From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: yanek@novavax.nova.edu (Yanek Martinson)
Date: Fri, 1 Jan 93 09:21:32 PST
To: gnu@cygnus.com
Subject: Random Number Generation references
In-Reply-To: <9212310751.AA21888@cygnus.com>
Message-ID: <9301011720.AA05280@novavax.nova.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Here's a list of references from the end of Rueppel's _Stream_Chiphers_
that seem to be relevant to random number generation:

J. Bernasconi and C.G. Gunther, "Analysis of a nonlinear feedforward logic
for binary sequence generators," BBC Tech. Rep., 1985

T. Beth and F. Piper, "The stop-and-go generator," in Lecture Notes in
Computer Science 109; Advances in Cryptology: Proc. Eurocrypt '84, T. Beth,
N. Cot, and I. Ingemarsson, Eds., Paris, France, April 9-11, 1984, pp.
88-92. Berlin: Springer-Verlag, 1985.

M. Blum and S. Micali, "How to generate cryptographically strong sequences
of pseudo-random bits," SIAM J. Comput., vol. 13, pp. 850-864, 1984

L. Blum, M. Blum , and M. Shub, "A simple unpredictable pseudo-random
number generator," SIAM J. Comput., vol. 15, pp. 364-383, 1986.

J.O. Bruer, "On pseudo random sequences as crypto generators," in Proc. Int
Zurich Seminar on Digital communication, Switzerland, 1984.

L. Brynielsson, "On the linear complexity of combined shift regiser
sequences," in Lecture Notes in Computer Science 219; Advances in
Cryptology: Proc. Eurocrypt '85, F. Pichler, Ed., Linz, Austria, April
1985, pp. 156-166. Berlin: Springer-Verlag, 1986.

J. Gait, "A new nonlinear pseudorandom number generator," IEEE Trans.
Software Eng., vols. S E3, no. 5, pp. 359-363, Sept. 1977.

O. Goldreich, S. Goldwasser, and S. Micali, "How to construct random
functions," J. ACM, vol. 33, no. 4, pp. 792-807, 1986.

D. Gollman, "Pseudo random properties of cascade connections of clock
controlled shift registers," in Lecture Notes in Computer Science 209;
Advances in Cryptology: Proc. Eurocrypt '84, T. Beth, N. Cot, and I.
Ingermasson, Eds., Paris, France, April 9-11, 1984, pp. 93-98. Berlin:
Springer-Verlag, 1985.

B. Kaliski, A pseudo random bit generator based on elliptic logarithms, M.
Sc. thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1987.

E. L. Key, "An analysis of the structure and complexity of nonlinear binary
sequence generators," IEEE Trans. Inform. Theory, vol. IT-22, no. 6, pp.
732-763, Nov. 1976.

M. Luby and C. Rackoff, "How to construct pseudorandom permutations from
pseudorandom functions," SIAM J. Comput. vol. 17, pp. 373-386, 1988.

J.L. Massey, A. Gubser, A. Fischer, P. Hochstrasser, B. Huber, and R.
Sutter, "A self-synchronizing digital scrambler for cryptographic
protection of data," in Proceedings of International Zurich Seminar, March,
1984.

J.L. Massey and R.A. Rueppel, "Linear ciphers and random sequence
generators with multiple clocks," in Lecture Notes in Computer Science 209;
Advances in Cryptology: Proc. Eurocrypt '84, T. Beth. N. Cot, and I.
Ingermasson, Eds., Paris, France, April 9-11, 1984, pp. 74-87. Berlin:
Springer-Verlag, 1985.

U. Maurer and J. L. Massey, "Perfect local randomness in pseudo-random
sequences," in Lecture Notes in Computer Science 435; Advances in
Cryptology: Proc. Crypto'89, G. Brassard, Ed., Santa Barbara, CA, Aug.
20-24. 1989, pp. 110-112.  Berlin: Springer-Verlag, 1990.

U. Maurer, "A provable-secure strongly-randomized cipher," in Lecture Notes
in Computer Science 473; Advances in Cryptology: Proc. Eurocrypt'90, I.
Damgard, Ed., Aarhus, Denmark, May 21-24. 1990, pp. 361-373.  Berlin:
Springer-Verlag.

S. Micali and C.P. Schnorr, "Efficient, perfect random number generators,"
preprint, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, University of Frankfurt,
1988.

R.A. Rueppel and O. Stafflebach, "Products of sequences with maximum linear
complexity," IEEE Trans. Inform. Theory, vol. IT-33, no.1, pp. 124-131,
Jan. 1987.

A. Shamir, "On the generation of cryptographically strong pseudo-random
sequences," 8th Int. Colloquim on Automata, Languages, and Programming,
Lecture Notes in Computer Science 62, Springer Verlag, 1981.

Y. Zheng, T. Matsumoto, and H. Imai, "Impossibility and optimality results
on constructing pseudorandom permutations," in Lecture Notes in Computer
Science 434; Advances in Cryptology; PRoc. Eurocrypt'89, J.-J. Quisquater
and J. Vandewalle, Eds., Houthalen, Belgium, April 10-23, 1989, pp.
412-422.  Berlin: Springer-Verlag, 1990.


--
Yanek Martinson    mthvax.cs.miami.edu!safe0!yanek     uunet!medexam!yanek
this address preferred -->> yanek@novavax.nova.edu <<-- this address preferred
Phone (305) 765-6300 daytime   FAX: (305) 765-6708  1321 N 65 Way/Hollywood
      (305) 963-1931 evenings       (305) 981-9812  Florida, 33024-5819




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: edgar@spectrx.Saigon.COM (Edgar W. Swank)
Date: Fri, 1 Jan 93 17:10:34 PST
To: Cypherpunks          <cypherpunks@toad.com>
Subject: Re: A solution remailer signature suppression
Message-ID: <1k4PwB7w165w@spectrx.saigon.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Hugh Daniels said here on Dec 28:
 
    There are very good reasons to build remailers (and all mail
    tools) to pass on all the bytes they can, trailing spaces and
    .sigs included.
 
Hugh doesn't say what these reasons are.  They are not obvious to me,
so I must disagree. I've already stated what I think are good reasons
at least for remailers whose purpose is anonymity to remove automatic
sigs which are likley to destroy anonymity.
 
I've said I would accept either a less ambiguous sig delimiter than
"--" or a remailer option to remove the sig (default) or leave it in.
 
    Might I sugjest that we set up the remailers with a feature where
    it tests mail sent from its owner to make sure there is no
    "compromising" content and that the outer shell verifies
    correctly, if it fails either of these tests it is dumped in a
    file and a note returned to you saying someings not right.
 
Hugh doesn't say what criteria we are to use to detect "compromising"
content (short of genuine AI) or what the outer shell is supposed to
verify to.  Why limit this test to the remailers "owner"?
 
This system I use doesn't allow me to run my own software, so I
think this idea wouldn't work for me, in any case.

--
edgar@spectrx.saigon.com (Edgar W. Swank)
SPECTROX SYSTEMS +1.408.252.1005  Silicon Valley, Ca





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: S.E. Brown <shawnb@ecst.csuchico.edu>
Date: Fri, 1 Jan 93 17:22:12 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Unsubscribe
Message-ID: <9301020122.AA09373@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Please unsubscribe me to the list.  I am on vacation and am not able to
clear my mailbox on a regular basis.

Thanks
Shawn




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: gnu (John Gilmore)
Date: Fri, 1 Jan 93 23:10:10 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com, gnu
Subject: Why mailers should not touch the body
In-Reply-To: <1k4PwB7w165w@spectrx.saigon.com>
Message-ID: <9301020710.AA15980@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>     There are very good reasons to build remailers (and all mail
>     tools) to pass on all the bytes they can, trailing spaces and
>     .sigs included.
> Hugh doesn't say what these reasons are.  They are not obvious to me,

A fair question (though not phrased as one).

The reason to build mailers that faithfully pass on the entire body of
the message, without any kind of alteration, is that it permits you to
send ANY body through that mailer and rely on its faithful arrival at the
destination.

If there are no exceptions to the "ANY body" rule, programs can assume
that the mail system is a black box (you put info in here, it comes out
over there -- you don't care about its guts).  If there are exceptions,
then it becomes more complicated for programs (and humans!) to use the
mail system to pass arbitrary information.

One of the great things about adding checksums to messages is that
mail and news paths which alter messages will be detected and corrected.

I think that if PGP is told that something it signs is text, it should
canonicalize line endings from the local storage format (whether
newlines are CR, LF, or CRLF) and that's it.  If a message passes
through a system that expands all tabs to spaces, the messages is
corrupted and its signature SHOULD not match.  Systems which cannot
represent strings of ASCII/ISO-Latin-1 text characters separated by
line-endings (such as IBM mainframes which assume EBCDIC 80-column
records padded out with trailing blanks) cannot be used "in the
obvious way" to move signed textual email.  The email will have to be
encoded to pass through such non-transparent mail systems -- which
will be sufficiently painful that eventually the mail systems will be
fixed.

It's already a pain that most Internet email won't handle a body consisting
of arbitrary 8-bit bytes.  If they fix that throughout 80% of the Internet,
the other 20% will be forced to go along, or forced to receive an endless
stream of corrupted binaries, uncheckable signatures, etc, from the
fully capable part of the net.

	John Gilmore

PS:  I note that my own mailer, MH, inserts an extra newline at the beginning
of many messages, and probably to the end as well.  A proper body checksum
would detect that and report an error.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: gnu (John Gilmore)
Date: Fri, 1 Jan 93 23:13:51 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com, gnu
Subject: Why remailers shouldn't suppress signatures
In-Reply-To: <1k4PwB7w165w@spectrx.saigon.com>
Message-ID: <9301020713.AA16058@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


A further issue relates to stripping signatures.  Let's be clear here.

	==> IF YOU ARE PRESENTING YOURSELF AS MULTIPLE IDENTITIES,
	    AND EXPECT THEM NOT TO BE LINKED, AVOIDING AUTOMATIC .SIGNATURE
	    FILES IS THE LEAST OF YOUR WORRIES! <==

Remove the file ".signature" from your home directory and you'll be done
with *that* hassle.

	John

PS: An extra credit note for the differently clued among us:  Suppose
you wanted to have a *different* signature for each of your multiple
identities?  I guess the remailers had better not strip off signatures, eh?




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: gnu (John Gilmore)
Date: Fri, 1 Jan 93 23:17:23 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Initial Release of Privacy Enhanced Mail
Message-ID: <9301020717.AA16145@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Forwarded from the PEM-DEV mailing list.

Message-Id: <9212301932.AA07388@TIS.COM>
From: James M Galvin <pem-info@TIS.COM>
To: pem-dev@TIS.COM
Cc: rsaref-users@rsa.com
Subject: Initial Release of Privacy Enhanced Mail
Date: Wed, 30 Dec 92 14:32:08 -0500

-----BEGIN PRIVACY-ENHANCED MESSAGE-----
Proc-Type: 4,MIC-CLEAR
Content-Domain: RFC822
Originator-ID-Asymmetric: MEYxCzAJBgNVBAYTAlVTMSQwIgYDVQQKExtUcnV
 zdGVkIEluZm9ybWF0aW9uIFN5c3RlbXMxETAPBgNVBAsTCEdsZW53b29k,02
MIC-Info: RSA-MD5,RSA,mHp3q4Av7Axil1BTXaaii+9NIdfm7doy00d/aw6TYEj
 y/eCt6CLpjbJzXHZt0kavc9ygC0eRNxOmAHiXmFC0Qg==

Trusted Information Systems Incorporated (TIS), under DARPA sponsorship,
in cooperation with RSA Data Security Incorporated (RSADSI), is
preparing to release a reference implementation of Privacy Enhanced Mail
(TIS/PEM) to the Internet community.  TIS/PEM is a UNIX-based
implementation that has been integrated with Rand MH 6.7.2 and is easily
integrated into other mail user agents.  TIS/PEM will be distributed in
source form with RSADSI BSAFE object code.  It will be widely available
within the United States and Canada for non-commercial use (not for
resale) with the stipulation that users join the Internet certification
hierarchy.

You are invited to participate in the testing of the initial release of
TIS/PEM.  Organizations and individuals must meet the following criteria
to be accepted as a tester of the initial release of TIS/PEM.

1. You must be a United States or Canadian organization, or a United
   States or Canadian citizen residing in the United States or Canada.

2. You must have available the computing resources necessary to run the
   software and either be responsible for the administration of the
   resources or be able to delegate the responsibility.

3. You must have FTP access in order to be able to retrieve the
   software.

With this release of TIS/PEM and an Internet certificate, you will be
able to send and receive authenticated and confidential electronic mail
messages, subject to the constraints of your local security policy.

Attached is a field test agreement form.  Please review it.  If you
agree to the terms and wish to participate, reply to this message and we
will provide an ftp account for you to retrieve the file.

The main features of this agreement are the following:

o This test period will last a few months, probably until the end of
  March.  When the test period is complete, we will release this code
  for general Internet distribution.

o There is no charge for the use of this code, but it may only be used
  by you or within your own organization within the United States or
  Canada.  It may not be given to others outside your organization or
  sold.  (If you have a multinational organization, contact us for
  further discussion.)

o When the system is released for regular use, users must obtain
  certificates through the regular certificate issuing channels and
  pay whatever fees are required.  During the test period, there is no
  charge for certificates.  When a regular certificate issuing mechanism
  is in place you will be informed.

o We intend for this version of the code to be usable for real traffic.
  Although new versions of the software will be issued, the messages and
  certificates generated by this system and the databases maintained by
  this system should be compatible with future distributions.

o We will undoubtedly issue changes, updates, bug fixes, etc. during
  this period.  When we issue updates or new releases, you are obligated
  to install these changes.

o You are free to drop out at any time.

Thank you very much for your time.



		    TIS/PEM Beta Test Site Agreement


Trusted Information Systems (TIS) in cooperation with RSA Data Security
Incorporated (RSADSI) is preparing to release TIS/PEM, a reference
implementation of Privacy Enhanced Mail, to the Internet community.

The purpose of beta testing is to evaluate TIS/PEM according to the
criteria specified below.  This agreement protects the interests of the
beta testers, TIS, and RSADSI during the beta test period.

By accepting a distribution of TIS/PEM during the beta test period, a
beta test site agrees to the following:

1. You will acquire no ownership interest in any software,
   documentation, or other pieces of TIS/PEM as a result of their being
   distributed to you by Trusted Information Systems during the beta
   test period.  Except as necessary to install and operate the software
   throughout your organization within the United States, TIS/PEM may
   not be distributed to others.  (If you have a multinational
   organization, contact us for further discussion.)

2. TIS/PEM is to be used only with certificates issued under a
   Certification Authority which is itself registered under a permanent
   or temporary Policy Certification Authority (PCA).  TIS is operating
   a PCA and will supply PCA services without charge during the beta
   test period.

3. At the conclusion of the beta test period, the beta test site may
   keep the software and continue to use it provided the site registers
   with a PCA and pays the appropriate fees.

4. Evaluations, comments, and suggestions about TIS/PEM should be
   communicated to Trusted Information Systems and may be communicated
   to other beta testers.

5. A technically competent systems administrator and programmer, someone
   capable of installing a software system comprising more than 50,000
   lines of C source code, is expected to be assigned responsibility for
   TIS/PEM.  All technical communication with a beta test site will be
   coordinated with this technical point of contact.

6. Upgrades will be installed and evaluated according to the criteria
   specified below in a timely fashion.  Obsolete versions of the system
   must be taken out of service as quickly as possible.

7. If the site elects to drop out of beta testing, all software,
   documentation, and other pieces of TIS/PEM as may be distributed
   during the beta test period must be returned to Trusted Information
   Systems.


During the beta test period, TIS agrees to the following:

1. One copy of all software, documentation, and other pieces of TIS/PEM
   as may be necessary to its correct and proper operation will be
   supplied to each beta test site for use during the beta test period.

2. Evaluations, comments, suggestions, bug fixes, and improvements of
   TIS/PEM will be acknowledged and incorporated into TIS/PEM according
   to an internal TIS review process.

3. During normal business hours, telephone and electronic mail technical
   support will be provided to the technical point of contact at each
   beta test site assigned responsibility for TIS/PEM.

4. One copy of upgrades to TIS/PEM incorporating evaluations, comments,
   suggestions, bug fixes, and improvements will be supplied to each
   beta test sites for use during the beta test period.

5. Beta test sites will be informed of the completion of beta testing
   and may be asked to return all software, documentation, and other
   pieces of TIS/PEM as may have been distributed during the beta test
   period.


		      TIS/PEM Evaluation Criteria

Beta test sites are requested to evaluation TIS/PEM according to the
following criteria.  The results of the evaluation must be returned to
TIS in order for changes to be incorporated in the next release of
TIS/PEM.  There are 5 areas of particular interest, but any and all
comments are hereby solicited.  Beta test sites are asked to evaluate
how well we achieve the objectives stated for each area.

1. Installability

   TIS/PEM is expected to operate on most BSD and SYS5 derived UNIXs.
   With respect to installability we want to achieve the following
   objectives:

   a. TIS/PEM should install smoothly on as many different "flavors" of
      UNIX as possible.

   b. TIS/PEM should install smoothly on as many different hardware
      platforms as possible.

   c. The installation process should be as simple as possible, but not
      simpler.

   Beta test sites are encouraged to port TIS/PEM to as many different
   software and hardware environments as possible.  If possible,
   enhancements to get TIS/PEM to install smoothly on other versions of
   UNIX that are returned to TIS will be incorporated into a future
   distribution of TIS/PEM.

2. Usability

   TIS/PEM is provided with a command line oriented interface.  In
   particular, it is integrated with the Rand MH Message Handling user
   agent.  This interface was chosen because of the ease with which
   TIS/PEM could be integrated and because it is in the public domain.

   For each site, a certificate administrator must be designated who
   will be responsible for the administration of TIS/PEM.  In
   particular, there is some site specific initialization to be
   completed.

   In addition, there is some initialization required to be executed by
   every user before they can make use of the TIS/PEM enhancements to
   MH.  Depending on local conventions, users may be required to request
   the initialization of their certificate administrator or they may be
   able to execute the initialization individually.

   With respect to usability we want to achieve the following
   objectives:

   a. For users familiar with MH, the integration of TIS/PEM and MH
      should appear to be a natural extension of the MH model.

   b. The initialization process should be as simple as possible.


   Users will need to be familiar with MH or be prepared to learn about
   it.  The MH source tree includes a tutorial of the minimal set of
   commands.

   In the future it is expected that others will contribute additional
   user interface software.  Beta test sites are encouraged to enhance
   local user interfaces to include TIS/PEM.  If possible, these
   enhancements will be included in future distributions of TIS/PEM.

3. Performance

   The performance of TIS/PEM is dominated by the processing time for
   certificates and cryptography.  We have attempted to minimize the
   impact of these factors but we encourage beta test sites to
   investigate the operation of the system and identify bottlenecks for
   which they have suggestions for improvement.

   With respect to performance we want to achieve the following
   objective:

   o The design and model of TIS/PEM, and its integration with various
     applications, should be such that it will perform as well as it
     can.

   Obviously, performance is a subjective criteria.  Different
   architectures will influence performance as much as the overall
   design of the system.  Beta test sites are encouraged to empirically
   observe the performance of TIS/PEM under various operating conditions
   and report those results.

4. Interoperability

   With respect to interoperability we want to achieve the following
   objectives:

   a. TIS/PEM should interoperate with other implementations of PEM.

   b. Future versions of TIS/PEM should be backward compatible with
      previous versions.

5. Documentation

   On-line manual pages are provided for all TIS/PEM programs and those
   programs we have changed as a result of our integration with MH.  In
   addition, we will provide an installation manual, an administrator's
   manual, and a user's manual.

   With respect to documentation we want to achieve the following
   objectives

   o All documentation should completely and accurately describe
     TIS/PEM.

   o All documentation should be easy to understand and easy to use.

   Beta test sites are encouraged to thoroughly review all documentation
   and provide feedback to be incorporated in future versions.
-----END PRIVACY-ENHANCED MESSAGE-----





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Hal <74076.1041@CompuServe.COM>
Date: Fri, 1 Jan 93 22:23:32 PST
To: CYPHERPUNKS <CYPHERPUNKS@TOAD.COM>
Subject: Remailer .sig suppressio
Message-ID: <930102062025_74076.1041_DHJ24-1@CompuServe.COM>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

From: edgar@spectrx.Saigon.COM (Edgar W. Swank)

> Hugh Daniels said here on Dec 28:
>  
>     There are very good reasons to build remailers (and all mail
>     tools) to pass on all the bytes they can, trailing spaces and
>     .sigs included.
>  
> Hugh doesn't say what these reasons are.  They are not obvious to me,
> so I must disagree. I've already stated what I think are good reasons
> at least for remailers whose purpose is anonymity to remove automatic
> sigs which are likley to destroy anonymity.
>  
> I've said I would accept either a less ambiguous sig delimiter than
> "--" or a remailer option to remove the sig (default) or leave it in.

I'll just relate one story that happened to me today.  I wanted to
try an experiment in which I would use two non-cypherpunks remailers
to set up a chained anonymous address.  One is anon.penet.fi, which
doesn't do any encryption, but which will allow you to specify an
arbitrary destination address.  The other is pax.tpa.com.au, which
does PGP decryption (but you can't encrypt the remailer destination
address like you can with our remailers).

The Pax remailer lets you send them a PGP key which it saves.  Then,
any future messages to you are encrypted by the remailer using that
key.  That way message contents are always protected between Pax and
you.

I wanted to send Pax a key via the Penet remailer so that Pax wouldn't
know who I really was.  I tried this, and got a message back from
Pax saying:

Error: you didn't include a public key for us !
So we can't assign an alias or send you our public key.

But I _had_ sent them a public key.  After some head-scratching
I figured out the answer.  My public key had started with the string:
"-----BEGIN PGP MESSAGE-----".  But the Penet remailer strips sigs, which
it considers to be any line starting with "--".  It thought my PGP key
was a signature!  It had stripped it, so that Pax received only a
blank message.

I haven't thought of a way around this problem yet.

Now, Edgar may take as the moral of the story that remailers should
have smarter sig recognition.  But I take the moral to be that munging
mail messages may cause problems when people try to use it for something
which you didn't anticipate.

Hal

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.1

iQCVAgUBK0UJOqgTA69YIUw3AQHusQP/YuzvntMZ8XPpfLwwE5YElLjwfKGF0Q2e
Cjk1PMmvtcn/bjSCB49lagOs0cEjm9Vt4gsEkTxwVlOya0+WOTeY/zzZAYlf3z4R
9QY7uRSyPQYJlPH6rosifEREMNWksRMCNMlISp8PDh1duJf3BvdwY3nyXk/PABpS
LTp6NAFaFi4=
=j0Wl
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----


Distribution:
  CYPHERPUNKS >INTERNET:CYPHERPUNKS@TOAD.COM





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: gnu (John Gilmore)
Date: Sat, 2 Jan 93 02:28:03 PST
To: cypherpunks
Subject: FYI: New report on public public-key infrastructure available
Message-ID: <9301021028.AA22146@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


------- Forwarded Message

To: John Gilmore <hoptoad!gnu@uunet.UU.NET>
Subject: FYI: New report on public public-key infrastructure available
Date: Tue, 01 Dec 92 19:37:12 +0000
From: Mike Roe <Michael.Roe@cl.cam.ac.uk>

In Europe, an EC-funded project called PASSWORD (`Piloting Authentication and 
Security Services Within OSI Research and Development') aims to deploy an
initial pilot service of privacy and integrity enhanced mail (and several more
exotic applications) between academic and industrial organisations throughout 
Europe. The plans for how we intend to do certificate-based key management are
described in a report entitled ``PASSWORD R2.5: Certification Authority 
Requirements''. Version 1.0 of this report is available by anonymous FTP from:

ftp.cl.cam.ac.uk (128.232.0.56)
reports/mrr-passwords.dvi.Z

I realise that you're probably far too busy with other matters right now, but
if you have any comments to make we'd be delighted to hear them.

Yours sincerely,
Michael Roe
Cambridge University Computer Lab
Computer Security Group

------- End of Forwarded Message

John here.  I have pulled this file down and translated it to
PostScript (which I haven't tried to read yet).  It's in
cygnus.com:/pub/mrr-passwords.ps.  The "DVI" format he provided is
sort of like object files output by TeX; I have no idea why he didn't
just provide us the TeX source, or the printable PostScript.

	John




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: jordan@imsi.com (Jordan Hayes)
Date: Sat, 2 Jan 93 12:19:21 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re:  Why mailers should not touch the body
Message-ID: <9301021504.AA28104@IMSI.COM>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


All the more reason why the signature should be in the envelope (i.e.
one of the headers in 822-land, in the p1? part for X.400, etc), not
the body.  Where did this convention of signing at the bottom come from
anyway?

/jordan




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: tribble@xanadu.com (E. Dean Tribble)
Date: Sat, 2 Jan 93 19:57:51 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: remailer architecture (and signatures)
Message-ID: <9301030327.AA13331@xanadu.xanadu.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


First a brief description of the new (read not-yet-available) remailer
architecture, then what's this means to signatures, etc.

The new remailer design comes from the realization that mail systems
are missing configurability on both sides of message delivery:  when
you receive mail, and when you send it.  Most of the 'remailer' is
just the infrastructure to allow programmatic modification to messages
in those two phases of delivery.  With this infrastructure, remailers
are trivial to construct.

There will be an Incoming Mail Rewriting Agent (IMRA) and on Outgoing
Mail Rewriting Agent.  The behavior of these agents is specified by
production/rewrite rules (match a pattern and take corresponding
action, possibly recurring) on the mail message they are processing.

The incoming agent is much like the existing framework for remailers.
It is invoked through .forward and handles mail before it gets to yout
mailbox.  The outgoing agent is invoked when you send mail to do any
rewriting necessary then (such as encryption, signture, etc.).

Note that .signature handling is a grody hack in existing mail systems
that directly implements a rather uninteresting piece of outgoing mail
rewriting (I had fun writing that :-).  It should just be junked for
the more general scheme, which can support real crypto signatures (and
.sig files, of course) for pseudonyms, outgoing encryption, automatic
remailer routing (a header: 'Hops: 3' that would route the mail
through 3 remailers to the eventual destination), etc.

It of course won't be junked immediately, but the default behavior of
remailers should certainly not be to strip anything that looks like
sigs.  Can we guarantee that all the tools that produce ascii
encodings like uuencode will never produce the trivial pattern that
the remailers thinks means 'signature.'  For example, hypertalk
comments start with '--', just like signatures.






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Hal <74076.1041@CompuServe.COM>
Date: Sat, 2 Jan 93 21:32:49 PST
To: CYPHERPUNKS <CYPHERPUNKS@TOAD.COM>
Subject: New remailers...
Message-ID: <930103052525_74076.1041_DHJ38-1@CompuServe.COM>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

From: tribble@xanadu.com (E. Dean Tribble)

> First a brief description of the new (read not-yet-available) remailer
> architecture, then what's this means to signatures, etc.
> [...]

This is neat.  It sounds like the plan is to provide a convenient
mail filtering tool which provides remailer capability as a SIDE EFFECT!
What a great way to spread remailers!

Not to mention, the same tools can provide automatic encryption and
decryption - the long-sought integration of PGP (or RIPEM, etc.) with
mail in an easy-to-use way.

I'm really looking forward to seeing more about this idea.

Speaking of integrating encryption into email, does anybody here
have access to the announced beta-test of PEM from TIS?  It would be
interesting to see the documentation about how they've handled the
user-interface issue.  I gather that it only works with the MH package
but presumably they've had to face some of the problems we're talking
about here.

Hal
74076.1041@compuserve.com

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.1

iQCVAgUBK0ZOFqgTA69YIUw3AQHQkwP/VjXxDvQWqpx+owL4re1YVtMTobydqcD4
myGTAyT9VVmB5R/DEQdatwyc+mXuvGAx7YTEX+o3MPuZE/5VXFG+FgZZb21PZqWS
UFae9YFY1AY6RHJi0APM5G5S8x6LHJJXtKo1wFgeKd8BjUeHS1l73qFpKeNzdN3g
SCzCS/BGslE=
=xw7Q
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----


Distribution:
  CYPHERPUNKS >INTERNET:CYPHERPUNKS@TOAD.COM





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: hughes@toad.com (Eric Hughes)
Date: Mon, 4 Jan 93 12:01:08 PST
To: KL62%MARISTB.bitnet@YaleVM.YCC.Yale.Edu
Subject: Re: The Need for Positive Repuations
Message-ID: <9301031713.AA21649@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


--------------------------- Original Message ---------------------------
You sent this to cypherpunks-request and not to cypherpunks.

Eric
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
Return-Path: <@YaleVM.YCC.Yale.Edu:KL62@MARISTB.BITNET>
Date:        Fri, 18 Dec 92 15:18:35 EST
From: "Ryan, Edmund J" <KL62%MARISTB.bitnet@YaleVM.YCC.Yale.Edu>
To: <cypherpunks-request@toad.com>
Subject: Re: The Need for Positive Repuations
In-Reply-To: In reply to your message of FRI 18 DEC 1992 11:45:55 EST

> Indeed, in the long run, when there are billions of people in the nets,
> even UseNet newsgroups devoted to people who use musical instruments as
> sex toys would have thousands of posts a day because given billions of
> possible subscribers, finding a few tens of thousands with a particularly
> obscure interest wouldn't be hard. Thus, in the long run, the nets will move
> to "closed" newsgroups and mailing lists in which to be a subscriber one
> will have to be explicitly subscribed to a list and will only be able to
> read with one's private key and post by digitally signing messages. In such
> an environment, anonymous abusers will simply be incapable of annoying people.

Well there won't be a complete movement in that direction.
The set up of the list may differ. Some lists may be open to all to
read but open only to subscribers to post. Some lists may be the
other way around. (Can't think of an example, but there may be one
out there.) By the way, I've never really seen too many abusive
postings on the Usenet groups I frequent.It doesn't seem to be a
problem. Just my opinion.

> A weak version of this exists already in the Extropians mailing list, which
> considers itself to be a closed list. The list is governed by a privately
> produced legal code (its in some ways a test of anarchocapitalist legal theory
> and since the adoption of the code, we've had a reduction of flaming by
> a large factor even though we've seen a three fold increase in list size.
> The content is improving because people know that sanctions will be applied
> for flaming and that they can actually be kicked off the list, and that being
> kicked off is meaningful. In the long run, all serious discussion groups
> will likely evolve in this direction, with the lists being closed to explicit
> subscribers and with meaningful sanctions like ostracism being applied to
> people that behave in an antisocial manner. Such lists have little reason
> to fear people hiding behind cloaks of anonymity. With digital signatures,
> even the anonymous can develop meaningful reputations and can be sanctioned
> for failing to live up to those reputations.
>
> Perry

Again, there will always be the fun of watching people flame.

Virtually,

Edmund J. Ryan

------------------------------------------------------------------------
- Edmund J. Ryan          C.I.S. Major           Extropian             -
- KL62@MARISTB            C.S. Minor             Libertarian           -
-               "Insert your snappy quote of the day."                 -
------------------------------------------------------------------------


------------------------------------------------------------------------
- Edmund J. Ryan              Major:  Computer Information Systems     -
- KL62@MARISTB                Minor:  Computer Science/Business        -
- Marist College              Political philosophy:  Libertarian       -
- Poughkeepsie, NY                                   Extropian         -
-                                                                      -
-               "Replace taxpayers with shareholders,                  -
-                regulators with customers: privatize!"                -
------------------------------------------------------------------------




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: jordan@imsi.com (Jordan Hayes)
Date: Sun, 3 Jan 93 08:08:38 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Why mailers should not touch the body
Message-ID: <9301031512.AA05222@IMSI.COM>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I got lots of mail telling me that signing messages in the body of the
message came about because "various mailers" munge header lines.  Now
it's true that for gateway processing, To: and From: lines need to get
translated, but I've never seen a mailer change or remove a header that
doesn't have to do with addressing before.  Can someone provide an
example?  My claim is that a signature belongs on the envelope and not
in the body.

-----

To be clear, I'm talking about (e.g.) a PGP signature, not a .signature
with a cute saying in it.

/jordan




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: edgar@spectrx.Saigon.COM (Edgar W. Swank)
Date: Mon, 4 Jan 93 17:02:47 PST
To: Cypherpunks          <cypherpunks@toad.com>
Subject: Re: Return addresses
Message-ID: <PZDTwB4w165w@spectrx.saigon.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Hal Finney wrote here on Dec 30:
 
    Chaum's idea was that the message contents would be encrypted at
    each step, as Eric suggests, but Chaum would have the encryption
    key be part of the anonymous address, created by the same person
    who made the anonymous address.  The idea would be, after
    decrypting the incoming message, the remailer would see something
    like:
 
        Anon-To: <next destination>
        Encrypt-With: <some DES or IDEA key>
 
    It would then encrypt the message "contents" (but not the
    "envelope", as Eric points out) using the specified key.  When the
    owner of the anonymous address received the message, he would
    decrypt it using the chain of "Encrypt-With" keys that he put into
    the anonymous address.
 
I'd like to point out that the "-ca" function of PGP could be used
to perform this function if Encrypt-With: specified a PGP pass-phrase
rather than a direct key.  I'd also like to suggest that the message-
body to be encrypted require heading and trailing delimiters such as:
 
-----BEGIN MESSAGE BODY-----
-----END MESSAGE BODY-----
 
Note delimiters would not be part of message body and would not
be encrypted.

--
edgar@spectrx.saigon.com (Edgar W. Swank)
SPECTROX SYSTEMS +1.408.252.1005  Silicon Valley, Ca





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: ghsvax!hal@uunet.UU.NET (Hal Finney)
Date: Sun, 3 Jan 93 17:28:45 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Anonymous discussion on Pax
Message-ID: <9301040105.AA26178@nano.noname>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


There has been some discussion on the Pax mailing list (mail to
anon.subscribe@pax.tpa.com.au to subscribe) about anonymous posting
and mail.  Here is an excerpt from one posting that I thought was
interesting.

From: mjr@netcom.com (Matthew Rapaport)
> >anonymous posting is just another noise source.  Very  little is riding
> >on who "wins" arguments on Usenet.
> 
> True, so I'll try something more serious. Suppose you were trying to
> convince some small group of vulnerable people to commit some crime, or
> aid in one directly or indirectly (perhaps for political reasons).
> He/she/they might resist one provacateur, but all *10* of *you* assure
> him/her/them that you've all done it (for which reason you must
> naturally hide your identities), it must be done, etc.
> 
> *******
> 
> >The idea of positive reputations is designed to help with the problem
> >that anonymity could lower the quality of postings by reducing
> >accountability.
> 
> The WELL tried a completely anonymous conference once. It quickly became
> a mire of flaming viciousness, lying, trickery and backstabbing. It was
> unbelievable to see how fast it got nasty, and in an otherwise
> reasonably well behaved user population.

Does anyone here have information on this experiment on the WELL?
That sounds like an interesting data point.  Presumably they did not
try to press on with some kind of rating or reputation system.

Hal
74076.1041@compuserve.com




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Richard Childers <rchilder@us.oracle.com>
Date: Sun, 3 Jan 93 20:28:18 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: A solution remailer signature suppression
Message-ID: <9301040426.AA10757@rchilder.us.oracle.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



"Hugh Daniels said here on Dec 28:
 
    There are very good reasons to build remailers (and all mail
    tools) to pass on all the bytes they can, trailing spaces and
    .sigs included."
 
"Hugh doesn't say what these reasons are.  They are not obvious to me,
 so I must disagree. I've already stated what I think are good reasons
 at least for remailers whose purpose is anonymity to remove automatic
 sigs which are likley to destroy anonymity."

I can think of a few ...

	(1)	it's a bad precedent to rewrite contents. one
		program's apparent signature could be another
		program's data or instruction.

	(2)	it is unnecessary complexity and falls under
		KISS, IE, 'Keep It Simple, Simon'.	(-:

	(3)	It is less robust and portable as a result of
		having this additional complexity. ( I use
		'portable' not in the conventional compiler-
		specific manner, but more to apply to a given
		application's usability for future, yet-to-be-
		known applications, IE, flexibility. ) In this
		respect it fails to conform to requirements
		for a good software 'tool'.

It is the user's job to hide his or her identity, but it should not
be the programmer's responsibility to anticipate the user's failure
to think at all. Someone who uses these tools without understanding
the principles upon which they are founded - such as people whom
accept keys from individuals whom are only electronically known -
will quickly founder upon their own, um, state of stupor, and one
should not undertake to protect them from this, as what you are pro-
-tecting them from, in reality, is the opportunity to learn from
their mistakes.

 
"I've said I would accept either a less ambiguous sig delimiter than
 "--" or a remailer option to remove the sig (default) or leave it in."

Until there is a convention, IE, an RFC or ANSI standard for signatures,
it would be unwise to build in any assumption.

I just realized an excellent example. For years, I've been signing
myself ...

-- richard

... such that everything after my name - IE, contact data - would be
trimmed off. Not well thought out ... I have actually seen this in the
case of a few mail servers that rewrite contents ( such as the elec-
-tric vehicles digest, EV-L ).


-- richard

=====
-- richard childers		rchilder@us.oracle.com		1 415 506 2411
         oracle data center  --  unix systems & network administration

 "If Life is a drama, then, surely, the hardest parts go to the most skillful."




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Matt Willis <ASTMWILL%STETSON.bitnet@CUNYVM.CUNY.EDU>
Date: Mon, 4 Jan 93 09:51:02 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Acceptance of Keys
Message-ID: <01GT4DS9PKZ40000QP@stetson.bitnet>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


<As excerpted from Julf (admin@anon.penet.fi)
>Richard Childers writes:
>
>> It is the user's job to hide his or her identity, but it should not
>> be the programmer's responsibility to anticipate the user's failure
>> to think at all. Someone who uses these tools without understanding
>> the principles upon which they are founded - such as people whom
>> accept keys from individuals whom are only electronically known -
>> will quickly founder upon their own, um, state of stupor, and one
>> should not undertake to protect them from this, as what you are pro-
>> -tecting them from, in reality, is the opportunity to learn from
>> their mistakes.

As wary as I am of expressing my ignorance, I'll give it a shot...

I'm new to the Cypherpunks list and I'm just curious, is it going against the
principles of PGP to "accept keys from individuals whom are only electronically
known"?    (if so, I guess I'm in a state of stupor)

Most of my dealings on the internet are internet-exclusive, that is, I never
meet the people with whom I communicate.  With the exception of some locals,
computer social life in FL, USA is pretty non-existant.  I wish my
communications to be secure and I believe that PGP is the best way and I will
never have the opportunity to meet the people I talk to in Kansas or in New
York  (both places, I hope I never visit).
If meat-relations are the only secure way I'm supposed to communicate, then I
guess I'll have to use carrier pigeons.   :)

DISCLAIMER:
Of course, I could be taking this TOTALLY out of context, and in that case this
message should read:
Hey, I really like this list... It's intellectually stimulating and a clearly
positive influence on my life.  How's the weather in Europe?

I'm not trying to be argumentative, I just have serious questions about the
keeping of public keys...  here's another one... couldn't we assign one at
birth... it'd be better than a social security number (dunno what you use in
Europe), but a whole lot harder to remember...

ALSO:  We Mac users are wondering when MacPGP 2.1 will be out?  Anyone have any
contact info?

thanks for reading my words.

+-------Matt-Willis--------------------------------+
|       Matt Willis       ASTMWILL@STETSON.BITNET  |        elsewhere:
|       Matt Willis       Head of the Underground  | mwill@mindvox.phantom.com
|       Matt Willis          Robotech PBM List     |
+-------Matt-Willis--------------------------------+
"Absolutely alone in awareness of the mechanism." -Agrippa by WG




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Karl L. Barrus <barrus@tree.egr.uh.edu>
Date: Mon, 4 Jan 93 12:04:01 PST
To: ASTMWILL%STETSON.bitnet@CUNYVM.CUNY.EDU
Subject: Acceptance of Keys
In-Reply-To: <01GT4DS9PKZ40000QP@stetson.bitnet>
Message-ID: <9301042003.AA13849@tree.egr.uh.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Matt,

	You posted some very good questions.  The reason why it is
"unacceptable" to accept keys electronically is that you may be
vulnerable to spoofing.  Okay, in reality, you have to realize that
attacking cryptographic protocols is a paranoid view of things, and
that you may not be attacked, but... if you send your public key to
somebody, it could be possible for someone to eavesdrop, grab your
key, substitute their own, and send that one along.  Then when someone
responds to "you", the eavesdropper could read the message, re-encrypt
it with the public key they stole, and send it along to you.  Then,
you don't even know you are the victim of eavesdropping.
	Anyway, it all boils down to validating the keys you receive.
Which makes it tough unless you can meet people face to face.
However, the latest version of pgp contains an option which computes
the md5 hash of your public key - which allows you to call someone,
and read each others hashes, thus completing the verification over the
phone.  Of course, now you have to worry about receiving their correct
phone number... :-)
	
/-----------------------------------\
| Karl L. Barrus                    |
| barrus@tree.egr.uh.edu (NeXTMail) |
| elee9sf@menudo.uh.edu             |
\-----------------------------------/




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: eric@parallax.com (Eric Messick)
Date: Tue, 5 Jan 93 01:01:56 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: RFC-822 header processing in perl
Message-ID: <9301050049.AA07963@parallax.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



I've written a perl script to parse RFC-822 style headers.  It was a
good deal harder than I had thought it would be.  Since it's over 300
lines (with comments) I won't post it, but will mail it to anyone who
wants to play with it.  It has the following features:

Doesn't touch anything unless you ask it to.  Leaves the ordering and
whitespace/folding of header lines unchanged.

Allows you to replace any header line (which appears only once) with
an arbitrary value, which is appropriatly folded on output.

Allows you to delete any header line, or add a header line to the end
of the header.  These are special cases of replacing a header line.

Allows you to access the value (stuff after the :) of any header line.

Given a list of addresses, returns an array of canonicalized addresses.

The last item is the hard part.  It correctly parses the sample
addresses in the RFC-822 paper, as well as some really gnarly looking
junk that I threw at it.  It correctly handles the various types of
quoted strings, and backslash quoting, not splitting addresses at
quoted commas.  It removes nested comments from addresses.  It deletes
the group name from a list of addresses without screwing up quoted
colons.

It should be useful as a first step in alias processing.  That's what
I'll be adding next, when I figure out exactly how I want to do it.

-- eric messick
eric@toad.com




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Johan Helsingius <julf@penet.FI>
Date: Mon, 4 Jan 93 07:39:52 PST
To: Richard Childers <rchilder@us.oracle.com>
Subject: Re: A solution remailer signature suppression
In-Reply-To: <9301040426.AA10757@rchilder.us.oracle.com>
Message-ID: <9301041652.aa07015@penet.penet.FI>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Richard Childers writes:

> It is the user's job to hide his or her identity, but it should not
> be the programmer's responsibility to anticipate the user's failure
> to think at all. Someone who uses these tools without understanding
> the principles upon which they are founded - such as people whom
> accept keys from individuals whom are only electronically known -
> will quickly founder upon their own, um, state of stupor, and one
> should not undertake to protect them from this, as what you are pro-
> -tecting them from, in reality, is the opportunity to learn from
> their mistakes.

Well, in principle I agree. And if I would start from a clean slate, I
would *gladly* leave out the sig stripper. But people in groups such as
alt.sexual.abuse.recovery have come to rely on the behaviour of previous
servers, and are *not* very computer- or e-mail-literate.

	Julf (admin@anon.penet.fi)





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Hal <74076.1041@CompuServe.COM>
Date: Mon, 4 Jan 93 23:41:21 PST
To: CYPHERPUNKS <CYPHERPUNKS@TOAD.COM>
Subject: Re: Remail addresses...
Message-ID: <930105070855_74076.1041_DHJ43-1@CompuServe.COM>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

From: edgar@spectrx.Saigon.COM (Edgar W. Swank)
>
>         Anon-To: <next destination>
>         Encrypt-With: <some DES or IDEA key>
> 
> I'd like to point out that the "-ca" function of PGP could be used
> to perform this function if Encrypt-With: specified a PGP pass-phrase
> rather than a direct key.

This sounds like a good idea.  The user would have to have some
scripts to decrypt incoming anonymous-address messages using this
pass phrase (or some sequence of pass phrases if more than one
remailer was used for the anonymous address).

> I'd also like to suggest that the message-
> body to be encrypted require heading and trailing delimiters such as:
>  
> -----BEGIN MESSAGE BODY-----
> -----END MESSAGE BODY-----
>  
> Note delimiters would not be part of message body and would not
> be encrypted.

These anonymous addresses do need a distinction between the "message
address" (or "envelope") and the message body.  The anonymous address
gets decrypted at each step, and the message body gets encrypted
at each step using the scheme above.

But Eric Hughes pointed out that we already have such a distinction
in the RFC822 message headers vs body.  We should use that existing
structure rather than try to create our own.  That means that anonymous
addresses should be designed to fit into mail headers.  Unfortunately
many mail agents make this difficult or inconvenient right now, but
perhaps that is an area where we could make some improvements.

In this model, we would not need message body delimiters, since mail
already has its message body delimited distinct from its headers.

If we do process the message body with encryption at each stage,
I do have an idea which could be useful.  If the body which is
being encrypted is already in the format of an ASCII-encoded message
using the standard RFC822 encryption used in PGP, RIPEM and PEM,
then rather than just encrypting it it could be de-ASCII'd, then
encrypted, then re-ASCII'd.  This would keep it from increasing
in size by a factor of 4/3 at each encryption step.

Hal

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.1

iQCVAgUBK0kHvKgTA69YIUw3AQHBuwP/ekp1feh06tLHwxws49DE3wVxnu/36Yg7
oW2l43n3llgRJC+r/KYJ2+5LTG0/f1Ib/R8c4qxUJzZeCj7zABSdJ6KSwIlwmfP6
Djz0vOBnife6CvhQRi+T/8NuFqFIzlxO1vK+7tG9KWshxP+7AMayGOLuY0pOTREX
7brcJHnn7Mg=
=9Uss
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----


Distribution:
  CYPHERPUNKS >INTERNET:CYPHERPUNKS@TOAD.COM





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Date: Tue, 5 Jan 93 09:56:19 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: purloined letter
In-Reply-To: <Pine.3.03.9301051003.C13150-9100000@ra.cs.umb.edu>
Message-ID: <9301051753.AA25648@netcom.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Peter Breton writes:

>  In using encrypted communications, how does one avoid the problem of
> calling attention to the message BECAUSE it is encrypted? "If he went to
> the trouble of coding it, there MUST be something in there!!" Granted that
> if everyone begins encrypting, this problem will vanish... are there
> practical solutions in the meantime? (eg, Codes that look like plaintext?)

The study of how to hide the _existence_ of an encrypted message is
called _steganography_.

Messages have traditionally been:

-placed on microdots and hidden inside letters, under stamps, etc.

-transformed into innocuous-looking messages ("Hello, Peter! Things
are going very well on this January morn.")...typically used with book
codes

-deposited in physical "dead drops," such as in tin cans by the side of
the road, in the branches of trees, etc. (all agreed-upon in advance,
of course)

The cypherspace domain offers new degrees of freedom for hiding such
messages:

-messages may be packed into the "least signficant bits" (LSBs) of
digital images, GIFs and TIFFs, sound samples, etc. As these bits are
at the "noise floor" for modern recording technology, message bits can
be easily made indistinguishable from "real" bits. A simple GIF image,
such as those posted worldwide in the various "pictures" groups, can
easily hold 50K bytes or more just in the LSBs (of each of the
colors). A standard 2-hour digital audio tape (DAT) can carry 80 M
bytes in the LSBs alone! (Imagine the Customs Department trying to
stop someone from carrying out the blueprints to the Aurora spy plane
packed into the LSBs of their favorite tape!)

-similar systems can be used to pack bits into the "ragged right"
margins of messages like this one, where the precise word spacing
carries some bits. Not very many, of course. And the spacing is
susceptable to munging.

-raw data, such as weather reports and sports scores, can be used.
Used since the dawn of espionage, and featured as a plot device in the
French thriller "Soft War," this method is certainly still possible to
use.


As the amount of bits moving around increases dramatically, so, too,
will the avenues for sending encrypted messages.

-Tim May


-- 
..........................................................................
Timothy C. May         | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,  
tcmay@netcom.com       | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
408-688-5409           | knowledge, reputations, information markets, 
W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA  | black markets, collapse of governments.
Higher Power: 2^756839 | PGP Public Key: by arrangement.





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: karn@qualcomm.com (Phil Karn)
Date: Tue, 5 Jan 93 10:03:47 PST
To: pbreton@cs.umb.edu
Subject: Re: purloined letter
Message-ID: <9301051802.AA17738@servo>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


A couple of years ago somebody posted some clever programs to
sci.crypt that hid arbitrary (cipher)text in seemingly innocuous
"plaintext". You had two options: plaintext that looked like a running
commentary on a baseball game (with the ciphertext encoded in the
choices of names of players at bat, the sequence of balls and strikes,
etc) or plaintext that looked like the writings of a particular legal
scholar (I think). I don't remember his name, but he was chosen
because Senator Joseph Biden of Delaware plagairized his works during
law school, and Biden had recently introduced S.266 with the
now-infamous "resolution" against cryptography. A nice touch. :-)

Another approach to this problem is this: if you can't make the
needles inconspicuous by themselves, generate some big haystacks to
hide them in.  I.e., write a program that produces bogus PGP
"messages" and execute it frequently to produce background traffic. I
wrote a first-order bogus PGP message generator and posted it to
sci.crypt two weeks ago.  I say "first order" because it looks like a
PGP message to the naked eye, but is clearly invalid when fed to PGP -
I didn't bother generating correct checksums on the ciphertext.  The
ideal bogus message generator would produce a message
indistinguishable from a real PGP message encrypted with an unknown
public key, or perhaps with a known public key chosen at random. 
Anybody want to write this?

Phil




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Peter Breton <pbreton@cs.umb.edu>
Date: Tue, 5 Jan 93 07:26:50 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: purloined letter
In-Reply-To: <9301050049.AA07963@parallax.com>
Message-ID: <Pine.3.03.9301051003.C13150-9100000@ra.cs.umb.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



  Hi,

  I'm fairly new here and not sure if this topic has come up before, but
I'll offer it anyway:

 In using encrypted communications, how does one avoid the problem of
calling attention to the message BECAUSE it is encrypted? "If he went to
the trouble of coding it, there MUST be something in there!!" Granted that
if everyone begins encrypting, this problem will vanish... are there
practical solutions in the meantime? (eg, Codes that look like plaintext?)
	
	
		Peter







From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: mch@sqwest.wimsey.bc.ca (Mark C. Henderson)
Date: Tue, 5 Jan 93 10:27:47 PST
To: Peter Breton <cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: purloined letter
In-Reply-To: <Pine.3.03.9301051003.C13150-9100000@ra.cs.umb.edu>
Message-ID: <9301051019.ZM15222@west.sq.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


On Jan 5, 10:19, Peter Breton wrote:
> Subject: purloined letter
> 
>   Hi,
> 
>   I'm fairly new here and not sure if this topic has come up before, but
> I'll offer it anyway:
> 
>  In using encrypted communications, how does one avoid the problem of
> calling attention to the message BECAUSE it is encrypted? "If he went to
> the trouble of coding it, there MUST be something in there!!" Granted that
> if everyone begins encrypting, this problem will vanish... are there
> practical solutions in the meantime? (eg, Codes that look like plaintext?)
The best way to prevent this type of traffic analysis is to encrypt
everything. As a second best, encrypt all correspondence with a specific
person.

Mark

-- 
Mark Henderson, SoftQuad Inc, 108-10070 King George Hwy, Surrey, B.C. V3T 2W4
Internet:  markh@wimsey.bc.ca, mch@sqwest.wimsey.bc.ca, mch@holonet.net
UUCP: {van-bc,sq}!sqwest!mch Telephone: +1 604 585 8394  Fax: +1 604 585 1926
RIPEM public key available by Email/finger mch@holonet.net/keyserver




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: whitaker@eternity.demon.co.uk (Russell E. Whitaker)
Date: Tue, 5 Jan 93 12:08:24 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: MEETING: Cypherpunks UK (2nd; last announcement)
Message-ID: <8326@eternity.demon.co.uk>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

2nd Meeting, Cypherpunks UK
- ---------------------------

Chris Tame, of FOREST and the Libertarian Alliance, has generously
offered the use of the meeting room at his offices for our gathering,
Sunday, 10 January 1993, from 1300 onwards, at:

  FOREST
  4th Floor
  2 Grosvenor Gardens
  London   SW1W 0DH
  071-823-6550

This is just around the corner from Victoria Station, at the end of the
mansion block near Hobart Place.  There's a dark green cabbie shelter
across the street from the entrance, and some British Telecom payphones.
Can't miss it, really.  However, if you have trouble, call the telephone
number above, or call my pager, on 081-812-2661.

If it helps, we're in the direction of Buckingham Palace, which is
(very) partially visible from our windows.

If you wish to attend, you should bring a 3.5" DOS-formatted diskette
(sorry!  My UN*X machine is an Intergraph workstation, and I can't use
it for crypto) with a copy of your PGP 2.0+ public key.  I'll sign it
there.  Mac users: if you don't have Apple File Exchange (what!?), I'll
be extra nice and take your keys anyway ( ;-)) for AFE conversion on my
IIcx.  Not to fear.

It might not be a bad idea to copy your public key on each of several
diskettes, so you've got a copy to distribute to each of the others.
Don't trust me to copy *your* key to others!  As a matter of fact, as
there are plenty of power points in the meeting room, you should bring your
laptop, and/or a desktop PC:  when someone hands you a disk-with-key,
you can sign her key, and hand her back her diskette, with your own
pubkey added.

[Note to the novice: don't hand another person your secret key... the
 one named secring.pgp.  Read the documentation.]

This should be a lively meeting.  Among the topics likely to be
discussed are:

  o   The proliferation of public key cryptography in the U.K.
  o   The local development of anonymous remailers and a proposed
        automated public key repository at Demon Internet Systems
  o   Electronic networking/email security for the novice
  o   Pro-active proliferation of PGP 2.1+ to interesting European,
        African, and Asian sites
        -  ftp placement
        -  BBS distribution
        -  sneakernet across borders
  o   The use of HPACK in securing local file installations

.. and much more!

Mark Turner, from Demon Internet Systems, is likely to be on hand to
demo DIS for non-DIS users.  We've set up our own local, high-quality
newsgroups:
         demon.security
         demon.security.keys

and established the /pub/pgp and /pub/ibmpc/pgp archives on
gate.demon.co.uk (expanding recently to include all versions of PGP,
and interesting related files).

Hope to see you there!

Semper vigilans,


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.1

iQCVAgUBK0lmwYTj7/vxxWtPAQFtVQQAna8vfz6LqC5J5fhlgE1FB+m4GpkvU4o9
HrpFd5NKTc+JrKZEuv/sEDbJvXScc5N38n9KCyIEKdPEUxsjSA58CffcLLEW4xnb
w3zAIMyr3wdsD0sxw0gqSi3sx6MbGP5fXwbUb+LyNJzCvpzt3MLYA5tYWZkvIbl9
ONV1PIPtB60=
=8qA3
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----


Russell Earl Whitaker                   whitaker@eternity.demon.co.uk
Communications Editor                       71750.2413@compuserve.com
EXTROPY: The Journal of Transhumanist Thought         AMiX: RWHITAKER
Board member, Extropy Institute (ExI)
================ PGP 2.0 public key available =======================




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: whitaker@eternity.demon.co.uk (Russell E. Whitaker)
Date: Tue, 5 Jan 93 12:10:16 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Anonymous thanks ;-)
Message-ID: <8333@eternity.demon.co.uk>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

Some kind U.S. cypherpunk sent me a copy of his public keyring
last week.  Unfortunately - mea culpa! - after having integrated
his keyring, I deleted his original message from my mailbase,
and thus lost his contact info.

I wish to thank this person for sending the keyring, whoever you
are... my memory is faulty: so much email to catch up on!

In the meantime, Mark Turner (mt@kram.org) is hard at work 1.)
porting PGP to 386BSD and 2.) developing a telnettable PGP Key
Server.  Details as they happen.

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.1

iQCVAgUBK0lqRITj7/vxxWtPAQGKeQQAo45IcgvBRON49bxyRtPSyHEpi4InsXQA
oNxAE+iN+mGTRYRov8a9twgPXp+i7YHv+Xx+A8+c0ZilJV/954uPFy22xAqxl+4P
kpUaITTt+oo/3no7g2cBPC2JhOZS7QTkokBvILhoofjNzRZJ+qTUScpyZ4QVlRvP
smkZ8WWQg6o=
=uvOA
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----


Russell Earl Whitaker                   whitaker@eternity.demon.co.uk
Communications Editor                       71750.2413@compuserve.com
EXTROPY: The Journal of Transhumanist Thought         AMiX: RWHITAKER
Board member, Extropy Institute (ExI)
================ PGP 2.0 public key available =======================




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: eab@msc.edu (Edward Bertsch)
Date: Tue, 5 Jan 93 09:21:50 PST
To: pbreton@cs.umb.edu (Peter Breton)
Subject: Re: purloined letter
In-Reply-To: <Pine.3.03.9301051003.C13150-9100000@ra.cs.umb.edu>
Message-ID: <9301051721.AA16197@uh.msc.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


->calling attention to the message BECAUSE it is encrypted? "If he went to
->the trouble of coding it, there MUST be something in there!!" Granted that
->if everyone begins encrypting, this problem will vanish... are there
->practical solutions in the meantime? (eg, Codes that look like plaintext?)

a good point indeed.  I know of no software that works the way it seems
you would like.  The best would be encryption software that makes your
'secret' message look like the kind of message that you would actually
be sending to the recipient.  Some kind of message that (when read by
a human) makes sense, and seems innocuous.  This sounds like a VERY
difficult problem, and one that is not likely to be solved any time soon
(in the sense of having this be done 100% by software).

Another option would be to have the message fit the letter-frequency,
letter-pair frequency, etc... that 'normal' messages have.  The idea
here is that messages may be scanned for unusual (i.e. non-english text)
properties in this regard, and then scanned further by humans and/or
computers in the order of their 'interestingness'.  So to defeat this
kind of scanning, your 'secret' message should 'appear' to be a 'ordinary'
message.

--

Edward A. Bertsch (eab@msc.edu)   Minnesota Supercomputer Center, Inc.
Operations/User Services          1200 Washington Avenue South
(612) 626-1888 work               Minneapolis, Minnesota  55415
(612) 645-0168 voice mail




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Matt Willis <ASTMWILL%STETSON.bitnet@CUNYVM.CUNY.EDU>
Date: Tue, 5 Jan 93 08:26:21 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Hiding PGP code
Message-ID: <01GT5P4IHYCG000224@stetson.bitnet>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Peter Breton <pbreton@cs.umb.edu> writes:
> In using encrypted communications, how does one avoid the problem of
>calling attention to the message BECAUSE it is encrypted? "If he went to
>the trouble of coding it, there MUST be something in there!!" Granted that
>if everyone begins encrypting, this problem will vanish... are there
>practical solutions in the meantime? (eg, Codes that look like plaintext?)

Here's an interesting solution...  You can program a message filter to add
extract letters to each PGP character to make it a word.
I'm sure you could find any database of words and have it randomly make first
letters... it'd be pretty simple... and then the receiver would just take every
letter followed by a space...  and if you wanted to be ultra-sneaky (who, us)
you could have null words that change conditions in the letter... like
switching to the second letter in the word, or skipping the next word
altogether... but what to do with no-letter PGP codes... ok, the first TWO
letters of the word indicate a character... sort of like a byte...
hey, I think I might just write this sucker...

Code will follow!

carpe crypto

+-------Matt-Willis--------------------------------+
|       Matt Willis       ASTMWILL@STETSON.BITNET  |        elsewhere:
|       Matt Willis       Head of the Underground  | mwill@mindvox.phantom.com
|       Matt Willis          Robotech PBM List     |
+-------Matt-Willis--------------------------------+
"Absolutely alone in awareness of the mechanism." -Agrippa by WG




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Matt Willis <ASTMWILL%STETSON.bitnet@CUNYVM.CUNY.EDU>
Date: Tue, 5 Jan 93 08:44:58 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: RE: Acceptance of Keys
Message-ID: <01GT5PQFUPTG000224@stetson.bitnet>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


From: "Karl L. Barrus" <barrus@tree.egr.uh.edu> writes:
>       You posted some very good questions.  The reason why it is
>"unacceptable" to accept keys electronically is that you may be
>vulnerable to spoofing.  Okay, in reality, you have to realize that
>attacking cryptographic protocols is a paranoid view of things, and
>that you may not be attacked, but... if you send your public key to
>somebody, it could be possible for someone to eavesdrop, grab your
>key, substitute their own, and send that one along.  Then when someone
>responds to "you", the eavesdropper could read the message, re-encrypt
>it with the public key they stole, and send it along to you.  Then,
>you don't even know you are the victim of eavesdropping.

But we both call the same system (at least the people I x-change keys with)
usually mindvox or a private system with a respected name... and in the case of
Minvox, we do a DCC on IRC... straight person-to-person...  to be
eavesdropping... one, they'd have to tap my line, heavy equipment needed to tap
a 16.8k HST v.42bis connection, seeing as I pretty much max out a phone line
and HST's are really picky... or two, they'd intercept a DCC on the IRC at
berkeley... but that's a 57.6k connection... however, that does seem
possible... does anyone have any suggestions on how to make e-transfers of keys
more secure, because, besides snail-mail (which would please the feds a lot) I
have no other way of getting my key to them...

>       Anyway, it all boils down to validating the keys you receive.
>Which makes it tough unless you can meet people face to face.
>However, the latest version of pgp contains an option which computes
>the md5 hash of your public key - which allows you to call someone,
>and read each others hashes, thus completing the verification over the
>phone.  Of course, now you have to worry about receiving their correct
>phone number... :-)

geez, I didn't know it was this complicated... if someone screws with the key,
it just doesn't decode, correct?  nowadays, with MNP and ARQ-retries and all of
our little .bis buddies, not to mention the CRC's in transfer protos, wouldn't
that make an error in transfer EXTREMELY remote... so the only other way'd be
tampering and even then it just wouldn't decode, so what... you get the key
again... but I oversimplify the situation, I guess...

Oh, and I know this is going to make me sound like a complete idiot in front of
my peers, but I've always did straight tranfers of keys...  how do you put
ascii keys into your keyring?  I can't seem to make MacPGP do it... sniffle...
and if ihe reason I can't decode the key is due to an error in transmission,
forget this entire message...

+-------Matt-Willis--------------------------------+
|       Matt Willis       ASTMWILL@STETSON.BITNET  |        elsewhere:
|       Matt Willis       Head of the Underground  | mwill@mindvox.phantom.com
|       Matt Willis          Robotech PBM List     |
+-------Matt-Willis--------------------------------+
"Absolutely alone in awareness of the mechanism." -Agrippa by WG




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: uri@watson.ibm.com
Date: Tue, 5 Jan 93 09:55:48 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: purloined letter
In-Reply-To: <9301051721.AA16197@uh.msc.edu>
Message-ID: <9301051754.AA20090@buoy.watson.ibm.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Edward Bertsch says:
>
> ->calling attention to the message BECAUSE it is encrypted? "If he went to
> ->the trouble of coding it, there MUST be something in there!!" Granted that
> ->if everyone begins encrypting, this problem will vanish... are there
> ->practical solutions in the meantime? (eg, Codes that look like plaintext?)

Well, my opinion is - the only way to go is to SHORTEN the transition
period. Switch to all-encrypted e-mail ASAP.

> a good point indeed.  I know of no software that works the way it seems
> you would like.
> ............................................This sounds like a VERY
> difficult problem, and one that is not likely to be solved any time soon
> (in the sense of having this be done 100% by software).

Agreed. Theoretically possible - practically infeasible. Plus imagine
message size... Plus it depends on how clever a scanner-program can
be - if eavesdroppers have enough CPU power, they could check for
the "validity" as well, i.e. right word sequences, not just
amount...

> Another option would be to have the message fit the letter-frequency,
> letter-pair frequency, etc... that 'normal' messages have.  The idea
> here is that messages may be scanned for unusual (i.e. non-english text)
> properties in this regard, and then scanned further by humans and/or
> computers in the order of their 'interestingness'.  So to defeat this
> kind of scanning, your 'secret' message should 'appear' to be a 'ordinary'
> message.

Again, it will, or will not work, depending on how smart the scanning
program is. There's no reason why it can't detect, that your letters
don't form valid English (German, Swedish, Arabic, whatever) words,
*or* the words don't form valid sentences...

I repeat - the surest way is to get over the hump sooner.
--
Regards,
Uri         uri@watson.ibm.com      scifi!angmar!uri 	N2RIU
-----------
<Disclamer>


From cypherpunks-request  Tue Jan  5 10:49:28 1993



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: wcs@anchor.ho.att.com (Bill_Stewart(HOY002)1305)
Date: Tue, 5 Jan 93 10:48:32 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: purloined letter
Message-ID: <9301051843.AA15785@anchor.ho.att.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text


The hiding-data-in-bogus-text system that Phil referred to is
Peter Wayner's Mimic functions, which let you represent data using
a Huffman code or context-free-grammar set of productions that
matches innocuous text.  The examples in the paper used baseball game
radio narration (hiding a message "Paul is dead" :-) and political
speeches by Mr. Neil Kinnock, the raving Labour Party honcho whose
speeches were plagiarized by Joe Biden.  (Biden, btw, was a nice guy
when he was elected to the Senate at age just-under-30,
but he's apparently gone Big Brotherish as he's aged.
I'm not bothered by one politician borrowing another's speeches,
but stooping to Neil Kinnock's syrupy ranting is a bit much :-)

The papers on the mimic functions are in ftp.cs.cornell.ecu,
under /pub/wayner/Mimic.  There are also a couple of papers on
building a highly parallel des-cracker out of content-addressable memory,

Until encryption becomes widely used, if yuo want to hide encrypted 
data, mimic functions or low-bits-of-gifs are good ways to go.

		Bill Stewart



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: wcs@anchor.ho.att.com (Bill_Stewart(HOY002)1305)
Date: Tue, 5 Jan 93 13:50:00 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: purloined letter -- mimic functions
Message-ID: <9301052145.AA17381@anchor.ho.att.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text


Peter Wayner sent along the following note about mimic functions:
------- cut here ------
Original-From: wayner@cs.cornell.edu (Peter Wayner)

Cool. I'm not a member of the mailing list.
You can tell them if they want a copy of the 
code they should send me a note. They can get it in 
either C or Pascal. The C comes with tar wrapping
paper for the faux industrial tech look.
(I can't wait until Crate and Barrel start 
mining the Civil Defencse era for new retro-trendy 
styles. )
-Peter
------ cut here -------

At the risk of sounding like Peter G Neumann, I should comment that
the combination of mimic functions and Mime mail could lead
to lots of silliness and hand-waving ....

			Bill



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Mark Turner" <mt@kram.org>
Date: Tue, 5 Jan 93 13:19:58 PST
To: whitaker@eternity.demon.co.uk
Subject: Re: Anonymous thanks ;-)
Message-ID: <9301052119.AA04308@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

On Tue, 05 Jan 93 11:00:49 BST, "Russell E. Whitaker" <whitaker@eternity.demon.co.uk> wrote:
> In the meantime, Mark Turner (mt@kram.org) is hard at work 1.)
> porting PGP to 386BSD and 2.) developing a telnettable PGP Key
> Server.  Details as they happen.

I was beaten too it with the port by Graham Toal (gtoal@gtoal.com) and
Adrian Hall (adrian@rachel.ibmpcug.co.uk). It's available for anon ftp
from rachel.ibmpcug.co.uk:/usr/local/src/pgp.

Regards,

Mark.

p.s. I'll announce the PGP server here once it's fully operational. It
will also have a mail server.

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.1

iQCVAgUBK0n6NUER4WTv6d3nAQHorAP/ekT7fQYOSBBuS3vcBXJ7FG7RtwoID8QP
NxspuGGrXcFSkKR4pCIzAArhWpxN3/gIqELiMQuEF2oGkzVomZBxmnyXvQxOjTtl
e1x42EISp06qgMplwx4xu1FyPtF00BYI+WLlzeELvJ4DEvej8A5o+WVqQyjn8Ah7
/fAWIx4JSaE=
=/ja0
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
-- 
/\/\ark Turner                               Demon Systems / Demon Internet
Office: mark@demon.co.uk (+44 81 349 0063)       42 Hendon Lane, London
Home: mt@kram.org (+44 831 823 212)                  N3 1TT, England
------------------ PGP version 2.1 Public Key available -------------------
*** IP level dial-up connectivity to the Internet for a tenner a month! ***




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: edgar@spectrx.Saigon.COM (Edgar W. Swank)
Date: Wed, 6 Jan 93 10:12:35 PST
To: Cypherpunks          <cypherpunks@toad.com>
Subject: Re: Remailer .sig suppressio
Message-ID: <k7RywB4w165w@spectrx.saigon.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

I was glad to read Hal's comments of Jan 2 about sig suppression and
his anecdote about trying to chain the penet and pax remailers.

I was not aware til now that the penet sig test was any line which
*starts with* "--". A more appropriate test would be any line
*consisting of only* "--" (exactly two dashes).  Do you know if the
pax sig test is the same as penet's?

I can't imagine any solution to your problem which does not involve
changing either the remailer (tighter sig test) or PGP (recognize
either ----- or - --- as starting a PGP message or key delimiter).

The best solution so far appears to be Miron Cuperman's remailer
which is similar to (based on) the cypherpunks remailer, but
*requires* encrypted input and does not remail any unencrypted text
which might preceed or follow the encrypted text.

But some modification of Miron's remailer to process trailing
plaintext seems to be necessary for ARA.  I hope it will include some
recognition of a well-defined unambiguous text delimiter such as

- -----END OF MESSAGE BODY-----

which will screen out any following text.

John Gilmore commented on my request for sig suppression:

    Remove the file ".signature" from your home directory and you'll
    be done with *that* hassle.

Well, my home directory doesn't *have" a ".signature" file! This
is an MS-DOS based WAFFLE BBS. All the sigs on this system look the
same so I suspect that they are made up from the user directory and
some file outside my home directory. I am led to believe from the
user doc that if I *create* a file "sig" or "mailsig" (no dots)
in my home directory this may affect the auto sig produced, but
I haven't had a chance to try it yet.  My fear is that if I
produce a null sig file that the "--" will still appear, making
it obvious that the auto sig is nulled. If this "--" appears at
the same time on both my regular and anonymous messages, people
who see both may put two and two together.

John:

    PS:  An extra credit note for the differently clued among us:
    Suppose you wanted to have a *different* signature for each of
    your multiple identities?  I guess the remailers had better not
    strip off signatures, eh?

Since I make up my outgoing mail offline, I would prefer to copy
in the correct sig corresponding to each message identity. That
way I can see that the correct sig is matched with the correct msg
in each case. I can easily avoid remailer stripping by using
a delimiter like "**" instead of "--".  As I said in a previous msg,
the problem with auto sigs is reliably switching them as you
send out (with an automatic script) messages from your different
ID's.

Since getting the wrong sig on the wrong msg could result in jail,
under some circumstances, I consider this a serious problem.  An
"anonymous" remailer which allows a user to lose his anonymity through
a simple lapse (forgetting about the auto sig) is one too dangerous
for me to use.

In another msg, John Gilmore delivers a long harangue about
"Why mailers should not touch the body".

I agree with the above phrase if we differentiate "mailers", which are
necessary for the generation and forwarding of all mail, from
"anonymous remailers", which have to be specifically requested
by the message sender, and whose only purpose is to obscure the
message origin. Since the automatic signature often reveals the
message origin, it's quite compatible with the mission of an anonymous
remailer to remove it.

John doesn't want PGP changed to eliminate trailing blanks on signed
plaintext. (Which I think would fix about 90+% of current problems
verifying sigs).  He wants us all to suffer until all the mailers in
the world are fixed to pass 8-bit binary.  Well, I won't hold my
breath for that.  I think UUENCODE and PGP armored form are going to
be around a long time.  I prefer a more pragmatic approach that will
give more immediate relief.

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.1

iQCVAgUBK0rOvt4nNf3ah8DHAQGBrQP+I9DKzknWE6sNTmYeSga3tQWv2IrHQPyc
hnqgXXqwq6GRvOUvGXqHdig9jfXbatYh7uYuMqn61xP9409JXnNJZ7QQuB9vSNdz
K5gvCKksPKjJoxAb5miDJvf61bS3N/bavl8gHM80DaRxv0n5UlzymLAvurZrL2qR
ZxgCWhz9P3o=
=CAUz
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

--
edgar@spectrx.saigon.com (Edgar W. Swank)
SPECTROX SYSTEMS +1.408.252.1005  Silicon Valley, Ca





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: yanek@novavax.nova.edu (Yanek Martinson)
Date: Wed, 6 Jan 93 05:53:09 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: RSAREF now available via anonymous FTP (fwd))
Message-ID: <9301061352.AA03071@novavax.nova.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


In case someone's interested:

Forwarded message:
> Date: Tue, 5 Jan 93 17:15:58 PST
> Message-Id: <9301060115.AA18302@RSA.COM>
> To: rsaref-users@RSA.COM
> From: burt@RSA.COM
> Subject: RSAREF now available via anonymous FTP
> Sender: rsaref-users-request@RSA.COM
> 
> Dear RSAREF user --
> 
> RSAREF is now available via anonymous FTP to 'rsa.com'. Along with
> RSAREF you can get RIPEM, Mark Riordan's RSAREF-based privacy-enhanced
> mail application, and an Emacs command interface to RIPEM. See the
> file 'README' in the FTP directory 'rsaref' for more information.
> 
> -- Burt Kaliski
> RSA Laboratories
> 


--
Yanek Martinson    mthvax.cs.miami.edu!safe0!yanek     uunet!medexam!yanek
this address preferred -->> yanek@novavax.nova.edu <<-- this address preferred
Phone (305) 765-6300 daytime   FAX: (305) 765-6708  1321 N 65 Way/Hollywood
      (305) 963-1931 evenings       (305) 981-9812  Florida, 33024-5819




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: peter honeyman <honey@citi.umich.edu>
Date: Wed, 6 Jan 93 08:48:52 PST
To: edgar@spectrx.Saigon.COM (Edgar W. Swank)
Subject: Re: A solution remailer signature suppression
In-Reply-To: <1k4PwB7w165w@spectrx.saigon.com>
Message-ID: <9301061648.AA16517@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


count me on the side of those folks who feel that remailers (and
mailers, for that matter) should keep their hands off the body of
the message.

furthermore, any editor that changes a file without being told to
(e.g., by stripping blanks) is (imho) broken.

edgar, you say:

> This system I use doesn't allow me to run my own software, so I
> think this idea wouldn't work for me, in any case.

that is probably not the sort of system you want to use if you are
interested in the privacy and integrity of your work.

	peter




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: tytso@ATHENA.MIT.EDU (Theodore Ts'o)
Date: Wed, 6 Jan 93 13:24:09 PST
To: peter honeyman <honey@citi.umich.edu>
Subject: Re: A solution remailer signature suppression
In-Reply-To: <9301061648.AA16517@toad.com>
Message-ID: <9301062123.AA17503@tsx-11.MIT.EDU>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I also agree that any sort of mailers should pass a message body
UNTOUCHED.  Next thing you know, people will be advocating that
remailers have AI capabilities for stripping out incriminating
statements made inside the body.

If your mail system is broken enough that it inserts signatures without
your permission, and you have no way to controlling it, it's broken.
End of statement.  Fix it or ditch it.  

							- Ted




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: shipley@merde.dis.org
Date: Wed, 6 Jan 93 20:25:15 PST
To: toad.com!cypherpunks@soda.berkeley.edu
Subject: mh wrapper
Message-ID: <9301070203.AA25280@merde.dis.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----




here is my first pass (a 7min hack) at a wrapper for a pgp<->mh use.
the next verion will me a replacement for the editor to automaticly
sign the body of a file (while leaving the header alone.

===== CUT HERE ====
#!/bin/sh

#pgpcomp - pgp compose
# Peter M. Shipley (Wed Jan  6 17:58:41 PST 1993)

umask 7077

TEMP=${TEMP-/tmp}
EDITOR=${EDITOR-/usr/ucb/vi}

whatnow=/usr/local/mh-6.7/bin/whatnow

export TEMP EDITOR

tempfile=$TEMP/pgp$$

/bin/cat << EEOOFF > $tempfile
To:
cc:
Fcc: +drafts
Subject:
Precedence: special-delivery
- --------


EEOOFF

$EDITOR $tempfile

/bin/sed  "/^--------/,$ d" < $tempfile > ${tempfile}.head
/bin/sed  "1,/^--------/d" < $tempfile > ${tempfile}.body

/usr/local/bin/pgp -sta +clearsig=on $tempfile.body -o $tempfile.signed

/bin/mv ${tempfile}.head ${tempfile}
/bin/cat << EEOOFF >> ${tempfile}
- --------

EEOOFF
/bin/cat < $tempfile.signed.asc >> ${tempfile}

/bin/rm -f ${tempfile}.*

exec  $whatnow -prom "pgpsend> " $tempfile
===== CUT HERE ====



-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.1

iQBFAgUBK0uPgMhmn7GUWLLFAQH7MAF9EuCX3ZAauG771viwGmnyk4YaiNDFhpmr
ann0Qvd6hVhTOnbSZNKet3Z9i0FUnDDu
=40PL
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: karn@qualcomm.com (Phil Karn)
Date: Wed, 6 Jan 93 21:54:47 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Russian analysis of PGP
Message-ID: <9301070552.AA22839@servo>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Anybody familiar with the internals of PGP care to comment on this item
that just showed up on sci.crypt?

It's amazing to think that the famous "kremvax" joke was only a decade
ago. Now the Russians are openly reviewing our cryptosystems for us.
May you live in interesting times.

Phil

From qualcom.qualcomm.com!walter!uunet!noc.near.net!lynx!mkagalen Wed Jan  6 21:48:32 PST 1993
Article: 12285 of sci.crypt
Xref: qualcom.qualcomm.com sci.crypt:12285 alt.security.pgp:1003
Newsgroups: sci.crypt,alt.security.pgp
Path: qualcom.qualcomm.com!walter!uunet!noc.near.net!lynx!mkagalen
From: mkagalen@lynx.dac.northeastern.edu (michael kagalenko)
Subject: discussion desired
Message-ID: <1993Jan7.002820.3579@lynx.dac.northeastern.edu>
Organization: Northeastern University, Boston, MA. 02115, USA
Date: Thu, 7 Jan 1993 00:28:20 GMT
Lines: 127

I'd appreciate greately your enlightened opinions on the following article.
(disclaimer : I have no qualification in the Great Science of
Cryptology(tm) ; I'm just posting someone's e-mail)




  About using the electronic signature for protection of
  commercial information:

  The analysis of PGP ver.2.0 program.


   ---------------------------------------------------------------------



     THE MOSCOW STATE UNIVERSITY named after m.V. Lomonosov
   ______________________________________________________________


        THE MATHEMATICAL CRYPTOGRAPHY PROBLEMS LABORATORY




    The MSU   mathematical   cryptography   problems   laboratory
employeers with  some  addition  specialists  were  executed  the
preliminary analysis of PGP ver.2.0 program.

    The preliminary study of  working  and  program  source  code
analysis result in following PGP features and problems:


    1. The common character problems


    - the  sequence  of  random numbers has strong prevalences on
bytes (up to 0.05 ...  0.1 on material of 10000 byte) and  strong
correlation dependence between contiguous bytes;

    - the program doesn't check it's own integrity,  so it can be
infected by  "virus"  which  intercept  confidential   keys   and
passwords used  for  their protection and save them onto magnetic
carriers;

    - the program has not  optimal  exponentiation  algorithm  in
GF(P) field,   when  P  -  prime  number,  which  result  in  low
performance;


    2. The RSA algorithm realization problems


    - the prime numbers reception using in this program (R and  q
in RSA  algorithm)  permits  not less than on two order to reduce
the labour-intensiveness of factorization;  with 256 bit blocks
of  data lenght it is possible to execute the cryptanalysis in
real time;

    - before using RSA the program executes compression and block
encryption that  positively  affects  on  the  common   stability
encryption.


    3. The electronic signature problems


    - for  signature  calculation the program originally executes
hashing of file into number of given  length  (256, 512 or 1024 bit),
but hashing function does not corresponds the ISO recommendations;

    - when considering the hashing function as the automatic  device
without output,  it  is  enough  simply possible to construct the
image of reverse automatic device and with using  the  blanks  in
text files  (or  free fields in some standard formats as in DBF),
to  compensate  the  hashing function  at  changed  file  to  former
significance.

    Thus, it  is  possible  to  forge  the  electronic  signature
without analysis of RSA algorithm.


    4. The block encryption algorithm problems


    - when executing analysis on  plaintext  and  ciphertext  the
linear correlation  dependences  with encryption key were founded
(0.01 and more degree);

    - also the effective method  of  decreasing security which
reduces the  order  of  time  necessery  to key definition in two
times in comparison with exhaustive search of all keys  (i.e.
algorithm has the labour-intensiveness which is equal the root
square from labour-intensiveness of the exhaustive search algorithm)
have been found.


    The conclusions:


    It is recommended to use encryption with 1024 bit key length.

    The using of electronic  signature  is  not  recommended  and
    requires the additional study.

    The block encryption algorithm has temporary stability.

    The hashing function  should  be  reduce  in conformity with ISO
    recommendations.

    The using of PGP program in actual version is undesired.




                       The MSU mathematical cryptography
                       problems Laboratory Manager
                       Academician

                          Dr. Sidelnikov V.M.

==END










From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Matt Willis <ASTMWILL%STETSON.bitnet@CUNYVM.CUNY.EDU>
Date: Mon, 11 Jan 93 11:02:02 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Commie's
Message-ID: <01GT8HKCAJFK0004WU@stetson.bitnet>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


To this southern boy, it looks like the pinkos are slamming American
(whoops, sorry, English) programming...   :)

"pgp in actual use is not recommended.", oh yeah, well our alphabet has more
characters, so there...

There were some interesting flaws that they pointed out...
Could someone do a follow up and say what has been fixed in PGP
version 2.1?

If pgp cyphertext/encrypted data is predictable, I wonder how that would affect
the "it'd take a Cray a year" figure?
(or were the pinkos being overconfident)

I actually like the Russians, but I'm just fulfilling my stereotype.
peace     :*

+-------Matt-Willis--------------------------------+
|       Matt Willis       ASTMWILL@STETSON.BITNET  |        elsewhere:
|       Matt Willis       Head of the Underground  | mwill@mindvox.phantom.com
|       Matt Willis          Robotech PBM List     |
+-------Matt-Willis--------------------------------+
"Absolutely alone in awareness of the mechanism." -Agrippa by WG




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Karl L. Barrus <barrus@tree.egr.uh.edu>
Date: Thu, 7 Jan 93 11:10:50 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: double anonymity via pax and penet
Message-ID: <9301071910.AA04605@tree.egr.uh.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Cypherpunks,

	I've been toying lately with "tying" the remailers at pax and
penet together.  Briefly, the anonymous service at anon.penet.fi
supports anonymous remailing (but you must register your id),
anonymous posting, and anonymous forwarding.  The remailer at
pax.tpa.com.au support anonymous remailing (runs pgp, must register
your key for encryption service) and anonymous posting.  For more
info, get the help files by mailing to help@anon.penet.fi and
anon.info@pax.tpa.com.au.
	Anyway, my idea is as follows: somehow get one of these
services to establish an id on the other one, and also establish a
path back to you.  Then, you should be able to receive mail by having
it sent to an anonymous id on one of the services, which will then
forward it to another anonymous id on the other service, which will
then forward to you.
	Of course, as cypherpunks, we have several of our own
cryptographically protected remailers, but I thought I'd explore using
these others ones also.
	If you don't have an id already established on either service,
you can get one by simple trying to use it (for example, posting a
message).  Since the remailer at anon.penet.fi allows anonymous
forwarding (using the % notation), I established a double system as
follows: (for convenience I shall reveal the anonymous id's I was
assigned by this test procedure; @penet shall mean @anon.penet.fi and
@pax shall mean @pax.tpa.com.au)

I mailed to anon.post.alt.test%pax.tpa.com.au@anon.penet.fi from
barrus@tree.egr.uh.edu.

This went to anon.penet.fi, where I was allocated an anonymous id for
barrus@tree.  The id I was given for barrus@tree was an5022@penet.
Then, penet forwarded to anon.post.alt.test@pax.tpa.com.au (because of
the % notation), which resulted in two things: a post to alt.test, and
the establishing of an id on pax for the anonymous id on penet -
anon.435@pax.  After a few minutes, I recieved acknowledgment of my
post to alt.test, sent from penet.  So pax sent the acknowledgement to
the anonymous id at penet, which then sent it to me - barrus@tree.  I
also watched for my post to alt.test to appear, which it did.
	So now, mail sent to anon.435@pax gets forwarded to me via
penet.
	Then, I tried the process in reverse.  I sent to the anonymous
pax allocated from my other account (elee9sf@menudo.uh.edu).  I sent
from the other account because I already have an anonymous id for that
one, and I wanted to keep new account allocation to a minimum, but as
it turns out I think I messed up.  Anyway, the mail I sent made it to
barrus@tree (via pax and penet), but I was allocated another anonymous
id from penet (an5030@penet), and the notice came to elee9sf!
	After thinking about it some more, I realized that what that
acknowledgement must be.  When I mailed to anon.435@pax from elee9sf,
I wasn't allocated an anonymous id because I have one.  So pax sent
the message to an5022@penet.  But penet hadn't seen a message from
anon.435@pax, so it allocated another id, and sent to acknowledgement
back to anon.435@pax.  But for some reason, the remailer at pax didn't
send this to an5022@penet - it jumped it and responded to my account
elee9sf@menudo.uh.edu.  So the pax service seems fairly intelligent.
Or there is a bug :-)
	Then, I tried to mail to anon.435@pax from barrus@tree.  I
thought I would be assigned an anonymous id at pax for barrus@tree,
but I wasn't.  Actually, for some reason, I was mailed the
acknowledgement of yet another anonymous id, an5047@penet!
	But, my original goal was to establish an anonymous id on pax
which would forward to an anonymous id on penet (and vice versa), and
I succeeded:

  mail sent to anon.435@pax goes to barrus@tree via penet
  mail sent to an5030@penet goes to elee9sf@menudo via pax

as an unplanned effect:
  mail sent to anon.437@pax goes to elee9sf@menudo via penet
  mail sent to an5047@penet goes to barrus@tree via pax

	These are the anonymous id's I beleive I've generated because
of this procedure: an5022@penet, an5030@penet, an5047@penet (I don't
understand this one), anon.435@pax, anon.437@pax (I don't understand
this one either).  I figured I would use four id's: one from penet for
barrus@tree, one from pax for barrus@tree, one from penet for pax, and
one from pax for penet.
	For some reason, when I mail to anon.437@pax or an5047@penet
from barrus@tree, the mail doesn't arrive in either of my accounts.
So I'm still trying to sort out this mess before I mail to the
administrators at both sites, explain what happened, and have these
various id's deleted.  Anybody with an id already established on pax
or penet is welcome to mail to me at anon.208@pax or an5030@penet to
help me figure out if it worked (I've run out of accounts to test this
from and I don't want to involve elee7h5@rosebud where I'm running a
remailer).
	I think the step I may have erred was mailing to anon.435@pax
from elee9sf, where I have an id.  Maybe by mailing from barrus@tree I
would have been assigned an id, and recieved acknowledgement of an id
from penet for the id at pax, and possibly an5047@penet wouldn't have
been generated.
	Some uses of this I can think of are of course mailing via
cypherpunk remailers to the first link in the pax/penet remailers
chain.  This would hide our remailers from others, since pax and penet
are well known anonymous services.  I haven't thought of a way to send
messages (other than posting to usenet) via pax/penet.  So I could
post a message, as described above, and collect responses via a double
anonymous reply.  
	Anyway, what do you think??  Any ideas or suggestions?

/-----------------------------------\
| Karl L. Barrus                    |
| barrus@tree.egr.uh.edu (NeXTMail) |
| elee9sf@menudo.uh.edu             |
\-----------------------------------/




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Karl L. Barrus <barrus@tree.egr.uh.edu>
Date: Thu, 7 Jan 93 13:53:49 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: chaining remailers...
Message-ID: <9301072153.AA05530@tree.egr.uh.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Geez, I can't beleive I forgot to consider that responding to me will
result in a steady stream of anonymous id allocations.

Guess I was caught sleeping on that one!

Back to the better cryptographically protected cypherpunk remailers
and Hal's "constructed" anonymous addresses...and I better ask the
administrators at pax and penet to wipe out some allocated id's :-)

/-----------------------------------\
| Karl L. Barrus                    |
| barrus@tree.egr.uh.edu (NeXTMail) |
| elee9sf@menudo.uh.edu             |
\-----------------------------------/




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Hal <74076.1041@CompuServe.COM>
Date: Thu, 7 Jan 93 13:04:27 PST
To: CYPHERPUNKS <CYPHERPUNKS@TOAD.COM>
Subject: Chaining remailers.
Message-ID: <930107205520_74076.1041_DHJ47-1@CompuServe.COM>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

It was interesting to see Karl Barrus's efforts to chain the Pax
and Penet remailers.  I think one of his problems is this:

If I reply to one of Karl's double-remailed aliases, I will get assigned
two anonymous aliases - one from each of pax and penet.  The first
machine I send to will assign me an anonymous alias, and forward my
mail on, with a "From:" indicating that same new alias.  The second
machine will then see mail coming in from that new alias, assign me
an alias for that, and send it back to me (via the first machine).

That's why Karl got an extra alias in some of his tests that he wasn't
expecting.  It also means that the fact that he is using a double
remailing alias will be revealed to anyone who chooses to send to him.

I think the lesson is that this process of automatic alias assignment
may not be the best way to handle things.  It sounds attractive and
simple, but look at all the problems Karl ran into.  And if you're using
a chain of remailers for an anonymous address, you really don't want
everyone who sends to you to find out exactly what chain you are using.

I still lean towards the idea of a "constructed" anonymous address,
where I decide ahead of time which remailers I'll use, and in what
order.  Then, I need some way to put that address into the return
field of my mail that I send.  If this were possible, then person A
could post a message, with his headers set so that replies will go
to this anonymous address.  And if person B wanted to send to A, he
could, using A's anonymous address, and B could arrange it so that
B's own anonymous address would go into the outgoing headers.

A and B could then communicate using two completely different paths,
both anonymously.  A could go from pax to penet to B, and B could go
from menudo to rebma to A.  Each user would establish his anonymous
address in the way he preferred.

I think this is probably a better system than all this automatic
assignment of anonymous aliases.  It seems simpler and it should still
be easy to use.  The automatic systems tend to get out of hand.

Hal Finney
74076.1041@compuserve.com

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.1

iQCVAgUBK0xuQagTA69YIUw3AQEGXAP/XxoWGmnMOm7E0d70uRGuwqHpG8KPzopk
uERMjltmE1Xug7auzmFYKEV1I24DZyd3ClaDyoZQWpI79dTLQfnEPOHqhgXD8Ul4
PgYo5Gyf2yKIv5kbsmetWnAB23oDeyuE6HR9X5vl/MNWq38exbRlt8I303FtXQCi
foIUiShHcaA=
=0k6V
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----


Distribution:
  CYPHERPUNKS >INTERNET:CYPHERPUNKS@TOAD.COM





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Johan Helsingius <julf@penet.FI>
Date: Thu, 7 Jan 93 15:20:26 PST
To: "Karl L. Barrus" <barrus@tree.egr.uh.edu>
Subject: Re: double anonymity via pax and penet
In-Reply-To: <9301071910.AA04605@tree.egr.uh.edu>
Message-ID: <9301072254.aa08873@penet.penet.FI>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



> 	I've been toying lately with "tying" the remailers at pax and
> penet together.  Briefly, the anonymous service at anon.penet.fi
> supports anonymous remailing (but you must register your id),
> anonymous posting, and anonymous forwarding.  The remailer at
> pax.tpa.com.au support anonymous remailing (runs pgp, must register
> your key for encryption service) and anonymous posting.  For more
> info, get the help files by mailing to help@anon.penet.fi and
> anon.info@pax.tpa.com.au.

Well, let's start by saying that fo%bar@blach addresses are pretty error
prone, as there are a lot of brain-damaged mailers out there. Much safer
to use the X-Anon-To: header for this kind of stuff. See the help file
from help@anon.penet.fi for more info.

Secondly, currently anon.penet.fi strips off PGP messages and signature
blocks. I am going to fix the .sig stripper Real Soon Now....

Thirdly, I notice a lot of mailers get "From:" and "Sender:" (or
envelope) addresses screwed up. Anon.penet.fi puts the anon id in the
"From:" field, but makes "Sender:" point to the anon admin, to catch
mail bounces that might reveal the true identity of an anon id. I don't
know how pax.tpa.com.au handles this....

> 	These are the anonymous id's I beleive I've generated because
> of this procedure: an5022@penet, an5030@penet, an5047@penet (I don't
> understand this one), anon.435@pax, anon.437@pax (I don't understand
> this one either).  I figured I would use four id's: one from penet for
> barrus@tree, one from pax for barrus@tree, one from penet for pax, and
> one from pax for penet.
> 	For some reason, when I mail to anon.437@pax or an5047@penet
> from barrus@tree, the mail doesn't arrive in either of my accounts.
> So I'm still trying to sort out this mess before I mail to the
> administrators at both sites, explain what happened, and have these
> various id's deleted.  Anybody with an id already established on pax
> or penet is welcome to mail to me at anon.208@pax or an5030@penet to
> help me figure out if it worked (I've run out of accounts to test this
> from and I don't want to involve elee7h5@rosebud where I'm running a
> remailer).
> 	I think the step I may have erred was mailing to anon.435@pax
> from elee9sf, where I have an id.  Maybe by mailing from barrus@tree I
> would have been assigned an id, and recieved acknowledgement of an id
> from penet for the id at pax, and possibly an5047@penet wouldn't have
> been generated.

I'll check on those id's tomorrow. It's 11pm out here, and I have a
specification to finish for a meeting tomorrow morning....

	Julf (an0@anon.penet.fi)





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: mjr@netcom.com (Matthew Rapaport)
Date: Fri, 8 Jan 93 19:57:22 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Alias cascades
Message-ID: <9301090357.AA07830@netcom2.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


****** Hal <74076.1041@CompuServe.COM> ******

>I think the lesson is that this process of automatic alias assignment
>may not be the best way to handle things... look at all the problems
>Karl ran into.

If I understand Karl right, he got this cascade of aliases because he
tried to talk to HIMSELF through different accounts/aliases at alternate
ends of the chain. Since no one would want to do that (other than to
test things) normally, this wouldn't be a problem.

>I still lean towards the idea of a "constructed" anonymous address,
>where I decide ahead of time which remailers I'll use, and in what
>order.

But I already *do* control the order of use for MY mail, that means
stuff I send out and stuff people send to me in DIRECT reply to my
stuff. There is nothing to stop someone from sending to my id on pax say
through a first remailer of their own choice, provided they originate
the mail (i.e. a REPLY is not equivalent to ORIGINAL mail in this case).

As for picking my own alias, this sounds appealing but is actually much
weaker then a randomly assigned one. Besides that, it could be an
administrative nightmare for the sysadmins on the aliasing systems.

matthew rapaport     Philosopher/Programmer At Large      KD6KVH
           mjr@netcom.com     70371.255@compuserve.com




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: nowhere@bsu-cs.bsu.edu (Chael Hall)
Date: Fri, 8 Jan 93 17:49:57 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: New Remailer
Message-ID: <9301090147.AA03071@bsu-cs.bsu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Fellow Cypherpunks:

     I am working on a program in C that will provide both anonymous
remailing capabilities and mail server operations.  In order to better
test the software I have installed it on my account through my .forward
and .maildelivery files so that all messages received with a header line
"X-Anon-To" or "Request-Remailing-To" will be remailed to the appropriate
address.  If you cannot add your own header lines with your mailer, set
the subject to contain "Request Remailing" and use the following format:

::
Request-Remailing-To: user@host
Subject: Anything you choose
::

     Any of the following fields can be placed within the "::" delimiters:

Request-Remailing-To:
X-Anon-To:
Subject:

     The remailer is case insensitive and you can place the "::" lines
anywhere within the message.  Signature stripping is NOT supported, however
a "kill line" will be implemented soon so that you can halt message
processing beyond a certain point.  Message body processors are supported
as an add-on feature.  PGP support would work as a message processor.  On
my end, I can define a "start processing" line and a "stop processing" line.
Only text between (and including) those lines will be passed to the message
processor.  Unfortunately, PGP is not installed on this system, so support
will have to wait.

     I will post full specifications later.  Plesae let me know of any
ambiguities.  Please also note that I am keeping detailed logs of the use
of this software for testing purposes, but I would rather delete all logs
than provide them to authorities.  The remailer is run on a multi-user
system for which I do not have a privileged account.

Chael Hall

Chael Hall                                   |     Campus Phone Number
nowhere@bsu-cs.bsu.edu                       |       (317) 285-3648
00CCHALL@bsuvax1.bitnet                      |
00CCHALL@LEO.BSUVC.BSU.EDU                   | "I hate it when that happens!"




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: nowhere@bsu-cs.bsu.edu (Chael Hall)
Date: Fri, 8 Jan 93 18:02:48 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: New Remailer (more)
Message-ID: <9301090200.AA03698@bsu-cs.bsu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



     I forgot to add:  If you are chaining remailers, you can use the
sequence "+::+" at the beginning of the line to pass the remaining characters
on that line through the remailer untouched.

For example:

Message sent to this remailer:

----------v
::
X-Anon-To: anon@anon.penet.fi
::
+::+::
X-Anon-To: nowhere@bsu-cs.bsu.edu
+::+::

beginning of text...

----------^

Message sent to anon.penet.fi:

----------v
::
X-Anon-To: nowhere@bsu-cs.bsu.edu
::

beginning of text...

----------^

Chael Hall

Chael Hall                                   |     Campus Phone Number
nowhere@bsu-cs.bsu.edu                       |       (317) 285-3648
00CCHALL@bsuvax1.bitnet                      |
00CCHALL@LEO.BSUVC.BSU.EDU                   | "I hate it when that happens!"




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: edgar@spectrx.Saigon.COM (Edgar W. Swank)
Date: Sat, 9 Jan 93 14:58:45 PST
To: Cypherpunks          <cypherpunks@toad.com>
Subject: Trailing blanks in signed plaintext
Message-ID: <sZT4wB6w165w@spectrx.saigon.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

Distribution:
   Cypherpunks          <cypherpunks@toad.com>
   Branko Lankester     <lankeste@fwi.uva.nl>

I noticed something about PGP signed plaintext the last time
used that feature to send a message to Cypherpunks.

Apparently PGP takes any line beginning with 5 dashes ("-----")
and adds "- " (dash blank) to it. I guess the purpose for this
is to avoid confusion if the plaintext message should contain
a PGP delimiter like

   -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----

But in my particular case, what I specified in my input plaintext was

   -----END OF MESSAGE BODY-----

(but with no indentation), but what came out was

   - -----END OF MESSAGE BODY-----

Given that PGP is going to make changes like this to signed plaintext,
I suggest there is no longer any reason to object if PGP also removes
trailing blanks from signed plaintext.

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.1

iQCVAgUBK02ta94nNf3ah8DHAQFX8wP/dyusrml+2XH7XQtFcsQveGW3Zz3ib6K9
xGGV2hnvhwIHbFs4HIKTIVT0BFR6Y4SuqFMeF0BS16FIu47GmW8Q55iIhweDP7x5
+CUMXSynwQsz4XOMU/CpqNAwJifNoM9BwNu+RqfhIxwi6KxO1i3FwJjxPzE+uHkh
Y7Mjl7Ytkd0=
=0l/6
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

--
edgar@spectrx.saigon.com (Edgar W. Swank)
SPECTROX SYSTEMS +1.408.252.1005  Silicon Valley, Ca





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: edgar@spectrx.Saigon.COM (Edgar W. Swank)
Date: Sat, 9 Jan 93 15:00:34 PST
To: Cypherpunks          <cypherpunks@toad.com>
Subject: Delimiting text body in ARA
Message-ID: <P1T4wB8w165w@spectrx.saigon.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


On Jan 5, Hal commented on my suggestions for ARA using a
Miron Cuperman remailer.

    > I'd also like to suggest that the message- body to
    > be encrypted require heading and trailing
    > delimiters such as:
    >
    > -----BEGIN MESSAGE BODY-----
    > -----END MESSAGE BODY-----
    >
    > Note delimiters would not be part of message body
    > and would not be encrypted.

    These anonymous addresses do need a distinction between the
    "message address" (or "envelope") and the message body.  The
    anonymous address gets decrypted at each step, and the message
    body gets encrypted at each step using the scheme above.

    But Eric Hughes pointed out that we already have such a
    distinction in the RFC822 message headers vs body.  We should use
    that existing structure rather than try to create our own.  That
    means that anonymous addresses should be designed to fit into mail
    headers.  Unfortunately many mail agents make this difficult or
    inconvenient right now, but perhaps that is an area where we could
    make some improvements.

    In this model, we would not need message body delimiters, since
    mail already has its message body delimited distinct from its
    headers.

I think "many mail agents" at least the one at this location, make
it downright impossible to put an ARA into the header.  Especially
a chained ARA, which is part address and part body (to all except the
last remailer in the chain).

I think we are better off writing tools which will work now on the
worst common denominator of mailers, rather than insisting that the
world change so our solutions can be more elegant.

Note that the user of an ARA is likely to be less computer & e-mail
literate than the person he is responding to.  It's easy to specify,
to reply, mail to the [first remailer address].  Put this encrypted
ARA block first in your message body, followed by your reply message
enclosed in

-----BEGIN MESSAGE BODY-----
-----END MESSAGE BODY-----

Only the text between these two delimiter lines will be received
by the original sender, so your anonymity will be protected too.

Note that this elegantly takes care of discarding the automatic sig
of the responder, if any.

Some here, like Richard Childers, don't want to protect users who
might not understand that they need to suppress their automatic sig
to maintain their anonymity with a remailer.  People who run
remailers have to be pretty gutsy anyway.  They may get sued by
disgruntled recipients of abusive or threatening anon msgs. It
seems to me they don't also need to risk being sued by disgruntled
message senders (or responders) who are embarassed (or worse) by
inadvertantly revealing their identity in what they intended as an
anonymous message.

Note that your average civil jury is not going to be terribly
computer-literate.  Even a suit which loses is going to cost a
lot to defend against.

As to Hal's other suggestion:

    If we do process the message body with encryption at each stage, I
    do have an idea which could be useful.  If the body which is being
    encrypted is already in the format of an ASCII-encoded message
    using the standard RFC822 encryption used in PGP, RIPEM and PEM,
    then rather than just encrypting it it could be de-ASCII'd, then
    encrypted, then re-ASCII'd.  This would keep it from increasing in
    size by a factor of 4/3 at each encryption step.

Sound's like a good idea, but it's not going to save anywhere near
1/3 (4/3 - 1), at least with PGP, since (recall) PGP (at least by
default) compresses before it encrypts.

--
edgar@spectrx.saigon.com (Edgar W. Swank)
SPECTROX SYSTEMS +1.408.252.1005  Silicon Valley, Ca





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Hal <74076.1041@CompuServe.COM>
Date: Fri, 8 Jan 93 23:43:08 PST
To: CYPHERPUNKS <CYPHERPUNKS@TOAD.COM>
Subject: New remailer in C.
Message-ID: <930109073836_74076.1041_DHJ43-1@CompuServe.COM>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

From: nowhere@bsu-cs.bsu.edu (Chael Hall)

> Fellow Cypherpunks:
> 
>      I am working on a program in C that will provide both anonymous
> remailing capabilities and mail server operations.

It's good to see more people working on remailers.  The cypherpunks
remailers have been written in Perl, which facilitates experimenting
and testing of new interfaces.  The idea might be to migrate them
to C eventually for efficiency, but during this experimental phase
we may want to try out new ideas, and it's easier to modify a Perl
script than a C program.

> If you cannot add your own header lines with your mailer, set
> the subject to contain "Request Remailing" and use the following format:
> 
> ::
> Request-Remailing-To: user@host
> Subject: Anything you choose
> ::
> 
>      Any of the following fields can be placed within the "::" delimiters:
> 
> Request-Remailing-To:
> X-Anon-To:
> Subject:
> 
>      The remailer is case insensitive and you can place the "::" lines
> anywhere within the message.

This is somewhat similar to the cypherpunks remailers; however, they
accept the :: only at the beginning of the message, allow any fields to
be put there that the user desires (not just those three), and terminate
the block by a blank line.  Does your alternate system have some
advantages?

>      I forgot to add:  If you are chaining remailers, you can use the
> sequence "+::+" at the beginning of the line to pass the remaining characters
> on that line through the remailer untouched.

I do find the use of this string to produce rather complicated looking
commands.  The cypherpunks remailers get the same effect by just putting
in blocks starting with :: and separated by blank lines:

::
Anon-To: anon@anon.penet.fi

::
Anon-To: nowhere@bsu-cs.bsu.edu

This looks simpler to me.

Hal Finney
74076.1041@compuserve.com

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.1

iQCVAgUBK05WUagTA69YIUw3AQGpaAP+LxpocNUI1/Zw3DAwwAxeKBtdj0sSyx8p
05xnI3FmklosxapVpcF/aVkDKL/FjzwBZ9ML5wt2m7UvqS1iX9UILQByPNAxTOKF
TIuFKkjt2wT5ykvHRGLl6ZAB6w6PzkNiclHNJw4FFEaFzoxmnz3bQXatKBFFgGFd
IjIMFF0d0Ig=
=ztz0
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----


Distribution:
  CYPHERPUNKS >INTERNET:CYPHERPUNKS@TOAD.COM





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Hal <74076.1041@CompuServe.COM>
Date: Fri, 8 Jan 93 23:47:53 PST
To: CYPHERPUNKS <CYPHERPUNKS@TOAD.COM>
Subject: Chaining addresses...
Message-ID: <930109073904_74076.1041_DHJ43-2@CompuServe.COM>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

From: mjr@netcom.com (Matthew Rapaport)

> >I think the lesson is that this process of automatic alias assignment
> >may not be the best way to handle things... look at all the problems
> >Karl ran into.
> 
> If I understand Karl right, he got this cascade of aliases because he
> tried to talk to HIMSELF through different accounts/aliases at alternate
> ends of the chain. Since no one would want to do that (other than to
> test things) normally, this wouldn't be a problem.

My understanding was that everyone who tried to talk to him would get
two aliases assigned automatically.  Karl made the problem worse by
talking to himself from two different addresses, but you're still
talking about a lot of aliases.

> >I still lean towards the idea of a "constructed" anonymous address,
> >where I decide ahead of time which remailers I'll use, and in what
> >order.
> 
> But I already *do* control the order of use for MY mail, that means
> stuff I send out and stuff people send to me in DIRECT reply to my
> stuff. There is nothing to stop someone from sending to my id on pax say
> through a first remailer of their own choice, provided they originate
> the mail (i.e. a REPLY is not equivalent to ORIGINAL mail in this case).

OK, so you can set up an anonymous address which, say, goes through pax
and then penet and then to you.  If someone replies to that address,
they will be anonymous to you, by default; their anonymous address will
go through penet and then pax.

But if they didn't want that anonymous address, they could use one of
their own (say, rebma to soda to themselves) first, then go to your
address.  Now when you reply to them, I guess your message will go
through penet, then pax, then rebma, then soda, then to them.

My feeling was it would be better if they could put a Reply-To: into
the message that just meant to go to rebma then to soda to themselves, and
get that Reply-To: to go through the pax-to-penet chain to you.  Also,
they would not get anonymous ID's assigned by penet and pax, ideally.
Instead, you would reply to them using this Reply-To address and go through
just rebma and soda to get to them.  This will be simpler and faster
than having all messages go through the union of both communicant's
anonymous address chains.

> As for picking my own alias, this sounds appealing but is actually much
> weaker then a randomly assigned one. Besides that, it could be an
> administrative nightmare for the sysadmins on the aliasing systems.

I wasn't really talking about picking my own alias.  It is more a
matter of having a straightforward way to construct an anonymous
address that goes through the specific chain of systems that I choose.

Hal Finney
74076.1041@compuserve.com

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.1

iQCVAgUBK05Wa6gTA69YIUw3AQFy+QP/RAepMQETJWqM7szQ9ID0TAgrIvQc8ArH
MX6S14lzb492skAIathLYllfyhN2TTO/gN+lCC4lvnzs9UOLJ2rlNzFxT8geV1yx
MxKKzIZ39tMmyCXHx2cnH7ySHMoEVzp5TqXqQhEbmqn0k6c7hoL+sz6l43/g6rPL
g++F+kRs2nQ=
=0OfU
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----


Distribution:
  CYPHERPUNKS >INTERNET:CYPHERPUNKS@TOAD.COM





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: eab@msc.edu (Edward Bertsch)
Date: Sat, 9 Jan 93 05:49:38 PST
To: karn@qualcomm.com (Phil Karn)
Subject: Re: Russian analysis of PGP
In-Reply-To: <9301070552.AA22839@servo>
Message-ID: <9301091348.AA01342@wc.msc.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


->    The conclusions:
->    It is recommended to use encryption with 1024 bit key length.
->    The using of electronic  signature  is  not  recommended  and
->    requires the additional study.
->    The block encryption algorithm has temporary stability.
->    The hashing function  should  be  reduce  in conformity with ISO
->    recommendations.
->    The using of PGP program in actual version is undesired.
->                       The MSU mathematical cryptography
->                       problems Laboratory Manager
->                       Academician
->                          Dr. Sidelnikov V.M.

these are serious claims.  What do the authors of the software have
to say about them?  Others?

--

Edward A. Bertsch (eab@msc.edu)   Minnesota Supercomputer Center, Inc.
Operations/User Services          1200 Washington Avenue South
(612) 626-1888 work               Minneapolis, Minnesota  55415
(612) 645-0168 voice mail




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: mjr@netcom.com (Matthew Rapaport)
Date: Sat, 9 Jan 93 09:20:46 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Cascading Aliases
Message-ID: <9301091720.AA17521@netcom2.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


****** Hal <74076.1041@CompuServe.COM> *****
>My understanding was that everyone who tried to talk to him would get
>two aliases assigned automatically.

Yes I suppose, but I can ignore them. Let's see if I got this right. In
the following scenario, I will represent alias servers and their aliases
in the following way: A-123 where 'A' is the server, and '123' is the
alias.

I receive a message from Z-999. I have no idea how many servers this has
gone through. I *originate* a message back to this person, but I sent it
first through *my* preferred alias chain, so the message goes from me
through A-123 -> B-456 -> Z-999 and then somewhere else (perhaps) before
reaching its final destination.

Now the Z server has never seen a message from B-456, so it
automatically generates a NEW alias (Z-111) for that ID. Now machine Z
bounces that new alias back along the chain B-456 -> A-123 and thence to
me, informing me that an alias has been established on machine Z for my
ID on machine B. It also uses that alias to send the message along to
the next machine on the chain (if there is one) which also creates a new
alias (never having seen a message from Z-111), and bounces it back,
etc. I see that this is where I get to detect the alias path my
recipient is using, but there is an easy solution (see below).

So one or more new aliases will be generated (you are correct) in
response to my original mail, BUT, I can ignore those aliases (once I
receive them in the reflected mail) and never need think about them
again because the link between B-456 and Z-111 is now established.
Further translation will take place automatically with no further bounce
backs in any future correspondence between the two parties *if* they
both use their own chosen mail paths consistently.

If in my next mail, however, I REPLY to Z-999 (i.e. I don't generate
original mail), then another alias will be generated on the Z machine
for mjr@netcom.com and I will also be informed of that, etc. Once again,
however, I don't have to care about that. From the recipients viewpoint,
however, mail has now been received from two different aliases that
represent the same person (one for my original mail, and one for my
REPLIES)

There are two possible solutions while still generating automatic
aliases:

1) Don't alias someone who hasn't specifically requested it (e.g. with a
ping or something). This is probably not a good idea. I like the fact
that these Aservers take a "most conservative approach" automatically
assuming that someone wants to be aliased if they are
originating/replying to an aliased ID.

2) Stop the alias-information-bounce-back unless someone specifically
requests it (e.g. with a ping). This might do the trick. I don't have to
KNOW what my alias number is even on the machine that does the first
outbound and last inbound conversion. All the conversions along the
chain are automatic, so why should I care what my alias numbers are?

matthew rapaport     Philosopher/Programmer At Large      KD6KVH
           mjr@netcom.com     70371.255@compuserve.com




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: tytso@ATHENA.MIT.EDU (Theodore Ts'o)
Date: Sat, 9 Jan 93 08:52:30 PST
To: eab@msc.edu
Subject: Re: Russian analysis of PGP
In-Reply-To: <9301091348.AA01342@wc.msc.edu>
Message-ID: <9301091651.AA21070@tsx-11.MIT.EDU>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


   From: eab@msc.edu (Edward Bertsch)
   Date: Sat, 9 Jan 93 7:48:46 CST

   these are serious claims.  What do the authors of the software have
   to say about them?  Others?

"Dr. Sidelnikov" has presented some very serious claims, indeed, but has not
produced one shred of evidence to back them up.  Some of his claims, to
wit his assertion that PGP's hashing function is breakable, he could
have very simply demonstrated, without using a lot of clumsy english.
(All he would have needed to do is to produce, two strings, X and Y,
where X != Y and MD5(X) == MD5(Y) --- or better yet, given message
digest Z which someone else picks, such as the test values in RFC-1321,
produce a string X such that MD5(Z) == X.

Some of his other claims, such as his complaint that PGP doesn't contain
any self-checking code to protect against "killer viruses", on the
surface seem to indicate a very shallow analysis of the problem.

Something else to consider is that the source of his posting is somewhat
suspect.  The person who posted it got it from a friend, who got it from
some other net where supposedly Dr. Sidelnikov posted it.  At the
moment, its source sounds like an awful lot of urban legend stories
which many of us have heard before.  An equivalent statement to his
posting might be: 

	"I heard from a friend who heard from an Eminent MIT Professor:
	Don't use XXX, since it uses DES which could be broken."   

While I might have a lot of respect for MIT and its professors, I would
want to see a demonstration of this fact before I would take that kind
of report very seriously.  The same standards should be held to Dr.
Sidelnikov.

							- Ted

P.S.  Note that I am not completely ruling out Dr. Sidelnikov's claims;
but we should keep in mind that up to this point, we have not one shred
of evidence that he is (a) who he claims to be, or (b) his statements
are true.  I would expect that most academics, when publishing something
of this magnitude, would include some sort of evidence to back their
claims up.

P.P.S.  Also note that if his claim about MD5 is true, then we are in a
lot more trouble than just PGP being insecure.  There are an awful lot
of other protocols that use MD5, including Privacy Enhanced Email (PEM).




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: mjr@netcom.com (Matthew Rapaport)
Date: Sat, 9 Jan 93 12:49:59 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Cascading Aliases
Message-ID: <9301092049.AA03501@netcom2.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


The discussion just above between Karl, Hal, Johan, and myself, has
made me realize that the standard "bounce back" behavior of all the
alias servers I've used so far actually defeates the purpose of remailer
chains no matter how one embeds the forwarding information.

When any person *first* replies to or originates mail across a remailer
chain, a new alias is generated at each hop (however many). So far, that
is good, a "most conservative assumption" approach, and it provides
easily for reply channel maintenance. The problem is that each machine
also reflects its new alias back along the chain to the message
originator thereby revealing the entire chain to the message originator,
something that might not be desirable to the party on the other side.

The solution is very simple, just stop bouncing the new alias
information back along the chain. This can not HURT anyone using the
alias/remailer system because you never need to know what your aliases
are as the conversion and forwarding process is automatic. If someone
needs, for some reason to KNOW his alias for a given system (or all of
them) on *his/her* chain, he/she can easily arrange to ping the server
at the appropriate level.

Besides not hurting any current operations, Stopping the *automatic*
reply to sender about a new alias helps to secure everything a great
deal more because it hides the "other guy's" chain, something that both
parties might reasonably expect.

matthew rapaport     Philosopher/Programmer At Large      KD6KVH
           mjr@netcom.com     70371.255@compuserve.com




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: norm@netcom.com (Norman Hardy)
Date: Sat, 9 Jan 93 17:52:25 PST
To: toad.com!cypherpunks@soda.berkeley.edu
Subject: Politics of Rmailers
Message-ID: <9301100152.AA02289@netcom2.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


 
Theodore Ts'o writes:
 
  If your mail system is broken enough that it inserts signatures without
  your permission, and you have no way to controlling it, it's broken.
  End of statement.  Fix it or ditch it.  
 
I can imagine a system administrator choosing to require that
all mail originating from his machine include a signature that 
correctly identifies the local name of the sender.
 
I make this special point to illustrate a broader problem with
remailers: They require operators of remailers to be sympathetic
with the ends of the users of remailers. This obviously does not
include the entire population for at least the recipient is not
sympathetic. I suspect that technical solutions sought in recent
mail will founder in presence of the politics of the operators
of the remailers. I understand that routing your message thru
at least one "friendly" remailer may be enough but if your reasons
for using remailers are not sufficiently popular, then society,
in some form, will pressure the friendly remailers to betray
the sender without advance warning.
 
If society polarizes into camps then there may be remailers in
each camp. A remailer in one camp is unlikely to service messages
from the other. Barriers then arise. I think that the technical
issues are only the tip of the iceberg.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Hal <74076.1041@CompuServe.COM>
Date: Sat, 9 Jan 93 15:33:30 PST
To: Cypherpunks <cypherpunks@toad.com>
Subject: Cascading aliases
Message-ID: <930109232813_74076.1041_DHJ76-1@CompuServe.COM>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I think Matthew Rapaport's point is good that much of the trouble with the
automatic assignment of aliases comes from the automatic mailing to the user
of a new alias.
 
Most of the remailing servers have a special address or command you can send
meaning "assign me a new alias, and tell me what it is".  Probably, as
Matthew says, they should only mail back the newly assigned alias when one
of these special commands is used.
 
I'm still not convinced that automatic alias assignment should always
be done when mail goes through a server from a new address.  It seems like
this might generate so many aliases that it would be too great a load on the
servers, especially if remailers become more widely used.  But it's hard to
say how bad a problem this is.
 
I feel that the main purpose of an anonymous address is to protect the
anonymity of the person being addressed, not people who send to him.  Just
because a person chooses to be anonymous is no reason to expect that
everyone who wants to talk to him also wants to be anonymous.  I think it
would be better to only provide anonymity when asked.  Systems that do too
much for people sometimes get in the way.
 
Hal Finney
74076.1041@compuserve.com
 



Distribution:
  Cypherpunks >INTERNET:cypherpunks@toad.com





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Hal <74076.1041@CompuServe.COM>
Date: Sat, 9 Jan 93 17:12:59 PST
To: Cypherpunks <cypherpunks@toad.com>
Subject: Trailing blanks in PGP
Message-ID: <930110010447_74076.1041_DHJ70-1@CompuServe.COM>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Edgar points out that PGP prepends a "- " string to every line that starts
with "-", and suggests that it would not be much further to go to strip
trailing blanks.
 
While I sympathize with the problems Edgar and others have with trailing
blanks messing up signature checking, it turns out that the "- " quoting is
done at a different stage of the processing than signature checking.
 
When a signed message is created, it is first "canonicalized", which
presently means only that each line is made to end with a carriage return
line feed.  The signature is then calculated on this form.  For the
cleartext signature, the message is then wrapped in the "-----BEGIN PGP
MESSAGE-----" lines, and the quoting of lines starting with "-" is done.  As
Edgar surmises, this quoting is so that the end of the message can be
accurately located, even if the message contains lines like "-----END PGP
MESSAGE-----".
 
On the receiving end, the message is first stripped of the -----BEGIN and
-----END lines, and the "-" quoting is undone.  The resulting message is
then canonicalized (so that lines end with CRLF's) and the signature is
calculated and checked against that sent with the message.
 
Space stripping could be done fairly easily in the "unwrapping" process, along
with the "-" de-quoting, as Edgar suggests.  But it would still fail if the
user signed a message which ended a line with a blank.  In fact, if he ever
did sign such a message, and the de-quoting routine were enhanced to strip
trailing blanks, the message would always fail the signature check, because
that necessary trailing blank will be gone.
 
What really needs to be done is to change the definition of a "canonical
text" message.  Presently it only specifies CRLF line terminators.  It would
have to be enhanced to specify also that no spaces precede any CRLF.  If
this were done, then the canonicalizing process done at both ends would
strip the trailing blanks before calculating the signature, and therefore
trailing blanks would not affect the signature check.
 
Presently, PGP "knows" that on a PC, canonical text form is the same as
regular text form.  That is because CRLF is the normal line terminator on a
PC.  So, canonicalizing is skipped on the PC, which speeds up signing and
verification on this class of machines, which include some of the slowest on
which PGP is run.  Adding blank-stripping to the definition of canonical
text means that all messages will have to be canonicalized on PC's, thus
adding an extra processing pass which is avoided now.  So there is some cost
in doing this.
 
There are also some compatibility problems, in that old signed messages
which had trailing blanks would no longer signature-verify if we changed the
definition of canonical text in this way.  However, there probably aren't
that many such messages, so this may be a tolerable cost.
 
I do think we should consider making this change, as many people have
complained about it.
 
Hal Finney
74076.1041@compuserve.com



Distribution:
  Cypherpunks >INTERNET:cypherpunks@toad.com





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Johan Helsingius <julf@penet.FI>
Date: Sat, 9 Jan 93 10:56:27 PST
To: Hal <74076.1041@compuserve.com>
Subject: Re: New remailer in C.
In-Reply-To: <930109073836_74076.1041_DHJ43-1@CompuServe.COM>
Message-ID: <9301092030.aa10557@penet.penet.FI>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



> >      I am working on a program in C that will provide both anonymous
> > remailing capabilities and mail server operations.
> 
> It's good to see more people working on remailers.  The cypherpunks
> remailers have been written in Perl, which facilitates experimenting
> and testing of new interfaces.  The idea might be to migrate them
> to C eventually for efficiency, but during this experimental phase
> we may want to try out new ideas, and it's easier to modify a Perl
> script than a C program.

I do appreciate the cypherpunks stuff, but perl is still not a very
widely used standard tool, and not everyone of us want to learn the
ins and outs of yet another language...  So I do applaud the C
version...

And please, I am *not* trying to start any religious wars...

	Julf (an0@anon.penet.fi)





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: mjr@netcom.com (Matthew Rapaport)
Date: Sat, 9 Jan 93 21:21:39 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Politics of Rmailers
Message-ID: <9301100521.AA28337@netcom2.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


***** norm@netcom.com (Norman Hardy) *****

>I can imagine a system administrator choosing to require that
>all mail originating from his machine include a signature that
>correctly identifies the local name of the sender.

I can too, but I suspect they wouldn't last long, particularly if they were
commercial systems and their paying users felt that the anonymity option was
something to be desired.

I worry about institutional constraints much more, particularly at the
national level "All machines on the Internet in this country will insure
that mail originators are identified...", etc. Even this can be overcome
technically though (smarter signature strippers).

>This obviously does not include the entire population for at least the
>recipient is not sympathetic.

This isn't necessarily so. I can appreciate some other person's desire
to remain anonymous in certain kinds of transactions. Also, people in other
parts of the world seem much more sensitive to issues of privacy then we
here in the US tend to be.

>If society polarizes into camps then there may be remailers in
>each camp. A remailer in one camp is unlikely to service messages
>from the other.

Well maybe, but this goes against the philosophical, political,
and technical grain of the International Internet as it now exists. I
note that the world already *is* polarized into camps to a greater or
lesser extent.

If there is eventual political and social fallout from the use of alias
remailers, I think it would be more of an us (the Internet community who use
remailers) vs. them (everyone else) kind of thing. I have detected murmurs
of dislike for people who use remailers just on general principles (i.e. you
should take responsibility for what you say).

matthew rapaport     Philosopher/Programmer At Large      KD6KVH
           mjr@netcom.com     70371.255@compuserve.com




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: tribble@xanadu.com (E. Dean Tribble)
Date: Sat, 9 Jan 93 23:56:14 PST
To: uunet!netcom.com!norm@uunet.UU.NET
Subject: Politics of Rmailers
In-Reply-To: <9301100152.AA02289@netcom2.netcom.com>
Message-ID: <9301100731.AA10229@xanadu.xanadu.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


	 Date: Sat, 9 Jan 93 17:52:01 -0800
	 From: uunet!netcom.com!norm (Norman Hardy)

	 I can imagine a system administrator choosing to require that
	 all mail originating from his machine include a signature that 
	 correctly identifies the local name of the sender.

I can imagine it, but none exist.  This is mostly because the From:
field is supplied by the mailer and satisfies that requirement,
whereas requiring things in teh body of the mail message goes against
the grain of how the systems are used.

	 remailers: They require operators of remailers to be sympathetic
	 with the ends of the users of remailers. This obviously does not

Are there other reasons to use a remailer besides anonymity?  I can't
think of any, so that solves the sympathy problem.  If a remailer
operator conspires to reveal who you are that's a different issue, and
is solved (or reduced a lot) by using a chain of remailers.  Then
*all* of the remailers have to be compromised to reveal that
connection from source to destination.

dean




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: tribble@xanadu.com (E. Dean Tribble)
Date: Sat, 9 Jan 93 23:56:11 PST
To: uunet!netcom.com!norm@uunet.UU.NET
Subject: Politics of Rmailers
In-Reply-To: <9301100152.AA02289@netcom2.netcom.com>
Message-ID: <9301100732.AA10236@xanadu.xanadu.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


	 Date: Sat, 9 Jan 93 17:52:01 -0800
	 From: uunet!netcom.com!norm (Norman Hardy)

	 I can imagine a system administrator choosing to require that
	 all mail originating from his machine include a signature that 
	 correctly identifies the local name of the sender.

I can imagine it, but none exist.  This is mostly because the From:
field is supplied by the mailer and satisfies that requirement,
whereas requiring things in teh body of the mail message goes against
the grain of how the systems are used.

	 remailers: They require operators of remailers to be sympathetic
	 with the ends of the users of remailers. This obviously does not

Are there other reasons to use a remailer besides anonymity?  I can't
think of any, so that solves the sympathy problem.  If a remailer
operator conspires to reveal who you are that's a different issue, and
is solved (or reduced a lot) by using a chain of remailers.  Then
*all* of the remailers have to be compromised to reveal that
connection from source to destination.

dean




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: mjr@netcom.com (Matthew Rapaport)
Date: Sun, 10 Jan 93 08:02:07 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Cascading-Automatic aliases
Message-ID: <9301101601.AA03100@netcom2.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Hal Finney:
> I think it would be better to only provide anonymity when asked.

Johan Helsingius:
> It all depends on the intended target audience.

I have to agree with Johan here, and with the way all (?) the Aserver
creators/administrators have chosen to go. Consider the following scenarios,
assuming that Person-X does not know anything about the particulars of the
Aserver(s) he/she is routed through when making a direct *reply* to an
anonymous message.

A) Person-X doesn't care if he/she is aliased when he/she replies, but
he/she is aliased anyway.

consequence: Not much, the message still gets through (as would a re-reply,
so if the Person-X *wants* to make his/her identity known later he/she can
always state it in a message body).

B) Person-X *wants* to be aliased in his/her reply, but *isn't* because the
Aserver doesn't do it automatically, and person-X isn't aware that such a
"switch" needs to be thrown.

consequence: Potentially disasterous to person-X!

I submit that automatic aliasing, by default, is consistent with the very
purpose of Aservers, more exactly their intended, legitimate, uses!

This doesn't mean that Aliasing software shouldn't contain some provision
for turning ON a switch that passes you through un-aliased, but this switch
should be for users who KNOW the server and how to modify its default
behavior. I wouldn't object to such a switch, but personally I don't see
much use for it either. Once I knew I wanted to reveal myself to someone, I
could just tell him/her in a message body. If they want to reveal themselves
to me, they can do likewise, and then we can address each other's machines
directly, bypassing the Aserver(s).

Now if these same creators/administrators would only *turn off* the
automatic (default) message saying: "An alias [ALIAS####] has been created
for you on Aserver@somewhere.in.the.world" the privacy of what seems to be a
growing, potential, aliasing network (Anetwork) would be significantly
enhanced. Reversing the default here would be consistent with the "most
conservative assumption" approach otherwise already taken with respect to
auto-alias.
matthew rapaport     Philosopher/Programmer At Large      KD6KVH
           mjr@netcom.com     70371.255@compuserve.com




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Johan Helsingius <julf@penet.FI>
Date: Sun, 10 Jan 93 00:45:29 PST
To: Hal <74076.1041@compuserve.com>
Subject: Re: Cascading aliases
In-Reply-To: <930109232813_74076.1041_DHJ76-1@CompuServe.COM>
Message-ID: <9301101022.aa17715@penet.penet.FI>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Hal Finney writes:

> I feel that the main purpose of an anonymous address is to protect the
> anonymity of the person being addressed, not people who send to him.  Just
> because a person chooses to be anonymous is no reason to expect that
> everyone who wants to talk to him also wants to be anonymous.  I think it
> would be better to only provide anonymity when asked.  Systems that do too
> much for people sometimes get in the way.

Well, yeeeeesss... but....

It all depends on the intended target audience. If our users are pretty
sophisticated netfreaks, I agree that the philosophy of the system ought
to be "only do what the user asks for". But if the users are
non-computer-literate people, seeking a source of support and
understanding in this vast mess of e-mail and netnews, I feel they need
and deserve all the hand-holding and safety switches the software can
provide.

So it seems there is room and need for *different* remailers.

	Julf





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Crys Rides <crys@eith.biostr.washington.edu>
Date: Sun, 10 Jan 93 08:22:48 PST
To: tribble@xanadu.COM (E. Dean Tribble)
Subject: Politics of Rmailers
In-Reply-To: <9301100152.AA02289@netcom2.netcom.com>
Message-ID: <9301101621.AA12728@ucunix.san.uc.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>>>>> On Sat, 9 Jan 93 23:32:18 PST, tribble@xanadu.com (E. Dean Tribble) said:

E.> 	 Date: Sat, 9 Jan 93 17:52:01 -0800
E.> 	 From: uunet!netcom.com!norm (Norman Hardy)

E.> 	 I can imagine a system administrator choosing to require that
E.> 	 all mail originating from his machine include a signature that 
E.> 	 correctly identifies the local name of the sender.

E.> I can imagine it, but none exist.  This is mostly because the From:
                          ^^^^^^^^^^^
E.> field is supplied by the mailer and satisfies that requirement,
E.> whereas requiring things in teh body of the mail message goes against
E.> the grain of how the systems are used.
*Bzzzzt* Wrong answer, thank you for playing.  The public access bbs
system running out of Chapel Hill, automatically appends the same signature
to all outgoing messages, and other sites are considering the same measures.

CrysRides




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: nowhere@bsu-cs.bsu.edu (Chael Hall)
Date: Sun, 10 Jan 93 17:33:05 PST
To: crys@eith.biostr.washington.edu (Crys Rides)
Subject: Re: Politics of Rmailers
In-Reply-To: <9301101621.AA12728@ucunix.san.uc.edu>
Message-ID: <9301110129.AA09743@bsu-cs.bsu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>E.> I can imagine it, but none exist.  This is mostly because the From:
>                          ^^^^^^^^^^^
>E.> field is supplied by the mailer and satisfies that requirement,
>E.> whereas requiring things in teh body of the mail message goes against
>E.> the grain of how the systems are used.
>*Bzzzzt* Wrong answer, thank you for playing.  The public access bbs
>system running out of Chapel Hill, automatically appends the same signature
>to all outgoing messages, and other sites are considering the same measures.

     I think what he's saying is that a signature that identifies which
*user* on the system as well as the system name does not exist.  I'm sure
there are a couple, but I agree with your point that most BBS's on any mail
network append an identifying "tagline" or signature.  As a matter of fact,
in many nets it is a requirement that your system append a tagline to all
messages.  Incidentally, it is preceded often by "--" on a line by itself.

Chael Hall

--
Chael Hall
nowhere@bsu-cs.bsu.edu, 00CCHALL@LEO.BSUVC.BSU.EDU, CHALL@CLSV.Charon.BSU.Edu
(317) 285-3648 after 3 pm EST




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Crys Rides <crys@eith.biostr.washington.edu>
Date: Sun, 10 Jan 93 17:44:13 PST
To: nowhere@bsu-cs.bsu.EDU (Chael Hall)
Subject: Re: Politics of Rmailers
In-Reply-To: <9301101621.AA12728@ucunix.san.uc.edu>
Message-ID: <9301110143.AA15332@ucunix.san.uc.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>>>>> On Sun, 10 Jan 93 20:29:47 EST, nowhere@bsu-cs.bsu.edu (Chael Hall) said:

>E.> I can imagine it, but none exist.  This is mostly because the From:
>                          ^^^^^^^^^^^
>E.> field is supplied by the mailer and satisfies that requirement,
>E.> whereas requiring things in teh body of the mail message goes against
>E.> the grain of how the systems are used.
>*Bzzzzt* Wrong answer, thank you for playing.  The public access bbs
>system running out of Chapel Hill, automatically appends the same signature
>to all outgoing messages, and other sites are considering the same measures.

Chael>      I think what he's saying is that a signature that identifies which
Chael> *user* on the system as well as the system name does not exist.  I'm
Chael> sure there are a couple, but I agree with your point that most BBS's on
Chael> any mail network append an identifying "tagline" or signature.  As a
Chael> matter of fact, in many nets it is a requirement that your system append
Chael> a tagline to all messages.  Incidentally, it is preceded often by "--"
Chael> on a line by itself.

Evidently I mis-interpreted his exact meaning in his statement, but if I
remember correctly, wasn't one of the original mail messages along this line
stating that any mail system which included a signature or identification
automatically was broken?  The point being is this is a common example
of how this is used, and that if an anonymous poster comes from such a site,
his sig would close the search area greatly if not removed.  So this
appears to me to be a good point in favor of signature stripping.

Chael> Chael Hall

Chael> --
Chael> Chael Hall
Chael> nowhere@bsu-cs.bsu.edu, 00CCHALL@LEO.BSUVC.BSU.EDU, CHALL@CLSV.Charon.BSU.Edu
Chael> (317) 285-3648 after 3 pm EST
CrysRides




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: tribble@xanadu.com (E. Dean Tribble)
Date: Sun, 10 Jan 93 22:30:18 PST
To: Cypherpunks@toad.COM
Subject: Politics of Rmailers
In-Reply-To: <9301110143.AA15332@ucunix.san.uc.edu>
Message-ID: <9301110548.AA14295@xanadu.xanadu.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


	 >E.> I can imagine it, but none exist.  This is mostly because the From:
	 >                          ^^^^^^^^^^^
	 >*Bzzzzt* Wrong answer, thank you for playing.  The public access bbs

Yes.  Absolutes are almost always wrong.  I've never encountered such
a system, however.

	 Chael>      I think what he's saying is that a signature that identifies which
	 Chael> *user* on the system as well as the system name does not exist.  I'm

There are lots of mailers that add the X-Organization: field, or some such.

	 Evidently I mis-interpreted his exact meaning in his statement, but if I

Now now.  No need to be too sarcastic.  :-)

dean




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: tribble@xanadu.com (E. Dean Tribble)
Date: Sun, 10 Jan 93 22:30:05 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: both stripping and not
Message-ID: <9301110551.AA14300@xanadu.xanadu.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


With even current remailer architectures, it's trivial to simply have
different services for normal remailing (which leaves body intact) and
stripping services that grundge the message arbitrarily.

When we really want anonymity, for instance, we will need message
rewriting services that break the correlation between authors and
writing style.  A friend of mine looked into that material and claims
that such analysis can do a depressingly good job at figuring out what
messages were written byt he same author, even if the author tries to
stilt his style.

dean




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: nowhere@bsu-cs.bsu.edu (Chael Hall)
Date: Sun, 10 Jan 93 20:22:10 PST
To: crys@eith.biostr.washington.edu (Crys Rides)
Subject: Re: Politics of Remailers
In-Reply-To: <9301110143.AA15332@ucunix.san.uc.edu>
Message-ID: <9301110419.AA14032@bsu-cs.bsu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>Evidently I mis-interpreted his exact meaning in his statement, but if I
>remember correctly, wasn't one of the original mail messages along this line
>stating that any mail system which included a signature or identification
>automatically was broken?  The point being is this is a common example
>of how this is used, and that if an anonymous poster comes from such a site,
>his sig would close the search area greatly if not removed.  So this
>appears to me to be a good point in favor of signature stripping.
>
>CrysRides

     True, it will make tracing the mail extremely simple if nothing is
done to strip the signature out.  Where I disagree is where Hal appears to
disagree--it is too simple to accidentally cut off the rest of your message
by putting a line starting with "--" in your message.  I think a "kill line"
would be best.  Anything after that line is ignored.

Chael

--
Chael Hall
nowhere@bsu-cs.bsu.edu, 00CCHALL@LEO.BSUVC.BSU.EDU, CHALL@CLSV.Charon.BSU.Edu
(317) 285-3648 after 3 pm EST




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Karl L. Barrus <barrus@tree.egr.uh.edu>
Date: Sun, 10 Jan 93 21:42:51 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: No Subject
Message-ID: <9301110542.AA20105@tree.egr.uh.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Hal <74076.1041@compuserve.com> said:
>My understanding was that everyone who tried to talk to him would get
>two aliases assigned automatically.

Actually, what I expected to happen was this: the acknowledgement of
an anonymous id on penet for the anonymous id on pax would be
generated, and this ack would be sent via the chain back to me
(barrus@tree) since I established the chain.  

That is, I had linked anon.435@pax to an5022@penet to barrus@tree.
Then, upon mailing to anon.435@pax from my other account (which
already has an anonymous id established, so another would not be
generated), the mail would proceed to an5022@penet, which would create
an id and send it back to anon.435@pax.  Now I expected this ack to
then be turned right around, send to an5022@penet and then on to
barrus@tree.  So I was expecting the creation of another anonymous id,
but the acknowledgement didn't go to barrus@tree.

My original thinking was that once I established the id's in both
direction, when someone responded to anon.435@pax, they would be
allocated an id if they didn't have one.  And since penet had by this
time seen anon.435@pax, no new id would be made, and the mail would
proceed on the me.  

Anyway, that was an experiment that seems to lead to explosive
anonymous id growth :-) I agree with Matthew that not mailing back an
ack would help cut down the flurry of mail, but it still results in
all sorts of extra id's.  I was hoping the whole thing would be like a
pointer: mail to id1@pax forwards to id2@penet and then on to me with
no extraneous account manufactured.

But since we have our own cryptographically protected remailers, we
cypherpunks can make our own remailing chains (Hal's constructed
anonymous addresses).  This way, you can decided on the path of your
outgoing mail and your return mail: create the appropriate header, and
attach your message on the end.  To receive responses, just send a
response header with the return path encrypted along with instructions
to your recipient to cut the response header into a new file, add a
message to the bottom, and mail to the appropriate remailer.  (Note:
I've used this method successfully twice, so it isn't too hard to do).
Just remember that if your recipient doesn't have pgp, don't route
your mail through extropia or their message will be blocked.

If I get a chance I'll work on a program that will generate the
appropriate header given routing input.

/-----------------------------------\
| Karl L. Barrus                    |
| barrus@tree.egr.uh.edu (NeXTMail) |
| elee9sf@menudo.uh.edu             |
\-----------------------------------/







From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: pmetzger@shearson.com (Perry E. Metzger)
Date: Mon, 11 Jan 93 22:44:03 PST
To: crys@eith.biostr.washington.edu
Subject: Re: Politics of Rmailers
Message-ID: <9301111556.AA03382@maggie.shearson.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



> From: Crys Rides <crys@eith.biostr.washington.edu>
> 
> >>>>> On Sat, 9 Jan 93 23:32:18 PST, tribble@xanadu.com (E. Dean Tribble) said:
> 
> E.> 	 Date: Sat, 9 Jan 93 17:52:01 -0800
> E.> 	 From: uunet!netcom.com!norm (Norman Hardy)
> 
> E.> 	 I can imagine a system administrator choosing to require that
> E.> 	 all mail originating from his machine include a signature that 
> E.> 	 correctly identifies the local name of the sender.
> 
> E.> I can imagine it, but none exist.  This is mostly because the From:
>                           ^^^^^^^^^^^
> E.> field is supplied by the mailer and satisfies that requirement,
> E.> whereas requiring things in teh body of the mail message goes against
> E.> the grain of how the systems are used.
> *Bzzzzt* Wrong answer, thank you for playing.  The public access bbs
> system running out of Chapel Hill, automatically appends the same signature
> to all outgoing messages, and other sites are considering the same measures.

Mr Rides;

Your rudeness is exceeded only by your apparent incapacity to read.

As has been stated, quite clearly, no one is doubting that such systems
exist. The "none exist" in the last paragraph refers to REASONS FOR THIS
PRACTICE, not to the number of sites practicing it.

As was said, the "From:" field satisfies the stated requirement without
the need for autosignatures. The notion of an automatic footer when automatic
headers exist already that satisfy the identification requirement is without
merit.

Perry




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Hal <74076.1041@CompuServe.COM>
Date: Mon, 11 Jan 93 09:03:28 PST
To: CYPHERPUNKS <CYPHERPUNKS@TOAD.COM>
Subject: Chaining Pax and Penet.
Message-ID: <930111164804_74076.1041_DHJ37-1@CompuServe.COM>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

From: Karl L. Barrus <barrus@tree.egr.uh.edu>
> My original thinking was that once I established the id's in both
> direction, when someone responded to anon.435@pax, they would be
> allocated an id if they didn't have one.  And since penet had by this
> time seen anon.435@pax, no new id would be made, and the mail would
> proceed on the me.  

The problem is this: when someone responds to your anonymous ID
anon.435@pax, their mail _from_ Pax does not come from anon.435.
Anon.435 is _your_ id.  Instead, their mail from Pax comes from their
own anonymous ID (possibly a newly allocated one).  Then, when the
mail goes to Penet, it sees this new "From" ID and allocates one of
its own.

The same thing happened when you sent to anon.435@pax from your
system which already had a Pax ID.  When the mail was forwarded from
Pax to Penet, it was not marked as coming from anon.435.  Instead,
it was marked as coming from this already-assigned Pax ID. (I don't
think you ever said what that already-assigned ID was.)  Penet had
not seen that ID before, so it allocated an alias for it and sent
back to that ID.  Penet's mail-back would _not_ go to anon.435, but
rather to the Pax ID which it was replying to.

Hal

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.1

iQCVAgUBK1F6D6gTA69YIUw3AQGMTAQAqXm7SdE6uyf+04J5GY3KU7dk7A2D7loC
TeT+0UqpsSPOI+31YrJPww2h9XuwGylAZ9dqu/hPdolIzukjr+WiOKRyU34imezd
iX9yYv3Ry3jCebcn9c79NY3zEQhjGh1LhqKmec5QLp3FjPB+gQZZypdaHz4GeDJF
4oDyArzKafc=
=wZgY
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----


Distribution:
  CYPHERPUNKS >INTERNET:CYPHERPUNKS@TOAD.COM





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Hal <74076.1041@CompuServe.COM>
Date: Mon, 11 Jan 93 09:03:59 PST
To: CYPHERPUNKS <CYPHERPUNKS@TOAD.COM>
Subject: .Sig suppression
Message-ID: <930111164833_74076.1041_DHJ37-2@CompuServe.COM>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

Chael> I'm
Chael> sure there are a couple, but I agree with your point that most BBS's on
Chael> any mail network append an identifying "tagline" or signature.  As a
Chael> matter of fact, in many nets it is a requirement that your system append
Chael> a tagline to all messages.  Incidentally, it is preceded often by "--"
Chael> on a line by itself.

I'd like to hear more about systems which do this.  What is the rationale
for adding the system name at the end?  Do these networks not use
Internet-style "From:" headers, so these automatic system-wide .sigs are
used for the same effect?

I guess there must be gateways between these bbs's and the internet,
for this issue to arise.  It's too bad that these gateways don't convert
the .sig info into a more conventional RFC-822 style Internet header.

Hal Finney

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.1

iQCVAgUBK1F586gTA69YIUw3AQFNogP9FU2W3wrHTnfrZeKtrMOq4Zz5aTUN7+vv
04iMOdV975fCzqdmgR7O758qamewguYV8XHmPVloLSMwgnmbzBNs8zRZkVAwTKnB
rpQqeahXPNeC1PVu/ezoiBvc26ujcN2Ga9OuGUWu9RFRvjwQ0rl51mTjHED1fJi+
7I/TV4kT4Kk=
=WeLq
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----


Distribution:
  CYPHERPUNKS >INTERNET:CYPHERPUNKS@TOAD.COM





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: ccat@netcom.com (Chris Beaumont)
Date: Mon, 11 Jan 93 12:03:17 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Atari PGP -is it available..
Message-ID: <9301112002.AA13654@netcom2.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


  Does anyone know if there is a current version of PGP
available for the Atari ST. Thanks!




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Richard Childers <rchilder@us.oracle.com>
Date: Mon, 11 Jan 93 12:11:31 PST
To: CYPHERPUNKS@TOAD.COM
Subject: request digest format
Message-ID: <9301112009.AA14251@rchilder.us.oracle.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



When is this going to be converted into a Digest format ?

Without wishing to appear peckish, Christmas would have been a good
opportunity ...


-- richard

=====
-- richard childers		rchilder@us.oracle.com		1 415 506 2411
         oracle data center  --  unix systems & network administration

	 ... whatever remains, however improbable, must be the truth.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: mjr@netcom.com (Matthew Rapaport)
Date: Mon, 11 Jan 93 16:09:41 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: multiple aliases. It doesn't matter how many
Message-ID: <9301112219.AA25430@netcom2.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


***** Karl L. Barrus <barrus@tree.egr.uh.edu> *****

>I agree with Matthew that not mailing back an ack would help cut down
>the flurry of mail, but it still results in all sorts of extra id's.

Yes, but so what? That is, why does it matter so long as all the
conversion from one to the next takes place automatically. The process
strengthens your security as well as that of any respondent. True this
may not be necessary, but under the circumstances (the whole point of
alias servers) isn't a "lets not take chances" approach best?

Lets take an extreme case (not that I'm suggesting things be implemented
this way). Imagine that every time you or anyone else originates mail
through an Aserver you are given a NEW ID (not just the first time, but
EVERY TIME). Again, so long as a relationship is maintained between all
your ID's on a given server and their corresponding ID's on the next
machine down or up the line, it shouldn't matter to you at all! After a
few years you could end up with hundreds or thousands of IDs. What
difference would it make? You don't need to know what *any* of them
are...

matthew rapaport     Philosopher/Programmer At Large      KD6KVH
           mjr@netcom.com     70371.255@compuserve.com




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Karl L. Barrus <barrus@tree.egr.uh.edu>
Date: Mon, 11 Jan 93 13:03:35 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: constructed anonymous addresses
Message-ID: <9301112102.AA23795@tree.egr.uh.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Had sort of a slow day at work, so I had the chance to crank out this:

Here is a rough script which will allow you to route your mail through
the various remailers.  (However, extropia is not yet supported...I'm
working on it).  You must have the public key for each remailer on
your keyring.

Save the file, run it, and it will prompt for 1) mail, or 2) header.
Choose 1 to pick a path and send a file, choose 2 to create a header
which can be used to reach you.  I intend option 2 to be used as
follows: create a message to someone you want to remain anonymous
from, run the script, pick 2, follow the prompts, and then instruct
the script to append the header to your letter.  Then your recipient
will be able to follow the directions and respond to you.

When the script prompts for "And then to (1-3 or address)", to end the
process, type the final address you want your mail sent to.  Of
course, if you are creating a header, you'll want to type your own
address.

Further improvements include supporting extropia; and rewriting in C,
perl, awk, ksh, or any language with arrays!

I've tested this script using the remailers at alumni and rosebud,
because the turnaround time seems faster.  But there is no reason
that rebma shouldn't work as well.

--------8<--cut here-->8--------
#!/bin/sh
# support script for anonymous remailers
# allows routing a message through various remailers
# NOTE: extropia remailer not supported just yet

#find out which mode user wants
echo "Do you want to:"
echo "1. Create routing and mail a file"
echo "   This will allow you to specify the route your message will take,"
echo "   and mail a file through that route."
echo "2. Create remailing header"
echo "   This creates an appropriate remailing header, with instructions."
echo "   Include the generated file in one of your own messages and"
echo "   someone else can use it to reply to you."

read choice

#declare remailers
mail1=hal@alumni.caltech.edu
mail2=remailer@rebma.mn.org
mail3=elee7h5@rosebud.ee.uh.edu
mail4=remail@extropia.wimsey.com

#temporary files
t1=.anon1
t2=.anon2
t3=.anon3

#set up header
echo "::" > $t1
echo "Encrypted: PGP" >> $t1
echo "" >> $t1

#blank out .anon3
cat /dev/null > $t3

#print menu
echo ""
echo "1) $mail1"
echo "2) $mail2"
echo "3) $mail3"
#echo "4) $mail4"
echo ""

#get hop
echo "Mail to (1-3): "
read to

#convert from number to address
if [ $to = "1" ]
then
  to=$mail1
elif [ $to = "2" ]
then
  to=$mail2
else
  to=$mail3
fi
firsthop=$to

notdone=true
#begin loop
while [ $notdone ]
do
#find out remailing request
	echo "And then to (1-3 or address): "
	read rto

	if [ $rto = "1" ]
	then
	  rto=$mail1
	elif [ $rto = "2" ]
	then
	  rto=$mail2
	elif [ $rto = "3" ]
	then
	  rto=$mail3
	fi

	echo "::" > $t2
	echo "Request-Remailing-To: $rto" >> $t2
	echo "" >> $t2

#	echo "remailing to $rto; encrypted for $to"
	pgp -ea $t2 $to 2> /dev/null
	cat $t1 $t2.asc >> $t3

	if [ $rto = $mail1 -o $rto = $mail2 -o $rto = $mail3 ]
	then
	  to=$rto
	else
	  notdone=""
	fi
done

if [ $choice = "1" ]
then
#now include message
  echo "Message to include? "
  read msg
  if [ ! -f $msg ]
  then
    echo "$msg not found"
    exit 1
  fi

  cat $msg >> $t3
  elm -s "anonymous mail" $firsthop < $t3
else
  echo "Append to file: "
  read msg
  echo "--------8<--cut here-->8--------" >> $msg
  cat $t3 >> $msg
  echo "" >> $msg
  echo "<To reply, save everything below the \"cut here\" marks above" >> $msg
  echo "<into another file.  Type your reply here (below the blank " >> $msg
  echo "<line three lines above!) and mail to $firsthop" >> $msg
fi

rm -rf $t1 $t1.asc $t2 $t2.asc
#end of script----------------------------


/-----------------------------------\
| Karl L. Barrus                    |
| barrus@tree.egr.uh.edu (NeXTMail) |
| elee9sf@menudo.uh.edu             |
\-----------------------------------/




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: nowhere@bsu-cs.bsu.edu (Chael Hall)
Date: Mon, 11 Jan 93 13:42:36 PST
To: 74076.1041@compuserve.com (Hal)
Subject: Re: .Sig suppression
In-Reply-To: <930111164833_74076.1041_DHJ37-2@CompuServe.COM>
Message-ID: <9301112135.AA21344@bsu-cs.bsu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>Chael> I'm
>Chael> sure there are a couple, but I agree with your point that most BBS's on
>Chael> any mail network append an identifying "tagline" or signature.  As a
>Chael> matter of fact, in many nets it is a requirement that your system append
>Chael> a tagline to all messages.  Incidentally, it is preceded often by "--"
>Chael> on a line by itself.
>
>I'd like to hear more about systems which do this.  What is the rationale
>for adding the system name at the end?  Do these networks not use
>Internet-style "From:" headers, so these automatic system-wide .sigs are
>used for the same effect?

     The reason why they were created (IMHO) was because most PC-based BBS
software only allows for a very limited space in the header for a From name
and for a To name.  For example, in ChaelBoard, a BBS package that I wrote,
this limitation is 31 characters (in order to make the string 32 bytes long).
Therefore, only names are used.  This gets ambiguous if two John Smith's
are sending messages to the same conference (similar to newsgroups).  So,
the systems started appending a line stating the origin of the message.
Sometimes it's as simple as "X BBS - (222) 222-2222 Smalltown, USA"  Other
times it's more complex.
     Some nets have decided upon a specific type of tagline so that they
all contain the same information in the same format.  Usually they contain
the phone number.  RelayNet(tm) and other popular nets provide for 
"Receiver-only, Routed" messages.  That is, the message is considered
private and sent from your system to a hub and that hub only sends it on
to other hubs or the appropriate node if it is connected to that hub.
Unfortunately, every SYSOP between your system and the receiving
system can read the message.  That's why encryption is important.

>I guess there must be gateways between these bbs's and the internet,
>for this issue to arise.  It's too bad that these gateways don't convert
>the .sig info into a more conventional RFC-822 style Internet header.

     Yes, gateways exist for many systems.  Most consider the tagline a
part of the message.  The de facto standard is to consider "--" on a line
by itself to mark the end of the message body and the beginning of the
tagline.  Users often append their own tagline before the system tagline.
Each mail reader has its own format, usually including the name of the
program on the line.

Chael Hall

--
Chael Hall
nowhere@bsu-cs.bsu.edu, 00CCHALL@LEO.BSUVC.BSU.EDU, CHALL@CLSV.Charon.BSU.Edu
(317) 285-3648 after 3 pm EST




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: phr@napa.Telebit.COM (Paul Rubin)
Date: Mon, 11 Jan 93 16:49:40 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: share room at RSA conference Thursday?
Message-ID: <9301120048.AA01484@napa.TELEBIT.COM>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Does anyone have crash space, or need some, at the Sofitel hotel on
Thursday night?  (I'm not sure if it's all booked up or what the
room rates are).

I live fairly close to Redwood City but figure that staying
at the conference hotel is the only way I'll have any chance
of getting up early enough for the 9:00 A.M. session on Friday.

I might also be interested in splitting up a room on Wednesday night
but the interesting sessions on Thurs. don't start til 10:45 a.m.
which is not quite as bad...

Please reply by direct email, as I'm not on the list any more.  Thanks.

	Paul





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: hugh@domingo.teracons.com (Hugh Daniel)
Date: Tue, 12 Jan 93 13:10:47 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Crypto Bus is not going to happen it looks like...
In-Reply-To: <9212300014.AA08503@domingo.teracons.com>
Message-ID: <9301122108.AA03857@domingo.teracons.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


  So far I have gotten three (3) positive replys to rideing the Crypto
Bus to Usenix, thats about $800 each round trip.  Unless I get an
avalanche of riders in the next couple of days I am not even going to
try to get a bus.
  If you need to know more about the idea of chartering a bus for bay
area folks (and anyone along the way) to Usenix, contace me.
		||ugh Daniel




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: peter honeyman <honey@citi.umich.edu>
Date: Tue, 12 Jan 93 11:37:57 PST
To: gnu@cygnus.com
Subject: Re: Random number generators
In-Reply-To: <9212310751.AA21888@cygnus.com>
Message-ID: <9301121937.AA00359@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> Can someone get the paper(s) and/or talk to the researcher?

got it!

		peter

------- Forwarded Message

Date: Tue, 12 Jan 1993 14:14:39 -0500
From: amf@csp2.csp.uga.edu (Alan Ferrenberg)
To: honey@citi.umich.edu
Subject: Re:  Phys. Rev. Let. paper

Dear Dr. Honeyman,

  A postscript version of the paper is available on our anonymous ftp site
(csp2.csp.uga.edu) in the /pub/documents/amf1 directory as rng.ps.

Alan Ferrenberg

PS:
  We are just beginning this ftp site, but have already collected a number of
(hopefully) interesting preprints from several authors here, as well as from
Japan and Israel.  Please feel free to browse through the selection of papers,
to upload any articles you feel might be interesting to simulational physicists
and to spread the word about this new service.

------- End of Forwarded Message




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: hugh@domingo.teracons.com (Hugh Daniel)
Date: Tue, 12 Jan 93 14:39:03 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Cascading aliases with ID forwarding re-mailers
In-Reply-To: <930109232813_74076.1041_DHJ76-1@CompuServe.COM>
Message-ID: <9301122237.AA03911@domingo.teracons.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


  I suspect that a ID creating forwarder should _never_ send the ID to
the user, as someone might be looking (both the current plain text
replys and traffic analsys are problems).  If the user wishes to know
their ID then they can send a message to themselvs, and read the ID
off of that, right?
		||ugh Daniel




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Karl L. Barrus <barrus@tree.egr.uh.edu>
Date: Tue, 12 Jan 93 20:00:31 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: security of constructed addresses
Message-ID: <9301130359.AA00390@tree.egr.uh.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Alert!  Hal Finney has alerted me to a problem with the way my script
builds an anonymous remailer chain.  Simply saving eachheader portion
into a seperate file and running pgp on the pieces reveals each link
in the chain.

The solution (also from Hal Finney) is: hide the intermediate hops
until they get to the machine that needs them.
(machine1, encrypt1(machine2, encrypt2(machine3, encrypt3(user@dest))))
Here, the entire header is decrypted at each remailer, revealing the
next destination to that remailer only.  No peeking ahead!  The only
remailer that will be revealed is the first one, where mail has to be
sent anyway.

I'll rework the script, provide a ksh version, and write a little help
file ASAP. 

/-----------------------------------\
| Karl L. Barrus                    |
| barrus@tree.egr.uh.edu (NeXTMail) |
| elee9sf@menudo.uh.edu             |
\-----------------------------------/





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Karl L. Barrus <barrus@tree.egr.uh.edu>
Date: Tue, 12 Jan 93 20:12:55 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: mental poker
Message-ID: <9301130412.AA00436@tree.egr.uh.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Okay, anybody want to play mental poker with me???

A protocol involving bit committment was posted to sci.crypt recently,
which we can use to play.  There is an RSA protocol, but a commutative
encryption/decryption is required, which I don't think PGP provides.

So here is the protocol:
1) A shuffles cards, creates a message M1 that lists the cards by
number.  A appends a random bit stream, and computes the hash (using
MD5).  A sends hash MD5(M1) to B.

2) B composes message M2 that lists the cards he chooses by number.  B
appends a random bit stream, and computes the hash.  B sends the hash
MD5(M2) to A.

3) A sends B M1 so B can get his cards.

4) B shuffles the remaining 47 cards, lists them by number, appends a
random bit stream to create M3, and computes the hash.  B sends hash
MD5(M3) to A.

5) A chooses cards by number, appends a random bit stream to create
M4, and computes hash.  A sends MD5(M4) to B.

6) B sends A M3 so A get get her cards.

A and B can catch cheating by comparing the various message and
hashes.

Getting extra cards can be left as further extensions, as can multiple
players (3 or more).

Any takers?

By the way, the hash function implementation I have is the sigfetch
routine contained in tripwire.  It includes md5, md4, md2, snefru,
crc, and crc32.  So before a game starts the players should verify
their respective hashers.

/-----------------------------------\
| Karl L. Barrus                    |
| barrus@tree.egr.uh.edu (NeXTMail) |
| elee9sf@menudo.uh.edu             |
\-----------------------------------/




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Hal <74076.1041@CompuServe.COM>
Date: Tue, 12 Jan 93 23:17:59 PST
To: CYPHERPUNKS <CYPHERPUNKS@TOAD.COM>
Subject: Mental poker.
Message-ID: <930113070548_74076.1041_DHJ40-1@CompuServe.COM>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Mental poker protocols are notorious for having sometimes subtle
weaknesses.  I missed the posting on sci.crypt which Karl mentioned
but his description of the protocol seems to have a flaw:

> 4) B shuffles the remaining 47 cards, lists them by number, appends a
> random bit stream to create M3, and computes the hash.  B sends hash
> MD5(M3) to A.
> [...]
> 6) B sends A M3 so A get get her cards.

If B in step 6 sends A message M3, which lists the 47 cards left after
B has chosen his 5 from the 52 they started with, then A will be able
to see which 5 B chose; those are the 5 not listed in M3.

Am I missing something in the description of the protocol, or was the
actual protocol perhaps a little different than this?

Hal Finney
74076.1041@compuserve.com





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Karl L. Barrus <barrus@tree.egr.uh.edu>
Date: Wed, 13 Jan 93 09:15:34 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: re: mental poker protocol
Message-ID: <9301131714.AA02844@tree.egr.uh.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Hal writes:
>Am I missing something in the description of the protocol, or was the
>actual protocol perhaps a little different than this?

Oops.  I typed too quickly; the posted protocol specified shuffling
the entire deck to form message M3.  Thus, each player draws from a
full deck.  While this isn't exactly poker, I'm still willing to play
somebody.  So Hal's right: the original protocol is different - it's
not broken like the one I posted :-)

The post to sci.crypt was in response to a bit commitment question.
Here, players commit by making public their hashes.  Later, everyone
can verify when the messages are known.

If anyone's interested, send me a notice to elee9sf@menudo.uh.edu.
(The server for my other account is acting erratic and I'm considering
moving my subscription).

/-----------------------------------\
| Karl L. Barrus                    |
| elee9sf@menudo.uh.edu             | <- preferred address
| barrus@tree.egr.uh.edu (NeXTMail) |
\-----------------------------------/




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: nowhere@bsu-cs.bsu.edu (Chael Hall)
Date: Wed, 13 Jan 93 13:36:56 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: bbs
Message-ID: <9301132133.AA22203@bsu-cs.bsu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>So they are using a whole bunch of accounts in an effort to conceal their
>identity? And they hope that one of the accounts will be approved 
>for full access to adult material, without the sysop really knowing 
>who they are?

     Yes, the intention is to get one approved without the SYSOP really
knowing who he approves.

>Do you always check the phone number supplied as part of the registration
>process or wait until the user abuses the BBS? It seems that someone
>could simply start taking names out of the phone book if he wanted to 
>conceal who he really is... 

     I used to check phone numbers, now I only check those of users with
strange names or wait until they abuse the system.  The first thing I check
when someone abuses my system is their identity.  If it's fraudulent, I put
the account in the system kill file and they can no longer login.  I use a
pretty good method for allowing access to adult areas.  A consent form must
be filled out and signed.  Then it is mailed to me with a photocopy of the
same person's driver's license (SSN can be blacked out, I'm not concerned
with it).  I file it away and give them access if it looks correct.

     Generally, I detect system abuse pretty soon after it occurs.  Then,
I handle the situation as quickly and efficiently as possible.  The same
user rarely tries it again.  I did voice validate all of my users, but that
got to be tedious, so I just check when something happens.  Many BBS's
require that they be able to call a user back directly before granting
full access.  This would not work over the Internet, a University modem
pool like many were using here, or long distance for the cheap SYSOP.
There are, however, a flurry of programs that perform "automatic call-back
telephone number verification."

Chael Hall

--
Chael Hall
nowhere@bsu-cs.bsu.edu, 00CCHALL@LEO.BSUVC.BSU.EDU, CHALL@CLSV.Charon.BSU.Edu
(317) 285-3648 after 3 pm EST




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: eric@parallax.com (Eric Messick)
Date: Wed, 13 Jan 93 18:07:53 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Details on return envelopes
Message-ID: <9301140202.AA22884@parallax.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



This is a long, complicated, and information dense message.  You've
been warned.

I've been working out details of what would be required of an
anonymous return envelope.  To make sure I've thought of everything,
I've filled in a matrix with the types of information that might need
to be passed between the various participants during the sending of a
message.  The person who created the envelope is the ultimate
recipient of the message (recv).  The envelope has somehow been
transmitted to a person (send) who wishes to send a message to recv.
The message will be transmitted via several remailers, collectively
referred to as hops.  This results in nine potential transmission
channels, several of which need not be possible for various reasons.
Clearly, the sender does not need a special channel to communicate
back to herself, and likewise the receiver does not need special
provisions to communicate to herself either.  The sender should be
unable to receive information from the various hops, as that would
compromise the path that the message takes.  The various hops already
communicate directly with their following neighbor through headers,
and we want to prohibit communication back towards the sender.  The
remaining five cases are listed below:

	     |		from
	     |	send	recv	hops
-------------+------------------------
	send |	-	pneed	(ack)
to	recv |	msg	-	pdue
	hops |	post	addr	-

where:
	msg is the message being delivered
	post is postage paid by the sender
	addr is addressing info from the receiver
	pneed is info to help sender provide postage
	pdue is info on missing postage
	(ack) is info that is disallowed

pneed is cleartext on the outside of the envelope.  This leaves us
with the message, and three parts of the envelope: the delivery
address, postage paid, and postage due.

Note that information other than what I'm describing here could be
sent along these channels; I am simply using postage as a concrete
example of information that might need to be transmitted.

And now, let's trace a message through to its delivery.  Being stuck
with ascii, the notation is not wonderful.  Groups of letters
represent sets of similar things.  Case is significant.  Lower case
letters r and v-z are public keys.  Upper case letters preceded by &
are the machines that know the associated secret keys (from the C
address of operator).  So machine &Y can decrypt something encrypted
with public key y.  Upper case letters A-F are conventional keys.
Keys A-C are generated by the sender, keys D-F by the receiver.  The
symbols P, S, Q, $, and # are followed by lower case letters
indicating who the item is associated with.  Q and # are conventional
keys, P and S form a public key-secret key pair, and $ is a digicash
stamp.

NOTATION:
	x(...)	contents encrypted with public key x
	&X	mail address for remailer using public key x
	A(...)	contents encrypted with conventional key A
	Px	public key for delivering postage to &X
	Sx	secret key for delivering postage to &X
	Qx	conventional key for postage due from &X
	$x	a postage stamp for &X to cash
	Amt_x	an amount of postage to deliver to &X
	Due_x	postage still due to &X, plus a unique ID
	#x	conventional key held by &X while postage is due
	pad	random padding (see below)
	&R	mail address of the final recipient
	Pr, Qr, $r
		stuff associated with &R
	M	the actual message to be delivered to &R
	junk	padding created by &R as a diversion

ABOUT PADDING:

K(stuff, pad) can be transformed into stuff by decrypting with key K.
Since stuff has a length associated with it inside the encryption, an
external viewer cannot tell the length of stuff.  It is also possible
to turn K(stuff) into K(stuff, pad) without knowing K.  The encryption
packet contains an external length as well as the internal length.
The external length must be adjusted to cover the added padding, which
is just a random bitstream appended to the cyphertext.  Once this
padding has been performed, it is impossible to determine the length
of stuff without decrypting with K.  In this manner, a portion of a
message can be either lengthened or shortened at every step along the
way, as long as a decryption is performed at each step.  This is the
motivation for the keys A..F in the exchange that follows.

PGP should be augmented with a function to pad a message, and should
explicitly accept padded data.  I have tested PGP2.1 on Unix and it
accepts padded data that I manually added.

OK, here we go...  The envelope provided by the receiver to the sender
looks like this:

Addr: &X, x, x(...)
Pneed: [Px, Amt_x], [Py, Amt_y], [Pz, Amt_z], [Pr, Amt_r]

Everything except the encrypted segment x(...) is considered public
knowledge.  The keys Px, etc... pose a slight problem: One of the hops
can identify which envelope a message is associated with by comparing
the postage key sealed inside the addressing info with this public
string of keys.  It's not clear how serious of an issue this is.

The sender decides to send the message through hosts &V and &W before
using the provided envelope.  She sends the following message to &V:

Addr: v(A), v(Sv, Qv, B, &W, w(B), w(Sw, Qw, C, &X, x(C), x(...)), pad)
Post: A(Pv($v, Pw($w, Px($x, Py($y, Pz($z, Pr($r)))))), pad)
Pdue: A(pad)
Message: A(M, pad)

She has created keys A-C, Pv, Sv, Pw, Sw, Qv, and Qw.  She obtains the
specified postage stamps and wraps them in the various postage keys.
The keys and addresses get wrapped in public keys for the address
field, and all of the other elements of the message are sealed with
key A.  The address field consists of two public key encrypted
segments because the sender must create key C, but cannot seal it into
the packet that the recipient has provided for host &X.  If C were
public knowledge, host &X could be monitored, and the plaintext of M
revealed to an external watcher.  As it is, M still occurs in
plaintext within each remailer, so it should be protected by the
recipient's public key (i.e. M = r(the real message) ).

&V decrypts the v() encryptions to find all of the keys necessary for
it to process the message.  The padding is removed from the address
field.  The key A unlocks the message M, allowing the stripping of the
padding, which is replaced with new padding before being encrypted
with key B.  It notes that the Pdue field is empty.  Sv allows it to
extract its postage stamp $v, and strip the padding.  The message it
sends to &W looks like this:

Addr: w(B), w(Sw, Qw, C, &X, x(C), x(...), pad)
Post: B(Pw($w, Px($x, Py($y, Pz($z, Pr($r))))), pad)
Pdue: B(pad)
Message: B(M, pad)

&W does likewise, and sends the following to &X (we have revealed the
encrypted part of the original envelope at this point):

Addr: x(C), x(Sx, Qx, D, &Y, y(D), y(Sy, Qy, E, &Z,
		z(E), z(Sz, Qz, F, &R, r(junk), r(junk))), pad)
Post: C(Px($x, Py($y, Pz($z, Pr($r)))), pad)
Pdue: C(pad)
Message: C(M, pad)

Postage rates have gone up since the envelope was first issued, so &X,
&W, and &Z will need to use the Pdue field.  It works like this:

Addr: y(D), y(Sy, Qy, E, &Z,
		z(E), z(Sz, Qz, F, &R, r(junk), r(junk)), pad)
Post: D(Py($y, Pz($z, Pr($r))), pad)
Pdue: D(Qx(Due_x), pad)
Message: D(#x(M), pad)

&Y then sends the following to &Z:

Addr: z(E), z(Sz, Qz, F, &R, r(junk), r(junk), pad)
Post: E(Pz($z, Pr($r)), pad)
Pdue: E(Qy(Due_y, Qx(Due_x)), pad)
Message: E(#y(#x(M)), pad)

&Z sends the following to &R:

Addr: r(junk), r(junk, pad)
Post: F(Pr($r), pad)
Pdue: F(Qz(Due_z, Qy(Due_y, Qx(Due_x)), pad)
Message: F(#z(#y(#x(M))), pad)

Now, &R (the receiver, who created the envelope in the first place)
knows F, Sr, Qx, Qy, Qz, and thus finds out Due_x, Due_y, Due_z,
#z(#y(#x(M))) [the message, with postage due], and gets a stamp $r.
&R then generates a message that is designed to deliver #x, #y, and
#z, and sends it to &X:

Addr: x(C), x(Sx, Qx, D, &Y, y(D), y(Sy, Qy, E, &Z,
		z(E), z(Sz, Qz, F, &R, r(junk), r(junk))), pad)
Post: C(Px($x, Due_x, Py($y, Due_y, Pz($z, Due_z, Pr(junk)))), pad)
Pdue: C(pad)
Message: C(pad)

&X unwraps it and sends #x along:

Addr: y(D), y(Sy, Qy, E, &Z, z(E), z(Sz, Qz, F, &R, r(junk), r(junk)), pad)
Post: D(Py($y, Due_y, Pz($z, Due_z, Pr(junk))), pad)
Pdue: D(Qx(#x), pad)
Message: D(pad)

And again:

Addr: z(E), z(Sz, Qz, F, &R, r(junk), r(junk), pad)
Post: E(Pz($z, Due_z, Pr(junk)), pad)
Pdue: E(Qy(#y, Qx(#x)), pad)
Message: E(pad)

And back to &R:

Addr: r(junk), r(junk, pad)
Post: F(Pr(junk), pad)
Pdue: F(Qz(#z, Qy(#y, Qx(#x))), pad)
Message: F(pad)

So &R now knows #x, #y, and #z, and so can recover M.

To keep &Z from knowing it is the tail of the path, extra postage
stamps are required of the sender.  These are cashable by the
receiver.  The sender thus has no way of knowing the length of the
path, but only has an idea of the upper bound on it.  If the sender
does not include sufficient postage on the steps she prepended to the
path, the receiver will not be able to read the message, as there is
no way for the receiver to find out Qv and Qw.  Perhaps these could be
affixed to the innermost stamp, along with &V and &W, but this is
probably not a good idea.

Since remailers wouldn't add extra encryption to the header fields of
a postage due message (it would make paying the postage due a lengthy
process), the postage due concept could be circumvented by placing the
message in the Post or Pdue headers disguised as postage info.  To
discourage this, remailers would only allow postage due deliveries for
a fixed period after a rate increase, and would still require the
older rate be paid.

Another use for postage due would be to disguise the use of an
expensive remailer.  Such a remailer would forward with postage due
when paid the prevailing rate.



Well, I've beaten this thing bloody now and can't find any more flaws.
I admit it's a bit of a monster, but most of it goes away if you don't
require postage.  I think the system needs to be designed with postage
in mind from the start, however.  Anyway, it's time for you people to
start ripping it apart.  Perhaps we can have a discussion of this at
the physical meeting this week if Eric Hughes can fit it into the
schedule.

-eric messick




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Karl L. Barrus <barrus@tree.egr.uh.edu>
Date: Wed, 13 Jan 93 17:42:17 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: new remailing script
Message-ID: <9301140141.AA05172@tree.egr.uh.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Here is the new sh version of the remailing script.  Enjoy!

#!/bin/sh
# support script for anonymous remailers
# allows routing a message through various remailers
# NOTE: to use extropia remailer, uncomment the appropriate lines
#       see the documentation file

#find out which mode user wants
echo "Do you want to:"
echo "1. Mail a file via anonymous remailers"
echo "2. Create a remailing header and append to a file"
echo ""
echo -n "Your choice? "
read choice

if [ "$choice" = "" -o "$choice" -lt 1 -o "$choice" -gt 2 ]
then
  echo "Error.  Improper mode selected."
  exit 1
fi

#declare remailers
mail1=hal@alumni.caltech.edu
mail2=remailer@rebma.mn.org
mail3=elee7h5@rosebud.ee.uh.edu
mail4=remail@extropia.wimsey.com

#temporary files
t1=.anon1
t2=.anon2
t3=.anon3

#set up encrypted pgp header
echo "::" > $t1
echo "Encrypted: PGP" >> $t1
echo "" >> $t1

#blank out .anon3
cat /dev/null > $t3

#get final destination
if [ "$choice" -eq 1 ]
then
  echo -n "Final destination (user@host): "
else
  echo -n "Your email address (user@host): "
fi
read to

#exit if no final destination
if [ ! "$to" ]
then
  echo "Error.  No destination specified."
  exit 1
fi

#print menu
echo ""
echo "Mailing via:"
echo "1) $mail1"
echo "2) $mail2"
echo "3) $mail3"
#echo "4) $mail4"                      # uncomment to use extropia
echo ""

notdone=true

#begin loop
while [ $notdone ]
do

#find out remailing request
  echo -n "via (1-3 or q)? "
  read rto

  if [ "$rto" = "" -o "$rto" = q ]
  then
	notdone=""                     # exit while loop
  else

#convert number to address
	case "$rto"
	in
	  1) rto=$mail1;;
	  2) rto=$mail2;;
	  3) rto=$mail3;;
#	  4) rto=$mail4;;              # uncomment to use extropia
	  *) echo "Invalid menu choice."; exit;;
	esac

#set up remailing request header
	echo "::" > $t2
	echo "Request-Remailing-To: $to" >> $t2
	echo "" >> $t2

#	echo "remailing to $rto; encrypted for $to"
	cat $t3 >> $t2	               # append previous message
	pgp -ea $t2 $rto 2> /dev/null  # do the encryption
	cat $t1 $t2.asc > $t3          # prepend header to encrypted message
	to=$rto                        # save last hop
  fi
done

if [ "$choice" -eq 1 ]
then
#now include message
  echo -n "Message to include? "
  read msg
  if [ ! -f "$msg" ]
  then
    echo "Error: $msg not found"
    exit 1
  fi

  cat $msg >> $t3
  mail -s "anonymous mail" $to < $t3
  echo "Mail sent."
elif [ "$choice" -eq 2 ]
then
  echo -n "Append to file: "
  read msg
  echo "--------8<--cut here-->8--------" >> $msg
  cat $t3 >> $msg
  echo "" >> $msg
  echo "<To reply, save everything below the \"cut here\" marks above" >> $msg
  echo "<into another file.  Type your reply here (below the blank " >> $msg
  echo "<line three lines above!) and mail to $to" >> $msg
else
  echo "Error. Invalid choice."
  exit 1
fi

#clean up some of the temporary files
rm -rf $t1 $t1.asc $t2 $t2.asc





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Karl L. Barrus <barrus@tree.egr.uh.edu>
Date: Wed, 13 Jan 93 17:46:04 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: help file for remailing script
Message-ID: <9301140145.AA05184@tree.egr.uh.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



And here is a short help file I've written.  I will try to write
another version of this script (maybe in perl or something) and submit
everything to be placed on the ftp site.  To cut down on mail, I won't
be mailing further versions, etc. to the list, so request it from me
or get it via ftp (once I get around to submitting it).

------------------------------

hop.mail is a shell script that automates the process of using the
cypherpunk cryptographically protected remailers.  Briefly, it has two
modes of operation: one is to send a file, the other is to create a
header which can be used by someone else to send a file to you.

WHAT YOU NEED TO HAVE

Well, you need to have PGP installed.  Also, you'll need the public
keys of the various remailers on your keyring.

SENDING A FILE

Create the message you want to mail, and save it as a file.

To send a file, choose option 1.  You will then be prompted for the
final destination of the file you would like to send (by final
destination I mean email address).  After that, the script will
continue prompting you for routing information.  Each remailer you
specify routes your mail through that particular remailer.

Note: due to the way the remailing headers are built up, the path your
file will actually take is the reverse of what you specify.  That is,
the first remailer you route through will be the one you file will
appear to come from.  The last remailer you specify is actually the
first hop in the chain.  

After routing your mail through as many remailers as you want (keep in
mind that your mail will arrive slower the more hops you take), enter
'q' to exit.

After you have set up your mail route, the script will ask what file
you wish to send.  The file is simply appended on to the header, and
the whole thing is sent off.  No encryption of the file takes place.
If you wish, you may encrypt the file you want to mail with your
destination's public key or some other encryption scheme.  The
advantage of not encrypting the message in with the remailing header
is that you can use this script to mail to people who don't use pgp.

CREATING A HEADER

Create the message you wish to send and save it as a file.

Choose option 2 to create a header.  The steps are similar to sending
a file, except remember that someone will use this to reply to you, so
type in the address you want them to respond to.  This can be your
real mail address, or an anonymous id on one of the various anonymous
services, or anything else.  Route your mail like you want, and enter
'q' to exit.

At this point, you will be prompted for a file to append to (the
message you created).  Enter the file you want the remailing header
appended to.  Now you have a file which contains the message you
typed, as well as instructions on how whoever you mail it to can use
the included header to reply to you.  If you wish, you may mail this
file via option 1!

NOTES

My first attempt at this script simply built each header separately.
This worked, but was vulnerable: simply save each piece in a separate
file, run pgp on them, and you will be told which remailer the header
is encrypted for!

This version nests the encryption, so that only the next destination
is revealed to the current remailer.  That is, the structure of the
header is:

encrypt1(address2, encrypt2(address3, encrypt3(message)))

So when your file arrives at remailer1, the header is decrypted to
reveal the next hop, and the rest of the header is mailed off the
remailer2, where it is decrypted to reveal the next hop, etc.

As I said above, the file you send is not encrypted.  If it bugs you
that your file is mailed plain text, then encrypt it first if the
person you are sending to can decrypt.  I purposely did not encrypt
the file you want to send so you can use this procedure with people
who don't have pgp.  Or you can post to usenet via a email-to-usenet
gateway.  Or whatever.

Also, the remailer at extropia is not supported yet.  Not because I
don't like it, but because encryption must be used there.  This isn't
bad or anything, but it causes difficulty building the remailing
header separately.  Extropia will not allow you to mail plain text
through it, you must encrypt it with extropia's public key.  So if you
do that, then you should be able to use extropia, and you'll need to
go through and uncomment the appropriate lines.

Finally, the mail command I used in the script is 
	mail -s "anonymous mail" 
Make the appropriate changes if you want to use another mailer or
change the subject line 

BUGS

Ug.  :-)  Send reports of problems to elee9sf@menudo.uh.edu, or
barrus@tree.egr.uh.edu, and I'll look into them!  Or, send any
comments you might have.


/-----------------------------------\
| Karl L. Barrus                    |
| elee9sf@menudo.uh.edu             | <- preferred account
| barrus@tree.egr.uh.edu (NeXTMail) |
\-----------------------------------/




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: eichin@cygnus.com (Mark Eichin)
Date: Thu, 14 Jan 93 06:48:48 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: pax anonymous remailer shutdown
Message-ID: <9301141447.AA19074@cygnus.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I include the article as it arrived here.			_Mark_

Path: cambridge-news.cygnus.com!enterpoop.mit.edu!gatech!rpi!zaphod.mps.ohio-state.edu!howland.reston.ans.net!sol.ctr.columbia.edu!flash.pax.tpa.com.au!britt!dclunie
From: dclunie@pax.tpa.com.au (David Clunie)
Newsgroups: aus.aarnet,aus.news,alt.sexual.abuse.recovery,alt.sex,alt.sex.bondage,alt.sex.motss,alt.sex.stories,talk.politics.homosexuality,alt.personals,alt.personals.bondage,alt.security.pgp,comp.security.misc,talk.politics.guns
Subject: PAX Anonymous & Encrypted Service shutdown
Date: 14 Jan 1993 07:39:22 GMT
Organization: PAX - Public Access Unix (Adelaide,South Australia)
Lines: 30
Distribution: world
Message-ID: <1j35baINNgm@flash.pax.tpa.com.au>
Reply-To: dclunie@pax.tpa.com.au
NNTP-Posting-Host: britt.pax.tpa.com.au
Xref: cambridge-news.cygnus.com alt.sexual.abuse.recovery:1414 alt.sex:4689 alt.sex.bondage:2827 alt.sex.motss:243 alt.sex.stories:1172 alt.personals:2845 alt.personals.bondage:459 alt.security.pgp:800 comp.security.misc:657 talk.politics.guns:2223

The anonymous and encrypted mail service at PAX has been shutdown.

The site that connects PAX has been told by someone from AARNet (the
Australian Academic Research Network) that the service is unsuitable
for AARNet, and that if it is not stopped then the feeding site will
be disconnected from the net.

There has been no communication from AARNet to me or anyone else at
PAX, but I cannot allow the feeding site to put itself at risk hence
the service is closed until further notice.

I am lead to believe that this is not so much AARNet's policy, but the
NSF Net's policy and the NSF have brought pressure to bear on AARNet,
as they believe that all mail that crosses their network must be traceable
to its origin, ipso facto no anonymous mailers. I have not been approached
by either organization personally so I cannot confoirm this.

I am extremely disappointed but c'est la vie.

It was an interesting experiment, and proof that the concept of anonymous
encrypted mail is feasible with simple tools. Hopefully someone somewhere
outside the jurisdiction of these authorities will be able to continue the
good work.

david clunie (dclunie@pax.tpa.com.au)

ex-anon.admin@pax.tpa.com.au :(






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Karl L. Barrus <barrus@tree.egr.uh.edu>
Date: Thu, 14 Jan 93 06:36:40 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: anonymous service shutdown (pax)
Message-ID: <9301141435.AA07332@tree.egr.uh.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



This was posted to alt.security.pgp: (I trimmed the header)
--------------------------------------------------------------
The anonymous and encrypted mail service at PAX has been shutdown.

The site that connects PAX has been told by someone from AARNet (the
Australian Academic Research Network) that the service is unsuitable
for AARNet, and that if it is not stopped then the feeding site will
be disconnected from the net.

There has been no communication from AARNet to me or anyone else at
PAX, but I cannot allow the feeding site to put itself at risk hence
the service is closed until further notice.

I am lead to believe that this is not so much AARNet's policy, but the
NSF Net's policy and the NSF have brought pressure to bear on AARNet,
as they believe that all mail that crosses their network must be traceable
to its origin, ipso facto no anonymous mailers. I have not been approached
by either organization personally so I cannot confoirm this.

I am extremely disappointed but c'est la vie.

It was an interesting experiment, and proof that the concept of anonymous
encrypted mail is feasible with simple tools. Hopefully someone somewhere
outside the jurisdiction of these authorities will be able to continue the
good work.

david clunie (dclunie@pax.tpa.com.au)

ex-anon.admin@pax.tpa.com.au :(
------------------------------------------------------------------------

Uh oh, looks like anon.penet.fi is the only one left (besides the one
at twwells, but it is more limited than pax or penet).

I think this raises some important and scary issues for we
cypherpunks.  Does anybody have a printout of NSF guidelines about
tracing mail back to its origin?  This may affect our remailers (if
word gets out!) in that logs might have to be kept...or worse :-(

I run an anonymous remailer, and I depend upon people to not abuse the
service.  If somebody wants to use it to request the source code for
the internet worm, fine.  Or distribute virus source code, okay (but
encrypt the code for heaven's sake :-)  But don't threaten, libel, or
insult somebody via anonymous mail (never mind that you can do all
these things anonymously with the postal service, but the difference
is everybody uses the post office).  

Like it says in the pgp docs, if everybody encrypted their mail, then
it would be a right taken for granted, and people would scream bloody
murder if it were taken away.  If "everybody" routes their mail, then
it too would become acceptable. So we need MORE remailers than the
four I know of - alumni, rebma, rosebud, extropia (there was one at
soda but it was shut down, right??)  (subliminal hint: it's real easy
to run one of the cypherpunk remailers, you just need unix, pgp, and
perl)

Comments?

/-----------------------------------\
| Karl L. Barrus                    |
| barrus@tree.egr.uh.edu (NeXTMail) |
| elee9sf@menudo.uh.edu             |
\-----------------------------------/






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: peter honeyman <honey@citi.umich.edu>
Date: Thu, 14 Jan 93 07:56:07 PST
To: "Karl L. Barrus" <barrus@tree.egr.uh.edu>
Subject: Re: anonymous service shutdown (pax)
In-Reply-To: <9301141435.AA07332@tree.egr.uh.edu>
Message-ID: <9301141556.AA12838@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> Does anybody have a printout of NSF guidelines about
> tracing mail back to its origin?

karl, don't leap to conclusions -- david said he is led to
believe that nsfnet pressure was brought to bear, but that
he had no evidence to confirm this suspicion.

personally, i doubt that there is any nsfnet policy regarding
the ability to trace mail back to an individual, but i'll ask.

	peter





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Rusty_H._Hodge@horizon.amgen.com
Date: Mon, 18 Jan 93 19:32:58 PST
To: uunet!citi.umich.edu!honey@uunet.UU.NET (peter honeyman)
Subject: Re: possible solution to the anonymous harrassment problem
Message-ID: <1993Jan14.123843.1227@horizon.amgen.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>for example, i can send postal mail with high confidence 
>of anonymity, and can make anonymous phone calls (with care,
>e.g., by using phone booths and moving around).

What about that little old ladie that watches the PO Box and Phone Booth
from her window?  What about the postman who sees you place the letter in
the mailbox?

>privacy and honesty are orthogonal.

I've often accidentially overheard things I wasn't suppost to.  If people
were totally honest, we wouldn't need such good encryption...





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Hal <74076.1041@CompuServe.COM>
Date: Thu, 14 Jan 93 12:09:52 PST
To: <cypherpunks@toad.com>
Subject: Re: Details on return envelopes
Message-ID: <930114195927_74076.1041_DHJ54-1@CompuServe.COM>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I've been studying Eric Messick's message.  It's pretty complicated and
it will take more time to really understand it.

I did spot one possible problem.  Remailer &V sends to &W an address
field that looks like:

Addr: w(B), w(Sw, Qw, C, &X, x(C), x(...), pad)

but I don't think &V has enough information to create the 2nd item here.
The reason for the A, B, etc. keys is, I think, to allow new padding to
be done as the message gets passed between each pair of remailers.
I think that may need to be used here as well.  &V can't put padding into
the w(Sw,...) block.

As a more general comment, I'd like to see some simpler examples.  Eric
has shown the most complex case in order to demonstrate that his scheme
works for that, but I think more people would be able to comment on it
if some simpler examples were provided.  How about an anonymous address
that is just one hop long, instead of 3, and which is used by the sender
without going through any remailers first?  I think that would be less
intimidating.

Another general point, which may be important.  Chaum emphasized that his
anonymous addresses should be use-once, because if two people send messages
to the same anonymous address, someone who has access to the mail goig
into and coming out of the remailer will see identical address fields
coming out for the pair of messages.  I think Eric's scheme has the same
property.

I have to admit that I don't see that a use-once anonymous address is very
useful, but I think we should give this some consideration.  I think
Eric's use of padding is to defeat just such an attacker, so that there
is no message-length correlation between incoming and outgoing messages.
If we are going to worry about such attacks, it calls into question the
whole approach to anonymous addresses.

As one possible corollary, if anonymous addresses were used once then the
postage could be supplied by the addressee.  This might change the protocol
very considerably.

Hal Finney
74076.1041@compuserve.com





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Marc.Ringuette@GS80.SP.CS.CMU.EDU
Date: Thu, 14 Jan 93 12:14:24 PST
To: dclunie@pax.tpa.com.au
Subject: Re: anonymous service shutdown (pax)
Message-ID: <9301142014.AA15788@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I think a large stink should be made at this point, to bring our
legitimate privacy concerns to the attention of net admins, and to
flush out who it was who threatened pax's net connection.

I'm really uncomfortable with the way that the pax anon remailer was
shut down on what seems to be pure hearsay.  I think we need a little
more guts from our anon administrators.  Stick to your guns!  Make them
at least deliver an ultimatum to you so you know where the threat came 
from.  

A note on whether we cypherpunks should "lie low" -- it's always
possible for us to go underground and hide from the authorities. 
I don't believe we should do this until it's absolutely necessary.  
As of now, we are legitimate net citizens.


M.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Hal <74076.1041@CompuServe.COM>
Date: Thu, 14 Jan 93 12:24:43 PST
To: <cypherpunks@toad.com>
Subject: Re: anonymous service shutdown (pax)
Message-ID: <930114200748_74076.1041_DHJ54-2@CompuServe.COM>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


to: >internet:cypherpunks@toad.com

I agree that the PAX shutdown is an ominous development.  Nobody's
internet access is perfectly free from the kinds of pressures that were
brought against PAX.  What steps can we take to keep the same thing from
happening to us?

I agree with Karl that a big step would be to spread remailers more widely.
Eric Hollander is running three remailers in addition to the ones Karl
mentioned - hh@soda.berkeley.edu, and two other machines which I don't
have handy.  They don't encrypt but they forward, and that's good enough
for many purposes.

Some time back, there was mention that the owner of the commercial Portal
system would run one.  Could someone follow up on that who knows him?

PGP is gradually disappearing from U.S. sites where it used to be
available.  Recently it got taken off the EFF area on Compuserve.
We can't afford to see encryption and remailers be slowly strangled.

Hal
74076.1041@compuserve.com





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: strat@intercon.com (Bob Stratton)
Date: Thu, 14 Jan 93 12:57:07 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Persecution of anon remailers
Message-ID: <9301142057.AA23582@intercon.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Things like this are what organs like Computer Underground Digest,
a.k.a CuD, are always crying for. 

It might not be bad to bounce a message or two to the RISKS Digest as
well. The best way to fight this sort of quite strangulation is to
bring it out into the light. 

People are starting to look at the Internet as a nascent version of
the next ubiqitous telecommunications technology. If we speak from the
stand of "we want to have privacy technology ready for the day the
general public gets this technology, and these guys are getting in the
way...", then we have an opportunity to get the libraries,
researchers, and other current net users up in arms about these
developments. 

Bob Stratton     Engineer, InterCon Systems Corp.	strat@intercon.com
+1 703 709 5525





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: wayner@cs.cornell.edu (Peter Wayner)
Date: Thu, 14 Jan 93 14:06:54 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: No Subject
Message-ID: <9301142206.AA23922@brokk.cs.cornell.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain




I often find it useful to think about these matters
by mapping them over to the real world. 

Anonymous remailers are really quite common. Here
are a few common sources:

1) Academic journals which review papers. These
often keep the names of the reviewers and the names
of the paper authors hidden to allow people the 
chnace to speak freely. 

2) Newspapers with personals sections offer both
anonymous mailboxes and anonymous voiceboxes for
obvious reasons. 

3) The WSJ also offers these advertisements for executive searches. 

4) The Police, in some cities, maintain anonymous tip lines.
They also occasionaly offer cash rewards to these
anonymous tipsters. I think the NYPD has a anonymity office set
up to do just this.

I realize that the cypherpunk mailing list likes
to cloak itself in the romance of the counter
culture, but in moments like this it might 
make sense to think about how mainstream and
suburban and respectable the concept of
anonymous mailers can be. In many cases,
authority reacts to the perceived threat--
not to the threat itself. 

-Peter Wayner




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Marc Horowitz <marc@MIT.EDU>
Date: Thu, 14 Jan 93 15:49:51 PST
To: Hal <74076.1041@CompuServe.COM>
Subject: Re: anonymous service shutdown (pax)
In-Reply-To: <930114200748_74076.1041_DHJ54-2@CompuServe.COM>
Message-ID: <9301142348.AA00333@TLA.MIT.EDU>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>> I agree that the PAX shutdown is an ominous development.  Nobody's
>> internet access is perfectly free from the kinds of pressures that were
>> brought against PAX.  What steps can we take to keep the same thing from
>> happening to us?

There's one very obvious thing, but it costs money (the real kind, not
the stuff we've been playing with).  Someone needs to *buy* a
connection to the *commercial* internet and put an anonymous remailer
where the NSF can't touch it.

NEARnet recently signed an agreement with ANS and CIX to use ANS as a
pipe between it and the CIX (note the lack of *any* government
involvement here).  If I understand this development correctly, this
means a site on NEARnet with the Commercial Routing Service (it costs
extra, numbers on request) can, I think, send packets anywhere without
crossing the NSFnet.  ANS simply leases bandwidth to the NSF.  Most
backbone bits cross this leased bandwidth, but now, it is possible to
buy access to this *privately* owned network.  Now, who has $16k
annually (that's the number, I have a quote on my desk) to sink into
the connection?  Are we serious enough about this to form some sort of
corporation (with legal ties that bind, and identify) to maybe set
this up?  There's enough people on this list to make this sort of
thing cost < $10/month each if *everyone* participated.

Of course, if we did this, we'd have to make it quite clear what we
were planning on doing.  Use of PGP makes this hard.  A company set up
for the purpose of making PGP easier to use would arouse the Wrath of
RSA really quickly.  FYI, the NEARnet AUP:

NEARnet Primary Goals

NEARnet, the New England Academic and Research Network, has been
established to enhance educational and research activities in New
England, and to promode access to regional and national innovation and
competitiveness.  NEARnet provides access to regional and national
resources to its Members, and access to regional resources from
organizations throughout the United States and the world.

NEARnet Acceptable Use Policy

1. All use of NEARnet must be consistent with NEARnet's primary goals.

2. It is not acceptable to use NEARnet for illegal purposes.

3. It is not acceptable to use NEARnet to transmit threatening,
obscene, or harassing materials.

4. It is not acceptable to use NEARnet so as to interfere with or
disrupt network users, services or equipment.  Disruptions include,
but are not limited to, distribution of unsolicited advertizing,
propagation of computer worms and viruses, and using the network to
make unauthorized entry to any other machine accessible via the
network.

5. It is assumed that information and resources accessible via NEARnet
are private to the individuals and organizations which own or hold
rights to those resources and information unless specifically stated
otherwise by the owners or holders of rights.  It is therefore not
acceptable for an individual to use NEARnet to access information or
resources unless permission to do so has been granted by the owners or
holders of rights to those resources or information.

Violation of Policy

NEARnet will review alleged violations of Acceptable Used Policy on a
case-by-case basis.  Clear violations of policy which are not promptly
remedied by Member organization may result in termination of NEARnet
Membership and network services to Member.


It seems to me that the user of possibly illegal software like PGP
could be considered a violation of rule 2.  The whole issue of
anonymous harassing email brings up rule 3.  I've send mail to one of
the NEARnet discussion lists asking how encryption and anonymity
affects the interpretation of rule 3.

		Marc




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: eab@msc.edu (Edward Bertsch)
Date: Thu, 14 Jan 93 16:53:28 PST
To: whitaker@eternity.demon.co.uk
Subject: re: quantum crypto/forwarded article
In-Reply-To: <9147@eternity.demon.co.uk>
Message-ID: <9301150052.AA05277@wc.msc.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


->For those who are interested, there is a short article in today's 
->(14/1/93) New Scientist explaining how quantum uncertainties can be used 
->to improve the security of exchanging cryptographic keys.

Scientific American had this quite recently also.  Or at least
something very like it.  I haven't seen the New Scientist article.
If anyone has it in GIF, TIFF, ASCII or PostScript format, I'd
like to see it.

Ed


--

Edward A. Bertsch (eab@msc.edu)   Minnesota Supercomputer Center, Inc.
Operations/User Services          1200 Washington Avenue South
(612) 626-1888 work               Minneapolis, Minnesota  55415
(612) 645-0168 voice mail




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Marc Horowitz <marc@Aktis.COM>
Date: Thu, 14 Jan 93 15:57:58 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: possible solution to the anonymous harrassment problem
Message-ID: <9301142356.AA26090@dun-dun-noodles.aktis.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


(I'm also marc@mit.edu.  But composing over a 9600 baud line sucks :-)

I just had an idea.  Assume we have some sort of workable system for
anonymous return addresses.  What if every message were *required* to
have one, and if the remailers verified their correctness (at least as
far as we can, given the fakability of net mail)?  Then, if someone
received harassing email, she could ask the remailer maintainers to
find the real name of the sender of a piece of mail.  Assuming
reasonable remailer maintainers (and we can use positive reputations
to decide that), they'd be able to do this.  The system has a built-in
safety:  All the remailer maintainers would have to agree that a
message was indeed harassing to the recipient before they would use
their private keys to follow the chain back.  Unless all the
maintainers agreed to trace the message, it would be impossible, and
the sender's anonymity would be assured.

I'm just trying to think of technical solutions to our societal woes,
as hopeless as this may be.  Remember, if people were honest, we
wouldn't need encryption, either.  Sigh.

		Marc




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: whitaker@eternity.demon.co.uk (Russell Earl Whitaker)
Date: Thu, 14 Jan 93 16:01:10 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Forwarded article.
Message-ID: <9147@eternity.demon.co.uk>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



This article was forwarded to you by whitaker@demon.co.uk (Russell Earl Whitaker):

--------------------------------- cut here -----------------------------

Newsgroups: demon.security
Path: eternity.demon.co.uk!demon!visigoth.demon.co.uk!pettsj
From: James Petts <pettsj@visigoth.demon.co.uk>
Subject: Public Key Exchange
Message-ID: <C0u8ww.1xD@demon.co.uk>
X-Xxmessage-Id: <A77AE8E4BD010855@visigoth.demon.co.uk>
X-Xxdate: Thu, 14 Jan 93 09:54:44 GMT
Sender: news@demon.co.uk
Nntp-Posting-Host: visigoth.demon.co.uk
Organization: No Affiliation
X-Useragent: Nuntius v1.1.1d13
Date: Thu, 14 Jan 1993 09:55:42 GMT

For those who are interested, there is a short article in today's 
(14/1/93) New Scientist explaining how quantum uncertainties can be used 
to improve the security of exchanging cryptographic keys.

 ===> James Petts <===

*** CAUTION - READ THIS .sig AT YOUR OWN RISK! ***************************
*                                                * NOTE! VISIGOTH HAS NO *
* Q. Wenn ist das Nunstueck git und Slotermeyer? * CONNECTION WITH ANY   *
* A. Ja!... Beiherhund das Oder die Flipperwaldt * OTHER SITE AT         *
*    gersput!                                    * DEMON.CO.UK           *
*                                                *                       *
**************************************************************************
*  pettsj@visigoth.demon.co.uk (preferred), pettsj@cix.compulink.co.uk   *
**************************************************************************


--------------------------------- cut here -----------------------------





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: peter honeyman <honey@citi.umich.edu>
Date: Thu, 14 Jan 93 19:44:54 PST
To: marc@mit.edu
Subject: Re: possible solution to the anonymous harrassment problem
In-Reply-To: <9301142356.AA26090@dun-dun-noodles.aktis.com>
Message-ID: <9301150344.AA22546@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


the remailer of my dreams would offer ironclad guarantees of
anonymity.  call me a cynic, but asking me to place my trust in the
hands of ...  well, just about anybody! leaves me cold.

i recognize that social issues will surely arise, but society has
managed to deal with anonymity in other contexts.  for example, i
can send postal mail with high confidence of anonymity, and can make
anonymous phone calls (with care, e.g., by using phone booths and
moving around).

something tells me that the difference here is that we are getting
remailer services for free.  how's the cypherpunks bank coming along?
i have an application in mind ...

a final comment:

>                              Remember, if people were honest, we
> wouldn't need encryption, either.

forgive me if i'm coming on too strong, but that is total bullshit.
privacy and honesty are orthogonal.


	peter




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Eric Messick <eric@parallax.com>
Date: Fri, 15 Jan 93 01:40:12 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Details on return envelopes
Message-ID: <9301150713.AA29658@parallax.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


As per Hal's suggestions, I've come up with a simpler example.  I've
also hardened it against an attack that he noticed, which has
considerably changed the protocol.

Hal writes:
> Another general point, which may be important.  Chaum emphasized that his
> anonymous addresses should be use-once, because if two people send messages
> to the same anonymous address, someone who has access to the mail going
> into and coming out of the remailer will see identical address fields
> coming out for the pair of messages.  I think Eric's scheme has the same
> property.

While thinking about this weakness, I realized that everything gets a
lot easier if each (re)mailer knows the public key of the next.  This
is public knowledge, so there's no need to hide the key once the next
destination is known.  If there was a complete database of public keys
of remailers that each remailer had, the key could be found from the
address.  Since that database might not be up to date, the public key
is transmitted along with the address.  Consequently, I was able to
remove all of the conventional keys from the protocol.  All
encryptions are now done with public keys.  Of course, there is still
the conventional encryption done for each public key encrypted packet.
The protocol is strengthened against this attack by fresh encryptions
at each stage which hide the constant string.

Note that the remailer itself can still identify the set of messages
that were sent using the same envelope.  It would be nice to fix this,
but it seems unlikely at this point.  Any ideas anyone?

---------------------------------------------------------------------

I've got two examples here: a paired down one, and a slightly fuller
one.  The first has no postage, which cuts down considerably on the
excess.  The second example is just the first with the postage added
back in (just to show that it still works).

The envelope specifies hosts &Z and &R.  The sender routes the message
through &Y before using the envelope.  So, the message goes from &S to
&Y to &Z to &R where it is delivered.

The complete simplified transaction is reproduced below, starting with
the initial envelope:

Addr: &Z, z, z(&R, r, r(junk))

To: &Y
Addr: y(y(&Z, z, z(&R, r, r(junk))), pad)
Message: y(M, pad)

To: &Z
Addr: z(z(&R, r, r(junk)), pad)
Message: z(M, pad)

To: &R
Addr: r(r(junk), pad)
Message: r(M, pad)

The sender basically ignores the contents of the envelope, but wraps
it in the public key y for safe delivery to &Y.  The message and the
address info are both then padded and encrypted with y.  The reason
for encrypting the address info with y twice will become clear
shortly.

&Y receives the message labeled To: &Y above.  The outer y encryptions
are removed, followed by the inner y encryption on the address field.
The message M, and the original envelope are thus revealed to &Y.  &Y
now knows to send the message to &Z, and knows the public key z.  The
message M is then padded and encrypted with z.

There is already a portion of the address field that is encrypted with
z. That portion contains all of the info that &Z needs to know, but
this info, as Hal pointed out, is a constant string; an external
observer could use this to associated a group of messages with a
single envelope.  To obscure this, the string is encrypted a second
time with z.  Recall that a random conventional key is generated each
time a public key encryption is done, so a constant plaintext string
will encrypt to a different cyphertext string each time.  The padding
helps keep the string from being identified by its length.  To keep
the protocol consistent, the original envelope had to be encrypted
with y twice.

The resulting message is sent to &Z, where the same processing is
done.  Let's trace it in detail this time, but without the extraneous
padding.

&Z has received:

Addr: z(z(&R, r, r(...)))
Message: z(M)

Which looks to the outside world like:

Addr: z(...)
Message: z(...)

But &Z can decrypt those z(...)'s to obtain, first:

Addr: z(&R, r, r(...))
Message: M

And then:

Addr: &R, r, r(...)
Message: M

With r thus exposed, &Z can encrypt both M and r(...) with it to
obtain:

To: &R
Addr: r(r(...))
Message: r(M)

Which to the outside world looks like:

To: &R
Addr: r(...)
Message: r(...)

With everything nicely hidden.  This is what gets sent to &R.  Knowing
r, &R can recover M.  We're done.

--------------------------------------------------------------------

I'll present the postage example without further comment, except to
note that at each step, all fields are freshly encrypted with the next
hop's public key.


Addr: &Z, z, z(Sz, Qz, &R, r, r(junk))
Pneed: Pz, Amt_z, Pr, Amt_r

To: &Y
Addr: y(y(Sy, Qy, &Z, z, z(Sz, Qz, &R, r, r(junk))), pad)
Post: y(Py($y, Pz($z, Pr($r))), pad)
Pdue: y(Qs(stuff_s), pad)
Message: y(M, pad)

To: &Z
Addr: z(z(Sz, Qz, &R, r, r(junk)), pad)
Post: z(Pz($z, Pr($r)), pad)
Pdue: z(Qy(stuff_y, Qs(stuff_s)), pad)
Message: z(M, pad)

To: &R
Addr: r(r(junk), pad)
Post: r(Pr($r), pad)
Pdue: r(Qz(stuff_z, Qy(stuff_y, Qs(stuff_s))), pad)
Message: r(M, pad)





-eric messick




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Eric Messick <eric@parallax.com>
Date: Fri, 15 Jan 93 01:40:12 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Details on return envelopes (padding)
Message-ID: <9301150753.AA29918@parallax.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Hal writes:
> I did spot one possible problem.  Remailer &V sends to &W an address
> field that looks like:
> 
> Addr: w(B), w(Sw, Qw, C, &X, x(C), x(...), pad)
> 
> but I don't think &V has enough information to create the 2nd item here.
> The reason for the A, B, etc. keys is, I think, to allow new padding to
> be done as the message gets passed between each pair of remailers.
> I think that may need to be used here as well.  &V can't put padding into
> the w(Sw,...) block.

It may not be at all obvious or intuitive, but &V *CAN* put padding
into the w(...) block.  I'm no longer trying to do this (see my
previous posting), but it could still be useful in some situations, so
I'll try to explain it more clearly.

PGP uses binary structures for all of this, but I'm going to pretend
that it's all ascii, just so we can see what's going on easier.  That
block w(...) looks something like this:

CTB: RSA			<-- that's *C*ypher *T*ype *B*yte
Length: 12345 bytes
Key_ID: w
IDEA_key: RSA(w, random_key)
CTB: IDEA
Length: 12315
	<random initialization bytes and cypher check>
	CTB: Plain Text
	Length: 12300
	Here we have 12300 characters.  Note that all of the lines
	that are indented are encrypted with random_key using
	the IDEA cypher.
	...End of the encrypted text.


To add padding to this, simply append some cryptographically strong
random bytes to the end, and adjust the unencrypted lengths by that
much.  No one can tell that your new bogus lengths don't match the
length on the plaintext packet without actually being able to see the
plaintext packet length field.  The decryptor believes the plaintext
packet length, and automatically throws away the bogus bytes that were
decrypted.

While writing this, I realized that when I tested this, I may have
only changed the outermost length.  It is possible (but I think it is
highly unlikely) that PGP would get sick if you changed the second
length value.  Since I no longer need to do this, I don't have any
incentive to check this out again.  It's not that difficult, but I
hate editing binary files...


-eric messick





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Hal <74076.1041@CompuServe.COM>
Date: Thu, 14 Jan 93 23:08:10 PST
To: <cypherpunks@toad.com>
Subject: Re: possible solution to the anonymous h
Message-ID: <930115065840_74076.1041_DHJ55-1@CompuServe.COM>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



I have to agree with Peter Honeyman that Marc Horowitz's proposal
that remailers reveal message sources under certain conditions
wouldn't work well.  Remailer users will prefer remailers which won't
do this.  So reputations and such will tend to push things in the
opposite direction.

Also, I'd point out that the Pax remailer actually did maintain a database
of anonymous addresses with the corresponding real addresses.  So it
already worked much as Marc suggested.  You can actually send mail to
someone who posts anonymously through Pax just as easily as you could
send to someone who posted non-anonymously.  So if you want to complain
about some offensive posting or email to the person who did it, you
still could with Pax.  These features didn't stop Pax from getting shut
down.

Marc's suggestion that commercial users could run remailers without pressure
from NSF sounds good in theory, but it's not clear how well it would work
in practice.  I don't think Cypherpunks could run such a remailer, even
if Marc is right and it would cost $10 per Cypherpunks reader per month.
I doubt that many people would be willing to make this charitable contribution
for what would be a public good - a remailer that anyone could use.

Even if it could be done, one remailer isn't enough.  We need many remailers
so that no one remailer can expose users.

I think the best bet would be a commercial site which has a connection for
other reasons, and which is willing to run a remailer on the side.  I
don't know what kinds of sites use these commercial connections.  The
commercial Internet access that I am aware of is through companies like
Compuserve, Portal, Netcom, the WELL, and so on, and I think they all have
to abide by the NSF acceptable use policies.  At least, I had to agree to
those on Portal and I think on Compuserve.  What would be an example of a
site with commercial Internet access which would be free of NSF pressure?

One other point I'd make with regard to Marc's message is that if PGP itself
is the problem, there's no reason the remailers can't use RIPEM.  That's
legal in the U.S., so the legality issue would not arise.  This might be
a good approach to take in broaching the subject with administrators.  I
haven't looked at RIPEM much but I'm sure the remailers could use it just
as easily as PGP.  Even non-encrypting remailers can provide basic
anonymous posting and mail, if those would be more acceptable.

A final point is that forwarding mail for another person can hardly be
made illegal in general.  If I receive a message from person A asking me
to forward it on to person B, and I do so, this is clearly a legitimate
email message that I choose to send.  To try to disallow this would be to
put intolerable restrictions on email content.  So, if this is allowed, it
seems to me that I should be able to write a program to do what I am
allowed to do manually.

If these remailers could be made widespread, with tens of thousands of people
running them as a routine service, I think a crackdown would be much more
difficult.  I think we need to educate users about the value of privacy
and anonymity in order to encourage more people to run remailing software.
Can anyone suggest a newsgroup where these kinds of discussions would be
appropriate?

Hal Finney
74076.1041@compuserve.com





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Hal <74076.1041@CompuServe.COM>
Date: Thu, 14 Jan 93 23:19:06 PST
To: <cypherpunks@toad.com>
Subject: Electronic money legality
Message-ID: <930115071353_74076.1041_DHJ55-2@CompuServe.COM>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



The question came up here some time ago as to whether it would be
legal to issue electronic money, or regular money, for that matter.
I got a couple of books out of the library to try to learn something
of the history of private bank notes.

It seems that private bank notes were the rule rather than the exception
in the U.S. up until around the time of the Civil War.  However, the
notes were issued by banks which generally had a charter or license from
the state government.  I'm not sure whether a private individual could
have legally issued his own banknotes without state permission.

Around the time of the Civil War the Federal government levied a 10%
tax on all issues of banknotes.  This was intended to drive them out
of use, and it did.  Apparently this tax is still in effect today.

George Selgin's book, The Theory of Free Banking, is a call to return
to a situation of competitive note issue, where each bank would print
its own "money" and people would use all these different monies freely
according to their preferences.  Regardless of the pros and cons of this
idea, he does mention the legal situation briefly in footnote 7 of chapter
11:

"Strictly speaking, issue of bank notes by commercial banks is not presently
illegal; however, such issue must still meet the bond-deposit requirements
established under the National Banking System or the 10 percent tax on state
bank notes.  Since all bonds eligible as security for circulating notes were
retired before 1935 (or had the circulation privilege conferred upon them
withdrawn), note issue, while not illegal, is nevertheless impossible under
existing law.  Restoration of commercial bank note-issuing privileges merely
requires repeal of the bond deposit provisions of the original National
Banking statutes and of the prohibitive tax on bank notes."

One other point I learned was about the nature of "legal tender" laws.
If a money is a legal tender, a creditor cannot turn down an offer by a
debtor to repay using that money.  If he does turn it down, the debt is
void (roughly).  So, legal tender laws don't forbid repayment of a debt
in some other form (I can give you a bike in place of the $100 I owe you),
(if we both agree), but they may specify that even if a debt is denominated
in some other units, I can repay using federal reserve notes.  This is
what happened when the U.S. stopped redeemin for gold during the 1930's -
long-term contracts had routinely been denominated in gold, but the courts
held that dollars could still be used to pay them off.

So, legal tender laws don't appear relevant to the use of digital money,
except that contracts based on digicash could still be paid off by dollar
bills if the debtor wants.

Hal Finney
74076.1041@compuserve.com





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Marc Horowitz <marc@MIT.EDU>
Date: Thu, 14 Jan 93 23:40:28 PST
To: Hal <74076.1041@CompuServe.COM>
Subject: Re: possible solution to the anonymous h
In-Reply-To: <930115065840_74076.1041_DHJ55-1@CompuServe.COM>
Message-ID: <9301150739.AA02931@deathtongue.MIT.EDU>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>> One other point I'd make with regard to Marc's message is that if PGP itself
>> is the problem, there's no reason the remailers can't use RIPEM.  That's
>> legal in the U.S., so the legality issue would not arise.  This might be
>> a good approach to take in broaching the subject with administrators.  I
>> haven't looked at RIPEM much but I'm sure the remailers could use it just
>> as easily as PGP.  Even non-encrypting remailers can provide basic
>> anonymous posting and mail, if those would be more acceptable.

I thought about this.  The major problem is that once the PEM
beta-testing period ends, all keys must be registered with "approved"
(by RSA) central authorities.  I highly doubt they'd issue
pseudonymous keys, but maybe they would allow someone to set up a
heirarchy especially for that purpose.  I'm not convinced.

		Marc




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Marc Horowitz <marc@MIT.EDU>
Date: Fri, 15 Jan 93 00:32:18 PST
To: dclunie@pax.tpa.com.au (David Clunie)
Subject: Re: possible solution to the anonymous h
In-Reply-To: <9301150805.AA01054@britt>
Message-ID: <9301150831.AA02997@deathtongue.MIT.EDU>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>> Who says ? RSA may wish this to happen, but surely anyone who wants to can
>> set up their own key service.

RSA has a patent on their algorithm.  It's quite likely that I can't
even create a key pair without their permission, let alone use it.

		Marc




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Marc.Ringuette@GS80.SP.CS.CMU.EDU
Date: Fri, 15 Jan 93 00:56:06 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: possible solution to the anonymous harrassment problem
Message-ID: <9301150856.AA27483@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> RSA has a patent on their algorithm.  It's quite likely that I can't
> even create a key pair without their permission, let alone use it.

You're poorly informed.  As a condition of a grant from DARPA to RSADSI,
RSAREF may be used noncommercially, for free, to do any of the following:
     -    RSA encryption and key generation, as defined by RSA Data
            Security's Public-Key Cryptography Standards (PKCS) [4]
     -    MD2 and MD5 message digests [3,5,6]
     -    DES (Data Encryption Standard) in cipher-block chaining mode
            [7,8]
Moreover, I believe you'll find that RSADSI has become much more helpful
recently.  For more information, anonymous ftp to rsa.com and look around.

I've just gone over the RSAREF license agreement again.  It seems to permit
any sort of not-for-profit operation, including a public key service.


-- Marc Ringuette (mnr@cs.cmu.edu)




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Daniel Ray <root@tnl.com>
Date: Fri, 15 Jan 93 03:36:22 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: need for more anon remailer sites
Message-ID: <9301150402.AA07973@tnl.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


With the shutdown of PAX, if we are not going to roll over and let this type
of site go away, what we need is a large new group of such sites.

20-50 or more anonymous remailer sites that each gets used randomly and
occaisionally, with usernames that are not obvious such as "anon432", both
in the U.S. and elsewhere in the world, are whats needed. the list of sites
must remain fluid and unpredictable, and formats and conventions must also
variate so that no one can get "a fix" on it.

A person that wants to anonymously mail something can choose different sites
each time, or perhaps there may be a subsystem that chooses this for them,
WITHOUT the mail actually going there first, if a site is in charge of "ran-
domizing" the traffic.

I suggest using a truly covert approach of using non-account first names
and other interesting words that are indistinguishable from regular usernames
as anonymous temporary mailing names. This obviously is very tricky and would
have to be worked out carefully, since it may, even in the future, conflict
with an actual choice of a valid username for an anonymous site. But it can
be done. and we need to spare the .sig at the bottom that advertises the anon
service. that should be left to separate ads, not mixed in covert email itself.

One of the things that has gotten to me is to do secret acts in overt ways,
almost asking the Government to defy them! Secret things should be done
secretly. Once, if in the future, cryptographic email is so common as to make
this unnecessary, then we can relax it. But not completely. Secret should still
always be DONE IN A SECRET WAY.

I.e. using steganography and other covert procedures, fluid, nonfixed proce-
dures, to ensure no disturbance with rerouted and/or encrypted email traffic.
Yes this is security-by-obscurity, but it can work if it is just an adjunct
to other strong methods such as good ciphers and procedures that use proper
contingency planning.

PAX, most likely, did no contingency planning for what happened to it.
All things of this type need "what ifs" for every possible interference that
can happen, not that all possibilities would be addressed. But they should
all be looked at, if they can be thought of.

Suppose the ante goes up and all this stuff becomes actively illegal. What
then? If a large network is *already* in place, the risk is much lower than
trying to do something after the fact. And it would be a more mature network
of rerouting and encrypting sites, that have already learned from their mis-
takes.

we need --all--this-- to survive. otherwise it is all just a toy application
of covert technology.

norstar
The Northern Lights, Troy NY                                 |     
tnl dialins: +1 518 237-2163 @ 1200-2400 bps 8N1 $free     ` | /   
-------------------------------------------------------  --- * --- 
Internet: norstar@tnl.com                                  / | .   
Sysop of TNL Public Access UNIX                              |     





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Daniel Ray <norstar@tnl.com>
Date: Fri, 15 Jan 93 03:36:26 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: more on security/obscurity/reality
Message-ID: <9301150610.AA09544@tnl.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Thinking about everything some more, I have a few more things to say
regarding my previous message stating the need for 20-50 new networked
and "randomized" anon remailer sites, and the need to keep secret things
secret.

One thing I've really noticed over the 5 or 6 years I've been on the net
is the real hatred people have for what is coined "security by obscurity."
I think it is because of the terrible way people have gotten burned by
relying on conceiled methods only, or secret algorithms as ciphers to
protect their material. The method is discovered one way or another, and
everything caves in on itself! Quite understandable.

Yet I cringe at the way people have just turned their backs on the whole
meta-philosophy of "coversion." If, for instance, you are to do battle with
an unbearable, overwhelming power, such as the Government, then what is the
only real way to "win?" Besides convincing them not to do battle with you?

It is by staying conceiled, secret, untargetable. If they don't know to fight
you, or, if they do know, but cannot find you, then you stay all right.
Once it gets to a face-to-face confrontation, however, you lose, and you
lose immediately, there is nothing you can bring to bear, since it is now
just a force equation, and they have over 10,000 times the force you do.
Or more...

This is one of the applications of the secret side of life. Modern crypto-
graphy has advanced, I think, by declaring all coversion as eventually
discoverable, and only seeking algorithms that will suffice even if the
enemy knows your methods. I agree with this. I guess I part company, however,
when people totally throw out being secretive as a partial or adjunctive
solution to something that is intrinsicly secret to begin with. The addition
of conceilment, disinformation, invisibility, etc. can be a tremendous
advantage when combined with strong methods (good ciphers that don't rely
on coversion). It is a multilayered approach that first tries to not become
a target, and, if it is a target is still hard to crack.

When us little people try to maintain privacy against a Govt. that is REALLY
PISSED OFF BY EVEN THE IDEA WE WANT TO STRONGLY PROTECT OURSELVES, a multi-
layered, contingency-based approach is required. The most important part of
it is not a strong cipher, but, not to become a detectable or locatable
target. i.e. coversion and secrecy.

People, in response to the PAX snafu, have advocated some kind of protest
and demonstration as a solution. Sure, these can be tried. But no Govt. in
its right mind will let this powerful privacy go on. It just cancels them
out, and they will not have it. It'll get worse as time goes on. It applies
equally to "free" and non-democratic Governments. To the world community
itself. They will not have it. And we will not have them. So there you are.

What to do? Create a fluid, "night"-based, invisible and unfixable multi-
system of coversion and strong ciphers. So, if they get a part, the rest
goes on as before. All parts of it well thought out. Everything subject
to evolution, but, a base assumption that things are already quite bad.
They are.

I wish more of you actually lived an illegal life...you would know what I
am saying without the need to say it. You need to have really faced a real
risk against authority, with YOUR life on the line. And no amount of talk
substitutes for experience here. Oh well.

norstar
The Northern Lights, Troy NY                                 |     
tnl dialins: +1 518 237-2163 @ 1200-2400 bps 8N1 $free     ` | /   
-------------------------------------------------------  --- * --- 
Internet: norstar@tnl.com                                  / | .   
Sysop of TNL Public Access UNIX                              |     





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "DrZaphod" <ncselxsi!drzaphod@ncselxsi.netcom.com>
Date: Fri, 15 Jan 93 07:48:00 PST
To: CypherPunks@Toad.Com
Subject: If People Were Honest
Message-ID: <23669.drzaphod@ncselxsi>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


In Message Thu, 14 Jan 1993 18:56:47 -0500,
  Marc Horowitz <Aktis.COM!marc@netcomsv.netcom.com> writes:

> Remember, if people were honest, we wouldn't need encryption,
> either.  Sigh.

     Being honest has nothing to do with wanting privacy.  Every mail system
should have, and NEEDS a way to be anonymous.  That is all.
TTFN!

DrZaphod
[AC/DC] / [DnA][HP]
[drzaphod@ncselxsi.uucp]
Technicolorized




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "DrZaphod" <ncselxsi!drzaphod@ncselxsi.netcom.com>
Date: Fri, 15 Jan 93 07:48:00 PST
To: cYPHERpUNKS@tOAD.cOM
Subject: Fans!?
Message-ID: <23683.drzaphod@ncselxsi>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


In Message Fri, 15 Jan 1993 09:30:37 +0000 (GMT),
  Mark Turner <demon.co.uk!mark@netcomsv.netcom.com> writes:

>> For your newsgroups file:
>> alt.fan.david-sternlight David Sternlight, sci.crypt crusader

>> The David Sternlight Fanclub

     Joke, Right????

DrZaphod
[AC/DC] / [DnA][HP]
[drzaphod@ncselxsi.uucp]
Technicolorized




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: BRIAN MCBEE <opac!brian%OPAC.osl.or.gov@CS.ORST.EDU>
Date: Fri, 15 Jan 93 08:43:25 PST
To: CYPHERPUNKS@TOAD.COM
Subject: pax shutdown
Message-ID: <00966A38.A1B67300.22879@OPAC.OSL.OR.GOV>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> I agree that the PAX shutdown is an ominous development.  Nobody's
> internet access is perfectly free from the kinds of pressures that were
> brought against PAX.  What steps can we take to keep the same thing from
> happening to us?
> 
> I agree with Karl that a big step would be to spread remailers more widely.
> Eric Hollander is running three remailers in addition to the ones Karl
> mentioned - hh@soda.berkeley.edu, and two other machines which I don't
> have handy.  They don't encrypt but they forward, and that's good enough
> for many purposes.
> 
> Some time back, there was mention that the owner of the commercial Portal
> system would run one.  Could someone follow up on that who knows him?
> 
> PGP is gradually disappearing from U.S. sites where it used to be
> available.  Recently it got taken off the EFF area on Compuserve.
> We can't afford to see encryption and remailers be slowly strangled.
> 
> Hal
> 74076.1041@compuserve.com
 
If it turns out that pressure to shut down really did come from the official
net hierarchy, there are other places on the net which should be nearly
immune from that kind of pressure.  There are thousands of UUCP sites which
predate the Internet.  And anyone getting their connectivity from one of the
commercial providers (PSI, UUNET, ANS, etc.) can theoretically use those 
networks for whatever purposes they choose.
 
----- Brian McBee ----- (503)378-4276 ----- brian@opac.osl.or.gov -----
----- Oregon State Library, State Library Building, Salem, OR 97310 -----
                   Plan globally, attack locally





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: gnu (John Gilmore)
Date: Fri, 15 Jan 93 09:15:32 PST
To: Daniel Ray <root@tnl.com>
Subject: Re: need for more anon remailer sites
In-Reply-To: <9301150402.AA07973@tnl.com>
Message-ID: <9301151715.AA06478@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I suggest using a dictionary to come up with "names" of anonymous users:

aback
abacus
abalone
abandon
abase
abash
abate
abater
abbas
...

You could pick them in random order, or sequentially.

> Suppose the ante goes up and all this stuff becomes actively illegal. What
> then? If a large network is *already* in place, the risk is much lower than
> trying to do something after the fact. And it would be a more mature network

This technology is sufficiently cheap to replicate that it doesn't
matter whether we set up a "covert" network before or after it becomes
illegal (if ever).  What matters is that we have experience at running
such a network.  Such experience is much easier to come by in the open --
since you can talk about it!

While I applaud the efforts of some people to set up contingencies for
"after we lose our liberties and need to actively oppose the
government", please don't forget to actively oppose poor government
policies *now*, before the loss of that liberty.  In other words,
there's plenty of work to be done today to *keep* this an open society.
And it's much easier to keep one than to get one back.

	John Gilmore




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: gnu (John Gilmore)
Date: Fri, 15 Jan 93 09:28:27 PST
To: cypherpunks
Subject: Re: If People Were Honest
In-Reply-To: <23669.drzaphod@ncselxsi>
Message-ID: <9301151728.AA06697@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


A few days ago I had a personal illustration of how even honest people
need privacy.

The Board of Directors of EFF had met to make some decisions.  Some of
these involved firing employees, closing offices, etc.  (See
comp.org.eff.news and .talk for all the details).  It took a few days
to finalize everything, though.  During that time, we needed privacy
in order to not hurt people (they might hear a false rumor that was
the result of an intermediate stage in the decision; they might hear
from some source other than us that they were losing their jobs, etc).

We seriously had to consider whether to use email to work out the
final details, since the system administrators had not yet been told.
Cellular phones were right out.

As it worked out, it was fine.  The announcement was posted to the net
slightly after the meeting in which we told all the employees what was
happening.  I won't say nobody was hurt -- we all were -- but we were
all a lot less hurt than if the staff had "accidentally" found out,
before anyone responsible for the decision had told them personally.

	John




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Mark Turner <mark@demon.co.uk>
Date: Fri, 15 Jan 93 01:32:56 PST
To: ecfp@demon.co.uk
Subject: /usr/lib/newsbin/ctl/newgroup: `news@math.fu-berlin.de (Math Department)' tried (fwd)
Message-ID: <9301150930.aa08405@demon.demon.co.uk>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


You may be interested in this recent attempt to create a bogus newsgroup,
especially if you've been following recent discussion in sci.crypt.

Regards,

Mark.

According to news@dis.demon.co.uk....
> From dis.demon.co.uk!news Fri Jan 15 00:38:27 1993
> To: usenet@dis.demon.co.uk
> Subject: /usr/lib/newsbin/ctl/newgroup: `news@math.fu-berlin.de (Math Department)' tried
> Date: Fri, 15 Jan 93 0:33:57 GMT
> From: news@dis.demon.co.uk
> Sender: news@dis.demon.co.uk
> Message-ID:  <9301150033.aa12907@dis.demon.co.uk>
> 
> /usr/lib/newsbin/ctl/newgroup: `news@math.fu-berlin.de (Math Department)' tried
> to create newsgroup `alt.fan.david-sternlight'.
> Request was refused:  component exceeds 14 characters.
> ===
> Control: newgroup alt.fan.david-sternlight
> Newsgroups: alt.fan.david-sternlight.ctl,control
> Path: demon!pipex!bnr.co.uk!bnrgate!nott!torn!spool.mu.edu!yale.edu!ira.uka.de!math.fu-berlin.de!lkdfjilu!sternlight.com!nobody
> From: dsfc@sternlight.org
> Subject: newgroup alt.fan.david-sternlight
> Message-ID: <rezalevabgib12370@sternlight.org>
> Sender: news@math.fu-berlin.de (Math Department)
> Organization: J. Random Site
> Date: Wed, 13 Jan 1993 20:14:32 GMT
> Approved: news
> Lines: 21
> 
> 
> one mo' time...
> 
> For your newsgroups file:                                            
> alt.fan.david-sternlight David Sternlight, sci.crypt crusader
> 
> 
> This group is designed for the praise of the wit and wisdom of our
> leader, David Sternlight, the man battling the evil use of
> cryptography wherever it may lie.
> 
> The group is being created entirely for the use of the David
> Sternlight Fanclub, which holds the patent on this newsgroup and would
> be forced to sue if anyone else tried to use it. Indeed, we would be
> disgusted by the implicit lack of respect for intellectual property.
> Also, this newsgroup may not be imported or exported from any eastern
> block country in contravention of the ITARs.
>  
> Thank you,
> 
> The David Sternlight Fanclub
> ===

-- 
/\/\ark Turner                               Demon Systems / Demon Internet
Office: mark@demon.co.uk (+44 81 349 0063)       42 Hendon Lane, London
Home: mt@kram.org (+44 831 823 212)                 N3 1TT, England
------------------ PGP version 2.0 Public Key available -------------------
*** IP level dial-up connectivity to the Internet for a tenner a month! ***



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: gnu@cygnus.com
Date: Fri, 15 Jan 93 09:36:17 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Whitfield Diffie gets award
Message-ID: <9301151735.AA17487@cygnus.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


		SUN ENGINEER RECEIVES INTERNATIONAL AWARD;
		 FOUNDED NEW FIELD OF SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH

MOUNTAIN VIEW, Calif. -- January 13, 1993 -- Whitfield Diffie, 48, 
Distinguished Engineer at Sun Microsystems Computer Corporation (SMCC),
was recently awarded the degree of Doctor of Technical Sciences,
Honoris Causa, by the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology.  The award
was given for founding a new field of scientific research, public key
cryptography, which grew out of discoveries Diffie made at Stanford
University in 1975.

The Swiss Federal Institute of Technology, or ETH after the initials of
its German name, is one of the most prestigious technical universities
in the world.  It counts among its alumni some of the foremost
scientists of the 20th century, including Albert Einstein and John
VonNeuman.  Doctorates "by reason of honor" make up less than one tenth
of the total number of doctoral degrees awarded by the ETH.  They are
granted for major scientific or engineering achievements and are given
only after a nomination and review process taking two to three years.

In conventional cryptography, encrypting and decrypting messages were
inseparable; anyone who could create an encrypted message could also
read it and vice versa.  By separating these functions, public key
cryptography allows people to guarantee the privacy of conversations
with people they have never met before and to apply unforgeable
"digital signatures" to their messages.  In Diffie's words: it does
what signatures and envelopes do for ordinary mail.

At the time Diffie began his work in cryptography, he was one of only a
handful of people not employed by government intelligence agencies who
took a serious interest in the field.  Today, the International
Association for Cryptologic Research, of which he is one of the
founding directors, has hundreds of members from industry and academia
worldwide.

Diffie joined Sun in the summer of 1991 with the title of Distinguished
Engineer, although one of his inventions had already been used in the
company's security products since 1987.  In hiring Diffie, Sun
recognized both the rising importance of security in computer
communications and the critical role of cryptography in achieving that
security.  In the latest Sun(TM) Solaris(R) operating system, the 
original "secure RPC" has been improved, while more comprehensive 
applications of cryptography are planned for future versions of 
Solaris.

Sun Microsystems Computer Corporation (SMCC) is the world's leading
supplier of open client-server computing solutions. With headquarters
in Mountain View, Calif., SMCC is an operating company of Sun
Microsystems, Inc. 

				###

Sun Microsystems, Sun Microsystems Computer Corp., Sun, the Sun logo,
are trademarks or registered trademarks of Sun Microsystems, Inc.
Solaris is a registered trademark of Sun Microsystems, Inc.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: tribble@xanadu.com (E. Dean Tribble)
Date: Fri, 15 Jan 93 11:35:19 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: random remailers
Message-ID: <9301151822.AA13343@xanadu.xanadu.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Has anyone thought about the consequence of randomly picking a
remailing path instead of using the same one?  It occurred to me
yesterday that randomly picked paths could reveal more information to
the remailer sites so that they could figure out the connection
between a pseudonym and the eventual destination pretty well.  It's
just an intuition at this point, though.

dean




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: dclunie@pax.tpa.com.au (David Clunie)
Date: Thu, 14 Jan 93 16:03:48 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: anonymous service shutdown (pax)
Message-ID: <9301150003.AA00743@britt>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I have had a fairly long discussion via email with the AARnnet administrator
involved.

He points out that wrongly or rightly (he believes wrongly) the AARNet
does not have an "open access" policy, and the network is setup exclusively
to service the university community. Public access systems are tolerated, but
barely, and mainly through the grace of those who administer the system
rather than those who fund it.

The complaint in question was actually not at all specific, and came not
from the NSF but from one of the NASA Internet officers who is responsible
for the US end of the link to Australia (and pay for some of it). Essentially
the complaint was one of increasing mail traffic on an already congested link
to the US, as well as concern about the "hiding people's identities so they
cannot be responsible for what they say".

Personally I disagree with the second complaint, but cannot dispute the first,
without statistsics about what component of the link was being consumed by
the posting service. I suspect it was very small but these things all add
up.

It seems a shame that the anonymous system is being terminated "on principle"
but the AARNet person has been friendly about it, in fact positively
graceful in view of my somewhat inflammatory post, and so I guess I just
have to leave it there.

Hopefully eventually commercial vendors will provide an alternative channel
to the university-based network here currently, much as has happened in the
US over the years, and these questions will be less of a concern.

david




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: BRIAN MCBEE <opac!brian%OPAC.osl.or.gov@CS.ORST.EDU>
Date: Fri, 15 Jan 93 12:57:34 PST
To: CYPHERPUNKS@TOAD.COM
Subject: use of ripem instead of pgp
Message-ID: <00966A50.87B655C0.23058@OPAC.OSL.OR.GOV>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> RIPEM is Mark Riordan's public-key program.  It is similar to PEM, but does
> not use the PEM certificates and therefore does not require people to have
> their keys signed by an agency.  It is not really PEM compatible. It does
> use the RSAREF public-domain encryption package, so it is legal for non-
> commercial use in the U.S. and Canada.
> 
> What I suggested was the use of RIPEM since it is available now, is legal,
> and is free.
> 
> Note, though, that whether RIPEM or PGP is used, they are only for non-
> commercial use.  A remailer that wanted to charge, such as the ones that
> Eric Messick is discussing, would probably have to license the technology
> from PKP directly to be legal.  (I'm not sure whether PEM also is limited
> to non-commercial use.)
> 
> Hal Finney
> 74076.1041@compuserve.com
 
Since the only reason we are talking about RIPEM is because of legality 
concerns about PGP, I thought I'd mention that it is (at least theoretically) 
illegal to export RIPEM from the US, annd therefore could not be legally used 
to correspond with persons overseas.

I don't know if there is a legal way to do public key cryptography between 
persons inside the US and persons outside the US.
 
----- Brian McBee ----- (503)378-4276 ----- brian@opac.osl.or.gov -----
----- Oregon State Library, State Library Building, Salem, OR 97310 -----
                   Plan globally, attack locally





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: uri@watson.ibm.com
Date: Fri, 15 Jan 93 09:27:02 PST
To: marc@MIT.EDU
Subject: Re: possible solution to the anonymous...
In-Reply-To: <9301150739.AA02931@deathtongue.MIT.EDU>
Message-ID: <9301151725.AA12991@buoy.watson.ibm.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Marc Horowitz says:
> >> I haven't looked at RIPEM much but I'm sure the remailers could use it
> >> as easily as PGP.  Even non-encrypting remailers can provide basic
> >> anonymous posting and mail, if those would be more acceptable.
> I thought about this.  The major problem is that once the PEM
> beta-testing period ends, all keys must be registered with "approved"
> (by RSA) central authorities.

Oh, NO!  RSADSI will CERTIFY you keys, IF YOU WISH; and
they'll certify your PERSONAL keys for free (unlike any
other level of "confidence", which MAY cost money :-)...

Where did you get this idea from?  [Also it's my understanding,
that one could use other certifying authorities besides RSADSI].
--
Regards,
Uri         uri@watson.ibm.com      scifi!angmar!uri 	N2RIU
-----------
<Disclamer>


From cypherpunks-request  Fri Jan 15 09:38:17 1993



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: pfarrell@cs.gmu.edu (Pat Farrell)
Date: Fri, 15 Jan 93 09:30:59 PST
To: 74076.1041@CompuServe.COM
Subject: shrinking availability of PGP
Message-ID: <9301151728.AA20322@cs.gmu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


 On 14 Jan, Hal wrote:
>
>PGP is gradually disappearing from U.S. sites where it used to be
>available.  Recently it got taken off the EFF area on Compuserve.
>We can't afford to see encryption and remailers be slowly strangled.
>
I agree that this would be terrible. Do you have any grounding
for this generalized statement? I can understand CI$ backing
off, as they were the only organization in the US making a
profit from PGP. And they have the resources and assetts that
could be a target if PKP wanted a test case.

I just had archie look arround, and to me the number of places
was about the same. For some reason, archie doesn't find it in
two places I know it is: soda.berkeley.edu and phil.utmb.edu
Archie did report that it is on wuarchive.

I'm affraid that the legal cloud will remain over PGP for
quite some time, and that the flawed PEM implementations will
become the standard. Until there is someone with real assetts
using PGP, PKP's lawyers will not bother to expose their
patent to the possibility of being invalidated. I also don't
expect to see those of us who are assett free changing from
PGP to RIPEM/PEM just because it is free of the cloud.
This cloud will make folks who are nervous about the changes
that netwroks, communications, and encryption will bring more
cautious. I expect that PGP will continue to move from site to
site. Which is why archie and gopher are so important to
all of us.

Pat

Pat Farrell,      Grad Student                       pfarrell@cs.gmu.edu
Department of Computer Science, George Mason University, Fairfax, VA
PGP key available via finger or request           #include standard.disclaimer




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: uri@watson.ibm.com
Date: Fri, 15 Jan 93 09:58:13 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: possible solution to the anonymous...
In-Reply-To: <9301150837.AA01096@britt>
Message-ID: <9301151731.AA13017@buoy.watson.ibm.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


David Clunie says:
> > RSA has a patent on their algorithm.  It's quite likely that I can't
> > even create a key pair without their permission, let alone use it.
>
> I am not familiar with the legal status of patents and software packages,
> but it seems to me that they can sell you a program and license you to
> use it, but forcing you to use one of their key servers instead of your
> own seems pretty far fetched.

Anyway, RSADSI released RSAREF toolkit free for non-commercial use.
RIPEM (with RSAREF bundled in :-) allows you to create as many key
pairs as your soul wishes.   And surprise,  you are allowed to use
them...

So let's face real problems, rather than RSA patent (which hopefully
will expire by itself :-).
--
Regards,
Uri         uri@watson.ibm.com      scifi!angmar!uri 	N2RIU
-----------
<Disclamer>


From cypherpunks-request  Fri Jan 15 15:51:35 1993



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Eric Messick <eric@parallax.com>
Date: Fri, 15 Jan 93 15:45:21 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: random remailers
In-Reply-To: <9301151822.AA13343@xanadu.xanadu.com>
Message-ID: <9301152057.AA03932@parallax.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



I've been thinking about random remailing paths for a while now, and I
must admit that I don't know if it's on the balance a positive or
negative thing.  My view is: give the user the option.

The positive points:

Traffic analysis *MAY* be more difficult.  If you are receiving a
large quantity of traffic, it won't all follow the same path, so it
won't show up as a big spike in traffic between any two hosts.  On the
other hand, it will all need to converge on you anyway.  You just need
to hide the incoming traffic with bogus outgoing traffic.  If you
intend to receive a large amount of anonymous mail, it would be wise
to run a popular remailer.

New remailers get up to speed faster.  With the remailer network
handling the addition of new remailers automatically, an announcement
of a new remailer could result in sufficient cover traffic quickly.
If you have to wait for PEOPLE to decide to use the new remailer, it
will ramp up much more slowly.  On the other hand, cover traffic could
be handled randomly, even with real messages always being staticly
routed by people.

Negative points:

Your messages travel through more hosts, increasing the likelihood of
having them encounter a compromised host.  This is more pronounced
since it is difficult to evaluate the reputations of hosts when you
have only indirect control of their selection.  On the other hand, we
would like our systems to be immune to the compromise of even a
moderately large portion of the remailers.

A difficult question to be sure.  That's why I advocate giving the
choice to the user.

-eric messick




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Hal <74076.1041@CompuServe.COM>
Date: Fri, 15 Jan 93 10:13:47 PST
To: <cypherpunks@toad.com>
Subject: RIPEM vs PEM
Message-ID: <930115175946_74076.1041_DHJ57-1@CompuServe.COM>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


There is a little confusion here between RIPEM and PEM.  PEM is the 
"official" Internet standard for Privacy Enhanced Mail.  An implementation 
is in beta test right now, and uses a centralized certificate hierarchy for 
all keys.  Everyone has to have their keys signed by an agency which is 
authorized by RSADSI (at least according to the Internet drafts I have, 
which are several months old).  Typically, that agency would be your 
company or your school, because they are in a position to vouch for your 
identity.  There is a provision, though, for pseudonymous keys to be 
issued, although they would be clearly marked as such.
 
RIPEM is Mark Riordan's public-key program.  It is similar to PEM, but does 
not use the PEM certificates and therefore does not require people to have 
their keys signed by an agency.  It is not really PEM compatible. It does 
use the RSAREF public-domain encryption package, so it is legal for non-
commercial use in the U.S. and Canada.
 
What I suggested was the use of RIPEM since it is available now, is legal, 
and is free.
 
Note, though, that whether RIPEM or PGP is used, they are only for non- 
commercial use.  A remailer that wanted to charge, such as the ones that 
Eric Messick is discussing, would probably have to license the technology 
from PKP directly to be legal.  (I'm not sure whether PEM also is limited 
to non-commercial use.)
 
Hal Finney
74076.1041@compuserve.com





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: jordan@imsi.com (Jordan Hayes)
Date: Fri, 15 Jan 93 11:18:55 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re:  pax shutdown
Message-ID: <9301151813.AA26738@IMSI.COM>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


	From: BRIAN MCBEE <opac!brian%OPAC.osl.or.gov@CS.ORST.EDU>

	If it turns out that pressure to shut down really did come from
	the official net hierarchy ...

There is no question: those who were paying for the (quite expensive,
relatively low bandwidth) connection between the US & Australia found
themselves with a saturated link and looked for a "good candidate" to
shut off.  It turns out that lots of the packets are mail, and a good
number of the mail messages were going to/from the anonymous service.
This was not a move against anonymous e-mail or the research into it.
This was just an abuse of "someone elses money" that was easy to
target.

Next topic please ... this is getting tired.

/jordan




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Hal <74076.1041@CompuServe.COM>
Date: Fri, 15 Jan 93 10:39:53 PST
To: <cypherpunks@toad.com>
Subject: more on security/obscurity/reality
Message-ID: <930115183334_74076.1041_DHJ45-1@CompuServe.COM>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I can understand Daniel Ray's proposing to keep a low profile in 
running remailers, using encryption and such.  Pax was probably the 
highest profile service, at least in the Usenet groups I use, and look 
what happened to it.
 
The problem is, how can a remailing service be secret?  Its address has 
to be known in order for it to be used!  The only way it could be 
secret that I can see would be for it to have only a small, select 
group of "clients" who use it, and who keep the address to themselves.  
But there is no such group; it's not like there's some kind of ring of 
privacy lovers out there who will want to use such services but who 
will be willing to keep the servers secret.
 
If remailers are going to be useful, they _have_ to be public.  People 
have to know how to reach them in order to use them.  The real task, it 
seems to me, is to justify anonymous mail to the Internet public, so 
that people will not support these shutdowns, and, even better, so that 
people will routinely use encryption and even remailing when they 
communicate.  Eric Hughes made the point here some time back that we 
should aim for a society where sending non-encrypted remail is 
considered rather eccentric: "What?  You send your mail _exposed_?  You 
don't mind if everyone reads it?"  In the same way, sending mail in 
such a way that everyone can see who you are communicating with, and 
that everyone you send to can see your true address automatically, 
could become equally unusual.
 
One other point I'd make regards the use of pseudonyms for replying.  
The Pax service created a pseudonym for each person who used the 
service which was put into the "From:" line of outgoing mail.  Then 
people could reply to that pseudonym and it would go back to the 
original sender.
 
The problem with this approach, as far as spreading remailers, is that 
you have to have privileges on your machine in order to create new user 
ID's.  An individual user who doesn't own or run a machine is generally 
not able to create such pseudonyms.  This means that the number of 
people who can run remailers which use such features is much smaller 
than the number who can run the simpler Cypherpunks remailers in their 
current versions.
 
The Cypherpunks remailers do allow for anonymous return addresses, but 
they are quite cumbersome to use, not automatic like the Pax type.  But 
they do have the advantage that anyone who has access to Unix, PGP and 
Perl can run them.  This is probably a much larger population.
 
Hal





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Derek Atkins <warlord@MIT.EDU>
Date: Fri, 15 Jan 93 11:19:09 PST
To: Marc.Ringuette@GS80.SP.CS.CMU.EDU
Subject: Re: possible solution to the anonymous harrassment problem
In-Reply-To: <9301150856.AA27483@toad.com>
Message-ID: <9301151918.AA06316@toxicwaste.MEDIA.MIT.EDU>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> You're poorly informed.  As a condition of a grant from DARPA to RSADSI,
> RSAREF may be used noncommercially, for free, to do any of the following:
>      -    RSA encryption and key generation, as defined by RSA Data
>             Security's Public-Key Cryptography Standards (PKCS) [4]
>      -    MD2 and MD5 message digests [3,5,6]
>      -    DES (Data Encryption Standard) in cipher-block chaining mode
>             [7,8]
> Moreover, I believe you'll find that RSADSI has become much more helpful
> recently.  For more information, anonymous ftp to rsa.com and look around.
> 
> I've just gone over the RSAREF license agreement again.  It seems to permit
> any sort of not-for-profit operation, including a public key service.

Uhh, this is not quite true.  If you read closer, you will see that
you need "special permission from RSADSI" to use non-published
interfaces to RSAREF.  At the end is an exerpt from the RSAREF
documentation about its interface.  If you want more functionality,
you have to ask special permission!

This means that without this permission, you CANNOT use "RSA
encryption" in-and-of itself.

-derek

---------- begin exerpt --------------
RSAREF is written entirely in C. Its application interface includes
the following routines:

      R_SignPEMBlock     computes a digital signature on a message
R_VerifyPEMSignature     verifies a digital signature on a message
R_VerifyBlockSignature   verifies a digital signature on a block of
                           data such as a certificate

      R_SealPEMBlock     computes a digital signature and encrypts a
                           message
      R_OpenPEMBlock     decrypts an encrypted message and verifies a
                           digital signature

       R_DigestBlock     computes a message digest on a message

   R_GeneratePEMKeys     generates an RSA public/private key pair

        R_RandomInit     initializes a random structure
      R_RandomUpdate     mixes bytes into a random structure
R_GetRandomBytesNeeded   computes the number of mix-in bytes still
                           needed to seed a random structure
       R_RandomFinal     zeroizes a random structure





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: matt@oc.com (Matthew Lyle)
Date: Fri, 15 Jan 93 12:40:13 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: resource for writing corp e-mail policy?
Message-ID: <199301152036.AA27269@ra.oc.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Can anybody out there point me towards some resources that could be used to
write a good corporate e-mail privacy policy?

--
Matthew Lyle    	       	       	       	       	(214) 888-0474
OpenConnect Systems     	       	       	       	matt@oc.com
Dallas, TX                                      

"...and once you have tasted flight, you will walk the earth with your 
    eyes turned skyward, for there you have been, and there you long 
    to return..."





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: uri@watson.ibm.com
Date: Fri, 15 Jan 93 12:19:29 PST
To: warlord@MIT.EDU (Derek Atkins)
Subject: Re: possible solution to the anonymous harrassment problem
In-Reply-To: <9301151918.AA06316@toxicwaste.MEDIA.MIT.EDU>
Message-ID: <9301152018.AA12839@buoy.watson.ibm.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Derek Atkins says:
> > I've just gone over the RSAREF license agreement again.  It seems to permit
> > any sort of not-for-profit operation, including a public key service.
> Uhh, this is not quite true.  If you read closer, you will see that
> you need "special permission from RSADSI" to use non-published
> interfaces to RSAREF. If you want more functionality,
> you have to ask special permission!

Well, their license says, that "they will grant permission for any
reasonable request" for modification to RSAREF, or to access to
those unpublished routines.

I guess until somebody asks about such a permission and gets
rejected, or granted - we'll never know...  [BTW, I aske and
got such permission for my own private needs...]  Now, who's
willing to volunteer? (:-)

> This means that without this permission, you CANNOT use "RSA
> encryption" in-and-of itself.

Legally, you mean (:-).
--
Regards,
Uri         uri@watson.ibm.com      scifi!angmar!uri 	N2RIU
-----------
<Disclamer>






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Marc.Ringuette@GS80.SP.CS.CMU.EDU
Date: Fri, 15 Jan 93 12:30:20 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: possible solution to the anonymous harrassment problem
Message-ID: <9301152030.AA10201@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> If you read closer, you will see that you need "special permission from
> RSADSI" to use non-published interfaces to RSAREF.

I thought their interface was good enough to do all of the obvious
operations -- RSA block encrypt and decrypt being the most important --
and that this restriction was just to prevent bizarrelly hacked
versions of their code from being confused with the original.

>       R_SignPEMBlock     computes a digital signature on a message
> R_VerifyBlockSignature   verifies a digital signature on a block of
>                            data such as a certificate

Let me know if I'm wrong, but I don't think I am.

-- Marc Ringuette (mnr@cs.cmu.edu)




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: eab@msc.edu (Edward Bertsch)
Date: Fri, 15 Jan 93 13:34:11 PST
To: cypherpunks-request@toad.com
Subject: unsubscribe
Message-ID: <9301152133.AA05997@wc.msc.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


unsubscribe
please




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: uri@watson.ibm.com
Date: Fri, 15 Jan 93 13:26:42 PST
To: opac!brian%OPAC.osl.or.gov@CS.ORST.EDU (BRIAN MCBEE)
Subject: Re: use of ripem instead of pgp
In-Reply-To: <00966A50.87B655C0.23058@OPAC.OSL.OR.GOV>
Message-ID: <9301152125.AA19820@buoy.watson.ibm.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


BRIAN MCBEE says:
> Since the only reason we are talking about RIPEM is because of legality
> concerns about PGP, I thought I'd mention that it is (at least theoretically)
> illegal to export RIPEM from the US, annd therefore could not be legally used
> to correspond with persons overseas.

RSAREF isn't legally exportable - that's correct. But RIPEM certainly
is. And there's nothing to prevent those overseas from using RIPEM
with whatever RSA and DES implementations they wish (they have at
least three good ones to choose from :-).

> I don't know if there is a legal way to do public key cryptography between
> persons inside the US and persons outside the US.

a) If "they" teach PGP to understand PEM - we could use RIPEM here
   to talk to them (they will use PGP, naturally).

b) If they get legal RIPEM and marry it with RSA/DES - we could talk
   with them using RIPEM on both ends.
--
Regards,
Uri         uri@watson.ibm.com      scifi!angmar!uri 	N2RIU
-----------
<Disclamer>





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: jthomas@kolanut.mitre.org (Joe Thomas)
Date: Fri, 15 Jan 93 13:35:21 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: use of ripem instead of pgp
Message-ID: <9301152131.AA01479@kolanut>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


BRIAN MCBEE <opac!brian%OPAC.osl.or.gov@cs.orst.edu> writes:
>Since the only reason we are talking about RIPEM is because of  
legality 

>concerns about PGP, I thought I'd mention that it is (at least  
theoretically) 

>illegal to export RIPEM from the US, annd therefore could not be  
legally used 

>to correspond with persons overseas.

>I don't know if there is a legal way to do public key cryptography  
between 

>persons inside the US and persons outside the US.

What is illegal to export is the software implementations of strong  
cryptography, not messages encrypted with them, or even detailed  
specifications of how to implement compatible software.  So,  
theoretically, if a group in each COCOM-complying country and a group  
out of the reach of COCOM each independently implemented software to  
do the public-key cryptography (the U.S. group is the only one that  
will have to worry about licensing PKP's patents), then trading  
encrypted mail would be unquestionably legal.

It would also be a lot of wasted work and duplicated effort, and I  
don't see any reason to respect the laws that make exporting or  
importing this software illegal.  RIPEM has no doubt escaped the U.S.  
since RSADSI put it up for anonymous FTP last week, and PGP is  
everywhere.

Joe




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Marc.Ringuette@GS80.SP.CS.CMU.EDU
Date: Fri, 15 Jan 93 13:39:48 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: use of ripem instead of pgp
Message-ID: <9301152139.AA11168@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Bear in mind that many countries have restrictions about shipping
encrypted traffic across their borders.  These restrictions will be
almost impossible to enforce, true, but do exist.

M.





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Derek Atkins <warlord@MIT.EDU>
Date: Fri, 15 Jan 93 13:41:59 PST
To: Marc.Ringuette@GS80.SP.CS.CMU.EDU
Subject: Re: possible solution to the anonymous harrassment problem
In-Reply-To: <9301152030.AA10201@toad.com>
Message-ID: <9301152141.AA07098@toxicwaste.MEDIA.MIT.EDU>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> I thought their interface was good enough to do all of the obvious
> operations -- RSA block encrypt and decrypt being the most important --
> and that this restriction was just to prevent bizarrelly hacked
> versions of their code from being confused with the original.
> 
> >       R_SignPEMBlock     computes a digital signature on a message
> > R_VerifyBlockSignature   verifies a digital signature on a block of
> >                            data such as a certificate
> 
> Let me know if I'm wrong, but I don't think I am.

You are wrong.  The interface does *not* give you RSA Block
De/Encrypt.

-derek





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: dclunie@pax.tpa.com.au (David Clunie)
Date: Fri, 15 Jan 93 00:05:55 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: possible solution to the anonymous h
Message-ID: <9301150805.AA01054@britt>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> I thought about this.  The major problem is that once the PEM
> beta-testing period ends, all keys must be registered with "approved"
> (by RSA) central authorities.  I highly doubt they'd issue
> pseudonymous keys, but maybe they would allow someone to set up a
> heirarchy especially for that purpose.  I'm not convinced.

Who says ? RSA may wish this to happen, but surely anyone who wants to can
set up their own key service.

david




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: dclunie@pax.tpa.com.au (David Clunie)
Date: Fri, 15 Jan 93 00:38:16 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: possible solution to the anonymous h
Message-ID: <9301150837.AA01096@britt>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> RSA has a patent on their algorithm.  It's quite likely that I can't
> even create a key pair without their permission, let alone use it.

I am not familiar with the legal status of patents and software packages,
but it seems to me that they can sell you a program and license you to
use it, but forcing you to use one of their key servers instead of your
own seems pretty far fetched.

I would be very surprised if the law is clear cut on this issue, or has
ever been tested. I gather software licenses are pretty hazy territory at
the best of times without getting involved in patent law as well !@#$

david




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: peter honeyman <honey@citi.umich.edu>
Date: Fri, 15 Jan 93 17:18:58 PST
To: tribble@xanadu.com (E. Dean Tribble)
Subject: Re: random remailers
In-Reply-To: <9301151822.AA13343@xanadu.xanadu.com>
Message-ID: <9301160118.AA14215@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> Has anyone thought about the consequence of randomly picking a
> remailing path instead of using the same one?  

what if the remailer flips a coin, choosing between final delivery
and remailing through another of its ilk.  "message delivery with
probability one ..."  imho, this beats source routing big time.
easy to hack into the scripts, too.

>                                                It occurred to me
> yesterday that randomly picked paths could reveal more information to
> the remailer sites so that they could figure out the connection
> between a pseudonym and the eventual destination pretty well.  

not sure what you mean.

	peter




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Al Billings <mimir@u.washington.edu>
Date: Fri, 15 Jan 93 23:16:32 PST
To: Hal <74076.1041@CompuServe.COM>
Subject: Re: more on security/obscurity/reality
In-Reply-To: <930115183334_74076.1041_DHJ45-1@CompuServe.COM>
Message-ID: <Pine.3.05y.9301152356.A18364-9100000@carson.u.washington.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain




On 15 Jan 1993, Hal wrote:

> One other point I'd make regards the use of pseudonyms for replying.  
> The Pax service created a pseudonym for each person who used the 
> service which was put into the "From:" line of outgoing mail.  Then 
> people could reply to that pseudonym and it would go back to the 
> original sender.

 Does anyone have a copy of the software PAX used?







From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Dave Banisar <banisar@washofc.cpsr.org>
Date: Fri, 15 Jan 93 20:25:16 PST
To: CPSR@gwuvm.gwu.edu
Subject: Released GSA Docs Slam FBI Wiretap Proposal
Message-ID: <9301152322.AA47734@hacker2.eff.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



"GSA Memos Reveal that FBI Wiretap Plan was 
Opposed by Government's Top Telecomm Purchaser"

 	The New York Times reported today on a document obtained 
by CPSR through the Freedom of Information Act.  ("FBI's 
Proposal on Wiretaps Draws Criticism from G.S.A.," New York 
Times, January 15, 1993, p. A12)

	The document, an internal memo prepared by the General 
Services Administration, describes many problems with the 
FBI's wiretap plan and also shows that the GSA strongly 
opposed the sweeping proposal.  The GSA is the largest 
purchaser of telecommunications equipment in the federal 
government. 

	The FBI wiretap proposal, first announced in March of 
1992, would have required telephone manufacturers to design 
all communications equipment to facilitate wire surveillance. 
The proposal was defeated last year. The FBI has said that it 
plans to reintroduce a similar proposal this year.

	The documents were released to Computer Professionals 
for Social Responsibility, a public interest organization, 
after CPSR submitted Freedom of Information Act requests 
about the FBI's wiretap plan to several federal agencies last 
year.

	The documents obtained by CPSR reveal that the GSA, 
which is responsible for equipment procurement for the 
Federal government, strongly opposed two different versions 
of the wiretap plan developed by the FBI.  According to the 
GSA, the FBI proposal would complicate interoperability, 
increase cost, and diminish privacy and network security.  
The GSA also stated that the proposal could "adversely 
_affect national security._"

	In the second memo, the GSA concluded that it would be a 
mistake to give the Attorney General sole authority to waive 
provisions of the bill.

	The GSA's objections to the proposal were overruled by 
the Office of Management and Budget, a branch of the White 
House which oversees administrative agencies for the 
President.  However, none of GSA's objections were disclosed 
to the public or made available to policy makers in 
Washington.

	Secrecy surrounds this proposal.  Critical sections of a 
report on the FBI wiretap plan prepared by the General 
Accounting Office were earlier withhold after the FBI 
designated these sections "National Security Information." 
These sections included analysis by GAO on alternatives to 
the FBI's wiretap plan.  CPSR is also pursuing a FOIA lawsuit 
to obtain the FBI's internal documents concerning the wiretap 
proposal.

	The GSA memos, the GAO report and others that CPSR is 
now seeking indicate that there are many important documents 
within the government which have still not been disclosed to 
the public.  

Marc Rotenberg
CPSR Washington office
rotenberg@washofc.cpsr.org

Note: Underscores indicate underlining in the original text. 
Dashes that go across pages indicate page breaks.


[Computer Professionals for Social Responsibility is a non-
profit, public interest membership organization. For 
membership information about CPSR, contact 
cpsr@csli.stanford.edu or call 415/322-3778.  For information 
on CPSR's FOIA work, contact David Sobel at 202/544-9240 
(sobel@washofc.cpsr.org).]


-------------------------------------------------------------


                      (#4A)

              Control No. X92050405
               Due Date:     5/5/92



Brenda Robinson (S)

After KMR consultations, we still _"cannnot support"_ Draft 
Bill. No. 118 as substantially revised by Justice after its 
purported full consideration of other agencies' "substantive 
concerns." 

Aside from the third paragraph of our 3/13/92 attachment 
response for the original draft bill, which was adopted as 
GSA's position (copy attached), Justice has failed to fully 
address other major GSA concerns (i.e., technological changes 
and associated costs).

Further, by merely eliminating the FCC and any discussion of 
cost issues in the revision, we can not agree as contended by 
Justice that it now " ... takes care of kinds of problems 
raised by FCC and others ...."

Finally, the revision gives Justice sole unilateral exclusive 
authority to enforce and except or waive the provisions of 
any resultant Iaw in Federal District Courts. Our other 
concerns are also shown in the current attachment for the 
revised draft bill.

Once again OMB has not allowed sufficient time for a more 
through review, a comprehensive internal staffing, or a 
formal response.


                       /Signature/

                       Wm. R. Loy  KMR     5/5/92

Info: K(Peay),KD,KA,KB,KE,KG,KV,KM,KMP,KMR,R/F,LP-Rm.4002

(O/F) -   9C1h (2) (a) - File (#4A)



-------------------------------------------------------------


                          ATTACHMENT
                 REVISED JUSTICE DRAFT BILL
                       DIGITAL TELEPHONY


The proposed legislation could have a widespread impact on 
the government's ability to acquire _new_ telecommunications 
equipment and provide electronic communications services.

_Existing_ Federal government telecommunications resources 
will be affected by the proposed new technology techniques 
and equipment. An incompatibility and interoperability of 
existing Federal government telecommunications system, and 
resources would result due to the new technological changes 
proposed.

The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) has been removed 
from the legislation, but the Justice implementation may 
require modifications to the "Communications Act of 1934," 
and other FCC policies and regulations to remove 
inconsistencies. This could also cause an unknown effect on 
the wire and electronic communications systems operations, 
services, equipment, and regulations within the Federal 
government. Further, to change a major portion of the United 
States telecommunications infrastructure (the public switched 
network within eighteen months and others within three years) 
seems very optimistic, no matter how trivial or minimal the 
proposed modifications are to implement.

In the proposed legislation the Attorney General has sole 
_unilateral exclusive_ authority to enforce, grant exceptions 
or waive the provisions of any resultant law and enforce it 
in Federal District Courts. The Attorney General would, as 
appropriate, only "consult" with the FCC, Department of 
Commerce, or Small Business Administration. The Attorney 
General has exclusive authority in Section 2 of the 
legislation; it appears the Attorney General has taken over 
several FCC functions and placed the FCC in a mere consulting 
capacity.

The proposed legislation would apply to all forms of wire and 
electronic communications to include computer data bases, 
facsimile, imagery etc., as well as voice transmissions.

The proposed legislation would assist eavesdropping by law 
enforcement, but it would also apply to users who acquire the 
technology capability and make it easier for criminals, 
terrorists, foreign intelligence (spies) and computer hackers 
to electronically penetrate the public network and pry into 
areas previously not open to snooping. This situation of 
easier access due to new technology changes could therefore 
affect _national security_.

                            (1)


-------------------------------------------------------------



The proposed legislation does not address standards and 
specifications for telecommunications equipment nor security 
considerations. These issues must be addressed as they effect 
both the government and private industry. There are also 
civil liberty implications and the public's constitutional 
rights to privacy which are not mentioned.

it must be noted that equipment already exists that can be 
used to wiretap the digital communications lines and support 
court- authorized wiretaps, criminal investigations and 
probes of voice communications. The total number of 
interception applications authorized within the United States 
(Federal and State) has been averaging under nine hundred per 
year. There is concern that the proposed changes are not cost 
effective and worth the effort to revamp all the existing and 
new telecommunications systems.

The proposed bill would have to have the FCC or another 
agency approve or reject new telephone equipment mainly on 
the basis of whether the FBI has the capability to wiretap 
it. The federal- approval process is normally lengthy and the 
United States may not be able to keep pace with foreign 
industries to develop new technology and install secure 
communications. As a matter of interest, the proposed 
restrictive new technology could impede the United States' 
ability to compete in digital telephony and participate in 
the international trade arena.

Finally, there will be unknown associated costs to implement 
the proposed new technological procedures and equipment. 
These costs would be borne by the Federal government, 
consumers, and all other communications ratepayers to finance 
the effort. Both the Federal government and private industry 
communications regular phone service, data transmissions, 
satellite and microwave transmissions, and encrypted 
communications could be effected at increased costs.

                               (2)

=============================================================
  Documents disclosed to Computer Professionals for Social     
Responsibility (CPSR), under the Freedom of Information Act
December 1992
=============================================================






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: tony@morgan.demon.co.uk (Tony Kidson)
Date: Fri, 15 Jan 93 19:27:50 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: more on security/obscurity/reality (fwd)
Message-ID: <1414@morgan.demon.co.uk>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


In message <9218@eternity.demon.co.uk> you write:
> Forwarded message follows:
>
> > From cypherpunks-request%toad.com@relay2.uu.net Fri Jan 15 12:52:47 1993
>
> One thing I've really noticed over the 5 or 6 years I've been on the net
> is the real hatred people have for what is coined "security by obscurity."
> I think it is because of the terrible way people have gotten burned by
> relying on conceiled methods only, or secret algorithms as ciphers to
> protect their material. The method is discovered one way or another, and
> everything caves in on itself! Quite understandable.
>
> Yet I cringe at the way people have just turned their backs on the whole
> meta-philosophy of "coversion." If, for instance, you are to do battle with
> an unbearable, overwhelming power, such as the Government, then what is the
> only real way to "win?" Besides convincing them not to do battle with you?
>
> It is by staying conceiled, secret, untargetable. If they don't know to fight
> you, or, if they do know, but cannot find you, then you stay all right.
> Once it gets to a face-to-face confrontation, however, you lose, and you
> lose immediately, there is nothing you can bring to bear, since it is now
> just a force equation, and they have over 10,000 times the force you do.
> Or more...
>
> This is one of the applications of the secret side of life. Modern crypto-
> graphy has advanced, I think, by declaring all coversion as eventually
> discoverable, and only seeking algorithms that will suffice even if the
> enemy knows your methods. I agree with this. I guess I part company, however,
> when people totally throw out being secretive as a partial or adjunctive
> solution to something that is intrinsicly secret to begin with. The addition
> of conceilment, disinformation, invisibility, etc. can be a tremendous
> advantage when combined with strong methods (good ciphers that don't rely
> on coversion). It is a multilayered approach that first tries to not become
> a target, and, if it is a target is still hard to crack.
>
> When us little people try to maintain privacy against a Govt. that is REALLY
> PISSED OFF BY EVEN THE IDEA WE WANT TO STRONGLY PROTECT OURSELVES, a multi-
> layered, contingency-based approach is required. The most important part of
> it is not a strong cipher, but, not to become a detectable or locatable
> target. i.e. coversion and secrecy.

While what you say is certainly true, it won't survive any kind 
of detailed attack. I'm all for the sentiment, but while there 
are so many mundane things going on round about, the best way to 
remain undetected is to remain undecipherable and to make sure 
that there is enough traffic about of the same sort. Press for 
encipherment of e-mail, that way, if everybody is doing it, who's 
to know what the underworld is doing? This is especially useful 
if you are not actually interested in violent revolution. You can 
then convince the powers that be that you are not worth 
monitoring.

regards

Tony
------------------+-------------------------------+--------------------------+
| Tony Kidson     |`morgan' is an 8MB  486/33 Cat-| Voice +44 81 466 5127    | 
| Morgan Towers,  |Warmer with a 670 MB Hard Disk.| E-Mail                   |      
| Morgan Road,    |It  resides at Morgan Towers in| tony@morgan.demon.co.uk  |
| Bromley,        |Beautiful  Down Town  Bromley. | tny@cix.compulink.co.uk  |
| England BR1 3QE |            -=<*>=-            | 100024.301@compuserve.com|
+=================+===============================+==========================+




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Chris Hibbert <hibbert@xanadu.com>
Date: Sat, 16 Jan 93 14:55:14 PST
To: Hal <uunet!CompuServe.COM!74076.1041@uunet.UU.NET>
Subject: Re: possible solution to the anonymous h
In-Reply-To: <930115065840_74076.1041_DHJ55-1@CompuServe.COM>
Message-ID: <9301162240.AA18137@entropy.xanadu.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain




> A final point is that forwarding mail for another person can hardly be
> made illegal in general.  If I receive a message from person A asking me
> to forward it on to person B, and I do so, this is clearly a legitimate
> email message that I choose to send.  To try to disallow this would be to
> put intolerable restrictions on email content.  So, if this is allowed, it
> seems to me that I should be able to write a program to do what I am
> allowed to do manually.

I don't believe the analogy holds up.  In dealing with it manually,
police would expect that there's  a chance that they could haul you
into court and ask you for names and dates.  In the manual
situation, you are responsible as editor, a responsibility you're
looking to get away from.  The law would prefer that someone is
responsible, so they may try to find a way to hold someone
responsible.

Chris




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Hal <74076.1041@CompuServe.COM>
Date: Sat, 16 Jan 93 17:48:21 PST
To: CYPHERPUNKS <CYPHERPUNKS@TOAD.COM>
Subject: Digital cash legality...
Message-ID: <930117014230_74076.1041_DHJ26-1@CompuServe.COM>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I've continued to try to learn about what laws might restrict the issuing
of electronic money.

Banking is controlled at both the state and the federal level.
One question was whether one could engage in bank-like activities
without calling yourself a bank.  Denning's California Codes, Financial,
has this definition:

------
Section 102.  "Bank"

The word "bank" as used in this division means any incorporated
banking institution which shall have been incorporated to engage in
commercial banking business or trust business.  The soliciting, receiv-
ing, or accepting of money or its equivalent on deposit as a regular
business shall be deemed to be doing a commercial banking business
whether such deposit is made subject to check or is evidenced by a
certificate of deposit, a passbook, a note, a receipt, or other writing;
provided, that nothing herein shall apply to or include money or its
equivalent left in escrow, or left with an agent pending investment in
real estate or securities for or on account of his principal.  It shall be
unlawful for any corporation, partnership, firm, or individual to
engage in or transact a banking business within this state except by
means of a corporation duly organized for such purpose.
------

This seems to say that it's illegal to do these bank-like activities
unless you either are a corporation specifically chartered to be a bank
(in which case the many banking laws apply to you), or unless you are
an escrow agent or a real estate or securities agent (in which case
many other laws apply to you).  The California financial codes are
three volumes long, so there is a considerable body of law that one
would have to be familiar with to consider engaging in such activies.

Another approach I have thought of would be to buy and sell digital
cash, calling it something else.  It's legal to buy and sell other
bit patterns, such as computer-readable pictures and software, so
it should be legal to buy and sell these cryptographic items.  The
idea would be that for $1.00 you will sell someone a #1.00 crypto-
cash file, either through email or over the counter if you wanted
(on a floppy).  Then, if someone comes to you with one of these #1.00
digital cash files, you will buy it back for $1.00.  At one level
you are simply buying and selling items just like the local dealer
in baseball cards, but at another level you are a "money changer",
converting between U.S. dollars and crypto-credits.  The credits
thus receive backing through your willingness to redeem them for
dollars at any time.

One issue is how certain people can be that you actually will buy
back this crypto-cash for its "face value".  Given that you're not
actually a bank, not actually a money dealer, and therefore not
bound by any regulations, there is nothing to compel you to continue
to accept the crypto money.  You could arbitrarily decide at any time
not to buy it back any more, just like the local baseball card dealer.
This, I think, is what makes this whole activity legal - you're not
making any promises to "depositers" that they can get their money back.
But, by the same token, it may prevent the digicash from being accepted.
It would basically come down to your reputation for being trustworthy
and committed.

Another problem is the issue of sales tax.  Using this "seller of
bit patterns" model, you will have to collect sales tax from your
customers who are within the state.  From my experience selling software,
you don't have to collect it for out-of-state customers.  I don't
know whether the state would also expect another "cut" when you buy
the bit patterns back.  But it sounds like there will be at least
a 7% transaction cost to turn dollars into digital cash, which is
probably prohibitive.  One solution might be to do this from a state
which doesn't collect sales tax.

(Coin dealers here in California have some exemptions from the sales
tax requirements, but I doubt whether these exemptions could be
stretched to cover what I am proposing here.  In other respects, though,
that business is rather similar to what I am talking about, in that
they do a lot of selling and buying back.)

A related issue is whether this should be thought of as a business
at all, or whether it could be a hobby.  The fact is, you could
actually make a lot of money at this, even though you buy and sell
at the same price, by investing the dollars you are paid until you
have to use them to buy the digital cash back.  Still, given the apparent
need to infringe or license both RSA's and Chaum's patents, I think
running it on a "non-commercial" basis would be more acceptable, if
that could be done.  I suppose if you were careful to segregate the
dollars used to purchase crypto-cash into a non-interest-bearing
account, so you didn't make any money on them, you could call it non-
commercial.  (Actually, it's not 100% clear to me that RSA's patents
would apply to a digital cash implementation, since their patent is
for a communications machine, even though the algorithm is the same.)

I'll let people know as I continue to learn more.

Hal





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Date: Sat, 16 Jan 93 23:45:44 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Ideal Remailers
In-Reply-To: <9301151822.AA13343@xanadu.xanadu.com>
Message-ID: <9301170742.AA11487@netcom3.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


SOME PROPERTIES OF IDEAL REMAILERS

Cypherpunks,

It's been exciting seeing the work being done by so many of you on
remailers! Not being either a PERL user or a UNIX box owner, I haven't
had much to add to the debate these past several weeks.

But on the issue of basic, primitive features of remailing networks, I
want to make some points. I'll use Dean's message as a starting point.

Dean Tribble writes:

> Has anyone thought about the consequence of randomly picking a
> remailing path instead of using the same one?  It occurred to me
> yesterday that randomly picked paths could reveal more information to
> the remailer sites so that they could figure out the connection
> between a pseudonym and the eventual destination pretty well.  It's
> just an intuition at this point, though.

I assume Dean means that by analyzing some kind of characteristic of
the message and enough of the routings, some "common factor" analysis
might reveal the sender.

This may be   true in cases  where  the routing   path  is   _visible_
(unencrypted at some or  all nodes) to  some  or all  of  the remailer
nodes. However, I  think we all  expect remailers to  (eventually) have
most or all of these properties:

* All packets are encrypted to the public key of the remailer node:
only the previous (n - 1) and next (n + 1) nodes in a remailer path
are known to node n, except by collusion between remailers.

* Some number of incoming messages are collected together before
remailing in an order that gives no clues about the order received,
e.g., lexicographic order. (I realize that at this stage of
experimentation, such "accumulation" may not be practical.)

* The remailer node n should "forget" the connection between incoming
and outgoing paths. The Chaum "digital mix" idea, when implemented
with tamper-resistant hardware, means a remailer can explicitly keep
no record of the incoming and outgoing paths, making collusion at a
later time (perhaps demanded by authorities) unproductive.

* The tamper-resistant, fully-automated nature is very important.
Running remailers on insecure boxes, or large Unix machines at
corporate and university sites, is not a long-term situation!

* Each originator of a piece of mail should, ideally, also operate a
remailing service (at least at some low level). This will allow any
message "traced back" (somehow) to a person to be "deniable"..."But I
didn't write that message, I just remailed it! And, no, my remailer
box doesn't keep any records."

* Payment for remailing services can be done in several ways.
Eventually, digital money can be used. A more immediately doable
scheme may to use the equivalent of "stamps." Since "digital stamps"
is confusing, call it "digtial postage." It may work as follows:

-Tim's Remailing Service sells "rolls" (lists) of 50-digit numbers
(large enough to make guessing unproductive) for perhaps $0.29 per
number. Each number is a "promise to remail" for some typical-sized
message, with more stamps needed for longer messages.

- No crypto protocols are really needed. Forgery by copying is handled
by simply saying that the first use of number is the only use...the
buyer of numbers must keep his numbers secure (at his site, and in
the remailing chain). The seller of numbers (e.g., Tim's Remailing
Service) is not likely to try to cheat purchasers of stamps by denying
he issued them (by standard reputation-based systems, independent
auditing services, etc.).

* Return envelopes can be handled by enclosing prepaid envelopes as
part of the message. (No record need be kept of the path, obviously,
as the return path through a web of remailers is independent of the
initial path.)

* It is very likely--almost certain, in fact--that various remailing
services will have have various policies, prices, reputations, etc.
Some will be cheap-but-not-secure, others will be secure-but-slow, and
so on. As our "Crypto Game" revealed so clearly last September at our
first Cypherpunks meeting, some remailer sites will be "narcs," some
will sell their knowledge to others, and so on. This is to be
expected, especially given that we will be operating in a nearly pure
anarchocapitalist situation, with no "enforcement" by
authorities...fortunately, free markets are quite efficient in
correcting such problems (the topic of another essay, perhaps).

But such a market will allow a user to select a remailing path, known
only to him (if collusion is avoided, and if the remailers have the
robust properties mentioned already).

I mention these robust properties--what we can call the "ideal
remailer"--because some of the existing or planned remailers do
various "non-ideal" things, like keep logs of all mail, run on
nonsecure machines, don't have strong encryption, and so on.

These imperfect remailers are still useful, especially at this early,
experimental stage. And they may exist even after more ideal remailers
come into use. Of course, there "market value" is likely to be fairly
low...

The robust, ideal remailers are what we should be shooting for.

And I think we're making amazingly fast progress.


-Tim May


-- 
..........................................................................
Timothy C. May         | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,  
tcmay@netcom.com       | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
408-688-5409           | knowledge, reputations, information markets, 
W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA  | black markets, collapse of governments.
Higher Power: 2^756839 | PGP Public Key: by arrangement.





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: k.campbell14@genie.geis.com
Date: Sun, 17 Jan 93 09:12:47 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: No Subject
Message-ID: <9301171714.AA14822@relay1.geis.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


i want to join the revolution. return to bablon. appreciated...




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Hal <74076.1041@CompuServe.COM>
Date: Sun, 17 Jan 93 10:53:20 PST
To: CYPHERPUNKS <CYPHERPUNKS@TOAD.COM>
Subject: Poor Man's Cash.
Message-ID: <930117184744_74076.1041_DHJ40-1@CompuServe.COM>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Tim May's message about remailers mentioned the possibility of a
simple way of handling digital postage.  This can be extended to be
a replacement for digital cash which doesn't use any cryptography.

As in Tim's suggestion, the "banker" (or "money changer" in the model
I described yesterday) simply creates 50-bit numbers, each of which is
a "piece of digital cash".  The banker keeps a list of the specific
numbers that are circulating.  When someone presents one for payment,
he checks to see if the number is on the list.  If so, he honors it
and then removes it from the list.  As with regular digital cash,
withdrawers keep the numeric values secret.

Nobody can forge the cash because no one can create numbers which are
on the banker's (secret) list.

There are two problems with this system.  The first is that there is
no way for the seller in a seller/buyer transaction to verify that
the random 50-bit numbers the buyer is offering him are actually valid
pieces of digital cash.  The only thing he could do is to send them
to the bank and have the bank report back as to whether they are valid
or not.

But in at least the simpler cryptographic protocols, the same problem
exists.  In those protocols, it may be possible to use digital signatures
to recognize that a particular piece of cash originally came from the
bank, but you still have the problem that this cash may have been
"spent" before.  Digital cash can be reproduced trivially, so any seller
must again check with the bank to make sure that the cash he is offered
is still valid.  (More complex schemes are intended to allow "incrimination"
of a buyer who reuses cash, but I feel that they have problems as well.)
So this problem is no worse than at least the simpler cryptographic
schemes.

The other problem is that this cash is not anonymous.  When a seller
sends in some cash he received from a buyer, the banker can recognize
which buyer that cash came from.

But there are several reasons why this might not be as bad as it seems.
First, the buyer and seller may themselves be anonymous to the bank.  The
bank may know them only through an anonymous address of the type we have
been discussing here.  So, at best, the banker could deduce things like
"account 1234 seems to be buying a lot from account 5678."  This is not
a direct loss of anonymity.  Second, our own paper cash already has this
problem, through the serial numbers printed on each bill.  Although this
is used occasionally by law enforcement to track criminals, it is not
considered in general to be a threat to anonymity.

And third, the banker could have a policy of not remembering which buyer
received each outgoing digital cash number.  This could be done by
having the banker publicize the software which he is running, so that
people can see that these records are not being kept, along with
occasional audits by some third party to verify that the banker is
actually running that software.  There would still be an element of
trust involved, but trust will always be a part of such relationships,
and reputations will be important.

This "poor man's digital cash" is not that interesting technically,
because no cryptography is involved.  But it does provide most of the
features of crypto-cash, and it does so in a manner which is easy to
understand and explain.  It also violates no one's patents, so it would
be that much easier to start experimenting with it safely.

Hal





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Hal <74076.1041@CompuServe.COM>
Date: Sun, 17 Jan 93 10:53:24 PST
To: CYPHERPUNKS <CYPHERPUNKS@TOAD.COM>
Subject: Crypto trading cards.
Message-ID: <930117184802_74076.1041_DHJ40-2@CompuServe.COM>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Giving a little more thought to the idea of buying and selling digital
cash, I thought of a way to present it.  We're buying and selling
"cryptographic trading cards".  Fans of cryptography will love these
fascinating examples of the cryptographic arts.  Notice the fine way
the bit patterns fit together - a mix of one-way functions and digital
signatures, along with random blinding.  What a perfect conversation
piece to be treasured and shown to your friends and family.

Plus, your friends will undoubtedly love these cryptographic trading
cards just as much.  They'll be eager to trade for them.  Collect a
whole set!  They come in all kinds of varieties, from the common
1's, to the rarer 50's, all the way up to the seldom-seen 1000's.
Hours of fun can be had for all.

Your friendly cryptographic trading card dealer wants to join the fun,
too.  He'll be as interested in buying your trading cards back as in
selling them.

Try this fascinating and timely new hobby today!

Hal





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Hal <74076.1041@CompuServe.COM>
Date: Sun, 17 Jan 93 20:48:33 PST
To: CYPHERPUNKS <CYPHERPUNKS@TOAD.COM>
Subject: Return envelopes.
Message-ID: <930118044221_74076.1041_DHJ53-1@CompuServe.COM>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I looked at Eric Messick's improved ideas for remailing with digital
postage, and they look pretty good.  I think it's especially good that
Eric has been able to show that anonymous addresses can be used by
more than one person without being incriminating.

But there is still an attack which they are vulnerable to, which Eric
mentions.  The "Pneed" field of the anonymous address has information
about the postage amounts which will be needed by each remailer in
the chain.  (But it doesn't reveal which specific remailers to use,
of course.)  It also has public keys to encrypt these amounts with,
which are matched by secret keys hidden in the encrypted address.

But the remailers themselves each see their corresponding postage secret
keys as they process the message.  This means that they know which
envelope was used to send each message.  That means that each remailer
can find out if it is part of a given anonymous address, and it can
find out what remailers are before and after it in the chain.  It is
especially unnerving that the last remailer in the chain can learn
this information, as it will see your true address.  The one consolation
is that it won't _know_ that it is the last remailer in the chain,
so it won't realize that it has actually broken the code and is seeing
the true correspondance between the anonymous address and the real
address.

But if most anonymous addresses only go through no more than a handful
of remailers, say 10, then that remailer must figure that it has at
least a 10% chance of having "broken" your address.  This degree of
information is more than I would like to have revealed about my anonymous
address.

Based on this, I would be inclined to use non-postage-charging remailers.
But even the non-postage remailers have the same flaw using Eric's
protocol.  Each remailer sees the "clear text" of the message M being
passed along.  If a remailer sent the message in the first place, it
created M, so if it then sees message M come through later, it again
knows the correspondance between an anonymous address and its own
forwarding activities.

Chaum's scheme avoided this problem by having M get encrypted at each
point.  Using Eric's notation, an anonymous address might be:

Addr: &Z, z, z(&R, r, A, r(junk))

The new addition is A, a random conventional key.  Z gets sent:

To: &Z
Addr: z(z(&R, r, A, r(junk)), pad)
Message: z(M, pad)

This is just like Eric's example.  What Z sends is:

To: &R
Addr: r(r(junk), pad)
Message: r(A(M), pad)

The new feature is that Z encrypted M with A as it passed through.
In this case we only had a one-step anonymous address, but if there
were more than one step, each would use a different conventional key
A, B, C, ....  This way even a remailer which created M wouldn't
recognize it when it passed through after at least one step.

Using this idea along with Eric's idea of random padding and double
encryption at each step, we have multiple-use return addresses for
which no information can be learned at any point about the correspondence
between anonymous and real addresses, as long as the return addresses
use at least two hops.

Hal





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Jay Prime Positive <jpp@markv.com>
Date: Mon, 18 Jan 93 21:47:16 PST
To: CYPHERPUNKS@toad.com
Subject: Poor Man's Cash -> Poor Man's Wallet
Message-ID: <9301182145.aa03856@hermix.markv.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


From: jpp@hermix
To: CYPHERPUNKS@TOAD.COM
In-reply-to: Hal's message of 17 Jan 93 13:47:45 EST <930117184744_74076.1041_DHJ40-1@CompuServe.COM>
Subject: Poor Man's Cash -> Poor Man's Wallet

  Here is a minor change which can be used with the Poor Man's Cash
protocol to increase the burden on banks which wish to trace
transactions.  I will call it Poor Man's Wallet protocol.

  Rather than maintain accounts, have the bank maintain only a map
from bills to values.  The bank will support three kinds of
transactions: Combine, Split, Validate.

  To check that a bill is good, I ask the bank to VALIDATE b1.  It
responds with v and b2.  V is the value of b1, and b2 is a new bill
that has the value of b1 (- bank fee).  (Naturaly the new value of b1
will be 0.)  Worthless bills b1 could result in either a b2 with a
value of 0 (thus issueing a new 0 worth bill) or with no bill at all.

  To add money to my wallet, I ask the bank to COMBINE a bill b1 from
somewhere else, to a bill b2 from my wallet.  Both b1's and b2's value
get zeroed, and a new bill b3 with value = to v(b1) + v(b2) (- bank
fee) is returned to me.

  To break a bill down to more convinient sizes (perhaps when I wish
to pay some one), I ask the bank to SPLIT a bill b1 into b2 and b3,
where v(b3) = v(b1) - v(b2) (- bank fee).

  It may be better (as far as anonymity goes) to require the bank fees
be paid with a seperate bill.  It will be better to have many banks,
and to have the banks each validate bills of other banks.  Since in
this case your anonymity is the maximum of the anonymities of the
chain of banks involved.

j'




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: peter honeyman <honey@citi.umich.edu>
Date: Mon, 18 Jan 93 20:29:00 PST
To: rusty_h._hodge@uunet.uu.net
Subject: Re: possible solution to the anonymous harrassment problem
In-Reply-To: <1993Jan14.123843.1227@horizon.amgen.com>
Message-ID: <9301190428.AA18683@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> >for example, i can send postal mail with high confidence 
> >of anonymity, and can make anonymous phone calls (with care,
> >e.g., by using phone booths and moving around).
> 
> What about that little old ladie that watches the PO Box and Phone Booth
> from her window?  What about the postman who sees you place the letter in
> the mailbox?

like i said, with care.  just as i have to be careful that my sys admin
isn't snoopy.  but that's not my point.  if you do exercise care, you
can send anonymous mail, just like you can communicate anonymously with
other media (if you are careful).  remailers institutionalize anonymity,
nothing more.

> >privacy and honesty are orthogonal.
> 
> I've often accidentially overheard things I wasn't suppost to.  If people
> were totally honest, we wouldn't need such good encryption...

if your point is that dishonesty makes privacy necessary, i agree.
but i do *not* agree that total honesty makes privacy unnecessary.

	peter




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "DrZaphod" <ncselxsi!drzaphod@ncselxsi.netcom.com>
Date: Tue, 19 Jan 93 07:32:36 PST
To: CypherPunks@toad.com
Subject: This Honesty Thing Again
Message-ID: <25637.drzaphod@ncselxsi>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


In Message Thu, 14 Jan 1993 12:38:43 PST,
  horizon.amgen.com!Rusty_H._Hodge@netcomsv.netcom.com writes:

> If people were totally honest, we wouldn't need such good encryption...

     I think we've gone over this b4.

DrZaphod
[AC/DC] / [DnA][HP]
[drzaphod@ncselxsi.uucp]
Technicolorized




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Daniel Ray <root@tnl.com>
Date: Tue, 19 Jan 93 16:35:51 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: need for more anon remailer sites
Message-ID: <9301190731.AA07288@tnl.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>
>I suggest using a dictionary to come up with "names" of anonymous users:
>
>aback
>abacus
>abalone
>abandon
>abase
>abash
>abate
>abater
>abbas
>...
>
>You could pick them in random order, or sequentially.
>
> ...
>	John Gilmore
>

certainly dictionary words are good, randomly, not in sequential order. But
also usernames such as cs135 and anything else. The point is not to form any
pattern distinguishable from the actual distribution of usernames in the real
world. So some would even look like univ. course accounts, even with a couple
"anon"-looking usernames thrown in! an analysis of actual usernames should be
in order for this, and the actual types and probabilities.... in other words,
take this situation full throttle!

and of course, we need not give up our legal rights to use email. but we
must, IN ADVANCE, be prepared and be already fully set for anything!

dan





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Daniel Ray <root@tnl.com>
Date: Tue, 19 Jan 93 16:34:37 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: no to DES
Message-ID: <9301190748.AA07434@tnl.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Maybe the general swing of some of you is to go with the "safer" RIPEM
since it is less legally contested...

But I won't trust it til it uses IDEA or triple DES or something much
sounder than a 56 bit cipher. It is just too likely that this is readable
by our big brother Nat Samuel Adams.

dan





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Daniel Ray <root@tnl.com>
Date: Tue, 19 Jan 93 16:34:46 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: random remailers
Message-ID: <9301190827.AA08003@tnl.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>...
>A difficult question to be sure.  That's why I advocate giving the
>choice to the user.
>
>-eric messick
>

DEFINATELY! Have a good, redundant system in place. Then let the chips--the
users--and the usage--fall where it may...  This makes things far more complex
than any singularly organized method.

dan





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Daniel Ray <root@tnl.com>
Date: Tue, 19 Jan 93 16:36:16 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: more on security/obscurity/reality
Message-ID: <9301190839.AA08188@tnl.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>
>While what you say is certainly true, it won't survive any kind 
>of detailed attack. I'm all for the sentiment, but while there 
>are so many mundane things going on round about, the best way to 
>remain undetected is to remain undecipherable and to make sure 
>that there is enough traffic about of the same sort. Press for 
>encipherment of e-mail, that way, if everybody is doing it, who's 
>to know what the underworld is doing? This is especially useful 
>if you are not actually interested in violent revolution. You can 
>then convince the powers that be that you are not worth 
>monitoring.
>
>regards
>
>Tony

this is dead on true. the whole problem of all this is our "transition
period" until encryption is matter-of-course. and the possibility that
serious opposition will actually arise to delay that day even further.

once everyone does it, most of (but not all of) the special contingencies
are unnecessary.

what I am trying to address is how things are now, and how they may change
one way, or another. and to find the best multi-solution for most of these
possibilities....until that happy day you speak of.

dan





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: pmetzger@shearson.com (Perry E. Metzger)
Date: Tue, 19 Jan 93 08:40:09 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: possible solution to the anonymous harrassment problem
Message-ID: <9301191535.AA05047@maggie.shearson.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



> From: Rusty_H._Hodge@horizon.amgen.com
> 
> >for example, i can send postal mail with high confidence 
> >of anonymity, and can make anonymous phone calls (with care,
> >e.g., by using phone booths and moving around).
> 
> What about that little old ladie that watches the PO Box and Phone Booth
> from her window?  What about the postman who sees you place the letter in
> the mailbox?

Any postman who can distinguish your plain white envelope at a distance
from the five thousand other plain white envelopes going into the mailbox
likely has sufficient psychic powers that he doesn't need to watch at all.

As for the compulsive payphone watchers, well, wear a disguise.


Perry




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Date: Tue, 19 Jan 93 11:36:09 PST
To: Eric.Fogleman@analog.com (Eric Fogleman)
Subject: Re: Q: What's happening in cryptography?
In-Reply-To: <9301191846.AA21685@ack.adstest.analog.com>
Message-ID: <9301191933.AA11035@netcom3.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Eric Fogleman writes:

> I'm interested in finding out what is currently happening in
> cryptography.  My (basement-level) knowledge of it has come from heavy
> mathematics-oriented texts; these books and articles make it seem as
> though all of the work in cryptography is done by Ph.Ds at
> universities.  I suspect that's not the whole story...

Well, you're on this list now, so you'll hear about some things that
are happening. You should also read sci.crypt for miscellaneous news
and chitchat about crypto technology and policy.

> Questions:
> 
> - What companies, universities are doing work in cryptography?  Are
> there people who get paid to "do cryptography" that don't work for the
> NSA?  If so, where do they work?

RSA Data Security, Cylink, BBN, GE, Trusted Information Systems,
M.I.T., Berkeley, Stanford, Montreal, are just a few of the many
companies and universities doing crypto work. The list is really too
long to go into. Many crypto functions lie outside the domain of the
NSA (though not necessarily by their choice!): computer security, ATM
machines and banking networks, personal indentification systems,
electronic documents, locks and keys, etc.

> - Does cryptography fall under mathematics or computer science at most
> universities?

Some of each, and sometimes under Electrical Engineering. Number
theory, elliptic functions, etc., is generally in math, while
complexity theory, algorithm analysis, etc. is generally under CS.

> - Are the real developments in cryptographic algorithms coming from the
> universities, from companies or from cypherpunks?

Again, a mixture. "Cypherpunks" cannot claim, yet, to have had any
breakthroughs. Perhaps someday.

> - Any suggestions on what to read, who to talk to, what to experiment
> with to move up from basement-level knowledge of cryptography?

1. This list and its FAQ (coming soon).
2. sci.crypt
3. The several articles on crypto that have appeared in IEEE Spectrum,
Communications of the ACM, Scientific American, and so on. Use your
library's resources to find them.
4. More than a dozen good crypto books exist. One recent one,
"Contemporary Cryptology," edited by Gus Simmons, has good review
articles in many of the new areas.

Good luck.

-Tim May

-- 
..........................................................................
Timothy C. May         | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,  
tcmay@netcom.com       | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
408-688-5409           | knowledge, reputations, information markets, 
W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA  | black markets, collapse of governments.
Higher Power: 2^756839 | PGP Public Key: by arrangement.





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Eric Fogleman <Eric.Fogleman@analog.com>
Date: Tue, 19 Jan 93 10:48:46 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Q: What's happening in cryptography?
Message-ID: <9301191846.AA21685@ack.adstest.analog.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I'm interested in finding out what is currently happening in
cryptography.  My (basement-level) knowledge of it has come from heavy
mathematics-oriented texts; these books and articles make it seem as
though all of the work in cryptography is done by Ph.Ds at
universities.  I suspect that's not the whole story...

Questions:

- What companies, universities are doing work in cryptography?  Are
there people who get paid to "do cryptography" that don't work for the
NSA?  If so, where do they work?

- Does cryptography fall under mathematics or computer science at most
universities?

- Are the real developments in cryptographic algorithms coming from the
universities, from companies or from cypherpunks?

- Any suggestions on what to read, who to talk to, what to experiment
with to move up from basement-level knowledge of cryptography?

Thanks...
Eric Fogleman




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: shipley@tfs.COM
Date: Tue, 19 Jan 93 20:57:02 PST
To: deltorto@aol.com
Subject: Re: Who Me? Paranoid? Naaaah...
In-Reply-To: <9301192229.tn56425@aol.com>
Message-ID: <9301200455.AA17238@edev0.TFS>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



>Hmmmm...
>
>I'm beginning to wonder if we shouldn't someday be able to run public email
>in a sort of "parallel universe," an entirely separate mail system complete
>with built-in RSA encryption on every piece of mail. That way, we would no
>longer rely on the Internet, which, unless I am completely off the mark,
>basically still exists at the pleasure of ARPA and could be completely
>infiltrated and controlled by the NSA for all we know.

Personaly (mostly before pgp) I used to set up direct uucp connections
to people I *had* have secure email with (I once had some sensitive email
intercepted thus causing *much* trouble for me).  

Since alot of my friends have unix boxes (Sun/SCO/386bsd/etc...) uucp
is alot easer.



			-Pete

PS: If anyone wants a uucp connection send me email

PPS: once I get my sendmail.cf cleaned up I can add people to my domain
	and I will set up a remailer.





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: deltorto@aol.com
Date: Tue, 19 Jan 93 19:32:35 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Who Me? Paranoid? Naaaah...
Message-ID: <9301192229.tn56425@aol.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Hmmmm...

I'm beginning to wonder if we shouldn't someday be able to run public email
in a sort of "parallel universe," an entirely separate mail system complete
with built-in RSA encryption on every piece of mail. That way, we would no
longer rely on the Internet, which, unless I am completely off the mark,
basically still exists at the pleasure of ARPA and could be completely
infiltrated and controlled by the NSA for all we know.

Along similar lines, has anyone heard the latest status on the gigabytes of
email generated by the Bush White House which are currently in danger of
being erased before anyone can get a peek at them? Imagine the damning
evidence that exists in those documents! I had heard something about a
voluntary freeze on the erasure until the matter can be decided in some
Federal Court, but that strikes me like suing your local City Government in
Municipal Court after being hit by a Municipal Bus - Bush's cronies will
probably invoke some executive priviledge and weasel off with 'em. I wonder
if such stuff will ever be released under the Freedom of Information Act
(probably not in our lifetimes, but just the threat would make me happy)?
Hey, a guy can _dream_ can't he?

  dave




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: nobody@pmantis.berkeley.edu
Date: Wed, 20 Jan 93 00:13:14 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: ILF Brings You Gilmore in Sci Am
Message-ID: <9301200813.AA13985@pmantis.berkeley.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


The Information Liberation Front brings you this article from the
February, 1993 "Scientific American."



Electronic Envelopes?

The uncertainty of keeping e-mail private

Recent legislative efforts to mandate remote wiretapping attachments
for every telephone system and computer network in the U.S. may have
been the best thing that ever happened for encryption software. "We
have mostly the FBI to thank," says John Gilmore of Cygnus Support in
Palo Alto, Calif. Gilmore is an entrepreneur, hacker and electronic
civil libertarian who helped to found the Electronic Frontier
Foundation (EFF). He is now watching closely the development of two
competing techniques for keeping electronic mail private.

As matters now stand, computers transmit messages from one user to
another in plain text. If a geneticist m Boston sends e-mail to a
molecular biologist in San Diego, any of the half a dozen or so
intermediary machines that forward the letter could siphon off a
copy- -and so could any of the dozens of workstations that might be
attached to the local-area network at the sender's or recipient's
university or company.

The Electronic Privacy Act of 1986 prohibits snooping by public e-
mail carriers or law-enforcement officials, except by court order.
Nevertheless, many people are becoming uncomfortable with the
electronic equivalent of mailing all their correspondence on
postcards and relying on people to refrain from reading it. They are
turning to public-key encryption, which allows anyone to encode a
message but only the recipient to decode it. Each user has a public
key, which is made widely available, and a closely guarded secret
key. Messages encrypted with one key can be decrypted only with the
other, thus also making it possible to "sign" messages by encrypting
them with the private key [see "Achieving Electronic Privacy," by
David Chaum; SCIENTIFIC AMERICAN, August 1992].

Two programs--and two almost diametrically opposed viewpoints
embodied in them--are competing for acceptance. Privacy Enhanced Mail
(PEM) is the long-awaited culmination of years of international
standard setting by computer scientists. Pretty Good Privacy (PGP) is
a possibly illegal work of "guerrilla freeware" originally written by
software consultant Philip Zimmermann.

The philosophies of PEM and PGP differ most visibly with respect to.
key management, the crucial task of ensuring that the public keys
that encode messages actually belong to the intended recipient rather
than a malevolent third party. PEM relies on a rigid hierarchy of
trusted companies, universities and other institutions to certify
public keys, which are then stored on a "key server" accessible over
the Internet. To send private mail, one asks the key server for the
public key of the addressee, which has been signed by the appropriate
certification authorities. PGP, in contrast, operates on what
Zimmermann calls "a web of trust": people who wish to correspond
privately can exchange keys directly or through trusted
intermediaries. The intermediaries sign the keys that they pass on,
thus certifying their authenticity.

PGP's decentralized approach has gained a wide following since its
initial release in June 1991, according to Hugh E. Miller of Loyola
University in Chicago, who maintains an electronic mailing list for
discussion among PGP users. His personal "keyring" file contains
public keys for about 100 correspondents, and others have keyrings
containing far more. As of the end of 1992, meanwhile, a final
version of PEM had not been officially released. Gilmore, who
subscribes to the electronic mailing list for PEM developers, says he
has seen "only five or 10" messages actually encrypted using the
software.

Although PGP's purchase price is right--it is freely available over
the Internet and on electronic bulletin boards throughout the
world--it does carry two liabilities that could frighten away
potential users. First, U.S. law defines cryptographic hardware and
software as "munitions." So anyone who is caught making a copy of the
program could run afoul of export-control laws. Miller calls this
situation "absurd," citing the availability of high-quality
cryptographic software on the streets of Moscow.

Worse yet, RSA Data Security in Redwood City, Calif., holds rights to
a U.S. patent on the public-key encryption algorithm, and D. James
Bidzos, the company's president, asserts that anyone using or
distributing PGP could be sued for infringement. The company has
licensed public-key software to corporations and sells its own
encrypted-mail package (the algorithm was developed with federal
support, and so the government has a royalty-free license). When
Bidzos's attorneys warned Zimmermann that he faced a suit for
developing PGP, he gave up further work on the program.

Instead PGP's ongoing improvements are in the hands of an
international team of software developers who take advice from
Zimmermann by e-mail. The U.S. is the only nation that permits the
patenting of mathematical algorithms, and so programmers in the
Netherlands or New Zealand apparently have little to fear.

U.S. residents who import the program could still face legal action,
although repeated warnings broadcast in cryptography discussion
groups on computer networks have yet to be superseded by legal
filings. Meanwhile, Gilmore says, the only substantive effect of the
patent threat is that development and use of cryptographic tools have
been driven out of the U.S. into less restrictive countries.

--Paul Wallich



-- 






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Marc Horowitz <marc@Athena.MIT.EDU>
Date: Tue, 19 Jan 93 21:29:07 PST
To: deltorto@aol.com
Subject: Re: Who Me? Paranoid? Naaaah...
In-Reply-To: <9301192229.tn56425@aol.com>
Message-ID: <9301200528.AA23701@portnoy.MIT.EDU>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>> That way, we would no longer rely on the Internet, which, unless I am
>> completely off the mark, basically still exists at the pleasure of
>> ARPA and could be completely infiltrated and controlled by the NSA for
>> all we know.

You are completely off the mark.  Much of the Internet is privately
owned and controlled, and most of what is government controlled
(including the backbone) is controlled by the NSF, not DARPA.  What is
military controlled is essentially an island.  None of our packets
traverse that part of the net.  (Of course, the NSA could still be
watching our packets, and there is much speculation that they actively
do so on international links.  But the domestic links are not owned by
the DoD directly.)

And what parallel universe would you use.  The Telcos?  The FBI
wiretap proposal should show you how good an idea that is.  Unless you
want to run your own physically secure wire (intractable), you need
encryption, so you might as well use the Internet.  Even if it is
NSA-controlled, which I doubt.

		Marc




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Hal <74076.1041@CompuServe.COM>
Date: Wed, 20 Jan 93 00:04:41 PST
To: CYPHERPUNKS <CYPHERPUNKS@toad.com>
Subject: Digital cash legality...
Message-ID: <930120075819_74076.1041_DHJ46-2@CompuServe.COM>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Continuing my research on the legality of digital cash...

I found something interesting.  As I posted before, one of the obstacles
to free printing of private bank notes is a 10% per year tax on the
circulation of bank notes from state-chartered banks.  This law took
effect on July 1, 1866.  According to "Monetary Decisions of the Supreme
Court", by Dunne, "The tax has become a permanent fixture in federal
law.  Its latest form is sections 4881-4886 of the Internal Revenue Code
of 1954."

That book is a little old, so I went tonight to look up these sections
of the 1992 IRC.  They don't exist.  There is a note saying:

"Prior sections 4881 to 4886, Act Aug. 16, 1954, c. 736, 68A Stat. 587-589,
imposed a tax on the circulation of banks.

"Repeal effective on the first day of the first month which begins more
than 90 days after Oct. 4, 1976."

So, it appears that these provisions have been repealed!  It's possible
that the same requirement has been re-enacted in some other form, but I
looked around a bit in the index and contents and although there are many
unusual taxes I could not find anything similar to this.

-----

I also got an email suggestion to look up the codes related to barter
exchanges.  It does appear that many of these suggestions for digital
cash could be construed to be covered by such laws.  Here is an excerpt
from the Code of Federal Regulations, 1.6045-1(f5):

"(i) A credit is an amount on the books of the barter exchange that is
transferable from one member or client of the barter exchange to another
such member or client, or to the barter exchange, in payment for property
or services;

"(ii) Scrip is a token issued by the barter exchange that is transferable
from one member or client of the barter exchange to another such member
or client, or to the barter exchange, in payment for property or services;
and

"(iii) Property does not include a credit or scrip."

The "credit" provision seems to cover "digital checking accounts", and
the "scrip" definition seems to cover digital cash.  A barter exchange
itself is defined in 1.6045-1(a):

"(4) The term 'barter exchange' means any person with members or clients
that contract either with each other or with such person to trade or
barter property or services either directly or through such person.
The term does not include arrangements that provide solely for the
informal exchange of similar services on a noncommercial basis."

Even though the crypto banker/money-changer may not be trading property
or services (just exchanging scrip for dollars), the larger system
composed of the banker and the users of digital cash (who presumably
are buying and selling property and services from each other using the
cash/scrip) seems to match this definition pretty closely.

I noticed the exception for noncommercial use, but the only example
they give is for people in a carpool, who exchange the service of driving
each other to work.  It's not clear whether a digital cash money exchange,
even if not operated for profit, would qualify.

If you are a barter exchange, and there are more than 100 transactions
occuring per year, you have to keep the taxpayer ID number of all the
customers on file, and send them all a form 1099 describing their
transactions and the market value of the transfers, as well sending
information directly to the IRS.  This doesn't sound like it will lead to
much anonymity, crypto or otherwise.

Hal
74076.1041@compuserve.com





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: norm@xanadu.com (Norm Hardy)
Date: Wed, 20 Jan 93 17:56:08 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Communications Policy
Message-ID: <9301210133.AA08802@xanadu.xanadu.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I hear concern over privacy and also over erasure of White House tapes.
I pose the following question: Should an institution have the right
to private communication? Is the White House an institution?
Notice that I say "should" not "does".
Which sort of world would you rather live in. I have mixed feelings.
If we say that all computer communications should be accessible to courts
then the effect will be to displace some communications from computers.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Date: Thu, 21 Jan 93 00:33:49 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Communications Policy
In-Reply-To: <9301210133.AA08802@xanadu.xanadu.com>
Message-ID: <9301210830.AA21995@netcom3.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Norm Hardy raises an important issue:

> I hear concern over privacy and also over erasure of White House tapes.
> I pose the following question: Should an institution have the right
> to private communication? Is the White House an institution?
> Notice that I say "should" not "does".
> Which sort of world would you rather live in. I have mixed feelings.
> If we say that all computer communications should be accessible to courts
> then the effect will be to displace some communications from computers.

Individuals, corporations, clubs, and perhaps even government agencies
should have the right to secure and private communications. The only
caveat with the "perhaps" for the government is that it, in theory,
belongs to "us."

I find it unsettling when people of one political party are screaming
for access to the private diaries and papers of members of the other
party. Citing Ollie North's crimes is no excuse.

If e-mail records are automatically seized and subject to archiving
and dissection, then e-mail just won't be used. Historians are already
becoming apoplectic at the vanishing of written records, letters,
notes, and the like...this may reduce even electronic records.

Strong crypto means even Ollie North can fully protect his records.
(Of course, he presumably already had access to reasonably strong
crypto, had he chosen to use it. And his e-mail was uncovered through
the very common method of finding the archived copies of IBM's "PROFS"
e-mail system kept by sysadmins. Sort of like the archives being kept
by some of the so-called anonymous remailers!)

-Tim May




-- 
..........................................................................
Timothy C. May         | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,  
tcmay@netcom.com       | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
408-688-5409           | knowledge, reputations, information markets, 
W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA  | black markets, collapse of governments.
Higher Power: 2^756839 | PGP Public Key: by arrangement.





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: david.brooks@cutting.hou.tx.us (David Brooks)
Date: Thu, 21 Jan 93 04:04:28 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: PGP on BBS
Message-ID: <10417.143.uupcb@cutting.hou.tx.us>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



   I have been mulling over the idea of a BBS door which allows users to
send PGP encrypted messages to other users using a system pubkey file. The
implimentation seems easy enough except for the problem of the secret key.
I don't see a way to do it without the sender having to transfer (at least
temporarily) his secret key to the host system. Obviously no one in his
right mind would ever consider doing such a thing. Has this kind of a
program been tried before? If so, how? If not, does anyone have any ideas?
Seems to me it would be a handy door for a BBS to have, but not at the
expense of compromised privacy...

David
david.brooks@cutting.hou.tx.us
<PGP 2.1 public key available by request>

 * Q-Blue v0.7 [NR] *                    
----
+---------------------------------------------------------------------+
| The Cutting Edge BBS (cutting.hou.tx.us)    A PCBoard 14.5a system  |
| Houston, Texas, USA    +1 713 466 1525          running uuPCB       |
+---------------------------------------------------------------------+




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Eric Hughes <hughes@soda.berkeley.edu>
Date: Thu, 21 Jan 93 08:14:31 PST
To: david.brooks@cutting.hou.tx.us
Subject: PGP on BBS
In-Reply-To: <10417.143.uupcb@cutting.hou.tx.us>
Message-ID: <9301211612.AA01687@soda.berkeley.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



The scenario David Brooks outlines is extremely common: one host
computer providing information services to another computer which acts
as a terminal.  This may be a BBS, Compuserve, Lexis, or any number of
other services.  If there exists an implementable mechanism which does
not require trust of the host, then it should be implemented.

In the case of cryptography, this means that secret information should
not be transmitted to the host.  Hence all operations which use secret
information must be performed on the terminal computer.  These
operations include session key generation and signing of messages.

The solution is cooperative processing systems, where both the host
and the terminal cooperate to perform some task.  Unfortunately, there
is precious little software infrastructure to support such a
development.  Terminal programs on PC's are still for the most part
acting as dumb terminals, with the notable exception of file transfer
protocols such as zmodem.

I believe that cooperative communication software will be necessary
for widespread use of cryptography--not just pleasant, but a
precondition to large scale deployment.

Although this topic is not directly related to cryptology, it is
certainly appropriate for discussion on this list.  It is the
cypherpunk goal for widespread use of crypto by the masses, and the
exact nature of the infrastructure necessary for that task should be
debated, then implemented, then deployed.

Onward.

Eric




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Karl L. Barrus <barrus@tree.egr.uh.edu>
Date: Thu, 21 Jan 93 06:15:39 PST
To: david.brooks@cutting.hou.tx.us
Subject: PGP on BBS
In-Reply-To: <10417.143.uupcb@cutting.hou.tx.us>
Message-ID: <9301211414.AA02759@tree.egr.uh.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



David Brooks writes:
>   I have been mulling over the idea of a BBS door which allows users to
>send PGP encrypted messages to other users using a system pubkey file. The

>I don't see a way to do it without the sender having to transfer (at least
>temporarily) his secret key to the host system. Obviously no one in his

Well, you could always allow the users to download the public key file
and do the encryption on their home machine, and then upload the mail file.

That way their secret key stays off the BBS...

/-----------------------------------\
| Karl L. Barrus                    |
| barrus@tree.egr.uh.edu (NeXTMail) |
| elee9sf@menudo.uh.edu             |
\-----------------------------------/




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Eric Hughes <hughes@soda.berkeley.edu>
Date: Thu, 21 Jan 93 08:38:55 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: random remailers
In-Reply-To: <9301160118.AA14215@toad.com>
Message-ID: <9301211636.AA02255@soda.berkeley.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>> Has anyone thought about the consequence of randomly picking a
>> remailing path instead of using the same one?  

>what if the remailer flips a coin, choosing between final delivery
>and remailing through another of its ilk.  "message delivery with
>probability one ..."

This is an excellent suggestion.  I have to think about the
mathematical properties some more, but a few spring to mind.  Assume,
for discussion, that there is constant probability of delivery at each
hop, say p.

First, the expected number of hops is 1/p.  To see this just sum the
following series.

	$ E(p) = \Sum_{n=1}^{\infinity} n p (p-1)^{n-1} $

Thus the syntax for routing can be extremely simple, just specifying
the expected number of hops wanted.  If you want to have guaranteed
minimum delivery, you can manually route through a few hops, then
randomize.

Eric




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Eric Hughes <hughes@soda.berkeley.edu>
Date: Thu, 21 Jan 93 08:44:20 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: possible solution to the anonymous harrassment problem
In-Reply-To: <9301151918.AA06316@toxicwaste.MEDIA.MIT.EDU>
Message-ID: <9301211642.AA02369@soda.berkeley.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>If you read closer, you will see that
>you need "special permission from RSADSI" to use non-published
>interfaces to RSAREF.  

I asked Jim Bidzos about this last Friday.  He states that the purpose
of this clause is to avoid the situation where modifications to the
package decrease its cryptographic security.

I gather that such special permission should not be too hard to get.

Eric




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: tribble@xanadu.com (E. Dean Tribble)
Date: Thu, 21 Jan 93 09:21:13 PST
To: uunet!penet.FI!julf@uunet.UU.NET
Subject: Communications Policy
In-Reply-To: <9301211119.aa20785@penet.penet.FI>
Message-ID: <9301211642.AA10997@xanadu.xanadu.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


	 Date: Thu, 21 Jan 93 11:38:45 +0200
	 From: Johan Helsingius <uunet!penet.FI!julf>

	 > by some of the so-called anonymous remailers!)

	 Hmmmm.... I find the accusation about anonymous remailers pretty strong.
	 If you have proof of stuff like that happening, or even reasonable cause
	 for suspicions, I feel the accusations and names of the sites should be
	 published as widely as possible. That is the only way we can stop
	 such unethical behavior.

The service of anonymous remailing is separate from the the guaranteed
anonymity of a remailers that don't keep logs.  You'll note that the
remailing aspects can be observed externally, whereas guaranteeing
that logs are not being kept is extremely hard.  One remailer operator
I know keeps logs because you have to assume that everyone keeps logs,
and try to be secure anyway.  You can be sure that the NSA remailers
will keep logs :-)

The right thing to do is run a remailer of your own, and send
everything encrypted through remailers, etc.

dean




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Eric Hughes <hughes@soda.berkeley.edu>
Date: Thu, 21 Jan 93 08:48:34 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: RIPEM vs PEM
In-Reply-To: <930115175946_74076.1041_DHJ57-1@CompuServe.COM>
Message-ID: <9301211646.AA02423@soda.berkeley.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Hal writes:

>A remailer that wanted to charge, such as the ones that 
>Eric Messick is discussing, would probably have to license the technology 
>from PKP directly to be legal.  

A note on licensing: PKP is the holder of the patents.  The Partners
are RSA Data Security, Cylink, MIT, and Stanford.  PKP has a staff of
two.

RSADSI is also entitled to license the technology.  Most people go
through them.  IBM dealt with PKP directly, evidently.

Eric




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Eric Hughes <hughes@soda.berkeley.edu>
Date: Thu, 21 Jan 93 08:52:29 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: possible solution to the anonymous h
In-Reply-To: <9301150739.AA02931@deathtongue.MIT.EDU>
Message-ID: <9301211650.AA02533@soda.berkeley.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



>I thought about this.  The major problem is that once the PEM
>beta-testing period ends, all keys must be registered with "approved"
>(by RSA) central authorities.  I highly doubt they'd issue
>pseudonymous keys, but maybe they would allow someone to set up a
>heirarchy especially for that purpose.  I'm not convinced.

I found out last Friday at the RSA conference that RSADSI itself is
going to issue "persona" (i.e. no attempt to find out who it really
is) certificates for free.

That's right.  No charge.

Eric




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Eric Fogleman <Eric.Fogleman@analog.com>
Date: Thu, 21 Jan 93 05:57:24 PST
To: norm@xanadu.com
Subject: Re: Communications Policy
Message-ID: <9301211355.AA27670@ack.adstest.analog.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Responding to the following from Norm Hardy:

> I hear concern over privacy and also over erasure of White House tapes.
> I pose the following question: Should an institution have the right
> to private communication? Is the White House an institution?
> Notice that I say "should" not "does".
> Which sort of world would you rather live in. I have mixed feelings.
> If we say that all computer communications should be accessible to courts
> then the effect will be to displace some communications from computers.

Institutions -- individuals, groups of individuals, companies -- should
have the right to private communication.  (In terms of e-mail, this
means that one knows where all copies of their letters are and has the
power to erase them?)

The right of government employees to private communication is limited
by one important factor:  many of these individuals are empowered to
use force against citizens, and they responsibile for justifying the
use of this force.  (Examples of what I mean by force:  arresting and
putting people in jail, searching, seizing, impounding, levying taxes,
wiretapping, shooting alleged criminals).  Anyone given this kind of
power has a heavy burden of proof and had better be able to prove
beyond a shadow of doubt that their actions are justified.

The burden should not be on individuals to constantly be open to
scrutiny to demonstrate their innocence, but on those with the
power to suspend individual rights.


===================================================================
Eric Fogleman                              eric.fogleman@analog.com
Analog Devices Semiconductor               Voice: (617) 937-2275
804 Woburn Street                          Fax: (617) 937-2024
Wilmington, MA  01887-3462                 
===================================================================




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: tribble@xanadu.com (E. Dean Tribble)
Date: Thu, 21 Jan 93 09:56:24 PST
To: uunet!soda.berkeley.edu!hughes@uunet.UU.NET
Subject: PGP on BBS
In-Reply-To: <9301211612.AA01687@soda.berkeley.edu>
Message-ID: <9301211702.AA11275@xanadu.xanadu.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


	 The solution is cooperative processing systems, where both the host
	 and the terminal cooperate to perform some task.  Unfortunately, there
	 is precious little software infrastructure to support such a
	 development.  Terminal programs on PC's are still for the most part
	 acting as dumb terminals, with the notable exception of file transfer
	 protocols such as zmodem.

What would the two systems be cooperating about?  I'm not sure to what
you are pointing.

	 Although this topic is not directly related to cryptology, it is
	 certainly appropriate for discussion on this list.  It is the
	 cypherpunk goal for widespread use of crypto by the masses, and the
	 exact nature of the infrastructure necessary for that task should be
	 debated, then implemented, then deployed.

I of course map these suggestions into Joule (the language I'm
developing).  Does that resemble what you're thinking of?

dean




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Date: Thu, 21 Jan 93 09:19:04 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Communications Policy
In-Reply-To: <9301211119.aa20785@penet.penet.FI>
Message-ID: <9301211716.AA27162@netcom3.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Johan Helsingius writes:
> Tim May writes:
> 
> > crypto, had he chosen to use it. And his e-mail was uncovered through
> > the very common method of finding the archived copies of IBM's "PROFS"
> > e-mail system kept by sysadmins. Sort of like the archives being kept
> > by some of the so-called anonymous remailers!)
> 
> Hmmmm.... I find the accusation about anonymous remailers pretty strong.
> If you have proof of stuff like that happening, or even reasonable cause
> for suspicions, I feel the accusations and names of the sites should be
> published as widely as possible. That is the only way we can stop
> such unethical behavior.
> 
> 	Julf (an0@anon.penet.fi)

This was well-debated about a month or so back. Some remailers are
archiving mail for debugging, others for legal protection (in case
threats, blackmail, etc., used), and others are simply automatically
archiving by site policies.

In a note I wrote back then, which did not name the particular site
involved, I reported that after sending a piece of "anonymous" mail, I
got a letter of "support" for my position from the remailer operator!

After I mentioned this to the Cypherpunks list, it came out that other
sites were also keeping various forms of archives (for some or all of
the reasons listed above).

Anyway, such human-operated remailers, running on UNIX boxes in
unsecure conditions, have many nonideal characteristics.


-Tim

-- 
..........................................................................
Timothy C. May         | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,  
tcmay@netcom.com       | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
408-688-5409           | knowledge, reputations, information markets, 
W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA  | black markets, collapse of governments.
Higher Power: 2^756839 | PGP Public Key: by arrangement.





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Date: Thu, 21 Jan 93 09:58:24 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Communications Policy (fwd)
Message-ID: <9301211755.AA27771@netcom3.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


After sending the attached message to Johan Helsingius, I decided it
might be of general interest to the Cypherpunks list. It's a message I
sent out in December, originally, and which got debated.

Johan's concern about my "accusations" suggests there may be enought
newcomers to the list to justify republication of posts. 

--Tim

From: tcmay (Timothy C. May)
Subject: Re: Communications Policy
To: julf@penet.FI (Johan Helsingius)
Date: Thu, 21 Jan 93 9:49:00 PST


> > e-mail system kept by sysadmins. Sort of like the archives being kept
> > by some of the so-called anonymous remailers!)
> 
> Hmmmm.... I find the accusation about anonymous remailers pretty strong.
> If you have proof of stuff like that happening, or even reasonable cause
> for suspicions, I feel the accusations and names of the sites should be
> published as widely as possible. That is the only way we can stop
> such unethical behavior.

Johan,

Attached below is the message I sent to the Cypherpunks list in
December, about remailers keeping logs. As I said in my message today
to the list, there was a debate about this, and an admission by
several remailers that they keep archives.



From: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Message-Id: <9212140649.AA12228@netcom.netcom.com>
Subject: A minor experimental result
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Date: Sun, 13 Dec 92 22:49:45 PST


One of the purposes of setting up remailers is to experiment with
them, see what kind of emergent behavior appears, see what kind of
flaws and obstacles arise, see how they break, etc.

Here's one: the compromise of my "anonymity" by one of the folks
running a remailer. (Who and where don't matter, just the phenomenon
itself.)

I used a single bounce without any encryption to send a message and
got a query from the owner of the remailer saying "I couldn't help
looking through my remailer archives and noticing...." and requesting
more information from me!!

Hoist by my own petard!

Several lessons:

* Multiple bounces help, even without encryption, as then the remailer
sysop can't be sure who originated the message.

* Encryption is of course even more desirable, though a hassle
(especially for Mac users).

* Remailer sysops should make a point to _not_ look at their remailer
archives. In fact, they should discard them immediately (for their own
legal protection, and for slightly greater trust amongst users, though
this is a hazy area...).

(Recall that the "mix" on which our software-based remailers are
loosely patterned are "memoryless," i.e., the tamper-resistant modules
that implement the receive-decrypt-store-forward protocol have no
memory of the mapping between incoming and outgoing messages. In
fact, the outside world cannot possibly compromise the protocols to get
at this information.)  

So, my laziness in using only a single bounce, combined with the
curiosity of a remailer sysop, breaks the anonymity.

Neither surprising nor profound, but I thought you folks would like to know.


--Tim May

--
..........................................................................
Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,
tcmay@netcom.com | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
408-688-5409 | knowledge, reputations, information markets,
W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA | black markets, collapse of governments.
Higher Power: 2^756839 | PGP Public Key: by arrangement.





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Johan Helsingius <julf@penet.FI>
Date: Thu, 21 Jan 93 01:47:25 PST
To: "Timothy C. May" <tcmay@netcom.com>
Subject: Re: Communications Policy
In-Reply-To: <9301210830.AA21995@netcom3.netcom.com>
Message-ID: <9301211119.aa20785@penet.penet.FI>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Tim May writes:

> crypto, had he chosen to use it. And his e-mail was uncovered through
> the very common method of finding the archived copies of IBM's "PROFS"
> e-mail system kept by sysadmins. Sort of like the archives being kept
> by some of the so-called anonymous remailers!)

Hmmmm.... I find the accusation about anonymous remailers pretty strong.
If you have proof of stuff like that happening, or even reasonable cause
for suspicions, I feel the accusations and names of the sites should be
published as widely as possible. That is the only way we can stop
such unethical behavior.

	Julf (an0@anon.penet.fi)

Johan Helsingius     Kuusikallionkuja 3 B 25   02210 Espoo    Finland    Yourp
net: julf@penet.fi   bellophone: int. +358 0400 2605  fax: int. +358 013900166




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Eric Messick <eric@parallax.com>
Date: Thu, 21 Jan 93 13:32:16 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: random remailers
Message-ID: <9301212047.AA04073@parallax.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>> Has anyone thought about the consequence of randomly picking a
>> remailing path instead of using the same one?
>
>what if the remailer flips a coin, choosing between final delivery
>and remailing through another of its ilk.  "message delivery with
>probability one ..."

The problem with this is that every site along the way has to know the
final delivery address, at least of this subset of the address chain.
Better to just send it directly, and add some load balancing traffic.

-eric messick




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Eric.Forste@f33.n125.z1.FIDONET.ORG (Eric Forste)
Date: Sat, 23 Jan 93 14:49:39 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: digicash fundamentals
Message-ID: <4565.2B601C59@fidogate.FIDONET.ORG>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



I came into this discussion fairly late and most of what I've been able to read has been good stuff about anonymous remailers. However, there are many tantalizing bits dropped here and there about digital cash, including some recent discussion of a form that requires no encryption.

However, I missed all the groundwork discussion on digicash, and I'd
really like to understand the digital cash protocols more thoroughly.

Can someone here please direct me to a text file with the basics of Chaum's digital-cash ideas presented in it? I am not a cryptographer, but I consider myself proficient in the use of PGP and I've read PGP's docs thoroughly and understand them, and have pretty good background in LAN communication protocols,
so that's about the technical level I'm at. Thanks.
--  
Eric Forste - via FidoNet node 1:125/555
    UUCP - ...!uunet!hoptoad!kumr!fidogate!33!Eric.Forste
INTERNET - Eric.Forste@f33.n125.z1.FIDONET.ORG




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "John Coryell." <jcoryell%nwu.edu@UICVM.UIC.EDU>
Date: Thu, 21 Jan 93 15:43:41 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: possible solution to the anonymous harrassment problem
In-Reply-To: <9301211642.AA02369@soda.berkeley.edu>
Message-ID: <9301212343.AA21192@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Are there any citations of instances of this happening?

John Coryell.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: deboni@diego.llnl.gov (Tom DeBoni)
Date: Thu, 21 Jan 93 14:59:21 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: privacy vs. public servants
Message-ID: <9301212254.AA01411@diego.llnl.gov>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


This is a very interesting thread. But should university academicians working
for state-supported institutions be subject to the same constraints on privacy
and freedom from arbitrary search and seizure in their email and computer files
as high federal governmental officials? I submit that the amount of (real or
potential) oversight should be somehow proportional to the potential for harm
or abuse of power available to the individual involved. Surely Ollie North
or Richard Nixon had much greater abilities to subvert the democratic process
or otherwise break the law than Professor Smith of the Chemistry Dept. of 
State U.

Tom DeBoni
(a state and federal employee with no power whatsoever)




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: deltorto@aol.com
Date: Thu, 21 Jan 93 14:37:37 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: public servant privacy
Message-ID: <9301211631.tn66179@aol.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


In response and affirmation of Eric Fogleman's note on Communications Policy,
I have to concur. ALL documents produced by a public official operating an
email system on public time and in pursuit of public policy (e.g. a White
House official) should be subject to scrutiny and should not be considered as
that person's private property. If such a person wants to have private
communications with other private citizens, they should do it on their OWN
time and with their OWN money. HOWEVER, if such persons then turn around and
abuse this freedom by abusing the public trust in those contexts (i.e. if
Ollie North started communicating with NSA officials through CompuServe to
order illegal shipments of money to CIA agents in Peruvian cocaine cartels),
they should, by virtue of their positions of public trust be subject to the
same (presumably high) levels of scrutiny as they are now - Congressional,
OMB, GSA, FBI investigations, etc.

>>The burden should not be on individuals to constantly be open to scrutiny
to
>>demonstrate their innocence, but on those with the power to suspend
individual
>>rights.

Yes, private citizens should not be subject to the same sorts of
investigations unless there is direct evidence of criminal intent or activity
in which case there should be a search warrant and notification of intent to
search.

Tim May notes (appropriately) that:
>>Strong crypto means even Ollie North can fully protect his records.

Yes, but shouldn't he be _required_ to "open" his files if he is under
criminal investigation just like a drug-dealer who's required to open the
locked trunk of his car?

I'm sure my opinion is open to development, but this is my gut-level
response.

  dave




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: thug@phantom.com (Murdering Thug)
Date: Thu, 21 Jan 93 15:20:09 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: public servant privacy
In-Reply-To: <9301211631.tn66179@aol.com>
Message-ID: <m0nFB8V-000jpMC@phantom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


deltorto@aol.com writes:

> 
> Yes, private citizens should not be subject to the same sorts of
> investigations unless there is direct evidence of criminal intent or activity
> in which case there should be a search warrant and notification of intent to
> search.
> 
> Tim May notes (appropriately) that:
> >>Strong crypto means even Ollie North can fully protect his records.
> 
> Yes, but shouldn't he be _required_ to "open" his files if he is under
> criminal investigation just like a drug-dealer who's required to open the
> locked trunk of his car?

Well, there are really two conflicting issues here:

1) The Fifth Amendment - the right not to testify against yourself,
   hence the Miranda warning when you're arrested. You can claim that
   being forced to decrypt your hard disk by the cops violates your
   Fifth Amendment rights, and refuse to decrypt it.

2) Obstruction of Justice - by not handing over the key to your hard disk,
   you may be obstructing an investigation.  By not decrypting your
   hard disk under court order, you maybe be held in contempt of court.


Number 2 may work for law enforcement if they are investigation a third
party and ask to see your hard disk in order to help their investigation.
A good example is an Internet site that is being used as a telnet launch-pad
by some hacker. If that site refuses to cooperate and keeps their files
encrypted, the police/court may charge you with obstruction of justice or
contempt of court.  HOWEVER, if you feel that by decrypting these files,
you would be providing testimony/evidence against yourself, you can plead
the 5th, and tell them to go screw themselves.


Thug 




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Joe Thomas <jthomas@access.digex.com>
Date: Thu, 21 Jan 93 17:03:28 PST
To: Murdering Thug <thug@phantom.com>
Subject: Re: public servant privacy
In-Reply-To: <m0nFB8V-000jpMC@phantom.com>
Message-ID: <Pine.3.05.9301211945.B29273-b100000@digex.digex.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain




On Thu, 21 Jan 1993, Murdering Thug wrote:

> deltorto@aol.com writes:
> > 
> > Tim May notes (appropriately) that:
> > >>
> > >>Strong crypto means even Ollie North can fully protect his records.

[Jeez, I feel like taking this to alt.cascade...]

> > 
> > Yes, but shouldn't he be _required_ to "open" his files if he is under
> > criminal investigation just like a drug-dealer who's required to open the
> > locked trunk of his car?
> 
> Well, there are really two conflicting issues here:
> 
> 1) The Fifth Amendment - [legal summary elided]
> 
> 2) Obstruction of Justice - [again]
. . . 
> 
> Number 2 may work for law enforcement if they are investigation a third
> party and ask to see your hard disk in order to help their investigation.
> A good example is an Internet site that is being used as a telnet launch-pad
> by some hacker. If that site refuses to cooperate and keeps their files
> encrypted, the police/court may charge you with obstruction of justice or
> contempt of court.  HOWEVER, if you feel that by decrypting these files,
> you would be providing testimony/evidence against yourself, you can plead
> the 5th, and tell them to go screw themselves.

I believe the only way for the autorities to get around that is to grant
you immunity for whatever you reveal (if giving crypto keys is held to be
more like giving testimony against one's self than like opening a car
trunk).  They did it for Ollie North, and he used that to get a later
conviction thrown out.  

To bring this back to crypto, the ability of authorities to compel
testimony from people by granting them immunity is a _great_ argument for
remailers not even keeping records.

Joe






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "DrZaphod" <ncselxsi!drzaphod@ncselxsi.netcom.com>
Date: Thu, 21 Jan 93 20:47:20 PST
To: CypherPunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: random remailers
Message-ID: <73148.drzaphod@ncselxsi>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


In Message Thu, 21 Jan 93 12:47:35 PST,
  Eric Messick <parallax.com!eric@netcomsv.netcom.com> writes:

>The problem with this is that every site along the way has to know the
>final delivery address, at least of this subset of the address chain.
>Better to just send it directly, and add some load balancing traffic.
>
>-eric messick

     What about letting every remailer see the second to last system in the
remailing process, another remailer.  Other remailers would route the
message around for a specified # of times +/- a small random # [users
choice with a max. limit set by remailers].  The second to last
remailer would recognize the last remailer from it's public key
encrypted message [::Request-Remailing-To: FinalDestination] and send
it on down to the last remailer which would decrypt the final remailing
block using it's secret key and send the intended message to it's final
destination.  This would provide random remailing routes without
compromising the ending not originating location.  The first remailer
wouldn't know if it had just received a message from a person, or another
remailer.  TTFN!

DrZaphod
[AC/DC] / [DnA][HP]
[drzaphod@ncselxsi.uucp]
Technicolorized




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: parish@cactus.org (Tom Parish)
Date: Thu, 21 Jan 93 21:35:17 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: unsubscribe
Message-ID: <9301220516.AA15042@cactus.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Please remove me from the mailing list.

Thank you
Tom




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: david.brooks@cutting.hou.tx.us (David Brooks)
Date: Sat, 23 Jan 93 18:33:50 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: PGP on BBS
Message-ID: <10496.143.uupcb@cutting.hou.tx.us>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



    David Brooks writes:

DB> >   I have been mulling over the idea of a BBS door which allows users
DB> to
DB> >send PGP encrypted messages to other users using a system pubkey file.

DB> >I don't see a way to do it without the sender having to transfer (at
DB> least
DB> >temporarily) his secret key to the host system.

    Karl L. Barrus responds:

KLB> Well, you could always allow the users to download the public key file
KLB> and do the encryption on their home machine, and then upload the mail
KLB> file.

KLB> That way their secret key stays off the BBS...

   Well, yeah, that's the way we do it now, use the BBS as a Public Key
Certification office...) I was sort of hoping for something a bit more
direct...

David
david.brooks@cutting.hou.tx.us

 * Q-Blue v0.7 [NR] *                                                                                        
----
+---------------------------------------------------------------------+
| The Cutting Edge BBS (cutting.hou.tx.us)    A PCBoard 14.5a system  |
| Houston, Texas, USA    +1 713 466 1525          running uuPCB       |
+---------------------------------------------------------------------+




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: david.brooks@cutting.hou.tx.us (David Brooks)
Date: Sat, 23 Jan 93 18:34:09 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: PGP on BBS
Message-ID: <10497.143.uupcb@cutting.hou.tx.us>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



   Eric Hughes speaks:

EH> The solution is cooperative processing systems, where both the host
EH> and the terminal cooperate to perform some task.  Unfortunately, there
EH> is precious little software infrastructure to support such a
EH> development.  Terminal programs on PC's are still for the most part
EH> acting as dumb terminals, with the notable exception of file transfer
EH> protocols such as zmodem.

EH> I believe that cooperative communication software will be necessary
EH> for widespread use of cryptography--not just pleasant, but a
EH> precondition to large scale deployment.

   You've hit the nail on the head here, Eric. If public key encryption is
REALLY going to be for the masses, we are going to need something like
this... But it seems I'm going to have to code the damned thing myself,
eh? Anyone want to help?

EH> Onward.

   Indeed!

David
david.brooks@cutting.hou.tx.us

 * Q-Blue v0.7 [NR] *                                                                           
----
+---------------------------------------------------------------------+
| The Cutting Edge BBS (cutting.hou.tx.us)    A PCBoard 14.5a system  |
| Houston, Texas, USA    +1 713 466 1525          running uuPCB       |
+---------------------------------------------------------------------+




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: thug@phantom.com (Murdering Thug)
Date: Thu, 21 Jan 93 21:52:44 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: the bill of rights hasn't been revoked. not yet, anyway.
Message-ID: <m0nFHGP-000jpaC@phantom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain





I've been thinking about this a bit, and it seems that the Constitution's
Bill of Rights has all the provisions required to implement and legally
use digital money, secure encryption, and anonymous communication networks.

Specifically, the First, Fourth, and Fifth Ammendments can be used as one's
defense in implementing any of the above.

The First Ammendment can be seen as allowing encryption.  Freedom of
Speech does not preclude the government or anybody for that matter having
to understand what I am saying. I can just as easly say  "blardi blahr oof
aarf bloo arrr foo barr arrh blard foobaaaaah" or "010110101101101011101.."
to anyone I like and be protected by the First Amendment.  Only those
that can decode my speech will understand it, those that can't won't. I am
free to speak to whoever I like (freedom of association / assembly). I am
free to speak anonymously provided I break no law (copyright, slander/libel,
etc.).  Even if I do break a law, the next two paragraphs will show that I
cannot be prosecuted for such a crime very easily.

The Fourth Ammendment protects us from illegal search and siezure.  If the
government can get a warrant, they can search my place and sieze all my
encrypted files. They can intercept my encrypted communications.
They can have them, it won't do them any good.  But it is their duty to
decode it, not mine, and the Fifth Amendment basically says that.. 

The Fifth Ammendment is the tastiest one of all when it comes to
encryption.  By pleading the Fifth, you do not have to decrypt anything
for the prosecution.  The Fifth Ammendment gives you the right not to
testify or provide evidence that would incriminate you.  Providing a
key to decrypt your hard disk would incriminate you, and you don't
have to do it.

In short the 1st & 5th ammendments + Secure Encryption can be used make even
a completely legal search or wiretap warrant against one self worthless. 
Hence, not enough evidence for prosecution, hence no prosecution.  They
can't force you to decrypt any of your communcations or stored files,
because you merely plead the Fifth amendment.  This is assuming one
encrypts everything, and has no accomplices/conspiritors who offer to
testify for the prosecution. Even then, with public key encryption, the
most that people who rat on you can give to the prosecutors are messages
that you sent to them (the rat).  And assuming all messages that you have
sent out are sufficiently vague/obscure as to be non-incriminating, you
are fairly safe there too.  Assuming all messages from you were sent
anonymously to a list, they can't even prove you sent them.
Thus if they cannot force you to decrypt your hard disk, you should be
relatively safe from successful prosecution for whatever, whether it be drug
running or running a anonymous digital money bank / barter house.

I guess now you can see why the government is so scared of encryption.
Widespread use of encryption on the part of the criminal class would
simultaneously obsolete all police, the FBI, CIA, Secret Service, and
Department of Justice, or at the very least make their jobs several
thousand orders of magnitude more difficult.  For example, a child
pornography ring that trades anonymously in encrypted .gifs using
truly anonymous remailers would be impossible to take down by just
taking down one member of the ring. Furthermore, it may be impossible
to prosecute even that one member.


Thug





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Johan Helsingius <julf@penet.FI>
Date: Thu, 21 Jan 93 15:48:46 PST
To: "Timothy C. May" <tcmay@netcom.com>
Subject: Re: Communications Policy
In-Reply-To: <9301211716.AA27162@netcom3.netcom.com>
Message-ID: <9301220100.aa01285@penet.penet.FI>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Tim May writes:

> This was well-debated about a month or so back.

Ooops. Sorry. Must have been just before I joined the list. Always
putting my foot in the wrong place...

> In a note I wrote back then, which did not name the particular site
> involved, I reported that after sending a piece of "anonymous" mail, I
> got a letter of "support" for my position from the remailer operator!

Urgh!

> After I mentioned this to the Cypherpunks list, it came out that other
> sites were also keeping various forms of archives (for some or all of
> the reasons listed above).

Double urgh!

> Anyway, such human-operated remailers, running on UNIX boxes in
> unsecure conditions, have many nonideal characteristics.

Agree.

	Julf





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: deltorto@aol.com
Date: Thu, 21 Jan 93 22:36:26 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: ...and other Trials
Message-ID: <9301220135.tn69465@aol.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>>      Tom DeBoni adds:
>>should university academicians working for state-supported institutions be
subject
>>to the same constraints on privacy and freedom from arbitrary search and
seizure in
>>their email and computer files as high federal governmental officials?

That's a tough one. I suppose there would have to be a body that decided on a
case by case (or a class by class) basis what accounts would be subject to
heavy scrutiny. Unfortunately, this begins to create a overseeing body so
huge and convolute as to render the entire process unwieldly approaching on
the absurd. I read Kafka's "The Trial" and I don't want to face that sort of
Juggernaut any time soon. On the other hand, if you don't lump _every_
friggin' state and federal employee (and I didn't) into the picture and only
consider those persons with a dangerous largesse inherent in their positions
(sorry, but that swell fella Ollie North somehow once again comes to mind),
the whole thing takes on a more manageable (notice I said "more") appearance.

Hey, this is a tough ethical dilemma. I ain't got all the answers, just an
opinion (just like assholes... everyone's got one, right?). Basically, I
worry about abuse of email systems by knowledgable/sinister government
officials. When you consider how hard it is for the general public to
conceive of abuse on paper memos, imagine how much damage and subversion a
savvy individual could do with a "computer" (gwarsh, Mickey! Whut's a
kum-pee-you-ter?) to the democratic process before anyone would pay attention
to a cypherpunk crying "wolf!"

Encryption to the Masses!

  dave





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: deltorto@aol.com
Date: Thu, 21 Jan 93 22:36:27 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Preferably a screw with BIG threads
Message-ID: <9301220135.tn69466@aol.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I dig Thug's comment about the "two conflicting issues here" (The Fifth
Amendment & Obstruction of Justice). Especially the part about "tell[ing]
them to go screw themselves."

   : )

I suppose that certain "specially designated' accounts belonging to certain
"specially designated" officials should be open to complete scrutiny by the
'balancing' arms of Government, i.e. the Executive Branch should be
'checkable' by the Legislative, etc, etc.

That begins to sound more Democratic, don't it? At least it sounds
"democratic" as we hope it would be (maybe not as we know it to be).

   dave




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Marc.Ringuette@GS80.SP.CS.CMU.EDU
Date: Thu, 21 Jan 93 23:08:40 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: the bill of rights hasn't been revoked. not yet, anyway.
Message-ID: <9301220708.AA26798@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> I've been thinking about this a bit, and it seems that the Constitution's
> Bill of Rights has all the provisions required to implement and legally
> use digital money, secure encryption, and anonymous communication networks.

I agree, but only if you do all the public key encryption inside your head.

:-)   :-(

You're interpreting the first amendment much more liberally than current
legal practice would warrant.  Just because something is an act of
communication doesn't mean it's protected speech under the first amendment.


-- Marc Ringuette (mnr@cs.cmu.edu)




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: jgarner@netcom.com (Jason Garner)
Date: Fri, 22 Jan 93 03:08:33 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Does anyone know of any specific cases
Message-ID: <9301221108.AA14072@netcom2.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Does anyone know of any specific legal cases which have tested or are testing
this issue of a conflict between the 5th amendment and Obstruction of Justice?
Seems I read about something like this recently in a California newspaper but
I cant seem to remember the case.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Eric Hughes <hughes@soda.berkeley.edu>
Date: Fri, 22 Jan 93 07:48:48 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: crypto, NSA, gnu, and cypherpunks in Boardwatch magazine
Message-ID: <9301221546.AA24473@soda.berkeley.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Jack Rickard was kind enough to send me the following.  A new member
of the list told me he had found out about the list from this article.

Eric
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
From: jack.rickard@boardwatch.com
Date: Wed Jan 20 09:57:55 1993 
Subject: CYPHERPUNKS COVERAGE

The following article appeared in the February, 1993 issue of Boardwatch
Magazine, a monthly publication covering electronic bulletin boards, 
online information services, and networking issues.

Boardwatch Magazine is published monthly at an annual subscription rate
of $36.  Boardwatch Magazine, 7586 West Jewell Ave., Suite 200, Lakewood
CO 80232; (303)973-6038 voice; (303)986-8754 fax; (303)973-4222 data.
Internet: jack.rickard@boardwatch.com.


FRONTAL ATTACK ON THE PUZZLE PALACE
by Lance Rose

A privately funded attack is underway against a little-known government agency
that has devoted itself to the control of privacy in this country (who gets to
have privacy, who doesn't, and how much privacy can anyone have?).  If
successful, it may begin to unravel decades of surreptitious information
control so effective most of us have not been aware of its operation.

The agency in question is the National Security Agency, or NSA.  It was
established in 1952 by President Harry Truman to monitor signal transmissions
that might affect the security of the United States.  Since that time, the NSA
has steadily cast a pall over public use and knowledge of cryptography, and
generally regulated the limits of privacy in this country.  It has done so with
40,000 or more active employees, and funding not readily discernible from
inspecting Congressional budget lines.

Those not already familiar with the NSA might be surprised at the depth and
extent of its influence.  For instance, rumor has it that NSA monitors much of
the digital telephone activity in this country, even though it is authorized
only to monitor foreign transmissions.  

NSA is also in charge of regulating the export of cryptographic devices to
other countries, which are officially deemed such a great security risk they
are dealt with as "munitions" under the U.S. export control laws.  Any device
or software intended for export and using encryption techniques (which are
usually included to aid in the privacy or security of personal or business
communications, such as in cellular phones) must be reviewed by the State
Dept., which generally passes on the review to the NSA.  These review processes
are so slow and nitpicking that they choke off almost all international trade
in effective encryption devices from the U.S.  The ultimate effect of this
process, as pointed out by John Barlow of the EFF, is to inhibit development of
strong encryption devices even within the U.S., since manufacturers are often
reluctant to make two different versions of their goods, one for domestic use
and one for export.  Well-known, powerful encryption techniques subject to
close NSA export control include devices based on the DES algorithm, and public
key devices based on the RSA algorithm.

In addition, NSA is actively involved, along with such cohorts as the FBI and
the Justice Department, in ongoing legislative efforts to keep effective new
cryptography and privacy techniques out of the public's hands.  Last year,
proposed Senate Bill 266 would have made it illegal to use a cryptographic
technique unless the government had been provided a "back door" enabling it to
easily extract the plain text from any message encrypted through that
technique.  Apparently, brute force cipher-cracking by the NSA was wasting a
little too much of the taxpayers' dollars (albeit through untraceable budget
lines) so we would all get a break if the government's obligatory snooping and
code-cracking activities cost a lot less.  Luckily, this bill was kept from
enactment, in large part through the efforts of the Electronic Frontier
Foundation.  

NSA and FBI came back this year with a new variation - a bill that would
require all phone companies to set up special wiretap stations for official
eavesdropping, so agents would not have to waste taxpayer dollars figuring out
how to tap those nasty optical fiber lines without being detected.  It's ironic
that in the face of a federal statute (the Electronic Communications Privacy
Act) with strong legal obstacles to discourage officials who seek to monitor
private telephone activities, those same officials want to install facilities
giving them the practical ability to wiretap as easily as you or I might open
the faucet for a glass of water.        Another NSA tactic has been massive
removal of texts on cryptography from public access through classifying them as
secret government documents.  Again, slowing down the transmission of knowledge
on cryptography in this manner has placed a drag on development of publicly
useful encryption methods.  The advent of the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA)
threatened this regime, with its provisions for requesting declassification of
government documents.  

However the NSA, like many other federal agencies, discovered a fairly
effective antidote to FOIA requests: ignore the requests, and when it could
ignore them no longer, make the requesting party drag the NSA bodily into court
over and over in escalating legal procedures to compel production of the
requested documents.  This process was such a burden on the requesting parties
that it weeded out all but the most dedicated and well-financed attempts to
fetch documents on cryptography out of the black hole of NSA classification. 
Such conduct was also literally illegal, since it involved failure to meet
statutory time limits to respond to FOIA document requests.  The NSA appeared
to be deliberately not meeting the time limits, and basically thumbing its nose
at those who sought the documents under its control. 

One of those who encountered the NSA's monumental heel- dragging in releasing
cryptography-related documents was John Gilmore.  Gilmore runs a software house
named Cygnus Support, was one of the founders of the Electronic Frontier
Foundation, and is a vocal and impassioned supporter of individual privacy
rights against the modern encroachments of the state.  Gilmore and his
attorney, Lee Tien, decided to challenge certain NSA practices head-on,
specifically the practices of overclassifying documents in the area of
cryptography, and the NSA's unwillingness to release cryptographic materials
into the public domain regardless of whether the materials actually have
strategic military value justifying their classification.

In July, 1992, Gilmore requested, under the FOIA, copies of the books "Military
Cryptanalysis" by Friedman, volumes 3-4 (earlier volumes were already
declassified) and "Military Cryptanalytics" by Friedman and Callimahos, volume
3 onward (the exact number of volumes is not publicly known).  The Friedman
books dated from the 1930's, the ones with Callimahos from the 1950's -  not
likely state of the art stuff.  To add a little irony, Friedman had been one of
the founders of the NSA.

To no one's surprise, the NSA did not respond to Gilmore's FOIA request for the
books.  Gilmore appealed the decision administratively, but again was unable to
obtain the materials, forcing him to the next step of filing a suit against NSA
in federal court in the Northern District of California.  Here is an example of
an administrative setup ripe for abuse, being played for all it's worth by the
NSA.  In an ordinary court action, a party who does not respond within a time
limit set by statute can lose the case by default.  Here, however, the NSA did
not lose anything by not responding to the FOIA requests in the administrative
agency setting.  In fact it actually gained an advantage, forcing Gilmore to
put more energy and resources first into a pointless administrative appeal, and
then finally starting a federal court action from scratch.

Some time after beginning the FOIA procedure, Gilmore tracked down the Friedman
volumes from the '30's at a couple of public repositories in California. 
Amazingly, when the NSA found out he had the books, they told him the books
were still classified or should be classified, and threatened him with a
criminal action if he dared to show the books to anyone else.  This received
some press attention in the S.F. Examiner and elsewhere, to the NSA's great
displeasure.  Not only was the NSA getting publicity, which it shuns, but it
looked like NSA was trying to bury ancient materials already fully accessible
to the public, and threatening to jail someone who dared assert the public had
a right to such materials.  

The attention had a salutary effect on the NSA's actions, however.  They
recently declassified the old Friedman volumes, making it perfectly legal for
Gilmore to distribute them.  Score one for the libertarians.  They have started
the NSA backpedalling.

As we go to press, Gilmore's case against the NSA is still proceeding for
purpose of obtaining the remaining Military Cryptanalytics volume(s), as well
as a "pattern and practice" claim against the NSA.  This last legal claim is
particularly important.  As described above, the NSA drags its heels on FOIA
requests, outlasting all but the most resolute opponents.  But any time a hardy
soul manages to push his case close to a court decision, the NSA can turn
around at the last moment and say, "here are the materials you requested."  The
case would then officially become moot because the request was finally honored,
and no court decision stating that the NSA engages in obstructive and delaying
practices would ever issue.  This sorry result can be avoided by the claim that
NSA engages in a "pattern and practice" of obstructing and delaying FOIA
requests for cryptographic materials.  It will survive any such "mooting" move
by the NSA, and if Gilmore perseveres, may result in a judicial decision laying
some of the NSA's practices bare on the public record.

If Gilmore and his attorney Lee Tien succeed, they could end up chipping off a
big piece of the NSA wall of darkness.  From the look of things, they may still
have some arduous going ahead.  No matter the decision on the trial court level, the NSA will have many court appeals left, and doubtless ot getting to 

UUCICO:USERLOG:d:\tbbs\userlog.inx

Those interested in cryptography issues may find a new Internet mailing list of
interest.  A group is physically meeting in John Gilmore's Silicon Valley
facilities and has started a mailing list under moderation of Timothy C. May
(tcmay@netcom.com). The group includes John Draper (Cap'n Crunch), Tom
Jennings, and others interested in cryptography, anonymous mail forwarding
techniques, encryption, the Pretty Good Privacy program, and other privacy
issues. You can join this mailing list from any service allowing Internet
e-mail by sending a message to CYPHERPUNKS-REQUEST@TOAD.COM.

[<BI>Lance Rose is an attorney practicing high-tech, computer and intellectual
property law in the New York City area, and is available on the Internet at
elrose@well.sf.ca.us and on CompuServe at 72230,2044. He works with shareware
publishers, software authors, system operators, technology buyers, interactive
media developers, on-line database services and others in the high technology
area. He is also author of the book SYSLAW, a legal guide for bulletin board
system operators, available from PC Information Group (800)321-8285. - Editor<D>] 








From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Eric Hughes <hughes@soda.berkeley.edu>
Date: Fri, 22 Jan 93 08:11:25 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: PGP on BBS
In-Reply-To: <9301211702.AA11275@xanadu.xanadu.com>
Message-ID: <9301221609.AA24776@soda.berkeley.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I wrote:
>>The solution is cooperative processing systems, where both the host
>>and the terminal cooperate to perform some task.  

Dean asks:
>What would the two systems be cooperating about?  I'm not sure to what
>you are pointing.

Here are two basic examples:

1. Session key creation.  I regularly log in remotely to my account at
soda.  I'd like to have that modem link encrypted, with session keys
generated on the fly.  So I'll want to use some implementation of
Diffie-Hellman key exchange to make a session key.  The nature of this
protocol means that both my terminal program and my host have to do
calculations and exchange data.  Therefore I need software on my PC at
home and software on the host that work together.

2. Digital signatures.  I read and send my e-mail on the host.  When I
send PGP-encrypted mail, I have to compose the message on the PC,
encrypt it with a PGP command line, upload it to the host with zmodem,
and read it in to my mailer.  I'm certainly not going to put my secret
key on the host.  

What would be ideal is a cooperative protocol that initiated (in the
background, away from my main connection) a channel, sent just the
data to be signed (an IDEA key, for example), have my PC sign the data
and send it back.  This not only entails software on each end, but
also a line multiplexer so that the signing can take place on a
separate channel.  If it doesn't occur on a separate channel, then I
have to see it, probably move to the shell in order to start it
properly, and in general make it non-automatic.

Eric




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: fen@genmagic.genmagic.com (Fen Labalme)
Date: Fri, 22 Jan 93 10:22:09 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: the bill of rights hasn't been revoked. not yet, anyway.
Message-ID: <9301221821.AA12809@>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> Murdering Thug writes:
> If you conduct EVERYTHING via encrypted and anonymous communications and
> keep all records encrypted, they really cannot touch you.
> 
> Don't you just love crypto-anarchy? I know I do.

So do I!

I get the feeling that MT is attempting to display some of the dangers of
crypto-anarchy via sarcasm.  (I really can't be sure, as such intonations
are really difficult to convey or pick up on in ascii.)

While it is true that in a free society, someone could buy a gun and kill
all their neighbors and possible even get away without a trace, I would rather
live in that free society than one that disallows the purchase of the gun
to begin with.  (The fact that I support strong gun control measures is not
contradictory to this.)

In the same way, I would like to encourage everyone, even the Ollie Norths,
to encrypt their communications.  Sure, there will be conspiracies that
take their toll upon society, but I feel that one of the biggest causes
of violence is the feeling of dis-empowerment caused by conventional laws.
Note, for example, that the countries that are less uptight about nudity
generally have less sex crimes.

Laws take power away from people.  Encryption affords people the capability
to gain access to the information they want and disseminate it to those
they want to without fear of recrimination.  This empowering technology
will, imho, empower the many to cause less harm to the few, and empower the
few to get what they want while protecting themselves from the wrath of the
many.

Hope that you find some of these ideas worthwhile...
Fen





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: thug@phantom.com (Murdering Thug)
Date: Fri, 22 Jan 93 09:39:03 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: the bill of rights hasn't been revoked. not yet, anyway.
In-Reply-To: <199301221440.AA05524@ra.oc.com>
Message-ID: <m0nFSHu-000jpKC@phantom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Matthew Lyle writes:
> In a recent message, Murdering Thug said:
> | The Fifth Ammendment is the tastiest one of all when it comes to
> | encryption.  By pleading the Fifth, you do not have to decrypt anything
> | for the prosecution.  The Fifth Ammendment gives you the right not to
> | testify or provide evidence that would incriminate you.  Providing a
> | key to decrypt your hard disk would incriminate you, and you don't
> | have to do it.
> 
> What the government has to do in this case is to give you immunity from
> prosecution.  They can then order you to decrypt your hard disk.  You can't
> refuse based on the 5th ammendment because you have been given immunity from
> prosecution.  They can't use the hard drive against you, but they then can
> in anybody elses prosecution.

Agreed. I guess if you refuse after that point, they can hold you in contempt
of court or cite you for obstruction of justice.

BUT, what if they "crime" involves only you. Then they (the prosecutors) are
up shit's creek, pardon the language. You're immune, and there's no one
left to prosecute.


Okay, let's assume the crime involves a conspiracy, and they give you immunity
and force you to decrypt your hard disk.  What good would this do them if
all your communications between your conspirators took place anonymously and
the messages from your conspirators are so vague/obscure as to be worthless
as evidence.  Now, they have already given you immunity, and now they can't
even go after your conspirators because they may not even know who those
conspirators are or even what the hell those conspirators were talking about
in their vague/obscure messages to you.  Even if the prosecutors know what
the messages are in reference to, they still have to prove that in a court
of law, beyond a reasonable doubt. Since they cannot go back on their
promise of immunity to you, the prosecutors are again up shit's creek.

All this will only work providing the prosecutors have no other evidence
against you (ie: voice wire taps, physical evidence (notes, cancelled checks,
survielance video, stashed cash, etc.)). If you conduct EVERYTHING via
encrypted and anonymous communications and keep all records encrypted, they
really cannot touch you.

Don't you just love crypto-anarchy? I know I do.


Thug
 




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Marc Horowitz <marc@MIT.EDU>
Date: Fri, 22 Jan 93 10:26:42 PST
To: thug@phantom.com (Murdering Thug)
Subject: Re: the bill of rights hasn't been revoked. not yet, anyway.
In-Reply-To: <m0nFSHu-000jpKC@phantom.com>
Message-ID: <9301221825.AA23938@tla.MIT.EDU>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


The major problem is that in any case which the government will be
interested, money is involved.

The problem with anonymous banking is that it can't look like banking,
because the reporting laws for banks are extrememly tight.  No matter
what the bill of rights says, certain things (such as cash
transactions over a certain amount) must be reported.  Interest must
be reported by federal taxpayer ID.  (Ok, we don't pay interest.  This
is the cost of privacy, I guess.)

And I'm not convinced that if the banks records were seized, that you
could avoid being traced.  you have to get the money to and from them
somehow.  And even if I'm unkown by name to them, I'll be damned if
I'm going to put *money* into a bank which I (or my agent) can't walk
up to and do business if I so choose.

		Marc




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Marc.Ringuette@GS80.SP.CS.CMU.EDU
Date: Fri, 22 Jan 93 10:33:25 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: the bill of rights hasn't been revoked. not yet, anyway.
Message-ID: <9301221833.AA06301@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> Agreed. I guess if you refuse [ to decrypt your files] after that
> point, they can hold you in contempt of court or cite you for
> obstruction of justice.

Oh yeah, this reminds me of a scheme by my friend Fuzzy.  Create
an encryption system which compresses and encrypts two files in
the space of one (more or less) using two different keys, the "real"
one and the "innocent" one.  When you encrypt something, you also 
encrypt a similar-sized hunk of innocuous text.  When they ask for
the key, you give them the one that spits out the fake stuff.

True, it's security by obscurity.  But I thought you might be interested.

-- Marc Ringuette (mnr@cs.cmu.edu)




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Eric Fogleman <Eric.Fogleman@analog.com>
Date: Fri, 22 Jan 93 10:50:13 PST
To: deltorto@aol.com
Subject: Re: privacy vs. public servants
Message-ID: <9301221847.AA01967@ack.adstest.analog.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Responding to Tom DeBoni's message concerning whether or not
government officials should have a right to secure communications.

> I submit that the amount of (real or potential) oversight should be
> somehow proportional to the potential for harm or abuse of power
> available to the individual involved. Surely Ollie North or Richard
> Nixon had much greater abilities to subvert the democratic process or
> otherwise break the law than Professor Smith of the Chemistry Dept. of
> State U.

Agreed!

I agree with Dave Deltorto's idea about "a body that decided on a case
by case (or a class by class) basis what accounts would be subject to
heavy scrutiny".  Or perhaps limiting certain public servants (the
chief executive, Oliver North's successor, etc) to a set of 
"open" computing systems and communication paths.  (Similar to limiting
people with security clearances to sets of closed computing systems, 
communication paths.)

Dave says:

> Unfortunately, this begins to create a overseeing body so
> huge and convolute as to render the entire process unwieldly 
> approaching on the absurd. I read Kafka's "The Trial" and I don't 
> want to face that sort of Juggernaut any time soon.   

Unwieldy?  Kafka-esque?  Expensive?  Possibly, but it doesn't have to
be that way.  As Bongo says:  "The price of freedom is eternal
vigilance."  How much do you want to pay?

Eric Fogleman




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu
Date: Fri, 22 Jan 93 15:24:53 PST
To: thug@phantom.com (Murdering Thug)
Subject: Re: the bill of rights hasn't been revoked. not yet, anyway.
In-Reply-To: <m0nFHGP-000jpaC@phantom.com>
Message-ID: <9301222323.AA05827@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


The Thug brings up some useful ideas of the constitution guaranteeing
the right to encryption.  The point that communication and encryption
are very similar is a very crucial idea.  However, he goes astray:

>I guess now you can see why the government is so scared of encryption.
>Widespread use of encryption on the part of the criminal class would
>simultaneously obsolete all police, the FBI, CIA, Secret Service, and
>Department of Justice, or at the very least make their jobs several
>thousand orders of magnitude more difficult.  For example, a child
>pornography ring that trades anonymously in encrypted .gifs using
>truly anonymous remailers would be impossible to take down by just
>taking down one member of the ring. Furthermore, it may be impossible
>to prosecute even that one member.

This makes it sound as if criminals will suddenly find no obstacle to
their deviant behavior with the use of cryptography, a ridiculous
assertion.  Law enforcement will be made more difficult but arguably
the government has never legitimately had the "right" to wiretap, and
law enforcement will of course will never be "obsoleted" by technology.
 We must separate the activity of spying from the activity of law
enforcement (the agencies noted are in both categories).  The former
will be perhaps "thousand orders of magnitude more difficult" but the
latter will not be significantly affected, I'd wager (most criminals
are low tech). A Murdering Thug will be caught, eventually, when he
murders somebody regardless of his use of cryptography.

BTW, it annoys me that anyone thinks that law enforcement will be made
impossible when cryptography becomes widespread.  This extreme idea is
absolutely absurd.  Definitely, it will be affected, and perhaps some
"criminals" will not be caught that once might have.  But I suspect
that the criminals perpetrating the worst crimes, the ones civilized
people find most abhorrent and heinous, will be largely unaffected. 
There are far better ways to improve the currently inefficient and
often ineffective law enforcement techniques than by improving
wiretapping techniques.  Its funny how totalitarian governing systems
(the logical extent of completely outlawing cryptography) often manage
to find "criminals" where previously none existed.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: lefty@apple.com
Date: Fri, 22 Jan 93 16:28:59 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Communications Policy
Message-ID: <9301230027.AA13100@apple.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>I hear concern over privacy and also over erasure of White House tapes.
>I pose the following question: Should an institution have the right
>to private communication? Is the White House an institution?

A _private_ institution should have a right to private communications.

The White House is _not_ a _private_ institution.

--
Lefty (lefty@apple.com)
C:.M:.C:., D:.O:.D:.






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu
Date: Fri, 22 Jan 93 16:02:13 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: public privacy, NSA resources
In-Reply-To: <9301221546.AA24473@soda.berkeley.edu>
Message-ID: <9301230001.AA06625@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Some ideas on just how "public" public servants' communication is have
been raised here.

>I have to concur. ALL documents produced by a public official operating an
>email system on public time and in pursuit of public policy (e.g. a White
>House official) should be subject to scrutiny and should not be considered as
>that person's private property.  (deltorto@aol.com)

I'd like to take this a bit further. The new emerging technology of
global networking is a means for previously uninfluential citizens to
take back control of our governments.  Is it just me, or does it seem
like the US version is way out of control?  Growing uncontrollably like
a cancerous tumor?  As a citizen of this country I am vehemently irate
at public servants who use their positions and influence to thwart
their own laws (e.g. Congress is exempt from many laws it passes). 
There seems to be a real undercurrent of stonewalling everywhere, and
the insideous attitude that the public is not who you serve, but who
you mislead to get more money or power.  Why shouldn't every budget of
every federal agency be public knowledge?  I could see where MY TAX
MONEY is being spent.  Why shouldn't I be able to determine what any
given US public official (elected or unelected) is doing on a given
day?  What a given agency is accomplishing?  Because its impractical? 
Because it's not my business?  HAH!  It is not only practical, but will
eventually happen.  Imagine if all this information were stored in a
single unified public database...!  As accessable as a library book? 
Imagine the horrors we would uncover!  (Interesting: technology will
greater polarize the distinctions of "public" and "private" information.)

The possibility of greater control over tax money is here too.  Some
presidential candidate (I forget who, Perot?) suggested having a box on
the tax form that would allow constituents to direct money directly to
the federal deficit.  Of course, in today's atmosphere of complete
fiscal irresponsibility and obfuscation such an idea is completely
meaningless. But in the government of tomorrow, we will have must
broader control over directing where our tax money will go.  Imagine
that I was required to spend a certain amount of money on government
services (my total taxes) but that I could redirect the actual amounts
to agencies (in broad categories) that serve me best.  Suppose that
even *private companies* could compete for this money on my tax form! 
It would almost be as if the federal government didn't even exist--our
government would be nothing but a method of reallocating money in the
most efficient way possible.  (Hm, I think I'll give $0.001 to the NSA
this year, hehe.)

Regarding inefficiency, note the sheer obstacles that "whistleblowers"
encounter in our government. Most are lucky to just be demoted.  Others
are harassed and threatened and fired, or worse.  All this for
potentially saving money and making an organization more efficient!  We
need to elevate the whistleblower to heroic status, and encourage every
member of the US population to be one if possible.  I'm not advocating
paranoia or violent revolution, just that we increase our vigilance by
increasingly exercising our rightful control with the aid of fresh
technological developments.

- - -

>FRONTAL ATTACK ON THE PUZZLE PALACE
>by Lance Rose

>Since that time, the NSA
>has steadily cast a pall over public use and knowledge of cryptography, and
>generally regulated the limits of privacy in this country.  It has done so with
>40,000 or more active employees, and funding not readily discernible from
>inspecting Congressional budget lines.

40,000?  Is this for real? Does anyone know how this would compare to
FBI or CIA?  Also, does anyone have a clue on the black budget?  The
author seems to hint here that while it is not "readily discernible" it
might be inferrable.

There were a lot of files maintained by the FBI on suspected communists
during the McCarthy era.  I wonder what delicious little morsels have
been squirreled away in the bowels of our massive behemoth?  Esp. with
the scarily massive capabilities of archival possible with today's
storage technologies...




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Jay Prime Positive <jpp@markv.com>
Date: Fri, 22 Jan 93 20:01:10 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: An ebank's vulnerability.
Message-ID: <9301221959.aa06199@hermix.markv.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


From: jpp@hermix
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: An ebank's vulnerability.

  I think that the physical location of an ebank's value reserve (be
it gold, corn, stock certificates, whatever) is really the trickyest
problem.  At that location the bank can be attacked by governments (or
other crooks).

  [enter fantasy... Person with gun says "Well, if all this money is
your's, then you sure owe us taxes (protection).  Don't pay and you're
going to jail (to the bottom of the river).  If it ain't your's, then
(I'll just take it for myself) you're a bank, and you're going to
jail." ...leave fantasy]

  One solution I see is to not have any physical deposit at all.  This
is what most governments do isn't it?  But without a physical resource
for reference the question of the value, or the origin of ecreds
becomes tricky (at least for my limited economic knowledge).  Suppose
I create a really great joke and try to sell it.  Where does the buyer
get the ecreds from?  If I wanted to buy a taco, would the vendor take
ecreds?  Would they take ecreds *I* printed up?

  Another solution is to use the banking system of a country which
*ALREADY* has anonymous value storage as a comodity for sale.  Supose
some enterprising Swiss citizen wanted to set up ebanking, I bet they
could do it.  I wouldn't mind my ecreds being denominated in Swiss
francs either.  But I suspect the Swiss government might drop by the
bank every year to collect some taxes from the accounts.  At what tax
rate would this become unacceptable?

  Someone could always set up an ungoverned value storage location.
Smuggling gold (or other valuables) into, with in, and out of governed
areas shouldn't cost too much, since valuables generaly have at least
the value/weight and value/volume than marijuana has.  The cost of
smuggling, and defending the valuables becomes the limiting factor.
How much could be "lost" to smuggling and defense befor this becomes
unacceptable?

j'




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: pfarrell@cs.gmu.edu (Pat Farrell)
Date: Fri, 22 Jan 93 17:44:33 PST
To: ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu
Subject: Re:  public privacy, NSA resources
Message-ID: <9301230140.AA12628@cs.gmu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


A fellow cypherpunk lister says about the number of employees
at NSA:
>40,000?  Is this for real? Does anyone know how this would compare to
>FBI or CIA?  Also, does anyone have a clue on the black budget?  The
>author seems to hint here that while it is not "readily discernible" it
>might be inferrable.
>
The number of employees at the FBI is public info. I don't
have it at hand. CIA employment used to be secret, and may
still be. Of course you can buy a picture from SPOT and count
the cars for an estimate. At both agencies, there are a
significant number of contract employees, who are not on the
employment rolls, but are efectively the same as government
employees. They aren't counted in public info.

I can't guess at the number of NSA folks. But I can relate an
story....

I gave a paper at this year's National Computer Security
Conference, in Baltimore. Like all conferences, it had a
registration area, vendor's booths, etc. 

Following form, it had nice folks behind counters with signs
over the top, with the usual:
	Prepaid A-F | Prepaid G-M | .... | Walkup | Press | ...

sections. What surprized me was the row of counters labeled:
NSA A-E | NSA F-H | ..... NSA W-Z

There were as many NSA booths as all the rest combined. (ok,
+- 10%) 

Another aside. The NCSC is essentially a front for the NSA.
NCSC exists but has no more than two employees, one is the
secretary to an NSA official.

Pat


Pat Farrell,      Grad Student                       pfarrell@cs.gmu.edu
Department of Computer Science, George Mason University, Fairfax, VA
PGP key available via finger or request           #include standard.disclaimer





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Date: Fri, 22 Jan 93 21:04:06 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: crypto, NSA, gnu, and cypherpunks in Boardwatch magazine
In-Reply-To: <9301221546.AA24473@soda.berkeley.edu>
Message-ID: <9301230501.AA07629@netcom3.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Eric Hughes passed along an article he got, which originally appeared
in "Boardwatch":
(lots of stuff elided)

> FRONTAL ATTACK ON THE PUZZLE PALACE
> by Lance Rose

(and if you read all the way to the end...)

> Those interested in cryptography issues may find a new Internet mailing list of
> interest.  A group is physically meeting in John Gilmore's Silicon Valley
> facilities and has started a mailing list under moderation of Timothy C. May
                                            ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
> (tcmay@netcom.com). The group includes John Draper (Cap'n Crunch), Tom
> Jennings, and others interested in cryptography, anonymous mail forwarding
> techniques, encryption, the Pretty Good Privacy program, and other privacy
> issues. You can join this mailing list from any service allowing Internet
> e-mail by sending a message to CYPHERPUNKS-REQUEST@TOAD.COM.
> 
> [<BI>Lance Rose is an attorney practicing high-tech, computer and intellectual

Needless to say to all of you, I don't moderate the list! Jeez, where
do they get this stuff? 

I haven't talked to this guy, so I have no idea where he got this
idea. Perhaps he thought my posts were more moderate than others?
Obviously he never saw my "Crypto Anarchist Manifesto"!


-- 
..........................................................................
Timothy C. May         | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,  
tcmay@netcom.com       | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
408-688-5409           | knowledge, reputations, information markets, 
W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA  | black markets, collapse of governments.
Higher Power: 2^756839 | Public Key: waiting for the dust to settle.





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Marc Horowitz <marc@MIT.EDU>
Date: Fri, 22 Jan 93 23:40:06 PST
To: pfarrell@cs.gmu.edu (Pat Farrell)
Subject: Re: perl scripts for PGP
In-Reply-To: <9301221257.AA10121@cs.gmu.edu>
Message-ID: <9301230738.AA01650@deathtongue.MIT.EDU>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>> Marc,
>> when you were here in DC, you mentioned some perl scripts that processed
>> PGP output. Can you please send me a copy?

yeah, and I'm cc'ing cypherpunks, since I think you all might be
interested, too.

This script has three functions.  All take the output of pgp -kvv as
input.

1) it "inverts" a pgp file, listing all the keys signed by a given
key, as compared to giving all the keys which have signed a given key.

2) given -kvv output (and it can merge several files of input
automatically, since it hashes on key id), it lists all the keys which
you (or any other key) have a path of signatures to, and the length of
the shortest such path.  So, the specified key has a path length 0.
All keys signed by that key have a path length 1, all keys signed by
those keys have path length 2, etc.

3) Optionally, it will list one of these paths for each key you can
reach.  There may be many paths, so this is only for interest; to
enumerate all paths would be painful.

The most interesting use for this script is to see what your "radius"
is (maximum distance to any key), and to see how big your "world" is.
Needless to say, I wouldn't trust keys which have a long path length
too much, if at all.  There are 155 keys in my "world" (out of a
keyring of about 350).  My current radius is 7.  Tom, if you're in
Boston anytime, my radius would decrease to 5 if I signed your key.
That would be cool :-)

		Marc

#!/afs/athena/contrib/perl/perl

#
# $Id: pgputil.pl,v 1.7 1993/01/23 07:29:27 marc Exp $
#

## pgputil.pl. Copyright 1993, Marc Horowitz <marc@mit.edu>
## 
## This program may be freely redistributed and used as long as the RCS
## Id, copyright, and this message are left intact.  It may also be used
## as the basis for other programs, as long as this program is
## acknowledged in the code and documentation, and it is made clear that
## the new program is a derivative work, and not the original.  Although
## not required, it would be nice if any modifications were sent back to
## me.

$save = "";

sub next {
    local($ret);

    return() if !defined($save);

    while(1) {
	$_ = $save || <>;
	$save = "";
	if (! $_) {
	    undef $save;
	    return($ret);
	} elsif (/^\s/) {
	    $ret .= $_;
	} elsif ($ret) {
	    $save = $_;
	    return($ret);
	} else {
	    $ret = $_;
	}
    }
}

sub parsekvv {
    local($keyid,$ring,$lastpub);

    while($_ = &next()) {
	if (/^Key ring:\s+'(.*)'$/) {
	    $ring = $1;
	} elsif (m!^pub\s+\d+/([0-9A-F]+)\s+\d+/\d+/\d+\s+!) {
	    $lastpub = $1;
	    $publine{$lastpub} = $_;
	    ($pubindent{$lastpub} = $_) =~ s!\d{4}/\d\d/\d\d!$&  !;
	} elsif (/^sig\s+([0-9A-F]+)/) {
	    $keyid = $1;
	    $sigindent{$keyid} = $_;
	    ($sigline{$keyid} = $_) =~ s/^(sig\s+[0-9A-F]{6})\s\s/$1/;
	    $siglist{$keyid} .= $lastpub." " if $siglist{$keyid} !~ /$lastpub/;
	}
    }
}

sub findsigned {
    local($level,@from) = @_;
    local($tmp,@next);

    foreach $hash (@from) {
	next if (defined $depth{$hash});

	$depth{$hash} = $level;
	for $nexth (split(' ',$siglist{$hash})) {
	    push(@next,$nexth);
	    $signedby{$nexth} = $hash if !defined $signedby{$nexth};
	}
    }

    if (@next) {
	&findsigned($level+1,@next);
    }
}

($zero = $0) =~ s!^.*/([^/]+)$!$1!;

sub usage {
    die  "usage: $zero signators [ file ... ]\n"
	,"       $zero recurse [ -v ] <keyid> [ file ... ]\n";
}

sub signators {
    &parsekvv();

    print "Type bits/keyID   Date       User ID\n";

    foreach $hash (keys %siglist) {
	next if ($sigline{$hash} =~ /Unknown signator/);

	print $sigline{$hash};
	foreach $pubhash (split(' ',$siglist{$hash})) {
	    print $pubindent{$pubhash};
	}
    }
}

sub recurse {
    for (@ARGV) {
	if (/^-v/) {
	    $verbose++;
	} else {
	    push(@newargv, $_);
	}
    }
    @ARGV = @newargv;
    $keyid = shift(@ARGV);

    if ($keyid !~ /^[0-9A-F]{6}$/) { &usage; }

    &parsekvv();
    $signedby{$keyid} = "";
    &findsigned(0, $keyid);

    foreach $pubhash (keys %depth) {
	$out{sprintf("%02d%s",$depth{$pubhash},$pubhash)} = 
	    sprintf("%2d %s",$depth{$pubhash},$publine{$pubhash});
    }

    foreach $k (sort keys %out) {
	print $out{$k};

	if ($verbose) {
	    $sig = $signedby{substr($k,2,6)};

	    while($sig) {
		($x = $pubindent{$sig}) =~ 
		print "   ",$x;
		$sig = $signedby{$sig};
	    }
	}
    }
}


## dispatch

$cmd = shift(@ARGV) || &usage();

if ($cmd =~ /^s/) {
    &signators();
} elsif ($cmd =~ /^r/) {
    &recurse();
} else {
    &usage();
}




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Juggler <IH23%UTEP.BITNET@ricevm1.rice.edu>
Date: Sat, 23 Jan 93 13:21:37 PST
To: <cypherpunks@toad.com>
Subject: No Subject
Message-ID: <23JAN93.15495907.0008.MUSIC@UTEP>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


COuld you sub me to the cypherpunk list? Thanks.

-Juggler

--------------------------------------------
| Juggler                  |  Insert cool  |
| IH23@utep.BITNET         |  saying here. |
| IH23@utepvm.ep.utexas.edu|Long live sigs!|
|******************************************|
| Sysop of Three Ring Circus (915)564-0026 |
--------------------------------------------
 My school doesn't have opinions....




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: deltorto@aol.com
Date: Sat, 23 Jan 93 13:27:32 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: a few good weasels
Message-ID: <9301231627.tn05014@aol.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Eric.Fogleman@analog.com contributes his view that:

>>I agree with Dave Deltorto's idea about "a body that decided on a case
>>by case (or a class by class) basis what accounts would be subject to
>>heavy scrutiny".  Or perhaps limiting certain public servants (the
>>chief executive, Oliver North's successor, etc) to a set of 
>>"open" computing systems and communication paths.  (Similar to limiting
>>people with security clearances to sets of closed computing systems, 
>>communication paths.)
>>
>>Dave says:
>>
>>> Unfortunately, this begins to create a overseeing body so
>>> huge and convolute as to render the entire process unwieldly 
>>> approaching on the absurd. I read Kafka's "The Trial" and I don't 
>>> want to face that sort of Juggernaut any time soon.   
>>
>>Unwieldy?  Kafka-esque?  Expensive?  Possibly, but it doesn't have to
>>be that way.  As Bongo says:  "The price of freedom is eternal
>>vigilance."  How much do you want to pay?

Well, Eric, I take your point, and I'm willing to 'pay' quite a bit for
freedom, especially if I have pals like you to help out in the biz of
watchfulness. :-)   I guess what I was trying to get at here was that the
process could become so convolute that it would no longer be _technically
feasible_ to keep an eye on the dangerous character(s) such as the
President's National Security Advisor, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the twisted
geeks at the CIA, their cronies at the FBI, Hillary Clinton (whoops, she's
probably OK) etc, etc, ad nauseam. This doesn't mean I wouldn't _like_ to
make sure they're carefully monitored, I just look at the volume of
paperwork/electronic files generated by even the most lowly federal agencies
and imagine that such a watchdog agency might be logistically incapable of
doing the job properly, assuming it could do it in an unobstructed and
non-compromised way in the first place. There would have to be a highly
selective, maybe viciously random way of keeping potential abusers in line.
And who watches the watchdog? Kevin Costner?

Speaking of which, has anyone seen this movie "A Few Good Men?" Jack
Nicholson plays this meansumnabitch Marine Colonel who basically takes the
law into his own hands, blinded by his self-righteous view of his job to
protect "us" to the point where he has a young Marine murdered (Jack's great
in this one, guys, go check out the bargain matinee). Now, I'm not saying
that all government agents are that sick and perverse in the zealous pursuit
of their goals, but I acknolwedge that such people can and probably do exist
and that if we remain divided and unguarded, we all live at their mercy. I
figure the only things that keep us safe at night are pure luck and the few
government dudes who let a few details slip into the hands of say, the few
crypto-anarchists who can balance things out. A world of absolutes is not a
fun world and it's not a safe world. Someone's gotta break the rules every
once in a while or we all go down the tubes. Of course, I _personally_ would
_never_ break any of the fine laws of our beloved nation, but I know deep in
my heart (but not anywhere on my hard disks) that such brave people exist and
that the effect of their less-than-legal efforts is the delicate equilibrium
in which we continue to prosper and innovate.

I have more to say in this, but it's almost dawn and I have to flitter back
to my coffin.

 dave




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: ghsvax!hal@uunet.UU.NET (Hal Finney)
Date: Sat, 23 Jan 93 17:29:09 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Digital cash redux
Message-ID: <9301240115.AA11642@nano.noname>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Here is an excerpt from a description of one version of Chaum's
digital cash, which I posted on Nov. 25:

> There are lots of proposals for electronic cash in the literature,
> mostly very complex.  I think one of Chaum's simpler proposals would be
> adequate for email "banking".  This proposal, from the beginning of
> his paper "Untraceable Electronic Cash" in Crypto 88(?), goes like
> this:
> 
> 1. Alice chooses a random x and r, and supplies the bank with
> B=r^3*f(x) mod n, where f is a one-way function (like MD5), and n is
> the modulus for the bank's public key.
> 
> 2. The bank takes the third root of B (e.g. via an RSA decryption) and
> sends it back to Alice: D = r * f(x)^(1/3), and withdraws one dollar from
> her account.
> 
> 3. Alice extracts C = f(x)^(1/3) by dividing D by r.  (Note that
> division can be done mod n without knowing the factors of n, but it's
> rather complicated.)
> 
> 4. To pay Bob one dollar, Alice gives him (x, C).
> 
> 5. Bob can verify that C = f(x)^(1/3), but he still has to send (x, C)
> to the bank in order to make sure that x hasn't been used before.
> Otherwise Alice could spend (x, C) twice.  The bank increases Bob's
> account by one dollar.
> 
> This scheme is pretty simple and provides untraceability - the bank
> saw B and D but not C, so although it can verify that (x, C) is legit,
> it can't correlate that with Alice's withdrawal.
> 
> The main disadvantage of this approach is that Bob has to send (x, C)
> to the bank right away (or at least before sending Alice anything in
> return for her cash) to verify that the cash hasn't been used before.
> But in email, where turnarounds of a day or more aren't unusual, this
> should be tolerable.
> 
> Alice and Bob could be pseudonyms, using anonymous addresses to
> communicate with each other and with the bank.
> 
> Different denominations of cash could correspond to different
> exponents than "3" in the example above.  (That is, $1 would use
> C=f(x)^(1/3), $2 would use C=f(x)^(1/5), $4 would use C=f(x)^(1/7),
> and so on.)
> 
> Technically, this would be quite easy to implement, using the code in
> PGP for the arithmetic, and MD5 for the one-way function.  We'd need
> to define a few message formats.  The RFC1113 ascii encoding from PGP
> could be used as well.
> 
> The "social" problems are more challenging, it seems to me.  What is
> the backing for this electronic money?  Why do people care what their
> bank balances are?  Is this stuff really worth anything?
> 
> One possibility is to base digital cash on real money.  People would
> open a pseudonymous account via email, then postal-mail dollars to the
> bank, enclosing their account number so the bank would know whom to
> credit with the deposit.  Later, if someone wanted to withdraw "real
> money" from their account they would have to give a real postal
> address where it could be mailed.  Now the electronic money is worth
> real dollars.  Even if people didn't deposit or withdraw very often,
> it still has value because of the backing.
> 
> Unfortunately, this approach would currently be illegal (at least,
> unless you actually were a real bank!).  If there were some way the
> bank itself could be anonymous, it might survive, but I don't see how
> to mail it money while keeping the anonymity.  Still, we could
> consider experimenting with this on a small scale with accounts of no
> more than a few dollars.  As long as it was clearly an experiment I
> doubt that any prosecutions would result even if it attracted
> government attention, because the expense involved in court costs
> would be so disproportionate to the few dollars involved in this
> technically illegal act.
> 
> Another approach would be not to try backing the digital cash at all,
> or rather backing it implicitly by the determination of various people
> to accept it and perform services or supply goods in return for it.
> Tim's offer to Xerox papers in return for digital cash would be one
> example.  Perhaps others could provide some other services.  It would
> be great if some shareware author would accept digital cash as a
> symbol of support for crypto anonymity.
> 
> One problem that I see with this approach is how you determine the
> size of the money supply.  Or, in other words, how does new digital
> cash get started circulating?  How do people get new accounts, and how
> much money is in them?
> 
> If these problems can be solved, a big advantage of this approach is
> that the banker can be anonymous.  He would be known only by his
> anonymous address and his public key(s).  This would provide some
> safety in the event that even a small-scale experiment like this
> was targetted for a crackdown.
> 
> Another issue is the prospect of multiple "banks", each issuing their
> own (incompatible) cash.  How would they compete?  Perhaps in terms of
> rapid turnaround?  Some might choose to be anonymous, others would go
> public.  The latter would have the advantage that people might trust
> them more, but OTOH there is more chance of your bank account
> disappearing after a crackdown for a public bank than an anonymous
> one.
> 
> Lots to think about here!
> 
> Hal
> 74076.1041@compuserve.com




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu
Date: Sat, 23 Jan 93 16:24:21 PST
To: pfarrell@cs.gmu.edu (Pat Farrell)
Subject: Re: public privacy, NSA resources
In-Reply-To: <9301230140.AA12628@cs.gmu.edu>
Message-ID: <9301240022.AA21591@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>Another aside. The NCSC is essentially a front for the NSA.
>NCSC exists but has no more than two employees, one is the
>secretary to an NSA official.

Extremely interesting. What  does NCSC stand for?

I am doubtful of the 40,000 figure even with contract employees. That's
a small army. What the hell could keep that many people busy? (shudder)

Do you know much about MITRE?  It has a high net profile and I was
wondering if it is a cover for something else too.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: jim@tadpole.com (Jim Thompson)
Date: Sat, 23 Jan 93 16:53:57 PST
To: pfarrell@cs.gmu.edu
Subject: Re: public privacy, NSA resources
Message-ID: <9301240052.AA18559@tadpole.tadpole.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> >Another aside. The NCSC is essentially a front for the NSA.
> >NCSC exists but has no more than two employees, one is the
> >secretary to an NSA official.
> 
> Extremely interesting. What  does NCSC stand for?
 
 tadpole 11 whois -h nic.ddn.mil ncsc.mil.
 National Computer Security Center (NCSC-DOM1)
    9800 Savage Road
    Fort George G. Meade, MD 20755-6000
	
Fort Meade *is* the main NSA campus.

docmaster.arpa (nee: docmaster.ncsc.mil) is one of the infamous Internet
spook hangouts.  :-)

> I am doubtful of the 40,000 figure even with contract employees. That's
> a small army. What the hell could keep that many people busy? (shudder)

You should take a look at the campus sometime, its big.  Lots of
big-sheilded buildings.  Lots of big satellite antennas.  I have no
trouble accepting the 40k figure, it is, after all a bureaucracy.

Jim





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Hal <74076.1041@CompuServe.COM>
Date: Sat, 23 Jan 93 21:23:07 PST
To: Cypherpunks <cypherpunks@toad.com>
Subject: Re. PGP on BBS
Message-ID: <930124051435_74076.1041_DHJ67-1@CompuServe.COM>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


One thing I didn't follow about this was the supposed need to put the
private key onto the BBS in order to send encrypted mail.  This is not
necessary.  The private key is only used for signing messages.  For privacy
purposes in many cases encryption is sufficient.  PGP could be run on the
BBS to do encryption.
 
Of course, the local sysop could see your message as you compose it or
upload it to the BBS, but if you're then sending it through a BBS network it
can travel privately.
 
Hal
74076.1041@compuserve.com
 






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Phiber Optik <phiber@eff.org>
Date: Sat, 23 Jan 93 21:55:16 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: This list...
Message-ID: <199301240554.AA16927@eff.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I'm not one to overlook the obvious.  Is it desireable that any Tom, Dick, or
Harry can telnet to toad's SMTP port, and use the sendmail expand command to
list everyone on this mailing list?
I'm sure less net-savvy users on this list are unaware, and it should be said.





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Marc Horowitz <marc@Athena.MIT.EDU>
Date: Sat, 23 Jan 93 22:58:53 PST
To: david.brooks@cutting.hou.tx.us (David Brooks)
Subject: Re: PGP on BBS
In-Reply-To: <10497.143.uupcb@cutting.hou.tx.us>
Message-ID: <9301240657.AA14069@m16-034-15.MIT.EDU>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


What you are all talking about here is a solved problem.  Many such
network protocols exist.  SLIP is probably the best example.  If you
use SLIP to connect to the BBS instead of a dumb terminal connection,
you get a real network link which supports multiple connections to
multiple destinations.  And free SLIP implementations exist.  The
author of one of the most popular is on this list, in fact.

Of course, this requires that your "terminal" be somewhat intelligent,
but even a lowly 8088 PC running DOS can run SLIP.

If you do this, all you need is a BBS which supports network services,
instead of the current menu-based sort of systems we have now.  If you
want to encrypt, you do so locally.  In fact, you'd probably do almost
everything locally.

		Marc




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Date: Sun, 24 Jan 93 12:25:25 PST
To: ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu
Subject: Re: public privacy, NSA resources
In-Reply-To: <9301240022.AA21591@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Message-ID: <9301242022.AA12398@netcom3.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


someone with a long net address, included in the "To:" field, writes:
(quoting someone else)

> >Another aside. The NCSC is essentially a front for the NSA.
> >NCSC exists but has no more than two employees, one is the
> >secretary to an NSA official.
> 
> Extremely interesting. What  does NCSC stand for?

National Computer Security Center. 

Send a letter requesting to be added to the distribution list of the
"Orange Book"-related materials (frequent updates to a set of
guidelines on computer security protocols, the most famous being one
with an orange cover, hence the name), and you will start receiving a
lot of stuff from them.

The address:

The INFOSEC Awareness Office can be reached at:

Department of Defense
National Security Agency
ATTN: S332
9800 Savage Road
Ft. George Meade, MD 20755-6000

or phone 301-766-8729

(these are the numbers I used a couple of years ago...your mileage may vary.)

> I am doubtful of the 40,000 figure even with contract employees. That's
> a small army. What the hell could keep that many people busy? (shudder)

NSA occupies two very large office buildings, including the longest
corridor in the world (a mile, if I recall correctly, but my copy of
"The Puzzle Palace" is not handy). I went and took a look, and can
confirm the parking lot is _huge_.

The 40,000 figure may or may not be accurate, as the NSA won't say.
Some say the employment is closer to 100,000. Certainly it is much
higher than that of the CIA.  Bear in mind that they are the nation's
primary SIGINT facility, operating the various listening posts in
conjunction with military personnel (via Army Security Agency, Naval
Security Group, Air Forc, etc.).

As always, read James Bamford's "The Puzzle Palace," which gets
referred to a lot on this list.

> Do you know much about MITRE?  It has a high net profile and I was
> wondering if it is a cover for something else too.

MITRE, derived from "MIT REsearch," is one of several defense-oriented
think tanks, the others being RAND Corporation ("R & D," not Ayn Rand!),
Institute for Defense Analysis (IDA), etc. The Communications Research
Division of IDA, located at Princeton, was formed in 1956 to help the
NSA. Lots of famous mathematicians, including Barkley Rosser, Andrew
Gleason, and others.

This shadowy world of defense think tanks is a subject unto itself.


-- 
..........................................................................
Timothy C. May         | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,  
tcmay@netcom.com       | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
408-688-5409           | knowledge, reputations, information markets, 
W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA  | black markets, collapse of governments.
Higher Power: 2^756839 | Public Key: waiting for the dust to settle.





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: pfarrell@cs.gmu.edu (Pat Farrell)
Date: Sun, 24 Jan 93 10:00:14 PST
To: david.brooks@cutting.hou.tx.us
Subject: NUpop is the answer was Re: PGP on BBS
Message-ID: <9301241756.AA14778@cs.gmu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I don't know if the sources are available, NorthWestern's
NUpop is the key to making PGP acceptable to masses of
not-very-computer-literate users. Ask archie for nupop103.zip

NUpop is a PC (MS-DOS) program that uses the PC as a computer.
It uses SMTP to send mail and receives mail via POP. It works
on networks and thru dialup. It works with SLIP and more
simply over a reliable ASCII connection.

It is a great program. CUA, mouse, folders, auto sigs, etc.
All it needs is to have a "encryption outgoing" flag
in its "group" (alias) directory, and pump the message thru
PGP in filter mode. On receipt, find the PGP headers,
push thru the filter, and show the clear text.

I haven't looked for either the PGP or NUpop sources, but 
I'd expect this to be a near trivial hack. It may even be
already done.

NUpop (and its Mac equivalent Eudora) are the right way to get
users on the net. Using a PC as a VT100 to login to a full
blown Unix system, using vi to edit mail, etc. is near
criminal. NUpop makes it easy enuff for econ profs.
(Seriously, I set up NUpop for an econ prof here last weekend.
He loves it. He is definitely not a Unix wizard.)

If NUpop source is not available, then we'll have to reverse
engineer something similar. I've learned how NUpop does the
communications, and it is straight-forward (also in the RFCs
if you care to look) I thought about doing a
Windows-only program, but wonder if we really have to
support diehard DOS users on ATs and less.

I've been meaning to ask about source availablity. I'll
do so now, and probably have an answer tomorrow.


Pat Farrell,      Grad Student                       pfarrell@cs.gmu.edu
Department of Computer Science, George Mason University, Fairfax, VA
PGP key available via finger or request           #include standard.disclaimer
Write PKP. Offer money for a personal use license for RSA.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: pfarrell@cs.gmu.edu (Pat Farrell)
Date: Sun, 24 Jan 93 11:40:23 PST
To: marc@MIT.EDU
Subject: Rational PC mail , was Re: PGP on BBS
Message-ID: <9301241935.AA14956@cs.gmu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


 Marc@mit.edu writes:
>
>What you are all talking about here is a solved problem.  Many such
>network protocols exist.  SLIP is probably the best example.  If you
>use SLIP to connect to the BBS instead of a dumb terminal connection,
>you get a real network link which supports multiple connections to
>multiple destinations.  And free SLIP implementations exist.  The
>author of one of the most popular is on this list, in fact.


It is a solved problem. It doesn't even require SLIP. I spent lots
of hours over the past year trying to get SLIP to work with
the GMU computers. it is officially "not supported"

With NUpop and Eudora, SLIP is optional. The NUpop docs say
that SLIP slows down the transfer, and recommends simple ASCII
async connection using a reliable modem (MNP or V42/V.42bis)

>Of course, this requires that your "terminal" be somewhat intelligent,
>but even a lowly 8088 PC running DOS can run SLIP.
>
>If you do this, all you need is a BBS which supports network services,
>instead of the current menu-based sort of systems we have now.  If you
>want to encrypt, you do so locally.  In fact, you'd probably do almost
>everything locally.

Using a computer as a computer is clearly the way to go. There
are a number of low-cost or free Unix providers, I expect that
they do, or can be talked into supporting POP.

I expect that current terminal/menu based BBSes will disapear
once folks realize how much better easier, faster, and all
around better programs that use computers as computers work.

Pat


Pat Farrell,      Grad Student                       pfarrell@cs.gmu.edu
Department of Computer Science, George Mason University, Fairfax, VA
PGP key available via finger or request           #include standard.disclaimer




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Matt Willis <ASTMWILL%STETSON.bitnet@CUNYVM.CUNY.EDU>
Date: Sun, 24 Jan 93 13:32:05 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Neuvo-Crypto
Message-ID: <01GTWJC6AX9S0000HM@stetson.bitnet>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I'm researching fractals here at glorious Stetson University and it crossed my
mind that there are possibilities in the combination of fractals with current
encryption standards...  for instance, using a piece of the mandelbrot set as a
key or a Julia set with a standard center and radius, thereby reducing a key to
a sort of x,y,z,F() coordinate...
And if you and a friend established a standard equation... that would make it a
sort of three-key system.

On a simpler level, couldn't the RSA method be converted to use the Complex
number system... (which is the base of fractal mathematics)

Anyone follow?

+-------Matt-Willis--------------------------------+
|       Matt Willis       ASTMWILL@STETSON.BITNET  |        elsewhere:
|       Matt Willis       Head of the Underground  | mwill@mindvox.phantom.com
|       Matt Willis          Robotech PBM List     |
+-------Matt-Willis--------------------------------+
"Absolutely alone in awareness of the mechanism." -Agrippa by WG




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: nowhere@bsu-cs.bsu.edu (Chael Hall)
Date: Sun, 24 Jan 93 19:12:03 PST
To: pfarrell@cs.gmu.edu (Pat Farrell)
Subject: Re: Rational PC mail , was Re: PGP on BBS
In-Reply-To: <9301241935.AA14956@cs.gmu.edu>
Message-ID: <9301250307.AA18287@bsu-cs.bsu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>Using a computer as a computer is clearly the way to go. There
>are a number of low-cost or free Unix providers, I expect that
>they do, or can be talked into supporting POP.

     I agree that it's the best way to go, but as you will see below
it's not (IMHO) what's best for everyone.

>I expect that current terminal/menu based BBSes will disapear
>once folks realize how much better easier, faster, and all
>around better programs that use computers as computers work.

     I think a wide variety of services need to be provided in order
to allow each person to use computer systems in their own way.  For
example, the following are all popular types of systems that each
have a large following:

     CompuServe, Prodigy, GEnie, etc.
     Bulletin Board Systems (dial-up, non-Internet related)
     VMS
     UNIX

     If BBSes were eliminated in the long run, many users would have
to learn the more difficult UNIX or resort to CI$ et al or VMS.  I
personally use BBSes, UNIX, and VMS (in no particular order) and
enjoy each for its special abilities.  BBSes are a totally different
environment than UNIX, thus I think they will stick around for quite
a while.  They allow the sysadm to provide much more personality and
creativity than UNIX with very little knowledge of the underlying
operating system by comparison.

Chael Hall

--
Chael Hall
nowhere@bsu-cs.bsu.edu, 00CCHALL@LEO.BSUVC.BSU.EDU, CHALL@CLSV.Charon.BSU.Edu
(317) 285-3648 after 4 pm EST




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Phiber Optik <mark@Panix.Com>
Date: Sun, 24 Jan 93 20:33:57 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: e-mail...
Message-ID: <199301250432.AA07927@sun.Panix.Com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


To the genius (Matthew Sean Pardo, mpaf1216@pelham.med.unc.edu), who
thought he was being clever by sending what he thought was "anonymous"
mail to me (by telnetting to port 25), you missed my point.
There's no need for the EXPN command to be used remotely.  I can only suggest
that John Gilmore disable it at toad, though it probably doesn't matter 
anymore.  If anonymity and privacy are as key as people are making them
out to be on this list, I find it ironic that privacy is lacking on such
a simple level.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Marc Horowitz <marc@MIT.EDU>
Date: Sun, 24 Jan 93 21:12:41 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: signature trades
Message-ID: <9301250511.AA09784@deathtongue.MIT.EDU>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I'm going to be in New York City on Wednesday, January 27.  I'll be
available in the evening if people want to get together somewhere and
trade signatures face-to-face.  I know some people on this list are in
that area.  Email me personally; I'll coordinate and send mail to
everyone who expresses an interest.  If you have a good idea for a
place to meet, please make a suggestion, since I don't know all that
many places to meet.

		Marc

PGP key in case you want to encrypt:

-----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----
Version: 2.1
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=37CN
-----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: avalon@coombs.anu.edu.au (Darren Reed)
Date: Sun, 24 Jan 93 16:08:48 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: no subject (file transmission) (fwd)
Message-ID: <9301250007.AA00793@coombs.anu.edu.au>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


                      CFP'93
The Third Conference on Computers, Freedom and Privacy
                 9-12 March 1993
 San Francisco Airport Marriott Hotel, Burlingame, CA

The CFP'93 will assemble experts, advocates and interested 
people from a broad spectrum of disciplines and backgrounds in 
a balanced public forum to address the impact of computer and 
telecommunications technologies on freedom and privacy in society. 

Participants will include people from the fields of computer 
science, law, business, research, information, library science, 
health, public policy, government, law enforcement, public 
advocacy and many others. Some of the topics in the wide-ranging 
CFP'93 program will include:

ELECTRONIC DEMOCRACY - looking at how computers and networks 
are changing democratic institutions and processes.

ELECTRONIC VOTING - addressing the security, reliability, 
practicality and legality of automated vote tallying systems 
and their increasing use.

CENSORSHIP AND FREE SPEECH ON THE NET - discussing the 
problems of maintaining freedom of electronic speech across 
communities and cultures.

PORTRAIT OF THE ARTIST ON THE NET - probing the problems and 
potential of new forms of artistic expression enabled by 
computers and networks.

DIGITAL TELEPHONY AND CRYPTOGRAPHY - debating the ability of 
technology to protect the privacy of personal communications 
versus the needs of law enforcement and government agencies 
to tap in.

HEALTH RECORDS AND CONFIDENTIALITY - examining the threats to 
the privacy of medical records as health care reform moves 
towards increasing automation.

THE MANY FACES OF PRIVACY - evaluating the benefits and costs 
of the use of personal information by business and 
government.

THE DIGITAL INDIVIDUAL - exploring the increasing 
capabilities of technology to track and profile us.

GENDER ISSUES IN COMPUTING AND TELECOMMUNICATIONS - reviewing 
the issues surrounding gender and online interaction.

THE HAND THAT WIELDS THE GAVEL - a moot court dealing with 
legal liability, responsibility, security and ethics of 
computer and network use.

THE POWER, POLITICS AND PROMISE OF INTERNETWORKING - covering 
the development of networking infrastructures, domestically 
and worldwide.

INTERNATIONAL DATA FLOW - analyzing the  issues in the flow 
of information over the global matrix of computer networks 
and attempts to regulate it.

The conference will also offer a number of in-depth tutorials 
on subjects including:

* Information use in the private sector
* Constitutional law and civil liberties
* Investigating telecom fraud
* Practical data inferencing
* Privacy in the public and private workplace
* Legal issues for sysops
* Access to government information
* Navigating the Internet 

INFORMATION
For more information on the CFP'93 program and advance 
registration call, write or email to:

CFP'93 INFORMATION
2210 SIXTH STREET
BERKELEY, CA 94710
(510) 845-1350
cfp93@well.sf.ca.us 

A complete electronic version of the conference brochure
with more detailed descriptions of the sessions, tutorials,
and registration information is also available via anonymous
ftp from  sail.stanford.edu  in the file:  /pub/les/cfp-93
or from sunnyside.com in the file: /cfp93/cfp93-brochure
or via email from listserv@sunnyside.com by sending email
with this text: GET CFP93 CFP93-BROCHURE






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: mjr@netcom.com (Matthew Rapaport)
Date: Mon, 25 Jan 93 12:34:55 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Coupled programs and security by obfuscation
Message-ID: <9301252034.AA21595@netcom2.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


**** Pat Farrel <pfarrell@cs.gmu.edu> writes

>I expect that current terminal/menu based BBSes will disapear
>once folks realize how much better easier, faster, and all
>around better programs that use computers as computers work.

I hope not... At least not until the BBS operators and writers agree
on some standardized API so people like me and other third parties
can write PC based interfaces in a language of our choice. The problem
with current "coupled systems" (for example the Coconet BBS software)
is that they all rely on proprietary interface programs on the PC. If
I communicate with 10 BBS systems (large or small), I must have 10
different communications programs... No thanks...

Also keep in mind that much of the value of these systems comes from
their availability to the widest possible audience. There are people
in many parts of the world who still have nothing better then 1970's
style glass tty's and even paper-output type terminals!

******

Back on the issue of privacy and anonymity, I don't understand the lure
of all these schemes for hiding mail paths, etc. If encrypted messages
pass through one aliaser, and get decrypted (and aliased again) on
another machine, you are protected. The machine that knows who you are
can't read your material, and the machine that can read you doesn't know
who you are. Any further obfuscation adds little (IMHO) to your
security. Revelation of your identity (in either case) depends on
collusion between system administrators on the different hosts. True
this might be even less likely where 3 or more hosts are involved, but
how much less so? If some agency is powerful enough to force two systems
in different parts of the world (and the net) to reveal what they know
about you, the chances are they can force three or four, etc.

matthew rapaport     Philosopher/Programmer At Large      KD6KVH
           mjr@netcom.com     70371.255@compuserve.com




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: edgar@spectrx.Saigon.COM (Edgar W. Swank)
Date: Mon, 25 Jan 93 14:58:27 PST
To: Cypherpunks          <cypherpunks@toad.com>
Subject: Re: public servant privacy
Message-ID: <TsayXB2w165w@spectrx.saigon.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


My friend Dave del Torto said recently:
 
    Tim May notes (appropriately) that:
    >>Strong crypto means even Ollie North can fully protect his
    >>records.
 
    Yes, but shouldn't he be _required_ to "open" his files if he is
    under criminal investigation just like a drug-dealer who's
    required to open the locked trunk of his car?
 
Actually, the drug dealer is *not* required to open his locked car
trunk.  But he might as well, otherwise the police (with search
warrent) will force it open, probably causing some damage which they
will not pay to repair.
 
There doesn't seem to be any practical way to "force open" a
(strongly) encrypted message without the key.  Failure to produce the
key when ordered might be an excuse for firing a govt. employee, but
it can't be the basis for a criminal prosecution (5th Amendment).
 
"Murdering Thug" further commented:
 
    Well, there are really two conflicting issues here:
 
    1) The Fifth Amendment - the right not to testify against
       yourself, hence the Miranda warning when you're arrested.  You
       can claim that being forced to decrypt your hard disk by the
       cops violates your Fifth Amendment rights, and refuse to
       decrypt it.
 
    2) Obstruction of Justice - by not handing over the key to your
       hard disk, you may be obstructing an investigation.  By not
       decrypting your hard disk under court order, you maybe be held
       in contempt of court.
 
 
    Number 2 may work for law enforcement if they are investigation a
    third party and ask to see your hard disk in order to help their
    investigation.  A good example is an Internet site that is being
    used as a telnet launch-pad by some hacker.  If that site refuses
    to cooperate and keeps their files encrypted, the police/court may
    charge you with obstruction of justice or contempt of court.
    HOWEVER, if you feel that by decrypting these files, you would be
    providing testimony/evidence against yourself, you can plead the
    5th, and tell them to go screw themselves.
 
Pleading the 5th will fail if you are offered *immunity* from
prosecution for anything you reveal (as Ollie North was, recall, for
his testimony before Congress). If you still don't want to testify (to
avoid providing damaging evidence against your friends, for example)
your next line of defense is "I forget".  Very hard for the prosecutor
to prove beyond reasonable doubt that you really remember that secret
key.

--
edgar@spectrx.saigon.com (Edgar W. Swank)
SPECTROX SYSTEMS +1.408.252.1005  Silicon Valley, Ca





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: pmetzger@shearson.com (Perry E. Metzger)
Date: Mon, 25 Jan 93 12:20:09 PST
To: phiber@eff.org
Subject: This list...
In-Reply-To: <199301240554.AA16927@eff.org>
Message-ID: <9301251834.AA07145@maggie.shearson.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>From: Phiber Optik <phiber@eff.org>

>I'm not one to overlook the obvious.  Is it desireable that any Tom, Dick, or
>Harry can telnet to toad's SMTP port, and use the sendmail expand command to
>list everyone on this mailing list?

Welcome to TCP/IP. You've told us what most of us already know. (By
the way, its the SMTP EXPN command, not the "sendmail" one, as
sendmail is just one MTA -- there are many other implementations). The
whole point of this list is to develop techniques to ensure privacy --
most of us understand that there isn't much right now.

Perry




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu
Date: Mon, 25 Jan 93 13:20:00 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: anonymous server compilation?
Message-ID: <9301252119.AA27366@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Hello. To my knowledge no public listing of known anonymous servers has
been compiled.  I'd like to start one.  This could possibly turn into a
FAQ if response is good.  I will put in this newbie-type introductory
information at the end of this document for review.  Please help me
improve this by sending constructive/informative feedback, esp.
sections flagged with (?).  This all is very weak right now but with
your help it could become very thorough and valuable.

pax.tpa.com.au
--------------
The most sophisticated anonymous posting system to my knowledge.  Uses
public key encryption for traffic in both ways (to/from) the server. 
No anonymous remailing capabilities yet but dclunie@pax.tpa.com.au, the
administrator, says he's considering it.  Had a serious bug recently
fixed that caused a reassignment of previously allocated anonymous
addresses.  Located in Australia.

anon.post.g@pax.tpa.com.au   for anonymous USENET posting where `g' is the group
anon.info@pax.tpa.com.au   for information
anon.subscribe@pax.tpa.com.au   to subscribe to the mailing list


acs@n7kbt.rain.com
------------------
no info (?). given to me by dclunie@pax.tpa.com.au


godiva.nectar.cs.cmu.ed
-----------------------
operated by Karl_Kleinpaste@cs.cmu.edu.  Mentioned by julf@penet.fi in
an introductory information.  This person has posted code to
alt.sources that implements anonymous server capabilities. (?)

anon.penet.fi
-------------
operated by julf@penet.fi.  Both anonymous posting and remailing capabilities. (?)


hh@pmantis.berkeley.edu
-----------------------
no info (?).  given to me by tcmay@netcom.com



Anonymity and Identity on the Internet
======================================

Generally, identity is amorphous and almost nonexistent on the Internet
for a variety of reasons.  One is the inherent fluidity of "cyberspace"
where people emerge and submerge frequently, and absences are not
readily noted in the "community".  You currently do not really have any
great assurance that the messages you get in mail and the messages you
see on USENET are from the people they appear to be from, nor do others
have of you.  Be careful not to be led astray; gullibility is perhaps
the greatest crime here, and skepticism the most useful virtue. 
Neither are there currently good assurances of privacy in your personal
email, and cases where it has been compromised are not uncommon.  New
encryption technologies are slowly gaining acceptance and penetration
into systems that make possible digital encryption and authentication
that will make the systems more trustworthy.  These can also protect
your identity and privacy by offering anonymous posting and mailing capabilities.

USENET

USENET is a worldwide decentralized news distribution system, adhering
to Internet standards described in RFC977 (?).

MAIL

The characters that you are reading are almost certainly encoded in
ASCII, the American Standard Code for Information Interchange that maps
alphabetic and symbolic characters onto numeric codes and vice versa. 
Virtually every computer system uses this code, and if not, has ways of
converting to and from it.  When you write a mail message, it is being
sent in ASCII, and since the standard is virtually universal, there is
no intrinsic privacy.  Anyone with access to hardware involved in
forwarding the message can theoretically read it.

Internet mail standards, described in RFC (?), are still evolving
rapidly and not entirely orderly.  For example, standards for mail
address `munging' or `parsing' tend to vary slightly between sites and
frequently mean the difference between finding addresses and bouncing
mail.  New standards are calling for uniform introduction of "privacy
enhanced mail" (PEM) which uses encryption technologies to ensure
privacy.  The current internet mailing protocol is slightly
anachronistic in that it was created when the system was somewhat
obscure and not widespread, with only a fraction of the traffic it now
sees.  Today about (?) of internet traffic is mail, comprising about
(?) messages.  (Source: (?))

A person's mailing address is far from an identification of an
individual.  First, anyone with access to the account, e.g. they know
the password, either legitimately or otherwise, can send mail with that
address in the From: line.  Secondly, as part of current mailing
protocol standards, forging the From: line is a fairly trivial
operation for many hackers.  Much less forgable is the status and path
information prepended to messages by intermediate hosts.

Note that bounced messages go to postmasters at a given site in their
entirety.  This means that if you address mail with an incorrect
address it has a good chance of being seen by a human other than the recipient.

Theoretically people at any site in the chain of sites that forwards a
given mail message over the Internet (about a half-dozen (?) on
average, depending on the distances) could potentially compromise the
privacy of that message and read it.  In practice, this appears to be
rare or unheard of.  Something more common is instances of immature and
unscrupulous system operators reading private mail at a local site,
such as a university.  The requirements and screening for getting a
system administration job (and access to *all* information on a system)
vary widely between sites and are sometimes frighteningly lax.

ANONYMOUS MAILING
-----------------

Some people find it useful to send anonymous mail to others.  Examples
of this include (?).  Here the distinction should be made between sort
of "hit and run" mail, where the sender does not want to carry on any
further communication, and anonymized mail, where the recipient can
respond but has no idea of the sender or origination of a message.  The
servers listed above allow for the latter type of communication.  The
former type is now largely confined to hackers who find it convenient
for scurrilous threats or whatever, but probably has legitimate uses as
well (?).  Another category is people who want to appear to have
regular but not traceable appearances, i.e. the userid and site
origination do not obviously flag their mail as anonymous.

Unfortunately, no set of standards is in place to handle the procedures
for anonymous posting.  Typically the approach is to set up an
"anonymous server" that, when activated by email to its address,
responds by allocating and supplying an "anonymous ID" that is unique
to the person requesting it (based on his email address).  This will
vary for the same person for different machine address email
originations.  To send anonymous mail, the user sends email directed to
the server containing the final destination. The server "anonymizes"
the message by stripping of identification information and forwards the
message, which appears to originate from the anonymous server only from
the corresponding anonymous user id.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Eric Hughes <hughes@soda.berkeley.edu>
Date: Mon, 25 Jan 93 15:09:59 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Coupled programs
In-Reply-To: <9301252034.AA21595@netcom2.netcom.com>
Message-ID: <9301252308.AA11480@soda.berkeley.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Matthew Rapaport writes:
>At least not until the BBS operators and writers agree
>on some standardized API so people like me and other third parties
>can write PC based interfaces in a language of our choice. 

This is exactly the goal.  For example, zmodem has a widespread
deployment and a public specification.  What needs to happen for
cryptography is the development of such protocols for key exchange,
signatures, and other cryptographic entities.

Eric




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Eric Hughes <hughes@soda.berkeley.edu>
Date: Mon, 25 Jan 93 15:20:38 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: security by obfuscation
In-Reply-To: <9301252034.AA21595@netcom2.netcom.com>
Message-ID: <9301252318.AA12294@soda.berkeley.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Matthew Rapaport writes:

>[...] I don't understand the lure
>of all these schemes for hiding mail paths, etc. 

The disambiguating question is "What is the capability of your
opponent?"  Some opponents have only access to their own machine as
users, and some have access as root.  Others have access to all
traffic on the local network and can thus see all mail entering and
leaving a system.  Others, we might assume, have access to all traffic
on any non-local network.

The rule is the following.  If it's cheap enough to defend against
even the strongest opponent, deploy it.  Cryptography, with its
presumably exponential difference between the costs of defense
(encryption) and offense (cryptanalysis), allows for economical
solutions against even the largest of opponents.

Cryptography is a greater leveler than the Colt .45 revolver.

Eric




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: peter honeyman <honey@put-in-bay.citi.umich.edu>
Date: Mon, 25 Jan 93 12:43:13 PST
To: pmetzger@shearson.com
Subject: Re: This list...
In-Reply-To: <9301251834.AA07145@maggie.shearson.com>
Message-ID: <9301252043.AA20045@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> The whole point of this list is to develop techniques to ensure privacy --
> most of us understand that there isn't much right now.

but but but ... sendmail already offers an easy way to hide the membership
of a mailing list.  why not use it?

	peter




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: John.Nieder@f33.n125.z1.FIDONET.ORG (John Nieder)
Date: Mon, 25 Jan 93 22:53:33 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: NSA STRENGTH
Message-ID: <4625.2B64DAF7@fidogate.FIDONET.ORG>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



from: john.nieder@f33.n125.z1.fidonet.org

>> I am doubtful of the 40,000 figure even with contract employees. That's
>> a small army. What the hell could keep that many people busy? (shudder)

>NSA occupies two very large office buildings, including the longest
>corridor in the world (a mile, if I recall correctly, but my copy of
>"The Puzzle Palace" is not handy). I went and took a look, and can
>confirm the parking lot is _huge_.

As is the case with a good many other gov't. agencies, one can be sure
that all the crew are not 9-to-5ers showing up at one office.

>The 40,000 figure may or may not be accurate, as the NSA won't say.
>Some say the employment is closer to 100,000. Certainly it is much
>higher than that of the CIA.

It has been a good many years since I traveled in the lower strata of
these circles, but it was my information that the NSA, at least at that
time, had a manpower pool "hugely greater than the CIA's."  It is my
understanding that the NSA budget is highly classified - unavailable
even to most members of Congress.

>Bear in mind that they are the nation's
>primary SIGINT facility...

I believe you'll find that the NSA also is involved in SATINT & ELINT
as well.  Never Say Anythings are busy little bees.

>operating the various listening posts in
>conjunction with military personnel (via Army Security Agency, Naval
>Security Group, Air Forc, etc.).

It is my belief from personal experience that the NSA requests &
receives operational assistance from those innocuous agencies in
positions to gather information of use to the NSA in the course of their
routine duties.

>As always, read James Bamford's "The Puzzle Palace," which gets
>referred to a lot on this list.

I've tried to read this famous tome a couple of times, but have been
unable to hack its turgid prose.  Someday. perhaps...

> Public Key: waiting for the dust to settle.

Excuse me, Tim?

        JN
-----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----
Version: 2.1

mQCNAitWeuoAAAEEAN2DcLjYiri8Th9HlUFfCxSyxt/FZLjIX121kWoGax9hb8wM
QRTtjeN+FKHdkdzD8zr7P+GbExF0X5DhZp02O1te6/2fuHDESHYUsymQpyDqoJpH
wd7xZ/VraYhEX6eQzbbS4k5jbdQLzzIdgD8URzAMXYmTkvLrXhAm8ppE4nk3AAUR
tDFKb2huIE5pZWRlciA8am9obi5uaWVkZXJAZjMzLm4xMjUuejEuZmlkb25ldC5v
cmc+
=237u
-----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----


... Who has the USSR's BIOWAR contageous snakebite virus?  
--- Blue Wave/Opus v2.12 [NR]
--  
John Nieder - via FidoNet node 1:125/555
    UUCP - ...!uunet!hoptoad!kumr!fidogate!33!John.Nieder
INTERNET - John.Nieder@f33.n125.z1.FIDONET.ORG




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: John.Nieder@f33.n125.z1.FIDONET.ORG (John Nieder)
Date: Mon, 25 Jan 93 22:53:35 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: 5th AMENDMENT & DECRYPTION
Message-ID: <4627.2B64DAF9@fidogate.FIDONET.ORG>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



from: john.nieder@f33.n125.z1.fidonet.org

> In a recent message, Murdering Thug said:
> | The Fifth Ammendment is the tastiest one of all when it comes to
> | encryption.  By pleading the Fifth, you do not have to decrypt anything
> | for the prosecution.  The Fifth Ammendment gives you the right not to
> | testify or provide evidence that would incriminate you.  Providing a
> | key to decrypt your hard disk would incriminate you, and you don't
> | have to do it.

I should like to see the body of case law on which this opinion is
based, if any.
.   Recently this question came up in another forum on encryption & an
"authority" on communications law claimed the probable scenario would be
that the arresting agency would have the encrypted material decrypted by
a competent government or academic agency & the costs of said decryption
would eventually be recovered from the defendant through civil suits,
presuming the defendant had sufficient assets.  It is my memory of the
thread that he claimed this had been done in previous cases.

        JN


... Gun control: It ain't about guns, it's about *control*.  
--- Blue Wave/Opus v2.12 [NR]
--  
John Nieder - via FidoNet node 1:125/555
    UUCP - ...!uunet!hoptoad!kumr!fidogate!33!John.Nieder
INTERNET - John.Nieder@f33.n125.z1.FIDONET.ORG




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: The Phantom <phantom@u.washington.edu>
Date: Mon, 25 Jan 93 16:41:42 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: New Anonymous Remailer site avail.
Message-ID: <Pine.3.05.9301251636.A8627-b100000@stein2.u.washington.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


After the forcing down of the penet site, with the help of Hal Finney I've
set up a remailer located at phantom@mead.u.washington.edu. Mail is not
cc'ed or kept track of, unless I start getting complaints about abuse,
which I will investigate.

PGP public key available via finger at phantom@mead.u.washington.edu. I'm
pretty sure if all of the encryption bugs are worked out, but I would much
appreciate someone helping me out on this; If you do send a message
through it and have problems, let me know. 

Aw, heck, here's the public key -

-----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----
Version: 2.1

mQCNAitcsHIAAAEEAPZ3Ex1rEwKLeANRoaRyTA72htDFGiGPmWkowByZyUtRkTRp
Vs/WdhgoJ1VLz76Chyb63I+ejpekeJfOud98gMh2HtVoTjNGYAawpCKo15tFyzYn
BFYVy0NjroyxwM6YnPCsYfYMpvyjEa5mfgrlyzvYBBeTDRD89vYoe7Eue0fDAAUR
tDJBbm9ueW1vdXMgUmVtYWlsZXIgPHBoYW50b21AbWVhZC51Lndhc2hpbmd0b24u
ZWR1PokAlQIFECtcqWpkhnxaNc7AOQEBZ+8EAIOOvsFf/niUrWw0BRvPhSEmtzrA
kQJt3q7kPXutjj3IsJ1/oR8oGhv4iPQ5BmNvvd5dnsbbCqOurhaftVgzlSpyQcYi
VryeNVvpdeX1+VTS7N+lAHVAlqnimoaEtUUIftDoDIjNNKRDi+nU4GbbL+1MqveC
1LKQMIi1WPjr6Wpw
=1XNo
-----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----


Matt

Matt Thomlinson
University of Washington, Seattle, Washington.
Internet: phantom@u.washington.edu      	    phone: (206) 528-5732
PGP 2.0 key availaible via email or finger phantom@hardy.u.washington.edu





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: pmetzger@shearson.com (Perry E. Metzger)
Date: Mon, 25 Jan 93 14:17:36 PST
To: honey@put-in-bay.citi.umich.edu
Subject: This list...
In-Reply-To: <9301252040.AA26396@uu5.psi.com>
Message-ID: <9301252142.AA12706@maggie.shearson.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>From: peter honeyman <honey@put-in-bay.citi.umich.edu>

>> The whole point of this list is to develop techniques to ensure privacy --
>> most of us understand that there isn't much right now.

>but but but ... sendmail already offers an easy way to hide the membership
>of a mailing list.  why not use it?

Prehaps that would be of value, but its best not to think of it as
worth too much. After all, the bad guys can likely just subscribe to
the list, and they could always just eavesdrop on the outgoing mail.
Fixing this "hole" is o.k. so long as no one believes that it has
actually added to security in any substantial way. Its best that no
false sense of security be engendered. Everyone should know and
understand that the structures as they exist are almost completely
insecure.

Perry




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: The Phantom <phantom@u.washington.edu>
Date: Mon, 25 Jan 93 17:27:22 PST
To: Peter Honeyman <honey@citi.umich.edu>
Subject: Re: New Anonymous Remailer site avail.
In-Reply-To: <9301260103.AA00955@bashful.u.washington.edu>
Message-ID: <Pine.3.05.9301251717.B9473-9100000@stein2.u.washington.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



On Mon, 25 Jan 1993, Peter Honeyman wrote:

> > After the forcing down of the penet site ...
> 
> you mean pax, not penet, right?
> 
> 	peter

Yes -- sorry.


Matt Thomlinson
University of Washington, Seattle, Washington.
Internet: phantom@u.washington.edu      	    phone: (206) 528-5732
PGP 2.0 key availaible via email or finger phantom@hardy.u.washington.edu






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Peter Honeyman <honey@citi.umich.edu>
Date: Mon, 25 Jan 93 16:54:56 PST
To: pmetzger@shearson.com
Subject: Re:  This list...
Message-ID: <9301260054.AA23403@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


eavesdropping on the list would not reveal lurkers.

	peter




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Peter Honeyman <honey@citi.umich.edu>
Date: Mon, 25 Jan 93 16:58:57 PST
To: edgar@spectrx.Saigon.COM
Subject: Re: public servant privacy
Message-ID: <9301260058.AA23462@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


i believe there is a special exception related to automobiles
that makes them subject to search without a warrant when the
driver is placed under arrest.  but check with a lawyer.

	peter




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Peter Honeyman <honey@citi.umich.edu>
Date: Mon, 25 Jan 93 17:01:57 PST
To: dclunie@pax.tpa.com.au
Subject: Re: anonymous server compilation?
Message-ID: <9301260101.AA23509@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> Unfortunately, the anonymous sytem at pax has been closed, as the local
> network in Australia was considered unsuitable for this kind of thing,
> partly due to the narrow bandwidth of the link to the US, and partly because
> of the prevailing attitude at the US end that anonymous mail is generally
> a bad thing.

i thought the latter theory was debunked -- ?

	peter




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Peter Honeyman <honey@citi.umich.edu>
Date: Mon, 25 Jan 93 17:03:57 PST
To: phantom@u.washington.edu
Subject: Re:  New Anonymous Remailer site avail.
Message-ID: <9301260103.AA23559@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> After the forcing down of the penet site ...

you mean pax, not penet, right?

	peter




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Al Billings <mimir@u.washington.edu>
Date: Mon, 25 Jan 93 23:34:45 PST
To: ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu
Subject: Re: anonymous server compilation?
In-Reply-To: <9301252119.AA27366@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Message-ID: <Pine.3.05y.9301252326.A5614-a100000@carson.u.washington.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain




On Mon, 25 Jan 1993 ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu wrote:
> 
> pax.tpa.com.au
> --------------
> The most sophisticated anonymous posting system to my knowledge.  Uses
> public key encryption for traffic in both ways (to/from) the server. 
> No anonymous remailing capabilities yet but dclunie@pax.tpa.com.au, the
> administrator, says he's considering it.  Had a serious bug recently
> fixed that caused a reassignment of previously allocated anonymous
> addresses.  Located in Australia.

 This is down and gone. They had problems with the net. I asked earlier if
anyone had copies of the code used to run it (as I liked their set-up) but
I received no replies.







From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Date: Tue, 26 Jan 93 00:04:51 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: 5th AMENDMENT & DECRYPTION
In-Reply-To: <4627.2B64DAF9@fidogate.FIDONET.ORG>
Message-ID: <9301260801.AA18233@netcom3.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



> from: john.nieder@f33.n125.z1.fidonet.org

(commenting on the strategy of "taking the 5th" on the matter of
decrypting one's files)

> .   Recently this question came up in another forum on encryption & an
> "authority" on communications law claimed the probable scenario would be
> that the arresting agency would have the encrypted material decrypted by
> a competent government or academic agency & the costs of said decryption
> would eventually be recovered from the defendant through civil suits,
> presuming the defendant had sufficient assets.  It is my memory of the
> thread that he claimed this had been done in previous cases.

With strong crypto, e.g., with 300 decimal digit moduli, the "costs"
of decryption by brute force could easily exceed the GNP/GDP of the
U.S.

So taking the 5th, or claiming to have "forgotten" the key, should
work, all other things being equal. But all other things are not
equal...perhaps they eavesdropped as the private key was being typed
in (and it was stored somewhere, presumably), perhaps they "black
bagged" the house, perhaps a simple pass phrase was used in lieu of
memorizing 300 digits, and so on.

A lot of work lies ahead.


-- 
..........................................................................
Timothy C. May         | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,  
tcmay@netcom.com       | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
408-688-5409           | knowledge, reputations, information markets, 
W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA  | black markets, collapse of governments.
Higher Power: 2^756839 | Public Key: waiting for the dust to settle.





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: karn@qualcomm.com (Phil Karn)
Date: Tue, 26 Jan 93 01:55:10 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re:  5th AMENDMENT & DECRYPTION
Message-ID: <9301260954.AA09481@servo>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Mike Godwin (formerly, I understand) of EFF and I had a lively
discussion on precisely this topic back at the Hackers' Conference.
Mike insists that there is no firm legal theory or case law on which
to base an assertion that the 5th amendment would shield you from
being compelled to divulge an encryption key that could then be used
to decrypt information to be used as evidence against you.

He says that the closest the Supreme Court came to this issue was an
offhand remark in a 5th amendment case to the effect that "of course,
we couldn't compel the defendant to, say, reveal the combination on a
lock".  I forget the precise legal term that Mike used to refer to
this comment, but he said it didn't establish a binding legal
precedent because it didn't relate directly to an issue in the case at
hand.

On the other hand, several other lawyers I've asked have responded "of
course!" when I ask them whether the 5th amendment would protect a
defendant from being compelled to divulge an encryption key without
immunity for the evidence it might decrypt.

My own opinion, given that I seem unable to get a complete consensus
from the lawyers, (has this *ever* been possible?)  is that the issue
is as yet untested in court and could go either way depending on the
actual case. But Mike seems much more pessimistic, and he *is* a
lawyer. I'm not.

Don't give up working on those steganographic schemes just yet. And
wherever practical (e.g., for communications as opposed to storage),
use a key management scheme that doesn't leave anything around that
can be seized or subpeonaed after the fact (e.g., Diffie's "perfect
forward secrecy" scheme.)

Phil




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Mitra <mitra@pandora.sf.ca.us>
Date: Mon, 25 Jan 93 18:57:10 PST
Subject: Re: Coupled programs
In-Reply-To: <9301252308.AA11480@soda.berkeley.edu>
Message-ID: <C1FxCF.757@pandora.sf.ca.us>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Eric Hughes (hughes@soda.berkeley.edu) wrote:
: This is exactly the goal.  For example, zmodem has a widespread
: deployment and a public specification.  What needs to happen for
: cryptography is the development of such protocols for key exchange,
: signatures, and other cryptographic entities.

I thought that was the point of PEM? Why not integrate the PGP
encryption protocol into the PEM structure?

- Mitra





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Phiber Optik <phiber@eff.org>
Date: Tue, 26 Jan 93 01:30:08 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: This list...
Message-ID: <199301260929.AA16274@eff.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> > The whole point of this list is to develop techniques to ensure privacy --
> > most of us understand that there isn't much right now.
>
> but but but ... sendmail already offers an easy way to hide the membership
> of a mailing list.  why not use it?
>
>         peter
>

Thank you.  Welcome to the world of common sense.
It's a given that certain things you just can't be secure against.
But when you don't take every precaution, no matter how small, it's
called laziness.
Not fixing it with the excuse that people have to understand or accept the
overall insecurity of things in general sounds pretty idiotic to me.
It isn't such a big deal.





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: veritas!u.washington.edu!news@markv.com
Date: Tue, 26 Jan 93 06:42:10 PST
Subject: No Subject
Message-ID: <d5b39e3ea1b35055306cf4daf00947ff@NO-ID-FOUND.mhonarc.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain







From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: tony@morgan.demon.co.uk (Tony Kidson)
Date: Tue, 26 Jan 93 04:51:23 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: 5th AMENDMENT & DECRYPTION
Message-ID: <1726@morgan.demon.co.uk>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Well, the autorities trying to decrypt somebody's files would 
make an 'interesting' test for PGP. Although, they'd only have to 
crack the 'conventional' cypher to find your secret key.

Tony
+-----------------+-------------------------------+--------------------------+
| Tony Kidson     |`morgan' is an 8MB  486/33 Cat-| Voice +44 81 466 5127    |
| Morgan Towers,  |Warmer with a 670 MB Hard Disk.| E-Mail                   |
| Morgan Road,    |It  resides at Morgan Towers in| tony@morgan.demon.co.uk  |
| Bromley,        |Beautiful  Down Town  Bromley. | tny@cix.compulink.co.uk  |
| England BR1 3QE |Honda ST1100  ==*==  DoD# 0801 | 100024.301@compuserve.com|
+=================+===============================+==========================+




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: tony@morgan.demon.co.uk (Tony Kidson)
Date: Tue, 26 Jan 93 04:52:57 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: 5th AMENDMENT & DECRYPTION
Message-ID: <1727@morgan.demon.co.uk>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


In message <9301260801.AA18233@netcom3.netcom.com> you write:
>
> > from: john.nieder@f33.n125.z1.fidonet.org
>
> (commenting on the strategy of "taking the 5th" on the matter of
> decrypting one's files)
..................
>
> With strong crypto, e.g., with 300 decimal digit moduli, the "costs"
> of decryption by brute force could easily exceed the GNP/GDP of the
> U.S.
........
> bagged" the house, perhaps a simple pass phrase was used in lieu of
> memorizing 300 digits, and so on.

But what is encrypted with the 'simple phrase' is quite short and 
does not provide much material for cryptanalysis.

Tony
+-----------------+-------------------------------+--------------------------+
| Tony Kidson     |`morgan' is an 8MB  486/33 Cat-| Voice +44 81 466 5127    |
| Morgan Towers,  |Warmer with a 670 MB Hard Disk.| E-Mail                   |
| Morgan Road,    |It  resides at Morgan Towers in| tony@morgan.demon.co.uk  |
| Bromley,        |Beautiful  Down Town  Bromley. | tny@cix.compulink.co.uk  |
| England BR1 3QE |Honda ST1100  ==*==  DoD# 0801 | 100024.301@compuserve.com|
+=================+===============================+==========================+




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Date: Tue, 26 Jan 93 10:31:31 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Computerized OTP (was 5th AMENDMENT & DECRYPTION)
In-Reply-To: <m0nGtQQ-000jp9C@phantom.com>
Message-ID: <9301261828.AA25565@netcom3.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Murdering Thug (not his real name) writes, quoting me:

> > With strong crypto, e.g., with 300 decimal digit moduli, the "costs"
> > of decryption by brute force could easily exceed the GNP/GDP of the
> > U.S.
> 
> Since none of us have ever been inside the NSA, we cannot underestimate
> their power and resources.  For all we know they may have 500 Intel Delta
> supercomputers linked together, each having 65,536 i860-XP/50mhz chips.
> We really don't know what kind of iron they possess.  Thus we can't assume
> that they can't factor extremely large numbers easily.

Doubtful. That's why I cited 300 decimal digit moduli...the current
factoring record is, I believe, a 105 digit number, and this took a
network of Sun workstations a year or so (this was big news some
months back). As a former Intel employee and current Intel stockholder
(yeah!), I certainly hope the NSA is consuming large numbers of
Touchstone Deltas, but they won't do much good against strong crypto.

A bigger effect would be a breakthrough in factoring. No evidence of
this, though. 

> The only way to thwart the NSA is to use an encryption scheme which has
> been _proven_ uncrackable.  The only one I know of is the One Time Pad.
> A person I know is working on a computerized version of the OTP that
....rest elided...

Sure, one-time pads are information-theoretically secure.

The problem is the key distribution problem, as well as the storage of
one-time pads. For example, for the couple of hundred folks on this
list to communicate securely will other members, each would have to
meet in person or deliver by trusted courier a one-time pad to _each_
of the others! A very tough logistical problem, fraught with potential
weaknesses, and much easier to spoof or break than, for example,
factoring very large numbers.

This is the problem, the key distribution problem, that public key
methods solve.

-Tim


-- 
..........................................................................
Timothy C. May         | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,  
tcmay@netcom.com       | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
408-688-5409           | knowledge, reputations, information markets, 
W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA  | black markets, collapse of governments.
Higher Power: 2^756839 | Public Key: waiting for the dust to settle.





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Karl Barrus <elee9sf@Menudo.UH.EDU>
Date: Tue, 26 Jan 93 08:55:07 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: digital bank
Message-ID: <199301261654.AA04341@Menudo.UH.EDU>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

Fellow cypherpunks:

I have been working on a digital bank, implementing Hal Finney's
simple bank protocol (random account number and random digicash - not
Chaum's more sophisticated system based on RSA encryption, decryption,
blinded messages, etc.)  The enhancement posted by ?? - I can't
remember right now - (having to do with wallets) is not implemented.

I beleive it is ready to enter the next test phase: everyone on the
list may apply for an account.

Send a message of this form to the anonymous remailer I run
(elee7h5@rosebud.ee.uh.edu) :

::
command: help

user@host



Be sure to include your real mail address in the user@host line,
because that's where the bank will send back the information.

/-----------------------------------\
| Karl L. Barrus                    |
| elee9sf@menudo.uh.edu             | <- preferred address
| barrus@tree.egr.uh.edu (NeXTMail) |
\-----------------------------------/

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.1

iQCVAgUBK2VsWoOA7OpLWtYzAQGCTQQAlM3qhbcO2DvAAIGunmoVMYdHhTISS+7w
YOq7oUoWU9Ys8kSaQMIHEmoaNITnaK5VZBIEbOdbI8oWzyUBkuKmPk+n8+SBr8PD
KCs2ULSm6fqQ9nOe0sqOa8U0F6Q8Pij7YLjbdApeSjKA32XcnT4PcVq/iCP0HhBn
svCTwLiXXIA=
=9mlF
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: dclunie@pax.tpa.com.au (David Clunie)
Date: Mon, 25 Jan 93 16:33:25 PST
To: ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu
Subject: Re: anonymous server compilation?
Message-ID: <9301260030.AA03959@britt>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> Hello. To my knowledge no public listing of known anonymous servers has
> been compiled.

> pax.tpa.com.au
> --------------

Unfortunately, the anonymous sytem at pax has been closed, as the local
network in Australia was considered unsuitable for this kind of thing,
partly due to the narrow bandwidth of the link to the US, and partly because
of the prevailing attitude at the US end that anonymous mail is generally
a bad thing.

david




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: jim@tadpole.com (Jim Thompson)
Date: Tue, 26 Jan 93 09:18:43 PST
To: pfarrell@cs.gmu.edu
Subject: Re:  Rational PC mail , was Re: PGP on BBS
Message-ID: <9301261717.AA13492@tadpole.tadpole.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> From: pfarrell@cs.gmu.edu (Pat Farrell)
> 
> With NUpop and Eudora, SLIP is optional. The NUpop docs say
> that SLIP slows down the transfer, and recommends simple ASCII
> async connection using a reliable modem (MNP or V42/V.42bis)

I don't understand how the authors of this document can do so.  Modern
compressed-header SLIP implementations will compress the TCP/IP/SLIP
headers down to 5 or 6 'bytes' (octets), on the average.  In theory, I
suppose its true, but in practice, it makes little difference.  Even
without header compression, and assuming minimal-sized datagrams, you
end up with an overhead of 41/576.  93% of your bandwidth is still
yours.

A simple ASCII async connection using MNP or V.42 still violates the
end-to-end argument.  Serial ports can, and do loose characters.  Leaving
your encrypted message, or even your key, to the whims of a cheap modem,
(you'll never know what the other guy has), or back serial drivers seems
a bad idea to me.

Jim




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: jim@tadpole.com (Jim Thompson)
Date: Tue, 26 Jan 93 09:34:03 PST
To: thug@phantom.com
Subject: Re: Computerized OTP (was 5th AMENDMENT & DECRYPTION)
Message-ID: <9301261732.AA13574@tadpole.tadpole.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> From: thug@phantom.com (Murdering Thug)
 
> Since none of us have ever been inside the NSA, we cannot underestimate
> their power and resources.  For all we know they may have 500 Intel Delta
> supercomputers linked together, each having 65,536 i860-XP/50mhz chips.
> We really don't know what kind of iron they possess.  Thus we can't assume
> that they can't factor extremely large numbers easily.

Um, I've been inside the NSA, (and I don't have a clearence.)  

They have a very nice visitors center, where they display some of their
more arcane technology, along with little placards explaining what the
hardware does.  For instance, they display a very nice looking u-wave
radio-based computer (complete with wax lenses), and a light-based
floating-point engine that develops God-only-knows how many hundres
Gflops, and yes, it can be custom programmed.  They display a RISC core
(of their own design) than also has a custom crypto unit on-chip, said
unit can be field re-programmed.  Also displayed are various arcane
(antique) crypto devices.

Jim

P.S.  Admittedly, I didn't get very far inside..




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: pmetzger@shearson.com (Perry E. Metzger)
Date: Tue, 26 Jan 93 09:01:32 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re:  This list...
Message-ID: <9301261633.AA17497@maggie.shearson.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> From: Peter Honeyman <honey@citi.umich.edu>
> To: pmetzger@shearson.com
> 
> eavesdropping on the list would not reveal lurkers.
> 
> 	peter

But eavesdropping on the mail coming out of toad.com would. In any case
I think I've made my point -- its fine to patch holes, so long as one
is aware that one hasn't given people a sense of false security in so doing.

Perry




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: thug@phantom.com (Murdering Thug)
Date: Tue, 26 Jan 93 08:49:57 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Computerized OTP (was 5th AMENDMENT & DECRYPTION)
In-Reply-To: <9301260801.AA18233@netcom3.netcom.com>
Message-ID: <m0nGtQQ-000jp9C@phantom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


tcmay@netcom.com writes:
 
> > from: john.nieder@f33.n125.z1.fidonet.org
> 
> (commenting on the strategy of "taking the 5th" on the matter of
> decrypting one's files)
> 
> > .   Recently this question came up in another forum on encryption & an
> > "authority" on communications law claimed the probable scenario would be
> > that the arresting agency would have the encrypted material decrypted by
> > a competent government or academic agency & the costs of said decryption
> > would eventually be recovered from the defendant through civil suits,
> > presuming the defendant had sufficient assets.  It is my memory of the
> > thread that he claimed this had been done in previous cases.
> 
> With strong crypto, e.g., with 300 decimal digit moduli, the "costs"
> of decryption by brute force could easily exceed the GNP/GDP of the
> U.S.

Since none of us have ever been inside the NSA, we cannot underestimate
their power and resources.  For all we know they may have 500 Intel Delta
supercomputers linked together, each having 65,536 i860-XP/50mhz chips.
We really don't know what kind of iron they possess.  Thus we can't assume
that they can't factor extremely large numbers easily.

The only way to thwart the NSA is to use an encryption scheme which has
been _proven_ uncrackable.  The only one I know of is the One Time Pad.
A person I know is working on a computerized version of the OTP that
extracts a truly random stream of bits from TV/RF static and massages it
using a DSP to be highly variable (e.g.: no runs of 0's or 1's longer than
5 bits). This stream is then XOR'd in one time pad fashion with an
LZW compressed version of a plaintext message. The key stream is never
re-used and after a byte from the key stream is used, it is erased 
(crossed off the digital pad).  Since no bit in the key stream has any
known relationship to any other bit (unlike in pseudo-random-number
generators), the goal of extracting either the key or the plain text is
intractable. 

If the NSA can crack the OTP, then they must have God himself on their
salary.  Read the sci.crypt FAQ on more info about the one time pad. The
only problem with the whole OTP scheme is that it can only be used for
provably secure communications over unsecure channels.  It is much more  
difficult to use a OTP to encrypt one's hard disk without having to memorize
50 million bits of TV/RF static. Then again 50 million bits of TV/RF static
can be stored on a totally-self-destructing memory device. For instance a
memory card with battary backed RAM that fits in my pocket. If the
law busts in, I merely have to pull out the lithium battary from the
card and the key is destroyed beyond all possible recovery.  If
the NSA can extract bits from the proverbial bit bucket in the sky
(also known as write once memory (WOM)), then they truly must have God
working on their side.



Thug
 




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: jthomas@kolanut.mitre.org (Joe Thomas)
Date: Tue, 26 Jan 93 09:24:19 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Computerized OTP (was 5th AMENDMENT & DECRYPTION)
Message-ID: <9301261719.AA00224@kolanut>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



From: thug@phantom.com (Murdering Thug)

tcmay@netcom.com writes:
 

> > from: john.nieder@f33.n125.z1.fidonet.org
> 

> (commenting on the strategy of "taking the 5th" on the matter of
> decrypting one's files)
> 

> > .   Recently this question came up in another forum on encryption  
& an
> > "authority" on communications law claimed the probable scenario  
would be
> > that the arresting agency would have the encrypted material  
decrypted by
> > a competent government or academic agency & the costs of said  
decryption
> > would eventually be recovered from the defendant through civil  
suits,
> > presuming the defendant had sufficient assets.  It is my memory  
of the
> > thread that he claimed this had been done in previous cases.
> 

> With strong crypto, e.g., with 300 decimal digit moduli, the  
"costs"
> of decryption by brute force could easily exceed the GNP/GDP of the
> U.S.

Since none of us have ever been inside the NSA, we cannot  
underestimate
their power and resources.  For all we know they may have 500 Intel  
Delta
supercomputers linked together, each having 65,536 i860-XP/50mhz  
chips.
We really don't know what kind of iron they possess.  Thus we can't  
assume
that they can't factor extremely large numbers easily.

The only way to thwart the NSA is to use an encryption scheme which  
has
been _proven_ uncrackable.  The only one I know of is the One Time  
Pad.

True, but impractical.  I can't conceive of any rational one-time-pad  
key distribution over the net.  Key distribution has to be over a  
guaranteed secure channel.  For RSA, the channel only has to be  
authenticated.  And if NSA can crack RSA, it would be worth having  
one cypherpunk lose one court case to find that out (yup, even if  
it's me...).

Joe




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: pmetzger@shearson.com (Perry E. Metzger)
Date: Tue, 26 Jan 93 10:12:27 PST
To: karn@qualcomm.com
Subject: Re:  5th AMENDMENT & DECRYPTION
Message-ID: <9301261731.AA19162@maggie.shearson.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> From: karn@qualcomm.com (Phil Karn)
> 
> On the other hand, several other lawyers I've asked have responded "of
> course!" when I ask them whether the 5th amendment would protect a
> defendant from being compelled to divulge an encryption key without
> immunity for the evidence it might decrypt.
> 
> My own opinion, given that I seem unable to get a complete consensus
> from the lawyers, (has this *ever* been possible?)  is that the issue
> is as yet untested in court and could go either way depending on the
> actual case. But Mike seems much more pessimistic, and he *is* a
> lawyer. I'm not.

One might, of course, validly ask what the potential penalty would be
for failing to divulge the key. Presumably, you would be held to be
in contempt of court and sent off to jail until you divulged the key -- but
at best you are likely to be locked up for a few months before the judge
gives up. Given that, one can make a decision on whether the data you had
encrypted is worth the loss of a few months of your life. (Remember,
by the way, that merely having been in contempt is not nearly the same
as having, say, a felony conviction on your record.)

So even if they might have an argument for why they should be able to order
you to give them a key, that doesn't mean that they have any real way to
get it -- you can still fail to hand it over if you are willing to pay the
price.

Perry




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: fnerd@smds.com (FutureNerd Steve Witham)
Date: Tue, 26 Jan 93 08:59:23 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Hash Cash and Ripped Checks
Message-ID: <9301261617.AB12479@smds.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Here's a form of digital cash and checks that takes off from Tim May's
and Hal's ideas, and might have advantages, but uses crypto.  I find it 
easier to understand than Chaum's method (but maybe the complexity
vs. benefits make it the worst of all possible worlds...lemme know).

Consider:
        This message can be exchanged for $x at Fred's Bank
        by the first person to present it along with a message whose
        MD5 hash is: h
        (Serial number: n)
        Digitally Signed,
                Fred's Bank

Think of this as the right half of a $x bill that's been ripped in half.  
The hash is the shape of the rip.  The bill is valid if you're the first
one with both matching halves.  The left half is blank (a random message
that hashes to h).

TO VERIFY: take a new piece of paper, rip it in half (generate a random 
number, take its hash).  Send both halves of the old bill, plus the right 
half of the piece of paper (the new hash), to the bank.  The bank either 
says the old bill was spent*, or sends back the right half with the same 
amount and their signature.  Now only you have the whole new bill.

CHECKS: ask the payee to give you a blank right half.  Pay the bank to fill 
it in.  The payee can verify that it's good without taking it to the bank.

STAMPS/TOKENS/GIFT CERTIFICATES: The payee gives you a pack of right 
halves.  You turn them to checks later.  They might include a serial
number with each one and ask you to give it back with the check so they
can look up (or regenerate!) the left halves easily.  They might even 
insist that you use the hash/serial # pairs in sequence!  (Or is crypto-
strong hashing of serial numbers too much to ask?)

There are even more compromises of anonymity here than with Tim and Hal's
ideas--I assume some compensation with remailers, as Hal suggested.

I was thinking you could launder money by buying checks from Bank B 
with checks to Bank B that are drawn on Bank A, etc.

A similar form would be something that said:
        This message can be exchanged for $x at Fred's Bank
        by the first person to present it 
        signed with the private key that matches this public key: k
        (Serial number: n)
        (pad)
        Digitally Signed,
                Fred's Bank

This would let you buy checks to random strangers without having to
transact anything with them first, but it's sure obvious who the check 
is to.

*Maybe you'd send the right half, then the bank would either
prove that it already had the left half, or you'd proceed as above.

-fnerd
quote me
fnerd@smds.com (FutureNerd Steve Witham)





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: P30TMR8%NIU.bitnet@UICVM.UIC.EDU
Date: Tue, 26 Jan 93 11:12:12 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: manifesto
Message-ID: <9301261912.AA09570@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


how would I get a copy of the manifesto?
                 Thanks,
                  Micheal Roberts




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: pfarrell@cs.gmu.edu (Pat Farrell)
Date: Tue, 26 Jan 93 10:29:30 PST
To: jim@tadpole.com
Subject: Re:  Rational PC mail , was Re: PGP on BBS
Message-ID: <9301261824.AA23577@cs.gmu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Jim,

While serial ports do lose characters, especially if you don't have
a 16550afn serial chip, I don't see this as a major hassle. In a pure
DOS space, you really arn't likely to lose the characters, and this
is the initial space of NUpop. With Windows, you have to learn to play
with the priorities to make it work well, or get one of the intellegent
serial driver DLLs that make it transparent.

It is possible that the authors of the NUpop document don't worry too
much about single character dropouts. There is plenty of redundancy in
english. PGP will complain, but I can see retransmitting a message
half a dozen times to get it thru cleanly will lose.

I never allow my private key anywhere near a serial port. The public keys 
are checksummed, so it is easy to see that a character is wrong.

I'd love to be able to use CSLIP. We (a bunch of folks on this campus) have
just convinced the admin to allow POP services. It will take a while before
we can convince them to allow SLIP, CSLIP, and PPP. In the meantime,
I'll happily live with NUpop's serial support.

Pat




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: pmetzger@shearson.com (Perry E. Metzger)
Date: Tue, 26 Jan 93 11:25:54 PST
To: jthomas@kolanut.mitre.org
Subject: Re: Computerized OTP (was 5th AMENDMENT & DECRYPTION)
Message-ID: <9301261853.AA21329@maggie.shearson.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> From: thug@phantom.com (Murdering Thug)
> Since none of us have ever been inside the NSA, we cannot  
> underestimate
> their power and resources.  For all we know they may have 500 Intel  
> Delta
> supercomputers linked together, each having 65,536 i860-XP/50mhz  
> chips.
> We really don't know what kind of iron they possess.  Thus we can't  
> assume
> that they can't factor extremely large numbers easily.

Mr. Thug doesn't seem to understand the issue here.

Your fear should be that the NSA knows something about number theory we don't,
not that they possess a huge number of supercomputers. Consider that
we believe the factoring problem to be exponential in the number of digits.
That means that doubling the number of digits doesn't double the size of
the problem -- it makes it far, far, far worse. Indeed, I suspect that it could
be shown that using a key of only a few thousand digits, barring a change
in factoring algorithm there would be no way to factor the number in the
lifetime of the universe even were all the matter and energy in the universe
given over to the factoring problem. There are problems that are known to
be that size, by the way -- such as trying to do a complete search on the
game tree for chess.

So, if you are worried that the NSA might have 10,000 times the resources
you suspected, you can just add a few more digits on to your key and defeat
that possibility.

Myself, I always use a key thats as long as possible to be safe, but I think
that paranoia about their HARDWARE is wholely misplaced. The thing to
be paranoid about is that they know something about factoring algorithms that
we do not.

Perry




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: jim@tadpole.com (Jim Thompson)
Date: Tue, 26 Jan 93 12:35:45 PST
To: pfarrell@cs.gmu.edu
Subject: Re:  Rational PC mail , was Re: PGP on BBS
Message-ID: <9301262034.AA14699@tadpole.tadpole.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> From pfarrell@cs.gmu.edu Tue Jan 26 12:28:05 1993
>
> While serial ports do lose characters, especially if you don't have
> a 16550afn serial chip, I don't see this as a major hassle. In a pure
> DOS space, you really arn't likely to lose the characters, and this
> is the initial space of NUpop. With Windows, you have to learn to play
> with the priorities to make it work well, or get one of the intellegent
> serial driver DLLs that make it transparent.

Let me try to put it another way.  The higher you drive the DTE rate,
the more likely you are to loose characters.  At the same time, you
start to care less about the (small) protocol overheads involved.

> It is possible that the authors of the NUpop document don't worry too
> much about single character dropouts. There is plenty of redundancy in
> english. PGP will complain, but I can see retransmitting a message
> half a dozen times to get it thru cleanly will lose.

But if characters change during transmit, how can you tell that the message
wasn't altered by some agent other than the device/driver?  Further, if it
happens only occasionally, won't you react with mistrust of the original message?

   "Hey, this message doesn't check with the author's key!"

If it happens a lot, aren't you more likely to say, 
	"Well, he must have meant $10,000, not $1000, the serial port must
	 be loosing again."

rather than resending some number of times?
 
> I never allow my private key anywhere near a serial port. The public keys 
> are checksummed, so it is easy to see that a character is wrong.

> I'd love to be able to use CSLIP. We (a bunch of folks on this campus) have
> just convinced the admin to allow POP services. It will take a while before
> we can convince them to allow SLIP, CSLIP, and PPP.

The older I get, the more I understand, "Power to the people."

Cheers,

Jim





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Marc.Ringuette@GS80.SP.CS.CMU.EDU
Date: Tue, 26 Jan 93 11:46:37 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Computerized OTP (was 5th AMENDMENT & DECRYPTION)
Message-ID: <9301261946.AA09982@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


thug@phantom.com (Murdering Thug) writes,
> A person I know is working on a computerized version of the OTP that
> extracts a truly random stream of bits from TV/RF static and massages it
> using a DSP to be highly variable (e.g.: no runs of 0's or 1's longer than
> 5 bits).

Cool!  You've managed to weaken the one time pad enough for someone to 
crack it!  [ I can collect statistics on the plaintext based on the fact
that if five zeroes occur in the OTP then the next bit is constrained to 
be one.  Of course, I don't have complete access to the OTP, but it's
an extremely useful statitistical foot-in-the-door.  ]

This failure occurred because your friend tried to create a number
sequence that is somehow "more random than random".  Such a sequence
is, by definition, weak.

-- Marc Ringuette (mnr@cs.cmu.edu)





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Vincent Dileonardo <vinman@ravel.udel.edu>
Date: Tue, 26 Jan 93 12:06:56 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: withdraw
Message-ID: <199301262005.AA22494@ravel.udel.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I would like to request that I be removed from your mailing list as soon as possible. Thank you.
				Vinnie DiLeonardo




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: thug@phantom.com (Murdering Thug)
Date: Tue, 26 Jan 93 12:46:59 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Computerized OTP (a clarification)
In-Reply-To: <9301261828.AA25565@netcom3.netcom.com>
Message-ID: <m0nGx7v-000jpDC@phantom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


tcmay@netcom.com writes:

> Sure, one-time pads are information-theoretically secure.
> 
> The problem is the key distribution problem, as well as the storage of
> one-time pads. For example, for the couple of hundred folks on this
> list to communicate securely will other members, each would have to
> meet in person or deliver by trusted courier a one-time pad to _each_
> of the others! A very tough logistical problem, fraught with potential
> weaknesses, and much easier to spoof or break than, for example,
> factoring very large numbers.
> 
> This is the problem, the key distribution problem, that public key
> methods solve.
> 

I never recommended the digital OTP as a replacement for public key
cryptography. Clearly the logistics of using OTPs on a large scale
are clearly dismal.  While public key solutions like PGP are good
for mass communication systems, they are not secure as far as I am
concerned.  I am sure the NSA has plenty of tricks up their sleeve
for dealing with PGP & RSA.

OTP is an excellent solution for small groups (5 people or less) who
MUST have completely secure communications.  It would be quite easy
for a small group like this to physically meet once a year and
exchange their fresh 250mb pads (stored on magnetic reel tape which
is incrementaly shreaded & burned on the way out of a OTP decoding
machine).  In fact only one trusted individual is needed to operate an
OTP pad generating machine to create the fresh pad tapes from RF noise
and only once a year. This could be the ring leader of the group and tape
distributor. 

A 250mb pad is enough for each individual to send 250,000 one kilobyte
messages to his conspirators, surely enough pad material to require physical
pad exchange only once a year, perhaps even less frequently. 

A terrorist group or drug ring could use OTPs quite easily
from a logistical and key distribution point of view and never
have to worry about their messages (e-mail or telex) being
decrypted by any agency on the face of the earth.  The costs of such
a method are minimal for a group of 5 terrorists, a 5-node system like
this could be built and set up for around $5000.

Of course an OTP scheme must insure physical security as well.
Used up key stream tape must be incrementally shredded and burned 
beyond recovery. And plaintext messages should be displayed to CRT,
never be stored. After each message is read or sent, it is destroyed by
being overwritten in RAM by nulls. The screen should either by an LCD
display or a Tempest proof CRT. Unused pad tape must be quickly removable
so that it can be dropped into a near by barrel of sulfuric acid should
the law bust through your door.  This would prevent the capture of the
unused pad tape and prevent the law from spoofing your conspirators by
sending and decoding messages as you. A ventilation system must be
put in place to suck out the fumes from the barrel of acid out of the
room. A wireless alarm system must be in place to allow the detection
of a law enforcement assault and allow the quick acid bath destruction of
unused pad material.  Note, this scheme comes directly from my mind
as I speak and does not fly out of anything.  It could be refined into a
very secure and inexpensive set up.  

A well implemented OTP scheme makes the interception
of plaintext impossible and the capture of messages by physical raids
also impossible.  This is what I believe to be the only provably secure
communication method.  If I was a drug king pin, this is what I would use. 


Thug
 




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: The Phantom <phantom@u.washington.edu>
Date: Tue, 26 Jan 93 16:24:02 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: weak point of PGP implementation
Message-ID: <Pine.3.05.9301261648.A20494-b100000@stein2.u.washington.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



tcmay says:

----
With strong crypto, e.g., with 300 decimal digit moduli, the "costs"
of decryption by brute force could easily exceed the GNP/GDP of the
U.S.
...
bagged" the house, perhaps a simple pass phrase was used in lieu of
memorizing 300 digits, and so on.
----

I've been wondering about this. It seems as though the weak point of PGP
is one of three possible things:

	1) RSA key length (a key length of 10 digits might be a good
target, but noone using pgp uses anything so absurdly small, so this can
be all but ruled out barring any huge jumps in factoring .. 

	2) 'conventional cryptography' used for encoding the secring.pgp
files, etc. What crypto, exactly, is used? How strong is it? If the NSA
knocked on the door and demanded your computer, would it try to crack your
key, or would it go directly for the secring.pgp file?

	3) length/triviality of pass phrase. This is, I would think, the
weakest point mentioned yet. How long does the pass phrase have to be
until this point becomes as secure as the weaker of the above two? If all
bits of your passphrase were random, how long would an exhaustive search
take? 

matt


Matt Thomlinson
University of Washington, Seattle, Washington.
Internet: phantom@u.washington.edu      	    phone: (206) 528-5732
PGP 2.0 key availaible via email or finger phantom@hardy.u.washington.edu





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: hugh@domingo.teracons.com (Hugh Daniel)
Date: Tue, 26 Jan 93 18:37:41 PST
To: nowhere@bsu-cs.bsu.edu
Subject: Remailer Changes
In-Reply-To: <9301270115.AA24665@bsu-cs.bsu.edu>
Message-ID: <9301270235.AA01717@domingo.teracons.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


  Why are you retaining the Subject: headder line?  If I want a
Subject: line I should include inside the encrypted block.

		||ugh Daniel
		hugh@toad.com




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Eric Hughes <hughes@soda.berkeley.edu>
Date: Tue, 26 Jan 93 19:29:55 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: weak point of PGP implementation
In-Reply-To: <Pine.3.05.9301261648.A20494-b100000@stein2.u.washington.edu>
Message-ID: <9301270327.AA17865@soda.berkeley.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Matt mentions three potential weaknesses in PGP: RSA key length, the
IDEA cypher, the pass phrase.  Let me add:

4. The random number generator used to make session keys.  If this is
weak, then an opponent might be able to guess them feasibly.  This attack
does not require breaking the underlying cryptography.

5. Weak random numbers for RSA key generation.  If the numbers in the
random number pool are not as random as they should be, then one might
simply simulate the prime generation algorithm and compile a table of
potential PGP primes.  Simply running trial division on this list
versus a storehouse of public keys might reveal common factors.  Even
running Euclid's algorithm to find g.c.d.'s on a such a storehouse
versus itself might produce factorizations.

From my quick reading of genprime.c, the PGP key generation algorithm
searches sequentially from a random starting point.  Thus it will tend
to find primes that are preceded by large blocks of composite numbers.
This alone reduces the search space some, possibly considerably.

Has anybody measured how good the keystroke timings are, anyway?

Eric




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Eric Hughes <hughes@soda.berkeley.edu>
Date: Tue, 26 Jan 93 19:36:42 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Computerized OTP (was 5th AMENDMENT & DECRYPTION)
In-Reply-To: <9301261946.AA09982@toad.com>
Message-ID: <9301270334.AA18297@soda.berkeley.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>thug@phantom.com (Murdering Thug) writes,
>> (e.g.: no runs of 0's or 1's longer than
>> 5 bits).

>Cool!  You've managed to weaken the one time pad enough for someone to 
>crack it!  

Taking 6-graph statistics, we seen that the entropy is 5.95, where it
should be 6.00.  Or in other words, .992 bits of entropy per bit
symbol.  That's not good.

Eric




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Eric Hughes <hughes@soda.berkeley.edu>
Date: Tue, 26 Jan 93 19:41:31 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Coupled programs
In-Reply-To: <C1FxCF.757@pandora.sf.ca.us>
Message-ID: <9301270339.AA18743@soda.berkeley.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



>Eric Hughes (hughes@soda.berkeley.edu) wrote:
>: What needs to happen for
>: cryptography is the development of such protocols for key exchange,
>: signatures, and other cryptographic entities.

Mitra writes:
>I thought that was the point of PEM? Why not integrate the PGP
>encryption protocol into the PEM structure?

I am talking about interactive protocols.  To generate a session key
for communication with some remote host will require both parties to
cooperate.

PEM is a standard for "privacy enchanced" electronic email formats and
encryption methods.  PEM is not a standard for interacting protocols.

Eric




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: nowhere@bsu-cs.bsu.edu (Chael Hall)
Date: Tue, 26 Jan 93 17:18:54 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Remailer Changes
Message-ID: <9301270115.AA24665@bsu-cs.bsu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



     The following changes have been made to the remailer running here
at bsu-cs.  Note that they are effective immediately.  If some of you
would please just try sending a few messages through the remailer so
I can be sure it is working (I don't care if you remail it to yourself,
but I want to look at the debug output so that I can turn off the logs.

Changes:

 - Thanks to a suggestion on here, I have changed to the more standard
   "::" format.  If and only if the first line of the message after the
   header contains "::" will the lines following it up until a blank
   line *OR* another "::" on a line by itself be parsed as though they
   are part of the header.
 - Any "X-Anon-To," "X-Anonymously-To," or "Request-Remailing-To," lines
   in the main header or the secondary header will cause the recipient's
   name to be set to its value.  The last one listed will be the one to
   which the mail is sent (I haven't decided whether or not multiple
   recipients are going to be supported yet)
 - Any "From" line in either header will be stripped.
 - Any line except the "Subject" line will be stripped from the main
   header before being sent.
 - Any lines aside from those already described above that are contained
   in the secondary header will be appended to the header before the message
   is sent out.
 - No X-Anon-To, X-Anonymously-To, or Request-Remailing-To header lines
   will be passed on in case this remailer is being chained onto another
   remailer (which would cause an endless loop if it found its own address
   as the X-Anon-To field and didn't strip it on outbound mail).

     Please let me know what you think.  Once again, this software is written
in C and I plan to release source code when the project is completed.

Chael Hall

--
Chael Hall
nowhere@bsu-cs.bsu.edu, 00CCHALL@LEO.BSUVC.BSU.EDU, CHALL@CLSV.Charon.BSU.Edu
(317) 285-3648 after 4 pm EST




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Jay Prime Positive <jpp@markv.com>
Date: Tue, 26 Jan 93 22:23:17 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: [veritas!u.washington.edu!news@markv.com: ]
Message-ID: <9301262221.aa12202@hermix.markv.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


From: jpp@hermix
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: [veritas!u.washington.edu!news@markv.com: ]

Interesting message I recieved...  Twice...

j'




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: John.Nieder@f33.n125.z1.FIDONET.ORG (John Nieder)
Date: Wed, 27 Jan 93 02:58:45 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: PRACTICAL DECRYPTION
Message-ID: <4652.2B66598A@fidogate.FIDONET.ORG>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



from: john.nieder@f33.n125.z1.fidonet.com

> (commenting on the strategy of "taking the 5th" on the matter of
> decrypting one's files)
>
> > .   Recently this question came up in another forum on encryption & an
> > "authority" on communications law claimed the probable scenario would be
> > that the arresting agency would have the encrypted material decrypted by
> > a competent government or academic agency & the costs of said decryption
> > would eventually be recovered from the defendant through civil suits,
> > presuming the defendant had sufficient assets.  It is my memory of the
> > thread that he claimed this had been done in previous cases.
>
> With strong crypto, e.g., with 300 decimal digit moduli, the "costs"
> of decryption by brute force could easily exceed the GNP/GDP of the
> U.S.

# Since none of us have ever been inside the NSA, we cannot underestimate
# their power and resources.  For all we know...

This is somewhat beside the point.  In actual fact, much of the seized
encrypted evidence in criminal cases employs built-in encryption
programs in major software packages (WordPerfect is a good example)
rather than obscurer stuff like PGP/IDEA/RSA.  Even highly-touted
commercial programs like Norton Utilities DiskReet w/DES use simple
passwords of a maximum ten-character size.
.   Much of this decryption may be trivially accomplished, though many
"experts" charged law enforcement agencies stout fees for the service.
It is now known that those specializing in WordPerfect files were using
a simple program available on most BBS file bases which will crack the
"secret" WordPerfect password in seconds on an old XT.
.   Apparently, the consulting fees for breaking bad crypto in most
cases is not prohibitive.
.   Tim's objections about high-end decryption are indeed valid, at least
theoretically, but we can not tell if a given encryption program has been
backdoored or if a fatal flaw has been uncovered that reduces the
security of the cyphertext.  If any cryptanalysts might find such flaws,
they would probably be those in no position to reveal their findings.
.   Jean-Loup Gailly [an original PGP team member in France] informs me
that the same general criticisms of PGP soundness voiced in the Moscow
State University report have been independently suggested in sci.crypto,
though he is aware of no instance of these alleged weaknesses being
exploited to break a PGP message.  The jury is still out on PGP's
ultimate security, I suppose.
.   Personally, I am not counting on PGP's brute-force decryption being
a task of the magnitude Tim suggests, though I _hope_ he's right.  I
sure wish some well-equipped crypto labs like Marty Hellman's would turn
their attentions to an evaluation of PGP...

        JN

--- Blue Wave/Opus v2.12 [NR]
--  
John Nieder - via FidoNet node 1:125/555
    UUCP - ...!uunet!hoptoad!kumr!fidogate!33!John.Nieder
INTERNET - John.Nieder@f33.n125.z1.FIDONET.ORG




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: nobody@alumni.cco.caltech.edu
Date: Tue, 26 Jan 93 22:57:43 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Computerized OTP (was 5th AMENDMENT & DECRYPTION)
Message-ID: <9301270659.AA10471@alumni.cco.caltech.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Murdering Thug wrote:

> Yes I do think the idea of making a "more random than random" stream
> by filtering out long runs of 0's or 1's weakens the the key stream
> in theory, but in practical use it strengthens it, because if the stream
> is left alone, runs of 500 bits of 0's or 1's can come through, and any
> fool can then extract plain text using XOR in this area of the cyphertext.

Thug is wrong about this, but it's a common mistake.  It does seem like
those runs of 0's (and, to a lesser extent, 1's) are dangerous - there's
your plaintext, totally exposed to the prying eyes of strangers!

But, what is forgotten is this: for every run of 0's which would reveal
your plaintext, there is an equally likely pattern of 1's and 0's which
transforms your plaintext into one of Shakespeare's plays.  Or into the
Declaration of Independence.  Or into anything else you like.

You see, xor'ing your message with a random stream means that the
resulting output is equally likely to be _any_ original message.
There is no way in theory or in practice to determine what the message
originally was; that is, all bit patterns are equally likely to be
the original message.

To see an example of this, suppose you had one of the simplest possible
original messages: all 1's.  Now you xor this with a random pattern.
To your dismay, your random stream happens to come up with a large block
of 0's.  This is what would happen:

Original message:   1111111111111111111111111111111111
Random stream:      0011010010000000110111010111001010
Resulting output:   1100101101111111001000101000110101

Look at that big block of 1's in there.  Won't that give it away?  No.
Such a block of 1's is expected to occur occasionally no matter what
the original message.  It's just as likely that the original message
and random stream looked like:

Original message:   1010101010101010101010101010101010
Random stream:      0110000111010101100010000010011111
Resulting output:   1100101101111111001000101000110101

There is no way to tell what the original message was, even when you see
a block of output which seems to match some pattern.  It doesn't tell
you anything.

Hal
74076.1041@compuserve.com





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: thug@phantom.com (Murdering Thug)
Date: Tue, 26 Jan 93 20:14:48 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Computerized OTP (was 5th AMENDMENT & DECRYPTION)
In-Reply-To: <m0nGyAP-000jpDC@phantom.com>
Message-ID: <m0nH47J-000jpKC@phantom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Timothy Newsham wries:
> Murdering Thug writes:
> > The only way to thwart the NSA is to use an encryption scheme which has
> > been _proven_ uncrackable.  The only one I know of is the One Time Pad.
> 
> didnt shannon prove that the only "unbreakable" encryptions (or
> encryptions with "zero knowledge") have to have a key at least
> as long as the message?

The key stream for a OTP system is infinitely long, and if a real
random source is used (e.g. RF noise/static) no bit in the key stream
has any relationship to any other bit in the key stream, unlike
a pseudo-random-gen key stream where there is a relationship and this
relationship can be found and the seed for the PRNG extracted and
thus the key is broken.  Since TV static on unused channels is
basically amplified RF garbage coming in from outer space radio
sources and is in fact "white noise", it makes the perfect encoding
stream for a one time pad system, it's infinitely long, never repeats,
and is never reused.

Yes I do think the idea of making a "more random than random" stream
by filtering out long runs of 0's or 1's weakens the the key stream
in theory, but in practical use it strengthens it, because if the stream
is left alone, runs of 500 bits of 0's or 1's can come through, and any
fool can then extract plain text using XOR in this area of the cyphertext.
LZW compression of the plaintext helps, but I feel that it is far better
to reduce the possibility of a key stream containing long runs of 0's or
1's, than to leave it alone.

The other possibility is to find a truly random RF source that has all
the properties you want, the more important being that the >average<
length of a homogenous bit run (0's or 1's) is around 4 or 5 bits. Of
course you should let run lengths of 12 bits come through to screw
the stat guys, but the >average< run length should be below 8 bits. Such
a highly variable stream of white noise makes the perfect key stream in my
opinion.


Thug





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: uri@watson.ibm.com
Date: Tue, 26 Jan 93 20:39:33 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com (cypherpunks)
Subject: Re: weak point of PGP implementation
In-Reply-To: <9301270327.AA17865@soda.berkeley.edu>
Message-ID: <9301270438.AA15194@buoy.watson.ibm.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Eric Hughes says:
> Matt mentions three potential weaknesses in PGP: RSA key length, the
> IDEA cypher, the pass phrase.

Probably the first two even a paranoid person won't call "weaknesses".
The pass-phrase - th docs should give some guidelines, as to how one
must choose his pass-phrase (if it's already there - apologies :-).

> Let me add:

And now you're talking! (:-)

> 4. The random number generator used to make session keys.  If this is
> weak, then an opponent might be able to guess them feasibly.  This attack
> does not require breaking the underlying cryptography.
>
> 5. Weak random numbers for RSA key generation.  If the numbers in the
> random number pool are not as random as they should be, then one might
> simply simulate the prime generation algorithm and compile a table of
> potential PGP primes.

It looks  like that [former] Soviet professor found and pointed out
exactly those weaknesses: poor RSA keys (making factoring about two
orders of magnitude easier) and poor something else (I couldn't
understand what he meant, sorry :-). Quite possible he hit
session keys (as likely as not)...
--
Regards,
Uri         uri@watson.ibm.com      scifi!angmar!uri 	N2RIU
-----------
<Disclamer>


From cypherpunks-request  Tue Jan 26 21:28:06 1993



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Marc.Ringuette@GS80.SP.CS.CMU.EDU
Date: Tue, 26 Jan 93 21:19:45 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Computerized OTP (was 5th AMENDMENT & DECRYPTION)
Message-ID: <9301270519.AA17681@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Thug writes,
> The other possibility is to find a truly random RF source that has all
> the properties you want, the more important being that the >average<
> length of a homogenous bit run (0's or 1's) is around 4 or 5 bits.

"All the properties you want?"  What you want is random, and nothing else!

Random isn't "average bit runs of 4 or 5 bits".  It isn't "nice white
noise".  It is TRULY RANDOM!  You need to understand that the absolutely
critical property for a one time pad bit-stream to have is this:  given 
all previous bits seen, the probability that the next bit seen will be
zero or one is exactly 0.5.  

What you need is a method for converting a biased random number stream
(say, one where after a run of zeroes, another zero has high probability)
into an unbiased one where the probability of the next bit being zero is
exactly 0.5.  Truncating runs to length 5 is an attempt at this, but a 
VERY BAD and cryptographically useless attempt.

Does anybody remember a good recipe for converting a biased RNG into an
unbiased one?  I can't think of one off the top of my head, and that's
what Thug's friend seems to need.  This has been discussed at length in
the literature.


-- Marc Ringuette (mnr@cs.cmu.edu)






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: tribble@xanadu.com (E. Dean Tribble)
Date: Wed, 27 Jan 93 00:50:22 PST
To: uunet!GS80.SP.CS.CMU.EDU!Marc.Ringuette@uunet.UU.NET
Subject: Computerized OTP (was 5th AMENDMENT & DECRYPTION)
In-Reply-To: <9301270519.AA17681@toad.com>
Message-ID: <9301270816.AA08283@xanadu.xanadu.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


	 "All the properties you want?"  What you want is random, and nothing else!

	 all previous bits seen, the probability that the next bit seen will be
	 zero or one is exactly 0.5.  

Note that in practice, the length of a string of 1's or 0' is
irrelevant:  The chance of a string of length N being all the same is
O(2^N), so becomes unlikely for reasonably short strings of bits (1 in
1024 for 10 bits), and virtually impossible for interesting sizes of N
(1 in 4 billion for 32 bits).  This doesn't even strike as being worht
the effort of figuring out how badly the OTP is compromised by
shortening such runs.

Remember how badly our intuitions are on things like security.
Believe the numbers, not your gut feel.

dean




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: edgar@spectrx.Saigon.COM (Edgar W. Swank)
Date: Wed, 27 Jan 93 03:42:17 PST
To: Cypherpunks          <cypherpunks@toad.com>
Subject: Re: a few good weasels
Message-ID: <Vm41XB3w165w@spectrx.saigon.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Dave del Torto said here:

    A world of absolutes is not a fun world and it's not a safe world.
    Someone's gotta break the rules every once in a while or we all go
    down the tubes.  Of course, I _personally_ would _never_ break any
    of the fine laws of our beloved nation, but I know deep in my
    heart (but not anywhere on my hard disks) that such brave people
    exist and that the effect of their less-than-legal efforts is the
    delicate equilibrium in which we continue to prosper and innovate.

I agree completely.  So would Ollie North, who is a fine example of
"such brave people".

--
edgar@spectrx.saigon.com (Edgar W. Swank)
SPECTROX SYSTEMS +1.408.252.1005  Silicon Valley, Ca





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: gnu (John Gilmore)
Date: Wed, 27 Jan 93 01:36:14 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: SunExpress to expand "unlockable" software distribution
Message-ID: <9301270936.AA24007@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


It would probably be a public service if some interested parties were
to determine the ``encryption'' method that Sun Express, the standard
Sun ``license manager'', and other packages use.  At the moment, the
details of these technologies are not described in the public
literature (as far as I know).

Rather than have these companies discover years too late that their
"unlockable" software is really unlockable by anyone who understands
cryptography, it'd be better for them to learn it this year, while
they are still handling low volumes of programs that way.  Also maybe
they will stop dumping these programs-that-you-have-but-must-pay-to-run on us.

	John 

----------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                        The Florida SunFlash

         SunExpress Unveils One-Stop Shopping From the Desktop

SunFLASH Vol 49 #21					        January 1993 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------

                New CD-ROM and facsimile services 
     make it easier than ever to select and purchase products
  
 
CHELMSFORD, Mass. --January 26, 1993-- SunExpress, a subsidiary of
workstation industry leader Sun Microsystems, Inc., today announced two
new customer services which simplify information retrieval and product
ordering.  FaxInfo(SM), which allows SunExpress customers to access
product information and order product through their fax machine, is
available now.  A second program will allow SunExpress customers to
"unlock" software applications directly from SunSoft's Catalyst
CDware(TM), the most widely-distributed demo CD for users of the
UNIX(R) operating system.  The CD-ROM program is being implemented in
twenty customer sites on a trial basis and will be generally available
later this year with Catalyst CDware Volume 5.0.

The integration of these technologies, coupled with other electronic
ordering innovations planned for release later in 1993, will allow
SunExpress to process orders more efficiently and provide a higher
level of customer satisfaction.  Eventually, these process innovations
will result in drastically fewer written orders, smaller inventories,
less postage, phone and freight costs, resulting in reduced costs for
SunExpress customers.

"SunExpress is committed to providing its customers with leading-edge
technologies that will make it easier than ever for them to select and
purchase products.  The new programs announced today are just the
beginning," said Dorothy Terrell, president of SunExpress.  "In the
near future, our customers will be able to browse through full color
on-line catalogs, watch video demonstrations and try out software all
without leaving their workstation."

FaxInfo

The FaxInfo program allows SunExpress customers to access detailed
product information about catalog offerings within minutes.  By calling
into the regular SunExpress ordering and information number
(800-USE-SUNX), customers can access FaxInfo and have technical data
sheets faxed back to the location of their choice by using the
touch-tone keypad on their phone.  SunExpress maintains up-to-date
datasheets on all of the products that it offers and makes revisions to
product specs as they are made available.

SunExpress joins with SunSoft's Catalyst CDware Program

Sun(TM) workstation users currently have access to SunSoft's Catalyst
CDware program which allows them to run demo versions of a range of
UNIX software applications from several major ISV's and decide whether
it is something they would like to buy.  With SunExpress' participation
in the program, interested customers can purchase and obtain a
fully-functional version of their chosen software -- all in one
toll-free phone call.

Currently this program is being tried out at twenty customer sites with
limited software product offerings including: Clarity's Rapport(TM),
and Ta-Dah!(TM) and SimCity(TM) from Dux Software.  The program is
targeted for full implementation with many more titles this summer, and
will be attractive to ISVs who are already marketing their product
through Catalyst CDware from SunSoft.  Catalyst CDware currently
carries 73 product presentations from 54 different vendors.

"We feel that this service from SunExpress can only enhance the
effectiveness and impact of our Catalyst CDware program," said Peter
Schakow, Manager of CD programs at SunSoft.  "We look forward to
providing this added service to our Catalyst CDware partners."

ISVs are interested in the SunExpress distribution strategy as a new
sales channel. "This program will greatly facilitate our marketing
efforts into the Sun installed base," said Bob Adams of DUX Software.
"In addition to assisting with new product sales, it will be extremely
useful and cost effective for distributing product enhancements and
upgrades."

SunExpress, a subsidiary of Sun Microsystems, Inc. provides customers
with easy access to a wide range of Sun and innovative 3rd party
products at low competitive prices and same day shipping.  SunExpress
supports SPARC(R), Solaris(R), and other computing environments based
on the UNIX operating system.  The company offers a 30-day no fault
return policy and is currently serving customers in the United States,
Europe and Japan.  SunExpress can be reached at 1 (800) USE-SUNX and is
headquartered in Chelmsford, MA.


Press Contact: 
Hi-Tech Communications
Mark Lederhos (508) 251-8278
Kathryn Lang (415) 904-7000 x204 

Sun
Lisa Ganier (415) 336-5637.
++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
For information send mail to info-sunflash@Sun.COM.
Subscription requests should be sent to sunflash-request@Sun.COM.
Archives are on solar.nova.edu, uunet.uu.net, sunsite.unc.edu,
src.doc.ic.ac.uk and ftp.adelaide.edu.au

All prices, availability, and other statements relating to Sun or third
party products are valid in the U.S. only. Please contact your local
Sales Representative for details of pricing and product availability in
your region. Descriptions of, or references to products or publications
within SunFlash does not imply an endorsement of that product or
publication by Sun Microsystems.

John McLaughlin, SunFlash editor, flash@Sun.COM. (305) 776-7770.





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: strat@intercon.com (Bob Stratton)
Date: Tue, 26 Jan 93 22:42:12 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: 5th Amendment and keys
Message-ID: <9301270641.AA08281@intercon.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


	It might be worth pinging Mike Godwin for a summary of his
current assessment. I was at a meeting with him over the weekend, and
he said he's slowly growing more optimistic with regard to this very
issue, as a result of some precedents he found.

	He'd probably be honored to know that a whole list was hanging
on his every word. :-)

--Strat





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Douglas Sinclair <dsinclai@acs.ucalgary.ca>
Date: Wed, 27 Jan 93 05:37:20 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Random OTP sources
Message-ID: <9301271305.AA25910@acs1.acs.ucalgary.ca>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Much discussion has been going on about creating a truly random OTP key by tuning in to dead TV channels, etc.  There is a much simpler, and more secure way.   
Look at the decay of a small radioactive source.  Find a time period in which
there is a 50% chance of seeing an event, and then clock a 1 if you do, or a
0 of you don't.  Radioactive sources and detectors are easily obtained from
smoke detectors, and it should be fairly easy to set up (though I havn't done
it).  If our understanding of quantum mechanics are correct, the resulting 
bitstream is truly random.  RF noise may be random.  Also, if the NSA or
other Big Brother organization knows what you are doing, they can try listening
in on the same channel and deducing your key.  To my knowledge, there is no
way to see what is going on in a small Californium source if you have more
than a few meters between the source and detector.  Anyhow, a given event
will probably only produce one particle, or maybe two, so your point detector
will only see a portion of the events and knowledge of particles in another
direction doesn't tell you anything.

Hm.  I hope that was coherent.  Any comments?
-- 
Vercotti: I was terrified of him.  Everyone was terrified of Doug.  I've seen
          grown men pull their own heads off rather than see Doug.  Even
          Dinsdale was frightened of Doug.
Interviewer: What did he do?
Vercotti: He used sarcasm.  He knew all the tricks, dramatic irony,
          metaphor, bathos, puns, parody, litotes and satire.
			-- Monty Python, Episode 14
PGP 2.1 Key by finger




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: peter honeyman <honey@citi.umich.edu>
Date: Wed, 27 Jan 93 07:08:01 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Computerized OTP (was 5th AMENDMENT & DECRYPTION)
In-Reply-To: <9301270659.AA10471@alumni.cco.caltech.edu>
Message-ID: <9301271507.AA12215@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Murdering Thug wrote:

> Yes I do think the idea of making a "more random than random" stream
> by filtering out long runs of 0's or 1's weakens the the key stream
> in theory, but in practical use it strengthens it, because if the stream
> is left alone, runs of 500 bits of 0's or 1's can come through, and any
> fool can then extract plain text using XOR in this area of the cyphertext.

this is a one in 2^500 event.  just to remind you, 2^500 is 

3,273,390,607,896,141,870,013,189,696,827,599,152,216,642,046,043,064,789,483,291,368,096,133,796,404,674,554,883,270,092,325,904,157,150,886,684,127,560,071,009,217,256,545,885,393,053,328,527,589,376

(sorry to those folks whose screens get bugged by looooong lines.)

i wouldn't worry about a 1 in 2^500 event occurring too often ...

	peter




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Scott Collins" <scott_collins@genmagic.genmagic.com>
Date: Wed, 27 Jan 93 10:40:15 PST
To: "Cypher Punks" <cypherpunks@toad.com>
Subject: Randomness and RE>OTPs
Message-ID: <9301271839.AA25190@>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Subject:  Randomness and RE>OTPs

>Does anybody remember a good recipe for converting a biased RNG into an
>unbiased one?  I can't think of one off the top of my head, and that's
>what Thug's friend seems to need.  This has been discussed at length in
>the literature.

1. If you want randomness, introducing order is bad.  As Eric Hughes
pointed out, trimming runs reduces the entropy of the sequence.  You
want to increase the entropy i.e. maximize the surprise.  One good
way to increase the entropy is to compress the 'random' sequence.  The
output of a good compressor has greater entropy than the input.  If the
input is already random, no harm done (again, with a GOOD compressor...
otherwise it is easy to accidentally introduce order).  If the input
has some subtle bias or regularity, the compressor will get rid of it
(at the cost of reducing the total volume of the sequence).  Good
compressors are much better at detecting regularity (and eliminating it)
than human beings.

2. Of course (as Thug stated) you are (also) compressing the plaintext before
you encrypt it.  It is best to do this with an adaptive scheme and an
arithmetic encoder so that a) the entropy of the plaintext is maximized
and so that b) accidentally decrypting something correctly in the middle
of the stream is useless.

My recommendation for a good binary scheme is DMC (dynamic markov compression)
feeding into almost any binary arithmetic encoder (e.g. the Q-coder, et. al.).
I would use this to compress both the plaintext stream before encryption, and
a 'suspect' random number stream.

If there is interest, I will post a bibliography of papers and books
relating to this.

Scott Collins (Scott_Collins@genmagic.com)






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: surfpunk@osc.versant.com (gubhtug gb ribxr fpvrapr svpgvba engure guna fpvrapr)
Date: Wed, 27 Jan 93 10:33:43 PST
To: surfpunk@osc.versant.com (SURFPUNK Technical Journal)
Subject: [surfpunk-0036] CRYPT: Sci Am on Public Key Cryptosystems
Message-ID: <surfpunk-0036@SURFPUNK.Technical.Journal>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


+                       +  Cypherpunks don't care if you don't like the
                        +  software they write.  Cypherpunks know that
                        +  software can't be destroyed.  Cypherpunks know
                        +  that a widely dispersed system can't be shut
                        +  down.
                        +                    -- the cypherpunk manifesto
                        +                 (cypherpunks-request@toad.com)
                        ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++

Here's a short piece from Scientific American on RSA, PEM, PGP etc.

Notice towards the end this article says "The U.S. is the only nation
that permits the patenting of mathematical algorithms."

That threw me at first -- it's not *supposed* to be permitted, but in
practice, it is.  So I suppose this is a true statement.

(The cover article of this Sci Am is on a team at the Science Museum in
London that did a 3-ton implementation of Babbage's Difference Engine.)

							       -- strick
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________

Source: Scientific American, February 1993, beginning at the 30th page.
	For fair use only.  


Electronic Envelopes?
The uncertainty of keeping e-mail private


  Recent legislative efforts to mandate remote wiretapping attachments
for every telephone system and computer network in the U.S. may have
been the best thing that every happened for encryption software.  "We
have mostly the FBI to thank," says John Gilmore of Cygnus Support in
Palo Alto, Calif.  Gilmore is an entrepreneur, hacker and electronic
civil libertarian who helped to found the Electronic Frontier
Foundation (EFF).  He is now watching closely the development of two
competing techniques for keeping electronic mail private.

  As matters now stand, computers transmit messages from one user to
another in plain text.  If a geneticist in Boston sends e-mail to a
molecular biologist in San Diego, any of the half a dozen or so
intermediary machines that forward the letter could siphon off a copy
-- and so could any of the dozens of workstations that might be
attached to the local-area network at the sender's or recipient's
university or company.

  The Electronic Privacy Act of 1986 prohibits snooping by public
e-mail carriers or law-enforcement officials, except by court order.
Nevertheless, many people are becoming uncomfortable with the
electronic equivalent of mailing all their correspondence on postcards
and relying on people to refrain from reading it.  They are turning to
public-key encryption, which allows anyone to encode a message but only
the recipient to decode it.  Each user has a public key, which is made
widely available, and a closely guarded secret key.  Messages encrypted
with one key can be decrypted only with each other, thus also making it
possible to "sign" messages by encrypting them with the private key
[see "Achieving Electronic Privacy," by David Chaum; Scientific
American, August 1992].

  Two programs -- and two almost diametrically opposed viewpoints
embodied in them -- are competing for acceptance.  Privacy Enhanced
Mail (PEM) is the long-awaited culmination of years of international
standard setting by computer scientists.  Pretty Good Privacy (PGP) is
a possibly illegal work of "guerilla freeware" originally written by
software consultant Philip Zimmermann.

  The philosophies of PEM and PGP differ most visibly with respect to
key management, the crucial task of ensuring that the public keys that
encode messages actually belong to the intended recipient rather than a
malevolent third party.  PEM relies on a rigid hierarchy of trusted
companies, universities and other institutions to certify public keys,
which are then stored on a "key server" accessible over the Internet.
To send private mail, one asks the key server for the public key of the
addressee, which has been signed by the appropriate certification
authorities.  PGP, in contrast, operates on what Zimmermann calls "a
web of trust":  people who wish to correspond privately can exchange
keys directly or through trusted intermediaries.  The intermediaries
sign the keys that they pass on, thus certifying their authenticity.

  PGP's decentralized approach has gained a wide following since its
initial release in June 1991, according to Hugh E. Miller of Loyola
University in Chicago, who maintains an electronic mailing list for
discussion among PGP users.  His personal "keyring" file contains
public keys for about 100 correspondents, and others have keyrings
containing far more.  As of the end of 1992, meanwhile, a final version
of PEM has not been officially released.  Gilmore, who subscribes to
the electronic mailing list for PEM developers, says he has seen "only
five or 10" messages actually encrypted using the software.

  Although PGP's purchase price is right -- it is freely available over
the Internet and on electronic bulletin boards throughout the world --
it does carry two liabilities that could frighten away potential
users.  First, U.S. law defines cryptographic hardware and software as
"munitions." So anyone who is caught making a copy of the program could
run afoul of export-control laws.  Miller calls this situation
"absurd," citing the availability of high-quality cryptographic
software on the streets of Moscow.

  Worse yet, RSA Data Security in Redwood City, Calif., holds rights to
a U.S. patent on the public-key encryption algorithm, and D. James
Bidzos, the company's president, asserts that anyone using or
distributing PGP could be sued for infringement.  The company has
licensed public-key software to corporations and sells its own
encrypted-mail package (the algorithm was developed with federal
support, and so the government has a royalty-free license).  When
Bidzos's attorneys warned Zimmermann that he faced a suit for
developing PGP, he gave up further work on the program.

  Instead PGP's ongoing improvements are in the hands of an
international team of software developers who take advice from
Zimmermann by e-mail.  The U.S. is the only nation that permits the
patenting of mathematical algorithms, and so programmers in the
Netherlands or New Zealand apparently have little to fear.

  U.S. residents who import the program could still face legal action,
although repeated warnings broadcast in cryptography discussion groups
on computer networks have yet to be superseded by legal filings.
Meanwhile, Gilmore says, the only substantive effect of the patent
threat is that development and use of cryptographic tools have been
driven out of the U.S. into less restrictive countries

			                             -- Paul Wallich



________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________

The SURFPUNK Technical Journal is a dangerous multinational hacker zine
originating near BARRNET in the fashionable western arm of the northern
California matrix.  Quantum Californians appear in one of two states,
spin surf or spin punk.  Undetected, we are both, or might be neither.
________________________________________________________________________

Send postings to <surfpunk@osc.versant.com>, subscription requests 
to <surfpunk-request@osc.versant.com>.  MIME encouraged.  
Xanalogical archive access soon.  Cypherpunks love to practice.
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________




                 #define DA_MD2 3
                 #define DA_MD5 5
                 #define MIN_RSA_MODULUS_BITS 508
                 #define MAX_RSA_MODULUS_BITS 1024
                 #define MAX_RSA_MODULUS_LEN ((MAX_RSA_MODULUS_BITS + 7) / 8)
                 #define MAX_RSA_PRIME_BITS ((MAX_RSA_MODULUS_BITS + 1) / 2)
                 #define MAX_RSA_PRIME_LEN ((MAX_RSA_PRIME_BITS + 7) / 8)







From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: pmetzger@shearson.com (Perry E. Metzger)
Date: Wed, 27 Jan 93 09:24:28 PST
To: thug@phantom.com
Subject: Randomness
Message-ID: <9301271622.AA02754@maggie.shearson.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> From: thug@phantom.com (Murdering Thug)
> 
> Yes I do think the idea of making a "more random than random" stream
> by filtering out long runs of 0's or 1's weakens the the key stream
> in theory, but in practical use it strengthens it, because if the stream
> is left alone, runs of 500 bits of 0's or 1's can come through, and any
> fool can then extract plain text using XOR in this area of the cyphertext.

The odds against a run of 500 1's is one in 2^500th, which is a number so
large I can't imagine a real random number source creating it in the lifetime
of our universe. Presumably, your problem is that your random number source
is crap.

Perry




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Eric Fogleman <Eric.Fogleman@analog.com>
Date: Wed, 27 Jan 93 14:51:10 PST
To: thug@phantom.com
Subject: Limiting "white" noise runlength
Message-ID: <9301272248.AA18636@ack.adstest.analog.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Mr. Thug,

In talking about "white" noise, you mentioned:

> Yes I do think the idea of making a "more random than random" stream
> by filtering out long runs of 0's or 1's weakens the the key stream
> in theory, but in practical use it strengthens it, because if the stream
> is left alone, runs of 500 bits of 0's or 1's can come through, and any
> fool can then extract plain text using XOR in this area of the cyphertext.
> LZW compression of the plaintext helps, but I feel that it is far better
> to reduce the possibility of a key stream containing long runs of 0's or
> 1's, than to leave it alone.

Why not feed back the previously encrypted bits to perform the
"present" encryption (something like cipher block chaining) to keep
this from happening?  Then any particular encrypted character will
depend on *all* previous characters and break up runs of "plaintext".
That seems much better than un-whitening your white noise...

Eric Fogleman




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Date: Wed, 27 Jan 93 19:41:55 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: (fwd) RISKS DIGEST 14.29
Message-ID: <9301280338.AA09001@netcom3.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I found this in RISKS. Apparently, law enforcement types are
approaching software vendors and seeking backdoors and other
compromises.

Note that Lotus is a licensee of RSA, so the encryption algorithms
worrying the FBI are probably the main RSA algorithms.

Cypherpunk activities are becoming more important than ever.

-Tim May


From: risks@CSL.SRI.COM (RISKS Forum)
Subject: RISKS DIGEST 14.29
Date: 27 Jan 93 22:05:31 GMT

------------------------------

Date: Wed, 20 Jan 93 17:58:49 EST
From: joltes@husc.harvard.edu
Subject: The FBI and Lotus cc:Mail

An interesting tidbit came to light while I was attending a demonstration of
Lotus' cc:Mail and Notes products at the Boston NetWorld this month.  During
the Notes portion of the presentation someone asked how secure the information
in the various databases was, and how the encryption was done.

The presenter said that the data was considered very secure, so much so that
the FBI had approached Lotus to ask that a "back door" be left in the software
in order to give the Bureau a method for infiltrating suspects' filesystems.
She said they were specifically targeting "drug dealers and other bad people."

Given this backdoor, what was to stop the Bureau from inspecting confidential
materials on any system?  The risks seem obvious.  Additionally, it makes one
wonder how many other vendors of supposedly "secure" software have been 
similarly approached by various Federal organizations, and how many have 
agreed to create the back doors as requested.

Happily, the presenter said that Lotus refused to honor the FBI's request.
Bravo!

Dick Joltes, Manager, Networks and Hardware, Harvard University Science Center
joltes@husc.harvard.edu

------------------------------






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Jay Prime Positive <jpp@markv.com>
Date: Wed, 27 Jan 93 20:45:22 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: thresholding to enhance secrecy
Message-ID: <9301272043.aa08979@hermix.markv.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


  Summary: You can improve the secrecy of weak cypher systems by using
thresholding.  You can gain linear (or better) improvements for linear
increase in the cyphertext size.  No claim for change in signature
strength is made.

  Thresholding is the name for a way of breaking up a peice of
information into X peices so that Y <= X peices are needed to recover
the information.  If even Y-1 peices recovered, you still have no idea
what the original information is.  A simple thresholding system which
requires 2 out of 2 peices to recover the original is to transform M
into R and R+M where R is a random bit stream, and R+M is the same
random bit stream xored with the message.

  Concider the weak cypher systems S1, S2, S3...  where each has a
probability of being 'broken' X1, X2, X3...  requireing the (expected)
expense of E1, E2, ... EN effort.  Threshold your message P into N
peices, P1, P2, P3, PN, such that all N are required to recover the
message.  Send S1(P1), S2(P2), S3(P3)... SN(PN).  I belive that the
probability of breaking this system should be (1-X1)*(1-X2)*(1-X3)*
...*(1-XN) and that the effort to break it to be E1+E2+...EN (with a
smaller deviation that the sum of the deviations of Ei).  This is only
a linear increase in effort, but more than linear increase in the
probability of secrecy.  (right?)

  If people fear that PGP doesn't provide strong enough secrecy, we
could switch to PGP^3, or even PGP^10.  And if people are going to
compress their messages anyway, there doesn't seem to be any good
reason NOT to switch to PGP^2.

  There is probably a similar system which increases the strength of
signatures too.  Any ideas?  (I suspect the naive aplication of
thresholding here will DECREASE signature strength.)  How about a way
to *exponentialy* increase the effort and probability?  Then it
wouldn't matter much how weak our cyphers were!

j'





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Eric Hughes <hughes@soda.berkeley.edu>
Date: Wed, 27 Jan 93 20:50:44 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Computerized OTP (was 5th AMENDMENT & DECRYPTION)
In-Reply-To: <m0nH47J-000jpKC@phantom.com>
Message-ID: <9301280448.AA02108@soda.berkeley.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



At risk of belaboring the point about random numbers, I have some
more, hopefully different comments.

Let me at least make the following point clear.  Making random numbers
is a hard problem.  It is hard on the scale of designing a good
cryptographic hash function.

>if a real
>random source is used (e.g. RF noise/static) 

It is unwise to conclude that a source is random merely because it
looks like noise.  Electrical noise is often a poor source of
randomness because much noise comes from unshielded oscillators of one
sort or another.  Even a source based on thermal noise must be
carefully designed, since solid state effects such as avalanching can
generate characteristic contributions.

I would suggest that everyone look and volume 2 of Knuth for the
difficulty of designing pseudorandom number generators in software.
Making hardware random numbers is harder than that, since it requires
all that knowledge and then some.  The difficulty is in knowing that
your numbers are random, not in making noise.

>no bit in the key stream
>has any relationship to any other bit in the key stream, 

This is not sufficient for a stream to be random.  I can have this
property and still have a very non-random stream.  For example,
suppose I have a random stream.  If for every two bits I output those
two bits and their xor (sum mod 2), then no two bits have any relation
to each other, but looking at bits three at a time shows awful
statistics.

The actual statement is that the every conditional probability that a
configuration of size n occur given any other independent
configuration is 1/n.  In others words, every combination of bits must
be independent from every other combination.  This is much stronger than
requiring mere bit independence.

And as an aside, long runs of bits can be removed (as Scott Collins
mentioned) by compression, and short configurations of bits can be
removed by hashing.

Eric




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: nowhere@bsu-cs.bsu.edu (Chael Hall)
Date: Wed, 27 Jan 93 20:51:20 PST
To: hugh@toad.com
Subject: Re: Remailer Changes
In-Reply-To: <9301270235.AA01717@domingo.teracons.com>
Message-ID: <9301280448.AA22419@bsu-cs.bsu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>  Why are you retaining the Subject: headder line?  If I want a
>Subject: line I should include inside the encrypted block.
>
>		||ugh Daniel
>		hugh@toad.com

     Taking Hugh's advice, I made the remailer strip subject lines from
the original header.  By the way, I could use a few more messages sent
through here for testing.  Please remember, it only gets remailed if:

X-Anon-To: user@host
X-Anonymously-To: user@host
Request-Remailing-To: user@host
Subject: Request Remailing

     One of the above lines *MUST* be in the header or else it won't
get remailed.  (it goes to my in box)

Thanks.

Chael Hall

--
Chael Hall
nowhere@bsu-cs.bsu.edu, 00CCHALL@LEO.BSUVC.BSU.EDU, CHALL@CLSV.Charon.BSU.Edu
(317) 285-3648 after 5 pm EST




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Scott Collins" <scott_collins@genmagic.genmagic.com>
Date: Thu, 28 Jan 93 14:46:48 PST
To: "Cypher Punks" <cypherpunks@toad.com>
Subject: Biblio re>randomness and OT
Message-ID: <9301282246.AA28614@>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Subject:  Biblio re>randomness and OTPs

Response was sufficient to merit posting this (brief
and specific) bibliography pertaining to a) randomness;
b) testing for randomness; and c) compression and
coding as it relates to privacy and maximizing entropy.

The items are listed in the order that *I* think
represents their helpfulness on this topic.

Two interesting quotes from Knuth (book [1] below):

  (sec3.2.2 para2 p25)
  One of the common fallacies encountered in
  connection with random number generation is the idea
  that we can take a good generator and modify it a
  little, in order get and "even-more-random" sequence.
  
  (sect3.3 para4 p38)
  ...The point of these remarks is that we cannot be
  trusted to judge by ourselves whether a sequence of
  numbers is random or not.  Some unbiased mechanical
  tests must be applied.

Books
==========
[1] "The Art of Computer Programming, vol 2:
Seminumerical Algorithms" by Donald Knuth.
ISBN 0-201-03822-6
Sections of interest:
  (3) Random Numbers

[2] "Text Compression" by Bell, Cleary and Witten.
ISBN 0-13-911991-4
Sections of interest:
  (5) From Probablilities to Bits, especially
    (5.2) Arithmetic Coding
  (7.3) Dynamic Markov Modeling
  (10.1.5) Privacy and Compression

[3] "Adaptive Data Compression" by Ross N. Williams.
ISBN 0-7923-9085-7
Sections of interest:
  (1.9) Arithmetic Coding
  (1.10.6.8) DMC
  (1.16) Error Correction, Data Compression and
    Cryptography

[4] "Image and Text Compression" edited by Storer.
ISBN 0-7923-9243-4
Sections of interest:
  (4) 'Practical mplementations of Arithmetic Coding'
    by Howard and Vitter.

Papers
==========
[5] "A note on the DMC data compression scheme" by
  Bell and Moffat.

[6] "Universal Coding, Information, Prediction, and
  Estimation" by Rissanen.

[7] "Linear Time Adaptive Arithmetic Coding" by Moffat.

[8] "A Simple General Binary Source Code" by Langdon
  and Rissanen.

[9] "An overview of the basic principles of the Q-Coder
  adaptive binary arithmetic coder" by Pennebaker, Mitchell,
  Langdon and Arps.

[10] "Software implementations fo the Q-Coder" by Mitchell
  and Pennebaker.

[11] "Optimal hardware and sofware arithmetic coding
  procedures for the Q-Coder" by Mitchell and Pennebaker.

[5] "Probability estimation for the Q-Coder" by Pennebaker
  and Mitchell.

I hope you find this information helpful.

Scott Collins (Scott_Collins@genmagic.com)







From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Fan Li TAI <USTAI%MEMSTVX1.bitnet@CUNYVM.CUNY.EDU>
Date: Thu, 28 Jan 93 21:22:56 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: is this true???
Message-ID: <9301290522.AA17978@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Hiya....
        I found this post in a newsgroup that I try to follow.  Don't know
about etiquette about how this should have been edited, so it's all here,
headers and all.  Anyway, I would like to know if the info is accurate, bull or
what?
        FYI, the ISA means Internal Security Act (back in Malaysia) and they
have had UUCP for a few years (but UUCP's hardly enough for the kinds of
traffic they are talking about, but then a few private companies *did* have
full Internet, so..... it's possible that the "thingy" was there without public
knowledge....


________begin reposting________
X-NEWS: msuvx1 soc.culture.asean: 11533
Relay-Version: VMS News - V6.1B5 17/9/92 VAX/VMS A5.5-2; site memstvx1.memst.edu
Path: memstvx1!cs.utk.edu!gatech!swrinde!zaphod.mps.ohio-state.edu!darwin.sura.n
   et!haven.umd.edu!uunet!mcsun!fuug!anon
Newsgroups: soc.culture.asean
Subject: ?? Electronic Monitoring ?? [The article]
Message-ID: <1993Jan20.211138.20587@fuug.fi>
From: an3284@anon.penet.fi (legend)
Date: Wed, 20 Jan 1993 19:40:25 GMT
Sender: anon@fuug.fi (The Anon Administrator)
Organization: Anonymous contact service
X-Anonymously-To: soc.culture.asean
Lines: 181



        sorry about the previous post.  The mailer cut off
everything after any "--" line, which I used to separate the
forwarded message.  Here'e the complete message.

legend.


In article <1993Jan20.041347.19567@husc3.harvard.edu>,
on@husc.harvard.edu writes:
|>
|> Now with Malaysia officially on Internet, I wonder if the ISA patrol
|> will be monitoring this (and maybe s.c.malaysia) newsgroup.  If so, then
|> I guess there'll be no more criticizing the government -- that could
|> get you detained without a trial.  And since posting here could be
|> interpreted as publishing, I guess there'll be no more talk on "sensitive"
|> issues or you'll be in hot soup under the Seditions Act.  Of course, now
|> we can't talk about freedom or basic human rights either because Mr.
|> what's-his-name here has declared that it has no place in Malaysian
|> society; therefore it has no place in s.c.a or s.c.m too!
|>
|> SIGH!  Soc.culture.asean will never be quite the same again...  But hey,
|> look on the bright side... we can always talk about food.
|>
|> Goodnight...
|>
|> Ahmad Zulqarnain b. Che On                              GO HOOSIERS!!
|> on@husc.harvard.edu              NO MORE DOOK... NO MORE DOOK... NO MORE DOOK
   !


        When in doubt, assume they will (or for that matter, have been).
In fact, Malaysia has *ALWAYS* been capable of monitoring Usenet news since a
long time ago, since Malaysia has long been connected via UUCP, which is
capable of providing a news feed.

        Included below is an article that appeared in alt.bbs.allsysop.
It's source has NOT been validated.   It is included here for your
pondering only.    PLEASE TREAT IT ONLY AS A RUMOR UNTIL THERE IS
EVIDENCE.   The possibility of the scenerio described in the article
happening is up for debate.

        Again, the article is included for discussion purposes only.
Please use your own discretion in deciding the truthfulness/falsefulness
of the content.   I am only forwarding an article that appeared in another
newsgroup.   This article was NOT originated from me.


legend.



        ************************************************************************
*
        ************************************************************************
*
        ***                                                                   **
*
        ***  IF YOU WISH TO QUOTE/RE-QUOTE PART/ALL OF THE FOLLOWING ARTICLE, **
*
        ***   PLEASE ALWAYS INCLUDE THIS DISCLAIMER/WARNING WITH IT. THANKS.  **
*
        ***                                                                   **
*
        ***     The following article appeared in alt.bbs.allsysop in         **
*
        ***     September '92 and is re-post here without permission.         **
*
        ***     It has been included here for DISCUSSION PURPOSES ONLY.       **
*
        ***     The validity of the information included has NOT BEEN         **
*
        ***     VERIFIED.  The reader should at best treat it as a RUMOR      **
*
        ***     at this point, and conduct his/her own investigation if       **
*
        ***     felt necessary.                                               **
*
        ***                                                                   **
*
        ************************************************************************
*
        ************************************************************************
*

ORIGINAL POST FOLLOWS:

Newsgroup: alt.bbs.allsysop
In article <1992Sep30.033757.24139@bnlux1.bnl.gov>,
foxworth@bnlux1.bnl.gov (Bob Foxworth) writes:
|>
|> The following message was received over our local Amateur Radio TCP/IP
|> VHF Radio network on 26 Sept. It came there from the Amateur AX.25 protocol
|> Packet Radio network, the originating radio BBS station (at Canton Ohio)
|> entered it into the Amateur packet network on 16 Sept. I am passing it
|> on "as received". I am not vouching for, nor am I disclaiming any statements
|> in this message. I hope it is not a repeat of anything...any replies, post
|> to the net, not to me. I tried to post it 3 days ago but it never
|> appeared here. It did also go to a moderated group who rejected it, however.
|>
|> [begin included tex]
|> - From n8ecw%kc2fd@kc2fd.ampr.org Sat Sep 26 14:05:28 1992
|> - Received: from n2mdq.ampr.org by k2euh.ampr.org with SMTP
|>      id AA9736 ; Sat, 26 Sep 92 13:59:54 UTC
|> - Received: from kc2fd.ampr.org by n2mdq.ampr.org
|> - (n2mdq@n2mdq.ampr.org) with SMTP
|> -    id AA10034 ; Tue, 22 Sep 92 13:49:44 UTC
|> - Date: 26 Sep 92 13:51:00 UTC
|> - Message-Id: <6087@kc2fd.ampr.org>
|> - From: n8ecw@kc2fd.#nli.ny.usa.na
|> - To: nli@n2mdq
|> - Subject: CP KC2FD: BBSs, Privacy, and You!
|> - X-BBS-Msg-Type: P
|> - Status: R
|>
|> - R:920926/1351Z @:KC2FD.#NLI.NY.USA.NA [Coram, LI, NY] FBB5.14d #:18091
|>
|> - From: N8ECW@KC2FD.#NLI.NY.USA.NA
|> - To  : NLI@N2MDQ
|>
|> - Original from N8ECW to ALL@USBBS
|> - R:920926/0848Z @:N2BQF.#NLI.NY.USA.NOAM [Copiague] FBB5.14d TELINK #:18005
|> -   intermediate headers deleted
|> - R:920916/1944z @:KA8Z.OH.USA Canton, Oh. #:26846 Z:44705
|>
|> I found the following message on a land line BBS. Since many packet users
|> also have modems and call land line BBSs, and many sysops also run such
|> BBSs I think that the information in the following message is something
|> we should all be aware of.
|>
|>                              ***
|>
|>   As someone involved in the telephone industry on the level of security
|>   and data integrity... I would like to inform everyone that uses modems
|>   and/or are bbs operators of some information.
|>
|>   The first thing that everyone that uses a modem should know is that
|>   every time you fire up your modem your activating monitoring equipment
|>   somewhere in the U.S.  I have worked for several large telephone
|>   networks that routinely monitor and reroute modem and fax transmissions
|>   through devices that allow them to view what is being transmitted and
|>   even decodes encrypted data and fax packets used by major corporations
|>   and governmental agencies.  This is allowed under the heading of
|>   "Maintenance Monitoring" and may be continued for up to 6 months without
|>   the need of any legal paperwork being generated.  Under an obscure
|>   pre-WWII ruling by the agency that is now the FCC... "No information may
|>   be encoded or transmitted over PUBLIC or PRIVATE forms of telephony or
|>   radio with the exception of those agencies involved in the National
|>   Security" a further designation goes on to say "with the exception of
|>   the MORSE system of 'transmittal', any communication that is not
|>   interpretable by the human ear is forbidden and unlawful."
|>
|>   The information gathered goes to 3 seperate database facilities...1 is
|>   codenamed Diana and is located in Brussels, the 2nd is named Fredrick
|>   and is located somewhere in Malaysia, the 3rd is named Elizabeth and is
|>   located in Boulder, Colorado.  The information stored in these systems
|>   is accessable by the US Government, Interpol, Scotland Yard and various
|>   other such agencies.  Your credit rating is also affected by your modem
|>   usage... if you ever get a copy of your credit history and find a
|>   listing that has HN06443 <--= this is a negative risk rating. or a code
|>   87AT4 <---= an even more negative risk rating.... these will usually
|>   have no description on them... and if you inquire about them they will
|>   tell you that it just comes from the system that way.
|>
|>   I am currently working for another major carrier as a consultant and
|>   have been able to watch these systems operate...at one unnamed long
|>   distance carrier here in Columbus Ohio in their NCC, Network Control
|>   Center, you can see several rows of computer terminals which have
|>   approximately 30 to 40 separate windows in each... these windows have
|>   data transmissions that are being monitored... banks of 9 track tapes
|>   are going constantly to record everything.  Everyone should realize that
|>   even if a sysop posts a disclaimer at the beginning of his bbs about no
|>   access to governmental agencies or law enforcement...that it isn't worth
|>   the time it takes to type it in... looking forward to hearing reactions
|>   to this.
|>
|>                              ******
|>
|> I apologize for the length of this message, but it's information that I
|> feel is important, especially for any land-line BBS sysop. Anytime you
|> enter a message, even if it's private, always do it with the assumtion
|> that it's going to be seen by anyone and everyone, everywhere.
|>
|> Tnx
|> 73s
|> de Tom, N8ECW@KA8Z.#NEOH.OH.USA.NA
|> [end included message]
|> Standard disclaimers apply. My employer, above, has no connection or
|> responsibility with anything I say or relay here. Of course.




-------------------------------------------------------------------------
To find out more about the anon service, send mail to help@anon.penet.fi.
Due to the double-blind system, any replies to this message will be anonymized,
and an anonymous id will be allocated automatically. You have been warned.
_______________________________________________________________________________
|___  ___  _____  ___ ___                   | User Services, Room 134, Adm Bldg|
||  \/  | / ____\ | | | | Fan Li TAI        | Memphis State University         |
|| \  / | \____ \ | |_| | Campus Box 528039 | Internet: USTAI@MSUVX1.MEMST.EDU |
||_|\/|_| \_____/ \_____/ Memphis, TN 38152 | Bitnet  : USTAI@MEMSTVX1         |
|___________________________________________|__________________________________|




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Phiber Optik <phiber@eff.org>
Date: Fri, 29 Jan 93 00:19:39 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Is this true???
Message-ID: <199301290818.AA18130@eff.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


That last message containing info on purported phone company monitoring
activities was the biggest load of propagandist bullshit I think I've seen
in a long time.
I'm sure it generated the expected fear and paranoia amongst more ignorant
people.





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Daniel Ray <norstar@tnl.com>
Date: Fri, 29 Jan 93 13:30:21 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: turning on yourself during car stops
Message-ID: <9301290553.AA10758@tnl.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



>From: Peter Honeyman <honey@citi.umich.edu>
>To: cypherpunks@toad.com, edgar@spectrx.Saigon.COM
>Date: Mon, 25 Jan 93 19:57:20 EST
>Subject: Re: public servant privacy
>
>i believe there is a special exception related to automobiles
>that makes them subject to search without a warrant when the
>driver is placed under arrest.  but check with a lawyer.
>
>	peter
>

essentially 90+% of all contraband found during traffic stops on the highway
is because the driver consented to a search. Literally the police officer
will ask "can I search your car?" and people, even experienced criminals, will
say "ok alright" even though they should know better.

some think that saying no means just a delay and they search anyways. this is
not the case. If they ask, and you say no, the most that happens is that you
get a delay and they may bring in a dog for a sniff. If they can search anyway,
they will just do it and not ask. Just respond "I want to preserve my privacy".
Police know that virtually NO ONE refuses a "consent-search" request. and in
most cases, if you do know better and refuse, they will not bring a dog and
will let you go.

lately a trucker consented to a search where they discovered several million
dollars in cocaine in his cab. Police know this phenomenon and, needless to
say, exploit it fully. And they know how to "sweet talk" people, which is
a method of questions & answers that further enhances cooperation from other-
wise noncompliant people.

Remember: "Just say no". It may save your ass.

norstar@tnl.com





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Douglas Sinclair <dsinclai@acs.ucalgary.ca>
Date: Fri, 29 Jan 93 05:02:48 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Radio-isotope OTP generators
Message-ID: <9301291302.AA49310@acs1.acs.ucalgary.ca>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I got some mail from someone on the list who told me that about a year ago
there had been much discussion of radio-isotope OTP random number generators,
and that the conclusion had been that they were too dangerous to use.  I replied
to that message, but my reply bounced for some reason.  So, could anybody please
send me a synopsis of the discussion?  Thanks.

I was talking to my father about this, and we concluded that a simple exposed-
silicon photodiode put in reverse bias should provide adequate detection.
Put it in darkness, and no current will flow.  Hit it with and alpha, and you
get a cascade on the order of a million electrons.  The alpha source need
only be some radium paint on the front of the diode.  This is not dangerous
stuff.  You'd have to go very far out of your way to do yourself any damage
with it.  If you eat it then bad things might happen, but I can say the same
thing about AA batteries...
My father designs and builds particle detectors for a living, so he probably
knows what he's talking about.

BTW: one error in my last message.  There is not Californium in a smoke
detector, it is Amerecium.  Same difference...
-- 
Vercotti: I was terrified of him.  Everyone was terrified of Doug.  I've seen
          grown men pull their own heads off rather than see Doug.  Even
          Dinsdale was frightened of Doug.
Interviewer: What did he do?
Vercotti: He used sarcasm.  He knew all the tricks, dramatic irony,
          metaphor, bathos, puns, parody, litotes and satire.
			-- Monty Python, Episode 14
PGP 2.1 Key by finger




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: hal@alumni.cco.caltech.edu (Hal Finney)
Date: Fri, 29 Jan 93 09:54:50 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: OTP Generators
Message-ID: <9301291755.AA08021@alumni.cco.caltech.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Douglas Sinclair asked about the earlier discussion re the use of 
radiation to generate true random numbers for one time pads.

The problem, as I recall, was with the quantity of bits needed.  OTP's 
eat bits like crazy.  People have talked about filling CD-ROM's or other 
optical media with hundreds of megabytes or even gigabytes of random 
numbers.

Now, the problem is how long it will take to produce that much random 
data.  A few bits per second won't be fast enough.  Suppose you wanted 
to produce 100 megabytes per day (which would take over a week to create 
a gigabyte).  That requires about 10,000 random bits per second.

Now, your detector is not going to be 100% efficient.  Only a certain 
fraction of the emitted particles are going to be detected.  So you will 
need more decays than this, possibly many more.

Also, relying on a half-life calculation in which we wait a certain time 
interval, and see if there is a decay or not, won't be that accurate.  
If your time is off a little, it could bias the results.

Tim May posted the best (IMO) fix for this.  You collect bits in pairs; 
discard 00 and 11; for each 01 output a 0, for each 10 output a 1.  This 
way even if there is a bias where, say, 60% of the bits are 0's and 40% 
are 1's you still get 50-50 0's and 1's out.  This means you get about 1 
output bit for each 4 inputs, so you have to increase the necessary 
decay rate by a factor of 4.

So, the needed particle emission rate is 40,000 divided by the 
efficiency of your detector.  Perhaps Douglas could get some efficiency 
figures from his father, and judge whether this rate of radiation 
emission would be safe.

Hal Finney
74076.1041@compuserve.com

{.





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: hal@alumni.cco.caltech.edu (Hal Finney)
Date: Fri, 29 Jan 93 10:05:55 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Remailer abuse?
Message-ID: <9301291807.AA08440@alumni.cco.caltech.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


When the Pax remailer was shut down, I stopped keeping any logs of my
remailer operation.  I felt that I did not want to provide information
that would be helpful to those forces which oppose information privacy.

So, I don't know the history of it, but today I received this message:

	To: hal@alumni.cco.caltech.edu
	Subject: Re: what you said you wanted
	
	I am shocked that you would send such trash to innocent young girls,  
	whom you don't even know (Not that it is better if you know them)
	Well, I am appalled!!!
	Why me??
	
Is someone using my remailer to send trash to innocent young girls?
I am uncomfortable to be facilitating this kind of activity.  Can anyone
offer suggestions for the ethical thing to do in this situation?

Hal
74076.1041@compuserve.com




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: sDun@isma.demon.co.uk (Stephen Dunne)
Date: Fri, 29 Jan 93 05:20:25 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: The FBI and Lotus cc:Mail
Message-ID: <728328337snx@isma.demon.co.uk>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


In article  ** unknown **  you write:
>An interesting tidbit came to light while I was attending a demonstration of
>Lotus' cc:Mail and Notes products at the Boston NetWorld this month.  During
>the Notes portion of the presentation someone asked how secure the information
>in the various databases was, and how the encryption was done.
>
> Blah Blah Blah
>
>Happily, the presenter said that Lotus refused to honor the FBI's request.
>Bravo!
>
>Dick Joltes, Manager, Networks and Hardware, Harvard University Science Center
>joltes@husc.harvard.edu

I suppose that really means "Lotus *said* they refused to honour it.."

Paranoid? Moi !?

Stephen
-- 
+--------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Stephen Dunne                             DoD#767 sdun@isma.demon.co.uk   |
|International Securities Market Association       I speak for me,thats all|
|Voice (+44) 71-538-5656    Fax (+44) 71-538-4902  PGP 2.1 key available   |
|We are not affiliated to any other Demon.Co.Uk site. (especially Evil!)   |
+--------------------------------------------------------------------------+




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Date: Fri, 29 Jan 93 10:29:42 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: OTP Generators
Message-ID: <9301291826.AA15886@netcom3.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Hal Finney writes:

> Douglas Sinclair asked about the earlier discussion re the use of 
> radiation to generate true random numbers for one time pads.
> 
> The problem, as I recall, was with the quantity of bits needed.  OTP's 
...stuff elided...
> So, the needed particle emission rate is 40,000 divided by the 
> efficiency of your detector.  Perhaps Douglas could get some efficiency 
> figures from his father, and judge whether this rate of radiation 
> emission would be safe.

Yes, we've discussed this a couple of times.

For a 2 pi detector geometry, about 100,000 decays per second are
needed to give the 40,000 or so that the detector could see. This is
about 3 microcuries (1 curie = 3.7 x 10^10 disintegrations per
second), which is far higher than the Am-241 smoke detector sources
have (0.1 microcurie, if I remember correctly...but I could be wrong
on this, as it's been years...).

(There's also the issue of detector drift, with such high levels
causing changes in the detector properties.)

Obviously, multiple detectors could be used, each generating perhaps
several thousand bits pers second. It'll still take a week or so to
fill a single CD-ROM.

Not too practical. Nor is the production and distribution of CD-ROMS
very convenient. Using this for "Cypherpunks"-type activities would be
a nightmare of inconvenience for all concerned.

-Tim



-- 
..........................................................................
Timothy C. May         | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,  
tcmay@netcom.com       | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
408-688-5409           | knowledge, reputations, information markets, 
W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA  | black markets, collapse of governments.
Higher Power: 2^756839 | Public Key: waiting for the dust to settle.



-- 
..........................................................................
Timothy C. May         | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,  
tcmay@netcom.com       | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
408-688-5409           | knowledge, reputations, information markets, 
W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA  | black markets, collapse of governments.
Higher Power: 2^756839 | Public Key: waiting for the dust to settle.





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: miron@extropia.wimsey.com (Miron Cuperman)
Date: Fri, 29 Jan 93 04:11:48 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: ARA security
Message-ID: <1993Jan29.105734.1737@extropia.wimsey.bc.ca>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

Proposition 1:
All remailing schemes are vulnerable in the case that all remailing
sites in the chain are compromised before transmission.

Proposition 2:
With ARAs and direct transmission (one recipient at each hop), if the
first n-1 hosts in a chain are compromised then the n_th host identity
is known.  If all hosts are compromised, the originator is known.

Corollary 1:
Direct-transmission ARAs are vulnerable to an adversary that can
compromise any small subset of all hosts.  This is done by sequentially
compromising the next host, and using that information to find
the identity of the next host after that.  No amount of "random"
routing has any effect in this case, since the randomness is implemented
by each host, but each host is compromised before it makes the delivery.

Proposition 3:
Normal anonymous transmission (not ARA) is "unconditionally" secure
after *one* passage through an uncompromised host, assuming no
traffic analysis and no log files.  (With log files, normal
transmission is as insecure as direct-transmission ARAs.)

Therefore, it seems like direct-transmission ARAs are much less
secure than normal anonymous transmission.  For better security,
we must find some other ARA scheme.

A proposal: broadcast ARAs and Message Pools
- --------------------------------------------

All messages to a message pool are sent to all subscribers to the
pool.  Messages to the pool are encrypted with the (pseudonymous)
public key of the recipient.  The ARA can thus belong to any of
the subscribers to the pool.  The connection between public keys
and subscribers is not maintained anywhere.  The subscribers have
attempt decryption of messages marked with their pseudonyms.

Once the key of a subscriber is destroyed, it is not possible to
prove that any message was destined for that subscriber, affording
a last resort to a subscriber suspecting that an attack is in
progress.

Pools must have a large number of subscribers in case it is possible
to compromise the key of any particular subscriber.  Pools can be
implemented as Usenet groups for a low-cost delivery medium.  Each
pool should be geographically limited in order to further minimize
costs (the Distribution: header works well here).  If costs are
minimized, the pools can be increased, affording better security.
For experimental, low-volume tests, mailing lists can be used.
- -- 
        Miron Cuperman <miron@extropia.wimsey.com> | NeXTmail/Mime ok
                       <miron@cs.sfu.ca>           | Public key avail
        AMIX: MCuperman                            |
cyberspacecomputingcryptoimmortalitynetworkslaissezfaire

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From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: henry strickland <strick@osc.versant.com>
Date: Fri, 29 Jan 93 11:16:40 PST
To: hal@alumni.cco.caltech.edu (Hal Finney)
Subject: Re: Remailer abuse?
In-Reply-To: <9301291807.AA08440@alumni.cco.caltech.edu>
Message-ID: <9301291920.AA13347@versant.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


# From cypherpunks-request@toad.com Fri Jan 29 10:57:37 1993
# From: hal@alumni.cco.caltech.edu (Hal Finney)
# Date: Fri, 29 Jan 93 10:07:37 PST
# Message-Id: <9301291807.AA08440@alumni.cco.caltech.edu>
# To: cypherpunks@toad.com
# Subject: Remailer abuse?
# 	
# Is someone using my remailer to send trash to innocent young girls?

My guess: no.

Just a guess, but based on the way it was worded and what 
troublesome forgeries frequently look like and say, I would
bet that the message to you about the alleged trash was forged, and
is not responding to any such event.

					strick
					strick@osc.versant.com
					henry strickland




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Eric Hughes <hughes@soda.berkeley.edu>
Date: Fri, 29 Jan 93 11:36:05 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: is this true???
In-Reply-To: <9301290522.AA17978@toad.com>
Message-ID: <9301291933.AA03094@soda.berkeley.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



The piece about widespread worldwide modem monitoring has one notable
difference from most similar pieces: the presence of a bit of
falsifiable information, namely the credit history codes HN06443 and
87AT4.

Anybody know how to find an authoritative source for independent
verification of this data?

Eric




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: ""L. Detweiler"" <ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Date: Fri, 29 Jan 93 10:41:07 PST
To: Phiber Optik <phiber@eff.org>
Subject: Re: Is this true???
In-Reply-To: <199301290818.AA18130@eff.org>
Message-ID: <9301291840.AA29938@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>That last message containing info on purported phone company monitoring
>activities was the biggest load of propagandist bullshit I think I've seen
>in a long time.
>I'm sure it generated the expected fear and paranoia amongst more ignorant
>people.

This is not a constructive comment. What is your evidence that it is
false?  We should dissect the claims.

|>Under an obscure
|>   pre-WWII ruling by the agency that is now the FCC... "No information may
|>   be encoded or transmitted over PUBLIC or PRIVATE forms of telephony or
|>   radio with the exception of those agencies involved in the National
|>   Security" a further designation goes on to say "with the exception of
|>   the MORSE system of 'transmittal', any communication that is not
|>   interpretable by the human ear is forbidden and unlawful."

This kind of stuff seems to happen whether there are laws sanctioning
it or not, but does anyone know what law is being referenced?

On a general note, what would tend to validate/rebut the claim?  First
of all, the simple feasibility of such an operation must be called into
question.  There is a tremendous amount of data going over modems on
public telephone lines.  What is the chance that even a small fraction
could be monitored? (And an even more infinitesmal fraction archived.) 
The claim has appeared here before that it is "trivial" for a
government agency to scan for interesting keywords and sort the data
based on that.  But I think that even that would lead to loads of
irrelevant crap and require an army of intelligence agents to sort. 
Where is this army?

Also, the claims in the letter are referring to public telephone
networks.  Would this include all the networks comprising the Internet?
 If so, this multiplies the data volume immensely.  How could anyone
find anything useful in these massive streams?  Granted, *very*
sensitive information is probably contained within it, but how the heck
could it be found efficiently?

|>   Your credit rating is also affected by your modem
|>   usage... if you ever get a copy of your credit history and find a
|>   listing that has HN06443 <--= this is a negative risk rating. or a code
|>   87AT4 <---= an even more negative risk rating.... these will usually
|>   have no description on them... and if you inquire about them they will
|>   tell you that it just comes from the system that way.

These claims that credit ratings are influenced by this secret
information are rather questionable.  What is the path from the
decision to mark a record with a black mark to the private companies
like TRW that record this?  Which clients or sources of TRW or whatever
are specifically those that monitor secret information?  What exactly
does he mean, "your credit rating is affected by your modem usage?"

If anyone could refute or demonstrate the actual meaning of HN06443 and
87AT4 codes on credit reports (I've never seen a report or these
codes), this would be a specific item to discredit, which would call
into question the whole of the claims.

|>   The information gathered goes to 3 seperate database facilities...1 is
|>   codenamed Diana and is located in Brussels, the 2nd is named Fredrick
|>   and is located somewhere in Malaysia, the 3rd is named Elizabeth and is
|>   located in Boulder, Colorado.  The information stored in these systems
|>   is accessable by the US Government, Interpol, Scotland Yard and various
|>   other such agencies.  

Regarding the claim that one major monitoring hub is code named
"elizabeth" in Boulder Colorado.  There is a government standards
agency there, if I am not mistaken, I forget if it is NIST (?).  Also,
the National Center for Oceanic Research, which has very tremendous
computing power (e.g. Cray YMP) is there also.  In their tours they
show massive archival storage areas, which they say record major
amounts of global atmospheric data (e.g. temperatures, wind currents
etc.) collected from satellites.  These could conceivably be in part
"covers" but the idea is also rather unimaginable.  Can anybody report
on agencies in the areas cited?  There is the very specific claim of a
carrier in Columbus Ohio.

I propose that cypherpunks list be a central reporting place for what
might be called "public counter spies" who report on the illicit
activities of our governments.  Its already largely in that area.  If
we get enough expertise, nonradicals, and infiltrators here we may be
able to get better ideas of what the heck NSA really is doing, what
kind of monitoring is really going on, what kind of cryptographic
techniques can really be broken, etc.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Eric Hughes <hughes@soda.berkeley.edu>
Date: Fri, 29 Jan 93 11:48:07 PST
To: jpp@markv.com
Subject: thresholding to enhance secrecy
In-Reply-To: <9301272043.aa08979@hermix.markv.com>
Message-ID: <9301291945.AA03526@soda.berkeley.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



It seems that your "thresholding" schemes require an increase in 
message size.  Do I read this correctly?

It also seems that you need to generate one time pads to effect this
increase in message size, with all the attendant costs of making that
quantity of random bits.

Eric




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Karl Barrus <elee9sf@Menudo.UH.EDU>
Date: Fri, 29 Jan 93 10:03:47 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: digital banking
Message-ID: <199301291802.AA15702@Menudo.UH.EDU>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----


Cypherpunks,

	It looks like a few people are trying out the bank...but there
is only so much you can try as a single user...so there needs to be a
way to contact other bank users and remain anonymous.  Being able to
contact other bank users will allow bank customers to conduct real
transactions, etc. 
	So, what I plan to do is create a remailing header using my
remailer's public key for everyone who uses the bank.  I will send the
appropriate remailing header to each user, which can then be attached
to correspondence between bank customers.  Then, each user can be
contacted via an anonymous remailer (mine) and the remailing header.
Following that I will send to each user the total list of remailing
headers, so each bank customer will be able to contact the other bank
customers.  Then, each user can contact the other users, and include
their own remailing header to receive responses.  Right now we're just
experimenting so I'd like the bank customers to be able to interact
with each other.
	How does this system sound?  I'd like to hear any comments
about the bank or ways the bank's customers may transact with each
other (preferably privately).
	Also, a few weeks ago, maybe even two months, someone posted
anonymously :-) that they were nearly complete with an implementation
of Chaum's digitcal cash (RSA encryption, decryption, blinded
signatures, etc.) scheme.  I'd like to hear from that person the
status of their project, and whether it is feasible to incorporate
their code into my bank server.  Remain anonymous if you prefer, and
include a remailing header so I can write you back.  Incorporating
Chaum's method, and cypherpunk-style remailers to conduct business
with the bank are two of my goals for this project.

/-----------------------------------\
| Karl L. Barrus                    |
| elee9sf@menudo.uh.edu             | <- preferred address
| barrus@tree.egr.uh.edu (NeXTMail) |
\-----------------------------------/


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From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: geoffw@nexsys.net (Geoff White)
Date: Fri, 29 Jan 93 12:43:55 PST
To: ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu
Subject: Re: Is this true???
Message-ID: <9301292031.AA01091@nexsys.nexsys.net>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> are specifically those that monitor secret information?  What exactly
> do> Regarding the claim that one major monitoring hub is code named
> "elizabeth" in Boulder Colorado.  There is a government standards
> agency there, if I am not mistaken, I forget if it is NIST (?).  Also,
> the National Center for Oceanic Research, which has very tremendous
> computing power (e.g. Cray YMP) is there also.  In their tours they
> show massive archival storage areas, which they say record major
> amounts of global atmospheric data (e.g. temperatures, wind currents
> etc.) collected from satellites.  These could conceivably be in part
> "covers" but the idea is also rather unimaginable.  Can anybody report
> on agencies in the areas cited?  There is the very specific claim of a
> carrier in Columbus Ohio.
>

Well to add more paranoid fuel to the fire, it is no secret that there is a lot
of "intelligence" activity around the boulder/colorodo springs area.
But I don't think this alone is enough to prop up or refute this claim.

The most damageing part of the story IMHO is the line about the 9 track tapes
going :) Get real! Now Banks of Hi-8 maybe ...




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: gnu (John Gilmore)
Date: Fri, 29 Jan 93 13:03:42 PST
To: cypherpunks
Subject: Privacy Enhanced Mail proceeds to Proposed Standard
Message-ID: <9301292103.AA11818@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


------- Forwarded Message

To: Jon Postel -- RFC Editor <postel@isi.edu>
To: IETF-Announce:;@CNRI.Reston.VA.US@TIS.COM
Cc: Internet Architecture Board <iab@isi.edu>
Cc: pem-dev@TIS.COM
Cc: The Internet Engineering Steering Group <IESG@IETF.CNRI.Reston.VA.US>
From: IESG Secretary <iesg-secretary@CNRI.Reston.VA.US>
Subject: Protocol Action: Privacy Enhanced Mail to Proposed Standard
Date: Fri, 29 Jan 93 14:29:02 -0500
Message-Id:  <9301291429.aa07535@IETF.CNRI.Reston.VA.US>

   The IESG has approved the Privacy Enhanced Mail Protocols as a 
   Proposed Standard.  These protocols are defined in the Internet Drafts:

   o "Privacy Enhancement for Internet Electronic Mail:  Part I: Message
     Encryption and Authentication Procedures" <draft-ietf-pem-msgproc-02.txt>

   o "Privacy Enhancement for Internet Electronic Mail: Part II:
     Certificate-Based Key Management" <draft-ietf-pem-keymgmt-01.txt>

   o "Privacy Enhancement for Internet Electronic Mail: Part III:
     Algorithms, Modes, and Identifiers" <draft-ietf-pem-algorithms-02.txt>

   o "Privacy Enhancement for Internet Electronic Mail:  Part IV: Key
     Certification and Related Services" <draft-ietf-pem-forms-01.txt>

   These documents are the product of the Privacy-Enhanced Electronic
   Mail Working Group. The IESG contact person is Steve Crocker.

Technical Summary

   The PEM specifications have been under development for almost 6
   years.  During that time, parts of the specifications have been
   published, revised and republished, with each new publication
   including corrections and enhancements commensurate with the
   experience obtained from implementations and continued
   deliberations.  The specifications have not changed dramatically
   since March 1992; they are technically sound and consistent with
   the internet architecture and the anticipated internet security
   architecture.

   This protocol opens the door for widespread use of cryptography
   throughout the Internet which will result in greatly increased
   security for mail traffic.  This protocol is of premier importance
   in the Internet and will facilitate transition of the Internet to a
   robust, commercially acceptable medium.

   The approach chosen in the design of this protocol is to use the
   public key infrastructure defined in X.509 and encapsulation of
   messages within the RFC 822 protocol.  This approach makes full use
   of the prior work in the CCITT and ISO community, and it fits
   cleanly into the existing mail model.

   There are two difficulties with the approach taken in this design.

      The articulation of boundaries and parameters is particular to
      the use of PEM within the RFC 822 mail protocol.  MIME includes
      general facilities for these functions.  It would be preferable
      for this protocol to be aligned with MIME.  MIME was not
      available at the time this protocol was designed, so it is
      proceeding separately.  See below for additional comments on the
      alignment of MIME and PEM.

      The certificate infrastructure is large and awkward to bring
      into existence.  It will pay off enormously in this and future
      protocols because it provides an organized framework for
      establishing trusted identification and binding of identities to
      public keys.  However, it is not easy to initiate and
      necessarily slows the deployment and adoption of PEM.

   Neither of these difficulties affect the soundness of the PEM
   design.  In the current milieu, it is important to deploy this
   protocol and deal with the difficulties over a period of time.

THE DOCUMENTS

 o Part 1, Message Encryption and Authentication Procedures

   This document defines message encryption and authentication
   procedures, in order to provide privacy-enhanced mail (PEM) services
   for electronic mail transfer in the Internet.  It is intended to
   become one member of a related set of four RFCs.  The procedures
   defined are intended to be compatible with a wide range of key
   management approaches, including both symmetric (secret-key) and
   asymmetric (public-key) approaches for encryption of data encrypting
   keys.  Symmetric cryptography is used for message text encryption.
   Cryptographic hash algorithms are used for message integrity check
   value computation.  Other documents specify supporting key
   management mechanisms based on the use of public-key certificates;
   algorithms, modes, and associated identifiers; and details of paper
   and electronic formats and procedures for the key management
   infrastructure being established in support of these services. 

   Privacy enhancement services (confidentiality, authentication,
   message integrity assurance, and non-repudiation of origin) are
   offered through the use of end-to-end cryptography between
   originator and recipient processes at or above the User Agent
   level.  No special processing requirements are imposed on the
   Message Transfer System at endpoints or at intermediate relay
   sites.  This approach allows privacy enhancement facilities to be
   incorporated selectively on a site-by-site or user-by-user basis
   without impact on other Internet entities.  Interoperability among
   heterogeneous components and mail transport facilities is
   supported.

   The current specification's scope is confined to PEM processing
   procedures for the RFC-822 textual mail environment.  Integration of
   PEM capabilities with MIME and possibly other mail environments is
   anticipated, but the specifications are yet to be worked out. In
   partial anticipation of such integration, the header
   "Content-Domain" with value "RFC822" is included as a hook.  See
   below for additional discussion.

Part II: Certificate-Based Key Management

   This document defines a supporting key management architecture and
   infrastructure, based on public-key certificate techniques, to
   provide keying information to message originators and recipients.  It
   is intended to be one member of a related set of four RFCs.

   The key management architecture described is compatible with the
   authentication framework described in CCITT 1988 X.509.  This
   document goes beyond X.509 by establishing procedures and conventions
   for a key management infrastructure for use with Privacy Enhanced
   Mail (PEM) and with other protocols, from both the TCP/IP and OSI
   suites, in the future.  The motivations for establishing these
   procedures and conventions (as opposed to relying only on the very
   general framework outlined in X.509) are explained in the document.

   The infrastructure specified in this document establishes a single
   root for all certification within the Internet, the Internet Policy
   Registration Authority (IPRA).  The IPRA establishes global
   policies, described in this document, which apply to all
   certification effected under this hierarchy.  Beneath IPRA root are
   Policy Certification Authorities (PCAs), each of which establishes
   and publishes (in the form of an informational RFC) its policies for
   registration of users or organizations.  Each PCA is certified by
   the IPRA. Below PCAs, Certification Authorities (CAs) will be
   established to certify users and subordinate organizational entities
   (e.g., departments, offices, subsidiaries, etc.).  Initially, the
   majority of users are expected to be registered via organizational
   affiliation, consistent with current practices for how most user
   mailboxes are provided.

   Some CAs are expected to provide certification for residential users
   in support of users who wish to register independent of any
   organizational affiliation.  For users who wish anonymity while
   taking advantage of PEM privacy facilities, one or more PCAs are
   expected to be established with policies that allow for registration
   of users, under subordinate CAs, who do not wish to disclose their
   identities.

Part III: Algorithms, Modes, and Identifiers

   This document provides definitions, formats, references, and
   citations for cryptographic algorithms, usage modes, and associated
   identifiers and parameters used in support of Privacy Enhanced
   Mail.  It is intended to become one member of a related set of four
   RFCs.

   It is organized into four primary sections, dealing with message
   encryption algorithms, message integrity check algorithms, symmetric
   key management algorithms, and asymmetric key management algorithms
   (including both asymmetric encryption and asymmetric signature
   algorithms).  Some parts of this material are cited by other
   documents and it is anticipated that some of the material herein may
   be changed, added, or replaced without affecting the citing
   documents.

Part IV: Key Certification and Related Services

   This document describes three types of service in support of
   Internet Privacy Enhanced Mail: key certification, certificate
   revocation list (CRL) storage, and CRL retrieval.  It is intended to
   be one member of a related set of four RFCs.

   The services described are among those required of a Certification
   Authority.  Each involves an electronic mail request message and an
   electronic mail reply message.  The request may be either a privacy
   enhanced mail message or a message with a new syntax defined in this
   document.  The new syntax has a different process type, thereby
   distinguishing it from ordinary privacy enhanced mail messages.  The
   reply is either a privacy enhanced mail message or an ordinary
   unstructured message.

   Replies that are privacy enhanced messages can be processed like any
   other privacy enhanced message, so that the new certificate or the
   retrieved CRLs can be inserted into the requester's database during
   normal privacy enhanced mail processing.

   Certification authorities may also require non-electronic forms of
   the request and may return non-electronic replies. It is expected
   that descriptions of such forms, which are outside the scope of this
   document, will be available through a Certification Authority's
   "information" service.


THE USE OF CERTIFICATES AND PRIVATE KEYS

   To aid in understanding the roles of public keys, certificates and
   private keys, it is useful to consider four functions:

   - Sealing and signing a message.  
   - Verifying the integrity and signature of a message.  
   - Encrypting a message to ensure confidentiality.  
   - Decrypting a confidential message.

   The protocols are designed so that sealing and signing are the base
   protocol, and encryption is an optional addition.  That is, a
   privacy enhanced message is always signed and is only optionally
   encrypted.

   To sign a message, the sender must have a public/private key pair.
   The sender uses the private key to sign the message.  Receivers use
   the corresponding public key to check the signature.  With respect
   to the issuance and use of certificates, only the sender need have a
   certificate.  Receivers use the sender's certificate to ascertain
   the sender's public key, and hence may check the integrity and
   authenticity of a message irrespective if whether they have a
   certificate.  This arrangement makes it possible for a sender to
   sign a public message, e.g. to a newsgroup, and each recipient may
   check the integrity and signature of the message.

   License agreements for RSAREF from RSA and TIS/PEM from TIS permit
   the use of their software for this purpose at no cost, as long as
   the software is not sold.  

   Encryption and decryption are a different matter.  To send an
   encrypted message, each receiver must have a private/public key
   pair. The sender accesses the receiver's public key and encrypts the
   message so only the receiver can decrypt the message.  Since
   encryption is designed as an optional additional to the integrity
   and signature process, the use of encryption necessarily implies
   both the sender and receiver have private/public key pairs.

   There is one exception to this rule.  The PEM specifications also
   permit a symmetric key algorithm to be used for encryption.  This is
   suitable for traffic between two parties who have manually exchanged
   keys previously.  DES is the algorithm used for this purpose, and it
   is in the public domain.


A COMMENT ON THE DECISION TO INCORPORATE PATENTED TECHNOLOGY.

   Some have asked whether it is necessary to incorporate a patented
   technology into the standard.  In a very real sense, the idea of
   wide scale cryptography in a public, networked environment is not
   viable without public key technology.  Public key technology opened
   up the field and enabled application not previously possible.
   Hence, the decision was not whether to choose public key technology
   versus some other technology.  Rather, the decision was to develop
   privacy enhanced mail once public key technology became available.

   The patent situation for public key technology is a bit strange.
   The patent rules vary slightly from country to country.  The basic
   ideas for public key cryptography were published before the patent
   was applied for.  In the U.S., there is a one year period in which
   it is still possible to apply for patents after publication.
   Elsewhere, publication prohibits patenting.  Hence, the patent
   governing RSA applies in the U.S. (and perhaps Canada) but not
   elsewhere in the world.

FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS

Integration of MIME and PEM

   As noted above, it is desirable for MIME and PEM to be integrated.
   Although there is great pressure to integrate these as quickly as
   possible, there is even greater pressure to bring PEM out as quickly
   as possible.  The clear consensus is to move these specifications
   forward now.  In the future, proposals and trial implementations for
   merged MIME-with-PEM systems will be developed, and the resulting
   specifications may appear on the standards track in short order.

   Compatibility between these specifications and any new
   specifications will be of obvious concern.  Preliminary analysis
   indicates that translation between PEM into MIME-with-PEM will be
   trivial.  In my opinion, translation from MIME-with-PEM to PEM is
   also expectEed to be straightforward as long as the MIME-with-PEM
   messages contain only plain text, message and multipart content
   types.

Alternative Algorithms

   Part III of these specifications define the use of the RSA, DES, MD2
   and MD5 algorithms.  The U.S. government is actively developing an
   alternative suite of algorithms which it intends to standardize.
   Many U.S. government agencies feel it will be necessary to use these
   algorithms and not to use the algorithms defined in Part III of this
   specification.

   As a separate but related matter, the U.S. government, along with
   other members of CoCom, prohibit the general export of software
   containing certain forms of cryptography.  In particular, software
   containing DES for encryption is not generally exportable.  Although
   software can be developed separately in some countries to avoid the
   export issue, a more general solution is to use a set of algorithms
   which are exportable.  Export permission has been granted for
   various symmetric algorithms which are weaker than DES and for the
   use RSA with limits on the key size.  Of particular note, the
   Software Publishers Association has reached agreement with the U.S.
   government for general export of software containing RC2 and RC4
   with 40 bit keys and RSA with a limit of 512 bit keys when RSA is
   used for key exchange.  (There is no limit when RSA is used only for
   signature and integrity.)  RC2 and RC4 are symmetric key encryption
   algorithms developed by RSADSI and available under license.  The
   U.S. government is now providing expedited processing of license
   requests for software that meets these terms.

   The pressure to use these alternative algorithms poses a challenge
   for our community and our standards process.  The introduction of
   new algorithm requires substantial vetting to make sure it is
   technically sound.  No complete methods exist for proving the
   soundness of a cryptographic algorithm, so this is necessarily a
   tedious and artful process.  Moreover, the use of multiple
   algorithms within the same environment poses substantial
   compatibility problems.  For these reasons, it is desirable to set a
   high threshold before admitting any additional algorithms onto the
   standards track.  At the same time, the pressures to incorporate
   additional algorithms are already evident. Completely ignoring or
   prohibiting the use of alternative algorithms will not be a
   successful strategy.

   The Part III specification speaks to the issue of incorporation of
   additional algorithms into the standard and says such incorporation
   will be accomplished by issuing a successor document.  Part III
   specification also addresses the interim development process by
   suggesting that alternative algorithms may be documented in
   Experimental or Prototype RFCs prior to adoption into the standard.
   As experience is gained, these protocols may be considered for
   incorporation into the standard.

PATENT STATEMENT

   The IESG has reviewed the patent issues and will have the following
   text added to each of the RFC documents:

   This version of Privacy Enhanced Mail (PEM) relies on the use of
   patented public key encryption technology for authentication and
   encryption.  The Internet Standards Process as defined in RFC 1310
   requires a written statement from the Patent holder that a license will
   be made available to applicants under reasonable terms and conditions
   prior to approving a specification as a Proposed, Draft or Internet
   Standard.

   The Massachusetts Institute of Technology and the Board of Trustees of
   the Leland Stanford Junior University have granted Public Key Partners
   (PKP) exclusive sub-licensing rights to the following patents issued in
   the United States, and all of their corresponding foreign patents:

      Cryptographic Apparatus and Method
      ("Diffie-Hellman")............................... No. 4,200,770

      Public Key Cryptographic Apparatus
      and Method ("Hellman-Merkle").................... No. 4,218,582

      Cryptographic Communications System and
      Method ("RSA")................................... No. 4,405,829

      Exponential Cryptographic Apparatus
      and Method ("Hellman-Pohlig").................... No. 4,424,414

   These patents are stated by PKP to cover all known methods of
   practicing the art of Public Key encryption, including the variations
   collectively known as El Gamal.

   Public Key Partners has provided written assurance to the Internet
   Society that parties will be able to obtain, under reasonable, 
   nondiscriminatory terms, the right to use the technology covered by
   these patents.  This assurance is documented in RFC-1170 titled "Public
   Key Standards and Licenses".  A copy of the written assurance dated
   April 20, 1990, may be obtained from the Internet Assigned Number
   Authority (IANA).

   The Internet Society, Internet Architecture Board, Internet Engineering
   Steering Group and the Corporation for National Research Initiatives
   take no position on the validity or scope of the patents and patent
   applications, nor on the appropriateness of the terms of the
   assurance.  The Internet Society and other groups mentioned above have
   not made any determination as to any other intellectual property rights
   which may apply to the practice of this standard. Any further
   consideration of these matters is the user's own responsibility.


Working Group Summary

   The PEM specifications originated with the Privacy and Security
   Research Group.  As part of the transition of the specifications
   from research to standards track documents a Working Group within
   the IETF was created, which has met at each IETF since its
   creation.  The documents have been available as an Internet Draft
   since at least September 1992 and represent the consensus of the
   Working Group.

Protocol Quality
 
   Although each of the PEM specifications has a different editor, they
   have all cooperated to make the documents fit together as a set.
   They are well written, easy to understand, and provide enough
   background material to make them suitable for a security neophyte.
   At the time of the third publication of the specifications, three
   independent, interoperable implementations were known to exist.
   Currently, only two of those are aligned with the current version of
   the specifications.


Greg Vaudreuil
IESG Secretary

------- End of Forwarded Message




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: gnu (John Gilmore)
Date: Fri, 29 Jan 93 13:05:37 PST
To: cypherpunks
Subject: RSA assurance referenced in PEM posting
In-Reply-To: <9301291429.aa07535@IETF.CNRI.Reston.VA.US>
Message-ID: <9301292105.AA11851@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Here is the RFC 1170 referred to in the posting about Privacy Enhanced
Mail.  I note that it only covers signatures, not key exchange.

	John

Network Working Group                                         R. Fougner
Request for Comments: 1170                           Public Key Partners
                                                            January 1991


                   Public Key Standards and Licenses

Status of this Memo

   This RFC is a public statement by Public Key Partners regarding
   Public Key Standards and Licenses.  This memo is for informational
   use only, and does not constitute an Internet standard.  Distribution
   of this memo is unlimited.

Public Key Standards and Licenses

   The Massachusetts Institute of Technology and the Board of Trustees
   of the Leland Stanford Junior University have recently granted Public
   Key Partners exclusive sublicensing rights to the following patents
   registered in the United States, and all of their corresponding
   foreign patents:

      Cryptographic Apparatus and Method
      ("Diffie-Hellman")............................... No. 4,200,770

      Public Key Cryptographic Apparatus
      and Method ("Hellman-Merkle").................... No. 4,218,582

      Cryptographic Communications System and
      Method ("RSA")................................... No. 4,405,829

      Exponential Cryptographic Apparatus
      and Method ("Hellman-Pohlig").................... No. 4,424,414

   These patents cover all known methods of practicing the art of Public
   Key, including the variations collectively known as El Gamal.

   Due to the broad acceptance of RSA digital signatures throughout the
   international community, Public Key Partners strongly endorses its
   incorporations in a digital signature standard.  We assure the
   interested parties that Public Key Partners will comply with all of
   the policies of ANSI and the IEEE concerning the availability of
   licenses to practice this art.  Specifically, in support of any RSA
   signature standard which may be adopted, Public Key Partners hereby
   gives its assurance that licenses to practice RSA signatures will be
   available under reasonable terms and conditions on a non-
   discriminatory basis.




Fougner                                                         [Page 1]


RFC 1170           Public Key Standards and Licenses        January 1991


   We take this opportunity to thank all of those concerned for their
   collective efforts in making this technology readily available for
   commercial implementation.

                                           Public Key Partners

                                           By:  Robert B. Fougner
                                                Director of Licensing

Security Considerations

   This memo discusses fair access to the use of public key technology
   to implement security.

Author's Address

   Robert B. Fougner
   Director of Licensing
   Public Key Partners
   130 B Kifer Court
   Sunnyvale, CA 94086

   Phone:  (408) 735-6779

Fougner                                                         [Page 2]




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: tribble@xanadu.com (E. Dean Tribble)
Date: Fri, 29 Jan 93 13:25:39 PST
To: uunet!alumni.cco.caltech.edu!hal@uunet.UU.NET
Subject: Remailer abuse?
In-Reply-To: <9301291807.AA08440@alumni.cco.caltech.edu>
Message-ID: <9301292115.AA19024@xanadu.xanadu.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Set up your remailer under an account named remailer so that you don't
get such responses.  Also, perhaps prepend to outgoing messages a note
to the effect that they have been forwarded by you and that you know
nothing of the contents.

dean




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Marc.Ringuette@GS80.SP.CS.CMU.EDU
Date: Fri, 29 Jan 93 13:19:44 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: OTP Generators
Message-ID: <9301292119.AA12633@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Hal> Also, relying on a half-life calculation in which we wait a certain time 
Hal> interval, and see if there is a decay or not, won't be that accurate.  
Hal> If your time is off a little, it could bias the results.
Hal> Tim May posted the best (IMO) fix for this.  You collect bits in pairs; 
Hal> discard 00 and 11; for each 01 output a 0, for each 10 output a 1.

This is better than nothing, but it doesn't completely fix the biased
bit stream.  For instance, if your detector typically has some runs of
zeroes, then after a 10 sequence, a 01 sequence is more likely than
another 10.

I think that all schemes which rely on _single_ random events from a
radioactive source are going to be very sensitive to tuning errors
which will make their random bit streams biased and thus useless.

Better is the following:  select a time interval in which 100-1000
random events will occur.  Count events in one of these time intervals
and output the parity of the count.  Repeat.  If you ever detect fewer
than 10 events in an interval, quit with an error.

This method has the advantage that no "tuning" of the randomness source
is necessary; you must only ensure that your time interval contains a
lot of random events, so that there is no chance of a small drift in the
random number source causing a corresponding failure in randomness.

Another useful technique, if you're willing to trust crypto technology,
is to compute MD5 hashes or DES encryptions of the bit stream.  This
will do a lot, actually.  If your bits are already random, then applying
a pseudo-random permutation can't hurt; but if you've been brain-dead
somehow, it's a great insurance policy to apply a well-known scrambling
algorithm to your bits.

I wish we weren't just discussing hacks, though.  I think I'll hunt for
some theoretical results to make this more solid.


-- Marc Ringuette (mnr@cs.cmu.edu)






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Brad Huntting <huntting@glarp.com>
Date: Fri, 29 Jan 93 14:14:32 PST
To: (L. Detweiler) <ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Subject: Re: Is this true???
In-Reply-To: <9301291840.AA29938@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Message-ID: <199301292212.AA02949@misc.glarp.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



> First of all, the simple feasibility of such an operation must be
> called into question.  There is a tremendous amount of data going
> over modems on public telephone lines.  What is the chance that
> even a small fraction could be monitored? (And an even more
> infinitesmal fraction archived.)

The intelgence community get's what it want's.  If congress wont
allocate the funds, they'll import drugs to pay for it.  I dought
they can keep everything on file, but they certainly filter for
interesting data.

> The claim has appeared here before that it is "trivial" for a
> government agency to scan for interesting keywords and sort the data
> based on that.  But I think that even that would lead to loads of
> irrelevant crap and require an army of intelligence agents to sort. 
> Where is this army?

Fort Mead, MD.

> Also, the claims in the letter are referring to public telephone
> networks.  Would this include all the networks comprising the Internet?
> If so, this multiplies the data volume immensely.  How could anyone
> find anything useful in these massive streams?  Granted, *very*
> sensitive information is probably contained within it, but how the heck
> could it be found efficiently?

A recent issue of Communications of the ACM is dedicated to the
issue of data filtering.  People have been working on this technology
for along time.  It's very importaint in the information age to
have all relivant information.

> Regarding the claim that one major monitoring hub is code named
> "elizabeth" in Boulder Colorado.  There is a government standards
> agency there, if I am not mistaken, I forget if it is NIST (?).  Also,
> the National Center for Oceanic Research, which has very tremendous
> computing power (e.g. Cray YMP) is there also.  In their tours they
> show massive archival storage areas, which they say record major
> amounts of global atmospheric data (e.g. temperatures, wind currents
> > etc.) collected from satellites.  These could conceivably be in part
> "covers" but the idea is also rather unimaginable.  Can anybody report
> on agencies in the areas cited?  There is the very specific claim of a
> carrier in Columbus Ohio.

That's National Center for _Atmosphearic_ research (the nearest
ocean is 1300mi away), and it's so public there's probably no way
it could be used for such a purpose.  NIST and NOAA are also very
open.  However, we do have an FBI office here (I only know because
a friend of mine works for a criminal defence lawyer located in
the same building... briliant planing, no?).  There are numerous
warehouses in the east quarter any number of which could house a
database like this.



brad




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Jay Prime Positive <jpp@markv.com>
Date: Fri, 29 Jan 93 15:25:54 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Is this true???
In-Reply-To: <9301291840.AA29938@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Message-ID: <9301291524.aa22898@hermix.markv.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>Under an obscure pre-WWII ruling by the agency that is now the FCC...
>"No information may be encoded or transmitted over PUBLIC or PRIVATE
>forms of telephony or radio with the exception of those agencies
>involved in the National Security" a further designation goes on to
>say "with the exception of the MORSE system of 'transmittal', any
>communication that is not interpretable by the human ear is forbidden
>and unlawful."

As a liscenced ham (amature radio operator), kb6wct, I can assure you
that the FCC allows transmissions other than phone, and morse code.
Here are just a few -- rtty, ascii, spread spectrum, fax, sstv, and
ntsc video.  Hams can SEND all of these over the radio.  There are
still other information transmission systems in use by comercial
interests.

However, the FCC does in fact dissallow hams from transmitting in "any
code or cypher with intent to obscure the content of the message."
This allows all cryptographic authentication systems, but not
encryption.

j'




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: eichin@ATHENA.MIT.EDU ("Mark W. Eichin")
Date: Fri, 29 Jan 93 12:43:44 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: a "real world" anonymous service
Message-ID: <9301292042.AA07489@tsx-11.MIT.EDU>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Here's an interesting anonymous service that is almost in the real
world (at least in the sense that Cable TV in general is more
mainstream than most of what we do...)
								_Mark_
File: /afs/athena.mit.edu/activity/s/sctv/CROSSLINK.info
What is CROSSLINK?
------------------
CROSSLINK is an anonymous message system run on MIT Student Cable TV-36.
It provides an anonymous medium through which MIT students can say those
things they might otherwise find difficult, inconvenient or impossible to
say in person.  It's also a way to send fun or totally random messages to
your friends over the air.  It is similar to the anonymous message pages
found in many college newspapers, except that it's electronic in nature and
it's free.

What kind of messages can I put on CROSSLINK?
---------------------------------------------
You can say whatever you want.  Get out your frustration.  Break the
ice with that person you're too shy to approach.  Try and re-establish
contact with the unknown person you saw last night.  Anything.

Well, almost anything; CROSSLINK is bound by the rules prohibiting
harassment at MIT.  Please don't use racial, sexual, or gender-based
slurs, because your message won't be run.  You can say a lot without
getting really nasty or lewd about it.

Also, we won't run commercial or group advertisements.  CROSSLINK is
intended to be a personal messaging system, not a billboard.

You can choose to sign your message however you wish (or not at all),
but the recipient must not be identified by name.  For instance,
"E.M.", "that guy with the crewcut", or "the loser behind me in 6.002"
are all perfectly acceptable ways to name your recipient, but "Eric
McDonald" and "E.  McDonald" are not.

How often is CROSSLINK on the air?
----------------------------------
CROSSLINK is on MIT Channel 36 whenever there's empty air time.  We
don't have 24-hours of non-stop student programming every day, and we
aren't always able to "hijack" the satellite signal, so CROSSLINK
should be on most of the time.

Who will see CROSSLINK?
-----------------------
With over 4,000 cable outlets on and around campus, many many people
can see your message on CROSSLINK.

How long do CROSSLINK messages run?
-----------------------------------
Unless you otherwise request, CROSSLINK messages will be run for about
two days.

How do I submit a message to CROSSLINK?
---------------------------------------
You can drop off your message in one of two ways:

1) Write it down, fold the paper, write "CROSSLINK" on the outside,
   and slide it under the door to room 9-026 (or send it via inter-
   departmental mail).

2) Send it by email to crosslink@athena.mit.edu.  We promise we won't make
   a note of who sent what message, and we'll erase all email after we've
   written down the messages.  If you don't trust us, you can: use method #1,
   send it as root, or find a fake mail sender (but it's really not
   necessary).

We're working on other means of delivery, but that's it for now.

Remember: you may sign your message however you wish, and you need not
sign it at all.

For more information
--------------------
This type of service is run successfully at colleges all over the
country, and it can be fun to read the messages some people leave.

If you want to find out more about CROSSLINK, please send email
to crosslink@athena.mit.edu.

 - Eric McDonald
   CROSSLINK Manager




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Douglas Sinclair <dsinclai@acs.ucalgary.ca>
Date: Fri, 29 Jan 93 17:17:39 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Radioactive sources
Message-ID: <9301300117.AA14374@acs1.acs.ucalgary.ca>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Yup, the 3 microcurie source makes sense.  With a pair of diodes we could 
make the detector 4 pi, but no big deal.  3 microcuries is not a problem
health-wise as long as you don't eat it.  As it's an alpha source, any shiledingor even a few centimeters of air will stop the rays.  Howerver, I just encountered a new angle on it.  According to my father, that's on the order of $100
worth of radium :(.  If we're willing to go with a much slower source, we can
use thorium which is only $2 per gram or so.  Alternativly, anyone have 
an old clock with a radium dial? <grin>

BTW: Cosmic ray background is only 1 event per square foot per minute.  Plus,
they occur in showers.  So that isn't going to work. 

-- 
Vercotti: I was terrified of him.  Everyone was terrified of Doug.  I've seen
          grown men pull their own heads off rather than see Doug.  Even
          Dinsdale was frightened of Doug.
Interviewer: What did he do?
Vercotti: He used sarcasm.  He knew all the tricks, dramatic irony,
          metaphor, bathos, puns, parody, litotes and satire.
			-- Monty Python, Episode 14
PGP 2.1 Key by finger




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Johan Helsingius <julf@penet.FI>
Date: Fri, 29 Jan 93 11:14:07 PST
To: Hal Finney <hal@alumni.cco.caltech.edu>
Subject: Re: Remailer abuse?
In-Reply-To: <9301291807.AA08440@alumni.cco.caltech.edu>
Message-ID: <9301292044.aa10755@penet.penet.FI>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



> When the Pax remailer was shut down, I stopped keeping any logs of my
> remailer operation.  I felt that I did not want to provide information
> that would be helpful to those forces which oppose information privacy.

> Is someone using my remailer to send trash to innocent young girls?
> I am uncomfortable to be facilitating this kind of activity.  Can anyone
> offer suggestions for the ethical thing to do in this situation?

Well, you can't have your cake and eat it. I do know the dilemma you are
facing, as I have to face the issue pretty regularily. Either you just
provide the service without any regard for the contents, or keep logs
and play police every now and then. With anon.penet.fi the choice is
simple because the way the server works - there has to be a database
mapping anon id's to real addresses, and anyway it is possible to flame
orginators of abusive stuff without even knowing their true identity.

But in the general case it is a pretty complicated ethical issue...

	Julf





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Karl Barrus <elee9sf@Menudo.UH.EDU>
Date: Fri, 29 Jan 93 23:05:46 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: randomness & 01/10
In-Reply-To: <9301292119.AA12633@toad.com>
Message-ID: <199301300456.AA28331@Menudo.UH.EDU>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



>bit stream.  For instance, if your detector typically has some runs of
>zeroes, then after a 10 sequence, a 01 sequence is more likely than
>another 10.

But you are looking at the stream in pairs - so whether or not you see
another 10 or 01 depends on whether there is an odd or even number of
zeroes before the next one.

/-----------------------------------\
| Karl L. Barrus                    |
| elee9sf@menudo.uh.edu             | <- preferred address
| barrus@tree.egr.uh.edu (NeXTMail) |
\-----------------------------------/




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: George A. Gleason <gg@well.sf.ca.us>
Date: Sat, 30 Jan 93 02:08:20 PST
To: dsinclai@acs.ucalgary.ca
Subject: Re:  Radioactive sources
Message-ID: <199301301005.AA19123@well.sf.ca.us>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Radioactive sources: if you're interested in thorium, it can be found in
Coleman lantern mantles: the little cloth bags you tie over the apertures in
the lantern where the flame appears.  These are apparently saturated with
the stuff.  I got the word from an engineer at a nuclear plant some years
ago, and was able to verify it at least partially: a geiger counter held
next to Coleman lantern mantles at the store got a very clear reading in the
range of 20mR/hr.  The counter I was using was not sensitive to alphas, so I
presume it was getting betas.  The thorium in the lantern mantles could
presumably be extracted with hydrochloric acid or by some other means.
Clearly not for the amateur, but something which could be done in a lab with
appropriate precautions.  
-gg




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Tom Libert <libert@citi.umich.edu>
Date: Sat, 30 Jan 93 08:19:07 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: randomness
Message-ID: <9301301619.AA09879@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


For a cheap truly random number generator, bias a diode
near the switch voltage (around .7V for silicon, if my
hazy memory serves.)  Take the result through an A/D
converter.  Should be Gaussian (or Poisson, I forget);
you could generate a good approximation to a uniform
distribution by inverting the source function (see
e.g. Knuth, "Seminumerical Algorithms" for an algorithm
for producing Gaussian variates from a pair of numbers
drawn from a uniform distribution.)




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: shipley@merde.dis.org
Date: Sat, 30 Jan 93 14:54:43 PST
To: toad.com!cypherpunks@soda.berkeley.edu
Subject: party...
Message-ID: <9301302241.AA01909@merde.dis.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----






(This is not my house warming (yet).. so don't trash it)


Deiodre Williams if having her B'day at my place.

she would like to have ner and intresting people attend

she is barrowing my house to throw a party.

she is throwing this party on Jan 30th.

she would like to see some new faces at this party (not just the
berkeley regulars)

Please call (510) 849-2230 if you have any questions



map info:


    2341 Spaulding Ave
    Berkeley Ca 94703-1627


the cross street is Channing
Spaulding is one block above Sacramento Ave. and only gos between Dwight
and Allston (it does not connect to Univ. Ave)


                                   ^
   MLK way/Telegraph/Shattuck ave  |

<- university ave


               |  |              |  |              |  |
               |  |              |  |              |  |
               |  |              |  |              |  |
               |  |              |  |      /-------+  +---
       --------+  +--------------+  +-----+   _ _ _    
                      California -  - - -             +---
       --------+  +--------------+  +--------------+  |
               |  |              |  |              |  |
               |  |              |  |              |  |
               |  |              |  |              |  |
               |  |              |  |              |  |
               |  |        3241  |  |              |  |
               |  |          X   |C |              |  |
       --------+B +--------------+h +--------------+D |
                a      Spaulding  a                 w |
       --------+n +--------------+n +--------------+i |
               |c |              |n |              |g |
               |r |              |i |              |h |
               |o |              |n |              |t |
               |f |              |g |              |  |
               |t |              |  |              |w |
               |  |              |w |              |a |
       --------+w +-------------- a +--------------+y +----------
        _ _ _   a   _ _ _ _ _ _   y  _ _ _ _ _ _ _     _ _ _ _ _
                y    Sacramento                                
       --------+  +--------------+  +--------------+  +----------
               |  |              |  |              |  |
               |  |              |  |              |  |
               |  |              |  |              |  |





               |  .  |
    ^          |  .  |  My Place ->	Take your favorite freeway to
    |          |  .  |			580/Berkeley and get off at the
  U.C.         |  .  |			University ave off ramp and drive 
  Campus       |  .  |			up toward U.C. Campus (stay in the 
               |  .  | Gas		right lane to be safe).
         7/11  |  .  | Station		
+--------------+     +--------------	The Second major intersection should
  _ _ _ _ _ _         _ _ _ _ _ _ _  	be Sacramento ave (~1 mile). Take a 
    Sacramento                          right on to Sacramento and get into
+--------------+     +--------------	the left lane (see map to the left)
       Gas     |U .  |  Video
       Station |n .  |  Store		At the next light take a left and
               |i .  |			drive one block then make a right
<-- North      |v .  |			onto Spaulding ave.
    Berkeley   |e .  |
    Bart       |r .  |			I live at 3241 Spaulding, it is the
    Station    |s .  |	580     	third house from Channing way, with
               |i .  |	 |		a red cracked drivway. (see other map)
               |t .  |   V
               |y .  |			In case you get lost my home number
               |  .  |			is (510) 849-2230





- ------- End of Forwarded Message


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Version: 2.1

iQBFAgUBK2sEL8hmn7GUWLLFAQHIQAF9FDQgyAvmf5bJVT6FWLlVI3BVYDB5a025
mGAOFlXJInUi7tmkGJavqu1enJ/g3MFE
=IgCI
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: nowhere@bsu-cs.bsu.edu (Chael Hall)
Date: Sat, 30 Jan 93 15:26:54 PST
To: tribble@xanadu.com (E. Dean Tribble)
Subject: Re: Remailer abuse?
In-Reply-To: <9301292115.AA19024@xanadu.xanadu.com>
Message-ID: <9301302324.AA01308@bsu-cs.bsu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Dean writes:
>Set up your remailer under an account named remailer so that you don't
>get such responses.  Also, perhaps prepend to outgoing messages a note
>to the effect that they have been forwarded by you and that you know
>nothing of the contents.

     I would append the note, because prepended text could screw up
chaining of remailers.

Chael Hall

--
Chael Hall
nowhere@bsu-cs.bsu.edu, 00CCHALL@LEO.BSUVC.BSU.EDU, CHALL@CLSV.Charon.BSU.Edu
(317) 285-3648 after 5 pm EST




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: nobody@alumni.cco.caltech.edu
Date: Sat, 30 Jan 93 19:15:46 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Remailer abuse
Message-ID: <9301310317.AA22540@alumni.cco.caltech.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Thanks for the many suggestions posted here and sent privately to me
about ways to deal with the possible use of my remailer to send abusive
messages.  I have taken two steps, and I could fairly easily take a
third.

First, I sent a letter to the girl who complained explaining that the
message was not actually from me, that it was from an experimental
remailing software package, and telling her to let me know if she got
more objectionable messages.

Second, I changed the header line inserted by my remailer to what you see
above.  (This message is being forwarded by my remailer.)  Hopefully this
will clue people in to what is happening.  I didn't want to mess with the
message body based on the discussion we have had here on that issue.  I'd
appreciate comments about the wording and appropriateness of the header
line, if anyone can offer improvements.

(As an unprivileged user of this system, I do not have the ability to
create new accounts so that the message would appear to come from
"remailer".  The best I could do is get it into the From: line in the
header, but my name still shows in the "out of band" From line which
precedes the header.)

What I could do, if more "problem" messages come through, is create a
list of people _not_ to forward mail to.  Some people have suggested
the creation of a list not to forward mail _from_, but that is more
difficult in an environment of chained remailers (since I can't always
determine the message source).  It should be pretty easy to check to
see whether the destination of a remail request is on the list of
people "not to be bothered", and to not send it in that case.  We could
even share this list among the various remailer operators.  That does
not require any collusion or message logging, and it seems like it
should largely address the problem.

Hal
74076.1041@compuserve.com




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: pmetzger@shearson.com (Perry E. Metzger)
Date: Sat, 30 Jan 93 17:40:46 PST
To: dsinclai@acs.ucalgary.ca
Subject: Radioactive sources
In-Reply-To: <9301300117.AA14374@acs1.acs.ucalgary.ca>
Message-ID: <9301310121.AA16272@maggie.shearson.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>From: Douglas Sinclair <dsinclai@acs.ucalgary.ca>

>Yup, the 3 microcurie source makes sense.  With a pair of diodes we could 
>make the detector 4 pi, but no big deal.  3 microcuries is not a problem
>health-wise as long as you don't eat it.  As it's an alpha source, any shiledingor even a few centimeters of air will stop the rays.  Howerver, I just encountered a new angle on it.  According to my father, that's on the order of $100
>worth of radium :(.  If we're willing to go with a much slower source, we can
>use thorium which is only $2 per gram or so.  Alternativly, anyone have 
>an old clock with a radium dial? <grin>

>BTW: Cosmic ray background is only 1 event per square foot per minute.  Plus,
>they occur in showers.  So that isn't going to work. 

Why not just go with the Newbridge Micro hardware RNG that we've
discussed several times in the past? Its only $50 for a 20kbit/sec
output rate.

Perry




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Don Henson <72466.3616@CompuServe.COM>
Date: Sat, 30 Jan 93 18:17:47 PST
To: <cypherpunks@toad.com>
Subject: Remailer Abuse?
Message-ID: <930131020759_72466.3616_EHB92-4@CompuServe.COM>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


-->

Is someone using my remailer to send trash to innocent young girls?
I am uncomfortable to be facilitating this kind of activity.  Can anyone
offer suggestions for the ethical thing to do in this situation?

Hal

<--

You didn't say but I assume from the context that your remailer is anonymous. 
If that is the case, then you have a decision to make.  You can either keep
your remailer anonymous and not be concerned about what goes thru it or you can
make it a moderated list so that you become responsible for everything that is
posted.  Which way do you want it?

Don Henson
PGP key available on request





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Don Henson <72466.3616@CompuServe.COM>
Date: Sat, 30 Jan 93 18:18:49 PST
To: <cypherpunks@toad.com>
Subject: MIME
Message-ID: <930131020801_72466.3616_EHB92-5@CompuServe.COM>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


One stupid question, please?  What is MIME?

Don Henson
PGP key available on request





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Douglas Sinclair <dsinclai@acs.ucalgary.ca>
Date: Sat, 30 Jan 93 20:12:46 PST
To: gg@well.sf.ca.us (George A. Gleason)
Subject: Re:  Radioactive sources
In-Reply-To: <199301301005.AA19123@well.sf.ca.us>
Message-ID: <9301310411.AA31726@acs1.acs.ucalgary.ca>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Yes, you can get Thorium from lamp nets.  A simpler way is to get it from
welding rods.  They are 40% thorium.  More than one unsespecting lab
technician has welded together an ultrasensitive detector with them, only
to find it not working for some reason <grin>
-- 
Vercotti: I was terrified of him.  Everyone was terrified of Doug.  I've seen
          grown men pull their own heads off rather than see Doug.  Even
          Dinsdale was frightened of Doug.
Interviewer: What did he do?
Vercotti: He used sarcasm.  He knew all the tricks, dramatic irony,
          metaphor, bathos, puns, parody, litotes and satire.
			-- Monty Python, Episode 14
PGP 2.1 Key by finger




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Douglas Sinclair <dsinclai@acs.ucalgary.ca>
Date: Sat, 30 Jan 93 20:17:04 PST
To: libert@citi.umich.edu (Tom Libert)
Subject: Re: randomness
In-Reply-To: <9301301619.AA09879@toad.com>
Message-ID: <9301310416.AA23281@acs1.acs.ucalgary.ca>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Yes, I have heard of using diodes for white noise production.  Hoewver, I am
conserned as to the nature of this noise.  Is it some property of the silicon
or is it just amplified radio noise that is bringing the diode above
threshold??

-- 
Vercotti: I was terrified of him.  Everyone was terrified of Doug.  I've seen
          grown men pull their own heads off rather than see Doug.  Even
          Dinsdale was frightened of Doug.
Interviewer: What did he do?
Vercotti: He used sarcasm.  He knew all the tricks, dramatic irony,
          metaphor, bathos, puns, parody, litotes and satire.
			-- Monty Python, Episode 14
PGP 2.1 Key by finger




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Johan Helsingius <julf@penet.FI>
Date: Sun, 31 Jan 93 01:08:50 PST
To: shipley@merde.dis.org
Subject: Re: party...
In-Reply-To: <9301302241.AA01909@merde.dis.org>
Message-ID: <9301311018.aa03334@penet.penet.FI>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



> Deiodre Williams if having her B'day at my place.
> she would like to have ner and intresting people attend
> she is barrowing my house to throw a party.
> she is throwing this party on Jan 30th.
> she would like to see some new faces at this party (not just the
> berkeley regulars)

Well, it would have been nice to attend, but...

a) Because of time zone differences, it was already 0:41 on Sunday, Jan
   31 out here at the time you sent your message

b) There was no way I could get hold of my travel agent to get a flight
   ticket.. And the flight from Helsinki, Finland to SF is close to 11
   hours anyway...

Just a reminder that the net is a pretty global thing... Hope the party
was fun!

	Julf


	"Oh so near to Russia, so far from Japan... Hai!
	 Quite a long way from Cairo, lots of miles from Vietnam."

	 (From "The Finland Song" by Monty Python).





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Tom Libert <libert@citi.umich.edu>
Date: Sun, 31 Jan 93 09:49:00 PST
To: dsinclai@acs.ucalgary.ca
Subject: Re: randomness
Message-ID: <9301311748.AA08822@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


	Yes, I have heard of using diodes for white noise production.
	Hoewver, I am conserned as to the nature of this noise.  Is it
	some property of the silicon or is it just amplified radio
	noise that is bringing the diode above threshold??

Fundamental property of the switch.  If you bias a diode near the knee,
random events at the quantum mechanical level can cause readily
observable changes in the output potential.  Recall that the diode does
not conduct below the switch threshold, and conducts readily above it.
But what happens AT the threshold?  Thermal noise produces dramatic
changes in the output.  This approach has been used for years to
produce "white" (or "pink") noise.  I also believe (but am not certain)
that electronic poker and bingo games also use this technique.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Brad Huntting <huntting@glarp.com>
Date: Sun, 31 Jan 93 12:23:10 PST
To: Don Henson <72466.3616@compuserve.com>
Subject: Re: MIME
In-Reply-To: <930131020801_72466.3616_EHB92-5@CompuServe.COM>
Message-ID: <199301312022.AA05273@misc.glarp.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> One stupid question, please?  What is MIME?

Multipurpose Internet Mail Extension(s)...

It provides a simple framework for sending typed body parts in
RFC822 mail.  One popular use for this is multimedia, but it can
also be used to send binaries, references to ftp-able files, etc.

It also provides an ideal framework for incorporating message
encryption and authentication into rfc822 message.


brad




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Peter Shipley <shipley@tfs.COM>
Date: Sun, 31 Jan 93 14:01:29 PST
To: Don Henson <72466.3616@compuserve.com>
Subject: Re: party...
In-Reply-To: <930131192921_72466.3616_EHB35-1@CompuServe.COM>
Message-ID: <9301312159.AA02274@edev0.TFS>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



>
>Does this mean that all cypherpunks live in driving distance of Berkeley?  If
>so, I guess I'd better unsubscribe fast since I live in Hawaii.  Be a bit of
>drive from there, eh?
>

When I sent the invite to the list I knew that there were many that do not
live within traveling distance.   But since there are there are a few
in the area I thought it would be a good opportunity to meet a few
of the locals (and trade keys).

PS: ther party went very well and I did get a chance to meet a few more
people from this list.

				-Pete




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Don Henson <72466.3616@CompuServe.COM>
Date: Sun, 31 Jan 93 11:38:41 PST
To: <cypherpunks@toad.com>
Subject: party...
Message-ID: <930131192921_72466.3616_EHB35-1@CompuServe.COM>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


-->

she would like to see some new faces at this party (not just the
berkeley regulars)

<--

Does this mean that all cypherpunks live in driving distance of Berkeley?  If
so, I guess I'd better unsubscribe fast since I live in Hawaii.  Be a bit of
drive from there, eh?

Don Henson
PGP key available on request

P.S.  Happy Birthday





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: henry strickland <strick@osc.versant.com>
Date: Sun, 31 Jan 93 14:50:27 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: party...
In-Reply-To: <9301312159.AA02274@edev0.TFS>
Message-ID: <9301312255.AA23576@versant.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


# PS: ther party went very well and I did get a chance to meet a few more
# people from this list.

I also made it to the party, and would not have, had it not been for
the announcement on cypherpunks.  Please do make announcements ...  and
leave it for individual punks to decide how far they should drive, fly,
swim, etc. for a party!  ( It took me two trains, one bus, and a seven
block walk. )


					strick
					strick@osc.versant.com






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: shipley@dis.org
Date: Sun, 31 Jan 93 16:01:44 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: party...
Message-ID: <9301312352.AA04056@merde.dis.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----



># PS: ther party went very well and I did get a chance to meet a few more
># people from this list.
>
>I also made it to the party, and would not have, had it not been for
>the announcement on cypherpunks.  Please do make announcements ...  and
>leave it for individual punks to decide how far they should drive, fly,
>swim, etc. for a party!  ( It took me two trains, one bus, and a seven
>block walk. )

I run a party mailing list if anyone is intrested, anyone holding a party
can email a invite to it the address is "ba-party@utter.dis.org" for
those in Santa Curz there is a mailing list called "party@amory.com"

email me if anyone is intrested ba-party.


			-Pete

PS: henry, I added you to the list already.

PPS: enough of this non-pgp stuff, anyone want to help me setup a remailer
	on my home systems?

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.1

iQBFAgUBK2xmTMhmn7GUWLLFAQEeEgF9EVFsIj8VA/zX4a8ycRppfyutsPO4shBQ
7L+FblZU7nL2ASYSmtVqQ4lu55SL35VB
=qYGx
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Karl Barrus <elee9sf@Menudo.UH.EDU>
Date: Sun, 31 Jan 93 15:56:29 PST
To: Eric.K.Kuecherer@Dartmouth.EDU
Subject: Yes
In-Reply-To: <2622117@blitzen.Dartmouth.EDU>
Message-ID: <199301312355.AA00130@Menudo.UH.EDU>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



>Is this real?
>-kuech-

Yes, this is the cypherpunk mailing list.  Subscribe by sending a note
to cypherpunks-request@toad.com

/-----------------------------------\
| Karl L. Barrus                    |
| elee9sf@menudo.uh.edu             | <- preferred address
| barrus@tree.egr.uh.edu (NeXTMail) |
\-----------------------------------/




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Eric.K.Kuecherer@Dartmouth.EDU
Date: Sun, 31 Jan 93 15:41:10 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com)
Subject: No Subject
Message-ID: <2622117@blitzen.Dartmouth.EDU>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Is this real?
-kuech-




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: tony@morgan.demon.co.uk (Tony Kidson)
Date: Sun, 31 Jan 93 14:00:56 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Remailer Abuse?
Message-ID: <1883@morgan.demon.co.uk>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


In message <930131020759_72466.3616_EHB92-4@CompuServe.COM> you write:
> -->
>
> Is someone using my remailer to send trash to innocent young girls?
> I am uncomfortable to be facilitating this kind of activity.  Can anyone
> offer suggestions for the ethical thing to do in this situation?
>
> Hal
>
> <--
>
> You didn't say but I assume from the context that your remailer is anonymous.
> If that is the case, then you have a decision to make.  You can either keep
> your remailer anonymous and not be concerned about what goes thru it or you can
> make it a moderated list so that you become responsible for everything that is
> posted.  Which way do you want it?

Not necessarily. Surely, he can keep logs for a limited period. 
If no complaint arrives, discard the logs. If anybody complains, 
pass it on with  endorsement if necessary. Also, put a disclaimer 
in your mail, that you are not responsible for the opinions 
expressed.

Tony
+-----------------+-------------------------------+--------------------------+
| Tony Kidson     |`morgan' is an 8MB  486/33 Cat-| Voice +44 81 466 5127    |
| Morgan Towers,  |Warmer with a 670 MB Hard Disk.| E-Mail                   |
| Morgan Road,    |It  resides at Morgan Towers in| tony@morgan.demon.co.uk  |
| Bromley,        |Beautiful  Down Town  Bromley. | tny@cix.compulink.co.uk  |
| England BR1 3QE |Honda ST1100  ==*==  DoD# 0801 | 100024.301@compuserve.com|
+=================+===============================+==========================+




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: shipley@dis.org
Date: Mon, 1 Feb 93 04:30:16 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: mh wrappers for pgp.
Message-ID: <9302011223.AA06080@merde.dis.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain




-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----




#!/usr/local/bin/tperl4.010
#!/usr/local/bin/perl

# pgpedit V1.0
# Mon Feb  1 04:10:42 PST 1993
# Peter Shipley (shipley@utter.dis.org -or- shipley@berkeley.edu)

# to install (mh instructions)
# place this script in your path (eg ~/bin)
# create few links:
#
#       ln -s /usr/local/mh/bin/repl ~/bin/pgprepl
#       ln -s /usr/local/mh/bin/comp ~/bin/pgpcomp
#
# Add the following to your .mh_profile:
#
#       pgprepl: -editor pgpedit
#       pgpcomp: -editor pgpedit
#
# To use just use the commands pgprepl or pgpcomp instead of repl or comp
#



require "sys/wait.ph";

#custom stuff here

#default editor
$defaulteditor="/usr/ucb/vi";


$pgpcommand="/usr/local/bin/pgp -sta +clearsig=on";

$debug=0;

#test the arg count
    die "bad argument count" if ($#ARGV > 0);

#set the umask to something really paranoid
    umask(07177);

#set the path if there is not one
    $ENV{'PATH'} = '/bin:/usr/ucp:/usr/bin' unless $ENV{'PATH'};

# get the editor
    if ($ENV{'VISUAL'}) {
	$editor=$ENV{'VISUAL'} ;
    } elsif ($ENV{'EDITOR'}) {
	$editor=$ENV{'EDITOR'} ;
    } else {
	$editor = $defaulteditor;
    }

    $editor = $defaulteditor if $editor =~ /pgpedit/ ;

# prepare the file.
    &prepfile($ARGV[0]);

# run the editor
    &runeditor($ARGV[0]);

# have pgp sign the file
    &SignMailFile($ARGV[0]);

# the end
    exit 0;




sub SignMailFile {

    local($INPUT) = @_;

    local($BODY) = "/tmp/pgp$$.body";
    local($PGPBODY) = "$BODY".".asc";


    print "$INPUT \n" if ($debug);

    open(INPUT, "+>>$INPUT" ) || die "failed to open $INPUT: $!\n";
    seek(INPUT,0, 0);

    open(BODY, "+>$BODY") || die "failed to open $BODY: $!\n";
    select(BODY); $| = 1; select(STDOUT);

line:
    while (<INPUT>) {
	if (/^--------/) {
	    $where = tell;
	    last;
	}
    }


    print STDERR "$BODY \n" if ($debug);

    while (<INPUT>) {
	print BODY $_;
    }

    print STDERR  "$pgpcommand $BODY\n" if ($debug);

    `$pgpcommand $BODY`;

    truncate(BODY, 0); unlink($BODY); close(BODY);


    open(PGPBODY) || die "failed to open $PGPBODY: $!\n";

    truncate(INPUT,$where) || warn "failed to truncate file $FILE: $!\n";
    seek(INPUT,$where,0);

    print INPUT "\n\n";

    print INPUT <PGPBODY>;

    truncate(PGPBODY, 0); unlink($PGPBODY); close(PGPBODY);

    return;
}




sub prepfile {

    local($FILE) = @_;
    local(@data);


    open(FILE, "+>>$FILE" ) || die "failed to open $FILE: $!\n";
    seek(FILE, 0, 0);

    while(<FILE>) { push (@data, $_); last if ( /^--------/ ); }

#	push (@data, "\n\n\n");

    while(<FILE>) { last if (/^-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----/); }

    if( !eof(FILE) ) {

	while(<FILE>) { 
	    last if (/^-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----/);
	    push (@data , $_); 
	}

	seek(FILE, 0, 0);
	truncate(FILE, 0);

	print FILE @data;

    }
    close(FILE);
	
    return;
}



sub runeditor {
    local($file) = @_;
    local($pid);

FORK: {
	if ($pid = fork) {
		wait;
	} elsif (defined $pid) { # $pid is zero here if defined
		exec "$editor $file";
	} elsif ($! =~ /No more process/) {     
		# EAGAIN, supposedly recoverable fork error
		sleep 5;
		redo FORK;
	} else {
		# weird fork error
		die "Can't fork: $!\n";
	}
}
    return;
}

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.1

iQBFAgUBK20WHMhmn7GUWLLFAQFBawF6AuCjRKbZQcAM1NFXwrYO1MLmTvPcV7FC
loRe/LqIoNwMST9sKfDFNSBoKmvCEaaB
=Cjuz
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Date: Mon, 1 Feb 93 10:53:30 PST
To: deltorto@aol.com
Subject: Eudora mail reader for the Macintosh
Message-ID: <9302011849.AA21976@netcom.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



(I wrote this as a reply to Dave Deltorto, then realized there may be other
Mac-using cypherpunks for whom this might be useful.)

Meta-message to list: I propose a brief AGENDA ITEM on mail readers like
Eudora and the DOS versions, as part of our understanding of what mail
readers are out there and what may need to be hacked to incorporate PGP.
RIPEM, etc. I'll speak very briefly on Eudora, and others can speak on
others readers. How's this sound?

Dave Deltorto writes: (part of some e-mail we exchanged....nothing
sensitive, so I hope Dave doesn't mind me quoting it and distributing it to
the List.) BTW, Dave is referring to my "Top Ten Reasons I Don't Use PGP"
article I sent out to this list a few months back and which I forwarded to
him recently.

>Listen, in case I didn't mention this, I DID enjoy your Top Ten spoof, and I
>sort of figured that by now you had the MacPGP (do you have the .73 beta?).

I have the 0.5.3 version, which seems to work OK. Eudora (the mail reader
program) has made reading PGP messages much easier--I automatically get all
my mail, cut the PGP messages into the clipboard, insert them into Vantage
(a text editor), rename them "message.asc", close the file, then tell
MacPGP to decrypt them. Seems to work, and is a whole lot better than
having to zmodem each file individually! (In case you're wondering, the
combination of NETCOM, Emacs, etc. would not allow me to cut-and-paste into
or out of the editor, hence the need to zmodem the files back to my home
machine. Eudora takes care of all of this!

I wrote, and then Dave replied:

>>>By the way, I've been using "Eudora," an automated mail delivery and
>>>retrieval system for the Mac. If you're interested, I can show it to you at
>>>the next Cypherpunks meeting.
>
>Yes, I am very interested in Eudora. Could I use it to automatically gather
>my Internet mail off the Well? I don't know anything about it, so that may be
>a dumb question, but I look forward to meeting you at the next meeting where
>you can clue me in and show it to me.

I'll bring a copy of Eudora 1.3b119 to the next meeting (Feb. 13th). I had
to ResEdit some stuff to make it work with NETCOM, with the help of a
friend. Stuff like login name, location of the POP server, and expected
responses. Getting it to work on the W.E.L.L. may take some hacking, but
I'm sure it'll work.

(NETCOM is a wonderful service, though, and you should seriously consider
using it instead of the W.E.L.L....fixed monthly fee for unlimited use. If
you're within one of the many POPs (points of presence, not to be confused
with the "Post Office Protocol" cited above!) in the Bay Area (or L.A.,
Seattle, Portland, Sacramento, etc.), the connections are free. Also, you
get 5 MB of storage for files, buffer space, etc., instead of the measly
W.E.L.L. allotment.)

-Tim
 


--

Timothy C. May               | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,  
tcmay@netcom.com        | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
408-688-5409               | knowledge, reputations, information markets, 
W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA       | black markets, collapse of governments.
Higher Power: 2^756839 | Public Key: waiting for the dust to settle.







From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: John W Noerenberg <jwn2@qualcomm.com>
Date: Mon, 1 Feb 93 11:23:40 PST
To: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Subject: Re: Eudora mail reader for the Macintosh
Message-ID: <9302011922.AA19052@harvey>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


At 10:49 AM 2/1/93 -0800, Timothy C. May wrote:
>
>I'll bring a copy of Eudora 1.3b119 to the next meeting (Feb. 13th). I had
>to ResEdit some stuff to make it work with NETCOM, with the help of a
>friend. Stuff like login name, location of the POP server, and expected
>responses. Getting it to work on the W.E.L.L. may take some hacking, but
>I'm sure it'll work.

The official release of 1.3 should be available  from our ftp site on the
3rd.  That's the day we are scheduled to go golden with the PC and Mac
verisons.

There will be other ftp sites as well.  Send a note to
eudora-info@qualcomm.com for our canned reply.

john noerenberg
jwn2@qualcomm.com
noerenberg.j (Applelink)
===========================================================
That which has always been accepted by everyone, everwhere,
is almost certain to be false.
-- John Millington Synge "Tel Quel" [1943]
===========================================================





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: pfarrell@cs.gmu.edu (Pat Farrell)
Date: Mon, 1 Feb 93 12:05:13 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: MAILreaders: NUpop
Message-ID: <9302012000.AA19337@cs.gmu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I've been playing with NUpop, (a PC program) and am impressed with it.
It would help bring PGP to the masses, except that currently the source
is not available. The author says that supporting external filter programs
is on his list, but it is a long list.

The home FTP site for nupop is casbah.acns.nwu.edu in the /pub/nupop
directory. Current field release is nupop103.zip, with nupop110.zip
in 'beta' stages. It is widely available - ask archie.

While I really like NUpop, unless the sources become available, or
the priority of external filters gets higher on the list, we need
to look elseware. 

Can someone with experience with Eudora for the PC give a short review?

Thanks
Pat

Pat Farrell,      Grad Student                       pfarrell@cs.gmu.edu
Department of Computer Science, George Mason University, Fairfax, VA
PGP key available via finger or request           #include standard.disclaimer




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Eric Hughes <hughes@soda.berkeley.edu>
Date: Mon, 1 Feb 93 16:04:42 PST
To: nowhere@bsu-cs.bsu.edu
Subject: Remailer abuse?
In-Reply-To: <9301302324.AA01308@bsu-cs.bsu.edu>
Message-ID: <9302020002.AA18305@soda.berkeley.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Re: adding notes indicating remailing.

There is a standard RFC-822 field, Comment, which would be perfect for
just such an application.  The original remailer I wrote added the
header field Remailed-By to indicate this.

You could also use another standard 822 field, Sender, as follows:

	Sender: anonymous remailing service <remailer@host>

Either way, the note goes in the header, where it can be seen or
stripped, but in any case handled without munging the message body.

Eric




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Brad Huntting <huntting@glarp.com>
Date: Mon, 1 Feb 93 16:41:08 PST
To: Eric Hughes <hughes@soda.berkeley.edu>
Subject: Re: Remailer abuse?
In-Reply-To: <9302020002.AA18305@soda.berkeley.edu>
Message-ID: <199302020039.AA00440@misc.glarp.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



> The original remailer I wrote added the header field Remailed-By to indicate this.

Custom headers in RFC822 messages must begin with "X-".  Making up
new headers that dont begin with "X-" is unnessary and violates
the standard.

> You could also use another standard 822 field, Sender, as follows:

> 	Sender: anonymous remailing service <remailer@host>

Unfortunatly, some broken mail user agents reply to "Sender" instead
of "From" or "Reply-To" (which also violates the standard).


brad




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: wcs@anchor.ho.att.com (Bill Stewart +1-908-949-0705 wcs@anchor.ho.att.com)
Date: Mon, 1 Feb 93 17:37:37 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: turning on yourself during car stops
Message-ID: <9302020136.AA03738@anchor.ho.att.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text


> >From: Peter Honeyman <honey@citi.umich.edu>

> >i believe there is a special exception related to automobiles
> >that makes them subject to search without a warrant when the
> >driver is placed under arrest.  but check with a lawyer.

Just be sure not to get out of your car -  there are different rules that apply 
to cars without occupants in them, though your state's rules may  vary.

But it's much better to avoid getting to that stage.  Be friendly in your
non-cooperation, and if a hostile-looking  cop wants to see whether your papers are in order, give him your license,  registration, insurance papers, 
*and* your ACLU card ("Don't leave home without it").

As a friend of mine says to cops, "If you've got a legal right to search 
my car, I'm sure you will, but if you need my permission, you don't have it."

Of course, this is no longer really cypherpunks material, just regular punks :-)

			Bill Stewart, somewhere in New Jersey



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: phr@napa.Telebit.COM (Paul Rubin)
Date: Mon, 1 Feb 93 21:54:00 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: DES flushed from numerical recipes
Message-ID: <9302020552.AA00120@napa.TELEBIT.COM>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Fans of the Numerical Recipes book might like to know there's a second
edition out.  It includes quite a few improvements, and a much expanded
chapter on random number generation.  However, the DES routine from
the first edition has been flushed on the grounds that it was too slow
to be useful as an RNG.  Oh well.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: nobody@soda.berkeley.edu
Date: Mon, 1 Feb 93 22:35:41 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Remailer abuse
Message-ID: <9302020633.AA16727@soda.berkeley.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

From: Brad Huntting <huntting@glarp.com>

> Custom headers in RFC822 messages must begin with "X-".  Making up
> new headers that dont begin with "X-" is unnessary and violates
> the standard.

What RFC 822 actually says is this:
  
    4.7.4.  EXTENSION-FIELD
    
    	A limited number of common fields have been defined in
    this document.  As network mail requirements dictate, additional
    fields may be standardized.  To provide user-defined fields with
    a measure of safety, in name selection, such extension-fields will
    never have names that begin with the string "X-".
    
    	Names of Extension-fields are registered with the Network
    Information Center, SRI International, Menlo Park, California.
    
    4.7.5.  USER-DEFINED-FIELD
    
    	Individual users of network mail are free to define and
    use additional header fields.  Such fields must have names which
    are not already used in the current specification or in any
    definitions of extension-fields, and the overall syntax of these
    user-defined-fields must conform to this specification's rules for
    delimiting and folding fields.  Due to the extension-field
    publishing process, the name of a user-defined-field may be pre-empted.
    
    Note: The prefatory string "X-" will never be used in the names of
    Extension-fields.  This provides user-defined fields with a protected
    set of names.

I must say, this is a refreshingly non-facist RFC.  There are few of
the prohibitions which we are accustomed to seeing in these "laws of
the net".  In particular, users can use any header fields they want,
as long as they aren't already used; they only risk being made obsolete
if their chosen field names become used.  That's why people use X-.

Hal
74076.1041@compuserve.com

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.1

iQCVAgUBK23k7agTA69YIUw3AQFUTAP/UScvi9FOj4o31sjsqmz/xIJ90KB7WnK5
8m4yKX/p46IbH9+FhSvgBfURokh7+dSk91+GR6NPM/4rXEm+5aMbee6uuMsJaTF/
qPmmen1JnvtabTZi9s0HeQ2frqK7kolr0GIair7U8CiPhX1QVNx0IwzYB6g9YQmP
Zv84fGUzGEw=
=U54Y
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: ghabrech@ultrix.ramapo.edu (The Knight of Ni)
Date: Mon, 1 Feb 93 23:34:20 PST
To: julf@penet.fi
Subject: Re: Remailer abuse?
Message-ID: <9302020736.AA25954@ultrix.ramapo.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


just got a ton of mail regarding the Remailer abuse.  This wouldn't have 
anything to do with the loophole in the telnet sendmail port (25) would it.
 Thanx,

Ghabrech@ultrix.ramapo.edu

P.S. I heard that PGP version 2.1 was out.  I used gopher but could not find
it.  Which sites would have it?

Thanx again, L8R




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Johan Helsingius <julf@penet.FI>
Date: Mon, 1 Feb 93 23:19:13 PST
To: Brad Huntting <huntting@glarp.com>
Subject: Re: Remailer abuse?
In-Reply-To: <199302020039.AA00440@misc.glarp.com>
Message-ID: <9302020824.aa17567@penet.penet.FI>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



> > You could also use another standard 822 field, Sender, as follows:
> 
> > 	Sender: anonymous remailing service <remailer@host>
> 
> Unfortunatly, some broken mail user agents reply to "Sender" instead
> of "From" or "Reply-To" (which also violates the standard).

Right. I am using this method on anon.penet.fi, and get *lots* of
incorrectly addressed stuff sent to the administrator because of this.
The worst culprits seem to be the BITNET LISTSERV (oh no, not again!),
VMS Mail-32 or DECMail or whatever, and elm/pine...

There was actually a case of a interaction of VMS mail and CC:mail that
caused the final recipient to *only* get the "Sender:" field, not the
"From:" field...

	Julf





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: hkhenson@cup.portal.com
Date: Tue, 2 Feb 93 11:22:11 PST
To: extropians@gnu.ai.mit.edu
Subject: NEWS!  Steve Jackson case
Message-ID: <9302021032.1.23048@cup.portal.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I pulled this off comp.org.eff.news.  I imagine many of you on both 
the extropian and cypherpunk list have been following this, but since 
there was no mention . . . . It is related to extropians because Steve 
is an Alcor member and Alcor once had similar problems (we sued the 
county using the same statute because our BBS was taken without a 
proper warrant and got $30k in an out of court settlement.)  This is a 
report of day three of the trial which ended last week.  There is more 
on the other two days posted in comp.org.eff.talk.  Enjoy.  

Thanks to wixer!pacoid@cs.utexas.edu (Paco Xander Nathan) for posting, 
Joe Abernathy for excellent reporting, *many* thanks to EFF and 
especially John Gilmore (EFF founder and owner of toad.com--home of the 
cypherpunks list) and congratulations to Steve Jackson!  Keith Henson 

-------

Steve Jackson Games/Secret Service wrapup

By JOE ABERNATHY
Copyright 1993, Houston Chronicle

AUSTIN -- An electronic civil rights case against the Secret Service 
closed Thursday with a clear statement by federal District Judge Sam 
Sparks that the Service failed to conduct a proper investigation in a 
notorious computer crime crackdown, and went too far in retaining 
custody of seized equipment. 

The judge's formal findings in the complex case, which will likely set 
new legal precedents, won't be returned until later. 

A packed courtroom sat on the edge of the seat Thursday morning as 
Sparks subjected the Secret Service agent in charge of the 
investigation to a grueling dressing-down. 

The judge's rebuke apparently convinced the Department of Justice to 
close its defense after calling only that one of the several 
government witnesses on hand. Attorney Mark Battan entered subdued  
testimony seeking to limit the award of monetary damages. 

Secret Service Special Agent Timothy Foley of Chicago, who was in 
charge of three Austin computer search-and-seizures on March 1, 1990, 
that led to the lawsuit, stoically endured Spark's rebuke over the 
Service's poor investigation and abusive computer seizure policies. 
While the Service has seized dozens of computers since the crackdown 
began in 1990, this is the first case to challenge the practice. 

"The Secret Service didn't do a good job in this case. We know no 
investigation took place. Nobody ever gave any concern as to whether 
(legal) statutes were involved. We know there was damage," Sparks said 
in weighing damages. 

The lawsuit, brought by Steve Jackson Games of Austin, said that the 
seizure of three computers violated the Privacy Protection Act, which 
provides First Amendment protections against seizing a publisher's 
works in progress. The lawsuit further said that since one of the 
computers was being used to run a bulletin board system containing 
private electronic mail, the seizure violated the Electronic 
Communications Privacy Act in regards to the 388 callers of the 
Illuminati BBS. 

Sparks grew visibly angry when it was established that the Austin 
science fiction magazine and game book publisher was never suspected 
of a crime, and that agents did not do even marginal research to 
establish a criminal connection between the firm and the suspected 
illegal activities of an employee, or to determine that the company 
was a publisher. Indeed, agents testified that they were not even 
trained in the Privacy Protection Act at the special Secret Service 
school on computer crime. 

"How long would it have taken you, Mr. Foley, to find out what Steve 
Jackson Games did, what it was?" asked Sparks. "An hour? 

"Was there any reason why, on March 2, you could not return to Steve 
Jackson Games a copy, in floppy disk form, of everything taken? 

"Did you read the article in Business Week magazine where it had a 
picture of Steve Jackson -- a law-abiding, tax-paying citizen -- 
saying he was a computer crime suspect? 

"Did it ever occur to you, Mr. Foley, that seizing this material could 
harm Steve Jackson economically?" 

Foley replied, "No, sir," but the judge offered his own answer. 

"You actually did, you just had no idea anybody would actually go out 
and hire a lawyer and sue you." 

More than $200,000 has been spent by the Electronic Frontier 
Foundation in bringing the case to trial. The EFF was founded by 
Mitchell Kapor amid a civil liberties movement sparked in large part 
by the Secret Service computer crime crackdown. 

"The dressing-down of the Secret Service for their behavior is a major 
vindication of what we've been saying all along, which is that there 
were outrageous actions taken against Steve Jackson that hurt his 
business and sent a chilling effect to everyone using bulletin boards, 
and that there were larger principles at stake," said Kapor, contacted 
at his Cambridge, Mass., office. 

"We're very happy with the way the case came out," said Shari Steele, 
who attended the case as counsel for the EFF. "That session with the 
judge and Tim Foley is what a lawyer dreams about." 

That session seemed triggered by a riveting cross-examination of Foley 
by Pete Kennedy, Jackson's attorney. 

Kennedy forced Foley to admit that the search warrant did not meet 
even the Service's own standards for a search-and-seizure, and did not 
establish that Jackson Games was suspected of being involved in any 
illegal activity. 

"Agent Foley, it's been almost three years. Has Chris Goggans been 
indicted? Has Loyd Blankenship been indicted? Has Loyd Blankenship's 
computer been returned to him?" 

The purported membership of Jackson Games employee Blankenship in the 
Legion of Doom hacker's group triggered the raids that day on Jackson 
Games, Blankenship's home, and that of Goggans, a Houstonian who at 
the time was a University of Texas student. No charges have been 
filed, although the computer seized from Blankenship's home -- 
containing his wife's dissertation -- never has been returned. 

After the cross-examination, Sparks questioned Foley on a number of 
key details before and after the raid, focusing on the holes in the 
search warrant, why Jackson was not allowed to copy his work in 
progress after it was seized, and why his computers were not returned 
after the Secret Service analyzed them, a process completed before the 
end of March. 

"The examination took seven days, but you didn't give Steve Jackson's 
computers back for three months. Why?" asked an incredulous Sparks. 
"So here you are, with three computers, 300 floppy disks, an owner who 
was asking for it back, his attorney calling you, and what I want to 
know is why copies of everything couldn't be given back in days. Not 
months. Days. 

"That's what makes you mad about this case." 

The Justice Department contended that Jackson Games is a manufacturer, 
and that only journalistic organizations can call upon the Privacy 
Protection Act. It contended that the ECPA was not violated because 
electronic mail is not "intercepted" when a BBS is seized. This 
argument rests on a narrow definition of interception.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: eric@synopsys.com
Date: Tue, 2 Feb 93 11:43:39 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Remailer abuse
Message-ID: <199302021942.AA14986@gaea>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Nobody (well, actually Hal) writes:

>> What I could do, if more "problem" messages come through, is create a
>> list of people _not_ to forward mail to.
>>
>> Hal
>> 74076.1041@compuserve.com

Another suggestion is to invert this:  create a list of addresses that
the remailer WILL send mail to.  But, that's STUPID, you say.  Well,
maybe, but I don't think so.  It is, however, sneaky.  If you run a
remailer, you should be registered with other remailers so they can
use you to forward stuff.  This places you on thier list of OK places
to remail stuff to.  Remailers should exchange these lists to keep
them up to date.  This, of course, encourages people to run remailers,
which is what we want.  It also silences any objections from people
concerning anonymous abuse, since you have to explicitly ask for
anonymous mail by running a remailer.

One problem this doesn't solve is how to send anonymous mail to
someone who hasn't registered, since that's exactly what we're trying
to avoid.  Someone could offer a human remailing service which
moderated the messages it sent through.  Using such a service, you
could request someone to run a remailer.  A cheaper service could just
send a standard message to an address that you send to it.  In all
these cases, the service provider is responsible for the content of
the messages sent out, and consequently would want to be very
conservative.

-eric messick

P.S.  Note the change in my address.  I've just changed jobs and am
now eric@synopsys.com.  All my old addresses (eric@parallax.com,
eric@toad.com) forward.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Don Henson <72466.3616@CompuServe.COM>
Date: Tue, 2 Feb 93 10:43:17 PST
To: <cypherpunks@toad.com>
Subject: Is this real?
Message-ID: <930202183156_72466.3616_EHB40-5@CompuServe.COM>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


-->

Is this real?
-kuech-

<--

Is what real?

Don Henson
PGP key available on request






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: fnordbox!loydb@cs.utexas.edu (Loyd Blankenship)
Date: Tue, 2 Feb 93 15:44:06 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: NEWS!  Steve Jackson case
Message-ID: <9302022204.AA00avp@fnordbox.UUCP>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


:"How long would it have taken you, Mr. Foley, to find out what Steve
:Jackson Games did, what it was?" asked Sparks. "An hour?
:
:"Was there any reason why, on March 2, you could not return to Steve
:Jackson Games a copy, in floppy disk form, of everything taken?
:
:"Did you read the article in Business Week magazine where it had a
:picture of Steve Jackson -- a law-abiding, tax-paying citizen --
:saying he was a computer crime suspect?
:
:"Did it ever occur to you, Mr. Foley, that seizing this material could
:harm Steve Jackson economically?"
:
:Foley replied, "No, sir," but the judge offered his own answer.
:
:"You actually did, you just had no idea anybody would actually go out
:and hire a lawyer and sue you."

This particular exchange makes me warm & tingly inside... :-)


:"Agent Foley, it's been almost three years. Has Chris Goggans been
:indicted? Has Loyd Blankenship been indicted? Has Loyd Blankenship's
:computer been returned to him?"

No, it hasn't. <sigh> Hopefully this will motivate them to return it. While
I can't get too excited about the then state-of-the-art 286 system, I'd
*really* like the laser printer back, and Whitney wants her papers returned.

Loyd

***************************************************************************
* loydb@fnordbox.UUCP	     Call the Fnordbox BBS   *	Loyd Blankenship  *
* GEnie: SJGAMES	    2 v32bis lines, 24 hrs   *	PO Box 18957	  *
* Compu$erve: [73407,515]	 512/444-2323	     *	Austin, TX 78760  *
* cs.utexas.edu!dogface!fnordbox!loydb		     *	512/447-7866	  *
***************************************************************************






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: maloned@ul.ie (Declan Malone)
Date: Wed, 3 Feb 93 01:17:07 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: No Subject
Message-ID: <9302021905.AA24282@itdsrv1.ul.ie>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


subscribe Declan Malone
thanks you.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Eric Hughes <hughes@soda.berkeley.edu>
Date: Tue, 2 Feb 93 19:20:21 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: mail policy
In-Reply-To: <9302020633.AA16727@soda.berkeley.edu>
Message-ID: <9302030317.AA06908@soda.berkeley.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Brad:
>> Custom headers in RFC822 messages must begin with "X-".  

As Hal points out, this is not true.

Hal:
>In particular, users can use any header fields they want,
>as long as they aren't already used; they only risk being made obsolete
>if their chosen field names become used.  

Let me make this point explicit, in case I haven't done so recently.

	Anonymity and pseudonymity should be standard
	features of electronic mail systems.

When I first picked the names for the header fields, I read RFC-822
carefully, and specifically chose *not* to use X- extension headers.
I fully intend to write an RFC, an extension to RFC-822, which
describes the syntax and semantics of anonymous/pseudonymous mail
messages.  There will likely be another describing the operation of a
"standard remailer."

(A note about MIME: I'm talking about the transport system here,
underneath the layers that MIME puts on.  At least that's the idea.)

The current policies favoring named mail originate in the conflation
of two notions of security.  The first, delivery security, is that the
mail be delivered correctly, i.e., delivered at all, to the correct
person, in a timely fashion, without alteration of the contents.  The
second, liability security, is that the provider of mail not be held
liable for content.  The provider removes liability by transferring it
to the sender of the message, who must therefore remain named.

One goal of remailer work is to cleave these two notions apart.  A
provider of email services should be responsible for accurate and
timely delivery, but should have no concern for or hand in content.
The service that the provider is offering is just that, computer
services.  It is not monitoring, not oversight, and not censorship.
Just as the phone company provides a communication channel on which I
may put whatever content I desire, so should any e-mail system offer
a communication channel and only a communication channel.

The origin, I believe, of this confusion is that e-mail systems were
by and large developed for internal uses and not for the open market.
That internal use, broadly conceived, might be for the military, for
academic research, or for intra-corporate memos.  In other words these
systems were provided (mostly) free of incremental charge to the
users.

In this environment, where service is being provided by context, it
was the legitimate concern that the provider might be held liable,
since the provider, in some strong sense, had caused the service to
exist in the first place.  When the social structures and situations
or e-mail communications were all so similar, this system worked out
fine.

Today, however, people seek out e-mail services for their direct
utility.  These people often have no prior relation with their service
provider; indeed, they wish not to be tied to a particular provider as
a guard lest the quality of the service suffer.  These people pay for
service themselves, typically.

And hence the separation between liability security and delivery
security is complete.  I want to buy common carriers of e-mail.  I
want bit pipes.  (Or, perhaps, in the e-mail world, bit bucket
brigades.)

But the standards of yesteryear are still with us.  The structure of
named mail persists.  We are changing that.  We do not wish to remain
skulking in the corners of respectability.  We want to be standard.
We want the standards, too, to be ours and to reflect our concerns.

Let us act with the care and deliberation that behoove all those who
wish to create standards to which others comply.

Onward.

Eric




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Anonymous@cs.Buffalo.EDU
Date: Tue, 2 Feb 93 16:55:29 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Remailer changes.
Message-ID: <9302030054.AA17885@armstrong.cs.Buffalo.EDU>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Hal Finney's remailer writes:
>Remailed-By: Hal Finney <hal@alumni.caltech.edu>
>Remail-Notice: This message is NOT from the person listed in the From
> line.  It is from an automated software remailing service operating at
> that address.  Please report problem mail to <hal@alumni.caltech.edu>.

I have taken similar precautions with my remailer...  as you can tell
from the header lines.  I'm still having trouble convincing my system
adminstrator to install PGP v2.1 (or even v2.0).  For some reason, he
seems to be ignoring my messages.  Since I only have a limited
knowledge of C, I really don't know how to fiddle around with the PGP
*.C source files too much, otherwise, I would install it myself.  

The error that I keep getting running under SunOS version 4.1.3 is:
> make sun4gcc
make all CC=gcc LD=gcc OBJS_EXT=sparc.o \
CFLAGS="-O -fpcc-struct-return -DUNIX -DHIGHFIRST -DIDEA32"
gcc -O -fpcc-struct-return -DUNIX -DHIGHFIRST -DIDEA32  -target sun4 -c  pgp.c
In file included from pgp.c:109:
/usr/include/stdlib.h:18: conflicting types for `abort'
<built-in>:0: previous declaration of `abort'
/usr/include/stdlib.h:26: conflicting types for `exit'
<built-in>:0: previous declaration of `exit'
*** Error code 1
make: Fatal error: Command failed for target `pgp.o'
Current working directory /tmp/pgp21/src
*** Error code 1
make: Fatal error: Command failed for target `sun4gcc'

If anyone can help me out, please e-mail me *DIRECTLY* and not to the list.
-- 
+==== Internet: babani@cs.buffalo.edu ===+======== Amateur-Radio: N2LYC ======+
!      Bitnet: V078LNGT@ubvms.BITNET     |        UUCP: rutgers!ub!babani     !
! Alternate: an173@cleveland.freenet.edu | Plsure dpnds on the othrs prmison. !
+==  PGP key available. (If you don't know what a PGP key is... find out!)  ==+




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: The Phantom <phantom@u.washington.edu>
Date: Tue, 2 Feb 93 20:21:20 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: I've had many requests for this, so here it is.
Message-ID: <Pine.3.05.9302022028.A12526-c100000@stein.u.washington.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


These are the instructions for the remailer set up on one of my accounts,
dubbed the 'phantom remailer' by some. These instructions are available by
fingering phantom@mead.u.washington.edu. 

Recently I had problems with the receiveing and decryption of encrypted
PGP messages, but everything is functional now. 

Please note the syntax: if you don't include the '::'s, the message will
end up in my mailbox! (this goes for all remailer systems).

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----


If you wish to bounce anonymous mail (remail):
- ----------------------------------------------
include the line "Request-Remailing-To: <user@host>" in the mail 
header, then the body of the message will be forwarded to the recipient.

- -or-
include the lines

::
Request-Remailing-To: <user@host>

in the body of the mail message, of which the rest of message will 
be forwarded to the recipient.


If you wish to send encrypted mail to remail:
- ---------------------------------------------
include the line "Encrypted: PGP" in the mail header, then the body
will be decrypted and searched for the above-mentioned convention for
finding the recipient.

- -or-
include the lines

::
Encrypted: PGP

in the body of the mail message, of which the rest of the message will
be decrypted and searched for the above-mentioned convention for finding
the recipient.

Recently, I was having problems with the encryption part of the remailer, 
but that has been fixed. The remailer phantom@mead.u.washington.edu is now
fully functional.

To encrypt the message for the remailer to decypher, you must use
the remailer's public key, which follows.



- -----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----
Version: 2.1

mQCNAitcsHIAAAEEAPZ3Ex1rEwKLeANRoaRyTA72htDFGiGPmWkowByZyUtRkTRp
Vs/WdhgoJ1VLz76Chyb63I+ejpekeJfOud98gMh2HtVoTjNGYAawpCKo15tFyzYn
BFYVy0NjroyxwM6YnPCsYfYMpvyjEa5mfgrlyzvYBBeTDRD89vYoe7Eue0fDAAUR
tDJBbm9ueW1vdXMgUmVtYWlsZXIgPHBoYW50b21AbWVhZC51Lndhc2hpbmd0b24u
ZWR1PokAlQIFECtcqWpkhnxaNc7AOQEBZ+8EAIOOvsFf/niUrWw0BRvPhSEmtzrA
kQJt3q7kPXutjj3IsJ1/oR8oGhv4iPQ5BmNvvd5dnsbbCqOurhaftVgzlSpyQcYi
VryeNVvpdeX1+VTS7N+lAHVAlqnimoaEtUUIftDoDIjNNKRDi+nU4GbbL+1MqveC
1LKQMIi1WPjr6Wpw
=1XNo
- -----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----



-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.1

iQCVAgUBK29GmvYoe7Eue0fDAQHxYwP/UapN+FYiB1J3ek18QiaXCJ90rcwFOx79
Mz596NYL/NArGCDGd/RPbEqBG0lpGW4H71TSvPK/G26ImyxgEvmjeMqBhB6jWZZK
Xh0zgd+cGN9DS4N5EOvvt0N2CaVGTPNO2uqyXuGM8j2GfV++2E0RHApeuDirooc1
sYyj1iiKYDk=
=LZMq
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----


Matt Thomlinson
University of Washington, Seattle, Washington.
Internet: phantom@u.washington.edu      	    phone: (206) 528-5732
PGP 2.0 key availaible via email or finger phantom@hardy.u.washington.edu





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Al Billings <mimir@u.washington.edu>
Date: Tue, 2 Feb 93 23:42:29 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Lame Gurus (fwd)
Message-ID: <Pine.3.05y.9302022338.A20963-d100000@carson.u.washington.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



 Here is an interesting (or maybe not) current use for one of the anon
remailers.

---------- Forwarded message ----------
Date: Tue, 2 Feb 93 22:44:09 EST
From: aliquis <an1226@anon.penet.fi>
To: future@nyx.cs.du.edu
Subject: Lame Gurus

Yawn.  CYBERPUNK: Virtual sex, smart drugs and synthetic
rock 'n' roll!  --TIME cover 8 February 1993.

Sure, but do they know how to set their umask values so that
people can't peek?  La-de-dah, let's check on one of the gurus...
(BTW, if you enjoy this, & you can get on the WELL, try some
of the other cyberpunk.gods from B. Sterling on.  Not that
they have anything much of interest....)
[Actual session script, edited only to protect the guilty.]
==============================================================

$ telnet well.sf.ca.us
Trying... Connected to WELL.SF.CA.US, a SEQUENT-S27 running DYNIX.

This is The WELL

DYNIX(R) V3.1.0  (well)

Type    newuser    to sign up.
Type    trouble    if you are having trouble logging in.

login: xxxxx
Password:
Last login: Tue Feb  2 XX:XX:XX from Xxxxxxx.xxx.xxxx

        DYNIX(R) V3.1.4 NFS  #2 (): Tue Mar 31 12:38:27 PST 1992
        ========================================================

    You own your own words. This means that you are responsible for the
    words that you post on the WELL and that reproduction of those words
    without your permission in any medium outside of the WELL's conferencing
    system may be challenged by you, the author.

    Thanks for dropping into the WELL.

    If you haven't changed your password since October 15, 1992,
    please do so now.  Type:  change password  at an OK prompt.  
  
    ****************************************************************

well 1: grep "Tim Leary" /etc/passwd
timleary:xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx:9339:200:Tim Leary:/uh/39/timleary:/usr/shell/menu
well 2: cd /uh/39/timleary
well 3: ls -l
total 54
-rw-r--r--  1 timleary  well           728 Jun 12  1992 1
-rw-r--r--  1 timleary  well           441 Jun 12  1992 240
-rw-r--r--  1 timleary  well           479 Jun 12  1992 29
-rw-r--r--  1 timleary  well           403 Jun 12  1992 359
-rw-r--r--  1 timleary  well           535 Jun 12  1992 42thnnks
-rw-r--r--  1 timleary  well          1096 Jun 12  1992 60
-rw-r--r--  1 timleary  well          1096 Jun 12  1992 62
-rw-r--r--  1 timleary  well          2051 Jun 12  1992 animatemcs
-rw-r--r--  1 timleary  well         11360 Jun 12  1992 animatemike
-rw-r--r--  1 timleary  well          4141 Jun 12  1992 barlow
-rw-r--r--  1 timleary  well           523 Jun 12  1992 barlow2
-rw-r--r--  1 timleary  well             0 Jun 12  1992 c
-rw-r--r--  1 timleary  well            11 Jun 12  1992 cbf.002464
-rw-r--r--  1 timleary  well             0 Jun 12  1992 cbf.005371
-rw-r--r--  1 timleary  well           527 Jun 12  1992 cbf.022859
-rw-------  1 timleary  well             4 Jun 12  1992 dead.letter
-rw-r--r--  1 timleary  well           727 Jun 12  1992 hlr
-rw-r--r--  1 timleary  well           403 Jun 12  1992 info
-rw-------  1 timleary  well         16663 Jan  9 23:43 mbox
-rw-------  1 timleary  well           452 Jan  9 23:36 q
-rw-r--r--  1 timleary  well           341 Jun 12  1992 xmodem.log
well 4: cat 29
>From rusirius Sun Jun 24 11:58:18 1990
Received: by well.sf.ca.us (4.12/4.7)
id AA02393; Sun, 24 Jun 90 11:58:15 pdt
Date: Sun, 24 Jun 90 11:58:15 pdt
From: rusirius (Mondo 2000)
Message-Id: <9006241858.AA02393@well.sf.ca.us>
To: timleary
Subject: Re:  Masonicks
Status: RO

Yeah, great to have you virtually in the kitchen.  Hope Steve might
be helpful. He's advising us.  Good business head!  Ill further discuss
the Burroughs thing with Mu & be back to you during the week.

well 5: echo Heh He He He
Heh He He He
well 6: exit
well 7: logout

Connection closed by Foreign Host
$ 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
To find out more about the anon service, send mail to help@anon.penet.fi.
Due to the double-blind system, any replies to this message will be anonymized,
and an anonymous id will be allocated automatically. You have been warned.
Please report any problems, inappropriate use etc. to admin@anon.penet.fi.






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Hal <74076.1041@CompuServe.COM>
Date: Wed, 3 Feb 93 00:03:20 PST
To: CYPHERPUNKS <CYPHERPUNKS@toad.com>
Subject: Remailer lists.
Message-ID: <930203075239_74076.1041_DHJ30-1@CompuServe.COM>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I have been working on a document describing in some detail how to use
the Cypherpunks anonymous remailers.  It is pretty long, about 25K,
but I'll post it here in a few days.

Meanwhile, here is a list of the current remailers which I know about.
If anyone else is running a remailer based on Eric Hughes' original
design, please let me know and I'll add it to the list.

All of the following remailers accept the basic "Request-Remailing-To"
remailing request:

	hh@pmantis.berkeley.edu
	hh@cicada.berkeley.edu
	hh@soda.berkeley.edu

The following remailers also accept the "Encrypted: PGP" function.
The public keys for all of the remailers (plus the special one mentioned
below) are in the keyring file below.  They can all be used for
anonymous addresses as described in the full document.

	phantom@mead.u.washington.edu
	hal@alumni.caltech.edu
	remailer@rebma.mn.org
	elee7h5@rosebud.ee.uh.edu
	hfinney@shell.portal.com

The next remailer is a variant on the Cypherpunks remailers.  It will
work _only_ with encrypted messages, using its public key (in the keyring
file below).  But it allows a simpler syntax.  It is not necessary to
put "Encrypted: PGP" into the message header.  In addition, the "::" pasting
operator is assumed, so you can leave that off.  Also, instead of
"Request-Remailing-To:" you can say just "To:".  So messages are much
simpler in format for this remailer.  This remailer runs at:

	remail@extropia.wimsey.com


Here is a PGP keyring file containing keys for the encryption based
remailers listed here:

-----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----
Version: 2.1
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=UbNP
-----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----


Hal Finney
74076.1041@compuserve.com





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: fnerd@smds.com (FutureNerd Steve Witham)
Date: Wed, 3 Feb 93 07:52:54 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: psEUDORAndom
Message-ID: <9302031531.AB24340@smds.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


While searching (in Eudora) for the word "eudora", I found instead
the word "pseudorandom."  One more property of "living at the P.O.?"

-fnerd
quote me
fnerd@smds.com (FutureNerd Steve Witham)





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: covin@cs.uchicago.edu
Date: Wed, 3 Feb 93 13:03:37 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: remailer modification: mailing list demon
Message-ID: <9302032102.AA22822@tartarus.uchicago.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



I have just joined this list, but I'm told that there was a recent discussion
about the problem of mailing-list aliases making the names of all the list
members publically available.  I.e., if you've established a mailing list
via a sendmail alias, certain sendmail commands will return the list of mailing
addresses associated with the alias.

I had been considering writing a mail-redistributing program, structurally 
similar to the user-account anonymous remailers, to get around this problem.
I'm told that this was discussed on this list, and that the conclusion was that
the sendmail hole could actually be plugged using regular sendmail features.

Could someone send me either a copy or a pointer to a copy of that discussion,
and/or the sendmail fix?

Thanks much,

                            -David




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: tribble@xanadu.com (E. Dean Tribble)
Date: Wed, 3 Feb 93 17:33:30 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: [markets!uunet!starr.com!alta: How to e-mail the White House]
Message-ID: <9302032358.AA00498@xanadu.xanadu.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Hi Folks,

	The following is NOT a joke.  It is a real service being
provided by President Clinton.  If you feel you have something to  
say,
send them a letter.  I heard they will reply to most messages.

 From: The White House <75300.3115@compuserve.com>

          As you know, this is the first time in history that the
White House has been connected to the public through electronic mail.
We welcome your comments and suggestions for ways to improve your
Public Access E-mail program.

      Jock Gill
      Electronic Publishing
      Public Access E-mail
      The White House
      Washington, D.C.

      75300.3115@Compuserve.com
      CLINTON PZ on America Online

------- End of Forwarded Message









From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: fnerd@smds.com (FutureNerd Steve Witham)
Date: Wed, 3 Feb 93 14:32:39 PST
To: extropians@gnu.ai.mit.edu
Subject: CFP '93 roommates?
Message-ID: <9302032112.AA15127@smds.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Fellow Extropians, Cypherpunks, and Computer Freedom and Privacy seekers--

Is anyone else hoping to share a room at the SF Airport Marriot for CFP '93?
The rates are $99 per room, single or multiple occupancy, for
conference attendees, with a limited block of rooms available, offer
expires Feb 9.

Please respond to

	sw@smds.com

NOT to fnerd.  Thanks.  (My fnerd mail goes through a two-day-long pipeline.)

--Steve Witham
sw@smds.com




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: mcdchg!marcal!apres!system (System Operator)
Date: Wed, 3 Feb 93 22:29:32 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: 5th Amendment and Encryption
Message-ID: <cH9eyB7w164w@apres.UUCP>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


For what it's worth, at H0H0 Con in December John Draper
related a story about a run-in with the BART police, and the
confiscation of "hundreds" of floppy disks.  John indicated
that information was stored in encrypted form, and that
the authorities were unable to read it.

Since John is on this list, perhaps he can elaborate.

Dan

--
system@apres.UUCP (System Operator)
Applied Research (cryptography & security BBS)  1 708 639 8853





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Phil Karn <karn@unix.ka9q.ampr.org>
Date: Fri, 5 Feb 93 00:02:23 PST
To: jpp@markv.com
Subject: spread spectrum synchronization
Message-ID: <9302040757.AA02215@unix.ka9q.ampr.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Synchronization is indeed one of the more complex parts of a spread
spectrum system. But there are standard, well studied ways to do it,
and any of several textbooks have good descriptions. It's more tedious
than difficult. A good job for VLSI.

The "gold codes" you mention are simply one family of spreading
sequences.  There are others.  You'd search for signals that use them
in the same way you'd search for any kind of spreading sequence -- by
searching the sequence space until you find a correlation between the
incoming signal and your local copy of the spreading sequence. You
detect this by the sudden increase in narrowband signal energy seen at
the output of the despreader around the nominal carrier frequency when
you're within a chip of the correct time. You then lock onto and track
the spreading sequence with a circuit very similar to a phase locked
loop.

Practical spread spectrum systems aid this process either by
synchronizing the spreading sequence to a common clock source, or by
using a small enough spreading sequence to make searching the entire
sequence feasible.

In our CDMA cellular system, we use both approaches and several
ordinary LSFR PN sequences (not Gold codes). There's a "short PN" code
(2^15 chips long) common to all cells that can be found by a mobile
within a few seconds of being turned on, and an additional per-user
"long code" (2^47-1 chips) that is synchronized with the aid of GPS
receivers at the cells. Both operate at the same chip rate (1.2288
Mhz).

The gory details can be found by anonymous FTP to lorien.qualcomm.com,
in /pub/cdma. Read the "overview" document first.

Phil





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: crunch@netcom.com (John Draper)
Date: Thu, 4 Feb 93 00:19:52 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Elaborating on BART pigs
Message-ID: <9302040819.AA11336@netcom2.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Dan says:

>John indicated
>that information was stored in encrypted form, and that
>the authorities were unable to read it.
>Since John is on this list, perhaps he can elaborate.

Yes,  I can...  Certainly.   I was using a Mac with a
HyperDrive,  and kept all me personal Email and job bids
encrypted using the "Security" program provided for the
HyperDrive users.    I don't know how many files I had
encrypted,   but if the police had somehow managed to
decrypt it,  they would be very dissapointed,  as I'm sure
they would find much use if any of it as evidance that I
was involved in any kind of conspiracy or something.   I was
just a neat program,  easy to use,   and after I archived
the programs,  I encrypted it,  and used a secret
key "Pigs suck" at the time.

Oh,  one other thing,  the new OOP version of the MacPGP Shell
is coming along quite nicely,   Blair has been very responsive
to provide me with a good solid design,  thus requiring little
interaction,   and those little GUI's are coming along just 
fine,  than you...

More later..
JD




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: ghabrech@ultrix.ramapo.edu (The Knight of Ni)
Date: Wed, 3 Feb 93 22:10:44 PST
To: tribble@xanadu.com
Subject: Re:  [markets!uunet!starr.com!alta: How to e-mail the White House]
Message-ID: <9302040613.AA26938@ultrix.ramapo.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I would like to welcome the whitehouse to the net.  It's nice to give the
public an easy way to make suggestions to somebody who would otherwise be
inaccessible (sp?, sorry no spell check). I hope that the users of the net
make use of this great opportunity.

Thanx,

George A. Habrecht

ghabrech@ultrix.ramapo.edu




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: deltorto@aol.com
Date: Thu, 4 Feb 93 03:38:32 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: White Mail
Message-ID: <9302040639.tn05266@aol.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Guys & Gals,

Here's a tidbit I thought you'd all like to know about:

(from Network World, 1 Feb. 1993, p. 37)
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
E-MAIL RULING MAY HAMPER CLINTON ADMINISTRATION

Washington, D.C. - A recent federal court ruling requiring the preserva
tion of the Bush administration's electronic mail tapes has left many
considering the ramifications for E-mail utilization in the Clinton White
House and the private sector.

Federal Judge Charles Richey ruled that President Bush's E-mail falls under
the 50-year-old Federal Records Act and cannot be destroyed until it has been
reviewed under stringent guidelines for its preservation. This ruling, which
is aimed at uncovering information concerning the Iran-Contra scandal, is the
first time electronic communications has fallen under the auspices of the
act.

Although the ruling is currently being appealed and it is unclear whether the
Bush administration will comply with the order, it has several implications
for the new White House staff.

"It will provide a real problem for the Clinton administration," said Michael
Cavanagh, executive director of the Electronic Mail Association here. The
ruling applies to all White House E-mail, Cavanagh said, even the most casual
conversations. "It will be difficult for them to do their job as efficiently
as they could if they were allowed to use E-mail freely," he said.

-- Combing Through Trash

Cavanagh likened the ruling to requiring that the contents of every White
House wastebasket be saved forever. "That enters the realm of ridiculousness,
but maybe that's what's happened with electronic mail in this decision."

Others were not so sure. "It's one of those issues that has a balance on both
sides." said Ronald Plesser, a partner in the Washington law firm of Piper
and Marbury and the former telecommunications team leader for the Clinton
transition. "From a freedom of information perspective, it's a good decision.
From an E-mail decision, we're concerned about it, but I don't think it's
overpowering."

Plesser said the ruling would encourage the White House staff to treat
sending E-mail as if they were writing a memo, rather than using it in an
informal manner.

"I understand the concern that E-mail will now be a record and it may
discourage some informal discussions," he said. "On the other hand, I think
the issues in the case are broader than E-mail and relate to all records of
public policy that should not be destroyed, and I'm in favor of that."

He did caution that the ruling will not automatically make all White House
E-mail public information because President Clinton will still have the
option of using his executive privilege to prevent information from being
subpoenaed.

-- Private Sector Implications

Beyond the White House, however, the implications for the private sector are
minimal.

"This doesn't have any direct ramifications for the business sector,"
Cavanagh said. "There certainly is not going to be a law requiring every
private company to keep everything on their computer disks forever; you'd
have to carve out something the size of the state of Wyoming to store those
computer disks."


Both Cavanagh and Plesser were in favor of having some kid of E-mail
retention policy, as do most businesses in the private sector. Once a
specified period has elapsed during which the information may be needed to
reconstruct certain events, for example, it can be destroyed.

"Increasingly, businesses institute retention policies for electronic mail
tapes and other computer tapes [in addition to paper records]," Cavanagh
said. "Generally, that's the correct route to go."

-----------------------------------------------------------------------------




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "DrZaphod" <ncselxsi!drzaphod@ncselxsi.netcom.com>
Date: Thu, 4 Feb 93 07:45:53 PST
To: CypherPunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: A Group Note From CypherPunks
Message-ID: <24111.drzaphod@ncselxsi>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>>> From: The White House <75300.3115@compuserve.com>

 From deltorto@aol.com
>Ladies & Gents, I think a group letter would be appropriate from all of us.
>What an opportunity. I love this country sometimes, y'know?

     Excellent Idea!  What better way to secure our position on cryptography
and privacy then to write a little note to Bill.  go for it.. and we can all
read it, make suggestions, and add bits.. incidentally, I've already sent my
PGP key down to the White House.. |-]
TTFN!

DrZaphod
[AC/DC] / [DnA][HP]
[drzaphod@ncselxsi.uucp]
Technicolorized




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: deltorto@aol.com
Date: Thu, 4 Feb 93 04:32:55 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: How to e-mail the White House
Message-ID: <9302040732.tn05372@aol.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>> The following is NOT a joke.  It is a real service being
>>provided by President Clinton.  If you feel you have something to  
>>say, send them a letter.  I heard they will reply to most messages.
>>
>> From: The White House <75300.3115@compuserve.com>
>>
>>          As you know, this is the first time in history that the
>>White House has been connected to the public through electronic mail.
>>We welcome your comments and suggestions for ways to improve your
>>Public Access E-mail program.

Ladies & Gents, I think a group letter would be appropriate from all of us.
What an opportunity. I love this country sometimes, y'know?

  dave

PS: Extra special thanks to Mr. Tribble for finding this. Where did you pick
it up?




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: tribble@xanadu.com (E. Dean Tribble)
Date: Thu, 4 Feb 93 11:33:45 PST
To: uunet!aol.com!deltorto@uunet.UU.NET
Subject: How to e-mail the White House
In-Reply-To: <9302040732.tn05372@aol.com>
Message-ID: <9302041741.AA03899@xanadu.xanadu.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


	 PS: Extra special thanks to Mr. Tribble for finding this. Where did you pick
	 it up?

Thanks for the thanks, but I just forwarded it.  I don't know who
originated the message.  Afterward I noted that the chatty part of the
message sounded like I had written it.  We can appropriately give
thansk to a now anonymous source :-)

dean




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: crunch@netcom.com (John Draper)
Date: Thu, 4 Feb 93 11:28:33 PST
To: CypherPunks@toad.com
Subject: Group note
Message-ID: <9302041928.AA05061@netcom2.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



>     Excellent Idea!  What better way to secure our position on cryptography
>and privacy then to write a little note to Bill.  go for it.. and we can all
>read it, make suggestions, and add bits.. incidentally, I've already sent my
>PGP key down to the White House.. |-]
>TTFN!

I didn't go that far,  but if we decide to send a letter to the White
House this way,   we all should collaborate on what to say,  in relation
to our concerns,  etc.   Then  each of us can "Sign" the letter
using our PGP Signatures.

I also thought about sending my PGP key,  but still deciding on what I
want to say relating to my personal concerns.

JD




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Jay Prime Positive <jpp@markv.com>
Date: Thu, 4 Feb 93 14:09:22 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: `Sunday Times' article on GSM changes
In-Reply-To: <9302042024.AA09970@maggie.shearson.com>
Message-ID: <9302041407.aa14565@hermix.markv.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Speculation: The "A5 `scrambling code'" is used as the spreading code
for a spread spectrum radio.

Spread spectrum radio has some features cypherpunks may find
interesting: both stegnagraphic and cryptographic.  A Spread Spectrum
signal is usualy based on xoring a very high rate "pseudorandom"
bitstream with the intelligence to be transmitted.  The resulting wide
spectrum signal is usualy transmitted via radio.  As a result the
signal is very hard to notice since the watts/hz can be orders of
magnitude under normal narrow band signals (stegnography).  As a
second result, once detected the signal cannot be understood without
syncronizing an identicle "pseudorandom" bitstream at the reciever
(cryptography).  The reason that gov't types would fear the dispersal
of the technology is obvious.  Btw. many of the wireless lans use
exactly this technology.

j'




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "John Coryell." <jcoryell%nwu.edu@UICVM.UIC.EDU>
Date: Thu, 4 Feb 93 16:51:11 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: How to e-mail the White House
In-Reply-To: <9302041741.AA03899@xanadu.xanadu.com>
Message-ID: <9302050051.AA07524@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>         PS: Extra special thanks to Mr. Tribble for finding this. Where did y
>pick
>         it up?
>
>Thanks for the thanks, but I just forwarded it.  I don't know who
>originated the message.  Afterward I noted that the chatty part of the
>message sounded like I had written it.  We can appropriately give
>thansk to a now anonymous source :-)
>
>dean

I've seen it broadcast on a number of listservs, actually; I don't
think it's being kept to any degree of secrecy.  However, nearly every
place it was posted soon found follow-ups reporting receiving undelivered
mail messages.  Maybe it's encrypted.

John Coryell.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: pmetzger@shearson.com (Perry E. Metzger)
Date: Thu, 4 Feb 93 12:59:35 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: `Sunday Times' article on GSM changes
Message-ID: <9302042024.AA09970@maggie.shearson.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Thought I'd forward this.


----- Begin Included Message -----

>From libernet-request@dartmouth.edu Wed Feb  3 18:51:12 1993
Resent-Message-Id: <4fQ2vaH0BwxI41u9ED@transarc.com>
Resent-Date: Wed,  3 Feb 1993 15:45:26 -0500 (EST)
Resent-From: Lyle_Seaman@transarc.com
Resent-To: libernet@dartmouth.edu
X-Andrew-Widereply: netnews.sci.crypt
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
Path: andrew.cmu.edu!bb3.andrew.cmu.edu!news.sei.cmu.edu!cis.ohio-state.edu!zaphod.mps.ohio-state.edu!howland.reston.ans.net!usenet.ins.cwru.edu!agate!doc.ic.ac.uk!rhbnc!andy
From: andy@csqx.cs.rhbnc.ac.uk
Subject: `Sunday Times' article on GSM changes
Organization: RHBNC
Date: Tue, 2 Feb 1993 16:07:01 GMT
Lines: 94
Sender: libernet-request@dartmouth.edu
X-Mailing-List: libernet@Dartmouth.EDU
Content-Length: 4387

  Having finally managed to track down a copy of last Sunday's `Sunday
Times', here is the text of the article describing changes to the GSM
mobile communications standard.

  The A5 `scrambling code' refered to in the article is the stream cipher
between the mobile and base stations, which uses a 64-bit key derived from
an initial authentication exchange.  Whilst it's not exactly secret, as
many people involved with developing GSM need to know the details, it is
covered by non-disclosure agreements.

  `New Scientist' also have an article on GSM in this week's issue.

andy
--

`The Sunday Times',  31 January 1993.   Main section, p. 12.  (Home News)

SPYMASTERS ORDER REDESIGN OF `TOO SECURE' MOBILE PHONES  by Christopher Lloyd

[Cartoon of a ridiculous mobile handset with various antennaea and dishes
protruding.  It is being held by a dismayed, purple-suited, man whilst a
sign reads: "New! GCHQ-approved mobile phone".]

  The next generation of mobile telephones has proved so secure against
tapping that it is to be made less safe on the advice of the intelligence
services.  The phones, based on coded digital technology, will have their
technology modified so that spies can continue to eavesdrop on private
conversations.

  The changes, ordered by a European Community (EC) telecommunications
committee in Brussels, are being made at the insistance of European
governments, including Britain's.  They fear that surveillance operations
against drug barons, the criminal underworld and foreign powers could be
undermined.

  Digital mobiles phones, based on a system called GSM, are already
replacing standard analogue networks across the world. They are equipped
with a sophisticated scrambling code called A5, offering protection from
interception equivelant to many military systems.

  It is this code that is to be replaced by one called A5X, to allow
undercover eavesdropping to continue.

  Last week a Department of Trade and Industry spokesman confirmed changes
were being introduced to make it easier for security agencies - ranging
from GCHQ, the British government's listening post near Cheltenham, to the
FBI in America - to eavesdrop.

  "Alternatice coding is being developed for the reasons you have
outlined," he said.  "There is a general desire for this among the
governments of Europe."

  The department, which issues export licenses for the phones, is
particularly concerned that the original A5 technology should not be sold
to countries that may adapt it for military applications. 

  In America, the FBI has voiced similar concern.  Nestor Michnyak,
spokesman for the FBI headquarters in Washington, said that digital
technology was advancing so fast that counter-surveillance was in danger
of being undermined.

  "We are trying to get companies and manufacturers to work with us to
allow us to maintain the surveillance operations we have undertaken since
the late 1960s," he said.  "All we are asking is to be able to continue to
do what we are currently doing and we want the same access we are having
now."

  Manufacturers of GSM mobile phones will be forced to adapt products to
work with the new codes.  Motorola, one of the leading makers of the
digital mobile handsets, complained that costs may rise as a result.

  "We are flying blind here," said Larry Conlee, the assistant general
manager of Motorola's European cellular division.  "The GSM system has
ended up more secure than it should have been for the commercial market
and now we're trying to recover from it."

  Vodafone, Britain's largest analogue mobile phone company, which has
already installed 250 GSM base stations covering 50% of the UK population,
said its network will need to be adapted to accept the new codes.

  "Government authorities have made it known that they don't want this
high level of encoding," said Mike Caldwell, the spokesman for Vodafone.

  Caldwell said the problem with the original system was that it would
take security services weeks rather than minutes to decode the
conversations they wanted to bug.  Despite the changes, it will be still
virtually impossible for any amateur eavesdropper to intercept calls made
on the digital mobile phones.

-- 
Andy Thomas
Information Security Group,  Department of Computer Science
Royal Holloway,  University of London   TW20 0EX, England
Internet:  andy@dcs.rhbnc.ac.uk   phone: + 44 784 443696


----- End Included Message -----





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu
Date: Thu, 4 Feb 93 16:03:52 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: White House letter
Message-ID: <9302050002.AA11919@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Hello, I think the official cyberpunk White House (Pres. Bill Clinton)
letter would be a great idea, although my experience is that the more
you want to say, the more people will say "that's not for cypherpunks
to say" or "I don't agree with that as a cypherpunk" and that it will
be hard to build consensus. But, on the other hand, a lot of
cypherpunks are kind of extremists that may even say some things don't
go far enough.  Anyway, here are some possible topics, as bland as I
can make them (but are all actually highly controverial):

1. Off the tip of the mailing list's tongue, phone encryption
particularly in cellular and hand-held phones.  The recent article from
the Sunday Times posted here stated that

> Despite the changes, it will be still
>virtually impossible for any amateur eavesdropper to intercept calls made
>on the digital mobile phones.

Hm, that's pretty questionable. Maybe we shouldn't make it a black and
white issue, but codes seem to me to be either broken or unbroken, and
the former is insecure and unusable whereas the latter is not.  There
are already examples of situations where lack of encryption led to
outrageous breaches of privacy--both Princess Diana and her previous
husband can attest to that!

Clinton could put pressure on intelligence agencies in the U.S. to
allow strong encryption for cellular phones, pass laws, or whatever,
and eventually commit to security in phone calls.  What do you think,
cypherpunks?  Should the government be allowed to wiretap "at all"?  Is
it a "right" of the government? (prepare for the flames)  Should we
insist on completely unlimited use of cryptography?  Is any other
scenario practical?  Is anything but this inevitable? (uh oh, some
opinion creeping in there)

Introduction of strong cryptography in hand-held phones could be *the*
stepping stone for widespread introduction of cryptography, if the
battle is won and becomes publicized enough.  I think if this was
painted in the right way, we could really get a lot of public support
for ideas like "I should be able to know when someone is listening to
my calls" or "I should be able to protect from that" or "I know when
somebody opens my mail, why not my phone calls?" or "that's not
something I want my government to be doing anyway".

2. The new national network NREN supported by the NSF will have massive
data communications capabilities, many times the bandwidth of the
current internet.  There are plenty of "guidelines" that could be
established on its use.  For example, how about commercial traffic? 
Are there restrictions on traffic?  I think the "new world highways"
analogy works here. While we can get and go on a highway whenever we
want, and carry loads up to certain reasonable restrictions, we have to
get licensed. Also, commercial companies rely on them heavily and our
economy is immensely dependent on them (they benefit it immensely). 
Should we oppose all taxes and licensing? Limitations on total traffic
permitted?  Believe it or not, these will become *hot* issues soon. 
Bigger than the time the FCC was thinking of taxing modem use.  Keep in
mind, we might be able to make arguments that the ideas like "volume"
are somewhat obsolete in terms of networks, in which in many cases
sending very large amounts of data is as costly (or even less so,
because of overhead) than sending smaller amounts.  Even if someone was
charged based on quantity of use, the actual money involved would have
to be something like $.0001/meg (I hope).

3. There are lot of restrictions and regulations on networks right now.
 For example, there are rules that prevent telephone companies from
providing "information services" over telephone lines, apparently
originating by rather bold but successful cable company lobbyists. 
Should these be removed?

4. Fiber optics will be penetrating into a lot of homes over the next
few years.  This will be related to the network expansion mentioned
above.  Should these be maintained and installed by private companies? 
Should there be limitations on the size of the companies running the networks?

5. In the letter, we should look at trying to explain our interests and
backgrounds.  Who ARE we to ask these things?  A bunch of teenage
computer geeks and hackers?  Computer professionals with a serious
interest in privacy, with important tax-paying jobs?  I don't really
know the answer to this one!

I'd be willing to hammer up some rough drafts, if no one objects, but
we need to hash this out, and decide about some kind of voting
procedure, I would say (majority passing? line-item veto?)

I suppose the one really major consensus of the cypherpunks is the
commitment to cryptography and the believe that it should be
unregulated and freely used.  So, if all this sounds too involved, we
could go the simple route and just fix up Eric Hugh's group charter to
send to Pres. Clinton.

ltr.



P.S. Here's a product that would *really* bring the issue of
cryptography to the forefront, making the public aware of it and
partial to it, and is just waiting to be invented by somebody with a
flair for electronics, packaging, and marketing.  Encryption technology
is becoming pretty inexpensive, and even some simple techniques are
better than nothing and not trivial to get around for the big
bureacracies that do wiretapping.  Imagine a single little plastic cup
that could be placed over a phone reciever with all the cheap
encryption electronics built in (maybe even analog based).  Market it
in every drugstore and discount store in existence in real flashy ways.
 Protect your calls! Just slip it on your phone! Use it to talk to your
friends! etc. introducing the CRYPTOCUP only $9.99.  The thing could be
adaptive, like pick one of 10 or 100 preprogrammed codes when it finds
another of the same at the other end of the line.  Or, maybe some
one-time PADs could be used by the users using touch-tones.

You could even market it as a child's toy: imagine that the kid could
slip it over his mouth and yell through it.  Another kid with a
receiving speaker could decrypt this into earphones or something.  Now,
to other kids on the playground, all they hear is goofyspeak that
sounds like pig latin from the pair, but the two kids are able to talk
about throwing snowballs at Suzy or whatever (endless laughs and
hilarity).  You could have all kinds of spiffy TV commercials with
little kids pretending to be spies, with the costumes and everything.
Wow!  You could sell a LOT of these if it was done right.  This would
be like the 20th century equivalent of the cups-and-string thing. 
(Just make sure I get plenty of royalties :)

Or how about this?  For us cypherpunks, the "kids toy" thing could be
little cover for the use that it was *designed* for: use over phones. 
The "kid toy" thing would just be a way to get it to be widespread so
that everybody had one and knew what it did.  Then, the rumors would
start. Wow! They fit on phones!  Drug dealer's use em!  People having
affairs use 'em!  Businessmen use 'em!  EVERYBODY uses em! Coach to
team player: did you remember your CUP?  Yes Sir!  Coach starts yelling
plays at quarterback.  Girlfriends would ask their boyfriends to slip
'em on before they started (do you have the PROTECTION with you?).
Then, we take over the world. HAHAHAHA <- evil laugh

If this was cheap enough, people might buy it just for the novelty of
it.  Especially if you don't have to choose the code, just slip it on
and it works (maybe with the better versions, you could pick the code).
 The point is, infiltrate the economy to the point where any kind of
silly regulation of "cryptography" would be perceived as completely
ridiculous by the general population.  "What are we going to do?"
They'd say, "register every kid's CRYPTOCUP?  HAHAHAHAHA!" <- side
splitting laugh at the sheer stupidity of government.  (Yeah, we have a
great one---once they even tried to regulate CRYPTOCUPS! HAHAHAHA! <-
now sides starting to hurt)

OK (regaining my composure and sanity), so if we're really boring, I
suppose we could go the route of just pressing for encryption in
cellular phones.  Or maybe just the middleaged employed people on the
group could go that route, and all the teenage hackers work on the toy.

P.S. how big is cypherpunks now anyway?  I'm interested in embarrassing
myself in front of as many people as possible. :)




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: tribble@xanadu.com (E. Dean Tribble)
Date: Thu, 4 Feb 93 23:33:01 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: [uunet!bigtex.cactus.org!wixer!wixer.cactus.org!jagwire: white house email (fwd)]
Message-ID: <9302050132.AA05527@xanadu.xanadu.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> From jmedway@ccwf.cc.utexas.edu  Wed Feb  3 20:24:33 1993
> From: jmedway@ccwf.cc.utexas.edu (johnjmedway)
> Message-Id: <9302031943.AA23259@huey.cc.utexas.edu>
> Subject: white house email
> To: jagwire@wixer.cactus.org (Dan Zappone),
>         resmith@ccwf.cc.utexas.edu (Rob Smith)
> Date: Wed, 3 Feb 93 13:43:54 CST
> X-Mailer: ELM [version 2.3 PL11]
> 
> One of my coworkers passed this out to all of us @ work.
> 
> Spread el verbum.
> 
> 
> >>  Subject: White House email address
> >>
> >>  I thought you might find this interesting...
> >>  
> >>  
> >>       ================= { Begin included text } =====================
> >>  
> >>  >
> >>  > How's this for interesting?
> >>  > We just got wind of it down here... :)  Barbie
> >>  > - --------
> >>  >
> >>  > President Clinton (The White House) = 75300.3115@Compuserve.com
> >>  >
> >>  > : Here's something you might find useful...  President Clinton's email
> >>  > : address.  (Obviously, he has people to screen it for him!)  A friend
> >>  > : just emailed this to me.
> >>  > :
> >>  > : >Posted-Date: 27 Jan 93 20:19:51 EST
> >>  > : >Date: 27 Jan 93 20:19:51 EST
> >>  > : >From: The White House <75300.3115@compuserve.com>
> >>  > : >Subject: Re: Press Briefing, January 27, 1993
> >>  > : >
> >>  > : > Thank you for your recent electronic mail message to the White
> >>  > : > House.  As soon as practicable it will be sent to the appropriate
> >>  > : > office for consideration.  You should receive a written reply in due
> >>  > : > course.  Unfortunately, we are not yet ready to respond substantively
> >>  > : > to your message by electronic mail.  We appreciate your patience as 
> >>  we
> >>  > : > implement our new electronic systems.
> >>  > : >
> >>  > : > As you know, this is the first time in history that the
> >>  > : > White House has been connected to the public through electronic
> >>  > : > mail.  We welcome your comments and suggestions for ways to 
> >>  improve
> >>  > : > your Public Access E-mail program.
> >>  > : >
> >>  > : >      Regards,
> >>  > : >      Jock Gill
> >>  > : >      Electronic Publishing
> >>  > : >      Public Access E-mail
> >>  > : >      The White House
> >>  > : >      Washington, D.C.
> >>  > : >
> >>  > : >      75300.3115@Compuserve.com
> >>  > : >      CLINTON PZ on America Online
> >>  > : >
> >>  > : > PS: If you did not include your U.S. mail return address in your
> >>  > : > message and you want a reply, please send your message again and
> >>  > : > include that information.
> >>  >
> >>  > ------- End of Forwarded Message
> >>  >
> >>  >
> >>  
> 
> 
> 
> ----------------------------------------------------------------
> jmedway@ccwf.cc.utexas.edu       "Be careful what you're doing,
> aka john j medway                 you're messing up my life."
>                                   -- John Lydon aka John Rotten
> ----------------------------------------------------------------
> 




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Brad Huntting <huntting@glarp.com>
Date: Thu, 4 Feb 93 17:37:15 PST
To: pmetzger@shearson.com (Perry E. Metzger)
Subject: Re: `Sunday Times' article on GSM changes
In-Reply-To: <9302042024.AA09970@maggie.shearson.com>
Message-ID: <199302050136.AA14323@misc.glarp.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> Caldwell said the problem with the original system was that it
> would take security services weeks rather than minutes to decode
> the conversations they wanted to bug.  Despite the changes, it will
> be still virtually impossible for any amateur eavesdropper to
> intercept calls made on the digital mobile phones.

The quotes I've heard are more like "any county sherif with a
radiomodem and a pc will be able to tap any conversation in range.

It's probably just as well.  Since end to end encryption is the
only reasonable solution anyway.


brad




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "DrZaphod" <ncselxsi!drzaphod@ncselxsi.netcom.com>
Date: Thu, 4 Feb 93 21:01:52 PST
To: CypherPunks@toad.com
Subject: RE: White House letter
Message-ID: <67402.drzaphod@ncselxsi>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


In Message Thu, 04 Feb 93 17:02:44 -0700,
  longs.lance.colostate.edu!ld231782@netcomsv.netcom.com writes:

>Hello, I think the official cyberpunk White House (Pres. Bill Clinton)
>letter would be a great idea, although my experience is that the more
>you want to say, the more people will say "that's not for cypherpunks
>to say" or "I don't agree with that as a cypherpunk" and that it will
>be hard to build consensus. But, on the other hand, a lot of
>cypherpunks are kind of extremists that may even say some things don't
>go far enough.

     I think to start off and get attention and respect from the big white
house we should simply send our stance on encryption and why it shouldn't be
regulated.. I think this is the common goal among all the cypherpunks on
this list [ that is except the NSA folks who are listening in |-] ].

     I think, for now, we just want to let people know that there IS a
specific group of individuals who are willing to protest for their right to
privacy [you are, aren't you?] and follow up with suggestions to specific
issues in later messages to the White House.  and YES we should definately
send all our public keys along with the message.. basically telling the
government that we DO enjoy extreme privacy in part of our lives and would
like to see it extended to all forms of communication.
TTFN!

DrZaphod
[AC/DC] / [DnA][HP]
[drzaphod@ncselxsi.uucp]
Technicolorized




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Brad Huntting <huntting@glarp.com>
Date: Thu, 4 Feb 93 17:48:18 PST
To: Jay Prime Positive <jpp@markv.com>
Subject: Re: `Sunday Times' article on GSM changes
In-Reply-To: <9302041407.aa14565@hermix.markv.com>
Message-ID: <199302050147.AA14360@misc.glarp.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



> Speculation: The "A5 `scrambling code'" is used as the spreading code
> for a spread spectrum radio.

It would seem that both the sender and reciever need to be exactly
syncronized to within 1/4 of a bit for this to work.  Since voice
data requires about 64Khz, if you spread this by a factor of 32
(for a scrambling frequency of 2.048Mhz) this would mean the sender
and reciever would need to be synced to well within 500ns of each
other.

Isn't this a bit difficult?  How do they do it?


brad




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: crunch@netcom.com (John Draper)
Date: Thu, 4 Feb 93 19:05:21 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: White house letter
Message-ID: <9302050305.AA21371@netcom2.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



>4. Fiber optics will be penetrating into a lot of homes over the next
>few years.

What about adding the issue of government grants for R&D on new technology
in Data Networking,  Virtual reality,  and other new technologies.  Or
at least generious tax breaks to encourage R&D.

JD




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Jay Prime Positive <jpp@markv.com>
Date: Thu, 4 Feb 93 19:45:57 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: `Sunday Times' article on GSM changes
In-Reply-To: <199302050147.AA14360@misc.glarp.com>
Message-ID: <9302041944.aa08169@hermix.markv.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Brad Huntting <huntting@glarp.com> asks:
>[...]this would mean the sender and reciever would need to be synced
>to well within 500ns of each other.  Isn't this a bit difficult?  How
>do they do it?

  You are right.  This is perhaps *the* central design issue of this
kind of spread spectrum system.

  One standard solution is to use "gold codes".  Gold codes are
special in that they are very self dissilimar.  That is they look very
unlike any shifted version of themselves.  So you can build a very
simple corelator which tries all the possible shiftings of a code to
the signal, until one pops up with "low frequency" data rather than
"high frequency" noise.

  Another is to begin a transmission with a special sync header (and
concievably intersperse additional ones bassed on the expected
frequency of loss of lock).  Currently available PLL's working at
900MHz have very low phase noise, and I can imagine the construction
of fixed frequency PLL's with even lower phase noise.

  A third is to transmit BOTH the spreading code, and the data.  You
can think of this technique as sending two channels of data, one which
is all 1's (or 0's), the other which is a little more interesting.
The two channels are then combined at the reciever to yield the data.

  A fourth is to use an externaly generated sync signal -- for example
a radio transmission that both sender and reciever can hear.  (For
this aplication, I don't see how this would be used...)

  Aditional solutions are possible.  (What is this S.A.W. thing I read
about??)

j'





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Jay Prime Positive <jpp@markv.com>
Date: Thu, 4 Feb 93 20:06:05 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: `Sunday Times' article on GSM changes
Message-ID: <9302042004.aa08268@hermix.markv.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I speculated:
> Speculation: The "A5 `scrambling code'" is used as the spreading code
> for a spread spectrum radio.

  But I now belive I was wrong.  A reader, who I will allow to remain
unnamed, informed me that there is only one SS cellular comunication
system -- interestingly enough they were using it at the time!  They
told me that the GSM system is narrow band.  So I now ...

Speculate: The "A5 `scrambling code'" is an actual cypher system.  But
the key is negociated between the phone and the cell, not the phone
and the other phone.


j'





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Tom Libert <libert@citi.umich.edu>
Date: Thu, 4 Feb 93 20:03:03 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: `Sunday Times' article on GSM changes
Message-ID: <9302050403.AA10938@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Jay Prime Positive <jpp@markv.com> writes:
>  A fourth is to use an externaly generated sync signal -- for example
>a radio transmission that both sender and reciever can hear.  (For
>this aplication, I don't see how this would be used...)

Some spread spectrum systems synchronize using the (very accurate)
time signals provide by Global Positioning System (GPS) satellites.

>  Aditional solutions are possible.  (What is this S.A.W. thing I read
>about??)

I don't know where you read it, but it might stand for "Surface
Acoustic Wave".




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Marc.Ringuette@GS80.SP.CS.CMU.EDU
Date: Thu, 4 Feb 93 21:13:16 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: White House letter
Message-ID: <9302050513.AA11882@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Dear ld231782,

I believe that a good letter to the President has _one_ theme.  If
it comes out to more than one, write more than one letter.

My own emphasis would be on computer security concerns, and the legitimate
privacy, anonymity, and electronic-cash interests of Internetters.  Aren't
these the issues which bring us together as cypherpunks?


-- Marc Ringuette (mnr@cs.cmu.edu)


p.s.  Here are two draft letters for your consideration.

Dear President Clinton,
   Bring democracy to the bits!  Let's take a vote among all the bits 
   to decide which value, 0 or 1, is most correct.  Then we can set all
   bits to that value and they will all be equal!
Best regards,  The Cypherpunks (Socialist Subgroup).

Dear President Clinton,
   Freedom for the bits!  We will not rest until each bit is free to
   determine its own natural orientation without outside coercion.  The
   good news is, you don't need to do anything at all; merely get out of
   the way of the free market, and the bits will free themselves.
Best regards,  The Cypherpunks (Anarchist Subgroup).




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "DrZaphod" <ncselxsi!drzaphod@ncselxsi.netcom.com>
Date: Fri, 5 Feb 93 07:29:48 PST
To: CypherPunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: White House letter
Message-ID: <23473.drzaphod@ncselxsi>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


In Message Thu, 4 Feb 1993 23:22-EST,
  GS80.SP.CS.CMU.EDU!Marc.Ringuette@netcomsv.netcom.com writes:

>Dear President Clinton,
>   Bring democracy to the bits!  Let's take a vote among all the bits
>   to decide which value, 0 or 1, is most correct.  Then we can set all
>   bits to that value and they will all be equal!
>Best regards,  The Cypherpunks (Socialist Subgroup).
>
     This one soundz a bit like self-rightiousness [sp?] FIND WHAT IS RIGHT
AND MAKE EVERYBODY "RIGHT".  I think that's what they're [we're?] already
doing.

>Dear President Clinton,
>   Freedom for the bits!  We will not rest until each bit is free to
>   determine its own natural orientation without outside coercion.  The
>   good news is, you don't need to do anything at all; merely get out of
>   the way of the free market, and the bits will free themselves.
>Best regards,  The Cypherpunks (Anarchist Subgroup).

     I like this one.. |-]
TTFN!

DrZaphod
[AC/DC] / [DnA][HP]
[drzaphod@ncselxsi.uucp]
Technicolorized




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "DrZaphod" <ncselxsi!drzaphod@ncselxsi.netcom.com>
Date: Fri, 5 Feb 93 07:29:50 PST
To: CypherPunks@toad.com
Subject: RE: White House Replies
Message-ID: <23484.drzaphod@ncselxsi>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


The White House writes:

> PS: If you did not include your U.S. mail return address in your
> message and you want a reply, please send your message again and
> include that information.

     Well this is completely useless, isn't it.. If we imagine this
logically we can see masses of e-mail entering the White House while snail
mail trickles out... Definately a buffer problem |-].  At least they're
trying, I suppose.  TTFN!

DrZaphod
[AC/DC] / [DnA][HP]
[drzaphod@ncselxsi.uucp]
Technicolorized




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: sDun@isma.demon.co.uk (Stephen Dunne)
Date: Fri, 5 Feb 93 03:23:58 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: How to e-mail the White House
In-Reply-To: <9302050051.AA07524@toad.com>
Message-ID: <728928401snx@isma.demon.co.uk>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


In article <9302050051.AA07524@toad.com> you write:
>>         PS: Extra special thanks to Mr. Tribble for finding this. Where did y
>>pick
>>         it up?
>>
>>Thanks for the thanks, but I just forwarded it.  I don't know who
>>originated the message.  Afterward I noted that the chatty part of the
>>message sounded like I had written it.  We can appropriately give
>>thansk to a now anonymous source :-)
>>
>>dean
>
>I've seen it broadcast on a number of listservs, actually; I don't
>think it's being kept to any degree of secrecy.  However, nearly every
>place it was posted soon found follow-ups reporting receiving undelivered
>mail messages.  Maybe it's encrypted.
>
>John Coryell.
>
Nah!! It's Compu$erve bouncing mail because the mail-box is probably full.
I can very easily imagine the net totally flooding it!! :-)

Stephen
-- 
+--------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Stephen Dunne                             DoD#767 sdun@isma.demon.co.uk   |
|International Securities Market Association       I speak for me,thats all|
|Voice (+44) 71-538-5656    Fax (+44) 71-538-4902  PGP 2.1 key available   |
|We are not affiliated to any other Demon.Co.Uk site. (especially Evil!)   |
+--------------------------------------------------------------------------+




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Eric Hughes <hughes@soda.berkeley.edu>
Date: Fri, 5 Feb 93 10:31:51 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Dear Mr. President
In-Reply-To: <9302051147.tn12993@aol.com>
Message-ID: <9302051829.AA09975@soda.berkeley.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



I applaud the Clinton administration for making itself available via
email.  I do not think it advisable, however, to send a single
cypherpunks letter.  Rather I urge all interested parties to compose
their own letters, and send them in separately.

Stress privacy, and technological defenses thereto.

At risk of offensively stating the obvious, I also urge the following
general writer's guidelines:

1) Engage brain before typing.  Think about the one thing you want to
talk about, and talk about that.

2) Do not be paranoid.  Do not rant.  These are a sure ways to
indicate that more money should be budgeted for public relations.

3) Be brief.  If you cannot summarize your argument into a single
paragraph, neither will the reader of the mail.  The mail system is
already overloaded, and concision indicates politeness.

4) Write in standard English.  Use a spelling checker, and use
complete sentences.

5) Offer to help.  Offer to make timely review of proposed policies.
If they accept your aid, keep your promises.

6) Have someone else read your letter for content and for form.  You
can do this yourself if you put the text aside for a week or two.
Remember that obsession with keeping every cleverness you think up in
a text is the surest way to ensure that it never improve.

Eric




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: crunch@netcom.com (John Draper)
Date: Fri, 5 Feb 93 10:50:46 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: A Bug?
Message-ID: <9302051847.AA05772@netcom3.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



  Don't know if it's something stupid I'm doing,  or if there's a bug
in the Mac PGP 2.1,   but after selecting Text only,  and Radix 64
mode,   after encrypting the text,   I lose all carriage returns
after decrypting it.   Almost everything I get had no carriage
returns in it.    I use the Think C editor,  or BBEdit for editing
my text.   Is there an option that permits PGP to retain the carriage
returns?

JD




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: crunch@netcom.com (John Draper)
Date: Fri, 5 Feb 93 11:01:06 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: RE: 'Sunday Times' article on GSM changes
Message-ID: <9302051857.AA06134@netcom3.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



>What makes you think they don't have the same kind of REMOB/BLV capability
>to the cellular telephone switches?  I mean, if a conversation is scrambled
>from the mobile phone to the switch over the radio, it must be unscrambled
>at the switch before it can be transmitted over the trunk lines into the
>PSTN network, and that's where the FBI places their tie-lines and REMOB
>units.

As far as I know,   most cellular interfaces to the BOC system is
digital.    But I suppose there might be some interface somewhere.
I'll put a few "feelers" out and see what I come up with.

JD

(Scuse line noise..)




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: gnu (John Gilmore)
Date: Fri, 5 Feb 93 11:17:05 PST
To: pmetzger@shearson.com (Perry E. Metzger)
Subject: Re: `Sunday Times' article on GSM changes
In-Reply-To: <9302051715.AA22381@maggie.shearson.com>
Message-ID: <9302051916.AA23983@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> > ... voice data requires about 64Khz...

Actually I think you meant 64 kbits/sec.

> Just as a point of information, you can compress voice into 4kbit/sec
> without any real loss of quality.

I wouldn't say "without any real loss of quality".  I have an AT&T secure
phone on loan for evaluation (attendees at the last Mt. View cypherpunks
meeting have played with it).  It compresses voice to 4800 b/s then encrypts
it and uses a stripped down V.32 modem to send it.

The voice is intelligible on the other end, but there is definitely a
loss of quality.  It sounds like you are talking through the bubbler
in an aquarium (underwater).  But it is possible to recognize
someone's voice on the other end, at least when you already know who
it is.  "No real loss of quality" goes way too far.

By the way, I have public domain (federally written) code that
compresses voice down to this size.  It's called CELP, Code Excited
Linear Prediction.  The only catch is the code they wrote runs much
slower than realtime (on workstations).  My guess is that there are
significant speedups that we could make by hacking on it and running
gprof.  Van Jacobson has done some work on this, but his policy seems
to be to sit on anything good for two to three years before releasing
it.  Anyone interested in beating him to the net with something that
would compress voice (or voicemail) in realtime on a 486 or a SPARC?

	John




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: ALAN DORN HETZEL JR <dorn@indigo.mese.com>
Date: Mon, 8 Feb 93 07:56:35 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: *Private* E-Mail to White House
Message-ID: <00967ACF.B07B7BE0.15202@INDIGO.MESE.COM>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Maybe we should suggest as a central theme to our first letter that the
White House should set up one or more PGP keys of their own.  The main
purpose being that then one could E-Mail someone in the administration
with reasonable certainty that the message could neither be intercepted
nor tampered with.  Of course, once they get around to responding via
e-mail, it works both ways....

Alan Dorn Hetzel, Jr.
dorn@indigo.mese.com

p.s. I'm not wired up with PGP yet because i'm using a VAX running VMS
     and DECUS UUCP.  Has anybody ported PGP to this platform?  Ideas?




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: deltorto@aol.com
Date: Fri, 5 Feb 93 08:46:33 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Dear Mr. President
Message-ID: <9302051147.tn12993@aol.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Here are a few thoughts on the letter we will send to Bill.

[A] We should make up a key for the whole group with an insanely long
password and all get together and sign it in person.

[B] We should send our message to Bill _heavily_ encrypted and as anonymously
as possible (I'm talkin' to you remailer studs), and we should send the key
under a separate 'envelope.' I suggest that this will definitely get the
White House's attention (probably a lot of other people at the No Shit
Association too, but hey...).

[C] Beyond a congratulatory notes that he has actually bothered to take the
Presidency "online," the letter might focus on two main areas:

1. Technology/Privacy:
- Privacy and how important it is to the preservation of Democracy.
Mentioning the White House email situation to bring it home.
- Advancement of technology and how the Government can support us by getting
the fuck out of the way and/or providing R&D support (hear, hear, Crunch).
I.e let's get those data highways rolling along.
- How we feel about the various Intelligence Services of the US Government
and how taming them might improve our international reputation. And tell them
not to fuck with our mobile phones, etc.

Politics:
We might also mention how nice it is that he supports Family Values (unlike
Bush and rich Cronies), how savvy he is to leave gays in the military alone
(unlike most of the GI's I have ever heard of, who mercilessly harrass
women), what a good thing it is to house homeless people in unused military
barracks and how important it is to send aid to Russia before they come over
here and try to live in our unused military barracks, stuff like that.

[D] Let's make it a nice letter, full of support, good vibes and humor. We
are an interesting group of engineers, artists and creative people and he
should be reminded that we are watching him and that he has some support. The
guy has a tough job cleaning up all the shit the Bushmen left behind. He
deserves some goodwill.

[E] ?

  dave




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: pmetzger@shearson.com (Perry E. Metzger)
Date: Fri, 5 Feb 93 10:53:24 PST
To: huntting@glarp.com
Subject: Re: `Sunday Times' article on GSM changes
Message-ID: <9302051715.AA22381@maggie.shearson.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> From: Brad Huntting <huntting@glarp.com>
> 
> It would seem that both the sender and reciever need to be exactly
> syncronized to within 1/4 of a bit for this to work.  Since voice
> data requires about 64Khz

Just as a point of information, you can compress voice into 4kbit/sec
without any real loss of quality.

Perry




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: crunch@netcom.com (John Draper)
Date: Fri, 5 Feb 93 12:20:11 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: `Sunday Times' article on GSM changes
Message-ID: <9302052019.AA05398@netcom2.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Gilmore writes:

>Anyone interested in beating him to the net with something that
>would compress voice (or voicemail) in realtime on a 486 or a SPARC?

I used to build voice scramblers,  but mostly in hardware using
a Psuedo noise source.    It wirked pretty good,  but had to
compress the bandwidth down to about 2kHz.   Thus the reason
why it sounds like talking in a tunnel.    Has anyone done a
feasability study on whether of not a 486 or Sparc station can
do this in real time?

It would seem to me that Voice mail systems should incorperate
this in their system,   thus scrambling the messages unless a
access code can be used to retrieve it.   

JD




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Eric Hughes <hughes@soda.berkeley.edu>
Date: Fri, 5 Feb 93 12:25:23 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: 'Sunday Times' article on GSM changes
In-Reply-To: <9302051849.AA18299@ack.adstest.analog.com>
Message-ID: <9302052022.AA16372@soda.berkeley.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Eric Fogleman writes:

>If getting around GSM encryption is no problem, then why are governments
>pushing the issue?

Cryptography is all economics.  Every barrier adds cost to interception.

Eric





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: deboni@diego.llnl.gov (Tom DeBoni)
Date: Fri, 5 Feb 93 12:44:58 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: hardware scramblers
Message-ID: <9302052040.AA24629@diego.llnl.gov>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I don't know a whole lot about this subject, but I'd like to hazard a suggestion
about hardware scramblers. I once upon a time saw an article in some source,
perhaps Popular Science or the like, on how to build a cheap voice scrambler
for telephones using a circuit called a ring demodulator (or something like
that). The curcuit had a ring of diodes, looking like a bridge rectifier,
with the voice and noise source feeding in and some function of the inputs
feeding out. The idea was to pick a radio station at random, use its audio as
a noise source, and let your partner at the other find the station that
renders the signal comprehensble. This only works if both parties have access
to the same radio signals, and can easily be defeated in short order by any
eavesdroppers with radios, but taping your conversation does them no good.
Further, it's cheap, requires no compression or sophisticated hardware, and
uses the whole telephone voice bandwidth.

I've never tried this, so I don't know how well it works, but since it's an
old idea, perhaps it could be dressed up for modern needs.

Tom DeBoni
deboni@llnl.gov




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: dead@phantom.com (Bruce Fancher)
Date: Fri, 5 Feb 93 10:05:43 PST
To: deltorto@aol.com
Subject: Re: Dear Mr. President
In-Reply-To: <9302051147.tn12993@aol.com>
Message-ID: <m0nKXN7-000k1sC@phantom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>Politics:
>We might also mention how nice it is that he supports Family Values (unlike
>Bush and rich Cronies), how savvy he is to leave gays in the military alone
>(unlike most of the GI's I have ever heard of, who mercilessly harrass
>women), what a good thing it is to house homeless people in unused military
>barracks and how important it is to send aid to Russia before they come over
>here and try to live in our unused military barracks, stuff like that.

	Why don't we just stick to privacy and encryption and leave out
everything else?  There is no way I'm going to affix my name to a letter
expressing any of the above opinions. 

-- 
Bruce Fancher -+- dead@phantom.com





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: thug@phantom.com (Murdering Thug)
Date: Fri, 5 Feb 93 10:18:57 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: RE: 'Sunday Times' article on GSM changes
Message-ID: <m0nKXZq-000k1sC@phantom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



According to what I read it seems that the whole issue of cellular radio
signal encryption is really a non-issue.  They could have the most secure
standard for radio signal encryption and it wouldn't matter.  The FBI
already uses tie lines and REMOBs (remote observation units) at the telephone
switching centers to access the conversation on any particular local loop
(phone number) that they want.  I know, because in my younger days as a phone
phreak my friends and I used to play with REMOBs and BLV all the time, so 
I personally know that they exist.  

What makes you think they don't have the same kind of REMOB/BLV capability
to the cellular telephone switches?  I mean, if a conversation is scrambled
from the mobile phone to the switch over the radio, it must be unscrambled
at the switch before it can be transmitted over the trunk lines into the
PSTN network, and that's where the FBI places their tie-lines and REMOB
units.

Like someone else in this thread already mentioned, high-level end-to-end
encryption is the only way to protect your privacy.

Thug 




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Eric Fogleman <Eric.Fogleman@analog.com>
Date: Fri, 5 Feb 93 10:52:13 PST
To: thug@phantom.com
Subject: RE: 'Sunday Times' article on GSM changes
Message-ID: <9302051849.AA18299@ack.adstest.analog.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


(Thug writes)

> According to what I read it seems that the whole issue of cellular radio
> signal encryption is really a non-issue.  They could have the most secure
...
> What makes you think they don't have the same kind of REMOB/BLV capability
> to the cellular telephone switches?  I mean, if a conversation is scrambled
...

If getting around GSM encryption is no problem, then why are governments
pushing the issue?

Eric Fogleman





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: thug@phantom.com (Murdering Thug)
Date: Fri, 5 Feb 93 11:40:52 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: RE: 'Sunday Times' article on GSM changes
In-Reply-To: <9302051849.AA18299@ack.adstest.analog.com>
Message-ID: <m0nKYr1-000k1tC@phantom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


(Eric Fogleman writes)
> (Thug writes)
> > According to what I read it seems that the whole issue of cellular radio
> > signal encryption is really a non-issue.  They could have the most secure
> ...
> > What makes you think they don't have the same kind of REMOB/BLV capability
> > to the cellular telephone switches?  I mean, if a conversation is scrambled
> ...
> 
> If getting around GSM encryption is no problem, then why are governments
> pushing the issue?
> 
> Eric Fogleman

The first reason is that they want to steer people's attentions away from the
real issues.  Thus if they are defeated on this one, they can say "Oh well,
we'll be nice guys and you chaps this one.. but from now on leave us alone and
let us go about our business of protecting you from yourselves." Basically,
they want to fight us every step of the way, to make sure we don't get close
enough to really start eating into their security..

The second reason of course is that they want to play super g-men, and ride
around in vans full of cellular equipment following their suspects around
the city.  It's just too damn boring for them to dail up a REMOB at the
cellular switch and listen in that way in the confort of their own offices.
They need outdoor recreation, they need to feel like they're all James Bond
or something.  That's what the second reason is.

Practically speaking though, cellular encryption does hamper their ability
to listen in.  Because sometimes they don't have access to the REMOB at
a cellular switch, like when they are listening in without a warrant.  If
they access the REMOB, that would be noted in a log somewhere and then they
could have problems if the suspect finds out they were wiretapping without
a warrant.  If they just pick it off the air, they don't need a warrant. If
they do a wiretap the old way, they do.  Hence, secure cellular encryption
would actually prevent unauthorized wiretapping, which is something they
never seem to mention to the people they are empowered to protect. 

 
Thug 




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: ncselxsi!chasw@netcom.com (Charles E. Wareing)
Date: Fri, 5 Feb 93 15:22:47 PST
To: eff.org!phiber@netcom.com (Phiber Optik)
Subject: Re: 'Sunday Times' article on GSM changes
In-Reply-To: <199302052123.AA26150@eff.org>
Message-ID: <9302052253.AA16230@ncselxsi.UUCP>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text


> 
> I must admit, the last thing I would've thought I'd see on this list is
> mindless, uninformed blabbering about "REMOBz".
> Give it a rest, will ya?

Maybe I'm a little out-of-sorts today, but...

I've heard (via Tv reports, reading, etc) that PhiberOptik (paraphrasing
here) "...knows more about Phone Systems than most Bell engineers".  Why
on Earth would you respond the way you did, rather than:

   1. Ignoring it
   2. Providing pointers to technical sources
   3. Refuting it with information.

I flame about *lots* of stuff, though I am, after all, a Sensei. Lose 
sight of your ability to teach, and you are nothing more than another
Technocrat.



-- 
Charlie Wareing    [:-)>             * "If it ain't broke, don't fix it"
chasw@ncselxsi.uucp                  * "If it's jammed, force it. If it
ELXSI 6400s fixed while you wait.    *   breaks, it needed replacing anyway."




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: gnu (John Gilmore)
Date: Fri, 5 Feb 93 16:12:59 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com, gnu
Subject: CELP speech compression code at cygnus.com:/pub/celp.speech.tar.Z
Message-ID: <9302060012.AA00780@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


The code is up for FTP where you-all can get it.  I made both compressed
and gzip'd versions (gzip gives smaller files than compress, is faster
to decompress, but slower to compress).

-rw-rw-r--   1 gnu      cygnus    2571835 Feb  5 16:04 celp.speech.tar.Z
-rw-rw-r--   1 gnu      cygnus    2099441 Feb  5 16:09 celp.speech.tar.z

Much of the tar file is samples of compressed and uncompressed speech,
(used for testing the code).  The actual C code is about 340K uncompressed,
and there's also a Fortran version in there.

I have a copy of the actual compression standard, but not online.
The Information Liberation Front is welcome to a copy -- maybe
I should just leave it on the table at the next meeting and hope someone
"anonymously" picks it up and scans it in.  It's public domain, so
there's no special thrill from liberating it.

	John




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Phiber Optik <phiber@eff.org>
Date: Fri, 5 Feb 93 13:25:04 PST
To: thug@phantom.com (Murdering Thug)
Subject: RE: 'Sunday Times' article on GSM changes
In-Reply-To: <m0nKYr1-000k1tC@phantom.com>
Message-ID: <199302052123.AA26150@eff.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I must admit, the last thing I would've thought I'd see on this list is
mindless, uninformed blabbering about "REMOBz".
Give it a rest, will ya?





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: pmetzger@shearson.com (Perry E. Metzger)
Date: Fri, 5 Feb 93 18:57:18 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: CELP speech compression code at cygnus.com:/pub/celp.speech.tar.Z
Message-ID: <9302060139.AA06488@maggie.shearson.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> From: gnu@toad.com (John Gilmore)
> 
> The code is up for FTP where you-all can get it.  I made both compressed
> and gzip'd versions (gzip gives smaller files than compress, is faster
> to decompress, but slower to compress).
> 
> -rw-rw-r--   1 gnu      cygnus    2571835 Feb  5 16:04 celp.speech.tar.Z
> -rw-rw-r--   1 gnu      cygnus    2099441 Feb  5 16:09 celp.speech.tar.z
> 
> Much of the tar file is samples of compressed and uncompressed speech,
> (used for testing the code).  The actual C code is about 340K uncompressed,
> and there's also a Fortran version in there.
> 
> I have a copy of the actual compression standard, but not online.
> The Information Liberation Front is welcome to a copy -- maybe
> I should just leave it on the table at the next meeting and hope someone
> "anonymously" picks it up and scans it in.  It's public domain, so
> there's no special thrill from liberating it.

It occured to me that some people might not get the significance of all
this, so prehaps I ought to amplify. 

With the ability to compress speech down into the
same baud rate as, say, a V.32 modem, all one would have to do to have
perfectly secure voice communications is replace your phone with a
setup that took in your speech, digitized it, compressed it, encrypted
it, and sent it over the modem to the other side where this would be
inverted. Fast enough software compression of voice would mean any PC 
with a DSP card and a V.32 modem could become an unbreakable scrambler.
The chief problem is that the DSP needed to do decent compression is
very crunchy, and encryption also tends to be crunchy, so there aren't
typically enough cycles on your average PC. Of course, were someone to
commercially market a board that did all this in hardware...

Perry




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Johan Helsingius <julf@penet.FI>
Date: Fri, 5 Feb 93 12:22:44 PST
To: "Perry E. Metzger" <pmetzger@shearson.com>
Subject: Re: `Sunday Times' article on GSM changes
In-Reply-To: <9302051715.AA22381@maggie.shearson.com>
Message-ID: <9302052105.aa02995@penet.penet.FI>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



> Just as a point of information, you can compress voice into 4kbit/sec
> without any real loss of quality.

GSM uses 11.5 kbit/s. GSM is also supposed to provide a digital 9600 bd
async connection, but I have not yet seen any implementations of data
GSM. Some manufacturers are promising to ship products supporting it during
1993...

	Julf





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Phiber Optik <phiber@eff.org>
Date: Sat, 6 Feb 93 00:09:28 PST
To: ncselxsi!chasw@netcom.com (Charles E. Wareing)
Subject: Re: 'Sunday Times' article on GSM changes
In-Reply-To: <9302052253.AA16230@ncselxsi.UUCP>
Message-ID: <199302060808.AA04899@eff.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> 
> > 
> > I must admit, the last thing I would've thought I'd see on this list is
> > mindless, uninformed blabbering about "REMOBz".
> > Give it a rest, will ya?
> 
> Maybe I'm a little out-of-sorts today, but...
> 
> I've heard (via Tv reports, reading, etc) that PhiberOptik (paraphrasing
> here) "...knows more about Phone Systems than most Bell engineers".  Why
> on Earth would you respond the way you did, rather than:
> 
>    1. Ignoring it
>    2. Providing pointers to technical sources
>    3. Refuting it with information.
> 
> I flame about *lots* of stuff, though I am, after all, a Sensei. Lose 
> sight of your ability to teach, and you are nothing more than another
> Technocrat.
> 
> 
> 
> -- 
> Charlie Wareing    [:-)>             * "If it ain't broke, don't fix it"
> chasw@ncselxsi.uucp                  * "If it's jammed, force it. If it
> ELXSI 6400s fixed while you wait.    *   breaks, it needed replacing anyway."
> 
> 
OK, you forced me into it.  Sigh.  The reason for the short quip is because
I know the person who posted it, and I get rather impatient after the 
thousandth time hot air starts up the silly rumor mill.
A telecom manufacturing company by the name of Teltone makes a product called
a REMOBS, for REMote OBservation System (their part number M240, M241, M242).
Somewhere along the line, numerous years ago, someone must've thought this was
a "cool" name, and wrote a text file which was uploaded to various "underground
BBS's", making up a whole fantasy story that this is some top secret system,
and one could simply dial into it, enter a code in touch-tone, enter a phone
number, and proceed to listen in on a conversation.  THIS IS COMPLETE NONSENSE.
Because of this misinformation, every time some kid comes across some unknown
phone number (anything from phone company test lines, to beepers), they claim
they've found a "REMOB".  There's always some blatant liar who contributes to
the propaganda by claiming they listen in to phone lines.
The actual product (go ahead and order the specs), is to sample trunk quality
by making a metallic connection.  The archaic M240 from the 70's, was for
electromechanical switches, the M241 was a portable model, and I believe the
M242 was for electronic switches.  They do have a remote feature, which allows
one to enter a code and specify a sequence of digits indicating a certain
trunk (depending on however it was wired in).  It's a rather low-tech piece of
equipment, and suffice to say, the BOCs DO NOT USE IT.  There are a number
of trunk and line testing systems which have been in standard use in the RBOCs
for years.  The fabled "REMOB" is not one of them.  In brief, the Switching
Control Centers (SCCs) and Network Terminal Equipment Centers (NTECs) use a
system called CAROT (Centralized Automatic Reporting On Trunks), a batch system
that in turn uses the complement of standard test lines (1004Hz S/N, type 105
ATMS, short ckt, open ckt, impedance, etc, etc.) to provide more than adequate
testing of trunks.  Digital switches (i.e. 5ESS and DMS100) have their own
trunk testing facilities.  As far as line testing goes, the Repair Service
Bureau (RSB) uses a plethora of systems.  Namely LMOS/MLT (Loop Maintenance
Operations System/Mechanized Line Testing), Tracker, Predictor, etc., etc.
I could go on and on, but I think I've made my point.
It's a SCIENCE, and it's silly to even consider such an irrelevant piece of
garbage as a REMOBS.  It's a gross and purposeless rumor, and now you see
why I hesitated wasting the time in explaining all this, because it comes up
OVER and OVER and OVER.





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "DrZaphod" <ncselxsi!drzaphod@ncselxsi.netcom.com>
Date: Sat, 6 Feb 93 09:27:02 PST
To: CypherPunks@toad.com
Subject: RE: 'Sunday Times' article on GSM changes
Message-ID: <30494.drzaphod@ncselxsi>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


In Message Fri, 5 Feb 93 13:14:58 EST,
  phantom.com!thug@netcomsv.netcom.com (Murdering Thug) writes:

>According to what I read it seems that the whole issue of cellular radio
>signal encryption is really a non-issue.  They could have the most secure
>standard for radio signal encryption and it wouldn't matter.  The FBI
>already uses tie lines and REMOBs (remote observation units) at the telephone
>switching centers to access the conversation on any particular local loop
>(phone number) that they want.

     The reason cells are encrypting is to protect against "unauthorized
persons" [i.e civilians who havn't joined the fedz and DON'T live off other
people's money [ours]].  I think this is another case that shows: letting
other people encrypt your data for your protection never works out to be
much good.  I agree with Thug in that we need to employ our OWN encryption
from one end to the other.  That CRYPTOCUP soundz pretty good right about
now.  TTFN!

DrZaphod
[AC/DC] / [DnA][HP]
[drzaphod@ncselxsi.uucp]
Technicolorized




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: thug@phantom.com (Murdering Thug)
Date: Sat, 6 Feb 93 12:16:33 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Compressed/Encrypted Voice using Modems
In-Reply-To: <9302060139.AA06488@maggie.shearson.com>
Message-ID: <m0nKvtB-000jrIC@phantom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Perry E. Metzger writes:
> It occured to me that some people might not get the significance of all
> this, so prehaps I ought to amplify. 
> 
> With the ability to compress speech down into the
> same baud rate as, say, a V.32 modem, all one would have to do to have
> perfectly secure voice communications is replace your phone with a
> setup that took in your speech, digitized it, compressed it, encrypted
> it, and sent it over the modem to the other side where this would be
> inverted. Fast enough software compression of voice would mean any PC 
> with a DSP card and a V.32 modem could become an unbreakable scrambler.
> The chief problem is that the DSP needed to do decent compression is
> very crunchy, and encryption also tends to be crunchy, so there aren't
> typically enough cycles on your average PC. Of course, were someone to
> commercially market a board that did all this in hardware...

This is a device waiting to be built, if it has not been built already.
I would estimate that a pair of such stand-alone encrypted telephones can
be built for under $2000 and about a month or two of development time.

And why are you limiting this to V.32 (9600bps)?  V.32bis (14.4k bps) modem
chips cost maybe 20% more than v.32 chips in quantity.

Even higher speeds are available if you're willing to go that far.  Zyxel
v.32bis modems have proprietary 16.8 kbps and 19.2 kbps full duplex raw
modulation rates, but they use DSPs instead of modem chips like the
ones from Rockwell, AT&T, and Intel.  I believe there are some v.FAST
(not CCITT compliant) modems like the one's from Motorola (Codex) that
can do 21.6 kbps and 24.0 kbps.  I believe the final speed of v.FAST once
standardized by the CCITT will be 28.8 kbps.

Even so, if CEPT coding provides somewhat intelligeable speech at 4800 bps,
then I am sure the sound quality at 14,400 bps is at least as good as
regular analog telphone conversations when it comes to voice.

Consider a device that uses this: 

       A. a dedicated CEPT codec chip if they currently exist
            OR
          a DSP chip programmed for CEPT compression coding/decoding 

       B. a high-speed dedicated DES chip
            OR 
          a RISC microcontroller (i960/amd29k) to do IDEA or LOKI 

       C. a quality UART like the Zilog SCC or National 16550AFN 

       D. an external 14,400 bps modem ( v.42 & v.42bis turned off)

                  _____         _____         _____          _____
  earpiece <-----|     |       |     |       |     |        |     | 
                 |     |  bus  |     |  bus  |     | RS-232 |     |
                 |  A  |-------|  B  |-------|  C  |--------|  D  |-----: RJ-11
                 |     |       |     |       |     |        |     |       jack 
mouthpiece >-----|_____|       |_____|       |_____|        |_____| 
                                                |
                                                |
                                           dialing keypad
                                         on/off-hook switch
                                             circuit

Of course, if the FBI's Digital Telephony act passes it would be illegal to
sell such devices if they do not have a back door.  HOWEVER, it would not
be illegal to build such devices for personal use.  Hence, one may publish
the schematics and DSP/microcontroller source code to such a device and
let people build them themselves.  However, the masses would not benefit
from this.  Only those with the skills or those with the money (mafia/drug
lords) to pay those with the skills, would be able to produce such devices
for their own use.  The FBI's proposal would not stop the people they want
to catch most from using encryption.  The FBI is wasting their time, and
taking away our rights for no good reason.

I assume a black market for such devices as the above already exists and
will expand massively as the price of DSPs and RISC microcontrollers
drops.  The logical end result would be to put this whole device onto a
single VLSI chip, and selling such crypt-phones for $100-200 a pop to the
mases, but there's a snowballs chance in hell of that happening if the world's
governments have anything to do with it.


Thug




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Phil Karn <karn@qualcomm.com>
Date: Sat, 6 Feb 93 18:17:30 PST
To: deltorto@aol.com
Subject: Re: White Mail
Message-ID: <9302070216.AA22433@servo>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



>E-MAIL RULING MAY HAMPER CLINTON ADMINISTRATION

Hmm, I wonder what would happen if they start using PGP? After all,
the Federal government has full rights to use RSA. (Dunno about IDEA).

I have mixed feelings on this issue. On the one hand, the people have
a right to know how government authority is being exercised. On the other
hand, even people in government have privacy rights. And if you mandate
that their email is a public record, then they will just find other ways
to have private conversations.

Maybe the real answer lies in not giving them so much power in the first place.

Phil





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Arthur Abraham <a2@well.sf.ca.us>
Date: Sat, 6 Feb 93 22:05:56 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: It's the Information, (that keeps you from being) Stupid!
Message-ID: <199302070603.AA14462@well.sf.ca.us>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Charles E. Wareing writes:

>I've heard (via Tv reports, reading, etc) that PhiberOptik (paraphrasing
>here) "...knows more about Phone Systems than most Bell engineers".  Why
>on Earth would you respond the way you did, rather than:
>
>   1. Ignoring it
>   2. Providing pointers to technical sources
>   3. Refuting it with information.

I strongly support this statement, particularly 3.

-a2.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Peter Shipley <shipley@tfs.COM>
Date: Sat, 6 Feb 93 22:16:48 PST
To: thug@phantom.com (Murdering Thug)
Subject: Re: Compressed/Encrypted Voice using Modems
In-Reply-To: <m0nKvtB-000jrIC@phantom.com>
Message-ID: <9302070615.AA19855@edev0.TFS>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



>
>And why are you limiting this to V.32 (9600bps)?  V.32bis (14.4k bps) modem
>chips cost maybe 20% more than v.32 chips in quantity.
>


at Interopt I heard some voice demos that were at 9600 4800 and 2400 baud
the 2400 sounded a phoneme chip but was *very* resionable.


		-Pete





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Marc Horowitz <marc@Athena.MIT.EDU>
Date: Sat, 6 Feb 93 22:06:54 PST
To: thug@phantom.com (Murdering Thug)
Subject: Re: Compressed/Encrypted Voice using Modems
In-Reply-To: <m0nKvtB-000jrIC@phantom.com>
Message-ID: <9302070605.AA27822@hodge>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>> Of course, if the FBI's Digital Telephony act passes it would be illegal to
>> sell such devices if they do not have a back door.  

Not True.

The proposed legislation states:

	  (a)  Providers of electronic communication services and private 
    branch exchange operators shall provide within the United States 
    capability and capacity for the government to intercept wire and 
    electronic communications when authorized by law:  

This law does not prevent *users* from providing *end-to-end*
encryption.

This does not mean that they might not try to remove this right in the
future, but they haven't gone that far yet.

		Marc




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Phiber Optik <phiber@eff.org>
Date: Sat, 6 Feb 93 22:49:38 PST
To: gnu@toad.com
Subject: Re: 'Sunday Times' article on GSM changes
In-Reply-To: <9302061733.AA10282@toad.com>
Message-ID: <199302070648.AA14155@eff.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> 
> Thanks for going into more detail on the REMOB fantasy.
> 
> Can you tell the group what facilities are available that actually do
> allow a technician to monitor a particular line (or group of lines),
> e.g. what could a telco emp or a phone phreak do (regarding a short or
> long term wiretap) if they wanted?  And what facilities are *actually
> used* when a court-ordered wiretap is implemented?  My impression is
> that the two are different.
> 
> 	John
> 
I'm glad you brought up this subject, John, because there is indeed a good
deal of misinformation in this area.
I'll start off with some of the numerous facilities available to a telco
technician.  The first I'll mention is MLT (Mechanized Loop or Line Testing),
a system which is part of the LCAMOS group of systems (Loop and Cable Admini-
stration Maintenance Operations System).  Used by Repair Service Attendants,
it's seamlessly accessed through LMOS (Loop Maintenance Operations System),
when the attendant specifies a 'mask' (form type) that would involve a real-
time test to be performed.  At the heart of LMOS is a System 370-type pro-
cessor.  Attendants access the various functions through a Front End (FE)
system, commonly running Unix.  The data comprising customer records and
their corresponding trouble reports/service histories is kept on a high-
capacity storage system (nicknamed the HICAPs).  Each front-end accesses
data from different HICAPs for the respective areas they cover.  Getting
back to masks, when the attendant gets a call on 611, upon the customer
hanging up, they usually issue the TEST mask, which accesses MLT which in
turn establishes a metallic connection to the phone line.  MLT then carries
out impedance, capacitance, frequency/amplitude response tests (at 404Hz,
1004Hz, and 2804Hz, standard), tests for line activity, etc., etc.  The
attendant then has the option to open a trouble record (using the ESTablish
mask), to initiate further testing and repair, possibly dispatching someone,
etc.  I'm getting a bit off topic, but I thought some background was in order
rather than just saying "MLT monitors lines, so there".  What I'm driving at
in this scenario is that there is also a mask known as TV, for Trouble
Verification.  The /FORm associated with this mask requests such information
as the phone number, the 3-digit employee code, a callback number for security,
and the type of TV (RCA, Magnavox, Toshiba, just kidding :), types being talk,
(the attendant can be heard) or monitor without speech path, to name the most
relevant.  It would not be impossible to substitute "someone with a computer
and the know-how" in the place of the word "attendant", but don't overestimate
this possibility.  It's bragged about FAR more than it is actually done.  But
it remains a possibility.
I'll continue this in successive messages, so it's in manageable chunks.





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Phiber Optik <phiber@eff.org>
Date: Sat, 6 Feb 93 23:44:31 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: (Non)Privacy in Phone System...
Message-ID: <199302070743.AA14539@eff.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


My last message was about LMOS/MLT, and MLT's monitoring capabilities of
subscriber lines.  Another phone company testing system worth mentioning
is SARTS (and DACS and SMAS.  That's three, but they're related.)  SARTS
is the Switched Access Remote Test System, and is used in testing special
service circuits.  And what's special service?  A lot of things that AREN'T
POTS (Plain Old Telephone Service).  Anything from WATS service, to digital
carriers (DDS, T1, etc.), and so on.  And it's the hard working men and women
of the aptly named Special Services Center (or just "Special Services") who
oversee nearly every aspect of installation and maintenance.  Ah, yes.
(Clears throat)  The reason I mention them is because every digital carrier
goes through your friendly neighborhood BOC central office, whether it be
a company's private carrier or someone's dedicated connection to the Internet
(EFF's, toad's, etc.).  Like MLT is a system used to test subscriber lines
in real time, so SARTS is a system used to test special service circuits.
In conjunction with SMAS (Switched Maintenance Access System), and the ability
to jack-in with their favorite test equipment (such as the much liked T-BERD),
together they make up an unbeatable arsenal in trouble shooting.  So why do
they screw up your leased-line service?  There are three rules in maintenance:
Training, training, and, of course, training.  Or lack thereof.
The lovely system which complements these, and even supercedes the need for
SMAS points, is DACS, the Digital Access and Cross-connect System.  One of its
most notable abilities, is providing per-channel 64kbps (DS0) electronic
cross-connection and test access to individual channels, IN ANALOG OR DIGITAL
FORM, from a T1 (DS1).  Sounds neat.  The FBI says "It can't be done!  You
have to make it built in!"  But it IS built in, they're just not allowed to
play with it (or are they anyway?)  Life is funny sometimes.

I'm going to pause for now, and concentrate on my Sherlock Holmes movie.
I'll see if my messages are well received, and pick it up tomorrow.





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: jim@tadpole.com (Jim Thompson)
Date: Sun, 7 Feb 93 02:03:20 PST
To: thug@phantom.com
Subject: Re: Compressed/Encrypted Voice using Modems
Message-ID: <9302071001.AA00783@ono-sendai>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



> From: Peter Shipley <shipley@tfs.COM>

> >And why are you limiting this to V.32 (9600bps)?  V.32bis (14.4k bps) modem
> >chips cost maybe 20% more than v.32 chips in quantity.
> 
> at Interopt I heard some voice demos that were at 9600 4800 and 2400 baud
> the 2400 sounded a phoneme chip but was *very* resionable.

Quite likely what you heard were 9600/4800/2400bps (bits per second),
not baud.  The two are different.  2400bps compression of voice is
quite a bit beyond current GP CPUs.

Also, note that 9600 baud (V.32 carriers) are based on a 2400bps carrier.
(And if they're not, I'm sure someone will correct me.)  2400 baud modems
are based a bit rate something less than 2400bps, though I can't remember
exactly what it is right now.

Jim





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: jim@tadpole.com (Jim Thompson)
Date: Sun, 7 Feb 93 02:58:06 PST
To: thug@phantom.com
Subject: Re:  Compressed/Encrypted Voice using Modems
Message-ID: <9302071056.AA00916@ono-sendai>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> And why are you limiting this to V.32 (9600bps)?  V.32bis (14.4k bps) modem
> chips cost maybe 20% more than v.32 chips in quantity.
> 
> Even higher speeds are available if you're willing to go that far.  Zyxel
> v.32bis modems have proprietary 16.8 kbps and 19.2 kbps full duplex raw
> modulation rates, but they use DSPs instead of modem chips like the
> ones from Rockwell, AT&T, and Intel.  I believe there are some v.FAST
> (not CCITT compliant) modems like the one's from Motorola (Codex) that
> can do 21.6 kbps and 24.0 kbps.  I believe the final speed of v.FAST once
> standardized by the CCITT will be 28.8 kbps.

I don't see how a 28.8kbps (raw) data rate is possible, as the Shannon
limit for a POTS line is 22kbps.  Certainly parts of the phone system
no longer impose the narrow bandwidth that are part of the 'spec', but
one can not always depend on getting a line that exceedes the published
parameters of the phone system.

The Rockwell (RC96AC/RC96ACL/RC144AC/RC144ACL) modem chip (set) has an
on-board codec that does ADPCM in hardware.  It makes for a very nice
programable answering machine.  Interestingly, the designers guide has
someting to say about bit rates.

At a sampling rate of 7.2 KHz, (the only sample rate this chipset
supports) 8 bit samples are presented at a bit rate of 57600 bps.  Add
in a start/stop bit, and you now need a DTE rate of 72,000 bps.  Most
UARTS don't support this rate, and thus you will need to find one that
will run at 115.2 Kbps.

Drop to 4 bit samples, and you get a bit rate of 28,800 bps, for a
required async DTE speed of 36,000.  (or 38400 bps on most uarts.)

I'm also fairly sure that recent Zyxel modems (e.g. the U-1496) use
this Rockwell chip(set), and not a dedicated DSP.

Jim




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "A.J. Janschewitz" <p00258@psilink.com>
Date: Sun, 7 Feb 93 06:35:39 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Request from a new reader.
Message-ID: <2938181047.1.p00258@psilink.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I am new to this group and apologize if my request is covered in a FAQ. 
Would someone kindly point me to an FTP site or the location of a binary 
application that can be used to encrypt/decrypt text in an MS-DOS 
environment? I understand that PGP is UNIX-based, unless there is a DOS 
version of which I am unaware, but that's why I'm reading this group.

Thank you in advance for your help.

==a.j.==




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: dclunie@pax.tpa.com.au (David Clunie)
Date: Sat, 6 Feb 93 16:33:58 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: PAX code posted
Message-ID: <9302070032.AA03792@britt>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


After many requests from loyal fans, I have posted the ugly and crude
scripts that used to be the PAX anonymous and encrypted remailing
service to alt.sources.





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: dionf@ERE.UMontreal.CA (Francois Dion)
Date: Sun, 7 Feb 93 09:13:29 PST
To: jim@tadpole.com (Jim Thompson)
Subject: Re: Compressed/Encrypted Voice using Modems
In-Reply-To: <9302071001.AA00783@ono-sendai>
Message-ID: <9302071709.AA28201@brise.ERE.UMontreal.CA>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Beyond the ultraworld of Jim Thompson:
> 
> 
> > From: Peter Shipley <shipley@tfs.COM>
> 
> > at Interopt I heard some voice demos that were at 9600 4800 and 2400 baud
> > the 2400 sounded a phoneme chip but was *very* resionable.
> 
> Quite likely what you heard were 9600/4800/2400bps (bits per second),
> not baud.  The two are different.  2400bps compression of voice is
> quite a bit beyond current GP CPUs.

Well, almost true. 9600 baud !=9600 bps in modems. 9600 bps modems are actually
2400 token per seconds, with each token beeing 4 bit long. 2400 bps modems
are also 2400 bauds (token per seconds) like the 9600 bps modems, but with each
token beeing 1 bit.

> Also, note that 9600 baud (V.32 carriers) are based on a 2400bps carrier.

No, it's the inverse 9600 bps are based on 2400 baud.

> (And if they're not, I'm sure someone will correct me.)  2400 baud modems
> are based a bit rate something less than 2400bps, though I can't remember
> exactly what it is right now.

No, a 2400 bps modem is 2400 baud because each token is 1 bit long.

Ciao,
-- 
Francois Dion
    '  _   _   _ 
 CISM (_) (_)  _) FM       Montreal , Canada       Email: CISM@ERE.UMontreal.CA
      (_)  / . _)             10000 Watts          Telephone no: (514) 343-7511
_______________________________________________________________________________
Audio-C-DJ-Fractals-Future-Label-Multimedia-Music-Radio-Rave-Video-VR-Volvo-...






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: thug@phantom.com (Murdering Thug)
Date: Sun, 7 Feb 93 09:46:59 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Modem Based Crypto Telephones
In-Reply-To: <9302071056.AA00916@ono-sendai>
Message-ID: <m0nLG0P-000jpMC@phantom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


jim@tadpole.com writes:
> thug@phantom.com writes:
> > Even higher speeds are available if you're willing to go that far.  Zyxel
> > v.32bis modems have proprietary 16.8 kbps and 19.2 kbps full duplex raw
> > modulation rates, but they use DSPs instead of modem chips like the
> > ones from Rockwell, AT&T, and Intel.  I believe there are some v.FAST
> > (not CCITT compliant) modems like the one's from Motorola (Codex) that
> > can do 21.6 kbps and 24.0 kbps.  I believe the final speed of v.FAST once
> > standardized by the CCITT will be 28.8 kbps.
> 
> I don't see how a 28.8kbps (raw) data rate is possible, as the Shannon
> limit for a POTS line is 22kbps.  Certainly parts of the phone system
> no longer impose the narrow bandwidth that are part of the 'spec', but
> one can not always depend on getting a line that exceedes the published
> parameters of the phone system.

Then how come Hayes demonstrated their v.FAST modems at Fall Comdex '92 in
Las Vegas.  According to the report on Comdex I am reading, the Hayes
modem dialed up another modem at Hayes headquarters in Atlanta and set
up a perfect 28.8 kbps full duplex raw data link.  With v.42bis the two
modems were exchanging text at close to 115.2 kbps.

> The Rockwell (RC96AC/RC96ACL/RC144AC/RC144ACL) modem chip (set) has an
> on-board codec that does ADPCM in hardware.  It makes for a very nice
> programable answering machine.  Interestingly, the designers guide has
> someting to say about bit rates.
> 
> At a sampling rate of 7.2 KHz, (the only sample rate this chipset
> supports) 8 bit samples are presented at a bit rate of 57600 bps.  Add
> in a start/stop bit, and you now need a DTE rate of 72,000 bps.  Most
> UARTS don't support this rate, and thus you will need to find one that
> will run at 115.2 Kbps.

This is way more than what is needed for telephone quality audio.  I
have programmed voice mail systems based on Dialogic hardware.  They use
a simple ADPCM codec and 6,000 4-bit samples/second.  This gives you
a audio bandwidth of 3khz, basically telephone quality.  At this rate,
we're talking about 6,000 x 4 bits = 24,000 bps.  And this is WITHOUT 
any kind of advanced compression.  A v.FAST modem doing 24.0 kbps
like the Motorola Codex can handle this now, and 28.8 kbps modems
can handles this and provide a 4kbps digital subcarrier for carrying
data with voice.  For instance, I could be having an encrypted conversation
with you and at the same time, I can send you a spreadsheet file at 4 kbps.
Obviously since the entire 28,800 bps stream would be encrypted, the
spreadsheet file would be encrypted as well.

You can also get excellent quality using 4800 samples/second using 3-bit
ADPCM samples.  This would give you 14,400 bps and an analog bandwidth
of 2400hz.  This is lower than phone quality which is 3000hz, but anything
above 2400hz is really useless for transmitting a male speaking voice
which hardly ever goes past 2000hz.  A female voice on the other hand might
sound somewhat distorted if everything above 2400hz is chopped off.  However,
using a DSP, one may shift the 0-2400hz bandwidth to 300-2700hz using a
toggle switch.  Thus all a female would have to do is toggle a switch on
the cryptophone to tell the other side about the shift.
 
> I'm also fairly sure that recent Zyxel modems (e.g. the U-1496) use
> this Rockwell chip(set), and not a dedicated DSP.

No, Zyxel uses a DSP. They are always updating their DSP roms to provide
new features.  Not only do Zyxel modems provide v.32/v.32bis/v.42/v.42bis,
and MNP 1-5, but also MNP 10, Caller ID, Voice Mail, and proprietary
16.8 kbps and 19.2 kbps full duplex modes. 

As soon as ISDN hits the streets, we won't have to worry about bandwidth
since it will be quite easy to build an all-digital crypto-phone that
provides end-to-end encryption based on a public key system.

Picture this: an ISDN phone that can operate in normal or encrypted mode,
that has a small 20mb 1.8" hard disk or flash eprom card to store the public
keys of all the people that you converse with who have similar phones.  In
fact, it is possible to set up a trusted centralized public key directory
assistance like service, which would contain perhaps everyone's public key,
and could be queried automatically at the beginning of each call.  The 20mb
storage could be a public key storage cache for people you call frequently,
while the public key directory assistance is used for people who you only
plan to call once.  On the other hand, a centralized authority is always
bad when it comes to security.  A PGP-like scheme of decentralized public
key distribution is much safer.  If Bob wants to give Mike's public key
(which is stored in Bob's phone) to Joe, all Bob has to do is call up
Joe, tell Joe that he that he wants to give him's Mike's phone number and
public key. Bob then presses a button on his phone and instantly uploads
Mike's public key to Joe's phone, either via a digital subchannel, or
via the main channel (and interrupt the conversation for a few seconds),
like the old video phones used to do to transmit still frames. 
 

Thug




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Eric Hughes <hughes@soda.berkeley.edu>
Date: Sun, 7 Feb 93 18:38:49 PST
To: p00258@psilink.com
Subject: Request from a new reader.
In-Reply-To: <2938181047.1.p00258@psilink.com>
Message-ID: <9302080236.AA05195@soda.berkeley.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


anon-ftp to soda.berkeley.edu::pub/cypherpunks.  There's a copy of PGP
there.  Get the .zip version; it's a PC binary.  PGP was originally
written on PC's and later moved to Unix.

Eric




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: fnordbox!loydb@cs.utexas.edu (Loyd Blankenship)
Date: Sun, 7 Feb 93 22:34:38 PST
To: @adi.analog.com:Eric.Fogleman@analog.com
Subject: Re: 'Sunday Times' article on GSM changes
Message-ID: <9302080056.AA00azz@fnordbox.UUCP>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



:(Thug writes)
:
:> According to what I read it seems that the whole issue of cellular radio
:> signal encryption is really a non-issue.  They could have the most secure
:...
:> What makes you think they don't have the same kind of REMOB/BLV capability
:> to the cellular telephone switches?	I mean, if a conversation is scrambled
:...

Eric Fogleman writes:
:
:If getting around GSM encryption is no problem, then why are governments
:pushing the issue?


This actually hits on one of my favorite rant topics. The feds like to
scream about how hard it is to tap a phone line with digital switching et
al, but don't talk about the fact that anyone with half a brain can tap a
line using the phone company's LMOS.

The only rational theory I've come up with to explain this is that the feds
aren't worried about court-ordered wiretaps, but about illegal wiretaps.
I bet there's a *lot* of monitoring going on out there that they can't get
a court order for, so they're doing it themselves. Monitoring without the
cooperation of the phone company will get harder when the company starts
paying more attention to security -- whether through encryption or simply
using a shredder. :-)

Loyd

***************************************************************************
* loydb@fnordbox.UUCP	     Call the Fnordbox BBS   *	Loyd Blankenship  *
* GEnie: SJGAMES	    2 v32bis lines, 24 hrs   *	PO Box 18957	  *
* Compu$erve: [73407,515]	 512/444-2323	     *	Austin, TX 78760  *
* cs.utexas.edu!dogface!fnordbox!loydb		     *	512/447-7866	  *
***************************************************************************






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Phil Karn <karn@qualcomm.com> (Phil Karn)
Date: Sun, 7 Feb 93 22:07:22 PST
To: jim@tadpole.com (Jim Thompson)
Subject: Re:  Compressed/Encrypted Voice using Modems
Message-ID: <9302080605.AA27589@servo>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


At  7 Feb 04:56 CST, Jim Thompson wrote:

>I don't see how a 28.8kbps (raw) data rate is possible, as the Shannon
>limit for a POTS line is 22kbps.  Certainly parts of the phone system
>no longer impose the narrow bandwidth that are part of the 'spec', but
>one can not always depend on getting a line that exceedes the published
>parameters of the phone system.

Where do you get this figure of 22 kbps? I would tend to dispute it since
I use a Codex FAST modem on my SLIP link and it really does run at 24.0 kb/s
on the wire (not counting compression). The throughput display often reads
30 kb/s even when I'm shipping a pre-compressed or encrypted binary file,
although that's a phony figure because it includes the asynch
start/stop bits that aren't actually sent over the wire.

The usual Shannon limit of a phone line is more like 30 kb/s, although
it can vary enormously. Generalizations are dangerous. At the very least,
you can certainly say that it's no greater than 64kb/s, since it's almost
certain that your call passes through a mu-law codec somewhere.

Back to vocoders, their quality does tend to be a strong function of data
rate. 8kb/s CELP is really not that bad - a little warbly when there's
background noise, but not objectionably so in my opinion. In a mobile
telephone
environment (where I'm familiar with it), it's *much* less objectionable
than the usual impairments you get from ordinary FM analog transmission.

4kb/s is noticeably worse. Things get rapidly better as you go above 10-12
kb/s with present algorithms. Also, vocoders need not be constant rate.
Ours selects
one of four rates on the fly depending on voice activity, which doubles
capacity in a CDMA radio environment. It'd also be useful in a packet
network, although
the small frame sizes (2/5/10/22 bytes) can make header overhead rather
significant.






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: root@extropia.wimsey.com (Anonymous)
Date: Sun, 7 Feb 93 22:51:41 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: No Subject
Message-ID: <199302080630.AA01555@xtropia>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Hi - I tried to use the anon.penet.fi remailer and got a warning that
some people had hacked it to find out for which anonymous ID any user
had.  It sounded like they would forge mail from the person they wanted
to find out about, have it go through penet, and then go to themselves.
Then they could look and see what anonymous ID it seemed to come from.

This has been fixed by making people register a password with the remailer
and then use it whenever they want to forward mail.

I'd like to see some discussion here about this problem so that other
remailers can avoid it.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: John.Nieder@f33.n125.z1.FIDONET.ORG (John Nieder)
Date: Mon, 8 Feb 93 07:59:06 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: CLINTON'S E-MAIL HOAX
Message-ID: <4809.2B768048@fidogate.FIDONET.ORG>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



from: john.nieder@f33.n125.z1.fidonet.org

>The White House writes:

> PS: If you did not include your U.S. mail return address in your
> message and you want a reply, please send your message again and
> include that information.

]     Well this is completely useless, isn't it.. If we imagine this
]logically we can see masses of e-mail entering the White House while snail
]mail trickles out... Definately [sic] a buffer problem |-].  At least
]they're trying, I suppose...

]DrZaphod

The White House E-Mail gambit is a gimmick without substance.  One -
according to a previous Cypherpunks post, the e-mail isn't getting
through; two - they want mailing addresses for acknowledgement, which is
absurd for any number of obvious reasons (take your pick or come up with
your own); finally (this is the _real_ kicker), tonight's news informs
me that the Clinton White House is making a "symbolic" cost-cutting
gesture by reducing staff "up to 25%."  Where will these reductions come
from?  "The reductions will come mostly from staff whose job is to
respond to mail from the public."
     This hoax is the biggest joke since Rush Limbaugh gave out his
CompuServe address.  A collective Cypherpunk e-letter to Slick?  Let's
not & say we did...[yawn!]

      JN

["The White House is informed that no group or persons are authorized by
  Mr. Nieder to speak on his behalf, including Mr. Clinton."]

... Source: "Deniable Asset Squares Up" - San Francisco, CA  
--- Blue Wave/Opus v2.12 [NR]
--  
John Nieder - via FidoNet node 1:125/555
    UUCP - ...!uunet!hoptoad!kumr!fidogate!33!John.Nieder
INTERNET - John.Nieder@f33.n125.z1.FIDONET.ORG




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Phiber Optik <phiber@eff.org>
Date: Sun, 7 Feb 93 21:22:26 PST
To: jim@tadpole.com (Jim Thompson)
Subject: Re: Compressed/Encrypted Voice using Modems
In-Reply-To: <9302071001.AA00783@ono-sendai>
Message-ID: <199302080521.AA05963@eff.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> 
> 
> > From: Peter Shipley <shipley@tfs.COM>
> 
> > >And why are you limiting this to V.32 (9600bps)?  V.32bis (14.4k bps) modem
> > >chips cost maybe 20% more than v.32 chips in quantity.
> > 
> > at Interopt I heard some voice demos that were at 9600 4800 and 2400 baud
> > the 2400 sounded a phoneme chip but was *very* resionable.
> 
> Quite likely what you heard were 9600/4800/2400bps (bits per second),
> not baud.  The two are different.  2400bps compression of voice is
> quite a bit beyond current GP CPUs.
> 
> Also, note that 9600 baud (V.32 carriers) are based on a 2400bps carrier.
> (And if they're not, I'm sure someone will correct me.)  2400 baud modems
> are based a bit rate something less than 2400bps, though I can't remember
> exactly what it is right now.
> 
> Jim
> 
> 

I'd wanted to say something about this for quite some time.  Everyone gets it
wrong, and let's just say you were CLOSE.  Lemme give a quick run down...
bps, or bits-per-second, is the bit rate of the datastream.  Now the rate
of MODULATION is called baud, named after the transmission engineer 
(telegraphy), Baudot.  Very simply, when you divide the bit-rate by the number
of bits per symbol, you get baud.  Everyone is in the (bad) habit of saying
'baud' for everything, because in FSK systems which code 1 bit per symbol
(only two phases), bps = baud.  But then and ONLY then.  They are not
universally synonymous.  But don't feel bad, the entire modem INDUSTRY gets it
wrong, too.  We're all throw backs to the 300 baud days, when 300 baud was
the same as 300 bps, the Bell 103 standard.  This was also true for 110 baud,
and the Bell 202 standard (1200 baud half-duplex).  Now then, when 1200 bps
FULL duplex was designed by CCITT, it was the V.22 standard.  The Bell system
created the Bell 212A standard.  In either case (they were slightly different),
Differential Phase Shift Keying (DPSK) was the modulation scheme, with four
phases, and TWO bits per symbol to encode each phase.  Hence, the full duplex
1200 bps standard modulates at a rate of 600 bauds.  Yes, in engineering, you
say 1 baud, and 2 or more bauds, but just saying baud is accepted.  Another
principle was introduced, called scrambling (that noise sound you hear when
modems handshake is the scrambler kicking in).  This alleviates the fact that
the higher the rate of modulation, the more likely that multiple identical
symbols in a row will cause phase sync errors.  The scrambler ensures that
a bit (1 or 0) does NOT get modulated to the same phase repeatedly.  This is
similar to digital carrier systems, which use AMI (Alternate Mark Inversion),
and have schemes such as BnZS or HDB3 (Binary N Zero Substitution and High
Density Binary 3).  But lemme not confuse you.  I was just drawing up the
parallel.  The scrambler is just a pseudorandom sequence generator (there's a
descrambler, too).  Phases are measured in degrees (360), and each phase is
encoded depending on the number of bits per symbol.  In V.22 and Bell 212A,
there are four phases, 0, 90, 180, and 270.  And each phase is coded with two
bits, or dibits (two bits per symbol, remember?)
Now, we all use the CCITT standard for 2400 bps.  It's called V.22bis.
It uses a scheme known as QAM, Quadrature Amplitude Modulation.  The rate
of modulation is also 600 bauds, but the use of amplitude as well as phase
come into play, and double the throughput.  There are four levels of phase,
and four levels of amplitude, encoded using 4 bits per symbol (quadbits). 
Isn't this fun?  There are a few 4800 bps systems, none of which really matter.
For 9600 bps, we use recommendation V.32.  QAM again, (as was 4800 and 2400),
with two modes of operation: 16 carrier states, and 32 achieved using trellis
encoding.  16 carrier states equals 4 bits per symbol again (QUADrature), and
simple arithmetic should tell you that the modulation rate is 2400 bauds.
V.32bis is an improved (and clever) scheme, with a bit rate of 14400 bps.
Everything I mentioned are full duplex systems (except Bell 202).  Higher bit
rates are achievable in half duplex systems, these modems are generally used
for transfers (polling for mail/news).
Oh, don't forget our error correction/compression protocols.  V.42 (EC), and
V.42bis (EC and compression) being the most common.  V.42bis can achieve a
maximum of 4:1 compression ratio, increasing throughput.  There's also your
Microcom Networking Protocol (MNP), MNP level 5 being the most common and
usually used at lower data rates.

Whew.  I'm probably giving you guys information overflow, so I'll end it for
now.  Just remember.  You measure the speed of a modem in BITS PER SECOND,
NOT BAUD.

See ya.





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Phiber Optik <phiber@eff.org>
Date: Sun, 7 Feb 93 21:38:33 PST
To: dionf@ere.umontreal.ca (Francois Dion)
Subject: Re: Compressed/Encrypted Voice using Modems
In-Reply-To: <9302071709.AA28201@brise.ERE.UMontreal.CA>
Message-ID: <199302080537.AA06100@eff.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> 
> No, a 2400 bps modem is 2400 baud because each token is 1 bit long.
Well, almost.  You got 9600 bps right.
I hope you read my message.

> 
> Ciao,
> -- 
> Francois Dion
>     '  _   _   _ 
>  CISM (_) (_)  _) FM       Montreal , Canada       Email: CISM@ERE.UMontreal.CA
>       (_)  / . _)             10000 Watts          Telephone no: (514) 343-7511
> _______________________________________________________________________________
> Audio-C-DJ-Fractals-Future-Label-Multimedia-Music-Radio-Rave-Video-VR-Volvo-...
> 
> 
> 





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: uni@acs.bu.edu (Shaen Bernhardt)
Date: Mon, 8 Feb 93 00:55:17 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Remailers (List available)
Message-ID: <9302080853.AA166918@acs.bu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



I was hopeing to find a list of the remailers available that use PGP for
traffic encryption.

I noticed that the PAX scripts were made public recently, does anyone plan
to employ them at any of the current remailing sites?

Despite its problems, I thought PAX was on the right track with regard to 
tactics....
Comments?





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: jim@tadpole.com (Jim Thompson)
Date: Mon, 8 Feb 93 02:16:02 PST
To: thug@phantom.com
Subject: Re:  Compressed/Encrypted Voice using Modems
Message-ID: <9302081014.AA01029@ono-sendai>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


The shannon limit of 22kpbs has something to do with the
frequency response of a 'standard' (old, non digital) POTS
phone line.

But you should know, you're Phil Karn (and I'm not.)

Jim




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Phil Karn <karn@qualcomm.com> (Phil Karn)
Date: Mon, 8 Feb 93 09:48:14 PST
To: phiber@eff.org>
Subject: Re: Compressed/Encrypted Voice using Modems
Message-ID: <9302081746.AA00348@servo>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Sounds like we need a new unit that specifically means "bits/sec" but
is easier to say. How about "Shannons", as in "I just bought a 14.4
kiloshannon modem". :-)

Phil





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Phil Karn <karn@qualcomm.com> (Phil Karn)
Date: Mon, 8 Feb 93 09:48:44 PST
To: thug@phantom.com (Murdering Thug)
Subject: Re: Modem Based Crypto Telephones
Message-ID: <9302081747.AA00377@servo>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


It's true, dialup modems are becoming so fast that low bit rate vocoders
may well prove unnecessary for a secure phone with good voice quality. But
vocoders are still handy for allowing the use of a slower modem (e.g., over
impaired lines, such as those with a lot of taps :-)) and for freeing up
bandwidth that you might want to use for other purposes (e.g., data).

Phil





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Phiber Optik <phiber@eff.org>
Date: Mon, 8 Feb 93 08:50:43 PST
To: jim@tadpole.com (Jim Thompson)
Subject: Re:  Compressed/Encrypted Voice using Modems
In-Reply-To: <9302081014.AA01029@ono-sendai>
Message-ID: <199302081649.AA13414@eff.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> 
> The shannon limit of 22kpbs has something to do with the
> frequency response of a 'standard' (old, non digital) POTS
> phone line.
> 
> But you should know, you're Phil Karn (and I'm not.)
> 
> Jim
> 

I spent the time posting a considerable message about this subject last night,
and I've yet to see it echoed back to me on the list.  Did ANYONE get it?
Topics were Shannon's capacity formula, Shannon limit, Nyquist 2-bit rule, etc.
I'd be very annoyed if it just 'disappeared' into the bit-bucket.





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Don Henson <72466.3616@CompuServe.COM>
Date: Mon, 8 Feb 93 09:13:25 PST
To: <cypherpunks@toad.com>
Subject: White House Mail
Message-ID: <930208170504_72466.3616_EHB51-2@CompuServe.COM>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Can someone repost the email address for the White House.  I seem to have
misplaced my copy.  :(

Don Henson
PGP key on request





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Phiber Optik <phiber@eff.org>
Date: Mon, 8 Feb 93 09:09:16 PST
To: jim@tadpole.com (Jim Thompson)
Subject: Re:  Compressed/Encrypted Voice using Modems
In-Reply-To: <9302081700.AA02209@ono-sendai>
Message-ID: <199302081708.AA13952@eff.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> 
> haven't seen it.
> 
OK, fearing the worst (maybe I forgot to CC my message to cypherpunks, but I'm
sure I did), I'll repost my original message.  It was a God-sent that I got 
cut off last night while composing it, and expreserve preserved it.
Here it is:

> 
> > ... because in FSK systems which code 1 bit per symbol
> > (only two phases), bps = baud.  But then and ONLY then....
> 
> Uhh, don't you mean two frequencies?  FSK is Frequency Shift Key, not
> Phase Shift Key (PSK).. ;-)
> 
> Actually, I KNOW you meant this, and it was probably just a typo,
> right?
> 
> -derek
> 
Woops!  Sorry.  To compensate, I'll give more information.  In the Bell 103
system (FSK), the frequencies are 2125Hz for answer, and 1170Hz for originate
carriers, with the frequency shifts being +/- 100Hz.  Compare with CCITT's
V.21, and substitute the carrier frequencies with 1750 and 1080Hz.  Same
+/- 100Hz shifting.

Someone else mentioned the almighty Claude Shannon in another message concern-
ing maximum bit-rate of a voice channel, and I wanted to clear up what was 
said.  Shannon's capacity formula said capacity in bits-per-second equals
bandwidth of channel in hertz times the base-2 (binary) logarithm of one plus
the signal (in watts) to noise (in watts) ratio.  As a side note, I say watts
because commonly, today, you measure signal and noise levels in decibels (dB),
and the S/N ratio is in dBm's (decibels per milliwatt).
In the phone system, we say a voice frequency channel (VFC) has a bandwidth of
4kHz.  In-band signalling is approximately from .3 to 3kHz.  This formula
(yielding the Shannon limit) is based on a "Gaussian Band Limited Channel"
(GBLC), which is an approximation of a VFC, with a signal wave of S watts
at the input of an "ideal" low-pass filter, subjected to Gaussian noise with
a mean power of N watts (uniformly).  Written, it's C = W log2(1 + S/N).
A simple example you can do in your head is W=3000Hz, pick an S/N of 1023,
1+1023 is 1024, and base-2 log of 1024 is simply 10, 3000 * 10 is 30000, so
Shannon's limit for these values is C = 30000bps.  Play with it.  Bear in mind,
Shannon didn't consider intersymbol interference.  Nyquist did.  Compare this
to Harry Nyquist's 2-bit rule, 2W, or double the bandwidth, and get the maximum
bit rate (this line of thinking led him to the infamous Nyquist sampling
theorem, sample at a rate twice the bandwidth of a channel, and you have all
the information you need to reconstruct it at the receiving end).  But Nyquist
deals only with binary systems.  Shannon's formula shows that theoretically
you could increase the data rate indefinitely by increasing the S/N ratio.
We achieve this in modern modulation systems by using multilevel systems,
(M-ary for short, with M > 2), and hence the protocols I described in my
previous message.  We can apply Nyquist's 2-bit rule to the multilevel system
by saying 2W log2 M bps is achievable, with an acceptable error rate.  As we
increase M (number of bits per symbol), so we have to find ways to increase
the signal to noise ratio, to maintain an acceptable error rate.
The whole thing is stupendously interesting to me, as I hope it is to the
rest of you folks.  To blow your mind with sheer genius, read Shannon's
classic "A Mathematical Theory of Communication" in Bell System Tech Journal,
July and October of '48 at your local university.  Also Nyquist's "Certain
Topics in Telegraph Transmission Theory", April '28.  Know your roots.

Good night.






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Johan Helsingius <julf@penet.FI>
Date: Mon, 8 Feb 93 03:34:59 PST
To: Shaen Bernhardt <uni@acs.bu.edu>
Subject: Re: Remailers (List available)
In-Reply-To: <9302080853.AA166918@acs.bu.edu>
Message-ID: <9302081238.aa22866@penet.penet.FI>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



> I noticed that the PAX scripts were made public recently, does anyone plan
> to employ them at any of the current remailing sites?

I was planning on doing it last weekend, but the urgent password fixes 
I had to implement at anon.penet.fi screwed up my plans. But Real Soon Now...

	Julf (admin@anon.penet.fi)





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Phil Karn <karn@qualcomm.com> (Phil Karn)
Date: Mon, 8 Feb 93 13:24:26 PST
To: Phiber Optik <phiber@eff.org>
Subject: Re:  Compressed/Encrypted Voice using Modems
Message-ID: <9302082123.AA00695@servo>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



>Shannon didn't consider intersymbol interference.

Sure he did. That's why the bandwidth term appears in his channel capacity
equation.

Shannon built on and generalized Nyquist's earlier work. Shannon's law
says only that it is theoretically *possible* to signal over a bandlimited
AGWN channel with specific bandwidth and S/N ratio with arbitrarily low
error as long as the signalling speed is less than the channel capacity
as given by his formula. What it doesn't show is *how* to do it. In
this respect, Shannon's law is much like the 2nd law of thermodynamics;
it tells you how efficient you can make a heat engine in theory, but it
doesn't tell a turbine designer how to shape his blades.

By the way, just to bring this back to crypto, everyone should be aware
that not only did Claude Shannon establish modern information theory,
he also wrote a seminal paper that established much of modern cryptography.
It was originally written during WWII and classified at that time, but
it was declassified soon after the war and appeared in the BSTJ in 1948,
I believe. Probably the most well known aspect of this paper is his
discussion of "product ciphers", whereby you can combine different
ciphers that are by themselves relatively weak (substitution and
permutation, which he calls "confusion" and "diffusion") and produce
a far more powerful cipher. DES is based on this principle, as are other
modern ciphers.

I bet this is one paper that the NSA wishes had never been declassified.
Far more important, in my opinion, than anything by Friedman.

Phil






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Johan Helsingius <julf@penet.FI>
Date: Mon, 8 Feb 93 07:36:58 PST
To: Anonymous <root@extropia.wimsey.com>
Subject: Re:
In-Reply-To: <199302080630.AA01555@xtropia>
Message-ID: <9302081609.aa24308@penet.penet.FI>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



> Hi - I tried to use the anon.penet.fi remailer and got a warning that
> some people had hacked it to find out for which anonymous ID any user
> had.  It sounded like they would forge mail from the person they wanted
> to find out about, have it go through penet, and then go to themselves.
> Then they could look and see what anonymous ID it seemed to come from.

Precisely!

> This has been fixed by making people register a password with the remailer
> and then use it whenever they want to forward mail.

Yeah. A bit cumbersome, but at least it is an attempt to find a workable
compromise between security and ease of use. The password is only
required if you intend to mail to "unregistered" addresses.

	Julf





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "A.J. Janschewitz" <p00258@psilink.com>
Date: Mon, 8 Feb 93 16:00:51 PST
To: "Don Henson" <72466.3616@compuserve.com>
Subject: Re: White House Mail
In-Reply-To: <930208170504_72466.3616_EHB51-2@CompuServe.COM>
Message-ID: <2938301699.1.p00258@psilink.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>Can someone repost the email address for the White House.  I seem to have
>misplaced my copy.  :(

Allegedly 75300.3115@compuserve.com

==a.j.==




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: deltorto@aol.com
Date: Mon, 8 Feb 93 17:32:31 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: E Pluribus Unum
Message-ID: <9302082032.tn29952@aol.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Fellow Cyphers,

Eric Hughes contributed:
>>I applaud the Clinton administration for making itself available via
>>email.  I do not think it advisable, however, to send a single
>>cypherpunks letter.  Rather I urge all interested parties to compose
>>their own letters, and send them in separately.

and also:
>>3) Be brief.  If you cannot summarize your argument into a single
>>paragraph, neither will the reader of the mail.  The mail system is
>>already overloaded, and concision indicates politeness.

These appear to be contradictory statements. I believe that sending a
powerful concise letter _together_ makes it more likely that it will be read,
and even more likely that it will be responded to. Otherwise, we're just a
bunch of nutty "individuals."

On the other hand I am repenting my suggestion that we _might_ include
anything political in our missive. This was ill-concieved on my part and I
have now "engaged my brain" (it's also not 4 am, heh-heh) and agree with
various other contributors that our message should be unidirectional and very
brief. I don't think it should be "cutesy" however, as much as I personally
enjoyed Marc Ringuette's "bit" suggestion #2:

>>Dear President Clinton,
>>   Freedom for the bits!  We will not rest until each bit is free to
>>   determine its own natural orientation without outside coercion.  The
>>   good news is, you don't need to do anything at all; merely get out of
>>   the way of the free market, and the bits will free themselves.
>>Best regards,  The Cypherpunks (Anarchist Subgroup).

Basically I like the underlying idea here (the track of allowing 'natural
orientation without outside coercion'), but I'd avoid the "anarchist"
tendencies, as they tend to render an otherwise approcahable letter "void"
for government bureaucrats perusing gigs of email to Bill & Co.

Eric suggests that we:
>>Stress privacy, and technological defenses thereto.

I agree. Especially the technological expertise side, as this is what
differentiates us from the mass of other people crying about privacy.

>>2) Do not be paranoid.  Do not rant.  These are a sure ways to
>>indicate that more money should be budgeted for public relations.

This is well-met. I totally back off from my previous political slant in
favor of getting _through_.

>>4) Write in standard English.  Use a spelling checker, and use
>>complete sentences.

What a concept. After reading a few months worth of mail on this list, I can
only agree.

>>5) Offer to help.  Offer to make timely review of proposed policies.
>>If they accept your aid, keep your promises.

This is my favorite suggestion. Imagine if they gave us all jobs at the NSA.
Heh-heh-heh.

Now, I have a general question: what is the current status of the White House
email capability as far as everyone can tell? Has anyone had a response yet,
by email or snailmail? Is there a possibility that this IS a hoax and that we
should just send paper mail instead?

    ddt




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: fnerd@smds.com (FutureNerd Steve Witham)
Date: Mon, 8 Feb 93 21:03:21 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: SunExpress to expand "unlockable" software distribution
Message-ID: <9302090339.AB10263@smds.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


gnu@toad.com (John Gilmore) says:

>It would probably be a public service if some interested parties were
>to determine the ``encryption'' method that Sun Express, the standard
>Sun ``license manager'', and other packages use.  At the moment, the
>details of these technologies are not described in the public
>literature (as far as I know).
>
>Rather than have these companies discover years too late that their
>"unlockable" software is really unlockable by anyone who understands
>cryptography, it'd be better for them to learn it this year, while
>they are still handling low volumes of programs that way.  Also maybe
>they will stop dumping these programs-that-you-have-but-must-pay-to-run on us.
>
>	John 

I was in a meeting where the license manager technology was explained from
a semi-technical, semi-business point of view.

 o  There's a standard that many companies are using.  It's for the rpc
    interface between licensed programs and license managers.  The
    program calls the manager, tells it a couple things, and asks,
    is it okay for me to run?

 o  License managers vary in the kinds of licenses they can support.
    There's enough variety of license possibilities to make your
    head swim.

 o  License managers generally work from "licenses," which are text files
    on your computer that describe the terms of particular licenses in a 
    license-manager-specific language.

 o  I think they use RSA, MD5, etc., for instance in signing logs that they
    keep.

 o  License-managers are themselves expensive and licensed, with a variety
    of up-front/per platform/per site/per end user/per developer license 
    combinations as well as the feature variety I mentioned.

I could probably find out what public documents exist if nobody else on the
list knows.

-fnerd
quote me
fnerd@smds.com (FutureNerd Steve Witham)





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Hal <74076.1041@CompuServe.COM>
Date: Mon, 8 Feb 93 22:43:57 PST
To: Cypherpunks <cypherpunks@toad.com>
Subject: Debate about anon posts
Message-ID: <930209063752_74076.1041_DHJ31-1@CompuServe.COM>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


For those interested, there has been an active debate on the Usenet
newsgroup news.admin.policy about whether anonymous posting should be
allowed on technical newsgroups.  Johan Helsingius's anonymous server at
anon.penet.fi is being widely attacked for allowing this function.  Several
questionable messages have been posted to various groups using this server
and some of these are being used as examples of why anonymous posting should
not be allowed.
 
There have been about 50 messages on the topic, with probably 40+ being
generally opposed to anonymous posting on the non-"personal" groups, and
only a few being in favor.
 
I don't really know how much influence that newsgroup has on the Usenet
anarchy but there certainly does seem to be a lot of opposition to anonymity.
Since it is an important part of our Cypherpunk ideals I think we need to
give some thought to how to "sell" the idea of anonymous mail and postings
to the net community.
 
Hal Finney
74076.1041@compuserve.com






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: miron@extropia.wimsey.com (Miron Cuperman)
Date: Tue, 9 Feb 93 03:12:48 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Anonymous pool created
Message-ID: <199302091046.AA09900@xtropia>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

From: miron (Miron Cuperman)
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Anonymous pool created

The pool is basically a mailing list with automatic maintenance.
The intention is that you add a reply-to: header to your anonymous
mail (or mention it somewhere in your mail) pointing at the
pool address.  Make sure that your correspondent put some identifying
marks on the reply (like encrypting it with your public key, and/or
putting your pseudonym on the Subject: line) so you can tell it apart
from the rest.  Of course, you should first subscribe to the pool.

Your anonymous reply address you should mention is:
	pool0@extropia.wimsey.com

All admin requests (handled by a program):
	pool0-request@extropia.wimsey.com

All problems to:
	miron@extropia.wimsey.com

The following Subject: lines are recognized:

subscribe
unsubscribe
help

and others - described in the help file.  Matching is actually quite
loose, so don't worry about whitespace or anything like that.

Experiments are welcome.
- -- 
        Miron Cuperman <miron@extropia.wimsey.com> | NeXTmail/Mime ok
                       <miron@cs.sfu.ca>           | Public key avail
        AMIX: MCuperman                            |
cyberspacecomputingcryptoimmortalitynetworkslaissezfaire

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.1

iQCVAgUBK3eLOZNxvvA36ONDAQEjfAP+LqMzz6ffgTcuVxnzivZKKAJHY7kzo6V2
cobwO4fWPOdw6m3TdJnX/++hit0nAiFOg5TZWMqJiUw/p51qcPIHxXvsw0Hq9mN5
y8eKoZDVVuALZD3IRzAbWuZ9gT404q5sUej7T8k/Ykf51fIMy29JXxAl00sXvRzi
mI0NNzykWSc=
=J84n
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Phiber Optik <phiber@eff.org>
Date: Tue, 9 Feb 93 01:17:08 PST
To: jim@tadpole.com (Jim Thompson)
Subject: Re:  Compressed/Encrypted Voice using Modems
In-Reply-To: <9302081750.AA02290@ono-sendai>
Message-ID: <199302090915.AA07775@eff.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> 
> So, what is a 'typical' S/N ratio for a POTS call?
> 
> 

Good question.  By the way, I think I may have slipped and reversed my units
in signal to noise ratios.  A minor typo.  The signal and noise are in dBm's
(decibels per milliwatt), and the resultant S/N ratio is in dB's (decibels).
A little background info: the ideal voice frequency channel has a FLAT
amplitude/frequency response, that is, it's uniform over the pass-band
(approx. .3 to 3kHz).  In reality, this isn't the case, but we want it to
be as close as possible.  In North America, we test signal level at 1kHz
(precisely 1004).  If we input a signal at -10dBm, we want -10dBm at the 
output.  The common type of test-line in the phone system for this purpose
is nicknamed the "milliwatt test", and is a continuous interrupted 1004Hz
tone.  Depending on the nature of the channel being tested, there would be
acceptable guidelines that would have to be met with.  For example, a typical
S/N value might be 40dB, based on customer satisfaction of line quality.
Another common test-line in wide use is the type-105 ATMS, Automatic Trans-
mission Measurement System (nicknamed "responders").  Signalled with Multi-
Frequency tones (MF), it is capable of doing: signal at 404, 1004, and 2804Hz
at two different levels (for comparative S/N ratios at the low, middle, and
top portion of the passband, a major improvement on the older "sweep tone"
method), and two types of noise (again I remember at two levels), the most
common being C-message noise (dBrnC).  C-message weighting is the modern means
of measuring signal and noise amplitude/frequency response, based on today's
telephone handsets (there were two previous major Western Electric weightings,
144 and F1A, now obsoleted).  The standard reference frequency (1004Hz), was
established by picking a frequency in the pass-band where the signal level
was JUST discernible by the human ear, and is between -85 to -90dBm, and the
derived units are positive.  We consider the noise measurement knowing the
zero reference (ideally 0 dB difference at the reference frequency), and the
weighting characteristics of the C-message standard telephone handset.
Unfortunately, I can't draw you a chart, but there is a characteristic curve
of frequency-response in weightings of channel noise for the C-message handset.
Noise measurement instruments have artificial filters that simulate the
response of the modern handset.
Am I making any sense?  I hope I am.  What I'm getting at, is that the accept-
able guidelines of signal and noise levels is simply based upon a chosen
standard handset sensitivity.  Got it?  C'mon!  It's easy!





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Phiber Optik <phiber@eff.org>
Date: Tue, 9 Feb 93 01:39:03 PST
To: karn@qualcomm.com (Phil Karn)
Subject: Re:  Compressed/Encrypted Voice using Modems
In-Reply-To: <9302082123.AA00695@servo>
Message-ID: <199302090937.AA07958@eff.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> 
> 
> >Shannon didn't consider intersymbol interference.
> 
> Sure he did. That's why the bandwidth term appears in his channel capacity
> equation.
> 
(stuff deleted)
I was probably being unclear.  According to my text, Shannon's capacity formula
does not account for intersymbol interference.  My text also states that 
Nyquist used intersymbol interference as a limit in his 2-bit rule.  I'm
considering my text to be correct, because the capacity formula doesn't account
for the imperfections (like intersymbol interference) and other problems
encountered in practice (envelope delay distortion, the need for echo cancell-
ation, etc.).  And in your words, it says that you can, but it doesn't say how.
For those who just tuned in, intersymbol interference refers to when the 
residual tail or bounce of a dying pulse interferes with a subsequent pulse.





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: wayner@cs.cornell.edu (Peter Wayner)
Date: Tue, 9 Feb 93 05:22:03 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Convincing people the value of anonymity...
Message-ID: <9302091320.AA19183@brokk.cs.cornell.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



I would think that many people who hang out on technical
newsgroups would be very familiar with the anonymous review
procedures practiced by academic journals. There is some value
when a reviewer can speak their mind about a paper without
worry of revenge. Of course everyone assures me that the system is never
really anonymous because there are alwys only three or four people qualified
to review each paper. :-) 

Perhaps we should go out of our way to make anonymous, technical
comments about papers and ideas in the newsgroups to fascilitate
the development of an anonymous commenting culture in cypberspace.

-Peter Wayner




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Eric Hughes <hughes@soda.berkeley.edu>
Date: Tue, 9 Feb 93 08:51:58 PST
To: 74076.1041@CompuServe.COM
Subject: Debate about anon posts
In-Reply-To: <930209063752_74076.1041_DHJ31-1@CompuServe.COM>
Message-ID: <9302091649.AA25077@soda.berkeley.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


More important than anonymity in a public forum such as Usenet is
pseudonymity.  A strictly anonymous posting might well be ignored, and
in cases should be.  An alternate identity, however, can be more
easily believed if it has said useful things in the past.

After all, most of the people I know on the net are as good as
pseudonyms to me.  I've never met them, have never even had voice
contact, and am unlikely to ever.  This is the case for everyone.  We
rely on the human net of familiarity to assure us that these are real
people.

But a pseudonym on the net looks to us like "someone else's friend."
We can't verify everyone personally, but we assume that someone has.
Therefore pseudonyms will always be possible on the net.

Indeed, they are already mostly with us.

Eric




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Eric Hughes <hughes@soda.berkeley.edu>
Date: Tue, 9 Feb 93 09:09:07 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: E Pluribus Unum
In-Reply-To: <9302082032.tn29952@aol.com>
Message-ID: <9302091706.AA25713@soda.berkeley.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I said, in effect:

-- Send your own mail, not from the group.
-- Be brief; the system is overloaded.

Dave responds:

>These appear to be contradictory statements. I believe that sending a
>powerful concise letter _together_ makes it more likely that it will be read,
>and even more likely that it will be responded to. Otherwise, we're just a
>bunch of nutty "individuals."

The particular advice to send individual mail stems from the following
method that organizations estimate demographics:

	"Count each letter as standing for the opinion of N people."

Were we a well-known, well-respected organization, such as, say, ANSI,
or IEEE, then a group letter carries weight.  As it is, however, the
cypherpunks are neither, and our goals, well, less than fully affirmed
by the general public.

Hence, I urge people to send individual letters.  In our context many
letters carry greater weight than one.  In the same vein, I urge people
to each compose a separate letter.  Many copies of an identical letter
are much less useful.

I wrote:
>Stress privacy, and technological defenses thereto.

This topic has many aspects.  Writing on this topic will not mean a
duplication of effort, merely a replication of concern.

>I agree. Especially the technological expertise side, as this is what
>differentiates us from the mass of other people crying about privacy.

That bit about "crying about" is exactly what I wish to avoid.  First
of all, in cryptography relying on others to grant you privacy doesn't
even work.  And second, asking for help to allow us to help ourselves
taps into deep currents in the U.S. culture.

>On the other hand I am repenting my suggestion that we _might_ include
>anything political in our missive. 

One of my own political principles is as follows:

	"If your issue becomes a partisan issue, then you've lost."

It is much easier to convince all sides of a dispute of the same thing
than to convince one side and have them convince the others.

Eric




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Eric Hughes <hughes@soda.berkeley.edu>
Date: Tue, 9 Feb 93 09:12:00 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Compressed/Encrypted Voice using Modems
In-Reply-To: <9302082123.AA00695@servo>
Message-ID: <9302091709.AA25872@soda.berkeley.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>By the way, just to bring this back to crypto, everyone should be aware
>that not only did Claude Shannon establish modern information theory,
>he also wrote a seminal paper that established much of modern cryptography.

Not only that, he was single handedly responsible for the 15 minute
delay rule in reporting stock market transactions.  Evidently he
applied information-theoretic techniques to the data and was able to
make a load of money at it.  I have no references on this, and would
love to see some.

Eric




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Eric Hughes <hughes@soda.berkeley.edu>
Date: Tue, 9 Feb 93 09:16:15 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Compressed/Encrypted Voice using Modems
In-Reply-To: <199302081708.AA13952@eff.org>
Message-ID: <9302091713.AA25988@soda.berkeley.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Phiber writes:
>Shannon's capacity formula said capacity in bits-per-second equals
>bandwidth of channel in hertz times the base-2 (binary) logarithm of one plus
>the signal (in watts) to noise (in watts) ratio.  

Properly it is the integral of the S/N function over frequency, but that's
a simple continualization of the stated formula.

Eric




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Eric Hughes <hughes@soda.berkeley.edu>
Date: Tue, 9 Feb 93 09:49:49 PST
To: cypherpunks-announce@toad.com
Subject: February 13 meeting
Message-ID: <9302091745.AA27350@soda.berkeley.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Cypherpunks physical meeting

Noon sharp, Saturday, February 13, 1993
Cygnus Support Offices, Mt. View, California, USA

I apologize for not getting out an announcement for the the last
meeting.  It showed, both in attendance and organization.  My regrets.

I make a solemn promise to be there before 12:00 p.m.  Let's start on
time for a change.

I hear that photographers are going to be there, so if you don't want
to be photographed, bring your favorite mask.  They're nice
photographers and they'll ask your permission first so that you don't
have to wear your mask at all times.

Eric

-----------------------------------------------------------------------------

AGENDA
======

-- The Ultra random number generator.  I presume Scott Collins is
going to talk on this, since he mentioned this, but I have not heard
from him. (Hint, hint) Ultra is a new random number generator designed
by some statisticians. It allegedly has extremely long period, good
distribution properties, and a fast implementation, since it is based
on the borrow from a subtract operation.

-- Eric Messick will present his posting on envelopes.  If any of you
need another copy of this, the address of his that I remember is
eric@toad.com.

-- Arthur Abraham will present on hash functions.  The talk will
include discussion of generally desirable properties and some specific
algorithms.

-- Some people wanted to talk about the Sidelnikov comments on PGP, but
I don't have a presenter yet.

-- And the usual progress reports and chat.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------------

DIRECTIONS
==========

	Cygnus Support
	1937 Landings Drive
	Mt. View, CA  94043
	+1 415 903 1400   switchboard
	+1 415 903 1418   John Gilmore

Take US 101 toward Mt. View.  From San Francisco, it's about a
40-minute drive.  Get off at the Rengstorff Ave/Amphitheatre Parkway
exit.  If you were heading south on 101, you curve around to the
right, cross over the freeway, and get to a stoplight.  If you were
heading north on 101, you just come right off the exit to the
stoplight.  The light is the intersection of Amphitheatre and
Charleston Rd.  Take a right on Charleston; there's a right-turn-only
lane.

Follow Charleston for a short distance.  You'll pass the
Metaphor/Kaleida buildings on the right.  At a clump of palm trees and
a "Landmark Deli" sign, take a right into Landings Drive.  At the end
of the road, turn left into the complex with the big concrete
"Landmark" sign.  Follow the road past the deli til you are in front
of the clock tower that rises out of one of the buildings, facing you.
Enter through the doors immediately under the clock tower.  They'll be
open between noon and 1PM at least.  (See below if you're late.)

Once inside, take the stairs up, immediately to your right.  At the top
of the stairs, turn right past the treetops, and we'll be in 1937 on 
your left.  The door is marked "Cygnus".

If you are late and the door under the clock tower is locked, you can
walk to the deli (which will be around the building on your left, as
you face the door).  Go through the gate in the fence to the right of
the deli, and into the back lawns between the complex and the farm
behind it.  Walk forward and right around the buildings until you see
a satellite dish in the lawn.  Go up the stairs next to the dish,
which are the back stairs into the Cygnus office space.  We'll prop
the door (or you can bang on it if we forget).

Or, you can find the guard who's wandering around the complex, who
knows there's a meeting happening and will let you in.  They can be
beeped at 965 5250, though you'll have trouble finding a phone.

Don't forget to eat first, or bring food at noon!  I recommend hitting
the burrito place on Rengstorff (La Costen~a) at about 11:45.  To get
there, when you get off 101, take Rengstorff (toward the hills) rather
than Amphitheatre (toward the bay).  Follow it about ten blocks until
the major intersection at Middlefield Road.  La Costen~a is the store
on your left at the corner.  You can turn left into the narrow lane
behind the store, which leads to a parking lot, and enter by the front
door, which faces the intersection.  To get to the meeting from there,
just retrace your route on Rengstorff, go straight over the freeway,
and turn right at the stoplight onto Charleston; see above.

See you there!

	John Gilmore







From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: covin@cs.uchicago.edu
Date: Tue, 9 Feb 93 07:52:26 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re:  E Pluribus Unum
Message-ID: <9302091551.AA27230@tartarus.uchicago.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>Now, I have a general question: what is the current status of the White House
>email capability as far as everyone can tell? Has anyone had a response yet,
>by email or snailmail? Is there a possibility that this IS a hoax and that we
>should just send paper mail instead?

What excellent timing you have.  I recently received this from a
friend:

[Forwarded, now several times...]

   January 31, 1993
 
                Important Information RE: E-Mail to the White House
 
        Yesterday, I saw several postings related to the E-mail address
   for the White House.  Along with a good number of others, I worked
   throughout the campaign as part of a network of E-mail volunteers
   for the Clinton campaign, so I can pass along some important
   information about that E-mail account.  The account is actually the
   personal compuserve account of Jock Gill.  Jock worked hard (along
   with a handful of programming volunteers, BBS operators, listserver
   maintainers, and computer sophisticates at places such as Marist
   College, MIT, San Francisco, Chicago, and elsewhere) during the
   campaign to put together an E-mail system for national campaigning.
   The system was later expanded to accommodate all three major
   Presidential campaigns.  It was an innovative, highly successful
   effort and it played a huge role in getting campaign position
   statements out to a wide public.  Things posted from that address
   found their way into the virtual reality as the messages got passed
   along many networks from their original posting.  Several weeks
   before the Inauguration of President Clinton, Jeff Eller was
   appointed by the President-Elect to have overall charge of
   establishing something which has never existed--an interactive
   public access E-mail system into the White House and into other
   offices of the administration.  Jock Gill was then hired by the
   administration to work under Jeff Eller.  Currently, Jock Gill is
   working in an office located in the Old Executive Office Building
   across the street from the White House.  At this point, he is
   working alone, without a staff.  His current assignment is to use
   the E-mail system (as during the campaign) to issue official copies
   of White House statements, the texts of press briefings and press
   conferences, copies of Executive Orders and Presidential Memos, and
   the like to the virtual world of E-mail.  Since the compuserve box
   is a regular personal mail box, it gets filled quickly, especially
   given the high volume of mail now beginning to arrive with the broad
   dissemination of his address.  Those of you who have sent E-mail to
   that address may well have received an error message stating that
   the box is full.  That's another way of saying it has been
   overwhelmed.  Jock has asked those of us who have been part of the
   volunteer E-mail team to help him out while he works to get a good
   interactive system up and running.  Basically, he has asked that
   everyone cooperate and not begin sending a barrage of E-mail to that
   compuserve address.  The White House itself employs a large staff to
   handle snail mail.  Actually, at this point in the development of
   the White House E-mail system, you will probably get your message
   through to the administration quicker through ordinary snail mail
   and telephone.  Later, once the administration's E-mail team
   develops the system they want and need, E-mail contacts should
   became the easier route.  All things in their time.  Once the E-mail
   address was circulated together with the heading the "White House",
   everyone understandably believed a real system was up and running.
   Not quite yet.
 
   SUGGESTION:  Use the compuserve address you have judiciously,
   reserving it for absolutely vital contacts.  Until such time that a
   real public access White house E-mail system is operational,
   consider relying on the traditional means of contacting the
   administration.  Given what they had to start with from the previous
   administration (scratch), I have every reason to expect that Jeff
   Eller and Jock Gill will work well--and as quickly as possible--to
   get an interactive system up and running.  But it will take time and
   patience.  We can all help them achieve that effort best if we
   refrain from acting as if that non-existent system were already in
   place.  PLEASE HELP RELAY THIS CONTEXT AND SUGGESTION TO OTHER
   NETWORKS AND INDIVIDUALS.  Thanks.
 
                Snail Mail Address and Phone Numbers -- White House
 
        White House Numbers:
            The President                 (202) 456-1414
            White House Comment Line      (202) 456-1111
                 (To register your opinion on an issue)
            When bill signed or vetoed    (202) 456-2226
 
            Vice President                (202) 456-2326
                                          (202) 456-7125
 
        Mailing Address:
 
            The White House
            1600 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
            Washington DC  20500
 
   ------
        Jon Darling
        PITT/Johnstown  -- January 31, 






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Douglas Sinclair <dsinclai@acs.ucalgary.ca>
Date: Tue, 9 Feb 93 10:39:45 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: PGP key by finger
Message-ID: <9302091838.AA29640@acs1.acs.ucalgary.ca>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


To all those that asked - my PGP 2.1 key is now available for finger.
I appologize to all for the technical difficulties.
-- 
Vercotti: I was terrified of him.  Everyone was terrified of Doug.  I've seen
          grown men pull their own heads off rather than see Doug.  Even
          Dinsdale was frightened of Doug.
Interviewer: What did he do?
Vercotti: He used sarcasm.  He knew all the tricks, dramatic irony,
          metaphor, bathos, puns, parody, litotes and satire.
			-- Monty Python, Episode 14
PGP 2.1 Key by finger




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: pmetzger@shearson.com (Perry E. Metzger)
Date: Tue, 9 Feb 93 11:39:59 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Compressed/Encrypted Voice using Modems
Message-ID: <9302091839.AA09736@maggie.shearson.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> From: Eric Hughes <hughes@soda.berkeley.edu>
> 
> >By the way, just to bring this back to crypto, everyone should be aware
> >that not only did Claude Shannon establish modern information theory,
> >he also wrote a seminal paper that established much of modern cryptography.
> 
> Not only that, he was single handedly responsible for the 15 minute
> delay rule in reporting stock market transactions.  Evidently he
> applied information-theoretic techniques to the data and was able to
> make a load of money at it.  I have no references on this, and would
> love to see some.

I don't believe this. You can buy data feeds that give you instant market
data, rather than 15 minute delayed information. I've worked for
operations like Morgan Stanley's Analytic Proprietary Trading Group,
and although I've seen some neat tricks applied to market data, I've
never heard tell of Shannon developing any, nor is there any delay
in the data such groups use for trading.

Perry




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: cp@jido.b30.ingr.com (Craig Presson)
Date: Tue, 9 Feb 93 13:07:00 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Compressed/Encrypted Voice using Modems
In-Reply-To: <9302091839.AA09736@maggie.shearson.com>
Message-ID: <199302092105.AA01119@jido.b30.ingr.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


In <9302091839.AA09736@maggie.shearson.com>, Perry E. Metzger writes:
|> > From: Eric Hughes <hughes@soda.berkeley.edu>
[...]
|> > Not only that, he was single handedly responsible for the 15 minute
|> > delay rule in reporting stock market transactions.  Evidently he
|> > applied information-theoretic techniques to the data and was able to
|> > make a load of money at it.  I have no references on this, and would
|> > love to see some.
|> 
|> I don't believe this. You can buy data feeds that give you instant market
|> data, rather than 15 minute delayed information. I've worked for
|> operations like Morgan Stanley's Analytic Proprietary Trading Group,
|> and although I've seen some neat tricks applied to market data, I've
|> never heard tell of Shannon developing any, nor is there any delay
|> in the data such groups use for trading.
|> 
|> Perry

In particular, Compuserve subscribers get 15-minute old stock
quotes for free, and pay extra to get closer to real-time.

To quote an advert from Open Systems (Propaganda) Today:
"            SuperHackers
D.E. Shaw & Co., a small, ... algorithmic trading firm,
seeks brilliant, world-class software professionals to
help create Wall Street's future. ..."

This may be drifting off-topic, unless someone sees a way to finance
anarcho-ventures with high-tech arbitrage. I suppose Perry would be in
the middle of any such cabal -- or maybe he isn't saying ;-)
        ^
       /
------/---- cp@jido.b11.ingr.com (Craig Presson)
     /
    /




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: John.Nieder@f33.n125.z1.FIDONET.ORG (John Nieder)
Date: Wed, 10 Feb 93 01:58:55 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: E Pluribus Unum
Message-ID: <4833.2B78CB7D@fidogate.FIDONET.ORG>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



 * Reply to msg originally in Cypherpunks
 BK> From: deltorto@aol.com
 BK> I believe that sending a
 BK> powerful concise letter _together_ makes it more likely that it will
 BK> be read, and even more likely that it will be responded to. Otherwise,
 BK> we're just a bunch of nutty "individuals."

Well, while I am personally of the opinion that this undertaking is of
neglible value for the sweat expended anyway, I would suggest that the
eventual note (if any) not presume to represent anyone but the
individual signatories.

 BK> On the other hand I am repenting my suggestion that we _might_ include
 BK> anything political in our missive.

Good.  The surreal laundry-list of crackpot causes in CPSR's written
agenda has gained them my absolute opposition & has probably turned off
others as well.  It would be a mistake for Cypherpunks to drag in
outside issues.

 BK> I don't think it should be "cutesy"

Of course not.  There's no quicker way to the bit bucket, assuming this
entire e-mail flap isn't a bad joke in the first place.

 >>Stress privacy, and technological defenses thereto.

 BK> I agree.

Me three.

 BK> Especially the technological expertise side, as this is what
 BK> differentiates us from the mass of other people crying about privacy.

A good point!  Nothing impresses bureaucrats like "experts" [cough!].

 >>5) Offer to help.  Offer to make timely review of proposed policies.
 >>If they accept your aid, keep your promises.

 BK> This is my favorite suggestion. Imagine if they gave us all jobs at
 BK> the NSA. Heh-heh-heh.

You wouldn't like it.

 BK> Now, I have a general question: what is the current status of the
 BK> White House email capability as far as everyone can tell? Has anyone
 BK> had a response yet, by email or snailmail? Is there a possibility that
 BK> this IS a hoax and that we should just send paper mail instead?

Check my previous message.
        JN

... Source: "Another Burned-Out Spook for Peace," S.F., CA
--- Blue Wave/Opus v2.12 [NR]
--  
John Nieder - via FidoNet node 1:125/555
    UUCP - ...!uunet!hoptoad!kumr!fidogate!33!John.Nieder
INTERNET - John.Nieder@f33.n125.z1.FIDONET.ORG




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: wcs@anchor.ho.att.com (Bill_Stewart(HOY002)1305)
Date: Tue, 9 Feb 93 17:10:58 PST
To: cypherpunks
Subject: Re: CELP speech compression code at cygnus.com:/pub/celp.speech.tar.Z
Message-ID: <9302100110.AA09266@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Forwarded for Bill Stewart, who I assume wanted it posted.

Eric
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------

John, Perry, and others have been commenting on the use of CELP voice compression
and crypto with V.32 or better modems to give end-to-end encrypted speech.
Perry says:
> Fast enough software compression of voice would mean any PC 
> with a DSP card and a V.32 modem could become an unbreakable scrambler.
> The chief problem is that the DSP needed to do decent compression is
> very crunchy, and encryption also tends to be crunchy, so there aren't
> typically enough cycles on your average PC. Of course, were someone to
> commercially market a board that did all this in hardware...

(Please excuse any shameless references to my employer's fine hardware products :-);
I do science fiction, er, um, systems engineering, not hardware...
and it's been a while since our chip people were in my building.)

It may not all be packaged on a single board, but it shouldn't be real tough.
PC and Mac Boards with AT&T DSP32C chips were out several years ago,
which provided something like 25 MFLOPS, which was more than enough
to do voice compression and have leftover guts for crypto
(or use your 386; DES at 9600 baud shouldn't cause much heartburn.)
I assume that by now there are reasonably-priced floating-point DSP boards
from several different vendors out, and AT&T makes modem chipsets and
supporting A/D and fixed-point DSP integer-crunchers.
If CELP can be done in integers, I'd guess you could chain together a
couple DSPs and put together a board for ~$100-150 parts-cost.

Also, how much can you do with the various SoundBlaster-related boards?

			Bill 





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: fen@genmagic.genmagic.com (Fen Labalme)
Date: Tue, 9 Feb 93 18:27:21 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: ["Joyce K. Reynolds": RFC1421 on Privacy Enhancement for Electronic Mail]
Message-ID: <9302100227.AA06002@>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Date: Tue, 09 Feb 93 20:46:25 -0500
From: James M Galvin <galvin@TIS.COM>
Sender: pem-dev-relay@TIS.COM

-----BEGIN PRIVACY-ENHANCED MESSAGE-----
Proc-Type: 4,MIC-CLEAR
Content-Domain: RFC822
Originator-ID-Asymmetric: MEYxCzAJBgNVBAYTAlVTMSQwIgYDVQQKExtUcnV
 zdGVkIEluZm9ybWF0aW9uIFN5c3RlbXMxETAPBgNVBAsTCEdsZW53b29k,02
MIC-Info: RSA-MD5,RSA,UYBpHzD3lP5l8Wi2DzdTRPWoag3lQ7NrqmF0U+cfykK
 VCKx5jxPRR9CaWaddI5QobfpA4hsIVA12ZpsPzmyo9g==

- ------------------------------------------------------------------------
This message digitally signed with Privacy Enhanced Mail.  Get your copy
of the Internet reference implementation from "pem-info@tis.com".


- ------- Forwarded Message

Message-ID: <199302092257.AA29999@zephyr.isi.edu>
Sender:     ietf-announce-request@IETF.CNRI.Reston.VA.US
From:       "Joyce K. Reynolds" <jkrey@isi.edu>
To:         IETF-Announce:;@IETF.CNRI.Reston.VA.US
cc:         jkrey@isi.edu
Date:       Tue, 09 Feb 93 14:56:08 PST
Subject:    RFC1421 on Privacy Enhancement for Electronic Mail


- - --NextPart


A new Request for Comments is now available in online RFC libraries.


        RFC 1421:

        Title:      Privacy Enhancement for Internet Electronic Mail:
                    Part I: Message Encryption and Authentication
                    Procedures
        Author:     J. Linn
        Mailbox:    104-8456@mcimail.com
        Pages:      42
        Characters: 103,894
        Obsoletes:  RFC 1113


This is one of a series of documents defining privacy enhancement
mechanisms for electronic mail transferred using Internet mail
protocols.  This document is the outgrowth of a series of meetings of
the Privacy and Security Research Group (PSRG) of the Internet
Research Task Force (IRTF) and the PEM Working Group of the Internet
Engineering Task Force (IETF).  The author would like to thank the
members of the PSRG and the IETF PEM WG, as well as all participants
in discussions on the "pem-dev@tis.com" mailing list, for their
contributions to this document.

This is now a Proposed Standard Protocol.

This RFC specifies an IAB standards track protocol for the Internet
community, and requests discussion and suggestions for improvements.
Please refer to the current edition of the "IAB Official Protocol
Standards" for the standardization state and status of this protocol.
Distribution of this memo is unlimited.

This announcement is sent to the IETF list and the RFC-DIST list.
Requests to be added to or deleted from the IETF distribution list
should be sent to IETF-REQUEST@CNRI.RESTON.VA.US.  Requests to be added
to or deleted from the RFC-DIST distribution list should be sent to
RFC-REQUEST@NIC.DDN.MIL.

Details on obtaining RFCs via FTP or EMAIL may be obtained by sending
an EMAIL message to "rfc-info@ISI.EDU" with the message body 
"help: ways_to_get_rfcs".  For example:

        To: rfc-info@ISI.EDU
        Subject: getting rfcs

        help: ways_to_get_rfcs

Requests for special distribution should be addressed to either the
author of the RFC in question, or to NIC@NIC.DDN.MIL.  Unless
specifically noted otherwise on the RFC itself, all RFCs are for
unlimited distribution.

Submissions for Requests for Comments should be sent to
RFC-EDITOR@ISI.EDU.  Please consult RFC 1111, "Instructions to RFC
Authors", for further information.


Joyce K. Reynolds
USC/Information Sciences Institute

...

Below is the data which will enable a MIME compliant Mail Reader 
implementation to automatically retrieve the ASCII version
of the RFCs.

- - --NextPart
Content-Type: Multipart/Alternative; Boundary="OtherAccess"

- - --OtherAccess
Content-Type:  Message/External-body;
        access-type="mail-server";
        server="mail-server@nisc.sri.com"

Content-Type: text/plain

SEND rfc1421.txt

- - --OtherAccess
Content-Type:   Message/External-body;
        name="rfc1421.txt";
        site="nic.ddn.mil";
        access-type="anon-ftp";
        directory="rfc"

Content-Type: text/plain


- - --OtherAccess--
- - --NextPart--

- ------- End of Forwarded Message

-----END PRIVACY-ENHANCED MESSAGE-----






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: fen@genmagic.genmagic.com (Fen Labalme)
Date: Tue, 9 Feb 93 18:28:23 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: ["Joyce K. Reynolds": RFC1423 on PEM: Algorithms, Modes and Identifiers]
Message-ID: <9302100228.AA06013@>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Date: Tue, 09 Feb 93 20:47:29 -0500
From: James M Galvin <galvin@TIS.COM>
Sender: pem-dev-relay@TIS.COM

-----BEGIN PRIVACY-ENHANCED MESSAGE-----
Proc-Type: 4,MIC-CLEAR
Content-Domain: RFC822
Originator-ID-Asymmetric: MEYxCzAJBgNVBAYTAlVTMSQwIgYDVQQKExtUcnV
 zdGVkIEluZm9ybWF0aW9uIFN5c3RlbXMxETAPBgNVBAsTCEdsZW53b29k,02
MIC-Info: RSA-MD5,RSA,SZBZEw1TKP4Mj68wVUb3t1uGaXKAhRfRScqDkULDMuG
 WRwco4HpFmpJxuBUzPLhysLhi0Rn6D9yG+YxFnZE4bA==

- ------------------------------------------------------------------------
This message digitally signed with Privacy Enhanced Mail.  Get your copy
of the Internet reference implementation from "pem-info@tis.com".


- ------- Forwarded Message

Message-ID: <199302092258.AA00118@zephyr.isi.edu>
Sender:     ietf-announce-request@IETF.CNRI.Reston.VA.US
From:       "Joyce K. Reynolds" <jkrey@isi.edu>
To:         IETF-Announce:;@IETF.CNRI.Reston.VA.US
cc:         jkrey@isi.edu
Date:       Tue, 09 Feb 93 14:56:45 PST
Subject:    RFC1423 on PEM: Algorithms, Modes and Identifiers


- - --NextPart


A new Request for Comments is now available in online RFC libraries.


        RFC 1423:

        Title:      Privacy Enhancement for Internet Electronic Mail:
                    Part III: Algorithms, Modes, and Identifiers      
        Author:     D. Balenson
        Mailbox:    balenson@tis.com
        Pages:      14
        Characters: 33,277
        Obsoletes:  RFC 1115


This document provides definitions, formats, references, and citations
for cryptographic algorithms, usage modes, and associated identifiers
and parameters used in support of Privacy Enhanced Mail (PEM) in the
Internet community.  This is one of a series of documents defining
privacy enhancement mechanisms for electronic mail transferred using
Internet mail protocols.  This document is the outgrowth of a series
of meetings of the Privacy and Security Research Group (PSRG) of the
Internet Research Task Force (IRTF) and the PEM Working Group of the
Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF).

This is now a Proposed Standard Protocol.

This RFC specifies an IAB standards track protocol for the Internet
community, and requests discussion and suggestions for improvements.
Please refer to the current edition of the "IAB Official Protocol
Standards" for the standardization state and status of this protocol.
Distribution of this memo is unlimited.

This announcement is sent to the IETF list and the RFC-DIST list.
Requests to be added to or deleted from the IETF distribution list
should be sent to IETF-REQUEST@CNRI.RESTON.VA.US.  Requests to be added
to or deleted from the RFC-DIST distribution list should be sent to
RFC-REQUEST@NIC.DDN.MIL.

Details on obtaining RFCs via FTP or EMAIL may be obtained by sending
an EMAIL message to "rfc-info@ISI.EDU" with the message body 
"help: ways_to_get_rfcs".  For example:

        To: rfc-info@ISI.EDU
        Subject: getting rfcs

        help: ways_to_get_rfcs

Requests for special distribution should be addressed to either the
author of the RFC in question, or to NIC@NIC.DDN.MIL.  Unless
specifically noted otherwise on the RFC itself, all RFCs are for
unlimited distribution.

Submissions for Requests for Comments should be sent to
RFC-EDITOR@ISI.EDU.  Please consult RFC 1111, "Instructions to RFC
Authors", for further information.


Joyce K. Reynolds
USC/Information Sciences Institute

...

Below is the data which will enable a MIME compliant Mail Reader 
implementation to automatically retrieve the ASCII version
of the RFCs.

- - --NextPart
Content-Type: Multipart/Alternative; Boundary="OtherAccess"

- - --OtherAccess
Content-Type:  Message/External-body;
        access-type="mail-server";
        server="mail-server@nisc.sri.com"

Content-Type: text/plain

SEND rfc1423.txt

- - --OtherAccess
Content-Type:   Message/External-body;
        name="rfc1423.txt";
        site="nic.ddn.mil";
        access-type="anon-ftp";
        directory="rfc"

Content-Type: text/plain


- - --OtherAccess--
- - --NextPart--

- ------- End of Forwarded Message

-----END PRIVACY-ENHANCED MESSAGE-----






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: fen@genmagic.genmagic.com (Fen Labalme)
Date: Tue, 9 Feb 93 18:29:09 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: ["Joyce K. Reynolds": RFC1424 on Key Certification and Related Services]
Message-ID: <9302100228.AA06016@>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Date: Tue, 09 Feb 93 20:47:53 -0500
From: James M Galvin <galvin@TIS.COM>
Sender: pem-dev-relay@TIS.COM

-----BEGIN PRIVACY-ENHANCED MESSAGE-----
Proc-Type: 4,MIC-CLEAR
Content-Domain: RFC822
Originator-ID-Asymmetric: MEYxCzAJBgNVBAYTAlVTMSQwIgYDVQQKExtUcnV
 zdGVkIEluZm9ybWF0aW9uIFN5c3RlbXMxETAPBgNVBAsTCEdsZW53b29k,02
MIC-Info: RSA-MD5,RSA,ev2s1woCBNlMsuccJpIUAAEuV9gQZZs5hbHG3fCPYxb
 hxSChOjQSJRO3cIf6/GyzyJYhRt7jZDc9VH+YLuPMeg==

- ------------------------------------------------------------------------
This message digitally signed with Privacy Enhanced Mail.  Get your copy
of the Internet reference implementation from "pem-info@tis.com".


- ------- Forwarded Message

Message-ID: <199302092258.AA00165@zephyr.isi.edu>
Sender:     ietf-announce-request@IETF.CNRI.Reston.VA.US
From:       "Joyce K. Reynolds" <jkrey@isi.edu>
To:         IETF-Announce:;@IETF.CNRI.Reston.VA.US
cc:         jkrey@isi.edu
Date:       Tue, 09 Feb 93 14:56:52 PST
Subject:    RFC1424 on Key Certification and Related Services


- - --NextPart


A new Request for Comments is now available in online RFC libraries.


        RFC 1424:

        Title:      Privacy Enhancement for Internet Electronic Mail:
                    Part IV: Key Certification and Related Services
        Author:     B. Kaliski     
        Mailbox:    burt@rsa.com
        Pages:      9
        Characters: 17,537
        Updates/Obsoletes:  none


This document describes three types of service in support of Internet
Privacy-Enhanced Mail (PEM): key certification, certificate-
revocation list (CRL) storage, and CRL retrieval.  This is one of a
series of documents defining privacy enhancement mechanisms for
electronic mail transferred using Internet mail protocols.  This
document is the product of many discussions at RSA Data Security, at
Trusted Information Systems, and on the <pem-dev@tis.com> mailing
list.  This document is the product of the Privacy-Enhanced Electronic
Mail Working Group.

This is now a Proposed Standard Protocol.

This RFC specifies an IAB standards track protocol for the Internet
community, and requests discussion and suggestions for improvements.
Please refer to the current edition of the "IAB Official Protocol
Standards" for the standardization state and status of this protocol.
Distribution of this memo is unlimited.

This announcement is sent to the IETF list and the RFC-DIST list.
Requests to be added to or deleted from the IETF distribution list
should be sent to IETF-REQUEST@CNRI.RESTON.VA.US.  Requests to be added
to or deleted from the RFC-DIST distribution list should be sent to
RFC-REQUEST@NIC.DDN.MIL.

Details on obtaining RFCs via FTP or EMAIL may be obtained by sending
an EMAIL message to "rfc-info@ISI.EDU" with the message body 
"help: ways_to_get_rfcs".  For example:

        To: rfc-info@ISI.EDU
        Subject: getting rfcs

        help: ways_to_get_rfcs

Requests for special distribution should be addressed to either the
author of the RFC in question, or to NIC@NIC.DDN.MIL.  Unless
specifically noted otherwise on the RFC itself, all RFCs are for
unlimited distribution.

Submissions for Requests for Comments should be sent to
RFC-EDITOR@ISI.EDU.  Please consult RFC 1111, "Instructions to RFC
Authors", for further information.


Joyce K. Reynolds
USC/Information Sciences Institute

...

Below is the data which will enable a MIME compliant Mail Reader 
implementation to automatically retrieve the ASCII version
of the RFCs.

- - --NextPart
Content-Type: Multipart/Alternative; Boundary="OtherAccess"

- - --OtherAccess
Content-Type:  Message/External-body;
        access-type="mail-server";
        server="mail-server@nisc.sri.com"

Content-Type: text/plain

SEND rfc1424.txt

- - --OtherAccess
Content-Type:   Message/External-body;
        name="rfc1424.txt";
        site="nic.ddn.mil";
        access-type="anon-ftp";
        directory="rfc"

Content-Type: text/plain


- - --OtherAccess--
- - --NextPart--

- ------- End of Forwarded Message

-----END PRIVACY-ENHANCED MESSAGE-----






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: fen@genmagic.genmagic.com (Fen Labalme)
Date: Tue, 9 Feb 93 20:47:39 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: ["Joyce K. Reynolds": RFC1422 on Certificate-Based Key Management]
Message-ID: <9302100447.AA06381@>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Date: Tue, 09 Feb 93 20:46:59 -0500
From: James M Galvin <galvin@TIS.COM>
Sender: pem-dev-relay@TIS.COM

-----BEGIN PRIVACY-ENHANCED MESSAGE-----
Proc-Type: 4,MIC-CLEAR
Content-Domain: RFC822
Originator-ID-Asymmetric: MEYxCzAJBgNVBAYTAlVTMSQwIgYDVQQKExtUcnV
 zdGVkIEluZm9ybWF0aW9uIFN5c3RlbXMxETAPBgNVBAsTCEdsZW53b29k,02
MIC-Info: RSA-MD5,RSA,SdwD9j3bEJftgUxTr4Oxa2StKH4giFOjvS5ey4B578J
 pEMgQYtXDXhzX4eNKmV23FducCqWXBaOHL2zvK7jK5A==

- ------------------------------------------------------------------------
This message digitally signed with Privacy Enhanced Mail.  Get your copy
of the Internet reference implementation from "pem-info@tis.com".


- ------- Forwarded Message

Message-ID: <199302092258.AA00113@zephyr.isi.edu>
Sender:     ietf-announce-request@IETF.CNRI.Reston.VA.US
From:       "Joyce K. Reynolds" <jkrey@isi.edu>
To:         IETF-Announce:;@IETF.CNRI.Reston.VA.US
cc:         jkrey@isi.edu
Date:       Tue, 09 Feb 93 14:56:39 PST
Subject:    RFC1422 on Certificate-Based Key Management


- - --NextPart


A new Request for Comments is now available in online RFC libraries.


        RFC 1422:

        Title:      Privacy Enhancement for Internet Electronic Mail:
                    Part II: Certificate-Based Key Management      
        Author:     S. Kent
        Mailbox:    kent@BBN.COM
        Pages:      32
        Characters: 86,085
        Obsoletes:  RFC 1114 


This is one of a series of documents defining privacy enhancement
mechanisms for electronic mail transferred using Internet mail
protocols.  This memo is the outgrowth of a series of meetings of the
Privacy and Security Research Group of the Internet Research Task
Force (IRTF) and the Privacy-Enhanced Electronic Mail Working Group of
the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF).  The author would like to
thank the members of the PSRG and the PEM WG for their comments and
contributions at the meetings which led to the preparation of this
document.  The author also would like to thank contributors to the
PEM-DEV mailing list ("pem-dev@tis.com") who have provided valuable
input which is reflected in this memo.

This is now a Proposed Standard Protocol.

This RFC specifies an IAB standards track protocol for the Internet
community, and requests discussion and suggestions for improvements.
Please refer to the current edition of the "IAB Official Protocol
Standards" for the standardization state and status of this protocol.
Distribution of this memo is unlimited.

This announcement is sent to the IETF list and the RFC-DIST list.
Requests to be added to or deleted from the IETF distribution list
should be sent to IETF-REQUEST@CNRI.RESTON.VA.US.  Requests to be added
to or deleted from the RFC-DIST distribution list should be sent to
RFC-REQUEST@NIC.DDN.MIL.

Details on obtaining RFCs via FTP or EMAIL may be obtained by sending
an EMAIL message to "rfc-info@ISI.EDU" with the message body 
"help: ways_to_get_rfcs".  For example:

        To: rfc-info@ISI.EDU
        Subject: getting rfcs

        help: ways_to_get_rfcs

Requests for special distribution should be addressed to either the
author of the RFC in question, or to NIC@NIC.DDN.MIL.  Unless
specifically noted otherwise on the RFC itself, all RFCs are for
unlimited distribution.

Submissions for Requests for Comments should be sent to
RFC-EDITOR@ISI.EDU.  Please consult RFC 1111, "Instructions to RFC
Authors", for further information.


Joyce K. Reynolds
USC/Information Sciences Institute

...

Below is the data which will enable a MIME compliant Mail Reader 
implementation to automatically retrieve the ASCII version
of the RFCs.

- - --NextPart
Content-Type: Multipart/Alternative; Boundary="OtherAccess"

- - --OtherAccess
Content-Type:  Message/External-body;
        access-type="mail-server";
        server="mail-server@nisc.sri.com"

Content-Type: text/plain

SEND rfc1422.txt

- - --OtherAccess
Content-Type:   Message/External-body;
        name="rfc1422.txt";
        site="nic.ddn.mil";
        access-type="anon-ftp";
        directory="rfc"

Content-Type: text/plain


- - --OtherAccess--
- - --NextPart--

- ------- End of Forwarded Message

-----END PRIVACY-ENHANCED MESSAGE-----





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Miron Cuperman <miron@extropia.wimsey.com>
Date: Tue, 9 Feb 93 23:52:32 PST
To: mjr@netcom.com (Matthew Rapaport)
Subject: The role of pools
Message-ID: <199302100735.AA16769@xtropia>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


A pool is used for *replying* to anon mail.  The problem is that it's hard  
to build a system that allows replies to anon email and still maintains  
absolute security.  One way is to broadcast the reply.  A pool does just  
that - it's basically a mailing list.  It could be a newsgroup.

Since any of the subscribers to the pool could be the intended recipient  
of any particular message, it would be very hard to use the pool to trace  
the anonymous recipient.

-- 

        Miron Cuperman <miron@extropia.wimsey.com> | NeXTmail/Mime ok
                       <miron@cs.sfu.ca>           | Public key avail
        AMIX: MCuperman                            |
cyberspacecomputingcryptoimmortalitynetworkslaissezfaire




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: sdw@sdwsys.lig.net (Stephen D. Williams)
Date: Tue, 9 Feb 93 21:23:07 PST
To: jim@tadpole.com (Jim Thompson)
Subject: Re: Compressed/Encrypted Voice using Modems
In-Reply-To: <9302071056.AA00916@ono-sendai>
Message-ID: <9302100519.AA12969@sdwsys.lig.net>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> 
> I don't see how a 28.8kbps (raw) data rate is possible, as the Shannon
> limit for a POTS line is 22kbps.  Certainly parts of the phone system
> no longer impose the narrow bandwidth that are part of the 'spec', but
> one can not always depend on getting a line that exceedes the published
> parameters of the phone system.
My impression was that most of the new systems dealt with variable 
bandwidth automatically.  28.8kbps might only be acheived on a higher
quality line.  The stated rates are max, not nominal.
> 
...
> I'm also fairly sure that recent Zyxel modems (e.g. the U-1496) use
> this Rockwell chip(set), and not a dedicated DSP.
They told me they use their own design 'datapump', and I know they use
a 68K (I swapped the rom in mine).
> 
> Jim
> 

Also, from a previous note, you wouldn't want to turn off V.42/V.42bis
since that is where the error correction is.  Also, even on compressed
data, you get some additional bandwidth because it does packetized 
synchronous data.  This gets close to 8bits/byte instead of 10 (start,
stop).

I get around 1760cps for LZW (zoo/compress) data.
This is Zyxel to non-zyxel (Cerfnet or World).

sdw




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Karl Barrus <elee9sf@Menudo.UH.EDU>
Date: Tue, 9 Feb 93 22:58:55 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: anonymous script
Message-ID: <199302100657.AA06626@Menudo.UH.EDU>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Cypherpunks,

Out of curiosity, what are the approximate computer ratios among this
list?  That is, how many people use MSDOS, how many use Mac's, how
many Amigas, many have Unix, how many have VMS?  

I'm just curious because it recently struck me that not everyone here
is running Unix, and thus can't really use the scripts I've written
(which help use the anonymous remailers).  So I wrote a helper program
in C++ for MSDOS, but after looking at the code, I've decided to bury
it and replace it with the following MSDOS script (at bottom of this
message). 

Also, I'm curious because I'm thinking of writing some help programs
for the digital bank, which will help automate interactions with the
bank.  

------8< cut here >8------
@echo off
rem anonmail.bat - MSDOS script to assist in using the anonymous remailers
rem Karl L. Barrus - elee9sf@menudo.uh.edu

if '%3'=='' goto help

echo :: > zzztemp1.txt
echo Request-Remailing-To: %2 >> zzztemp1.txt
echo. >> zzztemp1.txt

if '%3'=='1' goto noencrypt
if '%3'=='2' goto noencrypt
if '%3'=='3' goto noencrypt
if '%3'=='4' goto encrypt
if '%3'=='5' goto encrypt
if '%3'=='6' goto encrypt
if '%3'=='7' goto encrypt
if '%3'=='8' goto encrypt
if '%3'=='9' goto special

echo Improper choice.
goto done

:noencrypt
copy zzztemp1.txt + %1 zzztemp3.txt

goto done

:encrypt
if '%3'=='4' set pgpremail=hal@alumni.caltech.edu
if '%3'=='5' set pgpremail=remailer@rebma.mn.org
if '%3'=='6' set pgpremail=elee7h5@rosebud.ee.uh.edu
if '%3'=='7' set pgpremail=phantom@mead.u.washington.edu
if '%3'=='8' set pgpremail=hfinney@shell.portal.com

echo :: > zzztemp2.txt
echo Encrypted: PGP >> zzztemp2.txt
echo. >> zzztemp2.txt

pgp -ea zzztemp1.txt %pgpremail% 
copy zzztemp2.txt + zzztemp1.asc + %1 zzztemp3.txt

goto done

:special
if '%3'=='9' set pgpremail=remail@extropia.wimsey.com

copy zzztemp1.txt + %1 zzztemp2.txt
pgp -ea zzztemp2.txt %pgpremail%
copy zzztemp2.asc zzztemp3.txt

goto done

:help
echo  Usage: anonmail filename destination_address remailer_number
echo  1: hh@pmantis.berkeley.edu          no encryption
echo  2: hh@cicada.berkeley.edu           no encryption
echo  3: hh@soda.berkeley.edu             no encryption
echo  4: hal@alumni.caltech.edu           encryption
echo  5: remailer@rebma.mn.org            encryption
echo  6: elee7h5@rosebud.ee.uh.edu        encryption
echo  7: phantom@mead.u.washington.edu    encryption
echo  8: hfinney@shell.portal.com         encryption
echo  9: remail@extropia.wimsey.com       special
echo NOTE: final output will be placed in the filename specified
:done
del %1
rename zzztemp3.txt %1
del zzz*.*



/-----------------------------------\
| Karl L. Barrus                    |
| elee9sf@menudo.uh.edu             | <- preferred address
| barrus@tree.egr.uh.edu (NeXTMail) |
\-----------------------------------/




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: miron@extropia.wimsey.com
Date: Wed, 10 Feb 93 02:51:55 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Compressed/Encrypted Voice using Modems
In-Reply-To: <9302071056.AA00916@ono-sendai>
Message-ID: <1993Feb10.101337.17788@extropia.wimsey.bc.ca>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

sdw@sdwsys.lig.net (Stephen D. Williams) writes:

>Also, from a previous note, you wouldn't want to turn off V.42/V.42bis
>since that is where the error correction is.  Also, even on compressed
>data, you get some additional bandwidth because it does packetized 
>synchronous data.  This gets close to 8bits/byte instead of 10 (start,
>stop).

I think that you *do* want to turn off V.42.  V.42 does error
correction by using error detection and retransmission.  This
introduces variable delay and throughput, which are unacceptable in
a real-time application like voice.

I think that error correction through error correction codes is
the way to go.

- -- 
        Miron Cuperman <miron@extropia.wimsey.com> | NeXTmail/Mime ok
                       <miron@cs.sfu.ca>           | Public key avail
        AMIX: MCuperman                            |
cyberspacecomputingcryptoimmortalitynetworkslaissezfaire

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.1

iQCVAgUBK3i7lZNxvvA36ONDAQF3sQP+Ibesz2FVTGLfWL0Xsjj5X1jFkEU807va
+qpmDLDGghgdM5xCpc+Xv8Zl8lJx356WMPrbZfdshumXtmjsqf33Wq6fcAUse87k
6nsPiTkDpWnsga9g6oKUjPjTuQUcdk7VzrosJ+l3MAnvhQ0bD1TJD2ySIQk8NIPV
+uGM5Ore+6Q=
=7ViZ
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

New signature on my key:

-----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----
Version: 2.1
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=AVXx
-----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: thug@phantom.com (Murdering Thug)
Date: Wed, 10 Feb 93 08:47:10 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Compressed/Encrypted Voice using Modems
In-Reply-To: <1993Feb10.101337.17788@extropia.wimsey.bc.ca>
Message-ID: <m0nMKUy-000k1hC@phantom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


miron@extropia.wimsey.com (Miron Cuperman) writes:
> sdw@sdwsys.lig.net (Stephen D. Williams) writes:
> 
> >Also, from a previous note, you wouldn't want to turn off V.42/V.42bis
> >since that is where the error correction is.  Also, even on compressed
> >data, you get some additional bandwidth because it does packetized 
> >synchronous data.  This gets close to 8bits/byte instead of 10 (start,
> >stop).
> 
> I think that you *do* want to turn off V.42.  V.42 does error
> correction by using error detection and retransmission.  This
> introduces variable delay and throughput, which are unacceptable in
> a real-time application like voice.
> 
> I think that error correction through error correction codes is
> the way to go.

Exactly.  v.42/v.42bis packetizes the data stream and, depending on the
CODEC, would have adverse effects on voice quality.

I don't know if CELP requires an error-free transmittion stream from
codec to codec.  If it doesn't then that's great, I hope it self-synchronizes
itself after a byte or two of garbage coming through. Big deal, so you hear
a click or pop of static, so what.. you get that with analog lines.

On the other hand, since this stream will also be encrypted, it is unlikely
that errors could not mangle the entire conversation, and screw up the
encryption.  A single byte of garbage can unsync both encryption/decryption
sides and things could get very messy.

Here's how to deal with error checking/correction.  You CAN use v.42/v.42bis
if both crypto-phones offer somekind of FIFO chip in between the modem and
the crypto-chip.  This can smooth out a packety/bursty stream into a smooth
24kbps data stream. However, the resending of large packets by v.42 might
cause some wierd sound delays similar to what you hear on satellite circuits.

The best solution, as suggested by Miron is to use forward error correction.
There is plenty of bandwidth in a 19.2/21.6/24.0/28.8 kbps connection to
send CELP nybbles or bytes each along with their own ECC code. I believe a
4 bits of CELP would require 3 bits of ECC.  In any case, there is enough
bandwidth on a 19.2 kbps modem carrier to send a fully encrypted and fully
forward error corrected 9600 bps CELP stream. Let's assume we use a 4-bit
ECC code for each 4 bits of data, thus doubling our bandwidth.

Here's how it would look:

                                           9.6kbps    19.2kbps
sending:                                    |           |
                                            v           v 
voice ----> CELP ------------>     IDEA    --- ECC -------------v 
            coder    9.6kbps     encryption    coding         raw 19.2 
                                                             modulation
                                                                v 
                                                 9.6kbps  19.2k |
receiving:                                        |         |   |
                                                  v         v   |
voice <---- CELP <------------     IDEA       <------ ECC ------+ 
           decoder   9.6kbps     decryption           correction




Thug 




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Date: Wed, 10 Feb 93 11:57:33 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Timed-Release Crypto
Message-ID: <9302101955.AA09009@netcom.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Cypherpunks,

I want to share with you folks some preliminary ideas on "timed-release
cryptographic protocols," that is, methods for sending encrypted messages
into the future.

These ideas need more work, but since I have recently mentioned them to Hal
Finney, Max More, Mark Miller, and perhaps others, I guess it's time to say
something here.

Why would anyone want to send encrypted (sealed) messages into the future?

1. Foremost, to send money into the future, while protecting it in the
meantime from seizure, taxation, etc. This might be of interest to cryonics
folks who want to arrange for their own revival/reanimation at some time in
the future. (Existing systems have relied on creating endowments, insurance
contracts, trust funds, and the like. The trust of the agent is the means
for sending funds into the future--clearly this agent could be compromised,
raided, taxed, put out of business, etc. Though I am personally not a
cryonics client, I began thinking about this problem in 1989 and talked it
over with Phil Salin, who, ironically, is now himself in cryonic
suspension.)

2. To fulfill contracts with long payoff dates. One might wish to deliver
money at some future date, or to supply information at some future date.

3. "In the event of my death"-type messages, with guaranteed delivery of
some message or text in the event that something happens (or, of course,
that the message is not "countermanded" by the sender).

4. A software publisher might place source code in a timed-release escrow,
agreeing to release the code in 10 years, for whatever reason. (Of course,
he may lie, but that's another issue. Possibly the digital time-stamping
work of Haber and Stornetta can be used.)

I'm sure you can think of other uses. I argue that this timed-release
message is a kind of cryptographic primitive...though it may be argued that
it's just a variant of an ordinary message transmission, albeit one through
time instead of through space.

Diving right in, some approaches:

A message is encrypted (standard public key means, though private key
methods work the same way) and "sent out." Perhaps into a network of
remailers or a Cuperman-style "pool" (BTW, my compliments to Miron C. for
deploying such a thing..the first of many, I suspect). The encrypted
message is just a "passive" item in this scheme...it stays encrypted, is
available to all, etc. (in other words, the security of the message being
time-released does not in any way depend on hiding the existence or
location of the encrypted message, though of course it is important that
the encrypted message be widely distributed and not explicitly advertised
or tagged as being a timed-release message. 

(Detail note: Why not? Because some governments may see timed-release
messages as automatically being tax-avoiding, cryonics-supporting,
seditious, etc., messages and may attempt to hunt down and erase any such
messages...perhaps via "hunter-killer crypto viruses" or somesuch.)

Let us suppose the encrypted message is to be unlocked in 30 years. (It
could also be when some recognized event occurs, such as a Mars landing or
the death of the sender, or whatever...you'll see how this works). How can
the decryption key be prevented from being used in the meantime?

(To make this clear: both the encryted message _and_ the decryption key are
"in circulation" during all of those 30 years. Any scheme that relies on
the sender himself keeping the decryption key "secret" for those 30 years
is of course no fun at all...it's just what we have today and involved no
new cryptographic primitives, just ordinary human-mediated secrecy.) 

But if the encrypted message and the decryption key are both in circulation
for all of those 30 years, what's to keep someone from decrypting the
message in _one_ year, for example?

The answer: independent escrow agents who handle large volumes of messages
and agree to hold them for various amounts of time. Because they have no
idea of what's insided the encrypted messages they hold--and some may be
"test" messages deposited deliberately by reputation-rating or
credentialling agencies, such as "Consumers Crypto Guide"--and because
their business is holding things in escrow, they will not generally open
messages before the time specified.

"Aha!," I hear you exclaim, "Tim's scheme depends solely on the trust of
these escrow agents, and that's no different from depositing a sealed
envelope with your friendly lawyer and asking him to promise not to peek."

Here's how crypto and reputation-based sytems make my scenario different
(and stronger, I am arguing):

- an ecology of many escrow services, many pools, many encrypted-message
senders makes for a more robust system against subversion of any single
agent.

- no escrow agent knows what is contained in a sealed message, hence the
tempation to peek is reduced. (A wrinkle: escrow agents, like remailers,
will probably go to automatic hardware that is tamper-resistant (cf.
discussion of tamper-resistant or tamper-responding, modules in the Crypto
Glossary distributed at the first physical Cypherpunks meeting and
available in the archives). Thus, the hardware will automatically execute
certain protocols and make peeking a pain.)

- the best escrow agents (someday) may in turn increase security and their
own reputations by in turn using secondary contracts, i.e., by contracting
with _other_ escrow agents to seal parts or all of their messages.

- what results is that the original message is scattered around in various
publicly available locations (perhaps paid-for by dribbles of cryto-money
from crypto escrow agents, but this is a detail easily worked out in
various ways). The decryption key to the original message is itself broken
up into several or many pieces and scattered to a network of
"remailer"-like agents (they are essentially "remailers into the future,"
by agreeing as part of their protocol to hold messages for some amount of
time). As time passes, these various messages (pieces, remember) are
retrieved, forwarded, and generally bounced around the network.

- some escrow agents may be just "fixed delay" nodes. For example, "Alice's
Rest Stop" remailer node widely advertises that it will take in messages
and simply delay them for some fixed time, e.g., for a year. For some fee
based on message size. (Clearly the fixed time delay is a crufty approach,
much less flexible than variable delays negotiated by the messages
themselves, but it makes the idea clearer in some ways: a network of many
such one-year delays could thus "send" a message into the future in
one-year jumps.)

(It is important to remember that these messages are "first-class objects,"
to borrow a phrase, and that all messages essentially look the same and
have the same "rights" (Dean Tribble is probably barfing at my
appropriation of object-oriented lingo, but it seems appropriate). That is,
inspection of the bytes will not reveal to someone whether the message is a
$2 message, a simple love letter, a business contract, a remailed item, a
$100K cryonics payment, etc. Thus, the "authorities" cannot simply target
some class of messages and ban them or launch "hunter-killer crypto
viruses" against them, at least not without shutting down the whole
system!)

- the individual pieces may have instructions attached, such as "You will
be paid 10 crypto credits if you hold me for one year and then decrypt me."
(Not to belabor the point, but the means by which this "contract" can be
enforced are that the escrow agents never know when they're being tested,
when they're being monitored by rating services. This kind of "trust" is
what allows ordinary deposit banks to work...their business is talking
deposits and lending money, not repudiating the honest claims of
customers.)

- thus, I envision a swarm of messages being stored-and-forwarded in space
and time, with an observor seeing only  bits flowing around. Nobody except
the original "launcher" (who needs to be fairly careful about the path he
selects, about robustness against some fraction of the escrow/remailer
agents going out of business, etc.) knows what's going on.

- and as the end of the 30 years period approaches, to continue with the
example I started with, the decryption key gets "reconstituted" in various
ways (depends on what is desired, and how protocols evolve...I don't claim
to have the details already worked out). For example, after 30 years the
various messages stored in escrow accounts are forwarded separately to "The
Immortalist Foundation," which may in fact be a digital pseudonym (as we
have discussed so many times here). This entity puts the pieces together,
sort of like combining the missing pieces of a text and reconstituting a
genie or demon, and finds it can now unlock the original encrypted message.
It finds, say, a million crypto credits, or the location of some physical
treasure, or whatever. 

(Needless to say, there are some obvious questions about what long-term
money will be stable, what banks will still exist after 30 years, and so
on. I expect new forms of time deposits to evolve. Can the original sender
be expected to know what will evolve before he seals his original message?
Some obvious issues to work on--I never claimed it would be trivial, or
static. One approach is to allow some human intervention, where an
"investment agent" opens a digital money message, redeems it, and reinvests
it in some new instrument. As usual, he would not know who the original
investor was and would be "tested" by reputation-rating agencies. It _does_
get complicated, I know.)

The Key Point: Messages sent into this network of remailers, escrow
accounts, pools, and investment agents are untraceable to the sender and
are generally unidentifiable. To break a single message involves breaking
the entire system (or colluding with enough remailer nodes, as in any
DC-Net sort of system). As with remailer networks, the expectation is that
they will become sufficiently pervasive and trans-nationalized that
breaking the entire system is just too painful and difficult (much the way
the Net is already too pervasive to easily shut down, even if some uses of
it are undesirable to various national authorities).

Timed-release messages are objects that can be transmitted, encrypted, and
can carry further instructions on where to mail them next, on how much
digital money to pay to this next link, and various other instructions or
protocols.

(In other words, they are "agents" that can negotiate various contracts,
for remailing , for storage, etc. Since they are "powerless" in a human
sense, their security is provided by double-checks--perhaps by other agents
who are watching and waiting--and by the general "shell-game" system of
reputations, credentialling, and so on.)

To make this scheme clearer in a simple way, I could publicly post an
encrypted message to this list, or in one of the "pools," and then scatter
the decryption key in several pieces with several members of this list,
paying them $1 each to "hold" their piece for, say, a month. At the end of
the month, they would fulfill their end of the bargain by forwarding the
piece they hold to some public place or pool and the decryption key would
be reconstituted (don't press me for exact details....PGP doesn't support
this directly, but could). For robustness against loss of some of the
messages, an n-out-of-m voting scheme could be used (e.g., any 5 of 8
pieces are sufficient to reconstruct the decryption key).

The result is a message from the past, a timed-release message.

I'm anxious to hear your comments. I think such a cryptographic primitive
could be useful for a lot of purposes.

-Tim May

--

Timothy C. May               | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,  
tcmay@netcom.com        | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
408-688-5409               | knowledge, reputations, information markets, 
W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA       | black markets, collapse of governments.
Higher Power: 2^756839 | Public Key: waiting for the dust to settle.







From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: John.Nieder@f33.n125.z1.FIDONET.ORG (John Nieder)
Date: Thu, 11 Feb 93 08:07:30 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: E Pluribus Doodah
Message-ID: <4843.2B79C930@fidogate.FIDONET.ORG>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



from: john.nieder@f33.n125.z1.fidonet.org

 * Reply to msg originally in Cypherpunks

 BK> Currently, Jock Gill is
 BK> working in an office located in the Old Executive Office Building
 BK> across the street from the White House.  At this point, he is
 BK> working alone, without a staff.

This week's news indicates to me this will probably not improve.

 BK> The White House itself employs a large
 BK> staff to handle snail mail.

According to Monday night's news, this is from where these vaunted
"symbolic" 25% White House staff cuts will come.

 BK> All things in their time.  Once the
 BK> E-mail address was circulated together with the heading the "White
 BK> House", everyone understandably believed a real system was up and
 BK> running.

Yes, silly us.

 BK> SUGGESTION:  Use the compuserve address you have judiciously,
 BK> reserving it for absolutely vital contacts.

Oh, yes, _certainly_!  The _vital_ stuff should go into a nonexistant
system.  Naturally!

 BK> Until such time that a
 BK> real public access White house E-mail system is operational,
 BK> consider relying on the traditional means of contacting the
 BK> administration.  Given what they had to start with from the
 BK> previous administration (scratch), I have every reason to expect
 BK> that Jeff Eller and Jock Gill will work well--and as quickly as
 BK> possible--to get an interactive system up and running.  But it will
 BK> take time and patience.

Can anyone say, "VAPORWARE"?

 BK> We can all help them achieve that effort
 BK> best if we refrain from acting as if that non-existent system were
 BK> already in place.  PLEASE HELP RELAY THIS CONTEXT AND SUGGESTION TO
 BK> OTHER NETWORKS AND INDIVIDUALS.  Thanks.

Pass it around?  You bet.  It's f*cking _hilarious_!  My guess is that
this gaffe will (or at least ought to) get Gill fired, assuming he
survives this "symbolic" staff downsizing.  I might add that nothing
could be more "symbolic" than the announcement that the cuts will come
from those who actually respond to public input.  This "go away & don't
bother us" move on the part of the Clinton administration indicates that
it obviously doesn't care _what_ America thinks.
.   There is a _bright side_ to this, however:  Would such an
indifferent administration spend resources trying to break our codes
when it doesn't care what we have to say anyway? 8-)
        JN

... We want information./You won't get it!/By hook or by crook, we _will_!  
--- Blue Wave/Opus v2.12 [NR]
--  
John Nieder - via FidoNet node 1:125/555
    UUCP - ...!uunet!hoptoad!kumr!fidogate!33!John.Nieder
INTERNET - John.Nieder@f33.n125.z1.FIDONET.ORG




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu
Date: Wed, 10 Feb 93 14:12:43 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Timed-Release Crypto
In-Reply-To: <9302101955.AA09009@netcom.netcom.com>
Message-ID: <9302102211.AA22756@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


This is neat idea, T.C. May. Here are some things that popped into my
head thinking of it.

I think the idea of multiple encryption of the time-delay message would
be extremely useful here. Imagine this. You encrypt a message with as
many layers as there are intermediate escrows.  In other words, a
message is encrypted with layer1 pw, then reencrypted with layer2 pw,
then layer3, etc.  In the decryption message (separate) there is a long
sequence of keys.  The lower-level keys closer to the actual message
are also encrypted by the higher-level keys.  Now, suppose that the way
the message is held is this: after 1 level of protection has elapsed,
the password message and the encryption message are recombined to a
single escrow agent. That agent uses the top-level information (one key
is plaintext (maybe not), or encrypted with that agent's public key, or
whatever) to decode the top-level of encryption.  Then, he again
redistributes the next-lower-level of encryption password message and
actual message to unique escrow agents.

The beauty of this is that a given escrow agent, even once he gets a
password, can only strip off "his" topmost level of encryption (at
least, that's the intent). He is powerless to decrypt all the lower
levels and hence the message itself. Therefore to actually decrypt a
message ahead of time would require the collusion of many operators. 
The message should have some kind of indications at each level when it
is to be "reconstituted" (just add water), and escrow agents of course
should hold or reject messages that are sent to them for premature
decryption.  There is also the distinction of "joiners" and "storers"
although the two could be combined in some way (both are "forwarders").

The final destination should be the destination the original owner
intended, so that there is no final escrow agent that can decrypt the
message.  He only has an encoded message he can pass along, and another
agent only has a meaningless key and the final address as well.  When
the final destination is reached, the last layer of decryption can be
removed by the intended recipient (the money is in -X- account,
password -Y- or whatever).  I.e., the recipient is the final "joiner".

The idea of separating keys and the encoded messages is really
ingenious, and I'd guess this "disassociation" has other uses as well. 
An encrypted message with a password *existing* but *inaccessable* is
just as secure as a message using conventional encryption. In fact,
there is probably an added dimension of security---in most systems
*somebody* knows the key, but here, if it is generated automatically,
even the *key* is unknown for awhile!

Another possibility is to have some kind of standard protocol for time
encrypted messages (this is interesting and seems feasible). Let's say
I want a message [x] to be unencrypted on date [y].  I call a "time
encryption server" and ask for the secret key associated with my
message and date [y].  I encrypt the message and publicize that
version.  The time server is constantly spewing out the daily code for
messages that expire on that date. Anybody just listens to the
broadcast and decrypts the messages in their possession using the key. 
Note however that it is crucial that somehow the key depend on the
message itself (via the hashing approaches), otherwise everybody knows
everybody else's keys ahead of time just by submitting messages to the
server for the particular date.  I suppose public-key encryption could
be used here but I'm hazy on the details.

P.S. this is a really tricky situation compared to above, but it might
be possible to make messages with "insecure" passwords that can be
broken in a few lifetimes from searches. Of course, this depends very
crucially on the pace of technology and the resources devoted to the
cracking, two highly variable factors.

Also, keep in mind that every message in existence relying on
complexity of algorithms is encrypted based on the time-delayed release
of revolutionary and unforeseen computer techniques in cracking... or,
more specifically, the gamble that they will not occur...




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: deltorto@aol.com
Date: Wed, 10 Feb 93 12:20:37 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Speaking in Tongues
Message-ID: <9302101519.tn42504@aol.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>>From:  dmandl@shearson.com
>>Subj:   Re: E Pluribus Unum
>>
>>> From: deltorto@aol.com
>>> 
>>> Fellow Cyphers,
>>> 
>>> Eric Hughes contributed:
>>> >>I applaud the Clinton administration for making itself available via
>>> >>email.  I do not think it advisable, however, to send a single
>>> >>cypherpunks letter.  Rather I urge all interested parties to compose
>>> >>their own letters [etc., etc., etc., etc.]
>>
>>I think I've held my tongue long enough. 

Hmmmm. Perhaps not.   :-D

  ddt

PS: I can't afford six months, but I like (the symbolism of) the idea. There
are much more effective ways of pulling their plug, no?




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Karl Barrus <elee9sf@Menudo.UH.EDU>
Date: Wed, 10 Feb 93 13:55:53 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: timed-release crypto
Message-ID: <199302102154.AA20926@Menudo.UH.EDU>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Tim May writes:
>...I could publicly post an encrypted message to this list, or in one
>of the "pools," and then scatter the decryption key in several pieces
>with several members of this list, paying them $1 each to "hold" their
>piece for, say, a month.  At the end of the month, they would fulfill
>their end of the bargain by forwarding the piece they hold to some
>public place or pool and the decryption key would be reconstituted...

Cypherpunks, this is an experiment we can try right here right now.
We certainly have the anonymous mail facilities, pools, and
encryption, as well as a digital bank we could use to "pay" people :-)

Splitting a decryption key is fairly easy: we could use the simple XOR
method.  Say you want to encrypt a message of length m and split the
key among n people.  Choose n-1 sequences of m random bits (coin
flips, cryptographically strong pseudo-random number sequences, etc)
and XOR the message with all the random sequences (call the result
M').  Then your split secret is the M' and the n-1 sequences.  To
recover the message, calculate the XOR of M' and the n-1 sequences.
Providing for an n-out-of-m scheme takes more work and number theory,
but that can be done as well.

/-----------------------------------\
| Karl L. Barrus                    |
| elee9sf@menudo.uh.edu             | <- preferred address
| barrus@tree.egr.uh.edu (NeXTMail) |
\-----------------------------------/




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Marc.Ringuette@GS80.SP.CS.CMU.EDU
Date: Wed, 10 Feb 93 14:56:23 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Crypto goals
Message-ID: <9302102256.AA29342@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Y'know, just defining "what we should want" is one of the biggest
challenges in moving towards the next generation of crypto.  How
about making a list of features we want, and/or a list of scenarios
we want to be able to handle?

Uncontroversial features:
    message privacy
    message anonymity
    message untraceability
    digital cash
    digital time stamps

More difficult/controversial features:
    message invisibility [e.g. in low bits of video signal]
    untraceable access to databases [just anonymous email?]
    electronic black markets [just electronic cash and anonymous email?]
    electronic voting
    m-of-n trust schemes
    time-delay messages [are they useful?]
    executable but non-disassemblable code [is it possible?]
    tagging / un-tagging of copyrighted text [what is possible?]
       [explanation to follow in another message ]

I know how to take a crack at implementing all of these except the last
two, but would benefit from better theoretical and practical work on
all of them.  Most of them are obviously useful, and scenarios come
easily to mind.  

Have I missed anything?


-- Marc Ringuette (mnr@cs.cmu.edu)




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Eric Hughes <hughes@soda.berkeley.edu>
Date: Wed, 10 Feb 93 17:51:26 PST
To: kk@well.sf.ca.us
Subject: Wired photo shoot at cypherpunks on Saturday
Message-ID: <9302110148.AA11268@soda.berkeley.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Kevin Kelly, editor of Wired Magazine, former list member, and former
editor of Whole Earth Review, asked me to forward the following
message to the list.

OK, everybody, it's your chance for fame or the avoidance thereof.

Eric
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------

WIRED magazine is running a story by Steven Levy (Hackers, Artificial Life)
on crypto rebels and the current politics of encryption. The story takes an
extremely sympathetic view of the work  done by this list.

To illustrate this story, WIRED will have a professional photographer at
Cygnus at next Satuday's cyherpunk meeting. He will set up outside of the
meeting area somewhere. WIRED would like to shoot an anonymous group
picture, for those willing to participate. We propose supplying blank face
masks upon with individuals can write their public key. In addition we will
be shooting non-anonymous portraits of some individuals, if they are
willing. We would like it to be fun. We emphasize that this is all voluntary
and will take place away from the meeting area, perhaps before and after the
meeting.

If you have any questions about this you can email me, Kevin Kelly, editor
at WIRED, kk@well.sf.ca.us

We think this article will make a big splash by bringing the issues
you care about into the forefront. Having real people behind the ideas
leads credence to tthe movement. We seek your cooperation.





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Marc.Ringuette@GS80.SP.CS.CMU.EDU
Date: Wed, 10 Feb 93 15:05:36 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Tagging copyrighted text
Message-ID: <9302102305.AA29462@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Tim May and many of us argue that copyrights will become unenforceable 
as copying bits becomes cheaper and crypto privacy and anonymity becomes
more widely available.  This will mean that any static collection of
bits will just be FREE.  Musicians will have to make money on live
performances, because they couldn't sell many recordings.  Etc.

A question I've been thinking about is, will Dow Jones be able to charge
for its newswire?  

Step 1:  I subscribe to Dow Jones and then relay each message to a
mailing list, charging them a fraction of the original price.

Step 2:  Dow Jones starts changing random whitespace in the text, in an
attempt to "tag" the text untraceably to trace which subscriber is
leaking the information.  They cancel my subscription.

Step 3:  I get 20 new subscriptions, and use the redundancy to cancel
out Dow Jones's sneaky tagging.

Step 4: ...


Question:  who wins?  I haven't been able to work it out yet, but
it may just be a simple combinatorial exercise.


-- Marc Ringuette (mnr@cs.cmu.edu)




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu
Date: Wed, 10 Feb 93 17:49:10 PST
To: Marc.Ringuette@GS80.SP.CS.CMU.EDU
Subject: Re: Tagging copyrighted text
In-Reply-To: <9302102305.AA29462@toad.com>
Message-ID: <9302110148.AA26737@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>Tim May and many of us argue that copyrights will become unenforceable 
>as copying bits becomes cheaper and crypto privacy and anonymity becomes
>more widely available.  This will mean that any static collection of
>bits will just be FREE.  Musicians will have to make money on live
>performances, because they couldn't sell many recordings.  Etc.

Er, I'd say this is another instance of cypherpunk extremism: ``The
world as we know it is about to collapse.''  Yes, information will
probably be much freer over the nets, and copyright violations probably
more difficult to pursue and punish.  But think about this: with the
speed and ubiquity of networks, it now becomes possible for every
author or creative artist to keep the only copies of his work. Then, he
could post "links" to it anywhere in the world. When people pass around
the work, they wouldn't pass around the work itself, they'd pass the
"link".  Whenever someone wants to view the work, the link points to
the unchanging address for instantaneous downloading.  A very small
transaction charge is billed to the receiver by the sender. (Of course,
people could write stuff that would actually grab and store the text or
whatever instead of just "play" it. But I'll bet that most people will
eventually say, "why bother?" The direct access will be more convenient
and the charge so minimal.)  Links could be embedded wherever there is
information, like in bibliographies or references or compilations or whatever.

 There are virtually NO MIDDLEMEN---the investment return to the artist
is total.  Contrast this to today's vast overhead with records and
books, for example (these costs are largely associated with
distribution, I'd wager).  Of course, the individual artist is free to
make contracts with knowledgeable cohorts for album cover design or
whatever.  The essence of a copyright is really to give a creative
artist more control over their own works, and global, high-speed,
reliable networks will give artists absolutely unprecedented and
unparalleled control (and yes, I admit, a lack of it too).

Hey, consider that programmers are artists too.  I write some hot
program, but I don't distribute it: I run it on one of my systems as a
sort of network pipe.  People anywhere in the world pipe in their data
and get it back with a small transaction fee to me.  In fact, what I'm
really getting at is treating the entire world like Unix utilities with
standard input and output, sort of like electronic vending machines!  I
can pipe my manuscripts to some address and they pop out edited or
published.  I drop a file on that goofy icon, and it goes to Bill
Clinton.  I could hook up pipes between companies to set up my own
company!  There might be a lot of command line parameters to specify
and plenty of glitches reported on stderr, but it could work...  This
all would happen with commensurate drains on my online account (all
digital transactions, of course).  Imagine that you could write
software that would bill the user!  Big companies do it, why not individuals?




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Kevin Kelly <kk@well.sf.ca.us>
Date: Wed, 10 Feb 93 19:02:55 PST
To: kk@well.sf.ca.us
Subject: Re:  Wired photo shoot at cypherpunks on Saturday
Message-ID: <199302110300.AA18069@well.sf.ca.us>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain




Thanks.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: miron@extropia.wimsey.com (Miron Cuperman)
Date: Wed, 10 Feb 93 12:53:21 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Compressed/Encrypted Voice using Modems
In-Reply-To: <1993Feb10.101337.17788@extropia.wimsey.bc.ca>
Message-ID: <1993Feb10.193843.20507@extropia.wimsey.bc.ca>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

thug@phantom.com (Murdering Thug) writes:

>I don't know if CELP requires an error-free transmittion stream from
>codec to codec.  If it doesn't then that's great, I hope it self-synchronizes
>itself after a byte or two of garbage coming through. Big deal, so you hear
>a click or pop of static, so what.. you get that with analog lines.

CELP resyncs.  Not sure how fast.  Maybe after a tenth of a second or so.

On a side note, we are finishing up an implementation of CELP on the
TMS320C5x.  This is a 20 MIPS integer chip.  We are taking up less
than 15 MIPS.  We also know how to write error corrected CELP (such
that bits that cause more significant degradation are protected
better).
- -- 
        Miron Cuperman <miron@extropia.wimsey.com> | NeXTmail/Mime ok
                       <miron@cs.sfu.ca>           | Public key avail
        AMIX: MCuperman                            |
cyberspacecomputingcryptoimmortalitynetworkslaissezfaire

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Version: 2.1

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From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Marc Horowitz <marc@Athena.MIT.EDU>
Date: Wed, 10 Feb 93 22:29:36 PST
To: Marc.Ringuette@GS80.SP.CS.CMU.EDU
Subject: Re: Tagging copyrighted text
In-Reply-To: <9302102305.AA29462@toad.com>
Message-ID: <9302110113.AA20486@binkley.MIT.EDU>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>> Step 2:  Dow Jones starts changing random whitespace in the text, in an
>> attempt to "tag" the text untraceably to trace which subscriber is
>> leaking the information.  They cancel my subscription.

They don't just cancel your subscription.  They sue your butt into
next week.  You can make it harder for them to find you, but if you're
eating into their profits, they will, and the more effort you've made
them go through, the madder they'll be, and the harder their lawyers
will bite.

There's no way to "tag" a document in such a way that the tag cannot
be removed.  At worst, I read the document out loud, and have my
partner rekey it, while rewriting it slightly.  Unless it's something
like poetry which you can't just rewrite, this will pretty much
sanitize the data against any kind of keying.

The fact is, people copy music and software now.  It Happens, and as
much as they wish it didn't, it does.  And when things become more
electronic, it will still happen.  My guess is that unless such
duplication becomes institutionalized, it's not worth the effort to do
anything about it.  And if you start buying things, copying them, and
giving or selling them to lots of other people in an organized way,
the real owners will find you.

		Marc




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Marc.Ringuette@GS80.SP.CS.CMU.EDU
Date: Wed, 10 Feb 93 19:31:29 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Tagging copyrighted text
Message-ID: <9302110331.AA05651@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Dear ld23178, 

True, the abandonment of copyright isn't going to happen right away.
But I disagree with your claim that on the network of the future the
artist will make a few pennies per copy by being the most convenient
provider of the information.  The author is very unlikely to be the
most convenient and least expensive provider of their work, since they
have no advantage over specialists in the information providing business.

Your point about "unix pipes" across the network is an excellent one,
though.  Information filtering and processing services will be very
valuable and harder to obtain for free.  "Insert a 25c electronic coin
and a pile of news articles, and I'll filter them for you."


-- Marc Ringuette (mnr@cs.cmu.edu)




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Phil Karn <karn@qualcomm.com> (Phil Karn)
Date: Wed, 10 Feb 93 21:14:12 PST
To: sdw@sdwsys.lig.net (Stephen D. Williams)
Subject: Re: Compressed/Encrypted Voice using Modems
Message-ID: <9302110512.AA09668@servo>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


At  0:19 2/10/93 -0500, Stephen D. Williams wrote:

>Also, from a previous note, you wouldn't want to turn off V.42/V.42bis
>since that is where the error correction is.  Also, even on compressed
>data, you get some additional bandwidth because it does packetized 
>synchronous data.  This gets close to 8bits/byte instead of 10 (start,
>stop).

As somebody else mentioned, you do want to turn off LAPM/V.42bis when
running a speech application, because speech is a real-time application
and LAPM retransmissions introduce delay. Compression is not likely
to add much but delay either, since the vocoder itself is already
compressing the speech much more effectively than V.42bis, which is
designed specifically for textual information.

Almost all modern modems support synchronous terminals, although the
feature is rarely used. This is how you get around wasting 2 bits out
of every 10 on start and stop bits.

Phil





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: fen@genmagic.genmagic.com (Fen Labalme)
Date: Wed, 10 Feb 93 21:55:23 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Tagging copyrighted text
Message-ID: <9302110555.AA11170@>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Marc Ringuette (mnr@cs.cmu.edu) writes:
> True, the abandonment of copyright isn't going to happen right away.

I agree, too.  But there are many things here to look at.  Economics is
a strange bird, indeed, and I pretend to know little of it.  But here
are some points that the future may bring into focus...


1) It is easy to copy software (music, programs, video, etc.)

2) No matter what copy protection is developed, it will always be easy.

3) People will always pay for the *production* of software
   (a program that needs to be written, or live music, or...)
   (note that the Grateful Dead, top money maker, invites tapers)

4) People will always pay for support, maintenance, storage, etc.
   (note cygnus)

5) Storage and indexing become more valuable as info-quantity grows.

6) Likewise, effecient and accurate filtering (access)

7) People will pay for access to the info they want *now*.

8) Human editors will team with electronic filters to provide this service.


In conclusion, there will always be money to be made.  In (one of) the more
radical futures (that I happen to ascribe to) there will be less income
from past works (ala software patents) and more for storage and timely access.

But the developer of good software (the musician) will always be in demand.

Fen





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Date: Thu, 11 Feb 93 00:32:21 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Tagging copyrighted text
Message-ID: <9302110831.AA00835@netcom.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu (I'd use his real name, but this is all
I can find here....why don't people sign their messages?) writes,
commenting on some stuff by Marc Ringuette:

>>Tim May and many of us argue that copyrights will become unenforceable 
>>as copying bits becomes cheaper and crypto privacy and anonymity becomes
>>more widely available.  This will mean that any static collection of
>>bits will just be FREE.  Musicians will have to make money on live
>>performances, because they couldn't sell many recordings.  Etc.
>
>Er, I'd say this is another instance of cypherpunk extremism: ``The

Er, Marc R. didn't say the world as we know it is about to collapse, nor
did I. (BTW, for you cypherpunks, most of this debate about intellectual
property rights took place recently over on the Extropians list.) But I
certainly think some big changes are coming.

>world as we know it is about to collapse.''  Yes, information will
>probably be much freer over the nets, and copyright violations probably
>more difficult to pursue and punish.  But think about this: with the
>speed and ubiquity of networks, it now becomes possible for every
>author or creative artist to keep the only copies of his work. Then, he
>could post "links" to it anywhere in the world. When people pass around
>the work, they wouldn't pass around the work itself, they'd pass the
>"link".  Whenever someone wants to view the work, the link points to
>the unchanging address for instantaneous downloading.  A very small

With music, art, text, or executable code, once it is available for
listening, viewing, reading, or running on the customer's system, it is
also available for copying. This is the whole point--if you can read the
text, you can keep a copy of it. You mention this, but dismiss it as
inconvenient. Well, a popular song may be simultaneously requested by tens
of thousands of listeners....it is hard to imagine the 14 Gigabits per
second (10,000 x CD-quality sound) coming out of someone's home or business
to supply this need! The situation is vastly worse with video, naturally.
(I suppose some "servers," like ftp sites, could be set up to deal with
especially popular movies and music...cumbersome, though. And, yes, fiber
optics can in theory support very high bandwidths, but still not enough to
supply the video rental biz. And this traffic will clog the nets and cause
lots of problems, I would think.)

>transaction charge is billed to the receiver by the sender. (Of course,
>people could write stuff that would actually grab and store the text or
>whatever instead of just "play" it. But I'll bet that most people will
>eventually say, "why bother?" The direct access will be more convenient
>and the charge so minimal.)  Links could be embedded wherever there is
>information, like in bibliographies or references or compilations or whatever.

I agree that hypertext-like embeddings offer some hope, for things like
text especially, as a reader is essentially buying the total package of
texts and links, rather than just some specific text. (But any specific
text becomes vulnerable to "snagging.")

>Hey, consider that programmers are artists too.  I write some hot
>program, but I don't distribute it: I run it on one of my systems as a
>sort of network pipe.  People anywhere in the world pipe in their data
>and get it back with a small transaction fee to me.  In fact, what I'm
.....

Even with much faster networks, remotely running programs introduces lags
and inconveniences, not to mention security problems (e.g., "Now you can
use _our_ word processor at _our_ site to write your love letters!"). If
nothing else, speed of light delays will become very irksome.

But I do agree that "knowledge servers" may be a way for corporate
knowledge to remain bottled up in corporations (for example).

-Tim

--

Timothy C. May               | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,  
tcmay@netcom.com        | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
408-688-5409               | knowledge, reputations, information markets, 
W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA       | black markets, collapse of governments.
Higher Power: 2^756839 | Public Key: MailSafe and PGP available.







From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: John.Nieder@f33.n125.z1.FIDONET.ORG (John Nieder)
Date: Thu, 11 Feb 93 08:07:45 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: E PLURIBUS DOODAH
Message-ID: <4854.2B7A6A61@fidogate.FIDONET.ORG>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain




from: john.nieder@f33.n125.z1.fidonet.org

 

 * Reply to msg originally in Cypherpunks
 
 BK> Currently, Jock Gill is
 BK> working in an office located in the Old Executive Office Building
 BK> across the street from the White House.  At this point, he is
 BK> working alone, without a staff.
 
This week's news indicates to me this will probably not improve.
 
 BK> The White House itself employs a large
 BK> staff to handle snail mail.
 
According to Monday night's news, this is from where these vaunted
"symbolic" 25% White House staff cuts will come.
 
 BK> All things in their time.  Once the
 BK> E-mail address was circulated together with the heading the "White
 BK> House", everyone understandably believed a real system was up  
and
 BK> running.
 
Yes, silly us...to say nothing of the "CLINTON" AOL address
 
 BK> SUGGESTION:  Use the compuserve address you have judiciously,
 BK> reserving it for absolutely vital contacts.
 
Oh, yes, _certainly_!  The _vital_ stuff should go into a nonexistant
system.  Naturally!
 
 BK> Until such time that a
 BK> real public access White house E-mail system is operational,
 BK> consider relying on the traditional means of contacting the
 BK> administration.  Given what they had to start with from the
 BK> previous administration (scratch), I have every reason to expect
 BK> that Jeff Eller and Jock Gill will work well--and as quickly  
as
 BK> possible--to get an interactive system up and running.  But it  
will
 BK> take time and patience.
 
Can anyone say, "VAPORWARE"?
 
 BK> We can all help them achieve that effort
 BK> best if we refrain from acting as if that non-existent system  
were
 BK> already in place.  PLEASE HELP RELAY THIS CONTEXT AND SUGGESTION  
TO
 BK> OTHER NETWORKS AND INDIVIDUALS.  Thanks.
 
Pass it around?  You bet.  It's f*cking _hilarious_!  My guess is  that
this gaffe will (or at least ought to) get Gill fired, assuming he
survives this "symbolic" staff downsizing.  I might add that nothing
could be more "symbolic" than the announcement that the cuts will  come
from those who actually respond to public input.  This "go away &  don't
bother us" move on the part of the Clinton administration indicates  that
it obviously doesn't care _what_ America thinks.
.   There is a _bright side_ to this, however:  Would such an
indifferent administration spend resources trying to break our codes
when it doesn't care what we have to say anyway? 8-)
        JN
 
... We want information./You won't get it!/By hook or by crook, we  
_will_!
 
 


--  
John Nieder - via FidoNet node 1:125/555
    UUCP - ...!uunet!hoptoad!kumr!fidogate!33!John.Nieder
INTERNET - John.Nieder@f33.n125.z1.FIDONET.ORG




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Marc.Ringuette@GS80.SP.CS.CMU.EDU
Date: Thu, 11 Feb 93 00:35:37 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Tagging copyrighted text
Message-ID: <9302110835.AA09701@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I've been thinking more about how Dow Jones can catch customers which
leak its data.  Let's assume that I, as the thief, get 20
subscriptions, and that Dow Jones tries twiddling the value of various
bits of its output with some probability, differently for each
customer, to catch who's leaking its data.

My strategy as the thief is, whenever the newswire doesn't agree
between all of my subscriptions, they take a majority vote.

How many bits of random tag must Dow Jones add to its newsfeed to catch
a clique of size 20 out of its 10,000 customers?

I think I've narrowed the answer down to between 437 bits and 250 Gbits.

<sigh>


-- Marc Ringuette (mnr@cs.cmu.edu)




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: fergp@sytex.com (Paul Ferguson)
Date: Thu, 11 Feb 93 07:41:38 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Viral encryption
Message-ID: <RqHTyB2w165w@sytex.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Greetings, gentlemen and ladies.
 
Having just subscribed to this mailing list, I have several
interesting questions to pose, not exactly knowing which end
of the candle to light first.
 
First off, my background does include some cryptological
overtones. As a non-comissioned officer in the US Army, I
was a COMSEC systems integrator and a COMSEC account custodian.
(Anyone who may be familiar with the job knows the complexities
of involvement.) I now earn my keep as a network systems
integration consultant (great buzzwords) for a highly respected
(and major) computer consultant firm based in the  Washington,
DC area -- far removed from the crypto-analytical sciences
that you folks have an active interest. This job keeps me in the
New York city area four days a week (What personal life?).
 
Secondly, my professional area of expertise is networking (granted,
it _does_ pat the bills). My personal area of expertise (and
enjoyment), is DOS based computer virus "research". I was weened
in IBM system 360/370 assembler (once upon a time) and am quite
adept in the INTEL 80x86 assembler set. (Ralf Brown is one of my
heros.) I "de-program" for hobby; taking things (viruses) apart
to study their possible "interaction" and ability to cause major
problems (sometimes they really do). 
 
You're probably telling yourself at this point, "Gee, I wish this
guy would cut to the chase!" On that note -- I shall. ;-)
 
In the past year, the DOS world has been confronted with several
(two, significantly -- the MtE and more recently the TPE) encryption
"engines" which are being used as "envelopes" for existing viruses.
(Stay with me, now.) They are being called "polymorphs" by those
"in-the-know"; more specifically, polymorphic viruses. The
encryption is weak, compared to DES or RSA comparisons, but they do
pose a major problem to the computer community because of the
technological weaknesses of the antivirus product developers.
Algorithmic development is not exactly their bag of tricks, in most
cases. Most are reliant on pattern matching and have fits when
presented with code that is _totally_ static.
 
Although (I realize that) this conference newsgroup seems
dedicated to privacy and ciphering-related issues, I'm just curious
as to what exposure some of you may have with this type of problem.
(I used to have Kelly Goen to bounce ideas off of, but he seems to
have dropped out of the public eye a few years ago, but yet I see
his name mentioned in the PGP docs.)
 
Any serious responses are quite welcomed at fergp@systex.com.
Public interest responses (I'd hope) will suffice in this area.
 
Cheers from Manhattan.
 
Paul Ferguson                     |
Network Integration Consultant    |  "All of life's answers are
Alexandria, Virginia USA          |   on TV."
fergp@sytex.com     (Internet)    |           -- Homer Simpson
sytex.com!fergp     (UUNet)       |
1:109/229           (FidoNet)     |
         PGP public encryption key available upon request.

---
fergp@sytex.com (Paul Ferguson)
Sytex Systems Communications, Arlington VA, 1-703-358-9022




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Robin Hanson <hanson@ptolemy.arc.nasa.gov>
Date: Thu, 11 Feb 93 10:44:14 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Timed-Release Crypto
In-Reply-To: <9302102211.AA22756@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Message-ID: <9302111838.AA02493@ptolemy.arc.nasa.gov>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


[This is a first post by a crypto-naive person - be kind.]

>Another possibility is to have some kind of standard protocol for time
>encrypted messages (this is interesting and seems feasible). Let's say
>I want a message [x] to be unencrypted on date [y].  I call a "time
>encryption server" and ask for the secret key associated with my
>message and date [y].  I encrypt the message and publicize that
>version.  The time server is constantly spewing out the daily code for
>messages that expire on that date. Anybody just listens to the
>broadcast and decrypts the messages in their possession using the key. 
>Note however that it is crucial that somehow the key depend on the
>message itself (via the hashing approaches), otherwise everybody knows
>everybody else's keys ahead of time just by submitting messages to the
>server for the particular date.  I suppose public-key encryption could
>be used here but I'm hazy on the details.

What came to my mind as I read Tim's message was various competing
timed-key servers, each publishing its public key associated with
various future dates, and promising to release the associated private
key on that date (but not before).  

You then encode your message with an m-of-n scheme using n such
server's keys for your chosen date, and assume at least m of them will
eventually publish their promised key, and assume no more than m of
them will release early.  You then leave it with several escrow
services and ask them to try to decrypt it once a year with the new
year's keys.

To prove to all that a server is untrustworthy, simply reveal its
private key ahead of time, and win a bond posted by the service (easy
to implement - encode some money with the public key, see if anyone
cashes it.)  There are economies of scale in shared monitoring of
trust, so perhaps only a few dozen such servers would be needed.

Hmm.. but how does the server get paid if the public key is public
knowledge?   

Robin Hanson




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: thug@phantom.com (Murdering Thug)
Date: Thu, 11 Feb 93 08:55:04 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Viral encryption
Message-ID: <m0nMh4s-000k4cC@phantom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain




As Mr. Ferguson pointed out, polymorphic viruses are making their way into the
DOS world.  This is a problem in the short term, but not in the long term
because people will be changing to memory-protected & file-permission based
operating systems like NT, OS/2 and Unix, where it is very difficult for
most kinds of virus to spread.

I myself am very familiar with the virus underground, so for those who are
not, let me explain the two newest and most deadly virus techniques which
are being seen in the DOS world.

The first is something called "Stealth" viruses.  Stealth viruses imbed
themselves into DOS and intercept disk read calls from applications. If
those read system calls are reading non .EXE or .COM files, then they are
processed normally.  However when an application such as virus scanning
program is reading in .COM and .EXE files (in order to scan them for virus
code), the stealth code in DOS intercepts this and returns to the application
what the .EXE or .COM file would look like if it wasn't infected by the
stealth virus.  Thus, all virus checking programs can be decieved in this
manner.  There are steps to get around this, like booting off of a
write-protected floppy disk (with a clean copy of DOS on it) and running
the virus checking program directly from that floppy.  But people seldom
do that, so the stealth technology is a worthwhile one for virus creators
to pursue.

The second is called "Polymorphic" viruses.  These are viruses which
contain a tiny encryption/decryption engine.  The great thing about
polymorphic viruses is that they encrypt themselves with a different key
each time they replicate (make a new copy of themselves).  The small 
amount of virus bootstrap code which is not encrypted is changed in each
replication by dispursing random NOP's throughout the virus boostrap code.
Thus each sample of polymorphic virus looks completely different to
virus checking programs.  The virus checking programs cannot use
"signature" byte strings to detect polymorphic viruses.

I have seen something called D.A.M.E., also known as Dark Avenger
Mutation Engine.  This is a freeware polymorphic library/kernel/toolkit
which allows anyone to take an ordinary virus and wrap it in a polymorphic
shell.  Thus each new copy of the virus will look completely different
as it replicates.  D.A.M.E. is a great toolkit for those who want to
release new viruses but don't have the skills to write a virus from
scratch.  DAME works very well with Turbo Assembler and MASM.
I believe that DAME II will be coming out sometime this spring. At
least that is what the author has promised.  Among the new features
will be more powerful encryption, stealth capabilities, and compatibility
with Stacker and DR DOS compressed file systems.  I have read that the
author of DAME and DAME II will be coming out with a Virus Construction
Set, which will allow point-n-click building of new viruses using
object oriented techniques.  It works sort of like a Mr. Potatohead,
you point and click on the parts/modules you want and it builds it for
you.  You select the replication method, stealth capability,
polymorphism, and payload module (there are several payloads, varying
from playing music and showing graphics, to printing a text message on
screan, to complete wipe out of the HD). The really wonderful thing
is that you will be able to build your own modules and link them into
the virus.  I am sure a flourishing of third-party modules will occur.

With the VCS, a 9 year old can build a competely new virus just by
pointing, clicking, and dragging, popping up windows and choosing options.

My oh my, aren't we in for fun times ahead...


Thug 






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Date: Thu, 11 Feb 93 11:49:55 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Timed-Release Crypto
Message-ID: <9302111948.AA22424@netcom.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Robin Hanson writes:

>[This is a first post by a crypto-naive person - be kind.]

>What came to my mind as I read Tim's message was various competing
>timed-key servers, each publishing its public key associated with
>various future dates, and promising to release the associated private
>key on that date (but not before).  

Yes, a market or ecology of servers, with various competing capabilities
and reputations. "Distributed trust" is quite effective. 

(Someone sent me private e-mail saying he didn't like my scheme because it
wasn't as "mathematically solid" as pure encryption schemes. Let me point
out that many crypto schemes involve issues of trust, distributed trust,
collusion, and even trust. "Pure" schemes do not in general exist, except
as very basic operations. As one example, there are no unforgeable "digital
coins." And even the information-theoretically secure "dining
cryptographers" protocol is unsecure given enough collusion. The role of
reputations--common in business and interpersonal dealings--is generally
ignored in the academic crypto community, who end up tearing their hair out
over extremely complicated protocols that attempt to avoid issues of
reputation and economic incentives. Folks like Dean Tribble and Robin
Hanson have a lot to contribute to the actual realization of distributed,
agoric crypto systems.)

>You then encode your message with an m-of-n scheme using n such
>server's keys for your chosen date, and assume at least m of them will
>eventually publish their promised key, and assume no more than m of
>them will release early.  You then leave it with several escrow
>services and ask them to try to decrypt it once a year with the new
>year's keys.
>
>To prove to all that a server is untrustworthy, simply reveal its
>private key ahead of time, and win a bond posted by the service (easy
>to implement - encode some money with the public key, see if anyone
>cashes it.)  There are economies of scale in shared monitoring of
>trust, so perhaps only a few dozen such servers would be needed.

I don't follow this. How do you know a node (=server) hasn't just "peeked."
(BTW, if you've properly split your message/key up, peeking by any one node
will get them nothing--just bits--so they'll be disinclined to ever peek.)
I don't see how anyone but the node itself can discover its private key,
even if it cheats, peeks, or colludes.

(Which is not to say that unreliable or dishonest nodes will not be
revealed. I suspect it'll be more by testing agencies rather than by
(somehow) having the private key revealed...even a dishonest node will keep
its private key private. Possibly there are schemes that would allow proof
of "early opening" (cheating) to be revealed, vaguely analogous to Chaum's
scheme whereby digital money spent twice points to the spender...but
offhand I don't see an approach.)

>Hmm.. but how does the server get paid if the public key is public
>knowledge?   

A node or server gets paid by the digital cash attached either at the time
of arrival at the node (paying "rent" in advance, as it were), or after
decrypting after some amount of time (paying upon "checking out," as it
were). (Any message which doesn't include the necessary payments, by
whatever terms the node has set, doesn't get stored, sent, etc.--we saw a
lot of messages ending up in the bit buckets for failure to follow a
remailer's protocols when we played the "Crypto Game" at the physical
Cypherpunks meetings several months ago.)

The messages or packets sent between nodes can have various sub-parts,
including instructions for remailing (as with any remailer network),
payments for various services (such as holding the message for 2 years, or
splitting the message further, whatever), and so on. In general, each
message is sent to a node, with only that node being able to open it (as
it's encrypted with the public key of the node). Once opened, the node may
find various other messages, payments, instructions, etc.

If you meant something else by your question, I don't get it. Please ask it
again.

-Tim

--

Timothy C. May               | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,  
tcmay@netcom.com        | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
408-688-5409               | knowledge, reputations, information markets, 
W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA       | black markets, collapse of governments.
Higher Power: 2^756839 | Public Key: MailSafe and PGP available.







From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Robin Hanson <hanson@ptolemy.arc.nasa.gov>
Date: Thu, 11 Feb 93 12:58:09 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Timed-Release Crypto
In-Reply-To: <9302111948.AA22424@netcom.netcom.com>
Message-ID: <9302112058.AA03778@ptolemy.arc.nasa.gov>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Timothy C. May asks (regarding my naive proposal):

>I don't follow this. How do you know a node (=server) hasn't just
>"peeked."  ... If you meant something else by your question, I don't 
>get it. Please ask it again.

Yeah I think my terseness led to some communication failure.

I was imagining the key server publishing a key which thousands of
folks might then use to close their time capsules.  The key server
doesn't know which messages where are closed with their key, and even
if they did the messages are simultaneously closed with many different
keys, so they'd need wide collusion to peek (including collusion with
one of your escrow message holders).  And as Dorn suggests the escrow
holder of the message can't peek if "message itself could be encrypted
using the intended eventual recipients public key".

Dorn suggests: 
>The servers would generate a key pair on request, for a fee.  Send you
>the public key to encrypt the "message" for storage somewhere.  

I guess this might work, but now you have to be more specific in
telling your escrow service where to look for public keys to decode
you message.  With just a few standard time-key servers, this isn't
needed, and perhaps we could all share the costs of monitoring their
trustworthyness.  Needing just a few, the need might easily be met by
charity.

Robin 




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: pete@cirrus.com (Pete Carpenter)
Date: Thu, 11 Feb 93 14:11:21 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: E Plurbis Doodah
Message-ID: <9302112212.AA03149@ss2138.cirrus.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



> from: john.nieder@f33.n125.z1.fidonet.org
>
>    There is a _bright side_ to this, however:  Would such an
> indifferent administration spend resources trying to break our codes
> when it doesn't care what we have to say anyway? 8-)
>         JN

Ah, if only it were so...

Apparently you haven't heard about the new nomination for attorney general.
A prosecutor from Florida with a "get-tough" reputation. Undoubtedly an
anti-drug warrior. And since "everyone knows" that the only reason to hide
information from our "great benevolent government" is to "cover-up illegal
activites", I'm not quite so hopeful.

"Don't blame me, I voted Libertarian"


Pete Carpenter                           pete@cirrus.com
                                
Talk about your plenty, talk about your ills,
One man gathers what another man spills. - Robert Hunter




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: richard_mezirka@askinc.ask.com (Richard Mezirka)
Date: Thu, 11 Feb 93 15:28:50 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: pardon me, but it's been deathly quiet
Message-ID: <9302112329.AA02896@askinc.ask.COM>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


regrets about the perhaps poor use of scarce bandwidth:

sci.crypt has disappeared from my news server
I haven't seen a cypherpunks mail item for some time... I used to see
something daily, some very interesting/some just valuable to me for
awareness raising value

is anyone there or did all the things we're concerned about come true?
Rich




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "John Coryell." <jcoryell%nwu.edu@UICVM.UIC.EDU>
Date: Fri, 12 Feb 93 13:57:41 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Timed-Release Crypto
In-Reply-To: <9302112058.AA03778@ptolemy.arc.nasa.gov>
Message-ID: <9302122157.AA22875@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>I guess this might work, but now you have to be more specific in
>telling your escrow service where to look for public keys to decode
>you message.  With just a few standard time-key servers, this isn't
>needed, and perhaps we could all share the costs of monitoring their
>trustworthyness.  Needing just a few, the need might easily be met by
>charity.
>
>Robin

Considering what we've currently had to rely on, charity seems like
as good a place to start as any.  Perhaps when escrow clients operate
like wais in conducting a search of the available sources, and utilizing
feedback to reduce noise and identify likelihoods of correct decryption,
or perhaps this would never work at all.  Monitoring would still be
necessary.

John Coryell.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Eli Brandt <ebrandt@jarthur.Claremont.EDU>
Date: Thu, 11 Feb 93 16:17:21 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Viral encryption
In-Reply-To: <m0nMh4s-000k4cC@phantom.com>
Message-ID: <9302120017.AA28034@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> From: thug@phantom.com (Murdering Thug)
> I myself am very familiar with the virus underground, so for those who are
> not, let me explain the two newest and most deadly virus techniques which
> are being seen in the DOS world.

[ discusses stealth viruses, around for, oh, five years at least; and
  the MtE. ]

Reasonably accurate discussions, but let's leave the hype for _Time_
and McAfee.  "Stealth" viruses can be detected in memory, if you make
the mistake of getting infected in the first place.  MtE-derived
viruses enjoyed a window of about a month while they could not be
detected by scanners; they had no such reprieve from integrity
checkers.  Big deal.  (Well, from the point of view of a scanner
writer, it must be a pain, but that's not the user's problem.)
Cryptohash integrity checking is probably the way to go in the long
run, but scanners still work.

The "most deadly virus technique", in terms of number of infections
caused, is probably that of boot-sector infection.  Low-tech, but it
seems to work.

> Thug 

	 PGP 2 key by finger or e-mail
   Eli   ebrandt@jarthur.claremont.edu




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: corwin@Cayman.COM (Lord Among Panthers)
Date: Thu, 11 Feb 93 13:46:35 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Timed-Release Crypto
In-Reply-To: <9302112058.AA03778@ptolemy.arc.nasa.gov>
Message-ID: <9302112145.AA17000@cuba.Cayman.COM>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Robin  sez

>Dorn suggests: 
>>The servers would generate a key pair on request, for a fee.  Send you
>>the public key to encrypt the "message" for storage somewhere.  
>
> I guess this might work, but now you have to be more specific in
> telling your escrow service where to look for public keys to decode
> you message.  With just a few standard time-key servers, this isn't
> needed, and perhaps we could all share the costs of monitoring their
> trustworthyness.  Needing just a few, the need might easily be met by
> charity.

The escrow services could run the time-key servers (since without the time-key servers, there would be less business for the escrow services).  Getting keys
would then be free and the cost of running the server could be subsidised 
from the cost of storing the message.

corwin




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Karl Barrus <elee9sf@Menudo.UH.EDU>
Date: Thu, 11 Feb 93 20:42:11 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: wired & batch file
Message-ID: <199302120441.AA07645@Menudo.UH.EDU>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Cypherpunks,
	Douglas Sinclair has notified me of a slight bug/irritation
with the anonmail.bat script for MSDOS.  When run with no parameters,
file errors are reported since the batch file attempts to delete
nonexistent files.  So I fixed that and have submitted the revised
version to the ftp site.
	Also, in unix I can redirect stderr to /dev/null ( 2> /dev/null).  
Is there a way to do this in MSDOS (I can't seem to find a way).  This
would make the hopmail.bat batch file (similar to hop.mail) easier to
use since the PGP output will be suppressed.
	Finally, crypto is mentioned in WIRED magazine!  It's on the
"HYPE LIST" behind Object Oriented, Post-Modern, Raves, and ahead of
Smart Drugs.  Here is the paragraph on it (bottom of page 87):

Forty years ago cryptography wasn't even popular with mathematicians.
Now it's the hot topic on the net.  You've got the export issue,
always popular since it the [sic] NSA is the villain.  There's the
public key issue - RSA Inc. expressing concern over the public good,
not their profit margins.  Yeah right.  Now we have the
key-registration debate: Should PKC users have to register their keys?
OK, it's a bad idea, but probably a government conspiracy to eliminate
cash, as some rabid defenders of freedom are claiming.  Then there's
David Chaum, the Ted Nelson of the 90's, promoting his ingenious and
impractical crypto-schemes.  Since everyone wants to believe in nice
techno solutions to messy socio-policital problems, expect this issue
to continue its rise up the list.

So, fellow rabid defenders freedom, who is Ted Nelson?? :-)  I guess
I'm too young...

/-----------------------------------\
| Karl L. Barrus                    |
| elee9sf@menudo.uh.edu             | <- preferred address
| barrus@tree.egr.uh.edu (NeXTMail) |
\-----------------------------------/




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Phil Karn <karn@qualcomm.com> (Phil Karn)
Date: Thu, 11 Feb 93 23:09:26 PST
To: thug@phantom.com (Murdering Thug)
Subject: Re: Compressed/Encrypted Voice using Modems
Message-ID: <9302120707.AA13840@servo>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


At 11:41 2/10/93 -0500, Murdering Thug wrote:

>The best solution, as suggested by Miron is to use forward error correction.
>There is plenty of bandwidth in a 19.2/21.6/24.0/28.8 kbps connection to
>send CELP nybbles or bytes each along with their own ECC code.

But modern high speed modems already do quite a bit of FEC. I really
don't think more is really necessary. As long as the decryptor and voice
decoder automatically resynchronize after an error, there's no real
problem with letting a few through. It's certainly preferable to adding
long (or variable) delay.

The sychronization problem seems to occur in "real" (government) secure
phones too. They take a second or two to unmute following loss of clock
synchronization. But not every bit error causes loss of clock synch;
only a really bad line will do that.

Phil







From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Date: Thu, 11 Feb 93 23:36:09 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: wired & batch file
Message-ID: <9302120734.AA07610@netcom.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Karl Barrus writes:

>        Finally, crypto is mentioned in WIRED magazine!  It's on the
>"HYPE LIST" behind Object Oriented, Post-Modern, Raves, and ahead of
>Smart Drugs.  Here is the paragraph on it (bottom of page 87):

And I'm sure you all know "Wired" is preparing a major article on the
Cypherpunks and crypto. I've seen the Steven Levy rough draft and it looks
good.

>So, fellow rabid defenders freedom, who is Ted Nelson?? :-)  I guess
>I'm too young...

You _must_ be young! Lucky you. 

Ted Nelson is the chief popularizer (and early architect, to be fair) of
"hypertext," or nonlinear, linked writing. As in being able to click on
this word, "hypertext," and see lots of threads taking you off to various
other places, articles, sidebars, and so on. Hypertexts thus transcend the
simple linear writing style enforced on us by paper and books.

Nelson wrote an extremely influential book called "Computer Lib," circa
1975, which described hypertext and accurately predicted many of today's
most important trends. Microsoft Press reprinted it, with corrections and
addditions, a few years back. Definitely recommended!

His project, known as "Xanadu," has been developing for close to 30 years.
About 10 or so years a team of programmers nucleated around Xanadu to
commercialize it. Known as the Xanadu Operating Company, it was funded by
Autodesk (maker of Autocad) from 1988 until just a few months ago, when
Autodesk decided to reorient its efforts. XOC may still be seeking
alternative funding.

Our own Dean Tribble is centrally involved, and other participants included
Mark Miller, Roger Gregory, and various others (some of whom show up on
this list, or at the physical Cypherpunks meetings).

Apple's "HyperCard" was a poor imitation, in the sense that full
bidirectional links were not supported (and some other limitations, though
in fairness to Bill Atkinson and Apple, the original product, codenamed
"WildCard," was not intended to be full hypertext.)

(I use a true hypertext writing system called "StorySpace," for the Mac.
Other platforms have their own such programs. Nothing as grand as Xanadu,
though. And there's a newsgroup called alt.hypertext if you're interested.)

Ted Nelson is living in the Bay Area, working on various projects. He's
shown some interest in crypto things, and talked to some of us at a recent
Hackers Conference about the implications.

Hypertext is definitely a good idea, but the commercialization has been
slow in coming.

-Tim May




>
>/-----------------------------------\
>| Karl L. Barrus                    |
>| elee9sf@menudo.uh.edu             | <- preferred address
>| barrus@tree.egr.uh.edu (NeXTMail) |
>\-----------------------------------/





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Date: Thu, 11 Feb 93 23:38:01 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: wired & batch file
Message-ID: <9302120736.AA07718@netcom.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Karl Barrus writes:

>        Finally, crypto is mentioned in WIRED magazine!  It's on the
>"HYPE LIST" behind Object Oriented, Post-Modern, Raves, and ahead of
>Smart Drugs.  Here is the paragraph on it (bottom of page 87):

And I'm sure you all know "Wired" is preparing a major article on the
Cypherpunks and crypto. I've seen the Steven Levy rough draft and it looks
good.

>So, fellow rabid defenders freedom, who is Ted Nelson?? :-)  I guess
>I'm too young...

You _must_ be young! Lucky you. 

Ted Nelson is the chief popularizer (and early architect, to be fair) of
"hypertext," or nonlinear, linked writing. As in being able to click on
this word, "hypertext," and see lots of threads taking you off to various
other places, articles, sidebars, and so on. Hypertexts thus transcend the
simple linear writing style enforced on us by paper and books.

Nelson wrote an extremely influential book called "Computer Lib," circa
1975, which described hypertext and accurately predicted many of today's
most important trends. Microsoft Press reprinted it, with corrections and
addditions, a few years back. Definitely recommended!

His project, known as "Xanadu," has been developing for close to 30 years.
About 10 or so years a team of programmers nucleated around Xanadu to
commercialize it. Known as the Xanadu Operating Company, it was funded by
Autodesk (maker of Autocad) from 1988 until just a few months ago, when
Autodesk decided to reorient its efforts. XOC may still be seeking
alternative funding.

Our own Dean Tribble is centrally involved, and other participants included
Mark Miller, Roger Gregory, and various others (some of whom show up on
this list, or at the physical Cypherpunks meetings).

Apple's "HyperCard" was a poor imitation, in the sense that full
bidirectional links were not supported (and some other limitations, though
in fairness to Bill Atkinson and Apple, the original product, codenamed
"WildCard," was not intended to be full hypertext.)

(I use a true hypertext writing system called "StorySpace," for the Mac.
Other platforms have their own such programs. Nothing as grand as Xanadu,
though. And there's a newsgroup called alt.hypertext if you're interested.)

Ted Nelson is living in the Bay Area, working on various projects. He's
shown some interest in crypto things, and talked to some of us at a recent
Hackers Conference about the implications.

Hypertext is definitely a good idea, but the commercialization has been
slow in coming.

-Tim May




>
>/-----------------------------------\
>| Karl L. Barrus                    |
>| elee9sf@menudo.uh.edu             | <- preferred address
>| barrus@tree.egr.uh.edu (NeXTMail) |
>\-----------------------------------/





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Phiber Optik <phiber@eff.org>
Date: Thu, 11 Feb 93 21:43:13 PST
To: ebrandt@jarthur.Claremont.EDU (Eli Brandt)
Subject: Re: Viral encryption
In-Reply-To: <9302120017.AA28034@toad.com>
Message-ID: <199302120541.AA06625@eff.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> 
> > From: thug@phantom.com (Murdering Thug)
> > I myself am very familiar with the virus underground, so for those who are
> > not, let me explain the two newest and most deadly virus techniques which
> > are being seen in the DOS world.
> 
> [ discusses stealth viruses, around for, oh, five years at least; and
>   the MtE. ]
> 
> Reasonably accurate discussions, but let's leave the hype for _Time_
> and McAfee.  "Stealth" viruses can be detected in memory, if you make
> the mistake of getting infected in the first place.  MtE-derived
> viruses enjoyed a window of about a month while they could not be
> detected by scanners; they had no such reprieve from integrity
> checkers.  Big deal.  (Well, from the point of view of a scanner
> writer, it must be a pain, but that's not the user's problem.)
> Cryptohash integrity checking is probably the way to go in the long
> run, but scanners still work.
> 
> The "most deadly virus technique", in terms of number of infections
> caused, is probably that of boot-sector infection.  Low-tech, but it
> seems to work.
> 
> > Thug 
> 
> 	 PGP 2 key by finger or e-mail
>    Eli   ebrandt@jarthur.claremont.edu
> 

I'm sick and tired of all the virus hoo-hah myself.  The only "anti-virus
software" a hacker needs is DEBUG.  And maybe your favorite sector editor
utility, like DISKEDIT.  Anything more, and you're an embarassment.
Why don't you just send your life savings to McAfee while you're at it.
I could go and quote P. T. Barnum right now, but I think my point is made.





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: M..Stirner@f28.n125.z1.FIDONET.ORG (M. Stirner)
Date: Fri, 12 Feb 93 03:28:59 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: E pluribus doodah
Message-ID: <4868.2B7B7534@fidogate.FIDONET.ORG>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain




from: john.nieder@f33.n125.z1.fidonet.org

 * Reply to msg originally in Cypherpunks

 BK> Currently, Jock Gill is
 BK> working in an office located in the Old Executive Office Building
 BK> across the street from the White House.  At this point, he is
 BK> working alone, without a staff.

This week's news indicates to me this will probably not improve.

 BK> The White House itself employs a large
 BK> staff to handle snail mail.

According to Monday night's news, this is from where these vaunted
"symbolic" 25% White House staff cuts will come.

 BK> All things in their time.  Once the
 BK> E-mail address was circulated together with the heading the "White
 BK> House", everyone understandably believed a real system was up and
 BK> running.

Yes, silly us...particularly with the "CLINTON" AOL address.

 BK> SUGGESTION:  Use the compuserve address you have judiciously,
 BK> reserving it for absolutely vital contacts.

Oh, yes, _certainly_!  The _vital_ stuff should go into a nonexistant
system.  Naturally!

 BK> Until such time that a
 BK> real public access White house E-mail system is operational,
 BK> consider relying on the traditional means of contacting the
 BK> administration.  Given what they had to start with from the
 BK> previous administration (scratch), I have every reason to expect
 BK> that Jeff Eller and Jock Gill will work well--and as quickly as
 BK> possible--to get an interactive system up and running.  But it will
 BK> take time and patience.

Can anyone say, "VAPORWARE"?

 BK> We can all help them achieve that effort
 BK> best if we refrain from acting as if that non-existent system were
 BK> already in place.  PLEASE HELP RELAY THIS CONTEXT AND SUGGESTION TO
 BK> OTHER NETWORKS AND INDIVIDUALS.  Thanks.

Pass it around?  You bet.  It's f*cking _hilarious_!  My guess is that
this gaffe will (or at least ought to) get Gill fired, assuming he
survives this "symbolic" staff downsizing.  I might add that nothing
could be more "symbolic" than the announcement that the cuts will come
from those who actually respond to public input.  This "go away & don't
bother us" move on the part of the Clinton administration indicates that
it obviously doesn't care _what_ America thinks.
.   There is a _bright side_ to this, however:  Would such an
indifferent administration spend resources trying to break our codes
when it doesn't care what we have to say anyway? 8-)
        JN

... We want information./You won't get it!/By hook or by crook, we _will_!



... Forgive your enemies but remember their names.
___ Blue Wave/QWK v2.12
--  
M. Stirner - via FidoNet node 1:125/555
    UUCP - ...!uunet!hoptoad!kumr!fidogate!28!M..Stirner
INTERNET - M..Stirner@f28.n125.z1.FIDONET.ORG




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Barry.Kapke@f33.n125.z1.FIDONET.ORG (Barry Kapke)
Date: Fri, 12 Feb 93 03:58:40 PST
To: Cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: White House email address (fwd)
Message-ID: <4871.2B7B8BC2@fidogate.FIDONET.ORG>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



=============================================================================
From: DOUGLAS COFFMAN <lefty%MTU.EDU@Kentvm.Kent.edu>
Date:         Thu, 11 Feb 1993 18:01:53 EDT
----------------------------Original message----------------------------
Please pass this info along.

January 31, 1993

              Important Information RE: E-Mail to the White House

     Yesterday, I saw several postings related to the E-mail address for the
White House.  Along with a good number of others, I worked throughout the
campaign as part of a network of E-mail volunteers for the Clinton campaign,
so I can pass along some important information about that E-mail account.
The account is actually the personal compuserve account of Jock Gill.  Jock
worked hard (along with a handful of programming volunteers, BBS operators,
listserver maintainers, and computer sophisticates at places such as Marist
College, MIT, San Francisco, Chicago, and elsewhere) during the campaign to
put together an E-mail system for national campaigning.  The system was later
expanded to accommodate all three major Presidential campaigns.  It was an
innovative, highly successful effort and it played a huge role in getting
campaign position statements out to a wide public.  Things posted from that
address found their way into the virtual reality as the messages got passed
along many networks from their original posting.
     Several weeks before the Inauguration of President Clinton, Jeff Eller
was appointed by the President-Elect to have overall charge of establishing
something which has never existed--an interactive public access E-mail system
into the White House and into other offices of the administration.  Jock Gill
was then hired by the administration to work under Jeff Eller.  Currently,
Jock Gill is working in an office located in the Old Executive Office
Building across the street from the White House.  At this point, he is
working alone, without a staff.  His current assignment is to use the E-mail
system (as during the campaign) to issue official copies of White House
statements, the texts of press briefings and press conferences, copies of
Executive Orders and Presidential Memos, and the like to the virtual world of
E-mail.  Since the compuserve box is a regular personal mail box, it gets
filled quickly, especially given the high volume of mail now beginning to
arrive with the broad dissemination of his address.  Those of you who have
sent E-mail to that address may well have received an error message stating
that the box is full.  That's another way of saying it has been overwhelmed.
     Jock has asked those of us who have been part of the volunteer E-mail
team to help him out while he works to get a good interactive system up and
running.  Basically, he has asked that everyone cooperate and not begin
sending a barrage of E-mail to that compuserve address.  The White House
itself employs a large staff to handle snail mail.  Actually, at this point
in the development of the White House E-mail system, you will probably get
your message through to the administration quicker through ordinary snail
mail and telephone.  Later, once the administration's E-mail team develops
the system they want and need, E-mail contacts should became the easier
route.  All things in their time.  Once the E-mail address was circulated
together with the heading the "White House", everyone understandably believed
a real system was up and running.  Not quite yet.
     SUGGESTION:  Use the compuserve address you have judiciously, reserving
it for absolutely vital contacts.  Until such time that a real public access
White house E-mail system is operational, consider relying on the traditional
means of contacting the administration.  Given what they had to start with
from the previous administration (scratch), I have every reason to expect
that Jeff Eller and Jock Gill will work well--and as quickly as possible--to
get an interactive system up and running.  But it will take time and
patience.  We can all help them achieve that effort best if we refrain from
acting as if that non-existent system were already in place.  PLEASE HELP
RELAY THIS CONTEXT AND SUGGESTION TO OTHER NETWORKS AND INDIVIDUALS.  Thanks.

              Snail Mail Address and Phone Numbers -- White House

     White House Numbers:
          The President                 (202) 456-1414
          White House Comment Line      (202) 456-1111
               (To register your opinion on an issue)
          When bill signed or vetoed    (202) 456-2226

          Vice President                (202) 456-2326
                                        (202) 456-7125

     Mailing Address:

          The White House
          1600 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
          Washington DC  20500


--
On the Net,

Douglas J. "Lefty" Coffman

lefty@mtu.edu (Preferred)
LEFTY@MTUS5.BITNET or LEFTY@MTUS5.cts.mtu.edu
B0 f- w+ g++ k(+) s h r

=============================================================================--  
Barry Kapke - via FidoNet node 1:125/555
    UUCP - ...!uunet!hoptoad!kumr!fidogate!33!Barry.Kapke
INTERNET - Barry.Kapke@f33.n125.z1.FIDONET.ORG




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Date: Fri, 12 Feb 93 09:40:38 PST
To: ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu
Subject: Re: Tagging copyrighted text
Message-ID: <9302121739.AA21361@netcom.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Another thought on "ld231782"'s idea about high-speed networks and copyrights:

>But think about this: with the
>speed and ubiquity of networks, it now becomes possible for every
>author or creative artist to keep the only copies of his work. Then, he
>could post "links" to it anywhere in the world. When people pass around
>the work, they wouldn't pass around the work itself, they'd pass the
>"link".  Whenever someone wants to view the work, the link points to
>the unchanging address for instantaneous downloading.  A very small
>transaction charge is billed to the receiver by the sender.

With fast enough networks, we may see a big decline in sales of programs to
end-users, as the software is made available as "on-line services."
(Obviously this has always been going on, with service bureaus, circuit
design services, etc.)

To make this very concrete, I just installed a new release of the American
Heritage Dictionary, a complete edition with definitions, thesaurus,
anagrams, roots in Latin, Greek, German, Indo-European, etc. Look up a word
and one gets an entire screenful of stuff, including detailed etymologies,
usages, etc.

Now what happens when a "dictionary server" offers to look up a word for,
say, 10 cents? With fast enough networks, of the sort ld231782 proposes,
this could replace the current system in which folks buy their own copies.
(One would still need very high bandwidth programs like editors, word
processors, drawing programs, etc., but some classes of software would be
amenable to this kind of remote access use, especially with very fast
networks.)

There may be attempts to limit this, as with the laws which ban rental of
CDs (but not videos, presumably because few people have two VCRS, while
those renting CDs can presumably easily diub them onto cassettes).

This could also reduce the costs of entry to the market, as new programs
could be offered for sale or access in a low-cost way, such as through
information markets like AMIX.

I'm not taking a moral stand on either side, just noting one more
consequence of extremely high-speed networks.





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "DrZaphod" <ncselxsi!drzaphod@ncselxsi.netcom.com>
Date: Fri, 12 Feb 93 15:01:50 PST
To: CypherPunks@toad.com
Subject: RE: MSDOS AnonMail.Bat
Message-ID: <36540.drzaphod@ncselxsi>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


In Message Thu, 11 Feb 1993 22:41:04 -0600,
  Karl Barrus <Menudo.UH.EDU!elee9sf@netcomsv.netcom.com> writes:

> Also, in unix I can redirect stderr to /dev/null ( 2> /dev/null).
>Is there a way to do this in MSDOS (I can't seem to find a way).  This
>would make the hopmail.bat batch file (similar to hop.mail) easier to
>use since the PGP output will be suppressed.

     Use "> nul" to redirect to null.  IBM only used 3 character device
     names.

     And on WIRED.. now that I've heard the stories I'll have to pick up my
     copy! TTFN!

DrZaphod
[AC/DC] / [DnA][HP]
[drzaphod@ncselxsi.uucp]
Technicolorized




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "L. Detweiler" <ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Date: Fri, 12 Feb 93 10:54:02 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Viral encryption
In-Reply-To: <199302120541.AA06625@eff.org>
Message-ID: <9302121852.AA07368@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



>I'm sick and tired of all the virus hoo-hah myself.  The only "anti-virus
>software" a hacker needs is DEBUG.  And maybe your favorite sector editor
>utility, like DISKEDIT.  Anything more, and you're an embarassment.
>Why don't you just send your life savings to McAfee while you're at it.
>I could go and quote P. T. Barnum right now, but I think my point is made.

Unfortunately most of humanity is not in the category of "hacker", and
we should be considerate of them.  While we tout cryptography for example
we have to remember that the only way that it will get into the mainstream 
is if it is integrated very nicely into foolproof user-friendly (sorry,
the term makes me cringe a bit too) software.

I don't see any constructive purpose served by viruses, and if anybody
in this group is advocating or even pursuing their development, I think
that has just brought the quality of the list down several notches, and 
really damaged the credibility of the speakers.  Definitely, they are
interesting to study, but the havoc they wreak is incalculable.  To the
extent that they encourage designers to create more straightjacket-type
security mechanisms, they are detrimental to the goal of simple and
straightforward access to computer technology, and significantly undermine
confidence in and use of that technology.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: fergp@sytex.com (Paul Ferguson)
Date: Fri, 12 Feb 93 10:38:12 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Hasty analogy (WAS: Viral encryption)
Message-ID: <eLNVyB1w165w@sytex.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


On Friday, 12 Feb 1993,  Phiber Optik <uunet!eff.org!phiber> wrote -
 
PO> I'm sick and tired of all the virus hoo-hah myself.
PO> The only "anti-virus software" a hacker needs is DEBUG.
PO> And maybe your favorite sector editor utility, like DISKEDIT.
PO> Anything more, and you're an embarassment. Why don't you just
PO> send your life savings to McAfee while you're at it. I could
PO> go and quote P. T. Barnum right now, but I think my point is
PO> made.
 
 My apologies for strayiing even further from the topic, but
 Phyber's comments would not let me let this sleeping dog lie.
 
 Strictly using DEBUG is a bit ridiculous for the "masses", but I
 can understand your sentiment, at least to that end. As far as
 I'm concerned, I can isolate _any_ change in my operating
 environment (be it DOS, Novell NOS, UNIX or whatever, for that
 matter) with the utilities that accompany the operating system
 (and of course, a couple of home-brewed ones to boot). Viruses
 are simply nuisances, for those who are adept enough to bop
 around in assembly code.
 
 Your disdain for "anti-virus software" is shared by many -- even
 shared by myself, to a certain degree. Every time I read an
 advertisement in a trade rag that boasts, "Can now find and eradicate
 new and unknown viruses!" or "Now! Can kill the deadly Mutation
 Engine virus!", I can only shake my head and snicker.
 
 However, there are a couple of genuine "good guys" out there in
 computer land that produces some excellent "anti-virus" software.
 Dr. Alan Solomon (UK) and Fridrik Skulason (Iceland), both of whom I
 know personally, produce perhaps the most effective and timely virus
 detection software in the business. Yes, they both will tell you that
 they use DEBUG to trace code and disassemble.
 
 Sara told me that you were rather impetuous. ;-)
 
 Further discussions relating to thhis topic should be moved to
 comp.virus (virus-l@lehigh.edu) or directed to me by email.
 
Paul Ferguson                   |  "Sincerity is fine, but it's no
Network Integration Consultant  |   excuse for stupidity."
Alexandria, Virginia USA        |                       -- Anonymous
fergp@sytex.com     (Internet)  |
sytex.com!fergp     (UUNet)     |
1:109/229           (FidoNet)   |
         PGP public encryption key available upon request.

---
fergp@sytex.com (Paul Ferguson)
Sytex Systems Communications, Arlington VA, 1-703-358-9022




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Absinthe@debug.cuc.ab.ca
Date: Fri, 12 Feb 93 20:53:02 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: RSA
Message-ID: <m0nN9YG-0002hnC@debug.cuc.ab.ca>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Read about you guys awhile back in Mondo, seeing if I can get more info?
Also, recent byline in Sci Am about PGP,
   do you know a good source of RSA software?
   do you have info on either Zimmerman's E-Mail address or
      E.Miller's mailing list?
Any info appreciated, thanx.
 
-----------------------------------=>   The Crystal Wind is the Storm,
                                                and the Storm is Data,
                                                 and the Data is Life.
Absinthe@debug.cuc.ab.ca




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: sdw@sdwsys.lig.net (Stephen D. Williams)
Date: Fri, 12 Feb 93 21:09:58 PST
To: elee9sf@Menudo.UH.EDU (Karl Barrus)
Subject: Re: anonymous script
In-Reply-To: <199302100657.AA06626@Menudo.UH.EDU>
Message-ID: <9302130504.AA07864@sdwsys.lig.net>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> 
> Cypherpunks,
> 
> Out of curiosity, what are the approximate computer ratios among this
> list?  That is, how many people use MSDOS, how many use Mac's, how
> many Amigas, many have Unix, how many have VMS?  
Sun Unix, Interactive Unix, Linux, kids with a MSDOS game machine....
> 
> I'm just curious because it recently struck me that not everyone here
> is running Unix, and thus can't really use the scripts I've written
> (which help use the anonymous remailers).  So I wrote a helper program
> in C++ for MSDOS, but after looking at the code, I've decided to bury
> it and replace it with the following MSDOS script (at bottom of this
> message). 
...
> | Karl L. Barrus                    |
> | elee9sf@menudo.uh.edu             | <- preferred address
> | barrus@tree.egr.uh.edu (NeXTMail) |

sdw




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: sdw@sdwsys.lig.net (Stephen D. Williams)
Date: Fri, 12 Feb 93 21:18:27 PST
To: miron@extropia.wimsey.com (Miron Cuperman)
Subject: Re: Compressed/Encrypted Voice using Modems
In-Reply-To: <1993Feb10.193843.20507@extropia.wimsey.bc.ca>
Message-ID: <9302130510.AA08073@sdwsys.lig.net>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> 
> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
> 
> thug@phantom.com (Murdering Thug) writes:
> 
> >I don't know if CELP requires an error-free transmittion stream from
> >codec to codec.  If it doesn't then that's great, I hope it self-synchronizes
> >itself after a byte or two of garbage coming through. Big deal, so you hear
> >a click or pop of static, so what.. you get that with analog lines.
> 
> CELP resyncs.  Not sure how fast.  Maybe after a tenth of a second or so.
> 
> On a side note, we are finishing up an implementation of CELP on the
> TMS320C5x.  This is a 20 MIPS integer chip.  We are taking up less
> than 15 MIPS.  We also know how to write error corrected CELP (such
> that bits that cause more significant degradation are protected
> better).

Does everyone know that the new Zyxel's have CELP builtin?

Don't know details yet...

sdw





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: edgar@spectrx.Saigon.COM (Edgar W. Swank)
Date: Sat, 13 Feb 93 03:08:21 PST
To: Cypherpunks          <cypherpunks@toad.com>
Subject: Re: anonymous script
Message-ID: <XVmwyB8w165w@spectrx.saigon.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


My thanks to Karl Barrus.  I'm one of the MSDOS users and I appreciate
his effort in providing an MSDOS script for anonymous remailing.

--
edgar@spectrx.saigon.com (Edgar W. Swank)
SPECTROX SYSTEMS +1.408.252.1005  Silicon Valley, Ca





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: gnu (John Gilmore)
Date: Sat, 13 Feb 93 02:07:09 PST
To: cypherpunks
Subject: ["Vinton G. Cerf": Technology Policy and Information Infrastructure]
Message-ID: <9302131007.AA06784@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I sent him some sound bites about Internet policy and about crypto policy.
I'll send them to Cypherpunks too.

	John

------- Forwarded Message

To: trustees:;@isoc.org, isoc-interest@sgi.com, ietf@CNRI.Reston.VA.US,
        iab@isi.edu, iesg@CNRI.Reston.VA.US, Members:;@isoc.org
Subject: Technology Policy and Information Infrastructure
Date: Wed, 10 Feb 93 08:25:06 -0500
From: "Vinton G. Cerf" <vcerf@CNRI.Reston.VA.US>
Message-Id:  <9302100825.aa02728@IETF.CNRI.Reston.VA.US>

Dear Internauts and friends,

I have been invited to testify before the US House Subcommittee on
Technology on the subject of technology policy and information
intrastructure. To prepare my testimony, it would be helpful to
have SHORT (please!) comments, suggestions, "bullets" as input,
so that Internet Society ideas and considerations can be represented
(or, at the least, offer some national and international perspective
on a matter of global importance).

If you want to send something on this point, please send it ONLY
to: vcerf@cnri.reston.va.us. DO NOT SEND IT TO THE ENTIRE LIST OF
ADDRESSEES (or they will do something terrible to me).

Many thanks for letting me disturb your busy mailboxes, and thanks
in advance for your ideas.

Vint

p.s. I need any inputs by end of February

------- End of Forwarded Message





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Seth Morris <Seth.Morris@lambada.oit.unc.edu>
Date: Fri, 12 Feb 93 23:42:46 PST
To: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Subject: Re: Tagging copyrighted text
In-Reply-To: <9302121739.AA21361@netcom.netcom.com>
Message-ID: <9302130720.AA22872@lambada.oit.unc.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text


Timothy May writes: 
> To make this very concrete, I just installed a new release of the American
> Heritage Dictionary, a complete edition with definitions, thesaurus,
> anagrams, roots in Latin, Greek, German, Indo-European, etc. Look up a word
> and one gets an entire screenful of stuff, including detailed etymologies,
> usages, etc.
> 
> Now what happens when a "dictionary server" offers to look up a word for,
> say, 10 cents? With fast enough networks, of the sort ld231782 proposes,
> this could replace the current system in which folks buy their own copies.
> (One would still need very high bandwidth programs like editors, word
> processors, drawing programs, etc., but some classes of software would be
> amenable to this kind of remote access use, especially with very fast
> networks.)
	I'd point out that with unlimited Telnet access, I can already use
dictionaries and quote books, thesauri and other references, at reates varying
from free to hundreds of dollars an hour....
	The only software I "need" to do this is an OS and a comm program.

	This sounds like a great way to convince the holdouts of the value
of encryption: if services are offered, over comm links, available easily
from the home, with a minimum of fuss, to perform popular, resource
intensive searches/services (quote books, dictionaries, come to mind,
many of the things Gopher does), then the only software a user needs is
(1) an OS
(2) X server (or other screen manager/UI manager)
(3) comm program (integrated into screen manager w/drag-and-drop probably
	necessary in this day and age, when using things like a baby is c
	considered "mature technology"
(4) encryption package...
	If I cannot sign my requests (automagically, I suppose), then I can
	disavow billing, and if the service cannot encrypt the reply, any
	listener can receive "free" responses, perhaps over time duplicating
	much of the work and creativity that went into creating the service
	and selling it. I hate to support something like encryption with
	economics (the issues are deeper than that), but it sounds like an
	argument that would please many people. I just have to look at 
	Prodigy (yech) sales with modems (or Windows (double-yech) with
	systems!) to see the infiltration of a useful and powerful thing
	like online service (or GUI/device independence) into a previously
	reluctant market to see what a little convincing can do. (Remember
	Nintendo? Before they started their ad campaign, noone was buying
	dedicated game machines, then they convinced everyone that everyone
	else was playing, soon they were as common as TV's, in a market
	still reeling from Atari!)
	I also hate to suggest charging for something already free! Hopehully
	I'm thinking of something (a) cheap, (b) convenient (which Gopher is
	not, I feel), and (c) better.

 It just jumped into my head how tied up with encryption ALL telecom issues
are, even ones we've been doing for years now. Just look at how CI$ has had
to change as more users jumped on, or the difference between CI$ and AOL or
Prodigy.
 I'm new to this list, and probably repeating something axiomatic, but it
seemed that with "extreme high speed networks" comes an assumption of extreme
load (seems reasonable to me), and that means (1) commercial exploitation
(possibly a good thing!), (2) need for security, and (3) the usual lag of
technological penetration from the trailblazers to the huddled befuddled,
with the trading of glitz for substance, name for talent, and pretty for
powerful. 
> There may be attempts to limit this, as with the laws which ban rental of
> CDs (but not videos, presumably because few people have two VCRS, while
> those renting CDs can presumably easily diub them onto cassettes).
	If you assume that some of these systems (like the ones already
online) will be legal and entreprneureal(sp?), this might still hold! 

> This could also reduce the costs of entry to the market, as new programs
> could be offered for sale or access in a low-cost way, such as through
> information markets like AMIX.
	Am I correct in deducing that encryption cannot be offered in this
way? What other services are in this category?
 
> I'm not taking a moral stand on either side, just noting one more
> consequence of extremely high-speed networks.
> 
	Oh, can someone drop me a line with more information on digital
cash? I'm new here, like I said. I'm a math major on leave of absence,
currently unemployed (interview monday... crossing fingers), lately
working as a programmer or in support. I've been interested in public
key cryptography since the '79(?) Scientific American article (I was 13 
when I read it, in '83... may have been one of the things that pushed me
towards math) and am glad to finally get to play. (20 digit keys in
BASIC/6502 on a VIC-20 were fun, but that's all!)

 Seth Morris (seth.morris@launchpad.unc.edu)




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: gnu (John Gilmore)
Date: Sat, 13 Feb 93 03:02:33 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com, gnu
Subject: FCC Proposed Ruling on Scanners That Receive Cellphone Transmissions
Message-ID: <9302131102.AA09849@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Please at least write a one-page letter in response to this
proposed ruling.  The idiots in Congress decided that banning radios
was preferable to allowing (or requiring) decent encryption in
cellular phones.  Now the FCC is making rules to implement the
Congressional ban.  They should hear from us, loud and clear,
that this is completely backwards and wrong.

Your letter should reference Docket Number 93-1 and should clearly
state the subject on which you are commenting.  *Then* comment...

	John

------- Forwarded Message

Message-Id: <199302111305.AA17580@eff.org>
Date: Thu, 11 Feb 1993 08:10:14 -0500
To: gnu@toad.com (John Gilmore), barlow@eff.org, jberman@eff.org,
        mkapor@eff.org, blau@eff.org, farber@central.cis.upenn.edu
From: Daniel J. Weitzner <djw@eff.org>
Subject: FCC Proposed Ruling on Scanners That Receive Cellphone Transmissions

The file attached here was received today and is too long for
inclusion in a regular issue of the Digest. It is submitted for your
comments and consideration. You might want to send your comments to
the FCC as well.

PAT

  From: raisch@ora.com (Rob Raisch)
  Subject: FCC Proposed Ruling on Scanners That Receive Cellphone Transmissions
  Organization: O'Reilly & Associates, Inc.
  Date: Thu, 11 Feb 1993 05:10:24 GMT

47 CFR Parts 2 and 15

[ET Docket No. 93-1; FCC 93-1]

Radio Scanners That Receive Cellular Telephone Transmissions

AGENCY: Federal Communications Commission.

ACTION: Proposed rule.

SUMMARY: This Notice of Proposed Rule Making proposes to deny
equipment authorization to radio scanners capable of receiving
transmissions in the Domestic Public Cellular Radio Telecommunications
Service. This action is taken in response to the Telephone Disclosure
and Dispute Resolution Act (Pub. L. 102-556). The intended effect of
this action is to help ensure the privacy of cellular telephone
conversations.

DATES: Comments must be submitted on or before February 22, 1993, and
reply comments on or before March 8, 1993.

ADDRESSES: Federal Communications Commission, 1919 M Street, NW.,
Washington, DC 20554.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:

David Wilson, Office of Engineering and Technology, (202) 653-8138.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: This is a summary of the Commission's
Notice of Proposed Rule Making in ET Docket No. 93-1, FCC 93- 1,
adopted January 4, 1993, and released January 13, 1993. The full text
of this decision is available for inspection and copying during normal
business hours in the FCC Dockets Branch (room 230), 1919 M Street,
NW., Washington, DC. The complete text of this decision also may be
purchased from the Commission's duplicating contractor, Downtown Copy
Center, at (202) 659-8657 or 1990 M Street, NW., suite 640,
Washington, DC 20036.

Paperwork Reduction

   The following collection of information contained in this proposed
rule has been submitted to the Office of Management and Budget for
review under section 3504(h) of the Paperwork Reduction Act (44 U.S.C.
3504(h)). Copies of this submission may be purchased from the
Commission's duplicating contractor, Downtown Copy Center, at (202)
659-8657 or 1990 M Street, NW., suite 640, Washington, DC 20036.
Persons wishing to comment on this collection of information should
direct their comments to Mr. Jonas Neihardt, Office of Management and
Budget, room 3235 NEOB, Washington, DC 20554, (202) 395-4814. A copy
of any comments filed with the Office of Management and Budget should
also be sent to the following address at the Federal Communications
Commission: Federal Communications Commission, Office of the Managing
Director, Paperwork Reduction Project, Washington, DC 20554. For
further information contact Ms. Judy Boley, (202) 632-7513.

   OMB Number: None.
   Title: Scanning Receiver Compliance Exhibit.
   Respondents: Businesses or other for profit, small businesses/organizations 
   Action: New collection.
   Frequency of Response: On occasion reporting.
   Estimated Annual Burden: 
   Number of respondents: 40.
   Annual hours per respondent: 0.25.
   Total annual burden: 10.

Needs and Uses: An exhibit accompanying a Form 731 Application for
Equipment Authorization will determine compliance of applicants
requesting authorization to market scanning receivers and frequency
converters with Congressionally mandated regulations. The regulations
prohibit the marketing of radio scanners capable of intercepting, or
being modified to intercept, cellular telephone conversations.

Summary of the Notice of Proposed Rule Making:

   1. By this action, the Commission proposes to amend 47 CFR parts 2
and 15 to prohibit the manufacture or importation of radio scanners
capable of receiving frequencies allocated to the Domestic Public
Cellular Radio Telecommunications Service.  This action is in response
to the Telephone Disclosure and Dispute Resolution Act (Act), Pub. L.
102-556.

   2. The Domestic Public Cellular Radio Telecommunications Service
("Cellular Radio Service") provides telephone service to mobile
customers. Cellular telephones use frequencies in the bands 824-849
MHz and 869-894 MHz to connect their users to other cellular system
users and to the Public Switched Telephone Network.

   3. As defined in 47 CFR part 15 scanning receivers, or "scanners,"
are radio receivers that automatically switch between four or more
frequencies anywhere within the 30-960 MHz band. In order to control
their potential to cause harmful interference to authorized radio
communications, the rules require that scanners receive an equipment
authorization (certification) from the Commission prior to marketing.

   4. In the past five years, 22 different models of scanning
receivers capable of receiving cellular telephone transmissions have
been issued grants of equipment authorization. During this same
period, ten other models capable of tuning frequencies between 806 and
900 MHz except for the cellular bands have also been authorized.
Several publications currently on the market describe relatively
simple modifications that users can make to many of the latter
scanning receivers to enable that equipment to receive cellular
telephone transmissions.

   5. The Telephone Disclosure and Dispute Resolution Act requires
that the Commission, by April 26, 1993, prescribe and make effective
regulations denying equipment authorization for any scanning receiver
capable of:

    Receiving transmissions in the frequencies allocated to 
the domestic cellular radio service,
    Readily being altered by the user to receive transmissions 
in such frequencies, or
    Being equipped with decoders that convert digital cellular 
transmissions to analog voice audio.

The Act also stipulates that, beginning one year after the effective
date of the regulations adopted to satisfy the above requirements, no
receiver having the above capabilities shall be manufactured in the
United States or imported for use in the United States.

   6. In accordance with the Act, we are proposing to deny equipment
authorization to scanning receivers that tune frequencies used by
cellular telephones. We are also proposing to require applicants for
the authorization of scanning receivers to include in their
applications a statement declaring that their receivers cannot be
tuned to receive cellular telephone transmissions.

   7. Also in accordance with the Act, we are proposing to require
that scanning receivers be incapable of being readily altered by the
user to operate within the cellular bands. To assist us in determining
whether a scanner complies with this requirement, we propose to
require applicants for scanning receiver equipment authorization to
include in their applications a statement pledging that their
receivers cannot be readily altered to receive cellular telephone
transmissions. We also propose to prohibit the authorization of any
scanning receiver for which cellular coverage can be readily restored
by the user. We solicit comment on this proposed reporting requirement
and on the definition of "readily altered."  We also seek comment on
whether additional information, such as why the receiver cannot be
readily altered, should be required.

   8. In further compliance with the Act, we propose to deny equipment
authorization to any scanning receiver that can be equipped with
decoders that convert digital cellular transmissions to analog voice
audio. We invite comment on the potential impact of this requirement
on existing models of scanning receivers.

   9. There currently are a number of frequency converters on the
market that can be used in conjunction with scanners that receive
frequencies below 800 MHz to enable the reception of cellular
telephone transmissions. We are proposing to deny equipment
authorization to converters that tune, or can be readily altered by
the user to tune, cellular telephone frequencies. We will require that
applicants for FCC equipment authorization of frequency converters
used with scanners include in their applications a statement pledging
that the converters cannot be easily altered to enable a scanner to
receive cellular transmissions. We seek comment on whether this
statement should also include evidence indicating why the converter
cannot be easily modified.

   10. The Initial Regulatory Flexibility Analysis is contained in the
text of the Notice.

11. Comment Dates

   Pursuant to applicable procedures set forth in 47 CFR 1.415 and
1.419, interested parties may file comments on or before February 22,
1993, and reply comments on or before March 8, 1993. In order to
comply with the requirement of the Telephone Disclosure and Dispute
Resolution Act that FCC rules be promulgated within 180 days of
enactment, we will proceed with this Notice without furnishing a prior
text as provided by Article 607 of the United States-Canada Free-Trade
Implementation Act of 1988 (Pub. L. 100-499, 102 Stat. 1851). To do so
would frustrate achievement of a legitimate domestic objective. In
addition, the Commission is not likely to be able to accommodate
requests for extension of the comment periods. To file formally in
this proceeding, you must file an original and five copies of all
comments, reply comments, and supporting comments. If you want each
Commissioner to receive a copy of your comments, you must file an
original plus nine copies. You should send comments and reply comments
to Office of the Secretary, Federal Communications Commission,
Washington, DC 20554. Comments and reply comments will be available
for public inspection during normal business hours in the Dockets
Reference Room of the Federal Communications Commission, 1919 M
Street, NW., Washington, DC 20554.

12. Ex-Parte Rules-Non-Restricted Proceeding

   This is a non-restricted notice and comment rule making proceeding.
Ex parte presentations are permitted, except during the Sunshine
Agenda period, provided they are disclosed as provided in Commission
rules. See generally 47 CFR 1.1202, 1.1203 and 1.1206(a).

   13. For further information on this proceeding contact David
Wilson, Technical Standards Branch, Office of Engineering and
Technology, 202-653-8138.

List of Subjects in 47 CFR Parts 2 and 15:

   Communications equipment, Wiretapping and electronic surveillance.

Federal Communications Commission.

Donna R. Searcy,
Secretary.

   Parts 2 and 15 of title 47 of the Code of Federal Regulations are
proposed to be amended as follows:

PART 2-FREQUENCY ALLOCATIONS AND RADIO TREATY MATTERS; GENERAL RULES
AND REGULATIONS

   1. The authority citation for part 2 continues to read as follows:

   Authority: Secs. 4, 302, 303 and 307 of the Communications Act of
1934, as amended, 47 U.S.C. 154, 154(i), 302, 303, 303(r) and 307.

   2. Section 2.975 is amended by adding a new paragraph (a)(8) 
to read as follows:

2.975   Application for notification.

   (a) * * *
   (8) Applications for the notification of receivers contained 
in frequency converters used with scanning receivers shall be 
accompanied by an exhibit indicating compliance with the provisions 
of 15.121 of this chapter.
*     *     *     *     *     
   3. Section 2.1033 is amended by adding a new paragraph (b)(12) 
to read as follows:

2.1033   Application for certification.
*     *     *     *     *     
   (b) * * *
   (12) Applications for the certification of scanning receivers under
part 15 shall be accompanied by an exhibit indicating compliance with
the provisions of 15.122 of this chapter.  
* * * * *

PART 15-RADIO FREQUENCY DEVICES

   1. The authority citation for part 15 continues to read as follows:

   Authority: Secs. 4, 302, 303 and 307 of the Communications Act of
1934, as amended, 47 U.S.C. 154, 302, 303 and 307.

   2. Section 15.37 is amended by adding a last sentence to paragraph
(b), and adding a new paragraph (f), to read as follows:

15.37   Transition provisions for compliance with the rules.
*     *     *     *     *     
   (b) * * * In addition, receivers are subject to the provisions in
paragraph (f) of this section. 

 * * * * *

   (f) The manufacture or importation of scanning receivers, and
frequency converters used with scanning receivers, that do not comply
with the provisions of 15.121 shall cease on or before April 26, 1994.
Effective April 26, 1993, the Commission will not accept applications
for equipment authorization for receivers that do not comply with the
provisions of 15.121.  This paragraph does not prohibit the sale or
use of authorized receivers manufactured in the United States, or
imported into the United States, prior to April 26, 1994.

   3. Section 15.121 is added to read as follows:

15.121 Scanning receivers and frequency converters used with scanning
receivers.

   Scanning receivers, and frequency converters used with scanning
receivers, must be incapable of operating (tuning), or readily being
altered by the user to operate, within the frequency bands allocated
to the Domestic Public Cellular Radio Telecommunications Service.
Receivers capable of "readily being altered by the user" include, but
are not limited to, those for which the ability to receive
transmissions in the restricted bands can be added by clipping the
leads of, or installing, a diode, resistor and/or jumper wire; or
replacing a plug-in semiconductor chip. Scanning receivers, and
frequency converters used with scanning receivers, must also be
incapable of converting digital cellular transmissions to analog voice
audio.

------- End of Forwarded Message





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: gnu (John Gilmore)
Date: Sat, 13 Feb 93 04:19:30 PST
To: cypherpunks
Subject: [gnu@toad.com: Re: Technology Policy and Information Infrastructure ]
Message-ID: <9302131219.AA13076@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


------- Forwarded Message

To: "Vinton G. Cerf" <vcerf@CNRI.Reston.VA.US>, gnu@toad.com
Subject: Re: Technology Policy and Information Infrastructure 
Date: Sat, 13 Feb 93 01:43:31 -0800
From: gnu@toad.com

Sound bites for Congress re technology policy and information infrastructure:

  *  Government investment invariably brings government control, which
     is harmful to the development of a communications medium in a free
     and open society.

  *  The Government seized control of telegraphy, radio, and television
     early in their development, and they have never had full First Amendment
     protection.

  *  Private, interactive electronic media involve Fourth and Fifth Amendment
     issues as well.

  *  The Executive Branch is already advocating broad wiretapping, and 
     banning of privacy technologies, and they don't even own the network.
     If the government owned the network, there'd be no stopping them.

  *  The risk of moving society into media where individual rights are
     regularly abridged is too great.  Economics is pushing us into
     individual electronic communication, regardless.

  *  If Congress truly believes in the Bill of Rights, it should get the
     hell out of the networking business and stay out of it.

	John Gilmore
	(not speaking for) Electronic Frontier Foundation
	(but ask EFF if they want to say something like this...)

------- End of Forwarded Message





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: gnu (John Gilmore)
Date: Sat, 13 Feb 93 04:21:32 PST
To: cypherpunks
Subject: [Re: Crypto Technology Policy]
Message-ID: <9302131221.AA13150@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


------- Forwarded Message

Message-Id: <9302130952.AA06229@toad.com>
To: "Vinton G. Cerf" <vcerf@CNRI.Reston.VA.US>
Subject: Re: Technology Policy and Information Infrastructure 
Date: Sat, 13 Feb 93 01:52:35 -0800
From: gnu@toad.com

Vint, if your testimony will touch on "technology policy" as it relates to
cryptograpy policy, then here are a few more "sound bits":

  *  Privacy and authenticity technologies are key to reliable
     and trustworthy social and business interactions over networks.

  *  Current government policies actively prohibit and inhibit the
     research, design, manufacturing, sale, and use of these technologies.

  *  Taxpayers have been investing many billions of dollars per year
     in these technologies, in the NSA "black budget", but have seen no
     return on this investment.

  *  Current "cold war" policy should be turned on its head.  Privacy
     is one of the fundamental rights from which the Bill of Rights was
     derived.  Government policy should encourage privacy technologies.
     Government controls on cryptography should be completely removed.

  *  The taxpayer investment in privacy technologies should be returned to
     the taxpayers by declassifying NSA research and encouraging its
     widespread deployment to protect domestic civilian communications.

------- End of Forwarded Message





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: pozar@kumr.lns.com (Tim Pozar)
Date: Sat, 13 Feb 93 07:30:38 PST
To: gnu@toad.com (John Gilmore)
Subject: Re: FCC Proposed Ruling on Scanners That Receive Cellphone Transmissions
In-Reply-To: <9302131102.AA09849@toad.com>
Message-ID: <m0nNOo2-0000f6C@kumr.lns.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


John Gilmore wrote:
> Please at least write a one-page letter in response to this
> proposed ruling.  The idiots in Congress decided that banning radios
> was preferable to allowing (or requiring) decent encryption in
> cellular phones.  Now the FCC is making rules to implement the
> Congressional ban.  They should hear from us, loud and clear,
> that this is completely backwards and wrong.
> 
> Your letter should reference Docket Number 93-1 and should clearly
> state the subject on which you are commenting.  *Then* comment...
> 
> 	John

   I should add, it needs to be formated properly or it will not be read
into the record and just tossed.   Some where around here I have an
example folks can use.  I will dig it up and post it in a day or so.

             Tim





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "DrZaphod" <ncselxsi!drzaphod@ncselxsi.netcom.com>
Date: Sat, 13 Feb 93 16:38:12 PST
To: CypherPunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Letter to FCC
Message-ID: <39954.drzaphod@ncselxsi>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


In Message Sat, 13 Feb 93 7:29:25 PST,
  kumr.lns.com!pozar@netcomsv.netcom.com (Tim Pozar) writes:

>   I should add, it needs to be formated properly or it will not be read
>into the record and just tossed.   Some where around here I have an
>example folks can use.  I will dig it up and post it in a day or so.
>
     Well this is a nice little way for the government to bypass public
opinion.  "If it's not formatted right we won't read it."

DrZaphod
[AC/DC] / [DnA][HP]
[drzaphod@ncselxsi.uucp]
Technicolorized




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: geoffw@nexsys.net (Geoff White)
Date: Sat, 13 Feb 93 13:40:46 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: PGP Customs investigation
Message-ID: <9302132122.AA13118@nexsys.nexsys.net>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


This might be old news by now but for what it's worth ...



----- Begin Included Message -----

[stuff deleted ... ]

Subject: PGP Customs investigation
Content-Length: 1235
X-Lines: 34
Status: RO

>Date: Fri, 12 Feb 93 14:47:55 -0800
>Originator: pgp-dev@oc.com
>Errors-To: hughes@soda.berkeley.edu
>Reply-To: pgp-dev@oc.com
>Sender: pgp-dev@oc.com
>Version: 5.5 -- Copyright (c) 1991/92, Anastasios Kotsikonas
>From: prz@sage.cgd.ucar.EDU (Philip Zimmermann)
>To:
>Subject: PGP Customs investigation
>
>
>I just got a call from a criminal investigator from the US Customs
>in San Jose.  She wants to fly out here to Colorado next Thursday to 
>ask me how PGP got out of the USA.  I told her I didn't export it,
>but software published on domestic Internet sites can leak overseas.
>She said I was not legally obligated to answer her questions, but that
>she would like to come here and ask me questions about the program, and
>any other information I wanted to provide on how it got exported.
>She had a copy of the PGP 2.0 User's Guide (and, I presume, the software).
>
>I thought this bit of news would be of general interest to PGPeople.
>
>
>Philip Zimmermann
>12 Feb 93
>
>
>

----- End Included Message -----





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: pozar@kumr.lns.com (Tim Pozar)
Date: Sat, 13 Feb 93 17:17:34 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Letter to FCC
In-Reply-To: <39954.drzaphod@ncselxsi>
Message-ID: <m0nNXyA-00023FC@kumr.lns.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


DrZaphod wrote:
> In Message Sat, 13 Feb 93 7:29:25 PST,
>   kumr.lns.com!pozar@netcomsv.netcom.com (Tim Pozar) writes:
> >   I should add, it needs to be formated properly or it will not be read
> >into the record and just tossed.   Some where around here I have an
> >example folks can use.  I will dig it up and post it in a day or so.
>
>      Well this is a nice little way for the government to bypass public
> opinion.  "If it's not formatted right we won't read it."

  Ever try to mail order tickets for Grateful Dead concerts? :-)

                       Tim
-- 
    Internet: pozar@kumr.lns.com     FidoNet: Tim Pozar @ 1:125/555
Snail: Tim Pozar / KKSF / 77 Maiden Lane / San Francisco CA 94108 / USA
                        Voice: +1 415 788 2022





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: fnerd@smds.com (FutureNerd Steve Witham)
Date: Sat, 13 Feb 93 17:45:13 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Gold code?
Message-ID: <9302132253.AA24202@smds.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Could someone tell me (privately) what a Gold code is?
Or, could someone resend me the message that described it?
(I think it was in a thread about digital cellular phones.)

thanks,
-fnerd




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: ssandfort@attmail.com
Date: Sun, 14 Feb 93 13:38:28 PST
To: Extropians@gnu.ai.mit.edu
Subject: BattleZone
Message-ID: <9302142138.AA24608@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text


_________________________________________________________________
             FROM THE VIRTUAL DESK OF SANDY SANDFORT
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
ATTENTION:  Cypherpunks and Extropians--Free Fun

For those of you who live in the San Francisco Bay Area, or will
be visiting 25-26 February, you are invited to play a free game
at BattleZone.  BattleZone is an indoor, paintball combat field.
On the morning of either the 25th or the 26th, Channel 2 will be
doing a live report on BattleZone.

If you are interested in being televised while playing this very
intense, high adrenaline game, send me an e-mail note with your
voice phone numbers and the best times to get in touch with you.
I will call and/or e-mail you with details.

     S a n d y                         ssandfort@attmail.com
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: ssandfort@attmail.com
Date: Sun, 14 Feb 93 13:41:12 PST
To: Extropians@gnu.ai.mit.edu
Subject: Computer Game Software
Message-ID: <9302142141.AA24638@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text


_________________________________________________________________
             FROM THE VIRTUAL DESK OF SANDY SANDFORT
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
ATTENTION:  Cypherpunks and Extropians--South East Asian Markets

If you are involved with recreational or educational software, I
can assist you or your company to distribute it overseas.  I have
a very aggressive, very reliable business associate in Singapore,
who would like to distribute your computer game and educational
software throughout South East Asia.

If you would like to know more, let me know and I will get in
touch with you.  This is a very easy way for you to increase the
profitability of your software products.

     S a n d y                         ssandfort@attmail.com
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: scott@shrug.dur.ac.uk (Scott A. McIntyre)
Date: Mon, 15 Feb 93 04:26:29 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Join in?
Message-ID: <m0nO4rd-000M6BC@shrug.dur.ac.uk>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Could I be added to this list, if at all possible?

Thanks,

Scott




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: root@rmsdell.ftl.fl.us (Yanek Martinson)
Date: Mon, 15 Feb 93 22:07:46 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: dc-nets
Message-ID: <m0nOLIn-0002D8C@rmsdell.ftl.fl.us>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Just a quick note to let anyone interested know that I'm still 
working on a dc-net implementation.  I've had some problems
with the nodes getting out of synch and am implementing
some sort of ack/commit protocol.

I'm also trying to make it work over TCP links in addition to e-mail.

--
Yanek Martinson
yanek@novavax.nova.edu



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: scott@shrug.dur.ac.uk (Scott A. McIntyre)
Date: Tue, 16 Feb 93 03:16:24 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com (Cypherpunks)
Subject: Cyphering on the NeXT
Message-ID: <m0nOQGY-000M6kC@shrug.dur.ac.uk>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I've got a NeXTstation colour and am dabbling with the various tools that are  
available for electronic encryption.  As you may know, NeXT developed a Fast  
Elliptical Encryption system (FEE) based on public key technology, but was  
prohibited from exporting it due to US law; so the dropped the tool from  
their NeXTmail system which was set for International distribution.

I have however found PGP recently (but can not get it to compile; I'm no  
programmer so I'm just bumbling throug the code fixing what I can by trial  
and error, not wise, I know), and a few other tools (kerberos)...

I'd be interested in hearing from anyone else who is using any form of  
encryption on their NeXTs for electronic mail, how they implemented it, what  
they see as alternatives and so on.

Ta,
Scott
---
EMAIL: S.A.McIntyre@durham.ac.uk   OR   scott@shrug.dur.ac.uk (NeXTmail)
SNAIL: Pyschment of Departology, University of Durham, Durham, DH1 3LE
	"Did you know that the computer invented itself?" - SNL




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: gkennedy@ccs.carleton.ca (Garry Kennedy)
Date: Tue, 16 Feb 93 12:09:08 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: re:subscription
Message-ID: <9302162008.AA10150@superior.YP.nobel>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Subscribe.

Gary Kennedy
gkennedy@ccs.carleton.ca




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: scott@shrug.dur.ac.uk (Scott A. McIntyre)
Date: Tue, 16 Feb 93 08:49:02 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com (Cypherpunks)
Subject: Attn: Todd Steigerwald
Message-ID: <m0nOVSJ-000M6tC@shrug.dur.ac.uk>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Todd,

I am not able to mail you with the answer to your query as your mailer just  
said you were todd@imaginatio which is something less than complete...if you  
can mail me (S.A.McIntyre@durham.ac.uk) with your complete mail address, I  
can tell you how to get PGP working on the NeXT...I've been playing with it  
all afternoon!

Scott





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Date: Wed, 17 Feb 93 12:18:04 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Timed-Release Crypto
Message-ID: <9302172016.AA12281@netcom.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Dave Deltorto writes (about my idea for timed-release crypto):

>Well, yes, Tim, but what about the MTBF rating fo disk drives and or other
>storage media? Any such message would also be relying on the turst that the
>disk it's stored on, the mail system and or the organization it was sent to
>for storgae are still going to be around. Now, if there were dedicated places

Loss of hardware over the years due to unreliability is unlikely to be the
main issue, for several reasons:

1. Modern MTBFs for large disk drives are approaching 100,000 hours, or
well over 10 years. The drives are likelier to be voluntarily retired
first. And newer drives, including archival optical drives, are even more
reliable (the  drives may crash, but optical media survive). For the drives
that _do_ fail, backup strategies exist, as with all storage of critical
files. To wit, if your point is correct, then the failures of some disk
drives at banks, insurance companies, etc., should be producing some
fraction of "unrecoverable losses" each year. That they are not, because of
robust backup and redundant storage methods, is evidence that crypto time
vaults will also be reasonably secure. (Granted, you wouldn't want to trust
your $100,000 deposit for 20 years on Joe Random's aging Amiga 1000.)

2. A relatively large file by today's standards, e.g., 10 megabytes, will
be a very small file by the standards of 10 years from now. The upshot is
that new and more reliable storage methods (and transmission methods) will
make storage of such small files quite trivial. (And remember that since
the pieces are encrypted, physical duplication for backups, redundant
storage, etc., is not a compromise of security.)

3. The most reputatable crypto time vaults will of course be careful not to
lose client files, especially not for such mundane reasons as disk drive
failures. 

4. M-out-of-n voting strategies are likely in any case, to deal with
collusion of some of the nodes. That is, a file will be split into pieces
such that any 8 out of 12 pieces, for example, are sufficient to recover
the original file. (Encryption is a separate issue, though obviously
related.)

5. The files are likely to be moved around a lot, anyway, making hardware
failures manageable on an instantaneous basis (that is, bad nodes, etc.,
can be compensated for when the time comes to reroute the files). Thus, a
critical file does not just get "parked" at one site for 30 years.

>where such t-r crypto msgs could be stored, such as a digital "bank" (where
>they would no doubt charge a storage fee, possibly necessitating that each
>such msg would be able to "peel off" digicredits from itself every year to
>guarantee paying for it's own upkeep in case you were no longer aropund to
>sign checks), the question of whether or not it would BE there in 30 years
>might be moot, but that's a whole 'nother discussion.

"Persistent institutions" is what I call these systems or trusts that last
for many decades. If such systems can be built, using some of the ideas
discussed here in this group, then interesting new financial and political
structures are possible. Imagine an anonymous, distributed trust that has
$10 billion in crypto-assets and a "goal" of funding nanotech or cryonics
research. (Lots of complicated stuff yet to be considered in enough detail
on how such "goals" might be stored, acted on, etc. For the sake of
simplicity, think of it as a kind of Howard Hughes Medical Foundation,
which once owned the Hughes Corporation, but which is not located in any
one single country....)

>Still, I find your idea very compelling and full of merit.

Thanks. Lots more work is needed.

-Tim May


--
Timothy C. May               | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,  
tcmay@netcom.com        | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
408-688-5409               | knowledge, reputations, information markets, 
W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA       | black markets, collapse of governments.
Higher Power: 2^756839 | Public Key: MailSafe and PGP available.





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: deltorto@aol.com
Date: Wed, 17 Feb 93 11:10:02 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Timed-Release Crypto
Message-ID: <9302171328.tn22198@aol.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Tim May contributed a fascinating bit of thinking on timed-release messages,
including this:

>>"Aha!," I hear you exclaim, "Tim's scheme depends solely on the trust of
>>these escrow agents, and that's no different from depositing a sealed
>>envelope with your friendly lawyer and asking him to promise not to peek."

Well, yes, Tim, but what about the MTBF rating fo disk drives and or other
storage media? Any such message would also be relying on the turst that the
disk it's stored on, the mail system and or the organization it was sent to
for storgae are still going to be around. Now, if there were dedicated places
where such t-r crypto msgs could be stored, such as a digital "bank" (where
they would no doubt charge a storage fee, possibly necessitating that each
such msg would be able to "peel off" digicredits from itself every year to
guarantee paying for it's own upkeep in case you were no longer aropund to
sign checks), the question of whether or not it would BE there in 30 years
might be moot, but that's a whole 'nother discussion.

Still, I find your idea very compelling and full of merit.

  dave




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Karl Barrus <elee9sf@Menudo.UH.EDU>
Date: Wed, 17 Feb 93 14:35:24 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: digital store?
Message-ID: <199302172234.AA25466@Menudo.UH.EDU>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Cypherpunks,

	I've received mail from a bank user who wonders what to do
with the "money".
	I responded that there really isn't too much reason to spend
your money now, given that there isn't too much to buy :-)  I've been
trying to think of something the bank customers can do to trade bills,
sort of a fixed monetary economic experiment.  Anybody have ideas?
	Right now, bank customers can contact each other anonymously
by using remailing headers set up for the remailer
elee7h5@rosebud.ee.uh.edu - use the get command to receive a list of
headers (for more info see the new help file).  The only thing I can
think of right now that people can do is play "mental poker" and use
digital bills.  Of course, messages back and forth need to be
encrypted because such activity can be seen as gambling, although of
course there is no real money involved.
	I'm working on a help file/FAQ for the bank, but I want to
finish writing hop.mail for MSDOS first, and that isn't going as fast
as I would like since I find the DOS scripting language to be, well...
inadequate.  

/-----------------------------------\
| Karl L. Barrus                    |
| elee9sf@menudo.uh.edu             | <- preferred address
| barrus@tree.egr.uh.edu (NeXTMail) |
\-----------------------------------/




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: wayner@cs.cornell.edu (Peter Wayner)
Date: Wed, 17 Feb 93 15:30:07 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Gambling...
Message-ID: <9302172328.AA29824@brokk.cs.cornell.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



If there is no "real" money involved then you might want
to consider running a betting operation on sports games
or some other popular betting activity. Of course, many of
us would probably rather bet on the release date of the 586 then
some random ball game because that is where our expertise lies... :-)


-Peter




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: lefty@apple.com
Date: Thu, 18 Feb 93 10:45:53 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Trapdoors
Message-ID: <9302181844.AA06137@apple.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Sandy Sandfort wonders:
>How do we know the proposed legislation wasn't just a smoke
>screen?  Isn't it possible that the Feds have already compromised
>Intel or MicroSoft?  Is there some way to be sure that the new
>486 chip running your computer isn't recording each PGP or RSA
>private key you generate?

No, nor do we having any particular way of knowing that Packard-Bell
doesn't install an extremely tiny person into each keyboard they sell,
studiously copying down each one of your key strokes.

How in the world would the computer's CPU be able to distinguish the
generation of a PGP or RSA private key from any other computation?

--
Lefty (lefty@apple.com)
C:.M:.C:., D:.O:.D:.






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Date: Thu, 18 Feb 93 10:50:25 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Trapdoors
Message-ID: <9302181848.AA20187@netcom.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



>How do we know the proposed legislation wasn't just a smoke
>screen?  Isn't it possible that the Feds have already compromised
>Intel or MicroSoft?  Is there some way to be sure that the new
>486 chip running your computer isn't recording each PGP or RSA
>private key you generate?

>     S a n d y                         ssandfort@attmail.com

Sandy has discovered the deep dark secret of crypto! I worked for Intel
from 1974 to 1986 and can confirm this to be the case.

Every crypto key is secretly recorded by Intel microprocessors. Motorola
processors do not yet record keys, which I why use a Macintosh. The
specific instruction is the so-called "NSA instruction" which John Gilmore
identified some time ago. 

Sun Microsystems was ordered by the NSA to redesign their chips to capture
keys, which is why the SPARC processor was introduced. SPARC stands for
"Sun Processor Allowing Remote Capture."

Once the keys have been captured and stored on the user's hard disk (notice
how the drives occasionally turn on a night?), they are forwarded to the
NSA and National Surveillance Organization by "screen saver" programs, like
"After Dark," which were actually written by the Berkeley Microsystems
cut-out operation of the NSO. Real hackers don't use cutesy screen saver
programs.

This new automated system is much more convenient than the previous system,
where the FBI and NSO had to break into homes and offices in order to
retrieve the keys the Intel processors had recorded.

-Klaus! von Future Prime, Cypherpunk and Extropian





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: kelly@netcom.com (Kelly Goen)
Date: Thu, 18 Feb 93 12:50:01 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Chip Level Back Doors
In-Reply-To: <9302181756.AA28225@toad.com>
Message-ID: <9302182048.AA04620@netcom.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> 
> _________________________________________________________________
>              FROM THE VIRTUAL DESK OF SANDY SANDFORT
> ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
> I'm relatively new to the list, so this may be an idea that's
> already been dealt with.  If so, please let me know off-line.
> 
> PGP was created as an end-run to legislation that would have
> mandated trapdoors in all encryption hardware/software sold in
> the U.S.   Fortunately, such legislation has been defeated to
> date.
> 
> How do we know the proposed legislation wasn't just a smoke
> screen?  Isn't it possible that the Feds have already compromised
> Intel or MicroSoft?  Is there some way to be sure that the new
> 486 chip running your computer isn't recording each PGP or RSA
> private key you generate?
> 
>      S a n d y                         ssandfort@attmail.com
> ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
> 
> 


Actually I would like to respond to this one, from a technical level
silicon compilers use a process known as auto_insert logic,
this a a process where known gate libraries are automatically
inserted in the design of a chip, a gate level trapdoor may then be
created by designing a multiple level interdiction program, (virus
tech immediately came to mine on this one do to my work in
both the MS-DOS and Unix virus/security area, the first attack is
on the base OS that the OS for the cad package, generally its some variety of
Unix(tm), next the CAD package that manages the chip design, and finally the
silicon compiler itself, now while all these steps are essentially
trivial to an informed engineer in the business they are
essntially opaque to those outside of the design/foundry end for chip
design, could they be attacked in this fashion to create a gate level backdoor
??? With a modest investment intime and money by an attacker no,doubt
if he subverts an engineer on the project of interest.,-- whish could be at
the CAD software ivendor, the OS vendor for the cad platform,
now while design verification techniques are used in most chip houses
it should be relatively trivial to bypass that
given the complexity of todays designs... is it possible?? damn right,
Has it happened yet ??? I wouldnt know you tell me...
I worked on the CAD end, the OS end, and the Silicon compiler end
as well as having the skills needed to the the open holes in the whole
process... finding out a chip design had been
compromised wouldnt surprise me in the least...
A Chip level backdoor to reach into the middle of a running systems and grab
public keys is another magnitutde of complexity above what
we are
discussing on the gate level... is it possibile? most certainly...
It would cost immensely however, and would require the coorperation
or subversion of several steps in the chain  A LOT more code has to
be hidden in those auto_insert libraries and the
design verification process has to be MUCH more widely compromised,
and I believe performance hits WOULD be detectable at the end user level



       WHAT do YOU  think
       cheers
       kelly




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: root@rmsdell.ftl.fl.us (Yanek Martinson)
Date: Thu, 18 Feb 93 11:42:43 PST
To: ssandfort@attmail.com
Subject: Trapdoors (Not Very Likely)
Message-ID: <m0nPGWp-0002m0C@rmsdell.ftl.fl.us>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> Intel or MicroSoft?  Is there some way to be sure that the new
> 486 chip running your computer isn't recording each PGP or RSA
> private key you generate?

This is not very likely.  There would be several problems for anyone
attempting this.  First, where do you store it?  On-chip non-volatile
memory?  Second, how would the chip know that it was generating
a private key?  This would almost require artificial intelligence. 
You can't just scan for a sequence of instructions currently used
by PGP, for they change with each version released.  Or would it
store ALL data that passes through it?  Third, how useful would
that be?  What if you generate your keys on a sub-notebook computer 
which you carry with you or store in a secure place at all times.

So, no, this is not something you need to worry about.

--
Yanek Martinson
yanek@novavax.nova.edu



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: pmetzger@shearson.com (Perry E. Metzger)
Date: Thu, 18 Feb 93 13:42:33 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Trapdoors
Message-ID: <9302181938.AA10578@maggie.shearson.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> From: ssandfort@attmail.com
> 
> How do we know the proposed legislation wasn't just a smoke
> screen?  Isn't it possible that the Feds have already compromised
> Intel or MicroSoft?  Is there some way to be sure that the new
> 486 chip running your computer isn't recording each PGP or RSA
> private key you generate?

If you could actually build a 486 such that it was capable of this task,
you are a far better chip designer than any I know of. Not merely are
we to expect that the 486 is capable of recording anything, but we
are also to expect that its capable of solving a computationally
undecidable problem as well.

Perry




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: dmandl@shearson.com (David Mandl)
Date: Thu, 18 Feb 93 13:45:42 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Trapdoors
Message-ID: <9302181948.AA21706@tardis.shearson.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> _________________________________________________________________
>              FROM THE VIRTUAL DESK OF SANDY SANDFORT
> ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

[...]

> Isn't it possible that the Feds have already compromised
> Intel or MicroSoft?  Is there some way to be sure that the new
> 486 chip running your computer isn't recording each PGP or RSA
> private key you generate?
> 
>      S a n d y                         ssandfort@attmail.com
> ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

You may be right.  For example, I know for a fact that all 386/486
chips trap files with the string "Liz" in them--this is so that the
NSA can capture and read love letters from me to my girlfriend.  I
have been getting around this by changing my pet names for her
constantly, and placing the string "Liz" at random points in massive
junk files to waste the spooks' disk space.  Inconvenient, but it
works.  Ciao.

   --Dave.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: jim@tadpole.com (Jim Thompson)
Date: Thu, 18 Feb 93 12:58:33 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Trapdoors
Message-ID: <9302182057.AA00885@tadpole.tadpole.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> The specific instruction is the so-called "NSA instruction" which John Gilmore
> identified some time ago. 
> 
> Sun Microsystems was ordered by the NSA to redesign their chips to capture
> keys, which is why the SPARC processor was introduced. SPARC stands for
> "Sun Processor Allowing Remote Capture."

Interestingly enough, V9 SPARC has a population count (number of bits
set in word) instruction that was put in specificly at the request of
No Such Agency.

Jim




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: whitaker@eternity.demon.co.uk (Russell E. Whitaker)
Date: Thu, 18 Feb 93 07:10:41 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: MEETING: 4th Cypherpunks U.K.
Message-ID: <1159@eternity.demon.co.uk>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


4th Cypherpunks meeting, London
-------------------------------

Will be held Saturday, 20 February 1993, at 1400 in the office of:

  FOREST
  4th Floor
  2 Grosvenor Gardens
  London  SW1W 0DH
  071-823-6550

This location is 2 blocks from Victoria Station, at the corner
of Hobart Place, near Buckingham Palace.  The entrance is the
very last at the end of the office block, and is diagonally
across the street from a cabbie shelter and a bank of BT
payphones.  If you have trouble finding us, call the above
number or page me on 081-812-2661.

Attendees, as always, are encouraged to bring their laptop and
portable computers, for on-site PGP public key exchange and
certification.  Those who have already generated PGP 2.n public
keys, but who aren't bringing their own machines, should bring
diskettes with their public keys.  As is usually the rule in
this crowd, please don't copy your secret key on these
diskettes...

Amongst the usual topics of discussion will be:

    *  An introduction to data privacy for novices
    *  Further developments in U.K. anonymous remailers
    *  Further developments in U.K. PGP key servers (telnet,
         ftp, email)

.. and some interesting developments in re attempted
anti-privacy legislation in the U.K. and elsewhere.

Our special guest Saturday will be Dr. Whitfield Diffie, who
will join us informally for the meeting, before his return to
the U.S.  It looks to be a good meeting.  All are welcome.

In liberty,

Russell Earl Whitaker                   whitaker@eternity.demon.co.uk
Communications Editor                                 AMiX: RWhitaker
EXTROPY: The Journal of Transhumanist Thought
Board member, Extropy Institute (ExI)
================ PGP 2.0 public key available =======================






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: gnu (John Gilmore)
Date: Thu, 18 Feb 93 17:30:29 PST
To: w8sdz@TACOM-EMH1.Army.Mil (Keith Petersen - MACA WSMR)
Subject: Re: toad.com mailing list postings from possible virus authors
In-Reply-To: <9302181507.14268.w8sdz@TACOM-EMH1.Army.Mil>
Message-ID: <9302190130.AA08277@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Keith, Kenneth:

I have been busy both cutting a GDB release (which isn't done yet) and
dealing with immediate management needs at my company.  But your
concerns are also of grave concern to me, so I'll take the time to
answer you fully.


I am uninterested in censorship of discussion of *any* topic on
mailing lists through my machine.  Your opinion is that this is
inappropriate use of the Internet.  I own the machine free and clear.
I personally pay its network bills.  If you examine its net
connectivity and the associated connection contracts, you will find
that the machine is attached via a worldwide network that explicitly
promises not to censor any traffic UNLESS AND UNTIL a court of law --
not you -- has decided that that traffic is actually illegal.  And my
machine sends email traffic for any host (other than a short list
known to be on uncensored networks) to uunet, which is explicitly
authorized by NSF to forward uncontrolled outside traffic (e.g. from
uucp sites) into the NSFnet.

You see, I anticipated that third parties would want to control what I
and my friends might want to talk about using this wonderful
networking technolgy.  And we aren't interested in your opinion.
No offense intended, Keith -- I think you have done some truly great
work for the community.  But when you imply that conversations though
my machine are in any way illegal or inappropriate, you've overstepped
my respect for you.

> 				 This person appears to be a virus
> author, one who knows virus authors, and/or one who encourages such
> activity. 

Thank you, Senator McCarthy.  I believe that thug@phantom.com is not
a smart-card-carrying member of the virus authors' guild, but I'm not sure.

I think that the attitude that it's OK for "computer scientists" or
"virus researchers" to talk about viruses, to dissect them in detail,
and to write or modify them, but it isn't OK for anyone else to do so,
is two-faced and objectionable.  Security by obscurity -- forcing
people to be unaware of issues and threats like these, whether by
explicit censorship, pressure on intermediate sites, or by social
ostracism -- not only doesn't remove the threat, but is an affront to
our open society.

If you think that the public should be protected from the *content* of
the particular message that was forwarded to me, I recommend that you
look at recent issues of Info Security News (formerly ISPNews), one of
the better trade rags covering security products.  They seem to be
running an article series by Alan Solomon on exactly how stealth
viruses work, and they provided a lot more details than the overview
posting that came through toad.com.  I've seen articles in the Sep/Oct
and Nov/Dec 1992 issues so far.

Just as important to the cypherpunks posting was the author's
exploration of the impacts on society resulting from the technology
(the movement toward memory-protected and permission-controlled
operating systems, the impacts of automating virus creation so that
children can do it, etc).  The Solomon articles focused completely on
technical issues, leaving the reader in the dark about how to cope
over the next few years.

My own opinion is that viruses are what will finally put a stake
through the heart of DOS.  It's a dirty job, but somebody has to do it.
If true, or even 10% likely, it's something that a hundred million
people had better talk about, so they can prepare for it.

	John Gilmore
	gnu@toad.com




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: gnu (John Gilmore)
Date: Thu, 18 Feb 93 17:40:18 PST
To: gnu@toad.com
Subject: toad.com mailing list postings from possible virus authors
Message-ID: <9302190140.AA08377@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


This is the message I received which complained about "inappropriate
use of the Internet".  He also phoned me to complain.

I know the cyperpunks already know this, but Dave Farber's audience
might not have thought about the implications for free speech of
having the government build a multi billion dollar Internet
replacement.  Bureaucrats and random complaints from third parties on
such a network *will* cause you grief about what you are allowed to
say and do.  The company I buy networking from is Alternet, and
because they exist, I can protect myself from this sort of meddling.
They will not be able to compete with the taxpayer funded "national
information infrastructure", and my only option, if I want to be on
the net, will be to hook up under the government's rules.

If after seeing this this exchange you still don't believe me, talk to
someone at a controversial broadcast radio station.  Radio is living
under that yoke *now*, and they have some real stories to tell.

	John

Date: Tue, 16 Feb 1993 12:53:14 -0500 (EST)
To: gnu@cygnus.com (John Gilmore)
Cc: CMcDonald@WSMR-SIMTEL20.Army.Mil (Chris McDonald),
        krvw@cert.org ("Kenneth R. van Wyk")
Subject: toad.com mailing list postings from possible virus authors
From: w8sdz@TACOM-EMH1.Army.Mil (Keith Petersen - MACA WSMR)
Message-Id: <9302161253.16494.w8sdz@TACOM-EMH1.Army.Mil>

John, below is the posting I called about.  In my opinion this is
inappropriate use of the Internet.  This person appears to be a virus
author, one who knows virus authors, and/or one who encourages such
activity. 

What is the policy of toad.com concerning such postings?

Keith
--
Keith Petersen
Maintainer of the MS-DOS archive at WSMR-SIMTEL20.Army.Mil [192.88.110.20]
Internet: w8sdz@TACOM-EMH1.Army.Mil     or      w8sdz@Vela.ACS.Oakland.Edu
Uucp: uunet!umich!vela!w8sdz                         BITNET: w8sdz@OAKLAND

> From: thug@phantom.com (Murdering Thug)
> Subject: Re: Viral encryption
> To: cypherpunks@toad.com
> Date: Thu, 11 Feb 93 11:47:43 EST
> 
> As Mr. Ferguson pointed out, polymorphic viruses are making their way into the
> DOS world.  This is a problem in the short term, but not in the long term
> because people will be changing to memory-protected & file-permission based
> operating systems like NT, OS/2 and Unix, where it is very difficult for
> most kinds of virus to spread.
> 
> I myself am very familiar with the virus underground, so for those who are
> not, let me explain the two newest and most deadly virus techniques which
> are being seen in the DOS world.
> 
> The first is something called "Stealth" viruses.  Stealth viruses imbed
> themselves into DOS and intercept disk read calls from applications. If
> those read system calls are reading non .EXE or .COM files, then they are
> processed normally.  However when an application such as virus scanning
> program is reading in .COM and .EXE files (in order to scan them for virus
> code), the stealth code in DOS intercepts this and returns to the application
> what the .EXE or .COM file would look like if it wasn't infected by the
> stealth virus.  Thus, all virus checking programs can be decieved in this
> manner.  There are steps to get around this, like booting off of a
> write-protected floppy disk (with a clean copy of DOS on it) and running
> the virus checking program directly from that floppy.  But people seldom
> do that, so the stealth technology is a worthwhile one for virus creators
> to pursue.
> 
> The second is called "Polymorphic" viruses.  These are viruses which
> contain a tiny encryption/decryption engine.  The great thing about
> polymorphic viruses is that they encrypt themselves with a different key
> each time they replicate (make a new copy of themselves).  The small
> amount of virus bootstrap code which is not encrypted is changed in each
> replication by dispursing random NOP's throughout the virus boostrap code.
> Thus each sample of polymorphic virus looks completely different to
> virus checking programs.  The virus checking programs cannot use
> "signature" byte strings to detect polymorphic viruses.
> 
> I have seen something called D.A.M.E., also known as Dark Avenger
> Mutation Engine.  This is a freeware polymorphic library/kernel/toolkit
> which allows anyone to take an ordinary virus and wrap it in a polymorphic
> shell.  Thus each new copy of the virus will look completely different
> as it replicates.  D.A.M.E. is a great toolkit for those who want to
> release new viruses but don't have the skills to write a virus from
> scratch.  DAME works very well with Turbo Assembler and MASM.
> I believe that DAME II will be coming out sometime this spring. At
> least that is what the author has promised.  Among the new features
> will be more powerful encryption, stealth capabilities, and compatibility
> with Stacker and DR DOS compressed file systems.  I have read that the
> author of DAME and DAME II will be coming out with a Virus Construction
> Set, which will allow point-n-click building of new viruses using
> object oriented techniques.  It works sort of like a Mr. Potatohead,
> you point and click on the parts/modules you want and it builds it for
> you.  You select the replication method, stealth capability,
> polymorphism, and payload module (there are several payloads, varying
> from playing music and showing graphics, to printing a text message on
> screan, to complete wipe out of the HD). The really wonderful thing
> is that you will be able to build your own modules and link them into
> the virus.  I am sure a flourishing of third-party modules will occur.
> 
> With the VCS, a 9 year old can build a competely new virus just by
> pointing, clicking, and dragging, popping up windows and choosing options.
> 
> My oh my, aren't we in for fun times ahead...
> 
> Thug




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: ssandfort@attmail.com
Date: Thu, 18 Feb 93 09:56:43 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Trapdoors
Message-ID: <9302181756.AA28225@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text


_________________________________________________________________
             FROM THE VIRTUAL DESK OF SANDY SANDFORT
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
I'm relatively new to the list, so this may be an idea that's
already been dealt with.  If so, please let me know off-line.

PGP was created as an end-run to legislation that would have
mandated trapdoors in all encryption hardware/software sold in
the U.S.   Fortunately, such legislation has been defeated to
date.

How do we know the proposed legislation wasn't just a smoke
screen?  Isn't it possible that the Feds have already compromised
Intel or MicroSoft?  Is there some way to be sure that the new
486 chip running your computer isn't recording each PGP or RSA
private key you generate?

     S a n d y                         ssandfort@attmail.com
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: wixer!jonl@bigtex.cactus.org (Jon Lebkowsky)
Date: Fri, 19 Feb 93 07:11:58 PST
To: gnu@toad.com (John Gilmore)
Subject: Re: toad.com mailing list postings from possible virus authors
In-Reply-To: <9302190130.AA08277@toad.com>
Message-ID: <9302190302.AA17901@wixer>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> > 				 This person appears to be a virus
> > author, one who knows virus authors, and/or one who encourages such
> > activity. 
> 
> Thank you, Senator McCarthy.  I believe that thug@phantom.com is not
> a smart-card-carrying member of the virus authors' guild, but I'm not sure.
> 
> I think that the attitude that it's OK for "computer scientists" or
> "virus researchers" to talk about viruses, to dissect them in detail,
> and to write or modify them, but it isn't OK for anyone else to do so,
> is two-faced and objectionable.  Security by obscurity -- forcing
> people to be unaware of issues and threats like these, whether by
> explicit censorship, pressure on intermediate sites, or by social
> ostracism -- not only doesn't remove the threat, but is an affront to
> our open society.

I agree completely. thug was doing me & others like me a favor by
explaining in clear terms this next in a series of viral threats to our
systems' integrity, and I figger I owe him thanks...burning him at the
stake would be kinda rude, considering....

jonl





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: thug@phantom.com (Murdering Thug)
Date: Thu, 18 Feb 93 18:25:31 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: toad.com mailing list postings from possible virus authors
In-Reply-To: <9302190140.AA08377@toad.com>
Message-ID: <m0nPNK9-000jqZC@phantom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



With regard to Mr. Peterson:

I think we are finally seeing the net gestapo coming out of the woodwork.
We all knew they are on the net, we just couldn't pinpoint who exactly
they were.

This Peterson fellow seems to think he is the self-appointed protector of
decency on the net.  I have run across this Peterson fellow before, and
he seems to have this crazed desire to call up (by voice) system
administrators to complain about the net postings and mailing list postings
of users at those sites, and then threaten further action if his demands
are not met.

My previous encounter with Mr. Peterson occurred rather indirectly.
Apparently, a novice user here at phantom.com mistakenly mailed a posting
about gay lifestyles to some mailing list that Mr. Peterson was on.  Being a
net nazi, Mr. Peterson proceeded to call up the sysadm of phantom.com and
threatened to call up phantom.com's feed site (PSInet) complaining about
"inappropriate use of the net" and threatened to ask PSI to cut phantom.com
from the net.  This would not have worked since PSI is a commercial feed
provider, but I can see where this gestapo tactic would work on sites who
get their feeds for free/cheap from universities and other non-commercial
sites.

Is this guy on a power trip or something? And who the fuck appointed him
to watch over what is being said on the net?


Re: my virus posting

As you can read from the posting itself, there is nothing in there that
technically allows anyone to write a virus based on my words.  Nor is
there anything in there that encourages people to write viruses.  But
that's not the real issue, even if my post contained such information,
I think I am free to send it along to whever I wish.  The fact that my
post was devoid of such information, only makes Peterson look even more
foolish than he already does.

If anything, my post was meant to be humerous and sarcastic.  Especially
that part about how 9 year olds will be able to point-and-click together
viruses within a year, and how overpaid underachievers like Peterson and
his cronies in the virus-protection-racket are powerless to stop
this from occuring.

I think the other thing that made Peterson fly off the handle was the
fact that I am writing under an alias, an especially offensive one like
"Murdering Thug".  I'm sure if my virus post came from a "respected"
and "approved" individual like McAfee or John Dvorak, he wouldn't have
raised an eyebrow.  In fact Dvorak wrote an Editorial in PC Magazine
about a year back which was VERY similar to my post.  In his editorial
he discussed D.A.M.E. and Stealth viruses, and explained how they worked
in similar detail as I have done.  Did Mr. Peterson write a letter to
PC Magazine to complain?  I think not. He knows that someone like Dvorak
could make him look like the true idiot that he is.

Mr. Peterson, I am glad your are showing your gestapo personality
in front of the entire net.  Your underhanded tactics of threatening
system administrators with harassing voice phone calls will be exposed
to the net community at large, and YOU will be the one who is mocked
and censured, and rightly so.


Respectfully,

Murdering Thug 




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Karl Barrus <elee9sf@Menudo.UH.EDU>
Date: Fri, 19 Feb 93 07:11:44 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: hopmail.bat for MSDOS
Message-ID: <199302190429.AA10835@Menudo.UH.EDU>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Cypherpunks & cypherpunkettes :-)

At long last I beleive a working version of hopmail written in the
MSDOS scripting is finished.  I've tested it and it seems to work (and
I even sent messages with DOS CRLF's instead of unix NL and had no
problems), but if you find problems let me know.  I'm assuming you are
like me in that my pc doesn't have a dedicated net connection, so the
scripts just prepare file, but don't mail them.  You would upload the
file to your network account and go from there.

Warning: the code is ugly, but I plead innocence, citing the
constraints of the language!  I've never used so many goto's since my
last BASIC program ~11 years ago.

I think in the future I'll just write DOS stuff in C/C++, with system
calls, and offer source with executables, so you can recompile if
you've think I've added secret password catching commands :-)  I'd use
4DOS and other enhancements like some people have suggested (thanks!)
but I want to be sure as many people as possible can use the script,
so using just plain old DOS seems the best way to go.  Well, the best
way to go in DOS.

I'll write a help file and offer it, the script, and anonmail.bat up
for ftp.  Quickly, because getting input from the user in DOS is a
real pain/impossible without resorting to extra programs/assembly
hacks , all parameters are just entered on the command line.  Type
hopmail and a short help screen will appear.

Now I'll clean up the digital bank and circulate the source to those
interested. 

---------8< -- cut here -- >8----------
@echo off
rem hopmail.bat - allows routing a message through various remailers
rem extropia not supported just yet
rem Karl Barrus - elee9sf@menudo.uh.edu

rem if no parameters, print help file
if '%1'=='' goto help

rem get file name
shift
set filename=%0
if not exist %filename% goto errnofile

rem check mode
shift
set mode=0
if '%0'=='1' set mode=1
if '%0'=='2' set mode=2
if '%mode%'=='0' goto errmode

rem set up encrypted pgp header
echo :: > zzztemp1.txt
echo Encrypted: PGP >> zzztemp1.txt
echo. >> zzztemp1.txt

rem create null message
echo. > zzztemp3.txt

rem get email address
shift
set to=%0
if '%to%'=='' goto errmail

:repeat
shift
if '%0'=='' goto finish

if '%0'=='1' set rto=hh@pmantis.berkeley.edu
if '%0'=='2' set rto=hh@cicada.berkeley.edu
if '%0'=='3' set rto=hh@soda.berkeley.edu
if '%0'=='4' set rto=hal@alumni.caltech.edu
if '%0'=='5' set rto=remailer@rebma.mn.org
if '%0'=='6' set rto=elee7h5@rosebud.ee.uh.edu
if '%0'=='7' set rto=phantom@mead.u.washington.edu
if '%0'=='8' set rto=hfinney@shell.portal.com

rem set up remailing request header
echo :: > zzztemp2.txt
echo Request-Remailing-To: %to% >> zzztemp2.txt
echo. >> zzztemp2.txt

rem append previous message
copy zzztemp2.txt + zzztemp3.txt zzztemp4.txt > nul
del zzztemp2.txt
rename zzztemp4.txt zzztemp2.txt

if '%0'=='1' goto none
if '%0'=='2' goto none
if '%0'=='3' goto none

pgp -ea zzztemp2.txt %rto% > nul
copy zzztemp1.txt + zzztemp2.asc zzztemp3.txt > nul
goto next

:none
copy zzztemp2.txt zzztemp3.txt > nul

:next
set to=%rto%

goto repeat

:finish
if '%mode%'=='1' goto incmessage

rem append, user chose create to receive
echo -----cut here---- >> %filename%
copy %filename% + zzztemp3.txt  zzztemp4.txt > nul
echo. >> zzztemp4.txt
echo To reply, save everything below the cut here marks >> zzztemp4.txt
echo Type your reply below the blank line two lines above >> zzztemp4.txt
echo Mail resultant file to %to% >> zzztemp4.txt
del %filename%
rename zzztemp4.txt %filename%
goto done

:incmessage
rem user chose create header to send
copy zzztemp3.txt + %filename% zzztemp4.txt > nul
del %filename%
rename zzztemp4.txt %filename%
echo Remember to mail %filename% to %to% 

goto done

:help
echo Usage: hopmail filename mode address remailer# [remailer#]...
echo Mode:
echo 1: Mail a file via anonymous remailers
echo 2: Create a remailing header and append to a file
echo.
echo Address:
echo for mode 1, destination address
echo for mode 2, your address
echo.
echo Remailers:
echo 1: hh@pmantis.berkeley.edu
echo 2: hh@cicada.berkeley.edu
echo 3: hh@soda.berkeley.edu
echo 4: hal@alumni.caltech.edu
echo 5: remailer@rebma.mn.org
echo 6: elee7h5@rosebud.ee.uh.edu
echo 7: phantom@mead.u.washington.edu
echo 8: hfinney@shell.portal.com
rem echo 9: remail@extropia.wimsey.com
goto end

:errmode
echo Error: mode must be 1 or 2
goto end

:errmail
echo Error: no destination specified
goto done

:errnofile
echo Error: file %filename% does not exist
goto end

:done
del zzz*.*

:end





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Date: Fri, 19 Feb 93 07:10:33 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Defending Free Speech and Liberty
Message-ID: <9302190714.AA23494@netcom.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Cheers for John Gilmore in his defense of free speech and liberty! The
Net.Nazi who apparently criticized him for inappropriate use of the Net
clearly understands neither the nature of free exchange of ideas nor the
relative innocuousness of Murdering Thug's article on viruses.

Thug's article on polymorphic viruses was factual and made some good
points, and certainly was not very controversial. And even if it was
controversial, so what? Frankly, Thug's article was pretty tame (no
offense, Thug...a lot of our postings are pretty tame). I've seen more
details elsewhere on the Dark Avenger Mutation Engine, so big deal! 

(The "virus construction kit" idea was also recently the subject of an
article in one of the trade rags, and I recall Steve Gibson writing at
least two fairly alarmist and detailed articles on polymorphic viruses for
"Infoworld." And the trade journal "Computers and Security" has extensive
coverage of all of these virus technologies.)

As with so many things that the cop and spy mentalities want kept secret
from the riffraff, who gains by keeping the secrets? The Bulgarian virus
writers (could this whole "Bulgarian" thing be just part of the propaganda
campaign by the SPA and GoreTechs to ensure a "safe" network, a la NREN?
Just a thought.) certainly will be a lot more current than casual readers
of a brief article.

If discussion of viruses is discouraged--or even banned--who will benefit?
Ordinary citizens will be kept in the dark, while the virus guys at Los
Alamos and the Army Center for Signal Warfare (Vint Hill Station, VA) will
continue to let out contracts for virus warfare to MITRE and their ilk,
while bogus stories get out (like the supposed viruses planted in equipment
bound for Iraq just before the war started), and while the supposed "good
guys" like Fred Cohen (he wrote the first big study of viruses and
brunnering) are busy proposing "good viruses" that would seek out tax
evaders, deadbeat Dads, and other subversives! (Lord, save us from the
fools!).

Meanwhile, the French SDECE is spying on everyone they can and probably was
behind CLODO (Comite Liquidant ou Detoumant les Ordinateurs), the
anti-computer terrorist group. The better to scare the populace, don't you
know?

I say, let's expand the scope of the Cypherpunks list to include more
discussion of viruses. We can't let it become a monopoly of the Authorities
(the Brunner Authority instead of the Turing Authority?)

The "Cypherpunk Ethic" says we don't trust authority to tell us how to
compute, and we don't understand defense methods until we understand attack
methods. QED.

Frankly, I expect the next target of the powerfreak authorities to be our
work on anonymous remailers and digital money. They'll come to see that as
a bigger threat than mere viruses.

-Tim May
--
Timothy C. May               | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,  
tcmay@netcom.com        | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
408-688-5409               | knowledge, reputations, information markets, 
W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA       | black markets, collapse of governments.
Higher Power: 2^756839 | Public Key: MailSafe and PGP available.





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: peter honeyman <honey@citi.umich.edu>
Date: Fri, 19 Feb 93 07:11:30 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: the revocation blues
Message-ID: <9302190448.AA10424@cygnus.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


this certainly presents a challenge for the trust web.
i suppose the key ring needs a "kill" list.

		peter

------- Forwarded Message

Newsgroups: alt.security.pgp,sci.crypt
From: perry@jpunix.com (John A. Perry)
Subject: Key Revocation Problems
Organization: J. P. and Associates, Dickinson, TX
Date: Tue, 16 Feb 1993 23:56:35 GMT
Message-ID: <C2KFuC.7Iw@jpunix.com>
Keywords: PGP keys

- -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

Hello Everyone!

	Several of us have been wrestling with a key revocation
problem for some time now. When I first installed PGP 2.1 I had a
weird chain of events follow. I generated my personal key and sent a
copy of my public key to Vesselin Bontchev and Ken van Wyk. This key
was posted to one of the large keyrings almost immediately. Several
hours later, I was still playing with PGP and suffered a disk crash. I
had not yet had a chance to back up my keyring. Needless to say, I
lost the keyring and now I have no way to revoke the key. The specific
key I'm talking about is 0x76A3. The key I currently use, 0xB199 is
the one I plan on using from now on. It is backed up frequently of
course. About a week ago I sent a signed message to Vesselin
explaining the problem and he agreed to add his own comments, sign it,
and post it to alt.security.pgp and sci.crypt. The message seems to
have fallen through the cracks which is why I'm posting this message.
I'm sure if Vesselin, explorer@iastate.edu, and warlord@mit.edu are
reading this, they will add their own verifications of this problem.
If I receive the errant message from Vesselin, I'll repost it also.

	In the meantime, if you feel this is enough verification to
remove the public key 0x76A3 from your public keyring, I sure would
appreciate it. If you require further verification, I will be glad to
discuss it on the phone. My home number is 713-534-3653 and my work
number is 409-772-2706 (the secretary). I apologize for any
inconvenience. At least this fluke chain of events may show everyone
the importance of backing up your PGP keyrings often.

	Remember 0xB199 is the good one!!



- -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.1e

iQCVAgUBK4F/K1oWmV4X/7GZAQHRvAP/QYDZU8xD7v4y4SJbE1bgp2FVTQWOt106
YJjOAXSyKQuZKQVxLOSF2c4kq0PS3+kUQedWTvccxB6koUAp6gscBg4UFWYQAQc5
Tu5QIE/c9XHhmergEKGpVz9GDVPiolMJbKh3Ni6q/Wul8T65vtT+y9alN8KDIJZt
IGTeSspNtVo=
=whcq
- -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
- -- 
 John A. Perry  -  perry@jpunix.com
                   jpunix!perry

 PGP 2.1 signature available by fingering perry@phil.utmb.edu

------- End of Forwarded Message





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Phiber Optik <phiber@eff.org>
Date: Fri, 19 Feb 93 07:10:55 PST
To: gnu@toad.com (John Gilmore)
Subject: Re: toad.com mailing list postings from possible virus authors
In-Reply-To: <9302190140.AA08377@toad.com>
Message-ID: <199302190537.AA28048@eff.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Granted the idiocy of Mr. High-and-Mighty Army Man's opinion of what people
can and can't say, I couldn't help but point out two silly things in the
message he's complaining about:
[stuff deleted]
> > each time they replicate (make a new copy of themselves).  The small
> > amount of virus bootstrap code which is not encrypted is changed in each
> > replication by dispursing random NOP's throughout the virus boostrap code.
> > Thus each sample of polymorphic virus looks completely different to
> > virus checking programs.  The virus checking programs cannot use
> > "signature" byte strings to detect polymorphic viruses.
> > 
Either he's explaining it wrong, or the author is actually foolish enough to
think that people won't simply just IGNORE the randomly placed NOPs and only
consider the other instruction codes in forming a signature(s).  Wowie.
Real programmers know that the strength of polymorphic code lies in the fact
that the same instruction can be coded as numerous different opcodes on Intel
processors.

And...
> > I have seen something called D.A.M.E., also known as Dark Avenger
> > Mutation Engine.  This is a freeware polymorphic library/kernel/toolkit

Why does he keep referring to MtE, as "DAME"???

It never ceases to amaze me how such an elementary and sophomoric subject as
viruses can cause the strangest reactions from some people.  I think it has
something to do with the noxious connotations of the word 'virus'.  Maybe if
we all just agreed to call them 'nuisance programs', like flies on a horse's
rear-end, they wouldn't cause such fool panic.
On a finer note, I know a couple more of my "non-privacy in the phone system"
messages are in order, I was pleased by the response I got.  I'll try and work
myself into the mood.





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: ssandfort@attmail.com
Date: Fri, 19 Feb 93 07:10:51 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: LIST RULES
Message-ID: <9302190553.AA16486@cygnus.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text


_________________________________________________________________
             FROM THE VIRTUAL DESK OF SANDY SANDFORT
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
In a recent post, John Gilmore wrote:

    "Keith, Kenneth . . . I am uninterested in censorship of
    discussion of *any* topic on mailing lists through my
    machine . . .  the machine is attached via a worldwide
    network that explicitly promises not to censor any
    traffic UNLESS AND UNTIL a court of law --not you -- has
    decided that that traffic is actually illegal."

Because I agree COMPLETELY with what John wrote, I'm somewhat
miffed at him for his seeming lack of constituency.  Recently, I
posted a notice on this list about a software business contact I
have in South East Asia.  John sent me a terse note asking me not
to "advertise" on the list.

I was a bit surprised at his response for several reasons.
First, a founding Cypherpunk regular, Tim May, suggested I post
my question the list when I asked him if he knew anyone working
on recreational software.  Second, I have had several polite
enquiries from list members who where interested in what I
posted.  Finally, nobody else was offended enough to complain.

I sent a respectful note to John asking him, among other things,
if I had violated some prohibition of which I was unaware.
John's response was:

    "Please consider this message a prohibition against
    advertising.  Apparently nobody else on the list needed
    to hear it, except you, since you are the first person
    to abuse the list in this way."

Now I fully agree that it's John's ball, and I will play by his
rules, but I find it hard to reconcile John's public tolerance
with his private prohibition.  Does ANYONE else feel abused?  I
hope not.  What do others on this list think about "commercial"
postings?

I will not "advertise" on the list as long as John prohibits it.
But I sincerely hope his prohibition does not discourage others
from discussing the issues it raises.  I would like to hear what
the rest of you think.

     S a n d y                         ssandfort@attmail.com
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: geoffw@nexsys.net (Geoff White)
Date: Fri, 19 Feb 93 09:17:43 PST
To: w8sdz@TACOM-EMH1.Army.Mil
Subject: Re: toad.com mailing list postings from possible virus authors
Message-ID: <9302191709.AA02257@nexsys.nexsys.net>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> Subject: Re: toad.com mailing list postings from possible virus authors
> From: w8sdz@TACOM-EMH1.Army.Mil (Keith Petersen - MACA WSMR)
> Content-Type> : > text> 
> Content-Length: 2643
> X-Lines: 59
> Status: RO
> 
> John, by quoting and reposting without my permission, my private
> message to you to a public mailing list you have violated the Federal
> Communications Privacy Act of 1986. 
> 
>                PUBLIC LAW 99-508--OCT. 21, 1986   
>      
>         TITLE II--STORED WIRE AND ELECTRONIC COMMUNICA-
>             TIONS AND TRANSACTIONAL RECORDS ACCESS
>      
> ss. 2702. Disclosure of contents
>      
>      "(a) Prohibitions.--Except as provided in subsection (b)--
>           "(1) a person or entity providing an electronic
>      communication service to the public shall not knowingly
>      divulge to any person or entity the contents of a
>      communication while in electronic storage by that service;
>      and
>           "(2) a person or entity providing remote computing
>      service to the public shall not knowingly divulge to any
>      person or entity the contents of any communication which
>      is carried or maintained on that service--
>                "(A) on behalf of, and received by means of
>           electronic transmission from (or created by means of
>           computer processing of communications received by
>           means of electronic transmission from), a subscriber
>           or customer of such service; and
>           "(B) solely for the purposed of providing storage or
>           computer processing services to such subscriber or
>           customer, if the provider is not authorized to access
>           the contents of any such communications for purposes
>           of providing any services other than storage or
>           computer processing.

Keith,
	Maybe you should read more carefully...


>      "(b) Exceptions.-- A person or entity may divulge the
> contents of a communication--
>           "(1) to an addressee or intended recipient of such
>      communication or an agent of such addressee or intended
>      recipient;
>           "(2) as otherwise authorized in section 2516,
>      2511(2)(1) , or 2703 of this title;
>           "(3) with the lawful consent of the originator or an
>      addressee or intended recipient of such communication, or
>      the subscriber in the case of remote computing service;

I think John is the "intended recipient of such communication"
as I am also an "intended recipient" of this communication 
from you, which I will post to cypherpunks so others can see
what kind of person you are.  If your intention is to "threaten"
with this kind of foolishness, then I must warn you, I consider
this type of behavior harassment due to the confrontive nature of 
your post.  Let it go on record that I don't expect to be harassed,
intimidated or "threatened" and I think the Internet rules are
VERY clear about this type of behavior. 

				Geoff White (GW67)
				geoffw@nexsys.net




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: nobody@pmantis.berkeley.edu
Date: Fri, 19 Feb 93 09:51:53 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: anonymous mail
Message-ID: <9302191753.AA12638@pmantis.berkeley.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


This message routed through 7 remailers, sent around 11:45 CST 2/19/93:
pmantis -> soda -> alumni -> rosebud -> mead -> shell -> buffalo

All welcome the new remailer Rusty has set up!
Also, congrats to Chael Hall for his efforts - I'm testing his remailer
as well for inclusion in various scripts.

(Eric, I'm not getting any responses back from your remailer @cicada
for some reason, even if I just use it as a single hop)

Look for the 8 remailer routing confirmation coming soon - also
through rebma.

If there's some temporary problem with cicada and it's fixed, look for
the 9 remailer hopping message.

And if that shows, look for the 10 remailer routed message (now that's
security) utilizing extropia if I have to build the headers myself!!

Question: of the unix users, who does NOT have access to ksh (via your
login shell or #!/bin/ksh or somewhere else)?  Rewriting hop.mail in
ksh would allow me to support extropia, and reverse the chaining
direction (that is, route the mail as you specify and not actually in
reverse)

DOS folks can expect hopmail.exe (source + executable) because I don't
think its possible in the native batch language.

Well, I guess you can figure out who this is, so

/-----------------------------------\
| Karl L. Barrus                    |
| elee9sf@menudo.uh.edu             | <- preferred address
| barrus@tree.egr.uh.edu (NeXTMail) |
\-----------------------------------/







From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Peter Shipley <shipley@tfs.COM>
Date: Fri, 19 Feb 93 10:27:47 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: toad.com mailing list postings from possible virus authors
In-Reply-To: <9302190302.AA17901@wixer>
Message-ID: <9302191826.AA23693@edev0.TFS>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



>> Thank you, Senator McCarthy.  I believe that thug@phantom.com is not
>> a smart-card-carrying member of the virus authors' guild, but I'm not sure.

where do I sign up to join the "virus authors' guild"?  I hear that
the news letter is wonderful/informative and self propagating.





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Anonymous@cs.Buffalo.EDU
Date: Fri, 19 Feb 93 08:07:20 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: PGP anonymous remailer
Message-ID: <9302191606.AA13301@armstrong.cs.Buffalo.EDU>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Ok, I have finally decided that my remailer is ready for public use.
I think I have finally worked all the bugs out of it enough so that
it runs very smooth.

In case you want to write something to me...
Here is my *own* PGP key.  Rajesh (Rusty) Babani - babani@cs.buffalo.edu
-----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----
Version: 2.1

mQCNAislEwoAAAEEAKpPvevD7zlGmpbB9nYhqJghthanWvfoQlKXPa/sJe6B+Ztt
lbCVcLHZ4IpQfmcZ0hZqsKjQRunRFk1pT4woQsDSHJjax80xnrUwaLkPTOADahay
FCQ6+NqV/7vWLR/XaJ7wxTGwtoCi/69jOfidKIj1HY6cpnImue7qIk/4gBkDAAUR
tC1SYWplc2ggKFJ1c3R5KSBCYWJhbmkgPGJhYmFuaUBjcy5idWZmYWxvLmVkdT4=
=wZaf
-----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----


The address where I am running an anonymous remailing server based on
Eric Hughes' perl scripts is: <babani@cs.buffalo.edu>

To use the server, put "Request-Remailing-To: <destination-address>"
into the header of the message, and send it to the server address.  If
your mailer won't let you put things into message headers, instead make
the first line of your message body be just the two characters "::",
and make the next line be "Request-Remailing-To: <destination-address>",
and make the next line be blank.  The "::" tells the remailer to take
the following lines, up to a blank one, and put them into the header.

Also, make sure that you include a subject: line in your message,
otherwise, the messge will be sent to a black hole.  You will not hear
from the message again.

To use PGP with the remailer, first compose a message like above then
encrypt the message using the remailer's public key.  Then, in the
message body, make the first line be just the two characters "::", and
make the next line be "Encrypted: PGP" and make the next line be
balnk.

Here is my anonymous remailer's PGP public key:
Anonymous Remailer - babani@cs.buffalo.edu
-----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----
Version: 2.1

mQCNAitx/vQAAAEEAOUPjAfSeFmMsq7eWN47LzOwdSXmXoArMJOcBZ0bB3NRR3Nc
BF7ZIIbY5m/b/rBn6+IimthV/aa39hKOSPPnFZn7kxIAUwoolMmxUUPJRzcRcTDK
bsgLMCPfDuE8MWj0R960oaAFEE+yCCoDNiyPl6goN3XluVeie+ehVSuMvgdRAAUR
tCpBbm9ueW1vdXMgUmVtYWlsZXIgPGJhYmFuaUBjcy5idWZmYWxvLmVkdT4=
=BdRu
-----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----








From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Anonymous@cs.Buffalo.EDU
Date: Fri, 19 Feb 93 08:15:39 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Test the new remailer
Message-ID: <9302191614.AA13658@armstrong.cs.Buffalo.EDU>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I encourage everyone to at least send a test message through the
remailer so that I can lay my fears thtat the reamailer is not working
down to rest.

Not only that... it's really easy.  Try it!

-- 
+==== Internet: babani@cs.buffalo.edu ===+======== Amateur-Radio: N2LYC ======+
!      Bitnet: V078LNGT@ubvms.BITNET     |        UUCP: rutgers!ub!babani     !
! Alternate: an173@cleveland.freenet.edu | Plsure dpnds on the othrs prmison. !
+==  PGP key available. (If you don't know what a PGP key is... find out!)  ==+




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: kelly@netcom.com (Kelly Goen)
Date: Fri, 19 Feb 93 11:23:14 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: toad.com mailing list postings from possible virus authors (fwd)
Message-ID: <9302191921.AA20295@netcom.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Forwarded message:
> From cypherpunks-request@toad.com Fri Feb 19 07:53:56 1993
> From: Phiber Optik <phiber@eff.org>
> Message-Id: <199302190537.AA28048@eff.org>
> Subject: Re: toad.com mailing list postings from possible virus authors
> To: gnu@toad.com (John Gilmore)
> Date: Fri, 19 Feb 93 0:37:18 EST
> Cc: cypherpunks@toad.com
> In-Reply-To: <9302190140.AA08377@toad.com>; from "John Gilmore" at Feb 18, 93 5:40 pm
> 
> Granted the idiocy of Mr. High-and-Mighty Army Man's opinion of what people
> can and can't say, I couldn't help but point out two silly things in the

  BY Jove I think you have hit it, People go nto the military because
they have an inner need to be controlled and to control to the point of 
violence if need be( for the military in general and the
 army , marines and and special intelligence agencies>, they 
are after all as their prime mission capable of extreme violence and the
taking of human life, as a means of social control.
Law enforcement seems to have very similiar mentality as well,
with CONTROL being the agenda and reason for existance-- 
Suppose we think of guerilla products such as PGP and anoynmous
posting mechanisms and forwarders  in their larger social sense
As behaviour modification for those who would have our privacy
as well as our lives. No social insult is intended by this message about
mr peterson or the military /intelligence/police community.
We should remember however that with the same body of individuals
as just described we are dealing with seriously maladjusted
individuals who have an inate need to control others,
such has been adequately demonstrated by the individuals
attempted supression of Murdering Thug's constitutionally
protected speech, instead of taunting them maybe we should be
finding ways to prevent our tax dollars from
supporting them in their evil OBSCENE fantasies of violence and Control
I for one am DAMN TIRED of being censored supressed and persecuted
by the military/Law Enforcement/Intelligence community . I
am also putting my time in next project with peace/activist/political
groups such as the christic action peace groups(you know the folks
who use to sue the fed over intelligence abuses by the CIA/NSA/DEA/DIA
crouwd) Well i their national organization was wiped out by lawsuit by bush and 
and company and changes in their tax status. These were and are the same
people suing the CIA over the La-penca bombing in honduras of
Journalists during the times of the contras in Nicgura. They while their
agenda is a good bit more political than ours have been the only ones for years
keeping the federal government at bay by lawsuit.
They need technical assistance, hookins to peacenet and Econet and general help,
considering the widespread nature of the problem
we are fighting here maybe we should consider very actively
promultagating PGP and DC style anoymous networks among the
pease/political/human rights group. It would provide
convenient crypto-noise of PGP messgaes and greatly increase
the amount of money that the federal government has to spend investigating and
force them to spread themselves even more thinly...:)

It should also be remembered that the primary impact of products like
PGP and DC style nets beyond the privacy implications is economic.
Investigating citizens cost real tax dollars, the intelligence
oversight committees are not going to let the NSA et al keep
asking for more money year after year and the same
holds true for the law enforcement community, where a witch hunt was possible
before public domain crypto systems such as PGP were available, now
because of the blackout in communications to the intelligence community, 
they are getting very nervuous, people can now communicate secretly
about the best way to end the influence of a massively overbloated
cold war community and stop paying the bills for same...


if you were in THEIR shoes wouldnt you be seeking ways to keep

ATLAS from shrugging???

     
     cheers
      kelly
P.s. sorry for the long and drawn out nature and the rambling style
and the non-techical content, and I do feel it was 
important to express myself in the fashion I have...





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: pozar@kumr.lns.com (Tim Pozar)
Date: Fri, 19 Feb 93 11:29:02 PST
To: gnu@toad.com
Subject: Re: Letter to FCC
In-Reply-To: <39954.drzaphod@ncselxsi>
Message-ID: <m0nPdNc-0000f9C@kumr.lns.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text


(Tim Pozar) writes:
>   I should add, it needs to be formated properly or it will not be read
>into the record and just tossed.   Some where around here I have an
>example folks can use.  I will dig it up and post it in a day or so.


  Here is the format of the letter.  It need to be in there by this
Monday!  So Fed-Ex today!

---

                                 Before the
                     FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION
                             Washington, DC 20554
 
In the matter of                       )
                                       )
Amendment of Parts 2 and 15 to         )
Prohibit Marketin of Radio Scanners    )   ET Docket No. 93-1
Capable of Intercepting Cellular       )
Telephone Conversations                )
 
                      _COMMENTS OF [FULL NAME OF COMPANY]_
 
                                 _INTRODUCTION_
 
[Full name of company] (hereinafter "[abbreviation of company]") respectfully
submits its comments to the above captioned _Notice of Proposed Rule Makeing_
("NPRM"). [Abbreviation of company] is a [description of company].
 
                                  _BACKGROUND_
 
blah, blah, blah
 
                                 _DISCUSSION_
 
blah, blah, blah
 
                                 _CONCLUSION_
 
blah, blah, blah
 
                                      Respectfully submitted
 
 
 
 
                                      [Name of Person]
                                      [Full name of company]


-- 
    Internet: pozar@kumr.lns.com     FidoNet: Tim Pozar @ 1:125/555
Snail: Tim Pozar / KKSF / 77 Maiden Lane / San Francisco CA 94108 / USA
                        Voice: +1 415 788 2022



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Peter Wayner <pcw@access.digex.com>
Date: Fri, 19 Feb 93 08:35:03 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: For other news on SDECE and foreign intell ops...
Message-ID: <199302191633.AA04683@access.digex.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Check out a new book by Peter Schweitzer entitled _Friendly Spies_.
(Atlantic Monthly Press). It tells plenty of stories about how
many US companies are the targets for foreign economic intelligence.
To me, it is the best argument for the government to _encourage_
the widespread use of strong cryptography.

-Peter




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: geoffw@nexsys.net (Geoff White)
Date: Fri, 19 Feb 93 11:52:27 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: toad.com mailing list postings from possible virus authors
Message-ID: <9302191941.AA00340@nexsys.nexsys.net>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Boy,
	some people... They get a .mil on the end of their
	logins and they think their the cops of the world or something :)


		geoffw




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: kelly@netcom.com (Kelly Goen)
Date: Fri, 19 Feb 93 12:07:36 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Defending Free Speech and Liberty (fwd)
Message-ID: <9302192006.AA26951@netcom.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Forwarded message:
> From cypherpunks-request@toad.com Fri Feb 19 11:55:16 1993
> Message-Id: <9302191910.AA05405@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
> To: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
> Cc: cypherpunks@toad.com
> Subject: Re: Defending Free Speech and Liberty 
> In-Reply-To: Your message of "Thu, 18 Feb 93 23:14:44 PST."
>              <9302190714.AA23494@netcom.netcom.com> 
> Date: Fri, 19 Feb 93 12:10:23 -0700
> From: "L. Detweiler" <ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
> X-Mts: smtp
> 
> [t.c. May]
> >I say, let's expand the scope of the Cypherpunks list to include more
> >discussion of viruses. We can't let it become a monopoly of the Authorities
> >(the Brunner Authority instead of the Turing Authority?)
> 
> I say, unless it has to do with cryptography, please don't. Does
> anybody else want a lot of virus articles on this list?  I found the
> original thug article a bit questionable, as I said. But a new list
> (viruspunks?) might be a good idea.
> 
 Count a vote in for viruspunks... I too wish to keep cipherpunks clean
even though I love viruses and I wish to have a pure thread about
applied crypto and anonymity techniques...

-- 




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "L. Detweiler" <ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Date: Fri, 19 Feb 93 11:08:08 PST
To: peter honeyman <honey@citi.umich.edu>
Subject: Re: the revocation blues
In-Reply-To: <9302190448.AA10424@cygnus.com>
Message-ID: <9302191906.AA05283@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


peter honeyman <honey@citi.umich.edu>
>this certainly presents a challenge for the trust web.
>i suppose the key ring needs a "kill" list.

From: perry@jpunix.com (John A. Perry)
>Several of us have been wrestling with a key revocation
>problem for some time now.
>Several
>hours later, I was still playing with PGP and suffered a disk crash. I
>had not yet had a chance to back up my keyring. Needless to say, I
>lost the keyring and now I have no way to revoke the key.

I don't get it. The point of revocation is to remove a *compromised*
key, one that someone has potentially copied, etc.  If there is no
chance that the key can be accessed, how is this a problem? I guess the
problem is that only one key can be associated with one person
(identity) per keyring?  Then I would say the thing to do is propagate
the new key through the trust network in the same way it was originally
established...? This isn't really a deficiency in the software, is it?




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Date: Fri, 19 Feb 93 12:08:34 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Spreading Encryption to Political Groups
Message-ID: <9302192007.AA27273@netcom.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Kelly Goen expresses his outrage about the powerfreaks controlling the
police/spy/military agencies and encourages us to help spread encryption
and privacy technology to the groups figthing the government:

>and company and changes in their tax status. These were and are the same
>people suing the CIA over the La-penca bombing in honduras of
>Journalists during the times of the contras in Nicgura. They while their
>agenda is a good bit more political than ours have been the only ones for years
>keeping the federal government at bay by lawsuit.
>They need technical assistance, hookins to peacenet and Econet and general
>help,
>considering the widespread nature of the problem
>we are fighting here maybe we should consider very actively
>promultagating PGP and DC style anoymous networks among the
>pease/political/human rights group. It would provide
>convenient crypto-noise of PGP messgaes and greatly increase
>the amount of money that the federal government has to spend investigating and
>force them to spread themselves even more thinly...:)

I agree completely.

Even though I'm a libertarian (small "l") anarchocapitalist who happened to
vote for Perot (who has his defects!), I support some (but not all) of the
liberal agenda. Especially as regards getting the government out of our
lives. (And where I part company with many on the left is in the areas of
interference in free markets, anti-discrimination laws, and other statist
invasions of freedom and privacy.)

From the Cypherpunks I have met, either at the physical meetings or at
places like the Hackers Conference, I would say that about 50% are strongly
libertarian/anarchist, about 20% are liberal/leftist, and the rest I don't
know about.

What's the point? That we should follow Kelly's advice and make some
contacts with those in other movements. I suspect this may be happening
anyway, as Phil ZImmermann has said he wrote PGP partly to help peace
activists and the like.

Just my opinion, of course.

-Tim May

--
Timothy C. May               | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,  
tcmay@netcom.com        | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
408-688-5409               | knowledge, reputations, information markets, 
W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA       | black markets, collapse of governments.
Higher Power: 2^756839 | Public Key: MailSafe and PGP available.





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "L. Detweiler" <ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Date: Fri, 19 Feb 93 11:11:39 PST
To: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Subject: Re: Defending Free Speech and Liberty
In-Reply-To: <9302190714.AA23494@netcom.netcom.com>
Message-ID: <9302191910.AA05405@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


[t.c. May]
>I say, let's expand the scope of the Cypherpunks list to include more
>discussion of viruses. We can't let it become a monopoly of the Authorities
>(the Brunner Authority instead of the Turing Authority?)

I say, unless it has to do with cryptography, please don't. Does
anybody else want a lot of virus articles on this list?  I found the
original thug article a bit questionable, as I said. But a new list
(viruspunks?) might be a good idea.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: pozar@kumr.lns.com (Tim Pozar)
Date: Fri, 19 Feb 93 12:39:12 PST
To: pozar@kumr.lns.com (Tim Pozar)
Subject: Re: Letter to FCC
In-Reply-To: <m0nPdNc-0000f9C@kumr.lns.com>
Message-ID: <m0nPeTY-00029rC@kumr.lns.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text


   I just got a call back from Dave Wilson of the FCC and told me that
there is a minor change in the form I sent out. Everything after the
"INTRODUCTION" line should be double spaced.

               Tim
-- 
    Internet: pozar@kumr.lns.com     FidoNet: Tim Pozar @ 1:125/555
Snail: Tim Pozar / KKSF / 77 Maiden Lane / San Francisco CA 94108 / USA
                        Voice: +1 415 788 2022



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: kelly@netcom.com (Kelly Goen)
Date: Fri, 19 Feb 93 12:43:43 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Spreading Encryption to Political Groups (fwd)
Message-ID: <9302192042.AA03154@netcom.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Forwarded message:
> From cypherpunks-request@toad.com Fri Feb 19 12:28:13 1993
> Date: Fri, 19 Feb 93 12:07:00 -0800
> Message-Id: <9302192007.AA27273@netcom.netcom.com>
> To: cypherpunks@toad.com
> From: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
> Subject: Spreading Encryption to Political Groups
> 
> 
> Kelly Goen expresses his outrage about the powerfreaks controlling the
> police/spy/military agencies and encourages us to help spread encryption
> and privacy technology to the groups figthing the government:
> 
> Even though I'm a libertarian (small "l") anarchocapitalist who happened to
> vote for Perot (who has his defects!), I support some (but not all) of the
> liberal agenda. Especially as regards getting the government out of our
> lives. (And where I part company with many on the left is in the areas of
> interference in free markets, anti-discrimination laws, and other statist
> invasions of freedom and privacy.)
> 
> -Tim May
> 
> --
> Timothy C. May               | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,  
> tcmay@netcom.com        | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
> 408-688-5409               | knowledge, reputations, information markets, 
> W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA       | black markets, collapse of governments.
> Higher Power: 2^756839 | Public Key: MailSafe and PGP available.

As a further note I have been in communication with John Dinardo
who has been spreading a LOT of information of this type
around the net and who was responsible for my personal
awareness of the PROMIS/INSLAW/BCCI/Cabazon affair , A reporter
named Danny Casarlo lost hist life in the middle of this,
The investigative journalist and whistleblower community
has many among it who would come forward if onyl
a anonymity guranteed by technology(not by a sysadms promise not to look)
type of network such as David Chaums thoughts express...
The information that could then come forth could make the effects
of crypto spread to the common man MUCH more pronounced and help
us put ALL of the cold warriors in therapy where
they so obviously need to be... JUST for the record I am a randist...
not a socialist AND it makes nodifference to me what a socialist
says he/she/it no matter what political stripe or pursuasion or
sexual orientation has an equal right of access to privacy and anonymity
if our constitution is to survive the onslaught of the federal intelligence
communitys move from the cold war to the drug war.

         cheers
         kelly

> 


-- 




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: kelly@netcom.com (Kelly Goen)
Date: Fri, 19 Feb 93 12:53:46 PST
To: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Subject: Re: Spreading Encryption to Political Groups
In-Reply-To: <9302192007.AA27273@netcom.netcom.com>
Message-ID: <9302192052.AA04411@netcom.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain




 By the way thanks for your support and I LOVE your .sig

do you mind if I plagarize parts of it??? 


    cheers
    kelly
--------




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: kelly@netcom.com (Kelly Goen)
Date: Fri, 19 Feb 93 13:24:17 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Political reasons to spread Crypto(warning FLAME-BAIT)
Message-ID: <9302192122.AA08664@netcom.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


To All,
      For those of us who have chosen to stand up and be counted as leaders
in our electronic democracy, it is important  to remember the economic
impact activities and experiments such as the ones cypherpunks conduct
have on the social fabric of control that the government seeks to
have pervasive throughout our society. Leaders in other communities
such as the Black/Gay/Minorities/Women have been crushed, murdered/assasinated
and have had their rights trampled on by the Federal Intelligence community.
Buses such as COINTELPRO/MK ULTRA and other actions against american
citizens have been legion thoughout the existance of the federal
 intelligence community Their budgets for intelligense, spying, murder
are secret, so called black budgets and their activities among us have
been largely hidden being covered up by what ever means necessary.
The federal government has perverted virtuall every instrument,concept,iand
theory that has been handed it all in this insane reasoning of
"For reasons of National Security", Well I for one am DAMN sick
of seeing the constitution flushed down the drain by those marching
morons in their haste of expediency, I am damn sick of seeing my hard
 earned dollars go to support Wars of suppression in El Salvador and Brazil
where torture and Murder is both taught by the intelligence
community in this country and promulgated, Death squads and other
instruments of suppressiooon are still commonplace south of the border
and the DRUG war is now listed as the reason, GIVE ME A BREAK
what about the CIA retrofit base in Mena, Arkansas. What about
the contra/drug scandal. What About That damn rascal ex-president
BUSH, and dont think that means Clintons are any cleaner.
Well I for one am taking that stand I earlier suggested
and making DAMN sure this gets into all the hands of the
groups mentioned, as in my original publication of PGP 1.0
for Phil 2 years ago.... I am scared very scared, and
when I get scared I dont cower I fight back by whatever legal means are
left me... PGP and DC style protocols are effective LEGAL weapons
that have an extreme economic impact on the gathering of
illicit electronic intelligence by the federal intelligence community
from the citizens of this country and others in the political movements
WE as leaders in spreading this new technology to those groups
can have a very REAL WORLD effect in stopping murder, torture and political
supression. US readers have to be cautioned NOT to export Crypto technology from
 our borders telling others where to find it and how to set it up
and use it is PERFECTLY LEGAL however.
OK I will shut up now and let the flames roar!!!! :)

    A slightly agitiated CryptoAnarchist/Peace Activist/cypherpunk
    cheers
    kelly
--------




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: geoffw@nexsys.net (Geoff White)
Date: Fri, 19 Feb 93 13:53:14 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: code that works with mailtool
Message-ID: <9302192126.AA00662@nexsys.nexsys.net>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Anybody have some code that lets me use pgp with sun's v3 mailtool
In a selective way?




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Sauron ( Who did you expect? ) <jholder@phobos.unm.edu>
Date: Fri, 19 Feb 93 13:46:24 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: SUBSCRIBE
Message-ID: <9302192145.AA24096@phobos.unm.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


SUBSCRIBE




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: wcs@anchor.ho.att.com (Bill_Stewart(HOY002)1305)
Date: Fri, 19 Feb 93 12:36:31 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: toad.com mailing list postings from possible virus authors
Message-ID: <9302192035.AA03205@anchor.ho.att.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text


John - thanks for opposing censorship, having integrity, finding ways to set up a
	non-censorable system, and for letting us know about Keith's letter.
AlterNet folks - thanks for providing Internet access in a way that's not only 
	usable for commercial communications, but is outside government funding and control.
	If Al Gore's plans go through, I just can't *wait* to see what happens when
	Jesse Helms discovers that Congress controls the Next Generation Cable TV net....
Thug - never did like your psuedonym :-).  But thanks for writing a somewhat crypto-related
	note that lets us non-DOS followers know a bit more about what virus problems 
	may be hitting the machines around us - interesting stuff.
Geoff - thanks for posting Keith's mail with the ECPA excerpt.  It's nice to
	have confirmation that the ECPA explicitly permits originators, addressees,
	and intended recipients of electronic communication to divulge its contents,
	and interesting that it does not forbid service providers to divulge the contents
	of communication if they are otherwise authorized to see it, which John obviously was.
Keith - neither of us are lawyers, but if you wanted to complain about the legality of
	posting email by the recipient, you'll have to look at copyright laws,
	presuming that the ECPA language doesn't override copyright where the two conflict.
	But threatening people like that was in poor taste, just as requesting censorship was.
	John's posting of your request for censorship was appropriate - if you wanted to
	complain about Thug's public postings, an open letter to him would have been more appropriate.
	You've been a big help to the computing community, and we appreciate it,
	and I realize that viruses are a major problem to providing a site like Simtel.
	But lighten up, man!
Miss Manners, if you're reading this (:-)) - thanks for your recent comments on NPR's 
	Morning Edition about email ettiquette!  (She said that it was generally informal,
	and that expectations of it staying private are unrealistic, given the ease of 
	misrouting mail as well as people's tendencies to repeat things, and we might as 
	well get used to it.)  We're doing what we can to improve the technology for
	private communications, but technology isn't the whole problem, and it's
	going to take a while before we figure out the sociology of it....


				Bill Stewart, somewhere in New Jersey



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: kelly@netcom.com (Kelly Goen)
Date: Fri, 19 Feb 93 15:55:44 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Social effects of UNrestricted Crypto
Message-ID: <9302192354.AA00932@netcom.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


     "What does the Federal Intelligence  Community Fear"


#1. President Bush in a little notice move during the height of the
Iraq war had a ceratin statute in the vast body of
(un)LAW that compromise the National Security Act.
It became a violation of that same act to publish a
photo or information about a federal intelligence community member.
Thus all their actions are effectively hidden from view. With
anonymous posting and forwarding mechanisms it becomes easily for 
whistle-bloweres and Political activists to circumvent that
antithesis to the 1st amendment of the constitution and
expose all of the hidden plots of a vastly overbearing federal bueracracy
 The Federal Government knows this fact as their actions regarding
cryptography for the past 40 years shows it. Cryptography has a very
REAL world effect in exposing corruption while preventing
or inviting retribution from those selfsame federal lawbreakers
Truly anonymous posting/forwarding networks being totally beyond their ability
to coerce/interdict or penetrate scare the living hell out of them.
Imagine a SUNDEVIL type federal operation(witchhunt) where ALL
of the defendents email/posting are either encrypted or anonymized
:) it would pose some very hard problems for the investigators(witchunters)



   what are your thoughts?

   cheers
   kelly
p.s. Imagine an federal investigation where the investigators
became the investigated with the help of anonymous networks
digitized video clips and photos and easily obtainable/
publicly available investigative Databases
oops is this forbidden speech also???
 better watch what I say the Godamn US ARMY may be listening!!





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "DrZaphod" <ncselxsi!drzaphod@ncselxsi.netcom.com>
Date: Fri, 19 Feb 93 20:47:54 PST
To: CypherPunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: LIST RULEz
Message-ID: <58805.drzaphod@ncselxsi>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


In Message Fri, 19 Feb 93 19:56:41 +45722724,
  Marc Horowitz <MIT.EDU!marc@netcomsv.netcom.com> writes:

>It is conventional to avoid blatant commercial traffic on the Internet
>and the USENET.  Part of this is because of the Acceptable Use
>Policies which exist on parts of the net.  But a lot of it is that
>people generally don't want to see random advertisements.  I throw
>them away when the come in the paper mail; I don't want them in my
>email, either.
>

     Is this a problem on CypherPunks?  I havn't seen a single message here
that made me jump out of my seat and scream "I don't need to see this on
CypherPunks!"  It's not like we're getting continual junk posts advertising
trucks or something!  I say, "Don't let it bug ya until we start seeing a
junk trend on the list."  What do you guyz say?  TTFN!

Oh.. and I'm an AnArChIsT if anybody [including NSAs database] was
wondering.

DrZaphod
[AC/DC] / [DnA][HP]
[drzaphod@ncselxsi.uucp]
Technicolorized




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "A.J. Janschewitz" <p00258@psilink.com>
Date: Fri, 19 Feb 93 16:10:54 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Political reasons to spread Crypto(warning FLAME-BAIT)
In-Reply-To: <9302192122.AA08664@netcom.netcom.com>
Message-ID: <2939240668.3.p00258@psilink.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Not flame bait in this forum, I hope. I posted a message (very genteel 
by comparison) in alt.security.pgp and was informed of my ignorance for 
advancing the theory that legislated standards should always be suspect, 
lest we lose what little privacy we have left.

If keeping the details of my life out of the government's data maw is 
anarchy, give me a brick.

==a.j.==

PGP key available on request or from the usual servers.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Marc Horowitz <marc@MIT.EDU>
Date: Fri, 19 Feb 93 16:57:56 PST
To: ssandfort@attmail.com
Subject: Re: LIST RULES
In-Reply-To: <9302200002.AA11651@toad.com>
Message-ID: <9302200056.AA22028@deathtongue.MIT.EDU>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


It is conventional to avoid blatant commercial traffic on the Internet
and the USENET.  Part of this is because of the Acceptable Use
Policies which exist on parts of the net.  But a lot of it is that
people generally don't want to see random advertisements.  I throw
them away when the come in the paper mail; I don't want them in my
email, either.

The exceptions are lists where advertising is explicitly permitted,
and lists whose purpose is advertisements.  Many vendors maintain
lists to which they send pricing information, new product
announcements, etc.  This is fine, because I can ignore those lists
without missing anything I might really be interested.

If someone were involved with, say, selling licenses to use PGP
legally, or an electronic bank or escrow service, I think that might
be OK, since it is of *direct* interest to this list.  But even that
is a shady area.

If I want commercials, I subscribe to one of the appropriate lists.
You wouldn't want me discussing cooking techniques or airline travel
on cypherpunks , because it's not appropriate, and there are separate
forums for those topics.  Think of advertising the same way, and it
appears not like censorship, which it isn't, but simply staying on the
topic, which it is.

		Marc




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: kelly@netcom.com (Kelly Goen)
Date: Sat, 20 Feb 93 12:10:10 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: WHAT Can we do?
Message-ID: <9302200614.AA15345@netcom>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


 OK So I am preparing a posting for
alt.activism, misc.activism.prog alt.activism.d and alt.conspiracy,
alt.anarchy and alt.society.revolution. As well as alt.native!!.
I also plan to spread these postings into peacenet and econet.

     I plan a Monograph series with titles such as

      How to get find and use PGP for political and non-technical types.

      How to use PGP for the Investigative reporter.

      How to use PGP and a PAX anonymous posting Mechanism to
      become a whistle blower.

      Political/Whistleblowing/Investigative uses of 
      David Chaum anonymous networks.

      101 Political uses for an Anonymous Remailer

      How to investigate and expose the investigators
      safely and easily via use of DC Networks
      and Investigative Databases.

      How to digitise Video and Still photos and
      spread them anonymously via DC style networks and
      PAX Encrypted Anonymous posting Mechanisms.

Ad nauseam, I need volunteers to work on the monograpghs and
people to proofread. Some of the soures I am using are
the Security, Anonymity and Privacy FAQ parts 1-3. And
at present although  PAX has been shutdown we can use combinations of
multihop anonymnous remailers and sites like the penet site in
finland to ensure anonymity. Sites and Volunteers are needed for
more remailers, PGP key Servers and PAX anonymous Posting mechanisms
-- 




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: nobody@pmantis.berkeley.edu
Date: Fri, 19 Feb 93 23:23:19 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: anonymous mail
Message-ID: <9302200724.AA17077@pmantis.berkeley.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


This message routed through 8 remailers, sent around 11:50 CST 2/19/93:
pmantis -> soda -> alumni -> rebma -> rosebud -> mead -> shell -> buffalo

Actually, rewriting hop.mail and anon.mail in PERL might be a good idea...

Signed,  ?@?.?[.?]*





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: ssandfort@attmail.com
Date: Fri, 19 Feb 93 16:02:43 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: LIST RULES
Message-ID: <9302200002.AA11651@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text


Todd is new to the nets.  He sent the following to me by mistake.
He sent me another message and asked me to forward it to Cypherpunks.

------------- Begin Forwarded Message -------------
Date: Fri Feb 19 12:08:02 -0700 1993
From: internet!alembic.com!todd (Todd Steigerwald)
Subject: Re: LIST RULES
To: !ssandfort
Content-Length: 956



I will not "advertise" on the list as long as John prohibits it.
But I sincerely hope his prohibition does not discourage others
from discussing the issues it raises.  I would like to hear what
the rest of you think.


I do not argue with the decision to prohibit blatant advertising,  
however, with the increasing awareness of the internet and its  
potential, there is going to be more and more individuals that will  
want to extend beyond what it is currently being employed for.
	Regardless about individual feelings and ideals as to how and  
what the net should be used for, the issues WILL become increasingly  
debated, more than likely resulting in the eventual acceptance of  
advertising.  Simply put it is the new marketing frontier- many many  
people are seeing that already, and the beliefs of the few will not  
serve to stop it-as bad or good as that may be.

I will apologise beforehand since I am new to the net, but who is  
John?





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: deltorto@aol.com
Date: Sat, 20 Feb 93 01:43:45 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Back-Door Man
Message-ID: <9302200128.tn02698@aol.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>> How do we know the proposed legislation wasn't just a smoke
>> screen?  Isn't it possible that the Feds have already compromised
>> Intel or MicroSoft?  Is there some way to be sure that the new
>> 486 chip running your computer isn't recording each PGP or RSA
>> private key you generate?
>> 
>>      S a n d y                         ssandfort@attmail.com

Sheesh. I guess you just have to stand back and admire this level of
paranoia.
Can we establish a 'Cypherpunks Paranoia Achievement Award' for this?

Shortly thereafter Sandy sez: "Hey, wait a minnit... just _why are you voting
for ME?"

Technically, Kelly G.'s suggestion notwithstanding, I think this is
definitely a computationally-impossible task. However: in a very specific
circumstance, such as some foreign spook who's already under surveillance by
the feds, I suppose it's possible to create a one-time special chip that
might record keystrokes (or transmit them to a van, etc.) and then be
replaced *physically* with a replacement. The intelligence necessary to
coordinate an operation such as this, however, is pretty involved.
Personally, since I have NO interest in offing the President, I doubt they're
gonna bother with me.

Not only that, but also this: imho, it's more than _probable_ that the Feds
have compromised both Intel & Microsoft, but, as the old Polish saying goes:

     "You can put your shoes in the oven, but that don't make 'em biscuits."

   d-d-dave




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: George A. Gleason <gg@well.sf.ca.us>
Date: Sat, 20 Feb 93 02:44:18 PST
To: ssandfort@attmail.com
Subject: Re:  LIST RULES
Message-ID: <199302201041.AA02340@well.sf.ca.us>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I agree with ssandfort that a total ban on advertising on the list is a
not-good thing.  Commercial speech is still speech, and censorship is still
censorship.

Here's a possible win-win solution: on any commercial message, the subject
header should say "advertising included" or some obvious words or
abbreviations to that effect.  This way, those who wish to avoid such
messages can do so painlessly, those who wish to read them can do that, and
one more potential for restriction is eliminated.  

-gg




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: visionary@peg.apc.org
Date: Sat, 20 Feb 93 07:04:17 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: RE: Advertising on the net
Message-ID: <9302201420.AA14623@igc.apc.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Whilst the arguments "against" online advertising are many
and are BOUND to be the most vocal, I'd just like to put in
a pitch that counters that thread.

I really like to see what people are up to - if that means
they are tryin to earn a living from their activities, then thats
fine by me. So I like to see good, clever, informative and
interesting advertising material - PROVIDED it is NOT posted
repeatedly ad nauseam - i'd forgive once, twice, thrice over
a period of a month or so - then if it came in again I'd shout!

If you look closely at what actually comes across from all quarters
i think you'd agree that we do receive a lot of "advertising" in
many subtle guises. Gee - even crediting a magazine from which an
article is swiped is a form of advertising ;-)

I view the net as a way of life... as such i would even LIKE to
be able to order all sorts of things via email. For instance
if some of the more prolific writers among us wanted to earn
something from their writing, then i believe it would be very
acceptable to make books, journal subscriptions, limited print-runs
etc available in an online catalog - again, providing it was
interesting, informative reading in its own right then I would
have no objection whatsoever.

I could probably wax lyrical with many other examples, but i'm
sure you get my drift. I'm very interested in this debate and
hope that some sensible guidelines may be formulated by such
discussion. Naturally, in moderated newsgroups, this issue is
clearly dealt with... but yet is it correct that the moderator
be the "all-powerful" hand of CUT or KEEP.

You may also gather from the above that i am totally against
censorship of ANY sort - fully knowing what a can of worms that
opens up in regard to online communications.

...looking forward to hearing more...  enuf from me :-)

Michael Ney
PO Box 566 Milsons Point NSW 2061 Australia  
Tel: (+61-2) 692-8168
Email via APC: peg:visionary
via Internet: visionary@peg.apc.org
Engaged in graphic design, photography, journalism and publishing.
No job too small - will work within budget limitations - fast service!

...But that wasnt an advert - I was just telling you about myself :-)

________________ VISIONARY MEDIA _____________________________________






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: strat@intercon.com (Bob Stratton)
Date: Sat, 20 Feb 93 07:04:10 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: anonymous mail
In-Reply-To: <9302200724.AA17077@pmantis.berkeley.edu>
Message-ID: <9302201442.AA21465@intercon.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>>>>> On Fri, 19 Feb 1993 23:24:43 -0800, nobody@pmantis.berkeley.edu said:
	nobody> Remailed-By: Tommy the Tourist <tommy@out>

	nobody> This message routed through 8 remailers, sent around
	nobody> 11:50 CST 2/19/93: pmantis -> soda -> alumni -> rebma
	nobody> -> rosebud -> mead -> shell -> buffalo

Are you sure? If that's true, then someone along the way is munging
the headers pretty badly, because my Received: lines show it going
from

pmantis -> toad.com -> me

--Strat, being a mailer weenie






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: jordan@imsi.com (Jordan Hayes)
Date: Sat, 20 Feb 93 08:06:37 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: RE: Advertising on the net
Message-ID: <9302201549.AA12245@IMSI.COM>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


It's not so much the advertising I object to, but all the
"conversation" that gets repeated each time the issue comes up.  Give
it a rest.  Stay on the topic.  Keep your laser handy.

Anyone get very far with the CELP stuff yet?  I forget: is it or isn't
it "acceptable use" to implement Diffie-Helman in code you don't sell?
What if you sell it later?  At what point do you need to license it?

/jordan




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Karl Barrus <elee9sf@Menudo.UH.EDU>
Date: Sat, 20 Feb 93 09:27:34 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: anonymous mail
In-Reply-To: <9302201442.AA21465@intercon.com>
Message-ID: <199302201726.AA25317@Menudo.UH.EDU>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Earlier, Bob Stratton wrote:

>Are you sure?  If that's true, then someone along the way is munging
>the headers pretty badly, because my Received: lines show it going
>from

>pmantis -> toad.com -> me


That's right, because each remailer attempts to discard as much of the
header as possible.  Otherwise it wouldn't be anonymous - if I were to
send a message to you through rosebud and the headers showed the path
from me to rosebud and rosebud to you, you'd know where the message
really came from!

So the header of an anonymously mailed message should make it look
like the message originated from the last hop.

/-----------------------------------\
| Karl L. Barrus                    |
| elee9sf@menudo.uh.edu             | <- preferred address
| barrus@tree.egr.uh.edu (NeXTMail) |
\-----------------------------------/




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Stu Klingman <stuk@microsoft.com>
Date: Sat, 20 Feb 93 12:17:03 PST
To: ssandfort@attmail.com
Subject: LIST RULES and Advertising
Message-ID: <9302202014.AA00308@netmail.microsoft.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I know my reaction when being hit with the ad was,
"Hey! what the fuck is this!?", followed by,
"Okay, this person doesn't know any better".
If you've been on the net for a while, you'd know
that ads are >most< tre gauch.

If we really want to resolve the censorship stigma
and still be able to ignore the ads, perhaps we
could put AD: in front of any ad that was RELEVANT
to the list, and then we could filter them out, or
not, as the case may be.I've got to admit, the idea
of reading ads pertinent to the cypherpunks list
intrigues me.

Judges?





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Anonymous@cs.Buffalo.EDU
Date: Sat, 20 Feb 93 09:15:46 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: anonymous mail
Message-ID: <9302201714.AA11332@armstrong.cs.Buffalo.EDU>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Bob Stratton stated in the last message:
>Received: by toad.com id AA00166; Sat, 20 Feb 93 07:04:10 PST
>Return-Path: <strat@intercon.com>
>Received: from cygnus.com by toad.com id AA00161; Sat, 20 Feb 93 07:04:08 PST
>Received: from intercon.com by cygnus.com (4.1/SMI-4.1)
>	id AA18518; Sat, 20 Feb 93 06:43:27 PST
>Received: by intercon.com (911016.SGI/920928.RS)
>	for cypherpunks@toad.com id AA21465; Sat, 20 Feb 93 09:42:09 -0500

>>>>>> On Fri, 19 Feb 1993 23:24:43 -0800, nobody@pmantis.berkeley.edu said:
>	nobody> This message routed through 8 remailers, sent around
>	nobody> 11:50 CST 2/19/93: pmantis -> soda -> alumni -> rebma
>	nobody> -> rosebud -> mead -> shell -> buffalo
>
>Are you sure? If that's true, then someone along the way is munging
>the headers pretty badly, because my Received: lines show it going
>from
>
>pmantis -> toad.com -> me


This is correct in the same way I can see that the message sent from you
was sent from intercon.com -> cygnus.com -> toad.com -> me


-- 
+==== Internet: babani@cs.buffalo.edu ===+======== Amateur-Radio: N2LYC ======+
!      Bitnet: V078LNGT@ubvms.BITNET     |        UUCP: rutgers!ub!babani     !
! Alternate: an173@cleveland.freenet.edu | Plsure dpnds on the othrs prmison. !
+==  PGP key available. (If you don't know what a PGP key is... find out!)  ==+




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: deltorto@aol.com
Date: Sat, 20 Feb 93 09:28:45 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Quiet Nights @ the Keyboard with Ren & Stimpy
Message-ID: <9302201228.tn04104@aol.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


To Keith Peterson:

I guess it must get a bit quiet there at your keyboard in the room where you
sit chillin' day in and day out Maintaining that ol' MS-DOS archive at
WSMR-SIMTEL20.Army.Mil, huh? I guess I can understand wanting to bust out in
expression if indeed you find it inconvenient to do literally.

I mean no disrespect - after all, I don't know you at all, but _really_ now -
these comments of yours are so misplaced! Even a cursory view of Mr. Thug's
missal cannot possibly construe his comments as encouraging virus authors!
His observations are in the finest spirit of our treasured Fourth Estate -
the dissemination of information for the protection of everyone concerned.
For example, being a non-DOS user, I had never before heard of these Stealth,
etc. viruses before reading his description and I can sure tell you that I
will now know to warn every DOS user I meet to immediately switch their OS to
one where there is less inclination and more barriers to the construction of
destructive viruses. Okay that was a bit tongue-in-cheek, but you get the
idea.

To put this in martial terms for you, I recommend a strategy where you
acquire your targets a bit more carefully before launching. Lao Tsu offers
good advice on this sort of thing - 'premature attack reveals one's own
weaknesses' etc. Since your weakness appears at first glance to be a fickle
respect for the rights of other citizens to privacy and free speech, I
encourage you to instead get out and oxygenate your lungs and shake out all
that tension before you open your metaphorical mouth and insert your
figurative foot. Remember, we all go about defending this great nation of
ours in our own ways and though my way may not be your way, it may be a good
way anyway.

This is not to say that I don't encourage you to voice your opinion about
anything you want to at any time. I am proud to live in a country where we
can all agree to disagree. Just don't touch my freedom, Keith. I will defend
to the death your, Thug's and my right to say whatever the hell we want to
about anything we fucking well please anytime and anywhere. In future, then,
please be more judicious in the pursuit of your ideals.

To My Fellow Cypherpunks:

Be always vigilant, my friends. Those who would tell you that up is down and
right is left might well be coming out of the sun above and behind you even
now. It's a hard thing to express clear views of something so rotten to the
corps, but _someone_ has to do it.

Happy Trails,

   d2t





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: deltorto@aol.com
Date: Sat, 20 Feb 93 09:28:46 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: LIST RULES
Message-ID: <9302201229.tn04106@aol.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>>_________________________________________________________________
>>             FROM THE VIRTUAL DESK OF SANDY SANDFORT
>>~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
>>[etc. etc.]
>>What do others on this list think about "commercial" postings?

Sandy,

I have to agree with John that it's philosophically inappropriate to discuss
non-cryptographic topics on this list. Like many others, I come here to
discuss ideas and technical concepts in an intellectual environment and to
learn about how to protect everyone's privacy from people who know a hell of
a lot more than I do about the mechanics of digital privacy. Anything that
deviates from that had better, imho, do it quickly and as an aside to
something more in line with the purpose of this list.

I think you're respectful of that, and I don't have any _particular_ problem
with what you posted, but probably because your msg stuck out _like a sore
thumb_ (and thus the hyperbolic characterization of it as 'abuse') from the
body of the normal discussion here and because he is a naturally cautious
(thank goodness for that!) person, John probably mentioned this to you in the
best terse way he knows how. My impression of John is that he is not prone to
overreact, but rather that he prefers to deliver a srtaightforward warning
with sufficient emphasis to avoid having to do it twice.

Please get in touch with those of us who might have responded to your posting
through more discrete channels. I sense that we need not discuss this any
further here.

  d2t

PS: As an aside to the topic of commercialism, I'd just like to point out
what a hell of a nice job Zig is doing with the latest build of MacPGP
(2.1e87). Attaboy, Zig!




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: thug@phantom.com (Murdering Thug)
Date: Sat, 20 Feb 93 11:12:04 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Free Speech Is Not The Issue, Opression/Harassment Is.
Message-ID: <m0nPzVi-000jrDC@phantom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



With regard to the Peterson affair:

I am very glad to read all the responses that I have seen both publically
on the cypherpunks list, and privately in encouraging letters I have
received in mail.  I want to write responses to all these great letters,
but I have received far too many.  I would like to thank all of you who
support first ammendment rights, and who have told me that found my virus
post informative and useful. 

However, let us really ask ourselves if free speech is the real issue
here.  Yes, I know free speech is a major theme that comes out of all
this, but I don't think that it's the most imporant one.

There are always loonies who wish to yell and hollar about what should
be censored.  Whether it's on the radio like the FCC/Howard Stern affair,
on television, in the movies, on records/tapes/CD's (like Tipper Gore and
her gang).  Those kinds of people will always exist, and I don't see why
people expect them not to exist on Usenet/Internet as well.

What *REALLY* pisses me off about Peterson is his use of underhanded
tactics like threats, intimidation, and harassment.  I don't want to
go toe to toe with Peterson, because when it comes to underhanded tactics,
I can teach him a thing or two, and make his life a living hell should I
decide to do so.  Fortunately for him, I am well beyond that adolescent stage
and mode of thinking.

I think Peterson should realize that there are people out there who can
and will retaliate against him should he harass them in any way.  Just
because so far he has run into compliant and intimidated system admins,
doesn't mean his luck will hold up.  Eventually he will run into someone
who takes this kind of stuff VERY personally, especially if they are
awaken from their nap by a harassing and threatening phone call from Peterson.

If Peterson keeps up his reign of terror, I would not be surprised if he is
not dragged into court one of these days by someone whose personal, moral and
financial interests conflict with Peterson's desire to squash free speech.

A case can easily be made against Peterson in a court of law for harassment,
intimidation, and various civil rights charges having to do with trying to
deny others their constitutional rights.  And I guarantee you that there will
be plenty of system administrators and others who would be happy to testify
against him.

I recommend to Mr. Peterson that he watch his step in trying to step on
other people's constitutional rights. One day he may just step on a
land mine.  I phrase this in terms that a person in the military could
understand. 

Until such time as Peterson blows his legs off, I think it's up to all of
us to guard free speech by telling all system administrators on the net
about Peterson and his reign of terror, and asking them to publically
expose him each and every time he tries to assault our freedom of speech
through threats, initimidation, and harassment.


Murdering Thug





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: nowhere@bsu-cs.bsu.edu (Chael Hall)
Date: Sat, 20 Feb 93 12:04:46 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Remailer changes
Message-ID: <9302202001.AA28280@bsu-cs.bsu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



     After playing around with my .maildelivery file for a while, I
figured out how to make messages to the remailer go to it even if
nothing in the header indicates that it should be remailed (just
the "::" as the first line) and still receive all of my other mail.
So, you can use it just like the other Cypherpunks remailers out
there now.

     Could somebody send me the official instructions for another
remailer so I can *plagarize* them and save myself some work?  :)
Thanks in advance.

NoWhere Remailer:  nowhere@bsu-cs.bsu.edu

Chael Hall

--
Chael Hall
nowhere@bsu-cs.bsu.edu, 00CCHALL@BSUVC.BSU.EDU, CHALL@CLSV.Charon.BSU.Edu
(317) 285-3648 after 5 pm EST




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: SANDBERG@GUMBY.BCASD.AZ.HONEYWELL.COM (Jabe Sandberg)
Date: Sat, 20 Feb 93 14:34:09 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: UnSubscribe
Message-ID: <930220153249.2400045b@GUMBY.BCASD.AZ.HONEYWELL.COM>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Please remove me from the list.
Thanks.
sandberg@gumby.bcasd.az.honeywell.com





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: RFORBES@Gems.VCU.EDU
Date: Sat, 20 Feb 93 15:03:15 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Remove from list
Message-ID: <01GUYCFQ63Z690O773@Gems.VCU.EDU>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Please remove my name from this list. Interesting stuff but I can't keep
up, only signing on 1-2 times a week.

Thanks.






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: John.Nieder@f33.n125.z1.FIDONET.ORG (John Nieder)
Date: Sat, 20 Feb 93 23:58:41 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: FINE, BUT NOT HERE
Message-ID: <4976.2B873232@fidogate.FIDONET.ORG>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



from:  john.nieder@f33.n125.z1.fidonet.org

 * Reply to msg originally in Cypherpunks
 
 > [t.c. May]
 > >I say, let's expand the scope of the Cypherpunks list to include more
 > >discussion of viruses.

 > I say, unless it has to do with cryptography, please don't.

 BK> I too wish to keep cipherpunks
 BK> clean even though I love viruses and I wish to have a pure thread about
 BK> applied crypto and anonymity techniques...

Roughly my sentiments as well.  Virii are interesting, but so are
handguns & the Swedish Bikini Team; none belong in CYPHERPUNKS, however,
in Mr. Nieder's opinion (which may or may not be humble).
        JN

... "A dog in a sidecar is always a treat for other motorists." M. Stirner
--- Blue Wave/Opus v2.12 [NR]
--  
John Nieder - via FidoNet node 1:125/555
    UUCP - ...!uunet!hoptoad!kumr!fidogate!33!John.Nieder
INTERNET - John.Nieder@f33.n125.z1.FIDONET.ORG




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: John.Nieder@f33.n125.z1.FIDONET.ORG (John Nieder)
Date: Sun, 21 Feb 93 05:59:43 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: FINE, BUT NOT HERE
Message-ID: <4983.2B878448@fidogate.FIDONET.ORG>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



from:  john.nieder@f33.n125.z1.fidonet.org

 * Reply to msg originally in Cypherpunks
 
 > [t.c. May]
 > >I say, let's expand the scope of the Cypherpunks list to include more
 > >discussion of viruses.

 > I say, unless it has to do with cryptography, please don't.

 BK> I too wish to keep cipherpunks
 BK> clean even though I love viruses and I wish to have a pure thread about
 BK> applied crypto and anonymity techniques...

Roughly my sentiments as well.  Virii are interesting, but so are
handguns & the Swedish Bikini Team; none belong in CYPHERPUNKS, however,
in Mr. Nieder's opinion (which may or may not be humble).
        JN

... "A dog in a sidecar is always a treat for other motorists." M. Stirner
--- Blue Wave/Opus v2.12 [NR]
--  
John Nieder - via FidoNet node 1:125/555
    UUCP - ...!uunet!hoptoad!kumr!fidogate!33!John.Nieder
INTERNET - John.Nieder@f33.n125.z1.FIDONET.ORG




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu
Date: Sat, 20 Feb 93 19:35:48 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: whistleblower newsgroup?
Message-ID: <9302210334.AA02268@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Mulling over K. Goen's somewhat rambling, irate, and paranoid prose 
(but nevertheless mildly entertaining) has caused various random 
ideas to pop into my head on how to get pseudonymity/anonymity 
into the mainstream and even the spotlight, toward the goal of 
widespread public recognition, acceptance, and use to the point of
dependence, all in a nonthreatening way.

First of all, there have been a lot of famous uses of anonymity and 
pseudonymity, esp. in literature. It might be interesting for PR purposes
to collect a long list of everyone who has used aliases.  When people
start saying `wow, he's my favorite author, I didn't know he was someone
else' that would be great.  A sort of long history of anonymity and 
pseudonymity would be perfect. Deep Throat, Voltaire, Mark Twain, I think
even Scott Fitzgerald was a pseudonym.  Also, what about anonymous letters?
Did Martin Luther first post the `indulgence complaints' anonymously?  
I'm sure there's some cases where anonymous information changed the course 
of world history significantly (esp. during wars). Anonymous tips leading
to big busts, that kind of thing. (Remember the Lockerbie plane terrorist
crash? There was an anonymous tip to authorities that virtually pinpointed
the flight origination and bomb mechanism.)  Anybody know any, please 
send them to me, and I'll summarize to the group and credit you.  (please
give references where possible.)  If it works out I'll donate it to
K. Goen, assuming he hasn't been arrested or hospitalized by then :)

Next idea:  

How about a newsgroup devoted to `whistleblowing' 
where anonymity is encouraged? It could even be `anonymously moderated' 
where all the postings are guaranteed to go through an anonymous server 
before posting. (Whoever wanted to be *really* sure could anonymize the
message before posting.) I haven't seen *any* newsgroups dedicated to looking 
at government abuses from the "inside" (this would be for employees esp.) 
I can imagine all kinds of neat little secrets about our government's
illustrious practices leaking out..  The potential for `good' is good, 
esp. if the notices refer to ways of *saving money* and *eliminating waste*.
A sort of patriotic taxpayer watchdog group!  Although the possibility 
for `bad' is good too, people might just use it as a way of getting 
revenge. (Despite what others may think here, I hope it wouldn't turn into
a sort of perpetual incitement to revolution and anarchy...)  
The group might overlap into private industry too, although 
the federal government assuredly provides the most fodder...

Now, think about how much immense *press* and *publicity* 
that some government abuses get.  They can really be legendary (remember 
the $600 toilet seats?). Now, suppose that just coincidentally a major 
press story that got out *originated* in this anonymous group. 
Wow! That would be a story in itself, worthy of the
evening news. Can't you imagine some blank-faced, clueless reporter saying
``the story was first reported on a network bulletin board devoted to 
anonymous reporting of government abuses.'' Allright! Hey, it could get
to the point where reporters start watching it for hot tips!  There are
already a lot of big Washington groups that try to monitor the government,
and this could be a real catalyst for them.

So I'm putting out the idea. Maybe someone well-versed in the newsgroup
addition protocol can take care of the details.

(Ladies and gentlemen, fasten your seat belts, I think we're in for some 
hellacious turbulence ahead...)






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Christo Delaroderie <ctd@bach.udel.edu>
Date: Sat, 20 Feb 93 19:55:59 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Unscribe me
Message-ID: <199302210354.AA03588@bach.udel.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



	Please remove me from your mailing list.
						ctd




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: covin@cs.uchicago.edu
Date: Sun, 21 Feb 93 07:08:13 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re:  whistleblower newsgroup?
Message-ID: <9302211506.AA18925@tartarus.uchicago.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Well, now here's an idea that might help to sell anonymity: what if a
major world power were governed under a republican system in which votes
for public officials were filed anonymously, to protect each citizen's
right to unrestricted political opinions?

                            -David




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Eli Brandt <ebrandt@jarthur.Claremont.EDU>
Date: Sun, 21 Feb 93 13:01:24 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: anonymous mail
In-Reply-To: <9302191753.AA12638@pmantis.berkeley.edu>
Message-ID: <9302212101.AA26262@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> Question: of the unix users, who does NOT have access to ksh (via your
> login shell or #!/bin/ksh or somewhere else)?

You might want to work in perl, which would make the scripts work under
Unix and DOS, at least.  Is there a Mac perl?

Oh, you might want to add the remailer on this account to your
circumnavigation.  It could use some more traffic -- I've seen about
5K through here in the past couple of months.  Still no PGP; has
anyone gotten it to work (generate keys, specifically) on a Symmetry?

> | Karl L. Barrus                    |

	 PGP 2 key by finger or e-mail
   Eli   ebrandt@jarthur.claremont.edu




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: gnu (John Gilmore)
Date: Sun, 21 Feb 93 13:27:06 PST
To: cypherpunks
Subject: Remarks of John Perry Barlow to the First International Symposium on National Security & National Competitiveness
Message-ID: <9302212127.AA26790@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Date: Sun, 21 Feb 1993 07:35:20 -0500
To: interesting_people@aurora.cis.upenn.edu
From: Dave Farber <farber@central.cis.upenn.edu>

Remarks of John Perry Barlow
to the First International Symposium on
National Security & National Competitiveness

McLean, Virginia
December 1, 1992

I can't tell you the sense of strangeness that comes over someone who earns
his living writing Grateful Dead songs, addressing people who earn their
livings as many of you do, especially after hearing the last speaker. If
you don't appreciate the irony of our appearing in succession, you have no
sense of irony at all. You and I inhabit very different worlds, but I am
pleased to note, as my presence here strongly suggests, these two worlds
may be growing closer. 

The reason I am here has absolutely nothing to do with the Grateful Dead.
I'm here because I met a fellow named Mitch Kapor in 1989. Despite obvious
differences, I felt as if we'd both been up in the same saucer or
something...that we shared a sense of computers being more than just better
adding machines or a better typewriters. We saw that computers, connected
together, had the capacity to create an environment which human beings
could and did inhabit. 

Yesterday, I was encouraged to hear evidence that [former Presidential
Science Advisor] Dr. Jay Keyworth and [Conference Organizer and former CIA
agent] Robert Steele, might have been up in that saucer too.  The people
who share this awareness are natives of the future.  People who have a hard
time with it may always be immigrants.  

When Mitch and I saw that computers had created a place, we started asking
some questions about what kind of place it was....what were the operating
terms and conditions of this place, what kinds of people already lived
there, who was going to inhabit it, what was going on in it, did it have a
name?

We decided to name it Cyberspace, after Bill Gibson's description of a
futuristic place rather like it which we found in his novel Neuromancer. 
Rather than being a figment of Bill's imagination, we felt that Cyberspace
was already up and happening. 

Indeed, if you're having trouble with the concept, ask yourself where phone
conversation takes place.  That's right. Cyberspace is where you are when
you're on the phone. It's also where most of your money is, unless you keep
it in Krugerands buried out in the garden...which I suppose some folks in
this room might just do.  It's also...and I think this is very important...
the place where the greater part of the world's business is happening now.

So it's a highly significant locale, and yet it's invisible to most of the
people who are in it every day of their lives.  I believe it was Marshall
McLuhan who said, "We don't know who it was that discovered water, but
we're pretty sure it wasn't a fish..."  

In any case, when EFF first got together, our principal concern was making
certain the U.S. Constitution applied to Cyberspace.  We could see the
government, specifically the Secret Service, taking actions which made it
obvious that they didn't quite get it.  They didn't seem to be acting out
malice, but they were, at best, differently clued.  They clearly didn't
understand that the First Amendment applied as certainly to bytes as it did
to ink on paper. 

At the time we thought that we could just hire a few nasty civil liberties
lawyers from New York to put the fear of God in them, and that would be
that.  But it's been like tugging at a thread on your sweater, where you
begin to pull, and pretty soon you have more thread on the ground than on
your back.  It turns out that there are questions raised in this
environment to which we don't have good answers.

Indeed, it turns out that this is a place where the First Amendment...along
with just about every other law on the planet...is a local ordinance. 
There are no clean jurisdictional boundaries. This is a place which may
always be outside the law. This may be an unwelcome concept, but it is
true, and it is something we will all have to grapple with as society moves
into the virtual world. 

I believe you folks in the Intelligence Community are going to challenged
by these issues as directly as anyone. This is because intelligence, and
especially the CIA and NSA, are supposed to work under stern guidelines
intended to separate the domestic from the foreign.  You're not supposed to
be conducting domestic surveillance.  Well, in Cyberspace, the difference
between domestic and foreign, in fact the difference between any country
and any other country, the difference between us and them, is extremely
blurry. If it exists at all... 

This is also an economic environment in which everyone seems to be
everywhere at once.  I hear you're becoming interested in protecting
American Business from foreign espionage. But against this "everywhereness"
it becomes very difficult to say, "Alright, this is our guy, this is
General Motors, we're going to take care of his interests."  Nothing is so
cleanly delineated.   

These are a few of the fundamental changes which arise as a result of
literally moving out of the world of experience and onto the map of
information. Another one which is especially pertinent to the people in
this room, is what happens when you have direct e-mail access to every
member of your organization.  

This can have a terrifically decentralizing effect on structure.  It
weakens hierarchy.  It flattens the organization.  It can create one hell
of a lot of confusion, even as it speeds response time. There are in this
room representatives of some tall and rigid outfits.  Prepare for the
possibility that your organization is about to go all flat and squishy due
to tenderizing influence of e-mail.

We are also looking at a complete redefinition of ownership and property. 
I mean, we now have the mind as our principle source of commercial goods.
At last it seems we can we can really get something for nothing.  As
recently as fifteen years ago all new wealth derived from minerals
extraction or agriculture.  Everything else was simply passing it around. 
No longer must you rip your goods from the ground. You don't have to wait
for the sun to grow some.  New wealth can be had by just sitting around and
rubbing some facts together...essentially what you folks have been doing
all along.  This economy of virtual substance is a fundamental change and
one which you can exploit if you're willing.

We're also looking at some fundamental shifts in the nature of property.
This is going to be relevant to you as you move into a more open
interaction with the rest of the world.  In an information economy, much
depends on the sanctity of copyright. But copyright, it turns out, derives
most of its force from the physical manifestation of intellectual property.
 Copyright protects expression, the thing that happens when you print a
book or press a record.  In Cyberspace, you don't get that manifestation.
It never goes physical.

So the bottles we have been relying on for the protection of our
intellectual goods are disappearing, and, since we've been selling bottles
and not wine all along, we will soon have a lot of wine and nothing to put
it in. Interesting problems will arise. They're already upon us.

In any case, when EFF saw the multitude of things going on in this arena,
we battened ourselves down for the long haul, and we are dealing with a
whole range of issues, including the Open Platform initiative.  Which is
our effort to try to deploy something like universal data service.

We believe that the best thing that could happen for the American economy,
and actually the best thing that could happen for liberty on the Planet
Earth, would be to make everyone capable of jacking in if they want to.  

We find that other countries are lagging in this.  For example, the
Japanese see absolutely no use for high speed personal data connections.
The folks at NTT certainly can't see any reason to trade their 70,000
operators on digital switches.  So we have a significant leg up on the
Japanese that is not well known in this country.

Another thing that we are working on is the FBI's Digital Telephony
proposal which is, as you may know, the idea that we should stop all
telecommunications progress in this country in order to accommodate the FBI
is just amazing to me, and yet it somehow manage to live on Congress.  

Also, for those of you whose badges say U.S. Government [code for National
Security Agency], we are trying to overturn NSA's data encryption embargo. 
It's our position that trying to embargo software is like trying to embargo
wind. This is a fact that you are going to have to come to grips with. 
Digitized information is very to stamp classified or keep contained.

This stuff is incredibly leaky and volatile.  It's almost a life form in
its ability to self-propagate.  If something hits the Net...and it's
something which people on there find interesting...it will spread like a
virus of the mind.  I believe you must simply accept the idea that we are
moving into an environment where any information which is at all
interesting to people is going to get out.  And there will be very little
that you can do about it.  This is not a bad thing in my view, but you may
differ...

I'm going to talk a little bit now about the very nature of information. 
This conference, I must say, has blown me away.  I had no idea there were
people in your [the intelligence] community talking about these things.  I
am pleased and gratified by the folks I have met here and talked to
personally, but I want to reiterate Dr. Keyworth's phrase yesterday: which
is that government, especially  American government, must end its obsession
with secrecy.

We must do so because we are engaged in...and I don't want to use the word
warfare here...we are engaged in form of economic competition where our
principal advantage is our ability to distribute information. It is not our
ability to conceal it.  

Perhaps this has always been true. Let me tell you a story. Last year, I
was addressing the computer security establishment at the Department of
Energy.  These are the people in charge of protecting the computers that
nuclear weapons get designed on. 
The other keynote speaker at this conference was, uh, Edward Teller.
[Laughter.] Yeah, well, I was pretty sure if evil walked the planet, its
name was Edward Teller.  Anyway, I got up and said that I wasn't sure that
DOE's secrecy was an asset.  I wasn't going to say that it was a liability,
so much as beside the point. After all, I know how to make an atomic bomb.

You give me five and a half pounds of weapons grade plutonium and a week in
my garage and I'll give you a nuclear weapon.  It will be dirty, but it
will work.  The problem for anyone who wants to do this is that they can't
get enough industrial capacity ginned up to create the plutonium.  I mean,
I just can't get my high temperature gas diffusion centrifuges to work. 
Indeed, it takes a whole society to put them together, even if the design
information is available.  It is not the information, which is readily
available, that is crucial.  It is the ability to execute that is the
critical factor.

I was interested to see how Dr. Teller would respond to that. To my
surprise and satisfaction, he got up and agreed with me completely. He went
on to say that he had never found a nuclear secret that the Russians could
not obtain within a year of its development.  Where they couldn't compete
with us was in the areas where we were wide open.  He cited the electronics
industry, saying that at the end of World War II, we were about 20 years
ahead of the Russians in nuclear weapons design, and roughly neck and neck
in the electronics.  

Both sides entered a closed program on nuclear weapons design. And we went
into a wild free-for-all in electronics.  I mean, you should know that in
the computer business, there are so many loose lips, you actually have to
really try not to learn what you competitor is up to.  Computer scientists
are the meetingest bunch of people you ever saw, and when they meet, they
tell one anther everything.  

The results of this approach speak for themselves.  As Dr. Teller pointed
out, by the time the Russians quit being a threat, they had moved to a
position of parity with us in nuclear weapons, but they were 25 to 30 years
behind us in electronics.

I suspect one reasons for this conference is to figure out how you guys are
going to make your living now that the Party's Over.  I believe the
Intelligence Community still has a role.  We are entering the Information
Age.  And Information, after all, is what you do.  You have an edge in the
field, and I would hate to see you blow your lead.  

But there are some serious issues about information which must be dealt
with, and they have almost nothing to do with whether it is open or closed.
 The real questions regarding information relate to usability...whether or
not it is meaningful, whether or not it is relevant, whether or not it
accurate, whether or not it is genuinely useful.  

There is, for example, an enormous amount of information on the Net. But
the signal-to-noise ratio on the net is terrible. There's an awful lot of
racket.  So I suppose you do get a kind of secrecy, rather as in those
fancy restaurants with the highly reflective walls, where you can hear the
people shouting at you at your table, but you can't make out what anyone
else is saying for the hub-bub. It's the intimacy of white noise.

You folks have some expertise in an important function: sorting out that
which is relevant from the huge spray of data that is coming at everyone. 
That is an important problem that is largely overlooked...so far the
software solutions to it don't strike me as being much good.  We talk about
"smart agents" but they aren't smart, they're pretty dumb.  You send them
out and they return with too much.  

The problem is that the difference between data and information is meaning,
something machines know little of. To determine whether data are
meaningful, whether they are, in fact, information, you must pass them
through a human mind.  There is also a question of authority, reliability,
and bias.  For example, I think one of the things you will find in using
open sources is that most media are intentionally designed to evoke a
fearful response in the reader.  I mean, fear sells, as well you know.  

Perhaps you have an important role in certifying the reliability of
materials in open circulation. Perhaps you are already engaged in it. I
recently got a call from a friend who is an expert on computer networking
in the Confederation of Independent States, or whatever they call what's
left of the Evil Empire these days.  He was in a terrible state. He said,
"I just got visited by the CIA, I don't know what to do. They showed up and
wanted to know all about my most recent report. I'm afraid they're going to
try to make me a CIA agent!" A scary thought, eh?

I told him, "Look, it seems to me you already are a CIA agent." They're
just trying to figure out if you're a good one!" 

We may find that there are many CIA agents, of widely varying reliability.
The real CIA agents will have the subtler job of finding out which of them
is telling the truth.

The most important problem which the intelligence community must now
confront relates to your own bureaucratic sclerosis and the pace at which
information moves through your honeycomb of secrecy. The future, as IBM is
learning, will be to the supple and swift and not necessarily to the
mighty.

In a world moving as rapidly as this one, information becomes incredibly
time sensitive. Even if you do...as I think you absolutely must...eliminate
the unnecessary classification within and without your organizations, you
still have all the cumbersome buffers of bureaucracy to contend with. 

As I was preparing these remarks, I considered coming in here and
suggesting that you break up the CIA into about five different private
companies and go into business.  That's probably too good an idea to
implement.  But it seems worthy of consideration.  There is something that
happens to your sense of urgency when you have a bottom line.  You know
that if you don't deliver, someone else will, which might be exactly the
though to leave you on.

I would like to thank you very much for your indulgence of an entirely
different perspective.  I've genuinely enjoyed this opportunity to get to
know you.

------- End of Forwarded Message




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Eric Hughes <hughes@soda.berkeley.edu>
Date: Sun, 21 Feb 93 13:58:03 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Trapdoors
In-Reply-To: <9302182057.AA00885@tadpole.tadpole.com>
Message-ID: <9302212154.AA02012@soda.berkeley.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Jim writes:
>Interestingly enough, V9 SPARC has a population count (number of bits
>set in word) instruction that was put in specificly at the request of
>No Such Agency.

Does anybody have a good idea what applications this is useful for?

My first thought is that it's a very quick way to do linear error
detection codes, since this instruction directly computes the Hamming
weight of a code word.

I can also see it being useful to detect correlations between
sequences, such as a trial random stream and a known pseudorandom
number generator.  One would XOR the streams together and then count
bits to calculate a correlation frequency.

Other ideas?

Eric




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Eric Hughes <hughes@soda.berkeley.edu>
Date: Sun, 21 Feb 93 14:19:41 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: New document for ftp.
Message-ID: <9302212215.AA05824@soda.berkeley.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Hal Finney recently sent me an instruction manual for the cypherpunks
remailers.  Its on the ftp site.

    soda.berkeley.edu:pub/cypherpunks/hal's.instructions

Spread the words.

Eric




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Eric Hughes <hughes@soda.berkeley.edu>
Date: Sun, 21 Feb 93 14:32:28 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: RSA licensing policy
In-Reply-To: <9302201549.AA12245@IMSI.COM>
Message-ID: <9302212228.AA07818@soda.berkeley.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>Anyone get very far with the CELP stuff yet?  I forget: is it or isn't
>it "acceptable use" to implement Diffie-Helman in code you don't sell?
>What if you sell it later?  At what point do you need to license it?

This letter is not intended to start a flame war about patent rights,
licensing, or anything similar.  Reply directly to me.

I've spoken with Jim Bidzos, president of RSADSI, about this very
issue recently.  They have a very easy to understand principle that
governs the use of their patents.  I am rephrasing it; at no time was
this actually spoken.  It's very simple: "If you make money with it,
so do we."  Their licenses are not out of line with patent licenses
generally (and not just computer-related ones).

If you make public domain software and use it for personal use, RSADSI
will not come after you.

If you make commercial software and sell it without obtaining a
license, they will after you.  If you use the software as a
"mission-critical" part of your business and do not obtain a license,
they will come after you.

There are grey areas between these two poles.  I do not address them.

Eric




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: henry strickland <strick@osc.versant.com>
Date: Sun, 21 Feb 93 14:28:36 PST
To: hughes@soda.berkeley.edu (Eric Hughes)
Subject: Re: Trapdoors
In-Reply-To: <9302212154.AA02012@soda.berkeley.edu>
Message-ID: <9302212232.AA12362@versant.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


# From cypherpunks-request@toad.com Sun Feb 21 14:14:43 1993
# 
# Does anybody have a good idea what applications this is useful for?

The old CDC CYBER machines had population count in its instruction
set.  Perhaps some scientific-type programmers would know what they
used it for.  The CYBER did not have a lot of instructions -- they
were pretty practical about what they put in.   i.e.  != VAX 

# My first thought is that it's a very quick way to do linear error 
# detection codes, since this instruction directly computes the Hamming 
# weight of a code word.

That was always my assumption.  Anyway, it's not unprecedented.

						strick
						strick@osc.versant.com




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: karn@qualcomm.com (Phil Karn)
Date: Sun, 21 Feb 93 15:02:12 PST
To: hughes@soda.berkeley.edu
Subject: Re:  Trapdoors
Message-ID: <9302212253.AA14109@servo>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


A bit count instruction would be very handy in a project I've been
working on lately, which is a new packet radio link level protocol
for amateur packet radio. This protocol uses forward error correction,
so it needs a highly reliable way to delimit the start of each
physical link frame. A pseudo-random "sync" sequence is the standard
way to do this, and you detect it with a correlator. The bit count
instruction would come in handy here, since the only other fast
way to do it is to use table lookup.

Phil




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Anonymous@cs.Buffalo.EDU
Date: Sun, 21 Feb 93 11:56:43 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: whistleblower newsgroup?
Message-ID: <9302211955.AA12769@armstrong.cs.Buffalo.EDU>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>How about a newsgroup devoted to `whistleblowing'
>where anonymity is encouraged? It could even be `anonymously moderated' 
>where all the postings are guaranteed to go through an anonymous server 
>before posting. (Whoever wanted to be *really* sure could anonymize the
>message before posting.) I haven't seen *any* newsgroups dedicated to looking 
>at government abuses from the "inside" (this would be for employees esp.) 
>I can imagine all kinds of neat little secrets about our government's
>illustrious practices leaking out..  The potential for `good' is good, 

Excellent idea. I am a government official who has blown the whistle on 
several major abuses, and have trusted friends in the media. I can see 
to it that if alt.whistleblowers becomes real, it will be read.

Submissions should be to a mailbox that renders the articles anonymous 
before they go public. There might be an alt.whistleblowers.d for 
discussion where members of the press could (here's where crypto-tech 
comes in) post requests for further information. PGP (or whatever) sigs 
could serve as press "credentials" and interested reporters could post 
their public keys to a trusted repository.

This has a lot of merit.

Since we know that the press is the only effective means by which a tale 
of government abuse can be told, this could change the way government 
does business, knowing that honest people have nothing to fear by 
pointing out the crooks. I've seen it happen ... makes you feel good.


-- 
+==== Internet: babani@cs.buffalo.edu ===+======== Amateur-Radio: N2LYC ======+
!      Bitnet: V078LNGT@ubvms.BITNET     |        UUCP: rutgers!ub!babani     !
! Alternate: an173@cleveland.freenet.edu | Plsure dpnds on the othrs prmison. !
+==  PGP key available. (If you don't know what a PGP key is... find out!)  ==+




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: fergp@sytex.com (Paul Ferguson)
Date: Sun, 21 Feb 93 13:42:20 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Anon mailers
Message-ID: <V8FcZB1w165w@sytex.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


 
Greets.
 
Would someone be kind enough to post a listing of available anonymous
remailers?  And perhaps (as Kelly earlier interjected) be willing to
compose a "how-to" and "why-for" text as well.
 
As you might imagine, interest in this topic is picking up.
 
Cheers.

---
fergp@sytex.com (Paul Ferguson)
Access <=> Internet BBS, a public access internet site
Sytex Communications, Arlington VA, 1-703-358-9022




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: babani@cs.Buffalo.EDU (Rusty Babani)
Date: Sun, 21 Feb 93 12:05:55 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Last message about wistleblowing.
Message-ID: <9302212004.AA13024@armstrong.cs.Buffalo.EDU>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


The last message about whistle blowing ended up in my mailbox because
the request-remail-to line was formatted wrong.  I simply forwarded on
to the list seeing as it wasn't too much work.  I just want people to 
know that *I* wasn't the originator of the messgae even though it has
my signature on it!  Thanks.  The anonymimity of the original sender
was still protected, howver.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: kelly@netcom.com (Kelly Goen)
Date: Sun, 21 Feb 93 18:09:47 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Political and social action, cypherpunk assisted (fwd)
Message-ID: <9302220208.AA04250@netcom.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Forwarded message:
> From gnu@toad.com Sun Feb 21 12:27:13 1993
> Message-Id: <9302212028.AA25645@toad.com>
> To: farber@cis.upenn.edu, gnu@toad.com, barlow@eff.org
> Cc: kelly@netcom.com
> Subject: Political and social action, cypherpunk assisted
> Date: Sun, 21 Feb 93 12:28:10 -0800
> From: gnu@toad.com
> 
> Kelly, I think you should also add some more mainstream groups like
> talk.environment, talk.politics.misc, alt.politics.homosexuality,
> alt.society.civil-liberty, alt.society.civil-disob,
> comp.society.privacy, alt.privacy, comp.org.eff.talk.  This is not
> just a tool for conspirators, anarchists, and revolutionaries, though
> the FBI and NSA would love to pigeonhole us that way.  It's for anyone
> who wants to exercise their Constitutionally-protected rights to
> privacy or anonymity.
> 
> 	John
> 
 I agree completely John, in fact I have had a talk with Phil Z. and
have his best wishes in this area, one thing
that has come up recently is putting together COMPLETE
packages of Binaries of PGP for various platforms, along
with hopper email preparation scripts, programs to email
or otherwise get news to a newsgroup, or emailing list.
minimal configurations for the amove.
EASY installation scripts and/or instructions to install
and verify correct installation of same,
perhaps a Video could be prepared that could be distributed
throught the community cable channel network
or borrowable thought a public for the community station
could be arrange, the main thing I see is spreading this tech far and
wide first to the groups that have the most need of it and
then to the mainstream. A foreign site at present is best for the
complete packages because of US ITAR regulations, although
uncoercible platforms such as toad.com and hosts in the edu
domain could also be perhaps a contribution to the situation.
I see the CLEAR and  present DANGER if we dont start treading this
new legal ground quickly and establish legal precedent by action
and litigaion if need be. Our rights will be abridged and condensed so fast you
wont even be able to reply "thank you Mr. Webster" before
 people start assuming a Maxmillian code of Justice instead of the one granted
us by the US Constitution. I see Privacy and
anonymity as Inalienable rights reserved to the people under the 9th amendment.
 I also view the ITAR regulations classifying crypto as a weapon/munition
as putting crypto under the purview of the second amendment
under the right to keep and bear arms. I also hold that expression of free
thoughts feelings and the tangilbe manifestion of same
known as software to be forms of protected speech under the first amendment.
 As I am a member of society who always will test the letter of the law 
n these areas to the limit, I now realize that the socalled
crypto-war with the federal government has to have a broad base
of public support before we are adjudged criminals by the govt controlled
press in this country and have our rights trampled under like
the way all groups have had theirs trampled under by the govt.
I for one dont wish to wake up in some morning with some
federal agents gun stuck up my nostril such as happened in the
sundevil raids. RICO seizures are currently illegally used by
the federal lackeys to totally circumvent
all the protections of the bill of rights and to acquire
shamelessly computer hardware for local, state and federal law
enforcement agencies. Can you say THEFT!!.. Can you say Violation of the
4th amendment of the US Constitution!!
Oh DAMN!! I went and got passionately political again... OK
I will shutup... for now... besides I have to answer
all of this fascinating e-mail I seem to be getting...
And work on this document...
     cheers
     kelly




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Eli Brandt <ebrandt@jarthur.Claremont.EDU>
Date: Sun, 21 Feb 93 19:42:22 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: msdos perl
In-Reply-To: <no.id>
Message-ID: <9302220342.AA07039@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> Slight complaint:  The only available port of perl to DOS is 386 or
> higher only,

The perl419x.zip in simtel:msdos/perl doesn't even use the 386.
However, those without 386 + memory manager may have a bit of
a hard time with memory.  I don't know about the perl4019.zip in
the same directory; I snarfed it to check, but it has no docs (and
I don't care to disassemble for 386 code!)

> CrysRides

   Eli   ebrandt@jarthur.claremont.edu




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Crys Rides <crys@cave.tcp.COM>
Date: Sun, 21 Feb 93 17:14:04 PST
To: Eli Brandt <ebrandt@jarthur.Claremont.EDU>
Subject: Re: anonymous mail
In-Reply-To: <9302191753.AA12638@pmantis.berkeley.edu>
Message-ID: <9302220111.AA20996@ucunix.san.uc.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

>>>>> On Sun, 21 Feb 93 13:00:03 PST, Eli Brandt <ebrandt@jarthur.Claremont.EDU> said:

Eli> You might want to work in perl, which would make the scripts work under
Eli> Unix and DOS, at least.  Is there a Mac perl?

Slight complaint:  The only available port of perl to DOS is 386 or
higher only, so will definately limit your effective use more than an
executeable or batch file.  As for a Mac Perl, a quick scan of my
Camel book doesn't turn up a mention of one.  I could have missed it.

Eli> 	 PGP 2 key by finger or e-mail
Eli>    Eli   ebrandt@jarthur.claremont.edu

CrysRides

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.1

iQCVAgUBK4gkOpSqD+bQ7So3AQEO/gP+PeGnx2c+pYJwjJmrX9pQS074sQj3/ZaC
WwOMLj6JOKxcuFBWmRru9u+bB9WWIVmswSmF7IN69RbmNCOuSxPkjzfyZXmMBqkk
HzUJFZVOI6CKTi8POmfUuJD6kORTUjgoW2Jj3NycCDb6mdX2ysLrVJfz4LXKEm0B
Yl5M/CBju+M=
=37Z/
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Kelly Goen <snake@Cadence.COM>
Date: Sun, 21 Feb 93 21:07:03 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: New Directions on the Internet-Privacy what are the threats...
Message-ID: <9302220425.AA05986@cds9041>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Hi all,
     to John Gilmore in particular... John I would like to use the
incident I discussed with you in encrypted mail as a start to discussing what
the technical/programmed threats to privacy on the Internet
using just simple scripts and programs available on the Internet.
I agree that is does range somwhat far from the usual fare of crypto
but it began as a PGP-key-server to mailing list correlation and
it definitely illustrates the current threat there is to privacy...
I would like to use the toad.com site as an example while not revealing the
list contents in the open posting due to personal feelings and
ethics about privacy... how do you and the list feel about this new topic
area...

    thanx and cheers
    kelly (oklahoma) goen
p.s. The response I have gotten for my call to action has been gratifying
indeed I will get back to everyone of you as time and preparation
 of the FAQ permits... I welcome ALL of your suggestions, critiques and
help as well as pointers to programs and information...
btw is "Digital Privacy" off the presses yet and if so where
can I get a copy in the silicon valley area... best
of luck to all the members of this list  and thanx again...
--------




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: fnordbox!loydb@cs.utexas.edu (Loyd Blankenship)
Date: Mon, 22 Feb 93 09:27:50 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Government Encryption
Message-ID: <9302220445.AA00b4f@fnordbox.UUCP>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Recently there was a thread on a public-key program that would involve a
central, government-backed-or-authorized agency to issue key pairs and
serve as a repository. Could someone please post some details on this --
I seem to have gotten it into my head that this is how PEM works, and I
don't know whether I'm right or just medicated. :-)

Loyd

***************************************************************************
* loydb@fnordbox.UUCP	     Call the Fnordbox BBS   *	Loyd Blankenship  *
* GEnie: SJGAMES	    2 v32bis lines, 24 hrs   *	PO Box 18957	  *
* Compu$erve: [73407,515]	 512/444-2323	     *	Austin, TX 78760  *
* cs.utexas.edu!dogface!fnordbox!loydb		     *	512/447-7866	  *
***************************************************************************






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Bruce.Baugh@p23.f40.n105.z1.fidonet.org (Bruce Baugh)
Date: Mon, 22 Feb 93 08:45:22 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: subscribe
Message-ID: <730377978.AA01324@therose.pdx.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Please add me to your mailing list. Thanks!
UUCP !qiclab!therose   INTERNET: therose.fidonet.org  FIDONET: 1:105/7.0 
UUCP <> FidoNet(tm) Gate is a public service provided by therose.pdx.com.
   **Reply messages should not be sent to/through therose.pdx.com**





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Jay Prime Positive <jpp@markv.com>
Date: Mon, 22 Feb 93 00:57:57 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Computer Virus Origins
In-Reply-To: <9302190714.AA23494@netcom.netcom.com>
Message-ID: <9302220055.aa26050@hermix.markv.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


  It has been a bit of a sore point with me for some years.  When Fred
Cohen wrote his thesis he credited Len Adelman ((the A in RSA) our
professor at the time) with coining the term "virus".  In fact it was
I who did this.  It was I who introduced the class to the concept of
computer viruses.  I developed the idea with a guy named Eric ??? with
whom I worked at the time.  It was in private with Eric that I came up
with the name (or perhaps he may have sugested it).  I based the idea
on the "worm" from one of John Brunner's novels which I had just read.

  The name is a natural choice for this class of program, and I don't
doubt that others may have nearly simultaneuosly come upon the same
idea.  I certainly didn't write the first virus.

j' (computer virus meme source)




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Crys Rides <crys@cave.tcp.COM>
Date: Mon, 22 Feb 93 03:52:21 PST
To: Eli Brandt <ebrandt@jarthur.Claremont.EDU>
Subject: msdos perl
In-Reply-To: <9302220342.AA07039@toad.com>
Message-ID: <9302221150.AA00474@ucunix.san.uc.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

>>>>> On Sun, 21 Feb 93 19:41:06 PST, Eli Brandt <ebrandt@jarthur.Claremont.EDU> said:

> Slight complaint:  The only available port of perl to DOS is 386 or
> higher only,

Eli> The perl419x.zip in simtel:msdos/perl doesn't even use the 386.
Eli> However, those without 386 + memory manager may have a bit of
Eli> a hard time with memory.  I don't know about the perl4019.zip in
Eli> the same directory; I snarfed it to check, but it has no docs (and
Eli> I don't care to disassemble for 386 code!)

The executeable in the file you refer to can also be ftp'd from
tandem.com, it's source site, in the directory /pub/perl. To quote
the README file for that directory:

Last updated: Saturday, February 1, 1992
Latest bcdos version of Perl: 1.4

This is a port of Perl 4.019 to MS-DOS using Borland C++ V3.0.  It will
NOT compile with versions of BC++ prior to 3.0.

The port is complete given the functionality of DOS versus UNIX.  Support
will be added in the future for ndbm() routines using GNU-ndbm (when I
get around to it !).

The port makes use of Borland's VROOM technology and pretty much *requires*
access to extended memory.  There is approx. 300+ Kbytes of memory available
          ^^^^^^^^
for Perl scripts.  The amount of memory available can be checked using
two user subroutines added via Larry Wall's usersub.c hook.

	&heapfree()	- returns size of far heap in bytes
	&stkfree()	- returns size of free stack

The port also makes use of xspawn() (available from Simtel or Wuarchive
if you look hard enough) and will swap itself to either extended memory
or disk when Perl invokes the system() call.  This leaves about 605 Kbytes
of memory available for DOS apps on my 386 machine running DOS 5.0.

I've run this port of Perl against all the test cases supplied in the
normal Perl release.  They all work except those that call perl again
(not enough memory !) or have specific UNIX dependencies (that dont work
on DOS - too bad !).

This version of Perl has been tested on both 286 and 386 machines with
and without extended memory.  If you find problems on a specific machine
I would like to hear about them but don't necessarily commit to fix them.
As per the Artistic and GNU licenses, you get what you paid for and your 
on your own !


There are three files herein:

	bcv14_perl4-019.zip

		Contains all the source files.
		There are only one or two files that have changed from
		the standard 4.019 release (nice job lwall on portable
		code !).

	bcv14_perl4-019E.zip

		Contains the executeable for perl PERL.EXE and all the
		library files for perl.  If you don't intend to re-build
		PERL, then THIS IS THE FILE FOR YOU !

	xspawn34.zip

		This file contains the xspawn routine used by bcdos_Perl
		to swap out to extended memory or disk when running
		child processes.  It is identical to the the one that can
		be found on simtel or wuarchive.

Nota bene re extended memory;

This port attempts to reserve 128K bytes of extended memory for the
VROOM arena.  A 64K arena ran like a DOG so this is about the optimum 
size of memory versus speed.


Happy hacking !
Stuart G. Phillips N6TTO/G8HQA/DA4BM/OZ... (you get the idea)
[stu@tandem.com]

I've not encountered a non 286/386/486 with extended memory, which
this file says it requires.  Plus there is no testing on machines
other than those.  I've attempted to run this on an antiquated
8088.  It simply executes and drops back to the command line
without action.  Much as I feel perl would be an easy and useful way
to code this up, I don't feel it's a tool with the broadest reach
at this time for DOS.  Sorry.

> CrysRides

Eli>    Eli   ebrandt@jarthur.claremont.edu

CrysRides
again

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.1

iQCVAgUBK4i64JSqD+bQ7So3AQGA9wP/bcK1XiUJD2fCv6DslWXF9SGJjpg+XmZT
UbIXgk34EpQV2dvbpIv8Rb8w9kKHEsj+sb+Koxad2m2qDJPa0rPYD4VzUbBHEmIC
DTctXvcemjlwzLRHp19Udn3nMchtvnEz2hb0ZkTyBkuVJYrkU5r8HgCr2etpPgyX
IWwBsIINGGo=
=6W7Q
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Karl Barrus <elee9sf@Menudo.UH.EDU>
Date: Mon, 22 Feb 93 06:20:49 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: list of remailers
Message-ID: <199302221419.AA04336@Menudo.UH.EDU>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Paul Ferguson asks for a list of remailers.  Here's it the latest one
I have:

 1: hh@pmantis.berkeley.edu 
 2: hh@cicada.berkeley.edu 
 3: hh@soda.berkeley.edu 
 4: nowhere@bsu-cs.bsu.edu 
 5: ebrandt@jarthur.claremont.edu 
 6: hal@alumni.caltech.edu 
 7: remailer@rebma.mn.org 
 8: elee7h5@rosebud.ee.uh.edu 
 9: phantom@mead.u.washington.edu 
10: hfinney@shell.portal.com 
11: babani@cs.buffalo.edu 
12: remail@extropia.wimsey.com 

NOTES:
#1-#5	no encrypted remailing requests
#5-#12	support encrypted remailing requests; public key available
#2	requires remailing request to appear in header (am working on a
	PERL script which will do this)
#12	requires encryption (message and header together)
#7,#12	introduce larger than average time delay (which is probably a
	desirable thing!)

It's been a good week for remailers - three of them came to my
attention (nowhere@bsu, ebrandt@jarthur, babani@cs)!

/-----------------------------------\
| Karl L. Barrus                    |
| elee9sf@menudo.uh.edu             | <- preferred address
| barrus@tree.egr.uh.edu (NeXTMail) |
\-----------------------------------/




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Bruce.Baugh@p23.f40.n105.z1.fidonet.org (Bruce Baugh)
Date: Mon, 22 Feb 93 23:39:17 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: unsubscribe
Message-ID: <730436572.AA01330@therose.pdx.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I find that I must ask to have this address removed from your
mailing list. Sorry for the inconvenience.
UUCP !qiclab!therose   INTERNET: therose.fidonet.org  FIDONET: 1:105/7.0 
UUCP <> FidoNet(tm) Gate is a public service provided by therose.pdx.com.
   **Reply messages should not be sent to/through therose.pdx.com**





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: mark@coombs.anu.edu.au (Mark)
Date: Sun, 21 Feb 93 14:19:32 PST
To: ebrandt@jarthur.Claremont.EDU (Eli Brandt)
Subject: Re: Sources for perl code
In-Reply-To: <9302212101.AA26262@toad.com>
Message-ID: <9302212218.AA27312@coombs.anu.edu.au>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>You might want to work in perl, which would make the scripts work under
>Unix and DOS, at least.  Is there a Mac perl?

On coombs.anu.edu.au in /pub/perl/misc/perl.code.sources there is a list
of places to get perl source/binaries for Ataris, IBMs, Macs, and VMS.
Unix is available everywhere in the GNU sections of ftp archives.

Also there is a large number of scripts in /pub/perl/scripts.

See the README file for usage details and for the European mirror site.
The INDEX file lists each script and gives a short description.

Hope this helps,

Mark
mark@coombs.anu.edu.au




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Date: Mon, 22 Feb 93 10:18:19 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Key Registration
Message-ID: <9302221816.AA13316@netcom.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>Recently there was a thread on a public-key program that would involve a
>central, government-backed-or-authorized agency to issue key pairs and
>serve as a repository. Could someone please post some details on this --
>I seem to have gotten it into my head that this is how PEM works, and I
>don't know whether I'm right or just medicated. :-)
>
>Loyd

The proposal was slightly different and has not been officially proposed as
any kind of law. Here are some more details:

* Dorothy Denning, noted cypto and security expert, floated a trial balloon
at the Computer Security Conference last fall. (I summarized it and posted
it to sci.crypt, where more than 1000 messages related to this thread, "A
Trial Balloon to Ban Encryption?," eventually appeared.)

* Under her proposal, a user of P-K methods would take his _private_ key
and encrypt it to the _public_ key of an agency like the Justice Department
(which I'll use from now on to represent the government side). The
encrypted key would then be placed in a repository with another agency,
perhaps a private agency like the CPSR or even the EFF. The key storage
agency obviously could not read the messages (as they would be encryped to
the Justice Deparment's key).

* A properly-obtained warrant could then be presented to the key
repository, obtaining the specific key. The Justice Department could then
decrypt with its private key and thus have the private key of the user.

* Ostensibly, this prevents the Justice Department from simply snooping
through whatever messages it wishes to read.

* There are some obvious practical and constitutional issues:

- What happened to constitutional rights to privacy? Analogously, must one
escrow personal diaries? Install tape recorders in all private places and
escrow copies of all tapes? (Lots of comparisons to free speech, to gun
control, etc.)

- What happens when people register the "wrong" key? Is this even detectable?

- If "noise" is sent, will the Justice Department demand the "key" be
presented? How? And what penalties for noncompliance?

- Many applications demand dynamic generation of keys---many public keys,
many session keys, etc. How will these be registered? What fees?

- It seems likely that a key registration scheme will also place limits on
many of the things we hold dear on this list--digital money, anonymous
systems, remailers, and all the other wonders of crypto anarchy.

There's a lot more. And there was a lot of debate in sci.crypt about this.

Fortunately, I don't see any further moves to make this a law. But it may
come in a few years.

-Tim May
--
Timothy C. May               | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,  
tcmay@netcom.com        | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
408-688-5409               | knowledge, reputations, information markets, 
W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA       | black markets, collapse of governments.
Higher Power: 2^756839 | Public Key: MailSafe and PGP available.





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Eli Brandt <ebrandt@jarthur.Claremont.EDU>
Date: Mon, 22 Feb 93 10:42:31 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: msdos perl
In-Reply-To: <no.id>
Message-ID: <9302221842.AA20199@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> The executeable in the file you refer to can also be ftp'd from
> tandem.com, it's source site, in the directory /pub/perl. To quote
> the README file for that directory:

> The port makes use of Borland's VROOM technology and pretty much *requires*
> access to extended memory.  There is approx. 300+ Kbytes of memory available
>           ^^^^^^^^
(emphasis not mine)

Which means a 286, not a 386.  If there are a lot of people out there on
8086 machines, sorry.  People with that particular problem are going to
have a hard time running most modern software, let alone Unix ports.

> This version of Perl has been tested on both 286 and 386 machines with
> and without extended memory.

> CrysRides

	 PGP 2 key by finger or e-mail
   Eli   ebrandt@jarthur.claremont.edu




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: an5877@anon.penet.fi (deadbeat)
Date: Mon, 22 Feb 93 10:18:03 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Bug in the anon.penet.fi remailer
Message-ID: <9302221721.AA07390@anon.penet.fi>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

I believe I have uncovered a serious bug in the Finnish anonymous
remailer, one that allows me to piece together anonymous id's and
actual email addresses.

I'm reluctant to publish the details here, but I'll explain how it
works if you send me your email address.

> DEADBEAT

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.1

iQBFAgUBK4kCn/FZTpBW/B35AQEOkgF/euVoBz+q3iOb8oAFWaF5n/lPIIv76L0y
eT0bYJl7RebSiyV8tWzXWNibZrPn1aPc
=6ZVT
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
To find out more about the anon service, send mail to help@anon.penet.fi.
Due to the double-blind system, any replies to this message will be anonymized,
and an anonymous id will be allocated automatically. You have been warned.
Please report any problems, inappropriate use etc. to admin@anon.penet.fi.
*IMPORTANT server security update*, mail to update@anon.penet.fi for details.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: eric_r@zeus.c-engr2.siu.edu (Eric Rainbolt)
Date: Mon, 22 Feb 93 09:59:31 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Cancel subsciption
Message-ID: <9302221755.AA08329@zeus.c-engr2.siu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


please unsubscribe me from the mailing list

				ejr








From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Eli Brandt <ebrandt@jarthur.Claremont.EDU>
Date: Mon, 22 Feb 93 12:43:38 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Being kind to 8086 users - was: Re: msdos perl
In-Reply-To: <9302222004.AA00911@anchor.ho.att.com>
Message-ID: <9302222043.AA22967@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> There's one part of the market that's still heavily populated with
> 8086 machines - portables.

Good point.  Perhaps maintaining compatibility with this particular
archaism is not a bad idea after all.  Urk.

> 				Bill Stewart

   Eli   ebrandt@jarthur.claremont.edu




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: scott@shrug.dur.ac.uk (Scott A. McIntyre)
Date: Mon, 22 Feb 93 04:52:41 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com (Cypherpunks)
Subject: PGP question
Message-ID: <m0nQccr-000M5rC@shrug.dur.ac.uk>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



I'm sure this isn't the right place for this question, but what the hell.   
I've added a second mailing address to my public key, but this causes a  
validity error (unknown sigantor) when checked with -kc.  


How can I go about making that go away so that people who check will not be  
greeted by this message?  


Only been in PGP a week,
Scott




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: pmetzger@shearson.com (Perry E. Metzger)
Date: Mon, 22 Feb 93 11:10:37 PST
To: jpp@markv.com
Subject: Re: Computer Virus Origins
Message-ID: <9302221811.AA14814@maggie.shearson.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



> From: Jay Prime Positive <jpp@markv.com>
>   It has been a bit of a sore point with me for some years.  When Fred
> Cohen wrote his thesis he credited Len Adelman ((the A in RSA) our
> professor at the time) with coining the term "virus".  In fact it was
> I who did this.  It was I who introduced the class to the concept of
> computer viruses.  I developed the idea with a guy named Eric ??? with
> whom I worked at the time.  It was in private with Eric that I came up
> with the name (or perhaps he may have sugested it).  I based the idea
> on the "worm" from one of John Brunner's novels which I had just read.

Brunner's novel explicitly mentions the notion of viruses as well as
tapeworms. Remember the "phages"? A phage is a virus.

Perry




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: nowhere@bsu-cs.bsu.edu (Anonymous)
Date: Mon, 22 Feb 93 10:29:05 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: No Subject
Message-ID: <9302221825.AA18161@bsu-cs.bsu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

I believe I have uncovered a serious bug in the Finnish anonymous
remailer, one that allows me to piece together anonymous id's and
actual email addresses.

I'm reluctant to publish the details here, but I'll explain how it
works if you send me your email address.

> DEADBEAT

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.1

iQBFAgUBK4kCn/FZTpBW/B35AQEOkgF/euVoBz+q3iOb8oAFWaF5n/lPIIv76L0y
eT0bYJl7RebSiyV8tWzXWNibZrPn1aPc
=6ZVT
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
To find out more about the anon service, send mail to help@anon.penet.fi.
Due to the double-blind system, any replies to this message will be anonymized,
and an anonymous id will be allocated automatically. You have been warned.
Please report any problems, inappropriate use etc. to admin@anon.penet.fi.
*IMPORTANT server security update*, mail to update@anon.penet.fi for details.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: deltorto@aol.com
Date: Mon, 22 Feb 93 13:00:39 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Rambo Lives
Message-ID: <9302221330.tn00927@aol.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>>kelly@netcom.com
>>
>> [stuff removed]
>>                         ...the military in general and the
>>army , marines and and special intelligence agencies>, they 
>>are after all as their prime mission capable of extreme violence and the
>>taking of human life, as a means of social control.
>>Law enforcement seems to have very similiar mentality as well,
>>with CONTROL being the agenda and reason for existance-- 
>>Suppose we think of guerilla products such as PGP and anoynmous
>>posting mechanisms and forwarders  in their larger social sense
>>As behaviour modification for those who would have our privacy
>>as well as our lives

...and thus the government's decision to consider PGP (a privacy mechanism)
as "munitions." At first I thought it was outrageous, but it all makes
curious sense somehow when you bop yourself on the head the right way,
doesn't it?

I say we should ensure that as many citizens as possible get ahold of PGP as
soon as possible. After all, the NRA would have us believe that it's every
citizen's right to "bear arms," so why shouldn't we (especially those who
choose not to carry firearms like me) all have whatever sort of weapon we
choose to "carry?"

That's all for now, excuse me while I go hurl. All this crap really makes me
a bit ill, to tell you the truth. I only want the same respect I give to
other people, not a lot of static from a bunch of haircuts with sidearms.

  d2t

PS: Keep this in mind the next time you see someone you love patronize a
Rambo-style movie or play a game of shoot-'em-up Ninten
do - this is where the Bad Guys get their funding, lads.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: deltorto@aol.com
Date: Mon, 22 Feb 93 13:00:39 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Proposal - The 'Peterson.mil' Virus List
Message-ID: <9302221331.tn00928@aol.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Yo, Punks

I propose that we establish another list dedicated to the study of viruses
and name it after Keith Peterson. After all, why shouldn't he get some credit
for awakening a sleeping giant?

I want to know more about viruses so I can protect myself from
government-created viruses and so I can learn about the various mechanisms
involved.

In addition, the study of self-promulagting code has very positive
implications for the study of "smart email." For those of you who haven't
been following the exploits of General Magic and their Telescript protocol,
there will soon be mail which "delivers itself" to the right location. I'm
sure our members at General Magic can illuminate this subject further. The
implications of this technology reach into the world of encryption and
viruses and certainly further into the realm of privacy discussions.

Wot say, all?

   d2t





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: treason@gnu.ai.mit.edu
Date: Mon, 22 Feb 93 10:33:42 PST
Subject: No Subject
Message-ID: <9302221832.AA09541@spiff.gnu.ai.mit.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


 Does anyone know the status of this product?  Is it proprietary? What
 encryption algorityhms does it use?  Are there any flaws in it?

treason@gnu




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Hal <74076.1041@CompuServe.COM>
Date: Mon, 22 Feb 93 10:53:54 PST
To: Cypherpunks <cypherpunks@toad.com>
Subject: Government encryption
Message-ID: <930222183917_74076.1041_DHJ70-1@CompuServe.COM>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Loyd Blankenship asks whether PEM involves having a government agency create
key pairs.
 
I think this may be confusing two different issues.  PEM does not involve
having anyone else create key pairs for you.  You create your own keys and
keep the private key secret just as in any other public key system.
However, PEM requires you to get a "certificate" from an agency in order to
use the system.
 
The certificate-issuing agency is typically expected to be your employer or
your university, from my reading of the RFC's.  Large institutions like
these would issue certificates, which are basically similar to PGP's key
signatures, which certify that you are who you say you are.  The large
institutions themselves would have their own public keys signed by an agency
higher in some key-signing hierarchy.  Last I checked, the top of the
hierarchy was the company RSADSI; they would certify the companies and the
companies would certify the employees.  I think this part may have changed
a little in the last few drafts of the new RFC.
 
So, there's not really any government involvement.  There is a centralized
hierarchy for key signatures, but key generation is still an individual
activity.  Oh, yes, there may also be a charge for getting your key signed;
this charge might be borne by the company/university in some cases.  There
is also a provision to get a certificate outside this system; these
"persona" certificates wouldn't really vouch for anything but they would let
you use PEM.  I'm not sure what they will cost.
 
The other idea which Loyd might have been mixing up with this was Dorothy
Denning's proposal several months ago that all users of public key systems
be required to register their secret keys with some quasi-governmental
agency.  (Originally she proposed the Justice Department, then later
suggested an independent group.)  This way if the government wanted to spy
on your communications, it would have to get a court order (as it does now,
in theory, for wiretaps), and take this court order to the key-holding
agency to get them to reveal your secret keys.  Then it could read your
messages.
 
This proposal was subjected to a very strong attack led largely by our own
Tim May.  It soon became known as the "lead balloon" for its lack of support
and has not been heard of recently.  I don't think anyone would be terribly
surprised if some variant were to resurface, though.
 
Hal Finney
 






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: mccoy@ccwf.cc.utexas.edu (Jim McCoy)
Date: Mon, 22 Feb 93 11:49:17 PST
To: fnordbox!loydb@cs.utexas.edu (Loyd Blankenship)
Subject: Re: Government Encryption
In-Reply-To: <9302220445.AA00b4f@fnordbox.UUCP>
Message-ID: <9302221947.AA12383@tramp.cc.utexas.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text


Loyd Blankenship (fnordbox!loydb@cs.utexas.edu) writes:
> To: cypherpunks@toad.com
> Subject: Government Encryption
> 
> Recently there was a thread on a public-key program that would involve a
> central, government-backed-or-authorized agency to issue key pairs and
> serve as a repository. Could someone please post some details on this --

This "rumor" seems to be the result of two different, but not necessarily
better, events.  The first is an Usenet posting by Dorothy Denning (anyone
have a copy of this posting/report BTW, I seem to have lost mine and only
have the 400K or responses in sci.crypt...) and an article in the July 1992
CACM by Ron Rivest that suggested that people be required to register thier
_private_ keys with some government authority so that feds with a warrant
(and anyone with enough cash to bribe the civil servant sitting at the
"private-key desk") can break open messages and files encrypted using PKE.
The other is the PEM RFC that talked about certification authorities (and
mentioned that government institutions could be one type of, but not the
only type of, certification authority.  The two seem to have come together
into one nifty rumor that gives paranoid people ulcers and causes the rest
of us to be a little more vigilant... 

> I seem to have gotten it into my head that this is how PEM works, and I
> don't know whether I'm right or just medicated. :-)

No, not really.  PEM specifies a standard for exchange of encrypted mail
messages, but does not enforce a particular method of key certification.
They do talk a lot about certification authorities, but these are not
necessarily government institutions.  Check out RFC1113-1115 at your
friendly neighborhood RFC server.  The mrr-password.ps file on
soda.berkeley.edu in /pub/cypherpunks goes into a lot of detail about CAs
so you might also want to check that one out.

jim



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: nobody@rosebud.ee.uh.edu
Date: Mon, 22 Feb 93 12:44:13 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Beware of anon.penet.fi message!
Message-ID: <9302222044.AA22982@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Beware of the message about the security bug in the anon.penet.fi software!

If you do as requested, and send your true email address to an5877@anon.penet.fi
then he will see both your true email address and your anonymous address
(if you have one - if you don't, you will be assigned one and he will see
that).  Any future use you make of this anonymous server (say, to post
anonymously) will appear under that same anonymous address - and this
person will know your true email address that goes with it.

an5877's message appears to be a trick, designed to collect anonymous/real
address pairs.  Johan Helsingius should take action against this trickster.
Since he is learning other people's real addresses, perhaps it would be
appropriate for his own real address to be revealed.

But, this does point out that these systems which automatically assign
anonymous addrsses have several security flaws.  Johan has already had
to introduce a "password" feature to make it more difficult to send fakemail
that appears to be from a particular email address through the server,
thus revealing the corresponding anonymous address when it is delivered.

an5877's trick is a variant on one discussed in news.admin.policy where
it is pointed out that you can mail to someone via anon.penet.fi and
ask for information; when the return mail comes back it will be from that
person's anonymous address.  So again you can pair up real and anonymous
addresses.

These are serious problems.  We need some discussion of how to avoid these
simple tricks for defeating the anonymity while still having an easy-to-use
system.

::Xavier::





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: cp@jido.b30.ingr.com (Craig Presson)
Date: Mon, 22 Feb 93 12:58:17 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Trapdoors
In-Reply-To: <9302212232.AA12362@versant.com>
Message-ID: <199302222055.AA18782@jido.b30.ingr.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


In <9302212232.AA12362@versant.com>, henry strickland writes:
|> # From cypherpunks-request@toad.com Sun Feb 21 14:14:43 1993
|> # 
|> # Does anybody have a good idea what applications this is useful for?
|> 
|> The old CDC CYBER machines had population count in its instruction
|> set.  Perhaps some scientific-type programmers would know what they
|> used it for.  The CYBER did not have a lot of instructions -- they
|> were pretty practical about what they put in.   i.e.  != VAX 

More precedent: DG Eclipses have a COB (COunt Bits) instruction.
Interestingly enough, there seems to be no such instruction in the
VAX (This from R'ingTFM. I have pitifully little VAX experience.)
        ^
       /
------/---- cp@jido.b30.ingr.com (Craig Presson)
     /
    /





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: wcs@anchor.ho.att.com (Bill_Stewart(HOY002)1305)
Date: Mon, 22 Feb 93 12:05:06 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Being kind to 8086 users - was: Re: msdos perl
Message-ID: <9302222004.AA00911@anchor.ho.att.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text



The discussion on porting perl to MS-DOS led to the following comment:
> >*requires* access to extended memory.  There is approx. 300+ Kbytes of memory available
> >           ^^^^^^^^
> Which means a 286, not a 386.  If there are a lot of people out there on
> 8086 machines, sorry.  People with that particular problem are going to
> have a hard time running most modern software, let alone Unix ports.

There's one part of the market that's still heavily populated with 8086 machines - portables.
Especially cheap, lightweight portables, and palmtops like the HP95LX,
which people might use to do their private email from, or carry around to exchange PGP keys with,
or use as a smartcard for digicash and remote access to networks.
Another part is DOS emulation running on real machines - I think lots of that is 8086-like.

640K RAM is a hard limit to live with, and sometimes you just can't do it,
but it's nice if people don't *gratuitously* make their software not fit here.
There's lots of real work that can still be done on them, and really patient people
can even run Unix-like operating systems such as Minix.

				Bill Stewart



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Karl Barrus <elee9sf@Menudo.UH.EDU>
Date: Mon, 22 Feb 93 13:19:35 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: remailer scripts
Message-ID: <199302222118.AA18542@Menudo.UH.EDU>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Douglas Sinclair helped me uncover a subtle problem which may arise in
the use of the remailer scripts: since errors are redirected to
/dev/null or nul, if a key is untrusted (or isn't there), the script
will hang, waiting for input from a prompt you don't see.

New versions of hop.mail, hop.send, and anon.mail should be up at the
ftp site soon...

If anybody feels like porting these scripts to the Mac, Amiga, or VMS,
please feel free!  I know zippo about these platforms, as far as batch
languages.

Also, regarding compatibility with pc's - although the MSDOS script
language could stand some big time improvement, it seems the best to
use for max portability.  But I'll definitely attempt a PERL
translation and then the folks who can use PERL will be able to.

/-----------------------------------\
| Karl L. Barrus                    |
| elee9sf@menudo.uh.edu             | <- preferred address
| barrus@tree.egr.uh.edu (NeXTMail) |
\-----------------------------------/





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: an5877@anon.penet.fi (deadbeat)
Date: Mon, 22 Feb 93 20:56:30 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Beware of anon.penet.fi message!
Message-ID: <9302230431.AA28945@anon.penet.fi>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

Xavier hit the nail on the head -- my note was a subterfuge, intended
to reveal the association between anonymous id's and email addresses.

I think it's wrong for anon.penet.fi to operate this way.

> DEADBEAT

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.1

iQBFAgUBK4lD7/FZTpBW/B35AQGiCQF9HFeDhXk7FV9mhIMh9zGmxblLvCt8bszr
4daRmyo8/cJMK7Y5V7kfQN05CEdJo6oc
=KalQ
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
To find out more about the anon service, send mail to help@anon.penet.fi.
Due to the double-blind system, any replies to this message will be anonymized,
and an anonymous id will be allocated automatically. You have been warned.
Please report any problems, inappropriate use etc. to admin@anon.penet.fi.
*IMPORTANT server security update*, mail to update@anon.penet.fi for details.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: an5877@anon.penet.fi (deadbeat)
Date: Mon, 22 Feb 93 22:53:28 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Beware of anon.penet.fi message!
Message-ID: <9302230609.AA05038@anon.penet.fi>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

Xavier hit the nail on the head -- my note was a subterfuge, intended
to reveal the association between anonymous id's and email addresses.

I think it's wrong for anon.penet.fi to operate this way.

> DEADBEAT

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.1

iQBFAgUBK4lD7/FZTpBW/B35AQGiCQF9HFeDhXk7FV9mhIMh9zGmxblLvCt8bszr
4daRmyo8/cJMK7Y5V7kfQN05CEdJo6oc
=KalQ
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
To find out more about the anon service, send mail to help@anon.penet.fi.
Due to the double-blind system, any replies to this message will be anonymized,
and an anonymous id will be allocated automatically. You have been warned.
Please report any problems, inappropriate use etc. to admin@anon.penet.fi.
*IMPORTANT server security update*, mail to update@anon.penet.fi for details.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: David Reeve Sward <sward+@cmu.edu>
Date: Mon, 22 Feb 93 13:27:17 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Beware of anon.penet.fi message!
In-Reply-To: <9302222044.AA22982@toad.com>
Message-ID: <YfWIGZe00iV346rPEa@andrew.cmu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Excerpts from list.cypherpunks: 22-Feb-93 Beware of anon.penet.fi mes..
by nobody@rosebud.ee.uh.edu 
> These are serious problems.  We need some discussion of how to avoid these
> simple tricks for defeating the anonymity while still having an easy-to-use
> system.

Perhaps a new header such as

X-Anon-Doubleblind: yes|no

defaulting to yes...?  As was said, the doubleblind system is a great
idea, but incomplete if you want to correspond to someone without
revealing your anon id.
-- 
David Sward    sward+@cmu.edu





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: jthomas@kolanut.mitre.org (Joe Thomas)
Date: Mon, 22 Feb 93 13:31:55 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Anon bug
Message-ID: <9302222129.AA02099@kolanut>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


an5877@anon.penet.fi (deadbeat) wrote:
>> I believe I have uncovered a serious bug in the Finnish anonymous
>> remailer, one that allows me to piece together anonymous id's and
>> actual email addresses.
>> 

>> I'm reluctant to publish the details here, but I'll explain how it
>> works if you send me your email address.

To which Julf replied:

>Hmm. How about letting me know about it so that I have a chance to  
fix
>it?

I'm worried that the "serious bug" might be that the system won't  
prevent the gullible from mailing "deadbeat" their e-mail addresses  
through penet.  Once they've done that, he can "piece together" their  
anonymous IDs and email addresses quite easily.

I hope I'm wrong about this, though...

Joe
(Who is not writing virii at the MITRE Corporation... not doing much  
at all, really)




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Jumping Jack Flash <DDLEEDS@VM.CMP.ILSTU.EDU>
Date: Mon, 22 Feb 93 14:48:22 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Mac HD Cypher...
Message-ID: <9302222248.AA25236@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Does anyone know of a way or program that can completely encrypt a hard drive o
n a macintosh computer so that only the person that knows the key can decrypt i
t?  I am looking for a crypt that is completely IMPENETRABLE!!!
Your help would be appreciated,


Jumping Jack Flash




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: The Phantom <phantom@u.washington.edu>
Date: Mon, 22 Feb 93 16:51:07 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Unbreakable MacHD encryption
Message-ID: <Pine.3.05.9302221616.A8601-9100000@stein2.u.washington.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



You could also look at the new Norton Utilities package -- It says it uses
DES as the encryption engine.


Matt Thomlinson
University of Washington, Seattle, Washington.
Internet: phantom@u.washington.edu      	    phone: (206) 528-5732
PGP 2.1 key availaible via email or finger phantom@hardy.u.washington.edu





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Eric Hughes <hughes@soda.berkeley.edu>
Date: Mon, 22 Feb 93 17:00:03 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Remailer Use
In-Reply-To: <9302230010.AA11413@bsu-cs.bsu.edu>
Message-ID: <9302230056.AA16126@soda.berkeley.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Re: not discriminating between remailer mail and user mail.

The problem of persons uneducated in remailers not distinguishing
between different kinds of mail is a problem that will scale badly.
It looks like a problem that will have to be solved for any design
which relies on user accounts for remailing.  I have one suggestion,
but I'd like to hear others.

Suggestion--Put a big "Comment:" field in each remailed message which
explains what is going on.  Regular users will get tired of it, no
doubt.  Perhaps it could be called "X-Remailer-Education:"

Eric




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Eric Hughes <hughes@soda.berkeley.edu>
Date: Mon, 22 Feb 93 17:21:05 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: whistleblower newsgroup?
In-Reply-To: <9302210334.AA02268@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Message-ID: <9302230117.AA18417@soda.berkeley.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



The moderator to alt.whistleblower, instead of a person's mail
address, could be a mail alias which invokes a header field stripper.
That way it would be impossible to post to the group with your
identity in the header.  Every posting anonymous!  Sort of like a
mathematical dual of alt.forgery.

I would also suggest a periodic posting explaining exactly how secure
that is.  (Proof against casual attack, but not against local or
global network monitoring.)

It seems easy enough.  I'd do it myself if I had root anywhere.  The
perl scripts for remailing would be easily hacked.  You could even
retain the automatic PGP decryption for the more informed, the more
paranoid.

Eric




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: mccoy@ccwf.cc.utexas.edu (Jim McCoy)
Date: Mon, 22 Feb 93 15:28:18 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Mac HD Cypher...
In-Reply-To: <9302222248.AA25236@toad.com>
Message-ID: <9302222327.AA14360@tramp.cc.utexas.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text


Jumping Jack Flash <DDLEEDS@VM.CMP.ILSTU.EDU> writes:
> 
> Does anyone know of a way or program that can completely encrypt a hard
> drive on a macintosh computer so that only the person that knows the key
> can decrypt it?  

That depends, do you want to be able to use the drive once it has been
encrypted (e.g. decrypt on-demand for necessary files) or do you just want
to turn the whole thing into a lump of jumbled bits that must be decrypted
en masse to be usable again?  If you are looking for the former then I
believe that there is a product out there called FileLock or something
similar that will let you encrypt fils, folders, and entire drives in a
method that requires a password to gain access again.  I think that it also
does this "on demand" so that you can have an encrypted file that asks you
for the password when you pull it up in your word processor (or a folder
that asks for the password when you want to get a file from it), etc.  If
you just want to lock the whole drive then I believe that there is a DES
package that will let you crunch a while drive.

> I am looking for a crypt that is completely IMPENETRABLE!!! 

No such beast exists.

jim



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: treason@gnu.ai.mit.edu
Date: Mon, 22 Feb 93 14:30:13 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: moby crypt
Message-ID: <9302222227.AA01364@spiff.gnu.ai.mit.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Ok ok, my mailer is geeking, it has no real mailer here anyway.  None the
less I wanted to know if moby crypt is available, wher and what encryption
method it utilizes...I was told it supported several formats...
What are they??
What are the flaws?

treason@gnu



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: eric@Synopsys.COM
Date: Mon, 22 Feb 93 17:53:47 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Remailer Use
Message-ID: <199302230152.AA02878@gaea.synopsys.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Eric Hughes <hughes@soda.berkeley.edu> writes:

>> Suggestion--Put a big "Comment:" field in each remailed message which
>> explains what is going on.  Regular users will get tired of it, no
>> doubt.  Perhaps it could be called "X-Remailer-Education:"
>> 
>> Eric

My solution to this has two parts.

Part 1: mixes should refuse to resend mail to anywhere except the owner
of the mix or other (registered with it) mixes.

Part 2: someone should provide a service that sends a standard text
message to an arbitrary address.  The text message should tell the
recipient how to run a mix and register it with the network of mixes.
It will also say that someone wishes to contact them anonymously.

This should help calm people's fears that they might be held
responsible for abusive messages sent through a mix under their
control.  It is hard for someone to complain about receiving an
anonymous message when they had to explicitly run a piece of software
to be able to receive any anonymous messages at all.

The incentive structure for this system encourages people to run mixes
if they want to retain anonymity.  It has an advantage over filters
that keep a list of places to not send to:  it is a positive filtering
scheme, rather than a negative one, and thus should scale better.

The person who runs the standard text sender of part 2 can feel
comfortable being responsible for the messages sent out because they
wrote or approved the text.  They can throttle the service so the
message can only be sent occasionally to any given address, and block
it entirely for anyone who requests it.

For this to work, we need to have an easily installable mix package
that will run on a large variety of machines.  Not easy, but it should
be where we're heading anyway.

-eric messick (eric@synopsys.com)






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Eric Hughes <hughes@soda.berkeley.edu>
Date: Mon, 22 Feb 93 18:18:28 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Timed-Release Crypto
In-Reply-To: <9302101955.AA09009@netcom.netcom.com>
Message-ID: <9302230205.AA23892@soda.berkeley.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


By coincidence, I was thinking about time-release protocols the other
day.  I've got most of a system worked out, but I need to write it up
and look at it for a while to make sure it works.  what I think I have
is a system in which the sender is given a key by a beacon which he
can verify, at issuance time, will be revealed by the beacon at some
future time.  The implementation (but not the basic idea) relies on
using multiple public RSA keys with the same modulus.  I know there
are some attacks against this, but I don't know their nature.  If
someone who knows about this (or knows where to find out) could
contact me I would be most appreciative.

As far as sending money into the future goes, there are some tradeoffs
between anonymity of payment, length of time in the future, and
message size.  Anonymity of payment is difficult, since digital cash
has to expire in order for the bank not have to keep ever huger lists
of deposited numbers.  Large payments are less frequent anyway, and
provide less covering traffic.  If you continuously rotate your money
into the future, therefore, all the steps must be encapsulated, making
the size of the message grow linearly with the number of hops.  One
might be able to use a financial intermediary for anonymity, though.
It's not obvious to me that this will work.

Eric




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Eric Hughes <hughes@soda.berkeley.edu>
Date: Mon, 22 Feb 93 18:14:12 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: PC Eudora
Message-ID: <9302230211.AA24235@soda.berkeley.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I sent some mail to pc-eudora-info@qualcomm.com about the status of an
MSDOS version of eudora that worked over a straight serial line (i.e.
a modem dialup) rather than a TCP/IP stack.  The reply I got back said
that they had talked about it, but had not planned it in yet.

Anybody itching to do the world a favor who can do this should contact
them directly and volunteer.  Consider this an open invitation.

Eric




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: paul@fairgate.com (Paul Robichaux)
Date: Tue, 23 Feb 93 05:50:52 PST
To: Crys Rides <crys@cave.tcp.COM>
Subject: Re: anonymous mail
Message-ID: <m0nQzDn-0001cvC@gw.CrystalData.COM>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>Eli> You might want to work in perl, which would make the scripts work under
>Eli> Unix and DOS, at least.  Is there a Mac perl?
>
>...  As for a Mac Perl, a quick scan of my
>Camel book doesn't turn up a mention of one.  I could have missed it.

There is indeed a Mac perl; it exists as a standalone app and an MPW tool.
I'll post the location tomorrow if I remember to look it up; the
Internet-abled can try archie.

-Paul
--
Paul Robichaux, KD4JZG       |  Fairgate Technologies: Macintosh support, 
paul@fairgate.com            |  training, and development.
..uunet!xavax!fairgate!paul |  'ripem' PEM key available.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: mccoy@ccwf.cc.utexas.edu (Jim McCoy)
Date: Mon, 22 Feb 93 16:33:42 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Rambo Lives
In-Reply-To: <9302221330.tn00927@aol.com>
Message-ID: <9302230032.AA15285@tramp.cc.utexas.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text


deltorto@aol.com
> >>kelly@netcom.com
[...]
> >>Law enforcement seems to have very similiar mentality as well,
> >>with CONTROL being the agenda and reason for existance-- 

Not meaning to be an appologist for law enforcement agencies (some of whom
have gone off the deep end, this much is true...) but the purpose of law
enforcement agencies is to enforce the laws and protect the populace.  If
you disagree with what they are doing, change the laws.  Most of them are
people doing a thankless job that I would never want to have...

> >>Suppose we think of guerilla products such as PGP and anoynmous
> >>posting mechanisms and forwarders  in their larger social sense
> >>As behaviour modification for those who would have our privacy
> >>as well as our lives
> 
> ...and thus the government's decision to consider PGP (a privacy mechanism)
> as "munitions." At first I thought it was outrageous, but it all makes
> curious sense somehow when you bop yourself on the head the right way,
> doesn't it?

While we now look at this classification as "munitions" as somewhat silly,
please remember when ITAR was established: 1943.  At the time the US was at
war, cryptographic devices were _real machines_, computers occupied entire
buildings.  The government did not decide to classify PGP as munitions, it
classified _all_ cryptographic machines and processes as munitions (materials
necessary for war) and at the time it was a very easy equivalence to make.
There is a very good article about this by Peter Denning (and other
crypto-related articles) in the July 1992 issue of Communications of the
ACM. Now advanced cryptographic methods are used in private communications
and business but the old definitions remain...

> I say we should ensure that as many citizens as possible get ahold of PGP as
> soon as possible.

Definitely.  Spread the source.


jim



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Crys Rides <crys@cave.tcp.COM>
Date: Mon, 22 Feb 93 15:48:25 PST
To: Eli Brandt <ebrandt@jarthur.Claremont.EDU>
Subject: Re: Being kind to 8086 users - was: Re: msdos perl
In-Reply-To: <9302222004.AA00911@anchor.ho.att.com>
Message-ID: <9302222334.AA07621@ucunix.san.uc.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

>>>>> On Mon, 22 Feb 93 12:42:23 PST, Eli Brandt <ebrandt@jarthur.Claremont.EDU> said:

> There's one part of the market that's still heavily populated with
> 8086 machines - portables.

Eli> Good point.  Perhaps maintaining compatibility with this particular
Eli> archaism is not a bad idea after all.  Urk.

Second reason for compatibility that I was too sleep-depped to think
of this morning in my reply, is that do we really want to assume the
position that for the reasonable chunk of possible users out there
using 8088 or 8086 processors that we're going to tell them if they
don't plunk down the cash for a new system they can't get the
anonymity those more wealthy than them can?;>  Sounds just a trifle
arrogant to me, but then...

> 				Bill Stewart

Eli>    Eli   ebrandt@jarthur.claremont.edu

CrysRides

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.1

iQCVAgUBK4lWZpSqD+bQ7So3AQHhhgP/TddlrWx4hKQCeudOD3/v11ObegGCyqzj
ul3ZrDjcDsr5UTunBwpuN3Dt+UP/LBO3kccDM6o3BWLo4LdlWQR1cHa+UGlBnhon
gUkXVaRTSq4J4yz0BH0yYMCgdLeZu9nMl/DwqZX1GUwT85XwwONbp28yky+v5RFp
Ok7D259A5q4=
=SZ9t
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: nowhere@bsu-cs.bsu.edu (Chael Hall)
Date: Mon, 22 Feb 93 16:13:55 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Remailer Use
Message-ID: <9302230010.AA11413@bsu-cs.bsu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



     I would like to let everyone who hasn't already figured it out
know that I did *not* originate the message that was posted to
Cypherpunks through my account.  I do not know where it came from,
but it reached my account with the destination address of the
cypherpunks list because the message that came back to me from the
list said that "Anonymous <nowhere@bsu-cs.bsu.edu>" originated the
message.  That indicates that it went through the remailer.  If it
were from me, it would say "Chael Hall <nowhere@bsu-cs.bsu.edu>"
as the return address.  Another identifying characteristic is the
"X-Remailed-By: Anonymous <nowhere@bsu-cs.bsu.edu>" header line.
Just remember, don't believe everything you read.

Chael Hall

--
Chael Hall
nowhere@bsu-cs.bsu.edu, 00CCHALL@BSUVC.BSU.EDU, CHALL@CLSV.Charon.BSU.Edu
(317) 285-3648 after 5 pm EST




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: an5877@anon.penet.fi (deadbeat)
Date: Mon, 22 Feb 93 22:33:49 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Beware of anon.penet.fi message!
Message-ID: <9302230604.AA04535@anon.penet.fi>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

This is a longer response to the warning posted by Xavier.

> Beware of the message about the security bug in the
> anon.penet.fi software!

Indeed.

> If you do as requested, and send your true email address to
> an5877@anon.penet.fi then he will see both your true email
> address and your anonymous address (if you have one - if you
> don't, you will be assigned one and he will see that).  Any
> future use you make of this anonymous server (say, to post
> anonymously) will appear under that same anonymous address - and
> this person will know your true email address that goes with
> it.

You got me.  

I meant only slight malice here:  I had intended to "expose" a few
email/anon associations to highlight the problem.  The problem became
apparent to me when I sent pseudonymous mail to a prominent person on
this list; his reply exposed his pseudonymous id at anon.penet.fi,
surely without his knowledge.

> an5877's message appears to be a trick, designed to collect
> anonymous/real address pairs.  Johan Helsingius should take
> action against this trickster.  Since he is learning other
> people's real addresses, perhaps it would be appropriate for his
> own real address to be revealed.

Now that would be a _very_ serious "bug" in the anon.penet.fi remailer
(or, more accurately, in its administration); I am confident Johan
Helsingius will reject this suggestion.

> But, this does point out that these systems which automatically
> assign anonymous addrsses have several security flaws.  Johan
> has already had to introduce a "password" feature to make it
> more difficult to send fakemail that appears to be from a
> particular email address through the server, thus revealing the
> corresponding anonymous address when it is delivered.

I think that merely masks the real problem.

> an5877's trick is a variant on one discussed in
> news.admin.policy where it is pointed out that you can mail to
> someone via anon.penet.fi and ask for information; when the
> return mail comes back it will be from that person's anonymous
> address.  So again you can pair up real and anonymous
> addresses.

I missed that discussion, or I wouldn't have wasted your (our) time.

> These are serious problems.  We need some discussion of how to
> avoid these simple tricks for defeating the anonymity while
> still having an easy-to-use system.

Any ideas?  For starters, I think the default behavior of anon.penet.fi
is badly broken.  But a more serious problem with anon.penet.fi and the
other remailers I am aware of is the necessity that we pseudonymous
clients have to rely on the integrity of their administrators to keep
our pseudonyms private.  In the face of social pressure, such as
Xavier's, that may be asking a lot.

> ::Xavier::

DEADBEAT

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.1

iQBFAgUBK4lr4/FZTpBW/B35AQGqeAF/UBefmNprQacueYazdvhAKMF4nA+2vl44
/+FMACnWjd7yaoG99VeyhO/S6vptT1UB
=yZRb
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
To find out more about the anon service, send mail to help@anon.penet.fi.
Due to the double-blind system, any replies to this message will be anonymized,
and an anonymous id will be allocated automatically. You have been warned.
Please report any problems, inappropriate use etc. to admin@anon.penet.fi.
*IMPORTANT server security update*, mail to update@anon.penet.fi for details.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: an5877@anon.penet.fi (deadbeat)
Date: Mon, 22 Feb 93 22:33:29 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Remailer Use
Message-ID: <9302230604.AA04598@anon.penet.fi>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

>      I would like to let everyone who hasn't already figured it out
> know that I did *not* originate the message that was posted to
> Cypherpunks through my account.  I do not know where it came from,
> but it reached my account with the destination address of the
> cypherpunks list because the message that came back to me from the
> list said that "Anonymous <nowhere@bsu-cs.bsu.edu>" originated the
> message.  That indicates that it went through the remailer.  If it
> were from me, it would say "Chael Hall <nowhere@bsu-cs.bsu.edu>"
> as the return address.  Another identifying characteristic is the
> "X-Remailed-By: Anonymous <nowhere@bsu-cs.bsu.edu>" header line.
> Just remember, don't believe everything you read.

In the case of pseudonymous mail, don't believe _anything_ you read!

I don't see why Chael Hall is going to all this trouble to refute
a message that I don't even remember ...  Did I miss something
important?  (Or outre?)

Or (duh!) is he talking about _my_ earlier message?

DEADBEAT

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.1

iQBFAgUBK4lx8vFZTpBW/B35AQGnfwF/YdHtdc6B+oslFno9+rCowlph7GteEZF+
ot8jlZRA+gW+Sa1bpBUkV6ZryBlHYQMQ
=KMZW
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
To find out more about the anon service, send mail to help@anon.penet.fi.
Due to the double-blind system, any replies to this message will be anonymized,
and an anonymous id will be allocated automatically. You have been warned.
Please report any problems, inappropriate use etc. to admin@anon.penet.fi.
*IMPORTANT server security update*, mail to update@anon.penet.fi for details.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: nowhere@bsu-cs.bsu.edu (Chael Hall)
Date: Mon, 22 Feb 93 16:53:29 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Remailer Changes
Message-ID: <9302230050.AA14615@bsu-cs.bsu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



     I had an idea just a bit ago.  Here is the scenario:  a user wants
to know what my anonymous ID for nowhere@bsu-cs.bsu.edu is on anon.penet.fi.
All he has to do is send a message like the following to my account:

From: whomever@wherever.com
To: nowhere@bsu-cs.bsu.edu
X-Anon-To: anXXXX@anon.penet.fi  <-- his anon ID

...

     Then, that message will eventually get to him with my remailer's
anonymous ID on it!  That ID is the same as my personal ID.  Oops...
So, I made up a refuse list for the remailer.  Any address that contains
a "to" address that is on my refuse list will not be mailed to.  Complete
addresses can be used or just partial ones (for example "anon.penet.fi".)
I know that this also makes it impossible to mail to other users on the
penet site...  Oh, well.

     I just implemented the refuse list, so it will just "eat" any message
that is sent to an address on the refuse list.  No error message is sent
back to the user, it just doesn't get sent.  So, I guess my anonymous ID
is safe afterall.  :)  I would suggest that everyone else (if they
haven't already) refuse to remail to anon.penet.fi if their remailer is
setup on their personal account.

Chael Hall

--
Chael Hall
nowhere@bsu-cs.bsu.edu, 00CCHALL@BSUVC.BSU.EDU, CHALL@CLSV.Charon.BSU.Edu
(317) 285-3648 after 5 pm EST




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Brad Huntting <huntting@glarp.com>
Date: Mon, 22 Feb 93 19:38:42 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Rambo Lives
In-Reply-To: <9302230032.AA15285@tramp.cc.utexas.edu>
Message-ID: <199302230337.AA19045@misc.glarp.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



>> I say we should ensure that as many citizens as possible get ahold of PGP as
>> soon as possible.

> Definitely.  Spread the source.

But to realy get PGP going (or PEM for that matter) will require
wide spread key distribution.  It's clear that such distribution
mechanisms are not going to arise out of any "respectfull" institutions
mostly because of the legal entanglements they present.

Perhaps the time has come for "alt.pgp.keyrings".  A standard format
for postings could allow them to be automatically added to global
keyrings at usenet sites everywhere.  Several security issues will
have to be addressed before this can work.


brad




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: fergp@sytex.com (Paul Ferguson)
Date: Mon, 22 Feb 93 20:58:46 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Unforgotton topic
Message-ID: <gRqeZB1w165w@sytex.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I realize that this has already been an old topic amonst you folks,
but I just wanted to post a summary I found rather striking and an
issue I know still leaves a bad taste in our collective mouths -
 
"Threats to Privacy", "FBIs Wiretapping Proposal Thwarted", extracted
from Boardwatch Magazine, February, 1993, pages 19 - 22 ( BBS
Legislative Watch, Shari Steele, EFF) -
 
"In a move that worried privacy experts, software manufacturers and
telephone companies, the FBI proposed legislation to amend the
Communications Act of 1934 to make it easier for the Bureau to perform
electronic wiretappiing. The proposed legislation, entitled 'Digital
Telephony,' would have required communications service providers and
hardware manufacturers to make their systems 'tappable' by providing
'back doors' through which law enforcement officers could intercept
communications. Furthermore, this capability would have been provided
undetectably, while the communications was in progress, exclusive of
any communications between other parties, regardless of the mobility
of the target of the FBI's investigation, and without degradation of
service.
 
"The privacy implications are frightening. Today, all sorts of
information about who we are and what we do, such as medical records,
credit reports and employment data, are held on electronic databases.
If these databases have government-mandated 'tappability,' this
private information could be accessed by anyone tapping in. In
addition, the language in the proposed bill is vague. This is
especially troubling since, under the proposal, the Department of
Justice (DOJ) can keep communications products off the market if it
determines that these products do not meet the DOJ's own vague
guidelines. This will probably result in increased costs and reduced
competitiveness for service providers and equipment manufacturers,
since they will be unlikely to add any features that may result in a
DOJ rejection of their entire product. And to add insult to injury,
the FBI proposal suggests that the cost of this wiretapping 'service'
to the Bureau would have to be borne by the service provider itself,
which ultimately means you and I will be paying higher user fees.
 
"The Electronic Frontier Foundation organized a broad coalition of
public interest and industry groups, from Computer Professionals for
Social Responsibilty (CPSR) and the ACLU to AT&T and Sun
Microsystems, to oppose the legislation. A white paper produced by
the EFF and ratified by the coalition, entitled, 'An Analysis of the
FBI Digital Telephony Proposal,' was widely distributed throughout the
Congress. Senator Patrick Leahy (D-Vermont) and Representative Don
Edwards (D-California), chairs of two key committees, referred to the
EFF paper as they delayed the introduction of the FBI's proposal. As
Leahy stated before the Senate, 'Our goal is to assist law
enforcement,' but 'without jeopardizing privacy rights or frustrating
the development of new communications technologies.' The Justice
Department lobbied hard in the final days to get Congress to take up
the bill before Congress adjourned, but the bill never even found a
Congressional sponsor (and was therefore never officially introduced).
The FBI will almost certainly reintroduce "Digital Telephony" when the
103rd Congress convenes in January."
 
8<------------ End Article --------------
 
Take a stance. Voice your opinion. Write your congressman!
 
Paul Ferguson                     |  "Sincerity is fine, but it's no
Network Integration Consultant    |   excuse for stupidity."
Alexandria, Virginia USA          |                       -- Anonymous
fergp@sytex.com     (Internet)    |
sytex.com!fergp     (UUNet)       |
1:109/229           (FidoNet)     |
         PGP public encryption key available upon request.

---
fergp@sytex.com (Paul Ferguson)
Access <=> Internet BBS, a public access internet site
Sytex Communications, Arlington VA, 1-703-358-9022




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Karl Barrus <elee9sf@Menudo.UH.EDU>
Date: Mon, 22 Feb 93 18:57:37 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: remailers & anon.penet
Message-ID: <199302230256.AA03720@Menudo.UH.EDU>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Earlier, Chael Hall presented a creative and ingenious way to get
somebody's pseudonym on anon.penet.fi (well, at least the pseuodynm's
of remailers, if any).

But I think the attack won't work because Johan recently put a
password requirement into his software: with no password, the message
will bounce back.  Thus, in the attack described, the message will
wind up in your mailbox, alerting you that somebody is trying to
figure out your id!

Geez, this is somewhat exciting - reminds me of a _True Names_ world
in which others are constantly trying to figure out your real identity
while working to conceal theirs!

/-----------------------------------\
| Karl L. Barrus                    |
| elee9sf@menudo.uh.edu             | <- preferred address
| barrus@tree.egr.uh.edu (NeXTMail) |
\-----------------------------------/




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Johan Helsingius <julf@penet.FI>
Date: Mon, 22 Feb 93 11:23:05 PST
To: Anonymous <nowhere@bsu-cs.bsu.edu>
Subject: Re: Anon bug
In-Reply-To: <9302221825.AA18161@bsu-cs.bsu.edu>
Message-ID: <9302222030.aa09433@penet.penet.FI>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



> I believe I have uncovered a serious bug in the Finnish anonymous
> remailer, one that allows me to piece together anonymous id's and
> actual email addresses.
> 
> I'm reluctant to publish the details here, but I'll explain how it
> works if you send me your email address.
> 
> > DEADBEAT

Hmm. How about letting me know about it so that I have a chance to fix
it?

	Julf (admin@anon.penet.fi)





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Hal <74076.1041@CompuServe.COM>
Date: Mon, 22 Feb 93 19:25:06 PST
To: CYPHERPUNKS <CYPHERPUNKS@toad.com>
Subject: Anon address attack...
Message-ID: <930223022107_74076.1041_DHJ66-1@CompuServe.COM>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

It seems like there are several problems that arise from this "automatic"
anonymization of messages sent through the Penet remailer.

You have these security threats which involve people being tricked into
sending messages through the remailer in such a way that the recipient
knows the true email address from where the messages are coming.

(I think that is what happened here with "deadbeat", because otherwise
why would he have asked people to send their email addresses?  He wouldn't
need email addresses since he could reply to people without knowing them,
by just using a "reply" command in his mailer.)

(It's interesting that he also sent his message via one of the Cypherpunks
remailers.  Maybe he thought they worked like the Penet remailer and
he could break anonymity on those as well.)

Another problem that people have complained about is when they respond
to an anonymous posting, they get a message from Penet saying that they
now have an anonymous ID assigned.  This confuses and bothers some people.

We had some debate about this issue here several months ago (before
Penet was operating, I think).  One question is, if I send mail to
anonymous person A, does that mean or imply that I should be made
anonymous to A?  This is to some extent a matter of expectations.  Some
people argued that should be no expectation of anonymity in this case;
A is the one who wants to be anonymous, not the people who are sending
to him/her.  Others replied that since some anonymous remailers already
worked this way, there would be an expectation of anonymity, and so
the safest assumption was to anonymize all messages since people can
always override the anonymity by revealing their true addresses.

I think these attacks on Penet re-open these questions.  Evidentally
there is positive harm that can occur by automatically anonymizing
all messages which pass through a remailer.

(BTW, I certainly don't mean here to be presuming to tell Julf what
he should or should not do with Penet.  I'm just taking that as an
example.  We have discussed adding similar functionality to our Cypher-
punks remailers.

The main problem occurs when sending a message to an anonymous Penet
address.  For the other uses of the Penet remailer, for anonymous posting
and for mail to a non-anonymous address, it's more reasonable to assume
that anonymization is desired.  (Otherwise, why would they be using
the service?)  But when sending a message to an anonymous address,
it's not known whether the sender wants to be anonymized or not.

One possibility (which might not be that easy technically) would be to
assign a new anonymous ID for each such message through the Penet server.
This means that you would get a _different_ anonymous ID for each
of these messages, preventing an attacker from pairing up your "usual"
posting ID with your email address.  (Perhaps this anonymous ID
creation could be suppressed with another X- command, as proposed
earlier, but this could be the default behavior.)  It might be hard
to keep track of that many anonymous ID's, but perhaps they could be
kept active for only a limited period of time (several weeks or months)
and retired after that.

It might seem that people should just be careful about what they
send through Penet, but there are some problems with this.  What do
you do if you get a message from an5877@anon.penet.fi asking for
advice on cryptography mailing lists?  If you reply, your questioner
can figure out who the reply is coming from, and sees your Penet
alias.  There is no way to prevent this from happening currently.

Also, I have seen proposals that anonymous ID's should be made less
recognizable, so that instead of an5877@anon.penet.fi we would have
joe@serv.uba.edu.  In such a situation it might be tedious to
scrutinize every email address we send to (via replies, for example)
to make sure it isn't a remailer where you have an anonymous ID.

All in all, I think some changes need to be made in how anonymous
addresses are used and implemented in order to provide reasonable
amounts of security.

Hal Finney

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.1

iQCVAgUBK4lfIagTA69YIUw3AQGzQAQApOduiD7P2C26f7ml5tcOJf6xQff7bdV0
qw+zjOevW6hSBunOY59Qstkk5uQ2CoEALDAyUfKRsy7dionBAtCJYlwfX7uclHKL
Sonor8bg0NPHMP8SV/antacq00fK3b5wtiFFMn3WsjCvSEjhGoB9SIE/TB/zL9Et
Ow8JEodP488=
=cXHd
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: JTUCKER@VAX2.CSTP.UMKC.EDU
Date: Mon, 22 Feb 93 19:35:54 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: No Subject
Message-ID: <01GV1CASVU1C9QVVEO@vax2.cstp.umkc.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Unsubscribe




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: peter honeyman <honey@citi.umich.edu>
Date: Mon, 22 Feb 93 19:24:15 PST
To: wcs@anchor.ho.att.com (Bill_Stewart(HOY002)1305)
Subject: Re: Being kind to 8086 users - was: Re: msdos perl
In-Reply-To: <9302222004.AA00911@anchor.ho.att.com>
Message-ID: <9302230324.AA00302@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> There's one part of the market that's still heavily populated with
> 8086 machines - portables.

c'est what?  you must mean palmtops.  laptops and notebooks
run op systems like mach, bsd, plan 9, etc. -- they're not
running on 8086s.

of course, i can see wanting to run on an 8086 if it's guaranteed 
that it can't run perl.

	peter




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Peter Shipley <shipley@tfs.COM>
Date: Mon, 22 Feb 93 22:28:37 PST
To: Brad Huntting <huntting@glarp.com>
Subject: Re: Rambo Lives
In-Reply-To: <199302230337.AA19045@misc.glarp.com>
Message-ID: <9302230626.AA08227@edev0.TFS>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



>Perhaps the time has come for "alt.pgp.keyrings".  A standard format
>for postings could allow them to be automatically added to global
>keyrings at usenet sites everywhere.  Several security issues will
>have to be addressed before this can work.
>

the newsgroup alt.security.pgp has semi-regular keyring posting





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Hal <74076.1041@CompuServe.COM>
Date: Mon, 22 Feb 93 20:34:43 PST
To: CYPHERPUNKS <CYPHERPUNKS@toad.com>
Subject: Remailer to anon.penet.f
Message-ID: <930223033603_74076.1041_DHJ26-1@CompuServe.COM>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Chael Hall points out that remailer operators who use their personal
accounts for the remailing are vulnerable to having their anon.penet.fi
pseudonyms (if any) discovered by users who request remailing to that
site.

For those operating remailers based on the Perl scripts originally
written by Eric Hughes which I modified, I use the following maildelivery
file to prevent the attack Chael mentioned:

#
# field                 pattern action/ string 
#                               result  (quote included spaces)
#
Request-Remailing-To	anon.penet.fi	file	A	Bitbucket
Anon-To			anon.penet.fi	file	A	Bitbucket
Request-Remailing-To    ""      pipe A  remail.pl
Anon-To			""	pipe A  remail.pl
Encrypted               PGP     pipe A  pgpmail.pl
*                       ""      pipe ?  recurse.pl


This puts any message to anon.penet.fi into a file called Bitbucket.
My slocal.pl script does not support the slocal/maildelivery feature
which deletes a message, so this is the closest I can come.  (I suppose
another alternative would be to pipe it into "cat > /dev/null".  That
would look like:

Request-Remailing-To	anon.penet.fi	pipe	A	"cat > /dev/null"

I haven't tried this one.)

BTW, if anyone has made changes to the remailer scripts, please send
them to me.  I would like to clean up the scripts a little, add more
error checking, and submit a new version to the FTP site.

Hal Finney





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: peter honeyman <honey@citi.umich.edu>
Date: Mon, 22 Feb 93 19:38:12 PST
To: cp@jido.b30.ingr.com (Craig Presson)
Subject: Re: Trapdoors
In-Reply-To: <199302222055.AA18782@jido.b30.ingr.com>
Message-ID: <9302230338.AA00441@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> Interestingly enough, there seems to be no such instruction in the
> VAX ...

but i believe the vax has ffs (find first set) instruction, which seems
to have similar uses (whatever they may be).

	peter




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Eli Brandt <ebrandt@jarthur.Claremont.EDU>
Date: Mon, 22 Feb 93 23:00:28 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Anon address attack...
In-Reply-To: <930223022107_74076.1041_DHJ66-1@CompuServe.COM>
Message-ID: <9302230700.AA03047@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> One possibility (which might not be that easy technically) would be to
> assign a new anonymous ID for each such message through the Penet server.

I was thinking of installing a trivial hack in my remailer, such that
upon demand it adds some random (essentially unrepeatable) cruft to
the From: line, placing it as a name field so as to have no
addressing significance.  I believe penet assigns IDs based on this
line, so chaining this to a penet-style remailer would provide
"hit-and-run" anonymity -- even if the remailer wants nothing of the
sort.  The social desirability of this could be questioned, but it
certainly seems more secure to built pseudonyms on top of something
like this (using PGP sigs to provide a solid identity) than through
the presently-popular approach.  Comments?  (Julf?)

> Hal Finney

	 PGP 2 key by finger or e-mail
   Eli   ebrandt@jarthur.claremont.edu




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: an5877@anon.penet.fi (deadbeat)
Date: Mon, 22 Feb 93 23:12:55 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Beware of anon.penet.fi message!
Message-ID: <9302230608.AA04870@anon.penet.fi>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

David,

> As was said, the doubleblind system is a great idea, but incomplete
> if you want to correspond to someone without revealing your anon id.

Well, I don't agree that doubleblind is a great idea.

For example, if at any time, Alice sends pseudonymously to Bob, Bob can
not reply directly: this would expose his identity at anon.penet.fi.
Bob must reply through a remailer.

Note the irony -- Bob must take special steps to protect his pseudonym
because anon.penet.fi is acting affirmatively to conceal his actual
identity.  If Bob slips up and simply replies, he is exposed.

Hal,

> (It's interesting that he also sent his message via one of the Cypherpunks
> remailers.  Maybe he thought they worked like the Penet remailer and
> he could break anonymity on those as well.)

Actually, I don't know why my message went through a Cypherpunks
remailer -- I didn't ask it to.  I don't know of any weaknesses in
the Cypherpunks remailers (other than extreme vulnerability to social
engineering).

> Evidentally there is positive harm that can occur by automatically
> anonymizing all messages which pass through a remailer.  ... For
> anonymous posting and for mail to a non-anonymous address, it's more
> reasonable to assume that anonymization is desired.  ... But when
> sending a message to an anonymous address, it's not known whether the
> sender wants to be anonymized or not.

I think it's imperative that the sender use X-Anon-To to be
pseudonymous.  This is consistent with the principle of least
astonishment.

> It might seem that people should just be careful about what they
> send through Penet, but there are some problems with this.  What do
> you do if you get a message from an5877@anon.penet.fi asking for
> advice on cryptography mailing lists?  If you reply, your questioner
> can figure out who the reply is coming from, and sees your Penet
> alias.  There is no way to prevent this from happening currently.

A Cypherpunks remailer can be used to conceal the correspondent's
pseudonymous identity.

> Also, I have seen proposals that anonymous ID's should be made less
> recognizable, so that instead of an5877@anon.penet.fi we would have
> joe@serv.uba.edu.  In such a situation it might be tedious to
> scrutinize every email address we send to (via replies, for example)
> to make sure it isn't a remailer where you have an anonymous ID.

It would be a real boon to make pseudonyms less prominent -- this
seems to have kicked over a hornet's nest on USENET (even though
pseudonyms have been quietly in use for years).  But were this the
case, scrutiny would be an understatement.

> All in all, I think some changes need to be made in how anonymous
> addresses are used and implemented in order to provide reasonable
> amounts of security.

I agree that more discussion is in order.  I'm especially concerned 
about the broader issues regarding anonymity through remailers.

DEADBEAT

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7kxDSgFgB9J/A9rRgAL6S1Ux2ojU4opP
=RGlc
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
To find out more about the anon service, send mail to help@anon.penet.fi.
Due to the double-blind system, any replies to this message will be anonymized,
and an anonymous id will be allocated automatically. You have been warned.
Please report any problems, inappropriate use etc. to admin@anon.penet.fi.
*IMPORTANT server security update*, mail to update@anon.penet.fi for details.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Phiber Optik <phiber@eff.org>
Date: Mon, 22 Feb 93 21:00:43 PST
To: honey@citi.umich.edu (peter honeyman)
Subject: Re: Trapdoors
In-Reply-To: <9302230338.AA00441@toad.com>
Message-ID: <199302230459.AA27220@eff.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> 
> > Interestingly enough, there seems to be no such instruction in the
> > VAX ...
> 
> but i believe the vax has ffs (find first set) instruction, which seems
> to have similar uses (whatever they may be).
> 
> 	peter
> 
But that's not a population count (all bits set count) instruction.
In the Motorola 68020/30/40, there's BFFFO, for Bit Field Find First One,
if anyone was curious about 'find first set' instructions.  Might as well
mention that the 386/486 have BSF and BSR, Bit Scan Forward and Reverse,
but now we're just getting into run-of-the-mill bit manipulation.





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: nowhere@bsu-cs.bsu.edu (Anonymous)
Date: Mon, 22 Feb 93 21:08:59 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: No Subject
Message-ID: <9302230505.AA04240@bsu-cs.bsu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

Xavier hit the nail on the head -- my note was a subterfuge, intended
to reveal the association between anonymous id's and email addresses.

I think it's wrong for anon.penet.fi to operate this way.

> DEADBEAT

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.1

iQBFAgUBK4lD7/FZTpBW/B35AQGiCQF9HFeDhXk7FV9mhIMh9zGmxblLvCt8bszr
4daRmyo8/cJMK7Y5V7kfQN05CEdJo6oc
=KalQ
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
To find out more about the anon service, send mail to help@anon.penet.fi.
Due to the double-blind system, any replies to this message will be anonymized,
and an anonymous id will be allocated automatically. You have been warned.
Please report any problems, inappropriate use etc. to admin@anon.penet.fi.
*IMPORTANT server security update*, mail to update@anon.penet.fi for details.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: an5877@anon.penet.fi (deadbeat)
Date: Mon, 22 Feb 93 22:56:28 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Remailer to anon.penet.f
Message-ID: <9302230608.AA04938@anon.penet.fi>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

> This puts any message to anon.penet.fi into a file called Bitbucket.
> My slocal.pl script does not support the slocal/maildelivery feature
> which deletes a message, so this is the closest I can come.  (I suppose
> another alternative would be to pipe it into "cat > /dev/null".  That
> would look like:
>
> Request-Remailing-To  anon.penet.fi   pipe    A       "cat > /dev/null"
>
> I haven't tried this one.)

I think this is exactly the wrong thing to do.  Cypherpunks remailers are
essential for preventing accidental exposure of Finnish pseudonyms.

DEADBEAT

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.1

iQBFAgUBK4mwX/FZTpBW/B35AQF94gGAqqTUhXSKlb6CcsXNJ9T1eq2Hf5Qs3MKt
N18Y20a+azul5d/Y4DnMfD62sCWhMD/v
=A5c6
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
To find out more about the anon service, send mail to help@anon.penet.fi.
Due to the double-blind system, any replies to this message will be anonymized,
and an anonymous id will be allocated automatically. You have been warned.
Please report any problems, inappropriate use etc. to admin@anon.penet.fi.
*IMPORTANT server security update*, mail to update@anon.penet.fi for details.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: nowhere@bsu-cs.bsu.edu (Anonymous)
Date: Mon, 22 Feb 93 22:43:07 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: No Subject
Message-ID: <9302230639.AA09661@bsu-cs.bsu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

>      I would like to let everyone who hasn't already figured it out
> know that I did *not* originate the message that was posted to
> Cypherpunks through my account.  I do not know where it came from,
> but it reached my account with the destination address of the
> cypherpunks list because the message that came back to me from the
> list said that "Anonymous <nowhere@bsu-cs.bsu.edu>" originated the
> message.  That indicates that it went through the remailer.  If it
> were from me, it would say "Chael Hall <nowhere@bsu-cs.bsu.edu>"
> as the return address.  Another identifying characteristic is the
> "X-Remailed-By: Anonymous <nowhere@bsu-cs.bsu.edu>" header line.
> Just remember, don't believe everything you read.

In the case of pseudonymous mail, don't believe _anything_ you read!

I don't see why Chael Hall is going to all this trouble to refute
a message that I don't even remember ...  Did I miss something
important?  (Or outre?)

Or (duh!) is he talking about _my_ earlier message?

DEADBEAT

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ot8jlZRA+gW+Sa1bpBUkV6ZryBlHYQMQ
=KMZW
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
To find out more about the anon service, send mail to help@anon.penet.fi.
Due to the double-blind system, any replies to this message will be anonymized,
and an anonymous id will be allocated automatically. You have been warned.
Please report any problems, inappropriate use etc. to admin@anon.penet.fi.
*IMPORTANT server security update*, mail to update@anon.penet.fi for details.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: nowhere@bsu-cs.bsu.edu (Anonymous)
Date: Mon, 22 Feb 93 22:45:15 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: No Subject
Message-ID: <9302230642.AA09719@bsu-cs.bsu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

This is a longer response to the warning posted by Xavier.

> Beware of the message about the security bug in the
> anon.penet.fi software!

Indeed.

> If you do as requested, and send your true email address to
> an5877@anon.penet.fi then he will see both your true email
> address and your anonymous address (if you have one - if you
> don't, you will be assigned one and he will see that).  Any
> future use you make of this anonymous server (say, to post
> anonymously) will appear under that same anonymous address - and
> this person will know your true email address that goes with
> it.

You got me.  

I meant only slight malice here:  I had intended to "expose" a few
email/anon associations to highlight the problem.  The problem became
apparent to me when I sent pseudonymous mail to a prominent person on
this list; his reply exposed his pseudonymous id at anon.penet.fi,
surely without his knowledge.

> an5877's message appears to be a trick, designed to collect
> anonymous/real address pairs.  Johan Helsingius should take
> action against this trickster.  Since he is learning other
> people's real addresses, perhaps it would be appropriate for his
> own real address to be revealed.

Now that would be a _very_ serious "bug" in the anon.penet.fi remailer
(or, more accurately, in its administration); I am confident Johan
Helsingius will reject this suggestion.

> But, this does point out that these systems which automatically
> assign anonymous addrsses have several security flaws.  Johan
> has already had to introduce a "password" feature to make it
> more difficult to send fakemail that appears to be from a
> particular email address through the server, thus revealing the
> corresponding anonymous address when it is delivered.

I think that merely masks the real problem.

> an5877's trick is a variant on one discussed in
> news.admin.policy where it is pointed out that you can mail to
> someone via anon.penet.fi and ask for information; when the
> return mail comes back it will be from that person's anonymous
> address.  So again you can pair up real and anonymous
> addresses.

I missed that discussion, or I wouldn't have wasted your (our) time.

> These are serious problems.  We need some discussion of how to
> avoid these simple tricks for defeating the anonymity while
> still having an easy-to-use system.

Any ideas?  For starters, I think the default behavior of anon.penet.fi
is badly broken.  But a more serious problem with anon.penet.fi and the
other remailers I am aware of is the necessity that we pseudonymous
clients have to rely on the integrity of their administrators to keep
our pseudonyms private.  In the face of social pressure, such as
Xavier's, that may be asking a lot.

> ::Xavier::

DEADBEAT

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/+FMACnWjd7yaoG99VeyhO/S6vptT1UB
=yZRb
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
To find out more about the anon service, send mail to help@anon.penet.fi.
Due to the double-blind system, any replies to this message will be anonymized,
and an anonymous id will be allocated automatically. You have been warned.
Please report any problems, inappropriate use etc. to admin@anon.penet.fi.
*IMPORTANT server security update*, mail to update@anon.penet.fi for details.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: nowhere@bsu-cs.bsu.edu (Anonymous)
Date: Mon, 22 Feb 93 22:57:35 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: No Subject
Message-ID: <9302230654.AA10264@bsu-cs.bsu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

Xavier hit the nail on the head -- my note was a subterfuge, intended
to reveal the association between anonymous id's and email addresses.

I think it's wrong for anon.penet.fi to operate this way.

> DEADBEAT

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.1

iQBFAgUBK4lD7/FZTpBW/B35AQGiCQF9HFeDhXk7FV9mhIMh9zGmxblLvCt8bszr
4daRmyo8/cJMK7Y5V7kfQN05CEdJo6oc
=KalQ
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
To find out more about the anon service, send mail to help@anon.penet.fi.
Due to the double-blind system, any replies to this message will be anonymized,
and an anonymous id will be allocated automatically. You have been warned.
Please report any problems, inappropriate use etc. to admin@anon.penet.fi.
*IMPORTANT server security update*, mail to update@anon.penet.fi for details.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: nowhere@bsu-cs.bsu.edu (Anonymous)
Date: Mon, 22 Feb 93 23:13:41 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: No Subject
Message-ID: <9302230710.AA11131@bsu-cs.bsu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

> This puts any message to anon.penet.fi into a file called Bitbucket.
> My slocal.pl script does not support the slocal/maildelivery feature
> which deletes a message, so this is the closest I can come.  (I suppose
> another alternative would be to pipe it into "cat > /dev/null".  That
> would look like:
>
> Request-Remailing-To  anon.penet.fi   pipe    A       "cat > /dev/null"
>
> I haven't tried this one.)

I think this is exactly the wrong thing to do.  Cypherpunks remailers are
essential for preventing accidental exposure of Finnish pseudonyms.

DEADBEAT

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.1

iQBFAgUBK4mwX/FZTpBW/B35AQF94gGAqqTUhXSKlb6CcsXNJ9T1eq2Hf5Qs3MKt
N18Y20a+azul5d/Y4DnMfD62sCWhMD/v
=A5c6
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
To find out more about the anon service, send mail to help@anon.penet.fi.
Due to the double-blind system, any replies to this message will be anonymized,
and an anonymous id will be allocated automatically. You have been warned.
Please report any problems, inappropriate use etc. to admin@anon.penet.fi.
*IMPORTANT server security update*, mail to update@anon.penet.fi for details.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: nowhere@bsu-cs.bsu.edu (Anonymous)
Date: Mon, 22 Feb 93 23:18:19 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: No Subject
Message-ID: <9302230715.AA11401@bsu-cs.bsu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

David,

> As was said, the doubleblind system is a great idea, but incomplete
> if you want to correspond to someone without revealing your anon id.

Well, I don't agree that doubleblind is a great idea.

For example, if at any time, Alice sends pseudonymously to Bob, Bob can
not reply directly: this would expose his identity at anon.penet.fi.
Bob must reply through a remailer.

Note the irony -- Bob must take special steps to protect his pseudonym
because anon.penet.fi is acting affirmatively to conceal his actual
identity.  If Bob slips up and simply replies, he is exposed.

Hal,

> (It's interesting that he also sent his message via one of the Cypherpunks
> remailers.  Maybe he thought they worked like the Penet remailer and
> he could break anonymity on those as well.)

Actually, I don't know why my message went through a Cypherpunks
remailer -- I didn't ask it to.  I don't know of any weaknesses in
the Cypherpunks remailers (other than extreme vulnerability to social
engineering).

> Evidentally there is positive harm that can occur by automatically
> anonymizing all messages which pass through a remailer.  ... For
> anonymous posting and for mail to a non-anonymous address, it's more
> reasonable to assume that anonymization is desired.  ... But when
> sending a message to an anonymous address, it's not known whether the
> sender wants to be anonymized or not.

I think it's imperative that the sender use X-Anon-To to be
pseudonymous.  This is consistent with the principle of least
astonishment.

> It might seem that people should just be careful about what they
> send through Penet, but there are some problems with this.  What do
> you do if you get a message from an5877@anon.penet.fi asking for
> advice on cryptography mailing lists?  If you reply, your questioner
> can figure out who the reply is coming from, and sees your Penet
> alias.  There is no way to prevent this from happening currently.

A Cypherpunks remailer can be used to conceal the correspondent's
pseudonymous identity.

> Also, I have seen proposals that anonymous ID's should be made less
> recognizable, so that instead of an5877@anon.penet.fi we would have
> joe@serv.uba.edu.  In such a situation it might be tedious to
> scrutinize every email address we send to (via replies, for example)
> to make sure it isn't a remailer where you have an anonymous ID.

It would be a real boon to make pseudonyms less prominent -- this
seems to have kicked over a hornet's nest on USENET (even though
pseudonyms have been quietly in use for years).  But were this the
case, scrutiny would be an understatement.

> All in all, I think some changes need to be made in how anonymous
> addresses are used and implemented in order to provide reasonable
> amounts of security.

I agree that more discussion is in order.  I'm especially concerned 
about the broader issues regarding anonymity through remailers.

DEADBEAT

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.1

iQBFAgUBK4mrrvFZTpBW/B35AQE+PQGAh69FcaATFD05lIuhqqK8ZMmV+8xNi/LN
7kxDSgFgB9J/A9rRgAL6S1Ux2ojU4opP
=RGlc
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
To find out more about the anon service, send mail to help@anon.penet.fi.
Due to the double-blind system, any replies to this message will be anonymized,
and an anonymous id will be allocated automatically. You have been warned.
Please report any problems, inappropriate use etc. to admin@anon.penet.fi.
*IMPORTANT server security update*, mail to update@anon.penet.fi for details.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Hal <74076.1041@CompuServe.COM>
Date: Mon, 22 Feb 93 23:55:33 PST
To: Cypherpunks <cypherpunks@toad.com>
Subject: anon.penet.fi hacking
Message-ID: <930223074743_74076.1041_DHJ21-1@CompuServe.COM>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Well, I think I have deduced the identity of "Deadbeat" from his posting
style.  I don't think Julf should say who he is.  This was an important
demonstration of a weakness in the security of the remailers.
 
The Penet remailer seems now to require a password for all messages; at
least, I wasn't able to send to an5877@anon.penet.fi ("Deadbeat") without
using my password.  So chaining through Cypherpunks remailers to Penet would
seem not to be possible now.
 
Unless Eli's suggestion works - having our remailers put out a random
"From:" line (perhaps just on mail to Penet?) might cause Penet to issue a
new pseudonym for that apparent new user.  This would be kind of wasteful
from Penet's perspective - all those pseudonyms are never going to be
re-used.  But it might allow this form of chaining, without compromising the
pseudonym of the remailer operator.
 
(I had put my patch into the maildelivery file before Johan instituted his
password system, when I realized this weakness existed.  I forgot to mention
it here at the time.  My motivation was to protect my own Penet pseudonym.)
 
Another possibility would be for there to be a command to Penet to allow
users to send truly anonymous mail, mail which does not have a meaningful
"From" line (and in particular which does not have the user's Penet
pseudonym displayed as the "From" address).  We could set our remailers to
use that command for any mail sent to Penet.  Mail sent with that command
would not need a password.  This would be an alternative way for users to
deal with some of the other attacks, such as the one Deadbeat demonstrated.
 
Hal
 
P.S. - My, the list has sure been lively today.  Looks like we beat
Extropians again on volume!
 






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "DrZaphod" <ncselxsi!drzaphod@ncselxsi.netcom.com>
Date: Tue, 23 Feb 93 07:49:34 PST
To: CypherPunks@toad.com
Subject: posting and posting and posting.
Message-ID: <10525.drzaphod@ncselxsi>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


In Message Tue, 23 Feb 93 12:16:29 GMT,
  Tony Kidson <morgan.demon.co.uk!tony@netcomsv.netcom.com> writes:

>One reason the list has been so busy is that DEADBEAT's messages
>seem to be being posted both through penet and through a cypherpunks
>remailer.

     I was just going to ask about that.. I've gotten the same message from
DEADBEAT about 4 times..

DrZaphod
[AC/DC] / [DnA][HP]
[drzaphod@ncselxsi.uucp]
Technicolorized




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: deltorto@aol.com
Date: Tue, 23 Feb 93 03:50:51 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Dead(beat) give-away
Message-ID: <9302230651.tn06928@aol.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


"an5877@anon.penet.fi" (aka "deadbeat") sez:

>> I believe I have uncovered a serious bug in the Finnish anonymous
>> remailer, one that allows me to piece together anonymous id's and
>> actual email addresses.
>> 
>> I'm reluctant to publish the details here, but I'll explain how it
>> works if you send me your email address.

I smell something, and it's not my FPU overheating!

Anyone who's "reluctant" to discuss a flaw in an anon remailer HERE...
is definitely NOT on the up-and-up.

Somebody "out" this weasel, PRONTO!  (please!)

  d2t




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: deltorto@aol.com
Date: Tue, 23 Feb 93 03:50:49 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Mac HD Cypher... mostly
Message-ID: <9302230651.tn06929@aol.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>>From:  DDLEEDS@vm.cmp.ilstu.edu
>>Subj:        Mac HD Cypher...
>>
>>Does anyone know of a way or program that can completely encrypt a hard
drive
>>on a macintosh computer so that only the person that knows the key can
decrypt it?

Well, I don't know about "impenetrable" other than my first girlfriend when I
was 9's underpants, but FWB's Hard Disk ToolKit (aka HDT) provides, besides
very nice control over all aspects of SCSI drive configuration, three levels
of 'protection': a driver-level password (keeps yer granny out) and two
levels of block-by-block encryption - simple password-based (keeps your savvy
mate from editing the file blocks and recovering your loveletters) or DES
(keeps most non-Fed attackers out).

The advantage of this device-driver level encryption is that the drive can be
used normally as long as you know the password. Otherwise, if some spook with
a warrant tries to mount it down at his office, he has to fill out a shitload
of forms, FedEx it to Fort Meade and wait a few days for the lads in the lab
to crack it for him before he can come back with the 'cuffs.

I recommend giving the drive an HDT driver-level access password as well as
DES encryption if you're really concerned that your girlfriend is gonna see
the shit you been writing about her to that other chick. I use these options
on a couple of 44 MB SyQuest removeables. I sleep pretty well at night (when
I sleep, that is).

>>I am looking for a crypt that is completely IMPENETRABLE!!!

Dream on, Smedley. Anyone who's ever graduated from Paranoid U. can tell you
that when the chips are down (i.e. the New Sons of Armageddon come a-knockin'
at yer shack), DES is about as secure as my third girlfriend when I was 12's
panties - not very. OK, so I enjoyed puberty, sue me...

>>Your help would be appreciated,
>>
>>
>>Jumping Jack Flash

You can find HDT mentioned in any decent Mac 'zine. Happy Jumping.

   d2t

PS: I'd tell you FWB's phone number in the 415 (SF) area, but that might
sound like advertising.      :-)




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: robichau@lambda.msfc.nasa.gov (Paul Robichaux)
Date: Tue, 23 Feb 93 06:12:07 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Mac Perl info
Message-ID: <9302231410.AA18658@lambda.msfc.nasa.gov>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


As {promised | threatened} in my message to the list last night,
here's the info file for Mac Perl, available at fine FTP sites like
nic.switch.ch (the original site and holder of this file.)

I don't use Perl myself, but you can contact either Matthias or Tim
(see below); they have both been helpful with other stuff in the past.

Regards,
-Paul, posting from work for once





WELCOME TO MPW PERL

This is Perl for the Mac, ported to MPW C by Matthias Neeracher
<neeri@iis.ethz.ch> and Tim Endres <time@ice.com>. It runs every
program in the test suite that you could it reasonably expect to, and
some you probably didn't expect.  Feel free to give this program away
according to the terms stated in the README file.

System Requirements

Perl really likes MPW. The standalone version is not much use yet.
Some of the really cool features require ToolServer, System 7, and
enough RAM (Notably stuff like `CFront MacApp.cp`, while (<Å.c>) or
open(XXX, "Catenate Å.c |")) Some of the files barely compile with 5
megabytes of RAM.

Bugs, Suggestions, Damnations

Please send your bug reports and/or fixes to <neeri@iis.ethz.ch> (It
is rather unlikely that any of the bugs are relevant to the UNIX
version).

Mailing list

There is now a mailing list for announcing new releases, sharing
scripts, and discussions about how to make MPW Perl change your life.
To subscribe, send a mail to <mpw-perl-request@iis.ethz.ch>

Revision History

24Jan93	4.0.6

- choose() for files no longer includes the terminating null character.
- rename() and TCP sockets work better (thanks to Brad Pickering for reporting
  these bugs).
- standalone version can read scripts from its data fork and accepts more 
  startup files.
- (hopefully) improved the documentation a little. Added ObiWan support.
  
20Dec92	4.0.5

- Supports sockets and symbolic links.
- "ask", "answer" and "pick" are now builtins with a slightly changed syntax
  (sorry).
- A few mac scripts are now provided in :t:mac and :macscripts:
- The application now always searches for a #! line first. If none is found,
  the script is executed anyway, but the file has to be read twice.
  
27Sep92	4.0.4

This release upgrades the Mac version to UNIX patchlevel 35.

08Jun92	4.0.3

This release supports opendir (In fact, I thought the last one'd already support it.
Thanks to Mike Meckler <meckler@egg.gg.caltech.edu> for reporting this bug).

dbmopen & friends are now supported.

20Jan92	4.0.2

First public release.

-- 
Paul Robichaux, KD4JZG              | May explode if disposed of improperly.
Mission Software Development Div.   | Printed on recycled phosphors.
New Technology, Inc.		    | ** PGP 2.0 key available on request **




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Johan Helsingius <julf@penet.FI>
Date: Mon, 22 Feb 93 22:52:31 PST
To: Eric Hughes <hughes@soda.berkeley.edu>
Subject: Re: whistleblower newsgroup?
In-Reply-To: <9302230117.AA18417@soda.berkeley.edu>
Message-ID: <9302230751.aa16701@penet.penet.FI>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



> The moderator to alt.whistleblower, instead of a person's mail
> address, could be a mail alias which invokes a header field stripper.
> That way it would be impossible to post to the group with your
> identity in the header.  Every posting anonymous!  Sort of like a
> mathematical dual of alt.forgery.
> 
> I would also suggest a periodic posting explaining exactly how secure
> that is.  (Proof against casual attack, but not against local or
> global network monitoring.)
> 
> It seems easy enough.  I'd do it myself if I had root anywhere.  The
> perl scripts for remailing would be easily hacked.  You could even
> retain the automatic PGP decryption for the more informed, the more
> paranoid.

Well, I hereby volunteer anon.penet.fi for such use. I already have the
posting stuff in place, and .fi is outside US jurisdiction.... It would
be a one-line hack to disable the anon id generation for posters to that
group... So the security concerns re anon.penet.fi mentioned on this list
wouldn't apply... 

Now I only have to get PGP up on the damned Interactive UNIX... Or
switch to bsd/386 or something...

	Julf (admin@anon.penet.fi)





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Duncan Frissell <71562.3445@CompuServe.COM>
Date: Tue, 23 Feb 93 06:08:33 PST
To: <cypherpunks@toad.com>
Subject: RE: Advertising on the net
Message-ID: <930223140021_71562.3445_CHT76-1@CompuServe.COM>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Nothing like jumping into the middle with one's first posting...

Denizens of the nets have to realize that there are some extreme social
deviates out here who go beyond sodomy, go beyond working for the FDA,
go beyond rape as an instrumentality of war, go beyond voting and actually 
believe that adverting is an ennobling human activity.

Think about it.  Poor Michael in the last few episodes of "Thirtysomething"
suffering existential angst because he was great at advertising but 
considered it an unworthy occupation for a man.  If he'd only known that
advertising=mass markets=low prices=wealth beyond the dreams of ancient 
Kings.

Lack of advertising=Moscow before 1990.

If we have to accept your deviations (voting for the short fascist with the
bad haircut and the funny ears par example) you have to accept ours.  We
can live with each other without too much trouble.

Duncan Frissell

****************************************************************************
*                                                                          *
*                                                                          *
*                           YOUR AD HERE                                   *
*                                                                          *
*                                                                          *
****************************************************************************

PS - If you post a message about the existence and availability of PGP, you
are *ADVERTISING*.  Naughty, naughty, naughty.






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: peter honeyman <honey@citi.umich.edu>
Date: Tue, 23 Feb 93 06:30:24 PST
To: Duncan Frissell <71562.3445@CompuServe.COM>
Subject: Re: Advertising on the net
In-Reply-To: <930223140021_71562.3445_CHT76-1@CompuServe.COM>
Message-ID: <9302231430.AA10258@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


'scuse me if i'm failing to recognize sarcasm ...

you can think what you like, but the fact remains that
the cypherpunks list was created with a specific set
of topics in mind.  people subscribe to the list to 
discuss those specific topics.  

there is plenty of room in cyberspace for discussions 
of any sort you like, including the merits of advertising.  
but not here.  ok?

	peter




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Eric Hughes <hughes@soda.berkeley.edu>
Date: Tue, 23 Feb 93 09:31:42 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Beware of anon.penet.fi message!
In-Reply-To: <9302230851.aa19921@penet.penet.FI>
Message-ID: <9302231728.AA20762@soda.berkeley.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Currently to mail to person 1234 at penet, you send mail to 

	anon1234@penet.fi

This mail goes out anonymously from the sender, either using an
existing mail address or creating one.  But if one were able to reach
person 1234 also with the email address, say,

	name1234@penet.fi

the behavior could be _not_ to make this posting anonymous.

To wit, the 1234 indicates that you are replying to a pseudonymous
recipient, and the anon/name pair indicate whether the sender is
anonymous.  Thus no change in default behavior, and no new header
lines.

Eric





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Johan Helsingius <julf@penet.FI>
Date: Tue, 23 Feb 93 00:04:20 PST
To: deadbeat <an5877@anon>
Subject: Re: Beware of anon.penet.fi message!
In-Reply-To: <9302230604.AA04535@anon.penet.fi>
Message-ID: <9302230851.aa19921@penet.penet.FI>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



> I meant only slight malice here:  I had intended to "expose" a few
> email/anon associations to highlight the problem.  The problem became
> apparent to me when I sent pseudonymous mail to a prominent person on
> this list; his reply exposed his pseudonymous id at anon.penet.fi,
> surely without his knowledge.

I think this would be fixed by the "X-Anon-Anonymize: no" (or whatever)
hack. But for reasons I have outlined in the earlier round of
discussions, it can't be the default. Comments? 

> > an5877's message appears to be a trick, designed to collect
> > anonymous/real address pairs.  Johan Helsingius should take
> > action against this trickster.  Since he is learning other
> > people's real addresses, perhaps it would be appropriate for his
> > own real address to be revealed.
> 
> Now that would be a _very_ serious "bug" in the anon.penet.fi remailer
> (or, more accurately, in its administration); I am confident Johan
> Helsingius will reject this suggestion.

Definitely. I might block someone from using the server, but never (ok,
"never say never") expose somebody.

> > But, this does point out that these systems which automatically
> > assign anonymous addrsses have several security flaws.  Johan
> > has already had to introduce a "password" feature to make it
> > more difficult to send fakemail that appears to be from a
> > particular email address through the server, thus revealing the
> > corresponding anonymous address when it is delivered.
> 
> I think that merely masks the real problem.

It fixes *one* problem. I really appreciate suggestions for other
solutions.

> > These are serious problems.  We need some discussion of how to
> > avoid these simple tricks for defeating the anonymity while
> > still having an easy-to-use system.
> 
> Any ideas?  For starters, I think the default behavior of anon.penet.fi
> is badly broken.

There has been a lot of discussion about this, and I'm afraid it's too
late to change the *default* behavior now...

> But a more serious problem with anon.penet.fi and the
> other remailers I am aware of is the necessity that we pseudonymous
> clients have to rely on the integrity of their administrators to keep
> our pseudonyms private.  In the face of social pressure, such as
> Xavier's, that may be asking a lot.

True. And that's why PGP-based stuff & remailer chains is the way to go
for "hard" anonymity. But for posting to general newsgroups, we also
need a system with working return paths. This doesn't seem possible with
current remailer chain systems.

	Julf (admin@anon.penet.fi)

P.S. In case I forgot to announce it, as you could see from the message
I'm replying to, PGP stuff doesn't get stripped at anon.penet.fi
anymore.....




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: an5877@anon.penet.fi (deadbeat)
Date: Tue, 23 Feb 93 07:31:29 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: No subject
Message-ID: <9302231437.AA00626@anon.penet.fi>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


In-reply-to: Johan Helsingius' message of Tue, 23 Feb 1993 10:52:16 +0200.
	     <9302231011.aa20353@penet.penet.FI>

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

> > Well, I don't agree that doubleblind is a great idea.
> 
> Neither do I. But many of the users of anon.penet.fi are
> not very computer-and-email-literate, and they have been using other
> services, providing double-blind. Unfortunate, but too late to change now...

Can you elaborate on those other services?  The Finnish remailer is the
only one I'm aware of.

Also, I'm confused about these "not very computer-and-email-literate"
users -- aren't they forced to use an X-Anon-Password header?

I'm surprised there hasn't been more ruckus about the default
behavior.  There must be many folks whose identities have been
inadvertantly exposed.

> What we can do is to provide better ways for those who *are* computer
> literate enough to use extra headers etc.

I don't think this will help.  With my mail environment, I have to go
to lengths to send an anonymous message, concocting X-Anon-To and
X-Anon-Password headers.  It's worth the effort, since this helps to
preserve the secrecy of my pseudonymous identity.

But the first time I mess up, and send an unfettered message to an
anon.penet.fi client, I am unmasked.

What I'm saying is that I'm hip to headers; it's the simple stuff that
trips me up.

And I still don't understand how the unfettered message gets past the
X-Anon-Password filter.

> > I think it's imperative that the sender use X-Anon-To to be
> > pseudonymous.  This is consistent with the principle of least
> > astonishment.
> 
> But in this case I feel the principle of least astonishment is overruled
> by the principle of least risk of accidental exposure.

I think the risk of accidental exposure is heightened by the default
behavior of the Finnish remailer.  Maybe we're using the same words to
describe different things.

> I think that hornet's nest needed to be kicked. But I am also
> disappointed that not enough people defend the need for anonymity in
> places like news.admin.policy.

Some of us gave up on USENET policy long, long ago.  Personally, I stick
to the alt.* groups.

> I think pseudonyms *should* be prominent - as you have noticed, anon.penet.fi
> adds an explicit warning at the end of every message.

In time, I hope such warnings will be unnecessary, as people grow
accustomed to the use of pseudonyms.

DEADBEAT

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.1

iQBFAgUBK4o0+PFZTpBW/B35AQGlcAF/UC0HNtSoIQe2arEoK5uzkjX+7fCwPUqC
l/2o0wifS7SLGLfoshQpd3vaczDktaBV
=TPtY
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
To find out more about the anon service, send mail to help@anon.penet.fi.
Due to the double-blind system, any replies to this message will be anonymized,
and an anonymous id will be allocated automatically. You have been warned.
Please report any problems, inappropriate use etc. to admin@anon.penet.fi.
*IMPORTANT server security update*, mail to update@anon.penet.fi for details.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: mvario@inode.com (MICHAEL VARI)
Date: Tue, 23 Feb 93 07:11:00 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: REQUEST
Message-ID: <3498908CAA@inode.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Subj: Request
To: cypherpunks-request@toad.com

I would like to request to be placed on the cypherpunks mailing
list.

Thank you,

Michael Vario

mvario@inode.com

 
___ Blue Wave/QWK v2.12




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Nickey MacDonald <i6t4@jupiter.sun.csd.unb.ca>
Date: Tue, 23 Feb 93 06:07:48 PST
To: cypherpunks list <cypherpunks@toad.com>
Subject: Some questions
Message-ID: <Pine.3.05.9302230950.A13475-b100000@jupiter>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


{I have been reading the list for about a week now...  This is my first
post...  I hope this is not a FAQ...}

I am looking for solutions to a situation that people may find familiar...
Say you have a text file that contains sensitive configuration data (in a
particular case, the cross-index of anonymous ids and real mail addresses)
taht you want a program to be able to read, but you want it stored in
encrypted format.  (Which means you will decrypt it each time you read it,
and rewrite it in encrypted form when needed.  It will only exist in
decrypted in the computers RAM.)  Is there some sort of scheme that will
allow this, without having to have a user present to enter the password at
startup (a pain if its supposed to be an unattended program, such as a
remailer) or having the password compiled into the program...

Also, I have seen a number of references to DC nets...  I must confess I
have never heard of the term before...  can someone enlighten me?

---
Nick MacDonald
i6t4@jupiter.sun.csd.unb.ca






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Johan Helsingius <julf@penet.FI>
Date: Tue, 23 Feb 93 00:21:49 PST
To: Eli Brandt <ebrandt@jarthur.claremont.edu>
Subject: Re: Anon address attack...
In-Reply-To: <9302230700.AA03047@toad.com>
Message-ID: <9302230920.aa20039@penet.penet.FI>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



> I was thinking of installing a trivial hack in my remailer, such that
> upon demand it adds some random (essentially unrepeatable) cruft to
> the From: line, placing it as a name field so as to have no
> addressing significance.  I believe penet assigns IDs based on this
> line, so chaining this to a penet-style remailer would provide
> "hit-and-run" anonymity -- even if the remailer wants nothing of the
> sort.  The social desirability of this could be questioned, but it
> certainly seems more secure to built pseudonyms on top of something
> like this (using PGP sigs to provide a solid identity) than through
> the presently-popular approach.  Comments?  (Julf?)

I think we should come up with a more socially acceptable solution.
Widespread use of hit-and-run abuse on the net would certainly lead to
actions against sites such as anon.penet.fi. Some method that preserves
a return path is needed for a *general* posting facility
(alt.whistleblowers etc. would be special cases). And... Please remember
anon.penet.fi has something like 13000 existing users. And most of them
have been using other anonymous posting hosts with the same
limitations/defaults as anon.penet.fi. So we can't change everything
overnight...

	Julf





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: an5877@anon.penet.fi (deadbeat)
Date: Tue, 23 Feb 93 08:19:50 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Beware of anon.penet.fi message!
Message-ID: <9302231520.AA03498@anon.penet.fi>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


In-reply-to: Johan Helsingius' message of Tue, 23 Feb 1993 09:32:54 +0200.
	     <9302230851.aa19921@penet.penet.FI>
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

> >                                                    The problem became
> > apparent to me when I sent pseudonymous mail to a prominent person on
> > this list; his reply exposed his pseudonymous id at anon.penet.fi,
> > surely without his knowledge.
>
> I think this would be fixed by the "X-Anon-Anonymize: no" (or whatever)
> hack. But for reasons I have outlined in the earlier round of
> discussions, it can't be the default. Comments?

If it's not the default behavior, then it will be a recurring problem.

> There has been a lot of discussion about this, and I'm afraid it's too
> late to change the *default* behavior now...

Why?  It seems to me the X-Anon-Password header was a pretty major
change, yet you made that change to preserve people's pseudonymous
identities.  The instant challenge is just as grave, don't you think?

> P.S. In case I forgot to announce it, as you could see from the message
> I'm replying to, PGP stuff doesn't get stripped at anon.penet.fi
> anymore.....

Great stuff.  Thanks.

DEADBEAT

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.1

iQBFAgUBK4o8FfFZTpBW/B35AQFQgwF/QU9NQmgtFKfv+KMoghtSwTL/e8vh3G4b
vwlZy3yWF6D4+LVAnOEcuh0gvxJSNi51
=hD4O
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
To find out more about the anon service, send mail to help@anon.penet.fi.
Due to the double-blind system, any replies to this message will be anonymized,
and an anonymous id will be allocated automatically. You have been warned.
Please report any problems, inappropriate use etc. to admin@anon.penet.fi.
*IMPORTANT server security update*, mail to update@anon.penet.fi for details.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Date: Tue, 23 Feb 93 10:10:18 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Dining Cryptographers Nets--An Introduction
Message-ID: <9302231808.AA22381@netcom.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Nickey MacDonald writes:

>Also, I have seen a number of references to DC nets...  I must confess I
>have never heard of the term before...  can someone enlighten me?

Here's a summary of the "dining cryptographers net" I wrote back in the
pre-Cypherpunks days (which I later posted to the nascent Cypherpunks
list). I'm posting it here because of the question just asked, thinking
that others may be similary confused. (A "Glossary" also exists, and is in
the "soda" archive site.)

(I could apologize for the volume, but cyherpunks ought to be able to
handle a few measly kilobytes of stuff. Besides, at least this won't go out
multiple times to the list!)

Understand that DC-Nets are further off in the future than the
Cypherpunks-PAX-PENET-style remailers being discussed these last few
months. Chaum-style mixes, based on his 1981 CACM letter, have yet to be
implemented, let alone the more advanced DC-Net-style systems. Hal Finney,
Marc Ringuette, and Yanek Martinson are some of the folks on this list who
are interested in working on DC-Nets....Yanek even claims to have a
primitive one running on his local machine and is interested in volunteers
to test it on a larger basis.

The "Information Liberation Front" also posted Chaum's entire 1988 paper,
"The Dining Cryptographers Problem: Unconditional Sender and Recipient
Untraceability." I suppose you could ask them to repost the article or
forward it to you.

Hope the newcomers enjoy this.


To: Extropians@gnu.ai.mit.edu
From: uunet!netcom.com!tcmay (Timothy C. May)
Subject: Dining Cryptographers
Date: Tue, 18 Aug 92 15:45:34 PDT
Reply-To: uunet!gnu.ai.mit.edu!Extropians

Marc R. has opened the door for me to get into some really exciting
stuff:
> 
> Tim May mentioned a new method from Chaum for defeating traffic analysis:
> 
> > Chaum has since improved the tamper-responding "mix" by going to a pure
> > software scheme which he calls "the Dining Cryptographers Protocol." It's
> > described in Vol. 1, Number 1 of "Journal of Cryptology," 1988. If there's
> > interest, I'll summarize it.
> 
> Yes, please, Tim!
> 
> 
> M.

Complexity Warning: This stuff (I'm being informal) is easy once you
get the basic idea. But getting the basic idea usually involves reading
several articles on what RSA, digital signatures, etc., are all about,
working out some examples, thinking about it, drawing pictures with
other folks, and finally having an "Aha!" experience (in Werner Erhard's
terms, you "get it"). The ASCII nature of the Net is not conducive to learning
this stuff, despite the excellent summaries of crypto by Marc R. and Perry M.

The almost-latest "Scientific American," August, has an article by David Chaum
on digital money, and the latest "Spectrum," available at selected newstands,
has several articles on security and cryptography. Also, there are lots of
books. Look 'em up in a university library or flip through them at a large
technical bookstore and pick the one you like the most. (I like a slim
Springer-Verlag paperback, "Modern Cryptology," by Gilles Brassard, 1988, as
a good intro to "modern"--as opposed to "classical"--crypto.)

If the stuff in this posting, and on crypto in general, is beyond your
current understanding, either ignore it, skim it and try to get the gist,
or dig into the articles and books. 

Anyway, back to "The Dining Cryptographers Problem: Unconditional Sender and
Recipient Untraceability," David Chaum, Journal of Cryptology, I, 1, 1988.
Since this journal is hard to get, I'll discuss the article in some detail.
(The techniques have major implications for anarchocapitalism and for
Extropian ideas.)

Abstract: "Keeping confidential who sends which messages, in a world where any 
physical transmission can be traced to its origin, seems impossible.
The solution presented here is unconditionally or cryptographically secure,
depending on whether it is based on one-time-use keys or on public keys.
respectively. It can be adapted to address efficiently a wide variety of 
practical considerations."

A word on terminology: "Unconditionally secure" means what it says: no
computer will ever crack it. One-time pads are unconditionally secure...no
code or cipher is involved, except the one-time pad, so the message is
secure as long as the pad has not been compromised. "Cryptographically
secure" means secure so long as various crypto ciphers are secure, which
may be for a very, very long time (e.g., with very large primes, in RSA).

Chaum describes some "dining cryptographers," which I will playfully change
to "dining Extropians." (The term is of course a variant of the seminal
"dining logicians problem" in computer science)

Three Extropians are having dinner, perhaps in New York City. Their waiter
tells them that their bill has already been paid, either by the NSA
or by one of them. The waiter won't say more.

The Extropians wish to know whether one of them paid, or the NSA paid. But
they don't want to be impolite and force the Extropina payer to 'fess up,
so they carry out this protocol (or procedure):

Each Extropian flips a fair coin behind a menu placed upright between himself
and the Extropian on his right. The coin is visible to himself AND to the
Extropian on his left. Each Extropian can see his own coin and the coin to his
right.

STOP RIGHT HERE! Please take the time to make a sketch of the situation I've
described. If you lost it here, all that follows will be a blur. I'm sparing
you folks my attempt at an ASCII drawing!

Each Extropians then states out loud whether the two coins he can see are the
SAME or are DIFFERENT, e.g., "Heads-Tails" means DIFFERENT, and so forth. For
now, assume the Extropians are truthful.

A little bit of thinking shows that the total number of "DIFFERENCES" must
be either 0 (the coins all came up the same), or 2. Odd parity is impossible.

Now the Extropians agree that if one of them paid, he or she will SAY THE
OPPOSITE of what they actually see. Remember, they don't announce what their
coin turned up as, only whether it was the same or different as their neighbor.

Suppose none of them paid, i.e., the NSA paid. Then they all report the truth
and the parity is even (either 0 or 2 differences). They then know the NSA
paid.

Suppose one of them paid the bill. He reports the opposite of what he actually
sees, and the parity is suddenly odd. That is, there is 1 difference reported.
The Extropians now know that one of them paid. But can they determine which
one?

Suppose you are one of the Extropians and you know you didn't pay. One of the
other two did. You either reported SAME or DIFFERENT, based on what your 
neighbor to the right (whose coin you can see) had. But you can't tell which
of the other two is lying! (You can see you right-hand neighbor's coin, but
you can't see the coin he sees to his right!)

This all generalizes to any number of people. If none of them paid, the parity
is even. If one of them paid, the parity is odd. But which one of them paid
cannot be deduced. And it should be clear that each round can transmit a bit,
e.g., "I paid" is a "1". The message "Attack at dawn" could thus be "sent"
untraceably with multiple rounds of the protocol.

The Crypto Ouija Board: I explain this to people as a kind of ouija board.
A message, like "I paid" or a more interesting "Transfer funds from.....,"
just "emerges" out of the group, with no means of knowing where it came 
from. Truly astounding.

Now there are many interesting wrinkles and elaborations to this protocol. I'll
note just a few.

1. Collusion. Obviously the Extropians can collude to deduce the payer. 
This is best dealt with by creating multiple subcircuits (groups doing the 
protocol amongst themselves). Lots more stuff here. Chaum devotes most of the
paper to these kind of issues and their solutions.

2. With each round of this protocol, a single bit is transmitted. Sending
a long message means many coin flips. Instead of coins and menus, the 
neighbors would exchange lists of random numbers (with the right partners,
as per the protocol above, of course. Details are easy to figure out.)

3. Since the lists are essentially one-time pads, the protocol is 
unconditionally secure, i.e., no assumptions are made about the difficulty
of factoring large numbers or any other crypto assumptions.

4. Participants in such a "DC-Net" (and here we are coming to the heart
of the "crypto anarchy" I have mentioned several times, and which is
perhaps foolishly advertised in my .sig) could exchange CD-ROMs or DATs,
giving them enough "coin flips" for zillions of messages, all untraceable!
The logistics are not simple, but one can imagine personal devices, like
smart card or Apple "Newtons," that can handle these protocols (early 
applications may be for untraceable brainstorming comments, secure
voting in corportate settings, etc.)

5. The lists of random numbers (coin flips) can be generated with standard
cryptographic methods, requiring only a key to be exchanged between the 
appropriate participants. This eliminates the need for the one-time pad,
but means the method is now only cryptographically secure, which is 
often sufficient. (Don't think "only cryptographically secure" means
insecure....the messages may remain encrypted for the next billion years)

6. Collisions occur when multiple messages are sent at the same time. Various
schemes can be devised to handle this, like backing off when you detect
another sender (when even parity is seen instead of odd parity). In large 
systems this is likely to be a problem. Solutions are left as an exercise.

7. Noise. Some participants may try to flood the circuit with spurious
messages, to defeat the system or for whatever other reasons. This is
still an issue. (If there's anything to take away from crypto, it's that
nothing is as simple as it looks, that there are always devious ways to 
spoof, jam, and forge. I expect you've seen this from some of the debate
on digital voting schemes.)

What Can "DC-Net" Be Used For?:

* Untraceable mail. Useful for avoiding censorship, for avoiding lawsuits,
and for all kinds of crypto anarchy things.

* Fully anonymous bulletin boards, with no traceability of postings or 
responses. Illegal materials can be offered for sale (my 1987 canonical
example, which freaked out a few people: "Stealth bomber blueprints for
sale. Post highest offer and include public key."). Think for a few minutes
about this and you'll see the profound implications.

* Decentralized nexus of activity. Since messages "emerge" (a la the ouija
board metaphor), there is no central posting area. Nothing for the government
to shut down, complete deniability by the participants.

* Only you know who your a partners are....in any given circuit. And you can
be in as many circuits as you wish. (Payments can be made to others,
to create a profit motive. I won't deal with this issue, or with the issue
of how reputations are handled, in this posting.)

* The tamper-responding "digital mixes" can still be useful, and may supplement
this purely software-based approach.

* Digital money gets involved, too, both for payments in this system, and in
terms of "alternative currencies." I'm not an economist, so I'll leave this 
for others to go into in more detail.

Enough for now. Chaum's work is just the start. These systems can initially be
set up for "innocuous" purposes like research into crypto techniques (not yet
banned in the U.S.), role-playing games, religions, and the like. Once
they get going, it'll be too late to stop the other things.

Hope you liked this summary. Please read the articles...there's just no way
my posting can do justice to them (though I admit I've concentrated my efforts
on the political aspects, which "respectable" crypto researchers rarely
mention, so perhaps the flavor here is a bit more Extropian than you'll
find elsewhere.)

--Tim (part of the "Too Many Tims!" Conspiracy)

-- 
..........................................................................
Timothy C. May         | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,  
tcmay@netcom.com       | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
408-688-5409           | knowledge, reputations, information markets, 
W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA  | black markets, collapse of governments.
Higher Power: 2^756839 | RSA MailSafe Public Key: by arrangement





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Johan Helsingius <julf@penet.FI>
Date: Tue, 23 Feb 93 00:22:19 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re:
In-Reply-To: <9302230654.AA10264@bsu-cs.bsu.edu>
Message-ID: <9302230933.aa20090@penet.penet.FI>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



> I think it's wrong for anon.penet.fi to operate this way.

Well, then, how *should* anon.penet.fi operate? I really am open to
suggestions...

	Julf





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: an5877@anon.penet.fi (deadbeat)
Date: Tue, 23 Feb 93 08:32:23 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: anon.penet.fi hacking
Message-ID: <9302231549.AA05587@anon.penet.fi>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


In-reply-to: Tony Kidson's message of Tue, 23 Feb 1993 12:16:29 +0000.
	     <2497@morgan.demon.co.uk>

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

> One reason the list has been so busy is that DEADBEAT's messages
> seem to be being posted both through penet and through a cypherpunks
> remailer.

I don't know why this is happening -- my messages are being sent with
headers

    To: anon@anon.penet.fi
    X-Anon-To: cypherpunks@toad.com

Yet two copies are arriving, one from "an5877@anon.penet.fi (deadbeat)"
and another from "nowhere@bsu-cs.bsu.edu (Anonymous)."  Personally, I
think the latter remailer is broken.

DEADBEAT

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.1

iQBFAgUBK4pBIPFZTpBW/B35AQGqcAF9FmuI1E+L0hsWVFbshFQo96mmQoo3pRKt
22+lrGbZge7san/4PQnWmd93HjJEc97u
=KGNP
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
To find out more about the anon service, send mail to help@anon.penet.fi.
Due to the double-blind system, any replies to this message will be anonymized,
and an anonymous id will be allocated automatically. You have been warned.
Please report any problems, inappropriate use etc. to admin@anon.penet.fi.
*IMPORTANT server security update*, mail to update@anon.penet.fi for details.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Karl Barrus <elee9sf@Menudo.UH.EDU>
Date: Tue, 23 Feb 93 08:36:38 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: pgpshell
Message-ID: <199302231635.AA18689@Menudo.UH.EDU>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Cypherpunks:

A user new to unix, pgp, the net, etc. wrote to me asking for a "menu
type of shell" to protect from switch overload.  So I hacked this
together pretty quickly and have given it a once over testing.  It is
meant for new pgp users; something which will help until they are more
comfortable.  I mailed to the original user, but I thought there may
be wider interest.

pgpshell: it pretty much just passes on arguments to pgp, nothing
fancy, minimal functionality.

/-----------------------------------\
| Karl L. Barrus                    |
| elee9sf@menudo.uh.edu             | <- preferred address
| barrus@tree.egr.uh.edu (NeXTMail) |
\-----------------------------------/

------8< cut here >8-----
#!/bin/sh
# pgpshell: minimally functional script to help users of pgp
# (I'm not claiming this yet) :-)
# last update 2/23/93

echo " 1: encrypt a file"
echo " 2: decrypt a file"
echo " 3: conventionally encrypt a file"
echo " 4: sign and encrypt a file"
echo " 5: sign a file, result in ascii file"
echo ""
echo -n "choice: "
read choice

echo -n "Name of file? "
read filename

if [ ! -f "$filename" ]
then
  echo "File $filename not found."
  exit 1
fi

case "$choice" 
in
  1) echo -n "User id? ";
     read user;
     pgp -ea $filename $user;;
  2) pgp $filename;;
  3) pgp -c $filename;;
  4) echo -n "User id? ";
     read user;
     pgp -esa $filename $user;;
  5) pgp -sat +clearsig=on $filename;;
  *) echo "Improper choice."; exit 1;;
esac





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Johan Helsingius <julf@penet.FI>
Date: Tue, 23 Feb 93 00:52:04 PST
To: Hal <74076.1041@compuserve.com>
Subject: Re: anon.penet.fi hacking
In-Reply-To: <930223074743_74076.1041_DHJ21-1@CompuServe.COM>
Message-ID: <9302230955.aa20252@penet.penet.FI>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



> Well, I think I have deduced the identity of "Deadbeat" from his posting
> style.  I don't think Julf should say who he is.  This was an important
> demonstration of a weakness in the security of the remailers.

Definitely!

> The Penet remailer seems now to require a password for all messages; at
> least, I wasn't able to send to an5877@anon.penet.fi ("Deadbeat") without
> using my password.  So chaining through Cypherpunks remailers to Penet would
> seem not to be possible now.

Unless you include your password in the message! Remember that
anon.penet.fi can pick up the X-Anon-To: and X-Anon-Password: lines from
the start of the message text - they don't have to be header fields.

> Unless Eli's suggestion works - having our remailers put out a random
> "From:" line (perhaps just on mail to Penet?) might cause Penet to issue a
> new pseudonym for that apparent new user.  This would be kind of wasteful
> from Penet's perspective - all those pseudonyms are never going to be
> re-used.  But it might allow this form of chaining, without compromising the
> pseudonym of the remailer operator.

The social implications are more important.

> Another possibility would be for there to be a command to Penet to allow
> users to send truly anonymous mail, mail which does not have a meaningful
> "From" line (and in particular which does not have the user's Penet
> pseudonym displayed as the "From" address).  We could set our remailers to
> use that command for any mail sent to Penet.  Mail sent with that command
> would not need a password.  This would be an alternative way for users to
> deal with some of the other attacks, such as the one Deadbeat demonstrated.

I repeat: for general postings, we have to come up with a way to provide
anonymity while retaining a return path. Otherwise chaos ensues, just
look at the most blatant misuses of anon postings witnessed recently!

> P.S. - My, the list has sure been lively today.  Looks like we beat
> Extropians again on volume!

Yeah... Haven't ben able to get away from my machine to have my morning
shower yet (it's 10:30am in Finland).

	Julf





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: nowhere@bsu-cs.bsu.edu (Anonymous)
Date: Tue, 23 Feb 93 07:40:27 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: No Subject
Message-ID: <9302231537.AA28187@bsu-cs.bsu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


In-reply-to: Johan Helsingius' message of Tue, 23 Feb 1993 10:52:16 +0200.
	     <9302231011.aa20353@penet.penet.FI>

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

> > Well, I don't agree that doubleblind is a great idea.
> 
> Neither do I. But many of the users of anon.penet.fi are
> not very computer-and-email-literate, and they have been using other
> services, providing double-blind. Unfortunate, but too late to change now...

Can you elaborate on those other services?  The Finnish remailer is the
only one I'm aware of.

Also, I'm confused about these "not very computer-and-email-literate"
users -- aren't they forced to use an X-Anon-Password header?

I'm surprised there hasn't been more ruckus about the default
behavior.  There must be many folks whose identities have been
inadvertantly exposed.

> What we can do is to provide better ways for those who *are* computer
> literate enough to use extra headers etc.

I don't think this will help.  With my mail environment, I have to go
to lengths to send an anonymous message, concocting X-Anon-To and
X-Anon-Password headers.  It's worth the effort, since this helps to
preserve the secrecy of my pseudonymous identity.

But the first time I mess up, and send an unfettered message to an
anon.penet.fi client, I am unmasked.

What I'm saying is that I'm hip to headers; it's the simple stuff that
trips me up.

And I still don't understand how the unfettered message gets past the
X-Anon-Password filter.

> > I think it's imperative that the sender use X-Anon-To to be
> > pseudonymous.  This is consistent with the principle of least
> > astonishment.
> 
> But in this case I feel the principle of least astonishment is overruled
> by the principle of least risk of accidental exposure.

I think the risk of accidental exposure is heightened by the default
behavior of the Finnish remailer.  Maybe we're using the same words to
describe different things.

> I think that hornet's nest needed to be kicked. But I am also
> disappointed that not enough people defend the need for anonymity in
> places like news.admin.policy.

Some of us gave up on USENET policy long, long ago.  Personally, I stick
to the alt.* groups.

> I think pseudonyms *should* be prominent - as you have noticed, anon.penet.fi
> adds an explicit warning at the end of every message.

In time, I hope such warnings will be unnecessary, as people grow
accustomed to the use of pseudonyms.

DEADBEAT

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.1

iQBFAgUBK4o0+PFZTpBW/B35AQGlcAF/UC0HNtSoIQe2arEoK5uzkjX+7fCwPUqC
l/2o0wifS7SLGLfoshQpd3vaczDktaBV
=TPtY
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
To find out more about the anon service, send mail to help@anon.penet.fi.
Due to the double-blind system, any replies to this message will be anonymized,
and an anonymous id will be allocated automatically. You have been warned.
Please report any problems, inappropriate use etc. to admin@anon.penet.fi.
*IMPORTANT server security update*, mail to update@anon.penet.fi for details.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: pete@cirrus.com (Pete Carpenter)
Date: Tue, 23 Feb 93 10:45:18 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: KQED FM tuesday
Message-ID: <9302231841.AA04053@ss2138.cirrus.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



	The reference to a San Francisco radio station may seem a 
bit parochial, but I promise its related...  I just heard a few 
minutes of their 'Forum' program. The topic was local reaction to 
Clinton's visit by spokesmen for SIA and AEA, plus the head of SGI. 
(Semicon Industry Assoc, American Electronics Assoc, Silicon Graphics)

Someone called with concerns about privacy and wide spread use of 
encryption in cyberspace. If he had left it at that, a question 
about privacy, which everyone can grasp, he might have had his 
question answered. I would like to hear what these people had to 
say on this important topic. 

But no, the guy went off into a 'statement' about how the goverment 
wants to interfere with 'digital money', and the moderator cut him off, 
dry. No disscussion - substitute some other question about jobs.

The moral of the story is - KISS! keep it simple, when talking about
these issues to the general public. Privacy in the electronic age is 
something that everyone can understand. And quite a few 'regular' people 
are very much concerned. Offer wide spread public encryption technology 
as a solution to the problem.  

But PLEASE, don't gum up (public) disscussion with esoterica like 
'digital money'.  Most people don't even understand how 'regular' 
money works :-)


Pete Carpenter                           pete@cirrus.com
                                
Talk about your plenty, talk about your ills,
One man gathers what another man spills. - Robert Hunter





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Johan Helsingius <julf@penet.FI>
Date: Tue, 23 Feb 93 00:52:21 PST
To: mark@coombs.anu.edu.au
Subject: Re: anon.penet.fi remailers
In-Reply-To: <9302230753.AA18385@coombs.anu.edu.au>
Message-ID: <9302231003.aa20289@penet.penet.FI>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



> I balk at Yet-More-F******-Header-Lines (YMFHL) but a _possible_ patch
> is to have a:
> 
> X-Show-My-Anon: yes|no       (in the header),
> 
> or:
> 
> ::
> X-Show-My-Anon: yes|no       (in the body)

Yes. Thinking about something like this. But what is teh best syntax?

> (BTW I saw someone's .sig where they *advertised* their anon id on USENET.
>  Presumably this was because he thought thats what you had to do so others
>  could email them anonomously... obviously he wont be a whistle blower :)

Well, it could be somebody who doesn't care about his/her own anonymity,
but wants to make it as easy as possible to send anon mail to him/her.
It's so much easier to mail to anXXXX@anon.penet.fi than to use stuff
like user%host.domain@anon.penet.fi or hack around with strange extra
X-Anon-* headers (especially with anally-retentive mailers etc.).

	Julf





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Johan Helsingius <julf@penet.FI>
Date: Tue, 23 Feb 93 01:12:12 PST
To: Anonymous <nowhere@bsu-cs.bsu.edu>
Subject: Re:
In-Reply-To: <9302230715.AA11401@bsu-cs.bsu.edu>
Message-ID: <9302231011.aa20353@penet.penet.FI>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



> Well, I don't agree that doubleblind is a great idea.

Neither do I. But many of the users of anon.penet.fi are
not very computer-and-email-literate, and they have been using other
services, providing double-blind. Unfortunate, but too late to change now...

What we can do is to provide better ways for those who *are* computer
literate enough to use extra headers etc.

> > Evidentally there is positive harm that can occur by automatically
> > anonymizing all messages which pass through a remailer.  ... For
> > anonymous posting and for mail to a non-anonymous address, it's more
> > reasonable to assume that anonymization is desired.  ... But when
> > sending a message to an anonymous address, it's not known whether the
> > sender wants to be anonymized or not.
> 
> I think it's imperative that the sender use X-Anon-To to be
> pseudonymous.  This is consistent with the principle of least
> astonishment.

But in this case I feel the principle of least astonishment is overruled
by the principle of least risk of accidental exposure.

> > Also, I have seen proposals that anonymous ID's should be made less
> > recognizable, so that instead of an5877@anon.penet.fi we would have
> > joe@serv.uba.edu.  In such a situation it might be tedious to
> > scrutinize every email address we send to (via replies, for example)
> > to make sure it isn't a remailer where you have an anonymous ID.
> 
> It would be a real boon to make pseudonyms less prominent -- this
> seems to have kicked over a hornet's nest on USENET (even though
> pseudonyms have been quietly in use for years).  But were this the
> case, scrutiny would be an understatement.

I think that hornet's nest needed to be kicked. But I am also
disappointed that not enough people defend the need for anonymity in
places like news.admin.policy.

I think pseudonyms *should* be prominent - as you have noticed, anon.penet.fi
adds an explicit warning at the end of every message.

> > All in all, I think some changes need to be made in how anonymous
> > addresses are used and implemented in order to provide reasonable
> > amounts of security.
> 
> I agree that more discussion is in order.  I'm especially concerned 
> about the broader issues regarding anonymity through remailers.

Agree 100%.

	Julf





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Timothy Newsham <newsham@wiliki.eng.hawaii.edu>
Date: Tue, 23 Feb 93 13:27:05 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: link encryption
Message-ID: <9302232127.AA17003@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



I have been working lately on a program to encrypt my modem
traffic between home and the unix.  I call the program 'link'
for link encryption.  Currently it uses DES and RSA,  RSA to
exchange a random session key and DES to encrypt all general
traffic.  I spent some time today cleaning up some of the
code so that it would be more modular and portable.  The unix
end  i is presentable now but would require a remote end to
work along with it.  I dont feel that my Amiga end is
good enough to even use regularly, there are some bugs in the
Amiga end, and I haven incorporated the most recent changes into
it either.  I wrote the code to be modular and hopefully
easily attached to other term programs in hopes that people would
patch some code into their favorite term program and use it.
If anyone wants the unix code I'm giving it out now,  It is
a bit long so I wont post it to the list unless I get enough
replies (aand not too many "dont post it!" replies).  If anyone
has an ftp site they wish to put it on that is fine too.  I'm
releasing the code into the public domain, do with it what you
please.  Its in no way complete, I plan to add more features
and hopefully robustness to the code in the future.
                                ...




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Date: Tue, 23 Feb 93 11:23:32 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: The Futility of General Crypto Education?
Message-ID: <9302231921.AA01808@netcom.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Pete Carpenter (welcome, Pete!) writes:

....stuff about a radio call-in show elided....
>But no, the guy went off into a 'statement' about how the goverment 
>wants to interfere with 'digital money', and the moderator cut him off, 
>dry. No disscussion - substitute some other question about jobs.
>
>The moral of the story is - KISS! keep it simple, when talking about
>these issues to the general public. Privacy in the electronic age is 
>something that everyone can understand. And quite a few 'regular' people 
>are very much concerned. Offer wide spread public encryption technology 
>as a solution to the problem.  
>
>But PLEASE, don't gum up (public) disscussion with esoterica like 
>'digital money'.  Most people don't even understand how 'regular' 
>money works :-)

Point well taken. Most of the stuff we talk about is almost too esoteric
for _ourselves_ (well, at times), let alone for the public. 

Pete's point is that we should keep our message very simple, mostly by
focussing on privacy. (This is a theme Tom Jennings has also pushed, even
urging this list to drop references to "crypto," which he thinks connotes
spies and secrets, and instead replace it with "privacy," which he thinks
most people will find more palatable.)

But I think trying to educate the public is an absolutely lost cause. The
Libertarian Party has been trying for years, and just got the lowest vote
percentage in their history. (I suspect the Peace and Freedom Party, or
other parties, would admit the same thing.)

The average voter believes in UFOs, ghosts, brain cancer from cellular
phones, the dangers of nuclear power, psychics, the War on (Some) Drugs,
and the whole "democracy" thing. She certainly won't take the time to learn
about RSA, digital money, etc.

We won't get crypto liberty via the ballot box, we'll get it only if the
technology is sound and is deployed widely enough so that attempts to stop
it are futile. This has been how the most important changes in society have
occurred, from agriculture to printing to telephones: the technology filled
some need, spread, and became unstoppable. Convincing the voters at the
ballot box was never an issue.

Having said this, I agree that there's some role for educating some
fraction of the public, so I applaud the many fine efforts of the EFF,
CPSR, and so on. And some of these efforts may delay legislation which
would make otherwise delay the "Crypto Phase Change."

And I suppose I agree with Pete that if and when public forums are held,
common sense dictates that the really abstruse stuff be avoided--I know I'd
flip to another station if the discussion turned to the intricacies of PERL
scripts in remailers! :-}


-Tim May


--
Timothy C. May               | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,  
tcmay@netcom.com        | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
408-688-5409               | knowledge, reputations, information markets, 
W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA       | black markets, collapse of governments.
Higher Power: 2^756839 | Public Key: MailSafe and PGP available.





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: nowhere@bsu-cs.bsu.edu (Anonymous)
Date: Tue, 23 Feb 93 08:29:37 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: No Subject
Message-ID: <9302231626.AA01332@bsu-cs.bsu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


In-reply-to: Johan Helsingius' message of Tue, 23 Feb 1993 09:32:54 +0200.
	     <9302230851.aa19921@penet.penet.FI>
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

> >                                                    The problem became
> > apparent to me when I sent pseudonymous mail to a prominent person on
> > this list; his reply exposed his pseudonymous id at anon.penet.fi,
> > surely without his knowledge.
>
> I think this would be fixed by the "X-Anon-Anonymize: no" (or whatever)
> hack. But for reasons I have outlined in the earlier round of
> discussions, it can't be the default. Comments?

If it's not the default behavior, then it will be a recurring problem.

> There has been a lot of discussion about this, and I'm afraid it's too
> late to change the *default* behavior now...

Why?  It seems to me the X-Anon-Password header was a pretty major
change, yet you made that change to preserve people's pseudonymous
identities.  The instant challenge is just as grave, don't you think?

> P.S. In case I forgot to announce it, as you could see from the message
> I'm replying to, PGP stuff doesn't get stripped at anon.penet.fi
> anymore.....

Great stuff.  Thanks.

DEADBEAT

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.1

iQBFAgUBK4o8FfFZTpBW/B35AQFQgwF/QU9NQmgtFKfv+KMoghtSwTL/e8vh3G4b
vwlZy3yWF6D4+LVAnOEcuh0gvxJSNi51
=hD4O
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
To find out more about the anon service, send mail to help@anon.penet.fi.
Due to the double-blind system, any replies to this message will be anonymized,
and an anonymous id will be allocated automatically. You have been warned.
Please report any problems, inappropriate use etc. to admin@anon.penet.fi.
*IMPORTANT server security update*, mail to update@anon.penet.fi for details.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: an5877@anon.penet.fi (deadbeat)
Date: Tue, 23 Feb 93 10:20:48 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: No subject
Message-ID: <9302231704.AA10557@anon.penet.fi>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


In-reply-to: Johan Helsingius' message of Tue, 23 Feb 1993 10:14:27 +0200.
	     <9302230933.aa20090@penet.penet.FI>

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

> Well, then, how *should* anon.penet.fi operate? I really am open to
> suggestions...

I'll restrict my comments to anonymous email, but the application to
anonymous USENET posting is analogous.

I'll ignore messages of the sort

	From: Alice
	To: anon@anon.penet.fi
	X-Anon-To: Bob
	X-Anon-Password: zzz

since it's clear that Alice's identity should be concealed in this
case.  The problem we're dealing with is the message of the sort

	From: Alice
	To: Bob <anxxxx@anon.penet.fi>

Should the remailer expose Alice's identity in the message that it
forwards to Bob?  If it does so blindly, Alice's anonymous identity is
subject to accidental exposure.  If it does not conceal Alice's
identity, then certain expectations of anonymity might not be realized
(according to Johan).

Here's a way out that will satisfy me and Johan: assign Alice a new
pseudonym here and now, one that will be good for replies only.  If
Alice has registered with the remailer in the past, i.e., if she has a
password, then she knows how to X-Anon-To:, but has opted not to.  If
she has not registered, then it is also appropriate to assign her a new
ID.  However, should she later register, I suggest she be given a new,
permanent, password-protected ID, just in case her earlier reply
inadvertently exposed her real ID (in the way we have been discussing).

In essence, I'm suggesting that the Finnish remailer have two classes
of anonymous IDs, one that is password protected, and one that is not.
The former should never be used without the X-Anon-Password header.

DEADBEAT

P.S.: Another suggestion I would make is that the remailer _not_ strip
In-Reply-To: headers.

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.1

iQBFAgUBK4pRavFZTpBW/B35AQGC2AF/Q+LZt6T+SupvLftQom7xlon7+8LOGLpX
bSy1lT0XEyzPQ1nwCDGOr0+MF9KdwPEO
=AoKd
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
To find out more about the anon service, send mail to help@anon.penet.fi.
Due to the double-blind system, any replies to this message will be anonymized,
and an anonymous id will be allocated automatically. You have been warned.
Please report any problems, inappropriate use etc. to admin@anon.penet.fi.
*IMPORTANT server security update*, mail to update@anon.penet.fi for details.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: nowhere@bsu-cs.bsu.edu (Anonymous)
Date: Tue, 23 Feb 93 08:39:34 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: No Subject
Message-ID: <9302231636.AA02040@bsu-cs.bsu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


In-reply-to: Tony Kidson's message of Tue, 23 Feb 1993 12:16:29 +0000.
	     <2497@morgan.demon.co.uk>

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

> One reason the list has been so busy is that DEADBEAT's messages
> seem to be being posted both through penet and through a cypherpunks
> remailer.

I don't know why this is happening -- my messages are being sent with
headers

    To: anon@anon.penet.fi
    X-Anon-To: cypherpunks@toad.com

Yet two copies are arriving, one from "an5877@anon.penet.fi (deadbeat)"
and another from "nowhere@bsu-cs.bsu.edu (Anonymous)."  Personally, I
think the latter remailer is broken.

DEADBEAT

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.1

iQBFAgUBK4pBIPFZTpBW/B35AQGqcAF9FmuI1E+L0hsWVFbshFQo96mmQoo3pRKt
22+lrGbZge7san/4PQnWmd93HjJEc97u
=KGNP
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
To find out more about the anon service, send mail to help@anon.penet.fi.
Due to the double-blind system, any replies to this message will be anonymized,
and an anonymous id will be allocated automatically. You have been warned.
Please report any problems, inappropriate use etc. to admin@anon.penet.fi.
*IMPORTANT server security update*, mail to update@anon.penet.fi for details.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: an5877@anon.penet.fi (deadbeat)
Date: Tue, 23 Feb 93 09:56:24 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: posting and posting and posting.
Message-ID: <9302231710.AA11001@anon.penet.fi>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


In-reply-to: DrZaphod's message of Tue, 23 Feb 1993 02:55:22 -0600.
	     <10525.drzaphod@ncselxsi>

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

>      I was just going to ask about that.. I've gotten the same message from
> DEADBEAT about 4 times..

I don't think I'm to blame for this.  I think the problem is with the
"nowhere@bsu-cs.bsu.edu" remailer.

DEADBEAT

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.1

iQBFAgUBK4pTXvFZTpBW/B35AQGOngGAuhLA0SX22r0UVC9kMVfK31SjSSrCLc5k
+bRhYyMZXyQ/TfneslZ4/mIh/xAPD4MB
=V7Fj
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
To find out more about the anon service, send mail to help@anon.penet.fi.
Due to the double-blind system, any replies to this message will be anonymized,
and an anonymous id will be allocated automatically. You have been warned.
Please report any problems, inappropriate use etc. to admin@anon.penet.fi.
*IMPORTANT server security update*, mail to update@anon.penet.fi for details.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: pmetzger@shearson.com (Perry E. Metzger)
Date: Tue, 23 Feb 93 10:39:34 PST
To: huntting@glarp.com
Subject: Re: Rambo Lives
Message-ID: <9302231649.AA00522@maggie.shearson.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



> From cypherpunks-request@toad.com Mon Feb 22 23:23:46 1993
> To: cypherpunks@toad.com
> Subject: Re: Rambo Lives 
> Date: Mon, 22 Feb 1993 20:37:25 MST
> From: Brad Huntting <huntting@glarp.com>
> Content-Length: 649
> 
> 
> >> I say we should ensure that as many citizens as possible get ahold of PGP as
> >> soon as possible.
> 
> > Definitely.  Spread the source.
> 
> But to realy get PGP going (or PEM for that matter) will require
> wide spread key distribution.  It's clear that such distribution
> mechanisms are not going to arise out of any "respectfull" institutions
> mostly because of the legal entanglements they present.
> 
> Perhaps the time has come for "alt.pgp.keyrings".  A standard format
> for postings could allow them to be automatically added to global
> keyrings at usenet sites everywhere.  Several security issues will
> have to be addressed before this can work.

I see statements like this over and over again and I can't help but believe
it is due to extremely widespread ignorance about PGP keys.

There is no need for widespread key distribution, folks. If you want
to communicate with someone, provided their key has been signed by
someone who's signature you trust, you can just ask them, in the clear,
to email you their key, and all should be just fine. Some people seem
to obsessively keep hundreds and thousands of keys around. Why? Whats
the point? You can always just get keys from people any time you like.
There is no problem.

Perry




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Hal <74076.1041@CompuServe.COM>
Date: Tue, 23 Feb 93 09:01:58 PST
To: Cypherpunks <cypherpunks@toad.com>
Subject: Beware of anon.penet.fi
Message-ID: <930223165258_74076.1041_DHJ23-1@CompuServe.COM>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I'd like to verify that
 
X-Anon-Doubleblind: no
 
would mean that no X-Anon-Password would be needed with the message.  This
way, remailer operators who use their personal accounts for remailing could
establish a Penet anonymous ID and password for personal use, and be
confident that remailer users would not be able to send mail through Penet
that would be delivered with that anonymous ID exposed.
 
Also, we could patch the remailers to add the X-Anon-Doubleblind: no line to
mail which goes out to Penet, just in case the user forgets.  (I don't think
there is a need for mail through one of our remailers to be delivered to
Penet with an X-Anon-Password, since only the remailer operator knows the
correct password to use, so virtually no one would be able to use this
feature.)
 
I am confused about the exact rules that Penet uses to decide when a
password must be given.  I get the impression that if no password has been
registered, anonymous posting and mailing to non-anonymous addresses is
forbidden, but you can still mail to anonymous addresses.  If a password has
been registered, you must give it to do any of these three things.  Is this
right?
 
Hal
 






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Karl Barrus <elee9sf@Menudo.UH.EDU>
Date: Tue, 23 Feb 93 10:08:40 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: double messages
Message-ID: <199302231807.AA28212@Menudo.UH.EDU>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Cypherpunks,

This double & unexpected message problem reminds me of the problems I
had when I attempted to chain pax and penet together.  But that
resulted in unexpected userids, not duplicate messages.  And if an
unexpected userid occured, then it would show in the message to
cypherpunks from penet, assuming an5877 would say that that isn't his
normal pseudonym.

From what I understand, if someone does not have a penet id and uses
penet to send to this list, that someone will be allocated a penet id,
and allocation will be sent back to the original sender.  Then, mail
to penet with the remailing request to this list will show up as
originating from the pseudonym established.  So how in the world is
Chael's remailer getting hold of the messages and forwarding them to
this list?

I know a few times in the past I've received mail addressed to me and
the list (cc: cypherpunks@toad.com) and I've replied without noticing
the cc: header, so my reply showed up in both places (now I try to
look for the carbon copy header and delete it out!).  But an5877 says
that the header only contains the header he specified.

Now Chael wrote the remailer software himself (is this true?) and I
think he said there were several remailing request specifiers, one of
which is X-Anon-To: user@host - the same one penet uses.

So maybe an5877 is replying to messages with this header:

To: anon@anon.penet.fi
X-Anon-To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Cc: nowhere@bsu-cs.cs.edu

(If the header were this obvious, then I'm sure an5877 would catch it.
But sometimes extra stuff shows in the header, like message id's, etc.
so the cc: is hidden a bit)  Then, the nowhere remailer would
dutifully resend the message as instructed in the X-Anon-To: header.
Of course, to get the cc: nowhere@bsu in the header in the first place
would indicate that an5877 did try to use it at some point - for the
original message?

Well, its a bit far-fetched, but it does explain what is going on.

/-----------------------------------\
| Karl L. Barrus                    |
| elee9sf@menudo.uh.edu             | <- preferred address
| barrus@tree.egr.uh.edu (NeXTMail) |
\-----------------------------------/




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Tony Kidson <tony@morgan.demon.co.uk>
Date: Tue, 23 Feb 93 05:21:08 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: anon.penet.fi hacking
Message-ID: <2497@morgan.demon.co.uk>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


One reason the list has been so busy is that DEADBEAT's messages
seem to be being posted both through penet and through a cypherpunks
remailer.

Tony
+-----------------+-------------------------------+--------------------------+
| Tony Kidson     |`morgan' is an 8MB  486/33 Cat-| Voice +44 81 466 5127    |
| Morgan Towers,  |Warmer with a 670 MB Hard Disk.| E-Mail                   |
| Morgan Road,    |It  resides at Morgan Towers in| tony@morgan.demon.co.uk  |
| Bromley,        |Beautiful  Down Town  Bromley. | tny@cix.compulink.co.uk  |
| England BR1 3QE |Honda ST1100  ==*==  DoD# 0801 | 100024.301@compuserve.com|
+=================+===============================+==========================+




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Hal <74076.1041@CompuServe.COM>
Date: Tue, 23 Feb 93 09:38:43 PST
To: Cypherpunks <cypherpunks@toad.com>
Subject: Doubled penet messages
Message-ID: <930223173029_74076.1041_DHJ36-1@CompuServe.COM>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I see what's causing the double messages from Deadbeat.
 
Penet puts an X-Anonymously-To: cypherpunks@toad.com into the header that it
sends.  (I'm not sure why it has to do this; isn't this redundant with the
"To:" header?)  The cypherpunks mailing list rebroadcaster keeps this
header.  The mailing list goes to Chael Hall's remailer.  That remailer sees
the X-Anonymously-To line in the header and thinks this message is a
remailing request.  (The other Cypherpunks remailers uses a different header
line for their remailing requests.)  That remailer then obediently sends the
mail to Cypherpunks, and so we get two messages.
 
Either Chael's remailer should not accept X-Anonymously-To as its remailing
request, or Penet should not put X-Anonymously-To into the outgoing message
headers.
 
Perhaps this would be a good time to standardize the supported set of
headers for remailing requests.
 
Hal
 






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: eggo@STUDENT.umass.edu (Bullet in the Head)
Date: Tue, 23 Feb 93 09:43:18 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Finding Mac PGP software?
Message-ID: <9302231740.AA09941@titan.ucs.umass.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text


	I'm sure this is a FAQ, but can anyone point me to an FTP site
where I can obtain PGP for the Macintosh?  Does such a beast exist?
Thanks for your time.

+-    eggo@titan.ucc.umass.edu                 Eat Some Paste    -+
+-          Yorn desh born, der ritt de gitt der gue,            -+
+-      Orn desh, dee born desh, de umn bork! bork! bork!        -+




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Anonymous@cs.Buffalo.EDU
Date: Tue, 23 Feb 93 09:55:59 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: two copies of deadbeat's mail...
Message-ID: <9302231754.AA16626@armstrong.cs.Buffalo.EDU>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Attention deadbeat...

I'm getting two copies of your postings to cypherpunks from both
anon.penet.fi and from nowhere@bsu-cs.bsu.edu.

One copy is enough.

Thanks.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "L. Detweiler" <ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Date: Tue, 23 Feb 93 12:03:18 PST
To: CYPHERPUNKS <CYPHERPUNKS@toad.com>
Subject: dispatches from the front lines of anonymity
In-Reply-To: <930223022107_74076.1041_DHJ66-1@CompuServe.COM>
Message-ID: <9302232001.AA01786@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


A few notes on the progress in anonymity:

Eric Hughes suggests an alt.whistleblower with localized anonymizing. I
like this, but I don't see how NNTP provides it. Wouldn't every server
have to be modified or upgraded to support anonymizing? It would be
trivial but I think we will find that the people in charge of NNTP are
looking for ways to increase authentication and validation mechanisms,
and would be hostile to the idea, althought that's definitely the place
for it.  As I hinted in an earlier message, the possibility of a
centralized moderator stripping addresses, while already currently
supported in the software mechanisms, is problematic because it is a
single location with all the traffic--hence the need to go through
independent anonymous servers first. But I think the localized
header-stripping is totally superior to all this. Having a message
bounce around a net a bit with *real* information is very vulnerable,
when the ID could be stripped off at the source.

Regarding the alt.whistleblower group, someone has proposed starting a
.gov hierarchy on news.admin.policy very recently, and I sent along the
proposal to him. Watch for new RFCs and vote with your email.  For now
I think the route to go is to get a group and let independent servers
take care of anonymizing the traffic. Maybe the moderating address
could pick a random remailer from a list of active ones--?

I'd like to say a few things about what's going on in news.admin.policy
right now. The thing has turned into quite a conflagation. But most
notable is that Julf@penet has broken his silence on the really
voracious drubbing he's getting, and come forward to say that he has
taken actions against abusive posters, and is under severe amounts of
stress--he said he spends 5 hrs some days answering email
(administrative queries?) on the server. In one case an abusive poster
crashed his system by mailbombing (filling it up with junk). K.
Kleinpaste, who wrote original scripts that julf is using, IMHO is at
best a hypocrite and at worst a traitor to the cause. He has attacked
julf repeatedly on news.answers (most recently calling him a `bastard')
for not implementing the `fire extinguisher' (killing abusive posters)
or restricting group access, or using his own software for any of these
purposes, despite originally providing it.  In private email to him I
find him very authoritarian and narrowminded on issues of anonymity and
am frankly quite stunned he ever partook in the project.  I think
history will show very clearly that the great and tremendous popularity
of the penet server (10,000 users in a few months) is due *precisely*
to julf's decision to allow postings to all groups.

Anyway, if ever there was a call for other server operators (not just
account remailers)--this is it. We need people with as much control
over their own site as possible. Stuff that is running without the
knowledge of sysadmins at the site is great for experiments but its
just not going to cut it for some very serious future uses that are
approaching at the speed of light.  Also, if anyone from EFF is
listening, I think this could turn out to be one of the most important
net.issues over the coming years.  How about an EFF sponsored server?

I suspect, if anybody did a fairly impartial study, instead of all the
ranting and prejudice that is going on right now in news.admin.policy,
that anonymous abuse is not extremely problematic or unmanagable
compared to regular phantom/untraceable postings on Usenet. People are
so vocal about `abuses' right now, but only because they tend to be
highly visible. The anonymity is a red herring here. If julf@penet has
10,000 anonymous users, do we now have 10,000 times the problems on
Usenet in general?  Or *any* measurable fraction more than previously?

I think this anonymous use is getting very high use right now. We are
right in the midst of a major trend toward greater anonymized traffic.
Stats on news.lists show that a lot of traffic is starting to get
anonymized, traffic that was once (previously, probably) simply forged.
They'll be plenty of people complaining from upset status quo. Tell
them to take some virtual alkaseltzer.

- - -

I apologize for not bringing this to the attention of the list earlier,
as it sort of seems to be a recent epiphany on the list, but julf@penet
told me he added the password protection precisely for the forgery
questions that are popping up. Also, something to note on forgery is
that the forger may not necessarily *know* a person has an anonymous
mail address on a given server, and the forgery may result in
allocating a new anonymous ID for the forged address. The forger can
tell the difference if the message simply goes through or he gets back
a `you have been allocated xxx ID..'

Also, note the simple scheme of serially allocating anonymous ID's
could be a problem. If the infiltrator knows the rough date that
someone was allocated a new ID, he could narrow down the range of IDs.
For this reason randomly allocated IDs is a better idea.  The
infiltrator could even go around to new accounts all the time (or forge
them) to get an idea where the server is in the allocation cycle. It
seems to me that there are probably a lot of ID's that are not being
used on these servers and the issue of when to get rid of old ID's is a big problem.

Regarding some notes from Mr. Finney:

>You have these security threats which involve people being tricked into
>sending messages through the remailer in such a way that the recipient
>knows the true email address from where the messages are coming.

These are completely analogous to users being tricked into supplying
passwords in regular login situations. Not a new problem. And anybody
who hasn't figured out that you should *never* put any identifying
information in the message itself is probably a little too clueless to
be using the service in the first place. However, the idea of giving a
warning in the use introduction is ok: ``under NO CIRCUMSTANCES EVER DO
THIS'' type thing.

>Another problem that people have complained about is when they respond
>to an anonymous posting, they get a message from Penet saying that they
>now have an anonymous ID assigned.  This confuses and bothers some people.

Tell them to try not to be so sensitive that a breeze causes themselves
to panic.  Its a new scheme but they need to get used to it. They can
throw off the anonymity voluntarily any time they want by just
including their ID in their message. But they shouldn't do this if they
ever want to use the server in the future.  Really, all this comes down
to is that they get one extra reply in their mailbox other than
usual--the one from the server saying `you now have this ID'.  I think
most people are recognizing that people complaining about this are just
trying to be troublesome. The argument was called `pedantic' on news.admin.answers.

>Evidentally
>there is positive harm that can occur by automatically anonymizing
>all messages which pass through a remailer.

The problem is that the anonymity is implicitly requested by a message
to the server. Hence replies are getting this anonymity. One
possibility is an override switch in the header that leaves it entirely
intact and the server just acts like another hub forwarder. But what is
this `harm'? We have to recognize these complaints as completely
frivolous and without merit.  Please, don't find a problem where there
is none, you will only complicate simplicity.

One thing I'd like to see that no one has done is an `unlink' feature
for servers that carry address alias tables, so the user can erase all
trace of any previous transactions through the server (other than the
mail).  But maybe this is too close to the hit-and-run abuse out there.
Maybe there is a compromise somewhere, like a waiting period before
unlinking, during which complaints can be registered and possibly
prohibit future use.






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: fnerd@smds.com (FutureNerd Steve Witham)
Date: Tue, 23 Feb 93 21:33:09 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Crypto goals
Message-ID: <9302231806.AB16915@smds.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>How about making a list of features we want, and/or a list of scenarios 
>we want to be able to handle?
>...
>    executable but non-disassemblable code [is it possible?]
>...
>Have I missed anything?
>
>-- Marc Ringuette (mnr@cs.cmu.edu)

Encrypted computing.  This is even harder than non-disassemblable code.
The idea is that you couldn't even tell what happened to the data if you
watched it compute, tried again with slightly different inputs, etc.
I've heard that some restricted sort of encrypted computing is possible
with an exponential time cost!

The main application I have in mind is a mix that would be trustworthy
even if it was run by your worst enemies with the best computers in the
world.

This seems impossible but I don't have proof.

-fnerd
fnerd@smds.com (FutureNerd Steve Witham)





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: nowhere@bsu-cs.bsu.edu (Anonymous)
Date: Tue, 23 Feb 93 10:14:17 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: No Subject
Message-ID: <9302231810.AA09342@bsu-cs.bsu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


In-reply-to: DrZaphod's message of Tue, 23 Feb 1993 02:55:22 -0600.
	     <10525.drzaphod@ncselxsi>

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

>      I was just going to ask about that.. I've gotten the same message from
> DEADBEAT about 4 times..

I don't think I'm to blame for this.  I think the problem is with the
"nowhere@bsu-cs.bsu.edu" remailer.

DEADBEAT

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.1

iQBFAgUBK4pTXvFZTpBW/B35AQGOngGAuhLA0SX22r0UVC9kMVfK31SjSSrCLc5k
+bRhYyMZXyQ/TfneslZ4/mIh/xAPD4MB
=V7Fj
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
To find out more about the anon service, send mail to help@anon.penet.fi.
Due to the double-blind system, any replies to this message will be anonymized,
and an anonymous id will be allocated automatically. You have been warned.
Please report any problems, inappropriate use etc. to admin@anon.penet.fi.
*IMPORTANT server security update*, mail to update@anon.penet.fi for details.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Timothy Newsham <newsham@wiliki.eng.hawaii.edu>
Date: Tue, 23 Feb 93 15:46:40 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: scheme
Message-ID: <9302232346.AA19000@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



I posted this to sci.crypt,  I would also like the opinion
of the people on this list:

---------------------------------------
I have posted about this before, but this time I decided
to whip up some code so you can all see what I'm talking
about and all the details.

This encryption scheme uses XOR to encrypt data 1 character
at a time.  Because of this it is suitable for protocols
where you need to send single bytes (or less) at a time.
Examples of this would be interactive ascii.  Also it
is easily applicable to crippled lines like 7 bit lines.
This is because if the plaintext is 7 bits you can send
just the 7 bits after the XOR.  Even more general you can
use it to encrypt any size at a time, down to single bits
if you just have 1 bit to send immediately and dont want
to wait for more data to become applicable.

Ok.  So what are its disavantages?  Syncronization, as
soon as synchronization is gone thats it, its all over.  Each
block of 'pad' is generated from previous plaintext,  if you
cant figure out the previous plaintext you are lost.

Notice it uses a hash() function,  this could be anything, ie
DES,  or perhaps a one way function (no unhash() is ever needed).
The algorithm is fairly simple, the beginning is a bit wierd
and could have been done several ways.  The first 8 bits in
this implementation are used for synchronization.

prog -e key <file >file2
prog -d key <file2 >file3

ok.. here it is..  poke holes in it.  What are the weaknesses,
is it totally unsecure?  Is it as secure as the hash function
(ie. if DES was used, is strength equivalent to the strength of
DES?)


-------------cut here---------------------------------------------

#define SIZE 8
#ifdef MEMCPY
#define bcopy(s,d,l)   memcpy(d,s,l)
#endif

usage(s)
char *s;
{
  printf("%s [-e|e|-d|d] key\n",s);
  exit(1);
}

main(argc,argv)
char **argv;
int argc;
{
  char data[SIZE],pad[SIZE],c[1],c1[1],*p,key[SIZE];
  int cnt,encrypt=0;
  
  if(argc!=3) 
   usage(argv[0]);
  for(cnt=0;cnt<SIZE;cnt++)  /* fill in extra characters in key */
    key[cnt]=0xaa;
  strncpy(key,argv[2],SIZE);
  p=argv[1];
  if(*p=='-') p++;
  if(*p=='e')
    encrypt++;
  else
    if(*p!='d') usage(argv[0]);

  if(encrypt) {
  /* to start off encryption, we send a bunch of random bits */
  /* then we hash those bits and use them as pad             */
    blkrand(data,SIZE);
    write(1,data,SIZE);
    hash(data,key);
  } else {
  /* to start off decryption, we receive the random bits and */
  /* hash them (just like the encryptor did) and we should   */
  /* have the same starting pad as the encryptor             */
    read(0,data,SIZE);
    hash(data,key);
  }
  bcopy(data,pad,SIZE);
  
  cnt=0;
  while(read(0,c,1)>0) {
  /* read characters, send them with our pad       */
  /* every time we run out of pad, we make new pad */
  /* by hashing old data                           */
    *c1 = *c ^ pad[cnt]; 
    if(encrypt)        /* data is the plain text always */
      data[cnt]=*c;
    else
      data[cnt]=*c1;
    write(1,c1,1);
    if(++cnt==SIZE) {
      cnt=0;
      bcopy(data,pad,SIZE);
      hash(pad,key);
    }
  } 
}   
  
/* provide a block of random bits */
blkrand(block,len)
int len;
char *block;
{
  srand(time(0));
  while(len--) 
    *block++ = (rand() >>7)&0xff;
}

/* hash a block, could be DES, or even a one way function */
hash(block,key)
char *block,*key;
{
  char b2[SIZE];
  int i=SIZE;  

  while(i--) 
    b2[i] = *block++ ^ *key++;
  bcopy(b2,block,SIZE);
}


  
  





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: nowhere@bsu-cs.bsu.edu (Anonymous)
Date: Tue, 23 Feb 93 10:34:52 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: No Subject
Message-ID: <9302231831.AA12396@bsu-cs.bsu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


In-reply-to: Johan Helsingius' message of Tue, 23 Feb 1993 10:14:27 +0200.
	     <9302230933.aa20090@penet.penet.FI>

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

> Well, then, how *should* anon.penet.fi operate? I really am open to
> suggestions...

I'll restrict my comments to anonymous email, but the application to
anonymous USENET posting is analogous.

I'll ignore messages of the sort

	From: Alice
	To: anon@anon.penet.fi
	X-Anon-To: Bob
	X-Anon-Password: zzz

since it's clear that Alice's identity should be concealed in this
case.  The problem we're dealing with is the message of the sort

	From: Alice
	To: Bob <anxxxx@anon.penet.fi>

Should the remailer expose Alice's identity in the message that it
forwards to Bob?  If it does so blindly, Alice's anonymous identity is
subject to accidental exposure.  If it does not conceal Alice's
identity, then certain expectations of anonymity might not be realized
(according to Johan).

Here's a way out that will satisfy me and Johan: assign Alice a new
pseudonym here and now, one that will be good for replies only.  If
Alice has registered with the remailer in the past, i.e., if she has a
password, then she knows how to X-Anon-To:, but has opted not to.  If
she has not registered, then it is also appropriate to assign her a new
ID.  However, should she later register, I suggest she be given a new,
permanent, password-protected ID, just in case her earlier reply
inadvertently exposed her real ID (in the way we have been discussing).

In essence, I'm suggesting that the Finnish remailer have two classes
of anonymous IDs, one that is password protected, and one that is not.
The former should never be used without the X-Anon-Password header.

DEADBEAT

P.S.: Another suggestion I would make is that the remailer _not_ strip
In-Reply-To: headers.

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.1

iQBFAgUBK4pRavFZTpBW/B35AQGC2AF/Q+LZt6T+SupvLftQom7xlon7+8LOGLpX
bSy1lT0XEyzPQ1nwCDGOr0+MF9KdwPEO
=AoKd
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
To find out more about the anon service, send mail to help@anon.penet.fi.
Due to the double-blind system, any replies to this message will be anonymized,
and an anonymous id will be allocated automatically. You have been warned.
Please report any problems, inappropriate use etc. to admin@anon.penet.fi.
*IMPORTANT server security update*, mail to update@anon.penet.fi for details.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Date: Tue, 23 Feb 93 13:33:18 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Congratulations to All!
Message-ID: <9302232131.AA17884@netcom.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



With all the volume on this list, and the controversy over "Deadbeat" (in
both his/her content and the multiple postings), and the flame wars (not
here, of course!) over the anonymous postings, I wanted to say a few
things. I'll be brief.

* Congratulations to all on the amazing progress being shown. The
"problems" are themselves valuable learning experiences, spurring on new
developments and forcing important issues to the fore.

* The escapades of "Deadbeat" are especially valuable, as weaknesses are
revealed and fixes are implemented. The sociology of anonymous systems is a
largely unexplored territory. (From the phrasing he uses, "Deadbeat" seems
to be one of our regular posters, and is clearly not some malicious
outsider intent on destroying our system--and even if so, he's still doing
us a service!).

* Our own Lance Detweiler posted to sci.crypt a very long and excellent
summary of anonymous mail, remailers, and general issues. It is still
there, titled, "IDENTITY, PRIVACY, and ANONYMITY on the INTERNET."   I'm
surprised it hasn't been mentioned here more often. In fact, it ought to be
posted to _this_ list, in case someone isn't reading sci.crypt (that's hard
to believe, though). Others, like Hal Finney, have also posted recent
summaries of remailers.

* The "whistleblower" group idea is a good one, as is the "pools" idea. The
whistleblower application is already in use via a modem system in
Washington (I saw this mentioned about a year ago...I can dig up the
details, maybe), though not using any form of crypto anonymity. I confess
to having similar ideas some time back, which I mentioned at the first
physical Cypherpunks meeting, in September, though I completely missed the
importance in terms of _public relations_. In other words, I think it's a
great idea.

(The obvious benefits of an anonymous whistleblower group will make it hard
for government types to object. Even if a lot of "noise" is posted
(spurious claims, rumors, etc.), the exercise will be beneficial. And
journalists who begin to dip into such a group for possible articles, will
thus become educated themselves.)

* The actions of the "*.army.mil" guys may have also spurred on some of our
activists. What Kelly Goen is proposing to do--spreading these crypto
anarchy methods to other politically active groups--is also a wonderful
development.

* It seems we are getting lots of newcomers to the list (though I keep
seeing cancellations posted to the general list, too!). It might be nice to
hear from them about their reactions. And perhaps Eric Hughes could
occcasionally summarize list statistics, as he did several months back. For
example, how many are now on the list? How many "*.mil" sites? Etc.

* The recent interest by "Mondo 2000," "Wired," and "The Village Voice" in
Cypherpunks activity and in digital privacy in general suggests we are
doing something quite important and interesting.

* All in all, I think amazing progress is being made.

-Tim May
--
Timothy C. May               | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,  
tcmay@netcom.com        | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
408-688-5409               | knowledge, reputations, information markets, 
W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA       | black markets, collapse of governments.
Higher Power: 2^756839 | Public Key: MailSafe and PGP available.





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Marc.Ringuette@GS80.SP.CS.CMU.EDU
Date: Tue, 23 Feb 93 10:56:17 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: anonymous return addresses
Message-ID: <9302231856.AA13893@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


The recent penet troubles are a reminder that secure anonymous return
addresses are a lot harder than secure anonymous mail with no return
capability.  Maybe it's time to go over the options available to us
for anonymous return?

  1. Remailer memorizes a pseudonym.  I don't like this, mainly because
     it leaves the remailer operator vulnerable to pressure to reveal
     the correspondence between real and anonymous id's.  It
     also opens up about a million possible security holes, as
     we've noticed.

  2. The anonymous message includes a cryptographic "stamped
     self-addressed envelope" which contains a layered list of
     remailer addresses encrypted at each layer.  This requires
     modified behavior of remailers; they must be willing to "unwrap"
     an address-list separately from the message body, and then
     "wrap" the entire message with the destination's public key,
     in order to disguise the correspondence between input and output.
     I think this has been discussed here before.  Has anyone
     implemented it?
        I strongly suggest that this method be implemented in
     the cypherpunks remailers.  Let's call it the SASE feature.
     What do you think?

  3. The reply to an anonymous message can be posted in a public place
     encrypted for a key known only to the sender.

Have I missed any important methods?

-- Marc Ringuette (mnr@cs.cmu.edu)




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: covin@cs.uchicago.edu
Date: Tue, 23 Feb 93 12:22:27 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Digital Money/Anonymous mailing: an idea
Message-ID: <9302232021.AA03088@zinnia.uchicago.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



I haven't yet read enough on digital money to know the intricacies,
but here's a possible use (note that a variant of this is possible *now*,
due to the extremely insecure way that credit card charges are handled):

If a good way of implementing digital cash were found (maybe it has been?),
it would be possible to operate a truly anonymous *commercial* remailer.
You send the remailer a message, encrypted by its public key, containing
the message you want re-sent, the destination, and *payment for the service*.
For hit&run anonymity the remailer doesn't even need to ever know who you
are...

The main advantage of this is that it would allow someone to run a remailer
without having to fund it out of the goodness of their heart...  It's a
valuable service, and I'm sure there's a market... Also, it would provide a
*real* use for digital cash, thus starting the ball rolling on that...

Comments?

                            -David




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: nowhere@bsu-cs.bsu.edu (Chael Hall)
Date: Tue, 23 Feb 93 11:43:33 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Remailer FIXED!
Message-ID: <9302231940.AA20219@bsu-cs.bsu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Dearest Cypherpunks,

     I am really sorry about the remailer problem.  It is unique to
the configuration of anon.penet.fi and nowhere@bsu-cs.bsu.edu.  In
conjunction, they caused all of the anonymous postings to cypherpunks
to be echoed.  Anon.penet.fi inserts the "X-Anonymously-To" header
field into outbound messages.  Nowhere@bsu-cs.bsu.edu searches for
"X-Anonymously-To" header fields and auto-remails to that address.
I just changed the program so that the only header fields it will
respond to are "X-Anon-To" and "Request-Remailing-To."

     Personally, I think that anon.penet.fi should use a different
name than X-Anonymously-To *or* put it at the end of the message instead
of within the header.  I admit that my remailer was "broken" in the
terms of others, so I have fixed it.  This problem would have been
fixed sooner if I had realized what was going on, but since I foolishly
thought I didn't need to keep logs for my remailer anymore, I never
saw the incoming messages, just the ones that cypherpunks@toad.com
mailed back to me with *my* account name on them.

     I am terribly sorry for the inconvenience.

Chael Hall

--
Chael Hall
nowhere@bsu-cs.bsu.edu, 00CCHALL@BSUVC.BSU.EDU, CHALL@CLSV.Charon.BSU.Edu
(317) 285-3648 after 5 pm EST




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Johan Helsingius <julf@penet.FI>
Date: Tue, 23 Feb 93 04:52:26 PST
To: David Reeve Sward <sward+@cmu.edu>
Subject: Re: Beware of anon.penet.fi message!
In-Reply-To: <YfWIGZe00iV346rPEa@andrew.cmu.edu>
Message-ID: <9302231407.aa21810@penet.penet.FI>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



> Perhaps a new header such as
> 
> X-Anon-Doubleblind: yes|no
> 
> defaulting to yes...?

Sounds OK. Will implement it ASAP.

Thanks!

	Julf




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: mbrennan@netcom.com (Michael Brennan)
Date: Tue, 23 Feb 93 15:03:28 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: RE>Congratulations to All!
Message-ID: <9302232301.AA28595@netcom.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Reply to Message-Id: <9302232131.AA17884@netcom.netcom.com> from
tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)

> It seems we are getting lots of newcomers to the list (though I keep
> seeing cancellations posted to the general list, too!). It might be nice to
> hear from them about their reactions. 

Actually, I may (regretfully) be sending in my cancellation as well. This
group is fascinating, but I find most of the discussion goes right over my
head. Also, the mail generated is just too voluminous. I log into my netcom
account by modem (and use Eudora to retrieve my mail). Yesterday I had
about 40 messages from this list, today I had over 70! Whew!!! That's a lot
of mail to retrieve by modem.

What I'd really like to see is a digest form of this list. Also, for
newcomers like myself a FAQ would be of tremendous benefit.

> The recent interest by "Mondo 2000," "Wired," and "The Village Voice" in
> Cypherpunks activity and in digital privacy in general suggests we are
> doing something quite important and interesting.

I'd say you're quite right about that. Keep up the great work!

------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Michael Brennan
Internet:   mbrennan@netcom.com 
Applelink:  M.BRENNAN  
Compuserve: 76206,2462





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: nowhere@bsu-cs.bsu.edu (Chael Hall)
Date: Tue, 23 Feb 93 12:48:41 PST
To: ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu (L. Detweiler)
Subject: Re: dispatches from the front lines of anonymity
In-Reply-To: <9302232001.AA01786@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Message-ID: <9302232045.AA28686@bsu-cs.bsu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>Also, note the simple scheme of serially allocating anonymous ID's
>could be a problem. If the infiltrator knows the rough date that
>someone was allocated a new ID, he could narrow down the range of IDs.
>For this reason randomly allocated IDs is a better idea.  The
>infiltrator could even go around to new accounts all the time (or forge
>them) to get an idea where the server is in the allocation cycle. It
>seems to me that there are probably a lot of ID's that are not being
>used on these servers and the issue of when to get rid of old ID's is a big 
>problem.

     Here's an idea....  What if I added anonymous ID's to my remailer such
that the following would occur:

Messages with "Command: Create ID" header field will result in a random ID
being allocated to that user's account (if one does not already exist) and
mailed to the account.

Messages with "X-Allow-Reply: yes" header field (for example) will result
in the user's anonymous ID being sent to the recipient in a header field
(not From: because I do not have alias capabilities on this system).

Messages with "X-Anon-To: <an anon ID>" will get forwarded to the anon ID's
actual address.

     This is a sort of on-demand reply mechanism.  I could make flags on the
anon ID's so that I can disable a user's ID, set send/reply privileges, etc.
If a user wants to change his ID, he could send "Command: Change ID" or
"Command: Delete ID" to the remailer.  Then, I could either setup a waiting
period, make it require manual attention, or make it automatically do as
requested.  Since the program is written in C, about half of this is
trivial.  Making it secure is the most difficult part.  By default, of
course, messages would have no reply ability.  Any user who replies will
send mail to me.  They would have to specifically place the X-Anon-To header
line with the person's anon ID into the message.

     On the other hand, I could institute a serial number scheme where each
message receives a serial number.  Replies to that message for the period
of a week or a month or whatever I choose will be forwarded to the sender.
Each one has a different serial number no matter who it came from.  Of
course, this would require both a self-maintaining cross-reference list
and an extra header field and/or work on the part of the person who replies.

     I was wondering, what is the opinion on this list (just reply to me,
so we won't clog up cypherpunks any more than we (my remailer) already have)
as to whether or not I should append a footer to remailed messages saying
"Remailed by: nowhere@bsu-cs.bsu.edu" or some such nonesense that will let
the recipient know that I did not write the message.  My software already
supports footer files, but I haven't been using them.

>One thing I'd like to see that no one has done is an `unlink' feature
>for servers that carry address alias tables, so the user can erase all
>trace of any previous transactions through the server (other than the
>mail).  But maybe this is too close to the hit-and-run abuse out there.
>Maybe there is a compromise somewhere, like a waiting period before
>unlinking, during which complaints can be registered and possibly
>prohibit future use.

     I tried to incorporate this unlink idea of yours into my above
proposal.  The above is the way I understand your idea.  Is this correct?

Chael Hall

--
Chael Hall
nowhere@bsu-cs.bsu.edu, 00CCHALL@BSUVC.BSU.EDU, CHALL@CLSV.Charon.BSU.Edu
(317) 285-3648 after 5 pm EST




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Hal <74076.1041@CompuServe.COM>
Date: Tue, 23 Feb 93 13:08:34 PST
To: CYPHERPUNKS <CYPHERPUNKS@toad.com>
Subject: anon.penet.fi fixes
Message-ID: <930223205851_74076.1041_DHJ65-1@CompuServe.COM>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Eric Hughes suggests:

> Currently to mail to person 1234 at penet, you send mail to 
> 
>         anon1234@penet.fi
> 
> This mail goes out anonymously from the sender, either using an
> existing mail address or creating one.  But if one were able to reach
> person 1234 also with the email address, say,
> 
>         name1234@penet.fi
> 
> the behavior could be _not_ to make this posting anonymous.
> 
> To wit, the 1234 indicates that you are replying to a pseudonymous
> recipient, and the anon/name pair indicate whether the sender is
> anonymous.  Thus no change in default behavior, and no new header
> lines.

I'd extend Eric's idea
to say that mail to a non-anonymous address (like Deadbeat's postings to
Cypherpunks) should be shown as coming from "name5877" rather than
"an5877".  Then when we gullibly sent our true email addresses to him,
our Penet anonymous ID's would not be revealed (because the "reply"
command would send to "name5877" which would prevent the double-blinding).

But, what would we do for anonymous Usenet posts (assuming those are
still allowed)?  If they are shown as coming from "an5877" as they
are now, then Deadbeat's trick would work via posting to Usenet.
("Please send your current email address for information on the latest...").
If they are shown as coming from "name5877" then users who are
accustomed to the old way of working will find themselves not being
anonymized when they thought they would be.

Deadbeat suggests:

> Here's a way out that will satisfy me and Johan: assign Alice a new
> pseudonym here and now, one that will be good for replies only.  If
> Alice has registered with the remailer in the past, i.e., if she has a
> password, then she knows how to X-Anon-To:, but has opted not to.  If
> she has not registered, then it is also appropriate to assign her a new
> ID.  However, should she later register, I suggest she be given a new,
> permanent, password-protected ID, just in case her earlier reply
> inadvertently exposed her real ID (in the way we have been discussing).
> 
> In essence, I'm suggesting that the Finnish remailer have two classes
> of anonymous IDs, one that is password protected, and one that is not.
> The former should never be used without the X-Anon-Password header.

A problem with this is that I would have to remember, for each different
anonymous communicant I send to, whether I am using my "password" ID
or my "non-password" ID.  The difference would come down to what method
was used when I initially began communicating with this person.  If
the initial contact was in response to mail they sent to my "real" email
address, then I must remember to use the "non-password" ID for all
succeeding communication, on the theory that they know my real email
address.  OTOH, if the initial contact was to my anonymous address, then
I have to remember to use my "password" ID for all following communication,
so that I don't accidentally reveal my "non-password" ID, which some people
can link to my real address.

From this point of view, part of the problem appears to be the desire
to live in both worlds - the real world and the shadow world.  It will
be hard to keep track of which world each communication is in.

Perhaps Deadbeat's and Eric's ideas could be combined, where mail to
real email addresses would come from "name5877", and replies to such
addresses would use the "non-password" ID.  This might help people keep
track of how to reply to each message.  I still think there is a problem
with how anonymous posts should be labelled, and how replies to such
posts should be handled.

Hal





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Hal <74076.1041@CompuServe.COM>
Date: Tue, 23 Feb 93 13:08:41 PST
To: CYPHERPUNKS <CYPHERPUNKS@toad.com>
Subject: anonymous return addrs.
Message-ID: <930223205911_74076.1041_DHJ65-2@CompuServe.COM>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Marc.Ringuette writes:

  2. The anonymous message includes a cryptographic "stamped
     self-addressed envelope" which contains a layered list of
     remailer addresses encrypted at each layer.  This requires
     modified behavior of remailers; they must be willing to "unwrap"
     an address-list separately from the message body, and then
     "wrap" the entire message with the destination's public key,
     in order to disguise the correspondence between input and output.
     I think this has been discussed here before.  Has anyone
     implemented it?
        I strongly suggest that this method be implemented in
     the cypherpunks remailers.  Let's call it the SASE feature.
     What do you think?

I do think this is worth trying.  The current remailers will do the
"unwrapping" but they won't "re-wrap" in the public key of the next
remailer.  This means that the incoming and outgoing messages can
be easily matched up since the non-address portion is the same.

I'll look into trying something like this.  One issue is how the
remailer finds the public key of the next one in the chain.  The
simplest way would be for it to simply try a lookup on its PGP keyring
using the outgoing email address, and if it matches, encrypt it.
You'd want a special PGP keyring for this which had only remailer keys
on it.

(Or, it might be interesting to encrypt _all_ outgoing mail (even
to destinations) if we had a key for that outgoing address.  This might
increase the utilization of PGP, although users probably would complain!)

Even if not every remailer did this, you'd still get pretty good
security if several of them did.

Hal





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: tomj@fido.wps.com (Tom Jennings)
Date: Tue, 23 Feb 93 16:11:12 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Law&Disorder (fwd)
Message-ID: <9302240009.AA00948@fido.wps.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text


A friend sent this to me... MODERN TIMES is a good bookstore! They've got
lots 'o tech stuff, like internet info... definitely worth checking out.
Anyways, the firs tone (Feb) was "Navigating the Internet: a crash
course" by Eric Theise. How-to email, gopher, etc. I didn't know about
it in time.

I think this could be a good crowd to bring up cypherpunk issues with a
more social, less hardcore tech perspective... time to stop preaching to
the choir! (It's taken a while to find the door leading out of the
choir... :-)

		Tom Jennings



> From jerod23@well.sf.ca.us Tue Feb 23 10:35:44 1993
> Date: Tue, 23 Feb 1993 10:34:18 -0800
> From: Jerod Pore <jerod23@well.sf.ca.us>
> Message-Id: <199302231834.AA12863@well.sf.ca.us>
> To: tomj@fido.wps.com
> Subject: Law&Disorder
> 
> 
> Something closer, cheaper and probably more interesting than CFP
> 
> news.1174: Monthly cyberspace series begins at Modern Times
> 
> news.1174.39: fork: Not enough memory (estheise)  Mon 22 Feb 93 15:44
> 
>  Here's the press release for show number 2:
>  
>  
>  Jacking In: A Monthly Series on Cyberspace Literacy presents
>  LAW AND DISORDER ON THE ELECTRONIC FRONTIER
>  
>  Computer and telecommunications technologies hold great promise for 
>  individuals and society.  Increased access to information can enhance 
>  transborder commerce, informed political participation, community 
>  development, and public health, education, and safety.
>  
>  But, between activities of questionable legality and the countermeasures 
>  taken by private parties and law enforcement officials, these 
>  technologies are raising fundamental questions about our notions of 
>  privacy, property, freedom of speech, and freedom of assembly.
>  
>  Join us for a evening of provocative readings and presentations by:
>  
>  - Bruce Sterling, journalist, editor, and author of *The Hacker 
>    Crackdown*, *Islands in the Net*, *Schismatrix*, and co-author (with 
>    William Gibson) of *The Difference Engine*
>  - Mike Godwin, General Counsel, Electronic Frontier Foundation, leading 
>    advocate for extending Constitutional protections to cyberspace
>  - John Draper (a.k.a. Cap'n Crunch), wanted by the FBI for phone 
>    cracking in the '60s, working to promote data encryption in the '90s
>  - Mitch Ratcliffe, Editor at Large, MacWEEK, and cofounder of This!Group, a 
>    northern California organization working to publicize the benefits and 
>    dangers of a highly-networked information society
>  - Bruce Koball, General Chair, Third Conference on Computers, Freedom 
>    and Privacy, being held March 9-12, San Francisco Airport Marriott
>  
>  Sunday, March 7th, 7 pm
>  $3-$5 sliding scale
>  Modern Times Bookstore
>  888 Valencia (19th/20th)
>  San Francisco, CA 94110
>  (415)282-9246


-- 
  Tom Jennings / tomj@fido.wps.com / World Power Systems / San Francisco CA 




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: J. Michael Diehl <mdiehl@triton.unm.edu>
Date: Tue, 23 Feb 93 15:27:21 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Newbie comments.
Message-ID: <9302232326.AA26860@triton.unm.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I've been listening to this list quietly for about 2 weeks. Althought the
signal to noize ration as been a bit low lately, ;^) it's been very interesting.

I like the idea of alt.whistle.blowers, and support anything that promotes
privacy, and Constitutional rights.

But I have a (newbie?) question.  Isn't it true that, at the network level, it
is still possible to tell where a message came from and where it's going.  That
is, given the proper motivation, couldn't "and entity" sniff out all of this 
information and find out which machine a particular message came from.  And 
from logs at that machine, which The Entity  naturally has access to, It could
find out who send the message.  Just wondering.....

Major suggestion:  We need a FAQ!

Well, that's about it.  I'm still trying to get up to speed with pgp.

+----------------------+----------------------------------------------------+
| J. Michael Diehl ;-) |  I thought I was wrong once.  But, I was mistaken. |
|                      +----------------------------------------------------+
| mdiehl@triton.unm.edu| "I'm just looking for the opportunity to be        |
| Thunder@forum        |            Politically Incorrect!                  |
| (505) 299-2282       |                        <me>                        |
+----------------------+----------------------------------------------------+




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: mark@coombs.anu.edu.au (Mark)
Date: Mon, 22 Feb 93 22:29:37 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Unbreakable MacHD encryption
Message-ID: <9302230628.AA10278@coombs.anu.edu.au>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I have used a product in the past called Hard Disk Deadbolt. It has from
memory three encryption methods; quick-and-nasty hard-disk-deadbolt's-own
(no idea on the security of this one) and DES. The first is fastest for
stuff you dont want anyone to read but isnt super secret, whilst DES takes
the longest.

I liked the package all things considered. It was friendly, files didnt
change size and it was speedy enough for my uses.

Availability is unknown at this stage, ask in comp.sys.mac.* if you want.

Mark
mark@coombs.anu.edu.au




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Eric Hughes <hughes@soda.berkeley.edu>
Date: Tue, 23 Feb 93 18:49:18 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: dispatches from the front lines of anonymity
In-Reply-To: <9302232001.AA01786@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Message-ID: <9302240246.AA03185@soda.berkeley.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>Eric Hughes suggests an alt.whistleblower with localized anonymizing. I
>like this, but I don't see how NNTP provides it. Wouldn't every server
>have to be modified or upgraded to support anonymizing? 

In an already supported sense, yes.  As I understand it, when a
moderated group is created, an email address for the moderator is
propagated with it.  So every time a moderated group is created, every
server already is "modified".

But the anonymity does not take place in NNTP.  The news server mails
every posting to the moderator's address.  The header filtering take
place on that machine, unbeknowst to the original NNTP server.  I hear
that this mechanism didn't used to work reliably, but that it now
basically does.  Comments?

In addition, the direct mail address should be advertised
independently, so that those without easy access to Usenet news can
still use the system.

>[...] I think we will find that the people in charge of NNTP are
>looking for ways to increase authentication and validation mechanisms,

The way to forge a posting to alt.whistleblower would be to post with
your real address in it!  That's not exactly a positive feedback loop
for the outlaw.

> [...] a centralized moderator stripping addresses, [...]  is
>problematic because it is a single location with all the traffic

Granted.  Thus the need for a periodic posting stating exactly what
the security level of the system is.

>But I think the localized header-stripping is totally superior to all
>this.

Agreed.  That's why you publish the newsgroup entry point.  Then a
more sophisticated whistleblower could use a remailer chain to get to
the access point.

Eric




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Derek Atkins <warlord@MIT.EDU>
Date: Tue, 23 Feb 93 15:53:46 PST
To: J. Michael Diehl <mdiehl@triton.unm.edu>
Subject: Re: Newbie comments.
In-Reply-To: <9302232326.AA26860@triton.unm.edu>
Message-ID: <9302232352.AA05451@toxicwaste.MEDIA.MIT.EDU>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> But I have a (newbie?) question.  Isn't it true that, at the network
> level, it is still possible to tell where a message came from and
> where it's going.  That is, given the proper motivation, couldn't "and
> entity" sniff out all of this information and find out which machine a
> particular message came from.  And from logs at that machine, which
> The Entity naturally has access to, It could find out who send the
> message.  Just wondering.....

That is the point of encrypted, anonymous remailers.  Since the
message is encrypted, it looks like a random set of bits.  If it gets
re-encrypted at every stage, then the remailers can add random bits of
data to change the size.  They already change the headers.

So, the only thing left to worry about is a FIFO problem.  But that
is easily solved.

So, here is what happens:
  A message comes into a remailer (actually, a bunch of messages do,
but that's not important).  It comes in encrypted, so you can't read
the message.  The headers are stripped off in the remailer and the
message is re-encrypted, so the data changes.  If it gets stored an
arbistrary length of time, and the outgoing order is different than
the incoming order, than there is no way to figure out which message
came from or went to where.

There is a lot more to this, and a lot of other problems that need to
be solved, but this is it in a nutshell.

I hope it answers your question.  I'm sure people will correct any
mistakes I inadvertantly left in.

-derek

PGP 2 key available upon request, on the key-server:
	pgp-public-keys@toxicwaste.mit.edu
--
  Derek Atkins, MIT '93, Electrical Engineering and Computer Science
      Chairman, MIT Student Information Processing Board (SIPB)
           MIT Media Laboratory, Speech Research Group
           warlord@MIT.EDU       PP-ASEL        N1NWH




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: mark@coombs.anu.edu.au (Mark)
Date: Mon, 22 Feb 93 23:54:15 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: anon.penet.fi remailers
Message-ID: <9302230753.AA18385@coombs.anu.edu.au>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>For example, if at any time, Alice sends pseudonymously to Bob, Bob can
>not reply directly: this would expose his identity at anon.penet.fi.
>Bob must reply through a remailer.
>
>Note the irony -- Bob must take special steps to protect his pseudonym
>because anon.penet.fi is acting affirmatively to conceal his actual
>identity.  If Bob slips up and simply replies, he is exposed.

This, unfortunately, is true. I *have* to use a remailer to hide any
anon.penet.fi alias I have or the sender will see it and know I am
(for eg) anon1234@penet.

I balk at Yet-More-F******-Header-Lines (YMFHL) but a _possible_ patch
is to have a:

X-Show-My-Anon: yes|no       (in the header),

or:

::
X-Show-My-Anon: yes|no       (in the body)

addition so people who reply to a message from penet can feed their real email
address through the system rather than having it bounced to the recipient as
their anon id.  This would require either a smart mailer, checking exactly who
the orig letter was addressed to (your anon or your real address) and
inserting the line as appropriate. It *should* be automatic actually. All it
has to do is check a local list of your anon addressed and if someone has
mailed it then alter the above line as needed.

This raises question of the security of local lists of your anon addrs of
course.. but you get the idea..

Comments?

(BTW I saw someone's .sig where they *advertised* their anon id on USENET.
 Presumably this was because he thought thats what you had to do so others
 could email them anonomously... obviously he wont be a whistle blower :)

Mark
mark@coombs.anu.edu.au




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Eric Hughes <hughes@soda.berkeley.edu>
Date: Tue, 23 Feb 93 19:00:22 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: anonymous return addresses
In-Reply-To: <9302231856.AA13893@toad.com>
Message-ID: <9302240257.AA03919@soda.berkeley.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Re: options for anonymous return

Marc writes:
>  1. Remailer memorizes a pseudonym.  

>  2. The anonymous message includes a cryptographic "stamped
	self-addressed envelope" which contains a layered list of
	remailer addresses encrypted at each layer.  

>  3. The reply to an anonymous message can be posted in a public place
	encrypted for a key known only to the sender.

>Have I missed any important methods?

A variant of (1) greatly increases the security.  Have the remailer
memorize an anonymous return address of type (2).  The information
that is contained in a remailer then, per pseudonym, is

  a.  the pseudonym
  b.  the address of the next remailer to use
  c.  a block of stuff to be prepended to the outgoing mail.  Presumably
        this is forwarding instructions for the next remailer.  It would
	also be encrypted with the public key of the next remailer.

Thus, even if the whole pseudonym mapping list were compromised, it
would only reveal a list of sites to try and compromise next.  And at
some point the private remailer keys have to be compromised as well,
since all the remailing instruction are encrypted with them.

This system can also be chained, creating "routing pseudonyms" on
various remailers and encrypted instructions pointing one pseudonym to
another.

Eric





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Johan Helsingius <julf@penet.FI>
Date: Tue, 23 Feb 93 12:35:15 PST
To: Anonymous <nowhere@bsu-cs.bsu.edu>
Subject: Re:
In-Reply-To: <9302231537.AA28187@bsu-cs.bsu.edu>
Message-ID: <9302231817.aa23700@penet.penet.FI>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



> > Neither do I. But many of the users of anon.penet.fi are
> > not very computer-and-email-literate, and they have been using other
> > services, providing double-blind. Unfortunate, but too late to change now..
 > .
> 
> Can you elaborate on those other services?  The Finnish remailer is the
> only one I'm aware of.

The operating principles (and the early code) was copied from the
general service Karl Kleinpaste was running at godiva. There has been
two long-running servers serving some alt.* groups (alt.sex.*,
alt.sexual.abuse.recovery) for years.

> Also, I'm confused about these "not very computer-and-email-literate"
> users -- aren't they forced to use an X-Anon-Password header?

No. Not until now. And you can still post withaout it, and answer
anonymous mail without it, and of course set the password to "none", 
disabling passwords altogether.

> I'm surprised there hasn't been more ruckus about the default
> behavior.  There must be many folks whose identities have been
> inadvertantly exposed.

I know, looking at the error messages and missent mail, that there would
have been hundreds of persons exposed without the default double-blind.

> > What we can do is to provide better ways for those who *are* computer
> > literate enough to use extra headers etc.
> 
> I don't think this will help.  With my mail environment, I have to go
> to lengths to send an anonymous message, concocting X-Anon-To and
> X-Anon-Password headers.  It's worth the effort, since this helps to
> preserve the secrecy of my pseudonymous identity.
> 
> But the first time I mess up, and send an unfettered message to an
> anon.penet.fi client, I am unmasked.

No, once you set a password, the server won't let your message through
unless it's OK!

> And I still don't understand how the unfettered message gets past the
> X-Anon-Password filter.

Can you elaborate? I don't understand your question. Sorry, my english
isn't what it ought to be...

> > But in this case I feel the principle of least astonishment is overruled
> > by the principle of least risk of accidental exposure.
> 
> I think the risk of accidental exposure is heightened by the default
> behavior of the Finnish remailer.  Maybe we're using the same words to
> describe different things.

I beg to disagree.

> > I think that hornet's nest needed to be kicked. But I am also
> > disappointed that not enough people defend the need for anonymity in
> > places like news.admin.policy.
> 
> Some of us gave up on USENET policy long, long ago.  Personally, I stick
> to the alt.* groups.

Right. Unfortunately. Because had you followed the discussion in
news.admin.policy you would have realized thet sticking your head in the
bush isn't going to help.

	Julf





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Johan Helsingius <julf@penet.FI>
Date: Tue, 23 Feb 93 12:35:12 PST
To: Anonymous <nowhere@bsu-cs.bsu.edu>
Subject: Re:
In-Reply-To: <9302231626.AA01332@bsu-cs.bsu.edu>
Message-ID: <9302231822.aa23742@penet.penet.FI>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



> > There has been a lot of discussion about this, and I'm afraid it's too
> > late to change the *default* behavior now...
> 
> Why?  It seems to me the X-Anon-Password header was a pretty major
> change, yet you made that change to preserve people's pseudonymous
> identities.  The instant challenge is just as grave, don't you think?

It still didn't affect much of the functionality. You can still post,
and mail to anXXXX users without knowing anything about passwords or
X-Anon headers. And you only need to set your password to "none" to get
the old behaviour.

	Julf





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Johan Helsingius <julf@penet.FI>
Date: Tue, 23 Feb 93 12:36:02 PST
To: Hal <74076.1041@compuserve.com>
Subject: Re: Beware of anon.penet.fi
In-Reply-To: <930223165258_74076.1041_DHJ23-1@CompuServe.COM>
Message-ID: <9302231843.aa23893@penet.penet.FI>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



> I'd like to verify that
>  
> X-Anon-Doubleblind: no
>  
> would mean that no X-Anon-Password would be needed with the message.


X-Anon-Doubleblind: no would imply that the message goes straight thru,
without any checks, stripping, or anything to the intended anonymous
user.

> I am confused about the exact rules that Penet uses to decide when a
> password must be given.  I get the impression that if no password has been
> registered, anonymous posting and mailing to non-anonymous addresses is
> forbidden, but you can still mail to anonymous addresses.  If a password has
> been registered, you must give it to do any of these three things.  Is this
> right?

Right, except that if you don't register a password, you can still post.
And if you set the password to "none" no password is needed for
anything.

	Julf





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Johan Helsingius <julf@penet.FI>
Date: Tue, 23 Feb 93 12:36:33 PST
To: Eric Hughes <hughes@soda.berkeley.edu>
Subject: Re: Beware of anon.penet.fi message!
In-Reply-To: <9302231728.AA20762@soda.berkeley.edu>
Message-ID: <9302231921.aa24595@penet.penet.FI>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



> Currently to mail to person 1234 at penet, you send mail to 
> 
> 	anon1234@penet.fi
> 
> This mail goes out anonymously from the sender, either using an
> existing mail address or creating one.  But if one were able to reach
> person 1234 also with the email address, say,
> 
> 	name1234@penet.fi
> 
> the behavior could be _not_ to make this posting anonymous.
> 
> To wit, the 1234 indicates that you are replying to a pseudonymous
> recipient, and the anon/name pair indicate whether the sender is
> anonymous.  Thus no change in default behavior, and no new header
> lines.

A great idea, Eric! Thanks!

Oh, a minor correction, it`s an1234, not anon1234.
So in the name of symmetry the non-anonymous path should be na1234.
Now we only have to fight about what the From: line in anonymous
messages ought to say, an1234 or na1234?

	Julf





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Johan Helsingius <julf@penet.FI>
Date: Tue, 23 Feb 93 12:36:32 PST
To: Hal <74076.1041@compuserve.com>
Subject: Re: Doubled penet messages
In-Reply-To: <930223173029_74076.1041_DHJ36-1@CompuServe.COM>
Message-ID: <9302231927.aa24699@penet.penet.FI>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



> Penet puts an X-Anonymously-To: cypherpunks@toad.com into the header that it
> sends.  (I'm not sure why it has to do this; isn't this redundant with the
> "To:" header?) 

No. The To: shows the real receiver, X-Anonymously-To: shows the address
the message was originally sent to. Thus you know if the message was
sent to your anonymous or real address.

> Perhaps this would be a good time to standardize the supported set of
> headers for remailing requests.

Agree. Here is the anon.penet.fi set:

	X-Anon-To:	 - set by user, stripped by server
	X-Anon-Password: - set by user, stripped by server
	X-Anonymously-To: - set by server

 Julf





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Eli Brandt <ebrandt@jarthur.Claremont.EDU>
Date: Tue, 23 Feb 93 21:20:04 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: anonymous return addresses
In-Reply-To: <9302240257.AA03919@soda.berkeley.edu>
Message-ID: <9302240519.AA24254@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> A variant of (1) greatly increases the security.  Have the remailer
> memorize an anonymous return address of type (2).  The information
> that is contained in a remailer then, per pseudonym, is
> 
>   a.  the pseudonym
>   b.  the address of the next remailer to use
>   c.  a block of stuff to be prepended to the outgoing mail.  Presumably
>         this is forwarding instructions for the next remailer.  It would
> 	also be encrypted with the public key of the next remailer.

This is an excellent idea!  It would provide decent security without
forcing J. Random User to figure out how to use the SASE block.
You'd want to have a list of address/SASE pairs to use, choosing
randomly from those that have not yet died.

Oh, a complication.  It would probably be necessary to be able to
add new address/SASEs as they become available, to avoid death of
your pseudonym through cumulative remailer attrition.  But nobody
but the owner can be allowed to add destinations, for obvious
reasons.  The only apparent way to handle this is to require a
password at the time of pseudonym creation.  One-way-hash it, and
require it to add and remove destinations.  It should be
PK-encrypted on its way to the remailer, if possible.  This approach
does not require an identity to be irrevocably tied to a destination
address, interestingly -- you can remove chains to your old address,
and add ones to your new.

Suggestions?  Holes?  Implementations?

> Eric

	 PGP 2 key by finger or e-mail
   Eli   ebrandt@jarthur.claremont.edu




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Eli Brandt <ebrandt@jarthur.Claremont.EDU>
Date: Tue, 23 Feb 93 21:29:16 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Social engineering tips
Message-ID: <9302240529.AA24454@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


It might be helpful for those involved in the penet flamewar to
refer to the service it provides as "pseudonymity" rather than
"anonymity".  This suggests some level of continuity,
responsibility, moral fiber... well, maybe not *that*.  But it's
worth pointing out that getting a penet pseudonym is no different,
really, than getting an account called "u7364250@csvax.uza.za".

	 PGP 2 key by finger or e-mail
   Eli   ebrandt@jarthur.claremont.edu




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: kelly@netcom.com (Kelly Goen)
Date: Tue, 23 Feb 93 21:39:13 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Newbie comments. (fwd)
Message-ID: <9302240537.AA06252@netcom.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Forwarded message:
> From cypherpunks-request@toad.com  Tue Feb 23 15:40:37 1993
> From: J. Michael Diehl <mdiehl@triton.unm.edu>
> Message-Id: <9302232326.AA26860@triton.unm.edu>
> Subject: Newbie comments.
> To: cypherpunks@toad.com
> Date: Tue, 23 Feb 93 16:26:08 MST
> X-Also-Known-As: Thunder
> X-Goal-In-Life:  To make a lot of money -- Wanna make a donation?
> X-Mailer: ELM [version 2.3 PL8]
> 
> I've been listening to this list quietly for about 2 weeks. Althought the
> signal to noize ration as been a bit low lately, ;^) it's been very interesting.
> 
> I like the idea of alt.whistle.blowers, and support anything that promotes
> privacy, and Constitutional rights.
> 
> But I have a (newbie?) question.  Isn't it true that, at the network level, it
> is still possible to tell where a message came from and where it's going.  That
> is, given the proper motivation, couldn't "and entity" sniff out all of this 
> information and find out which machine a particular message came from.  And 
> from logs at that machine, which The Entity  naturally has access to, It could
> find out who send the message.  Just wondering.....


 Hi there, 
        well acutally at the network interface level all sorts of tricks are
available... for example at the smtp daemon level all
a snooper has to do is the following

telnet toad.com smtp

when the sendmail banner is seen then
type
VRFY cypherpunks
That will yeild yet another line referring to cypherpunks-real
which verifying will obtain ALL the mail addresses on this cypherpunks mailing
list... I have a small fragment of perl which does the same
trick recursively for every address on the cypherpunks mail list...
why did I write such a thing... well I am writing a mail list to PGP
key server extractor so I can automatically extract keys for members of
cypherpunks-real... I didnt think of the privacy issue until
some moments after I debugged the perl script and got it working...
Similiar open holes exist at EVERY level of the Network and associated
daemons and software, Johh and I have discussed this earlier via email
and he as well as I dont feel its a REAL exposure as the means to
protect yourself is well at hand...
AND yes ALL network traffic can theoretically be traced thats
when crackers and security admins start playing games with
connection laundries and firewall as well as early warning systems...
there are constraints to real world tracing... the Firewalls mailing
list at Firewalls@GreatCircle.COM discusses these and other
issues having to do with security at the network interface level

> 
> Major suggestion:  We need a FAQ!
> 
> Well, that's about it.  I'm still trying to get up to speed with pgp.
> 
> +----------------------+----------------------------------------------------+
> | J. Michael Diehl ;-) |  I thought I was wrong once.  But, I was mistaken. |
> |                      +----------------------------------------------------+
> | mdiehl@triton.unm.edu| "I'm just looking for the opportunity to be        |
> | Thunder@forum        |            Politically Incorrect!                  |
> | (505) 299-2282       |                        <me>                        |
> +----------------------+----------------------------------------------------+
> 

    cheers
   kelly
-- 




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Timothy Newsham <newsham@wiliki.eng.hawaii.edu>
Date: Wed, 24 Feb 93 00:21:07 PST
To: fnerd@smds.com (FutureNerd Steve Witham)
Subject: Re: Crypto goals
In-Reply-To: <9302231806.AB16915@smds.com>
Message-ID: <9302240821.AA27032@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> 
> Encrypted computing.  This is even harder than non-disassemblable code.
> The idea is that you couldn't even tell what happened to the data if you
> watched it compute, tried again with slightly different inputs, etc.
> I've heard that some restricted sort of encrypted computing is possible
> with an exponential time cost!
> 
> The main application I have in mind is a mix that would be trustworthy
> even if it was run by your worst enemies with the best computers in the
> world.
> 
> This seems impossible but I don't have proof.
> 
> -fnerd
> fnerd@smds.com (FutureNerd Steve Witham)
> 
> 
How can multiple keys be chosen?  The decryption key is needed
to execute the code, it can either be (1) built into the hardware
or (2) loaded in.  In #2, if its loaded in, it can be had before
it is loaded.  In #1,  how do you change keys?  only people who
know how to encrypt for that key can program the thing.  If a
public key scheme was used,  the processor could be built with
a private key inside, and you assemble and then encode in the
public key,  only the processor (and whoever else has the 
private key) can check the code.  Quite a bit of complexity, 
also how do you do encryption in small enough units for the
cpu to use?  How do you decrypt w/ random access any part
of the data?  If you choose too large blocks (ie. cache) how
do you keep enemy programs from grabbig already decrypted data?
obviously some data must go out as plaintext (for I/O)  then
you have to keep track of which data is to always remain crypted
and which needs to go to plaintext..   wow..  what a nightmare.
I think its probably possible...
sorry for the free-form :)






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: fergp@sytex.com (Paul Ferguson)
Date: Wed, 24 Feb 93 01:13:36 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Enough's enough already
Message-ID: <4JPgZB2w165w@sytex.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Excuse me for dropping my two cents in here, but just what's the big,
hairy deal?
 
I apologize for initially bringing up the topic of self-encrypting
viruses; had I known that folks would have reacted in such a childish
manner, I would never have posted that topic at all.
 
For those of you who wish to discuss it further, I'd suggest posting
to comp.virus in the future. I suppose I would take it a tad more
seriously when reading some of the posts that have drifted through
this area, if they were originally posted to an area that was
designed for virus banter.
 
If this sounds like a plea for some sort of sanity check, then I
must be coming across loud and clear.
 
Now, I'd like to ask the cypherpunk readership to clarify the need (or
perhaps a better term may be "desire") for anonymous remailers? Maybe
I'm not getting the "big picture", but it would appear to me that
insurance of private communications is the area of intended interest
here. I know that someone may declare my query as naive, but if you
feel strongly enough about a topic, why wouldn't you want the
recipient to know who you are, where you are and who they can respond
to?
 
I think my train of thought is geared towards anon remailers
protecting those who may operate in less than honorable means, without
ethical guidelines and wishing to "hide" behind a veil of anonymity.
 
Somehow, that just strikes me as less-than-honorable. (No, I was never
a Marine. Army, yes. Marine, no.)
 
Gee, I sure feel better.

Paul Ferguson                     |
Network Integration Consultant    |  "All of life's answers are
Alexandria, Virginia USA          |   on TV."
fergp@sytex.com     (Internet)    |           -- Homer Simpson
sytex.com!fergp     (UUNet)       |
1:109/229           (FidoNet)     |
         PGP public encryption key available upon request.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Bill Sommerfeld <sommerfeld@orchard.medford.ma.us>
Date: Tue, 23 Feb 93 21:28:49 PST
To: hughes@soda.berkeley.edu
Subject: dispatches from the front lines of anonymity
In-Reply-To: <9302240246.AA03185@soda.berkeley.edu>
Message-ID: <9302240423.AA00434@orchard.medford.ma.us>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

   Date: Tue, 23 Feb 93 18:46:17 -0800
   From: Eric Hughes <hughes@soda.berkeley.edu>

   >Eric Hughes suggests an alt.whistleblower with localized anonymizing. I
   >like this, but I don't see how NNTP provides it. Wouldn't every server
   >have to be modified or upgraded to support anonymizing?

   In an already supported sense, yes.  As I understand it, when a
   moderated group is created, an email address for the moderator is
   propagated with it.  So every time a moderated group is created, every
   server already is "modified".

That's how it *should* work, not how it *does* work.  In real life,
moderator addresses are distributed "out of band" to a relatively
small number of "backbone" sites; all the rest of the sites merely
forward the mail to a "backbone" site.

Making a newsgroup moderated in the absence of a moderation address is
an easy way to make it "read-only"; I think the folks who run the fj.*
groups do this instead of sending rmgroups (which are generally
ignored).

					- Bill

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.1

iQCWAgUBK4r4H69wjZexL7jBAQGBagQBAbrZ42usqd/JhdWqtMNbS6PmXHfSCcA7
5qvi34i/vSe0lKc4t5JFys4S7+4OCkR8URniwOhcDGMXoXMTfeonbqNakselMJn3
m3l0Zz/vmA8ZcY0eS0F27AVwydooIVSdRiI5TFVFOLrnOzSpmyBxYzgzavnG0jRm
T8vecJTtYqXf
=VFG/
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Dave Banisar <banisar@washofc.cpsr.org>
Date: Tue, 23 Feb 93 20:22:33 PST
To: CYPHERPUNKS@toad.com
Subject: Re: Finding Mac PGP software?
Message-ID: <9302232325.AA06567@hacker2.eff.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


MacPGP is available at mac.archives.umich.edu via gopher and FTP.

FYI. The most recent copies of the pgp site list are available from the CPSR 
archive at cpsr.org /cpsr/crypto along with quite a few other files on crypto 
and privacy  that may be of interest to the cypherpunks readers.



> 
> 	I'm sure this is a FAQ, but can anyone point me to an FTP site 
> where I can obtain PGP for the Macintosh?  Does such a beast exist? 
> Thanks for your time. 
> 
> +-    eggo@titan.ucc.umass.edu                 Eat Some Paste    -+ +-   
>        Yorn desh born, der ritt de gitt der gue,            -+ +-      
> Orn desh, dee born desh, de umn bork! bork! bork!        -+ 
> 
> 






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: M..Stirner@f28.n125.z1.FIDONET.ORG (M. Stirner)
Date: Wed, 24 Feb 93 05:11:21 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Pgp v 2.2
Message-ID: <5029.2B8B3A11@fidogate.FIDONET.ORG>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



According to a message I read today on the Fidonet Public Keys
conference, PGP is now in version 2.2 & is available off CompuServe.
Has anyone seen this yet?  If this is for real, let's get this thing
circulating pronto.
.   ~
.   M.


... "Huh?  BILL Clinton???  I thought I voted for GEORGE Clinton!!!"
___ Blue Wave/QWK v2.12
--  
M. Stirner - via FidoNet node 1:125/555
    UUCP - ...!uunet!hoptoad!kumr!fidogate!28!M..Stirner
INTERNET - M..Stirner@f28.n125.z1.FIDONET.ORG




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Hal <74076.1041@CompuServe.COM>
Date: Tue, 23 Feb 93 23:23:25 PST
To: CYPHERPUNKS <CYPHERPUNKS@toad.com>
Subject: Front lines of anon.
Message-ID: <930224071703_74076.1041_DHJ29-1@CompuServe.COM>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Lance Detweiler writes:

> >You have these security threats which involve people being tricked into
> >sending messages through the remailer in such a way that the recipient
> >knows the true email address from where the messages are coming.
> 
> These are completely analogous to users being tricked into supplying
> passwords in regular login situations. Not a new problem. And anybody
> who hasn't figured out that you should *never* put any identifying
> information in the message itself is probably a little too clueless to
> be using the service in the first place. However, the idea of giving a
> warning in the use introduction is ok: ``under NO CIRCUMSTANCES EVER DO
> THIS'' type thing.

It's not that simple.  "Deadbeat" reported that he discovered this problem
when he sent mail via Penet to a list member asking a question.  When that
person replied, it exposed his anonymous ID.  There was no need to put
identifying information in the message itself.  The mere fact that a
particular message is being replied to gives away the true email address
of the sender (because that is the address to which the question was
directed).

This means that if you receive mail asking an innocent question, like,
"what is the address to subscribe to cypherpunks?", you need to be aware
of whether that question came from the Penet remailer or one like it.  If
so, you need to take extra care when you respond so that your anonymous
ID is not revealed.

> The problem is that the anonymity is implicitly requested by a message
> to the server. Hence replies are getting this anonymity. One
> possibility is an override switch in the header that leaves it entirely
> intact and the server just acts like another hub forwarder. But what is
> this `harm'? We have to recognize these complaints as completely
> frivolous and without merit.

I don't think so.  It seems to me that the current system makes it easy
to accidentally expose your anonymous ID.  If more people start operating
pseudonym-based remailers it will be that much more difficult to keep
track of whether you want to be anonymized or not.

I think technical solutions are needed along the lines suggested by Eric
Hughes and Deadbeat.

Hal

P.S. How about Deadbeat posting a public key?  He keeps signing his
messages but I can't check them.





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: mjr@netcom.com (Matthew Rapaport)
Date: Wed, 24 Feb 93 08:22:13 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Anonymity vs accountability - a balanced view (maybe?)
Message-ID: <9302241620.AA25561@netcom2.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Concerning the discussions of privacy, and anonymity on various USENET
groups, attacks on Johan Helsingus, etc. I'd like to add my two cents...

If we are going to convince the USENET community as a whole of the value
of anonymity it seems to me we must also recognize the propriety and
value of what seems to be the dominant sentiment on the USENET now, that
being that accountability and responsibility (for what you say)
reflected in a real identification is also valuable, and under most
ordinary circumstances is more desirable then not.

Putting it another way, I think most of the USENET community would
accept the argument that access to anonymity is something that we should
all have. It is a desirable thing, but it becomes desirable only under
certain circumstances (e.g. active persecution, or a real threat of
same, by a government or corporation, etc). Most of the time, it is better
that people "stand for what they say" and accept the accountability that
goes with non-anonymized postings.

If we approach it this way I think we could achieve consensus at least to
the degree that the existence of alias servers are generally supported.

matthew rapaport     Philosopher/Programmer At Large      KD6KVH
           mjr@netcom.com     70371.255@compuserve.com




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: kelly@netcom.com (Kelly Goen)
Date: Wed, 24 Feb 93 08:38:42 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Poor Man's Anonymous Remailer (fwd)
Message-ID: <9302241637.AA20822@netcom.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Forwarded message:
> From cypherpunks-request@toad.com  Wed Feb 24 08:24:42 1993
> Date: Wed, 24 Feb 1993 11:08:17 -0500
> From: ghabrech@ultrix.ramapo.edu (The Knight of Ni)
> Message-Id: <9302241608.AA09746@ultrix.ramapo.edu>
> To: cypherpunks@toad.com, rubin@citi.umich.edu
> Subject: Re: Poor Man's Anonymous Remailer
> 
> I think the idea is just that it is an e-mail account.  I don't think you have
> any disk quota or such and probably can't even telnet or ftp from it.  The
> idea for this is privacy.  The best way to keep someone from reading your
> files is to make it so that they can't get their hands on 'em.
> 
> George
> 

 it really doesnt work out... MANY ways are inherent in the scheme
to eventually match a face with an account. If you always pay
in cash, if you always where a mask(WAIT MASK??? well I think you get the IDEA)
credit cards will; eventually be traced and bank accounts discovered
unless one started taking their precautions before the information age...
now the only absolute privacy/anonymity will be the ones that can
insure it with technology
   cheers
    kelly
-- 




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "DrZaphod" <ncselxsi!drzaphod@ncselxsi.netcom.com>
Date: Wed, 24 Feb 93 15:31:12 PST
To: CypherPunks@toad.com
Subject: RE: Poor Man's Anonymous Remailer
Message-ID: <33176.drzaphod@ncselxsi>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


In Message 24 Feb 93 10:13:44 EST,
  Duncan/Lois Frissell <CompuServe.COM!71562.3445@netcomsv.netcom.com> writes:

>Isn't an account that can't be traced to you anonymous?  How about an (email
>only) account for $3/month billed to you (no credit cards required).

     I think you're confusing pseunonymous with anonymous.  The goal is to
send data somewhere WITHOUT A TRACE as to where it came from.  If you used a
single e-mail address, [someone] could track it down, watch for logins, and
trace the line.  If you used MANY e-mail addresses it would clog the net..
remailers seem to be the way to go these days.  TTFN!

DrZaphod
[AC/DC] / [DnA][HP]
[drzaphod@ncselxsi.uucp]
Technicolorized




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: mbrennan@netcom.com (Michael Brennan)
Date: Wed, 24 Feb 93 09:30:25 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Law&Disorder (fwd)
Message-ID: <9302241728.AA27534@netcom.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Everything is happening in the Bay Area. And I'm stuck down here in the
L.A. wasteland (sigh).

Oh well. At least there's mailing lists.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
Michael Brennan                                 Internet: mbrennan@netcom.com
                                              Compuserve: 76206,2462
                                               Applelink: M.BRENNAN





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: cplai@csie.nctu.edu.tw
Date: Tue, 23 Feb 93 17:44:40 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: unsubscribe
Message-ID: <9302240144.AA03740@csie.nctu.edu.tw>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


unsubscribe




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Duncan/Lois Frissell <71562.3445@CompuServe.COM>
Date: Wed, 24 Feb 93 07:24:55 PST
To: <cypherpunks@toad.com>
Subject: Poor Man's Anonymous Remailer
Message-ID: <930224151344_71562.3445_CHT28-1@CompuServe.COM>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


To compensate the List for consuming bandwidth with my "political" posting
on advertising yesterday, I thought I'd offer some ideas on easy anonymous
posting -- no remailers required.

Isn't an account that can't be traced to you anonymous?  How about an (email
only) account for $3/month billed to you (no credit cards required).

AT&T Mail (desperate for customers) charges $3/month per Email box with no
setup fee.  They do charge a minimum of 70 cents per message sent (50 cents
if you use their pricy communications software) but they charge nothing
to receive mail and give you an Internet address that looks like
dfrissell@attmail.com.

If you open a mail receiving service box in a nome de guerre (which is not
hard to do in spite of what you might have heard), call AT&T Mail at (800)
624-5672 and sign up.  After you receive your signon info, you can drop the
box at the mail receiving service and just pay your future bills without
a printed bill.  They'll be happy to tell you what your balance is.  You can 
logon to AT&T Mail anytime at (800) 624-5123.  Use a payphone if you are 
really careful and enjoy anonymous posting without outside help and without 
having to worry about flaky remailers.

Duncan Frissell







From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Eric Hughes <hughes@soda.berkeley.edu>
Date: Wed, 24 Feb 93 10:23:56 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Beware of anon.penet.fi message!
In-Reply-To: <9302231921.aa24595@penet.penet.FI>
Message-ID: <9302241820.AA11378@soda.berkeley.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Re: an1234 vs. na1234

Julf writes:
>Now we only have to fight about what the From: line in anonymous
>messages ought to say, an1234 or na1234?

You can determine the From: line by looking at the destination.

If the destination is to another alias, then you use "an1234", since
the reply should appear to be coming from another alias.  Using the
"an1234" address triggers the aliasing mechanism.  

On the other hand, if the destination is to a non-alias mailbox, then
use the "na1234" form.  In this way the alias mechanism is not invoked
upon reply.

For messages with more than one addressee, split all the alias
destinations into one message, and all the non-alias destinations into
another.  Set the From: line accordingly in each message.  This avoids
the attack of using a two-recipient message to invoke an incorrect
alias behavior.

For newsgroup postings, where no particular addressee is listed, and
for mailing lists, I would suggest using "na1234", but this probably
is a change in the default behavior for newsgroups.  You would like
newsgroups and mailing lists to act the same, and that means either
keeping a list of mailing list entry points (ick), or using the
"na1234" form.

Eric




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: rubin@citi.umich.edu
Date: Wed, 24 Feb 93 07:51:40 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Poor Man's Anonymous Remailer
In-Reply-To: <930224151344_71562.3445_CHT28-1@CompuServe.COM>
Message-ID: <9302241551.AA05783@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I'm not sure I agree that it is a good idea to start having
many accounts all over the place that are not traceable to 
their users. It seems like this would be a cracker's dream.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: ghabrech@ultrix.ramapo.edu (The Knight of Ni)
Date: Wed, 24 Feb 93 08:07:14 PST
To: rubin@citi.umich.edu
Subject: Re: Poor Man's Anonymous Remailer
Message-ID: <9302241608.AA09746@ultrix.ramapo.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I think the idea is just that it is an e-mail account.  I don't think you have
any disk quota or such and probably can't even telnet or ftp from it.  The
idea for this is privacy.  The best way to keep someone from reading your
files is to make it so that they can't get their hands on 'em.

George




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Aviel David Rubin <rubin@citi.umich.edu>
Date: Wed, 24 Feb 93 09:02:15 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Poor Man's Anonymous Remailer
Message-ID: <9302241702.AA06872@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> it really doesnt work out... MANY ways are inherent in the scheme
> to eventually match a face with an account. If you always pay
> in cash, if you always where a mask(WAIT MASK??? well I think you get the IDEA)
> credit cards will; eventually be traced and bank accounts discovered
> unless one started taking their precautions before the information age...
> now the only absolute privacy/anonymity will be the ones that can
> insure it with technology
>    cheers
>     kelly  

No here's another application for anonymous cash.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: treason@gnu.ai.mit.edu
Date: Wed, 24 Feb 93 10:13:58 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: a project for those who like it
Message-ID: <9302241812.AA12695@spiff.gnu.ai.mit.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I have been working on an idea or a secure chat system for internet and have 
up with some ideas.  The concept is to runa server(a single server) to 
process the chat for up to say 50 users(more may lag you to death) using
public key to secure the system.  The server would be on an internet machine
and the client would be on the users home pc.  We use the home pc concept
to avoid transporting raw data(unencrypted) over internet and phone lines.
The basic gist (in a pseudo pseudocode) is this:

CLIENT SIDE

User runs client
client asks for password (from pgp key)
client checks for servers pgp public key
user then connects to the network and such(dumb teminal, with hotkey to
   activate encryption/decryption)
client connects to sever sending userid and hostname
client asks for alias
client sends server userid hostname
start main function
when message sent
   client encrypts with servers public key
   client sends message to server
when message received
   client decrypts message with users public key (using password supplied
      at initiation)
   client displays it to users screen
loop to start main function

SERVER SIDE

Admin starts server with server pgp password as a parameter
server waits for connection
server gets connection receives host and id
server checks id table looking for legal user
user is valid
   connect
else
   boot user
check and see if user is logged more than once
if true
   boot both users
   alarm admin
(* This is to make sure noone is lending out their account *)
server matches user with pgp key
start main function
if message sent
   encrypt message with users pgp public key and sends it out
if message received
   decrypt message sent by user using server secret key and password
   reencrypt it for each user on the server
   send message to each user
loop to start main function

The server would have a copy of each users public key, and a look up table
with this format to tell which key is paired with which user:

userid@host pgpkeyname

When I say a user is logged in more than once in the above comment, I mean
logged in on the server, not on his account.

The id or hostname of the user is never displayed and cannot be retrieved.
There is no similarity to irc, no channels, just one stream going to all users.
The data will be encrypted in blocks, and sent out in blocks.

There will need to be made some slight changes in pgp to get this to work.

flaws:  When entering a pgp password, and containing it in memory, this may be
retreivable by the root or the server machine.  Information will be
temporarily stored in kmem, although disorderly, raw.  People are stupid.

Tell me what you think.  People are already wrking on this project, but many
more may be needed to bring it to its completion.  Since I am not
the IP programmer from hell, at this point I am doing the pc client.

iI expect bitches about people saying people will use the server for illegal 
purposes, but because people can use a bathtub for illegal purposes if
they wanted to, I will ignore them.

Treason@gnu 



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Hal <74076.1041@CompuServe.COM>
Date: Wed, 24 Feb 93 10:29:13 PST
To: CYPHERPUNKS <CYPHERPUNKS@toad.com>
Subject: When's enough enough?
Message-ID: <930224182016_74076.1041_DHJ43-1@CompuServe.COM>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

Paul Ferguson asks:

> Now, I'd like to ask the cypherpunk readership to clarify the need (or
> perhaps a better term may be "desire") for anonymous remailers? Maybe
> I'm not getting the "big picture", but it would appear to me that
> insurance of private communications is the area of intended interest
> here. I know that someone may declare my query as naive, but if you
> feel strongly enough about a topic, why wouldn't you want the
> recipient to know who you are, where you are and who they can respond
> to?

There are several different advantages provided by anonymous remailers.
One of the simplest and least controversial would be to defeat traffic
analysis on ordinary email.

Two people who wish to communicate privately can use PGP or some other
encryption system to hide the content of their messages.  But the fact
that they are communicating with each other is still visible to many
people: sysops at their sites and possibly at intervening sites, as well
as various net snoopers.  It would be natural for them to desire an
additional amount of privacy which would disguise who they were communicating
with as well as what they were saying.

Anonymous remailers make this possible.  By forwarding mail between
themselves through remailers, while still identifying themselves in the
(encrypted) message contents, they have even more communications privacy
than with simple encryption.

(The Cypherpunk vision includes a world in which literally hundreds or
thousands of such remailers operate.  Mail could be bounced through
dozens of these services, mixing in with tens of thousands of other
messages, re-encrypted at each step of the way.  This should make traffic
analysis virtually impossible.  By sending periodic dummy messages which
just get swallowed up at some step, people can even disguise _when_
they are communicating.)

The more controversial vision associated with anonymous remailers is
expressed in such science fiction stories as "True Names", by Vernor
Vinge, or "Ender's Game", by Orson Scott Card.  These depict worlds in
which computer networks are in widespread use, but in which many people
choose to participate through pseudonyms.  In this way they can make
unpopular arguments or participate in frowned-upon transactions without
their activities being linked to their true identities.  It also allows
people to develop reputations based on the quality of their ideas,
rather than their job, wealth, age, or status.

The idea here is that the ultimate solution to the low signal-to-noise
ratio on the nets is not a matter of forcing people to "stand behind their
words".  People can stand behind all kinds of idiotic ideas.  Rather,
there will need to be developed better systems for filtering news and
mail, for developing "digital reputations" which can be stamped on one's
postings to pass through these smart filters, and even applying these
reputations to pseudonyms.  In such a system, the fact that someone is
posting or mailing pseudonymously is not a problem, since nuisance posters
won't be able to get through.

Other advantages of this approach include its extension to electronic
on-line transactions.  Already today many records are kept of our
financial dealings - each time we purchase an item over the phone using
a credit card, this is recorded by the credit card company.  In time,
even more of this kind of information may be collected and possibly sold.
One Cypherpunk vision includes the ability to engage in transactions
anonymously, using "digital cash", which would not be traceable to the
participants.  Particularly for buying "soft" products, like music,
video, and software (which all may be deliverable over the net eventually),
it should be possible to engage in such transactions anonymously.  So
this is another area where anonymous mail is important.

We anticipate that computer networks will play a more and more important
role in many parts of our lives.  But this increased computerization brings
tremendous dangers for infringing privacy.  Cypherpunks seek to put into
place structures which will allow people to preserve their privacy if they
choose.  No one will be forced to use pseudonyms or post anonymously.
But it should be a matter of choice how much information a person chooses
to reveal about himself when he communicates.  Right now, the nets don't
give you that much choice.  We are trying to give this power to people.

Hal Finney

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From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: bmullane@ultrix.ramapo.edu (JamesBond_007)
Date: Wed, 24 Feb 93 10:18:15 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: No Subject
Message-ID: <9302241821.AA19804@ultrix.ramapo.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

So, has pgp 2.2 really been released?
does anyone know?
Brian

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aTEldUjbjNc=
=Uje7
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Marc Horowitz <marc@MIT.EDU>
Date: Wed, 24 Feb 93 11:42:15 PST
To: treason@gnu.ai.mit.edu
Subject: Re: a project for those who like it
In-Reply-To: <9302241812.AA12695@spiff.gnu.ai.mit.edu>
Message-ID: <9302241940.AA21343@tla.MIT.EDU>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>> I have been working on an idea or a secure chat system for internet
>> and have up with some ideas.

A system such as this already exists at MIT.  It's called zephyr.
Currently, it uses kerberos (private-key) for authentication, and uses
cleartext, but the system just pushes around bits.  There's no reason
a message couldn't be a public key encrypted message.  ACLs already
exist (based on the kerberos authentication), but the system is
capable of supporting well over a thousand simultaneous clients, so
they might not be necessary.  The protocol is based on UDP, and is
well-documented.  Unix and macintosh clients exist; there are PC
clients in development.

If people want more information (up to and including the technical
papers), look on athena-dist.mit.edu (it's a mail server, too).  Or,
I'll be happy to discuss it on the list.

		Marc




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Marc.Ringuette@GS80.SP.CS.CMU.EDU
Date: Wed, 24 Feb 93 12:31:26 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Anonymous flooding
Message-ID: <9302242031.AA10553@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I wonder if full crypto anonymity as we envision it will be stable?
I'm very concerned about the problem of anonymous users intentionally
flooding the network with garbage in order to bring it to its knees.
Current practice, in the non-anonymous world, is to trace excess
traffic to its source and stop it from being generated.  This will no
longer be possible when true anonymity is available.

This would particularly be a problem if a remailer is willing to forward
an incoming message to more than one destination.  In that case, by sending a
single anonymous message, a saboteur could generate an exponential amount
of net traffic.  This would be bad.

Two basic precautions for a remailer to take are
  1. To require a 1-1 correspondence between input and output messages.
  2. To require that the address portion of the message shrink at each step
     (preventing infinite loops).  
If this is done, then the saboteur's original message can be at most
n-fold replicated, where n is the maximum number of remailer hops
allowed.

However, I still have some fundamental concerns that an anonymity-based
system is vulnerable to flooding and denial of service by the bad guys,
including Big Brother, who may wish to prevent effective use of such
systems.  This may make operating a remailer a difficult proposition.

I'm discouraged.  Any thoughts?


-- Marc Ringuette (mnr@cs.cmu.edu)




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Duncan/Lois Frissell <71562.3445@CompuServe.COM>
Date: Wed, 24 Feb 93 12:25:12 PST
To: <cypherpunks@toad.com>
Subject: Dining Crypto -- An Introduction
Message-ID: <930224201510_71562.3445_CHT104-1@CompuServe.COM>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


(Timothy May)

Thanks for your repost of your message from the "Dawn of Time" (August 
1992).  Your list of "What DC Nets are Good For" was not specific enough
for my taste.  What DC Nets (untraceable communications) are good for:

1)  Once voice/video/VR makes it to the nets and once we have enough 
bandwidth/speed even realtime communications can be untraceable:

It's December 2000 and President Elect Clinton (Hilary) calls me for advice.
The call goes to my "Virtual Communications Server" located "Somewhere on the
Nets".  The packets are forwarded to me after being split up and sent their
various ways through anonymous remailers.  My half of the conversation travels
back the same way.  The packets pay the anonymous remailers for their
services with digital cash attached to their address headers.  We notice 
no time lag because the nets are fast and the packets carry a "realtime"
priority.

With the proper setup, the President of the US will be talking to me without
knowing (or being able to find out) where (or who) I am.

2)  This means markets freed from even the theoretical possibility of regulation.
Anything that can be digitized can be sold with no restraints save the absence
of a willing buyer.  Books, movies, VR epics, financial products, and all
non-physical services can be traded without coercion (and without taxation).
Remember too that "non-physical services" includes almost all management and
professional services.  The technique of "anonymous credentials" can be
used to check out those you deal with.

3)  The lack of regulation in the "spiritual realm" will distort market
transactions in the still controlled "physical realm."  People will tend
to "unbundle" the non-physical aspects of their services and sell them on
the nets even if it is less convenient to do so because of the *tax* savings.

4)  The reduction is government "revenue" as economic activity transfers
to the nets will induce a beneficial downward spiral in the authority and
power of government.

5)  People who become used to freedom in one part of their lives (their
work and play on the nets) will not enjoy the coercion they suffer in the
remainder of their lives (the place they sleep).  They will have 
the motivation and the tools to liberate their whole lives.  All without
the Libertarian Party converting a single person.  Freedom is a powerful
recruiter.

Duncan Frissell







From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Date: Wed, 24 Feb 93 15:50:09 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Anonymous flooding
Message-ID: <9302242348.AA20887@netcom.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Marc Ringuette worries about anonymous messages flooding the nets:

>I wonder if full crypto anonymity as we envision it will be stable?
>I'm very concerned about the problem of anonymous users intentionally
>flooding the network with garbage in order to bring it to its knees.
>Current practice, in the non-anonymous world, is to trace excess
>traffic to its source and stop it from being generated.  This will no
>longer be possible when true anonymity is available.

The simple solution: paid transmissions. Remailers pass on messages only if
they receive the payment they've announced is their fee. While _some_
remailers may pass on messages for free (charity, policy, etc.), _their_
recipients are under no obligation (obviously) to continue to forward them
if no postage is attached.

This means the nets may indeed be filled with junk, but at least somebody
has to pay for it--and the remailers are making nice profits. Economics
thus provides a damping effect against runaway situations (as it does in so
many areas that at first seem unstable).

(The analogy with junk mail in the current postal system is apt: you may
not like getting 10 pieces of junk mail a day, but at least you never have
to pay for it directly...and the Postal System _likes_ "direct mail" (junk
mail), as it pays the bills.)

>This would particularly be a problem if a remailer is willing to forward
>an incoming message to more than one destination.  In that case, by sending a
>single anonymous message, a saboteur could generate an exponential amount
>of net traffic.  This would be bad.

Again, a remailer "willing to forward" to multiple destinations must pay
for the transmission--and the recipients will of course look to see that
_their_ remailing fees are paid. It is thus extremely expensive to "flood"
the nets, as each message costs some amount to transmit to remailers, to
remail, etc.

And don't forget that most folks will likely have various forms of
reputation filters running. The may scan incoming messages for interesting
content, for messages from senders known to them, etc. As with our ordinary
mail, the junk can be thrown away very quickly. 

>
>Two basic precautions for a remailer to take are
>  1. To require a 1-1 correspondence between input and output messages.
>  2. To require that the address portion of the message shrink at each step
>     (preventing infinite loops).  
>If this is done, then the saboteur's original message can be at most
>n-fold replicated, where n is the maximum number of remailer hops
>allowed.

Fine, some remailers may insist on a 1-1 correspondence, others may remail
to as many sites as postage is provided for. The market can then decide
which remailer to use. Businesses who take all paying customers generally
outcompete those with arbitrarily set policies or their own ideas of
rationing services (e.g., "But, sir, we can't let you buy five tubes of
toothpaste--what if _everyone_ tried to buy five tubes?").

>However, I still have some fundamental concerns that an anonymity-based
>system is vulnerable to flooding and denial of service by the bad guys,
>including Big Brother, who may wish to prevent effective use of such
>systems.  This may make operating a remailer a difficult proposition.
>
>I'm discouraged.  Any thoughts?

Little need to be discouraged. There are a great many "covers" for
anonymous mail, including legal consultations (attorney-client privilege),
psychiatric consultations (ditto), religions ("Digital Confessionals--the
Latest in Catholic Computing"), games (role-playing), and "personals" ads
(as in newspaper ads that match partners, dates, etc., except mediated
electronically in this case).

Stopping any one of these will be tough, stopping them all would be very
hard indeed.

-Tim May

--
Timothy C. May               | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,  
tcmay@netcom.com        | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
408-688-5409               | knowledge, reputations, information markets, 
W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA       | black markets, collapse of governments.
Higher Power: 2^756839 | Public Key: MailSafe and PGP available.





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: uri@watson.ibm.com
Date: Wed, 24 Feb 93 13:15:37 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com (cypherpunks)
Subject: Re: Anonymous flooding
In-Reply-To: <9302242031.AA10553@toad.com>
Message-ID: <9302242113.AA16811@buoy.watson.ibm.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Marc.Ringuette@GS80.SP.CS.CMU.EDU says:
> I wonder if full crypto anonymity as we envision it will be stable?
> I'm very concerned about the problem of anonymous users intentionally
> flooding the network with garbage in order to bring it to its knees.
> Current practice, in the non-anonymous world, is to trace excess
> traffic to its source and stop it from being generated.  This will no
> longer be possible when true anonymity is available.

Yes, this is a REAL danger. But if the network providers will
charge per-packet fee (what an ugly idea :-), and no packet
will be moved without being "taxed" (:-) - i.e. some
digital cash removed from it's header (:-) - well,
I see no reason, why somebody can't invest his
$1,000,000 in shutting y'all up for a day (:-).

> This would particularly be a problem if a remailer is willing to forward
> an incoming message to more than one destination.  In that case, by sending a
> single anonymous message, a saboteur could generate an exponential amount
> of net traffic.  This would be bad.

It only depends on who pays for each packet (:-).

> However, I still have some fundamental concerns that an anonymity-based
> system is vulnerable to flooding and denial of service by the bad guys,
> including Big Brother, who may wish to prevent effective use of such
> systems.  This may make operating a remailer a difficult proposition.

Yeah, THIS can be a problem: our Big Brother has enough
money to do all the smelly things we discussed above...
And if not - he'll tax us more...

> I'm discouraged.  Any thoughts?

There's no way to limit Big Brother's power, except
for getting rid of him altogether, I'm afraid...
--
Regards,
Uri         uri@watson.ibm.com      scifi!angmar!uri 	N2RIU
-----------
<Disclamer>





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@Athena.MIT.EDU>
Date: Wed, 24 Feb 93 14:18:18 PST
To: Marc.Ringuette@GS80.SP.CS.CMU.EDU
Subject: Re: Anonymous flooding
In-Reply-To: <9302242031.AA10553@toad.com>
Message-ID: <9302242216.AA16535@SOS>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


   Date: Wed, 24 Feb 1993 15:11-EST
   From: Marc.Ringuette@GS80.SP.CS.CMU.EDU

   I wonder if full crypto anonymity as we envision it will be stable?
   I'm very concerned about the problem of anonymous users intentionally
   flooding the network with garbage in order to bring it to its knees.
   Current practice, in the non-anonymous world, is to trace excess
   traffic to its source and stop it from being generated.  This will no
   longer be possible when true anonymity is available.

I think the real problem won't be flooding, but the bad name full crypto
anonymity will get when lusers start abusing the system to send
harrassing email and hide behind the protection of an anonymous
remailer.

At MIT, we're considering to start up an anonymous remailer, but with
the proviso that if we get a complaint about a particular pseudonym is
used to send harassing email, or email with threatening violence, and
some other well-defined occassions, that we would reveal, to the proper
authorities, the email address used for sending replies back.

A warning to that effect would be sent back to an email address the
first time the anonymous contact service saw that particular email
address, and assigned it a pseudonym address for replies.  This way,
users would have the proper expectations of privacy.

Ultimately, I think this is the only way that anonymous remailers will
be able to function.  Otherwise, the public outcry the first time one of
these remailers are abused will cause these full remailers to be
shutdown, or otherwise cut off from the net.

						- Ted




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Date: Wed, 24 Feb 93 17:23:43 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Internet is Not the Long Term Solution
Message-ID: <9302250122.AA02771@netcom.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



I want to clarify some points about my earlier posting on how remailer fees
fix the "anonymous flooding" problem which Marc Ringuette mentioned.

Implicit in my comments were some assumptions which I ought to break out
separately:

* The current Internet, glorious as it is, is not the likely long term
solution. The various bans and constraints on business interactions, on
fees, on commercial use, etc., are major limits to what we're talking about
here. (Some alternatives exist, like Alternet (sp?), but Internet is what
most of us are now using.)

* "Remailing fees" are the natural, free market solution to the costs of
transmitting, decrypting, storing, and forwarding messages. But these fees
run afoul of various Internet rules.

* The Internet policy statements are often invoked by sysadmins and
would-be censors (David Sternlight comes to mind) who are worried about
uses, abuses, and out of the ordinary situations. Ditto for Prodigy and
similar systems. The talk about bans on anonymous mail (nothing seriously
proposed, so far as I know) reflect the government-dominated nature of the
current Internet.

* Though what we are doing with anonymous mail, remailers, digital
pseudonyms, and even digital money is educational and even fun, I doubt any
of us expects our "constructions" to persist, to be a real foundation for
future digital economies. Well, at least I don't expect much to last.
Instead, what we learn with these systems will be carried over to new kinds
of networks, or on radically evolved descendants of today's networks.

* These new kinds of networks may look more like descendants of FIDONet
than of the Internet, in the sense of being more decentralized and outside
the control of institutions and government agencies. (Some have argued that
the Internet is already transnational and is already beyond the control of
governments. This sounds plausible in theory, but in practice most Internet
users _are_ subject to various rules about usage, about noncommercial use,
etc.)

* Some on this list have expressed distaste that remailing will have to be
_paid for_ by someone (other than themselves). This is the way economics
works. Remailers will act on the profit motive, and this in fact will do
more to increase the numbers and types of remailers than anything else.
When "Mom and Pop" remailer sites can be set up for the cost of a PC, hard
disk, and perhaps a "hardware mix" (a Chaum-style tamper-resistant  module
which mixes incoming messages, stores them for sufficient latency, then
remails them), then the profit motive will ensure lots of these remailers.

* I'm not saying the current Internet will not evolve into such a network.
In fact, the rapid growth in many countries and on many platforms may mean
it already has enough momentum to become the type of network we need to
develop these cyberspace constructs. But it's possible the form will be
quite different.

My crude timetable for the spread of crypto anarchy still has the 1993-5
period as a time of experimentation (such as we're doing), with more
robust, profit-oriented enterprises appearing around 1996 or so. (A few
brave souls may enter the market even earlier.) 

-Tim May

--
Timothy C. May               | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,  
tcmay@netcom.com        | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
408-688-5409               | knowledge, reputations, information markets, 
W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA       | black markets, collapse of governments.
Higher Power: 2^756839 | Public Key: MailSafe and PGP available.





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Peter Breton <pbreton@cs.umb.edu>
Date: Wed, 24 Feb 93 14:42:18 PST
To: Kelly Goen <kelly@netcom.com>
Subject: Re: Poor Man's Anonymous Digital Mail Drop
In-Reply-To: <9302241637.AA20822@netcom.netcom.com>
Message-ID: <Pine.3.05.9302241724.A12934-b100000@ra.cs.umb.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain




On Wed, 24 Feb 1993, Kelly Goen wrote:

> > I think the idea is just that it is an e-mail account.  I don't think you have
> > any disk quota or such and probably can't even telnet or ftp from it.  The
> > idea for this is privacy.  The best way to keep someone from reading your
> > files is to make it so that they can't get their hands on 'em.
> > 
> > George
> > 
> 
>  it really doesnt work out... MANY ways are inherent in the scheme
> to eventually match a face with an account. If you always pay
> in cash, if you always where a mask(WAIT MASK??? well I think you get the IDEA)
> credit cards will; eventually be traced and bank accounts discovered
> unless one started taking their precautions before the information age...
> now the only absolute privacy/anonymity will be the ones that can
> insure it with technology
>    cheers
>     kelly
> -- 

 I'm not saying that the phony email-account scheme has a lot of merit,
but it could surely be implemented: simply pay by money order from your
local Christys each month, and, of course, order the initial service from
a mail drop or something. I actually think the most reliable privacy methods
are low-tech (e.g., pay for things w/ cash instead of checks or credit cards)
but they involve sacrificing some of the convenience we may be accustomed
to. Personally, I get my access free, and I wouldn't want to pony up the
bucks to pay for a duplicate account...

		Peter








From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Timothy E. Buchanan <buchanan@rintintin.Colorado.EDU>
Date: Wed, 24 Feb 93 16:46:38 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: unsubscribe
Message-ID: <199302250045.AA00274@rintintin.Colorado.EDU>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Please unsubscribe. 




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: parish@cactus.org (Tom Parish)
Date: Wed, 24 Feb 93 16:28:40 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: remove me from the list
Message-ID: <9302250027.AA14977@cactus.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Overload ... please remove me from the list.

Thanks,
Tom




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: an5877@anon.penet.fi (deadbeat)
Date: Thu, 25 Feb 93 00:35:58 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Anonymity vs accountability - a balanced view (maybe?)
Message-ID: <9302250751.AA19616@anon.penet.fi>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


In-reply-to: Matthew Rapaport's message of Wed, 24 Feb 1993 08:20:43 -0800.
	     <9302241620.AA25561@netcom2.netcom.com>

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

Matthew argues for balance in the USENET battle over pseudo/anonimity.
Matthew is preaching to the choir.

Folks who have watched USENET for any appreciable length of time know
that reason is not highly prized there.  Volume is.

The self-apponted gods of the net can't stop us, they can only bitch
about us.  Let them.

This is no different than any other USENET issue.  The only way to win
is not to play.

DEADBEAT

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.1

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G+G9pvcjA/dJQn6Z/AtDuyIe0guaihxS
=VpJU
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
To find out more about the anon service, send mail to help@anon.penet.fi.
Due to the double-blind system, any replies to this message will be anonymized,
and an anonymous id will be allocated automatically. You have been warned.
Please report any problems, inappropriate use etc. to admin@anon.penet.fi.
*IMPORTANT server security update*, mail to update@anon.penet.fi for details.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Marc.Ringuette@GS80.SP.CS.CMU.EDU
Date: Wed, 24 Feb 93 19:05:54 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Anonymous flooding
Message-ID: <9302250305.AA17098@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


[ Problem: anonymous flooding.  Solution: digital postage stamps. ]

Thanks, guys.  Problem solved.  Should've seen it myself.


-- Marc Ringuette (mnr@cs.cmu.edu)




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: tlr1@acpub.duke.edu (Tristan Lanier Reid)
Date: Wed, 24 Feb 93 18:57:00 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: unsubscribe
Message-ID: <9302250255.AA25442@soc2.acpub.duke.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Please remove me from your mailing list...thank you for your time.

					Tristan Reid

					tlr1@acpub.duke.edu



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Timothy Newsham <newsham@wiliki.eng.hawaii.edu>
Date: Thu, 25 Feb 93 01:00:38 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: link encryption
Message-ID: <9302250900.AA22090@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



ahh..  I just thought of something I should mention about that
code I have sent out.  I am releasing MY CODE to the public domain,
but parts of the package are not mine :)   In particular the 
RSA code and the DES code come from other places.  I dont think
there are any restrictions on the code, but they dont become
public domain with my code :)   Lets keep me out of trouble





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Marc Horowitz <marc@Athena.MIT.EDU>
Date: Wed, 24 Feb 93 19:52:26 PST
To: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Subject: Re: Internet is Not the Long Term Solution
In-Reply-To: <9302250122.AA02771@netcom.netcom.com>
Message-ID: <9302250351.AA18094@steve-dallas.MIT.EDU>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>> * The current Internet, glorious as it is, is not the likely long term
>> solution. The various bans and constraints on business interactions, on
>> fees, on commercial use, etc., are major limits to what we're talking about
>> here. (Some alternatives exist, like Alternet (sp?), but Internet is what
>> most of us are now using.)

Agreed.  The Internet, in it's current form, is not going to be the
information center of the future.

>> * "Remailing fees" are the natural, free market solution to the costs of
>> transmitting, decrypting, storing, and forwarding messages. But these fees
>> run afoul of various Internet rules.

Yup.

>> * These new kinds of networks may look more like descendants of FIDONet
>> than of the Internet, in the sense of being more decentralized and outside
>> the control of institutions and government agencies. (Some have argued that
>> the Internet is already transnational and is already beyond the control of
>> governments. This sounds plausible in theory, but in practice most Internet
>> users _are_ subject to various rules about usage, about noncommercial use,
>> etc.)

This is where I disagree strongly.  We are entering a time when the
commercial advantages of internetworking are strong enough to cause
the formation of a real, commercially built, non-government-controlled
internet (small "i").  This network will be devoid of any AUP beyond
simple legality, and will operate much like a common carrier:  They
won't care what you put on the wire unless someone brings it to their
attention.

I highly doubt that FIDONET is the model of the future.  People are
moving toward increased connectivity and real-time services, not the
slow, store-and-forward model of FIDO and UUCP.  The example of
encrypted, untraceable real-time video requires internet technologies.
Mail forwarding just doesn't cut it.

>> * Some on this list have expressed distaste that remailing will have to be
>> _paid for_ by someone (other than themselves). 

My major problem with this is that I'd rather not have to stamp each
piece.  I'd like to see a remailer sell me an unlimited-use ticket for
a month, say.  But this is what the free market is for.  I'm sure
someone will see their way to offering the service I want to buy.

		Marc




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Date: Wed, 24 Feb 93 23:19:57 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Internet is Not the Long Term Solution
Message-ID: <9302250718.AA07261@netcom.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Marc Horowitz writes, referring to my comments:

>This is where I disagree strongly.  We are entering a time when the
>commercial advantages of internetworking are strong enough to cause
>the formation of a real, commercially built, non-government-controlled
>internet (small "i").  This network will be devoid of any AUP beyond
>simple legality, and will operate much like a common carrier:  They
>won't care what you put on the wire unless someone brings it to their
>attention.
>
>I highly doubt that FIDONET is the model of the future.  People are
>moving toward increased connectivity and real-time services, not the
>slow, store-and-forward model of FIDO and UUCP.  The example of
>encrypted, untraceable real-time video requires internet technologies.
>Mail forwarding just doesn't cut it.

I wasn't very clear, or detailed, about this. I certainly didn't mean "like
FIDONET" in the sense of a bunch of slow store-and-forward DOS-type
machines. I agree with Marc that fast networks are the way to go.

But the decentralized, privately-operated nature of FIODONET is intriguing,
especially if combined with high-speed fiber optic networks and such. 

And many of the packetized messages we expect to see in with digital mixes
will easily tolerate (and even require) some latency at each node. A large,
diverse system of store-and-forward nodes may be very suitable for much of
what we're talking about here. The long delays on the current FIDONET are
of course unacceptable. (No point in arguing how much latency, how much
delay is acceptable, etc., because it will all depend on the nature of the
communications.)

In summary, what I hope we get is a heterogeneous, decentralized,
market-oriented mixture of networks, some very high speed, some slower
speed, and some that are very slow but secure. So long as the Feds don't
force the development in one direction, this is what I expect to see.

>My major problem with this is that I'd rather not have to stamp each
>piece.  I'd like to see a remailer sell me an unlimited-use ticket for
>a month, say.  But this is what the free market is for.  I'm sure
>someone will see their way to offering the service I want to buy.

Like Marc says, perhaps someone will offer this, though I doubt it.
However, while passenger transportation systems can offer unlimited use
tickets, the same is not generally the case with freight transportation
(where someone might ship thousands of tons of freight on one ticket!). I
doubt anyone will offer unlimited data transport for some fixed time
period, for the same reason.

-Tim


--
Timothy C. May               | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,  
tcmay@netcom.com        | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
408-688-5409               | knowledge, reputations, information markets, 
W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA       | black markets, collapse of governments.
Higher Power: 2^756839 | Public Key: MailSafe and PGP available.





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Date: Wed, 24 Feb 93 23:20:04 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Anonymous flooding
Message-ID: <9302250718.AA07276@netcom.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Johan Helsingius <julf@penet.FI> writes:

>> Ultimately, I think this is the only way that anonymous remailers will
>> be able to function.  Otherwise, the public outcry the first time one of
>> these remailers are abused will cause these full remailers to be
>> shutdown, or otherwise cut off from the net.
>
>Exactly as has happened to anon.penet.fi. ;-)
>
>        Julf

Have I missed something? Has anon.penet.fi been shut down or cut off from
the net?

Please fill us in. I think most of us are rooting for you and your system
(though some *.army.mil readers are probably not--they just can't stand the
thought of defense secrets being sold on crypto anarchy nets!).

-Tim
--
Timothy C. May               | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,  
tcmay@netcom.com        | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
408-688-5409               | knowledge, reputations, information markets, 
W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA       | black markets, collapse of governments.
Higher Power: 2^756839 | Public Key: MailSafe and PGP available.





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Dave Banisar <banisar@washofc.cpsr.org>
Date: Wed, 24 Feb 93 21:11:05 PST
To: CYPHERPUNKS@toad.com
Subject: Clinton/Gore on export controls
Message-ID: <9302250013.AA39899@hacker2.eff.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


------ Forwarded Message
       E X E C U T I V E   O F F I C E   O F   T H E   P R E S I D E N T



                             THE WHITE HOUSE

                      Office of the Press Secretary
______________________________________________________________
For Immediate Release                          February 22, 1993     

	
                         REMARKS BY THE PRESIDENT
                          AND VICE PRESIDENT TO
                        SILICON GRAPHICS EMPLOYEES
	
                             Silicon Graphics
                      Mountain View, California    


10:00 A.M. PST
	
....


(All sorts of higly intereresting but ultimately irrelevant to this list's 
purpose deleted)
	
	
	THE VICE PRESIDENT:  Let me start off on that.  As you may know, 
the President appointed as the Deputy Secretary of Commerce John 
Rollwagon who was the CEO at Cray.  And he and Ron Brown, the Secretary 
of Commerce, have been reviewing a lot of procedures for stimulating U.S. 
exports around the world.  And we're going to be a very export-oriented 
administration.
	
	However, we are also going to keep a close eye on the legitimate 
concerns that have in the past limited the free export of some 
technologies that can make a dramatic difference in the ability of a 
Gaddafi or a Saddam Hussein to develop nuclear weapons or ICBMs. 
	Now, in some cases in the past, these legitimate concerns have 
been interpreted and implemented in a way that has frustrated American 
business unnecessarily.  There are, for example, some software packages 
that are available off the shelves in stores here that are, nevertheless, 
prohibited from being exported.  And sometimes that's a little bit 
unrealistic.  On the other hand, there are some in business who are 
understandably so anxious to find new customers that they will not 
necessarily pay as much attention as they should to what the customer 
might use this new capacity for.  And that's a legitimate role for 
government, to say, hold on, the world will be a much more dangerous 
place if we have 15 or 20 nuclear powers instead of five or six; and if 
they have ICBMs and so forth.
	
	So it's a balance that has to be struck very carefully.  And 
we're going to have a tough nonproliferation strategy while we promote 
more exports.
	
	THE PRESIDENT:  If I might just add to that -- the short answer 
to your question, of course, is yes, we're going to review this.  And let 
me give you one example.  Ken told me last night at dinner that --he 
said, if we export substantially the same product to the same person, if 
we have to get one permit to do it we'll have to get a permit every time 
we want to do the same thing over and over again.  They always give it to 
us, but we have to wait six months and it puts us behind the competitive 
arc.  Now, that's something that ought to be changed, and we'll try to 
change that.
	
	We also know that some of our export controls, rules and 
regulations, are a function of the realities of the Cold War which aren't 
there anymore.  But what the Vice President was trying to say, 
and he said so well -- I just want to reemphasize -- our biggest security 
problem in the future may well be the proliferation of nuclear and 
nonnuclear, like biological and chemical weapons of mass destruction to 
small, by our standards, countries with militant governments who may not 
care what the damage to their own people could be.  So that's something 
we have to watch very closely.
	
	But apart from that, we want to move this much more quickly and 
we'll try to slash a lot of the time delays where we ought to be doing 
these things.
	

.....

(even more material deleted)



                            END10:41 A.M. PST

------ End of Forwarded Message

If anyone is interested in the whole conference, I weill put it up on the 
CPSR Internet Library at cpsr.org /cpsr/clinton.


Dave






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@Athena.MIT.EDU>
Date: Wed, 24 Feb 93 22:03:27 PST
To: Johan Helsingius <julf@penet.FI>
Subject: Re: Anonymous flooding
In-Reply-To: <9302250618.aa14970@penet.penet.FI>
Message-ID: <9302250602.AA25287@SOS>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


   Date: Thu, 25 Feb 93 07:01:04 +0200
   From: Johan Helsingius <julf@penet.FI>

   Hmm... Could you briefly outline those "well-defined"
   occasions? How about this case: I send you a complaint about somebody
   who has repeatedly harrassed everybody soc.culture.india/tamil/srilanka
   with anonymous postings about faked reports about then indian army
   raping civilians in sri lanka?

We haven't completely finished drafting those policies yet, so I can't
give you a comprehensive answer.  (If you have suggestions about where
to draw the line, please send me email!)

As far as your example goes: What I do now, when someone sends me a
complaint like that, is I go to the Usenet newsgroup myself, and take a
look at the flame war in progress.  (Usually both sides are behaving
like pre-schoolers fighting in a sandbox, but we'll let that pass.)
Whether or not we would need to impose sanctions on someone because of
their USENET postings is a very hard-to-define area, which ultimately
comes down to a judgement call.  Usually, we try not to censor people,
although we do usually send them a note suggesting that the follow some
basic Net Etiquette.  So that might not be grounds for digging up the
real email address.

On the other hand, if someone posts a message threatening to kill the
President, and the Secret Service shows up at your doorstep (and no,
this is not a Hypothetical Example), I think we would very clearly have
justification for trying to track down the identity of the person
posting the message.  Threats of violence in general would probably be
grounds for tracking the person down and issuing sanctions of some kind.

The basic idea is that there are certain uses of a psedonym remailer
(I'm not using the word anonymous remailer because we wouldn't be
offering true anonymity) which are obviously legitimate --- for example,
an anonymous suggestion box, alt.personals, etc.  On the other hand,
there are certain activities which are clearly out of bounds --- threats
of violence, harassment, etc.  What to do in the middle ground will
require some amount of judgement, so perhaps we won't be able to make
the list completely well-defined.  Although obviously, it would be best
if that list were as well-defined as possible.

						- Ted




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: thug@phantom.com (Murdering Thug)
Date: Wed, 24 Feb 93 22:10:40 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: RE: POOR MAN'S ANONYMOUS REMAILER
In-Reply-To: <33176.drzaphod@ncselxsi>
Message-ID: <m0nRbgo-000jpDC@phantom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



DrZaphod writes:
>      I think you're confusing pseunonymous with anonymous.  The goal is to
> send data somewhere WITHOUT A TRACE as to where it came from.  If you used a
> single e-mail address, [someone] could track it down, watch for logins, and
> trace the line.  If you used MANY e-mail addresses it would clog the net..
> remailers seem to be the way to go these days.  TTFN!

Getting an anonymous account on Compuserve, AT&T Mail, MCI Mail or any of
the other major services not only requires a mail drop, but also a number
where they can call you back.  Usually, a voice mailbox will do.  Then
it becomes a question of having enough phony id to get both the drop and
the VMB, usually not a problem considering any cyberpunk worth his wieght
in salt can get access to a 300 dpi color ink jet printer (ie: Deskjet 550C),
a Polaroid camera, and a laminating machine, and put together enough good
looking ID to fool almost anybody.  BTW, don't try using phony ID to get
a U.S. Mail Post Office box, because they are trained to spot that, not
for the reason of preventing people from renting P.O. Boxes but to prevent
people from cashing money orders under false names.

Let us assume that obtaining an account on a major online service or major
e-mail carrier is fairly easy.  The question of traceability can be put
to rest assuming that whatever e-mail provider you choose has offline
messaging capability (ala NuPOP, Eudora, QWK, Compuserve CIM).  Now assume
you have a notebook or handheld PC (like the new Gateway Handbook).  You
can walk up to a payphone, download all your mail, then go to the park
and reply to all the messages while sitting at a park bench eating a
sandwitch and drinking coffee, then go to another payphone, and upload
all your offline mail responses.  Offline mail capability allows one to
EASILY use payphones as points of access.  You can download 50k of new
mail in less than 2 minutes at 2400 baud, and in less than 30 seconds at
9600 baud from a payphone and then go about the rest of your day.
An e-mail upload is even quicker. What could be simpler? However, make sure
not to use a calling card when dialing up your e-mail service provider's
point of presence. It's possible to use coins since the call will rarely
be longer than 3 minutes, and never longer than 5 minutes unless you
have huge uuencoded files coming into your mailbox, in which case it's
probably best to be using a 9600 or 14,400 baud portable modem anyway.
By the way, I think AT&T Mail has an 800 # dial-up that's free of per minute
charges, it's used by people who don't have a local dialup in their area.

I just realized that it's actually possible to be an anonymous UUCP site
in the same manner, since UUCP is nothing more than an advanced offline
download/upload protocol for news/mail/files.  Assuming you can scam
UUNET or PSI or whatever other UUCP provider by giving them false info,
you could actually become a fully mobile, roaming, and anonymous UUCP site..
Scary, ain't it... :)


Murdering Thug




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: George A. Gleason <gg@well.sf.ca.us>
Date: Thu, 25 Feb 93 01:07:18 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re:  Poor Man's Anonymous Remailer
Message-ID: <199302250904.AA03970@well.sf.ca.us>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Duncan's posting about AT&T mail as a "poor man's anonymous mailbox" misses
one crucial fact.  The moment you dial an 800 number, you generate a record
of your phone number via ANI, which means AT&T gets that information in
realtime and can probably correlate it with your phone account and service
address and name.  If you want anonymity, never ever ever use any service
which requires you call in via an 800 number.  

-gg@well.sf.ca.us




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: mbrennan@netcom.com (Michael Brennan)
Date: Thu, 25 Feb 93 01:03:13 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Finding Mac PGP software?
Message-ID: <9302250901.AA16429@netcom.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Dave Banisar <banisar@washofc.cpsr.org> writes:
> MacPGP is available at mac.archives.umich.edu via gopher and FTP.

Dave, I've tried ftp'ing to that site, but I get "unknown site". Is that
really the correct address? I appreciate the info.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
Michael Brennan                                 Internet: mbrennan@netcom.com
                                              Compuserve: 76206,2462
                                               Applelink: M.BRENNAN





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: John.Nieder@f33.n125.z1.FIDONET.ORG (John Nieder)
Date: Thu, 25 Feb 93 05:00:34 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: dispatches from the front lines of anonymity
Message-ID: <5046.2B8CB524@fidogate.FIDONET.ORG>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


 ("L. Detweiler") states:

 BK> the
 BK> possibility of a centralized moderator stripping addresses, while
 BK> already currently supported in the software mechanisms, is problematic
 BK> because it is a single location with all the traffic--hence the need to
 BK> go through independent anonymous servers first. But I think the
 BK> localized header-stripping is totally superior to all this. Having a
 BK> message bounce around a net a bit with *real* information is very
 BK> vulnerable, when the ID could be stripped off at the source.

There is also the problem of those (like me) who access the internet
from outside, through gates.  The messages are not only marked with the
point of origin automatically by the originating BBS's software, but are
also subject to monitoring by any number of systems operators en route
to internet.  When all of the headers (including passwords for the
anonymous servers) are in plaintext, the entire anonymous system seems
compromised.  While some servers I haven't tried yet seem to be PGPed,
this doesn't seem to be the case with penet.fi.

 BK> How about an EFF sponsored server?

Yes, and preferably at a site outside the US, just for good measure.
There is an obvious appeal to having servers outside the jurisdiction of
American law-enforcement busybodies.

        JN


... "A Few Years in the Absolute Elsewhere..."  
--- Blue Wave/Opus v2.12 [NR]
--  
John Nieder - via FidoNet node 1:125/555
    UUCP - ...!uunet!hoptoad!kumr!fidogate!33!John.Nieder
INTERNET - John.Nieder@f33.n125.z1.FIDONET.ORG




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: John.Nieder@f33.n125.z1.FIDONET.ORG (John Nieder)
Date: Thu, 25 Feb 93 05:00:34 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Enough's enough already
Message-ID: <5047.2B8CB525@fidogate.FIDONET.ORG>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



 * Reply to msg originally in Cypherpunks                    <INET>

Paul Ferguson writes:

 BK> I know that someone may declare my query as naive, but if you
 BK> feel strongly enough about a topic, why wouldn't you want the
 BK> recipient to know who you are, where you are and who they can respond
 BK> to?

I just had a chilling example of why last month.  Someone who made my
life a living hell (in real life, not cyberspace) "found" me again in a
discussion in a tech newsgroup and sent me a "yoo-hoo!" e-note.  I could
have gone a long time without that.  My identity was irrelevant to the
discussion, but was unfortunately very relevant to making this nasty
little surprise possible.

As the penet.fi helpfile mentions, one of the concerns was for the
privacy of those participating in theraputic discussions on such
touchy subjects as incest and abuse.  In that many theraputic
disciplines stress a confessional mode of treatment, the security
required for persons to "open up" must be (or appear to be) absolute.
These electronic therapy groups may not appeal to you or me, but they
have large followings and seem to serve a useful purpose for some.
Maximum anonymity is desirable for those participants.

I can think of several other very serious reasons for persons to desire
untracable communications, but they go beyond the scope of the matter at
hand.

More to the point, in my experience I have found very little to be
gained by revealing my true identity.  The less known about me, the
better for my personal security.  That's the whole point of the privacy
"movement."  Who I am is nobody's business but mine.

        JN


... "Is it too late to get the Russians to drop a nuke on Washington?"  
--- Blue Wave/Opus v2.12 [NR]
--  
John Nieder - via FidoNet node 1:125/555
    UUCP - ...!uunet!hoptoad!kumr!fidogate!33!John.Nieder
INTERNET - John.Nieder@f33.n125.z1.FIDONET.ORG




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Johan Helsingius <julf@penet.FI>
Date: Wed, 24 Feb 93 21:34:55 PST
To: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@athena.mit.edu>
Subject: Re: Anonymous flooding
In-Reply-To: <9302242216.AA16535@SOS>
Message-ID: <9302250618.aa14970@penet.penet.FI>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Teodore Ts'o writes:

> At MIT, we're considering to start up an anonymous remailer, but with
> the proviso that if we get a complaint about a particular pseudonym is
> used to send harassing email, or email with threatening violence, and
> some other well-defined occassions, that we would reveal, to the proper
> authorities, the email address used for sending replies back.
> 
> A warning to that effect would be sent back to an email address the
> first time the anonymous contact service saw that particular email
> address, and assigned it a pseudonym address for replies.  This way,
> users would have the proper expectations of privacy.

Hmm... Could you briefly outline those "well-defined"
occasions? How about this case: I send you a complaint about somebody
who has repeatedly harrassed everybody soc.culture.india/tamil/srilanka
with anonymous postings about faked reports about then indian army
raping civilians in sri lanka?

> Ultimately, I think this is the only way that anonymous remailers will
> be able to function.  Otherwise, the public outcry the first time one of
> these remailers are abused will cause these full remailers to be
> shutdown, or otherwise cut off from the net.

Exactly as has happened to anon.penet.fi. ;-)

	Julf





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Johan Helsingius <julf@penet.FI>
Date: Wed, 24 Feb 93 23:28:55 PST
To: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@athena.mit.edu>
Subject: Re: Anonymous flooding
In-Reply-To: <9302250602.AA25287@SOS>
Message-ID: <9302250805.aa15717@penet.penet.FI>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



> We haven't completely finished drafting those policies yet, so I can't
> give you a comprehensive answer.  (If you have suggestions about where
> to draw the line, please send me email!)

If you can come up with hard and fast rules that don't ultimately
reflect your own views and biases, I would *love* to see them! What I'm
claiming is that there can't ever be a clean-cut line, thus I am going
for the policy of *never* releasing someone's true identity. Blocking is
another matter...

> As far as your example goes: What I do now, when someone sends me a
> complaint like that, is I go to the Usenet newsgroup myself, and take a
> look at the flame war in progress.  (Usually both sides are behaving
> like pre-schoolers fighting in a sandbox, but we'll let that pass.)
> Whether or not we would need to impose sanctions on someone because of
> their USENET postings is a very hard-to-define area, which ultimately
> comes down to a judgement call.  Usually, we try not to censor people,
> although we do usually send them a note suggesting that the follow some
> basic Net Etiquette.  So that might not be grounds for digging up the
> real email address.

Censoring is not pretty, but still a long way off from actually exposing
somebody.

> On the other hand, if someone posts a message threatening to kill the
> President, and the Secret Service shows up at your doorstep (and no,
> this is not a Hypothetical Example), I think we would very clearly have
> justification for trying to track down the identity of the person
> posting the message.

I don't think so. This morning there was an article in my local paper
about an estonian poet who was convicted to 10 years of prison for
having written songs threatening Stalin and the Party apparatchniks with
"real revolution". Yes, this was USSR in the 50's, but...

According to your example you would gladly have helped KGB to find out
the real address of the poet, right? And I hope the response isn't "but
the President of the USA is *not* Stalin, and The Secret Service is not
the KGB...".

> Threats of violence in general would probably be
> grounds for tracking the person down and issuing sanctions of some kind.

Ok. So how about the complaint I got today from rec.pets.cats where
somebody had posted something about how he was poisoning and shooting the
cats in the neighbourhood?

> The basic idea is that there are certain uses of a psedonym remailer
> (I'm not using the word anonymous remailer because we wouldn't be
> offering true anonymity) which are obviously legitimate --- for example,
> an anonymous suggestion box, alt.personals, etc.  On the other hand,
> there are certain activities which are clearly out of bounds --- threats
> of violence, harassment, etc.  What to do in the middle ground will
> require some amount of judgement, so perhaps we won't be able to make
> the list completely well-defined.  Although obviously, it would be best
> if that list were as well-defined as possible.

What is legitimate for you might be (and certainly is, in some part of
the world) for somebody else. And vice versa.

And my apologies if I sound a bit harsh. I am still only sipping my
morning coffee....

	Julf





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: dmandl@shearson.com (David Mandl)
Date: Thu, 25 Feb 93 09:19:02 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Enough's enough already
Message-ID: <9302251454.AA10413@tardis.shearson.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> From: John.Nieder@f33.n125.z1.fidonet.org (John Nieder)
> 
> Paul Ferguson writes:
> 
>  BK> I know that someone may declare my query as naive, but if you
>  BK> feel strongly enough about a topic, why wouldn't you want the
>  BK> recipient to know who you are, where you are and who they can respond
>  BK> to?
> 
> I just had a chilling example of why last month.  Someone who made my
> life a living hell (in real life, not cyberspace) "found" me again in a
> discussion in a tech newsgroup and sent me a "yoo-hoo!" e-note.  I could
> have gone a long time without that.  My identity was irrelevant to the
> discussion, but was unfortunately very relevant to making this nasty
> little surprise possible.
> 

Yup, there are dozens of reasons to want anonymity.  This should be completely
obvious to anyone moving in cypherpunk circles--or alt.sex circles, where,
amazingly, some well-respected sexosophists actually spoke out against anonymous
posting recently.  No offense intended, but anyone who can't think of situations
where anonymity is essential should get out more.  Any first grader can list
dozens of places where even mild blasphemy will get you locked up for a long
time. [Begin Zerowork tangent] And even if you think the U.S. isn't one of them
(which it is), keep in mind that most workplaces are effectively stalinist
dictatorships, and bosses may not be thrilled about having their employees
discuss crypto anarchy, the overthrow of governments, or S & M on the net.

   --Dave.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: thug@phantom.com (Murdering Thug)
Date: Thu, 25 Feb 93 07:17:06 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re:  Poor Man's Anonymous Remailer
In-Reply-To: <199302250904.AA03970@well.sf.ca.us>
Message-ID: <m0nRkDb-000jw5C@phantom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


gg@well.sf.ca.us writes:
> Duncan's posting about AT&T mail as a "poor man's anonymous mailbox" misses
> one crucial fact.  The moment you dial an 800 number, you generate a record
> of your phone number via ANI, which means AT&T gets that information in
> realtime and can probably correlate it with your phone account and service
> address and name.  If you want anonymity, never ever ever use any service
> which requires you call in via an 800 number.  

There's an easy way to prevent your number from being passed to an 800
number owner via ANI.  Simply place the call using a TSPS/OSPS ("0") operator.
Say "I'm having trouble dialing 800-xxx-xxxx, could you please place the
call for me?" Once the call goes out over another trunk line, your number
is not passed on.  If you have ever dialed those ANI "Demo" 800 numbers
that read back your number via synthesized voice, and then tried calling
them again using a TSPS operator, you'll know exactly what I'm talking
about. This is at least the way it worked a while ago, I don't know if it
still applies or of they modified TSPS consoles pass on the number.
Perhaps Phiber could clarify this a bit and tell us if this still works,
and if it still works in all areas, or what areas it would not work in.  

Still, like I recommended in my previous post, the best way to implement
a poor man's anonymous mailer scheme is to use a notebook/handheld PC
and making all calls from payphones using coins or 800 dial-up, never using
your calling card.


Murdering Thug




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: pmetzger@shearson.com (Perry E. Metzger)
Date: Thu, 25 Feb 93 09:26:03 PST
To: tcmay@netcom.com
Subject: Re: Internet is Not the Long Term Solution
Message-ID: <9302251614.AA09427@maggie.shearson.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> From: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
> 
> I want to clarify some points about my earlier posting on how remailer fees
> fix the "anonymous flooding" problem which Marc Ringuette mentioned.
> 
> Implicit in my comments were some assumptions which I ought to break out
> separately:
> 
> * The current Internet, glorious as it is, is not the likely long term
> solution. The various bans and constraints on business interactions, on
> fees, on commercial use, etc., are major limits to what we're talking about
> here. (Some alternatives exist, like Alternet (sp?), but Internet is what
> most of us are now using.)

Alternet is part of the Internet. There is no central control on the
internet -- only on segments of it.

UUCP is even more anarchic...

> * The Internet policy statements are often invoked by sysadmins and
> would-be censors (David Sternlight comes to mind) who are worried about
> uses, abuses, and out of the ordinary situations. Ditto for Prodigy and
> similar systems. The talk about bans on anonymous mail (nothing seriously
> proposed, so far as I know) reflect the government-dominated nature of the
> current Internet.

The NSF NET has policy statements. There are no policies for the internet
and indeed given that the internet spans at least thirty or so national
jurisidictions and tens of thousands of different networks its impossible
to have one policy statment. The risk is that Al Gore and Company will
manage to ram through their goverment managed internet which would
put PSI and company out of business and which would permanently assure
that most traffic passes through zones with draconian policies.

Perry




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: dnorris@ibeam.intel.com (Dave Norris)
Date: Thu, 25 Feb 93 12:09:26 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Job Available
Message-ID: <m0nRorq-0004rGC@ishark.intel.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Intel (Mobile Software Architecture and Technology group)  is seeking a person
to be responsible for all security issues related to mobile computers.  

Applicant should have a BS/MS Degree in Computer Science, and more than 2 years
experience in software architecture.  Experience in MSDOS and/or Windows 
development environment is required.  Experience with software, network
and/or portable computer security is desired.  Authentication and
Encryption experience is required.  Experience with challenge/response
devices and Defender(TM) type devices is desired.

This individual will be a senior level individual contributor that will be
responsible for all aspects of security in a laptop/palmtop environment.
Problems must be identified and solutions advocated within Intel and
to outside vendors.  Prototypes and Proof-of-Concept software must be developed.

Partial responsibilities include: Work with Corporate Business Development to
recommend investment in outside security companies.  Evaluate security products
from outside vendors.  Present portable security vision at trade shows and
conferences.  Be an Intel expert on security.  Work with Corporate Information
Services to incorporate new security products within Intel.

The position is available in Hillsboro Oregon (a suburb of Portland).

For more information please contact either
Nancy Ohlson  (503) 696-2572 or
David Norris  dnorris@ibeam.intel.com

Please do not post responses to cypherpunks.





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Eric Fogleman <Eric.Fogleman@analog.com>
Date: Thu, 25 Feb 93 09:48:11 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: problem installing pgp on a sun4...
Message-ID: <9302251745.AA26765@ack.adstest.analog.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Cypherpunks,

I downloaded 'pgp' from soda.berkeley.edu and 'unproto' from
win.tue.nl, ran the Makefile (make sun4cc) and got a binary that passes
the test given in setup.doc.

However, I got the following warnings:

"crypto.c", line 1445: warning: constant 256 is out of range of
unsigned char comparison 
"crypto.c", line 1445: warning: result of comparison is always true

(along with the same messages for line 2445.)

Here are the relevant lines...  from pgp.h:
		#define MAX_PATH        256

from crypto.c:
			unsigned char litfile[MAX_PATH];
			...
1445 -->                if (litfile[0] < MAX_PATH) 
2445 -->                if (litfile[0] < MAX_PATH)

I can see where this is a problem; 256 won't fit into eight bits.  What
is the correct way to fix this.  Should MAX_PATH be set to something else?

Thanks for your help,
Eric Fogleman




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "L. Detweiler" <ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Date: Thu, 25 Feb 93 12:00:28 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: more ideas on anonymity
Message-ID: <9302251959.AA02941@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


The question as to what specifically to prohibit being posted
anonymously has come up, and is by far one of our most serious and
sensitive considerations. Of course, the decision is largely in the
hands of the anonymous server operator, but no generally accepted
guidelines currently exist, and we might help some people and advance
the cause by codifying `legitimate use'. First, let me assure you my
intent and preference is that it should be as liberal as possible. 
Let's look at some of the options (I'm tiptoeing on eggshells here,
please don't flame me too much):

1) operator makes decision for every posting brought to his attention. 

Things that would test this system: what about revisionists (not
ugly-enough term) who claim that the Holocaust never happened? Or
someone who is posting extremely provocative but fabricated data?  (The
first case happened on Prodigy--the censors let it through at one
point, and was documented in a column by Alan Dershowitz, famous
American lawyer defending e.g. Mike Tyson, and other major celebrities.
The second case happened with the now infamous challenger transcript
posting, where anonymous user of penet posts without any comment a
`transcript' of shuttle crew dialog during the crash.)

Here, I think one policy might be that if the poster seems to be
repeatedly and blatantly fabricating the data himself, maybe some
restriction or warning is in order. But if ever the poster includes
`real source' (no matter how trashy) from the outside world, and makes
it clear that they are not the originator, only the purveyor
(`messenger'), perhaps this is less serious.  (I think Mr. Helsingius'
current standards in this area should be held up as an outstanding
model of commitment to privacy and free speech.)

2) some kind of global system for keeping track of `abusive' posters.

Here are some interesting ideas--how about lists circulated among
anonymous server operators only (not public) that record barred users
by their email address or even real identity? The lists could be
categorized and tagged so that the administrator can prohibit use based
on the seriousness of the offense.  Here are some things that operators
`might' look at:

1) ad hominem attacks
2) flame baiting
3) lying outright
4) defying Usenet conventions: posting copyrighted material, binaries
to regular groups, massive amounts of data, etc.
5) number or existence of *any* complaints
6) `racist' remarks
7) terrorism
8) `harassment'
9) anything illegal in the poster's country (yes, tricky I know)

ad infinitum ad nauseam. Maybe we could try to organize the severity of
this kind of stuff, and classify servers as `type 1' or `type 2' and we
can get a feel for how liberal or conservative the operator is. The
operator would say which lists he subscribes to, and which lists your
email address will go on if you abuse the site. Really extreme
operators (like Mr. Kleinpaste) might actually be interested in
`public' lists -- abusers get their email addresses, along with the
offense, posted on the public list, i.e. `outed'.  Now, I think a lot
of this is pretty unpalatable, but we have things to gain by
formalizing these mechanisms, and as long as the anonymous user is
*warned* in the server intro-use message, and possibly even has ways of
redress, and has choice of different servers, then the system could be
fairly agreeable by most.  Remember, no one is preventing operators
from being conservative or liberal as they like, the only thing wanted
is adherence to their stated policies.

Look what we have to gain. Currently, there is a lot of censorship
(attempts? conquests?) going on behind the scenes, as a recent episode
here attests. No one really knows how effective in general it is
currently to hunt down and bar `abusive' users (hence a lot of
misinformation and paranoia about the effects of anonymous servers). If
we could have some *statistics* that show x% of nonanonymous users get
complaints and y% of anonymous ones do, this would be very useful for
gauging the social impact of our technologies.  (There could be some
very surprising results---I get the impression that many very
responsible people *prefer* anonymity, and conceivably the overall
complaints on anonymity could even be *less*).

3) Possibility of net.trials

Ok, so don't flame me too much on this one. But if `abusers' (this
could be for anonymity on a local server, but eventually involve to
other realms) were subject to a `trial by peers', imagine what this
could do to enhance the legitimate reputation of networks. Suddenly, a
judicial system. I certainly don't want to be known as an advocate of
bringing in lawyers and bureaucrats. Actually, that's precisely why I'm
proposing this, to prevent that scenario. Imagine that the net
establishes these formal self-regulating mechanisms.  People in the
real-world law enforcement would be much less likely to become enraged
by perceived abuses when they realize that there are intrinsic
mechanisms for quelling the psychopaths (uhm, maybe, anyway).  Also, if
people weren't added to blacklists just by the caprice of one operator
but after a perceived fair `trial', people at other sites would be much
more willing to enforce the sentences of suspension, expulsion or
whatever.  An electronic trial by peers? (with voting at the end?)  A
very interesting idea.  Each server may develop a kind of peer or
family structure, keeping kin in line. 

Maybe everyone that replies to an anonymous message could vote in their
header whether to get rid of the user, with the default `one vote of
approval' (limit voting regularity). Approves add, complaints subtract.
The user starts with some initial balance. If he gets down to zero,
*poof*.  Lots of `approval'? No problemo. Post something really
outrageous? You might get enough zaps to lose it all.  Imagine, this
could improve the accountability of users in *general* (the mechanisms
could be applied to new Usenet groups, for example, or if very
trustworthy and fair even logins themselves).

I've been a bit vague and ambiguous in some of these statements. This
is because, as I hope has become clear, the kind of things that start
out on anonymous servers could eventually have a much greater scope, so
that it `behooves' us to develop effective and dynamic mechanisms for
self-regulation.  Keep in mind a lot of these things are happening
already albeit in much less formal ways. For example, the convention is
to send complaints to the system adminstrator at a site regarding their
users, and they act as judge and jury (or use whatever other local
procedures are in place).  The user may or may not be able to justify
their actions (redress).  There is already a loose confederation of
cooperation between administrators, esp. over extremely abusive
posters.  We already get somewhat public `trials' of extremists, where
people put forward all the evidence on Usenet and argue both sides. 
`Enforcement' and `punishment' sometimes consists of revoking logins,
feeds, or whatever.  I think we ultimately stand to gain by
`formalizing' a lot of the currently informal mechanisms in place.  

My feeling is that if we don't head off these issues at the pass, so to
speak, Real World (tm) courts will start deciding them for us. Let's
develop something we can be proud of and will be a model of excellence
for the future, and not something frail and unstable.


Perhaps our anonymous motto:

``I disagree with what you say but will defend to my death your right
to say it.'' --Voltaire 
(written pseudonymously)




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Christo Delaroderie <ctd@bach.udel.edu>
Date: Thu, 25 Feb 93 11:13:35 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Unsubscribe me
Message-ID: <199302251912.AA14389@bach.udel.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain




	Please unscribe me.
	ctd




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Mike Johnson <exabyte!smtplink!mikej@uunet.UU.NET>
Date: Fri, 26 Feb 93 01:20:53 PST
To: newsham@wiliki.eng.hawaii.edu
Subject: scheme
Message-ID: <9302251625.A02767@smtplink.exabyte.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> This encryption scheme uses XOR to encrypt data 1 character
> at a time.  Because of this it is suitable for protocols
> where you need to send single bytes (or less) at a time.
> Examples of this would be interactive ascii.  Also it
> is easily applicable to crippled lines like 7 bit lines.
> This is because if the plaintext is 7 bits you can send
> just the 7 bits after the XOR.  Even more general you can
> use it to encrypt any size at a time, down to single bits
> if you just have 1 bit to send immediately and dont want
> to wait for more data to become applicable.

> Ok.  So what are its disavantages?  Syncronization, as
> soon as synchronization is gone thats it, its all over.  Each
> block of 'pad' is generated from previous plaintext,  if you
> cant figure out the previous plaintext you are lost.
>
> Notice it uses a hash() function,  this could be anything, ie
> DES,  or perhaps a one way function (no unhash() is ever needed).
> The algorithm is fairly simple, the beginning is a bit wierd
> and could have been done several ways.  The first 8 bits in
> this implementation are used for synchronization.
> ...(source code omitted)

If you use DES, you are just using a variation of DES in cipher
block chaining mode.  If you use some other hash function, your
cipher is as weak as the hash function.  If you use key bytes
directly to XOR with, and never reuse key material, you have a
variation of the one time pad (which is good, but takes LOTS of
key material).  If you reuse key material when XORing it directly,
you have a weak cipher vulnerable to a known plain text attack.

There is nothing really new here...

For more info on this, if you have a PC and a modem, you can call
a BBS at 303-938-9654, download CRYPTMPJ.ZIP, and read THESIS.DOC
in that file.  Perhaps one of you could put this file at an ftp
site for wider distribution?  The stuff in that file about data
compression is kind of out of date, but the cryptographic
information (including some source code) might be of interest to
some others in this group.

Mike Johnson
mikej@exabyte.com





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Johan Helsingius <julf@penet.FI>
Date: Thu, 25 Feb 93 09:33:59 PST
To: John Nieder <John.Nieder@f33.n125.z1.fidonet.org>
Subject: Re: dispatches from the front lines of anonymity
In-Reply-To: <5046.2B8CB524@fidogate.FIDONET.ORG>
Message-ID: <9302251604.aa21585@penet.penet.FI>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



> There is also the problem of those (like me) who access the internet
> from outside, through gates.  The messages are not only marked with the
> point of origin automatically by the originating BBS's software, but are
> also subject to monitoring by any number of systems operators en route
> to internet.  When all of the headers (including passwords for the
> anonymous servers) are in plaintext, the entire anonymous system seems
> compromised.  While some servers I haven't tried yet seem to be PGPed,
> this doesn't seem to be the case with penet.fi.

Penet.fi will be PGP:s as soon as I get PGP running reliably on the
Interactive UNIX system I use. This weekend, I hope... But if you all
keep coming up with other new features I have to add, I don't know how
long it's going to take. And I have to upgrade the hardware as well,
the load is getting so big the current server is running out of both CPU
and disk. This weekend I will upgrade to a 486SX motherboard and a
bigger disk.

>  BK> How about an EFF sponsored server?
> 
> Yes, and preferably at a site outside the US, just for good measure.
> There is an obvious appeal to having servers outside the jurisdiction of
> American law-enforcement busybodies.

Yeah, seems that (and the fact that I have 100% control not only of the
site but of the network as well) is what has kept anon.penet.fi up this
long...

	Julf





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: fergp@sytex.com (Paul Ferguson)
Date: Fri, 26 Feb 93 01:44:59 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: 1000 points of light?
Message-ID: <qF1JZB1w165w@sytex.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


<dmandl@shearson.com> David Mandl writes -
 
DM> Yup, there are dozens of reasons to want anonymity.  This
DM> should be completely obvious to anyone moving in cypherpunk
DM> circles--or alt.sex circles, where, amazingly, some
DM> well-respected sexosophists actually spoke out against anonymous
DM> posting recently.  No offense intended, but anyone who can't think
DM> of situations where anonymity is essential should get out more.
DM> Any first grader can list dozens of places where even mild
DM> blasphemy will get you locked up for a long time. [Begin Zerowork
DM> tangent] And even if you think the U.S. isn't one of them (which
DM> it is), keep in mind that most workplaces are effectively stalinist
DM> dictatorships, and bosses may not be thrilled about having their
DM> employees discuss crypto anarchy, the overthrow of governments, or
DM> S & M on the net.
 
 Point taken, however there will be those who will argue that, "S & M
 has no business being discussed on the net in the first place." Not
 exactly my sentiment, but you know the spiel. That type  of
 "Stalinist dictatorship" mentality inherently exists in every nook and
 cranny of society, including the nets.
 
 My original post was not issued as a challenge, but merely a question
 to gauge some of the responses and justifications I hoped to receive. 
;-)
 
 Cheers.

Paul Ferguson                     |
Network Integration Consultant    |  "All of life's answers are
Alexandria, Virginia USA          |   on TV."
fergp@sytex.com     (Internet)    |           -- Homer Simpson
sytex.com!fergp     (UUNet)       |
1:109/229           (FidoNet)     |
         PGP public encryption key available upon request.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: corwin@Cayman.COM (Lord Among Panthers)
Date: Thu, 25 Feb 93 14:53:44 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: archives
Message-ID: <9302252252.AA22873@cuba.Cayman.COM>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Is there an archive for this list?

thanx,

corwin




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: mark@coombs.anu.edu.au (Mark)
Date: Wed, 24 Feb 93 23:05:32 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: a project for those who like it
Message-ID: <9302250704.AA05982@coombs.anu.edu.au>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>I have been working on an idea or a secure chat system for internet and have 
>up with some ideas.  The concept is to runa server(a single server) to 
>process the chat for up to say 50 users(more may lag you to death) using
>public key to secure the system.  The server would be on an internet machine
>and the client would be on the users home pc.  We use the home pc concept
>to avoid transporting raw data(unencrypted) over internet and phone lines.
>The basic gist (in a pseudo pseudocode) is this:

>Tell me what you think.  People are already wrking on this project, but many
>more may be needed to bring it to its completion.  Since I am not
>the IP programmer from hell, at this point I am doing the pc client.

Hmmm, are you talking about '4m'? That is a similarly goaled communication
system as well. Currently it exists in plain text format, between the clients
and the (as of today, five) servers. The system has always been destined to
have encryption built into it, from triple des and PK for the key
transactions.

To get into it quickly ftp /pub/misc/4m-212.tar.Z from ftp.santafe.edu and
install. It runs on suns, bsd, aix and similar. I have an hpux port done by
someone if it is required.

It would seem smarter to develop an already existing and debugged instead of
reinventing the wheel.

Contact chasin@santafe.edu for details.

Mark
mark@coombs.anu.edu.au




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Jay Prime Positive <jpp@markv.com>
Date: Thu, 25 Feb 93 20:10:40 PST
To: mbrennan@netcom.com
Subject: Law&Disorder (fwd)
In-Reply-To: <9302241728.AA27534@netcom.netcom.com>
Message-ID: <9302252008.aa03961@hermix.markv.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Ok, there are two of us here in LA.  Any one (else) want to do a
cypherpunk meat meet?

j'




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Johan Helsingius <julf@penet.FI>
Date: Thu, 25 Feb 93 10:24:25 PST
To: deadbeat <an5877@anon>
Subject: Re: Re: Anonymity vs accountability - a balanced view (maybe?)
Message-ID: <9302251927.aa23422@penet.penet.FI>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> Folks who have watched USENET for any appreciable length of time know
> that reason is not highly prized there.  Volume is.
> 
> The self-apponted gods of the net can't stop us, they can only bitch
> about us.  Let them.
> 
> This is no different than any other USENET issue.  The only way to win
> is not to play.

I have been trying to do that. But...

Unfortunately they *can* stop a lot of us. Let's take anon.penet.fi as
an example. A poor 386 box playing sitting duck for anyone who really
wants to flood it (and Karl Kleinpaste, among others, has spoken about
doing this on news.admin.policy). The other thing is that in some
official circles news.admin.policy is regarded as some kind of
semi-authority. If that group reaches a consensus to ban anon postings
I would get hassled by at least the academic network in Finland, for
"causing Finland a bad name on international networks". It wouldn't stop
me, but might make my life a bit unconfortable. And it has managed to
stop almost every anonymous posting service to date.

	Julf





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Johan Helsingius <julf@penet.FI>
Date: Thu, 25 Feb 93 10:57:32 PST
To: "Timothy C. May" <tcmay@netcom.com>
Subject: Re: Anonymous flooding
In-Reply-To: <9302250718.AA07276@netcom.netcom.com>
Message-ID: <9302252003.aa23700@penet.penet.FI>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



> >Exactly as has happened to anon.penet.fi. ;-)
> 
> Have I missed something? Has anon.penet.fi been shut down or cut off from
> the net?

Notice the ";-)". I made a failed attempt at irony. Should have learned
never to try it in a foreign language ;-)

> Please fill us in. I think most of us are rooting for you and your system
> (though some *.army.mil readers are probably not--they just can't stand the
> thought of defense secrets being sold on crypto anarchy nets!).

Thanks! Appreciated!

	Julf





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Phiber Optik <phiber@eff.org>
Date: Thu, 25 Feb 93 18:15:09 PST
To: thug@phantom.com (Murdering Thug)
Subject: Re:  Poor Man's Anonymous Remailer
In-Reply-To: <m0nRkDb-000jw5C@phantom.com>
Message-ID: <199302260212.AA10770@eff.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> 
> gg@well.sf.ca.us writes:
> > Duncan's posting about AT&T mail as a "poor man's anonymous mailbox" misses
> > one crucial fact.  The moment you dial an 800 number, you generate a record
> > of your phone number via ANI, which means AT&T gets that information in
> > realtime and can probably correlate it with your phone account and service
> > address and name.  If you want anonymity, never ever ever use any service
> > which requires you call in via an 800 number.  
> 
> There's an easy way to prevent your number from being passed to an 800
> number owner via ANI.  Simply place the call using a TSPS/OSPS ("0") operator.
> Say "I'm having trouble dialing 800-xxx-xxxx, could you please place the
> call for me?" Once the call goes out over another trunk line, your number
> is not passed on.  If you have ever dialed those ANI "Demo" 800 numbers
> that read back your number via synthesized voice, and then tried calling
> them again using a TSPS operator, you'll know exactly what I'm talking
> about. This is at least the way it worked a while ago, I don't know if it
> still applies or of they modified TSPS consoles pass on the number.
> Perhaps Phiber could clarify this a bit and tell us if this still works,
> and if it still works in all areas, or what areas it would not work in.  

It's OSPS, by the way, referring to AT&T's Operator Service Position System,
operating on 5ESS switches, and the successor to TSPS.  And it's double zero,
('00'), not a single one.  '0' gets you your local BOC operator.  Also, TSPS
has been defunct for a number of years.
Currently, ANI is not passed along by OSPS, but the area code is, so you're
not completely anonymous.  I wouldn't expect this to last for any stretch of
time either, it isn't the most difficult thing in the world to simply pass
the entire number along.





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Mark Turner <mark@clio.kram.org>
Date: Thu, 25 Feb 93 15:02:39 PST
To: mbrennan@netcom.com (Michael Brennan)
Subject: Re: Finding Mac PGP software?
In-Reply-To: <9302250901.AA16429@netcom.netcom.com>
Message-ID: <9302252151.AA01607@clio.kram.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text


Michael Brennan is rumoured to have said....
> 
> Dave Banisar <banisar@washofc.cpsr.org> writes:
> > MacPGP is available at mac.archives.umich.edu via gopher and FTP.
> 
> Dave, I've tried ftp'ing to that site, but I get "unknown site". Is that
> really the correct address? I appreciate the info.

Also available in ftp.demon.co.uk:/pub/pgp.

Regards,

Mark.

-- 
/\/\ark Turner                       Demon Systems / Demon Internet
Home: mt@kram.org (PGP key available)        42 Hendon Lane, London
Office: mark@demon.co.uk (+44 81 3490063)           N3 1TT, England
*** IP level dialup Internet connectivity for a tenner a month! ***
PGP server: email to pgp-public-keys@demon.co.uk with subject 'help'



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: trump@pluto.ee.cua.edu (Louis Edward Trumpbour)
Date: Thu, 25 Feb 93 19:51:12 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: No Subject
Message-ID: <9302260351.AA17473@pluto.ee.cua.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


things on my mind

well i am relatively new to the cypherpunks list so i have a

few comments to make on my behalf.

 

(1) i read in a message about the current rise in the member

    of subscribers and this rise was passively related to

    Mondo. There was also some concern expressed in this

    message about the number of people dropping the list and

    from those comments i reply that the list does generate

    an awful lot of mail.  And this mail is often quite

    technical (well if i was talking from a technically

    illiterate point of view it would very technical...

    i generally can follow the idea and their technicality

    though) and this technicality is a turn off to the Mondo

    type. I know that Mondo has said allot about the problems

    of personal security on the information age but not in

    tech-speek... i believe that most of the Mondo types will

    unsubscribe from this list because it is not a part of

    their focal of interest. Yes the list talks about current

    issues but again from a technical point of view and for

    the Mondo crowed n general it is a real turn off.

 

(2) Att Mail is nice. If anyone cares i will find out about

    what features it has... i.e. ftp, telnet, irc, etc... My

    sister is an Att employee and she is given an attmail.com

    address for her on the go and work sight mail... it is

    nice because i can stay in contact with her because

    Att mail has a 800 international dialup. My sister has a

    portable NCR computer with modem and can get my mail

    where ever she is. In 1992 she was back and forth from

    Puerto Rico and New Jersey for AT&T now she is all over

    Europe. A very nice convenience for the (wo)man on the

    run.

 

(3) Am I from D.C. and i am unsure if the world knows about

    this but in November the Secret Service raided our 26oo

    meeting at the Pentagon City mall. I know that we here in

    D.C. have all the more concern about security and

    frequently use are PGP keys because there is little doubt

    that our BBS are being taped et cetera and i am certain

    that in the near future there will be an upsurge of us

    D.C. boyz to your list.

 

(4) About DES.

    The data encryption standard is, no doubt in my mind,

    quite cracked by NSA. If it is not completely cracked it

    is at least very easy to get into by these boys. I have

    found that there is too much evidence that NSA has gotten

    in to DES pretty well. For starters (not a proof by the

    way) the cryptographers who work for NSA spend most of

    their time breaking encryption and its pretty mind

    boggling to think that no short cuts have been found to

    DES by a bunch of dedicated cyptographers. Damn if that

    was my job and my field of knowledge i am sure i would

    have at least a little short cut of some sort.  So i have

    been doing a little work on DES but i am unsure about the

    validity of my ideas and their effects on encryption...

    if i do feel that i find something i will certainly let

    it out but i was just wondering if people had any DES

    source in all or any languages??? it would be very

    helpful to get cross language DES source...

 

Well i hope that this note wasn't too boring but i felt that

i had to get it out to the list. so hopefully i will get some





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Vince Tessier <vtessier@vela.acs.oakland.edu>
Date: Thu, 25 Feb 93 20:10:55 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Overload! Unsubscribe with regrets
Message-ID: <199302260409.AA00210@vela.acs.oakland.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I regret that I do not have time to keep up with the volume of mail
this list generates, and must unsubscribe.

If, however, you are able to digestify all the mail into a single
piece, I would be interested again.

	-- Vince
-- 
Vince Tessier (vtessier@vela.acs.oakland.edu)
"When guns are outlawed, only Carl Rowan will have guns."



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Marc Horowitz <marc@Athena.MIT.EDU>
Date: Thu, 25 Feb 93 21:36:58 PST
To: trump@pluto.ee.cua.edu (Louis Edward Trumpbour)
Subject: No Subject
In-Reply-To: <9302260351.AA17473@pluto.ee.cua.edu>
Message-ID: <9302260534.AA27732@bill-the-cat.MIT.EDU>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>> (4) About DES.
>>     The data encryption standard is, no doubt in my mind,
>>     quite cracked by NSA. If it is not completely cracked it
>>     is at least very easy to get into by these boys. I have
>>     found that there is too much evidence that NSA has gotten
>>     in to DES pretty well. For starters (not a proof by the
>>     way) the cryptographers who work for NSA spend most of
>>     their time breaking encryption and its pretty mind
>>     boggling to think that no short cuts have been found to
>>     DES by a bunch of dedicated cyptographers. Damn if that
>>     was my job and my field of knowledge i am sure i would
>>     have at least a little short cut of some sort.

I've heard this argument before.  The NSA has a whole lot of people
doing crypto, but (again, with no proof) I can't imagine that they
have whole armies of people dedicated to breaking DES.  The fact is,
there are a lot of very good cryptomathemeticians in academia, who do
publish their results.  Shamir is an excellent example of this.  The
fact is, the best known attack requires 2^37 *chosen* plaintexts, more
if the plaintexts must be ASCII.

I also believe that nobody's security is perfect, and that if
something as big as DES was broken, even at the NSA, we would have
heard about it.  If the world banking industry trusts DES for their
trillions of dollars a day, I'm willing to trust it for my little,
insignificant messages.

		Marc




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: George A. Gleason <gg@well.sf.ca.us>
Date: Fri, 26 Feb 93 01:38:21 PST
To: ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu
Subject: Re:  more ideas on anonymity
Message-ID: <199302260935.AA06571@well.sf.ca.us>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Re your posting on categories of offenses and so on.  Agreed strongly that
sites should post banners stating the policies they adhere to.  I'd suggest
the following division of offenses:

1) Anything involving physical violence, threats of violence, incitement to
violence.  (this includes acts such as rape, pedophelia etc., since these
acts involve power as much as anything and can be seen as primarily violent
acts)  (this also includes things like Nazi propaganda where there is a
historic precedent or strong undertone that violent acts are encouraged)

2) Other (not violent) crimes against persons or property.  

3) Antisocial or questionable actions such as victimless crime, propagation
of lies (for instance a faked Challenger transcript), violation of Net
rules.

Obviously these have descending levels of severity by most reasonable
standards.  I would not in any way make sysops or admins responsible for
postings which may be illegal in their country of origin: both for pragmatic
reasons (no one can possibly be held to know the laws in all the other
participating countries) and for ethical reasons (stalinist coup in Russia;
fascist consolidation in ex-Yugoslavia, now you have to play cop against
dissidents from both; no thanks!).  

I believe unpopular opinions ought to be protected as long as they don't
encourage illegal or violent actions.  The test case for this is racism or
some equivalent.  If someone wants to argue a case that their race is the
Master Race or whatnot, I can't see squelching them for making opinion-noise
unless they're also e.g. advocating violence.  Once we get in the
opinion-censoring biz, it's a steep slippery slope.  OTOH, we also shouldn't
be an arm of LE, and hence the idea that discussing victimless crimes ought
to be a very bottom-of-the-list kind of thing.  

-gg




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: George A. Gleason <gg@well.sf.ca.us>
Date: Fri, 26 Feb 93 02:00:32 PST
To: thug@phantom.com
Subject: Re:  Poor Man's Anonymous Remailer
Message-ID: <199302260956.AA08793@well.sf.ca.us>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Re Thug & Phiber on the long-term chances that OSPS will forward the entire
number to the destination....

The solution to this is Anonymous Diverters.  You have pairs of telephone
numbers set up.  Callers come in on one side, and are connected to the other
side behind a toll-restrictor that only allows calls beginning with 1-800+.
The minimum configuration is two lines, one in and one out.  With a PBX you
can handle from three patches at one time all the way up to 10,000.  I can
provide hardware and associated programming to anyone who is interested in
starting one of these services.   

When using an Anonymous Diverter, the destination 800-number only gets the
ANI of the diverter's outgoing side.  Now of course, Big Brother can simply
watch the incoming side of the diverter if he wants to, but at least this
keeps your originating number secret from the destination 800-number.  

Right now there are 900/976 numbers set up with this kind of service, but I
don't see any evidence that they are designed for data applications; and the
per-minute rates are typically way high.  What is needed is a network of
local service providers who can do the same job either free as a public
service or at a reasonable cost.  One way to provide service at reasonable
cost is to have prepaid flat-rate cash accounts from regular subscribers and
give each of them some kind of password (no ID there either; you pay cash
and choose your password, it never ties in to your name or anything else).
This is also something we can set up on our larger PBXs if you're
interested.

Come to think of it, we have a client whose PBX would be ideal for this, but
we have to check with them.  It would only be open on an after-hours basis
of course, when they're not using the lines.  And it won't cost them
anything since those 800+ calls are free.  Now also, if anyone in the Bay
Area wants to set up one of these, the actual monthly cost is less than
$50.00 for lines, plus line cards at the rate of about $600 per each eight
trunks (four links through the system).  Anyone interested...?

We're going to be putting in a larger switch later this year which will also
give us the ability to do those anonymous cash accounts such that you could
have toll-call dialling privileges through the system on a prepaid basis.  
Anyone interested in *that*...?

-  gg@well.sf.ca.us




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: mccoy@ccwf.cc.utexas.edu (Jim McCoy)
Date: Fri, 26 Feb 93 00:37:48 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Dining Crypto -- An Introduction
In-Reply-To: <930224201510_71562.3445_CHT104-1@CompuServe.COM>
Message-ID: <9302260836.AA23943@tigger.cc.utexas.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text


[...]
> 2)  This means markets freed from even the theoretical possibility of
> regulation. Anything that can be digitized can be sold with no restraints
> save the absence of a willing buyer.  Books, movies, VR epics, financial
> products, and all non-physical services can be traded without coercion (and
> without taxation).  Remember too that "non-physical services" includes
> almost all management and professional services.  The technique of
> "anonymous credentials" can be used to check out those you deal with.

There is no way you can get around taxation if you intend on using this
system in real life.  Your system is much like that of a drug dealer, he
gets all this money, but has no where to spend it until it has been
laundered.  They will get you at the banks or wherever you go to spend your
money.  The "War on Drugs" has really caused this kind of banking service
to dry up, and unless you are moving millions of dollars a day no one is
going to even look at you if you want to make your money untraceable...

> 3)  The lack of regulation in the "spiritual realm" will distort market
> transactions in the still controlled "physical realm."  People will tend
> to "unbundle" the non-physical aspects of their services and sell them on
> the nets even if it is less convenient to do so because of the *tax* savings.

Death and taxes.  You can't escape them, so lets drop that fantasy and
concentrate on the rest.  Your digital/untracealbe/untaxable cash can only
purchase items from this shadow world of non-physical things, and that just
doesn't pay the rent or put food on the table.  The appetite of the
taxation-beast will not diminish, and everyone will just end up having
higher taxes on the physical elements of daily life that can't be stuffed
on the wire.  Sounds like this is going to be a world of info-elite tax
dodgers...the public will love you...

The unbundling of the physical and non-physical aspects are nice, but how
many non-physical aspects of a service are there?  There are a lot of
things that can be done through a network, but there are still a lot of
things that will never escape thier own tangibility; these are generally
the things in life one cannot do without, like food, shelter, etc.  

> 4)  The reduction is government "revenue" as economic activity transfers
> to the nets will induce a beneficial downward spiral in the authority and
> power of government.

Yeah.  Right...  If only it were true...

jim



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: gnu (John Gilmore)
Date: Fri, 26 Feb 93 02:42:34 PST
To: Johan Helsingius <julf@penet.FI>
Subject: Re: Moral dilemma. (not really)
In-Reply-To: <9302260807.aa01498@penet.penet.FI>
Message-ID: <9302261042.AA18729@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> This is ticket scalping, pure and simple (selling a ticket for higher
> than its value.  This is extremely illegal in the United States.  This
> is also a posting promoting a private enterprise for profit on the
> internet, extremely unethical.

This person, like most such complainers, is uninformed.  They are
taking advantage of your physical and informational distance from the
actual situation:

(1)  It's completely a matter of local law whether "ticket scalping"
is legal or not.  Many jurisdictions have no problem with businesses
investing in "ticket futures" in the hope that the price will rise.
In any case, it is not "extremely illegal".  Murder is "extremely illegal",
except when done on behalf of a government.  Scalping is a minor crime
when it's a crime at all -- like jaywalking.

(2) Promoting a private enterprise for profit on the Internet is
completely legal and ethical.  The Transatlantic link is certainly
open to commercial business.  Now, if they'd said "...on the Usenet"
then there would be guidelines to follow, which mostly include
sticking to the topic and not posting repetitive ads.  I think that a
single ticket ad in the Grateful Dead newsgroup is not out of line on
either count.  Especially given the number of people who end up looking
for tickets because of bogus Grateful Dead Ticket Service policies.

(3)  Individuals selling things in "garage sale" mode are exempt from any
ethical or moral Usenet/Internet restrictions on "commercial use" anyway.

> Furthermore, the people who are doing this are selling what are known
> as "taper tickets".  These tickets are only available through the
> Grateful Dead Ticket Service via mail order.  The reason GDTS does
> this is to help deter scalpers.

Scalping tickets is a perfectly legitimate business enterprise.
Scalping Grateful Dead tickets is even a commendable activity,
considering the hassles that the Dead scene puts you through to get
tickets.  Personally, I only go when some friend offers me tickets,
since it ain't worth the bullshit of tracking when to order (via
email list or polling their phone service), sending in money orders
within half a day of then, and following all the little regulations
about the size and shape of the envelope, etc.

A lot of places that have little `protected' markets like this, are going
to find out what a free market is like.  Good.

	John




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: gnu (John Gilmore)
Date: Fri, 26 Feb 93 03:01:57 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com, gnu
Subject: Re: more ideas on anonymity
In-Reply-To: <199302260935.AA06571@well.sf.ca.us>
Message-ID: <9302261101.AA18976@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


We have to keep an eye on each others' knees here -- there's a
tendency for a knee-jerk reaction not based on reality.

Squabbling over what "crimes" or "antisocial acts" should disqualify one
from being able to use anonymity is ***WAY*** missing the point.  It is
the people who have crossed one of those lines who need the protection the
most!  And, at least the US Supreme Court thinks it is in society's interest
to protect them:

    The case is Talley v. California, 362 US 60 (1960), in which the
    Supreme Court invalidated an ordinance which prohibited the
    distribution of any handbill not bearing the name and address of the
    person who prepared it.  The Court rejected the state's claim that the
    ordinance was necessary to help identify those responsible for fraud,
    false advertising, or libel.  According to Tribe, the Court reasoned
    that "a ban on anonymous pamphleteering falls with much greater force
    upon individuals and groups who fear majoritarian disapproval and
    reprisal -- upon dissidents and upon the unpopular -- than upon those
    with widely approved messages to deliver."

To quote a cypherpunk who usually has more sense:

> I believe unpopular opinions ought to be protected [as long as they don't
> encourage illegal or violent actions].
> 						 Once we get in the
> opinion-censoring biz, it's a steep slippery slope.

I inserted the [ and ].  He forgot to note that he's *already*
advocating opinion-censoring, and yes, he's already sliding down the
slope.

	John Gilmore

PS:  There is no way to enforce rules on the content of messages sent
through encrypted anonymous remailers.  Think about it for a minute.

All there needs to be is *one* remailer anywhere in the world, which will
send any message to the final destination.  Anyone can send an encrypted
message to the "freedom-loving" remailer, via their local remailer.  Even
if the inputs to the freedom-loving remailer were tapped, the messages
that arrived there would already be anonymous (headers stripped) and
encrypted.

Since what passes through the rest of the "freedom-hating" anonymous
remailers is encrypted, they can't see the content anyway.  You could
prohibit encrypted messages through your freedom-hating remailer, but
(1) that's easy to circumvent, and (2) what would be the point of
your running a remailer?




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: George A. Gleason <gg@well.sf.ca.us>
Date: Fri, 26 Feb 93 04:02:15 PST
To: gnu@toad.com
Subject: Re: more ideas on anonymity
Message-ID: <199302261159.AA19219@well.sf.ca.us>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



John, I missed where I might have been advocating censorship... maybe it's
so late at night that my logic filter is getting fuzzy...  Of course one
can't see the content of an encrypted anonymised message, but the case I'm
concerned with here is where someone receives an encrypted threat message or
some such, and wants it traced.  In that case there ought to be some means.
I'm speaking from recent experience, having received what the Berkeley PD
considered a credible death threat on my answering machine last week...

Okay, maybe your point hinges on the "advocating violent acts" item.  Well
this is a pretty tight issue: hard to differentiate between someone
advocating insurrection, advocating race war, and advocating going out in
your own neighborhood and killing (whoever).  Either way it is advocacy of
violence against someone.  And I honestly don't have a simple answer to that
one.  The main point I was trying to go for is pretty unambiguous, that
direct threats of violent actions are much more significant than for
instance advocacy of committing some victimless crime or another... but
that's a dull-obvious one compared to the advocating violence item.  

Somehow I believe we're going to need to consider the threats & violence
questions sooner or later, if for no other reason than to have some
solutions at hand when it happens and people start clamoring for
restrictions on public access to crypto and anonymity.  (jeez my writing is
a mess at this hour!)

-gg




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: bill powell <71221.413@CompuServe.COM>
Date: Fri, 26 Feb 93 01:23:26 PST
To: <cypherpunks@toad.com>
Subject: my pgp key
Message-ID: <930226091524_71221.413_EHL28-2@CompuServe.COM>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


-----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----
Version: 2.1

mQCNAirtyeIAAAEEALTnTD+eyIxauah9U6TfH+aSW1oawYnF/MWiPvxdPAI5oGaN
xoMoJvmoGnidIxjNai7N16n4/suKAGta1eL5CXB7YYkRmDgkSYgP7phYQvZU4D6U
8TpdQ9pazK4DPdkS6EErS2PM0Pi184NJRpslh+FAfmNPWSWuO4bhudIf3n7fAAUR
tClXaWxsaWFtIFBvd2VsbCA8NzEyMjEuNDEzQGNvbXB1c2VydmUuY29tPg==
=45AN
-----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: John.Nieder@f33.n125.z1.FIDONET.ORG (John Nieder)
Date: Fri, 26 Feb 93 07:41:26 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: DES
Message-ID: <5067.2B8E35E1@fidogate.FIDONET.ORG>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



 * Reply to msg originally in Cypherpunks              <INET>
 marc@Athena.MIT.EDU (Marc Horowitz) writes:

 BK> I also believe that nobody's security is perfect, and that if
 BK> something as big as DES was broken, even at the NSA, we would have
 BK> heard about it.  If the world banking industry trusts DES for their
 BK> trillions of dollars a day, I'm willing to trust it for my little,
 BK> insignificant messages.

I'm surprised that you haven't had 53 replies to this already, but in
that you haven't I suppose I ought not let this go by unchallenged.
        In a _MicroTimes_ article by Jim Warren of the EFF, the
unreliability of DES was discussed at length.  In a nutshell, Marty
Hellman of Stanford broke the "unbreakable" 54-bit DES _prior to its
adoption as a standard_.  He promoted the idea of a 64-bit DES instead,
but was _opposed by the NSA_ for reasons we can all speculate upon at
length.  This opposition is the basis of the rumors (?) of DES being
backdoored by the NSA.  The upshot was that DES was adopted _after_
being demonstrably compromised.
        The postscript to this is that Hellman's proposed "unbreakable"
64-bit DES variant was later cracked as well.
        The post-postscript is an apocryphal story I personally got from
an Israeli communications tech and minor spook.  He claimed that DES was
broken by the cryptanalytic arm of Israeli intelligence _in two hours_.
        It is relatively certain that a DES-encrypted cyphertext can be
easily decrypted by well-equipped agencies.  Whether decryption is now
trivially accomplished by private parties is another question.

        JN

... "He isn't my president & these aren't my people."
--- Blue Wave/Opus v2.12 [NR]
--  
John Nieder - via FidoNet node 1:125/555
    UUCP - ...!uunet!hoptoad!kumr!fidogate!33!John.Nieder
INTERNET - John.Nieder@f33.n125.z1.FIDONET.ORG




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: John.Nieder@f33.n125.z1.FIDONET.ORG (John Nieder)
Date: Fri, 26 Feb 93 07:41:22 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: dispatches from the front lines of anonymity
Message-ID: <5068.2B8E35E2@fidogate.FIDONET.ORG>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



 * Reply to msg originally in Cypherpunks             <INET>
 julf@penet.FI (Johan Helsingius) writes:

 BK> Penet.fi will be PGP:s as soon as I get PGP running reliably on the
 BK> Interactive UNIX system I use. This weekend, I hope... But if you all
 BK> keep coming up with other new features I have to add, I don't know how
 BK> long it's going to take.

It must seem a thankless task sometimes, I'm sure.  One thing I noticed
about penet.fi's processing of messages is that it at least scrapes off
the trailing addresses automatically tacked on at the end of every
outgoing message leaving all Fido BBSs.  A test message sent via the
babani remailer arrived anonymously, but with all three lines of the
address footer (see below) attached.  Hardly anonymous...

 > Yes, and preferably at a site outside the US, just for good measure.
 > There is an obvious appeal to having servers outside the jurisdiction of
 > American law-enforcement busybodies.

 BK> Yeah, seems that (and the fact that I have 100% control not only of
 BK> the site but of the network as well) is what has kept anon.penet.fi up
 BK> this long...

Yes, and don't think that we don't appreciate your efforts!

        JN

... Criticism is nothing but a mild form of envy.
--- Blue Wave/Opus v2.12 [NR]
--  
John Nieder - via FidoNet node 1:125/555
    UUCP - ...!uunet!hoptoad!kumr!fidogate!33!John.Nieder
INTERNET - John.Nieder@f33.n125.z1.FIDONET.ORG




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Johan Helsingius <julf@penet.FI>
Date: Fri, 26 Feb 93 00:43:04 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Moral dilemma.
Message-ID: <9302260807.aa01498@penet.penet.FI>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



This is a typical example of the dilemmas faced by an anon posting
operator. Here is my reply to the complaint from an user in
rec.music.gdead. Don't feel good about it, but...

------- Forwarded Message

To:      <DELETED>
Subject: Re: abuse of internet access

> To whom it may concern:
> 
> I direct your attention to the following post made on the rec.music.gdead 
> newsgroup:
> 
> Article 30001 (26 more) in rec.music.gdead:
> From: an13488@anon.penet.fi
> Subject: Tickets available
> Organization: Anonymous contact service
> X-Anonymously-To: rec.music.gdead
> Date: Thu, 25 Feb 1993 20:48:01 GMT
> Lines: 28
>  
>  
> We have the following tickets available:
>  
> Rosemont:
> 3/9  12 tickets
> 3/10 6 tickets, 4 taper tickets
> 3/11 10 tickets, 8 taper tickets
>  
> Richfield:
> 3/14 12 tickets
>  
> Landover:
> 3/16 12 tickets
> 3/17 12 tickets, 6 taper tickets
>  
>  
> 3/17 12 tickets, 6 taper tickets
> 3/18 6 tickets, 2 taper tickets
>  
> Tickets will be sold for best offer.  Include your phone number with your
> bid.  Winning bidders will be contacted by phone to arrange payment
> and delivery of tickets.  We accept Visa and  Mastercard.  Bids are
> taken up to 5 days before the show, although we may contact you earlier
> if we feel your bid is suficient to warrant immediate sale.
> - -------------------------------------------------------------------------
> To find out more about the anon service, send mail to help@anon.penet.fi.
> Due to the double-blind system, any replies to this message will be anonymized,
> and an anonymous id will be allocated automatically. You have been warned.
> Please report any problems, inappropriate use etc. to admin@anon.penet.fi.
> *IMPORTANT server security update*, mail to update@anon.penet.fi for details.
> 
> 
> This is ticket scalping, pure and simple (selling a ticket for higher than its 
> value.  This is extremely illegal in the United States.  This is also a posting
> promoting a private enterprise for profit on the internet, extremely unethical.
>   
> 	Furthermore, the people who are doing this are selling what are known a
> s
> "taper tickets".  These tickets are only available through the Grateful Dead Ti
> cket Service via mail order.  The reason GDTS does this is to help deter scalpe
> rs.  I hereby request 2 courses of action from you:
> 
> 1)You immediately suspend Internet access priveleges of the individual(s)
> responsible for this posting.
> 
> 2)You provide the individual's (or individuals') name(s) to the Grateful
> Dead Ticket Service so they may take legal action against these criminals.
> 
> I hope my letter is merely one of many that have reached you concerning this su
> bject.  I assure you, there are many people who will not tolerate this and
> will do everything in their power to see that these people are caught and stopp
> ed.  Furthermore, if you are going to offer people anonymous Internet access, 
> be prepared to face the consequences when your clients break U.S. law.  As far
> as I am concerned, you are an accessory and should do everything in your power
> to rectify this situation.
> 
> I hope you take the time to respond and tell me what measures you have taken.


I have sent the person a message informing him/her that the account will
be blocked if the inappropriate postings continue. In an international
world, where laws, customs and morals vary from one place and culture to
another, and where a lot of people are trying to force their views onto
others, the only way a service like anon.penet.fi can operate is by very
simple and firm rules that are followed without exception. One rule is
that I *never* reveal the true identity of an anon user, and another is
that I *never* block access to the server without warning and without
giving the person a chance to defend him/herself.

I do understand your views, and I am very sympatetic to them, but I hope
you also realize that inpartial service requires "blind" abiding to
these rules.

	Julf



------- End of Forwarded Message





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Karl Barrus <elee9sf@Menudo.UH.EDU>
Date: Fri, 26 Feb 93 07:24:55 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: archives
In-Reply-To: <9302252252.AA22873@cuba.Cayman.COM>
Message-ID: <199302261523.AA06027@Menudo.UH.EDU>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Cypherpunks,

Recently, Corwin (one of the Nine Princes of Amber??) asked for an
archive of the list.  I've been saving articles since I joined - not
all of them! - and currently sent them to another person.  So right
now I have them in my account in tar compressed format.  I can also
easily get MSDOS arj format.  So if anyone else, especially folks new
to the list, wants the back articles I've been saving, let me know.
Eventually the FAQ for the list will be finished and new members can
retreive that.

My archive is split into different areas: digital cash, dc nets,
anonymous mail, pools, timed crypto, misc topics, and probably some
other stuff.  My home computer is an MSDOS compatible, so files are
named to comply with DOS restrictions!

/-----------------------------------\
| Karl L. Barrus                    |
| elee9sf@menudo.uh.edu             | <- preferred address
| barrus@tree.egr.uh.edu (NeXTMail) |
\-----------------------------------/




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Anonymous@cs.Buffalo.EDU
Date: Fri, 26 Feb 93 06:25:49 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Was: Poor man's anon server ...
Message-ID: <9302261424.AA22409@armstrong.cs.Buffalo.EDU>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


There was a mention uptopic of ANI "demo" numbers. Anyone have one of
them kicking about?




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: hkhenson@cup.portal.com
Date: Fri, 26 Feb 93 11:55:13 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: DES
Message-ID: <9302261100.2.21205@cup.portal.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


My take on breaking DES would be to just try all 2**56th keys on a 
massively parallel machine, though there may be better approaches.
Keith




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Hal <74076.1041@CompuServe.COM>
Date: Fri, 26 Feb 93 10:04:55 PST
To: <cypherpunks@toad.com>
Subject: Re: more ideas on anonymity
Message-ID: <930226173222_74076.1041_DHJ72-1@CompuServe.COM>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I want to add to John Gilmore's point about the practical difficulty of 
controlling anonymous postings and mailings if you are going to allow 
them at all.
 
Johan is taking a very principled position by promising not to reveal 
true identities behind the pseudonyms.  Instead, he offers to warn 
abusers, and if problems continue, to block their access to the service.
 
Unfortunately, as more remailer sites develop, this tactic may become 
ineffective.  It will be possible to chain remailers together in 
different ways, so that the effect is that you can post through Johan's 
system from many different addresses.  With multiple remailers and 
chaining there is no way for the final remailer in the chain to know 
when two messages are coming from the same person.
 
This will mean that it will not, in practice, be possible to block 
access for a given user.
 
We discussed this earlier in the context of anonymous email.  I had 
received a complaint from a young lady about receiving some offensive 
anonymous mail through my remailer.  (This story was resolved 
surprisingly, BTW: it turned out that it was a joke message sent by a 
good friend of hers, someone who knew one of the Cypherpunks and who 
knew about the remailers.  So she is no longer upset about the message 
at all.  But I didn't know this at the time.)  Realizing that it would 
not be practical to do source blocking, my suggestion was to implement 
destination blocking: no mail from my remailer would go to this person.
 
Eric Messick expanded upon this idea recently so that only people who 
had actually requested anonymous mail would receive it.  (A variation 
would be to first send a note to a person saying, "I have some anonymous 
mail for you; please reply within 48 hours if you'd like to receive it, 
otherwise it will be deleted.")  Other variations upon this approach 
could help to keep anonymous remailers politically acceptable.
 
But the idea doesn't generalize well to anonymous posting, except to do 
as Johan has done and forbid posting to certain newsgroups (sci.*, 
news.*, I'm not sure what else).  This throws out the good postings 
along with the bad, though.
 
I think the bottom line is that it will be difficult to provide 
anonymous/pseudonymous postings in a way which won't elicit the kinds of 
strong objections Johan has been facing.  His controls are OK for now, 
but in the long run I think they won't work.
 
What would happen if Johan just started ignoring the objectors?  What if 
he stopped reading his mail for a while and left the service operating?  
Would his newsfeed eventually get cut off by Finnish authorities goaded 
into action by email complaints?  Are there ANY sites in the world which 
would be immune to such pressures?
 
I read that at the Hacker's Conference, the owner of Portal offered to 
run a remailer.  Would he be able to stand up to these pressures?  How 
about John Gilmore's machine?  He made a powerful argument recently that 
he was not subject to various restrictions.  Would it be possible to run 
a remailer there, perhaps based on Johan's code, which simply ignored 
complaints and allowed anonymous postings to all groups?
 
Hal Finney
 





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Coyote Jack <cjack@u.washington.edu>
Date: Fri, 26 Feb 93 12:46:55 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: subscribe
Message-ID: <9302262045.AA111886@mead.u.washington.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


subscribe cjack@mead.u.washington.edu




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Phiber Optik <phiber@eff.org>
Date: Fri, 26 Feb 93 11:06:38 PST
To: John.Nieder@f33.n125.z1.fidonet.org (John Nieder)
Subject: Re: DES
In-Reply-To: <5067.2B8E35E1@fidogate.FIDONET.ORG>
Message-ID: <199302261905.AA23369@eff.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> 
> 
>  * Reply to msg originally in Cypherpunks              <INET>
>  marc@Athena.MIT.EDU (Marc Horowitz) writes:
> 
>  BK> I also believe that nobody's security is perfect, and that if
>  BK> something as big as DES was broken, even at the NSA, we would have
>  BK> heard about it.  If the world banking industry trusts DES for their
>  BK> trillions of dollars a day, I'm willing to trust it for my little,
>  BK> insignificant messages.
> 
> I'm surprised that you haven't had 53 replies to this already, but in
> that you haven't I suppose I ought not let this go by unchallenged.
>         In a _MicroTimes_ article by Jim Warren of the EFF, the
> unreliability of DES was discussed at length.  In a nutshell, Marty
> Hellman of Stanford broke the "unbreakable" 54-bit DES _prior to its
> adoption as a standard_.  He promoted the idea of a 64-bit DES instead,
> but was _opposed by the NSA_ for reasons we can all speculate upon at
> length.  This opposition is the basis of the rumors (?) of DES being
> backdoored by the NSA.  The upshot was that DES was adopted _after_
> being demonstrably compromised.

Slow down.  Firstly, DES encrypts a 64-bit block with a 56-bit key.  Are
you talking about key lengths?  It was originally proposed to use a 128-bit
key space, alla IBM's LUCIFER.  But they opted on the smaller key, which
fuels this NSA conspiracy theory.  The other major thing, are the S-boxes,
which no one has been able to deduce the reasoning behind the choice of the
values, and that's the source of the "backdoor" theory.
Saying that Hellman "broke" anything is a bit strong.  I remember reading
a published paper, I believe by Hellman and one other, describing that they
were able to WEAKEN DES (with a smaller key space for their experiment), using
a statistical approach, and that this could possibly be applied to the DES
standard.

>         The postscript to this is that Hellman's proposed "unbreakable"
> 64-bit DES variant was later cracked as well.
>         The post-postscript is an apocryphal story I personally got from
> an Israeli communications tech and minor spook.  He claimed that DES was
> broken by the cryptanalytic arm of Israeli intelligence _in two hours_.
>         It is relatively certain that a DES-encrypted cyphertext can be
> easily decrypted by well-equipped agencies.  Whether decryption is now
> trivially accomplished by private parties is another question.
> 
>         JN
Now this is just hearsay with no basis in fact, only rumor.
It remains that DES's only real "weakness", is that a major corporation,
sparing no expense, can have many massively-parallel machines at their
disposal, and do an exhaustive search of the key space.  Which is just
to state the obvious, that as computing speed increases, the amount of time
to do an exhaustive search decreases.  This has nothing to do with crypto-
graphic weaknesses in DES, as you're suggesting.
If you're not just some NSA-paranoid wacko, reference some papers to back
up your claims.  Otherwise, you're just another NSA-conspiracy theorist,
and part of the noise.  We're all capable of suspecting underhandedness
on the part of the NSA, but when you start misrepresenting your opinions
as fact, you're being nonconstructive. 
It would be of interest to all cypherpunks to be kept abreast of the academic
research being done in this area, and someone may wish to post a list of
recommended papers to read on developments in cryptographic weaknesses.





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Marc Horowitz <marc@MIT.EDU>
Date: Fri, 26 Feb 93 11:28:46 PST
To: Hal <74076.1041@CompuServe.COM>
Subject: Re: more ideas on anonymity
In-Reply-To: <930226173222_74076.1041_DHJ72-1@CompuServe.COM>
Message-ID: <9302261927.AA06725@tla.MIT.EDU>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


All of Hal's quesions are excellent, but I'm afraid he's asking the
wrong people.  The people we should be asking are people like Rick
Adams and Bill Schraeder, since utimately, it is people like them who
decide whether or not to sell their service to any given site in the
face of unpopular activites.  If any of you actually buy network
service from these guys, drop them a note and ask!

		Marc




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: mccoy@ccwf.cc.utexas.edu (Jim McCoy)
Date: Fri, 26 Feb 93 13:00:41 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: more ideas on anonymity
In-Reply-To: <199302261159.AA19219@well.sf.ca.us>
Message-ID: <9302262059.AA25682@tramp.cc.utexas.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text


George A. Gleason <gg@well.sf.ca.us> writes:
> 
> John, I missed where I might have been advocating censorship...
[...]
> 
> Okay, maybe your point hinges on the "advocating violent acts" item.  Well
> this is a pretty tight issue: hard to differentiate between someone
> advocating insurrection, advocating race war, and advocating going out in
> your own neighborhood and killing (whoever).  Either way it is advocacy of
> violence against someone. [...]

In the U.S. at least, there is nothing illegal about advocating race war or
violence against groups and classifications of members of society.  What
is illegal is inciting others to violent acts against a specific person or
target.  Saying "Kill all WASPs!" is not illegal, but saying "Kill John
Doe!" could get you arrested.   

You are treading a thin line (and I would say have passed onto the wrong
side....) if you begin establishing policy such that a particular group or
set of beliefs is denied access without justification, but just because
"they are X."  If you try to censor the communications of those who you
despise then you are no better than they are... 

jim



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: rubin@citi.umich.edu
Date: Fri, 26 Feb 93 12:14:25 PST
To: hkhenson@cup.portal.com
Subject: Re: DES
In-Reply-To: <9302261100.2.21205@cup.portal.com>
Message-ID: <9302262014.AA00768@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> My take on breaking DES would be to just try all 2**56th keys on a 
> massively parallel machine, though there may be better approaches.
> Keith

This isn't breaking DES. The best any encryption scheme can hope
for is to only be broken by exhaustive search.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Date: Fri, 26 Feb 93 16:59:15 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: What We Need to Censor
Message-ID: <9302270057.AA04000@netcom.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I, too, am disturbed and worried by the abuses and politically incorrect
postings being sent through anonymous remailers, so I support the calls by
some on this list for censorship of various "bad" postings. 

Topics for banning:

- hatred, such as the hatred some have for particular operating systems
(unless the hatred is for DOS, which is justifiable, and hence acceptable).

- advocacy of violence, which is why postings about Rambo movies and
various porno movies (violence against women, don't you know?) need to be
blocked by remailers. "Women Against Pornography" will be happy to instruct
us on what media materials are acceptable and what are not. Jesse Helms,
who is working closely with Andrea Dworkin and other feminists, will be
happy to provide a list of banned topics.

- this ban on advocating violence will also of course cover discussions of
the Mideast, Bosnia, and the student uprisings in China several years ago
(there was a lot of advocacy of violence then--can't have a repeat of
that!). Let's all chant: "Hey Ho, Hi Ho, "rec.guns" has got to go."

- ethnic slurs and advocacy of racial superiority (unless it involves the
heartfelt calls for action by our oppressed African-American brothers and
sisters, who have every right to call us honkies and advocate burning down
our cities--we just can't tolerate those who call themselves
"Aryan-Americans").

- advocacy of illegal acts, including nearly all postings to alt.drugs,
alt.sex.children, talk.bizarre, and sci.crypt.underground. Come to think of
it, perhaps those groups should just be shut down?

- anonymous phone calls apparently are possible...perhaps we can require
all phone calls go through government-cleared operators? And I have even
heard that anonymous letters--even threats, blackmail (wonder where _that_
name came from?), pornography, and extortion demands--are possible using
the U.S. mail system! How can this be? What can we do? I know, let's censor
the mail system the same way we plan to censor the Net!

So, you anarchists, let's implement these bans on what goes through remailers!

One small problem: how can we do this when everyone's a remailer? When
multiple routes exist? When sites are in many countries?

Hmmmhhh...perhaps we censors just need to shut down the nets and stop all
this loose talk.

-Tim, applying for a job as a Usenet censor



--
Timothy C. May               | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,  
tcmay@netcom.com        | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
408-688-5409               | knowledge, reputations, information markets, 
W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA       | black markets, collapse of governments.
Higher Power: 2^756839 | Public Key: MailSafe and PGP available.





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Brad Huntting <huntting@glarp.com>
Date: Fri, 26 Feb 93 17:36:21 PST
To: hkhenson@cup.portal.com
Subject: Re: DES
In-Reply-To: <9302261100.2.21205@cup.portal.com>
Message-ID: <199302270134.AA07742@misc.glarp.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



> My take on breaking DES would be to just try all 2**56th keys on a 
> massively parallel machine, though there may be better approaches.

A massively parallel colection of dedicated DES encryption hardware
might be more cost effective if had alot of these things to crack.

Speaking of which, does anyone know who makes "the DES chip" (is
there more than one?)? I'd like to find a data sheet for it.


brad




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@Athena.MIT.EDU>
Date: Fri, 26 Feb 93 16:05:42 PST
To: gnu@toad.com
Subject: Re: more ideas on anonymity
In-Reply-To: <9302261101.AA18976@toad.com>
Message-ID: <9302270004.AA06652@SOS>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


   From: gnu@toad.com (John Gilmore)
   Date: Fri, 26 Feb 93 03:01:53 -0800

   Squabbling over what "crimes" or "antisocial acts" should disqualify one
   from being able to use anonymity is ***WAY*** missing the point.  It is
   the people who have crossed one of those lines who need the protection the
   most!  

It is perhaps tempting to say that people committing antisocial acts and
crimes should be protected, if the image that comes to your mind is the
courageeous freedom fighter.  On the other hand, it behooves us all to
remember that "protecting criminals" also includes protecting the people
who threaten rape, murder or other violence.  

It may be the case that in order to protect the "freedom fighter", we
must also strike down the laws that protect us from the "axe murderer".
But we must make this choice consciously.  It is silly and stupid of us
to be obsessed with protecting ourselves from the axe murderer, that we
we are also surpressing basic freedomes.  At the same time, however, we
must not wax over-romantic thinking about the plight of the "freedom
fighter", of the "angry young man", without remembering that there are
also some really nasty people out there.

While anonymity has its features, we would do well to acknowledge that
it also has its dark side.  That people may hide behind a remailer, and
send hateful, petting, harrassing things that they might otherwise not
say if they actually had to take personal responsibility for their
actions.   Keep in mind that part of the mystique of the "freedom
fighter", who takes on the government in his/her selfless task of
Democracy and the American Way, is his courage and his willingness to
take personal risk and personal injury in his Quest For the Right.

Would we have the same respect for a coward who evades his personal
responsibility by sending petty, hateful mail through a remailer; who
breaks laws that he/she thinks are unjust, but is unwilling to face the
consequences of breaking said laws?  Remember, a big part of civil
disobedience is the willingness to be arrested.

						- Ted




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: John.Nieder@f33.n125.z1.FIDONET.ORG (John Nieder)
Date: Sat, 27 Feb 93 07:19:45 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: DES
Message-ID: <5085.2B8EFE60@fidogate.FIDONET.ORG>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



 * Reply to msg originally in Cypherpunks         <INET>

 phiber@eff.org (Phiber Optik) writes:

 BK> Slow down.  Firstly, DES encrypts a 64-bit block with a 56-bit key.
 BK> Are you talking about key lengths?

Yes.

 BK> It was originally proposed to use a
 BK> 128-bit key space, alla IBM's LUCIFER.  But they opted on the smaller
 BK> key, which fuels this NSA conspiracy theory.

As was their reaction to Hellman's proposal for a 64-bit key and any
other proposed out-of-house improvement at that time.

 BK> Saying that Hellman "broke" anything is a bit
 BK> strong.  I remember reading a published paper, I believe by Hellman and
 BK> one other, describing that they were able to WEAKEN DES (with a smaller
 BK> key space for their experiment), using a statistical approach, and that
 BK> this could possibly be applied to the DES standard.

I refer you to Warren on this.  It was my understanding of the article
that Hellman had actually decrypted DES cyphertext prepared with the
then-proposed 54-bit key standard.
 
 BK> If you're not just some NSA-paranoid wacko,
 BK> reference some papers to back up your claims.  Otherwise, you're just
 BK> another NSA-conspiracy theorist, and part of the noise.

Please, there's no need for abuse here.  I was referring to a published
column by Jim Warren of the Electronic Frontiers Foundation in
_MicroTimes_, a Bay Area computer paper.  I do not know if you consider
Warren or the EFF to be reputable.  I assumed Warren's statements were
factual.  The assertion that Israeli intelligence made short work of DES
was presented as I got it - an interesting rumor from someone who has
been a fairly-reliable source of information in the past.

 BK> We're all
 BK> capable of suspecting underhandedness on the part of the NSA, but when
 BK> you start misrepresenting your opinions as fact, you're being
 BK> nonconstructive.

I was merely relating published assertions by the EFF.  If you believe
these to be incorrect, then I'd advise you to take the issue up with
Warren.  I have no "opinion" in the matter, only suspicions.  A great
many people with academic background superior to mine also share these.
My own background is in applied rather than theoretical security.  I
defer to academics in academic matters, but know that in matters of top
security it is difficult to invest confidence in any mechanism as mired
in continuing controversy as DES.  That's all.

        JN
        

... "Oceania, 'tis for thee..."
--- Blue Wave/Opus v2.12 [NR]
--  
John Nieder - via FidoNet node 1:125/555
    UUCP - ...!uunet!hoptoad!kumr!fidogate!33!John.Nieder
INTERNET - John.Nieder@f33.n125.z1.FIDONET.ORG




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: root@rmsdell.ftl.fl.us (Yanek Martinson)
Date: Fri, 26 Feb 93 18:42:34 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: DES chips
Message-ID: <m0nSHSH-0002xnC@rmsdell.ftl.fl.us>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> Speaking of which, does anyone know who makes "the DES chip" (is
> there more than one?)? I'd like to find a data sheet for it.

There's no such thing as "the DES chip".

"Since publishing the Data Encryption Standard, NBS has validated 45
(as of May 7, 1991) hardware and firmware implementations.
Approximately three implementations are validated each year.  The list
of companies with validated chips is quite varied.  It contains very
small companies as well as many of the large U.S. electronics
corporations.  The implementations range from firmware programmable
read-only memories (PROMs), which implement only the basic DES
algorithm, to electronic chips that provide several different modes of
operation running at speeds up to 45 million bits per second."

...

"Hardware implementations of DES are widely available in the United
States at prices under $100; DES encryption boards that can encrypt
stored and transmitted data in a personal computer are available for
under $1000; and stand-alone encryption units may be purchased for
under $3000."

(This is from "The Data Encryption Standard, Past and Future" by Miles
Smid and Dennis Branstad, first appeared in Proceedings of the IEEE,
vol. 76, no. 5, May 1988)

I'm sure that since this was written the number of implementations has
increased, the prices decreased, and the speeds increased.

--
Yanek Martinson
yanek@novavax.nova.edu





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Hal <74076.1041@CompuServe.COM>
Date: Fri, 26 Feb 93 20:38:18 PST
To: <cypherpunks@toad.com>
Subject: Re: more ideas on anonymity
Message-ID: <930227024147_74076.1041_DHJ57-1@CompuServe.COM>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Ted Ts'o is right that anonymity can be used for many harmful purposes.  
On the other hand, as Tim May suggests, attempts to control the flow of 
information can easily lead to restrictions which do more harm than what 
they try to prevent.
 
Although I assume that most people here share a commitment to the 
overall goals of what Tim calls "crypto anarchy", it's possible that we 
all have different reasons for our support.  My own angle is that these 
techniques enhance privacy and provide power to individuals which can 
counterbalance the influence and authority of large institutions.  I've 
been influenced in this mostly by the papers of David Chaum.  For me, 
crypto anarchy is a way to oppose the constantly growing databases of 
information about each person, a way for individuals to take control of 
information about their own lives.
 
This is why I like one particular justification for anonymous posting 
that I read, that people should be free to choose for themselves how 
much information to reveal when they post.  I worry that, although the 
networks are in their infancy today, there may come a time when all 
information ever posted to Usenet is online, accessible, and searchable 
in a few seconds.  The posters' email addresses may be cross-linked to 
their current names and addresses.  Anything you post today may come 
back twenty years from now to haunt you.  (Already, the archives are 
being kept, so all that is needed is technological improvements to put 
the information on-line and allow that huge volume of data to be 
usefully searched.)
 
Now, you may say, so what, 99% of what is posted on Usenet couldn't 
possibly interest anyone anyway, and besides, I'm not posting anything 
anyone would care about.  This may be true, but think about how much you 
reveal about yourself over a period of time if you are an active poster.  
Imagine all of that information being available to every potential 
employer or new neighbor.  Imagine trying to run for public office!  I 
simply don't like the idea of everyone I meet potentially knowing my 
hobbies, interests, political affiliations, sexual preferences, and so 
on.
 
These same considerations apply in many other areas of our lives.  
Financial transactions can supply a lot of the same information.  So can 
phone records.  Perhaps someday our cars will be tracked routinely to 
collect information about where we go.
 
Uncomfortable as I may be with personal and private facts being used by 
marketers and employers to evaluate me, there is also the possibility of 
even more sinister uses.  Imagine how a dictatorship could exploit this 
much detailed information about the daily lives of its subjects.  
Probably "that will never happen here" but the mere possibility should 
provide another reason to guard our privacy.
 
I imagine most people here agree with the thrust of these arguments, so 
I won't go on.  But the point is that anonymous/pseudonymous 
communications can provide real benefits to all members of society.  
It's not just a romantic attraction to bomb-throwing revolutionaries or 
an elitist desire to escape the clutching hands of the greedy masses 
whcih drives us.  I believe that the benefits that crypto anonymity can 
provide to society will clearly outweigh the problems.
 
Hal Finney
74076.1041@compuserve.com





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: edgar@spectrx.saigon.com (Edgar W. Swank)
Date: Sun, 28 Feb 93 16:44:46 PST
To: Cypherpunks          <cypherpunks@toad.com>
Subject: Re: anon.penet.fi hacking
Message-ID: <DR9LZB7w165w@spectrx.saigon.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


On Feb 23, Hal said:

    Unless Eli's suggestion works - having our remailers put out a
    random "From:"  line (perhaps just on mail to Penet?)  might cause
    Penet to issue a new pseudonym for that apparent new user.  This
    would be kind of wasteful from Penet's perspective - all those
    pseudonyms are never going to be re-used.  But it might allow this
    form of chaining, without compromising the pseudonym of the
    remailer operator.

I would be cautious about a random "From:" line.  I think penet will
probably reject input that at least has does not have a valid (but not
necessarily truthful) return address.

For a while, Miron Cuperman's wimsey remailer was generating a bogus
From address, something like "yeltsy@kremlin.vax.ru".  I tried
chaining this to penet to post to newsgroups, but my anonymous
messages never appeared in the newsgroups.  This was because,
I think, penet sends a confirmation back to the sender. Since
"kremlin.vax" is not in penet's net tables, this would cause
the confirmation send to fail; my hypothesis is that this also
causes the newsgroup post at penet to fail.

One good From address to generate, at least for wimsey, would be

        pool0@extropia.wimsey.com

but you would need to add some boilerplate explaining to the
recipient that "pool0" is a group address and a return message may
be seen by up to (number? 10-100?) persons unless it is encrypted.

Wimsey could also establish its own penet password and automatically
insert it whenever it detected a "to" address ending in penet.fi.

It could also substitute the penet anonxxxx address for "pool0" in the
above boilerplate. This would allow a penet return to pool0. Note that
I don't mind too much if people know that they can reach Edgar Swank
through pool0, because pool0 is also an address for many other people,
so I can "plausibly deny" that any particular message addressed to
pool0 is for me.

I'd like to point out that so far the wimsey remailer is the only
useful remailer from my point of view because it's the only one
which allows me to delete the automatic sig.  This is because it
only forwards encrypted text and discards any appended unencrypted
text.

The other remailers were supposed to add a "kill line" to do the
same thing, but as far as I know this never happened.

--
edgar@spectrx.saigon.com (Edgar W. Swank)
SPECTROX SYSTEMS +1.408.252.1005  Silicon Valley, Ca





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: root@rmsdell.ftl.fl.us (Yanek Martinson)
Date: Fri, 26 Feb 93 19:44:49 PST
To: ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu
Subject: timestamps and signatures
Message-ID: <m0nSIOf-00030IC@rmsdell.ftl.fl.us>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> ||use electronic ... public-key signatures, the kind that make it impossible
> ||for one to deny having signed something.                ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
> ||^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
> | Nice theory, but too simple.
> | I can always deny signing something by claiming that my private key was
> | compromised.  I can even deliberately let it be known, if it's important
> There's some very nice work by two people at Bell Labs (whose names I can't

One of them is Stuart Haber (stuart@bellcore.com)

> unforgeable digital timestamps.  This is a much trickier problem than it firs
> appears to be, but they have a nice solution.  

It's not too complicated.  Basically, what you do is produce a hash
of your text, and publish it widely in a medium that is being
archived, and likely to be accessible and authenticable at a later
time, for example by posting it in a classified ad in a large
newspaper.

Later, when verifying the timestamp one can get a copy of that
newspaper from a library (or from several libraries, for greater
security) and compare the published hash with that of the text.

For greater efficiency, there's a simple way to combine a lot of
messages and produce only one hash which is published.  The
information you get back and store as a part of the timestamp is
enough to prove that this particular hash was one of the many combined
to produce the published value.

This system is actually operating, look in any Sunday New York Times
in the Business Classifieds.


> Given timestamps, we can then require that messages be not just
> signed but dated.  If my key becomes compromised, I revoke all
> my signatures from some time on.  By looking at the timestamp
> that goes with the signature, we can determine whether it was
> created before or after the compromise, and discard it if "after".

Once can always claim that they "just found out" that their key
has been compromised a year ago, and so deny having signed that
signature.


--
Yanek Martinson
yanek@novavax.nova.edu



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Phiber Optik <phiber@eff.org>
Date: Fri, 26 Feb 93 20:31:22 PST
To: huntting@glarp.com (Brad Huntting)
Subject: Re: DES
In-Reply-To: <199302270134.AA07742@misc.glarp.com>
Message-ID: <199302270428.AA02963@eff.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> 
> 
> > My take on breaking DES would be to just try all 2**56th keys on a 
> > massively parallel machine, though there may be better approaches.
> 
> A massively parallel colection of dedicated DES encryption hardware
> might be more cost effective if had alot of these things to crack.
> 
> Speaking of which, does anyone know who makes "the DES chip" (is
> there more than one?)? I'd like to find a data sheet for it.
> 
> 
> brad
> 

Many manufacturers make DES chips.  One that comes to mind is American Micro
Devices, though I don't remember a part number off hand.  I can find out and
post it to the list.  I do remember reading the data sheet, and it looked
like a nice implementation.  If I'm not mistaken, Motorola makes one as well,
though it may have been obsoleted by improvements in speed.





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Jay Prime Positive <jpp@markv.com>
Date: Sat, 27 Feb 93 01:01:40 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: more ideas on anonymity
In-Reply-To: <9302270004.AA06652@SOS>
Message-ID: <9302270059.aa04036@hermix.markv.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


  Umm.. Isn't all this talk about anonymous remail abuse really beging
for an pseudonymous/anonymous certificate service?

j'




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Marc Horowitz <marc@Athena.MIT.EDU>
Date: Fri, 26 Feb 93 22:17:19 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Biham and Shamir on cracking DES
Message-ID: <9302270616.AA21786@milquetoast.MIT.EDU>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



This is, I believe, the state of the art in published techniques to
break DES.  Note that this attack is basically useless against
one-time or short-lived keys, since there's no chance to make repeated
chosen plaintext attacks against the key.

Short form:  If you can get me to encrypt 2**37 plaintexts *of* *your*
*choice* against my key, you can crack it.

		Marc

This info is forwarded from a friend.

Eli Biham and Adi Shamir, "Differential Cryptanalysis of the full
16-round DES," December 19, 1991.  

The paper was announced in Dec. '91 on the net, and paper copies
circulated from people who had gotten copies directly from Biham &
Shamir.  The paper was submitted to Crypto '92 and presented there on
August 20, 1992.  The Crypto '92 proceedings will be published by
Springer-Verlag at some point, so you could also reference it this
way:

{\sl E.~Biham and A.~Shamir}, Differential Cryptanalysis of the full
16-round DES, {\sl Advances in Cryptology: Proceedings of Crypto '92},
E.~Brickell, ed., {\sl Lecture Notes in Computer Science},
Springer-Verlag, New York, to appear.

Biham is at Technion - Israel Inst. of Tech.
Shamir is at Weizmann Inst. of Science.

I don't know of an FTP site where the paper is available.  




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: George A. Gleason <gg@well.sf.ca.us>
Date: Sat, 27 Feb 93 04:01:42 PST
To: mccoy@ccwf.cc.utexas.edu
Subject: Re: more ideas on anonymity
Message-ID: <199302271158.AA29653@well.sf.ca.us>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I agree with Jim that I may be treading a thin line on censorship, but
consider the following: someone posts a series of inflammatory statements
with the intent of stirring up trouble, attracts a following, and starts
organising them for some kind of violence.  Then one day along comes a
message to start the race war or whatever.  The next day there are a bunch
of random acts of violence.  Uh-oh...

The point is that this is a broadcast medium, though without the limitations
of conventional broadcast.  I think we may end up facing these issues one
way or another, sooner or later.  Hopefully, LE can prevent violent acts by
conventional means without resorting to limiting privacy.  

The thing is though, given the increasing cultural diversity in society and
its resulting flattening of the normal curve of acceptable behavior, we're
more and more going to be facing issues which are located in the depths of
murky gray areas and in which we may find ourselves needing to tread fine
lines, split hairs, and make all kinds of distinctions where there are no
firm certainties.  (run-on sentence alert!)  

-gg




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: deltorto@aol.com
Date: Sat, 27 Feb 93 04:49:08 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Real World Kinda Guys Unite
Message-ID: <9302270749.tn34786@aol.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>>Hal
>>
>>P.S. How about Deadbeat posting a public key?  He keeps signing his
>>messages but I can't check them.

Yeah. How 'bout that, 'Beat? At _least_ we'd have the false security of being
able to check your Pkey now and then...

I feel full of Piss and Vinegar, so I'm volunteering to help get this
WhistleBlowers thingus up and rolling.

First, we need to disseminate PGP in it's various forms (UNIX, Amiga, Mac,
DOS, etc) to some news agencies (e.g. TV stations, newspapers, radio like
KQED, etc.). I need each person who represents a platform to send me a full
package of PGP with Docs that I can have duped for mailing (for educational
purposes only). No charge. We'll begin with a core group of media people and
see how it goes. I have floated a few trial balloons and they're ready to
bite. I suspect that we'll see it take off like a rocket, as Tim May
suggested.

All this discussion is truly fascinating, but if it doesn't get out into the
real world it ain't worth the media it's magnetized on. I guess I'm just a
real world kinda guy.

1. Let's get a reasonably friendly anon remailer process going for them. It
*must* come with complete instructions for the hapless many. Get writing and
send 'em to me. I am working on some simple instructions for MacPGP and will
post an example as soon as I can get through all the damn mail in my various
mboxes. (Overload!)

2. Let's hook some Govt. employees into it ASAP and really get this
whistleblowing thing going. I want to stir up some mud at the bottom like
Kelly suggests and I want it done NOW.

3. I need help from ALL of you to do this. I am beginning to compile a
comprehensive list of Govt Officials from the White House on down thru the
Congress to the Cabinet and the Joint Chiefs. This database will include
their various addresses (USM and email), their many phone and fax numbers,
and other pertinent info (party, salary, etc.). Anyone can have a copy when I
finish it. I hope to make it fairly administration-independent so it will
last and will probably set up a process on CompuServe so that public can send
in updates as officials are un-appointed, die and/or are voted out of office,
etc.

4. Eventually, we'll do an anonymous posting to a massive number of Govt
sites inviting WBlowers to post to the list and inviting Press people to log
on and download the dirt.

I will be at the Modern Times bookstore event on March 7th in San Francisco
if anyone wants to discuss this. I would also dearly like to attend CFP, but
I haven't yet found a way to do it without money (anyone who knows a way I
can volunteer my way in and help out please say so - I'll sweep up after,
anything...).

  d2t





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Johan Helsingius <julf@penet.FI>
Date: Sat, 27 Feb 93 07:13:52 PST
To: "Timothy C. May" <tcmay@netcom.com>
Subject: Re: What We Need to Censor
In-Reply-To: <9302270057.AA04000@netcom.netcom.com>
Message-ID: <9302270942.aa21741@penet.penet.FI>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



> So, you anarchists, let's implement these bans on what goes through remailers!
> 
> One small problem: how can we do this when everyone's a remailer? When
> multiple routes exist? When sites are in many countries?

Er.. How about setting up net.interpol? A international net.police
co-operation agency?

> -Tim, applying for a job as a Usenet censor

Julf, dreaming of traveling all over the world shutting down sites as a
net.interpol undercover agent.... Way cool...





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Dave Banisar <banisar@washofc.cpsr.org>
Date: Sat, 27 Feb 93 07:38:09 PST
To: CYPHERPUNKS@toad.com
Subject: Hellman and DES
Message-ID: <9302271040.AA45880@hacker2.eff.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



I've talked to Martin Hellman quite a few times (he came to my last crypto 
conference and gave an overview of the field), he has never said that he 
could crack true DES. When DES first came out, he was one of the people most 
actively opposing the 56 bit key as being too small. At the time, he 
estimated that a machine of parallel processors could be built for $10M that 
would crack DES keys easily. DES at the time was only supposed to be for 10 
years and then a new system was supposed to replace it.

Today, he advocates for security that you triple-DES your 
communications/files.

At last word (and I may have missed any advancements in the flame wars on 
sci.crypt), Shamir and Biham had cracked up to 2^^46, thats still quite a 
ways computationally from 2^^56.

Dave






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Eric Hughes <hughes@soda.berkeley.edu>
Date: Sat, 27 Feb 93 11:33:57 PST
To: cypherpunks-announce@toad.com
Subject: March 13 cypherpunks meeting
Message-ID: <9302271922.AA00053@soda.berkeley.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Announcing:  The First Annual Post-CFP cypherpunks meeting.

The next physical meeting of cypherpunks will be March 13, 1993, at
the usual time, noon, in the usual place, Cygnus Support Offices.

This is one day after CFP-93, the third Conference on Computers,
Freedom, and Privacy.  CFP is an increasingly important conference
concerning an only slightly broader spectrum of privacy issues than
are normally discussed on the cypherpunks list.  At the first CFP
conference I met David Chaum, who awakened a latent interest in
cryptography.  This awakening led indirectly to the formation of this
list.

There will be people from all over the country there.  We have set the
date of our meeting so that they could attend.  We are, in fact, going
to give out an open invitation there.

I would urge all of you who have been considering making a trek to
come to one of these meetings to do so this time.  And while I do not
expect Dorothy Denning to show up (although she would be welcome, if
uncomfortable), I do expect some surprises.  Please surprise me
yourself.  If you need a place to stay, ask on the list.  I myself am
already putting up some friends before the conference.

For that matter, I would urge all of you to come to the conference
itself.  If you can't afford to go, just remember that while the
sessions you have to pay for, the hotel bar you do not.  A word to the
wise is sufficient.

Thank you all.

Eric
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------

MEETING

Date: Saturday, 13 March 1993
Time: 12:00 noon
Where: Cygnus Support Offices, Mt. View, California


SCHEDULE

Meeting 12-6
Dinner 7-?


AGENDA

We have Arthur Abraham's talk on hash functions left over from last
time, which was interrupted by a photo shoot.  Scott Collins intimated
that he'd have more results on random numbers.

With the opportunity given to have so many people there, I'd suggest
that discussion of cryptographic infrastructure would be appropriate,
together with a goal setting session.

Please discuss this on the list.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------------

DIRECTIONS

	Cygnus Support
	1937 Landings Drive
	Mt. View, CA  94043
	+1 415 903 1400   switchboard
	+1 415 903 1418   John Gilmore

Take US 101 toward Mt. View.  From San Francisco, it's about a
40-minute drive.  Get off at the Rengstorff Ave/Amphitheatre Parkway
exit.  If you were heading south on 101, you curve around to the
right, cross over the freeway, and get to a stoplight.  If you were
heading north on 101, you just come right off the exit to the
stoplight.  The light is the intersection of Amphitheatre and
Charleston Rd.  Take a right on Charleston; there's a right-turn-only
lane.

Follow Charleston for a short distance.  You'll pass the
Metaphor/Kaleida buildings on the right.  At a clump of palm trees and
a "Landmark Deli" sign, take a right into Landings Drive.  At the end
of the road, turn left into the complex with the big concrete
"Landmark" sign.  Follow the road past the deli til you are in front
of the clock tower that rises out of one of the buildings, facing you.
Enter through the doors immediately under the clock tower.  They'll be
open between noon and 1PM at least.  (See below if you're late.)

Once inside, take the stairs up, immediately to your right.  At the top
of the stairs, turn right past the treetops, and we'll be in 1937 on 
your left.  The door is marked "Cygnus".

If you are late and the door under the clock tower is locked, you can
walk to the deli (which will be around the building on your left, as
you face the door).  Go through the gate in the fence to the right of
the deli, and into the back lawns between the complex and the farm
behind it.  Walk forward and right around the buildings until you see
a satellite dish in the lawn.  Go up the stairs next to the dish,
which are the back stairs into the Cygnus office space.  We'll prop
the door (or you can bang on it if we forget).

Or, you can find the guard who's wandering around the complex, who
knows there's a meeting happening and will let you in.  They can be
beeped at 965 5250, though you'll have trouble finding a phone.

Don't forget to eat first, or bring food at noon!  I recommend hitting
the burrito place on Rengstorff (La Costen~a) at about 11:45.  To get
there, when you get off 101, take Rengstorff (toward the hills) rather
than Amphitheatre (toward the bay).  Follow it about ten blocks until
the major intersection at Middlefield Road.  La Costen~a is the store
on your left at the corner.  You can turn left into the narrow lane
behind the store, which leads to a parking lot, and enter by the front
door, which faces the intersection.  To get to the meeting from there,
just retrace your route on Rengstorff, go straight over the freeway,
and turn right at the stoplight onto Charleston; see above.

See you there!

	John Gilmore






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Eric Hughes <hughes@soda.berkeley.edu>
Date: Sat, 27 Feb 93 12:11:00 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: more ideas on anonymity
In-Reply-To: <9302270059.aa04036@hermix.markv.com>
Message-ID: <9302272007.AA03400@soda.berkeley.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>  Umm.. Isn't all this talk about anonymous remail abuse really beging
>for an pseudonymous/anonymous certificate service?

Well, yes.

There has been a huge conflagration on the pem-dev list lately
concerning naming issues, X.500, etc.  I am somewhat disturbed by what
I see as a fundamental mentality of PEM: the desire to lift intact all
existing political, economic, and social relationships into the
electronic domain.

Naming is done in the ISO way, that is, subordinated to existing
national boundaries.  Individuals are expected to be registered in the
naming hierarchy.  Identities in the electronic world are expected to
map to entities in the real world.

Does this not seems fundamentally limiting to the potential of the
electronic world?

I agree with Tim that we have made good progress.  But we need more
than simple remailers.  We need people to use remailers, and we need
to make that easy to do.  We need key distribution mechanisms.  We
need better meeting spaces than mailing lists and Usenet newsgroups
and private mail.  We need markets and contracts.

If we wish to re-envision the world, we must do so while there is time
to implement it.  Let us proceed quickly.

Onward.

Eric






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Eric Hughes <hughes@soda.berkeley.edu>
Date: Sat, 27 Feb 93 12:44:52 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: more ideas on anonymity
In-Reply-To: <930227024147_74076.1041_DHJ57-1@CompuServe.COM>
Message-ID: <9302272041.AA05983@soda.berkeley.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Hal writes:
>For me, crypto anarchy is a way to oppose the constantly growing
>databases of information about each person, a way for individuals to
>take control of information about their own lives.

For many transactions, identity is not an issue fundamental to the
transaction.  If I pay cash to you for an item, I have not made any
implicit promise to pay you at a later date, as I have if I've paid
with credit (card or account).  Every obligation I might have to you I
have already fulfilled, fulfilled by paying cash.  My name is not
relevant here.

If I perform some service for you, and you acknowledge that the
service is complete as performed, then you have no need for my
identity.  (As far as the two of us are concerned.  Other parties
intrude on this interaction usually.)

Therefore, should not discrimination against anonymity when names are
not germane be considered (depending on one's ideology) unreasonable,
inefficient, coercive, intrusive, or illegal?

Eric




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Eric Hughes <hughes@soda.berkeley.edu>
Date: Sat, 27 Feb 93 13:02:53 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: more ideas on anonymity
In-Reply-To: <9302251959.AA02941@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Message-ID: <9302272059.AA07351@soda.berkeley.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>[...] and we might help some people and advance the cause by
>codifying `legitimate use'.

The only perfectly unambiguous position is that every use is a
legitimate use.

Eric




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: geoffw@nexsys.net (Geoff White)
Date: Sat, 27 Feb 93 13:15:50 PST
To: hughes@soda.berkeley.edu
Subject: Re: March 13 cypherpunks meeting
Message-ID: <9302272107.AA05936@nexsys.nexsys.net>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



I live in Mountain View about 2 miles from Cygnus
(a short drive or long walk) and can have a few people crash at my house.
I have lots of floor space But not many beds (I do have two sofas)
I think I can comfortably sleep 3 and sleep 5-6 in a pinch.

My address is 316 Escuela Ave. #62
		MTV CA.

I have an apartment not a house, It's clean but not lavish.
I do have a small internet so you can get e-mail and I'm one-hop
away from the Internet.  You don't have to pay me money but you do
have to buy your own food and bring your own supplies.  No smoking
in the house but you can smoke out on the balcony.

send me e-mail if you are interested.


-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
NEXUS SYSTEMS/CYBERTRIBE-5	
Editor/Instigator/Catalyst : Geoff White <geoffw@nexsys.net>
Production Crew		   : Universal Movement Trinity <umt@nexsys.net>

		--PGP Public key available upon request--
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Eric Hughes <hughes@soda.berkeley.edu>
Date: Sat, 27 Feb 93 13:18:50 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: dispatches from the front lines of anonymity
In-Reply-To: <9302240423.AA00434@orchard.medford.ma.us>
Message-ID: <9302272115.AA08914@soda.berkeley.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Re: alt.whistleblower moderation

I wrote:
>So every time a moderated group is created, every server already is
>"modified".

Bill writes:
>That's how it *should* work, not how it *does* work.  In real life,
>moderator addresses are distributed "out of band" to a relatively
>small number of "backbone" sites; all the rest of the sites merely
>forward the mail to a "backbone" site.

Well, we can weekly publish the submission address.  It would take
slightly more intelligence on the part of the would-be poster.

What are exactly the politics of propagating this moderator's address,
anyway?  Is it particularly difficult?  Is it automated?

Please advise.  alt.whistleblower, in addition to being a public good,
is a great way to raise hell.

Eric




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: mjr@netcom.com (Matthew Rapaport)
Date: Sat, 27 Feb 93 15:02:13 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: More ideas on anonymity
Message-ID: <9302272259.AA29137@netcom2.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


        Hal <74076.1041@CompuServe.COM> writes...
>I think the bottom line is that it will be difficult to provide
>anonymous/pseudonymous postings in a way which won't elicit the kinds of
>strong objections Johan has been facing.  His controls are OK for now,
>but in the long run I think they won't work.

This may be an example of an intractable problem. A case where
legitimate interests are mutually exclusive at least in practice of not
in theory.

If Johan has restricted output due to pressure from those communities,
then he has already been forced to hobble his service's most significant
*potential* benefit to the community. If a serious whistlblower were to
come along with some serious evidence and credibility, it is likely that
he/she would want to post his/her evidence in one or more of the groups
Johan has locked out! I mean no aspersion on Johan here, he is laboring
under pressure I'm sure, and he is a pioneer in all of this, and we are
sharing his experience. I don't mean to take political sides either,
both sides of the debate have legitimate arguments. In the one other
post I made on this topic before, I received but one reply remarking
that I "was preaching to the choir".

On the one hand, we have the principle of free speech and the right to
privacy and even anonymity if we so choose it. Taken in an unrestricted
way, this principle is rather radical (politically). True there are
areas of our social and political lives where a right to privacy and
anonymity are both desirable and generally accepted/practiced (these
vary of course in different parts of the world). But there are other
equally common areas in which they are not.

The strongest pressure against anonymity on the Usenet comes from
quarters where a strong positive pressure exists, on *principle* for
posters to "declare themselves", to "stand behind their words". In a
realm where egalitarianism, semi-anarchy, and bad signal/noise ratio
already make for a questionable mix or product value, "naming yourself"
is a significant benchmark. Even in these groups, most participants
would recognize the need for access to anonymity when it was really
"justified", but such cases are believed to be fairly few and far
between. as gg pointed out:

>The point is that this is a broadcast medium, though without the
>limitations of conventional broadcast.

The mutually exclusive nature of these principles emerges in practice
from what a former boss of mine called the human "ornery" factor. In
this case that some number of individuals will exercise their "right to
anonymity" not because they have to, but just because it's there.
Believe me I sympathize with this view. It keeps authorities and
would-be authorities on notice that there are those who will test the
limits of their rights and signal the rest of us if they are eroding. I
also accept Hal's argument that we are protecting ourselves from
possible future abuses of central authority. But I also sympathize with
the sentiments of the other side, that most of the time it is desirable
to put your name where your mouth/keyboard is. A consensual solution to
this problem depends on a common political viewpoint, something that is
certainly not in the cards for contemporary net participants. Of course
a solution may one day be "imposed", but that will not likely be to
anyone's liking. The likely direction of such an imposition is signaled
by what Dave Clunie experienced at PAX and what Johan is now
experiencing as well.

matthew rapaport     Philosopher/Programmer At Large      KD6KVH
           mjr@netcom.com     70371.255@compuserve.com




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: strat@intercon.com (Bob Stratton)
Date: Sat, 27 Feb 93 12:40:04 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: more ideas on anonymity
In-Reply-To: <9302272007.AA03400@soda.berkeley.edu>
Message-ID: <9302272038.AA04777@intercon.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>>>>> Eric Hughes <hughes@soda.berkeley.edu> writes:

	Eric> There has been a huge conflagration on the pem-dev list
	Eric> lately concerning naming issues, X.500, etc.  I am
	Eric> somewhat disturbed by what I see as a fundamental
	Eric> mentality of PEM: the desire to lift intact all existing
	Eric> political, economic, and social relationships into the
	Eric> electronic domain.

That doesn't surprise me in the least. There's a paradigm shift going
on in the networking community, but it's difficult to tell which way
it's going to land. The US, in have a very open, almost anarchic
protocol development process based highly in meritocracy, built
the core of the Internet while everyone else in the world was working
to start passing 128-byte X.25 packets, and trying to decide how much
to charge per packet.  

The unfortunate reality is that the same people overseas have found
the "golden goose", and are trying to figure out how to domesticate
it. The U.S. Government and the industry marketeers aren't helping,
either. I see a growing bureaucratization of the standards process
which may well not advance development much.

	Eric> ...Identities in the electronic world are expected to
	Eric> map to entities in the real world.

I think a lot of this is a combination of the "One lifetime phone
number would be great" phenomenon, and a lack of imagination regarding
pseudonymity. I think that we should start writing RFCs for any and
all applicable technologies and throwing them into the arena. At best,
we might get stellar contributions, at worst, we might slow down the
juggernaut that is the ISO.


	Eric> I agree with Tim that we have made good progress.  But
	Eric> we need more than simple remailers.  We need people to
	Eric> use remailers, and we need to make that easy to do.  We
	Eric> need key distribution mechanisms.  We need better
	Eric> meeting spaces than mailing lists and Usenet newsgroups
	Eric> and private mail.  We need markets and contracts.

I think that remailer authors should seriously consider spec'ing out
their technology and publishing RFC's as soon as possible. The
development of on-line markets seems to be one of the best-kept
secrets on the Net. I only know of a handful (if that) of companies
actively working on such things, but they're not known outside of
their own backyards.

Laissez faire,
---Strat





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: thug@phantom.com (Murdering Thug)
Date: Sat, 27 Feb 93 16:31:17 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: more ideas on anonymity
In-Reply-To: <9302272041.AA05983@soda.berkeley.edu>
Message-ID: <m0nSbit-000jr0C@phantom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Eric Hughes writes:
>
> For many transactions, identity is not an issue fundamental to the
> transaction.  If I pay cash to you for an item, I have not made any
> implicit promise to pay you at a later date, as I have if I've paid
> with credit (card or account).  Every obligation I might have to you I
> have already fulfilled, fulfilled by paying cash.  My name is not
> relevant here.
> 
> If I perform some service for you, and you acknowledge that the
> service is complete as performed, then you have no need for my
> identity.  (As far as the two of us are concerned.  Other parties
> intrude on this interaction usually.)
> 
> Therefore, should not discrimination against anonymity when names are
> not germane be considered (depending on one's ideology) unreasonable,
> inefficient, coercive, intrusive, or illegal?
> 

Try telling this to the person behind the counter when you're trying to rent
a car, rent a hotel room for the night, or rent a mailbox for 6 months.  Not
only do these people often ask for ID, but they get very upset if you're
not paying by credit card.  Discrimination against cash is widespread and
rampant.  Sure, if you bitch enough at them, and threaten to take them to
court, they might allow you to rent a hotel room without ID and paying in
cash.

The thing is, they never ask for ID if you're paying by credit card since
they assume the credit card is enough proof of who you are.  But as soon
as you start flashing some paper currency, they immediatly think that you're
up to no good and won't let you purchase their product/service without some
ID.  Hotels, airlines, and car rental companies are notorious for doing this,
especially if they think you're under 21. 

This brings up the question of using False ID when conducting perfectly legal
transactions, in order to preserve one's privacy.  Can anyone reading this
list with a legal background answer whether this is legal or not?  I am under
the, perhaps erroneous, assumption that it is illegal to use false ID only
when committing a crime (ie: purchasing alcahol while underage, renting a
mail drop specifically for use in mail fraud, gaining admission to private
property using false ID (trespassing)).  However, is it illegal to use
false ID in order to conduct perfectly legal transactions in order to
preserve privacy/anonymity?  How about it, any of you guys associated with
the CPSR, EFF, or ACLU, can you answer this one?


Murdering Thug




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu
Date: Sat, 27 Feb 93 19:00:25 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: A Modest Proposal
In-Reply-To: <9302272059.AA07351@soda.berkeley.edu>
Message-ID: <9302280259.AA20523@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


me:
>[...] and we might help some people and advance the cause by
>codifying `legitimate use'.

Eric Hughes <hughes@soda.berkeley.edu>
>The only perfectly unambiguous position is that every use is a
>legitimate use.

Once again I'm very seriously disturbed at the sentiments presented by
some eminent members of this list.  I believe in free speech perhaps as
rabidly as the next guy, but many of the most rabid advocates recognize
that there are limitations on `freedom'.  Everyone, please take the
following remarks impersonally but seriously.

Let me be very clear about this: I'm highly committed to pseudonymity
and anonymity as new, revolutionary social tools. However, completely
unrestrained anonymity (which, by the way, is related to but not
equivalent to freedom of speech) is unworkable and extremely dangerous
to *everybody* (not just corrupt government officials or big businesses
that were so ignorant they didn't hire you). Anybody here that thinks
that an anonymous service can act something like a Unix pipe that just
passes the raw stuff through forever unhindered and uninterrupted is
seriously deluding himself. Whoever does is ultimately discrediting and
detrimental to the cause itself.  If you think the problem is
exclusively because of self-appointed puritannical `censors' on the net
(which, I admit, exist), you are *wrong*. It gives me great anguish,
dread and fear to read of `limitation' of anonymity misguidedly
satirized as nothing but brutish censorship.

You can submit and agree to some minor and essential self-regulating
mechanisms, such as barring illegal and unrepetant users, `convicted'
email addresses circulated among anonymous server operators
voluntarily, a complaint-and-response system, perhaps even automated,
etc. Or you can call it all the most obnoxious and insidious stab at
your true God-given freedoms ever to ooze out of the sewer. But one
exemplary and commendable somebody who posts here and has committed
superhuman energy and dedication and commitment to the ideal of
anonymity for the Usenet masses, running a server TODAY, recognizes
that certain basic limitations are unpalatable but NECESSARY and
CRUCIAL. And if you don't sufficiently protect yourselves (and
unrestrained anonymity transfers to operators the most supreme exposure
and vulnerability) you will inevitably be rudely, shockingly surprised
at your liability and loss.

``Be careful what you wish for, you might get it.'' Everybody here that
thinks anarchy is kinda neato should reconsider.  By one meaning of
anarchy, at least, you cannot have even the most basic of conveniences
you have taken for granted, e.g. longtime social contacts or clothes,
food, privacy, or whatever (and you'll not easily convince me there are
more appealing variations thereof). Enclosed, an essay by a friend of mine...



WHY DIGITAL ANONYMITY SHOULD BE UNRESTRICTED
by D. Lewdud

I want net anonymity to be completely unrestrained, and anybody who
thinks otherwise is an unAmerican communist censor sleazebag Puritan
prude spy who should be ruthlessly exposed and stoned for the sheer
criminality of their ideas. 

I happen to like it when the Usenet groups I'm reading have a lot of
irrelevant junk, with the signal-to-noise ratio approaching absolute
zero.  Anonymity is great for vicious flame wars and haranging
diatribes, but anonymously posted binary files in science groups are
the best, especially if they are posted multiple times and take many
megabytes. In fact, if they crash my newsserver, that's even better. It
gives me an enviable vacation during which I can look forward to the
next assault and relish the inspiring poetry of it all.  But then the
narrowminded ignoramuses talk about shutting down some system or
excluding some users, depriving me of my sheer joy.

All this idiotic drivel about pornography and copyright violations
sanctioned by taxpayer money. OF COURSE!  That's everyone's right, to
exploit all that gushing money in our government--that's why it's
there.  Clearly our corrupted officials don't know what to do with it
besides pocket it.  Why, if some bloated bureacrat misses his snack of
caviar to subsidize this lovely GIF specimen, this masterpiece of
nudity spread before me lasciviously, posted by some exemplary
anonymous user, that's one small favor for humanity and a giant drool
for me.  Wow, think of what we could achieve and accomplish if we
completely dismantled the NSA, the FBI, the CIA, and my local pig
trough!  (Ah, but not everybody objects to pornography, so maybe I'm
preaching to the choir on that one.)

I want to be able to get mailbombed with regularity, I like it when my
system goes down and I am helpless and the cruel butt of other's jokes.
Its fun! Esp. when I know where the mail is originating from, but the
operator makes eloquent, impassioned, and irate speeches against
stopping the flow based on Constitutional rights. I've started a
collection of all the neat stuff I've received (millions of lines of
exquisite profanity and threats), and to make room for it have gotten
rid of all the other junk on my account like mail from my friends and
family and my previously-favorite programs, which pale in comparison to
records of the heights of eloquence of my tormentors. To think that
others pay for this gives me great pangs of ecstasy.

I paid good money for all my hardware, and my network connection is my
pride and joy, and finaly I'm getting a return on my serious
investment. Why, I'm so happy I'm going to buy another new computer to
replace the last three that have crashed. Rather than put in the many
hours required to repair them (which would definitely be gleeful), I've
decided they'll go up on my mantle as monumental testaments to the
grandeur of the great anonymous feats of humanity.

I want to see illegal, sinister, and evil groups like the Mafia to
flourish, using new technology like networks to perpetrate their
patriotic services.  The net is such a close-knit set of orderly people
and upstanding citizens, I'm sure they'll love to join the party. I
want them to be able to terrorize me without consequence. Anybody who
objects clearly is wholly ignorant of the beautiful social implications
wrought by this wonderful technological innovation, a blind mute living
in a black and white closet and a zealot of thin line-drawing. 

Although I haven't personally yet had the great joy of this, I can't
wait to receive an anonymous death threat or ransom notice via email,
possibly even directed at a close relative or loved-one. In fact, I'm
saving up as much digital money as possible right now for exactly this
eventuality.  Its my digital insurance fund.  That this can all be
completely untraceable with anonymity, well that's something as
exhilarating as a quivering digital orgasm.

Imagine the splendor of delivering an anonymous note to the mayor of
New York and the world that in 15 minutes a large chunk under a large
building, a symbol of international unity, will be conveniently
rearranged, at only minor risk to nearby inhabitants!  Wow, this could
really advance the cause of establishing a vast electronic
infrastructure for promoting all the splendid possibilities of digital
anonymity. Considering what's happened to the country's `real'
infrastructure, we need another! If the assurance of anonymity was
absolute, it would really encourage everyone to find similarly noble
uses of their own.

Don't get me wrong.  I'm totally free of bias for and prejudice against
various uses of anonymity (anything less, of course, would be fascist
totalitarianism).  For example, I like individual terrorists just as
much as the organized collections.  They sound like they could be
really completely uninhibited in their creative grasps of our true
freedoms, and more numerous with their stellar utilizations.  In fact,
the potential for individual, unassociated citizens to thwart the
abuses, and profoundly destabilize the foundations of frigid, faceless
bureacracies like big telephone companies, and even the government, I
find spine-tinglingly majestic---it even looks like this could soon
happen.  Imagine: nothing left but pure, omnipresent cyberspace!




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Date: Sat, 27 Feb 93 21:10:31 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Censorpunks Demand Action Against "D. Lewdud"
Message-ID: <9302280508.AA08174@netcom.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



The "Censorpunks" now demand that action be taken against the rantings of
one "D. Lewdud," an apparent newcomer to this list! His calls for complete
anonymity and even anarchy are dangerous and impermissable. He writes:

>WHY DIGITAL ANONYMITY SHOULD BE UNRESTRICTED
>by D. Lewdud
>
>I want net anonymity to be completely unrestrained, and anybody who
>thinks otherwise is an unAmerican communist censor sleazebag Puritan
>prude spy who should be ruthlessly exposed and stoned for the sheer
>criminality of their ideas. 

(rest of this excellent, er, I mean "unacceptable," posting elided)

Censorpunks, we cannot allow garbage like this to pollute our net! There
ought to be a law!

.......

But seriously, Lance Detweiler does raise some serious points. And I hope
neither Lance, nor George Gleason, nor anyone else was too offended by my
satire about censorship. I felt John Gilmore and others had made the
"slippery slope" arguments well enough, and I would add my comments in the
form of a satire (as I like to do...you ought to see some of my spoofs over
on the Extropians list!).

A few comments on Lance's points:

Nobody has ever said the transition to crypto anarchy will be pleasant
(remind me sometime to discuss how easy assassinations for pay will become,
once untraceable and robust digital cash becomes possible--it'll curl your
hair!).

The key is that it's essentially unstoppable by simple legalistic means.
New kinds of solutions, like "positive reputations," will have to evolve.
(In this context, a positive reputation system means people only accept
e-mail from names or digital pseudonyms they know or have reason to be
interested in.)

The stratagem of controlling flaky, bad, or illegal posts by cooperation of
the remailers will not really work, as new digital pseudonyms will be
easily generated (and only the last remailer, the one sending it to a pool
or a newsgroup, has any real hope of "controlling" the content by reading
the plaintext). 

At the risk of sounding like another satire, I could point to the obvious
problems we have in free and open societies with _verbal_ abuse, threats,
blackmail, lies, propaganda, and other unsavory behavior. I could then
suggest that controls on free speech are needed (I can expect someone to
chime in here with the chestnut about how you can't shout "Fire!" in a
crowded theater...the Supreme Court justice who coined this later said he
regretted ever doing so, as every censor used it to justify controls on
speech). 

The price paid to reduce these nuisances is too high.

By the way, I have some scenarios for how crypto anarchy may be fought, how
it may fight back, what law enforcement may do, etc. These are from a 2.2
MB file for my still-unfinished novel on these topics. The relevant
sections on crypto and crypto anarchy are about 200K. They're mostly in
"MORE" format (an outliner for the Mac), and conversion to ASCII tends to
produce some ugly line indentation problems (the subsections indent OK, but
the following lines wrap back to the left margin). Still, perhaps I'll try
to convert them into readable essays for this list, if there's any
interest.

-Tim May


--
Timothy C. May               | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,  
tcmay@netcom.com        | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
408-688-5409               | knowledge, reputations, information markets, 
W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA       | black markets, collapse of governments.
Higher Power: 2^756839 | Public Key: MailSafe and PGP available.





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Date: Sat, 27 Feb 93 21:23:28 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: more ideas on anonymity
Message-ID: <9302280521.AA00526@netcom.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Marc Horowitz writes:

>With certain exceptions, like the mailbox example, most situations of
>"rent foo" require the lessor to take a risk, and he wants *some*
>assurance that he'll get his rented thing back.  I'm not going to rent
>a car to someone without ID, for cash, because I have no guarantee
>that he isn't going to drive away with it and never come back.

Precisely. The car rental company _does_ have a continuing relationship
with you, at least until you return their car.

(BTW, digital escrow services may allow relative anonymity--and perhaps
true anonymity--while still assuring the rental car company that they'll
get paid and will get their car back. Think of this as a surety
bond...though I suppose that many of those who don't have credit cards, for
economic reasons, will also not have $10,000 in cash laying around to post
such a bond.)

>I'm not saying discrimination against cash doesn't exist.  It does,
>and that's reprehensible.  But not all cases of "plastic, yes, cash,
>no" are discriminatory.

I see nothing reprehensible about discrimination against certain kinds of
payment. Maybe I don't want to carry $10,000 around in East L.A. and
instead want to be paid with a cashier's check. Maybe I just think folding
money has too many germs on it. 

The point is, nobody is being coerced into an economic transaction. If I
offer my car for sale for $10,000 in copper pennies, that's the way it is.

(There is some confusing legalistic stuff about debts and "legal tender,"
applying, as I understand it, to debts already incurred. But I'm arguing
the principle, not the situaion in these Beknighted States.)

-Tim May
--
Timothy C. May               | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,  
tcmay@netcom.com        | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
408-688-5409               | knowledge, reputations, information markets, 
W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA       | black markets, collapse of governments.
Higher Power: 2^756839 | Public Key: MailSafe and PGP available.





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Marc Horowitz <marc@Athena.MIT.EDU>
Date: Sat, 27 Feb 93 20:39:53 PST
To: thug@phantom.com (Murdering Thug)
Subject: Re: more ideas on anonymity
In-Reply-To: <m0nSbit-000jr0C@phantom.com>
Message-ID: <9302280438.AA26643@steve-dallas.MIT.EDU>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>> > If I perform some service for you, and you acknowledge that the
>> > service is complete as performed, then you have no need for my
>> > identity.
>> 
>> > Therefore, should not discrimination against anonymity when names are
>> > not germane be considered (depending on one's ideology) unreasonable,
>> > inefficient, coercive, intrusive, or illegal?
>>
>> Try telling this to the person behind the counter when you're trying
>> to rent a car, rent a hotel room for the night, or rent a mailbox for
>> 6 months.

Thug, you didn't seem to get Eric's point.  When I walk up to the
newspaper guy on the corner, I hand him 35 cents, he hands me a paper.
We're both happy.  My name is irrelevant, because there's not a hell
of a lot either of us can do to screw the other one over, so he
doesn't need to know my name.  I don't need to know his.

With certain exceptions, like the mailbox example, most situations of
"rent foo" require the lessor to take a risk, and he wants *some*
assurance that he'll get his rented thing back.  I'm not going to rent
a car to someone without ID, for cash, because I have no guarantee
that he isn't going to drive away with it and never come back.

I'm not saying discrimination against cash doesn't exist.  It does,
and that's reprehensible.  But not all cases of "plastic, yes, cash,
no" are discriminatory.

>> This brings up the question of using False ID when conducting
>> perfectly legal transactions, in order to preserve one's privacy.  Can
>> anyone reading this list with a legal background answer whether this
>> is legal or not?  

This is a very good question.

		Marc




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Tony Kidson <tony@morgan.demon.co.uk>
Date: Sun, 28 Feb 93 01:11:48 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: more ideas on anonymity
Message-ID: <2829@morgan.demon.co.uk>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


In message <9302272006.AA16075@SOS> you write:
>    Date: Sat, 27 Feb 93 00:58:46 GMT
>    From: Tony Kidson <tony@morgan.demon.co.uk>
>
>    Yes, we can justify protecting those who threaten these acts.
>    This is a *far* cry fpom protecting those who *commit* those
>    acts.
>
> Ah, I see you are an absolute free-speach advocate.  The problem is that
> the line between speech and acts can be fuzzy at times, especially in
> the world of cyperspace model.

What you say is true, but I still think that you need to have a 
substantive act,  before you can apply *legal* sanctions.  The 
way to prevent threats, is, as people have said in other posts, 
to prevent the reception of anonymous mail by those who do not 
want to receive it.  

I freely admit that I *am* a free speech advocate.  I do not 
believe that you improve the condition of the world by preventing 
the speaking of undesirable words; Words should be countered by 
other words.  Many people plan to put the world to rights over a 
beer in a bar.  This may or may not include violent revolution. 
Are we to decree that this constitutes a violent criminal 
conspiracy?  

Speech does not harm anybody.  People acting on other's speech is 
what does the harm.  *Free* speech is indeed useful. It's when 
widely disseminated speech is in the hands of the few that its 
power can be wielded against the citizen and then it is 
unhealthy.

Tony
+-----------------+-------------------------------+--------------------------+
| Tony Kidson     |    PGP 2.1 Key by request     | Voice +44 81 466 5127    |
| Morgan Towers,  |                               | E-Mail                   |
| Morgan Road,    |         This Space            | tony@morgan.demon.co.uk  |
| Bromley,        |          to Rent              | tny@cix.compulink.co.uk  |
| England BR1 3QE |Honda ST1100  ==*==  DoD# 0801 | 100024.301@compuserve.com|
+-----------------+-------------------------------+----------------------------+




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Date: Sun, 28 Feb 93 00:13:48 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Reasons for Anonymity--A Long Selection
Message-ID: <9302280811.AA12278@netcom.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


The  following is part of an outline dealing with the topics on this list,
maintained since 1990 for a novel-in-progress (the writing, that is) I've
been working on for several years, off and on. In addition to using various
databases and hypertext systems (ArchiText, from Brainpower, and
StorySpace, from Eastgate Systems) for character developoment and plots, I
have also relied heavily on MORE, a powerful outline processor from
Symantec (MORE 3.0 is the direct descendent of ThinkTank, and feature
"cloning," where a branch of the outline can be replicated in many places,
allowing immediate hypertext-like jumps to distant parts of the outline,
and also maintaining database coherency). 

Several people have requested that I make good on my offer to post certain
parts of these notes, especially the parts dealing with "crypto anarchy"
and how it may get developed, how it may be fought by the law enforcement
types, what it can be used for, etc.

As an exeriment, I'll post here just one medium-sized branch, from deep in
the outline tree. "Reasons for Anonymity" seems in line with current list
interest. (Note that most of these comments were written in 1990-91, so
they may be slightly dated.) 

If the reaction is favorable, maybe I'll post more. Or, there may be other
options, such as placing parts of the outline in the archive site.

I've converted the nested outline structure to a flattened,
Harvard-labelled text file. It may still not be the easiest to read,
especially as many of the entries are intended only to jog my memory and to
help me organize my thinking.

Hope someone likes it.


Reasons for Anonymity and Digital Pseudonyms

I.  many of the same reasons as with Caller ID, but many 
new reasons as well

II.  Physical Threats

A.  "corporate terrrorism" is not a myth: drug dealers and 
other "marginal" businessmen face this every day

1.  extortion, threats, kidnappings

B.  and many businesses of the future may well be less 
"gentlemanly" than the conventional view has it

1.  witness the bad blood between Intel and AMD, and 
then imagine it getting ten times worse

2.  and national rivalries, even in ostensibly legal 
businesses (think of arms dealers), may cause more 
use of violence

3.  Mafia and other organized crime groups may try to 
extort payments or concessions from market 
participants, causing them to seek the relative 
protection of anonymous systems

a)  with reputations

4.  Note that calls for the threatened to turn to the police 
for protection has several problems

a)  the activities may be illegal or marginally illegal (this 
is the reason the Mafia can often get involved and 
why it may even sometimes have a positive effect, 
acting as the cop for illegal activities)

b)  the police are often too busy to get involved, what 
with so much physical crime clogging the courts

C.  extortion and kidnappings can be done using these 
very techniques of cryptoanarchy, thus causing a kind 
of arms race

D.  battered and abused women and families may need 
the equivalent of a "witness protection program"

1.  because of the ease of tracing credit card purchases, 
with the right bribes and/or court orders (or even 
hacking), battered wives may seek credit cards under 
pseudonyms

a)  and some card companies may oblige, as a kind of 
politically correct social gesture

b)  or groups like NOW and Women Against Rape may 
even offer their own cards

(1)  perhaps backed up by some kind of escrow fund

(2)  could be debit cards

E.  people who participate in cyberspace businesses may 
fear retaliation or extortion in the real world

1.  threats by their governments (for all of the usual 
reasons, plus kickbacks, threats to close them down, 
etcl)

2.  ripoffs by those who covet their success...

III.  Needed for Certain Kinds of Reputation-Based 
Systems

A.  a respected scientist may wish to float a speculative 
idea

1.  and be able to later prove it was in fact his idea

IV.  Legal Protection

A.  many transactions may be deemed illegal in some 
jursidictions

1.  even in some that the service or goods provider has no 
control over

a)  example: gun makers being held liable for firearms 
deaths in the District of Columbia (though this was 
recently cancelled)

2.  the maze of laws may cause some to seek anonymity 
to protect themselves against this maze

B.  "deep pockets"

1.  it will be in the interest of some to hide their 
identities so as to head off these kinds of lawsuits 
(filed for whatever reasons, rightly or wrongly)

2.  postings and comments may expose the authors to 
lawsuits for libel, misrepresentation, unfair 
competition, and so on (so much for free speech in 
these beknighted states)

3.  employers may also be exposed to the same suits, 
regardless of where their employees posted from

a)  on the tenuous grounds that an employee was acting 
on his employer's behalf, e.g., in defending an Intel 
product on Usenet

4.  this, BTW, is another reason for people to seek ways to 
hide some of their assets-to prevent confiscation in 
deep pockets lawsuits (or family illnesses, in which  
various agencies try to seize assets of anybody they 
can)

5.  and the same computers that allow these transactions 
will also allow more rapid determination of who has 
the deepest pockets!

C.  moonlighting employees (the original concern over 
Black Net and AMIX)

1.  employers may have all kinds of concerns, hence the 
need for employees to hide their identities

2.  note that this interects with the licensing and zoning 
aspects

D.  to beat zoning and licensing requirements

E.  Scenario: Anonymous organ donor banks

1.  e.g., a way to "market" rare blood types, or whatever, 
without exposing one's self to forced donation or other 
sanctions

a)  "forced donation" involves the lawsuits filed by the 
potential recipient

b)  at the time of offer, at least...what happens when the 
deal is consummated is another domain

2.  and a way to avoid the growing number of 
government stings

F.  avoidance of prosecution or damage claims for 
writing, editing, distributing, or selling such 
"damaging" materials is yet another reason for 
anonymous systems to emerge: those involved in the 
process will seek to immunize themselves from the 
various tort claims that are clogging the courts

1.  producers, distributors, directors, writers, and even 
actors of x-rated or otherwise "unacceptable" material 
may have to have the protection of anonymous 
systems

2.  imagine fiber optics and the proliferation of videos 
and talk shows....bluenoses and prosecutors will use 
"forum shopping" to block access, to prosecute the 
producers, etc.

V.  Anonymity in Requesting Information, Services, 
Goods

A.  a la the controversy over Caller ID and 900 numbers: 
people don't want their telephone numbers (and 
hence identities) fed into huge consumer-preference 
data banks

1.  of the things they buy, the videos they rent, the books 
they read. etc. (various laws protect some of these 
areas, like library books, video rentals)

2.  subscription lists are already a booming resale 
market...this will get faster and more finely "tuned" 
with electronic subscriptions: hence the desire to 
subscribe anonymously

B.  some examples of "sensitive" services that anonymity 
may be desired in (especially related to computers, 
modems, BBSes)

1.  reading unusual or sensitive groups: alt.sex.bondage, 
etc.

a)  or posting to these groups!

b)  recent controversy over NAMBLA may make such 
protections more desirable to some (and parallel calls 
for restrictions!)

2.  posting to such groups, especially given that records 
are perpetual and that government agencies read and 
file postings (an utterly trivial thing to do)

3.  requesting help on personal issues (equivalent to the 
"Name Witheld" seen so often)

4.  discussing controversial political issues (and who 
knows what will be controversial 20 years later when 
the poster is seeking a political office, for example?)

a)  given that some groups have already (1991) posted the 
past postings of people they are trying to smear!

5.  Note: the difference between posting to a BBS group 
or chat line and writing a letter to an editor is 
significant

a)  partly technological: it is vastly easier to compile 
records of postings than it is to cut clippings of letters 
to editors (though this will change rapidly as scanners 
make this easy)

b)  partly sociological: people who write letters know the 
letters will be with the back issues in perpetuity, that 
bound issues will preserve their words for many 
decades to come (and could conceivably come back to 
haunt them), but people who post to BBSes probably 
think their words are temporary

c)  and there are some other factors

(1)  no editing

(2)  no time delays (and no chance to call an editor and 
retract a letter written in haste or anger)

(3)  and letters can, and often are, written with the 
"Name Witheld" signature-this is currently next to 
impossible to do on networks

(a)  though some "forwarding" services have informally 
sprung up

C.  Businesses may wish to protect themselves from 
lawsuits over comments by their employees

1.  the usual "The opinions expressed here are not those 
of my employer" may not be enough to protect an 
employer from lawsuits

a)  imagine racist or sexist comments leading to lawsuits 
(or at least being brought up as evidence of the type of 
"attitude" fostered by the company, e.g., "I've worked 
for Intel for 12 years and can tell you that blacks make 
very poor engineers.")

2.  employees may make comments that damage the 
reputations of their companies 

a)  Note: this differs from the current situation, where 
free speech takes priority over company concerns, 
because the postings to a BBS are carried widely, may 
be searched electronically (e.g., AMD lawyers search 
the UseNet postings of 1988-91 for any postings by 
Intel employees besmirching the quality or whatever 
of AMD chips), 

3.  and so employees of corporations may protect 
themselves, and their employers, by adopting 
pseudonyms

D.  Businesses may seek information without wanting to 
alert their competitors

1.  this is currently done with agents, "executive search 
firms," and lawyers

2.  but how will it evolve to handle electronic searches?

3.  there are some analogies with filings of "Freedom of 
Information Act" requests, and of patents, etc.

a)  these "fishing expeditions" will increase with time, as 
it becomes profitable for companies to search though 
mountains of electronically-filed materials

(1)  environmental impact studies, health and safety 
disclosures, etc.

(2)  could be something that some companies specialize in

E.  Anonymous Consultation Services, Anonymous 
Stringers or Reporters

1.  imagine an information broker, perhaps on an 
AMIX-like service, with a network of stringers

a)  think of the arms deal newsletter writer in Hallahan's 
The Trade, with his network of stringers feeding him 
tips and inside information

(1)  instead of meeting in secretive locations, a very 
expensive proposition (in time and travel), a secure 
network can be used

(2)  with reputations, digital pseudonyms, etc.

2.  they may not wish their actual identities known

a)  threats from employers, former employers, 
government agencies

b)  harassment via the various criminal practices that will 
become more common (e.g., the ease with which 
assailants and even assassins can be contracted for)

(1)  part of the overall move toward anonymity

c)  fears of lawsuits, licensing requirements, etc.

3.  Candidates for Such Anonymous Consultation 
Services

a)  An arms deals newsletter

(1)  an excellent reputation for accuracy and timely 
information

(2)  sort of like an electronic form of Jane's

(a)  with scandals and government concern

(3)  but nobody knows where it comes from

(4)  a site that distributes it to subscribers gets it with 
another larger batch of forwarded material

(a)  NSA, FBI, Fincen, etc. try to track it down

b)  "Technology Insider" reports on all kinds of new 
technologies

(1)  patterned after Hoffler's Microelectronics News, the 
Valley's leading tip sheet for two decades

(2)  the editor pays for tips, with payments made in two 
parts: immediate, and time-dependent, so that the 
accuracy of a tip, and its ultimate importance (in the 
judgment of the editor) can be proportionately 
rewarded

(3)  PK systems, with contributors able to encrypt and then 
publicly post (using their own means of diffusion)

(a)  with their messages containing further material, such 
as authentications, where to send the payments, etc.

c)  Lundberg's Oil Industry Survey (or similar)

(1)  i.e., a fairly conventional newsletter with publicly 
known authors

(2)  in this case, the author is known, but the identities of 
contributors is well-protected

d)  A Conspiracy Newsletter

(1)  reporting on all of the latest theories of misbehavior 
(as in the "Conspiracies" section of this outline)

(2)  a wrinkle: a vast hypertext web, with contributors able 
to add links and nodes

(a)  naturally, their real name-if they don't care about 
real-world repercussions-or one of their digital 
pseudonyms (may as well use cryptonyms) is attached

i)  various algorithms for reputations

(1)  sum total of everything ever written, somehow 
measured by other comments made, by "voting," etc.

(2)  a kind of moving average, allowing for the fact that 
learning will occur, just as a researcher probably gets 
better with time, and that as reputation-based systems 
become better understood, people come to appreciate 
the importance of writing carefully

e)  and one of the most controversial of all: Yardley's 
Intelligence Daily

(1)  though it may come out more than daily!

(2)  an ex-agent set this up in the mid-90s, soliciting 
contributions via an anonymous packet-switching 
sysem

(a)  refined over the next couple of years

(b)  combination of methods

(3)  government has been trying hard to identify the 
editor, "Yardley"

(4)  he offers a payback based on value of the 
information, and even has a "Requests" section, and a 
Classifed Ad section

(5)  a hypertext web, similar to the Conspiracy Newsletter 
above

(6)  Will Government Try to Discredit the Newsletter 
With False Information?

(a)  of course, the standard ploy in reputation-based 
systems

(b)  but Yardley has developed several kinds of filters for 
this

i)  digital pseudonyms which gradually build up 
reputations

ii)  cross-checking of his own sort

iii)  he even uses language filters to analyze the text

(c)  and so what?

i)  the world is filled with disinformation, rumors, lies, 
half-truths, and somehow things go on....

f)  Other AMIX-like Anonymous Services

(1)  Drug Prices and Tips

(a)  tips on the quality of various drugs (e.g., "Several 
reliable sources have told us that the latest Maui 
Wowie is very intense, numbers below...")

(b)  synthesis of drugs (possibly a separate subscription)

i)  designer drugs

ii)  home labs

iii)  avoiding detection

(2)  The Hackers Daily

(a)  tips on hacking and cracking

(b)  anonymous systems themselves (more tips)

(3)  Product evaluations (anonymity needed to allow 
honest comments with more protection against 
lawsuits)

4.  Newspapers Are Becoming Cocerned with the Trend 
Toward Paying for News Tips

a)  by the independent consultation services

b)  but what can they do?

c)  lawsuits are tried, to prevent anonymous tips when 
payments are involved

(1)  their lawyers cite the tax evasion and national security 
aspects

F.  Private Data Bases 

1.  any organization offering access to data bases must be 
concerned that somebody-a disgruntled customer, a 
whistleblower, the government, whoever-will call 
for an opening of the files

a)  under various "Data Privacy" laws

b)  or just in general (tort law, lawsuits, "discovery")

2.  thus, steps will be taken to isolate the actual data from 
actual users, perhaps via cutouts

a)  e.g., a data service sells access, but subcontracts out the 
searches to other services via paths that are 
untraceable

(1)  this probably can't be outlawed in general-though 
any specific transaction might later be declared illegal, 
etc., at which time the link is cut and a new one is 
established-as this would outlaw all subcontracting 
arrangements!

(a)  i.e., if Joe's Data Service charges $1000 for a search on 
widgets and then uses another possibly transitory 
(meaning a cutout) data service, the most a lawsuit 
can do is to force Joe to stop using this untraceble 
service

(b)  levels of indirection (and firewalls that stop the 
propagation of investigations)

G.  Medical Polls (a la AIDS surveys, sexual practices 
surveys, etc.)

1.  recall the method in which a participant tosses a coin 
to answer a question...the analyst can still recover the 
important ensemble information, but the "phase" is 
lost

a)  i.e., an individual answering "Yes" to the question 
"Have you ever had xyz sex?" may have really 
answered "No" but had his answer flipped by a coin 
toss

2.  researchers may even adopt sophisticated methods in 
which explicit diaries are kept, but which are then 
transmitted under an anonymous mailing system to 
the researchers

a)  obvious dangers of authentication, validity, etc.

H.  Medical testing: many reasons for people to seek 
anonymity

1.  AIDS testing is the preeminent example

2.  but also testing for conditions that might affect 
insurablity or employment (e.g.,  people may go to 
medical havens in Mexico or wherever for tests that 
might lead to uninsurability should insurance 
companies learn of the "precondition")

3.  except in AIDS and STDs, it is probably both illegal 
and against medical ethics to offer anonymous 
consultations

a)  perhaps people will travel to other countries

VI.  Anonymity in Belonging to Certain Clubs, Churches, 
or Organizations

A.  people fear retaliation or embarassment should their 
membership be discovered, now or later

1.  e.g., a church member who belongs to controversial 
groups or clubs

B.  mainly, or wholly, those in which physical contact or 
other personal contact is not needed (a limited set)

C.  similar to the cell-based systems described elsewhere

D.  Candidates for anonymous clubs or organizations

1.  Earth First!, Act Up, Animal Liberation Front, etc.

2.  NAMBLA and similar controversial groups

E.  all of these kinds of groups have very vocal, very 
visible members, visible even to the point of seeking 
out television coverage

F.  but there are probably many more who would join 
these groups if there identities could be shielded from 
public group, for the sake of their careers, their 
families, etc.

G.  ironically, the corporate crackdown on outside 
activities considered hostile to the corporation (or 
exposing them to secondary lawsuits, claims, etc.) may 
cause greater use of anonymous systems

1.  cell-based membership in groups

H.  the growth of anonymous membership in groups 
(using pseudonyms) has a benefit in increasing 
membership by people otherwise afraid to join, for 
example, a radical environmental group

VII.  Anonymity in Giving Advice or Pointers to 
Information

A.  suppose someone says who is selling some illegal or 
contraband product...is this also illegal?

B.  hypertext systems will make this inevitable

VIII.  Anonymous Voting in Clubs, Organizations, 
Churches, etc.

A.  a major avenue for spreading CA methods: "electronic 
blackballing," weighted voting (as with number of 
shares)

1.  e.g., a corporation, perhaps one of JH's, issues "voting 
tokens," which can be used to vote anonymously

a)  or even sold to others (like selling shares, except 
selling only the voting right for a specific election is 
cheaper, and many people don't much care about 
elections)

2.  a way to protect against deep pockets lawsuits in, say, 
race discrimination cases

a)  wherein a director is sued for some action the 
company takes-anonymity will give him some legal 
protection, some "plausible deniability"

3.  is possible to set up systems (cf. Salomaa) in which 
some "supervotes" have blackball power, but the use 
of these vetos is indistinguishable from a standard 
majority rules vote

a)  i.e., nobody, except the blackballer(s), will know 
whether the blackball was used!

b)  will the government seek to limit this kind of 
protocol?

(1)  claiming discrimination potential or abuse of voting 
rights?

B.  will Justice Department (or SEC) seek to overturn 
anonymous voting?

1.  as part of the potential move to a "full disclosure" 
society?

2.  related to antidiscrimination laws, accountability, etc.

C.  Anonymous Voting in Reputation-Based Systems 
(Journals, Markets)

1.  customers can vote on products, on quality of service, 
on the various deals they've been involved in

a)  not clear how the voting rights would get distributed

b)  the idea is to avoid lawsuits, sanctions by vendors, etc. 
(as with the Bose suit)

2.  Journals

a)  a canonical example, and one which I must include, 
as it combines anonymous refereeing (already 
standard, in primitive forms), hypertext (links to 
reviews), and basic freedom of speech issues

b)  this will likely be an early area of use

3.  this whole area of consumer reviews may be a way to 
get CA bandwidth up and running (lots of 
PK-encrypted traffic sloshing around the various nets)

IX.  the 100% traceability of public postings to UseNet and 
other bulletin boards is very stifling to free expression 
and becomes one of the main justifications for the use 
of anonymous (or pseudononymous) boards and nets

A.  there may be calls for laws against such compilation, 
as with the British data laws, but basically there is 
little that can be done when postings go to tens of 
thousands of machines and are archived in perpetuity 
by many of these nodes and by thousands of readers

B.  readers who may incorporate the material into their 
own postings, etc. (hence the absurdity of the British 
law)








From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: thug@phantom.com (Murdering Thug)
Date: Sun, 28 Feb 93 06:59:19 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Real life pseudonyms (was re: more ideas on anonymity)
In-Reply-To: <9302280245.AA59295@acs1.acs.ucalgary.ca>
Message-ID: <m0nSpMf-000jqtC@phantom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Douglas Sinclair writes:

> I don't know the US laws on pseudos.  However, here in Canada one is allowed
> to go by whatever name one wishes PROVIDED it is not for fraudulent reasons.
> This also includes signatures -- I can sign as whoever I wish.  However,
> if the contract has a clause saying "This is the name by which I am
> legally and correctly known" then you are commiting fraud by signing with a
> psuedo.  This is in the fine print of a surprising number of things <sigh>.

I remember reading or hearing something similar as it applies in the United
States.  It seems that, as long as you're not committing a crime or a fraud,
in the process, you may identify by whatever name you wish. Can anyone with
a legal background confirm or deny this?

However, I am wondering if it also legal to present false ID in order to
insure your privacy/anonymity.  And isn't misrepresenting your true identity
considered to be a fraud in and of itself?

For instance, can I walk into a U.S. bank, present false ID, and obtain a
checking account to use for legitimate reasons?  How about a credit card?
Is this legal? I mean, I'm not stealing any money/products/services from
anybody, I'm only using a pseudonym.

 




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Eric Hughes <hughes@soda.berkeley.edu>
Date: Sun, 28 Feb 93 09:58:36 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: anon user on cypherpunks list
In-Reply-To: <9302281238.aa19179@penet.penet.FI>
Message-ID: <9302281755.AA13087@soda.berkeley.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



I have changed the subscription name in the list to the "na" form, so
the immediate problem for cypherpunks is fixed.

But this problem will persist.  Many, if not most, mailing lists are
running automated list software and the address given in the
subscription request is the address added.  Even if the administrator
manually changes the entry, the old one can be added right back.
Mailing list software could be changed to notice penet anonymous
addresses, but don't hold your breath for that to be deployed soon.

There are two problems with the current anon@penet design that I see
as fundamental.  The first, widely discussed and the proximate cause
of the above problem, is automatic pseudonym generation.  The second
is ensured by the first and is subtler: the remailer does not allow
multiple pseudonyms per incoming email address.

Multiple pseudonyms allow compartmentalization and has two benefits.
The first benefit is unlinkability.  I have sometimes wanted to argue
both sides of an issue, but refrained because that is too confusing
for most to follow.  (The semiotics of "consistency/ignorability" and
"one mind/one opinion" are fascinating and, here, digressing.)  I
might also wish to argue in two completely different fora and not have
these seen as the same person.

For every reason you might want a pseudonym in the first place, you
might also want a "pseudonym from your pseudonym," especially if you
use it a lot.

The second benefit of compartmented identities happens when the
pseudonym is revealed, either by choice or by chance.  There are many
situations when a temporary identity might be desired; I leave it to
others to list them.  With the current single-pseudonym system, one
revelation of identity reveals all others.  When there is no
particular benefit to being seen as the same identity, I would rather
have multiple identities for exactly this reason.

As far as implementations go, having multiple pseudonyms requires that
a separate "request for pseudonym" be added, as well as a way to
indicate from which pseudonym (or none of them) mail should be from.
I would suggest bouncing mail to "an" style addresses unless a
pseudonym has been declared; the bounce message would, of course,
contain instructions on how to obtain a pseudonym or use the "na"
form.

Therefore, I would suggest that a second version of the pseudonymous
system at penet do away with automatic generation and support multiple
pseudonyms.

Eric




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Eric Hughes <hughes@soda.berkeley.edu>
Date: Sun, 28 Feb 93 10:09:40 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: dispatches from the front lines of anonymity
In-Reply-To: <9302281154.aa16279@penet.penet.FI>
Message-ID: <9302281806.AA13608@soda.berkeley.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



>A more important matter is the way the group should be implemented.
>Moderated or unmoderated doesn`t matter, as the server already knows how
>to send messages to moderated groups to the moderator. 

Actually, I was thinking that whistleblower@anon.penet.fi would _be_
the moderator.  Then you just post directly.  All the messages would
come from that address, and no id's would be assigned.  Since all
messages are from "whistleblower", replies to a poster go right back
out to the list, also anonymized.

It's actually a much simpler system than is currently implemented,
since id's arenit involved at all.

>Pros are that it would make it very hard to track down the real
>poster, cons that it would be impossible to tell the different
>posters from each other, thus not enabling informers to earn good or
>bad reputations, unless they include key signatures or something.

PGP 2.1 contains the cleartext-signature feature, and the periodic
posting to the list should mention this.  This allows a real pseudonym
to develop, just like we want.

Eric




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: jordan@imsi.com (Jordan Hayes)
Date: Sun, 28 Feb 93 09:22:36 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: more ideas on anonymity
Message-ID: <9302281608.AA14296@IMSI.COM>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


	From thug@phantom.com Sat Feb 27 20:56:03 1993

	Try telling this to the person behind the counter when you're
	trying to rent a car, rent a hotel room for the night, or rent
	a mailbox for 6 months.

These are examples of transactions that are *ongoing* and thus are
*not* satisfied by an initial cash payment.  When you rent a car or
hotel room, the transaction does not finish until you have left and the
room has been inspected.  At my mailbox service, I can incur charges
for all kinds of things (receiving COD packages, receiving faxen, etc.)
during the term of my rent.

	The thing is, they never ask for ID if you're paying by credit
	card since they assume the credit card is enough proof of who
	you are.

No, the credit card says they can recover damages if you trash the room.

/jordan




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: jordan@imsi.com (Jordan Hayes)
Date: Sun, 28 Feb 93 09:22:41 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re:  Real life pseudonyms (was re: more ideas on anonymity)
Message-ID: <9302281619.AA14306@IMSI.COM>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


	From thug@phantom.com Sun Feb 28 10:48:57 1993

	For instance, can I walk into a U.S. bank, present false ID,
	and obtain a checking account to use for legitimate reasons?

Banking and Tax regulations provide solid legal ground for requiring
banks to verify identity and Tax status in the US.  Answer: no.  By
definition, there are no "legitimate" reasons for having a checking
account in this country that is unaccountable.  There are plenty of
other ways of hiding cash and money transactions without involving the
US banking system.  They don't want you to do this ...

	I'm not stealing any money/products/services from anybody, I'm
	only using a pseudonym.

No, you're just avoiding the accountability of your money.  This is
akin to not reporting income.  It's patently illegal.  You can stand
down your color PostScript printer now ...

/jordan




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: strat@intercon.com (Bob Stratton)
Date: Sun, 28 Feb 93 08:41:31 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Real life pseudonyms (was re: more ideas on anonymity)
In-Reply-To: <m0nSpMf-000jqtC@phantom.com>
Message-ID: <9302281640.AA13450@intercon.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>>>>> On Sun, 28 Feb 93 9:51:36 EST, thug@phantom.com (Murdering Thug) said:


	MT> I remember reading or hearing something similar as it
	MT> applies in the United States.  It seems that, as long as
	MT> you're not committing a crime or a fraud, in the process,
	MT> you may identify by whatever name you wish. Can anyone
	MT> with a legal background confirm or deny this?


Not being a lawyer, but an engineer with unhealthy interest in such
matters, I've looked a few things up and it appears that in most
relationships, using an assumed name is not fraud, unless "intent to
defraud" is present. Needless to say that's not very clear-cut these
days.

	MT> However, I am wondering if it also legal to present false
	MT> ID in order to insure your privacy/anonymity.  And isn't
	MT> misrepresenting your true identity considered to be a
	MT> fraud in and of itself?

Again, using aliases does not appear to be "malum in se", that is,
evil in and of itself. 

BUT, one thing I found in the course of doing a Westlaw search on the
use of Social Security Numbers:The federal laws on SSN use were
amended for the purpose of preventing welfare fraud, and wound up with
a potentially threatening modification. The law used to say that it
was illegal to give an invalid SSN in certain circumstances, for the
purpose of obtaining gov't benefits inappropriately.

The bad news is that it says that, but with "or for any other purpose"
appended. Thus, it appears that tossing around bogus SSNs (which are
still on many driver's licenses - sigh) could well be an offense in
and of itself. I'll try to dig up the citations.

--Strat





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Eric Hughes <hughes@soda.berkeley.edu>
Date: Sun, 28 Feb 93 11:54:03 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: A Modest Proposal
In-Reply-To: <9302280259.AA20523@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Message-ID: <9302281950.AA17286@soda.berkeley.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



I wrote:
>The only perfectly unambiguous position is that every use is a
>legitimate use.

and then L.D. wrote:
>Once again I'm very seriously disturbed at the sentiments presented by
>some eminent members of this list.  I believe in free speech perhaps as
>rabidly as the next guy, but many of the most rabid advocates recognize
>that there are limitations on `freedom'.  

Gotcha.

I make no claim above as to the propriety of an unambiguous position,
merely that there is one and only one completely clear position.
(There is another, that no use is legitimate, and we here conveniently
ignore that one :-)

The consequences of unambiguity must affect our discussions of this
matter.  If we desire unambiguity, then there is no need to
distinguish between uses.  If, however, the unambiguous solution is
not desirable, then there must be decisions made about propriety.  As
with every other question of power, the real question is

	"_Who_ decides propriety?"

The questions "What are significant criteria?", "When is the decision
made?", and others are all subordinate to the question "Who decides?"
Roughly speaking, there are three situations regarding anonymous
communication: the sender, the carrier, and the receiver.  In each of
these, we can examine what decisions they are _able_ to make.

As sender, I can choose who I present myself as, whom I send to to,
what carriers I want, and what I want to say.  As carrier, I can
choose whom to accept messages from, whom to send them to, what
content I am willing to pass.  As receiver, I can choose what carriers
to receive messages from, and from whom to accept mail.

>Anybody here that thinks that an anonymous service can act something
>like a Unix pipe that just passes the raw stuff through forever
>unhindered and uninterrupted is seriously deluding himself.

Well, an anonymous service _can_ do just that.  Whether or not the
rest of the world continues to communicate with them is a separate
question, an important question in the short run to be sure.

Acknowledgement that a procedure is an exigency does not make that
procedure desirable of itself.  All differential carriage based on
content is censorship.  I acknowledge the exigency of certain forms of
censorship in currently deployed anonymous systems.

Nonetheless, I will never desire censorship for its own sake and I
will also fight to remove the conditions which make censorship exigent
in the first place.

The problem is, who decides what is exigent?  We can either answer
that question, or change the world so that we never need ask it.

I decline to respond to the essay by Mr. D. Lewdud.

Eric




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: chrmsync@mindvox.phantom.com (Chrome Sync)
Date: Sun, 28 Feb 93 09:03:03 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Real life pseudonyms
Message-ID: <J3XoZB3w165w@mindvox.phantom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


In the US, you can use any identity you like, provided you're not doing so
to defraud anyone ... that is, if you do it to escape child care payments,
that's fraud. If you do it to rent a mailbox, *provided you don't do
anything otherwise illegal using the mailbox*, it's kosher. Start a
checking account -- I don't see why not.

I have a casual background in law/law enforcement, but got the first two
examples from a law school grad. who is currently working for a law
enforcement agency. I'lll have to run the third one by him ...

	Best,


                [ Cyber-Renaissance Man ]
                ||                     ||
                ||     Chrome Sync     ||
                ||                     ||
                [* & Frank Sinatra Fan *]




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Eric Hughes <hughes@soda.berkeley.edu>
Date: Sun, 28 Feb 93 12:11:20 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: more ideas on anonymity
In-Reply-To: <9302280438.AA26643@steve-dallas.MIT.EDU>
Message-ID: <9302282008.AA17976@soda.berkeley.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



>With certain exceptions, like the mailbox example, most situations of
>"rent foo" require the lessor to take a risk, and he wants *some*
>assurance that he'll get his rented thing back.  I'm not going to rent
>a car to someone without ID, for cash, because I have no guarantee
>that he isn't going to drive away with it and never come back.

Privacy costs.  It is possible to create a company which offers
insurance against damage and loss, paid for by the user, assigned to
the owner.  Such a policy could be presented to a car rental agency in
lieu of your name.  Your transaction with the rental agency would then
be anonymous, even if your transaction with the insurer were not.

Such an arrangement might even be preferable to a rental agency, since
it means they don't have to go after individuals with shallow pockets
in the event of damage or loss.

I can even imagine such a company which offers standard policies for
any number of different objects, written and digitally signed over the
phone.  Want to rent and apartment?  Get your damage and last month's
rent insured.  

There is already such a thing as "completion insurance" for
construction and the like, purchased by the builder as a condition of
contract.  If the transaction costs of this and similar types of
insurance were lowered, anonymity in the real world would increase.

Eric




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Johan Helsingius <julf@penet.FI>
Date: Sun, 28 Feb 93 02:13:59 PST
To: Matthew Rapaport <mjr@netcom.com>
Subject: Re: More ideas on anonymity
In-Reply-To: <9302272259.AA29137@netcom2.netcom.com>
Message-ID: <9302281129.aa16174@penet.penet.FI>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



> This may be an example of an intractable problem. A case where
> legitimate interests are mutually exclusive at least in practice of not
> in theory.

True. Sigh.

> If Johan has restricted output due to pressure from those communities,
> then he has already been forced to hobble his service's most significant
> *potential* benefit to the community.

Just want to clarify this... I did block access to groups outside alt.*
and soc.* for a week while the worst storm was raging, especially as
Karl Kleinpaste was threatening to kill the server by flooding. I did
re-establish the service as soon as there had been enough opposition to
Karl's suggestion.

At this point, only two groups are blocked, rec.nude and soc.singles,
both as a result of a formal poll on the group in question.

> If a serious whistlblower were to
> come along with some serious evidence and credibility, it is likely that
> he/she would want to post his/her evidence in one or more of the groups
> Johan has locked out!

I suppose this is why we are creating alt.whistleblowers. Other people
could forward those messages to any potentially blocked groups.

> I mean no aspersion on Johan here, he is laboring
> under pressure I'm sure, and he is a pioneer in all of this, and we are
> sharing his experience. I don't mean to take political sides either,
> both sides of the debate have legitimate arguments. In the one other
> post I made on this topic before, I received but one reply remarking
> that I "was preaching to the choir".

Well, I freely admit this is a learning experience for me. And I have
also started to realize that at some point I'm going to have to shut
donwn anon.penet.fi and set up Mark II, based on all the experience we
all have gained in this process. And I really do appreciate all the
enormously valuable experience and input this group has given me in this
matter!

> The mutually exclusive nature of these principles emerges in practice
> from what a former boss of mine called the human "ornery" factor. In
> this case that some number of individuals will exercise their "right to
> anonymity" not because they have to, but just because it's there.

Yes, I think I have seen enough good (bad) examples of this in action by
now, but I am afraid I'm going to see a lot more...

> Believe me I sympathize with this view. It keeps authorities and
> would-be authorities on notice that there are those who will test the
> limits of their rights and signal the rest of us if they are eroding. I
> also accept Hal's argument that we are protecting ourselves from
> possible future abuses of central authority. But I also sympathize with
> the sentiments of the other side, that most of the time it is desirable
> to put your name where your mouth/keyboard is. A consensual solution to
> this problem depends on a common political viewpoint, something that is
> certainly not in the cards for contemporary net participants.

Right. So for now we will just have to do a tightrope act... Anyone know
where I can get a pair of glittering thights?

	Julf





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: swc@uc1.ucsu.edu (Stuart W. Card)
Date: Sun, 28 Feb 93 09:09:37 PST
Subject: a few opinions, unasked
Message-ID: <9302281720.AA28414@uc1.ucsu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


1) Within a couple of years I am going to be setting up a network of
systems incorporating (among other functions) remailing.  I won't know
the 'true' identity of my subscribers any more than anyone else will.
If someone PROVES to me that a particular pseudonymous account has been
used for conspiracy to initiate force or committ fraud, I will shut it down.
But then, the (former) user can just obtain a new pseudonymous account
from me, and I won't even know it is the same guy.  So what's the point?
Quit discussing whether or not we SHOULD restrict anonimity or pseudonymity.
We CAN'T, because there are jerks like me who will set up systems which
will provide for total anonymity of subscriber applications.
End of thread, I hope.

2) Use of false ID is illegal in New York State, and (I think) throughout
the United States.  The definition of false ID is fuzzy, however.  If you
modify your driver's license or other government-issued ID, definitely a
crime.  However, if you obtain legitimate ID from someone under a name other
than the one you mostly use, that is not necessarily fake ID.  for instance,
if I am known to Joe's ID Cards-Are-Us as Mr. John Smith, and he issues me
an ID card in that name, neither of us has committed a crime, UNLESS there is
intent to use it to defraud or committ some other crime (such as obtain
admission to an alcohol-serving establishment if under legal drinking age).
How do I know? I moonlight as a bouncer at a bar, and (unique!) have actually
read SOME of the applicable law.

3) The ratio of philosphical ramblings to pragmatic how-to information is
pretty high.  For me personally, that means (S+N)/N < 0 dB.  Is there a
forum for discussion strictly of how to do it on a commercial basis or
society-affecting scale? I already have my philosophical house in order
(IMnotsoHO) and can't afford to waste time in discussion vs action.  I don't
wish to insult anyone, this discussion here has tremendous value, just not
to me right now.

4) Anyone got any idea how I plan to provide pseudonymous accounts on a
commercial (read, I MAKE MONEY AT IT) basis, while maintaining total
anonymity of subscriber applications (and pseudonymity of payments on
account)? I have a plan, but would like to see if it is obvious before
explaining it; also, I would like to see if there ar other ways to do it.

Who is John Galt?

--
Stuart W. Card <swc@uc1.ucsu.edu>




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Johan Helsingius <julf@penet.FI>
Date: Sun, 28 Feb 93 02:53:34 PST
To: Eric Hughes <hughes@soda.berkeley.edu>
Subject: Re: dispatches from the front lines of anonymity
In-Reply-To: <9302272115.AA08914@soda.berkeley.edu>
Message-ID: <9302281154.aa16279@penet.penet.FI>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



> Please advise.  alt.whistleblower, in addition to being a public good,
> is a great way to raise hell.

True. Actually, I want to ask for some help/advice. I am about to
implement alt.whistleblower on anon.penet.fi. But one thing I think I
would like some input on is the description text of the newsgroup for
the newsgroups file.

A more important matter is the way the group should be implemented.
Moderated or unmoderated doesn`t matter, as the server already knows how
to send messages to moderated groups to the moderator. But how should it
differ from other groups on anon.penet.fi? All groups will be able to
accept PGP-encrypted messages, but I was thinking of making a.w a
special case where id's aren't allocated at all, and every message would
just come from "an000000" or something. Is this a good idea? Pros are
that it would make it very hard to track down the real poster, cons that
it would be impossible to tell the different posters from each other,
thus not enabling informers to earn good or bad reputations, unless they
include key signatures or something.

Comments?

	Julf





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Johan Helsingius <julf@penet.FI>
Date: Sun, 28 Feb 93 03:25:51 PST
To: cypherpunks-request@toad.com
Subject: anon user on cypherpunks list
Message-ID: <9302281238.aa19179@penet.penet.FI>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Er... Seems somebody has added an13556@anon.penet.fi to the mailing
list, causing every message on the list to go through the server. This
results in everyone sending to the list being allocated an anon id!
Could you please change the address to be na13556@anon.penet.fi instead,
thus avoiding the problem (yes, I've implemented the feature, but I
don't want to announce it yet, as there are some implications I want to
fix first...). Also a *WARNING*... an13556@anon.penet.fi now knows the
anon id of everyone who have not set a password on anon.penet.fi, and have
sent messages to the list recently. So if you have been allocated an id
as a result of mailing to the list, you probably want to mail me and ask
to be deleted from the anon database.

	Julf (admin@anon.penet.fi)





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Matthew J Miszewski <MJMISKI@macc.wisc.edu>
Date: Sun, 28 Feb 93 11:55:56 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Fake ID to protect ID
Message-ID: <23022813532303@vms2.macc.wisc.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


 
 
  With regard to Thug's question about the use of false identification for legal
purposes, I did some cursory legal research on the subject.
 
  A search through LEXIS brings up only three cases throughout all of the
federal and state scourts.  The first case, and in fact the one most on point is
a 1991 US court of appeals case (LEXIS 219121).  In this case, the defendant
attempted to utilize the 'Thug defense' of no intent to defraud.  Unfortunately,
the court held that the actual making of false identification papers was the
illegal act and that the potential for illegal use was sufficient to merit
prosecution.
 
  There are a few possible ways a good attorney could get around this ruling
though.  First of all, the case is not a 'published' decision.  Therefore it
really holds little fmore than persuasive authority:).  Secondly, the defendant
in this case actually was involved in a conspiracy to commit illegal acts
(whereas Thug is only interested in protecting his true identity).  Finally,
there is an incredible void of case law on this specific subject.  That means
that a few cyber test cases making there way through the correct legal channels,
argued in the correct way, could start an actually legally recognized 'thug
defense'.
 
  Unfortunately, there are other problems (legal0 with the use of false ID.
Misrepresentation can be both tortious and can be utilized to weasel out of
otherwise sufficient contracts.  For the interests on this list, it would
probably be best to balance all of your interests and only use Thug's
suggestions when you are in realistic fear of abuse of your identity.
 
  I will do further research on the subject (This was only a quick search).
Anyone with other legal questions (NOT people looking for legal advice per se)
that I might hellp out with (RESEARCH ONLY) mail me privately.
 
mjmiski@macc.wisc.edu
 
-  Although I may detest what you say, I will defend with my life your right to
say it  - Voltaire
 




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: hkhenson@cup.portal.com
Date: Sun, 28 Feb 93 14:22:39 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: EFF Speaks to CIA
Message-ID: <9302281359.2.6481@cup.portal.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


A substantial number of you have probably seen this already, but if it
missed--well, it is worth reading.  Keith Henson
------
Remarks of John Perry Barlow
to the 
First International Symposium on National Security & National 
Competitiveness 
McLean, Virginia
December 1, 1993


I can't tell you the sense of strangeness that comes over 
someone who earns his living writing Grateful Dead songs, 
addressing people who earn their livings as many of you do, 
especially after hearing the last speaker. If you don't 
appreciate the irony of our appearing in succession, you have 
no sense of irony at all. You and I inhabit very different 
worlds, but I am pleased to note, as my presence here strongly 
suggests, these two worlds may be growing closer.

The reason I am here has absolutely nothing to do with the 
Grateful Dead. I'm here because I met a fellow named Mitch 
Kapor in 1989. Despite obvious differences, I felt as if we'd 
both been up in the same saucer or something...that we shared 
a sense of computers being more than just better adding 
machines or a better typewriters. We saw that computers, 
connected together, had the capacity to create an environment 
which human beings could and did inhabit.

Yesterday, I was encouraged to hear evidence that [former 
Presidential Science Advisor] Dr. Jay Keyworth and [Conference 
Organizer and former CIA agent] Robert Steele, might have 
been up in that saucer too. The people who share this 
awareness are natives of the future. People who have a hard 
time with it may always be immigrants.

When Mitch and I saw that computers had created a place, we 
started asking some questions about what kind of place it 
was....what were the operating terms and conditions of this 
place, what kinds of people already lived there, who was going 
to inhabit it, what was going on in it, did it have a name?

We decided to name it Cyberspace, after Bill Gibson's 
description of a futuristic place rather like it which we found in 
his novel Neuromancer. Rather than being a figment of Bill's 
imagination, we felt that Cyberspace was already up and 
happening.

Indeed, if you're having trouble with the concept, ask yourself 
where phone conversation takes place. That's right. Cyberspace 
is where you are when you're on the phone. It's also where 
most of your money is, unless you keep it in Krugerands buried 
out in the garden...which I suppose some folks in this room 
might just do. It's also...and I think this is very important... the 
place where the greater part of the world's business is 
happening now. 
So it's a highly significant locale, and yet it's invisible to most of 
the people who are in it every day of their lives. I believe it 
was Marshall McLuhan who said, "We don't know who it was 
that discovered water, but we're pretty sure it wasn't a fish..."

In any case, when EFF first got together, our principal concern 
was making certain the U.S. Constitution applied to Cyberspace. 
We could see the government, specifically the Secret Service, 
taking actions which made it obvious that they didn't quite get 
it. They didn't seem to be acting out of malice, but they were, 
at best, differently clued. They clearly didn't understand that 
the First Amendment applied as certainly to bytes as it did to 
ink on paper.

At the time we thought that we could just hire a few nasty civil 
liberties lawyers from New York to put the fear of God in them, 
and that would be that. But it's been like tugging at a thread on 
your sweater, where you begin to pull, and pretty soon you 
have more thread on the ground than on your back. It turns 
out that there are questions raised in this environment to 
which we don't have good answers. 
Indeed, it turns out that this is a place where the First 
Amendment...along with just about every other law on the 
planet...is a local ordinance. There are no clean jurisdictional 
boundaries. This is a place which may always be outside the 
law. This may be an unwelcome concept, but it is true, and it is 
something we will all have to grapple with as society moves 
into the virtual world.

I believe you folks in the Intelligence Community are going to 
be  challenged by these issues as directly as anyone. This is 
because intelligence, and especially the CIA and NSA, are 
supposed to work under stern guidelines intended to separate 
the domestic from the foreign. You're not supposed to be 
conducting domestic surveillance. Well, in Cyberspace, the 
difference between domestic and foreign, in fact the difference 
between any country and any other country, the difference 
between us and them, is extremely blurry. If it exists at all...

This is also an economic environment in which everyone seems 
to be everywhere at once. I hear you're becoming interested in 
protecting American Business from foreign espionage. But 
against this "everywhereness" it becomes very difficult to say, 
"Alright, this is our guy, this is General Motors, we're going to 
take care of his interests." Nothing is so cleanly delineated.

These are a few of the fundamental changes which arise as a 
result of literally moving out of the world of experience and 
onto the map of information. Another one which is especially 
pertinent to the people in this room, is what happens when you 
have direct e-mail access to every member of your 
organization.

This can have a terrifically decentralizing effect on structure. It 
weakens hierarchy. It flattens the organization. It can create 
one hell of a lot of confusion, even as it speeds response time. 
There are in this room representatives of some tall and rigid 
outfits. Prepare for the possibility that your organization is 
about to go all flat and squishy due to tenderizing influence of 
e-mail.

We are also looking at a complete redefinition of ownership 
and property. I mean, we now have the mind as our principle 
source of commercial goods. At last it seems we can we can 
really get something for nothing. As recently as fifteen years 
ago all new wealth derived from minerals extraction or 
agriculture. Everything else was simply passing it around. No 
longer must you rip your goods from the ground. You don't 
have to wait for the sun to grow some. New wealth can be had 
by just sitting around and rubbing some facts 
together...essentially what you folks have been doing all along. 
This economy of virtual substance is a fundamental change and 
one which you can exploit if you're willing. 
We're also looking at some fundamental shifts in the nature of 
property. This is going to be relevant to you as you move into a 
more open interaction with the rest of the world. In an 
information economy, much depends on the sanctity of 
copyright. But copyright, it turns out, derives most of its force 
from the physical manifestation of intellectual property.  
Copyright protects expression, the thing that happens when 
you print a book or press a record. In Cyberspace, you don't get 
that manifestation. It never goes physical.

So the bottles we have been relying on for the protection of our 
intellectual goods are disappearing, and, since we've been 
selling bottles and not wine all along, we will soon have a lot of 
wine and nothing to put it in. Interesting problems will arise. 
They're already upon us. 
In any case, when EFF saw the multitude of things going on in 
this arena, we battened ourselves down for the long haul, and 
we are dealing with a whole range of issues, including the Open 
Platform initiative. Which is our effort to try to deploy 
something like universal data service. 
We believe that the best thing that could happen for the 
American economy, and actually the best thing that could 
happen for liberty on the Planet Earth, would be to make 
everyone capable of jacking in if they want to. 
We find that other countries are lagging in this. For example, 
the Japanese see absolutely no use for high speed personal data 
connections. The folks at NTT certainly can't see any reason to 
trade their 70,000 operators on digital switches. So we have a 
significant leg up on the Japanese that is not well known in this 
country. 
Another thing that we are working on is the FBI's Digital 
Telephony proposal which is, as you may know, the idea that 
we should stop all telecommunications progress in this country 
in order to accommodate the FBI is just amazing to me, and yet 
it somehow manages to live on Congress. 
Also, for those of you whose badges say U.S. Government [code 
for National Security Agency], we are trying to overturn NSA's 
data encryption embargo. It's our position that trying to 
embargo software is like trying to embargo wind. This is a fact 
that you are going to have to come to grips with. Digitized 
information is very hard to stamp "classified" or keep 
contained. 
This stuff is incredibly leaky and volatile. It's almost a life form 
in its ability to self-propagate. If something hits the Net...and 
it's something which people on there find interesting...it will 
spread like a virus of the mind. I believe you must simply 
accept the idea that we are moving into an environment where 
any information which is at all interesting to people is going to 
get out. And there will be very little that you can do about it. 
This is not a bad thing in my view, but you may differ...

I'm going to talk a little bit now about the very nature of 
information. This conference, I must say, has blown me away. I 
had no idea there were people in your [the intelligence] 
community talking about these things. I am pleased and 
gratified by the folks I have met here and talked to personally, 
but I want to reiterate Dr. Keyworth's phrase yesterday: which 
is that government, especially American government, must end 
its obsession with secrecy.

We must do so because we are engaged in...and I don't want to 
use the word warfare here...we are engaged in a form of 
economic competition where our principal advantage is our 
ability to distribute information. It is not our ability to conceal 
it.

Perhaps this has always been true. Let me tell you a story. Last 
year, I was addressing the computer security establishment at 
the Department of Energy. These are the people in charge of 
protecting the computers that nuclear weapons get designed 
on.
The other keynote speaker at this conference was, uh, Edward 
Teller. [Laughter.] Yeah, well, I was pretty sure if evil walked 
the planet, its name was Edward Teller. Anyway, I got up and 
said that I wasn't sure that DOE's secrecy was an asset. I wasn't 
going to say that it was a liability, so much as beside the point. 
After all, I know how to make an atomic bomb. 
You give me five and a half pounds of weapons grade 
plutonium and a week in my garage and I'll give you a nuclear 
weapon. It will be dirty, but it will work. The problem for 
anyone who wants to do this is that they can't get enough 
industrial capacity ginned up to create the plutonium. I mean, I 
just can't get my high temperature gas diffusion centrifuges to 
work. Indeed, it takes a whole society to put them together, 
even if the design information is available. It is not the 
information, which is readily available, that is crucial. It is the 
ability to execute that is the critical factor.

I was interested to see how Dr. Teller would respond to that. To 
my surprise and satisfaction, he got up and agreed with me 
completely. He went on to say that he had never found a 
nuclear secret that the Russians could not obtain within a year 
of its development. Where they couldn't compete with us was 
in the areas where we were wide open. He cited the electronics 
industry, saying that at the end of World War II, we were 
about 20 years ahead of the Russians in nuclear weapons 
design, and roughly neck and neck in the electronics.

Both sides entered a closed program on nuclear weapons 
design. And we went into a wild free-for-all in electronics. I 
mean, you should know that in the computer business, there 
are so many loose lips, you actually have to really try not to 
learn what you competitor is up to. Computer scientists are the 
meetingest bunch of people you ever saw, and when they meet, 
they tell one anther everything.

The results of this approach speak for themselves. As Dr. Teller 
pointed out, by the time the Russians quit being a threat, they 
had moved to a position of parity with us in nuclear weapons, 
but they were 25 to 30 years behind us in electronics.

I suspect one reason for this conference is to figure out how 
you guys are going to make your living now that the Party's 
Over. I believe the Intelligence Community still has a role. We 
are entering the Information Age. And Information, after all, is 
what you do. You have an edge in the field, and I would hate to 
see you blow your lead. 
But there are some serious issues about information which 
must be dealt with, and they have almost nothing to do with 
whether it is open or closed.  The real questions regarding 
information relate to usability...whether or not it is meaningful, 
whether or not it is relevant, whether or not it accurate, 
whether or not it is genuinely useful. 
There is, for example, an enormous amount of information on 
the Net. But the signal-to-noise ratio on the net is terrible. 
There's an awful lot of racket. So I suppose you do get a kind of 
secrecy, rather as in those fancy restaurants with the highly 
reflective walls, where you can hear the people shouting at you 
at your table, but you can't make out what anyone else is 
saying for the hub-bub. It's the intimacy of white noise. 
You folks have some expertise in an important function: sorting 
out that which is relevant from the huge spray of data that is 
coming at everyone. That is an important problem that is 
largely overlooked...so far the software solutions to it don't 
strike me as being much good. We talk about "smart agents" 
but they aren't smart, they're pretty dumb. You send them out 
and they return with too much.

The problem is that the difference between data and 
information is meaning, something machines know little of. To 
determine whether data are meaningful, whether they are, in 
fact, information, you must pass them through a human mind. 
There is also a question of authority, reliability, and bias. For 
example, I think one of the things you will find in using open 
sources is that most media are intentionally designed to evoke 
a fearful response in the reader. I mean, fear sells, as well you 
know. 
Perhaps you have an important role in certifying the reliability 
of materials in open circulation. Perhaps you are already 
engaged in it. I recently got a call from a friend who is an 
expert on computer networking in the Confederation of 
Independent States, or whatever they call what's left of the 
Evil Empire these days. He was in a terrible state. He said, "I 
just got visited by the CIA, I don't know what to do. They 
showed up and wanted to know all about my most recent 
report. I'm afraid they're going to try to make me a CIA agent!" 
A scary thought, eh? 
I told him, "Look, it seems to me you already are a CIA agent." 
They're just trying to figure out if you're a good one!" 
We may find that there are many CIA agents, of widely 
varying reliability. The real CIA agents will have the subtler 
job of finding out which of them is telling the truth.

The most important problem which the intelligence community 
must now confront relates to your own bureaucratic sclerosis 
and the pace at which information moves through your 
honeycomb of secrecy. The future, as IBM is learning, will be to 
the supple and swift and not necessarily to the mighty.

In a world moving as rapidly as this one, information becomes 
incredibly time sensitive. Even if you do...as I think you 
absolutely must...eliminate the unnecessary classification 
within and without your organizations, you still have all the 
cumbersome buffers of bureaucracy to contend with. 
As I was preparing these remarks, I considered coming in here 
and suggesting that you break up the CIA into about five 
different private companies and go into business. That's 
probably too good an idea to implement. But it seems worthy of 
consideration. There is something that happens to your sense of 
urgency when you have a bottom line. You know that if you 
don't deliver, someone else will, which might be exactly the 
though to leave you on.

I would like to thank you very much for your indulgence of an 
entirely different perspective. I've genuinely enjoyed this 
opportunity to get to know you.





-- 
                    <<*>><<*>><<*>><<*>><<*>><<*>>                         
Cliff Figallo                                     fig@eff.org
Electronic Frontier Foundation                    (617)576-4500 (voice)
Online Communications Coordinator                 (617)576-4520 (fax)




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Seth Morris <Seth.Morris@lambada.oit.unc.edu>
Date: Sun, 28 Feb 93 12:04:18 PST
To: julf@penet.fi (Johan Helsingius)
Subject: Re: dispatches from the front lines of anonymity
In-Reply-To: <9302281154.aa16279@penet.penet.FI>
Message-ID: <9302281941.AA23759@lambada.oit.unc.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text


> accept PGP-encrypted messages, but I was thinking of making a.w a
> special case where id's aren't allocated at all, and every message would
> just come from "an000000" or something. Is this a good idea? Pros are
> that it would make it very hard to track down the real poster, cons that
> it would be impossible to tell the different posters from each other,
> thus not enabling informers to earn good or bad reputations, unless they
> include key signatures or something.

	I like the idea, but would this make it impossible to respond
anonymously and/or privately to a whistleblower? I couldn't write back
privately to compare evidence if I didn't want to go public with my
information yet (assuming that I had a similar interest, of course).
 	Of course, if they have included a public key I could post an
encrypted message to them, but is the idea to create a newsgroup where
much of the traffic could conceivably be encrypted E-mail?
	But, on yet another hand (I feel like I'm in _A Mote in God's 
Eye_), if a regular informational posting in a.w discussed these issues,
a whistleblower would be warned to post a publik key, a nom de guerre, and
(maybe) a regular anon ID, if they wished, or to join an anon pool.

 	To repeat: I do like the an00000 idea. But I think people may want 
E-mail response.

 Seth <seth.morris@launchpad.unc.edu>
	(Yay, I finally figured out +clearsig=on ! Now I need an option to
add a oublic-key block to a message before signing automatically!)




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Date: Sun, 28 Feb 93 15:45:58 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: CFP Costs Too Much!
Message-ID: <9302282344.AA12538@netcom.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


(I'm copying Bruce Koball, General Chair of the CFP Conference, on this
message, as I don't know if he gets the Cypherpunks list.)

Dave Deltorto is one of several people I know, including myself, who don't
like the prices of the upcoming Computers, Freedom, and Privacy Conference:

>.... I would also dearly like to attend CFP, but
>I haven't yet found a way to do it without money (anyone who knows a way I
>can volunteer my way in and help out please say so - I'll sweep up after,
>anything...).

In my opinion, $405 is way too much to pay for this conference. Science
Fiction conventions routinely get the use of major hotels at a far lower
per head price (from $40-$125 is typical). The BayCon convention takes over
most of the public facilities in San Jose's Red Lion Inn (several
ballrooms, many smaller rooms, and most of the public lobby areas), has
about 500 attendees (same as CFP), and charges less than $100 for 4 days
(and one-day memberships are typically around $30). And the "Hackers
Conference" has kept its cost down to around $300, which includes two
nights lodging and all meals (very sumptuous meals, too).

Granted, CFP puts out a nice transcript of the talks--credit them $20 for
that. Granted, a couple of meals are thrown in--credit them another $30 or
so. What's left is still too much. Yes, a "register early" discount
exists/existed, but inasmuch as there's a nonzero risk someone can't attend
(and hence loses what they paid, or some fraction of it), counting such
discounts is not really kosher. 

There are several possible reasons for the high fees: 

1. Price insensitivity. $405 is what the traffic will bear. Most attendees
are subsidized by their law firms (which often charge $200 or more per
hour, so $400 for a conference is practically invisible to them), their
corporations, or the government (taxpayers). I suspect most targeted
attendees are price-insensitive. 

I'm price-sensitive, because I have to _earn_ about $700-800 before taxes
to pay for the $405 being charged, and I have better uses for $405 (like a
new DAT machine).

2. "Everyone else is doing it." Conference prices have been skyrocketing
the last few years, although some conferences (like the SF conventions I
mentioned) are still price-conscious and hold down prices. 

If CFP meets their attendance goal of 550, I guess they'll have been
justified to price it as they did (though the mix of attendees could still
be an issue to consider). And if they fail to meet the goal of 550, even
with the comped or subsidized attendees, perhaps they can reconsider their
pricing.

3. Subsidies of journalists. In talking to several journalists and
journalistic wannabees, I've found they're getting "comped" passes. Thus,
the paying attendees are subsidizing the shmoozings and barhoppings of our
journalist friends! (This is not meant as an insult to the journalists out
there...I just can't see why they get subsidized attendance.) How important
a factor this is depends on the number of journalists, of course.

(With hundreds of new magazines every year, 50 channels of shit on the t.v.
(to borrow a phrase), and thousands of newsletters on every conceivable
subject, I am waiting for the day when there are more journalists at these
kinds of conferences than nonjournalists! They can all talk to themselves,
I guess.)

4. Other costs. And profits. Maybe it costs CFP much more to put on this
conference than it does some of the other conferences I've mentioned. Maybe
they have fewer volunteers.

In any case, I wish them luck. They are free to set their rates as they wish.

I don't plan to attend, in case I haven't already made that clear.

-Tim May


--
Timothy C. May               | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,  
tcmay@netcom.com        | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
408-688-5409               | knowledge, reputations, information markets, 
W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA       | black markets, collapse of governments.
Higher Power: 2^756839 | Public Key: MailSafe and PGP available.





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Eli Brandt <ebrandt@jarthur.Claremont.EDU>
Date: Sun, 28 Feb 93 16:23:50 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: anon user on cypherpunks list
In-Reply-To: <9302281755.AA13087@soda.berkeley.edu>
Message-ID: <9303010023.AA07585@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> For every reason you might want a pseudonym in the first place, you
> might also want a "pseudonym from your pseudonym," especially if you
> use it a lot.

A specific example: I am presently running a survey of drug prices,
and suggested that respondents might wish to reply through penet.
Unfortunately, I realized that I could not respond to these messages
without blowing my penet pseudonym.  Fortunately, I had never
actually used it, so I could safely "blow it".  At present, if I
need another penet pseudonym, I guess I'll create it through mail
games.  But IWBNI there were a built-in way to do this --
particularly for those who aren't able to hack mailers, who are the
ones who really need a service such a penet in the first place.

> Eric

	 PGP 2 key by finger or e-mail
   Eli   ebrandt@jarthur.claremont.edu




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@Athena.MIT.EDU>
Date: Sun, 28 Feb 93 13:57:19 PST
To: tony@morgan.demon.co.uk
Subject: Re: more ideas on anonymity
In-Reply-To: <2829@morgan.demon.co.uk>
Message-ID: <9302282156.AA25135@SOS>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


   Date: Sat, 27 Feb 93 23:59:30 GMT
   From: Tony Kidson <tony@morgan.demon.co.uk>

   > Ah, I see you are an absolute free-speach advocate.  The problem is that
   > the line between speech and acts can be fuzzy at times, especially in
   > the world of cyperspace model.

   What you say is true, but I still think that you need to have a 
   substantive act,  before you can apply *legal* sanctions.  The 
   way to prevent threats, is, as people have said in other posts, 
   to prevent the reception of anonymous mail by those who do not 
   want to receive it.  

   Speech does not harm anybody.  People acting on other's speech is 
   what does the harm.  *Free* speech is indeed useful. It's when 
   widely disseminated speech is in the hands of the few that its 
   power can be wielded against the citizen and then it is 
   unhealthy.

I see.  So you don't believe in libel or slander laws.

And NBC was perfectly justified in faking an explosion in a GM truck to
show it was unsafe, and broadcast it on prime-time TV.  And it didn't do
anybody any harm at all.  Uh huh.

Try again.....

						- Ted




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Eric Hughes <hughes@soda.berkeley.edu>
Date: Sun, 28 Feb 93 17:14:14 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: anon.penet.fi hacking
In-Reply-To: <DR9LZB7w165w@spectrx.saigon.com>
Message-ID: <9303010111.AA12729@soda.berkeley.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>The other remailers were supposed to add a "kill line" to do the
>same thing, but as far as I know this never happened.

Your call for this went unacknowledged but nevertheless listened to.
It was not until a week or two after the sig-kill stuff was over that
I came up with a solution.

The next revision of the remailer will have something like

	Body-Termination-Regex: <regex>

The first character in the body that matches the regex, and every
character after it, will be dropped.  This not only makes it a
one-liner in perl (!), but it means that the user can be as
arbitrarily complex in recognizing sig blocks as the are able.
Of course, we'll document the most common of these:

	Body-Termination-Regex: ^--$

For those of you who know nothing about regular expressions, this
recognizes a line containing two minus signs and nothing else.  If
your signature adder does it some other way, it's pretty much
automatically supported.  You could also put more of your signature in
the regex to ensure that it doesn't interfere unexpectedly with body
content.

Summary: user-defined, almost every case handled, not automatic.

I hate my sample header field name.  Please, someone think up a better
one.

Eric





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Eric Hughes <hughes@soda.berkeley.edu>
Date: Sun, 28 Feb 93 17:51:38 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Future of anonymity (short-term vs. long-term)
In-Reply-To: <9303010103.AA08082@toad.com>
Message-ID: <9303010148.AA16696@soda.berkeley.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Marc's short-term suggestion of bandwidth limiting from a particular
source seems like a reasonable exigency.  Let me suggest a way of
doing that which does not require keeping long-term logs.

Suppose your bandwidth limiter kept totals of all bytes sent in the
last week.  In order to keep that data current, it needs to know when
to remove byte counts that are a week old.  Thus it needs to keep logs
of the last week's worth of messages, at least in byte count form.

Instead of that, you can just make the byte count decay.  Once a day,
a process goes through the byte counts and reduces them.  Remove any
entries are <= 0.  If this decaying byte count is bigger than some
threshold, bounce the message.

I would suggest that the reduction equation be linear: multiply by
some constant between one and zero, and subtract off a fixed amount,
drop the fractional part.  The multiplicative factor, which I would
set between .9 and 1.0, means that an occasional large file could be
sent through without completely eliminating email delivery for a
while.  The subtractive amount cleans out the database more quickly.

Comments?

Eric




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Marc.Ringuette@GS80.SP.CS.CMU.EDU
Date: Sun, 28 Feb 93 16:43:02 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Future of anonymity (short-term vs. long-term)
Message-ID: <9303010042.AA07783@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Lance Detweiler lists some problems with freely available anonymity, and
suggests that those of us who are pushing for unrestricted anonymity are
unwise.  Many others on the list argue that unrestricted anonymity and
privacy are necessary and even inevitable.

First off, I should say that I think this is absolutely the most
critical issue that we cypherpunks must address:  how desirable
is anonymity, what restrictions should we accept and/or push for,
and what technological options can we offer as solutions?

Secondly, I think that some of us are talking past each other, by ignoring
the distinction between short-term and long-term solutions.  Lance, for
instance, concentrates on short-term problems with anonymity while ignoring
some easy-to-implement fixes for these problems in the medium to long term.
Tim May emphasizes the long-term inevitability of crypto anarchy while
skipping lightly over the practical problems of sysops trying to keep their
systems running in the short term.  Let's recognize the distinction between
short-term and long-term.  To help you out, I offer this handy diagram, which
I've filled in with my own opinions.

  Are restrictions
  on anonymity...           Desirable         Necessary         Feasible
                        ----------------------------------------------------
  Short-term  (3yrs)   |       No                Some             Yes       |
  Medium-term (10yrs)  |       No                No               Partly    |
  Long-term   (20yrs)  |       No                No               Partly    |
                        ----------------------------------------------------

More discussion of specific issues to follow in another message.  To sum
up, my opinions are that in the short term, remailers must try to be good
network citizens in order not to get kicked off the "one and only" network.
  In the long term, 


-- Marc Ringuette (mnr@cs.cmu.edu)



Subject: Future of anonymity (SHORT-TERM)

Lance Detweiler lists a few problems with freely available anonymity:
  -  newsgroup noise
  -  pornography GIFs
  -  email bombs / crashed computers
  -  Mafia & terrorist uses

He seems to believe that the best way to combat these problems is to
provide only limited anonymity, which is to be broken at the request
of the proper authorities.  [If I've misconstrued what you're saying,
Lance, I apologize.  Some cypherpunks are certainly saying this.]

I disagree that it is necessary for a remailer operator to reveal the sender
of a piece of mail under any circumstances, and I will not trust a remailer
which does not IMMEDIATELY THROW AWAY the correspondence between input and
output addresses.

I won't try to argue in detail that partial anonymity is not very useful.
I'll just say this:  if a remailer operator must be a moral arbiter of
when to release an anonymous address, then my assurance of anonymity
becomes much more tenuous and subjective, and the legal burdens on the
remailer operator become much greater.

---

I'd now like to deal with the practical objections to this suggestion
in the SHORT TERM.

First, let's postulate that anonymity is a desirable thing to have, if
we can limit its bad effects.  If we could solve the worst of the
practical problems, without keeping logs which allow tracing a message
to its source, wouldn't it be desirable to do so?

I would divide the problems into two types:  problems with volume and
problems with content.  The first three of Lance's objections were volume
problems; the last was a content problem.  My answer to the problems with
content:  tough.  It's a freedom of speech thing.

The only legitimate concern I see, in the short term, is anonymous
flooding.  This is going to be one of the toughest objections to
deal with in implementing an anonymous remailer, and one of the
biggest practical concerns, because there is the real possibility
of abuse of our poorly-controlled networks (for which the only
remedy to date has been to trace the problem to its source).



Here's my suggestion:  let's provide remailers which guarantee not to
flood the network with high volume, but keep no logs and are unable to
trace messages back to their source.  We can deal with the actual
mechanism of such volume control later; my point is that I'm suggesting
that the ONLY limitation we place on remailed messages is a volume limitation.
This restriction could of course go away once we have digital postage stamps,
but seems a reasonable one for remailers which don't charge money.



Remailer operators will have 

I propose the following solution:  that remailer operators voluntarily
compile aggregate "volume reports" 




I would predict that the primary means by which anonymity will be
restricted are:

    short-term:  crackdowns on anonymous remailing sites
    medium to long term:  by convincing most people to participate in 
        "real person only" newsgroups and to use "real person only" 
        email handlers.  These limitations could be implemented via 
        the PEM public key hierarchy, for instance.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Eric Hughes <hughes@soda.berkeley.edu>
Date: Sun, 28 Feb 93 18:05:54 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: header field indicating an anonymous address
Message-ID: <9303010202.AA17864@soda.berkeley.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Marc R. suggests that we standardize on a header field to indicate
that a message was anonymous.

I suggest "Anon-Sender:".  There's already a "Sender:" field in
RFC-822, indicating who sent the message, as separate from who wrote
the message.  The "Anon-Sender:" field should contain an email address
for the maintainer of the remailer. 

Why? To facilitate complaints. :-)

Eric




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: tlr1@acpub.duke.edu (Tristan Lanier Reid)
Date: Sun, 28 Feb 93 15:37:08 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: unsubscribe
Message-ID: <9302282335.AA16782@soc13.acpub.duke.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Please unsubscribe me as I am unable to handle the volume of 
your mail.

Thank you for your time.
				Sincerely,
				Tristan Reid

				tlr1@acpub.duke.edu

				



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Marc.Ringuette@GS80.SP.CS.CMU.EDU
Date: Sun, 28 Feb 93 17:03:49 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Future of anonymity (short-term vs. long-term)
Message-ID: <9303010103.AA08082@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Sorry, I sent my last message before it was ready (and before it got
divided into two separate messages).  It mostly says what I wanted it
to, so I won't bother you with another version.

On the SHORT-TERM end of things,  I have two more thoughts on how to
make truly anonymous remailers good net citizens:

  1.  Agree on a header line which identifies all messages coming out of 
      our remailers.  If someone wants to filter out all anonymous messages,
      I think we should help them to do so.

  2.  Here's my proposal for what kind of remailer logging to do:
          logging of source-to-destination mapping:  NONE.
          destination logging:  NONE.
          source logging:  on a machine-by-machine basis, log the total
              input volume over a fairly long period, with some random
              noise added.  When a source is providing too much volume,
              and it's not on your local list of "friendly" remailers,
              then take action to reduce the volume.  I suggest that the
              first action should be to INCREASE THE DELAY to reduce the
              volume-per-unit-time of messages from that site.  If the
              volume of spooled traffic from a site reaches a threshold, 
              only then start throwing away messages.


-- Marc Ringuette (mnr@cs.cmu.edu)




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: nowhere@bsu-cs.bsu.edu (Chael Hall)
Date: Sun, 28 Feb 93 17:08:13 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: anon.penet.fi hacking (fwd)
Message-ID: <9303010104.AA23332@bsu-cs.bsu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



>I'd like to point out that so far the wimsey remailer is the only
>useful remailer from my point of view because it's the only one
>which allows me to delete the automatic sig.  This is because it
>only forwards encrypted text and discards any appended unencrypted
>text.
>
>The other remailers were supposed to add a "kill line" to do the
>same thing, but as far as I know this never happened.
>
>--
>edgar@spectrx.saigon.com (Edgar W. Swank)
>SPECTROX SYSTEMS +1.408.252.1005  Silicon Valley, Ca

     Alright, I hear you, Mr. automatic sig (you really ought to
append it only when you want it).  I implemented a "kill line" in
my remailer.  All you have to do is put the line "--ignore--" exactly
as that, no spaces after it, no spaces before it, just a line precisely
like that and neither it nor the rest of the message will be put into
the outgoing message.  Edgar, you can test it by sending to my remailer
on this account.

Chael Hall

--
Chael Hall
nowhere@bsu-cs.bsu.edu, 00CCHALL@BSUVC.BSU.EDU, CHALL@CLSV.Charon.BSU.Edu
(317) 285-3648 after 5 pm EST
[non-automatic sig]





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: wcs@anchor.ho.att.com (Bill_Stewart(HOY002)1305)
Date: Sun, 28 Feb 93 17:06:13 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re:  Real life pseudonyms (was re: more ideas on anonymity)
Message-ID: <9303010106.AA15307@anchor.ho.att.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text


Jordan Hayes incorrectly (IMHO) states that "Banking and Tax regulations provide
solid legal ground for requiring banks to verify identity and tax status in tehe 
US."  There are really two halves to the problem:
- accounts paying interest - this is taxable, so they DO need your SSN,
	and you even have to tell them if they should do backup withholding.
	So you can have multiple accounts under different names if you're
	energetic about it, but they'll have the same SSN if you've only got 1.
	So of course the IRS will know.
- non-interest-paying checking accounts - remember those, from long ago ? :-)
	You could probably legally run a bank that didn't require SSNs 
	for these, though most banks don't.
	I haven't read through the immense pile of bank laws to find out
	what it takes to become a bank, or how much you can do if you're
	not a registered bank.

As far as "true names" go, in some states in the US, you can use any name
you want unless it's for fraudulent purposes, e.g. California ;
in other states they have this racket called "legally changing your name",
where you have to convince a government honcho to let you rename yourself,
with the implication that all your future transactions will happen under
your _new_ true name; New York and New Jersey are into this sort of thing.

(Offering a "name registration service" is a different game entirely,
though the free market is less likely to do so if there's a government
service already provided that you *have* to use for some purposes.)

Some places make it easier than others to build up ID under a new name;
the people I've known in the acting profession haven't had much trouble,
and if you're young and keeping the same first name, the line 
"my parents were divorced and I used the other name when I lived there"
seems to work fine; if you're female and keeping the same first name
you can mumble something about your first husband or maiden name.
In either case, the SS number is usually something you're stuck with,
so you just have to avoid using it when you can.

# Bill Stewart    wcs@anchor.ho.att.com  +1-908-949-0705 Fax-4876
# AT&T Bell Labs, Room 4M-312, Crawfords Corner Rd, Holmdel, NJ  07733-3030



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: wcs@anchor.ho.att.com (Bill_Stewart(HOY002)1305)
Date: Sun, 28 Feb 93 17:39:52 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: dispatches from the front lines of anonymity
Message-ID: <9303010139.AA15551@anchor.ho.att.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text


X-Real-Subject: Re: not assigning IDs for alt.whistleblower
X-Real-From: Richard M. Nixon
X-Real-Message-Body-Begin:
It's probably a reasonable policy - anybody who wants to can add a 
signature line or equivalent giving themselves a pseudonym, and
if they want private replies they can provide a PGP or RIPEM public key.
A clean way to avoid the problem of encrypted replies cluttering up the
newsgroup is to also create alt.whistleblower.followup or a.w.crypt,
with similar non-assignment of ids, so readers can easily skip over
the crypted private replies.
If some whistleblower, or some whistlelistener, is more trusting,
they can even post their an12345 address.

I *would* recommend the following policies -
- accept email in PGP, RIPEM, and also unencrypted MIME, X.400, and vanilla 
	formats- not everybody who wants to blow a whistle has the right-shaped
	whistle handy.  
- publish an "official" method for defining what part gets posted - e.g.
	Anonymous-Subject: Use me instead of the main header Subject:
	Begin-Anonymous-Message-Body:    .....
	End-Anonymous-Message-Body:
	as part of the *text* of the message, so that people with different
	mailers can be sure about what parts get kept and what don't -
	it would be real annoying to have the signature-stripper delete
	the good parts of a message because they looked like signatures,
	or leave on the signatures because they looked like text,
	but some mailers won't let your do what you want with headers.
	Also publish a policy for messages that _don't_ contain them.

	A proper approach might be to use the MIME headers, but accept them
	from inside the message body as well as from the headers of
	proper MIME messages, so people can do them by hand.
	This has the added advantage of supporting Content-Transfer-Encoding:
	headers so you can tell more easily which encryption was used,
	and so senders of unencrypted messages can use compression or 
	rot13 :-) to avoid having their message sent in obvious ascii.
	
X-Real-Signature:		"Maybe I _was_ a crook" 
X-Real-Message-Body-End:

				Bill

# Bill Stewart    wcs@anchor.ho.att.com  +1-908-949-0705 Fax-4876
# AT&T Bell Labs, Room 4M-312, Crawfords Corner Rd, Holmdel, NJ  07733-3030



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@Athena.MIT.EDU>
Date: Sun, 28 Feb 93 17:44:25 PST
To: Marc.Ringuette@GS80.SP.CS.CMU.EDU
Subject: Re: Future of anonymity (short-term vs. long-term)
In-Reply-To: <9303010103.AA08082@toad.com>
Message-ID: <9303010143.AA25226@SOS>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


   Date: Sun, 28 Feb 1993 19:59-EST
   From: Marc.Ringuette@GS80.SP.CS.CMU.EDU

     1.  Agree on a header line which identifies all messages coming out of 
	 our remailers.  If someone wants to filter out all anonymous messages,
	 I think we should help them to do so.

This would indeed be a considerate thing to do.  In the short run, the
only way a mailing list maintainer can avoid being abused by someone
twit determined to hide behind your network of maintainers is to
disallow anonymous postings altogether.

Since John Gilmore, the maintainer of the Cypherpunks mailing list, is
one of the absolute free speach advocates --- let me ask a question
directly at you:  What would you do if sometime next week, someone
decided to flood the Cypherpunks mailing list with a large amount of
trash postings, routed through different combinations of remailers?  Let
us assume that the trash is generated by grabbing varying snippets from
USENET articles, so that current AI technology is not able to
distinguish a true Cypherpunks submission from the flooded trash
postings.  What would you do?  Now let's also suppose someone does the
same thing to all of the GNU newsgroups.  What would you do then?

I ask these questions well aware that somewhere out there, some immature
twit might get an idea from this scenario, and make the above questions
less hypothetical.  :-( 

(Sorry for sounding so cynical, but after being a News admin at MIT for
a long time, and dealing with a lot of people suffering from severe
cases of freshmanitis, I have a less than optimistic view about human
nature.)

	     source logging:  on a machine-by-machine basis, log the total
		 input volume over a fairly long period, with some random
		 noise added.  When a source is providing too much volume,
		 and it's not on your local list of "friendly" remailers,
		 then take action to reduce the volume.  I suggest that the
		 first action should be to INCREASE THE DELAY to reduce the
		 volume-per-unit-time of messages from that site.  If the
		 volume of spooled traffic from a site reaches a threshold, 
		 only then start throwing away messages.

This doesn't work.  Someone clever could easily redirect the message
through different (non-anonymous) SMTP servers before the message
entered the remailer network; this would completely defeat the volume
logging, and while the first hop would still be logged somewhere, unless
the remailer administrator reveals the input/output address mapping,
you'd still have no way to trace the message from the destination to the
source.

							- Ted





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: thug@phantom.com (Murdering Thug)
Date: Sun, 28 Feb 93 17:58:11 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re:  Real life pseudonyms (was re: more ideas on anonymity)
In-Reply-To: <9302281619.AA14306@IMSI.COM>
Message-ID: <m0nSze4-000jqOC@phantom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Jordon Hayes writes: 
> 
> 	From thug@phantom.com Sun Feb 28 10:48:57 1993
> 
> 	For instance, can I walk into a U.S. bank, present false ID,
> 	and obtain a checking account to use for legitimate reasons?
> 
> Banking and Tax regulations provide solid legal ground for requiring
> banks to verify identity and Tax status in the US.  Answer: no.  By
> definition, there are no "legitimate" reasons for having a checking
> account in this country that is unaccountable.  There are plenty of
> other ways of hiding cash and money transactions without involving the
> US banking system.  They don't want you to do this ...

Yes, I know they don't want me to do this because they don't respect my
privacy.  Not because I am doing anything illegal.  If I pay my taxes on
the money, I should be allowed to stash it anywhere I fucking please.

> 	I'm not stealing any money/products/services from anybody, I'm
> 	only using a pseudonym.
> 
> No, you're just avoiding the accountability of your money.  This is
> akin to not reporting income.  It's patently illegal.  You can stand
> down your color PostScript printer now ...

I never said the checking account would be used for tax evasion.  Assuming,
I pay taxes on all my income, I don't see why it should be illegal to 
deposit it in a checking account under, let us say, my dogs name. Hell, there
are these old ladies who die and leave all their money to their cats, right?
So I assume the cats must have somekind of bank accounts / trusts.  What if
I want to set up a bank account for my dog? I don't see why that should
be illegal.  I mean if it's a problem with setting up accounts under
non-existant people's identities, one could always use the family pet as
the bank account holder.

Thug




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: strat@intercon.com (Bob Stratton)
Date: Sun, 28 Feb 93 18:28:35 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: header field indicating an anonymous address
In-Reply-To: <9303010202.AA17864@soda.berkeley.edu>
Message-ID: <9303010227.AA18304@intercon.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>>>>> Eric Hughes <hughes@soda.berkeley.edu> writes:

	Eric> Marc R. suggests that we standardize on a header field
	Eric> to indicate that a message was anonymous.

	Eric> I suggest "Anon-Sender:".  There's already a "Sender:"
	Eric> field in RFC-822, indicating who sent the message, as
	Eric> separate from who wrote the message.  The "Anon-Sender:"
	Eric> field should contain an email address for the maintainer
	Eric> of the remailer.


I think that's certainly a viable idea. Of course, the Sender: field
is more honored in the breach than the observance by many mailers.
Another thing to remember is "Errors-To:" which can save a lot of
grief when handling bounces. 

	Eric> Why? To facilitate complaints. :-)

It would warm my heart to see questions like this come up at IETF
meetings. Keep up the good work.

--Strat






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Date: Sun, 28 Feb 93 21:37:49 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Handling Abuses of Remailers
Message-ID: <9303010536.AA10591@netcom.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I'll keep this one very short.

* To handle _abusive volumes_ through remailers, charge for remailing.
Short term, this may be a problem, but this is the long term market
solution.

* To handle _abusive messages_ through remailers, ignore them. "Sticks and
stones" and all that. Put positive reputation filters in place. Accept
e-mail only through those you know or have reason to trust.

As Sandy Sandfort so cogently put it, punish the perps, not the words of
the perps. This is the basis of our society, and a good basis, too. 

-Tim May

 
--
Timothy C. May               | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,  
tcmay@netcom.com        | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
408-688-5409               | knowledge, reputations, information markets, 
W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA       | black markets, collapse of governments.
Higher Power: 2^756839 | Public Key: MailSafe and PGP available.





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Eric Hughes <hughes@soda.berkeley.edu>
Date: Sun, 28 Feb 93 21:40:04 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: A Modest Proposal
Message-ID: <9303010536.AA07263@soda.berkeley.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



I wrote:
>Acknowledgement that a procedure is an exigency does not make that
>procedure desirable of itself.  All differential carriage based on
>content is censorship.  I acknowledge the exigency of certain forms of
>censorship in currently deployed anonymous systems.

A member of the list wrote back to me to say that this went over his
head because he wasn't a lawyer.  I am not a lawyer either.  Since a
compact statement has been too compact, allow me to be more verbose.

An exigency is something you do because you have to in order to
accomplish something else.  It's not something you do because someone
told you to or because you promised to do it.  Exigencies, if you
don't like them, are often called 'necessary evils,' with all the
connotations of that phrase.  In this case, restrictions on remailers
are an exigency, something you might have to do to stay on the net.

Now just because you have to do something doesn't mean that's a good
thing.  In California, you have to give out your thumbprint in order
to get a driver's license.  Giving the thumbprint is an exigency.  I
did not want to do that; I don't think it's a good thing; I did it
anyway because I wanted a driver's license more than I wanted my
thumbprint not to be digitized.

Differential means that two things are not the same and has the
connotation that one is preferable to the other.  Carriage is the noun
form of the verb 'to carry' and in this context refers to the act of
carrying an electronic message.  Thus differential carriage is
carrying some messages preferentially, such as refusing to mail to or
from a particular site, or to delay or alter some messages but not
others.

I claim that all differential carriage where the differences in how
the messages are carried arise from the content (or expected content)
of those messages is, in fact, censorship and should be called such.
If am operate an anonymous service and I refuse to pass a message
because someone has complained about it, I have exercised a preference
and created a difference in the way I treat the message.  I have
exercised censorship over that message.  I have presented my service
as a public utility, and yet I have created a difference in how I
treat messages.  My domain of potential censorship is not large, but
it is there.

It is an unfortunate fact of the internet that there will be pressure
brought to bear against the operators of anonymous remailers, and that
in the interim such pressure might be strong enough to force such
operators off the net.  Some restrictions against content might be
necessary to keep these services online.  If so, then I believe that
these restriction should be implemented.  I'd rather have the services
running.

Nonetheless, I deplore any such restrictions.

And if it not perfectly clear by now, let me finally state that I am
in agreement with Lance Detweiler on this point, that some restriction
may be necessary in order to keep anonymous services online.  But that
said, I still don't like it.

I will continue to dislike it, and I will work to make the necessity
for restrictions disappear.

Eric




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: nobody@alumni.cco.caltech.edu
Date: Sun, 28 Feb 93 22:05:13 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Infrastructure
Message-ID: <9303010605.AA10013@alumni.cco.caltech.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

Some time back there was some debate here about whether MIME
("Multipurpose Internet Mail Extensions") features could be exploited
to make encryption easier to use.  I didn't pay much attention at the
time, because I didn't know anything about MIME.  But then a couple of
weeks ago John Gilmore posted about Metamail, a software system
designed to make it easy to integrate MIME into commonly-used mailers.

I've played with Metamail a bit, and I do think this could be a good
approach.  Metamail basically performs a mail-sorting function,
automatically passing mail which has the MIME "Content-type" header to
a filter or display program based on a very flexible "mailcap" file.
To add PGP (or PEM, or RIPEM) support would be a matter of defining a
Content-type header for this application, then creating the
appropriate 1-line entry in the mailcap file.  This does sound like a
pretty easy way to add this capability.

The nice thing is, Metamail has already done the work of figuring out
how to patch a whole bunch of different mailers to add this support.
By using metamail we would be leveraging off this already-existing
work.  Here are some excerpts from the "mailers.txt" file that comes
with the distribution, written by Nathaniel S. Borenstein:

>  Abstract
>  
>  It is surprisingly easy to use the RFC1049 "Content-type" header to turn
>  virtually any mail reading interface into a multi-media mail reading
>  interface.  Mail readers are simply modified to use the new "metamail"
>  program whenever they receive non-text mail.  The metamail program is
>  itself easily customizable by the use of a "mailcap" file that specifies
>  the media types supported by a given site or user.  Given the existence
>  of the metamail program,  this document explains how to add multimedia
>  support to sixteen very different mail reading programs, including all
>  of the most popular UNIX mail reading programs and (so far) one DOS mail
>  reading program.  
>  [...]
>  The Basic Idea
>  
>  Basically, there are only two things you have to do to each mail reading
>  program:
>  
>  1.  Make the mail reader notice the special header ("Content-type") that
>  marks a message as a non-text message.  (In the case of mail readers
>  that already understand certain content-types, such as Andrew, the mail
>  reader must be modified only to deal with the content-types it does not
>  already know how to handle.
>  
>  2.  When the special header appears, instead of (or, if it's much
>  easier, in addition to) showing the user the body of the message, the
>  mail reader must send that body off to the metamail interpreter.  The
>  metamail interpreter includes features that deal with the diverse
>  situations of terminal-oriented and window-oriented mail readers.
>  [...]
>  A Variety of Mail and Bulletin Board Reading Interfaces 
>  
>  With this document, you can patch all of your site's mail reading
>  interfaces to support whatever multimedia formats are deemed useful at
>  your site.  This means that those who regularly use the multimedia tools
>  can begin to send mail in those formats freely, without worrying about
>  the ability of any local user to interpret the mail.  It is my intent to
>  make this document exhaustive; as time goes on, I hope it will grow to
>  include an ever widening set of mail reading interfaces.  Currently it
>  includes all of the mail reading interfaces that I know to be in use
>  anywhere in Bellcore's research laboratories.
>  
>  Currently this document describes how to add support for the following
>  mail readers:
>  
>        Berkeley Mail (/usr/ucb/Mail, /usr/ucb/mail, and Tahoe mail)
>        SunMail (another version of Berkeley mail, but rather different)
>        Xmail (an X11 interface to Berkeley mail)
>        Mailtool (older versions of a SunTools interface to Berkeley mail)
>        Imail (Bellcore MICE mailer)
>        PCS readmail/rdmail/sreadmail (another Bellcore mailer)
>        MH -- Rand Message Handling System
>        XMH -- X11 Interface to Rand Message Handling System
>        Rmail -- GNU Emacs mail reading package
>        VM -- Another GNU Emacs mail reading package
>        MH-E -- Yet another GNU Emacs mail reading package (GNU interface to MH)
>        CUI -- Andrew low-end mail reader 
>        VUI -- Andrew termcap-based mail reader
>        Messages -- Andrew multimedia mail reader
>        BatMail -- Andrew Emacs mail-reading interface
>        Elm -- Mail reader from HP.
>        Mush -- Yet another popular mail reader
>        Msgs -- simple Berkeley bulletin board reader
>        UUPC --a mail reading program for MS-DOS
>        TRN -- a threaded netnews reader.
>  
>  
>  If you have mail readers that are not dicussed here, you will still
>  probably find some of this code useful as a model.  If you develop a
>  patch for some other mail reader, and you send it back to me, I'll
>  include it in future versions of this document.

I am very impressed with the range of mailers covered here.
Unfortunately, access to source is needed for most of the patches.
But my guess would be that patched versions would become available
even to people who don't have source.

I'm not really sure what is happening with PGP specifically in terms
of MIME.  I think there has been some work done with PEM integration.
There doesn't seem to be any reason why these programs can't integrate
nicely with MIME, and this Metamail package looks like it might be the
most cost-effective way of getting widespread encryption into use.

Hal

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From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: jordan@imsi.com (Jordan Hayes)
Date: Sun, 28 Feb 93 20:08:42 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re:  Real life pseudonyms (was re: more ideas on anonymity)
Message-ID: <9303010316.AA24294@IMSI.COM>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


	From wcs@anchor.ho.att.com Sun Feb 28 20:56:24 1993

	non-interest-paying checking accounts - remember those, from
	long ago ? :-) You could probably legally run a bank that
	didn't require SSNs for these, though most banks don't.

Banks need your SSN (at least) for being able to report to the IRS
anything they are required to report.  This can include interest
payments, but also includes things like making cash transactions of
more than $10k.  Bank accounts *must* be fully documented in this
country.  Switzerland, and certain small islands have more lax rules.

The USA does not.

Privacy is one thing.  Money is another, at least in this country.

/jordan




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu
Date: Sun, 28 Feb 93 21:18:45 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: some PRACTICAL ideas on ...
Message-ID: <9303010517.AA10570@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Ahem, well, there have been some complaints of too much impractical
philosophizing and ranting of late, so here's my penance. Notes on how
to protect alias files, ideas on digital money, and an excerpt on
computer raid techniques from The Hacker Crackdown by Bruce Sterling. 
(Disclaimer: In no way should any of this be contrued as encouraging or
advocating destruction of evidence.)

self-Encryption time bombs
--------------------------
Some lost soul asked an excellent question about a week ago regarding
how to protect things like the alias file of an anonymous server from
attack, possibly using encryption. This is actually a very interesting
and difficult problem, and I've been rolling it around in my brain a
bit, and some things are now rattling out onto the keyboard. The
question applies really in general: how do you simultaneously use and
protect data from prying eyes?  I don't think there are really any
simple and ingenious approaches, or they might have been suggested by
now. Actually, the silence on the topic assures me that its indeed rather difficult.

One idea is to keep the only the encrypted version in permanent
storage. Keep the usable copy in something volatile like memory (e.g. a
Ramdisk). This makes it much less solid.

Another idea is to have a `time-bomb' encryption device. Here's the
idea applied to  a remailer. Every few hours the remailer asks for the
owner to type a password. If the meow isn't answered, it panics and
locks up everything, electronically `burning' anything important and
encrypting stuff that needs to be kept around.

This of course is problematic because if someone grabbed the server
they could utilize it in the time window. Ok, so imagine that the
server can somehow `sense' whether its real owner is present and
typing. This could mean that the owner types in a certain way or runs a
dummy command at least once an hour or whatever, or has his foot on a
footpedal or whatever.  Again, the server panics if it sees something awry.

Also, note that usually computers are switched off and cables unplugged
when confiscated. If the interesting stuff is in only in RAM, no
problemo.  This gives other ideas though. When a certain cable is
unplugged, *poof* goes certain data or whatever. Ideally there would be
a daemon that is always alive (even with switched off power) that could
deal with the signal that something bad has happened.

Another idea is to check for operator signals at boot time.  When the
confiscator boots the computer (assuming they do, and not unplug the
hard drive for analysis) the computer could look for the cue and say
something like ``one monent, loading system'' while it is in a mad dash
to encrypt everything important (but it must delete the password used
for this at the end, of course!). Then it could give a regular login
prompt and even let in the infiltrator.

Finally, note that in raids usually the operator is taken away from the
computer immediately (see attached notes) while the confiscators (I'm
trying to stay neutral here) grab all the hardware. Hence, a `direct'
signal to the computer that requires the operator to do something and
the computer to respond is difficult in these situations. But the
possibility of rigging panic-encrypt buttons in surreptitious places
all over your house (flush!!!)  is not completely outlandish.

digital $$$
-----------

There seems to be a lot of interest in this topic. Now, unfortunately I
think anyone who wants to set up a *real* bank on the internet right
now and handle transactions via email would really swiftly arouse the
fearsome ire and wrath of vast segments of the net.  Whatever, I'd like
to point out that it is entirely feasible *right now* using *credit
cards*. There are obviously automated credit card machines that can
make transactions solely electronically based only on that lovely
*data* cypherpunks love so much (card # and exp. date).  Maybe some
even have RS232 interfaces! (for the brain dead, that means they'd be
as trivial and familiar to interface to a computer as MODEMs!).

Imagine this scenario: a banking server! user registers with the server
by giving card data.  He can then let other businesses make debits
through the server to his account, with all the
cryptographic/authentication assurances that this can only happen when
he permits, of course.

Anybody who ever started doing this, I think there should be at first
*huge* amounts of verification, like email sent to the user asking for
confirmation of every transaction, monthly statements, ceilings, etc. 
But *wow* think--its all entirely doable right now!  If the banker
wanted to he could even deal with requests to open real accounts with
regular money.  But this is probably much farther off--the idea of the
server as nothing but a link to credit cards is very convenient and
more accessable, it seems to me. (The case could be made, if initially
the service was free, that no commercial service was being performed.)
Imagine being able to write programs that send mail to a server to bill
users for services. Neat!  But OOH the phreakers would have a field day
with this kind of thing if it wasn't AIRTIGHT SECURE.

* * *

Now a little transcription gift to the net. I found the following
account of the typical `hacker raid' interesting.  It comes from the
book `The Hacker Crackdown' by Bruce Sterling (1992 Bantam books). p160
 The account is mostly based on U.S. police tactics during the
Operation Sun Devil raid in the early 1990s.

A typical hacker raid goes something like this. First, police storm in
rapidly, through every entrance, with overwhelming force, in the
assumption that this tactic will keep casualties to a minimum. Second,
possible suspects are removed immediately from the vicinity of any and
all computer systems, so that they will have no chance to purge or
destroy evidence.  Suspects are herded into a room without computers,
commonly the living room, and kept under guard--not *armed* guard, for
the guns are swiftly holstered, but under guard nevertheless. They are
presented with the search warrant and warned that anything they say may
be held against them. Commonly they have a great deal to say,
especially if they are unsuspecting parents. 

Somewhere in the house is the `hot spot'--a computer tied to a phone
line (possibly several computers and several phones). Commonly it's a
teenager's bedroom, but it can be anywhere in the house; there may be
several such rooms. This `hot spot' is put in the carge of a two-agent
team, the `finder' and the `recorder.'  The finder is computer-trained,
commonly the case agent who actually obtained the search warrant from a
judge.  He or she understands what is being sought and actually carries
out the seizures: unplugs machines, open drawers, desks, files,
floppy-disk containers, and so on.  The recorder photographs all the
equipment, just as it stands--especially the tangle of wired
connections in the back, which can otherwise be a real nightmare to
restore.  The recorder also commonly photographs every room in the
house, lest some wily criminal claim that the plice had robbed him
during the search.  Some recorders also carry videocams or tape
recorders; however, it's more common for the recorder simply to take
written notes.  Objects are described an numbered as the finder seizes
them, general on standard preprinted police inventory forms.

Even Secret Service agents were not, and are not, expert computer
users.  They have not made, and do not make, judgments on the fly about
potential threats posed by various forms of equipment.  They may
exercise discretion, they may leave Dad his computer, for intance, but
they don't *have* to.  Standard computer crime search warrants, which
date back to the early 1980s, use a sweeping language that targets
computers, most anything attached to a computer, most anything used to
operate a computer---most anything that remotely resembles a
computer--plus most any and all written documents surrouding it. 
Computer-crime investigators have strongly urged agents to seize the works. 





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@Athena.MIT.EDU>
Date: Sun, 28 Feb 93 19:21:00 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Piercing anonymitiy and censorship
Message-ID: <9303010319.AA25260@SOS>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I noticed that in several postings, people have made the jump that
revealing the real person (or the previous hop in a remailer chain) from
an anonymous remailer is tantamount to censorship.  I'd like to call
into question that assumption.

In many ways, I have a lot of sympathy with the Libertarian position ---
whether or not I think it would realistically work as a system of
governement is another question.  In any case, I don't like censorship
in any form.  But disclosing who sent a particular piece of anonymous
mail is not the same as censorship.  I believe in free speach, but
today, if someone violates the responsibility that goes along with free
speach --- by yelling at the top of his/her lungs at 4am in the morning,
when I am trying to sleep, or by libelling or slandering me ---- I have
legal recourse; I can call the police and have him/her arrested for
disturbing the peace, or I can sue him/her for libel or slander.

But by making anonymous remailers airtight, you are removing the
possibility for recourse, and thus removing the burden of personal
responsibility from the sender of these messages.

Perhaps there are people who believe Free Speech should be so much of an
absolute that you should be allowed to scream at the top of their lungs
at 5am in the morning in a residential area, and that libel and slander
laws shouldn't exist.  But it's not fair to call that a mainstream
position.  And it is unreasonable to assume that as an axiom.

						- Ted

P.S.  It is true that by revealing the identity of an user of a
remailer, you are breaching their privacy --- however, most people also
don't believe that the right to privacy is absolute.  It certainly
isn't explicitly listed in the U.S. Constitution.   While, I also
believe very strongly in a right to privacy, there are certainly times
--- for example when someone is operating under a false name to commit
fraudulent acts --- that a person's privacy should be breached.  

While it is much simpler to say "the right of privacy is always supreme
over all other considerations", or "the right of free speech is supreme
over all other considerations," that is a very simplistic view which I
don't believe is very realistic.   In any case, it is certainly not
widely held.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: jordan@imsi.com (Jordan Hayes)
Date: Sun, 28 Feb 93 20:08:21 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re:  Real life pseudonyms (was re: more ideas on anonymity)
Message-ID: <9303010324.AA24305@IMSI.COM>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


	>>> So I assume the cats must have somekind of bank accounts
	...

[ maybe you're kidding? ]

The way those old coots leave their money to their cat is to set up a
trust with an executor (human) who pays the bills incured by the cat.
The cat never actually receives money, just services that are paid for
by the executor.

-----

This is silly.  You must (under US Banking Regulations) provide a SSN
to open any kind of account.  This includes (but is not limited to)
non-interest bearing accounts.  Any bank that would open you an account
without proof of who you are is asking for a lot of trouble.

/jordan




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu
Date: Sun, 28 Feb 93 21:41:19 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: more annoying philosophizing on anonymity
Message-ID: <9303010540.AA10913@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


OK, I'll keep this brief. Yes, the postal service delivers anonymous
mail. Yes, you can make anonymous telephone calls using pay phones. 
But like all hastily construed analogies, they fail in the magnified
specifics.  The problem here is that the fragile remailers being built
right now are operated by *individual users*, while these other
services are parts of vast public infrastructures. Now, until anonymous
servers become part of the vast public infrastructure (I'll give us all
the benefit of the doubt on this one), operators will be *extremely*
vulnerable to what goes through their remailers. 

All this idealistic ranting about free speech is really inspiring (uhm,
occasionally) but it doesn't help people whatsoever (in fact, it
clearly is a very strong turn-off!) who want to establish remailers and
anonymous posting services *right now*.  For their sake, please switch
off the impassioned speeches for unattainable lofty heights.  (My
previous message is my own feeble gesture of penance.)  These people
will go somewhere else if they find that our ideas are hopelessly
naive, impractical, unrealistic, etc.

Somehow, I just get the feeling that people won't be quite so
uninhibited and be a bit more subdued when the first cypherpunk
operator is jailed on contempt-of-court charges for refusing to decrypt
his log/alias files, or prosecuted for destruction of evidence, or
whatever. (Or maybe this would be a call-to-arms on the level of the
Alamo or Pearl Harbor.)

Mr. Ringuette is discerning in his view that some
talking-past-each-other is going on based on issues of time frames and
assumed/hidden agendas; and that the issue is the most serious one
facing us *right now* is right on target.

Please accept some minor sacrifices in the short term for some vast
gains in the future.  I think if we take the position that some ugly
and gross mechanisms for anonymity limitations are put into place right
now, they can be training wheels that will eventually mostly be taken
off in the future, but in the meantime help to convince the world of
our `good faith' intent, and serve as practical models for future
systems. (What, you say we don't have good faith or practical systems? 
Maybe I'm seriously deluding *myself*.)




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: hkhenson@cup.portal.com
Date: Sun, 28 Feb 93 23:22:10 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: more annoying philosophizing on anonymity
Message-ID: <9302282241.1.9858@cup.portal.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Re this thread, and picking up a current theme, what do you think would
happen if a message claiming to be responsible for the WTC blast came
through an anon remailer?  Keith Henson




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: ALAN DORN HETZEL JR <dorn@indigo.mese.com>
Date: Sun, 28 Feb 93 22:45:09 PST
To: cypherpunks@indigo.mese.com
Subject: anonymity + untraceable digital money = potential problems
Message-ID: <00968D43.DD87FB00.21534@INDIGO.MESE.COM>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Dear Group,

I believe that I see a potential serious problem with they onset of
truly unbreakable anonymous communication combined with untraceable
digital cash.

The problem is that crimes such as blackmail and extortion would become
absolutely impossible to defend against.  Kidnapping for ransome would
get a LOT easier.

One of the serious deterrents to crimes such as kidnapping is the 
probability that one will get caught attempting to communicate ones
demands or collect the payment.  If one can make TRULY anonymous demands
and receive payment which is TRULY untraceable, one can strike without
warning and then proceed virtually without risk.

I could send you an anonymous note threating to poison your dog, kill
your wife, burn down your house, whatever..., ... unless you pay me
$$$ in untraceable digital cash.  What can you do?  You pay and I go
my merry way with your money, or you assume I am bluffing and don't pay.

MANY PEOPLE WILL NOT CALL THIS BLUFF, and there is the serious problem...

I foresee a great way for jerks to "earn extra income in their spare time"
threatening hundreds of people in mass anonymous mailings.  Some of these
folks will be scared enough to pay off.  Where is the risk to the person
who commits these acts?  He's COMPLETELY anonymous!

Food for thought.

Dorn





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Karl Barrus <elee9sf@Menudo.UH.EDU>
Date: Sun, 28 Feb 93 21:24:01 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Cypherpunk remailers 03/01/93
Message-ID: <199303010522.AA03559@Menudo.UH.EDU>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



The list of cypherpunk remailers known to me:

 1: hh@pmantis.berkeley.edu 
 2: hh@cicada.berkeley.edu 
 3: hh@soda.berkeley.edu 
 4: nowhere@bsu-cs.bsu.edu 
 5: ebrandt@jarthur.claremont.edu 
 6: hal@alumni.caltech.edu 
 7: remailer@rebma.mn.org 
 8: elee7h5@rosebud.ee.uh.edu 
 9: phantom@mead.u.washington.edu 
10: hfinney@shell.portal.com 
11: babani@cs.buffalo.edu 
12: remail@extropia.wimsey.com 

NOTES:
#1-5	no encryption of remailing headers
#6-12	support encryption of remailing headers
#2	requires remailing request to appear in header
#12	requires text to be encrypted along with remailing request
#7,#12	introduce larger than average delay

/-----------------------------------\
| Karl L. Barrus                    |
| elee9sf@menudo.uh.edu             | <- preferred address
| barrus@tree.egr.uh.edu (NeXTMail) |
\-----------------------------------/




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: gnu (John Gilmore)
Date: Sun, 28 Feb 93 23:31:30 PST
To: ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu
Subject: Re: Anonymity in the real world
In-Reply-To: <9302280259.AA20523@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Message-ID: <9303010731.AA18617@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> I want to see illegal, sinister, and evil groups like the Mafia to
> flourish, using new technology like networks to perpetrate their
> patriotic services...

> Although I haven't personally yet had the great joy of this, I can't
> wait to receive an anonymous death threat or ransom notice via email,

> Imagine the splendor of delivering an anonymous note to the mayor of
> New York and the world that in 15 minutes a large chunk under a large
> building, a symbol of international unity, will be conveniently
> rearranged, at only minor risk to nearby inhabitants!  Wow, this could

The person who wrote this stuff hasn't thought it through.  Any of these
things can and do happen right now over the telephone (anonymously)
and through postal mail (anonymously).  Somehow, society has not fallen
into anarchy because anyone can drop a letter in a mailbox.  Why not?

(pause here and actually think about it...)








> Wow, think of what we could achieve and accomplish if we
> completely dismantled the NSA, the FBI, the CIA, and my local pig
> trough!

Now you are closer to reality.  It appears that at least the DEA is
getting *severe* funding cuts under President Inhalation.  It's about time
someone fired those thugs.

> 		  For example, I like individual terrorists just as
> much as the organized collections.  They sound like they could be
> really completely uninhibited in their creative grasps of our true
> freedoms, and more numerous with their stellar utilizations.  

There are two problems with terrorism.  The first is that it is regularly
practiced by governments -- against their own populations as well as
against non-citizens -- so governments can't truly be too opposed to it.
I'll give you the definition of terrorism from the CIA in 1980
(as reported by Admiral Stansfield Turner):

	Terrorism:  The threat or use of violence for political
	purposes by individuals or groups ... when such actions
	are intended to shock, stun, or intimidate a target group
	wider than the immediate victims.

("Terrorism and Democracy", ISBN 0-395-43086-0, p. 181).

If forcibly arresting someone and putting them in jail for selling
drugs to a willing buyer doesn't fall squarely into this definition, I
don't know what does.  Every law that Congress passes "to send a message"
falls into this definition -- it's to intimidate a group wider than
the group who will be arrested and tried.

The second problem is *not* that it's too hard to tap the phones of
identified terrorists -- it's that you can't pick out the terrorists
from the billions of other humans.  Even police states have trouble
with this, but they tend to provoke more people to become terrorists.
Anonymity makes it possible (as in alt.whistleblowers) for people who
know terrorists to safely expose them.  Have you noticed that the way
the Feds have attacked the Mob has been by convincing insiders to
testify and giving them untraceable new identities (the "Witness
Protection Program")?

The beauty and the strength of an open society is that it brings all
kinds of problems and conflicts out where everyone can see them and
they can potentially be worked out -- BEFORE anyone sees a need to
escalate to mass violence.  In a rigidly structured society, by the
time the government knows it needs to change, it has already been deposed.

> In fact,
> the potential for individual, unassociated citizens to thwart the
> abuses, and profoundly destabilize the foundations of frigid, faceless
> bureacracies like big telephone companies, and even the government, I
> find spine-tinglingly majestic---it even looks like this could soon
> happen.

It has already happened.  A small number of individuals have done this
-- Freud, Marx, Moses, Jefferson, for example.  Most profoundly
destabilizing ideas are derived from the work of a single mind
(nanotechnology for example).  But most destabilization of
bureacracies comes from ordinary change, not profound change, and
the improved communication tools we're building will *help*
individuals and bureacracies to deal with change.

	John Gilmore




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Hal <74076.1041@CompuServe.COM>
Date: Sun, 28 Feb 93 20:43:20 PST
To: CYPHERPUNKS <CYPHERPUNKS@toad.com>
Subject: Censorship...
Message-ID: <930301043312_74076.1041_DHJ75-1@CompuServe.COM>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Ted Ts'o writes:

> I noticed that in several postings, people have made the jump that
> revealing the real person (or the previous hop in a remailer chain) from
> an anonymous remailer is tantamount to censorship.  I'd like to call
> into question that assumption.

"Censorship" is an emotional term.  My New World Dictionary defines it as the
act of censoring, and a censor as "an official with the power to examine
publications, movies, television programs, etc. and to remove or
prohibit anything considered obscene, libelous, politically objectionable,
etc."  I think this corresponds pretty closely with how we use the
word.  It suggests that a good test for whether an action is censorship
is whether the prohibition is based on the content of the message along
the lines above, where a message is controversial, obscene, etc.

(Many Libertarians would argue that no private action can be censorship,
that only government actions backed up by the threat of force can be.
They might point to the word "official" in the definition above.  I
think that the more common use of the word would include the concept
of private censorship; as, for example, in the case of a newspaper
editor who kills a story because it attacks a powerful political friend
of the editor.  He can be considered an official of the newspaper.)

Ted then gives the example of someone yelling at 4AM in the morning.
Stopping this action would not be censorship by this test.  You don't
care about the content of his speech, just the volume.

Ted also mentions libel and slander.  Stopping these would apparently be
censorship by the definition above (which explicitly mentions "libelous").

For the remailer cases, stopping usage due to excessive volume would not
be censorship.  It would be analogous to stopping someone from yelling
at 4AM.  Your restriction is not based on content.

On the other hand, stopping usage due to the content of a message would
be censorship, especially if it was due to the message content being
"obscene, libelous, politically objectionable, etc."  I think many of
the attacks on anonymous messages based on content would in fact fall
into these categories.

I am not arguing here that censorship is wrong, although certainly the
word has acquired negative connotations.  It's interesting to see that
stopping libel can be considered censorship, and this fact might cause
those who believe in laws against libel to consider whether censorship
may sometimes be good.  If they do feel comfortable with that, then they
can openly call for censorship by remailer operators without mincing words.

Hal Finney





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@Athena.MIT.EDU>
Date: Sun, 28 Feb 93 20:39:48 PST
To: ssandfort@attmail.com
Subject: Re: more ideas on anonymity
In-Reply-To: <9303010240.AA10573@toad.com>
Message-ID: <9303010438.AA25312@SOS>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


   From: ssandfort@attmail.com
   Date: 1 Mar 93 02:36:10 GMT

   There is only one realistic and moral solution to threats of
   violence.  Punish the perpetrators, not the messenger.  Even in
   today's world, crimes are rarely solved by wiretaps, forensic
   science or any of that.  Perps gets fingered by someone they
   know; perps confess; perps screw up and accidentally give
   themselves away; or the intended victim blows the perp's head off
   during an attempt to carry out the threat.  Again, punish the
   perpetrators, not the messengers.

I agree 1000%!!!!  But in order to punish the perpetrators, it is first
necessary to *identify* the perpetrators......

							- Ted




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Colin Orion Chandler <orion@crl.com>
Date: Fri, 11 Feb 94 19:42:27 PST
To: "Robert A. Hayden" <hayden@krypton.mankato.msus.edu>
Subject: Re: MOO: on the virtual meeting
In-Reply-To: <Pine.3.89.9402111557.A14223-0100000@krypton.mankato.msus.edu>
Message-ID: <Pine.3.87.9302111914.A3704-0100000@crl.crl.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I agree... I am a wizard on BayMOO, and I can tell you: Yeroc, Yea, 
Dr.J, and I all use tinyfugue... "Wizard used, wizard reccommended." ==|:-)= 

___________________________________________________________________________
|---===================================--|     /\     |  |  \ |_ _\ \  / |
|---Colin Titus Orion Xavier Chandler----|    \\ \    |  | .  |  | >  <  |
|---===================================--|   \ \\ /  \__/ _|\_|___|_/\_\ |
| _____                                  |  / \/ / /		         |
|/\  __ \         __  "What year is it?" | / /   \//\   "If it's not a   | 
|\ \ \/\ \  _ __ /\_\    ___     ___     | \//\   / /	Sun, it's not a  |
| \ \ \ \ \/\`'__\/\ \  / __`\ /' _ `\   |  / / /\ /  	   computer."    |
|  \ \ \_\ \ \ \/ \ \ \/\ \L\ \/\ \/\ \  |   / \\ \  .__          __     |
|   \ \_____\ \_\  \ \_\ \____/\ \_\ \_\ |    \ \\   |_. | | |\ |  -|    |
|    \/_____/\/_/   \/_/\/___/  \/_/\/_/ |     \/    __| I_| | \| __|/160|
+________________________________________+_______________________________+
|  Colin Chandler |"It can only be accountable to *human* error."-HAL9000|
|  (415) 388-8055 | orion@crl.com, wizard @ BayMOO (mud.crl.com 8888)    |
|________________________________________________________________________|

On Fri, 11 Feb 1994, Robert A. Hayden wrote:

> I also recommend, if you don't want to use emacs, that you look for the 
> client called 'tiny fugue'.  That's what I connected with and it did a 
> very good job do keeping things sane.
> 
> There are, of course, several other clients out there as well.  Check the 
> rec.games.mud* FAQs for a list.
> 
> ____        Robert A. Hayden          <=> hayden@krypton.mankato.msus.edu
> \  /__          -=-=-=-=-             <=>          -=-=-=-=-
>  \/  /   Finger for Geek Code Info    <=> In the United States, they
>    \/  Finger for PGP 2.3a Public Key <=> first came for us in Colorado...
> -=-=-=-=-=-=-=-
> (GEEK CODE 1.0.1)  GAT d- -p+(---) c++(++++) l++ u++ e+/* m++(*)@ s-/++
> 		       n-(---) h+(*) f+ g+ w++ t++ r++ y+(*)
> 
> 





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Marc Horowitz <marc@MIT.EDU>
Date: Sun, 28 Feb 93 21:15:28 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: more ideas on anonymity
In-Reply-To: <9303010240.AA10573@toad.com>
Message-ID: <9303010514.AA05974@deathtongue.MIT.EDU>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>> One last note about practicality.  We live in a world with pay
>> telephones, which anyone may use to threaten anyone else,
>> anonymously.  Shall we eliminate pay phones?  Today in the United
>> States, a uniformed agent of the government will deliver your
>> anonymous threat to your victims door for only US$0.29.  Shall we
>> eliminate the Postal Service? 

This is different than anonymous remailers currently.  Why?  Because
pay phones and letters *cost* *money*.

So, I have a proposal.  Have someone *sell* signed keys, for real
money.  The only purpose of the signature is so that someone can
verify that it's been paid for.  It can be bought out of band.  For
example, I can email the signing agent my public key, and paper-mail a
money order with no return address.  Maybe in the future, we can just
use digital money.  When he gets my money, he signs my key and sends
it back to me, possibly via some remailer or whatever.

Now, when I send a message via a remailer, the mailer checks to see if
the message has been signed by a key which has been signed by the key
signing agent.  If it has been, then it forwards the mail.  If not, it
doesn't.

Now, here's the trick.  If too many people complain about a particular
sender (see below), the key gets revoked by the signing service.  This
means flooding newsgroups, slander, etc., *costs* *real* *money*.
This is a big encouragement not to abuse the net, because it costs
money.  Perhaps we even have different levels of signing, based on
costs.  Pay $1, and the remailers will let you send to alt groups
only.  Pay $10, and you can send to alt, soc, misc, talk, and some set
of high-traffic, low-signal lists. Pay $100, and you can post
anywhere, including individuals.  These are all example numbers, of
course.

 - People can easily remain pseudonymous.
 - There is a monetary incentive not to be a bonehead.
 - Revocation is possible.  There's no punishing wrongdoers, but
people aren't likely to put much credence behind anonymous claims.
 - This works like the Real World.  People with enough money can
create false identites for themselves, anyway.
 - Remailer owners can choose which signing agents to trust.  Other
than monetary schemes might be able to be set up.  For instance, if
you can get five real, trustable people to vouch for your pseudonym,
you win.  If you screw up, their reputations become tarnished, as
well.

I guess all this is is a positive reputation scheme, bootstrapped by
money, which is more important to some people than reputation, anyway.
I mean, someone willing to go through the bother of spending $10 to
get his key signed is either very bored, or has to have something to
say.

Now, back to complaints.  What constitutes a complaint?  Each
certifier would probably have to decide this on their own.  Some might
choose never to revoke a signature.  Some might do it only after some
number of complaints.  Some might come up with systems of arbitration,
with judges, voting, and everything.  The remailers can vote with
their feet: whichever signing agents match the policies they like,
they trust.  And recipients (like newsgroups, mailing lists, or even
individuals) can choose to accept messages only from remailers they
"trust".

So, we have a fairly complex system with multiple degrees of freedom,
where endusers can pick and choose from among the policies they like
best.  This is sort of like credit card purchases.  Hertz is willing
to rent me a car based on Visa's evaluation of my creditworthyness.
Similarly, large-public-mailing-list@site.domain can decide to accept
messages from a given remailer, based on their published policies.
Actually dealing with signatures isn't their problem.  It's to the
signing agent's advantage to be trustworthy, or else nobody will pay
attention to his signatures, and nobody will give him money to sign
their keys.  Poof, a free market.

It isn't simple, but I think one thing we can all agree on is that no
solution to these problems we are facing will be both adequate and
simple.

		Marc




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Phiber Optik <phiber@eff.org>
Date: Sun, 28 Feb 93 21:50:55 PST
To: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Subject: Re: CFP Costs Too Much!
In-Reply-To: <9302282344.AA12538@netcom.netcom.com>
Message-ID: <199303010549.AA21368@eff.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


It should be noted that journalists aren't the only people eligible for
free admission.  There's a scholarship program open to students/hackers/etc.
If you can't get in free (it's obviously too late now), or otherwise be
sponsored by an employer or other, the pricey fee does tend to exclude people
who would otherwise benefit the conference and vice versa.
What I can suggest, knowing the hotel it's going to be at (same as first),
is hang out in the spacious lobby and mingle/eat/drink/etc.  A number of
people did this.  Much of the "conference" is interaction with people, outside
of the panels.





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Peter & <shipley@merde.dis.org>
Date: Mon, 1 Mar 93 01:14:34 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Pgp with MH & MIME
Message-ID: <9303010855.AA08526@merde.dis.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/x-pgp



--------Enter additional text


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----



> Some time back there was some debate here about whether MIME
> ("Multipurpose Internet Mail Extensions") features could be exploited
> to make encryption easier to use.  I didn't pay much attention at the
> time, because I didn't know anything about MIME.

Here is my latest copy of "pgpedit", I have modified it to insert a
"Content-Type" line to that MIME mailer will automaticly 


#!/usr/local/bin/perl
#!/usr/local/bin/tperl4.036

# pgpedit V1.5
# Mon Mar  1 00:40:49 PST 1993
# Peter Shipley

# to install (mh instructions)
# place this script in your path (eg ~/bin)
# create few links:
#
#       ln -s /usr/local/mh/bin/repl ~/bin/pgprepl
#       ln -s /usr/local/mh/bin/comp ~/bin/pgpcomp
#       ln -s /usr/local/mh/bin/forw ~/bin/pgpforw
#
# Add the following to your .mh_profile:
#
#       pgprepl: -editor pgpedit
#       pgpcomp: -editor pgpedit
#	pgpforw: -editor pgpedit
#
# To use just use the commands pgprepl or pgpcomp instead of repl or comp
#
# If you are Useing MH 6.8 with MIME you may also want to add the following:
#
#	mhn-show-text/x-pgp: %ppgp -m '%F'
#	mhn-store-text/x-pgp: %m%P.pgp
#
# This `instruct' MH how to interpet the MIME header "Content-Type: text/x-pgp"
# and have MH automaticly invoke pgp for devcryption or signature verification
#




require "sys/wait.ph";

#custom stuff here

#default editor
$defaulteditor="/usr/ucb/vi";


$pgpcommand="/usr/local/bin/pgp -sta +clearsig=on";

$debug=0;

#test the arg count
    die "bad argument count" if ($#ARGV > 0);

#set the umask to something really paranoid
    umask(07177);

#set the path if there is not one
    $ENV{'PATH'} = '/bin:/usr/ucb:/usr/bin' unless $ENV{'PATH'};

# get the editor
    if ($ENV{'VISUAL'}) {
	$editor=$ENV{'VISUAL'} ;
    } elsif ($ENV{'EDITOR'}) {
	$editor=$ENV{'EDITOR'} ;
    } else {
	$editor = $defaulteditor;
    }

    $editor = $defaulteditor if $editor =~ /pgpedit/ ;

# prepare the file.
    &prepfile($ARGV[0]);

# run the editor
    &run($editor, $ARGV[0]);

# have pgp sign the file
    &SignMailFile($ARGV[0]);

# the end
    exit 0;




sub SignMailFile {

    local($INPUT) = @_;

    local($BODY) = "/tmp/pgp$$.body";
    local($PGPBODY) = "$BODY".".asc";
    local(@header);


    print "$INPUT \n" if ($debug);

    open(INPUT, "+>>$INPUT" ) || die "failed to open $INPUT: $!\n";
    seek(INPUT,0, 0);

    open(BODY, "+>$BODY") || die "failed to open $BODY: $!\n";
    select(BODY); $| = 1; select(STDOUT);

    while (<INPUT>) {
	last if (/^--------/);
	push (@header, $_);
    }


    if ($debug) {
	print STDERR "\n--header--\n";
	print STDERR "@header \n" ;
	print STDERR "\n--BODY--\n";
	print STDERR "$BODY \n" ;
    }

    while (<INPUT>) {
	print BODY $_;
    }

    print STDERR  "$pgpcommand $BODY\n" if ($debug);

    `$pgpcommand $BODY`;

#    &run($pgpcommand, $BODY);

    if (! $? ) {

	truncate(BODY, 0); unlink($BODY); close(BODY);
	truncate(INPUT,0);

	open(PGPBODY) || die "failed to open $PGPBODY: $!\n";

	seek(INPUT, 0, 0);

	print INPUT @header;
	print INPUT "Content-Type: text/x-pgp; charset=\"us-ascii\"\n";
	print INPUT "--------\n\n";

	print INPUT <PGPBODY>;

    } else {
    
	truncate(BODY, 0); unlink($BODY); close(BODY);

	if ( -f $PGPBODY ) {
	    truncate(PGPBODY, 0); unlink($PGPBODY); close(PGPBODY);
	}
    }

    return;
}




sub prepfile {

    local($FILE) = @_;
    local(@data);


    open(FILE, "+>>$FILE" ) || die "failed to open $FILE: $!\n";
    seek(FILE, 0, 0);

    while(<FILE>) {
	next if ( ?text/x-pgp? );
	push (@data, $_);
	last if ( /^--------/ );
    }

#	push (@data, "\n\n\n");

    while(<FILE>) { last if (/^-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----/); }

    if( !eof(FILE) ) {

	while(<FILE>) { 
	    last if (/^-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----/);
	    push (@data , $_); 
	}

	seek(FILE, 0, 0);
	truncate(FILE, 0);

	print FILE @data;

    }
    close(FILE);
	
    return;
}



sub run {
    local($editor, $file) = @_;
    local($pid);

FORK: {
        if ($pid = fork) {
		wait;
        } elsif (defined $pid) { # $pid is zero here if defined
                exec "$editor $file";
        } elsif ($! =~ /No more process/) {     
                # EAGAIN, supposedly recoverable fork error
                sleep 5;
                redo FORK;
        } else {
                # weird fork error
                die "Can't fork: $!\n";
        }
}
    return;
}


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.1

iQBFAgUBK5HPZchmn7GUWLLFAQHGfgF9HFh4CwpEGi0UxYtswMA6VCxDSA/UaKzZ
An7db1dLCOzZ3FEf7YjAi8Fi80482b+/
=j2S2
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Phiber Optik <phiber@eff.org>
Date: Sun, 28 Feb 93 22:12:28 PST
To: ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu
Subject: Re: more annoying philosophizing on anonymity
In-Reply-To: <9303010540.AA10913@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Message-ID: <199303010611.AA21525@eff.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> 
> OK, I'll keep this brief. Yes, the postal service delivers anonymous
> mail. Yes, you can make anonymous telephone calls using pay phones. 
> But like all hastily construed analogies, they fail in the magnified
> specifics.  The problem here is that the fragile remailers being built
> right now are operated by *individual users*, while these other
> services are parts of vast public infrastructures. Now, until anonymous
> servers become part of the vast public infrastructure (I'll give us all
> the benefit of the doubt on this one), operators will be *extremely*
> vulnerable to what goes through their remailers. 
[stuff deleted]

You fail to realize the obvious.  Anyone who makes use of "vast public
infrastructures" is also usually defenseless against the POWERS THAT BE,
and fall victim to them abusing this power.
Your snail mail can be intercepted/stolen and read at the command of the
federales, any and all telephone calls can be intercepted/blocked/eavesdropped
on.
Sorry, but I'll take my chances with "fragile remailers", and the choice of
use dictated by the positive reputations of both the remailer and the sender.
Simple.





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: wcs@anchor.ho.att.com (Bill_Stewart(HOY002)1305)
Date: Sun, 28 Feb 93 23:09:07 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: RISKS for alt.whistleblowers
Message-ID: <9303010709.AA18343@anchor.ho.att.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text


I would expect two kinds of people to cause trouble for alt.whistleblowers:
amateurs and professionals.  Amateur troublemakers may cause the most volume
of trouble, and the largest signal-to-noise problem, but the more serious
concern is what happens if there's enough signal in the noise to be a threat
to professionals, whether governments, corporations, or criminals.

If I were a professional who wanted to stop a group like this, and options
like court orders, violence, or confiscation weren't appropriate,
I'd consider a few approaches like the following:
- Flooding - it's really not hard, even with automatic protections -
	if you can emulate, or abuse, all the neighboring anon-remailers,
	you may even force disconnects from them.
- Crying wolf, and other disinformation - if there are enough bogus posts,
	people will stop reading the newsgroup, and the talk.bizzare crowd
	wil take over because they're the only ones who can handle the noise ..
- Posting libel, slander, child pornography, calls for violence, bomb threats
	followed by real bombings, blackmail requests, photographs of local
	politicians in real or fake compromising situations, and enough other
	legally dangerous material that the moderator and/or people who carry
	the newsgroup wouldn't be able to take the heat.

It's really not all that hard, if somebody's serious about it.
Crypto-anarchy is a good thing, but governments and other bad guys can 
hide behind it just as effectively as anarchists can.

.... and the last count I've heard on the radio was that 19 separate groups
have called in to claim responsibility for the World Trade Center bombing;
some even called 911, though presumably they used pay phones ...

			Bill Stewart, somewhere out in Cyberspace



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: ssandfort@attmail.com
Date: Sun, 28 Feb 93 18:40:51 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: more ideas on anonymity
Message-ID: <9303010240.AA10573@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text


_________________________________________________________________
             FROM THE VIRTUAL DESK OF SANDY SANDFORT
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Today, Theodore Ts'o raised the specter of libel and slander to
justify some forms of censorship for anonymous remailers.  He
assumed, rhetorically, that if you believe in total freedom of
speech, than you must not believe in libel or slander.

He is correct, of course.  Nevertheless, his implied conclusion
is in error.  He would have us give up free speech to uphold
libel and slander.  I say, let's give up the artificial concepts
of libel and slander and uphold our freedom of speech.

Can people be harmed by speech?  Maybe yes, maybe no.  But if so,
that is the price that must be paid to avoid a far greater harm.
Damnum absque injuria--there are some loses for which there is no
remedy at law.

If your girlfriend impugns your manhood, there may be harm.  But
should her speech be ILLEGAL?  I think not.

I'm sure that what NBC did was NOT libel or slander.  It may have
been fraud, though.  In any event, if a free society chose not to
make what NBC did illegal, that in no way implies that NBC was
"perfectly justified" in faking an explosion.  It just says
society takes any remedy out of the hands of the state.  Of
course, NBC's acts have already damaged its own reputation karma.
Serves 'em right, too.

One last note about practicality.  We live in a world with pay
telephones, which anyone may use to threaten anyone else,
anonymously.  Shall we eliminate pay phones?  Today in the United
States, a uniformed agent of the government will deliver your
anonymous threat to your victims door for only US$0.29.  Shall we
eliminate the Postal Service?  (The answer is "yes," but for
other reasons.)  So what's the point?  Why should we be any
harsher on the networks than we are on all the other anonymous
channels?

There is only one realistic and moral solution to threats of
violence.  Punish the perpetrators, not the messenger.  Even in
today's world, crimes are rarely solved by wiretaps, forensic
science or any of that.  Perps gets fingered by someone they
know; perps confess; perps screw up and accidentally give
themselves away; or the intended victim blows the perp's head off
during an attempt to carry out the threat.  Again, punish the
perpetrators, not the messengers.

     S a n d y                         ssandfort@attmail.com
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: tony@morgan.demon.co.uk (Tony Kidson)
Date: Mon, 1 Mar 93 08:33:53 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: more ideas on anonymity
Message-ID: <2900@morgan.demon.co.uk>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


In message <9302282156.AA25135@SOS> you write:
>    Date: Sat, 27 Feb 93 23:59:30 GMT
>    From: Tony Kidson <tony@morgan.demon.co.uk>
>
> I see.  So you don't believe in libel or slander laws.

It's people believing and acting on the words that actually 
causes the damage.  I believe that you must judge the reputation 
of the subject and issuer of any statement before you make up 
your mind to act on a statement.  It is only possible to widely 
disseminate a libel if you have control of the means of 
dissemination.  That, is not free speech. Where is the 
opportunity for contrary assertion by the person libelled?

> And NBC was perfectly justified in faking an explosion in a GM truck to
> show it was unsafe, and broadcast it on prime-time TV.  And it didn't do
> anybody any harm at all.  Uh huh.

Faking the explosion, was neither here or there.  Did they deny 
GM the right of denial. Could they be sued by the people that 
they misled?  I do believe in their right to say anything they 
like. They have a reputation to protect.  How much reputation has 
an anonymous source?  Are you going to believe an anonymous tip 
off until you have investigated it?  If so bigger fool you.

Tony

+-----------------+-------------------------------+--------------------------+
| Tony Kidson     |    PGP 2.1 Key by request     | Voice +44 81 466 5127    |
| Morgan Towers,  |                               | E-Mail                   |
| Morgan Road,    |         This Space            | tony@morgan.demon.co.uk  |
| Bromley,        |          to Rent              | tny@cix.compulink.co.uk  |
| England BR1 3QE |Honda ST1100  ==*==  DoD# 0801 | 100024.301@compuserve.com|
+-----------------+-------------------------------+----------------------------+




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Eric Hughes <hughes@soda.berkeley.edu>
Date: Mon, 1 Mar 93 08:07:18 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: anon.penet.fi hacking
In-Reply-To: <9303010721.aa25945@penet.penet.FI>
Message-ID: <9303011604.AA11556@soda.berkeley.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



>> 	Body-Termination-Regex: ^--$

Julf writes:

>Ok... Now.. Show me the regex that strips anything starting with '--',
>such as '-----------------------------', except a PGP boundary line...

OK.  It's a mess.  The backslash means line continuance.  Remember that
concatenation binds higher that alternation (|).

^--...([^B]|B[^E]|BE[^G]|BEG[^I]|BEGI[^N]|BEGIN[^ ]|BEGIN [^P]|BEGIN P[^G]\
|BEGIN PG[^P])

Eric





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Johan Helsingius <julf@penet.FI>
Date: Sun, 28 Feb 93 23:02:24 PST
To: Eric Hughes <hughes@soda.berkeley.edu>
Subject: Re: anon.penet.fi hacking
In-Reply-To: <9303010111.AA12729@soda.berkeley.edu>
Message-ID: <9303010721.aa25945@penet.penet.FI>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



> The first character in the body that matches the regex, and every
> character after it, will be dropped.  This not only makes it a
> one-liner in perl (!), but it means that the user can be as
> arbitrarily complex in recognizing sig blocks as the are able.
> Of course, we'll document the most common of these:
> 
> 	Body-Termination-Regex: ^--$

Ok... Now.. Show me the regex that strips anything starting with '--',
such as '-----------------------------', except a PGP boundary line...

	Julf





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Pat Farrell" <pfarrell@gmuvax2.gmu.edu>
Date: Mon, 1 Mar 93 05:42:48 PST
To: cfp93@well.sf.ca.us
Subject: RE: CFP Costs Too Much!
Message-ID: <31288.pfarrell@gmuvax2.gmu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


In Message Sun, 28 Feb 93 15:44:21 -0800,  tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May) writes:
>.... I would also dearly like to attend CFP, but

I also would dearly love to attend CFP again. I went to last year's
session on a student subsidy and loved it. It changed the direction of my
academic study.

I don't understand where CFP's organizers are coming from. I applied for a
student tuition subsidy for this year, and heard nothing. I submitted
a request for a "birds-of-a-feather" session to talk about key registration,
and got Dorothy Denning, TC May, and Mike Godwin to tentatively agree
to participate. I've heard nothing.

It is much too late to get cheap airfare to SF, so I'm not going.

I'm a student. I can't afford the $2000 that attending CFP will cost,
including airfare, hotel, meals, conference fee, etc. I admit to
having a part time job, which supports my wife, daughter, mortgage, and
pays tuition and buys books. It sure doesn't pay well enough to afford
CFP93.

Pat

Pat Farrell      Grad Student                 pfarrell@cs.gmu.edu
Department of Computer Science    George Mason University, Fairfax, VA
PGP Public key availble via finger          #include <standard.disclaimer>




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Eric Hughes <hughes@soda.berkeley.edu>
Date: Mon, 1 Mar 93 09:45:32 PST
To: julf@penet.FI
Subject: anon.penet.fi hacking
In-Reply-To: <9303011752.aa19512@penet.penet.FI>
Message-ID: <9303011742.AA15188@soda.berkeley.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Julf challenged:
>Ok... Now.. Show me the regex that strips anything starting with '--',
>such as '-----------------------------', except a PGP boundary line...

I posted something which didn't quite work, as Julf says:

>But... It still
>doesn't strip off something starting with only "--" on a line by itself...

^--(|.|..|...(|[^B]|B[^E]|BE[^G]|BEG[^I]|BEGI[^N]|BEGIN[^ ]|BEGIN [^P]\
|BEGIN P[^G]|BEGIN PG[^P]))

Some implementations don't support empty alternation, so that could be
changed with the ? syntax, since (|a) and (a?) are the same.

That should do it.

Eric
	




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: tribble@xanadu.com (E. Dean Tribble)
Date: Tue, 2 Mar 93 00:58:40 PST
To: uunet!Athena.MIT.EDU!tytso@uunet.UU.NET
Subject: Piercing anonymitiy and censorship
In-Reply-To: <9303010319.AA25260@SOS>
Message-ID: <9303011845.AA22881@memexis.xanadu.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


	 Perhaps there are people who believe Free Speech should be so much of an
	 absolute that you should be allowed to scream at the top of their lungs
	 at 5am in the morning in a residential area, and that libel and slander
	 laws shouldn't exist.  But it's not fair to call that a mainstream

I would like to separate the issues of hollering anything at 4am in
residential areas from things like libel and slander.  Disturbing
people with your volume independent of its content is like blasting
white noise at damaging volume levels.  The remedies for it have
nothing to do with speech, they have to do with disturbing the peace;
your sound is crossing onto my property at intolerable levels.

dean




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: fen@genmagic.genmagic.com (Fen Labalme)
Date: Mon, 1 Mar 93 11:37:02 PST
To: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Subject: Re: CFP Costs Too Much!
Message-ID: <9303011935.AA22448@>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> In my opinion, $405 is way too much to pay for this conference.

One note on the other side of the coin:

Email announcements of the conference began in December of '92, including
the complete pricing schedule:

> Registration Fees are: 
>       If mailed by:       7 February        8 March         on site 
>       Conference Fees:      $300             $355             $405
>       Tutorial Fees:        $135             $165             $195
>       Conference & Tutorial $435             $520             $600

Note that there was over a month's time to get registered at $300, and the
price of registration is currently $355, *not* $405.

Now I have to pay the $355 out of my own pocket (as Magic decided not to
pay my way) and I understand the pain you feel with having to shell out
such big bucks.  But, for one reason or another, I believe that CFP has not
done incredibly well financially, and they've got to cover their ass.  One
way to do that is by encouraging early registration, which smooths the
planning process.

So get your registration in now!

> Registration is limited to 550 participants, so register early and save!
> 
> By Mail:                               By Fax:
> (with Check or Credit Card)            (with Credit Card only)
> CFP'93 Registration                    Send Registration Form
> 2210 Sixth Street                      (510) 845-3946
> Berkeley, CA 94710                     Available 24 hours
> 
> By Phone:                              By E-Mail:
> (with Credit Card only)                (with Credit Card only)
> (510) 845-1350                         cfp93@well.sf.a.us
> 10 am to 5 pm Pacific Time

On the other hand, Glenn Tenney has done a remarkable job in keeping the
price of Hackers down...

Fen





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Eric Hughes <hughes@soda.berkeley.edu>
Date: Mon, 1 Mar 93 12:01:37 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: more ideas on anonymity
In-Reply-To: <2900@morgan.demon.co.uk>
Message-ID: <9303011958.AA24443@soda.berkeley.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



>I do believe in their right to say anything they 
>like. They have a reputation to protect.  How much reputation has 
>an anonymous source?  Are you going to believe an anonymous tip 
>off until you have investigated it?  If so bigger fool you.

"How much reputation has an anonymous source?"

I think this might be key to solving the "anonymous libel" problem.
Simply declare "anonymous libel" an oxymoron!  We might argue that
otherwise libelous statements, when made anonymously, carry a
presumption of falsity, for otherwise the speaker would be willing to
speak truthfully in his or her own person.

Or, in other words, "Coward! He must be lying!"

Could some of the folks with LEXIS or WESTLAW access check and see if
there is any case law where the social status of the speaker is
brought into question?

Perhaps Tony Kidson could tell us some of the effects of libel law in
the UK.  The US law, which grew out of British law, seems to have gone
in the direction of reducing the power of a libel complaint, while
British law has done the opposite.  I can't speak for the UK, but
those who live there could.

In California, a very promising decision occurred last week: the first
test of the anti-SLAPP law (Strategic Lawsuit Against Public
Participation).  The law is to prevent lawsuits designed to drain the
resources of those exercising their First Amendment rights.  It
requires the plaintiff to show that they will probably win (I don't
know what the wording of the actual test is).  Defendants are entitled
to recover attorney's fees and court costs.

The suit was basically as follows.  One comic book company published a
Lensman comic.  The heir to the Lensman rights stated in print that
this company had not received permission.  The comic book company sued
the heir and the publisher of her words, claiming libel.  The case was
immediately dismissed based on the new anti-SLAPP law.

The law is designed to protect First Amendment rights, but it looks
like it will also have the salutatory effect of reducing libel claims
generally.

Eric




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Hal <74076.1041@CompuServe.COM>
Date: Mon, 1 Mar 93 09:34:08 PST
To: Cypherpunks <cypherpunks@toad.com>
Subject: anon.penet.fi hacking
Message-ID: <930301171036_74076.1041_DHJ55-1@CompuServe.COM>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Eric shows a complicated regular expression, but I don't think it
will match just --, because this line provides nothing to match the
"." and "[^B]", etc.
 
I think the real point is that Eric's idea allows the user to customize the
regular expression to match the particular signature line used by his
system.  If the line is just --, he can use Eric's simple example.  If it's
something else, another line can be used to look for the match.  Since it's
not hard for users to find out how their signatures look it should not be
hard to set up a pattern that will strip them.
 
Hal
 






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: jthomas@mango.mitre.org (Joe Thomas)
Date: Mon, 1 Mar 93 09:25:01 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: A novel (?) return address idea
Message-ID: <9303011721.AA02070@mango>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


It seems clear now that the default behavior of the anon.penet.fi  
remailer (generating only one anonymous ID per user, and anonymizing  
all messages to other anon users with that ID) is inadequate.  At the  
same time, Julf argues persuasively that users have come to expect  
that their replies to anonymous Usenet articles will be anonymized.   
The current na/an address workaround is okay, but I think we could do  
better.

Here's my scheme:

When a user first mails to or through a penet-style remailer, the  
remailer software will automatically allocate an ID for the sender's  
return address, as usual.  _But_, it will keep this number secret, in  
an internal database.  Let's consider this ID to be a binary number.   
The remailer appends to this ID number some "salt" bits (random bits,  
perhaps with some time-stamp info to guarantee that the same salt  
bits are never applied twice, if the RNG is weak).  This collection  
of bits is then encrypted with a secret key only the remailer knows  
(note: this should _not_ be the secret half of a public/private key  
pair, for reasons that should become clear).  The encrypted bit  
string is converted by a uuencode/armourtext process that produces  
characters that will be legal for an e-mail address.  This is then  
used for a return address.

When someone wants to reply to an anonymous message or post, the  
remailer decrypts the address, ignores the "salt" bits, looks up the  
anonymous ID in its database, and sends it on to the desired  
recipient.  


The advantage of this scheme is that no two messages will have the  
same return address, and no information about the sender can be  
gleaned from the return address; yet the remailer can allow replies  
to every message without keeping any more records than it does under  
the current version.

A couple disadvantages could be running out of bits for the return  
address, and adding more encryption work for the remailer.  You'd  
definitely have to own the machine, and implement some, er, different  
mailing software, since you'd have to accept mail for users with any  
random name whatsoever.  And, of course, this method is only useful  
for penet-style remailers, not cypherpunk/mixnet remailers which  
should not remember anything about messages that pass through.

What do you all think about this for a "Mark II" anon.penet.fi?

Joe




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Johan Helsingius <julf@penet.FI>
Date: Mon, 1 Mar 93 03:05:13 PST
To: "Bill_Stewart(HOY002" <wcs@anchor.ho.att.com>
Subject: Re: RISKS for alt.whistleblowers
In-Reply-To: <9303010709.AA18343@anchor.ho.att.com>
Message-ID: <9303011215.aa06268@penet.penet.FI>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



> If I were a professional who wanted to stop a group like this, and options
> like court orders, violence, or confiscation weren't appropriate,
> I'd consider a few approaches like the following:

> - Flooding - it's really not hard, even with automatic protections -

True. But at least the source of the trouble would be hard to hide.

> - Crying wolf, and other disinformation

Yes. This might be the hardest one, and the one I have been worrying
about.

> - Posting libel, slander, child pornography, calls for violence, bomb threats

We will have to accept the fact that we are sitting ducks. It all
depends on how strong support we have.

> It's really not all that hard, if somebody's serious about it.
> Crypto-anarchy is a good thing, but governments and other bad guys can 
> hide behind it just as effectively as anarchists can.

True. And that's why we have to abide to the old banner "united we stand,
divided we fall". We need to support each other, and have organisations such
as EFF supporting our cause as well. In many ways our case (with
whistleblowers) is very similar to organisations such as Amnesty
International. Single groups and individuals are easy to silence, but a
big enough, distributed enough and visible enough organization with good
communications channels is much harder to shoot down. Hmm... Maybe we
ought to get in touch with people like Amnesty and offer our services to
them as well?

Anyway, let me give you a hypotetical case. Let's say anon.penet.fi
starts running alt.whistleblower, and some suitable US organisation
decides to shut it down. They can do it by using international
political pressure - something that would definitely be effective if it
was something that was done silently by agreement between the Finnish
and the US government agencies involved. But it would be impossible if
the thing was exposed to international media. Similarily for cases of
putting pressure to telephone/network companies, or trying to kill the
server with stuff breaking local laws or something.

	Julf





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Johan Helsingius <julf@penet.FI>
Date: Mon, 1 Mar 93 03:06:52 PST
To: nobody@alumni.cco.caltech.edu
Subject: Re: Infrastructure
In-Reply-To: <9303010605.AA10013@alumni.cco.caltech.edu>
Message-ID: <9303011220.aa06293@penet.penet.FI>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



> I'm not really sure what is happening with PGP specifically in terms
> of MIME.  I think there has been some work done with PEM integration.
> There doesn't seem to be any reason why these programs can't integrate
> nicely with MIME, and this Metamail package looks like it might be the
> most cost-effective way of getting widespread encryption into use.

Definitely. The work I am doing on integrating PGP into anon.penet.fi is
based on metamail. Makes it really easy to add PEM etc.

	Julf





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: nowhere@bsu-cs.bsu.edu (Chael Hall)
Date: Mon, 1 Mar 93 10:16:58 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: anon.penet.fi confusion
Message-ID: <9303011813.AA12208@bsu-cs.bsu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



     I thought that someone would bring it up, but since no one has, I
guess I will.  Isn't is very easy to accidentally type na1234 or an1234
when intending the other?  It's just a matter of transposing two
characters.  This could result in a user signing a message that is
sent with the anonymous ID or accidentally sending the actual address
when thinking it was anonymous.  Since a password can be assigned,
the prior could be eliminated, but the latter is still possible.

     I commend Johan for his work and appreciate the new service,
regardless of how it may sound.

Chael Hall

--
Chael Hall
nowhere@bsu-cs.bsu.edu, 00CCHALL@BSUVC.BSU.EDU, CHALL@CLSV.Charon.BSU.Edu
(317) 285-3648 after 5 pm EST




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Johan Helsingius <julf@penet.FI>
Date: Mon, 1 Mar 93 03:27:25 PST
To: "Timothy C. May" <tcmay@netcom.com>
Subject: Re: Handling Abuses of Remailers
In-Reply-To: <9303010536.AA10591@netcom.netcom.com>
Message-ID: <9303011229.aa06385@penet.penet.FI>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



> * To handle _abusive volumes_ through remailers, charge for remailing.
> Short term, this may be a problem, but this is the long term market
> solution.
> 
> * To handle _abusive messages_ through remailers, ignore them. "Sticks and
> stones" and all that. Put positive reputation filters in place. Accept
> e-mail only through those you know or have reason to trust.
> 
> As Sandy Sandfort so cogently put it, punish the perps, not the words of
> the perps. This is the basis of our society, and a good basis, too. 

All this is very well for a cypherpunks-type remailer, used by a small
number of experienced users. But it doesn't apply very well to anonymous
posting/mailing services for a large number of "simple" users (services like
anon.penet.fi), nor to alt.whistleblower. Do we need to split up the
list to handle the rather diferent threads?

	Julf





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Johan Helsingius <julf@penet.FI>
Date: Mon, 1 Mar 93 03:29:49 PST
To: Eric Hughes <hughes@soda.berkeley.edu>
Subject: Re: header field indicating an anonymous address
In-Reply-To: <9303010202.AA17864@soda.berkeley.edu>
Message-ID: <9303011241.aa07850@penet.penet.FI>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



> I suggest "Anon-Sender:".  There's already a "Sender:" field in
> RFC-822, indicating who sent the message, as separate from who wrote
> the message.  The "Anon-Sender:" field should contain an email address
> for the maintainer of the remailer. 

Anon.penet.fi has supported the Sender: field from the start. This has
forced me to use an automatic script that send a message like this:
(it gets to handle 20-30 messages/day)

I don't think this was intended for me (anon@penet.fi, the anon server
administrator, also working under names "daemon" and "julf"). I suppose you
wanted to send it to an<something>@anon.penet.fi, but accidentally replied to
the envelope "Sender:" address instead of the "From:" orginator address...

	Julf




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: pmetzger@shearson.com (Perry E. Metzger)
Date: Mon, 1 Mar 93 11:44:50 PST
To: tytso@athena.mit.edu
Subject: Re: more ideas on anonymity
Message-ID: <9303011827.AA15335@maggie.shearson.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



> From: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@athena.mit.edu>

> I see.  So you don't believe in libel or slander laws.
> 
> And NBC was perfectly justified in faking an explosion in a GM truck to
> show it was unsafe, and broadcast it on prime-time TV.  And it didn't do
> anybody any harm at all.  Uh huh.
> 
> Try again.....

I believe that Theodore is confusing the notion of tort and the notion of
crime.

Slander and Libel are torts, that is, they are civil matters. Prior restraint
of speech is brought up in the context of CRIMINAL acts. As an example,
obviously, if I promise you that what I am about to tell you is the
true formula for a drug who's design I am selling you and I lie, I
am liable under our contract. Also similarly, it is possible under various
legal arguments to consider slander to be a tort. However, it is something
different if the government claims that my saying "all green people should
be killed" is a crime. Now, on the issue of slander, the notion of anonymity
is largely unimportant. If I had walked into the middle of the street and
ranted for an hour saying that GM trucks are unsafe, that would be largely
ignored, as most anonymous denunciations likely are. The issue is if a
non-anonymous individual or entity with credibility, like NBC, says something
that is false.

Perry




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Johan Helsingius <julf@penet.FI>
Date: Mon, 1 Mar 93 03:57:24 PST
To: "Bill_Stewart(HOY002" <wcs@anchor.ho.att.com>
Subject: Re: dispatches from the front lines of anonymity
In-Reply-To: <9303010139.AA15551@anchor.ho.att.com>
Message-ID: <9303011245.aa09219@penet.penet.FI>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



> A clean way to avoid the problem of encrypted replies cluttering up the
> newsgroup is to also create alt.whistleblower.followup or a.w.crypt,
> with similar non-assignment of ids, so readers can easily skip over
> the crypted private replies.

Good idea! Will implement!

> I *would* recommend the following policies -
> - accept email in PGP, RIPEM, and also unencrypted MIME, X.400, and vanilla 
> 	formats- not everybody who wants to blow a whistle has the right-shaped
> 	whistle handy.  

Yes.

	Julf





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Johan Helsingius <julf@penet.FI>
Date: Mon, 1 Mar 93 03:59:16 PST
To: Marc.Ringuette@gs80.sp.cs.cmu.edu
Subject: Re: Future of anonymity (short-term vs. long-term)
In-Reply-To: <9303010042.AA07783@toad.com>
Message-ID: <9303011309.aa09356@penet.penet.FI>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



> I disagree that it is necessary for a remailer operator to reveal the sender
> of a piece of mail under any circumstances, and I will not trust a remailer
> which does not IMMEDIATELY THROW AWAY the correspondence between input and
> output addresses.

I agree with your disagreement but disagree with your conclusion (huh?).

IMHO a remailer operator should *NEVER* reveal any identities, but I
also believe very strongly that especially if you provide a way to post
news articles, there has to be a way to send replies to the original
sender. Thus a remailer must maintain mapping info.

	Julf





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Johan Helsingius <julf@penet.FI>
Date: Mon, 1 Mar 93 03:59:23 PST
To: Eric Hughes <hughes@soda.berkeley.edu>
Subject: Re: dispatches from the front lines of anonymity
In-Reply-To: <9302281806.AA13608@soda.berkeley.edu>
Message-ID: <9303011312.aa09448@penet.penet.FI>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



> Actually, I was thinking that whistleblower@anon.penet.fi would _be_
> the moderator.  Then you just post directly.  All the messages would
> come from that address, and no id's would be assigned.  Since all
> messages are from "whistleblower", replies to a poster go right back
> out to the list, also anonymized.

Well, this was my original idea as well, but the ensuing discussion
confused me.

> It's actually a much simpler system than is currently implemented,
> since id's arenit involved at all.

Exactly. And it's already implemented. I just have to enable it. But it
doesn't support PGP/MIME yet.

> PGP 2.1 contains the cleartext-signature feature, and the periodic
> posting to the list should mention this.  This allows a real pseudonym
> to develop, just like we want.

Agree. But this requires us to really actively distribute PGP 2.1.

	Julf





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: tribble@xanadu.com (E. Dean Tribble)
Date: Tue, 2 Mar 93 00:58:46 PST
To: uunet!soda.berkeley.edu!hughes@uunet.UU.NET
Subject: anon.penet.fi hacking
In-Reply-To: <9303010111.AA12729@soda.berkeley.edu>
Message-ID: <9303012157.AA23027@memexis.xanadu.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


		 Body-Termination-Regex: ^--$

	 I hate my sample header field name.  Please, someone think up a better
	 one.

Alternatives:

Sig-Pattern
Sig-Regex
End-Pattern

dean





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: tribble@xanadu.com (E. Dean Tribble)
Date: Tue, 2 Mar 93 00:58:41 PST
To: uunet!soda.berkeley.edu!hughes@uunet.UU.NET
Subject: anon.penet.fi hacking The next revision of the remailer will have something like
In-Reply-To: <9303010111.AA12729@soda.berkeley.edu>
Message-ID: <9303012158.AA23036@memexis.xanadu.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


		 Body-Termination-Regex: <regex>

	 The first character in the body that matches the regex, and every

BTW I think this is just the right thing.  Excellent idea!

dean




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Johan Helsingius <julf@penet.FI>
Date: Mon, 1 Mar 93 04:25:40 PST
To: "Edgar W. Swank" <edgar@spectrx.saigon.com>
Subject: Re: anon.penet.fi hacking
In-Reply-To: <DR9LZB7w165w@spectrx.saigon.com>
Message-ID: <9303011321.aa09556@penet.penet.FI>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



> I would be cautious about a random "From:" line.  I think penet will
> probably reject input that at least has does not have a valid (but not
> necessarily truthful) return address.

I have no way to check the validity of an address, unless it's
syntactically illegal.

> For a while, Miron Cuperman's wimsey remailer was generating a bogus
> >From address, something like "yeltsy@kremlin.vax.ru".  I tried
> chaining this to penet to post to newsgroups, but my anonymous
> messages never appeared in the newsgroups.  This was because,
> I think, penet sends a confirmation back to the sender. Since
> "kremlin.vax" is not in penet's net tables, this would cause
> the confirmation send to fail; my hypothesis is that this also
> causes the newsgroup post at penet to fail.

No, the posting must have failed fort some other reason. The problem is
that you never know why, as the error messages don't reach you...

> Wimsey could also establish its own penet password and automatically
> insert it whenever it detected a "to" address ending in penet.fi.

This could be one solution. But what do you do with bounces due to
some user error?

> I'd like to point out that so far the wimsey remailer is the only
> useful remailer from my point of view because it's the only one
> which allows me to delete the automatic sig.  This is because it
> only forwards encrypted text and discards any appended unencrypted
> text.

This will be solved using MIME. The .sig killer used at anon.penet.fi is
a pain in the rear...

	Julf





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: pmetzger@shearson.com (Perry E. Metzger)
Date: Mon, 1 Mar 93 14:06:12 PST
To: tytso@athena.mit.edu
Subject: Re: Future of anonymity (short-term vs. long-term)
Message-ID: <9303011908.AA16594@maggie.shearson.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> From: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@athena.mit.edu>
> 
> Since John Gilmore, the maintainer of the Cypherpunks mailing list, is
> one of the absolute free speach advocates --- let me ask a question
> directly at you:  What would you do if sometime next week, someone
> decided to flood the Cypherpunks mailing list with a large amount of
> trash postings, routed through different combinations of remailers?  Let
> us assume that the trash is generated by grabbing varying snippets from
> USENET articles, so that current AI technology is not able to
> distinguish a true Cypherpunks submission from the flooded trash
> postings.  What would you do?  Now let's also suppose someone does the
> same thing to all of the GNU newsgroups.  What would you do then?
> 

I know what I would do: I'd rig the list so it only took PGP signed messages,
and then only from official subscribers. They could be anonymous, but
they'd have to be operating under "known" pseudonyms. This is a "closed"
list -- the Extropians list in principle works under much the same
mechanism, only without PGP. This being in place, people who had not joined
could not flood the list, and anyone flooding the list could be cut off.
Note that just because one is in favor of free speech does not mean that
one would necessarily permit arbitrary disruptions in one's living
room, and being the list "owner" I think John would be much within his
rights to stop non-communicative disruptive "noise" postings.

> (Sorry for sounding so cynical, but after being a News admin at MIT for
> a long time, and dealing with a lot of people suffering from severe
> cases of freshmanitis, I have a less than optimistic view about human
> nature.)

I think that instead you should have a less than optimistic view of the
quality of our current netnews software. The problem you list can
be fixed with public key cryptography and some intelligent changes.

For instance, there is an easy fix to the "idiots posting newgroups" messages
that I heard Nat Howard propose years ago -- use public key signatures
on newgroup messages, and each news administrator picks other administrators
he trusts in the same sort of "web of trust" notion that PGP has. If
the newgroup/delgroup message was posted by someone you trust you take
it, otherwise you reject it. Given that, you are practically done.

As another example, its easy to assure that moderated newsgroups are run
just by the moderator -- he public key signs instead of posting with
the "Authorized" header. Easy as pi.

Perry




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Johan Helsingius <julf@penet.FI>
Date: Mon, 1 Mar 93 04:25:47 PST
To: Eli Brandt <ebrandt@jarthur.claremont.edu>
Subject: Re: anon user on cypherpunks list
In-Reply-To: <9303010023.AA07585@toad.com>
Message-ID: <9303011328.aa09601@penet.penet.FI>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



> > For every reason you might want a pseudonym in the first place, you
> > might also want a "pseudonym from your pseudonym," especially if you
> > use it a lot.
> 
> A specific example: I am presently running a survey of drug prices,
> and suggested that respondents might wish to reply through penet.
> Unfortunately, I realized that I could not respond to these messages
> without blowing my penet pseudonym.  Fortunately, I had never
> actually used it, so I could safely "blow it".  At present, if I
> need another penet pseudonym, I guess I'll create it through mail
> games.  But IWBNI there were a built-in way to do this --
> particularly for those who aren't able to hack mailers, who are the
> ones who really need a service such a penet in the first place.

Agree. And I *think* I have come up with a way to handle it "safely".
Will do a test implementation RSN.

	Julf





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Johan Helsingius <julf@penet.FI>
Date: Mon, 1 Mar 93 04:25:51 PST
To: Eric Hughes <hughes@soda.berkeley.edu>
Subject: Re: anon user on cypherpunks list
In-Reply-To: <9302281755.AA13087@soda.berkeley.edu>
Message-ID: <9303011333.aa10348@penet.penet.FI>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



> I would suggest bouncing mail to "an" style addresses unless a
> pseudonym has been declared; the bounce message would, of course,
> contain instructions on how to obtain a pseudonym or use the "na"
> form.

This only works if the From: lines of postings show the "na" form, but
this breaks the "historical" expectations of current users.

> Therefore, I would suggest that a second version of the pseudonymous
> system at penet do away with automatic generation and support multiple
> pseudonyms.

I might even try to do it in the current version. I might have worked
out a way that doesn't break too much of the current functionality.

	Julf





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@Athena.MIT.EDU>
Date: Mon, 1 Mar 93 12:19:20 PST
To: pmetzger@shearson.com
Subject: Re: more ideas on anonymity
In-Reply-To: <9303011827.AA15335@maggie.shearson.com>
Message-ID: <9303012016.AA26328@SOS>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


   Date: Mon, 1 Mar 93 13:27:24 EST
   From: pmetzger@shearson.com (Perry E. Metzger)

   Now, on the issue of slander, the notion of anonymity
   is largely unimportant. If I had walked into the middle of the street and
   ranted for an hour saying that GM trucks are unsafe, that would be largely
   ignored, as most anonymous denunciations likely are. The issue is if a
   non-anonymous individual or entity with credibility, like NBC, says
   something that is false.

I don't know about that.  It is certainly true that non-anonymous
individual or entity with credibility, like NBC, can do the most amount
of damage when they slander someone.

But what about someone who sends 20 different mail messages, each
through a different remailer path so they have different reply
addresses, all of them detailing some similar (but false) story about
how some GM truck went up in flames aftering being hit lightly by a Geo
Metro?  Or suppose someone sends 20 messages (all different) about how
Perry Metzger stiffed him/her out of some amount of digital cash?  I'd
suspect you could do some real damage that way.  Not as much, perhaps,
as something like a faked demonstration tape broadcast on prime-time
evening news, but damange nevertheless.

							- Ted




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: fen@genmagic.genmagic.com (Fen Labalme)
Date: Mon, 1 Mar 93 15:28:40 PST
To: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@Athena.MIT.EDU>
Subject: Re: more ideas on anonymity
Message-ID: <9303012327.AA23552@>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> From: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@Athena.MIT.EDU>
>
> Or suppose someone sends 20 messages (all different) about how
> ---- ------ stiffed him/her out of some amount of digital cash?  I'd
> suspect you could do some real damage that way.

In response to this, let me first quote Eric Hughes:

> "How much reputation has an anonymous source?"

I believe that this is the true question being asked.  I believe that in
the not-so-far-off future there will be an immense quantity of anonymous
traffic on the nets, and I will set my filters to ignore the large
percentage of it (though perhaps I may want to see notes with my name in
them, or perhaps not).

This doesn't mean I won't see *any* anonymous messages, as my positive
reputation system will work to counter-balance the effect of the filter,
and allow messages from anonymous sources that are connected to me via a
"line of trust", that is, through a set of anonymous keys and signatures
that prove to me that the source of the information is from someone that I
trust, or that they trust, or...

Further, pseudonymous posters may gain quite a bit of respect.  As was
earlier pointed out on this list, most posters to net news are today
pseudonymous, for I know not if their real name is what their From: line
states, but I learn to recognize and differentiate names (pseudonyms)
bearing good info from those that know not what they say or those that just
flame.

It is from this last set of anonymous publishers that we may have the
problem being discussed.  For example, "NBC" may as well be an anonymous
pseudonym, but we (well, a lot of the general public, anyway) have decided
to place a fair amount of trust into them.  This problem stems from people
being too ready to abdicate their responsibility from having to think
critically about the world around them, and the information they receive.

In other words, the big problem, as we all know, is one of education.

Just say "know"!
Fen





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Peter Shipley <shipley@tfs.COM>
Date: Mon, 1 Mar 93 16:27:32 PST
To: mccoy@ccwf.cc.utexas.edu (Jim McCoy)
Subject: Re: ideas on an encrypted BSD filesystem (LONG, technical)
In-Reply-To: <9303020004.AA01774@tramp.cc.utexas.edu>
Message-ID: <9303020025.AA25924@edev0.TFS>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



>Greetings:
>
>I have been working on a few ideas I have to make a BSD system (like a
>386BSD system on a nice fast PC) into a secure base system for a BBS that
>is somewhat "raid-proof".  The basic plan is the encrypt the filesystem and
>use public key encryption to separate the system administrator from the
>information contained within the system and make it harder to do blanket
>searches of computer systems such as those I have seen happen in this area.
>Here is a basic outline of what I plan on doing, any comments would be
>appreciated. 
>

my office mate and I were talking along simular lines, but for DOS. we
were thinking of setting up disk/partition encryption software that works
like the product "stacker" or  "double disk". but instead of just compressing
we encrypt.    When the system boots it will ask for a password phrase, it
you do not provide on the disk will not me accessable  (it will just appear
to be a unformated partition).   

Thus when you are raided and they power down your system, they will loose
access to the date.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: pmetzger@shearson.com (Perry E. Metzger)
Date: Mon, 1 Mar 93 14:27:15 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: anonymity + untraceable digital money = potential problems
Message-ID: <9303012153.AA22065@maggie.shearson.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> From: ALAN DORN HETZEL JR <dorn@indigo.mese.com>
> 
> Dear Group,
> 
> I believe that I see a potential serious problem with they onset of
> truly unbreakable anonymous communication combined with untraceable
> digital cash.
> 
> The problem is that crimes such as blackmail and extortion would become
> absolutely impossible to defend against.  Kidnapping for ransome would
> get a LOT easier.

I see serious problems with allowing people to take drugs. They can
get addicted to them. Lets ban medicines.

I see serious problems with allowing people to own guns -- they might
commit crimes with them.

I see serious problems with allowing people to speak freely -- they might
blaspheme, or tell lies.

Mr Hetzel, I'm an anarchist. I have very little "faith" in human beings,
which means I don't trust big complicated structures run on the assumption
that human beings are inherently trustworthy -- like governments, for
example. I prefer systems that decentralize power and make it possible
for people to operate without the necessity to trust each other. Yes,
digital cash makes kidnapping easier. So, for that matter, do telephones
and cash itself -- had money never been invented, anonymous kidnapping
would have never been possible. However, the alternative to permitting
market structures to take care of problems in a competitive way is to
allow central structures in which we are asked to trust in the benificence
of government officials. I'm not the trusting type. If history has
had any lesson, it is that governments degenerate and are taken over
by evil men, over and over and over. The structures needed to stop
digital cash, anonymous postings, and the like would be so draconian as
to assure that should a dictator ever wish to sieze power the structures
needed to do so would be waiting for him. I'd prefer a system in which
he would have to build them from scratch, even if it means one or two
people can be blackmailed once in a while. Utopia isn't possible. I'd
prefer, therefore, to settle for the best we can do.

> 
> I could send you an anonymous note threating to poison your dog, kill
> your wife, burn down your house, whatever..., ... unless you pay me
> $$$ in untraceable digital cash.  What can you do?

Today, I could send you an anonymous note threatening to poison your
dog if you don't leave $5000 in the poorbox at the corner church. What
can you do right now? Easy. Watch your dog. The police have a myriad
of techniques at their disposal. Their jobs have never been easy,
but they have to cope with anonymous messages and untraceable cash
thefts right now. To eliminate the capacity to use digital cash means
to require monitoring of all speech and ban most international traffic,
to prohibit strong cryptography and require key registration. Even then
I'm not convinced that it would work because people would still try to
avoid these restrictions.

All technologies are fraught with dangers. All of them. The knife you
use to slice your bread can be used to kill your wife. Shall we dispense
with knives? Shall we pretend that we can unlearn what we know? A bright
10 year old with a computer can produce a cypher machine. Shall we
lobotomize all ten year olds and destroy all the computers? You CANT put
some djinni back in the bottle after you've rubbed the first time. We
can't stop people from knowing things. At least the well meaning fools
who advocate gun control have the fact that good machine shops aren't
in practically every home on their side -- telephones, modems and computers
are becoming ubiquitous, however, and they are all capable of aiding
and abbetting in the criminal techniques you mention. Welcome to the world.

Perry Metzger




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Timothy Newsham <newsham@wiliki.eng.hawaii.edu>
Date: Mon, 1 Mar 93 21:00:15 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: tapping
Message-ID: <9303020333.AA04345@relay1.UU.NET>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



[forwarded from elsewhere]
> 
> [From Data Communications, January 1993]
> 
> INVENTION CUTS CABLING TIES
> 
> An inventor working from a garden shed in the U.K. has come up with a device
> that enables PCs and other LAN equipment to send and receive data through
> the plastic outer jacket of copper LAN cabling-- without piercing the
> cabling.  Called the Watsonlinc Cable Coupling Transformer, the device
> allows users to attach LAN equipment at any point in a network without going
> through time-consuming and costly cable attachment procedures.  The
> Watsonlinc, which must be placed directly next to a cable's outer jacket,
> uses a proprietary technique to reduce noise interference while picking up
> and transmitting data signals.  Watsonlinc-equipped network interface cards
> (NICs) will appear in the next 12 months, according to inventor Mike Watson
> (Walton-on-Thames, U.K.), who says the device's production cost of about $5
> per unit will not significantly increase NIC sticker prices.  The Watsonlinc
> works with both shielded and unshielded twisted-pair copper cabling, is
> small enough to fit on laptop PC internal adapters, and is capable of
> handling all common LAN speeds, Watson says.  The internationally patented
> invention works just as well with voice signals.  Predictably, it already
> has been licensed for use in telephone surveillance equipment.
> 
> 





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: nihilis@mindvox.phantom.com (Joel Boutros)
Date: Mon, 1 Mar 93 14:34:46 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: UNSUBSCRIBE
Message-ID: <g58qZB1w165w@mindvox.phantom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


UNSUBSCRIBE

Love the list, just don't logon and 120 new posts is just too many,
especially when I have to tell it apart from stuff straight to me...

(maybe if I can get a 14400 dialup to telnet through)


         |:-                 nihilis@phantom.com               -:|
         |:-                    Joel Boutros                   -:|




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: pmetzger@shearson.com (Perry E. Metzger)
Date: Mon, 1 Mar 93 15:21:51 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: more ideas on anonymity
Message-ID: <9303012228.AA23306@maggie.shearson.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



> From: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@athena.mit.edu>
> 
>    Date: Mon, 1 Mar 93 13:27:24 EST
>    From: pmetzger@shearson.com (Perry E. Metzger)
> 
>    Now, on the issue of slander, the notion of anonymity
>    is largely unimportant. If I had walked into the middle of the street and
>    ranted for an hour saying that GM trucks are unsafe, that would be largely
>    ignored, as most anonymous denunciations likely are. The issue is if a
>    non-anonymous individual or entity with credibility, like NBC, says
>    something that is false.
> 
> I don't know about that.  It is certainly true that non-anonymous
> individual or entity with credibility, like NBC, can do the most amount
> of damage when they slander someone.
> 
> But what about someone who sends 20 different mail messages, each
> through a different remailer path so they have different reply
> addresses, all of them detailing some similar (but false) story about
> how some GM truck went up in flames aftering being hit lightly by a Geo
> Metro?  Or suppose someone sends 20 messages (all different) about how
> Perry Metzger stiffed him/her out of some amount of digital cash?  I'd
> suspect you could do some real damage that way.  Not as much, perhaps,
> as something like a faked demonstration tape broadcast on prime-time
> evening news, but damange nevertheless.

I doubt it. As people get more and more used to the capacity to do
such things, its likely that such anonymous accounts will be more and
more untrusted.

Perry




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Date: Mon, 1 Mar 93 17:39:11 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Future of anonymity (short-term vs. long-term)
Message-ID: <9303020137.AA19657@netcom.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Ted Ts'o comments ruefully:

>There doesn't seem to be a lot of realism in these discussions, which is
>really bothering me.  Oh, well....
>
>                                                - Ted

There are certainly differing agendas and differing time horizons, as
others have also noted (especially Marc Ringuette's analysis of time
scales). Some are writing code to be put into their programs _tonight_,
while others take a longer view. 

Some on this list operate real remailers, even world-famous remailers. The
day to day discussion of mail protocols, PERL scripts, headers, REGEX
stuff, and actual code submitted to the list is certainly pretty strong
evidence that folks are deeply immersed in realism.

Your own concerns about anonmity have also been well-received, I think,
even if many of us disagree with you in some areas. Speaking for myself, I
agree that some limits on anonymous posting may develop--this doesn't mean
_we_ should put the limits in! (Granted, some of those operating remailers
need to think about these issues. Johan Helsingius, for example, has done a
very impressive job of balancing needs and threats and is considering how
to deal with various kinds of abuses. Many on this list are contributing
ideas. You can't get much more real than this.)

Bugs, flaws, problems, cruftiness, and other defects exist. So what? That's
the main point of trying to actually deploy these systems--to expose
weaknesses, to try new approaches, to come out with "Mark II" versions of
systems, and to have concrete examples to point to.

As far a realism goes, the folks in this group have built real anonymous
mailing systems, have been deeply involved in the PGP development (not me,
certainly, but look at the PGP docs and you'll see some names from this
list), and are working on many aspects of the evolution of digital privacy.
As one who has been interested in this area since 1987, I think the
progress in the last year or so has been nothing short of amazing.

-Tim May


--
Timothy C. May               | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,  
tcmay@netcom.com        | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
408-688-5409               | knowledge, reputations, information markets, 
W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA       | black markets, collapse of governments.
Higher Power: 2^756839 | Public Key: MailSafe and PGP available.





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Eric Hughes <hughes@soda.berkeley.edu>
Date: Mon, 1 Mar 93 17:47:45 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Future of anonymity (short-term vs. long-term)
In-Reply-To: <9303020037.AA26459@SOS>
Message-ID: <9303020144.AA01018@soda.berkeley.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Re: authenticated news software

>Also, keep in mind that netnews is run
>by lots of real sites, who have real assets which could be reached if
>sued by RSA.

Why is there a presumption that any such authenticated news software
would be used without license?  RSADSI is not trying to sit on their
patents, but to make money from them.  

>There doesn't seem to be a lot of realism in these discussions, which is
>really bothering me.  

What you believe to be real and what I believe to be real may be
different.  To claim that another is being unrealistic is to mask
what is foremost a difference in belief.

What assumptions here do you disagree with?  If you are explicit,
perhaps we can forge an agreement.

Eric




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: dclunie@pax.tpa.com.au (David Clunie)
Date: Mon, 1 Mar 93 00:32:52 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: a few opinions, unasked
Message-ID: <9303010733.AA14820@britt>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> Who is John Galt?

The man who said he would stop the motor of the world - and did.

:)

Where is John when you need him ?





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: mccoy@ccwf.cc.utexas.edu (Jim McCoy)
Date: Mon, 1 Mar 93 16:06:22 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: ideas on an encrypted BSD filesystem (LONG, technical)
Message-ID: <9303020004.AA01774@tramp.cc.utexas.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text


Greetings:

I have been working on a few ideas I have to make a BSD system (like a
386BSD system on a nice fast PC) into a secure base system for a BBS that
is somewhat "raid-proof".  The basic plan is the encrypt the filesystem and
use public key encryption to separate the system administrator from the
information contained within the system and make it harder to do blanket
searches of computer systems such as those I have seen happen in this area.
Here is a basic outline of what I plan on doing, any comments would be
appreciated. 


jim
mccoy@ccwf.cc.utexas.edu

-------------

1. Purpose:

To create a system that offers subscribers/users a greater level of privacy
and security than offered in most BBS/unix systems.  The basic goal is to
make a system somewhat "raid-proof".  Users have the ability to make thier
files encrypted is such a manner that even the system administrator is
unable to access/view the files.  Through such a system I hope to create a
sort of userspace that can allow an administrator to detach themselves from
the actual content of the files in the system in a sort of "common-carrier"
or "bookseller" philosophy that will offer both the admin and the user more
protection from over-zealous law enforcement agents and unauthorized
intruders.  If the users so choose, they can create files that even the
admin cannot access without modifying the system to spoof out keys during
transmission.  

The system is designed to be very difficult (if not impossible) for
external forces to gain access to information contained therein simply
through possession of the physical hardware of the system.  Essentially, I
want to separate the information content of the system from the hardware
(disk drives)  of the system by creating a wall using public key
encryption.  Access to files can be controlled by the users to whom those
files belong.

2. Some general conventions (mostly for lack of ASCII subscripting...):

X_p = X's public key
X_r = X's private key
X_p(X_r) = X's private key encrypted with X's public key
X_p(X_r1,X_r2...) = Private keys X_r1, X_r2, etc encrypted with pubkey X_p
K = one-time key used for encrypting a file
X_p(K) = File key K encrypted using X's public key

In most cases, S_r and S_r are user for the system keys, U_r and U_p for
user keys and G_r and G_p for public group keys.

3. Implementation:

This system will be based upon BSD (386BSD specifically, because the source
is there...) with the hopes of providing a set of low-level privacy and
security options that others can use to provide secure BBS and
general-access unix systems.  The system is in not invulnerable to external
attack and access of user's files without thier consent (known weaknesses
are listed after implementation details), but it tries to make the system
as "raid-proof" as possible. This privacy/security is implemented though
the use of an encrypted filesystem and built-in support for management of
the keys used for this encryption through public key encryption.

3.1 The filesystem 

In general, the system will encrypt the users' files using DES or IDEA
using a one-time random key.  This key will be encrypted with the user
public key and stored with the file.  When the file is accessed the key is
decrypted from the private-key stored in memory and the file key is found
and the file decrypted.  Not all files are encrypted; whether or not a file
is encrypted depends on its permissions.

If a file is world-readable then it is not encrypted, if it does not have
any r, w, or x permissions for world then the file is encrypted and the
one-time key used for the encryption is stored in the inode structure.
This structure contains space for holding both a "users" and a "group"
entry for the encryption key K.  

At this point the DES v IDEA choice depends on whether or not there is any
chip out there to do IDEA in hardware.  If not, I will probably use DES
(double or triple DES maybe...) because I can snag a card to do it and
offload this burden from the basic system.

3.2 Groups

The concept of "group" is also changed.  Basically, I can't see any real
benefit from the current implementation of groups in BSD, so I am going to
dump it all and rebuild something in the holes left behind.  The basic goal
of these "groups" is to implement something more like access control lists
than the standard Berkeley groups.  At the moment, I am thinking of
implementing two types of groups: public and personal.  

3.2.1 ACLs

A personal group is actually an ACL for a particular file.  This group
appears in a ls -g as "user-acl" (i.e. user "jdoe" sees the file's group as 
"jdoe-acl").  The default acl for files contains only the user as a member,
but for each file they can add or remove people from the acl.  This is
implemented by creating a default user-acl entry in the group file and
creating an entry for the user in the systems private acl list.   When a
user modifies the acl for a file a reference to the file is added to the
private acl list and entries foe each user or public group added to the
list are made in the following fashion:

fileref:gid or uid:rwx:(S_p(U_p(K))):gid or uid:rwx:(S_p(U_p(K))...

This holds the user id or group id, thier permissions, and the file key
wrapped in the particular user's public key (the user added to the acl, not
the owner of the file) and this is wrapped with the system public key.

3.2.2 Public groups

The other type of group are the public groups, which are somewhat similar
to the BSD groups, but differ in how they are created and how user's are
added.  Anyone can create a new public group.  This facility is implemented
with an application that simply asks the user for a unique name for the new
group.  When created the person creating the group is added to that group.
From that point on, the membership of groups is controlled by the group
members.  When someone wants to enlist another person in a group, they
sponsor the user, and the other members of the group are sent a message
indicating the person who would be joining and the sponsor (groupnames are
automatically made to be mail aliases for all group members as well).  Each
member of the group has the power to "blackball" a prospective member by
returning a mail message to the group server with a no vote.  Otherwise,
when all members return yes votes, or a specified time period has elasped,
the person is added to the group.

The membership of groups is knowledge that is limited to the members of the
group and the system.  Groupnames and membership is not public knowledge,
and unless you are a member of a group, a ls -g of a file with a particular
group set to it will return only the number (group-name->gid mapping is not
publicly accessible).  The group listing is kept wrapped in the system
public key, and each group is assigned it's own unique public/private
keypair.  The actual users do not know this key, it is held for them by the
system, but they can change thier effective gid if they are a member of a
group through a user command.  The groupfile help by the system holds
groups in the format: 

groupname:gid:G_p:U1_p(G_r):U2_p(G_r):...

When a new member is "sponsored" the system uses the U_r of the sponsoring
member to pull out the group private key from this file and puts the
U_p(G_r) of the member they are sponsoring in a file similar to the group
file, but holding "probationary members".  Both the group file and the
holding file for sponsored users are wrapped with the system public key.

3.3 System calls and access to privacy additions

All of the addtions mentioned here are run through the kernel.  User-level
processes have no access to these facilities otther than through a few
functions that will be added.  Specifically, access to the additional
entries in the inode holding the file key K and to the public and private
keys held in memory will only be available to the kernel.  The regular
system calls that access this sort of information (stat, for example) will
return what they normally return under BSD.  Whether or not the data blocks
they may access are encrypted or not is determined by the kernel and the
keys assigned to a particular user process.

There will be a few additional system calls and functions to allow people
to change the group of thier process, perhaps to change the private/public
key running with thier process, and some new user programs to manipulate
the new additions will be created.  For the most part, I am trying to make
the applications and user processes run on top of this system as
transparently as possible.

3.4 General notes

These are just some notes about the system that I am lumping together under
the category of "general".  They include known weaknesses and general notes
on the bahavior and operation of such as system.  

3.4.1 User interface to operations

The only significant difference a user will notice (other than the bizarre
permissions stuff for acls and groups) is a slight modification to the
login sequence.  The user will enter thier login and password as always,
and they will then be prompted for their private key wrapped in the systems
public key.  If successful they will have full access to thier files.  If
not they will still be able to login, but will not have a valid keypair
assigned to them and will be unable to access files they have on the system
that were encrypted.  I ahve not decided yet if the system will broadcast
it's public key to the user before asking for S_p(U_r) or if I should
assume they know it and then let it croak if they are wrong or it has
changed (allowing them to move around in a limited fashion with a process
without a keypair and find the new key).  I believe that the second option
is somewhat better at defeating some spoofing methods, but I am not really
sure... 

It should be noted that the public/private keypair that I have been talking
about as belonging to specific users should not be a keypair they
distribute.  The key is only for access and encryption of files on the
system and user's would be reminded often to use a completely different
keypair for email, etc.

3.4.2  Known weaknesses

Snooping on the line:
	There is nothing to prevent someone from tapping the line between
	the system and the user.  All such communications are in cleartext
	and by tapping the line in such a way someone can get around the
	privacy safeguards installed in the system (they can see the
	decrypted text come down the wire to the user and don't need to get
	to the hardware).  It would be really nice if I could do this whole
	thing encrypted using public key encryption, but I really don't
	feel like writing the necessary code for client programs so that
	non-technoid users could access the system.

Compromising the system private key:
	Through perhaps the threat of violence or other nasty force,
	someone might be able to get the system private key out of the
	sysadmin.  I have considered adding in a booby-trap of some sort,
	whereby the sysadmin could perhaps transpose a predetermined
	sequence from the private key and invoke a "slash and burn" on the
	system.

	The system private key may also be unknowingly compromised if it is
	not guarded carefully by the admin.  This is particularly dangerous
	because it allows someone to essentially crack the entire system
	over time without anyone knowing.  By having access to the system
	private key, the intruder/snooper can concievably snag private keys
	as they come in and decrypt user files, or even change the system
	keys and hold everything hostage...

A few others that I am too tired to write down right now:
	This is basically designed to make it hard for someone to scan
	every user's files just by grabbing the physical hardware.  Down
	here in the land where Steve Jackson Games had something like this
	happen to its BBS I want to make it difficult for the intruder.
	Not impossible, but force them to deal with each individual user as
	more than just another directory to search through and perhaps
	force them to be specific about what they want/are looking for if
	they have proper authority...or maybe make it so that the sysadmin
	could honestly say "Sorry, but even _I_ can't look at that file..." 


3.4.3  System public and private key

It may seem that I am wrapping a lot of stuff in the system public key when
it is not necessarily needed.  This is because I hope to set things up so
that most, if not all, system files are not encrypted.  The system protects
those files or bits of information that might need a little bit more
security through wrapping the piece in the system public key.  The system
private key is entered at the console at boot time (therefore it must
always be booted by hand), the private key entered is tucked away in memory
and is _never_ stored on disk (not even to swap space).  

The system private key seems to be the most important thing to hide,
because if the system private key is discovered, it is possible to run the
system in a spoof-mode or to gain access to a lot of things just through
possesion of the hardware.  If an improper private key is entered at boot
up time things will fail fast because the system will be unable to properly
access most user files and the system will also be unable to attach valid
user private keys to thier processes because it will not be able to decrypt
the S_p(U_r) packages users send at login.  Another reason for sneaking in
S_p as a wrapper for things is that it makes it much more difficult for
someone with possesion of the hardware to substitute in a new
public/private keypair for the system.  They could put it in, but the
files and group lists wrapped with the old key would still be inaccessible.

The method for legitimately changing the system's public and private keys
will require the admin having both the public and private keys for the
system.  This means that if an admin loses the system's private key the
users are screwed, so the admin really needs to make sure this is not lost.
Making a couple of copies on paper and storing them somewhere might not be
a bad idea (I know someone who made a stencil of his asciified PGP private
key and spray-painted it on a couple of walls of abandoned buldings around
town.  It fits in with the other graffiti, is much less fragile than a
floppy disk, and only he knows what the graffiti means... :)


----------

This is my basic outline, I welcome any comments or ideas people have on
beefing this up or problems in it that I may have overlooked.

jim




	

	-all comm to and from system is encrypted using idea with the
	 session key 



file system:
	-all files compressed and encrypted with IDEA or DES (DES if I can
	 find a nice hardware implementation [the need for speed...] and
	 otherwise IDEA in preference to DES)

	-when a file is read it is pulled up into an area of memory only
	 the system can access and decrypted?




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Karl Barrus <elee9sf@Menudo.UH.EDU>
Date: Mon, 1 Mar 93 16:30:44 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: she's at it again :-)
Message-ID: <199303020029.AA27124@Menudo.UH.EDU>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Cypherpunks,

	(My apologies if this is already widely known; I haven't seen
any mention of it on this list)

	In the March 1993 IEEE Spectrum magazine on pp. 16-17, Dorothy
Denning again floats her support for digital telephony bill in an
article entitled "Wiretapping and cryptography".  I quote her:

"Although government regulation of cryptography may be somewhat
cumbersome and subject to evasion, we should give it full
consideration.  Regulated encryption would undoubtedly provide far
greater security and privacy than no encryption at all, the current
state of affairs for most personal and corporate communications."

Regulated encryption!?

This topic was discussed quite thoroughly in sci.crypt in response to
Tim May's post.  And the topic is still kicking...

The article is very interesting, containing many oxymorons:

"On the contrary, implementation of an intercept capability together
with appropriate security measures is more likely to lead to
telecommunication systems that are "smarter," more secure, and of
commercial interest to other countries."

"while often labeled as "anti-privacy," wiretapping actually serves to
protect the privacy of law-abiding citizens and the business
interests of corporations"

/-----------------------------------\
| Karl L. Barrus                    |
| elee9sf@menudo.uh.edu             | <- preferred address
| barrus@tree.egr.uh.edu (NeXTMail) |
\-----------------------------------/




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Johan Helsingius <julf@penet.FI>
Date: Mon, 1 Mar 93 08:48:11 PST
To: Eric Hughes <hughes@soda.berkeley.edu>
Subject: Re: anon.penet.fi hacking
In-Reply-To: <9303011604.AA11556@soda.berkeley.edu>
Message-ID: <9303011752.aa19512@penet.penet.FI>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



> >Ok... Now.. Show me the regex that strips anything starting with '--',
> >such as '-----------------------------', except a PGP boundary line...
> 
> OK.  It's a mess.  The backslash means line continuance.  Remember that
> concatenation binds higher that alternation (|).
> 
> ^--...([^B]|B[^E]|BE[^G]|BEG[^I]|BEGI[^N]|BEGIN[^ ]|BEGIN [^P]|BEGIN P[^G]\
> |BEGIN PG[^P])

Hats off to you, Eric! Much better than I could do! But... It still
doesn't strip off something starting with only "--" on a line by itself...

	Julf





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Eric Hughes <hughes@soda.berkeley.edu>
Date: Mon, 1 Mar 93 18:41:36 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: cryptographic activism
Message-ID: <9303020238.AA15164@soda.berkeley.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Dave Deltorto, in a message to the list last week, was all fired up to
start some real political activism in this country.  More power to
him.

May I suggest publicly, though, Dave, that you broaden your focus?
The US really does work pretty well.  For example, Fourth Amendment
protections agains search and seizure, while eroding in some ways, are
still basically intact.  I do not claim that the US does not have
problems, just that the nature of governmental violence against its
own citizenry is much lower here than in other countries.  Therefore I
suggest that we extend an international hand of cryptographic aid.

I suggest that we start with Singapore.  Singapore is highly
industrialized has a good telecommunications base.  So good, in fact,
that it supports their national payment and identity card system.
Purchases really are tracked and data is filtered to look for unusual
behavior.  The subway and the toll booths all take the payment card.
Singapore is, in many ways, the crypto-anarchist's worst nightmare.

I do not know if the government there has cryptography restrictions,
but I'm sure they will soon, if only as reaction.  So now is the time
for all of you folks to start writing your steganographic
(information-disguising) applications!  They are actually useful here.

I would suggest that interested parties listen in on
soc.culture.singapore for a while, and then carefully broach the
subject about deploying secure communications.

This is about as real-world as it gets, folks.  The need for
cryptography as a tool against oppression is real.  In the US and
Europe we deploy it to prevent oppression in the future, and we must
be grateful that is the future we speak about.  Nevertheless, others
are not so fortunate.  It behooves us to consider them.

Singapore is not the only place in the world this is useful; it is
only my first suggestion.

Eric




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: ssandfort@attmail.com
Date: Mon, 1 Mar 93 11:34:03 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Piercing anonymity and censorship
Message-ID: <9303011933.AA00711@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text


_________________________________________________________________
             FROM THE VIRTUAL DESK OF SANDY SANDFORT
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Theodore Ts'o wrote:

    ". . . I don't like censorship in any form.  But
    disclosing who sent a particular piece of anonymous mail
    is not the same as censorship."

How about FORCING a third-party to make such a disclosure?  It
seems Ted would ask or force remailers to be the nets' policemen.
If remailers are required to compromise the anonymity of their
service, the "chilling" effect on speech IS censorship.

    ". . . there are people who believe . . . that libel and
    slander laws shouldn't exist.  But it's not fair to call
    that a mainstream position.  And it is unreasonable to
    assume that as an axiom."

I never claimed that such a position was "mainstream" nor assumed
it was an "axiom."  I don't think I've seen ANY "ad populum"
arguments (other than Ted's) on Cypherpunks, we tend to think for
ourselves.

    ". . . *MOST PEOPLE* also don't believe that the right
    to privacy is absolute.  It certainly isn't explicitly
    listed in the *U.S. CONSTITUTION"*.  (Emphasis added.SS)

Our desire for privacy is not the result of a *popularity
contest* nor is it an argument from *authority*.  Rather, it is
derived from the logical requirements of freedom.

    "But in order to punish the perpetrators, it is first
    necessary to *identify* the perpetrators......"

RE-READ my post, Ted.

     S a n d y                         ssandfort@attmail.com
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@Athena.MIT.EDU>
Date: Mon, 1 Mar 93 16:39:05 PST
To: pmetzger@shearson.com
Subject: Re: Future of anonymity (short-term vs. long-term)
In-Reply-To: <9303011908.AA16594@maggie.shearson.com>
Message-ID: <9303020037.AA26459@SOS>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


   Date: Mon, 1 Mar 93 14:08:14 EST
   From: pmetzger@shearson.com (Perry E. Metzger)

   I think that instead you should have a less than optimistic view of the
   quality of our current netnews software. The problem you list can
   be fixed with public key cryptography and some intelligent changes.

   As another example, its easy to assure that moderated newsgroups are run
   just by the moderator -- he public key signs instead of posting with
   the "Authorized" header. Easy as pi.

And you have an over optimistic view about how fast new netnews software
could be developed and deployed.  Also, keep in mind that netnews is run
by lots of real sites, who have real assets which could be reached if
sued by RSA.

There doesn't seem to be a lot of realism in these discussions, which is
really bothering me.  Oh, well....

						- Ted




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@Athena.MIT.EDU>
Date: Mon, 1 Mar 93 16:42:36 PST
To: fen@genmagic.genmagic.com
Subject: Re: more ideas on anonymity
In-Reply-To: <9303012327.AA23552@>
Message-ID: <9303020041.AA26464@SOS>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


   Date: Mon, 1 Mar 1993 15:29:12 -0800
   From: fen@genmagic.genmagic.com (Fen Labalme)

   I believe that this is the true question being asked.  I believe that in
   the not-so-far-off future there will be an immense quantity of anonymous
   traffic on the nets, and I will set my filters to ignore the large
   percentage of it (though perhaps I may want to see notes with my name in
   them, or perhaps not).

Well, unless and until this mythical "positive reputation filter" is
developped, many people may deal with this by just not allowing
anonymous traffic to be posted to Usenet (at least not via their site),
and by simply not allowing anonymous traffic on their mailing lists.
But that would be the free-market solution that everyone favors, I
suppose.

						- Ted




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: wcs@anchor.ho.att.com (Bill_Stewart(HOY002)1305)
Date: Mon, 1 Mar 93 16:45:37 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: anonymity + untraceable digital money = potential problems
Message-ID: <9303020045.AA07711@anchor.ho.att.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text



> > From: ALAN DORN HETZEL JR <dorn@indigo.mese.com>
> > Dear Group,
> > I believe that I see a potential serious problem with they onset of
> > truly unbreakable anonymous communication combined with untraceable
> > digital cash.
> > The problem is that crimes such as blackmail and extortion would become
> > absolutely impossible to defend against.  Kidnapping for ransome would
> > get a LOT easier.

Yes, some criminals would find blackmail, extortion, and kidnapping easier.
But others would find it harder.  Just think about who's most likely to
demand half your salary and threaten you with violence if you don't pay,
or take your house and not give it back unless you tell them the name they want,
or throw you in a locked room and not let you out until you pay ransom?
That's right!  It's the *government*!

I may not be as much of an anarchist as Perry, or maybe just more trusting :-),
but I'd still feel a lot more secure if the government didn't know how much
money I make and where to get it if they feel like taking it,
and couldn't read my mail and accuse me of corresponding with known
ANARCHISTS AND DRUG USERS AND FOREIGN NATIONALS AND MUNITIONS DEALERS
(obviously I must be conspiring with them since I didn't turn them in)
and quite frankly I'd like to be able to discuss different medicinal and
recreational products with people without having to worry that they'll
knock on my door one night and tear my house apart looking for things that
aren't there, or things that were legal when I bought them but aren't now,
and I'd like to be able to discuss interesting software without them coming
and stealing my wife's home business laptop and laser printer 
because they couldn't find the disk drive on my VT-100 clone.  

I'm not paranoid, but I have friends who are :-), and I'd like to be able to
talk to them on the phone without us worrying about wiretappers.
And I have friends of friends who come from other countries, and maybe their
papers aren't in order, and they don't want to go back to places where the
governments are less concerned about human rights than our benevolent 
Immigration and Naturalization Service, or maybe they just like it here.

And the lack of anonymous communication hasn't stopped the Mafia from
burning down restaurants here in New Jersey or up in Rochester;
it just means they've got to invest some of their profits in bribing cops.
My friend's brother didn't get an anonymous postal-mail message,
he got a visit from two big ugly guys he didn't know who told him how much
protection would cost.

On the other hand, my reading of Chaum's digicash paper makes it look like
marked digicash may be possible, if the original account-holder wants to
reveal the numbers and can trace the connection from the recipient's bank
back to their bank, so kidnappers will still need money-launderers,
though money-laundering will be easier.
(Blackmailers still can get revenge by revealing their secrets, but at least
you'll be able to be anonymous when you do some of the stupid things you
could get blackmailed for :-)

				Bill Stewart, wcs@anchor.att.com



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Johan Helsingius <julf@penet.FI>
Date: Mon, 1 Mar 93 10:23:03 PST
To: Eric Hughes <hughes@soda.berkeley.edu>
Subject: Re: anon.penet.fi hacking
In-Reply-To: <9303011742.AA15188@soda.berkeley.edu>
Message-ID: <9303011914.aa20158@penet.penet.FI>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



> ^--(|.|..|...(|[^B]|B[^E]|BE[^G]|BEG[^I]|BEGI[^N]|BEGIN[^ ]|BEGIN [^P]\
> |BEGIN P[^G]|BEGIN PG[^P]))
> 
> Some implementations don't support empty alternation, so that could be
> changed with the ? syntax, since (|a) and (a?) are the same.

Uh... Eric? Would it be ok to use it as a shocker example on the basic UNIX 
courses I do?

	Julf





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Johan Helsingius <julf@penet.FI>
Date: Mon, 1 Mar 93 10:58:50 PST
To: Joe Thomas <jthomas@mango.mitre.org>
Subject: Re: A novel (?) return address idea
In-Reply-To: <9303011721.AA02070@mango>
Message-ID: <9303011947.aa20452@penet.penet.FI>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



> The current na/an address workaround is okay, but I think we could do  
> better.

Definitely agree!

> Here's my scheme:

> When someone wants to reply to an anonymous message or post, the  
> remailer decrypts the address, ignores the "salt" bits, looks up the  
> anonymous ID in its database, and sends it on to the desired  
> recipient.  

> A couple disadvantages could be running out of bits for the return  
> address,

Lemmesee... Monocase, and can't use much more than letters, digits and
some special signs. Could be feasible, but we would get some rather
weird addresses...

> and adding more encryption work for the remailer.

This could be a problem. Anon.penet.fi is currently a feeble 25 Mhz 386,
and I have already ordered the replacement, a 60 Mhz 486 to handle the
load problems.

> You'd  
> definitely have to own the machine, and implement some, er, different  
> mailing software, since you'd have to accept mail for users with any  
> random name whatsoever.

Anon.penet.fi already does this. As long as we have something to pattern
match for (to separate alt.sex.bestiality@anon.penet.fi from
xy656b-akw@anon.penet.fi).

> What do you all think about this for a "Mark II" anon.penet.fi?

Have to sleep on it (it's 8:30pm here in finland), but it sounds
feasible to me...

	Julf





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@Athena.MIT.EDU>
Date: Mon, 1 Mar 93 20:54:18 PST
To: Eric Hughes <hughes@soda.berkeley.edu>
Subject: Re: Future of anonymity (short-term vs. long-term)
In-Reply-To: <9303020144.AA01018@soda.berkeley.edu>
Message-ID: <9303020248.AA26533@SOS>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


   Date: Mon, 1 Mar 93 17:44:23 -0800
   From: Eric Hughes <hughes@soda.berkeley.edu>

   >There doesn't seem to be a lot of realism in these discussions, which is
   >really bothering me.  

   What you believe to be real and what I believe to be real may be
   different.  To claim that another is being unrealistic is to mask
   what is foremost a difference in belief.

   What assumptions here do you disagree with?  If you are explicit,
   perhaps we can forge an agreement.

Well, let's see.... the most recent assumption I disagreed with was the
claim that we could implement full-fledged postive reputation filters,
complete with the use of RSA, and deploy it on the Usenet in some sort
of time-frame less than ten years out --- and even that is doubtful.
Look at how many sites are running B News, long after C news has been
out.  Anonymous remailers are here *today*.

Then there's assumption that anonymous ID's would automatically have no
weight --- they may have very little weight, but even today, they
probably have some weight.  I could probably construct some sort of NSA
conspiracy theory, and have it posted so it looked like it came from 20
different pseudonyms, and it probably would be believed by a lot of
people.  

Fundamentally, however, there's the basic assumption that anarchy per se
is good; which is a basic philosophical belief which I just plain
disagree with.  I have strong Libertarian leanings, although I don't
necessarily believe in the Libertarian party --- however, complete and
total anarchy goes far beyond what I believe is a reasonable or
realistic way to run a society; that's basically a "might makes right"
form of government.  In cyberspace, most of the people on this list
would probably be listed among the mighty: we understand computers, and
cryptography, and how to use them, "much better than the average bear".
So it is not surprising that there are many on this list who think
crypto anarchy is a good thing; however, I am not convinced that this
would be a terribly just or better society than what we have now --- the
only difference which class of people would be in power.

In any case, a basic assumption which seems to permeate the arguments
made by various people on this list is that anarchy is good.  Perhaps I
am running away from an argument, but in my experience, it is rare that
an argument with a religious fanatic bears any fruit, and it seems that
there are people who such militant anarchists that futher discussion
doesn't seem to have much of a point.

How does that saying go?  "Don't bother trying to teach a pig to sing.
It just frustrates you, and annoys the pig."

						- Ted




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: pmetzger@shearson.com (Perry E. Metzger)
Date: Tue, 2 Mar 93 02:46:22 PST
To: elee9sf@menudo.uh.edu
Subject: Re: she's at it again :-)
Message-ID: <9303020309.AA04736@maggie.shearson.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> From: Karl Barrus <elee9sf@menudo.uh.edu>

> The article is very interesting, containing many oxymorons:
> 
> "On the contrary, implementation of an intercept capability together
> with appropriate security measures is more likely to lead to
> telecommunication systems that are "smarter," more secure, and of
> commercial interest to other countries."
> 
> "while often labeled as "anti-privacy," wiretapping actually serves to
> protect the privacy of law-abiding citizens and the business
> interests of corporations"

Ugh. File under "Abeit Macht Frei" along with slogans like
"Freedom is Slavery".

Perry




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: mccoy@ccwf.cc.utexas.edu (Jim McCoy)
Date: Mon, 1 Mar 93 20:51:30 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: more ideas on anonymity
In-Reply-To: <9303011827.AA15335@maggie.shearson.com>
Message-ID: <9303020450.AA04260@tramp.cc.utexas.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text


Perry Metzger writes:
> 
> > From: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@athena.mit.edu>
> 
> > I see.  So you don't believe in libel or slander laws.
> > 
> > And NBC was perfectly justified in faking an explosion in a GM truck to
> > show it was unsafe, and broadcast it on prime-time TV.  And it didn't do
> > anybody any harm at all.  Uh huh.
> > 
> > Try again.....
> 
> I believe that Theodore is confusing the notion of tort and the notion of
> crime.
> 
[disctinction between crimes and torts wrt slander and libel...]
>
> The issue is if a
> non-anonymous individual or entity with credibility, like NBC, says something
> that is false.
> 

Remember the intent as well.  It is not enough that one utters false
statements, one must also intend to do damage with those statements (the
"malice aforethoght" part).  If I honestly thought that GM trucks were
firebombs waiting to happen and told someone else I am not being libelous,
but if I were to publish a statement that I knew was untrue (or one in
which I was negligent in my research, but I am not sure about this...) then
I might have a date in court in the near future...

Either way, these actions are civil one, not criminal.  The U.S. government
is extremely limited in it's ability to use prior restraint to prevent
publication of something (although there are many ways around the existing
protections, as many on this list will undoubtably attest to.)

jim




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: swc@uc1.ucsu.edu (Stuart W. Card)
Date: Mon, 1 Mar 93 20:44:52 PST
Subject: volume
Message-ID: <9303020405.AA04367@uc1.ucsu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I know better than to send an unsubscribe message to the whole list, but...

I really like this stuff.  I intend fully to set up my own remailer
Real Soon Now :-)

Unfortunately, the rigors of grad study + running a struggling business
don't permit me to keep up with all the reading.

So, thanks all, I'll be back this summer.

--
Stuart W. Card <swc@uc1.ucsu.edu>




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: arcticus!Xenon (Christopher Eric Hanson)
Date: Wed, 3 Mar 93 00:28:10 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Handling Abuses of Remailers
In-Reply-To: <CypherPunksList.0606@arcticus.UUCP>
Message-ID: <9303020542.AA0061q@arcticus.UUCP>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


In article <CypherPunksList.0606@arcticus.UUCP> tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May) writes:
> * To handle _abusive volumes_ through remailers, charge for remailing.
> Short term, this may be a problem, but this is the long term market
> solution.

  Quick but relevant question: Assuming a commercial anonymous remailer
were set up tomorrow, with (don't ask me how this would be done, it's
hypothetical...) provable anonymity -- what should it charge per message,
or per kilobyte of message?

> -Tim May
> tcmay@netcom.com        | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero

Chris - Xenon
-- 
   Xenon%arcticus@burner.com = Chris Hanson | Lord Xenon | Kelson Haldane
 I work, but you don't know who I work for, and I'm not on their machine(s).
"There is no Truth. There is only Perception. To Perceive is to Exist." - Xen
Home (303)745-0108|Work (303)696-8973|Flames (976)DEV-NULL|PGP2.1 key by req.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: swc@uc1.ucsu.edu (Stuart W. Card)
Date: Mon, 1 Mar 93 20:35:00 PST
Subject: Yanek Martinson <yanek@novavax.noval.edu>
Message-ID: <9303020446.AA04562@uc1.ucsu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I tried to respond directly to Yanek Martinson
<yanek@novavax.noval.edu> directly without success.
Could someone please directly e-mail me a good
address for him? Thanks.
--
Stu Card <swc@uc1.ucsu.edu>




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: dclunie@pax.tpa.com.au (David Clunie)
Date: Mon, 1 Mar 93 05:40:27 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Mail server for PGP sources
Message-ID: <9303011339.AA15227@britt>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I gather some people have had trouble obtaining sources for PGP. I
have accumulated those I can and they are available from my mail
server. If you can get these somewhere closer then great, but
if desperate feel free to get them from here (as long as the load
doesn't get out of hand I will keep it going).

The address is "mail-server@pax.tpa.com.au".

Help is available by sending in the message body:

  send help
  end

An index of PGP files is available by sending in the message body:

  index pgp
  end

And results in something like the following ...

     Date       Size  Index: pgp
  ----------  ------  ----------------------------
  1992/12/25    216K  security/pgp/macpgp2.0.sit.hqx
  1992/12/25    160K  security/pgp/msiguide.zip
  1992/12/25     33K  security/pgp/ngclon11.zip
  1992/12/25    168K  security/pgp/pgp-ng.zip
  1992/09/13    184K  security/pgp/pgp20.zip
  1992/09/13    376K  security/pgp/pgp20src.zip
  1992/12/25    536K  security/pgp/pgp21.tar.Z
  1992/12/25    192K  security/pgp/pgp21.zip
  1992/12/25    656K  security/pgp/pgp21ami.lha
  1992/12/25    240K  security/pgp/pgp21os2.zip
  1992/12/25    440K  security/pgp/pgp21src.zip
  1992/12/25    224K  security/pgp/pgp21_next.tar.Z
  1992/12/25    256K  security/pgp/pgp21_sparc.tar.Z
  1992/09/13    464K  security/pgp/unix_pgp20.tar.Z

Probably pgp21.tar.Z or pgp21.zip are what you want for unix or pcdos
respectively.

If anyone has a more recent mac version I will put that up too.

david




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Tony Kidson <tony@morgan.demon.co.uk>
Date: Mon, 1 Mar 93 20:54:06 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Libel UK
Message-ID: <2957@morgan.demon.co.uk>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


In message <9303011958.AA24443@soda.berkeley.edu> you write:

> Perhaps Tony Kidson could tell us some of the effects of libel law in
> the UK.  The US law, which grew out of British law, seems to have gone
> in the direction of reducing the power of a libel complaint, while
> British law has done the opposite.  I can't speak for the UK, but
> those who live there could.

In the UK, We don't have a first amendment :-(

The law has developed in such a way that anybody with funds 
available can silence criticism by issuing a writ.  

There is much more protection for public figures. for example 
Robert Maxwell, proprietor of Mirror Group Newspapers (& 
Pergammon Press amongst others) robbed his companies blind.  
Everybody knew that he was a crook, but nobody could say so 
because he had the financial clout to silence everybody who said 
so with libel writs.  The UK needs anonymous posting far more 
than the US does.


Regards


Tony Kidson
+-----------------+-------------------------------+--------------------------+
| Tony Kidson     |    PGP 2.1 Key by request     | Voice +44 81 466 5127    |
| Morgan Towers,  |                               | E-Mail                   |
| Morgan Road,    |         This Space            | tony@morgan.demon.co.uk  |
| Bromley,        |          to Rent              | tny@cix.compulink.co.uk  |
| England BR1 3QE |Honda ST1100  ==*==  DoD# 0801 | 100024.301@compuserve.com|
+-----------------+-------------------------------+----------------------------+




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@Athena.MIT.EDU>
Date: Mon, 1 Mar 93 21:21:58 PST
To: mccoy@ccwf.cc.utexas.edu
Subject: Re: more ideas on anonymity
In-Reply-To: <9303020450.AA04260@tramp.cc.utexas.edu>
Message-ID: <9303020520.AA26631@SOS>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


   From: mccoy@ccwf.cc.utexas.edu (Jim McCoy)
   Date: Mon, 1 Mar 1993 22:50:03 -0600 (CST)

   > The issue is if a
   > non-anonymous individual or entity with credibility, like NBC, says something
   > that is false.
   > 

   Either way, these actions are civil one, not criminal.  The U.S. government
   is extremely limited in it's ability to use prior restraint to prevent
   publication of something (although there are many ways around the existing
   protections, as many on this list will undoubtably attest to.)

You are all missing my point.  I am well aware that libel and slander
are civil actions; not criminal ones.  However, they *all* *hinge* *on*
*having* *someone* *to* *sue*.   Today, it is generally not possible to
be anonymous while broadcasting your views to a large number of people.
The closest you can get to that is at a rally, and even then, since you
are phyiscally present, there is some link between what you say and your
identity; hence, there is a certain amount of personal responsibility in
what you say publically.

Anonymous remailers completely removes this check on undisciplined free
speech; it is now possible to spout GIF images, rantings that Elvis is
alive, the fact that Jim McCoy didn't beat his wife today --- all
without any personal risk on the part of the broadcaster.  While, this
may be a feature in some cases, in other cases it is most definitely a
BUG.  If you ignore this, you are only burying your head in the sand.

						- Ted





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Tony Kidson <tony@morgan.demon.co.uk>
Date: Mon, 1 Mar 93 20:52:37 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: anonymity + untraceable digital money = potential problems
Message-ID: <2958@morgan.demon.co.uk>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


In message <9303012153.AA22065@maggie.shearson.com> you write:

>                                                           Shall we
> lobotomize all ten year olds and destroy all the computers? 

This is perhaps the first sensible suggestion that this group has 
come up with.


Tony
+-----------------+-------------------------------+--------------------------+
| Tony Kidson     |    PGP 2.1 Key by request     | Voice +44 81 466 5127    |
| Morgan Towers,  |                               | E-Mail                   |
| Morgan Road,    |         This Space            | tony@morgan.demon.co.uk  |
| Bromley,        |          to Rent              | tny@cix.compulink.co.uk  |
| England BR1 3QE |Honda ST1100  ==*==  DoD# 0801 | 100024.301@compuserve.com|
+-----------------+-------------------------------+----------------------------+




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: wcs@anchor.ho.att.com (Bill_Stewart(HOY002)1305)
Date: Mon, 1 Mar 93 22:10:11 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: A novel (?) return address idea
Message-ID: <9303020609.AA10483@anchor.ho.att.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text


Joe Thomas's proposal for anonymous return addresses is nice:
	return_addr = printable_encoding( encrypt( K, (salt, userid) ) )
	userid = substring( n, decrypt( K, print_to_binary( return_addr ) ) )
where userid is the remailer's pointer to the real email address / pubkey,
K is a secret key in the remailer, and salt is different for each message.
(printable encoding may need to be monocase for some mailers.)

If you used DES encryption, you could do 32 bits of UID and 32 bits of salt,
you can turn the 64 bits of cyphertext into 13 printable characters using
an obvious 5bit encoding; a good choice for a mailer is to prepend an x
	x<13_char_encoding>   ( e.g. xabcdefghijklm )
and not have any real UIDs starting with x, so your mail delivery program
can easily tell what to hand to the remailer-reply process and what to
deliver more normally. 

Aside from being nice round numbers, this lets you support 4 billion users with
4 billion messages each, but is this really the right balance?
Many users, like x<13rand>@remailer.foo.com, will only send a few messages,
while a few others, like mailer-daemon@crypto.bank.com, will send lots.
Should we perhaps use a Class A - Class B - Class C approach like IP addresses,
with the bits broken up 16/48 - 32/32 - 48/16 or maybe 24/40 - 32/32 - 56/8?
Unlike IP, of course, these address spaces are local only, and the user
probably shouldn't know the userid number - the class is really just advisory.
	X-Anon-Request-New-UserID: C
	X-Anon-Request-User-Class: C
could be used to request a new / reused userid of class C.
	
Ideas for the extra-secure implementations:
- it might be interesting to use a separate internal secret key to store
  the mapping from (real-email, userid) -> email-publickey.
  Hiding the mapping from real-email <-> userid is tougher.
- if you really want longer userid+salts much bigger than this,
  you've got to handle email names noticably longer than 16 characters,
  or play games with hashing to reduce the size of the email name.
  The main motivation would be to use encryption other than DES,
  such as a public-key system with blocks longer than 64 bits,
  but hashing increases the amount of information you have to store,
  and the annoyance of deciding how to age it, avoid overload, etc.

			Bill Stewart
# Bill Stewart    wcs@anchor.ho.att.com  +1-908-949-0705 Fax-4876
# AT&T Bell Labs, Room 4M-312, Crawfords Corner Rd, Holmdel, NJ  07733-3030



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "DrZaphod" <ncselxsi!drzaphod@ncselxsi.netcom.com>
Date: Tue, 2 Mar 93 07:47:50 PST
To: CypherPunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Future of anonymity (short-term vs. long-term)
Message-ID: <6341.drzaphod@ncselxsi>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


In Message Mon, 1 Mar 93 21:48:39 -0500,
  Theodore Ts'o <Athena.MIT.EDU!tytso@netcomsv.netcom.com> writes:

> Well, let's see.... the most recent assumption I disagreed with was the
> claim that we could implement full-fledged postive reputation filters,
> complete with the use of RSA, and deploy it on the Usenet in some sort
> of time-frame less than ten years out

     So this doesn't seem possible to you, does it?  10 years to me seems
more than enough time to design the code and implement it in key places
like USENET and mailing lists.  10 years AGO we were happy to have the
tiny 5 1/4" floppy disk as opposed to the 8".  Now we have flopptical and
WORM..  Perhaps the world of mainframes moves slower than the rest of the
world.. but that doesn't matter because in 10 years the many PCs will be on
the internet with ISDN with plenty of free cycles to maintain [or consult] a
database of positive reputations.


> Fundamentally, however, there's the basic assumption that anarchy per se
> is good; ... however, complete and total anarchy goes far beyond what I
> believe is a reasonable or realistic way to run a society

     It's not a way to RUN a society... it just happens.

> that's basically a "might makes right" form of government.

     Isn't that what we have now?  If the DEA busted down your door could
you defend yourself?  If NSA wants to waste more of your money do they ask
you?  Because we have rules I think people are misled into thinking it's
fair.  Society will ALWAYS be a "might makes right" way of life.. the
"might" is not necissarily physical power but it's still might.  TTFN.

DrZaphod
[AC/DC] / [DnA][HP]
[drzaphod@ncselxsi.uucp]
Technicolorized




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: root@rmsdell.ftl.fl.us (Yanek Martinson)
Date: Tue, 2 Mar 93 03:30:19 PST
To: swc@uc1.ucsu.edu
Subject: Yanek Martinson
Message-ID: <m0nTV1O-0002hMC@rmsdell.ftl.fl.us>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> I tried to respond directly to Yanek Martinson
> <yanek@novavax.noval.edu> directly without success.
                     ^

I'm yanek@novavax.nova.edu (note, no l).

--
Yanek Martinson
yanek@novavax.nova.edu





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: jcoryell@nwu.edu (John Coryell.)
Date: Wed, 3 Mar 93 07:47:20 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Just came back.. (fwd)
Message-ID: <9303031545.AA04169@casbah.acns.nwu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Newsgroups: alt.cyberspace
From: andyc@rock.concert.net (Richard A Ciordia -- Personal Account)
Subject: Just came back..
Message-ID: <1993Feb24.042117.12675@rock.concert.net>
Organization: CONCERT-CONNECT -- Public Access UNIX
Date: Wed, 24 Feb 1993 04:21:17 GMT
Lines: 6

Just came back from a VR Lecture, hosted by one of the Directors at Autodesk.
There are some new VR releases comming out that is Wicked.. Lower cost too.
Anyhow... It was way cool.. 3d-Studio, for those who havent used, grab a copy
it's a blast.. Easy to make, rend, animate.. Hasta..
Andy







From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Al Billings <mimir@u.washington.edu>
Date: Tue, 2 Mar 93 08:53:19 PST
To: jb@paris7.jussieu.fr
Subject: Re: TIME magazine article about cyberpunks
In-Reply-To: <00968e6d.50110011.20804@paris7.jussieu.fr>
Message-ID: <Pine.3.05z.9303020826.A15907-a100000@carson.u.washington.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



On Tue, 2 Mar 1993 jb@paris7.jussieu.fr wrote:

> I've just read an article about the cyberpunks (cypherpunks??) in
> Time's n#9 issue. I feel it tells very well where it started it
> why and by who.

 Actually, it is a rather typically badly written piece on the so-called
"cyberpunks" and attempts to throw in the buzz words. It is factually
inaccurate in places and the EFF is seeking a retraction for what was said
about it in the article (the author passed 's problem when they asked for
a retraction).







From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Tiia Roth-Biester <72147.3504@CompuServe.COM>
Date: Tue, 2 Mar 93 06:33:38 PST
To: <cypherpunks@toad.com>
Subject: Re: Dining Crypto -- An Introduction
Message-ID: <930302142453_72147.3504_EHC51-1@CompuServe.COM>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


(Jim McCoy)

>There is no way you can get around taxation if you intend on using this
>system in real life.  Your system is much like that of a drug dealer, he
>gets all this money, but has no where to spend it until it has been
>laundered.  

So in other words the earnings of the international banks located "offshore"
and lending $trillions in the "Eurodollar" (now world financial) markets
have been taxed for the last 30 years?  Their balance sheets don't reflect
these taxes.

The new technology will let everyone "expatriate" themselves either 
actually or virtually.  If, today, I am traveling in the South of France
and writing the Great American Novel, I have no French tax liability and
am not violating work permit laws even though I am working and may be
earning $millions.  (If I am or have been an American within the previous
10 years I would have US tax liability of course.)  On the nets I can do
a host of jobs while wandering around the world.  In most countries I would
have no income tax liability.  Taxing me (or net entities created by me)
would be even more difficult in a practical sense.

>They will get you at the banks or wherever you go to spend your
>money.  The "War on Drugs" has really caused this kind of banking service
>to dry up, 

Digital cash will be able to buy lots of goodies (entertainment, 
communication, non-physical services, and physical services once the VR 
interface improves sufficiently).  Dumped into an account that is 
otherwise unconnected to you it can be accessed via smart cards, debit 
cards, and ATMs from anywhere in the world.  It is still not that 
difficult to obtain a bank account somewhere in the world in a nome de 
guerre.

>The appetite of the taxation-beast will not diminish, and everyone will 
>just end up having higher taxes on the physical elements of daily life 
>that can't be stuffed on the wire.  Sounds like this is going to be a 
>world of info-elite tax dodgers...the public will love you...

Actually the poor evade more taxes (as a portion of income) than the rich 
these days.  The appetite of the beast has not stopped the forex markets 
from tripling in size since 1986 (quite a bit untaxed).  Legally, services
sold "internationally" are not subject to tax and there is no entity
capable of levying such a tax.  The nets exist in an "international" realm.
As time goes on the percentage of gross world product that is non physical
is bound to grow (the non-physical bits have been growing steadily for
years).  Once future Madonnas determine that they can double their take 
home pay by renouncing their American citizenship (either actually or 
virtually) and selling their voices and images via the nets things will 
change.  If the coercive sector has to increase the taxes again and 
again on an ever smaller portion of gross world product, it will starve 
to death.

>The unbundling of the physical and non-physical aspects are nice, but how
>many non-physical aspects of a service are there? 

If your VR interface is good enough most services can be delivered non
physically.  Nonphysical services include:  writing (anything), 
entertainment, law, much of medicine, all of management, telecoms, 
advertising and marketing, all of financial services.  Once automation 
develops much of manufacturing will be non physical as you purchase 
"custom" goods made on the spot from downloaded patterns.

Authority can be a delicate thing.  On November 9th 1989 you would have 
been shot crossing the Berlin Wall without permission on November 11th 
1989 you could cross at will.  

Many of your supposed restraints only apply to US citizens in any case.  
British citizens living "overseas" have no UK tax liability and this is 
true of the citizens of most countries.  Everyone is "overseas" on the 
nets.  Even though US expatriates have continuing liabilities, 60% of 
them are tax nonfilers according to an IRS study of tax compliance.  
Shattering geographical bounds shatters legal ones as well even in this 
day and age.

Duncan  Frissell






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Pat Farrell" <pfarrell@gmuvax2.gmu.edu>
Date: Tue, 2 Mar 93 06:34:14 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: RE: she's at it again :-)
Message-ID: <34377.pfarrell@gmuvax2.gmu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


In Message Mon, 1 Mar 1993 18:29:29 -0600,
  Karl Barrus <elee9sf@Menudo.UH.EDU> writes:

>        In the March 1993 IEEE Spectrum magazine on pp. 16-17, Dorothy
>Denning again floats her support for digital telephony bill in an
>article entitled "Wiretapping and cryptography".

See also the March 1993 Communications of the ACM. Altho there is little
new on the topic for most folks on this list. Sigh.

Pat Farrell      Grad Student                 pfarrell@cs.gmu.edu
Department of Computer Science    George Mason University, Fairfax, VA
PGP Public key availble via finger          #include <standard.disclaimer>




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@Athena.MIT.EDU>
Date: Tue, 2 Mar 93 06:40:17 PST
To: memexis!tribble@uunet.UU.NET
Subject: Re: Piercing anonymitiy and censorship
In-Reply-To: <9303011845.AA22881@memexis.xanadu.com>
Message-ID: <9303021439.AA02074@SOS>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


   Date: Mon, 1 Mar 93 10:45:32 PST
   From: memexis!tribble@uunet.UU.NET (E. Dean Tribble)

   I would like to separate the issues of hollering anything at 4am in
   residential areas from things like libel and slander.  Disturbing
   people with your volume independent of its content is like blasting
   white noise at damaging volume levels.  The remedies for it have
   nothing to do with speech, they have to do with disturbing the peace;
   your sound is crossing onto my property at intolerable levels.

And again, I repeat..... with anonymous remailers, you no longer have a
way to enforce said grounds of disturbing the peace ---- unless you do
things like approach the finnish authorities and ask that penet be
disconnected from the network for disturbing the peace of various Usenet
groups.....

						- Ted




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Pat Farrell" <pfarrell@gmuvax2.gmu.edu>
Date: Tue, 2 Mar 93 06:53:08 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: RE: she's at it again :-)
Message-ID: <35501.pfarrell@gmuvax2.gmu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


In Message Mon, 1 Mar 1993 18:29:29 -0600,
  Karl Barrus <elee9sf@Menudo.UH.EDU> writes:

>        In the March 1993 IEEE Spectrum magazine on pp. 16-17, Dorothy
>Denning again floats her support for digital telephony bill in an
>article entitled "Wiretapping and cryptography".

See also the March 1993 Communications of the ACM. Altho there is little
new on the topic for most folks on this list. Sigh.

Pat Farrell      Grad Student                 pfarrell@cs.gmu.edu
Department of Computer Science    George Mason University, Fairfax, VA
PGP Public key availble via finger          #include <standard.disclaimer>




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: jb@paris7.jussieu.fr
Date: Tue, 2 Mar 93 01:26:46 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: TIME magazine article about cyberpunks
Message-ID: <00968e6d.50110011.20804@paris7.jussieu.fr>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Hi there,

I've just read an article about the cyberpunks (cypherpunks??) in
Time's n#9 issue. I feel it tells very well where it started it
why and by who.
Cheers,
jb




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: mab@vax135.att.com
Date: Tue, 2 Mar 93 07:30:09 PST
To: mccoy@ccwf.cc.utexas.edu (Jim McCoy)
Subject: Re: ideas on an encrypted BSD filesystem (LONG, technical)
In-Reply-To: <9303020004.AA01774@tramp.cc.utexas.edu>
Message-ID: <9303021525.AA16574@vax135.UUCP>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text


I've built something that has a similar flavor; it was presented
at the works-in-progress session at the January '93 USENIX conference.
A full paper (and hopefully the released software) will be forthcoming
("any day now").  Here's the abstract that was at USENIX:

.TL
A Cryptographic File System
.AU
Matt Blaze
.AI
AT&T Bell Laboratories
Holmdel, NJ 07733
mab@research.att.com

January 14, 1993
.PP
As computing systems (especially distributed ones) grow in size,
issues of data security and privacy become increasingly complex.
Cryptographic techniques can help ensure that data are not read by
unauthorized persons, but most encryption software requires either
that special purpose application software be used or that the user
manually encipher and decipher files as needed.
.PP
The Cryptographic File System (CFS) makes it easier to take
advantage, in a secure manner, of file system services (storage,
backup, etc.) on potentially insecure servers and networks.
.PP
CFS provides a transparent Unix file system interface to directory
hierarchies which are automatically DES encrypted with user-specified
keys.  Users "attach" an encrypted directory by providing a key, the
name of a directory where the encrypted files are to be stored, and
the name of a cryptographic "mount point" to be created under /crypt.
Directories under /crypt are accessible with all standard system calls
and tools to the users who created them.  The underlying encrypted
files (with encrypted names) can reside on any accessible file system
(including remote file systems such as NFS); routine system
administration tasks, such as file backup and restore, can be
performed on the encrypted directories in the ordinary manner without
knowledge of the key.  When run on a client workstation, CFS ensures
that cleartext is never stored on a disk or transmitted over a
network.  CFS uses a standard portable NFS client interface and has
has been implemented for a variety of Unix platforms.



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: mccoy@ccwf.cc.utexas.edu (Jim McCoy)
Date: Tue, 2 Mar 93 08:34:19 PST
To: 72147.3504@CompuServe.COM (Tiia Roth-Biester)
Subject: Re: more ideas on anonymity
In-Reply-To: <930302160011_72147.3504_EHC32-1@CompuServe.COM>
Message-ID: <9303021632.AA07790@tramp.cc.utexas.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text


Tiia Roth-Biester <72147.3504@CompuServe.COM> writes:
>
> (George A. Gleason)
> 
> >1) Anything involving physical violence, threats of violence, incitement to
> >violence.  (this includes acts such as rape, pedophelia etc., 
> 
> Don't forget that this also includes government.  I for one would favor
> banning the advocacy of government from the nets.  Serve them right <G>.  
> Interesting that most people support murder, robbery, and slavery when 
> practiced in the name of the State but might shirk from supporting rape 
> in the service of the State.  Sounds inconsistent to me.

Not really.  Since its foundation, the cornerstone of government is that it
maintains the only legitimate monopoly on the use of violence.  Like it or
not, this is how it works and most of the sheep/citizens are quite happy to
maintain this system.  It is kind of ironic that you would propose to ban
the advocacy of government on the nets considering the fact that without
governement the nets would not be here in the first place.  Sounds
inconsistent to me...

jim



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Date: Tue, 2 Mar 93 10:36:25 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: anon.penet.fi hacking
Message-ID: <9303021834.AA12367@netcom.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>                 Body-Termination-Regex: ^--$
>
>         I hate my sample header field name.  Please, someone think up a better
>         one.
>
>Alternatives:
>
>Sig-Pattern
>Sig-Regex
>End-Pattern
>
>dean

In honor of Dorothy Denning's latest posting, how about:

Sig-Heil

The Feds will probably like this.


--
Timothy C. May               | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,  
tcmay@netcom.com        | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
408-688-5409               | knowledge, reputations, information markets, 
W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA       | black markets, collapse of governments.
Higher Power: 2^756839 | Public Key: MailSafe and PGP available.





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Date: Tue, 2 Mar 93 10:36:30 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Textual Analysis
Message-ID: <9303021834.AA12381@netcom.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


"Tiia Roth-Biester" writes:

>(Jim McCoy)
>
>>There is no way you can get around taxation if you intend on using this
>>system in real life.  Your system is much like that of a drug dealer, he
>>gets all this money, but has no where to spend it until it has been
>>laundered.  
>
>So in other words the earnings of the international banks located "offshore"
>and lending $trillions in the "Eurodollar" (now world financial) markets
>have been taxed for the last 30 years?  Their balance sheets don't reflect
>these taxes.

This reveals a minor and probably obvious weakness of pseudonyms--writing
styles.

As I was reading this post from apparent newcomer "Tiia Roth-Biester," and
wondering at how a woman (I think Tiia is a woman's name) got interested in
this list, I said to myself: "Wait a minute, this sounds exactly like
Duncan Frissell!" 

Sure enough, Duncan wrote it.

Imagine what can be done with word and phrase frequency analysis, with
examination of punctuation styles (e.g., some people use _this_ for
emphasis while others use *this*), and so on. Entropy measures, etc.

Someday this may be important.

-Tim

--
Timothy C. May               | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,  
tcmay@netcom.com        | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
408-688-5409               | knowledge, reputations, information markets, 
W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA       | black markets, collapse of governments.
Higher Power: 2^756839 | Public Key: MailSafe and PGP available.





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: gnu (John Gilmore)
Date: Tue, 2 Mar 93 10:38:20 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com, gnu
Subject: Re: A novel (?) return address idea
In-Reply-To: <9303021603.AA09007@mango>
Message-ID: <9303021838.AA29102@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


There seems to me to be a serious problem with the "novel return
address" idea.  The information that ties together multiple anonymous
messages from the same person is out in the world, encrypted by a
single key in a conventional cipher.

If that single key is compromised, everyone's identity is exposed. (Or,
at least, the correlation among all messages sent by that individual, 
even if their legal or email name is not revealed).

Furthermore, breaking the key will be possible by sending test-probes
and doing exhaustive search.  E.g. if you add 128 bits of salt,
someone can send five or ten messages to themself through the
remailer, and accumulate ten encrypted addresses that are known to be
for the same sender.  When decrypted, these keys will have maybe a 16-
or 32-bit "return address ID" and 128 bits of salt.  The attacker can
then search the key space for keys that include large numbers of
identical bits when decrypting those ten keys.  This search is easily
amenable to parallelization, fast hardware also exists to do it, and
it may be possible to find improved algorithms to use the knowledge of
identical plaintext bits to speed up the search process.

The idea also suffers from the dossier problem -- all the information
about return addresses will exist in a single place (at the remailer
site) where it's tempting for a government (or other adversary of
privacy) to try for it.

Keep thinking, folks!  We aren't there yet...

	John




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: pmetzger@shearson.com (Perry E. Metzger)
Date: Tue, 2 Mar 93 12:59:20 PST
To: tytso@athena.mit.edu
Subject: Re: Future of anonymity (short-term vs. long-term)
Message-ID: <9303021551.AA03777@maggie.shearson.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> From: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@athena.mit.edu>
> 
>    From: Eric Hughes <hughes@soda.berkeley.edu>
> 
>    >There doesn't seem to be a lot of realism in these discussions, which is
>    >really bothering me.  
> 
>    What you believe to be real and what I believe to be real may be
>    different.  To claim that another is being unrealistic is to mask
>    what is foremost a difference in belief.
> 
>    What assumptions here do you disagree with?  If you are explicit,
>    perhaps we can forge an agreement.
> 
> Well, let's see.... the most recent assumption I disagreed with was the
> claim that we could implement full-fledged postive reputation filters,
> complete with the use of RSA, and deploy it on the Usenet in some sort
> of time-frame less than ten years out --- and even that is doubtful.

Oh, come ON. This is insane, Ted, and you know it. Project Athena didn't
take ten years. RSAREF is out there -- someone could build a version of
news that used public key for verifying moderation on newsgroups and
control messages within a month if they felt like it -- and working part
time, too. As for the rest, well, it shouldn't be too hard. For
unmoderated lists, keep sets of users you want to read the messages of
and verify signatures if forgery starts becoming a problem. Crude but it 
would work.

> Look at how many sites are running B News, long after C news has been
> out.  Anonymous remailers are here *today*.

Well, the folks running B News and C News will have to live without
the public key extensions, and it will be their fault. The people with
the public key extensions will have the benefits. Is it your argument that
because some men are fools all must suffer, Ted? Lets say that tommorrow
someone made available, for free, pills that cured all disease. Are we
to say "no, thats bad, some idiots won't take them?"

> Then there's assumption that anonymous ID's would automatically have no
> weight --- they may have very little weight, but even today, they
> probably have some weight.  I could probably construct some sort of NSA
> conspiracy theory, and have it posted so it looked like it came from 20
> different pseudonyms, and it probably would be believed by a lot of
> people.  

Yeah, well, so what? Right now people post such things non-anonymously, or
could forge such postings. People put out infinte supplies of garbage. I'd
argue that the average church causes more damage than all the anonymous
posters on Usenet ever could and those are perfectly legal. You aren't
arguing for non-anonymity. You are arguing that free speech is bad. Well,
fine. See if you can stop it, Ted -- the rest of us aren't playing along
with that game. Given that you have no choice but to accept reality, why
not quit bitching and just work on fixing the problem?

The Extropians list works on a closed subscription system today, folks. Its
crude -- no public keys involved, subscription checking done very ad hoc --
but it works. People ARE out there fixing these problems. If someone really
thinks anonymity is going to be a problem, they can fix it, and it won't
take ten years -- a couple of months of evenings would likely allow
for overkill.

> Fundamentally, however, there's the basic assumption that anarchy per se
> is good; which is a basic philosophical belief which I just plain
> disagree with.

That isn't even an issue here, Ted. Anonymity exists whether we want it
or not -- its like asking if gravity is a good idea. The anarchy issue
is not part of this. Even you would have to recognise that its impossible
even with a society as closed as the Soviet Union to stop anonymity, let
alone in a society as free as ours. The choices are to live with it and
find ways to cope or to try for draconian measures. One is practical -- the
other is impractical and harmful in and of itself.

Perry




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Tiia Roth-Biester <72147.3504@CompuServe.COM>
Date: Tue, 2 Mar 93 08:08:35 PST
To: <cypherpunks@toad.com>
Subject: Re: more ideas on anonymity
Message-ID: <930302160011_72147.3504_EHC32-1@CompuServe.COM>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


(George A. Gleason)

>1) Anything involving physical violence, threats of violence, incitement to
>violence.  (this includes acts such as rape, pedophelia etc., 

Don't forget that this also includes government.  I for one would favor
banning the advocacy of government from the nets.  Serve them right <G>.  
Interesting that most people support murder, robbery, and slavery when 
practiced in the name of the State but might shirk from supporting rape 
in the service of the State.  Sounds inconsistent to me.

Duncan Frissell





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: jthomas@mango.mitre.org (Joe Thomas)
Date: Tue, 2 Mar 93 08:06:38 PST
To: wcs@anchor.ho.att.com (Bill_Stewart(HOY002)1305)
Subject: Re: A novel (?) return address idea
Message-ID: <9303021603.AA09007@mango>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


wcs@anchor.ho.att.com (Bill_Stewart(HOY002)1305) write:
> 

> Joe Thomas's proposal for anonymous return addresses is
> nice:

Thanks :^).  [Nice summary deleted]

> If you used DES encryption, you could do 32 bits of UID and
> 32 bits of salt, you can turn the 64 bits of cyphertext into
> 13 printable characters using an obvious 5bit encoding;
> a good choice for a mailer is to prepend an x
> 	x<13_char_encoding>   ( e.g. xabcdefghijklm ) and not
> have any real UIDs starting with x, so your mail delivery
> program can easily tell what to hand to the
> remailer-reply process and what to deliver more
> normally. 


Yeah, I was thinking around 5 bits per character, and you have to  
pattern-match something.  Could be "an-" or "x" or whatever...

> Aside from being nice round numbers, this lets you
> support 4 billion users with 4 billion messages each, but
> is this really the right balance?

Seems about right to me.  If there's demand for a different mix, you  
can always add that later (with a different prefix to clue the  
software into how to interpret).  Meanwhile this version could be  
implemented quickly, and would offer a good deal of security.  As to  
what to use for the salt... If you don't expect users to send more  
than one message per second (at least, if they do, they won't mind  
both of them having the same return address) you can just use a  
straight timestamp -- Unix gives you 32 bits worth for free (as sec.  
since 1 Jan 1970).  This guarantees you won't have loops from a PRNG.   
The time won't ever be reset to a past value.

[other stuff deleted]

I don't really think we need to do any encryption of the ID to  
address database, since only the remailer software should be using  
it.  And while adding more salt bits might be nice (random bits  
increase strength against known plaintext attacks -- a danger since  
you know the approximate time, and that your ID will be the same in  
each message you send), I don't see how hashing could be useful,  
since it is one-way by definition.  The remailer needs to both create  
and resolve return addresses.

Is the source for the anon.penet.fi remailer available?  I might have  
a crack at implementing this...

Joe




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: mjr@netcom.com (Matthew Rapaport)
Date: Tue, 2 Mar 93 11:22:43 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: anon.penet.fi hacking
Message-ID: <9303021921.AA12649@netcom2.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>>       Body-Termination-Regex: ^--$
>
>Ok... Now.. Show me the regex that strips anything starting with '--',
>such as '-----------------------------', except a PGP boundary line...
>
>        Julf

Ok... How about:

        Body-Termination-Regex: ^--$
        Body-Termination-Exclude-Regex: ^-----BEGIN PGP [ A-Z]*-----$
        Body-Termination-Exclude-Regex: ^-----END PGP [ A-Z]*-----$

Just EXPLICITLY exclude anything you don't want stripped...

(Don't know if I got my regular expression just right, but I think you
get the idea)

At some point (maybe already) the average header collection will exceed
the average message in size... Talk about overhead... :-)

matthew rapaport     Philosopher/Programmer At Large      KD6KVH
           mjr@netcom.com     70371.255@compuserve.com




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: tribble@xanadu.com (E. Dean Tribble)
Date: Wed, 3 Mar 93 01:31:20 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: more ideas on anonymity
In-Reply-To: <9303011958.AA24443@soda.berkeley.edu>
Message-ID: <9303021951.AA26424@memexis.xanadu.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


	 "How much reputation has an anonymous source?"

	 I think this might be key to solving the "anonymous libel" problem.
	 Simply declare "anonymous libel" an oxymoron!  We might argue that
	 otherwise libelous statements, when made anonymously, carry a
	 presumption of falsity, for otherwise the speaker would be willing to
	 speak truthfully in his or her own person.

	 Or, in other words, "Coward! He must be lying!"

The perspective you propose is an easy way of orienting people towards
positive reputations.  If people consider an unestablished anonymous
source as similar to a drunk on the street staggerring up to them,
then sources start out with little positive reputation.

For some things, anonymity is sufficiently valuable that its use
doesn't discredit the source: crime tip-offs, inside corruption
revealing, etc.  In many of those cases, however, the source would
need to establish their validity, which ties them back into the
positive reputation game: an insider could reveal information that
proves their inside knowledge, an informer could establish a long-term
anonymous reputation, etc.  In the case of the informer, police might
still respond to random tips, but not with the same alacrity (yeah
right) with which they respond to tips from established informers.

dean




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: The Ministry of Silly Walks <TSMWG@acad1.alaska.edu>
Date: Tue, 2 Mar 93 14:12:12 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: No Subject
Message-ID: <01GVC13HVSR890NADM@mr.alaska.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


UNSUBSCRIBE





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: The Ministry of Silly Walks <TSMWG@acad1.alaska.edu>
Date: Tue, 2 Mar 93 14:13:16 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: No Subject
Message-ID: <01GVC14UBOGK90NADM@mr.alaska.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Enjoyed this mailing list enormously, but am unable to keep up with
the quantity of mail!  Please unsubscribe me.  Thanx =-=MwG=-=





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "DrZaphod" <ncselxsi!drzaphod@ncselxsi.netcom.com>
Date: Tue, 2 Mar 93 19:47:32 PST
To: CypherPunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: You Aren't [I'm Not]
Message-ID: <47610.drzaphod@ncselxsi>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>   Date: Tue, 2 Mar 93 10:51:31 EST
>   From: pmetzger@shearson.com (Perry E. Metzger)
>
>   **You aren't arguing for non-anonymity.** You are arguing that free
>   speech is bad.
>

> In Message Tue, 2 Mar 93 16:57:22 -0500,
>  Theodore Ts'o <Athena.MIT.EDU!tytso@netcomsv.netcom.com> writes:
>
>**No, I am not argueing for non-anonymity.**  Please stop defending your
>position by putting misrepresentations in my mouth.

     Aren't these the same thing?  TTFN!

[Waiting for reply: "That's the same thing!"]

DrZaphod
[AC/DC] / [DnA][HP]
[drzaphod@ncselxsi.uucp]
Technicolorized




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: fen@genmagic.genmagic.com (Fen Labalme)
Date: Tue, 2 Mar 93 13:35:42 PST
To: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@Athena.MIT.EDU>
Subject: Re: Piercing anonymitiy and censorship
Message-ID: <9303022134.AA27063@>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>    Date: Mon, 1 Mar 93 10:45:32 PST
>    From: memexis!tribble@uunet.UU.NET (E. Dean Tribble)
> 
>    I would like to separate the issues of hollering anything at 4am in
>    residential areas from things like libel and slander.  Disturbing
>    people with your volume independent of its content is like blasting
>    white noise at damaging volume levels.  The remedies for it have
>    nothing to do with speech, they have to do with disturbing the peace;
>    your sound is crossing onto my property at intolerable levels.
> 
> And again, I repeat..... with anonymous remailers, you no longer have a
> way to enforce said grounds of disturbing the peace ---- unless you do
> things like approach the finnish authorities and ask that penet be
> disconnected from the network for disturbing the peace of various Usenet
> groups.....
> 
>                                                 - Ted


Don't most news readers have "kill files" (sometimes known as "bozo
filters")?  I definately prefer decentralized solutions.  Anyone mandating
what I can and cannot read is slime (synonomous with censor), imo.

I want to make that choice myself, thank you very nice.

Fen





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: pmetzger@shearson.com (Perry E. Metzger)
Date: Tue, 2 Mar 93 12:58:54 PST
To: tytso@athena.mit.edu
Subject: Re: Piercing anonymitiy and censorship
Message-ID: <9303021915.AA10138@maggie.shearson.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> From: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@athena.mit.edu>
> 
>    Date: Mon, 1 Mar 93 10:45:32 PST
>    From: memexis!tribble@uunet.UU.NET (E. Dean Tribble)
> 
>    I would like to separate the issues of hollering anything at 4am in
>    residential areas from things like libel and slander.  Disturbing
>    people with your volume independent of its content is like blasting
>    white noise at damaging volume levels.  The remedies for it have
>    nothing to do with speech, they have to do with disturbing the peace;
>    your sound is crossing onto my property at intolerable levels.
> 
> And again, I repeat..... with anonymous remailers, you no longer have a
> way to enforce said grounds of disturbing the peace ---- unless you do
> things like approach the finnish authorities and ask that penet be
> disconnected from the network for disturbing the peace of various Usenet
> groups.....

Of course there are ways -- and they need not be so drastic. You could,
for instance, simply prevent non-subscribers from posting to your list,
and use public key to verify identities. This would allow you to swiftly
stop abuse. I've already noted this twice. You've claimed this is impractical,
but the tools to do this, AND WITHOUT PATENT PROBLEMS, already exist and
would be cheap to implement.

Perry
 




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: tribble@xanadu.com (E. Dean Tribble)
Date: Wed, 3 Mar 93 01:31:28 PST
To: uunet!penet.FI!julf@uunet.UU.NET
Subject: Future of anonymity (short-term vs. long-term)
In-Reply-To: <9303011309.aa09356@penet.penet.FI>
Message-ID: <9303022222.AA26658@memexis.xanadu.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


	 IMHO a remailer operator should *NEVER* reveal any identities, but I
	 also believe very strongly that especially if you provide a way to post
	 news articles, there has to be a way to send replies to the original
	 sender. Thus a remailer must maintain mapping info.

I like this.  Does it make sense (and has it already been talked
about?) to preserve the return information only for a limited time?

dean




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: tribble@xanadu.com (E. Dean Tribble)
Date: Wed, 3 Mar 93 01:29:32 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: implementing positive reputation systems
Message-ID: <9303022249.AA26686@memexis.xanadu.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


The scheme I always think of when envisioning positive reputation
systems is that I get the feed of everything I might be interested in,
then sort and filter using whatever cleverness I desire.  Occasionally
(perhaps regularly) I exchange message with various people so that we
can update our transitive reputation information.

Eric Hughes and the recent discussion about volume problems got me
thinking about how to implement positive reputations at server sites.
I want a system in which the semantics are similar to the ideal
scenario above, but lower overhead in bandwidth and in processing
power for the receiver.  I suspect that the mailing list server would
provide filtering, and the receiver would provide sorting.

This will let us create mailing lists with anonymous participants
without letting them overwhelm the list.  It controls volume, etc.
Hmmmm....

Anyone with ideas, please send them to me (or the list) and I'll
collect them and post them.

dean




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: jthomas@mango.mitre.org (Joe Thomas)
Date: Tue, 2 Mar 93 11:59:50 PST
To: gnu@toad.com (John Gilmore)
Subject: Re: A novel (?) return address idea
Message-ID: <9303021956.AA11428@mango>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


From: gnu@toad.com (John Gilmore):

>There seems to me to be a serious problem with the "novel return
>address" idea.  The information that ties together multiple
>anonymous messages from the same person is out in the world,
>encrypted by a single key in a conventional cipher.

[attack methods deleted]

>The idea also suffers from the dossier problem -- all the
>information about return addresses will exist in a single place (at
>the remailer site) where it's tempting for a government (or other
>adversary of privacy) to try for it.

>Keep thinking, folks!  We aren't there yet...

Quite true.  I guess I never really made it clear that I don't  
believe this return address method is very secure, just better than  
the current version available through anon.penet.fi.  Certainly it's  
no reason to abandon the work on SASE's for cypherpunk remailers.

My idea was just to make it difficult to associate different messages  
from the same anon user, while keeping anon.penet.fi's current  
framework.  Now all messages from the same user bear the same return  
address (e.g. an1234).  If you reveal your identity in one anonymized  
message, all of your past messages can be easily linked with you.   
Under the new scheme, associating two messages from the same sender  
would require breaking the remailer's cipher.  Yes, it's possible,  
but it's not trivial.

It's also possible to limit the damage done when a single key is  
compromised.  Change keys periodically (weekly? daily?) and include a  
few bits at the front of the return address that will let the  
remailer know which key to decrypt the rest with. 


The dossier problem is a real one, of course.  If Julf or his machine  
is compromised, all the aliases could be revealed.  But that's true  
now, as well.

Joe




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: tribble@xanadu.com (E. Dean Tribble)
Date: Wed, 3 Mar 93 01:29:30 PST
To: uunet!Athena.MIT.EDU!tytso@uunet.UU.NET
Subject: Future of anonymity (short-term vs. long-term)
In-Reply-To: <9303020248.AA26533@SOS>
Message-ID: <9303022349.AA26712@memexis.xanadu.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


			>There doesn't seem to be a lot of realism in these discussions, which is
			>really bothering me.  

People often mistake being a wet blanket and finding lots of
objections to thing with 'being realistic'.  Is that what you are
doing?  Otherwise, given how much work I see people doing to both
spread the ideas and to build tools, I can't imagine to what you are
referring.  People are building and deploying remailers, integrating
crypto stuff into mail programs, testing anonymity, writing
publilcations on teh subject, successfully suing government
organizations for privacy violations, working towards positive
reputation systems, etc.  Pretty damn good for people's spare time.
And certainly plenty 'realistic'.  Discussion of visions and long term
goals might qualify, but the grandiose visions we indulge in drive the
day-to-day improvements we make on the technology and ideas about
privacy that are available.

			What assumptions here do you disagree with?  If you are explicit,
			perhaps we can forge an agreement.

	 Well, let's see.... the most recent assumption I disagreed with was the
	 claim that we could implement full-fledged postive reputation filters,
	 complete with the use of RSA, and deploy it on the Usenet in some sort
	 of time-frame less than ten years out --- and even that is doubtful.
	 Look at how many sites are running B News, long after C news has been
	 out.  Anonymous remailers are here *today*.

I must have missed that message.  I looks like a munging together of
lots of separate things that are in the works, and that will integrate
in some reasonable way.  As I put together my thoughts for an answer
here, I realized that my summary of what's going on would better fit
in a separate message.  I'll send that later.

	 conspiracy theory, and have it posted so it looked like it came from 20
	 different pseudonyms, and it probably would be believed by a lot of

It would only be believed by people who tend to believe in that stuff.
The people that read home.ec.cooking will just look at a message like
that strangely and wonder what it has to do with cooking.  There
aren't many forums in which such a message is even appropriate.  In
the ones that are, I suspect acceptance would be slow for a sudden
flurry of anonymous postings :-)  Most of hte people who would believe
that kind of thing easily simply aren't on the net.

	 Fundamentally, however, there's the basic assumption that anarchy

I don't even think Tim May believes that :-)  I think the basic
assumption is that government rstriction of freedom and privacy is
*bad*.  There's almost certainly more agreement with that.  I
certainly can't htink of time when it was good...

	 necessarily believe in the Libertarian party --- however, complete and
	 total anarchy goes far beyond what I believe is a reasonable or
	 realistic way to run a society; that's basically a "might makes right"

Anarchy is just a bad word because it brings to mind the image of
utter lawlessness and destruction.  I certainly want all the things
typically (badly) supplied by the government:  health care, police,
fire, national defense, etc., I just don't think that we need the
gov't to provide them.  Any anarchy that I advocate has to support at
least the level of society we have now, and I certainly believe that
to be possible.

	 there are people who such militant anarchists that futher discussion

Labelling someone with a name, then insisting that it belongs to them
is hardly a useful style of argument.

	 How does that saying go?  "Don't bother trying to teach a pig to sing.
	 It just frustrates you, and annoys the pig."

This is just righteousness that is intended to put people down.  It
just prompts flaming and doesn't contribute to the discussion.

Finally, I would note that people are actively pursuing crypto stuff
for a variety of reasons.  I can disgree about philosophy and still
productively cooperate with people.  We contribute to each other's
goals.

What are your goals with respect to this stuff, and *what are you
doing* to pursue them?  You want more realism:  what are *your* plans?
Objecting to someone else's is easy.  Doing something is hard (that's
why I support other people doing something even if I don't quite agree
with them).

dean




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Eric Hughes <hughes@soda.berkeley.edu>
Date: Tue, 2 Mar 93 15:57:42 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: tapping
In-Reply-To: <199303022155.AA04077@eff.org>
Message-ID: <9303022354.AA27572@soda.berkeley.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



>> > uses a proprietary technique to reduce noise interference while picking up
>> > and transmitting data signals.  

>> > works with both shielded and unshielded twisted-pair copper cabling, is
>> > small enough to fit on laptop PC internal adapters, 

Phiber writes:
>Mike Watson rediscovers inductance, and the inductive tap.
>Film at 11.

Don't be so dismissive.  There is something interesting going on here,
even if it's not very complex.  This thing works with _shielded_ pair.
With twisted pair to begin with, you largely attenuate the inductive
signal.  (A very short lesson in physics: Current generates magnetic
fields.  Opposite travelling currents generate cancelling fields.
Fields do not completely cancel because the wires are not in exactly
the same place.)  Shielding a twisted pair further attenuates a
signal.

It sounds to me like it's an inductive tap with some sort of phase
locking built into it.  By the mentioning networks, it indicates to me
a digital signal.  I doubt this thing would tap a POTS line carrying
voice.

Eric




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Marc Horowitz <marc@MIT.EDU>
Date: Tue, 2 Mar 93 12:57:14 PST
To: Tiia Roth-Biester <72147.3504@CompuServe.COM>
Subject: anarchism (was: Re: Dining Crypto -- An Introduction)
In-Reply-To: <930302142453_72147.3504_EHC51-1@CompuServe.COM>
Message-ID: <9303022055.AA24072@tla.MIT.EDU>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>> If the coercive sector has to increase the taxes again and again on an
>> ever smaller portion of gross world product, it will starve to death.

Do all you anarchists out there really think that society can hold
itself together, in any form, without government?  I believe that
government today has its hands in way to many places.  I believe in
downsizing government, but not in eliminating it.

I believe in the free market, but I also believe that the free market
can be abused, and that controls need to be in place to prevent that.
(Those of you who don't believe me, look at the railroad industry in
the end of the 19th century.)

I believe in protecting our freedoms in whatever ways possible, but
there are times when wiretaps and other such actions *are* the most
expidient ways to investigate criminals.  These views are
inconsistent, I think.  I will probably decide that absolute privacy
through crypto is the most reasonable solution.  But I'm still trying
to think of compromises.

IMHO, things like alt.whisteblowers, with airtight anonymity, will do
far more to insure our rights than simply protecting our own privacy,
since the former is active, and the latter is passive.

Now that I'm in free-association mode, Perhaps a.w should be a
heirarchy:

a.w.search-and-seizure
a.w.foia
a.w.corrupt-politicians

That's only what I thought of off the top of my head.  If the New York
Times or some publication of similar stature were to pick up the "best
of" of all the different categories, research them, and publish them
if they turn out to be true, this would have the result of making
government far less corrupt, which would make me far more comfortable
than just knowing the corrupt ones couldn't read my data.  After all,
even with perfect crypto (yeah, I know, can't be done), my *body* is
still vulnerable, and they will still have guns and prisons.  In the
worst case, they don't *need* an excuse.

After all, the real problem today is not that they might see what I
say in private, but that they might decide they don't like it, and do
something about it.  If drugs, and prostitution, and all those non-PC
things were legalized, the security of information would matter a lot
less.

I guess what I'm saying is that crypto is an imperfect solution to a
real problem, and that while it lets us go on with our lives the way
we think we should be able to, solving the real problem would be a lot
better.  This is not to say that I don't think crypto privacy doesn't
have its place: a.w, abuse hotlines, etc. are all excellect examples.
But instead of merely hiding from the system, perhaps we should also
keep an eye to changing it.

Whew.

		Marc




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Eric Hughes <hughes@soda.berkeley.edu>
Date: Tue, 2 Mar 93 16:32:46 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Poor Man's Time Release Crypto
Message-ID: <9303030029.AA01349@soda.berkeley.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


An obvious but very important point about any time release protocol
can be observed in the following one:

   1. Publish some non-random encrypted data.
   2. Wait.

Computational increases will eventually make cracking the code
feasible.  Your secret will be revealed, but you just don't know when!

Technological progress puts an upper bound on the amount of time a
secret can remain secret.  Likewise, Diffie-Hellman is forward secure,
but only until taking discrete logs in the chosen ring is feasible.

Eric




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@Athena.MIT.EDU>
Date: Tue, 2 Mar 93 13:41:18 PST
To: pmetzger@shearson.com
Subject: Re: Piercing anonymitiy and censorship
In-Reply-To: <9303021915.AA10138@maggie.shearson.com>
Message-ID: <9303022139.AA02344@SOS>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


   Date: Tue, 2 Mar 93 14:15:15 EST
   From: pmetzger@shearson.com (Perry E. Metzger)

   Of course there are ways -- and they need not be so drastic. You could,
   for instance, simply prevent non-subscribers from posting to your list,
   and use public key to verify identities. This would allow you to swiftly
   stop abuse. I've already noted this twice. You've claimed this is impractical,
   but the tools to do this, AND WITHOUT PATENT PROBLEMS, already exist and
   would be cheap to implement.

If they are so cheap to implement them, could someone please implement
them FOR THE USENET GROUPS?  (Where you don't have a concept of
subscribers or non-subscribers?)

I here lots of *talk* of how easy it is to do this, or how easy it is to
do that.  If it's so easy, why doesn't someone prove it to the rest of
us by actually doing it.   I hate to bring the Real World down upon you
guys, but talk is cheap; code sometimes isn't.

							- Ted





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@Athena.MIT.EDU>
Date: Tue, 2 Mar 93 13:49:11 PST
To: fen@genmagic.genmagic.com
Subject: Re: Piercing anonymitiy and censorship
In-Reply-To: <9303022134.AA27063@>
Message-ID: <9303022147.AA02357@SOS>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


   Date: Tue, 2 Mar 1993 13:36:13 -0800
   From: fen@genmagic.genmagic.com (Fen Labalme)

   Don't most news readers have "kill files" (sometimes known as "bozo
   filters")?  I definately prefer decentralized solutions.  Anyone mandating
   what I can and cannot read is slime (synonomous with censor), imo.

   I want to make that choice myself, thank you very nice.

I suppose that a kill file of something like ".*@remailer.site" for each
of the remailers would filter out all of the anonymous kill files.  It
still would slow down everyone news reader's, though.

And as a news admin, if someone anonymous user abuses USENET by sending
large GIF's to a newsgroup, this filling up my news spool, I (and each
individual news admin) can make the individual choice to mail each
offending anonymous news posting to the postmaster@remailer.site.  
Is that what you meant by a decentralized solution?  :-)

							- Ted




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Tiia Roth-Biester <72147.3504@CompuServe.COM>
Date: Tue, 2 Mar 93 17:03:56 PST
To: <cypherpunks@toad.com>
Subject: Re: more ideas on anonymity
Message-ID: <930302214903_72147.3504_EHC47-1@CompuServe.COM>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


 
>However, is it illegal to use false ID in order to conduct perfectly legal
>transactions in order to preserve privacy/anonymity?  How about it, any of
>you guys associated with the CPSR, EFF, or ACLU, can you answer this one?
 
>Murdering Thug
 
 
Lexus research elided...
 
>(Matthew J Miszewski)
 
At Common Law, you could call youself anything you wanted as long as
there was no intent to defraud.  Generally you can still do this today.
Matthew-In the case you dug up what sort of identity documents were
used?  Obviously, forging government ID documents is a separate crime.
If you are signing something "under penlty of perjury" or "with a
warranty of truthfullness" the person you are dealing with may be able to
throw the agreement (whatever it is) out.  There is also the possibility
of legal action.  You can cross the language out before signing (we are
always free to negotiate) and hope that the bored clerk you are dealing
with doesn't notice or if you are using forms that can be obtained in
advance in blank you can remove the offending language and replace it
with nondescript language using DTP technology.
 
Avoid using government ID and substitute "soft ID" such as employment
ID or school ID.  Since anyone in America is free to form a "company" or
a school ID can also be issued.  Obtain a secured VISA card or a VISA
debit card in a nome de guerre.  This is pretty good ID.  If the
financial institution is overseas, you may not have to provide proof of
identity.  In this country (or Canada) bank accounts -- including secured
credit card accounts -- can still be obtained in a nome de guerre if you
work at it.
 
If you aren't engaging in other illegal activity, prosecutions for using
an alternate identity are rare.
 
Duncan Frissell
 





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: deltorto@aol.com
Date: Tue, 2 Mar 93 16:15:04 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: 976-OVERDOSE
Message-ID: <9303021655.tn55494@aol.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Fellow Cypherpunks,

I know that some of you have lives, jobs and studies and you probably, like
me, are ofttimes overwhelmed by the sheer voluime of mail on this list.

I have a simple proposal to solve th
is problem: break the current list into topic areas.

These would include:

  anon/pseudo_cpunks   Anoymity/Pseudonymity
  remailers_cpunks     Remailer Technology
  dining_cpunks        DC Nets
  random-cpunks        Random Generators
  digimoney_cpunks     Digital Banking
  pgp_cpunks           PGP App/Current Info  <- new vers info/var. plat's
  ziplips_cpunks       Crypto-Censorship
  fweee_cpunks         Whistleblowers (The "Keith Peterson Area"?)
  physmtgs_cpunks      Physical Meetings/Conferences  
<- CFP, events...

 and several more that I've forgotten, I'm sure...

We should clearly state the general thread of each topic. People could
subscribe to as many as they want to and thus dramatically reduce the amount
of mail they get on topics about which they have little or no interest.

I'm learning a lot from the list, but the sheer volume of the postings is
becoming pretty unmanageable. We seem to have a range of subspecies
developing, so it make sense to cater to them seperately.

I hope we can remedy this situation before many more people have to
unsubscribe. Most newcomers from Mondo articles, etc. should  probably be
subscribed to the <announce> list first, then maybe we could periodically
post synopses of what's available on the other topics and let them wander in
more deliberately. I hope everyone appreciates that my approach is geared
toward bringing in more quality participation and not a flurry of
curiousity-cats who dash in and out and post UNSUBSCRIBE mail to the whole
list (thus gumming things up even further).

What do you Punks think? I hope to see a comment or two about this from
people, I think it's an issue whose time has come. "An ounce of prevention os
worth a pound of cure" as they say.

  dave "verbum sat spaienti est" del torto





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Phiber Optik <phiber@eff.org>
Date: Tue, 2 Mar 93 13:56:43 PST
To: newsham@wiliki.eng.hawaii.edu (Timothy Newsham)
Subject: Re: tapping
In-Reply-To: <9303020333.AA04345@relay1.UU.NET>
Message-ID: <199303022155.AA04077@eff.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> 
> 
> [forwarded from elsewhere]
> > 
> > [From Data Communications, January 1993]
> > 
> > INVENTION CUTS CABLING TIES
> > 
> > An inventor working from a garden shed in the U.K. has come up with a device
> > that enables PCs and other LAN equipment to send and receive data through
> > the plastic outer jacket of copper LAN cabling-- without piercing the
> > cabling.  Called the Watsonlinc Cable Coupling Transformer, the device
> > allows users to attach LAN equipment at any point in a network without going
> > through time-consuming and costly cable attachment procedures.  The
> > Watsonlinc, which must be placed directly next to a cable's outer jacket,
> > uses a proprietary technique to reduce noise interference while picking up
> > and transmitting data signals.  Watsonlinc-equipped network interface cards
> > (NICs) will appear in the next 12 months, according to inventor Mike Watson
> > (Walton-on-Thames, U.K.), who says the device's production cost of about $5
> > per unit will not significantly increase NIC sticker prices.  The Watsonlinc
> > works with both shielded and unshielded twisted-pair copper cabling, is
> > small enough to fit on laptop PC internal adapters, and is capable of
> > handling all common LAN speeds, Watson says.  The internationally patented
> > invention works just as well with voice signals.  Predictably, it already
> > has been licensed for use in telephone surveillance equipment.
> > 
> > 
> 
> 

Mike Watson rediscovers inductance, and the inductive tap.
Film at 11.





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@Athena.MIT.EDU>
Date: Tue, 2 Mar 93 13:58:53 PST
To: pmetzger@shearson.com
Subject: Re: Future of anonymity (short-term vs. long-term)
In-Reply-To: <9303021551.AA03777@maggie.shearson.com>
Message-ID: <9303022157.AA02360@SOS>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


   Date: Tue, 2 Mar 93 10:51:31 EST
   From: pmetzger@shearson.com (Perry E. Metzger)

   You aren't arguing for non-anonymity. You are arguing that free
   speech is bad. 

No, I am not argueing for non-anonymity.  Please stop defending your
position by putting misrepresentations in my mouth.

Believe me, I understand why anonymity has its features.  I am just
pointing out some of its bad sides, which you seem to refuse to accept
even exist.

If the only way you can defend your position is by ranting and raving
and calling me a censorship-loving Nazi, then perhaps we should just end
this discussion right here.

						- Ted




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Date: Tue, 2 Mar 93 17:09:10 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: 976-OVERDOSE
In-Reply-To: <9303021655.tn55494@aol.com>
Message-ID: <9303030107.AA11675@netcom3.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Dave,

I suspect others will tell you what I'm telling you: we considered
breaking up the list a while back, and concluded we should not.

Some reasons:

- much more work for list maintainers. What _you_ save by not having to
hit the delete key as often will be more than made up for by Eric
Hughes having to do a lot more work (and he refuses)

- having as many sublists as you suggest would be way too much...we
even decided that a simple split into "technical" and "political" was
not warranted, at least not back then. (Perhaps this can be
reconsidered, thought the extra list maintenance work is still an issue.)

- many will post their messages to more than one group, to make sure
it gets to the appropriate people

- topics bounce around, anyway, so some groups would have no traffic
(and folks would send messages like: "Hey, how come it's so quiet on
cypherpunks.music?")

- people would miss key debates and key developments because they
didn't think some group was important. (And if and when they decided
something was important, they'd probably then ask others to forward
them relevant material.)

- the solution is for people to quickly delete message topics they
don't want to see. Off-line newsreaders like Eudora (for the Mac) are
quite useful.

-Tim

-- 
..........................................................................
Timothy C. May         | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,  
tcmay@netcom.com       | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
408-688-5409           | knowledge, reputations, information markets, 
W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA  | black markets, collapse of governments.
Higher Power: 2^756839 | Public Key: PGP and MailSafe available.





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Alexander Chislenko <sasha@ra.cs.umb.edu>
Date: Tue, 2 Mar 93 14:53:31 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Textual analysis
Message-ID: <199303022252.AA14712@ra.cs.umb.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


 Tim May writes:
>Imagine what can be done with word and phrase frequency analysis, with
>examination of punctuation styles (e.g., some people use _this_ for
>emphasis while others use *this*), and so on. Entropy measures, etc.

   I know for sure that Soviet KGB did a lot of work in graphology and 
kept samples of print of every typewriter there was in the country.
<not that it helped them ;) >

   It might be easy to write a program that would randomly modify spacing,
indentations, punctuation styles, spelling, replace words with random
synonyms, reorder words in phrases, etc.  It can eliminate most of the
clues, excluding the concepts.
You will have to compromise between the accuracy of the message and its
privacy protection, but it is still something...

Alexander Chislenko




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: thug@phantom.com (Murdering Thug)
Date: Tue, 2 Mar 93 15:52:27 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: tapping
In-Reply-To: <199303022155.AA04077@eff.org>
Message-ID: <m0nTgcn-000jqXC@phantom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Phiber Optik writes:
> 
> > 
> > 
> > [forwarded from elsewhere]
> > > 
> > > [From Data Communications, January 1993]
> > > 
> > > INVENTION CUTS CABLING TIES

[stuff deleted]

> > > 
> > > works with both shielded and unshielded twisted-pair copper cabling, is
> > > small enough to fit on laptop PC internal adapters, and is capable of
> > > handling all common LAN speeds, Watson says.  The internationally patented
> > > invention works just as well with voice signals.  Predictably, it already
> > > has been licensed for use in telephone surveillance equipment.
> > > ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ 
> > > 
> > 
> > 
> 
> Mike Watson rediscovers inductance, and the inductive tap.
> Film at 11.

And patents it!  Gee, I wonder if I patent the RF transmittion, and start
charging licensing fees like Watson does with inductance.  Hell, some guy
has a patent on using XOR in making inverse cursors on CRTs. 

Thug




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: thug@phantom.com (Murdering Thug)
Date: Tue, 2 Mar 93 15:56:52 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Textual analysis
In-Reply-To: <199303022252.AA14712@ra.cs.umb.edu>
Message-ID: <m0nTghU-000jqOC@phantom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Tim May writes:

>Imagine what can be done with word and phrase frequency analysis, with
>examination of punctuation styles (e.g., some people use _this_ for
>emphasis while others use *this*), and so on. Entropy measures, etc.

I believe that such programs already exist. They are used to identify
unknown authors of famous documents.  I believe some of Shakespeare's
work was under close scrutiny a number of years ago, as were the
Fedaralist papers.

There was an article in Byte about three or four years ago all about
this kind of technology.

Thug 




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: wcs@anchor.ho.att.com
Date: Tue, 2 Mar 93 16:17:34 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: A novel (?) return address idea
Message-ID: <9303030015.AA23087@anchor.ho.att.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text


John Gilmore writes:
> There seems to me to be a serious problem with the "novel return
> address" idea.  The information that ties together multiple anonymous
> messages from the same person is out in the world, encrypted by a
> single key in a conventional cipher.

I'm not sure there IS a good answer for anonymous news-posting with replies.
For email, you can create a use-once-then-delete anonymous reply address,
which hangs around until a reply happens or garbage-collection hits,
but this isn't practical for news or multiple-recipient email -
you need to keep an alias around for multiple replies to use.
You can assign a new reply address for each posting, which is in some sense
more secure, but it means that there are now many copies of the poster's
email address and public-key (though multiple public keys may be a win.)
But if the remailer site gets compromised, these are about as risky as
multiple messages cryptically pointing to one copy of the address.
(Unless the mapping from anon-reply-id to real-id is cryptographically 
protected.)  (These comments also apply to the dossier problem below.)

If the key-compromise issues you bring up below can be fixed,
then this method is more secure than the one-anon-address-per-user for all
postings method that seems to currently be in use,
and if users can get a new return-address-id on request, 
and delete old return-address-ids on request (features you really need anyway),
it's basically equivalent.

> Furthermore, breaking the key will be possible by sending test-probes
> and doing exhaustive search.  E.g. if you add 128 bits of salt,
> someone can send five or ten messages to themself through the
> remailer, and accumulate ten encrypted addresses that are known to be
> for the same sender.  When decrypted, these keys will have maybe a 16-
> or 32-bit "return address ID" and 128 bits of salt.  The attacker can
> then search the key space for keys that include large numbers of
> identical bits when decrypting those ten keys.  This search is easily

Hmm.  So it's not good enough to just lump 32 bits of address-id and 32 bits
of salt together, because a key-search over 56-bit keys will trigger on
the ones that get the same first 32 bits for multiple cyphertexts.
What if you use triple-DES instead of single-DES as the cypher,
which increases the key search space to at least 112 bits?
This is presumably big enough, especially since the return-address-id
doesn't directly give you the address, though that can be easier to crack.
 
> The idea also suffers from the dossier problem -- all the information
> about return addresses will exist in a single place (at the remailer
> site) where it's tempting for a government (or other adversary of
> privacy) to try for it.

Deleting old addresses and getting new ones helps.
Joe's suggestion of changing the keys also helps: including a few bits in the
crypted address that are essentially another salt to let you pick the crypt key,
but of course this means you need to keep ALL the older keys loaded in the 
system (or at least the last N), either stored (bad) or typed in (also bad.)
I suppose you'd at least store them crypted.  If you periodically dispose of
the oldest ones, then you've limited the amount of time the correspondence is
exposed, which is a good thing, but you've also made it impossible to reply
to really old messages.  (I guess a certain fraction of the postings will be
requests for the poster of <message-ID> to repost something?)

Also, this kind of remailer/reposter may still be chained - 
there's no need for the return address to be a _real_ return address.

				Bill Stewart





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: pmetzger@shearson.com (Perry E. Metzger)
Date: Tue, 2 Mar 93 19:46:10 PST
To: tytso@athena.mit.edu
Subject: Re: Piercing anonymitiy and censorship
Message-ID: <9303030105.AA21682@maggie.shearson.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> From: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@athena.mit.edu>
> 
>    Date: Tue, 2 Mar 93 14:15:15 EST
>    From: pmetzger@shearson.com (Perry E. Metzger)
> 
>    Of course there are ways -- and they need not be so drastic. You could,
>    for instance, simply prevent non-subscribers from posting to your list,
>    and use public key to verify identities. This would allow you to swiftly
>    stop abuse. I've already noted this twice. You've claimed this is impractical,
>    but the tools to do this, AND WITHOUT PATENT PROBLEMS, already exist and
>    would be cheap to implement.
> 
> If they are so cheap to implement them, could someone please implement
> them FOR THE USENET GROUPS?  (Where you don't have a concept of
> subscribers or non-subscribers?)

I don't have time Ted, I have really busy schedule. But, this is the
thumbnail of what you want.

1. Build a decent tool to handle the public key sigs on news format
message files and tell you if the file sender corresponds with
the signature -- a variant on RIPEM (more like a half hour hack) should
be able to do this.

2. Change the shell scripts handling incoming control messages inside
the news software to check signatures against a trusted list.

3. Set some scripts handling incoming moderated newsgroups that check
the signature against a trusted list.

4. Build a tool that checks that incoming signed messages correspond
with signatures stored in the signature database for the site, and
somehow flag non-authenticated or otherwise bogus signed messages.
Add a header line to give out this info so rn and other newsreaders can
nuke non-authenticated messages or what have you.

Sounds like this begins to give you a large fraction of what you want
without changing too much, and I bet its a few days of hacking. Its
primitive, but it seems like the right thing for a start and you can
take it from there. I specify keeping signatures on your news server and
checking them there to keep users from needing special new newsreaders and
to keep them from needing to run the signature code over and over again;
presumably they can trust their sysadmin and if they cant they can
get new tools so they don't have to.

> I here lots of *talk* of how easy it is to do this, or how easy it is to
> do that.  If it's so easy, why doesn't someone prove it to the rest of
> us by actually doing it.   I hate to bring the Real World down upon you
> guys, but talk is cheap; code sometimes isn't.

As I've said, I don't have time myself, but the above is really easy for
someone with a good knowledge of C News, RIPEM and the like. The hardest
part is handling a key database and doing key management since RIPEM has
no such provisions, but you can likely fix that. Then there is the issue
of getting RSA to permit your hacks to RIPEM to get out, which I suspect
they would. Okay, maybe not a few days, but certainly not much of a challenge
here and you have the start of the system we were talking about. Among
other things, it fixes forged control messages (presumably you
would leave cancel messages alone, but it could let you authenticate
newgroup and delgroups, which is a big problem), forged moderated messages,
and give you the start of what you would need to start ignoring unsigned
messages or messages from users you don't like on newsgroups. The
stuff for non-moderated newsgroups would be primitive, but it would be
a start and would let users have the option of deciding what they want
to do with non-authenticated messages.


Perry




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: pmetzger@shearson.com (Perry E. Metzger)
Date: Tue, 2 Mar 93 19:41:35 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Future of anonymity (short-term vs. long-term)
Message-ID: <9303030107.AA21716@maggie.shearson.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



> From: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@athena.mit.edu>
> 
>    Date: Tue, 2 Mar 93 10:51:31 EST
>    From: pmetzger@shearson.com (Perry E. Metzger)
> 
>    You aren't arguing for non-anonymity. You are arguing that free
>    speech is bad. 
> 
> No, I am not argueing for non-anonymity.  Please stop defending your
> position by putting misrepresentations in my mouth.
> 
> Believe me, I understand why anonymity has its features.  I am just
> pointing out some of its bad sides, which you seem to refuse to accept
> even exist.

Of course I accept that they exist. However, I believe the benefits
outweigh the problems, and in any case it matters little what we think
since we cannot reasonably stop such systems from arising.

> If the only way you can defend your position is by ranting and raving
> and calling me a censorship-loving Nazi, then perhaps we should just end
> this discussion right here.

I don't believe I called you a Nazi. I also believe you took my quote out
of context.

Perry





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: kwaldman@tanstaafl.extropy1.sai.com (Karl M Waldman)
Date: Tue, 2 Mar 93 18:11:18 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: anarchism (was: Re: Dining Crypto -- An Introduction) (fwd)
Message-ID: <2b9406fd@tanstaafl.extropy1.sai.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> (Those of you who don't believe me, look at the railroad industry in
> the end of the 19th century.)
	No free market here, government gave them the land for the railroad
for free or very low cost.

> That's only what I thought of off the top of my head.  If the New York
> Times or some publication of similar stature were to pick up the "best
	Or maybe NBC could pick the best ones :-)
	
> 		Marc
		
	The basic trouble with government is, no matter what the quality
of ideas they have, they tend to put a gun to your head. "For your
best interest of course"


	Voluntarily yours,

	Karl Waldman




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: root@rmsdell.ftl.fl.us (Yanek Martinson)
Date: Tue, 2 Mar 93 17:52:18 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: META: prefixes for easy filtering
Message-ID: <m0nTiSl-0001y6C@rmsdell.ftl.fl.us>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> is problem: break the current list into topic areas.

A similar situation occurred a while ago on the Extropians list.  Many
people were complaining about excess volume, people were
unsubscribing, and there was talk of splitting the list into many
sublists.  There are some problems with sublists.  Many people would
subscribe to all the lists, or many of them.  List management chores
((un)subscriptions, bounces, address changes, etc) would increase.
Many messages would get "cross-posted" to several or all lists, and
thus would appear many times in everyone's mail box, thus even
increasing the number of messages to sift through.  There are other
problems, which I will not mention now.

I proposed a simple solution which is in use now, and has greatly
increased the quality of the list, makes it easy for everyone to only
read the messages they want, and does not require deployment of any
new software.  The actual volume has not decreased, probably it even
increased.  But the information flow is so much more manageable.

The solution is the use of prefixes in Subject: lines.  When you post,
prefix your Subject: line with a short "tag" such as "ANON:",
"DCNET:", "PGP:", "DCASH:", or others.  For example, you would see
subjects like

PGP: new version available
ANON: an new idea for anonymous replies

etcetera.  When reading your mail, just have your mailer sort the mail
by Subject: line (if your mailer can't do that, get a new mailer), and
all messages about PGP will come together, all messages about
anonymous remailers will be in one area, etc.  Then it's easy to
delete them all without reading, to save them to a file for future
reference, or to read them if that is a topic you are interested in.

The beauty of this system is it's anarchistic nature.  There is no
need for people to maintain an official list of prefixes, or to vote
on new ones (as is done with newsgroups), or to ask someone to create
one (as would be necessary for mailing sublists).  There's no need for
the group as a whole to agree on anything.  Just start using them.
Try to find a logical prefix for each message that matches its subject
area.

Most likely people posting on the same topic will choose same or similar
prefix.  After some initial fluctuation, different prefixes for the same
topic will converge to one that will become customary for that topic.

New prefixes will pop up every once in a while, and the ones not used
will fade from the group memory.  This is a flexible, dynamic system.

As a starting point I will make up a prefix for each of the sublists 
you proposed (if you don't like my prefix, use a different one!):

   ANON:    anon/pseudo_cpunks   Anoymity/Pseudonymity
   REMAIL:  remailers_cpunks     Remailer Technology
   DCNET:   dining_cpunks        DC Nets
   RANDOM:  random-cpunks        Random Generators
   DCASH:   digimoney_cpunks     Digital Banking
   PGP:     pgp_cpunks           PGP App/Current Info 
   FLAME:-) ziplips_cpunks       Crypto-Censorship
   WHISTLE: fweee_cpunks         Whistleblowers (The "Keith Peterson Area"?)
   MEET:    physmtgs_cpunks      Physical Meetings/Conferences  

Here are some more:  META: discussions on the list about the list
itself, such as this post, or the post I am replying to which suggested
splitting the list.  Complaints about high volume, messages saying something
does or does not belong on the list, etc, would use this prefix.

ANNOUNCE: important messages that everyone may be interested in.

FRIV: for jokes, parodies, other frivolous posts.

If a post fits in more than one subject area, the main prefix should
be put first, for sorting purposes.  The other prefix(es) would follow,
separated by slashes.  For example "PGP/ANNOUNCE: new version available"
or "RANDOM/FRIV: why not just flip coins?".  This is in no way mandatory,
it's just a convention that developed on Extropians, and it may be
advantageous to use it, to ease further processing.

Some other ideas:

You can use procmail, elm filter, slocal, or any other mail processing
tool to handle messages with different prefixes.

For example if you are a very busy person, or are reading your mail
over a low-speed link, you may want to save all REMAIL/ANNOUNCE
messages in a "remailers" file, delete all FRIV, META, and FLAME
messages, and for each other prefix, save the message to an
appropriate folder for reading later.

If you were not interested in discussion, but wanted to keep up 
on what's going on, you would have the filter delete all the messages
from the mailin list that do not have an ANNOUNCE: prefix.

Or, if you have enough time and/or are using a high-speed connection,
you may just sort all the messages by Subject: thereby lumping all the 
messages on a subject together.  Then you can decide which you are going
to read first, which ones you want to delete, etc.

If this idea takes off, and most people will start using prefixes, further
evolution of the concept is possible.  For example a group of extropians
are developing some software on the list host machine that will let people
customise their subscription, for example choosing not to receive messages
with a certain prefix, not to receive messages that don't have a prefix,
or choosing to receive only some selected prefixes, plus any new prefixes
that come to use.

All this is sometime in the future.  Right now, let's start by just
prefixing each subject line with an appropriate prefix.

--
Yanek Martinson
yanek@novavax.nova.edu



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: fergp@sytex.com (Paul Ferguson)
Date: Wed, 3 Mar 93 01:13:37 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Let's look at this ....
Message-ID: <6HNTZB1w165w@sytex.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Okay, cypherpunks -
 
I've watched enough "unsubscribe me" requests drop in, now I figure
(that's a Virginia word, BTW) that since I'm silently digesting most
of this nonsense, I can at least crop a few pennies in the mill from
time to time.
 
I've managed to irk several of you with the virus encryption post (a
bona fide topic, for those of you who snicker); then with the "Why
Anon (especially when there are twelve step programs) ?", but the
federal deficit is peanuts to popcorn compared to the bandwidth wasted
here.
 
<Soap_box_mode_off>
 
Lest I begin to resemble some cypher-drop-out (never happen), let's
re-examine what we are now discussing:
 
o Problems (solved yet?) with penet.fi
 
o Arguments and innuendo regarding:
 
   _ digital cash
   _ digital anarchy (Gee, thanks, Tim.)
   _ digital bad-mouthing
 
The one topic that _does_ interest me is the nonsensical fodder
stemming from a post regarding the (actual?) governmental
consideration to license keys. That just drops my carrier.
This is probably the one reason why I tolerate the wasted bandwidth
here -- there are many powerful souls amongst you (us) who can keep this
bullshit from happening.
 
On a serious note, I have been a programmer-slash-analyst from the
card-punch days of not_so_old. My assembly programming began in the
bowels of a IBM 360; somehow that weeded it's way into the desktop
arena. Damned odd.
 
Now I just put networks together. Much like tinker toys.
 
My (long-winded) question is this: What are cypherpunk priorities?
(NO, no, please do not cite the norms. I've heard 'em.)
 
Where are we going with anon mailers? Are they going to serve us or
cause us unlimited problems? (From a political point of view?)
 
I stand _strongly_ behind private communications, and behind the right
to privately encrypt. Personally, I do not think that it can be taken
away from us.
 
Thoughts?
 
Cheers.

Paul Ferguson                     |
Network Integration Consultant    |  "All of life's answers are
Alexandria, Virginia USA          |   on TV."
fergp@sytex.com     (Internet)    |           -- Homer Simpson
sytex.com!fergp     (UUNet)       |
1:109/229           (FidoNet)     |
         PGP public encryption key available upon request.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: root@rmsdell.ftl.fl.us (Yanek Martinson)
Date: Tue, 2 Mar 93 19:49:14 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: ANON: Textual analysis
Message-ID: <m0nTk5E-0002TpC@rmsdell.ftl.fl.us>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> This reveals a minor and probably obvious weakness of pseudonyms--writing
> styles.

We probably need "rephrasing remailers" which do some rudimentary
grammar parsing on input text, and randomly substitute equivalent
constructs such as switching active/passive voice, synonyms, changing
the word order where it is insignificant, joining/splitting sentences,
etc.  Anyone here have any experience in NLP (natural language processing),
specifically parsing english?

A possible start would be to look at "grammar checker" programs that 
check for various grammatical mistakes/misusages and suggest improvements.

Another starting point is language translation software.  After your text
has been translated automatically to spanish -> french -> german -> english,
not much of the orignal style will remain.  Hopefully, enough meaning
will be preserved to allow understanding.

Are there any public domain programs that do one of the above?

One constraint on these is that the message must be present in clear text,
so that it must be the last remailer in the chain.

> examination of punctuation styles (e.g., some people use _this_ for
> emphasis while others use *this*)

This could be alleviated by using a standard markup format, such as
MIME RichText, or the simpler markup convention recently proposed
on the mime list.


--
Yanek Martinson
yanek@novavax.nova.edu



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@Athena.MIT.EDU>
Date: Tue, 2 Mar 93 19:59:15 PST
To: pmetzger@shearson.com
Subject: Re: Piercing anonymitiy and censorship
In-Reply-To: <9303030105.AA21682@maggie.shearson.com>
Message-ID: <9303030357.AA14312@SOS>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


The problem with trying to put RSA signed keys into Usenet is that it is
simply not that simple.  People aren't going to adopt the software
overnight; it will take literally years before they adopt the software.

In an earlier message, you said:

   Well, the folks running B News and C News will have to live without
   the public key extensions, and it will be their fault. The people with
   the public key extensions will have the benefits. 

That's just not true, and your proposed solution demonstrates that
nicely.  Until the majority of the poeple are posting signed messages,
it is not useful to tell your newsreader to nuke all non-signed
messages, as you suggested in your proposed solution --- you'd just be
throwing out the signal with the noise......  

Until nearly everyone on Usenet starts using the public key extension,
we *all* will not have the benefits.  There will be no way to
distinguish the good (but unsigned messages) from the remailer abusers'
unsigned (or untrusted) messages.

							- Ted




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@Athena.MIT.EDU>
Date: Tue, 2 Mar 93 20:04:57 PST
To: "DrZaphod" <ncselxsi!drzaphod@ncselxsi.netcom.com>
Subject: Re: You Aren't [I'm Not]
In-Reply-To: <47610.drzaphod@ncselxsi>
Message-ID: <9303030403.AA14595@SOS>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


   Date: Tue, 2 Mar 93 13:13:25 CST  
   From: "DrZaphod" <ncselxsi!drzaphod@ncselxsi.netcom.com>
   Sender: ncselxsi!drzaphod@ncselxsi.netcom.com

   > In Message Tue, 2 Mar 93 16:57:22 -0500,
   >  Theodore Ts'o <Athena.MIT.EDU!tytso@netcomsv.netcom.com> writes:
   >
   >**No, I am not argueing for non-anonymity.**  Please stop defending your
   >position by putting misrepresentations in my mouth.

	Aren't these the same thing?  TTFN!

Sorry; typo on my part.  What I meant to say was "No, I am not arguing
that free speach is bad."  Mr. Metzger was putting words in my mouth
when claimed that I was saying that.

Anonymity and free speach are *NOT* the same thing.  As I posited in an
earlier message, which no one has yet to comment on, those two concepts
are not the same thing.  

Sorry for the typo; in my outrage that he would stoop to such depths to
make his point, and what I meant to say and what I actually typed
weren't the same thing.

							- Ted





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Alexander Chislenko <sasha@ra.cs.umb.edu>
Date: Tue, 2 Mar 93 20:33:25 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Mailing request.
Message-ID: <199303030432.AA26783@ra.cs.umb.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


  Could somebody send me today's mail?  I lost it :(
Thanks.

Alex.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Giuseppe Cimmino <0005533039@mcimail.com>
Date: Tue, 2 Mar 93 16:25:13 PST
To: deltorto <deltorto@aol.com>
Subject: PGP distribution
Message-ID: <23930302233832/0005533039ND1EM@mcimail.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


OK, a short note.  I'm willing to round up some old 3 1/2" 720K floppies and
time on a disk duplicator to facilitate PGP distribution at Interop here in DC
next week.  To be specific:  If someone wants to organize the distribution, I'll
help in the production.

-Giuseppe






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Eli Brandt <ebrandt@jarthur.Claremont.EDU>
Date: Tue, 2 Mar 93 23:40:45 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: anon.penet.fi hacking
In-Reply-To: <930301171036_74076.1041_DHJ55-1@CompuServe.COM>
Message-ID: <9303030740.AA11601@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> Eric shows a complicated regular expression, but I don't think it
> will match just --, because this line provides nothing to match the
> "." and "[^B]", etc.

Instead of these ballooning regexps, how about just using Chael
Hall's standardized "end of body" marker?  Even if some people had
to add it manually to each message, well, that's not a big deal.
But I suspect that the people who have sigs being added by BBS
software are going to have trouble adding strange header lines, even
if they have the regexp expertise to construct them.  

Anyone who does control their sig, but doesn't want to take the
trouble to include it only some of the time, can just add the
marker.  People might even be able to convince BBS sysops to add it
to their autosigs.  Or if this just looks too cluttered, maybe the
sig-clipper header could just be "Signature-Lines:" -- clip that
many, or none by default, and you're done.

> Hal

	 PGP 2 key by finger or e-mail
   Eli   ebrandt@jarthur.claremont.edu




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Eli Brandt <ebrandt@jarthur.Claremont.EDU>
Date: Tue, 2 Mar 93 23:51:12 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Future of anonymity (short-term vs. long-term)
In-Reply-To: <9303020248.AA26533@SOS>
Message-ID: <9303030751.AA11924@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> Fundamentally, however, there's the basic assumption that anarchy per se
> is good; which is a basic philosophical belief which I just plain
> disagree with.

It's not an assumption, to begin with; I was not born an "anarchist".
Nor is it a philosophical belief, in my case; it's a sociological
conclusion.  And I only claim that it's what I want, not that it's
"good" for you -- that depends, for example, on whether you couldn't
be happy except as an IRS employee.  I'm not quite sure what you
intend by your later comments on "religious fanatics", but any
clarification or random flamage would best be done off-list.

> 						- Ted

	 PGP 2 key by finger or e-mail
   Eli   ebrandt@jarthur.claremont.edu




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Eli Brandt <ebrandt@jarthur.Claremont.EDU>
Date: Wed, 3 Mar 93 00:14:38 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: more ideas on anonymity
In-Reply-To: <9303020520.AA26631@SOS>
Message-ID: <9303030814.AA12447@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> Today, it is generally not possible to be anonymous while
> broadcasting your views to a large number of people.

To do this for free, no.  But you can send direct mail anonymously,
although you can't get cheap bulk rates.

> While, this may be a feature in some cases, in other cases it is
> most definitely a BUG.

True.  Perhaps we should look at the problems of universal anonymity
in contexts where they can already be observed -- like cellulose
mail.  

It would be possible to implement a "postage" analog without a backed
crypto currency.  Each remailer could issue usage tickets, good for
a certain flow per month.  Issue them to individuals, and let them
circulate.  There are obvious problems; for one, transactions would
be on a good-will basis, except in the case of trades to consolidate
a block with a single remailer.  This would produce allocation
problems.  In this mileau, a net.loser might be able to panhandle a
truckload of tickets.  On the up side, it's a good cover for getting
currency up and running.

With real postage, I think the problem would be negligible.  I can
imagine a custom developing that mail from nyms not on the "pass"
list would have to include a certain fee just to make into the
mailbox.  A motivation pre-filter for just mail, at least.  If mail
transmission is flat-fee, such a system seems quite likely.

> 						- Ted

	 PGP 2 key by finger or e-mail
   Eli   ebrandt@jarthur.claremont.edu




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Date: Wed, 3 Mar 93 01:16:53 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Handling Abuses of Remailers
Message-ID: <9303030915.AA21640@netcom.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



>In article <CypherPunksList.0606@arcticus.UUCP> tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C.
>May) writes:
>> * To handle _abusive volumes_ through remailers, charge for remailing.
>> Short term, this may be a problem, but this is the long term market
>> solution.
>
>  Quick but relevant question: Assuming a commercial anonymous remailer
>were set up tomorrow, with (don't ask me how this would be done, it's
>hypothetical...) provable anonymity -- what should it charge per message,
>or per kilobyte of message?
>
>> -Tim May
>> tcmay@netcom.com        | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
>
>Chris - Xenon

I don't know. That's for the market to decide.

This is not a glib answer. There is no "real" price for any service or
commodity, only a complicated emergent market price that typically evolves
and changes.

An anonymous remailer (the "Mom and Pop" remailer I like to cite) may
initially charge some price and find it is being undercut by others, or
others are not matching its price. Prices will change, evolve.

It is, however, that remailing prices will be much below a few pennies per
1 KB message, nor much above $2.00. I often use the crude estimate of $0.50
per remailing, suggesting that a 5-hop mailing will then cost about $2.50.

(But once the infrastructure for remailer hops is in place, then even a
single hop is basically enough--this may sound paradoxical, but think about
it.)

-Tim

--
Timothy C. May               | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,  
tcmay@netcom.com        | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
408-688-5409               | knowledge, reputations, information markets, 
W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA       | black markets, collapse of governments.
Higher Power: 2^756839 | Public Key: MailSafe and PGP available.





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Hal <74076.1041@CompuServe.COM>
Date: Tue, 2 Mar 93 23:01:06 PST
To: CYPHERPUNKS <CYPHERPUNKS@toad.com>
Subject: REMAIL: Usage stats.
Message-ID: <930303065109_74076.1041_DHJ45-1@CompuServe.COM>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

I got mail from a remailer operator asking how he could keep some
information about how much his remailer was being used without keeping
logs of the messages.  This seemed like a good feature so I have added
it to my maildelivery file.  This is how it looks now:

#
# field                 pattern action/ string 
#                               result  (quote included spaces)
#
Request-Remailing-To    ""      pipe R  "date >> LOG.REMAIL"
Request-Remailing-To    ""      pipe A  remail.pl
Anon-To		        ""      pipe R  "date >> LOG.REMAIL"
Anon-To			""	pipe A  remail.pl
Encrypted               PGP     pipe R  "date >> LOG.ENCRYPTED"
Encrypted               PGP     pipe A  pgpmail.pl
*                       ""      pipe ?  recurse.pl

The lines which say "date >> LOG.XXX" will append one line to the
LOG.* file each time a remailing or decryption is done.  That line
will tell when it is done.  No other information is kept to allow
reconstruction of who sent the message or what it was.  You can use
"wc" to count how many lines are in the files, archive and/or delete
them periodically, or do whatever you like.

A couple of notes: When you have more than one line that matches a
particular field/pattern (defined in the first two columns), use the
letter R for the result code for the first ones, and A for the last.

Also, be SURE you put quotes around the command string if it is more
than one word.  Otherwise ALL of your mail will DISAPPEAR!  (I need to
do a little work on the slocal.pl script to make it more robust about
this. :-)

If you're using slocal rather than slocal.pl this should still work.

Hal Finney

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.1

iQCVAgUBK5Qqe6gTA69YIUw3AQEYiAQArkTzGy4b2oFetX/AOzXjZ9Wpv8zlthCa
rDs54X0mhw2fqe1zRt8VNw4X66qNwV1niyBMJV37IQsiCJVKXYI1ey3bRD5xNKGx
FSZogubeoxIJFvKcVnLTe0l6bsRZpzSPRaePslXZsxb0t3ysDKKnzX0GJe0Zg8k0
+4d1mh8q5qQ=
=+Bo3
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: raob@mullian.ee.mu.OZ.AU
Date: Tue, 2 Mar 93 13:45:58 PST
To: rob@mullian.ee.mu.OZ.AU
Subject: tapping
Message-ID: <9303022144.22401@mullian.ee.mu.OZ.AU>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



[forwarded from elsewhere]
> 
> [From Data Communications, January 1993]
> 
> INVENTION CUTS CABLING TIES
> 
> An inventor working from a garden shed in the U.K. has come up with a device
> that enables PCs and other LAN equipment to send and receive data through
> the plastic outer jacket of copper LAN cabling-- without piercing the
> cabling.  Called the Watsonlinc Cable Coupling Transformer, the device
> allows users to attach LAN equipment at any point in a network without going
> through time-consuming and costly cable attachment procedures.  The
> Watsonlinc, which must be placed directly next to a cable's outer jacket,
> uses a proprietary technique to reduce noise interference while picking up
> and transmitting data signals.  Watsonlinc-equipped network interface cards
> (NICs) will appear in the next 12 months, according to inventor Mike Watson
> (Walton-on-Thames, U.K.), who says the device's production cost of about $5
> per unit will not significantly increase NIC sticker prices.  The Watsonlinc
> works with both shielded and unshielded twisted-pair copper cabling, is
> small enough to fit on laptop PC internal adapters, and is capable of
> handling all common LAN speeds, Watson says.  The internationally patented
> invention works just as well with voice signals.  Predictably, it already
> has been licensed for use in telephone surveillance equipment.
> 
> 



------- End of Forwarded Message





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Eric Hughes <hughes@soda.berkeley.edu>
Date: Wed, 3 Mar 93 09:01:49 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: more ideas on anonymity
In-Reply-To: <9303021951.AA26424@memexis.xanadu.com>
Message-ID: <9303031658.AA14314@soda.berkeley.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



>For some things, anonymity is sufficiently valuable that its use
>doesn't discredit the source: crime tip-offs, inside corruption
>revealing, etc.  In many of those cases, however, the source would
>need to establish their validity, 

"Externally verifiable" is the key phrase here.  An anonymous
allegation that Bush and Barb do unspeakable things their bedroom is
much harder to verify than the location of Jimmy Hoffa's bones.

The weekly posting for alt.whistleblower will contain an exhortation
to include such information as can be verified without requiring the
accused party to admit to something.

Eric




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: jthomas@mango.mitre.org (Joe Thomas)
Date: Wed, 3 Mar 93 06:43:02 PST
To: yanek@novavax.nova.edu
Subject: ANON: Textual analysis
Message-ID: <9303031439.AA22164@mango>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> > This reveals a minor and probably obvious weakness of  
pseudonyms--writing
> > styles.

>We probably need "rephrasing remailers" which do some rudimentary
>grammar parsing on input text, and randomly substitute equivalent
>constructs such as switching active/passive voice, synonyms,  
changing
>the word order where it is insignificant, joining/splitting  
sentences,
>etc.  Anyone here have any experience in NLP (natural language  
processing),
>specifically parsing english?

...

>Another starting point is language translation software.  After your  
text
>has been translated automatically to spanish -> french -> german ->  
english,
>not much of the orignal style will remain.  Hopefully, enough  
meaning
>will be preserved to allow understanding.

This whole problem looks to me to be AI-complete.  I mean, I can't  
understand the manual from my Roland synth without a whole lot of  
head-scratching, and that was translated by a human!  I don't think  
you're going to see a computer program giving intelligible rephrasing  
any time soon.  The burden of disguising writing style may continue  
to fall on the author, but if everyone has the tools to statistically  
analyze their own messages before they send them, they'll at least  
see what they need to change around before sending.  [I, for example,  
might decide to use sentences with fewer than three clauses...]

Joe




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Eric Hughes <hughes@soda.berkeley.edu>
Date: Wed, 3 Mar 93 09:50:26 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: implementing positive reputation systems
In-Reply-To: <9303022249.AA26686@memexis.xanadu.com>
Message-ID: <9303031747.AA17054@soda.berkeley.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Dean writes:  [emphasis added]
>The scheme I always think of when envisioning positive reputation
>systems is that I get the feed of __everything I might be interested__ in,
>then sort and filter using whatever cleverness I desire.  

Marc Ringuette's observation about the distinction between content and
volume is relevant here.  The existence of high-volume noise sources
(and let us not call this abuse, merely an undesirable consequence of
the more desirable anonymity) means that you may not be able to get
everything you might be interested in.

Dean suggests filtering at the server.  This just pushes the same
problems with volume onto the server, which does have some benefit.
I too would like to see suggestions.

One of the basic problems with the model for internet news and mail
transport is the presumption that the receiving side will generally
accept everything it is handed.  Rejections of transmission are
treated as exceptions and not as primary elements of the protocols.
In addition, the protocols do not provide, in advance of full
transmission, a way for a receiver to determine whether to receive
based on message size, receiver, or signature.

The two protocols I am specifically referring to are NNTP (RFC-977)
and SMTP (RFC-821).  (For those of you not in the know about RFC's,
that's where all the internet standards are.  ftp to nic.ddn.mil in
directory /rfc.)  SMTP says who the sender is, but doesn't tell you
the length of the message or anything else about it.  NNTP allows you
to receive the header and the body separately, an improvement, but the
header can still be arbitrarily long.  Each of these protocols, at
minimum, should allow the receiver to look at the length of the
message before it receives to see if it will accept that message.
Likewise, sending other characteristics of a message prior to
transmission of the whole would be desirable.  Short messages might
take less time to transmit than to negotiate, so providing length
seems to be the first extension.

It seems that you could implement length notification and rejection by
only changing some of the informational messages, meaning that changes
to the basic protocol and the drastic reworkings of software required
could be alleviated.

Flooding attacks seem important to prevent, and I think that the
underlying protocols should enable this to the extent they can.

The second-most useful thing to add to the server are those functions
which require examination of the entire message body.  I am foremost
thinking of the hash function on top of which a signature is
generated.  Signature checking seems like a proper function for a
server as a common resource.  This is a separate subject.

Eric




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Eric Hughes <hughes@soda.berkeley.edu>
Date: Wed, 3 Mar 93 10:05:26 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Handling Abuses of Remailers
In-Reply-To: <9303030915.AA21640@netcom.netcom.com>
Message-ID: <9303031802.AA18266@soda.berkeley.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Re: remailer price schedules

Tim writes:
>I don't know. That's for the market to decide.
>This is not a glib answer. 

While it is not glib, it is also not very useful for planning.

As a general rule of thumb, market minima are set by costs, and market
maxima are sent by alternatives.  Alternatives in this case are
alternate transport means, such as fax and snail mail, alternate
carriers undertaken pseudonymously, e.g. attmail with a fake id, or
free experimental services subsidized by academia and which don't work
quite right.

Costs are easier to calculate.  Cost of a net connection, hardware,
staff (i.e. your own) time, and financial transactions (i.e. Visa
fees).  Make a reasonable assumption that each message takes a certain
amount of time to be processed on a certain class of machine (or
measure it!), call some vendors (i.e. alternet).

My guess on all this is that you could make an awful lot of money at a
dime a hop for a less-than-10K message.  Sell hops only in packages
of a hundred, in order to reduce your finance charges.

Eric





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: pmetzger@shearson.com (Perry E. Metzger)
Date: Wed, 3 Mar 93 07:58:07 PST
To: tytso@athena.mit.edu
Subject: Re: You Aren't [I'm Not]
Message-ID: <9303031508.AA26458@maggie.shearson.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> From: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@athena.mit.edu>
> 
> Sorry; typo on my part.  What I meant to say was "No, I am not arguing
> that free speach is bad."  Mr. Metzger was putting words in my mouth
> when claimed that I was saying that.
> 
> Anonymity and free speach are *NOT* the same thing.  As I posited in an
> earlier message, which no one has yet to comment on, those two concepts
> are not the same thing.  

Yes they are, Ted. They are mathematically equivalent. If I can say
anything, I can say it in code. If I can say anything, I can repeat what
someone else said in code, possibly transforming it. Ta Da, remailers.

To stop remailers, you will need to stop free speech. Please at least
admit this much. It might be unpleasant, but in a society with no
prior restraints on speech it is likely not possible to stop cryptographic
systems to assure anonymity.

Perry





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Johan Helsingius <julf@penet.FI>
Date: Wed, 3 Mar 93 00:34:30 PST
To: Eli Brandt <ebrandt@jarthur.claremont.edu>
Subject: ANON: Re: anon.penet.fi hacking
In-Reply-To: <9303030740.AA11601@toad.com>
Message-ID: <9303030922.aa22669@penet.penet.FI>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



> Instead of these ballooning regexps, how about just using Chael
> Hall's standardized "end of body" marker?  Even if some people had
> to add it manually to each message, well, that's not a big deal.
> But I suspect that the people who have sigs being added by BBS
> software are going to have trouble adding strange header lines, even
> if they have the regexp expertise to construct them.  

Didn't we go through this at least twice already. Yes, your suggestion
is perfectly OK for a "pure" cypherpunks remailer with sophisticated
users. It is *NOT* OK for something like the typical anon.penet.fi user
from alt.sexual.abuse.recovery or alt.transgendered. And at least
anon.penet.fi allows for using the special header lines as part of the
message body, to compensate for braindamaged mail systems. But some users
might not even be *aware* that their systems add sigs - yes, I've come
across a lot of those....

	Julf





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: kelly@netcom.com (Kelly Goen)
Date: Wed, 3 Mar 93 10:18:37 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Wasted BAndwidth
Message-ID: <9303031817.AA05176@netcom.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Forwarded message:
> 	You are right that because of the right free speach, it is
> impossible to prohibit remailers.  However, while I don't believe in
> prior restraint; but I do believe in personal responsibility.  It is
> certainly true that it is possible to construct a remailer service,
> using cryptography, such that it would be impossible to trace it back to
> the original sender.  This class of remailer would generally not provide
Well Ted I am not here to make ad-hominen attacks AND... 
there are a number of issues raised... 

Personal responsibility is a choice accepted by the person exercising
THEIR right of free speech... it is important to remember
that it is #1 and foremost a CHOICE... you CANT force an
attitude of personal responsibility

> So in this model, how can you provide personal responsibility?  Well, I
> would argue that the buck should stop at the remailer site.  They are
> the closest link to the chain of liability, and they have intentionally
> performed measures which make it impossible find the next link in the
> chain of liability.  So, let the liability rest with the remailer site!
> Now, I'm not a lawyer, and as far as I know, this legal theory hasn't
> been tested in a court.  So only time will tell what happens when these
> remailers hit the real world.
> 
> As far as remailers like Julf's are concerned, I very much like the idea 
> which Tim Moors suggested --- which is to have some method which the
> identity between the input and output address could be revealed.  This
> provides general anonymity, but one that can be breached when someone
> has abused that anonymity, as convicted by a jury of their peers.
> Perhaps the way this could be reflected into the "real world" legal
> system is that remailers which do keep a mapping between input and
> output addresses, and which are willing to reveal them under appropriate
> circumstances, would be exempt from being held liable for what comes out
> of their remailer.
> 
> Perhaps these are not the right sets of tools to be used to provide some
> sort of controls over remailers so that the negative effects of these
> remailers can be controlled.  But it is our responsibility to consider
> them, and not just pretend they don't exist.   I hope we don't have the
> attitude of "Vonce the rockets go up, who cares vere they come down?
> That's not my department....."
> 
> 						- Ted
> 

 Ted ,
	you seem more concerned with how you and the particular cabal
who agrees with you are going to control how others use their machines
and software to ensure THEIR right of choice...
Sorry but the attitudes you personally espouse just dont wash in the real
world...Liability law is civil LAW... in most cases there are NO
treaties between countries for laws such as libel...
Anonymity will flourish... and in the VERY near future... it wont be
dependent on the good-will of a sysadm or a government...
there simply WONT be the means to control spread of anonymity tools
Your viewpoint brings to mind an OLD saying
"Those who would trade a little freedom for security deserve neither"
and I apologize if I have misquoted here...I am afraid the scam
of social control and responsibilty that you and others such as 
government practice and espouse is about over...
"may you have an Interesting life"
         cheers
         kelly
p.s. Atlas is shrugging
-- 




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Eric Hughes <hughes@soda.berkeley.edu>
Date: Wed, 3 Mar 93 10:40:24 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Let's look at this ....
In-Reply-To: <6HNTZB1w165w@sytex.com>
Message-ID: <9303031837.AA21712@soda.berkeley.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Paul Ferguson asks: "What are cypherpunk priorities?"

Here's my list, in order:

Technical track:

1.  More remailer usage.  You can't start rearranging the order of
incoming and outgoing messages until you have messages to reorder.
Right now routing is still hard, even using a script.  Thus priority 1
implies number 2:

2.  Outgoing rewriting systems integrated into mailers.  Until one can
say

	To: cypherpunks

in their mailer and have this turned into a double-hop, fully
encrypted message on the way out, I don't think you'll see a huge
amount of traffic.

3. Mixing remailers.  Until mailers mix, they are extremely vulnerable
to network monitoring.  Mixing is rearranging the order of incoming
and outgoing messages, with a known lower bound on the number of
messages it could have been rearranged with.  Mixing also requires
message size quantization, since reordering is only significant among
messages of identical length.  Note that this requires a significant
volume of traffic per remailer.  While this is a high priority, its
implementation is not imminent.

4. Positive reputations.  The very simplest reputation is a signature
claiming identity.  Deployment of signature-based communication fora
is the first step.


Political track:

1. Understand the nature of anonymity now and in the future.  We are
trying to improve the world, not just change it.  It is therefore
necessary that we try to the limits our ability to understand the
effects of the social changes.

2. Making our arguments public.  Once we have convinced ourselves, we
have to convince others.  This means public participation in
conferences such as CFP, in the editorial pages of newspapers, in the
IETF meetings, in Usenet newsgroups, and, if necessary, in courts.

And a word of advice: Arguments are more effective the fewer shared
assumptions between the parties there are.  In particular, while you
can convice another libertarian with a libertarian argument, you can't
convince a socialist with one.  Nevertheless, both libertarians and
socialists desire open societies and personal privacy.  We must base
our arguments on deep shared culture if they are going to succeed.

3. Going international.  There do and will exist national restrictions
on various and different aspects of privacy goals.  One can go around
many of these restrictions by going around the nation involved.
Knowledge is extremely difficult to contain, so let us make more of
it, everywhere in the world!

4. Fighting restrictions on cryptography.  In the US, that means
getting actively engaged in fighting key registration ideas.  This
means preemptively writing your elected leaders _in advance_ of a
specific issue.  It also means writing about export restrictions in
cryptography.  In France, that means raising public awareness on
cryptography restrictions and the eventual effects that will have on
the open society there.  In all countries, it requires vigilance.

5. Increasing awareness of privacy issues.  Most think they have
nothing to hide.  Most also hate it when they get extremely detailed
junk mail about their own lives.  Teach the defense of privacy.


Eric




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: jthomas@mango.mitre.org (Joe Thomas)
Date: Wed, 3 Mar 93 07:48:15 PST
To: tribble@xanadu.com (E. Dean Tribble)
Subject: Re: Future of anonymity (short-term vs. long-term)
Message-ID: <9303031544.AA25573@mango>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



>	 IMHO a remailer operator should *NEVER* reveal any  
identities, but I
>	 also believe very strongly that especially if you provide a  
way to post
>	 news articles, there has to be a way to send replies to the  
original
>	 sender. Thus a remailer must maintain mapping info.

>I like this.  Does it make sense (and has it already been talked
>about?) to preserve the return information only for a limited time?

It could make sense.  It would make _practical_ sense in a scheme  
like the one I proposed (then amended thanks to John Gilmore's  
comments) in which the remailer encrypts the return addresses with a  
key that is regularly changed.  Just forget the old keys after a  
certain amount of time.   


(BTW, forget I ever said anything about using timestamps as salt.   
The amount of known-plaintext per message is huge if you do that.   
Any PRNG would be better.  I must have left my brain at home  
yesterday...)

Joe




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: fen@genmagic.genmagic.com (Fen Labalme)
Date: Wed, 3 Mar 93 11:20:06 PST
To: Eric Hughes <hughes@soda.berkeley.edu>
Subject: Re: Handling Abuses of Remailers
Message-ID: <9303031918.AA00242@>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> Re: remailer price schedules
>
> My guess on all this is that you could make an awful lot of money at a
> dime a hop for a less-than-10K message.  Sell hops only in packages
> of a hundred, in order to reduce your finance charges.


Geeez, Eric!  I'd think a penny a hop would be a pretty high price...  And
given that most messages go through two hops, then you'd really be giving
your 2 cents worth!

Note that there can be about 50 cypherpunks messages a day -- if each went
through 2 hops at $0.10 / hop, as you proposed, that would be $10 / day in
revenues for the remailers.  Seems like a lot to me.

I would support the idea if I felt that the system would quiet the flame
wars, but I think rather it would simply quiet the poor...

Fen





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: fen@genmagic.genmagic.com (Fen Labalme)
Date: Wed, 3 Mar 93 11:24:03 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Let's look at this ....
Message-ID: <9303031922.AA00249@>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


fergp@sytex.com (Paul Ferguson) writes:

> The one topic that _does_ interest me is the nonsensical fodder
> stemming from a post regarding the (actual?) governmental
> consideration to license keys. That just drops my carrier.
> This is probably the one reason why I tolerate the wasted bandwidth
> here -- there are many powerful souls amongst you (us) who can keep this
> bullshit from happening.


Me too.  It's not the only topic of interest to me, but one that I feel
strongly about.  Is there any suggested action that we can take?

Fen





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Eric Hughes <hughes@soda.berkeley.edu>
Date: Wed, 3 Mar 93 11:42:43 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: You Aren't [I'm Not]
In-Reply-To: <9303031741.AA19535@SOS>
Message-ID: <9303031939.AA26579@soda.berkeley.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Ted writes:
>[...] but I do believe in personal responsibility.  

I do not think this is an entirely forthright self-assessment.

>It is certainly true that it is possible to construct a remailer
>service, using cryptography, such that it would be impossible to
>trace it back to the original sender.

Let me call that strong anonymity.  Let me also call the possibility
for revealment weak anonymity.

>So in this model, how can you provide personal responsibility?  Well, I
>would argue that the buck should stop at the remailer site.  They are
>the closest link to the chain of liability, and they have intentionally
>performed measures which make it impossible find the next link in the
>chain of liability.  So, let the liability rest with the remailer site!

I interpret you to mean that it is not personal responsibility for
speech that you want, but the existence of someone to sue.

The placement of liability on the remailer does not directly affect
what the anonymous sender is going to say.  The assignment of
liability has, foremostly, legal consequences.  The way I see that it
will increase personal responsibility for speech is to make the legal
climate (in the U.S., at least) impossible for strong anonymity.  By
eliminating strong anonymity, you can ensure that their anonymity is
only conditionally revealed.

Now, you haven't directly stated that you think that strong anonymity
shouldn't exist.  If this is what you think, plase say so directly.
You can then make whatever argument you wish to support this position,
but I, for one, would like to argue against clearly stated positions.

>Now, I'm not a lawyer, and as far as I know, this legal theory hasn't
>been tested in a court.  So only time will tell what happens when these
>remailers hit the real world.

No, not only time will tell.  This seems like an important enough
point to legislate into existence before a court test.  And for those
with objections to making legislation, remember that the issue will be
resolved publicly by law, but by lawyers in the courts.  How about
something like the following:

	"Speech made anonymously will carry a presumption of falsity
	in all consideration of tort resulting from said speech."

>Perhaps these are not the right sets of tools to be used to provide some
>sort of controls over remailers so that the negative effects of these
>remailers can be controlled.  

One can eliminate the negative effects by eliminating the positive
ones as well.  I do believe strong anonymity to be one of these
benefits.

Eric




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Eric Hughes <hughes@soda.berkeley.edu>
Date: Wed, 3 Mar 93 11:51:22 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Let's look at this ....
In-Reply-To: <9303031922.AA00249@>
Message-ID: <9303031948.AA27241@soda.berkeley.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Re: key registration

>Me too.  It's not the only topic of interest to me, but one that I feel
>strongly about.  Is there any suggested action that we can take?

We have received word on the list about publications in both IEEE
Spectrum and Communications of the ACM of Dorothy Denning's key
registration proposals.  What can we do?

Flood their mailboxes with thoughful outrage.

Eric




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: babani@cs.Buffalo.EDU (Rusty Babani)
Date: Wed, 3 Mar 93 08:49:19 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: ANON: Textual analysis
In-Reply-To: <m0nTk5E-0002TpC@rmsdell.ftl.fl.us>
Message-ID: <9303031648.AA17469@armstrong.cs.Buffalo.EDU>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Yanek Martinson stated in the last message:
>From cypherpunks-request@toad.com  Tue Mar  2 23:06:23 1993
>Subject: ANON: Textual analysis
>Reply-To: yanek@novavax.nova.edu

>> This reveals a minor and probably obvious weakness of pseudonyms--writing
>> styles.
>
>We probably need "rephrasing remailers" which do some rudimentary
>grammar parsing on input text, and randomly substitute equivalent
>constructs such as switching active/passive voice, synonyms, changing
>the word order where it is insignificant, joining/splitting sentences,

That is insane... remailers are not the place where this kind of work
should be taking place. If anything the user should run his document
that (s)he wants stripped of grammer clues with software designed for
that purpose on on his/her own machine.  This way, the user can see
immediate results.  They don't have to wait anywhere from 1 minute to
a few days to see the results of the "rephrasing remailer".

-- 
+==== Internet: babani@cs.buffalo.edu ===+======== Amateur-Radio: N2LYC ======+
!      Bitnet: V078LNGT@ubvms.BITNET     |        UUCP: rutgers!ub!babani     !
! Alternate: an173@cleveland.freenet.edu | Plsure dpnds on the othrs prmison. !
+==  PGP key available. (If you don't know what a PGP key is... find out!)  ==+




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Date: Wed, 3 Mar 93 11:52:34 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: REPS: Filters Against Unwanted Messages
Message-ID: <9303031950.AA18115@netcom.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Attached below is a message wherein the author advertises in his .sig this item:

"(anon. postings not read)"

Simple, but it gets the point across. Expect to see more such declarations. 

In my off-line newsreader, Eudora, (which ironically is also the subject of
the message attached below--must be a plot), it's easy enough to mark all
the stuff from some anonymous site for deletion.

Such "filters" are a basic kind of positive reputation system and are in
use in many places. Some on this list have asked for this kind of filtering
to be incorporated (somehow) into NetNews readers. Maybe this will come
someday, but for now the best approach is to simply not read anonymous
postings, if that's important to you.

I want to also describe an important use of filters:

Publishers almost never accept unsolicited material. Manuscripts "thrown
over the transom," as the saying goes, are returned _unopened_ or sometimes
just thrown away. And the publishers are careful to publicize this fact.
Why?

Mainly to head off charges that they or one of their writers "stole" an
idea. Merely by opening the manuscript's envelope, they are exposing
themselves, potentially, to lawsuits from would-be authors who claim to see
elements of their ideas in someone else's "Movie of the Week" or Great
American Novel. So publishers and editors scrupulously refuse to look at
unsolicited manuscripts.

(I have heard, anecdotally, that the onset of electronic submissions is
causing them great distress. Without the option of "returned unopened,"
what are they to do? Various cryptographic solutions suggest
themselves...this could be a small niche market for some cypherentrepreneur
to fill, and could also be a way to get some P-K and reputation-filtering
software out in the world.)

Some forms of crypto-extortion can be handled the same way. (I described
this approach to Dean Tribble a while back.) Simply advertise widely--like
in your .sig--that you do not read messages unless they come from known
sources. 

Would-be extortionists ("Deposit 10 kilocrypts in this account or I will do
X") come to realize that they cannot easily contact their victim. To be
sure, other channels exist (anonymous postal mail, phone calls, routing
through other sources, etc.), but the lack of a direct channel makes the
initial threat harder to issue. It's a kind of crypto speed bump.

This approach, "I don't listen to extortion threats," is akin to "We don't
negotiate with hostage takers." Far from perfect, but still a "damping"
force.

-Tim

Here's the posting I cited earlier:

>Newsgroups: netcom.general
>Path: netcom.com!pfeiffer
>From: pfeiffer@netcom.com (Kevin Pfeiffer)
>Subject: Re: EUDORA for DOS?
>Message-ID: <1993Mar3.171249.26738@netcom.com>
>Organization: Pfeiffer Design Assoc.
>X-Newsreader: TIN [version 1.1 PL8]
>References: <1993Mar3.062411.9712@netcom.com>
>Date: Wed, 3 Mar 1993 17:12:49 GMT
>
>        You might look into pceudora... Can't speak for it, but Eudora (Mac)
>seems well-designed. No matter what seems to break my connections (me, the
>phone company, etc.) Eudora (and unix) leaves my mail intact at Netcom.
>Knock on wood.
>-- 
>   * Kevin Pfeiffer   <pfeiffer@netcom.com>   (anon. postings not read) *
>--





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Date: Wed, 3 Mar 93 12:22:27 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Handling Abuses of Remailers
Message-ID: <9303032020.AA21829@netcom.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


(Sorry, Cypherpunks, for the ">" in this message--I made the classic
mistake of sending this message only to Fen, hence this forwarded form.
I'll try to watch this in the future!)

>Fen Labalme believes Eric's "penny a hop" is still too expensive, especially
>for "the poor":
>
>>Geeez, Eric!  I'd think a penny a hop would be a pretty high price...  And
>>given that most messages go through two hops, then you'd really be giving
>>your 2 cents worth!
>>
>>Note that there can be about 50 cypherpunks messages a day -- if each went
>>through 2 hops at $0.10 / hop, as you proposed, that would be $10 / day in
>>revenues for the remailers.  Seems like a lot to me.
>>
>>I would support the idea if I felt that the system would quiet the flame
>>wars, but I think rather it would simply quiet the poor...
>>
>>Fen
>
>You don't have to support the idea, Fen, you just have to open your own
>remailing node! If you think you can do it more cheaply--perhaps subsidizing
>the costs from your other income, or perhaps just doing it as charity--you are
>completely free to do so.
>
>The "liquidity" of remailer hops (with the "Mark V" software that handles the
>grunge automatically) will be quite interesting to see. Some will go for
>minimum cost (one cheap hop), others will route messages through dozens of
>hops. 
>
>Services will arise which "rate" the quality of remailers, in terms of
>pricing, security, latency, message sizes accepted, past experiences, etc.
>
>Bandwidths are increasing so rapidly and computer hardware is getting so
>cheap, that I doubt even the poorest of the poor, in the U.S. at least, will
>be unable to send these kinds of messages. The costs of transmission are just
>so trivial compared to other costs that even poor people routinely pay.
>
>(Whether the poor and downtrodden will _want_ to participate in this Brave New
>World is another matter. My guess is they will.)
>
>-Tim





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Hal <74076.1041@CompuServe.COM>
Date: Wed, 3 Mar 93 10:45:08 PST
To: CYPHERPUNKS <CYPHERPUNKS@toad.com>
Subject: REMAIL: Juries...
Message-ID: <930303173253_74076.1041_DHJ77-1@CompuServe.COM>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Tim Moors offers an interesting suggestion that a jury should be used
to decide when a remailer operator should pierce the anonymity of an
especially egregious poster.  But I could see a way this could fail.

If a post really is terrible, one might expect the poster to have taken
some extra precautions.  What if Tim's jury starts up, deliberates,
argues, goes back and forth, and finally decides that the real email
address of the poster should be revealed.  When this is done, it may
well turn out that the original email address was forged, or was another
remailer which doesn't keep logs!

This would mean that no replies to the message would have worked, but
if the posting was harmful enough the poster might have been willing
to give up the capability to receive private replies (he can always
read followup postings on the newsgroup).

In a case like this, all the effort on the part of the jury would have
been wasted.

We should also realize that, in a sufficiently bad case, there may
well have been law enforcement involvement, anyway.  If the harm is
"real world" (not just something net folk would object to) then the
jury activity may be superfluous, as court orders could have been used
to force the remailer to reveal his mappings.

I wonder, though, if Tim's jury could be married with Marc Horowitz's
idea to have remailer operators support anonymous posting only from
"approved" pseudonyms.  Marc's idea was that people would literally
buy approval of given digital pseudonyms (e.g. public keys).  This
approval would be granted by the operator(s) themselves, or buy some
other agencies, and would be shown by a public log of signed pseudonymous
public keys.  Each message through the remailer would have to be digitally
signed by one of these approved keys.

(The approval process would be _completely anonymous_, that is, there
would be _no_ correspondence between real identities and approved
pseudonyms.)

Then, if someone posted abusive messages, their approval could be cancelled.
Their digital pseudonym (e.g. public key) would be removed from the list
of approved "nyms" (I like Eli's shorthand).  This way they could not
post any more, at least unless they were willing to spend more of their
hard-earned money to buy approval of another nym.  This way we get the
parallels to the postal service.

If the approval agencies donated their earnings then this would not
represent commercialization so it could even be done today.

(Another thought along these lines would be to use Karl Barrus' digital
bank to buy approval.  I'm not sure this would work, but it's worth
considering.)

One weakness of Marc's proposal was what criteria would be used to yank
approval of nyms.  A person might be reluctant to pay real money for
an approval certificate if he knew that it could be removed just because
some blowhard complained about one of his postings.  And remailer operators
would be constantly forced to make judgement calls (as I gather Julf is
today).

Perhaps Tim's juries could serve this purpose.  People would get their
approval certificate removed only upon a jury's recommendation.  The jury
could even be specified in advance, composed of respected but fair members
of the net community.

If people had this kind of assurance that their posting privileges would
be lost only under a fair system like this, they would be more willing to
pay for an anonymous posting certificate.

Hal Finney





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@Athena.MIT.EDU>
Date: Wed, 3 Mar 93 09:43:12 PST
To: pmetzger@shearson.com
Subject: Re: You Aren't [I'm Not]
In-Reply-To: <9303031508.AA26458@maggie.shearson.com>
Message-ID: <9303031741.AA19535@SOS>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Perry:
	You are right that because of the right free speach, it is
impossible to prohibit remailers.  However, while I don't believe in
prior restraint; but I do believe in personal responsibility.  It is
certainly true that it is possible to construct a remailer service,
using cryptography, such that it would be impossible to trace it back to
the original sender.  This class of remailer would generally not provide
a return address mapping feature, since if the remailer can generate a
return path, it can be revealed.  There are ways to make it more
difficult to reveal, but they still don't make it impossible.  So Julf's
remailer doesn't fall into this category, but ones where the input and
output mappings are destroyed immediately do.

So in this model, how can you provide personal responsibility?  Well, I
would argue that the buck should stop at the remailer site.  They are
the closest link to the chain of liability, and they have intentionally
performed measures which make it impossible find the next link in the
chain of liability.  So, let the liability rest with the remailer site!
Now, I'm not a lawyer, and as far as I know, this legal theory hasn't
been tested in a court.  So only time will tell what happens when these
remailers hit the real world.

As far as remailers like Julf's are concerned, I very much like the idea 
which Tim Moors suggested --- which is to have some method which the
identity between the input and output address could be revealed.  This
provides general anonymity, but one that can be breached when someone
has abused that anonymity, as convicted by a jury of their peers.
Perhaps the way this could be reflected into the "real world" legal
system is that remailers which do keep a mapping between input and
output addresses, and which are willing to reveal them under appropriate
circumstances, would be exempt from being held liable for what comes out
of their remailer.

Perhaps these are not the right sets of tools to be used to provide some
sort of controls over remailers so that the negative effects of these
remailers can be controlled.  But it is our responsibility to consider
them, and not just pretend they don't exist.   I hope we don't have the
attitude of "Vonce the rockets go up, who cares vere they come down?
That's not my department....."

						- Ted




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Tony Kidson <tony@morgan.demon.co.uk>
Date: Wed, 3 Mar 93 08:09:56 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: META: Support for prefixes
Message-ID: <3098@morgan.demon.co.uk>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


In message <m0nTiSl-0001y6C@rmsdell.ftl.fl.us> you write:
> > is problem: break the current list into topic areas.
> 
> A similar situation occurred a while ago on the Extropians list.  Many
> people were complaining about excess volume, people were
> unsubscribing, and there was talk of splitting the list into many
> sublists.  There are some problems with sublists.  Many people would
> subscribe to all the lists, or many of them.  List management chores
> ((un)subscriptions, bounces, address changes, etc) would increase.
> Many messages would get "cross-posted" to several or all lists, and
> thus would appear many times in everyone's mail box, thus even
> increasing the number of messages to sift through.  There are other
> problems, which I will not mention now.
> 
> I proposed a simple solution which is in use now, and has greatly
> increased the quality of the list, makes it easy for everyone to only
> read the messages they want, and does not require deployment of any
> new software.  The actual volume has not decreased, probably it even
> increased.  But the information flow is so much more manageable.
> 
> The solution is the use of prefixes in Subject: lines.  When you post,
> prefix your Subject: line with a short "tag" such as "ANON:",
> "DCNET:", "PGP:", "DCASH:", or others.  For example, you would see
> subjects like
> 
> PGP: new version available
> ANON: an new idea for anonymous replies
> 
> etcetera.  When reading your mail, just have your mailer sort the mail
> by Subject: line (if your mailer can't do that, get a new mailer), and
> all messages about PGP will come together, all messages about
> anonymous remailers will be in one area, etc.  Then it's easy to
> delete them all without reading, to save them to a file for future
> reference, or to read them if that is a topic you are interested in.
> 
> The beauty of this system is it's anarchistic nature.  There is no
> need for people to maintain an official list of prefixes, or to vote
> on new ones (as is done with newsgroups), or to ask someone to create
> one (as would be necessary for mailing sublists).  There's no need for
> the group as a whole to agree on anything.  Just start using them.
> Try to find a logical prefix for each message that matches its subject
> area.
> 
> Most likely people posting on the same topic will choose same or similar
> prefix.  After some initial fluctuation, different prefixes for the same
> topic will converge to one that will become customary for that topic.
> 
> New prefixes will pop up every once in a while, and the ones not used
> will fade from the group memory.  This is a flexible, dynamic system.
> 
> As a starting point I will make up a prefix for each of the sublists 
> you proposed (if you don't like my prefix, use a different one!):
> 
>    ANON:    anon/pseudo_cpunks   Anoymity/Pseudonymity
>    REMAIL:  remailers_cpunks     Remailer Technology
>    DCNET:   dining_cpunks        DC Nets
>    RANDOM:  random-cpunks        Random Generators
>    DCASH:   digimoney_cpunks     Digital Banking
>    PGP:     pgp_cpunks           PGP App/Current Info 
>    FLAME:-) ziplips_cpunks       Crypto-Censorship
>    WHISTLE: fweee_cpunks         Whistleblowers (The "Keith Peterson Area"?)
>    MEET:    physmtgs_cpunks      Physical Meetings/Conferences  
> 
> Here are some more:  META: discussions on the list about the list
> itself, such as this post, or the post I am replying to which suggested
> splitting the list.  Complaints about high volume, messages saying something
> does or does not belong on the list, etc, would use this prefix.
> 
> ANNOUNCE: important messages that everyone may be interested in.
> 
> FRIV: for jokes, parodies, other frivolous posts.
> 
> If a post fits in more than one subject area, the main prefix should
> be put first, for sorting purposes.  The other prefix(es) would follow,
> separated by slashes.  For example "PGP/ANNOUNCE: new version available"
> or "RANDOM/FRIV: why not just flip coins?".  This is in no way mandatory,
> it's just a convention that developed on Extropians, and it may be
> advantageous to use it, to ease further processing.
> 
> Some other ideas:
> 
> You can use procmail, elm filter, slocal, or any other mail processing
> tool to handle messages with different prefixes.
> 
> For example if you are a very busy person, or are reading your mail
> over a low-speed link, you may want to save all REMAIL/ANNOUNCE
> messages in a "remailers" file, delete all FRIV, META, and FLAME
> messages, and for each other prefix, save the message to an
> appropriate folder for reading later.
> 
> If you were not interested in discussion, but wanted to keep up 
> on what's going on, you would have the filter delete all the messages
> from the mailin list that do not have an ANNOUNCE: prefix.
> 
> Or, if you have enough time and/or are using a high-speed connection,
> you may just sort all the messages by Subject: thereby lumping all the 
> messages on a subject together.  Then you can decide which you are going
> to read first, which ones you want to delete, etc.
> 
> If this idea takes off, and most people will start using prefixes, further
> evolution of the concept is possible.  For example a group of extropians
> are developing some software on the list host machine that will let people
> customise their subscription, for example choosing not to receive messages
> with a certain prefix, not to receive messages that don't have a prefix,
> or choosing to receive only some selected prefixes, plus any new prefixes
> that come to use.
> 
> All this is sometime in the future.  Right now, let's start by just
> prefixing each subject line with an appropriate prefix.
> 
> --
> Yanek Martinson
> yanek@novavax.nova.edu
> 
I fully support this call for prefixes by subject class.

Tony
+-----------------+-------------------------------+--------------------------+
| Tony Kidson     | ** PGP 2.1 Key by request **  | Voice +44 81 466 5127    |
| Morgan Towers,  |  The Cat has had to move now  | E-Mail(in order)         |
| Morgan Road,    |  as I've had to take the top  | tony@morgan.demon.co.uk  |
| Bromley,        |  off of the machine.          | tny@cix.compulink.co.uk  |
| England BR1 3QE |Honda ST1100 -=<*>=- DoD# 0801 | 100024.301@compuserve.com|
+-----------------+-------------------------------+--------------------------+




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: ghabrech@ultrix.ramapo.edu (Phil_Osfy)
Date: Wed, 3 Mar 93 09:53:58 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Unsubscribe
Message-ID: <9303031756.AA28930@ultrix.ramapo.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Please unsubscribe me.  I am involved in a few other email groups and my 
load is way too high.  I may resubscribe again, but for now can't handle it.
Thanx
George
ghabrech@ultrix.ramapo.edu




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Chuck Lever <cel@citi.umich.edu>
Date: Wed, 3 Mar 93 10:07:19 PST
To: tytso@athena.mit.edu
Subject: Re: You Aren't [I'm Not]
In-Reply-To: <9303031508.AA26458@maggie.shearson.com>
Message-ID: <9303031807.AA21650@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



<  > From: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@athena.mit.edu>
<  > 
<  > Sorry; typo on my part.  What I meant to say was "No, I am not arguing
<  > that free speach is bad."  Mr. Metzger was putting words in my mouth
<  > when claimed that I was saying that.
<  > 
<  > Anonymity and free speach are *NOT* the same thing.  As I posited in an
<  > earlier message, which no one has yet to comment on, those two concepts
<  > are not the same thing.  
<  
<  Yes they are, Ted. They are mathematically equivalent. If I can say
<  anything, I can say it in code. If I can say anything, I can repeat what
<  someone else said in code, possibly transforming it. Ta Da, remailers.
<  
<  To stop remailers, you will need to stop free speech. Please at least
<  admit this much. It might be unpleasant, but in a society with no
<  prior restraints on speech it is likely not possible to stop cryptographic
<  systems to assure anonymity.

   let me say that some of this discussion has certainly been mind-
   bending, and i appreciate having taken part.  i would like to
   add my 2 pfennigs worth.  anonymity and free speech are different 
   in precisely this way:

   that we are free to say what we want doesn't mean we aren't also
   accountable for what we may say.  when we can speak freely *and*
   anonymously, then we are no longer accountable for what we say.

   anonymous free speech is a *stronger* form of free speech; this is
   what i think perry is arguing.  however, this stronger form of 
   freedom means individuals are no longer accountable for their 
   words or behavior;  this, i believe, is ted's concern.

   i can see that some members of this list are interested in providing
   an environment where these fundamentally social issues are solved 
   technically.  however, this seems to be an issue which cries out for 
   a social solution, with perhaps a technical implementation.  they
   may be looking to (over)simplify these social issues so that they are 
   *easily* solved technically, and this is where they might be going
   astray.

   in our society, for example, there are strong cultural restrictions on
   what we can say.  these are not mandated by law.  these are the rules
   of the game when it comes to existing in a particular culture.  an
   instance of such rules might be "politeness vs. rudeness."

   accountability can have positive or negative affects.  it seems to
   me that the usefulness of anonymous free speech hinges on whether
   the speaker should or should not be held accountable for her/his
   words.  i can't find an easy technical way of making possible free
   speech which is beneficial, but limiting non-beneficial free speech.
   there may be, however, ways of structuring or socially incorporating
   anonymous free speech such that the benefial uses are encouraged, and
   the maleficient uses are reduced.  but i feel strongly that the 
   approach will have to be socially, not technically based.

   i don't think digital cash is a really equitable way of accomplishing
   this.  as soon as economics are involved, individuals will be sucked
   into classes of "haves" and "have-nots".  while markets are good, the
   effects on individuals can be horrendous, as serious as censorship.  
   are we trying for meritocracy, or for rule based on who has the most 
   dough?  

   accountability is critical to those who can't protect themselves from 
   the government or from other members of society.  these are precisely
   the people who would be burned by such an economic system.  this *is*
   what the media is for, right?




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Ryan, Edmund J" <KL62%MARISTB@VM.MARIST.EDU>
Date: Wed, 3 Mar 93 10:23:40 PST
To: <cypherpunks@toad.com>
Subject: No Subject
Message-ID: <03MAR93.14444011.0177.MUSIC@MARISTB>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Greetings,

Please unsubscribe me. I'd appreciate it if cypherpunks
had a digest. It would be easier to handle the mail volume.

Virtually,

Ed

------------------------------------------------------------------------
- Edmund J. Ryan              Major:  Computer Information Systems     -
- KL62@MARISTB                Minor:  Computer Science/Business        -
- Marist College              --Cypherpunk--------Extropian-------     -
- Poughkeepsie, NY            --Libertarian-------Voluntarist-----     -
-                                                                      -
-               "Replace taxpayers with shareholders,                  -
-                regulators with customers: privatize!"                -
------------------------------------------------------------------------




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: eknipp@lobo.rmhs.colorado.edu (Ethan Knipp)
Date: Wed, 3 Mar 93 13:11:46 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: PGP: Help!
Message-ID: <9303032107.AA17969@lobo.rmhs.colorado.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Not to be stupid, but could somebody email me a plainspeak (Ok, I know some 
UNIX- I'm not *that* outta it) msg on what exactly pgp is, how to use it, and 
a copy of it.
 
Thanx
-- 
T'han The Unbeliever            | "Fear is the mind killer."- Dune
eknipp@lobo.rmhs.colorado.edu   |  
Nobody believes what I say.     |  Laugh when life sucks.  It helps.
Future Autopian			|  




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Marc Horowitz <marc@GZA.COM>
Date: Wed, 3 Mar 93 11:14:10 PST
To: kelly@netcom.com (Kelly Goen)
Subject: Re: Wasted BAndwidth
In-Reply-To: <9303031817.AA05176@netcom.netcom.com>
Message-ID: <9303031909.AA11228@dun-dun-noodles.aktis.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


(I'm also marc@mit.edu.  This is my work account.  Anyway....)

I think Ted is merely trying to be realistic.

Let me put it this way:  You tell something embarrasing, but true,
about Big Organization With Lots Of Money And Guns (BOWLOMAG).
They're not going to *care* that the last remailer on the chain (who
will, presumably, be identifiable) wasn't responsible for the message
which was sent.  They're just going to invade the building the
remailing host is in, kill everyone in the room, and destroy the
machine, and all the machines around it.  If they don't know which is
the remailer, they'll just blow up the whole block.  They don't care.
They're BOWLOMAG.

After this happens a few times, remailer operators are going to think
twice about passing anything which goes through their site.  They
don't want to be BOWLOMAG's next victim.  And this is exactly what
BOWLOMAG wants.  Control by fear.

Is this a likely scenario?  Probably not.  But in today's society, the
very organizations you are rightly trying to protect yourself against
are the ones with all the Money and Guns.  And they could care less
that it's mathematically impossible for you to monitor messages.  They
merely want it to stop.  Will they blow up buildings?  Not likely.
But I'm sure for every Steve Jackson Games we hear about, there are
other instances we don't.  And the Secret Service is a much easier
target than the CIA.

>> Personal responsibility is a choice accepted by the person exercising
>> THEIR right of free speech... it is important to remember that it is
>> #1 and foremost a CHOICE... you CANT force an attitude of personal
>> responsibility

You can't force and attitude of personal responsibility, it is true.
But you can still make people be responsible for their actions.  Even
if you don't think libel or slander is wrong, if I know who you are,
and I can prove it, I can still sue you.

As long as people are slinging quotes around:

    Liberty means responsibility. That is why most men dread it.
	    - George Bernard Shaw, Liberty

    The sole end for which mankind are warranted, individually or
    collectively, in interfering with the liberty of action of any
    of their number, is self-protection.
	    - John Stuart Mill, On Liberty, ch.1

People who want complete anonymity, without any way to make people
answer for they actions, seem to want liberty without the
responsibility.  And, they would remove my ability to protect myself,
by hiding the identity of my attacker.  Is this what we want?

Pseudonymity has its place in a free society, but there *must* be
bounds on it.  The recent idea of digital juries is a good one.
(Maybe it's not new; I like it anyway.)  This is better than trusting
the government.  

I do not advocate censorship.  I advocate responsibility.

		Marc




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Eric Hughes <hughes@soda.berkeley.edu>
Date: Wed, 3 Mar 93 16:05:11 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: You Aren't [I'm Not]
In-Reply-To: <9303032127.AA19605@SOS>
Message-ID: <9303040002.AA25892@soda.berkeley.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I thank Ted for such a clear reply.

He writes:
>Sorry for not being clear; I was merely speculating on how the Real
>World might react to the presense of remailers.  I actually think this
>might be a reasonable response, and perhaps even a likely one.

This was the other interpretation I came up with, yet it did not seem
as likely to me as the one I assumed.  Excuse me if I ever implied you
were a freedom-hating, Dorothy-Denning-loving crypto-fascist. ;-)

Yes, there are plenty of large organizations who sue at the drop of a
hat.  Yes, it is likely that remailer operators would get sued.  I do
think, however, there are legislative and judicial defenses.

>Let's cast this into a physical world example.  
	[anonymous bullhorn example deleted]

The place that this example breaks down is that silence is a commons,
and a communications network is not.  Society finds it profitable to
break up control of land into ownerships.  It is not, on the other
hand, profitable to do so with airspace as a sound-carrying medium,
because the cost of shielding, in addition to being expensive, looks
awful.  Thus sound has remained a commons wherein all maintain an
interest equal to their proximity.

A communications network, however, is an artifact, _i.e._ an object
created by design and technology.  As such it has no status as commons
unless the owners agree to grant it such.  One might argue that the
aggregate actions of backbone sites create such a commons.  Granted,
but the fact remains that the transmission of data in a particular way
or in a particular form or structure is not fundamental to the medium.
Like any other artifact, it can be changed.

Furthermore, the analogy of shouting at the neighbors does not
accurately reflect the facts of reception.  The sound from a
loudspeaker cannot be silenced except with great expenditure and loss
of sightline.  The speech of an anonymous posting source can be easily
silenced with filter.  There is a salient difference in effort here.

The loudspeaker example is that of an additive medium; all sounds come
over the same channel.  A telecommunications network, however, is on
the other end of the spectrum; every message comes in separately.  The
electronic medium is the most separable there is.  Filtering is not
possible for the loudspeaker; it is easy for the messages.

And again, no one requires a carrier to carry anonymous messages.
Practically speaking, you might easily end up with a situation like
the alt.* hierarchy, where only certain subnets agree to exchange
anonymous traffic.  I suspect this is inevitable in the short term.

>On the other hand, if you receive crank
>calls, you are entitled to call your phone company, and they will make
>an attempt track down the crank caller and turn over his identity to the
>police, with the charge of harassment.

But the phone company is not held liable when the call was made from a
pay phone.

>Whether or not it "shouldn't exist" is somewhat irrelevant, don't you
>think?  If people really want to put them up, they're going to exist.

I don't think it is irrelevant.  If we allow each person unlimited
personal freedom, that freedom include the freedom not to cooperate
with those one disagrees with.  Since the power of groups is larger
than the power of individuals, there is no such thing as unlimited
personal action.  To wit: "You may do what you like, but I don't have
to help, and I may actively hinder you."

>In any case, I don't believe the benefits of strong anonymity are worth
>the negative consequences, and that most of the benfits of strong
>anonymity are also provided by weak anonymity.  

Here is where we differ.  I do believe that strong anonymity is
desirable.  I believe that weak anonymity is undesirable for the same
reason that I believe key registration is undesirable.  (That said, I
think weak anonymity is not nearly as dangerous as key registration.)
The similarity is this: that an action performed in expectation of one
setting (privacy or anonymity) is later found to have been performed
in another.

[re: legislative protections of anonymous speech.]
>One can pass legislation proclaiming this to be the case; legislation
>has been passed declaring PI to be 3.  The question is whether or not
>this is a really a true statement the way the human mind works in
>general.  

A law which states that from now on that pi will be three does not
change the actual ratio of the circumference to the diameter.  A law
which says that certain facts of a situation are to be considered in a
certain way in a court of law does, in fact, change the way those
facts are considered.  

If someone makes a claim and it is rejected because of protecting
legislation, then even if the person was offended, the law still says
there is no redress.  If you declared that claims of offense are to be
disallowed, then they are disallowed, regardless of whatever perceived
or even actual harm there is.

Can such legislation could be passed?  There's the rub.  We can
certainly work for it.

>While tort law often seems to bear little or no resemblence to
>the outside world, it is supposed to based on the real world.

It is meant to describe society's reaction to the facts of the real
world, not to describe the facts themselves.

>On the other hand, if it is true that people will believe statements
>made anonymously, and so real damage can be done as a result, then the
>person who has been wronged should have every right to obtain
>compensation for those damages.  

Any such legislation would not claim that people did or did not
believe them.  It would state that regardless of whether they did or
not, that as a matter of public policy it would not matter.

Your statement begs the question of whether anonymous speech can
cause "real damage."  I will leave this to another discussion.

Eric




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: babani@cs.Buffalo.EDU (Rusty Babani)
Date: Wed, 3 Mar 93 13:04:40 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: ANON: My remailer
Message-ID: <9303032103.AA26981@armstrong.cs.Buffalo.EDU>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Due to circumstances beyond my control, I have had to take down the
remailer that is running in my account.  (read: If I put it back up
again... my account will be taken away.)

I only got a brief message from the system administrator stating
"Running anonymous remailers is against University policy."

Thus, since my account is more important (considering I need it for 
projects and the like...) than a remailer, I have taken it down.

I'd appreciate it if you spread the word.

-- 
+==== Internet: babani@cs.buffalo.edu ===+======== Amateur-Radio: N2LYC ======+
!      Bitnet: V078LNGT@ubvms.BITNET     |        UUCP: rutgers!ub!babani     !
! Alternate: an173@cleveland.freenet.edu | Plsure dpnds on the othrs prmison. !
+==  PGP key available. (If you don't know what a PGP key is... find out!)  ==+




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Eric Hughes <hughes@soda.berkeley.edu>
Date: Wed, 3 Mar 93 16:22:08 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: SOCIETY: crypto impact
In-Reply-To: <199303032336.AA26450@Menudo.UH.EDU>
Message-ID: <9303040018.AA28660@soda.berkeley.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



>Like any new technology, selling crypto to the public will be
>difficult at first.  I'll bet the telephone, something so vital to
>today's society it is difficult to imagine functioning without it, was
>tough to get going.

For an interesting look at this, see _When Old Technologies Were New_;
I've forgotten the author.  It's about electrification and the
telephone.

And remember, just because there's opposition, it could still be a bad
idea!  :-)  Let's not get too self-congratulatory here.

>On a related note, it is amazing how much information about you
>exists.  [...] Some supermarkets were even testing a
>system in which your purchases (scanned by the bar code reader) are
>saved and indexed by your credit card or check!  

It really is unsettling.  There is, in fact, a speculative market in
personal information.  Some of these companies doing supermarket
systems had the collection systems developed, and then went looking
for customers.

Eric




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@Athena.MIT.EDU>
Date: Wed, 3 Mar 93 13:28:39 PST
To: Eric Hughes <hughes@soda.berkeley.edu>
Subject: Re: You Aren't [I'm Not]
In-Reply-To: <9303031939.AA26579@soda.berkeley.edu>
Message-ID: <9303032127.AA19605@SOS>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


   Date: Wed, 3 Mar 93 11:39:32 -0800
   From: Eric Hughes <hughes@soda.berkeley.edu>

   >So in this model, how can you provide personal responsibility?  Well, I
   >would argue that the buck should stop at the remailer site.  They are
   >the closest link to the chain of liability, and they have intentionally
   >performed measures which make it impossible find the next link in the
   >chain of liability.  So, let the liability rest with the remailer site!

   I interpret you to mean that it is not personal responsibility for
   speech that you want, but the existence of someone to sue.

Sorry for not being clear; I was merely speculating on how the Real
World might react to the presense of remailers.  I actually think this
might be a reasonable response, and perhaps even a likely one.

Let's cast this into a physical world example.  Suppose someone has
developed a system which will allow someone to broadcast, over a
bullhorn, at 150db, in your neighborhood.  Suppose further that said
system will allow anybody to broadcast over that source, at either free
or at 10 cents a minute, in such a way that it is impossible to track
down the source.  Now suppose that this bullhorn (which is located on
private property) starts spewing announcements and other people
exercising their right of free speach, at all hours of the day and
night.

Now, then, let us explore the this example.  In this example, is it
reasonable to presume that it is each individual houseowner's
responsibility to put up soundproofing, to protect themselves from
unwanted noise?  If so, why?  Why not?  And if the people of the
neighborhood decided to get together and sue someone, who would be the
likeliest target?

Does this example apply to the remailer issue?  Well, their are
certainly examples that go both ways.  For example, if you receive junk
mail, you just throw it out.  On the other hand, if you receive crank
calls, you are entitled to call your phone company, and they will make
an attempt track down the crank caller and turn over his identity to the
police, with the charge of harassment.

   Now, you haven't directly stated that you think that strong anonymity
   shouldn't exist.  If this is what you think, plase say so directly.
   You can then make whatever argument you wish to support this position,
   but I, for one, would like to argue against clearly stated positions.

Whether or not it "shouldn't exist" is somewhat irrelevant, don't you
think?  If people really want to put them up, they're going to exist.

In retrospect, it was a mistake for me to point out that it might be a
bad idea to make that sort of services available, since I doubt any of
the anonymity salwarts have been listening to me anyway.  (It sometimes
certainly as seemed like no one has really be listening to me, as some
of the accusations of my being a censorship lover and being associated
with some evil cabal (tm) seem to attest.)  Some of my less than
thoughtful outbursts were caused by my exasperation at how people were
obviously not listening, and who were responding by name-calling and
arguments that were completely beside the point.  I apologize for those
outbursts.

In any case, I don't believe the benefits of strong anonymity are worth
the negative consequences, and that most of the benfits of strong
anonymity are also provided by weak anonymity.  Hopefully, if strong
anonymity does have the bad effects I fear, there will be ways for our
society to correct for them --- for example, holding the administrators
of the remailers liable for the damage caused by the remailers.  This
may not be the case, given things like international boundaries.  But it
is probably unproductive to argue about whether or not this will or will
not happen.  Time alone will tell.

	   "Speech made anonymously will carry a presumption of falsity
	   in all consideration of tort resulting from said speech."

One can pass legislation proclaiming this to be the case; legislation
has been passed declaring PI to be 3.  The question is whether or not
this is a really a true statement the way the human mind works in
general.  While tort law often seems to bear little or no resemblence to
the outside world, it is supposed to based on the real world.

This is why when someone is suing someone else for Libel, English Common
Law states that you have meet three standards: (a) the statements must be
false, (b) the speaker must have know the statements were false, and
spoke them with malicious intent, and (c) real damages were incurred.
(And that is what the plaintiff is sueing to recover for.)

If what you say is true, that human beings have a presumption against
believing statements made anonymously, then test (c) will fail
automatically; no real damage would have occurred.  In this case, the
legislation is simply not needed.  

On the other hand, if it is true that people will believe statements
made anonymously, and so real damage can be done as a result, then the
person who has been wronged should have every right to obtain
compensation for those damages.  That's what the tort system is all
about.

						- Ted




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Karl Barrus <elee9sf@Menudo.UH.EDU>
Date: Wed, 3 Mar 93 15:16:15 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: REMAIL: updated list
Message-ID: <199303032314.AA24899@Menudo.UH.EDU>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



(I intend to send this message to the list about once a month, or when
"emergencies" arise)

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----


Q1: What cypherpunk remailers exist?

A1: The list of cypherpunk remailers known to me:

 1: hh@pmantis.berkeley.edu 
 2: hh@cicada.berkeley.edu 
 3: hh@soda.berkeley.edu 
 4: nowhere@bsu-cs.bsu.edu 
 5: ebrandt@jarthur.claremont.edu 
 6: hal@alumni.caltech.edu 
 7: remailer@rebma.mn.org 
 8: elee7h5@rosebud.ee.uh.edu 
 9: phantom@mead.u.washington.edu 
10: hfinney@shell.portal.com 
11: remail@extropia.wimsey.com 

NOTES:
#1-5	no encryption of remailing headers
#6-11	support encryption of remailing headers
#2	requires remailing request to appear in header
#11	requires text to be encrypted along with remailing request
#7,#11	introduce larger than average delay

============================================================
Q2: How do I use the cypherpunk remailers?

A2: Instructions and helper scripts are available via anonymous ftp at
soda.berkeley.edu (128.32.149.19) in the pub/cypherpunks directory.

hal's.instructions     instructions on how to use the remailers
scripts.tar.Z          various Unix scripts to assist remailer use
anonmail.arj           various MSDOS batch files to assist remailer use

/-----------------------------------\
| Karl L. Barrus                    |
| elee9sf@menudo.uh.edu             | <- preferred address
| barrus@tree.egr.uh.edu (NeXTMail) |
\-----------------------------------/
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.1

iQCVAgUBK5U6XoOA7OpLWtYzAQEuJgQAx3qgMv9ZTG0LXWuaUgfT+27NB9gQAFga
8f3L4Ew41JlaIqXAUqo8JUra9NjE9Xrgg5DFN31j1pTiGZOdCUc0qzq+R8Tvw8iC
ujWvWKkoVExrPQqyArh+DSDeJdfykopL2I0W7NF0Z66Y13h89aNF1NN6H2W3Pf+I
naWmJL6Oxd8=
=S3XH
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: nowhere@bsu-cs.bsu.edu (Chael Hall)
Date: Wed, 3 Mar 93 14:29:42 PST
To: dclunie@pax.tpa.com.au (David Clunie)
Subject: Re: ANON: My remailer
In-Reply-To: <9303032153.AA17736@britt>
Message-ID: <9303032218.AA03614@bsu-cs.bsu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>What they probably mean is it is against their system administrator's
>policy ! I would be very surprised if the governing body of the
>university had a policy regarding this !
>
>Not that you are in a position to argue of course.
>
>david

     Uhg...  This is not a good sign.  My remailer is running on a
university computer system as well.  I have been trying to get a SLIP
connection for the past few months for my 386BSD system so that I can
take part of the load off of their system and provide anonymity on my
local hardware.  The sysadmin don't know about my remailer and I am
trying to keep them from finding out.  Right now, my mail volume is so
high that those messages are cloaked by the rest of my incoming and
outgoing mail.  Plus, it isn't used that much.  I have approval for
my mail servers, because we worked out a modification to slow down my
program so it wouldn't flood the system with sendmail processes.
Unfortunately, I don't have approval for the remailer, but at the
same time, there has been no mention of it.

     In the login banner, it says, "This system will be monitored for
unethical and malicious behavior."  That sort of leaves it up to them
to decide whether or not to shut down the remailer and they can just
give a quick "it's not ethical" reason.  Luckily, they like me.  :)
In the long run, I am working on a solution, but money is tight.
Otherwise, I would have a T-1 coming directly into my house and all
would be fine; well at least better.

     Enough rambling--I'm sorry to see a remailer demise and hope
that mine will not fall under the unethical clause here.  If I find
a solution, you will be the first to know.

Chael Hall

--
Chael Hall
nowhere@bsu-cs.bsu.edu, 00CCHALL@BSUVC.BSU.EDU, CHALL@CLSV.Charon.BSU.Edu
(317) 285-3648 after 5 pm EST




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Karl Barrus <elee9sf@Menudo.UH.EDU>
Date: Wed, 3 Mar 93 15:37:49 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: SOCIETY: crypto impact
Message-ID: <199303032336.AA26450@Menudo.UH.EDU>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Like any new technology, selling crypto to the public will be
difficult at first.  I'll bet the telephone, something so vital to
today's society it is difficult to imagine functioning without it, was
tough to get going.

PROPONENT: "Just imagine the service and convenience!"

OPPONENT: "What services and conveniences?  I visit the people I want
           to talk to and conduct my business withing 5 miles of home."

At the time there were no neat services or conveniences.  Buying into
new technology will cause resistance, since people are not going to
miss what they do not have.

However, I think some crypto technology will be easier to sell than
others.  It should be easy to convince people of the need for good
encryption, the kind that can protect you or your company's financial
information, mail, ideas, etc.  Also, digital signatures and
authentication techniques should face little resistance.

Now, anonymous remailers and other privacy methods will be a little
harder :-)  (witness the debate over anonymous speech occuring right
now!)

On a related note, it is amazing how much information about you
exists.  Did anyone else watch a PBS documentary about this (sorry, I
can't remember the name of it)?  In the report, a writer researched
how direct mail marketing departments seek out infomation - from going
to the county court house and obtaining property and deed information,
to using census information to classify your living habits,
professional organizations you belong to, catalogs for mailing lists
of various interests, etc.  Some supermarkets were even testing a
system in which your purchases (scanned by the bar code reader) are
saved and indexed by your credit card or check!  Banks could then sell
this extremely valuable information to direct mail houses.

/-----------------------------------\
| Karl L. Barrus                    |
| elee9sf@menudo.uh.edu             | <- preferred address
| barrus@tree.egr.uh.edu (NeXTMail) |
\-----------------------------------/




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: root@rmsdell.ftl.fl.us (Yanek Martinson)
Date: Wed, 3 Mar 93 14:54:23 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: ANON: un-filterable pseudonyms
Message-ID: <m0nU2HH-0002ZcC@rmsdell.ftl.fl.us>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> In my off-line newsreader, Eudora, (which ironically is also the subject of
> the message attached below--must be a plot), it's easy enough to mark all
> the stuff from some anonymous site for deletion.

This is only possible if there are few, well known, anonymous sites,
and/or if all anonymous aliases look similar, such as an1234.

How do you know if KSDF32@KMUVAX is an anonymous address, or a real
user login?

I also expect to see pseudonyms that look like real names.  I don't think
it would be too hard to pick a random first and last name from a list
of real names, and create a From: line like jsmith@someplace.edu (John Smith)
which will look just like a regular address.

Even the remailers that don't create reply-able aliases could generate
random real-looking From: lines, just to make the posts look non-anonymous.

The only possible solution would be to ignore all messages not from addresses
you trust.  This is basically the "don't talk to strangers" policy.


--
Yanek Martinson
yanek@novavax.nova.edu



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Peter & <shipley@merde.dis.org>
Date: Wed, 3 Mar 93 18:13:48 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: a /etc/magic for the unix file command
Message-ID: <9303040209.AA02043@merde.dis.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/x-pgp



-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----


to "teach" the Unix file(1) command to identify pgpfiles add the following
to your /etc/magic file:


# pgp hacks
0       short           0x9900                  pgp key public ring
0       short           0x9501                  pgp key security ring
0       string          -----BEGIN\040PGP       pgp armored data
>15     string          PUBLIC\040KEY\040BLOCK- public key blocK
>15     string          MESSAGE-                message
>15     string          SIGNED\040MESSAGE-      signed message
>15     string          PGP\040SIGNATURE-       signature
#


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.1

iQBFAgUBK5Vk5shmn7GUWLLFAQH7LwF9FxXXT2BldFcSQsRN1OzB8o5qauyFvOJq
fXzOOEZxU+aAAS194IPzGwjysKEVn3m/
=sDtW
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Alexander Chislenko <sasha@ra.cs.umb.edu>
Date: Wed, 3 Mar 93 16:48:27 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: META/PERSONAL: Thanks for mailing.
Message-ID: <199303040047.AA05134@ra.cs.umb.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


   I am grateful to both people who sent me the mail I lost;
I don't think I have a right to disclose their identity  ;-)
but I am grateful to them anyway, as well as to all those who
might want to send it to me later - please don't - too bad I'll
never know your names... Thanks anyway!

BTW, I missed the point when people started using prefixes in message
titles; was there an 'official' suggestion for it?

Alex.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: tim@atri.curtin.edu.au (Tim Moors)
Date: Wed, 3 Mar 93 04:01:29 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: ANON: Revealing identities
Message-ID: <9303031201.AA13190@atri.curtin.edu.au>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I sent the following to Julf earlier, and he encouraged me to post it to
news.admin.policy and the cypherpunks list. He mentioned that "the mapping
thing has been discussed recently". Feel free to tear it to shreds, but
remember that it is only a rough idea at present: don't tell me I forgot to
cross the 'l's (oops 't's).

---- 8< Cut Here 8< ----



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Anonymous
Date: Tue Sep 07 12:37:41 1999
To: julf@penet.FI
Subject: Revealing identities
Message-ID: <e736d399b29a511b1e60935c9e8e02e8@NO-ID-FOUND.mhonarc.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Johan,

I haven't been paying close attention to the latest on the anonymity debate,
so please tell me if the following has been raised before.

In your message <9302260807.aa01498@penet.penet.FI> of
Fri, 26 Feb 93 08:50:19 +0200 on the subject "Moral dilemma." to the
cypherpunks list, you mentioned that

>One rule is
>that I *never* reveal the true identity of an anon user,

While I believe that you should be able to use any policy you want for
this sort of thing, I do not believe that both your server and this policy
can survive together.

Because you/the-server cannot censor the content of anonymous postings/mail
(you lack the time, and knowledge of what is legal in every corner of the
world), you can only withdraw someone's anonymous posting permission in
response to complaints to something that they have already posted. I believe
that eventually, someone will post something so damaging/incensing that
sufficient pressure will be applied that either: the service cannot continue
(e.g. disconnected from the network), or you will be forced to reveal or
destroy the mappings between alias(es) and user(s). For example, on the
cypherpunks list, the question of what would happen if someone claiming
responsibility for the New York bombing posted through the anonymous server.
Bodies in the US (from people providing parts of the Internet service through
to political and criminal bodies such as the FBI/CIA/NSA) could easily apply
very strong pressure. Unfortunately, I feel that this pressure will come
sooner rather than later because there is nothing preventing people opposed
to the anonymous service from making these postings merely to discredit your
service.

I think that there *MAY* be a way around this. I assume the reasons behind your
non-disclosure policy are:
i.	You cannot decide which identities should be revealed.
ii.	Revealing an identity removes their anonymity from all of their
	previous postings, some of which may have had reason to be anonymous.
	For example, I think it "unjust" to reveal what someone wrote to
	alt.sex.abuse because they violated copyright or whatever in some
	other group.

The second of these reasons could be avoided by permitting anonymous users
to have a different alias for each posting that they make. This would increase
the loading on the alias space and records of alias<->ID mappings. I can see
no reason why you would need to reveal all of the aliases of one real identity.

The decision of when an identity should be revealed could be left to a jury:
If you receive a reasonable complaint about a posting (not just a flame, but
something more significant such as copyright violation, libel, etc) then you
would post this complaint to a group of anonymous jurors who decide on what
action should be taken. The plaintiff and defendant could even argue their
positions to the jury, and might advertise on a newsgroup asking for assistance
from relevant groups (e.g. pro/anti-anonymity groups).

The problem now is how to select the jury. Some factors are:
i.	The number of jurors influences the probability that the decision
	can be swayed because of the random composition of the jury. So
	one juror would be too few, 12 as used in orthodox courts might be
	reasonable, etc.
ii.	Jurors would not want to spend too much time on the case, so there
	should be an upper limit on the number of bytes transmitted by
	defendant and plaintiff, and the time span of the case.
iii.	The degree of "consensus" required for a decision. Perhaps 2/3 majority
	is OK, perhaps 75%. The larger the majority required, the less likely
	that the case will be swayed by the composition of the jury, but also
	the longer it would take to reach the decision.
iv.	The jury can't be composed just of users of the anonymous service
	because of their bias. Perhaps jurors could be selected at random
	from the names of people who have posted to the news in the past?
v.	Jurors would have to accept their position -- there's no use in having
	a juror who doesn't read the information passed to him/her.
I feel that the problem of selecting a jury would be easier to solve than
that of defending the anonymous service against the uproar that may result from
some postings. With this judicial process, anonymous users would also be
accountable for what they post.

Some other issues would be
i.	What happens if the jury can't decide?
ii.	What sort of "punishment" is possible? Warning the person? Barring the
	person from anonymous posting? Revealing their identity to the
	necessary body? etc

The idea is *VERY* rough at the moment, but perhaps it has some merit?
As I see it, the good part for the anonymous service provider is that they
do not have to participate in the process (apart from filtering trivial
flaming cases from the judicial system), which will avoid claims of bias and
lessens your already considerable load.

Comments?


			Tim
---- 8< Cut Here 8< ----


			Tim Moors

__________________________________________________________
Australian Telecommunications Research Institute   .-_!\  
GPO Box U 1987     Email: tim@atri.curtin.edu.au  /     \ 
Perth, WA 6001     Phone: +61 9 351 3243          \_.-._/ 
Australia            Fax: +61 9 351 3244               o  
                "beLIEve" -- U2 Zoo TV Tour




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: wcs@anchor.ho.att.com (Bill_Stewart(HOY002)1305)
Date: Wed, 3 Mar 93 18:04:54 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: PGP: informal faq for eknipp
Message-ID: <9303040204.AA12596@anchor.ho.att.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text


Eknipp asked for an overview of PGP; my reply to him bounced, but it's of
enough possible general use that I'm inflicting it on the list.
It's rough and rambling, but believe it if you need it....,
and please send me any corrections if there are offensive errors.
The details of corporate relationships regarding PKP and RSA are especially
haphazard.
			Thanks;  Bill
--
   "He wouldn't have wanted that _thing_ walking around with his name on it"
------


well, here's a rough overview and definitions, ignore the parts you know already.
You can get a proper faq by ftp from rsa.com, in the directory pub/faq.

Cryptography = writing stuff only authorized people can read.  Real crypto 
	depends on algorithms that are secure as long as the Bad Guys
	don't know the keys, even if they know everything else.
	Most of the interesting stuff depends on mathematical
	processes that take exponential amounts of time,
	so a 56-bit key would take 2**56 attempts to guess -
	you can't guess it a bit at a time in 56 steps.
	Factoring large numbers is believed to take roughly expontential time.
	M = plaintext message
	Cyphertext C = E(k, M), E = encryption function, k = key.
	Plaintext M = D(k, C)

ITAR - International Traffic In Armaments Regulations - the US has a bunch
	of laws about exporting munitions, and crypto hardware and software
	count as munitions - algorithms are OK, but our Benevolent Govt 
	KNOWS that foreigners aren't bright enough to turn algorithms into code.
	Lots of flamewars discuss exactly the boundaries, and the laws are
	contradictory about which bureaucrats are really in control,
	but nobody's wanted to get thrown in jail for arms dealing badly
	enough to force a court case ....
	Appears to apply to importing crypto also, though that hasn't been
	something anybody's made a big deal about.
	Other countries besides the US may have major restrictions as well.
Alice and Bob - the people sending messages to each other.
	Eve may be eavesdropping, and Charlie may be around also,
Secret-Key Cryptosystem, also called Symmetric-key or private-key -
	the same key k is used for E and D, or at least a closely related
	key that's easy to derive if you know the other one.
DES = Data Encryption Standard = IBM/NSA-designed secret-key system,
	very widely used, keys 56 bits long which may be a bit short,
	some people worry there may be an trapdoor put there by NSA,
	but if I told you I'd have to kill you :-)  Banks use it, for instance.
IDEA - a Swiss-written secret-key system, maybe more secure than DES,
	newer anyway.  Patented in Switz but not US, easy licensing.
Public-Key CryptoSystem - Encryption key ke and Decryption key kd are related,
	but in a way that you can't determine kd knowing only ke.
	ke is called the public key and kd the private key -
	you can publish ke where everyone can see it and encrypt stuff
	to mail to you, you can decrypt with private key kd.
	(If you want to reply, you've got to get their public key.)

	Public-key algorithms are pretty slow, so generally people
	use create a random secret key, encrypt their message with a
	secret-key algorithm like DES, and encrypt the secret key with
	the recipient's public key; recipient decrypts the secret key
	with his private key, then uses it to decrypt the message.

Digital Signatures - if you can do public-key crypto, then you can do the
	reverse as well to sign a message - you *decrypt* the message
	with your private key, and the recipient encrypts it with your
	public key - if it restores the original message, she knows it's good
	and knows that *you* sent it, because only you have your private key.
	For speed, you normally make a "hash" checksum of the message,
	and sign the hash instead of the whole thing.
	Some public-key algorithms can only be used for encryption, some only
	for signatures, some for both but you need different keys.

MD-4 and MD-5 - Message Digest hashing algorithms from (?) Rivest,
	which are thought to be unforgeable, unlike the CRC checksums
	used by many programs which are easily forged.

RSA - A public-key algorithm developed by Rivest, Shamir, and Adelman.
	It's the only well-known public-key algorithm that does everything everybody
	wants, including signatures and public-key, that's secure enough
	that you can't crack it as long as you use reasonably long keys.
	Unfortunately, it's patented in the US, by Public Key Partners,
	a company R, S, A, and friends started that owns most of the interesting
	patents related to public-key.  On the other hand, to avoid having the
	NSA classify their patent right when they applied (the NSA can do that),
	they published the algorithm before applying, which means that
	it's public-knowledge in most of the world and you can't patent it
	there, even in places that do allow algorithm patents.

	Their claims about what techniques their patents cover are *very* broad;
	if you want to do anything public-key related in the US,
	you've got to deal with them or carry a BIG lawyer, and so far
	everybody's chosen to deal with them rather than risk a long expensive
	difficult court case, or else chosen to ignore or infringe their patent 
	but not sell their products for cash, and hoped to get away with it.

RSAREF - an RSA implementation from PKP, which you may use free for personal
	non-commercial use as long as you agree to follow a set of rules
	that are much less restrictive than they used to be; you can't
	export it outside the US and Canada, and can't change the interface
	without their permission, and a few other terms.  Better implementations
	of RSA's algorithms have been done, but you can use this one free,
	with their permission.  Or you can pay them money and get support
	for incorporating their techniques into your products.

Key certification - Public Keys are usually long - RSA keys are often 1024 bytes.
	Public keys crypto is only secure if you can be SURE you have the
	public key for the person you're trying to send a message to,
	like Bob, and that Eve hasn't handed you HER public key instead -
	she could be intercepting all your mail to Bob, decrypting it,
	and re-encrypting with Bob's key.  So you need to find a secure way
	to transmit public keys, where "secure" means it can't be forged
	without you knowing about it (though anybody can read them.)
	Publishing in the New York Times classified ads is one approach,
	as is any other broadcast method you can be SURE everyone gets correctly.
	Another method is to use digital signatures - somebody you trust,
	whose public key you can be sure you know accurately, gets Bob's
	public key from Bob, and signs it with their public-key.
	Since not everybody knows somebody who knows Bob, the problem can
	be handled by a chain or hierarchy of key certifications -
	Charlie signs Bob's, Dave signs Charlie's ... and You know Xerxes yourself.
	Or George Bush signs all the general's keys, the generals all sign
	the keys for the colonels under them, the colonels sign for the
	majors under them, .... and you can check some sergeant's key
	because it's got a certificate from his lieutenant on up to Bush,
	and Bush's key is in the Phone Book.

PGP - Phil's Pretty Good Privacy program - a nice packaging of this technology
	that can be used easily to prepare secure email.  The original version
	used RSA and a choice of DES or a home-brew secret-crypto system;
	the current version uses RSA and IDEA.  For certification,
	the method is non-hierarchical - you have a "keyring" containing
	public keys you know, maybe with certificates, and you can sign
	the ones *you* trust and give your signed keyring to your friends.
	Hierarchies imply the potential for control; this is cooperative anarchy,
	and there's no chain of people you HAVE to obey to exchange keys.

	When PGP version 1 first came out, RSA yelled at Phil Zimmerman,
	the author, and told him he was risking patent infringement lawsuits
	and such if he didn't cease and desist, so he's no longer distributing it.
	But some of those SNEAKY FOREIGNERS *somehow* got a copy,
	and so ongoing development of PGP is taking place outside the US,
	unhindered by patent problems.  Version 2.1 is out, 2.2 real soon.
	Parts of PGP are probably not covered by PKP's patents,
	and parts are clearly not covered by ITAR, but some parts are a problem.

RIPEM - Mark Riordan's public-key email system, which uses RSAREF to do RSA,
	so it's legally kosher but not exportable, and is related to the
	internet Privacy Enhanced Mail stuff that was being developed
	for a while.  Still real new, but probably Pretty Good also;
	I seem to remember its key certification was more hierarchical.

----
More PGP info - PGP was originally written for a DOS environment (there are
	problems trusting any system you don't totally control,
	and it's tough to say you totally control a multi-user system),
	but it's been ported to lots of things by now, including
	UNIX and some early Mac ports (work is in progress to make the 
	Mac port feel like Mac-stuff rather than Unix-stuff.)
	You can get the source, compile it, play with it, and
	do anything you want that doesn't infringe PKP's patent,
	so remember not to use it to exchange keys with anyone or send them
	mail unless you've got a licensing agreement.....
	Once it's compiled, type 
		pgp -h
	to get help, and/or read the documentation.

Where to get things:  The fun place to shop is nic.funet.fi, by anonymous ftp,
	but if you telnet to an archie server like archie.rutgers.edu (login
	as archie) you can ask it wher to find anything.  Using a US site would
	be potentially better legally, and also cuts down on the bandwidth
	used between here and Finland....

				Bill Stewart




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: babani@cs.Buffalo.EDU (Rusty Babani)
Date: Wed, 3 Mar 93 18:15:47 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: ANON: anon policy of UB
Message-ID: <9303040214.AA09381@armstrong.cs.Buffalo.EDU>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Here is a copy of the policy that my system administrator was refering to:

From: gerland@ubvmsb.cc.buffalo.edu (James R. Gerland)
Subject: UCS Computing Usage Policy.
Date: 16 May 90 19:56:27 GMT

         CONDITIONS OF USE OF THE COMPUTING CENTER FACILITIES

                      Academic Computing Services
                     University Computing Services
                State University of New York at Buffalo

                             March 4, 1988

     The use of University at Buffalo academic computer systems by members 
of the university community is authorized by Academic Computing, University
Computing Services.  All classes of users (students, faculty, and staff
members) have equal privileges and equal access to the Computing
Center's facilities,  and all have the responsibility to use the Computing
Center's services in an effective, efficient, ethical, and legal manner.

     Every computer account issued by University at Buffalo is the 
responsibility of the person in whose name it is issued.  As a result, 
acquiring an account in another person's name, or using an account without 
the explicit permission of the owner and the full knowledge of Academic
Computing will be considered to be theft of services, and will be dealt
with according to the "Student Rules and Regulations" and/or Chapter 514
of the New York State Penal Law.

     It is mandatory that the owner of an account be careful to keep the
account secure by keeping the password secret, changing the password
often, and reporting to Academic Computing when anyone else is using
the account without permission.

Authorized Use

     As a condition for use of the Academic Computing systems, all users
are expected:

(1)  To respect the privacy of others.  For example, users shall not
     intentionally seek information on, obtain copies of, or modify files
     or passwords belonging to others.

(2)  To respect the integrity of the University at Buffalo computing systems.
     For example, users shall not intentionally develop or use programs
     that harass other users, infiltrate a computing system, or damage or
     alter the software components of a computing system.

(3)  To not develop programs or use any mechanisms to alter or avoid
     accounting for the use of computing services or to employ means by
     which the facilities and systems are used anonymously or by means
     of an alias.  For example, users shall not send messages or mail, or
     print files which do not show the username of the user using the
     system or which exhibit a username other than that of the sender.

(4)  To respect the legal protection provided by copyright and licenses
     held by the Computing Center.  For example, users shall not make
     copies of a licensed computer program to avoid paying additional
     license fees.

(5)  To use the accounts only for University related purposes.  For
     example, users shall not authorize individuals who are not associated
     with the University to use an account nor use the academic
     computers for non-university related work, without prior
     arrangements with Academic Computing.

     Violation of these conditions, i.e., unauthorized use of another
person's account, tampering with other users' files or passwords, or
harassment of other users is certainly unethical and possibly a criminal
offense.  Whenever Academic Computing becomes aware of a possible
violation of these conditions, Academic Computing will initiate an
investigation.  In order to prevent further unauthorized activity, Academic
Computing may suspend the authorization of computing services to the
individual.  Confirmation of unauthorized use of the facilities may result
in the closing of accounts permanently, billing for computer time used for
non-university endeavors, disciplinary action, and/or legal action.

Responsible use

     Users are expected to use computing resources in a responsible and
efficient manner consistent with the instructional, research, and
administrative goals of the University.  Users are expected to refrain
from engaging in deliberately wasteful practices such as printing large
amounts of unnecessary listings, performing endless unnecessary
computations, or unnecessarily holding public terminals, tape drives, dial-
up phone lines for long periods of time when others are waiting for these
resources.  In addition, the playing of games or using networks for purely
recreational purposes when others are waiting for terminals represents
irresponsible use of the equipment.

     Academic Computing prefers not to act as a disciplinary agency or
to engage in policing activities.  However, in cases of unauthorized or
irresponsible behavior, Academic Computing does reserve the right to take
remedial action, commencing with an investigation of the possible abuse.
Users, when requested, are expected to cooperate in such investigations.

-- 
+==== Internet: babani@cs.buffalo.edu ===+======== Amateur-Radio: N2LYC ======+
!      Bitnet: V078LNGT@ubvms.BITNET     |        UUCP: rutgers!ub!babani     !
! Alternate: an173@cleveland.freenet.edu | Plsure dpnds on the othrs prmison. !
+==  PGP key available. (If you don't know what a PGP key is... find out!)  ==+




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Peter Honeyman <honey@citi.umich.edu>
Date: Wed, 3 Mar 93 18:24:15 PST
To: CypherPunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: You Aren't [I'm Not]
Message-ID: <9303040224.AA01178@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


    Date: Wed, 3 Mar 93 12:41:48 -0500
    From: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@Athena.MIT.EDU>
    Subject: Re: You Aren't [I'm Not]
    
                                                  ... I don't believe in
    prior restraint; but I do believe in personal responsibility ...
    
    ... in this model, how can you provide personal responsibility?  

ted, when you say you favor personal responsibility, do you mean
"i am in favor of people acting responsibly," which i take to be the
sense of the first quote, or do you mean "i want there to be a way to
hold people responsible for their actions," which i take to be the
meaning of the second?

(i favor the former, but am undecided about the latter.  not that
anyone asked ...)

    peter

ps:  pardon my wild excerpting; i hope it doesn't obscure.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: babani@cs.Buffalo.EDU (Rusty Babani)
Date: Wed, 3 Mar 93 18:27:29 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: ANON: My remailer
In-Reply-To: <9303032218.AA03614@bsu-cs.bsu.edu>
Message-ID: <9303040226.AA10720@armstrong.cs.Buffalo.EDU>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Chael Hall stated in the last message:
>From cypherpunks-request@toad.com Wed Mar  3 17:44:33 1993
>From: nowhere@bsu-cs.bsu.edu (Chael Hall)
>To: dclunie@pax.tpa.com.au (David Clunie)

>>What they probably mean is it is against their system administrator's
>>policy ! I would be very surprised if the governing body of the
>>university had a policy regarding this !

>     Uhg...  This is not a good sign.  My remailer is running on a
>university computer system as well.  I have been trying to get a SLIP

I know that the remailer I was running wasn't the biggest kept secret,
however, I made sure not to mention it to too many local people.  I
wonder if my sysadmin found out thru mail-logs or thru a pgp key
server or somebody told him or what?  I guess I'll never find out.

>     Enough rambling--I'm sorry to see a remailer demise and hope
>that mine will not fall under the unethical clause here.  If I find

Chael, it might be wise to check out exactly what your "university's"
policy concerning this is... before it's too late!

-- 
+==== Internet: babani@cs.buffalo.edu ===+======== Amateur-Radio: N2LYC ======+
!      Bitnet: V078LNGT@ubvms.BITNET     |        UUCP: rutgers!ub!babani     !
! Alternate: an173@cleveland.freenet.edu | Plsure dpnds on the othrs prmison. !
+==  PGP key available. (If you don't know what a PGP key is... find out!)  ==+




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: trump@pluto.ee.cua.edu (Louis Edward Trumpbour)
Date: Wed, 3 Mar 93 18:51:18 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: what is all o f this talk
Message-ID: <9303040251.AA06498@pluto.ee.cua.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



well i dislike this argument of anon remailers etc being bad or what not because
people can threten or what not wiht it... this argument is pretty bogus since i
could do the same thing from an inactive hacked account... but thats my haypenny

also what is the true to life name of Unix's passwd encryption program of scheem
???
Louis




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Nickey MacDonald <i6t4@jupiter.sun.csd.unb.ca>
Date: Wed, 3 Mar 93 18:58:53 PST
To: Peter &amp; <shipley@merde.dis.org>
Subject: Re: a /etc/magic for the unix file command
In-Reply-To: <9303040209.AA02043@merde.dis.org>
Message-ID: <Pine.3.05.9303032200.B979-a100000@jupiter>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Just a note...  to save people some time...  The fields for those additions
to the magic file must be seperated by TABs....

---
Nick MacDonald               | NMD on IRC
i6t4@jupiter.sun.csd.unb.ca  | PGP 2.1 Public key available via finger


On Wed, 3 Mar 1993, Peter & wrote:

> # pgp hacks
> 0       short           0x9900                  pgp key public ring
> 0       short           0x9501                  pgp key security ring
> 0       string          -----BEGIN\040PGP       pgp armored data
> >15     string          PUBLIC\040KEY\040BLOCK- public key blocK
> >15     string          MESSAGE-                message
> >15     string          SIGNED\040MESSAGE-      signed message
> >15     string          PGP\040SIGNATURE-       signature
> #






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@Athena.MIT.EDU>
Date: Wed, 3 Mar 93 20:28:12 PST
To: Eric Hughes <hughes@soda.berkeley.edu>
Subject: Re: You Aren't [I'm Not]
In-Reply-To: <9303040002.AA25892@soda.berkeley.edu>
Message-ID: <9303040426.AA24707@SOS>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


   Date: Wed, 3 Mar 93 16:02:00 -0800
   From: Eric Hughes <hughes@soda.berkeley.edu>

   A communications network, however, is an artifact, _i.e._ an object
   created by design and technology.  As such it has no status as commons
   unless the owners agree to grant it such.  One might argue that the
   aggregate actions of backbone sites create such a commons.  Granted,
   but the fact remains that the transmission of data in a particular way
   or in a particular form or structure is not fundamental to the medium.
   Like any other artifact, it can be changed.

True, like any other artifact, it can be changed.  But then again,
someone could try to change the status of sound as a "commons" as well.
Perhaps the real problem is that there are a large number of people who
are currently using mailing lists and Usenet newsgroups with the
expectation that there are currently existing controls on the
signal-to-noise levels and protection against mail bombs, which are
being enforced by simple standards of personal (or at worse, site)
accountability.  So in affect, the common usage of these colections of
sites has created a "commons" which you are proposing to take away.

As an artifact, certainly that can be changed; and you are proposing
that we change them.  But then, who should bear the cost of this change?
To bring this back to the house/anonymous bull horn analogy, that would
be like deciding cease considering sound (or rather lack of sound) a
commons, and expecting each home owner, who up until now enjoyed the
relative peace and quiet of their neighborhood, to pay the cost of
losing their sightlines, and needing to put up expensive shielding.

Maybe there are good, sound, policy reasons for making this change.  But
out of fairness, one would think that the agents of change should be
prepared to bear some of cost of that change.  Without that, the
homeowners will not be bought into such a change, and you can hardly
blame them for resisting.  Wouldn't you, in similar situations?

   And again, no one requires a carrier to carry anonymous messages.
   Practically speaking, you might easily end up with a situation like
   the alt.* hierarchy, where only certain subnets agree to exchange
   anonymous traffic.  I suspect this is inevitable in the short term.

Well, this really can only happen if a carrier can easily distinguish
anonymous messages from non-anonymous messages.  Out of fairness, I
would argue for putting in a standard header which clearly labels a
message as being anonymous, so that carriers can have the choice of
whether or not they want to carry that message.  Given the earlier
discussion of doing filtering at the server level, this seems to fit
right in.

   >On the other hand, if you receive crank
   >calls, you are entitled to call your phone company, and they will make
   >an attempt track down the crank caller and turn over his identity to the
   >police, with the charge of harassment.

   But the phone company is not held liable when the call was made from a
   pay phone.

True; but the phone company is a common carrier.  The networks today
aren't.  This could be changed by legislation, and that's something I
would support, for networks.  However, I doubt that such legislation
would actually extend as far as protecting hosts on a network, such as
remailer sites.  It might happen, but it would definitely be a much
harder sell.

   >On the other hand, if it is true that people will believe statements
   >made anonymously, and so real damage can be done as a result, then the
   >person who has been wronged should have every right to obtain
   >compensation for those damages.  

   Your statement begs the question of whether anonymous speech can
   cause "real damage."  I will leave this to another discussion.

You misunderstand my argument.  My argument is that if anonymous speech
doesn't cause "real damage", then your proposed legislation isn't
necessary, since real damage is a requirement for a successful libel
action.  On the other hand, if it does cause "real damage", then your
proposed legislation would prevent someone who had been damaged from
obtaining redress.  So I would argue that such legislation would be bad
public policy.

						- Ted




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Nickey MacDonald <i6t4@jupiter.sun.csd.unb.ca>
Date: Wed, 3 Mar 93 19:40:36 PST
To: Eric Hughes <hughes@soda.berkeley.edu>
Subject: A anon remailer addressing suggestion
In-Reply-To: <9302281755.AA13087@soda.berkeley.edu>
Message-ID: <Pine.3.05.9303032303.C979-b100000@jupiter>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I 'm way behind on my cypherpunks mail..  I just hope this hasn't been
recently discussed...

How about implimenting an anonymous remailer where the return address is
some sort of hash to the original id...  maybe based on time or count of
messages from that id, or something...  Thus, two messages sent from the
same person would have "differnt" return addresses...  and you would never
really keep an anonymous id...  it would be constantly changing...  but you
could always be reached, even at your "previous" addresses...  This would
beg for some sort of pseudonym option, in case you wanted a stream of your
messages to appear to come from the same person (granted with diff
addresses).  This could even be taken one step further, to include a small
portion of your original message in any replies... but thats probably  bit
too much...  :-)


crude example:

From:  <Pseudonym> anonabcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz0123456789@remailer.anon
Subject:  An idea         ^^^^ Some weird has to return address

From:  <Pseudonym> anonabcdefghijkl0123456789zyxwtsrqponm@remailer.anon
Subject:  A second idea   ^^^^ A new hash for a new mail message


Am I just blowing hot air...  or is this a worthwhile idea?

---
Nick MacDonald              | NMD on IRC
i6t4@jupiter.sun.csd.unb.ca | PGP 2.1 Public key available via finger 






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Johan Helsingius <julf@penet.FI>
Date: Wed, 3 Mar 93 14:52:32 PST
To: Fen Labalme <fen@genmagic.genmagic.com>
Subject: ANON: Re: Handling Abuses of Remailers
In-Reply-To: <9303031918.AA00242@>
Message-ID: <9303032301.aa28689@penet.penet.FI>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



> Note that there can be about 50 cypherpunks messages a day -- if each went
> through 2 hops at $0.10 / hop, as you proposed, that would be $10 / day in
> revenues for the remailers.  Seems like a lot to me.

Uh... If anon.penet.fi charged $0.10 / message for the 3000 messages a
day it's curently handling that would give me $9,000/month - no problem
upgrading the hardware! ;-)

But...

> I would support the idea if I felt that the system would quiet the flame
> wars, but I think rather it would simply quiet the poor...

*Quiet* the flame wars? I can already hear them scream "and he is even
getting *money* from terrorizing the net!!" ;-)

I think anon.penet.fi will have to remain a for-free, public service...

	Julf





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: deltorto@aol.com
Date: Thu, 4 Mar 93 03:27:38 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: FWEE!: Whistleblower progress update
Message-ID: <9303040630.tn06635@aol.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Gang,

First off, since I have just now been able to process some of the couple
hundred msgs in my box, I'd like to respond to a good idea...
>>From:  yanek@novavax.nova.edu
>>
>>  [good stuff removed]
>>
>>The solution is the use of prefixes in Subject: lines.  When you post,
>>prefix your Subject: line with a short "tag" such as "ANON:",
>>"DCNET:", "PGP:", "DCASH:", or others.

Excellent idea, Yanek, I like the elegance of it very much. However, I prefer
to label all my Whistleblower posts with "FWEEE:" rather than the mundane
"WHISTLE:" and besides, it's shorter.  :-)  Other than that, I like your
suggestions,e and here are my (short) ones (marked with "-"):

   ANON:      Anoymity/Pseudonymity
  -MIX:       Remailer Technology
   DCNET:     DC Nets
   RANDOM:    Random Generators
   DCASH:     Digital Banking
   PGP:       PGP App/Current Info 
   FLAME:     Crypto-Censorship
  -FWEE!:     Whistleblowers (T
he "Keith Peterson Area"?)
  -MTGS:      Physical Meetings/Conferences

-------------- OK, now Whistleblowers ---------------
Secondly,
I suppose that everyone has by now heard about Bill Clinton's 800 numbers for
government waste whistleblowers and anyone else to call. A great idea, and I
applaud him for it (it'll keep Al Gore out of trouble for a while), but it's
"kid stuff" compared to the picture I have in my mind for our Whistleblowers
anonymous remailer system. Eventually, I would like to see anon msgs (some
encrypted) alerting specific investigators about assassinations, military
cost overruns, govt sex scandals, private sector insider trading and all
sorts of other nefarious goings-on. This is gonna be GREAT! We're gonna "rock
the world" of the rats out there.

Over the next few weeks, I will post some plans like the one below for all of
you to comment on. Among these will be a phased roadmap which will hopefully
diagram for all Cypherpunks what needs to be done to get a true anon remailer
up and running and populate it with juicy tidbits.

Make no mistake, this is no small job: it will require a team effort. Prepare
to be called on for small jobs, and feel free to refuse if the work is out of
your league of if you haven't enough time. It'll get done: the People are
counting on us.

For now, we are in Phase 1: planning, design & data acquisition.

Data Acq'n:
I am now working on a database which will eventually cover all of Congress,
the Executive, the Judiciary and the Pentagon. As noted before, this db will
list email addresses wherever possible. Many Congresspeople do not currently
have email, so we may even assist our elected officials in the process of
getting looped in. We will send out our initial offers to some highly placed
people to visit the Whistleblowers list and sign on, get a key and start
paying attention.

Phase 2 will be to spec out the remail and produce a preliminary set of
instructions to be sent out with the invitation to participate.

Phase 3 will be the initial remailer implementation and testing.

Phase 4 will involve getting a few press and activist people to log on and
get used to PGP and the whole idea. I expect by then that we may already have
some whistles being blown.

Later Phases will be discussed as I think of them, this is a rough
preliminary sketch intended for comment.

FYI: several Congressperson's offices have drooled audibly over the prospect
and may contribute resources or assistance to our effort. I tend to think we
should do this ourselves to avoid any sort of indebtedness to any official
entity. In addition, a local SF TV news service has expressed real interest
in getting a copy of PGP (DOS), so I will soon post a request for someone to
supply that to a certain address (stay tuned). Again, I want to stress the
importance of a central repository of all PGP versions for distribution for
non-profit purposes such as being able to sign on to this list. The
importance of ensuring that the software at this site is not compromised in
any way is crucial, just to state the obvious.

More later. Hope to see people at CFP and the Modern Times bookstore gig on
Sunday.

   dave|evad

PS: In future, I will be receiving mail from the Cypherpunks list at
<internaut@aol.com>. any personal msgs can still be sent to me at
<deltorto@aol.com>.

-----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----
Version: 2.1e

mQCNAitfCt4AAAEEANk+zWV0Z1tnxsJm25BAvH2NI68RbNOaumDofJgVUL9BePQI
HNNbOdu4gAmhcEXMvFVwu3vju4nh9qnzz7lYpw5Yh6TcgVI+vb9OsljfAR+ibhDN
j5ParKfwZ+mexOCAfrgdt1z71XLY588qxs70ha6u76dvxUsdw6HBOF9KrwDlAAUT
tCJEYXZpZCBEZWwgVG9ydG8gPGRlbHRvcnRvQGFvbC5jb20+
=YGwT
-----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: dclunie@pax.tpa.com.au (David Clunie)
Date: Wed, 3 Mar 93 13:56:04 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: ANON: My remailer
Message-ID: <9303032153.AA17736@britt>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> I only got a brief message from the system administrator stating
> "Running anonymous remailers is against University policy."

What they probably mean is it is against their system administrator's
policy ! I would be very surprised if the governing body of the
university had a policy regarding this !

Not that you are in a position to argue of course.

david






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@Athena.MIT.EDU>
Date: Thu, 4 Mar 93 05:56:13 PST
To: Peter Honeyman <honey@citi.umich.edu>
Subject: Re: You Aren't [I'm Not]
In-Reply-To: <9303040224.AA01178@toad.com>
Message-ID: <9303041354.AA25816@SOS>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


   From: Peter Honeyman <honey@citi.umich.edu>
   Date: Wed, 3 Mar 93 21:22:27 EST

						     ... I don't believe in
       prior restraint; but I do believe in personal responsibility ...

       ... in this model, how can you provide personal responsibility?  

   ted, when you say you favor personal responsibility, do you mean
   "i am in favor of people acting responsibly," which i take to be the
   sense of the first quote, or do you mean "i want there to be a way to
   hold people responsible for their actions," which i take to be the
   meaning of the second?

Yes, I mean the second interpretation; what generally tends to happen is
that without the second, generally the first deteriorates over time.
And "holding somone responsible for their actions" doesn't necessarilly
mean throwing someone in jail, or sueing them for lots of money --- it
can be as simple as their knowing that what they say can be traced back
to them, and their own personal credibility is on the line.  (As opposed
to some pseudonym's credibility, which can always be discarded and a new
one requested.)

						- Ted





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Peter Honeyman <honey@citi.umich.edu>
Date: Thu, 4 Mar 93 06:51:18 PST
To: CypherPunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: You Aren't [I'm Not]
Message-ID: <9303041451.AA15191@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


    Date: Thu, 4 Mar 93 08:54:56 -0500
    From: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@Athena.MIT.EDU>
    
    And "holding somone responsible for their actions" doesn't necessarilly
    mean throwing someone in jail, or sueing them for lots of money --- it
    can be as simple as their knowing that what they say can be traced back
    to them, and their own personal credibility is on the line.  

ted, do you think today's nets offer this assurance?  i certainly do not.

	peter




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Peter Breton <pbreton@cs.umb.edu>
Date: Thu, 4 Mar 93 06:54:30 PST
To: Karl Barrus <elee9sf@Menudo.UH.EDU>
Subject: Re: SOCIETY: crypto impact
In-Reply-To: <199303032336.AA26450@Menudo.UH.EDU>
Message-ID: <Pine.3.05.9303040936.A1050-a100000@ra.cs.umb.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain




> On a related note, it is amazing how much information about you
> exists.  Did anyone else watch a PBS documentary about this (sorry, I
> can't remember the name of it)?  In the report, a writer researched
> how direct mail marketing departments seek out infomation - from going
> to the county court house and obtaining property and deed information,
> to using census information to classify your living habits,
> professional organizations you belong to, catalogs for mailing lists
> of various interests, etc.  Some supermarkets were even testing a
> system in which your purchases (scanned by the bar code reader) are
> saved and indexed by your credit card or check!  Banks could then sell
> this extremely valuable information to direct mail houses.

  Check out the books "Privacy for Sale" and "The Naked Consumer" for
thorough treatments of this topic. Or read the *.privacy groups for a
while....

		Peter







From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: tribble@memex.com (E. Dean Tribble)
Date: Fri, 5 Mar 93 00:45:42 PST
To: uunet!cs.Buffalo.EDU!babani@uunet.UU.NET
Subject: ANON: Textual analysis
In-Reply-To: <9303031648.AA17469@armstrong.cs.Buffalo.EDU>
Message-ID: <9303041831.AA03710@memexis.memex.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


	 >We probably need "rephrasing remailers" which do some rudimentary

	 That is insane... remailers are not the place where this kind of work
	 should be taking place. If anything the user should run his document

Hardly insane.  If the rephrasing software were available for
Connection Machines and nothing else, then one would very much want a
remailing server that would rewrite phrases for you.  It'd be
wonderful if it worked on Joe Schmoe's 286 box, but it's pretty
unlikely.

Until it does, using such capabilities built into remailers would be
an improvement over the current situation.  

Note that I'm not making any claims that the technology is possible
any time soon. 

dean




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@Athena.MIT.EDU>
Date: Thu, 4 Mar 93 07:40:37 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Encrypted voice protocol?
Message-ID: <9303041539.AA25836@SOS>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


People may find this very interesting.....  the Pro Audio Spectrum 16
soundboard can play and record sound at the same time; as far as I know,
this is the only commercially available board on the market that will do
this.  (Commercially available is important, because it means that
people would be able to purchase said board cheaply, or perhaps
alreadydy have.)

So for roughly $200 US, and a little software, it should be possible to
put together something that would do encrypted voice communications over
the network.  Is there any interest in developing some sort of standard
protocol and software to do encrypted, compressed voice communications
over TCP/IP?  

I can think some obvious design constraints right away; it should be
device independent, which means it needs to be able to support multiple
sampling rates, and negotiate sampling rates, in case one side as a
limited range of sampling rates to choose from.  It should support both
multiple private and public key encryption algorithms, as well as
multiple choicese of compression technologies.  We'd probably want to
have a core set of algorithms that everyone would be expected to
support, for the sake of interoperability, and allow for people to
experment with more powerful encryption/compression techniquese.

And finally, for obvious reasons, at least one implementation should be
developed in a non-COCOM country.  :-)

Is this something that people would be interested in working on?

						- Ted


------- Forwarded Message

From: "Linux Activists" <linux-activists@joker.cs.hut.fi>
To: "Linux-Activists" <linux-activists@joker.cs.hut.fi>
Reply-To: "Linux-Activists" <linux-activists@joker.cs.hut.fi>
X-Note1: Remember to put 'X-Mn-Key: SOUND' to your mail body or header
Subject: Linux-Activists - SOUND Channel digest. 93-2-4-3:1
X-Mn-Key: SOUND
Sender: owner-linux-activists@joker.cs.hut.fi
Date: Thu, 4 Mar 1993 08:25:39 +0200

From: hsavolai@cs.Helsinki.FI (Hannu Savolainen)
Subject: Preliminary GUS driver available
Date: Thu, 4 Mar 1993 02:29:29 +0200


Hi folks,

There is a very early testing version of the GUS
(Gravis Ultrasound) driver available at

klingon.epas.utoronto.ca (the GUS archive site) in
directory pub/pc/ultrasound/submit.

This version contains a simple API which makes it possible to write
applications for GUS under Linux. Since there is no such applications
yet, this is just a hacker's release. 

*** This is just a pre pre pre alpha version. I will release an official
version after a couple of months. The official and supported version is
1.0 which you propably have already ***

Additionally this version contains some changes for SB and PAS users. It
is for example possible to record and play at the same time with PAS16 
(there is a new devicefile (/dev/dsp1 (minor 19)), whic is connected to
the SB DSP emulator of PAS.

......


------- End Forwarded Message




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: tribble@memex.com (E. Dean Tribble)
Date: Fri, 5 Mar 93 00:45:39 PST
To: uunet!genmagic.genmagic.com!fen@uunet.UU.NET
Subject: Handling Abuses of Remailers
In-Reply-To: <9303031918.AA00242@>
Message-ID: <9303041853.AA03723@memexis.memex.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


	 I would support the idea if I felt that the system would quiet the flame
	 wars, but I think rather it would simply quiet the poor...

Not at all.  It would merely prevent them from using those particular
anonymous remailers.  Still a problem, but much less of one.

dean




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@Athena.MIT.EDU>
Date: Thu, 4 Mar 93 07:57:30 PST
To: Peter Honeyman <honey@citi.umich.edu>
Subject: Re: You Aren't [I'm Not]
In-Reply-To: <9303041451.AA15191@toad.com>
Message-ID: <9303041556.AA25853@SOS>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


   From: Peter Honeyman <honey@citi.umich.edu>
   Date: Thu, 4 Mar 93 09:49:10 EST

       Date: Thu, 4 Mar 93 08:54:56 -0500
       From: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@Athena.MIT.EDU>

       And "holding somone responsible for their actions" doesn't necessarilly
       mean throwing someone in jail, or sueing them for lots of money --- it
       can be as simple as their knowing that what they say can be traced back
       to them, and their own personal credibility is on the line.  

   ted, do you think today's nets offer this assurance?  i certainly do not.

Not completely, no.  But to a certain extent, yes.  It is generally much
more difficult to get a new account on a (same or differemt) computer
system, then it is to get a new pseudonym assigned to you by a remailer,
or to generate a new public/private key pair.  So if you drag your email
identity through the mud, you are damaging yourself.  If today's nets
did not have this characteristic, why are people building remailers in
the first place?!?  The answer, of course, is that they do have this
effect. 

And, of course, if someone is truely abusive --- or perhaps isn't being
intentially malicious, but by accident started a mail loop of some kind,
perhaps involving a buggy vacation program --- you can always send mail
to the postmaster of his/her site.

There are definitely controls on undesireable behavior (whether
intentional or non-intentional) which get lost when you move to a
remailer based system.

							- Ted




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Peter Honeyman <honey@citi.umich.edu>
Date: Thu, 4 Mar 93 08:05:18 PST
To: CypherPunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: You Aren't [I'm Not]
Message-ID: <9303041605.AA16665@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


ted, i think that with just a little of the right technical stuff, it is
very easy to establish a nym in today's nets.  e.g., if you buy a cheap
unix box, it comes with uucp, so you can hook up to one of many anonymous
uucp sites.

that's easy.

i know of several slip/ppp endpoints that aren't password protected.  more
every day, in fact.

that's easy.

perhaps it's this easy with fido.  the point of remailers is to enable this
technology to the technologically challenged.  (as well as to explore the
technical and social space that nyms define.)

	peter




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: tribble@memex.com (E. Dean Tribble)
Date: Fri, 5 Mar 93 00:45:36 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: ANON: My remailer
In-Reply-To: <9303032218.AA03614@bsu-cs.bsu.edu>
Message-ID: <9303041907.AA03744@memexis.memex.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


				Enough rambling--I'm sorry to see a remailer demise and hope
	 that mine will not fall under the unethical clause here.  If I find
	 a solution, you will be the first to know.

This is not intended as pressure.   Coudln't you argue with their
conclusion that it is unethical?  If they were to make such a claim,
it would certainly be a good opportunity to push them on the issue of
free speech.

dean




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: eichin@cygnus.com (Mark Eichin)
Date: Thu, 4 Mar 93 11:11:40 PST
To: tytso@Athena.MIT.EDU
Subject: re: You Aren't [I'm Not]
In-Reply-To: <9303041824.AA26578@SOS>
Message-ID: <9303041910.AA28103@cygnus.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>   i know of several slip/ppp endpoints that aren't password protected.  more
>   every day, in fact.

>probably clamp down anyway, since presumably they didn't pay good money
>for those resources to give them away free to anyone who can dail up to

I was wondering about that -- I kind of assumed that Peter meant
"real" endpoints that were unprotected because they provided service
that way. For example, UUNET has (had?) a 1-900-GETSRCS (or something
like that) UUCP dialin, the phone company mediated money handling,
uunet didn't care who you were -- but as far as I know it would only
allow file transfer.
	Are there any slip/ppp/uucp+rmail points that are "open" that
aren't likely to dry up if they get widely announced? If so, please
announce them!
								_Mark_




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: nobody@rosebud.ee.uh.edu
Date: Thu, 4 Mar 93 11:09:55 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: FLAME: Defending unpopular views
Message-ID: <9303041909.AA20077@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


From John Stuart Mill, On Liberty, 1859:

[I]f any opinion is compelled to silence, that opinion may, for aught
we can certainly know, be true. To deny this is to assume our own
infalliabilty ....
[T]hough the silenced opinion be an error, it may, and very commonly
does, contain a portion of truth; and since the general or prevailing
opinion on any subject is rarely or never the whole truth, it is only
by the collision of adverse opinions that the remainder of the truth
has any chance of being supplied ....
[E]ven if the received opinion be not only true, but the whole truth;
unless it is suffered to be, and actually is, vigorously and earnestly
contested, it will, by most of those who receive it, be held in the
manner of a prejudice, with little comprehension [of] or feeling [for]
its rational grounds.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@Athena.MIT.EDU>
Date: Thu, 4 Mar 93 10:26:19 PST
To: Peter Honeyman <honey@citi.umich.edu>
Subject: Re: You Aren't [I'm Not]
In-Reply-To: <9303041605.AA16665@toad.com>
Message-ID: <9303041824.AA26578@SOS>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


   From: Peter Honeyman <honey@citi.umich.edu>
   Date: Thu, 4 Mar 93 11:03:53 EST

   ted, i think that with just a little of the right technical stuff, it is
   very easy to establish a nym in today's nets.  e.g., if you buy a cheap
   unix box, it comes with uucp, so you can hook up to one of many anonymous
   uucp sites.

   that's easy.

Buying a unix box and finding a UUCP connection is still a lot more
effort than getting a new anonymous remailer pseudomnym.  It certainly
costs a lot more money!  And if you continuously mailbomb someone, the
victim still has the (somewhat tenuous) recourse of asking the upstream
uucp site to cut off the miscreant.

There are controls to reduce how much someone can abuse the network.

   i know of several slip/ppp endpoints that aren't password protected.  more
   every day, in fact.

   that's easy.

And if those endpoints were abused, the owners of said endpoints would
probably clamp down and protect them.  (If they're used too much, they'd
probably clamp down anyway, since presumably they didn't pay good money
for those resources to give them away free to anyone who can dail up to
them.)

There are controls to reduce how much someone can abuse the network.

You seem to be proposing that all such controls be removed.

						- Ted




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: peter honeyman <honey@citi.umich.edu>
Date: Thu, 4 Mar 93 10:44:15 PST
To: CypherPunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: You Aren't [I'm Not]
In-Reply-To: <9303041824.AA26578@SOS>
Message-ID: <9303041844.AA19612@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> Date: Thu, 4 Mar 93 13:24:58 -0500
> From: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@Athena.MIT.EDU>
> 
> There are controls to reduce how much someone can abuse the network.

they are no more stringent than those employed by remailer operators.

> You seem to be proposing that all such controls be removed.

you are reading me wrong.

	peter




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: babani@cs.Buffalo.EDU (Rusty Babani)
Date: Thu, 4 Mar 93 10:55:51 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: PGP: removed from UB
Message-ID: <9303041854.AA04739@armstrong.cs.Buffalo.EDU>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


This message came to me immidatly after I requested the sysadmin here
at UB to upgrade to PGP to version 2.1 Do I need to explain this?

---------Begin Included Message-----
Organization: University at Buffalo
Date: Tue, 2 Mar 1993 00:20:53 GMT
Path: acsu.buffalo.edu!ub!pjg
From: ACSU Staff <acsu-staff@acsu.buffalo.edu>
Subject: UNIX Change Notice -- pgp removed

  Product:	pgp
  Version:      2
  Systems:      UCS public suns
   Change:      removed
  Contact:	pjg@acsu.buffalo.edu
Effective:	2-March-93

   Notes:       given the questionable legal status of the PGP software
		it has been removed from UCS supported areas.  people
		interested in authentication/privacy should use ripem.

-- 
+==== Internet: babani@cs.buffalo.edu ===+======== Amateur-Radio: N2LYC ======+
!      Bitnet: V078LNGT@ubvms.BITNET     |        UUCP: rutgers!ub!babani     !
! Alternate: an173@cleveland.freenet.edu | Plsure dpnds on the othrs prmison. !
+==  PGP key available. (If you don't know what a PGP key is... find out!)  ==+




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: peter honeyman <honey@citi.umich.edu>
Date: Thu, 4 Mar 93 11:20:21 PST
To: CypherPunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: You Aren't [I'm Not]
In-Reply-To: <9303041910.AA28103@cygnus.com>
Message-ID: <9303041920.AA20297@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> 	Are there any slip/ppp/uucp+rmail points that are "open" that
> aren't likely to dry up if they get widely announced? If so, please
> announce them!

no can do -- in fact, i regret opening my mouth in the first place.
(i should have used a nym!)

	peter




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: nowhere@bsu-cs.bsu.edu (Chael Hall)
Date: Thu, 4 Mar 93 12:05:00 PST
To: babani@cs.buffalo.edu (Rusty Babani)
Subject: ANON/ANNOUNCE: Sysadmin Policies at Universities (and high schools)
In-Reply-To: <9303041854.AA04739@armstrong.cs.Buffalo.EDU>
Message-ID: <9303042001.AA11479@bsu-cs.bsu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>
>This message came to me immidatly after I requested the sysadmin here
>at UB to upgrade to PGP to version 2.1 Do I need to explain this?
>
>   Notes:       given the questionable legal status of the PGP software
>		it has been removed from UCS supported areas.  people
>		interested in authentication/privacy should use ripem.

     It sounds like someone needs to take a stand against the UCS policies
at Buffalo or else they are going to go farther and farther...  Trust me,
that is happening on this campus too.  I used to go to high school here
on the other end of campus.  It was a new HS when I started (first graduating
class) so they had a lot to learn.  I walked in, found the manager of the
LAN and other sundry computer duties, and told him, "I would like to help
you out in any way I can.  I would suggest enlisting my help, because you
don't want me on the other side."  I thought it was kinda cute with the
right balance of cockiness...  Well, he didn't enlist my help...  He gave
up coordination of the LAN after a lot of student troubles and the next
guy was a real tyrant.

     If it weren't for the work of five "lab supervisors" (i.e. student
assistants to the sysadmin) the system would have fallen last year.  I
was one of the five and we worked very hard to keep the students' interests
in mind while steering policy to an open and simple system.  Now that we
are gone, they made the policy more restrictive step by step.  A student
presumably got access to the sysadmin's account and changed all of the
Novell stuff around so that the students were sysadmin but the sysadmin
couldn't get into the network at all.  (oops)  Now they have gone to a
closed lab policy:  each person has to run his/her student ID through
a scanner, gets assigned a computer, and is watched like prey.  Any files
that have "questionable" content or are named "unsuitably" are deleted
and the student loses his/her account for a few days.

     They are suspending kids for a week just because they bypass the
program that lets the sysadmin view their screen.  Granted, this LAN
is owned and operated by the school, but they would not set a policy
even when we proposed one to them that was in their favor (at the time).
So, the policy changes from day to day and the students, being the
oppressed, get the short end of the stick.  I have taken myself out of
the situation as much as I can...  Strangely, I now work for the
university's LAN support group, but they know better than to assign me
to jobs dealing with the HS.  The students have no voice there--I realize
that minors do not have freedom of speech, but grievances should be heard
and policy should be decided in an unbiased way.  I disagree with some of
what the students are doing, but I abhor the policy (or lack thereof) of
dealing with "crimes" by the students.

     If you want to let Buffalo take a turn for the worse as far as
policy goes, then don't say anything about their decisions.  I would
NONviolently oppose whatever you think is not right.  The questions
I have for you are:  how do you get an account on their system?  If
every student is given one (like our VMS system at BSU) then they will
likely not take it away if you fight for your rights.  If you have to
request the account and they disable them as soon as you no longer
"need" them, you should be careful about which channels you use...  I
would have friends complain for you.  :)  Do it anonymously through
a remailer...

     No matter what, if you are passive, you'll lose.

Chael Hall

--
Chael Hall
nowhere@bsu-cs.bsu.edu, 00CCHALL@BSUVC.BSU.EDU
(317) 285-3648 after 5 pm EST




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: dclunie@pax.tpa.com.au (David Clunie)
Date: Wed, 3 Mar 93 20:56:53 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: ANON: My remailer
Message-ID: <9303040454.AA18059@britt>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> I know that the remailer I was running wasn't the biggest kept secret,
> however, I made sure not to mention it to too many local people.  I
> wonder if my sysadmin found out thru mail-logs or thru a pgp key
> server or somebody told him or what?  I guess I'll never find out.

Why not just ask him/her ?

And while you are at it, you could ask them why they developed such a policy.
Though you are obviously obliged to respect it, there is no harm in asking
them what their rationale is ... it would be nice to know whether the policy
was adopted on purely theoretical grounds or whether they were responding
to a specific pattern of misuse.

I also noticed that the policy you posted made no reference to the privacy
of plaintext email, or its lack thereof.

david




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: nowhere@bsu-cs.bsu.edu (Chael Hall)
Date: Thu, 4 Mar 93 14:14:13 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: ANNOUNCE/ANON:  Posting in alt.cyberpunk
Message-ID: <9303042210.AA22524@bsu-cs.bsu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



     For those who do not read alt.cyberpunk, I found an interesting
article that I think is applicable to cypherpunks.

Chael Hall

--- Begin forwarded message

Newsgroups: alt.cyberpunk
Subject: internet and security
Message-ID: <C3AJrG.LpB@dartvax.dartmouth.edu>
From: strake@coos.dartmouth.edu (strake)
Date: 3 Mar 93 02:18:51 GMT

a request to all you folks out there.

I am thinking of doing a research type paper on the internet and security.
More to the point, I'm interested in how the internet users themselves view
security. If internet and security strike some cord in you, please send me
some email about your babblings.

My goal is to get a general impression about how the people
who use the net feel about the security measures that exist or may soon exist
and whether or not they are a help or a hindrance to the net and its use.

For the rest of you on a more specific note, here are some questions that
hopefully will get your creative juices flowing.


Do you think the internet is secure?

What types of security measures would you like to see put in place?

In an ideal world, how would security work? What would be protected?
What kinds of measures would you need to gain access to the information?

Should the DES be the standard for encryption?

Do you think access should be restricted? (period, should all information just b
e free?)

Do you like people who make anonymous postings?

Should a human have _any_ part of the anonymous servers?

What do you think of Hackers? Do you like them? Are the a benefit?

What do you think of the NSA, FBI, CIA, and everything else government related?

If you knew how to hack into your bank account and change the amount of money yo
u had, would you?



If you have an answer to one (or all or anything in the middle) of these
questions please email me back with your answer. Help me pass my classes
and graduate. *grin*


--
strake@dartmouth.edu
its not pop, its not coke, its not soda. where I'm from its a 'soedaher'





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: fergp@sytex.com (Paul Ferguson)
Date: Fri, 5 Mar 93 01:13:40 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Privacy awareness (Was: Cypherpunks priorities)
Message-ID: <syZwZB2w165w@sytex.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Eric Hughes <hughes@soda.berkeley.edu> writes -
 
EH> 4. Fighting restrictions on cryptography.  In the US, that means
EH> getting actively engaged in fighting key registration ideas.  This
EH> means preemptively writing your elected leaders _in advance_ of a
EH> specific issue.  It also means writing about export restrictions in
EH> cryptography.  In France, that means raising public awareness on
EH> cryptography restrictions and the eventual effects that will have on
EH> the open society there.  In all countries, it requires vigilance.
 
 Amen, brother.
 
EH> 5. Increasing awareness of privacy issues.  Most think they have
EH> nothing to hide.  Most also hate it when they get extremely detailed
EH> junk mail about their own lives.  Teach the defense of privacy.
 
 This is perhaps the most difficult feat to accomplish. Education and
 "awareness" are both strictly accomplished on a somewhat voluntary
 basis. For those who can absorb the importance and criticality of
 digital privacy, however, it's an eye-opener. A lot of folks have no
 idea how some of the proposed "legislation" would affect them
 personally.
 
 Cheers.

Paul Ferguson                     |
Network Integration Consultant    |  "All of life's answers are
Alexandria, Virginia USA          |   on TV."
fergp@sytex.com     (Internet)    |           -- Homer Simpson
sytex.com!fergp     (UUNet)       |
1:109/229           (FidoNet)     |
         PGP public encryption key available upon request.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: nowhere@bsu-cs.bsu.edu (Chael Hall)
Date: Thu, 4 Mar 93 14:41:08 PST
To: nowhere@bsu-cs.bsu.edu (Chael Hall)
Subject: Re: ANNOUNCE/ANON:  Posting in alt.cyberpunk
In-Reply-To: <9303042210.AA22524@bsu-cs.bsu.edu>
Message-ID: <9303042237.AA24507@bsu-cs.bsu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


FYI, my personal responses:

>Do you think the internet is secure?

     Nope...  There are lots of "security holes" discussed in alt.hackers
and related places.

>What types of security measures would you like to see put in place?

     I don't think much security is necessary...  If you must have some,
let's make sure terrorists can't bomb the computer systems between me
and the outside world so that my Internet work can get done.  :)

>In an ideal world, how would security work? What would be protected?
>What kinds of measures would you need to gain access to the information?

     Well, I think each user should have a "public" area and a "private"
area.  Public stuff can be seen by anyone wandering by.  That could be
the casual observer using anonymous FTP or NFS mount or someone local to
your system.  Private stuff should be kept away from the sysadmin's eyes
as well...  There is no good way to do this, of course.  I would like
either of the following scenarios:  sysadmin has a laissez-faire attitude
to my files and how I use the system or sysadmin can't see or control
either of the above.

>Should the DES be the standard for encryption?

     No.

>Do you think access should be restricted? (period, should all information just b
>e free?)

     What I want protected should be protected and what I want available
should be available.  Right now, I have difficulty making what I have
available to others.  At the same time, I don't have enough quota to do
any kind of work (my account is full with PGP 2.1, the remailer, and my
mail.

>Do you like people who make anonymous postings?

     On an individual basis, I like some and dislike some.

>Should a human have _any_ part of the anonymous servers?

     Yes, the human should be there to answer questions and reboot the
server when it hangs.  :)

>What do you think of Hackers? Do you like them? Are the a benefit?

     I like them and I think that much of the work that has been done
for the good of the community has been done by hackers.  I think it is
important to be able to finger a soft drink machine at a university in
another state.  :)  I vigorously agree that they are beneficial.

>What do you think of the NSA, FBI, CIA, and everything else government related?

     Well, if that isn't a way to lump it all together...  The government
of the U.S. and the U.K. and Australia to some extent from what I have seen
seem to believe that they need to have a hand in the control of computers,
information, and computer communications of information.  I think the should
have access and possibly provide access for the poor, but they should not
control any of the above.

>If you knew how to hack into your bank account and change the amount of money yo
>u had, would you?

     Is it traceable?  ;)  No, I wouldn't.  I work for a modest sum and I
spend that money as I see fit.  I live comfortably on what I make, so I
do not ask for more.  When I find that it is too little, I will ask for
more, but stealing is not necessary because I will be happy no matter
how much I have (as long as I have computer access 24 hours a day).

Chael Hall

--
Chael Hall
nowhere@bsu-cs.bsu.edu, 00CCHALL@BSUVC.BSU.EDU
(317) 285-3648 after 5 pm EST




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Peter Honeyman <honey@citi.umich.edu>
Date: Thu, 4 Mar 93 18:29:16 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re:  ANON/ANNOUNCE: Sysadmin Policies at Universities (and high schools)
Message-ID: <9303050229.AA01270@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


don't overreact -- they are withdrawing support of pgp (i'm surprised
they offered it in the first place), but are they prohibiting users
from building and using pgp?  now *that* would be an outrage.

are they?

	peter




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: ghabrech@ultrix.ramapo.edu (Phil_Osfy)
Date: Thu, 4 Mar 93 18:58:31 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: unsubscribe
Message-ID: <9303050301.AA21415@ultrix.ramapo.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


PLEASE UNSUBSCRIBE ME!!!!   ghabrech@ultrix.ramapo.deu
errr..... edu




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Karl Barrus <elee9sf@Menudo.UH.EDU>
Date: Thu, 4 Mar 93 20:17:41 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: CASH/REMAIL: combination
Message-ID: <199303050416.AA01513@Menudo.UH.EDU>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

Cypherpunks,

Some people have made excellent suggestions regarding digital cash and
anonymous remailers.  I'm going to try to obtain another account from
a friend in order to implement a remailer which accepts digital cash.
(However, this will probably wait until I am able to upgrade the bank
to PERL)

Maybe future for "profit" anonymous services will work similarly, thus
helping to cut down on remailer abuse since abusers must be willing to
"pay" for the service.  I don't think I can work in usenet posting as
well (technical reasons not philosophical ones!) but the whole thing
should be an interesting experiment anyway.

The remailer will work like the others, except valid cash must be
included or the remailer will not forward the message.  For ease, a
number of bills will be generated upon request, which will then be
deposited as used.  As a side effect, bank accounts will be
incremented as well (too bad real banks don't work like this) so
customers may "withdraw" more bills to use for remailing messages.

Since the bank won't mail back confirmation of deposits (messages may
be coming from other remailers, etc.) and it would be nice to have a
way for you to see if your cash was accepted and your message
forwarded, I think I'll have the bank accounts copied into the .plan
file so you can finger the account, check your account number and
balance, and determine whether or not the remail was successful.  Of
course, the full account number will not be displayed - perhaps the
MD5 hash of an account number or whatever will be put in the file,
along with the account balance.  I'll also provide a command to obtain
the .plan file via email, for those without finger.

Actually, for the purposes of this experiment, it might be best to not
use the new site in a chain.  At least until the single hop mode works
well!

Nathan Estey suggested to me that traffic analysis could be made more
difficult if messages under a certain length were padded, and message
over the length were split and remailed a piece at a time.  This will
help, although I think it would be easier for the sender to include
padding in the message itself (thus identical messages plus random
padding will encrypt differently).  Plus, the message may be multiply
encrypted and thus padding cannot be added "inside."  Maybe future
mail software will automatically pad in addition to encrypt :-)

I may implement a delay feature, which would help foil traffic
analysis.

Comments?

/-----------------------------------\
| Karl L. Barrus                    |
| elee9sf@menudo.uh.edu             | <- preferred address
| barrus@tree.egr.uh.edu (NeXTMail) |
\-----------------------------------/
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.1

iQCVAgUBK5bTsoOA7OpLWtYzAQEYMQP/WGUGNFiA9ftV7N8JRe01zLooa5b1hTaG
Fh5eYiQflf9S1ttv0DCvZXo+6/yUVWLmPZHqG04xsnZXc6Z1SFw9C0zd3oP/kM9h
2IMrbrqF8ICNA8hSoDV97U2Rf+r0qpUVtSzgoOsuxw+4EVEkgjflNA9v8YJcL+Sv
ZQR/6po1lU8=
=QdR1
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: avalon@coombs.anu.edu.au (Darren Reed)
Date: Thu, 4 Mar 93 04:21:01 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Diffie-hellman
Message-ID: <9303041219.AA28412@coombs.anu.edu.au>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Does anyone know of any 'sample code' that can be ftp'd from around
the place or anything which uses it ?





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: gnu (John Gilmore)
Date: Fri, 5 Mar 93 00:51:03 PST
To: Eric Hughes <hughes@soda.berkeley.edu>
Subject: Re: more ideas on anonymity
In-Reply-To: <9303031658.AA14314@soda.berkeley.edu>
Message-ID: <9303050850.AA08447@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I heard today that the Federal Public Health Service has been trying
to eliminate anonymous AIDS testing, but it's unlikely to disappear,
at least in San Francisco.  (The PHS claims to want peoples'
identities so PHS can tell their sex partners that they're at risk.
Though I haven't figured out how PHS plans to find out who's having
sex with who.)

It occurred to me that truly anonymous postings to online discussions
about AIDS would allow people who have AIDS to discuss the changes it
puts them through, without letting them be discriminated against by
having their identities revealed.

A video I saw about AIDS testing mentioned that if you get a positive
result, you should be careful about who you tell, because there are
still many unenlightened employers, landlords, insurance companies, etc.

	John




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: aa996@freenet.carleton.ca (Francoys Crepeau)
Date: Thu, 4 Mar 93 22:22:44 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Please unsubscribe me
Message-ID: <9303050621.AA01770@freenet.carleton.ca>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain




Please unsubscribe me.

Much as I find the subject quite interesting, I cannot at present devote
enough time to read all of the information that comes up.  I hope to be
able to re-subscribe at a later date. 

With great regrets...

--
 ---------------------------------------------------------------
|  Francoys Crepeau, Ottawa, Canada    (613) 565-7198 (VOICE)   |
|    aa996@freenet.carleton.ca         (613) 733-7191 (FAX)     |
 ---------------------------------------------------------------




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Bob Stratton <strat@intercon.com>
Date: Fri, 5 Mar 93 00:53:21 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Encrypted voice protocol?
Message-ID: <9303050351.AA59962@horton.intercon.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> Date: Thu, 4 Mar 93 10:39:20 -0500 
> From: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@athena.mit.edu> 
> Subject: Encrypted voice protocol? 
> 
> 
> So for roughly $200 US, and a little software, it should be possible to 
> put together something that would do encrypted voice communications 
> over the network.  Is there any interest in developing some sort of 
> standard protocol and software to do encrypted, compressed voice 
> communications over TCP/IP?  
> 

I don't know how many of you are at sites on the MBONE, or multicast 
backbone. There are already a few pieces of code out there for 
experimentation with transmission of audio and video information, in a 
variety of forms/encoding, and probably the most widely used tool, "vat - the 
Visual Audio Tool", already has provisions for carrying on encrypted audio 
teleconferences via IP. In fact, it's as simple as typing a key into a field, 
and the tool will DES en/decrypt the conference. 

--Strat, budding multicast weenie







From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Eric Hughes <hughes@soda.berkeley.edu>
Date: Fri, 5 Mar 93 09:49:13 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Privacy awareness (Was: Cypherpunks priorities)
In-Reply-To: <syZwZB2w165w@sytex.com>
Message-ID: <9303051746.AA13510@soda.berkeley.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I wrote:
>EH> 5. Increasing awareness of privacy issues.  Most think they have
>EH> nothing to hide.  Most also hate it when they get extremely detailed
>EH> junk mail about their own lives.  Teach the defense of privacy.

Paul replies:
> This is perhaps the most difficult feat to accomplish. 

I agree.  I think junk mail may be one of the best examples from which
to extrapolate for the general public.  It becomes really clear
exactly that they do know something, because it says so right on the
letter.  It's usually easier to get people thinking about their own
lives than abstract privacy issues.

Eric




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Date: Fri, 5 Mar 93 10:43:32 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Encrypted voice protocol?
Message-ID: <9303051842.AA27887@netcom.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Bob Stratton writes:

>I don't know how many of you are at sites on the MBONE, or multicast 
>backbone. There are already a few pieces of code out there for 
>experimentation with transmission of audio and video information, in a 
>variety of forms/encoding, and probably the most widely used tool, "vat - the 
>Visual Audio Tool", already has provisions for carrying on encrypted audio 
>teleconferences via IP. In fact, it's as simple as typing a key into a field, 
>and the tool will DES en/decrypt the conference. 
>
>--Strat, budding multicast weenie

I just read in the local paper about "Internet Radio," which sounds like
some kind of transmission of compressed audio, if I have the details right.

This could be interesting. The "Crypto Home Companion Show"?

Anybody know anything about this? (The originator comes from Alexandria,
Virginia, so perhaps Strat and our other D.C. area folks have heard more
about this.)

-Tim


--
Timothy C. May               | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,  
tcmay@netcom.com        | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
408-688-5409               | knowledge, reputations, information markets, 
W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA       | black markets, collapse of governments.
Higher Power: 2^756839 | Public Key: MailSafe and PGP available.





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: babani@cs.Buffalo.EDU (Rusty Babani)
Date: Fri, 5 Mar 93 07:57:09 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: ANON: Sysadmin Policies at Universities (and HS)
In-Reply-To: <9303050229.AA01270@toad.com>
Message-ID: <9303051556.AA19327@armstrong.cs.Buffalo.EDU>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Peter Honeyman stated in the last message:
>From cypherpunks-request@toad.com Thu Mar  4 23:20:49 1993
>From: Peter Honeyman <honey@citi.umich.edu>
>To: cypherpunks@toad.com
>Subject: Re:  ANON/ANNOUNCE: Sysadmin Policies at Universities (and high scho
>
>don't overreact -- they are withdrawing support of pgp (i'm surprised
>they offered it in the first place), but are they prohibiting users
>from building and using pgp?  now *that* would be an outrage.

No, not yet anyway.  I've announced it in the local school newsgroups
that I have pgp available in my directories (with world readable and
executable permisions).  But my original intent was to get pgp working
in a system directory so that I wouldn't have to spare my own quota (what
little I have of it).  PGP eats up space!

I'm begining to wonder if someday they'll say something like, "Stop
using PGP or we'll close your account."  That's when I'll seriously
have to consider transferring.

-- 
+==== Internet: babani@cs.buffalo.edu ===+======== Amateur-Radio: N2LYC ======+
!      Bitnet: V078LNGT@ubvms.BITNET     |        UUCP: rutgers!ub!babani     !
! Alternate: an173@cleveland.freenet.edu | Plsure dpnds on the othrs prmison. !
+==  PGP key available. (If you don't know what a PGP key is... find out!)  ==+




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: babani@cs.Buffalo.EDU (Rusty Babani)
Date: Fri, 5 Mar 93 08:35:43 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: ANON: Sysadmin Policies at Universities (and HS)
In-Reply-To: <9303042001.AA11479@bsu-cs.bsu.edu>
Message-ID: <9303051634.AA21842@armstrong.cs.Buffalo.EDU>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Chael Hall stated in the last message:
>From nowhere@bsu-cs.bsu.edu Thu Mar  4 15:03:59 1993
>Subject: ANON/ANNOUNCE: Sysadmin Policies at Universities (and high schools)
>To: babani@cs.Buffalo.EDU (Rusty Babani)

>>This message came to me immidatly after I requested the sysadmin here
>>at UB to upgrade to PGP to version 2.1 Do I need to explain this?
>>
>>   Notes:       given the questionable legal status of the PGP software
>>		it has been removed from UCS supported areas.  people
>>		interested in authentication/privacy should use ripem.

>     It sounds like someone needs to take a stand against the UCS policies
>at Buffalo or else they are going to go farther and farther...  Trust me,
>that is happening on this campus too.  I used to go to high school here

[nice story about sudents and privacy deleted]

>     If you want to let Buffalo take a turn for the worse as far as
>policy goes, then don't say anything about their decisions.  I would
...
>I have for you are:  how do you get an account on their system?  If

They haven't changed their policy since 1988.  That was when it was
created and that is the same policy I had to sign to get an account
one and a half years ago.

VAX accounts and unix accounts on the time-share hosts are pretty much
given to anyone who asks for one.  Both these systems are very slow
due to the high load in the daytime.

Unix accounts on the special CS machines are only given to those who
can prove they are in a CS related major.  (I have all three types of
accounts.)


>NONviolently oppose whatever you think is not right.  The questions

I was doing this by running the remailer... However, they caught up
with me.

>I would have friends complain for you.  :) Do it anonymously
>through a remailer... No matter what, if you are passive, you'll lose.  

They seem to stand behind their policies and have even given me
reasons as to why the policies are such.  Here is the responce I got
as to WHY I CANT RUN A REMAILER IN MY ACCOUNT...

-------Begin Quote-------
It has always been our policy that your accounts may only be used by
you. Without such a policy, illegal and untracable actions may take
place and these in turn put the University at serious legal risk. By
installing such a mailer you are giving limited use of your account
to the entire world.
--------End Quote--------

Then he went on to say something to the effect of having an account
is not a right but a privilage, etc.

I think complaining would only hurt me right now.  Even if I complain
"Anonymously" I think they would be able to figure out who was behind
the complaints.  If I mailed a message form my account to them, they
could easily trace it back to me if they wanted to... I would have to
find another account on a machine not connected directly to UB to
complain from.  Of course, I would have to go the encrypted my
messages to the anonymous remailers... all the way, and make it at
MINIMUM a double hop message.  It's possible.  But is it worth the
work especially since they seem pretty content with the policy the way
it is?

-- 
+==== Internet: babani@cs.buffalo.edu ===+======== Amateur-Radio: N2LYC ======+
!      Bitnet: V078LNGT@ubvms.BITNET     |        UUCP: rutgers!ub!babani     !
! Alternate: an173@cleveland.freenet.edu | Plsure dpnds on the othrs prmison. !
+==  PGP key available. (If you don't know what a PGP key is... find out!)  ==+




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: babani@cs.Buffalo.EDU (Rusty Babani)
Date: Fri, 5 Mar 93 08:47:40 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: ANON: Textual analysis
In-Reply-To: <9303041831.AA03710@memexis.memex.com>
Message-ID: <9303051646.AA22313@armstrong.cs.Buffalo.EDU>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


E. Dean Tribble stated in the last message:
>From memexis!tribble@uunet.uu.net Fri Mar  5 03:44:47 1993
>Date: Thu, 4 Mar 93 10:31:17 PST
>From: memexis!tribble@uunet.uu.net (E. Dean Tribble)
>To: uunet!cs.Buffalo.EDU!babani@uunet.uu.net
>Subject: ANON: Textual analysis
>
>	 >We probably need "rephrasing remailers" which do some rudimentary
>
>	 That is insane... remailers are not the place where this kind of work
>	 should be taking place. If anything the user should run his document
>
>Hardly insane.  If the rephrasing software were available for
>Connection Machines and nothing else, then one would very much want a
>remailing server that would rewrite phrases for you.  It'd be
>wonderful if it worked on Joe Schmoe's 286 box, but it's pretty
>unlikely.

I was under the impression that such software could be developed for
Joe Schmoe's 286 box or even Joe Schmoe's 386 box or (if Joe is rich)
his 486 box.  The power of these computers shouldn't be underestimated.

The first step is to develop the programs. Are there any programs
redily available for testing and/or analysis on any type of platform?

-- 
+==== Internet: babani@cs.buffalo.edu ===+======== Amateur-Radio: N2LYC ======+
!      Bitnet: V078LNGT@ubvms.BITNET     |        UUCP: rutgers!ub!babani     !
! Alternate: an173@cleveland.freenet.edu | Plsure dpnds on the othrs prmison. !
+==  PGP key available. (If you don't know what a PGP key is... find out!)  ==+




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Eric Fogleman <Eric.Fogleman@analog.com>
Date: Fri, 5 Mar 93 09:03:31 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: ANNOUNCE:  Boston-area cypherpunks meeting?
Message-ID: <9303051658.AA25665@ack.adstest.analog.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Is there any interest in a meeting of Boston-area cypherpunks?  (I've
seen at least two mit.edus out there...)  I'd be interested in meeting
some of you in person, exchanging keys, etc.

Eric Fogleman




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: robichau@lambda.msfc.nasa.gov (Paul Robichaux)
Date: Fri, 5 Mar 93 10:39:05 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: ANNOUNCE: Huntsville/Atlanta-area cypherpunks meeting?
Message-ID: <9303051837.AA01339@lambda.msfc.nasa.gov.msfc.nasa.gov>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


To echo Eric Fogleman's request for a Boston-area meeting, I'd like to know
if there's any local interest in a southeast-US meeting.

I'd like to hear from anyone within the quadrilateral with vertices at
New Orleans, Atlanta, Huntsville, and Pensacola. As was mentioned,
there are some preemptive actions we 'punks should be taking; many of
them depend on coordinated action between people in the same
geographic region.

[And, of course, any other 'punk who happens to be in or near
Huntsville is welcome to contact me.]

-- 
Paul Robichaux, KD4JZG              | May explode if disposed of improperly.
Mission Software Development Div.   | I'm not white- I'm Euro-American.
New Technology, Inc.		    | RIPEM key on request.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Eric Hughes <hughes@soda.berkeley.edu>
Date: Fri, 5 Mar 93 12:44:36 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: You Aren't [I'm Not]
In-Reply-To: <9303040426.AA24707@SOS>
Message-ID: <9303052041.AA05452@soda.berkeley.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>Perhaps the real problem is that there are a large number of people who
>are currently using mailing lists and Usenet newsgroups with the
>expectation that there are currently existing controls on the
>signal-to-noise levels 

Existing controls on the signal-to-noise ratio?

However such postulated controls might function in practice, they
don't function well enough to make Usenet useful to as many people as
its bandwidth is capable of.  I don't read Usenet any more.  I can't
find enough useful information in a short enough period of time.  
I have _no_ expectations about any controls of content on Usenet.
Ted postulates that standards of accountability provide a control over
the signal-to-noise level.  I grant that.  It does prevent the very
worst excesses from occurring.  It does provide an upper bound on noise
in discussion groups.

Yet this upper bound is ineffectual.  Let us take the widely used
analogy of Usenet as a sewer.  Reading Usenet is like wading chest
high through the muck.  But am I reassured that there is an overflow
valve so that it never gets past my chin?  Hardly at all.  I won't
drown, to be sure; what a _slight_ comfort.  (For those of you who
want a much more graphic depiction of walking through sewers, read the
relevant chapters in _Les Miserables_.)

>and protection against mail bombs, 

I had thought that we had pretty clearly established that attacks on a
system of content and of volume were of different natures.  Lack of
robustness in mail software makes a mailbomb possible, not lack of
accountability.

>As an artifact, certainly that can be changed; and you are proposing
>that we change them.  But then, who should bear the cost of this change?

The structures need to be changed for much better reasons than to
prevent anonymous attacks.  I infer from your arguments that you think
that our current communications fora, newsgroups and mailing lists,
are not fundamentally broken.  I do think they are fundamentally broken.
(This doesn't mean that they are completely non-functional.)

I think they are fundamentally broken because they do not facilitate
human communication as they were intended.  They did when they were
small, I grant, but they did not scale well.  They even continue to
work when small and focused, but very few things with wide interest or
large import remain small.

We already have most of the features of anonymity and pseudonymity
already online, in the system that already exist.  I've made this
point before; I'll make again now.  I have never met most of the
people I've conversed with online.  I expect that I will never meet
most of them.  The personal responsibility that comes with personal
contact is mostly not present online.  The negative feedback loops
that are normally present in face-to-face conversation are not present
online, and it shows.

One of the greatest lacks in online life is the lack of restraint.
How many people online do you know who continue to rant about their
own positions without engaging in dialectic with another?  How many do
you know who, even given FAQ's, continue to ask newbie questions?  How
many do you know who jump to answer with the conventional
net-foolishness about whatever issue is at hand.  (For a concrete
example, consider patent legalities.)  Lack of restraint causes far
more problems that lack of accountability.

We have most all of the disadvantages of pseudonymity, but hardly any
of the advantages.  Our correspondents are able to be determined
readily by anyone with the ability to monitor (and that's quite a few
people).  We therefore cannot conduct our affairs online with the same
amount of privacy we can create in the physical world.  There is no
assurance, when exposing the corruption of a powerful figure, that
one's identity cannot be determined and punitive actions taken.  Those
who have some sort of taint imputed them by certain sections of
society do not out of fear speak freely.

The virtues of technically secure anonymity outweigh the negative
effects.  You can flame impersonally as much as you want right now,
and there is no recourse.  Yet you cannot keep private from your own
sysadmin the identities of those with whom you communicate.

Anonymity in communciations is fundamentally consistent with an open
society dedicated to free speech.

>To bring this back to the house/anonymous bull horn analogy, that would
>be like deciding cease considering sound (or rather lack of sound) a
>commons, and expecting each home owner, who up until now enjoyed the
>relative peace and quiet of their neighborhood, to pay the cost of
>losing their sightlines, and needing to put up expensive shielding.

I will not press the point further than the following.  Whereas we
cannot change the physics of wave propagation in air, we can change
where the cables are laid.

>Maybe there are good, sound, policy reasons for making this change.  But
>out of fairness, one would think that the agents of change should be
>prepared to bear some of cost of that change.  

Were there silence before in the neighborhood, I would agree.  

>   And again, no one requires a carrier to carry anonymous messages.
>   Practically speaking, you might easily end up with a situation like
>   the alt.* hierarchy, where only certain subnets agree to exchange
>   anonymous traffic.  I suspect this is inevitable in the short term.

>Well, this really can only happen if a carrier can easily distinguish
>anonymous messages from non-anonymous messages.  

The simple expedient of a standard header line has already been agreed
upon.

Re: crank calls
>   But the phone company is not held liable when the call was made from a
>   pay phone.

>True; but the phone company is a common carrier.  The networks today
>aren't.  This could be changed by legislation, and that's something I
>would support, for networks.  

I think that networks will be common carriers, for the same reasons
that phone companies became such: that having a common carrier is
consistent with freedom of speech in an open society.

>However, I doubt that such legislation
>would actually extend as far as protecting hosts on a network, such as
>remailer sites.

You can't protect the network unless you *do* protect individual
sites.  The network as a whole is not a legal entity, only the
companies and individuals that run them are.

I have left off a reply of the libel issue for such a time after I
have read up a little on the subject.

Eric




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Eric Hughes <hughes@soda.berkeley.edu>
Date: Fri, 5 Mar 93 12:57:42 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: ANON:  Sysadmin policies at universities
In-Reply-To: <9303052014.AA26191@ack.adstest.analog.com>
Message-ID: <9303052054.AA07423@soda.berkeley.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>In a truly free society, you have
>the right to use your property as you see fit.  And so does the university.

Let us remember that in this case the university is a state
university, which does not sove the problem, of course, but which does
change it in some significant ways.

Eric




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: ghabrech@ultrix.ramapo.edu (Phil_Osfy)
Date: Fri, 5 Mar 93 10:59:12 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Unsubscribe me!!!!
Message-ID: <9303051901.AA01141@ultrix.ramapo.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Come on guys, I asked a couple of times already,
UNSUBSCRIBE ME!!!
UNSUBSCRIBE ME!!!
UNSUBSCRIBE ME!!!
UNSUBSCRIBE ME!!!
UNSUBSCRIBE ME!!!
UNSUBSCRIBE ME!!!
UNSUBSCRIBE ME!!!
UNSUBSCRIBE ME!!!
UNSUBSCRIBE ME!!!
UNSUBSCRIBE ME!!!
UNSUBSCRIBE ME!!!
UNSUBSCRIBE ME!!!
UNSUBSCRIBE ME!!!
UNSUBSCRIBE ME!!!
UNSUBSCRIBE ME!!!
UNSUBSCRIBE ME!!!
UNSUBSCRIBE ME!!!
UNSUBSCRIBE ME!!!
UNSUBSCRIBE ME!!!
UNSUBSCRIBE ME!!!
UNSUBSCRIBE ME!!!
UNSUBSCRIBE ME!!!
UNSUBSCRIBE ME!!!
UNSUBSCRIBE ME!!!
UNSUBSCRIBE ME!!!
UNSUBSCRIBE ME!!!
UNSUBSCRIBE ME!!!
UNSUBSCRIBE ME!!!
UNSUBSCRIBE ME!!!
UNSUBSCRIBE ME!!!

Got the point?

Thanx,

ghabrech@ultrix.ramapo.edu




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: jordan@imsi.com (Jordan Hayes)
Date: Fri, 5 Mar 93 11:28:57 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: ANON: Sysadmin Policies at Universities (and HS)
Message-ID: <9303051904.AA25221@IMSI.COM>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


	From babani@cs.buffalo.edu Fri Mar  5 13:56:06 1993

	Here is the responce I got as to WHY I CANT RUN A REMAILER IN
	MY ACCOUNT...

Why do you continue to think it's "your" account?

If you want to have such a thing to call "your account" you're welcome
to plunk down some $$$, buy a machine, get yerself a network link, and
remail to your heart's content.  If I were another CS student at UB, I
would be bummed if the scarce (by your account, and by most others at
universities) cycles I needed to get my homework done were being given
away to folks all over the world via a remailer.

That's all those machines need is more sendmail processes running :-)

/jordan




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: rustman@netcom.com (Rusty Hodge)
Date: Fri, 5 Mar 93 14:06:35 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: MISC: Internet Talk Radio
In-Reply-To: <m0nUih6-0003AOC@rmsdell.ftl.fl.us>
Message-ID: <9303052205.AA23397@netcom2.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> This is not really relevant to the topics of this list, but...
> > From: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
> > I just read in the local paper about "Internet Radio," which sounds like
> > some kind of transmission of compressed audio, if I have the details right.
> > Anybody know anything about this? 
> What they are going to do is produce talk radio programs in professional
> audio studios, and then instead of broadcasting on the air, they will
> convert it all to a large (estimated about 15MB) sound file, which is
> then widely distributed using ftp, and played by anyone who wants,
> on their workstation (or a PC with a sound card).

Is that related to Internet TV, where professionally produced television
shows are converted to digital video (a la Quicktime), and then the 200mb
file is ftp'ed to the world? :->
-- 




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: dmandl@shearson.com (David Mandl)
Date: Fri, 5 Mar 93 12:05:59 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Encrypted voice protocol?
Message-ID: <9303051935.AA18846@tardis.shearson.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> I just read in the local paper about "Internet Radio," which sounds like
> some kind of transmission of compressed audio, if I have the details right.
> 
> This could be interesting. The "Crypto Home Companion Show"?
> 
> Anybody know anything about this? (The originator comes from Alexandria,
> Virginia, so perhaps Strat and our other D.C. area folks have heard more
> about this.)
> 
> -Tim

Yup, big article in the New York Times yesterday (front page!), and a smaller
article in today's New York Newsday.  Anyone out there have the time to post
either of them to the group???

BTW, a friend and I are just wrapping up a big anthology on radio (the new
issue of Semiotext(e), if anyone's interested).  I would have loved to get this
stuff in there, but alas, we just missed...

   --Dave.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: kelly@netcom.com (Kelly Goen)
Date: Fri, 5 Mar 93 14:50:43 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: ANON POLICY: was I`m not
Message-ID: <9303052249.AA26423@netcom.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Forwarded message:
> From cypherpunks-request@toad.com Fri Mar  5 13:38:47 1993
> Date: Fri, 5 Mar 93 16:26:11 -0500
> From: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@Athena.MIT.EDU>
> Message-Id: <9303052126.AA02211@SOS>
> To: Eric Hughes <hughes@soda.berkeley.edu>
> Cc: cypherpunks@toad.com
> In-Reply-To: Eric Hughes's message of Fri, 5 Mar 93 12:41:24 -0800,
> 	<9303052041.AA05452@soda.berkeley.edu>
> Address: 1 Amherst St., Cambridge, MA 02139
> Phone: (617) 253-8091
> 
>    Date: Fri, 5 Mar 93 12:41:24 -0800
>    From: Eric Hughes <hughes@soda.berkeley.edu>
> 
>    Existing controls on the signal-to-noise ratio?
> 
>    Yet this upper bound is ineffectual.  Let us take the widely used
>    companies and individuals that run them are.
> 
> Sure you can; you can protect regional and national networks such as
 MUCH deleted
> If you cause someone damage by your speech, and you maliciously did so
> knowing that your speech was false, the person you harmed should be able
> to recover damages from you, whether it is done over the phone or done
> over a TCP/IP network.
> 
> 							- Ted
> 
> 
 Fortunately... Libel is a totally ineffectual law for attempting
to impose the kinds of censorship that Ted seems to be espousing.
Libel and slander laws are OFTEN used by the powers that be
(governmental, corporate etc) to silence the oppostion in
matters of human rights, ecology etc...
just because a charge of libel or slander
has been made doesnt mean that the charges are just or proper...
often it is merely an attempt to silence the opposition...
 The world of cyberspace crossing without form international
boundaries for now is a shield against censorship due to the
 complex legalities involved... remailers in seperate countries
careful chosen offer complete protection against Ted and his loyal opposition.
(your cabal ted... :) BTW: for me... control=censorship,interdiction etc...




              cheers
              kelly
-- 




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: jcoryell%nwu.edu@UICVM.UIC.EDU (John Coryell.)
Date: Fri, 5 Mar 93 16:17:56 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Encrypted voice protocol?
In-Reply-To: <9303051842.AA27887@netcom.netcom.com>
Message-ID: <9303060017.AA26284@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>I just read in the local paper about "Internet Radio," which sounds like
>some kind of transmission of compressed audio, if I have the details right.
>
>This could be interesting. The "Crypto Home Companion Show"?
>
>Anybody know anything about this? (The originator comes from Alexandria,
>Virginia, so perhaps Strat and our other D.C. area folks have heard more
>about this.)
>
>-Tim

Wasn't this the subject of that article in the NYT the other day?

John Coryell.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: wcs@anchor.ho.att.com (Bill_Stewart(HOY002)1305)
Date: Fri, 5 Mar 93 11:55:09 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Encrypted voice protocol?
Message-ID: <9303051954.AA22260@anchor.ho.att.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text


(Carl - this is a reply to a cypherpunks mailing list mention of your
program.  Way to go, and good luck!)

Internet Talk Radio also made the Front Page of the New York Times 3/4/93.
The picture of Carl Malamud showed him in his office, with a computer near the
front with "Internet Talk Radio" running on it, and a poster on the
back wall saying "Freedom of the Press belongs to those who own one",
put out by some computer company or other.   Story by John Markoff, of course.

It's basically going to be a half-hour audio segment, with interviews
("Geek of the Week") plus miscellaneous news and stories, kind of in the
style of All Things Considered.  Folks with high-end systems will be able to
listen in real-time; folks with lower-end will need to download slowly and
listen later.  Size is about 15 MB, data rate 64 kb/s, estimated 2400-baud time
14 hours.  I'm surprised he's not doing better compression than that,
but (speculation) this may be broadcast-quality audio with ADPCM rather than
telephone-quality 3kHz audio uncompressed?  The broadcast will be split up
into segments, so you can get pieces without downloading the whole thing.
Initially it's audio-only but may add some multi-media stuff, especially for 
navigation through the sound files.  GIFs of the guest would be an obvious
extension....

Some good interviews with Nicholas Negroponte of MIT Media Lab and
Paul Saffo of Institute for the Future.  No mention of encryption, MIME,
pricing, retransmission policy, etc.  Some nice commentary on the relationship
between this and the broadcast industry.

Computer fu.  Gratuitous NREN fu.  No blood but a little Gore.
Joe Bob says "Check it out!"


				Bill Stewart  wcs@anchor.att.com




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: root@rmsdell.ftl.fl.us (Yanek Martinson)
Date: Fri, 5 Mar 93 12:29:31 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: MISC: Internet Talk Radio
Message-ID: <m0nUih6-0003AOC@rmsdell.ftl.fl.us>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


This is not really relevant to the topics of this list, but...

> From: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
> 
> I just read in the local paper about "Internet Radio," which sounds like
> some kind of transmission of compressed audio, if I have the details right.
> Anybody know anything about this? 

What they are going to do is produce talk radio programs in professional
audio studios, and then instead of broadcasting on the air, they will
convert it all to a large (estimated about 15MB) sound file, which is
then widely distributed using ftp, and played by anyone who wants,
on their workstation (or a PC with a sound card).

I have an article on it, if you want me to send it to you, let me know.

--
Yanek Martinson
yanek@novavax.nova.edu



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Duncan Frissell <76630.3577@CompuServe.COM>
Date: Fri, 5 Mar 93 13:13:32 PST
To: <cypherpunks@toad.com>
Subject: Re: Wasted BAndwidth
Message-ID: <930305201210_76630.3577_EHL17-1@CompuServe.COM>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>They're not going to *care* that the last remailer on the chain (who
>will, presumably, be identifiable) wasn't responsible for the message
>which was sent.  They're just going to invade the building the
>remailing host is in, kill everyone in the room, and destroy the
>machine, and all the machines around it.  If they don't know which is
>the remailer, they'll just blow up the whole block.  They don't care
>
>I do not advocate censorship.  I advocate responsibility.
>
>                Marc

In another couple of years, the "remailers" will not be *in* buildings 
but running as distributed processes on machines from Anchorage to 
Wellington.  Hard to raid.  You will be able to set up your own 
communications server located "somewhere on the nets" to handle message 
forwarding to you.  Hard to raid a billion "processes".

This over romatization of government power and violence is peculiar to 
writers of technothrillers and certain libertarians.  You know who you 
are.  Government is good at point force.  It can bomb and raid fairly 
effectively.  This ability to put a mass of organized muscle in the field 
was decisive in earlier technological eras.  If you are fighting 
peasants bound to the soil or undisciplined barbarians, a Roman Square 
could prevail.  Government is less able to apply force on a widespread 
basis.  It depends on the respect, fear, or acquiescence of its 
subjects.  If those weaken or disappear governments weaken or disappear.

Markets apply "force" (incentives) across a wide front.  They do not 
require fear or acquiescence to survive.  They are self-enforcing.  Even 
commies know trade.

As we become stronger as individuals (I just spent a week's pay to buy 
more computing power (hardware) than existed on earth in 1955) we have 
less fear of (others) government and greater capabilities for self-
government.  

The "anarchy" debates are beside the point.  If the market is engaged in 
breaking down hierarchies, the government monopoly cannot stand either.  
King Canute cannot order back the sea.  Radical restructuring 
(peristroika) is on the march.  Strong individuals cannot avoid 
replacing "others government" with self government.  Others government 
is only stable when a monopoly institution can maintain control over 
information and force.  Information and force are becoming widely 
spread.  We are seeing the collapse of the coercion metaphor at least in 
its wholesale form.  

When people and markets turn away from the state, it disappears.  If its 
monopoly is broken, we will be in the realm of competing legal systems.

Duncan Frissell






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Duncan Frissell <76630.3577@CompuServe.COM>
Date: Fri, 5 Mar 93 13:13:21 PST
To: <cypherpunks@toad.com>
Subject: UCS Computing Usage Policy.
Message-ID: <930305201226_76630.3577_EHL17-2@CompuServe.COM>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>Here is a copy of the policy that my system administrator was referring to:
>
>From: gerland@ubvmsb.cc.buffalo.edu (James R. Gerland)
>Subject: UCS Computing Usage Policy.

So call the ACLU and see if they are interested.  Buffalo is a State Uni 
and subject to the 1st Amendment. Sounds like they are censoring 
messages based on content (or lack of content in the case of anonymity.  
Could the University Post office refuse to accept or deliver anonymous 
letters?  It is unlikely that a government could force a publisher to 
reveal the identity of an anonymous author.  There are cases in point in
which people wanted NAACP membership lists where the orders were overturned
on the basis of freedom of association and speech.  Likewise anti-mask 
ordinances in some cities.  As long as your remailer wasn't causing 
volume problems, regulation would fall outside the "time, place, and 
manner" restrictions.  

Maybe the Electronic Frontier Foundation would be interested as well.

Duncan Frissell






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Eric Fogleman <Eric.Fogleman@analog.com>
Date: Fri, 5 Mar 93 12:22:43 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: ANON:  Sysadmin policies at universities
Message-ID: <9303052014.AA26191@ack.adstest.analog.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Jordan Hayes responds to Rusty Babani:

> 	From babani@cs.buffalo.edu Fri Mar  5 13:56:06 1993
> 
> 	Here is the responce I got as to WHY I CANT RUN A REMAILER IN
> 	MY ACCOUNT...
> 
> Why do you continue to think it's "your" account?
> 
> If you want to have such a thing to call "your account" you're welcome
> to plunk down some $$$, buy a machine, get yerself a network link, and
> remail to your heart's content...

I have to agree with Jordan on this.  In a truly free society, you have
the right to use your property as you see fit.  And so does the university.

Your right to free speech doesn't mean you have the right to someone
else's soapbox.

Eric Fogleman




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: kelly@netcom.com (Kelly Goen)
Date: Fri, 5 Mar 93 16:03:33 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: VOICE PRIVACY: Internet av phones
Message-ID: <9303060002.AA04236@netcom.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Forwarded message:
> From cypherpunks-request@toad.com Fri Mar  5 15:32:07 1993
> Date: Fri, 5 Mar 93 18:20:30 -0500
> From: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@Athena.MIT.EDU>
> Message-Id: <9303052320.AA02319@SOS>
> To: Bob Stratton <strat@intercon.com>
> Cc: cypherpunks@toad.com
> In-Reply-To: Bob Stratton's message of Fri,  5 Mar 1993 03:51:59 -0500,
> 	<9303050351.AA59962@horton.intercon.com>
> Subject: Re: Encrypted voice protocol?
> Address: 1 Amherst St., Cambridge, MA 02139
> Phone: (617) 253-8091
> 
>    Date: Fri,  5 Mar 1993 03:51:59 -0500
>    From: Bob Stratton <strat@intercon.com>
> 
>    I don't know how many of you are at sites on the MBONE, or multicast 
>    backbone. There are already a few pieces of code out there for 
>    experimentation with transmission of audio and video information, in a 
>    variety of forms/encoding, and probably the most widely used tool,
>    "vat - the  Visual Audio Tool", already has provisions for carrying
>    on encrypted audio teleconferences via IP.  In fact, it's as simple
>    as typing a key into a field, and the tool will DES en/decrypt the
>    conference.  
> 
> That's a good start!  Now all we need something which is a bit more
> general in its selection of the asymmetric encryption algorithm, and
> something which does public key for authentication and protection of the
> assymetric session key.
> 
> 							- Ted
> 

 would suggest a diffie-hellman key exchange protocol to ensure
non-recovery of the session key...
BTW at least your hearts in the right place Ted...
     cheers
     kelly

-- 




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Peter & <shipley@merde.dis.org>
Date: Fri, 5 Mar 93 16:17:48 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: yet another remailer
Message-ID: <9303060015.AA07939@merde.dis.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/x-pgp



-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----




I have just set up a remailer on the system utter.dis.org
the address for this remailer is remailer@utter.dis.org.

utter.dis.org: is my home Sun Sparc Station thus you should not have
worry about the local sysad shutting the remailer down.
	
the system does not know that much about uucp aliases thus if you want it
get there you should use internet style addressing.

if anyone would like a direct uucp connection please email me.


- -----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----
Version: 2.1

mQBNAiuX3kAAAAECAMd6YkS3ylajgNSzX+wYLrpW03D+99OFvePQLlR5N+R5iZBr
y4FbAMeDj+eCeEAqiEyNjUxHN5tGlqx1g6tk6KcABRG0JFJlbWFpbGluZyBTZXJ2
aWNlIDxyZW1haWxlckBkaXMub3JnPrQsIEFub255bW91cyBSZW1haWxlciA8cmVt
YWlsZXJAdXR0ZXIuZGlzLm9yZz4=
=cnrS
- -----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.1

iQBFAgUBK5ftAchmn7GUWLLFAQFbPwF+Jvtrkm9lR4GWCTFfB6BXWVl4SmJ7t7Wp
a+lZaNZ+qC6TmUVJ3Eyq4jwPbDd3L25h
=gkXN
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@Athena.MIT.EDU>
Date: Fri, 5 Mar 93 13:27:31 PST
To: Eric Hughes <hughes@soda.berkeley.edu>
Subject: Re: You Aren't [I'm Not]
In-Reply-To: <9303052041.AA05452@soda.berkeley.edu>
Message-ID: <9303052126.AA02211@SOS>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


   Date: Fri, 5 Mar 93 12:41:24 -0800
   From: Eric Hughes <hughes@soda.berkeley.edu>

   Existing controls on the signal-to-noise ratio?

   Yet this upper bound is ineffectual.  Let us take the widely used
   analogy of Usenet as a sewer.  Reading Usenet is like wading chest
   high through the muck.  But am I reassured that there is an overflow
   valve so that it never gets past my chin?  Hardly at all.  I won't
   drown, to be sure; what a _slight_ comfort.  

Touche'.  Granted, the signal-to-noise ratio on Usenet varies widely.
However, some groups still are able to function quite well, although
perhaps not as well as they could in an ideal world.  Just because they
aren't working perfectly isn't an excuse to break them completely, or at
least until this mythical positive reputation technology is implemented,
debugged, and deployed on the all over Usenet.

As far as the sewer analogy goes, what you are trying to do is to remove
the overflow valve *now*, while not providing the drain to actually
drain out all of the muck.  While there has been some prototype designs
which have been thrown about, I have yet to hear a coherent, realistic
plan for how it could be installed on all or most of the Usenet servers
and readers *today*.

   I had thought that we had pretty clearly established that attacks on a
   system of content and of volume were of different natures.  Lack of
   robustness in mail software makes a mailbomb possible, not lack of
   accountability.

However, this mail software is deployed all over the world, and is not
going to change anytime soon.  And again, I have yet to see a coherent
and realistic protocol that will be able to screen out mailbombs while
leaving "only the good stuff" on the SMTP layer --- let alone an
implementation of the same.  

   >Maybe there are good, sound, policy reasons for making this change.  But
   >out of fairness, one would think that the agents of change should be
   >prepared to bear some of cost of that change.  

   Were there silence before in the neighborhood, I would agree.  

There may not have been silence, but nevertheless, if the agents of
change are going to increase the average sound level by 50db, it is
unreasonable to assume that the people who will suffer from this noise
increase, and who will have to go out of their way to implement
soundproofing, etc. are going to sit back passively and let you screw
them.

   You can't protect the network unless you *do* protect individual
   sites.  The network as a whole is not a legal entity, only the
   companies and individuals that run them are.

Sure you can; you can protect regional and national networks such as
NEARnet, by making them common carriers.  I think that would be a fine
idea!  However, that does not mean that people who connect to that
network should then be also protected.  In the same way, just because
Nynex is a common carrier, it doesn't and shouldn't mean that anyone who
uses Nynex to place a call is similarily protected from legal liability.

If you cause someone damage by your speech, and you maliciously did so
knowing that your speech was false, the person you harmed should be able
to recover damages from you, whether it is done over the phone or done
over a TCP/IP network.

							- Ted





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: babani@cs.Buffalo.EDU (Rusty Babani)
Date: Fri, 5 Mar 93 13:32:19 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: ANON: Sysadmin Policies at Universities (and HS)
In-Reply-To: <9303051904.AA25221@IMSI.COM>
Message-ID: <9303052131.AA06942@armstrong.cs.Buffalo.EDU>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Jordan Hayes stated in the last message:
>From cypherpunks-request@toad.com Fri Mar  5 14:48:05 1993
>Date: Fri, 5 Mar 93 14:04:19 EST
>From: jordan@imsi.com (Jordan Hayes)
>Subject: Re: ANON: Sysadmin Policies at Universities (and HS)
>
>	From babani@cs.buffalo.edu Fri Mar  5 13:56:06 1993
>
>	Here is the responce I got as to WHY I CANT RUN A REMAILER IN
>	MY ACCOUNT...
>
>Why do you continue to think it's "your" account?

[argues that I should get my own network link and then run a remailer on
"my" machine]

>That's all those machines need is more sendmail processes running :-)


Well, "the" account has "my" name stamped all over it.  With a few
resstrictions... I have full use of the account.  But that's not
proof.  Here's proof... quoting from UB's own computing policy ...
(which I am now THOUROULY familiar with!  :->  )

>acquiring an account in another person's name, or using an account without 
>the explicit permission of the owner and the full knowledge of Academic
                                ^^^^^
...

>     It is mandatory that the owner of an account be careful to keep the
                               ^^^^^
>account secure by keeping the password secret, changing the password
...


Even the policy seems to agree that someone is an "owner" of a given
account.  It doesn't mention that ACS (Academic Computing Services) is
the "owner" of the account.  Need I say more?

-- 
+==== Internet: babani@cs.buffalo.edu ===+======== Amateur-Radio: N2LYC ======+
!      Bitnet: V078LNGT@ubvms.BITNET     |        UUCP: rutgers!ub!babani     !
! Alternate: an173@cleveland.freenet.edu | Plsure dpnds on the othrs prmison. !
+==  PGP key available. (If you don't know what a PGP key is... find out!)  ==+




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Derek Atkins <warlord@MIT.EDU>
Date: Fri, 5 Mar 93 13:35:29 PST
To: Eric Fogleman <Eric.Fogleman@analog.com>
Subject: Re: ANNOUNCE: Boston-area cypherpunks meeting?
In-Reply-To: <9303051658.AA25665@ack.adstest.analog.com>
Message-ID: <9303052134.AA00846@toxicwaste.MEDIA.MIT.EDU>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I was speaking to some people here about that not that long ago.  I'm
not sure how many of the Boston Cypherpunks there are out there.  Eric
-- do you have a place in mind to meet?  If not, I could probably
arrange a room on campus.  How many people would be interested in
this?  (Send mail to me instead of the cypherpunks list, to cut down
on the traffic.)

Also, when would be a good date to hold it?

-derek

PGP 2 key available upon request on the key-server:
	pgp-public-keys@toxicwaste.mit.edu
--
  Derek Atkins, MIT '93, Electrical Engineering and Computer Science
     Secretary, MIT Student Information Processing Board (SIPB)
           MIT Media Laboratory, Speech Research Group
           warlord@MIT.EDU       PP-ASEL        N1NWH




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: babani@cs.Buffalo.EDU (Rusty Babani)
Date: Fri, 5 Mar 93 14:03:28 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Revocation of key...
Message-ID: <9303052202.AA08479@armstrong.cs.Buffalo.EDU>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Well, since the remailer won't be running in "my" account at UB anymore...
I've issued a compromise certificate for the key to the remailer:
Anonymous Remailer <babani@cs.buffalo.edu>

-----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----
Version: 2.1

mQCNAitx/vQAAAEEAOUPjAfSeFmMsq7eWN47LzOwdSXmXoArMJOcBZ0bB3NRR3Nc
BF7ZIIbY5m/b/rBn6+IimthV/aa39hKOSPPnFZn7kxIAUwoolMmxUUPJRzcRcTDK
bsgLMCPfDuE8MWj0R960oaAFEE+yCCoDNiyPl6goN3XluVeie+ehVSuMvgdRAAUR
iQCVAgUgK5fLK+ehVSuMvgdRAQF7KQP/exSgzXs4GWB39ZwIGCuGvqlIeTaDOmSc
Uru9F8LNO8ytz2BCxdQA3N5Aj9AzNL3U5Fhbum/ZhP0MmfrYqT3S+BjEvMNdFpTp
7K8ApRgx3upqcd6I4mhAgUjlygl4dHJl/b8kdblO7unzRq38vSxyiIOXLwlY33lF
9H/n3fWKlTi0KkFub255bW91cyBSZW1haWxlciA8YmFiYW5pQGNzLmJ1ZmZhbG8u
ZWR1Pg==
=S9lO
-----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----

-- 
+==== Internet: babani@cs.buffalo.edu ===+======== Amateur-Radio: N2LYC ======+
!      Bitnet: V078LNGT@ubvms.BITNET     |        UUCP: rutgers!ub!babani     !
! Alternate: an173@cleveland.freenet.edu | Plsure dpnds on the othrs prmison. !
+==  PGP key available. (If you don't know what a PGP key is... find out!)  ==+




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@Athena.MIT.EDU>
Date: Fri, 5 Mar 93 15:21:48 PST
To: Bob Stratton <strat@intercon.com>
Subject: Re: Encrypted voice protocol?
In-Reply-To: <9303050351.AA59962@horton.intercon.com>
Message-ID: <9303052320.AA02319@SOS>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


   Date: Fri,  5 Mar 1993 03:51:59 -0500
   From: Bob Stratton <strat@intercon.com>

   I don't know how many of you are at sites on the MBONE, or multicast 
   backbone. There are already a few pieces of code out there for 
   experimentation with transmission of audio and video information, in a 
   variety of forms/encoding, and probably the most widely used tool,
   "vat - the  Visual Audio Tool", already has provisions for carrying
   on encrypted audio teleconferences via IP.  In fact, it's as simple
   as typing a key into a field, and the tool will DES en/decrypt the
   conference.  

That's a good start!  Now all we need something which is a bit more
general in its selection of the asymmetric encryption algorithm, and
something which does public key for authentication and protection of the
assymetric session key.

							- Ted




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu
Date: Fri, 5 Mar 93 17:33:02 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: USENET: musings on a new MUSENET
In-Reply-To: <9303052041.AA05452@soda.berkeley.edu>
Message-ID: <9303060131.AA02315@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Interesting the conversation about accountability and free speech has
turned toward discussing the weaknesses in Usenet. I've been thinking
about Usenet software a lot, and think there are some fundamental
methods that could vastly improve the dreary and
oft-discussed-lamented-cursed signal-to-noise ratio. I would propose
these ideas in some newsgroup devoted to the topic but these tend to be
frequented by fuddy duddies with too much at stake in the current
system and completely unimaginative and uninnovative, and interested in
yucky stuff like strengthening authentication (in stark contrast to the
sheer brilliance in our club).  (For an existence proof, look at the
brouhaha on anonymity in news.admin.policy.)

Now, I think we should get a thread started on the ultimate news
posting software system.  Let's recall the totally ad hoc nature of the
original Usenet, which just sort of *emerged* because people started
writing and running software for it. I fully believe this could happen
with `our' system, esp. if the systems are "workable" and very
attractive, and *effective*.  I propose to call it MUSENET, because
it's what I'm musing on at the moment.

Above I called authentication mechanisms `yucky', and I still believe
that they should be avoided, or at least I want to be able to peruse
groups with no posting restrictions.  But the authentication technique
really does improve signal-to-noise ratios.  That is because, no matter
what anybody tells you, it is really only used for holding users
accountable for their posts, to the degree of complaining to their
sysadmins.  I submit that high-signal-to-noise and total freedom of
posting (e.g. anonymity) are mostly mutually exclusive objectives, but
unfortunately each equally preferrable.

So, here's the idea. Let USENET continue to ferment in relative
`peaceful anarchy', with total freedom in posting. Lets start MUSENET
with significant registration mechanisms. Just having an internet
account wouldn't cut it.  Some groups might be invitation only, others
you might fill out an application/background form and current members
vote on you, or whatever.  The system should allow as much flexibility
across groups as possible. Wouldn't it be great if every new user had
to pass a multiple choice test on the group's FAQ? (sort of like
getting a poster's license!)  Or that the faq was archived along with
group postings?  Wouldn't it be great to peruse lists of members, their
backgrounds or ``electronic resumes'', and their interests?  This all
should be possible. (Imagine reading a neat post and reading about the
accomplishments of the person behind it, where they work, etc.)

Now, imagine that every group also has an associated 'metagroup' for
discussions about the group itself, whether it should be split, posters
that are abusing it and the actions against them, etc.

*built into the software* would be mechanisms for "complaining" about a
post. If a user gets too many complaints, depending on the group
charter, he might be automatically expelled or suspended. I proposed
earlier the idea of a bank account that people can credit or debit
based on your postings, and membership dependent on nonbankruptcy! 
There could be "trials" and "proceedings" against the accused in the
meta-group.  Also, mechanisms for tracking article use would be great.
People could vote on articles they *liked* also.  Each group would
automatically have an associated "supergroup" where the best articles
are percolated up, not by posting, but by positive vote mechanisms. It
would be a great honor to make it into certain of these groups. In
fact, there might be a net-wide "super hall of fame" (or even a "hall of shame").

I'd also like to see a lot of tracking about when articles are saved,
how long they are being read, that kind of thing--propagated back to
the poster! Can you imagine what kind of effect that would have on
quality? (er, maybe I mean `could'...)  There is a tremendous amount of
analysis of articles that is going on *completely behind the scenes*
right now, totally separated from the articles themselves.  Lets get
that beautiful data into cyberspace!

Group charters should be very specific about the mechanisms involved in
the particular group, and what kind of speech will be tolerated, and
how abuses will be dealt with.  There should be some way for a group to
approve their "official faq", or more than one of such. Maybe it would
appear first as a regular article, and make it into FAQhood if there
are enough positive votes.

I also like the idea of "free-lance moderators" or "free-lance
editors". The newservers would not only propagate articles but
meta-articles built by these free-lance editors of their favorite
articles, perhaps in a single group but ideally globally. These editors
would be able to create very customized portfolios of their favorite
articles, even with their own comments on the stuff, and anyone can
read the portfolios instead of the raw unfiltered stuff.  I think
anyone should be able to become a free-lance moderator. I think many people will.

There should be some way to keep around outstanding articles. I.e., if
they get enough votes, they are archived on some machine (ideally, the
site they originated from or whatever) and they can be referenced in
future articles.  I think there ought to be a new "pseudonymous FTP"
where anybody with an internet account could set up a part of their
directory for archiving their favorite articles, made available to
other newsreaders, possibly on the local news server. (My luddite
administrators can seem to deal with anonymous FTP.)

Holy cow, I haven't even gotten to all the cryptography features.
Traffic should be encrypted. Everybody has public and private keys with
verification. No free posting--if an article is transmitted, it means
that it really was written by someone, by strength of their password
secrecy.  Hashing on articles to ensure they're untampered, etc.

I think people should get away from the point of view that any
restrictions on posting are anti-free-speech.  I see a lot of news
admins pretend that they don't want more control, and that any such
suggestion is an insult to their unimpeachible ethical standards. 
There is a lot of hypocrisy going on right now. Lets make control
legitimate, something *everyone* can exercise. More control is not
censorship. It is the means toward improving s/n drastically.

Anonymity should be built into the software for the appropriate groups.
 *no* tracking (e.g. storing machine routing paths) should be appended
to the articles that are posted anonymously. In fact, the new server
should act like our lovely remailers in this regard (cloaking/rerouting
mechanisms, etc.)

OK, I have to mention hypertext too. What if articles could incorporate
GIF pictures or postscript files? Audio sound? have push-button
pointers to other articles and files and FTP sites? yowza!

Please don't misconstrue any of this.  I don't advocate getting rid of
completely free posting areas, forcing everyone to be validated, etc.
In fact, I think these systems should always be there, and that they
*will* always be frequented even after much better systems with better
s/n will come along (there may also be a "creep" of outstanding
freely-posted articles into the selective groups by people who vouch
for them by posting them, and take the consequences for failures of
judgement, as determined by voting response).

Whaddya say, cypherpunks? want to be in on the next communication
revolution?  Want to mold the onslaught of cyberspace the way you like
it, according to your distinct and prophetic vision?  All we have to do
is put a little prototype code together...




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@Athena.MIT.EDU>
Date: Fri, 5 Mar 93 15:37:17 PST
To: kelly@netcom.com
Subject: Re: ANON POLICY: was I`m not
In-Reply-To: <9303052249.AA26423@netcom.netcom.com>
Message-ID: <9303052335.AA02332@SOS>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


   From: kelly@netcom.com (Kelly Goen)
   Date: Fri, 5 Mar 93 14:49:20 PST

    Fortunately... Libel is a totally ineffectual law for attempting
   to impose the kinds of censorship that Ted seems to be espousing.
   Libel and slander laws are OFTEN used by the powers that be
   (governmental, corporate etc) to silence the oppostion in
   matters of human rights, ecology etc...

There's a good reason for that.  The reason why Libel exists is not to
impose censorship!  

The powers that be may *abuse* libel and slander laws in attempt to
silence The Opposition, but the mere potential for abuse isn't grounds
to say that those laws shouldn't exist.  If you do make that argument,
then by the same token, *remailers* shouldn't exist because of their
potential for abuse.  :-)

						- Ted




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: nobody@rosebud.ee.uh.edu
Date: Fri, 5 Mar 93 18:21:34 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: CASH/REMAIL: combination
Message-ID: <9303060221.AA29007@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

Karl Barrus posted some ideas for running a remailer which requires
payments in the form of digital cash.  I have some comments.

> The remailer will work like the others, except valid cash must be
> included or the remailer will not forward the message.  For ease, a
> number of bills will be generated upon request, which will then be
> deposited as used.  As a side effect, bank accounts will be
> incremented as well (too bad real banks don't work like this) so
> customers may "withdraw" more bills to use for remailing messages.

If I follow this, Karl will allow users to request digital-cash bills
from the bank, then require them to send one of those along with each
remailed message.  The bank then puts the bills back into the user's
account(!) leaving him with as much "money" as he started with.

This may be OK for an exercise to get the code working, but to really
have any effect the remailer should not give the money back to the
user as soon as he "spends" it.  This makes the whole thing rather
pointless.

I had an idea which would be a variant of this: make the users send
you a postal-mail letter to authorize issuing another batch of digital
"stamps".  The letter could include an email address to send the
stamps to.  Maybe you could send 5 stamps per letter.

This would force the user to pay 29 cents each time he wanted a set of
stamps.  Unfortunately, he's not paying the remailer operator, but
rather the U.S. government.  But it would still limit the ability of
people to swamp the net with large numbers of messages.

(With this system, I would not anticipate that people would have
"accounts", but rather that Karl would just send out the digital stamps
and let people hold it, and use them as they mailed letters.)

> Nathan Estey suggested to me that traffic analysis could be made more
> difficult if messages under a certain length were padded, and message
> over the length were split and remailed a piece at a time.  This will
> help, although I think it would be easier for the sender to include
> padding in the message itself (thus identical messages plus random
> padding will encrypt differently).  Plus, the message may be multiply
> encrypted and thus padding cannot be added "inside."  Maybe future
> mail software will automatically pad in addition to encrypt :-)

Remailers might require standard-sized messages for their operation,
or refuse to pass messages larger than some limit.  This, in
conjunction with requiring per-message postage, should eliminate the
possibilities of "volume abuse" which so worried Ted Ts'o.  ("Content
abuse" is much less of an issue given the free-speech traditions on
the net.)

As it turns out, PGP compresses, then encrypts messages (usually):

	C = Encrypt (KEY, Compress(M)).

The decryption phase is then:

	M = Decompress (Decrypt (KEY, C));

Now, as it turns out, the decompression is self-terminating.  That
means that you can add some junk to the message after the compression
phase but before the encryption phase, and it will be automatically
ignored by the decompresser:

	C = Encrypt (KEY, Pad (Compress(M), N))

	M = Decompress (Decrypt (KEY, C));

(This represents padding the message with N bytes after compression,
then encrypting it.)

I had a patch for an earlier version of PGP which would always pad to
1K byte boundaries using random bytes.  It was kind of annoying to use
because it made small messages quite a bit bigger.  But I think what
would be very nice would be a utility to encrypt a message which
produced one or more constant-sized files as output.  Then you would
want a corresponding program to decrypt which would put the files
together and strip the padding.

This way, all files sent to the remailer would be exactly the same
size, and it could then act as a "Mix", as Eric described, holding a
bunch of files in a batch, shuffling them, then sending them out.

Hal
74076.1041@compuserve.com

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From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Johan Helsingius <julf@penet.FI>
Date: Fri, 5 Mar 93 21:57:29 PST
To: Eric Fogleman <Eric.Fogleman@analog.com>
Subject: Re: ANNOUNCE: Boston-area cypherpunks meeting?
In-Reply-To: <9303051658.AA25665@ack.adstest.analog.com>
Message-ID: <9303052007.aa26857@penet.penet.FI>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



> Is there any interest in a meeting of Boston-area cypherpunks?  (I've
> seen at least two mit.edus out there...)  I'd be interested in meeting
> some of you in person, exchanging keys, etc.

Uh... It just so happens that I will be in Boston from April 7th to
18th...

	Julf





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Anonymous <nowhere@bsu-cs.bsu.edu>
Date: Fri, 5 Mar 93 20:13:20 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: No Subject
Message-ID: <9303060409.AA14753@bsu-cs.bsu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Dewdz,

Stuff for the whistleblowers group. This looks like some good shit. 

Way cool--Pentagon gettin' zapped!


F-117A Nighthawk ("Stealth") Program--Summary


Construction

The primary RAM and infrared-reflecting material used on the F-117A
Nighthawk, also known as the Stealth Fighter, is Dow Chemical's Fibaloy
(Lockheed Memorandum TK-523). Fibaloy is used for structural airframe parts
in the F-117A and for skin panels, spars, ribs, and 1ongerons. Only 10
percent of the airframe's structural weight is from metal. Reinforced
carbon fiber, developed by the Air Force Materials Laboratory at Wright
Patterson AFB in Dayton, Ohio, is another important RAM used on the F-117A.
This material not only absorbs radar energy, but dissipates it as well and
helps reduce the F-117A's infrared signature. It is used primarily for
high-temperature areas like outer skin panels near the engines, and wing
and vertical-fin leading edges.

The F-117A's unique shape is one factor that contributes to RCS reduction.
Edges are rounded, and skins are made of Fibaloy in a secret and difficult
manufacturing process. These skins are built in multiple layers that are
filled with bubbles and tiny fibers oriented in a specific alignment,
spacing, and density for maximum RCS reduction. This process is the most
secret element of stealth technology. Parts are formed using super-plastics
and are joined with strong adhesives. Kevlar 49 and Silag are used in key
crossbar struts.

Internal structural architecture of the F-117A has an even greater effect
on RCS reduction. A design called cut-diamond, which employs several
thousand flat surfaces, is used on the F-117A. Each of the small, flat
surfaces is angled so it does not share a common radar reflective angle
with any other small, flat surface. When a radar beam strikes the F-117A,
only one or two of the flat surfaces reflects the incoming radar energy,
while the adjacent surfaces present too high an incident angle to reflect
the radar energy back to the radar receiver.
The cut-diamond structure is covered by a layer of Fibaloy and Retinyl
Schiff base salt materials that is able to absorb 98.7 percent of all
radiated energy. Like the SR-71, internal plastic radar -absorbing
triangular inserts are fitted to the F-117A's vertical-fin and wing leading
edges. Iron ball RAM (supplied by TDK Magnetics, cf. Import Waivers) is
applied to external surfaces and to some internal metal parts. All gear
doors and access panels are specially shaped and tightly fitted to maintain
the airframe's low RCS.

To enhance its low visual signature, the F-117A employs both active and
passive background-masking camouflage techniques that enable it to change
color to match the background. Two camouflage colors are used: flat-black
for night missions, and dull gray for day missions.
The active camouflage technique is "background-clutter signal to aircraft
RCS matching." This technique makes use of the F-117's extensive ECM/ESM
suite and does not require any changes to the aircraft's structure. With
this technique, an F-117A flying at low level protects itself from
look-down interceptor radars by matching its overall RCS (as detected from
above) with that of the terrain below. This ability makes the F-117A show
up as ground clutter on the interceptor's radar, provided the F-117A's RCS
precisely matches that of the terrain below it, and the hostile radars
would simply reject the clutter and the F-117A masked in the clutter, and
never detect the F-117A. 

ECM/ESM equipment is housed in smart skins, or portions of the F-117A's
airframe that incorporate microcircuitry, thus avoiding the need to install
antennae or sensors that might have a high RCS on the outside of the
airframe. This feature has the combined benefit of saving space on the
inside of the airframe and permitting the airframe to be lighter and
smaller.

Reconnaissance/weapons systems include a forward-looking laser radar used
for both terrain-following navigation (TERCOM) and for attacking targets. A
forward-looking infrared (FLIR) system is installed, as well as a low light
level TV and a head-up display. Its weapons suite includes the optically
guided AGM-65 missile and the AGM-45 Shrike antiradiation missile. The
AGM-88A high-speed antiradiation missile (HARM) is also included. An
advanced gun system developed by Hughes called the in-weather survivable
gun system/covert is installed, and all weapons are carried internally.

Another weapon that is planned for deployment in FY 93 is the AGM-I36A
Tacit Rainbow antiradiation drone missile. This weapon can loiter after
release and protect the F-117A from hostile radar tracking by detecting and
destroying hostile radars. The Tacit Rainbow is small enough that four can
be carried internally by the F-117A.

In one recent test of the F-117A's weapon aiming and guidance system, a
500-lb bomb was dropped from altitude of 10,000 feet, and the bomb scored,
going right into the top of its target, a 55-gallon drum. Results are
similar to the Gulf War experience.

Lear Siegler has developed a quadruple redundant electronic fly-by-wire
system for the F-117A that eliminates the need for control cables, thus
saving weight and simplifying construction. The pilot controls the F-117A
with a side-stick controller mounted on the right side of the cockpit.

The F-117A pilot sits on an ACES ejection seat. The pilot's canopy has flat
surfaces, and should be coated with an optically transparent RAM to prevent
radar reflection from the pilot or cockpit equipment. Landing gear is
designed for rough-field operations, and each gear leg has a single wheel.

Infrared signature is reduced by mixing fan-bypass air and air from cooling
baffles with exhaust gases. Mixing of air with exhaust also has the benefit
of reducing the acoustic signature. Because infrared homing missiles track
aircraft by the heat of their exhaust nozzles, not the heat of the exhaust
gas, the nozzles are made of materials that keep the infrared signature
low. Cooling baffles and special coatings also help reduce the infrared
signature from hot engine-exhaust nozzles. Newer infrared homing missiles
with all-aspect launch angles can track only the exhaust plume, but the
work done to cool exhaust nozzles and cool exhaust gases on the F-117A (and
other stealth aircraft) makes infrared lock-on by these kinds of missiles
highly unlikely.

Two modified nonafterburning 12,500-1b General Electric F404-HB turbofan
engines power the F-117A. Two-dimensional thrust-vectoring exhaust nozzles,
which can vector thrust in various vertical and horizontal positions, are
installed; however, the nozzles are only two-dimensional in shape, with no
vectoring capability. 

Material around the engine bays is a matrix sandwich of polymers and
pyramidic noise-absorbing structures. The sound-proofing is so effective
that the F-117A  makes only a medium-level (53 dB) humming noise at a
distance of 100 feet, and on takeoff a slight whine (61 dB) is heard. The
F-117A uses a Benson-designed Rotorduct system that provides additional
cold thrust from the engines. The Rotorduct system is connected to the
forward and aft sections of the engines.
 
During night operations, the F-117A flies lights out, with no navigation,
strobe, 
or position lights of any kind. F-117As are equipped for all-weather
operations without any outside assistance. All guidance systems are
passive, except for the laser radar, but that gives no signals that could
be detected. Guidance systems include a ring-laser gyro based inertial
navigation system and global positioning system receiver, both of which are
passive navigation systems. 

Performance

Although the F-117A can fly at supersonic speeds (Mach 1.73), most of its
flying is done below the speed of sound close to the ground to take
advantage of terrain-masking of hostile radar installations. High-speed
flight at low levels also protects the F-117A from infrared-guided weapons
or infrared detection systems. At higher altitudes, the F-117A would be
exposed to such systems for longer periods of time, while at low levels,
the F-117A is not over one area long enough for weapons systems to lock on.
Even if the weapons could lock on briefly, the F-117A flies so quickly that
it would be long gone before the weapon could shoot it down. 

Operating at high speeds and low levels makes the F-117A somewhat unstable 
due to its large wing/fuselage planform. USAF cites this as one reason,
among others, for one or two of the four operational crashes. The F-117A
uses small ride-control vanes similar to those on the nose of the B-I
bomber. These are known as impedance-loaded flow-control vanes, and they
alleviate the often bumpy ride encountered during low-level and high-speed
flight. 

Supersonic flight in the F-117A is inefficient because of the materials
from which it is built. Some of the materials, while excellent at reducing
detectability signatures, have a rough finish that add to the F-117A's
parasite drag. 

F-117A Operational Basing

An F-117A unit is permanently based at Tonopah Base (Area 30, also known as 
Sandia Strip and Mellon Strip) in the northwest corner of the highly secret
Nellis 
Test Range about 170 miles from Las Vegas, in Nevada. Tonopah Base has 72
hangars and was refurbished in 1979 by the U.S. Air Force. (It hadn't been
used since World War II.) The unit is known as Team One--Furtim Vigilans
(covert 
vigilantes), and there are 95 F-117As based there. (The term literally 
means "vigilant by stealth" or "stealthily vigilant" in Latin.) The
full-service F-117A wing gained initial operational capability in 1983 at
Tonopah Base. 
There are F-117A temporary-duty (TDY) detachments at Elmendorf AFB and 
Shemya AFB in Alaska, Kadena Air Base in Japan, and in the United Kingdom. The 
F-117A also has been active in the Middle East and in Latin America, used
in the Gulf War and in covert drug trafficking survellance operations.

The U.S. Air Force uses the F-117A in various roles and has integrated F-117A 
operations with those of the rapid-deployment forces and with the new special
operations command. Two of the F-117A's known missions are covert
reconnaissance and covert surgical strikes on preselected targets. In
operational tests, this effective stealth aircraft has flown within 17
miles of actual Soviet-manned radar stations without being detected, and
Soviet-manned Iraqi radar stations detected fewer than 3 of the F-117As in
753 different sorties over Iraq.

F-117A Nighthawk Specifications

Length         56.43 ft
Height          15.72 ft
Wingspan      40.20 ft
Empty weight    19,674 lb
Maximum takeoff weight    34,120 lb
Cruise speed     Mach 0.93   
Maximum speed   Mach 1.12 at 36,000 ft
Powerplant    two 12,700 lb GE F404-HB nonafterburning turbofans highly
modified. Composites used in engine construction
Combat radius   498 miles






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: crunch@netcom.com (John Draper)
Date: Sat, 6 Mar 93 01:44:36 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Internet radio
Message-ID: <9303060943.AA04654@netcom2.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Re: Internet radio....

  I can see (or actually hear it now)  - Stay tuned for the super duper
Cypherspace hot hit 100,  coming up after these messages...  And about
15 minutes of BS about the right hair spray to buy...

JD




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: edgar@spectrx.Saigon.COM (Edgar W. Swank)
Date: Sat, 6 Mar 93 04:24:28 PST
To: Cypherpunks          <cypherpunks@toad.com>
Subject: Kill lines
Message-ID: <k6JZZB4w165w@spectrx.saigon.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I agree with Eli Brandt that Chael Hall's simple implementation of
a standard "kill" line is preferable to the complicated "Regexp"
specification.  I could manage it, but I agree with Eli that many
could not.
 
Eli offers an alternative of
 
   Signature-Lines: <count>
 
Assuming that this can be inserted in the body of the message with
the :: convention as well as among the headers, this is acceptable,
but is still more complicated than the "kill line".  The proper
number for "signature-lines" will have to be found by trial and
error, by sending messages to oneself.
 
One caveat here.  Any remailer which implements "signature-lines" will
have to -remove- that line from the header (or change <number> to
zero) when it removes the <number> of signature lines from the end of
the body.
 
Otherwise, a chain of "signature-lines" remailers would -each-
see the "signature-lines" header and would -each- remove <number>
lines from the end of the message body.

--
edgar@spectrx.saigon.com (Edgar W. Swank)
SPECTROX SYSTEMS +1.408.252.1005  Silicon Valley, Ca





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: judic@sunnyside.com (Judi Clark)
Date: Sat, 6 Mar 93 09:16:38 PST
To: tcmay@netcom.com
Subject: One last time Re: CFP Costs Too Much! (long)
Message-ID: <199303061715.AA25795@snyside.sunnyside.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Hi Tim

I wanted to take a minute to respond to your note about the cost of CFP'93.
There are several things that you a) don't know, and/or b) aren't taking
into account. Altho' my writing style is somewhat cut-throat (why I am not a 
writer), this is not a re-flame, but rather an informational piece.
As such, if you are still interested, I can discuss the conference costs
in more detail at a future date (like sometime after the conference?).

>Dave Deltorto is one of several people I know, including myself, who don't
>like the prices of the upcoming Computers, Freedom, and Privacy Conference:
>
>>.... I would also dearly like to attend CFP, but
>>I haven't yet found a way to do it without money (anyone who knows a way I
>>can volunteer my way in and help out please say so - I'll sweep up after,
>>anything...).

Dave found a way to attend. He is a volunteer for the conference, and as
such, gets in free. There are over 20 such volunteers this year.

FYI, volunteers impact the costs of the conference in two ways: 

1) They help to keep staffing costs out of the budget
2) They aren't guaranteed lunches/banquets so as not to increase food costs.
Given that many paid registrants don't show up for one meal or another,
volunteers help "take up the slack" with the extra meals. :-)

optional info:
In addition, volunteers help to round out the attendance. As volunteer
coordinator, I have sought to fill as many volunteer positions with 
women and minorities as possible. Dave, as a hacker, is one such minority.
(I'm sure this method of choosing volunteers will vary with future confs.)

>In my opinion, $405 is way too much to pay for this conference. Science
>Fiction conventions routinely get the use of major hotels at a far lower
>per head price (from $40-$125 is typical). The BayCon convention takes over
>most of the public facilities in San Jose's Red Lion Inn (several
>ballrooms, many smaller rooms, and most of the public lobby areas), has
>about 500 attendees (same as CFP), and charges less than $100 for 4 days
>(and one-day memberships are typically around $30). And the "Hackers
>Conference" has kept its cost down to around $300, which includes two
>nights lodging and all meals (very sumptuous meals, too).

Conventions typically don't have 80 speakers, nor formal banquet functions.
Meals are certainly a BIG part of our costs. Speaker meals are part of costs.

Admittedly, if we were offering "a place to show things", we would be 
partly subsidized by booth space costs and other commercial ventures;
our costs would be less. CFP has traditionally ruled that commercial
booths are NOT a part of the program, and have declined offers to "buy"
space on our floor.

You mention that Hacker's keeps costs down to $300 for two nights. While
we don't include the cost of the night's lodging for a number of reasons,
we do include meals. Further, Hacker's attendees all pay equally. CFP
has 80 speakers which, while they do not receive pay for their part, do
receive all meals. Part of the cost in attending reflects what you're
coming to hear, in the settings that we have arranged (single-track
sessions, banquet speakers, etc.)

>Granted, CFP puts out a nice transcript of the talks--credit them $20 for
>that.

Thanks for credit for the transcripts, but the $20 isn't ours. The 
proceedings need to be transcribed word for word from the conference, 
edited, and made camera-ready before IEEE or ACM (or whoever publishes
it) get the $20 each. 

optional info:
IEEE published the first conference, and has not yet made back the cost
of printing their small run. Those transcripts are now online. What do 
you think their chances are now of making their costs back?

The transcripts also need to be re-edited/indexed for free online public 
distribution. Noone has offered to do any of this for free yet...

>Granted, a couple of meals are thrown in--credit them another $30 or so.

You haven't talked with hotels lately. Continental breakfasts typically
cost $5 per person, lunches are another $15 per person, and dinners $20.
Add an 18% service charge and 8.25% tax to that, and multiply by 3 days...

>What's left is still too much. Yes, a "register early" discount
>exists/existed, but inasmuch as there's a nonzero risk someone can't attend
>(and hence loses what they paid, or some fraction of it), counting such
>discounts is not really kosher. 

You're missing the point of the early registration. You apparently didn't
take into account that we printed brochures and paid for mailings to some
40,000 people plus thousands more in press. While two of us worked for
several months with no pay, we did incur many expenses. We bear the costs
of bringing this conference to you until we are reimbursed. As Jim Warren
will tell you, this is no small change. The first conference, with 400+ 
attendees, made $1000 in "profit", and was donated to CPSR, conf sponsors. 

>There are several possible reasons for the high fees: 
>
>1. Price insensitivity.

Wrong. We have a history of what this conference costs, and do all that
we can to keep costs down. For example, the conference chairman doesn't
get paid. As Organizing Coordinator, I might or might not, depending on
the conference outcome.

While the cost of this conference is minimal to a few of the attendees, it
is obviously a big factor to many. That's why we received over 100 requests
for scholarships this year, and why we were able to find separate funding 
for 40 full registrations (twice as many as last year!). We would like to 
have gotten more...

>2. "Everyone else is doing it." 

This is irrelevant. We are not doing anything because "Everyone else is
doing it." Rather, we are trying to do things that everyone else is NOT
doing.

>3. Subsidies of journalists.

Journalists are admitted free, but must pay for meals themselves.

Tim, I'm sorry to hear you won't be there for whatever reason.
Phiber's right, lots of the good stuff happens throughout the whole place.
And thanks, Fen, we try. (Hacker's is a different world. Would it be that
we could do some things more informally...)

I look forward to a fun, informative and project-generating conference.
  judi <judic@sunnyside.com>






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Stephen Dunne             (+44) 71-538-5656"    <sdun@isma.demon.co.uk>
Date: Sat, 6 Mar 93 05:55:34 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: ANON: Sysadmin Policies at Universities (and HS)
Message-ID: <9303062148.AA0035@isma.demon.co.uk>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>If you want to have such a thing to call "your account" you're welcome
>to plunk down some $$$, buy a machine, get yerself a network link, and
>remail to your heart's content.  If I were another CS student at UB, I
>would be bummed if the scarce (by your account, and by most others at
>universities) cycles I needed to get my homework done were being given
>away to folks all over the world via a remailer.

Hmmm.. Unless you guys in the states get third level education for free you've 
*already* plunked down some $$$ as course fees. I would assume that a portion 
of the fees for an IT related course would be applied to purchase/upkeep of the
relevant kit.

IMHO the attitude of educational establishments which can border on the 
paranoid whenever they come across usage of "their" systems which isn't typical
is very similar to the classic model of the commercial DP gruppenfuhrer... Both
can be regarded as empire-builders..

Stephen





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: composer@Beyond.Dreams.ORG (Jeff Kellem)
Date: Sat, 6 Mar 93 11:59:34 PST
To: Eric Fogleman <Eric.Fogleman@analog.com>
Subject: Re: ANNOUNCE: Boston-area cypherpunks meeting?
In-Reply-To: <9303051658.AA25665@ack.adstest.analog.com>
Message-ID: <9303061958.AA05570@Beyond.Dreams.ORG>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


On the cypherpunks mailing list, Eric Fogelman wrote...
 > Is there any interest in a meeting of Boston-area cypherpunks?  (I've
 > seen at least two mit.edus out there...)  I'd be interested in meeting
 > some of you in person, exchanging keys, etc.

Sure thing.  Perhaps those of us from the Boston area that'll be at CFP-3
should get together while we're there next week to plan something in Boston.
A sort of pre-meeting.. ;-)

See you in SF at CFP-3...

			-jeff

Jeff Kellem
Internet: composer@Beyond.Dreams.ORG




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Jim C <collins@socrates.umd.edu>
Date: Sat, 6 Mar 93 14:47:05 PST
Subject: No Subject
Message-ID: <9303062247.AA21226@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


subscribe me!





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Matthew J Miszewski <MJMISKI@macc.wisc.edu>
Date: Sat, 6 Mar 93 20:05:15 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: ACT NOW!
Message-ID: <23030622022987@vms2.macc.wisc.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Dear Cypherpunks-
 
  The talk on this list is incredible.  Having grown up during
the dawn of personal telecommunications, (I remember a 110 baud
modem and running to get the phone in he cups in time), it
amazes me how far we have come.  Compared to the first BBSs, the
level of discourse ha also advanced.  Well, now that we have all
matured (no offense to my first mentors) the time has come to
combine our social concerns and our knowledge of technology.  Now
is the time for empowerment and action.
 
  I know many of you have been discussing (flaming) about
anarchy.  I understand that movement but I believe we are ready
to act on a different level.  Most of us hold strong personal and
political beliefs.  I think it is time for us to come together
(as much as is possible) and distribute and activate our ideas.
 
  Cryptography (finally got to the point) will play an intimate
part in any real technical revolution.  I am _far_ from an expert
(finally unzipped PGP2.1).  And so, I need to enlist the great
minds present on or reading this list.
 
  I speak in general terms so as not to offend some.  I know some
feel that power need not be redistributed and I respectfully have
kept things vague (did you see that graceful sidestep of the
inevitable *flame*).  I also kept this brief so as not to disturb
the S/N ratio any more.  So, very briefly, I assert:
 
  Information, technology and control of both _is_ power.
*Anonymous* telecommunications has the potential to be the
greatest equalizer in history.  Bringing this power to as many as
possible will forever change the discourse of power in this
country (and the world).  This is intimately involved with
political and economic theory, but can be accomplished without
fatally altering the existing models of these theories.  We, with
the knowledge, have the power to change everything we see.  But,
we must act.  We must organize.  And we must start _now_.
 
  Please send me private email so as not to burden the
Cypherpunks list or increase the noise.  I will listen to all
(and fully expect certain folks).
 
  BTW, I am not a socialist, communist, liberal, conservative,
fascist, et al.  I do not believe in simple change, but actual
progress.  I believe in progression not politics.  I believe the
private sector is an untapped resource for furthering social
justice.  I am a Law Student with a deep sense of social urgency.
(Not your typical lawyer-to-be).  I await _ALL_ responses.
 
Thanx,
 
mjmiski@macc.wisc.edu
Matthew J. Miszewski




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Michael <wk01847@worldlink.com>
Date: Sun, 7 Mar 93 00:39:51 PST
To: Alfred Martinez <75300.717@compuserve.com>
Subject: Re: F-117A Nighthawk pseudo"revelation".
Message-ID: <9303070838.AA00566@worldlink.worldlink.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Re: The F117A message left to cypherpunks by an anonymous fellow on Fri 4/5.

What a bunch of bull! Consider the following reasons which are obvious to any 
intelligent and technologically savvy reader:

"employs active and passive techniques to change color"
Logical baloney. What is a "passive way to change color"? "Passive" means to 
do nothing, yet changing color is an obviously "active act". 
Sounds like $100 words that mean absolutely nothing if one things about what 
he is reading, rather than swallowing it whole.

"When flying low, it adjusts its radar cross section to a high flying 
interceptor aiming radar downwards at it, so as to match its own radar 
reflectance to that of the ground".
Logical baloney again. How can that plane know the radar cross section (the 
reflectance) of the terrain below it unless it is itself aiming a radar at 
the ground? But if it did aim a radar itself, it would stand out like a sore 
thumb to ground based receivers, so it couldn't logially do so.

"ECM/ESM circuitsd are mounted on the skin to avoid the need for antennas".
Technical baloney! A radio fequency receiver or transmitter needs a means to 
couple to the outside world; this means is called antenna. You just cannot 
wish the function of an antenna away; basic physics (of which the writer of 
the nonsense I am responding to is ignorant) requires a physical capture area 
for an antenna.

And on and on and on...

And besides, lets consider the motivation of the writer of the message which 
ostensibly "unvovered" the information he broadcast to the world. (Never mind 
that it was nonsense, as per above.
Since internet is worldwide, is that fellow telling us that he, in his 
infinite wisdom, decided that what is presented as classified info should be 
released? Why? And, assuming that his information was correct which it isn't 
as per above, does he say that ALL classified information should be released 
by anybody that has it, or is he saying that he himself is blessd ed by the 
almighty to have this super judgement to unilaterally declassify things?
Or is he telling us (assuming that his info is correct, which it isn't as per 
above) that he is knowingly guilty of treason for disclosing classified info 
and, as a logical corollary, that he wants to harm this country?

Oh, well, the world never had a shortage of snake oil salesmen nor of 
irresponsible and treasonous fools.






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "DrZaphod" <ncselxsi!drzaphod@ncselxsi.netcom.com>
Date: Sun, 7 Mar 93 15:05:31 PST
To: CypherPunks@toad.com
Subject: Fw: Law and Disorder on the Electronic Frontier
Message-ID: <18782.drzaphod@ncselxsi>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


-- Thought Cypherpunks would benefit from this.. Odd that we didn't
   get it first. --
------------------------------
From: netcom!mcg@netcomsv.netcom.com (Tiamat the Chaos-Ocean)
Sat, 6 Mar 93 23:05:03 -0800
To: sfraves@soda.berkeley.edu (SFRaves)
Subject: Law and Disorder on the Electronic Frontier

I thought this might be of interest to a few of us SFRavers, given the
recent threads on privacy, virtual culture and the law, etc.  This is
taking place TOMORROW (Sunday), and I'd say there's an 80% chance I'll
be there -- I'd encourage as much SFR participation as possible.

------------  QUOTED FLYER FOLLOWS ------------

        Jacking In:  A Monthly Series on Cyberspace Literacy presents:

        Law and Disorder on the Electronic Frontier

        Computer and telecommunications technologies hold great
        promise for individuals and society.  Increased access to
        information can enhance commerce, political participation,
        community development, and public health and education.

        But, between activities of questionable legality and the
        countermeasures taken by private parties and law enforcement
        officials, these technologies are raising fundamental questions
        about privacy, property, and our freedoms of speech and assembly.

        Join us for an evening of provocative presentations by:

        BRUCE STERLING, author, journalist, editor
        MIKE GODWIN, Electronic Frontier Foundation
        JOHN DRAPER, a.k.a. Cap'n Crunch, reformed cracker
        MITCH RATCLIFFE, cofounder This!Group
        BRUCE KOBALL, Chair, Third Conference on Computers, Freedom,
                        and Privacy

        Sunday, March 7, 7 pm
        $3 - $5 sliding scale

        Modern Times Bookstore
        888 Valencia (19th/20th)    ==> a few doors down from Zanzibar
        San Francisco, CA  94110
        (415) 282-9246

----____----____--__--__--__--__-_-_-_-_-_-__--__--__--__--____----____----
         MykL G             Look to the future!      mcg@netcom.com
____----____----__--__--__--__--_-_-_-_-_-_--__--__--__--__----____----____

DrZaphod
[AC/DC] / [DnA][HP]
[drzaphod@ncselxsi.uucp]
Technicolorized




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: internaut@aol.com
Date: Sun, 7 Mar 93 06:48:34 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: FWEE!: Premature Ejaculation
Message-ID: <9303070949.tn25905@aol.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>>nowhere@bsu-cs.bsu.edu
>>
>>Way cool--Pentagon gettin' zapped!
>>
>>F-117A Nighthawk ("Stealth") Program--Summary

Uh-huh... OK. Easy now, Lads... Let's not "jump the gun."

It is with a strange mixture of giddy delight and dire trepidation that I
'pen' this note to you all. I read "nowhere's" posting with no small amount
of interest and yet I have a BIG PROBLEM with it, so I thought I would post
this tiny reminder to everyone about "what the hell are we fighting for"
(anyone else around here remember singing along with Country Joe and MEANING
it? ...1-2-3) before any more such postings occur. If you answer "don't ask
me, I don't give a damn," I worry about you (...5-6-7).

Some thoughts:

1. The Whistleblower system currently under construction (in more ways than
one) is of extremely high value both to us as digital pioneers and ultimately
to the People of this country and by extension of the world. It promises to
open up 'doors' that would otherwise stay very tightly shut. This is no small
thing.

2. The WB system should be directed toward uncovering structural ABUSES by
persons or companies entrusted with the interests and/or funds of the People.
Remember, this whole gig is supposed to be "of, by and for the People." We're
just here to remind the trustees not to cook the books like George Herbert
Fucking Walker Bush did. Infact he can be considered as one of our most
interesting subjects, whatever flat little Texas rock he might be hiding
under right now. We haven't forgotten you George, we're just getting our
digital posse rounded up. Except there's someone among us who's wearing
his/her gun belt a little too tight already, to wit:

3. The purpose of such a system is NOT to cater to the puerile (look it up,
it comes from the Latin for 'childish' and yes, I indulge in it often enough
to understand) impulses of people who'd like to anger the Dark Side just for
the sake of thumbing their noses at Authority, but to truly cut the Dark Side
to the bone - to expose their Darkest Secrets and leave them bleeding ink all
over the front pages. I recently paraphrased the Bible (and probably every
other religious tome since recorded Herstory began) in conversation with two
of my favorite Cypherpunks and I now see the value of sharing this tidbit
with all of you:

"That which is whispered of in closets, shall be shouted from the rooftops
for all to hear."

...I propose this as a suitable motto for the Whistleblowers and possibly
even the Cypherpunks - at least those with an ironic bent. (Btw, would the
more Bible-literate among us please feel free to cite chapter & verse, so I
can find where I read this and quote it more accurately in the future.)

4. Posting information of the kind in "nowhere's" transmission (though
admittedly fascinating) will only serve to ALERT and STRENGTHEN the position
and attack capabilities of those who would defeat the WB system BEFORE it
truly gets off the ground. Post data like this NOW and you provide ammunition
to sharpshooters who need an excuse to terminate us with extreme prejudice.
Compare the value of information of the sort in "nowhere's" posting (which I
might add can probably be found by the more astute among us in certain
lesser-known defense industry publications) with an anonymous posting by
someone taking a very BIG chance with his/her life by proclaiming the
complete and utter lack of integrity of persons charged with the maintenance
of Democracy or persons charged with the maintenance of the Safety and
Security of the People. I ask you, fellow Patriots: what would you rather
read? Would the expose' of a high-ranking member of the Military-Industrial
Complex be of greater value to you than the specs on the composition of a
plastic wing's leading-edge? Let us not forget who arranges for the
development of such weapons - those who loose the Dogs of War, not the Dogs
themselves should be our Enemy.

Another hypothetical example: would you like to know what the US Government
knows about _who_ shot John Fitzgerald Kennedy and _why_? Keep posting
information on expensive black budget D-Fens items and see if we ever find
out. I don't particularly want some haircut sliding in my front door with a
warrant just because I'm on this list - and don't think I'm overreacting
(because I am). FLAME.

A wise man chooses his weapon carefully and does not shoot his bolt before
the target is well in sight. In the teachings of ancient strategists, one can
find many sage postings on when to keep one's powder dry, when to retreat for
strategic/tactical advantage and when to just plain shut the fuck up so no
one knows you're hiding there with your pointy stick.

"Verbum sat sapienti est." In Latin (remember how far those Roman strategists
got!) this means "wise up or someone with much fancier toys will come and
take your cereal box and you'll be left with no whistle to blow. I get off on
reading about Inspector Gadget's Flying Doomsday Jets as much as the next
technoweenie, but I also have an idea of what's really important here. As a
person who threw bricks at riot police in the '60's, I have an indelible
impression of what it is that Freedom of Speech is all about and I don't want
to risk a potentially incredible source of Freedom of Speech all for a few
nuts and bolts descriptions of some weapons systems that some very dangerous
mofos will do just about anything to keep under wraps. Remember, no system of
anonymity or encryption is _completely_ secure: give the wrong entity a good
reason to focus its highbeams on us now, and you jeapordize our whole
mission. One might even say that a valid attack strategy for someone who
wants to take us down is to float such postings NOW so that serious, formal
complaints could be substantiated in the not-too-distant future.

  dave "are you experienced?" del torto, aka d2t





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: internaut@aol.com
Date: Sun, 7 Mar 93 06:48:34 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: MEETING: CFP>$!
Message-ID: <9303070949.tn25907@aol.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Gang,

Since Tim May took the pardonable liberty of putting virtual words in my
mouth about my opinion of the costs of CFP, I just thought that I would
"reply" by publicly posting my thanks to Judi Clark for her explanation of
what goes into a CFP conference. I have been both educated and humbled by her
communication. Thank you, Judi.

Firstly, I have to say that my initial reservation (all puns intended) about
CFP's cost was motivated PURELY my current lack of cash. Naturally, I would
have preferred to have returned a conference fee reimbursement slip to some
FatCat with a stouter wallet than my own, but alas, I currently have no such
overly-resourced feline to fall back on.

Secondly, although I surely did mutter about how much it costs and Tim was
perfectly within the bounds of reason to infer some reticence on my part, I
did manage to do something constructive about it by volunteering to help out
with a good cause. Judi was generous to mention my fairly insignificant
contribution, especially compared to the vast amount of work that she and her
cohorts have put in, but given any opportunity, I would have been, and still
am, willing to do what I can to ensure that the whole thing goes smoothly.
With every bite of every free meal I can weasel out of this deal, I will be
thanking her for the favor she is doing to my pathetic cash-flow situation.
BTW, Judi, should I be caught stuffing dinner rolls up my sleeves, I trust
you'll keep the Sheriff from cuffing me too tightly.

Thirdly, for philosophical and intellectual reasons, I am _really_ excited to
be able to attend, even as a janitor/hacker, and will do my best to feed back
information and impressions to everyone on the list who doesn't have the
opportunity to attend. In case someone has not been paying attention, my
philosophy involves dirtying my hands when something shows value to me and to
others. Anonymous remailers in support of Whistleblowers; conferences that
support the Mission; visiting dignitaries who need a ride to the airport
("May I carry your briefcase Ms. Denning?"), whatever...

Finally, to be fair, I do NOT want to imply that Tim is whining. CFP _IS_
very expensive for us mortals and there are a lot of people who _should_ be
attending instead of me but simply can't afford it. Tim probably has a
full-time job (unlike yours truly) and no time for volunteerism so I won't
for a nsec lean out of my glass house and suggest that he's alone in his
opinions because I basically agree that everything should be free. In fact,
Tim's contributions to this list dwarf mine to the point where I should be
thanking him just for enlightening me with his opinions. Thanks, Tim.

     David "Steal This Email" Del Torto
     ^                        ^   ^      =  DDT  ... d2t




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Eric Hughes <hughes@soda.berkeley.edu>
Date: Sun, 7 Mar 93 15:09:42 PST
To: cypherpunks-announce@toad.com
Subject: pgp 2.2
Message-ID: <9303072302.AA21043@soda.berkeley.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


PGP version 2.2 has just been released.  Copies may be obtained from
the cypherpunks archive site via anonymous ftp.

	soda.berkeley.edu:pub/cypherpunks/pgp

There is a .tar.Z file and two .zip files.

Enjoy.

Eric






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: mccoy@ccwf.cc.utexas.edu (Jim McCoy)
Date: Sun, 7 Mar 93 15:04:03 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Pgp 2.2 is out
Message-ID: <9303072247.AA05804@tramp.cc.utexas.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text


Well, since no one else seems to have mentioned it and it seems somewhat
important to the general purpose of this list, I thought I would make sure
poeple knew that PGP 2.2 is not out and available at ftp sites.  Here are
the sites listed in the announcement in alt.security.pgp:

nic.funet.fi:pub/msdos/incoming
garbo.uwasa.fi:pc/incoming
src.doc.ic.ac.uk:tmp/pgp

I snagged mine from src.doc.ic.ac.uk, so I know it is at least at that
site...

jim



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: sneal@muskwa.ucs.ualberta.ca (Steve Neal)
Date: Sun, 7 Mar 93 16:32:55 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Mailer weirdness
Message-ID: <9303080031.AA19392@muskwa.ucs.ualberta.ca>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


[Disclaimer: this may very well be a dumb newbie-type thing]
The last two messages posted to the list by David Del Torto popped up in
my mailer with a long list of "Apparently To" fields, thus identifying
a bunch of list members.  This is something of a breach of privacy for anyone
who didn't want to be known as a cypherpunk.
 
    Beggin' your pardon if this strikes you as an amazingly lame thing to 
bring up; I'm relatively new to mailing lists and Internet, and my eyes
film over after relatively short exposure to the RFCs, so I ain't read all
the relevant ones yet.
 
   -- Steve




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Crys Rides <crys@cave.tcp.COM>
Date: Sun, 7 Mar 93 15:52:26 PST
To: mccoy@ccwf.cc.utexas.EDU (Jim McCoy)
Subject: Pgp 2.2 is out
In-Reply-To: <9303072247.AA05804@tramp.cc.utexas.edu>
Message-ID: <9303072350.AA03348@ucunix.san.uc.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

>>>>> On Sun, 7 Mar 1993 16:47:48 -0600 (CST), mccoy@ccwf.cc.utexas.edu (Jim McCoy) said:
Jim> Content-Type: text
Jim> Content-Length: 450       
*grumblegrumble*  Are these MIME headers, or what? I'll have to hack this
citer to handle them.

Jim> Well, since no one else seems to have mentioned it and it seems somewhat
Jim> important to the general purpose of this list, I thought I would make sure
Jim> poeple knew that PGP 2.2 is not out and available at ftp sites.  Here are
Jim> the sites listed in the announcement in alt.security.pgp:

Jim> nic.funet.fi:pub/msdos/incoming
The files on this one were zero-length nulls at the time of my checking.

Jim> garbo.uwasa.fi:pc/incoming
The directory was empty, and the files weren't elsewhere on the system
to an admitedly cursory scan.
Jim> src.doc.ic.ac.uk:tmp/pgp

Jim> I snagged mine from src.doc.ic.ac.uk, so I know it is at least at that
Jim> site...

And that was where I got mine, the only site I was able to actually find
them.

Jim> jim

CrysRides

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.2

iQCVAgUBK5qJ6JSqD+bQ7So3AQEQNwQAobkQfUtpAvg9YF0nnpgRsSkYqFpK9y7v
WrXg7IWhjZHrjHtA6qXq72KDfHknR0b74PJMXH1bA/1n9eytgm9SqFxC/kAM98FR
4VBBH7EOOLDQ6Q8Hxd+o8/+vVyYS/wLmNCVhmrqwA4ImqaTSjaBj7CmQw2PzWQ6d
tkLB7eyrSl8=
=kRLu
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: strat@intercon.com (Bob Stratton)
Date: Sun, 7 Mar 93 16:48:05 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Mailer weirdness
In-Reply-To: <9303080031.AA19392@muskwa.ucs.ualberta.ca>
Message-ID: <9303080046.AA08567@intercon.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----


I don't think it's lame to bring up stuff like inadvertent disclosures
of information via mail headers. My first suspicion was (and still is)
that someone BCCed the people in the Apparently-To: headers, or CCed
them, and the list exploder tried to do the right thing. Then again, I
was in that list in the copy I received, but I haven't gotten two
copies yet, so I may be all wet.

- --Strat

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.1

iQCVAgUBK5qXZtpAw4w47a4DAQEmNwQAq2vJKmD6vWbVbPIkYO2HwyeWJMO7BNGK
hnwiRotk/d5rLesxF5aPo7FJ/QXA5cC5kA4hzsIO8WnFNLCvkuj048v3Ey1Mqsbm
DbmBhMdq/5Vo2R1UCRG2qRYqQ0qauvCwYddaFtkUEw79AEliRPS4C3k6ier/n4ml
wgMwcmSfydI=
=tQ0N
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Doug.Brightwell@Corp.Sun.COM (Doug Brightwell)
Date: Mon, 8 Mar 93 10:20:24 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Pgp 2.2 is out
Message-ID: <9303081818.AA07274@media.Corp.Sun.COM>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



FYI, I tried src.doc.ic.ac.uk:tmp/pgp and the directory was empty.

Doug



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Peter & <shipley@merde.dis.org>
Date: Mon, 8 Mar 93 11:59:47 PST
To: eichin@cygnus.com (Mark Eichin)
Subject: Re: You Aren't [I'm Not]
In-Reply-To: <9303041910.AA28103@cygnus.com>
Message-ID: <9303081847.AA13966@merde.dis.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/x-pgp



-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----


>>   i know of several slip/ppp endpoints that aren't password protected.  more
>>   every day, in fact.
>
>       Are there any slip/ppp/uucp+rmail points that are "open" that
>aren't likely to dry up if they get widely announced? If so, please
>announce them!


I was doing some password ginding a few days ago (I do this as a favor for
a few people, and I sometimes  throw passwd files from friends systems
into the "soup").  Recently I cracked a friends dialup slip password, it was
a hard choice on if I should "slip in" or not (the possiblities of the
practcal jokes was endless).  If I was attampting a malicious attack or
to compromise system integrity for future attacks


                        -Pete

btw: if I "sliped in" I would have just run changed their Xwindow backgrounds
    to say they should correct the situation (nothing malicious).



-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.2

iQBFAgUBK5uUt8hmn7GUWLLFAQHNhAF+LCMvPSR04uf5ORT0oQbDfqbSF+Q4iwD8
K6796+LEdeQu1oIjWcCWITIs9jnKsJUP
=r7Ca
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Doug Mason - MIS Czar <approach!douglas@approach.com>
Date: Mon, 8 Mar 93 14:16:03 PST
To: <cypherpunks@toad.com>
Subject: PGP 2.2 is hard to find...!
Message-ID: <EF2E9B2B815640D9>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain




The _ONLY_ place that I have been able to find PGP 2.2 is on
soda.berkeley.edu, thanks to Eric.  Ever other place that has been
advertised seems to be empty for whatever reasons.  Apparently it was at
some of these locations previously, as others say that this is where their
copy came from, but it is only on Soda as of this morning (Monday).


--Doug

---
Douglas Mason                                douglas@approach.com
Network Administration                       CompuServe: 76646,3367
Approach Software Corporation                +01 415.306.7890




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: The Phantom <phantom@u.washington.edu>
Date: Mon, 8 Mar 93 15:16:27 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: PGP 2.2 is also available at
Message-ID: <Pine.3.05.9303081541.A4358-9100000@stein2.u.washington.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


	
	ftp.u.washington.edu: /pub/user-supported/cypherpunks

This should be a stable site.


Matt Thomlinson
University of Washington, Seattle, Washington.
Internet: phantom@u.washington.edu      	    phone: (206) 528-5732
PGP 2.2  key available via email or finger phantom@hardy.u.washington.edu





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: jim@tadpole.com (Jim Thompson)
Date: Mon, 8 Mar 93 14:15:59 PST
To: crys@cave.tcp.COM
Subject: Re: Pgp 2.2 is out
Message-ID: <9303082117.AA01927@tadpole.tadpole.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



> From cypherpunks-request@toad.com Sun Mar  7 18:01:28 1993
> Date: 07 Mar 1993 18:50:27 -0500
> From: Crys Rides <crys@cave.tcp.COM>
> Subject: Pgp 2.2 is out
> Sender: Crys Rides <crys@cave.tcp.COM>

> Jim> garbo.uwasa.fi:pc/incoming
> The directory was empty, and the files weren't elsewhere on the system
> to an admitedly cursory scan.
Hmm, look in fileutil/pgp22.zip


Heck, its even in ftp.uu.net:/tmp/pgp22.tar.Z,/tmp/pgp22.zip,/tmp/pgp22src.zip
now.

Jim




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: fergp@sytex.com (Paul Ferguson)
Date: Mon, 8 Mar 93 14:15:05 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: PGP v2.2
Message-ID: <TRa5ZB1w165w@sytex.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Would someone be so kind as to post the filename(s), directories and FTP 
locations for PGP v2.2? All references that I have read so far have been 
vague or incomplete.
 
Muchas gracias.
 

Paul Ferguson                     |
Network Integration Consultant    |  "All of life's answers are
Alexandria, Virginia USA          |   on TV."
fergp@sytex.com     (Internet)    |           -- Homer Simpson
sytex.com!fergp     (UUNet)       |
1:109/229           (FidoNet)     |
         PGP public encryption key available upon request.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: markh@wimsey.bc.ca (Mark C. Henderson)
Date: Mon, 8 Mar 93 16:36:08 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: PGP 2.2 is hard to find...!
Message-ID: <9303081627.ZM29189@wimsey.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

Subject: Re: PGP 2.2 is hard to find...!

Also wimsey.bc.ca
~ftp/pub/crypto/PGP/2.2

Mark

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.2

iQCVAgUBK5vkLPfE/ap/JEqpAQEpgAP9FRomKPPC57dyxQhkSh3BXLWxvw+hKtJL
KpkeulGmxK7XTEBvn7P0D+6CwQ3DGTi2zUUr4rN2+0LRo5uEf+fl9OR+JrNSeoy3
ydh59dlhmJAwZepCJVSQP4PsYuoKo6TyGeK5GWWzVIqQDM22QrZI9vdHe76zNi8X
t2uqk0MWsqs=
=sv9a
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Bob Stratton <strat@intercon.com>
Date: Mon, 8 Mar 93 14:15:17 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Encrypted voice protocol?
Message-ID: <9303081648.AA50608@horton.intercon.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> Date: Fri, 5 Mar 93 14:35:15 EST 
> From: dmandl@shearson.com (David Mandl) 
> Subject: Re: Encrypted voice protocol? 
> 
> Yup, big article in the New York Times yesterday (front page!), and a 
> smaller article in today's New York Newsday.  Anyone out there have the 
> time to post either of them to the group??? 

Also, if any of you who'll be at either CFP or the Saturday meeting have it, 
I'd love a xerox.

--Strat







From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Peter Wayner <pcw@access.digex.com>
Date: Mon, 8 Mar 93 14:43:15 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Clinton/Gore and Commerace vs. State...
Message-ID: <199303082241.AA15461@access.digex.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



I seem to remember that Clinton and Gore indicated that
they would move regulation of the encryption technology
from the State Dept to the Commerace Dept when they
were elected. Now, things are more on hold. Can anyone
bring me up-to-date on the whole story? 

-Peter




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: internaut@aol.com
Date: Mon, 8 Mar 93 15:04:06 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: LISTBIZ: Mailer weirdness
Message-ID: <9303081804.tn03793@aol.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>>From:  sneal@muskwa.ucs.ualberta.ca
>>Subj:  Mailer weirdness
>>
>>The last two messages posted to the list by David Del Torto
>>popped up in my mailer with a long list of "Apparently To" >>fields, thus
identifying a bunch of list members.  This is >>something of a breach of
privacy for anyone who didn't want to >>be known as a cypherpunk.
>> 
>>Beggin' your pardon if this strikes you as an amazingly lame
>>thing to bring up; I'm relatively new to mailing lists and       
>>Internet, and my eyes film over after relatively short exposure >>to the
RFCs, so I ain't read all the relevant ones yet.
>> 
>>   -- Stev

    ! ******* !

No, Steve, you're NOT crazy and YES this was a completely unintentional
thing. I did nothing out of the ordinary - I only addressed my mail to the
list (as usual).

Furthermore, my subject field was replaced with "Unknown subject" - which was
expressly NOT the subject of my original posting.

Who's tinkering? ...Please STOP. I don't want my mail or anyone else's to
trigger any more of these listings. I'm wondering out loud if this anomaly
could indicate some subrosa official investigation of our list - perhaps
someone Not Silly at All has been in to take a look and needs these lists of
members?  Hmmmm.

   dave del torto     aka d2t





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: internaut@aol.com
Date: Mon, 8 Mar 93 15:04:36 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: LISTBIZ: metaprefixes update
Message-ID: <9303081805.tn03802@aol.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Hi everybody!

A REMINDER:

In the interest of making the LARGE volume of Cypherpunks list mail a bit
easier to parse visually, we have taken to adding metaprefixes to our subject
fields.

Although this is optional, you may find that many of us ignore your postings
if you don't use some sort of mechanism to help us know what you're posting
about. Several people are automating their mail readers to put your postings
in "boxes" that they want to follow, so please pick up on this habit -
thanks!  :)

Some sample metaprefixes:

ANON:    Anoymity/Pseudonymity
CENSOR:  Cryptography & Censorship
DCASH:   Digital Money, Digital Banking
DCNET:   Dining Cryptographer Nets
FWEE!:   Whistleblower Project
LISTBIZ: General Cypherpunk list business
MTGS:    Physical Meetings/Conferences (e.g. CFP, etc.)
OPIN:    Personal Opinions
PGP:     PGP App/Current Availability on FTP, etc.
RANDOM:  Random Generators
REMAIL:  Remailer technology, Problem reports

(this is probably not a complete listing, but it's MOST of 'em)

Collect 'em all!
Trade 'em with your friends!
Feel free to create your own if the topic of your mail does not fall into one
of these logical cubbyholes.

 d2t





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: ronin@pinetree.org (Douglas Sinclair)
Date: Mon, 8 Mar 93 16:01:59 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Need telnet access
Message-ID: <5ca5ZB1w165w@pinetree.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Hi there.  This is Doug - I'm subscribed to the list as 
dsinclai@acs.ucalgary.ca.  Unfortuantely, though my account is in 
Calgary, I'm flesh in Ottawa.  I also just lost my telnet access as a 
local switch upped its security.  Is anyone out there in a position to 
lend a fellow cypherpunk a hand and get me a telnet account in Ottawa?  
It would be much appreciated.  Please reply to this account.  Thanks.

---
"In the instant of putting Gunhead through the Schonbrunn's 
locked-and-armed Benedict Canyon gate, Rydell had experienced a fleeting 
awareness of something very high, very pure, and quite clinically 
_empty_;" -- William Gibson, _Virtual Light_, yet to be released.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: fen@genmagic.genmagic.com (Fen Labalme)
Date: Mon, 8 Mar 93 18:52:19 PST
To: think@oracle.com
Subject: Fwd: cyberspace, congressional hearings
Message-ID: <9303090251.AA15257@>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> Date: Mon, 8 Mar 1993 17:51:38 -0800
> From: Bruce Smith <bruce@wri.com>
> Subject: cyberspace, congressional hearings

The following is quoted/paraphrased from a column by Brian Robinson on page 26
of the 1 March 93 Electronic Engineering Times. By passing it on I imply no
specific attitude of my own. I don't know the date of the hearings, but if
someone finds out if/when it will be viewable on C-Span, I'd like to know.
Feel free to pass the following info to individuals, mailing lists, or
newsgroups.

---

The House Telecommunications Subcommittee, chaired by Edward Markey (D-Mass),
will soon be holding hearings on the relationship of future communications
technologies to modern culture. In particular, it will be looking at the
not-so-far-off universe of cyberspace. Some of the issues the panel will be
considering are (in Markey's own words):

+ Are the fundamental values of our society so universal and enduring that they
will not be threatened by the advent of new technologies or any new subcultures
such technologies produce?

+ Will cyberspace instead become some lawless place, where the Constitution is
cracked open by fiber fissures created when trying to convert a 200-year-old
parchment document into a binary world of 0s and 1s? Can it continue to be a
"living, breathing document"?

+ Will cyberspace develop its own distinct laws? Will it develop "digital
vigilantes" to patrol and police the electronic bulletin boards and electronic
highways?






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Eric Hughes <hughes@soda.berkeley.edu>
Date: Mon, 8 Mar 93 19:20:10 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: You Aren't [I'm Not]
In-Reply-To: <9303052126.AA02211@SOS>
Message-ID: <9303090316.AA17160@soda.berkeley.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Last night I spoke with Mike Godwin of the EFF about the issue of
anonymous libel.  Mike is not on the list, and I've copied him on this
message.  Mike knows more about electronic speech issues than pretty
much anyone else.  Here is my remembrance about what he said:

1. Anonymous libel exists.  Just because the speech is anonymous does
not mean it can't be libellous.  If libellous speech is made, and you
can infer the identity of the speaker, you can sue.  

2. An anonymous remailer is not liable.  In order to be liable for the
libellous speech, the operator of the remailer would have to have
prior knowledge that the speech was libellous.  Since the operation of
the remailer is fully automated, prior knowledge is impossible.

Those two points are my summary of Mike's opinion.  For further
clarifications, please post to the list and to Mike.  

Left out of this message is any consideration on the _realpolitik_ of
anonymous remailers: whether others will carry such traffic.  I'd like
to not fill Mike's inbox with clutter.

Eric





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: deltorto@aol.com
Date: Mon, 8 Mar 93 18:27:20 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: PGP: MacPGP v2.2 is GO!
Message-ID: <9303082128.tn05369@aol.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Gang,

Thanks to the efforts of Phil Zimmerman, Zbigniew "Zig" Fiedorowicz and
the pgp.dev group, there is a new Macintosh PGP v2.2 (MacPGP) available
to the public FOR EDUCATIONAL PURPOSES ONLY.

The version number is v2.2 b91.

This is the nicest version I have seen yet, replete with sexy interface
features (well, sorta, anyway), well-organized menus and stable
operation FOR EDUCATIONAL PURPOSES ONLY. I will demo it to anyone who
wants to see it at the CFP 93 conference.

Contact me about getting it for your Mac FOR EDUCATIONAL PURPOSES ONLY.
The best way to do this is mail me at <deltorto@aol.com> and give me
your CompuServe, AppleLink or America Online address so I can send it
to you intact (& compressed) FOR EDUCATIONAL PURPOSES ONLY.

Please indicate:
 -1- Your favorite compression scheme.
        Compactor Pro
        StuffIt
        DiskDoubler (my fave)
        I can also send it as a self-expanding archive.

 -2- If this is a _new_ installation, in which case I'll include
     some docs and the randseed.bin and config.txt files along
     with the app.

 -3- Clearly that you intend to use it FOR EDUCATIONAL PURPOSES ONLY.

   d2t





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: internaut@aol.com
Date: Mon, 8 Mar 93 23:31:56 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: VOICE: Encrypted V. protocol
Message-ID: <9303090232.tn07525@aol.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Druids,

>>From:  strat@intercon.com
>>Subj:  Re: Encrypted voice protocol?
>>To:    Internaut
>>
>>> Date: Fri, 5 Mar 93 14:35:15 EST 
>>> From: dmandl@shearson.com (David Mandl) 
>>> Subject: Re: Encrypted voice protocol? 
>>> 
>>> Yup, big article in the New York Times yesterday (front page!), and a 
>>> smaller article in today's New York Newsday.  Anyone out there have the 
>>> time to post either of them to the group??? 

Speaking of which, if ANYONE knows the name, telephone and email
address of the guy who wrote the Article for the NYT - PLEASE send
it to me, (along with the text if any) - I want to have him/her on
file for the Whistleblower Project (aka "WB!").

>>Also, if any of you who'll be at either CFP or the Saturday meeting have
it, 
>>I'd love a xerox

Me too! Bring several copies and we'll pay you for the Xeroxing.

  d2t




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: pfarrell@gmuvax2.gmu.edu (Pat Farrell)
Date: Tue, 9 Mar 93 05:35:25 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: zip version for pgp2.2?
Message-ID: <9303091335.AA21039@gmuvax2.gmu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I just downloaded pgp22.zip from soda, and pkunzip complains about every
file having a bad checksum. I'm still using pkunzip 1.1, and I know
that pgp20 had problems with some versions of pkunzip. Do I need
to get pkunzip 2.04g?
Thanks
Pat




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: robichau@lambda.msfc.nasa.gov (Paul Robichaux)
Date: Wed, 10 Mar 93 11:41:33 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: FWEE!: F-117A post considered harmful
Message-ID: <9303091453.AA11794@lambda.msfc.nasa.gov.msfc.nasa.gov>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


[ disclaimer: I don't work on classified projects anymore. My experience
  as an aircraft mechanic is with helicopters. I read a lot. ]

I believe that the recent anonymous "whistle" purporting to reveal
information about the F-117A aircraft:

	a) didn't reveal any "real" information, and in fact
	contained several factual errors. For example, the 
	Tacit Rainbow program has been cancelled for some time.
	Flight characteristics of the F-117A are very similar to
	the A-7, which is markedly subsonic.

	b) created the appearance of distributing classified
	information. Whistleblowing on fraud/waste/abuse is one
	thing. Disclosing classified information, however-
	especially when it's not relevant to revealing fraud,
	waste, or abuse- is probably not a good way to keep
	the whisteblower group safe from the Three-Letter Gang.

	c) created the appearance that the whistleblowers group
	is for posting anything too "sensitive" for normal,
	attributed posting. I didn't think it was; from reading
	this list, I thought it was for blowing the whistle- not
	blowing smoke.

Perhaps a charter for alt.whistleblowers was posted, and I missed it.
If not, I submit that we should try to develop one.

Regards,
-Paul

-- 
Paul Robichaux, KD4JZG              | May explode if disposed of improperly.
Mission Software Development Div.   | I'm not white- I'm Euro-American.
New Technology, Inc.		    | RIPEM key on request.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: David L Racette <dlr@world.std.com>
Date: Tue, 9 Mar 93 06:05:56 PST
To: Pat Farrell <pfarrell@gmuvax2.gmu.edu>
Subject: Re: zip version for pgp2.2?
In-Reply-To: <9303091335.AA21039@gmuvax2.gmu.edu>
Message-ID: <Pine.3.05.9303090855.A25654-a100000@world.std.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain




On Tue, 9 Mar 1993, Pat Farrell wrote:

> I just downloaded pgp22.zip from soda, and pkunzip complains about every
> file having a bad checksum. I'm still using pkunzip 1.1, and I know
> that pgp20 had problems with some versions of pkunzip. Do I need
> to get pkunzip 2.04g?
> Thanks
> Pat

I dnloaded pgp22.zip from soda and used pkunzip 2.04g to decompress it
without a hitch. Looks like it might be your version of pkzip. Of course
if you didn't use binary for the ftp that would mess it up also.

Dave






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: pfarrell@gmuvax2.gmu.edu (Pat Farrell)
Date: Tue, 9 Mar 93 07:19:21 PST
To: dlr@world.std.com
Subject: Re: zip version for pgp2.2?
Message-ID: <9303091518.AA24407@gmuvax2.gmu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I'll try it again, but I was sure I used binary :-)

Pat




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Duncan Frissell <76630.3577@CompuServe.COM>
Date: Tue, 9 Mar 93 10:28:43 PST
To: <cypherpunks@toad.com>
Subject: PGP: zip version for pgp2.2?
Message-ID: <930309181806_76630.3577_EHL2-1@CompuServe.COM>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Even PGP2.1 wouldn't unzip with PKUNZIP 1.x.  I had to use PKUNZIP 2.4.
I assume PGP22.ZIP is the same.

Duncan Frissell





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: jla@gnu.ai.mit.edu (Joseph Arceneaux)
Date: Tue, 9 Mar 93 10:41:01 PST
To: fen@genmagic.genmagic.com
Subject: Fwd: cyberspace, congressional hearings
In-Reply-To: <9303090251.AA15257@>
Message-ID: <9303091839.AA04773@geech.gnu.ai.mit.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


These hearings look interesting, but it looks to me that the tide is
against solutions which are helpful to society.

I recently saw that the American Library Association is opposed to
putting the Library of Congress online.  They feel that publishers
will retaliate by refusing to allow new books to enter the library
system.  I think it is time to come up with a different paradigm for
our society than "intellectual property".


On Monday March 15 at 10AM KQED's Forumn will have a panel discussion
of "the NREN proposal" and related issues.  Panelists will include EFF
representatives, members of Al Gore's staff, and folks from Silicon
Valley.

Joe




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: shawn mic ael larsonneiolaings <larsons@triton.unm.edu>
Date: Tue, 9 Mar 93 13:27:27 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: SUBSCRIBE
Message-ID: <9303092126.AA13932@triton.unm.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


SUBSCRIBE





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Al Billings <mimir@u.washington.edu>
Date: Tue, 9 Mar 93 17:28:12 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: PGP: zip version for pgp2.2?
In-Reply-To: <930309181806_76630.3577_EHL2-1@CompuServe.COM>
Message-ID: <Pine.3.05z.9303091700.A10580-9100000@carson.u.washington.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain




On 9 Mar 1993, Duncan Frissell wrote:

> Even PGP2.1 wouldn't unzip with PKUNZIP 1.x.  I had to use PKUNZIP 2.4.
> I assume PGP22.ZIP is the same.

 That's strange. I only have version 1.1 of Pkunzip and I have never had a
problem with unzipping PGP and I just unzipped the 2.2 package.







From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Derek Atkins <warlord@Athena.MIT.EDU>
Date: Tue, 9 Mar 93 14:54:07 PST
To: Nickey MacDonald <i6t4@jupiter.sun.csd.unb.ca>
Subject: Re: Questions about PGP 2.2 compilation messages
In-Reply-To: <Pine.3.05.9303091730.A12744-d100000@jupiter>
Message-ID: <9303092252.AA05397@milquetoast.MIT.EDU>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

I looked at the lines where those errors were:  It appears to be
a #define for SKIP_RETURN.  I'm not sure what its about, but I
would suggest doing one of two things:

        1) Test the heck out of your binary.  Make sure it works for all
cases that you find important.  In particular, see where those particular
places in the code are, and see if it is doing the right thing, or

        2) Get gcc 2.3.2 (or greater) and compile with that... I use that,
and I don't get the errors..

Its possible that unproto is doing something funky, or perhaps its something
the compiler is doing with code that says:
        do {
                [do somethine here
        } while(0);

I'm not sure, exactly.  Sun compiler bugs are not unheard of.  ;-)

- -derek

PGP 2 key available upon request on the key-server:
        pgp-public-keys@toxicwaste.mit.edu
- --
  Derek Atkins, MIT '93, Electrical Engineering and Computer Science
     Secretary, MIT Student Information Processing Board (SIPB)
           MIT Media Laboratory, Speech Research Group
           warlord@MIT.EDU       PP-ASEL        N1NWH

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.2

iQBuAgUBK50fkjh0K1zBsGrxAQFTlALDBWJ/yZBRTQoRkI7uc0jo7DF1e/J8DfIB
N7Q9SmdpLTcyFClOoluNZeqJQQpGGyp0I+VgegcX9Ls3PDkXh8/0wfpexa46p6Ex
AAZARjYdyDgZSR8nPv+0YYk=
=zCC0
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Nickey MacDonald <i6t4@jupiter.sun.csd.unb.ca>
Date: Tue, 9 Mar 93 14:04:46 PST
To: cypherpunks list <cypherpunks@toad.com>
Subject: Questions about PGP 2.2 compilation messages
Message-ID: <Pine.3.05.9303091730.A12744-d100000@jupiter>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Sorry for the large size of this post, but I want to make sure I'm not the
only one who has seen this...

This is a log of my compilation of PGP 2.2 on a Sun4...  There are some
warnings that don't look that serious, by should there be any warnings at
all?  (I'd prefer the docs mentioned them if they're supposed to be
there...  but I didn't see any mention in any of the docs...)

--- Log Starts ---
jupiter [/tmp/i6t4/pgp/pgp22/src] {i6t4.50}% make sun4cc
cd unproto && make
`cpp' is up to date.
make all CC=cc LD=cc OBJS_EXT=sparc.o \
CFLAGS="-Qpath unproto -O -DUNIX -DHIGHFIRST -DIDEA32"
cc -Qpath unproto -O -DUNIX -DHIGHFIRST -DIDEA32  -target sun4 -c  pgp.c
cc -Qpath unproto -O -DUNIX -DHIGHFIRST -DIDEA32  -target sun4 -c  crypto.c
"crypto.c", line 910: warning: & before array or function: ignored
cc -Qpath unproto -O -DUNIX -DHIGHFIRST -DIDEA32  -target sun4 -c  keymgmt.c
"keymgmt.c", line 471: warning: statement not reached
"keymgmt.c", line 478: warning: statement not reached
"keymgmt.c", line 490: warning: statement not reached
"keymgmt.c", line 497: warning: statement not reached
"keymgmt.c", line 508: warning: statement not reached
"keymgmt.c", line 516: warning: statement not reached
"keymgmt.c", line 519: warning: statement not reached
"keymgmt.c", line 524: warning: statement not reached
"keymgmt.c", line 529: warning: statement not reached
"keymgmt.c", line 534: warning: statement not reached
"keymgmt.c", line 538: warning: statement not reached
"keymgmt.c", line 587: warning: statement not reached
cc -Qpath unproto -O -DUNIX -DHIGHFIRST -DIDEA32  -target sun4 -c  fileio.c
cc -Qpath unproto -O -DUNIX -DHIGHFIRST -DIDEA32  -target sun4 -c  mdfile.c
cc -Qpath unproto -O -DUNIX -DHIGHFIRST -DIDEA32  -target sun4 -c  more.c
cc -Qpath unproto -O -DUNIX -DHIGHFIRST -DIDEA32  -target sun4 -c  armor.c
cc -Qpath unproto -O -DUNIX -DHIGHFIRST -DIDEA32  -target sun4 -c  mpilib.c
cc -Qpath unproto -O -DUNIX -DHIGHFIRST -DIDEA32  -target sun4 -c  mpiio.c
cc -Qpath unproto -O -DUNIX -DHIGHFIRST -DIDEA32  -target sun4 -c  genprime.c
cc -Qpath unproto -O -DUNIX -DHIGHFIRST -DIDEA32  -target sun4 -c  rsagen.c
cc -Qpath unproto -O -DUNIX -DHIGHFIRST -DIDEA32  -target sun4 -c  random.c
cc -Qpath unproto -O -DUNIX -DHIGHFIRST -DIDEA32  -target sun4 -c  idea.c
cc -Qpath unproto -O -DUNIX -DHIGHFIRST -DIDEA32  -target sun4 -c  passwd.c
cc -Qpath unproto -O -DUNIX -DHIGHFIRST -DIDEA32  -target sun4 -c  md5.c
cc -Qpath unproto -O -DUNIX -DHIGHFIRST -DIDEA32  -target sun4 -c  system.c
cc -Qpath unproto -O -DUNIX -DHIGHFIRST -DIDEA32  -target sun4 -c  language.c
cc -Qpath unproto -O -DUNIX -DHIGHFIRST -DIDEA32  -target sun4 -c  getopt.c
cc -Qpath unproto -O -DUNIX -DHIGHFIRST -DIDEA32  -target sun4 -c  keyadd.c
"keyadd.c", line 760: warning: statement not reached
cc -Qpath unproto -O -DUNIX -DHIGHFIRST -DIDEA32  -target sun4 -c  config.c
cc -Qpath unproto -O -DUNIX -DHIGHFIRST -DIDEA32  -target sun4 -c  keymaint.c
cc -Qpath unproto -O -DUNIX -DHIGHFIRST -DIDEA32  -target sun4 -c  charset.c
cc -Qpath unproto -O -DUNIX -DHIGHFIRST -DIDEA32  -target sun4 -c  zbits.c
cc -Qpath unproto -O -DUNIX -DHIGHFIRST -DIDEA32  -target sun4 -c  zdeflate.c
cc -Qpath unproto -O -DUNIX -DHIGHFIRST -DIDEA32  -target sun4 -c  zfile_io.c
cc -Qpath unproto -O -DUNIX -DHIGHFIRST -DIDEA32  -target sun4 -c  zglobals.c
cc -Qpath unproto -O -DUNIX -DHIGHFIRST -DIDEA32  -target sun4 -c  zinflate.c
cc -Qpath unproto -O -DUNIX -DHIGHFIRST -DIDEA32  -target sun4 -c  zip.c
cc -Qpath unproto -O -DUNIX -DHIGHFIRST -DIDEA32  -target sun4 -c  zipup.c
cc -Qpath unproto -O -DUNIX -DHIGHFIRST -DIDEA32  -target sun4 -c  ztrees.c
cc -Qpath unproto -O -DUNIX -DHIGHFIRST -DIDEA32  -target sun4 -c  zunzip.c
as  -sparc -o sparc.o sparc.s
cc -o pgp pgp.o crypto.o keymgmt.o fileio.o  mdfile.o more.o armor.o mpilib.o mp

iio.o  genprime.o rsagen.o random.o idea.o passwd.o  md5.o system.o language.o g

etopt.o keyadd.o  config.o keymaint.o charset.o zbits.o zdeflate.o zfile_io.o zg

lobals.o  zinflate.o zip.o zipup.o ztrees.o zunzip.o sparc.o
--- Log Ends ---

Anyone care to comment?

---
Nick MacDonald               | NMD on IRC
i6t4@jupiter.sun.csd.unb.ca  | PGP 2.1 Public key available via finger






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Eric Fogleman <Eric.Fogleman@analog.com>
Date: Tue, 9 Mar 93 17:32:26 PST
To: i6t4@jupiter.sun.csd.unb.ca
Subject: Re: Questions about PGP 2.2 compilation messages
Message-ID: <9303100125.AA10660@ack.adstest.analog.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Nickey,

I recently compiled _pgp2.1_ on my sun4 and had a similar problem...  I
got a binary that seemed to work, but I got a list of warnings.

In my case, the program actually had a bug in it; it was trying to
compare an unsigned character variable (8 bits) for maximum path length
to 256 (nine bits) as defined in the source code.  I asked around on
the list and I got the same sort of responses you did...

I ended up redefining and changing the compare statement to make the
compiler happy and still get the intended code...

So, pgp may not be entirely bug free...  The sun4 compiler may be more
conscientious about flagging things.  I'd suggest looking through the
source to see if there's something simple.  In my case, it was.

Let me know how you fare; I'll be going through the same thing shortly...

Eric Fogleman




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: kelly@netcom.com (Kelly Goen)
Date: Wed, 10 Mar 93 00:57:52 PST
To: simsong@netxworld.com
Subject: NSA TApping
Message-ID: <9303100856.AA10642@netcom.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Xref: netcom.com sci.crypt:12315 alt.privacy:6117
Path: netcom.com!netcomsv!decwrl!waikato.ac.nz!aukuni.ac.nz!cs18.cs.aukuni.ac.nz!pgut1
Newsgroups: sci.crypt,alt.privacy
Subject: NSA tapping of UK communications
Message-ID: <1993Mar8.104302.10737@cs.aukuni.ac.nz>
From: pgut1@cs.aukuni.ac.nz (PeterClaus          Gutmann        )
Date: Mon, 8 Mar 1993 10:43:02 GMT
Organization: Computer Science Dept. University of Auckland
Lines: 26

The following appeared in the NZ Herald on March 4th - I thought it might be of
interest to sci.crypt and alt.privacy readers.  It backs up claims made in
places like "The Puzzle Palace":
 
"  A former MI6 officer told the Daily Express that US agents tapped royal
 calls on behalf of the GCHQ spy centre.
   Mr James Rusbridger told the paper two top-secret listening stations -
 operated by the NSA - illegally tap large numbers of private conversations
 from their bases in Cornwall and Yorkshire.
   'By getting the Americans to do it, the British Government is able to say
 truthfully, though misleadingly, that GCHQ does not tap domestic telephone
 calls', Mr Rusbridger said.
   'The reason the Government is resisting an official investigation into the
 tapping of royal conversations is that it would be forced to admit publicly
 that these American owned and controlled listening stations exist on UK soil'.
 
Incidentally, NZ has it's own NSA-controlled listening stations, the largest
being at Tangimoana on the South Island.
 
Peter.
--
 pgut1@cs.aukuni.ac.nz||p_gutmann@cs.aukuni.ac.nz||gutmann_p@kosmos.wcc.govt.nz
peterg@kcbbs.gen.nz||peter@nacjack.gen.nz||peter@phlarnschlorpht.nacjack.gen.nz
             (In order of preference - one of 'em's bound to work)
             -- C++ will do for C what Algol 68 did for Algol --





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: dclunie@pax.tpa.com.au (David Clunie)
Date: Tue, 9 Mar 93 14:27:31 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: PGP: zip version for pgp2.2?
Message-ID: <9303092222.AA02495@britt>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> Even PGP2.1 wouldn't unzip with PKUNZIP 1.x.  I had to use PKUNZIP 2.4.
> I assume PGP22.ZIP is the same.

I would not make this assumption ... I will try it when the zip files
have finished ftp'ing across and let you know.

david




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: richard_mezirka@askinc.ask.com (Richard Mezirka)
Date: Wed, 10 Mar 93 09:41:50 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: March 1993 Communications of ACM Denning on Encryption
Message-ID: <9303101739.AA22396@askinc.ask.COM>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I've just read with considerable distress the Dorothy Denning article in 
my March 1993, Communications of the ACM and all the follow up 
discussions supporting or refuting her positions.  I can not in any way 
support the further erosion of the rights I believe I have to personal  
privacy and protection from the abuses of government. I'm contacting 
the EFF as a concerned member and the ACM Risk forum... are there 
more actions we can and should take? 

Professor Denning does not convince me of the benevolence of the 
government nor the necessity for private enterprise to foster 
government programs (such as building in wire tap support or reducing 
the effort of government agencies to invade private messages or 
interactions amongst citizens). A precidential extension might have 
the auto makers building in governors into all vehicles such that they 
can't exceed the national speed limit to support traffic law 
enforcement (the crooks couldn't have faster cars than the cops).

I'd suggest cypherpunks get and read the article if they haven't already 
done so (it covers both wire tap and , as a not too subtle tag on, 
encryption availability). I'd also suggest we direct our responses to 
those who can derail this or similar legislation with the EFF and ACM 
as two likely candidates and congress folks as additional ones. 

My  personal professional dilemma is how can I raise consciousness 
of  the quiet majority who will not immediately be impacted... like my 
retired parents who fear computers like the flu and still have a strong 
belief that the government protects their rights rather than restricts 
them. Their response to Steve Jackson's tiff with the treasury 
department and law enforcement was along the lines that if he had 
nothing to hide the government wouldn't have bothered him.

Still watching quietly, worried, and now letting others know...
Rich





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: John.Nieder@f33.n125.z1.FIDONET.ORG (John Nieder)
Date: Wed, 10 Mar 93 13:01:23 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: zip version for pgp2.2?
Message-ID: <5296.2B9E5101@fidogate.FIDONET.ORG>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



 * Reply to msg originally in Cypherpunks              <INET>

 BK> I just downloaded pgp22.zip from soda, and pkunzip complains about
 BK> every file having a bad checksum. I'm still using pkunzip 1.1, and I
 BK> know that pgp20 had problems with some versions of pkunzip. Do I need
 BK> to get pkunzip 2.04g?

The problem I found was that the file was not only compressed with the
2.04? PKZip, but that the -d option had been invoked to preserve a very
silly \DOC subdirectory for the documentation.  The result was that
PGP22.ZIP could not be unZIPped with _either_ version's simple PKUNZIP
command, but required the 2.04 version with the -d switch in the command
line.
   I finally got the file unZIPped, but rezipped it as a simple .ZIPfile
- without the ridiculous subdirectory - with v 1.10, which will unpack
with either version.  It's this package that I'm passing along.
   Hope this helps.

        JN

... When the going gets tough, the smart get lost.
--- Blue Wave/Opus v2.12 [NR]--  
John Nieder - via FidoNet node 1:125/555
    UUCP - ...!uunet!hoptoad!kumr!fidogate!33!John.Nieder
INTERNET - John.Nieder@f33.n125.z1.FIDONET.ORG




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: fergp@sytex.com (Paul Ferguson)
Date: Wed, 10 Mar 93 12:34:18 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Steve Jackson Games - Legal issues resolved?
Message-ID: <i6T8ZB3w165w@sytex.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


This text was extracted from RISKS DIGEST 14.39 -
 
8<------- Cut Here -----------------------
 
Date: Tue, 9 Mar 93 10:25:35 -0500
From: Eric Haines <erich@eye.com>
Subject: Steve Jackson Games/Secret Service wrapup
 
   [Eric Haines, erich@eye.com, sent me a Houston Chronicle article
   by Joe Abernathy, a sometime contributor to RISKS, which Eric found
   in the electronic mail magazine "Desperado" ("no, it's not a magazine
   about hacking").  "There can be justice in the world, after all..."  
EH.
   I cannot include the long copyrighted article here, but have excerpted
   from the beginning, as follows.  It's a good article.  Alas, no date.
   But Joe may still be available at Joe.Abernathy@houston.chron.com if
   you want to dig up the whole thing.  Also, see RISKS-9.95,96;10.01,ff.
   for the    earlier history.  PGN]
 
Steve Jackson Games/Secret Service wrapup
By JOE ABERNATHY Copyright 1993, Houston Chronicle [no date given]
 
 AUSTIN -- An electronic civil rights case against the Secret Service
 closed Thursday with a clear statement by federal District Judge Sam
 Sparks that the Service failed to conduct a proper investigation in a
 notorious computer crime crackdown, and went too far in retaining
 custody of seized equipment.
 
 The judge's formal findings in the complex case, which will likely set
 new legal precedents, won't be returned until later.  [...]
 
 The judge's rebuke apparently convinced the Department of Justice to
 close its defense after calling only ... one of the several government
 witnesses on hand.  "The Secret Service didn't do a good job in this
 case.  We know no investigation took place.  Nobody ever gave any
 concern as to whether (legal) statutes were involved.  We know there
 was damage," Sparks said in weighing damages.
 
 The lawsuit, brought by Steve Jackson Games of Austin, said that the
 seizure of three computers violated the Privacy Protection Act, which
 provides First Amendment protections against seizing a publisher's works
 in progress.  The lawsuit further said that since one of the computers
 was being used to run a bulletin board system containing private
 electronic mail, the seizure violated the Electronic Communications
 Privacy Act in regards to the 388 callers of the Illuminati BBS.
 
The testimony described by Joe was rather strange.  Agents testified that
there was no criminal connection, they were not even trained in the
Privacy Protection Act, and it took them only an hour to discover the
true nature of the situation.  The Electronic Frontier Foundation spent
over $200,000 bringing this case to trial.  The legal ramifications are
considerable. Perhaps someone from EFF will contribute an analysis to
RISKS, although many EFFers (and I) are at Computers, Freedom, and
Privacy 93 this week.  Don't hold your breath, but perhaps we need to
wait for the judge?  PGN
 
8<------- Cut Here -----------------------
 
Cheers.

Paul Ferguson                     |
Network Integration Consultant    |  "All of life's answers are
Alexandria, Virginia USA          |   on TV."
fergp@sytex.com     (Internet)    |           -- Homer Simpson
sytex.com!fergp     (UUNet)       |
1:109/229           (FidoNet)     |
         PGP public encryption key available upon request.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: derek@cs.wisc.edu (Derek Zahn)
Date: Wed, 10 Mar 93 12:04:10 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Hidden encrypted messages
Message-ID: <9303102002.AA24037@lynx.cs.wisc.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



If true encryption is ever outlawed in the U.S., I wonder if it's
possible to have an encryption technique that preserves plausible
deniability.  That is, if seemingly innocuous messages could contain
encrypted messages (for example, first-letter-of-words strung
together).  In such a case, I'd think that it would be difficult
to prove that said message contained a hidden message unless the
decryption key was available (the embedded encrypted message wouldn't
look suspicious, even if an onlooker knew where to look).  Is
this a common idea in cryptographic circles?

derek





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: J. Michael Diehl <mdiehl@triton.unm.edu>
Date: Wed, 10 Mar 93 13:13:58 PST
To: richard_mezirka@askinc.ask.com (Richard Mezirka)
Subject: Re: March 1993 Communications of ACM Denning on Encryption
In-Reply-To: <9303101739.AA22396@askinc.ask.COM>
Message-ID: <9303102112.AA29509@triton.unm.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> I've just read with considerable distress the Dorothy Denning article in 
> my March 1993, Communications of the ACM and all the follow up 
> discussions supporting or refuting her positions.  I can not in any way 
> support the further erosion of the rights I believe I have to personal  
> privacy and protection from the abuses of government. I'm contacting 
> the EFF as a concerned member and the ACM Risk forum... are there 
> more actions we can and should take? 
> 
> I'd suggest cypherpunks get and read the article if they haven't already 
> done so (it covers both wire tap and , as a not too subtle tag on, 

But don't buy the articles.  Get them at the library.  No point in giving them 
your money and your opinions! ;^)

> encryption availability). I'd also suggest we direct our responses to 
> those who can derail this or similar legislation with the EFF and ACM 
> as two likely candidates and congress folks as additional ones. 

Next time someone tells me to get in touch with someone to complain to and 
doesn't give me their address, I'LL SCREEM!  Not a flame, just a (subtle) 
suggestion. ;^)

We need to publish the addresses of various people, so that those people can get
a "proper" understanding of our fears/outrage.

Just my $.02.

+----------------------+----------------------------------------------------+
| J. Michael Diehl ;-) |  I thought I was wrong once.  But, I was mistaken. |
|                      +----------------------------------------------------+
| mdiehl@triton.unm.edu| "I'm just looking for the opportunity to be        |
| Thunder@forum        |            Politically Incorrect!                  |
| (505) 299-2282       |                        <me>                        |
+----------------------+----------------------------------------------------+




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: J. Michael Diehl <mdiehl@triton.unm.edu>
Date: Wed, 10 Mar 93 13:18:46 PST
To: robichau@lambda.msfc.nasa.gov (Paul Robichaux)
Subject: Re: FWEE!: F-117A post considered harmful
In-Reply-To: <9303091453.AA11794@lambda.msfc.nasa.gov.msfc.nasa.gov>
Message-ID: <9303102117.AA00331@triton.unm.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Lets assume that the poster was a "good-guy," as opposed to just a prankster.

Then he has pointed out a serious flaw in the WB system.  He has demonstrated 
the ability for a person to obtain (bonefied) classified information and 
broadcast it worldwide, with out any fear of being caught or censored.  I 
support anonymity, but I wonder about how it will be "regulated" to keep this
from happening for real.

Comments?

+----------------------+----------------------------------------------------+
| J. Michael Diehl ;-) |  I thought I was wrong once.  But, I was mistaken. |
|                      +----------------------------------------------------+
| mdiehl@triton.unm.edu| "I'm just looking for the opportunity to be        |
| Thunder@forum        |            Politically Incorrect!                  |
| (505) 299-2282       |                        <me>                        |
+----------------------+----------------------------------------------------+




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: jthomas@mango.mitre.org (Joe Thomas)
Date: Wed, 10 Mar 93 12:14:43 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: FWEE!: Re: F-117A post considered harmful
Message-ID: <9303102010.AA00726@mango>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Hmm...  I thought that was the point.

When I read the F-117A message, I thought the poster was trying to  
point out that a "whistleblower"-type newsgroup could be abused by  
people trying to leak classified information (not that that should be  
news to anyone).  I didn't take the information in it any more  
seriously than I took DeadBeat's request that I send him my e-mail  
address through anon.penet.fi, so he could describe a security hole  
there.

Am I the only one who got that impression?

Joe




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: J. Michael Diehl <mdiehl@triton.unm.edu>
Date: Wed, 10 Mar 93 15:30:31 PST
To: corwin@cayman.com (Lord Among Panthers)
Subject: Re: Hidden encrypted messages
In-Reply-To: <9303102302.AA23528@cuba.Cayman.COM>
Message-ID: <9303102329.AA14202@triton.unm.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> There is an even simpler solution.  Encrypt your message as you
> normally would, and what do you end up with?  A bunch of seemingly
> random bits.  Wrap a little header around it claiming it is data from
> a Johnson-Noise measurement experiment, or some such thing.  To
> increase plausibility, you can build yourself a Johnson Noise
> measurement aparatus (all you need is a high-sensativity voltmeter and
> a resistor).


Or, how about making it look like a uuencoded binary.  The filename could stand
for the subject of the letter.  If you don't specify the platform or purpose of
the file, it would be hard to find out that it wasn't really uuencoded data.

Thoughts?

+----------------------+----------------------------------------------------+
| J. Michael Diehl ;-) |  I thought I was wrong once.  But, I was mistaken. |
|                      +----------------------------------------------------+
| mdiehl@triton.unm.edu| "I'm just looking for the opportunity to be        |
| Thunder@forum        |            Politically Incorrect!                  |
| (505) 299-2282       |                        <me>                        |
+----------------------+----------------------------------------------------+




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu
Date: Wed, 10 Mar 93 16:06:35 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: CRYPT: Dingaling Denning & random # generators
In-Reply-To: <9303102302.AA23528@cuba.Cayman.COM>
Message-ID: <9303110005.AA03709@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



I don't think we need to be too concerned about D. Denning's proposals
(the D. stands for Dingaling, in case you're wondering). Has she
addressed `adequately' the issue of giving false keys to the archiving
authority in her article? (If such a thing is even possible.) The whole
idea sounds so unbelievably unrealistic and bizarre I can't believe
anyone with a significant intelligence or reputation on the line would
propose it (but then again, academics can make a living on outdoing
each other in their unrealistic and bizarre proposals).

I don't really see how this idea of wiretappable encrypted
communications could be carried out, unless there are some kind of
centralized encryption servers run by the government (I'm ashamed to
even say such a thing), and make "private" encryption illegal.  This
smacks of such blatant totalitarianism I can't imagine anyone in the
U.S. seriously considering it (except, of course, perhaps law
enforcement types or NSA operatives).  Considering how much copiers
were regulated in the Soviet Union, I can't say that it'd be impossible
to regulate every single of the 100's of millions of PC's in the world
or in a country to pull this off, but there's no end to the strange
effects brewed from isolated, idealistic bureacrats (and no limit to
the severity of threats to freedom...)

As I posted once to sci.crypt: encrypted communication is virtually
interchangeable with and indistinguishable from communication itself.
How does someone `know' that you are encrypting a message? Even
straight ASCII messages can contain encrypted messages. (In fact, it
would be interesting to write an application that will take any message
and encode it like this.)  Can you imagine the Meaning Police showing
up on your doorstep demanding to know what your last message REALLY
MEANS, and smirking malevolently when you insist that it's just a love
note to your girlfriend? Unless a really severe cold front hits Hell, I
think we're safe on this one.  The thing we DO need to be VERY AFRAID
OF, and LOBBY VEHEMENTLY AGAINST, is bizarre laws that are vague and
can be twisted to whatever means police desire, and put the burden of
proof and recovery on possibly innocent victims, such as the
without-due-process property-confiscating drug laws we have now.

(I suppose one possibility is requiring `carriers' -- phone companies,
telegraph services, etc.--to provide keys for messages they encrypt.
But what is the strength of nonlocal encryption? Would anybody use
this?  I guess there are a lot of unsophisticated people who want
somebody else to do their encryption for 'em, but boy, not I...)

To do something like have completely tappable communications, we'd need
half the country to monitor the other half, to make sure nothing out of
context is going on. Only problem with this is, who monitors the
monitors? (The cypherpunks?)  (I suppose I shouldn't be so flippant,
because Nazi Germany was one example of a state with a comprehensive
populace-monitoring apparatus...)

No, I don't buy that paranoid plop about how it would be "trivial" to
set up filters that "detect" encryption, or that this is happening on a
widespread scale by the NSA in the U.S. This is an absolutely absurd
claim.  These mechanisms could be just as trivially defeated (although
a-priori knowledge of their function may be required).  People who
think encryption is different from communication think that symbols are
different than letters.  Speaking as a programmer, good luck explaining
it to a computer.

I just think Mrs. Denning is well-intentioned but completely out of
touch with reality on this one (hm, what's a nice academic PC term for
this? cluefully challenged?) Is *anybody* taking her seriously? Maybe
we should start an email campaign to SEND HER CLUES.  Maybe a Cease and
Desist court order?  Maybe we could get the police to do a search on
her house for all her cryptography keys (hehe, anonymous tip that she
keeps an encrypted database of illegal activities? sorry, don't take me seriously).

- - -

From: corwin@Cayman.COM (Lord Among Panthers)

>Encrypt your message as you
>normally would, and what do you end up with?  A bunch of seemingly
>random bits.  Wrap a little header around it claiming it is data from
>a Johnson-Noise measurement experiment, or some such thing.  To
>increase plausibility, you can build yourself a Johnson Noise
>measurement aparatus (all you need is a high-sensativity voltmeter and
>a resistor).

*= <- light bulb going off -- hm, could something like that be used as
a hardware random number generator?




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Date: Wed, 10 Mar 93 17:08:44 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: F-117A Nighthawk post--Conclusions of Experiment
Message-ID: <9303110107.AA05111@netcom.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


J. Michael Diehl guesses the truth:

>Lets assume that the poster was a "good-guy," as opposed to just a prankster.
>
>Then he has pointed out a serious flaw in the WB system.  He has demonstrated 
>the ability for a person to obtain (bonefied) classified information and 
>broadcast it worldwide, with out any fear of being caught or censored.  I 
>support anonymity, but I wonder about how it will be "regulated" to keep this
>from happening for real.
>
>Comments?

Well, I _hope_ I am a good guy, at least by the standards of this list.

I posted the F-117A "revelations" about the Stealth fighter, through a
series of 6 or 7 remailers (which I first tested, as I like to do, by
pinging them all) in order to examine the reactions of the list to what
"whistleblowing" acts are very likely to look like.

The reactions have been interesting. Some of you got angry, some even
practically foamed at the mouth, calling me a "treasonous fool." Fair
enough, as I hoped to see this kind of range of opinions. 

Some points:

1. Nothing in the posting, as some of you observed, was controversial or
classified. I took an article from the book, "Stealth Technology: The Art
of Black Magic," J. Jones, Aero Books, 1989, and scanned it and OCRed it. A
few "probably"s and "could be"s were deleted, and minor other changes were
made (e.g., I converted approximate numbers to precise--though of course
wrong--numbers). The speculations about supersonic capability were in the
original--I can't say how plausible they are. Likewise, the stuff about
"changing color" was also in the original (I was trained as
physicist--would I make something like that up?).

2. Ironically, the "Discovery Channel" ran an hour-long program,
"Nighthawk: Secrets of the Stealth," which was many times more revealing
than my post. "Aviation Week and Space Technology," also known as "Aviation
Leak and Spy Technology," has also carried far more detailed information
over the years.

3. As both Joe Thomas and J. Michael Diehl pointed out, I was "testing" the
nascent "whistleblower" system. I decided it would be interesting to guage
the reaction of the list to what might at first glance look like classified
information being posted--something we can surely expect to see if the
"whistleblower" group really gets going. (That, and deliberate
misinformation to discredit the group, flames to drown out the actual
whistleblowing, illegal or grossly offensive material to try to get the
group taken off the Net, etc.)

If you folks really want to set such a thing up, better be prepared for all
kinds of weird stuff. Of course, the posting of "classified"
documents--ersatz though this one may have been (in the sense of not being
classified!)--can happen even without the "whistleblower"
connotations...any anonymous remailer will work, naturally. But a
whistleblower list (which I support, by the way) is going to attract all
kinds of strange postings, once publicity is gotten (as it must, else
what's the point?).

4. On the appropriateness of defense information as "whistleblower"
material, consider these facts: The most serious cases of whistleblowing in
the last few years have been on *defense* issues--coast over-runs, weapons
systems that failed to work or were unsafe, bribes to DoD or company
officials, and so on. This is the fodder for "60 Minutes" and "20/20,"
who've all run pieces on defective weapons systems, the Bradley Fighting
Vehicle, the Apache Helicopter, the "DIVAD" gun, and so on. (Would my
article have been any less offensive to some of the censorious among you if
I'd fabricated stuff about the Nighthawk not meeting design goals, not
being safe to fly, costing too much, etc.? I suspect not.)

5. In most cases, the DoD has tried to limit the scrutiny on such systems
by invoking "national security" as a cloak. This, even though the Soviets
already had the info--generally far in advance and in much greater detail.
The invocation of national security has generally resulted in Americans
being ignorant of malfeasance and chicanery. The whole idea of the
whistleblowing list is to allow anonymous, untraceable postings of
controversial material like this! Much of what is posted will by necessity
contain material that someone thinks should not be released to the public.
Q.E.D. (or haven't folks thought this one out?).

(So if you whistleblower advocates out there are going to get cold feet
when seemingly sensitive materials is sent out, you'd better just quit
right now!)

6. Paul Robichaux and Dave Deltorto have opined that posts like this should
*not* be posted (and tell me how they'll ever be stopped in the real
world?), as they invite the attention of the NSA and other TLAs (Three
Letter Acronyms). This seems overly paranoid for even this list, given the
megabytes of solid info published by Av Leak and other technical mags. If
some defense stuff is going to get us shut down, we'd better stop now.

(Actually, the problems with the whistleblower's list or group are
sufficiently clear that I'd recommend that nobody be _formally_ affiliated
with it. If it just "appears," somehow, probably in the alt heierchy, then
people can post to it through anonymous remailers.)

7. Speaking of which, a whistleblowers group will likely face attack on
several fronts, depending on whose ox is gored. There may in fact be
deliberate postings of truly classified material just to cause the group to
be shut down (or to cause Internet sites not to carry it, etc.). Some child
porn posted anonymously may get nearly any group pulled. Ditto for
Holocause revisionism, racist jokes, extortion demands, etc. Consider my
little experiment a very benign little "innoculation," a hint of what to
expect.

8. Again, I feel we should all be _using_ anonymous remailers to test, or
probe, these various ideas we have. Better that we try out a few ideas
related to "whistleblowing" in the safety of our own group before launching
it out into the world.

Of course, now that I've exposed myself as the originator, this may make
you all skeptical of posts from "Anonymous" or "Nobody." And you _should_
be skeptical!
That's an important part of the whole process.

And don't assume everything from "Anonymous" is from me!

Cheers,

-"Anonymous"

aka, Tim May, Cypherpunk, Crypto Anarchist, and Gadfly


--
Timothy C. May               | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,  
tcmay@netcom.com        | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
408-688-5409               | knowledge, reputations, information markets, 
W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA       | black markets, collapse of governments.
Higher Power: 2^756839 | Public Key: MailSafe and PGP available.





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: corwin@Cayman.COM (Lord Among Panthers)
Date: Wed, 10 Mar 93 15:03:31 PST
To: derek@cs.wisc.edu
Subject: Hidden encrypted messages
In-Reply-To: <9303102002.AA24037@lynx.cs.wisc.edu>
Message-ID: <9303102302.AA23528@cuba.Cayman.COM>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


There is an even simpler solution.  Encrypt your message as you
normally would, and what do you end up with?  A bunch of seemingly
random bits.  Wrap a little header around it claiming it is data from
a Johnson-Noise measurement experiment, or some such thing.  To
increase plausibility, you can build yourself a Johnson Noise
measurement aparatus (all you need is a high-sensativity voltmeter and
a resistor).

corwin








From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Derek Atkins <warlord@MIT.EDU>
Date: Wed, 10 Mar 93 15:47:22 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: MEET: San Diego Trip in my future
Message-ID: <9303102346.AA15180@deathtongue.MIT.EDU>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

Hi.

I am going to be in the San Diego area for the weekend of March 20th.
I don't know where I'm going to be staying, and I don't know the San
Diego area at all.  (I do know that I will be near the beach ;-)

However I'd like to meet people, if they have time to get together.
If you have time and want to meet some time that weekend, please send
me a piece of mail and let me know.

OBTW -- what are the good 2m and 70cm repeaters out there?  ;-)

- -derek

PGP 2 key available upon request on the key-server:
	pgp-public-keys@toxicwaste.mit.edu
- --
  Derek Atkins, MIT '93, Electrical Engineering and Computer Science
     Secretary, MIT Student Information Processing Board (SIPB)
           MIT Media Laboratory, Speech Research Group
           warlord@MIT.EDU       PP-ASEL        N1NWH

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.2

iQBuAgUBK559fDh0K1zBsGrxAQFCeQLFGYxSChJPELdBQoutkMYa55OuxJP3e9wW
PTEsrn6U1sC5p6SnyC7Al9mb38vBtmoSLnT88udMwgsbE0dJ0P//lRm4MZUVJINn
83yy3ouSyKLSk/pq2YN6Bcg=
=6M90
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: J. Michael Diehl <mdiehl@triton.unm.edu>
Date: Wed, 10 Mar 93 19:06:19 PST
To: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Subject: Re: F-117A Nighthawk post--Conclusions of Experiment
In-Reply-To: <9303110107.AA05111@netcom.netcom.com>
Message-ID: <9303110304.AA11055@triton.unm.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> J. Michael Diehl guesses the truth:
> 
> >Lets assume that the poster was a "good-guy," as opposed to just a prankster.
> >
> >Then he has pointed out a serious flaw in the WB system.  He has demonstrated 
Oh how I like to be told I'm right! Wish it happened more often. ;^)

> >the ability for a person to obtain (bonefied) classified information and 
> >broadcast it worldwide, with out any fear of being caught or censored.  I 
> >support anonymity, but I wonder about how it will be "regulated" to keep this
> >from happening for real.
> >
> >Comments?
> 
> Well, I _hope_ I am a good guy, at least by the standards of this list.
> 
> The reactions have been interesting. Some of you got angry, some even
> practically foamed at the mouth, calling me a "treasonous fool." Fair
> enough, as I hoped to see this kind of range of opinions. 

Reminder:  "Treasonous fools" started the Revolutionary War.

> 1. Nothing in the posting, as some of you observed, was controversial or
> classified. I took an article from the book, "Stealth Technology: The Art

Well, I didn't read it completely, but printed it instead, thinking it might
be juicy.  Can you say Gotcha? ;^)

> 6. Paul Robichaux and Dave Deltorto have opined that posts like this should
> *not* be posted (and tell me how they'll ever be stopped in the real
> world?), as they invite the attention of the NSA and other TLAs (Three
> Letter Acronyms). This seems overly paranoid for even this list, given the

No it is not.  I assume that the TLA's read EVERYTHING I post.  How's that
for paranoia?
> 
> (Actually, the problems with the whistleblower's list or group are
> sufficiently clear that I'd recommend that nobody be _formally_ affiliated
> with it. If it just "appears," somehow, probably in the alt heierchy, then
> people can post to it through anonymous remailers.)

Good point, but please read my closing comments.
> 
> 7. Speaking of which, a whistleblowers group will likely face attack on
> several fronts, depending on whose ox is gored. There may in fact be
> deliberate postings of truly classified material just to cause the group to
> be shut down (or to cause Internet sites not to carry it, etc.). Some child
> porn posted anonymously may get nearly any group pulled. Ditto for
> Holocause revisionism, racist jokes, extortion demands, etc. Consider my
> little experiment a very benign little "innoculation," a hint of what to
> expect.

Perhapse by a TLA?
> 

Once anonymous remailers become widely used, they will become "powerfull."  When
they become "too" powerfull, they will be under attack.  The eventual goal being
to shut them down on an individual basis.  I don't see them being attacked as a
whole.  The attack will be to simply shut them down.  Well, perhapse an attack
might be to discredit them...as a whole, but I digress.

What we need is a protocol that would notify the rest of the net/world when a
remailer is shut down.  What if the bbs in opperation Sundevil was expected to
send a message every day to other sites around the world.  When the bbs was
shut down, that message wouldn't be sent and every one would know what 
happened?  I don't have time to go on, but does anyone have any comments?

+----------------------+----------------------------------------------------+
| J. Michael Diehl ;-) |  I thought I was wrong once.  But, I was mistaken. |
|                      +----------------------------------------------------+
| mdiehl@triton.unm.edu| "I'm just looking for the opportunity to be        |
| Thunder@forum        |            Politically Incorrect!                  |
| (505) 299-2282       |                        <me>                        |
+----------------------+----------------------------------------------------+




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Tony Kidson <tony@morgan.demon.co.uk>
Date: Wed, 10 Mar 93 18:46:05 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: FWEE!: F-117A post considered harmful
Message-ID: <3369@morgan.demon.co.uk>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


In message <9303091453.AA11794@lambda.msfc.nasa.gov.msfc.nasa.gov> you write:
> [ disclaimer: I don't work on classified projects anymore. My experience
>   as an aircraft mechanic is with helicopters. I read a lot. ]
>
> I believe that the recent anonymous "whistle" purporting to reveal
> information about the F-117A aircraft:

>     thing. Disclosing classified information, however-
> 	especially when it's not relevant to revealing fraud,
> 	waste, or abuse- is probably not a good way to keep
> 	the whisteblower group safe from the Three-Letter Gang.
>
Perhaps that was the idea???

Tony
+-----------------+-------------------------------+--------------------------+
| Tony Kidson     | ** PGP 2.1 Key by request **  | Voice +44 81 466 5127    |
| Morgan Towers,  |  The Cat has had to move now  | E-Mail(in order)         |
| Morgan Road,    |  as I've had to take the top  | tony@morgan.demon.co.uk  |
| Bromley,        |  off of the machine.          | tny@cix.compulink.co.uk  |
| England BR1 3QE |Honda ST1100 -=<*>=- DoD# 0801 | 100024.301@compuserve.com|
+-----------------+-------------------------------+--------------------------+




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: internaut@aol.com
Date: Wed, 10 Mar 93 21:31:31 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: FWEE!: Markoff/NYT/VoiceCrypt
Message-ID: <9303110032.tn17218@aol.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Thanks to everyone who sent John Markoff's name, email address
and/or past life animal. I'll let all of you know what transpires
when I buzz him about the VoiceCrypt article and get some info
for the Whistleblower Project.

BTW, Pretty amazing day at CFP today (especially the session on
Censorship on the 'net): watch this cyberspace for details next
week...

Not-Entirely-Unrelated note: to all of you who have asked for a
FTP-able version of MacPGP, I will provide that this Sunday (the
life of a CFP volunteer!). Hope you can all keep your pants on
until then.  :)  It's worth the wait.

  dave

"It's not the voting that makes Democracy, it's the counting."
   - T. Stoppard




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: nobody@pmantis.berkeley.edu
Date: Thu, 11 Mar 93 01:16:28 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: PGP Tutorial Gone.
Message-ID: <9303110917.AA12013@pmantis.berkeley.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


soda.berkeley.edu is supposed to have several files reguarding pgp.  The
problem is that this site is refusing connections.  Could we get an
alternative site?




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Alexander Chislenko <sasha@ra.cs.umb.edu>
Date: Wed, 10 Mar 93 22:38:11 PST
To: corwin@Cayman.COM
Subject: Re:  Hidden encrypted messages
Message-ID: <199303110636.AA09866@ra.cs.umb.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


   What about encoding a message by chnging spacing between the words?
It is surely not the most compact method, but one might be able to transmit
a pretty long message hidden in the text of "Alice in Wonderland" that
would still be neatly formatted and *word-to-word* indistinguishable from
the original.
   
 Alex.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: ghoast@gnu.ai.mit.edu
Date: Wed, 10 Mar 93 23:14:55 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re:  Hidden encrypted messages
Message-ID: <9303110713.AA14022@hal.gnu.ai.mit.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> 
>    What about encoding a message by chnging spacing between the words?
> It is surely not the most compact method, but one might be able to transmit
> a pretty long message hidden in the text of "Alice in Wonderland" that
> would still be neatly formatted and *word-to-word* indistinguishable from
> the original.
>    
>  Alex.
> 
  
  Of course, if someone knew what they were looking for, it "would be trivial"
to set up some sort of filter to find this type of message (in this case, one
with a great number of spaces).  This assumes unnoticability due to lack of
knowledge, which is the current thought process being applied to computer
security.  It's a very falible one, as many companies have found.  If you
assume whatever kind of filter you may be dealing with will be a program
(and not a person) looking for a certain frequency of special characters, or
just a range in which >90% of your characters fall (like do you use many more
alphanumerics than *&&*^%$#'s?) then you could just have every fifth letter 
in your _Alice_ transmission be a character of your encrypted message..
  On the other hand, in dealing with that kind of program, I'm sure you could
write some program that would represent non-alphanumerics with a recognizable
code of alphanumerics which wouldn't be normally generated by the encryptor
(and failing that, just convert the entire piece to hex or something..).

Hmm, in writing this it seems to me that hiding a encrypted file in a way that
would evade anything drempt up to distiguish it from text is a lot more 
difficult than just calling it something else:  "Umm, yeah Mr. NSA, that was
a sound file of the pgp sound format!  ..right."  (or that noise suggestion too)

ghoast@gnu.ai.mit.edu   (Devin Jones)




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Peter Shipley <shipley@tfs.COM>
Date: Thu, 11 Mar 93 08:48:40 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: PGP Tutorial Gone.
In-Reply-To: <9303110917.AA12013@pmantis.berkeley.edu>
Message-ID: <9303111647.AA23903@edev0.TFS>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/x-pgp



-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----


>From: nobody@pmantis.berkeley.edu
>soda.berkeley.edu is supposed to have several files reguarding pgp.  The
>problem is that this site is refusing connections.  Could we get an
>alternative site?

soda suffered a disk crash. it is being restored as we speak.


                        -Pete


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.2

iQBFAgUBK59ssMhmn7GUWLLFAQEEeQF9Gv//0Ze8IqdSGKLbdpvGaQy273Gq+7Qj
1kUUre2vl00j35hzduGofJVR9lkyoYnr
=/ng3
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: derek@cs.wisc.edu (Derek Zahn)
Date: Thu, 11 Mar 93 07:02:43 PST
To: ghoast@gnu.ai.mit.edu
Subject: Re:  Hidden encrypted messages
In-Reply-To: <9303110713.AA14022@hal.gnu.ai.mit.edu>
Message-ID: <9303111501.AA26622@lynx.cs.wisc.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Devin Jones responds to Alex:

> Hmm, in writing this it seems to me that hiding a encrypted file in a way that
> would evade anything drempt up to distiguish it from text is a lot more 
> difficult than just calling it something else:  "Umm, yeah Mr. NSA, that was
> a sound file of the pgp sound format!  ..right."

Alex's (good) idea about using creative spacing to hide an encrypted message
is similar to that what I'd originally proposed (and of course it has to
be hiding an *encrypted* message!).  I've gotten a number of responses
of the form "Why not just claim that an encrypted message is data?",
but my original point was Plausible Deniability.  That is, I was
postulating an environment in which Big Brother has outlawed cryptography.
Now, confronted with a confiscated message, the sender has to defend
himself from the Inquisition.  Can't just claim it's a sound file;
the Inquisitor will want it played.  The question I'm trying to answer
is how to produce on demand a causal explanation of data (which actually
contains an encrypted message) that satisfies an investigator and
doesn't reveal the encrypted message.  Some simple scheme like, "Uh,
it's the result of my new random number generation algorithm" isn't
likely to be *satisfying* and is certain to produce the response,
"OK, let's see the algorithm."

derek
don't bother running sophisticated analyses of the above message (oops,
I suppose that's a suspicious thing to say)




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: thug@phantom.com (Murdering Thug)
Date: Thu, 11 Mar 93 07:36:39 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Hiding Encrypted Messages
Message-ID: <m0nWpAZ-000jozC@phantom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I think it would be quite easy to hide encrypted text in music/sound or
graphics files.

In order to do it with sampled music/sound:

1.  Use a SoundBlaster-type card to sample a given amount of music from a
radio/tape/cd/whatever using 8-bit samples at some low sampling rate
like 11,000 samples/second. This would give you a lot of music for the
space used.

2. Then take an encrypted PGP file and dispurse it bit-by-bit into the
LSB (least-significant-bit) of each sample.  This wouldn't distort the
sound sample to any extent noticable by the human ear.  Thus each byte
of PGP file would be dispursed into 8 bytes of sound file.  Thus if
you wanted to send a 20k PGP file, you would have to put it into a
160k music file. 

If you're ever forced to explain what that file contains (unlikely, since
you can always take the Fifth Ammendment) you can just play it on your
computer and have the NSA/SS/FBI/Whatever listen to James Brown go
"Hyeeeah... I feel good!"



+---------------+     +-------------------------------------------------+
                      |  *****       ___\!/_   *         *     *     *  |
 Murdering Thug       |    *      __/_  /|\    * *       *      *   *   |
                      |    *     /    \        *   *     *       * *    |
thug@phantom.com      |    *    |      |       *     *   *        *     |
                      |    *     \____/        *       * *        *     |
                      |  *****                 *         *        *     |
+---------------+     +-------------------------------------------------+





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Date: Thu, 11 Mar 93 11:04:58 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Hiding Encrypted Messages
Message-ID: <9303111903.AA13537@netcom.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Uri writes about Thug's LSB method:
>
>a) This method has essentially the same complexity, as one-time pad,
>   but without it's strength.
>
>b) If it's played and recognized - one can trace your source (a CD, a
>   tape of radio broadcast, whatever) and do a comparison. Then the
>   file containing of all the LSBs is cryptanalyzed...
>
>I might be wrong IF those nice LSBs are too hard to track... But then
>again, you're facing the need to communicate that one-time pad...

I've written several pieces for sci.crypt and for the Cypherpunks list
about encrypting messages in the LSBs of music--I doubt I was the first,
though my first posting on this was in 1988.

(A posting on this is included at the end of this message.)

Uri's points:

a) The idea is to _hide_ the existence of the message, a la steganography.
A Digital Audio Tape carried across a border is a whole less obvious than a
one time pad of numbers.

b) A nearly essential aspect, one I've emphasized repeatedly, is to _not_
use a digital copy of a CD, but rather to use an _analog_ dub. The noise
floor (cables, imperfections in the DACs and ADCs, analog circuits) will be
well above the LSB, making the message bits virtually indistinguishable
from noise. Sophisticate spectral analysis, and entropy analysis, may
reveal the message bits to be other than noise, but this will be quite
difficult (and some masssaging of the bits will help make their statistics
match that of noise).

c) Yes, the method is that of the one-time pad. In fact, it's a way to
_transport_ one-time pads.

Here's one of my postings on this subject:

From: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Subject: Messages in the Least Significant Bits
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Date: Tue, 27 Oct 92 19:03:19 PST
Cc: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)

Cypherpunks,

Here's a message I just posted to another mailing list. It has rather
strict policies against cross-posting, so I've edited out the headers
and the initial chunk of text I quoted. That should make me kosher.

(This topic also came up in some e-mail with George Gleason.)

Forwarded message:
>From tcmay Tue Oct 27 18:43:34 1992

xxxx is exactly right on this. Several years ago I posted to sci.crypt
my "novel" idea for packing bits into the essentially inaudible "least
significant bits" (LSBs) of digital recordings, such as DATs and CDs.
Ditto for the LSBs in an 8-bit image or 24-bit color image. I've since
seen this idea reinvented _several_ times on sci.crypt and
elsewhere...and I'm willing to bet I wasn't the first, either (so I
don't claim any credit).

A 2-hour DAT contains about 10 Gbits (2 hours x 3600 sec/hr x 2
channels x 16 bits/sample x 44K samples/sec), or about 1.2 Gbytes. A CD
contains about half this, i.e., about 700 Mbytes. The LSB of a DAT is
1/16th of the 1.2 Gbytes, or 80 Mbytes. This is a _lot_ of storage!

A home-recorded DAT--and I use a Sony D-3 DAT Walkman to make
tapes--has so much noise down at the LSB level--noise from the A/D and
D/A converters, noise from the microphones (if any), etc.--that the
bits are essentially random at this level. (This is a subtle, but
important, point: a factory recorded DAT or CD will have predetermined
bits at all levels, i.e., the authorities could in principle spot any
modifications. But home-recorded, or dubbed, DATs will of course not
be subject to this kind of analysis.) Some care might be taken to
ensure that the statistical properties of the signal bits resemble
what would be expected with "noise" bits, but this will be a minor
hurdle.

Adobe Photoshop can be used to easily place message bits in the
"noise" that dominates things down at the LSB level. The resulting GIF
can then be posted to UseNet or e-mailed. Ditto for sound samples,
using the ideas I just described (but typically requiring sound
sampling boards, etc.). I've done some experiments along these lines.

This doesn't mean our problems are solved, of course. Exchanging tapes
is cumbersome and vulnerable to stings. But it does help to point out
the utter futility of trying to stop the flow of bits.

--Tim

-- 
..........................................................................
Timothy C. May         | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,  
tcmay@netcom.com       | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
408-688-5409           | knowledge, reputations, information markets, 
W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA  | black markets, collapse of governments.
Higher Power: 2^756839 | PGP 2.0 and MailSafe keys by arrangement.





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: The Phantom <phantom@u.washington.edu>
Date: Thu, 11 Mar 93 11:57:02 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: HIDE: embedding msgs into snd & graphics
Message-ID: <Pine.3.05.9303111113.B29695-b100000@stein2.u.washington.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



writes uri@watson.ibm.com:
----
Yes, a very valid point.  But it seems to me, that Random Data
claim is the best, with the highest chances to keep one out of
trouble (if anything can :-).

The algorithm? Oh, sorry, but it's a HARDWARE random data generator!
And if it's truly good random gen, there are no patterns to track...
One can use it to create huge one-time pads, BTW...   "Salt" some of
the encrypted (or plaintext :-) messages with those...
----

Yes? Hardware? Well, then, where is the piece of hardware you used, then?
It seems this falls to the Big Brother 'where is the algorithm' test even
harder, as it is a physical piece of equipment.

It seems to me that if I were an agent and I were looking for
transmissions from an individual and I saw him sending out 10 copies of
the `Rocky & Bullwinkle Show' intro per week, I'd look into those, even
though they seem normal enough. When I checksummed them and they didn't
match, I'd be more than suspicious: I'd start stripping the lower bits
off. If I knew that the suspect used PGP and RIPEM, I'd most certainly try
and push the output through them, if they weren't plainly recognizable.

Seems to me that the best thing to hide pgp in would be a low-quality
host-medium (lots of noise!) that changes frequently, so the checksumming
cannot occur against the same message. The low quality could also be
attained by pushing more of your message into the host; maybe alternating
between the 8th bit and another bit. In any case, I don't think that the
host should be a stable one (frequently used) or one that can be easily
compared to the original.


Matt

Matt Thomlinson
University of Washington, Seattle, Washington.
Internet: phantom@u.washington.edu      	    phone: (206) 528-5732
PGP 2.2  key available via email or finger phantom@hardy.u.washington.edu








From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Matthew J Miszewski <MJMISKI@macc.wisc.edu>
Date: Thu, 11 Mar 93 10:20:38 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: CYPHER: Plain encypher
Message-ID: <23031112170179@vms2.macc.wisc.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


 
  In response to all those interested in disguising messages
in complicated graphics/sound/random # generators/etc I believe
this would unnecessarily defeat the purpose.
 
  TLA types become suspicious when they see random pgp type
data transmissions flying across their screens.  When they get
one of these monsters, they of course attempt to decrypt it
(assuming its from someone they wish to monitor (All of us?).
 
  They also become suspicious when incredibly long plain text
transmissions are broadcast.  It seems desireable to have a mode
of encryption that will encrypt my message and then package it
in a short (relatively) plain text message.
 
  The NSA/CIA/FBI wont bother trying to decrypt messages that
are the equivalent of 'My slide show of my trip to Florida".
And even if they were to suspect, or by some miracle decrypt it,
you have your Plausible Deniability.  Make the message generator
sufficiently general that all final messages are plausible real
messages.
 
  Only those expecting a message that is encrypted in plain text will
know they have one.  They would have the key to decrypt it.  And
no one would be the wiser.
 
Matt           mjmiski@macc.wisc.edu
 




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: uri@watson.ibm.com
Date: Thu, 11 Mar 93 09:27:06 PST
To: derek@cs.wisc.edu (Derek Zahn)
Subject: Re: Hidden encrypted messages
In-Reply-To: <9303111501.AA26622@lynx.cs.wisc.edu>
Message-ID: <9303111725.AA20493@buoy.watson.ibm.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Derek Zahn says:
> ....................I've gotten a number of responses
> of the form "Why not just claim that an encrypted message is data?",
> but my original point was Plausible Deniability.  That is, I was
> postulating an environment in which Big Brother has outlawed cryptography.
> Now, confronted with a confiscated message, the sender has to defend
> himself from the Inquisition.  Can't just claim it's a sound file;
> the Inquisitor will want it played.  The question I'm trying to answer
> is how to produce on demand a causal explanation of data (which actually
> contains an encrypted message) that satisfies an investigator and
> doesn't reveal the encrypted message.  Some simple scheme like, "Uh,
> it's the result of my new random number generation algorithm" isn't
> likely to be *satisfying* and is certain to produce the response,
> "OK, let's see the algorithm."

Yes, a very valid point.  But it seems to me, that Random Data
claim is the best, with the highest chances to keep one out of
trouble (if anything can :-).

The algorithm? Oh, sorry, but it's a HARDWARE random data generator!
And if it's truly good random gen, there are no patterns to track...
One can use it to create huge one-time pads, BTW...   "Salt" some of
the encrypted (or plaintext :-) messages with those...

The only thing to be concerned of - the cipher [to be claimed a
random data] shouldn't be crackable, and SHOULDN'T have any
patterns! Or they could present an evidence, that the
data isn't a product of your random gen...
--
Regards,
Uri         uri@watson.ibm.com      scifi!angmar!uri 	N2RIU
-----------
<Disclamer>


From cypherpunks-request  Thu Mar 11 12:44:24 1993



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: The Phantom <phantom@u.washington.edu>
Date: Thu, 11 Mar 93 12:42:28 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: HIDE: embedding msgs into snd & graphics
Message-ID: <Pine.3.05.9303111236.A1583-b100000@stein2.u.washington.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


tcmay's comments on the use of DAT tapes to 'dub off' other recordings as
the host-medium and to apply the signal to the low-end significant bits
works out something I brought up earlier: checking the copy against the
original.

The idea of using a DAT tape as a mode of transport, however, doesn't
appeal that greatly to me. To send a message, I have to pull out one of my
prevoiusly recorded DAT host-tapes, then record over the 5th song with my
mix of host/message pair, then fed-ex it (or hand-deliver it) to my
target. If I take this signal and push it across internet, I no longer
have the passive-looking DAT tape in my DAT music collection. Instead, I
have a 900k sound file that I push across the net. Since the net is
usually not used to push the latest Michael Jackson tune, it might raise a
flag. 

Tim's comments are valid and definitely help solve problems on the
physical level: now how about cyberspace?

mt

Matt Thomlinson
University of Washington, Seattle, Washington.
Internet: phantom@u.washington.edu      	    phone: (206) 528-5732
PGP 2.2  key available via email or finger phantom@hardy.u.washington.edu





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: uri@watson.ibm.com
Date: Thu, 11 Mar 93 09:33:35 PST
To: thug@phantom.com (Murdering Thug)
Subject: Re: Hiding Encrypted Messages
In-Reply-To: <m0nWpAZ-000jozC@phantom.com>
Message-ID: <9303111731.AA20272@buoy.watson.ibm.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Murdering Thug says:
> I think it would be quite easy to hide encrypted text in music/sound or
> graphics files.
> 1.  Use a SoundBlaster-type card to sample a given amount of music from a
> radio/tape/cd/whatever using 8-bit samples at some low sampling rate
> like 11,000 samples/second. This would give you a lot of music for the
> space used.
> 2. Then take an encrypted PGP file and dispurse it bit-by-bit into the
> LSB (least-significant-bit) of each sample.  This wouldn't distort the
> sound sample to any extent noticable by the human ear.  Thus each byte
> of PGP file would be dispursed into 8 bytes of sound file.  Thus if
> you wanted to send a 20k PGP file, you would have to put it into a
> 160k music file.
> If you're ever forced to explain what that file contains (unlikely, since
> you can always take the Fifth Ammendment) you can just play it on your
> computer and have the NSA/SS/FBI/Whatever listen to James Brown go
> "Hyeeeah... I feel good!"

a) This method has essentially the same complexity, as one-time pad,
   but without it's strength.

b) If it's played and recognized - one can trace your source (a CD, a
   tape of radio broadcast, whatever) and do a comparison. Then the
   file containing of all the LSBs is cryptanalyzed...

I might be wrong IF those nice LSBs are too hard to track... But then
again, you're facing the need to communicate that one-time pad...

> +---------------+     +-------------------------------------------------+
>                       |  *****       ___\!/_   *         *     *     *  |
>  Murdering Thug       |    *      __/_  /|\    * *       *      *   *   |
>                       |    *     /    \        *   *     *       * *    |
> thug@phantom.com      |    *    |      |       *     *   *        *     |
>                       |    *     \____/        *       * *        *     |
>                       |  *****                 *         *        *     |
> +---------------+     +-------------------------------------------------+

Oh yes, and I'm sure LOTS of people would join! (:-)
--
Regards,
Uri         uri@watson.ibm.com      scifi!angmar!uri 	N2RIU
-----------
<Disclamer>





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Eric Fogleman <Eric.Fogleman@analog.com>
Date: Thu, 11 Mar 93 10:10:59 PST
To: uri@watson.ibm.com
Subject: Re: Hiding Encrypted Messages
Message-ID: <9303111807.AA16545@ack.adstest.analog.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> > 2. Then take an encrypted PGP file and dispurse it bit-by-bit into the
> > LSB (least-significant-bit) of each sample.  This wouldn't distort the
> > sound sample to any extent noticable by the human ear.  Thus each byte
> > of PGP file would be dispursed into 8 bytes of sound file.  Thus if
> > you wanted to send a 20k PGP file, you would have to put it into a
> > 160k music file.
> > If you're ever forced to explain what that file contains (unlikely, since
> > you can always take the Fifth Ammendment) you can just play it on your
> > computer and have the NSA/SS/FBI/Whatever listen to James Brown go
> > "Hyeeeah... I feel good!"
> 
> a) This method has essentially the same complexity, as one-time pad,
>    but without it's strength.
> 

Insert pgp-encrypted (not plaintext) into the sound file...  It's then
no weaker that pgp.

> b) If it's played and recognized - one can trace your source (a CD, a
>    tape of radio broadcast, whatever) and do a comparison. Then the
>    file containing of all the LSBs is cryptanalyzed...

Use a "windows sound system" board and record yourself talking --
No "reference source"... The codec on that board has better than 
two bits of noise per 16 bit word through the ADC channel...

Nice idea, thug!

===================================================================
Eric Fogleman                              eric.fogleman@analog.com
Analog Devices Semiconductor               Voice: (617) 937-2275
804 Woburn Street                          Fax: (617) 937-2024
Wilmington, MA  01887-3462                 
===================================================================




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: uri@watson.ibm.com
Date: Thu, 11 Mar 93 10:17:48 PST
To: Eric Fogleman <Eric.Fogleman@analog.com>
Subject: Re: Hiding Encrypted Messages
In-Reply-To: <9303111807.AA16545@ack.adstest.analog.com>
Message-ID: <9303111815.AA20695@buoy.watson.ibm.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Eric Fogleman writes:
 > > a) This method has essentially the same complexity, as one-time pad,
 > >    but without it's strength.
 > Insert pgp-encrypted (not plaintext) into the sound file...  It's then
 > no weaker that pgp.

Please... I said: "It's as cumbersome, as one-time pad, but
without one-time pad security."  Yes, it can be made as
secure as PGP, but it's still less safe, than
one-time pad.

 > Use a "windows sound system" board and record yourself talking --
 > No "reference source"... The codec on that board has better than
 > two bits of noise per 16 bit word through the ADC channel...

Then you're creating a sort-of one-time pad,  which you now
must convey securely to your correspondent. And this system
is still much less safe, than one-time pad, because of some
possible regularities in the lower bits (now I admit I know
very little of what such a recording would look like, so in
fact it MIGHT be as safe as "real" one-time pad).

Regards,
Uri.
------------
<Disclaimer>




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: covin@cs.uchicago.edu
Date: Thu, 11 Mar 93 11:22:47 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Hiding Encrypted Messages
Message-ID: <9303111921.AA11361@tartarus.uchicago.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>Please... I said: "It's as cumbersome, as one-time pad, but
>without one-time pad security."  Yes, it can be made as
>secure as PGP, but it's still less safe, than
>one-time pad.

I thought the point of hiding the message in a sound or picture file
was to *hide* it, not to gain additional encryption.  Any encryption
you want to do on the message is a separate issue.  Hiding the bits is
just supposed to keep anyone from *trying* to decrypt it in the first
place, and/or to allow you to claim if the message is intercepted that
you weren't *really* sending encrypted messages.

I suspect that if someone manages to decrypt the message, you just flat-out
lose on the "plausible deniability" question.  At least, if the message is
fairly long, coherent, grammatical, etc.  It's just too unlikely that a
long coherent message will be hidden in any regular way in an otherwise
random sequence of bits.  A little statistical analysis might allow some
happy government cryptographers to tell you exactly *how* unlikely it is
that they'd find a message in your data by chance...

As another way to muddy the waters, you might try making the original 
plaintext a bit muddled, ungrammatical, semi-incoherent, rife with 
misspellings, etc... :)

                            -David

ure
that are ahead of the mainstream, oriented towards the near-future.
This includes all realms of what is commonly called "new edge",
"technoculture", or "cyberculture" -- a mishmash of postmodernism,
psychedelics, hacking, raves, cyberspace, industrial music, cyberpunk
fiction and realities, etc., that are proving to be important
constructs in the evolution of world culture.
 
The file continues to grow and morph, and the initial response to it
prompted me to begin the FutureCulture E-List.  Those who share an
interest in the topics discussed in the file can participate in
in-depth or light-hearted discussions via the FutureCulture E-list,
which has proven to be an interesting and unique addition to the
vastness of cyberspace.
 
Readers and participants in FutureCulture have included at one time or
another a wide variety of sociologists and anthropoligists, authors
and writers, hackers, scientists, students, and prominent "cyber-"
oriented figures.
 
For a long time, I have dismissed print media in wake of the
interaction I saw occuring via e-media, such as the FutureCulture
list, and I would be one of those to shun society's love affair with
paper in wake of advancing computer and networking technologies.  Yet
through a seemingly unending discussion regarding the scope of the
popular phrase "information wants to be free", I have found my love
affair with e-media to in fact be quite out of date.  That may seem
contradictory to some, yet if we are truly to arrive at an infoculture
of global real-time interaction via cyberspace, we must first look at
the world in which we currently inhabit.  We live in a world where
paper and television are the informational messangers of choice to the
masses.
 
Thus, in an attempt to further propagate information to as wide an
audience as possible, I have begun [the] Infinite Edge zine.
 
The zine will be printed in black & white and 8 1/2 x 11", using
Macintoshes and laserprinters.  Below follows a basic text outline of
what [the] Infinite Edge will look like sans graphics and design, of
course.
 
I am looking for submissions and assistance with this project from all
angles:  fiction writers, essayists, ranters, graphic designers,
artists, poets, etc.  Submissions are welcome in any form, in any
style, in any tone, though that is not a guarantee that everything I
receive will be printed.  I am looking for submisison as soon as
possible, but feel free to send them in whenever you like.  For first
issue, send them in by the end of March.
 
Due to lack of available resources, I am unable as of yet to reward
monetarily those who contribute to [the] Infinite Edge.  I have little
money, and my primary interest is producing the highest-quality zine
possible, containg an immense spectrum of information.
 
If you would like to contribute to [the] Infinite Edge in any way,
shape, or form, please send all queries, submissions, tips, words of
wisdom, etc., to me on the Internet at:
 
                      ahawks@nyx.cs.du.edu
 
If you do not have Internet access, please send mail to:
 
                      Andy Hawks
                      4290 South Mobile Cir. #D
                      Aurora,  CO     80013
                      USA
 
By the way, I am looking at offering [the] Infinite Edge at a cost of
$3 per issue.  The first issue is not completed yet, but if you are
anxious, please contact me via email or snail mail.  Groovy.
 
[the] Infinite Edge
___________________
 
 
Focusing on the Edges of Culture, examining the Fringes of Reason and
the Reasons of Fringe, the Here and Now and Soon-to-Be, via
unstrcutured Tones that Ebb and Flow from In-Form Information to
Formless Rants of Altered States.
 
[the] Infinite Edge is Divided into the following sections:
 
GENESYS
 
      Notes from the Editor, Leters from those that Grep and/or Grok
      the Infinite Edge.
 
 
32-BIT
 
      Soundbytes of the World, Unite and Take Over.  Blurbs
      pertaining to interesting news and products, quotes,
      technology, factoids, etc.
 
 
MODERN
 
      Cultural Commentary - Realizing, Focusing, and Morphing
      the PostModern World.  Rants, Essays, Theses, Observations,
      Predictions, Analyses, Streams and Rivers of Consciousness.
 
 
-SUB
 
      The Depths of the Underground Subcultures.  Rants, Essays,
      Theses, Observations, Predicions, Analyses, and Information.
 
 
E+
 
      The Virtual World.  News, Notes, Notables and Quotables, Rants,
      Essays, Theses, Observations, Predictions, Analyses,
      Communication, Teknologies.
 
 
VILLAGE VIEWS
 
      Interviews (I-Views) and E-Views with those who Surf, Ride,
      Make and Break the Edges of Culture.
 
 
STREAMZ
 
      Fiction on The Edge:  Transreal, Hyperreal, SlipStream,
      Cyberpunk, Post-Cyberpunk, [insert_any_word_here], etc.
 
 
MEDI8
 
      Reviewing, Analyzing, and Commentary regarding Popular and
      Underground Media:  Books, Magazines, Zines, E-Zines, E-Books,
      Hypertext, Music, Film, Video, Television, Software, etc.
 
 
MOBIUS
 
      One Last Informational Fix, Closing Words, Late-Crashing News,
      etc.
 
 
If you would like to contribute to [the] Infinite Edge in any way,
shape, or form, please send all queries, submissions, tips, words of
wisdom, etc., to me on the Internet at:
 
                      ahawks@nyx.cs.du.edu
 
If you do not have Internet access, please send mail to:
 
                      Andy Hawks
                      4290 South Mobile Cir. #D
                      Aurora,  CO     80013
                      USA
 




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Date: Thu, 11 Mar 93 13:23:51 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: HIDE: embedding msgs into snd & graphics
Message-ID: <9303112122.AA00150@netcom.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Matt Thomlinson writes:

>The idea of using a DAT tape as a mode of transport, however, doesn't
>appeal that greatly to me. To send a message, I have to pull out one of my
>prevoiusly recorded DAT host-tapes, then record over the 5th song with my
>mix of host/message pair, then fed-ex it (or hand-deliver it) to my
>target. If I take this signal and push it across internet, I no longer
>have the passive-looking DAT tape in my DAT music collection. Instead, I
>have a 900k sound file that I push across the net. Since the net is
>usually not used to push the latest Michael Jackson tune, it might raise a
>flag. 
>
>Tim's comments are valid and definitely help solve problems on the
>physical level: now how about cyberspace?

Granted, a DAT can carry more data in the LSBs--about 80 MB, about the
length of 10 Bibles--than one really needs.

The GIF option I mentioned allows a widely disseminated image file to
contain about 32 KB in just the LSBs of a 512 x 512 x 8-bit gray scale
image. A color image could easily hold three times more (LSBs in each color
channel). And some GIFs are much larger than 512 on a side.

So, a fairly long message could be inserted into the "noise floor" bits of
a scanned or frame-grabbed image, or of a piece of "original art" and then
posted worldwide in one of the GIF groups. Who knows what evil messages are
even now being sent in GIFs of Cindy Crawford and Claudia Schiffer?

Use your imagination and you'll see there are several other easy ways to
hide messages. (Again, we're talking steganography--check the "Glossary" in
the soda.berkeley.edu archives if this is new to you.)

-Tim May
--
Timothy C. May               | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,  
tcmay@netcom.com        | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
408-688-5409               | knowledge, reputations, information markets, 
W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA       | black markets, collapse of governments.
Higher Power: 2^756839 | Public Key: MailSafe and PGP available.





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: mbrennan@netcom.com (Michael Brennan)
Date: Thu, 11 Mar 93 13:54:41 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: cypherpunks-request mail is ignored
Message-ID: <9303112153.AA03254@netcom.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I hate to mail administrative  requests to the whole group, but I had
previously sent my request to cypherpunks-request to no avail. Is that
not the correct address? Maybe the reason you all keep seeing unsubscribe
requests mailed to the entire group is because such requests sent to
cypherpunks-request are being ignored.

Anyway, someone PLEASE unsubscribe me from this list. I would like to
subscribe to cypherpunks-announce only. I can't handle this volume of mail.

Thanks.

 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Michael Brennan
Internet:   mbrennan@netcom.com 
Applelink:  M.BRENNAN  
Compuserve: 76206,2462





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: jb@paris7.jussieu.fr
Date: Thu, 11 Mar 93 05:17:35 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: University Policies
Message-ID: <0096959f.9201c152.25188@paris7.jussieu.fr>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Hi,

Following the thread about some Universities policy about using
computing services I'd like to ask if you can send me YOUR
Uni policy about the above matter. I'd like to make somekindda
compilation of them and put it on our ftp server (smup7.jussieu.fr).

Cheers,
jb




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: J. Michael Diehl <mdiehl@triton.unm.edu>
Date: Thu, 11 Mar 93 13:24:44 PST
To: derek@cs.wisc.edu (Derek Zahn)
Subject: Re:  Hidden encrypted messages
In-Reply-To: <9303111501.AA26622@lynx.cs.wisc.edu>
Message-ID: <9303112121.AA28347@triton.unm.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> Alex's (good) idea about using creative spacing to hide an encrypted message
> is similar to that what I'd originally proposed (and of course it has to
> be hiding an *encrypted* message!).  I've gotten a number of responses
> of the form "Why not just claim that an encrypted message is data?",
> but my original point was Plausible Deniability.  That is, I was
> postulating an environment in which Big Brother has outlawed cryptography.
> Now, confronted with a confiscated message, the sender has to defend
> himself from the Inquisition.  Can't just claim it's a sound file;
> the Inquisitor will want it played.  The question I'm trying to answer

So I say, "Damn! CRC Error!  Must be a bad disk.  Well, no point in keeping
THIS sitting around."

> is how to produce on demand a causal explanation of data (which actually
> contains an encrypted message) that satisfies an investigator and
> doesn't reveal the encrypted message.  Some simple scheme like, "Uh,

I understand what you want.  Wish I understood how to do it. ;^)

> it's the result of my new random number generation algorithm" isn't
> likely to be *satisfying* and is certain to produce the response,
> "OK, let's see the algorithm."
+----------------------+----------------------------------------------------+
| J. Michael Diehl ;-) |  I thought I was wrong once.  But, I was mistaken. |
|                      +----------------------------------------------------+
| mdiehl@triton.unm.edu| "I'm just looking for the opportunity to be        |
| Thunder@forum        |            Politically Incorrect!                  |
| (505) 299-2282       |                        <me>                        |
+----------------------+----------------------------------------------------+




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: ghabrech@ultrix.ramapo.edu (George A. Habrecht)
Date: Thu, 11 Mar 93 15:42:48 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: No Subject
Message-ID: <9303111959.AA03378@ultrix.ramapo.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


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Get the message?!?  Thanx

ghabrech@ultrix.ramapo.edu




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Stu Klingman <stuk@microsoft.com>
Date: Thu, 11 Mar 93 15:18:49 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: FW: Hiding Encrypted Messages
Message-ID: <9303112315.AA12701@netmail.microsoft.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


FWD'd from a secure redirector, Raf sez:

Someone wrote:
> b) If it's played and recognized - one can trace your source (a CD, a
>    tape of radio broadcast, whatever) and do a comparison. Then the
>    file containing of all the LSBs is cryptanalyzed...

Actually, this is not really a problem.  The odds of being able to
resample, even using the same source and come up with the same byte
string is infinitesmal.  You've got chaos theory on your side here
with massive "Sensitive Dependence on Initial Conditions."  The
exact byte string you got depends on:

1) volume
2) sampling device used
3) playback fidelity of your reproduction
4) the exact microsecond you clicked "record" (cause you'll be hitting
   different points in the same wave form)

Just make sure to an application like Shredder or Flamefile to
permanently erase your initial sample, and nobody should be able
to tell. (unless they are aware of the trick beforehand)

Rafial





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Date: Thu, 11 Mar 93 15:20:45 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re:  Hidden encrypted messages
Message-ID: <9303112319.AA12884@netcom.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Uri writes:

>Probably creating a  GIF/TIFF/whatever  file yourself,
>with normal consumer-grade equipment (noise-prone :-)
>and substituting it's LSB (or whatever certainly lies
>BELOW the noise floor) with bits of the message, does
>sound like the best choice today.

..stuff elided...

>Disadvantages:
>        1) Somebody has to do it, to write code, to
>           buy a Camcoder (:-).

I have a couple of camcorders, a video digitizer for my Mac, a scanner
(1-bit only--bought as a bundle with TypeReader, a wonderful OCR program),
etc. Equipment isn't the problem, per se, it's the lack of standards (e.g.,
so what if *I* put a message into a GIF with Adobe Photoshop--others have
to be able to extract it).

We won't be seeing digitized images as carriers of secret messages in wide
use anytime soon. In this sense, I agree with Uri's point.

>        2) May lead to outlawing of ALL the image and
>           sound transmission  via  electronic media,
>           if Big Brother gets really annoyed (:-).

Doubtful--too widespread. JPEG, MPEG, and a zillion other image standards
are spreading. Big Brother can't ban images, GIFs, JPEG stuff, QuickTime
movies, etc., without shutting down the economy. And digitized voice works
just as well for the LSB method, albeit with a different software approach.
Modem-based voice handling systems are already widespread, and the
"Internet Talk Radio" concept discussed here last week indicates the
feasibility of sending packetized audio. Such a mail system is already
available for the NeXT, I gather.

-Tim


--
Timothy C. May               | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,  
tcmay@netcom.com        | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
408-688-5409               | knowledge, reputations, information markets, 
W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA       | black markets, collapse of governments.
Higher Power: 2^756839 | Public Key: MailSafe and PGP available.





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: uri@watson.ibm.com
Date: Thu, 11 Mar 93 14:18:16 PST
To: J.Michael Diehl <mdiehl@triton.unm.edu>
Subject: Re:  Hidden encrypted messages
In-Reply-To: <9303111501.AA26622@lynx.cs.wisc.edu>
Message-ID: <9303112216.AA15346@buoy.watson.ibm.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


 > So I say, "Damn! CRC Error!  Must be a bad disk.  Well, no point in keeping
 > THIS sitting around."

Yeah, but remember, in the world we're heading to, presumption
of innocence is worth even less, than President's word!
Then it will be *your* responsibility to satisfy the
Inquisitor, or he might not let you out from his
building, where you were invited to explain
yourself and your messages. (:-) (:-(

 > > is how to produce on demand a causal explanation of data (which actually
 > > contains an encrypted message) that satisfies an investigator and
 > > doesn't reveal the encrypted message.  Some simple scheme like, "Uh,
 > > it's the result of my new random number generation algorithm" isn't
 > > likely to be *satisfying* and is certain to produce the response,
 > > "OK, let's see the algorithm."

And the response to this will be: "Sure, here it is, this
nice hardware implementation. You may have it, if you
wish!" (:-)  It's fool-proof, but  still the Big
Brother might dislike your desire to play with
those bad random generators, and decide,
that you better be kept in KZ-camp...

Probably creating a  GIF/TIFF/whatever  file yourself,
with normal consumer-grade equipment (noise-prone :-)
and substituting it's LSB (or whatever certainly lies
BELOW the noise floor) with bits of the message, does
sound like the best choice today.

Advantages:
	1) Doesn't look suspicious, no more, than
	   "traditional" sending photos of your
	   house, family, yourself...

	2) Has enough of bandwidth to communicate
	   reasonably large personal messages
	   (though a binary og PGP might
	   not fit into a "normal"
	   GIF file :-).

	3) Requires only widely available consumer
	   appliances (Camcoder, digitizer, .....).

	4) The image doesn't have to be known to your
	   correspondent in advance (a big one!).

Disadvantages:
	1) Somebody has to do it, to write code, to
	   buy a Camcoder (:-).

	2) May lead to outlawing of ALL the image and
	   sound transmission  via  electronic media,
	   if Big Brother gets really annoyed (:-).

	   [Don't laugh, you! Look at the latest
	    Scanner Bill! :-]

Regards,
Uri.
------------
<Disclaimer>




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: blojo@sting.Berkeley.EDU (Jon Blow)
Date: Thu, 11 Mar 93 18:59:47 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re:  HIDE: embedding msgs into snd & graphics
Message-ID: <9303120259.AA03718@sting.Berkeley.EDU>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> I would have it take a GIF file and a
> binary file to be embedded, and produce an output GIF with the low order 
> bit of each byte changed to be the next bit of the embedded binary file.  

I've been thinking about writing this too, but, alas, I have been too busy.

If you write this program, I would encourage you to support encoding/decoding
in more than just GIF files.  My main reasoning behind this is something
like: if there is one piece of software that is commonly used to hide data
in noise bits, and it only supports one format, then things in that one format
are automatically suspect-- it's almost as bad as not hiding the data.

I'd encourage you to support JPEG and sunaudio formats (though the info
density one could store in each of these is probably a lot lower than what
you could pack into a GIF), as well as some less-used formats like tiff
and rast.  Hmm... and if you can figure out how to pack a useful amount
of data into an XPM, I'll be really impressed.

I don't know if you actually know GIF format (I don't) but I know that you'd
have to do some reasonably intelligent churning of the data.  For one, it's
just not going to be as easy as dropping a noise bit from each n-byte set;
GIF format is fairly compressed as I understand.  Also, if you're not
careful, you'll end up with a picture that chokes displays after encoding
that worked fine before encoding.  (Many machines have 8-plane displays,
which means a 256-color colormap.  If you mess with the noise bits on a
GIF that has 200 colors, you're going to come up with one that has 400
colors.  Many display programs (like xv) will compress the colormap when
they see this; the X server will also slide colors together when you
allocate things and the map is full.  BUT, such high-colormap-size gifs
would basically have "I AM A CONTAINER FOR ENCRYPTED DATA" tattooed on
the backs of their necks.

    -J




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: mbrennan@netcom.com (Michael Brennan)
Date: Thu, 11 Mar 93 19:56:21 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: CYPHERPUNKS=EMAIL HARASSEMENT?
Message-ID: <9303120354.AA14008@netcom.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Hopefully my subject line got someone's attention.
I just received a 3K file in my mailbox from George A. Habrecht with
lines repeating over and over "Please unsusbcribe me!!!" Perhaps many
of you simply deleted it without even noticing what the mail said. But you
should all take note that the cypherpunks list is starting to piss off
 a lot of people who would be supportive of what you are doing if not
for the huge volumes of unwanted mail.

Loading up peoples mailboxes with unwanted mail is IRRESPONSIBLE!
Is this what cypherpunks wants to become known for on the net? It's really
very simple: if someone send an unsubscribe request, it should be honored.
There's no excuse for ignoring such requests. Clearly someone is asleep
at the wheel here and the situation needs to be rectified.

The cypherpunks list is increasingly running the risk of some vengeful 
retaliation from a pissed off individual frustrated at having their
"unsubscribe" requests repeatedly ignored. Is this what the cypherpunks
want? I'm not saying that Mr. Habrecht would do such a thing. I'm simply
saying that it is a real possibility that someone may be tempted to do
such a thing, and it could be easily avoided if whoever is supposed to be
overseeing this list would get their act together!

I was annoyed at getting that 3K file in my mailbox, but I am completely
sympathetic to his frustration. I am saddened by seeing cypherpunks so 
insensitive to this frustration and oblivious to the anger that some 
people are starting to feel toward this list. Do you not care
that cypherpunks is developing a tarnished reputation because of this?
Don't any of you cypherpunks think that maybe sending huge volumes of
unwanted mail to people is innappropriate? Don't you think that maybe
someone should get their act together and rectify this situation?!!!

My esteem for this group is dropping lower and lower with each passing day
that I see my and others' "unsusbscribe" requests being ignored. It truly
saddens me because i think that the mission of this group is a worthy one,
but it is becoming tarnished by this maling list fiasco. I think it's very
sad.

P.S. If someone DOES finally get their act together on this, I'll like to
subscribe to cypherpunk-announce only.





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: New World Fnorder <miller_su@swam1.enet.dec.com>
Date: Thu, 11 Mar 93 20:28:13 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: UNSUBSCRIBE
Message-ID: <9303120425.AA24535@enet-gw.pa.dec.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I, too, am finding it impossible to get off this list.  I hope the list
admistrator can get his server fixed and take me off the list soon.  I
don't want to be reduced to bombing the list with massive unsubscribes!




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Hal <74076.1041@CompuServe.COM>
Date: Thu, 11 Mar 93 17:43:30 PST
To: <cypherpunks@toad.com>
Subject: HIDE: embedding msgs into snd & graphics
Message-ID: <930312013441_74076.1041_DHJ25-1@CompuServe.COM>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Tim mentions that Adobe Photoshop can be used to overlay messages into 
the low-order bits of a graphics image.  Photoshop is expensive, so I'm 
wondering whether it would be worthwhile for me to write a simple, free 
utility just for this purpose.  I would have it take a GIF file and a 
binary file to be embedded, and produce an output GIF with the low order 
bit of each byte changed to be the next bit of the embedded binary file.  
For output, it would do the opposite - produce a binary file determined 
solely by the low-order bits of the GIF file.
 
I played with GIF a few years ago and wrote a viewer, so I have some 
familiarity with that format.  It doesn't sound too hard to write a 
program like this.  One concern is whether such a program would be 
redundant, whether widely available tools already exist to perform the 
same function.  Perhaps there are PD image-processing tools that could 
be adapted.  If anybody knows of any please let me know.
 
For this kind of program to be useful, you'd want to use PGP in its 
long-discussed "stealth mode".  This would be a mode in which PGP would 
produce output that was basically indistinguishable from random data.  
Presently PGP puts out some header fields which can be used to recognize 
that a file is a PGP file.  Stealth mode would suppress this 
information.  PGP would not be able to automatically choose which key to 
use to decrypt such a file, but since most people have only one secret 
key this would not be a big problem.
 
The PGP developer's group has been talking about this for a long time 
(over a year) but nobody has cared enough to do anything about it.  
Maybe it should be done.
 
Hal Finney
74076.1041@compuserve.com





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: mbrennan@netcom.com (Michael Brennan)
Date: Thu, 11 Mar 93 21:12:21 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: CYPHERPUNKS=EMAIL HARASSEMENT?
Message-ID: <9303120510.AA20163@netcom.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>I sent a letter to the person you talked about, from what I have read
>you should send your request to the same address that was used to join
>the list.
> <cypherpunks-request@toad.com> with the subject being what ever it is
>you want done to your name in ref. with the list.
>
>                     Dan :)
>
> I myself was not impressed with his stupid little note.

You are very wrong! As a matter of fact, I have sent unsubscribe requests
to cypherpunks-request and those requests have been ignored! That's why I
sent this last message of mine to the whole list. I'd be willing to bet
that the individual who sent the 3K file had also attempted initially to
send his request to cypherpunks-request and had his request ignored. In
fact, it's quite possible that MANY of the people who have sent their
"unsubscribe" requests to the whole list have done so because initial
requests sent to cypherpunks-request were ignored!

Brushing this matter aside as a non-issue and pretending there is no
problem will not make the problem go away! UNSUBSCRIBE REQUESTS SENT TO
CYPHERPUNKS-REQUEST ARE BEING IGNORED!!!

Certainly you cypherpunks can understand the disaster you are inviting upon
yourselves if you continue to piss people off with huge volumes of unwanted
mail. I repeat: UNSUBSCRIBE REQUESTS SENT TO CYPHERPUNKS-REQUEST ARE BEING
IGNORED!!! Have some consideration, folks, and fix the damn problem!!!!

-----
Michael Brennan      - mbrennan@netcom.com





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Doug Humphrey <digex@access.digex.com>
Date: Thu, 11 Mar 93 18:25:01 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: [CRYPT: Dingaling Denning & random # generators]
Message-ID: <199303120223.AA11719@access.digex.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



>As I posted once to sci.crypt: encrypted communication is virtually
>interchangeable with and indistinguishable from communication itself.
>How does someone `know' that you are encrypting a message? 

This is not strictly true.  While someone might not be able to tell
that you are engaged in the act of encrypting a message, the
transmission of encrypted communications is often detectable.
Spread spectrum transmissions often look like an increase in the
noise floor of certain communications channels, prompting systems
to think that there are malfunctions, and to dispatch someone to 
take a look at the facility.  If they throw a spectrum analyser 
on it, it doesn't look like valid data in most cases, just noise.

With voice communications it is easy to recognize the patterns
that speech generates, and they look very different from the 
randomness that simple crypto produces.  Unless one uses a 
post-crypto wave shaper to simulate the amplitude changes that 
speech produces, it is simple to build a circut that can make a 
pretty accurate evaluation of voice/data/crypto going by it.
Nothing more difficult in 1993 than was the first 2600 hz
detector circut when it was put into widespread production use
in the phone network.  In fact, given that modern switches are 
already digitizing the signals, a little DSP hardware should 
make quick work of the first cut, narrowing down which lines 
should receive harder evaluation to see if people are trying to 
protect their privacy.

>To do something like have completely tappable communications, we'd need
>half the country to monitor the other half, to make sure nothing out of
>context is going on.

You under estimate some technologies ;-)

>Only problem with this is, who monitors the monitors? 

Who watches the watchmen?

>No, I don't buy that paranoid plop about how it would be "trivial" to
>set up filters that "detect" encryption, or that this is happening on a
>widespread scale by the NSA in the U.S. This is an absolutely absurd
>claim.

It would not be trivial.  On the other hand, an order allowing the 
modification of the entire telephone network to allow the FBI to 
have "most-favored-wiretapper" status is also non-trivial, and some
are trying to make it happen.

>These mechanisms could be just as trivially defeated (although
>a-priori knowledge of their function may be required).  People who
>think encryption is different from communication think that symbols are
>different than letters.  Speaking as a programmer, good luck explaining
>it to a computer.

Maybe you over-estimate technology here.  We are not talking about
breaking crypto here, just detecting it.  By its nature it changes
the overall composition of the data.  Randem data still looks random,
it is true, but a phone call represents a certain context, and 
within that context there is an expected behaviour pattern (or ten
or twenty behaviours, but it makes no difference).  Within the 
context, it can be easy to see the change that crypto brings, 
unless there are active means taken against it.

Doug




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Date: Thu, 11 Mar 93 21:42:33 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: HABRECHT=EMAIL HARASSEMENT
Message-ID: <9303120541.AA23327@netcom.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


<<PLEASE FOLKS! Don't "mail-bomb" this or any other list with humongous
files!!>>

Michael Brennan writes:

>Hopefully my subject line got someone's attention.
>I just received a 3K file in my mailbox from George A. Habrecht with
>lines repeating over and over "Please unsusbcribe me!!!" Perhaps many
>of you simply deleted it without even noticing what the mail said. But you
>should all take note that the cypherpunks list is starting to piss off
> a lot of people who would be supportive of what you are doing if not
>for the huge volumes of unwanted mail.
            ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
(My mail reader said nearly 80 kilobyes...perhaps your figure was in _lines_?)

I don't know what the delay has been in unsubscribing people. As always,
send requests to the list maintenance address,
"cypherpunks-request@toad.com". The list manager, Eric Hughes
(hughes@soda.berkelely.edu), has been away at the CFP conference this
week...perhaps this is part of the delay.

In any case, the 80 KB (according to my mail reader, Eudora) file was sent
by George Habrecht, and was not "caused" by Eric Hughes, nor was it caused
by "the cypherpunks list." So lighten up on this point, will ya?

>Loading up peoples mailboxes with unwanted mail is IRRESPONSIBLE!
>Is this what cypherpunks wants to become known for on the net? It's really

>Don't any of you cypherpunks think that maybe sending huge volumes of
>unwanted mail to people is innappropriate? Don't you think that maybe
>someone should get their act together and rectify this situation?!!!

Huh? Like I said, it was Mr. Habrecht who sent the "huge volumes of
unwanted mail" and not the Cypherpunks list (unless you're advocating that
someone screen postings for content and length?). So if you're angry at
getting an 80 K file, be angry at Habrecht. His frustration at having to
wait some extra time to get off the list is no excuse for mail-bombing a
couple of hundred people!

The average Cypherpunks message is about 3 KB, or about 4% of Habrecht's
message. With about 25 Cypherpunks messages a day (I'm guessing), Habrecht
equalled the average list volume in his angry action. If there are 200
subscribers, then he caused roughly "200 list-days" of mail to go out to
readers...all because he couldn't get off the list exactly when he gave the
order!

As for the average mail volume...well, it is fairly light compared to some
other mailing lists. And it is not the list manager who determines the
volume, it is of course the list members. The list software simply
"reflects" incoming messages to the distribution list...if people write a
lot, a lot goes out. Q.E.D.

As Sinbad O'Connor would put it: "Know the real enemy."

-Tim May

P.S. What I did was to _reply_ to Mr. Habrecht, explaining the situation. I
attached my reply to a *quoted copy* of his message AND MAILED IT BACK TO
HIM! (Actually, my mailer splits incoming messages into 24 KB pieces, so I
only mailed one of these back to him....he got off lucky. If several more
people do this, he'll think twice about mail-bambing a list again.)

--
Timothy C. May               | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,  
tcmay@netcom.com        | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
408-688-5409               | knowledge, reputations, information markets, 
W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA       | black markets, collapse of governments.
Higher Power: 2^756839 | Public Key: MailSafe and PGP available.





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Marc.Ringuette@GS80.SP.CS.CMU.EDU
Date: Thu, 11 Mar 93 18:48:39 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: spread spectrum; secret sharing
Message-ID: <9303120248.AA09181@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I'd like to find a brief tutorial on spread spectrum communications.

I'd also like to become familiar with a decent secret sharing protocol
(say, to share a secret among N people so that any K of them can obtain
the secret but no K-1 of them can).

Anyone have anything to offer me?


-- Marc Ringuette (mnr@cs.cmu.edu)




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Marc.Ringuette@GS80.SP.CS.CMU.EDU
Date: Thu, 11 Mar 93 19:05:22 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Tagging data to detect thieves
Message-ID: <9303120305.AA09556@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I've done some further thinking on the text tagging problem,
spurred by a question on sci.crypt about tagging pictures
(under the subject line "Permanent signatures for pictures").

Here's a summary.

----

Let's say Dow Jones wants to sell newswire subscriptions to individuals,
but someone is anonymously forwarding their articles to a newsgroup.  Can
they succeed in tagging the text to detect the thief?  The idea is to
make some small twiddle to each subscriber's copy of the text, so that
the stolen copy can be matched with some subscriber and their
subscription cancelled.

Short answer:  the thieves win.  At first, I thought the answer
was the opposite.

----

There are two issues which must be addressed in order to show that
the tagger wins:

  1.  The taggee must not be able to "smooth away" all of the tag bits.
  2.  The taggee must not be able to cross-correlate multiple copies
      of the data in question in order to produce a "clean" version.

Regarding issue #1, the basic techique is to alter a few features of
your data which are important enough that your opponent can't afford to
randomize ALL such bits.  In the case of text, small changes in word
choice are a good candidate.  Two criteria are:

   A.  The changes must be "important" enough that the thief can't
       smooth them all away.
   B.  The changes shouldn't be "important" enough that the newswire
       becomes worthless!

The tagger has an advantage in this case, though.  He can change, say,
1 in 1000 of these "important, non-smoothable-away" candidate bits.  If
the thief wants to cancel them out and only has a single copy of the
picture, he must somehow canonicalize _all_ of the candidate tag bits,
or some very large proportion of them.

So if your tagging process does a little bit of "damage" to your
data, like in the map-maker case of adding an extra small street
here and there, then the opponent must either try to detect exactly
where your damage is, or must make wholesale changes to the data (such
as removing all small roads altogether).  The thief, in trying to cover
up your damage, must make a thousand times as much damage.  Choose your
damage level appropriately so that your level of damage isn't too much
but the thief's is.

----

Issue #2, thieves cross-correlating between multiple copies of the data,
is a bit more subtle.  

Here's the scenario:

  Dow Jones has 10,000 customers, 64 of whom are in a conspiracy to steal
  and re-sell the newswire.  Dow Jones tries various tagging strategies,
  altering whitespace and word choice individually for each subscriber.
  The thieves try to cross-correlate between their copies of the text
  in order to "cancel out" the tags from the copy which they wish to re-sell.

Can Dow Jones detect the thieves and cancel their subscriptions?

In the discussion below, when Dow Jones "twiddles a bit" of their
newswire, they do so by substituting a word's synonym at a chosen
location, using a separate (possibly biased) coin flip for each
subscriber.  Here are the strategies I've considered.  

  Dow Jones strategy:  twiddle some bits with probability 0.5.
     If the thieves use majority vote, each thief will have a reasonably
     high correlation with the output bits.  (In fact, the probability of a
     match will exceed 50% by approximately the chance of a tie vote among
     the thieves, which is about 0.8/sqrt(n) where n is the number of
     thieves.  This computation is a bit hairy.)
  Thief countermeasure:  reliably detect which bits are being twiddled
      (by cross-checking between, say, 64 different subscriptions)
      and flip a fair coin to determine the output.  There's a chance
      of only 2 in 2^64 that the thieves fail to detect the twiddle.

  Dow Jones strategy:  twiddle some bits with low probability (e.g. p=0.01).
      Reasonably often, the bit values will be the same for all thieves.
      If the thieves use the flip-a-coin strategy, we can determine which
      tag bits they've failed to detect, and identify them that way.
  Thief countermeasure:  use a majority vote.

  Dow Jones strategy:  hybrid of the two.
  Thief countermeasure:  hybrid of the two.  Flip a coin if the vote is 
       fairly even, go with the majority if the vote is uneven.  For
       example, get 64 subscriptions, go with the majority vote if 
       fewer than 16 dissenters, flip a fair coin otherwise.

This last strategy for the thieves is the one I can't beat.

Theoretical help, anyone?

-- Marc Ringuette (mnr@cs.cmu.edu)




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: thug@phantom.com (Murdering Thug)
Date: Thu, 11 Mar 93 18:59:00 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: [CRYPT: Dingaling Denning & random # generators]
In-Reply-To: <199303120223.AA11719@access.digex.com>
Message-ID: <m0nWzoe-000josC@phantom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Doug Humphrey writes:
>
> >As I posted once to sci.crypt: encrypted communication is virtually
> >interchangeable with and indistinguishable from communication itself.
> >How does someone `know' that you are encrypting a message? 
> 
> This is not strictly true.  While someone might not be able to tell
> that you are engaged in the act of encrypting a message, the
> transmission of encrypted communications is often detectable.
> Spread spectrum transmissions often look like an increase in the
> noise floor of certain communications channels, prompting systems
> to think that there are malfunctions, and to dispatch someone to 
> take a look at the facility.  If they throw a spectrum analyser 
> on it, it doesn't look like valid data in most cases, just noise.
> 
> With voice communications it is easy to recognize the patterns
> that speech generates, and they look very different from the 
> randomness that simple crypto produces.  Unless one uses a 
> post-crypto wave shaper to simulate the amplitude changes that 
> speech produces, it is simple to build a circut that can make a 
> pretty accurate evaluation of voice/data/crypto going by it.
> Nothing more difficult in 1993 than was the first 2600 hz
> detector circut when it was put into widespread production use
> in the phone network.  In fact, given that modern switches are 
> already digitizing the signals, a little DSP hardware should 
> make quick work of the first cut, narrowing down which lines 
> should receive harder evaluation to see if people are trying to 
> protect their privacy.

Why not send your PGP encoded files using V.27 or whatever the 9600
baud fax transmittion modulation is?  By the year 2000, there will
be around 40 million fax machines in the U.S.  Assuming the FBI/NSA/ASPCA
can tell apart voice from fax by scanning all the phone trunks in the U.S.
with high speed parallel computers, it wouldn't help them if there are
around 100 million fax transmissions taking place each day.  No way in
hell are they going to pick up your signal from the other 99,999,999 fax
transmissions taking place that day, and then spend the rest of their
lives trying to crack your PGP message.

The same can be said about modems.  If Prodigy, America Online, and
Compuserve keep up their newbie recruitment pace, about 50% of the homes
in the U.S. will have modems by the year 2000.  And don't tell me they can
build computers that can distinguish between a PGP file transmission and some
hormone crazed 15 year old dork downloading the latest GIF of Cindy Crawford
or a ZIPed ware.  I've looked at hexdumps of GIFs and ZIPs and for all
practical purposes they look about as random as PGP data.  If the NSA
can build a parellel computer that scans all the trunks in the U.S.
simultaneously AND can tell the difference between PGP streams and ZIP/GIF
file data streams, then I just might as well go and shoot myself right
now.


Thug




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Peter & <shipley@merde.dis.org>
Date: Thu, 11 Mar 93 22:17:57 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: HIDE: embedding msgs into snd & graphics
In-Reply-To: <9303112122.AA00150@netcom.netcom.com>
Message-ID: <9303120608.AA28356@merde.dis.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/x-pgp



-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----


>
>The GIF option I mentioned allows a widely disseminated image file to
>contain about 32 KB in just the LSBs of a 512 x 512 x 8-bit gray scale
>image. A color image could easily hold three times more (LSBs in each color
>channel). And some GIFs are much larger than 512 on a side.

IT should be trival to include date into GIFs (or most any other non-lossy
formats) using the ppmplus library.

    giftoppm Image.gif | ppmInsertData data.pgp | ppmtogif > Image2.gif

where ppmInsertData is a program that modifies the data stream using
the file data.pgp as the crypt data source 

to extract just a command simular to:

        ppmExtractData < Image2.gif > data.pgp

for sound file it would just as easy (in fact I am almost tempted to
write some demo code but I have more email to attend to :-)

                       -Pete



-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.2

iQBFAgUBK6Aoxchmn7GUWLLFAQFSRQF+LvzpcW2fx/+FFklWI4RtW27E2GuWbfJn
nun4KJ1YAzsf/lwxF/KcaGeGq6NwS6AP
=vcGK
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Mark C. Henderson <markh@wimsey.bc.ca>
Date: Thu, 11 Mar 93 23:18:36 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: CYPHERPUNKS=EMAIL HARASSEMENT?
Message-ID: <m0nX3q7-0000VfC@squirrel.wimsey.bc.ca>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

Subject: Re: CYPHERPUNKS=EMAIL HARASSEMENT?

On Mar 11, 21:16, Michael Brennan wrote:
} Subject: Re: CYPHERPUNKS=EMAIL HARASSEMENT?
} 
} Brushing this matter aside as a non-issue and pretending there is no
} problem will not make the problem go away! UNSUBSCRIBE REQUESTS SENT TO
} CYPHERPUNKS-REQUEST ARE BEING IGNORED!!!

Well, sending a 3000 line file to hundreds of people, wasn't the
correct response to the situation.

But, to add something constructive, why don't we use majordomo to 
handle list additions and delections automatically? 

Mark

- -- 
Mark Henderson
mch@squirrel.wimsey.bc.ca
markh@wimsey.bc.ca

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.2

iQCVAgUBK6A2sPfE/ap/JEqpAQEK6AQAqejFaX3122HwrkLibTYr/rEGEoL6qpSv
sSn2oVxoOJXc+R52P8RCZzfp/X0O5tp92tUf4sAL2YKIlb72W2y9rXZ9TXMxpmxi
AgRqqpts1uoKAfUMBaM9Lr0QJ2V7fnMRjOJiu2mU/bSbC4Tzr15reKjmhkQDDZXo
FoybTVchSEw=
=3DYZ
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Eli Brandt <ebrandt@jarthur.Claremont.EDU>
Date: Thu, 11 Mar 93 23:38:53 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re:  HIDE: embedding msgs into snd & graphics
In-Reply-To: <9303120259.AA03718@sting.Berkeley.EDU>
Message-ID: <9303120738.AA15498@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> I don't know if you actually know GIF format (I don't) but I know that you'd
> have to do some reasonably intelligent churning of the data.  For one, it's
> just not going to be as easy as dropping a noise bit from each n-byte set;
> GIF format is fairly compressed as I understand.

What you'd want to do is uncompress the byte stream, twiddle the low
bits, and LZW it back up.  Well, that's easy enough.  The problem is
that GIFs are colormapped, and the map need have no coherence
between entries 8 and 9.  Even optimally arranged (a non-trivial
task; looks like the salesman travels colorspace...), that low bit
is probably going to be significant enough to munge things visibly.
What you'd have to do is remap the file to 128 colors, duplicate
them in the colormap, and encode your message in the choice of
identical entries.  Unfortunately, most images look bad enough
mapped to 256 colors, and will degrade further in 128.  Though I
suppose nobody really wants to look at the image anyway...

Your compression is also going to die.  This may provide a quick way
to scan for this technique, and finding a redundant colormap is a
dead giveaway of either secrecy or stupidity.  You could fix that by
tweaking twin colors slightly, adding a bit of visible noise.

I think color images, as opposed to mapped, would be the way to go
for steganography.  More room, and nobody expects them to compress.

>     -J

	 PGP 2 key by finger or e-mail
   Eli   ebrandt@jarthur.claremont.edu




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: mbrennan@netcom.com (Michael Brennan)
Date: Fri, 12 Mar 93 00:02:41 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Cypherpricks think they're cool
Message-ID: <9303120801.AA05719@netcom.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>Date: Fri, 12 Mar 1993 01:01-EST
>From: Marc.Ringuette@GS80.SP.CS.CMU.EDU
>To: cypherpunks@toad.com
>Subject: Cypherpunks know they're cool
>
>Hey, man, we're the cypherpunks.  We're too hip to worry about a 
>trivial little mail bomb.  But if we did get upset...well, who
>do you think has the bigger arsenal of dirty tricks, him or us?

>Date: Thu, 11 Mar 93 21:41:04 -0800
>To: cypherpunks@toad.com
>From: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
>Subject: HABRECHT=EMAIL HARASSEMENT
>
>P.S. What I did was to _reply_ to Mr. Habrecht, explaining the situation. I
>attached my reply to a *quoted copy* of his message AND MAILED IT BACK TO
>HIM! (Actually, my mailer splits incoming messages into 24 KB pieces, so I
>only mailed one of these back to him....he got off lucky. If several more
>people do this, he'll think twice about mail-bambing a list again.)


What arrogant little pricks you are, Mr. Ringuette and Mr. May! So is this
what cypherpunks is really all about: "dirty tricks", "mail bombs", endless
harassment of people on the net who simply wish to be left alone? I had
originally thought that cypherpunks had higher objectives in mind than
that, but evidently at least some of you simply fancy yourselves as some
sort of cyber-terrorists (although you're really no better than petty
vandals).

I've seen many of you raise issues about responsibility on the net. Is
proving that you have a "bigger arsenal of dirty tricks" you're idea of
responsibility? And do you really think that cypherpunks could survive such
a war? You yourselves have admitted that you have many enemies in your
quest for net privacy and anonymity. Do you foolishly believe that they
won't seize upon this irresponsible behavior on your part and use it to
prove their point? You will only succeed in bringing about precisely what
you claim to oppose: oppressive controls on the internet to stop petty
vandals like yourself.

I would hope that there are some among you that have some scrap of sanity
left, and realize that there is nothing to be gained from bringing a
needless war down upon yourselves. Wise up!

From tcmay:
>I don't know what the delay has been in unsubscribing people. As always,
>send requests to the list maintenance address,
>"cypherpunks-request@toad.com". The list manager, Eric Hughes
>(hughes@soda.berkelely.edu), has been away at the CFP conference this
>week...perhaps this is part of the delay.

I sent one request to cypherpunks-request about three weeks ago, and a
second about a week ago. Was Eric Hughes at the CFP conference then? And
you may have noticed that a third person has now stepped forward and
expressed frustration over being in the same predicament. Do you still want
to pretend there is no problem? What will it take for you to realize there
is: the third person, the fourth, fixth, sixth? I'll say it again: Wise up!


I've been very patient over this, but I'm disgusted at your arrogant
promises of "dirty tricks" and "mail bombs" against those who simply want
to unsubscribe from the list! What phenomenal assholes you are!!!

-----
Michael Brennan      - mbrennan@netcom.com





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Karl Barrus <elee9sf@Menudo.UH.EDU>
Date: Thu, 11 Mar 93 22:17:22 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: CASH/BANK: combo
Message-ID: <199303120616.AA20557@Menudo.UH.EDU>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----


Hal saw through my laziness attempt: I thought it would be "easiest"
for a cash accepting remailer to increment an account (marking bills
as spent) and have users request more bills from the bank rather that
filter requests through me.  However, this does lead to a perpetually
full bank account...

But actually, a full service bank isn't required (although maybe that
would be nice) - all that's really needed is for the remailer software
to compare the included digicash versus a spent cash list and a valid
cash list.  The banking portion need only be one command for me to
use: one that deposits newly created cash into the valid cash list.
When a letter arrives, the digicash is checked, added to the spent
cash list, and re-routed.

For privacy, requests for digicash could come to me via anonymous
remailers, along with the appropriate header to allow me to respond.
This would render logs relating digicash and user useless, since I
wouldn't know who is requesting digicash bills.  On the other hand,
somebody could store up several digicash bills by routing their
request through the various remailers.  But I'll accept that risk,
hoping that nobody on this list would prepare a email attack (except
for the unfortunate folks who can't seem to unsubscribe :-) 
JUST KIDDING!!)

/-----------------------------------\
| Karl L. Barrus                    |
| elee9sf@menudo.uh.edu             | <- preferred address
| barrus@tree.egr.uh.edu (NeXTMail) |
\-----------------------------------/
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Version: 2.2

iQCVAgUBK6Ap24OA7OpLWtYzAQHZQAQAo2ofd6lPBx/7XMR3Jr+7G2atMzevNcj3
Wtdrjr1GQJ+15z9duu3vh3yyV4j0rswyJlqp3eJZPCcb1NgEeKVZ1pP54YjDRwL2
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fE9mYRkNUII=
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From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: ghabrech@ultrix.ramapo.edu (George A. Habrecht)
Date: Thu, 11 Mar 93 21:30:20 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: UNSUBSCRIBE ME!!!!!
Message-ID: <9303120533.AA14817@ultrix.ramapo.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


DAMN!!!!!  UNSUBSCRIBE ME ALREADY!!!!!
GHABRECH@ULTRIX.RAMAPO.EDU
ghabrech@ultrix.ramapo.edu




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: blojo@sting.Berkeley.EDU (Jon Blow)
Date: Fri, 12 Mar 93 00:53:27 PST
To: ebrandt@jarthur.Claremont.EDU
Subject: Re:  HIDE: embedding msgs into snd & graphics
Message-ID: <9303120852.AA03893@sting.Berkeley.EDU>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> I think color images, as opposed to mapped, would be the way to go
> for steganography.  More room, and nobody expects them to compress.

Yeah; but even if we're talking full 24-bit images, we're going to have
problems.  Once 24-bit displays become standard, I really doubt that
there will be many images stored in a non-lossy format.  And once
you try to hide data in a lossy encoding scheme, you run into a
lot (though not all) of the problems you have with colormaps.

It would be a lot easier to hide data in an image if one had a control-image
(the original) as well as the altered-image (the one holding the message),
but this defeats half the niftiness of trying to do things this way.

>    Eli   ebrandt@jarthur.claremont.edu

    -J.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@Athena.MIT.EDU>
Date: Thu, 11 Mar 93 21:55:35 PST
To: thug@phantom.com
Subject: Re: [CRYPT: Dingaling Denning & random # generators]
In-Reply-To: <m0nWzoe-000josC@phantom.com>
Message-ID: <9303120554.AA28908@SOS>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


   From: thug@phantom.com (Murdering Thug)
   Date: Thu, 11 Mar 93 21:49:43 EST
   
   And don't tell me they can
   build computers that can distinguish between a PGP file transmission
   and some 
   hormone crazed 15 year old dork downloading the latest GIF of Cindy Crawford
   or a ZIPed ware.  I've looked at hexdumps of GIFs and ZIPs and for all
   practical purposes they look about as random as PGP data.  If the NSA
   can build a parellel computer that scans all the trunks in the U.S.
   simultaneously AND can tell the difference between PGP streams and ZIP/GIF
   file data streams, then I just might as well go and shoot myself right
   now.

Er.... you might want to get your gun out..... the middle of hexdumps of
GIF's and ZIP's and PGP files may look the same, but the file headers
are quite distinguishing.  If you want to hide encrypted data, each
person needs to find their own way of doing it ---- if everyone hides it
in the low bits of a GIF file, it would be very simple for the NSA to
scan GIF files to see if the low bits looked like the header of a PGP
file.....

						- Ted




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Marc.Ringuette@GS80.SP.CS.CMU.EDU
Date: Thu, 11 Mar 93 22:05:33 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Cypherpunks know they're cool
Message-ID: <9303120605.AA13446@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Hey, man, we're the cypherpunks.  We're too hip to worry about a 
trivial little mail bomb.  But if we did get upset...well, who
do you think has the bigger arsenal of dirty tricks, him or us?

Heh.

Marc

p.s.  I'm being interviewed by a campus radio show, regarding
cypherpunk-related stuff.  I'd welcome any suggestions on topics to
bring up, or ammunition to add to my pro-privacy and pro-anonymity
arguments.  Send them directly to me and I'll summarize to the list.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: ghabrech@ultrix.ramapo.edu (George A. Habrecht)
Date: Thu, 11 Mar 93 22:05:13 PST
To: tcmay@netcom.com
Subject: Re:  HABRECHT=EMAIL HARASSEMENT
Message-ID: <9303120608.AA15248@ultrix.ramapo.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


A pesk, me?  Ha!  The only reason I did it was because I asked a month ago,
politely, to be taken off and every day I still have a ton of junk messages in
my mailbox.  The other person (Name cut off in reply) was right.  I'm sick and
tired of reading some news about bullshit.  I mean it seems that some people
have been writing in whenever they have to take a crap.  Some of the articles
are excellent, some ok, but when you have to weed through 20-30-even 40 
messages to get one or two good ones it's just not worth it.  Therefore I wish
to be taken off.  If, in a while, things get straightened up I may resubscribe
but for now, I don't have the time.
George (The E-mail harrasser) Habrecht
ghabrech@ultrix.ramapo.edu (for those who wish to mail my mailbox....  I'll
nuke it anyway :) ).




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: mbrennan@netcom.com (Michael Brennan)
Date: Fri, 12 Mar 93 01:20:44 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Unacceptable slander by dclunie
Message-ID: <9303120919.AA11896@netcom.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>Date: Fri, 12 Mar 93 17:41:03 CST
>From: dclunie@pax.tpa.com.au (David Clunie)
>To: Postmaster@ultrix.ramapo.edu
>Subject: Unacceptable behaviour by ghabrech
>Cc: root@ultrix.ramapo.edu, ghabrech@ultrix.ramapo.edu, cypherpunks@toad.com
>
>>From one of the very popular mailing lists I received the following posting
>by one of your users. While I can understand his frustration at having
>difficulties unsubscribing from a relatively high volume list, or his
>ignorance at not being aware that such requests should be directed to the
>"x-request" alias not the "x" list, this is no excuse for such a long and
>unpleasant post that has consumed considerable expensive bandwidth for no
>good reason ... I am surprised you tolerate students with such a childish
>attitude on your system and they do no credit to your institution's
>reputation.

  [ abridged quote from metioned user's posting deleted...]

Think about this scenario for a moment: dclunie sends mail to the system
adiministrator of an institution complaining of the mail sent by a
particular user. The system administrator confronts the user, who then
explains the situation. He explains that he has sent numerous requests to
be unsubscribed from the list, but they continue to send large volumes of
mail. Out of frustration, he sends an 80K file to the list hoping it will
get someone's attention. The mail continues, and several members of the
list makes threats of "dirty tricks" and "mail bombs" against him. Now one
of the "cypherpunks" is sending libelous mail to the system administrator.
The system administrator now understands the situation; an educational
institution on the net is made aware of a rapidly developing campaign of
harrassment and vandalism by the cypherpunks. So what happens now? Are the
cypherpunks winning?

Are you people blind to what you are doing? What fools!!!

What upsets me the most about all of this is that I am truly an advocate of
net freedom, privacy, and anonymity. But the cypherpunks is setting itself
up for a big fall and they threaten to tarnish the whole movement toward
net freedom and privacy with their petty, puerile, and vandalous behavior!

-----
Michael Brennan      - mbrennan@netcom.com





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Hal <74076.1041@CompuServe.COM>
Date: Thu, 11 Mar 93 23:56:36 PST
To: <cypherpunks@toad.com>
Subject: Tagging data to detect thieves
Message-ID: <930312075211_74076.1041_DHJ35-1@CompuServe.COM>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Mark Ringuette asks about schemes to detect which copies of some 
proprietary information were used to resell the data.
 
I recall reading a paper on this in the proceedings of one of the crypto 
conferences within the past several years.  Unfortunately, I don't have 
a more accurate reference handy.  The authors referred to this problem 
as "digital fingerprinting" (i.e. adding a "fingerprint" to each copy of 
a document).
 
As I recall, the idea was to twiddle bits in such a way that any subset 
of copies up to a specified size would have a certain number of 
identically twiddled bits.  The thiefs who cross-correlate 64 (or 
however many) copies will not know about the bit twiddles which were 
common to all 64 copies.  Their output will still contain those common 
bit-twiddles, and this information allows the thiefs to be caught.  The 
paper shows a formula for the number of possible bit-twiddle-places and 
the number of bit-twiddles per copy needed, as a function of how many 
copies you are defending against the bad guys getting.  It was basically 
just a combinatorial/counting argument.
 
I do seem to recall that if the bad guys could get a lot of copies the 
number of bits needed grew exponentially.  I don't know whether 
defeating an attack with 64 copies was practical using this scheme.
 
Mark also asked about secret sharing.  The classic secret sharing paper 
is "How to Share a Secret"; I think it was by Shamir, in an old CACM 
from the 70's.  As I recall, he proposed encoding the data as a K-1 
degree polynomial in some modulus field.  Give each person a point on 
the polynomial.  K points are required to recover the polynomial.  I 
don't recall how the encoding of the data as a polynomial was to be 
done, but the author showed that K-1 points gives you no information 
about it.
 
Hal
74076.1041@compuserve.com





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Hal <74076.1041@CompuServe.COM>
Date: Thu, 11 Mar 93 23:56:58 PST
To: <cypherpunks@toad.com>
Subject: CYPHERPUNKS=EMAIL HARASSEMENT?
Message-ID: <930312075344_74076.1041_DHJ35-2@CompuServe.COM>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


So how many days, exactly, have people waited for response from
cypherpunks-request before giving up and posting to the list?  Just
one or two, or are we talking weeks here?

Hal





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Peter Wayner <pcw@access.digex.com>
Date: Fri, 12 Mar 93 04:46:24 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Secret messages in images...
Message-ID: <199303121244.AA17859@access.digex.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



I wrote a quick little version to stick bits in the LSB of
a file. It runs in the Macintosh as an added feature to a popular
program, NIH Image. (The source code and frequent revision are
published at the major ftp sites.) It is very easy to add 
a function to handle this process because all of the file i/o
and format decoding are already present. 

If anyone would like a copy, they're welcome to write to me.
I'll send them instructions and a short file. Alas, it only
handles 8 bit images. 

Also, you can also request Mimic function code for hiding 
messages in text with a grammar. 

-Peter Wayner
(pcw@access.digex.com)




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Karl Barrus <elee9sf@Menudo.UH.EDU>
Date: Fri, 12 Mar 93 06:40:44 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: REMAIL: help with utter.dis.org
Message-ID: <199303121439.AA16993@Menudo.UH.EDU>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Cypherpunks,

I'm having trouble using the new remailer at utter.dis.org.  I've sent
several test messages, but have received none back.  Recently, I tried
to email to the person running the remailer (shipley@merde.dis.org?),
but my mail bounced:

[stuff deleted here and there]
>Return-Path: MAILER-DAEMON@soda.berkeley.edu
>From: Mail Delivery Subsystem <MAILER-DAEMON@soda.berkeley.edu>
>Subject: Returned mail: Host unknown
>   ----- Transcript of session follows -----
>550 merde.dis.org.tcplocal... 550 Host unknown
>550 <shipley@merde.dis.org>... Host unknown: Inappropriate ioctl for device
>From: Karl Barrus <elee9sf@Menudo.UH.EDU>
>To: shipley@merde.dis.org

I'd like to include this new remailer in the scripts, but would first
like to verify that it works...  

So Peter: I'd like to help work out any problems, but I can't reach
you at shipley@merde.dis.org (unless this is related to soda's disk
crash?)

/-----------------------------------\
| Karl L. Barrus                    |
| elee9sf@menudo.uh.edu             | <- preferred address
| barrus@tree.egr.uh.edu (NeXTMail) |
\-----------------------------------/




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: mbrennan@netcom.com (Michael Brennan)
Date: Fri, 12 Mar 93 08:42:09 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Unacceptable slander by dclunie
Message-ID: <9303121640.AA12159@netcom.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>Date: Fri, 12 Mar 1993 09:34:53 -0600
>To: cypherpunks@toad.com, mbrennan@netcom.com (Michael Brennan)
>From: matt@oc.com (Matthew Lyle)
>X-Sender: matt@ra.oc.com
>Subject: Re: Unacceptable slander by dclunie
>
>It is not appropriate for someone to post a 3600 line "junk" file to a
>mailing list.  UNDER ANY CIRCUMSTANCES!  (Think about those sites that are
>paying hard cash for e-mail transfers!)  It is reasonable for such actions
>to be reported to the administrator of a system.

I don't agree it was appropriate to notify the administrator. This could
all have been handled far more elegantly considering the circumstances. 

>So far as getting off the cypherpunks list, there are a number of other things
>to try if cypherpunks-request isn't working.  Send mail to root@toad.com. 
>Send mail to the administrative contact listed in the WHOIS database for
>toad.com (John Gilmore, in this case).  Talk to your local systems
>administrator and ask his assistance.  What ghabrech did is something I
>would expect from an immature freshman. (who knows... maybe he is one)

Thank you for this information. I will attempt these courses of action.
Perhaps if someone had attempted to offer helpful information from the
outset, this problem never would have reached this level. Instead certain
individuals chose to post arrogant promises of "retribution" against
others, rather than trying to be constructive in this.

>Retaliatory strikes aren't right either, of course.

I agree wholeheartedly, and I am glad this discourse now finally seems to
be moving onto a level-headed and constructive level. I appeal to all of
the cypherpunks to keep it this way! Let's figure what's going wrong here
and resolve the situation instead of playing one-upmanship with mail bombs
and threats of "dirty tricks".
-----
Michael Brennan      - mbrennan@netcom.com





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: matt@oc.com (Matthew Lyle)
Date: Fri, 12 Mar 93 07:39:47 PST
To: mbrennan@netcom.com (Michael Brennan)
Subject: Re: Unacceptable slander by dclunie
Message-ID: <199303121534.AA08509@ra.oc.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


At  1:24 AM 3/12/93 -0800, Michael Brennan wrote:
>> [ Mail from David Clunie to ramapo.edu systems admin deleted ]
>
>  [ abridged quote from metioned user's posting deleted...]
>
>Think about this scenario for a moment: dclunie sends mail to the system
>adiministrator of an institution complaining of the mail sent by a
>particular user. The system administrator confronts the user, who then
>explains the situation. He explains that he has sent numerous requests to
>be unsubscribed from the list, but they continue to send large volumes of
>mail. Out of frustration, he sends an 80K file to the list hoping it will
>get someone's attention. The mail continues, and several members of the
>list makes threats of "dirty tricks" and "mail bombs" against him. Now one
>of the "cypherpunks" is sending libelous mail to the system administrator.
>The system administrator now understands the situation; an educational
>institution on the net is made aware of a rapidly developing campaign of
>harrassment and vandalism by the cypherpunks. So what happens now? Are the
>cypherpunks winning?

Libelous mail??  Hardly.

It is not appropriate for someone to post a 3600 line "junk" file to a
mailing list.  UNDER ANY CIRCUMSTANCES!  (Think about those sites that are
paying hard cash for e-mail transfers!)  It is reasonable for such actions
to be reported to the administrator of a system.

So far as getting off the cypherpunks list, there are a number of other things
to try if cypherpunks-request isn't working.  Send mail to root@toad.com. 
Send mail to the administrative contact listed in the WHOIS database for
toad.com (John Gilmore, in this case).  Talk to your local systems
administrator and ask his assistance.  What ghabrech did is something I
would expect from an immature freshman. (who knows... maybe he is one)

>Are you people blind to what you are doing? What fools!!!

Retaliatory strikes aren't right either, of course.

--
Matthew Lyle    	       	       	       	       	(214) 888-0474
OpenConnect Systems     	       	       	       	matt@oc.com
Dallas, TX                                      

"...and once you have tasted flight, you will walk the earth with your 
    eyes turned skyward, for there you have been, and there you long 
    to return..."





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Peter & <shipley@merde.dis.org>
Date: Fri, 12 Mar 93 10:03:48 PST
To: Karl Barrus <elee9sf@Menudo.UH.EDU>
Subject: Re: REMAIL: help with utter.dis.org
In-Reply-To: <199303121439.AA16993@Menudo.UH.EDU>
Message-ID: <9303121800.AA00711@merde.dis.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/x-pgp



-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----



>
>Cypherpunks,
>
>I'm having trouble using the new remailer at utter.dis.org.  I've sent
>several test messages, but have received none back.  Recently, I tried
>to email to the person running the remailer (shipley@merde.dis.org?),
>but my mail bounced:


the system soda.berkeley.edu had suffered a disk crash thus loosing 
alot of configuration infomation (like how to me a MX for *.dis.org)
I hope to get around to having the sendmail.cf fixed this weekend.

the system merde.dis.org/utter.dis.org can also be reached as
merde.tfs.com (but it should be noted that the tfs.com mailer gateway
munges email headers).


>So Peter: I'd like to help work out any problems, but I can't reach
>you at shipley@merde.dis.org (unless this is related to soda's disk
>crash?)

I can be reach at:
        shipley@tfs.com			(work address)
        shipley@merde.tfs.com		(secure home system; cSlip'ed into work)
        shipley@berkeley.edu		(generalised email alias)
        shipley@soda.berkeley.edu	(a sometimes useful account)
	shipley@dis.org			(secure home system, MX=soda)


sorry for the inconvenience...

                -Pete




-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.2

iQBFAgUBK6DPushmn7GUWLLFAQFeWwF+L792NQXoKS/cZ28lDRVEAuqZU4rzbr7S
O+/og98BK8Bjjy++UWozVCfI/hrHhR6M
=l3N9
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: lefty@apple.com (Lefty)
Date: Fri, 12 Mar 93 10:15:42 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: UNSUBSCRIBE ME!!!!!
Message-ID: <9303121814.AA28760@apple.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>DAMN!!!!!  UNSUBSCRIBE ME ALREADY!!!!!
>GHABRECH@ULTRIX.RAMAPO.EDU
>ghabrech@ultrix.ramapo.edu

You know, if you went down to the local expressway and lay down along one
of the broken white lines and worked on perfecting your impression of a
median strip, your problems would soon stop bothering you.

--
Lefty (lefty@apple.com)
C:.M:.C:., D:.O:.D:.






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: lefty@apple.com (Lefty)
Date: Fri, 12 Mar 93 10:29:49 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re:  HABRECHT=EMAIL HARASSEMENT
Message-ID: <9303121828.AA01892@apple.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


George "I don't give a shit who I inconvenience" Habrecht writes:
>If, in a while, things get straightened up I may resubscribe but for now, I 
>don't have the time.

I would hope that, if you _do_ ask to be added to the list in the future,
the list admin would put you on the "Periodic BSD UNIX Kernal Binaries"
list instead.

--
Lefty (lefty@apple.com)
C:.M:.C:., D:.O:.D:.






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Date: Fri, 12 Mar 93 10:48:15 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: An Appeal to Calm
Message-ID: <9303121846.AA00432@netcom.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Folks,

Tempers have flared. Angry words have been sent out to the list. We've all
been mail-bombed by an angry member of the list (who wants off--NOW!).

I guess this is our first real flame war--now we're a real mailing list!

But let's not let the current controversy confuse our very real mission,
nor hide the progress we've seen so far (remailers, spread of PGP,
experiments with digital cash, etc.). If we let the list self-destruct
through a few unfortunate incidents, all hope is lost.

* The "unsubscribe" problem will hopefully soon be fixed. Maybe an
automatic handler (like "majordomo," someone suggested) can be installed.

* Mailing lists like this one characteristically have wildy fluctuating
traffic levels. No messages for a couple of days (leading to "Is the list
broken?" queries) and then 50 messages in a single day (leading to "Enough
already! I can't take the volume." messages). Remember, it is the list
membership that is generating the volume, not the list management (such as
it is).

* Some have said the "cypherpricks" list is generating all noise and no
signal. Many of us would disagree. Actual code is being written, deployed,
and experimented with. One bunch is helping with PGP, another is writing
and deploying remailer programs, another is pursuing steganography (hiding
messages). Pretty impressive. Especially for a new mailing list.

* And relatively little flaming is going on. The closest we've come to a
real act of malice was the mail bombing of the list by a disgruntled
member--I won't go into that further. 

* There are serious issues involving the uses and abuses of these various
tools and capabilities. Anonymous postings carry obvious concerns. So does
untraceable electronic mail, with the potential for extortion threats and
even fully-secure markets for assassinations and other crimes. Some of
these issues have been discussed on the list. No doubt some see these
debates as "noise." Well, a mailing list cannot of course only cater to one
particular set of needs.

* If we don't discuss these kinds of issues on this list, who will? The FBI
and NSA undoubtedly. So why not we the people?

I hope things can calm down a bit.

-Tim May



--
Timothy C. May         | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,  
tcmay@netcom.com       | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
408-688-5409           | knowledge, reputations, information markets, 
W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA  | black markets, collapse of governments.
Higher Power: 2^756839 | Public Key: MailSafe and PGP available.





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: mbrennan@netcom.com (Michael Brennan)
Date: Fri, 12 Mar 93 11:02:56 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Unacceptable slander by dclunie [FLAME]
In-Reply-To: <9303121801.AA18929@buoy.watson.ibm.com>
Message-ID: <9303121901.AA02158@netcom.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> Michael Brennan writes:
>  > Are you people blind to what you are doing? What fools!!!
> 
> OK, so you ass*** tell me what I'm doing. 
You are flaming. Get a clue.

>And don't
> forget to explain, why am I subjected to all this
> crap about some ass***ish subscription, and why
> my mailbox should receive junk mail from some
> irresponsible participants? 

You shouldn't have to receive junk mail from anyone. And neither should
anyone else! Why are you so special that you shouldn't have to get junk
mail but others should? If the cypherpunks list simply honored unsubscribe
requests, then no one here would be getting unwanted junk mail. It's really
that simple.

My postings were intended as an appeal for sanity and responsibility on the
part of the cypherpunks, but you seem intent on dragging this whole affair
down to new depths. I have simply tried to call attention to the fact that
there is a problem with cypherpunks-request and that unsubscribe requests are
being ignored. For my own part, I've made several such requests over the course
of about a month. Your arrogant, puerile rantings contribute nothing 
constructive to the situation.

I am glad that other cypherpunks are not sinking to the petty-minded depths
that Uri has chosen to sink to. (And to those that I may have insulted in a 
previous posting, I apologize, but I would hope that you now realize that
promises of "retaliation" against those who just want to unsubscribe was
innappropriate.)

Let's please all try for some civility and sanity and just try to get the 
problem resolved!






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: mbrennan@netcom.com (Michael Brennan)
Date: Fri, 12 Mar 93 11:10:03 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: UNSUBSCRIBE ME!!!!!
In-Reply-To: <9303121814.AA28760@apple.com>
Message-ID: <9303121908.AA03134@netcom.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> 
> >DAMN!!!!!  UNSUBSCRIBE ME ALREADY!!!!!
> >GHABRECH@ULTRIX.RAMAPO.EDU
> >ghabrech@ultrix.ramapo.edu
> 
> You know, if you went down to the local expressway and lay down along one
> of the broken white lines and worked on perfecting your impression of a
> median strip, your problems would soon stop bothering you.
> 
> --
> Lefty (lefty@apple.com)
> C:.M:.C:., D:.O:.D:.

Please explain to me, lefty, why you insist on flaming someone who simply 
wants to unsubscribe from the list. This is truly beyond comprehension. I had
thought for a moment that the cypherpunks were rising above petty, arrogant
slanders, but evidently I was wrong. Clearly uri and lefty wish to drag this
whole affair down to new depths. And why? Just to prove to everyone that you
can insert your head up your ass further than anyone can imagine?

You are truly pathetic.





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: mbrennan@netcom.com (Michael Brennan)
Date: Fri, 12 Mar 93 11:19:52 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: An Appeal to Calm
In-Reply-To: <9303121846.AA00432@netcom.netcom.com>
Message-ID: <9303121918.AA04403@netcom.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> Folks,
> 
> Tempers have flared. Angry words have been sent out to the list. We've all
> been mail-bombed by an angry member of the list (who wants off--NOW!).

  [...]

> I hope things can calm down a bit.
> 
> -Tim May

I would hope things would calm down a bit, as well. Sending a massive mail bomb
to the list may have been innappropriate, but so is continuing to send unwanted
mail to a user who has made repeated unsubscribe requests. Why are some of you
insisting on waging a flame war?!! What do you intend to gain from such 
puerility?

I am encouraged that at least some voices of reason are now emerging amidst all
of this, and I would hope that the cypherpunks would try to understand the
frustation of those who have their unsubscribe requests ignored and continue
to receive unwanted mail.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: lefty@apple.com (Lefty)
Date: Fri, 12 Mar 93 11:40:25 PST
To: mbrennan@netcom.com (Michael Brennan)
Subject: [FLAME] (Was Re: UNSUBSCRIBE ME!!!!!)
Message-ID: <9303121939.AA11758@apple.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>Please explain to me, lefty, why you insist on flaming someone who simply 
>wants to unsubscribe from the list.

Mr. Brennan, I wouldn't ever flame anyone who simply wanted to unsubscribe
from this list.  I _would_, however, certainly flame a fool with a
room-temperature IQ who feels that the best way of dealing with his _own_
_personal_ problem unsubscribing from the list is to send 80,000 bytes of
garbage to over two hundred people who couldn't do anything about his
problem even if they wanted to.  People who may, in fact, be paying good
money to receive electronic mail and who didn't have any particular need
for 3,600 copies of the words "Unsubscribe me!!!!"

>This is truly beyond comprehension.

Given the apparent level of your comprehension, I'm not in the least
surprised.  I imagine this sort of thing must happen to you frequently,
say, whenever you're faced with a situation more complicated that deciding
whether you want fries with your Big Mac.

>I had thought for a moment that the cypherpunks were rising above petty,
>>arrogant slanders, but evidently I was wrong.

I suggest you look up the word "slander" in the dictionary.  Get one of the
big kids to help you with it, if necessary, and if you can find one who
won't beat you up on sight.

It doesn't mean what you apparently believe it does.

>Clearly uri and lefty wish to drag this whole affair down to new depths. And 
>why? Just to prove to everyone that you can insert your head up your ass
>>further than anyone can imagine?
>
>You are truly pathetic.

Gosh, Mr. Brennan, those are pretty strong words for a fellow who cries
"slander" at the apparent drop of a hat.  If you keep this sort of thing
up, you're liable to convince me that you're not only an idiot but a
hypocrite as well.

Somebody's got his head up his ass here, but I suspect it's not me, Chucko.

--
Lefty (lefty@apple.com)
C:.M:.C:., D:.O:.D:.






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: uri@watson.ibm.com
Date: Fri, 12 Mar 93 09:19:52 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: FW: Hiding Encrypted Messages
In-Reply-To: <9303112315.AA12701@netmail.microsoft.com>
Message-ID: <9303121718.AA15444@buoy.watson.ibm.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



-----BEGIN PRIVACY-ENHANCED MESSAGE-----
Proc-Type: 2001,MIC-CLEAR
Originator-Name: uri@watson.ibm.com
Originator-Key-Asymmetric:
 MIGcMAoGBFUIAQECAgQAA4GNADCBiQKBgQC8G6+5wJDTbII6rK3nx6/XSWIE79FW
 1UnBUJx1lAEbay5o7larnOTWbVicXRfkd8cJxl4FAQ3z/O4vhNvqMqkfGPt48F1t
 O82PD1NstJ3zuMqCCSfTk/Lo3KNh2zz8oGQG8XOfK+UnGcqWhgZ2froBc4yNFlyK
 To0gYp7xKqpcLQIDAQAB
MIC-Info: RSA-MD5,RSA,
 rwr1sC6NxFTeD2RQkn1d3a9DD72bfS6RX6KvRfCERRGxlNsIbqkSciSNmHxTJPRH
 /SuFRODhd9eqhyO5a4KORoAIse/QJjgpWDY/gcUx8WmaPBLTUyImVmBUHeaWlBG6
 8zwHpOLrZHlX3j//9bpITl+0N90K9Nn4j2DFRxHQAV8=


Stu Klingman writes:
 > Someone wrote:
 > > b) If it's played and recognized - one can trace your source (a CD, a
 > >    tape of radio broadcast, whatever) and do a comparison. Then the
 > >    file containing of all the LSBs is cryptanalyzed...
 >
 > Actually, this is not really a problem.  The odds of being able to
 > resample, even using the same source and come up with the same byte
 > string is infinitesmal.

Remember - the goal is to HIDE the fact, that there's a message!
If, having CDs and DAT tapes widely available, somebody sends
a home-brew digitized copy of it, won't it look somewhat
suspicious for KGB?  And if/when they throw you in a
nice small cell, you can explain your innocence
to the walls at infinitum (:-).

 > You've got chaos theory on your side here
 > with massive "Sensitive Dependence on Initial Conditions."

You're certainly right. But still see above.

 > Just make sure to an application like Shredder or Flamefile to
 > permanently erase your initial sample, and nobody should be able
 > to tell. (unless they are aware of the trick beforehand)

Do you mean, THEY don't monitor this forum? (:-)

Regards,
Uri.
- ------------
<Disclaimer>
-----END PRIVACY-ENHANCED MESSAGE-----




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Stephen Dunne             (+44) 71-538-5656"    <sdun@isma.demon.co.uk>
Date: Fri, 12 Mar 93 05:02:00 PST
To: CypherPunks Mailing List                         <cypherpunks@toad.com>
Subject: Unacceptable slander by dclunie
Message-ID: <9303122054.AA0036@isma.demon.co.uk>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Forgive me if I appear slow over this but I don't see any problem with Davids 
response..

Mailbombing a mailing list like cypherpunks with 80K of dross is not acceptable
behaviour (whether it was through ignorance or malice) and in those 
circumstances contacting the site postmaster seems a reasonable thing to do.

I do agree with another post who suggested that the admin side of the list does
need to be tightened up so that future incidents like this do not occur. 
However we are in danger of blowing this up out of all proportion.

Stephen
--
+--------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Stephen Dunne                             DoD#767 sdun@isma.demon.co.uk   |
|International Securities Market Association       I speak for me,thats all|
|Voice (+44) 71-538-5656    Fax (+44) 71-538-4902         PGP key available|
|We are not affiliated to any other Demon.Co.Uk site.                      |
+--------------------------------------------------------------------------+

----------------------------- Note follows -----------------------------
Message-Id: <9303120919.AA11896@netcom.netcom.com>
Date: Fri, 12 Mar 1993 01:24:48 -0800
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
From: Michael Brennan <mbrennan@netcom.com>
Subject: Unacceptable slander by dclunie

>Date: Fri, 12 Mar 93 17:41:03 CST
>From: dclunie@pax.tpa.com.au (David Clunie)
>To: Postmaster@ultrix.ramapo.edu
>Subject: Unacceptable behaviour by ghabrech
>Cc: root@ultrix.ramapo.edu, ghabrech@ultrix.ramapo.edu, cypherpunks@toad.com
>
>>From one of the very popular mailing lists I received the following posting
[shortened even more]
Think about this scenario for a moment: dclunie sends mail to the system
adiministrator of an institution complaining of the mail sent by a
particular user. The system administrator confronts the user, who then
explains the situation. He explains that he has sent numerous requests to
be unsubscribed from the list, but they continue to send large volumes of
mail. Out of frustration, he sends an 80K file to the list hoping it will
get someone's attention. The mail continues, and several members of the
list makes threats of "dirty tricks" and "mail bombs" against him. Now one
of the "cypherpunks" is sending libelous mail to the system administrator.
The system administrator now understands the situation; an educational
institution on the net is made aware of a rapidly developing campaign of
harrassment and vandalism by the cypherpunks. So what happens now? Are the
cypherpunks winning?

Are you people blind to what you are doing? What fools!!!

-----
Michael Brennan      - mbrennan@netcom.com






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: uri@watson.ibm.com
Date: Fri, 12 Mar 93 09:57:43 PST
To: mbrennan@netcom.com (Michael Brennan)
Subject: Re: Cypherpricks think they're cool [FLAME]
In-Reply-To: <9303120801.AA05719@netcom.netcom.com>
Message-ID: <9303121756.AA17375@buoy.watson.ibm.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



#FLAME ON

Michael Brennan writes:
 > >Hey, man, we're the cypherpunks.  We're too hip to worry about a
 > >trivial little mail bomb.  But if we did get upset...well, who
 > >do you think has the bigger arsenal of dirty tricks, him or us?
 >
 > What arrogant little pricks you are, Mr. Ringuette and Mr. May! So is this
 > what cypherpunks is really all about: "dirty tricks", "mail bombs", endless
 > harassment of people on the net who simply wish to be left alone?.........
 >
 > I've seen many of you raise issues about responsibility on the net. Is
 > proving that you have a "bigger arsenal of dirty tricks" you're idea of
 > responsibility? And do you really think that cypherpunks could survive such
 > a war? You yourselves have admitted that you have many enemies in your
 > quest for net privacy and anonymity. Do you foolishly believe that they
 > won't seize upon this irresponsible behavior on your part and use it to
 > prove their point? You will only succeed in bringing about precisely what
 > you claim to oppose: oppressive controls on the internet to stop petty
 > vandals like yourself.

I symphatize for poor Mr. Habrecht being unable to get off this list.
Does it mean, that he, in his frustration bombing my mailbox, is
"justified"?  Hey, it's not me, who signed himon to this list,
it's not me, who can throw him out! So why did he choose to
shoot from the hip at innocent bystanders? By the same
logic, if one feels he was treated unjustly
anywhere - just make a bomb and blow up
the highest building in your area
with the largest amount of
people in it. What a real
responsible bastard can
do such things...

And who's talking about responsibility?!
An "e-mail terrorist"? Ha!

Can cypherpunks survive the "war"? With who? Lighten up!

Spitting saliva and terms like "petty vandals"? Well, well...
Who was that idiot, who vandalized my mailbox with his
stupid 3K lines of excrements? That's what true
"vandalism" is, in my eyes... Oh, and if you
aren't satisfied with how car service in
your city works - get a gun and hunt
their passengers... What a man...

And the last - who the hell needs that privacy? Is it
something valuable for cypherpunks only, something
you don't really need for yourself? Just joined
this list out of kindness to help those poor
kids?

 > I would hope that there are some among you that have some scrap of sanity
 > left, and realize that there is nothing to be gained from bringing a
 > needless war down upon yourselves. Wise up!

Yeah. Always nice to have a peace defender...

 > I sent one request to cypherpunks-request about three weeks ago, and a
 > second about a week ago. Was Eric Hughes at the CFP conference then? And
 > you may have noticed that a third person has now stepped forward and
 > expressed frustration over being in the same predicament. Do you still want
 > to pretend there is no problem? What will it take for you to realize there
 > is: the third person, the fourth, fixth, sixth? I'll say it again: Wise up!

Well, list manager, are you there? Ain't this pure truth?
And as Mark pointed out, can it be managed AUTOMATICALLY?
Somebody out there, please?

 > I've been very patient over this, but I'm disgusted at your arrogant
 > promises of "dirty tricks" and "mail bombs" against those who simply
 > want to unsubscribe from the list!

Oh no! Seeing a terrorist attack, we should seek a reason for
that poor person to act this way, to justify his doings, and
to change our behaviour, because obviously, a person with
grievance isn't responsible, or liable for his
actions - we are!   Thus we shouldn't
threaten a "mail-bomber" with
response in kind, oh no!

Give me my wish, or ye all will suffer the consequenses!

 > What phenomenal assholes you are!!!

Sounds like you were looking at the mirror too much
recently (:-).

Uri.
------------
<Disclaimer>




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: lefty@apple.com (Lefty)
Date: Fri, 12 Mar 93 13:01:33 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Returned mail: User unknown
Message-ID: <9303122100.AA23230@apple.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Apparently, Mr. Habrecht's problems have been solved.

>   ----- Transcript of session follows -----
>>>> RCPT To:<ghabrech@ultrix.ramapo.edu>
><<< 550 <ghabrech@ultrix.ramapo.edu>... Addressee unknown
>550 <ghabrech@ultrix.ramapo.edu>... User unknown

--
Lefty (lefty@apple.com)
C:.M:.C:., D:.O:.D:.






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: uri@watson.ibm.com
Date: Fri, 12 Mar 93 10:03:07 PST
To: mbrennan@netcom.com (Michael Brennan)
Subject: Re: Unacceptable slander by dclunie [FLAME]
In-Reply-To: <9303120919.AA11896@netcom.netcom.com>
Message-ID: <9303121801.AA18929@buoy.watson.ibm.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



#FLAME ON

Michael Brennan writes:
 > Are you people blind to what you are doing? What fools!!!

OK, so you ass*** tell me what I'm doing. And don't
forget to explain, why am I subjected to all this
crap about some ass***ish subscription, and why
my mailbox should receive junk mail from some
irresponsible participants? [Don't tell me,
that I've joined the club - since I have
a grievance with your silly rambling
here, by your logic I'm not liable
for this, you are...]

Uri.
------------
<Disclaimer>




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@Athena.MIT.EDU>
Date: Fri, 12 Mar 93 10:39:17 PST
To: uri@watson.ibm.com
Subject: Re: Cypherpricks think they're cool [FLAME]
In-Reply-To: <9303121756.AA17375@buoy.watson.ibm.com>
Message-ID: <9303121837.AA00315@SOS>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


   Date: Fri, 12 Mar 1993 12:56:02 -0500
   From: uri@watson.ibm.com

   #FLAME ON

   [ Rest of flame deleted.]

What I don't understand is, why are people complaining?  We're just
seeing people exercise their sacred right to free speech..... all over
this mailing list.  After all, isn't this what you were working towards?

So now that this group is getting a taste of free speech, why do we see
people sending mail to system administrators, asking that certain people
be censured for sending messages to this mailing list?  Not too long
ago, people were saying that censuring people for their speech, even
after the fact, was tantamount to censorship!

It seems just a little hypocritical to me, given the strong and sprited
defense of anonymous remailers just a week or two ago.....

							- Ted




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: pmetzger@snark.shearson.com (Perry E. Metzger)
Date: Fri, 12 Mar 93 15:30:45 PST
To: mbrennan@netcom.com
Subject: Re: CYPHERPUNKS=EMAIL HARASSEMENT?
Message-ID: <9303121900.AA17618@snark.shearson.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> From: mbrennan@netcom.com (Michael Brennan)
> 
> You are very wrong! As a matter of fact, I have sent unsubscribe requests
> to cypherpunks-request and those requests have been ignored! That's why I
> sent this last message of mine to the whole list. I'd be willing to bet
> that the individual who sent the 3K file had also attempted initially to
> send his request to cypherpunks-request and had his request ignored. In
> fact, it's quite possible that MANY of the people who have sent their
> "unsubscribe" requests to the whole list have done so because initial
> requests sent to cypherpunks-request were ignored!
> 
> Brushing this matter aside as a non-issue and pretending there is no
> problem will not make the problem go away! UNSUBSCRIBE REQUESTS SENT TO
> CYPHERPUNKS-REQUEST ARE BEING IGNORED!!!

You are a whining child, Mr. Brennan. How long have these messages been
ignored? Months? Years? I suspect a matter of days. Well, I'm sorry to
tell you this, but you aren't paying anyone to maintain this list, and
people don't do it full time. Its not a job. Prehaps the moderator went
on vacation. Prehaps he has no time for a week. Have you actually waited
a reasonable amount of time, which I would define as no less than a week
and likely no less than two?

I've run mailing lists. Its lots of long and hard work, and sometimes you
go on vacation, and when you do lots of whining fools start getting pissed
off that you aren't a robot that provides them with instant gratification.
Sorry, but no one owes you instant service. You didn't pay for a subscription
you know. This is a volunteer effort, and that means that you accept
whenever you sign on to any mailing list the possibility that, horror
of horrors, people might not process your requests every fifteen minutes.

It would not be anything like a big deal to delete the mail for a few 
more days. Instead, you involve all of us in something that we cannot
change. What makes you think that if the moderator is not reading the
-request alias that he will read the list itself?

In conclusion, get a grip. When the guy behind the counter at the
7-11 is a little slow, do you just take the food you bought without
paying? No? Then what in hell are you doing posting obnoxious mail to
hundreds of people when you know very well it violates all network
custom?

Perry Metzger




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Karl Barrus <elee9sf@Menudo.UH.EDU>
Date: Fri, 12 Mar 93 12:20:04 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: MISC: steganography & pics
Message-ID: <199303122018.AA14921@Menudo.UH.EDU>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

Cypherpunks,

I too have played around with graphics formats, specifically the TIFF
format.  It's a large and complicated format, but it does leave room
for customization.  I just mention this because I'm more familiar with
TIFF than the GIF format.

Skipping over 99% of the details: the TIFF format has a header (magic
numbers and stuff), tags and corresponding information fields, and
picture data - real terminology exists, like image file directories
and so forth, but I'll skip that.  The TIFF format allows you to
specify quite a bit of info: information fields such as time of
creation, author name, comments, host system; picture information such
as rows, columns, whether the minimum value corresponds to black or
white; color models: RGB, CMY, CMYK, greyscale; compression model:
none, LZW, JPEG; alpha values, and many other fields.  Finally, the
picture data is stored, non-sequentially if desired (that is, row 1,
then row 137, the row 54, etc.)  TIFF is extendible by simply defining
new tags.

Because the TIFF format is so all encompassing, few software packages
can read and write the entire thing - that is, valid TIFFs may be
created that may not be recognized by other software.  Sam Lieffler
(sp?) at sgi has written a comprehensive TIFF manipulation package
available via anonymous ftp which helps to overcome this problem.  

Anyway, for steganography purposes, we wouldn't want to define a
"crypto" tag obviously!  Maybe we could adapt one of the other fields,
like host computer or whatever, so that the signal that a TIFFs
contains hidden information is that one of the fields has a certain
value, to be arranged in advance or whatever.  

A 256x256 image contains 65536 pixels, each of which could contribute
1 bit to a message, which comes to 8192 bytes (say each pixel is 8 bit
and not 24 or something fancy like that), more than enough for a
message.  

This sounds like fun - I imagine in a few weeks there will be a
message to the list to retrieve the recently posted image from
alt.binaries.pictures.misc and read the hidden message!

/-----------------------------------\
| Karl L. Barrus                    |
| elee9sf@menudo.uh.edu             | <- preferred address
| barrus@tree.egr.uh.edu (NeXTMail) |
\-----------------------------------/
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.2

iQCVAgUBK6DvpoOA7OpLWtYzAQG1PgP/bI+s4p6kcMkHcv2iR+iJJV9TK32zicos
fNOqufuPZvWepfxbEqhsY70RBQAZjuqEhKcjP54yFr7wuDbroFhbfIBMQQLn1znj
v5dcaM7GrykNMhR9andfskRG6k72dxlmyBhQRcR3pbhwpPZLdw141yS4VPzHnez7
VgQ9Z+Gsb9s=
=qGIH
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: bmullane@ultrix.ramapo.edu (James Bond-007)
Date: Fri, 12 Mar 93 11:19:27 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: No Subject
Message-ID: <9303121922.AA23237@ultrix.ramapo.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

   Date: Fri, 12 Mar 1993 12:56:02 -0500
   From: uri@watson.ibm.com

   #FLAME ON

   [ Rest of flame deleted.]

What I don't understand is, why are people complaining?  We're just
seeing people exercise their sacred right to free speech..... all over
this mailing list.  After all, isn't this what you were working towards?

So now that this group is getting a taste of free speech, why do we see
people sending mail to system administrators, asking that certain people
be censured for sending messages to this mailing list?  Not too long
ago, people were saying that censuring people for their speech, even
after the fact, was tantamount to censorship!

It seems just a little hypocritical to me, given the strong and sprited
defense of anonymous remailers just a week or two ago.....

							- Ted

Ted, don't you realize that people only believe in things as long
as it is convinient(sp) or nonoffensive to them?
Maybe the admins will yell at me for being on this list now
that they got mail from the net.nazis concerning ghabrech's
action. maybe they will find out what the file pgp is in my acct
and force me to delete it...
                                  later,
                                  Brian

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.2

iQCVAgUBK6DittvH71LYWYb3AQHzYAQAgzC5znnv0gsOO+NiUDN+hwHOVYOdvwhc
0yTkigSx/FaS1YuHy2Wntlh0NbLJ59n6ZyyVOHhiE0cWwksXsQ4jwfU0KulUa5cF
nR06UDLqrhFtkRS2HcA99vPbXlbGFeVCV+02pVbc1NDSmvMTMpAvFrwlRQuQEfBW
WFZrOl1NCfU=
=2yTO
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Marc.Ringuette@GS80.SP.CS.CMU.EDU
Date: Fri, 12 Mar 93 13:05:54 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Cypherpunks know they're cool
Message-ID: <9303122105.AA06413@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Ted Ts'o writes,
> What I don't understand is, why are people complaining?  We're just
> seeing people exercise their sacred right to free speech..... all over
> this mailing list.  After all, isn't this what you were working towards?

Heh.  I agree with Ted.  Try taking the same advice we'd give someone who
received a offensive anonymous note:  quit your bitching & moaning, you
losers!

Yeah, yeah, I know, volume attacks are of a different kind than
offensive content.  But my own belief is, if our software is broken, we
shouldn't blame the doofus who comes along and tickles it.  If we end
up having a problem of volume harrassment, we should expect to have to
PROTECT OURSELVES with some half decent mailing list software.  For
instance, something that accepts mail only from subscribers or that
shunts large messages (or excessive number of messages from a single
person) to the moderator for review.  The fact that we have stupid
software is our own fault.

To me, this has the same feel to it as the current flap about 
anonymous newsgroup postings.  The right answer, in my opinion,
is to use news distribution software which can filter out anonymous
postings (and, in order to enable that, and prior to the availability
of "real person" cryptographic certificates, to ask that all remailers
provide a special header line).

What these solutions have in common is that we ask people to protect
themselves, rather than requiring everyone else to adhere to their
notions of good behavior.

Which brings to mind the potential problem that 99% of everybody
may choose to participate exclusively in "real person only" groups.
Any hints at a solution to that one?  How about if we try to 
convince people to participate in "pay as you go" groups using
digital postage?  That would solve many of the problems, in a way
that is less offensive to the freedom-loving among us.

-- Marc Ringuette (mnr@cs.cmu.edu)




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Nickey MacDonald <i6t4@jupiter.sun.csd.unb.ca>
Date: Fri, 12 Mar 93 12:08:42 PST
To: jb@paris7.jussieu.fr
Subject: Re: University Policies
In-Reply-To: <0096959f.9201c152.25188@paris7.jussieu.fr>
Message-ID: <Pine.3.05.9303121540.A1094-d100000@thebe.sun.csd.unb.ca>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Well... This is available from our site via anonymous FTP... so I suppose
there are no copyright problems by sending it to you...  enjoy...

OBTW, the title lines are my addition...  and the file is normally printed
(on the sheet they give you with your initial password) in small print,
and so the file is formatted to about 132 columns...


Univeristy of New Brunswick Computing Policies
  (UNB, Fredericton, New Brunswick, Canada)
----------------------------------------------

 POLICIES                                              5.  Improper use of Computing Services may  result
                                                           in  withdrawal  of  access privileges or other
 The  computing  and  communication  systems at the        penalties.  The following (but not limited  to
 University of New Brunswick  are  intended  to  be        the following) may be considered improper:
 used in a manner that is supportive of the Univer-
 sity's   objectives.    All  constituents  of  the        ù   Frivolous use of any workstation, computer
 University are able to apply to  use  the  univer-            or network.
 sity's  computing facilities.  When that privilege        ù   Inspection  of data or functions which are
 is granted (e.g., when an account is  issued),  it            neither allotted  to  the  inspector,  nor
 is  granted with the understanding that the use of            specified as public.
 the  computing  system  will  correspond  to   the        ù   Inspection  of  data which have to do with
 purpose(s) stated in the request.                             utilization, authorization or security.
                                                           ù   Modification of data which are not specif-
 At  the University of New Brunswick Computing Ser-            ically assigned to or created by the modi-
 vices Department,  internal  customers  (students,            fier.
 faculty  and  staff) are not personally billed for        ù   Use of another's account.
 use but are held personally  responsible  for  use        ù   Interference with other persons  accessing
 made  of  their  accounts.   Certain practices are            the systems, networks or equipment.
 considered a misuse of university property.  Exam-        ù   Destruction  of  data or property which is
 ples of such misuse are the use of any part of the            not owned by the destroyer.
 computing system for personal or corporate profit,        ù   Attempting to gain access to another's re-
 or to provide free resources to unauthorized  per-            sources, programs, or data.
 sons.                                                     ù   Use of another's programs or data  without
                                                               their permission.
 The  following  policies  govern  the  use  of the        ù   Sending obscene or vulgar messages.
 University of  New  Brunswick  Computing  Services        ù   Abusive  or destructive use of hardware or
 Department facilities:                                        public software.
                                                           ù   Use of  the  facilities  for  personal  or
 1.  No  person or persons shall use the facilities            corporate  gain  without  an  external ac-
     of the University Computing  Services  Depart-            count.  Examples of such use include  pro-
     ment  without  due  authorization by Computing            ducing   invitations,   posters,  personal
     Services.                                                 correspondence, etc., and the sale of com-
                                                               puter programs or results developed  under
 2.  Every allocation  of  computing  resources  is            an internal account.
     made  on  the  understanding  that it is to be
     used only for the purpose for which it was re-    6.  Customers are expected to:
     quested and only by the person or  persons  by
     whom  or on whose behalf the request was made.        a.  Be  responsible  for the use of their com-
     Use shall not be made of  computing  resources            puter accounts.  They should  make  appro-
     allocated  to  another  person or group unless            priate  use  of  system  provided security
     such use has been specifically  authorized  by            features and take precautions against oth-
     Computing Services.                                       ers obtaining access  to  their  computing
                                                               resources.
 3.  No  person  or  persons shall by any wilful or
     deliberate act  jeopardize  the  integrity  of        b.  Refrain   from  engaging  in  deliberately
     computing  equipment,  networks,  programs, or            wasteful practices such as:
     other stored information.
                                                               ù   unnecessary holding of workstations or
 4.  Persons authorized to use computing and commu-                telecommunications lines;
     nication resources shall be expected to  treat            ù   producing unnecessarily large  printer
     as privileged, any information not provided or                listings;
     generated  personally  which may become avail-            ù   performing unnecessary computations;
     able to them through their use  of  these  re-            ù   creating  and  retaining unnecessarily
     sources;   they   shall   not   copy,  modify,                large files;
     disseminate, or use any part  of  such  infor-            ù   unnecessary  holding   of   peripheral
     mation  without  permission of the appropriate                equipment.
     person or body.
                                                           c.  Utilize efficient and effective techniques
                                                               for program execution.

---
Nick MacDonald               | NMD on IRC
i6t4@jupiter.sun.csd.unb.ca  | PGP 2.1 Public key available via finger


On Thu, 11 Mar 1993 jb@paris7.jussieu.fr wrote:

> Hi,
> 
> Following the thread about some Universities policy about using
> computing services I'd like to ask if you can send me YOUR
> Uni policy about the above matter. I'd like to make somekindda
> compilation of them and put it on our ftp server (smup7.jussieu.fr).
> 
> Cheers,
> jb







From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: deltorto@aol.com
Date: Fri, 12 Mar 93 16:10:51 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: FWEE! premature testing
Message-ID: <9303121624.tn02614@aol.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Dewds,

Just a thought on Tim May's anonymous baptism by Stealth-fire of the WB!
project:

Tim: though I appreciate your enthusiasm, could you *please* wait until there
is something in place to actually _test_ before you test it? I know you
really wanted to post that nifty F-117A thing you OCR'd _somewhere_ but that
was not particularly helpful. It's not like I'm unaware of this issue.

Remember, we're still in Phase One (design & data collection) now. Help with
the design and data collection before you go off on your own and try to show
where the holes are or have some fun with it. Later on, you can be very
helpful if you want to play the Devil's Online Advocate.

[Also, could you please spell my name correctly for the NSA's records? It's
David Del Torto (not Deltorto). I promise not to spell your name "TiM aye" so
they can come and get you too.]

Someone suggested a set of WB guidelines should be posted. I began this
process, and will continue next week after CFP. I ask your patience while I
educate myself.

CFP News: I had a *very* interesting/enlightening discussion with Nicholas
Johnson, the former head of the FCC (under Johnson) last night about the WB!
project - he loves the idea and is willing to help out "somehow." Also, Ralph
Nader's organization is interested in what we're up to. Jim Settle (FBI
Computer Crime Squad) is also surprisingly supportive of the idea. Also,
believe it or not, a fellow from the CIA likes the idea and posits that, if
done "correctly," the system can 'perhaps be somewhat protected' from posting
by pranksters/attackers with bogus revelations - it might require someone to
preview postings (I would like to DE-nominate myself and suggest that MAYBE a
small review group be set up - let's discuss this, tell me what you think is
a good idea). I believe that the implementation of a simple WB Key system can
assist in this as well (refer to an earlier posting of mine). Of course, this
would require widespread dissemination of encryption software for anyone
needing that option. Dorothy Denning is there: does anyone have a question
for her? A statement? I can post her email address after tonight if y'all
like.

More Later, Gotta Run...

    dave (Del Torto)




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: pmetzger@snark.shearson.com (Perry E. Metzger)
Date: Fri, 12 Mar 93 15:42:54 PST
To: mbrennan@netcom.com
Subject: Re: UNSUBSCRIBE ME!!!!!
Message-ID: <9303122126.AA17863@snark.shearson.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> From: mbrennan@netcom.com (Michael Brennan)
> 
> > 
> > >DAMN!!!!!  UNSUBSCRIBE ME ALREADY!!!!!
> > >GHABRECH@ULTRIX.RAMAPO.EDU
> > >ghabrech@ultrix.ramapo.edu
> > 
> > You know, if you went down to the local expressway and lay down along one
> > of the broken white lines and worked on perfecting your impression of a
> > median strip, your problems would soon stop bothering you.
> > 
> > --
> > Lefty (lefty@apple.com)
> 
> Please explain to me, lefty, why you insist on flaming someone who simply 
> wants to unsubscribe from the list.

Because, you pathetic asshole, he didn't just want to subscribe to the list;
he sent out a goddamn 80k garbage message to everyone. That you cannot
see the difference between these two demonstrates a substantial deficit
in your capacity for mentation.

Perry




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: bill@anubis.network.com (Bill O'Hanlon)
Date: Fri, 12 Mar 93 15:19:35 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Unacceptable slander by dclunie [FLAME]
Message-ID: <9303122317.AA11464@anubis.network.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

[ a bunch of bickering deleted concerning who was wrong to have lost their

 temper first.  ]

Folks, this is the cypherpunks list.  I have three observations to make.

1.  Joining it is voluntary.
2.  It generates a tremendous amount of traffic.
3.  Many people on it can write filters and such.  It's a technical list.

Why do I mention three obvious points?  Here's my personal situation.  I 
suspect it is similar to many here.  I read many mail lists.  The traffic
on them is large, and the unsubscribe messages are numerous.  Being a
pro-code kind of person, rather than complain frequently about people being
stupid with unsubscribe requests, I filtered 'em.  So, I've never seen the
unsubscribe requests.  Anything with unsubscribe in the subject gets filtered.
I've never seen any of you complain about a problem with the list.  Suddenly,
some genius craps in my mail file.  My problem was with said genius, so I
replied to him.  End of problem, right?  Wrong.  Someone with a chip on his
shoulder makes a federal case about it and starts name calling.  It's
really ironic that Tim May gets blasted as a petty vandal for mailing
George back a third of George's post.

I'm not in any position to be able to help with a problem with the subscription
list.  When it comes down to a choice between writing a quick filter to make
sure I don't see mail that irritates me or complaining, I write a filter.  When
it comes down to passively accepting "punishment" from someone who voluntarily
joined the list, wants to quit the list due to traffic, and then hypocritically
worsens the situation by doubling the traffic for a day singlehandedly, I
refuse.  If this list was for beginning computer users and children, I'd be 
much more patient.  

I didn't want George's mail, so I gave it back to him.

- -- 
Bill O'Hanlon               Network Systems Corporation
bill@network.com

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.2

iQCVAgUBK6EZ+uUL0gzXlqP9AQGZYAP9G9f/WukRsNPZG4F5MrlVB+gUINW0L2pJ
qbYgvbIOReNXckNrDtm/soToE+tMVcRbj3r0fv3VW14fveQssIJE02fpiTxJ/LAZ
+pIuOEzYV/tUubm5F5ZeunAt5tnsfCofvqisWVan4tJr8mpL4sx+0z9dTM6xsZcb
mLSkZPrDImk=
=hpCC
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: dclunie@pax.tpa.com.au (David Clunie)
Date: Fri, 12 Mar 93 00:14:09 PST
To: Postmaster@ultrix.ramapo.edu
Subject: Unacceptable behaviour by ghabrech
Message-ID: <9303120811.AA05897@britt>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


From one of the very popular mailing lists I received the following posting
by one of your users. While I can understand his frustration at having
difficulties unsubscribing from a relatively high volume list, or his
ignorance at not being aware that such requests should be directed to the
"x-request" alias not the "x" list, this is no excuse for such a long and
unpleasant post that has consumed considerable expensive bandwidth for no
good reason ... I am surprised you tolerate students with such a childish
attitude on your system and they do no credit to your institution's
reputation.

This is an abridged version of George A. Habrecht's 3264 line post !

> From cypherpunks-request@toad.com Fri Mar 12 16:48:53 1993
Date: Thu, 11 Mar 1993 14:59:21 -0500
From: ghabrech@ultrix.ramapo.edu (George A. Habrecht)
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Content-Length: 74877

Hello?  I have asked several times and am starting to get pissed off!!!!
So do as follows!!!!!
Unsubscribe me!!!!!!!!
Unsubscribe me!!!!!!!!
...
...
Unsubscribe me!!!!!!!!
Unsubscribe me!!!!!!!!

Get the message?!?  Thanx

ghabrech@ultrix.ramapo.edu






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Al Billings <mimir@u.washington.edu>
Date: Fri, 12 Mar 93 18:50:24 PST
To: Michael Brennan <mbrennan@netcom.com>
Subject: Re: An Appeal to Calm
In-Reply-To: <9303121918.AA04403@netcom.netcom.com>
Message-ID: <Pine.3.05z.9303121714.A17185-b100000@carson.u.washington.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain




On Fri, 12 Mar 1993, Michael Brennan wrote:

> > Folks,
> > 
> > Tempers have flared. Angry words have been sent out to the list. We've all
> > been mail-bombed by an angry member of the list (who wants off--NOW!).
> 
>   [...]
> 
> > I hope things can calm down a bit.
> > 
> > -Tim May
> 
> I would hope things would calm down a bit, as well. Sending a massive mail bomb
> to the list may have been innappropriate, but so is continuing to send unwanted
> mail to a user who has made repeated unsubscribe requests. Why are some of you
> insisting on waging a flame war?!! What do you intend to gain from such 
> puerility?
> 
> I am encouraged that at least some voices of reason are now emerging amidst all
> of this, and I would hope that the cypherpunks would try to understand the
> frustation of those who have their unsubscribe requests ignored and continue
> to receive unwanted mail.

 You are a fucking prick. There is nothing ANY of us can do to get you off
the list. IF you want off, you'll have to wait. Meanwhile, why don't you
quit posting to the list since you want off so fucking bad?








From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@Athena.MIT.EDU>
Date: Fri, 12 Mar 93 18:01:22 PST
To: Marc.Ringuette@GS80.SP.CS.CMU.EDU
Subject: Re: Cypherpunks know they're cool
In-Reply-To: <9303122105.AA06413@toad.com>
Message-ID: <9303130159.AA01968@SOS>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


   Date: Fri, 12 Mar 1993 15:07-EST
   From: Marc.Ringuette@GS80.SP.CS.CMU.EDU

   What these solutions have in common is that we ask people to protect
   themselves, rather than requiring everyone else to adhere to their
   notions of good behavior.

Hmm..... how is this alike, and how is this different, from a hardliner
NRA saying, "We should ask people to protect themselves by wearing
bulletproof vests, instead of trying to ban guns"?

   Which brings to mind the potential problem that 99% of everybody
   may choose to participate exclusively in "real person only" groups.
   Any hints at a solution to that one?  How about if we try to 
   convince people to participate in "pay as you go" groups using
   digital postage?  That would solve many of the problems, in a way
   that is less offensive to the freedom-loving among us.

Carrying the above metaphor further, is it really a problem if 99% of
everybody chooses to live in firefight-free zones, so that they don't
have to wear bullet-proof vests?  And is saying that, "O.K, we'll make
people pay for bullets" really going to help?  It just restricts the
people who can fire bullets (or write large amounts of anonymous
postings) to those who have lots o' cash.

As long as we are really being freedom-loving, there's nothing we can do
(or should _want_ to do) to get people to attend groups that allow
anonymous posters, if they only want to travel in "real person only"
circles.  If they've made a choice not to want to read anonymous
postings (perhaps by installing a filter which deletes all anonymous
postings unread), how is this a "problem"?

							- Ted





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Eli Brandt <ebrandt@jarthur.Claremont.EDU>
Date: Fri, 12 Mar 93 21:06:58 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re:  HIDE: embedding msgs into snd & graphics
In-Reply-To: <9303120852.AA03893@sting.Berkeley.EDU>
Message-ID: <9303130506.AA18442@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> And once you try to hide data in a lossy encoding scheme, you run
> into a lot (though not all) of the problems you have with colormaps.

I think it's even worse... with unlossy compression, you can frob
the uncompressed bits and just lose compression.  With lossy, you
can't do that, because your message will be smeared away.  And
frobbing the compressed stream will produce ghastly artifacts.

But not all images will be lossily compressed.  I find that JPEG,
for example, usually introduces too much gunk to be useful.
Certainly, sending an LZW TIFF should be above suspicion for quite
some time.
 
> It would be a lot easier to hide data in an image if one had a control-image
> (the original) as well as the altered-image (the one holding the message),
> but this defeats half the niftiness of trying to do things this way.

Yeah, this is just a cheesy OTP.  Not much point, really.

I've been thinking about the GIF case; the "optimize for colormap
cyclic continuity" technique looks like it will produce better
images than the "crunch to 128 colors".  Since I have to write some
annealing code for a neural-net trainer, maybe I'll repackage it for
colormap optimization and see what the results look like.  If you
wanted minimum visible crud, you could start with a true-color pic,
find the colormap, order it, and dither down -- rather than adding
white noise to pre-existing dithering.

You know, I think I've been taking the graphics-weenie approach to
this.  Who cares how the image looks?  Who cares if it's even an
image?  Just take your damned PGP file, ^=0xff it, and rename it
"hotbabe.gif".  uuencode and mail.  The NSA is not going to be
viewing every picture you send, I hope.  This fails on "plausible
deniability", I guess.

>     -J.

   Eli   ebrandt@jarthur.claremont.edu




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Marc.Ringuette@GS80.SP.CS.CMU.EDU
Date: Fri, 12 Mar 93 18:24:54 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Cypherpunks know they're cool
Message-ID: <9303130224.AA15122@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> Hmm..... how is this alike, and how is this different, from a hardliner
> NRA saying, "We should ask people to protect themselves by wearing
> bulletproof vests, instead of trying to ban guns"?

Ted, please don't be a bonehead on purpose.  I bet you can see the
difference between some bits coming down a wire and a bullet coming
at you at 1000 feet per second.  It has to do with the level of threat
and the feasibility of protecting yourself.

> As long as we are really being freedom-loving, there's nothing we can do
> (or should _want_ to do) to get people to attend groups that allow
> anonymous posters, if they only want to travel in "real person only"
> circles.

Not true at all!  Just because I like freedom doesn't mean I shouldn't
try to convince people to act in a way that is more freedom-loving.

-- Marc Ringuette (mnr@cs.cmu.edu)




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Bill Sommerfeld <sommerfeld@orchard.medford.ma.us>
Date: Fri, 12 Mar 93 21:33:18 PST
To: MJMISKI@macc.wisc.edu
Subject: CYPHER: Plain encypher
In-Reply-To: <23031112170179@vms2.macc.wisc.edu>
Message-ID: <9303130448.AA00298@orchard.medford.ma.us>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


For a good time, read the sections from "The Codebreakers" regarding
what kind of lengths war-time censors went through to foil
steganography.

In this day & age, rearranging the spacing of messages "just for the
heck of it" would be a rather obvious equivalent to what they did back
then (BITNET does things like this today just out of sheer
perversity).  So would scrambling the low-order bits of a sound file.

				- Bill








From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@Athena.MIT.EDU>
Date: Fri, 12 Mar 93 22:13:25 PST
To: Marc.Ringuette@GS80.SP.CS.CMU.EDU
Subject: Re: Cypherpunks know they're cool
In-Reply-To: <9303130224.AA15122@toad.com>
Message-ID: <9303130612.AA07820@SOS>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


   Date: Fri, 12 Mar 1993 21:18-EST
   From: Marc.Ringuette@GS80.SP.CS.CMU.EDU

   > Hmm..... how is this alike, and how is this different, from a hardliner
   > NRA saying, "We should ask people to protect themselves by wearing
   > bulletproof vests, instead of trying to ban guns"?

   Ted, please don't be a bonehead on purpose.  I bet you can see the
   difference between some bits coming down a wire and a bullet coming
   at you at 1000 feet per second.  It has to do with the level of threat
   and the feasibility of protecting yourself.

I'm not being a bonehead; this is a serious question!  I was drawing an
analogy; of course bits and bullets are different!  What is the same is
the philosophy of "the initiator can do know wrong"; i"it's always the
receivers' problems."  I am merely pointing out that your philosophy of: 

>What these solutions have in common is that we ask people to protect
>themselves, rather than requiring everyone else to adhere to their
>notions of good behavior.

is dangerously close, if not identical to "if the victim gets hurts it
his/her fault (for not protecting him/her-self)".  This logic obviously
does not work for rape; whether or not someone protects herself, there
are standards of conduct which say that rape is still a bad thing.  
The question is whether or not there are similar standards of conduct
for cyberspace --- "community standards" or not.

							- Ted




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Hal <74076.1041@CompuServe.COM>
Date: Fri, 12 Mar 93 22:56:34 PST
To: <cypherpunks@toad.com>
Subject: HIDE: embeddin msgs into snd & graphics
Message-ID: <930313065252_74076.1041_DHJ21-2@CompuServe.COM>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


The considerations that Eli mentioned make it clear that embedding data in 
the low bits of an image is not as trivial as it sounds, with commonly-used 
image formats.  In the case of GIF, Eli points out that you may have a 256 
entry color table, with each pixel indexing into that table.  Flipping the 
low bit of a pixel may lead to a completely different color.
 
What you could do is to renumber the color table so that, to the extent 
possible, every even-numbered color has some odd-numbered color that is 
similar (close in color space), and vice versa.  Then rather than just 
altering the low-order bit of each pixel, you'd change the color of that 
pixel to be the nearest color of opposite even-odd-ness.  For the decode 
step, though, you could still just check the low-order bit of the 
(uncompressed) image.  That renumbering step sounds like the tricky part.
 
I think Eli is right, too, that lossy compression is pretty much out of the 
question for this application.  It would be too easy to lose the message 
that is encoded in the low-order bits.
 
Images that would be good candidates for this would be natural, scanned-in 
pictures.  Hand-drawn artworks and most computer-generated images would not 
have enough natural randomness to allow the message to be slipped in 
unnoticeably.  Fortunately, nudes would fall into the useful category, and 
they make up a large fraction of the images people exchange.
 
Hal
74076.1041@compuserve.com





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Pat Farrell" <pfarrell@cs.gmu.edu>
Date: Mon, 15 Mar 93 18:27:10 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: alternate US site for pgp22
Message-ID: <51920.pfarrell@cs.gmu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Hi,
Can someone point me to another US FTP site with PGP22. I've downloaded
it a couple of times from soda.berkeley.edu, and can't get it unzipped.
I've tried all known combinarions of binary, non-binary, etc.
The file, once it reaches my PC is 209409 but pkunzip 204g says it is
broken. If I use pkzipfix, I can get some of the files, docs, keyserver,
etc. but it always fails with a CRC error on or after
exploding LANGUAGE.TXT

One piece of tech info: I have to FTP to a SUN server, and then
use Kermit to bring the file to my PC. This has worked many times for
many other files, but there could be some user error in here.

Thanks
Pat

Pat Farrell      Grad Student                 pfarrell@cs.gmu.edu
Department of Computer Science    George Mason University, Fairfax, VA
PGP Public key availble via finger          #include <standard.disclaimer>




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: ORNTS188@ksuvxb.kent.edu
Date: Tue, 16 Mar 93 06:44:46 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: PGP 2.2
Message-ID: <01GVRJAXTNGI0002O4@ksuvxb.kent.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Hello, from reading some of the postings, I gather that there is
another list that deals more with just PGP. If so could someone
send the address to me.

         Thanks.....
                     Dan :)





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Seth Morris <Seth.Morris@lambada.oit.unc.edu>
Date: Mon, 15 Mar 93 18:27:18 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: HIDE (Fnord): Targa-24/YUV/D-xxx and headers
Message-ID: <9303132047.AA05640@lambada.oit.unc.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text



 W.r.t. the steganography issue and image files (although I think sound
files are probably more useful), Targa-24 images are RGB bytes (triples for
each pixel, bottom-left to top-right), and seem appropriate for hiding a 
msg. They are also widely supported for conversion and function as a nice
"device independant" image format (The Stone Soup Group's PicLab does a
good job on them, IMHO).
 Does anyone know anything about YUV format? Also, DYUV or some other delta
compressed format seems good. If a pixel changes by one more or one less
than it "should" the image simply looks like a mediocre scan.
 Hmmm..... FLI is a delta format... is it appropriate?

 So... can someone whip up a utility to strip the PGP header and then
perfoem some simple filtering (^= with some magic numbers, perhaps, or
with some function of the preceeding bytes? Can this eventually help
recover a better image, if that could ever be important? I don't think so)
and tack on a valid Targa or other header (or correct any headers on 
images we've slid into).

 I just started a new job and am swamped, or I'd have written first and
posted later ;-) .

	Seth morris <seth.morris@laUNChpad.unc.edu>




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Derek Upham <upham@cs.ubc.ca>
Date: Mon, 15 Mar 93 18:27:23 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: HIDE: embeddin msgs into snd & graphics
Message-ID: <199303140130.AA08704@grolsch.cs.ubc.ca>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> I think Eli is right, too, that lossy compression is pretty much out of the 
> question for this application.  It would be too easy to lose the message 
> that is encoded in the low-order bits.

Uh, unless the JPEG FAQ sheet has seriously mislead me, lossy
compression would be excellent for this sort of steganography.

In the standard JPEG encoding procedure, an image is broken into
square blocks of pixels, eight per side.  These blocks are run through
a 2-D discrete cosine transform, producing a set of cosine waves that
are equivalent to the original blocks (within small errors).  If the
original image was smooth (a natural image, for example), the low-
frequency waves will contain all the information necessary for
reproducing the block; the high-frequency waves will contain nothing
but faint noise.  So the JPEG encoder _dumps_ the high-frequency
cosine waves.  That's how the format gets a lot of its compression.

This is where steganography comes in.  Take these empty wave slots and
stick your data in them.  For example, if the wave magnitudes are
stored as four-byte integers, store one byte of data in the lowest-
order byte in the slot (or go down to four, two, or even one bit per
integer, if necessary; floating-point would be wonderful, here).  As
long as the hidden data representation looks like very tiny values to
the JPEG decoder, the data should be completely unnoticeable on
display---but the steganographic decoder will know where to look for
it and what to do with it.

Anyone have honest-to-god practical experience with JPEG/JFIF to
assess the feasibility of this technique?

Derek

Derek Lynn Upham                               University of British Columbia
upham@cs.ubc.ca                                   Computer Science Department
=============================================================================
"Ha!  Your Leaping Tiger Kung Fu is no match for my Frightened Piglet Style!"




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Al Billings <mimir@u.washington.edu>
Date: Mon, 15 Mar 93 18:27:38 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Threat of restoring the status quo
In-Reply-To: <C3r9vE.EIx@redpoll.neoucom.edu>
Message-ID: <9303140515.AA07333@stein.u.washington.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


 Forwarded from news.admin.policy where this individual is threatning to
set up a cancel message generating script to kill all posts from Julf's
Anon Service.

In article <C3tzLF.5ou@redpoll.neoucom.edu> Richard Depew
<red@redpoll.neoucom.edu writes: 

>Hi David,
>
>    I hope you don't mind my changing the title of this thread... I
>didn't care for the one you were using:
>Re: Threat of mass cancellings was Re: Anonymity is NOT the issue
>
>     Tisk, tisk... you make it sound as if masses of postings are
>threatened.  Have you *looked* for anonymous postings in the "sci"
>hierarchy?  There are really very few.  Only two, for Friday:
><1993Mar12.010241.2849@fuug.fi>
><1993Mar12.061727.9451@fuug.fi>
>
>     The best time to put out a fire is while it is still small.  :-)
>
>In article <1nq1f2INNfed@flash.pax.tpa.com.au> dclunie@pax.tpa.com.au writes:
>[...]
>
>>I presume that cancel messages can be cancelled ... though I haven't
>>experimented with this yet, but it looks like I might have to. In fact I
>>think I will probably just turn off response to cancel messages totally if
>>you go ahead with this scheme, and I encourage other news administrators
>>to do the same ... they were a bad kludge in the first place and still are.
>>It seems to me they are rarely used for other than controversial purposes
>>like you are proposing (I don't like other people's postings so I won't let
>>anyone else read them).
>
>     That (disabling cancel messages) would be unfortunate.  They have
>many legitimate uses.  Cancelling inappropriate postings is one of
>these legitimate uses.  Controversial, sure, but my reason for
>activating the Automated Retroactive Minimal Moderation script, if
>Julf remains unwilling to accept any compromise, is simply to
>demonstrate that the status quo with regards to anonymous postings from
>a particular site *can* be effectively enforced.  As I have said many
>times before, I do *not* object to anonymous postings in newsgroups
>that invite them.  However, I think it *is* important to demonstrate
>that USENET *does* have a defense against a self-styled cyberpunk
>who refuses to cooperate with the rest of the net.  Whether USENET can
>find the *will* to oppose him remains an open question.  I simply
>intend a brief demonstration of one defense mechanism.
>
>>I really think you are getting carried away with a non-issue here, and
>>inflamming the situation is going to make you extremely unpopular, and
>>undoubtedly start a "cancelling war" at the very least.
>
>    The issue of an irresponsible system administrator trying to
>impose his anonymous server on readers of thousands of newsgroups is
>not a trivial one.  My proposal to restore the status quo in a
>hierarchy that has protested anonymous postings may not make me
>popular with anonymous posters, but I haven't seen a single message
>claiming that any sci newsgroup has invited anonymous postings.  If
>there is to be a "cancelling war", it will be very brief.  If I
>activate the ARMM script, it will only be for the weekend.
>     
>>No-one has appointed you as the moderator of all the non-alt groups
>>retrospectively or otherwise, and no-one is likely to appoint anyone else
>>in such a position either.
>
>    You are right, no one has appointed me to the post of
>minimal-moderator.  It is a volunteer position with, I assure you,
>miserable fringe benefits.  I will gladly relinquish the position when
>the opportunity arises.  :-)
>
>[...]
>>> There shouldn't be much controversy over this, but there will be
>>> anyhow.  :-)
>>
>>There should be and there will be ... you are way out of line here Richard,
>>regardless of how many smileys you tack on the end of your message.
>
>     No.  It is Julf who is way out of line here... and has been for
>four months, now.  He has finally met someone who has gotten fed up
>with his silly game, and is willing to call his bluff.
>
>>I hope you are prepared to take responsibility for what is going to happen
>>to your institution's news and mail servers if you go ahead with this plan.
>
>     I hope you didn't mean that the way it reads... as a threat.  I
>thought you were more responsible than that.  Perhaps I am wrong.  You
>*have* been one of Julf's strongest supporters in this newsgroup,
>urging him to ignore the advice of the experienced news administrators
>in this group.  To date, this has been an argument between, if not
>friends, then at least respected opponents.  Most of us have the best
>interests of the net in mind, agree that anonymous postings have their
>place, and agree that cooperative anarchy is a wonderful experiment.
>You may not like my "Automated Retroactive Minimal Moderation" script,
>but you must at least admit that it is simply an automated version of
>moderation - a well-accepted practice in newsgroups that want to keep
>an acceptable signal/noise ratio.  You may protest that I have
>bypassed the usual mechanisms for establishing moderation, and you
>would be right.  I have brused some USENET traditions while trying to
>protect others.  However, threats against the integrity of internet
>sites are a far more serious matter.  I sent a long note to the
>system administrators of my feed site, explaining my proposal and
>pointing out some of the threats that might affect them.  We then
>had a long talk.  They were, as you might expect, less than thrilled
>at my rash proposal, which received a decidedly mixed reception.  They
>were even less thrilled at the prospect of being the recipient of
>denial-of service attacks.  They will take any such attacks seriously,
>indeed.
>
>[...]
>>I am sure you don't want to become Usenet's next "J Palmer" in terms of
>>reputation. (This is reference is becoming a bit like the "who is John Galt ?")
>
>   Glad to see you haven't lost your sense of humor.  :-)
>
>Regards,
>Dick
>-- 
>Richard E. Depew, Munroe Falls, OH               red@redpoll.neoucom.edu
>"Leap years are a pain; the earth should be stabilised." - Geoff Collyer
>                                         and Mark Moraes in getabsdate.3






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Al Billings <mimir@u.washington.edu>
Date: Mon, 15 Mar 93 18:27:34 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: warning to "sci" anonymous posters
Message-ID: <9303140519.AA07710@stein.u.washington.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


 This is another message on the Cancel Message Generator issue in
news.admin.policy.

In article <C3tzrs.5t5@redpoll.neoucom.edu> Richard Depew
<red@redpoll.neoucom.edu writes:
>     As I promised yesterday, I emailed each recent anonomous poster
>in the "sci" hierarchy a note explaining what may happen this
>weekend.  
>
>Dick
>=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=
>Dear anonymous poster,
>
>     You may not be aware of the discussion in news.admin.policy
>concerning the propriety of posting anonymously to newsgroups which
>have not invited such postings.  As someone who has posted anonymously
>to the "sci" hierarchy recently, you should read it.
>
>     I am writing to inform you that if Julf, admin@anon.penet.fi,
>does not soon block anonymous postings to the "sci" hierarchy, then
>I will activate an "Automated Retroactive Minimal Moderation" script
>that will cancel postings to this hierarchy from his server.  This is
>intended to restore the pre-Julf status quo, at least temporarily,
>over the weekend.
>
>     Rest assured that there is nothing personal in this.  I have not
>read your postings, and I have no reason to believe that they were out
>of line in any way other than being anonymous.  I have nothing against
>anonymous postings to groups that have decided to accept such
>postings, nor do I object to any newsgroup deciding to do this.  I
>*do* object to Julf's permitting his server to post to newsgroups
>without any effort to determine whether the readers of those newsgroups
>want to permit anonymous postings.
>
>     You have several possible courses of action if you wish to post
>to the "sci" hierarchy while the "Automated Retroactive Minimal
>Moderation" is in effect:
>
>*1  convince Julf to accept the "Petersen Proposal" for default
>    settings for different hierarchies.  I promise to turn off the
>    ARMM script as soon as I hear that he will do this (or anything
>    reasonably responsive).
>
>*2  convince the readers of the newsgroup to which you want to post
>    that anonymous postings should be accepted in that newsgroup.
>    I can think of several valid reasons that may prompt such a desire,
>    but the decision should be made by the readers of the newsgroup, not
>    imposed by a single person such as Julf, or me.  I promise to
>    abide by whatever decision the newsgroup makes.  This does not
>    need to be a formal vote.  A straw vote with a clear majority will
>    suffice.
>
>*3  have a friend post for you, use a different anonymous server,
>    or, if all else fails, post under your own name.  People used to
>    do this, you know.  :-)
>
>    If none of these suit you, then simply be patient, and wait until
>Monday.  I intend to run ARMM, if I run it at all, for less than 48
>hours... this time.  This is merely intended to be a demonstration
>that an effective enforcement mechanism for blocking postings from a
>particular site can work.
>
>    I apologize in advance for any inconvenience this may cause you.
>My argument is with Julf and is about the default setting for entire
>hierarchies; it is not with you or your particular postings.
>
>Sincerely,
>Dick Depew
>=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=
>-- 
>Richard E. Depew, Munroe Falls, OH               red@redpoll.neoucom.edu
>"Leap years are a pain; the earth should be stabilised." - Geoff Collyer
>                                         and Mark Moraes in getabsdate.3






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Doug Humphrey <digex@access>
Date: Mon, 15 Mar 93 18:27:29 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: [detecting interesting lines to look at]
Message-ID: <199303140418.AA28175@access>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


   
>   And don't tell me they can
>   build computers that can distinguish between a PGP file transmission
>   and some 
>   hormone crazed 15 year old dork downloading the latest GIF of Cindy Crawford
>   or a ZIPed ware.  I've looked at hexdumps of GIFs and ZIPs and for all
>   practical purposes they look about as random as PGP data.  If the NSA
>   can build a parellel computer that scans all the trunks in the U.S.
>   simultaneously AND can tell the difference between PGP streams and ZIP/GIF
>   file data streams, then I just might as well go and shoot myself right
>   now.
>
>Er.... you might want to get your gun out..... the middle of hexdumps of
>GIF's and ZIP's and PGP files may look the same, but the file headers
>are quite distinguishing.  If you want to hide encrypted data, each
>person needs to find their own way of doing it ---- if everyone hides it
>in the low bits of a GIF file, it would be very simple for the NSA to
>scan GIF files to see if the low bits looked like the header of a PGP
>file.....

To some extent, this discussion is ignoring the importance of 
"context".  Yes, if you have to do detailed searches of the data
traveling down a million lines, you are likely to fail.  That is
why you don't do it.  

What you DO is look for things that look out of the ordinary,
things that alone would look fine, but within a given context 
would look wrong, and then search those exception cases in 
more detail.  Example, someone comes up with a way that voice
looks just like fax from the data spectrum standpoint.  Great,
no way that anyone can scan the line and figure out, in the 
few seconds that they are scanning, that what they are seeing 
is really voice.  So, you attack it by looking at connection 
records, and looking for what looks like fax machines from the 
data standpoint, but seems to have a usage record (times of day, 
duration of calls, time between retrys, etc) of telephones.

Remember, even though the technology has changed, the end users
of it have not, and the end users are the ones that you are 
looking for, the ones who are setting up the usage records.

So, they now have a catagory of "fax machines that behave like
fax machines" and "fax machines that behave like phones".

Wonder which ones they will use the Special Equipment on, eh?

Same goes for PGP vs. GIFS.  The guy moving 4k long GIFS is
the guy moving the PGP stuff that looks like GIFS.  It doesn't 
nail all of the possible uses, but this is all a game of the 
odds anyway, and in the long run the usage patterns, the more meta
data, can give people good clues to work with.






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Marc.Ringuette@GS80.SP.CS.CMU.EDU
Date: Mon, 15 Mar 93 18:27:43 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Community standards for email anonymity
Message-ID: <9303141011.AA05636@cygnus.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Good point, Ted, what we're after is some "community standards"
for cyberspace, and what I'm suggesting is the fairly libertarian
standard that goes like this:

    Prefer technological solutions and self-protection solutions
    over rule-making, where they are feasible.

This is based on the notion that the more rules there are, the more
people will call for the "net police" to enforce them.  If we can
encourage community standards which emphasize a prudent level of
self-protection, then we'll be able to make do with fewer rules and
a less intrusive level of policing.

Some more specific versions of this:

      Self-protection                       Protection via rules
      ---------------                       --------------------

 "Don't read the newsgroup 	       Forbid all newsgroups which a
 if it offends you"                    reasonable person would find offensive.


 Allow anonymous posting       Use software to           Forbid all
 in all newsgroups; use        allow anonymity in        anonymous posting.
 information filters.          some groups only.     


 Handle volume bombs by                Track down volume bombs
 using digital postage and             and disconnect the offender.
 information filters.                   


 Trace harrassing notes to          Tell people to just ignore or filter
 the source.                        out harrassing material.


I guess it's a matter of preference.  I wonder if it's asking
too much to achieve general agreement among us cypherpunks?


-- Marc Ringuette (mnr@cs.cmu.edu)




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: edgar@spectrx.Saigon.COM (Edgar W. Swank)
Date: Mon, 15 Mar 93 18:27:48 PST
To: Cypherpunks          <cypherpunks@toad.com>
Subject: PGP: PGP & WAFFLE??
Message-ID: <B6BF1B6w165w@spectrx.saigon.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


The SYSOP of this system posted the following enquiry to me:
 
    I've heard that there is a program to allow pgp stuff online with
    waffle; if you know of such a thing, please point me towards it.
    I'd like to be able to secure this site for people who want it.
 
I haven't heard of any such program, but if you have, please reply
by E-mail to
 
  edgar@spectrx.saigon.com (Edgar W. Swank)

--
edgar@spectrx.saigon.com (Edgar W. Swank)
SPECTROX SYSTEMS +1.408.252.1005  Silicon Valley, Ca





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Peter shipley <shipley@tfs.COM>
Date: Mon, 15 Mar 93 18:27:54 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: soda.berkeley.edu
Message-ID: <9303150746.AA10775@merde.dis.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/x-pgp



-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----


fyi: soda just had yet another disk crash, thus anonymous ftp and
some remailers will not be avalible for a "while".


			-Pete

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.2

iQBFAgUBK6Q0Tshmn7GUWLLFAQFk6wF9H7sLT/bPi+dMy1gRu5FMBAM1H6AJFZ9F
oCe/ba1i9VM2QSwF/TAtA4EvjddvpOl4
=zeUe
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: wixer!pacoid@cactus.org (Paco Xander Nathan)
Date: Mon, 15 Mar 93 18:28:45 PST
To: fringeware@wixer.cactus.org
Subject: We have a verdict. (fwd)
Message-ID: <9303150755.AA27651@wixer>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


For Lists That Care About Computer Privacy:

In case you didn't catch this elsewheres..  I've been covering the
SJG vs. SS trial for certain magazines.  Hopefully you'll be able
to read soon an in-depth, first hand account of the fiasco our paid 
officials attempted to conduct during the SS trial.

The bueno news is that individuals and small companies can actually 
sue the US Fed govt for privacy violations, and win.

Judge Sparks didn't give a whole lot of airplay to the *damages*
sustained, but this is an important step forward.  The flood 
gates are opened..

pxn.
----

Forwarded message:
> From cs.utexas.edu!tic.com!sjackson@cactus.org  Sun Mar 14 16:25:06 1993
> Date: Sun, 14 Mar 93 15:05:19 -0600
> From: tic.com!sjackson@cactus.org (Steve Jackson)
> Message-Id: <9303142105.AA17568@aahsa.tic.com>
> To: ...
> Subject: We have a verdict.
> 
> We won.
>  
> Pete Kennedy, our attorney at George, Donaldson & Ford, called me
> with the news about 3:30 today. Apparently the decision came in late
> Friday while Pete was at the CFP.
>  
> The judge ruled for us on both the PPA and ECPA, though he says that
> taking the computer out the door was not an "interception." (I have not
> read the decision yet, so no quotes here.)
>  
> He awarded damages of $1,000 per plaintiff under the ECPA.
>  
> Under the PPA, he awarded SJ Games $42,259 for lost profits in 1990, and
> out of pocket costs of $8,781.
>  
> Our attorneys are also entitled to submit a request for their costs.
>  
> No word on appeal yet.
>  
> Look for a more complete and coherent account after we all read
> the decision.
>  
> Please copy this announcement to all electronic and other media.
>  
> Thanks for your support through all this!





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: gnu@cygnus.com
Date: Mon, 15 Mar 93 18:29:01 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: crypto poem
Message-ID: <9303151811.AA15886@cygnus.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


To: rms@ai.mit.edu
Subject: crypto poem
From: pgut1@cs.aukuni.ac.nz
Date: Sun, 14 Mar 93 15:17:29 -0800
Subject: And now for something completely different...

    PGP or not PGP      (from Hamlet Act III Scene I)
    --------------
 
PGP or not PGP - that is the question
Whether 'tis nobler in the mind to suffer
The slings and arrows of outrageous patents,
Or to take arms against a sea of lawyers,
And by encrypting end them?  To crypt, to sign
No more; and by a program to say we end
The patents and the export restrictions
That RSA is heir to - 'tis a consummation.
Devoutly to be wish'd.  To crypt, to sign.
To crypt - perchance to pem-code:  aye, there's the rub!
For in that test of wills what lawyers may come
When we have shuffled off this PGP business,
Must give us pause.  There's the respect
that makes calamity of such legal restrictions.
For who would bear the whips and scorns of Leavenworth
Th'patent systems wrong, the export laws worse,
The pangs of despis'd lawyers, the NSA's delay,
The insolence of Sternlight, and the spurns
That patient usage of PGP takes
When he himself might his quietus make
with PEM?  Who would this program bear,
To grunt and sweat under a weary system,
But that the dread of something after PEM
The undiscover'd country, from whose bourne
No cryptographer returns -- puzzles the will,
And makes us rather bear those ills we have
Than fly to others that we know not of?
Thus conscience does make cowards of us all,
And thus the native hue of resolution
Is sicklied o'er with the pale cast of thought,
And enterprises of great pith and moment
With this regard their currents turn awry
And lose the name of action.
 
    - Apologies to Bill Shakespeare




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Anonymous
Date: Tue Sep 07 12:37:43 1999
Subject: No Subject
Message-ID: <d41d8cd98f00b204e9800998ecf8427e@NO-ID-FOUND.mhonarc.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Bill Sommerfeld writes:

>For a good time, read the sections from "The Codebreakers" regarding
>what kind of lengths war-time censors went through to foil
>steganography.
>
>In this day & age, rearranging the spacing of messages "just for the
>heck of it" would be a rather obvious equivalent to what they did back
>then (BITNET does things like this today just out of sheer
>perversity).  So would scrambling the low-order bits of a sound file.

Good reminder that the opponents may try to foil (or detect) such schemes.

Fortunately, signing such messages will presumably not be illegal (we
hope!) and so alterations will show up immediately and cause howls of
protest.

-Tim May

--
Timothy C. May         | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,  
tcmay@netcom.com       | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
408-688-5409           | knowledge, reputations, information markets, 
W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA  | black markets, collapse of governments.
Higher Power: 2^756839 | Public Key: MailSafe and PGP available.





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Al Whaley <Al.Whaley@sunnyside.com>
Date: Mon, 15 Mar 93 21:33:28 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: volunteers and standards
Message-ID: <199303160532.AA19680@snyside.sunnyside.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I apologize for sending this broadly for it will not apply to
most of you who work with and understand the meaning of
standards...

If a person sticks his/her neck out to let you volunteer for
a desirable  event, and you don't hold up your end of the
bargain, you can expect your own treatment back in the
future.

Anyone wanting to receive a scholarship or volunteer for the
Computers, Freedom and Privacy '94 conference should please
contact George Trubow at g.trubow@compmail.com
He'll also have  a WELL account soon. I suggest that he's
not facile with email yet, so you're welcome to copy me
with your notes and I'll also make sure he gets them for now.

Despite  controversy about its cost, it will continue to
cost about the same amount next year as this year, with
the probable exception of adding student rates (yes, you'll
have to be full time at some school/university/college).

Thanks.
  judi

-- 
Al Whaley        al@sunnyside.com       +1-415 322-5411(Tel), -6481 (Fax)
Sunnyside Computing, Inc., PO Box 299, Palo Alto, CA 94302



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@Athena.MIT.EDU>
Date: Mon, 15 Mar 93 20:32:03 PST
To: Marc.Ringuette@GS80.SP.CS.CMU.EDU
Subject: Re: Community standards for email anonymity
In-Reply-To: <9303141011.AA05636@cygnus.com>
Message-ID: <9303160430.AA10106@SOS>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


   Date: Sun, 14 Mar 1993 03:27-EST
   From: Marc.Ringuette@GS80.SP.CS.CMU.EDU

	 Self-protection                       Protection via rules
	 ---------------                       --------------------

    Allow anonymous posting       Use software to           Forbid all
    in all newsgroups; use        allow anonymity in        anonymous posting.
    information filters.          some groups only.     


    Handle volume bombs by                Track down volume bombs
    using digital postage and             and disconnect the offender.
    information filters.                   


There's only one problem.... information filters and digital postage are
not widely available right now, and will probably not be widely used for
a long time.  And while digital postage sounds nice, as long as once
remailer site doesn't require digital postage, twits will still be able
to perform volume bombs.

So until the majority of the people reading USENET have the means of
self-protection, is it unreasonable to that people get protected via
some set of rules?  

You say that what you suggesting is a "Libertarian standard"; yet even
the most rabid Libertarians believe in having rules against murder, and
violence, instead of claiming that everyone must train themselves in
martial arts so they can defend themselves.....

						- Ted




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: David L Racette <dlr@world.std.com>
Date: Tue, 16 Mar 93 04:28:28 PST
To: Pat Farrell <pfarrell@cs.gmu.edu>
Subject: Re: alternate US site for pgp22
In-Reply-To: <51920.pfarrell@cs.gmu.edu>
Message-ID: <Pine.3.05.9303160704.A7761-a100000@world.std.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain




On Sat, 13 Mar 1993, Pat Farrell wrote:

> Can someone point me to another US FTP site with PGP22. I've downloaded
> it a couple of times from soda.berkeley.edu, and can't get it unzipped.
> I've tried all known combinarions of binary, non-binary, etc.
> The file, once it reaches my PC is 209409 but pkunzip 204g says it is
> broken. If I use pkzipfix, I can get some of the files, docs, keyserver,
> etc. but it always fails with a CRC error on or after
> exploding LANGUAGE.TXT
> 
> One piece of tech info: I have to FTP to a SUN server, and then
> use Kermit to bring the file to my PC. This has worked many times for
> many other files, but there could be some user error in here.
> 

I had no problems with the version at soda using pkunzip v204g. Worked the
first time. 

Dave






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: hughes (Eric Hughes)
Date: Tue, 16 Mar 93 09:32:07 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: the recent mailing list flames
Message-ID: <9303161732.AA07066@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


A word from your list maintainer.

Some people have no patience.  I was at CFP for three days last week,
soda has crashed twice (and is still down as of this writing), I've
had house guests.  I just this morning finished all the pending list
requests.  (All the deletions I did yesterday.)

One of the two loud complainers, mbrennan@netcom.com, had actually
doubled subscribed himself to the list.  I had already removed him
once, so I thought; I had moved him over to the -announce list.

Since we don't believe in security by obscurity here, the following
will generate a mail bomb for the next time _you_ want to be an
asshole:

	yes "UNSUBSCRIBE ME\!\!\!" | head -30000

The program 'yes' (be repetitively affirmative) goes into an infinite
loop printing its argument.  When the pipe buffer fills up, the kernal
blocks the 'yes' process and invokes 'head', which partially empties
the buffer; 'yes' refills it.  This goes on until 'head' has seen
enough lines and terminates and closes the pipe.  Closing the pipe
then causes 'yes' to terminate.  So even though 'yes' is nominally an
infinite loop, when bound to a pipe and to a program which accepts a
bounded number of lines, it stops being an infinite loop.  I consider
this clever.

Enjoy, but do not deploy this one.

Eric




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: hughes (Eric Hughes)
Date: Tue, 16 Mar 93 09:34:20 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: news.admin.policy: A Report From the Front
In-Reply-To: <9303161607.AA25953@anon.penet.fi>
Message-ID: <9303161734.AA07151@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


As far as this automatic cancelling business goes, what can be
automatically cancelled can also be automatically regenerated.

Who here has been in such a news war and has software already written?

Eric




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: an5877@anon.penet.fi (deadbeat)
Date: Tue, 16 Mar 93 09:11:23 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: news.admin.policy: A Report From the Front
Message-ID: <9303161607.AA25953@anon.penet.fi>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

The good guys are beginning to prevail in the news.admin.policy battle
over pseudonymous postings, aided in no small part by the opposition, one
of whom began unilaterally cancelling articles by nyms.  This tactical
blunder produced a firestorm of protest and brought in fresh voices eager
to speak out on the side of privacy and freedom of expression.  We need to
continue to weigh in on the side of pseudonymous postings.  Perhaps the
most constructive approach is to do so pseudonymously!

DEADBEAT

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.2

iQBFAgUBK6X6HPFZTpBW/B35AQFOJgF9Fk/bNUE1cgl2vKJgFJCWg+1KDIqyeVtS
ferduPOhXxNrdwyHWvx4vm+vIWKvdVEO
=QHmk
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
To find out more about the anon service, send mail to help@anon.penet.fi.
Due to the double-blind system, any replies to this message will be anonymized,
and an anonymous id will be allocated automatically. You have been warned.
Please report any problems, inappropriate use etc. to admin@anon.penet.fi.
*IMPORTANT server security update*, mail to update@anon.penet.fi for details.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Derek Atkins <warlord@MIT.EDU>
Date: Tue, 16 Mar 93 09:56:33 PST
To: hughes@toad.com (Eric Hughes)
Subject: Re: news.admin.policy: A Report From the Front
In-Reply-To: <9303161734.AA07151@toad.com>
Message-ID: <9303161755.AA14876@deathtongue.MIT.EDU>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

> As far as this automatic cancelling business goes, what can be
> automatically cancelled can also be automatically regenerated.
> 
> Who here has been in such a news war and has software already written?
> 
> Eric

While I agree with you in spirit, I think this would be a bad move.
We don't want to get into a news war.  We want people to listen to us.
The best was to sway people to our side, especially when there are
others who are pissing people off, is to keep a calm head and stature.

The more that that other person pisses off the news admins, the more
they will be willing to listen to our side.  If we rush head-long and
get into an all-out news war, then those same admins might not listen
to us as intently as they would if we stay cool and calm.

Please, no news wars.  It can only hurt our cause!

- -derek

PGP 2 key available upon request on the key-server:
	pgp-public-keys@toxicwaste.mit.edu
- --
  Derek Atkins, MIT '93, Electrical Engineering and Computer Science
     Secretary, MIT Student Information Processing Board (SIPB)
           MIT Media Laboratory, Speech Research Group
           warlord@MIT.EDU       PP-ASEL        N1NWH

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.2

iQBuAgUBK6YUZTh0K1zBsGrxAQEvIgLFEQM+XkIlgkZWFPz25Ic3wRYKOMPYTDF5
6rVn1zOYppNZ/37BHBFzEvIGWI8X4wX+mBgzIxzi/NmNKlUrm1/EMPzI0OyZPqOS
yoQClw/n1D1XDw7Ofxnr17M=
=DBN5
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Chris Hibbert <hibbert@memex.com>
Date: Wed, 17 Mar 93 01:03:39 PST
To: Nickey MacDonald <i6t4@jupiter.sun.csd.unb.ca>
Subject: Re: [cleaned-up] University Policies
In-Reply-To: <Pine.3.05.9303121540.A1094-d100000@thebe.sun.csd.unb.ca>
Message-ID: <9303162224.AA18391@entropy.memex.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain




 POLICIES                                             
                                                      
 The computing and communication systems at the University of New
 Brunswick are intended to be used in a manner that is supportive of
 the University's objectives.  All constituents of the University are
 able to apply to use the university's computing facilities.  When
 that privilege is granted (e.g., when an account is issued), it is
 granted with the understanding that the use of the computing system
 will correspond to the purpose(s) stated in the request.
                                                      
 At the University of New Brunswick Computing Services Department,
 internal customers (students, faculty and staff) are not personally
 billed for use but are held personally responsible for use made of
 their accounts.  Certain practices are considered a misuse of
 university property.  Examples of such misuse are the use of any part
 of the computing system for personal or corporate profit, or to
 provide free resources to unauthorized persons.
                                                      
 The following policies govern the use of the University of New
 Brunswick Computing Services Department facilities:
                                                      
 1.  No person or persons shall use the facilities of the University
     Computing Services Department without due authorization by
     Computing Services.
                                                      
 2.  Every allocation of computing resources is made on the
     understanding that it is to be used only for the purpose for
     which it was requested and only by the person or persons by whom
     or on whose behalf the request was made.  Use shall not be made
     of computing resources allocated to another person or group
     unless such use has been specifically authorized by Computing
     Services.
                                                      
 3.  No person or persons shall by any wilful or deliberate act
     jeopardize the integrity of computing equipment, networks,
     programs, or other stored information.
                                                      
 4.  Persons authorized to use computing and communication resources
     shall be expected to treat as privileged, any information not
     provided or generated personally which may become available to
     them through their use of these resources; they shall not copy,
     modify, disseminate, or use any part of such information without
     permission of the appropriate person or body.

 5.  Improper use of Computing Services may result in withdrawal of
     access privileges or other penalties.  The following (but not
     limited to the following) may be considered improper:

     * Frivolous use of any workstation, computer or network.
     * Inspection of data or functions which are neither allotted to
         the inspector, nor specified as public.
     * Inspection of data which have to do with utilization,
         authorization or security.
     * Modification of data which are not specifically assigned to
         or created by the modifier.
     * Use of another's account.
     * Interference with other persons accessing the systems,
         networks or equipment.
     * Destruction of data or property which is not owned by the
         destroyer.
     * Attempting to gain access to another's resources, programs,
         or data.
     * Use of another's programs or data without their permission.
     * Sending obscene or vulgar messages.
     * Abusive or destructive use of hardware or public software.
     * Use of the facilities for personal or corporate gain without
         an external account.  Examples of such use include producing
         invitations, posters, personal correspondence, etc., and the
         sale of computer programs or results developed under an
         internal account.

 6.  Customers are expected to:

     a.  Be responsible for the use of their computer accounts.  They
         should make appropriate use of system provided security
         features and take precautions against others obtaining access
         to their computing resources.

     b.  Refrain from engaging in deliberately wasteful practices such
         as:

         * unnecessary holding of workstations or telecommunications
             lines;
         * producing unnecessarily large printer listings;
         * performing unnecessary computations;
         * creating and retaining unnecessarily large files;
         * unnecessary holding of peripheral equipment.

     c.  Utilize efficient and effective techniques for program
         execution.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: jordan@imsi.com (Jordan Hayes)
Date: Tue, 16 Mar 93 16:23:36 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re:  news.admin.policy: A Report From the Front
Message-ID: <9303162033.AA23984@IMSI.COM>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


	>>> Who here has been in such a news war ...

I was involved in a slightly different news war a few years ago.  I was
being harrassed by a particularly prolific news poster (at one point he
represented nearly 9% of the total USENET weekly volume), and it turned
out that I was running a site that had an NNTP feed to his site.  I
talked with the admin there, found out their fan-out plan, and made
sure that anything I got from them got fanned out as soon as possible.

Except I would modify the message in subtle ways, like change the
attribution line from something like

	From: john@somesite.net (John Q. Public)

to

	From: john@somesite.net (Wimpy Math Grad Student)

Anyway, I was able to make my version of his postings "the" version by
hitting all the other sites his site fanned out to first.  It was fun
for a while until he found out and tried to mail bomb me.  Fortunately,
I was around when it started, and put a reflector in to send his bombs
back automatically piece by piece.  His machine was a lowly VAX 750
running some backwater rev of 4.3 alpha-alpha, and sendmail promptly
sent the load to 40 and crashed the machine.

His PhD advisor was not amused.

/jordan




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Eric Hughes <hughes@soda.berkeley.edu>
Date: Wed, 17 Mar 93 09:13:15 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: CYPHERPUNKS=EMAIL HARASSEMENT?
In-Reply-To: <930312075344_74076.1041_DHJ35-2@CompuServe.COM>
Message-ID: <9303171709.AA06397@soda.berkeley.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>So how many days, exactly, have people waited for response from
>cypherpunks-request before giving up and posting to the list?  Just
>one or two, or are we talking weeks here?

Most of the unsubscribe message that have gone out over the list in
the last month are the _first_ messages sent out by people.
Therefore, let me repeat this.

To unsubscribe from the list, send mail to

	cypherpunks-request@toad.com

A human, namely me, Eric Hughes, will read your mail and take
appropriate response.  Do not expect immediate answers; I am not a
program.

If you send to the whole list asking to be removed, I will send you a
piece of junk mail (with the above info in it) and ignore your
request.  I don't do maintenance for the list on the same account as I
read mail.

Thanks you all.

Eric




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Eric Hughes <hughes@soda.berkeley.edu>
Date: Wed, 17 Mar 93 09:39:05 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: The new welcome message, for your general information
Message-ID: <9303171735.AA08132@soda.berkeley.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I've changed the welcome message for the list to update it with the
ftp site, and other changes.

I would like everyone to take a glance at this.  I've written down
some of the mailing list policies that have been _de facto_.

Please reply to me if you have any questions.

Eric
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
You have been added to the cypherpunks mailing list.

The cypherpunks list is a forum for discussing personal defenses for
privacy in the digital domain.  It is a high volume mailing list.  If
you want to be added or removed from the list, send mail to

	cypherpunks-request@toad.com

There is no automated list processing software; a human (me, Eric
Hughes) will read your message and take the appropriate action.  If
you get two of these welcome messages, it likely means you've double
subscribed and will have trouble getting off the list.  Send mail to
the above address and tell me if this happens.

Do not expect instant turnaround.  Remember, a human is looking at
your requests, not a program.  I try to do list maintenance every
other day or so, but sometimes the delays are longer.

Do not mail to the whole list asking to be removed.  You'll just get
the members of the list thinking you're a newbie and you'll get a note
from me telling you to send mail the the -request address.

If your mail bounces repeatedly, you will be removed from the list.
Nothing personal, but I have to look at all the bounce messages.

There is no digest version available.

There is an announcements list which is moderated and has low volume.
Announcements for physical cypherpunks meetings, new software and
important developments will be posted there.  Mail to

	cypherpunks-announce-request@toad.com

if you want to be added or removed to the announce list.  All
announcements also go out to the full cypherpunks list, so there is no
need to subscribe to both.

There is an ftp site for cypherpunks.  It is

	soda.berkeley.edu:pub/cypherpunks

This site contains code, information, rants, and other miscellany.
There is a glossary there that all new members should download and
read.  Also recommended for all users are Hal Finney's instructions on
how to use the anonymous remailer system; the remailer sources are
there for the perl-literate.

Enjoy and deploy.

Eric

-----------------------------------------------------------------------------

Cypherpunks assume privacy is a good thing and wish there were more
of it.  Cypherpunks acknowledge that those who want privacy must
create it for themselves and not expect governments, corporations, or
other large, faceless organizations to grant them privacy out of
beneficence.  Cypherpunks know that people have been creating their
own privacy for centuries with whispers, envelopes, closed doors, and
couriers.  Cypherpunks do not seek to prevent other people from
speaking about their experiences or their opinions.

The most important means to the defense of privacy is encryption. To
encrypt is to indicate the desire for privacy.  But to encrypt with
weak cryptography is to indicate not too much desire for privacy.
Cypherpunks hope that all people desiring privacy will learn how best
to defend it.

Cypherpunks are therefore devoted to cryptography.  Cypherpunks wish
to learn about it, to teach it, to implement it, and to make more of
it.  Cypherpunks know that cryptographic protocols make social
structures.  Cypherpunks know how to attack a system and how to
defend it.  Cypherpunks know just how hard it is to make good
cryptosystems.

Cypherpunks love to practice.  They love to play with public key
cryptography.  They love to play with anonymous and pseudonymous mail
forwarding and delivery.  They love to play with DC-nets.  They love
to play with secure communications of all kinds.

Cypherpunks write code.  They know that someone has to write code to
defend privacy, and since it's their privacy, they're going to write
it.  Cypherpunks publish their code so that their fellow cypherpunks
may practice and play with it.  Cypherpunks realize that security is
not built in a day and are patient with incremental progress.

Cypherpunks don't care if you don't like the software they write. 
Cypherpunks know that software can't be destroyed.  Cypherpunks know
that a widely dispersed system can't be shut down.

Cypherpunks will make the networks safe for privacy.





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: robichau@lambda.msfc.nasa.gov (Paul Robichaux)
Date: Wed, 17 Mar 93 07:39:23 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: PGP: Mac PGP 2.2 available at UMich ftp
Message-ID: <9303171537.AA28125@lambda.msfc.nasa.gov.msfc.nasa.gov>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


v2.2 of PGP for the Macintosh is available for anonymous FTP at the
University of Michigan archives (mac.archive.umich.edu or
141.211.32.2) in /mac/util/encryption.

Enjoy and deploy,
-Paul

-- 
Paul Robichaux, KD4JZG              | May explode if disposed of improperly.
Mission Software Development Div.   | I'm not white- I'm Euro-American.
New Technology, Inc.		    | RIPEM key on request.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Eric Hughes <hughes@soda.berkeley.edu>
Date: Wed, 17 Mar 93 11:49:09 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: HUMOR: Manifesto anyone?
Message-ID: <9303171945.AA17870@soda.berkeley.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I got the following message in my inbox today:

>I saw news of your "A Cypherpunk's Manifesto" on AppleLink today.  Is there a
>chance you can e-mail me a copy (un-encrypted please)???

Hmm.  The thought of sending out encrypted manifestos...  I suppose we
could proselyte the NSA.

This one sounds like prime list member material, no?

Eric




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Eric Hughes <hughes@soda.berkeley.edu>
Date: Wed, 17 Mar 93 11:54:59 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: RANTS: A Cypherpunk's Manifesto
Message-ID: <9303171951.AA18216@soda.berkeley.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I've been meaning to write up a longer version of the welcome message
text for some time now.  I took the opportunity to do so before the
Computers, Freedom, and Privacy Conference.  I made up 300 paper
copies of this for distribution on the literature table.  All but a
couple dozen remained at the end of three days.

So then, this is my _real_ manifesto.  I took all the good lines out
of the previous version and added more.

I hope you enjoy it.  It's available on the ftp site in the rants/
directory.

Eric
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
                   A Cypherpunk's Manifesto

                        by Eric Hughes

Privacy is necessary for an open society in the electronic age.
Privacy is not secrecy.  A private matter is something one doesn't
want the whole world to know, but a secret matter is something one
doesn't want anybody to know. Privacy is the power to selectively
reveal oneself to the world.  

If two parties have some sort of dealings, then each has a memory of
their interaction.  Each party can speak about their own memory of
this; how could anyone prevent it?  One could pass laws against it,
but the freedom of speech, even more than privacy, is fundamental to
an open society; we seek not to restrict any speech at all.  If many
parties speak together in the same forum, each can speak to all the
others and aggregate together knowledge about individuals and other
parties.  The power of electronic communications has enabled such
group speech, and it will not go away merely because we might want it
to.

Since we desire privacy, we must ensure that each party to a
transaction have knowledge only of that which is directly necessary
for that transaction.  Since any information can be spoken of, we
must ensure that we reveal as little as possible.  In most cases
personal identity is not salient. When I purchase a magazine at a
store and hand cash to the clerk, there is no need to know who I am. 
When I ask my electronic mail provider to send and receive messages,
my provider need not know to whom I am speaking or what I am saying
or what others are saying to me;  my provider only need know how to
get the message there and how much I owe them in fees.  When my
identity is revealed by the underlying mechanism of the transaction,
I have no privacy.  I cannot here selectively reveal myself; I must
_always_ reveal myself.

Therefore, privacy in an open society requires anonymous transaction
systems.  Until now, cash has been the primary such system.  An
anonymous transaction system is not a secret transaction system.  An
anonymous system empowers individuals to reveal their identity when
desired and only when desired; this is the essence of privacy.

Privacy in an open society also requires cryptography.  If I say
something, I want it heard only by those for whom I intend it.  If 
the content of my speech is available to the world, I have no
privacy.  To encrypt is to indicate the desire for privacy, and to
encrypt with weak cryptography is to indicate not too much desire for
privacy.  Furthermore, to reveal one's identity with assurance when
the default is anonymity requires the cryptographic signature.

We cannot expect governments, corporations, or other large, faceless
organizations to grant us privacy out of their beneficence.  It is to
their advantage to speak of us, and  we should expect that they will
speak.  To try to prevent their speech is to fight against the
realities of information. Information does not just want to be free,
it longs to be free.  Information expands to fill the available
storage space.  Information is Rumor's younger, stronger cousin;
Information is fleeter of foot, has more eyes, knows more, and
understands less than Rumor.

We must defend our own privacy if we expect to have any.  We must
come together and create systems which allow anonymous transactions
to take place.  People have been defending their own privacy for
centuries with whispers, darkness, envelopes, closed doors, secret
handshakes, and couriers.  The technologies of the past did not allow
for strong privacy, but electronic technologies do.

We the Cypherpunks are dedicated to building anonymous systems.  We
are defending our privacy with cryptography, with anonymous mail
forwarding systems, with digital signatures, and with electronic
money.

Cypherpunks write code.  We know that someone has to write software
to defend privacy, and since we can't get privacy unless we all do,
we're going to write it. We publish our code so that our fellow
Cypherpunks may practice and play with it. Our code is free for all
to use, worldwide.  We don't much care if you don't approve of the
software we write.  We know that software can't be destroyed and that
a widely dispersed system can't be shut down. 

Cypherpunks deplore regulations on cryptography, for encryption is
fundamentally a private act.  The act of encryption, in fact, removes
information from the public realm.  Even laws against cryptography
reach only so far as a nation's border and the arm of its violence.
Cryptography will ineluctably spread over the whole globe, and with
it the anonymous transactions systems that it makes possible. 

For privacy to be widespread it must be part of a social contract.
People must come and together deploy these systems for the common
good.  Privacy only extends so far as the cooperation of one's
fellows in society.  We the Cypherpunks seek your questions and your
concerns and hope we may engage you so that we do not deceive
ourselves.  We will not, however, be moved out of our course because
some may disagree with our goals.

The Cypherpunks are actively engaged in making the networks safer for
privacy.  Let us proceed together apace.

Onward.

Eric Hughes
<hughes@soda.berkeley.edu>

9 March 1993






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Eric Hughes <hughes@soda.berkeley.edu>
Date: Wed, 17 Mar 93 12:03:13 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: ADMIN: ftp site
Message-ID: <9303171959.AA18710@soda.berkeley.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I've cleaned up the ftp site a bit, set read permissions on one file
(oops), added a README, and generally made things more easy to use.

The site, for those of you who do not yet know, is

	soda.berkeley.edu:pub/cypherpunks

Here's a short intro:

README			an orientation primer
crypto.ftp.sites/	a place for external pointers
misc/			read, "I don't know where else this goes"
pgp/			PGP 2.2 distribution, DOS, Unix, Mac
rants/			for all those pesky manifestos that pop up
remailer/		remailer code and instructions and tools
welcome.message		the welcome message to the list

The site is yours to use.  If there is something you'd like to see on
the ftp site, let me know.  If you have contributions, let me know.

Eric





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Eric Hughes <hughes@soda.berkeley.edu>
Date: Wed, 17 Mar 93 13:04:40 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: pgp2.2 in cypherpunks
Message-ID: <9303172100.AA23522@soda.berkeley.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I obtained another copy of pgp22.zip for the cypherpunks archive site.
The previous one was the same length, but had some difference buried
in the middle.  The new one seems fine.  All those who had trouble
might want to download it again.  I also put up another copy of
pgp22src.zip, since it left and I don't know where it went.

Eric




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: root@rmsdell.ftl.fl.us (Yanek Martinson)
Date: Wed, 17 Mar 93 17:03:02 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: GOV: DMS PreMSP
Message-ID: <m0nZ7tO-0002ozC@rmsdell.ftl.fl.us>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Forwarded message:
> Date: Wed, 17 Mar 1993 15:10:53 -0500
> To: Markowitz@DOCKMASTER.NCSC.MIL
> From: shirley@mitre.org (Robert W. Shirey)
> Cc: pem-dev@TIS.COM
> 
> In a previous message, I said:  "Just as soon as I know for sure that
> information on this subject [DMS PreMSP] is publicly releasable, I will
> forward it or references to this list."  Here are pointers to the
> currently available public info.
> 
> A Request For Information (RFI) was issued by the Air Force Standard
> Systems Center, Gunter AFB,Al, on December 1992.  (See "Commerce Business
> Daily" for 17 December 1992.)  This RFP concerns X.400 products for use
> in the Defense Message System.  In brief, DOD needs hundreds of thousands
> (of units) of secure UAs over the next several years.
> 
> In the RFI, there is publicly released information concerning Preliminary
> Message Security Protocol (PMSP, or sometimes, PreMSP), which is to be
> used for unclassified by sensitive information.  PMSP is something that
> exists.  Do not expect it to interoperate with PEM.
> 
> Saying "Pre" MSP implies there is a "real" MSP to come later.  There is.
> It comes from NSA's Secure Data Network System Program.  SDNS and MSP
> information is available from NIST, and decriptions are found in the
> proceedings of the National Computer Security Conference and other major
> security conferences in the last few years.  (Perhaps someone will chime
> in again with the NIST references, etc.)
> 
> DMS security developments, including PMSP, will be addressed further by
> an NSA representative at the AFCEA [Armed Forces Communications and
> Electronics Association] DMS Symposium on 8 April.
> 
> Regards, -Rob-
> 
> Robert W. Shirey, The MITRE Corporation, Mail Stop Z202
> 7525 Colshire Dr., McLean, Virginia  22102-3481  USA
> shirey@mitre.org * tel 703-883-7210 * fax 703-883-1397
> 
> ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
> The following statement on MSP was released previously:
> 
>                       Defense Information Systems Agency
>                      Defense Network Systems Organization
> 
> In reply Refer To:  DISM                                      12 November 1991
> 
> MEMORANDUM FOR DEFENSE MESSAGE SYSTEM (DMS) MILITARY COMMUNICATIONS
>                ELECTRONICS BOARD (MCEB) COORDINATOR
> 
> SUBJECT:       Rationale for the Secure Data Network System (SDNS) Message
>                Security Protocol (MSP) for the DMS
> 
> 
> 1. As a result of the Allied Message Handling (AMH) International Subject
> Matter Experts (ISME) working group meeting held in March 1991, certain
> actions regarding message security were tasked to the U.S. representatives.
> These tasks include two information papers which address the U.S. intentions
> to use MSP to provide required message security services.
> 
> 2. The first of these papers, which addresses the rationale and near-term
> interoperability issues for the use of MSP, is enclosed.  We are forwarding
> this paper to you, as the DMS MCEB Coordinator, for dissemination to the AMH
> ISME membership.
> 
> 3. This paper has also been forwarded to the Chairman, Data Communications
> Protocol Standards (DCPS) Technical Management Panel (DTMP) for use in
> resolving an Interoperability Resolution Process (IRP) issue regarding the DoD
> position on the use of MSP.  Both the AMH ISME and DTMP processes will be
> worked as parallel efforts.
> 
> 4. My point of contact for this effort is CPT(P) Wayne C. Deloria, DISA/DISMB,
> (703)285-5232, DSN 346-5232.  He can be reached through electronic mail at
> DELORIAW@IMO-UVAX.DCA.MIL.  Please do not hesitate to contact him with any
> question regarding this matter.
> 
> 
> Enclosure a/s                                        THOMAS W. CLARKE, Chief  
>                                                      DMS Coordination Division
> 
> cc:      DMS Coordinators
> 
> 
>                                                                22 October 1991
> 
>                        THE DEFENSE MESSAGE SYSTEM (DMS)
>              MESSAGE SECURITY PROTOCOL AND ALLIED INTEROPERABILITY
> 
> 
> 1.  Introduction
> 
>     The Defense Message System (DMS) Program has adopted Message Security
> Protocol (MSP) as the target security protection mechanism for all DMS
> organizational and individual message traffic.  MSP was developed under the
> auspices of the Secure Data Network System (SDNS) Program concurrent with
> international development of the CCITT X.400 1988 Recommendation.  SDNS MSP
> and 1988 X.400 offer a similar set of security services.  However, the two
> approaches diverge in certain areas, due to differing priorities and
> requirements, and the operational environment of the U.S. Department of
> Defense (DoD).  The purpose of this paper is to define the principal points of
> departure, provide rationale for U.S. use of MSP, and to provide a framework
> for agreement on near term messaging interoperability.
> 
> 2.  Rationale for Use of MSP
> 
>     While the security services provided by MSP are similar to the 1988 X.400
> Recommendation, the divergence in their implementation introduces
> incompatibilities between the two strategies.  Following is U.S. rationale for
> use of MSP.
> 
>     2.1  High Level of Assurance:  DMS provides secure automated store-and-
> forward message service to meet the operational requirements of the U.S. DoD.
> The DMS conveys information ranging from unclassified to the most sensitive
> classifications and compartments, requiring very high levels of assurance
> throughout the system.  While few, if any, individual User Agents (UAs) will
> handle this entire range, many will handle more than one, and therefore
> require a high degree of trust.  MSP provides high assurance in the areas of
> implementation strategy, access control, content security, and use of
> commercially available products and services.
> 
>       2.1.1  Implementation Strategy.  To achieve a high level of assurance,
> MSP was designed to provide separation of message security from message
> processing, and to facilitate a certifiable and accreditable implementation.
> By implementing the MSP security services in a separate protocol sub-layer, a
> multi-level secure (MLS) architecture can follow conventional approaches in
> the design of certifiable systems.  The MSP approach depends upon creating a
> small nucleus of "trusted" software, implemented as an adjunct to the UA, that
> interacts with multiple, single-level instantiations of more complex software,
> e.g., text editors and communications protocols.  Further, placing the
> security services at the end system (originator/recipient) is consistent with
> the principle of "least privilege", which requires security processes in a
> system to grant only the most restrictive set of privileges necessary to
> perform authorized tasks.
> 
>                                        1
> 
> 
>                                                                22 October 1991
> 
>       2.1.2  Access Control.  The approach to access control adopted by MSP
> places access control decisions in a separate process within the originator
> and recipient UAs, providing a higher level of assurance for this service.
> This high level of assurance is supported by detailed security design analyses
> performed on various MSP prototype implementations.
> 
>         2.1.2.1  MSP access control decisions are made as part of message
> preparation and release, and as part of the processing of a received message.
> End system (UA) responsibility for access control is a cornerstone of the MSP
> security architecture.  The access control decision relies on authorization
> information contained in multiple certificates.  These certificates provide
> extended resolution for access control decisions and are further protected by
> cryptography at the UA.  Consequently, no access control message security
> requirements are levied on the Message Transfer Agents (MTAs).
> 
>         2.1.2.2  In contrast, 1988 X.400 access control decisions and
> enforcement are vested in the Message Transfer System (MTS) and are exercised
> independently by the MTAs at each end of the message transfer.  This requires
> that every subscriber uniformly trust all of the MTAs to enforce access
> control for the subscriber community.  A message originator has no independent
> means of determining the access rights of a possible recipient, nor the means
> to determine the level of trust of the MTAs that make access control
> decisions.  He must rely on the correct operation of the MTAs.
> 
>       2.1.3  Content Security.  MSP provides content security and integrity
> services with the implementation of independent cryptographic algorithms and
> key management system at the UA.  Encapsulation of message content with
> appropriate security parameters (e.g., algorithm identification and signature
> information) into a MSP content prior to submitting it to the MTS, ensures
> writer-to-reader control for all security services.  This is true regardless
> of the message transfer system employed.  Since only the originator and
> recipient may access the information, content security is preserved, and the
> means for message confidentiality, integrity, authentication, and non-
> repudiation with proof of origin is maintained.
> 
>       2.1.4  Commercial Products/Services.  A primary objective of the DMS
> Program is to employ commercially available products and services wherever
> possible, to minimize or eliminate the need for specialized systems.  It is
> also assumed that such products and services will undoubtedly be "untrusted"
> from the security perspective.  The use of MSP allows the DMS to deploy over
> any reliable and heterogeneous MTS and still provide the same level of message
> security and system assurance.  The MSP design and implementation strategy,
> coupled with the incorporated access control and content security mechanisms,
> is consistent with this objective.  While the 1988 X.400 Recommendation offers
> similar services, its employment by DMS would require use of "trusted" MTAs, a
> prospect that is not only cost prohibitive by lacking in deployment
> flexibility.
> 
>                                        2
> 
> 
>                                                                22 October 1991
> 
>     2.2  Key Management Support.  MSP was designed to be independent of
> cryptographic algorithms and key management schemes.  Although 1988 X.400
> maintains independence of the cryptographic algorithms used, it does employ a
> specific key management scheme as defined in CCITT Recommendation X.509.  The
> protocol mechanisms that realized this key management scheme are incompatible
> with MSP key management.
> 
>       2.2.1  A solution consistent with the MSP concept might be implemented
> within the X.400 syntax, but would represent a semantic inconsistency.  Within
> X.400, no syntax exists to exchange multiple certificates and other per-
> message security data.
> 
>       2.2.2  Even if a certifiable architecture using MSP-like key management
> schemes could be developed to be consistent with 1988 X.400, it would likely
> represent a substantial departure from COTS products.
> 
>     2.3  Performance.  Like MSP, the 1988 X.400 Recommendation defines both
> per-message and per-recipient security data items.  However, the allocation of
> security relevant data, especially the signature and receipt information, is
> different in X.400 and in MSP.  1988 X.400 requires one signature per
> recipient while MSP requires one per message.  The major performance
> implications of this difference are the higher number of signature generation
> operations required by 1988 X.400, and the higher volume of additional data
> carried in each 1988 X.400 message.
> 
> 3.  Allied Interoperability.
> 
>     3.1  Suggestions from the Allied Message Handling International Subject
> Matter Experts Working Group (AMH ISME WG) recommend that the U.S. incorporate
> MSP mechanisms with the 1988 X.400 framework.  In reviewing this, technical
> difficulties surface as previously discussed, and present a resultant product
> which is semantically non-conformant with the 1988 X.400 Recommendation.  This
> suggestion is unacceptable from a security protection standpoint, and is cost
> prohibitive.
> 
>     3.2  The differences in the MSP and 1988 X.400 security protection
> strategies as described in the rationale serve to illustrate an allied message
> interoperability issue.  It is evident that the U.S. will continue to pursue
> implementation of MSP while U.S. allies, including NATO, appear poised to
> pursue implementations of the 1988 X.400 Recommendation.  When the U.S. begins
> deployment of X.400/MSP components in the 1996 and beyond time frame, a MSP
> gateway will be required to facilitate interoperability between users who have
> implemented X.400 with MSP and users who have not.  A Gateway will be required
> to perform protocol mappings between MSP and X.400-based systems, and to
> provide the required cryptographic and key management conversion services for
> the systems employed.  This Gateway will facilitate U.S. transition to MSP, as
> well as provide interoperability with allied users during the international
> transition to X.400.
> 
>                                        3
> 
> 
>                                                                22 October 1991
> 
> 4. Conclusions.
> 
>     4.1  Based on the rational provided above, the U.S. concludes that use of
> MSP is superior to 1988 X.400 security protection in terms of assurance, key
> management, performance, deployment flexibility, and cost.
> 
>     4.2  As indicated above, allied interoperability will require an MSP
> Gateway.  The AMH ISME WG is an excellent forum to collect requirements for
> this Gateway to ensure its timely development and deployment, and
> effectiveness in providing near term allied interoperability.  Long term
> interoperability is being analyzed and will be the subject of a 15 February
> 1992 U.S. submission to the AMH ISME WG.
> 
>                                        4
> 
> -----------------------------------------------------------------------
> The Privacy and Security Research Group (PSRG) (i.e., that part of the
> Internet Research Task Force that invented PEM and tossed it over the
> fence into the Internet Engineering Task Force for final standardization
> and deployment)  received inqiries about the position of the U.S.
> Federal Government on the use of Privacy-Enhanced Mail (PEM) (see RFCs
> 1421, 1422, 1423, and 1424).  The PSRG issued a statement which is now
> outdated but was along the following lines:
> 
> The PSRG does not speak for the U.S. Federal Government or for any other
> government.  It can, however, arrange some referrals for those seeking
> Government information.
> 
> Like all bodies operating under the cognizance of the Internet
> Activities Board (IAB), the PSRG is an independent committee of
> professionals with a technical interest in the health and evolution
> of the Internet system (see RFC 1160).  When the PSRG was designing
> and developing PEM, and when the IAB approved and encouraged PEM
> implementation, there was discussion of existing U.S. and other government
> policies and policy trends.  No agreements were reached with any agency
> or official.  Some PSRG members are aware of talks that have taken place
> within the U.S. Government about PEM, but the PSRG is not aware of any
> publicly-announced policies that have been directed specifically at PEM.
> 
> For further information, the PSRG suggests that questions be directed
> to the following PSRG members, who will either answer the question
> or provide a referral to responsible officials:
> 
> For questions regarding the U.S. Government generally:
> 
>    Miles Smid    smid@st1.ncsl.nist.gov
>    National Institute for Standards and Technology
>    Building 225, Room A216
>    Gaithersburg, Maryland  20899
> 
> For questions regarding the U.S Department of Defense in general, and
> the Defense Message System in particular:
> 
>    Rob Shirey    shirey@mitre.org  
>    The MITRE Corporation, Mail Stop Z269
>    7525 Colshire Drive, McLean, VA  22102-3481
> 
> For other questions, send to pem-dev@tis.com and hope for the best!
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 

--
Yanek Martinson
yanek@novavax.nova.edu



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: nowhere@bsu-cs.bsu.edu (Chael Hall)
Date: Wed, 17 Mar 93 17:15:32 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: RE: the recent mailing list flames
Message-ID: <9303180111.AA02926@bsu-cs.bsu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>One of the two loud complainers, mbrennan@netcom.com, had actually
>doubled subscribed himself to the list.  I had already removed him
>once, so I thought; I had moved him over to the -announce list.

     Well, I sent a personal message to mbrennan@netcom.com about
the posting he made where he criticized "Mr. May and Mr. Ringuette"
for their misunderstanding.  :)  He misinterpreted my meaning of
"you are in my kill list, but the others aren't."  I meant that my
.maildelivery destroys mail from him, but not from anyone else.  *sigh*
He wrote my sysadmin about it and said that it came from my remailer
and all hell broke loose on my end.  My boss's boss took me into his
office and we discussed it...  He just said, "Someone was harrassing
a guy at AT&T (of all places) through your remailer."  I tracked down
the message, "talk"ed to mbrennan about it and he agreed to write a
message of apology to my sysadmin saying he misunderstood the "threat."

     *sigh*  What an avoidable mess if he hadn't been so touchy!  Now
they are investigating my remailer.  My response was, "Oh, it's just
a play-thing for me and a few friends."  They think I should be
responsible for what goes through it.  Hahahaha...  Right.  I only
see messages that don't go through for one reason or another (bounces
and errors in "::" use).

Chael Hall

--
Chael Hall
nowhere@bsu-cs.bsu.edu, 00CCHALL@BSUVC.BSU.EDU, chall@ref.tfs.com
(317) 285-3648 after 5 pm EST






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Matthew J Miszewski <MJMISKI@macc.wisc.edu>
Date: Wed, 17 Mar 93 20:18:04 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: White House
Message-ID: <23031722144365@vms2.macc.wisc.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


 
 
Cypherpunks,
 
  MCI announced a new email address for access to the White House.  However,
This time they make no pretense that it will be read electronicly.  From
what I could glean from RISKS (I was in quite a hurry), the messages will
be sent through the regular USPS.  This appears to be a way to increase
profits for MCI and Internet messages may very well bounce.
 
  Anyway, I know that the cypherpunks are trying to access the handles
of power in this country and gain some respect at the same time.  I also
watched the last thread about what form our communication should take.
Well, here's another chance.
 
0005895485@mcimail.com   -   White House
 
Matt
mjmiski@macc.wisc.edu
 




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Jim C <collins@socrates.umd.edu>
Date: Thu, 18 Mar 93 06:42:37 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Cypher: Subject naming proposal
In-Reply-To: <9303120305.AA09556@toad.com>
Message-ID: <9303181442.AA19725@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Can I suggest that any messages posted to cypherpunks start with "Cypher:"
in the subject line? The mail from this list is getting mixed in with all
my other mail, cause my newsreader (elm) can't sort on "To:" fields.
	Does anyone else have this problem? Does this idea seem reasonable?
JIm C.

 




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Brad Huntting <huntting@glarp.com>
Date: Thu, 18 Mar 93 09:07:29 PST
To: Jim C <collins@socrates.umd.edu>
Subject: Re: Cypher: Subject naming proposal
In-Reply-To: <9303181442.AA19725@toad.com>
Message-ID: <199303181705.AA03002@misc.glarp.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



> The mail from this list is getting mixed in with all my other mail,
> cause my newsreader (elm) can't sort on "To:" fields.

Perhaps you should get a better mail reader (e.g. MH).




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: markh@wimsey.bc.ca (Mark C. Henderson)
Date: Thu, 18 Mar 93 10:57:49 PST
To: Brad Huntting <collins@socrates.umd.edu>
Subject: Re: Cypher: Subject naming proposal
In-Reply-To: <199303181705.AA03002@misc.glarp.com>
Message-ID: <9303181023.ZM11582@wimsey.bc.ca>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


On Mar 18, 12:05, Brad Huntting wrote:
> Subject: Re: Cypher: Subject naming proposal
> 
> > The mail from this list is getting mixed in with all my other mail,
> > cause my newsreader (elm) can't sort on "To:" fields.
> 
> Perhaps you should get a better mail reader (e.g. MH).
>-- End of excerpt from Brad Huntting

mush will also allow filtering based on more or less whatever
you want (e.g. To: fields).

Mark
--
Mark Henderson
markh@wimsey.bc.ca




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: derek@cs.wisc.edu (Derek Zahn)
Date: Thu, 18 Mar 93 08:27:46 PST
To: collins@socrates.umd.edu (Jim C)
Subject: Re: Cypher: Subject naming proposal
In-Reply-To: <9303181442.AA19725@toad.com>
Message-ID: <9303181626.AA16870@lynx.cs.wisc.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> Can I suggest that any messages posted to cypherpunks start with "Cypher:"
> in the subject line? The mail from this list is getting mixed in with all
> my other mail, cause my newsreader (elm) can't sort on "To:" fields.
> 	Does anyone else have this problem? Does this idea seem reasonable?
> JIm C.

There's a program called "filter" (which I think is part of the elm
distribution) that I use to automatically route messages from different
mailing lists to separate folders, which can then be read at leisure.
Very handy!

derek




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: nowhere@bsu-cs.bsu.edu (Chael Hall)
Date: Thu, 18 Mar 93 07:43:44 PST
To: collins@socrates.UMD.EDU (Jim C)
Subject: Re: Cypher: Subject naming proposal
In-Reply-To: <9303181442.AA19725@toad.com>
Message-ID: <9303181539.AA29429@bsu-cs.bsu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>Can I suggest that any messages posted to cypherpunks start with "Cypher:"
>in the subject line? The mail from this list is getting mixed in with all
>my other mail, cause my newsreader (elm) can't sort on "To:" fields.
>	Does anyone else have this problem? Does this idea seem reasonable?
>JIm C.

     I use the following .forward file to make slocal "sort" my mail based
upon the contents of the .maildelivery file below.

-- $HOME/.forward --
| /usr/lib/mh/slocal -user nowhere
<EOF>

     You should use something like the following .maildelivery file to
tell slocal where to put the messages.

-- $HOME/.maildelivery --
#
# field	"pattern" action "command"
#
To "cypherpunks@toad.com" file ? Mail/cypherpunks

     This will file messages directed to cypherpunks to a file in your
Elm mail directory, but leave all other messages untouched.  You have
to then choose the folder "=cypherpunks" to read those messages.

     NOTE:  You need to change the path of slocal to the appropriate
path for your system.  You can find it with the whereis -b command or
the find utility.  Am I forgetting anything?

Chael Hall

--
Chael Hall
nowhere@bsu-cs.bsu.edu, 00CCHALL@BSUVC.BSU.EDU
(317) 285-3648 after 5 pm EST




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: root@rmsdell.ftl.fl.us (Yanek Martinson)
Date: Thu, 18 Mar 93 10:07:01 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: HASH: cryptanalysis of MD5? (fwd)
Message-ID: <m0nZOy0-0002L1C@rmsdell.ftl.fl.us>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Forwarded message:
>  Newsgroups: sci.crypt
>  From: schneier@chinet.chi.il.us (Bruce Schneier)
>  Subject: Successful Cryptanalysis of MD5
>  Message-ID: <C42Gr3.M3w@chinet.chi.il.us>
>  Organization: Chinet - Public Access UNIX
>  Date: Thu, 18 Mar 1993 04:06:39 GMT
>  
>  This is from Bart Preneel's Ph.D. thesis, "Analysis and Design of
>  Cryptographic Hash Functions," Jan 1993, p. 191.  It is about the
>  cryptanalysis of MD5:
>  
>          B. den Boer noted that an approximate relation exists between
>          any four consecutive additive constants.  Moreover, together
>          with A. Bosselaers he developed an attack that produces
>          pseudo-collisions, more specifically they can construct two
>          chaining variables (that only differ in the most significant
>          bit of every word) and a single message block that yield the
>          same hashcode.  The attack takes a few minutes on a PC.  This
>          means that one of the design principles behind MD4 (and MD5),
>          namely to design a collision resistant function is not satisfied.
>  
>  I have not seen the actual paper yet, which will be presented at
>  Eurocrypt.  Both PEM and PGP rely on MD5 for a secure one-way hash
>  function.  This is troublesome, to say the least.
>  
>  Bruce
>  
>  **************************************************************************
>  * Bruce Schneier
>  * Counterpane Systems         For a good prime, call 391581 * 2^216193 - 1
>  * schneier@chinet.chi.il.us
>  **************************************************************************
> 
> 

--
Yanek Martinson
yanek@novavax.nova.edu



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Eli Brandt <ebrandt@jarthur.Claremont.EDU>
Date: Thu, 18 Mar 93 14:24:39 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: a steganographic test
Message-ID: <9303182224.AA05626@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Taking the easy way out, I tried a steganographic encoding in a GIF
by mapping down to 128 colors, duplicating them, and frobbing the
low bits of the image.  This worked surprisingly well.  The
resulting image showed little degradation, and was smaller than the
original -- the information thrown out when mapping down to 128 was
not fully replaced, as the "hidden" file did not fill the GIF.

Rather than screw with GIF and Heckbert code for this throwaway, I
did the {en,de}giffing and palette manipulation by hand with the PC
program PICLAB.  It supports scripts, which would automate the
process, except for the palette duplication, which a sed script
could do.  The bit bashing code is appended, though it's pretty
trivial stuff.

Anyway, I ended up with the canonical Earth-seen-from-space,
320x200x8, with an embedded DOS-format text file chosen for
verisimilitude.  I can ship it by e-mail to anyone who wants it,
though there's not really a whole lot you can *do* with the thing.
("Hey.  Wow.  There really is a file in the low bits.")

	 PGP 2 key by finger or e-mail
   Eli   ebrandt@jarthur.claremont.edu

	the guts of ensteg.c:
/*
 * We smear the hidef stream MSB-first into the low bits of the picf stream.
 * This code is not optimal, but hey, it's short.
*/
   int picbyte, hidebyte, mask=0;
   long count=0;

   while (EOF!=(picbyte=getc(picf)))  {
      if (!mask)  {
	 mask = 0x80;
	 if (EOF==(hidebyte=getc(hidef)))
	    hidebyte=0;			// pad with nulls
      }
      putc(picbyte&0xfe | ((hidebyte&mask)/mask), outf);

      mask/=2;
   }

	and of desteg.c:
/*
 * Pull the picf bits out, and put them together, MSB-LSB order.
*/
   int picbyte, hidebyte=0, bit=7;

   while (EOF!=(picbyte=getc(picf)))  {
      if (bit<0)  {
	 putc(hidebyte, hidef);
	 hidebyte=0;
	 bit=7;
      }
      hidebyte |= (picbyte%2)<<bit--;
   }
   if (bit<0)  putc(hidebyte, hidef);


Caveats: no error checking.  The pic file had better be eight times
as large as the file to put in it.  If the null-padding will cause
problems, you should wrap the file with an archiver first.

Sorry about that putc() line in ensteg.c; it was late.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: R.Tait@bnr.co.uk
Date: Fri, 19 Mar 93 03:45:39 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com (Cypherpunks Mailing List)
Subject: CYPHER: Problems with pgp2.2 ELM scripts?
Message-ID: <199303181729.20139@bnsgs200.bnr.co.uk>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

Hi all,
Has anyone apart from me experienced problems with Vesselin's perl
scripts for ELM that came bundled with pgp2.2? I'm running ELM 2.4 pl21,
on a Sparc IPX, and basically, sometimes morepgp works, and sometimes
it doesn't. mailpgp is proving fine. 

Now, I'm no perl wiz, so I can't really dive in and fix it, nor am I
asking for someone to fix it (unless they want to), but it would be nice
to know that it's just not my utter ineptitude...  ;=)

- -- 
Rick M. Tait                              Bell Northern Research (Europe)
Tel: +44-81-945-3352, Fax: +44-81-945-3352     Network Management Systems
<PGP 2.2 public key available on request>       New Southgate, London. UK
email: ricktait@bnr.co.uk || gomez@cix.compulink.co.uk || ricktait@bnr.ca

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.2

iQCVAgUBK6ixmdIfJtINuGaBAQGjWgP/R67RPs45OJLD65ZqtJVKOLpYrwaLQ8cT
GOo9Ek9P2flywLt30U+h6/6JOmNCI9UhzeDUKpvnymk4OyReHnayDvtVqjM9c4AL
dj+xez2wjFHgxvpOfaAVNGvLlYj5BiVu+D5S3w9laxczT0MvSDTfFhwJFEP+VWxE
NbkeIjN4FrI=
=/qoI
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Crys Rides <crys@cave.tcp.COM>
Date: Thu, 18 Mar 93 15:40:34 PST
To: nowhere@bsu-cs.bsu.EDU (Chael Hall)
Subject: Re: Cypher: Subject naming proposal
In-Reply-To: <9303181442.AA19725@toad.com>
Message-ID: <9303182329.AA21721@ucunix.san.uc.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

>>>>> On Thu, 18 Mar 93 10:39:46 EST, nowhere@bsu-cs.bsu.edu (Chael Hall) said:

>Can I suggest that any messages posted to cypherpunks start with "Cypher:"
>in the subject line? The mail from this list is getting mixed in with all
>my other mail, cause my newsreader (elm) can't sort on "To:" fields.
>	Does anyone else have this problem? Does this idea seem reasonable?
>JIm C.

Hall>     I use the following .forward file to make slocal "sort" my mail based
Hall> upon the contents of the .maildelivery file below.

[snip]

Hall>      NOTE:  You need to change the path of slocal to the appropriate
Hall> path for your system.  You can find it with the whereis -b command or
Hall> the find utility.  Am I forgetting anything?

Erm, only that this apparently appears to pretty much _require_ switching
mailreaders to MH.  A more transparent solution can be achieved with the
'procmail' package, available from any comp.sources.misc archive.  This
package allows rule-based filtering on message content, size, and other
factors, and can be installed workably with most mailreaders to my
knowledge, without requiring much effort.

Hall> Chael Hall

Hall> --
Hall> Chael Hall
Hall> nowhere@bsu-cs.bsu.edu, 00CCHALL@BSUVC.BSU.EDU
Hall> (317) 285-3648 after 5 pm EST

Crys Rides

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.2

iQCVAgUBK6kEyJSqD+bQ7So3AQH/fwQAuRsviaD3uoG8VFU6nM2IDz+Nllbc5+KO
o3wCYGg7S15skdCjz+p7s97hAJlQ+IKtAdMia0Hya6W4cDOUHJGTlXeMmSXlEKlu
2W9kZN8bAR6D4TkuW0RqMFAzCW0U+87VajKO28IZLSEFGo1KPbFYlVP2eXsi/mPj
UND/fuivjzU=
=5b+o
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: karn@qualcomm.com (Phil Karn)
Date: Thu, 18 Mar 93 18:35:46 PST
To: nowhere@bsu-cs.bsu.edu
Subject: Re: Cypher: Subject naming proposal
Message-ID: <9303190233.AA19703@servo>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Several years ago I wrote a UNIX utility that splits my incoming mail
(directly from the spool) into files based on the To: and Cc: fields.
I can specify the various mailing lists to which I subscribe in the
shell script, with all others going to a file named "other".

This way I can give higher priority to the mail that names me specifically
as a recipient, and put off the mailing lists for later. And I can use
any conventional mailer (like Mail) to read the split files.

Phil




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: nowhere@bsu-cs.bsu.edu (Chael Hall)
Date: Thu, 18 Mar 93 18:02:02 PST
To: crys@cave.tcp.com (Crys Rides)
Subject: Re: Cypher: Subject naming proposal
In-Reply-To: <9303182329.AA21721@ucunix.san.uc.edu>
Message-ID: <9303190157.AA14620@bsu-cs.bsu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>Erm, only that this apparently appears to pretty much _require_ switching
>mailreaders to MH.  A more transparent solution can be achieved with the
>'procmail' package, available from any comp.sources.misc archive.  This
>package allows rule-based filtering on message content, size, and other
>factors, and can be installed workably with most mailreaders to my
>knowledge, without requiring much effort.

     I don't know what you mean...  The incoming mail ends up in
/var/spool/mail (on my system) whether or not you use it.  I use ELM
as my mailreader and everything works fine.  He did say that he is
using ELM.  To me, this is less effort than FTPing 'procmail.'

>Crys Rides

Chael Hall

--
Chael Hall
nowhere@bsu-cs.bsu.edu, 00CCHALL@BSUVC.BSU.EDU
(317) 285-3648 after 5 pm EST




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Mike Godwin <mnemonic@eff.org>
Date: Thu, 18 Mar 93 19:16:33 PST
To: hughes@soda.berkeley.edu (Eric Hughes)
Subject: Re: You Aren't [I'm Not]
In-Reply-To: <9303090316.AA17160@soda.berkeley.edu>
Message-ID: <199303190313.AA15580@eff.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


 
Eric Hughes writes:

> Last night I spoke with Mike Godwin of the EFF about the issue of
> anonymous libel.  Mike is not on the list, and I've copied him on this
> message.  Mike knows more about electronic speech issues than pretty
> much anyone else.  Here is my remembrance about what he said:
><text deleted> 
> 2. An anonymous remailer is not liable.  In order to be liable for the
> libellous speech, the operator of the remailer would have to have
> prior knowledge that the speech was libellous.  Since the operation of
> the remailer is fully automated, prior knowledge is impossible.

I'd modify that second point slightly--specifically, I'd say that an
anonymous remailer *probably* is not liable. There's never been a case
of this sort, but current American libel law suggests that the remailer
would not be liable.


--Mike







From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Alexander Chislenko <sasha@cs.umb.edu>
Date: Thu, 18 Mar 93 23:43:35 PST
To: extropians@gnu.ai.mit.edu
Subject: POLI/TECH/SURVEY: Feds and computers.
Message-ID: <199303190742.AA10986@ra.cs.umb.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


    There were two interesting articles today in the Marketplace section
of the Wall Street Journal.
 
  I advise you to read them, and will give only brief references here:
 
1.  "White House lets you turn on your PC, tune into politics"
   - Some stuff on White House and its email addresses, email in general,
etc. Some of it informative, some stupid, some babble.
One remarkable piece:
 
    "... the backward White House computer system doesn't receive the 
    electronic messages directly, and the mail isn't answered electronically.
    Instead, the e-mail messages are delivered to White House on disk,
    where they are printed out and answered by low-level workers through
    regular paper mail."
 
       Ain't that amazing?!
 
2.   To the right from the big central material on the crucially important
subject of bacon sales, there starts an article "Ruling gives privacy a
high-tech edge" - about the Jackson Games BBS case.  While it might not
offer conceptual breaktrhoughs to anybody on this list, it is (IMO) a very
informative and sympathetic material; it describes the history of the case,
recent rulings, their implications, etc.  It is very nice that this is
offered to a large audience. 
- Well worth reading.
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
|  Alexander Chislenko | sasha@cs.umb.edu | Cambridge, MA  |  (617) 864-3382 |
------------------------------------------------------------------------------




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Arthur Abraham <a2@well.sf.ca.us>
Date: Fri, 19 Mar 93 08:47:05 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Anonymity in the real world
Message-ID: <199303191643.AA15623@well.sf.ca.us>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Re: Anonymity in the real world

John Gilmore writes:

>The person who wrote this stuff hasn't thought it through. 
Any of these
>things can and do happen right now over the telephone
(anonymously)
>and through postal mail (anonymously).  Somehow, society has
not fallen
>into anarchy because anyone can drop a letter in a mailbox. 
Why not?
>
>(pause here and actually think about it...)


A lot of the stuff that appears on this list appears to come
from people glassey-eyed hypnotized by the "power" of the
internet, as if society had suddenly started behaving
differently because we now type over our telephones. 
Actually, this is an abuse of a technology, since it's much
quicker, and accurate, to talk over a telephone -- greater
bandwidth, for those who insist on describing people in
mechanical terms.

If all our desks were in the same large room, each in its own
little cubical, and we communicated by writing on pieces of
paper and magically passing them around, the effect would be
much the same as the internet -- except that the internet
saves about a forest per gigabyte.  

For those who insist the difference is that the internet is
"free", let them remember that each person has either
purchased or is paying rent for their desk, but some of the
rent is in the form of labor, etc. 

In this large room there are many people I have never meet,
but who still send me pieces of paper.  The pieces of paper
have names on them, but since I have never meet the person who
sends me a particular piece of paper, the names mean nothing;
the sender is Anonymous to _me_, though I hope they have some
friends.  If I get enough pieces of paper from the same
person, I eventually come to recognize the name, and form some
expectations of what they have written on the piece of paper;
then the person is a Pseudonym to _me_, since I still have not
yet met that individual.  

This does not seem to be a lot to argue over.

Suppose I now receive a piece of paper that says "Your doom is
coming! You have been using my pieces of paper to blow your
nose on!  I cannot let this insult go unpunished: You will die
at midnight!"  I could think: well, it's just a piece of
paper, there's no particular reason to be afraid of it.  I
could think: it's a large room, and this sender will have
trouble finding me, so my doom will never arrive.  I could
think: as with most of the people in the room, this sender has
never meet me, so my doom will not be able to recognize me.  

But what do think is: I will arrange to have a policeman at my
desk at midnight, since it is still the real world.   

This is my experience of the internet.


**************************************
bandwidth expander: :-) starts here
**************************************

Now I will tell a fable about the old use of the telephone.

Once upon a time, in a kingdom by the sea, the phone company
(TPC) wanted to sell the peasants' phone numbers to anybody
the peasants would call.  It was an easy way to make gold.

TPC said over and over again that peasants really enjoy doing
this. However, the peasants didn't want to join in the fun,
and insisted on having an option of deciding when TPC could
sell the phone numbers -- a cypherpunk might say the peasants
wanted to retain control of their anonymity.  

TPC saw that most of the peasants wouldn't release their phone
numbers, and so there wouldn't be enough gold in it, and
decided not to offer this wonderful service, and the peasants
lived anonymously ever after...

...for about three days until the all the people in the
kingdom, suddenly drunk on the newfound anonymity, completely
overloaded and destroyed the phone system, by all lifting
their phones at once, to place bomb threats. 

-a2.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Jim C <collins@socrates.umd.edu>
Date: Fri, 19 Mar 93 07:05:22 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Cypher:Subject naming- SUMMARY
Message-ID: <9303191505.AA01177@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Ok, here's a summary of replies regarding sorting of mail by To: fields,
or more in general, grouping all list mail together by mailing list.
Thanx to all who responded. As you can see, there are a variety of ways
to approach this problem.
All of these replys were posted to Cypherpunks already, so re-posting
is kosher.

I've cut out the extra header stuff and the PGP signatures, and edited
the messages for brevity.

>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>

From: nowhere@bsu-cs.bsu.edu (Chael Hall)
Subject: Re: Cypher: Subject naming proposal
To: collins@socrates.umd.edu (Jim C)
Cc: cypherpunks@toad.com

>Can I suggest that any messages posted to cypherpunks start with "Cypher:"
>in the subject line? The mail from this list is getting mixed in with all
>my other mail, cause my newsreader (elm) can't sort on "To:" fields.
>       Does anyone else have this problem? Does this idea seem reasonable?
>JIm C.

     I use the following .forward file to make slocal "sort" my mail based
upon the contents of the .maildelivery file below.

-- $HOME/.forward --
| /usr/lib/mh/slocal -user nowhere
<EOF>

     You should use something like the following .maildelivery file to
tell slocal where to put the messages.

-- $HOME/.maildelivery --
#
# field "pattern" action "command"
#
To "cypherpunks@toad.com" file ? Mail/cypherpunks

     This will file messages directed to cypherpunks to a file in your
Elm mail directory, but leave all other messages untouched.  You have
to then choose the folder "=cypherpunks" to read those messages.

     NOTE:  You need to change the path of slocal to the appropriate
path for your system.  You can find it with the whereis -b command or
the find utility.  Am I forgetting anything?

Chael Hall

--
Chael Hall
nowhere@bsu-cs.bsu.edu, 00CCHALL@BSUVC.BSU.EDU
(317) 285-3648 after 5 pm EST

>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>

From: Crys Rides <crys@cave.tcp.COM>
Subject: Re: Cypher: Subject naming proposal


>>>>> On Thu, 18 Mar 93 10:39:46 EST, nowhere@bsu-cs.bsu.edu (Chael Hall) said:

Hall>     I use the following .forward file to make slocal "sort" my mail based
Hall> upon the contents of the .maildelivery file below.

[snip]

Hall>      NOTE:  You need to change the path of slocal to the appropriate
Hall> path for your system.  You can find it with the whereis -b command or
Hall> the find utility.  Am I forgetting anything?

Erm, only that this apparently appears to pretty much _require_ switching
mailreaders to MH.  A more transparent solution can be achieved with the
'procmail' package, available from any comp.sources.misc archive.  This
package allows rule-based filtering on message content, size, and other
factors, and can be installed workably with most mailreaders to my
knowledge, without requiring much effort.

Crys Rides

>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>

From wimsey.bc.ca!markh@wimsey.com Thu Mar 18 13:: Cypher: Subject naming propos
al

There's a program called "filter" (which I think is part of the elm
distribution) that I use to automatically route messages from different
mailing lists to separate folders, which can then be read at leisure.
Very handy!

derek

>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>

To: Brad Huntting <huntting@glarp.com>, Jim C <collins@socrates.umd.edu>
Subject: Re: Cypher: Subject naming proposal
Cc: cypherpunks@toad.com

mush will also allow filtering based on more or less whatever
you want (e.g. To: fields).

Mark
--
Mark Henderson
markh@wimsey.bc.ca











From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: J. Michael Diehl <mdiehl@triton.unm.edu>
Date: Fri, 19 Mar 93 13:38:18 PST
To: R.Tait@bnr.co.uk
Subject: Re: CYPHER: Problems with pgp2.2 ELM scripts?
In-Reply-To: <199303181729.20139@bnsgs200.bnr.co.uk>
Message-ID: <9303192136.AA11513@triton.unm.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> Hi all,
> Has anyone apart from me experienced problems with Vesselin's perl
> scripts for ELM that came bundled with pgp2.2? I'm running ELM 2.4 pl21,
> on a Sparc IPX, and basically, sometimes morepgp works, and sometimes
> it doesn't. mailpgp is proving fine. 

I am too.  When I try to read my mail w/ elm, I get a (long!) pause then
the message:

Bad flag -S

And the program bugs out.

> Now, I'm no perl wiz, so I can't really dive in and fix it, nor am I
> asking for someone to fix it (unless they want to), but it would be nice
> to know that it's just not my utter ineptitude...  ;=)

Then we're both inept. ;^)

+----------------------+----------------------------------------------------+
| J. Michael Diehl ;-) |  I thought I was wrong once.  But, I was mistaken. |
|                      +----------------------------------------------------+
| mdiehl@triton.unm.edu| "I'm just looking for the opportunity to be        |
| Thunder@forum        |            Politically Incorrect!                  |
| (505) 299-2282       |                        <me>                        |
+----------------------+----------------------------------------------------+




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: The Phantom <phantom@u.washington.edu>
Date: Fri, 19 Mar 93 14:44:31 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: HIDE: embedded msgs in grphics & snd
Message-ID: <Pine.3.05.9303191413.A10793-c100000@stein2.u.washington.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
 
Recently George Gleason and myself have exchanged email concerning the
embedding of messages into broadcast medium. We discussed options that
would confound the traffic analysis performed upon the host medium. We
came up with a few ideas that may be interesting to the list.
 
George pointed out what I pointed out earlier - sending the latest
Michael Jackson tune over the net might raise eyebrows as well as
copyright violations. Being from the 'grunge town' of Seattle, it was
discussed that perhaps it would be possible to send a copy of some
'unknown' band over the net without harm. In fact, perhaps this is a
good place to start: the underground music scene.
 
gg - "This week on Music By Wire, a new song by the Subversives,
recorded at Pretty Good Productions. . ."
 
This distribution channel has advantages over DAT -- no delay and the
possibility of a large audience if there was a steady flow of musical
traffic.
 
Next, discussion turned to the integration of modem carrier tones as
samples in music (rap). If this new twist caught on, the artist could
encode messages (in plaintext, or later ciphertext) into the song,
including the key on the record insert. What does this do for us? By
using ciphertext "... as an artistic product, ..[we] thereby gain
another layer of 1st Amendment protection." Free speech.
 
Lastly and perhaps most interesting: I suggested that by using one of
these garage bands, we might be able to distribute our own messages
on CD. By getting ahold of a local bands' master before they take it
to get a record pressed, we could digitize it ourselves, encode our
messages (the kama sutra, a message of goodwill, the songs' lyrics,
whatever the band wants, too!) into the LSBs and then give it back to
the band to press CDs (put the key on the front cover if you like).
The band could be told that not only were they certain to sell ~100
CDs (@ $12-$14 each = $1,300 -- no small sum for a garage band) just
to cypherpunk members, but they would also be "the first band in
history to digitally encode messages into their music... etc."
I don't think the ~100 CDs is an understatement, either. How many
cypherpunks do we have nowadays? I would be willing to shell over
$15 for a (basically) small-capacity encrypted CD ROM disk, even
though I personally don't have a player.
 
gg and myself are both rather interested in this last idea --
tweaking with a bands' CD before it gets pressed. Does it
sound promising to anyone else?
 
matt
 
 
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.2
 
iQCVAgUBK6oMPWSGfFo1zsA5AQEW0AQAqUNNUqdgNyyN2WPGSRx4RCy4umV985CL
eHc6TnEsuVDO1InA8nsB4UVh96a3TG/jhSG3xVsGWYt/z5uJbTyqeHtkPWEiLz+j
BgR5/mKmeAi0rvFDaIQS1JcoB9gBb3+EFnvOT4RpTtsw+pN5Fry+0PQpQi9zKXbZ
pRCGtHKdiiE=
=UvO3
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----


Matt Thomlinson
University of Washington, Seattle, Washington.
Internet: phantom@u.washington.edu      	    phone: (206) 528-5732
PGP 2.2  key available via email or finger phantom@hardy.u.washington.edu





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: J. Michael Diehl <mdiehl@triton.unm.edu>
Date: Fri, 19 Mar 93 14:11:10 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: We need a FAQ.
Message-ID: <9303192209.AA13248@triton.unm.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I'd like to find out about remailers, reposters, and keyservers.  All of this 

has been posted before, I know.  We need to consolidate this into a FAQ for
easier access.  I'd almost do it myself if I still had the info on hand.

+----------------------+----------------------------------------------------+
| J. Michael Diehl ;-) |  I thought I was wrong once.  But, I was mistaken. |
|                      +----------------------------------------------------+
| mdiehl@triton.unm.edu| "I'm just looking for the opportunity to be        |
| Thunder@forum        |            Politically Incorrect!                  |
| (505) 299-2282       |                        <me>                        |
+----------------------+----------------------------------------------------+




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: mccoy@ccwf.cc.utexas.edu (Jim McCoy)
Date: Fri, 19 Mar 93 17:04:26 PST
To: phantom@u.washington.edu (The Phantom)
Subject: Re: HIDE: embedded msgs in grphics & snd
In-Reply-To: <Pine.3.05.9303191413.A10793-c100000@stein2.u.washington.edu>
Message-ID: <9303200102.AA14124@tramp.cc.utexas.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text


The Phantom <phantom@u.washington.edu> writes:
>  
> Lastly and perhaps most interesting: I suggested that by using one of
> these garage bands, we might be able to distribute our own messages
> on CD. By getting ahold of a local bands' master before they take it
> to get a record pressed, we could digitize it ourselves, encode our
> messages (the kama sutra, a message of goodwill, the songs' lyrics,
> whatever the band wants, too!) into the LSBs and then give it back to
> the band to press CDs (put the key on the front cover if you like).
[...]
> I would be willing to shell over
> $15 for a (basically) small-capacity encrypted CD ROM disk, even
> though I personally don't have a player.

A nice idea, but functionally impossible with today's technology.  The
firmware of CD-Rom players does not allow them to read the digital data of
an audio CD and output it in digital, the output must be analog.  The only
exception to this that I know of is the SGI CD-rom.  This restriction
against digital output from audio CDs was put in after the music publishing
industry made a big issue over pirating music, etc...

I am not sure what mods have been done to the firmware of the SGI CD rom
players, but the people on alt.cd-rom say it can read the digital data from
audio-cds.  Without this capacity you are not going to be able to stick the
message in the CD as easily as you would be able to with a cd-rom player
that could read digital...

jim



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: jg@uruk.genmagic.com (John Giannandrea)
Date: Fri, 19 Mar 93 19:43:16 PST
To: mccoy@ccwf.cc.utexas.edu (Jim McCoy)
Subject: Re: HIDE: embedded msgs in grphics & snd
In-Reply-To: <9303200102.AA14124@tramp.cc.utexas.edu>
Message-ID: <9303200341.AA01604@uruk.genmagic.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



  Jim McCoy writes:
    > The firmware of CD-Rom players does not allow them to read the digital data of
    > an audio CD and output it in digital, the output must be analog.  The only
    > exception to this that I know of is the SGI CD-rom.

This drive is the Toshiba TXM3301.
Although the firmware was specially commissioned by SGI I believe that
the drive is available from Toshiba America directly.






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: J. Michael Diehl <mdiehl@triton.unm.edu>
Date: Fri, 19 Mar 93 20:36:50 PST
To: phantom@u.washington.edu (The Phantom)
Subject: Re: HIDE: embedded msgs in grphics & snd
In-Reply-To: <Pine.3.05.9303191413.A10793-c100000@stein2.u.washington.edu>
Message-ID: <9303200435.AA26847@triton.unm.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> George pointed out what I pointed out earlier - sending the latest
> Michael Jackson tune over the net might raise eyebrows as well as
> copyright violations. Being from the 'grunge town' of Seattle, it was

Besides, Michael Jackson sucks! ;^)

> discussed that perhaps it would be possible to send a copy of some
> 'unknown' band over the net without harm. In fact, perhaps this is a
> good place to start: the underground music scene.

I assume you mean with their permission.  Think of it, you tell a band that you want to distribute one of their demo's around the world.  I think they'd buy it.
And I don't think they'd care that you embedded a message in it, either.  And a
lot of cypherpunks like underground music.  Works for all of us.  I like this 
idea and think it could work.

> gg - "This week on Music By Wire, a new song by the Subversives,
> recorded at Pretty Good Productions. . ."

I love it! Pretty Good Productions...  That's the best. ;^)

> Next, discussion turned to the integration of modem carrier tones as
> samples in music (rap). If this new twist caught on, the artist could
> encode messages (in plaintext, or later ciphertext) into the song,

I don't know, will a modem weed out all of the noise to get to the carrier
tones that we embedded in the crap...er...I mean rap music. ;^)

> including the key on the record insert. What does this do for us? By
> using ciphertext "... as an artistic product, ..[we] thereby gain
> another layer of 1st Amendment protection." Free speech.

Nice!
>  
> Lastly and perhaps most interesting: I suggested that by using one of
> these garage bands, we might be able to distribute our own messages
> on CD. By getting ahold of a local bands' master before they take it
> to get a record pressed, we could digitize it ourselves, encode our
> messages (the kama sutra, a message of goodwill, the songs' lyrics,
> whatever the band wants, too!) into the LSBs and then give it back to
> the band to press CDs (put the key on the front cover if you like).

I wonder if a PC will read the data that comprises a CD data-set.  My
consern is about directory structure etc.

> The band could be told that not only were they certain to sell ~100
> CDs (@ $12-$14 each = $1,300 -- no small sum for a garage band) just
> to cypherpunk members, but they would also be "the first band in
> history to digitally encode messages into their music... etc."

Kind of a new twist on backward subliminal messages, eh? ;^)

> I don't think the ~100 CDs is an understatement, either. How many
> cypherpunks do we have nowadays? I would be willing to shell over
> $15 for a (basically) small-capacity encrypted CD ROM disk, even
> though I personally don't have a player.

We could distribute the needed source code on an underground basis.
We could distribute whole software packages piggy-backing on a garage 
band's demo!  Bitchen!
>  
> gg and myself are both rather interested in this last idea --
> tweaking with a bands' CD before it gets pressed. Does it
> sound promising to anyone else?

Most definately!

+----------------------+----------------------------------------------------+
| J. Michael Diehl ;-) |  I thought I was wrong once.  But, I was mistaken. |
|                      +----------------------------------------------------+
| mdiehl@triton.unm.edu| "I'm just looking for the opportunity to be        |
| Thunder@forum        |            Politically Incorrect!                  |
| (505) 299-2282       |                        <me>                        |
+----------------------+----------------------------------------------------+




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Arthur Abraham <a2@well.sf.ca.us>
Date: Fri, 19 Mar 93 21:43:13 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Future Copy
Message-ID: <199303200539.AA18329@well.sf.ca.us>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Somehow, I think some of the readers of this list will find
this interesting, I don't know why.

Popular Science: April 1993

"Color Copiers
Countering Counterfeiters

An unfortunate result of advances in color copiers is that it
is now easier to counterfeit currency.  To make it more
difficult, Cannon has developed two defenses.  One is a
currency-recognition technology similar to that used in
vending machines.  But Canon has enhanced the technology to
recognize a bill regardless of its orientation of it it's
among a clutter of material.  In a demonstration, a Canon
official tried to copy a Japanese bill.  The copier sounded an
alarm and spit out a piece of paper with a blackened rectangle
where the image should have been.

"Once a bill is recognized, we could do anything -- have the
machine stop, sound an alarm, or, it it's connected to a phone
line, call the police,' the official says.  The copier will
recognize as many currencies as possible.

A second feature traces counterfeiters of official documents. 
Each copier embeds a code into the copied image, which is
impossible to see.  A special scanner extracts the code and a
computer program then furnishes the copier's serial number,
allowing identification of the registered purchaser of the
machine.

With the new anti-counterfeiting technology, Canon can also
include a two-sided copying feature previously omitted from
its color copiers."

Of course, the second to the last paragraph is most
interesting, along these lines:
     a. how are they doing that?
     b. is this preserved on a second, third, etc. generation
copy?
     c. it is likely that computer scanning and OCR defeats
this.
     c. anybody posting to whistleblowers should be aware of
these new machines, and learn how to identify them, and their
products. 



-a2.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: J. Michael Diehl <mdiehl@triton.unm.edu>
Date: Fri, 19 Mar 93 20:43:21 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: We need a FAQ.
Message-ID: <9303200441.AA27024@triton.unm.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I'd like to have information on anon. remailers, news posters an key servers.
I know this has been posted here before, but I lost it all and think that this
stuff should be kept together for convenience.  I'd almost do it myself if 
someone would mail me the info.


+----------------------+----------------------------------------------------+
| J. Michael Diehl ;-) |  I thought I was wrong once.  But, I was mistaken. |
|                      +----------------------------------------------------+
| mdiehl@triton.unm.edu| "I'm just looking for the opportunity to be        |
| Thunder@forum        |            Politically Incorrect!                  |
| (505) 299-2282       |                        <me>                        |
+----------------------+----------------------------------------------------+




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: George A. Gleason <gg@well.sf.ca.us>
Date: Sat, 20 Mar 93 02:28:13 PST
To: phantom@u.washington.edu
Subject: Re: HIDE: embedded msgs in grphics & snd
Message-ID: <199303201024.AA09757@well.sf.ca.us>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Re. cyphertext and music: I've been professionally involved in the
recording/production scene and could arrange something.  There are plenty of
damn good bands in the Bay Area who might volunteer for this kind of thing;
I can think of a couple of candidates right away.  Also a great local
studio, Polymorph Productions, which would be amenable to this.  All we need
to get going is for someone to cover the actual cost of studio time, which
is only $30/hour.  Now the only hitch right now is my own schedule being
really really busy, but I could get a free weekend, or hook up some local
cypherpunx with the bands and the studio, and see where it goes.  Basically
I get the idea that if this worked, the record would get a lot of interest
including from a wider audience than cypherpunx, and that translates into
attention on the band as such, and that translates into paying back the
original production investment with interest.   So, anyone interested...?

-gg@well.sf.ca.us.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Date: Sat, 20 Mar 93 10:37:46 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: HIDE: embedded msgs in grphics & snd
Message-ID: <9303201836.AA18301@netcom.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


George Gleason writes:

>Re. cyphertext and music: I've been professionally involved in the
>recording/production scene and could arrange something.  There are plenty of
>damn good bands in the Bay Area who might volunteer for this kind of thing;
>I can think of a couple of candidates right away.  Also a great local
>studio, Polymorph Productions, which would be amenable to this.  All we need
>to get going is for someone to cover the actual cost of studio time, which
>is only $30/hour.  Now the only hitch right now is my own schedule being

I'm all for exploring hiding messages in the LSBs of images and audio
(having written on this since 1988, and several times on this list), but I
don't understand the idea of putting messages in widely distributed,
publicly-advertised commercial or semi-commercial CDs:

- if lots of people know about it--presumably the goal here--then why hide
the message? (Granted, it'll make some people say "Like, wow! Like,
messages, man!"...or whatever the current vernacular version would be.)

- how would the key be distributed as widely? 

- clearly this is not a practical way to steganographically send messages. 


So, what exactly is the point of this exercise?


-Tim May

--
Timothy C. May         | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,  
tcmay@netcom.com       | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
408-688-5409           | knowledge, reputations, information markets, 
W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA  | black markets, collapse of governments.
Higher Power: 2^756839 | Public Key: MailSafe and PGP available.





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: J. Michael Diehl <mdiehl@triton.unm.edu>
Date: Sat, 20 Mar 93 14:45:23 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Problems with pgp elm scripts.
Message-ID: <9303202243.AA21880@triton.unm.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I finally got my mailer script to work.  I deleted the -S parameter to less in
the perl script.  But now, it seems that it can't sign my mail unless i'm in 
another directory but my home.  It complains that it can't find a key in 
secring.pgp for user 'me'.  me is an alias that I use for myself, but even if I
send mail to mdiehl@triton, it still tries to find a key for 'me'. What gives?
 
+----------------------+----------------------------------------------------+
| J. Michael Diehl ;-) |  I thought I was wrong once.  But, I was mistaken. |
|                      +----------------------------------------------------+
| mdiehl@triton.unm.edu| "I'm just looking for the opportunity to be        |
| Thunder@forum        |            Politically Incorrect!                  |
| (505) 299-2282       |                        <me>                        |
+----------------------+----------------------------------------------------+




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: alrub@pro-sol.cts.com (Al Rubottom)
Date: Sat, 20 Mar 93 19:06:21 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: yr mailing list
Message-ID: <ck61102@pro-sol.cts.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Dear friends: Please add my name to your mailing list.  U.S. snail mail
address;
        Al E. Rubottom
        5352 Via Carancho
        San Diego, CA 92111
internet address:
        alrub@pro-sol.cts.com

Thanking you in advance for your attnetin, I remain
        Appreciateively yours,
                                                Alrub

ProLine:  alrub@pro-sol
Internet: alrub@pro-sol.cts.com
UUCP:     crash!pro-sol!alrub





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: uri@watson.ibm.com
Date: Sat, 20 Mar 93 16:37:39 PST
To: gg@well.sf.ca.us (George A. Gleason)
Subject: Re: HIDE: embedded msgs in grphics & snd
In-Reply-To: <199303201024.AA09757@well.sf.ca.us>
Message-ID: <9303210036.AA21784@buoy.watson.ibm.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


George A. Gleason says:
> Re. cyphertext and music: I've been professionally involved in the
> recording/production scene and could arrange something.  There are plenty of
> damn good bands in the Bay Area who might volunteer for this kind of thing;
> I can think of a couple of candidates right away.

Maybe I'm missing something,  but why bother with recording
professional and semi-professional music, when you can just
as easily record your OWN voice  and send a digitized voice
message (as an e-mail enhancement)?

In order to prevent smart censorship  (i.e. altering LSBs
under you) one must design sort of crypto-CRC, or like...
--
Regards,
Uri         uri@watson.ibm.com      scifi!angmar!uri 	N2RIU
-----------
<Disclamer>





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: zane@genesis.mcs.com (Sameer Parekh)
Date: Sun, 21 Mar 93 13:59:01 PST
To: George A. Gleason <gg@well.sf.ca.us>
Subject: Re: HIDE: embedded msgs in grphics & snd
In-Reply-To: <199303201024.AA09757@well.sf.ca.us>
Message-ID: <m0naXvR-000MT1C@genesis.mcs.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


In message <199303201024.AA09757@well.sf.ca.us>, George A. Gleason writes:
> I get the idea that if this worked, the record would get a lot of interest
> including from a wider audience than cypherpunx, and that translates into
> attention on the band as such, and that translates into paying back the
> original production investment with interest.   So, anyone interested...?
> 
	For exactly this reason, I don't think that this is a very good
idea. The discussion here started as a search for a way to make
encrypted data not look like encrypted data. (Once it becomes illegal).
If encoding in LSBs becomes a famous technique, then once data
encryption becomes illegal searching the LSBs will become standard
procedure for that data cops.

--
| Sameer Parekh-zane@genesis.MCS.COM-PFA related mail to pfa@genesis.MCS.COM |
| Apprentice Philosopher, Writer, Physicist, Healer, Programmer, Lover, more |
| "Be God" - Me __ "Specialization is for Insects" - Robert A. Heinlein ____/
 \_____________/  \____________________________________________________/ 




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Joe Thomas <jthomas@access.digex.com>
Date: Sun, 21 Mar 93 09:06:16 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Looking for key-signers in DC
Message-ID: <Pine.3.05.9303211210.A2216-8100000@access.digex.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I finally got my act together, and got PGP running on my pseudo-Mac
(actually an Atari with an emulator, but that's another story).  Is anyone
around DC and available to sign it before I send it to the servers, etc.?

Thanks,
Joe






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: J. Michael Diehl <mdiehl@triton.unm.edu>
Date: Sun, 21 Mar 93 18:39:05 PST
To: zane@genesis.mcs.com (Sameer Parekh)
Subject: Re: HIDE: embedded msgs in grphics & snd
In-Reply-To: <m0naXvR-000MT1C@genesis.mcs.com>
Message-ID: <9303220237.AA02600@triton.unm.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> 
> In message <199303201024.AA09757@well.sf.ca.us>, George A. Gleason writes:
> > I get the idea that if this worked, the record would get a lot of interest
> > including from a wider audience than cypherpunx, and that translates into
> > attention on the band as such, and that translates into paying back the
> > original production investment with interest.   So, anyone interested...?
> > 
> 	For exactly this reason, I don't think that this is a very good
> idea. The discussion here started as a search for a way to make
> encrypted data not look like encrypted data. (Once it becomes illegal).
> If encoding in LSBs becomes a famous technique, then once data
> encryption becomes illegal searching the LSBs will become standard
> procedure for that data cops.

At which time we simply abandon this media.  But think of it.  Don't  you think
a record company would be interested in a new record-selling gimmic?  And they
have enough money.....er...I mean clout, ya that's it, to protect their new-
found gimmic.  Just my (last) $.02, Thanx for listening. ;^)

+----------------------+----------------------------------------------------+
| J. Michael Diehl ;-) |  I thought I was wrong once.  But, I was mistaken. |
|                      +----------------------------------------------------+
| mdiehl@triton.unm.edu| "I'm just looking for the opportunity to be        |
| Thunder@forum        |            Politically Incorrect!                  |
| (505) 299-2282       |                        <me>                        |
+----------------------+----------------------------------------------------+





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: crunch@netcom.com (John Draper)
Date: Sun, 21 Mar 93 22:42:31 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Double messages
Message-ID: <9303220641.AA00445@netcom2.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I'm getting double messages from people.    Is there something wrong with
the mailing list?
JD




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: djwright <djwright@blackfoot.ucs.indiana.edu>
Date: Sun, 21 Mar 93 21:00:36 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Idea
Message-ID: <9303220500.AA03848@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



 Although the material is interesting, my mailbox is getting flooded..
perhaps the mail should be compiled into a newsletter or 'zine format
and mailed monthly. Phrack magazine is sent with an automated mailer..
If you want more information.. send requests to root@stormking.com.

 Please seriously consider this, the bulk of mail vs. my time to deal with 
the volume of little messages is limited, and it is much better if it's a monthly o r weekly newsletter which I can download and browse at my leisure. It really is not much work to have a program dump all the mail into a file, then another program send out the file monthly.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: J. Michael Diehl <mdiehl@triton.unm.edu>
Date: Sun, 21 Mar 93 23:12:40 PST
To: julf@penet.fi (Johan Helsingius)
Subject: Re: Idea
In-Reply-To: <9303220715.aa23117@penet.penet.FI>
Message-ID: <9303220711.AA12900@triton.unm.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> 
> 
> >  Although the material is interesting, my mailbox is getting flooded..
> > perhaps the mail should be compiled into a newsletter or 'zine format
> > and mailed monthly.
> 
> I have no problems keeping up with the cypherpunks messages (they form
> such a small procentage of my mail anyway), and a good mail reader
> definitely helps. But if the messages got digested into huge batches, I
> would definitely stop reading them.

Me to!  I might venture into the table of contents.  If nothing seemed 
interesting there, (and there might be good stuff) I'd simpy hit 'd'.  Don't
digest them!  Thanx.

+----------------------+----------------------------------------------------+
| J. Michael Diehl ;-) |  I thought I was wrong once.  But, I was mistaken. |
|                      +----------------------------------------------------+
| mdiehl@triton.unm.edu| "I'm just looking for the opportunity to be        |
| Thunder@forum        |            Politically Incorrect!                  |
| (505) 299-2282       |                        <me>                        |
+----------------------+----------------------------------------------------+




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Nickey MacDonald <i6t4@jupiter.sun.csd.unb.ca>
Date: Sun, 21 Mar 93 21:44:58 PST
To: Tony Kidson <tony@morgan.demon.co.uk>
Subject: Re: META: Support for prefixes
In-Reply-To: <3098@morgan.demon.co.uk>
Message-ID: <Pine.3.05.9303220148.B168-b100000@jupiter>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


{I realize I'm a mere two weeks behind in my mail...  please ignore me if
I'm way out of date on this...}

I agree that this is a great idea... and looking ahead into the mail I am
behind in, it looks like it is being done...  I'd also like to be able to
tell which mail list t he mail was from... I'd like it if the remailed
mail from the list had CYPH: prepended to the front of all the subjects...

On another note.... Tony... Please don't requote a large post, just to add
a one line reply...  It wastes a lot of bandwidth...  I hope that no
mailers still exist that do not allow you to edit the text that it
includes from an original message when doing a reply...  5 minutes of
editing for one person saves hundreds of people from wasting their time
skipping a redundant post...

---
Nick MacDonald               | NMD on IRC
i6t4@jupiter.sun.csd.unb.ca  | PGP 2.1 Public key available via finger


On Wed, 3 Mar 1993, Tony Kidson wrote:

> >  [ a convincing but long repost deleted ] ...
> > Yanek Martinson
> > yanek@novavax.nova.edu

> I fully support this call for prefixes by subject class.
> | Tony Kidson     | ** PGP 2.1 Key by request **  | Voice +44 81 466 5127    |







From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: George A. Gleason <gg@well.sf.ca.us>
Date: Mon, 22 Mar 93 04:19:59 PST
To: zane@genesis.mcs.com
Subject: Re: HIDE: embedded msgs in grphics & snd
Message-ID: <199303221218.AA23483@well.sf.ca.us>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


"once data encryption becomes illegal, searching for LSBs will become
standard procedure for datacops."

Aha, but if we can establish artistic protection for cyphertext, that will
be one more brick in the wall that keeps the censors out.  The point is to
prevent it becoming illegal in the first place.  Now so far we have one
great strategy: making crypto ubiquitous, so there is no way to get the
horses back into the barn.  I think we can benefit from additional
strategies, such as expanding into all the various areas of constitutional
protection that might be available.  

-gg




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Johan Helsingius <julf@penet.FI>
Date: Sun, 21 Mar 93 22:22:53 PST
To: djwright <djwright@blackfoot.ucs.indiana.edu>
Subject: Re: Idea
In-Reply-To: <9303220500.AA03848@toad.com>
Message-ID: <9303220715.aa23117@penet.penet.FI>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



>  Although the material is interesting, my mailbox is getting flooded..
> perhaps the mail should be compiled into a newsletter or 'zine format
> and mailed monthly.

I have no problems keeping up with the cypherpunks messages (they form
such a small procentage of my mail anyway), and a good mail reader
definitely helps. But if the messages got digested into huge batches, I
would definitely stop reading them.

	Julf





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: mccoy@ccwf.cc.utexas.edu (Jim McCoy)
Date: Mon, 22 Mar 93 08:19:08 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Idea
In-Reply-To: <9303220711.AA12900@triton.unm.edu>
Message-ID: <9303221617.AA13744@tramp.cc.utexas.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text


> > 
> > >  Although the material is interesting, my mailbox is getting flooded..
> > > perhaps the mail should be compiled into a newsletter or 'zine format
> > > and mailed monthly.
> > 
> > I have no problems keeping up with the cypherpunks messages (they form
> > such a small procentage of my mail anyway), and a good mail reader
> > definitely helps. But if the messages got digested into huge batches, I
> > would definitely stop reading them.
> 
> Me to!  I might venture into the table of contents.  If nothing seemed 
> interesting there, (and there might be good stuff) I'd simpy hit 'd'.  Don't
> digest them!  Thanx.

Perhaps it might make sense to digest them and offer the digest (perhaps
weekly or even a daily digest) as an alternative mirror of the regular
list.  The cypherpunks messages make a small percentage of my mail too, but
when I get a one or two hundred messages a day it is hard for me to keep
track of ongoing discussions in this list and I have a tendency to nuke the
messages outright if the subject doesn't interest me.  Redirecting the
messages to a seperate folder doesn't help much either because I sometimes
don't have the time to check the folder more than once a day and then when
I do check it I spend more time thinking about how to trim the many
messages than anything else...

It is kind of ironic that a list which deals with the dispersal and
protection of information only offers a single, inefficient, method for
accessing that information.  Offering a daily or weekly digest of messages
would be agood thing, IMHO. In addition to making the list accessible to
people who have real jobs or better things to do with thier time during the
day [ :-) ] it would also offer an easy method for archival of messages on
the list (e.g. just store the daily or weekly logs somewhere for ftp...) 

jim



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Arthur Abraham <a2@well.sf.ca.us>
Date: Mon, 22 Mar 93 14:57:05 PST
To: mccoy@ccwf.cc.utexas.edu
Subject: Re: Idea
Message-ID: <199303222255.AA22533@well.sf.ca.us>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>>> preceeding postings not copied to increase the brevity of this message
\
I like that last one too, but who will bell the cat?

-a2.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: mccoy@ccwf.cc.utexas.edu (Jim McCoy)
Date: Mon, 22 Mar 93 15:52:28 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Idea
In-Reply-To: <199303222255.AA22533@well.sf.ca.us>
Message-ID: <9303222350.AA19244@tramp.cc.utexas.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text


> 
> >>> preceeding postings not copied to increase the brevity of this message
> \
> I like that last one too, but who will bell the cat?

It has already been done.  Find the majordomo package (i found several
sites with it via archie) and run this.  It will automagically digestify
and will also handle the subscribe/unsubscribe stuff.  It is close to being
a listserv for unix, but lacks the archive retrieval via mail functions.

jim



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: fnerd@smds.com (FutureNerd Steve Witham)
Date: Mon, 22 Mar 93 15:20:11 PST
To: Timothy Newsham <newsham@wiliki.eng.hawaii.edu>
Subject: Re: Encrypted computing questions
Message-ID: <9303222315.AB22500@smds.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Timothy Newsham <newsham@wiliki.eng.hawaii.edu> asks a lot of questions
about my "crypto goal" of encrypted computing.  Rather than answer his
questions one at a time, I'll try to clarify what I meant.  Also, below
I ask about a related crypto goal of "trans-cryption."

The idea is that you have a program and maybe some initial state information.
The program accepts data in some encrypted form.  It does the equivalent of
decrypting it and processing it.  EXCEPT...
  o  It never turns any part of it into plaintext (unless the output is
     plaintext, in which case it only shows up after the computing is done).
  o  It's impossible by analyzing the code or watching it run to figure out
     what it did, or which bits went where.
  o  In particular, you can't figure out the decrypting key by analyzing
     the program or watching it run.
  o  If there's state information left over, it has to be in some 
     encrypted form.
Working backward from these goals, I figure that the program is somehow 
combined with its private key when it is turned into a crypto-program.
How do you convince users that this is what you've done, that your program
is actually a crypto program that never reveals its private key or 
plaintext of its inputs--that it doesn't just decrypt and then process the
plaintext--and that you've thrown away the private key used to make it?

When it runs, it has to process all its data in encrypted form!  What sort
of encryption could this be?  The data has to be shuffled all around
continuously, and it would seem you'd have to have lots of "if" statements
to make sure it behaved very differently with small input changes, so
that no one could tell what any input bit affected.

If the program were an interpreter for a general-purpose language, 
you could send it encrypted programs to run.

A related idea is trans-cryption.  Is it possible to do the equivalent
of two RSA encryption steps (e.g., decrypt with one key, then encrypt
with another), without storing information that would let you deduce either 
of the keys or the data between the two steps?

-fnerd
fnerd@smds.com (FutureNerd Steve Witham)





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Eric Hollander <hh@soda.berkeley.edu>
Date: Tue, 23 Mar 93 00:08:52 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: another remailer goes on line
Message-ID: <9303230804.AA14414@soda.berkeley.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Three remailers was not enough for me.  I set up a fourth:
00x@uclink.berkeley.edu.  It uses Hal's scripts, and will soon
be running pgp (I already have pgp comiled for it).  I'll post keys as soon
as they are available.

e




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Phil Karn <karn@unix.ka9q.ampr.org>
Date: Tue, 23 Mar 93 02:46:23 PST
To: denning@cs.cosc.georgetown.edu
Subject: your note on sci.crypt
Message-ID: <9303231045.AA01021@unix.ka9q.ampr.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Dr. Denning:

Although you are correct that many of the responses to your proposal
contained personal attacks (in which people called you naive, etc),
you seem to believe that this invalidates the fundamental underlying
point they were making.  This is not so.

This fundamental point can be summarized as follows:

The US government has repeatedly shown by its past conduct that it
simply cannot be trusted to obey its own laws regarding spying on
private citizens, particularly those who are organized in lawful,
peaceful opposition to government policies. And history has shown that
it can take many years for unlawful monitoring to become public, if
indeed they ever do (consider the current story I just sent you about
the Army spying on Dr. Martin Luther King). In other words, the
government has frequently ignored its own laws, because it knows it
can do so with impunity.

No credible case can be made that the problem has been "fixed" since
the now-publicized abuses of the 1960s and 1970s, i.e., that new
safeguards have somehow rendered the government incapable of violating
the privacy rights of its citizens. Privacy violations may or may not
still be occurring; we have no way to know. But I suspect it depends
far more on the people in power than on any post-Watergate
"safeguards" against the abuse of that power.

The private use of strong cryptography provides, for the very first
time, a truly effective safeguard against this sort of government
abuse. And that's why it must continue to be free and unregulated.

I should credit you for doing us all a very important service by
raising this issue. Nothing could have lit a bigger fire under those
of us who strongly believe in a citizens' right to use cryptography
than your proposals to ban or regulate it.  There are many of us out
here who share this belief *and* have the technical skills to turn
it into practice. And I promise you that we will fight for this belief
to the bitter end, if necessary.

Phil Karn








From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Eric Hughes <hughes@soda.berkeley.edu>
Date: Tue, 23 Mar 93 10:40:07 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: FWEE! premature testing
In-Reply-To: <9303121624.tn02614@aol.com>
Message-ID: <9303231835.AA14090@soda.berkeley.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Dave Del Torto writes regarding Tim May's whistleblower test:
>I know you
>really wanted to post that nifty F-117A thing you OCR'd _somewhere_ but that
>was not particularly helpful.  

I think it was extremely helpful.  Especially when we are in a design
phase, it is good to know just how strong a reaction there will be to
some of these posts.  It benefits us to have had the experience, not
just an awareness of the problem.

>Someone suggested a set of WB guidelines should be posted. 

Any guidelines must remain completely neutral about content of
postings.  A whistleblowers group is for expressing outrage.  The
things you are outraged about will be necessarily different from what
others are outraged about.  It is certain that one act of outrage will
itself be outrageous to another.  We have seen this already with Tim's
post.

A whistleblowers newsgroup must remain value-neutral with respect to
all values except the freedom to speak.  When all agree in advance
that freedom of speech is a good thing, then we avoid problems when
specific speech is to one party's disadvantage.

Value neutrality must be taught; it will not come automatically.
This, and the ability to teach the defense of privacy, are in the long
run much more valuable than any one specific whistleblowing.

>Nicholas Johnson, the former head of the FCC (under Johnson) 
>Ralph Nader's organization 
>Jim Settle (FBI Computer Crime Squad) 
>a fellow from the CIA  [his name's Ross Stapleton]

Dave mentions all these people are in favor of whistleblowing.  The
place where they can help the most is by affixing their signature to a
document that defends the whistleblowers group in advance of
"problems" with it.  If we can gather enough signatures from a wide
enough spectrum of the political process, the publication of the
document alone will be worth press coverage.  It might also be
worthwhile to take out a few big ads in major newspapers and print a
position paper.

[Re: comments from Ross Stapleton]
>done "correctly," the system can 'perhaps be somewhat protected' from posting
>by pranksters/attackers with bogus revelations - it might require someone to
>preview postings 

There's no need to preview anything.  Let people say whatever they
want.  Then, should the CIA wish to confirm something, they can issue
a statement with a digital signature attached to it, referencing the
post in question.

Review and verification is a valid concern; pre-review is not.

Eric




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: jthomas@coconut.mitre.org (Joe Thomas)
Date: Tue, 23 Mar 93 09:09:00 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: REMAIL: Anon.penet.fi no more
Message-ID: <9303231705.AA05316@coconut>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


You probably have seen this already, but it's certainly of relevance  
to cypherpunks:

> Newsgroups:  
comp.org.eff.talk,news.admin.policy,alt.privacy,alt.sexual.abuse.reco 
very,alt.support,alt.transgendered,soc.motss
> Path:  
linus.mitre.org!linus!agate!howland.reston.ans.net!usc!elroy.jpl.nasa 
.gov!decwrl!uunet!mcsun!fuug!penet!julf
> From: julf@penet.fi (Ze Julf)
> Subject: Anon.penet.fi no more
> Organization: No!
> Date: Tue, 23 Mar 1993 15:03:59 GMT
> Message-ID: <1993Mar23.150359.16883@penet.fi>
> Lines: 54
> 

> The anonymous service at anon.penet.fi has been closed down.  
Postings to
> netnews and mail to arbitrary addresses has been blocked. To enable  
users
> who know each other only by their anon ID's to arrange alternate
> communication paths, mail to anonymous users will still be  
supported for
> two weeks. After this period all database entries will be deleted.
> 

> Due to the lawsuit-intensive climate in the US, many anonymous  
services have
> been short-lived. By setting up anon.penet.fi in Finland, I hoped  
to create
> a more stable service. Anon.penet.fi managed to stay in operation  
for almost
> five months. The service was protected from most of the usual  
problems that
> had forced other services to shut down. But there are always going  
to be
> ways to stop something as controversial as an anon service. In this  
case, a
> very well-known and extremely highly regarded net personality  
managed to
> contact exactly the right people to create a situation where it is
> politically impossible for me to continue running the service.
> 

> But of course this political situation is mainly caused by the  
abuse of the
> network that a very small minority of anon users engaged in. This  
small
> group of immature and thoughtless individuals (mainly users from US
> universities) caused much aggravation and negative feelings towards  
the
> service. This is especially unfortunate considering these people  
really are
> a minuscule minority of anon users. The latest statistics from the  
service
> show 18203 registered users, 3500 messages per day on the average,  
and
> postings to 576 newsgroups. Of these users, I have received  
complaints
> involving postings from 57 anonymous users, and, of these, been  
forced to
> block only 8 users who continued their abuse despite a warning from  
me.
> 

> In retrospect I realize that I have been guilty to keeping a far  
too low
> profile on the network, prefering to deal with the abuse cases  
privately
> instead of making strong public statements. Unfortunately I  
realized this
> only a couple of days before being forced to shut down the service,  
but the
> results of a single posting to alt.binaries.pictures.erotica.d gave  
very
> positive results. I take full blaim for my failure to realize the
> psychological effects of a strongly stated, publicly visible  
display of
> policy with regards to the abuse cases. For this I have to  
apologize to the
> whole net community.
> 

> On the other hand I am deeply concerned by the fact that the  
strongest
> opposition to the service didn't come from users but from network
> administrators. I don't think sysadmins have a god-given mandate to
> dictate what's good for the users and what's not. A lot of users  
have
> contacted me to thank me for the service, describing situations  
where
> anonymity has been crucial, but I could never have imagined in my  
wildest
> dreams. At the same time quite a few network administrators have  
made
> comments like "I can't imagine any valid use for anonymity on the  
net" and
> "The only use for anonymity is to harrass and terrorize the net".
> 

> Nevertheless, I really want to apologize both to all the users on  
the
> network who have suffered from the abusive misuse of the server,  
and to all
> the users who have come to rely on the service. Again, I take full
> responsibility for what has happened.
> 

> 	Julf
> 


Very sad, rather scary.  Sorry to hear this, Julf.

Joe




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Eric Hughes <hughes@soda.berkeley.edu>
Date: Tue, 23 Mar 93 12:32:42 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Idea
In-Reply-To: <9303221617.AA13744@tramp.cc.utexas.edu>
Message-ID: <9303232028.AA20325@soda.berkeley.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Jim writes:
>It is kind of ironic that a list which deals with the dispersal and
>protection of information only offers a single, inefficient, method for
>accessing that information.  

My main goal for cypherpunks is to get people to defend their own
privacy, rather than relying on someone else to provide it for them.
There were several different methods recently mentioned that allow
people to take control of their own email flow.  I would suggest that
all those who would rather have another way of accessing the list do
so on their own computers.

In addition to all the methods for handling mail mentioned before, the
remailer source code includes a rewrite of slocal in perl done by Hal
Finney.  Available from soda.berkeley.edu:pub/cypherpunks/remailer.

Eric




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: fergp@sytex.com (Paul Ferguson)
Date: Tue, 23 Mar 93 12:26:44 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Legal Net Monthly Newsletter
Message-ID: <F2VV1B6w165w@sytex.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


 
Opinion, editorial and news worthy submissions are currently being
(sought and) accepted for a new start-up electronic news journal.
This monthly compilation will be called 'The Legal Net Monthly
Newsletter' and will focus on the legal and ethical aspects of
computer networking. Legal Net Monthly will be a non-biased, open
forum electronic newsletter keeping in step with the networking
environment of the '90's and will be availble by E-Mail subscription.
 
Legal Net Monthly is aiming to release it's first issue on May 1st,
1993. Articles on the following topics are especially welcome:
 
        o   Defining "Criminal Mischief" on the Nets
        o   Authoring/Distributing Computer Viruses: Legal Implications
        o   Legislative news around the world
 
 
Send all sumissions, subscription requests and correspondence to:
fergp@sytex.com
 

Paul Ferguson                     |  "Sincerity is fine, but it's no
Network Integration Consultant    |   excuse for stupidity."
Centreville, Virginia USA         |                       -- Anonymous
fergp@sytex.com     (Internet)    |
sytex.com!fergp     (UUNet)       |
1:109/229           (FidoNet)     |
       PGP 2.2 public encryption key available upon request.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Duncan Frissell <76630.3577@CompuServe.COM>
Date: Tue, 23 Mar 93 12:08:48 PST
To: <cypherpunks@toad.com>
Subject: Re: HIDE: embedded msgs in grphics & snd
Message-ID: <930323195931_76630.3577_EHL41-1@CompuServe.COM>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>>>For exactly this reason, I don't think that this is a very good
>>>idea. The discussion here started as a search for a way to make
>>>encrypted data not look like encrypted data. (Once it becomes illegal).

I tell you three times, I tell you three times, I tell you three times...

The Feds are *not* going to outlaw encryption.  They believe in 
encryption.  They even have official bodies designed to encourage 
encryption.  They are not even going to outlaw encryption they can't 
break.  They are internally split on the issue.  By the time they got 
around to actually *doing* anything, we will have been online with a 
fully encrypted communications system for years.  

They can't move fast enough.  They lack the overall control of the 
networks to implement such a proposal.  There would be First Amendment 
challenges.  

In order for such regulation to be enacted, there would have to be a 
collective appreciation of the risk that encryption poses to the world's 
States (it risks their destruction but we won't tell them that).  This 
is too much of a high order abstraction for a collective decision making 
process to handle.  We've had powerful encryption techniques for a 
while in any case.  One-time pads are more than 100 years old, aren't 
they.  

"Publication" in the international realm is not subject to local laws in 
any case.  International publications routinely carry ads for goods or 
services that would be illegal to sell in the individual countries 
reached.  Sometimes a country like Singapore will censor a publication 
like the Asian Wall Street Journal.  Ridiculous since it can be read online.

Outlawing encryption is a form of censorship and censorship will prove 
increasingly difficult as time goes on.  If they can't keep crack 
cocaine out of Sing Sing, how can they keep PGP out of my computer (or 
computers under my control somewhere in the world). 

The enforcement problems are staggering.  What about sentencing.  What 
is the social damage involved in my sending my wife a 2.5K encrypted 
file.  Pretty petty offense.  Even if encryption was generally outlawed, 
anyone involved a privileged communication (spouses, attorney-client, 
physician-patient, priest-penitent, etc.) could continue to use the 
technology since assuring privacy is one of the technical requirements 
of exercising such a privilege.

Say, what if I as an attorney operate an anonymous remailer.  <G>  I 
know that privilege probably wouldn't attach because I wasn't a party to 
the communications but it would make for some entertaining litigation.  

No one has yet answered my legal question of several months ago.  If you 
have an unbroken coded message, how does the prosecutor prove beyond a 
reasonable doubt and to a moral certainty that it is a coded message.  
Even if it has identifying headers and footers, that say "PGP 2.2" you 
can claim that you just put them on to random noise for fun in order to 
tweak the noses of the authorities.     

Duncan Frissell








From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Hal <74076.1041@CompuServe.COM>
Date: Tue, 23 Mar 93 13:14:19 PST
To: CYPHERPUNKS <CYPHERPUNKS@toad.com>
Subject: REMAIL: Anon.penet.fi no
Message-ID: <930323210434_74076.1041_DHJ74-1@CompuServe.COM>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

> The anonymous service at anon.penet.fi has been closed down.

> But of course this political situation is mainly caused by the abuse of the
> network that a very small minority of anon users engaged in. This small
> group of immature and thoughtless individuals (mainly users from US
> universities) caused much aggravation and negative feelings towards the
> service. This is especially unfortunate considering these people really are
> a minuscule minority of anon users. The latest statistics from the service
> show 18203 registered users, 3500 messages per day on the average, and
> postings to 576 newsgroups. Of these users, I have received complaints
> involving postings from 57 anonymous users, and, of these, been forced to
> block only 8 users who continued their abuse despite a warning from me.

This is truly tragic.  Julf has endured weeks of attacks and now The
Powers That Be have managed to shut down this widely used service.

In the debates we've had here about anonymous posting, we have distinguished
two problems: volume abuse and content abuse.  Volume abuse is the use of
the remailers to send "mail bombs", excessivelly large or numerous messages
to an individual designed to fill his mailbox, or to similarly bombard
newsgroups with large numbers of messages.  Most of us have agreed that
this is a legitimate problem, and various mechanisms have been discussed
to address this.

Content abuse is more problematical; it basically refers to someone posting
a message whose contents someone else objects to.  The traditions of
freedom of speech and freedom of the press in the U.S. make it difficult
to argue in favor of restrictions based on message content.

Despite this, I have the impression that most of the objectionable messages
Johan refers to actually were objected to based on their content.  It's
not that people were bombarding newsgroups with excessive numbers of messages,
it's that they were posting things that (some) people didn't want them to
post.

It would be useful if Johan, after he has a chance to rest up a bit from
the recent political battles, could take the time to summarize information
about "abusive" posts.  To what extent are the problems due to message
contents, versus size or frequency, for example?  Are there any patterns
that can be gleaned about what material people most object to?  In particular,
it would be interesting to know whether there was material posted which was
arguably illegal versus just in bad taste (in someone's opinion).

This kind of information would be useful for the next time someone is
willing to brave the net censors and start another anonymous posting
service.

Hal

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.1

iQCVAgUBK69QWKgTA69YIUw3AQHl7gP9H4iOSInpXNnpC8UGlrUlIXyQAX5m5ude
5Gn8tK9qgo0QRpwCMyVnYf3W+5Zpr5GVZJ53TrArODwpqW49mfFg2NmAX3npq9jo
Bx9Etmhj2M0krJZ0WAF3TBTx/cmfrStBJA1+dpjeacjuGhAD7b8518TFqFRlGbRB
sIlEd6laEgA=
=FH2l
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Perry E. Metzger" <pmetzger@snark.shearson.com>
Date: Tue, 23 Mar 93 14:55:05 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: REMAIL: Anon.penet.fi no
In-Reply-To: <930323210434_74076.1041_DHJ74-1@CompuServe.COM>
Message-ID: <9303232205.AA07849@snark.shearson.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Hal says:
> 
> This is truly tragic.  Julf has endured weeks of attacks and now The
> Powers That Be have managed to shut down this widely used service.
[...]
> Despite this, I have the impression that most of the objectionable messages
> Johan refers to actually were objected to based on their content.  It's
> not that people were bombarding newsgroups with excessive numbers of messages
,
> it's that they were posting things that (some) people didn't want them to
> post.

Interesting, isn't it, that Ted Tso's nightmare about horrible
libelous or volume-bomb postings didn't come true, but my nightmare
about censorship seems to have.

They've succeeded this time, but I doubt that they will next time...

Perry




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: dmandl@shearson.com (David Mandl)
Date: Tue, 23 Mar 93 19:31:27 PST
To: extropians@gnu.ai.mit.edu
Subject: Call for Submissions: Autonomedia
Message-ID: <9303240019.AA22037@tardis.shearson.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Please feel free to distribute the following to anyone you think might be
interested.  Thanks.

--------------------------------------------------------------------

CALL FOR CONTRIBUTIONS

Dear Friends,

Autonomedia is preparing an anthology of essays and possible visual
material for a book (and electronic media) on the issues surrounding
communications, intellectual property, work, and new information
technologies.  We anticipate a publication date at the end of this year.

Among the many topics we hope to address:

The anti-copyright movement
State information-control mechanisms
"Plunderphonics" and sound sampling
Immediatism
Plagiarism
Cypherpunk and crypto anarchy
Hacking and cracking
The politics of "academic freedom"
Virtual prisons and digital leashes
Class struggle on the high-tech front
Phone sex and computer porn
Obsolescent media and "product"
The politics of mail art and free radio
Future tech
Network TV, cable, and narrowcasting
Laws and borders, globalism
Aesthetics of appropriation after post-modernism
Electronic banking, digital cash, the end of "money"
Visual imaging and electronic pictography
Virtual reality and electronic spectacularity
Data piracy: computer viruses, high tech luddism, etc.
Anonymity and digital identities
Genetics as commercial medium
Primitivism and the anti-technology movement
The legacy and future of phone phreaking
Body politics, angelic capital, mormons in space
Robots and computerized industrial production
Media ecology and media diets
Surveillance and popular defense
"Information economy"
Cybergnosis

This list is meant to be suggestive, not exhaustive.  Query us with
your suggestions as soon as possible.  We hope to make contact with
all possible contributors by the start of summer, with a final deadline
of October 1, 1993,  for submissions.  Wherever feasible, please send
submissions on computer disk (ASCII or any word processing format in any
platform) as well as by paper copy.

We appreciate any help you may be able to offer in this endeavor.

AUTONOMEDIA COLLECTIVE
P.O. Box 568
Williamsburg Station
Brooklyn, NY 11211-0568
USA

email: jafhc@cunyvm.cuny.edu or dmandl@shearson.com
Fax: 718-387-6471

--------------------------------------------------------------------




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Johan Helsingius <julf@penet.FI>
Date: Tue, 23 Mar 93 17:17:21 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: anon.penet.fi bites the dust
Message-ID: <9303232122.aa19890@penet.penet.FI>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Today I posted the attached message to various newsgroups. I still plan
to continue mail service, and my work on the alt.whistleblowers project.

	Julf


-----------

The anonymous posting service at anon.penet.fi has been closed down. Postings
to netnews and mail to arbitrary addresses has been blocked.

Mail to anonymous users will still be supported, so anon.penet.fi can be
used as an anonymous P.O.Box service.

Due to the lawsuit-intensive climate in the US, many anonymous services have
been short-lived. By setting up anon.penet.fi in Finland, I hoped to create
a more stable service. Anon.penet.fi managed to stay in operation for almost
five months. The service was protected from most of the usual problems that
had forced other services to shut down. But there are always going to be
ways to stop something as controversial as an anon service. In this case, a
very well-known and extremely highly regarded net personality managed to
contact exactly the right people to create a situation where it is
politically impossible for me to continue running the service.

But of course this political situation is mainly caused by the abuse of the
network that a very small minority of anon users engaged in. This small
group of immature and thoughtless individuals (mainly users from US
universities) caused much aggravation and negative feelings towards the
service. This is especially unfortunate considering these people really are
a minuscule minority of anon users. The latest statistics from the service
show 18203 registered users, 3500 messages per day on the average, and
postings to 576 newsgroups. Of these users, I have received complaints
involving postings from 57 anonymous users, and, of these, been forced to
block only 8 users who continued their abuse despite a warning from me.

In retrospect I realize that I have been guilty to keeping a far too low
profile on the network, prefering to deal with the abuse cases privately
instead of making strong public statements. Unfortunately I realized this
only a couple of days before being forced to shut down the service, but the
results of a single posting to alt.binaries.pictures.erotica.d gave very
positive results. I take full blaim for my failure to realize the
psychological effects of a strongly stated, publicly visible display of
policy with regards to the abuse cases. For this I have to apologize to the
whole net community.

On the other hand I am deeply concerned by the fact that the strongest
opposition to the service didn't come from users but from network
administrators. I don't think sysadmins have a god-given mandate to
dictate what's good for the users and what's not. A lot of users have
contacted me to thank me for the service, describing situations where
anonymity has been crucial, but I could never have imagined in my wildest
dreams. At the same time quite a few network administrators have made
comments like "I can't imagine any valid use for anonymity on the net" and
"The only use for anonymity is to harrass and terrorize the net".

Nevertheless, I really want to apologize both to all the users on the
network who have suffered from the abusive misuse of the server, and to all
the users who have come to rely on the service. Again, I take full
responsibility for what has happened.

	Julf





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: internaut@aol.com
Date: Wed, 24 Mar 93 01:17:51 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: FREE: warning to "sci" anonymous posters
Message-ID: <9303240415.tn73502@aol.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Sir,

I find the contents of your warning message (appended below) to be an
outrageous affront to the right of Freedom of Speech granted to all Americans
in the Constitution. In fact, if you take a moment to think globally, your
proposals are detrimental to the future freedom of all Citizens of the World.
I think that you *yourself* should be warned that there are many of us
watching your actions with great interest - and some of us have very long
memories when such repressive actions are considered. particularly vexing is
the idea that ANY anonymous mail might be censored - this might edit out
EXACTLY the voices of criticism that make out Nation and our Internet great.
Any newsgroup that can't accept the fundamental right anonymous posting
should have the option of IGNORING them, but not  removing them. People who
want to censor speech in such a knee-jerk way have no place in public with
other free people.

If the reasoned opinion of any upstanding Citizen of the Internet or the US
has any effect on your actions, I strongly urge you to stop this practice (if
you have begun using it) and to never, ever begin it (if you have not yet).

Someday you may want to vote in a US election. You'll probably want to cast a
secret ballot, won't you? This is only one small example of the fundamental
role of anonymity in our great Democracy. We don't need this brand of
"enforcement" example on the Internet, and we don't need berobed Ku Klux Klan
members lynching people to remind minorities to "behave." Erode these
freedoms, and you may one day be unable to cast a ballot without being
photographed and fingerprinted - it wouldn't be a very satisfactory way to
run a Democracy, would it? You might scoff at my example, but one can build a
mountain from many pebbles, and your action is a large chunk of stone in the
mountain of Thought Bondage.

I prefer to believe that you are a well-educated, thoughtful person who can
see the Orwellian Thought Control inherent in this idea. i refer to imagine
that you will not only reconsider such actions and vow to never follow those
censorial urges, but also actively persuade others of such restrictive
opinions to reconsider and stop their actions. A good Golden Rule to follow
is: "Don't limit anyone's Freedom of Speech or you might be next one to be
silenced!"

Do the Right Thing!

dave

>     As I promised yesterday, I emailed each recent anonomous poster
>in the "sci" hierarchy a note explaining what may happen this
>weekend.  
>
>Dick
>=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=
>Dear anonymous poster,
>
>     You may not be aware of the discussion in news.admin.policy
>concerning the propriety of posting anonymously to newsgroups which
>have not invited such postings.  As someone who has posted anonymously
>to the "sci" hierarchy recently, you should read it.
>
>     I am writing to inform you that if Julf, admin@anon.penet.fi,
>does not soon block anonymous postings to the "sci" hierarchy, then
>I will activate an "Automated Retroactive Minimal Moderation" script
>that will cancel postings to this hierarchy from his server.  This is
>intended to restore the pre-Julf status quo, at least temporarily,
>over the weekend.
>
>     Rest assured that there is nothing personal in this.  I have not
>read your postings, and I have no reason to believe that they were out
>of line in any way other than being anonymous.  I have nothing against
>anonymous postings to groups that have decided to accept such
>postings, nor do I object to any newsgroup deciding to do this.  I
>*do* object to Julf's permitting his server to post to newsgroups
>without any effort to determine whether the readers of those newsgroups
>want to permit anonymous postings.
>
>     You have several possible courses of action if you wish to post
>to the "sci" hierarchy while the "Automated Retroactive Minimal
>Moderation" is in effect:
>
>*1  convince Julf to accept the "Petersen Proposal" for default
>    settings for different hierarchies.  I promise to turn off the
>    ARMM script as soon as I hear that he will do this (or anything
>    reasonably responsive).
>
>*2  convince the readers of the newsgroup to which you want to post
>    that anonymous postings should be accepted in that newsgroup.
>    I can think of several valid reasons that may prompt such a desire,
>    but the decision should be made by the readers of the newsgroup, not
>    imposed by a single person such as Julf, or me.  I promise to
>    abide by whatever decision the newsgroup makes.  This does not
>    need to be a formal vote.  A straw vote with a clear majority will
>    suffice.
>
>*3  have a friend post for you, use a different anonymous server,
>    or, if all else fails, post under your own name.  People used to
>    do this, you know.  :-)
>
>    If none of these suit you, then simply be patient, and wait until
>Monday.  I intend to run ARMM, if I run it at all, for less than 48
>hours... this time.  This is merely intended to be a demonstration
>that an effective enforcement mechanism for blocking postings from a
>particular site can work.
>
>    I apologize in advance for any inconvenience this may cause you.
>My argument is with Julf and is about the default setting for entire
>hierarchies; it is not with you or your particular postings.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: ssandfort@attmail.com
Date: Tue, 23 Mar 93 21:08:24 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: anon.penet.fi bites the dust
Message-ID: <9303240508.AA10264@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text


_________________________________________________________________
             FROM THE VIRTUAL DESK OF SANDY SANDFORT
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Johan Helsingius (Julf) writes:

    ". . . a very well-known and extremely highly regarded
    net personality managed to contact exactly the right
    people to create a situation where it is politically
    impossible for me to continue running the service."

Excuse me.  Why aren't the names of the "net personality" and
"exactly the right people" given in this post?  Did they request
anonymity?

Of course, you wouldn't want to get them mad.  They might punish
you by . . . by, oh, I don't know . . . maybe shutting down your
anonymous remailers?  Couldn't have that, could we?

     S a n d y                         ssandfort@attmail.com

     "A slave is one who waits for someone else to free him."
                       -- Rosellen Brown --
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "John Coryell." <jcoryell%nwu.edu@UICVM.UIC.EDU>
Date: Sat, 27 Mar 93 01:43:04 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: your note on sci.crypt
Message-ID: <9303270942.AA06381@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Very nicely stated, Phil.

John Coryell.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Date: Wed, 24 Mar 93 15:14:22 PST
To: Cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Many Important Items in the News
Message-ID: <9303242312.AA07079@netcom.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain




I urge all Cypherpunks to keep up with what's happening in several newsgroups:

* alt.security.pgp and sci.crypt, for the latest in availability of PGP,
MacPGP, etc. Also, a debate over Dorothy Denning's ideas on key
registration and restrictions on crypto. (And for entertainment, David
Sternlight and our own Perry Metzger are duking it out. Sternlight caused
MacPGP to be pulled off the announced archive sites.)

* news.admin.policy, for the latest on Julf's shutdown of his anonymous
server, and for discussion of proposed successors. The whole shutdown is an
important topic--perhaps someday Julf will be able to tell the whole story.


Mention of the "Cypherpunks remailers" has been made in several
places....this may be a good time to a) prepare for a wave of new users, b)
be sure the code is solid and ready, and c) advertise the existence of the
remailers and which one are up, which ones require PGP, etc. 

And given that our systems are "even more anonymous" that Julf's was, the
abuses seen with his system will have to be faced on our systems. The
alleged abuses of Julf's system: supposedly a picture of a burn victim was
posted to one of the erotica groups (tacky in the extreme, but hardly
illegal or a threat), instructions on how to poison cats (also tacky but
not ipso facto criminal), etc. (I don't know what the culminating case was,
nor will I speculate.)

As we've talked about before, some folks may try to shut us down by
deliberately posting extremely controversial material.

There was also a major flamewar over the weekend when one Richard DePew
decided to initiate his "ARMM" ("Automated Retroactive Minimal Moderation")
program, which sent out "CANCEL" notices for anonymous messages posted to
certain groups. Very controversial, and a sign of things to come. (The
connection, if any, with Julf's shutdown remains unclear. Certainly the
whole issue of anonymous postings reached a head this past weekend.
Sternlight's threats about PGP may have been involved as well. Julf?)

(Cypherpunks remailers may want to change the "Nobody" and "Anonymous" tags
to names that are less screenable, less susceptible to censorship by
ARMM-type programs. Using a rotating list of fictional or historical names
may be an approach, but I'm sure we can think of many ways to bypass
ARMM-type cancellers.)

These are certainly interesting times.

-Tim May


--
Timothy C. May         | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,  
tcmay@netcom.com       | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
408-688-5409           | knowledge, reputations, information markets, 
W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA  | black markets, collapse of governments.
Higher Power: 2^756839 | Public Key: MailSafe and PGP available.





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: karn@qualcomm.com (Phil Karn)
Date: Wed, 24 Mar 93 18:57:35 PST
To: tcmay@netcom.com
Subject: Re:  Many Important Items in the News
Message-ID: <9303250255.AA11589@servo>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>(Cypherpunks remailers may want to change the "Nobody" and "Anonymous" tags
>to names that are less screenable, less susceptible to censorship by
>ARMM-type programs. Using a rotating list of fictional or historical names
>may be an approach, but I'm sure we can think of many ways to bypass
>ARMM-type cancellers.)

I'm not sure I like this idea. In my own discussions with people on
this issue, I've found that "filterability" (for lack of a better
term) overcomes *many* (if not all) of the standard objections to
anonymous email.

I see email anonymity as directly analogous to Caller-ID in the
telephone network. Historically, telephony and email have taken
competely opposite tacks on the caller privacy issue: telephone calls
have always been anonymous while the Internet has effectively had
"Caller ID" with no blocking.  Caller ID changes the former
assumption, while the anonymous remailer changes the latter.

A consensus seems to be emerging on Caller ID: it's a good thing,
*provided* there's a way to block it. In other words, the calling and
called parties must agree on whether or not the caller will identify
himself. If they don't agree, the call won't go through.

Because the Caller ID messages explicitly state when the caller's
number is blocked (as opposed to simply being unavailable for other
reasons), it would be straightforward to build a call filter box that
would disable your ringer and return an error message to any caller
that invokes caller ID blocking. ("I'm sorry, the number you have
reached will not accept anonymous calls. If you wish to reach this
party, please unblock caller ID and try your call again.")

I think this approach strikes an eminently reasonable balance between
the privacy interests of the two parties. Personally, I would not use
such a box unless I was actually having problems with anonymous crank
calls. But a single woman living alone might well feel differently.
The important thing is to let each individual make that decision for
him/herself, not to impose one policy on the entire world.

I think this is also exactly the right solution for email. The policy
for the Internet should be that anonymous email is perfectly okay as
long as it is clearly labeled as such. Then anyone who doesn't want to
receive it can automatically remove it from their incoming mail
without ever having to set eyes on it.

This allows anonymous email to flourish wherever the recipients
consent to receiving it, while it could not be used (for very long,
anyway) to harass a nonconsenting recipient.

More elaborate filters could be constructed that would accept
anonymous email only when it had been signed by certain specific RSA
keys. This would let consenting parties communicate by means of
pseudonyms, without having to open themselves up to anonymous
harassment from the entire net.

What do you think?

Phil




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Date: Wed, 24 Mar 93 21:24:49 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re:  Many Important Items in the News
Message-ID: <9303250523.AA15039@netcom.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Phil Karn comments on my proposal:

>>(Cypherpunks remailers may want to change the "Nobody" and "Anonymous" tags
>>to names that are less screenable, less susceptible to censorship by
>>ARMM-type programs. Using a rotating list of fictional or historical names
>>may be an approach, but I'm sure we can think of many ways to bypass
>>ARMM-type cancellers.)
>
>I'm not sure I like this idea. In my own discussions with people on
>this issue, I've found that "filterability" (for lack of a better
>term) overcomes *many* (if not all) of the standard objections to
>anonymous email.

A very good point. I was thinking more about the "ARMM"-style attacks and
not so much about the normal filters people might write to keep from seeing
anonymous posts.

So, anything we do to make it hard for a determined attacker (writing
ARMM-style filters), makes it even harder for casual users.

I guess the solution is to discourage global, ARMM-style filters (and
perhaps even look again, as a community, at digital sigs for postings, so
that only the author can cancel them).


-Tim May

--
Timothy C. May         | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,  
tcmay@netcom.com       | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
408-688-5409           | knowledge, reputations, information markets, 
W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA  | black markets, collapse of governments.
Higher Power: 2^756839 | Public Key: MailSafe and PGP available.





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: portwatson@firefly.rain.com (Port Watson Ltd)
Date: Thu, 25 Mar 93 03:02:30 PST
To: portwatson-info@firefly.rain.com
Subject: Tropical Libertaria
Message-ID: <m0nblsP-0004Y2C@firefly.rain.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



                    An Island in the Net...

Dear Freedom Lover,

     Do you yearn for freedom now?

     Do you ever daydream...plotting your daring escape from the
faceless bureaucrats and their idiotic edicts?
     
     Imagine, for a moment, your picture of "utopia"...a place
where you are free to be you...with friends and neighbors who share
your views on liberty, individualism, free thought and free
enterprise. 

     A place where the sun sets and rises on a locale of mutual
acceptance and intellectual emancipation...

     A place where your personal lifestyle is your business...

     Your very own private tropical paradise where freedom flows
gently through the palms like a tradewind breeze...

     Safe, secure, crime-free...yet fun and exciting...
     
     A place which has existed only in our hearts and minds...

...until now:

     We invite you to visit Port Watson where the quality of life
is our first concern...

     Located on Clove Cay, Exuma, Bahamas, Port Watson is being
created as an intentional community of Free-thinkers, Artists,
Writers, Cybernauts, Philosophers, Computer Professionals, Free-
Market Leaders, and other Interesting Individuals in the midst of
a true tropical island paradise surrounded by the best sailing,
fishing, and diving waters in the world! Conspicuous by their
absence are Cops, Jails, Tax Collectors, and Bureaucrats.

     Your neighbors will be adventuresome free-thinkers who
understand freedom and personal responsibility...

     Free-spirited intellectuals who share your vision of a
libertarian intentional community...

     People like YOU.
                      
     Picture yourself on a hammock between twin palms gently
swaying in the tradewinds' breeze beside a quiet lagoon as
sailboats glide gracefully by.  The water is light green, deep blue
and every imaginable hue in between, yet clear as glass down to the
sand dollars, starfish and colorful shells below...

     Or, if you seek the more active lifestyle, water sports abound
in the calm, clear seas surrounding Port Watson. The diving is
rated among the best in The Bahamas, which is to say the best in
the world, and yachtsmen the world over revere the waters for their
unsurpassed clarity and beauty and uninhabited white beaches. 

     Famous for its abundant fishing, being rich in Blue Marlin,
Bonefish, Tuna, Amberjack and Grouper, Port Watson is a true Deep
Sea Fisherman's dream.
     
     Make your next car a boat!
     
     Whether you plan to become a year-around resident, or decide
to build a vacation home, Port Watson is exclusive, private,
quiet...for the discerning few who know the value of ocean front
property...
     
     Port Watson at Clove Cay is a rare real estate opportunity
that you can visit, build your dream home on, vacation at, or live
forever with those you love. 

     In fact, the friendly new free-market government of The
Bahamas is encouraging your emigration...
     
     If you're an interesting person, chances are you fall under
the Group 4 Specialist Category, which means that you qualify for
permanent residence without giving up your U.S. citizenship...all
the benefits of Bahamian citizenship with all the comforts of home.

     The Bahamas - the perfect NO-TAX haven...
     
     No personal or corporate income tax, no sales tax, no capital
gains tax, no withholding tax, no business tax, no estate tax, no
gift tax, no inheritance tax, no death duties, no employment taxes,
no probate fees, (and, in the case of Port Watson, a generous
exemption from property tax.)

     Individuals, corporations (including nonresident-controlled
Bahamian corporations), partnerships, trusts, and estates can all
enjoy this immunity!

     And, there's more... 
     
     ...The Bahama's model bank secrecy laws are the envy of the
world...and the scourge of greedy bureaucrats. The Bahamian secrecy
laws are imposed on all Bank and Trust Companies, their directors,
officers, and employees, attorneys, and auditors. The Bahamas is
not a party to any tax or fiscal information-sharing agreements
(i.e., tax treaties) with any other country. Neither the IRS,
Revenue Canada, British Inland Revenue, nor any other foreign
principality or power can obtain information about a bank account
you may have in The Bahamas...Once you open an account in The
Bahamas, you are the only one who has the privilege to access it!

     Freedom isn't free, but we've made it as low cost as possible.

     Lots start at $20,000 at 10% down/10 years....owner financing
is available! All land sales and transfers are being handled by
Graham Thompson & Co., Sassoon House, Nassau, Bahamas.

     We have investigated the cost of materials and local labor,
and can recommend several styles of homes and building materials.
Using state-of-the-art building techniques and materials, your home
could be on-site and up in a matter of weeks.

     If you wish, we can arrange the rental of your vacation home
for you. Homes in the area currently rent from $150 to $300 per
night. If you elect to rent out your vacation home through us,
full-time caretakers are available to maintain your home and
grounds during your absence for a small fee, contingent upon
rental.  

     With an eye toward our goal of reasonable self-sufficiency,
co-ops are being encouraged to meet such needs as energy, food,
communications, etc., to ensure that Port Watsonians enjoy the
comforts of gracious high-tech living. Even co-op housing options
are available as a cost-saving alternative for the budget minded,
and our planned state-of-the-art satellite communications facility
will make telecommuting a comfortable reality for our residents.

     We've caught the attention and encouragement of such notables
as Peter Lamborn Wilson, author and editor of Semiotext(e), Robert
Anton Wilson, author of Prometheus Rising, et. al., and Dr. Mary
Ruwart, author of "Healing Our World: The  Other Piece of the
Puzzle," and Andre Marrou's first choice as Vice Presidential
running mate. As Dr. Ruwart expressed to us: "A libertarian
community, ESPECIALLY IN THE BAHAMAS, is a GREAT idea!"

     You see, Port Watson is an Idea Whose Time Has Come.

     For itinerary and more information contact Kevin Bloom, of
Port Watson Ltd, 303-442-6256 (11 AM to 6 PM Mountain Time) or
portwatson@firefly.rain.com or 74640.606@compuserve.com... 
     
     VISIT PORT WATSON, the intentional community at Clove Cay,
Exuma, Bahamas...AND LET THE ADVENTURE BEGIN!  

     Your Visit May Be Tax Deductible!

     This offer of freedom void where prohibited by law or similar
inanity.
                             
Sincerely Yours,
Benjamin Hamilton Power,
Secretary-Treasurer
Port Watson, Ltd.
portwatson@firefly.rain.com

-more-

Addendum:

     Having read this far, you have a pretty good idea of what
we're doing at Port Watson, and whether Port Watson sounds like the
place you've been looking for.

     We, of Port Watson, know that freedom is precious and
essential to personal growth and prosperity, and this philosophy is
central to our community. 

     We also know that freedom doesn't just "happen."  It must be
created...

     Indeed, we're turning dream into reality, and we're inviting
you to join us!

     Those of us who launched this project are totally committed to
its success, and will be living at Port Watson permanently.  We
beckon you to join us in this exciting adventure. Our model of
tolerance, personal liberty and intellectual freedom will be the
paradigm of the consummate intentional community...the very idea of
such an environment is attracting "just the right people," and we'd
like you to be among them. 

     In addition to having a social atmosphere conducive to
creativity and free trade, we are also developing an economic
environment which will help ensure the project's success. A system
of voluntary cooperatives is being encouraged to take care of such
needs as food, energy, communications, waste-management, consumer
goods and other staples, electronics, toys, education, banking and
investments, and so forth. Your participation in any or all of
these co-ops is, of course, completely voluntary.  Please inquire.

     One unique option being offered for those with an eye toward
budget is that of Alternative Co-op Housing. If you're not familiar
with Co-op housing, it works like this: Each family unit (or
individual) owns its own dwelling. This can be either an unattached
cottage or a condo style arrangement. Centrally located is a larger
building which holds a large kitchen, dining hall, and
living/entertaining area. Cooking duties are shared by Co-op
members on a rotational basis ...depending on the size of your Co-
op, your kitchen shift could occur as infrequently as once a
month...this alone makes Co-op housing extremely attractive.
Members of the Co-op housing group can also arrange for child-care
and home schooling options with other members. Co-op housing
members are able to pool their resources to create mega-workshops,
computer LAN systems, or whatever they desire. Co-housing offers a
genuine feeling of community at an affordable price, and is a
logical arrangement for those of you who may be coming on board as
a group. It is very popular in Denmark, and has enjoyed some
success in communities in the United States.

     If you prefer conventional housing, many different styles and
materials are obtainable locally, and labor is available in George
Town on nearby Great Exuma. 

     If you're looking for that special location to build a
vacation or retirement home, rest assured that Port Watson is the
place for you. Vacation homes rent for $150 to $300 per night in
this part of the world, and with the proper listing and promotion
many of those homes stay quite "busy." Your rental profits could be
deposited in your Bahamian bank account, if you so desire.

     Our planned state-of-the-art satellite communications facility
will provide for the transmission of voice/video/data, making
telecommuting a viable option for many residents of Port Watson,
especially writers and individuals involved in the development of
software products.  Most Port Watsonians are computer professionals
who have decided to break free from the bumper-to-bumper chain-gang
choosing, instead, the tranquility of a beach-front paradise as
their office.

     If you're an entrepreneur, many excellent opportunities exist
in the form of tourist concessions such as diving, boating,
windsurfing, fishing, food service, tavern, etc., in what is
basically virgin territory. Remember, your Bahamian bank account is
your business. Please inquire.

     We are eager to hear from you, and will gladly answer any
questions you may have. The prospects are exciting, paradise
awaits, and the time to embark is now...

     Our initial group will consist of fifty people, but in order
to meet our contractual obligations, we must have those fifty
people confirmed within the next sixty days.....so call now.

     Those addresses, again, are: 


     Kevin Bloom
     Voice 303-442-6256 (11 AM to 6 PM Mountain Time)
     CompuServe 74640,606
     CompuServe via Internet: 74640.606@compuserve.com
     or Internet: portwatson@firefly.rain.com

Some oft-asked questions:

Q: Are you starting your own country?
A: No, we are creating an intentional community on a beautiful
privately owned island.

Q: Where is Clove Cay?
A: Clove Cay is an island in the Brigantine Chain of The Bahamas,
which  parallels the Exuma Chain. It is a 15 minute boat ride from
Barreterre Island, which is connected by bridge to the northern tip
of Great Exuma. George Town is 45 minutes away by car.

Q: How do I get there?
A: Several airlines, including American Eagle (800-433-7300) and
Airway International (305-526-3852) have daily flights to George
Town from Miami or Ft. Lauderdale. Bahamasair (800-327-8080) flies
to George Town daily from Nassau. Hire a car from George Town north
to Barreterre at the tip of Great Exuma (about 45 minutes) and
onward by boat to Port Watson on Clove Cay (15-20 minutes.) A
representative of Port Watson is living on the island to host
visitors. Your stay will be quite enjoyable. Call Kevin Bloom at
303-442-6256 to make arrangements for your visit.

Q: Must I give up my U.S. citizenship to live at Port Watson?
A: No. U.S. citizens are allowed to stay for up to three months
almost automatically, and renewing is usually very easy. 
Professional skills are in demand in The Bahamas and can get you
Group Four Specialist classification which qualifies you for
Permanent Residence status. Entrepreneurs investing in new
businesses can also obtain permanent residence quite easily.

Q: Do I need a passport or visa to visit Port Watson?
A: U.S. citizens do not need a passport or visa to enter The
Bahamas. You will need two pieces of identification to re-enter the
United States, such as a valid driver's license and a voter
registration stub.

Q: Will we be under Bahamian jurisdiction?
A: Yes, but don't panic. The Bahamian government does not pester
privately owned islands. One of the most popular resorts, Abaco,
boasts of no police and no jails. There is very little crime in the
Out-islands and, because there are so few taxes, the government has
little reason to meddle in private affairs. The rule of thumb is
that the further away you get from the central government in
Nassau, the less interference you receive. The recently elected
government of The Bahamas leans very strongly toward free-market
principles and is dedicating itself to removing much of the
bureaucracy and restrictions put in place by the former Pindling
administration. Frankly speaking, the Bahamians like our project
and want us there. Taken together, all of these factors should lead
to an environment markedly freer of government interference than is
currently the case in the U.S. or much of the rest of the world.

Q: Are there homes already on the island?
A: There is one home and several out-buildings, all of which are
currently in use. 

Q: Is Port Watson, Ltd., acting as developer?
A: Port Watson, Ltd., is not a developer, per se, and is only
subdividing the island and making the lots available to interested 
persons. Each property owner is responsible for developing his or
her own property, including providing water, waste disposal, power,
phone service, and so forth. We are encouraging buyers to form
cooperatives to fill such needs, and are facilitating the formation
of such co-ops; participation by each property owner is strictly
voluntary.

Q: How long will it take for me to build my home?
A: With today's materials and techniques, your home could be up in
a few weeks.

Q: What about firearms?
A: Unfortunately, The Bahamas has gone the way of other
Commonwealth nations on that one...better leave them at home.
However, shotgun permits may be obtained. We have Bahamian
attorneys to help in such matters.

Q: Are medical facilities available?
A: Yes. The George Town Medical Clinic has two nurses and one
resident physician less than an hour away.  Also, the Bahamian
government keeps aircraft on standby for Out-island emergencies.

Q: What about drinking water?
A: Water catchment systems are the norm in the region, and are
generally found to be quite adequate. Also, you may wish to
consider joining or forming a desalination co-op. Port Watson,
Ltd., retains underground water rights to the island.

Q: What about energy?
A: Most homes in the Out-islands rely on small generators for their
electrical, and bottled gas for cooking. Wind and solar sources are
also becoming popular. You, and your neighbors, may wish to form an
energy co-op utilizing a larger, quieter, more efficient diesel
generator shared among several homes. 

Q: What about waste management?
A: We are encouraging the use of chemically assisted composting
toilets and other forms of recycling. Your participation in a waste
management and recycling co-op is strongly encouraged.

Q: How do I go about joining or forming a co-op?
A: Just let us know. We will put you in touch with other Port
Watsonians who share the same interests.

Q: What about currency?
A: U.S. currency is accepted everywhere, with a value of one to
one. Change is often given using both U.S. and the colorful
Bahamian currency.

Q: Where can I do my banking?
A: Both Barclay's Bank and the Bank of Nova Scotia have George Town
branches.

Q: The C.I.A. is directing microwaves at my brain in an attempt to
drive me insane, forcing me to wear a tin-foil lined bicycle helmet
at all times, even while sleeping. Will my situation improve if I
move to Port Watson?
A: No.

Q: What about my plastic?
A: The larger resort towns, such as Nassau and Freeport, accept all
major U.S., British, and continental credit cards, as do most
hotels in the Out-islands. Many shops, however, do not, so it's a
good idea to bring along travellers checks, just to be sure.

Q: How can I support myself on an island? Are any employment
opportunities available?
A: Port Watson offers many opportunities for entrepreneurs in the
form of tourist concessions and support services, as well as a 
planned telecommuting infrastructure ideal for computer
specialists, writers, and other information-age professionals. As
Port Watson grows, so will many other opportunities.

Q: Are there any restrictions on what I can do with my property?
A: Property owners are free to do as they wish with their property,
but may not take anything from or discharge anything onto
neighboring properties without the appropriate owners' permission.
On Clove Cay, property boundaries are clearly defined to prevent
any "tragedies of the commons." Buildings of greater than two
stories are discouraged. Let's all be aware of how our actions are
affecting our neighbors' sunlight, wind, views, etc. Of course, a
group of property owners is free to place voluntary contractual
restrictions on the use of their own properties, if they so desire.

NOTE: Take a look at our beautiful island! Digitized photographs
of Clove Cay are available on the Internet via anonymous ftp from
onion.rain.com (147.28.0.161) in the directory /pub/portwatson.





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Peter Honeyman <honey@citi.umich.edu>
Date: Wed, 24 Mar 93 22:06:35 PST
To: tcmay@netcom.com
Subject: Re:  Many Important Items in the News
Message-ID: <9303250606.AA17600@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


digital signatures for cancellation might allow "uncancellable"
messages, which has some attraction in the current climate.
(armm, macpgp muscled off of archives, the loss of pax and now penet.)

	peter




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: mccoy@ccwf.cc.utexas.edu (Jim McCoy)
Date: Wed, 24 Mar 93 23:26:25 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: A New Usenet...
Message-ID: <9303250724.AA25473@tigger.cc.utexas.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text


The automatic cancellation/censorship was the straw that broke this camel's
back.  I have had it with what I perceive as limitations in Usenet based
upon artifacts of a design that did not understand just how fast and large
it would become.  The time has come to rebuild that system.

No one else is going to do it if we don't, and no one will take into
consideration the distinct nature of privacy and expression in this medium
as much as the sort of people who are on this list.  The time has come for
a revolution.  I will take up the sword of my C compiler and the shield of
perl scripts alone if necessary, but I hope to find the cadre of network
visionaries and inspired hackers that are willing to help shape the next
generation of the Usenet.

Usenet is suffering from growing pains.  If you want to help shape it then
send me mail (I will set up an actual mailing list in the next day or two,
once I do so I will let people know.)  Even if you are not particularly
interested in working on this project, I am looking for a nice snappy name
(marketing, marketing, marketing.... :) and would love to hear suggestions.

Enough of the grand speeches though, here are a few things that I think
that need to be a part of the next usenet:

Multi-level news hierarchies:
	-Some are read-write, like the current usenet.  In these groups,
	identity has no real meaning (it is so trivial to fake postings now
	that I could not believe the indignation peopel seemed to feel
	about anonymous postings) and it functions much like the current
	usenet with only a few modifications (no cancel messages and a few
	other hacks to get people up to speed with the realities of modern
	communication) 

	-Read-only groups, similar to existing moderated groups, but
	moderation is authenticated using cryptographic techniques.

	-Read-mostly groups, in these groups thre exist moderators and a
	small group of people who are given the ability to post messages.
	Those who are given posting ability is determined by others in the
	group or some other agreed upon method.  This is mostly for
	technical and scientific groups where the purpose is to maintain a
	very high signal-noise ratio.  The function of the moderators is to
	provide minimal guidance regarding topics and to provide an
	editorial gateway through which people who are not members of the
	group could post questions or comments.

MIME and crypto authetication built into messages.
	-only the poster or moderator (if there is one) could cancel a
	message 
	-people are identified only by thier key and not by any particular
	email address.  the news server itself can serve as a gateway to
	get messages to people who post an article (and can include the
	basics of the anonymous remailers to preserve poster anonymity if
	desired

Any other idea out there?  Let me know.  The only limitation I can see at
the moment on the scope of ideas is that it needs to be backward compatible
with the existing system; this makes it much easier to implement and have a
wide ranging audience from day one.

Comments?

jim



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "DrZaphod" <ncselxsi!drzaphod@ncselxsi.netcom.com>
Date: Thu, 25 Mar 93 07:41:33 PST
To: CypherPunks@toad.com
Subject: Re:  Many Important Items in the News
Message-ID: <5659.drzaphod@ncselxsi>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


     I think we need to gear our remailers more towards pseudonymous
communication.  I agree with Phil Karn when he says mailer filters will
eventually be capable [and widespread] as to filter by RSA public-key so as
to only need one anonymous acct... But for now I believe we need to open up
more pseudonymous remailers such as penet, with an anonymous option.
     There may be legal trouble upon action of this suggestion, and all the
better to bring attention to our cause.. assuming we can get enough people
to start this type of remailer.

(Phil Karn) writes:

>More elaborate filters could be constructed that would accept
>anonymous email only when it had been signed by certain specific RSA
>keys. This would let consenting parties communicate by means of
>pseudonyms, without having to open themselves up to anonymous
>harassment from the entire net.
-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-
- DrZaphod                #Don't Come Any Closer Or I'll Encrypt!   -
- [AC/DC] / [DnA][HP]     #Xcitement thru Technology and Creativity -
- [drzaphod@ncselxsi.uucp]#     [MindPolice Censored This Bit]      -
-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: internaut@aol.com
Date: Thu, 25 Mar 93 04:50:36 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: ANON: Anon.penet.fi no more
Message-ID: <9303250649.tn83751@aol.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>>> The anonymous service at anon.penet.fi has been closed down.

This is a dark day indeed. The forces of Repression are upon us yet again.

OK, where do we set up the next one? I guess the solution here is to have a
floating set of difficult-to-detect anon remailers and switch between them
regularly.

Someday, when I can afford the hardware, I vow to provide this service and
not be harrassed into shutting down. Toward this end, it would be great if
Julf could post a list of the sys admin's who were instrumental in shutting
down penet.fi. I think all of us should be made aware of their presence for
future reference.

And now, Upward!

  dave




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: edgar@spectrx.Saigon.COM (Edgar W. Swank)
Date: Thu, 25 Mar 93 09:44:17 PST
To: Cypherpunks          <cypherpunks@toad.com>
Subject: REMAIL:  Whence Remailers?
Message-ID: <gD7y1B7w165w@spectrx.saigon.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


With the unfortunate recent forced demise of the penet.fi
remailer,  The Cypherpunks remailers now seem to be the
only holdouts.  So where do we go from here?  Is anyone
feeling intimidated yet?

Chael Hall has implemented an "--ignore--" kill line in his
remailer, which I have verified works.  I wish you other
remailer operators (except Miron Cuperman) would adopt
that hack into your own remailers.  You also might help
Chael integrate PGP into his remailer; he says he's having
problems.

Another feature I've asked for is ability to post to newsgroups
through the remailers.  With the demise of penet.fi, this becomes
more urgent.  I've been told that one can post anonymously by
using Cypherpunks remailers in conjunction with a non-anonymous
e-mail server newsgroup poster like ucbvax.berkeley.edu.

The instructions I've received say to

Send to, e.g., sci-crypt@ucbvax.berkeley.edu to post to sci.crypt.

But what about newsgroups which contain dashes in the name, such
as "rec.video.cable-tv"; how does one encode the ucbvax address
for those.  Anyone who knows, please post or send e-mail.

But adding code to the current remailers to post instead of
mail by using say,

  ::
  Request-Reposting-To:  [newsgroup]

should be pretty easy, shouldn't it??

--
edgar@spectrx.saigon.com (Edgar W. Swank)
SPECTROX SYSTEMS +1.408.252.1005  Silicon Valley, Ca





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: david@staff.udc.upenn.edu (R. David Murray)
Date: Thu, 25 Mar 93 07:50:58 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re:  Many Important Items in the News
Message-ID: <9303251547.AA23456@staff.udc.upenn.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Phil Karn suggests that the ability for potential recipients to block
anonymous mail is important.  I agree.

If you don't mind a few comments from someone who has been lurking until
now . . . 

If, as Tim May says, the cyphperpunks anonymous remailers have been
mentioned more widely, it may be time for the cypherpunks to 'go public'. 
I suspect, from the traffic on news.admin.policy (which I just read a bunch
of) that things would have been less acrimonious if Julf had chosen to
respond to admin complaints and been seen to be clearly working toward a
mutually acceptible solution.  I understand (I think) why he chose not
to, but if news.admin.policy starts talking about cypherpunk remailers,
then, based on what we learned from Julf's experience (thanks
Julf, and sorry it turned out the way it did, and happy it wasn't worse)
I don't think we can afford to remain silent.  I suspect that even if Julf
had been participating in that discussion he still would have been shut
down, but it might have taken longer, and people might (/might/)
understand his/our position better.

I suggest we be proactive about 'anonymous call blocking', and prepare
information sheets and code to make it easy for people who choose to do
so to block anonymous mail/postings, and at the appropriate time publish
these widely.

Perhaps a member with an effective writing style (Tim?) could prepare a
'position paper' explaining our position.  Of course, talk of Anarchy
would be a little much, so the problem would be what to include . . . 

An argument that might appeal to the control freaks is that anonymous
remailers are inevitable, and it would be better to codify it and
provide mechanisms for 'anonymous message blocking' than to have to deal
with it anew each time someone new starts up an anonymous service.

The biggest problem I see is that a number of Julf's supporters pointed
to the fact that penet anonymous users could be sent email, just like a
regular net id, and had a sysadmin who could block them for bad
behaviour, just like a regular net id.  Cypherpunk remailers do away
with that, and that could be a hard sell.  The danger of asking
news.admin.policy in on a standardization discussion is that they could
decide this level of 'accountability' was required and get really nasty
about anything else.

I hope others have some better ideas about how to prepare for what comes
next.  The one clear thing is that we have a lot to learn from Julf's
experience.  Anyone interested in the future of anonymity on the net who
has not read through some of the postings on news.admin.policy should do
so.

-- 
david			david@staff.udc.upenn.edu




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Marc Horowitz <marc@GZA.COM>
Date: Thu, 25 Mar 93 08:20:41 PST
To: Peter Honeyman <honey@citi.umich.edu>
Subject: Re: Many Important Items in the News
In-Reply-To: <9303250606.AA17600@toad.com>
Message-ID: <9303251618.AA01313@dun-dun-noodles.aktis.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>> digital signatures for cancellation might allow "uncancellable"
>> messages, which has some attraction in the current climate.

What's uncancellable?  If someone starts abusing things with
"uncancellable" messages, then the USENET backbone gets together and
stops passing these "uncancellable" messages from site to site.  The
messages will die very quickly, I assure you.  If you change the
names/message ids/whatever, then *all* such messages will end up
getting nuked.  Our protection here is that the backbone sites have
proven in the past to be very strong supporters of speech.  If that
changes, we have worse problems.

>> (armm,

USENET would fall apart without the ability to cancel messages.

>> macpgp muscled off of archives

Huh?  I don't care how many and whose signatures you put on something.
When the guy who owns the disk wants it to go away, it will.

>> the loss of pax and now penet.)

Same as above.  When the network provider decides to remove the
connection for whatever reason, it's gone.


I'm all in favor of technological solutions when appropriate.  And I
think that the use of ARMM on sci.* when there was no substantial
reason was irresponsible and wrong.  However, I don't think problems
like volume abuse can be solved by purely technical means.

When some bonehead starts putting megabytes of noise on sci.crypt, I
want to be able to cancel his messages.  Don't give me lines about
user filtering; The best user agent in the world isn't going to make
my net connection any bigger.  I don't have the net bandwidth at my
site to suck over megabytes of trash in order to ignore it until it
expires.

		Marc




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Peter Honeyman <honey@citi.umich.edu>
Date: Thu, 25 Mar 93 08:56:27 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Many Important Items in the News
Message-ID: <9303251656.AA00930@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


marc, if article cancellation is made cryptographically secure, there
is the possibility that articles can be made uncancellable.  of course,
if there is some wild card that allows the backbone cabal to cancel
articles remotely and after the fact, then i suspect usenet will remain
vulnerable to forged cancellation messages.  but maybe not.

i see your point about backbone admins refusing to traffic in certain
kinds of messages, but as a veteran of usenet from before it was even
called usenet, i assure you that other admins would quickly fill in the
gaps in connectivity.  this has happened many times.

i don't agree, btw, that we can rely on the backbone admins to be very
strong supporters of speech, nor should we.

as for "the guy with the disk" wanting macpgp to go away, that's not
what happened here.  everyone i've talked to that has a direct role in
the decision agrees that there is a valid research and education
function served by distributing macpgp.  ah well, sometimes the dragon
wins.

and regarding the network providers decision to pull penet's plug, i
believe this decision was based principally on the opinion of ... how
did julf put it?  ... oh yes, "a very well-known and extremely highly
regarded net personality"  (i doubt that i would regard him as a strong
supporter of free speech, btw).  i suspect that when we get to the
bottom of this, we'll discover that many people's interests were being
represented without their knowledge, assent, or agreement.

regarding your comments about net abuse and megabytes of trash, i agree
that we need to brainstorm and find ways to address these problems.
i am optimistic that technical solutions hold a lot of promise; it's just
a matter of discovering them.  let's put our shoulder to the wheel!

	peter




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Joe Thomas <jthomas@access.digex.com>
Date: Thu, 25 Mar 93 09:19:42 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Distributed anonymous posting (was Re: Many Important Items...)
Message-ID: <Pine.3.05.9303251227.A7954-d100000@access.digex.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
 
Tim May writes:
 
> Phil Karn comments on my proposal:
> 
> >>(Cypherpunks remailers may want to change the "Nobody" and "Anonymous"
tags
> >>to names that are less screenable, less susceptible to censorship by
> >>ARMM-type programs...
 
> >I'm not sure I like this idea. In my own discussions with people on
> >this issue, I've found that "filterability" (for lack of a better
> >term) overcomes *many* (if not all) of the standard objections to
> >anonymous email.
 
> A very good point. I was thinking more about the "ARMM"-style attacks and
> not so much about the normal filters people might write to keep from seeing
> anonymous posts.
 
We may be getting ahead of ourselves here.  Because of design decisions in
the cypherpunk remailers, I think they'd be a poor infrastructure for
anonymous Usenet posting.  Anonymous posting has been around as long as
Usenet, in the form of forged messages.  The most important service Julf's
remailer provided was a _return_path_ for replies, something cypherpunk
remailers take deliberate steps to destroy.  If one of the cypherpunk
remailers suddenly decided to implement anonymous Usenet posting as-is, I
think ARMM II would be the least of its problems.
 
I have been working through a few ideas for the design of a _distributed_
anonymous posting service, in which the loss of one machine would not
destroy all return addresses at that machine, nor compromise the return-
path database.  A handful of penet-style servers who share their return-
address databases (kept updated through an encrypted e-mail protocol,
perhaps) act as a Usenet "front-end" for posting.  But their databases
contain encrypted SASE paths through several cypherpunk remailers, instead
of normal return addresses.  Messages posted through any of the front
ends could be sent to the same user-name at any of the other front-end
machines, since they keep the same databases.  In order to assure that SASE
return path is robust, despite an environment in which remailers may be
shut down at any time, secret sharing might be used for remailer private
keys.  When a remailer went down, a quorum of the remaining remailer
operators would nominate a site to replace it, and send the "pieces" of the
lost remailer's secret key to the replacement site's administrator.  The
remaining remailers would adjust their "routing tables" so mail whose next
hop should be to the lost remailer is sent to its replacement instead.
 
The best part is that all of this would be transparent to the Usenet user,
who would just see a penet-style return address, along with a note in the
automatically appended signature that said that "if mail to an1234@foo.com
bounces, just try an1234@bar.uk or baz.fi," or whatever.
 
No doubt there are some problems with this scheme (traffic analysis attacks
on the SASE paths if the front-end database is compromised, etc.) that need
to be addresssed, but I offer it as a preliminary idea for a replacement
service whose stability would not be subject to the whims of any one site
or network connection.
 
> I guess the solution is to discourage global, ARMM-style filters (and
> perhaps even look again, as a community, at digital sigs for postings, so
  that only the author can cancel them).
 
Agreed.  This could even be implemented into today's news structure.  Old
servers would continue to blindly heed all cancel messages, while the new
software would verify PEM-style signatures, possibly as a header field.
And if a cabal of prudish newsadmins wanted to let each other cancel those
offensive anonymous articles at their sites, they could simply tell their
software to accept cancels signed by cabal-members' keys.  I don't see how
anyone could oppose this.
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.2
 
iQCVAgUBK7Hk7Iwu6QoBw6rbAQF5owQAlfXjo8G+cKiSVEbfIBAXIAsmTJkBLcAH
OhCzyXZXyCKeH5J8yB9cgTgpCsxQCdBgQLsW2aqvyWaVgMX4rXvjx6vqYbm4BW5p
9OQ6YhLI17zArrqPPsyzbYYHwUXXY2vYEWAmFXNhYBv9r4vbbT3IqPJgCTKltShA
5ho53DEkIRA=
=6q8R
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

--
Joe Thomas <jthomas@access.digex.com>
PGP key available by request or by finger.
PGP key fingerprint:  1E E1 B8 6E 49 67 C4 19  8B F1 E4 9D F0 6D 68 4B







From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Hal <74076.1041@CompuServe.COM>
Date: Thu, 25 Mar 93 10:19:34 PST
To: <cypherpunks@toad.com>
Subject: Re: Many Important Items in the News
Message-ID: <930325181131_74076.1041_FHD33-1@CompuServe.COM>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Responding to Phil Karn's proposal that anonymous mail should be clearly 
marked as such:
 
The only thing I object to in this is that it implicitly gives up one of 
the strongest arguments in favor of anonymity/pseudonymity, which is 
that there is already no way to verify identities on the net.  In Phil's 
analogy with Caller ID, where the net is said to already be a "Caller 
ID" environment, the thing to realize is that the "ID's" are not 
necessarily accurate.  To a large extent, identity on the net is an 
illusion.  Pseudonymous remailers like Julf's should be seen as a 
natural extension of net culture.
 
This situation is only going to become more extreme as the net continues 
to move beyond its original, relatively controlled, community of large 
universities and government research labs, to include the general 
public.  As more and more "Free Net", Public Access, and BBS systems 
become part of the internet, there is either going to have to be a 
massive and universal crackdown on identity verification, which I think 
is unlikely, or else there is going to have to be acceptance that net 
identity doesn't necessarily correspond to real names.  (I myself have 
had email-capable accounts in three names besides my own on various 
systems.)
 
Granted, this argument did not persuade the facist forces which forced 
the shutdown of Julf's remailer, but that doesn't invalidate it.  Julf's 
remailer was not shut down due to reasoned disagreement and a consensus 
that it was wrong; rather, its shutdown was (as far as is known so far) 
a demonstration of raw power by some person or small group.
 
 
Responding to Marc Horowitz's point about problems with the idea of 
uncancellable messages:
 
Marc raises the issue of volume abuse.  I think it's important to note 
that, as far as I know, the Penet postings which people complained about 
where NOT examples of volume abuse.  The objections to these messages 
were based on their contents.  (In some cases, people objected to some 
messages not because of their contents or their volume, but simply 
because they were "anonymous"!)
 
I realize that Marc was addressing the issue of uncancellable messages 
in general, not specifically with regard to anonymous messages.  I am 
not an expert on news software but reading the debate on this issue in 
news.admin.policy it appears that the current system is far too lax in 
allowing cancel messages.  It appears to be very easy to cancel postings 
made by someone else.  This led to De Pew and his cancel daemon, which 
itself led to counter-threats for cancel daemons to be activated against 
De Pew and other posters from his site.  All this points to design flaws 
in the cancel mechanism.
 
I do think that it would be appropriate to put more restrictions on 
cancel messages, and digital signatures could play a part in this.  
Perhaps Marc's concern about payment for volume abuse could be dealt  
with by some limitations on large postings.  I don't really know how 
Marc (or anyone) distinguishes between a 100K byte junk file in 
sci.crypt and a 100K byte file in alt.graphics.misc which he might find 
equally uninteresting and for which he has to pay equally.  Maybe he's 
only reading sci.crypt?  In that case perhaps a solution would be for 
the news transfer software to be enhanced to allow some filtering.
 
Hal
74076.1041@compuserve.com
 
P.S. Edgar asks about the mail-to-news gateway at ucbvax.berkeley.edu.
Recently I saw postings indicating that this gateway had shut down.
If anyone has information on mail-to-news gateways please post it here.





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: karn@qualcomm.com (Phil Karn)
Date: Thu, 25 Mar 93 13:51:17 PST
To: david@staff.udc.upenn.edu
Subject: Re:  Many Important Items in the News
Message-ID: <9303252149.AA17207@servo>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I agree. It's time to take mail anonymity into the mainstream. There
are plenty of legitimate reasons for anonymity, as the Caller ID
debate shows.

I think an enlightened approach that eschews a single, network-wide
policy on the acceptability of anonymous messages in favor of leaving
it up to the individual email recipient is something that we could
sell to the Internet as a whole. We shouldn't have to treat this as a
confrontational either-or issue when there's a third way out that
balances everybody's interests.

Phil






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: tribble@memex.com (E. Dean Tribble)
Date: Fri, 26 Mar 93 00:38:23 PST
To: julf@penet.FI
Subject: anon.penet.fi bites the dust
In-Reply-To: <9303232122.aa19890@penet.penet.FI>
Message-ID: <9303252216.AA03597@memexis.memex.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


	 ways to stop something as controversial as an anon service. In this case, a
	 very well-known and extremely highly regarded net personality managed to
	 contact exactly the right people to create a situation where it is
	 politically impossible for me to continue running the service.

I would really like to know who the person is or why I can't be told.
Did they put pressure on you to keep it quiet?  Did they hold a gun to
your head?

	 a minuscule minority of anon users. The latest statistics from the service
	 show 18203 registered users, 3500 messages per day on the average, and

This is impressive.

	 In retrospect I realize that I have been guilty to keeping a far too low
	 profile on the network, prefering to deal with the abuse cases privately
...I apologize to the
	 whole net community.

Let me rephrase: You took a long step towards providing true privacy
on the net and it worked so well that people wanted to stop you.
You've shut down, but come out of it with lots of experience with
running such a service, lots of good publicity (and some bad stuff),
lots of new uses to which people put that sort of anonymity to, and
some really good ideas for how to make these systems succeed
politically (the being very visible thing).  Though the outcome isn't
optimal, it sure sounds like an impressive success to me.
Congratulations.

Now I hope you will follow up this experiment with a write-up to
document the things you learned (positive and negative), and your
recommendations on how to do the next one.

dean

PS and if you can't tell us about the politics of the shutdown, I'm
sure there's someone else in the know that can publish it anonymously
so you won't have to :-)




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: A.J. Janschewitz <ajay@holonet.net>
Date: Thu, 25 Mar 93 17:35:18 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: New key
Message-ID: <9303260129.AA17624@holonet.net>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Mess-DOS struck again. My PGP directory got scrunged, so any servers and
individuals who may have added my PGP public key that I posted last month
have it wrong. My error.

Sorry about that. My *new* key, which can be easily identified as the
proper one by noting that my moribund psilink account is not on it, is
available via fingering me ajay@holonet.net.

Listfolks please note and remove my old key. Again, sorry.

==a.j.== 


-- 
Persons attempting to find a motive in this narrative will be prosecuted;
persons attempting to find a moral in it will be banished; persons attempting
to find a plot in it will be shot. -Mark Twain, used w/o permission 
                                    by ajay@holonet.net




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: david@staff.udc.upenn.edu (R. David Murray)
Date: Thu, 25 Mar 93 14:58:57 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re:  Many Important Items in the News
In-Reply-To: <9303252149.AA17207@servo>
Message-ID: <9303252255.AA08705@staff.udc.upenn.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Phil Karn writes:
> I think an enlightened approach that eschews a single, network-wide
> policy on the acceptability of anonymous messages in favor of leaving
> it up to the individual email recipient is something that we could
> sell to the Internet as a whole.

You know, what we might to do is figure out a first cut position, and
then set up a mock debate.  Have some members 'role-play' vociforous
opponents of nyms.  That way we might be able to work out in
advance good counter arguments for the nastiest objections any of us can
think of.  I'm sure the /real/ ojectors will come up with stuff we
don't, but at least it would give us a leg up.  I think I'd recommend
setting this up as a formal 'game', with all participants adopting nyms
to keep the argumentation distinct from normal discourse.  Even if it
was done on a separate mailing list.  See, another good use for nyms
<grin>.

-- 
david			david@staff.udc.upenn.edu




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: jb@paris7.jussieu.fr
Date: Thu, 25 Mar 93 09:01:37 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: ARMM?
Message-ID: <0096a0bf.8fb237b2.4300@paris7.jussieu.fr>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Hi,

What's ARMM or whatever it's called?
Thanx,
jb




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Arthur Abraham <a2@well.sf.ca.us>
Date: Thu, 25 Mar 93 18:41:52 PST
To: internaut@aol.com
Subject: Re:  FREE: warning to "sci" anonymous posters
Message-ID: <199303260240.AA10751@well.sf.ca.us>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Dear internaut@aol.com,

I note that the quoted posting, threatening use of an
"Automated Retroactive Minimal Moderation" to "restore the
pre-Julf status quo" is anonymous.  I assume you know the
identity of this poster...how delicate of you to conceal it.

-a2.





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Arthur Abraham <a2@well.sf.ca.us>
Date: Thu, 25 Mar 93 19:01:42 PST
To: tcmay@netcom.com
Subject: Re:  Many Important Items in the News
Message-ID: <199303260259.AA16986@well.sf.ca.us>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


"Consenting adults" should be able to do whatever they want -- your
comments go to obtaining consent for anonymity.

Since on my good days I try to act like an adult, I support the truth
in labeling of anonymous postings as anonymous postings.

-a2.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: ggoebel@sun1.ruf.uni-freiburg.de (Garrett Goebel)
Date: Thu, 25 Mar 93 10:24:46 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Add Me to the List
Message-ID: <9303251823.AA19435@sun1.ruf.uni-freiburg.de>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text


I have tried many a time, to send mail
asking to subscribe to cypherpunks-request@toad.com

I have never received any list mail.

I think I have been added to the announce list...
but I would greatly appreciate it if someone 
would add me on to the main list.  

thanks,

-- 
C. Garrett Goebel
<ggoebel@sun1.ruf.uni-freiburg.de>



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: karn@qualcomm.com (Phil Karn)
Date: Thu, 25 Mar 93 21:02:14 PST
To: tcmay@netcom.com
Subject: Re:  Many Important Items in the News
Message-ID: <9303260500.AA17758@servo>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Absolutely -- "Consenting adults" is the key phrase here. I think we
should stress it in everything we do as cypherpunks.

This profound concept once made it as far as an important Supreme
Court majority decision. But that was a long time ago. Look how far
downhill we've gone since then.

Phil




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Marc.Ringuette@GS80.SP.CS.CMU.EDU
Date: Thu, 25 Mar 93 20:14:24 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: REMAIL: cypherpunks strategy
Message-ID: <9303260414.AA12167@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


We must address a strategy question before it jumps on us.  Do we want to be
yet another "this remailer exists, let's stomp on it" whipping boy, or will
another tactic be more effective?

I have the following suggestion.  Do not announce our cypherpunks remailers
right away.  This is not the right time.  Instead, announce that we intend,
at a later date, to install remailers which are "friendly" in the sense that
they use a special header line, but which will be not be able to be shut down.

[ My suggestion for how to do this:  encourage thousands of users who
support anonymity to run the software, and make it easy for them to
do so.  Then, thousands of users must be kicked out in order to prevent
remailers being available! ]

But, here's the important part, DELAY RELEASE until after a waiting period.
The delayed release is intended to allow concerned network sites and
individuals to install filters for these messages, and to allow users the
time to discuss this (and, for instance, to voice their objections to
catch-all anonymity filters at the news-relay level).  It also prevents
our opponents from achieving a sense of "something must be done" urgency.

My goal is to push a particular policy -- remailers which add a header line
and end-user filtering based on that header line -- as an interim solution
until more sophisticated techniques come into use.  Discussion is also
welcomed on exactly what kind of setup we should be trying to encourage.
This is my current cut at it.


-- Marc Ringuette (mnr@cs.cmu.edu)




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Eric Hughes <hughes@soda.berkeley.edu>
Date: Thu, 25 Mar 93 23:11:23 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: ANON: Anon.penet.fi no more
In-Reply-To: <9303250649.tn83751@aol.com>
Message-ID: <9303260707.AA22600@soda.berkeley.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>Someday, when I can afford the hardware, I vow to provide this service and
>not be harrassed into shutting down. 

They won't harrass you, they'll harrass your connectivity provider.

To this end, it would be beneficial to collect connectivity policies
in the face of complaints from the major service providers.  Alternet,
for starters, and all the others I'm not really familiar with.

I learned a couple of weeks ago that Sprint is now offering IP
connectivity direct.  I would guess that Sprint has a good track
record from being in the long distance business for not telling their
customers to go away because someone they are talking to doesn't like
what they are saying.

To wit: who can I buy IP from who will not disconnect me unless I
don't pay?

Eric




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Eric Hughes <hughes@soda.berkeley.edu>
Date: Thu, 25 Mar 93 23:15:24 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Many Important Items in the News
In-Reply-To: <9303251618.AA01313@dun-dun-noodles.aktis.com>
Message-ID: <9303260711.AA22802@soda.berkeley.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>USENET would fall apart without the ability to cancel messages.

Potential imminent death of the Usenet predicted!

Usenet has survived lots worse than anonymous flamers.

Eric




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Eric Hughes <hughes@soda.berkeley.edu>
Date: Thu, 25 Mar 93 23:30:20 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Distributed anonymous posting (was Re: Many Important Items...)
In-Reply-To: <Pine.3.05.9303251227.A7954-d100000@access.digex.com>
Message-ID: <9303260725.AA23290@soda.berkeley.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>Anonymous posting has been around as long as
>Usenet, in the form of forged messages.  

This is an excellent point of rhetoric.  Perhaps we should teach mail
and news forgery as a technique to the defense of privacy?   1/2 :-)

>I have been working through a few ideas for the design of a
>_distributed_ anonymous posting service, 

>[...] secret sharing might be used for remailer private keys.

I have convinced myself that some form of secret sharing will be
necessary for a distributed system that is robust against single point
failure.  You don't want single point manipulability, either, if you
can get it.

There are two basic ways to proceed: hard nodes, difficult to take
down, or soft nodes, easy to reconfigure around.  Both approaches
should be looked at.

Hard nodes are more difficult politically; soft nodes are more
difficult technically.

A soft node necessity: a directory lookup service, distributed,
sharing data.  Merely specifying the first point of contact and
alternate paths doesn't cut it.  You don't want to have to retry a
bounced message so many times.

Who here knows enough about sendmail to consider the eventual
feasibility of integrating pseudonym lookup into mail transfer?

Eric




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Eric Hughes <hughes@soda.berkeley.edu>
Date: Thu, 25 Mar 93 23:37:02 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Many Important Items in the News
In-Reply-To: <9303252149.AA17207@servo>
Message-ID: <9303260732.AA23550@soda.berkeley.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>I think an enlightened approach that eschews a single, network-wide
>policy on the acceptability of anonymous messages in favor of leaving
>it up to the individual email recipient is something that we could
>sell to the Internet as a whole. 

It would help if there existed some filter software that automatically
installed itself in a user's .forward and filter out anonymous posts
(and nothing else).  Such a tool should be written in nothing more
than shell scripts and grep, for the absolute widest in portability.
(Not even perl, which, believe it or not, is not yet universally
available.)

Were such a utility posted to alt.sources, and if all a user had to do
was ftp it from an archive, unpack it, and run it once, we would be in
a much better position politically, (even if the utility received very
little use).

It is difficult to install mail filters.  Our argument for user
filtering would be much stronger if installation were simple.

A similar argument holds for anonymous posting filters in a global
KILL file.

Eric






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Eric Hughes <hughes@soda.berkeley.edu>
Date: Thu, 25 Mar 93 23:55:59 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: REMAIL: cypherpunks strategy
In-Reply-To: <9303260414.AA12167@toad.com>
Message-ID: <9303260751.AA24316@soda.berkeley.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>Instead, announce that we intend,
>at a later date, to install remailers which are "friendly" in the sense that
>they use a special header line, but which will be not be able to be shut down.

An excellent tactic, I think.

>[ My suggestion for how to do this:  encourage thousands of users who
>support anonymity to run the software, and make it easy for them to
>do so.  Then, thousands of users must be kicked out in order to prevent
>remailers being available! ]

Automatic installation is key.  (Just as it is for anonymity
filtering!)

I have some comments on automatic installation.  In all cases, make
sure the shell can execute the filter before changing the .forward
file in any way.

Case 1.  The .forward file doesn't exist.  Easy.  Just write a new
forward file pointing to the software, "| remailer".  The remailer
must know how to deliver mail in this case.

Case 2.  The .forward file already points to a filter.  The
implementations of .forward that I have seen accept multiple pipe
commands.  Therefore if the .forward previously said "| <filter>",
rewrite to "| remailer | <filter>".  When the remailer handles a
message, it won't pass any output along the pipe.  Thus for remailed
messages, the filter is never invoked.  Thus the remailer looks
transparent.
	
Case 3.  The .forward file points to a name.  Rewrite the .forward
as "| remailer | mail <old_name>".

Someone who knows more about writing portable shell scripts between
Sys V and BSD should tackle this one.  If we can get auto-installation
to work, we'd lower one of the larger hurdles there is right now.

>But, here's the important part, DELAY RELEASE until after a waiting period.

Not to mention, it gives us time to design and write the code.  This
looks like a good use of vaporware as a political tool.  :-)

Eric




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Eric Hughes <hughes@soda.berkeley.edu>
Date: Fri, 26 Mar 93 00:00:42 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Many Important Items in the News
In-Reply-To: <9303260549.AA12789@toad.com>
Message-ID: <9303260756.AA24450@soda.berkeley.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>marc, if article cancellation is made cryptographically secure, there
>is the possibility that articles can be made uncancellable.  of course,
>if there is some wild card that allows the backbone cabal to cancel
>articles remotely and after the fact, then i suspect usenet will remain
>vulnerable to forged cancellation messages.  but maybe not.

What you are describing here is an alternate method of cancellation,
not a forgery of the main way of cancelling.

Of course, if they really want such an alternate method of cancelling,
let's write it for them, so that it also uses signatures to check
authenticity.

>i see your point about backbone admins refusing to traffic in certain
>kinds of messages, but as a veteran of usenet from before it was even
>called usenet, i assure you that other admins would quickly fill in the
>gaps in connectivity.  this has happened many times.

All the more reason to allow the backbone admins the power to not pass
anonymous articles.  It won't work, they'll feel like they're in
control, and everyone wins.

Eric






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: sdw@sdwsys.lig.net (Stephen D. Williams)
Date: Thu, 25 Mar 93 21:50:14 PST
To: mccoy@ccwf.cc.utexas.edu (Jim McCoy)
Subject: Re: A New Usenet...
In-Reply-To: <9303250724.AA25473@tigger.cc.utexas.edu>
Message-ID: <9303260547.AA17449@sdwsys.lig.net>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Beware: I couldn't think of any alternatives after this lex-meme flooded
my mind....  It's fairly contrived, but not as bad as the coff / robotussin
pair from GNU bintools...


I'm interested in discussing, reviewing, and writing parts of the proposed
new netnews system extensions/rewrites.

I've been modifying the current system anyway, so why not?

(I have already added compressed/archived news storage to INN and Tin for
my Local Internet Gateway (LIG) project/company/turn-key system.)

Now, about a name: the first thing that popped into my mind is:

PANTO (need I point this out? [MIME]  Hey, one good name deserves another...)

What's it stand for? hmmm..

Protected, Anonymous News Transaction Operation    or Operator
Protected  Ambiguity Net  Transaction Option
Protected, Authenticated News Trans.  Option
				      Oligarchy (hmmm. got to look that one up)
			 	      (Begins with O, syn. for: system, server,
				       standard, service, interconnect, format)
				      
A PantoMime system is therefore one that supports News, Mail, with
Mime, PGP/PEM/whatever, etc. capabilities.

I always view News, Mail, and IRC as three legs of a triad of 
speed/bandwidth/audience tradeoffs so I'd like to have a cute extension to
cover realtime interactive also.

sdw




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: peter honeyman <honey@citi.umich.edu>
Date: Thu, 25 Mar 93 21:49:26 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Many Important Items in the News
Message-ID: <9303260549.AA12789@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


this seems to have fizzled out somewhere along the line.

------- Forwarded Message

Date: Thu, 25 Mar 93 11:54:30 EST
From: Peter Honeyman <honey@citi.umich.edu>
Subject: Re: Many Important Items in the News
To: cypherpunks@toad.com

marc, if article cancellation is made cryptographically secure, there
is the possibility that articles can be made uncancellable.  of course,
if there is some wild card that allows the backbone cabal to cancel
articles remotely and after the fact, then i suspect usenet will remain
vulnerable to forged cancellation messages.  but maybe not.

i see your point about backbone admins refusing to traffic in certain
kinds of messages, but as a veteran of usenet from before it was even
called usenet, i assure you that other admins would quickly fill in the
gaps in connectivity.  this has happened many times.

i don't agree, btw, that we can rely on the backbone admins to be very
strong supporters of speech, nor should we.

as for "the guy with the disk" wanting macpgp to go away, that's not
what happened here.  everyone i've talked to that has a direct role in
the decision agrees that there is a valid research and education
function served by distributing macpgp.  ah well, sometimes the dragon
wins.

and regarding the network providers decision to pull penet's plug, i
believe this decision was based principally on the opinion of ... how
did julf put it?  ... oh yes, "a very well-known and extremely highly
regarded net personality"  (i doubt that i would regard him as a strong
supporter of free speech, btw).  i suspect that when we get to the
bottom of this, we'll discover that many people's interests were being
represented without their knowledge, assent, or agreement.

regarding your comments about net abuse and megabytes of trash, i agree
that we need to brainstorm and find ways to address these problems.
i am optimistic that technical solutions hold a lot of promise; it's just
a matter of discovering them.  let's put our shoulder to the wheel!

	peter

------- End of Forwarded Message





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: XXCLARK@indst.indstate.edu
Date: Thu, 25 Mar 93 21:49:21 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: No Subject
Message-ID: <9303260549.AA12784@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Subscribe Ernest Clark




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: gnu (John Gilmore)
Date: Fri, 26 Mar 93 00:52:02 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com, gnu
Subject: there ain't no usenet "backbone"
In-Reply-To: <9303260835.AA25644@soda.berkeley.edu>
Message-ID: <9303260851.AA15506@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


"Backbone" actually used to mean something, in the days when most of the
news moved cross-country and to Europe over dialed telephone calls.  It
meant that those sites that made the calls were paying big bucks and were
hard to replace.

At one point when the "backbone" wouldn't carry a newsgroup on drugs,
Brian Reid, Gordon Moffett and I created a nationwide "alt backbone"
that carried the alt newsgroups (including alt.drugs, the first).  The
alt backbone was needed for more than a year, til the creation of
alt.sex and its subsequent popularity caused a large proportion of the
net to pass alt groups around.

Nowadays when hundreds of sites on each coast have leased T1 lines
that all connect to each other (it's called the Internet), it's not a
big deal.  Any such site can manage a full news feed to any other such
site.  These sites can manage ten full news feeds if they want high
redundancy or fanout.  Even people with 56K leased lines (like
toad.com) have no trouble with multiple redundant feeds to get around
censorship.

There is a single site `backbone' now -- uunet -- which has a stated 
policy of passing all traffic.  (Why not?  They get paid by the minute.)
It's still important for the thousands of UUCP sites, especially those
that are in the boonies, far from local Internet nodes.

The idea of the backbone needs to die.  Let's solve the real problems
and skip the strawmen.

John Gilmore                gnu@toad.com  --  gnu@cygnus.com  --  gnu@eff.org
  I agree it is a very good document, and I envy it - the country I live
  in doesn't have such a constitution.  I just wish you guys would _use_
  it.  Your assertion about "the freest country" fails because you don't
  - it would perhaps be true if the system would work according to the
  constitution.  But it does no good to have such a document just
  rotting away locked up somewhere, after even banning the material it's
  printed on.  				//Jyrki Kuoppala, jkp@cs.HUT.FI





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: gnu (John Gilmore)
Date: Fri, 26 Mar 93 01:11:43 PST
To: Marc.Ringuette@GS80.SP.CS.CMU.EDU
Subject: Re: REMAIL: cypherpunks strategy
In-Reply-To: <9303260414.AA12167@toad.com>
Message-ID: <9303260911.AA15667@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> We must address a strategy question before it jumps on us.  Do we want to be
> yet another "this remailer exists, let's stomp on it" whipping boy, or will
> another tactic be more effective?

It depends on the location and setup of the remailer(s).

> [ My suggestion for how to do this:  encourage thousands of users who
> support anonymity to run the software, and make it easy for them to
> do so.  Then, thousands of users must be kicked out in order to prevent
> remailers being available! ]

Thousands of users are not enough.  If individual users are doing it,
they are too subject to pressure from their system managers.  We don't
have software capable of rerouting among a thousand remailers, 100 of which
get their accounts canceled daily, 100 new ones added each day.  We
aren't likely to get it soon, either.

To permanently restore at least last month's level of service, we need
a couple of dedicated, firewalled, buttressed sites.  You want a few
geographically separated people who own their own systems (or who own
or run the company that owns them), who have solid network links
(possibly redundant), and who are fully committed to the idea -- as
committed as funet.fi to persist past the vilification and harassment
and threats.

And those people need backup from the rest of us -- legal help if they
need or want it, money to pay the networking bill if things get tight,
loans of backup equipment during failures under load, system
administration when folks try to break in and trash their machines,
software creation and maintenance, advocacy, policy work, advice, and
a bunch of shoulders to cry on and warm words of encouragement.

Three to five people providing such setups, in collaboration, would
wedge a steel-toed boot so firmly in the door that it couldn't be
slammed by any dyspeptic "net god".

Are we up to this job?  If not, let's scale back what we're trying to
do.  I'd rather succeed at raising consciousness on the issue for a
later try, than try now to set up such a beachhead and fail at it.

	John




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: greg@ideath.goldenbear.com (Greg Broiles)
Date: Fri, 26 Mar 93 01:56:02 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Anonymity, accountability, and control
Message-ID: <26H11B1w164w@ideath.goldenbear.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



With respect to recent discussion about anonymous posts/mail, and the
wishes of some to avoid passing anonymous traffic .. I guess I've really
got to wonder just how difficult people think it is to get onto the net,
anyway.

I've got my net access becuase I pay UUNET roughly $50/month for
it - and I get my own domain name, with as many hosts (and as many users
on those hosts) as I care to set up. I set up 'fake' accounts on a
regular basis - not becuase I'm trying to trick anyone, per se, but
becuase it's the easiest way I know of to tweak the flow & storage of
mail on disparate subjects & topics. I can post a message and say
"Please E-mail to me, and I'll summarize with a post", and do so easily
- I just set up a special account that I'd like replies to go to, and
then I post from that account.  (Usually, just to be polite, I'll use
the same 'real name', but multiple account names - 'gb@goldenbear.com'
vs 'greg@goldenbear.com' vs 'gbroiles@goldenbear.com', and so forth.)
Then, a few days/weeks later, it's no big deal to concatenate the
replies in those different mailboxes into different summary messages for
posting. This seems like the sort of thing everyone ought to be able to
do - such that you could request (or command) that replies to a message
be directed into a particular E-mail folder owned by your account.

What all of this brings home to me is how easily I could just create an
entirely fictitious 'person', and use it for posting & mailing - it'd be
totally anonymous, provide me with easy way to receive replies & carry
on conversations .. *and* nobody would even know they were talking to
a real person via a fake name. I don't do this because it seems impolite
to converse with people under false pretenses; if I wanted or needed to
post/mail anonymously, I'd probably use a redirector (if I could find
one) because it seems more polite to be clear about my desire for
discretion & privacy.

Apparently, however, some of the powers that be would rather see folks
like me using fake but real-sounding names when we want privacy, instead
of being clear about what's going on. I think that's a shame, because it
seems like lying.

The Internet has already had to deal with the fact that it's not
possible to trust a user simply because they're root on their local
machine - it may well be that 'root' (as in my case) is just some guy
with a '386 who likes to play on the net. There is, I think, still some
expectation that user names are what they appear - if you see a post
from "cjones@leviathan.com (Chris Jones)" there's some expectation that
there really is a human being out there named "Chris Jones", who's
probably got a job and a desk and a boss, or at least some form of
accountability.

It's this slippery notion of 'accountability' that is perhaps at the
root of this 'anonymity' problem - the idea that there's gonna be some
hell to pay if somebody writes to 'postmaster@leviathan.com', and
complains about Chris Jones. The fact is, you can mail to
'postmaster@goldenbear.com' and whine all you like, it's just another
alias for the same damn person (me). I think there are going to be
more & more people like me in the future - I *am* my boss,
the postmaster, and the sysadmin - and if people don't like what I do or
say on the net, that's just too damn bad.

This illusion of accountability and control can't last much longer ..
can it? As I see it, these "net gods" who don't like anonymity have
two choices - anonymity they can detect, or anonymity they can't.
I'd much prefer to be polite and straightforward about things, and post
clearly marked anonymous posts/mail when that's what I want to do -
but if that traffic is going to be suppressed, I'll resort to more
clandestine anonymous transmissions. The days when it was possible
to make any assumptions at all about human to "real name" to net
address correspondences and mappings have passed, if they ever
existed at all. I think about my E-mail address(es) as ways to
direct the flow of mail such that it's convenient for me; I know
other people do this too.  My E-mail address isn't a license plate,
it's a file folder.

--
Mail to pgpserv@goldenbear.com, subject="Greg Broiles" for PGP public key.
Greg Broiles                            greg@goldenbear.com
Golden Bear Consulting                  +1 503 465 0325
Box 12005 Eugene OR 97440               BBS: +1 503 687 7764




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Clark Reynard <clark@metal.psu.edu>
Date: Thu, 25 Mar 93 23:22:36 PST
To: sdw@sdwsys.lig.net
Subject: Re: A New Usenet...
Message-ID: <9303260717.AA27522@metal.psu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


a possible idea is simply a modification of what ringuette suggested;
while i am all for anonymous posting, i believe that they should be
marked as such (or at least marked with some sort of alias so that
one knows which anonymous poster is which--for example, my actual name
is Robert Clark, but my user name on this system is Clark Reynard--
not because I am here illegally, but because the sysadmin of this
site (a personal friend) is unable to give me an account here for
political reasons).

irt the idea of a new usenet, i doubt that a 'new' USEnet is possible;
it is so firmly entrenched, by 'tradition' et cetera, that it is very
likely that what will exist is merely an improvement and expansion of
the existing usenet; however, i believe that alternative means of reading
usenet should exist; i have found, since rejoining usenet after
a three-year absence, that the signal-to-noise ratio has increased
greatly (and who hasn't noticed that?).  what is necessary, given the
constant increase in broadcast, is a correspondingly great increase
in 'broadcatch,' that is, the ability to find the information that you
actually wish to have (one man's signal is another man's--or person's--
noise).  thus, rather than have kill files, having scanning programs
capable of filtering out particular TYPES of data, rather than the poster
him- or her-self, will be of far more use than excluding a usenet poster
who may very well post a greatly useful file amidst a welter of
useless files.  thus, some sort of syntax/subject/type of data file
scanner (which requires asi--my acronym for artificial semi-intelligence)
is necessary to make the usenet actually new, and not merely IMPROVED--
usenet improves constantly.  if anyone wishes to comment regarding this,
rather than clutter the list with more articles like this, send them
to me, either here, or to rclark@nyx.cs.du.edu, and i will summarize
and post.

fc




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Clark Reynard <clark@metal.psu.edu>
Date: Thu, 25 Mar 93 23:38:26 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: To be a bit more clear
Message-ID: <9303260733.AA28484@metal.psu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Since, after all, the difficulties of broadcasting either anonymously
or under one's actual name are not really pronounced; given Ringuette's
idea of multiple remailing sites, perhaps several thousand, only a
few dozen sites would be necessary to serve as remailers to the
larger numbers of anonymous sites; this makes it difficult to trace
(unfortunately far from impossible); since each post of a person
would seemingly originate from a different site, and in additionit would arrive at that different site from a different point of origin
(since NNTP would not begin logging path until after it travelled
from site to site via email).  Now, to avoid the (inevitable) possibility
that one or many of the reposters would have been killed (or simply
gone down due to incompetence) each of the actual addresses would have
a list of possible sites to attempt to post the message from; 

the essential fact here is that there is no real way to guarantee
this so-called 'minimal moderation.'  the possible ways of circumventing
it, either by telnetting to different nntp ports manually and simply
coming from different sites, or by setting up a number of anonymous
remailers to actual anonymous posting sites (none of them having
a full list of possible hosts, to avoid a single person from knowing
all of them, makes it essentially impossible to track someone
determined to post anonymously; people have tried for literally
YEARS to avoid anonymous messages.  they ain't done it yet,
thank god.  a lot of people with useful information do not
wish to reveal their names, and this is their right.

of course, it will be abused as well, as it always has, but this
is simply something to be tolerated or ignored.  the backbone
doesn't have to carry these messages, and if it doesn't wish to,
another 'backbone' will arise that will.  

fc




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: J. Michael Diehl <mdiehl@triton.unm.edu>
Date: Fri, 26 Mar 93 02:40:10 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: help with pgp 2.2
Message-ID: <9303261017.AA04830@triton.unm.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Hi all,

I'm having problems with pgp 2.2.  I am trying to add someone's key to my ring.
I get e-mail from them, save it to a file and xfer it to my home system.  Then
I type pgp -ka <filename> to add the new stuff to my keyring.  I've even edited
the file to just include the pgp stuff.  What am I doing wrong?  
Thanx in advance.
P
+----------------------+----------------------------------------------------+
| J. Michael Diehl ;-) |  I thought I was wrong once.  But, I was mistaken. |
|                      +----------------------------------------------------+
| mdiehl@triton.unm.edu| "I'm just looking for the opportunity to be        |
| Thunder@forum        |            Politically Incorrect!                  |
| (505) 299-2282       |                        <me>                        |
+----------------------+----------------------------------------------------+





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: grady@public.btr.com (Grady Ward  grady@btr.com)
Date: Fri, 26 Mar 93 06:18:43 PST
To: Cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: TEMPEST in a teapot
Message-ID: <9303261417.AA04493@public.btr.com.BTR.COM>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



TEMPEST in a teapot

A note discussing the prevention of electromagnetic eavesdropping
of personal computers.

Grady Ward   <grady@netcom.com>
public key verification by PK server, finger, or by request

Version 1.0   22 March 93

 TEMPEST is the code name for technology related to limiting unwanted
electromagnetic emissions from data processing and related equipment.
Its goal is to limit an opponent's capability to collect information about
the internal data flow of computer equipment. Most information concerning
TEMPEST specifications is classified by the United States Government and
is not available for use by its citizens.

 The reason why TEMPEST technology is particularly important for
computers and other data processing equipment is the kinds of signals
components in a computer use to talk to each other ("square waves") and
their clock speeds (measured in megahertz) produce a particularly rich set
of unintentional signals in a wide portion of the electromagnetic spectrum.
Because the spurious emissions occupy so wide a portion of that spectrum,
technologies used to block one portion of the spectrum (as pulling the shades 
closed on a window to stop the visible light portion) are not necessarily
effective in another portion.

 Unintentional emissions from a computer system can be captured and
processed to reveal information about the target systems from simple
levels of activity to even remotely copying keystrokes or capturing
monitor information. It is speculated that poorly protected systems can
be effectively monitored up to the order of one kilometer from the target
equipment.

 This note will examine some practical aspects of reducing the
susceptibility of your personal computer equipment to remote monitoring
using easily-installed, widely available after-market components.


I

 One way of looking at TEMPEST from the lay person's point-of-view is
that it is virtually identical to the problem of preventing electromagnetic
interference ("EMI") by your computer system to others' radios, televisions,
or other consumer electronics. That is, preventing the emission of wide-band
radio "hash" from your computers, cabling, and peripherals both prevents
interference to you and your neighbors television set and limits the useful
signal available to a person surreptitiously monitoring.

 Viewing the problem in this light, there are quite a few useful documents
available form the government and elsewhere attacking this problem and
providing a wealth of practical solutions and resources. Very useful for the
lay person are:

Radio Frequency Interference: How to Find It and Fix It. Ed Hare, KA1CV
and Robert Schetgen, KU7G, editors
The American Radio Relay League, Newington , CT
ISBN 0-87259-375-4  (c) 1991, second printing 1992

Federal Communications Commission Interference Handbook 
(1991)
FCC Consumers Assistance Branch
Gettysburg, PA  17326
717-337-1212
and
MIL-STD-188-124B in preparation
(includes information on military shielding of tactical 
communications systems)
Superintendent of Documents
US Government Printing Office
Washington, DC  20402
202-783-3238

Information on shielding a particular piece of consumer 
electronic equipment may be available from the:

Electronic Industries Association (EIA)
2001 Pennsylvania Ave NW
Washington, DC  20006


 Preventing unintended electromagnetic emissions is a relative term.
It is not feasible to reduce to zero all unintended emissions. My personal
goal, for example, might be to reduce the amount and quality of spurious
emission until the monitoring van a kilometer away would have to be in my
front yard before it could effectively eavesdrop on my computer. Apartment
dwellers with unknown neighbors only inches away (through a wall) might
want to even more carefully adopt as many of the following suggestions as
possible since signal available for detection decreases as approximately the
inverse square of the distance from the monitoring equipment to your computer.


II

Start with computer equipment that meets modern standards for emission.

 In the United States, the "quietest" standard for computers and peripherals
is known as the "class B" level. (Class A level is a less stringent standard for
computers to be use in a business environment.).

 You want to verify that all computers and peripherals you use meet the class B
standard which permits only one-tenth the power of spurious emissions than the
class A standard. If you already own computer equipment with an FCC ID, you
can find out which standard applies. Contact the FCC Consumers Assistance
Branch at 1-717-337-1212 for details in accessing their database.

 Once you own good equipment, follow the manufacturer's recommendations
for preserving the shielding integrity of the system. Don't operated the system
with the cover off and keep "slot covers" in the back of the computer in place.


III

Use only shielded cable for all system interconnections.

 A shielded cable surrounds the core of control wires with a metal braid or
foil to keep signals confined to that core. In the late seventies it was common
to use unshielded cable such as "ribbon" cable to connect the computer with, 
say, a diskette drive. Unshielded cable acts just like an antenna for signals
generated by your computer and peripherals. Most computer manufacturer
supply shielded cable for use with their computers in order to meet FCC
standards. Cables bought from third-parties are an unknown and should be
avoided (unless you are willing to take one apart to see for yourself!)
	
 Try to avoid a "rat's nest" of wire and cabling behind your equipment and
by keeping all cables as short as possible. You want to reduced the length of
unintended antennas and to more easily predict the likely paths of electric
and magnetic coupling from cable to cable so that it can be more effectively
filtered.


IV

Block radiation from the power cord(s) into the house wiring.

 Most computers have an EMI filter built into their body where the AC
line cord enters the power supply. This filter is generally insufficient to
prevent substantial re-radiation of EMI voltages back into the power wiring
of your house and neighborhood. To reduce the power retransmitted down
the AC power cords of your equipment, plug them in to special EMI filters
that are in turn plugged into the wall socket. I use a model 475-3
overvoltage and EMI filter manufactured by

Industrial Communication Engineers, Ltd.
P.O. Box 18495
Indianapolis, IN  46218-0495
1-800-ICE-COMM
ask for their package of free information sheets

 (AC and other filters mentioned in this note are available from a wide
variety of sources including, for example, Radio Shack. I am enthusiastic
about ICE because of the "over-designed" quality of their equipment.
Standard disclaimers apply.)
 This particular filter from ICE is specified to reduce retransmission of
EMI by a factor of at least 1000 in its high-frequency design range. Although
ideally every computer component using an AC line cord ought to be filtered,
it is especially important for the monitor and computer CPU to be filtered in
this manner as the most useful information available to opponents is believed
to come from these sources.


V

Block retransmitted information from entering your fax/modem or telephone
line.

 Telephone line is generally very poorly shielded. EMI  from your computer
can be retransmitted directly into the phone line through your modem or can
be unintentionally picked up by the magnetic portion of the EMI spectrum
through magnetic induction from power supplies or the yoke of your cathode
ray tube "CRT" monitor.

 To prevent direct retransmission, EMI filters are specifically designed for
modular telephone jacks to mount at the telephone or modem, and for
mounting directly at the service entrance to the house.

 Sources of well-designed telephone-line filter products include ICE
(address above) and

K-COM
Box 82
Randolph, OH  44265
216-325-2110

 Your phone company or telephone manufacturer may be able to supply
you with free modular filters, although the design frequencies of these
filters may not be high enough to be effective through much of the EMI 
spectrum of interest. Keep telephone lines away from power supplies of
computers or peripherals and the rear of CRTs:  the magnetic field often
associated with those device can inductively transfer to unshielded lines
just as if the telephone line were directly electrically connected to them. 
Since this kind of coupling decreases rapidly with distance, this kind of
magnetic induction can be virtually eliminated by keeping as much distance
(several feet or more) as possible between the power supply/monitor yoke
and cabling.


VI

 Use ferrite toroids and split beads to prevent EMI from escaping on
the surface of your cables.

 Ferrites are magnetic materials that,  for certain ranges of EMI
frequencies, attenuate the EMI by causing it to spend itself in heat in
the material rather than continuing down the cable. They can be applied
without cutting the cable by snapping together a "split bead" form over
a thick cable such as a power cord or by threading  thinner cable such as
telephone several times around the donut-shaped ferrite form. Every cable
leaving your monitor, computer, mouse, keyboard, and other computer
peripherals should have at least one ferrite core attentuator. Don't forget
the telephone lines from your fax, modem, telephone or the unshielded DC
power cord to your modem. Ferrites are applied as close to the EMI emitting
device as possible so as to afford the least amount of cable that can act as
an antenna for the EMI.


Good sources for ferrite split beads and toroids include

Amidon Associates, Inc.
P.O. Box 956
Torrance, CA  90508
310-763-5770
(ask for their free information sheet)

Palomar Engineers
P.O. Box 462222
Escondido, CA  92046
619-747-3343
(ask for their free RFI information sheet)

and Radio Shack.


VII

Other practical remedies.

 Other remedies that are somewhat more difficult to correctly apply
include providing a good EMI "ground" shield for your computer equipment
and other more intrusive filters such as bypass capacitor filters.

 You probably ought not to think about adding bypass capacitors unless you
are familiar with electronic circuits and digital design. While quite effective,
added improperly to the motherboard or cabling of a computer they can
"smooth out" the square wave digital waveform -- perhaps to the extent
that signals are interpreted erroneously causing mysterious "crashes" of
your system. In other cases, bypass capacitors can cause unwanted parasitic
oscillation on the transistorized output drivers of certain circuits which
could damage or destroy those circuits in the computer or peripherals. Also,
unlike ferrite toroids, adding capacitors requires actually physically splicing
them in or soldering them into circuits. This opens up the possibility of
electric shock, damage to other electronic components or voiding the
warranty on the computer equipment.

 A good EMI ground is difficult to achieve. Unlike an electrical safety ground,
such as the third wire in a three-wire AC power system, the EMI ground
must operate effectively over a much wider part of the EMI spectrum. This 
effectiveness is related to a quality known as electrical impedance. You
desire to reduce the impedance to as low a value as possible over the entire
range of EMI frequencies. 
	
 Unlike the AC safety ground, important factors in achieving low impedance
include having as short a lead from the equipment to a good EMI earth ground
as possible (must be just a few feet); the gauge of the connecting lead (the
best EMI ground lead is not wire but woven grounding "strap" or wide copper
flashing sheets; and the physical coupling of the EMI into the actual earth
ground. An 8 ft. copper-plated ground may be fine for AC safety ground, but
may present appreciable impedance resistance to an EMI voltage. Much better
would be to connect a network of six to eight copper pipes arranged in a
six-foot diameter circle driven in a foot or two into the ground, electrically
bonded together with heavy ground strap and connected to the equipment to be
grounded via a short (at most, several feet), heavy (at least 3/4-1" wide)
ground strap.
	
 If you can achieve a good EMI ground, then further shielding possibilities
open up for you such as surrounding your monitor and computer equipment in
a wire-screen Faraday cage. You want to use mesh rather than solid sheet
because you must preserve the free flow of cooling air to your equipment.
Buy aluminum (not nylon) screen netting at your local hardware store. This
netting typically comes in rolls 36" wide by several feet long. Completely
surround your equipment you want to reduce the EMI being careful to make 
good electrical bonds between the different panels of netting and your good
earth ground. I use stainless steel nuts, bolts, and lock washers along with
special non-oxidizing electrical paste (available from Electrical contractors 
supply houses or from ICE) to secure my ground strapping to my net "cages".
A good Faraday cage will add several orders of magnitude of EMI attenuation
to your system.


VIII

Checking the effectiveness of your work.

 It is easy to get a general feeling about the effectiveness of your
EMI shielding work with an ordinary portable AM radio. Bring it very
close to the body of your computer and its cables in turn. Ideally, you
should not hear an increased level of static. If you do hear relatively
more at one cable than at another, apply more ferrite split beads or
obtain better shielded cable for this component. The practice of determining
what kind of operating system code is executing by listening to a nearby
AM radio is definitely obsolete for an well-shielded EMI-proof system!

 To get an idea of the power and scope of your magnetic field emissions,
an ordinary compass is quite sensitive in detecting fields. Bring a compass
within a few inches of the back of your monitor and see whether it is
deflected. Notice that the amount of deflection decreases rapidly with 
distance. You want to keep cables away from magnetic sources about as
far as required not to see an appreciable deflection on the compass.


VIIII

Summary

 If you start with good, shielded equipment that has passed the FCC
level B emission standard then you are off to a great start. You may
even be able to do even better with stock OEM equipment by specifying
"low-emission" monitors that have recently come on the market in
response to consumer fears of extremely low frequency ("ELF") and
other electromagnetic radiation. Consistently use shielded cables, apply
filtering and ferrite toroids to all cabling entering or leaving your computer
equipment. Finally, consider a good EMI ground and Faraday cages. Beyond
this there are even more effective means of confining the electrical and
magnetic components of your system through the use of copper foil 
adhesive tapes, conductive paint sprays, "mu metal" and other less common
components.

Copyright (c) 1993 by Grady Ward. All Rights Reserved.
Permission is granted for free electronic distribution.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Karl Barrus <elee9sf@Menudo.UH.EDU>
Date: Fri, 26 Mar 93 07:19:43 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: REMAIL: list of remailers 3/26/93
Message-ID: <199303261518.AA10961@Menudo.UH.EDU>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

Q1: What cypherpunk remailers exist?

A1:

 1: hh@pmantis.berkeley.edu 
 2: hh@cicada.berkeley.edu 
 3: hh@soda.berkeley.edu 
 4: nowhere@bsu-cs.bsu.edu 
 5: ebrandt@jarthur.claremont.edu 
 6: hal@alumni.caltech.edu 
 7: remailer@rebma.mn.org 
 8: elee7h5@rosebud.ee.uh.edu 
 9: phantom@mead.u.washington.edu 
10: hfinney@shell.portal.com 
11: remailer@utter.dis.org 
12: 00x@uclink.berkeley.edu 
13: remail@extropia.wimsey.com 

NOTES: 
#1-#5	remail only, no encryption of headers
#6-#12	support encrypted headers
#13	special - header and message must be encrypted together
#7,#13	introduce larger than average delay
#11	CANNOT CONFIRM OPERATION YET! TEST BEFORE ATTEMPTING TO USE. *
#12	public key not yet released

======================================================================

Q2: What help is available?

A2:

Check out the pub/cypherpunks directory at soda.berkeley.edu
(128.32.149.19).  Instructions on how to use the remailers are in the
remailer directory, along with some unix scripts and dos batch files.

Mail to me (elee9sf@menudo.uh.edu) for further help and/or questions.

======================================================================

* Here are a few lines of a bounced message from utter.dis.org:

554 utter.dis.org!remailer... Never heard of host utter in domain dis . org
554 hoptoad!Menudo.UH.EDU!elee9sf... Possible alias loop
554 No valid recipients

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.2

iQCVAgUBK7MebIOA7OpLWtYzAQEgAQQAgDHr/0QFixBrtGLc6gN2uK93hTD2j/M9
3BwOPKWXt5DKr6gnioCuyDjTs/Ng7pFGo8AYV8lJmv9DcG5BkpXB5fHl9VRRD55Y
1As9fXSX6l1Qnq9mYgvQ4igcrzA737JvG2Dc5x8uJV+6GnA5v7A4QtCQAHG7TRlv
+k0JwClg0B0=
=KtpQ
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Peter Honeyman <honey@citi.umich.edu>
Date: Fri, 26 Mar 93 06:57:29 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re:  Many Important Items in the News
Message-ID: <9303261457.AA19460@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> All the more reason to allow the backbone admins the power to not pass
> anonymous articles.  It won't work, they'll feel like they're in
> control, and everyone wins.

more likely it won't work so they will use underhanded means to
accomplish their vile ends.  as in the instant case.

	peter




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: rubin@citi.umich.edu
Date: Fri, 26 Mar 93 07:30:29 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Remailers
Message-ID: <9303261530.AA19663@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I contacted Eric Hughes, and he suggested that my question was of
general enough interest to share with the group. Here is my question
followed by Eric's response:


 ----------

Hi,

You pointed me in the direction of hal's remailer at
        soda.berkeley.edu:pub/cypherpunks
and I have the code now. However, since I'm not that familiar
with perl, I'm having trouble figuring out exactly how it works.
Do you know if anyone has written a technical description of
how the remailer works?

I would like to build a remailer too, and I wanted to try and
understand how Hal's remailer works first. Also, do you know if
there is code available for any other remailers in shell script
or C?

Thanks a lot,
Avi Rubin

 -----------


Chael Hall wrote a remailer in C.  He should be willing to share his
code.  Ask on the list.

The question you asked me about understanding the remailer operation
is of general enough interest that you ought to just ask the list at
large.

In specific, I don't know of any such theory of operation.

Eric




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: lefty@apple.com (Lefty)
Date: Fri, 26 Mar 93 10:40:35 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: ANON: Shutdown of Anon.penet.fi
Message-ID: <9303261838.AA25842@apple.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I have been told that Clayton Cramer, the bete noire of alt.sex.bondage, is
the "net.personality" responsible for the shutdown of anon.penet.fi.  I do
not know this to be a fact.

Funny, I never thought of him as being particularly "highly regarded".

--
Lefty (lefty@apple.com)
C:.M:.C:., D:.O:.D:.






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: jet@nas.nasa.gov (J. Eric Townsend)
Date: Fri, 26 Mar 93 10:59:23 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: re: new usenet
In-Reply-To: <9303260711.AA22802@soda.berkeley.edu>
Message-ID: <9303261857.AA28431@boxer.nas.nasa.gov>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



I thought the whole point of alt.* was for sites that didn't mind
carrying a truly anarchic hierarchy...

(We're losing alt.* here at Ames, it appears, along with soc. and
talk.)





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: lefty@apple.com (Lefty)
Date: Fri, 26 Mar 93 11:27:02 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: ANON: Shutdown of Anon.penet.fi
Message-ID: <9303261858.AA26930@internal.apple.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I have been told that Clayton Cramer, the bete noire of alt.sex.bondage, is
the "net.personality" responsible for the shutdown of anon.penet.fi.  I do
not know this to be a fact.

Funny, I never thought of him as being particularly "highly regarded".

--
Lefty (lefty@apple.com)
C:.M:.C:., D:.O:.D:.






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: mccoy@ccwf.cc.utexas.edu (Jim McCoy)
Date: Fri, 26 Mar 93 09:05:51 PST
To: clark@metal.psu.edu (Clark Reynard)
Subject: Re: A New Usenet...
In-Reply-To: <9303260717.AA27522@metal.psu.edu>
Message-ID: <9303261704.AA06403@tramp.cc.utexas.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text


> From: Clark Reynard <clark@metal.psu.edu>
[...]
> 
> irt the idea of a new usenet, i doubt that a 'new' USEnet is possible;
> it is so firmly entrenched, by 'tradition' et cetera, that it is very
> likely that what will exist is merely an improvement and expansion of
> the existing usenet;

This was what I was thinking about.  Something that would sit on top of the
existing usenet and provide different levels of service and information.  I
realize that it would be next to impossible to replace the usenet as a
whole, what I am thinking about is extended services and newsgroups that
exist in parallel with the current usenet paradigm.  For example, a "new
usenet" server could sit on prot 119, and when it gets a connection it can
work like a normal usenet server if no special information is given to it
or it can take articles for the authenticated service if additional
commands or flags are given.  To the regular user it would just appear as a
new hierarchy (newusenet.sci.crypt, etc).  If the person connecting wanted
to post articles to the new groups it would require them to use commands or
a client that extends the commands available in the current RFC.



> [s/n ratio has increased, but we just need smarter readers...]  thus,
> rather than have kill files, having scanning programs 
> capable of filtering out particular TYPES of data, rather than the poster
> him- or her-self, will be of far more use than excluding a usenet poster
> who may very well post a greatly useful file amidst a welter of
> useless files.  thus, some sort of syntax/subject/type of data file
> scanner (which requires asi--my acronym for artificial semi-intelligence)
> is necessary to make the usenet actually new, and not merely IMPROVED--
> usenet improves constantly. 

As someone who has spent the past several years working in an AI lab, let
me tell you that this is a very, very difficult task.  The easiest method
is to do something like user-supplied tags, which is what is happening now
with the overview package and increased usage of the References line.
Don't expect the "tell me what is in this group that would interest me"
newsreaders to appear any time this decade and don't expect them to be
free... 

It is still much easier for a person to do this kind of filtering and the
current structure of usenet is designed for this.  The newsgroup naming
scheme allows readers to select groups based upon thier interests
(topic/name of the group) and moderation in groups allows filtering.  The
problem that I see now is that there are some unmoderated groups that are
too popular for thier own good.  Take comp.org.eff.talk for example.  I
would love to stay current on this group, but there is so much noise
(mostly in people repeating the same thing in 5 different subject lines...)
that I will often skip it if I don't have the time.  What would be nice
would be for a group to exist that selects articles and threads from that
group and puts them in some group like comp.org.eff.talk.best-of...

Eh, either way I will start coding....

jim




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: rustman@netcom.com (Rusty Hodge)
Date: Fri, 26 Mar 93 11:10:21 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: To Digest or Not To Digest
Message-ID: <9303261908.AA06218@netcom2.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I think the optimum solution is to provide it both ways, in
digest form as well as the way it is now.  Digesting it would
also help provide a standard way to archive the list.  We really
need archives of this available, "official" archives that we know
contain all the messages.  While many readers are keeping archives,
they aren't standardized.

--Rusty
-- 




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@Athena.MIT.EDU>
Date: Fri, 26 Mar 93 08:45:18 PST
To: greg@ideath.goldenbear.com
Subject: Re: Anonymity, accountability, and control
In-Reply-To: <26H11B1w164w@ideath.goldenbear.com>
Message-ID: <9303261643.AA04023@SOS>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


   From: greg@ideath.goldenbear.com (Greg Broiles)
   Date: Fri, 26 Mar 93 01:14:00 PST

   I've got my net access becuase I pay UUNET roughly $50/month for
   it - and I get my own domain name, with as many hosts (and as many users
   on those hosts) as I care to set up......

   It's this slippery notion of 'accountability' that is perhaps at the
   root of this 'anonymity' problem - the idea that there's gonna be some
   hell to pay if somebody writes to 'postmaster@leviathan.com', and
   complains about Chris Jones. The fact is, you can mail to
   'postmaster@goldenbear.com' and whine all you like, it's just another
   alias for the same damn person (me). I think there are going to be
   more & more people like me in the future - I *am* my boss,
   the postmaster, and the sysadmin - and if people don't like what I do or
   say on the net, that's just too damn bad.

Well, there is still *some* accountability --- if you do something
really wretched, and someone complains to UUNET, won't UUNET at least
tell that person who is paying for that link, and if you do something
really egregious, and UUNET gets enough complaints, will UUNET shut you
down?

I suspect that it would take something really serious to cause UUNET to
shut you down --- for example, if you started sending child porn, which
might enable the Feds to seize *UUNET*'s computers --- but there is
still some limited amount of accountability, and potential retribution
if you do something which enough people considers is wrong.


If we lived in a world where it was easy to filter out anonymous {mail,
news}, and the anonymous poster had to *pay* for each octet of {mail,
news} that he/she posted, then I suspect that a lot of objections to
Anonymous mail and news would die down.  Many people have said this
repeatedly, and I agree with them.

Unfortunately, we do not live in such a world now, and pretending that
we are in such a world (by answering people's complaints with promises
of vaporware) is just going to make enemies.  But by working towards
such a world, so that people can get all of the benefits of anonymity
without forcing *other* people to pay the costs of anonymity --- that is
certainly something which should be applauded.

						- Ted




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Peter Shipley <shipley@gateway>
Date: Fri, 26 Mar 93 11:54:04 PST
To: jet@nas.nasa.gov (J. Eric Townsend)
Subject: Re: new usenet
In-Reply-To: <9303261857.AA28431@boxer.nas.nasa.gov>
Message-ID: <9303261951.AA00899@edev0.TFS>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



>
>I thought the whole point of alt.* was for sites that didn't mind
>carrying a truly anarchic hierarchy...
>
>(We're losing alt.* here at Ames, it appears, along with soc. and
>talk.)


if you are needing a site to readnews from I can enable your system
to read news from my site (tfs.com)


			-Pete




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: mccoy@ccwf.cc.utexas.edu (Jim McCoy)
Date: Fri, 26 Mar 93 09:56:16 PST
To: tytso@Athena.MIT.EDU (Theodore Ts'o)
Subject: Re: Anonymity, accountability, and control
In-Reply-To: <9303261643.AA04023@SOS>
Message-ID: <9303261754.AA06965@tramp.cc.utexas.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text


> From: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@Athena.MIT.EDU>
> 
>    From: greg@ideath.goldenbear.com (Greg Broiles)
>    Date: Fri, 26 Mar 93 01:14:00 PST
> 
>    I've got my net access becuase I pay UUNET roughly $50/month for
>    it - and I get my own domain name, with as many hosts (and as many users
>    on those hosts) as I care to set up......
>    [...] and if people don't like what I do or
>    say on the net, that's just too damn bad.
> 
> Well, there is still *some* accountability --- if you do something
> really wretched, and someone complains to UUNET, won't UUNET at least
> tell that person who is paying for that link, and if you do something
> really egregious, and UUNET gets enough complaints, will UUNET shut you
> down?

I believe that UUNET has applied for and received common carrier status, in
which case they are not responsible for thier traffic and cannot make any
judgement calls regarding the traffic coming from a particular site.  It is
kind of like the phone company; they may not approve of the 976-BABE
numbers, but as long as those operations do not break the law there is
nothing the phone company can do about them no matter how many complaints
they may receive.

jim



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Jonathan K Saville <ee92jks@brunel.ac.uk>
Date: Fri, 26 Mar 93 04:11:54 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: help with PGP 2.2
Message-ID: <9519.9303261210@monge.brunel.ac.uk>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Michael Diehl writes:

>I'm having problems with pgp 2.2.  I am trying to add someone's key to my ring.
>I get e-mail from them, save it to a file and xfer it to my home system.  Then
>I type pgp -ka <filename> to add the new stuff to my keyring.  I've even edited
>the file to just include the pgp stuff.  What am I doing wrong?  

I had the same problem - I believe it is to do with a new flag PGP 2.2 sets
in your public keyring (see documentation). I solved the problem by 
executing 'pgp -kc' which checks the contents of your keyring. After that PGP
worked fine, although to be honest I'm not sure why.

Hope this helps.

Jon
-- 
 ------------------------ -------------------------------------
|      Jon Saville       |   Who alive can say, 'Thou art no   |
|  ee92jks@brunel.ac.uk  |  Poet, may'st not tell thy dreams?' |
 ------------------------ -----------  Keats, 1819  -----------
     PGP 2.2 public key available upon request or by finger




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: nobody@alumni.cco.caltech.edu
Date: Fri, 26 Mar 93 13:31:39 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: ANON: Shutdown of Anon.penet.fi
Message-ID: <9303262028.AA06217@alumni.cco.caltech.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


It is fruitless to guess.  You only tar innocent people.  The truth will
come out, more likely sooner than later.      Nowhere, Man.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: pete@cirrus.com (Pete Carpenter)
Date: Fri, 26 Mar 93 12:51:45 PST
To: grady@public.btr.com
Subject: Re:  TEMPEST in a teapot
Message-ID: <9303262028.AA11335@ss2138.cirrus.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



----- Begin Included Message -----

It is speculated that poorly protected systems can
be effectively monitored up to the order of one kilometer from the target
equipment.

----- End Included Message -----

The "readability" of the relatively high energy sweeps in a standard CRT monitor
is well known. Any idea of similar effects on LCD screens ?  The energy involved
would be orders of magnitude less, just for starters.  Also, since the whole screen
is effectively oscillating, I'm not sure that there is any 'raster' sweep per se
going on here at all.  This could be a factor for the truly paranoid :-) using 
portables with LCD screens.


Pete Carpenter                           pete@cirrus.com
                                
Talk about your plenty, talk about your ills,
One man gathers what another man spills. - Robert Hunter




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: trump@pluto.ee.cua.edu (Louis Edward Trumpbour)
Date: Fri, 26 Mar 93 09:37:49 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: hmm
Message-ID: <9303261736.AA20017@pluto.ee.cua.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



well one thing i really haven't seen in this whole anon. remailer bid is what
are the treats to individuals and how often would these threats be eminent or
really occur and does the bad really out weigh the good? i will go into it
futher someother time but just food for thought...
Clovis




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: grady@netcom.com (Grady Ward)
Date: Fri, 26 Mar 93 12:44:21 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Mac app: trash helper 1/1
Message-ID: <9303262042.AA28028@netcom.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Enclosed is a small Macintosh application that writes over the unallocated
space on the current volume with a long-period stream RNG seeded with the 
system clock.  Similar in speed and function to the "erase empty space" option
in the Norton Utilities, it is for Mac users who would prefer to have happy
nonsense rather than boring zeros on their unallocated blocks.  
In cpt.hqx format.

It is cypherpunkware: if you like it, secretly give it to a someone else.

(This file must be converted with BinHex 4.0)
:&&4bBA0S)%KPE("PFL!a,M!ZBh"d!&""3e4$8%08!3!!!(A&!!!!!&@F!3(p"J!
!G*@!4@GRGhKiHAPUL)U*LSQ*Q'PkLhKjLBKhHBQ+QSU*HSKhHBQ)D(Q+H(ThLBQ
+QjZBD)L)CiLCH(GUH)LDHBYmLRLDQ)L+UCUBLTUEUjbVUjTkQTUUH+bDR(QDQUU
DLjZDLBZDUTUVQjZ*LTZEQCZEQBUDQCQDQjUDLjZ,QBL)GQ8J!!%N49GRH*QCUUZ
UZVbmZ`[G!-!0!0!!d!!!$3!!!!T!*%9Q9&ChGiD)KiL&L(LBH)L*D)L)L)L)Q)L
*QAQBHCQ*HTLCQSLCQBQBL*Q)QALCQCQDLCQDQDLDUDUCUUUDUS3L!6r$m8)F)"*
'JPlVYC2p1HrUPpKmZABi'Gq6e(1!Mc[aG6IkhDl+A-f0j2f0r,k@[XCH[[TrD5!
jY,LidqLd6J3(BKZDKaBEVYFKplaT2q`%8hq2Y#"9,%2f(b'SIr6mTa),(AZ#25f
,SPRh4,TA"+GVR4,1Z#3Xqb!3#+MYJ)eBSmZq`p&C3Li2)Xmdi%DG`)lT`)mTS4r
9*F#2*D%E(kM3LIil3MDmGS4YUK`)bMJ4A1"'UF#2fY#0[Nh!MFZ"$L%EILZ"(V1
"(*D%GR61"&Zi%E*`)[(!M&D%I3F6$k$K4p$F1"(LZ"(S1"(-D%B'GF#,e`)r+d)
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6-3c,-H*P!%64*E"SQ)N0%`L64))64)BC1K+XqD0%N5jSd54,QQ"dR'FhN!#F*c8
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From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Johan Helsingius <julf@penet.FI>
Date: Fri, 26 Mar 93 03:39:41 PST
To: John Gilmore <gnu@toad.com>
Subject: Re: REMAIL: cypherpunks strategy
In-Reply-To: <9303260911.AA15667@toad.com>
Message-ID: <9303261213.aa24686@penet.penet.FI>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



> Thousands of users are not enough.  If individual users are doing it,
> they are too subject to pressure from their system managers.  We don't
> have software capable of rerouting among a thousand remailers, 100 of which
> get their accounts canceled daily, 100 new ones added each day.  We
> aren't likely to get it soon, either.

Agree 100%.

> To permanently restore at least last month's level of service, we need
> a couple of dedicated, firewalled, buttressed sites.  You want a few
> geographically separated people who own their own systems (or who own
> or run the company that owns them), who have solid network links
> (possibly redundant), and who are fully committed to the idea -- as
> committed as funet.fi to persist past the vilification and harassment
> and threats.

Uh... I'm not so sure FUNET (the Finnish University NETwork) would agree
with you ;-)

But the truly overwhelming response in support of anon.penet.fi (I still
get flooded by notes of sympathy and support) on the net seems actually
to make a difference, as does effort of prominent personalities (especially
Peter Honeyman) to contact the Finnish autorithies. After talking to
them today, I might actually risk putting up the service again. But I
feel that to ensure that this is the last time the net.demigods try to
close down a server like this we should do our best to address their
concerns. This way, everybody saves face, and we might get a lot of
brownie points.

So what I would like to suggest is that I announce that anon.penet.fi
mark II goes on the air - let's say April 15th, with slightly changed
policies and with all the technical improvements we've been discussing.
And meanwhile I set up an adress for receiving sugestions on
improvements (both technical and political), and encourage newsgroups to
do polls on allowing or disallowing anonymity in that particular group.

But before doing anything, I really would like to get comments, views
and ideas from all of you!

> And those people need backup from the rest of us -- legal help if they
> need or want it, money to pay the networking bill if things get tight,
> loans of backup equipment during failures under load, system
> administration when folks try to break in and trash their machines,
> software creation and maintenance, advocacy, policy work, advice,

Couldn't agree more. If I go for anon.penet.fi Mk. II, I really want to
replace the current mess of shell and awk scripts with something more
efficient (linear search of a 0.5 meg database isn't very speedy...),
and I really would like to have code to check that the incoming SMTP
message actually comes from and existing site, and so on - so there is a
lot of coding to be done that I really could use some help on!

> a bunch of shoulders to cry on and warm words of encouragement.

Yes! I don't know how to express how important the support has been! You
really have to be a stubborn, crazy bastard to do anything like this,
but the hate mail still wears you down if you don't get a kind word of
encouragement every now and then. I really have to thank all of you for
your support!

> Three to five people providing such setups, in collaboration, would
> wedge a steel-toed boot so firmly in the door that it couldn't be
> slammed by any dyspeptic "net god".

Well, looking at the way the discussion is going all over the net, I
think we might be almost there already!

	Julf





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Johan Helsingius <julf@penet.FI>
Date: Fri, 26 Mar 93 09:00:00 PST
To: John Gilmore <gnu@toad.com>
Subject: Re: there ain't no usenet "backbone"
In-Reply-To: <9303260851.AA15506@toad.com>
Message-ID: <9303261218.aa24726@penet.penet.FI>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



> There is a single site `backbone' now -- uunet -- which has a stated 
> policy of passing all traffic.  (Why not?  They get paid by the minute.)
> It's still important for the thousands of UUCP sites, especially those
> that are in the boonies, far from local Internet nodes.

You have to remember that there are still not too many redundant
connections between US and Europe, Australia and Japan. To some extent
we ase still dependent on singular connection points (uunet/AlterNet/CIX
etc.).

	Julf





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Peter Wayner <pcw@access.digex.com>
Date: Fri, 26 Mar 93 11:11:04 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Anonymous Corollary...
Message-ID: <199303261908.AA26423@access.digex.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



The debate about the advantages of anonymity reminds me of
the debate over Hillary's Health Care Committee which is
a nameless group of individuals who have all signed a secrecy
pledge. Many are not part of the government and can't be held
accountable or even fired. The Wall Street Journal was able
to get the list of the people involved and published it along
with a reminiscence of the good old days when studying who
was in power in the Kremlin involved watching the cars to 
see who was coming and going and meeting in the baths at
the same time. There never was any dependable list of who
was in power at the Kremlin back then. 

Now, in response to the WSJ's coup de fax, the Clintonians
say that they'll release the list as soon as it has been
prepared. 

The point: the government has a relentless desire to document
and assign accountability for everything. It's bred in their
bones. Even the President can avoid it. 

-Peter




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "L. Detweiler" <ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Date: Fri, 26 Mar 93 13:12:13 PST
To: Eric Hughes <hughes@soda.berkeley.edu>
Subject: Re: Many Important Items in the News
In-Reply-To: <9303260756.AA24450@soda.berkeley.edu>
Message-ID: <9303262110.AA06813@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>All the more reason to allow the backbone admins the power to not pass
>anonymous articles.  It won't work, they'll feel like they're in
>control, and everyone wins.

wait, are you advocating news admins allowed to filter anonymous mail
from downstream/upstream feeds?  I don't get this.





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Round Waffle <eggo@student.umass.edu>
Date: Fri, 26 Mar 93 11:36:17 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: PGP: Elm patch question
Message-ID: <9303261934.AA29696@titan.ucs.umass.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text


     I heard some discussion on here a while back regarding problems
getting the Elm Perl scripts included in 2.2 to work correctly.  I too have
had this problem, and have very limited knowledge of Perl.  Did anyone ever
get something working smoothly?  I've munged around with the script in
every way I feel safe doing, and somewhere along the lines, it's still
choking.

+-   eggo@titan.ucs.umass.edu      --><--       Eat Some Paste   -+
+-          Yorn desh born, der ritt de gitt der gue,            -+
+-      Orn desh, dee born desh, de umn bork! bork! bork!        -+
+----------------- The Durex Blender Corporation -----------------+



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Date: Fri, 26 Mar 93 14:49:02 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: How secure is an anonomous mail-server
In-Reply-To: <9303262144.AA07992@walrus.chp.atmel.com>
Message-ID: <9303262247.AA18162@netcom3.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Peter Baumbach writes:

> Suppose somone wanted to compromise an anonomous mail-server.  Couldn't it
> be possible without the owner of the mail-server knowing?  The attack might
> consist of monitoring all traffic to and from that address.  Unless the 
> server waits a long and random time to forward the incoming mail, couldn't
> a mapping be made of real-name/possible-anon-names?  If a users uses the
> same anonomous name for long enough (2 times?) couldn't the attacker be
> very confident of the mapping?  If the attacker uses the server themselves
> creatively, wouldn't the task be even easier?  
> 
> This seems like a simple cipher easily broken.
> 
> I am new to this, so I appologize if this is a dumb question.

Yes, this is basically the "traffic analysis" problem. This is
discussed (briefly) in the "Glossary" located in the Cypherpunks
archives at soda.berkeley.edu (in the /pub/cypherpunks directory).

Existing remailers are not secure against either traffic analysis or
record-keeping by the operators. Nor are they secure against textual
analysis (a lesser problem). 

Adding encryption helps against operator record-keeping. Accumulating
enough messages (e.g., 10) so that following a message through 10
remailers is problematic is another approach, though nobody is now
doing this. (And even with lots of accumulated messages and lots of
remailers, statistical evidence can be accumulated. For example, if
everytime "Deadbeat" posts to some group there was a packet leaving my
machine some hours before.....)

David Chaum's 1981 CACM paper/letter described "mixes," which some on
this list are pursuing. His even more advanced "DC-Nets" (also covered
in the Glossary and in _many_ postings on this list) are
information-theoretically secure. We may see them deployed soon, in at
least an experimental form.

Not a dumb question, just one that's come up several times. (Someday
we may even have a Cypherpunk FAQ.)


-Tim May

-- 
..........................................................................
Timothy C. May         | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,  
tcmay@netcom.com       | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
408-688-5409           | knowledge, reputations, information markets, 
W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA  | black markets, collapse of governments.
Higher Power: 2^756839 | Public Key: PGP and MailSafe available.





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: mccoy@ccwf.cc.utexas.edu (Jim McCoy)
Date: Fri, 26 Mar 93 13:20:12 PST
To: tytso@Athena.MIT.EDU (Theodore Ts'o)
Subject: Re: Anonymity, accountability, and control
In-Reply-To: <9303262102.AA04094@SOS>
Message-ID: <9303262118.AA09185@tramp.cc.utexas.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text


>    I believe that UUNET has applied for and received common carrier
>    status [...]
> 
> 	I'd love to hear more about this --- my understanding was that
> "common carrier" status only had a specific meaning for telephone
> companies, and also meant as a side effect that they had to regulated by
> the FCC.  I was not aware that "common carrier" status had any meaning
> in the computer networking arena, since no regulatory agency would have
> the right to receive applications and grant common carrier status,
> unless a law were specifically passed by Congress or perhaps some action
> resulting from a Federal court decision.

I am fairly certain that the people doing Skynet (Usenet news over
satelite) are common carriers (or at least that is what Len Rose told me, I
could be wrong...)  For an example that predates computer communication by
some time but might be a worthwhile example anyway, take a look at Western
Union's telegraph business.  What is/was thier status regarding the
messages they sent?

jim



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@Athena.MIT.EDU>
Date: Fri, 26 Mar 93 12:53:13 PST
To: Peter Wayner <pcw@access.digex.com>
Subject: Re: Anonymous Corollary...
In-Reply-To: <199303261908.AA26423@access.digex.com>
Message-ID: <9303262051.AA04090@SOS>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


   Date: Fri, 26 Mar 1993 14:08:05 -0500
   From: Peter Wayner <pcw@access.digex.com>

   The point: the government has a relentless desire to document
   and assign accountability for everything. It's bred in their
   bones. Even the President can avoid it. 

There is an interesting quote reportedly made by Stephen Wolfe, head of
the NSF, when someone was amazed about the incredible inefficiency of
some of the government purchasing procedures ---- ``The people don't
want efficient goverment; they want an accountable government --- and
there's a difference.''

Given the distrust voiced by many people when Dr. Demming's proposal was
brought forth, anonymity is probably a bad thing when it comes to
goverment officials performing official actions in the line of duty.
Given how petty, vicious, and evil (tm) government bureaucrats are(*), it's
probably a good thing that they have to be held strictly accountable for
everything they do, and for all of that to be documented.  Would you
like to give all sorts of powers to the likes of Ollie North, and then
give them license to work anonymously?

Now, this line of reasoning only applies to government officials ---
what standards should apply to private citizens are of course completely
different.  In the case of Hillary's Health Care Committee, it isn't
clear whether or not the names listed were merely private citizens
giving "testimony" or "evidence" to feed into the process as input, or
whether they're people who are making policy decisions.  If they're
people making policy decisions, even if they are not officially
governmente employees, the Wall Street Journal's decision to publish
their names is emminently justifiable.  The last thing a democracy needs
is a secret cabal making all the decisions in a back room.

						- Ted

(*) or at least how evil(tm) it is widely believed them to be....




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: nowhere@bsu-cs.bsu.edu (Chael Hall)
Date: Fri, 26 Mar 93 12:50:46 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: REMAIL: send-mail.c (alpha version)
In-Reply-To: <9303261530.AA19663@toad.com>
Message-ID: <9303262052.AA15182@bsu-cs.bsu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>I would like to build a remailer too, and I wanted to try and
>understand how Hal's remailer works first. Also, do you know if
>there is code available for any other remailers in shell script
>or C?
>
>Thanks a lot,
>Avi Rubin
>
> -----------
>
>Chael Hall wrote a remailer in C.  He should be willing to share his
>code.  Ask on the list.
>
>Eric

     The code that is included here was not intended for release yet.
There are several bugs and oversights.  I have been going through a
complete redesign of Send-Mail (SM), but haven't coded any of it yet.
What is here is the old source patched to do most of what I want it to
do.  You can see that there is support for a file processor and indeed
PGP works okay with it, but I don't *like* the way they work together,
so I do not recommend using the processor feature.  In the redesigned
version, the remailer operator can setup as many file processors as
he/she wants.  A file can be processes several times before it gets
sent.

     Most of the important stuff that would differ can be set in the
.send-mailrc file (which should be in the user's home directory, it
can be linked to another place) or is defined at the beginning.  Let
me know what you think; I am open to suggestions.

Chael Hall

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M4V +C(%;@P:.,8W$ S?YI",01G!>-\%#A\^F8*80CTGR"^;-\1I;<* I3"IL
ML"V:$'U7\I;I;)V9@SU9"\MWJ->1Y0&6CL_RJRZ[\G8MP^ =G['?\FB>RUC=
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M#/[:?3"D14YPP< &;:$9!ML*@; 9" H;?M<SK7<YF>82L044(ENV]>1A;""#
MV[=RG12.X<0VLI4[&][)QNTA0?F8RN8ML&PODD*"$Z%)$Q#0MB();4V!BQ1P
M@4A04G.4LTUR*QLTU1[Y; "/<=@E-4!,4EY4M"UR%-!R@P)<=^!A>"@>CH?D
*87EH'IZ'Z.%U!QLT
 
end




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@Athena.MIT.EDU>
Date: Fri, 26 Mar 93 13:04:15 PST
To: mccoy@ccwf.cc.utexas.edu
Subject: Re: Anonymity, accountability, and control
In-Reply-To: <9303261754.AA06965@tramp.cc.utexas.edu>
Message-ID: <9303262102.AA04094@SOS>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


   From: mccoy@ccwf.cc.utexas.edu (Jim McCoy)
   Date: Fri, 26 Mar 1993 11:54:39 -0600 (CST)

   I believe that UUNET has applied for and received common carrier status, in
   which case they are not responsible for thier traffic and cannot make any
   judgement calls regarding the traffic coming from a particular site.  It is
   kind of like the phone company; they may not approve of the 976-BABE
   numbers, but as long as those operations do not break the law there is
   nothing the phone company can do about them no matter how many complaints
   they may receive.

	I'd love to hear more about this --- my understanding was that
"common carrier" status only had a specific meaning for telephone
companies, and also meant as a side effect that they had to regulated by
the FCC.  I was not aware that "common carrier" status had any meaning
in the computer networking arena, since no regulatory agency would have
the right to receive applications and grant common carrier status,
unless a law were specifically passed by Congress or perhaps some action
resulting from a Federal court decision.

	Or is it that UUNET merely considers themselves a "common
carrier" but that this has yet to be tested in court?

	Would Mike Goodwin be willing to comment on this?  It would
certainly have a lot of implications towards providing free speech on
computer nets, and I'd love to have a real lawyer's perspective on this
--- as opposed to the perspective of millions of people who merely play
one on USENET.  :-)

						- Ted




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: pete@cirrus.com (Pete Carpenter)
Date: Fri, 26 Mar 93 16:57:36 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re:  ANON: Shutdown of Anon.penet.fi
Message-ID: <9303270027.AA11431@ss2138.cirrus.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


----- Begin Included Message -----

Date: Fri, 26 Mar 1993 10:38:31 -0800
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
From: lefty@apple.com (Lefty)
Subject: ANON: Shutdown of Anon.penet.fi

I have been told that Clayton Cramer, the bete noire of alt.sex.bondage, is
the "net.personality" responsible for the shutdown of anon.penet.fi.  I do
not know this to be a fact.

Funny, I never thought of him as being particularly "highly regarded".

----- End Included Message -----

Mr. Cramer is highly regarded for his scolarly work in regard to the 
Civil War, and the political history of the Second Amendment. He has 
just published a book on the later.

His other 'opinions' have always amused me somewhat, because he was one 
of the first net.people that got me interested in the Libertarian Party. 
Those rantings seem very out of step with this general political attitude, 
quite un-libertarian, in fact.  


Pete Carpenter                           pete@cirrus.com
                                
Talk about your plenty, talk about your ills,
One man gathers what another man spills. - Robert Hunter




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: nowhere@bsu-cs.bsu.edu (Chael Hall)
Date: Fri, 26 Mar 93 13:26:10 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: REMAIL: sendmail.cf problems
Message-ID: <9303262128.AA18752@bsu-cs.bsu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



     I am working on a new project on 386BSD with pseudonymous user ID's.
What I want to do is use a rule in the /etc/sendmail.cf file to make
all messages to "anon.###" be processed by the anonymous contact service
and everything else to be processed as local mail.  I added the following
lines to my configuration file and made a new frozen config file, but I
keep having trouble getting it to work:

Ranon.$-	$#acs$:anon.$1

Macs,	P=/usr/guest/anon/anon-reply, F=nlF, S=10, R=20, A=anon-reply $u

     The first line should make all mail directed to "anon.*" be processed
by the mailer "acs."  The second should define a mailer named acs that
executes anon-reply.  I found that this would make it impossible to alias
anon.post, anon.admin, anon.ping, anon.help, etc.  So, I changed the first
line to:

Ranon.[0-9]$-	$#acs$:anon.$1

     That makes newaliases stop bitching about the aliases, but any mail
directed to an anon.### account bounces and it says "User unknown."  I
ignored the alias problem once and actually got it to get farther, where
it said "Unknown mailer error 2."  I think that's because it was using
/bin/sh instead of /bin/csh which is required for the scripts that I got
from a friend.  (acs2.2 is what I got, it was used for alt.personals)

     I want to rewrite it, but the important part is getting the aliasing
to work.  The rest is a piece of cake once I can get sendmail do to this.
I hate to rebuild my alias database, besides which, that slows down ALL
mail.  If anyone knows which RFC's to look at for the sendmail.cf format
or has experience with this problem, I would be eternally grateful.

Chael Hall

--
Chael Hall
nowhere@bsu-cs.bsu.edu, 00CCHALL@BSUVC.BSU.EDU
(317) 285-3648 after 5 pm EST




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: baumbach@atmel.com (Peter Baumbach)
Date: Fri, 26 Mar 93 13:55:59 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: How secure is an anonomous mail-server
Message-ID: <9303262144.AA07992@walrus.chp.atmel.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Suppose somone wanted to compromise an anonomous mail-server.  Couldn't it
be possible without the owner of the mail-server knowing?  The attack might
consist of monitoring all traffic to and from that address.  Unless the 
server waits a long and random time to forward the incoming mail, couldn't
a mapping be made of real-name/possible-anon-names?  If a users uses the
same anonomous name for long enough (2 times?) couldn't the attacker be
very confident of the mapping?  If the attacker uses the server themselves
creatively, wouldn't the task be even easier?  

This seems like a simple cipher easily broken.

I am new to this, so I appologize if this is a dumb question.

Peter Baumbach
baumbach@atmel.com




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: stig@transam.ece.cmu.edu (Jonathan Stigelman)
Date: Fri, 26 Mar 93 20:55:04 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Availability of filtering scripts
Message-ID: <223@x15_remote.stigmobile.usa>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


In message <9303260732.AA23550@soda.berkeley.edu> you write:

>Were such a utility posted to alt.sources, and if all a user had to do
>was ftp it from an archive, unpack it, and run it once, we would be in
>a much better position politically, (even if the utility received very
>little use).
>
>It is difficult to install mail filters.  Our argument for user
>filtering would be much stronger if installation were simple.
>
>A similar argument holds for anonymous posting filters in a global
>KILL file.
>

two points:

1.  An even more convienient way to distribute this filter would be
by having it available from the anonymizing server itself.  Mail to
filter-request@anon.foonet.bar to get a copy.  This is better for
sites that do not have ftp available.

1.5  A variant on this approach would be for the server itself to do
the blocking of mail.  Mail to block-my-mail@anon.foonet.bar.  Would
prevent that server from sending anonymous mail to you.  (the server
would, of course, send a receipt for the transaction to the user
who's mail is blocked...just in case of request forgery.)

2.  This would be a political win, but it would really be just a step
in the right direction since many people don't read their mail from
UNIX boxes....  PCs, Macs, Fidonet boards, VMS, etc.

	Stig







From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: J. Michael Diehl <mdiehl@triton.unm.edu>
Date: Fri, 26 Mar 93 17:38:00 PST
To: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Subject: we need a faq.
In-Reply-To: <9303262247.AA18162@netcom3.netcom.com>
Message-ID: <9303270136.AA27824@triton.unm.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> 
> Not a dumb question, just one that's come up several times. (Someday
> we may even have a Cypherpunk FAQ.)
> 

I will mantain the faq if people will send my usefull information, such as ftp
sites, remailer-reposter sites, short answers to "obvious" questions, etc.  I
will mail it out on a regular basis and perhapse to new subscribers, if that is
possible.

Come on folks give me a hand here! ;^)

+----------------------+----------------------------------------------------+
| J. Michael Diehl ;-) |  I thought I was wrong once.  But, I was mistaken. |
|                      +----------------------------------------------------+
| mdiehl@triton.unm.edu| "I'm just looking for the opportunity to be        |
| Thunder@forum        |            Politically Incorrect!                  |
| (505) 299-2282       |                        <me>                        |
+----------------------+----------------------------------------------------+




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Date: Fri, 26 Mar 93 18:57:57 PST
To: J. Michael Diehl <mdiehl@triton.unm.edu>
Subject: Re: we need a faq.
Message-ID: <9303270256.AA21236@netcom.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


J. Michael Diehl writes:

>I will mantain the faq if people will send my usefull information, such as ftp
>sites, remailer-reposter sites, short answers to "obvious" questions, etc.  I
>will mail it out on a regular basis and perhapse to new subscribers, if that is
>possible.
>
>Come on folks give me a hand here! ;^)

The problem with FAQs is that someone almost always volunteers to put
together a FAQ if people will "send them stuff." Then he realizes what an
enormous job it is, as the submissions are either a) not there, b) are too
brief or confusing, c) require lots of editing, or d) other problems exist.
Then that volunteer just sort of lets it all slide--and several months
later some new eager beaver makes a similar proposal. I've seen this happen
on several groups and mailing lists.

Someone on this list boldly stepped forward last September, begged for
submissions (some of us even sent stuff in), then let it slide. Officially,
I suppose he is still working on it, but nothing has appeared. I'm not
holding my breath.

Since we are an anarchy, nobody can force him--or you, for that mattter--to
finish it. The way FAQs traditionally get done is for someone to just write
the whole damn thing...this will of course mean that someone must become
quite knowledgeable about remailers, PERL, Chaum's work, the math of
crypto, the politics and jargon of crypto privacy, and on and on. Not
trying to scare you off, just pointing out that a FAQ will not write
itself, nor can you count on others to "contribute" (for the reasons
mentioned above).

(Sometimes a "stone soup" approach works, where a "Rev. 0" FAQ is posted
and then the critics come out of the woodwork to suggest improvements. If I
was writing the FAQ, that's how I'd approach it...just get *something* out
as quickly as possible and then see if anyone wants to change anything or
make additions.)

If you publicly announce your plans to do the FAQ, and begin soliciting
contributions, PLEASE make sure it gets finished!

By the way, in my opinion, the Cypherpunks FAQ is *essentially* available
already in the regular postings of list members Lance Detweiler (he posts a
long article to sci.crypt describing privacy on the Internet) and Karl
Barrus (he keeps an updated list of remailers).

Good luck.

-Tim May
--
Timothy C. May         | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,  
tcmay@netcom.com       | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
408-688-5409           | knowledge, reputations, information markets, 
W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA  | black markets, collapse of governments.
Higher Power: 2^756839 | Public Key: MailSafe and PGP available.





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Eric Hughes <hughes@soda.berkeley.edu>
Date: Fri, 26 Mar 93 19:06:39 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Remailers
In-Reply-To: <9303261530.AA19663@toad.com>
Message-ID: <9303270302.AA28743@soda.berkeley.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I wrote:
>The question you asked me about understanding the remailer operation
>is of general enough interest that you ought to just ask the list at
>large.

>In specific, I don't know of any such theory of operation.

When I wrote this, I wasn't thinking.  When I wrote the original
remailer code, I posted it to alt.hackers along with a theory of
operation.  I don't know if I have a copy of that anymore.

Can someone provide it?  It was from last September.  Who gets
Usenet on CD here, anyway?

Eric




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Eric Hughes <hughes@soda.berkeley.edu>
Date: Fri, 26 Mar 93 19:43:32 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Many Important Items in the News
In-Reply-To: <9303262110.AA06813@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Message-ID: <9303270339.AA00329@soda.berkeley.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>>All the more reason to allow the backbone admins the power to not pass
>>anonymous articles.  It won't work, they'll feel like they're in
>>control, and everyone wins.

>wait, are you advocating news admins allowed to filter anonymous mail
>from downstream/upstream feeds?  I don't get this.

Yes.  If someone doesn't want to pass traffic, let them.  It's
extremely foolish; they'll get a bad rep for it.  If they're a
commercial site, they'll lose customers.  If they're not, they'll lose
face.  Freedom to filter is freedom to shoot yourself in the foot.

But as Peter Honeyman points out, filtering anonymous posts won't work
to prevent them from being passed around, and they'll continue to use
external channels to pressure connectivity and administration.  These
channels have no technical amelioration; doing politics in the broad
sense is the only solution for this.

Eric





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Johan Helsingius <julf@penet.FI>
Date: Fri, 26 Mar 93 12:59:08 PST
To: "Timothy C. May" <tcmay@netcom.com>
Subject: Re: Many Important Items in the News
In-Reply-To: <9303242312.AA07079@netcom.netcom.com>
Message-ID: <9303261839.aa28234@penet.penet.FI>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



> And given that our systems are "even more anonymous" that Julf's was, the
> abuses seen with his system will have to be faced on our systems. The
> alleged abuses of Julf's system: supposedly a picture of a burn victim was
> posted to one of the erotica groups (tacky in the extreme, but hardly
> illegal or a threat), instructions on how to poison cats (also tacky but
> not ipso facto criminal), etc. (I don't know what the culminating case was,
> nor will I speculate.)

Uh... I really am a bit hesitant to talk about this, so I would appreciate
it if you kept this private. A very visible and highly-regarded net
personality took offense at some rather abusive exchanges in
talk.politics.mideast, and contacted just the right people in a very
politically loaded Finnish networking scene, but I know he acted out of
a regard for (his wiew of) the best for the networking community.
I have been expecting him to come forward and state his reasons.

The problem is that I live in a country where somebody got thrown in
jail for high treason for selling a couple of old, second-hand VAX
machines to the former Eastern Block. And as people managed to
turn the mail "from an international networking authority" into proof of
the fact that I was destroying the image of networking in Finland in the
eyes of the international community....

> There was also a major flamewar over the weekend when one Richard DePew
> decided to initiate his "ARMM" ("Automated Retroactive Minimal Moderation")
> program, which sent out "CANCEL" notices for anonymous messages posted to
> certain groups. Very controversial, and a sign of things to come. (The
> connection, if any, with Julf's shutdown remains unclear. Certainly the
> whole issue of anonymous postings reached a head this past weekend.
> Sternlight's threats about PGP may have been involved as well. Julf?)

The ARMM thing actually backfired in a spectacular fashion, causing a
lot of people to speak up in defence of the service.

> These are certainly interesting times.

Uh, yes, in many ways (says Julf, fresh back from Slovakia...)





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Lord Krieg" <CVADSAAV@CSUPomona.Edu>
Date: Fri, 26 Mar 93 22:38:11 PST
To: "cypherpunks" <cypherpunks@toad.com>
Subject: Comments on anonymous servers
Message-ID: <9303270638.AA02109@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

Joe Thomas has suggested that a group of penet-style anonymous servers 
be set up to act as "front ends" for the Cypherpunk remailers. This seems 
like a good idea (provided that the technical problems can be overcome), 
but I'd like to propose an addition.

Having more than one of the penet-style front ends active at once will 
only provide more targets for (anonymous) net.fascists. I suggest that 
instead of having a handful of front ends operating, have only one front 
end actually operational at a time. Other servers would be on standby, 
and would constantly update their database with the active server. That 
way, the moment someone trashed the active server, another could be 
activated. This way the service would be interupted only briefly.

Since it has thus far taken some time for anonymous servers to be brought 
down, this should allow the front ends to keep up. If someone out there 
trashes a new front end every month, we would only need to find a new 
server every month, with a "cushion" of servers waiting on standby.

Now, as I understood the suggestion from Joe Thomas, the Cypherpunk 
remailers behind the front ends would only be "visible" to the people 
involved in running the service. This would certainly make the remailers 
more secure, since the net.fascists would not know who to terrorize to 
can the remailers.

Although I certainly may be misunderstanding something, I don't really 
see why the users of the service would ever need to see a message about 
"if mail to here bounces, try there." Shouldn't the loss of a remailer be 
dealt with entirely "behind the scenes," by the service administrators?

If I've said something really stupid or obvious here, please bear with 
me. The whole idea of anonymity only became of interest to me a few days 
ago. (It's amazing how badly some people react to fascist slime telling 
them they can't do something, even if they never thought of doing it 
before.)

                            Kenneth G. Hagler

**********************************************************************
*   Internet: cvadsaav@csupomona.edu    *   My insurance company     *
*   Phone: (909) 865-7751               *     is Beretta U.S.A.      *
*   PGP 2.2 key available on request    *                            *
*--------------------------------------------------------------------*
*   ...study of the military arts will make one who is naturally     *
*   clever more so and one who is born somewhat dull rather less     *
*   so.                                                              *
*            --Daidoji Yuzan Shigesuke, _Budo Shoshinshu_            *
**********************************************************************
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Version: 2.2

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From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: edgar@spectrx.Saigon.COM (Edgar W. Swank)
Date: Sat, 27 Mar 93 07:44:18 PST
To: Cypherpunks          <cypherpunks@toad.com>
Subject: PGP:  Key Updates
Message-ID: <L6q31B7w165w@spectrx.saigon.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

I'm re-posting my 512 and 1024 bit public keys.  They haven't
changed, but some new signatures have been added.

- --Type bits/keyID   Date       User ID
- --pub  1024/87C0C7 1992/10/17  Edgar W. Swank <edgar@spectrx.saigon.com>
- --sig       AF00E5               David Del Torto <deltorto@aol.com>
- --sig       DD98D9               Vesselin V. Bontchev
- --                               <bontchev@fbihh.informatik.uni-hamburg.de>
- --sig       67F70B               Philip R. Zimmermann <prz@sage.cgd.ucar.edu>
- -----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----
Version: 2.1

mQCNAirfypkAAAEEAKe2jziPeFw6hY19clR2GtQ4gtGCSSVOTgPKEJzHfuC74Scf
9PEuu1kebLhHk43A9wo1vr52o4jpH/P/tnFmRtBQOMzLUzAt5rMucswtSVviMQS2
hBuc9yGJKWHVcyfA79EARKEYTdhx+2qKI+hFJcPE+rmD8wVoF94nNf3ah8DHAAUR
tClFZGdhciBXLiBTd2FuayA8ZWRnYXJAc3BlY3RyeC5zYWlnb24uY29tPokAlQIF
ECuXMhOhwThfSq8A5QEBqF0D/itGhJWncb4qLTC+RwC+mfC3u9IRikddKTKgLwt0
Cqz1t+3k0NM7KSDDkfWoUbUOiqTqhHTLFjST3V5WgFVyUtYNv3iw07cmMcko79B0
4OKTkOmZcSdCEF8uW6O5iQK0mOgG/X5B0iaee/1o2J0a4sCd429n5Q02p8TchFKH
M3DciQCVAgUQK2PmLDZWl8Yy3ZjZAQEMRgP/aIwyaXrl4Vo1as0/tptiHxBbf4ye
PKXkI2kCMaTF6OYibidkqpQc3kO4bOkkOey1HBvPp1pcrXldygzWbyC6G7pTMjAe
z36FsoTqKdMLPgLSYTnk9Ka8X96ON7GcbOyIWm4WeM3+xGtIdznt+U4hRYEJkPwe
LPPdpgHGa/AnzreJAJUCBRArERcc4nXeDv9n9wsBAbJiA/9qly/1XYxscWBTSGXQ
PgwuoaMFF5R8OujFAKyCxNv/SevVb3KW0Eypg+APtOEsB/avEg81sbIPtVQDbstP
BBNLqfaZu2Qc68ZBXDsnYbBMDrfX0Z/RCd7QzWHtUlaMVfRXOO6H+eTpu3Eza5Mt
IXadSwNd7n/03ld56wWGttc2sw==
=F7iK
- -----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----

- --Type bits/keyID   Date       User ID
- --pub   512/4F0C47 1992/09/26  Edgar W. Swank <edgar@spectrx.saigon.com>
- --sig!      DD98D9 1993/02/02    Vesselin V. Bontchev
                                 <bontchev@fbihh.informatik.uni-hamburg.de>
- --sig!      67F70B 1992/10/14    Philip R. Zimmermann <prz@sage.cgd.ucar.edu>
- -----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----
Version: 2.1
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=XtlP
- -----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----

I can receive messages encrypted with either key, but
I will usually -sign- messages with the 1024-bit key.

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.2

iQCVAgUBK7RY1N4nNf3ah8DHAQHB4QP+LE70bsNtOy1TjpV73P5xHHib4wH/LGX5
rMoU5w8t4p8q8OCUhUaQG5OmtE79nZFt2q49rIg9FQZH1NlhKlfpZa5JSCMcs4Ls
IOY2BKDw2voxAIpooueqUTHMwRNGakMA3utUnVTQ8gf001Ie8GRpdomDxbsmW6uG
PtXkyQpuRQo=
=TGiw
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

--
edgar@spectrx.saigon.com (Edgar W. Swank)
SPECTROX SYSTEMS +1.408.252.1005  Silicon Valley, Ca





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: edgar@spectrx.Saigon.COM (Edgar W. Swank)
Date: Sat, 27 Mar 93 07:44:22 PST
To: Cypherpunks          <cypherpunks@toad.com>
Subject: REMAIL:  "Stealth" Remailers
Message-ID: <y6q31B8w165w@spectrx.saigon.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

In the wake of the forced demise of penet.fi, Dave del Torto
said:

    >>> The anonymous service at anon.penet.fi has been closed down.

    This is a dark day indeed.  The forces of Repression are upon us
    yet again.

    OK, where do we set up the next one?  I guess the solution here is
    to have a floating set of difficult-to-detect anon remailers and
    switch between them regularly.

I have an idea for making remailers more difficult to find. This
applies only to systems where the remailer operator owns the
system, such as at wimsey.com.  (But a "system" can be just
a PC/XT with hard disk and modem - maybe under $1000).

Where the remailer operator controls the system, it's easy to
"forge" net headers. The problem is that once you send mail,
other systems are going to add "Received:" lines to the net
headers that point back to you.  I don't know how to stop this
once the mail leaves your control.

But it should be possible to add -extra- "Received:" headers,
indicating you received the message from some system "behind" you.
Should the "net police" trace an "offensive" message back to you,
you can point to the added net headers and say, "Oh, but this came
from -him-, not -me-; -I'm- just an innocent forwarder (not remailer)
of this message.  That SOB down at the end there must be running one
of those infernal remailers; Go get him!!"  By the way, these phony
added headers should all have -real- system names.

It's fairly easy to trace messages along the "mainline" internet,
because those are all "hard-wired" leased lines.  But there's another
class of system called UUCP which sends and receives messages over the
- -switched- network (ordinary dialup telephone lines).  Many of the
mainline systems accept UUCP accounts, so UUCP systems usually have
the same internet connectivity as the mainline systems for E-mail.
(They can't do FTP and Telnet).  Furthermore, UUCP systems can allow
other systems UUCP accounts, creating long chains over the dial-up
net.  Furthermore, a UUCP system can be set up with a minimal
investment in hardware.

A single hardware system can be -many- different UUCP "systems" by
just dialing into different UUCP "accounts".  A good strategy
is to accept mail for remailing at one well-publicized UUCP
address, but -never- use that same account for -sending- remailed
mail. Just use one of several -other- UUCP accounts for that,
adding phony "From:" and "Received:" net headers as explained above.

Be generous in accepting UUCP accounts from other systems; don't take
too much trouble verifying the registration info they give you.  Once
they've been on a while, start using their names in the phony
"Received:"  headers you generate.

Well, I'm not an expert on either the net or the "Waffle" software
used to run small UUCP systems (like this one).  But perhaps the
above ideas will prove useful to those of you who are.

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.2

iQCVAgUBK7RidN4nNf3ah8DHAQG1/AP/dphEH+j0pou/jZ86PhQEffyVyzcHBm0A
lwEnJFhX7RXx3l4RNlhv9dTRwQwaQPiaZ7qfWhdtqIsWwBSD39krfv7RwZDVI6Rs
nuzE67BvLljl4N1rEqUdW/ln3gFvUBo/ud+b3DBFJFZEOMRPJFFkE5hux5RBxG+N
wk3X28rUUM8=
=BVPy
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

--
edgar@spectrx.saigon.com (Edgar W. Swank)
SPECTROX SYSTEMS +1.408.252.1005  Silicon Valley, Ca





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: grady@netcom.com (Grady Ward)
Date: Sat, 27 Mar 93 09:30:12 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Distributed distribution of PGP 2.2
Message-ID: <9303271728.AA12159@netcom.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Since most of us live in widely-separated places, it might really              
help broaden the popular support and use of PGP by distributing it             
to your local BBS.  Most of these people are disjoint from Unix                
people with Internet connections and so would welcome access to                
whatever versions and platforms of PGP you can upload.                         
                                                                 
I've just finished uploading the MSDOS, Mac, and Unix (with source)
versions to the local rural BBS.  If many people did the same for  
their areas it is hard to imagine how PGP could ever be "stamped out".

Lists of BBS for your area code are available from your favorite
platform archive site.
                                                    
Not negligibly, many more people exposed to and using PGP means that
many more eyes and fingers finding bugs, suggesting patches and     
improvments and generally playing with the PGP concept.           
                                                                  
Apple Computer is reputed to be readying the release of their
new "cyclone" computers during the next month or so.  This
top-end line of machines has been said to incorporate licensed      
RSA technology at the operating system level.  With the usual                                                                        
marketing hoopla this will mean that security in general but                   
specifically RSA and public key technologies will get a                        
big public push.                                                               
                                                                               
It would be great if at the time of this marketing blitz                       
people could turn to their local bbs and satisfy their                         
curiosity about RSA and public keys with PGP 2.2...                            
                                                                 
                                                                   
--                                                                 
grady@netcom.com  2EF221 / 15 E2 AD D3 D1 C6 F3 FC  58 AC F7 3D 4F 01 1E 2F
                                                    
                                                                    
                     




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Peter Honeyman <honey@citi.umich.edu>
Date: Sat, 27 Mar 93 07:47:28 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: How secure is an anonomous mail-server
Message-ID: <9303271547.AA16120@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


one way to defeat traffic analysis is to maintain a steady stream of
traffic.  to this end, avi and i are considering a "remailer tax" -- if
you send a message through a remailer, you pay a tax of (say) ten
additional messages sent and ten received.  so if you send a message
via a remailer, your software is obliged to send out an additional ten
nonce messages, spaced out over time.  that's not so onerous ... but
those messages have to *go* somewhere, so you will also be taxed by
receiving ten nonce messages.

this remailer tax is not completely thought out ... what do you
think?  if remailers catch on, the nonce traffic can be cut back.

i'm also still enamored of the probabilistic remailer notion i proposed
a few months ago, where a remailer flips a coin to determine whether to
deliver a message to it's destination or whether to throw it back into
a pool of like remailers.

	peter




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: ghoast@gnu.ai.mit.edu
Date: Sat, 27 Mar 93 12:33:31 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re:  TEMPEST in a teapot
Message-ID: <9303272031.AA36215@hal.gnu.ai.mit.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> 
> ----- Begin Included Message -----
> 
> It is speculated that poorly protected systems can
> be effectively monitored up to the order of one kilometer from the target
> equipment.
> 
> ----- End Included Message -----
> 
> The "readability" of the relatively high energy sweeps in a standard CRT monitor
> is well known. Any idea of similar effects on LCD screens ?  The energy involved
> would be orders of magnitude less, just for starters.  Also, since the whole screen
> is effectively oscillating, I'm not sure that there is any 'raster' sweep per se
> going on here at all.  This could be a factor for the truly paranoid :-) using 
> portables with LCD screens.
> 
> 
> Pete Carpenter                           pete@cirrus.com
>                                 

I've been told that the CRT is not what is generating the signals at all, rather
that it is the CPU, and that having an LCD screen won't save you, strength of
signal reduced or otherwise.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: AJ Janschewitz <0005037030@mcimail.com>
Date: Sat, 27 Mar 93 09:38:09 PST
To: Cypherpunks <cypherpunks@toad.com>
Subject: PGP key
Message-ID: <00930327173700/0005037030ND3EM@mcimail.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


My "old" PGP key died with my PSI account. The new key is below, and can be
accessed by fingering my secondary mail address, ajay@holonet.net.

If the list server ops would kindly kill my old key (which should have my
name and an attached address of p00258@psilink.com), I'd appreciate it.

Scary thought: If any goon wanted to trace remailers, with the Clintoon
Administration now accepting E-Mail, all one would have to do is send a
threatening message through a remailer and it would give the brownshirt
squad license to do all kinds of things.

A government bent on knowing everything might even initiate such a move
itself. How do the people running remailers and those of us who might have
occasion to use them deal with this straw man threat?

==a.j.==

-----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----
Version: 2.2

mQCNAiuyVNUAAAEEAMWyeYBYXNT6JXDS/3ixsS1tFd02K/qekH6gjAThcm8KkFmL
FVRsW9pwgpkrLV/nra3kWKeV6tA1Lic+21pmoXhdAR9tMLpy6k0KFYPTbYob8hkr
kZ6u6rpRz2WcvA3LxpVbPXMMa5R/rsH9r6lnE23gD3JxGoqkaxk4MFKFFwHhAAUT
tDdBLkouIEphbnNjaGV3aXR6IDxhamF5QGhvbG9uZXQubmV0LDUwMzcwMzBAbWNp
bWFpbC5jb20+
=Ylln
-----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Hal <74076.1041@CompuServe.COM>
Date: Sat, 27 Mar 93 15:28:58 PST
To: CYPHERPUNKS <CYPHERPUNKS@toad.com>
Subject: REMAIL: Anon. remailers
Message-ID: <930327232156_74076.1041_FHD20-1@CompuServe.COM>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

Kenneth G. Hagler, "Lord Krieg" <CVADSAAV@CSUPomona.Edu>, writes:

> Joe Thomas has suggested that a group of penet-style anonymous servers 
> be set up to act as "front ends" for the Cypherpunk remailers. This seems 
> like a good idea (provided that the technical problems can be overcome), 
> but I'd like to propose an addition.

I don't see the advantage of having behind-the-scenes remailers.  The
addresses of the front-end remailer(s) will have to be advertised,
and that is where people will think of the service as originating.  That
is where their attacks will be focussed.  It won't matter if there
are other systems involved with the remailing.

If one front-end gets shut down then yes, it would be nice to have
another.  Again, I don't see how this is made much easier by the
existance of multiple back-end systems.  Penet has not been replaced
yet, and I think the reason is because nobody wants to take the heat
for running such a system.  What difference does it make whether you
are running front-end software or an entire remailer?  Either way you
have to be a system manager in order to install new mail aliases
("an12345", etc.).  There just aren't that many system managers out
there willing to take on the traffic load and the political heat for
a service which they may not even believe in that strongly.

> Now, as I understood the suggestion from Joe Thomas, the Cypherpunk 
> remailers behind the front ends would only be "visible" to the people 
> involved in running the service. This would certainly make the remailers 
> more secure, since the net.fascists would not know who to terrorize to 
> can the remailers.

Again, saying that it is the back ends which are the remailers is
misleading.  As far as the net at large will be concerned, it is the
front end which is the remailer.  That is where you send your mail if
you want it to be remailed.  That is where the heat will be.  And
shutting down all the front ends will shut down the remailing service.
The existance of back ends does not affect the strategy used by our
opponents, nor does it give us any additional defense that I can see.

> Although I certainly may be misunderstanding something, I don't really 
> see why the users of the service would ever need to see a message about 
> "if mail to here bounces, try there." Shouldn't the loss of a remailer be 
> dealt with entirely "behind the scenes," by the service administrators?

How could this be done?  If I still try to send mail to an1234@anon.penet.fi,
it will not be remailed.  If Julf does start enabling such messages to
be remailed, by forwarding or by any other way, he will presumably face
the same consequences which convinced him to stop.

On the other hand, if all messages from a remailer say "reply to address
A; if that doesn't work try B, and then C" then I can guarantee that when
net powers try to shut down the remailers they will go after A, B, and C.
Exposing their names like that will just give opponents of anonymity more
time to marshall their forces against these alternative remailer sites.

I think the only reasonable approach is to make the remailer code widely
available, and to try to convince people to run it who are in a position
not to be exposed to pressure.  From earlier postings here, it sounds
like someone who is paying his own money for a UUNET connection, which
someone said costs about $50 per month (what does that $50 include?),
would be a good choice.  It sounds like UUNET is not going to cut off
a paying customer just because others complain about his use of the net,
particularly if it is true that UUNET is a immune to legal threats about
what they carry.  If he who pays for the feed is willing to carry the
remailer traffic then he should be immune to pressure.

Hal Finney
74076.1041@compuserve.com

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.1

iQCVAgUBK7SyjagTA69YIUw3AQEVkwP/T6VMZJToUCvNnBTwrYZRKiJarxproRRP
usOFFWyQ27ABBGypS79PfJmJZUyJAuZkAGExEapMTF/Nh0zNb8feZimfJk8A7SbM
5CvlITUMJsjmNCvk/HeeJadhkADyFiD9zRbuZiSzPGNCankt4lCxoGA2qIDklBYp
ZlcMs+eHxbs=
=IT8B
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Hal <74076.1041@CompuServe.COM>
Date: Sat, 27 Mar 93 15:28:55 PST
To: CYPHERPUNKS <CYPHERPUNKS@toad.com>
Subject: ANON: Mark anon. posts a
Message-ID: <930327232219_74076.1041_FHD20-2@CompuServe.COM>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

I sent mail to Cypherpunks on this a couple of days ago, but it never
appeared.

There is a problem with the notion that all "anonymous" remailers and
news-posting services should label their messages as anonymous so that
users can decide whether to read them or not.  This approach abandons one
of the strongest arguments in favor of anonymous remailers, which is
that the net is inherently an anonymous environment.

Especially as more public access Unix systems, BBS systems, and so on
become part of the net, we are going to see less and less of the strict
controls on identity which were possible when the net was restricted to
a few government labs and large universities.  The level of anarchy will
inevitably increase as larger numbers of people acquire net access.
Unless massive and universal authentication efforts are undertaken, it
is going to be more and more the case that you will know little about
the true identity of a poster.

Because of this, those who object to having to read the words of an
"anonymous" poster are taking an untenable position.  They are already
reading words of people about whom they know no more than they would
about an anonymous poster.  And the argument that "non-anonymous" posters
are subject to a form of discipline not available to anonymous posters -
messages to the system operator - is clearly falsified by the existance
of many sysops who care nothing about complaints.  As more and more people
run their own machines with net access, these cases will only increase.

In short, we anonymous remailer operators have every right to be part of
the net.  We introduce no more problems than are already happening and
will continue to occur as the net grows and becomes more universal.  The
resistance we've seen is from old-time sysops who are unable to adjust
to a changing network environment.

Rather than placating obsolete beliefs about network identity by agreeing
to mark our messages with the scarlett letter A for anonymity, by accepting
that we deserve to be in a ghetto set aside for inferior posts, I feel that
we should challenge the net with messages that blur the distinction between
anonymous and authenticated posts.  The sooner people realize that there is
no line that divides the clean from the unclean, the sooner anonymity will
be widely accepted on the net.

Hal Finney
74076.1041@compuserve.com

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.1

iQCVAgUBK7S2oqgTA69YIUw3AQEfagP8DlzINcvUDn7jc351S+hHTBz5NtB3RbRC
l+0rgltFcn6QxWaE0GsWFcOa6RcPOe1DOTlwiJejiT6MbnfuDopbUoS98bCiIzLE
0Q2ZVhtsfLs5zFdUj08bRzzU7zyuzSmNoSsCx01O6OiGZB/zs0PEnx/0XqRtXFD2
RM1YTCPIF7Y=
=0zw5
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: wixer!pacoid@cactus.org (Paco Xander Nathan)
Date: Sat, 27 Mar 93 17:48:55 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: REMAIL: Anon. remailers
Message-ID: <9303280123.AA04407@wixer>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


One alternative would be to use the technology within its
own narrative..

If IP providers and other sysops are *annoyed* that an 
anonymous remailer passes "untraceable" email, why not
have a remailer that passes email with a trail of
encrypted SASE ??

That way, the identity of the person posting is preserved,
albeit not the physical location..

pxn.
pacoid@wixer.cactus.org




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: nobody@alumni.cco.caltech.edu
Date: Sat, 27 Mar 93 20:37:54 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: ANON: Shutdown of Anon.penet.fi
Message-ID: <9303280437.AA23525@alumni.cco.caltech.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


It is fruitless to try to guess the identity of the famous network
personality.  You only tar innocent people.  The truth will come out,
more likely sooner than later.                     Nowhere, Man




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Round Waffle <eggo@student.umass.edu>
Date: Sat, 27 Mar 93 19:12:58 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: TEMPEST in a teapot
In-Reply-To: <9303272031.AA36215@hal.gnu.ai.mit.edu>
Message-ID: <9303280311.AA28562@titan.ucs.umass.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text


Possessed by The Unholy, ghoast@gnu.ai.mit.edu scrawled the following in blood:
> I've been told that the CRT is not what is generating the signals at all, rather
> that it is the CPU, and that having an LCD screen won't save you, strength of
> signal reduced or otherwise.
> 
     Actually, it's almost entirely the cables, and somewhat the screen
(CRT, that is).  A shielded CPU box isn't going to be giving off really any
appreciable amount of RF waves, certainly not enough to read coherently.
An LCD will help, since they don't emit the same kind of signals (no CRT),
and no cables going to them.

+-   eggo@titan.ucs.umass.edu      --><--       Eat Some Paste   -+
+-          Yorn desh born, der ritt de gitt der gue,            -+
+-      Orn desh, dee born desh, de umn bork! bork! bork!        -+
+----------------- The Durex Blender Corporation -----------------+



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: David Heck <O1DSH@VM1.CC.UAKRON.EDU>
Date: Sat, 27 Mar 93 20:07:25 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Speaking of TEMPEST....
Message-ID: <9303280407.AA07006@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I was able to procure a tempest specced HP Laserjet + (model 2686 TA),
used around a year ago and recently did a motherboard swap to upgrade
the unit to 2mb of RAM...wasn't all that much to rip apart and put back
together...even with all the damn machined-screws and shielding, the thing
still emits a fair amount of noise, but no farther than the room it's in...
I checked all my cables and system box and switched to shielded cables and
cleaned up the the noise as best I could...interesting design and at least
I would see the damn snoops...they'd have to be in my front yard to pick it
up...anyone else hack any used TEMPEST stuff?

David a.k.a. Unixorn




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: J. Michael Diehl <mdiehl@triton.unm.edu>
Date: Sat, 27 Mar 93 22:46:25 PST
To: O1DSH@VM1.CC.UAKRON.EDU (David Heck)
Subject: Re: Speaking of TEMPEST....
In-Reply-To: <9303280407.AA07006@toad.com>
Message-ID: <9303280644.AA11996@triton.unm.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> I was able to procure a tempest specced HP Laserjet + (model 2686 TA),
> used around a year ago and recently did a motherboard swap to upgrade
> the unit to 2mb of RAM...wasn't all that much to rip apart and put back
> together...even with all the damn machined-screws and shielding, the thing
> still emits a fair amount of noise, but no farther than the room it's in...

How does one go about testing such a thing?

> I checked all my cables and system box and switched to shielded cables and
> cleaned up the the noise as best I could...interesting design and at least
> I would see the damn snoops...they'd have to be in my front yard to pick it
> up...anyone else hack any used TEMPEST stuff?

Is there any way of Jamming a computers emmisissions?  Just a thought.
+----------------------+----------------------------------------------------+
| J. Michael Diehl ;-) |  I thought I was wrong once.  But, I was mistaken. |
|                      +----------------------------------------------------+
| mdiehl@triton.unm.edu| "I'm just looking for the opportunity to be        |
| Thunder@forum        |            Politically Incorrect!                  |
| (505) 299-2282       |                        <me>                        |
+----------------------+----------------------------------------------------+




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Eli Brandt <ebrandt@jarthur.Claremont.EDU>
Date: Sat, 27 Mar 93 23:35:48 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Speaking of TEMPEST....
In-Reply-To: <9303280644.AA11996@triton.unm.edu>
Message-ID: <9303280735.AA11161@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> How does one go about testing such a thing?

Anything that is interfered with will work, but listening to an AM
radio tuned to maximal interference is easy.  When you have no
audible interference, though, it just means that there's none left
that this will pick up.

> Is there any way of Jamming a computers emmisissions?  Just a thought.

Technically, sure.  But you'd need some kinda broadband licence to
operate it... legally.

> | J. Michael Diehl ;-) |  I thought I was wrong once.  But, I was mistaken. |

	 PGP 2 key by finger or e-mail
   Eli   ebrandt@jarthur.claremont.edu




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Marc.Ringuette@GS80.SP.CS.CMU.EDU
Date: Sat, 27 Mar 93 23:26:59 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: ANON: real-person newsgroups
Message-ID: <9303280726.AA11118@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Hal Finney (I think) writes,
> the net is inherently an anonymous environment.
> ...The sooner people realize that there is
> no line that divides the clean from the unclean, the sooner anonymity will
> be widely accepted on the net.

But there _is_ a line, and people will likely want to draw it.  It's
true that currently there aren't any security guarantees to prevent a
person from pretending to be someone else, but there will be.  PEM
certificates will distinguish between real people and personas.  A
public-key-authenticated "real person newsgroup" can be implemented.

This raises the possibility that most newsgroups will transition to
real-person-only status.  This will cramp the style of those of us who
wish to participate in the net using a persona.

I think a major task ahead of us is to provide an alternative to
"real people = good, personas = bad", and to put forward alternatives
to "real person newsgroups" which are tolerable to most and more 
palatable to us.  

So what's the distinction we might wish to put forward instead of
"real person"?  "Paying customer", perhaps, or "respected reputation"?
Yeah, that sounds good.  Maybe it's time to set up some reputation
based newsgroups, with a means of keeping track of who has been
posting good stuff, and of filtering for credibility.

-- Marc Ringuette (mnr@cs.cmu.edu)






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Eric Hughes <hughes@soda.berkeley.edu>
Date: Sun, 28 Mar 93 08:58:12 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: ANON: real-person newsgroups
In-Reply-To: <9303280726.AA11118@toad.com>
Message-ID: <9303281938.AA29951@soda.berkeley.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Marc Ringuette writes:
>PEM certificates will distinguish between real people and personas.
>A public-key-authenticated "real person newsgroup" can be
>implemented.

I am opposed to "is-a-person" credentials, especially of the type
"is-this-specific-person".  The knowledge of personal identity is in
most cases not salient.

We are in danger of creating a system similar to the SSN fiasco, where
a public identity is now not only a number but a cryptographically
protected one.  When such a system exists, there will be strong
pressures to use it for other purposes, just as there are with SSN's.

In short, do not support the PEM certification hierarchy in any way.
If you are in a corporate position with the power to make this
decision, nix it.  If you are an individual, do not get or use these
certificates.  Do not even get persona certificates; it strengthens
the person identification system by its negative.

>I think a major task ahead of us is to provide an alternative to
>"real people = good, personas = bad", and to put forward alternatives
>to "real person newsgroups" which are tolerable to most and more 
>palatable to us.  

Newsgroups could be the first structure to require identity, and they
wouldn't be the last.  We need alternatives before authentication
to real people becomes prevalent.

I fully agree that the creation of better structures is pressing on
us.  I would prefer to be the default and make PEM "the alternative".

>So what's the distinction we might wish to put forward instead of
>"real person"?  "Paying customer", perhaps, or "respected reputation"?

The simplest replacement for "real person" is "public key."  Carl
Ellison argues mightily and well for this, and has for several years.
By going to just public key, you can support other models and retain
continuity of conversation, where that is desired.

>Yeah, that sounds good.  Maybe it's time to set up some reputation
>based newsgroups, with a means of keeping track of who has been
>posting good stuff, and of filtering for credibility.

We need to set up some replacement for the existing fora.  Here are
some of the characteristics I've thought about:

1.  Eliminate the default behavior to transmit everything received.
On both mailing lists and newsgroups, everthing anybody wants to say
to is sent to the whole group.  There are two common restrictions on
this.  One is closed mailing lists, where the same default
transmission occurs but is a closed group.  That group can get large,
however, and manifest all the probelms of an open group.  The other is
to use a moderator, or more accurately an approver, to pre-read all
the material before transmission.

So default transmission has to go.  What will replace it?  Whatever it
is, it must have the characteristic that there will be posts that will
not be sent to everybody when they first arrive.  Simple, but this is
an extremely important characteristic of any future forum.

I think the origin of this behavior lies in the UUCP origins of
newsgroups, where interactive use was difficult and expensive, and
where mail delivery turnaround times were measured in days.  Back
then, it actually was better to do default transmission, especially in
a fairly homogenous environment where most people got along OK.

2.  For bootstrapping purposes, default transmission must be supported
to some subset of the member of the forum.  This seems to directly
conflict the point made above.  Default transmission must be supported
to some, but can't be to all.  If you require that anybody who wants
to use this new forum install "work-in-progress" software in order to
participate, you'll cut out most of your participants.  Now people
won't participate unless there's some content to the forum, and that
will have to be provided by more than just the users of the new
software.

2a. Corollary: A "lurker-only" mode must always be supported.  There
will always be those who just want to listen who are not expected to
otherwise participate.  A lurker mode, by its nature, will be default
transmission, but not of the whole discussion, perhaps.

3.  The social relations among individuals must not have any assymetry
enforced by the software.  A moderator, for example, is in a different
position than any other list participant.  That means that all people
must be able to participate in deciding what they want to read and
what they want to say about what they've read.

4.  The development of social assymetries must not be prevented by the
software.  Some people will want to ignore others and want to listen
only to others.  When these preferences become commonplace, there are
optimizations that can take place which create assymetries, for
example, by doing transmissions to lurkers based on the ratings of the
most respected group members.

5.  Since people must base their decisions on something other than the
content of the postings themselves, and since meta-traffic about
postings shouldn't completely overwhelm the forum itself, it is
desirable that ratings be specified in some contrained grammar,
preferably very small and machine-parsable.

6.  There must exist a mechanism for ensuring that the aggregate
rating information is not unbounded.  This is a subtle point which I
illustrate with an analogue: in an adventure game, there must be some
limit on the total amount of money.  If voting is completely
unconstrained, you quickly get vote inflation and the devaluation of
an individual's opinion.  If I can vote one hundred times for myself,
something's wrong.  

Therefore I suggest that opinion votes be issued similarly to money.
Each person voting gets to withdraw one "permission to publish an
opinion" per message, withdrawn by a blind signature, and then gets to
use it however they want.  They can cast it themselves, or give it
someone else to cast by proxy.  (Note that a blind signature is an
interactive protocol.)  You want a blind signature to avoid the trap
of revealing privacy information by default.  If someone wants to say
what they thought, they are, of course, free to do so.

7.  Participants should have the ability to distinguish between blind
votes and public votes.  People should have the option of ignoring the
"prevailing wisdom," especially when that prevailing wisdom tends to
crush minority opinions.

8.  The rating system should be separable from the transmission
system.  This is to allow multiple rating systems to emerge.  A rating
collective built on top of a mailing list, for example, could get a
full feed of all posts, but not transmit all of them to all of its
members.

9.  Someone is going to have to look at the really awful stuff in
order to rate it negatively.  "I just don't want it to be me."  Many
will say this, no doubt.

That's all for now.

Eric





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Eric Hughes <hughes@soda.berkeley.edu>
Date: Sun, 28 Mar 93 09:13:28 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: ANON: Mark anon. posts a
In-Reply-To: <930327232219_74076.1041_FHD20-2@CompuServe.COM>
Message-ID: <9303281953.AA00227@soda.berkeley.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Hal writes:
>[...] one
>of the strongest arguments in favor of anonymous remailers, which is
>that the net is inherently an anonymous environment.

It is anonymous by default.  If someone wants to break anonymity, they
may.  I make this stronger below.

>In short, we anonymous remailer operators have every right to be part of
>the net.  We introduce no more problems than are already happening and
>will continue to occur as the net grows and becomes more universal.  

We create no new problems to be sure; we just bring them on faster, in
order to prepare for them.

>Rather than placating obsolete beliefs about network identity by agreeing
>to mark our messages with the scarlett letter A for anonymity, by accepting
>that we deserve to be in a ghetto set aside for inferior posts, I feel that
>we should challenge the net with messages that blur the distinction between
>anonymous and authenticated posts.

I agree.  Hal argues that this means not marking anonymous posts.  I
disagree with this technique.

My solution to this is to make the posting anonymous but to sign the
post with your real name.  (Yes, that means however _you_ construe
your real name.)  If we wish to blur the distinction, we should make
the means of transport anonymous and the contents of the posting named.

Surely this blurs the distinction between named and anonymous posts.
People will ask "Why would anyone not want the routing information
revealed when they are saying who they are?"  This question, even
merely asked, has positive effects.  It makes one aware that identity
is not an email address, nor is accountability the ability to complain
to an authority.

It allows people to kill anonymous posts out of whatever spite they
feel to "those cowardly hypocrites".  It also allows the worst
excesses to be restrained.  Yet if there is a visible group of
respected individuals who use anonymous mechanisms for reasons other
than avoiding rebuttal, those who unrestrainedly ignore anonymity will
find themselves missing out.

I suggest that those who participate in news.admin.policy and
sci.crypt be the first to start this practice.  The more respected
users of anonymous servers there are, the greater will be the
incentive not to ignore anonymity completely.

Eric




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Eric Hughes <hughes@soda.berkeley.edu>
Date: Sun, 28 Mar 93 09:17:40 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: REMAIL:  "Stealth" Remailers
In-Reply-To: <y6q31B8w165w@spectrx.saigon.com>
Message-ID: <9303281958.AA00395@soda.berkeley.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Edgar writes:
>I have an idea for making remailers more difficult to find. 
[added extra Received: fields to obscure the actual origin]

I do not think that any solution which requires deception in order to
work is a good solution for creating a social agreement.

We should implement systems that are upfront about their activity.  We
wish to say "I am protecting the privacy of others, and in doing so I
am protecting my own."  We do not wish to say "Who, me?" and be
roundly disbelieved.

Eric




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Eric Hughes <hughes@soda.berkeley.edu>
Date: Sun, 28 Mar 93 09:26:28 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: alt.hackers post
Message-ID: <9303282007.AA00701@soda.berkeley.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Rusty Babani forwarded me my hackers postings from six months ago.

Thanks!

Here they are (in two messages).

Eric
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
From: hughes@soda.berkeley.edu (Eric Hughes)
Newsgroups: alt.hackers
Subject: Remailer that will run on a user account
Date: 25 Sep 92 16:17:25 GMT
Distribution: alt
Organization: /accounts/hughes/.organization
Lines: 347

What follows are a couple of postings to the recently formed
cypherpunks mailing list.  They are tutorial in form because
the list is not entirely hackers.

Enjoy and deploy.

Eric

=============================================================================

How to Make an Automated Remailer in Your Copious Spare Time with Easy
to Find and Inexpensive Software Tools You May Have Lying Around.

<reprinted from Popular Cryptography, September 1992. Used with permission>


The basic remailer illustrates how to hook in automated software
processing into the Unix mail system.  Here are the basic elements.

1. .forward
2. slocal and .maildelivery
3. remail.perl
4. /usr/lib/sendmail

--------------------------------------------
1. .forward

Unix mail provides a way to have accounts on many different machines
but to receive all your mail in one place.  That facility is the
.forward file, which resides in the home directory.  The file is one
line long and contains the email address to which the mail will be
forwarded.

But the .forward file has another mode of operation.  If the string
begins with the pipe character '|', the mail will be piped through the
program listed.  Enclose the string with double quotes if you need
spaces included.  Here is my .forward file:

"| /usr/local/lib/mh/slocal -user hughes"

Thus all my mail gets processed by the slocal program, described next.

I don't know where the man page for .forward is.  Perhaps someone
could provide a reference.

---------

2. slocal and .maildelivery

The software system MH contains a bunch of useful tools for handling
mail, only one of which we need.  For details on MH, do 'man mh'.

MH has a nice little mail hook processor called slocal.  Its docs can
be found by 'man mhook'.  slocal can conditionally perform operations
on mail messages and consider them either delivered or not.  It allows
multiple operations on individual mail messages.

slocal reads the file .maildelivery when it starts up for
instructions. Here is my .maildelivery file:

#
# field			pattern	action/	string 
#				result	(quote included spaces)
#
Request-Remailing-To	""	pipe R	"perl remail.perl" 
Request-Remailing-To	""	file R	archive.remailer

The various pieces of the .maildelivery file are fully documented in
the man page.  I'll just explain what mine does.  Each line describes
one operation to be performed on each incoming mail message.  Fields
are separated by whitespace, so if you need to include spaces, use
quotes.

The first field, labelled field, is the mail header field to look for.
slocal can selectively process on any header line.  If the header line
does not exist, then the mail does not match this line and no
operation is performed.  If the header line does exist, processing
continues.

The second field, pattern, is a text string to match with the contents
of that header line, i.e. with everything after the colon.  In my
case, I put the empty string in, which matches everything.  You need
the pair of quotes to have a placeholder for the field contents.

The next field, action, tells what to do with the message.  'pipe'
sends the message to the standard input of the named program.  'file'
appends the message to an archive or log file.  A useful pipe command
for testing is "tee foo", which makes a copy of the message in file
foo, but does not append, so that you get an exact copy of what slocal
is going to pass to your pipe.  This allows testing of the pipe
program without sending yourself mail all the time.

The next field, result, tells what to do with the message after
processing.  I am currently using R for Regardless to indicate that
this action should always be performed no matter what.  The code R
indicates that the mail should be considered not delivered after
processing; thus slocal writes the mail back into my local spool and I
see it as normal.  Later, after I'm sick of looking at all the
forwarded mail, I'll change this code to A, meaning if the processing
succeeds, then the mail is considered delivered.  The archive file
will always remain R.

The last field, string, is the parameter to the action.  It is a file
name or program.  Use quotes to include spaces.  The name of my mail
processor is "perl remail.perl", which is to run the perl script
remail.perl on the mail.

The .maildelivery file is also the place to put encryption hooks to
automatically decrypt the bodies of messages.  More on that in a
future version.

---------

3. remail.perl

Perl is a wonderful language for doing all sorts of useful work like
processing mail headers.  Do 'man perl' for details, or get the
O'Reilly book and really learn how to use it.

The perl script, in summary, strips off the mail headers, saving the
Subject: line, rewrites a new header, and appends the body of the
previous message.  Here is the script:

--------- cut here ---------
while (<>) {
	last if /^$/ ;
	$subject = $_ if /^Subject:/ ;
	if (/^Request-Remailing-To:/) {
		chop ;
		s/^.*:// ;
		$addressee = $_ ;
	}
}

#open( OUTPUT, ">foo" ) || die "Cannot open 'foo'." ;
open( OUTPUT, "| /usr/lib/sendmail " . $addressee ) ;
select( OUTPUT ) ;

print "To:" . $addressee . "\n" ;
print "From: nobody\n" ;
print $subject ;
print "Remailed-By: Eric Hughes <hughes@soda.berkeley.edu>\n" ;
print "\n" ;

while (<>) {
} continue {
	print ;
}
--------- cut here ---------

Here is a summary of the operation.  To really understand this, you'll
have to learn perl.

The while loop processes standard input.  'last' terminates the loop
as soon as a blank line is seen.  A blank line separates the header
from the body.  The subject line, if seen, sets the subject variable
to the whole subject line.  The Request- header line has its final
newline removed, the contents up to the colon substituted into
nonexistence, and saves the rest in the addressee variable.

Next the pipe to sendmail is opened and its output is selected so that
all print commands will go to the pipe.  There is a comment for a
different output channel to the file foo which can be commented in for
testing.

Next the remailed header is constructed out of print statements.

Lastly the rest of the standard input is passed through unmodified to
the output channel.  The while loop terminates when there is no more
input.

---------

4. sendmail

sendmail is the backend mailer; it expects complete mail messages and
does not usually generate any line itself except for the first "From"
(with no colon) line.  Any header you construct will thus get passed
through mostly unmodified.  Hence you can put in any "From:" line you
want and any other header info, such as my "Remailed-By:" line.

sendmail expects the name of the addressee on its command line,
otherwise it puts an "Apparently-To:" line in the header.

Any mail processor which remails should probably go through sendmail,
although it would also be possible to talk to an SMTP port directly,
were you so motivated.  MH also has some remailing programs; see 'man
mhook'.

---------

A few words for tinkerers.

-- You can always send mail to yourself.  Especially after you've done
one kind of mail processing and want to pass the mail through the
filters again.

-- When getting started, create an empty .maildelivery file first and
then get your .forward file working.  Test it by sending messages to
yourself.  If you're not getting them, they are going into the bit
bucket.  All your other mail will as well, in this case, so if you
can't afford to lose mail, do it right the first time or work on a
spare account.  

-- Any mail slocal does not process will get delivered as normal.
Running a remailer will not interfere with your other work.

-- Remember to use quote marks.

-- You don't need to be a sysadmin to run this kind of remailer.
There is nothing, however, to prevent a sysadmin from running this
sofware under an alias.  The sysadmin is also a 'trusted user' to
sendmail and can get rid of pesky "From"-no-colon lines.

-- Perl has a random function which could be used to automatically
choose various "From:" lines from a database.  Remember to include
yeltsy@kremvax.rus.

-- postnews or inews could be substituted for sendmail.  Different
header lines would have to be created.  Such a service could run in
parallel with a remailer.  You too can now repost to alt.sex.bondage!


Enjoy.  And watch for interesting improvements like encryption.


Eric
=============================================================================

The hopping remailer is finished.  I wrote it this morning.

The change to make a hopping remailer is very easy.  Here's the new
perl script:

--------- cut here ---------
while (<>) {
	last if /^$/ ;
	$subject = $_ if /^Subject:/ ;
	if (/^Request-Remailing-To:/) {
		chop ;
		s/^.*:// ;
		$addressee = $_ ;
	}
}

#open( OUTPUT, ">foo" ) || die "Cannot open 'foo'." ;
open( OUTPUT, "| /usr/lib/sendmail " . $addressee ) ;
select( OUTPUT ) ;

print "To:" . $addressee . "\n" ;
print "From: nobody\n" ;
print $subject ;
print "Remailed-By: Eric Hughes <hughes@soda.berkeley.edu>\n" ;

#
# check to see if there are header lines in the body to collapse 
#   into the full header.
#

if ( $_ = <> ) {
	if (/^##$/) {
		# do nothing if the pasting token appears
		# the rest of the body will be directly appended
		# this allows for extra header lines to be added
	} else {
		# normal line
		print "\n" ;
		print $_ ;
	}
} else {
	# empty body
	exit ;
}

while (<>) {
} continue {
	print ;
}
--------- cut here ---------

Short explanation.  The 'print "\n" ;' line was moved inside the new
if statement.  The if statement reads a line of the body and stops the
script if there is no body.  The line read is tested to see if it
contains the two characters "##" alone on the line.  "##" is the ANSI
C token pasting operator.  If there is no pasting, a blank line is
printed to mark the end of the header and the first line of the body
is printed.  If there is pasting, then the conditional does nothing,
which has the effect that the body is appended directly onto the end
of the header, allowing you to add more header lines after the header
is rewritten.


Here is a sample message that I sent myself after the new script was
installed:

--------- cut here ---------
To: hughes
Subject: multiple hops
Request-Remailing-To: hughes

##
X-Hop: 1
Request-Remailing-To: hughes

##
X-Hop: 2
Request-Remailing-To: hughes

##
X-Hop: 3

This is a test message of multiple hops.

Eric
--------- cut here ---------


I received four pieces of mail after sending this to myself.  The
first was the actual letter, which is still delivering normally and
not being filtered.  The next two were the first and second
remailings; they had X-Hop: 1 and 2.  The last message was the final
one, had X-Hop: 3 in its header and was delivered normally.

At each stage, the header got rewritten and a new
Request-Remailing-To: line inserted.  When that mail got delivered, it
was again rewritten, with a new remailing request.  This process is
extensible up to the 50K or so practical limitatation on mail size.

Note that this system is not at all secure by itself.  But if each
message body were encrypted first, and the message first decrypted
before the header re-write took place, the routing instructions as a
whole would be hidden from prying eyes.

That's the next project.

Eric

=============================================================================

To be on the cyhperpunks mailing list, mail to 

	cypherpunks-request@toad.com

I'll put you on.

Eric







From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Eric Hughes <hughes@soda.berkeley.edu>
Date: Sun, 28 Mar 93 09:27:10 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: alt.hackers post
Message-ID: <9303282007.AA00730@soda.berkeley.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Here's the other one

Eric
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
From: hughes@soda.berkeley.edu (Eric Hughes)
Newsgroups: alt.hackers
Subject: a new feature of the remailer
Message-ID: <HUGHES.92Oct9095848@soda.berkeley.edu>
Date: 9 Oct 92 13:58:48 GMT
Distribution: alt
Organization: /accounts/hughes/.organization
Lines: 191


Here is the third in the series of articles on the remailer.
Remember, these are meant to be fairly tutorial.

Eric

-----------------------------------------------------------------------------

There's a new feature in the remailing software.

Some people can't add arbitrary header fields because of mailer or
gateway restrictions.  This restricts them from using the remailer.  I
have added a facility to allow new header fields to be pasted onto the
end of a header when the mail arrives.  This effectively happens
before processing by the remailer software.  These new fields exist
during transit in the message body, where they remain untouched.  Only
after the message is delivered to my account does this operator
take effect.

Syntax: If the first line of the body is the two characters "::", then
the following lines are appended to the header, up to the next blank
line.

Here's how it works.

First of all, here's my new .maildelivery file:

------- cut here -------
#
# field			pattern	action/	string 
#				result	(quote included spaces)
#
Request-Remailing-To	""	pipe R	"perl remailer/remail.perl" 
Request-Remailing-To	""	file R	remailer/archive
*			""	pipe R	"/usr/local/lib/mh/rcvtty -biff"
*			""	pipe ?	"perl remailer/incoming.header.perl"
------- cut here -------

Comments are indicated by #.  The Request-Remailing-To lines have been
there.  The second of the makes an archive for debugging purposes.  It
will go eventually.  The third field, "*", indicates all fields, it
runs 'rcvtty' on my mail; this replaces the function of biff, since
mail is getting piped to slocal now, disabling biff.

The last line is the important one.  It says "If the mail hasn't been
delivered by now, run the incoming header rewrite script on it.  If
that doesn't work, continue trying to deliver it."

Now here's the trick.  slocal has no way of taking the output of the
rewrite and continuing to process it.  (It should.  It would make this
whole job easy.)  So in order to continue processing, you need to
redeliver the mail.  You could invoke sendmail and mail it back to
yourself, but that would mangle the existing header.  So the thing to
do is to recursively invoke slocal from within the perl script.

Here's the perl script to do all this:

------- cut here -------
  # First read in the whole header.
  # We check for the Second-Pass: line to detect infinite loops.

while (<>) {
	last if /^$/ ;
	exit 1 if /^Second-Pass:/ ;
	$header .= $_ ;
}

  # We have just read the last line in the header.
  # Now we check to see if there is a pasting operator.

if ( ( $_ = <> ) && /^::$/ ) {
	while (<>) {
		last if /^$/ ;
		$header .= $_ ;
	}
} else {
	# There is either an empty body or no pasting operator
	#   Thus exit with a return code of 1 to indicate that
	#   the mail has not been delivered.
		exit 1 ;
}

# There was a header pasting operator.
#   So we open 'slocal' as a pipe, effectively redelivering the mail
#   back to ourselves.

#open( OUTPUT, ">foo" ) ;
open( OUTPUT, "| /usr/local/lib/mh/slocal -user hughes" ) ;
select( OUTPUT ) ;

# print a "From " line to satisfy slocal

@weekdays = ( "Sun","Mon","Tue","Wed","Thu","Fri", "Sat" ) ;
@months = ( "Jan","Feb","Mar","Apr","May",
	"Jun","Jul","Aug","Sep","Oct","Nov","Dec" ) ;
($sec,$min,$hour,$mday,$mon,$year,$wday,$yday,$isdst) = localtime ;
printf "From hughes  %s %s ", @weekdays[ $wday ], @months[ $mon ] ;
printf "%2d %02d:%02d:%02d 19%d\n", $mday, $hour, $min, $sec, $year ;

# Now just print out the message

print $header ;
print "Second-Pass:\n" ;
print "\n" ; 
while (<>) {
} continue {
	print ;
}

------- cut here -------

Here's how the perl script works.

The first loop reads lines from the existing header.  When it sees a
blank line (regexp /^$/) it terminates the loop.  If it sees a field
"Second-Pass", it knows it has filtered this message before and exits
with a return code indicating that the mail has not been delivered.
The variable $header is appended with the current header line.
$header contains the whole header when the loop terminates.

Properly speaking, the Second-Pass test is not necessary to detect
infinite loops.  Since the pasting operator gets removed during the
rewrite, the script won't return an exit status of 0 more times than
the pasting operator appears.  But should something get screwed up,
such as a different module adding pasting commands (how? I don't know),
the Second-Pass test should prevent infinite recursion.

The next statement reads another line from the input file.  This line
is the first line of the message body.  If this line is the pasting
operator, then header lines are accumulated in $header as before until
a blank line.  The difference is that these header lines are being
read from the body of the message.  If there is no pasting operator,
the script exits undelivered.

At this point we now have to redeliver the message back to ourselves.
We first open slocal as the output pipe.

The next section is a kludge.  It turns out that slocal strips off the
out-of-band "From " (no colon) line that the mail delivery system
uses.  In other words, the message which slocal pipes into its pipes
is not identical to the message it itself received.  This means that
slocal cannot be directly recursed.  What this section does is to
create a "From " line to make slocal happy.  It calls localtime() and
then formats those numbers into the proper form.

It turns out that slocal will deliver this mail without the "From "
line, even to /usr/spool/mail, but it doesn't do so properly.  On my
system, in added some delimiters which I think I've tracked down to
the 'mtstailor' file, namely mmdelivery1 and mmdelivery2.  Since these
are not null on my system, there's some garbage added which screws up
separation of the spool file into messages.  Adding a "From " line
fixes that.  This misbehavior may not be so surprising, considering
that slocal was "meant" to be invoked only in a .forward file.

Now we print the variable $header which contains the whole header,
including newlines.  Using a single string removes the need for an
array.  We added the Second-Pass line and a blank line for the end of
the header.  The final loop prints out the rest of the message body.

There is another way to proceed to get the same functionality.  One
could write a filter to translate the first occurrence only of
\n\n::\n into \n. We could then pass the message through this filter
before slocal saw it.  And for now, that would do the same thing.

But suppose we want more that one rewrite rule active?  Then you would
only be able to apply each rewrite rule exactly once in fixed order.
You want to be able to rewrite a message and then apply all the
rewrite rules again.  

At least one other rewrite rule is planned: automatic decryption.
Since decrypting a message will completely change the body, and since
some of the header fields may need to be hidden, you have to be able
to decrypt the body and then paste on header lines.  But since you
need to indicate an encrypted body by a header line (well, not really,
but it's more reliable), and since some people can't add these header
lines, you need to paste lines before encryption as well.

Thus the rewrite rules need to be applied asyncronously and hence I'm
using a fairly complex slocal scheme to do a simple filter.
Eventually I hope to write an equivalent to slocal which knows about
message rewrites and simple filters, but that's for later.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------------

To follow this project (and others soon to be started), send mail to

	cypherpunks-request@toad.com

and I'll add you to the mailing list.

Eric






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Dan McGuirk <mcguirk@enws302.eas.asu.edu>
Date: Sun, 28 Mar 93 10:43:05 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Penet.fi replacement up
Message-ID: <9303282130.AA00433@enws302>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I just wanted to let everyone know that another penet.fi-style
anonymous service has been set up.  It works the same as anon.penet.fi
did for anonymous mail, but it only allows anonymous posting to about
ten newsgroups.  For information, send a message to
"anonymus+info@charcoal.com" (yes, anonymous should be misspelled).




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Eli Brandt <ebrandt@jarthur.Claremont.EDU>
Date: Sun, 28 Mar 93 16:17:30 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: a blackmail opportunity
Message-ID: <9303290017.AA05745@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


While writing some appropriate paranoia for a canned response to
remailer info requests, I realized that running a remailer is a
perfect prelude to blackmail.  An unscrupulous person running a
remailer can obviously keep records of truenames, along with
messages that their senders do not want associated with them.
Making use of this information could involve a scenario to the
crypto-extortion previously discussed, but blackmail would be far
more believable than anonymous threats.  Alternatively, the
blackmailer could be low-tech and resort to present techniques.

Always encrypting helps with mail, but not with news.

	 PGP 2 key by finger or e-mail
   Eli   ebrandt@jarthur.claremont.edu




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Lord Krieg" <CVADSAAV@CSUPomona.Edu>
Date: Sun, 28 Mar 93 18:42:51 PST
To: "cypherpunks" <cypherpunks@toad.com>
Subject: anonymous services
Message-ID: <9303290242.AA09702@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

After reading Mr. Finney's response to my comments, I can see that I 
really shouldn't try to make suggestions on how an anonymous service 
should be implemented. I clearly don't have the knowledge necessary to 
address this subject without sounding like an idiot. :-)

So... I'll instead simply say what I would like to see in an anonymous 
service, and I'll leave discussion of the technicalities to people who 
know what they're talking about.

I'd like to see something which combines the strengths of the different 
types of anonymous services while reducing or eliminating the weaknesses.

A service which can be used as easily as anon.penet.fi would certainly be 
nice. I'd also like to see encryption available as an option. Ideally, 
messages would not _have_ to be encrypted. Making encryption optional 
would be good for paranoid individuals such as myself, while making the 
service more accessible to people who are willing to sacrifice security. 
This would also accomodate people within the U.S. who want to use the 
service put are afraid of Mr. Sternlight. :-)

I like the way the Cypherpunks Remailers let users chain and encrypt 
their messages so that even the remailers can't know both the sender and 
recipient. This is something I'd also like to see in a new anonymous 
service.

I still think that one or more back-up servers would not be a totally bad 
idea. I realize that I don't know what I'm talking about, but I just 
don't understand why it would be impossible to have a back-up server 
(with a copy of the active server's database) on standby. I'm not saying 
that the existence of such a back-up should be advertised--I just think 
that it should be possible to have somebody set up a backup _without 
actually running it_ so that when the active server gets shut down, it 
can quickly step in to take over.

Oh, and on a unrelated subject...
Could anybody with information on $50/month UUNET connections please send 
it to me, or tell me who I should write to about it? Thanks in advance.

                            Kenneth G. Hagler

**********************************************************************
*   Internet: cvadsaav@csupomona.edu    *   My insurance company     *
*   Phone: (909) 865-7751               *     is Beretta U.S.A.      *
*   PGP 2.2 key available on request    *                            *
*--------------------------------------------------------------------*
*   ...study of the military arts will make one who is naturally     *
*   clever more so and one who is born somewhat dull rather less     *
*   so.                                                              *
*            --Daidoji Yuzan Shigesuke, _Budo Shoshinshu_            *
**********************************************************************
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.2

iQCVAgUBK7aFnSipatcRAyu9AQF6UgQAwmchM/JwJS16i/FA6MF0yVAhUg2gpkX2
osLEPpPrlISCwy1dulBxpHJhFyIVSshTx2J5962efiw4pR9+/1F47tOESFHbGLN1
yfKU1pJo1pNyh2ZX72YKK2AvOvAtgz22sXZK01I7jDJbCZdvfoha2T1c5H4KfRQ6
23ddGKcUOVc=
=VXNO
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: miron@extropia.wimsey.com (Miron Cuperman)
Date: Sun, 28 Mar 93 12:45:57 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: REMAIL: "Stealth" Remailers
In-Reply-To: <y6q31B8w165w@spectrx.saigon.com>
Message-ID: <1993Mar28.223940.23755@extropia.wimsey.bc.ca>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

edgar@spectrx.Saigon.COM (Edgar W. Swank) writes:

>I have an idea for making remailers more difficult to find. This
>applies only to systems where the remailer operator owns the
>system, such as at wimsey.com.  (But a "system" can be just

Make that "extropia.wimsey.com".  "wimsey.com" is my feed.

- -- 
        Miron Cuperman <miron@extropia.wimsey.com> | NeXTmail/Mime ok
                       <miron@cs.sfu.ca>           | Public key avail
        AMIX: MCuperman                            | PSM 18Mar93 0/0
Laissez faire, laissez passer. Le monde va de lui meme.

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.2

iQCVAgUBK7YpDpNxvvA36ONDAQH6TQP+MvdAXTKDqzDgKJVHgsw5qBab+SEYsYRh
ohCmrAkY5Y+N7RFRuwIv1COiE8Z9o67SYLWZ+yxCrBjF9SM2gAPlxIRCy/sK7BjZ
/x5t7Znhhip1ihkh8lAqV6VHPz4L692x7j0yT2L8yAD89Yw6fA+ypSE7SAMHikL/
9D8RdipXrXA=
=CBh9
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: greg@ideath.goldenbear.com (Greg Broiles)
Date: Sun, 28 Mar 93 21:53:38 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: UUNET connections
Message-ID: <8qZ61B1w164w@ideath.goldenbear.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



My previous message re my UUCP connection to UUNET has generated several 
questions in E-mail, as well as a recently posted question about "the $50 
connections to UUNET", so I feel like I oughta answer the question(s) 
apparently created by my quick summary of my use of UUNET's services.

UUNET will allow you to make a UUCP connection to their machines for an 
"administrative fee" of $36 per month, plus hourly connect rates. These 
rates are (as of my booklet rcvd from them in 1/93) $2.60/hr if you call 
their local dialup (NPA 703), and $5.60/hr if you dial in via the Compuserve 
packet network. Their local dialups support the PEP protocol as well as v.32 
connections; I average around 700 cps when I dial in directly with v.32, and 
around 450 cps when I dial in via Compuserve.

The $50 figure I quoted is my average monthly cost for a slow but steady 
trickle of mail (roughly 7K per day) and approximately 20 newsgroups, none 
of which are binary-oriented and none of which are super-high traffic.  This 
includes my hourly cost for both direct-dial and Compuserve connections; I 
prefer to dial in directly, but have my Systems file set up to use 
Compuserve as a backup means of connection when the direct lines are busy 
(which happens with some frequency.)

UUNET will register a domain name for you for free if you are a subscriber; 
if you do not subscribe to their service, the cost is $50.  (I incorrectly 
quoted $25 for this to someone via E-mail.)

UUNET sends a free copy of O'Reilly & Associates' _Managing uucp & Usenet_ 
when you sign up with them; great book, nice touch, probably saves them 
money for all of the questions it answers.

To get in touch with UUNET:

info@uunet.uu.net
or
800-488-6384

I think you could also probably find some information files if you FTP'd to 
ftp.uu.net; I'm unsure about that and offer no guarantees.

UUNET also offers a "low-volume" agreement that I don't know much about 
since I don't subscribe to it. I know that PSI offers similar service; my 
recollection is that they want $75/3mos for mail, and $225/3mos for news, 
flat-rate. PSI can be reached at 'info@psi.com' or 703-620-6651.

I have no connection with UUNET beyond being a happy & satisfied customer; 
I've found them to be friendly & helpful and generally good to work with. 
The folks at PSI seem nice too but their prices for what I want right now 
are higher. UUNET and PSI both offer realtime IP connections, in addition to 
UUCP links like the one I use; call them for more information.


--
Greg Broiles                            greg@goldenbear.com
Golden Bear Consulting                  +1 503 465 0325
Box 12005 Eugene OR 97440               BBS: +1 503 687 7764




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: mccoy@ccwf.cc.utexas.edu (Jim McCoy)
Date: Sun, 28 Mar 93 19:49:13 PST
To: uni@acs.bu.edu (Shaen Bernhardt)
Subject: Re: PGP Secure?
In-Reply-To: <9303290550.AA41108@acs.bu.edu>
Message-ID: <9303290632.AA21124@tigger.cc.utexas.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text


> 
> Forgive my slow math mind, but I pose the following question, knowing
> in advance that it's a FAQ, but I can't find an answer anywhere....
> 
> Given a brute force attack on ciphertext encrypted with PGP2.2
> using the 1024 bit key, how many operations are required to
> hit on the session key...?
> (The session key being used with the IDEA cipher)

This has been recently hashed over in sci.crypt.  Here are a few
generalities, read the articles in sci.crypt for the real numbers.

	-If you did 1000 attempts to break a 1024 bit RSA key every second
	and started your calculations at the beginning of the universe, you
	would still have several trillion years to go.
	-If you stored every attempted key in a single atom, you would run
	out of atoms in the universe long before you ran out of keys.

If I remeber correctly there are something like 10^152 primes possible with
a 512 bit key.  That is what most people refer to as a BIG number...  :)

> The real meat of this question boils down to: What are the capabilities
> currently, and what is required to brute force the various stages of PGP?

What it boils down to is that anyone who tried a brute-force attack on your
RSA key is either very stupid or hopes to be very lucky.  (very, very, very
lucky)  It would be easier for the person to track you down, put a gun to
your face and force you to disclose the message.  Barring any mathematical
miracle with regards to factoring large numbers, RSA using large keys is
safe from brute-force attack.


> Also:  What does 1024 bit refer to?  The IDEA session key? or the RSA key?

The RSA key.  It would probably be easier for someone to try to brute-force
your IDEA session key than your RSA key; but this would only give them one
message, while cracking a RSA key gives you all messages that have the
session key wrapped with that RSA keypair.

jim



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: uni@acs.bu.edu (Shaen Bernhardt)
Date: Sun, 28 Mar 93 19:07:03 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: PGP Secure?
Message-ID: <9303290550.AA41108@acs.bu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Forgive my slow math mind, but I pose the following question, knowing
in advance that it's a FAQ, but I can't find an answer anywhere....

Given a brute force attack on ciphertext encrypted with PGP2.2
using the 1024 bit key, how many operations are required to
hit on the session key...?
(The session key being used with the IDEA cipher)

What about derriving the RSA key pair from the public key and message?
How many operations might this require?

Along these lines, what's the best guess at the highest technology level
available today with regard to speed?  How many operations per second
might the most resourced orginization be expected to achieve?

The real meat of this question boils down to: What are the capabilities
currently, and what is required to brute force the various stages of PGP?

Also:  What does 1024 bit refer to?  The IDEA session key? or the RSA key?

Thanks in advance...
uni




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Eric Hughes <hughes@soda.berkeley.edu>
Date: Mon, 29 Mar 93 06:36:45 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: anonymous services
In-Reply-To: <9303290242.AA09702@toad.com>
Message-ID: <9303291717.AA20805@soda.berkeley.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>A service which can be used as easily as anon.penet.fi would certainly be 
>nice. 

Right now the cypherpunks remailers are designed as a back end.
Clever people can program the back end directly, but it's not for
everybody.

It's the user's software that should provide a good front end.  

>I'd also like to see encryption available as an option. Ideally, 
>messages would not _have_ to be encrypted. 

That's the way the current remailers work (with the exception of Miron
Cuperman's).  But fundamentally, there's no good reason not to
encrypt, except, of course, for the last hop out of a Usenet post.
The user's front end software should encrypt automatically.

Remember, you need to encrypt everything, so that when you really need
the protection, it doesn't appear as though anything is different.

>This would also accomodate people within the U.S. who want to use the 
>service put are afraid of Mr. Sternlight. :-)

The remailers could just as easily be built on top of RSAREF.
Licensing is a red herring for this project.

Eric




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Eric Hughes <hughes@soda.berkeley.edu>
Date: Mon, 29 Mar 93 06:47:27 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: a blackmail opportunity
In-Reply-To: <9303290017.AA05745@toad.com>
Message-ID: <9303291727.AA21227@soda.berkeley.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Eli Brandt writes:
>An unscrupulous person running a
>remailer can obviously keep records of truenames, along with
>messages that their senders do not want associated with them.

>Always encrypting helps with mail, but not with news.

If you don't trust your remailer operator, use more than one.  This is
the whole point of multiple chainings.  A single point failure can be
any number of different threats: blackmail, coerced disclosure by
threat of violence, compromised equipment.  All of these can be
defended against by making a system proof against single point
failure.

For posting to news, one should always use two hops.  The first
destroys any the identity of the poster and the second one decrypts it
for transmission.  Both hops are encrypted, but the second relay sees
the plaintext and cannot link it to anyone because the first relay is
anonymous.

Eric




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: thug@phantom.com (Murdering Thug)
Date: Mon, 29 Mar 93 05:40:09 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: PGP: Improvements needed.
Message-ID: <m0ndMd8-000jreC@phantom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain





I like PGP 2.2 a lot, but I think there is still much room for improvement.
I would like to throw the following suggestions on the table and open up
a discussion on them:

Here is what I think needs to be done:

- PGP needs the talked about "stealth" mode, wherein PGP encrypted files
  and documents contain no PGP header.  This would allow the embedding
  of PGP documents into files containing "white noise static" data,
  or into the LSBs of graphic and sound files.

- PGP needs to use a better compression algorithm.  From what I know,
  I believe PGP currently uses LZW (the same algorithm as in the Unix
  compress utility).  Anyone who has used Gnuzip (aka: gzip) knows that
  LZW typically compresses text files down to only 40-45% of their
  original size, while LZ77 (the algorithm in gzip) compresses text
  files down to 30% or less of their original size.  Clearly LZ77 not
  only saves space, but improves the entropy/randomness of the
  cyphertext, making PGP that much harder to crack.

- PGP needs a version or front end for the masses.  A point-and-click
  version or front end that runs under DOS.  I know there are really good
  front ends for pkzip for DOS, so how come someone doesn't write a front
  end for pgp2.2?  I would also suggest a Windows version, but that is
  not as important as having a really user friendly DOS version.

Hopefully, by PGP 2.5 or 3.0, these things will happen. But I'd like to
see them in 2.3 if possible.


Thug

 




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: uri@watson.ibm.com
Date: Mon, 29 Mar 93 06:16:49 PST
To: mccoy@ccwf.cc.utexas.edu (Jim McCoy)
Subject: Re: PGP Secure?
In-Reply-To: <9303290550.AA41108@acs.bu.edu>
Message-ID: <9303291700.AA17161@buoy.watson.ibm.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Jim McCoy writes:
 > > Given a brute force attack on ciphertext encrypted with PGP2.2
                         ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
 > > using the 1024 bit key, how many operations are required to
 > > hit on the session key...?
 > 	-If you did 1000 attempts to break a 1024 bit RSA key every second
 > 	and started your calculations at the beginning of the universe, you
 > 	would still have several trillion years to go.
 > 	-If you stored every attempted key in a single atom, you would run
 > 	out of atoms in the universe long before you ran out of keys.

Well, of course one doesn't have to break RSA to get the _session_ key,
it would be enough to break IDEA, which will automatically deliver
the key to you along with the cleartext. Again of course, it's
not obvious, why one might want that session key (:-).

 > What it boils down to is that anyone who tried a brute-force attack on your
 > RSA key is either very stupid or hopes to be very lucky.  (very, very, very
 > lucky)  .............

Sure... How about one, who simply knows how to improve
brute-force key-search attack on IDEA?  A possibility? (:-)

Regards,
Uri.
------------
<Disclaimer>




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Mr. Noise" <mrnoise@econs.umass.edu>
Date: Mon, 29 Mar 93 07:01:58 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: anon email/caller id
Message-ID: <9303291745.AA27050@titan.ucs.umass.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text



Phil Karn's anology between anonymous e-mail & caller i.d. gets it
right, I think.  If you don't want to read it, don't, just as you
may block calls without caller i.d.  There are two concerns I'd like to
see addressed, though:  first, what about those who use anon email to
get away with behavior that wastes net resources?  When the identity of
the poster is know, they can be 'disciplined' by other net.citizens (call
it frontier justice if you like...).  second, from the opposite end, won't
the availability of caller i.d. mean that it will become more diffuclt to
engage in truly anonymous conversations over the telephone network, as
revealing one's identity becomes the norm?

As to the first objection, I suppose we could continue to rely on the
site administrators (& remailer admins) to discipline the offenders.  After
all, the sites are still subject to the same discipline we can inflict on
the individual poster if known.  As to the second, I suppose we can always
observe that those who won't accept our anonymous call aren't worth talking
to in the first place, but that evades the question IMHO.  Also, having the
capability in the phone system means someone can still abuse it without our
knowledge.

I would suggest another solution to this dilemma:  'handles'.  Having a
semi-secret identity means having control over your Real Life exposure to
risk, whiel still allowing those you come in contact with to indentify you--
& ignore you if they wish with minimal trouble.  It also means that you can
set different levels of security:  anyone who cares to can find out who Mr.
Noise is, but how many of you know the *other* 'real mes'?

Well, just some rambling thoughts at lunchtime as a way of saying hello to
all of you on this list, since I just joined a week ago & didn't want to
'lurk'.  :-)  Have an anonymous day!

Mr. Noise



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: baumbach@atmel.com (Peter Baumbach)
Date: Mon, 29 Mar 93 08:50:32 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: PGP Secure?
Message-ID: <9303291843.AA08556@walrus.chp.atmel.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> This has been recently hashed over in sci.crypt.  Here are a few
> generalities, read the articles in sci.crypt for the real numbers.

For those of us who don't have access to USENET, is there a mailing-list
that echo's it's content and allows posting?

> 	-If you did 1000 attempts to break a 1024 bit RSA key every second
> 	and started your calculations at the beginning of the universe, you
> 	would still have several trillion years to go.
> 	-If you stored every attempted key in a single atom, you would run
> 	out of atoms in the universe long before you ran out of keys.

Couldn't this argument also be made about a simple substitution code?
How secure is PGP with current smarter attacks?

Peter Baumbach
baumbach@atmel.com




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: George A. Gleason <gg@well.sf.ca.us>
Date: Tue, 30 Mar 93 01:54:36 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: discount datacom rates?
Message-ID: <199303300954.AA03537@well.sf.ca.us>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



I've discovered there may be a way to provide late night (1am - 4am) dialup
data communication at a substantial discount in long distance charges.  We'd
need something like a few thousand users in order to get this running.

Feedback...?  Ideas...?  Email gg@well.sf.ca.us





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: jcook@pro-storm.metronet.com (Julian Cook)
Date: Tue, 30 Mar 93 07:06:10 PST
To: gg%well.sf.ca.us.cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: discount datacom rates?
Message-ID: <cu31387@pro-storm.metronet.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Well you definitely have my interest peaked. Let's discuss this scheme some
more

Julian Cook

JCook@pro-storm.metronet.com

ProLine:  jcook@pro-storm
Internet: jcook@pro-storm.cts.com
UUCP:     crash!pro-storm!jcook
Bitnet:   jcook%pro-storm.cts.com@nosc.mil





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: stig@transam.ece.cmu.edu (Jonathan Stigelman)
Date: Tue, 30 Mar 93 12:51:19 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Many Important Items in the News
Message-ID: <227@x15_remote.stigmobile.usa>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


In message <9303270339.AA00329@soda.berkeley.edu> you write:

>>wait, are you advocating news admins allowed to filter anonymous mail
>>from downstream/upstream feeds?  I don't get this.
>
>Yes.  If someone doesn't want to pass traffic, let them.  It's
>extremely foolish; they'll get a bad rep for it.  If they're a
>commercial site, they'll lose customers.  If they're not, they'll lose
>face.  Freedom to filter is freedom to shoot yourself in the foot.
>

All this is presuming that future and present net.users remain as
abreast of net activity as the frontiersmen (hi John) that were
adamant enough about uncensored communication to create the alt
backbone.

Thankfully, the frontiersmen haven't ridden off into the sunset,
never to be seen again...and the number of net users with their
mindset has even grown.  But, the growth of the net also means
that there will be a continuing influx of people who think a lot
more about Monday night football than they think about censorship.

>[...] doing politics in the broad sense is the only solution for this.

If, by this, you mean that the *REAL* battle is one of marketing, I
think that you're right.  People with censored feeds WON'T KNOW WHAT
THEY'RE MISSING (because they don't get to see it)! 

And, if the votes for the right to anonymous expression are going to
be cast via economic choices, then it's important to remember that
it's not a one person one vote situation.

	Stig





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: stig@transam.ece.cmu.edu (Jonathan Stigelman)
Date: Tue, 30 Mar 93 12:51:22 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: ANON: Mark anon. posts a
Message-ID: <229@x15_remote.stigmobile.usa>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>There is a problem with the notion that all "anonymous" remailers and
>news-posting services should label their messages as anonymous so that
>users can decide whether to read them or not.  This approach abandons one
>of the strongest arguments in favor of anonymous remailers, which is
>that the net is inherently an anonymous environment.
>

Here's a queer thought:

You've heard about the usenet dossiers that have been compiled and
sold to prospective employers?  How about a dossier-lookup function
integrated into your favorite news reader?  It would connect to a
dossier server and quickly provide a cross-reference of all the other
posts by the current poster...copies of the last 10 revisions of his
plan file...and an analysis of his individual quirks...(along with,
perhaps, a list of the top ten reasons not to hire him)....

Is this so off-base?  We've also been talking a lot about reputation
filters, which would probably require such activity logging.

Hell, it could even be put to a few good uses:  We could call up
Eric's dossier to quickly find his original remailer post to
alt.hackers... 

	Stig





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: scott@shrug.dur.ac.uk (Scott A. McIntyre)
Date: Tue, 30 Mar 93 02:53:13 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com (Cypherpunks)
Subject: Anybody out there?
Message-ID: <m0nddw7-000M6oC@shrug.dur.ac.uk>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



I have received nothing on this list sicne Feb 20th, is it just me?

Thanks,
Scott




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Hal <74076.1041@CompuServe.COM>
Date: Tue, 30 Mar 93 09:22:34 PST
To: CYPHERPUNKS <CYPHERPUNKS@toad.com>
Subject: ANON: UUNET Info.
Message-ID: <930330171358_74076.1041_FHD43-1@CompuServe.COM>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Thanks to Greg Broiles for the information on UUNET.  I ftp'd some
info from ftp.uu.net as he suggested.  Here is an edited version of
one of their main info files.  I have left in the part relevant to
UUCP connections.

I would comment that this looks like it would not be an economical
approach for providing an anonymous posting service.  The volume
experienced by these services has been very high.  Greg indicates
that he gets about 700 chars per second for his link.  Any posting
or remailing request is going to have to be transmitted twice (once
in, once out).  At $2.47 per connect-hour we're talking about $2.00
per megabyte posted or remailed.  I believe Julf has seen several
megabytes per day.  So this volume will push the bill up to the range
of hundreds of dollars a month.  This is pretty expensive just to
support truth, justice and the American way on the net.  (This could
be reduced if large messages were filtered, but I don't know if UUCP
allows for a way to filter incoming messages so you don't get billed
for them.  After a while, though, if people learned that large messages
don't get remailed, they might stop sending them.  OTOH, the operator
of this service would be vulnerable to mail bombs by those opposed;
the bombs would land right in his wallet.)

Info from UUNET, edited, follows below.

Hal
74076.1041@compuserve.com
--------------------------------------------------------------------------


UUNET offers access to:

* UUCP mail
	- Over 2,000 direct mail connections
	- UUNET is an authorized Internet mail gateway, and can act 
	  as your Internet mail forwarder.
	- UUNET serves as the principal gateway to European, Australian
	  Asian, Indian, and South American UUCP sites.

* USENET news
	- UUNET offers a full or partial news feed; all news groups 
	  are offered.
	- Over 1,000 news feeds

[...]

WHICH ACCESS METHODS ARE AVAILABLE?

* From within the United States:
	- Dial your closest CompuServe network access number (local
  	  from thousands of US cities).  You are then connected
	  to UUNET via the X.25 public data network.  No registration
	  with CompuServe is necessary.

	- Direct dial modem at our Austin, TX; Berkeley, CA, Boston, MA; 
	  Falls Church, VA; Palo Alto, CA; Portland, OR; and San Jose, CA
	  hubs.

	- 800 number

	- 900 number for anonymous access to our archive

* Connection Methods
	- UUNET supports all standard modems 
	  (V.32 / V.22bis / Bell 212A / Bell 103)

	- For those of you with UNIX platforms, you only need the 
	  standard UNIX uucp programs.  For those with non-UNIX
	  platforms, software is available through commercial vendors.

* Modem Types
	- UUNET uses Telebit T2500 Modems

	- We support Telebit PEP / 9600 V.32 / 2400 / 1200 / 300 bps

[...]

HOW DO I SUBSCRIBE TO UUNET?

We have several subscription options for users with different needs.
The options and pricing are described below.  Call us and ask for the
General Information Packet on UUNET and AlterNet.  Fill out the UUNET
Subscription Form and send the original in to us!

Subscription options are:

* Regular uucp
  Our basic service which provides email and news connectivity for
  $36 per month plus your connect hours.  Charges for connect hours
  are listed below.

                                                     RATE
TYPE                                        RATE    LESS 5%  MINIMUM
_____________________________________________________________________
Local Inbound (per hour)                |   $2.60 |  $2.47 | 1 min.
Local Outbound (per hour)               |   $2.60 |  $2.47 | 3.6 min.
                                        |         |        |
Remote Inbound (per hour)               |   $5.60 |  $5.32 | 1 min.
                                        |         |        |
Compuserve Modem (per hour)             |   $5.60 |  $5.32 | 1 min.
                                        |         |        |
Inbound (800) and Outbound WATS Daytime |  $16.00 | $15.20 | 1 min.
Inbound (800) and Outbound WATS Evening |  $13.00 | $12.35 | 1 min.
Inbound (800) and Outbound WATS Night   |  $10.00 |  $9.50 | 1 min.
--------------------------------------------------------------------
   
* Low-volume Users 
  All sites are entitled to three connect hours per month for an annual
  fee of $300, paid in advance.  Customers may connect via local dialup,
  remote dialup, or the CompuServe remote network (CompuServe charges 
  are included in the fee).

  In addition, customers may use UUNET's 800 number for an additional
  $180 per year (total $480, paid in advance). 
	
  Restrictions
	- Sites exceeding three connect hours will be charged at 
	  regular UUNET rates for the entire monthly usage, not
   	  just the excess.  This includes the $36 administrative fee.

	- The yearly fee is non-refundable and will not be prorated
	  for partial months.

	- This offer is only available in the continental USA and may
	  be withdrawn at any time.

[...]

WHO DO I CONTACT WITH QUESTIONS?

Please contact us and ask for Customer Support.

WHERE IS UUNET?

The address is:

UUNET Technologies, Inc.
3110 Fairview Park Drive, Suite 570
Falls Church, Virginia 22042 USA
+1 800 4UUNET4 (voice)
+1 703 204 8000 (voice)
+1 703 204 8001 (fax)
info@uunet.uu.net





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Joe Thomas <jthomas@access.digex.com>
Date: Tue, 30 Mar 93 10:49:27 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: FWEE!: Supreme Court news
Message-ID: <Pine.3.05.9303301347.A3561-c100000@access.digex.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
 
In the ÒWhy We Need an Anonymous Whistleblower GroupÓ department, I
quote the last few paragraphs of a story in todayÕs paper (ÒJustices to
Rule on ÔPretty WomanÕ Parody,Ó but thatÕs not what this is about...)
 
The Washington Post, page A4, Thursday, 30 March 1993, reproduced
without permission:
 
   Separately yesterday, the justices refused to hear an appeal by two
   former defense contractors who were convicted in 1991 of illegally
   obtaining Pentagon information in the fraud scandal known as
   ÒOperation Ill Wind.Ó
 
   Thomas D. McAusland and Christopher M. Pafort, former executives at
   Litton Data Systems, which was seeking Navy contracts, were
   prosecuted under federal statutes that bar theft of government
   property.  In their appeal, they argued that government information
   is not ÒpropertyÓ and that no statute or published regulation
   actually barred dissemination of the information.
 
   Their lawyers said an appeals court ruling in the case, _McAusland v.
   U.S._, could make any leak of government information, even to the
   press, the basis for criminal liability.
 
[The defendants are apparently typical sleazy contractors who managed to
get some inside information on a contract they were pursuing.  Obtaining
such information was made a crime _after_ they got the information, so
the government charged them with the Òtheft of government propertyÓ
crime -JGT]
 
And, from an editorial in the Post (Ò. . . Custom and CrimeÓ), page A20:
 
   It is not necessary to make a judgment on the defendantsÕ conduct to
   be appalled by the use of the theft statute to prosecute them.  There
   should be a presumption that government information belongs to the
   people unless specifically protected by law, as national security
   data have been for some time and as contracting information now is.
   The Washington Post joined other media organizations in filing a
   brief in this case to make exactly that point.  The high courtÕs
   failure to review this case leaves in place a ruling that would make
   it possible to prosecute journalists who receive tips from government
   sources about corruption or public advocacy groups that listen to
   whistleblowersÕ charges about waste and inefficiency.  It is not
   enough to say, as the government does, that this probably wonÕt
   happen.  The court should have reversed these convictions to make
   clear that it cannot happen.
 
 
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.2
 
iQCVAgUBK7iTLYwu6QoBw6rbAQHcMgP+N0g3KbTfy5KOlKoylYMg+ZFZrw+Rf4T7
pERTml6QQ4ZYkerLXZD24QGqJHNv/eNeHhwQmTvm4b8mQIY0M1fdecOZNsfKV9GJ
sRKs2gu0Jgl/PW51gDkbZaIvTnz1bJF5gbvGylcZHOiMwva+p5ioxYOMhey79bOk
15KzBlhTQ94=
=G3NJ
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
--
Joe Thomas <jthomas@access.digex.com>
PGP key available by request or by finger.
PGP key fingerprint:  1E E1 B8 6E 49 67 C4 19  8B F1 E4 9D F0 6D 68 4B







From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: deltorto@aol.com
Date: Tue, 30 Mar 93 11:34:27 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: FWEE! latest WB news/ideas
Message-ID: <9303301434.tn14761@aol.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

Gang,

Much Cpunx mail is passing under the bridge and my boat is brimming, but I am
bailing with alacrity. In this case, I prefer to view things as "half empty"
(with apologies to Confucius), to wit:

Eric Hughes contributed these [>>] kewl comments:

>>regarding Tim May's whistleblower test:
>>>I know you
>>>really wanted to post that nifty F-117A thing you OCR'd _somewhere_ but
that
>>>was not particularly helpful.  
>>
>>I think it was extremely helpful.  Especially when we are in a design
>>phase, it is good to know just how strong a reaction there will be to
>>some of these posts.  It benefits us to have had the experience, not
>>just an awareness of the problem.

Touche`, mon ami. I guess what I meant to say was "I'M not ready," which is
different. I am getting ready-er. :-)

>>>Someone suggested a set of WB guidelines should be posted. 
>>
>>Any guidelines must remain completely neutral about content of
>>postings.  A whistleblowers group is for expressing outrage.

And well should they be - neutral, that is. Any and all submissions to me at
<deltorto@aol.com> or on the list* are appreciated.

While I accept that WB's themselves might BE outraged, it is my hope to
enshrine in the WB Guidelines the idea that the area is for CONSTRUCTIVE
CRITICISM of some ABUSIVE STATUS QUO in government or industry that needs
attending to by the media or activist groups, and NOT simple OUTRAGE that
there's "bad stuff going on in government" (gee, really, Virginia?). We have
a loooong way to go with this and I would like it to at least get OFF on the
right foot. I'm sure that in short order, lots of "maroons" will be posting
spurious dingleberries (not _you_ Tim, you're just helping to test the system
<grin>!) and we'll be attacked by various three-lettered government agencies.
There will also be the many, many interested onlookers posting items of
dubious
value and waves of inane banter, but we'll have to develop strict
guidelines/metaprefixes to help filter that noise-chaff from the Pithy Stuff.

(Earpluuugs, gitcher-earplugs heere... fittycents! gitcher-eeearplugs!)

One among us, who shall remain anonymous mainly because I like him, suggested
in private to me that Organized Crime might be interested in providing an
"impervious" site for anon remailing, but I am publicly poo-pooing that idea
lest we get off on the wrong foot in deep water with cement overshoes (howzat
for mixed metaphors, big daddy-o?).

>>A whistleblowers newsgroup must remain value-neutral with respect to
>>all values except the freedom to speak.

Solid, baby. That's a 10-4, as long as the normal newsgroup guidelines such
as adhering to the general topic-flow are inherently adhered to by all
adherents (coherently, if possible).

>>Value neutrality must be taught; it will not come automatically.

Amen, however, once we achieve value-neutrality as a species we will either:
[1] simultaneously enter the Kingdom of Heaven hand-in-hand and thus never
need
    encryption ever again, rendering this entire discussion moot, or
[2] perish in a vast and uniformly logical fireball of hitherto unimagined
proportions

Pick a scenario, any scenario, operators are standing by at 976-ARMAGEDDON.
Self-fulfilling prophecies accepted upon receipt of your validated reality
check-stub.

>>This, and the ability to teach the defense of privacy, are in the long
>>run much more valuable than any one specific whistleblowing.

Perhaps so, but then one day, there may be that _one special whistle_ that
gets
blown, iykwim. That's the one I'M listening for, the "Big Fwee," as it were.
Or
as Bullwinkle might say to Rocky: "Give me Fweedom or give me Death." And
now,
here's something you'll REALLY like:

>>>Nicholas Johnson, the former head of the FCC (under Johnson) 
>>>Ralph Nader's organization 
>>>Jim Settle (FBI Computer Crime Squad) 
>>>a fellow from the CIA  [his name's Ross Stapleton]
>>
>>Dave mentions all these people are in favor of whistleblowing.  The
>>place where they can help the most is by affixing their signature to a
>>document that defends the whistleblowers group in advance of
>>"problems" with it.

Speaking of Boris & Natasha, with the _specific exception_ of the "fellow
from
the CIA" whose name I did not mention at his express request (| open mouth;
insert keyboard; repeat | Eric) and will not herein verify 'identity-wise'
(regardless of Mr. Hughes' dental bills), the above-mentioned entities are
well-intentioned and supportive of the WB idea in general and might well help
out with signatures affixed to such a predefensive document. The Devil's in
the
Details however, and they may balk depending on how "mature" that document
is.
We can gather a lot of support beforehand, so spread the word now and have
people email me at <deltorto@aol.com> so I can put them into the db. The WB
Position Paper is "under construction" and will be pre-circulated on the
Cpunks
list for commentary and revision before being broadcast publicly.

>>If we can gather enough signatures from a wide enough spectrum
>>of the political process, the publication of the document alone
>>will be worth press coverage.  It might also be worthwhile to
>>take out a few big ads in major newspapers and print a position
>>paper.

Agreed, wholeheartedly. I am quietly trying to garner support from various
left-leaning politcos as we type (She with the pugilistic name for one). I
caution all that this is currently an "idea under development" and they are
all
post-nasal-Hip enough to regard it as such until we broadcast its
availability
widely. Needless to say, almost everyone I have spoken to about it is
fairly-to-extremely enthusiastic about the idea and wants immediate access
when
it's online. I also plan to send a note to Billary Clinton when we have our
schtick happening, so's the White House can tune in and listen to the crackle
of disgruntled Govvamint Employees.

Again submissions for the WB Guidelines and the WB Position Paper are
strongly
encouraged. Keep in mind that this is a positive, constructive outlet for the
technology we're discussing on this list and a great opportunity for good
press. And write lots of clever stuff so I don't have to, willya?  :-)

>>[Re: comments from xxxxx Mistah CIA-mon xxxxx]
>>>done "correctly," the system can 'perhaps be somewhat protected' from
>>>posting by pranksters/attackers with bogus revelations - it might
>>>require someone to preview postings 
>>
>>There's no need to preview anything.  Let people say whatever they
>>want.  Then, should the CIA wish to confirm something, they can issue
>>a statement with a digital signature attached to it, referencing the
>>post in question.

I explained what the "nameless one from the CIA" had to say rather poorly. He
was not proposing that his Agency have any previewing capabilities, although
he
ventured in the most generic terms the opinion that CIA Tech would be doing
it's best to break the anonymity as soon as possible (anon remailer
technologists take heed of the most subtle and pernicious attacks). Rather,
what we discussed as two private citizens interested in Freedom of Speech and
the Occasional Corrective Force applied to the Tiller of the Ship of State
was more along the lines of:

>>Review and verification [...as was ably interpreted by E. Hughes...]

...by a Cypherpunk committee monitoring the WB list or _another group_ whose
charge is to evaluate claims by anon posters for their veracity and to
establish the reliability of such sources for future correspondence. I
ventured
that this would be far too involved for the Cpunks to deal with and that it
would have to be the responsibility of the interested parties in the media or
activist org's to verify anon WB claims. We can at best provide good
mechanisms
for them to use, IMHO. Furthermore, there was no implication that ANYone
would
edit postings (least of all the Certifiably Insane Agency), only that those
chartered with verification might scribble them into invisibility if it was
determined by the committee that the source was chronically unreliable.
Beware,
anon bombers and other nefarious monkey-wrenchers, lest you SLIP on your own
banana protocols.

This Verification Thing, by the way, is the single biggest issue with the
entire WB process and the one that frames encryption as an interesting
possible
solution to the problem of establishing successive levels of trust between
postees and verifiers (on top of the basic anon remail technology). More on
this later as Those Who Know Far More than I Do contribute their Wisdom.

IMPORTANT NOTE along those Lines: would all Cypherpunks who:
[1] run an anonymous service
[2] have new improvements to existing anon services
[3] have experience and/or the desire to actually run the WB remailer system
[4] know what a dingleberry is

...PLEASE make yourselves known to me asap so I can know who the players are
and co-ordinate who can be asked to provide what part of the process and
when.
There is no purchase necessary and no commitment for now, I just need to
build
a db of skills and volunteers. For this purpose ONLY, please mail me at
<yinyang@aol.com>. Please include (and format in NEON for easy readability):
[1] What you would be willing to offer in the way of remailer
    software/hardware technology and wisdom, etc.
[2] Your current Public Key (even if you think I already have it and esp if
you
    bin slackin' off sending it) [that means YOU, Gnu... git with the
program!]
[3] Your t-shirt size (S, M, L, XL) and 1-bit chromatic preference (B or W)
[4] Your favorite recipe for fudge brownies (optional, but really helpful)

Hey, is this great or what?

  dave

* My mail reader (sweet Eudora) and I are noting a strong propensity for
folks
to FORGET to use metaprefixes in their SUBJECT lines. Once again, and on
behalf
of all those suffering masses who have to sift daily through Unsubscribe
dribble, flame-flotsam and other ubiquitous jetsam, I ask that ALL
Cypherpunks
with even a passing semblance of politesse put appropriate "PREFIX:
blahblahblah" thingies in the SUBJECTs of their postings to the list: it's a
courteous habit to get into (...that, and wearing clean underwear on a second
date).

- -------
PS/FYI: All of you who have requested an anon ftp site for MacPGP v2.2 will
not
have much longer to wait (zzzzzzz-HUH?!?). Also, the version about to be
posted
(ftp details soon) will be the "final" version and not the .91 beta
previously
mentioned. I will also make it available to CompuServe people  who can then
forward it along to colleagues, friends and relatives FOR EDUCATIONAL
PURPOSES
ONLY. Any weasel who sent me mail asking for it thusly and who didn't include
a
CompuServe address better get aboard - you know who you are. It will be a
self-expanding archive, fully System 7.1-compatible. There's even an
custom folder icon for that educational "ooohhh-aaahhh" factor.
Wowsie-wowsie-woo-woo.
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.2

iQCVAgUBK7gshKHBOF9KrwDlAQF3swP/d6z6k/NYLBw0I4peteh8Nif+1Z3r0NoL
UnhoHJVfMmYON5XJcIOgcBgzYvMJgZuEXVjjwMnXgUf0jmG/FJTV6VFv89PseigT
V/tj/D5rcDUnK9+gkbTAwYdISmnGroXyZc5+L+Ozm0xgACWDlz2iM3B4FfMYG0ew
VfUI9sSKsa8=
=95TB
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Eric Hughes <hughes@soda.berkeley.edu>
Date: Tue, 30 Mar 93 19:26:51 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Another UUCP service provider
In-Reply-To: <5ga01B1w164w@ideath.goldenbear.com>
Message-ID: <9303311648.AA18969@soda.berkeley.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>I'm 
>getting kinda bored with the topic of small-system connectivity and don't 
>think it's really what the cypherpunks list is about/for; 

This information is generally useful for the following tactical reasons:

1. Anonymous remailers are disapproved of.
2. Pressure is brought to bear against the operators of such systems.
3. All the owners of the machines and the communications channels must
   not give in to such pressure in order to avoid shutdown.
4. Private ownership of remailer nodes seems essential.
5. No organizations have volunteered use of their machines.
6. Personal ownership by individuals seems necessary in order to get this
   off the ground.

We don't need to discuss it much, but news is appreciated.

Eric




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Hal <74076.1041@CompuServe.COM>
Date: Wed, 31 Mar 93 09:27:47 PST
To: CYPHERPUNKS <CYPHERPUNKS@toad.com>
Subject: REMAIL: Filters for copyright?
Message-ID: <930331171832_74076.1041_FHD21-1@CompuServe.COM>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Among thuh objections to anonymous postin', like, we have discussed various
ideas for controllin' volume abuse.  Content abuse is ya know, like, what
seems to cause most of thuh complaints, like, wow, though.

I think we can awesumly ignore those who simply object to an obnoxious,
tasteless or inappropriate message.  Man, another issue that has been
raised is the question of illegal messages.

It's not clear to me what would be illegal in thuh U.S.  Like, there is that
nasty old First Amendment that keeps gettin' in thuh way.

One class which has been discussed is copyrighted messages.  If someone
posts a long excerpt from a published document without thuh author's
permission, man, this would violate his copyright.

I had thuh idea of performin' a transformation on all messages so that
the text of a message would be altered.  Since copyright does not protect
ideas, fer shure, but rather thuh specific expression of an idea, man, this
might keep any message from violatin' copyright.

Like, there are a couple of filters in comp.sources.games: jive and valspeak.
These are pretty amusin'.  Perhaps a variation on these filters, fer shure,
ones which do some simple word substitution, man, would be enough to prevent
copyright violations to come out of an anonymous postin' service.

Like, ya know, this messages has been processed by thuh valspeak filter.

Hal Finney
74076.1041@compuserve.com





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: tjw@GAS.uug.Arizona.EDU (Theodore J Weinberg)
Date: Wed, 31 Mar 93 11:32:23 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: subscribe
Message-ID: <9303311954.AA09764@GAS.uug.Arizona.EDU>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


thanks
'.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: stig@transam.ece.cmu.edu (Jonathan Stigelman)
Date: Thu, 1 Apr 93 11:24:31 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: a blackmail opportunity
Message-ID: <232@x15_remote.stigmobile.usa>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


In message <9303290017.AA05745@toad.com> you write:

>perfect prelude to blackmail.  An unscrupulous person running a
>remailer can obviously keep records of truenames, along with
>messages that their senders do not want associated with them.

That's why you use more than one remailer and you encrypt the messages.
This guards against single-point failures...  

>Always encrypting helps with mail, but not with news.
>

Why?  One layer of encription is stripped by each remailer.  Use
three layers of encription and three remailers: The first remailer
will know that you sent something encripted; the third will see the
message and the destination but not know that you were the author.

	stig





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: robichau@lambda.msfc.nasa.gov (Paul Robichaux)
Date: Thu, 1 Apr 93 08:18:16 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: PHRACK: Article from PHRACK 42 on encryption
Message-ID: <9304011902.AA26513@lambda.msfc.nasa.gov>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Attached is an article from PHRACK 42 written by "The Racketeer."

Exposing factual errors and flaws in reasoning is left as an exercise
for the reader.

-Paul



              ###################################################
              # The Paranoid Schizophrenics Guide to Encryption #
              #   (or How to Avoid Getting Tapped and Raided)   #
              ###################################################

                        Written by The Racketeer of
                            The /-/ellfire Club


        The purpose of this file is to explain the why and the how of Data
Encryption, with a brief description of the future of computer security,
TEMPEST.

        At the time of this issue's release, two of the more modern software
packages use encryption methods covered in this article, so exercise some of
your neurons and check into newer releases if they are available.  Methods
described in this file use PGP, covering an implementation of Phil Zimmermann's
RSA variant, and the MDC and IDEA conventional encryption techniques by using
PGP and HPACK.

                              --------------------
                              WHY DATA ENCRYPTION?
                              --------------------

        This isn't exactly the typical topic discussed by me in Phrack.
However, the importance of knowing encryption is necessary when dealing with
any quasi-legal computer activity.  I was planning on starting my series on
hacking Novell Networks (so non-Internet users can have something to do), but
recent events have caused me to change my mind and, instead of showing people
how to get into more trouble (well, okay, there is plenty of that in this file
too, since you're going to be working with contraband software), I've opted
instead to show people how to protect themselves from the long arm of the Law.

        Why all this concern?

        Relatively recently, The Masters of Deception (MoD) were raided by
various federal agencies and were accused of several crimes.  The crimes they
did commit will doubtlessly cause more mandates, making the already
too-outrageous penalties even worse.

        "So?" you might ask.  The MoD weren't exactly friends of mine.  In fact,
quite the contrary.  But unlike many of the hackers whom I dealt with in the
"final days" prior to their arrest, I bitterly protested any action against the
MoD.  Admittedly, I followed the episode from the beginning to the end, and the
moral arguments were enough to rip the "Hacker World" to pieces.  But these
moral issues are done, the past behind most of us.  It is now time to examine
the aftermath of the bust.

        According to the officials in charge of the investigation against MoD
members, telephone taps were used to gain evidence against members
successfully.  All data going in and out of their house was monitored and all
voice communications were monitored, especially between members.

        So, how do you make a line secure?  The party line answer is use of
effective encryption methods.

        Federal investigative agencies are currently pushing for more
technological research into the issue of computer security.  All of the popular
techniques which are being used by hackers today are being used by the
government's R&D departments.

        Over the course of the last 5 years, I've watched as the U.S.
Government went from a task force of nearly nil all the way to a powerful
marauder.  Their mission?  Unclear.  Regardless, the research being
accomplished by federally-funded projects dealing with the issues of computer
security are escalating.  I've personally joined and examined many such
conferences and have carefully examined the issues.  Many of these issues will
become future Phrack articles which I'll write.  Others, such as limited-life
semiconductors and deliberate telephone line noise sabotage caused by ACK
packet detections in order to drive telecommunication costs higher, are sadly
unpreventable problems of the future which won't be cured by simple awareness
of the problem.

        They have different names -- Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT),
Computer Assisted Security Investigative Analysis Tool (FBI's CASIAT), the
Secret Service's Computer Fraud Division, or the National Computer Security
Center (NSA's NCSC).  Scores of other groups exist for every network, even
every operating system.  Their goal isn't necessarily to catch hackers; their
goal is to acquire information about the act of hacking itself until it is no
longer is a problem.  Encryption stands in the way.

        Computer Security is literally so VAST a concept that, once a person
awakens to low-level computer mechanics, it becomes nearly impossible to
prevent that person from gaining unauthorized access to machines.  This is
somewhat contradictory to the "it's all social engineering" concept which we
have been hearing about on Nightline and in the papers.  If you can't snag them
one way though, you can get them another -- the fact is that computers are
still too damn vulnerable these days to traditional hacking techniques.

        Because of the ease of breaking through security, it becomes very
difficult to actually create an effective way to protect yourself from any form
of computer hacking.  Look at piracy:  they've tried every trick in the book to
protect software and, so far, the only success they have had was writing
software that sucked so much nobody wanted a copy.

        Furthermore, totally non-CPU related attacks are taking place.  The
passing of Anti-TEMPEST Protection Laws which prevent homes from owning
computers that don't give off RF emissions has made it possible for any Joe
with a few semesters of electrical engineering knowledge to rig together a
device that can read what's on your computer monitor.

     Therefore:

     Q:  How does a person protect their own computer from getting hacked?

     A:  You pretty much can't.

        I've memorized so many ways to bypass computer security that I can
rattle them off in pyramid levels.  If a computer is not even connected to a
network or phone line, people can watch every keystroke typed and everything
displayed on the screen.

        Why aren't the Fedz using these techniques RIGHT NOW?

        I can't say they are not.  However, a little research into TEMPEST
technology resulted in a pretty blunt fact:

        There are too many computer components to scan accurately.  Not the
monitor, oh no!  You're pretty much fucked there.  But accessories for input
and output, such as printers, sound cards, scanners, disk drives, and so
forth...the possibility of parallel CPU TEMPEST technology exists, but there are
more CPU types than any mobile unit could possibly use accurately.

        Keyboards are currently manufactured by IBM, Compaq, Dell, Northgate,
Mitsuma (bleah), Fujitsu, Gateway, Focus, Chichony, Omni, Tandy, Apple, Sun,
Packard-Bell (may they rot in hell), Next, Prime, Digital, Unisys, Sony,
Hewlett-Packard, AT&T, and a scattering of hundreds of lesser companies.  Each
of these keyboards have custom models, programmable models, 100+ key and < 100
key models, different connectors, different interpreters, and different levels
of cable shielding.

        For the IBM compatible alone, patents are owned on multiple keyboard
pin connectors, such as those for OS/2 and Tandy, as well as the fact that the
ISA chipsets are nearly as diverse as the hundreds of manufacturers of
motherboards.  Because of lowest-bid practices, there can be no certainty of
any particular connection -- especially when you are trying to monitor a
computer you've never actually seen!

        In short -- it costs too much for the TEMPEST device to be mobile and
to be able to detect keystrokes from a "standard" keyboard, mostly because
keyboards aren't "standard" enough!  In fact, the only real standard which I
can tell exists on regular computers is the fact that monitors still use good
old CRT technology.

        Arguments against this include the fact that most of the available PC
computers use standard DIN connectors which means that MOST of the keyboards
could be examined.  Furthermore, these keyboards are traditionally serial
connections using highly vulnerable wire (see Appendix B).

        Once again, I raise the defense that keyboard cables are traditionally
the most heavily shielded (mine is nearly 1/4 inch thick) and therefore falls
back on the question of how accurate a TEMPEST device which is portable can be,
and if it is cost effective enough to use against hackers.  Further viewpoints
and TEMPEST overview can be seen in Appendix B.

        As a result, we have opened up the possibility for protection from
outside interference for our computer systems.  Because any DECENT encryption
program doesn't echo the password to your screen, a typical encryption program
could provide reasonable security to your machine.  How reasonable?

        If you have 9 pirated programs installed on your computer at a given
time and you were raided by some law enforcement holes, you would not be
labeled at a felon.  Instead, it wouldn't even be worth their time to even raid
you.  If you have 9 pirated programs installed on your computer, had 200
pirated programs encrypted in a disk box, and you were raided, you would have
to be charged with possession of 9 pirated programs (unless you did something
stupid, like write "Pirated Ultima" or something on the label).

        We all suspected encryption was the right thing to do, but what about
encryption itself?  How secure IS encryption?

        If you think that the world of the Hackers is deeply shrouded with
extreme prejudice, I bet you can't wait to talk with crypto-analysts.  These
people are traditionally the biggest bunch of holes I've ever laid eyes on.  In
their mind, people have been debating the concepts of encryption since the dawn
of time, and if you come up with a totally new method of data encryption, -YOU
ARE INSULTING EVERYONE WHO HAS EVER DONE ENCRYPTION-, mostly by saying "Oh, I
just came up with this idea for an encryption which might be the best one yet"
when people have dedicated all their lives to designing and breaking encryption
techniques -- so what makes you think you're so fucking bright?

        Anyway, crypto-(anal)ysts tend to take most comments as veiled insults,
and are easily terribly offended.  Well, make no mistake, if I wanted to insult
these people, I'd do it.  I've already done it.  I'll continue to do it.  And I
won't thinly veil it with good manners, either.

        The field of Crypto-analysis has traditionally had a mathematical
emphasis.  The Beal Cipher and the German Enigma Cipher are some of the more
popular views of the field.  Ever since World War 2, people have spent time
researching how technology was going to affect the future of data encryption.

        If the United States went to war with some other country, they'd have a
strong advantage if they knew the orders of the opposing side before they were
carried out.  Using spies and wire taps, they can gain encrypted data referred
to as Ciphertext.  They hand the information over to groups that deal with
encryption such as the NSA and the CIA, and they attempt to decode the
information before the encrypted information is too old to be of any use.

        The future of Computer Criminology rests in the same ways.  The
deadline on white collar crimes is defaulted to about 3-4 years, which is
called the Statute of Limitations.  Once a file is obtained which is encrypted,
it becomes a task to decrypt it within the statute's time.

        As most crypto-analysts would agree, the cost in man-hours as well as
supercomputer time would make it unfeasible to enforce brute force decryption
techniques of random encryption methods.  As a result of this, government
regulation stepped in.

        The National Security Agency (referred to as "Spooks" by the relatively
famous tormenter of KGB-paid-off hackers, Cliff Stoll, which is probably the
only thing he's ever said which makes me think he could be a real human being)
released the DES -- Data Encryption Standard.  This encryption method was
basically solid and took a long time to crack, which was also the Catch-22.

        DES wasn't uncrackable, it was just that it took "an unreasonable
length of time to crack."  The attack against the word "unreasonable" keeps
getting stronger and stronger.  While DES originated on Honeywell and DEC PDPs,
it was rumored that they'd networked enough computers together to break a
typical DES encrypted file.  Now that we have better computers and the cost
requirements for high-speed workstations are even less, I believe that even if
they overestimated "unreasonable" a hundredfold, they'd be in the "reasonable"
levels now.

To explain how fast DES runs these days...

        I personally wrote a password cracker for DES which was arguably the
very first true high-speed cracker.  It used the German "Ultra-Fast Crypt"
version of the DES algorithm, which happened to contain a static variable used
to hold part of the previous attempt at encrypting the password, called the
salt.  By making sure the system wouldn't resalt on every password attempt, I
was able to guess passwords out of a dictionary at the rate of 400+ words per
second on a 386-25 (other methods at that time were going at about 30 per
second).  As I understand it now, levels at 500+ for the same CPU have been
achieved.

        Now this means I can go through an entire dictionary in about five
minutes on a DES-encrypted segment.  The NSA has REAL cash and some of the
finest mathematicians in the world, so if they wanted to gain some really
decent speed on encryption, DES fits the ideal for parallel programming.
Splitting a DES segment across a hundred CPUs, each relatively modern, they
could crank out terraflops of speed.  They'd probably be able to crack the code
within a few days if they wanted to.

        Ten years from now, they could do it in a few seconds.

        Of course, the proper way to circumnavigate DES encryption is to locate
and discover a more reliable, less popular method.  Because the U.S. Government
regulates it, it doesn't mean it's the best.  In fact, it means it's the
fucking lamest thing they could sweeten up and hope the public swallows it!
The last attempt the NSA made at regulating a standard dealing with encryption,
they got roasted.

        I'm somewhat convinced that the NSA is against personal security, and
from all the press they give, they don't WANT anyone to have personal security.
Neither does the Media for that matter.

        Because of lamers in the "Biblical Injustice Grievance Group of
Opposing Terrible Sacrilege" (or BIGGOTS) who think that if you violate a LAW
you're going to Hell (see APPENDIX C for my viewpoint of these people) and who
will have convinced Congress to pass ease-of-use wire taps on telephone lines
and networks so that they can monitor casual connections without search
warrants, encryption will be mandatory if you want any privacy at all.

        And to quote Phil Zimmermann, "If privacy is outlawed, only the
outlaws will have privacy."

        Therefore, encryption methods that we must use should be gathered into
very solid categories which do NOT have endorsement of the NSA and also have
usefulness in technique.

HOW TO USE DECENT ENCRYPTION:

(First, go to APPENDIX D, and get yourself a copy of PGP, latest version.)

        First of all, PGP is contraband software, presumably illegal to use in
the United States because of a patent infringement it allegedly carries.  The
patent infringement is the usage of a variant of the RSA encryption algorithm.
Can you patent an algorithm?  By definition, you cannot patent an idea, just a
product -- like source code.  Yet, the patent exists to be true until proven
false.  More examples of how people in the crypto-analyst field can be assholes.

        Anyway, Phil's Pretty Good Software, creators of PGP, were sued and all
rights to PGP were forfeited in the United States of America.  Here comes the
violation of the SECOND law, illegal exportation of a data encryption outside
of the United States of America.  Phil distributed his encryption techniques
outside the USA, which is against the law as well.  Even though Mr. Zimmermann
doesn't do any work with PGP, because he freely gave his source code to others,
people in countries besides the United States are constantly updating and
improving the PGP package.

        PGP handles two very important methods of encryption -- conventional
and public key.  These are both very important to understand because they
protect against completely different things.

                            -----------------------
                            CONVENTIONAL ENCRYPTION
                            -----------------------

        Conventional encryption techniques are easiest to understand.  You
supply a password and the password you enter encrypts a file or some other sort
of data.  By re-entering the password, it allows you to recreate the original
data.

        Simple enough concept, just don't give the password to someone you
don't trust.  If you give the password to the wrong person, your whole business
is in jeopardy.  Of course, that goes with just about anything you consider
important.

        There are doubtlessly many "secure enough" ciphers which exist right
now.  Unfortunately, the availability of these methods are somewhat slim
because of exportation laws.  The "major" encryption programs which I believe
are worth talking about here are maintained by people foreign to the USA.

        The two methods of "conventional" encryption are at least not DES,
which qualifies them as okay in my book.  This doesn't mean they are impossible
to break, but they don't have certain DES limitations which I know exist, such
as 8 character password maximum.  The methods are:  MDC, as available in the
package HPACK; and IDEA, as available in Pretty Good Privacy.

        Once you've installed PGP, we can start by practicing encrypting
some typical files on your PC.  To conventionally encrypt your AUTOEXEC.BAT
file (it won't delete the file after encryption), use the following command:

C:\> pgp -c autoexec.bat
Pretty Good Privacy 2.1 - Public-key encryption for the masses.
(c) 1990-1992 Philip Zimmermann, Phil's Pretty Good Software. 6 Dec 92
Date: 1993/01/19 03:06 GMT

You need a pass phrase to encrypt the file.
Enter pass phrase:                                      { Password not echoed }
Enter same pass phrase again: Just a moment....
Ciphertext file: autoexec.pgp

C:\> dir

 Volume in drive C is RACK'S
 Directory of  c:\autoexec.pgp

autoexec.pgp      330 1-18-93  21:05

        330 bytes in 1 file(s)          8,192 bytes allocated
  52,527,104 bytes free

        PGP will compress the file before encrypting it.  I'd say this is a
vulnerability to the encryption on the basis that the file contains a ZIP file
signature which could conceivably make the overall encryption less secure.
Although no reports have been made of someone breaking PGP this way, I'd feel
more comfortable with the ZIP features turned off.  This is somewhat contrary
to the fact that redundancy checking is another way of breaking ciphertext.
However, it isn't as reliable as checking a ZIP signature.

        Although PGP will doubtlessly become the more popular of the two
programs, HPACK's encryption "strength" is that by being less popular, it will
probably not be as heavily researched as PGP's methods will be.  Of course, by
following PGP, new methods of encryption will doubtlessly be added as the
program is improved.

        Here is how you'd go about encrypting an entire file using the HPACK
program using the MDC "conventional" encryption:

C:\> hpack A -C secret.hpk secret.txt
HPACK - The multi-system archiver Version 0.78a0 (shareware version)
For Amiga, Archimedes, Macintosh, MSDOS, OS/2, and UNIX
Copyright (c) Peter Gutmann 1989 - 1992.  Release date: 1 Sept 1992

Archive is 'SECRET.HPK'

Please enter password (8..80 characters):
Reenter password to confirm:
Adding SECRET  .TXT

Done

        Anyway, I don't personally think HPACK will ever become truly popular
for any reason besides its encryption capabilities.  ZIP has been ported to an
amazing number of platforms, in which lies ZIP's encryption weakness.  If you
think ZIP is safe, remember that you need to prevent the possibility of four
years of attempted password cracking in order to beat the Statutes of
Limitations:

        Here is the introduction to ZIPCRACK, and what it had to say about how
easy it is to break through this barrier:

(Taken from ZIPCRACK.DOC)
-----
     ZIPCRACK is a program designed to demonstrate how easy it is to find
passwords on files created with PKZIP.  The approach used is a fast,
brute-force attack, capable of scanning thousands of passwords per second
(5-6000 on an 80386-33).  While there is currently no known way to decrypt
PKZIP's files without first locating the correct password, the probability that
a particular ZIP's password can be found in a billion-word search (which takes
about a day on a fast '486) is high enough that anyone using the encryption
included in PKZIP 1.10 should be cautious (note:  as of this writing, PKZIP
version 2.00 has not been released, so it is not yet known whether future
versions of PKZIP will use an improved encryption algorithm).  The author's
primary purpose in releasing this program is to encourage improvements in ZIP
security.  The intended goal is NOT to make it easy for every computer user to
break into any ZIP, so no effort has been made to make the program
user-friendly.
----- End Blurb

        Likewise, WordPerfect is even more vulnerable.  I've caught a copy of
WordPerfect Crack out on the Internet and here is what it has to say about
WordPerfect's impossible-to-break methods:

(Taken from WPCRACK.DOC:)
-----
WordPerfect's manual claims that "You can protect or lock your documents with a
password so that no one will be able to retrieve or print the file without
knowing the password - not even you," and "If you forget the password, there is
absolutely no way to retrieve the document."  [1]

Pretty impressive!  Actually, you could crack the password of a Word Perfect
5.x file on a 8 1/2" x 11" sheet of paper, it's so simple.  If you are counting
on your files being safe, they are NOT.  Bennet [2] originally discovered how
the file was encrypted, and Bergen and Caelli [3] determined further
information regarding version 5.x.  I have taken these papers, extended them,
and written some programs to extract the password from the file.
----- End Blurb

                             ---------------------
                             PUBLIC KEY ENCRYPTION
                             ---------------------

        Back to the Masters of Deception analogy -- they were telephone
tapped.  Conventional encryption is good for home use, because only one person
could possibly know the password.  But what happens when you want to transmit
the encrypted data by telephone?  If the Secret Service is listening in on your
phone calls, you can't tell the password to the person that you want to send
the encrypted information to.  The SS will grab the password every single time.

        Enter Public-Key encryption!   The concepts behind Public-Key are very
in-depth compared to conventional encryption.  The idea here is that passwords
are not exchanged; instead a "key" which tells HOW to encrypt the file for the
other person is given to them.  This is called the Public Key.

        You retain the PRIVATE key and the PASSWORD.  They tell you how to
decrypt the file that someone sent you.  There is no "straight" path between
the Public Key and the Private Key, so just because someone HAS the public key,
it doesn't mean they can produce either your Secret Key or Password.  All it
means is that if they encrypt the file using the Public Key, you will be able
to decrypt it.  Furthermore, because of one-way encryption methods, the output
your Public Key produces is original each time, and therefore, you can't
decrypt the information you encrypted with the Public Key -- even if you
encrypted it yourself!

        Therefore, you can freely give out your own Public Key to anyone you
want, and any information you receive, tapped or not, won't make a difference.
As a result, you can trade anything you want and not worry about telephone
taps!  This technique supposedly is being used to defend the United States'
Nuclear Arsenal, if you disbelieve this is secure.

        I've actually talked with some of the makers of the RSA "Public-Key"
algorithm, and, albeit they are quite brilliant individuals, I'm somewhat
miffed at their lack of enthusiasm for aiding the public in getting a hold of
tools to use Public Key.  As a result, they are about to get railroaded by
people choosing to use PGP in preference to squat.

        Okay, maybe they don't have "squat" available.  In fact, they have a
totally free package with source code available to the USA public (no
exportation of code) which people can use called RSAREF.  Appendix E explains
more about why I'm not suggesting you use this package, and also how to obtain
it so you can see for yourself.

        Now that we know the basic concepts of Public-Key, let's go ahead and
create the basics for effective tap-proof communications.

Generation of your own secret key (comments in {}s):

C:\> pgp -kg               {  Command used to activate PGP for key generation }
Pretty Good Privacy 2.1 - Public-key encryption for the masses.
(c) 1990-1992 Philip Zimmermann, Phil's Pretty Good Software. 6 Dec 92
Date: 1993/01/18 19:53 GMT

Pick your RSA key size:
        1)       384 bits- Casual grade, fast but less secure
        2)       512 bits- Commercial grade, medium speed, good security
        3)      1024 bits- Military grade, very slow, highest security
Choose 1, 2, or 3, or enter desired number of bits: 3  {DAMN STRAIGHT MILITARY}

Generating an RSA key with a 1024-bit modulus...
You need a user ID for your public key.  The desired form for this
user ID is your name, followed by your E-mail address enclosed in
<angle brackets>, if you have an E-mail address.
For example:  John Q. Smith <12345.6789@compuserve.com>

Enter a user ID for your public key:
The Racketeer <rack@lycaeum.hfc.com>

You need a pass phrase to protect your RSA secret key.
Your pass phrase can be any sentence or phrase and may have many
words, spaces, punctuation, or any other printable characters.
Enter pass phrase:                                     { Not echoed to screen }
Enter same pass phrase again:                          {  "    "    "    "    }
Note that key generation is a VERY lengthy process.

We need to generate 105 random bytes.  This is done by measuring the
time intervals between your keystrokes.  Please enter some text on your
keyboard, at least 210 nonrepeating keystrokes, until you hear the beep:
1 .*                                                             { decrements }
-Enough, thank you.
..................................................++++ ........++++
Key generation completed.

        It took a 33-386DX a grand total of about 10 minutes to make the key.
Now that it has been generated, it has been placed in your key ring.  We can
examine the key ring using the following command:

C:\> pgp -kv
Pretty Good Privacy 2.1 - Public-key encryption for the masses.
(c) 1990-1992 Philip Zimmermann, Phil's Pretty Good Software. 6 Dec 92
Date: 1993/01/18 20:19 GMT

Key ring: 'c:\pgp\pubring.pgp'
Type bits/keyID   Date       User ID
pub  1024/7C8C3D  1993/01/18 The Racketeer <rack@lycaeum.hfc.com>
1 key(s) examined.

        We've now got a viable keyring with your own keys.  Now, you need to
extract your Public Key so that you can have other people encrypt shit and have
it sent to you.  In order to do this, you need to be able to mail it to them.
Therefore, you need to extract it in ASCII format.  This is done by the
following:

C:\> pgp -kxa "The Racketeer <rack@lycaeum.hfc.com>"
Pretty Good Privacy 2.1 - Public-key encryption for the masses
(c) 1990-1992 Philip Zimmermann, Phil's Pretty Good Software. 6 Dec 92
Date: 1993/01/18 20:56 GMT

Extracting from key ring:  'c:\pgp\pubring.pgp', userid "The Racketeer
<rack@lycaeum.hfc.com>".

Key for user ID: The Racketeer <rack@lycaeum.hfc.com>
1024-bit key, Key ID 0C975F, created 1993/01/18

Extract the above key into which file? rackkey

Transport armor file: rackkey.asc

Key extracted to file 'rackkey.asc'.

        Done.  The end result of the key is a file which contains:

-----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----
Version: 2.1

mQCNAisuyi4AAAEEAN+cY6nUU+VIhYOqBfcc12rEMph+A7iadUi8xQJ00ANvp/iF
+ugZ+GP2ZnzA0fob9cG/MVbh+iiz3g+nbS+ZljD2uK4VyxZfu5alsbCBFbJ6Oa8K
/c/e19lzaksSlTcqTMQEae60JUkrHWpnxQMM3IqSnh3D+SbsmLBs4pFrfIw9AAUR
tCRUaGUgUmFja2V0ZWVyIDxyYWNrQGx5Y2FldW0uaGZjLmNvbT4=
=6rFE
-----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----

        This can be tagged to the bottom of whatever E-Mail message you want to
send or whatever.  This key can added to someone else's public key ring and
thereby used to encrypt information so that it can be sent to you.  Most people
who use this on USENET add it onto their signature files so that it is
automatically posted on their messages.

        Let's assume someone else wanted to communicate with you.  As a result,
they sent you their own Public Key:

-----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----
Version: 2.1

mQA9AitgcOsAAAEBgMlGLWl8rub0Ulzv3wpxI5OFLRkx3UcGCGsi/y/Qg7nR8dwI
owUy65l9XZsp0MUnFQAFEbQlT25lIER1bWIgUHVkIDwxRHVtUHVkQG1haWxydXMu
Yml0bmV0Pg==
=FZBm
-----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----

        Notice this guy, Mr. One Dumb Pud, used a smaller key size than you
did.  This shouldn't make any difference because PGP detects this
automatically.  Let's now add the schlep onto your key ring.

C:\> pgp -ka dumbpud.asc
Pretty Good Privacy 2.1 - Public-key encryption for the masses.
(c) 1990-1992 Philip Zimmermann, Phil's Pretty Good Software. 6 Dec 92
Date: 1993/01/22 22:17 GMT

Key ring: 'c:\pgp\pubring.$01'
Type bits/keyID   Date       User ID
pub   384/C52715  1993/01/22 One Dumb Pud <1DumPud@mailrus.bitnet>

New key ID: C52715

Keyfile contains:
   1 new key(s)
Adding key ID C52715 from file 'dumbpud.asc' to key ring 'c:\pgp\pubring.pgp'.

Key for user ID: One Dumb Pud <1DumPud@mailrus.bitnet>
384-bit key, Key ID C52715, crated 1993/01/22
This key/userID associate is not certified.

Do you want to certify this key yourself (y/N)?  n {We'll deal with this later}

        Okay, now we have the guy on our key ring.  Let's go ahead and encrypt
a file for the guy.  How about having the honor of an unedited copy of this
file?

C:\> pgp -e encrypt One                     {PGP has automatic name completion}
Pretty Good Privacy 2.1 - Public-key encryption for the masses.
(c) 1990-1992 Philip Zimmermann, Phil's Pretty Good Software. 6 Dec 92
Date: 1993/01/22 22:24 GMT


Recipient's public key will be used to encrypt.
Key for user ID: One Dumb Pud <1DumPud@mailrus.bitnet>
384-bit key, Key ID C52715, created 1993/01/22

WARNING:  Because this public key is not certified with a trusted
signature, it is not known with high confidence that this public key
actually belongs to: "One Dumb Pud <1DumPud@mailrus.bitnet>".

Are you sure you want to use this public key (y/N)? y

-- 
Paul Robichaux, KD4JZG                | May explode if disposed of improperly.
NTI Mission Software Development Div. | RIPEM key on request.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Date: Thu, 1 Apr 93 12:27:00 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: (fwd) Plan Nine from Cypherspace
Message-ID: <9304012311.AA13318@netcom3.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I noticed a new group formed, called alt.cabal, and decided to
"christen" it with a suitably caballistic message. Don't bother trying
to decrypt it, obviously.

Perhaps we can simply co-opt alt.cabal for our own uses?

-Tim


Newsgroups: alt.cabal
Path: netcom.com!tcmay
From: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Subject: Plan Nine from Cypherspace
Message-ID: <tcmayC4tuCq.9r5@netcom.com>
Organization: Netcom - Online Communication Services (408 241-9760 guest)
X-Newsreader: Tin 1.1 PL5
Date: Thu, 1 Apr 1993 22:55:37 GMT


-----BEGIN PGP MESSAGE-----
Version: 2.2
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=VFR9
-----END PGP MESSAGE-----

Post response to alt.cabal in normal form.

-- 
..........................................................................
Timothy C. May         | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,  
tcmay@netcom.com       | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
408-688-5409           | knowledge, reputations, information markets, 
W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA  | black markets, collapse of governments.
Higher Power: 2^756839 | Public Key: PGP and MailSafe available.







From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Perry E. Metzger" <pmetzger@shearson.com>
Date: Thu, 1 Apr 93 10:20:53 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: PHRACK: Article from PHRACK 42 on encryption
In-Reply-To: <9304011902.AA26513@lambda.msfc.nasa.gov>
Message-ID: <9304012043.AA04761@snark.shearson.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Paul Robichaux says:
> Attached is an article from PHRACK 42 written by "The Racketeer."
> 
> Exposing factual errors and flaws in reasoning is left as an exercise
> for the reader.
> 

The flaws are big enough to drive a bakery truck through. Its trash.


Perry




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Hal <74076.1041@CompuServe.COM>
Date: Thu, 1 Apr 93 13:20:30 PST
To: <cypherpunks@toad.com>
Subject: REMAIL: Usage statistics
Message-ID: <930401235941_74076.1041_FHD46-1@CompuServe.COM>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


About a month ago, I added a simple logging capability to my remailer, by
adding these lines to my maildelivery file:

Request-Remailing-To    ""      pipe R  "date >> LOG.REMAIL"
Anon-To                 ""      pipe R  "date >> LOG.REMAIL"
Encrypted               PGP     pipe R  "date >> LOG.ENCRYPTED"

Here is a summary of the information from my LOG.REMAIL file.  It shows
the dates on which a remailed message went through my remailer, with a count
of how many messages went through on that day:

   1 Tue Mar 2
   2 Wed Mar 3
   1 Thu Mar 4
   7 Fri Mar 5
   1 Wed Mar 10
   1 Sun Mar 14
   1 Mon Mar 15
   1 Tue Mar 16
   1 Wed Mar 17
   1 Thu Mar 18
   1 Sun Mar 21
   2 Mon Mar 22
  10 Tue Mar 23
  10 Wed Mar 24
   6 Thu Mar 25
   7 Fri Mar 26
   6 Sat Mar 27
   4 Sun Mar 28
   1 Mon Mar 29
   3 Wed Mar 31
   4 Thu Apr 1

These statistics may be useful in considering such approaches as batching
or rearranging messages to achieve greater anonymity.

Hal
74076.1041@compuserve.com





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Phiber Optik <phiber@eff.org>
Date: Thu, 1 Apr 93 22:54:28 PST
To: pmetzger@shearson.com
Subject: Re: PHRACK: Article from PHRACK 42 on encryption
In-Reply-To: <9304012043.AA04761@snark.shearson.com>
Message-ID: <199304020654.AA27442@eff.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> 
> 
> Paul Robichaux says:
> > Attached is an article from PHRACK 42 written by "The Racketeer."
> > 
> > Exposing factual errors and flaws in reasoning is left as an exercise
> > for the reader.
> > 
> 
> The flaws are big enough to drive a bakery truck through. Its trash.
> 
> 
> Perry
> 

Welcome to the wonderful world of "Phrack".





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: trump@pluto.ee.cua.edu (Louis Edward Trumpbour)
Date: Fri, 2 Apr 93 07:34:19 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: could someone
Message-ID: <9304021534.AA21746@pluto.ee.cua.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



could someone please re mail me the letter that contains the Phrack 42 article
and comentary... my mail was lost and i would like to see this one

Clovis




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: robichau@lambda.msfc.nasa.gov (Paul Robichaux)
Date: Fri, 2 Apr 93 13:11:29 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: list ping; ignore
Message-ID: <9304022111.AA26160@lambda.msfc.nasa.gov>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


[ sorry to do this; listmail is only reaching us sporadically and I'm
  trying to find out why. ]

-- 
Paul Robichaux, KD4JZG                | May explode if disposed of improperly.
NTI Mission Software Development Div. | RIPEM key on request.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: gnu (John Gilmore)
Date: Fri, 2 Apr 93 16:11:04 PST
To: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@Athena.MIT.EDU>
Subject: Uunet is an "enhanced service provider", not a common carrier
In-Reply-To: <9303262102.AA04094@SOS>
Message-ID: <9304030010.AA04500@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I spoke with Mike O'Dell about this; he says uunet is an enhanced service
provider.  It is not a common carrier.  (Let's not discuss this in cypherpunks
anyway -- I just wanted to set the record straight.)

	John





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Eric Hughes <hughes@soda.berkeley.edu>
Date: Sat, 3 Apr 93 12:06:43 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: WB: public kiosks
Message-ID: <9304032003.AA11049@soda.berkeley.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


One of the necessities of a truly effect whistleblowing system is the
existence of public kiosks where anybody can post from--the equivalent
of public telephones for the net.  This is useful when the sending of
any encrypted message at all will be grounds for reprisal.  (It is, of
course, useful for paranoids as well...)

Last night I spoke with Wayne Gregori, who runs a system called sfnet
(with some variant of capitalization) here in the Bay Area.  sfnet is
a coffeehouse network, with public terminals located in various
locations in SF, Berkeley, Oakland, etc.  There is the equivalent of
IRC and private mail for the users, almost all of whom use handles.
there is also dialup service available.

sfnet just got their internet hookup.  It's not integrated into the
rest of the software yet; that is being worked on.

Wayne is supportive of the idea of putting a whistleblowers interface
into the sfnet public terminals.

New slogan: Drop the dirty quarter!

Eric




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: kieran2101@aol.com
Date: Sat, 3 Apr 93 09:23:54 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: could someone
Message-ID: <9304031222.tn14272@aol.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I'd also like a copy of the Phrack article, since my account here clipped off
a big chunk of the article at the end.  If someone could forward a copy to my
account at kieran@mindvox.phantom.com, I'd appreciate it.

--Aaron




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: grady@netcom.com (1016/2EF221)
Date: Sat, 3 Apr 93 12:57:04 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: PGP: suggestions from the trench
Message-ID: <9304032057.AA06227@netcom.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



After carefully reading RSA.COM's FAQ (version 1.0 draft 1e [14 
Sep 1992] by Paul Fahn; available via anonymous ftp from 
RSA.COM), I have some comments about the various PGP 
implementations.

First of all: well done!  These implementations and ports have 
taken a lot of unremunerated work from a lot of people.  If you 
compare the number of people registering public keys on the PGP 
servers such as pgp-public-keys@toxicwaste.mit.edu to the number 
registering for the RIPEM versions licensed by RSA/PK partners, 
for example, found on rpub.cl.msu.edu, PGP enjoys an order of 
magnitude more popularity.

So regardless of the outcome of legal, support, standards and 
interoperability issues, the PGP experiment has already been a 
tremendous success in letting us common folk learn about 
effective and convenient public key encryption.

One of the great advantages of a popular application is the great 
number of fingers and eyes that can be used to detect and 
document problems to make PGP even a greater success.  Here are 
the thoughts of one user:

1.  PGP RSA bit lengths are too short.  According to RSA's FAQ, 
the US Government (NSA) does not consider export licenses for RSA 
moduli used for privacy greater than 512 bits [section 2.23].  
This may imply something about NSA's capability in attacking RSA 
systems with fewer than 512 bits of modulus; Ron Rivest, a co-
inventor of RSA, estimates the cost of factoring a 512-bit 
modulus *today* at $8.2 million dollars (much less of course in 
the future) [section 2.8].  Although it is true that the time to 
generate a new RSA key goes as the order of 16 times the modulus 
length, this is only done once or a very few times.  Encryption 
and signature verification time on the other hand goes only as 
the order of four time the modulus length [section 2.8].  And the 
faster computers of tomorrow will virtually eliminate this 
performance penalty compared to the vastly increased time 
required for a factoring attack on RSA moduli that increasing its 
size entails.

Taking all these factors into consideration, I would suggest that 
the *minimum* size of the RSA modulus available for PGP is 1024 
bits with a minimum ceiling of 2048 bits (or even more).  If for 
performance reasons on certain platforms 1024 is deemed 
impossibly slow, then a lesser number of bits ought to be 
permitted *provided* that the security level for any key length 
under, say, 768 bits is clearly labeled "TOY GRADE".

And because factoring security is a moving target with increases 
in computer speed and factoring methods, rather than the static 
(and rather melodramatic) labels of "commercial grade," military 
grade", and so on, the labels ought to be specific years that 
intelligent estimates (such as Ron Rivest's) that that size 
modulus will be factored by a determined opponent.  For example, 
512 bits should be labeled "1992", 768 bits labeled "2005", 1024 
bits labeled "2020", and so on, using an estimate of about 15-20 
bits a year of modulus degradation.  This also supplies a clue as 
to selecting intelligent public key expirations given individual 
security goals.

While this may seem too conservative, consider that many public 
moduli kept by a certifying authority may be attacked in 
parallel, similar to cracking a passwd file NOT using a salt.  We 
must be *absolutely sure* that the theoretical basis of the 
encryption function is the paramount consideration in PGP.

2.  The hash function generates too short a digest.  In section 
6.3 of the RSA FAQ, RSA recommends MD5 with its 128 bit digest 
when using 512 bit or shorter RSA keys.  This is because they 
estimate the work factor of breaking a 128 bit digest is on the 
order of 2^64 operations or roughly equivalent today to factoring 
512 bit numbers.

If PGP increases the minimum recommended modulus size but does 
not simultaneously increase the hash digest size, then attacks 
such as "guessed plaintext," where guesses are made as to the 
IDEA key being encrypted under RSA are made compared to a trial 
RSA encryption, will become more and more attractive.

The RSA FAQ recommends using the SHS (Secure Hash Standard) 
[available from csrc.nist.gov] which generates a 160 bit digest 
or a modified MD4 algorithm that produces a 256 bit digest.  In 
any event, the 128 bit IDEA key to be encrypted under RSA ought 
to at the very least have a 64 or 128 bit random salt (that will 
later be discarded) appended before RSA encryption to thwart the 
"guessed plaintext" attack on RSA.  According to the RSA FAQ, MD4 
and MD5 are available for unrestricted use via RSA.COM or 
ftp.nisc.sri.com as rfc1320 (MD4) and rfc1321 (MD5).

3.  Triply encrypted DES with CBC ought to be another 
"conventional encryption" option under PGP menus.  RSA FAQ cites 
Campbell and Wiener's "Proof that DES is not a group" (Advances 
in Cryptology - Crypto '92 Springer-Verlag, New York 1993, To 
appear) that proves that DES with multiple encryption does indeed 
spread the encryption mapping over a broader space and thus 
presumably increases the work factor to direct cryptanalysis.  
IDEA, while attractive in speed, size and theory, has no such 
group-free proof and has not long withstood the public scrutiny 
that DES has endured.  Three 56 bit keys could easily be derived 
from a single MD4 256 bit digest (with an additional 64 bits of 
Initializing Vector, to boot) to double the brute-force key 
guessing DES work factor to roughly 112 bits.  A slightly non-
standard version such as Outerbridge/Lau/Gillogly/Karn's newdes, 
which is provably at *least* as secure as plain DES, might be 
used in order to thwart dedicated DES hardware attacks.

4.  Add a "enter random seed" option in addition to keystroke 
timing.  It is suspected that the timing biases in keystroke 
timing is far more pronounced than rolls of an ordinary die, 
especially over the broad range of platforms that PGP has been 
ported to.  A useful option to make user rest easier about the 
amount of bias in the random seeding for the search for the 
public-key RSA modulus and the generation of conventional (IDEA 
and triple-DES keys) would be to permit the direct data entry of 
fifty or sixty rolls of a die to further disperse the original 
seed.  Given the difficulty of obtaining noisy diodes or sources 
counting radioactive decay, rolling dice is probably the easiest 
and comparatively least biased of ways of selecting random seeds 
[see Knuth v.2] *and* is under the direct personal control of the 
user.

5. Offer a "use strong primes" option in RSA key generation.  
While it is true that as it is said in the RSA FAQ [section 2.7] 
and the PGP documentation that "strong primes" may not now be 
necessary given the non-favoritism of ECM ("elliptic curve 
method") of factoring (Lenstra: Factoring integers with elliptic 
curves. Annals of Mathematics 126:649-673, 1987), there is only 
the one-time penalty of selecting "strong" primes in public key 
generation and, as the RSA FAQ suggests, future breakthroughs in 
factoring technique may very well once again favor the "strong" 
prime over the garden variety one.

6.  Probably my most urgent recommendation:  I use MacPGP 2.2 and 
it did not come with a) a source b) a digitally-signed archive or 
c) a pointer to send bug reports.  Without these features it is 
very hard to make specific implementation bug reports or 
interface improvement suggestions.  As the RSA FAQ says in 
section 2.6: "In practice, most successful attacks will likely be 
aimed at insecure implementations and at the key management 
stages of an RSA system."  Please, please include the source to 
the Mac version (or upon request), or at least an object map so I 
can effectively disassemble and test portions of the code.


-----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----
Version: 2.2

mQCOAiumM0QAAAED+JPD8OULO2aXRvU2FDksMjJeGT96kGK5eJK1grkXuIHz+6pe
jiedYOv72kBQoquycun191Ku4wsWVTz6ox/bpReBs5414OTPzQVJgWQzCW1N4BfV
Wr4eEn3qnFsVLXXxk3oYGydIeJcmelSyuPSq/Oq7Q+eHkKgjqxDTjVMu8iEAEQEA
AbABh7QuR3JhZHkgV2FyZCAgPGdyYWR5QG5ldGNvbS5jb20+ICAoNzA3KSA4MjYt
NzcxNbABAw==
=e3rN
-----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----

Comments appreciated.  Grady Ward  grady@netcom.com





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: karn@qualcomm.com (Phil Karn)
Date: Sat, 3 Apr 93 16:56:53 PST
To: Cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: TEMPEST in a teapot
Message-ID: <9304040056.AA07411@servo>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


A few minor comments on a pretty comprehensive and well written article.

Although TEMPEST is closely related to EMI shielding, remember that
TEMPEST is concerned only with *information bearing* radiations, not
interference. In particular, the switching power supply, a potentially
prodigious source of EMI, is not a significant TEMPEST issue because
power supply emissions carry little if any information. (Varying loads
might cause minor modulations of switching frequencies, etc, but this is
probably something that only the paranoid "covert channel" types worry
about. Maybe you coull tell when the floppy drive motor starts and stops,
but I doubt you could do much else.)

Who knows, cutting down on power supply radiation might make it easier
to extract information from the emissions that remain, because of the
jamming effect of power supply noise. But don't let that stop you. It's
your duty to your neighbors to emit as little RF noise as possible. When
I lived in New Jersey, I learned to my chagrin that my two PC clones
made my next door neighbor's AM radio useless. Only 25 miles from New
York, he was unable to listen to WABC, a 50KW clear channel AM station!
The problem disappeared completely when I installed some inline AC RFI
filters in the power supplies. Since we shared a pole transformer, I
theorize that the noise was conducted from my computer to his radio
directly over the power lines.

Which brings me to my next point. I have not seen *any* clone-grade PC
power supplies with adequate power line filtering. They have a minimal
LC lowpass network on the power supply board itself, but this is usually
inadequate. Whenever I buy a new power supply, the first thing I do when
I get it home is to replace the IEC power connector with an integrated,
shielded power connector/RFI line filter. These devices are widely
available for several dollars from electronics surplus houses and
amateur radio "hamfests". I also use power cords with built-in ferrite
"lumps" but these are probably harder to find (one particular hamfest
vendor had a lot of them a few years ago, but I haven't seen them
since.)

Modern monitors are *much* better shielded than the early PC monitors,
especially those no-name Korean or Taiwanese copies of the original IBM
PC monochrome monitor. If you have the misfortune of owning one of those
old monitors, as I do on one of my systems, chances are the lion's share
of its emissions are coming from the +70V power lead that runs from the
main circuit board to the video output stage on the base of the CRT.
(Note! Do NOT confuse this with the high voltage lead going to the anode
of the CRT!)

The +70V power line to the video output driver acts as an antenna for
radiated video signals that can be *quite* strong. I suspect that the
reports we've seen of successfully picking up the image on a computer
display were taking advantage of this. To fix the problem, just replace
the plain wire with a piece of shielded coax, bypass the ends with .01
or .1 uF capacitors of sufficient working voltage, and ground the
shields to circuit board ground on both ends.

Phil




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Marc Horowitz <marc@Athena.MIT.EDU>
Date: Sat, 3 Apr 93 18:07:59 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: MEET: I'm going West! (Bay Area)
Message-ID: <9304040207.AA00881@deathtongue>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I'm going to be at a meeting at the Westin hotel in Milbrae, CA.  I'm
taking an early-morning (ugh) flight out on Tuesday, and I'm
red-eye'ing back Friday night/Saturday morning (to be back for the
Boston Area Cypherpunks meeting :-) I should be free in the evenings,
namely, Tuesday, Wednesday, and Thursday nights.

I'd be interested in getting together with people to exchange
signatures, talk about stuff, eat dinner, or whatever.  I can be
reached by email at <marc@mit.edu>, which I should be reading
remotely, or you can leave a message for me at the hotel at
415-692-3500.

		Marc



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: J. Michael Diehl <mdiehl@triton.unm.edu>
Date: Sat, 3 Apr 93 21:58:14 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: PGP help and comments.
Message-ID: <9304040558.AA17596@triton.unm.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I am really learning to love PGP, and I haven't even used it much yet! I'm 
insisting that all my friends get keys.  But....

I would like to set up two secret keys for myself.  One 512 bits long and 
another 1024 bits long.  I'll distribute the short one.  I'll give the long
one to trusted and close friends.  I'm having difficulty setting it up so that
pgp defaults to using the short key to encrypt stuff.  Note that I want the 
same user id for both, but perhapse with a "secure" flag in the user id of the
large key.  How can I do this?

Can we get someone to compile and distribute pgp for the amoeba, er, I mean
Amiga? ;^)  My friend has one, but no C compiler.

Some suggestions for future versions...

Is there any chance of pgp cloaking it's ascii armoured output to look like
uuencoded data?

I would like to use pgp on the mainframes, but don't want to store my secret
key on their disks.   Would it be possible to have pgp accept it's secret key
via stdin.  I could do an ascii upload of my secret key and never expose my
key to disk-storage.

How about password protecting pgp itself.  No one could use my copy of pgp 
unless they knew my password.  And only my copy of pgp could decrypt my 
secret key.  Just a thought.

How about a -wn option that would wipe the original file 'n' times.  Like 
pgp -wen10 very_secret_stuff cohort.  That should keep even Big Brother from
prying.

Is it possible to have pgp develope a third key that looks just like a regular
key except that when it is used in place of your secret key, it produces  an
alternate plaintext.  This way, if Big Brother "requested" you'r key, and
you needed to dissavow all of you'r messages, you could exchange the third key
for you'r secret key.  When someone used this key, they'd get some insulting
message that may or may not have been the original message...and there'd be
no way of knowing.  I kinda doubt it on this one, but wouldn't it be nice!

Geez, have I really gone on for 40 lines?  Sorry about that, but any comments?

Hope to hear from you.

-----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----
Version: 2.2
 
mQBNAiu21SIAAAECAMKkKKP4JIxSPR7rOUZ7mbi6yDPfFa7T6zOtOBX8iI939tIU
9JFTxdyvTejK3qmYDGozNaqySQ/0++nGqZgikcsABRG0LUouIE1pY2hhZWwgRGll
aGwsIG1lLCA8bWRpZWhsQHRyaXRvbi51bW4uZWR1Pg==
=YquS
-----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Eli Brandt <ebrandt@jarthur.Claremont.EDU>
Date: Sun, 4 Apr 93 00:05:14 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: jarthur remailer has PGP
Message-ID: <9304040805.AA19784@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Snarfed PGP 2.2 and found it more successful on a Symmetry than 2.1,
which I couldn't get to stop dumping core on keygen.  So the
remailer on jarthur now supports encryption, I think.  Bang on it
and see if you agree.

The jarthur remailer's key: (512 bits only, it's on an insecure box)
-----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----
Version: 2.2

mQBNAiu+hVUAAAECAMVjEfl2IMNgSOJ+/fx1V6EbH50ofa6K4r1PBKMmkcHQextP
ghwC4lXIgaAWUlLJ9x61+qf4jB5fpNUZLrF9FUsABRG0NWphcnRodXIgcmVtYWls
ZXIgIGMvbyA8ZWJyYW5kdEBqYXJ0aHVyLmNsYXJlbW9udC5lZHU+
=Zxy7
-----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----

The makefile paragraph:
symmetry_gcc:
	$(MAKE) all CC=gcc LD=gcc OBJS_EXT=_80386.o \
	CFLAGS="-O -I. -DNOTERMIO -D_BSD -DUNIX -DUSE_NBIO $(BYTEORDER) -Di386"

Logging is turned back on until the glitches are out.  Enjoy.

	 PGP 2 key by finger or e-mail
   Eli   ebrandt@jarthur.claremont.edu




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: J. Michael Diehl <mdiehl@triton.unm.edu>
Date: Sun, 4 Apr 93 00:18:19 PST
To: mccoy@ccwf.cc.utexas.edu (Jim McCoy)
Subject: Re: PGP help and comments.
In-Reply-To: <9304040758.AA07164@tigger.cc.utexas.edu>
Message-ID: <9304040818.AA20036@triton.unm.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>J. Michael Diehl <mdiehl@triton.unm.edu> writes:
>> I would like to use pgp on the mainframes, but don't want to store my secret
>> key on their disks.   Would it be possible to have pgp accept it's secret key
>> via stdin.  I could do an ascii upload of my secret key and never expose my
>> key to disk-storage.
> 
> This is even more dangerous than storing it on the disks of a multi-user
> machine.  Unless you are running in a kerberos environment it is trivial to
> snoop your upload off the network, and even without that weakness you are
> exposing yourself to the same problem that the docs mention (it is really
> pretty easy to scan someone's terminal input) only you are giving them the
> key outright instead of only giving them the passphrase to your key.

Point taken. 
> 
> Bad idea.

Sure is.  Thanx.
-----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----
Version: 2.2
 
mQBNAiu21SIAAAECAMKkKKP4JIxSPR7rOUZ7mbi6yDPfFa7T6zOtOBX8iI939tIU
9JFTxdyvTejK3qmYDGozNaqySQ/0++nGqZgikcsABRG0LUouIE1pY2hhZWwgRGll
aGwsIG1lLCA8bWRpZWhsQHRyaXRvbi51bW4uZWR1Pg==
=YquS
-----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: mccoy@ccwf.cc.utexas.edu (Jim McCoy)
Date: Sat, 3 Apr 93 23:58:38 PST
To: mdiehl@triton.unm.edu (J. Michael Diehl)
Subject: Re: PGP help and comments.
In-Reply-To: <9304040558.AA17596@triton.unm.edu>
Message-ID: <9304040758.AA07164@tigger.cc.utexas.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text


J. Michael Diehl <mdiehl@triton.unm.edu> writes:
> 
> I would like to use pgp on the mainframes, but don't want to store my secret
> key on their disks.   Would it be possible to have pgp accept it's secret key
> via stdin.  I could do an ascii upload of my secret key and never expose my
> key to disk-storage.

This is even more dangerous than storing it on the disks of a multi-user
machine.  Unless you are running in a kerberos environment it is trivial to
snoop your upload off the network, and even without that weakness you are
exposing yourself to the same problem that the docs mention (it is really
pretty easy to scan someone's terminal input) only you are giving them the
key outright instead of only giving them the passphrase to your key.

Bad idea.

jim




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: George A. Gleason <gg@well.sf.ca.us>
Date: Sun, 4 Apr 93 03:31:52 PDT
To: hughes@soda.berkeley.edu
Subject: Re:  WB: public kiosks
Message-ID: <199304041031.AA11760@well.sf.ca.us>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Re public kiosks; recall that Community Memory started the idea of
coin-operated kiosks years ago; and presumably still has terminals located
around town.  The technology is quite simple apparently.  Could be
genralised pretty easily.  The terminals are connected to their servers via
off-premise extension circuits, which allow keeping the lines open fulltime
at no per-minute charge.  Then you drop coins in order to respond to stuff.
This of course requires a server in evrey local exchange area where you want
terminals, but that should be no problem in most places.

-gg




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Nickey MacDonald <i6t4@jupiter.sun.csd.unb.ca>
Date: Sat, 3 Apr 93 22:47:55 PST
To: "J. Michael Diehl" <mdiehl@triton.unm.edu>
Subject: Re: PGP help and comments.
In-Reply-To: <9304040558.AA17596@triton.unm.edu>
Message-ID: <Pine.3.05.9304040318.A1931-c100000@jupiter>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


My comments below...

---
Nick MacDonald               | NMD on IRC
i6t4@jupiter.sun.csd.unb.ca  | PGP 2.1 Public key available via finger


On Sat, 3 Apr 1993, J. Michael Diehl wrote:

> I am really learning to love PGP, and I haven't even used it much yet! I'm 
> insisting that all my friends get keys.  But....

I have been 'introducing' my friends to PGP too... I figure that its no
good if I have a key, but no one to use it with...  :-)  Its amazing how
many people will take the time to play with an interesting new toy...

> I would like to set up two secret keys for myself.  One 512 bits long and 
> another 1024 bits long.  I'll distribute the short one.  I'll give the long
> one to trusted and close friends.  I'm having difficulty setting it up so that
> pgp defaults to using the short key to encrypt stuff.  Note that I want the 
> same user id for both, but perhapse with a "secure" flag in the user id of the
> large key.  How can I do this?

I'm not too sure here... but PGP should default to using the newest
(youngest) key on you private key ring...  If you have two of them with
the same name, I'm not sure how you could choose other than the first... 
The trick here might be to a a key size option to PGP, to say I want the
key that is (or is at least) n bits in size.

> Can we get someone to compile and distribute pgp for the amoeba, er, I mean
> Amiga? ;^)  My friend has one, but no C compiler.

I'll not get into computer wars...  I'll just say that I'll take an Amiga
over an IBM clone any day!  >;-)  As far as I can tell.. there are folx
out there that make sure the Amiga version goes public pretty soon after a
new version is released...  I've hade 2.2 since about 3 days after I knew
it was released...  There are a series on AmiNet "mirrors" all over the
world, the one that most IBM'ers would recognize right off being
wuarchive.wustle.edu (128.252.135.4) in /pub/aminet/util/crypt. 

> Some suggestions for future versions...

I have some options on some of your ideas, but I'll save them for another
post at another time..  :-)






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Derek Atkins <warlord@Athena.MIT.EDU>
Date: Sun, 4 Apr 93 00:52:45 PST
To: Eric Fogleman <cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: MEET: Boston area Cypherpunks Meeting
In-Reply-To: <9303311907.AA22588@milquetoast.MIT.EDU>
Message-ID: <9304040852.AA13135@hodge>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

The FIRST Boston-area cypherpunks meeting:

Date: Saturday, April 10, 1993
Time: 12 noon - ~5 pm
Where: MIT Room 1-115

If you need better directions, please feel free to send me e-mail,
or you can call me at 617 868-4469.

Hope to see people there!

- -derek

PGP 2 key available upon request on the key-server:
	pgp-public-keys@toxicwaste.mit.edu
- --
  Derek Atkins, MIT '93, Electrical Engineering and Computer Science
     Secretary, MIT Student Information Processing Board (SIPB)
           MIT Media Laboratory, Speech Research Group
           warlord@MIT.EDU       PP-ASEL        N1NWH

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.2

iQBuAgUBK76hsTh0K1zBsGrxAQHD7ALFExaf+JQ3l21P1c5Tuxx2RdKy/AsLLZo1
D6Y0LsaPe7YEW9bofbQr0HKdW08KvZgDHowUomjCFgLRVJPtwyTJkqWuL4424/XU
cuSe+LWeNJ+llrbosFgsk/o=
=wZJR
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: x62727g2@usma8.USMA.EDU (Gatlin Anthony CDT)
Date: Sun, 4 Apr 93 10:07:07 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Mailing LIst
Message-ID: <9304041704.AA14583@usma8.usma.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I am very very interested in getting on your mailing list. PLease include me.
Thank you.


Anthony GAtlin
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Notice: In accordance with Title 18 USC 2511 and 18 USC 2703, any monitoring
of this communication without a Federal warrant or consent of sender or
receiver is in violation of Federal Law. Consent for monitoring is not given.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: zane@genesis.mcs.com (Sameer Parekh)
Date: Sun, 4 Apr 93 13:45:16 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Looking for PGP porting help
Message-ID: <m0nfbO4-000MU6C@genesis.mcs.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


	I'm busy (actually, I'm procrastinating doing my schoolwork ;-)
porting PGP 2.2 to the Apple IIGS. I have two problems and one question--
The question: Who should I contact with the fact that I'm doing this
port so that once a new version of PGP comes out all my porting work
isn't lost?
	The problems:

	I'm not a very experienced C programmer/porter. I seem to be one of
two people in the Apple IIGS community who's interested in porting PGP.
(The other is even LESS experienced at C-- he just learned C recently.)
Any ideas?


	Thanks,
--
| Sameer Parekh-zane@genesis.MCS.COM-PFA related mail to pfa@genesis.MCS.COM |
| Apprentice Philosopher, Writer, Physicist, Healer, Programmer, Lover, more |
| "Be God" - Me __ "Specialization is for Insects" - Robert A. Heinlein ____/
 \_____________/  \____________________________________________________/ 




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: szabo@techbook.com (Nick Szabo)
Date: Sun, 4 Apr 93 15:20:37 PDT
To: uunet!toad.com!cypherpunks@uunet.UU.NET
Subject: Keys on public machines
Message-ID: <m0nfd2y-0006WuC@techbook.techbook.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain




[lost attributions, sorry]
>> I could do an ascii upload of my secret key and never expose my
>> key to disk-storage.
>>
> This is even more dangerous than storing it on the disks of a multi-user
> machine.  Unless you are running in a kerberos environment it is trivial to
> snoop your upload off the network...

I don't find the risk of a real-time snoop to be as bad as the risk
of a future snoop finding my private key alongside encrypted files that 
have been stored forever (backups).

To mitigate either problem, how about having two layers of encryption: a 
private key to decrypt files for reading on a public machine, and a second
public/private pair to reencrypt the files for storage and 
transmission to the home machine.  The public machine knows 
the first private key (if snooped) and the second public key; only the 
home machine knows the second private key.  Snooping the first private 
key compromises only unread and future messages until the key is 
changed.  Messages archived in the reencrypted state are secure, but
messages archived in the unread state with the first private key are 
still compromised forever.  Is backing up mail directories a common 
practice?  Are there (probably system-dependent) ways to avoid backups,
such as anticipating or detecting when backups are about to occur,
hidden directories, file permissions, etc?

Also, this system introduces some user hostility, in that 
reencrypted files cannot be read again until moved to the 
home machine.  

Another idea is to implement the relevant features of Kerberos in
a high-level client/server package that can be used to secure personal 
network communications of this kind.  The package could be distributed 
with PGP.  

Nick Szabo					szabo@techbook.com



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: treason@gnu.ai.mit.edu
Date: Sun, 4 Apr 93 13:14:32 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Second posting (emucs)
Message-ID: <9304042014.AA15614@spiff.gnu.ai.mit.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


This is the second posting I have posted about emucs (encrypted multi-user
chat system) on the list.  I am hoping to get a little more involvement
from stable coders to help develop this product.  Most of you are
knowledgable of irc and how flawed it is, the ease of logging, and the
fascism of the operators therof.  I want to alleviate this problem by producing
a multi-user chat system involving 1 server and up to 50 clients which
is counterproductive to promoting logging and such.  My design is easy:

All messages sent from a user will be encrypted(pgp) by the pc(msdos machine 
initially) before its sent over the phone line, to the server.  The server will
then determine if the message is public or private (very easy to do) and if 
private, will decrypt it using the servers public key.  It will then pass the
message to all users on the server in unencrypted format.  If it is private
the server will pass it directly to the recieving party, who's client will 
decrypt it (if its private the sender must have the receiver's public key)
and display it to their view screen.  

I was considering encrypting and handling everything in a private manner, but 
have decided that this would be more than too much load on the recieving pc's
so have decided to keep only private messages completely secure.  When the
person wanting to engage in the chat decides to run the client, he would
supply his pass phrase as a command line parameter, and it would be stored in
memory until the chat is terminated.  Any time a private message comes to him
the client would automatically decrypt it with his key and pass phrase.

There will be key handling and exchanging utilities built into the server.
The client will allow for vt100 emulation and will work as a terminal program
until the chat is entered, at which time, the client wwill be prompted by the
server to start its new function(ie. encryption).  If anyone has any
ideas or wishes to help me with this, please respond to treason@gnu.ai.mit.edu
and explain what you can do, or what ideas you have.  On the last posting
of this sort, there was very little response, which frightens me because
of the serious need for this kind of software.

Treason@gnu.ai.mit.edu



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: gnu@cygnus.com
Date: Sun, 4 Apr 93 17:56:05 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Problems with "high quality" random number generators, FYI
Message-ID: <9304050056.AA05690@cygnus.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Good sources of randomness are key to good cryptography.

Date: 03 Apr 1993 13:04:37 -0700 (MST)
From: uunet!asgard.lpl.Arizona.EDU!schulze@uunet.UU.NET (Dean Schulze)
Subject: Problems with "high quality" random number generators
To: na.digest@surfer.EPM.ORNL.GOV
Cc: numeric-interest@validgh.com
Message-Id: <9304032004.AA06752@asgard.lpl.Arizona.EDU.LPL-West>

    A recent Physical Review Letter [1] points out that serious problems
can arise in Monte Carlo computations due to subtle correlations in "high
quality" random number generators.  The quality of these number generators
was determined to be "good" because they passed a battery of tests for
randomness.  However, they produced erroneous results when used together
with the Wolff algorithm for cluster-flipping in a simulation of a 2
dimensional Ising model for which the results are known.  The author of
this Letter, Alan M. Ferrenburg of the University of Georgia, says that
an algorithm must be tested together with the random number generator
being used regardless of which tests the random number generator has
passed on its own.

    In another development, Shu Tezuka of IBM, Tokyo and Pierre L'Ecuyer
of the University of Montreal have proven that the Marsaglia-Zaman random
number generators are "essentially equivalent" to  linear congruential
methods [2].  (Linear congruential number generators produced better results
in Ferrenburg's simulations than random number generation algorithms
that are of higher quality, however.)

    [1]    Alan M. Ferrenburg, D.P. Landau, and Y. Joanna Wong,
           "Monte Carlo simulations: Hidden errors from 'good'
           random number generators", Phys. Rev. Lett., 69, pp.
           3382-4, 1992.

    [2]    Science News, v142, pg. 422, 1992.

------- End of Forwarded Message





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: wixer!pacoid@cactus.org (Paco Xander Nathan)
Date: Sun, 4 Apr 93 17:31:28 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: CONF - "CopCon", organized by B Sterling
Message-ID: <9304042359.AA22084@wixer>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


                Electronic Frontier Foundation -- Austin
                          in conjunction with
                       The University Co-op and
          The University of Texas Computer Science Department
 
                              Presents
 
 ..from the Federal Computer Investigations Committee, Federal Law
Enforcement Training Center, and the International Association of
Computer Investigation Specialists:
 
                          GAIL THACKERAY

         Maricopa County prosecuting attorney, Phoenix, Arizona 
 
speaking on:  computer crime in the 1990s, "Operation Sundevil," 
corporate PBX fraud, boiler-room consumer-fraud rackets, credit-card
rip-offs, pirate bulletin-board systems, and outlaw hacking!
 
               Sunday, April 18, 1993,  1:30PM-3:30PM
                 UT Campus, Taylor Hall, room 2.106
 
TO BE FOLLOWED BY:
 
            C O M P U T E R   S E C U R I T Y   S O I R E E !
             UT Co-op, Second Floor, Computer Books Section
 
                       From 3:30 PM  -- (?) 
  
                    where Ms. Thackeray will greet the
                    Austin public and answer questions 
                    from any and all interested parties!
 
FREE!! ..another EFF-Austin service to the Texan computer community
EFF-Austin, PO Box 18957, Austin, Texas 78760    eff-austin@tic.com




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: trump@pluto.ee.cua.edu (Louis Edward Trumpbour)
Date: Sun, 4 Apr 93 16:53:36 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: PGP 2.2 for mac
Message-ID: <9304042354.AA04977@pluto.ee.cua.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



yes i am looking for pgp 2.2 for mac so if anyone knows where i can find it
or if anyone can tell me if they can uuencode it and mail it to me (please
contact me before mailing) i would be most greatful... i do not have a mac but
i have a friend at the university of wisconsin that i feel sould have pgp...
so as i plea for help into the black hole of the internet cypherpunk remailer
i hope to hear some feed back....

also do the people in dc want to get a cypher punk meeting together??? i am wi 
willing to organize...

Clovis




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: J. Michael Diehl <mdiehl@triton.unm.edu>
Date: Sun, 4 Apr 93 19:06:26 PDT
To: szabo@techbook.com (Nick Szabo)
Subject: Re: PGP help and comments.
In-Reply-To: <m0nfZem-0006WuC@techbook.techbook.com>
Message-ID: <9304050206.AA13467@triton.unm.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> [lost attributions, sorry]
So did I! ;^)

> >> I could do an ascii upload of my secret key and never expose my
> >> key to disk-storage.
> > This is even more dangerous than storing it on the disks of a multi-user
> > machine.  Unless you are running in a kerberos environment it is trivial to
> > snoop your upload off the network...
> I don't find the risk of a real-time snoop to be as bad as the risk
> of a future snoop finding my private key alongside encrypted files that 
> have been stored forever (backups).

I am the writer of the original post, and I quite agree with the responce that
said that this was a bad idea.  The whole point in being secure, is being as
secure as possible.

> To mitigate either problem, how about having two layers of encryption: a 
> private key to decrypt files for reading on a public machine, and a second
> public/private pair to reencrypt the files for storage and 
> transmission to the home machine.  The public machine knows 
> the first private key (if snooped) and the second public key; only the 
> home machine knows the second private key.  Snooping the first private 

You still have to store a secret key somewhere.  And to do that, you must trust
your system administrater.....

> key compromises only unread and future messages until the key is 
> changed.  Messages archived in the reencrypted state are secure, but
> messages archived in the unread state with the first private key are 
> still compromised forever.  Is backing up mail directories a common 
> practice?  Are there (probably system-dependent) ways to avoid backups,
> such as anticipating or detecting when backups are about to occur,
> hidden directories, file permissions, etc?
> 
> Also, this system introduces some user hostility, in that 
> reencrypted files cannot be read again until moved to the 
> home machine.  

It was suggested that I keep my public keyring on the mainframe and use it to
read mail.  When I want to send mail, I encrypt it at home and upload it into
my mailer.  This is what I do now.  I forgot who you were, but you gave me a 
good idea.  Thanx.

> Another idea is to implement the relevant features of Kerberos in
> a high-level client/server package that can be used to secure personal 
> network communications of this kind.  The package could be distributed 
> with PGP.  

What are these features?  I don't know what kerberos is.


+----------------------+----------------------------------------------------+
| J. Michael Diehl ;-) |  I thought I was wrong once.  But, I was mistaken. |
|                      +----------------------------------------------------+
| mdiehl@triton.unm.edu| "I'm just looking for the opportunity to be        |
| Thunder@forum        |            Politically Incorrect!                  |
| (505) 299-2282       |                        <me>                        |
+----------------------+----------------------------------------------------+




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: J. Michael Diehl <mdiehl@triton.unm.edu>
Date: Sun, 4 Apr 93 23:38:08 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: PGP help
Message-ID: <9304050638.AA25783@triton.unm.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Hi all.

The manual for pgp ver. 2.2 says that it can encrypt a file for receipt by
multiple users, pgp -e file user1 user2.  I can't seem to get it to work.
It creates one file, readable by user1.  I'm using the msdos version.

What am I doing wrong?

Thanx in advance.

+----------------------+----------------------------------------------------+
| J. Michael Diehl ;-) |  I thought I was wrong once.  But, I was mistaken. |
|                      +----------------------------------------------------+
| mdiehl@triton.unm.edu| "I'm just looking for the opportunity to be        |
| Thunder@forum        |            Politically Incorrect!                  |
| (505) 299-2282       |                        <me>                        |
+----------------------+----------------------------------------------------+




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Derek Atkins <warlord@MIT.EDU>
Date: Mon, 5 Apr 93 00:08:07 PDT
To: J. Michael Diehl <mdiehl@triton.unm.edu>
Subject: Re: PGP help
In-Reply-To: <9304050638.AA25783@triton.unm.edu>
Message-ID: <9304050708.AA01498@deathtongue>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

> The manual for pgp ver. 2.2 says that it can encrypt a file for receipt by
> multiple users, pgp -e file user1 user2.  I can't seem to get it to work.
> It creates one file, readable by user1.  I'm using the msdos version.
> 
> What am I doing wrong?

This should create a single file which is readable by both users, user1
and user2.  Did you try giving this file to user2 and have them decrypt
it?  Is user2 using PGP 2.2, or an earlier version?  It doesn't look like
you are doing anything wrong...

- -derek

PGP 2 key available upon request on the key-server:
	pgp-public-keys@toxicwaste.mit.edu
- --
  Derek Atkins, MIT '93, Electrical Engineering and Computer Science
     Secretary, MIT Student Information Processing Board (SIPB)
           MIT Media Laboratory, Speech Research Group
           warlord@MIT.EDU       PP-ASEL        N1NWH

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.2

iQBuAgUBK7/awTh0K1zBsGrxAQGwKwLDBE/AgE5YY84RDMIcXa/qW7qEkgAd+jZW
Wl5wXZDGrgbWZuZOiR9HKnEs4HzJtGrhi5DmDwPTVXu/rASU6trS1suk5thK/Fu8
TuDKvGX/6S+tOGQlgdRDdDg=
=a8mO
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Eric Hughes <hughes@soda.berkeley.edu>
Date: Mon, 5 Apr 93 11:58:33 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: wpcrack on archive site
Message-ID: <9304051855.AA28910@soda.berkeley.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I just put up Ron Dippold's wpcrack code up on the ftp site, a program
that breaks the (very bad) encryption of Word Perfect files.  The
distribution is four files

	wpcrack.c
	wpcrack.doc
	wpuncryp.c
	wpuncryp.doc

in directory pub/cypherpunks/cryptanalysis.

The anonymous ftp site is soda.berkeley.edu.

Eric




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: stig@transam.ece.cmu.edu (Jonathan Stigelman)
Date: Mon, 5 Apr 93 19:42:37 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Re: PGP help and comments.
Message-ID: <243@x15_remote.stigmobile.usa>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


In message <9304040758.AA07164@tigger.cc.utexas.edu> you write:
>
>This is even more dangerous than storing it on the disks of a multi-user
>machine.  Unless you are running in a kerberos environment it is trivial to
>snoop your upload off the network, and even without that weakness you are
>exposing yourself to the same problem that the docs mention (it is really
>pretty easy to scan someone's terminal input) only you are giving them the
>key outright instead of only giving them the passphrase to your key.
>

Yeah....  So if your key can be snooped off the net, so can your
cleartext.  To decript online, then, is akin to using only weak
encription...which indicates only the desire for limited privacy.

But if even if you do decript online, you're still protected from
file snooping.

What's needed is PGP decription built into your terminal program.

	stig





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Eric Hughes <hughes@soda.berkeley.edu>
Date: Mon, 5 Apr 93 17:28:01 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: WB: public kiosks
In-Reply-To: <199304041031.AA11760@well.sf.ca.us>
Message-ID: <9304060025.AA04499@soda.berkeley.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>Re public kiosks; recall that Community Memory started the idea of
>coin-operated kiosks years ago; and presumably still has terminals located
>around town.  

For those of you not familiar with Community Memory, it is a Berkeley
only system intended to make community stronger in Berkeley.  Steven
Levy wrote about it in _Hackers_.

SFNET is an expanding commercial service; I want to use SFNET as an
example a springboard for much wider deployment of public access to
whistleblowing.

Eric




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: J. Michael Diehl <mdiehl@triton.unm.edu>
Date: Tue, 6 Apr 93 00:44:07 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: PGP error.
Message-ID: <9304060743.AA28329@triton.unm.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


When I use the following command line in a batch file, I get a Compression/
decompression error.  No files are created.  The contents of the batch file is:

pgp -es %1 %2 Diehl

Where %1 is the name of the file to send, and %2 is the other person's name.

What am I doing wrong, or is ther a problem with my pgp?

Thanx in advance.
-----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----
Version: 2.2
 
mQA9Aiu/jVAAAAEBgM2F5mSlCA+KRd6TXIrqmPfiiAEytwSttZs7Yua939GMu2mP
JL+5Qpi/ZKqF2nAJAwAFEbQsSi4gTWljaGFlbCBEaWVobCwgMSwgPG1kaWVobEB0
cml0b24udW5tLmVkdT4=
=lyvx
-----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: fergp@sytex.com (Paul Ferguson)
Date: Tue, 6 Apr 93 19:28:27 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Smaller is better.
Message-ID: <mmmL2B1w165w@sytex.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


On Mon, 05 Apr 93 12:36:09 PST,
 Jonathan Stigelman <uunet!transam.ece.cmu.edu!stig> writes -
 
JS> Yeah....  So if your key can be snooped off the net, so can your
JS> cleartext.  To decript online, then, is akin to using only weak
JS> encription...which indicates only the desire for limited privacy.
 
JS> But if even if you do decript online, you're still protected from
JS> file snooping.
 
JS> What's needed is PGP decription built into your terminal program.
 
 I think that you guys are missing the point here. IMHO, if you wish
 maximum assurance of security, than I'd suggest not trying to run
 programs such as PGP on a multi-user system to begin with! What's
 wrong with using a PC for this? It offfers a maximum convenience,
 single-user secure system quite unlike the security problems
 associated with your university's mainframe.
 
 The PC offers the communications availability and the flexibilty to
 provide an extremely high level of privacy, if you know what you're
 doing.
 
 You should try it sometime ....
 
 Cheers.
 

Paul Ferguson                     |  "Sincerity is fine, but it's no
Network Integration Consultant    |   excuse for stupidity."
Centreville, Virginia USA         |                       -- Anonymous
fergp@sytex.com     (Internet)    |
sytex.com!fergp     (UUNet)       |
1:109/229           (FidoNet)     |
       PGP 2.2 public encryption key available upon request.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: karn@qualcomm.com (Phil Karn)
Date: Tue, 6 Apr 93 16:39:24 PDT
To: mdiehl@triton.unm.edu (J. Michael Diehl)
Subject: Re: PGP help and comments.
Message-ID: <9304062339.AA22656@servo>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


At 01:58 AM 4/4/93, Jim McCoy wrote:
>J. Michael Diehl <mdiehl@triton.unm.edu> writes:
>> 
>> I would like to use pgp on the mainframes, but don't want to store my secret
>> key on their disks.
>This is even more dangerous than storing it on the disks of a multi-user
>machine.

I agree 100%. Security packages like PGP are meaningful only when you
have your own personal machine to run it on. Indeed, it would be nice if
PGP could somehow tell when it is being run over a network, and severely
warn the user when he is about to type something secret (like a passphrase).
I don't know of any clean way to do it, though.

Phil




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Scott Northrop <skyhawk@first.cac.washington.edu>
Date: Tue, 6 Apr 93 12:47:52 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: PGP and problems therewith.
Message-ID: <9304061947.AA01322@first.cac.washington.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I was under the impression that there was a newsgroup for discussion of
how to use PGP.  I most certainly don't mind talk about how to most
effectively use PGP (PC-based decryption of files on your unsecure unix
box, for example), and I don't have much room for criticism given the
nil that I've contributed to this forum.  But please, in the name of all
that's holy, could the How To Use PGP Q&A go somewhere else?  Please?

Scott

PS - Did the list get the message by sand@u.washington.edu about the correct
place to put hidden data in a JPEG image?  Our mail reflector burped, and we
didn't get that week...  :(  (Mail, please, don't reply to the list.) 




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Peter Shipley <shipley@tfs.COM>
Date: Tue, 6 Apr 93 14:12:42 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: PHRACK: Article from PHRACK 42 on encryption
Message-ID: <9304062112.AA23379@edev0.TFS>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



>> Exposing factual errors and flaws in reasoning is left as an exercise
>> for the reader.
>>
>
>The flaws are big enough to drive a bakery truck through. Its trash.

maybe you should do a better writeup and publish it in PHRACK or 2600?






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Marc.Ringuette@GS80.SP.CS.CMU.EDU
Date: Tue, 6 Apr 93 11:25:46 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: WB: public kiosks
Message-ID: <9304061825.AA28189@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Public kiosks are OK as a simple and moderately effective technique for
assuring anonymity, and they're ideal for a security-naive person who
is unable to verify the security of a more complex system.  But for
my own use, I am much more confident in the security guarantee given by
encryption on a portable computer and anonymizing using Chaum-style
remailers...

-- Marc Ringuette (mnr@cs.cmu.edu)




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Douglas Mason <approach!douglas@approach.com>
Date: Tue, 6 Apr 93 18:08:23 PDT
To: <cypherpunks@toad.com>
Subject: Re: PHRACK: Article from PHRACK 42 on encryption
Message-ID: <DFBAC12B815640D9>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain




> >> Exposing factual errors and flaws in reasoning is left as an exercise
> >> for the reader.

> >The flaws are big enough to drive a bakery truck through. Its trash.
 
> maybe you should do a better writeup and publish it in PHRACK or 2600?

I agree.  Anyone can sit and say "Oh, that article is a piece of crap", but
these same people never put their "money where their mouth is" and write an
article of their own.

I've written for both Phrack and 2600 and it sure as hell isn't hard to get
something submitted.  If you think you can do better by all means write an
article and send it in.  If trash is being published, why not try to correct
it?

If you have any problems with where to send it, I'll gladly forward you the
address.

Otherwise, shut the hell up.  

If you don't like your goverment, vote.  If you don't like something that is 
published, write something yourself.  It's not some type of elite club of
writers, both publications welcome people of all walks to submit.  

--Doug

---
Douglas Mason                                douglas@approach.com
Network Administration                       CompuServe: 76646,3367
Approach Software Corporation                +01 415.306.7890




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: karn@qualcomm.com (Phil Karn)
Date: Tue, 6 Apr 93 18:00:45 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re:  WB: public kiosks
Message-ID: <9304070100.AA23113@servo>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>Public kiosks are OK as a simple and moderately effective technique for
>assuring anonymity, and they're ideal for a security-naive person who
>is unable to verify the security of a more complex system.  But for
>my own use, I am much more confident in the security guarantee given by
>encryption on a portable computer and anonymizing using Chaum-style
>remailers...

Indeed. By definition, a public kiosk is in a public area, with open
access to all including the Bad Guy's agents and investigators. And
tracking people's physical movements in public places is an art that
investigators have had many years to refine and perfect. Many more
than, say, factoring large RSA public keys...

Phil






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Peter shipley <shipley@merde.dis.org>
Date: Tue, 6 Apr 93 20:01:18 PDT
To: Brad Huntting <huntting@glarp.com>
Subject: Re: "hacker" publications
Message-ID: <9304070233.AA02535@merde.dis.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>
>> PHRACK or 2600?
>
>Does anyone have a phone number and/or address for these or any
>other "hackers" publications?
>

2600:           2600@well.sf.ca.us
phrack:         phrack@stormking.com	(also see included file)
InfoHax:        see nestey@csn.org

there is also a list called zardoz but I suspect it is dead.  the main problem
with these  lists is that people want info but do not want to give up
any of their secret.

Some security lists I have been on insist that all members contribute
something or they are droped from the list.

			-Pete



---- Included file

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

                      HOW TO SUBSCRIBE TO PHRACK MAGAZINE

     The distribution of Phrack is now being performed by the software called
Listserv.  All individuals on the Phrack Mailing List prior to your receipt of
this letter have been deleted from the list.

If you would like to re-subscribe to Phrack Inc. please follow these
instructions:

1.  Send a piece of electronic mail to "LISTSERV@STORMKING.COM".  The mail
    must be sent from the account where you wish Phrack to be delivered.

2.  Leave the "Subject:" field of that letter empty.

3.  The first line of your mail message should read:
    SUBSCRIBE PHRACK <your name here>

4.  DO NOT leave your address in the name field!
    (This field is for PHRACK STAFF use only, so please use a full name)

Once you receive the confirmation message, you will then be added to the Phrack
Mailing List.  If you do not receive this message within 48 hours, send another
message.  If you STILL do not receive a message, please contact
"SERVER@STORMKING.COM".

You will receive future mailings from "PHRACK@STORMKING.COM".

If there are any problems with this procedure, please contact
"SERVER@STORMKING.COM" with a detailed message.

You should get a conformation message sent back to you on your subscription.

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -



---- End of Included file




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Brad Huntting <huntting@glarp.com>
Date: Tue, 6 Apr 93 18:50:25 PDT
To: Peter Shipley <shipley@tfs.com>
Subject: "hacker" publications
Message-ID: <199304070150.AA00873@misc.glarp.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



> PHRACK or 2600?

Does anyone have a phone number and/or address for these or any
other "hackers" publications?

I've pretty much had it with the "legit" computer security information
sources (CERT et al).  Between the censorship and the untimely
notification they are next to worthless for keeping abreast of
computer and network security issues.


thanx in advance,
brad
	huntting@glarp.com


P.S.  I cant read Dutch (yet).




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: J. Michael Diehl <mdiehl@triton.unm.edu>
Date: Tue, 6 Apr 93 20:28:44 PDT
To: fergp@sytex.com (Paul Ferguson)
Subject: Re: Smaller is better.
In-Reply-To: <mmmL2B1w165w@sytex.com>
Message-ID: <9304070327.AA23357@triton.unm.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Well, I guess I started this thread, so lets see if I can finish it... ;^)

> On Mon, 05 Apr 93 12:36:09 PST,
>  Jonathan Stigelman <uunet!transam.ece.cmu.edu!stig> writes -
> JS> Yeah....  So if your key can be snooped off the net, so can your
> JS> cleartext.  To decript online, then, is akin to using only weak
> JS> encription...which indicates only the desire for limited privacy.
> JS> But if even if you do decript online, you're still protected from
> JS> file snooping.

This is akin to using an umbrella with a hole in it and saying, "Well, at least 
my face doesn't get wet.  If you want to stay dry, you want to stay COMPLETELY
dry.

> JS> What's needed is PGP decription built into your terminal program.

Someone posted a program, link, that would encrypt modem communcations.  Would
you post an address for it.  I can't find where I put it.

>  I think that you guys are missing the point here. IMHO, if you wish
>  maximum assurance of security, than I'd suggest not trying to run
>  programs such as PGP on a multi-user system to begin with! What's
>  wrong with using a PC for this? It offfers a maximum convenience,
>  single-user secure system quite unlike the security problems
>  associated with your university's mainframe.

This is, IMHO, the best solution.  BTW, I have several telix scripts that make
it actually convenient, even at 1200 baud!  (gak!).  I would post them, but they
are trivial.  Thanx, Phantom, for the suggestion.  

What we need here is a "security package" that we distribute in an effort to 
make it easier to use secure practices.

>  The PC offers the communications availability and the flexibilty to
>  provide an extremely high level of privacy, if you know what you're
>  doing.

And many people don't...  I've taken a minor flame or two for asking for help 
with using pgp on this list.  The whole point of this list, IMHO, is to make
strong security practices as easy and as wide-spread as possible.  Correct me
if I'm wrong.

+----------------------+----------------------------------------------------+
| J. Michael Diehl ;-) |  I thought I was wrong once.  But, I was mistaken. |
|                      +----------------------------------------------------+
| mdiehl@triton.unm.edu| "I'm just looking for the opportunity to be        |
| Thunder@forum        |            Politically Incorrect!                  |
| (505) 299-2282       |                        <me>                        |
+----------------------+----------------------------------------------------+




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: bmullane@ultrix.ramapo.edu (James Bond-007)
Date: Tue, 6 Apr 93 18:27:26 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: please remove me
Message-ID: <9304070131.AA20100@ultrix>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


please remove me from the mailing list
i wish that i had the time to try to keep up with the list, but i dont
i may rejoin at some time in the future
                         thanks,
                         Brian




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Round Waffle <eggo@student.umass.edu>
Date: Tue, 6 Apr 93 19:09:51 PDT
To: huntting@glarp.com (Brad Huntting)
Subject: Re: "hacker" publications
In-Reply-To: <199304070150.AA00873@misc.glarp.com>
Message-ID: <9304070208.AA11409@titan.ucs.umass.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text


Possessed by The Unholy, Brad Huntting scrawled the following in blood:
> 
> 
> > PHRACK or 2600?
> 
> Does anyone have a phone number and/or address for these or any
> other "hackers" publications?
> 
> I've pretty much had it with the "legit" computer security information
> sources (CERT et al).  Between the censorship and the untimely
> notification they are next to worthless for keeping abreast of
> computer and network security issues.
> 
> 
> thanx in advance,
> brad
> 	huntting@glarp.com

2600 Magazine
PO Box 752 (for subscriptions)  OR  PO Box 99  (for letters/submissions)
Middle Island, NY 11953-0752
(516) 751-2600
2600@well.sf.ca.us
$21 for 4 issues
back issues are $25/year

Phrack Magazine
603 W. 13th #1A-278
Austin, TX 78701
phrack@well.sf.ca.us 


+-   eggo@titan.ucs.umass.edu      --><--       Eat Some Paste   -+
+-          Yorn desh born, der ritt de gitt der gue,            -+
+-      Orn desh, dee born desh, de umn bork! bork! bork!        -+
+----------------- The Durex Blender Corporation -----------------+



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: fnordbox!loydb@cs.utexas.edu (Loyd Blankenship)
Date: Wed, 7 Apr 93 00:23:17 PDT
To: fnordbox!cypherpunks, cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: hello?
Message-ID: <9304070532.AA00biv@fnordbox.UUCP>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I hate messages like this one, but is this list sick? I haven't gotten
anything for many days . . .

Loyd

***************************************************************************
* loydb@fnordbox.UUCP	     SJ Games: 1	     *	Loyd Blankenship  *
* GEnie: SJGAMES	     US Secret Service: 0    *	PO Box 18957	  *
* Compu$erve: [73407,515]			     *	Austin, TX 78760  *
* cs.utexas.edu!dogface!fnordbox!loydb		     *	512/447-7866	  *
***************************************************************************






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: dlr@world.std.com (David L Racette)
Date: Tue, 6 Apr 93 21:09:38 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Mac PGP on The Well
Message-ID: <199304070409.AA00146@world.std.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I was just reading in the EFF conference on the Well that they have asked that the pgp version for the mac be removed ...at least temporarily because of the possible legal problems. I don't use a mac and already have a copy thankak you anyway




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Doug.Brightwell@Corp.Sun.COM (Doug Brightwell)
Date: Wed, 7 Apr 93 06:47:15 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Mac PGP 2.2 Sites?
Message-ID: <9304071346.AA12241@media.Corp.Sun.COM>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Anyone know of any ftp sites where I could find the new 2.2 version?

Thanks,
Doug



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Douglas Mason <approach!douglas@approach.com>
Date: Wed, 7 Apr 93 08:28:27 PDT
To: <cypherpunks@toad.com>
Subject: Re: PHRACK: Article from PHRACK 42 on encryption
Message-ID: <FB8AC22B815640D9>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain




> groups like sci.crypt already have some pretty good documents.
> There is no need for spreading of misinfomation like phrack.

The problem is that Phrack has a distribution that goes in other directions,
where a simple Usenet newsgroup can not reach.  I've seen files from past
Phrack issues available on Public Domain archive sets for BBS's.  Phrack has
been around for quite a while now and unlike a lot of the other series
on-line mags, it is probably going to be around for a while longer.  CuD and
the likes are great for news, but where else can you find somewhat lengthy
papers on various topics?  Even if most of it is elementary, there is always
something interesting in each issue, even if it is just to see some of the
personalities that are out there.

Like it or not, piece of crap or otherwise, it does get around.  It's going
through ownership changes and probably would like to find some people that
would be willing to help out with "cleaning" it up.  Why not help?


--Doug

---
Douglas Mason                                douglas@approach.com
Network Administration                       CompuServe: 76646,3367
Approach Software Corporation                +01 415.306.7890




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Derek Atkins <warlord@MIT.EDU>
Date: Wed, 7 Apr 93 07:08:28 PDT
To: Doug.Brightwell@Corp.Sun.COM (Doug Brightwell)
Subject: Re: Mac PGP 2.2 Sites?
In-Reply-To: <9304071346.AA12241@media.Corp.Sun.COM>
Message-ID: <9304071408.AA01175@toxicwaste.MEDIA.MIT.EDU>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

The sites I know of that carry MacPGP 2.2 are:

    black.ox.ac.uk  (129.67.1.165)
        /src/security/macpgp2.2.cpt.hqx     (Macintosh version)

    ftp.demon.co.uk  (158.152.1.65)
        /pub/ibmpc/pgp/MacPGP2.2    (Macintosh version)

    nic.funet.fi  (128.214.6.100)
        /pub/crypt/MacPGP2.2

    soda.berkeley.edu  (128.32.149.19)
        /pub/cypherpunks/pgp/macpgp2.2.cpt.hqx

    night.nig.ac.jp  (133.39.16.66)
        /pub/security/PGP/MacPGP2.2

Enjoy!

- -derek

PGP 2 key available upon request on the key-server:
	pgp-public-keys@toxicwaste.mit.edu
- --
  Derek Atkins, MIT '93, Electrical Engineering and Computer Science
     Secretary, MIT Student Information Processing Board (SIPB)
           MIT Media Laboratory, Speech Research Group
           warlord@MIT.EDU       PP-ASEL        N1NWH

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.2

iQBuAgUBK8LgNzh0K1zBsGrxAQFqLwLFFGWzH5+NH/oGZq5Bv/TwkZeW47CEQwCC
is1ZoVB8djkqZk7kD6IMpL552zly4q0mYfo7y2QKH/BJNQ7CcABSVReEd9uT5t+X
UfHBYXgC+5zXi7AphDvRqIE=
=Dbf7
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: sean@gomez.Jpl.Nasa.Gov (Sean Barrett)
Date: Wed, 7 Apr 93 10:20:01 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Remailers
Message-ID: <9304071720.AA00382@gomez.Jpl.Nasa.Gov>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Would someone be so good as to mail me the list of anonymous remailers?
My copy was lost in a backup-restore cycle.  Thanks.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: cls6@midway.uchicago.edu (Cory Scott)
Date: Wed, 7 Apr 93 08:37:46 PDT
To: Doug.Brightwell@corp.sun.com (Doug Brightwell)
Subject: Re: Mac PGP 2.2 Sites?
Message-ID: <9304071537.AA09036@midway.uchicago.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>Anyone know of any ftp sites where I could find the new 2.2 version?

Try soda.berkeley.edu /pub/cypherpunks/pgp.

If that's, for some reason impossible, I will send it (Binhexed) to anyone
who wants a copy.


Cory

Cory L. Scott
-----------------------------------------------------------
Computing Assistant and Consultant
Phoenix Project, Biological Sciences Division
University of Chicago
cls6@midway.uchicago.edu
-----------------------------------------------------------
Member, U of C Student Computing Issues Committee





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: robichau@lambda.msfc.nasa.gov (Paul Robichaux)
Date: Wed, 7 Apr 93 08:59:02 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: PHRACK: my draft reply to the crypt article
Message-ID: <9304071558.AA12663@lambda.msfc.nasa.gov>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Attached is a short rebuttal or reply to the PHRACK article I posted
last week. I'd appreciate comments and suggestions on how to improve
it- my knowledge is far behind Marc, Tim, Perry, and many of the
others on this list.

So, I got off my butt. Hopefully this will satisfy Doug :)

-Paul




My background: I've been into the scene for about 12 years. My day job
is writing unix s/w for a NASA contractor. My night job... well, never
mind that. I have a strong amateur interest in crypto, and I'd like to
share some of what people in the usenet/internet community have been
kind enough to teach me.

Racketeer sez:
>        If you think that the world of the Hackers is deeply shrouded with
>extreme prejudice, I bet you can't wait to talk with crypto-analysts.  These
>people are traditionally the biggest bunch of holes I've ever laid eyes on. In
>their mind, people have been debating the concepts of encryption since the 
>dawn of time, and if you come up with a totally new method of data encryption,
> -YOU ARE INSULTING EVERYONE WHO HAS EVER DONE ENCRYPTION-, mostly by saying 
>"Oh, I just came up with this idea for an encryption which might be the best
>one yet" when people have dedicated all their lives to designing and breaking
>encryption techniques -- so what makes you think you're so fucking bright?

One real reason for this reaction is that people _have_ been studying
encryption for 100 years or so. As a result, many simple cryptosystems
are continuallly being reinvented by people who haven't ever made even
a simple study of cryptosystems.

Imagine if someone came up to you and said "Wow! I just found a
totally K00L way to send fake mail! It's radical! No one's ever
thought of it before!"

You'd laugh, right? _Anyone_ can figure out how to forge mail.

Well, _anyone_ can come up with the n-th variation of the Vigniere or
substitution cipher.

An even more important reason for their 'tude is that cypherpunks are
suspicious by nature.  A key principle of crypto is that you can only
trust algorithms that have been made public and thoroughly picked
over. Without that public scrutiny, how can you trust it?

The feds' Digital Signature Standard (DSS) got raked in the crypto and
industry press because the feds wouldn't disclose details of the
algorithm. "How do we know it's secure?" the cypherpunks asked. "We
won't use it if we don't know it's secure!"

Point being: (for those of you who skipped over) cypherpunks trust NO
ONE when the subject is encryption algorithms. Maybe J. Random Hacker
has come up with a scheme faster and more secure than, say, RSA. If
JRH won't share the details, no one will use it.

Racketeer goes on to talk about DES. It's fairly clear that for a
known-ciphertext attack (i.e. you have a block of encoded text, but
neither the key nor the plaintext) will, at worst, require 2^56
decryption attempts. Various schemes for parallel machines and so
forth have been posted in sci.crypt. Does the NSA have something that
can crack DES? Probably.

My claim would be that cracking passwords is (at minimum)
order-of-magnitude faster than a known-ciphertext attack against a
"typically secure" ciphertext. By typically secure, I mean one
encrypted with DES in CBC mode (_not_ the more common and
easier-to-implement ECB mode) using a strong key (not a password of
"123", for example.)

Remember that DES is mostly used for short-lived session keys. ATMs
are a good example; they typically use a DES key for one communication
session with the central bank. New session, new key. DES is _not_ very
well suited for long-term encryption, since it can probably be
attacked in "reasonable" time by a determined, well-equipped opponent.

Now, on to PGP. Pretty Good Software was indeed threatened with a
lawsuit by Public Key Partners (PKP). PKP holds the patent on the RSA
public-key algorithm. (Many people, me included, don't think that the
patent would stand up in court; so far, no one's tried.)

The nice thing about PGP is that it offers IDEA and RSA in a single,
well-integrated package. When you encrypt a file, PGP generates an
IDEA session key, which is then encrypted with RSA. An opponent would
have to either a) exhaustively search the entire IDEA key space or b)
break RSA to decrypt the file without the password.

Racketeer also mentions that PGP can optionally compress files before
encryption. There's a solid crypto reason behind this, too. One
well-known and successful way to attack an encrypted file is to look
for patterns of repeated characters. Since the statistical frequencies
of word and letter use in English (and many other languages; some
folks have even compiled these statistics for Pascal & C!) are
well-known, comparing the file contents with a statistical profile can
give some insight into the file's contents.

By compressing files before encrypting them, PGP is moving the
redundancy out of the text and into the small dictionary of
compression symbols. You'd still have to decrypt the file before you
could do anything useful with that dictionary, or even to determine
that it _had_ a signature!

-- 
Paul Robichaux, KD4JZG                | May explode if disposed of improperly.
NTI Mission Software Development Div. | RIPEM key on request.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: mccoy@ccwf.cc.utexas.edu (Jim McCoy)
Date: Wed, 7 Apr 93 09:25:24 PDT
To: fergp@sytex.com (Paul Ferguson)
Subject: Re: Smaller is better.
In-Reply-To: <mmmL2B1w165w@sytex.com>
Message-ID: <9304071625.AA25481@flubber.cc.utexas.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text


fergp@sytex.com (Paul Ferguson) writes:
> 
> On Mon, 05 Apr 93 12:36:09 PST,
>  Jonathan Stigelman <uunet!transam.ece.cmu.edu!stig> writes -
>  
> JS> [pgp on multi-user systesm stuff]
>  
>  I think that you guys are missing the point here. IMHO, if you wish
>  maximum assurance of security, than I'd suggest not trying to run
>  programs such as PGP on a multi-user system to begin with! What's
>  wrong with using a PC for this? It offfers a maximum convenience,
>  single-user secure system quite unlike the security problems
>  associated with your university's mainframe.

Some people either do not have the option, or need the convenience of a
multi-user system.  My PC is sitting at home with a toasted modem (waiting
for a Paradyne to arrive... :) and even when it is running fine I spend
8-12 hours a day working on multi-user systems with connectivity that is
light-years beyond what my PC has.  If I want to send out am email message
and do not want to spend an hour walking home, encrypting it, walking back,
and then transferring the file and sending it I will use my copy of PGP on
a multi-user machine.  I have a different key that I use (my key on a
server) for this type of communication and accept and understand the
consequences of using PGP in this manner.

As long as the user knows the weaknesses of the system they are using they
should make thier own choices regarding how to use PGP.  You may consider
your PC at home to be completely safe and secure, but unless you recognize
the weaknesses of that particular setup you are not reaching the "maximum
assurance of security" that you claim.

jim



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: fen@genmagic.genmagic.com (Fen Labalme)
Date: Wed, 7 Apr 93 12:04:16 PDT
To: pmetzger@shearson.com
Subject: FLAME: Perry M. vs. taking action (was: Re: PHRACK...)
Message-ID: <9304071904.AA17502@>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Perry -

> > If you don't like your goverment, vote.
> 
> I'm an anarchist. You might as well say to an atheist "if you don't
> like Catholicism, start a schism."

I, too, aspire towards anarchy, but I don't ignore the tools around me. 
Not voting in today's society is a cop out.  It is most certainly not
perfect, and the choices suck, but it remains one of the major voices you
have today in the world.

Anarchy works best when people are informed.  Education is key.  Simply
bad-mouthing other's works is not giving people a choice to decide which of
two views they feel are better.  Rather, it just fuels the fires of apathy
(that the governemnt have been fanning for so long).

Cypherpunks are trying to change the world.  Sounds like you're just going
to whine about it.  Positive action will always be more effective.  And
better received.

Fen

PS:  I must say that with your lack of content in your posts,
     if I had a filter on my email, it would filter out yours.





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Eric Hughes <hughes@soda.berkeley.edu>
Date: Wed, 7 Apr 93 12:39:02 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Real-time BBS Encryption??
In-Reply-To: <01930407174710/0005857625DC2EM@mcimail.com>
Message-ID: <9304071935.AA26846@soda.berkeley.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Re: encrypting modem links

>I'm wondering if there is a way to do this with PCs?  

Yes, with difficulty, and not transparently.

>Is there a way to encrypt a remote users entire connection with
>the BBS, so that they would have to have a special term program to access
>the system?  

For PC's, replacing the terminal software is really the best way.
There is no effective abstraction of serial port hardware in the PC
world.  The int 0x14 driver in the BIOS was rampantly defective, and
MSDOS does not provide a standard interface.

As a result, almost all comm software on PC's talks to the serial port
directly.  Now in MS Windows, there is abstraction for ther serial
ports, but I don't know how easy it is to insert a device layer.

>It would be best if the user only had to load a device driver
>or something so that they wouldn't all have to use the same comm program.

It might be possible, using a 386, to make a driver that acted as if
it were hardware but actually did encryption.  Ick.  Reliability and
cross-program compatibility would be shit.  And it would have to be
made compatible with whatever else was taking over the 386.

Remember: I hate DOS.

Eric




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Eric Hughes <hughes@soda.berkeley.edu>
Date: Wed, 7 Apr 93 12:46:31 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: WB: public kiosks
In-Reply-To: <9304070100.AA23113@servo>
Message-ID: <9304071943.AA27401@soda.berkeley.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I thank Marc Ringuette and Phil Karn for their comments on public
kiosks.  They remind me that public kiosks are not a panacea, and that
we need to educate others to that awareness.

Nevertheless, let us remember the econmonics of the situation.  It is
expensive to follow people around--more expensive, say, than an
illegal tap on a home phone line.  By increasing the cost of the
suppression of information, one ensures that more information, in the
aggregate, is released.

We may not be able to provide for any particular individual's privacy,
but we can take actions for which we know that we will increase the
total amount of privacy (however hard that would be to strictly
define).

Eric




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Karl Barrus <elee9sf@Menudo.UH.EDU>
Date: Wed, 7 Apr 93 10:49:29 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: ANON: list of remailers Apr 7, 1993
Message-ID: <199304071749.AA04629@Menudo.UH.EDU>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Sorry this is late, but I was delaying waiting for the uclink
remailer's public key to be released, plus, I'm still not getting
responses from remailer@dis.org (but at least I'm not getting bounced
mail).  Some users have informed me that they were able to use
remailer@dis.org, so that's good!

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

Q1: What cypherpunk remailers exist?

A1:

 1: hh@pmantis.berkeley.edu 
 2: hh@cicada.berkeley.edu 
 3: hh@soda.berkeley.edu 
 4: nowhere@bsu-cs.bsu.edu 
 5: ebrandt@jarthur.claremont.edu 
 6: hal@alumni.caltech.edu 
 7: remailer@rebma.mn.org 
 8: elee7h5@rosebud.ee.uh.edu 
 9: phantom@mead.u.washington.edu 
10: hfinney@shell.portal.com 
11: remailer@utter.dis.org 
12: 00x@uclink.berkeley.edu 
13: remail@extropia.wimsey.com 

NOTES: 
#1-#5	remail only, no encryption of headers
#6-#12	support encrypted headers
#13	special - header and message must be encrypted together
#7,#13	introduce larger than average delay
#11	CANNOT CONFIRM OPERATION YET! TEST BEFORE ATTEMPTING TO USE. *
#12	public key not yet released

======================================================================

Q2: What help is available?

A2:

Check out the pub/cypherpunks directory at soda.berkeley.edu
(128.32.149.19).  Instructions on how to use the remailers are in the
remailer directory, along with some unix scripts and dos batch files.

Mail to me (elee9sf@menudo.uh.edu) for further help and/or questions.

======================================================================

* I've had others tell me that they have successfully used this
remailer, but I still don't get any responses...will keep trying!


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.2

iQCVAgUBK8MS/YOA7OpLWtYzAQGgvwQAll6hwIfabxKGdtCSNPUa3M3RCBaqzPT2
VM+k8O94IVxAqX+RUMzRGUVJigrj+5XcNicX1ZvE61rh5InLbzqvUS8mQNbss6wr
b098F0uHyCQCKCF13lzkLU0Gu+HxE+LoBuhaTiwonvcbQYgH+2+lhoU9yAbfduIq
9Syr3gaf3fk=
=W8vL
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Perry E. Metzger" <pmetzger@shearson.com>
Date: Wed, 7 Apr 93 11:22:45 PDT
To: Douglas Mason <approach!douglas@approach.com>
Subject: Re: PHRACK: Article from PHRACK 42 on encryption
Message-ID: <9304071652.AA02691@snark.shearson.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Douglas Mason says:
> 
> 
> > >> Exposing factual errors and flaws in reasoning is left as an exercise
> > >> for the reader.
> 
> > >The flaws are big enough to drive a bakery truck through. Its trash.
>  
> > maybe you should do a better writeup and publish it in PHRACK or 2600?
> 
> I agree.  Anyone can sit and say "Oh, that article is a piece of crap", but
> these same people never put their "money where their mouth is" and write an
> article of their own.
> 
> I've written for both Phrack and 2600 and it sure as hell isn't hard to get
> something submitted.  If you think you can do better by all means write an
> article and send it in.  If trash is being published, why not try to correct
> it?

Because I lack an interest in doing so?

Anyway, there is no need, as the PGP manual is very good and actually
explains things properly. Lots of fine articles have already been
written on all sorts of cryptography subjects.

> If you have any problems with where to send it, I'll gladly forward you the
> address.
> 
> Otherwise, shut the hell up.  

Why should I? The article WAS crap.

> If you don't like your goverment, vote.

I'm an anarchist. You might as well say to an atheist "if you don't
like Catholicism, start a schism."

Perry




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Eric Hughes <hughes@soda.berkeley.edu>
Date: Wed, 7 Apr 93 13:08:41 PDT
To: cypherpunks-announce@toad.com
Subject: April 10 meeting
Message-ID: <9304072002.AA28305@soda.berkeley.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Last month at Cypherpunks West, we decided that meetings would be held
monthly on the second Saturday.  So, for any of you planning to be in
the area any time, keep this in mind.

The April meeting for Cypherpunks West will be April 10, 1993.  There
was some delay getting this announcement out because our normal
meeting sponsor, John Gilmore, will be out of town.  Mike Werner, also
of Cygnus, will be sponsoring our meeting at the same location, so
there's no need to change plans.  Thanks, Mike!


ANNOUNCEMENT

Cypherpunks West April Meeting
Saturday, April 10, 1993
12:00 noon - 6:00 pm PDT
Cygnus Support Offices, Mt. View (directions follow)

Contact Mike Werner for physicalities: mtw@cygnus.com, 415-903-1421.


AGENDA

Arthur Abraham on hash functions
Mail services (works in progress)
Secure phones (updates)
Other stuff as announced

If you have anything you want to talk about, send me mail:
hughes@soda.berkeley.edu


DIRECTIONS

	Cygnus Support
	1937 Landings Drive
	Mt. View, CA  94043
	+1 415 903 1400   switchboard
	+1 415 903 1418   John Gilmore (out of town, see note above)

Take US 101 toward Mt. View.  From San Francisco, it's about a
40-minute drive.  Get off at the Rengstorff Ave/Amphitheatre Parkway
exit.  If you were heading south on 101, you curve around to the
right, cross over the freeway, and get to a stoplight.  If you were
heading north on 101, you just come right off the exit to the
stoplight.  The light is the intersection of Amphitheatre and
Charleston Rd.  Take a right on Charleston; there's a right-turn-only
lane.

Follow Charleston for a short distance.  You'll pass the
Metaphor/Kaleida buildings on the right.  At a clump of palm trees and
a "Landmark Deli" sign, take a right into Landings Drive.  At the end
of the road, turn left into the complex with the big concrete
"Landmark" sign.  Follow the road past the deli til you are in front
of the clock tower that rises out of one of the buildings, facing you.
Enter through the doors immediately under the clock tower.  They'll be
open between noon and 1PM at least.  (See below if you're late.)

Once inside, take the stairs up, immediately to your right.  At the top
of the stairs, turn right past the treetops, and we'll be in 1937 on 
your left.  The door is marked "Cygnus".

If you are late and the door under the clock tower is locked, you can
walk to the deli (which will be around the building on your left, as
you face the door).  Go through the gate in the fence to the right of
the deli, and into the back lawns between the complex and the farm
behind it.  Walk forward and right around the buildings until you see
a satellite dish in the lawn.  Go up the stairs next to the dish,
which are the back stairs into the Cygnus office space.  We'll prop
the door (or you can bang on it if we forget).

Or, you can find the guard who's wandering around the complex, who
knows there's a meeting happening and will let you in.  They can be
beeped at 965 5250, though you'll have trouble finding a phone.

Don't forget to eat first, or bring food at noon!  I recommend hitting
the burrito place on Rengstorff (La Costen~a) at about 11:45.  To get
there, when you get off 101, take Rengstorff (toward the hills) rather
than Amphitheatre (toward the bay).  Follow it about ten blocks until
the major intersection at Middlefield Road.  La Costen~a is the store
on your left at the corner.  You can turn left into the narrow lane
behind the store, which leads to a parking lot, and enter by the front
door, which faces the intersection.  To get to the meeting from there,
just retrace your route on Rengstorff, go straight over the freeway,
and turn right at the stoplight onto Charleston; see above.

See you there!

	John Gilmore






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: pozar@kumr.lns.com (Tim Pozar)
Date: Wed, 7 Apr 93 13:16:33 PDT
To: hughes@soda.berkeley.edu (Eric Hughes)
Subject: Re: Real-time BBS Encryption??
In-Reply-To: <9304071935.AA26846@soda.berkeley.edu>
Message-ID: <m0nggXl-0002NuC@kumr.lns.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text


Eric Hughes wrote:
> >Is there a way to encrypt a remote users entire connection with
> >the BBS, so that they would have to have a special term program to access
> >the system?  
> 
> For PC's, replacing the terminal software is really the best way.
> There is no effective abstraction of serial port hardware in the PC
> world.  The int 0x14 driver in the BIOS was rampantly defective, and
> MSDOS does not provide a standard interface.
> 
> As a result, almost all comm software on PC's talks to the serial port
> directly.  Now in MS Windows, there is abstraction for ther serial
> ports, but I don't know how easy it is to insert a device layer.
> 
> >It would be best if the user only had to load a device driver
> >or something so that they wouldn't all have to use the same comm program.
> 
> It might be possible, using a 386, to make a driver that acted as if
> it were hardware but actually did encryption.  Ick.  Reliability and
> cross-program compatibility would be shit.  And it would have to be
> made compatible with whatever else was taking over the 386.

   Using something like a FOSSIL driver (a replacement serial port driver
that many BBSes use) you could do this.  I would imagine that it would
only encode when carrier is up and the BBS software sends an INT14 AX=xx
instruction to turn on encryption.

    Tim
-- 
    Internet: pozar@kumr.lns.com     FidoNet: Tim Pozar @ 1:125/555
Snail: Tim Pozar / KKSF / 77 Maiden Lane / San Francisco CA 94108 / USA
             POTS: +1 415 788 2022  Radio: KC6GNJ / KAE6247



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: jet@nas.nasa.gov (J. Eric Townsend)
Date: Wed, 7 Apr 93 13:35:21 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Real-time BBS Encryption??
In-Reply-To: <m0nggXl-0002NuC@kumr.lns.com>
Message-ID: <9304072035.AA14210@boxer.nas.nasa.gov>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



What about a streams module that does encryption?  Of course, it'd
require people to run a real OS instead of dos/system...

--
J. Eric Townsend jet@nas.nasa.gov 415.604.4311
NASA Ames Numerical Aerodynamic Simulation      |    play: jet@well.sf.ca.us
Parallel Systems Support, CM-5 POC              |      '92 R100R / DoD# 0378
PGP2.1 public key available upon request or finger jet@simeon.nas.nasa.gov





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: mccoy@ccwf.cc.utexas.edu (Jim McCoy)
Date: Wed, 7 Apr 93 11:36:18 PDT
To: 0005857625@mcimail.com (Michael McMahon)
Subject: Re: Real-time BBS Encryption??
In-Reply-To: <01930407174710/0005857625DC2EM@mcimail.com>
Message-ID: <9304071836.AA26678@flubber.cc.utexas.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text


Michael McMahon <0005857625@mcimail.com> writes:
[...]
> I'm wondering if there is a way to do [end-to-end encryption] with PCs?
> Is there a way to encrypt a remote users entire connection with the BBS,
> so that they would have to have a special term program to access the
> system?

Sure, no problem, provided you are willing to do a lot of coding...

The basic idea would be to use public-key encryption to do a short
negotigiation of a one-time key to use for DES/IDEA encryption of the
session.  You could then use a public key for the system as a whole (with
which the users can encrypt thier personal public keys for uploading during
the initial connection) and the user's public key to send the key
transmitted from the BBS for the session.

All that would be necessary is for you to add a bit of code to the comm
program so that it would recognize when it was talking to a system such as
this and do the right thing when needed (the actual encryption code is
readily available in systems like PGP and the various DES implementations
out there.)  The downside is that there are a lot of terminal programs out
there for microcomputers and not many supply source code for such
modifications.  I had thought about using such a system when planning out a
raid-proof 386BSD system and the hassles of trying to get at least one
program to do this for every platform that might want to connect to such a
BBS was more work that I wanted to do.  Perhaps as an option (e.g. one line
using end-to-end encryption and others normal) for connecting to a system,
but if all the lines are done like this you will probably find making it
difficult for people to connect like this keeps people away from the
system.

jim



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: karn@qualcomm.com (Phil Karn)
Date: Wed, 7 Apr 93 14:23:13 PDT
To: jet@nas.nasa.gov
Subject: Re: Real-time BBS Encryption??
Message-ID: <9304072122.AA29477@servo>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Actually, I think a much more powerful solution is to run TCP/IP over
the serial link and to encrypt individual IP datagrams. This is the
charter of the IETF "ip-security" working group, and there is already
a prototype implementation of one approach working.

Phil




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: karn@qualcomm.com (Phil Karn)
Date: Wed, 7 Apr 93 15:22:56 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: EMI shielding
Message-ID: <9304072222.AA29676@servo>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Apropos the recent discussion about TEMPEST shielding, there's an
interesting product that might prove quite useful: CAPCON EMI
suppressant tubing. A colleague got a shipment of it today.

It's ordinary black rubber tubing that has been loaded with iron
oxide. It comes in 26 sizes from .04" ID to 1.25" ID, and is claimed
to have much better attenuation than ferrite beads, especially at UHF
and microwave frequencies.

You can shield entire cable lengths with it, or you can apply it in
short segments (1" to 1') just like ferrite beads and get plenty of
attenuation for less cost and weight (this stuff is *heavy*, and the
1/2" stuff cost several dollars per foot.)

It's also available as sheeting in various thicknesses for lining
cabinets, etc.

I got the bright idea to test the absorptivity claims for this stuff
by putting an 8" piece into a microwave oven. After 10 seconds, it was
too hot to handle. I'd say it's doing just what it's supposed to do.

Contact info:
Capcon, Inc
147 W 25th St
New York, NY 10001
212-243-6275
212-645-0185 (fax)

Phil





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: J. Michael Diehl <mdiehl@triton.unm.edu>
Date: Wed, 7 Apr 93 14:32:22 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Real-time BBS Encryption??
Message-ID: <9304072132.AA14268@triton.unm.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> Re: encrypting modem links
> >I'm wondering if there is a way to do this with PCs?  
> Yes, with difficulty, and not transparently.
> 
> >Is there a way to encrypt a remote users entire connection with
> >the BBS, so that they would have to have a special term program to access
> >the system?  
> 
> For PC's, replacing the terminal software is really the best way.
> There is no effective abstraction of serial port hardware in the PC
> world.  The int 0x14 driver in the BIOS was rampantly defective, and
> MSDOS does not provide a standard interface.

Or, we could impliment an "external protocal" like zmodem.  This would simply
take keystrokes, buffer them, then encrypt/decrypt them.

Make the source portable, and obtainable.





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Perry E. Metzger" <pmetzger@shearson.com>
Date: Wed, 7 Apr 93 13:10:25 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: FLAME: Perry M. vs. taking action (was: Re: PHRACK...)
In-Reply-To: <9304071904.AA17502@>
Message-ID: <9304071953.AA02995@snark.shearson.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Fen Labalme says:
> Perry -
> 
> > > If you don't like your goverment, vote.
> > 
> > I'm an anarchist. You might as well say to an atheist "if you don't
> > like Catholicism, start a schism."
> 
> I, too, aspire towards anarchy, but I don't ignore the tools around me. 
[...]

This isn't appropriate to this list -- I'm replying in private mail.

.pm




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Brad Huntting <huntting@glarp.com>
Date: Wed, 7 Apr 93 15:04:02 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Security Dynamics
Message-ID: <199304072203.AA02670@misc.glarp.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



The MIS department where I work has started using "Secure-ID" cards
made by Security Dynamics Inc for access to their MVS systems.
After listening to a presentation by marketing droids and technical
support from Security Dynamics I had these impressions:

	The cards are programmed at the factory with a "random"
	seed.  They have an internal clock, and a lithium battery.
	They use a proprietary encryption algorithm to encrypt the
	time of day using the internal seed and display it on an
	LCD display using about 6 or 7 digits.  The display updates
	itself every 60 seconds (this frequency is adjustable when
	you order the cards)

	An authenticating host will have the cards seed, as well
	as the cards "clock offset" (the time the card was seeded,
	and the clock reset).  The user has a 4 digit PIN (personal
	identification number) known only to the host (and of course
	written on the back of the card :-).  PIN numbers must be
	unique since they are used to identify the user.  At login
	time, the user is asked to type in her PIN, as well as the
	number currently displayed on the card.  This is checked
	by the host, and if it's correct the user is authenticated.

	If used on a regular basis, the authenticating host can
	detect clock drift and will adjust it's database accordingly.

	Cards can be used across multiple "realms", but this
	nessesitates trusting the cards shared key with each host
	that wants to authenticate that card.

	The cards are timed to deactivate after some time interval
	(again, this is an option) the default lifespan is 3 years,
	they can go as high as 4 or 5, but after that, the battery
	isn't reliable.

You can probably imagine some of the problems with such a system.
First and foremost in my opinion, it uses an unknown proprietary
algorithm which is a closely guarded company secret known only to
them and anyone which a dissasembler.  Obviously such an algorithm
has never undergone any serious scrutiny.  Most respectable
researchers (outside of Ft Meade) do not need to disassemble code
to find material to write papers on.

Second, the cards are programmed at the factory, and the user has
no way of reseeding them.  The company actually touts the fact that
they have all the card info for all customers on file, and will
gladly send you encrypted tapes or floppys if you loose you database!
Of course they will only talk with one designated contact at your
site, and they will only ship materials to that person.  In all
fairness if your a big client, and you insist, they might be
compelled to tell you how to seed the cards, and give you a batch
of "raw" cards.

When I mentioned how ludicrous it was for us to trust their internal
security, they made some lame noises about employees being "bonded".
In other words, they have established plausible denyability and
are "out of the loop" should your security data be compromised.
I was a little furious.

Lastly, their expensive.  Something on the order of $60/card in
quantities of 250 to 500 for cards that last 3 years and change
every 60 seconds.  Programmable DES devices (used by DEC and others)
which employ a challenge response system are about one third as
much.

I came away from the talk with a bitter taste in my mouth.  As I
understand it (and please correct me if I'm wrong) they are, at
this point, one of the largest companies "crypto card" companies
in the world.  This is, to say the least, unsettling.

If you want more info, they're Colorado office is at:

	Security Dynamics
	5299 DTC Boulevard
	Suite 500
	Englewood, CO 80111
	Phone: +1 303 773-6519




brad




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: David Reeve Sward <sward+@cmu.edu>
Date: Wed, 7 Apr 93 13:38:27 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Real-time BBS Encryption??
In-Reply-To: <9304071935.AA26846@soda.berkeley.edu>
Message-ID: <kfkngsG00WBNQ6osED@andrew.cmu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Excerpts from internet.cypherpunks: 7-Apr-93 Real-time BBS Encryption??
by Eric Hughes@soda.berkele 
> For PC's, replacing the terminal software is really the best way.
> There is no effective abstraction of serial port hardware in the PC
> world.  The int 0x14 driver in the BIOS was rampantly defective, and
> MSDOS does not provide a standard interface.
>  
> As a result, almost all comm software on PC's talks to the serial port
> directly.  Now in MS Windows, there is abstraction for ther serial
> ports, but I don't know how easy it is to insert a device layer.

Actually, there is a rather old (for the PC) abstraction called FOSSIL
(Fido Opus Seadog Serial Interface Layer ... or so).  It is essentially
an extention/replacement for the BIOS int 0x14 driver.  It is certainly
possible to further extend this for encryption by adding some functions
to the interface.  The two FOSSILs I know of are X00 and BNU - They can
be found in oak.oakland.edu:/pub/msdos/fossil
-- 
David Sward    sward+@cmu.edu





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Karl Barrus <elee9sf@Menudo.UH.EDU>
Date: Wed, 7 Apr 93 14:43:25 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: WB: public kiosks
Message-ID: <199304072143.AA00959@Menudo.UH.EDU>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



On the importance of anonymity (in regards to the whistleblower
project):

Last week, the Houston Chronicle ran two or three articles on how ill
run the Nuclear Regulatory Commission is.  Specifically, the article
described how one or two people had their careers absolutely ruined by
raising safety concerns at nuclear plants.  In each case, the
employees involved were terminated shortly after citing safety hazards
(such as spills left uncleaned on table tops, etc.)  Someone quoted in
the article stated this behavior undoubtedly scares off other
potential informers.

Plus, I read an article in the Chronicle about how a NASA employee was
fired for his political beliefs.  Well, it is more complicated: the
employee actively participated in some usenet group
(talk.politics.china?), and had a store of back articles on his
computer at work, which his superiors discovered.  Shortly thereafter,
he lost his job.

I've been busy of late and could kick myself for not saving these
papers, because real world incidents such as these strengthen our
arguments for privacy and anonymity.  Some people have such an
irritating tendency to assume irresponsibility and abuse when a
freedom becomes available - just read news.admin.policy.

/-----------------------------------\
| Karl L. Barrus                    |
| elee9sf@menudo.uh.edu             | <- preferred address
| barrus@tree.egr.uh.edu (NeXTMail) |
\-----------------------------------/




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: trump@pluto.ee.cua.edu (Louis Edward Trumpbour)
Date: Wed, 7 Apr 93 13:52:27 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: well
Message-ID: <9304072053.AA17147@pluto.ee.cua.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



if anyone comes up with a solution to the bbs encryption problem then get to me
... i plan on starting a Waffle based BBS that may have "sensitive" information
on line in subs and in files... you all know the story... well if i could have
this encryption feature i would be most happy... i have looked into this a bit
but to my suprise it has comeup on the list... as for the problem of d           
distribution of the program the would encryp and decrypt via modem and bbs, i 
have that pretty much taken care of already... thanks

Clovi
/s
^ been bbsing for too long





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Mr. Noise" <mrnoise@econs.umass.edu>
Date: Wed, 7 Apr 93 14:02:38 PDT
To: grady@netcom.com (1016/2EF221)
Subject: Re: PGP: suggestions from the trench
In-Reply-To: <9304032057.AA06227@netcom.netcom.com>
Message-ID: <9304072102.AA20984@titan.ucs.umass.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text


> Taking all these factors into consideration, I would suggest that 
> the *minimum* size of the RSA modulus available for PGP is 1024 
> bits with a minimum ceiling of 2048 bits (or even more).  If for 
> performance reasons on certain platforms 1024 is deemed 
> impossibly slow, then a lesser number of bits ought to be 
> permitted *provided* that the security level for any key length 
> under, say, 768 bits is clearly labeled "TOY GRADE".

While I agree that keys of greater lengths out to be made available for
those fortunate enough to possess platforms powerful enough to use them,
your choice of words--'TOY GRADE'--is, perhaps, unfortunate.  Every user
of PGP has different reasons for needing/wanting encryption, & not all users
need the sort of protection that can withstand a determined attack mustered
by cryptographic experts.  Some users, frankly, just don't like people
snooping into their private mail, & therefore use PGP encryption as an
'envelope'.  Sure, the 'envelope' can be 'steamed open', but it's not likely
to be worth the trouble if you have no major secrets to conceal...




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Brad Huntting <huntting@glarp.com>
Date: Wed, 7 Apr 93 16:11:58 PDT
To: fen@genmagic.genmagic.com (Fen Labalme)
Subject: Re: FLAME: Perry M. vs. taking action (was: Re: PHRACK...)
In-Reply-To: <9304071904.AA17502@>
Message-ID: <199304072311.AA02853@misc.glarp.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



> Not voting in today's society is a cop out.  It is most certainly not
> perfect, and the choices suck, but it remains one of the major voices you
> have today in the world.

Voting arguably endorses the system.  If you are vocal about why
you dont endorse the system, your refusal to vote can have alot
more impact than going to the polls.  After all, in any reasonably
large election, your vote barely counts at all, but your voice can
be heard a long way away if your saying something interesting and
your saying it loud enough.


brad




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Michael McMahon <0005857625@mcimail.com>
Date: Wed, 7 Apr 93 10:55:41 PDT
To: cypherpunks <cypherpunks@toad.com>
Subject: Real-time BBS Encryption??
Message-ID: <01930407174710/0005857625DC2EM@mcimail.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I thought of this the other day, but don't know enough about programming
and cryptography to do it, or if it actually could be done.  Anyways, I 
figured I'd share it with all of you and see if anyone has any ideas.

Here's the situation:  We all know that some advanced computer systems
have real-time encryption built into all modem connections.  When a 
bank branch dials into the main office the entire transmission may be
encrypted.  This occurs even between terminal connections and the host.
I'm wondering if there is a way to do this with PCs?  Say I'm setting up
a computer bulletin board for my company that is going to run off of a 
DOS PC.  Is there a way to encrypt a remote users entire connection with
the BBS, so that they would have to have a special term program to access
the system?  It would be best if the user only had to load a device driver
or something so that they wouldn't all have to use the same comm program.
Could this be done by loading a special device driver on both the host and
remote so that all data going through com port 2 (or whatever) is encrypted?

Anybody know if something like this is available?



 * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
 * Mike McMahon                                                          *
 * Internet:  585-7625@mcimail.com                                       *
 * PGP Fingerprint:  95 F9 2A 1B 81 4F D8 31  56 ED BC A5 4F 64 A7 02    *
 * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Derek Atkins <warlord@Athena.MIT.EDU>
Date: Wed, 7 Apr 93 14:51:30 PDT
To: J. Michael Diehl <mdiehl@triton.unm.edu>
Subject: Re: Real-time BBS Encryption??
In-Reply-To: <9304072132.AA14268@triton.unm.edu>
Message-ID: <9304072151.AA07442@steve-dallas.MIT.EDU>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

> Or, we could impliment an "external protocal" like zmodem.  This would simply
> take keystrokes, buffer them, then encrypt/decrypt them.
> 
> Make the source portable, and obtainable.

I'm doing something like this for my Thesis (i.e., wait a couple of
weeks.. ;-) It's based upon Kerberos, but it will securely get you a
TGT on a server machine that is on the Internet from a client terminal
that is dialled up to it...

Moreover, you can extract the session key from the protocol, which
would allow for DES encryption of the session.  While I haven't yet
implemented the encryption of the session, I have been able to obtain
kerberos tickets securely....

More info on request, or you can wait to read my thesis when it's
done...

Enjoy!

- -derek

PGP 2 key available upon request on the key-server:
	pgp-public-keys@toxicwaste.mit.edu
- --
  Derek Atkins, MIT '93, Electrical Engineering and Computer Science
     Secretary, MIT Student Information Processing Board (SIPB)
           MIT Media Laboratory, Speech Research Group
           warlord@MIT.EDU       PP-ASEL        N1NWH

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.2

iQBuAgUBK8NMvzh0K1zBsGrxAQFQwwLECieud4DvqHhkxsjwmrHt4Unpq2eR9hlT
DKuKF2CqCfYVabks11r7TaZvrsSQ9Vs5zZFbXhfihaiQywTpdj2Bp8aSo0B+7paR
ukzbY3GT1RLcSRrK+6KjPGw=
=lzg8
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Mr. Noise" <mrnoise@econs.umass.edu>
Date: Wed, 7 Apr 93 15:25:38 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: PHRACK:  ...put up or...
Message-ID: <9304072224.AA27727@titan.ucs.umass.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text


> > >The flaws are big enough to drive a bakery truck through. Its trash.
>  
> > maybe you should do a better writeup and publish it in PHRACK or 2600?
> 
[...]
> If you don't like your goverment, vote.  If you don't like something that is 
> published, write something yourself.  It's not some type of elite club of
> writers, both publications welcome people of all walks to submit.  

Hear, hear!  For cryin' out loud, Fido 'Snooze' accepts *everything* they're
sent!  ...& if that isn't good enough, start your own:  electrons are free! 
(Well, sort of...)



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Doug.Brightwell@Corp.Sun.COM (Doug Brightwell)
Date: Wed, 7 Apr 93 19:32:10 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Thanks for Mac PGP 2.2 Pointers
Message-ID: <9304080231.AA12843@media.Corp.Sun.COM>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Thanks to all who responded to my query regarding ftp sites for Mac PGP 2.2.

Doug Brightwell



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: kieran2101@aol.com
Date: Wed, 7 Apr 93 17:25:19 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: PGP and problems therewith.
Message-ID: <9304072025.tn41388@aol.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> I was under the impression that there was a newsgroup for discussion of how
> to use PGP.

There is: alt.security.pgp.  Of course, like all alt.* groups, its
propagation may vary.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Marc Horowitz <marc@GZA.COM>
Date: Wed, 7 Apr 93 17:41:58 PDT
To: mccoy@ccwf.cc.utexas.edu (Jim McCoy)
Subject: Re: Real-time BBS Encryption??
In-Reply-To: <9304071836.AA26678@flubber.cc.utexas.edu>
Message-ID: <9304080043.AA28900@pad-thai.aktis.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>> Sure, no problem, provided you are willing to do a lot of coding...

A lot of coding?  You can come very close to doing it with
off-the-shelf code.  ka9q for SLIP.  Telnet authentication is now an
RFC, and encryption will be available probably within a few weeks.

Plus, with IP, you can use existing mechanisms (like POP) to get your
mail on your local PC and do your decryption there.  This is beyond
any PC code I know, and would require new development.

		Marc




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Date: Wed, 7 Apr 93 21:33:22 PDT
To: Extropians@gnu.ai.mit.edu
Subject: MATH: Zero Knowledge Proofs
Message-ID: <9304080431.AA26255@netcom.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


[Since this should also be of interest to the Cypherpunks list, which Ray
is/was subscribed to, I am posting this essay to that list.]

Ray Cromwell writes:

>   Could someone explain zero knowledge proofs and give me an example. I
>have taken number theory and abstract algebra so feel free to use equations.
>
>(I know that zero knowledge proofs are a way of certifying something without
>revealing the information you are certifying, but I want to know how they
>work mathematically)

Zero knowledge interactive proof systems ("ZKIPS") are sometimes called
"minimum disclosure proofs" (with some subtle differences) and are exciting
and mysterious (at first) methods that lie at the heart of modern
cryptology. Here's a simple explanation. Too bad we don't have a
blackboard!

ALICE AND BOB (some people call them Peggy the Prover and Vic the Verifier)

Alice wishes to prove to Bob that she knows some item of knowledge without
actually giving Bob any of that knowledge.

Let us first imagine that Alice claims she knows a "Hamiltonian cycle" on a
particular graph. (For a given set of nodes and arcs linking some of those
nodes, a Hamiltonian cycle is one which passes through each node once and
only once. You might want to draw some graphs on a sheet of paper and try
to find a Hamiltonian cycle for the graphs, to get a feel for the problem.)


The particular graph may be "registered" somewhere with Alice's claim that
she--and only she, for reasons I'll discuss at the end--knows a Hamiltonian
cycle for the graph. In a sense, this is her "proof of identity."

To make this example concrete, Alice is using this piece of knowledge as
her *password* to get into some system. She presents a map of 50  cities
and some set of highways interconnecting them and says "I am who I say I am
if and only if I know a Hamiltonian cycle for this graph."

The conventional (non zero knowledge) way to convey this knowledge is for
Alice to simply *show* the Hamiltonian cycle to Bob. This is how passwords
are currently handled. Bob, and anybody else who is spying on the exchange,
then knows the "secret," which isn't a secret anymore. (Anybody who saw the
exchange, including Sysadmin Bob, could then impersonate her.)

ENTER ZERO KNOWLEDGE

Alice, instead of showing Bob the Hamiltonian cycle, takes the cities and
covers them with something, say, coins. (On a computer, this is all done in
software, using the cryptographic protocol called "bit commitment.")

Alice scrambles the position of the cities (covered by coins) so as not to
allow positional cues. (Most of the 50 cities should have about the same
number, ideally exactly the same number, of links to other cities, to
ensure that some cities are not "marked" by having some unique number of
links. A detail.) Needless to say, she scrambles the cities out of sight of
Bob, so he can't figure out which cities are which. However, once she's
done with the scrambling, she displays the cities in such a way that she
can't *later change*..i.e., she "commits" to the values, using well-known
cryptographic methods for this. (If this sounds mysterious, read up on it.
It's how "mental poker" and other crypto protocols are handled.)

Bob sees 50 cities with links to other cities, but he doesn't have any way
of knowing which of the covered cities are which. Nor, I should add, are
the links labelled in any way--it wouldn't do to have some links
permanently labelled "Route 66" or "Highway 101"!

She says to Bob: "Pick one choice. Either you can see a Hamiltonian cycle
for this set of covered cities and links, or you can see the cities
uncovered." In other words, "Alice cuts, Bob chooses."

Bob tosses a coin or chooses randomly somehow and says: "Show me the cities."

Alice uncovers all the cities and Bob examines the graph. He sees that
Akron is indeed connected to Boise, to Chicago, to Denver, not to Erie, and
so on. In short, he confirms that Alice has shown him the original graph.
No substitution of another graph was made.

Bob, who is suspicious that this person is really who she claims to be, 
says to Alice: "Ok, big deal! So you anticipated I was going to ask you to
show me the cities. Anybody could have gotten Alice's publicly registered
graph and just shown it to me. You had a 50-50 chance of guessing which
choice I'd make."

Alice smugly says to him: "Fine, let's do it again." She scrambles the
cities (which are covered) and displays the graph to Bob...50 covered
cities and various links between them. She tells Bob to choose again.

This time Bob says: "Show me the Hamiltonian cycle."

Without uncovering the cities (which would give the secret away, of
course), Alice connects the cities together in a legal Hamiltonian cycle.

Bob says, "OK, so this time you figured I was going to ask you the opposite
of what I did last time and you just substituted some other graph that you
happened to know the Hamiltonian cycle of. I have no guarantee the graphs
are really the same."

Alice, who knows this is just the beginning, says: "Let's do the next round."

...and so it goes....

After 30 rounds, Alice has either produced a legal Hamiltonian cycle or a
graph that is the same as (isomorphic to...same cities linked to same other
cities) the registered graph in each and every one of the rounds.

There are two possibilities:

1. She's an imposter and has guessed correctly *each time* which choice Bob
will make, thus allowing her to substitute either another graph altogether
(for when Bob wants to see the Hamiltonian cycle) or just the original
graph (for when Bob asks to see the cities uncovered to confirm it's the
real graph). Remember, if Alice guesses wrong even once, she's caught
red-handed.

2. She really is who she claims to be and she really does know a
Hamiltonian cycle of the specified graph.

The odds of #1 being true drop rapidly as the number of rounds are
increased, and after 30 rounds, are only 1 in 2^30, or 1 in a billion. Bob
choose to believe that Alice knows the solution.

Alice has conveyed to Bob proof that she is in possession of some knowledge
without actually revealing any knowledge at all! The proof is
"probabilistic."

This is the essence of a zero knowledge proof. There's more to it than just
this example, of course, but this is the basic idea.


SOME DETAILS

1. Could someone else discover the Hamiltonian cycle of Alice's graph? 

Exhaustive search is the only way to guarantee a solution will be
found--the Hamiltonian cycle problem is a famous "NP-complete"
combinatorial problem. This is intractable for reasonable numbers of nodes.
50 nodes is intractable. 

2. If finding a Hamiltonian cycle is intractable, how the hell did Alice
ever find one?

She didn't *have* to find one! She started with 50 cities, quickly
connected them so that the path went through each city only once and then
wrote this path down as her "secret" solution. Then she went back and added
the other randomly chosen interconnects to make the complete graph. For
this graph, she obviously knows a Hamiltonian cycle, *by construction*.

3. Can Bob reconstruct what the Hamilonian cycle must be by asking for
enough rounds to be done?

Not generally. Read the papers for details on this, which gets deeply into
under what circumstance partial knowledge of the solution gives away the
complete solution.

4. Are there other problems that can be used in this same way?

Yes, there are many forms. I find the Hamiltonian cycle explanation quite
easy to explain to people. (Though usually I can draw pictures, which helps
a lot.)

5. How general is the "zero knowledge interactive proof" approach?

Anything provable in formal logic is provable in zero knowledge, saith the
mathematicians and crypto gurus. Check out the various "Crypto Conference"
Proceedings.

Hope this helps.

-Tim May


--
Timothy C. May         | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,  
tcmay@netcom.com       | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
408-688-5409           | knowledge, reputations, information markets, 
W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA  | black markets, collapse of governments.
Higher Power: 2^756839 | Public Key: MailSafe and PGP available.





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: crunch@netcom.com (John Draper)
Date: Wed, 7 Apr 93 23:47:02 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: The WELL took off PGP from public downloads
Message-ID: <9304080647.AA11935@netcom4.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Just thought I should mention,  that "gail" has removed PGP from the
WELL's public downloads,  and when I asked her why,  she didn't comment
(yet!).

JD




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: rjc@gnu.ai.mit.edu
Date: Wed, 7 Apr 93 22:59:54 PDT
To: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Subject: Re: MATH: Zero Knowledge Proofs
In-Reply-To: <9304080431.AA26255@netcom.netcom.com>
Message-ID: <9304080559.AA63552@hal.gnu.ai.mit.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



   Excellent essay Tim (as usual). Is there a more practical method based on
a simpler 'intractable' problem? 

[not that it's useless. I could probably code up an implementation based on 
your description, but it seems like a pain to generate graphs everytime you 
want to prove some trivial knowledge.]


-Ray

-- Ray Cromwell        |    Engineering is the implementation of science;    --
-- EE/Math Student     |       politics is the implementation of faith.      --
-- rjc@gnu.ai.mit.edu  |                         - Zetetic Commentaries      --



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: George A. Gleason <gg@well.sf.ca.us>
Date: Thu, 8 Apr 93 02:32:08 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Musical Cypher CD project
Message-ID: <199304080931.AA02038@well.sf.ca.us>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Excellent news...!  Recall Matt's & my postings about putting cyphertext
into a CD as part of the artistic presentation....?  The idea being to
establish it as part of the overall protected artistic speech as it were.  

Well, I've found a band in the area who have tried doing something VERY
similar and currently have a very decent quantity of material READY TO GO.
Includes hypercard stacks, quicktime movies, macromind movies, miscellaneous
art & screen savers.... a lot of it is footage of the band playing live,
with music tracks included (i.e. show videos), some of it is computer
graphic art, and so on.  The band is called NOW, and they sound like a cross
between Rush, Crimson, and Yes; are incredibly talented, write new songs so
prolifically (sp?) that they could put out 5-10 more albums with what's
already ready... have a couple of albums out on an indie label... and are
ready & willing & way interested in doing a project.  

What they wanted to do was put all the video and other stuff on the first
track of a CD so it would be accessible on a CDROM player.  They got that
far and also some studio sessions with the songs for the album, and then ran
into a wall as far as the tech angle on getting the stuff to work right.  

We have studios available to record the music, the band can go in any time,
and they're hip to encrypting their video stuff & having people go hunting
for the key (put it in the lyric sheets, have people write for it, etc).  

I recall someone from Contra Costa offering to fund this; well, we're ready.

This will easily sell a few thousand copies which will pay back costs; and
given the band's artistic strengths, will probably do better than that.  And
it will certainly be a first, and a decent stake in the ground for crypto as
artistic freedom of expression.  

Email gg@well.sf.ca.us for more info.  





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: anon0709@nyx.cs.du.edu (Name withheld by request)
Date: Thu, 8 Apr 93 03:31:44 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: subscribe
Message-ID: <9304081033.AA24771@nyx.cs.du.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Please subscribe me to the cypherpunks list.
Sean Carton
/es




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: mark@coombs.anu.edu.au (Mark)
Date: Wed, 7 Apr 93 14:15:29 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Real-time BBS Encryption??
Message-ID: <9304072115.AA22888@coombs.anu.edu.au>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>What about a streams module that does encryption?  Of course, it'd
>require people to run a real OS instead of dos/system...

You might want to look at the link.tar.Z program newsham@wiliki.eng.hawaii.edu
wrote. THe server is currently unix based but it should be transportable.
It uses pgp to swap des session key and happily talks away. There are still
some bugs and when he has the time they will be taken care of. The client is
written for an amiga at the moment, I havent had the opportunity to do the ibm
port yet. Contact him at the above address. He is busy with studies but you
might get some joy from emailing him.

Hope this helps
Mark
mark@coombs.anu.edu.au




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: D Anton Sherwood <dasher@well.sf.ca.us>
Date: Thu, 8 Apr 93 07:58:48 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: false analogy
Message-ID: <199304081458.AA06134@well.sf.ca.us>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> If you don't like your goverment, vote.  If you don't like something that
> is published, write something yourself.  . . .

That should be -- If you don't like your government, start your own.
Or better yet --- If you don't like your government, govern yourself.

*\\* Anton                                                     Ubi scriptum?
;)




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: greg@ideath.goldenbear.com (Greg Broiles)
Date: Thu, 8 Apr 93 14:56:11 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Real-time BBS Encryption??
In-Reply-To: <01930407174710/0005857625DC2EM@mcimail.com>
Message-ID: <PXBP2B1w164w@ideath.goldenbear.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

Michael McMahon <uunet!mcimail.com!0005857625> writes:

[Talks about real-time end-to-end encryption of user sessions on BBS's.]

It's not quite as sexy and "James Bond" as real-time end-to-end encryption, 
but I think an easier approach to this would be to adopt the architecture of 
the offline mail-reading programs that are available.

For the benefit of people unaccustomed to offline readers, these programs 
collect up all of the unread messages, E-mails, and file descriptions from a 
BBS, .ZIPs or otherwise packs/compresses the files, and then the user 
downloads that "packet", and hangs up. The user then uses a program on her 
local PC to read and reply to messages in that packet, dials the BBS again, 
and uploads her responses.

I haven't fussed around with offline readers much, but I'll bet it'd be 
pretty simple to add a step to the collection/.ZIP process, which would 
encrypt the whole package with some prearranged key.

This would allow folks to use standard BBS programs, standard terminal 
programs, and perhaps even standard offline readers. It should be pretty 
simple from a programming standpoint, as well; it's perhaps implementable 
with only batch commands. Yes, the "bad guys" will get to watch the user log 
on and log off, and can read the menus and choices - but so what? It's 
possible (easy, really) to encrypt all of the really interesting stuff.

- --
Greg Broiles                            greg@goldenbear.com
Golden Bear Consulting                  +1 503 465 0325
Box 12005 Eugene OR 97440               BBS: +1 503 687 7764



-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.2

iQCVAgUBK8R3jH3YhjZY3fMNAQHDagP6AkE+8WrEtSOVNfBDiL6UYplI+TAihl66
IffYPilZ+b9Nxq2VHBF8aUYnX7duLRaivILQ7CPIRsNnKRq3DF5bljcvLY9B9VNn
3SSFSGJFQFYvakElcZPbCGhFbsLdmF8QNN97Z8Cdbx4fGYmj83brNidhHYNeXhpo
5Nk2+5W80mE=
=Yxdd
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: pete@cirrus.com (Pete Carpenter)
Date: Thu, 8 Apr 93 15:06:37 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: FLAME: taking action
Message-ID: <9304082207.AA16844@ss2138.cirrus.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



>> Not voting in today's society is a cop out.  It is most certainly not
>> perfect, and the choices suck, but it remains one of the major voices you
>> have today in the world.
>
> Voting arguably endorses the system.  If you are vocal about why
> you don't endorse the system, your refusal to vote can have a lot
> more impact than going to the polls.

If you don't vote, your opinion literally doesn't count, and means that
you are perfectly happy with the status quo. Not voting guarantees that 
you will have no voice.  Perot's name will be remembered a lot longer 
than some nuts whining how about the process doesn't work. The best way 
to protest the current system, is to vote for something else. 

I'm a Libertarian rather than a Perotian, but I give him a lot of credit 
for allowing so many people to see beyond the two party system. 

Vote with your feet, not with your butt.

---
Pete Carpenter                           pete@cirrus.com
                                
Talk about your plenty, talk about your ills,
One man gathers what another man spills. - Robert Hunter




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: vanam@shadow.ksu.ksu.edu (Stephen Lee(Second son of Caine))
Date: Thu, 8 Apr 93 15:17:22 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Help, please.
Message-ID: <9304082217.AA07305@shadow.ksu.ksu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I am very new to the world of hacking... Could you all give me a hand
understanding...(aka suggested reading and helpful tips for a newbie.)

Thanx in advance

Stephen






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Pat_Barron@transarc.com
Date: Thu, 8 Apr 93 15:03:15 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Security Dynamics
In-Reply-To: <199304072203.AA02670@misc.glarp.com>
Message-ID: <ofl_2sj0Bwx29UQucJ@transarc.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


At one point, I talked to Security Dynamics, and experienced the same
reaction as the original poster.  Additionally, I found it ludicrous
that the cards were programmed to self-destruct after a period of
time, that they keep their encryption scheme so secret (though they'll
sell you source code if you fork over sufficient bucks), and that
there was no way to reprogram/reset the cards in the field.

I also couldn't stomach their "well, you just have to trust us"
response to a lot of my objections about it being a closed proprietary
system, having them know all of my key data, and not being able to
reprogram the cards.

I had much better luck with Digital Pathways, and their "SecureNet
Key" product.  This is a small (about as long and wide as the SecurID
card, but about 2.5 times as thick) hand-held authenticator that's
meant to go with Digital Pathways' "Data Defender" secure
communications front-end, though they sell the SecureNet Keys
separately, and they're not very expensive.  They use DES, are
individually field-programmable, and Digital Pathways is only too
happy to give you as much info about them as you want - for free.
With the info they gave me, it was no problem towrite code that knows
how to use the SecureNet Key.

--Pat.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Perry E. Metzger" <pmetzger@shearson.com>
Date: Thu, 8 Apr 93 16:18:45 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com (Pete Carpenter)
Subject: Re: FLAME: taking action
In-Reply-To: <9304082207.AA16844@ss2138.cirrus.com>
Message-ID: <9304082228.AA10301@snark.shearson.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



This message isn't appropriate for cypherpunks, so I am replying in
private mail.

Pete Carpenter says:
> If you don't vote, your opinion literally doesn't count, and means that
[...]




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: internaut@aol.com
Date: Thu, 8 Apr 93 16:32:02 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: FWEE!: kiosks
Message-ID: <9304081930.tn48662@aol.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Yo Dewds,

I guess it's time for me to throw in my two bits on the Public WB Kiosk
idea...

I guess I appreciate the intent of implementing such a system, but there are
some BIG strikes against it:

[1] Strike One: Installation and maintenance costs (economics again). Can you
IMAGINE what it would cost to build and maintain a network (and it would have
to be a big one!) of public kiosks? Better to piggyback on existing
infrastructure for purely practical reasons. I have an account on the
aforementioned SF Net (little tables in coffeehouses all over the San
Francisco Bay Area) and I have come to the conclusion that it would be
prohibitive to just maintain such a system. Wayne Gregori would back me up on
this. If you think it's a pain to keep your baby-powdered PC at home in
decent working order, imagine one with beer spilt on it daily, bozos who type
like Paul Bunyan on Steroids and the occasional
chairleg-yanking-the-plug-out-of-the-wall incident. Most of the time, I log
in to SF Net from home anyway.

[2] Strike Two: Lack of Privacy while using the kiosks. I think Eric Hughes'
argument (with due respects to Eric) about the expensive economics of
monitoring the kiosks falls down just a tad when you consider that these
would not even be _moving targets_! (In both the literal and figurative
senses.) Sure, it's expensive to "tail" someone and find out where they go
and who they meet, but it's less than trivial to set up a discreet camera
that just watches a stationary kiosk all day long or maybe photographically
or electromagnetically (with a moderately sophisticated bug) monitor the
keystrokes. Maybe you _could_ make them portable and move them around; maybe
you _could_ come up with a clever physical design that would preclude
keystroke photography (but bugs?), but any such defenses would pale in
comparison with the Privacy inherent in the WB input from a single user's
personal system.

"Public Privacy:" now _there's_ an oxymoron for the 90's! All jocularity
aside, it would be pretty difficult to convince anyone with serious
information on Govt abuses to stroll into a Mall and spill their guts on a PC
Junior in a plywood box - I sure as hell wouldn't, would you? Hell, you could
put touchscreens on it and I STILL wouldn't take the chance. Anyone ever seen
the "Human Jukebox" in SF? A guy dresses up in a huge cardboard refrigerator
shipping box and when you drop a quarter in, he plays (on trumpet) some
selection from a list on the outside. Very funny stuff: I suggest you ask for
"Strangers in the Night."

[3] Strike Three (yer OUT!): those ugly little plastic-encased keyboards get
all that icky finger dirt on 'em. Sure you laugh NOW, but just IMAGINE where
people put their fingers before typing on them little keyboards. Yuck! Think
of the diseases! The nose pickings! The leftover popcorn-butter residue! The
Jeri-Curl! Yeesh... makes me wanna HURL.

But Serially, Folks:
If a group COULD surmount these difficulties, it would then have to begin to
focus on the TYPE of whistleblowing that would take place on such systems. I
have the feeling that they would be a PRIMARY contributor to the overall
bullshit noise that would clutter up a decent WB systems and exponentially
increase the difficulty of filtering out the "good" stuff for proper use.
Sure, you could rely on OTP's to provide relatively secure transmissions, but
the big question is: do we really want a bunch of Valley Girls at the local
Mall logging in and complaining that they "can't get the proper shade of
eyeliner and, like, why doesn't the Federal Govurnmint toe-tully reform the
Health In-fersure-ance System" so they could, like, get the bunyons burned
off their right foot in time for the Prom. I think you get my point.

We have a ot more to work on before I consider this to be a desirable, much
less viable, idea.

  dave

  ------------------------------------------------
  |                                              |
  |  no fancy-dan sig-stamps, just li'l ol' me.  |
  |                                              |
  ------------------------------------------------




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Aviel David Rubin <rubin@citi.umich.edu>
Date: Fri, 9 Apr 93 09:03:17 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Speed of RSA
Message-ID: <9304091603.AA23216@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Does anyone have anything on the speed of RSA encryption for
various key lengths on various machines?

In particular, I am interested in how long it takes to decrypt
mail headers on an IBM rt or RS6000, for various key lengths.
I'm sure this has been measured. Any help would be appreicated.
Thanks.

Avi Rubin




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: nowhere@bsu-cs.bsu.edu (Chael Hall)
Date: Fri, 9 Apr 93 11:01:37 PDT
To: vanam@shadow.ksu.ksu.edu (Stephen Lee(Second son of Caine))
Subject: Re: Help, please.
In-Reply-To: <9304082217.AA07305@shadow.ksu.ksu.edu>
Message-ID: <9304091805.AA18414@bsu-cs.bsu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>
>I am very new to the world of hacking... Could you all give me a hand
>understanding...(aka suggested reading and helpful tips for a newbie.)
>
>Thanx in advance
>
>Stephen

Stephen,

     I would strongly suggest _Hackers_ by Steven Levy (ISBN: 0-440-13405-6).
After you have read this book, you will have a very good understanding of
what true hacking is (versus all of the new "meanings.")  After that, perhaps
the _Hacker Crackdown_ by Bruce Sterling (?).  Then after that, you pretty
much choose your own course...  If you want to get into MSDOS programming,
you will get lots of interrupt listings, disassemblers, etc.  If you want to
get into UNIX programming, you will get lots of UNIX books, recompile your
kernel a few times, etc.  :)  Hacking is a very personal experience for me,
and usually I'm hacking.  The term is defined as "learning by trial and
error."  You can hack a car if you get the manual, sit down, and just start
fiddling until you get it right.

     Incidentally, psychology backs up hacking as a good method for learning,
because operant conditioning (where when you are on the right track, you
start getting positive responses [rewards], so you go in that direction, and
when you eventually get it right, you will remember how you got there) is
known to be a strong teaching tool.  For example, your program isn't working,
but when you add a particular statement to the code, it starts to behave,
but the results aren't right.  So you follow in that vein of thinking and
soon enough the whole thing is fixed (aside from new undocumented features.)
I thought that psychology would come in handy sometime...

Chael

--
Chael Hall
nowhere@bsu-cs.bsu.edu, 00CCHALL@BSUVC.BSU.EDU
(317) 285-3648 after 5 pm EST




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: nowhere@bsu-cs.bsu.edu (Chael Hall)
Date: Fri, 9 Apr 93 11:19:08 PDT
To: greg@ideath.goldenbear.com (Greg Broiles)
Subject: Re: Real-time BBS Encryption??
In-Reply-To: <PXBP2B1w164w@ideath.goldenbear.com>
Message-ID: <9304091815.AA19210@bsu-cs.bsu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


[ Info on offline readers ]

>I haven't fussed around with offline readers much, but I'll bet it'd be 
>pretty simple to add a step to the collection/.ZIP process, which would 
>encrypt the whole package with some prearranged key.

     Yes, that's a definite possibility.  Most of the popular offline
readers require that you first send them a packet (usually empty) so that
they will put you in the database.  The reader could just accept a certain
file (pubkey.asc for example) that contains the key you want to be used.
Then all sessions with you will be so encrypted.  Your mail to the BBS could
also be encrypted with the BBS's public key.  Unfortunately, one problem
still exists:  I don't know of too many BBS's where the e-mail messages are
actually encrypted on the disk.  As a matter of fact, the SYSOP can usually
read all mail.

>This would allow folks to use standard BBS programs, standard terminal 
>programs, and perhaps even standard offline readers. It should be pretty 
>simple from a programming standpoint, as well; it's perhaps implementable 
>with only batch commands. Yes, the "bad guys" will get to watch the user log 
>on and log off, and can read the menus and choices - but so what? It's 
>possible (easy, really) to encrypt all of the really interesting stuff.

     Some of those programs (MegaMail, TomCat, etc) run PKUNZIP to unzip the
file(s) then take care of the files themselves.  There isn't an easy way to
throw in encryption.  I would be willing to add an encryption option to my
offline mail software, though.  I have written a UTI (Universal Text
Interface) for ChaelBoard that lets it interface with RelayNet(tm) and
offline mail readers that use UTI's.  I also write a QWK/REP interface that
allows  ChaelBoard to be a node (the hub software isn't quite done yet) on
WildNet and for offline mail reading/replying.  I could implement encryption
in the ZIP/UNZIP step (for the users who have PGP keys registered with the
BBS).

     Do you think it's worth my time?

Chael Hall

--
Chael Hall
nowhere@bsu-cs.bsu.edu, 00CCHALL@BSUVC.BSU.EDU
(317) 285-3648 after 5 pm EST




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: rustman@netcom.com (Rusty Hodge)
Date: Sat, 10 Apr 93 22:43:25 PDT
To: 0005857625@mcimail.com (Michael McMahon)
Subject: Re: Real-time BBS Encryption??
In-Reply-To: <01930407174710/0005857625DC2EM@mcimail.com>
Message-ID: <9304110543.AA26230@netcom.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> Here's the situation:  We all know that some advanced computer systems
> have real-time encryption built into all modem connections.  When a 
> bank branch dials into the main office the entire transmission may be
> encrypted.  This occurs even between terminal connections and the host.

This is usually accomplished through an external "data encryption unit",
which is interfaced between the terminal (host) and modem. It is NOT in
software.

> I'm wondering if there is a way to do this with PCs? 

Aside from those very expensive high-end boxes that banks use for
their sensative information, there was a DES encryptor made by Practical
Peripherals years ago.  It still may be available.
-- 




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: norm@netcom.com (Norman Hardy)
Date: Sun, 11 Apr 93 00:18:32 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: REMAIL: cypherpunks strategy
Message-ID: <9304110718.AA19161@netcom4.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


In-Reply-To: <26H11B1w164w@ideath.goldenbear.com>
I just got around to Greg Broiles interesting note where he describes
his practice of using several account names. He feels apologetic about it.
Authors have used pen-names for a long time without opprobrium.
The mathematician Eric Temple Bell wrote science fiction under the pen name
"John Taine". Several authors have written different styles of works,
one pen name per style. As I understand the law there is nothing illegal
in using an alias as long as the purpose is not fraud, which is already
illegal. One must protect the reputation of each alias.
Where aliases are common negative reputations loose their bite but the
benefits of positive reputations provide incentives for good behavior.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: mike@EGFABT.ORG (Mike Sherwood)
Date: Mon, 12 Apr 93 12:14:20 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: REMAIL: cypherpunks strategy
In-Reply-To: <9304110718.AA19161@netcom4.netcom.com>
Message-ID: <XTsu2B2w165w@EGFABT.ORG>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


norm@netcom.com (Norman Hardy) writes:

> I just got around to Greg Broiles interesting note where he describes
> his practice of using several account names. He feels apologetic about it.
> Authors have used pen-names for a long time without opprobrium.
> The mathematician Eric Temple Bell wrote science fiction under the pen name
> "John Taine". Several authors have written different styles of works,
> one pen name per style. As I understand the law there is nothing illegal
> in using an alias as long as the purpose is not fraud, which is already
> illegal. One must protect the reputation of each alias.
> Where aliases are common negative reputations loose their bite but the
> benefits of positive reputations provide incentives for good behavior.

How does everyone else feel about the idea of maintaining multiple 
accounts as a method of maintaining pseudo-anonymity?  I commonly use two 
accounts on each of my systems, one by my real name, one by my alias, 
which is the same everywhere.  The purpose of this is to allow me to send 
or recieve mail to/from people who I know from other bbs's and such and 
relay information in that way without giving them my real name.  as greg 
pointed out, it's very easy to have multiple accounts; some of us run 
sites that give us the ability to create pseudo-users, and pseudo-sites 
for that matter, and others can make use of public bbs's with net access. 
I know of a few bbs's in my area (silicon valley) that offer net access 
and don't do any sort of validation, making it very simple to set up and 
maintain multiple accounts.  How do people feel about doing something 
like this rather than using remailers since it seems that a lot of 
problems come up when people run remailers and start getting complaints?
-Mike

--
Mike Sherwood
internet: mike@EGFABT.ORG     uucp: ...!sgiblab!egfabt!mike





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: stig@netcom.com (Jonathan Stigelman)
Date: Mon, 12 Apr 93 12:27:09 PDT
To: vanam@shadow.ksu.ksu.edu)
Subject: Help, please.
In-Reply-To: <9304082217.AA07305@shadow.ksu.ksu.edu>
Message-ID: <9304120053.AA11205@netcom2.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Not that I'm exactly of godlike hacking proportions, but these are obvious
to me....  

	patience, persistance, obsessiveness, curiousity

also, there's no such thing as a dumb question, but it's not terribly
difficult to ask questions in the wrong place and,thereby, waste other
people's time and piss them off.  Your question isn't terribly appropriate
to the cypherpunks list and it's so amazingly general that you won't get
anything but a general answer.

the most important thing about being a hacker is working with other
hackers.  Despite common misperceptions, hacking is a social thing.

	stig




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: stig@netcom.com (Jonathan Stigelman)
Date: Mon, 12 Apr 93 11:50:17 PDT
To: greg@ideath.goldenbear.com
Subject: Real-time BBS Encryption??
In-Reply-To: <PXBP2B1w164w@ideath.goldenbear.com>
Message-ID: <9304120103.AA11884@netcom2.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>I haven't fussed around with offline readers much, but I'll bet it'd be
>pretty simple to add a step to the collection/.ZIP process, which would
>encrypt the whole package with some prearranged key.

that's vulnerable...it's the secret key problem.  The ELEGANT way to do
this with encription is to just make a normal ZIP file, but then build
diffie-hellman into your file downloader (zmodem).  This is also the least
work solution.

SO, since we're talking about offline mail readers...  Whats the best one
for the PC that works (or can easily be made to work) with rfc822 mail
files?  There's pcelm, which sucks...and there's mush, which is slooooow
as hell because of all the overlays.  I was writing my own, but I got
side-tracked...somebody want to save me some programming?







From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: J. Michael Diehl <mdiehl@triton.unm.edu>
Date: Mon, 12 Apr 93 11:15:54 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: how secure is secring.pgp?
Message-ID: <9304120127.AA06741@triton.unm.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Yet another pgp question... We don't get any pgp news groups here.

Since we need a passphrase to access our secret key, it is reasonable to think
that our secring.pgp file is pretty secure, as long as our passphrase is 
notrivial.  What am I missing here?

Thanx in advance.

+----------------------+----------------------------------------------------+
| J. Michael Diehl ;-) |  I thought I was wrong once.  But, I was mistaken. |
|                      +----------------------------------------------------+
| mdiehl@triton.unm.edu| "I'm just looking for the opportunity to be        |
| Thunder@forum        |            Politically Incorrect!                  |
| (505) 299-2282       |                        <me>                        |
+----------------------+----------------------------------------------------+




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: sdw@sdwsys.lig.net (Stephen D. Williams)
Date: Mon, 12 Apr 93 11:20:59 PDT
To: hughes@soda.berkeley.edu (Eric Hughes)
Subject: Re: Distributed anonymous posting (was Re: Many Important Items...)
In-Reply-To: <9303260725.AA23290@soda.berkeley.edu>
Message-ID: <9304120045.AA13308@sdwsys.lig.net>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


...
> 
> A soft node necessity: a directory lookup service, distributed,
> sharing data.  Merely specifying the first point of contact and
> alternate paths doesn't cut it.  You don't want to have to retry a
> bounced message so many times.
> 
> Who here knows enough about sendmail to consider the eventual
> feasibility of integrating pseudonym lookup into mail transfer?
> 
> Eric

Hey, no problem!

Just use the same escape call as the uucp pathalias.

When integrating an Internet/DNS aware gateway with 1200 Unix workstations
using /etc/hosts (no domain) and an X.400 connection to a VMS X.400 backbone,
I hooked in a little C program that converted all the addressing to proper
formats while also looking up userid's <-> fullnames in a B+tree database.
I even did fuzzy matching on names on a best-unique or exact basis.

Blew away X.500 functionality, which Dec and HP didn't even have integrated
with X.400 at the time.

Just need a program that takes an address on the command line and returns
it possibly modified with a yey or ney return code.

sdw




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: norm@netcom.com (Norman Hardy)
Date: Mon, 12 Apr 93 10:54:32 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Trusting PGP
Message-ID: <9304120442.AA28271@netcom2.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


   At last I have read the operating instructions for PGP 2.2. I am impressed. 
I raised the issue of trusting PGP. John Draper correctly suggested that 
it was possible to trust PGP because the code was available for inspection.   
I agree that this places PGP far ahead of various competition regarding trust. 
I propose, however, that if there were a single specification that 
covered various file formats and perhaps program logic, that PGP would 
eventually gain substantially more trust. Here is why.
 
As it is now, someone who reads the code to establish his trust in PGP must be 
familiar with C, in which PGP is written, number theory and various crypto 
threats and weaknesses. There are certainly such people. If, however, there 
were one operating specification then many more people would be attracted to 
the effort, ultimately yielding greater trust in PGP. Cryptographers without 
the skill or tenacity to read the code could contribute, as could programmers 
without the crypto theory. Each class would consult the specs, the programmers 
to verify that the code implemented the specs and the cryptographers to ponder 
whether programs with such specs were appropriate for their market.
 
Such specifications are required for government rated secure software for just 
this reason.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: miron@extropia.wimsey.com (Miron Cuperman)
Date: Mon, 12 Apr 93 10:54:16 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Modem encryption proposal
In-Reply-To: <01930407174710_0005857625DC2EM@mcimail.com>
Message-ID: <1993Apr12.030810.5488@extropia.wimsey.bc.ca>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

Let's talk less and do more. :)

How about adding encryption to kermit and iScreen so that they may
talk to each other in a secure manner?  I am proposing these two
programs because they are widely portable.  kermit works on most
Unix and MSDOS systems.  iScreen works on most Unix systems.

(Note that this would solve the network/modem eavesdropping problem,
but not the untrusted remote system problem.  The latter has no
solution in my opinion.  You just have to trust the sysadmin.)

I propose writing a link encryption library which could be usable
in other comm and BBS programs.

Any takers?

BTW, watch for an encrypted Unix talk program coming to a ftp site
near you.
- -- 
        Miron Cuperman <miron@extropia.wimsey.com> | NeXTmail/Mime ok
                                                   | Public key avail
        AMIX: MCuperman                            | PSM 18Mar93 0/0
Laissez faire, laissez passer. Le monde va de lui meme.

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.2

iQCVAgUBK8jc6pNxvvA36ONDAQEJlAP9HYJ94Ll7H0YHr5tNj3Kp3xQ8WRryyO2W
BNLKYhBvoPapNMZ/4mPiPSgVZw8Tu/JXFdVtbhhA2Q7u8ef7+daf2g/fyi4M1Mb4
0a9+AKjDG6FvwMMo4AjlqTG1x0+Xl/YeizBqD1hVW/2pAu3I7IyvZavWY2HkVwwD
tTDfiOSIxVk=
=zhoD
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: edgar@spectrx.Saigon.COM (Edgar W. Swank)
Date: Mon, 12 Apr 93 10:29:20 PDT
To: Cypherpunks          <cypherpunks@toad.com>
Subject: PGP: Re: PGP Error
Message-ID: <w66V2B3w165w@spectrx.saigon.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

Michael Diehl wrote on April 6:

    When I use the following command line in a batch file, I get a
    Compression/ decompression error.  No files are created.  The
    contents of the batch file is:

    pgp -es %1 %2 Diehl

    Where %1 is the name of the file to send, and %2 is the other
    person's name.

    What am I doing wrong, or is ther a problem with my pgp?

I think there's a problem with PGP.  A net-friend of mine in Poland
first brought this to my attention.  He says he's already notified PGP
author Branko Lankester.  The problem's occurance seems to depend on
the file being compressed/encrypted.  Files which are already
compressed, but are not ZIP files (e.g.  ARJ files) seem to cause the
problem.  I was able to reproduce a similar problem by trying to
compress ARJ.EXE (ARJ 2.30).  In my case, the system crashed shortly
- -after- PGP exited, and some of the armored files produced (I used
- -eas) were obviously messed up.

The obvious temporary bypass is to turn off compression for files
which cause problems; not much of a penalty, since the file is already
compressed. This can be done by a (temporary) change to the CONFIG.TXT
file.  I think there may also be an (undocumented) way to do this from
the command line. Try:

  +compress=off

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.2

iQCVAgUBK8YEFN4nNf3ah8DHAQH1IgP9E0gvLSF2DQ5dkVcyXGGLZa4+bCcZ0kOM
TefqfqFZLjU4MvOPMzXzkB01aDpg1IUyfExJazNjADCrbJKqFoZymyhuB+X6KMmy
faTyFGsCeNcpA5x897qwsD/M7zM3j7EVauctAjNBTM9t/34eTuaYuesPPBmEaUcS
yp7J1VOvbWM=
=8+bK
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

--
edgar@spectrx.saigon.com (Edgar W. Swank)
SPECTROX SYSTEMS +1.408.252.1005  Silicon Valley, Ca





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Eric Hughes <hughes@soda.berkeley.edu>
Date: Mon, 12 Apr 93 09:53:09 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Security Dynamics
In-Reply-To: <ofl_2sj0Bwx29UQucJ@transarc.com>
Message-ID: <9304121649.AA26494@soda.berkeley.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Re: security dynamics 

One could perform an interesting test with one of these Security
Dynamics card.

Aim a video camera at the LCD display so that the display takes up the
full width of the image.  Hook the video signal up to a digitizer
board, and recognize the numbers that appear on the face.  Spit them
out as often as they appear.  For someone with all the equipment, this
should be a one or two evening hack.

Now, if the number changes every minute, that's a little over 10,000
samples in a week, certainly enough to determine if they are using
weak random number generation.

I'll put the data on the ftp site, should anyone actually do this.

Eric




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Eric Hughes <hughes@soda.berkeley.edu>
Date: Mon, 12 Apr 93 10:17:28 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: FWEE!: kiosks
In-Reply-To: <9304081930.tn48662@aol.com>
Message-ID: <9304121714.AA28356@soda.berkeley.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Dave writes on public kiosks:
>[1] Strike One: Installation and maintenance costs (economics again). 
>[They are too high.]

I'm not talking about building a network of machines just for the
purpose of whistleblowing.  I'm talking about making interfaces to
existing systems.  In particular, the public machines at sfnet would
_also_ be interfaces to any whistleblowing system.  The incremental
cost is minimal; it's a small bit of software at the server.

>[2] Strike Two: Lack of Privacy while using the kiosks. 

There is a different kind of privacy in a public space than in private
space.  In a private space, everyone may know where you live, but
nobody knows what goes on inside.  In a public space, everyone may see
what happens, but no one knows who you are.  Please consider these
approximations to reality.

In particular, since it is anonymity which is desired, a public place
is sufficient.

>I think Eric Hughes' argument (with due respects to Eric) about the
>expensive economics of monitoring the kiosks falls down just a tad
>when you consider that these would not even be _moving targets_!

The cost of placing a video camera to monitor a computer inside a
coffeehouse must also include the possibility of negative publicity
and lawsuit when such an emplacement is discovered.  Monitoring a
public place in advance of any "crime" being committed is _very_ bad
for job security and department funding.

>[...] but any such defenses would pale in comparison with the Privacy
>inherent in the WB input from a single user's personal system.

I am also not talking about replacing the ability to post from home.
I am talking about expanding the number of entry points into the
distribution system.

The largest benefit for public-space access is that you can use this
if you don't have a computer at home.  You can also use it if you
don't have a computer at work.

>have the feeling that they would be a PRIMARY contributor to the overall
>bullshit noise that would clutter up a decent WB systems and exponentially
>increase the difficulty of filtering out the "good" stuff for proper use.

A whistleblower system, by default, must be free of judgements about
what is "good" to be on it and what is "bad".  If someone thinks that
something ought to be brought to light, then I say let them speak, no
matter how trivial or inappropriate it might be.

It is easy to ignore messages you don't want to consider.  It is much,
much harder to read messages that the author hesistates to write for
fear of reprisal.  A whistleblower system can tolerate more noise than
usenet, since the core content of it can be so extremely valuable.

If there is only access to a whistleblowing system for those who own
computers or are provided access to them, then any such system will
remain only a tool of the wealthy.  You do not hear of abuses in labor
law from anybody but the employees; these employees do not have
computers.

Anybody who has NATIONAL SECRETS to tell is, I would guess, a fool to
post twice from a particular location.  Anybody who has anything
lengthy or digitally copied to say cannot easily use this system.
It's not conducive to digital signatures.

Public kiosks are not a panacea.  To argue that they should therefore
not exist is nonsense.

Eric




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Eric Hughes <hughes@soda.berkeley.edu>
Date: Mon, 12 Apr 93 11:57:22 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: a new usenet group
Message-ID: <9304121854.AA06143@soda.berkeley.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


There is a new Usenet group that some on this list might be interested
in.  It's called

	alt.privacy.anon-server

This group seems to have been created as a spillover for the debate on
anonymity in news.admin.policy.  My nntp server has seen less than 100
articles to date.

I would encourage those in this group who have strong opinions to
participate in this new forum, as it seems the advocates of strong
privacy are not so numerous as they are here.

Eric




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: david@staff.udc.upenn.edu (R. David Murray)
Date: Mon, 12 Apr 93 11:10:31 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: forward: cryptanalysis talk abstract
Message-ID: <9304121808.AA14458@staff.udc.upenn.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Thought people might find this abstract of a talk being given here at
Penn of some interest.  Please let me know if I'm wrong <grin>.
(And, no, I won't be attending; almost all of it would be over my head.
What is in this abstract is probably as much of it as I could understand
without considerable preparation <grin>).

------------------------------------------------------------------------
In article <119753@netnews.upenn.edu>, holland@central.cis.upenn.edu (Billie Holland) writes:
> 
> 	   Statistical Techniques for Language Recognition:
> 	An Introduction and Empirical Study for Cryptanalysts
> 
> 			   Alan T. Sherman
> 		     Computer Science Department
> 	       University of Maryland Baltimore County
> 
> In cryptanalysis, how can a computer program recognize when it has
> discovered all or part of the secret message?  For example, how can a
> program recognize character strings such as ``Attack at dawn!'',
> ``DES@RT ST\&RM'', or ``?tta????t d?wn'' as fragments of intelligible
> messages?  In the early days of cryptology a human would perform these
> language-recognition tasks manually.  In this talk I will explain how
> to recognize language automatically with statistical techniques.
> 
> Statistical techniques provide powerful tools for solving several
> language-recognition problems that arise in cryptanalysis and other
> domains.  Language recognition is important in cryptanalysis because,
> among other applications, an exhaustive key search of any cryptosystem
> from ciphertext alone requires a test that recognizes valid plaintext.
> Although I will focus on cryptanalysis, this talk should be relevant
> to anyone interested in statistical inference on Markov chains or
> applied language recognition.
> 
> Modeling language as a finite stationary Markov process, I will adapt
> a statistical model of pattern recognition to language recognition.
> Within this framework I will consider four well-defined
> language-recognition problems: 1) recognizing a known language, 2)
> distinguishing a known language from uniform noise, 3) distinguishing
> unknown 0th-order noise from unknown 1st-order language, and 4)
> detecting non-uniform unknown language.  For the second problem I will
> give a most powerful test based on the Neyman-Pearson Lemma.  For the
> other problems, which typically have no uniformly most powerful tests,
> I will give likelihood ratio tests.  I will also discuss the
> chi-squared test statistic $X^2$ and the Index of Coincidence $IC$.
> 
> In addition, I will present the results of computer experiments that
> characterize the distributions of five test statistics when applied to
> strings of various lengths drawn from nine types of real and simulated
> English.
> 
> 
> This is joint work with Ravi Ganesan.  Most of this work was carried
> out while Sherman was a member of the Institute for Advanced Computer
> Studies, University of Maryland College Park.
> 
> 			Thursday, 15 April 93
>                         TOWNE BUILDING - 337
> 			     3:00 - 4:30
> 

-- 
david			david@staff.udc.upenn.edu




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Perry E. Metzger" <pmetzger@shearson.com>
Date: Mon, 12 Apr 93 12:24:30 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Modem encryption proposal
In-Reply-To: <1993Apr12.030810.5488@extropia.wimsey.bc.ca>
Message-ID: <9304121904.AA01126@snark.shearson.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Miron Cuperman says:

> Let's talk less and do more. :)
> 
> How about adding encryption to kermit and iScreen so that they may
> talk to each other in a secure manner?  I am proposing these two
> programs because they are widely portable.  kermit works on most
> Unix and MSDOS systems.  iScreen works on most Unix systems.
> 
> (Note that this would solve the network/modem eavesdropping problem,
> but not the untrusted remote system problem.  The latter has no
> solution in my opinion.  You just have to trust the sysadmin.)
> 
> I propose writing a link encryption library which could be usable
> in other comm and BBS programs.

A good idea, but getting the protocol right is hard -- you don't want
to put any real overhead on the line, but you also want to do error
detection and resychronization so that your cypher will run properly.
Discussing a proposal for a line protocol that has these features
would, of course, be germane to the list.

Perry




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: vanam@interceptor.ksu.ksu.edu (Stephen Lee(Second son of Caine))
Date: Mon, 12 Apr 93 15:35:48 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Thanks a lot!!!!!
Message-ID: <9304122235.AA01870@interceptor.ksu.ksu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Thank for your answers and any other help for a beginer
would be helpful...

But to all that answered Thanks again...

Stephen






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Derek Atkins <warlord@Athena.MIT.EDU>
Date: Mon, 12 Apr 93 19:36:55 PDT
To: J. Michael Diehl <mdiehl@triton.unm.edu>
Subject: Re: how secure is secring.pgp?
In-Reply-To: <9304120127.AA06741@triton.unm.edu>
Message-ID: <9304130236.AA01768@hodge>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

> Since we need a passphrase to access our secret key, it is
> reasonable to think that our secring.pgp file is pretty secure, as
> long as our passphrase is notrivial.  What am I missing here?

The secret key on the secring.pgp is IDEA-encrypted... So, it is only
as strong as IDEA, and your passphrase.

To break the security, someone needs to be able to:
	1) Obtain your secret keyring.. This is either watching it
go over the net, reading the file system, borrowing your floppy, or
whatever, and
	2) Obtain your secret passphrase...

Only when both are accomplished can they get to your secret key,
although once they have accomplished #1, they can try to break the
IDEA algorithm...

- -derek

PGP 2 key available upon request on the key-server:
	pgp-public-keys@toxicwaste.mit.edu
- --
  Derek Atkins, MIT '93, Electrical Engineering and Computer Science
     Secretary, MIT Student Information Processing Board (SIPB)
           MIT Media Laboratory, Speech Research Group
           warlord@MIT.EDU       PP-ASEL        N1NWH

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.2

iQBuAgUBK8onIzh0K1zBsGrxAQHn0QLECpGbaKS3PpXdJTE0956AkeaYGuZGATJ3
Jgq7I/cEB5l2e3PPr31xdctywTi/+RBIKOJEVokPO9UMsu5KQvwngHta7NeYF8UB
qS3wPDH85ro60H4fFsg/s6E=
=4s7l
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Marc Horowitz <marc@GZA.COM>
Date: Mon, 12 Apr 93 20:01:11 PDT
To: Eric Hughes <hughes@soda.berkeley.edu>
Subject: Re: Security Dynamics
In-Reply-To: <9304121649.AA26494@soda.berkeley.edu>
Message-ID: <9304130302.AA02654@pad-thai.aktis.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>> Now, if the number changes every minute, that's a little over 10,000
>> samples in a week, certainly enough to determine if they are using
>> weak random number generation.

1) not true.  I read an article about a pseudorandom number generator
which appeared random to every test they used on it.  Then they went
and did a monte carlo simulation of something based on that prng.
Guess what?  It wasn't quite random enough.  Lesson: it can be *very*
hard to determine randomness.

2) The sequence is not random.  It is cryptographically pseudorandom.
This is very different.

3) A friend who has a significant math background in crypto stuff has
seen the Security Dynamics algorithms (under non-disclosure), and says
that they're credible.  That vouches for their theory.  That they
insist on programming the cards and keeping the keys themselves, and
that they do not allow you to program the cards yourself, is a major
problem, no matter how good their math is.

		Marc




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: karn@qualcomm.com (Phil Karn)
Date: Mon, 12 Apr 93 23:36:15 PDT
To: hughes@soda.berkeley.edu
Subject: Re:  FWEE!: kiosks
Message-ID: <9304130636.AA27437@servo>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Eric's comment about the complementary natures of a public kiosk and
a person's home suggests a hybrid whistleblowing scheme that combines
the best of both. The whistleblower creates his file in the privacy
of his own home on a floppy disk, encrypts it in the public key of
the whistleblowing system, and carries it to a public kiosk where he
sends it.

This gives the whistleblower plenty of time and quite a bit of privacy
as he composes his message (unless the PTB have bugged his home
computer, a possibility for a suspected repeat "offender"). The
step of physically carrying his file to the kiosk eliminates anything
that could be done to the whistleblower's phone (including traffic
analysis), although it would not stop physical surveillance of the
whistleblower.

And if the whistleblower is accosted on his way to the kiosk, all they
could seize would be the ciphertext of his message, encrypted in the
public key of the whistleblowing service -- which the whistleblower
himself would not be able to decrypt even if he wanted to.

Think of the kiosk more as a public mailbox than a public phone.

Phil




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: karn@qualcomm.com (Phil Karn)
Date: Tue, 13 Apr 93 00:21:26 PDT
To: pmetzger@lehman.com
Subject: Re: Modem encryption proposal
Message-ID: <9304130721.AA29941@servo>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Crypto synchronization seems to be a problem mainly in real-time
appliations like digital voice, where you don't have a reliable
protocol underneath you.

I advocate two approaches that don't seem to have been pursued much
yet, at least in the Internet: per-packet encryption (and possibly)
authentication) just above the IP layer, and stream encryption just
above TCP.

The former technique has the advantage of denying your adversary the
maximum amount of information, because only the IP header is in the
clear.  The transport header and all user data is protected, so an
eavesdropper can't tell which applications are communicating. And with
IP-in-IP encapsulation, you can even deny him knowledge about which
machines are actually communicating - a network-level service
analogous to anonymous remailers. With authentication, network level
security also provides good protection against replay attacks.

The latter technique (encrypting above TCP) has the advantage of being
more efficient (it doesn't break Van Jacobson TCP/IP header
compression), which may make it desirable for some interactive
sessions. This is essentially how encrypted Kerberos Telnet works now,
although I would like to generalize the service to work with any TCP
client.

Phil






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: karn@qualcomm.com (Phil Karn)
Date: Tue, 13 Apr 93 01:15:15 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Security Dynamics
Message-ID: <9304130815.AA00379@servo>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Several years ago, before leaving Bellcore, I got so annoyed at the
SecurID cards and how they were being foisted on us by a paranoid
security organization that I built an alternative one-time password
system of my own. It's now called "S/KEY" (no, I didn't pick the name).

Essentially, I reinvented a scheme of Leslie Lamport involving iterated
one way functions. Each time you log in, you crunch your password
N-1 times through a one-way function like MD4 or MD5, where N is the
number of times you did it last time. The host crunches it once more
(to make its password file somewhat less sensitive) and compares it to
the stored password. If it matches, the file is updated and you get in.

A passive eavesdropper cannot generate the next password in the
sequence from the current one because that would require inverting the
one-way function.

The nice thing about this scheme is that it provides essentially the
same service as SecurID (protection against passive eavesdropping of
user passwords) without having to pay exhorbitant prices for cards and
integrating some really clunky hardware into your host. You have the
option of building the algorithm into your own comm programs, or even
the ultra-low-tech option of printing out a list in advance and
putting it in your wallet. (Use rice paper if you fear capture - you
can eat it!  :-))

The bad thing about this scheme is that it provides no more protection
than SecurID -- it doesn't stop someone from hijacking your session
after you've authenticated it, nor does it protect the session itself
against eavesdropping.  And frankly, at the time I was more concerned
about the security droids reading my email off the Ethernet than I was
about some outside cracker guessing my password.

Phil




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Peter Honeyman <honey@citi.umich.edu>
Date: Mon, 12 Apr 93 22:17:12 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Security Dynamics
Message-ID: <9304130517.AA24164@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>               I read an article about a pseudorandom number generator
> which appeared random to every test they used on it.  Then they went
> and did a monte carlo simulation of something based on that prng.
> Guess what?  It wasn't quite random enough.  Lesson: it can be *very*
> hard to determine randomness.

if this is the phys. rev. let. paper by ferenburg et al., there's a
postscript copy up for ftp in csp2.csp.uga.edu:/pub/documents/amf1/. 
i can summarize.

their simulations were based on five to ten runs, with 10^7 updates
per run.  they aren't precise about the exact number of random
numbers needed, at least not in this paper, but i assume it's in the
order of one per update, in which case 10,000 would not be enough.
more info can be gleaned from the paper in /pub/documents/adler3/.

they compared four basic rngs.

a linear congruential algorithm (cong)

	x[n] = (16807 * x[n-1]) mod 2^31-1

two different shift register algorithms (sr250 and sr1279)

	x[n] = x[n-103] xor x[n-250]
	x[n] = x[n-103] xor x[n-1279]

a subtract with carry generator algorithm (swc)

	x[n] = x[n-22] - x[n-43] - c
	if x[n] < 0 {
		x[n] += 2^32 - 5
		c = 1
	} else
		c = 0

a combined swc-Weyl generator (swcw)

	y[n] = (y[n-1] - 362436069) mod 2^32
	x[n] = (swc[n] - y[n]) mod 2^32

the authors report that the tables were initialized with some care
(i.e., with cong).  

the result reported in the phys rev let paper is that r250 gave results
that were way off (the model being simulated has an exact solution),
swc was better, but had error in the opposite direction, swcw was
better but still showed signs of bias, and cong was within error limits.
they also report that r1279 was much better than r250, but the tables
are missing from the paper, so ...

on the other hand, using every fifth value from r250 gave results
within error limits.  same with swc.  odd ...

maybe someone can comment on the particular rngs being tested here.
they don't look particularly sophisticated to me, although the authors
describe them as "ostensibly high quality rngs."  hmmm ...

looking over thir recent pubs, it doesn't look like this group (of
statistical physicists) is following up on the rng testing angle.

	peter




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Nickey MacDonald <i6t4@jupiter.sun.csd.unb.ca>
Date: Mon, 12 Apr 93 23:29:09 PDT
To: pmetzger@lehman.com
Subject: Re: Modem encryption proposal
In-Reply-To: <9304121904.AA01126@snark.shearson.com>
Message-ID: <Pine.3.05.9304130307.C27556-b100000@jupiter>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Perry:

I may have missed something, but I don't see where synchronization is a
concern.  The whole of idea of Kermit is to provide a "binary" path
between two computers.  It is Kermit's responsibility to ensure the data
is received in the same order as sent (sychronization is part of the
Kermit protocol, no?).  If we have a data stream coming from
a keyboard or whatever, which we run through an invertable encryption
algorithm, and then pipe it into Kermit which makes sure it gets to the
other side, Kermit need not know where the data is coming from.  The other
side of course has to know the protocol and the key...  I believe that
Kermit allows variable sized packets per file transferred, but does it
allow the packet size to vary during the transfer?  I'd have to go find my
Kermit protocol reference on that one.  You would want this, as well as a
relaxed timing on the protocol, if its to come from the keyboard, as a
user does not (and/or cannot) normally type as a consistant rate...

---
Nick MacDonald               | NMD on IRC
i6t4@jupiter.sun.csd.unb.ca  | PGP 2.1 Public key available via finger


On Mon, 12 Apr 1993, Perry E. Metzger wrote:

> A good idea, but getting the protocol right is hard -- you don't want
> to put any real overhead on the line, but you also want to do error
> detection and resychronization so that your cypher will run properly.
> Discussing a proposal for a line protocol that has these features
> would, of course, be germane to the list.






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Derek Atkins <warlord@Athena.MIT.EDU>
Date: Tue, 13 Apr 93 02:46:14 PDT
To: karn@qualcomm.com (Phil Karn)
Subject: Re: Modem encryption proposal
In-Reply-To: <9304130721.AA29941@servo>
Message-ID: <9304130945.AA02555@hodge>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

> Crypto synchronization seems to be a problem mainly in real-time
> appliations like digital voice, where you don't have a reliable
> protocol underneath you.

Phil, there is more to this than meets the eye.  What happens if I, as
an attacker, start feeding extra characters onto the modem line?
Granted, I wont know what you are saying, since the link is encrypted,
but if I can get an extra character on there, then the decryption will
lose sync, and wont return the proper value...

For example...
	Sender:  	more foo
	Encrypted data:	HaoVwAog

	Received data:	HaooVwAog
	Decrypted:	morOmf&sm

Now what?  The sender and receiver are out of sync....  I believe this
was what Nickey was talking about..  I was discussing this problem
with a few people and haven't come up with a good, viable solution...
yet.

> This is essentially how encrypted Kerberos Telnet works now,
> although I would like to generalize the service to work with any TCP
> client.

Uhh, there is a kstream package somewhere (or am I thinking of
vapor-ware, it's late and I'm tried).  This wouldn't be very hard to
create.  In fact, I was hoping to do something like this with my
Thesis...  Although it might get left for "future work".  This depends
upon having a clearly denoted stream, which neither telnet nor kermit
provide a good interface.  (Trust me on this -- it took me a while to
try to create one for the little I've hacked them for my Thesis).

- -derek

PGP 2 key available upon request on the key-server:
	pgp-public-keys@toxicwaste.mit.edu
- --
  Derek Atkins, MIT '93, Electrical Engineering and Computer Science
     Secretary, MIT Student Information Processing Board (SIPB)
           MIT Media Laboratory, Speech Research Group
           warlord@MIT.EDU       PP-ASEL        N1NWH

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.2

iQBuAgUBK8qLvTh0K1zBsGrxAQG39QLFFn0/Nz1zVRi6kHp+j+R0KAQQlEL6588d
RfSshGGFhuXIJE/S8BP8kqLrKeSeRgSbil3zBLQZNeconnExaq6VUeO5Yvn9U/0S
cHggKYBTlcz1zqjp7BLxLz8=
=TBaq
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Eric Hughes <hughes@soda.berkeley.edu>
Date: Tue, 13 Apr 93 08:15:58 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: FWEE!: kiosks
In-Reply-To: <9304130636.AA27437@servo>
Message-ID: <9304131512.AA13719@soda.berkeley.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>The whistleblower creates his file in the privacy
>of his own home on a floppy disk, encrypts it in the public key of
>the whistleblowing system, and carries it to a public kiosk where he
>sends it.

This is the ideal scenario.  I suspect that kiosks for other purposes
will eventually contain some form of user-available I/O.  I'm guessing
it will be infrared, maybe rs232 serial.  Diskette drives are too
vulnerable and expensive to be feasible in a pay phone environment;
they're called armor phones, and for good reason.  In particular,
sfnet doesn't have diskette access.

No bother, we're not going to create the best system on the first
revision.  A good enough system will drive later systems.

Eric




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Eric Hughes <hughes@soda.berkeley.edu>
Date: Tue, 13 Apr 93 08:18:34 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Security Dynamics
In-Reply-To: <9304130517.AA24164@toad.com>
Message-ID: <9304131515.AA13826@soda.berkeley.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Re: checking distribution in 10^4 samples

>their simulations were based on five to ten runs, with 10^7 updates
>per run.  they aren't precise about the exact number of random
>numbers needed, at least not in this paper, but i assume it's in the
>order of one per update, in which case 10,000 would not be enough.

The method of randomness-checking done here is to run a physical
simulation with the random numbers.  Direct statistical methods are
much more efficient.

Eric




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Eric Hughes <hughes@soda.berkeley.edu>
Date: Tue, 13 Apr 93 08:29:10 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Security Dynamics
In-Reply-To: <9304130302.AA02654@pad-thai.aktis.com>
Message-ID: <9304131525.AA14338@soda.berkeley.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>>> Now, if the number changes every minute, that's a little over 10,000
>>> samples in a week, certainly enough to determine if they are using
>>> weak random number generation.

>1) not true.  I read an article about a pseudorandom number generator
>which appeared random to every test they used on it.  [...] Lesson:
>it can be *very* hard to determine randomness.

The experiment I was proposing would possibly answer 'yes' to the
question "Is the number generation weak?"  It would not say how strong
it was, or even if it was strong.  it would, however, give some lower
bound on its strength or else show that it was in fact not very strong
at all.

>2) The sequence is not random.  It is cryptographically pseudorandom.
>This is very different.

Since we are talking about a device in which a sequence is duplicated
on two ends, I did not feel the need to belabor the difference between
pseudorandom and random.  The context makes it clear that this can't
be a random device based on a physically random process.

>3) A friend who has a significant math background in crypto stuff has
>seen the Security Dynamics algorithms (under non-disclosure), and says
>that they're credible.  

That bit of information may mean that a 10^4 sample test is not worth
doing.

>That vouches for their theory.  

That changes our trust from no trust at all into trust in your friend's
ability and your assessment of it. :-)

>That they
>insist on programming the cards and keeping the keys themselves, and
>that they do not allow you to program the cards yourself, is a major
>problem, no matter how good their math is.

Granted.  Their keeping the keys is worth, say, using a linear
congruential generator (or worse) in terms of overall security.

I was merely curious as to whether they were fools on all fronts, as
opposed just to the secrecy front.

Eric




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Eric Hughes <hughes@soda.berkeley.edu>
Date: Tue, 13 Apr 93 08:41:42 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: how secure is secring.pgp?
In-Reply-To: <9304130236.AA01768@hodge>
Message-ID: <9304131538.AA14939@soda.berkeley.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I've-forgotten-who writes:
>> Since we need a passphrase to access our secret key, it is
>> reasonable to think that our secring.pgp file is pretty secure, as
>> long as our passphrase is notrivial.  What am I missing here?

There are two security items here.  The first is that the secret RSA
key nott be revealed.  The second is that the name attached to that
key pair not be revealed.

Derek writes:
>The secret key on the secring.pgp is IDEA-encrypted... So, it is only
>as strong as IDEA, and your passphrase.

This protection applies to the first criterion--your secret key is not
revealed.  No one can steal your key and impersonate you.

The second datum, name attached to a key, is protected only by one's
sole possession of the secring.pgp file.  If you are using a
pseudonym, and using an RSA signature to enforce it, and doing thing
with this pseudonym that you don't want identified with you, then
you'd better make sure that secring.pgp file is not discovered on your
machine.  The format of the keyring file is such that the name
attached to a key is in the clear.

This is really a huge hole.  Since secret keys are presumed to be in
the possession of only those who actually use the keys, possession of
a secret key on the secring.pgp is tantamount to proof that you are
that pseudonym.

In short: everything about a secret key ring should be encrypted.

A parallel (not as consequential): everything about a public key ring
should be encrypted.

Eric




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Eric Hughes <hughes@soda.berkeley.edu>
Date: Tue, 13 Apr 93 09:02:00 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: forward: cryptanalysis talk abstract
In-Reply-To: <9304121808.AA14458@staff.udc.upenn.edu>
Message-ID: <9304131558.AA16178@soda.berkeley.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>> Language recognition is important in cryptanalysis because,
>> among other applications, an exhaustive key search of any cryptosystem
>> from ciphertext alone requires a test that recognizes valid plaintext.

For exhaustive key search on any reasonably good symmetric cipher
(like DES), some simple entropy measure for n-bit-grams should suffice
to distinguish random from non-random.  These other approaches in this
talk seem like overkill in this context.  But then again, maybe we're
trying to break Enigma. :-)

>> Modeling language as a finite stationary Markov process, 

A finite stationary Markov process is large fancy math-speak for what
a travesty generator does.  "finite" means that the total number of
states is finite, and that means you get to use matrices instead of
kernel integrals, which means that your averagely educated scientist
can follow this.  "stationary" means that the transition matrix is not
a function of time, that is, it's a constant matrix.  This means that
time appears only in an exponent.  A "Markov process" is a transition
from one state to another, probabilistically.  (Approximately.  All
these definitions are meant to explain, not to define.)

The talk looks interesting, to be sure, but it looks more significant
for making a better /etc/magic for file(1) than it does for
cryptanalysis.

Eric




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Perry E. Metzger" <pmetzger@lehman.com>
Date: Tue, 13 Apr 93 07:40:28 PDT
To: Nickey MacDonald <i6t4@jupiter.sun.csd.unb.ca>
Subject: Re: Modem encryption proposal
In-Reply-To: <Pine.3.05.9304130307.C27556-b100000@jupiter>
Message-ID: <9304131439.AA06324@snark.shearson.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Nickey MacDonald says:
> I may have missed something, but I don't see where synchronization is a
> concern.  The whole of idea of Kermit is to provide a "binary" path
> between two computers.  It is Kermit's responsibility to ensure the data
> is received in the same order as sent (sychronization is part of the
> Kermit protocol, no?).

I don't belive people were talking about Kermit the Protocol. They
were talking about Kermit the PD terminal emulation software, which
contains Kermit the Protocol. Obviously the protocol can handle error
correction -- but that does nothing for you if you want to log in to a
machine and do arbitrary things.


Perry




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: eichin@cygnus.com (Mark Eichin)
Date: Tue, 13 Apr 93 11:25:32 PDT
To: warlord@Athena.MIT.EDU
Subject: re: Modem encryption proposal
In-Reply-To: <9304130945.AA02555@hodge>
Message-ID: <9304131825.AA04147@cygnus.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>> Uhh, there is a kstream package somewhere (or am I thinking of
>> vapor-ware, it's late and I'm tried).  This wouldn't be very hard to
	kstream was written by Ken Raeburn of Cygnus as part of our
Cygnus Network Security work (support for Kerberos V4) and was
included in the MIT Kerberos V4 patchlevel 10 "final" release. Our
kerberized rlogin and rcp use it to handle encryption, it cleans up
the code a bit and makes it easier to modify other programs.

				_Mark_ <eichin@athena.mit.edu>
				MIT Student Information Processing Board
				Cygnus Support <eichin@cygnus.com>



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: sean@gomez.Jpl.Nasa.Gov (Sean Barrett)
Date: Tue, 13 Apr 93 16:39:03 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Sign-off
Message-ID: <9304132338.AA15246@gomez.Jpl.Nasa.Gov>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Please remove me from this list.  Thanks.
--
 Sean Barrett                       How many boards would the Mongols
 sean@pugsley.jpl.nasa.gov (fast)    hoard, if the Mongol Hordes got bored?
 sbar@genie.geis.com (reliable)     PGP key by finger or from key servers.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Eric Hughes <hughes@soda.berkeley.edu>
Date: Tue, 13 Apr 93 17:53:45 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: how secure is secring.pgp?
In-Reply-To: <9304132317.AA03404@dun-dun-noodles.aktis.com>
Message-ID: <9304140050.AA03988@soda.berkeley.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I said:
>>> There are two security items here.  The first is that the secret RSA
>>> key not be revealed.  The second is that the name attached to that
>>> key pair not be revealed.

Marc said:
>I may be nitpicking here, but I have to argue.  Although there is a
>relationship, security and privacy are not one and the same.  You have
>named a security item, and a privacy item, not two security items.

As long as we're being precise, allow me to restate my claim.  If you
use a pseudonym with PGP, and you don't want it revealed, and for some
reason it is revealed (through some other security breach), then the
secret ring has a security failure (lack of encryption) which leads to
a breach of privacy.

The lack of encryption is a material cause of the privacy compromise.
As far as I can tell, I was using security to refer to material causes
and Marc was referring to end results.

>I believe that the secring.pgp is secure, for most reasonable
>purposes.  

So do I.  On an encrypted file system, this is not nearly so large an
issue.  

>>> A parallel (not as consequential): everything about a public key ring
>>> should be encrypted.

A point of clarification for below: that's one's own personal copy of
a public key ring.

>[... this] point is
>ludicrous, IMHO.  If it's a public key, why should it be encrypted?
>The whole purpose of a public key is that it can be widely published.

The point of a public key is that someone else can perform an
operation that only you can undo (and vice-versa, properly stated).
Public keys are for anybody that is not you.  This does not mean that
everyone will have them, or even that everyone should have them.  The
social form of fully published keys need not be the norm.

>You could claim that the keyring
>identified the people with whom I talk, but that is easily overcome by
>just keeping a few thousand people on your keyring.  

If this is the only datum available, that would work.  When another
list is available to intersect your keyring with, the attempted
diffusion may fail unexpectedly.

Keeping your identities of your correspondents private (through a
security mechanism on the keyring) is much the same as using some of
the stronger forms of remailers that have been discussed.

Eric




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Marc Horowitz <marc@GZA.COM>
Date: Tue, 13 Apr 93 16:20:28 PDT
To: Eric Hughes <hughes@soda.berkeley.edu>
Subject: Re: how secure is secring.pgp?
In-Reply-To: <9304131538.AA14939@soda.berkeley.edu>
Message-ID: <9304132317.AA03404@dun-dun-noodles.aktis.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>> There are two security items here.  The first is that the secret RSA
>> key nott be revealed.  The second is that the name attached to that
>> key pair not be revealed.

I may be nitpicking here, but I have to argue.  Although there is a
relationship, security and privacy are not one and the same.  You have
named a security item, and a privacy item, not two security items.
For privacy to exist, security may be necessary, but that doens't make
it a security item.  For instance, I trust my roommate to respect my
privacy.  There's no lock on my bedroom door.  He knocks before coming
in if I'm in there.  This is a privacy system based on trust, not on
security.  I'm not proposing this model for the net, don't worry!
(That's Dorothy Denning's job. :-) I'm just pointing out that privacy
can exist without security, given appropriate constraints.  Similarly,
security can exist without privacy:  You can clearsign a message w/o
encrypting it.

>> This is really a huge hole.  Since secret keys are presumed to be in
>> the possession of only those who actually use the keys, possession of
>> a secret key on the secring.pgp is tantamount to proof that you are
>> that pseudonym.

I believe that the secring.pgp is secure, for most reasonable
purposes.  (You can debate this, but I'll just keep changing my
definition of reasonable on you.  So don't bother.)  However, it is
clearly not private.  One could argue that the entire secring.pgp
should be encrypted, and I might even agree with you.  I'll have to
think about it more.

>> In short: everything about a secret key ring should be encrypted.
>> 
>> A parallel (not as consequential): everything about a public key ring
>> should be encrypted.

The former point is probably true.  However, the latter point is
ludicrous, IMHO.  If it's a public key, why should it be encrypted?
The whole purpose of a public key is that it can be widely published.
Encrypting it sort of kills the idea.  If the name<->key mapping on
the public key is protected, it's useless for me to know that key ID
B4B951 signed some message.  I want to know who that person is, or at
least, who they claim to be.  You could claim that the keyring
identified the people with whom I talk, but that is easily overcome by
just keeping a few thousand people on your keyring.  Then the signal
is buried in the noise.  Even if you don't want someone's public key
visible on your own keyring, it's still reasonable for their key to be
published in some "global" directory, in the clear.

		Marc




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Sandy <72114.1712@CompuServe.COM>
Date: Tue, 13 Apr 93 17:27:44 PDT
To: <cypherpunks@toad.com>
Subject: Encrypted Cordless phones
Message-ID: <930414002026_72114.1712_FHF79-1@CompuServe.COM>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


_________________________________________________________________
             FROM THE VIRTUAL DESK OF SANDY SANDFORT
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
At the Bay Area Cypherpunks meeting, I mentioned two cordless
telephones that encrypt between the handset and the base unit.
Here is some information about them.

VTech Tropez 900DX

Transmits signal digitally between handset and base unit on one
of 20 channels in the 900 MHz band.  Automatically selects one of
over 65,000 digital security codes each time handset is returned
to the base unit.  Range is up to 800 meters; with up to 4.5
hours of continuous talk time.  Suggested retail cost is $349.95.
For more information:  Steve Johnson, (503) 643-8981.

PhoneMate 2910

Transmits signal digitally between handset and base unit on one
of 10 channels in the 900 MHz band.  Automatically selects one of
over 1,000 digital security codes each time handset is returned
to the base unit.  Range is up to probably about the same as the
VTech.  No figures are given for talk time.  Suggested retail
price is $219.95.  For more information:  Suzanne Nastaskin,
(310) 314-6649.

Both phones have all the usual advanced features like auto-redial
and such.  Neither company's literature tells what encryption
technology they uses.

 S a n d y
_________________________________________________________________
PLEASE RESPOND TO: ssandfort@attmail.com (except from CompuServe)
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Clark Reynard <clark@metal.psu.edu>
Date: Tue, 13 Apr 93 17:28:43 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: alt.whistleblowers
Message-ID: <9304140125.AA16266@metal.psu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I suggest that as a first step in the process of making alt.whistleblowers
a reality, that we kick around the idea for a while, either here
or on alt.config.  If I receive a positive response, I will
post the control message myself.  

Three possible choices of action:
1) Kick it around on alt.config.
2) Kick it around on news.groups, etc.
3) Kick it around here.
4) Don't even bother kicking it around; just create the group,
   and hell with anyone who doesn't like it.

So, what's the general consensus on the best course of action?
And, yes, I know that was four, and not three possible choices;
it's probably really eight or ten.
----
Robert W. Clark
rclark@nyx.cs.du.edu   PGP signature available by mail or finger




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Eli Brandt <ebrandt@jarthur.Claremont.EDU>
Date: Tue, 13 Apr 93 20:31:51 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Encrypted Cordless phones
In-Reply-To: <930414002026_72114.1712_FHF79-1@CompuServe.COM>
Message-ID: <9304140331.AA27969@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> Both phones have all the usual advanced features like auto-redial
> and such.  Neither company's literature tells what encryption
> technology they uses.

It doesn't much matter; they're using ten- and sixteen-bit keys.  
Assuming it takes some 50 ms to tell voice from the white noise that
a failed attempt will generate, a brute-force attack on these
systems should take under a minute and an hour respectively,
worst-case.  This is hardly rock-solid security; it looks like it
rests mostly on nobody reverse-engineering their algorithm.

>  S a n d y

   Eli   ebrandt@jarthur.claremont.edu




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Joe Thomas <jthomas@access.digex.com>
Date: Tue, 13 Apr 93 19:18:30 PDT
To: Mark <mark@coombs.anu.edu.au>
Subject: Re: alt.whistleblowers
In-Reply-To: <9304140117.AA19145@coombs.anu.edu.au>
Message-ID: <Pine.3.05.9304132251.A8541-a100000@access.digex.net>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


On Wed, 14 Apr 1993, Mark wrote:

> >4) Don't even bother kicking it around; just create the group,
> >   and hell with anyone who doesn't like it.
> 
> We're sposed to be anarchists right? :) 'sides alt.* groups come out daily
> with little or no discussion. Ours wont rock boats, at least in it's creation,
> the content is a different story. Personally I hope it doesnt degenrate into a
> narc fest for people who have grudges against people... that would be sad..
> 
> I vote to just make it. Not all will like it, but then they are maybe the ones
> who will feature in it (great way to shut them up :).

Couldn't hurt to mention it in alt.config.  It would probably get a good
response, and get propagated more widely (some newsadmins are a bit
skeptical about newgroups from out of the blue...)

Joe
--
Joe Thomas <jthomas@access.digex.com>
PGP key available by request or by finger.
PGP key fingerprint:  1E E1 B8 6E 49 67 C4 19  8B F1 E4 9D F0 6D 68 4B







From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Marc Horowitz <marc@GZA.COM>
Date: Tue, 13 Apr 93 20:11:29 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: ["Vinton G. Cerf": Letter to Congress/RSA + DES]
Message-ID: <9304140312.AA23170@pad-thai.aktis.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Vint Cerf is a very well-known and respected person in the Internet
community.  I don't know if his testimony will mean anything, but it's
interesting to read.

		Marc

------- Forwarded Message

To: internauts:;@IETF.CNRI.Reston.VA.US
Subject: Letter to Congress/RSA + DES
Date: Tue, 13 Apr 93 20:26:01 -0400
Sender: cclark@IETF.CNRI.Reston.VA.US
From: "Vinton G. Cerf" <vcerf@CNRI.Reston.VA.US>




Dr. Vinton G. Cerf
3614 Camelot Drive
Annandale, VA 22003-1302

11 April 1993
The Honorable Timothy Valentine
Committee on Science, Space and Technology
Subcommittee on Technology, Environment and Aviation
House of Representatives
Rayburn House Office Building

Dear Chairman Valentine:

I recently had the honor of testifying before the 
Subcommittee on Technology, Environment and Aviation 
during which time Representative Rohrabacher (R, 
California) made the request that I prepare 
correspondence to the committee concerning the 
present US policy on the export of hardware and 
software implementing the Data Encryption Standard 
(DES) and the RSA Public Key encryption algorithm 
(RSA).

As you know, the DES was developed by the National 
Institute for Standards and Technology (NIST) in the 
mid-1970s, based on technology developed by 
Internatonal Business Machines (IBM). The details of 
the algorithm were made widely available to the 
public and considerable opportunity for public 
comment on the technology was offered. In the same 
general time period, two researchers at Stanford 
University (Martin Hellman and Whitfield Diffie) 
published a paper describing the possible existence 
of mathematical functions which, unlike the 
symmetric DES algorithm, could act in a special, 
pairwise fashion to support encryption and 
decryption. These so-called "public key algorithms" 
had the unusual property that one function would 
encrypt and the other decrypt -- differing from the 
symmetric DES in which a single function performs 
both operations. The public key system uses a pair 
of keys, one held private and the other made public. 
DES uses one key which is kept secret by all parties 
using it.

Three researchers at MIT (Rivest, Shamir and 
Adelman) discovered an algorithm which met Hellman 
and Diffie's criteria. This algorithm is now called 
"RSA" in reference to its inventors. The RSA 
technology was patented by Stanford and MIT and a 
company, Public Key Partners (PKP), created to 
manage licensing of the RSA technology. A company 
called RSA Data Security, Inc., was also formed, 
which licensed the technology from PKP and markets 
products to the public based on the technology.

The current policy of the United States places DES 
and RSA technology under export control. Because 
cryptography falls into the category of munitions, 
it is controlled not only by the Commerce Department 
but also by the State Department under the terms of 
the International Traffic in Arms regulations. 
Despite the public development of both of these 
technologies and their documented availability 
outside the United States over the last 15 years, US 
policy has been uniformly restrictive concerning 
export licensing. 

As the United States and the rest of the world enter 
more fully into the Information Age in which digital 
communications plays a critical role in the global 
infrastructure, the "digital signature" capability 
of public key cryptography is a critical necessity 
for validating business transactions and for 
identifying ownership of intellectual property 
expressed in digital electronic forms.

Registration and transfer of intellectual property 
rights in works which can be represented in digital 
form will be cenral factors in the national and 
global information infrastructure. A number of 
parties are exploring technical means for carrying 
out rights registration and transfer, making use of 
public key cryptography as a basic tool. 

In addition, there is a great deal of current work 
on electronic mail systems which support privacy by 
means of encryption and support authenticity by 
means of digital signatures. One of these systems, 
developed in the Internet environment I mentioned in 
my testimony, is called Privacy-enhanced Mail (PEM) 
and makes use of DES, RSA and some other special 
"hash" functions which are integral to the 
production of digital signatures.

For these various systems to be compatible on an 
international basis, it would be very helpful for 
the cryptographic components to be exportable on a 
world-wide basis. A number of vendors make produces 
relying on these technologies within the United 
States but often find it very difficult to engage in 
international commerce owing to the export licensing 
required for these technologies. Ironically, the 
technology appears to be widely available outside 
the US and also outside the COCOM countries, so US 
firms face both competition outside the US and 
export inhibitions in their attempts to develop 
worldwide markets.

There are  many valid national security reasons for 
limiting the export of cryptographic capabilities, 
since these technologies may aid an opponent in time 
of war or other conflict. Perhaps just as important, 
US intelligence gathering capability can be eroded 
by the availability of high grade cryptography on a 
worldwide basis. Recently, it has also been alleged 
that the world-wide availability of cryptography 
would also seriously impede US drug enforcement and 
anti-crime efforts. While these reasons seem 
sufficient, many have pointed out that the 
widespread accessibility to the detailed 
specifications of DES and RSA and availability and 
existence of software and hardware outside the US 
have long since done whatever damage is going to be 
done in respect of warfighting, crime or drug 
potential. This line of reasoning leads to the 
conclusion that our policies only inhibit legitimate 
commerce, but have little impact on the other 
concerns expressed.

As in all such controversy, there is often some 
truth on both sides. The National Institutes of 
Standards and Technology (NIST), has offered 
alternative digital signature capability. Technical 
assessments of the alternative have turned up 
weaknesses, in the opinions of some experts. There 
is not yet an alternative to DES, unless it is to be 
found in NSA's Commercial Crypto Evaluation Program 
(CCEP) in which NSA proposes to provide algorithms 
which are implemented in hardware by industry and 
made available for civilian use. As I understand 
this program, NSA does not intend to release any 
details of the algorithms, leaving open questions 
about the nature and strength of the technology. 
Some experts will persist in the belief that such 
offerings have weaknesses which are deliberately 
built in and hidden (so-called "Trojan Horses") 
which will allow the agency to "break" any messages 
protected by this means.

The critics complained loudly that the reasoning 
behind the design of certain parts of the DES 
algorithm (specifically the "S-boxes") was never 
made public and therefore that the algorithm was 
suspect. In fact, the DES has proven to be very 
strong - indeed, it may be that very fact which 
makes it so unpalatable in some quarters to permit 
its unrestricted export. It may be that the CCEP 
technology offered is satisfactory, but this is hard 
to tell without knowing more about its provenance. 

Presuming the wide availability of both DES and RSA 
technology, it seems to me appropriate and timely to 
re-examine US export control policy regarding these 
two algorithms. In all probability, any such review 
will require some classified testimony which will 
have to be heard in confidence by cleared members of 
your committee. I sincerely hope that the outcome 
will be favorable to use by US industry in 
international commerce, but even if the outcome 
results in continuation of present policy, it is 
timely to make such a review, in my opinion.

Sincerely,


Vinton G. Cerf






------- End of Forwarded Message





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Hal <74076.1041@CompuServe.COM>
Date: Tue, 13 Apr 93 23:38:45 PDT
To: CYPHERPUNKS <CYPHERPUNKS@toad.com>
Subject: REMAIL: Positive Reputations Now!
Message-ID: <930414063404_74076.1041_FHD59-1@CompuServe.COM>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

There's been a lot of talk on news.admin.policy about ways of handling
abusive or illegal anonymous posts.  One proposal is to restrict posts
from certain people, but this will fail if multiple remailers allowing
chaining become available.

I had an idea for another way of filtering anonymous posts which might
be achievable with current news software.  It would require some work by
the remailer operators, though.

We have talked here about positive reputations as a filtering method.
A positive reputation would basically be a recommendation by some respected
person that a particular poster is worth listening to.  If posts could be
marked with such recommendations, people could set up their news software
to filter out non-recommended anonymous posts.  This would be a way of
distinguishing between those who want to post anonymously just for privacy,
and those who want to harrass or abuse others.

Current news software doesn't provide for such reputations.  But there
were suggestions being made at one time for a standard way of marking
anonymous posts.  One idea was to give them a unique identifier in the
"Distribution" field of "anon".  I gather that this would require a little
modification of major news distribution sites to honor this distribution
but from what I understand the changes needed are not major.

My idea is to implement positive reputations at the source which is in the
best position to provide them: the remailer operator.  Applying the
distribution idea, posts which were from people on a "good guys list"
would be posted from the remailer with a specific distribution that
identifies them as such.  Anonymous posts from people not on the list
would get a different identification.

In order to verify that posts were really from who they claimed, they would
have to be PGP (or RIPEM or PEM) signed.  The list would actually be a list
of keys rather than a list of user ID's.

People would get on the list by asking the remailer operator, perhaps by
pointing to some of their posts which were responsible.  People would
be removed from the list at the remailer operator's discretion, presumably
when they posted objectionable messages.

The advantage of this system is that it introduces, in a limited way, the
idea of positive reputations.  It fits into the current killfile system
so that people easily offended can avoid seeing most offensive anonymous
posts.  It encourages the use of encryption software on the part of people
who want to post anonymously and get a good reputation.  And the only
difficult software requirements are in the remailing/posting software;
everybody else just runs the current SW.

Now, since I don't run a remailing/posting service, I am in the rather
embarrassing position of offering a "solution" which requires somebody
else to do the work.  I would be very willing to help with the software
requirements for recognizing incoming PGP signed messages and looking
up keys in a database.

The actual maintenance of the good posters list would take some time and
energy on the part of the operator.  But perhaps this would not be that
much more than the other activities involved.  And it would have the
advantage that it would point out a new direction for the net, towards
a system where privacy and responsibility can coexist.

Hal Finney
74076.1041@compuserve.com

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.2

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gAAkEwcgJsMuvEjtcgRFkHxxW6uCF/8m2kLU3HUA8lnT94BR5TJc/0K5xH05gKhH
NvU+74sCxIV68ef+0pz1X9TzC1E7tUxAhJKPQ80li1QFsBw5yATzuh1UHeDIk/5O
7yyVS8AGQFc=
=RyI6
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: George A. Gleason <gg@well.sf.ca.us>
Date: Wed, 14 Apr 93 03:20:16 PDT
To: ebrandt@jarthur.Claremont.EDU
Subject: Re: Encrypted Cordless phones
Message-ID: <199304141019.AA21841@well.sf.ca.us>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


And also.... Radio Shack just entered the market with a cordless which uses
frequency inversion.  That's analog...  Probably can be broken in less than
a minute, even by amateurs who know how to solder.   About 1986 or so, a
certain state agency ordered some expensive walkie-talkies which were
supposed to be secure against protesters with scanners.  Guess what?  Analog
frequency inversion.  

And in fact, with a little practice, you can listen to inverted speech
directly and make sense of it.  





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Brad Huntting <huntting@advtech.uswest.com>
Date: Wed, 14 Apr 93 08:42:16 PDT
To: Clark Reynard <clark@metal.psu.edu>
Subject: Re: alt.whistleblowers
In-Reply-To: <9304140125.AA16266@metal.psu.edu>
Message-ID: <9304141542.AA19694@futureworld.advtech.uswest.com.advtech.uswest.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> 1) Kick it around on alt.config.

I think this is the best option.  news.groups is (mostly) for standard
"usenet" hierarchies (e.g. misc.whisleblowers).

If you mention "discussed in alt.config" in your newgroup I think you
will get much better reception.


brad




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: mark@coombs.anu.edu.au (Mark)
Date: Tue, 13 Apr 93 18:17:29 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: alt.whistleblowers
In-Reply-To: <9304140125.AA16266@metal.psu.edu>
Message-ID: <9304140117.AA19145@coombs.anu.edu.au>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>4) Don't even bother kicking it around; just create the group,
>   and hell with anyone who doesn't like it.

We're sposed to be anarchists right? :) 'sides alt.* groups come out daily
with little or no discussion. Ours wont rock boats, at least in it's creation,
the content is a different story. Personally I hope it doesnt degenrate into a
narc fest for people who have grudges against people... that would be sad..

I vote to just make it. Not all will like it, but then they are maybe the ones
who will feature in it (great way to shut them up :).

Mark
mark@coombs.anu.edu.au




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: wcs@anchor.ho.att.com
Date: Wed, 14 Apr 93 10:46:44 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: FWEE!  Re: alt.whistleblowers
Message-ID: <9304141746.AA27675@anchor.ho.att.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text


> Kick it around on alt.config
>> Just do it ....
The problem is that alt.whistleblowers is technically more complex
than just creating an alt.group and having one anon.poster site -
we need to resolve issues of secure mail standards (e.g. should
the system use RIPEM or just PGP, are there any non-US sites with RIPEM
so that non-US anon.poster sites can use it, should there be multiple
anon.sites and should they do remailing between them, etc.)
Otherwise we may end up with a single point of failure,
and if it's any good, it will at least get its mail watched,
if it doesn't get raided - traffic analysis is important here.

Are we only going to use anon.posting sites, or are forged postings
also going to be an acceptable technique?  Do we at least need 
to publish a guide to forging mail headers so your mail to the
anon.poster can appear to come from kremvax or whitehouse.com?

Let's try to get a good idea of what we want to do before dropping
it into alt.config.

			Bill Stewart

--
This isn't the 8th Dimension, we're somewhere over New Jersey



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: rclark@nyx.cs.du.edu (Robert W. F. Clark)
Date: Wed, 14 Apr 93 14:02:36 PDT
To: extropians@gnu.ai.mit.edu
Subject: WARNING: Forward of unposted alt.config message
Message-ID: <9304142104.AA19705@nyx.cs.du.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I am sending this here _prior_ to posting it to give advance
warning; responses received have varied on the methods of
creation of the group, but have largely tended toward a consensus
that it is wise to have some sort of discussion period; in
addition, I have chosen a cross-post to those groups most likely
to have an interest in creating the group, and if this results
in a flamewar in alt.config, so be it.  After I tally the votes
and they vastly outnumber the NOs I will create the newsgroup
without further delay.  I just wish for people to clarify; sorry
if you missed it, but this is going out in four hours exactly to
the aforementioned newsgroups.  I will implement all important
suggestions mailed to me by that time, including alteration of
procedural points, wording changes, alteration of Newsgroups:
line, etc.  I will also delay posting if valid and immediate
concerns are brought to light; however, since I leave the 
major axes:  Moderated or unmoderated, length of discussion
period, length of voting period, open for discussion, it should
not be a disaster if it goes out in its current form.  Join
the discussion, and if you like the idea, PLEASE send a YES
vote only WHEN the Call for Votes is posted.

Additionally, suggestions for additions/deletions of Newsgroups
from the crosspost, or a more appropriate place to
redirect replies, or any suggestions whatever will be adopted
if suitable.

If you have no interest in the privacy issue, please type 'd' now.

----

Newsgroups: alt.config, alt.privacy, alt.privacy.anon-server, soc.motss, alt.sex, alt.sex.bestiality, alt.drugs, comp.protocols.tcp-ip.eniac
Followup-to: alt.config
Subject: Call for discussion: alt.whistleblower

In light of the current debate concerning whether anonymous posting
can serve a useful purpose, I propose the immediate experiment of creating
a group which shall provide a genuinely useful service to the
public.  

This newsgroup is to be called alt.whistleblower, and is for the purpose
of allowing those who might otherwise be unwilling to come forward to
provide information about the illegal activities of government
agencies, large corporations and similar malefactors without fear
of illegal reprisals against them.

The need for this group is evident in light of the extreme usefulness
of information concerning the behavior of the governing bodies of
the United States, and the large number of government employees and
corporate employees with access to the Internet and anonymous posting
services.

This group could also include reports of illegal discrimination
by those who fear reprisal if they reveal their names, information
concerning safety issues by those who know that their company is
releasing an unsafe or dangerous product, or defrauding customers
by dishonest and illegal means.

Considering the immediate need for this newsgroup in light of
those who, in many cases, provide services for a fee and then
provide an inadequate service by cutting their downstream sites
from reading anything that the service-provider deems is inappropriate,
I request a waiver of procedure in this matter and that, if significant
interest is present and seems to form a general consensus, it shall
be accepted that I revise and present a prospectus for this newsgroup 
and a call for votes on a date no sooner than seven days from
this initial posting and no later than ten days after the call
for discussion.  Procedural points concerning the length of the
voting period are to be addressed in the public discussion, and
anyone wishing to send anonymous mail should forward it to me.

This newsgroup is necessary and of great potential
use, as those of you with a legitimate need for privacy
know well.  If you value your privacy, let us discuss this
wisely and equitably in order to reach a consensus.   

Whether this newsgroup is to be moderated or unmoderated,
whether the name is appropriate or another hierarchy would
be preferable, and all procedural points are to be decided
based on the general consensus.

I realize there will be those who will oppose the creation
of this newsgroup on the oft-cited grounds that "Anyone who
needs privacy must be hiding something."

This is true; however, in our society there are many things
which need to be revealed as well as many things which need
to be concealed.

I believe that a corollary truism could be applied to those
who oppose the notion of public privacy.  "Anyone who
fears privacy must be hiding something."

Let the discussion begin.

Final note:  Do NOT, repeat, NOT send votes until I post
a "Call for Votes" at the end of the discussion period.  The
length of the discussion period may be increased if some
drastic occurrence requires it, but I'm planning to post
it in one week.  Vote then.  I thank you for your consideration
in this matter.
----
"Occasionally an honest man is sent to the legislature." Mark Twain
rclark@nyx.cs.du.edu      PGP key available by mail or finger
rclark@metal.psu.edu      
 




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Eli Brandt <ebrandt@jarthur.Claremont.EDU>
Date: Wed, 14 Apr 93 15:10:46 PDT
To: clark@metal.psu.edu
Subject: Re: WARNING: Forward of unposted alt.config message
In-Reply-To: <9304142104.AA19705@nyx.cs.du.edu>
Message-ID: <9304142210.AA23480@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> From: rclark@nyx.cs.du.edu (Robert W. F. Clark)

> Join the discussion, and if you like the idea, PLEASE send a YES
> vote only WHEN the Call for Votes is posted.

Is there some reason to run a CFV and all that on this proposed alt
group?  Looks to me as if the usual creation procedure should work
fine for this group.

> Newsgroups: [...] alt.sex.bestiality, alt.drugs, comp.protocols.tcp-ip.eniac

Chuckle.

   Eli   ebrandt@jarthur.claremont.edu




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Clark Reynard <clark@metal.psu.edu>
Date: Wed, 14 Apr 93 15:10:20 PDT
To: wcs@anchor.ho.att.com
Subject: Re: FWEE!  Re: alt.whistleblowers
Message-ID: <9304142306.AA01506@metal.psu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


This would come into play as something necessary only after the
creation of the group, and at least the anonymous posting part
of it is already being studied by others, for entirely different
reasons.  And, in addition, the method of posting will be determined
by the nature of the group itself, which is only determinable after
a period of discussion.  For which alt.config is as suitable a
place for discussion as this mailing list.  In fact, the newsgroup
is better, since we'll be getting feedback from the Enemy as
well.  

A fogware (not quite vaporware) FAQ could be provided at a moment's
notice, simply containing an explanation of the newsgroup and
its purpose (which would be a slightly modified carbon copy of
the Call for Votes; more vaporware), the list of anonymous remailers
at soda.berkeley.edu, and perhaps some cullings from more cogent
postings regarding the anonymity issue.

Then, as FAQs actually appear, it can be expanded.  I am capable
of doing this at least for the next few months, and probably longer.

Once the newsgroup, which I think would be unmoderated by its
very nature, or moderated in something of the same way as alt.hackers,
except that the accepted moderator-list would consist of any
anonymous remailer on the list in the FAQ (this, I couldn't do,
since I don't maintain the anonymous remailer list and couldn't
be guaranteed of getting it right).  In any case, I think that
having it unmoderated and not doing anything but posting a
FAQ every week should take care of it.  It's an unusual newsgroup
idea, but in execution it should be similar to existing newsgroups.

In any case, I think that beginning the discussion is appropriate;
if the specs for the newsgroup are to be changed, they can always
be changed before the posting of the Call for Votes, when everything
becomes Locked in Stone.
----
Robert W. Clark
rclark@nyx.cs.du.edu   PGP signature available by mail or finger




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: trump@pluto.ee.cua.edu (Louis Edward Trumpbour)
Date: Wed, 14 Apr 93 15:27:16 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: .....
Message-ID: <9304142228.AA08551@pluto.ee.cua.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



ok well i am sure that there are a lot of people out there that want to learn 
how to do basic cypher/decyphering... so i think it would be nice if people 
gave their knowledge on how to do decryption... even if its very very basic
and perhaps a faq could be made out of this info...

Clovis




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: KINNEY WILLIAM H <kinney@spot.Colorado.EDU>
Date: Wed, 14 Apr 93 17:58:52 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: alt.whistleblowers
Message-ID: <199304150058.AA21866@spot.Colorado.EDU>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Some comments on alt.whistleblowers from an (up to now) lurker. In brief,
this strikes me as being a very foolish idea. 

In detail:

-- Does anyone really think this is going to have much of an effect on
   anything? My suspicion is that a forum providing unlimited ability
   for people to anonymously post undocumented accusations against 
   powerful people will be summarily ignored, not just by the targets
   of the accusations, but by everybody else with an actual life. There
   seems to be no discussion of the biggest weakness of this idea: the
   expected signal to noise ratio. This accomplishes nothing if it is 
   overrun by, say, Kennedy asassination loons. It doesn't seem wise to me
   for the Cypherpunks' first major public act to be something this
   pointless and ill-conceived.

Ok. Suppose I'm wrong about the above, and this thing works like people
seem to think it will.

-- The tools available to accomplish this task (PGP, remailers, anon servers)
   are certainly impressive, but I really don't think they're well developed
   enough yet to give cause for much confidence in taking on the government
   and the entire U.S. corporate sector in a frontal assault. 

-- Is this really in line with the purpose of the Cypherpunks? To quote from
   the charter

   "Cypherpunks write code.  They know that someone has to write code to
   defend privacy, and since it's their privacy, they're going to write
   it.  Cypherpunks publish their code so that their fellow cypherpunks
   may practice and play with it.  Cypherpunks realize that security is
   not built in a day and are patient with incremental progress."

   I like this paragraph, and what it says to me is that (a) people
   are, in the end, responsible for their OWN security and need to be made
   to realize this, and (b) PATIENCE is the most important prerequisite
   for success. Both of these principles are being violated by the
   hasty creation of alt.whistleblowers. This has nothing to do with
   enabling people to independently achieve data security, and it shows
   no patience whatsoever.

Wouldn't everybody be better served by quiet, patient development and
distribution of tools, instead of a huge juvenile "FUCK YOU!" to people
who could really care less? Let's not piss away a solid foundation with
cheap theatrics.

                                -- Will


"Getting people to fight by letting the force of momentum work
is like rolling logs and rocks. Logs and rocks are still when in a
secure place, but roll on an incline; they remain stationary if
square, they roll if round. Therefore, when people are skillfully
led into battle, the momentum is like that of round rocks rolling down
a high mountain -- this is force."

-- Sun Tzu


*** PGP PUBLIC KEY AVAILABLE BY FINGER




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: J. Michael Diehl <mdiehl@triton.unm.edu>
Date: Wed, 14 Apr 93 18:10:50 PDT
To: trump@pluto.ee.cua.edu (Louis Edward Trumpbour)
Subject: Re:decryption request.
In-Reply-To: <9304142228.AA08551@pluto.ee.cua.edu>
Message-ID: <9304150110.AA14652@triton.unm.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> ok well i am sure that there are a lot of people out there that want to learn 
> how to do basic cypher/decyphering... so i think it would be nice if people 
> gave their knowledge on how to do decryption... even if its very very basic
> and perhaps a faq could be made out of this info...

Well, you took the words right out of my fingers! ;^)  I was going to post the 
same request myself.  So....any offers?

Thanx in advance.

+-----------------------+-----------------------------+---------+
| J. Michael Diehl ;-)  | I thought I was wrong once. | PGP KEY |
|                       |    But, I was mistaken.     |available|
|                       +-----------------------------+---------+
| mdiehl@triton.unm.edu | "I'm just looking for the opportunity |
| mike.diehl@fido.org   | to be Politically Incorrect!   <Me>   |
| (505) 299-2282        |                                       |
+-----------------------+---------------------------------------+




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: rclark@nyx.cs.du.edu (Robert W. F. Clark)
Date: Wed, 14 Apr 93 19:02:53 PDT
To: kinney@spot.Colorado.EDU (KINNEY WILLIAM H)
Subject: Re: alt.whistleblowers
In-Reply-To: <199304150058.AA21866@spot.Colorado.EDU>
Message-ID: <9304150204.AA03482@nyx.cs.du.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



> Some comments on alt.whistleblowers from an (up to now) lurker. In brief,
> this strikes me as being a very foolish idea. 

Perhaps it is; this is why I'm sending it out for discussion instead
of just newgrouping it.

> -- Does anyone really think this is going to have much of an effect on
>    anything? My suspicion is that a forum providing unlimited ability
>    for people to anonymously post undocumented accusations against 
>    powerful people will be summarily ignored, not just by the targets
>    of the accusations, but by everybody else with an actual life. There
>    seems to be no discussion of the biggest weakness of this idea: the
>    expected signal to noise ratio. This accomplishes nothing if it is 
>    overrun by, say, Kennedy asassination loons. It doesn't seem wise to me
>    for the Cypherpunks' first major public act to be something this
>    pointless and ill-conceived.

Actually, it is more my act, which I decided upon based on memes
I received partially from this list; the cypherpunks, if they do
choose to support the idea, will do it individually; and, as yet,
I have not had the arrogance to make a public announcement to
the effect that the cypherpunks made this action.  My name only
is attached to this; no praise, no blame.

> Ok. Suppose I'm wrong about the above, and this thing works like people
> seem to think it will.

Well, it might not; there are a number of potential hurdles, like
the possibility that it will turn into a mindless narc fest; my
personal opinion as to this is that I would prefer to leave the
group unmoderated, but with an _option_ to moderate if the worst
occurs.  Of _course_ this will be abused, but I believe that it will
also be used.

This will provide an empirical basis for our principles.  Success
or failure will determine whether hypotheses need to be revised,
or if they do, in fact, have predictive capability.

> -- The tools available to accomplish this task (PGP, remailers, anon servers)
>    are certainly impressive, but I really don't think they're well developed
>    enough yet to give cause for much confidence in taking on the government
>    and the entire U.S. corporate sector in a frontal assault. 

Well, if people are careful, and don't log in to an anonymous server
_from_ an account with their name, but from an anonymous dataswitch,
all Bell or the Department of Housing and Urban Development would
know is that someone who works for them posted this anonymous message;
which they knew already.  Of course, anything beyond the first posting
would be tracable if someone really wanted to do it, but what would it
prove, unless they traced it to that person?  

Another possibility is to go primitive and use snailmail, digitize
images and data or type in by hand.  Without very specific reasons,
opening U S Mail is not condoned.

> -- Is this really in line with the purpose of the Cypherpunks? To quote from
>    the charter

>["Cypherpunks write code" paragraph from FAQ]

>    I like this paragraph, and what it says to me is that (a) people
>    are, in the end, responsible for their OWN security and need to be made
>    to realize this, and (b) PATIENCE is the most important prerequisite
>    for success. Both of these principles are being violated by the
>    hasty creation of alt.whistleblowers. This has nothing to do with
>    enabling people to independently achieve data security, and it shows
>    no patience whatsoever.

You may be right.  I may not be orthodox cypherpunk.  

However, with the proliferation of retroactive posting cancellation
of anonymous posts, I believe it is possible to be patient to so
great an extent that one calmly and rationally discusses a situation
until the moment when action would have been useful has passed; 
in other words, you've discussed battle strategy until the enemy's won.

> Wouldn't everybody be better served by quiet, patient development and
> distribution of tools, instead of a huge juvenile "FUCK YOU!" to people
> who could really care less? Let's not piss away a solid foundation with
> cheap theatrics.

Again, I believe that you _can_ be quiet and develop tools.  It
is good that this is being done by _somebody_.  

However, I take issue with your assertion that a formal Request
for Discussion, worded in a non-inflammatory manner, is a juvenile
"FUCK YOU!"  If you doubt this, check out the RFD when it appears
in news.announce.newgroups.  What little temperature was in it
was deleted; I spent about three hours implementing the suggestions
of others and cut the verbiage by a half.  

I do not see how this can damage what foundation we have;
essentially a few software packages and an ideology.

However, to protect from just this occurence, I did not present
my viewpoints as cypherpunk viewpoints in the announcement, merely
as my own.

The word 'cypherpunk' does not occur anywhere in the article.

If cypherpunks wish to discuss this group, why it would be a good
or bad idea, or if it would be better-named, it may be discussed.

If it is decided that the idea should be shelved, then so be it.

I, and we, shall bide our time, and create it as an alt.group
in the meantime.

Very likely, at least in the beginning, privacy will be provided
by the person who wishes to have it, and that person will take
responsibility for the consequence of his or her actions.

Check out the discussion.  Let the net decide.
----
Robert W. Clark
rclark@nyx.cs.du.edu   PGP signature available by mail or finger




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu
Date: Wed, 14 Apr 93 22:27:19 PDT
To: KINNEY WILLIAM H <kinney@spot.Colorado.EDU>
Subject: Re: alt.whistleblowers
In-Reply-To: <199304150058.AA21866@spot.Colorado.EDU>
Message-ID: <9304150527.AA21340@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



>Some comments on alt.whistleblowers from an (up to now) lurker. In brief,
>this strikes me as being a very foolish idea. 
>   My suspicion is that a forum providing unlimited ability
>   for people to anonymously post undocumented accusations against 
>   powerful people will be summarily ignored, not just by the targets
>   of the accusations, but by everybody else with an actual life.

Mr. Kinney's comments annoy me tremendously. They bespeak a lukewarm,
lackadaisical, and wishwashy view of something of extreme importance.
Frankly, it bothers me that it has taken this long just to get the
whistleblower group going. I don't think anything is being accomplished
by delaying newsgroup creation.  It just gives people who are enemies
more time to mount a concerted attack against this new blip in the status quo.

Where is your trademark cypherpunk fanaticism, Mr. Kinney? Do you wear
a suit and tie and go to endless meetings debating the relative merits
of implementing a given policy? Where is your passion? Where is your
*impatience*?  Where is your frustration that nothing seems to be happening?

The point is that these things will start out unpolished and become
refined. But they don't become refined by people debating their
theoretical implications in a vacuum. They get refined when problems
*arise* from *use*.  That is the place where unforeseen merits and
demerits are discovered (the unanticipated ones discovered in practice,
I assure you, are always the most significant).  Julf's server is a
beautiful example of the evolution of an unrefined idea into a
practical and increasingly sophisticated reality.

It alarms me tremendously that word leaked out about the whistleblower
group at the Freedom and Privacy conference (attended by such
luminaries as e.g. D. Denning, and don't ask what the D. stands for);
and that a former C.I.A. official has ideas on how to filter out the
"noise". I find this quite nauseating.  The greatest inventions are not
the result of people who sought to reduce risks. It is precisely this
risktaking (and yes, somewhat cavalier attitude) that produces the breakthrough!

>   The tools available to accomplish this task (PGP, remailers, anon servers)
>   are certainly impressive, but I really don't think they're well developed
>   enough yet to give cause for much confidence in taking on the government
>   and the entire U.S. corporate sector in a frontal assault. 

We are all playing with toys right now in the hope that they become
entrenched and refined.  Which they will, inevitably! Because they are
good ideas! (Time is the universe's mechanism for rewarding good
ideas!)  Yesterday's Apple II is today's Quadra.  Paved roads started
out as rocky dirt paths, and in retrospect they look quaint, but they
progressed because they were well-trodden.  People just used them.  If
you think that new technology starts out any other way, then I'm
impressed with your naivete...

>-- Is this really in line with the purpose of the Cypherpunks? To quote from
>   the charter

well, let me put it this way--if it isn't virtually the essence of
Cypherpunkhood (challenging entrenched, ineffective, mediocre, bloated,
or even corrupt and sinister authority through revolutionary new
technology) then what is? What is your vision? Or do you prefer not to
have one because they are so inconvenient and uncomfortable to pledge
allegiance to, to nourish and sustain?  Because they force you to
rethink some of your most beloved and rooted prejudices? Because they
require such devotion and sacrifice?

> PATIENCE is the most important prerequisite
>   for success.

patience has its place *after* all possible means for advancement have
been employed. This `patience' thing of yours seems to me like a
euphemism for `chill out'.  Patience is for saints.  Impatience is for
humans. Agitation is for cypherpunks.

>Wouldn't everybody be better served by quiet, patient development and
>distribution of tools, instead of a huge juvenile "FUCK YOU!" to people
>who could really care less? Let's not piss away a solid foundation with
>cheap theatrics.

Is that your perception of this project? Do you think that the creation
of the newsgroup is equivalent to advocating that statement? Where do
you find such animosity? How is it that something so intrinsically
neutral such as creating a newsgroup be twisted into an act of evil
rebellion and subversion? Is it possible that you should be embarrassed
by reading a bit more into cypherpunks than is there? Is it possible
that you have some agenda we don't know about?

The whistleblower newsgroup will be quite like any other newsgroup.
There will be plenty of noise and unverifiable froth and fizz. We will
work toward trying to improve that content, but it is always a case of
`caveat emptor'. It is a ridiculously impossible ideal to attain of
having a group with only the `truth' posted.  We are not setting out to
replace the entire world government today (although, as for *tomorrow*...)

I think the freedom in posting is the very essence of the whistleblower
group. I think it might be interesting to promote the idea of different
groups, each with different levels of verifiability. The lowest level
would have completely unverified claims and *totally* free posting
(esp. anonymity). Higher groups would have more important mechanisms to
ensure the quality of the information (moderation, prerequisites to
posting, digital signatures, etc.)  I imagine that the verifiable and
meritorious claims would tend to "rise" to higher groups where people
with much higher reputations toss around the data.

(Actually, I can imagine all of Usenet of the future working like this,
with various `tiers' that people can pick at will. People into totally
rabid free speech can subscribe to the raw unfiltered stuff, and at the
other end of the spectrum, all the PC academics into diversity but no
offensiveness to sensitive sensibilities can subscribe to the groups
where a few happy-sunny-whee messages slip through a day...)

p.s. I hate to jab a self-admitted lurker so bluntly, but this reminds
me of Lincoln's advice that ``it is better to be silent and thought a
fool than to speak up and remove all doubt''... Mr. Kinney, maybe we
should call you back in a few years when everything is commercialized,
corporate, conservative, and soulless enough for your tastes.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: internaut@aol.com
Date: Thu, 15 Apr 93 03:31:51 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: FWEE!: alt.prematurity
Message-ID: <9304150631.tn01219@aol.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


*/ Ladies & Germs, /*

Certain cpunks have called for the immediate establishment of
alt.whistleblowerson Usenet. I have noted a certain respect for engineering
matters in these notes, but a lack of acknowledgement for the "other"
business involved in setting up a serious whistleblower service. I beg your
attention for a moment whilst I toss in my two cents:

As I am the person doing some of the legwork to establish the body of
Users/Subscribers for the alt.wb service (in my spare time), I would like to
request that this action NOT be taken at this time. I am as anxious as anyone
to see this become a reality, but I have learned over the years that both
information services and sex can be ruined by prematurity. You're welcome to
screw up your sex lives by cumming in your pants too soon, but PLEASE don't
give saddle this potentially IMPORTANT information service a huge birth
defect by putting it out before I am ready. There, I've admitted it, I am not
ready yet (nor are the Users). If it flies before I can set up the org's that
will take advantage of it, it would not be a good thing, IMHO.

I have mentioned prematurity before this and have been roundly ignored, to my
chagrin. Alas...

I am not suggesting that we can't begin exPERimenting in SOME way to get the
technology right, but I AM saying that we have a LOT of work to do if we want
this service to mean anything. On the other hand, if we're just a bunch of
engineers jacking off over our ideas, and not true crusaders trying to invent
a new method for busting sniveling government weasel-embezzelers, then who am
I to stop y'all?

Gee, Dave, just _why_ is it a bad idea right now?

- Not enough people are educated enough to use it. I have spoken with
Congressional staffers, media people and several activist orgs. They all need
either email accounts, PGP software and some readme files (or all three)
before they can take advantage of any WB info. They're not even sure how to
approach the issue of verification and we'll have to help them with this
concept. Imagine Picasso pitching the wonders of Assymetry to an audience of
People Who've Never Heard of Painting.

- We haven't figured out who'll be polled to send in msgs and exactly HOW
we'll offer them some sort of anonymity and what they need to do afterward.
It should be a select group at first, but we have not established the
guidelines for this service. Putting it out without any kind of guidelines
could be disastrous. This is the Trusted Reputation Issue. Please do not
underestimate this.

- Not a single cpunk has yet submitted any suggestions to me for the
Guidelines as I have asked twice. Not one person. Do that first, O Verbose
Ones! After we build such a document and have prominent people (such as
Nicholas Johnson, former FCC head under L.B.Johnson - "eh... no relation")
sign statements of support based on it (as discussed before, with I think,
nearly unanimous approval), then we can more _safely_ proceed. Have you heard
of the Declaration of Independence? They prepared that document well, got all
their Ducks in a Row and it's lasted for over 200 years. How many decades do
you think a good WB system could last/evolve for? I ask only that you engage
your long-range vision for a moment.

- Except for good ol' John Gilmore, no one has sent me their pubkey for the
list of volunteers after I publicly requested same some weeks back. Belly up
to the Bar, Dewds.

- ?

There are other excellent reasons to keep it in our collective pants for a
while, but if THESE don't convince you, then perhaps I am asking the wrong
group of folks to help get this started properly. I suggest that we set up a
dummy area and begin to conduct some experiments ala Tim May's F117A bogus
post. Hopefully, this will allow our more impatient members to spew to their
heart's delight while the rest of us continue with the legwork and phonework
to give it social armor.

Anybody can put a box out on the street and say "everybody put your
complaints in here," but it takes some real thinkers to put out a serious
whistleblower system.

Lastly, I ask your forgiveness for all my sins...

   dave

PS: Only kiddin', I never sin. Well, hardly ever these days. Well, pretty
often then, but I keep it to a few times a day. OK, well, maybe hourly, but
I'm really acting in the best interest of everyone. OK, I lied, I sin and sin
and sin every second of my existence.                    ...So sue me!




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Peter Meyer <meyer@mcc.com>
Date: Thu, 15 Apr 93 11:47:50 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Decryption
In-Reply-To: <9304142228.AA08551@pluto.ee.cua.edu>
Message-ID: <19930415184700.2.MEYER@OGHMA.MCC.COM>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


    Date: Wed, 14 Apr 1993 17:28 CDT
    From: trump@pluto.ee.cua.edu (Louis Edward Trumpbour)

    ok well i am sure that there are a lot of people out there that want to learn 
    how to do basic cypher/decyphering... so i think it would be nice if people 
    gave their knowledge on how to do decryption... even if its very very basic
    and perhaps a faq could be made out of this info...

    Clovis

sci.crypt has recently put out a FAQ (at last).  I forget where it's
ftp-able from but there's always someone on sci.crypt asking where the
FAQ is, and it gets reposted from time to time.

There are lots of ways to encrypt/decrypt/cryptanalyze.  The sci.crypt
FAQ lists some books on the subject.  Would-be cryptanalysts could take
a look at Abraham Sinkov's "Elementary Cryptanalysis, A Mathematical
Approach", published by The Mathematical Association of America, 1966.

-- Peter Meyer





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: hal@alumni.cco.caltech.edu (Hal Finney)
Date: Thu, 15 Apr 93 14:08:16 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Chaining to Julf's remailer
Message-ID: <9304152107.AA16806@alumni.cco.caltech.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


On news.admin.policy, a 'nym' called Nowhere, Man called somebody an
asshole and told them to fuck off.

Someone objected, and Nowhere responded:

> You're right, and I'm really sorry if my insults got somebody bent out
> of shape.  I just think some people deserve to get flamed once in a while.
> Also, the mail return address doesn't work becuase this message goes therough
> a chain of other remailers before it gets to JUlf's base.  So netnews is
> the only way to get messages to me.  Hey, maybe there should be a board
> just for messages to nyms.  Crypted, even.  How about it, news.admin.policy
> phreaks, should we put it to a vote?                          Nowhere, Man .

Apparently it is in fact possible to chain remailers now.  I assume that
he is chaining through cypherpunks remailers into penet.  I'm curious to
know which remailer is being used for this purpose?  Perhaps we could add
a description of how to do this to the documentation.  My guess is that
"Nowhere" reads this list.

Hal




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: grady@netcom.com (1016/2EF221)
Date: Thu, 15 Apr 93 16:46:44 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: SOURCE to Macintosh PGP 2.2 released
Message-ID: <9304152346.AA07957@netcom.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Complete Symantec THINK C 5.0.4 source code
including projects and user documentation is available
via anonymous FTP from:

netcom.com
[192.100.81.100]

in directory pub/grady

file is type ASCII, Compact Pro .sea processed with BinHex 4.0.

MGET MacPGP2.2src.sea.hqx
MGET MacPGP2.2srcSIGNATURE

HQX file is digitally signed by me;
verification of signature via public key servers or by phone.

Please distribute this code widely -- read the READ ME file
included with the package.





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: ORNTS188@ksuvxb.kent.edu
Date: Thu, 15 Apr 93 15:12:28 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Q&A DataBase
Message-ID: <01GX1S55DSEA0005UJ@ksuvxb.kent.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


	Hello All, does anyone know much about the this program?
I would like to be able to pick the passwords out of the database file.
	In this program (Q&A) the database can be set up so that users have limeted access to different areas of the files. I just got the code and doc files
for WP hack, and they were great. I am still going thur the code. 
	Well thanks  

                     Red :)




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Perry E. Metzger" <pmetzger@lehman.com>
Date: Thu, 15 Apr 93 15:30:38 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Q&A DataBase
In-Reply-To: <01GX1S55DSEA0005UJ@ksuvxb.kent.edu>
Message-ID: <9304152230.AA22243@snark.shearson.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



ORNTS188@ksuvxb.kent.edu says:
> 	Hello All, does anyone know much about the this program?
> I would like to be able to pick the passwords out of the database file.
> 	In this program (Q&A) the database can be set up so that users have lim
eted access to different areas of the files. I just got the code and doc files
> for WP hack, and they were great. I am still going thur the code. 

Pardon, but what does this have to do with Cypherpunks?

Perry




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: rclark@nyx.cs.du.edu (Robert W. F. Clark)
Date: Thu, 15 Apr 93 20:22:07 PDT
To: extropians@gnu.ai.mit.edu
Subject: WARNING: Pointer article to soc.whistleblowers debate
Message-ID: <9304160323.AA06370@nyx.cs.du.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


The news software has been activated.

David Tale has accepted the article, sans a paragraph specifying
a procedural point (which I didn't think would fly, anyway) and
bagging alt.sex and alt.drugs from the discussion, but keeping
many others; I think if I hadn't put those two in, he might have
knocked out a few I was serious about.

So, in any case, the article, in a modified form, partially by
me and partially by Tale, is now posted to news.announce.newgroups,
and the debate shall begin shortly.

Those of you who consider this newsgroup a beneficial and good
thing, and who wish to discuss its implementation and name
and other germane issues, should immediately go to news.groups
and begin posting like lunatics.

Those of you who consider this newsgroup a menace to society
should go to news.groups and post scathing articles about my
sexual preferences.  (Humor, of course.)

In any case, I have not identified myself as a cypherpunk or,
for that matter, as an Extropian, not having the boundless arrogance
to presume that cypherpunks all share my opinion of the methods of
implementing this; so those of you who do agree with me, or 
disagree only on procedural points, should post your opinion;
people have a larger tendency to vote YES when they think others
agree with them.  Also try to avoid excessively inflammatory
postings (on the order of "You fucking moron, how DARE you
disagree with me."), as these will tend to garner a bunch of NOs.

I don't mean be a total schmuck and bend over backwards for
a flaming, but flame back in a constructive spirit and without
senseless _ad hominem_ attacks.  

I hope that this group can be created with as little
sturm and drang as possible, but if it _does_ require
sturm OR drang OR both, heat may need to be applied.

Again, post whether or not you agree.  And don't send votes
yet, of course.  I'll just junk them, according to net.law.

If the cypherpunks wish to present this as a cypherpunk issue,
or if individuals wish to support it as individuals, feel free.
I'm not going to attach the name 'cypherpunk' to it myself
because, not to be rude, it would further politicize an already
highly-politicized issue.  However, if we'd be more effective
as THE DREADED Extropians/Cypherpunks bloc, which I don't think
is necessarily the case, feel free.  It's not my net.  

Apologies are extended for the lengthy crosspost, but it shall
be the last crosspost; further discussion ought to occur in
news.groups.  And battle plans in cypherpunks, if we even need
battle plans.  With any luck, there won't be a battle.

If we sneak this in by acclamation without a flamewar or
controversy, we're ENTRENCHED.  NOBODY can stop us, or any
other people who could utilize this most valuable resource.

But I'm not holding my breath on that one. 

Although I cross-posted mainly to groups with a large population
of potential YES voters, and ignored, say, news admin hangouts,
those who would oppose this are sure to find out about it; but
I think we can muster sufficient political clout to pass this.

Me?  I'm currently going to enlist some old friends from talk.bizarre. . .

Don't worry, they're not the current crop but the same crowd that
passed comp.protocols.tcp-ip.eniac.  I'll ask for as little
inflammatory material as possible, like I did here, but I
don't want this to become any more of a flamewar than necessary,
and, again and for the last time, would prefer it didn't end
up that way at all.

End of crosspost.  We now return you to your regular round
of discussing radix sorts and monozygotic recessives.

Thank you. 
----
Robert W. Clark
rclark@nyx.cs.du.edu   PGP signature available by mail or finger




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Hal <74076.1041@CompuServe.COM>
Date: Thu, 15 Apr 93 22:13:49 PDT
To: <cypherpunks@toad.com>
Subject: ANON: Chaining to Penet remailer
Message-ID: <930416050708_74076.1041_FHD24-1@CompuServe.COM>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Well, after a fair amount of experimentation I have learned who the
mysterious an10757@anon.penet.fi is.
 
It's me.
 
Or, more specifically, it is my remailer operating at hal@alumni.caltech.edu.
If you send mail from this remailer to anon.penet.fi for posting or remailing
it is identified as comin from an10757, the same address used in the post
by "Nowhere, Man".
 
This address is different from the address I get if I just send to
ping@anon.penet.fi from that account.  I think the reason is that the mail
sent from the remailer is identified as comin from "nobody" instead of "hal"
in the From: field.  This causes Julf's remailing software to assign a
different anonymous ID.
 
I don't see any problems with this (not right away, anyway) and in fact it
seems to me to be a desirable feature.  I think we should document this for
people who want to use the Penet remailer for posting, in a more untraceable
way.
 
Send mail to either:
 
hal@alumni.caltech.edu              (posts as an10757@anon.penet.fi)
hfinney@shell.portal.com            (posts as an19579@anon.penet.fi)
 
Have as the first lines of your message:
 
::
Request-Remailing-To: anon@anon.penet.fi
X-Anon-To: news.admin.policy
 
Follow this with a blank line, then your message.  Put whatever newsgroups you
like (separated by commas) after X-Anon-To.
 
This method of posting does not allow you to receive replies.  I have set
"nicknames" for these two accounts as "Untraceable account" which will appear
in the "From" line on the postings.  Hopefully that will offer a clue that
the normal reply mechanism doesn't work.  Maybe the nickname should say so
more explicitly?
 
I believe this approach would work with most of the other Cypherpunks
remailers.  The one thing for remailer operators to watch out for is
what is put in the From: line when the remailer sends it.  You want it
to be different from your regular account name or else your anonymous
ID will be used for all messages through that remailer.
 
Naturally, this is vulnerable to abuse.  If "Nowhere" or someone else continues
to post obscenities and flames then Julf may have to block off all of our
cypherpunks remailers, which would be unfortunate.  Until there are more
remailers I think anonymous posters need to continue to exercise some self-
restraint.
 
Hal





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Eli Brandt <ebrandt@jarthur.Claremont.EDU>
Date: Fri, 16 Apr 93 02:00:58 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: ANON: Chaining to Penet remailer
In-Reply-To: <930416050708_74076.1041_FHD24-1@CompuServe.COM>
Message-ID: <9304160900.AA04650@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> From: Hal <74076.1041@CompuServe.COM>
> This method of posting does not allow you to receive replies.  I have set
> "nicknames" for these two accounts as "Untraceable account" which will appear
> in the "From" line on the postings.  Hopefully that will offer a clue that
> the normal reply mechanism doesn't work.  Maybe the nickname should say so
> more explicitly?

You'd better make it quite clear that replies will not work.  The
consequences of misunderstanding here is that somebody's missive to
an apparent penet user ends up in your remailer machine's
postmaster's mailbox.  This is not good; it's an unexpected breach
of privacy, and it will tick off the sysadmin if it continues to
happen.  It's happened at least once -- I did it.  Fortunately, my
message to "NOWHERE, MAN" was about netiquette, not 'shrooms.
Nothing to cause your postmaster's jaw to drop, but it could have
been.

The security provided by this technique could be provided without
the IMHO serious disadvantage of having no return address.  Eric's
hybrid approach, where a pseudonym server hands mail to an remailer
chain, is secure (barring sophisticated traffic analysis) if you
trust the last remailer in the chain.  Julf, have you thought about
whether you want to do something like this?

> Hal

   Eli   ebrandt@jarthur.claremont.edu




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: KINNEY WILLIAM H <kinney@spot.Colorado.EDU>
Date: Fri, 16 Apr 93 07:13:24 PDT
To: 74076.1041@compuserve.com
Subject: Proposal for anon chaining
Message-ID: <199304161412.AA09006@spot.Colorado.EDU>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Recent traffic on anonymous remailers/servers:

>From:  Eli   <ebrandt@jarthur.claremont.edu>
>> From: Hal <74076.1041@CompuServe.COM>
>> This method of posting does not allow you to receive replies.  I have set
>> "nicknames" for these two accounts as "Untraceable account" which will appear
> >in the "From" line on the postings.  Hopefully that will offer a clue that
> >the normal reply mechanism doesn't work.  Maybe the nickname should say so
>> more explicitly?
>
>
>The security provided by this technique could be provided without
>the IMHO serious disadvantage of having no return address.  Eric's
>hybrid approach, where a pseudonym server hands mail to an remailer
>chain, is secure (barring sophisticated traffic analysis) if you
>trust the last remailer in the chain.  Julf, have you thought about
>whether you want to do something like this?

> Hal

Here's an idea I haven't seen suggested before, which would remove the need
for a pseudonym server:

The way things stand now, chaining Cypherpunk remailers works by nesting PGP
encryptions of the form

<remail header>

***********
message text
***********

If you want to chain remailers, you encrypt the above, make IT the new 
message text, and then add another header, and so on until you get bored. 
My proposal is for a modification of this protocol to allow for 
pseudonymous return mail addresses, like this:

The trick would be to separate the message text from the remailer routing 
information, in a message of the form

***********
ROUTING INFORMATION
***********

***********
MESSAGE TEXT
***********

where both blocks are encrypted with PGP. The message text would be 
encrypted with the PGP public key of the intended final recipient of the 
message, and would not be modified by the intermediate anon remailers. 
The routing information would be for the benefit of the remailers only. 
It would be created by the RECIPIENT and made publicly available as a 
pseudonymous mail address. It would work like this:

Suppose user foo@bar.com wishes to establish a pseudonymous identity, and 
wants to route it through anon remailers "anon1" and "anon2". What he does 
is take a message of the form

::
Request-Remailing-To: foo@bar.com

and encrypts it with server anon1's PGP public key, to create 
<ANON1 ENCRYPTED ADDRESS>.  Then he adds another header to make

::
Request-Remailing-To: anon1

<ANON1 ENCRYPTED ADDRESS>

and encrypts THIS with anon2's public key to make <ANON2 ENCRYPTED ADDRESS>, 
and adds a header to make

::
Request-Remailing-To: anon2

<ANON2 ENCRYPTED ADDRESS>

Obviously, this procedure can be nested to arbitrary depth, chaining 
through as many anon servers as you like. The trick is that this address 
block can be made PUBLIC, since the only way to unwind the routing is 
to have access to the secret keys of all the intermediate anon servers, 
and the identity of the recipient is protected. foo@bar.com then 
anonymously posts a PGP public key and a routing block to some public forum,
and people can communicate with him without having any idea as to his 
actual identity.  When I want to send a message to him, I encrypt the 
message with his provided public key, and then add the encrypted routing 
header, which he has also provided.  I give him my own pseudonymous 
mail routing header to allow him to reply.

This seems to me to be a very robust pseudonymous mail system which 
could be implemented by relatively minor changes to the existing Cypherpunk 
remailer structure. It has the additional advantage of being decentralized 
and maintenance-free.  It could be used for pseudonyms on net news, e-mail, 
wherever, and could presumably be integrated in some way into Julf's 
anon server.

Comments?

                                -- Will





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Date: Fri, 16 Apr 93 09:38:00 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: White House announcement on encryption--FORWARDED
Message-ID: <9304161638.AA19495@netcom3.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Cypherpunks,

Here's a message from sci.crypt that's of relevance to us in several
ways. I assume from its length, seriousness, and wording that it's not
a spoof...I can't check the White House's signature!

Some messages:

1. It tells us what Denning and Rivest were probably actually working
on when they floated their "trial balloons" last summer and fall.

2. A goverment-sanctioned phone encryption technique has implications
for the phone encryption topics we've discussed at the Cypherpunks
meetings (notably with Paul Rubin and Whit Diffie).

3. As always, end-to-end encryption, bypassing such schemes as this,
is looking better and better.

4. It is not clear if the government scheme will legally preclude
other encryption schemes.

5. I expect a lively debate will soon take place in sci.crypt.


Newsgroups: sci.crypt
Path: netcom.com!netcomsv!decwrl!uunet!dove!csrc.ncsl.nist.gov!clipper
From: clipper@csrc.ncsl.nist.gov (Clipper Chip Announcement)
Subject: text of White House announcement and Q&As on clipper chip encryption
Message-ID: <C5L17v.GH5@dove.nist.gov>
Sender: news@dove.nist.gov
Organization: National Institute of Standards & Technology
Distribution: na
Date: Fri, 16 Apr 1993 15:19:06 GMT
Lines: 282


Note:  This file will also be available via anonymous file
transfer from csrc.ncsl.nist.gov in directory /pub/nistnews and
via the NIST Computer Security BBS at 301-948-5717.
     ---------------------------------------------------

                         THE WHITE HOUSE

                  Office of the Press Secretary

_________________________________________________________________

For Immediate Release                           April 16, 1993


                STATEMENT BY THE PRESS SECRETARY


The President today announced a new initiative that will bring
the Federal Government together with industry in a voluntary
program to improve the security and privacy of telephone
communications while meeting the legitimate needs of law
enforcement.

The initiative will involve the creation of new products to
accelerate the development and use of advanced and secure
telecommunications networks and wireless communications links.

For too long there has been little or no dialogue between our
private sector and the law enforcement community to resolve the
tension between economic vitality and the real challenges of
protecting Americans.  Rather than use technology to accommodate
the sometimes competing interests of economic growth, privacy and
law enforcement, previous policies have pitted government against
industry and the rights of privacy against law enforcement.

Sophisticated encryption technology has been used for years to
protect electronic funds transfer.  It is now being used to
protect electronic mail and computer files.  While encryption
technology can help Americans protect business secrets and the
unauthorized release of personal information, it also can be used
by terrorists, drug dealers, and other criminals.

A state-of-the-art microcircuit called the "Clipper Chip" has
been developed by government engineers.  The chip represents a
new approach to encryption technology.  It can be used in new,
relatively inexpensive encryption devices that can be attached to
an ordinary telephone.  It scrambles telephone communications
using an encryption algorithm that is more powerful than many in
commercial use today.

This new technology will help companies protect proprietary
information, protect the privacy of personal phone conversations
and prevent unauthorized release of data transmitted
electronically.  At the same time this technology preserves the
ability of federal, state and local law enforcement agencies to
intercept lawfully the phone conversations of criminals. 

A "key-escrow" system will be established to ensure that the
"Clipper Chip" is used to protect the privacy of law-abiding
Americans.  Each device containing the chip will have two unique


                                2


"keys," numbers that will be needed by authorized government
agencies to decode messages encoded by the device.  When the
device is manufactured, the two keys will be deposited separately
in two "key-escrow" data bases that will be established by the
Attorney General.  Access to these keys will be limited to
government officials with legal authorization to conduct a
wiretap.

The "Clipper Chip" technology provides law enforcement with no
new authorities to access the content of the private
conversations of Americans.

To demonstrate the effectiveness of this new technology, the
Attorney General will soon purchase several thousand of the new
devices.  In addition, respected experts from outside the
government will be offered access to the confidential details of
the algorithm to assess its capabilities and publicly report
their findings.

The chip is an important step in addressing the problem of
encryption's dual-edge sword:  encryption helps to protect the
privacy of individuals and industry, but it also can shield
criminals and terrorists.  We need the "Clipper Chip" and other
approaches that can both provide law-abiding citizens with access
to the encryption they need and prevent criminals from using it
to hide their illegal activities.  In order to assess technology
trends and explore new approaches (like the key-escrow system),
the President has directed government agencies to develop a
comprehensive policy on encryption that accommodates:

     --   the privacy of our citizens, including the need to
          employ voice or data encryption for business purposes;

     --   the ability of authorized officials to access telephone
          calls and data, under proper court or other legal
          order, when necessary to protect our citizens;

     --   the effective and timely use of the most modern
          technology to build the National Information
          Infrastructure needed to promote economic growth and
          the competitiveness of American industry in the global
          marketplace; and 

     --   the need of U.S. companies to manufacture and export
          high technology products.

The President has directed early and frequent consultations with
affected industries, the Congress and groups that advocate the
privacy rights of individuals as policy options are developed.



                                3

The Administration is committed to working with the private
sector to spur the development of a National Information
Infrastructure which will use new telecommunications and computer
technologies to give Americans unprecedented access to
information.  This infrastructure of high-speed networks
("information superhighways") will transmit video, images, HDTV
programming, and huge data files as easily as today's telephone
system transmits voice.

Since encryption technology will play an increasingly important
role in that infrastructure, the Federal Government must act
quickly to develop consistent, comprehensive policies regarding
its use.  The Administration is committed to policies that
protect all Americans' right to privacy while also protecting
them from those who break the law.

Further information is provided in an accompanying fact sheet. 
The provisions of the President's directive to acquire the new
encryption technology are also available.  

For additional details, call Mat Heyman, National Institute of
Standards and Technology, (301) 975-2758.

---------------------------------


QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS ABOUT THE CLINTON ADMINISTRATION'S
TELECOMMUNICATIONS INITIATIVE




Q:   Does this approach expand the authority of government
     agencies to listen in on phone conversations?

A:   No.  "Clipper Chip" technology provides law enforcement with
     no new authorities to access the content of the private
     conversations of Americans.

Q:   Suppose a law enforcement agency is conducting a wiretap on
     a drug smuggling ring and intercepts a conversation
     encrypted using the device.  What would they have to do to
     decipher the message?

A:   They would have to obtain legal authorization, normally a
     court order, to do the wiretap in the first place.  They
     would then present documentation of this authorization to
     the two entities responsible for safeguarding the keys and
     obtain the keys for the device being used by the drug
     smugglers.  The key is split into two parts, which are
     stored separately in order to ensure the security of the key
     escrow system.

Q:   Who will run the key-escrow data banks?

A:   The two key-escrow data banks will be run by two independent
     entities.  At this point, the Department of Justice and the
     Administration have yet to determine which agencies will
     oversee the key-escrow data banks.

Q:   How strong is the security in the device?  How can I be sure
     how strong the security is?  

A:   This system is more secure than many other voice encryption
     systems readily available today.  While the algorithm will
     remain classified to protect the security of the key escrow
     system, we are willing to invite an independent panel of
     cryptography experts to evaluate the algorithm to assure all
     potential users that there are no unrecognized
     vulnerabilities.

Q:   Whose decision was it to propose this product?

A:   The National Security Council, the Justice Department, the
     Commerce Department, and other key agencies were involved in
     this decision.  This approach has been endorsed by the
     President, the Vice President, and appropriate Cabinet
     officials.

Q:   Who was consulted?  The Congress?  Industry?

A:   We have on-going discussions with Congress and industry on
     encryption issues, and expect those discussions to intensify
     as we carry out our review of encryption policy.  We have
     briefed members of Congress and industry leaders on the
     decisions related to this initiative.

Q:   Will the government provide the hardware to manufacturers?

A:   The government designed and developed the key access
     encryption microcircuits, but it is not providing the
     microcircuits to product manufacturers.  Product
     manufacturers can acquire the microcircuits from the chip
     manufacturer that produces them.

Q:   Who provides the "Clipper Chip"?

A:   Mykotronx programs it at their facility in Torrance,
     California, and will sell the chip to encryption device
     manufacturers.  The programming function could be licensed
     to other vendors in the future.

Q:   How do I buy one of these encryption devices? 

A:   We expect several manufacturers to consider incorporating
     the "Clipper Chip" into their devices.
     
Q:   If the Administration were unable to find a technological
     solution like the one proposed, would the Administration be
     willing to use legal remedies to restrict access to more
     powerful encryption devices?

A:   This is a fundamental policy question which will be
     considered during the broad policy review.  The key escrow
     mechanism will provide Americans with an encryption product
     that is more secure, more convenient, and less expensive
     than others readily available today, but it is just one
     piece of what must be the comprehensive approach to
     encryption technology, which the Administration is
     developing.

     The Administration is not saying, "since encryption
     threatens the public safety and effective law enforcement,
     we will prohibit it outright" (as some countries have
     effectively done); nor is the U.S. saying that "every
     American, as a matter of right, is entitled to an
     unbreakable commercial encryption product."  There is a
     false "tension" created in the assessment that this issue is
     an "either-or" proposition.  Rather, both concerns can be,
     and in fact are, harmoniously balanced through a reasoned,
     balanced approach such as is proposed with the "Clipper
     Chip" and similar encryption techniques.

Q:   What does this decision indicate about how the Clinton
     Administration's policy toward encryption will differ from
     that of the Bush Administration?  

A:   It indicates that we understand the importance of encryption
     technology in telecommunications and computing and are
     committed to working with industry and public-interest
     groups to find innovative ways to protect Americans'
     privacy, help businesses to compete, and ensure that law
     enforcement agencies have the tools they need to fight crime
     and terrorism.

Q:   Will the devices be exportable?  Will other devices that use
     the government hardware?

A:   Voice encryption devices are subject to export control
     requirements.  Case-by-case review for each export is
     required to ensure appropriate use of these devices.  The
     same is true for other encryption devices.  One of the
     attractions of this technology is the protection it can give
     to U.S. companies operating at home and abroad.  With this
     in mind, we expect export licenses will be granted on a
     case-by-case basis for U.S. companies seeking to use these
     devices to secure their own communications abroad.  We plan
     to review the possibility of permitting wider exportability
     of these products.

 
     

--
..........................................................................
Timothy C. May         | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,  
tcmay@netcom.com       | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
408-688-5409           | knowledge, reputations, information markets, 
W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA  | black markets, collapse of governments.
Higher Power: 2^756839 | Public Key: PGP and MailSafe available.



-- 
..........................................................................
Timothy C. May         | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,  
tcmay@netcom.com       | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
408-688-5409           | knowledge, reputations, information markets, 
W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA  | black markets, collapse of governments.
Higher Power: 2^756839 | Public Key: PGP and MailSafe available.





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Eli Brandt <ebrandt@jarthur.Claremont.EDU>
Date: Fri, 16 Apr 93 10:17:12 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Proposal for anon chaining
In-Reply-To: <199304161412.AA09006@spot.Colorado.EDU>
Message-ID: <9304161717.AA15797@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> From: KINNEY WILLIAM H <kinney@spot.Colorado.EDU>
> The routing information would be for the benefit of the remailers only. 
> It would be created by the RECIPIENT and made publicly available as a 
> pseudonymous mail address. It would work like this:
...
> This seems to me to be a very robust pseudonymous mail system which 
> could be implemented by relatively minor changes to the existing Cypherpunk 
> remailer structure.

This appears to be the ARA system that was previously suggested,
which I was speaking of using with penet.  Your comment that changes
would be needed implies that it is different; if so, could you
clarify the difference?

The reason Eric suggested hanging this off the side of a pseudonym
server is that it is rather inconvenient in its pure form,
particularly for unsophisticated users.  It involves a thirty-line
block of cruft, cutting and pasting... ideally your MUA would handle
everything, but this isn't going to happen soon.  Grafting this onto
a nymserver as a return address gives you the ease of use of
something like penet, without having to maintain a central
nym<--->name mapping.

>                                 -- Will

   Eli   ebrandt@jarthur.claremont.edu




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "L. Detweiler" <ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Date: Fri, 16 Apr 93 11:02:29 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: FWEE!: The Counterrevolutionaries Strike Back
In-Reply-To: <9304150631.tn01219@aol.com>
Message-ID: <9304161802.AA25932@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


[internaut]
>As I am the person doing some of the legwork to establish the body of
>Users/Subscribers for the alt.wb service (in my spare time), I would like to
>request that this action NOT be taken at this time. I am as anxious as anyone
>to see this become a reality, but I have learned over the years that both
>information services and sex can be ruined by prematurity.
>
>There, I've admitted it, I am not
>ready yet (nor are the Users).

If you think that you are the whistleblower moderator, fine. Be one.
But we need a completely unmoderated group. If you think you have any
right to hold up an unmoderated group to squeeze through your own
bottleneck, please go elsewhere.

I admire and appreciate your work to gain mainstream acceptance of this
group. But we have a great deal to lose through `premature' publicizing
this project. Anonymous servers, if they hadn't been `sneaked on' to
the net, would probably be specifically banned if news and network
administrators were forewarned of their presence. Now I see an awful
lot of backpeddling and fence-hopping by these hypocrites on e.g.
news.admin.policy who say ``Oh gee, we think anonymity is *great*, we
just want to control where you can use it.'' If it weren't for
pioneering and underground cypherpunk work in this area, I believe the
statement would be ``that issue was brought up, and they have been
specifically banned from the network because anonymity is worthless and
only for cowards and criminals.''

You are talking to many people (i.e. bureacrats and legislators) who
may be totally displaced and bypassed (i.e. lose illegitimate power) by
this service.  There are a great many people you are talking to, I
think, whose every interest is to totally castrate the project of any
`offensiveness'. I think you are trying to operate on a much more
respectable level than is possible currently. That level can only be
attained by a gradual evolution of the medium, starting with something
rather crude, kludgy, and unsophisticated.

>Not enough people are educated enough to use it.

we are not trying to get everyone in the U.S. to understand how this
works immediately. This is an impossible goal. Your efforts amount to
singlehandedly educating the public about the Internet. To most, the
idea of a worldwide bulletin board is mindboggling enough. If you wait
until everybody and his grandma know what you are talking about, I'll
be dead by then. If you wait until every legislator and bureacrat
understands it, the earth will have crumbled before you finish.

There are plenty of sophisticated people who can benefit from this
*immediately*. We are starting something with training wheels. If we
were IBM we would be doing it like you have in mind, an incredible
backroom strategizing effort before a massive and highly publicized
public rollout with great hype and fanfare. But we are not IBM. We are
cypherpunks. We are the silent underground who slips radical new
conquests past people before they even realize it. Anything less is too
formal, fragile, and lifeless. We are not waiting for you to come out
with your Press Kit before this thing starts.

>- We haven't figured out who'll be polled to send in msgs and exactly HOW
>we'll offer them some sort of anonymity and what they need to do afterward.

polled? sounds like an election, like something democratic, like
something that can be twisted by a misguided majority. Again, you sound
like you are looking for a group with high quality control.
Unfortunately, I think this goal is largely antithetical the essential
spirit of the whistleblower idea. The whistleblower is alone and
isolated, almost by definition. Your ideas on filtering incoming
messages, gained from those you've talked to, sound rather naive and
dangerous to me. You're welcome to set up all these mechanisms outside
of a *totally*free* group and `ride' on the traffic therein. But don't
ever propose tampering with that traffic in a centralized fashion. You
will be badly burned.

>Not a single cpunk has yet submitted any suggestions to me for the
>Guidelines as I have asked twice. Not one person. Do that first, O Verbose
>Ones!

I think a FAQ posted to the group is an excellent idea. In fact I am
considering putting one up here. But if the group hasn't even been
created yet, we have nowhere to post. The FAQ should come as soon as
possible, but *after* the creation of the group. And if there are a lot
of conflicting demands on a single group, than a FAQ that everyone
agrees to would be impossible to come up with amidst all the objections.

I just don't get it. This is a group like any other. Why do you think
the whole international public has to be prepared for its creation by
you personally?  People have to judge for themselves what to post, and
how reliable the mechanisms are. Sure, we will give the facts on the
security of the medium in the FAQ. But if they don't trust it (and
there will be plenty of reasons not to) then they shouldn't risk it. If
anywhere else there should be less content restrictions and our
overseeing `recommendations' (i.e. dictations) on postings.

>Have you heard
>of the Declaration of Independence? They prepared that document well, got all
>their Ducks in a Row and it's lasted for over 200 years. How many decades do
>you think a good WB system could last/evolve for? I ask only that you engage
>your long-range vision for a moment.

There was an interim government prior to the passage of this document.
And there was enormous haggling over the content of it, with many
compromises. The document is not perfect. There are flaws and cracks
that have poked through after 200 years. Do you think our judicial
system is as effective as possible? Do you think our legislative system
is the most representative of people's expectations of and directives
to their subservient government? Do you think our government today
truly represents, in all ways, the intentions of its founders? Do you
think they considered all possible scenarios? Do you think they would
not want to make some minor adjustments or major changes after seeing
200 years pass from their noble experiment? Do you think that anything
that is dynamic can be static?

Our democratic system, at the time of its inception, was almost
radically experimental. The broad commitment to state and human rights,
to the exclusion of federal ones, was quite flabbergasting to the
slaves of the European model...

>Anybody can put a box out on the street and say "everybody put your
>complaints in here," but it takes some real thinkers to put out a serious
>whistleblower system.

Look at everything that is efficient in the world, and you will see
that it is so because of *independently operating* components, with
minimized centralized control. When you want to get on your car and go
somewhere, you don't submit any proposals to a government agency for a
Transportation Plan.  The capitalist system works (and certain others,
which shall remain nameless, have failed) precisely because everybody
pursues and uses money *independently*. If they have an idea how to run
a business, they just start one (with great hassle from government
regulations). Usenet works because every server keeps abreast of all
articles *independently*. Message transmission on the internet is so
reliable because virtually an infinite number of routing pathways exist
that a message can take, avoiding any obstacles, each component
performing its job *independently*. Now, let me hear again how you want
us to submit all our public keys to you, submit the group guidelines
for your personal perusal (and presumably veto), and wait for all your
congressional friends to understand the concept? And how this will
ultimately lead to an ideal and robust system?

You simply don't understand. This idea is bigger than you, it is bigger
than me. Anyone who tries to wrap themselves completely around it will
explode from the pressure.

This system will *grow* *itself* to become extremely sophisticated and
respected. Let us not smother the sapling with misguided preconceptions
for nourishment.

>There are other excellent reasons to keep it in our collective pants for a
>while, but if THESE don't convince you, then perhaps I am asking the wrong
>group of folks to help get this started properly.

`Let's' start a mailing group for `nambypambypunks'. `We'll' get George
``Wouldn't be Prudent at this Juncture'' Bush to join. In fact, `we'
better even start it until `we're' sure he likes the idea.

p.s. cypherpunks, I certainly don't claim to speak for the group as a
whole (such a task would be impossible no matter *what* is said) but I
am becoming a bit disenchanted and disillusioned with some of the
opinions expressed herein. Is it just that the weasels are more vocal?




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Perry E. Metzger" <pmetzger@lehman.com>
Date: Fri, 16 Apr 93 09:03:13 PDT
To: extropians@gnu.ai.mit.edu
Subject: Dorothy Denning's friends strike
Message-ID: <9304161602.AA27246@snark.shearson.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



To: cypherpunks@toad.com, libernet@dartmouth.edu, extropians@gnu.ai.mit.edu

[Libernet readers -- please do not follow up on libernet, as it is
only for announcements. All readers -- please do not CC lists you are
not on with replies.]

According to a front page article in today's New York Times, the
Clinton Administration is going to be releasing a standard encryption
technology that commercial users will be encouraged to adopt that
involves having the government keep copies of "back door" keys
associated with every device deployed. The article is entitled,
with unintentional irony, "Communications Plan to Balance Government
Access with Privacy". The article indicates that the move is "inteded
to resolve a long standing dilema[...] how to preserve the legitimate
right for businesses and citizens to use codes [...] without letting
criminals and terrorists conspire beyond the reach of the law".

The implications are obvious.

Perry Metzger




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: gnu (John Gilmore)
Date: Fri, 16 Apr 93 12:24:26 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: White House press release on encryption policy
Message-ID: <9304161924.AA18313@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Note:  This file will also be available via anonymous file
transfer from csrc.ncsl.nist.gov in directory /pub/nistnews and
via the NIST Computer Security BBS at 301-948-5717.
     ---------------------------------------------------

                         THE WHITE HOUSE

                  Office of the Press Secretary

_________________________________________________________________

For Immediate Release                           April 16, 1993


                STATEMENT BY THE PRESS SECRETARY


The President today announced a new initiative that will bring
the Federal Government together with industry in a voluntary
program to improve the security and privacy of telephone
communications while meeting the legitimate needs of law
enforcement.

The initiative will involve the creation of new products to
accelerate the development and use of advanced and secure
telecommunications networks and wireless communications links.

For too long there has been little or no dialogue between our
private sector and the law enforcement community to resolve the
tension between economic vitality and the real challenges of
protecting Americans.  Rather than use technology to accommodate
the sometimes competing interests of economic growth, privacy and
law enforcement, previous policies have pitted government against
industry and the rights of privacy against law enforcement.

Sophisticated encryption technology has been used for years to
protect electronic funds transfer.  It is now being used to
protect electronic mail and computer files.  While encryption
technology can help Americans protect business secrets and the
unauthorized release of personal information, it also can be used
by terrorists, drug dealers, and other criminals.

A state-of-the-art microcircuit called the "Clipper Chip" has
been developed by government engineers.  The chip represents a
new approach to encryption technology.  It can be used in new,
relatively inexpensive encryption devices that can be attached to
an ordinary telephone.  It scrambles telephone communications
using an encryption algorithm that is more powerful than many in
commercial use today.

This new technology will help companies protect proprietary
information, protect the privacy of personal phone conversations
and prevent unauthorized release of data transmitted
electronically.  At the same time this technology preserves the
ability of federal, state and local law enforcement agencies to
intercept lawfully the phone conversations of criminals. 

A "key-escrow" system will be established to ensure that the
"Clipper Chip" is used to protect the privacy of law-abiding
Americans.  Each device containing the chip will have two unique


                                2


"keys," numbers that will be needed by authorized government
agencies to decode messages encoded by the device.  When the
device is manufactured, the two keys will be deposited separately
in two "key-escrow" data bases that will be established by the
Attorney General.  Access to these keys will be limited to
government officials with legal authorization to conduct a
wiretap.

The "Clipper Chip" technology provides law enforcement with no
new authorities to access the content of the private
conversations of Americans.

To demonstrate the effectiveness of this new technology, the
Attorney General will soon purchase several thousand of the new
devices.  In addition, respected experts from outside the
government will be offered access to the confidential details of
the algorithm to assess its capabilities and publicly report
their findings.

The chip is an important step in addressing the problem of
encryption's dual-edge sword:  encryption helps to protect the
privacy of individuals and industry, but it also can shield
criminals and terrorists.  We need the "Clipper Chip" and other
approaches that can both provide law-abiding citizens with access
to the encryption they need and prevent criminals from using it
to hide their illegal activities.  In order to assess technology
trends and explore new approaches (like the key-escrow system),
the President has directed government agencies to develop a
comprehensive policy on encryption that accommodates:

     --   the privacy of our citizens, including the need to
          employ voice or data encryption for business purposes;

     --   the ability of authorized officials to access telephone
          calls and data, under proper court or other legal
          order, when necessary to protect our citizens;

     --   the effective and timely use of the most modern
          technology to build the National Information
          Infrastructure needed to promote economic growth and
          the competitiveness of American industry in the global
          marketplace; and 

     --   the need of U.S. companies to manufacture and export
          high technology products.

The President has directed early and frequent consultations with
affected industries, the Congress and groups that advocate the
privacy rights of individuals as policy options are developed.



                                3

The Administration is committed to working with the private
sector to spur the development of a National Information
Infrastructure which will use new telecommunications and computer
technologies to give Americans unprecedented access to
information.  This infrastructure of high-speed networks
("information superhighways") will transmit video, images, HDTV
programming, and huge data files as easily as today's telephone
system transmits voice.

Since encryption technology will play an increasingly important
role in that infrastructure, the Federal Government must act
quickly to develop consistent, comprehensive policies regarding
its use.  The Administration is committed to policies that
protect all Americans' right to privacy while also protecting
them from those who break the law.

Further information is provided in an accompanying fact sheet. 
The provisions of the President's directive to acquire the new
encryption technology are also available.  

For additional details, call Mat Heyman, National Institute of
Standards and Technology, (301) 975-2758.

- - ---------------------------------


QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS ABOUT THE CLINTON ADMINISTRATION'S
TELECOMMUNICATIONS INITIATIVE




Q:   Does this approach expand the authority of government
     agencies to listen in on phone conversations?

A:   No.  "Clipper Chip" technology provides law enforcement with
     no new authorities to access the content of the private
     conversations of Americans.

Q:   Suppose a law enforcement agency is conducting a wiretap on
     a drug smuggling ring and intercepts a conversation
     encrypted using the device.  What would they have to do to
     decipher the message?

A:   They would have to obtain legal authorization, normally a
     court order, to do the wiretap in the first place.  They
     would then present documentation of this authorization to
     the two entities responsible for safeguarding the keys and
     obtain the keys for the device being used by the drug
     smugglers.  The key is split into two parts, which are
     stored separately in order to ensure the security of the key
     escrow system.

Q:   Who will run the key-escrow data banks?

A:   The two key-escrow data banks will be run by two independent
     entities.  At this point, the Department of Justice and the
     Administration have yet to determine which agencies will
     oversee the key-escrow data banks.

Q:   How strong is the security in the device?  How can I be sure
     how strong the security is?  

A:   This system is more secure than many other voice encryption
     systems readily available today.  While the algorithm will
     remain classified to protect the security of the key escrow
     system, we are willing to invite an independent panel of
     cryptography experts to evaluate the algorithm to assure all
     potential users that there are no unrecognized
     vulnerabilities.

Q:   Whose decision was it to propose this product?

A:   The National Security Council, the Justice Department, the
     Commerce Department, and other key agencies were involved in
     this decision.  This approach has been endorsed by the
     President, the Vice President, and appropriate Cabinet
     officials.

Q:   Who was consulted?  The Congress?  Industry?

A:   We have on-going discussions with Congress and industry on
     encryption issues, and expect those discussions to intensify
     as we carry out our review of encryption policy.  We have
     briefed members of Congress and industry leaders on the
     decisions related to this initiative.

Q:   Will the government provide the hardware to manufacturers?

A:   The government designed and developed the key access
     encryption microcircuits, but it is not providing the
     microcircuits to product manufacturers.  Product
     manufacturers can acquire the microcircuits from the chip
     manufacturer that produces them.

Q:   Who provides the "Clipper Chip"?

A:   Mykotronx programs it at their facility in Torrance,
     California, and will sell the chip to encryption device
     manufacturers.  The programming function could be licensed
     to other vendors in the future.

Q:   How do I buy one of these encryption devices? 

A:   We expect several manufacturers to consider incorporating
     the "Clipper Chip" into their devices.
     
Q:   If the Administration were unable to find a technological
     solution like the one proposed, would the Administration be
     willing to use legal remedies to restrict access to more
     powerful encryption devices?

A:   This is a fundamental policy question which will be
     considered during the broad policy review.  The key escrow
     mechanism will provide Americans with an encryption product
     that is more secure, more convenient, and less expensive
     than others readily available today, but it is just one
     piece of what must be the comprehensive approach to
     encryption technology, which the Administration is
     developing.

     The Administration is not saying, "since encryption
     threatens the public safety and effective law enforcement,
     we will prohibit it outright" (as some countries have
     effectively done); nor is the U.S. saying that "every
     American, as a matter of right, is entitled to an
     unbreakable commercial encryption product."  There is a
     false "tension" created in the assessment that this issue is
     an "either-or" proposition.  Rather, both concerns can be,
     and in fact are, harmoniously balanced through a reasoned,
     balanced approach such as is proposed with the "Clipper
     Chip" and similar encryption techniques.

Q:   What does this decision indicate about how the Clinton
     Administration's policy toward encryption will differ from
     that of the Bush Administration?  

A:   It indicates that we understand the importance of encryption
     technology in telecommunications and computing and are
     committed to working with industry and public-interest
     groups to find innovative ways to protect Americans'
     privacy, help businesses to compete, and ensure that law
     enforcement agencies have the tools they need to fight crime
     and terrorism.

Q:   Will the devices be exportable?  Will other devices that use
     the government hardware?

A:   Voice encryption devices are subject to export control
     requirements.  Case-by-case review for each export is
     required to ensure appropriate use of these devices.  The
     same is true for other encryption devices.  One of the
     attractions of this technology is the protection it can give
     to U.S. companies operating at home and abroad.  With this
     in mind, we expect export licenses will be granted on a
     case-by-case basis for U.S. companies seeking to use these
     devices to secure their own communications abroad.  We plan
     to review the possibility of permitting wider exportability
     of these products.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: jthomas@coconut.mitre.org (Joe Thomas)
Date: Fri, 16 Apr 93 09:27:24 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Proposal for anon chaining
Message-ID: <9304161626.AA02630@coconut>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


KINNEY WILLIAM H <kinney@spot.colorado.edu> writes:

> Recent traffic on anonymous remailers/servers:
> 

> >From:  Eli   <ebrandt@jarthur.claremont.edu>
> >> From: Hal <74076.1041@CompuServe.COM>
> >> This method of posting does not allow you to receive replies.  I  
have set
> >> "nicknames" for these two accounts as "Untraceable account"  
which will appear
> > >in the "From" line on the postings.  Hopefully that will offer a  
clue that
> > >the normal reply mechanism doesn't work.  Maybe the nickname  
should say so
> >> more explicitly?
> >
> >
> >The security provided by this technique could be provided without
> >the IMHO serious disadvantage of having no return address.  Eric's
> >hybrid approach, where a pseudonym server hands mail to an  
remailer
> >chain, is secure (barring sophisticated traffic analysis) if you
> >trust the last remailer in the chain.  Julf, have you thought  
about
> >whether you want to do something like this?
> 

> > Hal
> 

> Here's an idea I haven't seen suggested before, which would remove  
the need
> for a pseudonym server:
> 

> [Description of chain-encrypted header info, separated from message  
text]
> 

> This seems to me to be a very robust pseudonymous mail system which 

> could be implemented by relatively minor changes to the existing  
Cypherpunk 

> remailer structure. It has the additional advantage of being  
decentralized 

> and maintenance-free.  It could be used for pseudonyms on net news,  
e-mail, 

> wherever, and could presumably be integrated in some way into  
Julf's 

> anon server.
> 

Yes, this would seem to be the way to do this, and this type of  
nested-encrypted routing information is what I was referring to as an  
"SASE" in my front-end/back-end anonymous posting design.  There are  
some drawbacks, however.

Traffic analysis by watching a remailer's feed, and seeing messages  
come in and go back out is much easier, since the message _text_ is  
unchanged from one remailer to the next.  In fact, however, such  
traffic analysis is not difficult with the present system, since  
message lengths can be used to correlate messages going in and out,  
and the remailers aren't getting enough traffic to do much internal  
"mixing" to avoid obvious FIFO behavior.  The obvious solutions are a  
remailing protocol that supports padding out messages to a few  
"standard" lengths, and increasing the remailer traffic, perhaps with  
dummy messages.

But this doesn't help in the above case, when routing information is  
separate from message text, and not known to the sender (except for  
the first hop).  One possible solution relies on the fact that each  
remailer must know the next hop a message will take.  When the  
remailer is forwarding mail with separately encrypted header  
information, it will append some random bits to the message, then  
encrypt it with the next remailer's public key.  (Note that if the  
appending of random bits is skipped, the system provides no security  
against traffic analysis, since the adversary can simply try  
encrypting incoming messages with various remailers' public keys,  
then watch to see if that message comes back out).

I've got some more ambitious ideas for this (encrypted return  
addresses as a MIME content-type?), but I think the version outlined  
above could be implemented pretty easily, although I admit I haven't  
really read through the remailer scripts.  I'll take a crack at it as  
soon as I get my Linux box (a couple weeks) if people think it's a  
good idea.

Joe




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Hal <74076.1041@CompuServe.COM>
Date: Fri, 16 Apr 93 09:56:19 PDT
To: <cypherpunks@toad.com>
Subject: ANON: Chaining suggestions
Message-ID: <930416165143_74076.1041_FHD34-1@CompuServe.COM>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Will Kinney suggests a form of anonymous return address in which 
"Request-Remailing-To" headers are nested and encrypted, then used for 
addressing.
 
This is a fine idea, Will, but we're way ahead of you on this.  This 
approach has been used ever since we added encryption to the remailers.  
Karl Barrus even wrote a script specifically for constructing anonymous 
addresses like this.  It's available from the Cypherpunks ftp site.  
(soda.berkeley.edu, /pub/cypherpunks.  I think the file is something 
like "scripts.tar".)
 
The problem with this in practice is, first, that the return address 
block is rather large, especially if more than one level of nesting is 
used (often 10, 20 lines or more); and second, that it does not lend 
itself to automatic use of the "reply" function.  Instead, the replier 
has to cut and paste this block of text from the message he's replying 
to and put it in the right place in his own message.  And he has to be 
instructed in how to do this.  (Karl's script adds the instructions when 
it creates the return address.)  This is pretty complicated.
 
This is why Eli suggested (based on suggestions from Eric Hughes) that 
at least Julf's remailer be enhanced so instead of just mapping, say, 
an12345 to joe@foo.com, it would map to a Cypherpunks return address of 
the type Will is describing - a block of encrypted text.  People could 
then have the convenience of automatic replies to an12345 along with the 
security of a chained address.
 
I don't think the idea quite works in this form, since I don't see how 
messages to Julf get translated to an12345.  Presumably only messages 
from one specific user should get posted under this ID (the user whose 
address is buried in the encrypted return address to which Julf's 
remailer will forward replies).  Perhaps another set of commands is 
needed to tell the remailer what ID to use to post under.  By the time 
you do this much I don't think that what you have bears much resemblence 
to Julf's current software.
 
I am stymied in doing experimentation in this area by one fundamental 
problem.  I do not have the power to create user ID's on any systems 
which I use, so I can't create pseudonym accounts.  I have tried various 
tricks.  For example, I sent mail with a "Reply-To:" of 
"hal@alumni.caltech.edu (Pseudonym 12345)".  I hoped that if someone did 
a reply to this mail, it might come to me with that whole field in the 
"To" line, and I could then parse it for the pseudonym number.  That 
didn't work on the particular reply mailer that I used; it stripped the 
comment field in parentheses.
 
The one other idea I've had is to put something at the beginning of the 
Subject: line, so if the user remailed a message with a Subject: of 
"How's it going, Jack?" it would actually go out as "Subject: (P12345) 
How's it going, Jack?".  Then when they reply it will probably come back 
as "Subject: Re: (P12345) How's it going, Jack?" or something similar, 
and I can parse for the (Pxxxxx).  This might work pretty often but 
munging the Subject line is bad for news posting since a lot of news 
readers sort by subject line.  I could put the (Pxxxxx) at the end but 
it might get truncated?  Maybe not.
 
I wonder if anyone knowledgable in mail systems could suggest a 
relatively robust way of setting up outgoing headers so that return mail 
will (A) come back to me (hal@alumni.caltech.edu in this case) and (B) 
be marked in some unique way that would let me do a pseudonym mapping.  
Any ideas would be appreciated.
 
Hal Finney
74076.1041@compuserve.com





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: nobody@alumni.cco.caltech.edu
Date: Fri, 16 Apr 93 13:00:25 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: ANON: Chaining to Penet remailer
Message-ID: <9304162000.AA00123@alumni.cco.caltech.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I am not very inclined to defend myself or my news.admin.policy
postings, since saying someones an asshole seems to be what the
group is for, but I am listening to the discussion and take seriously
peoples crticisms and listening hard.  FOr what it's worth, I said
I was sorry but It pisses me off that when a nym tells some jerk
to fuck off, everyone jumps all over me.  EVen so, I'll listen to
what people have to say since I don't want to lose access ... without
the remailers I am                                   Nowhere, Man.

Isn't that ironic???




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: gnu (John Gilmore)
Date: Fri, 16 Apr 93 13:54:23 PDT
To: cypherpunks-announce@toad.com
Subject: EFF crypto statement and press release
Message-ID: <9304162054.AA19449@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


April 16, 1993

INITIAL EFF ANALYSIS OF CLINTON PRIVACY AND SECURITY PROPOSAL

The Clinton Administration today made a major announcement on cryptography
policy which will effect the privacy and security of millions of Americans.
 The first part of the plan is to begin a comprehensive inquiry into major
communications privacy issues such as export controls which have
effectively denied most people easy access to robust encryption, and law
enforcement issues posed by new technology.

However, EFF is very concerned that the Administration has already reached
a conclusion on one critical part of the inquiry, before any public comment
or discussion has been allowed.  Apparently, the Administration is going to
use its leverage to get all telephone equipment vendors to adopt a voice
encryption standard developed by the National Security Agency.  The
so-called "Clipper Chip" is an 80-bit, split key escrowed encryption scheme
which will be built into chips manufactured by a military contractor.  Two
separate escrow agents would store users' keys, and be required to turn
them over law enforcement upon presentation of a valid warrant.  The
encryption scheme used is to be classified, but the chips will be available
to any manufacturer for incorporation into its communications products.

     This proposal raises a number of serious concerns .

First, the Administration has adopted a solution before conducting an
inquiry.  The NSA-developed Clipper Chip may not be the most secure
product. Other vendors or developers may have better schemes. Furthermore,
we should not rely on the government as the sole source for the Clipper or
any other chips.  Rather, independent chip manufacturers should be able to
produce chipsets based on open standards.

Second, an algorithm cannot be trusted unless it can be tested. Yet, the
Administration proposes to keep the chip algorithm classified.  EFF
believes that any standard adopted ought to be public and open.  The public
will only have confidence in the security of a standard that is open to
independent, expert scrutiny.  

Third, while the use of the use of a split-key, dual escrowed system may
prove to be a reasonable balance between privacy and law enforcement needs,
the details of this scheme must be explored publicly before it is adopted. 
What will give people confidence in the safety of their keys?  Does
disclosure of keys to a third party waive an individual's Fifth Amendment
rights in subsequent criminal inquiries?  These are but a few of the many
questions the Administrations proposal raised but fails to answer.

In sum, the Administration has shown great sensitivity to the importance of
these issues by planning a comprehensive inquiry into digital privacy and
security.  However, the "Clipper Chip" solution ought to be considered as
part of the inquiry, and not be adopted before the discussion even begins.

DETAILS OF THE PROPOSAL:

ESCROW

The 80-bit key will be divided between two escrow agents, each of whom hold
40-bits of each key.  The manufacturer of the communications device would
be required to register all keys with the two independent escrow agents.  A
key is tied to the device, however, not the person using it.

Upon presentation of a valid court order, the two escrow agents would have
to turn the key parts over to law enforcement agents.  According to the
Presidential Directive just issued, the Attorney General will be asked to
identify appropriate escrow agents.  Some in the Administration have
suggested that one non-law enforcement federal agency (perhaps the Federal
Reserve), and one non-governmental organization could be chosen, but there
is no agreement on the identity of the agents yet.

CLASSIFIED ALGORITHM AND THE POSSIBILITY OF BACK DOORS

The Administration claims that there are no back doors -- means by which
the government or others could break the code without securing keys from
the escrow agents -- and that the President will be told there are no back
doors to this classified algorithm.  In order to prove this, Administration
sources are interested in arranging for an all-star crypto cracker team to
come in, under a security arrangement, and examine the algorithm for trap
doors.  The results of the investigation would then be made public.

The Clipper Chipset was designed and is being produced and a sole-source,
secret contract between the National Security Agency and two private firms:
 VLSI and Mycotronx.  NSA work on this plan has been underway for about
four years.  The manufacturing contract was let 14 months ago.

GOVERNMENT AS MARKET DRIVER

In order to get a market moving, and to show that the government believes
in the security of this system, the feds will be the first big customers
for this product.  Users will include the FBI, Secret Service, VP Al Gore,
and maybe even the President.  At today's Commerce Department press
briefing, a number of people asked this question, though:  why would any
private organization or individual adopt a classified standard that had no
independent guaranty of security or freedom from trap doors?

COMPREHENSIVE POLICY INQUIRY

The Administration has also announced that it is about to commence an
inquiry into all policy issues related to privacy protection, encryption,
and law enforcement.  The items to be considered include:  export controls
on encryption technology and the FBI's Digital Telephony Proposal.  It
appears that the this inquiry will be conducted by the National Security
Council.  Unfortunately, however, the Presidential Directive describing the
inquiry is classified.  Some public involvement in the process has been
promised, but they terms have yet to be specified.

FROM MORE INFORMATION CONTACT:

Jerry Berman, Executive Director (jberman@eff.org)
Daniel J. Weitzner, Senior Staff Counsel (djw@eff.org)

Full text of the Press releases and Fact Sheets issued by the
Administration will be available on EFF's ftp site.

===================

PRESS RELEASE

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE:  April 16, 1993

Electronic Frontier Foundation responds to Clinton Administration Digital
Privacy and Security proposals.

EFF Chairman Mitchell Kapor praises process but questions need for secret
standard.

The Clinton Administration today made a major announcement on privacy and
security for electronic communications including regular and cellular
phones.  Mitchell Kapor, EFF Chairman of the Board, praised Administration
efforts to study comprehensive solutions to privacy problems, but
questioned the specific solution which the government is seeking to impose.
 

"The Administration is to be commended for launching a broad inquiry into
these critical problems," said Kapor, "but they should not attempt to
impose a solution before the process has begun."

"A system based on classified, secret technology will not and should not
gain the confidence of the American public," continued Kapor, commenting on
the proposed use of the NSA-developed "Clipper Chip."  The Clipper chip is
to be sold to private corporations for incorporation in communications
products, but will be based on a classified coding system.

Kapor explained that "in the past, government-designed standards have
suffered under the suspicion that a hidden 'trap door' would allow
unauthorized governmental or private intrusion.  The only way to avoid this
mistake is to publish open standards and subject them to expert,
independent scrutiny."

The Clipper proposal would also require users to deposit their code "keys"
with "trusted" escrow agents in order to allow law enforcement to conduct
court-authorized wiretaps.

Jerry Berman, EFF's Executive Director, said that "the escrow system is an
intriguing proposal, but the details of this scheme must be explored
publicly before it is adopted. What will give people confidence in the
safety of their keys? Does disclosure of keys to a third party waive an
individual's Fifth Amendment rights against self-incrimination? The
administration will need to answer questions such as these before it
proceeds with this, or any other, proposal."

Contact:
Jerry Berman, Executive Director
Daniel J. Weitzner, Senior Staff Counsel
tel: 202-544-3077 or 202-544-9237
eff@eff.org




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Date: Fri, 16 Apr 93 14:18:18 PDT
To: Cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Key Registration and Big Brother--Time to Fight!
Message-ID: <9304162117.AA29302@netcom.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


(Perry Metzger forwarded my message this morning to the Cypherpunks list on
the latest White House proposal....I should've also sent it to the
Extropians list myself, my vacation from the list notwithstanding. Some
things are just too important!)

The latest White House proposal to authorize a certain form of encryption,
called "Clipper Chip," (a bizarre name, which also conflicts with the
"Clipper" processor made by Intergraph), represents the reification of all
the "key registration" themes discussed for many months on sci.crypt and
elsewhere.

I urge those on the Extropians list who are interested in preserving their
dwindling freedoms in these Beknighted States of America to:

1. Follow the debate on sci.crypt and elsewhere. Hal Finney just mentioned
the various places the White House announcement was posted.

2. Subscribe to the Cypherpunks list by sending a message to
"cypherpunks-request@toad.com".  The latest "Wired," which I have not yet
seen myself, apparently has some good stuff on our group. (I reviewed
Levy's article for him, but haven't seen the mag on the newsstands yet.)

3. Get your PGP and MacPGP before "the other shoe drops." The "other shoe"
may be legal moves by RSA Data Security and others (Commerce? Justice?) to
crack down on PGP...rumblings of this have been heard for months now, and
were discussed at the last physical Cypherpunks meeting. (And the
steganographic aspects--the hiding of the mere _existence_ of an encrypted
message--will probably assume a greater importance than before.)

4. The Boston area just had its first physical Cypherpunks meeting, with
Julf intending to attend (J. Helsingius, operator of the Finnish anonymous
remailer)....I haven't heard the outcome. The U.K has had one for several
months, and of course the Bay Area has had one since before there was even
a mailing list. The Southern California area has several leading
Cypherpunks (Hal Finney, Phil Karn, Eli Brandt, others) and wants to host a
meeting of "the Cypherpunks." Instead, and in light of the serious danger
that encryption will soon have limits placed on it, I would urge them to
*just begin their own meeting* ASAP! (Sorry to sound so urgent, but they
need to start meeting long before we can arrange a meeting in San Diego or
LA.)

(One thing we talked about at the 4-10-93 meeting in Mountain View, CA, was
a conference call linking up some of the "satellite Cypherpunks." Not
secure, of course, but then neither is this list nor our physical
meetings...anybody can attend, can get added to the list, etc.)

5. Prof. Denning has more to say about key escrow and registration in the
latest (or very recent) "Communications of the ACM," which should be
available in large university libraries. Now that the proposal has become
real, it takes on more meaning.

6. It is clear that the "trial balloon" I cited in my message many months
back to sci.crypt is nauseatingly real. Under the guise of stopping "drug
dealers, terrorists, and child pornographers," we will see limits placed on
our ability to communicate privately. I have few hopes that this proposal
will be overturned by the courts, including the Supreme Court. A "garrison
state" like the U.S. is turning itself into, what with the War on (Some)
Drugs, the no-knock raids on suspects, the civil forfeiture laws, and the
attacks on "whacko Waco religious cults," has need of Nazi-like police
powers.

It seems ironic, and appropriate, that this White House announcement came
on the 50th anniversary of the discovery of LSD...April 16th, 1943.

As I said six months ago, "Be afraid, be very afraid."

As Phil Karn put it, the battle is joined.


-Tim May
--
Timothy C. May         | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,  
tcmay@netcom.com       | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
408-688-5409           | knowledge, reputations, information markets, 
W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA  | black markets, collapse of governments.
Higher Power: 2^756839 | Public Key: MailSafe and PGP available.





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: dmandl@shearson.com (David Mandl)
Date: Fri, 16 Apr 93 12:03:03 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Phil Zimmerman on the Radio
Message-ID: <9304161840.AA17929@tardis.shearson.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


FYI, for those of you in the NYC area, I'm going to be conducting a
brief interview with Phil Zimmerman (author of PGP) on my radio show
tomorrow to discuss the recent NSA/Big Brother crypto developments
(see the front page of today's New York Times).

WFMU, East Orange, NJ, 91.1 FM.  My show airs from noon-3:00 local time,
and the interview will start at around 1:00.

N.B.: I will NOT be taping the show, so I can't make tapes for anyone.
Anyone else listening is free to make copies and do whatever they want
with them, of course.

   --Dave.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: derek@cs.wisc.edu (Derek Zahn)
Date: Fri, 16 Apr 93 13:00:08 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: circling the wagons
Message-ID: <9304162000.AA29054@lynx.cs.wisc.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Assuming that the "Clipper chip" initiative isn't a teapot
tempest, I suppose we'd better start sharpening our rhetorical
knives.

Privacy arguments and sheer outrage will be useful, but it
seems to me that the "modern steganography" discussion from
a few weeks back offers an irrefutable argument:

  By performing rather simple camouflaging, it is possible
  to make an encrypted message undetectable by encoding
  it in (images, voice, any other signal that could plausibly
  contain noise).  This is rather easy to do, so those who
  REALLY want to hide what they're doing (terrorists, criminals,
  republican campaign staff) will still be able to do so.
  In fact, by encrypting the wrapper with your "Clipper"
  system, they look like they're hiding noting.  All that you
  are buying is a false sense of security.

derek





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: pmetzger@lehman.com (Perry E. Metzger)
Date: Fri, 16 Apr 93 12:46:29 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Mailing list name
Message-ID: <9304161946.AA27724@snark.shearson.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



In the light of recent developments concerning government cryptography
initiatives, we might soon find ourselves innundated by working press.

Given this, I think that the name "cypherpunks" produces the wrong
connotations -- it makes us sound like criminals when we are in fact
people who are interested in expanding personal privacy with
technology. Often, little things like this end up being of tremendous
importance in the long haul.

I would propose changing the name of the mailing list to
"cryptoprivacy" or something similar. It denotes what we are about in
a way that mundane people understand better, and it portrays us in the
proper light -- as people struggling to improve the prospects for
personal freedom, not a bunch of "punks".

Perry





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Peter Wayner <pcw@access.digex.com>
Date: Fri, 16 Apr 93 14:56:30 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: The New Mykotronix phones...
Message-ID: <199304161954.AA20309@access.digex.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Okay, let's suppose that the NSA/NIST/Mykotronix Registered
Key system becomes standard and I'm able to buy such a system
from my local radio shack. Every phone comes with a built in
chip and the government has the key to every phone call. 
I go and buy a phone and dutifully register the key. 

What's to prevent me from swapping phones with a friend or 
buying a used phone at a garage sale? Whooa. The secret registered
keys just became unsynchronized. When the government comes 
to listen in, they only receive gobbledly-gook because the 
secret key registered under my name isn't the right one. 

That leads me to conjecture that:

1) The system isn't that secure. There are just two master keys
that work for all the phones in the country. The part about
registering your keys is just bogus. 

or 

2) The system is vulnerable to simple phone swapping attacks
like this. Criminals will quickly figure this out and go to
town.

In either case, I think we need to look at this a bit deeper.

-Peter Wayner






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: treason@gnu.ai.mit.edu
Date: Fri, 16 Apr 93 13:14:50 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: White House Encryption idea
Message-ID: <9304162014.AA05785@spiff.gnu.ai.mit.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Well, this all sounds fine and dandy, but...

1)  They are not passing out the algorithym, and I dont trust ANYONE to tell
me its secure.  I am not a cryptographer, so it wouldn't help any if they gave
the code to me, but it just being out there for public perusal helps me to
think it IS secure.  I trust no payola.

2)  It is very possible that the 'criminal' effort may be able to modify
these devices so that there is no possiblility for the agencies to decrypt
their trasmissions (If it IS truly secure with no backdoors or decyphering
possibilities) in which case, it can only harm the law abiding.

3)  It allows the government the ability to determine WHAT encryption
method industry uses, and they should be able to have a choice.  Those who
understand this very misleading comment will understand, those who do not, will
prolly never be able to.

4) No explanation of what the 'key' contents are composed of (numbers, letters,
alphanum, characters, some odd cyphercode???) is even implied.

5)  No explanation of how the key is propegated or if it will even be needed
for the remote site is mentioned.  How are the remote sites going to
decypher your cyphersounds(text)?

There was no mention of further releases in information...is this all we get?

treason@gnu 



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: treason@gnu.ai.mit.edu
Date: Fri, 16 Apr 93 13:31:36 PDT
To: pmetzger@lehman.com
Subject: Re: Mailing list name
In-Reply-To: <9304161946.AA27724@snark.shearson.com>
Message-ID: <9304162031.AA05882@spiff.gnu.ai.mit.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> 
> 
> In the light of recent developments concerning government cryptography
> initiatives, we might soon find ourselves innundated by working press.
> 
> Given this, I think that the name "cypherpunks" produces the wrong
> connotations -- it makes us sound like criminals when we are in fact
> people who are interested in expanding personal privacy with
> technology. Often, little things like this end up being of tremendous
> importance in the long haul.
> 
> I would propose changing the name of the mailing list to
> "cryptoprivacy" or something similar. It denotes what we are about in
> a way that mundane people understand better, and it portrays us in the
> proper light -- as people struggling to improve the prospects for
> personal freedom, not a bunch of "punks".
> 
> Perry
> 
> 
I agree wholeheartedly, and I think I have the experience to say so.  You 
wouldn't believe how much importance people and groups put on names.  Even
though I have not, nor ever intend to commit the act described by my name,
people still look at me with a leery eye.  Becase I am

treason@gnu




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Timothy Newsham <newsham@wiliki.eng.hawaii.edu>
Date: Fri, 16 Apr 93 19:44:48 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: white house blunder
Message-ID: <9304170244.AA25203@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Even though the white house proposal may seem bad it could be
used to your advantage in some ways:

swap keys with someone else...   if serial number isnt sent
in transmission this takes gives a big headache when they try
to decrypt your stream.

use another encryption before sending to clipper chip...
this way everything looks normal, and if they are playing according
to the rules (cross fingers)  they dont know anything is fishy
until they try to get a warrant and decrypt. 

First keys wont match.  When they do find the correct key they'll
decrypt and get a file encrypted in another system.
This might be great for averting suspicion of using another crypto-
system.   Everyone will be using clipper, and your message will look
like its from the clipper chip.  It wont look like an RSA file
or DES'ed voice or whatever.  The chip gives you a opaque (hopefully)
envelope to put things into.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Date: Fri, 16 Apr 93 16:51:11 PDT
To: extropians@gnu.ai.mit.edu
Subject: (fwd) White House Public Encryption Management Fact Sheet
Message-ID: <9304162351.AA00841@netcom.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Message from Tim: The following forwarded message (below, after these
introductory comments) explains in more detail the NIST/NSA proposal and
adds a few disturbing wrinkles: 

1. Quote: "INSTALLATION OF GOVERNMENT-DEVELOPED MICROCIRCUITS

The Attorney General of the United States, or her representative,
shall request manufacturers of communications hardware which
incorporates encryption to install the U.S. government-developed
key-escrow microcircuits in their products."

This suggests more than just voice communications will be affected by the
policy. "Communications hardware" suggests a broad scope. Modem makers may
be told to (somehow) incorporate this system into their products...not
clear what this means for old equipment, incompatible equipment, etc.

2. The "shall request manufacturers..." bit does not sound voluntary. (The
whole line about "Clipper" being so attractive that manufacturers will
gladly design it in....total B.S.)

3. At the end of this document is mention of using the civil forfeiture
laws to enforce the new system. Not state, but implicit (I believe) is that
the threat of civil forfeiture will be used to scare users into compliance.
Very disturbing.

Read it and weep! Then start planning.

-Tim May, who hopes the Cypherpunks will adopt my suggestion that we use
the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists-style "clock"...I call it 10 minutes
before midnight


***Begin forwarded message from sci.crypt and other groups***

From: clipper@csrc.ncsl.nist.gov (Clipper Chip Announcement)
Subject: White House Public Encryption Management Fact Sheet
Organization: National Institute of Standards & Technology
Date: Fri, 16 Apr 1993 20:44:58 GMT


Note:     The following was released by the White House today in
          conjunction with the announcement of the Clipper Chip
          encryption technology.

                           FACT SHEET

                  PUBLIC ENCRYPTION MANAGEMENT

The President has approved a directive on "Public Encryption
Management."  The directive provides for the following:

Advanced telecommunications and commercially available encryption
are part of a wave of new computer and communications technology. 
Encryption products scramble information to protect the privacy of
communications and data by preventing unauthorized access. 
Advanced telecommunications systems use digital technology to
rapidly and precisely handle a high volume of communications. 
These advanced telecommunications systems are integral to the
infrastructure needed to ensure economic competitiveness in the
information age.

Despite its benefits, new communications technology can also
frustrate lawful government electronic surveillance.  Sophisticated
encryption can have this effect in the United States.  When
exported abroad, it can be used to thwart foreign intelligence
activities critical to our national interests.  In the past, it has
been possible to preserve a government capability to conduct
electronic surveillance in furtherance of legitimate law
enforcement and national security interests, while at the same time
protecting the privacy and civil liberties of all citizens.  As
encryption technology improves, doing so will require new,
innovative approaches.

In the area of communications encryption, the U. S. Government has
developed a microcircuit that not only provides privacy through
encryption that is substantially more robust than the current
government standard, but also permits escrowing of the keys needed
to unlock the encryption.  The system for the escrowing of keys
will allow the government to gain access to encrypted information
only with appropriate legal authorization.

To assist law enforcement and other government agencies to collect
and decrypt, under legal authority, electronically transmitted
information, I hereby direct the following action to be taken:

INSTALLATION OF GOVERNMENT-DEVELOPED MICROCIRCUITS

The Attorney General of the United States, or her representative,
shall request manufacturers of communications hardware which
incorporates encryption to install the U.S. government-developed
key-escrow microcircuits in their products.  The fact of law
enforcement access to the escrowed keys will not be concealed from
the American public.  All appropriate steps shall be taken to
ensure that any existing or future versions of the key-escrow
microcircuit are made widely available to U.S. communications
hardware manufacturers, consistent with the need to ensure the
security of the key-escrow system.  In making this decision, I do
not intend to prevent the private sector from developing, or the
government from approving, other microcircuits or algorithms that
are equally effective in assuring both privacy and a secure key-
escrow system.

KEY-ESCROW

The Attorney General shall make all arrangements with appropriate
entities to hold the keys for the key-escrow microcircuits
installed in communications equipment.  In each case, the key
holder must agree to strict security procedures to prevent
unauthorized release of the keys.  The keys shall be released only
to government agencies that have established their authority to
acquire the content of those communications that have been
encrypted by devices containing the microcircuits.  The Attorney
General shall review for legal sufficiency the procedures by which
an agency establishes its authority to acquire the content of such
communications.

PROCUREMENT AND USE OF ENCRYPTION DEVICES

The Secretary of Commerce, in consultation with other appropriate
U.S. agencies, shall initiate a process to write standards to
facilitate the procurement and use of encryption devices fitted
with key-escrow microcircuits in federal communications systems
that process sensitive but unclassified information.  I expect this
process to proceed on a schedule that will permit promulgation of
a final standard within six months of this directive. 

The Attorney General will procure and utilize encryption devices to
the extent needed to preserve the government's ability to conduct
lawful electronic surveillance and to fulfill the need for secure
law enforcement communications.  Further, the Attorney General
shall utilize funds from the Department of Justice Asset Forfeiture
Super Surplus Fund to effect this purchase.

--





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Joseph Truitt <joseph@valis.biocad.com>
Date: Fri, 16 Apr 93 18:30:50 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: [fwd] Initial EFF analysis of Clinton Privacy and Security Proposal
Message-ID: <9304170040.AA21888@valis.biocad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



I don't recall having posted to this list before, but I am a truly
supportive lurker as it were, doing my bit to sow seeds of crypto-anarchy
at the layperson level to many friends.

Anyway, in light of today's foreboding announcement from the White House, I
thought you might be interested in this blurb from the EFF.

------- Forwarded Message

Date: Fri, 16 Apr 1993 15:17:02 -0400
From: Cliff Figallo <fig@eff.org>
Subject: EFFector Online 5.06
To: eff-news@eff.org (eff-news mailing list)

******************************************************************
           //////////////     //////////////     //////////////
         ///                ///                ///
       ///////            ///////            ///////
     ///                ///                ///
   //////////////     ///                ///
******************************************************************
EFFector Online Volume 5 No. 6       4/16/1993       editors@eff.org
A Publication of the Electronic Frontier Foundation   ISSN 1062-9424

...

                       April 16, 1993

      INITIAL EFF ANALYSIS OF CLINTON PRIVACY AND SECURITY  
                           PROPOSAL

       The Clinton Administration today made a major announcement 
on cryptography policy which will effect the privacy and security of 
millions of Americans.  The first part of the plan is to begin a 
comprehensive inquiry into major communications privacy issues 
such as export controls which have effectively denied most people 
easy access to robust encryption as well as law enforcement issues 
posed by new technology.

       However, EFF is very concerned that the Administration has 
already reached a conclusion on one critical part of the inquiry, before 
any public comment or discussion has been allowed.  Apparently, the 
Administration is going to use its leverage to get all telephone 
equipment vendors to adopt a voice encryption standard developed 
by the National Security Agency. The so-called "Clipper Chip" is an 
80-bit, split key escrowed encryption scheme which will be built into 
chips manufactured by a military contractor.  Two separate escrow 
agents would store users' keys, and be required to turn them over 
law enforcement upon presentation of a valid warrant.  The 
encryption scheme used is to be classified, but they chips will be 
available to any manufacturer for incorporation into their 
communications products.

       This proposal raises a number of serious concerns .

       First, the Administration appears to be adopting a solution 
before conducting an inquiry.  The NSA-developed Clipper chip may 
not be the most secure product. Other vendors or developers may 
have better schemes. Furthermore, we should not rely on the 
government as the sole source for Clipper or any other chips.  Rather,
independent chip manufacturers should be able to produce chipsets 
based on open standards.

       Second, an algorithm can not be trusted unless it can be tested. 
Yet the Administration proposes to keep the chip algorithm 
classified.  EFF believes that any standard adopted ought to be public 
and open.  The public will only have confidence in the security of a 
standard that is open to independent, expert scrutiny.  

       Third, while the use of the split-key, dual-escrowed 
system may prove to be a reasonable balance between privacy and 
law enforcement needs, the details of this scheme must be explored 
publicly before it is adopted.  What will give people confidence in the 
safety of their keys?  Does disclosure of keys to a third party waive 
individual's fifth amendment rights in subsequent criminal 
inquiries?  

       In sum, the Administration has shown great sensitivity to the 
importance of these issues by planning a comprehensive inquiry into 
digital privacy and security.  However, the "Clipper chip" solution 
ought to be considered as part of the inquiry, not be adopted before 
the discussion even begins.

DETAILS OF THE PROPOSAL:

ESCROW

The 80-bit key will be divided between two escrow agents, each of 
whom hold 40 bits of each key.  Upon presentation of a valid 
warrant, the two escrow agents would have to turn the key parts 
over to law enforcement agents.  Most likely the Attorney General 
will be asked to identify appropriate escrow agents.  Some in the 
Administration have suggested one non-law enforcement federal 
agency, perhaps the Federal Reserve, and one non-governmental 
organization.  But, there is no agreement on the identity of the agents 
yet.

Key registration would be done by the manufacturer of the 
communications device.  A key is tied to the device, not to the person 
using it.

CLASSIFIED ALGORITHM AND THE POSSIBILITY OF BACK DOORS

The Administration claims that there are no back door means by 
which the government or others could break the code without 
securing keys from the escrow agents and that the President will 
be told there are no back doors to this classified algorithm.  In order 
to prove this, Administration sources are interested in arranging for 
an all-star crypto cracker team to come in, under a security 
arrangement, and examine the algorithm for trap doors.  The results 
of the investigation would then be made public.

GOVERNMENT AS MARKET DRIVER


In order to get a market moving, and to show that the government 
believes in the security of this system, the feds will be the first big 
customers for this product.  Users will include the FBI, Secret Service, 
VP Al Gore, and maybe even the President. 

FROM MORE INFORMATION CONTACT:

Jerry Berman, Executive Director
Daniel J. Weitzner, Senior Staff Counsel

...

=============================================================

     EFFector Online is published by
     The Electronic Frontier Foundation
     666 Pennsylvania Ave., Washington, DC 20003
     Phone: +1 202 544-9237 FAX: +1 202 547 5481
     Internet Address: eff@eff.org
     Coordination, production and shipping by Cliff Figallo, EFF 
     Online Communications Coordinator (fig@eff.org)
 Reproduction of this publication in electronic media is encouraged.
 Signed articles do not necessarily represent the view of the EFF.
 To reproduce signed articles individually, please contact the authors
 for their express permission.

      *This newsletter is printed on 100% recycled electrons*

------- End of Forwarded Message

--
Joseph Truitt * BioCAD Corporation * joseph@biocad.com * voice 415/903-3923
fax 415/961-0584 * "The hardest thing in the world to understand is the
income tax."  --Albert Einstein






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Perry E. Metzger" <pmetzger@lehman.com>
Date: Fri, 16 Apr 93 15:40:24 PDT
To: Peter Wayner <pcw@access.digex.com>
Subject: The Big Brother Proposal
In-Reply-To: <199304161954.AA20309@access.digex.com>
Message-ID: <9304162238.AA28087@snark.shearson.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Peter Wayner says:

> What's to prevent me from swapping phones with a friend or 
> buying a used phone at a garage sale? Whooa. The secret registered
> keys just became unsynchronized. When the government comes 
> to listen in, they only receive gobbledly-gook because the 
> secret key registered under my name isn't the right one. 

Perhaps you can deduce which chip is doing the encryption by
identification data transmitted by the chip down the line -- they
might identify themselves, making it impossible for you to avoid
having them figure out which pair of keys registered with the Ministry
of Truth and the Ministry of Love are to be used to listen in on your
conversation. After all, they keys are registered by the
manufacturer...

Perry

PS We all remember the Ministry of Love and the Ministry of Truth,
don't we? This proposal was, of course, created by a group spun off
from the Ministry of Peace, a.k.a. No Such Agency.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: jet@nas.nasa.gov (J. Eric Townsend)
Date: Fri, 16 Apr 93 18:51:43 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: ietf-telnet-encryption.01.txt
In-Reply-To: <9304170126.AA08500@nyx.cs.du.edu>
Message-ID: <9304170151.AA00130@boxer.nas.nasa.gov>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Robert W. F. Clark writes:
 > It sounds a little suspicious to me, though.  Snag those copies
 > of PGP while you can.  Expect trouble in coming months.

While we're on the subject of "things that might go away", the Icom
IC-R1 is getting hard to find locally.  I bought the last one at
Quantel electronics for $450 or so.  (The R1 is a handheld
scanner/receiver that has continuous coverage from 100Khz-1.3Ghz.)





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: George A. Gleason <gg@well.sf.ca.us>
Date: Fri, 16 Apr 93 19:11:44 PDT
To: tcmay@netcom.com
Subject: Re:  (fwd) White House Public Encryption Management Fact Sheet
Message-ID: <199304170211.AA01739@well.sf.ca.us>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Re Big Brother proposal.

The "asset forfeiture" mention isn't quite so ominous as suggested: what it
seems to say is that the Atty General will procure (i.e. buy) encryption
devices for use by law enforcement in their own secure communications (i.e.
police radio and computer links), and "the funding to effect this purchase"
will come from the "superfund" of money derived from existing asset
forfeitures.   In other words, smoke a joint, lose your house, and Uncle Sam
sells the house to get money to buy more crypto gear for cops.  

I don't see an implication that crypto gear makers will be facing forfeiture
for failing to comply with the "request" to incorporate key escrow.  

It appears that this is directed at first to establish the use of key escrow
in government-related communications: "federal communications systems that
process sensitive but unclassified information."  So for instance, Ollie
North's memos would be recoverable, and so on.  But the real risk is that it
will spread out to encompass any facility receiving government funding or
contracts, i.e. the universities; and from there, widen so as to restrict
other types of crypto from being used at those sites.  

So far it doesn't seem to restrict crypto on private microcomputers, though
a widely accepted standard could eventually be written into law.  

The proposal specifically says it will allow other manufacturers to develop
other approaches to key escrow systems.  I think what the long-term plan
might be, is to win acceptance for the idea of key escrow, and then require
it.  This isn't exactly a backdoor into your hardware; what it would allow
would be for instance NSA to get your key and then read your communications
as they occur.  So your local hardware isn't storing anything in a different
way or being remotely accessed or triggered, but your key is available
elsewhere, at some approved facility.  

Now I'm guessing here, but what I think the way the crypto part of this has
to work, is with a "device-specific" key and a "session"-type of key; where
the first is what is escrowed, and the second is user-variable.  Both are
required to decrypt messages, and recovery of the second key would be
relatively straightforward.  Now you buy a modem or whatever, and it has a
crypto chip in it, with a device-specific key that is registered along with
the serial number of the device.  So your purchase record has that
serial number on it, and that's used to track the device key, which of
course has been escrowed by the manufacturer before shipping the modem out.
This would suggest that device keys would be relatively hard to crack, and
therefore that some improvement in privacy would be possible by simply
swapping the key chip in the device; and this would be easy enough with a
black market in key escrow chips.  

In the mean time, from our end of it, someone oughta start working on
steganography FAST.  Spread spectrum designs are feasible.  Slow is okay;
the goal being to do anything that will render key escrow obsolete by making
it impossible to tell when ciphertext (or for that matter any kind of data)
is being sent.  

-gg




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: peb@PROCASE.COM
Date: Fri, 16 Apr 93 19:21:54 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: (fwd) White House Public Encryption Management Fact Sheet
Message-ID: <9304170220.AA02462@banff>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



>From: Peter Wayner <pcw@access.digex.com>
>2) The system is vulnerable to simple phone swapping attacks

Yes, that's when the it becomes necessary to register your phone
and phone license with the government every year.  Remember, "using 
a telephone is a privilage, not a right!"  8^)  Nice way to charge
license fees too!

>From: gnu@toad.com (John Gilmore)
>Subject: EFF crypto statement and press release
> Does disclosure of keys to a third party waive an individual's Fifth Amendment
> rights in subsequent criminal inquiries?

This is a very important question and it gets to the heart of the matter.


Paul E. Baclace
peb@procase.com





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: George A. Gleason <gg@well.sf.ca.us>
Date: Fri, 16 Apr 93 19:30:03 PDT
To: tcmay@netcom.com
Subject: Re:  Key Registration and Big Brother--Time to Fight!
Message-ID: <199304170224.AA04394@well.sf.ca.us>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Instead of a conference call in clear voice, how about doing it online from 
the various meetings, and encrypted?  What would it take to set up a        
broadcast encryption system that will work in chat mode...?   A conference
call in clear voice is almost certain to be monitored, and I would bet that
it would yield a whole lot more high-grade intelligence than we would
usually expect: first of all, voices of all participants (for later use in
voiceprint recognition surveillance), second, all the background
discussions, and third, a lot of the kind of deliberation and
working-through-things that ordinarily gets filtered out by the process of
posting things to this list.  

Yes, they can theoretically send visitors to our meetings.  But
realistically this is more labor intensive and potentially risky than
recording a conference call which has all the meetings on line.  Let's not
go leaving any huge holes, please...!

-gg




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: rclark@nyx.cs.du.edu (Robert W. F. Clark)
Date: Fri, 16 Apr 93 18:25:07 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: ietf-telnet-encryption.01.txt
Message-ID: <9304170126.AA08500@nyx.cs.du.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Does anyone know why this Internet draft was deleted?

I've sent a quick message to Internet-drafts@nri.reston.va.us
to determine the reason.  Will report.

It sounds a little suspicious to me, though.  Snag those copies
of PGP while you can.  Expect trouble in coming months.
----
Robert W. Clark
rclark@nyx.cs.du.edu   PGP signature available by mail or finger




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Perry E. Metzger" <pmetzger@lehman.com>
Date: Fri, 16 Apr 93 16:58:08 PDT
To: extropians@gnu.ai.mit.edu
Subject: "Big Brother" Proposal
Message-ID: <9304162357.AA28273@snark.shearson.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



It has been suggested that we start refering to the latest Encryption
Initiative by the feds as the "Big Brother" proposal. I think this is
an excellent idea. If we can get the media to adopt the term, it means
that every time someone refers to the proposal they have already given
our propaganda slant to it.

Perry




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Eric Hughes <hughes@soda.berkeley.edu>
Date: Fri, 16 Apr 93 20:05:41 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: a cypherpunk's clipper reaction
Message-ID: <9304170302.AA10041@soda.berkeley.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Fellows:

I will, in the coming weeks have much more to say on the matter of
this Clipper chip proposal.  For now, however, I have only one thing
to say.

No compromises.

Eric




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: nobody@pmantis.berkeley.edu
Date: Fri, 16 Apr 93 20:09:56 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: No Subject
Message-ID: <9304170312.AA19797@pmantis.berkeley.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


  With regard to the White House's attempt to force the "Clipper" on you:
 
I guess the time has come for the Cypherpunks to break their 'political teeth'.
This issue is squarely on point with the purpose of the cpunks and needs to be
addressed.  The best thinkers on these topics are on this list (as are many
libertarian thinkers).  The Cypherpunks have gotten a fair amount of media play
as of late and I think those interested in privacy and security are frothing at
the mouth.  I know in general cpunks dont believe in the necessity for leaders,
but leader'ship' is a different matter.  I believe that there are people here
with the knowledge to fight against this proposal.  So, Cypherpunks, step to the
political plate.
 
>  In the past, it has
>been possible to preserve a government capability to conduct
>electronic surveillance in furtherance of legitimate law
>enforcement and national security interests, while at the same time
>protecting the privacy and civil liberties of all citizens.
 
Just some levity to start off with :-)
 
>The Attorney General of the United States, or her representative,
>shall request manufacturers ...
 
I read this differently than does Tim.  "shall" coupled with "request" actually
equals ambiguity and seems not to compel anyone.  Im sure that the language was
meant to confuse though.
 
>In making this decision, I do
>not intend to prevent the private sector from developing, or the
>government from approving, other microcircuits or algorithms that
>are equally effective in assuring both privacy and a secure key-
>escrow system.
 
Well, the door does still appear to be open for private circuit development and
a better escrow system (better?).  This does lend credence to the opinion that
this may just be a very forceful suggestion and not an order per se.
 
>The Attorney General shall make all arrangements with appropriate
>entities to hold the keys for the key-escrow microcircuits
>installed in communications equipment.
 
Gotta agree with Tim that this appears to be an incredibly obvious backdoor to
all telecommunications equipment.  This should be made clear in any public
statements about this document.
 
>  The Attorney
>General shall review for legal sufficiency the procedures by which
>an agency establishes its authority to acquire the content of such
>communications.
 
OK.  This might be the key to the downfall of this proposal.  The Govt appears
to be showing its weak hand here.  They have either not thouroughly addressed
the legal concerns or they are standing on shaky legal ground.  I believe there
could be a number of problems (legally speaking) with the proposal.  Seperation
of Powers, Commerce concerns, penumbra Right to Privacy, etc just to name a few.
Well, I guess Im off to the library to research another interesting, yet
inapplicable directly to my legal studies, topic.  (As if I dont spend enough
time in the library)  I guess if she's gonna review the legal sufficiency there
should be no problem with me 'parallel processing' that same information.
 
>  Further, the Attorney General
>shall utilize funds from the Department of Justice Asset Forfeiture
>Super Surplus Fund to effect this purchase.
 
Surplus...what happened to the defecit?   :^)
 
  In general I believe that this event calls for a public expression of
intellectual disagreement.  An assertion of the power of the ideas expressed on
this list will put the Cypherpunks in the discourse of public policy.
Obviously, it should be well thought out and expressed in the most positive way.
Calm, cool, calculated response will gain the cpunks respect, a knee jerk,
emotional response will only get our ideas ignored.
 
  If politics doesn't work there also appears to be an economic out.  Creating
REAL encryptive circuits whose keys are not held by the government but rather by
the owner.  Private enterprise and a result to our concerns for liberty appear
amenable.  So any hardware cypherpunk hacks, get out your tools.
 
  Finally, a simple analogy.  The current state of the law does not require me
to register the key to my home with a government agency so that they can gain
access to my home in a more efficient way if they feel the need.  I keep the key
and the control (until they break down my door).  In that case, the value is
placed on my freedom, not the efficiency with which the police could access my
private communications.  There are reasons that search warrents were 'initially'
difficult to acquire and reasons why it should be difficult to access my home
(i.e. they must break down my door.)  Those reasons dealt with the severity of
encroachment upon my privacy and rights thereto.  In fact, that is the reason
given for the remaining formalistic requirements of the necessity of prior
judicial consent for warrents.  No, the judge does not ponder long and hard
about whether to give the warrent.  Rather, the purpose is to give the officers
pause.  The ritual is designed to make the parties involved at least ponder the
severity of their actions.  This proposal would only make invasions of our
privacy easier to achieve and eliminate obstacles in the way of officers, giving
them even less time to ponder the severity of their encroachment.
 
 
 
////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
 VOLTAIRE                                      Studying the law,
                                                  Finding the flaws,
                                                      Creating a light,
                                                          Out of the night!
////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
Tim- Aren't we closer than 10 mins. to midnight???????




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Arthur Abraham <a2@well.sf.ca.us>
Date: Fri, 16 Apr 93 20:21:03 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: 1984 deja vu
Message-ID: <199304170320.AA14330@well.sf.ca.us>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


If you haven't heard about John Markoff's article yet, it'
cause you've been spending all your time reading Cypherpunks
instead of the front page of the Friday NY Times... read it
now.

There's an awful lot to be said about this article, mostly we
know what it is, and mostly we agree about it.  This a major
social issue that must be corrected, so here's my proposal:


==> DON'T POST ANYTHING ABOUT THE MARFKOFF ARTICLE.  <==


We shouldn't waste time writing each other letters that we'll
learn nothing by reading.  We should spend that same time
writing to newspapers, congress people, phone companies,
Clinton, Gore, and anybody else who thinks they can get away
with this because they feel the citizenry either doesn't care
about or doesn't understand the issues. 

What I want to see in re this issue on this list is something
I don't already know, like the name and address of AT&T's
president's secretary -- s/he'll complain to the prez if
enough privacy mail arrives.

Be imaginative, be active, rattle cages, but telling me how
pissed you are won't change a thing, except to decrease the
time we're both spending on doing something effective.

Be effective.

Please.

-a2.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Eli Brandt <ebrandt@jarthur.Claremont.EDU>
Date: Fri, 16 Apr 93 20:26:05 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: ANON: Chaining suggestions
In-Reply-To: <930416165143_74076.1041_FHD34-1@CompuServe.COM>
Message-ID: <9304170325.AA25696@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> From: Hal <74076.1041@CompuServe.COM>
> I don't think the idea quite works in this form, since I don't see how 
> messages to Julf get translated to an12345.  Presumably only messages 
> from one specific user should get posted under this ID (the user whose 
> address is buried in the encrypted return address to which Julf's 
> remailer will forward replies).  Perhaps another set of commands is 
> needed to tell the remailer what ID to use to post under.

I don't know what Eric was thinking, but I was thinking as follows:
  * I send a message to the nymserver, telling it to create a nym
entry.  The body of the message is a public key.  All further
commands to the server must be signed by this key.
  * I then send a message to the nymserver, telling it to add a
return block to the nym's list of return addresses.  (signed)
  * Another (signed) command sets up a human-readable name, if I
wish.  Now we're in business.

  * Joe User sends a message to eli-alias@nymserver.  The server
looks up eli-alias, picks the preferred return path, and richochets
the message out.
  * or, I tell the nymserver to post vitriol to alt.fan.clinton
under the name "eli-alias".  Again, the command must be correctly
signed.

(Can PGP let me rename my eli-alias private key to something
innocuous -- like "test3"?  This would provide some deniability if
they seize my secring.pgp -- they need no passphrase to see the
names of the keys on it.  Denied this information, can `they'
associate private and public keys in some way?)

Hopefully, all commands to the nymserver would be encrypted with its
public key.  They might well be bounced to it through anonymous
remailers, or sent with whatever other anonymity tech -- such as
DC-nets -- is available.  Yanek, were you setting up an experimental
DC-net?  How's it look?

Any holes here?  The requirement of a signature on all commands is
parallel to the present use of a password, but far more secure.  It
provides continuity of identity, rather than the present use of
return address.  Attack this protocol, folks.

Now, this does look like a lot of hair to add to penet.  Maybe I
should learn perl and write a remailer.  Heh.

(Aside: anybody here running linux?  Do you know of a
non-destructive repartitioner?)

> Hal Finney

   Eli   ebrandt@jarthur.claremont.edu
(with a big disk and a small flaky tape drive)




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Peter Meyer <meyer@mcc.com>
Date: Fri, 16 Apr 93 19:16:21 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: The New Mykotronix phones...
In-Reply-To: <199304161954.AA20309@access.digex.com>
Message-ID: <19930417021528.5.MEYER@OGHMA.MCC.COM>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


    Date: Fri, 16 Apr 1993 14:54 CDT
    From: Peter Wayner <pcw@access.digex.com>

    Okay, let's suppose that the NSA/NIST/Mykotronix Registered
    Key system becomes standard and I'm able to buy such a system
    from my local radio shack. Every phone comes with a built in
    chip and the government has the key to every phone call. 
    I go and buy a phone and dutifully register the key. 

    What's to prevent me from swapping phones with a friend or 
    buying a used phone at a garage sale? Whooa. The secret registered
    keys just became unsynchronized. When the government comes 
    to listen in, they only receive gobbledly-gook because the 
    secret key registered under my name isn't the right one. 

Knowing nothing except what I've read on the net today, I suppose that
while scrambling the phone conversation the chip inserts in the data
stream some ID (perhaps once per second) to tell the govt. which chip is
doing the scrambling.  This would allow multiple trapdoor keys (as
claimed) and also there would be no need for phone users to register.
The chip might also insert the number of the phone originating and/or
receiving the call, though presumably the wiretappers would already know
this.

-- Peter Meyer




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Date: Fri, 16 Apr 93 21:19:43 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: IMPORTANT--WE WON......NOT!
Message-ID: <9304170419.AA26923@netcom.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Sandy Sandfort looks on the bright side. Unfortunately, I can't agree with him.

He writes:

>FIRST, THE BAD NEWS--The government wants to control encryption.
>Though they are playing coy about it, it's clear that eventually
>they will try to ban "the good stuff."  It's clear Zimmermann,
>and others, have gotten their attention.
>
>NOW, THE GOOD NEWS--I t  d o e s  n o t  m a t t e r.  The game
>is over.  We won.  The government may engage in holding actions,
>but it still doesn't matter.  What we have here, is the State's
>pitiful attempt to make the best of a bad situation.  This
>amazing "policy" announcement is a tacit admission of defeat.
>
>HOW CAN I BE SO SURE?--The cat is out of the bag.  Free, mil spec
>data encryption is readily available to all.  Within a year,
>equivalent voice encryption freeware will join it.  There is no
>way the government can stuff the encryption cat back in the bag.
>They can pass their laws.  We will do as we please--and they will
>help us.
...rest of post elided....

Drugs are freely available on nearly every inner city street corner. The
"cat is out of the bag," as you say. And yet....

- the War on (Some) Drugs....
- mandatory hard time for first offenses (ask the Santa Cruz kid doing 10
years without parole for possession of some amount of acid...the weight of
the blotter paper kicked it up to the 10-year level)
- civil forfeiture... "We find a roach, we get your yacht."
- midnight raids, often killing innocent citizens (ask the Malibu retired
guy who got zapped by the Feds...turns out they'd already greedily started
to divvy up his land to various parks...and of course he was totally
innocent--and now dead)
- "D.A.R.E."-type brainwashing of children, encouraging them to turn in
their parents

...and so on. You should all know about these things, on this of all days
(16 April 1943, 50 years ago, was the discovery of LSD).

Restricting crypto means the government has a big club they use to
threaten, intimidate, force cooperation, etc. Just like with taxes, drugs,
and everything else they control.

Under the civil forfeiture laws, my assets (which I depend on to live out
the rest of my life on!!) could be seized if the government suspects I'm
using "illegal crypto." Not under current laws, but certainly under the
laws that follow from the "Clinton Clipper."

Anyone with assets to seize--a house, a business, a stock account--becomes
a fair target.

>
>  But never doubt it,  W E   H A V E   W O N.
>

No, but we haven't lost yet.

-Tim

--
Timothy C. May         | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,  
tcmay@netcom.com       | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
408-688-5409           | knowledge, reputations, information markets, 
W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA  | black markets, collapse of governments.
Higher Power: 2^756839 | Public Key: MailSafe and PGP available.





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Peter Meyer <meyer@mcc.com>
Date: Fri, 16 Apr 93 19:42:56 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: White House Encryption idea
In-Reply-To: <9304162014.AA05785@spiff.gnu.ai.mit.edu>
Message-ID: <19930417024202.6.MEYER@OGHMA.MCC.COM>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


    Date: Fri, 16 Apr 1993 15:13 CDT
    From: treason@gnu.ai.mit.edu

    Well, this all sounds fine and dandy, but...

    1)  They are not passing out the algorithym, and I dont trust ANYONE to tell
    me its secure.  ...

    4) No explanation of what the 'key' contents are composed of (numbers, letters,
    alphanum, characters, some odd cyphercode???) is even implied.

    5)  No explanation of how the key is propegated or if it will even be needed
    for the remote site is mentioned.  How are the remote sites going to
    decypher your cyphersounds(text)?

    There was no mention of further releases in information...is this all we get?

    treason@gnu 

Question (5) is particularly acute.  Offhand I can think of two ways the
remote site might decrypt the message:

1.  If the two phones can talk to each other then the originator phone
might ask the receiver phone for its public key (as in public key
cryptography) and then use this to encrypt the message.  (The receiver
phone then decrypts with its private key.)  But since the encryption is
occurring in real time, this is probably not feasible unless short keys
are used.

2.  The originator phone might simply send the encryption key down the
line, perhaps itself encrypted or disguised in some way.  If so then it
might not be too hard to discover the key.  In this case all security
lies in ignorance of the encryption algorithm used (violating crypto-
logical principles).  It probably wouldn't be too long (at most a year
or so) before someone figures out what the algorithm is, in which case
all security is compromised.  However, security in particular cases is
relative to the expertise of the attacker, so it might still be the case
that one's neighbors and business competitors could not decrypt the
message, even if XYZ Security Consultants could.

-- Peter Meyer





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Peter Meyer <meyer@mcc.com>
Date: Fri, 16 Apr 93 20:20:59 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: New versions of encryption software released
Message-ID: <19930417032006.8.MEYER@OGHMA.MCC.COM>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I suppose I could use a fig leaf to cover the price of this software so
that this posting might seem less "commercial", but - what the hell -
this isn't sci.crypt and we're not concerned with maintaining academic
purity.  This encryption software is available *now*.  You might
consider shelling out a few bucks (which allows you to make use of the
result of a few years' work) before the govt. makes it illegal to buy,
sell or use encryption software.

                   New Version Release Announcement
             Dolphin Software releases three new versions
                    of MS-DOS encryption software

Dolphin Software's data encryption software has been released in two
new versions, Dolphin Encrypt (V. 2.11) and Dolphin Encrypt Advanced
Version (V. 2.10).  The encryption routines are also available as a
C function library.

Both Dolphin Encrypt and the Advanced Version use a symmetric key
encryption process to encrypt data on MS-DOS computers, and can
encrypt multiple files with a single command.  File pathnames are
supported and there is extensive error checking.  If you wish to
transmit encrypted data as email then Dolphin Encrypt can be told to
output the encrypted data as text.  There is no limit on the size,
the type or the number of files.  Files are normally compressed during
encryption.  Screen output can be sent to a file or to a printer for a
record of operations.  The encryption process, described in detail in
the documentation, relies partly on the RSA Data Security, Inc., MD5
Message Digest Algorithm.

The Advanced Version has all of the features described above, and also
encrypts whole floppy disks.  All common disk sizes are supported and
are automatically recognized.  Additional command line options are
supported, including the options of echoing or not echoing the
encryption key during entry.  There is a decrypt-and-display-only
option (with no plaintext written to disk).  The Advanced Version can
be run silently from another application program to encrypt or decrypt
files.  It has a script language (with if-else-endif) which allows
automation of frequently-performed, complex or conditional operations.
The Advanced Version comes with utility programs to read multiple text
files, compare files, purge files and wipe a disk clean of data; these
can be called from scripts.

The Dolphin Encryption Library is a C function library containing
functions for encrypting and decrypting blocks of data in memory
(from 1 byte to about 10K in size).  Complete source code is included.

Dolphin Encrypt is priced at $64.00 and the Advanced Version at $128.00.
The function library is available for licensing to developers.  For more
information contact Dolphin Software at 4815 W. Braker Ln. #502, Austin,
TX 78759 (phone 512-479-9208).




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Eric Hughes <hughes@soda.berkeley.edu>
Date: Fri, 16 Apr 93 22:26:39 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Q&A DataBase
In-Reply-To: <01GX1S55DSEA0005UJ@ksuvxb.kent.edu>
Message-ID: <9304170523.AA17229@soda.berkeley.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Re: Q&A (a DOS database program)

>	   Hello All, does anyone know much about the this program?
>I would like to be able to pick the passwords out of the database file.

One of the purposes of cypherpunks is to figure out stuff like this
and to help others learn how to do it.

In short, you figure it out, and tell us.

To begin with, make a database with some permissions.  Make a complete
copy of that database in another directory.  Now change exactly one
password by exactly one letter.  Use a differencing tool to find the
differences.  Save this copy as well.  Change the same password again.
Check to see if the differences are in the same place.

Do the same with different passwords.  Correlate this information with
the database structures.  Write some software to generate
plaintext/ciphertext pairs.  Get at least a thousand, preferably lots
more.  You'll use these later to verify that your reconstruction of
the algorithm is correct.

If the encryption isn't obvious by now (yes, some of this stuff is
extremely weak) hook up a debugger to the executable and start looking
for the routine which does password encryption.  When you find it,
reverse engineer it and write a C routine that matches the
functionality.

Now you'll be considered having done your homework.  If you still
don't know how to crack passwords after knowing the algorithm, post
the algorithm here and we'll look at it.

Eric




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Sandy <72114.1712@CompuServe.COM>
Date: Fri, 16 Apr 93 20:12:35 PDT
To: <cypherpunks@toad.com>
Subject: IMPORTANT--WE WON
Message-ID: <930417030350_72114.1712_FHF52-1@CompuServe.COM>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


_________________________________________________________________
             FROM THE VIRTUAL DESK OF SANDY SANDFORT
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
FIRST, THE BAD NEWS--The government wants to control encryption.
Though they are playing coy about it, it's clear that eventually
they will try to ban "the good stuff."  It's clear Zimmermann,
and others, have gotten their attention.

NOW, THE GOOD NEWS--I t  d o e s  n o t  m a t t e r.  The game
is over.  We won.  The government may engage in holding actions,
but it still doesn't matter.  What we have here, is the State's
pitiful attempt to make the best of a bad situation.  This
amazing "policy" announcement is a tacit admission of defeat.

HOW CAN I BE SO SURE?--The cat is out of the bag.  Free, mil spec
data encryption is readily available to all.  Within a year,
equivalent voice encryption freeware will join it.  There is no
way the government can stuff the encryption cat back in the bag.
They can pass their laws.  We will do as we please--and they will
help us.

THEY WILL *HELP* US?--The Administration's plan will have one,
unintended, result.  It will give legitimacy to privacy through
encryption.  Legitimacy will beget usage.  And usage will mean
TRAFFIC.  Our securely encrypted messages will be hidden in plain
sight.  Whispers in a wind tunnel.  One digitally encrypted phone
call sound just like another--no matter what algorithm is used.

A PLOY FOR THE PARANOID--Still think the Secret Service is going
to get you?  No problem.  Just *PRE-encrypt* your phone or data
communications with your home-made encryption unit, before you
re-encrypt it using the government approved model.  ("Hey, I
don't know why you couldn't use your back door key to eavesdrop
on my secure phone.  Sounds like a personal problem to me.")

THE ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUNDATION IS RIGHT, TOO--Yes, we can
rejoice because we won.  But it is still important to continue
the fight against the State's last gasps.  Even when the
government is in random-walk mode, it's still possible to get
stepped on.  They have lost, but they can still do us plenty of
damage.  We should continue to press them on all fronts to secure
our victory.  But never doubt it,  W E   H A V E   W O N.


 S a n d y
_________________________________________________________________
PLEASE RESPOND TO: ssandfort@attmail.com (except from CompuServe)
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Date: Fri, 16 Apr 93 23:10:57 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: (fwd) Re: Once tapped, your code is no good any more.
Message-ID: <9304170611.AA29961@netcom3.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Cypherpunks, 

I agree with Arthur Abraham that we ought to first make our arguments
in public and not preach to the converted here on this list. Unless
the ideas presented are Cypherpunks-related.

In this spirit, here's something I wrote about the consequences of key
escrow.


Newsgroups: sci.crypt,alt.security,comp.org.eff.talk,comp.security.misc,comp.org.acm,comp.org.ieee
From: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Subject: Re: Once tapped, your code is no good any more.
Date: Sat, 17 Apr 1993 04:53:55 GMT

Brad Templeton (brad@clarinet.com) wrote:
: It occurs to me that if they get a wiretap order on you, and the escrow
: houses release your code to the cops, your code is now no longer secure.
: 
: It's in the hands of cops, and while I am sure most of the time they are
: good, their security will not be as good as the escrow houses.
: 
: 
: What this effectively means is that if they perform a wiretap on you,
: at the end of the wiretap, they should be obligated to inform you that
: a tap was performed, and replace (for free) the clipper chip in your
: cellular phone so that it is once again a code known only to the
: escrow houses.

Getting the court order to reveal the key *also* makes decipherable
all *past* conversations (which may be on tape, or disk, or whatver),
as I understand the proposal. I could be wrong, but I've seen no
mention of "session keys" being the escrowed entities.

As the EFF noted, this raises further issues about the fruits of one
bust leading to incrimination in other areas.

But is it any worse than the current unsecure system? It becomes much
worse, of course, if the government then uses this "Clinton Clipper"
to argue for restrictions on unapproved encryption. (This is the main
concern of most of us, I think. The camel's nose in the tent, etc.)

And it may also become much worse if the ostensible security is
increased, thus allowing greater access to "central office" records by
the government (the conversations being encrypted, who will object to
letting the government have access to them, perhaps even automatically
archiving large fractions...). This was one of the main objections to
the S.266 proposal, that it would force telecom suppliers to provide
easy access for the government.

One the government has had access to months or years of your encrypted
conversations, now all it takes is one misstep, one violation that
gets them the paperwork needed to decrypt *all* of them!

Do we want anyone to have this kind of power?

-Tim May, whose sig block may get him busted in the New Regime

-- 
..........................................................................
Timothy C. May         | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,  
tcmay@netcom.com       | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
408-688-5409           | knowledge, reputations, information markets, 
W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA  | black markets, collapse of governments.
Higher Power: 2^756839 | Public Key: PGP and MailSafe available.






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: x62727g2@usma8.USMA.EDU (Gatlin Anthony CDT)
Date: Fri, 16 Apr 93 23:33:04 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Data Encryption Algorithm
Message-ID: <9304170633.AA27514@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Fellow Cypherpunks,
     I am a cadet at West Point and have been involved in developing a new
encryption algorithm which I believe is stronger than DES. I realize that
many of you enjoy the challenge of breaking encryption schemes and I
wondered if you might be interested in trying to break mine. I would be very
interested in any analysis that you could give of my system. Please contact
me if you are interested.

Anthony J. Gatlin                  |-------------------------------------|
CDT PVT, G-2                       |PGP Public Key available on request. |
                                   |-------------------------------------|





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: greg@ideath.goldenbear.com (Greg Broiles)
Date: Sat, 17 Apr 93 01:30:08 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Clinton Administration crypto proposal/policy
Message-ID: <Jm752B1w164w@ideath.goldenbear.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



The Clinton Administration's recent proposal, and responses to same from
the net community, have left several questions in my mind:

o       Are these devices intended to be used as isolated pairs - such that
two phones/modems/whatever will only speak with each other .. or will any
such device speak with any other such device? If any device can communicate
with any other device, how is the key(s) for en/decryption for any
particular session determined? .. and what prevents an eavesdropper who is
present from the beginning of the session from using that data to decrypt
the conversation?

o       According to the EFF response to the proposal, there aren't really
two keys, but two 40-bit halves of one 80-bit key. Doesn't this imply that
were a "bad guy" able to get just one of those halves, the computing power
required to do a brute-force attack is considerably lessened? (I'm asking
a question here, not making a statement. I read about this because I think
it's interesting but it's not really my field.)

o       Presumably, these devices will insert into the data stream some
sort of "sender ID" which will allow eavesdroppers to know which key(s)
they need a warrant for - doesn't this seem to make it pretty easy to
keep track of data along the lines of "Station 12345 sent 500 packets to
station 31415, who sent 7734 packets in return" .. which would seem to
present privacy questions separate from (but dwarfed by :) the
security of the encryption itself?

Also, cypherpunks readers may find these two snippets from two articles
re the proposal interesting (and chilling):

---
_NY Times_, 4/16/93, p. A1 (National edition)
"The Clinton Administration plans a new system of encoding electronic
communications that is intended to preserve the Government's ability
                                                             ^^^^^^^
to eavesdrop for law enforcement and national security reasons .."
---
Eugene, Oregon's _Register-Guard_, 4/16/93, p. 3A
"The Clinton Administration is about to announce a plan to preserve
privacy in electronic communications, including telephone calls and
electronic mail, while also insuring [sic] the government's right
                                                            ^^^^^
to eavesdrop for law enforcement and national security reasons."
---

Emphasis, of course, added by me. The Register-Guard article is taken
from the NY Times' article (presumably from a wire service) and
consists of paragraphs 2,3,4,5,6,8, and 9 of the NY Times article, with
changes to the first paragraph noted above.

Grr.

--
Greg Broiles                            greg@goldenbear.com
Golden Bear Consulting                  +1 503 465 0325
Box 12005 Eugene OR 97440               BBS: +1 503 687 7764




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: wcs@anchor.ho.att.com
Date: Fri, 16 Apr 93 22:52:28 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Big Bubba's Wiretapping Directive
Message-ID: <9304170552.AA16461@anchor.ho.att.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text


While I don't share Sandy Sandfort's wild optimism, at least steganography
becomes a bit easier - the default assumption is about encrypted material 
becomes "Oh, it's just encrypted with the Tapper Chip, we can break it later"
rather than "Oh, boy, it's encrypted, we can confiscate his computer!",
and if it gets taken to court, and the wiretap approved by the Rubber Stamp 
Agency and then isn't able to be decrypted, the average person can say
"I don't understand how the Secret Government Wiretapping Chip works, 
so I can't tell you what's wrong here!"

On the more technical side, what precisely does the Mykotoxin chip *do*?
Does it generate random keys for DES/etc., saving a copy for later?
Or does it actually *do* the encryption with some classified algorithm?
If it's the former, the user could presumably replace it with a pin-compatible
non-wiretapping random number generator, unless there's some requirement
that export-approved systems have soldered-in chips, and a foreign-made
version might be compatible with US phones while not being tappable.

On the other hand, if the MicroToker chip actually *does* encryption,
whether secret-key or RSA or other public-key, or some other essential
part of the encryption process, then you *have* to use it to be compatible.
Assuming the US approves it for widespread use in phones, etc.,
it provides an incentive for everybody in the world to use it,
especially if the Feds agree to share keys with their fellow governments
who can wiretap their own citizens, and gives a boost to the 
balance of trade by being one product that you've got to buy from the US.

Some questions that Clinton's Q&A blatantly stepped around are
"When the Two Agencies approve the wiretap, *what* conversations become 
	tappable?  Everything they've recorded?  The last N conversations?
	Future conversations only?"
"Once one government group has YOUR phone wiretap key from the Two Agencies,
	can they pass it around to the IRS, FBI, local cops, and everyone else?
"What if they make a mistake on a tap - do you have to buy a new phone
	now that they've spread YOUR phone wiretap key around?"

We *do* have to try to control the language here - the Clintonistas
are referring to the subjects of a hypothetical wiretap as
	"the drug smugglers"
but we ought to redirect it to
	"YOUR phone's wiretap key"
so people remember we're talking about them and their privacy.
It might also be good for us to give examples like
"The IRS suspects you're cheating on your income tax so they want to 
	wiretap your phone calls to your accountant, so they do XXXXX."
because it feels like something that might happen to THEM.

Sigh.

			Bill Stewart




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: grady@netcom.com (1016/2EF221)
Date: Sat, 17 Apr 93 08:18:53 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: fuzzy grep available
Message-ID: <9304171519.AA27926@netcom.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



"agrep" version 2.0.4 available via anonymous FTP
from sunsite.unc.edu (including source) has a
feature of cryptographic interest: fuzzy searches.

For example, agrep -2 cypherpunks newsgroupspooldirectory

would find all occurrence of"cypherpunks" or any such
pattern with up to two errors of substitution, addition
or deletion.  cpyherpunks, cyphernks cipherapunks would
all be found, fer instance.  And the thing is Boyer-Moore
sublinear FAST.  Also has egrep features looking for up
to 30,000 (yes, thirty thousand) patterns simultaneously
with Boyer-Moore speed.

For the NSA the applications are obvious: look for a bounch
of keys words like revolution Timothy May NSA quickly.

For us a good initial use might be to screen out "bad" passwords
that are to simply a variant of a normal word.  For example,
if agrep -3 <prospective password/phrase> usr/dict/words
or the lyric library, or the star trek location list or whatever,
if anything were found then that password FAILS.  This is
a lot easier to use than other available tools.


Like, MacPGP2.2 source, I will mail this on request IF you
cannot do anonymous FTP from where you are.

Grady Ward




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Eric Hughes <hughes@soda.berkeley.edu>
Date: Sat, 17 Apr 93 08:36:36 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: History of Gov. Telecom Interception
In-Reply-To: <199304171327.AA03871@sun.Panix.Com>
Message-ID: <9304171533.AA04312@soda.berkeley.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Harry Shapiro mentions what sounds like an excellent little book,
titled "The Invisible Weapon"

I've made a directory called clipper/ in the ftp site.  I'm looking
for information to fill it up with.

Harry, I'd like to publicly ask you to write an annotated bibliography
entry for this book so that I could put it up.  Full reference
details, of course, two or three sentences describing the contents of
each chapter, and a small summary.  Thanks in advance.

If anyone has an electronic copy of the New York Times article, please
send it in.

Please send all your submissions via email, as I don't have the
necessary permissions to use the incoming directory on soda.

Send submissions to hughes@soda.berkeley.edu.
Download stuff from soda.berkeley.edu:pub/cypherpunks via anon ftp.

Eric




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: grady@netcom.com (1016/2EF221)
Date: Sat, 17 Apr 93 08:57:57 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: REAL ftp address of agrep tool
Message-ID: <9304171558.AA29574@netcom.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


The real address is:

cs.arizona.edu

in the directory "agrep".

The incorrect ftp site I mentioned before,
sunsite.unc.edu, has some interesting poly sci
papers, but not much code.

Too many archives.  Too little time.

Grady Ward




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Harry Shapiro <habs@Panix.Com>
Date: Sat, 17 Apr 93 06:27:41 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: History of Gov. Telecom Interception
Message-ID: <199304171327.AA03871@sun.Panix.Com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Last year Oxford press published a book called

	The Invisible Weapon - it details, from 1851 - 1945,
how governments, esp. the British have used "backdoors" into
coded messages to watch/listen/read messages.

At one time the British has a strangle hold on world wide telegram
service. They made very strong claims that they would never read
their clients (often other governments) mail, but instead went
to detailed and expensive measures to insure that in fact they
could/did.

The IBSN # is :0-19-506273-6

We should read this book (I have) so in the up coming debate on
the Clipper, we can frame the Clipper in the rich historical context
it deserves to be placed in.

-- 
Harry Shapiro  				      habs@panix.com
List Administrator of the Extropy Institute Mailing List
Private Communication for the Extropian Community since 1991



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Harry Shapiro <habs@Panix.Com>
Date: Sat, 17 Apr 93 06:32:53 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Big Brother: Post Filtering the Clipper
Message-ID: <199304171332.AA03999@sun.Panix.Com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Some posters have speculated that it might be possible to get
a phone, swap it with someone else, and then the feds would not
be able to get the correct key-pair.

An other poster assumed that each clipper chip would send out some
sort of Clipper-ID in plain-text before and/or during and/or after
a session.

Which causes me to further speculate that it may be possible to filter
out these plain text messages. (They are probally built in to the
exchange of keys ritual and so can't be filtered out without
preventing the Clipper to do it thing...).

If they can be filter, filtering them may either be an out right
criminal act or be considered probally cause for a warrent to determine
why you are filtering them out, etc.

-- 
Harry Shapiro  				      habs@panix.com
List Administrator of the Extropy Institute Mailing List
Private Communication for the Extropian Community since 1991



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Harry Shapiro <habs@Panix.Com>
Date: Sat, 17 Apr 93 06:40:08 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Big Brother: Easy to Break
Message-ID: <199304171339.AA04237@sun.Panix.Com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I recall having a conversation at the Boston ExI meeting, talking
about super computers and how fast they could break small keys
(like 80  bits).

I think it was carlf, and I don't recall the exact estimate given,
it I think it was on the order of several hours to several days for
a fast connection machine class super computer to break such a key
by brute force.

The NSA certainly has plenty of fast machines, and I assume they will
be able to break any clipper based encryption routinely.

Certainly as 64-bit, high speed multiprocessors come on line in the
next few years it will be easier and easier for even us plain folks
to break such keys (although I sure not a simple task).

With NSA having the algorithim and access to perhaps at least half
the key or perhaps some little bit of "known text" that clippper puts
into each message to make it easier to do a known text attack on
someone's clipper encoded message, we can assume that the escrowed
keys are at best a ruse...

-- 
Harry Shapiro  				      habs@panix.com
List Administrator of the Extropy Institute Mailing List
Private Communication for the Extropian Community since 1991



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Harry Shapiro <habs@Panix.Com>
Date: Sat, 17 Apr 93 06:47:32 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Big Brother: Public Escrow is Needed
Message-ID: <199304171347.AA04366@sun.Panix.Com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


All the talk about Escrowing of keys by sepeerate agencies is all
well and good.

However, to be really secure, the computer system they reside on, and
all access to it, must be in some way very public and very very limited.

The public needs to know that at least one of the key-pairs, can in
no we be retrieved except through some very public process. That
law enforcement or some cracker doesn't have some back order into
teh Escrowed Key Server...

As as somebody else pointed out, once my key is know ALL my communication
is now "OPEN." Not just what they got a warrent for.

Thus, the actual opening of my "mail/voice/etc" should be done in more,
again very public place, so they my key-pair (and the cost of replacing
it if the warrent is unfounded) is kept secure and never in the hands
of any person or agency.

In other words, I don't want my key-pair sitting in a non-secured database,
to re-used latter (with or without a warrent.)

If the key-pair is turned over to someone/agency and I am not found
quilty or indicted, etc. I need to be told so I can change my keys,
or even have the government pay me for this cost as they have un lawfully
taken the value of my Clipper based device away from me.

/harry

-- 
Harry Shapiro  				      habs@panix.com
List Administrator of the Extropy Institute Mailing List
Private Communication for the Extropian Community since 1991



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Harry Shapiro <habs@Panix.Com>
Date: Sat, 17 Apr 93 06:49:42 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Big Brother: Unlawful Taking
Message-ID: <199304171349.AA04451@sun.Panix.Com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I think the gov. involvement in the Clipper is an unlawful taking
against anyone else who has made an investment in selling encryption.

RSA, for example. These people should sue the government to talking
this multi-billion dollar business away from them.

/harry

-- 
Harry Shapiro  				      habs@panix.com
List Administrator of the Extropy Institute Mailing List
Private Communication for the Extropian Community since 1991



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Dave Banisar <banisar@washofc.cpsr.org>
Date: Sat, 17 Apr 93 06:52:52 PDT
To: CYPHERPUNKS@toad.com
Subject: CPSR Statement on White House Plan
Message-ID: <9304170958.AA39915@hacker2.eff.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


  CPSR Crypto Statement
-----------------------------------------------
April 16, 1993
Washington, DC

               COMPUTER PROFESSIONALS CALL FOR PUBLIC
           DEBATE ON NEW GOVERNMENT ENCRYPTION INITIATIVE

        Computer Professionals for Social Responsibility (CPSR)
today called for the public disclosure of technical data
underlying the government's newly-announced "Public Encryption
Management" initiative.  The new cryptography scheme was
announced today by the White House and the National Institute
for Standards and Technology (NIST), which will implement the
technical specifications of the plan.  A NIST spokesman
acknowledged that the National Security Agency (NSA), the super-
secret military intelligence agency, had actually developed the
encryption technology around which the new initiative is built.

        According to NIST, the technical specifications and the
Presidential directive establishing the plan are classified.  To
open the initiative to public review and debate, CPSR today
filed a series of Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests
with key agencies, including NSA, NIST, the National Security
Council and the FBI for information relating to the encryption
plan.  The CPSR requests are in keeping with the spirit of the
Computer Security Act, which Congress passed in 1987 in order to
open the development of non-military computer security standards
to public scrutiny and to limit NSA's role in the creation of
such standards.

        CPSR previously has questioned the role of NSA in
developing the so-called "digital signature standard" (DSS), a
communications authentication technology that NIST proposed for
government-wide use in 1991.  After CPSR sued NIST in a FOIA
lawsuit last year, the civilian agency disclosed for the first
time that NSA had, in fact, developed that security standard.
NSA is due to file papers in federal court next week justifying
the classification of records concerning its creation of the
DSS.

        David Sobel, CPSR Legal Counsel, called the
administration's apparent commitment to the privacy of
electronic communications, as reflected in today's official
statement,  "a step in the right direction."  But he questioned
the propriety of NSA's role in the process and the apparent
secrecy that has thus far shielded the development process from
public scrutiny.  "At a time when we are moving towards the
development of a new information infrastructure, it is vital
that standards designed to protect personal privacy be
established openly and with full public participation.  It is
not appropriate for NSA -- an agency with a long tradition of
secrecy and opposition to effective civilian cryptography -- to
play a leading role in the development process."

        CPSR is a national public-interest alliance of computer
industry professionals dedicated to examining the impact of
technology on society.   CPSR has 21 chapters in the U.S. and
maintains offices in Palo Alto, California, Cambridge,
Massachusetts and Washington, DC.  For additional information on
CPSR, call (415) 322-3778 or e-mail <cpsr@csli.stanford.edu>.

======================================






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Dave Banisar <banisar@washofc.cpsr.org>
Date: Sat, 17 Apr 93 07:09:13 PDT
To: CYPHERPUNKS@toad.com
Subject: More info on Clipper Chip
Message-ID: <9304171015.AA20088@hacker2.eff.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Comments on White House Clipper Plan

I attended the "interesting" NIST press conference yesterday
on the "Clipper Chip" and may be able to clear up a few quaestions.

According to NIST:

The Chip has 4 functions, including
	Key
	Encryption
	Serial Number
	Escrow functionality

Thus, it sounds like a key management system may have to be built
into the devices that will be sold with the chip. However this means that 
they will also be able to determine which key to get becuase they will know 
the serial number. It also seems likely that once your key is compromised, 
its gone forever. This is a serious problem

The Attorney General will determine next week who will be the escrow agents 
for this. I am willing to bet $ that NIST/Commerce will be one of them (not a 
lot, after all, I do work for a non-profit).

Everything about this proposal is classified. The chip is classified but even 
more disturbing, the president directing ordering a review into crypto policy 
is also classified. CPSR has already filed 11 FOIA requests for all 
information, including the directive. You can expect that we will be filing 
suit shortly to get those documents and force this out into the open. When I 
questioned them about why the review was happening after the proposal, they 
did not answer me.

This is not 1984 all over again-its '86. The NSA tried this exact same "black 
box" proposal (minus the escrow) in 1986. Industry laughed them out of the 
park. 

NIST also stated that the proposal has been implimented for 14 months and 
they (NSA actually) have been working on it for at least 4 years. 

AT&T announced yesterday that will will begin selling devices with these 
Clippers in them immediatly. We've been sold down the river by ma bell again.

Dave Banisar
CPSR Washington Office










From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: KINNEY WILLIAM H <kinney@spot.Colorado.EDU>
Date: Sat, 17 Apr 93 09:55:59 PDT
To: ebrandt@jarthur.Claremont.EDU (Eli Brandt)
Subject: Re: Proposal for anon chaining
In-Reply-To: <9304161717.AA15797@toad.com>
Message-ID: <199304171655.AA24267@spot.Colorado.EDU>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



I write:
> > This seems to me to be a very robust pseudonymous mail system which 
> > could be implemented by relatively minor changes to the existing Cypherpunk 
> > remailer structure.
 
Eli  <ebrandt@jarthur.claremont.edu> writes:
> This appears to be the ARA system that was previously suggested,
> which I was speaking of using with penet.  Your comment that changes
> would be needed implies that it is different; if so, could you
> clarify the difference?

No, evidently I wasn't reading carefully enough. These do appear
to be the same. 

> The reason Eric suggested hanging this off the side of a pseudonym
> server is that it is rather inconvenient in its pure form,

Although I would suggest making the raw data available to those who
wish to bypass the nym server for some reason. Say, a 
"Request-Routing-Header <anon_id>", command. Although I imagine
you guys have your hands full getting even a basically functional
version up.

                             -- Will





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: J. Michael Diehl <mdiehl@triton.unm.edu>
Date: Sat, 17 Apr 93 11:31:11 PDT
To: dmandl@shearson.com (David Mandl)
Subject: Re: Phil Zimmerman on the Radio
In-Reply-To: <9304161840.AA17929@tardis.shearson.com>
Message-ID: <9304171830.AA25558@triton.unm.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> FYI, for those of you in the NYC area, I'm going to be conducting a
> brief interview with Phil Zimmerman (author of PGP) on my radio show
> tomorrow to discuss the recent NSA/Big Brother crypto developments
> (see the front page of today's New York Times).

Anyone get a tape, or transcript of this.  I'd really like to hear it.

+-----------------------+-----------------------------+---------+
| J. Michael Diehl ;-)  | I thought I was wrong once. | PGP KEY |
|                       |    But, I was mistaken.     |available|
|                       +-----------------------------+---------+
| mdiehl@triton.unm.edu | "I'm just looking for the opportunity |
| mike.diehl@fido.org   | to be Politically Incorrect!   <Me>   |
| (505) 299-2282        |                                       |
+-----------------------+---------------------------------------+




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Bill Sommerfeld <sommerfeld@orchard.medford.ma.us>
Date: Sat, 17 Apr 93 10:36:45 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Boston Globe article 4/17/93
Message-ID: <9304171657.AA00125@orchard.medford.ma.us>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


[I've called the Globe to complain about their swallowing the
government's story, hook, line, and sinker; I suggest others do
likewise...]

US reveals computer chip for scrambling telephones

By John Mintz
Washington Post

WASHINGTON -- The White House yesterday announced its new plan to
prevent criminals, terrorists, and industrial spies from decoding
communications over telephones, fax machines, and computers while
ensuring the government's ability to eavesdrop.

The plan features a $1200 government-developed computer chip embedded
in a scrambling device the size of a small notebook, which the
government hopes will be adopted as the universal means of encryption.
The Clinton administration said the technology will balance the
interests of civil libertarians, corporations, and individuals on the
one hand against law enforcement and intelligence agencies on the
other.

The official White House announcement yesterday was the endorsement of
the Clipper Chip, developed by NSA, as the government standard for
encryption devices.

Industry and US officials said that means the Clipper Chip also will
become widely accepted in corporate America, because companies and
individuals desiring to do business with federal agencies that encode
their information would have to use the government's standard.

The success of the government's initiative depends on the willingness
of companies to accept encryption that the government can crack.

AT&T announced yesterday it would use the new chip in all its secure
nongovernment telephones.

The NSA has licensed two California firms to manufacture and market
the Clipper Chip, officials said.  The price is expected to drop to
about $25 each, they said.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Mail Delivery Subsystem <MAILER-DAEMON@Panix.Com>
Date: Sat, 17 Apr 93 20:29:11 PDT
To: habs@Panix.Com
Subject: Returned mail: User unknown
Message-ID: <199304172211.AA00916@sun.Panix.Com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


   ----- Transcript of session follows -----
While talking to toad.com:
>>> RCPT To:<cyhperpunks@toad.com>
<<< 550 <cyhperpunks@toad.com>... User unknown
550 cyhperpunks@toad.com... User unknown

   ----- Unsent message follows -----
Received: by sun.Panix.Com id AA00914
  (5.65c/IDA-1.4.4 for cyhperpunks@toad.com); Sat, 17 Apr 1993 18:11:23 -0400
Received: by sun.Panix.Com id AA29602
  (5.65c/IDA-1.4.4 for habs); Sat, 17 Apr 1993 17:42:12 -0400
Date: Sat, 17 Apr 1993 17:42:12 -0400
From: Mail Delivery Subsystem <MAILER-DAEMON>
Message-Id: <199304172142.AA29602@sun.Panix.Com>
To: habs
Subject: Returned mail: User unknown
Sender: habs

   ----- Transcript of session follows -----
While talking to toad.com:
>>> RCPT To:<cypherpunk@toad.com>
<<< 550 <cypherpunk@toad.com>... User unknown
550 cypherpunk@toad.com... User unknown

   ----- Unsent message follows -----
Received: by sun.Panix.Com id AA29600
  (5.65c/IDA-1.4.4 for extropians@gnu.ai.mit.edu); Sat, 17 Apr 1993 17:42:12 -0400
From: Harry Shapiro <habs>
Message-Id: <199304172142.AA29600@sun.Panix.Com>
Subject: PGP & RSA -> Legal
To: cypherpunk@toad.com, extropians@gnu.ai.mit.edu (Harry Shapiro)
Date: Sat, 17 Apr 1993 17:42:11 -0400 (EDT)
Reply-To: habs
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=US-ASCII
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
Content-Length: 698       

I recall at some point that RSA put something out on the net
which allowed anyone to use the "patents or source code" for
non-commercial use.

Do I remember correctly? (I replied to the announcement)

If I am remembering correctly, would that give me a defacto
licensing of PGP for con-commercial use?

The reason I bring this up is that if the feds crack down,
they many decide to "help" RSA by legally fighting PGP users.

Which why it would be in our interest to legally (patent-wise,
despite how you feel about RSA, etc.) use PGP.

-- 
Harry Shapiro  				      habs@panix.com
List Administrator of the Extropy Institute Mailing List
Private Communication for the Extropian Community since 1991








From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Date: Sat, 17 Apr 93 14:25:46 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: An Alliance with RSA?
Message-ID: <9304172125.AA28195@netcom3.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Fellow Cypherpunks,

In this message I am urging we all consider an alliance with RSA Data
Security, the only company or group able to actually provide an
alternative to the "weak crypto" of the Clinton Clipper.

I have no idea if RSA is interested, or if in fact they're already in
league with the NSA and other privacy clippers.

I chose a public forum because I'm in no position to negotiate for
anybody in private. I also mailed a copy to Jim Bidzos, in case he's
not reading sci.cryt right now.


-Tim


Newsgroups: sci.crypt,alt.security,comp.org.eff.talk,comp.security.misc,comp.org.acm,comp.org.ieee
From: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Subject: Re: Don't fight Clipper Chip, subvert or replace it !
Date: Sat, 17 Apr 1993 21:09:13 GMT

Robert Lewis Glendenning (rlglende@netcom.com) wrote:
: Clipper Chip is a response to the fact that there is no business
: or professional body in a position to establish a standard and
: provide chipsets to implement it for analog or digial transmission
: systems.
: 
: RSA might be in position to do it, if they had active cooperation of
: a couple of manufacturers of cellular phones or desktop phones.
.......
: Is RSA independt of the gov enough to spearhead this?  I, for one,
: would *gladly* pay royalties via purchasing secure phones.


Hear hear! I completely agree that we need to work quickly to
establish alternatives to the government's Clinton Clipper. As Brad
Templeton and others have noted, once the Clipper becomes ensconced in
enough phones there will be enormous pressure to make it the *legal*
standard, and it will become the "market* standard as well. (There is
a lot of confusion in the proposal about whether the use of Clipper is
mandated, about whether non-escrow alternatives will be allowed, etc.)

(There are also unclear issues about how hard, or how illegal, it will
be to make "workalikes" which meet the standard but which generate
phony or untappable keys...I'm sure the next several weeks will see
these issues thrashed out in this and other groups.)

Meanwhile, I'd be interested to hear RSA Data Security's reaction.
Often criticized in this group for their licensing policies (the usual
complaints about MailSafe costing too much, at $125 or so, and the
general issue of software patents...), we may find that *allying*
ourselves with RSA is the best thing we can do. What's a mere
licensing fee when our liberty may be at stake? (If everyone who
wanted true security paid, say, $100 for a lifetime use of all of
RSA's patents--which expire in the period 1998-2002, or so--then RSA
would make tons of money and be happy, I'm sure. A small price to pay.
For those to whom $100 sounds like too much, I'm sure the actual terms
could be different, spread out over several years, whatever. To me,
it's a small price to pay.)

Strong crypto means strong privacy. Escrowing keys, sending copies of
keys to large databases, and splitting keys into two 40-bit pieces,
all done with secret and non-analyzable protocols and algorithms, is
*NOT* strong crypto!

Whatever some of us may think about the abstract principles of
patenting number theory applications, this minor issue pales in
comparison with the potential dangers of the Clipper proposal (note
that I said "potential"...we'll presumably learn more in the coming
months).

The RSA algorithms are at least public, have been analyzed and
attacked for years, and source code is available (to better ensure no
deliberate weakenesses or trapdoors).

I know of a number of groups putting together voice encryption systems
using off-the-shelf hardware (like Soundblaster boards for the PC) and
CELP-type software. The new generations of PCs, using fast 486s and
Pentiums are fast enough to do real-time voice encryption. Combined
with Diffie-Hellman key exchange, this should provide an alternative
to the Clipper system.

Of course, we don't really know if the Administration proposes to
outlaw competing systems. (It seems to me that their goal of tapping
terrorists, child pornographers, and Hilary bashers would be thwarted
if low-cost alternatives to Clipper proliferated. Not to defend child
pornographers or terrorists, but limiting basic freedoms to catch a
few criminals is not the American way of doing things. End of soapbox
mode.)

I suggest we in these groups set aside any differences we may have had
with RSA (and don't look at me....I have both MacPGP *and* a fully
legal copy of "MailSafe"!) and instead work with them as quickly as we can.

RSA?, Jim?, are you listening?

-Tim May

P.S. I reserve the right to retract these opinions if it should turn
out that RSA Data Security was involved in the Clipper proposal.
-- 
..........................................................................
Timothy C. May         | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,  
tcmay@netcom.com       | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
408-688-5409           | knowledge, reputations, information markets, 
W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA  | black markets, collapse of governments.
Higher Power: 2^756839 | Public Key: PGP and MailSafe available.







From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: J. Michael Diehl <mdiehl@triton.unm.edu>
Date: Sat, 17 Apr 93 14:00:59 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Automation package.
Message-ID: <9304172100.AA00859@triton.unm.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Since I've been using encrypted mail for about a month, now, I've developed a
few usefull batch files and telix script files.  Would anyone be interested in
having them.  For the most part, they're pretty simple, but I use them, and 
they work. ;^)  

I don't use the perl scripts that came with pgp since I don't trust the phone
connection.  I xfer encrypted messages and read them at home.  BTW, I use 4dos
version 4.02 as opposed to command.com as my command interpreter; some of my 
batch files require features that 4dos has that msdos does not.  Anyway, 4dos
is a much better package than straight pms-dos.

I think we need to develope methods to make encryption as simple to use as 
possible.  Is this something that you all are interested in or am I just blowing
smoke? ;^)


+-----------------------+-----------------------------+---------+
| J. Michael Diehl ;-)  | I thought I was wrong once. | PGP KEY |
|                       |    But, I was mistaken.     |available|
|                       +-----------------------------+---------+
| mdiehl@triton.unm.edu | "I'm just looking for the opportunity |
| mike.diehl@fido.org   | to be Politically Incorrect!   <Me>   |
| (505) 299-2282        |                                       |
+-----------------------+---------------------------------------+




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Harry Shapiro <habs@Panix.Com>
Date: Sat, 17 Apr 93 12:41:41 PDT
To: hughes@soda.berkeley.edu (Eric Hughes)
Subject: Brief review of "The Invisible Weapon."
In-Reply-To: <9304171533.AA04312@soda.berkeley.edu>
Message-ID: <199304171941.AA23905@sun.Panix.Com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


a conscious being, Eric Hughes wrote:
> 
> Harry Shapiro mentions what sounds like an excellent little book,
> titled "The Invisible Weapon"
> 
> I've made a directory called clipper/ in the ftp site.  I'm looking
> for information to fill it up with.
> 
> Harry, I'd like to publicly ask you to write an annotated bibliography
> entry for this book so that I could put it up.  Full reference
> details, of course, two or three sentences describing the contents of
> each chapter, and a small summary.  Thanks in advance.

Hope this is close enough:

The Invisible Weapon.

Telecommunications and International Politics (1851-1945)

By Daniel R. Headrick, Prof. of History and Social Sciences at
Roosevelt University, author of "The Tools of the Empire" and "The
Tentacles of Progress."

Copyright 1991 Oxford University Press, Inc.
ISBN: 0-19-506273-6
1. Telecommunications - History
2. Telecommunications - Political aspects - History
3. Telecommunications - Military aspects  - History
4. World Politics -- 1900 - 1945
5. World Politics -- 19th century

From the book jacket - 
"A vital instrument of power, telecommunications
is and always has been a profoundly political technology. In "The
Invisible Weapon," Headrick examines the political history of
telecommunications from the mid-nineteenth century to the end of world
war II, and illustrates how this technology gave nations a new
instrument for international relations.

Headrick's discusses the political aspects of information technology in
modern history. He shows how telegraphy created conflicts in far-flung
empires which hastened the deterioration of diplomacy on the brink
of the first world war; increased the political interest in controlling
news; and how the security of telecommunications made communications
strategy, communications intelligence, and cryptography decisive tools
during the two world wars."

This book is of interest to be because it details all of the positive
accepts of why a government "needs" to know everything that is
telecommunicated everywhere it can. Even more importantly is shows how
the British government routinely intercepted communications sent through
British owned telecommunications infrastructure despite publicly
claiming they would never do such a thing.

It also shows how interception "hastened the deterioration of
diplomacy."


The Chapters:

1. Telecommunications and International relations

2. The New Technology

3. The Expansion of the World Cable Network, 1866-1895

4. Telegraphy and Imperialism in the Late Nineteenth Century

5. Crisis at the Turn of the Century, 1895-1901

6. The Great Powers and the Cable Crisis, 1900-1913

7. The Beginnings of Radio, 1895 - 1914

8. Cables and Radio in World war I

9. Communications Intelligence in World War I

10. Conflicts and Settlements, 1919 - 1923

11. Technological Upheavals and Commercial Rivalries, 1924 - 1939

12. Communications Intelligence in World War II

13. The War at Sea

14. The Changing of the Guard

15. Telecommunications, Information, and Security

/harry



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Clark Reynard <clark@metal.psu.edu>
Date: Sat, 17 Apr 93 17:59:31 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: How to Block the Big Brother Proposal--Petition, fax, mail?
Message-ID: <9304180148.AA00469@metal.psu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I've looked into the issue a little more.

I think it's probably the most important cypherpunk issue.

Perhaps it _is_ time to write the White House.  But I think
individual emailed letters to the White House ought to be combined
with some sort of petition, carefully drafted, and sent by 
(telegram/fax/snailmail) and signed by everyone we can get, copied
as one of those mailer files like shareware uses for registration,
so that anyone can print it out, sign it and stamp it. 

Though individually-written letters would have a greater impact,
the sheer volume of mail achievable by a large crosspost
(I don't like massive crossposts, but one is necessary.)  of the
mailer, even if only .1% of the readership considers it worth
doing.  

In addition, individual letters to government officials of note,
in particular Representative Rohrbacker (anyone have an email/
snailmail address?), Lloyd Bentsen and anyone else who potentially
could have an interest.

Does anyone have any specific input about what ONE person could
do to fulfill his part of the obligation to block this lame Nazi bullshit?

Again, I think a petition would be a good idea, but getting it signed
by everyone would be difficult, and signing it electronically via
PGP might be considered just a _mite_ provocative, like making a 
peace offering to William Bennett by offering him a toke off a
J.

Any input?
----
Robert W. Clark
rclark@nyx.cs.du.edu   PGP signature available by mail or finger




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu
Date: Sat, 17 Apr 93 19:55:51 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: BIGBROTHER: a public attack plan in 14 points
Message-ID: <9304180255.AA22660@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Someone please wake me from this nightmare.

OK, I'll try to be pragmatic and cut the fiery rhetoric here and avoid
choir-preaching.

This thing is out. Let's man the battlestations. Here's a nice little
summary sheet of things that we should emphasize in public on the
proposal, for the tip-of-the-tongue comments to friends, coworkers, and
your grandmother. The public stance should be as straightforward and
nontechnical as possible. We should attempt to derail the plan on as
many nontechnical points as possible, because to attack technical
points lends an aura of legitimacy to it, making it sound like `they
had good intentions, but it's not going to work.' The truth (of course)
is that this proposal is an illegitimate child, this time borne of
grotesque bedfellows (e.g. Denning, Clinton and the NSA) but a monster
no matter WHO the parents...  Without further ado, the 14 Points...

1. Look how the proposal was `handed down' like a unilateral decree. It
smacks of a government making decisions for us and excluding us from
the process. The whole proposal sounds kind of sinister when viewed in
the light of its tone of ``we know what's best for you'' and ``if you
don't cooperate, we may have to roll out more nasty things.'' This
unilateral handing-down is really obnoxious, because the administration
has wholly bypassed the congress and the public at large! It has all
the noxious smell of something a dictator (or a naive president prodded
by the sheer force of a massively funded secret federal agency) would do.

2. Clearly there has been a huge amount of secret development on this
and taxpayer money funding it. Why is it that this process has been
wholly shielded from public view until now? Why is so much money being
spent on depriving Americans of their rights? Why are we spending so
much money to eavesdrop on our neighbors (esp. when they seem like such
*nice* people)? It's all so horrifyingly undemocratic and authoritarian
and impolite. Does our government have something to hide? Do they think
we are too stupid to understand the details? Or are they afraid we
would become more disgusted the more we hear?

3. AT&T has already committed, say the rumors, to building phones with
the chip. There must be some sleazy backroom collusion between
executives of this company and the government. Why were others
excluded? Is this part Clinton's vision of free enterprise? Does the
government play favorites among companies? Isn't there something
blatantly illegal about this?

4. The announcement is outright obfuscatory. It specifically excludes
any mention of the NSA when its noninvolvement is a total fantasy. In
fact, the sheet in stating that other agencies are behind it is
something of a lie in this regard. We should attack the proposal as
being absurdly vague on extremely important, *central* points (such as
which two agencies carry the keys), but that even if the
swiss-cheese-quality holes were diminished, the proposal would *still*
be unacceptable; it is fundamentally flawed, a wrong idea that has no
merit whatsoever.

5. Here is a neat analogy. Notice how Joe Policeman has to buy his cars
at any regular car dealer. We don't get excited when we hear that
hoodlums and terrorists and drug dealers can buy cars at the same
place. In other words, law enforcement agencies are not entitled to
special perks or privileges from private industry.  And we don't
tolerate extreme obstructions in our ability to buy cars when we have
the money, the car is there, and we like it. And the government doesn't
restrict us from having cars that can drive faster than policecars. We
don't let the government install special boxes in our cars that can
cripple them by remote control when a cop is chasing us! (note that
analogies have to be perfect or they turn into minutae bogs)

6. More on the free enterprise issue. Why was this single company that
created the Clipper Chip favored by the government? What gives them the
right to have a monopoly? Why is the government deliberately *creating*
a monopoly?  It is thumbing its nose at all those other poor
hardworking cryptography companies who worked so hard, coming up with
better schemes, and were rejected (a little melodrama for grandma there)

7. The chip was developed by `government engineers'. Who? Why is the
government in the realm of something that is the role of private
industry? What is our government doing creating `state of the art'
stuff *at*all*? And why, of all the things they could be improving, are
they coming up with a device to invade people's privacy?

8. We have to attack the ``state-of-the-art'' thing ad infinitum. Has
the government *ever* come up with something state of the art? Do we
Americans want to be  state-of-the-art in the field of privacy
deprivation? How do we know it is `state-of-the-art' when we can't
*look* at it for ourselves, and only hear it from people who are
involved in the project saying `trust us, it's way cool'? Even if it
was as sophisticated as a Cray Supercomputer, are there just some
machines that shouldn't be built? Are there some devices, that, while
technically feasible, shouldn't be built?

9. One of the most important claims is that ``this chip provides no new
authority to wiretap''. We've got to focus on this one. We can say the
constitution specifically prohibits illegal search and seizure, and
that we don't really remember who it was that decided that the
government had free reign on wiretapping. We can say that it has always
been the right of the government to obtain warrents, but it has always
been the right of people to speak in codes, and now new technology is
*helping* people to exercise a right that has always existed but lay
undiscovered because of complexity. 

10. In fact, we have to make it sound like new technology like
encryption and cyberspace is going to help us rediscover our rights,
and that vast government agencies that have been built up because we
simply were ignorant of these dormant rights, and are based on our lack
of exercising them, are going to gradually dissolve away, like the way
those associated with the Cold War have, because they are superfluous.
Sure, people will get displaced, and be noisy in their complaints, but
their jobs are no longer necessary or even *possible* in the 21st
century (allusions to breakup of NSA). In fact, maybe we should get a
Privacy Dividend like the much-heralded Peace Dividend  when our
government agencies no longer have the capability to intercept private
communication. How about that--tell the public that we all get a
Privacy Dividend if they embrace unbreakable encryption!

11. Notice that the problem with surveillance and wiretapping is that
it has always been a catch-22---the government needs the data to prove
you are a criminal, but shouldn't have access to that data unless it
can prove you are a criminal. Notice that the proposal talks about The
solution lay in not wiretapping, of course! And now we have technology
to *enforce* this choice. And the proposal talks about `criminals and
terrorists' as if we know exactly who they are---but (as I understand
it, and last I checked!) that is the point of a court to decide.

12. The plan makes it sound like we can somehow boost technological
competitiveness (a real button-pushing hot topic among the public) by
protecting the private communications of companies etc. We have to
attack this and say that these companies only benefit if they have
control over the scheme and it is not `imposed from above' and that
when it is `imposed from above' it actually has the effect of
*weakening* their technological competiveness, because it restricts
their choices into buying something that may not be right for their
needs. We should point out that privacy is complex and the ability for
the government to foresee all needs is ridiculous, and furthermore even
if it had such a capability it would not be its proper role. We have to
really drive this one home: privacy choices (i.e. encryption) is an
issue that has to be decided by the individual. That's the American Way
(tm) -- insert at this point the National Anthem, flag waving, smiling
kid eating apple pie.

13. ``The government must develop consistent, comprehensive policies''
regarding the use of the new infrastructure of data highways. Well, yes
and no. We should talk about data highways as not like real ones in
that people can't have accidents, they are virtually impossible to
damage with mere data, they can withstand tremendous strains in
traffic, regulating mechanisms are *built in* to the software and
hardware, hence the need for government `regulations' is a bit
misguided and inapplicable. Also, the government has no business
telling you that you can only drive one kind of car, or that your car
has to be crippled so it can't go faster than 55 MPH, or that you have
to tell them where you're going every time you get in it, etc.

14. The proposal makes it sound like if the government is just shrewd
enough, they will always be able to intercept and decrypt traffic. We
have to drive home the point that no amount of ingenuity whatsoever can
plug the dike of advancing technology, and that it is not the case that
we warp or befuddle the technology to support our
government--increasingly we will be adapting our government to harness
new and powerful technology!  I.e. we require a fundamental change in
our governing systems, to `access' our newfound rights that have lain
dormant for too long via novel technology, and this proposal can be
viewed as a `last gasp' of a dying system...

Finally, the bright side (really?). We can point out that this
proposal, while intrinsically flawed and nauseatingly abhorrent, is
bringing into public view important issues of cryptography, that much
more sophisticated cryptography will be discovered and widely utilized,
that it reveals the true aims of and weaknesses in our government
process that we can alter, fix, or remove, that people are starting to
realize how much wiretapping is going on and that the sensible and
patriotic goal is to not encourage but limit or abolish it (by making
it impossible), that it reveals the need for trully strong encryption
easily accessable by all the unwashed masses, that it is just a tiny
thread starting the weaving of an entirely new colorful tapestry in our
nation and our government's history (oops, here comes the blaring music
and the flapping flag and the bright-eyed kid again...)

I insert my patriotic and emotional salute to us Cypherpunks here...

p.s. we should point out that Thomas Jefferson actually came up with a
highly sophisticated cryptographic rotor code that was so secure it was
used even for a long time at the beginning of this century, and that
clearly a Founding Father has a strong commitment to strong
cryptography! (see The Codebreakers by Kahn for more info on Jefferson's code)

``If it were necessary to choose between the Government and Privacy, I
should not hesitate to prefer the latter...''

``Give me Privacy, or give me Death...''

p.s. we should point out that Thomas Jefferson actually came up with a
highly sophisticated cryptographic rotor code that was so secure it was
used even for a long time at the beginning of this century, and that
clearly a Founding Father has a strong commitment to strong cryptography!




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Marc Horowitz <marc@Athena.MIT.EDU>
Date: Sat, 17 Apr 93 18:52:23 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: repost from sci.crypt
Message-ID: <9304180152.AA34123@oliver.MIT.EDU>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I just posted this to sci.crypt.  You conspiracy theorists out there
are probably going to start getting ulcers soon.

		Marc

From: marc@mit.edu (Marc Horowitz N1NZU)
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
Subject: The source of that announcement
Date: 18 Apr 1993 01:19:38 GMT
Organization: Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Lines: 38
Distribution: world
Message-ID: <MARC.93Apr17211937@oliver.mit.edu>
NNTP-Posting-Host: oliver.mit.edu

The message from the NIST about the clipper chip comes from the
following address:

	clipper@csrc.ncsl.nist.gov (Clipper Chip Announcement)

Just who is that, I asked myself, or rather, I asked the computer.

    % telnet csrc.ncsl.nist.gov 25
    Trying...
    Connected to csrc.ncsl.nist.gov.
    Escape character is '^]'.
    220 first.org sendmail 4.1/NIST ready at Sat, 17 Apr 93 20:42:56 EDT
    expn clipper
    250-<csspab@mail-gw.ncsl.nist.gov>
    250-<denning@cs.georgetown.edu>
    250-<hoffman@seas.gwu.edu>
    250-<mkapor@eff.org>
    250-<rotenberg@cpsr.org>
    250-<rivest@mit.edu>
    250-<mhellman@stanford.edu>
    250-<alanrp@aol.com>
    250-<dparker@sri.com>
    250-<jim@rsa.com>
    250-<branstad@tis.com>
    250 <mgrsplus@csmes.ncsl.nist.gov>
    quit
    221 first.org closing connection
    Connection closed.

Well, isn't that interesting.  Dorothy Denning, Mitch Kapor, Marc
Rotenberg, Ron Rivest, Jim Bidzos, and others.  The Government, RSA,
TIS, CPSR, and the EFF are all represented.  I don't suppose anybody
within any of these organizations would care to comment?  Or is this
just the White House's idea of a cruel joke on these peoples' inboxes?

		Marc
--
Marc Horowitz N1NZU <marc@mit.edu>				617-253-7788




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Clark Reynard <clark@metal.psu.edu>
Date: Sat, 17 Apr 93 19:08:56 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: PGP & RSA -> Legal
Message-ID: <9304180257.AA00395@metal.psu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


If RSA wished to make it extremely difficult to get its
patent revoked, it could raise its regular price to something
on the order of $50,000.  Then, it could offer a $49,900.00
discount to those who would be willing to perform for them
the 'service' of writing to the government to complain about
any possible outlawing of cryptographic technology.

Then, if the government wished to illegalize this software,
since the software was legal at the time of purchase, it could
not be confiscated without due payment of value.  If thousands
of people were to say, "Hey, this software's worth fifty
thousand dollars, you have to pay that."  It would throw
at least something of a legal obstacle in the path of this
obscene government menace.

Does anyone know of any legal precedent which might be
binding to a case of this nature?  I know that eminent
domain laws are usually _very_ generous in compensation
for property seized for public works, if there is even
the slightest _trace_ of impropriety in their actions.
----
Robert W. Clark
rclark@nyx.cs.du.edu   PGP signature available by mail or finger




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: TO1SITTLER@APSICC.APS.EDU
Date: Sat, 17 Apr 93 21:53:11 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Fear
Message-ID: <930417225056.12c3@APSICC.APS.EDU>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I just thought I should add that I agree with the last poster.  Cryptography
will be increasingly hard to learn in the future, if this kind of thing goes on.
But it will be ten or fifteen years before anyone has computers which can
crack an 128-bit version of DES.  I am cryptologically naive, but I think 
that people can always find privacy when they want it.  An underground
cypherpunk movement may be the only way to bring up new cryptographers.

More important is the issue of equipment.  Is a computer communications
equipment?  If so, we might have clipper chips on our motherboards.  Reading
input from the keyboard.

This is a crisis for privacy.  Can someone, preferably the people who run 
the cypherpunk list, set up a Privacy Advertising Fund?  I would be willing to
donate money, and hopefully many other cypherpunks would too.  We might win
that way.  Urge people to protest with full-page ads in newspapers.  With 30-
second TV spots.  With demonstrations.

I will donate, if it is formed, but I can not form it except under the most
extreme conditions.  I have no experience in advertising or management.

Be afraid.  Be very afraid.
Kragen Sittler




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Harry Shapiro <habs@Panix.Com>
Date: Sat, 17 Apr 93 20:06:37 PDT
To: ji@cs.columbia.edu
Subject: Even more
Message-ID: <199304180306.AA14149@sun.Panix.Com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



csspab is the first name on the clipper list it expands as follows:

Trying 129.6.48.199 ...
Connected to mail-gw.ncsl.nist.gov.
Escape character is '^]'.
220 mail-gw.ncsl.nist.gov sendmail 4.1/rbj/jck-3 ready at Sat, 17 Apr 93 
23:04:29 EDT
<expn csspab
250-<burrows@ecf>
250-<mcnulty@ecf>
250-Bill Colvin <colvin>
250-<Gangemi@dockmaster.ncsc.mil>
250-John Kuyers <kuyers>
250-<slambert@cgin.cto.citicorp.com>
250-<lipner@mitre.org>
250-<gallagher@dockmaster.ncsc.mil>
250-<cindy_rand@postmaster.dot.gov>
250-<walker@tis.com>
250-<willis@rand.org>
250-Eddie Zeitler <zeitler>
250-Cris Castro <castro>
250 <whitehurst@vnet.ibm.com>
-- 
Harry Shapiro  				      habs@panix.com
List Administrator of the Extropy Institute Mailing List
Private Communication for the Extropian Community since 1991



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: karn@qualcomm.com (Phil Karn)
Date: Sat, 17 Apr 93 23:23:43 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re:  1st Amendment Clipped?
Message-ID: <9304180623.AA28101@servo>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>I then transmit the following and am arrested --
 
>-----BEGIN PGP MESSAGE-----
[cipher text deleted]
 
>Won't the prosecution be embarrassed when I decrypt it in court and present
>the plaintext:
 
>      1st Amendment
>      Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
	[remaining text deleted]

No, they won't. Possession of such an OBVIOUSLY subversive document
will prove conclusively that you're a dangerous enemy of the state,
and must be severely dealt with.

You'll be lucky to have a swift and painless execution.

Thought for the day:

"All I want is peace on earth, good will toward men."
"We're the United States Government. We don't do that sort of thing!"
		--Sneakers (great flick, just saw it. Seemed appropriate.)

Phil




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Duncan Frissell <76630.3577@CompuServe.COM>
Date: Sat, 17 Apr 93 20:55:09 PDT
To: <cypherpunks@toad.com>
Subject: 1st Amendment Clipped?
Message-ID: <930418035104_76630.3577_EHK38-1@CompuServe.COM>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Potential First Amendment problems with an encryption ban --
 
Let's assume that the Clinton administration bans non-Clipper encryption
technology.
 
I then transmit the following and am arrested --
 
-----BEGIN PGP MESSAGE-----
Version: 2.2
 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=i5Mq
-----END PGP MESSAGE-----
 
Won't the prosecution be embarrassed when I decrypt it in court and present
the plaintext:
 
      1st Amendment
      Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
      religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging
      the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the
      people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the government for
      a redress of grievances.
 
 
I don't see how the mere fact of encryption itself fits a message into one of
the 1st amendment exceptions -- pornography, national security, libel, etc.
 
Since it is easy to establish in information theory that a cyphertext is a
form of *information* itself and not just a *means* of transmitting the
information contained in the plaintext, outlawing the encryption of plaintext
because the algorithm is unapproved is classic censorship of a writing
*because* of its content.
 
Additionally, there are several types of communications that cannot legally be
wiretapped.  These would include lawyer-client and husband-wife as well as
certain others.  Since the privacy of these communications requires that you
make an effort to keep them private, you could argue that in these cases the
use of secure encryption is legally required.
 
The crypto-fascists have used these sorts bluffs ever since the late 1920s
when someone was discouraged from publishing a history of the State
Department's code office.  The NSA also threatened to lock up the developers
of the RSA encryption system if they published "A Proposal for a Public Key
Encyption System" in the Proceedings of the IEEE in 1977.  They published
anyway and are still walking around.
 
Don't let them bluff anyone again.  It is neither legally nor technically
possible to ban secure cryptography.
 
Duncan Frissell
 
 





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Harry Shapiro <habs@Panix.Com>
Date: Sat, 17 Apr 93 20:52:37 PDT
To: extropians@gnu.ai.mit.edu (Harry Shapiro)
Subject: Big Brother: True Names
Message-ID: <199304180352.AA16131@sun.Panix.Com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Here are some background I was able to gather about those
people on the csspab@mail-gw.ncsl.nist.gov, who had accounts
directly on that machine.

Eddie Zeitler is vice president of information security for Fidelity
Investment Corp. He used to work for Pacific National Bank, Glendale,
Calif.,

Cris Castro is director of information security programs at SRI
International.

Bill Colvin is NASA Inspector General

John Kuyers is Ernst & Young's Dallas-based regional director of
information systems auditing

-- 
Harry Shapiro  				      habs@panix.com
List Administrator of the Extropy Institute Mailing List
Private Communication for the Extropian Community since 1991



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Phil Karn <karn@unix.ka9q.ampr.org>
Date: Sun, 18 Apr 93 00:20:07 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Thoughts on the proposal
Message-ID: <9304180722.AA01178@unix.ka9q.ampr.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Some points to add, some of which I don't think have been made yet.

It is entirely possible that Clinton, if he understands anything at
all about this proposal, sincerely thinks that he's helping the cause
of personal privacy. Consider that his entire education on the
subject of cryptography probably consisted of a 5 minute briefing
that probably went something like this:

	The US government is making available, for widespread public use,
	encryption technology developed by the greatest cryptographers in the
	world - NSA's.  Civilian cryptographers are simply not capable of
	producing anything as good, so what does it matter if the keys are
	registered with the government? Users will still be better off than
	they are now, so what do they have to lose?

And I bet that this would sound perfectly reasonable to the average
man on the street, too.

Well...I'd say we know better. And we have a big educational job to
do.  We need to let the public know that civilian cryptography is
already quite good. Good enough that the communications industry
doesn't need any "help" in the form of new chips from the government
to secure its communications, thank you very much. And simple and
cheap enough that it would have already have been made widely
available in products such as digital cellular telephones if the
government hadn't considered it "too good" and done everything they
could behind the scenes to stop it.

Clinton needs to learn that if he *really* wants to help the cause of
civilian cryptography, he only needs to call off the goons over in
NSA.  We don't need their "help". We just want them to get the hell
out of our private conversations and our private lives.

Phil




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Harry Shapiro <habs@Panix.Com>
Date: Sat, 17 Apr 93 21:25:38 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: More True Names: The NIST Security Board
Message-ID: <199304180425.AA17780@sun.Panix.Com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


The csspub mailing list: csspab@mail-gw.ncsl.nist.gov,
and address on the clipper mailing list, seems to contain
basically the members of the NIST security board.

In addition to the names already posted, their true names are as
follows:

burrows@ecf = James Burrows a director of NIST's National Computer
Systems Laboratory

mcnulty@ecf = F. Lynn McNulty an associate director for computer
security at the National Institute of Standards and Technology's
Computer Systems Laboratory

Gangemi@dockmaster.ncsc.mil = Gaetano Gangemi is director of the
secure systems program at Wang Laboratories Inc. He wrote: Computer
Security Basics by Deborah Russell and G. T.  Gangemi, Sr. -1991,
O'Reilly and Associates

slambert@cgin.cto.citicorp.com = Sandra Lambert is vice-president of
information security at Citibank, N.A.

lipner@mitre.org = Lipner is Mitre Corp.'s director of information
systems.

gallagher@dockmaster.ncsc.mil = Patrick Gallagher, director of the
National Security Agency's National Computer Security Center and a
security board member

walker@tis.com = Stephen Walker a computer security expert and
president of Trusted Information Systems, Inc. in Glenwood, Md

willis@rand.org = Willis H.  Ware a the Rand Corp.  executive who
chairs the security board.

whitehurst@vnet.ibm.com = William Whitehurst is a security board
member and director of IBM Corp.'s data security programs.

-- 
Harry Shapiro  				      habs@panix.com
List Administrator of the Extropy Institute Mailing List
Private Communication for the Extropian Community since 1991



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Matthew J Miszewski <MJMISKI@macc.wisc.edu>
Date: Sat, 17 Apr 93 22:27:53 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: CLIP: Legal Aspects
Message-ID: <23041800272877@vms2.macc.wisc.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Clinton Clipper Legal Stuff:
 
  With regard to the fear that the issuance of your 'Klinton Key'
will allow your favorite TLA to decrypt all conversations taped
previous to the issuance of the warrant granting the key, there
is precedence that disallows it.  In US v. Plamondon 407 US 297,
the Supreme Ct. held that *prior* judicial approval is a must for
any evidence sought to be admitted.  Therefore, while the
precedence does not prevent them from actually decyphering your
previous conversations, there is support that states it can not
be used against you.
 
In US v. Donovan (sorry lost the cite), the court held that the
actual application must Identify *all* parties to be surveilled.
Thus, the CIA cannot simply run a tape on you and expect to use
it in court.  It is important that everyone understand that none
of these cases *prevent* any agency from *doing* the
surveillance, and that probable cause is still an easy standard
to meet in order to get the warrant.  These cases merely tell you
what would be admissable against anyone in court (i.e. this does
not affect TLA (three letter acronyms) from blackmailing you or
scaring the hell out of you.
 
There is an enormous body of law out there on this topic and
could use some guidance from the Cypherpunk elders for search
topics.  What's needed out there.  Email me privately.
 
TOTALLY aside from the Clipper topic:  Just got the new WIRED.
Excellent article.  Groovy pix.  Which one is Murdering Thug? 8^)
 
mjmiski@macc.wisc.edu                    CyberLaw, etc.
Matt




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: TO1SITTLER@APSICC.APS.EDU
Date: Sat, 17 Apr 93 23:32:34 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: RE: CLIP: Media Blitz
Message-ID: <930418003021.13c0@APSICC.APS.EDU>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Sorry I can't quote, but

Giant media blitz sounds like a great idea to me.  Post the media list and put 
it on the FTP site too.  Roots-up sounds much more cypherpunk than funds- and 
TV- and newspaper-down.

Thank you, Matt.

Kragen




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Matthew J Miszewski <MJMISKI@macc.wisc.edu>
Date: Sat, 17 Apr 93 22:37:03 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: CLIP: Media Blitz
Message-ID: <23041800363830@vms2.macc.wisc.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Cypherpunks,
 
  I know Ive got a huge list of fax/phone numbers and addresses of all
of the MAJOR media sources in this country.  Im going to find it now.
The idea is a major blitz on the media's editorial boards from plain
old outraged readers (OK cypherpunks aren't plain or old), the media
shows like Larry King, et al would love a point counterpoint on this
topic and this could create a cypher phenomenon from the roots up.
 
  If this sounds like a good idea to others out there let me know.  I
believe that a groundswell (or apparent one) will catch the eye of those
in Congress and in WAShington much more than will petitions or letters
from an ambiguous and generally anonymous email list (although everyones
thoughts are in the right place).  People in Washington react to what
appears to be public sentiment.  So lets create it :-)
 
  Ill post the media list unless many people would rather me not do so.
 
Matt




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: uni@acs.bu.edu (Shaen Bernhardt)
Date: Sat, 17 Apr 93 21:36:28 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Reaction time and Crypto
Message-ID: <9304180436.AA49530@acs.bu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain




 
I must complement the group on the speed and vigor with which they have
 
pursued the Clinton proposal.
 
It is my hope that we can somehow make it apparent to the public that they
are losing, not winning here.
 
It seems to me that the following technologies are going to be of increasing
import despite the outcome of the Clinton proposal.
 
1.  Raw headerless output from packages like PGP.  It seems obvious that
if crypto is regulated, it must be easier to disguise the type of crypto
one is using, or indeed if one is using crypto.
 
2.  Methodology for the disguising of cyphertext in more innocous data.
 
3.  The proliferation and consistant use of Crypto for even everyday
communications.
 
1>  The harder it is to find, the less potential there is for regulation.
2>  The harder it is to look for, the less potential there is for regulation.
3>  The harder it is to abolish, the less potential there is for regulation.
 
More than the specific plan here, I am stunned by the emerging MOVEMENT that
seems to be at work here.
 
I can only ask, what's next?
 
I don't think any proposal to regulate crypto will focus on the users, but
rather the development and distrubution of said crypto.  This is what
frightens me the most.  The precedent for regulation of private software
and hardware applications is painfully visable on the horizion.
 
Someone said before:  Be afraid, be very afraid.


uni (Dark)




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Date: Sun, 18 Apr 93 00:59:23 PDT
To: Extropians@gnu.ai.mit.edu
Subject: Comments from Jim Bidzos, Pres. of RSA Data Security
Message-ID: <9304180759.AA05469@netcom.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Jim Bidzos, Pres. of RSA Data Security, sent me a nice note this evening in
response to my posting on sci.crypt. In that post, I suggested that only
RSA has the algorithms and protocols ready to go for an alternative to
Clipper, and that perhaps we should set aside our differences with RSA
(over patents on software, etc.) and instead seek an alliance.

Basically, Jim said he knew *nothing* of Clipper until he read about it in
the Friday morning papers!!  If true, this is astounding. (And having met
Jim several times, I believe him.)

He's also preparing a FAQ entitled "RSA/PKP/Clipper Flap FAQ" to deal with
the many questions raised.

Jim has some interesting theories about the motivations for Clipper, and
why AT&T was so quick to jump on the bandwagon.

Please don't quote my comments in public discussions of this issue (Jim
asked me not to, which is why I'm being vaguely elliptic here.)

This is all I can say for now, but I remain convinced that RSA was not
involved (I suspect the presence of "jim@rsa.com" on the NIST mailing list,
as reported in this group by a couple of folks, is not necessarily the
cabal that put Clipper together).

Interesting times indeed!

-Tim May
--
Timothy C. May         | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,  
tcmay@netcom.com       | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
408-688-5409           | knowledge, reputations, information markets, 
W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA  | black markets, collapse of governments.
Higher Power: 2^756839 | Public Key: MailSafe and PGP available.





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: baumbach@atmel.com (Peter Baumbach)
Date: Sun, 18 Apr 93 06:14:20 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: The gov't makes sense ;-)
Message-ID: <9304180514.AA25169@sole.chp.atmel.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


My eyes have been opened, after reading the White House press release.
Privacy can only be allowed if the users don't break any laws.  If
through accident or other means we find that someone who is using 
privacy has broken the law, we need to be able to discover what has
been hidden by privacy in the past to see if other laws were broken.
It is for the greater good!  Let's have the gov't set a good example
for us too follow.  I want all government employees and anyone they
have spoken to, to be recorded always.  The tapes will be encrypted
and stored safely in the hands of all losing presidential candidates.
If a citizen has probable cause to believe that a person in gov't has
broken the law, then, with proper safeguards, he will be given copies
of the appropriate tapes and the keys, to get to the bottom of this.
If through accident or other means we find that someone who is using
privacy has broken the law, we need to be able to discover what has
been hidden by privacy in the past to see if other laws were broken.

It is for the greater good.

Peter Baumbach
baumbach@atmel.com




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: zane@genesis.mcs.com (Sameer)
Date: Sat, 17 Apr 93 23:30:31 PDT
To: Clark Reynard <clark@metal.psu.edu>
Subject: Re: PGP & RSA -> Legal
In-Reply-To: <9304180257.AA00395@metal.psu.edu>
Message-ID: <m0nkSlv-000MU1C@genesis.mcs.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


In message <9304180257.AA00395@metal.psu.edu>, Clark Reynard writes:
> since the software was legal at the time of purchase, it could
> not be confiscated without due payment of value.  If thousands
	Ha. (Sorry, but I'm feeling cynical.)

--
| Sameer Parekh-zane@genesis.MCS.COM-PFA related mail to pfa@genesis.MCS.COM |
| Apprentice Philosopher, Writer, Physicist, Healer, Programmer, Lover, more |
| "Be God" - Me __ "Specialization is for Insects" - Robert A. Heinlein ____/
 \_____________/  \____________________________________________________/ 




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: George A. Gleason <gg@well.sf.ca.us>
Date: Sun, 18 Apr 93 01:20:05 PDT
To: karn@unix.ka9q.ampr.org
Subject: Re:  Thoughts on the proposal
Message-ID: <199304180819.AA14555@well.sf.ca.us>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Agreed with Phil here.  Clipper can't have been developed since Inauguration
Day; it has to be a hand-me-down from the Bush administration, and I'm
willing to bet that Clinton has been sold a bill of goods to get his
support.  Now a lot of folks on this list are ideologically committed to
positions which are opposite to those of the Clinton amdministration, but
please let's not let that blur our perception here.  Clinton has shown a
decent commitment to civil liberties (particularly concerning sexual
freedom and reproductive rights, a very hard place to take a stand because
there's such strong rightwing opposition); he's also shown an interest in
telecom issues; I suspect what we're facing here isn't malice but lack of
information on his part.  Crypto is an elite area in math and computer
science; for most people outside of this circle it's something they assume
that they could never possibly understand and so they tend to accept the
word of experts at hand.  And the experts who are closest to the White House
are at Fort Meade.    The task we face is to bring the expertise of the best
minds on our side, to the attention of the White House.  

-gg




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: szabo@techbook.com (Nick Szabo)
Date: Sun, 18 Apr 93 02:07:06 PDT
To: extropians@gnu.ai.mit.edu
Subject: Wiretapping chip
Message-ID: <m0nkVMl-000hn0C@techbook.techbook.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



I agree we should write letters, but not (or not just) to government
officials.  Consider targetting the big phone makers -- both domestic 
and overseas.  Let them know our privacy needs as customers -- that 
we want secure encryption, that means encryption with _published 
algorithms_ and without having the key available to _any_ third party,
be it the U.S. or any other government, or any nontrustworthy private 
organization.  I almost agree with Sandy that "we've won", but an important
part of the market process that brings such victory is giving
good customer feedback to communications suppliers.  

Also for consideration: boycott AT&T and all other companies making
phones with the wiretap chip, and let the phone makers know about 
the boycott early and often.

Also I am curious specifically how (a) encrypted international
phone calls and (b) foreign-made phones will fair under this
proposal (or possible follow-on proposals when they see the
weak points in this one).  Can the U.S. government dictate
key registration to the world?

I agree with Perry that "cypherpunks" is a bad label when
these kinds of issues get raised in public, and would also add 
"crypto-anarchy" to that.   Our main "talking point" is privacy, 
and other less popular stuff is best kept -- private.

Nick Szabo					szabo@techbook.com



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Date: Sun, 18 Apr 93 02:11:07 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: A Long History for Clipper...
Message-ID: <9304180909.AA07839@netcom.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



George Gleason writes:

>Agreed with Phil here.  Clipper can't have been developed since Inauguration
>Day; it has to be a hand-me-down from the Bush administration, and I'm
>willing to bet that Clinton has been sold a bill of goods to get his
>support.  Now a lot of folks on this list are ideologically committed to

It's clearly stated that the program is at least 4 years old and that, for
example, the contracts with VLSI Tech and Mxxxxtronix (I keep forgetting
the name of the previously obscure So. Cal. defense contractor) were let 14
months ago, that production of the chips has begun, blah blah. No argument
that the program started under Bush, and perhaps under Reagan (recall his
various NSDDs and the Computer Security Act...).

This doesn't mean the proposal will be casually tossed aside by Clinton as
some objections are raised. Most policies of this sort percolate up through
the entrenched bureacracies in Justice, State, Defense, NSA, etc. In this
case, the AG, Janet Reno, was a well-known drug warrior in the Miami/Dade
area....undoubtedly she made use of wiretaps, seizures, etc. She also
probably understands the issues of law enforcement pretty well and fully
understands what the proposal means.

So, I don't think Clinton will easily change this policy.

A firestorm of proposed civil disobedience, scoffing at the Clipper, etc.,
*might* have some effect. But I don't favor concentrating on legislative
fixes. Give me technology any day.

-Tim

P.S. However, I'm trying to find the net address to send ersatz "protest"
letters to Intergraph Corp about "Clipper." Clipper is the name of their
32-bit RISC chip--my thought is that enough indignant letters to
Intergraph, deliberately confusing the Clinton Clipper with their product,
will get Intergraph's lawyers to file a protest with the Administration!
Perhaps even a name change will be ordered....a minor embarrassment, to be
sure, but a stick in their eye nonetheless.
--
Timothy C. May         | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,  
tcmay@netcom.com       | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
408-688-5409           | knowledge, reputations, information markets, 
W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA  | black markets, collapse of governments.
Higher Power: 2^756839 | Public Key: MailSafe and PGP available.





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: szabo@techbook.com (Nick Szabo)
Date: Sun, 18 Apr 93 02:42:38 PDT
To: extropians@gnu.ai.mit.edu
Subject: Wiretapping chip: vid clips & sound bites
Message-ID: <m0nkVv7-000hn0C@techbook.techbook.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



I was on a Portland-area TV forum this evening and was able to raise 
the wiretap chip issue to a lay audience (in addition to being
in some ways a lay person myself on this issue, but quite concerned).
Here are some talking points and phrases I found helpful:

* Compared and contrasted a "wiretap chip", which gives government
agencies the keys to your private conversations, and a "privacy chip" 
where you keep the keys (come to think of it, I'm not sure that second
point is technically correct -- how would a truly private phone
handle the keys?)
* Compared giving government agencies crypto keys to giving the
IRS the keys to your house and filing cabinet.
* As examples I used lawyer/client, psychiatrist/patient, 
priest/confessor and political campaign work done over the phone.
* Showed New York Times front page story (Fri. 4/16) to the camera,
to demonstrate that this is important, not a fringe issue and that 
the wiretap chip is real.  Quoted Stephen Bryen of Secured 
Communications Technologies Inc., "I think the government is
creating a monster."
* Emphasized importance of learning about telephone and e-mail
technology, and how they can be made private with
open cryptography.  (As opposed to top-secret chip designs which
I called "closed cryptography").
* Stated that I was switching from AT&T to another provider in
protest of their selling phones containing wiretap chips.

I wanted to use a see-thru telephone as a prop to point at
computer chips inside the phone, but wasn't able to locate one
in time.

Some of this may sound corny and less accurate than a
technical presentation, but I needed to make the lay
audience at least mildly informed, sympathetic and perhaps even 
motivated to write their phone company or their Congresscritters 
within about the three minutes of air time.  Further suggestions for 
sound bites, vid clips etc. to use in a media campaign greatly 
appreciated.

Nick Szabo					szabo@techbook.com



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: rjc@gnu.ai.mit.edu
Date: Sun, 18 Apr 93 03:58:15 PDT
To: Extropians@gnu.ai.mit.edu
Subject: Re: Wiretapping chip: vid clips & sound bites
In-Reply-To: <9304180942.AA03151@churchy.gnu.ai.mit.edu>
Message-ID: <9304181058.AA75057@hal.gnu.ai.mit.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


 
  The best innovation you came up with is calling it the "wiretap chip."
I propose that we stop referring to this chip as the "clipper chip" and
always refer to it as "the wiretap chip." Also, when using analogies, don't
bring up drug smugglers or terrorists.  One key to winning this battle is
to wage an information war. We have to manipulate the image of this proposal
so it looks more like a menace instead of a "protection."

-- Ray Cromwell        |    Engineering is the implementation of science;    --
-- EE/Math Student     |       politics is the implementation of faith.      --
-- rjc@gnu.ai.mit.edu  |                         - Zetetic Commentaries      --



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: smb@research.att.com
Date: id AA02705sendmail 5.67/QC-subsidiary-2.1 via SMTPSun, 18 Apr 93 05:17:07 -0700 for karn
To: mischu, matt, reeds, lacy, don, gong@csl.sri.com, karn
Subject: technical information on Clipper
Message-ID: <9304181217.AA17562@qualcomm.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



------- Forwarded Message

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Date: Sat, 17 Apr 93 23:05:23 PDT
From: "Martin Hellman" <hellman@isl.stanford.edu>
Message-Id: <9304180605.AA22827@ISL.Stanford.EDU>
To: DAVIDNEWMANPC@mcimail.com, NORMILE.J@applelink.apple.com,
        adw@research.att.com, amo@research.att.com, bach@cs.wisc.edu,
        berson@sri.com, biham@cs.technion.ac.il, branstad@st1.ncsl.nist.gov,
        brassard@iro.umontreal.ca, burt@rsa.com, carl@joe.math.uga.edu,
        caronni@nessie.cs.id.ethz.ch, clipper@csrc.ncsl.nist.gov,
        denning@cs.cosc.georgetown.edu, diffie@eng.sun.com,
        eor@ISL.Stanford.EDU, erdmann@leland, fahn@cs,
        gfung%ccm.UManitoba.CA@cornellc.cit.cornell.edu, gill@ISL.Stanford.EDU,
        gormish@ISL.Stanford.EDU, infort%czheth5a.BITNET@forsythe.stanford.edu,
        jeffr@sco.com, jhwang@ISL.Stanford.EDU, jim@rsa.com,
        jwarren@well.sf.ca.us, jwolf@ucsd.edu, kurlberg@leland,
        langford@ISL.Stanford.EDU, lenstra@flash.bellcore.com, markoff@nyt.com,
        matt@rsa.com, merkle@xerox.com, minnieho@ISL.Stanford.EDU,
        mitran@asic.sc.ti.com, ovseev@ippi.msk.su, rivest@theory.lcs.mit.edu,
        roche@ISL.Stanford.EDU, rotenberg@washofc.cpsr.org,
        scholtz@jimmie.usc.edu, shamir%wisdom.bitnet@forsythe,
        smb@research.att.com, taher@rsa.com, voois@ISL.Stanford.EDU,
        welch@irving.usc.edu, wesel@ISL.Stanford.EDU
Subject: Clipper Chip


Most of you have seen the announcement in Friday's NY Times,
etc. about NIST (National Institute of Standards & Technology)
announcing the "Clipper Chip" crypto device. Several messges
on the net have asked for more technical details, and some have
been laboring under understandable misunderstandings given
the lack of details in the news  articles. So here to help out
is your friendly NSA link: me. I was somewhat surprised Friday
to get a call from the Agency which supplied many of the missing
details. I was told the info was public, so here it is (the cc of this
to Dennis Branstad at NIST is mostly as a double check on my
facts since I assume he is aware of all this; please let me know
if I have anything wrong):

The Clipper Chip will have a secret crypto algorithm embedded in 
Silicon. Each chip will have two secret, 80-bit keys. One will be the 
same for all chips (ie a system-wide key) and the other will be unit 
specific. I don't know what NIST and NSA will call them, but I will 
call them the system key SK and unit key UK in this message. 
The IC will be designed to be extremely difficult to reverse so 
that the system key can be kept secret. (Aside: It is clear that 
they also want to keep the algorithm secret and, in my opinion, 
it may be as much for that as this stated purpose.) The unit key 
will be generated as the XOR of two 80-bit random numbers K1 
and K2 (UK=K1+K2) which will be kept by the two escrow 
authorities. Who these escrow authorities will be is still to be 
decided by the Attorney General, but it was stressed to me that 
they will NOT be NSA or law enforcement agencies, that they 
must be parties acceptable to the users of the system as unbiased. 
When a law enforcement agency gets a court order, they will 
present it to these two escrow authorities and receive K1 and 
K2, thereby allowing access to the unit key UK.

In addition to the system key, each user will get to choose his 
or her own key and change it as often as desired. Call this key 
plain old K. When a message is to be sent it will first be 
encrypted under K, then K will be encrypted under the unit key UK, 
and the serial number of the unit added to produce a three part 
message which will then be encrypted under the system key SK 
producing

     E{ E[M; K], E[K; UK], serial number;  SK}

When a court order obtains K1 and K2, and thence K, the law 
enforcement agency will use SK to decrypt all information 
flowing on the suspected link [Aside: It is my guess that 
they may do this constantly on all links, with or without a 
court order, since it is almost impossible to tell which links 
over which a message will flow.] This gives the agency access to 

     E[M; K], E[K; UK], serial number

in the above message. They then check the serial number 
of the unit and see if it is on the "watch list" for which they 
have a court order. If so, they will decrypt E[K; UK] to obtain K, 
and then decrypt E[M; K] to obtain M.

I am still in the process of assessing this scheme, so please do 
not take the above as any kind of endorsement of the proposed 
scheme. All I am trying to do is help all of us assess the scheme 
more knowledgably. But I will say that the need for just one court 
order worries me. I would feel more comfortable (though not 
necessarily comfortable!) if two separate court orders were 
needed, one per escrow authority. While no explanation is
needed, the following story adds some color: In researching
some ideas that Silvio Micali and I have been kicking around,
I spoke with Gerald Gunther, the constitutional law expert
here at Stanford and he related the following story: When
Edward Levi became Pres. Ford's attorney general (right
after Watergate), he was visited by an FBI agent asking
for "the wiretap authorizations." When Levy asked for
the details so he could review the cases as required by
law, the agent told him that his predecessors just turned
over 40-50 blank, signed forms every time. Levi did not
comply and changed the system, but the lesson is clear: 
No single person or authority should have the power to
authorize wiretaps (or worse yet, divulging of personal
keys). Sometimes he or she will be an Edward Levi
and sometimes a John Mitchell.

Martin Hellman

------- End of Forwarded Message






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Harry Shapiro <habs@Panix.Com>
Date: Sun, 18 Apr 93 05:29:13 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Media Blitz: May ourselves available
Message-ID: <199304181229.AA27858@sun.Panix.Com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


If there is going to me some kind of media blitz then we
have to put some of ourselves forward as "experts" for
the media to interview. Tim May, John Gilmore, come to mind.

Any of us that are clean shaven and wear suits, etc. would
also make good spoke-folks

/harry

-- 
Harry Shapiro  				      habs@panix.com
List Administrator of the Extropy Institute Mailing List
Private Communication for the Extropian Community since 1991



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
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Date: Sun, 18 Apr 93 06:30:37 PDT
To: habs@Panix.Com
Subject: Returned mail: Deferred: Connection reset by peer during greeting wait with churchy.gnu.ai.mit.edu
Message-ID: <199304181241.AA28611@sun.Panix.Com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
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   ----- Transcript of session follows -----
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<<< 550 <cyhperpunks@toad.com>... User unknown
550 cyhperpunks@toad.com... User unknown
451 extropians@gnu.ai.mit.edu... timeout waiting for input
421 churchy.gnu.ai.mit.edu (TCP)... Deferred: Connection reset by peer during greeting wait with churchy.gnu.ai.mit.edu

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  (5.65c/IDA-1.4.4 for extropians@gnu.ai.mit.edu); Sun, 18 Apr 1993 08:41:03 -0400
From: Harry Shapiro <habs>
Message-Id: <199304181241.AA28608@sun.Panix.Com>
Subject: Re: More True Names: The NIST Security Board (fwd)
To: cyhperpunks@toad.com, extropians@gnu.ai.mit.edu (Harry Shapiro)
Date: Sun, 18 Apr 1993 08:41:03 -0400 (EDT)
Reply-To: habs
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a conscious being, David Farber wrote:





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Harry Shapiro <habs@Panix.Com>
Date: Sun, 18 Apr 93 05:50:09 PDT
To: future@nyx.cs.du.edu (FutureCulture)
Subject: The mysterious mailing list (fwd)
Message-ID: <199304181248.AA28813@sun.Panix.Com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


There have been reports about a mailing list set-up at NIST that had a
number of people on it including Mitch Kapor.

The list is named "clipper" and it was through that list that part of
the Wire Tap Chip announcement came.

I asked Mitch directly, what is involvement with that list was; I
asked him if he was involved with the development of the Wire Tap
Chip.

Below is is reply. I believe him.

/harry

a conscious being, Mitchell Kapor wrote:
> From mkapor@eff.org Wed Apr 17 23:11:38 1993
> Message-Id: <199304181111.AA05559@eff.org>
> Date: Sun, 18 Apr 1993 07:11:38 -0800
> To: habs@Panix.Com
> From: Mitchell Kapor <mkapor@eff.org>
> Subject: The mysterious mailing list
> 
> I believe the list in the question is an informational list set up at NIST.
>  My name was placed on it.  I did not ask to be put on such a list.  We
> were (obviously)  not involved in the development of Clipper.

> I was sent the Clipper announcement fact sheet, for instance.

> There has been a small amount of traffic on it, none of it consequential. 

> I would appreciate it if you would make these facts known.

I have told Mitch I will put this info out and have asked that he
make clipper list mail public at some FTP site.

I have also asked him when he started getting traffic from this list.

/harry


-- 
Harry Shapiro  				      habs@panix.com
List Administrator of the Extropy Institute Mailing List
Private Communication for the Extropian Community since 1991



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Harry Shapiro <habs@Panix.Com>
Date: Sun, 18 Apr 93 06:22:00 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Mitch on the Clipper Mailing list
Message-ID: <199304181319.AA29552@sun.Panix.Com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I had asked Mitch to repost any communications that
have gone over this list. He has.

I appreciate his willing to clear up this issue.

As I have stated before, I believe him, that NIST simply
created this list of people they wanted to be in direct
contact with.

/harry


a conscious being, Mitchell Kapor wrote:
> From mkapor@eff.org Sun Apr 18 00:58:00 1993
> Message-Id: <199304181257.AA06031@eff.org>
> Date: Sun, 18 Apr 1993 08:58:00 -0800
> To: habs@Panix.Com
> From: Mitchell Kapor <mkapor@eff.org>
> Subject: Re: The mysterious mailing list
> 
> I received the statement of the Press Secretary and the public fact sheet
> from Ed Roback.  I have not repoduced the full text as it is readily
> available elsewhere.
> 
> Following this is a thread between Gerano Cannoni and Martin Hellman.  I
> have deleted the text of Marty's longest response, as it is being
> circulated elsewhere.

> Last, there is a single message from A. Pagett Patterson.

> And that's it (assuming I haven't missed something in reviewing my
mail stream).

> Feel free to re-post this, put in on an FTP, whatever.  I don't have any
> more time to deal with this issue.
> 
> Date: Fri, 16 Apr 93 11:02:59 EDT
> From: Ed Roback <roback@first.org>
> Organization: FIRST, The Forum of Incident Response & Security Teams
> Posted-Date: Fri, 16 Apr 93 11:02:59 EDT
> To: clipper@csrc.ncsl.nist.gov
> Subject: text of White House announcement and Q&As on clipper chip encryption
> 
> Note:  This file will also be available via anonymous file
> transfer from csrc.ncsl.nist.gov in directory /pub/nistnews and
> via the NIST Computer Security BBS at 301-948-5717.
>      ---------------------------------------------------
> 
>                          THE WHITE HOUSE
> 
>                   Office of the Press Secretary
> 
> _________________________________________________________________
> 
> For Immediate Release                           April 16, 1993
> 
> 
>                 STATEMENT BY THE PRESS SECRETARY
> 
> 
> The President today announced a new initiative that will bring
> the Federal Government together with industry in a voluntary
> program to improve the security and privacy of telephone
> communications while meeting the legitimate needs of law
> enforcement.
> ...
> 
> Date: Fri, 16 Apr 93 16:44:10 EDT
> From: Ed Roback <roback@first.org>
> Organization: FIRST, The Forum of Incident Response & Security Teams
> Posted-Date: Fri, 16 Apr 93 16:44:10 EDT
> To: clipper@csrc.ncsl.nist.gov
> Subject: White House Public Encryption Management Fact Sheet
> 
> 
> 
> Note:     The following was released by the White House today in
>           conjunction with the announcement of the Clipper Chip
>           encryption technology.
> 
>                            FACT SHEET
> 
>                   PUBLIC ENCRYPTION MANAGEMENT
> 
> The President has approved a directive on "Public Encryption
> Management."  The directive provides for the following:
> ...
> 
> Posted-Date: Sat, 17 Apr 93 01:26:06 +0200
> From: caronni@nessie.cs.id.ethz.ch (Germano Caronni)
> Date: Sat, 17 Apr 93 01:26:06 +0200
> To: clipper@csrc.ncsl.nist.gov
> Subject: Clipper-Chip Escrow-System Flaws
> Newsgroups:
> alt.privacy,sci.crypt,alt.security,comp.security.misc,comp.org.eff.talk
> Organization: Swiss Federal Institute of Technology (ETH), Zurich, CH
> Cc: 
> 
> 
> Good day,
> as a non-citizien of USA I have read your announcment of the
> 'Clipper-Chip' with great interest, and am happy to see a increase
> in lawful privacy in the USA. I hope this policy will extend to
> other countries too.
> In the meantime I suspect two flaws in the 'Clipper-Chip' as it was
> announced today via NIST/electronic media.
> 
> 1) Keeping secret the algorithm which performs encryption is in my
>    humble opinion a bad idea. It hinders 'Clipper' to get publicly
>    accepted, and hinders the minute examination of the Clipper-
>    Algorithm by other then a few experts.
>    But I am sure this was well considered.
> 
> Now the important suggestion :=)
> 
> 2) By splitting the 80-Bit-Key of clipper in two parts, and give
>    them to different organizations, you add an uneeded WEAKNESS
>    to the escrow-system. This way, corruption of one escrow will
>    allow an easier attack on the Key than might be possible.
>    (e.g. if I obtain 40 bits of possible 80 bits keys, exhaustive
>     keysearch is definitively no problem.)
>    You might instead generate 2 (or even more, if this ist not
>    politically indesired) 80-Bit-Sequences which, when XOR-ed
>    together will provide the original, needed key, but alone they
>    are worthless. I am sure persons with knowledge in this area, which
>    surely can be found at NIST (or wherever) will agree.
> 
> I hope that this remark is of interest for you.
> 
> Friendly greetings,
> 
> 	Germano Caronni
> 
> 
> P.S.
> I am sure you have remarked, that the current policy is interpretable
> to tend toward an abolition of 'unbreakable' secure communication
> via electronic Media, and hope that this will _not_ come true.
> 
> Disclaimer: This mail is in now way whatsoever connected to the Swiss 
> Federal Inst. of Technology, but expresses my personal thoughts.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Organization: FIRST, The Forum of Incident Response & Security Teams
> Posted-Date: Fri, 16 Apr 93 22:32:14 PDT
> Date: Fri, 16 Apr 93 22:32:14 PDT
> From: "Martin Hellman" <hellman@isl.stanford.edu>
> To: caronni@nessie.cs.id.ethz.ch, clipper@csrc.ncsl.nist.gov
> Subject: Re:  Clipper-Chip Escrow-System Flaws
> 
> I received your message suggesting:
> 
> 2) By splitting the 80-Bit-Key of clipper in two parts, and give
>    them to different organizations, you add an uneeded WEAKNESS
>    to the escrow-system. This way, corruption of one escrow will
>    allow an easier attack on the Key than might be possible.
>    (e.g. if I obtain 40 bits of possible 80 bits keys, exhaustive
>     keysearch is definitively no problem.)
>    You might instead generate 2 (or even more, if this ist not
>    politically indesired) 80-Bit-Sequences which, when XOR-ed
>    together will provide the original, needed key, but alone they
>    are worthless. 
> 
> In a conversation with NSA today, I was told
> that two random 80-bit numbers will be XORed to produce
> the 80-bit key and the two individual numbers kept by
> two separate escrow authorities  -- who they are is
> to be decided. So your suggestion is, in fact, how it
> will be handled.
> 
> martin hellman
> 
> Disclaimer: this in no way should be interpreted to mean
> that I approve of the Clipper Chip. While I am still in the
> process of learning more about it, my immediate reaction
> was not positive. More later.
> 
> Organization: FIRST, The Forum of Incident Response & Security Teams
> Posted-Date: Sat, 17 Apr 93 23:05:23 PDT
> Date: Sat, 17 Apr 93 23:05:23 PDT
> From: "Martin Hellman" <hellman@isl.stanford.edu>
> To: ...clipper@csrc.ncsl.nist.gov...
> Subject: Clipper Chip
> 
> 
> Most of you have seen the announcement in Friday's NY Times,
> etc. about NIST (National Institute of Standards & Technology)
> announcing the "Clipper Chip" crypto device. Several messges
> on the net have asked for more technical details, and some have
> been laboring under understandable misunderstandings given
> the lack of details in the news  articles. So here to help out
> is your friendly NSA link: me. I was somewhat surprised Friday
> to get a call from the Agency which supplied many of the missing
> details. I was told the info was public, so here it is (the cc of this
> to Dennis Branstad at NIST is mostly as a double check on my
> facts since I assume he is aware of all this; please let me know
> if I have anything wrong):
> 
> ...
> 
> 
> Organization: FIRST, The Forum of Incident Response & Security Teams
> Posted-Date: Sat, 17 Apr 93 08:55:31 -0400
> Date: Sat, 17 Apr 93 08:55:31 -0400
> From: padgett@tccslr.dnet.mmc.com (A. Padgett Peterson)
> To: "clipper@csrc.ncsl.nist.gov"@uvs1.dnet.mmc.com
> Subject: Panel
> 
> I would like to be considered for the "outside panel" assessing the 
> Clipper Technology.
> 						A. Padgett Peterson, P.E.
> 
> 
> 


-- 
Harry Shapiro  				      habs@panix.com
List Administrator of the Extropy Institute Mailing List
Private Communication for the Extropian Community since 1991



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Harry Shapiro <habs@Panix.Com>
Date: Sun, 18 Apr 93 06:24:16 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: It is two 80-bit "halfs"
Message-ID: <199304181322.AA29623@sun.Panix.Com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


From Mail sent via the Clipper Mailing list, forwarded
to me:

> In a conversation with NSA today, I was told that two random 80-bit
> numbers will be XORed to produce the 80-bit key and the two individual
> numbers kept by two separate escrow authorities -- who they are is to
> be decided. So your suggestion is, in fact, how it will be handled.

> martin hellman

/HARRY

-- 
Harry Shapiro  				      habs@panix.com
List Administrator of the Extropy Institute Mailing List
Private Communication for the Extropian Community since 1991



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Timothy Newsham <newsham@wiliki.eng.hawaii.edu>
Date: Sun, 18 Apr 93 12:47:23 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: clipper
Message-ID: <9304181947.AA03035@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



smb@att.com has created a newsgroup for clipper conversation.
alt.privacy.clipper I believe.
I think it would be best (in keeping traffic here down and
in getting everybody interested in clipper together) if
everyone uses that newsgroup for clipper topics if possible.





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Dave Banisar <banisar@washofc.cpsr.org>
Date: Sun, 18 Apr 93 06:43:31 PDT
To: CYPHERPUNKS@toad.com
Subject: AT&T Press Release on Clipper
Message-ID: <9304180949.AA35839@hacker2.eff.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Here's AT&T's announcement on the Clipper.


 AT&T TO INCORPORATE NEW 'CLIPPER' CHIP INTO SECURE COMMUNICATIONS
PRODUCT LINE

GREENSBORO, N.C., April 16


    AT&T (NYSE: T) said today it is moving to improve the security and privacy
of telephone communications by incorporating a just-announced new U.S.
government technology for voice  encryption  into its secure communications
product line.

   AT&T will use the Clipper chip, announced today by President Clinton as a 
new technology for voice  encryption,  in all of its secure telephone products
except those specially designed for government classified customers.  The
Commerce Department has announced a six-month timetable for the final
certification of Clipper.

   "AT&T is pleased to be the first company to publicly commit to adoption of
the Clipper chip," said Ed Hickey, AT&T vice president, Secure Communications
Systems.  "We believe it will give our customers far greater protection in
defeating hackers or eavesdroppers attempting to intercept a call.

   "And now all commercially available AT&T voice  encryption  products will 
be compatible with each other, a major step forward in bringing secure
communications capabilities to the business community."

   In standardizing AT&T voice  encryption  products on the Clipper chip, AT&T
will include the algorithm in the Telephone Security Device as well as in the
Secure Voice/Data Terminal.

   The AT&T Telephone Security Device is a compact, lightweight unit that 
brings advance  encryption  technology to conventional land-line and cellular
telephones.  It provides a powerful, convenient and reliable way to protect 
the most sensitive telephone conversations.

   The device works with a conventional land-line or transportable/mobile
cellular phone.  It turns the phone's signal into a digital stream of 
encrypted information that is decrypted by a Telephone Security Device 
attached to the phone at the receiving end of the call.

   The AT&T Telephone Security Device connects easily to desk telephones or
tranportable or mobile phones.  It weighs 1.5 pounds and is 7 inches long, 4.5
inches wide and 1.5 inches high.  And it's as easy to use as it is portable.

   The AT&T Secure Voice/Data Terminals are desktop telephones that provide
 encryption  for both telephone calls and data transmissions.

   These AT&T secure communications products use an enhanced voice  
encryption  technique that provides very high voice quality.  This technology 
allows calls placed with these products to approach the voice quality of 
normal calls.

   To further enhance interoperability, AT&T will consider licensing to other
manufacturers its enabling technologies for interoperability. Interoperability
of  encryption  devices requires common technology beyond the use of a common
 encryption  algorithm, specifically common methods of digital voice encoding
and signaling.

   AT&T has already performed integration tests with Clipper chips 
manufactured by the government's supplier, Mykotronx Inc., of Torrence, 
Calif., and is preparing to integrate the chip into the manufacturing of its 
secure products.   AT&T's Clipper-equipped telephone security devices will be 
available to customers by the end of the second quarter.

    The federal government intends to adopt the Clipper chip as the
standard for voice  encryption  to help protect proprietary information,
protect the privacy of personal phone conversations and prevent
unauthorized release of data transmitted electonically.  At the same
time, use of the Clipper chip will preserve the ability of federal,
state and local law enforcement agencies to intercept lawfully the phone
conversations of criminals.
    "Adoption of Clipper will support both the government's efforts to
protect the public and the public's right to privacy," Hickey said.
    AT&T Secure Communication Systems provides products to protect
voice, data, fax, cellular and video communications.  It also engineers
and integrates secure communications applications.  Its customers
include the governments of the United States and other nations as well
as major corporations around the world.
    AT&T Secure Communications Systems is headquartered in Greensboro.
    For more information about the AT&T Telephone Security Device 3600
and other AT&T Secure Communications Products, call David Arneke at
919-279-7680.
     CONTACT: David Arneke of AT&T Secure Communications Systems, 919-279-
7680,or after hours, 919-273-5687, or Herb Linnen of AT&T Media Relations,
202-457-3933, or after hours, 202-333-9162






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Dave Banisar <banisar@washofc.cpsr.org>
Date: Sun, 18 Apr 93 07:10:18 PDT
To: CYPHERPUNKS@toad.com
Subject: Media Sugestions, History of Clipper and Conspiracy theories
Message-ID: <9304181016.AA32068@hacker2.eff.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


RE: Press Blitz

I have found from experience, with some success, that the best way to
handle press if you to contact local press and present yourself
as a local expert on the subject. This gives them a local connection
for their stories. You should have apack ready to send them, including
copies of the White House documents, and a 1 page fact sheet of your own
pointing out the problems with the proposal. Present yourself as a local 
computer scientist who sees the deeper issues behind this proposal and wants
to air them.

The major national newspapers are already covering this but its the smaller 
local papers that most people read. Only a few million people total read the
NY Times, Washinging Post etc. Thinks of the millions that read their local 
papers and get to them. If they respond, this will be killed.


History of Clipper:

As I mentioned before, Iwas at the NIST press Conference on Fri. They 
responded to a question by saying that they had been working on this for 4 
years and had been implimenting it for 14 months.


Suggestion for campaign name:

Clip the Clipper!


Mailing List:

No CPSR, etc. were not involved as a cabal supporting this dingbat proposal. 
If you beliueve that then go back to reading your endless 
JFK/CIA/Mafia/aliens conspiracy theory books and let the rest of us go on 
living in the real world. They have put together a very slick electronic 
media blitz here, sending the proposal to every applicable newsgroup etc.

Dave Banisar
CPSR Washington Office






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Harry Shapiro <habs@Panix.Com>
Date: Sun, 18 Apr 93 07:35:37 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com (Good Guys)
Subject: Test, please ignore
Message-ID: <199304181435.AA10152@sun.Panix.Com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Just a alias test - please ignore

/harry

-- 
Harry Shapiro  				      habs@panix.com
List Administrator of the Extropy Institute Mailing List
Private Communication for the Extropian Community since 1991



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Pat Farrell" <pfarrell@cs.gmu.edu>
Date: Sun, 18 Apr 93 08:15:32 PDT
To: tcmay@netcom.com
Subject: RE: A Long History for Clipper...
Message-ID: <40466.pfarrell@cs.gmu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Timothy C. May) writes:
>George Gleason writes:
>>  Clipper can't have been developed since Inauguration
>>Day; ...
>It's clearly stated that the program is at least 4 years old and that,
>[supporting stuff deleted]
>This doesn't mean the proposal will be casually tossed aside by Clinton as
>some objections are raised. Most policies of this sort percolate up through
>the entrenched bureacracies in Justice, State, Defense, NSA, etc.

I was listening to a lecture by Dr. Denning (Peter J) about a week ago.
He was referencing NREN, not his wife's key registration idea, but
in light of Clipper, the comments are germane. He said that some of  his
left-coast collegues were all concerned about NREN providing equal access
so it won't be a "yuppie-only" communication medium. Prof. Denning said that
these well meaning folks are too late. Gore's data superhighways were
announced as a big deal for political reasons by the Clinton
Administration, but it was actually the result of nearly 10 years of work.
He said these things take years to create, and that the consensus is in
place before it announced so acceptance is assured.

Clearly CLIPPER has been percolating thru the TLAs for quite some time.
I think the self selection process (see The New Republic's Clincest article)
has allowed those who have been sending up trial balloons to think
they've reached an acceptable position. It was clear at last Fall's
National Computer Security Conference (sponsored by NSA) that the TLAs were
going to keep pushing to get this thru.

BTW, I live "inside the Beltway" and have been trying to figure out
a way to use my ability to easily popover the DC for face to face
meetings to help stop this madness. I tried working with EFF last
Fall, but they couldn't figure out how to use volunteer help.
If any crypo-privacy list readers have ideas, please let me know.

Pat
(My pgp key is on the utmb and mit servers.)




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Pat Farrell" <pfarrell@cs.gmu.edu>
Date: Sun, 18 Apr 93 08:14:28 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: RE: Media Blitz: Make ourselves available
Message-ID: <40480.pfarrell@cs.gmu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


  Harry Shapiro  writes:
>Any of us that are clean shaven and wear suits, etc. would
>also make good spoke-folks

I can't claim expert status, but I do live "inside the Beltway"
wear suits, have gray hair, have appeared on CNN during the Morse worm
discussions, presented a paper on security at the National Computer
Security Conference last Fall, work for a high-tech software firm, think
the big brother chip is a crock, and am willing.

How do I make myself more available? My 24-hour voicemail number is
(703) 267-2986.

Pat




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Pat Farrell" <pfarrell@cs.gmu.edu>
Date: Sun, 18 Apr 93 08:14:40 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Knowledge of cryptography, Was: RE: More True Names: The NIST Security Board
Message-ID: <40485.pfarrell@cs.gmu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Harry identified several names on the CLIPPER list, including:
>mcnulty@ecf = F. Lynn McNulty an associate director for computer
>security at the National Institute of Standards and Technology's
>Computer Systems Laboratory

At this Fall's National Computer Security Conference, Mr. McNulty
was a speaker on the NIST's digital signature session. They talked about
both the non-RSA DSS, and use of Certifying Authorities with a RSA-based
scheme.

At that same conference, I gave a paper on security that described
a fishnet of trust between systems. This was written in February 92,
well before I read Phil's "web of trust" from the PGP docs, which I
read sometime over the summer.

During the Q&A, I asked Mr NcNulty to compare the advantages and
disadvantages of a heirarchical CA approach to an interlocking fishnet/web
of trust. I hoped he would at least recognize that any heirarchy has
problems from the top down if an upper level is compromised. Instead,
he could not address any differences. I believe that working in the
government has made the hierarchy seem to be the only implementation that
he envisioned. He fobbed the question off to one of his technical
underlings, but he, too, was unable to answer it (or even coherently
address it).

I believed then (and still do) that the closed loop process used
by NIST and the TLAs has caused them to overlook a number of promissing
alternatives. This means that we crypto-provacy advocates must start an
education effort.

Pat




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Matthew J Miszewski <MJMISKI@macc.wisc.edu>
Date: Sun, 18 Apr 93 10:09:08 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: MEDIA: Partial List
Message-ID: <23041812084521@vms2.macc.wisc.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Cypherpunks,
 
  OK a couple of things.  First, this is a partial list as should be
obvious by the truncation of the first entry.  If and when I can find
the whole and complete list I will post it.  Second, I post this grudgingly
realizing that some might abuse it.  I do feel however that the tone
of discussion on the list has been positive and intellectual enough
to positively affect the cause.  I realize this list is not exhaustive
but it is a start.  Ill work on expansion.  I suggest, as have others, that
we utilize one simple technology extensively - fax/fax-modems.  Also remember
that Washington responds to perceived PUBLIC opinion.  Most people
dont understand crypto much less know our names.  It should appear that
these comments are coming from a good cross section of the country.
 
Finally, I agree with the poster that suggested that we put forth some
spokespeople of sorts.  Media types love point people rather than the
horizontal structure of cypherpunks.  I know we will never get total agreement
on whom they should be, but I think that Tim May, John Gilmore, Eric Hughes,
etc. are pretty much acceptable (They represented us eloquently in WIRED)
Use the list with good intent.
 
-------------------8<---------------8<-----------------
 
Lane Vernardos
Fax: 212 7652724
 
Associated Press
50 Rockefeller Plaza
New York NY 10020
Phone: 212 6211600
 
This Week With David Brinkley
1717 De Sales St., NW
Washington DC 20036
David Glodt
Phone: 202 8877777      Fax: 202 8877977
 
CBS Evening News
524 W. 57th St.
New York NY 10019
Tom Bettag
Phone: 212 9753693      Fax: 212 9751519
 
CBS This Morning
524 W. 57th St.
New York NY 10019
 
Eric Sorenson
Phone: 212 9752824      Fax: 212 9752115
 
CSM Publishing Society
One Norway St.
Boston MA 02115
Phone: 800 2257090
 
One CNN Center
Box 105366
Atlanta GA 30348
Phone: 404 8271500
 
CNN, Washington Bureau
111 Massachusetts Ave., NW
Washington DC 20001
Phone: 202 8987900
Face the Nation, CBS News
2020 M St., NW
Washington DC 20036
Marianne Brooks
Phone: 202 4574321      Fax: 202 4666237
 
 
Good Morning America, ABC News
1965 Broadway
New York NY 10023
Jack Riley
Phone: 212 4961800      Fax: 212 8874724
 
Larry King Show, Mutual Radio
1755 S. Jefferson Davis Hwy.
Arlington VA 22202
Pat Piper
Phone: 703 6852175      Fax: 703 6852142
 
Larry King Live TV, CNN
111 Massachusetts Ave., NW
Washington DC 20001
Thomas Haddad
Phone: 202 8987900      Fax: 202 8987617
 
Los Angeles Times
Times-Mirror Square
Los Angeles CA 90053
Phone: 800 5281637      Fax: 213 2377679
 
 
MacNeil/Lehrer News Hour
P.O. Box 2626
Washington DC 20013
Phone: 703 9982870
 
MacNeill/Lehrer News Hour WNET
356 W. 58th St.
New York NY 10019
Les Crystal
Phone: 212 5603113      Fax: 212 5817353
 
Meet the Press, NBC News
4001 Nebraska Ave., NW
Washington DC 20016
Christie Basham
Phone: 202 8854200      Fax: 202 3622009
 
 
Morning Edition, NPR
2025 M St., NW
Washington DC 20036
Phone: 202 8222000
 
N B C Nightly News
30 Rockefeller Plaza
New York NY 10112
Steven Freidman
Phone: 212 6644971      Fax: 212 6646045
 
New York Times, DC Bureau
1627 Eye St., NW, 7th Floor
Washington DC 20006
Phone: 202 8620300
 
New York Times
229 W. 43rd St.
New York NY 10036
Phone: 212 5561234
 
Newsweek
444 Madison Ave.
New York NY 10022
Phone: 212 3504000
 
Nightline, ABC News
47 W. 66th St.
New York NY 10023
Dorrance Smith
Phone: 212 8874995      Fax: 212 4563335
 
ABC News
1717 DeSales, NW
Washington DC 20036
Ted Koppel
Phone: 202 8877364
 
Public Broadcasting Service
1320 Braddock Pl.
Alexandria VA 22314
Phone: 704 7395000
 
Time Magazine, DC Bureau
Washington DC 20001
Mr. Cloud, Bureau Chief
Phone: 202 8614000
 
Time Warner, Inc.
Time Life Bldg.
Rockefeller Center
New York NY 10020
Phone: 212 5221212
 
The Today Show
30 Rockefeller Plaza
New York NY 10112
Tom Capra
Phone: 212 6644249
 
USA Today
1000 Wilson Blvd.
Arlington VA 22229
Phone: 703 2763400
 
U S  News & World Report
2400 N St., NW
Washington DC 20037
Phone: 202 9552000
 
United Press International
1400 Eye St., NW
Washington DC 20006
Phone: 202 8988000
 
WETA-TV
P.O. Box 2626
Washington DC 20013
Phone: 703 9982626
 
Wall Street Journal
200 Liberty St.
New York NY 10281
Phone: 212 4162000
 
Washington Post
1150 15th St., NW
Washington DC 20071
Phone: 202 3346000
 




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Date: Sun, 18 Apr 93 12:11:02 PDT
To: extropians@gnu.ai.mit.edu
Subject: Fighting the Wiretap Chip Plan
Message-ID: <9304181911.AA04196@netcom.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


(I'm using the "Wiretap Chip" name instead of "Clipper," as someone has
suggested. It _does_ carry a better message.)

This essay is bit rambling, as I'm in my lousy editor and don't have
time to rearrange things into a more formal essay. Instead, I'll just
make a number of points.

I've seen a lot of discussion here about who to talk to, how to phrase
the issues, and so forth. Fax numbers (good!), phone numbers, etc. But
let me point out that the public discussion is not likely to do very
much, for several reasons.

1. A very tiny universe of listeners. Crypto is too abstract for most
people. I doubt anything we say can change this. And "privacy" is a
complicated theme....the anti- and pro-abortion sides have been
bandying it about for over a decade, to little avail. The key is to
reach the relatively small fraction of policy shapers, both outside
government and inside.

2. Journalists want the pithy quote, the sound bite, the attention
grabber. They don't really care if 37 faxes have been received in
support of some position--that just isn't news. 

I often shake my head in despair at the demands for "good quotes," but
I still try to spew them out.  Ironically, my .sig block, with all the
comments about "crypto anarchy," "information markets," "zero
knowledge," etc., often were the triggers that got me in touch with
journalists. For example, Julian Dibell of the "Village Voice" saw my
stuff in sci.crypt last fall and called me...only then did he learn of
the existence of the Cypherpunks group. Likewise, Kevin Kelly, of
"Whole Earth Review" fame, and now editor of "Wired," contacted me to
ask about the terms in my cryptically cryptic sig.

(Some people have already put good stuff about "Stop the Big Brother
Chip" and "Say No to the Wiretap Chip" in their sigs...this is great
advertising!) 

3. I've been interviewed on crypto matters by several journalists, all
of whom I respect. (They were, for the record: Steven Levy, for the
"Wired" piece, Kevin Kelly, as editor of "Wired" and for a possible
story in "Whole Earth Review," Julian Dibell, for "The Village Voice"
(forthcoming, he tells me), Dave Mandl, for a radio station in New
Jersey, and a couple of minor quotes here and there. (I can't begin to
compete of course with John Gilmore or Eric Hughes, in terms of
numbers of interviews.)

4. My conclusion is that the very term "Cypherpunks" was useful--even
though I had little to do with choosing the name and sometimes find it
distasteful (I prefer Miles Davis to Nine Inch Nails, for example).
Consider that there are already several well-publicized groups devoted
to various aspects of computer privacy: the EFF, the CPSR, the ACLU,
etc. (these groups should be well-known to all of you). Before we came
along, complete with our semi-outlaw, trendy name, the standard
process when a crypto or privacy issue came up would be to get
obligatory interviews with John Perry Barlow (I like him, but if I
read one more account of his experiences as a lyricist for the
Grateful Dead I'm going to puke...this is overexposure with a capital
"O"), Mitch Kapor, and various folks from the ACLU and CPSR. The
Cypherpunks provide a useful contrast, in my opinion.

5. And the Cypherpunks turn out to have a lot of very bright and
interesting people, including many from the phone phreaker community,
the PGP development community, and various other subcultures (like
FidoNet, modem makers, wireless communications, and so on). This
automatically makes us more diverse than groups like the CPSR and
ACLU.

6. In a sense, we occupy an ecological niche that meets certain
journalistic needs.

7. In summary, I wouldn't place a lot of emphasis on standard
political actions...it just doesn't go very far. Talking to our
friends and family will have a miniscule effect, both in raw numbers
and because the next election is a long way off. Need I say more?

Subversive actions that generate media attention, that trigger other
people to begin to do things (such as homebrew voice encryption with
SoundBlaster boards and CELP compression, as just one example), and
that create new communities (Cypherpunks, Extropians, etc.), are much
more effective.

By the way, in a more standard way of doing things, I've been in touch
with Jim Bidzos, President of RSA Data Security. I sent out a note on
this recently.

And I'll be meeting this evening with Eric Hughes, who's visiting the
Monterey Bay area. We may be calling an emergency meeting of the
Cypherpunks soon. Stay tuned.

Don't get me wrong, folks. These are crucial times. A "War on Crypto"
that mimics the "War on Drugs" is a distinct possibility. Any actions
we take, from writing letters to calling t.v. stations to boycotting
vendors of the "Wiretap Chip," will be useful.

-Tim


-- 
..........................................................................
Timothy C. May         | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,  
tcmay@netcom.com       | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
408-688-5409           | knowledge, reputations, information markets, 
W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA  | black markets, collapse of governments.
Higher Power: 2^756839 | Public Key: PGP and MailSafe available.





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: karn@qualcomm.com (Phil Karn)
Date: Sun, 18 Apr 93 12:14:32 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Clipper details via Hellman
Message-ID: <9304181914.AA03014@servo>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: jwarren@autodesk.com (Jim Warren)
Date: Sun, 18 Apr 93 12:23:27 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: illustrating govt's preoccupation with terrorism
Message-ID: <9304181915.AA01239@megalon.YP.acad>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


This is an excerpt from a LONG msg echoed to me by Dave Farber.  Though it's
from USIA -- not a police/enforcement agency -- it is nonetheless heavily
concerned with "terrorism", the theme repeatedly referenced in the White
House's Clipper Chip announcement.

I've included the first part down through the first article as an example,
and gave only the headlines of the remaining articles -- but you get the
idea.

Just FYI.  [And, no, I don't know where/how Dave got it electronically in the
first place.  :-)  ]
--jim
===============
Posted-Date: Sat, 17 Apr 1993 11:15:04 -0500
From: David Farber <farber@central.cis.upenn.edu>
X-Sender: farber@linc.cis.upenn.edu
Subject: I hope this continues to be distributed
To: interesting-people@eff.org (interesting-people mailing list)

>UNITED STATES INFORMATION AGENCY
>FOREIGN MEDIA REACTION--DAILY DIGEST
>
>For further information:  Anne Chermak, Chief
>Media Reaction Staff (P/M), Tele. No. (202) 619-6511
>
>Monday, April 12, 1993
>
>                   TERRORISM AND WORLD INSECURITY
>
>In recent editorials, Iran was universally recognized as the source
>of the double threat of state-sponsored terrorism and Islamic
>extremism.  But beyond this fear and condemnation, journalists found
>little common ground that would compel both North and South, and Arab
>and non-Arab nations to work together to combat the global threat of
>terrorism.  For example, Egyptian and Algerian papers were in the
>forefront in charging U.S. complicity in the current instability in
>the Middle East.  Those commentators asserted that the United States
>had promoted Islamic fundamentalism during the Afghanistan War and
>had further added to regional instability by alternately encouraging
>Iraq and Iran.
>
>India's papers weighed the pros and cons of helping the West to
>identify Pakistan's role in promoting terrorism, noting on the one
>hand that doing so could "bring ruination to Islamabad's Kashmir
>cause" but, on the other, could also bring India's security apparatus
>uncomfortably close to the CIA and the Mossad.  Arab papers continued
>to portray Iraq and Libya as being unfairly treated by the UN while
>Israel remains unpunished for resolutions which it has violated.
>
>Concerning Northern Ireland, President Clinton's message of
>consolation to the victims of the Warrington bombing was seen in
>British tabloids as signalling a tougher stance by the American
>government against violence by the IRA.  
>
>
>
>This survey is based on 32 reports from 10 countries, April 1-12.
>
>EDITOR:  Gail H. Burke
> 
>
=====

This goes on for many pages with a range of article summaries including:

>                             MIDDLE EAST
>ALGERIA:  "Middle East Equation Has Changed"
>"Injustice Will Not Defeat Dignity"
>"After the Neglect...Wake Up, Washington!"
>"U.S. Did Not Make the Best Choice"
>"Change of Tone"
>EGYPT:  "West Will Not Let Go Of Libya"
>"Can Anybody Explain U.S. Contradictory Posture Regarding Iran?"
>"Who Will Anti-Terrorism Front Target?"
>"Puzzling Approach To Abdel Rahman's Stay In U.S."
>"An Insult To Egyptian People, Leadership"
>"Islamic Extremism Threat Has Links To Afghanistan War"
>JORDAN:  "Call For Arab Unity"
>"Clinton Administration Should Start A New Page with Iraq"
>"Arabs Should Not Support The U.S. Against Iran"
>MOROCCO:  "Something New In Lockerbie Issue?"
>"The West Has To Understand Libya's Flexibility"
>TUNISIA:  "Why The War On Muslims?"

>                             SOUTH ASIA
>INDIA:  "Time To Be Worldly-Wise"
>"War By Other Means"
>"Perils Of Intelligence Links With The CIA And Mossad"
>"Embittering Ties With Pakistan"
>PAKISTAN:  "Another Step Closer"
>"Terrorism In Kashmir"
>                               EUROPE
>BRITAIN:  "Northern Ireland--Significant Gesture By Clinton"
>"Clinton's  Blown To IRA Killers"
>ITALY:  "Enter Iran"
>"The Ayatollah's Latest Threat"
>"Silence Over Israel"
>"Warning to Iran, Islamic Fundamentalism"
>
>                            LATIN AMERICA
>CHILE:  "Iran's Objectives"




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: hal@alumni.cco.caltech.edu (Hal Finney)
Date: Sun, 18 Apr 93 12:55:09 PDT
To: extropians@gnu.ai.mit.edu
Subject: IMPORTANT!
Message-ID: <9304181952.AA16918@alumni.cco.caltech.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Based on some of the suggestions I've seen here and on the net, I am
inclined more to believe that there is no threat to make non Clipper
cryptography illegal.  The plan instead is to make it a de facto
standard for all encrypted voice communications.  You will notice in
the AT&T press release posted here that AT&T is offering to release its
technical information in order to allow this standardization to
proceed.  (As the release said, you need more than just a common
encryption standard, you also need standardization on the voice
encoding.)

AT&T is obviously in bed with the government on this, and it doesn't
really matter at this point why.  It's a big company and the government
can do a lot for it.  AT&T is apparently determined to take whatever
steps are necessary for this standardization to come about.

As far as non-clipper encryption, I imagine the government will initially
exert as much influence as it can to prevent any competing standard from
getting a toehold.  They have apparently waited until the chips were
ready to deliver in quantity.  AT&T is promising to release clipper
phones later this year.  It's doubtful that anyone else could even come
up with a standard that soon, let alone get it into hardware (or
firmware).

If the standard does become established, it could be tough to defeat it.
How easy is it going to be to sell a phone which is incompatible with
everybody else's for secure communication?  You'd have to buy one for
everybody in your company or group who wanted to communicate.  Then if
they wanted to make a secure call to someone outside (say, a supplier or
distributor) they wouldn't be able to do it.

It would be a similar problem to the video phones.  Why buy one when
almost no one else has one and so you can hardly ever use it?  Who will
buy a Beta VCR today?  An RCA non-laser video disk?  Non-clipper
encrypted phones may experience similar lack of success.

I think this is their main strategy.  If it doesn't work, they have a
fallback before they would have to forbid encryption in the way we have
feared.  That is to forbid the sale of commercial devices with
non-clipper encryption.  You don't stop private individuals from making
their own devices, you just make it illegal to sell them.

There is precedent for this, I think, in the scanner business.  You can't
sell scanners capable of eavesdropping on cellular calls.  But nothing
stops you from building your own if you are an electronics whiz.  (I am
not expert on the legalities of scanner law.  Someone please correct me
if I am wrong here.)

Notice that in their document they said that U.S. citizens do not have
the right to unlimited-strength commercial encryption.  I didn't pay much
attention to the word "commercial" before, but now I think it is important.
This would imply that their next step would be to ban only commercial
implementations of cryptography.

This way they can counter our civil-liberties arguments by saying that
nothing stops anyone from encrypting his messages if he really wants to;
he's doing it in the privacy of his own home, after all.  But when he
gets out in the commercial arena the government has many precedents for
limiting what is bought and sold, the scanner laws being just one of
many.

I'm not sure how ominous such a world would be - clipper chips dominating
the (small) encrypted phone market, no commercial competition, and only a
few hobbyists with PC's and modems able to set up clumsy untappable
conversations via modem-to-modem links.  I might be able to talk to Tim
May securely, but not to Mom and Dad.  In a way, I can still have privacy,
if I really want it.  But it won't be available to most people.

I wouldn't be surprised if something similar to this vision were the goal of
those behind the clipper.

Hal




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Doctor Zaphod" <ncselxsi!drzaphod@ncselxsi.netcom.com>
Date: Sun, 18 Apr 93 13:06:37 PDT
To: CypherPunks@toad.com
Subject: CLIP: Chip -- Modification?
Message-ID: <46995.drzaphod@ncselxsi>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


     I havn't waded thru the entire stream of CypherPunks mail yet... but I
thought I'd make a suggestion.

If the clipper chip DOES in fact become widespread, in telephones, modems,
whatever.. why don't we make an alternative chip [say.. based off the IDEA
cypher and PGP keys] that uses the same pinouts as the Clipper chip.  We, on
the list, have been waiting for devices with the capability for encryption..
and it sounds as if ATT will be making it easier for us!  Of course there
might be some legal conflict with modifiying the devices.. and I think
that's where our battle begins.

 ---------------------------------------------------------------------
| DrZaphod                   | Stop, or I'll Encrypt!                 |
| [AC/DC] / [DnA][HP]        | Xcitement is Technology and Creativity |
| [drzaphod@ncselxsi.uucp]   | [Mind Police Censored]                 |
 ---------------------------------------------------------------------
DrZaphod
[AC/DC] / [DnA][HP]
[drzaphod@ncselxsi.uucp]
Technicolorized





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: zane@genesis.mcs.com (Sameer)
Date: Sun, 18 Apr 93 15:03:02 PDT
To: Dave Banisar <banisar@washofc.cpsr.org>
Subject: Re: Media Sugestions, History of Clipper and Conspiracy theories
In-Reply-To: <9304181016.AA32068@hacker2.eff.org>
Message-ID: <m0nkhOl-000MU5C@genesis.mcs.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


In message <9304181016.AA32068@hacker2.eff.org>, Dave Banisar writes:
>
> RE: Press Blitz
> 
> I have found from experience, with some success, that the best way to
> handle press if you to contact local press and present yourself
> as a local expert on the subject. This gives them a local connection
	This seems to be an EXCELLENT idea. I wholeheartedly think that
every cypherpunk with a strong knowledge of crypto (I haven't a
strong knowledge yet-- still a newbie) contact the local press and offer
your services as a local crypto-expert.
	I think that I probably know 10-15 times more than the general
public about crypto, and it also seems that most of the people on this
list know about 10-15 times more about crypto than myself. Thus there's
a HUGE gulf of knowledge which must be remedied.

--
| Sameer Parekh-zane@genesis.MCS.COM-PFA related mail to pfa@genesis.MCS.COM |
| Apprentice Philosopher, Writer, Physicist, Healer, Programmer, Lover, more |
| "Be God" - Me __ "Specialization is for Insects" - Robert A. Heinlein ____/
 \_____________/  \____________________________________________________/ 




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: jwarren@autodesk.com (Jim Warren)
Date: Sun, 18 Apr 93 13:39:06 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Hellman cogitates on the Clipper Chip
Message-ID: <9304182028.AA01470@megalon.YP.acad>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Received this on Saturday and got Marty's permission to repost it to 'punks.
--jim

======



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Martin Hellman" <hellman@isl.stanford.edu>
Date: Tue Sep 07 12:37:57 1999
To: ... <large copy-list deleted to protect the innocent  :-)  >
Subject: No Subject
Message-ID: <be8e5062ebf4d56cc83b999b02f0fc94@NO-ID-FOUND.mhonarc.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Subject: Clipper Chip

Most of you have seen the announcement in Friday's NY Times,
etc. about NIST (National Institute of Standards & Technology)
announcing the "Clipper Chip" crypto device. Several messges
on the net have asked for more technical details, and some have
been laboring under understandable misunderstandings given
the lack of details in the news  articles. So here to help out
is your friendly NSA link: me. I was somewhat surprised Friday
to get a call from the Agency which supplied many of the missing
details. I was told the info was public, so here it is (the cc of this
to Dennis Branstad at NIST is mostly as a double check on my
facts since I assume he is aware of all this; please let me know
if I have anything wrong):

The Clipper Chip will have a secret crypto algorithm embedded in 
Silicon. Each chip will have two secret, 80-bit keys. One will be the 
same for all chips (ie a system-wide key) and the other will be unit 
specific. I don't know what NIST and NSA will call them, but I will 
call them the system key SK and unit key UK in this message. 
The IC will be designed to be extremely difficult to reverse so 
that the system key can be kept secret. (Aside: It is clear that 
they also want to keep the algorithm secret and, in my opinion, 
it may be as much for that as this stated purpose.) The unit key 
will be generated as the XOR of two 80-bit random numbers K1 
and K2 (UK=K1+K2) which will be kept by the two escrow 
authorities. Who these escrow authorities will be is still to be 
decided by the Attorney General, but it was stressed to me that 
they will NOT be NSA or law enforcement agencies, that they 
must be parties acceptable to the users of the system as unbiased. 
When a law enforcement agency gets a court order, they will 
present it to these two escrow authorities and receive K1 and 
K2, thereby allowing access to the unit key UK.

In addition to the system key, each user will get to choose his 
or her own key and change it as often as desired. Call this key 
plain old K. When a message is to be sent it will first be 
encrypted under K, then K will be encrypted under the unit key UK, 
and the serial number of the unit added to produce a three part 
message which will then be encrypted under the system key SK 
producing

     E{ E[M; K], E[K; UK], serial number;  SK}

When a court order obtains K1 and K2, and thence K, the law 
enforcement agency will use SK to decrypt all information 
flowing on the suspected link [Aside: It is my guess that 
they may do this constantly on all links, with or without a 
court order, since it is almost impossible to tell which links 
over which a message will flow.] This gives the agency access to 

     E[M; K], E[K; UK], serial number

in the above message. They then check the serial number 
of the unit and see if it is on the "watch list" for which they 
have a court order. If so, they will decrypt E[K; UK] to obtain K, 
and then decrypt E[M; K] to obtain M.

I am still in the process of assessing this scheme, so please do 
not take the above as any kind of endorsement of the proposed 
scheme. All I am trying to do is help all of us assess the scheme 
more knowledgably. But I will say that the need for just one court 
order worries me. I would feel more comfortable (though not 
necessarily comfortable!) if two separate court orders were 
needed, one per escrow authority. While no explanation is
needed, the following story adds some color: In researching
some ideas that Silvio Micali and I have been kicking around,
I spoke with Gerald Gunther, the constitutional law expert
here at Stanford and he related the following story: When
Edward Levi became Pres. Ford's attorney general (right
after Watergate), he was visited by an FBI agent asking
for "the wiretap authorizations." When Levy asked for
the details so he could review the cases as required by
law, the agent told him that his predecessors just turned
over 40-50 blank, signed forms every time. Levi did not
comply and changed the system, but the lesson is clear: 
No single person or authority should have the power to
authorize wiretaps (or worse yet, divulging of personal
keys). Sometimes he or she will be an Edward Levi
and sometimes a John Mitchell.

Martin Hellman

========
And, his permission to repost.  PLEASE NOTE HIS "RESTRICTION."
--jim
=======



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Martin Hellman" <hellman@isl.stanford.edu>
Date: Tue Sep 07 12:37:57 1999
To: jwarren@autodesk.com
Subject: Re:  Marty's 4/17 Clipper Chip post-to-many ...
Message-ID: <8adae482c22dbd963ba836e92e0723e2@NO-ID-FOUND.mhonarc.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Jim,

It is fine to post my previous message to cypherpunks 
if you also post this message with it in which:

I ask recipients to be very sparse in their requesting further info 
from me or asking for comments on specific questions. By
this posting I apologize for any messages I am unable to
respond to. (I already spend too much time answering too much
e-mail and am particularly overloaded this week with other
responsibilities.) 

martin
=========

Finally, there has been a significant reponse to this by a cryptoid
well-known to all of us.  Am seeking permission to repost it, also.
--jim


Incidentally, Marty sez he had no forewarning that Clipper was about to
sail.  The NY Times article blind-sided him about 11:30 Thursday night.
  Sounds like the government is really doing an outstanding job of
careful, collaborative policy-making.  [Danger!  Novice gunslinger is
shooting from the hip!]
--jim




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "James A. Donald" <jamesdon@infoserv.com>
Date: Sun, 18 Apr 93 23:27:00 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: subscribe
In-Reply-To: <m0nkhW2-000hn3C@techbook.techbook.com>
Message-ID: <2bd1c9a7.jamesdon@infoserv.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


subscribe James A. Donald

In case a human is reading this, I wish to subscribe to the 
cypherpunks mailing list.

 ---------------------------------------------------------------------
                       |
James A. Donald        |  Joseph Stalin said: "Ideas are more powerful
                       |  than guns.  We would not let our enemies have
jamesdon@infoserv.com  |  guns, why should we let them have ideas."




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: uni@acs.bu.edu (Shaen Bernhardt)
Date: Sun, 18 Apr 93 10:43:58 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Media Blitz
Message-ID: <9304181743.AA38488@acs.bu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Having sent faxes to all the targets on my media list, I'm looking for the
following:
 
1>  A Fax number for AT&T public relations so I can explain to them that they
can count my business out if they don't wise up.
 
2>  A Fax number for Intergraph Corp
 
3>  Internet addresses for same.
 
I sent the following text to several media contacts:


April 18, 1993
 
Sir or Madam,
 
 
I am sending this text to call your attention to what I and others 
believe to be a grievous attack on privacy for the private sector and 
the public at  large.
 
On April 16, 1993 the White House Office of the Press Secretary 
issued a statement regarding the administration's emerging policy on 
encryption hardware and technology.  In short this policy is a ruse.
 
With the increasing reliance on data links and E-Mail to 
communicate, cryptography has evolved to protect the otherwise 
vulnerable data traffic in this country.  E-Mail and data transfers are 
not as secure from tampering and compromise as is the postal 
service.  Messages sent through mail nets have no "envelopes" and 
are unprotected from the prying eyes of system administrators on 
any of the many nodes a message may pass through.  Indeed those 
using electronic mediums for mail services are entitled to some 
reasonable assurance of privacy.  As a result, cryptography and 
encryption have become fruitful industries in this country.
 
The Clinton administration seems well on the way to destroying this 
industry and stomping on the rights of citizens to secure their 
communications from surveillance.
 
The "Clipper Chip Proposal," which is becoming known in the 
academic community as the "Big Brother Proposal," bills itself as a 
solution to the conflict between law enforcement and "crypto 
industry."  It is not.  By enforcing the Clipper technology as a 
standard, the Clinton administration has taken the first step in 
regulating all encryption technology and selling short the American 
people.
 
The Clipper technology, by the administration's own admission, is 
compromised from the beginning.  Cipher keys for Clipper 
hardware are to be segmented and stored in depositories maintained 
by two agencies, (which remain yet unnamed) and released with "the 
proper authorization."  No one educated in the nuances of 
encryption would take such a system seriously.  Willingness to 
accept a system that comes already compromised is simply 
unimaginable, at least while other systems are still around.
 
The administration insists that the algorithm for the Clipper 
technology is secret, and will not be released to the academic sector 
or the public at large.  A vital part of the development process of 
any new algorithm is its' ability to withstand the scrutiny of the 
academic and private sectors.  The current encryption standard 
(DES) is a prime example.  The algorithm for DES was made 
available to the academic and private sectors at no loss of security to 
those using DES based systems.  Indeed the weaknesses of DES 
were eventually revealed by the academic sector as a direct result of 
this scrutiny.  Part of the mark of a well designed system is in the 
ability to remain secure despite disclosure of the algorithm.  No 
entity can be expected to trust such a system without being able to 
review it for additional "backdoors" written into the system.
 
I cannot fathom that the administration has not realized these 
points.  They must know that such a system as the Clipper Chip is 
unmarketable and doomed to failure in its' current state.  As long as 
other technology remains available, who would buy the Clipper 
Chip?  And how does the introduction of the Clipper Chip aid law 
enforcement in protecting American citizens?  Alone it does not.  
Any organization, criminal or otherwise, would be quite content to 
patronize other vendors not employing the Clipper Chip, many of 
which currently exist.
 
I can only assume then that the administration's next step is to place 
heavy regulations on other hardware and software products not 
utilizing Clipper Chip technology, using the availability of Clipper 
systems to justify their move.
 
The increasingly authoritarian methods the administration continues 
to adopt deserve careful scrutiny.  The precedents established by 
this move, namely the regulation of the software industry, denial of 
reasonable freedom from government intrusion in personal affairs, 
and government created technology monopolies, are more than 
alarming, but dangerous.
 
When confronted with the possibility of facing fines or criminal 
penalties for which computer program we use, the phrase I hear 
more and more often is, "I can't believe it's happening here."
 
 
						Most Concerned,
 
						[Signature]
						Shaen Logan Bernhardt I
						(uni@acs.bu.edu)


Are my letters annyoing anyone yet?

uni (Dark)




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: karn@qualcomm.com (Phil Karn)
Date: Sun, 18 Apr 93 13:47:37 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Followup message from Hellman
Message-ID: <9304182047.AA03182@servo>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: David Reeve Sward <sward+@cmu.edu>
Date: Sun, 18 Apr 93 11:02:18 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: MEDIA: Adam Smith
Message-ID: <4foNRYG00Uh_E2XtYF@andrew.cmu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


One person I didn't see listed is Adam Smith.  Sometime during the last
week of March he aired a piece about privacy - use of SSN, the
information you can get via computer & modem and others.  He may be
receptive to wiretap chip debate.
-- 
David Sward     sward+@cmu.edu     Finger or email for PGP public key
3D567F fingerprint = E5 16 82 B0 3C 96 DB 6F  B2 FB DC 8F 82 CB E9 45




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Timothy Newsham <newsham@wiliki.eng.hawaii.edu>
Date: Sun, 18 Apr 93 17:03:28 PDT
To: psionic@wam.umd.edu (Haywood J. Blowme)
Subject: Re: Amiga programmers.
In-Reply-To: <199304182317.AA18599@rac3.wam.umd.edu>
Message-ID: <9304190003.AA06605@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> The basic idea I think would need the following:
> 
> - A sound digitizer
> - High speed modem
> - 68020 or above processor (for speed purposes)
> - Good encryption algorithm (IDEA for example)
> 
> Implementing the system would involve using the digitizer to digitize the
> voice. Then processing the sample (in real time) through the encryption
> algorithm and sending the output to the modem for transmission. The process
> would be repeated on the other end.
> 
> The problems I see occurring are the following
> 
> - Speed of the computer affecting real time encryption
> - Synchronizing the data packets for accurate decryption on the other side.
> - simultaneous I/O on the serial and parallel ports(for modem and digitizer)
> - outputing to speakers on receiving end.
> - having the whole process operate in a full duplex mode (ie. both people
>   can talk at the same time).
> 
> 
> I think the majority of functions can be handled by the system libraries and
> outside sources (such as xpkidea.library for encryption).
> 
> Does this sound feasible??

From what I gather CELP takes about 10 to 15 MIPS and LPC takes
somewhere under 5 MIPS on DSP chips.  Instructions including
fixed point multiplies and accumulations (not counting divisions).
Thats quite a load for a 68020 to bear and still do encryption
and communications isnt it?

I have been working on an encrypted link protocol,  I have
written a unix end (w/ sockets for debugging) as well as
some prototype amiga ends (nothing nice yet).  It is basically
a term program with an encrypted mode built in.  I have released
the unfinished but operational unix end so far (link.tar.Z)
but have been too pressed for time to work on it lately.

I am also working with a DSP chip and plan to implement LPC
at bandwidths of about 2000 bps.  This will be low quality
(less than toll quality, but "good enough" for..  well for
me :)
I hope the end product will be reproduceable for under $50.
(I am using the ADSP 2105 DSP microcontroller which offers
10 MIPS for about $12)

Someone has mentioned that there is a ZYXEL chip that has
CELP built in to it,  this might be a faster way to go,
does anyone have more details?


I plan to incorporate the two when I am finished to allow
encrypted voice between two endpoints,  and hopefully
also over some networks (were delay time doesnt cause too
much problems,  long distances over packet switching
might not work so nicely).

progress:
  I have developed and implemented the protocol engine of
the link protocol and written a unix end.

  I have started assembling (but not programming) the DSP
board,  I plan later to add on-board d/a and a/d but
for the time being I will be importing samples from the
amiga, and retrieving LPC coded data.


I am encouraging other people to use my protocol engine
and incorporate it into terminal programs.  




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: zane@genesis.mcs.com (Sameer)
Date: Sun, 18 Apr 93 15:04:12 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Putting out a paper-magazine
Message-ID: <m0nkhOn-000MU8C@genesis.mcs.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


	I HIGHLY suggest that publishing-inclined cypherpunks start
publishing cypherpunk-oriented PAPER newsletters to:
	A) Get out the word about how Clipper sucks
	B) Educate people about strong crypto, in layman's terms (tough one)
	C) Raise public support for strong crypto.

	There are probably other reasons why we want to do this as well.
(When the discussion here was about technical details, I was greatly
interested, but I had nothing to say-- now that the time has come for
activism.. I feel that I can help..)
	The idea for full-page ads is nice. I'd advertise for raising funds
for such a venture in my libertarian-leaning newsletter.

--
| Sameer Parekh-zane@genesis.MCS.COM-PFA related mail to pfa@genesis.MCS.COM |
| Apprentice Philosopher, Writer, Physicist, Healer, Programmer, Lover, more |
| "Be God" - Me __ "Specialization is for Insects" - Robert A. Heinlein ____/
 \_____________/  \____________________________________________________/ 




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Phil Karn <karn@unix.ka9q.ampr.org>
Date: Sun, 18 Apr 93 15:31:38 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: voice privacy for the masses
Message-ID: <9304182233.AA01522@unix.ka9q.ampr.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I think Hal Finney's analysis is not far from the mark. Saner elements
in the government probably do realize the utter impossibility of a
complete ban on uncrackable crypto given the existence of talented,
knowledgeable and highly motivated (especially now!) "cypherpunks".

But the government has also found that with very little effort, they
can still have an enormous practical effect on the non-cypherpunk
masses.  Heck, look at what the NSA did to the digital cellular
standards by standing in the shadows and quietly threatening to
withhold export approval to phones with meaningful technology.

The NSA barely had to whisper its objections, because the industry
simply doesn't care very much about customer privacy. Certainly not
enough to risk not only their non-US markets, but also the ability to
have phones manufactured overseas for the US market. And then NSA rubs
salt in the wound by brazenly claiming that they're only concerned
about encryption getting into the hands of unfriendly foreign
governments. As far as they're concerned, they say with a perfectly
straight face, Americans are free to use any encryption scheme they
want.

I wonder how people like that can sleep at night.

Well, the implications are obvious. If the public is ever to benefit
on a large scale from strong encryption technology, it cannot depend
on a normal market to sell it to them in turnkey packages. As soon as
you go into business overtly selling such packages, the government
pressure will begin. They will make sure that you do not become too
successful, either by banning exports or by flooding the market with
inferior technology that they can break (like Clipper).

So we need to create a rather nonconventional "market". More
specifically, we need to find a way to bring the efforts of the
cypherpunks to the public with minimal cost and in a way that the
government cannot control.

By far the best way to do this is to write and distribute free crypto
software that requires only readily available general purpose hardware
to run. As we know, duplicating and distributing software is so
trivial that controlling it is virtually impossible. And while it's
theoretically somewhat easier for the government to ban or regulate,
say, modems faster than 2400 bps or CPUs faster than 10 MHz 286s,
general purpose computer hardware like this has so many other
"legitimate" uses that in practice a ban would again be impossible.

I've contributed a little to this effort myself with my public domain
DES code, but it's the PGP effort that has really made this a reality.
PGP is now unstoppable, and it's well on the way toward providing
large scale privacy for email and other textual information.

But voice is still a problem. What we really need now is "PGVP"
("Pretty Good Voice Privacy"), i.e., a package of public domain
software that, when again combined with readily available general
purpose computer hardware, produces a highly secure telephone.

We already have two of the three hardware components of a digital
secure telephone well in hand: CPUs capable of encrypting digital
voice in real time, and reasonably fast telephone modems. The one
remaining piece to the puzzle is the vocoder, as conventional waveform
sampling of speech produces a data rate too high for telephone modems.
(Faster modems might alleviate the need for a low bit rate vocoder,
but current generation modems are already running very close to
theoretical limits, and there won't be too many more improvements.)

Ready-made vocoders are available. In fact, my company (Qualcomm) just
announced one (the Q4400) as a spinoff of our CDMA digital cellular
system.  It's a mask-programmed AT&T DSP-16A DSP chip. Unfortunately,
like many leading-edge products, it's not cheap: $69/ea in quantity
1000, and reportedly nearly $200 in small quantities.

A second alternative is to run your own vocoder software. But vocoders
are notoriously compute-intensive, and they're traditionally run on
DSPs.  And DSPs do not yet qualify as "widely available general
purpose computer hardware".

That leaves a third possibility: tuning vocoder software to run in
real time on a fast general purpose processor like a 486. John Gilmore
has already obtained and distributed public domain code that
implements the Federal standard CELP vocoder algorithm (used in
government secure telephones, a nice twist) but my understanding is
that it's too slow to run in real time on popular computers. Van
Jacobson at LBL has reportedly tuned it to run in better than real
time on a Sparc 1+, but he hasn't released it yet and he's a
notoriously hard guy to get ahold of.

So the request of the day is this: who's willing to take that CELP
code, bum enough instructions out of it so it will run in real time on
a 486, and place his or her work back out into the public domain?

Phil











From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: zane@genesis.mcs.com (Sameer)
Date: Sun, 18 Apr 93 15:06:34 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Address of major telecom decision makers (AT&T, etc.)
In-Reply-To: <9304170414.AA23048@churchy.gnu.ai.mit.edu>
Message-ID: <m0nkhOn-000MU9C@genesis.mcs.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


	If someone has the addresses of these people it would be a very
good idea to post these addresses (addresses of the NIST, Denning, etc.
folk would be good as well.. I don't know those but those are probably
more well-known than head-AT&T folk) here so that we can inundate them
with mail and use these addresses in the full-page ads we buy in the
newspapers. 

--
| Sameer Parekh-zane@genesis.MCS.COM-PFA related mail to pfa@genesis.MCS.COM |
| Apprentice Philosopher, Writer, Physicist, Healer, Programmer, Lover, more |
| "Be God" - Me __ "Specialization is for Insects" - Robert A. Heinlein ____/
 \_____________/  \____________________________________________________/ 




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: R.Tait@bnr.co.uk
Date: Sun, 18 Apr 93 07:46:56 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: What Clinton's proposal will mean to the Rest of the World
Message-ID: <199304181446.7907@bnsgs200.bnr.co.uk>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Cypherpunkers,

Having just digested the press release, and the subsequent
followups on sci.crypt and on here, I am beginning to wonder what
ramifications this might have in other countries, specifically the
"Superpowers". Surely setting such a precedent in his own country will
spark off a flurry of activity in places such as the UK, Germany,
France et al, so that they are not "left behind", so-to-speak? 

To be quite honest, I can't see the English government taking such
radical steps about secure telecommunications, quite simply, because
BT have such a lacsidasical [sp?] approach to new and emerging
technologies. Take for instance, IDSN. Their philosophy of marketing
and "selling" ISDN is laughable - I once read a newspaper article 
which related a tale of a Corporation who wanted to learn if ISDN 
could be useful to it's business practices, and it seems that BT 
just kept jostling them between department (Dept X: "Phone Dept Y",
Dept Y: "Phone Dept X" etc). 

Can anyone really see that the US government (or whoever) will
completely outlaw all strong data encryption? This violates the
basic human right of free communications/privacy. 

What a world we live in, huh?

-- 
Rick M. Tait                                Bell Northern Research Europe
Tel: +44-81-945-3352, Fax: +44-81-945-3352     Network Management Systems
<PGP 2.2 public key available on request>       New Southgate, London. UK
email: ricktait@bnr.co.uk  || rt@cix.compulink.co.uk  ||  ricktait@bnr.ca



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: smb@research.att.com
Date: id AA03087sendmail 5.67/QC-subsidiary-2.1 via SMTPSun, 18 Apr 93 13:14:19 -0700 for karn
To: gong@csl.sri.com, karn
Subject: correction from Hellman
Message-ID: <9304182014.AA01706@qualcomm.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Here's a follow-up note from Hellman, in response to a question I sent
(and also in response to my request to post his original note to
netnews).

------- Forwarded Message

Date: Sun, 18 Apr 93 11:41:42 PDT
From: "Martin Hellman" <hellman@isl.stanford.edu>
To: smb@research.att.com
Subject: Re: Clipper Chip

It is fine to post my previous message to sci.crypt 
if you also post this message with it in which:

1. I ask recipients to be sparse in their requesting further info 
from me or asking for comments on specific questions. By
this posting I apologize for any messages I am unable to
respond to. (I already spend too much time answering too much
e-mail and am particularly overloaded this week with other
responsibilities.) 

2. I note a probably correction sent to me by Dorothy Denning.
She met with the person from NSA that
I talked with by phone, so her understanding is likely to
better than mine on this point: Where I said the transmitted
info is  E{ E[M; K], E[K; UK], serial number;  SK}
she says the message is not double encrypted. The system
key (or family key as she was told it is called) only encrypts
the serial number or the serial number and the encrypted
unit key. This is not a major difference, but I thought it
should be mentioned and thank her for bringing it to
my attention. It makes more sense since it cuts down
on encryption computation overhead.

------- End of Forwarded Message






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: AJ Janschewitz <0005037030@mcimail.com>
Date: Sun, 18 Apr 93 09:36:17 PDT
To: cypherpunks <cypherpunks@toad.com>
Subject: Another one-way street
Message-ID: <51930418163515/0005037030ND3EM@mcimail.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----


Well, the Clintoon Administration has opened up yet another electronic
channel besides the one on CI$. The White House can also be reached at
5895485@mcimail.com.

Their usual rules apply: Give a snail return address if you want a
response. Looks like the "data highway" is, for the time being, a
one-way street ...

==a.j.==


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.2

iQCVAgUBK9F98xk4MFKFFwHhAQH42AP/ZRh7WRDqdP2LpkDiO2/IGzEbaVr9UR7y
AeqRQAAjSCmC5o1ApJ5oAd22GIqyeaRfnpXy0WuRsJRkxdEpDLbzYnGLSCaT4DOh
o4Hj4EHTFIy7exN9vRkAFaXA1E7E9dl7D1xajbv7F4L6Y26TivvhMP5WRtKuHIxW
re2YpapLOuY=
=amKI
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: zane@genesis.mcs.com (Sameer)
Date: Sun, 18 Apr 93 16:23:16 PDT
To: extropians@gnu.ai.mit.edu
Subject: CLIP: Sample/Draft letter to the editor
Message-ID: <m0nkiN8-000MSSC@genesis.mcs.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


	I wrote up a letter to the editor on the issue, which I will send
to the local newspapers and the major newspapers. I'd like comments, and
criticisms so that I may make the letter more effective.
	I also plan on writing an article in my newsletter _The Free
Journal_ on this big brother plan. (I plan on including excerpts from
_From Crossbows to Cryptography_ in this "Crypto" issue as well.)

Editor:

	The Clinton administration on Friday unveiled their plan for
establishing a standard data encryption system for voice communications.
This plan is abhorrent and reeks of Big Brother.
	President Clinton says that he wants to bring the United States
into the twenty-first century. This proposal is bringing us to 1984.
First I will mention technical reasons why the system is inadequate.
	The encryption algorithim is classified. Only a select group of
people will be allowed to examine the algorithim for flaws. The members
of the cryptographic community emphasize that the only way to make sure
that a cryptographic system is secure is to have as many people as
possible analyze and try to break it for as long as possible. A system
which has been examined by a small segment of the population will not be
trusted to be secure.
	The key used in this algorithim is very small-- it is easily
attacked by brute-force. The encryption key is only eighty bits long.
Such a small key lends itself to easy decryption by an unauthorized
party. It would lend a false sense of security to laypersons in the
field who do not realize that a key of such simplicity could be cracked
easily by any talented criminal.
	Apart from the technical flaws in the system, there are many
political problems with the recent big brother proposal. First, there is
the assumption that the government has a right to spy on its own
citizens. The proposal for this wiretap chip includes the registration
of keys with two escrow agencies.  This is purported to allow law
enforcement to keep track of "terrorists" and "drug-dealers." The first
flaw in this key-escrow system is that no self-respecting criminal will
use a cryptography system which can be easily tapped by law enforcement
officials-- they will use strong cryptography. Thus the only people who
may end up using the wiretap encryption system will be law-abiding
laypeople who don't fully understand cryptography. (Law-abiding citizens
who do understand cryptography will use strong cryptography to preserve
their privacy from a talented criminal.) 
	The proposal says that in order to obtain the key of a wiretap
chip user a law enforcement agency must first establish that they have a
valid interest in the key. Translated out of legalese, that means that
all a government agency will have to do to get access to all of the
private communications between, for example, a lawyer and her client
will be to fill out the necessary forms. Registering cryptographic keys
with the government is similar to giving the IRS the keys to your house
and filing cabinet.
	The chip is being manufactured exclusively by one company. The
release stated that the Attorney shall request (i.e. coerce)
telecommunication product manufacturers to use this product.  This
aspect of the system is a government-mandated monopoly. Such monopolies
result in high prices and the elimination of market forces which drive
the improvement of technology. (One needs only look at the state of the
Soviet Union to see how the lack of market forces affects consumer
technology.)
	What is feared the most from the proposal is that if the wiretap
chip becomes the standard, strong cryptography will be declared illegal.
If such is the case, then only criminals will have access to strong
cryptography. As I have stated above-- the wiretap chip will not be used
by criminals because of the obvious flaws in the crypto-system--
criminals will use strong crypto, while law-abiding citizens will have
to use a system which can be easily defeated by any criminal.
	Strong cryptography already exists for data communications, for
-free-. Strong cryptography for voice communications for -free- is only
a few months away for people who own a personal computer. There is no
way that making strong cryptography illegal will stop it-- it will only
turn otherwise law-abiding citizens into criminals.


			Sincerely,

			Sameer Parekh





--
| Sameer Parekh-zane@genesis.MCS.COM-PFA related mail to pfa@genesis.MCS.COM |
| Apprentice Philosopher, Writer, Physicist, Healer, Programmer, Lover, more |
| "Be God" - Me __ "Specialization is for Insects" - Robert A. Heinlein ____/
 \_____________/  \____________________________________________________/ 






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Clark Reynard <clark@metal.psu.edu>
Date: Sun, 18 Apr 93 15:04:20 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Cypherpunks--Mission Statement Needed
Message-ID: <9304182253.AA01388@metal.psu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


CP is for Crypto Privacy, because we feel that privacy and cryptography
are now more inextricably linked than ever.  We shall likely have to
use crypto to hide our crypto.

CP is for Changing Policy, both CP policy and existing government
policy.  

CP is for Conscious Paranoia.  We know and understand the issues
involved, both the political and the scientific.  We _are_ paranoid,
but we know _why_ we're paranoid, and justify it as a _rational_
response.  [The use of 'paranoia' is loose, of course, since
the strict meaning and popular meaning differ widely.]

CP is for Cypher Punks.  Cypher because not only do we use cyphers,
but in a certain sense we _are_ cyphers.  Punks?  A contemptuous term
created by those contemptuous of those who fail to pay allegiance
to the Almighty Government.  Should it be a badge of pride, or a
shameful term used for a shameful purpose?

I believe that if we are to be effective, we ought to decide on
a number of tenets which just aren't in the FAQ now.  Tim May's
.signature seems as good a place to start as any.  

Methods of implentation, boat-rocking and some form of plan
will likely be necessary.  Send mail to me or to the list,
preferably to my mail address at nyx.cs.du.edu; and I will
summarize and post, stripping headers if requested and eliminating
redundant entries.  The FAQ needs to be revised, I believe, to
reflect the current crisis, and I am more than willing to help
re-write it if anyone finds it agreeable.

Thank you.

[Aside:  I appear to be getting two copies of many letters--
 if anyone makes a snide comment about multiple postings of
 articles, I'll, I'll, I'll, uh, grin and look sheepish--
 and I wonder if others have this problem; it's not a double
 sub, per se, as some letters _aren't_ doubled.  

 Ah, well, it's probably nothing, just the side effects of the
 surveillance software.]

----
Robert W. Clark
rclark@nyx.cs.du.edu   PGP signature available by mail or finger





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: uni@acs.bu.edu (Shaen Bernhardt)
Date: Sun, 18 Apr 93 15:17:31 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Status of Voice Encryption with PC/Mac?
Message-ID: <9304182217.AA114200@acs.bu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



I keep hearing about voice scrambling technology in conjunction
with high speed modems and soundblaster cards....

Anyone care to comment on the availability of said devices?

The Supra people mentioned something, I'll check into it.

how about the potential for RAW cyphertext from PGP?
Hiding cyphertext in other mediums...?

Is any of this available today?

uni (Dark)




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: hkhenson@cup.portal.com
Date: Sun, 18 Apr 93 19:21:06 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: AT&T Press Release on Clipper
Message-ID: <9304181828.2.10206@cup.portal.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


On Sun, 18 Apr 1993 09:49:35 -0500 Dave Banisar 
<banisar@washofc.cpsr.org> posted: 

>Subject: AT&T Press Release on Clipper
>
>Here's AT&T's announcement on the Clipper.
>
>
> AT&T TO INCORPORATE NEW 'CLIPPER' CHIP INTO SECURE COMMUNICATIONS
>PRODUCT LINE
>
>GREENSBORO, N.C., April 16
>
>    AT&T (NYSE: T) said today it is moving to improve the security and privacy
>of telephone communications by incorporating a just-announced new U.S.
>government technology for voice  encryption  into its secure communications
>product line.
>
>   AT&T will use the Clipper chip, announced today by President Clinton as a 

[mucho deleted]

>    AT&T Secure Communications Systems is headquartered in Greensboro.
>    For more information about the AT&T Telephone Security Device 3600
>and other AT&T Secure Communications Products, call David Arneke at
>919-279-7680.
>     CONTACT: David Arneke of AT&T Secure Communications Systems, 919-279-
>7680,or after hours, 919-273-5687, or Herb Linnen of AT&T Media Relations,
>202-457-3933, or after hours, 202-333-9162
             
Expecting to get a recording or something of the like, I called the 
last of these numbers, and got a considerably agitated Herb Lennen--at 
home--who had already been the recipient of a call or two.  He was not 
happy, to put it mildly!  I kindly informed him that his home phone 
number had been posted all over the computer nets by someone posting 
an official ATT press release, and that the government's universal 
wiretap chip, er Clipper chip, was fast becoming a controversial 
topic.  He accused me of being with an "organized hacker group," and 
stated that he only talks to people from news organizations of the NYT 
and Wall Street Journal size.  I offered to send him a sample of the 
comments, but he declined to give me his email address.  (Though I 
suspect that Herb_Lennen@att.com might work.) 

Most interesting though, he told me that John Markoff had written the 
definitive (and he implied positive) story on the chip.  Yo John!  If 
you are not reading the cypherpunks list for the "other side" of this 
story, you might want to. 

Keith Henson 
  




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: uni@acs.bu.edu (Shaen Bernhardt)
Date: Sun, 18 Apr 93 15:43:22 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: FAQ's
Message-ID: <9304182243.AA107262@acs.bu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Perhaps someone should cook up a frequently asked questions sheet
with regard to our position on the Wiretap chip proposal?

Something bent a little more in the direction of consequences
and not promises?

Q:  What will the Clipper Chip really mean for Privacy?

A:  The Clipper chip bills itself as the answer to a nations right
for privacy, when indeed it is less secure than many of the algorithms
in circulation today.  Buying a Clipper Chip device is the same as
handing the government your login password and accepting the promise,
"We'll only use it with proper authorization..."

Admittedly my example is less than eloquent, perhaps someone
can come up with better?  Given this format, and if the
questions and answers are kept in layman's terms, it could reasonably
be distrubuted to some of the less technical news groups and things
like comp.mac.comm and such....

uni (Dark)




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Haywood J. Blowme" <psionic@wam.umd.edu>
Date: Sun, 18 Apr 93 16:18:11 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Amiga programmers.
Message-ID: <199304182317.AA18599@rac3.wam.umd.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


A curious thought occurred to me several months ago, and it was recently
brought up again when someone mentioned doing it on IBM's with
soundblasters.

This idea has been sitting basically on the back burner for a while now. But
now with the current climate (Wiretap chip proposed) I think it is relevant.

This idea basically applies to Commodore Amiga computers. So if you are a
programmer and would like to help me with this please E-Mail me about it.

The basic idea I think would need the following:

- A sound digitizer
- High speed modem
- 68020 or above processor (for speed purposes)
- Good encryption algorithm (IDEA for example)

Implementing the system would involve using the digitizer to digitize the
voice. Then processing the sample (in real time) through the encryption
algorithm and sending the output to the modem for transmission. The process
would be repeated on the other end.

The problems I see occurring are the following

- Speed of the computer affecting real time encryption
- Synchronizing the data packets for accurate decryption on the other side.
- simultaneous I/O on the serial and parallel ports(for modem and digitizer)
- outputing to speakers on receiving end.
- having the whole process operate in a full duplex mode (ie. both people
  can talk at the same time).


I think the majority of functions can be handled by the system libraries and
outside sources (such as xpkidea.library for encryption).

Does this sound feasible??




=============================================================================
      ///    | psionic@wam.umd.edu | Q: How did the govt. decide to use an 80
 __  /// C=  | Craig H. Rowland    |    bit key for the new clipper chip?
 \\\/// Amiga| PGP Key Available   | A: They combined Bill and Hillary
  \///  1200 | by finger.          |    Clintons' IQ's.
=============================================================================




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: vanam@phazer.ksu.ksu.edu (Stephen Lee(Second son of Caine))
Date: Sun, 18 Apr 93 18:04:43 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: unsub
Message-ID: <9304190104.AA16243@phazer.ksu.ksu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


unsubscribe me please thanx....

Stephen





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Bill Sommerfeld <sommerfeld@orchard.medford.ma.us>
Date: Sun, 18 Apr 93 17:37:05 PDT
To: karn@qualcomm.com
Subject: Followup message from Hellman
In-Reply-To: <9304182047.AA03182@servo>
Message-ID: <9304190011.AA00158@orchard.medford.ma.us>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Quoting Martin Helmann as forwarded by Steve Belloving and Phil Karn:

   she [Denning -sommerfeld] says the message is not double encrypted.
   The system key (or family key as she was told it is called) only
   encrypts the serial number or the serial number and the encrypted
   unit key. This is not a major difference, but I thought it should
   be mentioned and thank her for bringing it to my attention.

This sounds pretty unlikely to me -- if the message isn't
double-encrypted, the "tags" could be separated from the ciphertext
without too much effort.  Of course, it's not clear whether the
receiving system checks the serial number, or whether the serial
number is factored into E[M;K]; conceivably, those things could be
reconstituted on the other end if the receiving wiretap chip needed
them..

					- Bill




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Matthew J Miszewski <MJMISKI@macc.wisc.edu>
Date: Sun, 18 Apr 93 18:14:20 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: MEDIA: Calm
Message-ID: <23041820135802@vms2.macc.wisc.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Everyone,
 
  Im glad to see so many insightful letters being sent/broadcast to media
types.  I think that our cause would be better served with a toning down
of the rhetoric and techno-talk.  I understand what your saying but Joe
Byline may not.  Keep it simple.
 
  On that note, I think one more effective strategy is for some cypherpunks
to write thoughtful letters which appear (or do) come from strict lay people
scared at the thought of the "Wiretap Chip".  If it appears that only techno-
types care about this issue, then no one else will.  I know non-crypto experts
read this list, so this is a call to you to express your opinions publically
as john/jane doe on the street.  You dont have to speak to the technical
side of things at all.  Simply let the world know your afraid and so should
everyone else.  Leave the cryptoanalysis to the experts (Tim, Eric, et al)
 
  Keep up the good work everyone.
 
Matt
 




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: D Anton Sherwood <dasher@well.sf.ca.us>
Date: Sun, 18 Apr 93 22:48:08 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: gentlemen
Message-ID: <199304190547.AA19600@well.sf.ca.us>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Who was the statesman who said, two generations ago, "Gentlemen do not read
each other's mail"?

By the way, the San Francisco Chronicle's business section's Saturday
headline was
	Secret Phone Plan Under Fire
or maybe it was
	Secure Phone Scheme Draws Fire

*\\* Anton                                                     Ubi scriptum?




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Haywood J. Blowme" <psionic@wam.umd.edu>
Date: Sun, 18 Apr 93 19:50:39 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Amiga Crypto
Message-ID: <199304190250.AA12313@rac3.wam.umd.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


 
Return-Path: <newsham@wiliki.eng.hawaii.edu>
 
>> The basic idea I think would need the following:
>> 
>> - A sound digitizer
>> - High speed modem
>> - 68020 or above processor (for speed purposes)
>> - Good encryption algorithm (IDEA for example)
>> 
>> Implementing the system would involve using the digitizer to digitize the
>> voice. Then processing the sample (in real time) through the encryption
>> algorithm and sending the output to the modem for transmission. The process
>> would be repeated on the other end.
>> 
>> The problems I see occurring are the following
>> 
>> - Speed of the computer affecting real time encryption
>> - Synchronizing the data packets for accurate decryption on the other side.
>> - simultaneous I/O on the serial and parallel ports(for modem and digitizer)
>> - outputing to speakers on receiving end.
>> - having the whole process operate in a full duplex mode (ie. both people
>>   can talk at the same time).
>> 
>> 
>> I think the majority of functions can be handled by the system libraries and
>> outside sources (such as xpkidea.library for encryption).
>> 
>> Does this sound feasible??
 
 
 
newsham@wiliki.eng.hawaii.edu Writes:
 
>From what I gather CELP takes about 10 to 15 MIPS and LPC takes
>somewhere under 5 MIPS on DSP chips.  Instructions including
>fixed point multiplies and accumulations (not counting divisions).
>Thats quite a load for a 68020 to bear and still do encryption
>and communications isnt it?
 
[Stuff deleted]
 
 
This is true. But if a sampling rate of about 9000-10,000 samples per second
are used this will allow for good voice quality and the encryption algorithm 
should be able to handle it. The IDEA implementations I have seen for the
Amiga run about 30-50K per second on my Amiga 1200 with 68020. This should
be fast enough. If you then can send that data directly to the serial port
with a fast modem 14.4K it should work. But it might sound choppy (haven't
done the figures yet on how much data would be going to the modem while
the person speaks, but it may be substantial enough to make the use of
a high speed modem not feasible. Also I have to consider that data compression
in the form of LAP/M or MNP will be ineffective against the encrypted data
as it will appear as white noise and will be largely uncompressable..
 
 
=============================================================================
      ///    | psionic@wam.umd.edu | Q: How did the govt. decide to use an 80
 __  /// C=  | Craig H. Rowland    |    bit key for the new clipper chip?
 \\\/// Amiga| PGP Key Available   | A: They combined Bill and Hillary
  \///  1200 | by finger.          |    Clintons' IQ's.
=============================================================================
 




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu
Date: Sun, 18 Apr 93 22:06:28 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: musings from a madman
Message-ID: <9304190506.AA09069@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain




Hellman's Hints
---------------

[Hellman]
>When a message is to be sent it will first be 
>encrypted under K, then K will be encrypted under the unit key UK, 
>and the serial number of the unit added to produce a three part 
>message which will then be encrypted under the system key SK 
>producing
>
>     E{ E[M; K], E[K; UK], serial number;  SK}
>
>When a court order obtains K1 and K2, and thence K

Just a quibble, Mr. Hellman says earlier that K1 and K2 lead to unit
key UK, not family code K. And given the above, how do they ever
decrypt the message if they don't have K, unless the scheme is insecure
under the `family code'? (>barf<, leave it for the Ministry of Truth to
come up with some user-friendly term for something inherently
nauseating like `friendly fire', I wonder if Dingaling is behind this one too...)

Do you get it?
--------------

This little formula is not obvious to me. It seems to me two basic
questions have to be answered, could someone spell these out given what's known?

1. How the phones interact prior/during a call
2. How the sinister TLAs wiretap
3. How casual eavesdropping by other than billion-dollary agencies is
prevented (if at all)

The Flimsy Code
---------------

The family code is clearly a propaganda wrench in the works. `They' now
have some pretty powerful ammunition--it must be secure if you get to
change your code whenever you want, right? It's so simple anyone can
use it! I'm a bit surprised it wasn't mentioned in the announcement. I
guess all the hoopla and slick and vapid AT&T ads about `wow, you get
to *choose* your combination!' will come a bit later, it'll fit in
quite nicely with their `I' plan, as in Illegal... (I hope Sprint and
MCI sue the pants off AT&T and the government for this outrageous
collusion, unless of course they are in the collusion too...)

Conspiracy Theories
-------------------

how is it that CPSR and EFF came out with responses to the initial
announcement virtually instantaneously after its release? Are they just
really swift? I want to know what >every< single person on those
mailing lists has to say about how their name got there and how long
they knew about this abomination (and before they have a chance to
agree on stories!). I don't appreciate Mr. Banisar's little slash
suggesting that the issue is already closed and that anyone who thinks
something just a tad unusual is going on is a deranged conspiracy
monger... I think its kind of cute how he says that `nothing
significant' appeared in the traffic...

Who Has the Keys?
-----------------

The evasion of `who stores the keys' makes me wonder. It suggests that
the proposal was poorly crafted (which is true in any case), but, more
likely, IMHO, the scheme is weak enough for the NSA (but maybe not
cops) to break regardless, and hence their casual disregard for this
seemingly monumentally crucial point.  Also, they can make it sound
like they are `compromising' by giving the appearance of public debate
on the agencies, because it won't really matter, while diverting
attention from the *real* issues (look here! see your rights? now you
see 'em, now you don't... pick a key, any key---was it this one? >wow<
how'd you *do* that?).

What IS Acceptable
------------------

We should be prepared to say what >is< acceptable for the government to
do; don't get caught off guard with a question like ``well, what are
you people proposing as an alternative?'' Here are a few ideas...

1) Get the hell out of the cryptography and hardware development
business, and leave private industry alone to do what it does best when
not harrassed by extortionists and terrorists who shall remain nameless
but have the initials N.S.A. ...

2) Let the NIST pick a phone encryption scheme after totally open
debates and total noninvolvement by the NSA, who is obviously biased.
We can note that this has been attempted to be followed for other
encryption schemes (e.g. digital signature, DES, etc.) why not here?
what's so special?

3) Let communications companies loose on it, stay out of the way or get
trampled by the stampede, and we'll all be happy.

Ministry of Truth (1993-?)
--------------------------

Finally, drive home the point: the government may have always had the
`precedent' (don't ever use `right' here) to *listen*, there has never
been any assurance that they must *understand* what is being said, and
we are assured by our Noble Constitution that we can say what we
please, and if by exercising this fundamental and inalienable right we
upset the fragile status quo, then so be it, because the monument of
freedom of speech will always overshadow the weak and tenuous
`precedent to listen'. Cryptography simply alters their *understanding*
of what is on a line from the meaningful to the meaningless, and only
the Ministry of Truth is allowed to regulate *meaning* (hm, maybe that
will be the next government agency created under the New Regime...)

Mea Culpa
---------

sorry for the rough editing on the last message, that's what happens in
the heat of the moment from one of those impatient and extremely
agitated cypherpunks... For those of you keeping score at home, the
``Notice how the proposal talks about'' non sequitur should read
``Notice how the proposal talks about criminals and terrorists without
any qualifications such as `alleged' and `suspected' ''. as my penance
you have this little beauty in front of you...

How Does Cypherpunk Sound?
--------------------------

`cypherpunk' actually has some pretty endearing qualities as a name,
and I'd be a bit horrified to give it up, just when I was waiting for
the T shirt ``Cypherpunks do it stealthily'' (secretly? sneakily?). The
public seems to have a bit of fascination for `cyberpunk' right now and
we are just riding on it (stealthily? secretly? sneakily?).  OK, so we
don't publicize that term, but it could actually increase the glamor
and mystery of the cause; we shouldn't pretend that we're not seriously
pissed off...

Quote Corner
------------

``the TURNCOATS ARE COMING!''

``REMEMBER THE LIBERTY!''

``They're HEEEERE...''

``Keys? I thought YOU had the keys! Do you have a crypt hanger? We
better call the cryptsmith...''




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: wbe@bbn.com (Winston Edmond)
Date: 18 Apr 93 23:29:17
Subject: Figuring out ZyXEL's CELP specs
In-Reply-To: <116416f1@ofa123.fidonet.org>
Message-ID: <WBE.93Apr18232917@crystal.bbn.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


   After various people expressed interest in the ZyXEL modem CELP specs...

Tyrone.Horton@p101.f701.n202.z1.fidonet.org replied:
> As far as CELP, ZyXEL will not be releasing the specs.

   OK.  In that case, it's up to us to figure it out.  :-)  I saw the
following post about 4800 CELP on another newsgroup and thought it might help
someone here get closer to figuring out how ZyXEL's 9600 CELP works.

PLEASE: the following message mentions a source of CELP source code that's
	free.  Rather than everyone calling all at once, I suggest:

  (1) If you live in the D.C. area, maybe go ahead and call anyway and then
      post the results in this newsgroup.

Otherwise
  (2) If you have a high interest and it's likely you'll actually do
      something with the information, POST A NOTE TO THIS NEWSGROUP saying
      so and wait a couple of days so we can all see who else is interested.

  (3) When the dust settles, the most interested, and/or those nearest
      Washington, D.C., call to get the source code and then post it to the
      newsgroup (if permitted).  (Unfortunately, you may have to consider
      U.S. export restrictions, but since the author says the code "is
      available for worldwide distribution", I don't expect this to be a
      problem.)
 -WBE
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
From: jpcampb@afterlife.ncsc.mil (Joe Campbell)
Newsgroups: comp.compression.research
Subject: Re: CELP vocoder refs
Date: 17 Jan 93 21:38:07 GMT
Organization: The Great Beyond

Hi,
I hope that the following information answers your questions.
Joe

The U.S. DoD's Federal-Standard-1016 based 4800 bps code excited linear
prediction voice coder version 3.2 (CELP 3.2) Fortran and C simulation
source codes are available for worldwide distribution at no charge (on
DOS diskettes, but configured to compile on Sun SPARC stations) from:

Bob Fenichel
National Communications System
Washington, D.C.  20305
1-703-692-2124
1-703-746-4960 (fax)

Example input and processed speech files, a technical information bulletin,
and the official standard "Federal Standard 1016, Telecommunications:
Analog to Digital Conversion of Radio Voice by 4,800 bit/second Code
Excited Linear Prediction (CELP)" are included at no charge.

The following articles describe the Federal-Standard-1016 4.8-kbps CELP
coder (it's unnecessary to read more than one):
 
Campbell, Joseph P. Jr., Thomas E. Tremain and Vanoy C. Welch,
"The Federal Standard 1016 4800 bps CELP Voice Coder," Digital Signal
Processing, Academic Press, 1991, Vol. 1, No. 3, p. 145-155.
 
Campbell, Joseph P. Jr., Thomas E. Tremain and Vanoy C. Welch,
"The DoD 4.8 kbps Standard (Proposed Federal Standard 1016),"
in Advances in Speech Coding, ed. Atal, Cuperman and Gersho,
Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1991, Chapter 12, p. 121-133.
 
Campbell, Joseph P. Jr., Thomas E. Tremain and Vanoy C. Welch, "The
Proposed Federal Standard 1016 4800 bps Voice Coder:  CELP," Speech
Technology Magazine, April/May 1990, p. 58-64.


The U.S. DoD's Federal-Standard-1015/NATO-STANAG-4198 based 2400 bps
linear prediction coder version 53 (LPC-10e v53) Fortran or C simulation
source codes are available on a limited basis upon written request to:
 
Tom Tremain
Department of Defense
Ft. Meade, MD  20755-6000
USA

The U.S. Federal Standard 1015 (NATO STANAG 4198) is described in:
Thomas E. Tremain, "The Government Standard Linear Predictive Coding
Algorithm:  LPC-10," Speech Technology Magazine, April 1982, p. 40-49.

There is also a section about FS-1015 in the book:
Panos E. Papamichalis, Practical Approaches to Speech Coding,
Prentice-Hall, 1987.

The voicing classifier used in the enhanced LPC-10 (LPC-10e) is described in:
Campbell, Joseph P., Jr. and T. E. Tremain, "Voiced/Unvoiced Classification
of Speech with Applications to the U.S. Government LPC-10E Algorithm,"
Proceedings of the IEEE International Conference on Acoustics, Speech, and
Signal Processing, 1986, p. 473-6.

Copies of the official standards "Federal Standard 1015, ...", and
"Federal Standard 1016, Telecommunications: Analog to Digital Conversion
of Radio Voice by 4,800 bit/second Code Excited Linear Prediction (CELP)"
are available for US$ 2.50 each from:
 
GSA Rm 6654
7th & D St SW
Washington, D.C.  20407
1-202-708-9205

Realtime DSP code for FS-1015 and FS-1016 is sold by:
 
John DellaMorte
DSP Software Engineering
165 Middlesex Tpk, Suite 206
Bedford, MA  01730
1-617-275-3733
1-617-275-4323 (fax)
dspse.bedford@channel1.com
 
DSP Software Engineering's FS-1016 code can run on a DSP Research's Tiger 30
(a PC board with a TMS320C3x and analog interface suited to development work)
or on Intellibit's AE2000 TMS320C31 based 3" by 2.5" card.
 
DSP Research                Intellibit
1095 E. Duane Ave.          P.O. Box 9785
Sunnyvale, CA  94086        McLean, VA  22102-0785
(408)773-1042               (703)442-4781
(408)736-3451 (fax)         (703)442-4784 (fax)
-- 
.............................................................................
; Dr. Campbell  N3JBC  jpcampb@afterlife.ncsc.mil  74040.305@compuserve.com ;
; My opinions are mine!   Happiness = Reality - Expectations, Click & Clack ;
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~







From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: crunch@netcom.com (John Draper)
Date: Mon, 19 Apr 93 00:11:33 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: My comments on the Clipper or Tapper chip,
Message-ID: <9304190711.AA12484@netcom4.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



I don't know wheter or not I should post this in alt.security.pgp,
or other newsgroups,   but here's my official comments on what
I think of the Clinton Adm "Clipper" or "Tapper" chip.  Any press
people are welcome to use it,  and feel free to send it out 
wherever it will help.

My official statement and comments on the "Tapper chip"
=======================================================

  I believe that the Clintom Admin is trying to push this idea through
without giving much thought on the ramifications of this rather intreguing
idea of "registering" your keys with some government agency.   This
overwhelming urge to "tap into" our private conversations is just going
to promote private encryption and voice scrambling.   It is not going
to make law enforcement's job any easier to catch criminals,  because 
they will also encrypt their voice and data.  It reminds me of that
popular bumper sticker "If guns are outlawed,  then only outlaws will
have guns".   It is clear that the government considers encryption as
a "weapon",  used by the enemy to keep nosey people away.  Look at
the current export laws to convince yourself of that.   I guess I
can think of it as a weapon to preserve my privacy.

  This is not only going to get a bad reception in the industry,  but
it will cost the government more money by adding huge administration
costs.   Talk about government "FAT"?    I thought our goals are to
cut government spending,   not add to it.    Lets see!!  You need
two agencys (Hopefully ones that people can trust).   Gee!!  I cannot
even think of just ONE agency that I can trust!!  can you?    Then,
these agencys have to keep track of one half of an 80 bit key.   
I guess there is one key for each "clipper" chip,  so there has to be
the capability of millions of keys,   each one has to perfectly match
the other half.    Then there will be people needed to "register" these
"tapper" phones.    Lets not even think about what happens when one
decides to sell it!!    MORE government FAT!!.   I guess thats why
they're called FAT CATS.

  Now,  if I were a criminal,   do you think I would be dumb enough to
"register" my phone with the government.   Of course not.    I would
probably get mine on the black market,  or though some other illicit
means!!   If I were a law abiding citizen,  would I trust some government
agency with my encryption key?   Would you??

  Then,  there is this classified algorithm used in the clipper chip 
itself.    I'm sure its pretty good,   and it is probably hard to attack
and crack.    But can you really be absolutely sure that there isn't some
sort of "back door" in it??    

  It is clear that the industry hasn't been consulted,  or ideas were
not put forth in some public forum.   So,  where is this democratic
process??   We ARE still a democracy,  aren't we?

  How was this company that sells the "Clipper chip" selected??   Was
RSA data security people contacted??

  It is clear that a lot of questions have to be answered before something
like this can be accepted.   I just hope the right people make the right
decision,  and that PRIVATE encryption be the responsibility of the user,  
and NOT the carriers.

   It is important that more and more private encryption programs,  equipment,
etc,  can be made available on the market.    If RSA is two tight with
their licensing fees and policys,  then there should be more math whiz 
types making better algorithms than RSA's.    The field is wide open,  so
lets exploit them!!

John D.
 




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: hkhenson@cup.portal.com
Date: Mon, 19 Apr 93 00:21:09 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Fighting the Wiretap Chip Plan
Message-ID: <9304190012.2.12250@cup.portal.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



When this "Clipper chip" story broke, I was off on an extropian (if 
not cypherpunk) activity--helping freeze Alcor's 27 patient (another 
HIV+ case.)  

I doubt I am the strongest hardware person on these groups, but nobody 
else has commented on this aspect.  You just *can't* make chips 
entirely resistant to reverse engineering.  I know, I have spent close 
to 10% of my engineering career reverse engineering things.  Given 
time and a few samples, *any* chip can be reverse engineered.  This is 
especially true with tools such as SEM stimulator/state readers and 
Focused Ion Beam chip slicers and dicers widely available.  *Somebody* 
will dig out every gate in their spare time.  Thus the following 
statement looks very odd: 

>Q:   How strong is the security in the device?  How can I be sure
>     how strong the security is?
>
>A:   This system is more secure than many other voice encryption
>     systems readily available today.  While the algorithm will
>     remain classified to protect the security of the key escrow
>     system,

Say what?  Does this mean that if somebody slices up a chip and 
publishes the algorithm the "security of the key escrow system" is 
broken?  Can a representative of the government say why, or if, this 
is the case?  If it is not the case, why not publish the algorithm and 
be done with it?  Because, soon as the chip can be bought over the 
counter or stolen, the algorithm will be deduced.

>             we are willing to invite an independent panel of
>     cryptography experts to evaluate the algorithm to assure all
>     potential users that there are no unrecognized
>     vulnerabilities.

Well, unless the "independent panel" includes people who can follow 
the algorithm all the way through to silicon, I would not trust their 
report even if I trusted the experts, and that goes double for the 
next set of masks. 

Keith Henson




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: norm@netcom.com (Norman Hardy)
Date: Mon, 19 Apr 93 01:31:45 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Hellman's Hints
Message-ID: <9304190831.AA17466@netcom4.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I presume that Hellman meant to say 
            "K1 and K2, and thence UK"
in place of "K1 and K2, and thence K" at least it makes sense that way.
A later posting from Hellman (I think) emmended the description
of the transmitted message from
    E{ E[M; K], E[K; UK], serial number; SK}
to  E[M; K], E{ E[K; UK], serial number; SK}
 
If you know SK then you can compute (E[K; UK], serial number)
Then knowing UK (= K1+K2) you can compute K
from which you get M via E[M; K].




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: denning@cs.cosc.georgetown.edu (Dorothy Denning)
Date: Tue Sep 07 12:37:57 1999
To: <<long list deleted for *their* privacy>>
Subject: Re:  Clipper Chip
Message-ID: <1a306eb9a79382308c1cabac1e90bbba@NO-ID-FOUND.mhonarc.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I just had another conversation with NSA to clarify some of the features
of Clipper.  Please feel free to distribute this and my other messages
on Clipper.

The name of the encryption algorithm is "Skipjack."

Martin Hellman had written

                and the serial number of the unit added to produce a three part 
                message which will then be encrypted under the system key SK 
                producing

                     E{ E[M; K], E[K; UK], serial number;  SK}

To which I responded:

        My understanding is that E[M; K] is not encrypted under SK (called the
        "family key") and that the decrypt key corresponding to SK is held by
        law enforcement.  Does anyone have first hand knowledge on this? 

I was correct in that E[M; K] is not encrypted under SK.  However, Skipjack
being a single-key system, there is, of course, not a separate decrypt key
for the family key SK.

        The unit key, also called the "chip key," is generated from the
        serial number N as follows.  Let N1, N2, and N3 be 64 bit blocks
        derived from N, and let S1 and S2 be two 80-bit seeds used as keys.
        Compute the 64-bit block 

                R1 = E[D[E[N1; S1]; S2]; S1] 

        (Note that this is like using the DES in triple encryption mode with
        two keys.)  Similarly compute blocks R2 and R3 starting with N2 and N3.
        (I'm unlear about whether the keys S1 and S2 change.  The fact that
        they're called seeds suggests they might.)  Then R1, R2, and R3 are
        concatenated together giving 192 bits.  The first 80 bits  form K1 and
        the next 80 bits form K2.  The remaining bits are discarded.

The seeds S1 and S2 do not change.   The whole process is performed on
a laptop computer, and S1 and S2 are supplied by two independent people
so that no one person knows both.  The same S1 and S2 are used during
an entire "programming session" to generate keys for a stream of serial
numbers.  Everything is discarded at the end (the computer could be
thrown out if desired).

The serial number is 30 bits and the values N1, N2, and N3 are formed
by padding the serial number with fixed 34-bit blocks (separate padding
for each value).

The resulting keys K1 and K2 are output onto separate floppy disks, paired
up with their serial number.  Each pair is stored in a separate file.  The
floppy disks are taken away by two separate people on behalf of the two
escrow agencies.

Dorothy Denning
denning@cs.georgetown.edu


======

From eff.org!interesting-people-request@netcomsv.netcom.com Mon Apr 19 20:07:50 
1993
Posted-Date: Mon, 19 Apr 1993 21:17:27 -0500
From: David Farber <farber@central.cis.upenn.edu>
X-Sender: farber@linc.cis.upenn.edu
Subject:  More technical details -- Chipper
To: interesting-people@eff.org (interesting-people mailing list)

Personal note.  Denning suggests such firms as

" SRI, Rand, Mitre, the national labs (Sandia, LANL, Los Alamos), Treasury,
GAO" as possible escrow organizations. I personally believe that firms
which get their funding from the government are just too susceptible  to
pressure which we have seen historically. It would be best to use
organizations that have a more arms length relationship with the government
so everyone believes the escrows task is being performed properly.

Dave

From: smb@research.att.com (Steven Bellovin)
Subject: More technical details
Date: 19 Apr 93 13:43:46 GMT

Here are some corrections and additions to Hellman's note, courtesy of
Dorothy Denning.  Again, this is reposted with permission.

Two requests -- first, note the roles of S1 and S2.  It appears to me
and others that anyone who knows those values can construct the unit
key.  And the nature of the generation process for K1 and K2 is such
that neither can be produced alone.  Thus, the scheme cannot be
implemented such that one repository generates the first half-key, and
another generates the second.  *That* is ominous.

Second -- these postings are not revealed scripture, nor are they
carefully-crafted spook postings.  Don't attempt to draw out hidden
meanings (as opposed to, say, the official announcements of Clipper).
Leave Denning out of this; given Hellman's record of opposition to DES,
which goes back before some folks on this newsgroup knew how to read, I
don't think you can impugn his integrity.

Oh yeah -- the folks who invented Clipper aren't stupid.  If you think
something doesn't make sense, it's almost certainly because you don't
understand their goals.

                --Steve Bellovin

-----

Date: Sun, 18 Apr 93 07:56:39 EDT
From: denning@cs.georgetown.edu (Dorothy Denning)
Subject: Re:  Clipper Chip
To: (a long list of folks)

I was also briefed by the NSA and FBI, so let me add a few comments to
Marty's message:

        The Clipper Chip will have a secret crypto algorithm embedded in 

The algorithm operates on 64-bit blocks (like DES) and the chip supports
all 4 DES modes of operation.  The algorithm uses 32 rounds of scrambling
compared with 16 in DES.

        In addition to the system key, each user will get to choose his 
        or her own key and change it as often as desired. Call this key 
        plain old K. When a message is to be sent it will first be 

K is the session key shared by the sender and receiver.  Any method
(e.g., public key) can be used to establish the session key.  In the
AT&T telephone security devices, which will have the new chip, the key
is negotiated using a public-key protocol.
 
        encrypted under K, then K will be encrypted under the unit key UK, 
        and the serial number of the unit added to produce a three part 
        message which will then be encrypted under the system key SK 
        producing

             E{ E[M; K], E[K; UK], serial number;  SK}

My understanding is that E[M; K] is not encrypted under SK (called the
"family key") and that the decrypt key corresponding to SK is held by
law enforcement.  Does anyone have first hand knowledge on this?  I
will also check it out, but this is 7am Sunday so I did not want to wait.

        The unit key 
        will be generated as the XOR of two 80-bit random numbers K1 
        and K2 (UK=K1+K2) which will be kept by the two escrow 

The unit key, also called the "chip key," is generated from the
serial number N as follows.  Let N1, N2, and N3 be 64 bit blocks
derived from N, and let S1 and S2 be two 80-bit seeds used as keys.
Compute the 64-bit block 

        R1 = E[D[E[N1; S1]; S2]; S1] 

(Note that this is like using the DES in triple encryption mode with
two keys.)  Similarly compute blocks R2 and R3 starting with N2 and N3.
(I'm unlear about whether the keys S1 and S2 change.  The fact that
they're called seeds suggests they might.)  Then R1, R2, and R3 are
concatenated together giving 192 bits.  The first 80 bits  form K1 and
the next 80 bits form K2.  The remaining bits are discarded.

        authorities. Who these escrow authorities will be is still to be 
        decided by the Attorney General, but it was stressed to me that 
        they will NOT be NSA or law enforcement agencies, that they 
        must be parties acceptable to the users of the system as unbiased. 

Marty is right on this and the FBI has asked me for suggestions.
Please pass them to me along with your reasons.  In addition to Marty's
criteria, I would add that the agencies must have an established record
of being able to safeguard highly sensitive information.  Some suggestions
I've received so far include SRI, Rand, Mitre, the national labs (Sandia,
LANL, Los Alamos), Treasury, GAO.

        When a court order obtains K1 and K2, and thence K, the law 
        enforcement agency will use SK to decrypt all information 
        flowing on the suspected link [Aside: It is my guess that 
        they may do this constantly on all links, with or without a 
        court order, since it is almost impossible to tell which links 
        over which a message will flow.] 

My understanding is that there will be only one decode box and that it
will be operated by the FBI.  The service provider will isolate the
communications stream and pass it to the FBI where it will pass through
the decode box, which will have been keyed with K.

        for "the wiretap authorizations." When Levy asked for
        the details so he could review the cases as required by
        law, the agent told him that his predecessors just turned
        over 40-50 blank, signed forms every time. Levi did not
        comply and changed the system, but the lesson is clear: 
        No single person or authority should have the power to
        authorize wiretaps

No single person does, at least for FBI taps.  After completing a mound
of paperwork, an agent must get the approval of several people on a chain
that includes FBI legal counsel before the request is even taken to the
Attorney General for final approval.

Dorothy Denning




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: grady@netcom.com (1016/2EF221)
Date: Mon, 19 Apr 93 07:38:12 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: more specific address for 'agrep'
Message-ID: <9304191438.AA13031@netcom.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



I've been asked to supply more specific directions
for automated fetching of the source and documentation
for "agrep," the powerful similarity pattern matching tool.

It is at

cs.arizona.edu
192.12.69.5

in directory

/agrep/README
/agrep/agrep-2.04.tar.Z
/agrep/agrep.ps.1.Z
/agrep/agrep.ps.2.Z

(The .ps suffixed files are the optional postscript docs; 
a reasonably good research report with benchmarks is
included.)

Note for Macintosh MPW users: after a few hours of drudgery,
I ported the tool to MPW 3.2.3 running under System 7.1.  If you
would like me to e-mail a binhexed copy of the tool suitable
for dropping in to your MPW/tools folder, please write...

I've been having lots of fun picking up the "lost"
references to things I'm interested in. For example,
starting a search like:

agrep -1 -i 'Burning Chrome' cyberpunkspool 

immediately finds references like 'burning crome' that I
have always missed before.  See how many times John
Gilmore's name is mentioned in the CUD archives
(and how often misspelled).  How about _your_ name?

As usual, I will e-mail the uuencoded tar.Z upon request
if you cannot do anonymous FTP.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: grady@netcom.com (1016/2EF221)
Date: Mon, 19 Apr 93 07:56:43 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Do it yourself voice encryption CELP
Message-ID: <9304191456.AA14568@netcom.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



For those interested in off-the-shelf vocoders that implement
the high-compression CELP algorithms, you might be interested
in the ZyXEL model U1496E+ modem (about $400) that offers
19.8(and maybe v.fast when specified)/14.4 kbps fax/ CELP
(subscribe to comp.dcom.modems for more info).

For those interested in the CELP algorithm directly here is some
specific directions on getting your own copy:




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Lestat" <arms!72@bikini.cis.ufl.edu>
Date: Mon, 19 Apr 93 05:47:20 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Request
Message-ID: <2bd298b2.arms@arms.uucp>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Please add me to your mailing list; as a passionate support of freedom
of speech and expression of all kinds in all mediums, I'm concerned
about the ClipperChip and interested in what you have to offer.
 
Thanks,
 
Lestat, aka Howard S. Jones
72@arms.uucp





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Bill Sommerfeld <sommerfeld@orchard.medford.ma.us>
Date: Mon, 19 Apr 93 06:37:00 PDT
To: psionic@wam.umd.edu
Subject: Amiga Crypto
In-Reply-To: <199304190250.AA12313@rac3.wam.umd.edu>
Message-ID: <9304191229.AA00116@orchard.medford.ma.us>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I think you're off by a factor of 8..

8K samples/sec is 8K bytes/second, not 8Kbits/sec

If we had universal ISDN at 56kb/s or 64kb/s, encrypted voice using
PC-class machines would be trivial.  Instead, we have to compress down
to a data rate comparable to ~1800 8-bit samples/second (V.32bis
speed; modem compression won't do very much -- unless nobody's talking
-- as voice samples do *not* compress effectively using compression
algorithms optimized for ASCII text).  While fiddling with my
SoundBlaster and some dialogue sampled from a T.V.  program last
night, it became clear to me that cutting back to ~4K 4-bit
samples/second isn't quite good enough, and the compression in either
UNIX compress or PGP isn't really tuned for audio samples.

It's not the crypto that's the limiting factor, it's the compression.

That's why the CELP technology that Phil Karn and John Gilmore are
talking about is so important..

					- Bill






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: dmandl@shearson.com (David Mandl)
Date: Mon, 19 Apr 93 07:12:24 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Mailing list name
Message-ID: <9304191232.AA17766@tardis.shearson.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> In the light of recent developments concerning government cryptography
> initiatives, we might soon find ourselves innundated by working press.
> 
> Given this, I think that the name "cypherpunks" produces the wrong
> connotations -- it makes us sound like criminals when we are in fact
> people who are interested in expanding personal privacy with
> technology. Often, little things like this end up being of tremendous
> importance in the long haul.
> 
> I would propose changing the name of the mailing list to
> "cryptoprivacy" or something similar. It denotes what we are about in
> a way that mundane people understand better, and it portrays us in the
> proper light -- as people struggling to improve the prospects for
> personal freedom, not a bunch of "punks".
> 
> Perry

Perry, I'm absolutely stunned.  What next: should we all make sure we shave
every day (women: don't forget those legs and armpits!)?  Or make tcmay remove
the word "anarchy" and other ungood words from his .sig?  Anyone who feels
like talking to the press or lobbying her representatives (and I'm not
claiming that those tactics are either good or bad) can wear a suit, makeup,
a respectable haircut, or whatever--that's their decision.  I can understand
the need to confront this issue as a large and united group, and I suspect that
other groups like the EFF, CPSR, etc., are better for that purpose anyway.  You
don't need to mention that you're a "cypherpunk" when dealing with media or
government officials if you think that'll diminish your credibility or legitimacy.

It's easy to be idealistic when things are good.  At the _very first hint_ of trouble,
we shouldn't immediately cower and go straight (this may seem like an exaggeration,
but the name-change proposal strikes me as a dangerous first step).  Shit, we're not
even doing anything _illegal_.  Relax.

Love and Kisses,

   --Dave.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Bill Sommerfeld <sommerfeld@orchard.medford.ma.us>
Date: Mon, 19 Apr 93 06:37:27 PDT
To: norm@netcom.com
Subject: Hellman's Hints
In-Reply-To: <9304190831.AA17466@netcom4.netcom.com>
Message-ID: <9304191241.AA00129@orchard.medford.ma.us>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


It occurred to me that the "clipper chip" makes it easier for the
government to tap voice telephone trunks & do traffic analysis.
Current long-haul phone technology uses out-of-band signalling on
different, reportedly encrypted, trunks, so to make any sense out of
the data trunks you also have to listen in on the signalling trunks
and correllate what you record there with what you record off the data
trunks.

With the wiretap chip in place, all they need to do is to "surf" the
data trunks looking for the encrypted serial number of the devices
they're interested in.

Depending on what the encryption tag blocks *really* look like, you
might not even need SK in order to do traffic analysis.  Even if the
tag blocks are built with confounders and similar randomness included
to discourage ciphertext matching, the SK can be found in *every
single chip* and it's only a matter of time before someone gets it,
either by electron microscope or by bribing some of the hundreds of
people likely to have access to the key.

				- Bill




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Kaya Bekiroglu <trystro!kaya@Think.COM>
Date: Mon, 19 Apr 93 06:00:58 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: subscribe
Message-ID: <9304191300.AA05048@Early-Bird.Think.COM>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text



subscribe me.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: david@staff.udc.upenn.edu (R. David Murray)
Date: Mon, 19 Apr 93 05:58:09 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Hellman's Hints
In-Reply-To: <9304190831.AA17466@netcom4.netcom.com>
Message-ID: <9304191256.AA17713@staff.udc.upenn.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Please excuse some questions from a somewhat crypto-naive person, but
I'd like to try to understand this thing a little better so I don't make
any stupid goofs if I talk about it.

I presume that we can simply consider this 'universal' key as if it
didn't exist?  Well, actually, I suppose it prevents 'joe average' from
getting the serial number, but certainly not foreign agents or any
criminal who has motivation to get it(*).  After all, a secret known by
more than one person will not remain a secret long, and this one is
going to be known by thousands.  Why even bother with it?  It seems like
it just adds compute overhead that could be better used for other
things.

(* I assume the TLAs get it legally)

The fact that the serial number is effectively in the clear then means
that traffic analysis attacks can glean information for anyone who can
get at the phone lines, yes?  Even if the states were to outlaw caller
id, these tapper phones would reintroduce that level of traceability.
Even worse, in some ways, since your tapper 'identity' goes with you if
you change phone numbers as long as you keep your old phone.

Finally, can anyone explain to me how this thing /works/, at the simple
'this is what you do with this key' level of description of how RSA
works?  I can't figure out how two phones can communicate with each
other without compromising one key or another, since RSA does /not/ seem
to be involved in this (there is no public key registry, right?)
Sorry if this is a dumb question . . . 

-- 
david			david@staff.udc.upenn.edu




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "ERIC \"Thin 'n Crispy\" SPAULDING" <ESPAULDING@CENTER.COLGATE.EDU>
Date: Mon, 19 Apr 93 07:57:31 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Subscription request
Message-ID: <01GX6YAQC7EQ90NU0W@CENTER.COLGATE.EDU>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I wish to subscribe to the mailing list.  Thank you.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Douglas Barnes <wixer!wixer.bga.com!gumby@cactus.org>
Date: Mon, 19 Apr 93 09:44:57 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Wiretap Chip Questions
Message-ID: <9304191559.AA19235@wixer>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain





I am working on articles and article proposals for some local media
outlets. I need to get some specific information regarding the
Clipper Chip (aka Wiretap Chip) proposal:

Questions:

1) What is a rough estimate of how long it would take a brute-force
   attack on an 80-bit key using a parallel architecture
   system costing less than, say, $25,000 two to three years from now.

2) How, in your opinion, would this affect the creation of international
   standards for encryption? Would this help or hinder development of the
   global economy?

3) I understand that the scheme relies on the secrecy of the encryption
   algorithm to protect the transmission of keys at the beginning of 
   a session. (It uses a system key to encyrpt the keys for the two
   devices). If the algorithm is successfully reverse-engineered,
   does this compromise the entire system?

4) I am assuming that this system would be just as vulnerable to a "known 
   plaintext attack" as other schemes. Is this correct?

Please identify yourself and your credentials, and indicate whether or
not you wish to be quoted in any articles on this subject. 

Thanks,

Douglas Barnes
gumby@wixer.bga.com




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: matt@oc.com (Matthew Lyle)
Date: Mon, 19 Apr 93 09:02:56 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Article from Knight/Ridder Wire
Message-ID: <199304191602.AA04097@ra.oc.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I hadn't seen this article fly by yet, so...


-----
New Scrambler Designed to Protect Privacy, But Allow Police Monitoring By
Christopher Drew, Chicago Tribune 
Knight-Ridder/Tribune Business News 

WASHINGTON--Apr. 19--As a step toward the development of vast new data
"superhighways," the federal government has designed a powerful device that
would protect the privacy of electronic communications by encoding them but
still allow police to eavesdrop. 

Critics say the project, announced Friday by the Clinton administration,
raises serious questions about the protection of civil liberties as more
people use cellular and cordless phones and computer-based communications. 

They also warned that the device is not likely to help law-enforcement
agents foil high-tech criminals unless it becomes the most widely used
commercial encryption system - and drives private competitors out of the
business. 

"'A.k.a. Big Brother,' that's what I call it," said Stephen Bryen, a former
Pentagon official who runs a company developing a rival encryption system. 

Bryen said it was "very disturbing" that the government has gone so far
with the previously classified project "without consulting with experts in
the industry" whose investments could be wiped out. 

One high-ranking federal official, Raymond Kammer, acknowledged that such
concerns are part of an "appropriate debate" that needs to be held over the
project. 

"Maybe it turns out that society, as it debates this, finds it
unacceptable," said Kammer, acting director of the National Institute for
Standards and Technology. "I'm not sure. This is the start of that debate."


Millions of people who exchange information via computers and make calls
from cordless and cellular phones, which are especially vulnerable to
interception, could be affected. Experts say an era is dawning in which
traveling executives exchange electronic memos and negotiate sensitive
deals via hand-held communicators using vulnerable wireless transmitters. 

In endorsing the plan, the White House described it Friday as an outgrowth
of federal efforts to capitalize on advances in telephone and computer
technology while preventing drug dealers and terrorists from finding new
ways to mask their misdeeds. 

In last year's campaign, President Clinton pledged to invest billions of
dollars in faster and more secure data links to enhance the standing of
U.S. firms in the global economy. 

But as the computer industry has developed systems to enable businesses to
scramble data transfers and telephone conversations as a safeguard against
industrial espionage, a growing number of criminals also have begun using
them to foil court-authorized wiretaps. 

Under the new plan, engineers at the National Security Agency invented a
new coding device, called the "Clipper Chip," which is said to be much
harder to crack than encoding systems now on the market. 

The government licensed two California companies - Mykotronx and VLSI
Technology - to make the computer chips. The chips will form the "brains"
inside small scrambling devices that can be attached to individual
telephones. 

To spur the venture, the Justice Department will soon purchase several
thousand of the devices. Military and spy agencies also are expected to use
them. 

Private businesses would not be required to use the technology. But federal
officials hope their sponsorship will establish the Clipper chips as the
new industry standard and crowd out competing systems. 

Indeed, AT&T announced Friday that it will use the new chips in a desktop
device for encrypting telephone conversations that it expects to sell for
$1,195. 

But in return for gaining the extra encoding power built into the new
system, users would have to accept the fact that government code-breakers
would always hold the keys to tap into the information. 

In an effort to prevent abuses of civil liberties, federal officials said, 

they will set up a system in which they would have to match two coding keys
held by different officials to unscramble any communications.
National-security and law-enforcement officials could bring the keys
together only under court- authorized operations. 

But Bryen said it is hard to see how the Clipper chips project will provide
much help to the FBI. Even if the new coding devices drove others off the
U.S. market, Bryen said, sophisticated criminals would simply buy encoding
devices overseas, as many already do. 

Multinational and foreign-based companies also could prove leery of a
system that has a built-in point of entry for U.S. authorities. 

The FBI separately is seeking legislation that would force telephone
companies to modify their equipment to keep other advances in technology
from hampering its ability to perform wiretaps. AT&T and other phone
companies have opposed this idea.  END!B&?TB-SCRAMBLER 



Transmitted:  93-04-18 23:12:00 EDT






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: matt@oc.com (Matthew Lyle)
Date: Mon, 19 Apr 93 09:02:59 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Article 2 from Knight/Ridder
Message-ID: <199304191602.AA04101@ra.oc.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain




--
Matthew Lyle    	       	       	       	       	(214) 888-0474
OpenConnect Systems     	       	       	       	matt@oc.com
Dallas, TX                                      

"...and once you have tasted flight, you will walk the earth with your 
    eyes turned skyward, for there you have been, and there you long 
    to return..."
Computer Group, Libertarians Question Clinton Phone Privacy Stance By Rory
J. O'Connor, San Jose Mercury News, Calif. 
Knight-Ridder/Tribune Business News 

SAN JOSE, Calif.--Apr. 17--Civil libertarians and a major computer industry
group raised concerns Friday about how much protection a Clinton
administration plan would afford private electronic communications, from
cellular telephone calls to computer data. 

The administration Friday said it would begin using technology developed by
the government's National Institute of Standards and Technology to balance
two competing interests: the desire of citizens to keep their conversations
private and the need for law enforcement agencies to monitor those
conversations after getting a court order. 

The technology that enables this is a computer chip called the Clipper Chip
that scrambles a telephone call or computer message using a secret
algorithm, or formula. 

But each chip also comes with a pair of electronic "keys" that could be
used by law enforcement agencies to decipher the secret messages generated
by the chip. 

The Clinton proposal calls for one key to be held by each of two separate
"trusted" third parties, who would release them to law enforcement agencies
that obtained legal authority to intercept the communications. Both keys
would be needed to decipher a message. 

The Electronic Frontier Foundation, a not-for-profit civil liberties group, 

praised the administration for considering the issue. But it criticized the
lack of public input into the plan. 

"They've announced a big inquiry with public input, but they've reached a
conclusion before they started," said Daniel J. Weitzner, staff counsel for
the Washington-based foundation. 

Although the administration's plan calls only for equipping government
telephones with the security devices, some groups are concerned the plan
might become a standard for all manner of electronic communication before
the public has a chance to debate its merits. 

"I don't want to sound too stridently opposed to this," said Ken Wasch,
executive director of the Software Publishers Association (SPA) in
Washington. "But...we feel blindsided." 

The SPA was discussing data security issues with Clinton administration
officials but had not expected any White House action until August, said
Ilene Rosenthal, general counsel. 

Besides the lack of initial hearings, both groups said they had two major
concerns about the Clinton plan: 

- Because the algorithm itself is secret, the groups say it is impossible
for the public to discern if it is truly secure. Users can't be certain
government spy agencies have not hidden a "back door" in the software that
will allow them to read anything they want. 

"So far there hasn't been a credible explanation about why the algorithm
has to be secret," Weitzner said. 

- The administration hasn't decided who will be the escrow agents, and it
seems unlikely any government agency, corporate entity or other
organization would be deemed trustworthy by every user. 

Even assuming all concerned can agree on who will hold them, civil
libertarians are concerned that the keys, by giving law enforcement
agencies access to individuals' private communications, might pose a threat
to constitutional protections against self-incrimination. 

Washington sources who requested anonymity suggested the White House might
have drafted its plan quickly because of concern over sales of an AT&T
device that encrypts phone calls using an older standard, Data Encryption
Standard. The sources said law enforcement officials feared the device
would create an explosion in secured telephone traffic that would severely
hamper their efforts to wiretap calls. 

American Telephone & Telegraph Co. announced Friday it would adapt the
$1,200 product, called the Telephone Security Device, to use the Clipper
Chip by the end of this fiscal quarter. AT&T makes a related device, which
encrypts voice and computer data transmissions, that could be converted to
the Clipper technology, said spokesman Bill Jones. 

Jones said he wasn't aware of any concern by the government over the
current model of the Telephone Security Device, which has been sold to
government and business customers. 

At least one company was quite pleased with the plan: San Jose chip maker
VLSI Technology, which will manufacture the Clipper chips for a Torrance
company that is selling them to the government and to AT&T. 

VLSI, which invented a manufacturing method the company said makes it
difficult to "reverse engineer" the chip or discern the encryption scheme, 

expects to make $50 million in the next three years selling the device,
said Jeff Hendy, director of new product marketing for the company.
END!A?SJ-SECURITY 



Transmitted:  93-04-18 21:06:00 EDT






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: dstalder@gmuvax2.gmu.edu (Darren/Torin/Who ever...)
Date: Mon, 19 Apr 93 09:01:51 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com (CypherPunks)
Subject: AT & T Contact Point
Message-ID: <9304191602.AA20825@gmuvax2.gmu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I talked to Herb Linnen at AT & T.  He talked to me some but kept harping
on the point of how ATT is devoted to customer privacy and that the ATT
Vice-President of Information Systems (I forget his name) is an expert on
cryptography and he obviously can't be wrong when he says that the wiretap
chip is robust.

He asked that I call David Arneke or Bill Jones at 919-279-7680 to discuss
this since his department wasn't involved in the wiretap chip.

The ATT operators dealing with calling cards and residential phone service
have had other people cancelling their accounts because of this...

Think free,
--
Defeat the        Torin/Darren Stalder/Wolf           __
  Big Brother     Internet:  dstalder@gmuvax2.gmu.edu \/ PGP2.x key available.
  Proposal!       Bitnet:    dstalder@gmuvax                  Finger me.
Write me for      Sprintnet: 1-703-845-1000
  details.        Snail:     10310 Main St., Suite 110/Fairfax, VA/22030/USA
DISCLAIMER: A society where such disclaimers are needed is saddening.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: jthomas@coconut.MITRE.ORG (Joe Thomas)
Date: Mon, 19 Apr 93 10:07:52 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: CLIPPER: Network World article
Message-ID: <9304191612.AA04115@coconut>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


From Network World, April 19, 1993, quoted without permission:

---
Clinton security plan hints of Big Brother

Clipper Chip would let governemnt eavesdrop on encrypted voice and  
data communications.

By Ellen Messmer
Senior Correspondent

WASHINGTON, D.C. -- President Clinton last week announced a policy  
review of encryption while endorsing a new encryption technology  
called Clipper Chip that would give law enforcement agencies a key to  
unlock users' encrypted communications.

[rehash of various press releases deleted]

But government officials had a difficult time last week rebutting the  
question why any criminal would use a Clipper Chip-based product when  
the person knows the government could listen in, particularly since  
there are a host of other encryption products available on the market  
that are, in theory, unbreakable codes.

"A criminal probably wouldn't use it," said Mike Agee, marketing  
manager for secure products at AT&T, adding that the Clipper Chip is  
for the rest of the world.

[familiar Kapor quote deleted]
---

Nice quote, that.  I like the headline, too.

Joe




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: TO1SITTLER@APSICC.APS.EDU
Date: Mon, 19 Apr 93 12:10:27 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: ÿûalt.privacy.clipper
Message-ID: <930419130811.1b3e@APSICC.APS.EDU>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


NOT all of us have usenet!  Please keep convercation on cypherpunks!
Kragen Sittler




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: jthomas@coconut.mitre.org (Joe Thomas)
Date: Mon, 19 Apr 93 10:09:58 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Article from Knight/Ridder Wire
Message-ID: <9304191709.AA04224@coconut>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


matt@oc.com (Matthew Lyle) writes:
> New Scrambler Designed to Protect Privacy, But Allow Police  
Monitoring By
> Christopher Drew, Chicago Tribune 


Oh, well, if only Chris can do it, I guess it's okay.  I trust him  
with my keys... ;^)

Joe




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: greg@amex-trs.com (Greg Thompson)
Date: Mon, 19 Apr 93 17:25:05 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Subscribing
Message-ID: <9304192016.AA39795@tonga.cs90-dev.amex-trs.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Hello,

Please add me to your list of subscribers.  Thanks.

Greg Thompson                  greg@amex-trs.com





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Perry E. Metzger" <pmetzger@lehman.com>
Date: Mon, 19 Apr 93 10:25:07 PDT
To: dmandl@shearson.com (David Mandl)
Subject: Re: Mailing list name
In-Reply-To: <9304191232.AA17766@tardis.shearson.com>
Message-ID: <9304191724.AA16244@snark.shearson.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



David Mandl says:
> > In the light of recent developments concerning government cryptography
> > initiatives, we might soon find ourselves innundated by working press.
> > 
> > Given this, I think that the name "cypherpunks" produces the wrong
> > connotations -- it makes us sound like criminals when we are in fact
> > people who are interested in expanding personal privacy with
> > technology. Often, little things like this end up being of tremendous
> > importance in the long haul.
> > 
> > I would propose changing the name of the mailing list to
> > "cryptoprivacy" or something similar. It denotes what we are about in
> > a way that mundane people understand better, and it portrays us in the
> > proper light -- as people struggling to improve the prospects for
> > personal freedom, not a bunch of "punks".
> > 
> > Perry
> 
> Perry, I'm absolutely stunned.  What next: should we all make sure we shave
> every day (women: don't forget those legs and armpits!)?  Or make tcmay remove
> the word "anarchy" and other ungood words from his .sig?

I notice, David, that you wear a tie when you come in to work in the
morning. (I happen to work with Dave.)

Why do you do this, in spite of your general dislike for imposed
standards? Because you want something out of your employer and feel
its better to put up with the minor inconvenience of wearing a tie.

Look, we can give people cryptography, or we can change their notions
of what "punk" means. Its not necessarily possible to do both at the
same time. I vote for keeping the world free, and putting up with
minor inconveniences in the meantime. I never liked "cypherpunks" in
the first place. I'm not a punk. I'm a reasonable person. Reasonable
people want the world to be free -- its not just a "punk" viewpoint.
We want people to have privacy via cryptography. Something like
"cryptoprivacy" seems like a better reflection of who we are.

Perry




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: deltorto@aol.com
Date: Mon, 19 Apr 93 10:31:30 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: FWEE!: Silence is Golden, already
Message-ID: <9304191332.tn35237@aol.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Gang,

Lance Detweiler wrote a rather stinging (and somewhat rude, IMHO) rebuttal of
Will Kinney's posting:

>>Mr. Kinney's comments annoy me tremendously. They bespeak a lukewarm,
>>lackadaisical, and wishwashy view of something of extreme importance.
>>Frankly, it bothers me that it has taken this long just to get the
>>whistleblower group going. I don't think anything is being accomplished
>>by delaying newsgroup creation.  It just gives people who are enemies
>>more time to mount a concerted attack against this new blip in the status
>>quo.

Mr. Detweiler's (who is otherwise pretty sensible and intelligent on this
list) comments annoy me tremendously. To imagine that Mr. Kinney is without
passion just because he doesn't run across the ice without listening for
cracks first is to vastly underestimate his intelligence. That sort of
thinking gets your tail wet every time, Lance. Better to proceed cautiously
and stay dry.

Who says a measured, patient build doesn't result in solid software (to be
metaphorical)? Using Lance's logic, we'd all throw together code "real fast"
and not worry about it crashing on everyone's systems. I like my 1.0's more
stable than that, and I just don't understand this need that some folks have
to rush the WB into the public light. In fact, I can't imagine why it should
be public at all! I think Lance and others have no clue about how
Whistleblowing works!

However, I think I might have an idea why Lance et. al. are so confused:
There are TWO DIFFERENT WB systems being discussed here! That's right! TWO!
DIFFERENT!

[1] Lance is talking about a USENET newsgroup.

[2] I'm talking about a service that uses the Internet, but NOT a NEWSGROUP!
Why does WB info need to be placed in public view? Since when does someone
with sensitive information blow it all over the front pages? Never. They call
a reporter first and let him do the legwork with proof they provide: THEN the
reporter blows it all over the front page. I believe that Lance and the
USENET folks want to get their jollies and read all about it in public on
their own personal USENET front page newsgroup (doomed to be a "narc fest" as
someone sagely termed it), whereas MY idea is to have the Cypherpunks pool
technology and assistance to set up something that is used by others outside
the inbred USENET community for the common good and taking advantage of the
inherent advantages of anon/encrypted email technology.

My original concept was not intended to glorify anyone, least of all the
Cypherpunks. In fact it shoould be as QUIET AS POSSIBLE to be of any good at
all. Why is it necessary to get all this glory if the WB system provides REAL
WORLD BENEFITS to the people? Hmmm? Think about it: whose good are we in it
for: our own or everybody's?

Let me be a bit more specific about my vision, lest Lance or anyone jump all
over Will Kinney or anyone else with sound ideas (and decent Sun Tzu quotes)
any further:

[1] The WB System is a stand-alone email system using anonymous mixes and
encryption to provide secure, safe communications between two primary groups:

- Whistleblowers:
People in Government and Industry who have first-hand information about abuse
of human rights, public funds and/or the Constitution, etc. by members of
Corporate and Government entities.

- Users:
Members of the Press, members of Congress and representatives of
public-interest activist groups (eg. Ralph Nader, James Love, Greenpeace,
Amnesty Int'l, Worldwatch, Consumer Reports, NORML, etc.) who can INVESTIGATE
the reports and TAKE ACTION on them against the abusers in the public eye and
in the Courts. Many of these people are clueless about email, much less the
Internet, anonymous remailers or encryption - but they know what they need
and they know we've got it.

[2] The system consists of a network of anonymous mixes laid over the
Internet and reaching in and out of the borders of the US wherever
applicable. It is not a USENET newsgroup for public digest, although
occasional digests would be posted to USENET by interested Cypherpunks.

Anyone who insists on discussing these sensitive plans in public is IMHO
working against the interests of the WB Team and should be considered one of
the Enemy. Anyone who wants to test the technology should be encouraged to do
so on the Cypherpunks list and NOT on USENET, thus maintaining a certain
amount of "radio silence." Broadcasting the D-Day invasion was considered
Treason: broadcasting the WB launch is the same kind of betrayal of the
Cypherpunk Ethos, IMHO. THose who would betray us should be asked to go away
in the interest of all those people who would be hurt by a crippled WB
system. What we need is cunning and stealth, not big-mouthed dweebs (present
readership excluded, natch) who can't keep something quiet.

>>If you think that you are the whistleblower moderator, fine. Be one.
>>But we need a completely unmoderated group. If you think you have any
>>right to hold up an unmoderated group to squeeze through your own
>>bottleneck, please go elsewhere.

I don't think any such thing. If nominated, I will not run, if elected, I
will not serve. However, I think your idea that WB should be a group,
moderated or otherwise, is completely off-kilter. All I'm asking is that you
let go of the glory and let it do its work quietly and effectively, without
me, even.

>>I just don't get it. This is a group like any other.
>>Why do you think the whole international public has
>>to be prepared for its creation by you personally?

I'm not even sure if I should bother to answer such a completely misguided
question, but I will: I do not think this, and have never even implied
anything of the sort. Furthermore, IMHO, it ain't a group: it's a new kind of
beast and you're trying to apply old paradigms to it. Shift, man. I am only
trying to help something be born properly.

>>You are talking to many people (i.e. bureacrats and legislators) who
>>may be totally displaced and bypassed (i.e. lose illegitimate power) by
>>this service.  There are a great many people you are talking to, I
>>think, whose every interest is to totally castrate the project of any
>>`offensiveness'. I think you are trying to operate on a much more
>>respectable level than is possible currently. That level can only be
>>attained by a gradual evolution of the medium, starting with something
>>rather crude, kludgy, and unsophisticated.

Call your local Congressperson's office and tell them there is a possibility
that they could receive whistleblowing info on Govt abuses from reliable
sources reporting via direct anon/encrypted email and see if they think it's
offensive. My experience is that they rub their hands with glee - it might be
dirt on their opponents. Try the same thing with ANY member of the Press or
any Activist Org (I suggest your local Amnesty Int'l office). If they
complain it's "offensive," and you can prove that, I will personally buy you
a car. If you can get them to label it as "respectable" I'll throw in a boat.
Since I'm poor, you can gather that I feel pretty certain it won't happen.

>>Your efforts amount to singlehandedly educating the public about the
>>Internet.

Nope, just email. How to get it and send it anonymously and encrypt it with
PGP, but that's enough for most people. They could use CompuServe, I don't
care. Whatever's easy. No messy Newsgroups, no Internet user's guides,
nothing fancy: I leave stuff like that to Ed Krol. This is WB-ing for the
common person. Lowcommondenominatorsville.

I can't IMAGINE where you read this stuff into my postings - it must be YOUR
agenda laid over mine...

>>>- We haven't figured out who'll be polled to send in msgs and exactly HOW
>>>we'll offer them some sort of anonymity and what they need to do
>>afterward.
>>
>>polled? sounds like an election, like something democratic, like
>>something that can be twisted by a misguided majority. Again, you sound
>>like you are looking for a group with high quality control.
>>Unfortunately, I think this goal is largely antithetical the essential
>>spirit of the whistleblower idea. The whistleblower is alone and
>>isolated, almost by definition.

Somehow, the word has to be passed across the Internet and other media
(print, TV) to potential WBers. I invite your ideas as to how to do this.

>>Your ideas on filtering incoming
>>messages, gained from those you've talked to, sound rather naive and
>>dangerous to me.

Filtering? Did I say that? I think I said that the Users would have to filter
out the useful WB messages from the bogus, as they would with any volume of
WB info coming in. This is their job, not mine and is the natural thing to
do. Call if "verification" if you like, it's still a LOT of work for them,
not for us (or me). There's nothing naive about this: if someone calls you
and says "the DOD spent $80K on a toothbrush," you would have to make sure it
was true before you went to Congress or to a Court or the front page. Simple
as that.

>>The [US Constitution] is not perfect. There are flaws and cracks
>>that have poked through after 200 years. Do you think our judicial
>>system is as effective as possible? Do you think our legislative system
>>is the most representative of people's expectations of and directives
>>to their subservient government? Do you think our government today
>>truly represents, in all ways, the intentions of its founders? Do you
>>think they considered all possible scenarios? Do you think they would
>>not want to make some minor adjustments or major changes after seeing
>>200 years pass from their noble experiment? Do you think that anything
>>that is dynamic can be static?

Do you think I would be working so hard on a friggin' Whistleblower project
if I could answer 'yes' to _any_ of those questions? What are you THINKing?

>>Look at everything that is efficient in the world, and you will see
>>that it is so because of *independently operating* components, with
>>minimized centralized control.
>>[...]
>>Message transmission on the internet is so
>>reliable because virtually an infinite number of routing pathways exist
>>that a message can take, avoiding any obstacles, each component
>>performing its job *independently*.

Exactly why Wb should be a non-USENET-oriented phenomenon, not associated
with any attackable entity, totally in the hands of individual WB's and their
corresponding Users.

>>Now, let me hear again how you want
>>us to submit all our public keys to you, submit the group guidelines
>>for your personal perusal (and presumably veto), and wait for all your
>>congressional friends to understand the concept? And how this will
>>ultimately lead to an ideal and robust system?

Man, you really don't read me very carefully, do you? I don't want all your
Public keys so I can control anything, I want them so I can discuss elements
of the technology with each of you who volunteer to add a brick to the
structure of the system. Period. If you want to discuss things in the clear,
that's your right, I just might not want to send you sensitive info that
might compromise others, so it's your loss. Besides, why are you guarding
your PUBLIC key like I'm some sort of enemy? And I have NO INTEREST and have
never espoused any interest in becoming a veto power over the Guidelines,
only the collector of everyone's ideas, a position i would GLADLY vacate at
the drop of a SprintPin if someone else was doofus enough to volunteer. As
for waiting for all my "congressional friends:" I have no friends in
Congress, in fact, I have very little respect for anyone holding public
office. The only reason I called any of them was [1] because they might
impart a bit of respectability to our efforts if they sign on early, and [2]
congressional committees and their investigators routinely raise hell with
other branches of Govt (eg. the Military) and the prospect of supplying them
with ammunition to shoot at each other pleases me immensely.

>>You simply don't understand. This idea is bigger than you, it is bigger
>>than me. Anyone who tries to wrap themselves completely around it will
>>explode from the pressure.

Thanks for your advice. Sheesh. FYI, the only thing I wrap myself completely
around is a burritto. Bang! :)

>>Let's' start a mailing group for `nambypambypunks'.

This sort of ad hominem puerility doesn't even deserve a response.

I'm tired of discussing this here: If anyone is still too dense to understand
what I'm saying about patience, silence and persistence at this point, they
have no business using anything as complicated as a computer. If those people
continue to insist on trashing all the leg and phonework I have put in
contacting Users by blorting the WB concept all over USENET with half-assed,
ill-conceived newsgroups and Votes on Vaporware, I may just go elsewhere to
do my good works and see if there are any people who have good invisible ink
technology and can make up physical envelopes without leaving fingerprints. I
imagine that those Cypherpunks who've put significant time into coding the
anon and crypto technology can empathize.

I don't feel like repeating myself any more. Let's be Golden, shall We?

  dave (slow and steady but getting pretty fed up by now)




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: deltorto@aol.com
Date: Mon, 19 Apr 93 10:40:50 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: FWEE!: Silence is Golden, already
Message-ID: <9304191339.tn35251@aol.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Gang,

Lance Detweiler wrote a rather stinging (and somewhat rude, IMHO) rebuttal of
Will Kinney's posting:

>>Mr. Kinney's comments annoy me tremendously. They bespeak a lukewarm,
>>lackadaisical, and wishwashy view of something of extreme importance.
>>Frankly, it bothers me that it has taken this long just to get the
>>whistleblower group going. I don't think anything is being accomplished
>>by delaying newsgroup creation.  It just gives people who are enemies
>>more time to mount a concerted attack against this new blip in the status
>>quo.

Mr. Detweiler's (who is otherwise pretty sensible and intelligent on this
list) comments annoy me tremendously. To imagine that Mr. Kinney is without
passion just because he doesn't run across the ice without listening for
cracks first is to vastly underestimate his intelligence. That sort of
thinking gets your tail wet every time, Lance. Better to proceed cautiously
and stay dry.

Who says a measured, patient build doesn't result in solid software (to be
metaphorical)? Using Lance's logic, we'd all throw together code "real fast"
and not worry about it crashing on everyone's systems. I like my 1.0's more
stable than that, and I just don't understand this need that some folks have
to rush the WB into the public light. In fact, I can't imagine why it should
be public at all! I think Lance and others have no clue about how
Whistleblowing works!

However, I think I might have an idea why Lance et. al. are so confused:
There are TWO DIFFERENT WB systems being discussed here! That's right! TWO!
DIFFERENT!

[1] Lance is talking about a USENET newsgroup.

[2] I'm talking about a service that uses the Internet, but NOT a NEWSGROUP!
Why does WB info need to be placed in public view? Since when does someone
with sensitive information blow it all over the front pages? Never. They call
a reporter first and let him do the legwork with proof they provide: THEN the
reporter blows it all over the front page. I believe that Lance and the
USENET folks want to get their jollies and read all about it in public on
their own personal USENET front page newsgroup (doomed to be a "narc fest" as
someone sagely termed it), whereas MY idea is to have the Cypherpunks pool
technology and assistance to set up something that is used by others outside
the inbred USENET community for the common good and taking advantage of the
inherent advantages of anon/encrypted email technology.

My original concept was not intended to glorify anyone, least of all the
Cypherpunks. In fact it shoould be as QUIET AS POSSIBLE to be of any good at
all. Why is it necessary to get all this glory if the WB system provides REAL
WORLD BENEFITS to the people? Hmmm? Think about it: whose good are we in it
for: our own or everybody's?

Let me be a bit more specific about my vision, lest Lance or anyone jump all
over Will Kinney or anyone else with sound ideas (and decent Sun Tzu quotes)
any further:

[1] The WB System is a stand-alone email system using anonymous mixes and
encryption to provide secure, safe communications between two primary groups:

- Whistleblowers:
People in Government and Industry who have first-hand information about abuse
of human rights, public funds and/or the Constitution, etc. by members of
Corporate and Government entities.

- Users:
Members of the Press, members of Congress and representatives of
public-interest activist groups (eg. Ralph Nader, James Love, Greenpeace,
Amnesty Int'l, Worldwatch, Consumer Reports, NORML, etc.) who can INVESTIGATE
the reports and TAKE ACTION on them against the abusers in the public eye and
in the Courts. Many of these people are clueless about email, much less the
Internet, anonymous remailers or encryption - but they know what they need
and they know we've got it.

[2] The system consists of a network of anonymous mixes laid over the
Internet and reaching in and out of the borders of the US wherever
applicable. It is not a USENET newsgroup for public digest, although
occasional digests would be posted to USENET by interested Cypherpunks.

Anyone who insists on discussing these sensitive plans in public is IMHO
working against the interests of the WB Team and should be considered one of
the Enemy. Anyone who wants to test the technology should be encouraged to do
so on the Cypherpunks list and NOT on USENET, thus maintaining a certain
amount of "radio silence." Broadcasting the D-Day invasion was considered
Treason: broadcasting the WB launch is the same kind of betrayal of the
Cypherpunk Ethos, IMHO. THose who would betray us should be asked to go away
in the interest of all those people who would be hurt by a crippled WB
system. What we need is cunning and stealth, not big-mouthed dweebs (present
readership excluded, natch) who can't keep something quiet.

>>If you think that you are the whistleblower moderator, fine. Be one.
>>But we need a completely unmoderated group. If you think you have any
>>right to hold up an unmoderated group to squeeze through your own
>>bottleneck, please go elsewhere.

I don't think any such thing. If nominated, I will not run, if elected, I
will not serve. However, I think your idea that WB should be a group,
moderated or otherwise, is completely off-kilter. All I'm asking is that you
let go of the glory and let it do its work quietly and effectively, without
me, even.

>>I just don't get it. This is a group like any other.
>>Why do you think the whole international public has
>>to be prepared for its creation by you personally?

I'm not even sure if I should bother to answer such a completely misguided
question, but I will: I do not think this, and have never even implied
anything of the sort. Furthermore, IMHO, it ain't a group: it's a new kind of
beast and you're trying to apply old paradigms to it. Shift, man. I am only
trying to help something be born properly.

>>You are talking to many people (i.e. bureacrats and legislators) who
>>may be totally displaced and bypassed (i.e. lose illegitimate power) by
>>this service.  There are a great many people you are talking to, I
>>think, whose every interest is to totally castrate the project of any
>>`offensiveness'. I think you are trying to operate on a much more
>>respectable level than is possible currently. That level can only be
>>attained by a gradual evolution of the medium, starting with something
>>rather crude, kludgy, and unsophisticated.

Call your local Congressperson's office and tell them there is a possibility
that they could receive whistleblowing info on Govt abuses from reliable
sources reporting via direct anon/encrypted email and see if they think it's
offensive. My experience is that they rub their hands with glee - it might be
dirt on their opponents. Try the same thing with ANY member of the Press or
any Activist Org (I suggest your local Amnesty Int'l office). If they
complain it's "offensive," and you can prove that, I will personally buy you
a car. If you can get them to label it as "respectable" I'll throw in a boat.
Since I'm poor, you can gather that I feel pretty certain it won't happen.

>>Your efforts amount to singlehandedly educating the public about the
>>Internet.

Nope, just email. How to get it and send it anonymously and encrypt it with
PGP, but that's enough for most people. They could use CompuServe, I don't
care. Whatever's easy. No messy Newsgroups, no Internet user's guides,
nothing fancy: I leave stuff like that to Ed Krol. This is WB-ing for the
common person. Lowcommondenominatorsville.

I can't IMAGINE where you read this stuff into my postings - it must be YOUR
agenda laid over mine...

>>>- We haven't figured out who'll be polled to send in msgs and exactly HOW
>>>we'll offer them some sort of anonymity and what they need to do
>>afterward.
>>
>>polled? sounds like an election, like something democratic, like
>>something that can be twisted by a misguided majority. Again, you sound
>>like you are looking for a group with high quality control.
>>Unfortunately, I think this goal is largely antithetical the essential
>>spirit of the whistleblower idea. The whistleblower is alone and
>>isolated, almost by definition.

Somehow, the word has to be passed across the Internet and other media
(print, TV) to potential WBers. I invite your ideas as to how to do this.

>>Your ideas on filtering incoming
>>messages, gained from those you've talked to, sound rather naive and
>>dangerous to me.

Filtering? Did I say that? I think I said that the Users would have to filter
out the useful WB messages from the bogus, as they would with any volume of
WB info coming in. This is their job, not mine and is the natural thing to
do. Call if "verification" if you like, it's still a LOT of work for them,
not for us (or me). There's nothing naive about this: if someone calls you
and says "the DOD spent $80K on a toothbrush," you would have to make sure it
was true before you went to Congress or to a Court or the front page. Simple
as that.

>>The [US Constitution] is not perfect. There are flaws and cracks
>>that have poked through after 200 years. Do you think our judicial
>>system is as effective as possible? Do you think our legislative system
>>is the most representative of people's expectations of and directives
>>to their subservient government? Do you think our government today
>>truly represents, in all ways, the intentions of its founders? Do you
>>think they considered all possible scenarios? Do you think they would
>>not want to make some minor adjustments or major changes after seeing
>>200 years pass from their noble experiment? Do you think that anything
>>that is dynamic can be static?

Do you think I would be working so hard on a friggin' Whistleblower project
if I could answer 'yes' to _any_ of those questions? What are you THINKing?

>>Look at everything that is efficient in the world, and you will see
>>that it is so because of *independently operating* components, with
>>minimized centralized control.
>>[...]
>>Message transmission on the internet is so
>>reliable because virtually an infinite number of routing pathways exist
>>that a message can take, avoiding any obstacles, each component
>>performing its job *independently*.

Exactly why Wb should be a non-USENET-oriented phenomenon, not associated
with any attackable entity, totally in the hands of individual WB's and their
corresponding Users.

>>Now, let me hear again how you want
>>us to submit all our public keys to you, submit the group guidelines
>>for your personal perusal (and presumably veto), and wait for all your
>>congressional friends to understand the concept? And how this will
>>ultimately lead to an ideal and robust system?

Man, you really don't read me very carefully, do you? I don't want all your
Public keys so I can control anything, I want them so I can discuss elements
of the technology with each of you who volunteer to add a brick to the
structure of the system. Period. If you want to discuss things in the clear,
that's your right, I just might not want to send you sensitive info that
might compromise others, so it's your loss. Besides, why are you guarding
your PUBLIC key like I'm some sort of enemy? And I have NO INTEREST and have
never espoused any interest in becoming a veto power over the Guidelines,
only the collector of everyone's ideas, a position i would GLADLY vacate at
the drop of a SprintPin if someone else was doofus enough to volunteer. As
for waiting for all my "congressional friends:" I have no friends in
Congress, in fact, I have very little respect for anyone holding public
office. The only reason I called any of them was [1] because they might
impart a bit of respectability to our efforts if they sign on early, and [2]
congressional committees and their investigators routinely raise hell with
other branches of Govt (eg. the Military) and the prospect of supplying them
with ammunition to shoot at each other pleases me immensely.

>>You simply don't understand. This idea is bigger than you, it is bigger
>>than me. Anyone who tries to wrap themselves completely around it will
>>explode from the pressure.

Thanks for your advice. Sheesh. FYI, the only thing I wrap myself completely
around is a burritto. Bang! :)

>>Let's' start a mailing group for `nambypambypunks'.

This sort of ad hominem puerility doesn't even deserve a response.

I'm tired of discussing this here: If anyone is still too dense to understand
what I'm saying about patience, silence and persistence at this point, they
have no business using anything as complicated as a computer. If those people
continue to insist on trashing all the leg and phonework I have put in
contacting Users by blorting the WB concept all over USENET with half-assed,
ill-conceived newsgroups and Votes on Vaporware, I may just go elsewhere to
do my good works and see if there are any people who have good invisible ink
technology and can make up physical envelopes without leaving fingerprints. I
imagine that those Cypherpunks who've put significant time into coding the
anon and crypto technology can empathize.

I don't feel like repeating myself any more. Let's be Golden, shall We?

  dave (slow and steady but getting pretty fed up by now)




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: deltorto@aol.com
Date: Mon, 19 Apr 93 10:40:50 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: BIZ: Mailing list name
Message-ID: <9304191340.tn35254@aol.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> In the light of recent developments concerning government cryptography
> initiatives, we might soon find ourselves innundated by working press.
> 
> Given this, I think that the name "cypherpunks" produces the wrong
> connotations -- it makes us sound like criminals when we are in fact
> people who are interested in expanding personal privacy with
> technology. Often, little things like this end up being of tremendous
> importance in the long haul.
> 
> I would propose changing the name of the mailing list to
> "cryptoprivacy" or something similar.

How about Cypherfolks? Cryptoids? PrivacyWarriors?  :)

    dave





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: deltorto@aol.com
Date: Mon, 19 Apr 93 10:43:57 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: FWEE!: more on kiosks
Message-ID: <9304191342.tn35269@aol.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Yo Peoples,

Eric responded to my "Three Strikes" against public kiosks:

>>>[1] Strike One: Installation and maintenance costs (economics again). 
>>>[They are too high.]
>>
>>I'm not talking about building a network of machines just for the
>>purpose of whistleblowing.  I'm talking about making interfaces to
>>existing systems.  In particular, the public machines at sfnet would
>>_also_ be interfaces to any whistleblowing system.  The incremental
>>cost is minimal; it's a small bit of software at the server.
>>
>>>[2] Strike Two: Lack of Privacy while using the kiosks. 
>>
>>There is a different kind of privacy in a public space than in private
>>space.  In a private space, everyone may know where you live, but
>>nobody knows what goes on inside.  In a public space, everyone may see
>>what happens, but no one knows who you are.  Please consider these
>>approximations to reality.

In theory, I think it's not a dead idea, ie. there are possibilities here to
be explored, and yes it's basically a simple software addition to SF Net by a
remailer coder such as Eric. HOWEVER, having used the SF Net tables, I am a
bit dubious about their Privacy viability in their current state. I have had
bozos lean over my shoulder buggin me when I am having a "private"
conversation with someone, and I have even seen people _photograph_ someone
at the screen without their permission (amazing, huh?). IF there was a sort
of Passport PhotoBooth approach, it might mitigate such physical problems:
THEN the software end would become more feasible. Also, unless there is
encryption built into SF Net (made unlikely by the overhead?), I probably
wouldn't drive over from the Federal Building to log on and blow the whistle
on some blue-suited government weasel.

I still think that this is several stages away from being a useful idea UNTIL
we have a working model with anonymity and encryption working on USENET
first.

>>In particular, since it is anonymity which is desired, a public place
>>is sufficient.
>>
>>>I think Eric Hughes' argument (with due respects to Eric) about the
>>>expensive economics of monitoring the kiosks falls down just a tad
>>>when you consider that these would not even be _moving targets_!
>>
>>The cost of placing a video camera to monitor a computer inside a
>>coffeehouse must also include the possibility of negative publicity
>>and lawsuit when such an emplacement is discovered.  Monitoring a
>>public place in advance of any "crime" being committed is _very_ bad
>>for job security and department funding.

Well, your point is taken Eric, but I still stress that video monitoring
would be trivial. First of all, if I was a three-letter agency, i SURE as
hell wouldn't go to the operators of say, Brainwash Cafe and ASK to put a
video cam up on the ceiling! I'd sneak in late one night and place a more
sophisticated (and extremely tiny) unit over the table where it couldn't
easily be found. Secondly, since when does the FBI worry about job security?
I think they could easily convince a federal judge that they had reason to
believe that government secrets might be leaked in public and get permission
to monitor "that subversive group known as the 'Whistleblowers' and _every
public terminal_ they've placed around SF." Maybe it's unlikely, but then so
was the notion that CREEP would break into the Watergate Towers and stick
bugs on McGovern's phones...

>>>[...] but any such defenses would pale in comparison with the Privacy
>>>inherent in the WB input from a single user's personal system.
>>
>>I am also not talking about replacing the ability to post from home.
>>I am talking about expanding the number of entry points into the
>>distribution system.

I do understand this point, I'm just not totally convinced that public kiosks
are the best solution to this problem. I am open to suggestions along this
line, and I do think that it would at least be worth a test on SF Net.

>>The largest benefit for public-space access is that you can use this
>>if you don't have a computer at home.  You can also use it if you
>>don't have a computer at work.

Agree 100%. I don't intend to discriminate against people just because they
don't have a computer.

>>>have the feeling that they would be a PRIMARY contributor to the overall
>>>bullshit noise that would clutter up a decent WB systems and exponentially
>>>increase the difficulty of filtering out the "good" stuff for proper use.
>>
>>A whistleblower system, by default, must be free of judgements about
>>what is "good" to be on it and what is "bad".  If someone thinks that
>>something ought to be brought to light, then I say let them speak, no
>>matter how trivial or inappropriate it might be.

Forgive my semantics. When I say "good" (note the quotes), I refer to useful
material that eventually produces the desired results. As far as the apparent
triviality of an item, that is entirely up to the users (ie. the Press,
Activist, or other operatives who "process" the information). As I have
stated, it is not up to us to preview anything, only to help make it more
likely that useful information from determined WB's with strategic info gets
to the right people who can do something about it. This is a tough one, I
admit. I believe that the key to this problem is part technology and part
psychology: make the system easy enough to use that as many potential
whistleblowers as possible will look at it, and just difficult enough so that
only the most determined will actually send in their information.

>>It is easy to ignore messages you don't want to consider.  It is much,
>>much harder to read messages that the author hesistates to write for
>>fear of reprisal.  A whistleblower system can tolerate more noise than
>>usenet, since the core content of it can be so extremely valuable.

A valid proposition. Keep in mind that part of the initial acceptance of the
system among the users will be a high signal-to-noise ratio (at least during
the early phases).

>>If there is only access to a whistleblowing system for those who own
>>computers or are provided access to them, then any such system will
>>remain only a tool of the wealthy.  You do not hear of abuses in labor
>>law from anybody but the employees; these employees do not have
>>computers.

Agree 95%.

>>Anybody who has NATIONAL SECRETS to tell is, I would guess, a fool to
>>post twice from a particular location.  Anybody who has anything
>>lengthy or digitally copied to say cannot easily use this system.
>>It's not conducive to digital signatures.

"Level 10 WB" (with serious national secrets to divulge, such as unmentioned
abuses at nuclear waste disposal plants, etc.) MUST be able to post from ANY
location using a key established through preliminary contact with a WB
Central User Registry. Ie., once a WB has established credentials by
providing verifiable info, s/he must be given a key to a "WB PO Box" wherein
s/he can leave msgs from any terminal with anonymity and encryption. FYI, a
TV reporter mentioned that the most useful information usually crops up in
the third or fourth contact with a WB - after all, there's a lot of
preliminary "getting-to-know-each-other" formality to get past (the Trust
Factor goes both ways, especially if the WB is placing him/herself in
Jepoardy). Such capabilities should be built into any kiosk calling itself
"fully WB-enabled." Perhaps SF Net tables could be considered "Introducing
Stations" and not full-blown (pun intended) WB Stations, used only for a
preliminaries.

>>Public kiosks are not a panacea.  To argue that they should therefore
>>not exist is nonsense.

I'm certainly glad I didn't say that in any way, as I hate being nonsensical.


Phil Karn's excellent (and adventurous) suggestion that kiosk(s) be thought
of more as a public mailbox than a public phone, strikes at the crux of the
issue, though it presupposes that SF Net tables have floppy drives (of the
correct type eg. Mac- or DOS-compatible drives?) and other technological
amenities that they do not (yet?) have. The idea that a WB could prepare
material in the privacy of his/her own home is very, very appealing.

I genuinely apreciate all thoughful comments on the project.

  dave




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: internaut@aol.com
Date: Mon, 19 Apr 93 11:08:57 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: FWEE!: the importance of being patient
Message-ID: <9304191408.tn35454@aol.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Yo,

Apropos of my earlier posting calling for a delay in the establishment of the
WB remailer, I herein repost portions of Marc Ringuette's excellent comments
from March 26th on Remailer strategies:

>>We must address a strategy question before it jumps on us.
>>Do we want to be yet another "this remailer exists, let's
>>stomp on it" whipping boy, or will another tactic be more
>>effective?
>>
>>I have the following suggestion.  Do not announce our
>>cypherpunks remailers right away.  This is not the right time.
>>Instead, announce that we intend, at a later date, to install
>>remailers which are "friendly" in the sense that they use a
>>special header line, but which will be not be able to be shut
>>down.

Essentially, Marc and I agree on this issue (if I read him correctly). Marc's
point seems to be that prematurely establishing anon remailers such as the WB
system before the World is really ready for them will make us vulnerable to
attack on a policy level and will significantly dimish the viability of such
systems in general, by opening debate on whether or not this is a good idea
before most potential users even understand WHAT it is we're trying to do.

>>[ My suggestion for how to do this:  encourage thousands of
>>users who support anonymity to run the software, and make it
>>easy for them to do so.  Then, thousands of users must be
>>kicked out in order to prevent remailers being available! ]

This gets back to what I was saying about educating WB users, providing them
with friendly software and getting lots of support before going public.

>>But, here's the important part, DELAY RELEASE until after a
>>waiting period. The delayed release is intended to allow
>>concerned network sites and individuals to install filters for
>>these messages, and to allow users the time to discuss this
>>(and, for instance, to voice their objections to catch-all
>>anonymity filters at the news-relay level).  It also prevents
>>our opponents from achieving a sense of "something must be
>>done" urgency.  [...]

I couldn't have put it better. Opponents are looking for a chink in the
theoretical anon armor, and at this point there are many.

Calling all remailer specialists...

  dave

-----
ASIDE: I'm not sure how many of you saw the posting about Port Watson in the
Bahamas "An Island in the Net...", but it got me to thinking about how many
Cypherpunks, Extropians and Libertarians would actually be interested in
collaborating on setting up a physical location for the preservation of a
secure, encrypted, anon remailing site on an island not legally bound by any
nation (ie. no more problems like Julf has). I suppose it's a bit fantastic
to consider, but I'm looking into the viability of selling/renting my SF
house and moving down there. Anyone want to join me for a meeting on this
subject? Would it be appropriate for discussion at the next physical meeting?




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: internaut@aol.com
Date: Mon, 19 Apr 93 11:08:57 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: ANON: accountability
Message-ID: <9304191408.tn35455@aol.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


greg@ideath.goldenbear.com contributed:

>>It's this slippery notion of 'accountability' that is perhaps
>>at the root of this 'anonymity' problem - the idea that there's
>>gonna be some hell to pay if somebody writes to
>>'postmaster@leviathan.com', and complains about Chris Jones.
>>The fact is, you can mail to 'postmaster@goldenbear.com' and
>>whine all you like, it's just another alias for the same damn
>>person (me). I think there are going to be more & more people
>>like me in the future - I *am* my boss, the postmaster, and the
>>sysadmin - and if people don't like what I do or say on the
>>net, that's just too damn bad.

I think Greg is right on the money here. The first time someone complained to
my sysadmin (me), I'd send that person a sorrowful note apologizing for the
nasty-icky behaviour prompting the complaint and assuring the complainer that
the offending user on my system (also me) would have his account cancelled
immediately.

Then, I'd go back to living my life as I please.  :)

Seems to me that this approach would guarantee accountability on my system
and keep everyone happy.

  dave
  Level Seven Design
  <postmaster@lsd.com>




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: TO1SITTLER@APSICC.APS.EDU
Date: Mon, 19 Apr 93 13:26:38 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Another forwarded message
Message-ID: <930419142408.1d39@APSICC.APS.EDU>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


From:	APSICC::GR2KITTRELL  "TOO MANY SECRETS" 18-APR-1993 21:52:10.16
To:	TO1SITTLER
CC:	
Subj:	Process

From:	SMTP%"igor@e5.ijs.si" 18-APR-1993 18:05:57.69
To:	gr2kittrell@apsicc.aps.edu
CC:	
Subj:	(fwd) Re: Secret algorithm [Re: Clipper Chip and crypto key-escrow]

Date: Mon, 19 Apr 1993 01:34:02 +0200
From: Igor Petrovski <igor@e5.ijs.si>
Message-Id: <199304182334.AA00721@kekec.e5.ijs.si>
To: gr2kittrell@apsicc.aps.edu
Subject: (fwd) Re: Secret algorithm [Re: Clipper Chip and crypto key-escrow]
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
Organization: Open Systems & Networks, ijs, Slovenia

Relay-Version: VMS News - V6.1 30/1/93 VAX/VMS V5.5-1; site cathy.ijs.si
Path: cathy.ijs.si!arnes.si!scsing.switch.ch!ira.uka.de!sol.ctr.columbia.edu!zaphod.mps.ohio-state.edu!darwin.sura.net!haven.umd.edu!uunet!looking!brad
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
Subject: Re: Secret algorithm [Re: Clipper Chip and crypto key-escrow]
Message-ID: <1993Apr17.204850.26711@clarinet.com>
From: brad@clarinet.com (Brad Templeton)
Date: Sat, 17 Apr 1993 20:48:50 GMT
References: <strnlghtC5LGFI.JqA@netcom.com> <jhesseC5LuMC.2Ex@netcom.com> <rdippold.735042679@qualcom>
Organization: ClariNet Communications Corp.
Keywords: encryption, wiretap, clipper, key-escrow, Mykotronx
Lines: 24

One presumes the system could work as follows:

a) Blank clips are manufactured by Mykotronx and VLSI.  The number
produced is carefully audited and they are shipped to the first
escrow house.

It programs the chips with its half the key, and prints out a paper slip
with the key half and non-secret chip serial number.   The reams of paper
are filed in locked boxes in the vault, a fuse is burnt in the chip so
that the key is now unreadable.

The chip then goes to the next escrow house, where the same thing is
done.  This continues through N escrow houses, perhaps, could be more than
2.

The last one provides the chip to the cellular phone maker.

And yes, this has to be a public key system or it would be almost
impossible to handle.  It might not be RSA, but that does not mean
that PKP doesn't get paid.  Until 1997, PKP has the patent on the
general concept of public key encryption, as well as the particular
implementation known as RSA.
-- 
Brad Templeton, ClariNet Communications Corp. -- Sunnyvale, CA 408/296-0366




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Andrew Loewenstern <andrew@cubetech.com>
Date: Mon, 19 Apr 93 15:41:05 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: comments on the clipper
Message-ID: <9304191939.AA11767@valinor.cubetech.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Going through all the messages on the Clipper, I noticed what may be  
a flaw that wasn't quite addressed...

The family key, which is the same for all devices, is hardwired onto  
the chip with the algorithm.  However, the device serial number and  
the unit key must be burned into a ROM.  This is somewhat like the  
EIN/MIN burned into the ROM of a cellular phone.  Just ask anyone who  
is familiar with cellular fraud how difficult it is to change the  
EIN/MIN of the phone.  So it should be more than possible for anyone  
to throw a wrench into the system by using hacked phones that have a  
random device serial number.  In this way it would not be possible  
for authorities to obtain the proper unit key since the device serial  
number would not exist in the escrow authority's database or would  
have the incorrect unit key associated with it.

Of course, it is possible that the scheme (i.e. the algorithm and the  
handshaking) is not secure.  Assuming it is not truly secure, I would  
think that only such agencies as the NSA and FBI would have not only  
the resources to decrypt Clipper generated communications without the  
session key, but the resources to keep such equipment from public  
knowledge (i.e. there is a companion device that breaks such  
communications).  It would most likely be too difficult to keep such  
equipment secret if it were available to local and state authorities.

Furthermore, the whole idea of escrow agents is hogwash to me.  How  
difficult is it to get someone's credit report?  How difficult is it  
to get social security records on a person?  Apparently no  
information held by a government or even private agency like TRW is  
impossible or even exceedingly difficult to obtain, and anyone  
wishing to intercept your communications will simply have to buy off  
the appropriate persons at each escrow authority.


To sum up, I think the whole idea stinks.


andrew




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: fnerd@smds.com (FutureNerd Steve Witham)
Date: Mon, 19 Apr 93 12:14:30 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Mad Musings/Sneath
Message-ID: <9304191859.AA25735@smds.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu sez> 
> 
> `cypherpunk' actually has some pretty endearing qualities as a name,
> and I'd be a bit horrified to give it up, just when I was waiting for
> the T shirt ``Cypherpunks do it stealthily'' (secretly? sneakily?). 

Cypherpunks do it with Sneath.  (Sneath is a road near San Francisco.)

Hey, did anybody think to just mail the people on that Clipper 
chip announcements list and ask them how they got on it?

-fnerd
quote me




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: jet@nas.nasa.gov (J. Eric Townsend)
Date: Mon, 19 Apr 93 15:34:26 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: non-cypher related question on audio analysis
Message-ID: <9304192234.AA26763@boxer.nas.nasa.gov>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



This is only the tiniest bit related to crypto, but that doesn't seem
to be much outside the criteria for submissions to this list.. :-)

Anyone got pointers to decoding audio tones?  An intro book, source
code, newsgroup, mailing list, somebody I can take to lunch?  I'd like
to sample audio with my SGI, and suck out various simple tones and
combinations of tones.  (DTMF, single pitch variant tones, etc.)

thx.

--
J. Eric Townsend jet@nas.nasa.gov 415.604.4311
NASA Ames Numerical Aerodynamic Simulation      |    play: jet@well.sf.ca.us
Parallel Systems Support, CM-5 POC              |      '92 R100R / DoD# 0378
PGP2.1 public key available upon request or finger jet@simeon.nas.nasa.gov





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: david@staff.udc.upenn.edu (R. David Murray)
Date: Mon, 19 Apr 93 13:03:35 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: How tapper works: see alt.privacy.clipper
Message-ID: <9304192001.AA18866@staff.udc.upenn.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


If it is not too late, please ignore my previous request for an
explanation of how tapper works.  I found the answer in
alt.privacy.clipper.  The missing piece of info was that the session key
must be negotiated separately.
-- 
david			david@staff.udc.upenn.edu




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: fnerd@smds.com (FutureNerd Steve Witham)
Date: Mon, 19 Apr 93 13:18:00 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: AT&T Announcement?
Message-ID: <9304192015.AA26036@smds.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> AT&T announced yesterday that will will begin selling devices with these 
> Clippers in them immediatly. We've been sold down the river by ma bell again.
> 
> Dave Banisar
> CPSR Washington Office

Does someone know how to get an official-looking printed form of this
announcement?  I want something to xerox and send in when I switch long
distance service.

-fnerd
quote me




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: robichau@lambda.msfc.nasa.gov (Paul Robichaux)
Date: Mon, 19 Apr 93 14:20:56 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Intergraph speaks! (sort of)
Message-ID: <9304192120.AA00819@lambda.msfc.nasa.gov>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I just had a nice phonecon with Jim Ruester of Intergraph's public
relations department. For those of you who don't follow CAD,
Intergraph produces a line of workstations based on the Clipper CPU, a
private-label RISC chip that Intergraph acquired from Fairchild some
years ago.

He hadn't seen the press release, or heard of the wiretap chip. His
(predictable) reaction was to say that he'd forward it to their legal
department. I asked that he pass any comments back to me for reposting
here.

A plea: please *don't* call Intergraph and bother them about this.
Putting pressure on AT&T (which has announced products based on the
wiretap chip) is one thing. Harrassing a company with a similarly
named (and trademarked!) product, in the hope that they'll put
pressure on the gov't, is nothing more than bothersome.

-Paul

-- 
Paul Robichaux, KD4JZG                | HELP STOP THE BIG BROTHER CHIP!
NTI Mission Software Development Div. | RIPEM key on request.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: sneal@muskwa.ucs.ualberta.ca (Sneal)
Date: Mon, 19 Apr 93 16:03:21 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: The first casualty of war
Message-ID: <9304192302.AA10374@muskwa.ucs.ualberta.ca>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu writes:
>Who Has the Keys?
>-----------------
>
>The evasion of `who stores the keys' makes me wonder. It suggests that
>the proposal was poorly crafted (which is true in any case), but, more
>likely, IMHO, the scheme is weak enough for the NSA (but maybe not
>cops) to break regardless, and hence their casual disregard for this
>seemingly monumentally crucial point.
 
     It appears that the opposition is using the old rhetorical trick
of "begging the question."  Rather than stating the important
question (which is "Should there be a key registration scheme?"),
they jump right over it to "Who will register the keys?".  The
purpose is to focus debate on the latter issue without anyone
stopping to examine the former.  
 
     However, two can play at that game, as in:
 
"Nobody seems to have thought about what will happen when Clipper is
broken."
 
"Developing a system that is "impervious" (to anyone but its developers)
required at least four years." 
 
     Sleazy?  Yeah.  Not that I'm advocating fighting fire with fire or
anything.
 
 




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: KINNEY WILLIAM H <kinney@pprince.colorado.edu>
Date: Mon, 19 Apr 93 16:09:38 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: True Randoms
Message-ID: <9304192309.AA11889@pprince.colorado.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



A little nuclear physics anyone?

Seems like one real bitch with roll-your-own cryptography is the 
scarcity of good random numbers to work with. I've read about various
schemes using I/O buffers, or keystroke timing like PGP does (even
there, true randoms are referred to as "precious").

So I thought a bit about how one could construct a true random generating
box. Went out to Sears and bought a $7 smoke detector, a "Family Gard"
model FG888D, and took it apart. What's inside is a 1.0 microCurie chunk
of Americium 241 (I checked other models, and they seem to all be AM241,
right around the 1 uCi activity range, although I have an older one at home
with 5.0 uCi). I did a little research on the isotope in the CRC Handbook and
the Brookhaven National Lab's online database, and what I found was pretty
interesting:

About AM241:

Half-Life: 458 years
Decay: AM241 ---> (Neptunium 237) + (5.5 MeV alpha particle)
1.0 uCi = 37,000 decays/second average
NP237 has a half-life of around 2 million years

This is very good design. AM241 has only one basic decay mode, and it 
decays to an essentially inert daughter product without any intermediate
daughters to worry about. Very simple and safe. In addition, the 1.0 uCi
activity of the sample makes the decay rate just right for counting alphas
with electronic devices -- a 100 KHz sample rate would be overkill for
resolving individual alphas. And the half-life is long enough to make the
source relatively stable over a reasonable period of use.

I took my sample into the lab and it barely registered on the geiger counter,
but when I set it up on a scintillating detector, I got about 1200 counts/sec
above a background of 25 count/sec. A nice clear signal. Seems to me it
would be pretty easy to buy a small solid-state detector and a couple of
chips and wire it up to toggle a pin on an RS232 cable, giving a nice true 
random source -- for instance, assuming the 1200 counts/sec rate I saw in 
the lab, you could count alphas for 10 milliseconds and send a 1 down the 
cable if you saw an odd number, a 0 if you saw an even number. Could
probably do better than 1200 /sec, too, I bet.

Does anyone see a real need for something like this?
Any hardware jocks out there who could lend some expertise?

Radiological safety data (permissible quarterly intake):

AM241 (oral): 7.6 uCi
AM241 (inhalation): 3.8E-03 uCi
NP237 (oral): 6.2 uCi
NP 237 (inhalation): 2.5E-03 uCi

In other words, whatever you do, don't smoke it...

                                -- Will




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: jet@nas.nasa.gov (J. Eric Townsend)
Date: Mon, 19 Apr 93 18:14:40 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: NSA and all this (was Let's see here ...
In-Reply-To: <B4402B1w165w@sytex.com>
Message-ID: <9304200114.AA02335@boxer.nas.nasa.gov>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Paul Ferguson writes:
 > - The Clinton administration was presented with a golly-gee proposal
 > from either the NSA or the NIST (probably both) on a way to "offer"
 > public encryption. ('Nuf said.)

Actually, according to an ex-NSA'er I know, probably not the NSA.
They claim that this sort of thing gets attributed to them quite often
when they in fact have little, if anything, to do with "minor stuff
like that".  They went on to say "anybody who really *needs* to have
crypto cellular calls will already buys stuff from other countries and
modifies it for use here."  Think about the resources *that* implies.

Also, if the clipper thing is "minor", I'm not sure I want to know
what major is.





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: peb@PROCASE.COM
Date: Mon, 19 Apr 93 18:17:10 PDT
To: pmetzger@lehman.com
Subject: Re: Mailing list name
Message-ID: <9304200115.AA03350@banff>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I vote for cryptoprivacy because it is more appropriate, and due to
recent events, it helps to be clear about these things when the media
gets involved.

Examples: 

1.  The infamous CBS coverage of the Hacker's Conference that turned
  "Cracker" Conference in the nightly news regardless of what the 
  reporters were told.

2. Notice how the NIST press release said ``This system is more secure
than many other voice encryption systems readily available today.
[^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ not claiming the best]
While the algorithm will remain classified to protect the security of
the key escrow.'' 

but the Knight-Ridder translated this into:

``...National Security Agency invented a new coding device, called the
"Clipper Chip," which is said to be much harder to crack than encoding
systems now on the market.

Now the wiretap chip sounds better than any equipment on the market
rather than "better than many" which is a very weak claim. 

Happens all the time.  Information must be very clear.  Punk isn't
the right word.


Paul E. Baclace
peb@procase.com





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: peb@PROCASE.COM
Date: Mon, 19 Apr 93 18:42:50 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Sound bite time
Message-ID: <9304200141.AA03355@banff>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Okay, here are my sound bytes:

1. The long one (needed when they try to outlaw encryption):

As we move into the electronic frontier, the freedom to use crypto-privacy 
technology is becoming the equivalent to the right to bear arms:
it is the last line of defense against a tyrannic government.  The good 
news is that privacy is a defensive technology, not an offensive one.
Giving up this un-enumerated right could be disasterous to future 
generations.

2. The short one (simple-minded Clipper is no good):

Crypto Privacy is like a bullet proof vest for your transmitted speech; 
the Clipper chip is a paper jacket with extra zippers in the back.


Paul E. Baclace
peb@procase.com





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: <cburian@uiuc.edu> (Chris Burian)
Date: Mon, 19 Apr 93 17:20:17 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: send info
Message-ID: <199304200020.AA11361@ux4.cso.uiuc.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


send info
#or, if you're human, _please_ send info on how to subscribe & send the FAQ.
#Thanks, Chris Burian

--------------------------------------------------------------------------
|  Chris Burian  |     PGP public key available on a server near you     |   
--------------------------------------------------------------------------
	<cburian@uiuc.edu>	<NeXT: cburian@sumter.cso.uiuc.edu>




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Nathan Rorvig <rorvig@plains.NoDak.edu>
Date: Mon, 19 Apr 93 17:32:22 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Unsubscribe
Message-ID: <Pine.3.03.9304191909.A4355-7100000@plains>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Please, unsubsribe me now. Thanks. The mail volume is way to much.






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: grady@netcom.com (1016/2EF221)
Date: Mon, 19 Apr 93 19:37:39 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Waco, crypto, and unbreakable links
Message-ID: <9304200237.AA14578@netcom.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



We can only speculate that the loss of life
might have been much fewer if the Branch Davidian
cult had a copy of PGP as well as a 2m packet
radio.

They could have maintained private links with journalists
who could have given us their side of the story, which
now, tragically will never be told.





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Date: Mon, 19 Apr 93 19:42:36 PDT
To: KINNEY WILLIAM H <kinney@pprince.colorado.edu>
Subject: Re: True Randoms
Message-ID: <9304200242.AA15040@netcom.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


William Kinney writes:

>A little nuclear physics anyone?
>
>Seems like one real bitch with roll-your-own cryptography is the 
>scarcity of good random numbers to work with. I've read about various
>schemes using I/O buffers, or keystroke timing like PGP does (even
>there, true randoms are referred to as "precious").
>
>So I thought a bit about how one could construct a true random generating
>box. Went out to Sears and bought a $7 smoke detector, a "Family Gard"

>
>Does anyone see a real need for something like this?
>Any hardware jocks out there who could lend some expertise?

What follows is my standard "alpha particles as sources of random numbers"
posting, which I have forwarded to the list a couple of times. (I'm not
being at all critical of William Kinney for raising the issue again.)

Quick summary: thermal noise in a back-biased diode is easier to get, has
more bandwidth, doesn't have safety concerns, and is readily buildable.


From: tcmay (Timothy C. May)
Message-Id: <9210260530.AA00679@netcom2.netcom.com>
Subject: Alpha Particles and One Time Pads
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Date: Sun, 25 Oct 92 22:30:54 PDT
Cc: tcmay (Timothy C. May)
X-Mailer: ELM [version 2.3 PL11]

Fellow Cypherpunks,

Here's a posting I just sent to sci.crypt, dealing with using alpha
particle sources as noise sources for generating one-time pads.
Ordinarily I wouldn't bother you folks with this, especially since
you're all reading sci.crypt (aren't you? Only the FidoNetters have a
good excuse not to.).

But this thread ties together two aspects of my life, cryptography and
alpha particle errors in chips. 

--Tim

Newsgroups: sci.crypt
Path: netcom.com!tcmay
From: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Subject: Re: Hardware random number generators compatible with PCs?
Message-ID: <1992Oct26.051612.29869@netcom.com>
Organization: Netcom - Online Communication Services  (408 241-9760 guest) 
X-Newsreader: Tin 1.1 PL5
References: <1992Oct25.224554.1853@fasttech.com>
Date: Mon, 26 Oct 1992 05:16:12 GMT

Bohdan Tashchuk (zeke@fasttech.com) wrote:

: The recent post on building a random number generator using a zener diode got
: me to thinking once again about commercial alternatives.
: 
: I haven't seen any commercial alternatives discussed here recently. And since
: the market is so specialized, they may well exist but I'm simply not aware of
: them.
: 
: The ideal product would have the following features:
: 
:       * cost less than $100
:       * use a radioactive Alpha ray emitter as the source

It's a small world! In my earlier incarnation as a physicist for
Intel, I discovered the alpha particle "soft error" effect in memory
chips. By 1976 chips, especially dynamic RAMs, were storing less than
half a million electrons as the difference between a "1" and a "0". A
several MeV alpha could generate more than a million electron-hole
pairs, thus flipping some bits.  

(Obviously the effect of alphas on particle detectors was
known, and smoke detectors were in wide use, but nobody prior to 1977
knew that memory bits could be flipped by alphas, coming from uranium
and thorium in the package materials. It's a long story, so I won't
say any more about it here.)

:       * connect to an IBM PC serial or parallel port
:       * be "dongle" sized, ie be able to plug directly onto the port, and
:               not have a cable from an external box to the port
:       * be powered directly from the port
:       * generate at least 1000 "highly random" bits per second

This should be feasible by placing a small (sub-microcurie) amount of
Americium-241 on a small DRAM chip that is known to be alpha-sensitive
(and not all of them are, due to processing tricks). Errors would
occur at random intervals, depending on which bits got hit. Getting
1000 errors a second would be tough, though, as such high intensities
would also tend to eventually destroy the chip (through longterm
damage to the silicon, threshold voltage shifts, etc.). If you really
want to pursue this seriously, I can help with the calculations, etc.

: Details:
: 
: Certainly in high volume these things can be made cheaply. Smoke detectors
: often sell for under $10, and have a radioactive source, an IC, a case, etc.

Yes, but smoke detectors use ionization in a chamber (the smoke from a
fire makes ionization easier). That is, no real ICs. But ICs, and even
RAM chips, are cheap, so your $10 figure is almost certainly in the ballpark.

A bigger concern is safety, or the _perceived_ safety. Smoke detectors
have, I understand, moved away from alpha particle-based detectors to
photoelectric detectors (smoke obscures beam of light). Don't
underestimate the public's fear of radioactivity, even at low levels.

: Using a well-designed circuit based on Alpha decay should mean that the
: randomness is pretty darn good.

But not necessarily any better than noise from a Zener. With the
higher bit rate from diode noise, more statistical tricks can be done.
The relatively low bit rate from alpha decay gives less flexibility.
On the other hand, alpha hits are undeniably quite random, with
essentially no way to skew the odds  (unlike with diode noise).

: Everyone these days has either a serial or parallel port available, either
: directly or thru a switch box.
: 
: The tiny "dongle" size is a convenience. If it is small and powered directly
: from the port, there are no cables to get in the way. There is enough power
: available from the signal lines on these ports to power simple devices. E.g.
: most mice don't require an external power supply.
: 
: For most applications 1000 bits per second should be adequate. For example,
: it would be quite adequate for session keys. For generating pseudo
: one-time-pads, an overnight run should generate plenty of values. Continuously
: generating values for a month would produce about 300 MB, which should be
: enough to exchange new CD-ROM key disks once a month.

One time pads are complicated to use. Only very high security
applications that can also afford them use them. For example, some
diplomatic traffic. I can't conceive of a case where 300 MB a month
could be used. 

And _theft_ (or copying) of the CD-ROM one time pads has got to be a
much bigger issue that whether alpha particle noise sources are better
than diode noise sources! By about 10 orders of magnitude I would say.

Black bag jobs on the sites holding the keys will be the likeliest
attack, not trying to analyze how random the noise is (even a fairly
crummy noise source will not yield enough information to a
cryptanalyst trying to break a one-time pad).

Having said all this, I'm glad you gave some thought to alphas. For a
time in the late 1970s this was the chip industry's number one
headache...it was definitely the most exciting time of my life.

--Tim
-- 
..........................................................................
Timothy C. May         | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,  
tcmay@netcom.com       | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
408-688-5409           | knowledge, reputations, information markets, 
W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA  | black markets, collapse of governments.
Higher Power: 2^756839 | PGP 2.0 and MailSafe keys by arrangement.






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: fergp@sytex.com (Paul Ferguson)
Date: Mon, 19 Apr 93 17:54:10 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Let's see here ...
Message-ID: <B4402B1w165w@sytex.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


 
Once again, I pull together my collective thoughts (that _was_
rather difficult) and send them along for the remainder of the
cypherpunks to ponder.
 
It would appear that several things have happened; let's see if I can
summarize -
 
- The Clinton administration was presented with a golly-gee proposal
from either the NSA or the NIST (probably both) on a way to "offer"
public encryption. ('Nuf said.)
 
- From what we have surmised (researched, hypothesized and down-right
taken for face value), the government (whether it be the NIST or
whomever) has obviously been working on this "technology" for a few
years. Albeit, their negligence to inform anyone.
 
- Mr. Clinton and crew obligingly acknowledge this new, technological
wonder, and think that they're doing us all a favor.
 
- Enter the "Clipper Chip", and all it's fanfare.
 
Okay. I took The Dark One's advice (not that I needed the prodding,
mind you) and faxed every one of the contacts on the list that he
posted earlier (a couple of which were voice numbers, BTW). The big
three (ABC, NBC and CBS + CNN) got my fax and my thoughts on the
subject. I'm mad as hell, too -- yet I'm more prone to bringing this
highly volatile subject (it would seem that it's only an explosive
situation to those of us who understand it's implications) into the
public eye. Let's put this topic into proper prospective -- for the
layman, for the "man in the streets."
 
Let me try to put this into prospective for some of our less
politically inclined participants.
 
For those of you who live within earshot of the "Beltway", you are
probably familiar with the G. Gordon Liddy radio show. Well, to make a
long story short, one afternoon the topic was computer crime. A young
man called in to express  his concern with the topic of "underground"
computer virus distribution and all that rot. He was talking on a deaf
ear, folks. The program was dominated by yuppies, calling in worried
about their precious credit records and how they could possibly be
disclosed or damaged by the computer criminals. I turned off the show
in disgust at that point, but the point is this: No matter how hard
you attempt to bring matters into the light that the _computer_ public
should be concerned about, they revert into their own realm of
protected computerdom. This is an observation, not a conviction.
 
What we need to do, is to make folks understand that this is not just
a computer issue -- it's privacy issue, for cryin' out loud! If the
techno-fascists within certain levels of government service think that
they can _impose_ their will on the computer community at large, they
are most definately ill-informed.  Most would probably think that they
could fluff this little tidbit of "legislation" into reality.
 
Bottom line: I stand by the ideals that we have every right, as common
citizens, to encrypt and cipher as we see fit. Legality be damned.
(This is not a legality issue, for christ's sake!) This is an issue
where the government is playing bully and we find ourselves on the
receiving end of their quest for superiority.
 
I urge each and every one of you to take the time to write your
congressman, fax the closest televison or radio station and make this
topic as public as possible!
 
I refuse to be treated like a criminal because I desire electronic
privacy.
 
Say "No".
 
Cheers.
 
Oh. By the way, I'm looking for some kind sort to offer an avenue to
place Legal Net News on an archive site on a regular basis. I find it
extremely difficult to meet subscription requests and would prefer to
offer this compilation as an anon FTP'able newsletter. Any takers?
Issue 2 has bee released, which covers our recent travails ....
 

Paul Ferguson                    |  Uncle Sam wants to read
Network Integration Consultant   |       your e-mail...
Alexandria, Virginia USA         | Just say "NO" to the Clipper
fergp@sytex.com                  |          Chip...




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Date: Mon, 19 Apr 93 21:02:58 PDT
To: extropians@gnu.ai.mit.edu
Subject: (fwd) THE CLIPPER CHIP: A TECHNICAL SUMMARY
Message-ID: <9304200403.AA18854@netcom3.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Cypherpunks,

Here's the most complete and readable summary of the Wiretap Chip I've
seen. Ironically, it comes from none other than Dorothy, the Wicked
Witch of the East, who claims she knew nothing of it until Thursday
night, just before the announcement. Curiouser and curiouser.

-Tim May


From: denning@guvax.acc.georgetown.edu
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
Subject: THE CLIPPER CHIP: A TECHNICAL SUMMARY
Date: 19 Apr 93 18:23:27 -0400
Distribution: world
Organization: Georgetown University


The following document summarizes the Clipper Chip, how it is used,
how programming of the chip is coupled to key generation and the
escrow process, and how law enforcement decrypts communications.
Since there has been some speculation on this news group about my
own involvement in this project, I'd like to add that I was not in
any way involved.  I found out about it when the FBI briefed me on
Thursday evening, April 15.  Since then I have spent considerable
time talking with the NSA and FBI to learn more about this, and I
attended the NIST briefing at the Department of Commerce on April 16.  
The document below is the result of that effort. 

Dorothy Denning
---------------

                     THE CLIPPER CHIP: A TECHNICAL SUMMARY

                               Dorothy Denning

                                April 19, 1993


INTRODUCTION

On April 16, the President announced a new initiative that will bring
together the Federal Government and industry in a voluntary program
to provide secure communications while meeting the legitimate needs of
law enforcement.  At the heart of the plan is a new tamper-proof encryption
chip called the "Clipper Chip" together with a split-key approach to
escrowing keys.  Two escrow agencies are used, and the key parts from
both are needed to reconstruct a key.


CHIP STRUCTURE

The Clipper Chip contains a classified 64-bit block encryption
algorithm called "Skipjack."  The algorithm uses 80 bit keys (compared
with 56 for the DES) and has 32 rounds of scrambling (compared with 16
for the DES).  It supports all 4 DES modes of operation.  Throughput is
16 Mbits a second.

Each chip includes the following components:

   the Skipjack encryption algorithm
   F, an 80-bit family key that is common to all chips
   N, a 30-bit serial number
   U, an 80-bit secret key that unlocks all messages encrypted with the chip


ENCRYPTING WITH THE CHIP

To see how the chip is used, imagine that it is embedded in the AT&T
telephone security device (as it will be).  Suppose I call someone and
we both have such a device.  After pushing a button to start a secure
conversation, my security device will negotiate a session key K with
the device at the other end (in general, any method of key exchange can
be used).  The key K and message stream M (i.e., digitized voice) are then
fed into the Clipper Chip to produce two values:

   E[M; K], the encrypted message stream, and 
   E[E[K; U] + N; F], a law enforcement block.  

The law enforcement block thus contains the session key K encrypted
under the unit key U concatenated with the serial number N, all
encrypted under the family key F.


CHIP PROGRAMMING AND ESCROW

All Clipper Chips are programmed inside a SCIF (secure computer
information facility), which is essentially a vault.  The SCIF contains
a laptop computer and equipment to program the chips.  About 300 chips
are programmed during a single session.  The SCIF is located at
Mikotronx.

At the beginning of a session, a trusted agent from each of the two key
escrow agencies enters the vault.  Agent 1 enters an 80-bit value S1
into the laptop and agent 2 enters an 80-bit value S2. These values
serve as seeds to generate keys for a sequence of serial numbers.

To generate the unit key for a serial number N, the 30-bit value N is
first padded with a fixed 34-bit block to produce a 64-bit block N1.
S1 and S2 are then used as keys to triple-encrypt N1, producing a
64-bit block R1:

        R1 = E[D[E[N1; S1]; S2]; S1] .

Similarly, N is padded with two other 34-bit blocks to produce N2 and
N3, and two additional 64-bit blocks R2 and R3 are computed:  

        R2 = E[D[E[N2; S1]; S2]; S1] 
        R3 = E[D[E[N3; S1]; S2]; S1] .

R1, R2, and R3 are then concatenated together, giving 192 bits. The
first 80 bits are assigned to U1 and the second 80 bits to U2.  The
rest are discarded.  The unit key U is the XOR of U1 and U2.  U1 and U2
are the key parts that are separately escrowed with the two escrow
agencies.

As a sequence of values for U1, U2, and U are generated, they are
written onto three separate floppy disks.  The first disk contains a
file for each serial number that contains the corresponding key part
U1.  The second disk is similar but contains the U2 values.  The third
disk contains the unit keys U.  Agent 1 takes the first disk and agent
2 takes the second disk.  The third disk is used to program the chips.
After the chips are programmed, all information is discarded from the
vault and the agents leave.  The laptop may be destroyed for additional
assurance that no information is left behind.
 
The protocol may be changed slightly so that four people are in the
room instead of two.  The first two would provide the seeds S1 and S2,
and the second two (the escrow agents) would take the disks back to
the escrow agencies.

The escrow agencies have as yet to be determined, but they will not
be the NSA, CIA, FBI, or any other law enforcement agency.  One or
both may be independent from the government.


LAW ENFORCEMENT USE

When law enforcement has been authorized to tap an encrypted line, they
will first take the warrant to the service provider in order to get
access to the communications line.  Let us assume that the tap is in
place and that they have determined that the line is encrypted with
Clipper.  They will first decrypt the law enforcement block with the
family key F.  This gives them E[K; U] + N.  They will then take a
warrant identifying the chip serial number N to each of the key escrow
agents and get back U1 and U2.  U1 and U2 are XORed together to produce
the unit key U, and E[K; U] is decrypted to get the session key K.
Finally the message stream is decrypted.  All this will be accomplished
through a special black box decoder operated by the FBI.


ACKNOWLEDGMENT AND DISTRIBUTION NOTICE.  All information is based on
information provided by NSA, NIST, and the FBI.  Permission to
distribute this document is granted.


    

--






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: fnerd@smds.com (FutureNerd Steve Witham)
Date: Mon, 19 Apr 93 19:01:07 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: The Wing-Clipper
Message-ID: <9304200142.AA27709@smds.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> Matthew Lyle    	       	       	       	       	(214) 888-0474
> OpenConnect Systems     	       	       	       	matt@oc.com
> Dallas, TX                                      
> 
> "...and once you have tasted flight, you will walk the earth with your 
>     eyes turned skyward, for there you have been, and there you long 
>     to return..."

It's the Wing-Clipper chip.
Great emblem: a bald eagle with its wings clipped.
-fnerd
quote me




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Marc Horowitz <marc@GZA.COM>
Date: Mon, 19 Apr 93 19:04:36 PDT
To: peb@PROCASE.COM
Subject: Re: Sound bite time
In-Reply-To: <9304200141.AA03355@banff>
Message-ID: <9304200203.AA15663@mu-hsu-chicken.aktis.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Neither of those is aimed at Joe Average Citizen.

The first isn't any good, because most people don't see any need to
protect against a tyranny.

The second is no good because although people might be afraid of
getting shot, most people don't go around wearing bulletproof vests
all the time.

I'd be for something applicable and simple like

"Giving the government keys to your encrypted messages is like giving
them keys to the front door of your house."

People can relate to that.

		Marc




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: J. Michael Diehl <mdiehl@triton.unm.edu>
Date: Mon, 19 Apr 93 21:35:40 PDT
To: sasha@cs.umb.edu (Alexander Chislenko)
Subject: Re: Is 40 bits too little?
In-Reply-To: <199304200401.AA26166@ra.cs.umb.edu>
Message-ID: <9304200423.AA04402@triton.unm.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>    Yes, in just a trillion iterations you can test all possible keys.
> But if for testing *each* key you will have to figure out whether a text
> /signal you produced represents sensible speech... - it may be prohibitively
> expensive.
>   

Well, what if you're "close?"  Will it sound "kinda sensible?"  Perhapse it 
would sound like long distance.... ;^)

Just a thought.

+-----------------------+-----------------------------+---------+
| J. Michael Diehl ;-)  | I thought I was wrong once. | PGP KEY |
|                       |    But, I was mistaken.     |available|
|                       +-----------------------------+---------+
| mdiehl@triton.unm.edu | "I'm just looking for the opportunity |
| mike.diehl@fido.org   | to be Politically Incorrect!   <Me>   |
| (505) 299-2282        |                                       |
+-----------------------+---------------------------------------+




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: uni@acs.bu.edu (Shaen Bernhardt)
Date: Mon, 19 Apr 93 20:13:41 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Sound Bite
Message-ID: <9304200313.AA107798@acs.bu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


"Giving the government keys to your encrypted messages is like giving
them keys to the front door of your house."
 
+ "and accepting the promise, we'll only use them with proper authority."





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Douglas Barnes <wixer!wixer.bga.com!gumby@cactus.org>
Date: Mon, 19 Apr 93 23:43:34 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Sound bite (a bit crude)
Message-ID: <9304200447.AA28123@wixer>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain




Came up during brainstorm session for article:

"Clipper Chip Encryption: A leaky condom for the masses?"

-- Doug 
(gumby@wixer.bga.com)




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: David Reeve Sward <sward+@cmu.edu>
Date: Mon, 19 Apr 93 20:52:04 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Sound Bite
In-Reply-To: <9304200313.AA107798@acs.bu.edu>
Message-ID: <wforAkK00WBOIABopb@andrew.cmu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> "Giving the government keys to your encrypted messages is like giving
> them keys to the front door of your house."
>  
> + "and accepting the promise, we'll only use them with proper authority."

"*wink* *wink*"
-- 
David Sward     sward+@cmu.edu     Finger or email for PGP public key:
3D567F  Fingerprint = E5 16 82 B0 3C 96 DB 6F  B2 FB DC 8F 82 CB E9 45
Stop the Big Brother Chip - Just say NO to the Clipper "Wiretap" Chip!




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: karn@qualcomm.com (Phil Karn)
Date: Mon, 19 Apr 93 23:53:42 PDT
To: peb@PROCASE.COM
Subject: Re:  Sound bite time
Message-ID: <9304200653.AA10987@servo>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Paul E. Baclace:

>As we move into the electronic frontier, the freedom to use crypto-privacy 
>technology is becoming the equivalent to the right to bear arms:
>it is the last line of defense against a tyrannic government.  The good 
>news is that privacy is a defensive technology, not an offensive one.
>Giving up this un-enumerated right could be disasterous to future 
>generations.

I really, *REALLY* hope that this argument doesn't catch on.
Regardless of your opinions on gun control, you have to admit that
linking crypto to weapons saddles it with an enormous amount of
political baggage that we simply doesn't need. And it plays right into
the hands of those in the government who consider it as a "munition"
for export control purposes.

I think we already have plenty of strong arguments in defense of the
right to encrypt without opening up this can of worms. It can only
turn off a lot of people who would otherwise support us.

Phil






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Alexander Chislenko <sasha@cs.umb.edu>
Date: Mon, 19 Apr 93 21:01:14 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Is 40 bits too little?
Message-ID: <199304200401.AA26166@ra.cs.umb.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


   Yes, in just a trillion iterations you can test all possible keys.
But if for testing *each* key you will have to figure out whether a text
/signal you produced represents sensible speech... - it may be prohibitively
expensive.
  
		Alex  Chislenko.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: wcs@anchor.ho.att.com
Date: Mon, 19 Apr 93 21:35:53 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re:  Is 40 bits too little?
Message-ID: <9304200435.AA00977@anchor.ho.att.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text


h
Yes, 40 bits would be too little, especially since you can probably tell
if you've got the correct key by the form of the data, but they're actually
generating your 80-bit key as the XOR of two other 80-bit numbers,
and searching 2**80 still takes reasonably long.  Unfortunately,
the method of generating the two 80-bit numbers is disturbingly suspect;
see articles in sci.crypt and alt.privacy.clipper posted by Steve Bellovin
and somebody with email from Martin Hellman and Dorothy Denning.
			Bill Stewart



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Date: Tue, 20 Apr 93 01:08:21 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re:  Sound bite time
Message-ID: <9304200808.AA15339@netcom.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Phil Karn, referring to some parallels with gun control, writes:

>I really, *REALLY* hope that this argument doesn't catch on.
>Regardless of your opinions on gun control, you have to admit that
>linking crypto to weapons saddles it with an enormous amount of
>political baggage that we simply doesn't need. And it plays right into
>the hands of those in the government who consider it as a "munition"
>for export control purposes.
>
>I think we already have plenty of strong arguments in defense of the
>right to encrypt without opening up this can of worms. It can only
>turn off a lot of people who would otherwise support us.

I agree. Mentioning guns raises too many confusing issues, including
emotional reactions, talk of private vs. public ownership, etc. Several
decades ago it might have been better received.

The compelling "sound bites" revolve around these kinds of examples:

- having to deposit copies of all your private letters with the
authorities, "in case" they need to later read them...

- not being allowed to use locks--on anything--that the government can't bypass

- recording all private conversations and escrowing the tapes, just in case
the government later wants to hear them

- video cameras in all bedrooms to allow the police to check for illegal
activities (even with proper "court orders," most people will react with
shock at this suggestion)

These are things that everyone can understand. And be shocked by. When they
realize just how similar the "key escrow" idea is to these examples, they
may get more indignant.

-Tim May
--
Timothy C. May         | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,  
tcmay@netcom.com       | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
408-688-5409           | knowledge, reputations, information markets, 
W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA  | black markets, smashing of governments.
Higher Power: 2^756839 | Public Key: MailSafe and PGP available.
Waco Massacre + Big Brother Wiretap Chip = A Nazi Regime





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Hal <74076.1041@CompuServe.COM>
Date: Mon, 19 Apr 93 22:38:04 PDT
To: Cypherpunks <cypherpunks@toad.com>
Subject: Is 40 bits too little?
Message-ID: <930420053136_74076.1041_FHD37-1@CompuServe.COM>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Just to remind everyone, the clipper key is not 40 bits.
 
It is 80 bits.
 
It is not divided up into two 40-bit halves.
 
It is the result of xor'ing two 80-bit numbers, each of which would be held
separately.  Knowing one of the numbers would not improve your chances of
guessing the key.
 
Hal
 






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Perry E. Metzger" <pmetzger@lehman.com>
Date: Tue, 20 Apr 93 03:09:46 PDT
To: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Subject: Another Clipper Weakness
In-Reply-To: <9304200403.AA18854@netcom3.netcom.com>
Message-ID: <9304201009.AA21829@snark.shearson.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Another clipper weakness.

The unit key is derived directly from the serial number for the chip.
We are supposed to feel comfy that the unit key is 80 bits long -- but
the unit serial numbers are only 30 bits long! Am I crazy, or could
you could systematically generate all possible unit keys!

Perry





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: robichau@lambda.msfc.nasa.gov (Paul Robichaux)
Date: Tue, 20 Apr 93 06:03:37 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: NPR piece on "Clipper Chip" this morning
Message-ID: <9304201303.AA23547@lambda.msfc.nasa.gov>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


NPR did a (for them, anyway) well-balanced piece on the wiretap chip
this morning. Per their standard, the reporter (Dan Charles) had sound
bites from both sides: Whit Diffie, representing the
strong-privacy-through-crypto crowd, and the (acting?) director of
NIST, Raymond whose-last-name-I-forget.

Highlights: Diffie compared Clipper to a real estate lockbox. The feds
don't have to have the key to the house (=phone), just the key to the
lockbox. If you change your Clipper key, the chip keeps a copy.

NIST guy said that he strongly supports individual privacy, but law
enforcement needs have to be counted, too.

Diffie (rough quote): "Technology makes policy. If the gov't spends
hundreds of millions of dollars on a chip which allows them to tap
phones, they will do so because the technology's there."

Good for NPR. A balanced piece.

-Paul

-- 
Paul Robichaux, KD4JZG                | HELP STOP THE BIG BROTHER CHIP!
NTI Mission Software Development Div. | RIPEM key on request.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Peter Wayner <pcw@access.digex.com>
Date: Tue, 20 Apr 93 05:21:01 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Objections...
Message-ID: <199304201220.AA27725@access.digex.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



I think one very serious objection to the SkipJack system is
that the secrecy prevents us from coming up with Software implementations
of the system. Naturally, they don't want that to happen because
people start finding easy ways to screw up the encrypted block of 
key information needed by the government. But regardless of that,
software implementations of DES have been extremely useful for
everyone. There is probably 10 times as much encryption done using
software DES than hardware. Maybe 1000 times as much. 

The fact is that software protection is much easier for the public
to use. They don't need to buy an extra chip for their computer. 
They just run some software. It's cheaper. More populist. 

I think this is the most practical and non-inflamatory argument
for public access to the algorithm.

-Peter Wayner




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: zane@genesis.mcs.com (Sameer Parekh)
Date: Tue, 20 Apr 93 06:35:33 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: CLIP: Revised sample letter
Message-ID: <m0nlINS-000MVQC@genesis.mcs.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text


	I finished my letter about the wiretap chip. (I still need to proof
for grammar, but the content I have set.)
	I'm posting it here so others may see it and their efforts could be
aided. Feel free to distribute this AS MUCH as possible. If you want to
comment on the letter, so so publicly, because I am sending this tomorrow
morning and sending to me privately will do no good-- I will have sent it by
the time I read your comments. Comments *will* be helpful though for other
people.

	I will keep the lists informed as to what response I get from my
letter if people wish.

-- 
| Sameer Parekh-zane@genesis.MCS.COM-PFA related mail to pfa@genesis.MCS.COM |
| Apprentice Philosopher, Writer, Physicist, Healer, Programmer, Lover, more |
| "Be God" - Me __ "Specialization is for Insects" - Robert A. Heinlein ____/


Editor:

	The Clinton administration on Friday unveiled their plan for
establishing a standard data encryption system for voice communications.
President Clinton says that he wants to bring the United States
into the twenty-first century. This proposal is bringing us to 1984. I
will mention first the technical reasons why the system is inadequate.
	The encryption algorithim is classified; only a select group of
people will be allowed to examine the algorithim for flaws. The members
of the cryptographic community continually and persistently emphasize
that the only way to ensure security in a cryptographic system is to
have as many people as possible analyze and try to break it for as long
as possible. A system which has been examined by a small segment of the
population should not be trusted.
	Release of the algorithim is crucial to verification of a good
encryption method. The earlier Data Encryption Standard (DES) for data
storage encryption was a very strong standard; the academic world
examined it and after a number of months found weaknesses, spawning the
now-standard "triple-DES" system which is more secure.
	From what little is known about the encryption system, it
appears to be a weak system. Such a weak system lends itself to
easy decryption by an unauthorized party. It would lend a false sense of
security to laypersons in the field who do not realize that a key of
such simplicity could be cracked easily by any talented criminal. The
necessarily secure communications between a doctor and his patient could
be thus breached. If the system were strong, the government would use it
for internal use, but according to the AT&T release, the government will
not be using the same chip which is marketed to consumers.
	Apart from the technical flaws in the system, there are many
political problems with this big brother proposal. First, there is the
assumption that the government has a right to spy on its own citizens.
The proposal for this wiretap chip includes the registration of keys
with two escrow agencies.  This proposal is purported to allow law
enforcement to keep track of "terrorists" and "drug-dealers." The first
flaw in this key-escrow system is that no self-respecting criminal will
use a cryptography system which can be easily tapped by law enforcement
officials-- they will use strong cryptography. The only people who
may end up using the wiretap encryption system will be law-abiding
laypeople who don't fully understand cryptography. (Law-abiding citizens
who do understand cryptography will use strong cryptography to preserve
their privacy from a talented criminal.) 
	The proposal states that in order to obtain the key of a wiretap
chip user a law enforcement agency must first establish that they have a
valid interest in the key. Translated out of legalese, that means that
all a government agency will have to do to get access to all of the
private communications, for example, between a lawyer and her client
will be to fill out the necessary forms. Registering cryptographic keys
with the government is similar to giving the IRS the keys to your house
and filing cabinet. A criminal who wants access to the communications
between a priest and confessor needs only to find a corrupt judge.
	The chip is being manufactured exclusively by one company. The
release stated that the Attorney shall request (i.e. coerce)
telecommunication product manufacturers to use this product.  This
aspect of the system is a government-mandated monopoly. Such monopolies
result in high prices and the elimination of market forces which drive
the improvement of technology. (One needs only look at the state of the
Soviet Union to see how the lack of market forces affects consumer
technology.)
	The system exposes our President's hypocrasy because of his
campaign promise to protect womens' rights to privacy and that he will
see a Supreme Court nominee who believes that the Bill of Rights
guarantees a right to privacy. By mandating a weak cryptosystem he is
reneging on his promise to provide privacy rights to the nation's
citizenry. If Clinton supported a right to privacy to limit government
interference with regards to abortions, he must limit government
interference with regards to communication.
	Another element of Clinton's hypocrasy lies in his promise to
reduce the budget deficit. By introducing additional responsibilities
for government agencies (keeping track of the millions of keys
registered in escrow) he is only using our tax dollars to invade our
privacy, tax dollars which are better spent lowering the budget deficit.
	What I fear most from the proposal is that if the wiretap chip
becomes the standard, strong cryptography will be declared illegal. If
such is the case, then only criminals will have access to strong
cryptography. As I have stated above-- the wiretap chip will not be used
by criminals because of the obvious flaws in the crypto-system--
criminals will use strong crypto, while law-abiding citizens will have
to use a system which can be easily defeated by any criminal.
	Strong cryptography already exists for data communications, for
-free-. Strong cryptography for voice communications for -free- is only
a few months away for people who own a personal computer. There is no
way that making strong cryptography illegal will stop it-- it will only
turn otherwise law-abiding citizens into criminals.


			Sincerely,

			Sameer Parekh
			829 Paddock Lane
			Libertyville, IL 60048-3743
			zane@genesis.mcs.com
			708-362-9659





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: pat@tstc.edu (Patrick E. Hykkonen)
Date: Tue, 20 Apr 93 06:43:02 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Waco, crypto, and unbreakable links
Message-ID: <9304201342.AA08444@tstc.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> We can only speculate that the loss of life
> might have been much fewer if the Branch Davidian
> cult had a copy of PGP as well as a 2m packet
> radio.
> 
> They could have maintained private links with journalists
> who could have given us their side of the story, which
> now, tragically will never be told.


I thought about this yesterday at lunch, at about the time the fire
started in the Davidian compound.  Only as it applies to the overthrow
of a government or such.

Agree on the initial frequency and time, then send the next frequency
and time encoded in the message text to avoid jamming.

"A rebellion is not a few men huddled around a candle talking in
whispers.  But a large, well funded, organization with an intricate
communications network."  - Unknown

-- 
Pat Hykkonen, N5NPL                     Texas State Technical College at Waco
{pat,postmaster}@tstc.edu                      Instructional Network Services
PGP Key available by finger.                 3801 Campus Dr.  Waco, Tx  76705
                                           V:(817) 867-4830  F:(817) 799-2843




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Kang Meng Chow <mckang@solomon.technet.sg>
Date: Mon, 19 Apr 93 19:03:57 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Subscribe me
Message-ID: <Pine.3.05.9304201022.A1571-5100000@solomon.technet.sg>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain




SUBSCRIBE ME








From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: peb@PROCASE.COM
Date: Tue, 20 Apr 93 10:31:28 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re:  Sound bite time
Message-ID: <9304201727.AA03474@banff>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



I like the newer sound bites.

``Having to deposit copies of all your private letters with the
authorities, "in case" they need to later read them...''

and

``Giving the government keys to your encrypted messages is like giving
 them keys to the front door of your house.''

seem best.

Phil,  About the right to bear arms and crypto-privacy...you are
right--it is not a good sound bite for J. Q. Public, but could be a 
good angle for *understanding* (uhg, I hate this sound bite stuff.)


Paul E. Baclace
peb@procase.com




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: jet@nas.nasa.gov (J. Eric Townsend)
Date: Tue, 20 Apr 93 10:40:23 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Waco, crypto, and unbreakable links
In-Reply-To: <9304200237.AA14578@netcom.netcom.com>
Message-ID: <9304201740.AA18148@boxer.nas.nasa.gov>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


1016/2EF221 writes:
 > We can only speculate that the loss of life
 > might have been much fewer if the Branch Davidian
 > cult had a copy of PGP as well as a 2m packet
 > radio.

Yes, we can only speculate.  We can only speculate what would have
happened if the members who had left had told what they knew -- they
had/have many chances, including one member who called media from
prison.

Maybe the BD's didn't have anything to say in the first place?  Koresh
et al got plenty of radio time, and had even more time offered.  His
lawyers negotiated with media for film rights...

I don't think PGP/packet would have helped him a bit.  Having all his
neurons operating in a reality the rest of us live in might have
helped a bit more.

(I used to live in Texas, and have long known of the "Wackos in Waco",
so my sympathy level is a bit low...)






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: jim@tadpole.com (Jim Thompson)
Date: Tue, 20 Apr 93 08:41:58 PDT
To: extropians@gnu.ai.mit.edu
Subject: Re: (fwd) THE CLIPPER CHIP: A TECHNICAL SUMMARY
In-Reply-To: <9304200403.AA18854@netcom3.netcom.com>
Message-ID: <9304201041.ZM1104@chiba>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Note that SCIF is not Secure Computer Information Facility,
its Secure Compartment(alized) Information Facility.

One can only wonder what else Dottie Denning got wrong.

What happens to the disk that has 'U' on it?  :-)

Jim






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Eric Hughes <hughes@soda.berkeley.edu>
Date: Tue, 20 Apr 93 11:01:07 PDT
To: cypherpunks-announce@toad.com
Subject: Ad hoc Cypherpunks meeting April 24
Message-ID: <9304201754.AA23465@soda.berkeley.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



ANNOUNCEMENT
============

Ad Hoc Cypherpunks Meeting on the recent Wiretap Chip proposal.

Where: Cygnus Support, Mt. View (directions follow)
When: 12:00 noon sharp - 6:00 p.m.

I'm mad as hell.  I know that a lot of other folks are too.  So I'm
calling an ad hoc meeting to vent some spleen, to calm our heads, and
to plan a counterattack.  If you have any interest in this whatsoever,
please attend.

As with all cypherpunks meetings, this meeting is open.  Tell anyone
you want to tell.  Show up.  Encourage your friends to show up.  I'm
going to try to get some of the folks from RSA Data Security to show
up, as well as some others who would normally not attend.

Eric Hughes
cypherpunks list and ftp maintainer


AGENDA
======

12:00 - 6:00  Wiretap chip discussions.  There will be a break.


DIRECTIONS
==========

	Cygnus Support
	1937 Landings Drive
	Mt. View, CA  94043
	+1 415 903 1400   switchboard
	+1 415 903 1418   John Gilmore

Take US 101 toward Mt. View.  From San Francisco, it's about a
40-minute drive.  Get off at the Rengstorff Ave/Amphitheatre Parkway
exit.  If you were heading south on 101, you curve around to the
right, cross over the freeway, and get to a stoplight.  If you were
heading north on 101, you just come right off the exit to the
stoplight.  The light is the intersection of Amphitheatre and
Charleston Rd.  Take a right on Charleston; there's a right-turn-only
lane.

Follow Charleston for a short distance.  You'll pass the
Metaphor/Kaleida buildings on the right.  At a clump of palm trees and
a "Landmark Deli" sign, take a right into Landings Drive.  At the end
of the road, turn left into the complex with the big concrete
"Landmark" sign.  Follow the road past the deli til you are in front
of the clock tower that rises out of one of the buildings, facing you.
Enter through the doors immediately under the clock tower.  They'll be
open between noon and 1PM at least.  (See below if you're late.)

Once inside, take the stairs up, immediately to your right.  At the top
of the stairs, turn right past the treetops, and we'll be in 1937 on 
your left.  The door is marked "Cygnus".

If you are late and the door under the clock tower is locked, you can
walk to the deli (which will be around the building on your left, as
you face the door).  Go through the gate in the fence to the right of
the deli, and into the back lawns between the complex and the farm
behind it.  Walk forward and right around the buildings until you see
a satellite dish in the lawn.  Go up the stairs next to the dish,
which are the back stairs into the Cygnus office space.  We'll prop
the door (or you can bang on it if we forget).

Or, you can find the guard who's wandering around the complex, who
knows there's a meeting happening and will let you in.  They can be
beeped at 965 5250, though you'll have trouble finding a phone.

Don't forget to eat first, or bring food at noon!  I recommend hitting
the burrito place on Rengstorff (La Costen~a) at about 11:45.  To get
there, when you get off 101, take Rengstorff (toward the hills) rather
than Amphitheatre (toward the bay).  Follow it about ten blocks until
the major intersection at Middlefield Road.  La Costen~a is the store
on your left at the corner.  You can turn left into the narrow lane
behind the store, which leads to a parking lot, and enter by the front
door, which faces the intersection.  To get to the meeting from there,
just retrace your route on Rengstorff, go straight over the freeway,
and turn right at the stoplight onto Charleston; see above.

See you there!

	John Gilmore







From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: jrk@information-systems.east-anglia.ac.uk (Richard Kennaway)
Date: Tue, 20 Apr 93 03:21:00 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: True Randoms
Message-ID: <23693.9304201020@sys.uea.ac.uk>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I have seen mentioned in sci.electronics (not recently) that true random
number generator chips are available off-the-shelf.  Texas Instruments was
mentioned as one source, but I don't remember details.

--                                ____
Richard Kennaway                  \ _/__    School of Information Systems
Internet:  jrk@sys.uea.ac.uk       \X  /    University of East Anglia
uucp:  ...mcsun!ukc!uea-sys!jrk      \/     Norwich NR4 7TJ, U.K.





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Hal <74076.1041@CompuServe.COM>
Date: Tue, 20 Apr 93 08:56:46 PDT
To: Cypherpunks <cypherpunks@toad.com>
Subject: Another Clipper weakness
Message-ID: <930420155129_74076.1041_FHD54-1@CompuServe.COM>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Perry asks about the 30-bit serial number.
 
Actually, it appears that the unit key UK is a function of the serial
number plus the two 80-bit random numbers input by the escrow agents
when the chips are programmed.  This would prevent an easy guessing
attack as long as these random numbers S1 and S2 are unknown.
 
The one problem is that S1 and S2 are not changed for each chip, but are
rather kept the same in programming a batch of about 300 chips.  Then
they are supposed to be destroyed.
 
The potential weakness is that if someone managed to keep a copy of the S1
and S2 values which were used to program all clipper chips (only about 3000
such values for a million chips), then Perry's suggested attack could work.
This would be few enough bits that the unit key could be guessed.
 
Those who are asked to judge the safety of the system will presumably pay
careful attention to the measures used to insure that S1 and S2 are not
saved.  I don't know how they'll check for NSA micro-cameras in the vault
ceiling, though...
 
Hal
 






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: dstalder@gmuvax2.gmu.edu (Darren/Torin/Who ever...)
Date: Tue, 20 Apr 93 09:10:21 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com (CypherPunks)
Subject: WIRETAP: Non-technical statement
Message-ID: <9304201606.AA10704@gmuvax2.gmu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I've had some people ask me about a non-technical synopsis of the Wiretap
Chip proposal.  What follows is it.  Can you please look over it for
errors?  I am still very much the amateur when it comes to cryptography.

The WIRE-TAP Proposal:  Problems with it.

The White House sent out a press release on Friday 16 April about a voice
encryption chip called the Clipper chip.  This has come to be known as the
Wiretap chip since it allows any Law Enforcement agency to automatically
decrypt any conversations made with it with a search warrant.  The LE
presents said search warrant to two different escrow agencies to obtain the
keys (80 bits long) that automatically decrypts your conversation.  The
Electronic Freedom Foundation (EFF) and the Computer Professionals for
Social Responsibility (CPSR) have both criticized the proposal.  There was
even a negative article already in Network World (19 Apr 93).  The
paragraphs that follow are facts and problems I have collected by listening
to other discuss the Wiretap chip.

Say you wanted to encrypt your talk with someone over a phone.  Well, since
you and the person you want to talk to both have the Wiretap (Clipper) chip
in your phones, you can automatically encrypt your conversation.  All fine
and good encryption for the consumer.  Now, what if you come under
investigation by the local constabulary?  The get a court order and ask the
escrow agencies (non-law enforcement types) for your key.  They already
have the family key since that is the same in each chip.  They now have
your specific key.  With these two keys, they can decrypt all conversations
that you have.  This includes conversations that are not legal to wiretap
such as attorney-client, doctor-patient and so on.  They also have that key
for any all future sessions that you use that phone for.  Start to see the
problem?  This part is all legal...  Search warrants are even exceedingly
easy to get at times.  There have been reports of the FBI get groups of 50
signed and blank search warrants from the DoJ.

Now, there are other problems.  Would you give the IRS keys to your house
and filing cabinet as long as they promised that they would only use it
under proper authorization?  The key length of 80 bits is still considered
cryptographically weak.  It would take determined effort by an agency with
a supercomputer but your key could be broken.  The cryptographic algorithm
is also being kept classified.  This is not the usual practice.  In the
cryptographic community, algorithms are public.  This way people can be
assured there aren't any back doors and that the algorithm can stand on its
own strengths, not that of secrecy.  It has also been hinted at by NIST
(the agency behind the technical implementation of the chip.) that the chip
could be compromised if the algorithm was made public.  It is not that
difficult to reverse engineer a chip these days.

Finally, some of the implications behind this announcements are dire.  The
Wiretap chip could become the market or legislative standard.  This could
mean that other implementations of cryptographic voice transactions would
be very difficult to obtain or would be illegal to obtain.  Why would a
criminal use the Wiretap chip when they knew it wouldn't encrypt their
conversations against the LE agencies?  They wouldn't, they would use other
encryption technologies.  Would this mean that using something other than
the Wiretap chip is probable cause and puts you under suspicion?  One last
fishy thing is that AT&T has already (on the same day) announced phones
with this chip.  This implies (means?) that AT&T has known about this chip
for a while.  They seem to be more concerned about getting a jump on the
competition than producing a product that will actually give their users
real security.  'Course, there is the question of collusion between the
governement and industry.  Only two companies will be allowed to
manufacture the chip, VLSI and Mykotronix.  Jeff Hendy, director of new
product marketing for VLSI, says his company expects to make $50 million of
the chip in the next 3 years.  (This from the San Jose Mercury News.)

Hopefully, I haven't left stuff out.  I am going to forward this to
cypherpunks for the experts there to check it out.

Think free,
--
Defeat the        Torin/Darren Stalder/Wolf           __
  Wiretap Chip    Internet:  dstalder@gmuvax2.gmu.edu \/ PGP2.x key available.
  Proposal!       Bitnet:    dstalder@gmuvax                  Finger me.
Write me for      Sprintnet: 1-703-845-1000
  details.        Snail:     10310 Main St., Suite 110/Fairfax, VA/22030/USA
DISCLAIMER: A society where such disclaimers are needed is saddening.






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: TO1SITTLER@APSICC.APS.EDU
Date: Tue, 20 Apr 93 12:23:58 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: cypherpunks vs. cryptoprivacy
Message-ID: <930420132135.2132@APSICC.APS.EDU>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



I agree with those who think that "CypherPunks" is a bad name for the list.
It brings up negative associations in the minds of outsiders, who are, after
all, the people who we want to influence against the Big Brother wiretap chip.

Kragen




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: wcs@anchor.ho.att.com
Date: Tue, 20 Apr 93 10:35:05 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Wiretapping chip: vid clips & sound bites
Message-ID: <9304201734.AA09381@anchor.ho.att.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text



I strongly agree with Ray Cromwell's suggestions that we consistently
refer to "the wiretap chip", and avoid "drug dealer" examples.
One that might be closer to home when you need an example is
	   "Suppose the IRS thinks you may have cheated on your income tax
	   and decides they want to wiretap your phone ..."

It's within the range of things people imagine could happen to them,
and it makes the point that it's *their* phone that's being trapped,
not some public enemy bogeyman.  Making it personal is important...

		   Bill 
# Bill Stewart    wcs@anchor.ho.att.com  +1-908-949-0705 Fax-4876
# AT&T Bell Labs, Room 4M-312, Crawfords Corner Rd, Holmdel, NJ  07733-3030




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: szabo@techbook.com (Nick Szabo)
Date: Tue, 20 Apr 93 13:33:45 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: WIRETAP: Non-technical statement
In-Reply-To: <9304201609.AA20256@churchy.gnu.ai.mit.edu>
Message-ID: <m0nlP2e-000huKC@techbook.techbook.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



> [proposed press statement]
> ....
> This has come to be known as the
> Wiretap chip since it allows any Law Enforcement agency to automatically
> decrypt any conversations made with it with a search warrant.
> ...

I understand there are some situations where law enforcement agencies
can gain access to keys _without_ a search warrant, and furthermore
access to the keys allows wiretapping of conversations that go well
beyond the scope of the search warrant.  This might be better phrased 
"with, or in many cases even without, a search warrant".

Does anybody know of specific examples of wiretapping without a 
search warrant, or beyond the scope of the search warrant that
we can cite?  Especially famous ones (didn't Nixon wiretap 
somebody?)

Question: does there need to be a warrant to search *both*
parties in a conversation, or just one?  What if one of the parties
is a foreign citizen calling from their homeland?  What about
conference calls?

In addition to lawyer-client and doctor-patient conversations, 
ubiquity of the wiretap chip allows the U.S. government exclusive access 
to recording the following calls under the rubric of a "secure" system:

* husband-wife
* psychologist-client
* priest-confessor
* foreign tourists, businessmen, and diplomats
* international phone calls 
* phone calls outside the U.S. involving Clipper phones
	(last I heard AT&T was planning to
	export the wiretap chip phone, can that be verified?)
* etc.

We might design a special press release to be sent to
the *international* press and foreign companies.  We might especially
target electronics giants like Matsushita, Phillips, Siemens, Fujitsu,
NEC, etc. that can make alternative chips if they feel there is market 
demand for privacy from U.S. spooks who speak of using the wiretap
chip to "enhance U.S. economic competitiveness".  This might be a joint
venture with U.S. companies like Security Technologies Inc. that 
AT&T and the U.S. government have screwed with their collusion.
The vast majority of consumer-product chips are manufactured outside the 
U.S.  It is doubtful that VLSI can compete, much less corner the market 
if international concern is raised over the potential U.S. wiretapping 
monopoly.  

However, we do need to do this in such a way that we do not encourage
foreign government escrow-key schemes.  Let's use the term "wiretap 
chip" for the entire class of escrow-key hardware schemes.  I think
we have a shot at giving the entire class of Denning-style schemes
a bad reputation in the international community.  One desirable
foreign government action would be to ban the import of phone
equipment containing escrow-key chips from the U.S.; a very
undesirable outcome is for foreign governments to set up their
own escrow-key systems.   Primarily, we want to give wiretap
chips a bad reputation in the market.

We also need to dig up information on the phone call archives being
kept by the NSA and other agencies.  How extensive are they?  Is
there any guarantee phone calls will be deleted after some period,
or are phone calls once tapped stored forever on some CD-ROM?
Can foreign companies operating in the U.S. have any confidence that
the U.S. government is not wiretapping their phones, gleaning trade
secrets and distributing them to favored U.S. megacorps like AT&T?
If we don't have answers to these questions we need to ask them,
in public and often.

Nick Szabo					szabo@techbook.com



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "L. Detweiler" <ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Date: Tue, 20 Apr 93 14:01:03 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Denning Unmasked
Message-ID: <9304202034.AA24791@crestone>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Denning, April 19
>I'd like to add that I was not in
>any way involved.  I found out about it when the FBI briefed me on
>Thursday evening, April 15.

Mr. May calls Mrs. Denning's claims that she was ``not in any way
involved'' with this project ``curious''. I'm a bit amazed at
everyone's tiptoeing around Mrs. Denning and reluctance to challenge
her outright given overwhelming evidence as to her two-facedness. Maybe
it is her established reputation in the field, maybe it is her
cryptography book, maybe it is her participation at conferences like CFP.

Nevertheless, I cannot let lies stand. Mrs. Denning wants to have her
cake and eat it too. She wants to be perceived as an unbiased academic
and taken seriously for her participation in scientific forums. She
also wants to mask her involvement in this proposal, which for me,
appears unequivocal, and only the *degree* and *extent* is unclear. I
cannot comprehend how she cannot be involved. It would not be so
outrageous if she stated that ``I cannot comment on my involvement for
obvious reasons''.  But her denial to me has all the signs of a
desperate fabrication.  Lets look at what she's done:

1. She was the *first*, if I'm not mistaken, to bring up the idea of
splitting keys among impartial agencies many months ago on sci.crypt
after the firestorm and barrage of protests on the initial balloon on
key registration.

2. She has shown ``prescient insight'' (as another tiptoer noted on
sci.crypt) into anticipating major aspects of the proposal.  Key
registration itself was largely unheard-of until she began advocating
the idea. She posts a massive technical description to sci.crypt less
than a week after her initial ``briefing''.

3. The rhetoric (more aptly called propaganda) of the public
announcement closely mirrors words and arguments she used in the
initial debate on sci.crypt, esp. the ``need to balance legitimate law
enforcement goals with privacy.''

4. Since she persists in her sheer, ugly chutzpuh, and people here and
on sci.crypt are still pussyfooting around her, I must offer my new evidence. 

In early April I became extremely concerned about her continuing
advocation of key registration in the recent further CACM articles in
the face of such vocal opposition and defiance on sci.crypt.  I was
astonished with the claims in her latest posting to sci.crypt when I
read it on 28 March, and replied to it.

I expressed my appreciation for her postings, because ``you're
definitely one of the most highly regard personalities in this area
posting publicly,'' (I was disenchanted enough then not to say
`authority') and I wrote of my extreme concern with her seeming evasion
of addressing critical aspects of the key-registration idea from a
scientific standpoint. I advised her to ``abandon the idea to salvage
the remainder of your reputation''. I will be quoting only some
critical parts of her letter now (there is only one, but it speaks
volumes), and I ask that I not be assaulted for this, because in my
opinion the extreme circumstances merit it, and her hypocrisies cannot
go unchallenged!  Her comments follow her pattern of revealing a few
more details of the overall plan after being violently assaulted on the
revealed ones. (I remind the reader that this all transpired before any
knowledge on my part whatsoever of the Clipper proposal, but apparently
not before her own...)

- - -

L.D.:  (Sun, 28 Mar 93 22:13:06 -0700)
>The issue is not that "the government is corrupt QED" but that such a
>system would be such a tremendous temptation to a government only bordering
>on moral rectitude, as ours generally is...  Part of the idea of 
>democracy is not even INTRODUCING mechanisms that have a potential for
>extremely insideous and treacherous abuse. 

D.D.: (Tue, 30 Mar 93 17:23:14 EST)
>I am convinced that with the new technologies and crypto, we can make it
>extremely difficult -- much more difficult than now -- for the government
>to perform illegal taps. 

L.D.:  (Sun, 28 Mar 93 22:13:06 -0700)
>I like those new technologies for the same revolutionary reasons.
>hehe, we can make it IMPOSSIBLE right now for the government to tap AT
>ALL. I guess you can imagine how appealing your proposal is in the face
>of this.  We're doing just fine, thank you very much. The best thing
>the government can do on this issue is STAY OUT OF IT. Given it's
>unweildy and intrusive history, this is quite an optimistic expectation.

- - -

L.D.:  (Sun, 28 Mar 93 22:13:06 -0700)
>There are just no good assurances that these kind of systems won't
>be radically abused, and until you describe precisely how to do this
>most reasonable people will not touch your proposals with a 20ft
>pole, even in cyberspace...

D.D.: (Tue, 30 Mar 93 17:23:14 EST)
>Obviously a much more detailed proposal would be needed in
>order to answer all the questions people have asked. 

L.D.: (Tue, 30 Mar 93 17:03:04 -0700)
>We eagerly await such a proposal from you or others, to show how none
>of the specifics can possibly be implemented without a totalitarian
>state, bizarre and unrealistic assumptions, unbearable and
>anti-competitive commercial restrictions, or new grotesque government 
>bureacracies.

- - -

L.D.:  (Sun, 28 Mar 93 22:13:06 -0700)
>The issue is not that "criminals won't comply QED"
>but that "enforcement is impossible except in a totalitarian state".

D.D.: (Tue, 30 Mar 93 17:23:14 EST)
>Not necessarily if you don't try to demand 100% compliance.  Everyone is
>required to register their car, and this has not required a totalitarian state.
>Compliance might be enforced only when there is already probably cause and
>a warrant issued.  Compliance might be promoted by putting requirements on
>products that are sold.

L.D.: (Tue, 30 Mar 93 17:03:04 -0700)
>I object to this vehemently. I consider this somewhat of a subterfuge.
>The public then may not be aware how much they are spending to promote
>an agenda of the anointed government officials' plans detrimental to
>privacy. It would weaken technological competiveness, for companies to
>be burdened by these artificial and warped restrictions.
>
>Unfortunately, I find it one of your most dangerously insidious ideas,
>because it has the most likelihood of influencing some naive,
>uninformed, and misguided policymaker...
>
>These policies you have in mind are exactly the kind that sound good on
>paper and intent, but when implemented come nothing close to the
>intentions of the purveyors, who on hint of failure would then
>disassociate themselves, saying that ``it wasn't implemented according
>to my suggestions.''  That's the problem, its an inherently flawed idea
>to begin with, and NO implementation would have the desired effect...

- - -

D.D.: (Tue, 30 Mar 93 17:23:14 EST)
>I do not find 
>sci.crypt a constructive environment to explore the issues or try to develop
>a more concrete proposal, so I will use other forums for this.

L.D.: (Tue, 30 Mar 93 17:03:04 -0700)
>definitely, Usenet has all the delicacy, subtlety and finesse of a
>melee. On the other hand, it also has a low tolerance for pretentious
>and impractical ideas ...
>
>I'm serious. I think you ought to stop promoting the idea. Otherwise,
>the label "Denning Proposal" will have all the valiant credibility that
>the label "Chamberlain Treaty" had after WWII....  Don't say I didn't warn
>you!
>
>Do you know how much trouble the NSA has caused for the development and
>proliferation of cryptography?  Do you think they have harmed American
>interests in the international market? Weakened their ability to
>compete? I guarantee that all this would PALE TOTALLY in comparison to
>any kind of key-registration scheme, and would earn its advocates, in
>historical hindsight, the utmost black discredit imaginable.

- - -

Mrs. Denning did not respond to my letter of Tue, 30 Mar 93 17:03:04
-0700,  for obvious reasons... Let me add that of all the things she
wrote about, the `commercial compliance by requirements on products
sold' alarmed me the most, and I thought she might be hinting at
Telephony-style bill.  I considered sending a warning to the cypherpunk
list, but decided that it would be premature and I intended to watch
and wait for more signs first...

Perhaps I am condemning aspects of my own future in academic circles
for attacking Denning. Perhaps I am the subject of zealous blacklisting
at this moment for my public comments on the Clipper chip. But I cannot
be silent in the face of repulsive and outrageous hypocrisy.

Because of her denial, I have no alternative but to recognize Mrs.
Denning as the intellectual and moral equivalent of a double-agent. 
She is a traitor to at least *one* cause.  I hope her friends involved
in the Clipper proposal appreciate her work in that area, because, for
me, she no longer has any credibility whatsoever as an unbiased
cryptographic authority or an honest and ethical scientist.  Like a
compromised code, the integrity has been lost...

NOTE! this letter is a *warning* for the private cypherpunks list only!
I do not grant, and specifically prohibit, redistribution. If Mrs.
Denning publicly addresses the points I have raised in this letter, I
will consider my sincere trust misguided and violated.





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: norm@netcom.com (Norman Hardy)
Date: Tue, 20 Apr 93 14:45:48 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Webs of Trust vs Trees of Trust
Message-ID: <9304202145.AA19546@netcom2.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I have worked with the NCSC (National Computer Security Center)
on certifying operating systems according to the "Orange Book".
 
As I understand RIPEM there is a tree of agencies such that everyone
must trust all elements of the tree between him and the root.
This is much ingrained in all of the legally mandated security
systems that I am aware of. It assumes, at first glance, that there
is a root, an inner sanctum, which is totally trusted by all.
 
The Orange Book for operating system security has such assumptions
embedded deeply. We had to essentially weeken our security features
by disableing our "mutually supicious user" logic to meet their
requirements.
>In <40485.pfarrell@cs.gmu.edu> Pat Farrell says:
>At this Fall's National Computer Security Conference, Mr. McNulty
>was a speaker on the NIST's digital signature session. They talked about
>both the non-RSA DSS, and use of Certifying Authorities with a RSA-based
>scheme.
>>At that same conference, I gave a paper on security that described
>a fishnet of trust between systems. This was written in February 92,
>well before I read Phil's "web of trust" from the PGP docs, which I
>read sometime over the summer.
 
>During the Q&A, I asked Mr NcNulty to compare the advantages and
>disadvantages of a heirarchical CA approach to an interlocking fishnet/web
>of trust. I hoped he would at least recognize that any heirarchy has
>problems from the top down if an upper level is compromised. Instead,
>he could not address any differences. I believe that working in the
>government has made the hierarchy seem to be the only implementation that
>he envisioned. He fobbed the question off to one of his technical
>underlings, but he, too, was unable to answer it (or even coherently
>address it).
 
It is a pervasive mind-set in military security.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: norm@netcom.com (Norman Hardy)
Date: Tue, 20 Apr 93 15:46:00 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Webs of Trust vs Trees of Trust
Message-ID: <9304202246.AA26311@netcom2.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I have worked with the NCSC (National Computer Security Center)
on certifying operating systems according to the "Orange Book".
 
As I understand RIPEM there is a tree of agencies such that everyone
must trust all elements of the tree between him and the root.
This is much ingrained in all of the legally mandated security
systems that I am aware of. It assumes, at first glance, that there
is a root, an inner sanctum, which is totally trusted by all.
 
The Orange Book for operating system security has such assumptions
embedded deeply. We had to essentially weeken our security features
by disableing our "mutually supicious user" logic to meet their
requirements.
>In <40485.pfarrell@cs.gmu.edu> Pat Farrell says:
>At this Fall's National Computer Security Conference, Mr. McNulty
>was a speaker on the NIST's digital signature session. They talked about
>both the non-RSA DSS, and use of Certifying Authorities with a RSA-based
>scheme.
>>At that same conference, I gave a paper on security that described
>a fishnet of trust between systems. This was written in February 92,
>well before I read Phil's "web of trust" from the PGP docs, which I
>read sometime over the summer.
 
>During the Q&A, I asked Mr NcNulty to compare the advantages and
>disadvantages of a heirarchical CA approach to an interlocking fishnet/web
>of trust. I hoped he would at least recognize that any heirarchy has
>problems from the top down if an upper level is compromised. Instead,
>he could not address any differences. I believe that working in the
>government has made the hierarchy seem to be the only implementation that
>he envisioned. He fobbed the question off to one of his technical
>underlings, but he, too, was unable to answer it (or even coherently
>address it).
 
It is a pervasive mind-set in military security.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Hal <74076.1041@CompuServe.COM>
Date: Tue, 20 Apr 93 13:13:48 PDT
To: CYPHERPUNKS <CYPHERPUNKS@toad.com>
Subject: Re: Another Clipper weakness
Message-ID: <930420195747_74076.1041_FHD36-1@CompuServe.COM>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

From: "Perry E. Metzger" <pmetzger@lehman.com>

> I've just looked over the proposal again, and I've seen no mention of
> random inputs -- only that the 30 bit key would get a "fixed 34 bit
> padding" added to it.

Here is what Denning's writeup says:

  At the beginning of a session, a trusted agent from each of the two key
  escrow agencies enters the vault.  Agent 1 enters an 80-bit value S1
  into the laptop and agent 2 enters an 80-bit value S2. These values
  serve as seeds to generate keys for a sequence of serial numbers.
  
  To generate the unit key for a serial number N, the 30-bit value N is
  first padded with a fixed 34-bit block to produce a 64-bit block N1.
  S1 and S2 are then used as keys to triple-encrypt N1, producing a
  64-bit block R1:
  
          R1 = E[D[E[N1; S1]; S2]; S1] .
  
  Similarly, N is padded with two other 34-bit blocks to produce N2 and
  N3, and two additional 64-bit blocks R2 and R3 are computed:  
  
          R2 = E[D[E[N2; S1]; S2]; S1] 
          R3 = E[D[E[N3; S1]; S2]; S1] .
  
  R1, R2, and R3 are then concatenated together, giving 192 bits. The
  first 80 bits are assigned to U1 and the second 80 bits to U2.  The
  rest are discarded.  The unit key U is the XOR of U1 and U2.  U1 and U2
  are the key parts that are separately escrowed with the two escrow
  agencies.

Here, the notiation E[X; Y] means to encrypt 64-bit number X using 80-bit
key Y with the Skipjack algorithm.

U1 and U2 come from concatenating R1, R2, and R3.
Each of R1, R2, and R3 is a function not only of N, the serial number,
along with the 3 fixed 34-bit blocks, but also S1 and S2, the two random
numbers entered by agents from the escrow organizations.


> > The one problem is that S1 and S2 are not changed for each chip, but are
> > rather kept the same in programming a batch of about 300 chips.  Then
> > they are supposed to be destroyed.
> 
> This was not clearly implied, either. Furthermore, no clear reason has
> been stated why all this complexity is needed and U1 and U2 can't just
> be randomly generated.

  All Clipper Chips are programmed inside a SCIF (secure computer
  information facility), which is essentially a vault.  The SCIF contains
  a laptop computer and equipment to program the chips.  About 300 chips
  are programmed during a single session.  The SCIF is located at
  Mikotronx.

I agree that the process seems complex.  Why should the keys
U1 and U2 be correlated with the serial number in this way?  Here is
one thought:

The most straightforward approach would be to get two random seeds,
S1 and S2, and use them to run a PRNG that produces U1 and U2, the
two key-halves, and N, the serial number.

But the problem with this is that you are depending on the security
of your PRNG to ensure that there is no correlation between N and
U1/U2.  Ordinary PRNG's might allow some correlation to exist.  This
would be weak because then just knowing the N of your chip might allow
a good organization like NSA to crunch out U1 and U2 without going
through the escrow agencies, by exploiting weaknesses in the PRNG.

Instead, they go through a roundabout process which appears to show that
the relationship between N and U1/U2 is as strong as the Skipjack
algorithm itself, in fact when run in a triple-encryption mode.
If NSA had a way, given N, to produce U1/U2, then it would appear
that they must be able to break Skipjack, in which case they wouldn't
need U1/U2.  So this key generation process can be argued not to
introduce any new vulnerability in the system.

Hal

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From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Perry E. Metzger" <pmetzger@lehman.com>
Date: Tue, 20 Apr 93 13:32:50 PDT
To: Hal <74076.1041@compuserve.com>
Subject: Re: Another Clipper weakness
In-Reply-To: <930420195747_74076.1041_FHD36-1@CompuServe.COM>
Message-ID: <9304202032.AA23137@snark.shearson.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Hal says:
> Here is what Denning's writeup says:
> 
>   At the beginning of a session, a trusted agent from each of the two key
>   escrow agencies enters the vault.  Agent 1 enters an 80-bit value S1
>   into the laptop and agent 2 enters an 80-bit value S2. These values
>   serve as seeds to generate keys for a sequence of serial numbers.
>   
>   To generate the unit key for a serial number N, the 30-bit value N is
>   first padded with a fixed 34-bit block to produce a 64-bit block N1.
>   S1 and S2 are then used as keys to triple-encrypt N1, producing a
>   64-bit block R1:
[...]

I've reread the text again. There seems to be no assurance at all that
S1 and S2 are random or that they are not the same for all chips.
There also seems to be no rational explanation of why N is only thirty
bits long -- its a strange number in the modern world of computing.

> I agree that the process seems complex.  Why should the keys
> U1 and U2 be correlated with the serial number in this way?  Here is
> one thought:
> 
> The most straightforward approach would be to get two random seeds,
> S1 and S2, and use them to run a PRNG that produces U1 and U2, the
> two key-halves, and N, the serial number.

The number N is not secret and is not random -- it is therefore not
necessary that the PRNG generate N, and indeed N is not generated, it
is given. Its presumably just an ordinary serial number.

> But the problem with this is that you are depending on the security
> of your PRNG to ensure that there is no correlation between N and
> U1/U2.  Ordinary PRNG's might allow some correlation to exist.  This
> would be weak because then just knowing the N of your chip might allow
> a good organization like NSA to crunch out U1 and U2 without going
> through the escrow agencies, by exploiting weaknesses in the PRNG.
> 
> Instead, they go through a roundabout process which appears to show that
> the relationship between N and U1/U2 is as strong as the Skipjack
> algorithm itself, in fact when run in a triple-encryption mode.
> If NSA had a way, given N, to produce U1/U2, then it would appear
> that they must be able to break Skipjack, in which case they wouldn't
> need U1/U2.  So this key generation process can be argued not to
> introduce any new vulnerability in the system.

Why not just generate U1 and U2 by a more straighforward approach that
doesn't involve strange padding and odd randomly selected constants?
Indeed, why not just use true random numbers? Surely a radioactive
source isn't unavailable to Mykotronix.

Furthermore, Denning says about 300 chips are programmed in a batch
using baroque methods in a vault. Well, folks, that just won't do if
twenty or thirty million of these babys are being sold a year -- or
even if just five million are sold a year. Seems to me that the
processing is going to have to get more efficient, and likely thus
much more sloppy.

Perry




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: norm@netcom.com (Norman Hardy)
Date: Tue, 20 Apr 93 17:08:25 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Anonymous Remailers, WB etc.
Message-ID: <9304210008.AA25503@netcom4.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


If I were chartered to be prepared to find the source
of anonymous mail, and had the money, attitude and
resources that skeptics among us assume are available
for such efforts, here is how I would proceed. This plan
is due, in part, to my experience in building secure operating
systems.
 
I would catalog the various weaknesses of Unix and perhaps
other systems where the remailers live.
I would make a list of remailers and suspected remailers.
I would design programs that would inhabit the remailer machines
benignly except for gathering information that I need.
 
Such efforts are a natural by product of the public NCSC charter
to know OS weaknesses.
 
I would further examine the IP protocols for weaknesses.
Those protocols trust not only the machines thru which the 
data flows but also trusts other machines on the net not to
introduce phony datagrams that at least bolix legitimate
traffic and may well spoof it. This is aided by a real time
passive tap on the links carrying the legitimate traffic.
 
It is not the style of this group to study OS security and I don't
propose to change the style. OS security and protocol security may,
however, be an Achilles heel to anonymity.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Hal <74076.1041@CompuServe.COM>
Date: Tue, 20 Apr 93 14:26:00 PDT
To: CYPHERPUNKS <CYPHERPUNKS@toad.com>
Subject: Re: Another Clipper weakness
Message-ID: <930420210931_74076.1041_FHD64-1@CompuServe.COM>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

From: "Perry E. Metzger" <pmetzger@lehman.com>

> The number N is not secret and is not random -- it is therefore not
> necessary that the PRNG generate N, and indeed N is not generated, it
> is given. Its presumably just an ordinary serial number.

Yes, sorry, I was confused about that.  N is indeed an ordinary serial
number.

> Why not just generate U1 and U2 by a more straighforward approach that
> doesn't involve strange padding and odd randomly selected constants?
> Indeed, why not just use true random numbers? Surely a radioactive
> source isn't unavailable to Mykotronix.

Again, I think the fact that the S1 and S2 are introduced by agents
of the escrow organizations is supposed to make the process appear more
trustworthy.  Since the escrow organizations must be trusted, it does
not add any weaknesses to have them creating the random seeds for the
keys.

Getting numbers from a true random source would be better in some ways,
but it would be hard to know whether the source was truly random and
was not subtly hacked by the NSA to reduce the randomness.  Verifying
the randomness of a black box could not be done easily on site.  With
the S1/S2 approach, theoretically an escrow agent could stop the process
at some point and issue a challenge, making S1 and S2 public and verifying
that the keys were in fact generated by the specified algorithm.  However,
there has been no discussion of such a challenge in the key-creation
protocol.

> Furthermore, Denning says about 300 chips are programmed in a batch
> using baroque methods in a vault. Well, folks, that just won't do if
> twenty or thirty million of these babys are being sold a year -- or
> even if just five million are sold a year. Seems to me that the
> processing is going to have to get more efficient, and likely thus
> much more sloppy.

Yes, this is a good point, although it depends on the specific numbers
of chips being produced and how long it takes to go through this process
for a batch of 300 chips.  I gather that the chips are actually programmed
in this vault, under control of the laptop computer which holds the
keys (and is then destroyed?  Ha!).  If they had a batch programmer
which actually did 300 chips in a tray, then several batches could be
done in a sitting.

There are probably a few hundred million phones in the U.S., but I
doubt that more than a few percent of them would be secure phones in
the next three or four years.  This might correspond to a production
level of a few hundred thousand chips per year, which would be a
couple of dozen batches per week.  This sounds doable.  Beyond this
point there would be problems, though.  Probably other manufacturers
would be involved by then.

Hal

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From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Timothy Newsham <newsham@wiliki.eng.hawaii.edu>
Date: Tue, 20 Apr 93 20:30:16 PDT
To: psionic@wam.umd.edu (Haywood J. Blowme)
Subject: Re: Artilce
In-Reply-To: <199304210237.AA27464@rac3.wam.umd.edu>
Message-ID: <9304210329.AA07440@relay2.UU.NET>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



this is exactly like the vhs vs. beta issue.

Beta is technically superior,  yet it isnt used because
its non-standard,  its just too good for our public :)




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: zane@genesis.mcs.com (Sameer)
Date: Tue, 20 Apr 93 17:28:52 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Petition to Clinton, digisigned
Message-ID: <m0nlSSC-000MU8C@genesis.mcs.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


	I noticed someone post about writing up a petition and emailing it
to Pres. Clinton, signing it with digital signatures, but that was in a
joking manner. To me it seems like a good idea. What do others think?
Good/bad?
	(I'm not too PGP-experienced-- The petition would be circulated and
people would create "signature certificates" and forward those to the
person sending the petition-- once all the signatures are collected then
the petition and all the certificates would be sent together? I'd
imagine that the signatures certs could be sent in a different package
than the petition, but I don't think Clinton's aides would be able to
recognize that all the certificates belong with the petition.)

--
| Sameer Parekh-zane@genesis.MCS.COM-PFA related mail to pfa@genesis.MCS.COM |
| Apprentice Philosopher, Writer, Physicist, Healer, Programmer, Lover, more |
| "Be God" - Me __ "Specialization is for Insects" - Robert A. Heinlein ____/
 \_____________/  \____________________________________________________/ 




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Douglas Barnes <wixer!wixer.bga.com!gumby@cactus.org>
Date: Tue, 20 Apr 93 21:11:35 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Objections...
In-Reply-To: <199304201220.AA27725@access.digex.com>
Message-ID: <9304210108.AA07845@wixer>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Peter Wayner writes:

> I think this is the most practical and non-inflamatory argument
> for public access to the algorithm.

Along the same lines, I am left scratching my head about the 
"baroque activities in the vault." Surely this is going to 
add substantially to the cost of these chips over a system
that uses a known algorithm and non-escrowed keys.

Given that such a system would be cheaper to produce and would 
offer stronger security, I think it is not especially
inflamatory to suggest that the government is contemplating
either an outright ban or the strong discouragement of 
alternative systems.

-- Doug Barnes
(gumby@wixer.bga.com)




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: uni@acs.bu.edu (Shaen Bernhardt)
Date: Tue, 20 Apr 93 17:23:27 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: No Subject
Message-ID: <9304210023.AA194636@acs.bu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Does anybody know of specific examples of wiretapping without a
search warrant, or beyond the scope of the search warrant that
we can cite?  Especially famous ones (didn't Nixon wiretap
somebody?)
 
-----


By exec. order (12333 is it?)  those suspected of espionage for a
foreign may be wiretaped, searched without warrant.

(foreign = foreign power)





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Mark C. Henderson <markh@wimsey.bc.ca>
Date: Tue, 20 Apr 93 20:43:40 PDT
To: norm@netcom.com (Norman Hardy)
Subject: Re: Webs of Trust vs Trees of Trust
Message-ID: <m0nlVPm-0001B2C@squirrel.wimsey.bc.ca>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

Subject: Re: Webs of Trust vs Trees of Trust

On Apr 20, 14:45, Norman Hardy wrote:
} Subject: Webs of Trust vs Trees of Trust
} As I understand RIPEM there is a tree of agencies such that everyone
} must trust all elements of the tree between him and the root.

I just want to point out (as has been pointed out before) that it is a 
mistake to confuse RIPEM with PEM. 

RIPEM is an implementation of a subset of PEM. At this moment, RIPEM has
absolutely no support for certificates or signed public keys.

PEM on the other hand, is a draft internet standard which requires
certificates and a hierarchy that can be described as a "Tree of Trust".

There are at least a couple of full PEM implementations. Probably
the best known at this point is the one from T.I.S. which is currently
in beta test.

Apologies in advance for cluttering the mailboxes of the majority
of cypherpunks who already know this.

Mark

- -- 
Mark Henderson
mch@squirrel.wimsey.bc.ca
markh@wimsey.bc.ca

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From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Eli Brandt <ebrandt@jarthur.Claremont.EDU>
Date: Tue, 20 Apr 93 21:07:30 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Article
In-Reply-To: <199304210237.AA27464@rac3.wam.umd.edu>
Message-ID: <9304210407.AA29203@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> From: "Haywood J. Blowme" <psionic@wam.umd.edu>
[ quoting an article ]

>    President Clinton gave a major boost yesterday to one telephone-
> scrambler technology in a decision its delighted manufacture likens to the
> choice of VHS over Beta for videotape machines.

Interesting that they picked that particular analogy.  It's quite
close, in that it's an inferior technology winning over a superior
one.  It's different, of course, in that the Federales had nothing
to do with videotape standards (afaik), and certainly didn't outlaw
Beta.

>    An administration official said the consideration will be given to
> BANNING more sophisticated systems investigators cannot crack, thereby
> creating a balance between banning private encryption and declaring a public
> right to unbreakably coded coversations.

Right on schedule.  "Consideration will be given", will it?
This looks like a good time to load up on source code and photocopy
relevant journal articles.

While it won't sway Joe Public much, it's worth remembering that the
suppression of strong communications privacy will also make it
difficult or impossible to get good digicash (or other systems relying
on cryptographic techniques) deployed before our government proposes
its "just one little loophole" scheme, HarmoniousBalanceCash.  Don't
worry, transaction records will only be released upon formal request
from the IRS or a major marketing division, and only suspected drug
users and potential terrorists will have their assets annulled.  And
statute strictly prohibits intelligence agencies from padding their
assassination budgets by using the loophole to forge cash.

	 PGP 2 key by finger or e-mail   (offer void when prohibited)
   Eli   ebrandt@jarthur.claremont.edu





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: szabo@techbook.com (Nick Szabo)
Date: Tue, 20 Apr 93 21:08:38 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: European front: wiretapping vs. GSM
Message-ID: <m0nlW9s-000hv7C@techbook.techbook.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Forwarded from comp.dcom.telecom:

Subject: Re: Truly Amazing, Truly Amazing ... Feds
Reply-To: Michael_Lyman@sat.mot.com
Message-ID: <telecom13.254.17@eecs.nwu.edu>
Organization: Motorola Inc. - Satellite Communications
Sender: Telecom@eecs.nwu.edu

In article 1@eecs.nwu.edu, naddy@mips.ruessel.sub.org (Christian
Weisgerber) writes:

> I wonder, is the signal only digitally encoded or digitally encoded
> and *additionally* encrypted?

Yes on both counts. On the air interface between the base station (
BSS ) and mobile station ( MS ) the signals are digitally encoded.
Traffic channel rate is 13 Kb/s. In addition to this, ciphering is
done to protect the signalling channel such that user data privacy is
provided then, encryption is provided for all voice traffic. As an
aside, the GSM system also assigns "alias" subscriber numbers which
are changed automatically with ( usually ) every call -- the
subscribers real phone number is never ( well, almost never ) used
over the air.

> I'm getting a little paranoid over this, but in Germany when you buy
> an approved wireless phone you are told that it is impossible to
> listen in to it. Bullsh*t. In fact it's only impossible to listen in
> with another (unmodified) wireless phone -- just get a scanner and
> you're in.

For GSM, the level of privacy for both signalling and voice is
considerable.  Just to give you an idea, encryption keys change for
each call made by the subscriber and the encryption algorithms use the
changing physical properties of the radio channel.

As a matter of fact, GSM is SO secure that several European
governments including Britain are insisting that the scrambling
algorithm ( called A5 in GSM ) be modified to allow at least
government operatives ( read "undercover eavesdroppers" ) to listen in
on suspected criminal activities. Agencies such as GCHQ, the British
government's listening post near Cheltenham and the FBI in America are
concerned that the A5 scrambling algorithm provided with the GSM
Mobile Stations is equivalent to many military systems and in fact
when exported may be adapted for military applications.

Vendors of GSM equipment are starting to run into export problems due
to the nature of the encryption / ciphering.

Although there are some industrious "scanners" out there, I dare say
that listening in on a GSM conversation will be a bit of a job.


Michael Lyman    Motorola - Iridium     Phoenix, Arizona



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: eab@msc.edu (Edward Bertsch)
Date: Tue, 20 Apr 93 20:20:57 PDT
To: hughes@soda.berkeley.edu (Eric Hughes)
Subject: Re: Ad hoc Cypherpunks meeting April 24
In-Reply-To: <9304201754.AA23465@soda.berkeley.edu>
Message-ID: <9304210320.AA01800@uh.msc.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text


As I wasn't able to attend this meeting (for obvious geographic reasons)
I did the next best thing (and urge every concerned list member to do
the same):

I gave my elected goons^h^h^h^h^hpoliticians a barrage of fax messages
on the subject.  If you don't have a fax modem, it's about time you get
one, it really is the best way to make your views heard by your
elected thugs (and to have them heard in your words, not summarized
like will happen when you call and give your message to their staff
by voice).  I write one leter, then select multiple (local) fax phone
#'s to send it to.  The program takes care of the rest.

(I use a multitech modem with a beta version of the windows print
capture fax software)

Get PGP22 before it becomes illegal!

Edward A. Bertsch (eab@msc.edu)   Minnesota Supercomputer Center, Inc.
Operations/User Services          1200 Washington Avenue South
(612) 626-1888 work               Minneapolis, Minnesota  55415
(612) 645-0168 voice mail         FAX: (612) 624-6550



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Haywood J. Blowme" <psionic@wam.umd.edu>
Date: Tue, 20 Apr 93 19:37:26 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Artilce
Message-ID: <199304210237.AA27464@rac3.wam.umd.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


                        The Washington Times
               April 17, 1993 Saturday, Final Edition
 
 
        Government picks affordable chip to scramble phone calls.
 
                          By Frank J. Murray
 
          [Nasty sarcastic comments inserted by psionic@wam.umd.edu ]
          [Typing errors by me.                                     ]
 
 
   President Clinton gave a major boost yesterday to one telephone-
scrambler technology in a decision its delighted manufacture likens to the
choice of VHS over Beta for videotape machines.
 
   Mr. Clinton's action could allow the use of relatively cheap scramblers on
almost every cellular, business and government phone and make scramblers
common even on ordinary home telephones.
 
   An administration official said the consideration will be given to
BANNING more sophisticated systems investigators cannot crack, thereby
creating a balance between banning private encryption and declaring a public
right to unbreakably coded coversations.
^^^^^
     [Does this assert that the government has an inherent right to ]
     [hear everything its citizens say? Or does it mean that only   ]
     [the government has a right to good encryption systems??       ]
 
   "We've got a balance we've got to strike between the public's important
need for privacy and the public's need to be assured it's save from crime,"
                                                                    ^^^^^
 [What crime? Please cite an example where an encrypted message was later]
 [proven to be connected with a criminal activity. (Messages intercepted ]
 [from the CIA don't count because they never do anything illegal.)      ]
 [Also what are the chances that a criminal that doesn't want to get     ]
 [caught will actually use this crippled chip?                           ]
 
said Raymond G. Kammer, acting director of the National Institute of
Standards and Technology, which developed the system with the National
Security Agency.
 
 [And of course the NSA would never think of listening to every sattelite ]
 [communication coming into and out of this country would they?           ]
 
   In an unusual decision he said was examined by the National Security
Council, Mr. Clinton directed the Commerce and Justice departments to
encourage the development of the high-tech system, which inludes electronic
master keys to enable law enforcement officials to decode transmissions if
they obtain court orders.
 
   "This technology preserves the ability of federal, state and local law
enforcement agencies to intercept lawfully the phone conversations of
criminals." Mr. Clinton said, citing the fear that encryptoed phones could
aid terrorists and drug dealers.
    ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
 
  [If you want to spook americans, just say the word terrorist or drug  ]
  [dealer. Realistically, they have the money to buy good, secure crypto]
  [gear. Again, is this system to realy catch "Drug dealers" and        ]
  ["terrorists", or is it to spy on citizens and businesses??           ]
 
   The system is designed to protect from unauthorized interception the
electronic transmission of conversations, computer data and video images at
a cost per telephone that could be under $30, said Ted Bettwy, executive
vice president of the manufactureer, Mykotronx Inc. of Torrance, Calif.
 
   He said the chip announced yesterday, internally referred to as MYK-78,
costs about $40 and uses an algorithm 16 million times more complex than
that used by chips now on the market. Computer hackers have penetrated the
current chips.
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
 
  [This is incorrect. If they have penetrated the "Current Chips" this is ]
  [news to me. If they could break the current technology so easily then  ]
  [there would be no need for the clipper chip would there?               ]
 
The new chip uses an 80-bit code instead of the 56-bit code that is the
digital encryption standard (DES).
 
  [Yeah, well IDEA uses a 128 bit key. My RSA Public key is 1024 bits.    ]
  [If I were to use an 80 bit public key that would be considered weak.   ]
  [So I don't care how many bits it has, I want to see the algorithm and  ]
  [then decide. Too bad it's classified...                                ]
 
   The new chip eventually could sell in lots of 10,000 for about $25 each,
Mr. Kammer said, with later versions priced around $10 each.
 
   Government engineers at NSA and the Commerce Department's NIST designed
and developed the chip, which was then produced by privately owned Mykotronx
and a publicly traded subcontractor, VLSI Technology.
 
   A Silver Spring [Maryland] competitor cried foul, particularly because
the commercial device was developed without notice or competitive bids in a
classified laboratory that does work for the National Security Agency.
 
   "If the purpose of this chip is to catch bad guys, then no bad guy will
use it." said Stephen Bryen of Secure Communications Technology in Silver
Spring, which produces a competitive chip he said could sell for $10.
 
   "The answer is to invest more money intor breaking codes," Mr. Bryen said
in an interview after yesterday's announcement. "They're trying to put us
out of business."
 
   Mr. Kammer said the secrecy was justified.
 
   "The technology we're using was actually developed in a classified
environment in the first place and then transferred to a sole-source
supplier. I don't know that there was any way around it," he said in an
interview.
 
   The Justice Department will buy several thousand of the Mykotronx
devices, which use a "Clipper Chip." They are being incorporated into other
systems by Mororola and American Telegraph & Telephone Co., Mr Bettwy said.
 
  [So this means that secret agencies will still have access to secure ]
  [communications devices. While the ordinary person will not. Sounds  ]
  [fair enough for me!                                                 ]
 
   Other sophisticated encryption systems do not allow ready access for
authorized law enforcement purposes, said Mr. Bryen, who predicted that an
^^^^^^^^^^
          [Also don't allow access for unauthorized law enforcement either]
 
elaborate security plan for the electronic master key would not prevent
misuse.
 
   Mike Newman, a spokesman for the National Institute of Standards and
Technology, said "The key is split into two parts and stored separately to
ensure security of the key system."
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
  [If the key is stored in a computer database, then unauthorized access]
  [is possible no matter what precautions are taken to ensure security. ]
 
   Access would be provided to the two parts for an agency that produced
legitimate authority or a court order, he said. The Justice Department will
determine whether the two parts will be held by separate federal agencies or
a federal agency and a private agency.
 
   "This chip is going to do something that we, the citizens, really need,
and that is to allow us the privacy we want as common citizens," Mr. Bettwy
said in a telephone interview from California yesterday.
 
  [Translation: "This chip is going to do something that we, the NSA,   ]  
  [really need, and that is to allow us to listen to whoever we want    ]
  [whenever we want to, whether they are private citizens, or commercial]
  [organizations."                                                      ]
 
   He said the vital part of yesterday's decision is the government's
declaration that it intends to use the device. Mr. Bettwy says that use will
establish his device as the new standard and will require private facilities
to use the same system to communicate with the govenment.
 
   He said the decision's impact is "exactly" like the adoption of VHS
standards, making most private use of Beta video systems obsolete.
 
  [But that doesn't mean that VHS is better just because it is the standard]
 
   "I hope that's true," he said of the business implications for Mykotronx.
"We're hoping this will become the new standard."
 
  [Translation: "I hope that's true," he said of the business implications]
  [for Mykotronx. "Because were going to reap a lot of cash out of this   ]
  [bloated hoax of a system.                                              ]
 
   Only compatible phones can receive secure communications from a phone
using a clipper chip.
 
   "To me the real siginificance is if everybody uses this, everybody can
talk to anyone else," Mr. Bettwy said.
 
  [And only the govt. can listen. That makes me feel safe.]
 
   "It creates false hope," Mr. Bryen said.
 
   "The secret key could fall into other people's hands. When you create a
system that has a back door, other people will find the back door."
 
   [Amen. ]
 
 
------------ end of article -----------------

The government is making this chip out as a great gift to humanity. This is
really too bad because people are losing quite a bit of privacy with this
new farce the government is trying to pull. I'm writing my congressman tommorrow
to voice my concerns.

Also I'll try to contact the company mentioned in there (in Silver Spring, MD)
to find out information about their chip. I'll post the information here..


=============================================================================
      ///    | psionic@wam.umd.edu | Fight the WIRETAP CHIP!! Ask me how!
 __  /// C=  |                     |
 \\\/// Amiga| PGP Key Available   | "Those who would give up liberty for
  \///  1200 | by request.         |  security deserve neither."
=============================================================================




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Date: Tue, 20 Apr 93 23:26:27 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Proliferating Cypherpunks Groups!
In-Reply-To: <3Tcc3B1w165w@sytex.com>
Message-ID: <9304210626.AA22823@netcom3.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Paul Ferguson writes:

>  You're right, Eric -- we are mad as hell, too. But I'm not about to
>  jump on a flight to the west coast to simply share strategies. The
>  fact that I would even consider it negates the functions which we are
>  working towards, no? I propose that us east coasters organize and
>  meet as well. Pat and I are DC bourne, for those interested, I'd like
>  to propose a DC local meeting. Suggestions? Keep in mind that I'm in
>  NYC during the week, so my only available meeting times aare on the
>  weekends. (By the way, lets get our shit together DC'ers. We need
>  technologists, not lacidaisical idealisms.)
>  
>  Your DC based Cypherpunk group is hereby established. BTW, if anyone

Hear, hear! We need more such groups!

I get occasional messages from folks bemoaning the fact that the
Silicon Valley seems to be where it's all happening. Well, it's easier
for *you folks* in other areas to pull together a local meeting than
it was for Eric Hughes and others of us to set up the first such
meeting last September. A list now exists and that helps a lot.

(I'll grant you that some of your communities may be more scattered
and out-of-touch with each other than our community was...it seems we
in the Bay Area mostly all know each other through frequent parties,
Hackers Conferences, science fiction groups and parties, high-tech
startups, Xanadu, VR, "Mondo 2000," "Wired," and so on. In other
less-interconnected areas, you may have to advertise well in advance
on this list and perhaps even elsewhere to reach enough like-minded
people. But not to sound snotty or anything, that's how your
"backwater" regions like Washington can become "happening" places like
our area....actually, this is a gross exaggeration, as D.C. has had a
very active "2600" group, as has NYC, so neither is a backwater.)

There are currently 3 groups holding physical meetings, that I know
of:

* Silicon Valley/San Francisco Bay Area, meeting since September.

* UK Cypherpunks, meeting in London since around December/January.

* Boston Cypherpunks, just had its first meeting recently.

There are several very active Cypherpunks in the Southern California
area, covering San Diego, LA, and as far north as Santa Barbara. Some
of them have asked us to have a Cypherpunks meeting down there, which
we may still do (personally, I favor some kind of "West Coast
Cypherpunks" meeting just before or just after the Crypto Conference
this summer, held as always in Santa Barbara. Santa Barbara is about
halfway between the two extremes, and is a nice place to meet.). 

But a better idea is for the SoCal Cypherpunks to form their own
group.

Likewise, the Washington, D.C. area seems a natural spot, as there are
several Cypherpunks that I know of off-hand who're in the area.

New York, too.

Well, you get the point. No permission is needed!

Good luck in these dark days.


-Tim May

-- 
..........................................................................
Timothy C. May         | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,  
tcmay@netcom.com       | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
408-688-5409           | knowledge, reputations, information markets, 
W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA  | black markets, collapse of governments.
Higher Power: 2^756839 | Public Key: PGP and MailSafe available.





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: szabo@techbook.com (Nick Szabo)
Date: Tue, 20 Apr 93 23:26:42 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: FAQ: Overview of crypto
Message-ID: <m0nlYJS-000hvOC@techbook.techbook.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



The wiretap chip has generated quite a bit of new interest in
learning how to protect our electronic privacy.  We need to
bring folks up to speed quickly on practical use of crypto,
so I'm going to write up some mini-FAQs.  Experts, please send me 
succinct descriptions of PGP, anonymous remailers, the Clipper 
wiretap chip, GMS, or anything else you feel is an important basic.  
Alternatively, write up and post your own FAQ, and we'll sort it 
out later.

Here is an overview of computer-based crypto that Bill Stewart posted a
few weeks ago.

Nick Szabo					szabo@echbook.com

-----------------------------------------------------------------
You can get a proper faq by ftp from rsa.com, in the directory pub/faq.

Cryptography = writing stuff only authorized people can read.  Real crypto 
	depends on algorithms that are secure as long as the Bad Guys
	don't know the keys, even if they know everything else.
	Most of the interesting stuff depends on mathematical
	processes that take exponential amounts of time,
	so a 56-bit key would take 2**56 attempts to guess -
	you can't guess it a bit at a time in 56 steps.
	Factoring large numbers is believed to take roughly expontential time.
	M = plaintext message
	Cyphertext C = E(k, M), E = encryption function, k = key.
	Plaintext M = D(k, C)

ITAR - International Traffic In Armaments Regulations - the US has a bunch
	of laws about exporting munitions, and crypto hardware and software
	count as munitions - algorithms are OK, but our Benevolent Govt 
	KNOWS that foreigners aren't bright enough to turn algorithms into code.
	Lots of flamewars discuss exactly the boundaries, and the laws are
	contradictory about which bureaucrats are really in control,
	but nobody's wanted to get thrown in jail for arms dealing badly
	enough to force a court case ....
	Appears to apply to importing crypto also, though that hasn't been
	something anybody's made a big deal about.
	Other countries besides the US may have major restrictions as well.
Alice and Bob - the people sending messages to each other.
	Eve may be eavesdropping, and Charlie may be around also,
Secret-Key Cryptosystem, also called Symmetric-key or private-key -
	the same key k is used for E and D, or at least a closely related
	key that's easy to derive if you know the other one.
DES = Data Encryption Standard = IBM/NSA-designed secret-key system,
	very widely used, keys 56 bits long which may be a bit short,
	some people worry there may be an trapdoor put there by NSA,
	but if I told you I'd have to kill you :-)  Banks use it, for instance.
IDEA - a Swiss-written secret-key system, maybe more secure than DES,
	newer anyway.  Patented in Switz but not US, easy licensing.
Public-Key CryptoSystem - Encryption key ke and Decryption key kd are related,
	but in a way that you can't determine kd knowing only ke.
	ke is called the public key and kd the private key -
	you can publish ke where everyone can see it and encrypt stuff
	to mail to you, you can decrypt with private key kd.
	(If you want to reply, you've got to get their public key.)

	Public-key algorithms are pretty slow, so generally people
	use create a random secret key, encrypt their message with a
	secret-key algorithm like DES, and encrypt the secret key with
	the recipient's public key; recipient decrypts the secret key
	with his private key, then uses it to decrypt the message.

Digital Signatures - if you can do public-key crypto, then you can do the
	reverse as well to sign a message - you *decrypt* the message
	with your private key, and the recipient encrypts it with your
	public key - if it restores the original message, she knows it's good
	and knows that *you* sent it, because only you have your private key.
	For speed, you normally make a "hash" checksum of the message,
	and sign the hash instead of the whole thing.
	Some public-key algorithms can only be used for encryption, some only
	for signatures, some for both but you need different keys.

MD-4 and MD-5 - Message Digest hashing algorithms from (?) Rivest,
	which are thought to be unforgeable, unlike the CRC checksums
	used by many programs which are easily forged.

RSA - A public-key algorithm developed by Rivest, Shamir, and Adelman.
	It's the only well-known public-key algorithm that does everything everybody
	wants, including signatures and public-key, that's secure enough
	that you can't crack it as long as you use reasonably long keys.
	Unfortunately, it's patented in the US, by Public Key Partners,
	a company R, S, A, and friends started that owns most of the interesting
	patents related to public-key.  On the other hand, to avoid having the
	NSA classify their patent right when they applied (the NSA can do that),
	they published the algorithm before applying, which means that
	it's public-knowledge in most of the world and you can't patent it
	there, even in places that do allow algorithm patents.

	Their claims about what techniques their patents cover are *very* broad;
	if you want to do anything public-key related in the US,
	you've got to deal with them or carry a BIG lawyer, and so far
	everybody's chosen to deal with them rather than risk a long expensive
	difficult court case, or else chosen to ignore or infringe their patent 
	but not sell their products for cash, and hoped to get away with it.

RSAREF - an RSA implementation from PKP, which you may use free for personal
	non-commercial use as long as you agree to follow a set of rules
	that are much less restrictive than they used to be; you can't
	export it outside the US and Canada, and can't change the interface
	without their permission, and a few other terms.  Better implementations
	of RSA's algorithms have been done, but you can use this one free,
	with their permission.  Or you can pay them money and get support
	for incorporating their techniques into your products.

Key certification - Public Keys are usually long - RSA keys are often 1024 bytes.
	Public keys crypto is only secure if you can be SURE you have the
	public key for the person you're trying to send a message to,
	like Bob, and that Eve hasn't handed you HER public key instead -
	she could be intercepting all your mail to Bob, decrypting it,
	and re-encrypting with Bob's key.  So you need to find a secure way
	to transmit public keys, where "secure" means it can't be forged
	without you knowing about it (though anybody can read them.)
	Publishing in the New York Times classified ads is one approach,
	as is any other broadcast method you can be SURE everyone gets correctly.
	Another method is to use digital signatures - somebody you trust,
	whose public key you can be sure you know accurately, gets Bob's
	public key from Bob, and signs it with their public-key.
	Since not everybody knows somebody who knows Bob, the problem can
	be handled by a chain or hierarchy of key certifications -
	Charlie signs Bob's, Dave signs Charlie's ... and You know Xerxes yourself.
	Or George Bush signs all the general's keys, the generals all sign
	the keys for the colonels under them, the colonels sign for the
	majors under them, .... and you can check some sergeant's key
	because it's got a certificate from his lieutenant on up to Bush,
	and Bush's key is in the Phone Book.

PGP - Phil's Pretty Good Privacy program - a nice packaging of this technology
	that can be used easily to prepare secure email.  The original version
	used RSA and a choice of DES or a home-brew secret-crypto system;
	the current version uses RSA and IDEA.  For certification,
	the method is non-hierarchical - you have a "keyring" containing
	public keys you know, maybe with certificates, and you can sign
	the ones *you* trust and give your signed keyring to your friends.
	Hierarchies imply the potential for control; this is cooperative anarchy,
	and there's no chain of people you HAVE to obey to exchange keys.

	When PGP version 1 first came out, RSA yelled at Phil Zimmerman,
	the author, and told him he was risking patent infringement lawsuits
	and such if he didn't cease and desist, so he's no longer distributing it.
	But some of those SNEAKY FOREIGNERS *somehow* got a copy,
	and so ongoing development of PGP is taking place outside the US,
	unhindered by patent problems.  Version 2.1 is out, 2.2 real soon.
	Parts of PGP are probably not covered by PKP's patents,
	and parts are clearly not covered by ITAR, but some parts are a problem.

RIPEM - Mark Riordan's public-key email system, which uses RSAREF to do RSA,
	so it's legally kosher but not exportable, and is related to the
	internet Privacy Enhanced Mail stuff that was being developed
	for a while.  Still real new, but probably Pretty Good also;
	I seem to remember its key certification was more hierarchical.

----
More PGP info - PGP was originally written for a DOS environment (there are
	problems trusting any system you don't totally control,
	and it's tough to say you totally control a multi-user system),
	but it's been ported to lots of things by now, including
	UNIX and some early Mac ports (work is in progress to make the 
	Mac port feel like Mac-stuff rather than Unix-stuff.)
	You can get the source, compile it, play with it, and
	do anything you want that doesn't infringe PKP's patent,
	so remember not to use it to exchange keys with anyone or send them
	mail unless you've got a licensing agreement.....
	Once it's compiled, type 
		pgp -h
	to get help, and/or read the documentation.

Where to get things:  The fun place to shop is nic.funet.fi, by anonymous ftp,
	but if you telnet to an archie server like archie.rutgers.edu (login
	as archie) you can ask it wher to find anything.  Using a US site would
	be potentially better legally, and also cuts down on the bandwidth
	used between here and Finland....

				Bill Stewart






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: szabo@techbook.com (Nick Szabo)
Date: Tue, 20 Apr 93 23:39:37 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: FAQ: where to get PGP
Message-ID: <m0nlYVz-000hvQC@techbook.techbook.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Here is a list of PGP sites generated by "archie".  I have checked
sony.com which has PGP 2.2 but have not checked the other sites.
If you know any of these sites to be down, out of date, etc. please
let me know and I'll update the list.  Also let me know of sites
archie did not catch.

Strong crypto is available worldwide, but the Clinton Adminstration
has threatened to ban it in the U.S.  In the age of digitial telecom
and fascist governments, strong crypto is your only guarantee of
electronic privacy.  Get it, learn it, and use it while it's still 
legal!

Nick Szabo					szabo@techbook.com

-----------------------------------------------

/usr2/users/szabo> archie pgp

Host sony.com

    Location: /pub
      DIRECTORY drwxr-xr-x        512  Apr  9 20:26  pgp

Host quepasa.cs.tu-berlin.de

    Location: /pub/os/386BSD/386bsd-0.1/unofficial/doc/software
           FILE -rw-rw-r--      12121  Feb  2 00:01  pgp

Host reseq.regent.e-technik.tu-muenchen.de

    Location: /informatik.public/comp/usenet/alt.sources
      DIRECTORY drwxrwxr-x        512  Dec  9 01:24  pgp

Host ftp.uni-kl.de

    Location: /pub1/unix/security
      DIRECTORY drwxrwxr-x        512  Feb 24 19:24  pgp

Host cwdynm.echem.cwru.edu

    Location: /scriptures/ALL.plain
           FILE -r--r--r--     167535  Sep 11 1991  pgp

Host goya.dit.upm.es

    Location: /tmp
      DIRECTORY drwxr-xr-x        512  Aug 22 1992  pgp

Host walton.maths.tcd.ie

    Location: /src/misc/pgp-2.0/src
           FILE -rwxr-xr-x     316640  Oct 18 00:00  pgp

Host ftp.uu.net

    Location: /pub/security
      DIRECTORY drwxrwxr-x        512  Mar  9 15:13  pgp

Host isy.liu.se

    Location: /pub/misc
      DIRECTORY drwxr-xr-x        512  Mar 11 23:54  pgp

Host ftp.luth.se

    Location: /pub/infosystems
      DIRECTORY drwxr-xr-x        512  Jan 27 12:59  pgp

Host unix.hensa.ac.uk

    Location: /pub/uunet/pub/security
      DIRECTORY drwxr-xr-x        512  Mar 19 07:35  pgp



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: tcorcora@sunlab.cit.cornell.edu (Travis Corcoran)
Date: Tue, 20 Apr 93 21:36:07 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Radical politics
Message-ID: <9304210435.AA11296@vinca.cit.cornell.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Sheesh,

	it's enough to make one turn into a radical
libertarian/anarchist (if one wasn't already...).  I firmly suggest
that we all call ou

[ unauthorized communication, re: Sec 12-2, .2-12.6;
  channel closed under Anti-Terrorist-Communications Act
  on 00:30 21 MAR 93.  Authorization  4ff0 -NIST]






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: fergp@sytex.com (Paul Ferguson)
Date: Tue, 20 Apr 93 22:41:15 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: A few notes on the WIRED article (kudos)
Message-ID: <61ac3B1w165w@sytex.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I hope this goes over well. I found this article to be just what we need 
--- publicity. The kind that opens eyes. Tim, Eric and John -- I sat to 
thee, "How come this only happens in California?"  ;-)

- Snip, Snip ----- 8< ------

            From the "For What It's Worth Department"...
 
   A totally biased review of Steven Levey's "Crypto Rebels" article in
             WIRED, Volume 1, Issue 2, May/June 1993
 
 
I was a bit interested when a fellow cypherpunk mentioned that there
was a "decent" write-up in WIRED on the cypherpunk issues. Somehow, I
envisioned some sidebar mention. In these interesting times, any
mention of our efforts on the computer privacy frontier gets A-1
attention in my book. However, I was startled (and pleasantly
surprised) when I took a jaunt down to my local magazine-ary on
Broadway and found that my internaut campadres were on the cover, no
less. Golly gee, imagine that.
 
The cover itself conjures images of computer cultist symbolism. Tim
May, Eric Hughes and John Gilmore strike an interesting pose wearing
plain white, plastic carnival masks. The American flag held in their
hands is even more striking considering the topic at hand. (What the
hell does the Russian inscription mean?) I remember reading the post
announcement in the cypherpunks mail area about that meeting in
Mountain View. (If I had known that you western cypherpunks
would get all the press attention, I would've hopped a red-eye and
met you guys at Cygnus.) It's ironic that this topic built steam and
attention _before_ the "Clipper Chip" fiasco and still provides the
computer community with viable (perhaps not altogether proper)
alternatives. I knew it would. Ha.
 
Steven Levey has long since established himself as a solid, factual
and sometimes thought-provoking writer. His book "Hackers" is
considered by many professionals in the field to be the authoritative
work on the progression of computer hackers. Levey earns himself one
more brownie badge by bringing attention to the cypherpunk dilemma. The
article is thought provoking (read: it is not designed for
disinterested parties), accurate and for the most part, right on the
mark.
 
Key statements are sprinkled on the page margins, including "In the
Cypherpunk mind, cryptography is too important to leave to government
or even well-meaning companies. To insure that the tools of privacy
are available to all, individual acts of heroism are required." That
piece alone is enough to invoke thoughts of ...
 
A key profile is included about John Gilmore and his headaches with
the NSA, the Cypherpunk subscription mail group and several other
side-bar notes that lend some valuable credibility to the otherwise
incredulous auspices of the cypherpunk image.
 
Not only is this article well written, as far as information blurbs
go, this is good stuff, even for us neanderthals on the east coast.
In a broader aspect, WIRED is a magazine that deserves your attention.
Pick up this rag and give it the once-over. Somehow, I classify this
'zine as a combination of INFO World, The New Yorker and Mondo 2000.
Isn't that a draw? Humor and seriousness implied...
 
Paul Ferguson, Editor, Legal Net News

- Snip, Snip --- 8< -----

I loved the feel of the magazine, too. All recycled. Ain't that great?

Cheers.


Paul Ferguson                    |  Uncle Sam wants to read
Network Integration Consultant   |       your e-mail...
Alexandria, Virginia USA         | Just say "NO" to the Clipper
fergp@sytex.com                  |          Chip...




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: fergp@sytex.com (Paul Ferguson)
Date: Tue, 20 Apr 93 22:41:11 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Meets 'n Greets
Message-ID: <3Tcc3B1w165w@sytex.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


On Tue, 20 Apr 93 10:54:00 -0700,
 Eric Hughes <uunet!soda.berkeley.edu!hughes> wrote -
 
EH> ANNOUNCEMENT
EH> ============
 
EH> Ad Hoc Cypherpunks Meeting on the recent Wiretap Chip proposal.
 
EH> Where: Cygnus Support, Mt. View (directions follow)
EH> When: 12:00 noon sharp - 6:00 p.m.
 
EH> I'm mad as hell.  I know that a lot of other folks are too.
 
 You're right, Eric -- we are mad as hell, too. But I'm not about to
 jump on a flight to the west coast to simply share strategies. The
 fact that I would even consider it negates the functions which we are
 working towards, no? I propose that us east coasters organize and
 meet as well. Pat and I are DC bourne, for those interested, I'd like
 to propose a DC local meeting. Suggestions? Keep in mind that I'm in
 NYC during the week, so my only available meeting times aare on the
 weekends. (By the way, lets get our shit together DC'ers. We need
 technologists, not lacidaisical idealisms.)
 
 Your DC based Cypherpunk group is hereby established. BTW, if anyone
 noticed, the EFF is drawing some serious fire by the public press.
 "Sold out to commercialism", one headline reads.
 
 Cheers.
 
 

Paul Ferguson                    |  Uncle Sam wants to read
Network Integration Consultant   |       your e-mail...
Alexandria, Virginia USA         | Just say "NO" to the Clipper
fergp@sytex.com                  |          Chip...




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: jhart@agora.rain.com (Jim Hart)
Date: Wed, 21 Apr 93 01:31:06 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: GSM vs. wiretapping: Australia
Message-ID: <m0nlaBz-0001bcC@agora.rain.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Forwarded from comp.org.eff.talk

In article <1993Apr12.081136.1@cc.curtin.edu.au>, zrepachol@cc.curtin.edu.au (Paul Repacholi) writes:
> In article <1993Apr11.175007.10136@news.acns.nwu.edu>, jlacour@merle.acns.nwu.edu (John LaCour) writes:

> Have not seen a proposal like the FBI one yet, doesn't mean it isn't out there
> though. One thing that has happened is the delaying of the new GSM digital
> mobile phones. It seems that ASIO and friends have been told by GCHQ about
> the dificulty of breaking MD5. Info is still a bit thin. You could try posting
> to aus.comms.
> 

Please note, I have added aus.comms and aus.politics to this one.

I enquired of Austel ( the Australian telecoms regulatory body), and the
Federal Atourny Generals Office today.

The Telecom GSM trail marketing that started in Brisbane in March has been
canceled. GSM will *NOT* be legal in Australia till the use of MD% encryption
is changed, or the system is altered to allow monitoring of calls. This is
a requirement of the 'Telecomunications Interception Act'( AG perth.)

There are also prohibitions on using codes and cyphers in the 'Crimes Act'
various state police acts and criminal codes ( thought these would not
affect Telecomms, as that is federal jusistiction.

I will try to find the acts, and quote the relevent sections on this.

There has also been posts on 'pen-recorders' I notice. The .au situation
on this is that a commisioned officer of the federal police can give the
telco a written notice requiring the supplying of cal info for the date
range in the notice. I saw this some monthes ago, and had the impression
that this included info *PRIOR* to the notice, info Telecom claims not to
have if mear chattels inquire! Strange, wonder where it matterializes
from. Note the absence of words like 'warrant', 'judge', 'court' or other
such! I think there is a requirement for the commisioner of the FP to
include in his anual report to parlament the number of notices issued.

All this has been in place in one form or another for decades. I first saw
this sort of stuff when I worked in the post office ( ob history: the post
offie used to run the phon system in australia years ago ) As I worked both
as a night shift telephonist and in the office itself, I had to sign a stack
of secrecy stuff, and a copy of the 'Posts and Telegraphs Act' was standard
issue. This had a prohibition on "unlawfull codes, cyphers and secret writings"
The Comercial Telex Code was the *ONE* allowed code. Any other code used
in a telegram *HAD* to be stated on the logment form. Don't know what happened
after that. Small country town, never saw one. Only the banks used codes.
This would have been Dec '67 or '68 I think.

Will try to fill in the gaps, and post a full account later. Note that I will
be probably away next week, ( school hols ) so it may be a while. I will
also try to get some extra info on use etc.

~Paul





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "$HOME/.sig" <kelly@pleiku.netcom.com>
Date: Wed, 21 Apr 93 02:55:38 PDT
To: sytex.com!fergp@netcom.com (Paul Ferguson)
Subject: Re: Meets 'n Greets
In-Reply-To: <3Tcc3B1w165w@sytex.com>
Message-ID: <9304210955.AA04369@netcomsv.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/x-pgp


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From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Craig Nottingham <cnotting@cosmos.gmu.edu>
Date: Tue, 20 Apr 93 23:12:26 PDT
To: fergp@sytex.com (Paul Ferguson) (Paul Ferguson)
Subject: Re: Meets 'n Greets
In-Reply-To: <3Tcc3B1w165w@sytex.com>
Message-ID: <9304210612.AA02469@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>  You're right, Eric -- we are mad as hell, too. But I'm not about to
>  jump on a flight to the west coast to simply share strategies. The
>  fact that I would even consider it negates the functions which we are
>  working towards, no? I propose that us east coasters organize and
>  meet as well. Pat and I are DC bourne, for those interested, I'd like
>  to propose a DC local meeting. Suggestions? Keep in mind that I'm in
>  NYC during the week, so my only available meeting times aare on the
>  weekends. (By the way, lets get our shit together DC'ers. We need
>  technologists, not lacidaisical idealisms.)
>  
>  Your DC based Cypherpunk group is hereby established. BTW, if anyone
>  noticed, the EFF is drawing some serious fire by the public press.
>  "Sold out to commercialism", one headline reads.
>  
>  Cheers.
> 
> Paul Ferguson                    |  Uncle Sam wants to read
> Network Integration Consultant   |       your e-mail...
> Alexandria, Virginia USA         | Just say "NO" to the Clipper
> fergp@sytex.com                  |          Chip...
> 
There is plenty of DC area support fr such a group.  The only problem
that presents it self is where to hold a meeting where there will be
no hassles.

In addition a thought that many people are overlooking-  the wiretap chip
transmissions of encrypted data would make a perfect envelope for the 
transfer of more secure information encrypted with powerful encryption
schemes.  There would be no easy way to tell the diffence between
pre-encypted transmissions and wiretap chip encrypted conversation.

~~~~~
Craig Nottingham                                       <cnotting@cosmos.gmu.edu>
-Reality is for people who lack imagination   NeXTmail<cnotting@gravity.gmu.edu>
-I hate to advocate drugs, alcohol, violence or insanity to anyone, but they've
 always worked for me.                                     <=> Hunter S Thompson
-A good cap of acid costs five dollars and for that you can hear the Universal
 Symphony with God singing solo and the Holy Ghost on drums.    <=> H.S Thompson
~~~~~





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: gnu (John Gilmore)
Date: Wed, 21 Apr 93 02:51:51 PDT
To: szabo@techbook.com (Nick Szabo)
Subject: Re: FAQ: Overview of crypto
In-Reply-To: <m0nlYJS-000hvOC@techbook.techbook.com>
Message-ID: <9304210951.AA05964@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> You can get a proper faq by ftp from rsa.com, in the directory pub/faq.

Last time I looked, it was something like 75 pages.  Those questions
aren't all asked *that* frequently.

> ITAR - International Traffic In Armaments Regulations - the US has a bunch
...
> 	Appears to apply to importing crypto also, though that hasn't been
> 	something anybody's made a big deal about.

This part is false.  The ITAR does *not* apply to importing crypto.
I have read the regs and found no evidence of import regulations on
cryptography.  If anyone tells you that they exist, ask for a copy of
the regulations, or a citation of the regulations, or a citation of a
court case that was based on the regulations.  Any of these will let
me (or you) determine what is actually happening.  [Nobody who I've
asked for this stuff has ever been able to produce it.]

> 	as archie) you can ask it wher to find anything.  Using a US site would
> 	be potentially better legally, and also cuts down on the bandwidth
> 	used between here and Finland....

Ditto -- no legal problem, just bandwidth.  Though the posting appears
to assume that the reader is in the U.S., a bad assumption.  `Using a
local site...`?

	John Gilmore




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: crunch@netcom.com (John Draper)
Date: Wed, 21 Apr 93 03:00:20 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Lets connect the meetings together
Message-ID: <9304211000.AA09748@netcom4.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I propose that the E. Coaster Cypherpunks connect via computer to 
the one on the West Coast on the 24th.  Perhaps on a private IRC channel,
but doing it via encryption would be the best.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Robert Luscombe <ral@telerama.pgh.pa.us>
Date: Wed, 21 Apr 93 00:54:03 PDT
To: Cypherpunks <cypherpunks@toad.com>
Subject: PGP help?
Message-ID: <Pine.2.4.9304210347.A12873@telerama.pgh.pa.us>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



I am in search of any MSDos (or Windows, but not preferred) offline mail
readers, text editors, etc. that work well with PGP-- anything to help me
use PGP for everyday email.  I use a dial-up internet connection, so i
have no choice but to use the remote system's PINE mail reader... if
anyone knows of anything that will let me compose and encrypt email
locally and format the messages into a .QWK packet for upload, that would
be IDEAL, but anything else could still help.

(BTW-- i have already posted on alt.security.pgp and nothing ever came of
it. So it goes.)

--Robert Luscombe
  Internet: ral@telerama.pgh.pa.us      Voice:412/488-0941
            robert@well.sf.ca.us        (Finger for PGP Pub Key)




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: pat@tstc.edu (Patrick E. Hykkonen)
Date: Wed, 21 Apr 93 06:19:37 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Meets 'n Greets (IRC Meetings Maybe?)
Message-ID: <9304211319.AA12656@tstc.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>  You're right, Eric -- we are mad as hell, too. But I'm not about to
>  jump on a flight to the west coast to simply share strategies. The
>  fact that I would even consider it negates the functions which we are
>  working towards, no? I propose that us east coasters organize and
>  meet as well. Pat and I are DC bourne, for those interested, I'd like
>  to propose a DC local meeting. Suggestions?

Yeah.  Does anybody have the resources to setup an IRC at a known 
cypherpunk site?

-- 
Pat Hykkonen, N5NPL                     Texas State Technical College at Waco
{pat,postmaster}@tstc.edu                      Instructional Network Services
PGP Key available by finger.                 3801 Campus Dr.  Waco, Tx  76705
                                           V:(817) 867-4830  F:(817) 799-2843




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Harry Shapiro <habs@Panix.Com>
Date: Wed, 21 Apr 93 05:29:39 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com (Good Guys)
Subject: The Family Key
Message-ID: <199304211229.AA28337@sun.Panix.Com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I think the largest weakness in the whole Clipper scheme, and
I am not sure If I am right about this is,....

The NSA knows the family key (the key that is built into each
chip; or perhaps large meta batch of chips).

The family key encrypts the Law Enforcement Block [LEB] of the message,
which contains the serial number for the chip in the device
being used to communicate. This key is known to NSA.

Thus, the NSA will be able to maintain an active traffic pattern
analysis of ALL communications sent via the Clipper chiped devices.

I think in many ways that traffic watching can and does often reveal
more information about someone than at time listening in to what
is actually being said.

The big point here is the the press release claims that the Clipper
chip doesn't provide anything more than what Law Enforcement already
has. That is not true. What they get is a complete serialized,
accurate method of traffic analysis.

Note: Denning claims that a proper order to wire tap an encrypted
communication will be "gotten" prior to decoding the LEB. Then a
second batch of paper work will be processed once the serial number is
revealed to get the encrypted/escrowed keys.


-- 
Harry Shapiro  				      habs@panix.com
List Administrator of the Extropy Institute Mailing List
Private Communication for the Extropian Community since 1991



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: grady@netcom.com (1016/2EF221)
Date: Wed, 21 Apr 93 08:33:40 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: alt.encrypted
Message-ID: <9304211533.AA16188@netcom.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



I guess the cryptowranglers read this group too.  But of
course I knew that because it is so easy to do.  There is
not a single doubt in my mind that every byte that passes
every significant gateway or 'bone is captured for the
colligation of data about __________?  (Maybe your name is here).

Maybe we should start a newsgroup for the distribution of encrypted 
posts intended of members of affinity groups with a shared private
key.  For example at the coming up Cypherpunks meeting, a private
key corresponding to that particular meeting could be passed out
by a moderator.  Minutes, followup comments to other participants,
and so on could be posted to the alt.encrypted group for the use
of the people who attended. Communiques intended by the group for
non-attendees could of course just be signed using the private key
but otherwises not encrypted.

Starting a alt.encrypted newsgroup rather than just maintaining
mailing lists is better for several reasons.  First, it would be
easier to archive for people who might join a group "late" and
who might like to easily read earlier posts; second, traffic analysis
to know exactly to whom an affinity message is directed would be foiled;
three, a newsgroup is much more public and would serve to publicize
available privacy measures on the internet.

And it would be fun to accumulate a secret keyring full of such
keys -- it beats giving out t-shirts as a door prize.

We could send a copy of alt.encrypted directly to Judge William
Sessions or Admiral Studeman to save them the time of having it
collected for them.


-- 
grady@netcom.com  2EF221 / 15 E2 AD D3 D1 C6 F3 FC  58 AC F7 3D 4F 01 1E 2F






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Communism is like MS-DOS: It doesn't work, and you wouldn't want to use it even if it did.  21-Apr-1993 1120" <yerazunis@aidev.enet.dec.com>
Date: Wed, 21 Apr 93 08:48:35 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Making Clippers More Secure
Message-ID: <9304211548.AA29737@enet-gw.pa.dec.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Agreeing with all the previous problems and issues put forth; key-escrow,
secret algorithms that can't be formally tested, etc...

So, let's *assume* that the US Gummint makes all other encryption illegal,
except those that use this chip, and they intend to check all messages
that look encrypted to verify that they have the correct system key:

Well, we can use more than one chip, or use it in ways that were
"unanticipated".

F'rinstance:

Use PGP (or SROT, or some other p.d. crypto package) to encrypt 
once, and then use a Clipper to put a legal-looking wrapper on the
message.  The problem with this is that *if* there is a law making
all other cryptosystems illegal, then you still do time.
                                                        
Then the gummint says "You can use chips, but ONLY chips.  No other
encryptation.".

Well, how 'bout this: Use three chips.  The first two are BOTH fed the message,
and the resulting bitstreams are XORed together and then fed to the third
chip (to provide a legal-looking "wrapper")  The XORing should obscure 
the serial numbers of the first two chips, meaning that the NSA can not
go to a key-escrow authority with a blanket court order and obtain the keys.  
Rather, assuming the "secret algorithm" is good, the worst-case scenario
is either a full search of the keyspace (if the secret algorithm forms a 
mathematical "group", or an exhaustive search of [issued-keyspace]^2.

Yes, the above does not address the issue of decoding (as stated above, 
you can't recover the plaintext.)  But that's soluble, by inserting a known
(but secret) string into the start of the bitstream for both the encoding 
and decoding second chips; the result is that by the time the second decoding 
chip needs to start knowing what was XORed into the incoming stream, the 
first decoding chip has already decoded that part of the message, which can 
be re-encoded using the first encoding chip's keys to provide the continuing 
bitstream needed for the XOR.  

Now, the BIG issue is this: is it possible to obtain the serial numbers of 
a pair of Clipper chips from the XOR of two output streams?  How about three?
How about N, where N is large?

Without knowing the algorithm, this will be difficult to answer...

	-Bill

% ====== Internet headers and postmarks (see DECWRL::GATEWAY.DOC) ======
% Received: by enet-gw.pa.dec.com; id AA02474; Wed, 21 Apr 93 05:13:14 -0700
% Received: from mc by mc.lcs.mit.edu id ak02907; 20 Apr 93 11:15 EDT
% Received: from enet-gw.pa.dec.com by mc.lcs.mit.edu id aa02377; 20 Apr 93 10:20 ED
% Received: by enet-gw.pa.dec.com; id AA27388; Tue, 20 Apr 93 07:19:42 -0700
% Message-Id: <9304201419.AA27388@enet-gw.pa.dec.com>
% Received: from aidev.enet; by decwrl.enet; Tue, 20 Apr 93 07:19:43 PDT
% Date: Tue, 20 Apr 93 07:19:43 PDT
% From: "Dulce et decorum est pro patria mori. 20-Apr-1993 0950" <aidev::yerazunis>
% To: elbows@mc.lcs.mit.edu
% Cc: aidev::yerazunis
% Apparently-To: elbows@mc.lcs.mit.edu
% Subject: Clipper Chip




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: jwarren@autodesk.com (Jim Warren)
Date: Wed, 21 Apr 93 13:38:10 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: more details from Denning
Message-ID: <9304211652.AA24148@megalon.YP.acad>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I've been collecting this flow over the last few days, and finally have a
chance to upload it to 'punks.  I think all of it is new, but part of it
might have already appeared in the last several daze [sic] deluge.  If so,
apologies for repetition.

And, a coupla tidbits about Dorothy:  I have known her for several years,
worked closely with her on creating the first Computers, Freedom & Privacy
conference in 1991, have absolutely the *highest* regard for her integrity,
honesty and candor -- and absolutely trust what she says ... even when it's
about a subject on which we may disagree.
  Dorothy Denning is an honorable person with great personal integrity, and
I urge that she be treated as such -- even in disagreement.

--jim
Jim Warren, MicroTimes futures columnist; InfoWorld founder; DataCast founder;
founder & chair, First Conf. on Computers, Freedom & Privacy, blah blah blah :-)
============echoing the messages of significance==========



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: denning@cs.georgetown.edu (Dorothy Denning)
Date: Tue Sep 07 12:37:58 1999
To: jwarren@autodesk.com
Subject: Re:  Marty's 4/17 Clipper Chip post-to-many & Dorothy's 4/8 response
Message-ID: <5f4f1a395e5d370f678c533a1fafa331@NO-ID-FOUND.mhonarc.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Fine with me.  Post anywhere.

Dorothy

=====




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Pat Farrell"  <pfarrell@cs.gmu.edu>
Date: Wed, 21 Apr 93 07:09:25 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: RE: Webs of Trust vs Trees of Trust
Message-ID: <36516.pfarrell@cs.gmu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


In  norm@netcom.com (Norman Hardy) writes:
>This is much ingrained in all of the legally mandated security
>systems that I am aware of. It assumes, at first glance, that there
>is a root, an inner sanctum, which is totally trusted by all.
>
>It is a pervasive mind-set in military security.

While I can't claim to understand the military mind set, I can believe
that it is pervasive. It is also at best simplistic. Under the "new world
order" we must forge aliances according the the needs of the situation,
so that the trusted aliance's members vary over time. Economic aliances
have similar dynamics, with trust and allegiance changing.

The government's view seems to be that trust is transitive. I believe
that it can't be, because the world is not a simplistic heirarchy that
starts with Billery and flows down.

The tree of trust also ignores international exchanges, as Billery's
signature means far less to an European than to a US citizen. There was a
recent article about a ring of college students in Texas selling forged
driver's licenses. They used Montana and Idaho as samples, with the
expectation that a bouncer in a Texas bar wouldn't know a real Idaho license
if he saw one. Seems like the value of a US-based signature would be lowered
in Sydney or Delhi in a similar manner.

More importantly, I expect that digital signatures will be used for
commercial transactions accross the net. This means that there is money
involved, and with a tree of trust, the higher level trees are _worth_
bribing, forging, and perhaps killing for. Once a high level node is
compromised, all lower nodes are worthless.

This is why we need a serious education effort for the "decision makers" in
the government.

Pat

Pat Farrell      Grad Student                 pfarrell@cs.gmu.edu
Department of Computer Science    George Mason University, Fairfax, VA
Public key availble via finger          #include <standard.disclaimer>




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: gnu (John Gilmore)
Date: Wed, 21 Apr 93 11:17:43 PDT
To: pat@tstc.edu (Patrick E. Hykkonen)
Subject: Re: Meets 'n Greets (IRC Meetings Maybe?) -- Internet audio?
In-Reply-To: <9304211319.AA12656@tstc.edu>
Message-ID: <9304211816.AA14002@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


We could set up an encrypted `vat' audio session between the locations.
Cygnus has T1 connectivity to the Internet.  Someone would need
to provide a good self-powered speaker to plug into the Sun audio
port (a standard mini phono plug).  We have a microphone that will possibly
work, though we should run some tests before the meeting.

Cygnus does not have multicast support, so we can't feed the `mbone'
(multicast backbone) with it, but we can attempt one or several
point-to-point links.

`vat' runs on Suns and is available from ftp.ee.lbl.gov or
ftp.cygnus.com:/pub/vat.1.56.tar.Z.  It's `Van's Audio Tool',
unfortunately available only in binary.  Its encryption option
requires that the participants agree on a key in advance, and type it
into each workstation at the time of the conference.

	John Gilmore





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: ggoebel@sun1.ruf.uni-freiburg.de (Garrett Goebel)
Date: Wed, 21 Apr 93 02:21:35 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: cypherpunks vs. cryptoprivacy
Message-ID: <9304210921.AA17398@sun1.ruf.uni-freiburg.de>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text


All,

Kragen writes:
} I agree with those who think that "CypherPunks" is a bad name for the list.
} It brings up negative associations in the minds of outsiders, who are, after
} all, the people who we want to influence against the Big Brother wiretap chip
Is anyone against changing the name from cypherpunks to cryptoprivacy?

Seems to be the general consensus... that cryptoprivacy would be more PC.
Unoriginal Thought:  couldn't the list/group name be changed to "CP"?

o  For outsiders, and formally, it could stand for CryptoPrivacy
o  To insiders... it could still stand for CypherPunks
o  CP is the opposite of PC (I like that).

back to lurking,
Garrett

-- 
C. Garrett Goebel
<ggoebel@sun1.ruf.uni-freiburg.de>



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: fergp@sytex.com (Paul Ferguson)
Date: Wed, 21 Apr 93 09:44:18 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: DC Cypherpunks
Message-ID: <eo7c3B3w165w@sytex.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


On Wed, 21 Apr 93 2:07:49 EDT,
 Craig Nottingham <uunet!cosmos.gmu.edu!cnotting> wrote -
 
CN> There is plenty of DC area support fr such a group.  The only
CN> problem that presents it self is where to hold a meeting where
CN> here will be no hassles.
 
 I'm putting together of interested parties who would like to get
 together for physical meetings on a "psuedo-random" basis. As Pat
 mentioned earlier, my free time is non-existant at least until
 mid-May (getting re-married May 1), but I'm eager to meet, unite
 and build a DC chapter.
 
 Solidarity and determination, my brothers and sisters!
 
 Also, send your pubkey. Little things mean alot.
 

Paul Ferguson                    |  Uncle Sam wants to read
Network Integration Consultant   |       your e-mail...
Centreville, Virginia USA        | Just say "NO" to the Clipper
fergp@sytex.com                  |          Chip...




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: fergp@sytex.com (Paul Ferguson)
Date: Wed, 21 Apr 93 09:43:51 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: DC Cypherpunks
Message-ID: <Z27c3B10w165w@sytex.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
 
On Wed, 21 Apr 93 09:15:25 EST,
 Pat Farrell <uunet!cs.gmu.edu!pfarrell> writes -
 
PF> Craig, there is no problem having a meeting, you just have to have
PF> more sense than the kids who think Pentagon City Mall is public
PF> space. A small meeting can be in my house, or at Maggie's bar over
PF> beer and pizza.
 
 You've got my vote for beer and pizza. ;-)
 
 Pat, let's plan accordingly. I'd like to be there for the first
 meeting, so I'll give you a call and we can discuss this at length.
 In the meantime, I'm keeping a list and building a kering of
 interested parties.
 
 Cheers.
 
 
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.2
 
iQCVAgUBK9VurZRLcZSdHMBNAQG6GQP/aWlhwgaBwLU2QFUsjdoauIuPYrVRiu5f
87z4s8YhRj/dNX/alIO6LTGIT0Q4V5UW7w9gu2EChok618KJly3zgqg1slDBhg0x
F6ZIJjbdiPmkeNGjlswfm/x/yGF2NWLu+F2YsMfbXEjnmdOaZaooiOQFA1tiMN2x
AysEJYTBnJs=
=q/Pf
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

Paul Ferguson                    |  Uncle Sam wants to read
Network Integration Consultant   |       your e-mail...
Centreville, Virginia USA        | Just say "NO" to the Clipper
fergp@sytex.com                  |          Chip...




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: szabo@techbook.com (Nick Szabo)
Date: Wed, 21 Apr 93 12:32:20 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Intergraph employee claims trademark violation
Message-ID: <m0nlkZZ-000hwlC@techbook.techbook.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Forwarded from Libernet:

Date: Tue, 20 Apr 93 10:30:47 PDT
From: ald@clipper.clipper.ingr.com (Al Date)
Subject: "Clipper Chip"  --NOT!
To: libernet@Dartmouth.EDU

Clipper TM chip is a registered trademark of Intergraph Corp.

The so-called Clipper chip which was recently mentioned here
and in other media
with respect to encryption is being used in violation of that trademark.  

The Intergraph Clipper chip is a Unix microprocessor, originally 
developed by Fairchild Semiconductors, and has no relationship
to the encryption chip whatsoever.  

I mention this here with the hope that someone reading this will
intercede before the group alt.privacy."clipper" is established.


--Al Date





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Bob Stratton <strat@intercon.com>
Date: Wed, 21 Apr 93 10:55:58 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: DC Cypherpunks
Message-ID: <9304211239.AA53513@horton.intercon.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> Subject: DC Cypherpunks 
> From: fergp@sytex.com (Paul Ferguson) 
> Date: Wed, 21 Apr 93 12:16:22 EDT 
> 
> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- 
>  
> On Wed, 21 Apr 93 09:15:25 EST, 
>  Pat Farrell <uunet!cs.gmu.edu!pfarrell> writes - 
>  
> PF> Craig, there is no problem having a meeting, you just have to have 
> PF> more sense than the kids who think Pentagon City Mall is public 
> PF> space. A small meeting can be in my house, or at Maggie's bar over 
> PF> beer and pizza. 
>  
>  You've got my vote for beer and pizza. ;-) 
>  
>  Pat, let's plan accordingly. I'd like to be there for the first 
>  meeting, so I'll give you a call and we can discuss this at length. In 
>  the meantime, I'm keeping a list and building a kering of 
>  interested parties. 

Hear, hear. I think I can also swing permission to have it at my office in 
Herndon, if having a T1 to the Net is at all helpful. I'll ask, if anyone's 
interested.

--Strat, whose company actually took a position on the Clipper chip!
(It's the right one, BTW)



Help stop the wiretap chip! (a.k.a "Clipper")
RIPEM and PGP keys available on request.







From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: peb@PROCASE.COM
Date: Wed, 21 Apr 93 13:09:45 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Free Speech
Message-ID: <9304211949.AA03767@banff>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



What do people think about crypto being considered Free Speech?  This 
might be the most powerful angle.  Freedom of expression would be a
great way to protest a ban on hard crypto; detecting the use of
crypto on the Internet would be like Prodigy monitoring all news
groups for non-family (and non-Prodigy) material.  Not only that, 
but if the proported crypto material wasn't actually crypto but
random bits, then no laws would be broken.  

The next step for the tyrant in this arms race is to send messages that
merely appear to contain crypto illegal.  By analogy, the FCC can fine
people for joking about the metal detector and xray equipment security
check points.  I don't know if this is a law, but the FCC could enforce
its fine by not allowing you to fly again on a commercial airline.
(Monopolies, they work just great. ;^)

A further step in this scenario is for the pro-free-speech people
to start using various data compression techniques--a proliferation
of non-standards for various reasons (well, C++ compression
could be specialized--no dictionary need be sent if the reciever
knows it is C++; same for English used on particular news groups, 
poetry, etc.).

This would cause massive false positives of packets that appear to be
encrypted.  Obviously, fairly enforcing a law against such usage would be
impossible.

I can see two outcomes at this stage: (1) the laws are eliminated, or
(2) they are enforced only selectively.  Considering the way things
usually work, (2) seems more likely, however the fact that the merger 
of phones and computers is already happening (e.g., Sun ss10 with ISDN
has a complete phone answering system written by Jeff Peck at Sun), 
the volume of resistance can easily be *large* and *convenient*.  Few
protests are convenient; with this, people don't even have to leave 
work!  (The downside is, however, that it would be difficult to get
media attention for doing it...TV camera pointed at the workstation,
OK, I'm pressing the Send button now.  Hah!  Take that!)

If the powers-that-be then come up with a law that crypto is illegal only
if used for illegal activity, I wouldn't complain so much.  Changing
your name is legal as long as you don't commit fraud, so there are
tolerable examples of this type of law now.  


Paul E. Baclace
peb@procase.com





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Date: Wed, 21 Apr 93 13:53:57 PDT
To: Cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Crypto Activism and Respectability
Message-ID: <9304212053.AA23743@netcom.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Crypto Activism and Respectability, or, Should We Become "Suits"?


Several Cyperpunks, er, "Privacy Advocates," have called for the name
"Cypherpunks" to be changed to something more serious, more respectable,
less likely to scare the horses. Something like "Cryptography Privacy" or
"Cryptologic Research Association." Some even want a parallel to the NRA,
such as the "National Cryptography Association."

Further, there have been comments that referring to "crypto anarchy," as
I've been doing for several years (my "Crypto Anarchist Manifesto" was
first distributed in 1988) is, to put it bluntly, "not helpful to the
cause." Talk of libertarian ideas, "If crypto is outlawed, only outlaws
will have crypto," and other such "crypto radicalism" is seen as
unrespectable, as counterproductive. We're not speaking the language of the
"suits," it's said. Middle America will be turned off by the hippie
radicals in t-shirts, leather jackets, sandals, and beards. 

(Some readers of this list have volunteered that they'd make better
spokespersons for the Cause because they are clean-shaven, they look like
good corporate citizens, and they know how to make the right soothing
noises to interviewers. I say, "Great! We need more publicity." Just don't
tell the rest of us California types, where sandals, beards, and jeans
remain common, that we need to "go corporate." Picture a "smiley" here, if
that's your style.)

I want to respond by making several comments:

* Radicals like ourselves have always been under pressure to conform to
societal norms, whether to dress in the "gray flannel suit" in the 1950s or
to eschew long hair and beads in the 60s. 

* Guess what? The message is almost more important than the messenger.
People have a pretty clear idea of what people are saying, despite their
appearance. And, frankly, my guess is that even most of Middle America will
feel somewhat more comfortable listening to a John Gilmore, for example,
than a Bill Gates-type nerd clone. People know honesty and sincerity when
they see it, and they know lawyers when they see them. It's been 25 years
since the hippie heyday, and most Americans have adjusted to varying
outward appearances. (Actually, they've internalized and accepted long hair
and beards....shaved heads, nose piercings, and body adornments they
probably haven't yet accepted. But most of the "crypto anarchist
cypherpunks" are of the more conventional kind of "disreputable"
appearance, so the point is moot.)

* The more serious message of toning down our calls for complete and total
access to whatever crypto tools we can get is potentially more divisive to
this group. We don't all have the same politics...some of us are
anarcho-capitalists, some are socialists (I hear), some are nonpolitical
(as near as I can tell), some decline to state, and some may off in their
own uncharted territory. But what we all seem to believe in common is that
no government has the right to force us to make tape recordings of all of
our conversations (to be placed in escrow, in case the government someday
needs to listen to them!), to tap our phones, to insist we speak in
government-approved non-coded language, and to use their "Wiretap Chips."

I said "potentially" more divisive. In practice, nobody on this list is
really disagreeing in a major way with our general goals of privacy and
access to tools (to borrow the "Whole Earth" phrase). A few people
disagreed with the way remailers, like our home-grown remailers and like
Johan Helsingius' (he's also on this list, of course), were being handled.
But that's the kind of debate we want.

* To some, like David Sternlight, Dorothy Denning, and Andrew Molitor,
these are radical, unreasonable, and subversive views. "Remember, children,
the policeman is your *friend*." seems to sum up their view of crypto. It's
hard to imagine just what we have to "be reasonable" about with such
people. A basic ideological divide separates us.

* I fully agree with many of you that the name "Cypherpunks" has some,
shall we say, _unusual_ connotations. Some will assume we're skateboarding
geeks, others will assume we're "crypto primitives" who pierce our bodies
and spend all our time at raves. But the name has undeniable appeal to
many, and certainly grabs a lot of attention. It seems improbable that some
staid name like "Northern California Cryptography Hobbyists Association"
would've gotten much attention, let alone a write-up in "Wired" (and
upcoming pieces in "Whole Earth Review," "The Village Voice," etc.).

(Perhaps you out there who first heard about us via an article in "Mondo
2000," or "Wired," or a reference someplace, like MindVox or sci.crypt, can
tell us what grabbed your attention, what you liked and disliked about the
name, etc. Just as feedback.)

In any case, it's much too late to change the name now. Publicity of
"Cypherpunks" has spread the name, lots of journalists are intrigued by it,
and it basically *does* capture the spirit of our group. After all, for
basic civil liberties and cyberspace issues, the ACLU, CPSR, and EFF
already exist and do a fair job at presenting lawyer-like faces to the
press. And for conventional "phreaking," the group "2600" is having their
own meetings. We don't have to be the group with the subdued and staid
image.

And note tha the "Hackers Conference" has not changed _their_  name,
either, despite the negative publicity given the name. (A meta-rule: There
is no such thing as negative publicity. All they have to do is spell your
name right. Ironically, in a recent "MacWorld" column, Steven Levy
misspelled our name as "Cipherpunks." He got it right in his "Wired" piece,
though.)

* As for respectablity, is our goal to be "co-opted" into the
Establishment? (Geez. these words I'm writing could've been written in
1968!) Is it to be a respectable voice for moderation and the gentle
process of negotiating? I think not.

(Note that the Wiretap Chip was *not* presented for discussion and for
industry comment. Neither the Bush nor Clinton camps presented this for
public debate--unless you consider Dorothy Denning's comments to be the
"trial balloon" I suggested it was last fall in sci.crypt...Denning has
made the curious claim that she knew "nothing" of the Clipper plan until
the night before it was publicly announced. This plan is a fait accompli,
production of the chips is underway, and AT&T has already announced their
Clipper-tapped phone. The best we can do is undermine the proposal, deploy
strong crypto as widely as possible before it's outlawed completely
(Clipper will fail if strong crypto alternatives are available...what do
you think Big Brother plans to do about this?), and continue to make as
much noise as we can about the evils of invading privacy in this way. I see
little indication that reasonable negotiation is being invited.)

* There are already several groups, as I've mentioned, made up of lawyers
and "respectable spokesmen" like Mitch Kapor and Mike Godwin (wherever he
is now). In a sense, Cypherpunks fill an important ecological niche by
being the outrageous side, the radical side...perhaps a bit like the role
the Black Panthers, Yippies, and Weather Underground played a generation
ago. (By the way, "The Crypto Underground" was one of my favorite name
proposals....aren't you glad now we settled on Jude Milhon's "Cypherpunks"
suggestion?)

* Cypherpunks write code, as Eric put it. They write code, they build
remailers, they test systems to see how they break, they share their
findings, they ignore restrictions on crypto, they look at the consequences
of strong crypto, and they write articles like this.

* Now I'm all for respectability in certain ways, ways that come naturally
to each of us. When I talk to journalists, I speak in complete sentences, I
explain things in the most straightforward way possible, etc. I don't roll
in on my skateboard and say "Dewd! Yo bro, let's skank this Clipper shit!"

But I don't plan to shave off my beard, cut my hair, start wearing suits,
or be "moderate and reasonable" in my arguments. Nor do I intend to water
down my messages about digital money, anonymous systems, and crypto
anarchy.

"Let a thousand flowers bloom."  --Mao (not one of my heroes)

"Live dangerously." --Nietzsche (one of my heroes)


-Tim May, Cypherpunk

--
Timothy C. May         | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,  
tcmay@netcom.com       | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
408-688-5409           | knowledge, reputations, information markets, 
W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA  | black markets, smashing of governments.
Higher Power: 2^756839 | Public Key: MailSafe and PGP available.
Waco Massacre + Big Brother Wiretap Chip = A Nazi Regime





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: uni@acs.bu.edu (Shaen Bernhardt)
Date: Wed, 21 Apr 93 11:37:47 PDT
To: sytex.com!fergp@netcom.com
Subject: Re: Meets 'n Greets
Message-ID: <9304211837.AA240185@acs.bu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


de_armor_file: infile = AppDisk:fm ?, outfile = AppDisk:fm ?.$00, curline = 0
ERROR: Badly formed ASCII armor checksum, line 28.
 
Error: Transport armor stripping failed for file AppDisk:fm ?
 


Please resend




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Date: Wed, 21 Apr 93 14:47:02 PDT
To: Cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Crypto Activism and Respectability
Message-ID: <9304212146.AA01218@netcom.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Crypto Activism and Respectability, or, Should We Become "Suits"?


Several Cyperpunks, er, "Privacy Advocates," have called for the name
"Cypherpunks" to be changed to something more serious, more respectable,
less likely to scare the horses. Something like "Cryptography Privacy" or
"Cryptologic Research Association." Some even want a parallel to the NRA,
such as the "National Cryptography Association."

Further, there have been comments that referring to "crypto anarchy," as
I've been doing for several years (my "Crypto Anarchist Manifesto" was
first distributed in 1988) is, to put it bluntly, "not helpful to the
cause." Talk of libertarian ideas, "If crypto is outlawed, only outlaws
will have crypto," and other such "crypto radicalism" is seen as
unrespectable, as counterproductive. We're not speaking the language of the
"suits," it's said. Middle America will be turned off by the hippie
radicals in t-shirts, leather jackets, sandals, and beards. 

(Some readers of this list have volunteered that they'd make better
spokespersons for the Cause because they are clean-shaven, they look like
good corporate citizens, and they know how to make the right soothing
noises to interviewers. I say, "Great! We need more publicity." Just don't
tell the rest of us California types, where sandals, beards, and jeans
remain common, that we need to "go corporate." Picture a "smiley" here, if
that's your style.)

I want to respond by making several comments:

* Radicals like ourselves have always been under pressure to conform to
societal norms, whether to dress in the "gray flannel suit" in the 1950s or
to eschew long hair and beads in the 60s. 

* Guess what? The message is almost more important than the messenger.
People have a pretty clear idea of what people are saying, despite their
appearance. And, frankly, my guess is that even most of Middle America will
feel somewhat more comfortable listening to a John Gilmore, for example,
than a Bill Gates-type nerd clone. People know honesty and sincerity when
they see it, and they know lawyers when they see them. It's been 25 years
since the hippie heyday, and most Americans have adjusted to varying
outward appearances. (Actually, they've internalized and accepted long hair
and beards....shaved heads, nose piercings, and body adornments they
probably haven't yet accepted. But most of the "crypto anarchist
cypherpunks" are of the more conventional kind of "disreputable"
appearance, so the point is moot.)

* The more serious message of toning down our calls for complete and total
access to whatever crypto tools we can get is potentially more divisive to
this group. We don't all have the same politics...some of us are
anarcho-capitalists, some are socialists (I hear), some are nonpolitical
(as near as I can tell), some decline to state, and some may off in their
own uncharted territory. But what we all seem to believe in common is that
no government has the right to force us to make tape recordings of all of
our conversations (to be placed in escrow, in case the government someday
needs to listen to them!), to tap our phones, to insist we speak in
government-approved non-coded language, and to use their "Wiretap Chips."

I said "potentially" more divisive. In practice, nobody on this list is
really disagreeing in a major way with our general goals of privacy and
access to tools (to borrow the "Whole Earth" phrase). A few people
disagreed with the way remailers, like our home-grown remailers and like
Johan Helsingius' (he's also on this list, of course), were being handled.
But that's the kind of debate we want.

* To some, like David Sternlight, Dorothy Denning, and Andrew Molitor,
these are radical, unreasonable, and subversive views. "Remember, children,
the policeman is your *friend*." seems to sum up their view of crypto. It's
hard to imagine just what we have to "be reasonable" about with such
people. A basic ideological divide separates us.

* I fully agree with many of you that the name "Cypherpunks" has some,
shall we say, _unusual_ connotations. Some will assume we're skateboarding
geeks, others will assume we're "crypto primitives" who pierce our bodies
and spend all our time at raves. But the name has undeniable appeal to
many, and certainly grabs a lot of attention. It seems improbable that some
staid name like "Northern California Cryptography Hobbyists Association"
would've gotten much attention, let alone a write-up in "Wired" (and
upcoming pieces in "Whole Earth Review," "The Village Voice," etc.).

(Perhaps you out there who first heard about us via an article in "Mondo,"
or "Wired," or a reference someplace, like MindVox or sci.crypt, can tell
us what grabbed your attention, what you liked and disliked about the name,
etc. Just as feedback.)

In any case, it's much too late to change the name now. Publicity of
"Cypherpunks" has spread the name, lots of journalists are intrigued by it,
and it basically *does* capture the spirit of our group. After all, for
basic civil liberties and cyberspace issues, the ACLU, CPSR, and EFF
already exist and do a fair job at presenting lawyer-like faces to the
press. And for conventional "phreaking," the group "2600" is having their
own meetings. We don't have to be the group with the subdued and staid
image.

And note tha the "Hackers Conference" has not changed _their_  name,
either, despite the negative publicity given the name. (A meta-rule: There
is no such thing as negative publicity. All they have to do is spell your
name right. Ironically, in a recent "MacWorld" column, Steven Levy
misspelled our name as "Cipherpunks." He got it right in his "Wired" piece,
though.)

* As for respectablity, is our goal to be "co-opted" into the
Establishment? (Geez. these words I'm writing could've been written in
1968!) Is it to be a respectable voice for moderation and the gentle
process of negotiating? I think not.

(Note that the Wiretap Chip was *not* presented for discussion and for
industry comment. Neither the Bush nor Clinton camps presented this for
public debate--unless you consider Dorothy Denning's comments to be the
"trial balloon" I suggested it was last fall in sci.crypt...Denning has
made the curious claim that she knew "nothing" of the Clipper plan until
the night before it was publicly announced. This plan is a fait accompli,
production of the chips is underway, and AT&T has already announced their
Clipper-tapped phone. The best we can do is undermine the proposal, deploy
strong crypto as widely as possible before it's outlawed completely
(Clipper will fail if strong crypto alternatives are available...what do
you think Big Brother plans to do about this?), and continue to make as
much noise as we can about the evils of invading privacy in this way. I see
little indication that reasonable negotiation is being invited.)

* There are already several groups, as I've mentioned, made up of lawyers
and "respectable spokesmen" like Mitch Kapor and Mike Godwin (wherever he
is now). In a sense, Cypherpunks fill an important ecological niche by
being the outrageous side, the radical side...perhaps a bit like the role
the Black Panthers, Yippies, and Weather Underground played a generation
ago. (By the way, "The Crypto Underground" was one of my favorite name
proposals....aren't you glad now we settled on Jude Milhon's "Cypherpunks"
suggestion?)

* Cypherpunks write code, as Eric put it. They write code, they build
remailers, they test systems to see how they break, they share their
findings, they ignore restrictions on crypto, they look at the consequences
of strong crypto, and they write articles like this.

* Now I'm all for respectability in certain ways, ways that come naturally
to each of us. When I talk to journalists, I speak in complete sentences, I
explain things in the most straightforward way possible, etc. I don't roll
in on my skateboard and say "Dewd! Yo bro, let's skank this Clipper shit!"

But I don't plan to shave off my beard, cut my hair, start wearing suits,
or be "moderate and reasonable" in my arguments. Nor do I intend to water
down my messages about digital money, anonymous systems, and crypto
anarchy.

"Let a thousand flowers bloom."  --Mao (not one of my heroes)

"Live dangerously." --Nietzsche (one of my heroes)


-Tim May, Cypherpunk

--
Timothy C. May         | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,  
tcmay@netcom.com       | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
408-688-5409           | knowledge, reputations, information markets, 
W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA  | black markets, smashing of governments.
Higher Power: 2^756839 | Public Key: MailSafe and PGP available.
Waco Massacre + Big Brother Wiretap Chip = A Nazi Regime





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Stanton McCandlish <anton@hydra.unm.edu>
Date: Wed, 21 Apr 93 13:51:24 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: FAQ: PGP where?
Message-ID: <9304212051.AA14092@hydra.unm.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


For those with modems but not full Internet access, you can obtain PGP2.2
from the BBS listed in the .sib below.  Full access first call.
I stock the DOS, Mac, and Unix versions, the source code/utils package (in
.ZIP format), and the DOS menu/shell program.  Look in the LOGIN and NON-
IBM file areas.  All are direct from wel established FTP sites (garbo, oak, 
etc.), NOT from uploads or from other BBSs.  Clean as whistle!  If you wish
anonymity, you can get the DOS ver, source and shell from the LOGIN file
area, if you login as GUEST password GUEST.  Don't futz about though, the
GUEST acct. is quite time-restricted.  Best bet is login normally.
If you never plan to call again, just enter x and 0000 for all the question-
naire fields, and leave a "delete me" <C>omment to sysop, if you would.
-- 
Testes saxi solidi!  **********************   Podex opacus gravedinosus est!  
Stanton McCandlish,  SysOp:  Noise in the Void Data Center BBS
IndraNet: 369:1/1      FidoNet: 1:301/2      Internet: anton@hydra.unm.edu
Snail: 8020 Central SE #405, Albuquerque, New Mexico 87108 USA
Data phone: +1-505-246-8515 (24hr, 1200-14400 v32bis, N-8-1)
Vox phone:  +1-505-247-3402 (bps rate varies, depends on if you woke me up...:)




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: morrison@tantalus.scl.ameslab.gov (Andrew Morrison)
Date: Wed, 21 Apr 93 12:55:29 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Cancellation
Message-ID: <9304211951.AA19740@tantalus.scl.ameslab.gov>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Please remove me from the list. I have limited access to my e-mail, and can't
keep up.
                Thank you,
                         Andrew Morrison




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: ah@uknet.ac.uk
Date: Wed, 21 Apr 93 07:07:09 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: No Subject
Message-ID: <9304211406.AA10509@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain




To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: The Family Key
Newsgroups: ml.cypherpunks
In-Reply-To: <199304211229.AA28337@sun.Panix.Com>
Organization: Dunathad
Cc: 

In article <199304211229Y.AA28337@sun.Panix.Com> wrote:
>I think the largest weakness in the whole Clipper scheme, and
>I am not sure If I am right about this is,....
>...
>Thus, the NSA will be able to maintain an active traffic pattern
>analysis of ALL communications sent via the Clipper chiped devices.
>
>I think in many ways that traffic watching can and does often reveal
>more information about someone than at time listening in to what
>is actually being said.
>

I can't help feeling that they'll be looking for a little more, an edge;
not enough that their promises to the executive are broken, but enough to
get an edge if they need to decrypt without the key. No offense against
the NSA of course, but that's how I'd expect the British to work "in the
National Interest".

Rgds
Alan

---
Alan Hunter
Johnson Hunter Ltd
Isle of Islay, Scotland
A.Hunter@dunaad.co.uk          fax: +44-496-2336         voice: +44-496-2286






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Danny.Swerdloff@f246.n107.z1.ieee.org (Danny Swerdloff)
Date: Wed, 21 Apr 93 19:05:15 PDT
To: Cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: John Draper
Message-ID: <28187.2BD5FC66@nisc.ieee.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Anyone know how I can contact John Draper ("Cap'n Crunch")
Thanx...
Danny

--  
=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=
 Danny Swerdloff - Internet: Danny.Swerdloff@f246.n107.z1.ieee.org




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Date: Wed, 21 Apr 93 15:09:54 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Crypto Activism and Respectability
Message-ID: <9304212209.AA03876@netcom.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Crypto Activism and Respectability, or, Should We Become "Suits"?


Several Cyperpunks, er, "Privacy Advocates," have called for the name
"Cypherpunks" to be changed to something more serious, more respectable,
less likely to scare the horses. Something like "Cryptography Privacy" or
"Cryptologic Research Association." Some even want a parallel to the NRA,
such as the "National Cryptography Association."

Further, there have been comments that referring to "crypto anarchy," as
I've been doing for several years (my "Crypto Anarchist Manifesto" was
first distributed in 1988) is, to put it bluntly, "not helpful to the
cause." Talk of libertarian ideas, "If crypto is outlawed, only outlaws
will have crypto," and other such "crypto radicalism" is seen as
unrespectable, as counterproductive. We're not speaking the language of the
"suits," it's said. Middle America will be turned off by the hippie
radicals in t-shirts, leather jackets, sandals, and beards. 

(Some readers of this list have volunteered that they'd make better
spokespersons for the Cause because they are clean-shaven, they look like
good corporate citizens, and they know how to make the right soothing
noises to interviewers. I say, "Great! We need more publicity." Just don't
tell the rest of us California types, where sandals, beards, and jeans
remain common, that we need to "go corporate." Picture a "smiley" here, if
that's your style.)

I want to respond by making several comments:

* Radicals like ourselves have always been under pressure to conform to
societal norms, whether to dress in the "gray flannel suit" in the 1950s or
to eschew long hair and beads in the 60s. 

* Guess what? The message is almost more important than the messenger.
People have a pretty clear idea of what people are saying, despite their
appearance. And, frankly, my guess is that even most of Middle America will
feel somewhat more comfortable listening to a John Gilmore, for example,
than a Bill Gates-type nerd clone. People know honesty and sincerity when
they see it, and they know lawyers when they see them. It's been 25 years
since the hippie heyday, and most Americans have adjusted to varying
outward appearances. (Actually, they've internalized and accepted long hair
and beards....shaved heads, nose piercings, and body adornments they
probably haven't yet accepted. But most of the "crypto anarchist
cypherpunks" are of the more conventional kind of "disreputable"
appearance, so the point is moot.)

* The more serious message of toning down our calls for complete and total
access to whatever crypto tools we can get is potentially more divisive to
this group. We don't all have the same politics...some of us are
anarcho-capitalists, some are socialists (I hear), some are nonpolitical
(as near as I can tell), some decline to state, and some may off in their
own uncharted territory. But what we all seem to believe in common is that
no government has the right to force us to make tape recordings of all of
our conversations (to be placed in escrow, in case the government someday
needs to listen to them!), to tap our phones, to insist we speak in
government-approved non-coded language, and to use their "Wiretap Chips."

I said "potentially" more divisive. In practice, nobody on this list is
really disagreeing in a major way with our general goals of privacy and
access to tools (to borrow the "Whole Earth" phrase). A few people
disagreed with the way remailers, like our home-grown remailers and like
Johan Helsingius' (he's also on this list, of course), were being handled.
But that's the kind of debate we want.

* To some, like David Sternlight, Dorothy Denning, and Andrew Molitor,
these are radical, unreasonable, and subversive views. "Remember, children,
the policeman is your *friend*." seems to sum up their view of crypto. It's
hard to imagine just what we have to "be reasonable" about with such
people. A basic ideological divide separates us.

* I fully agree with many of you that the name "Cypherpunks" has some,
shall we say, _unusual_ connotations. Some will assume we're skateboarding
geeks, others will assume we're "crypto primitives" who pierce our bodies
and spend all our time at raves. But the name has undeniable appeal to
many, and certainly grabs a lot of attention. It seems improbable that some
staid name like "Northern California Cryptography Hobbyists Association"
would've gotten much attention, let alone a write-up in "Wired" (and
upcoming pieces in "Whole Earth Review," "The Village Voice," etc.).

(Perhaps you out there who first heard about us via an article in "Mondo,"
or "Wired," or a reference someplace, like MindVox or sci.crypt, can tell
us what grabbed your attention, what you liked and disliked about the name,
etc. Just as feedback.)

In any case, it's much too late to change the name now. Publicity of
"Cypherpunks" has spread the name, lots of journalists are intrigued by it,
and it basically *does* capture the spirit of our group. After all, for
basic civil liberties and cyberspace issues, the ACLU, CPSR, and EFF
already exist and do a fair job at presenting lawyer-like faces to the
press. And for conventional "phreaking," the group "2600" is having their
own meetings. We don't have to be the group with the subdued and staid
image.

And note tha the "Hackers Conference" has not changed _their_  name,
either, despite the negative publicity given the name. (A meta-rule: There
is no such thing as negative publicity. All they have to do is spell your
name right. Ironically, in a recent "MacWorld" column, Steven Levy
misspelled our name as "Cipherpunks." He got it right in his "Wired" piece,
though.)

* As for respectablity, is our goal to be "co-opted" into the
Establishment? (Geez. these words I'm writing could've been written in
1968!) Is it to be a respectable voice for moderation and the gentle
process of negotiating? I think not.

(Note that the Wiretap Chip was *not* presented for discussion and for
industry comment. Neither the Bush nor Clinton camps presented this for
public debate--unless you consider Dorothy Denning's comments to be the
"trial balloon" I suggested it was last fall in sci.crypt...Denning has
made the curious claim that she knew "nothing" of the Clipper plan until
the night before it was publicly announced. This plan is a fait accompli,
production of the chips is underway, and AT&T has already announced their
Clipper-tapped phone. The best we can do is undermine the proposal, deploy
strong crypto as widely as possible before it's outlawed completely
(Clipper will fail if strong crypto alternatives are available...what do
you think Big Brother plans to do about this?), and continue to make as
much noise as we can about the evils of invading privacy in this way. I see
little indication that reasonable negotiation is being invited.)

* There are already several groups, as I've mentioned, made up of lawyers
and "respectable spokesmen" like Mitch Kapor and Mike Godwin (wherever he
is now). In a sense, Cypherpunks fill an important ecological niche by
being the outrageous side, the radical side...perhaps a bit like the role
the Black Panthers, Yippies, and Weather Underground played a generation
ago. (By the way, "The Crypto Underground" was one of my favorite name
proposals....aren't you glad now we settled on Jude Milhon's "Cypherpunks"
suggestion?)

* Cypherpunks write code, as Eric put it. They write code, they build
remailers, they test systems to see how they break, they share their
findings, they ignore restrictions on crypto, they look at the consequences
of strong crypto, and they write articles like this.

* Now I'm all for respectability in certain ways, ways that come naturally
to each of us. When I talk to journalists, I speak in complete sentences, I
explain things in the most straightforward way possible, etc. I don't roll
in on my skateboard and say "Dewd! Yo bro, let's skank this Clipper shit!"

But I don't plan to shave off my beard, cut my hair, start wearing suits,
or be "moderate and reasonable" in my arguments. Nor do I intend to water
down my messages about digital money, anonymous systems, and crypto
anarchy.

"Let a thousand flowers bloom."  --Mao (not one of my heroes)

"Live dangerously." --Nietzsche (one of my heroes)


-Tim May, Cypherpunk

--
Timothy C. May         | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,  
tcmay@netcom.com       | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
408-688-5409           | knowledge, reputations, information markets, 
W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA  | black markets, smashing of governments.
Higher Power: 2^756839 | Public Key: MailSafe and PGP available.
Waco Massacre + Big Brother Wiretap Chip = A Nazi Regime





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: The Phantom <phantom@u.washington.edu>
Date: Wed, 21 Apr 93 15:29:58 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: JOBS: Cypherpunks employing Cypherpunks
Message-ID: <Pine.3.05.9304211540.A7089-b100000@stein2.u.washington.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Clipper:

If anyone wants it, I can send you the text to the letter I just sent
President Clinton and the local papers. I think it is a decent,
fairly non-technical letter that might point out some of the parallels
between this crypto chip and invasion of privacy to the common person.

In my local area, I have now been responsible for 'educating' over 30
people to my interpretation of the meaning of this chip offering. I think
it is important that the public knows a little about what is going on so
that they can make a conscious decision about the usefulness of it.

I don't however, wish to waste list bandwidth with the text of it, as I
don't personally think it is a masterpeice. :)


Cypherpunks employing Cypherpunks:

On another note, I hate it when people use the list for purely personal
reasons, but I really need a summer job / internship. If you own your
own business [ :) ] or know of a _possible_ opening in a company you work
for, please, please contact me and run it by me. I am an Electrical
Engineering student at the University of Washington (I hold a 3.2 in my EE
classes) and have very few qualms about relocating over the summer (it
might even be nice if it were in the bay area, as then I could make it to
a Cypherpunk meeting!)

It'd be really nice to finally meet some of the people I've been talking
to for all of these months.

Any leads or ideas would be appreciated. 



Matt Thomlinson
University of Washington, Seattle, Washington.
Internet: phantom@u.washington.edu      	    phone: (206) 528-5732
PGP 2.2  key available via email or finger phantom@hardy.u.washington.edu





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: mark@coombs.anu.edu.au (Mark)
Date: Tue, 20 Apr 93 22:30:50 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Just a thought...
Message-ID: <9304210524.AA11273@coombs.anu.edu.au>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Whilst being heavily opposed to the chip although less affected by it since
I dont reside on US soil, one useful purpose of it would to exploit the
functions of it to send your pre-encrypted data through it and have it come
out the other end in the same form, thus using it's protocols of retransmission
and error correction. Using the encryption part of it isnt worth considering
due to the real lack of data integrity if (as?) the TLA's have backdoors.

Basically mooch it's good points and ignore the bad points as your data wont
be channeled to the phone in cleartext anyway.

(This isnt an advocacy of the damn thing, just a note that it has SOME
functionality for those that wont use the encryption functions).

Mark
mark@coombs.anu.edu.au




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: peb@PROCASE.COM
Date: Wed, 21 Apr 93 16:07:41 PDT
To: habs@Panix.Com
Subject: Re: The Family Key
Message-ID: <9304212235.AA03841@banff>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>From: Harry Shapiro <habs@Panix.Com>

>press release claims that the Clipper
>chip doesn't provide anything more than what Law Enforcement already
>has. That is not true.

I was about to say this myself too, but Hellman already pointed it out.
However, it is worth mentioning for emphasis.

The Family key is known not only to the NSA, but to the FBI with their
black box units.  No special protection is given to this key and it
allows the equivalent of Caller-ID *and* Callee-ID over all transmissions
using Clipper regardless of how the calls are routed.  This is *much*
cheaper than speaker recognition used in roving wiretaps!  Roving wire
taps are given out sparingly, but it seems that Clipper would make the 
scanning of huge numbers of calls and saving traffic info the normal
mode of operation.

In my letter to Casa Blanca I mentioned that I noticed this deception 
in the NIST press release.

Another feature of the F key is that it could be changed in new runs of
chip making, but evidently, protecting F is not a great concern by
NIST/FBI, et al. The 3, 34 bit pads, if/when the entire system is
entirely compromised, could be changed--in fact they could do it regularly
anyway--they can keep a list of Serial number to pad mappings.  This
would prevent the system from entirely being compromised by an outside
[NSA] entity, so it is somewhat robust to that possibility.


Paul E. Baclace
peb@procase.com





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Robert Luscombe <ral@telerama.pgh.pa.us>
Date: Wed, 21 Apr 93 12:46:46 PDT
To: Cypherpunks <cypherpunks@toad.com>
Subject: Re:PGP again.
Message-ID: <Pine.2.4.9304211538.A21569@telerama.pgh.pa.us>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I apologize for this, but...
If anyone sent me a response re:pgp help, i just lost my incoming mailbox
before i read my mail.  I did see a few responses listed in my new mail,
but they were gone when i tried to read them.  Sorry for the hassle, but
could anyone who did send me something re-send it?  I am not too happy
about all my lost mail.
 --Robert Luscombe
  Internet: ral@telerama.pgh.pa.us      Voice:412/488-0941
            robert@well.sf.ca.us        (Finger for PGP Pub Key)




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Arthur Abraham <a2@well.sf.ca.us>
Date: Wed, 21 Apr 93 16:09:53 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: The (very) next Saturday Meeting
Message-ID: <199304212309.AA12908@well.sf.ca.us>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I will be presenting a short talk entitled: 
	
	Clipper (Nail* | *Ship): External Functionality   

based on the hardware specs of this topical device.


p.s. I tried to get samples, but the price was $300,000 for 10,000 units,
and I didn't think that many pe




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Arthur Abraham <a2@well.sf.ca.us>
Date: Wed, 21 Apr 93 16:09:55 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: The (very) next Saturday Meeting
Message-ID: <199304212309.AA12929@well.sf.ca.us>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I will be presenting a short talk entitled: 
	
	Clipper (Nail* | *Ship): External Functionality   

based on the hardware specs of this topical device.


p.s. I tried to get samples, but the price was $300,000 for 10,000 units,




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Stanton McCandlish <anton@hydra.unm.edu>
Date: Wed, 21 Apr 93 15:31:36 PDT
To: Extropians@gnu.ai.mit.edu
Subject: Re: Crypto Activism and Respectability
In-Reply-To: <9304212055.AA04324@churchy.gnu.ai.mit.edu>
Message-ID: <9304212230.AA21644@hydra.unm.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


RE: becoming suits.  No.  Cypherpunks is a unique group, don't cheapen it.
Get the suits sympathetic to you (and among you) to do the suit thing.

RE: change the name.  Why?  It is not as if cypherpunks is a cable network.
It is a mailing list.  Most people will never know it exists.  If you send
out missives for the masses, just sign them with you name, and don't put 
"cypherpunks" on it, if you fear it will be misinterpreted.  I know how it
feels.  My BBS sounds like a hackers' den, but it is a clean, legal online
library, and has not that much in common with the typical BBS.  Sometimes
I think of changing the name and then I think, "No, no Noise in the Void was
the name, is the name, will be the name."

If people want a Nat'l. Cryptography Assoc., let them go make one.  

Re: why I joined, and if it has anything to do with the name. 
I signed on the list, because I needed info on crypto, and sci.crypt is in-
convenient (I hardly use UseNet anymore, it becomes more worthless by the 
second it seems.)  However I did grin punkishly at the name.  I like it.
If the list had been Nat'l. Crypto. Assoc., I would likely have avoided it,
simple because it sounds suit, and I have no patience with suits, and do 
not trust them.  <shrug>
-- 
Testes saxi solidi!  **********************   Podex opacus gravedinosus est!  
Stanton McCandlish,  SysOp:  Noise in the Void Data Center BBS
IndraNet: 369:1/1      FidoNet: 1:301/2      Internet: anton@hydra.unm.edu
Snail: 8020 Central SE #405, Albuquerque, New Mexico 87108 USA
Data phone: +1-505-246-8515 (24hr, 1200-14400 v32bis, N-8-1)
Vox phone:  +1-505-247-3402 (bps rate varies, depends on if you woke me up...:)




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: fergp@sytex.com (Paul Ferguson)
Date: Wed, 21 Apr 93 14:42:24 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: WIRED snippet
Message-ID: <ZFkD3B1w165w@sytex.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


On Wed, 21 Apr 93 11:30:24 -0600,
 L. Detweiler <uunet!longs.lance.colostate.edu!ld231782>
 
LD> EFF is drawing fire on the proposal or EFF is drawing fire on
LD> itself?
 
I read this elsewhere, but I just can't remember where, off the top
of my head. Anyway, here is a snippet from WIRED (Vol 1, Issue 2,
May/June 1993, page 97) that also mentions it -
 
8<------- Cut Here ------------
 
HYPE LIST          Current        Position        Months
                   Position       Last Month      on List
                   --------       ----------      -------
 
Cryptography          1               4              3
 
Wireless Everything   2               -              2
 
Wired                 3               -              1
 
EFF Sells Out         4               -              1
 
Piercing              5               -              2
 
 
1. Cryptography
 
Cryptography continues to rise in popularity as the solution for all
digital ills. The use of the software encryption package Pretty Good
Privacy (PGP) for e-mail is now tres hip among the network elites,
and public keys are being traded like baseball cards. Of course,
encryption is just a way to hide the same boring messages, but it
does add that element of intrigue. Crypto-philes are a '90s version of
the NRA gun nuts: paranoid of the government's attempts to legislate,
and coonvinced that their guns (codes) are necessary for freedom. "If
encryption is outlawed, only outlaws will have encryption," is already
splattered around the Net.
 
2. Wireless Everything
 
There seems to be an unwritten rule nowadays that every product
announcement must trumpet the fact that the new gizmo is, even if
only in some minor way, wireless.  We now have wireless mice,
keyboards, modems, printers, and networks. The once-esoteric
deliberations concerninng radio bandwidth auctioning have become
front page news in the Wall Street Journal. What's strange is that
there is no corresponding consumer clamor for wireless products. In
fact, wireless keyboards and printers have flopped every time thay have
been introduced. But don't expect this to stop Buck Rogers-obsessed
electronics companies anytime soon.
 
3. Wired
 
The glut of recent media hype surrounding this new rag is proof the
WIRED staff has read and understood its Marshall McLuhan. Through
deliberate manipulation of broadcasters, spin-doctored press releases,
and billboards everywhere, WIRED has achieved near total ubiquity,
including spots on everything from Good Morning America to NPR. While
the mainstream media looks on in disbelief, the reaction on the Net
has been more divided. Some on alt.cyberpunk see it as the unholy
offspring of M2 and the Economist, while others see it as a rehash of
the Same Old Stuff, down to the obligatory article on virtual sex.
Like VR, it's a viewpoint-dependent medium.
 
4. EFF Sells Out
 
The Electronic Frontier Foundation's announcement of their
reorganization and the closure of their Cambridge office was greeted
with cries of betrayal and the ripping of membership cards. Many
people on the Net saw the reorganization as a move by the EFF towards
a more slick-corporate-Washington D.C.-Clinton-ass-kicking type of
organization. The critics have grossly exaggerated the charges, but
there is a kernel of truth to them: The EFF gets most of its financial
support from large corporations such as AT&T and Apple, and John Perry
Barlow has admitted that this has influenced the EFF's actions. (Heck,
how many times hhave you seen John Sculley standing next to Clinton
in the past four months?) But a well-endowed EFF is sure to be more
effective than a politically correct one -- we just need to hope that
what is best for Apple is also best for us.
 
5. Piercing
 
Body piercing has been hyped for the last five years, but only
recently has it really caught on in the computer community. Now it
seems as though every programmer in San Jose has a pierced nipple and
is eagerto tell you about it. As Jaron Lanier said, piercing is the
only thing left that can still get a rise from a teenager's ex-hippy
parent. Cyberpunk lit has always emphasized body malfunctions, from
fake eyes to knives implanted under yourr finger nails, and piercing
is a cheap and easy way to be like your heros -- and it;s oh so
rebellious. I just hope that liposuction becomes the next big trend
with this group.
 
- Steve Steinberg
 
8<----- Cut Here ---------
 
Cheers.
 
 

Paul Ferguson                    |  Uncle Sam wants to read
Network Integration Consultant   |       your e-mail...
Centreville, Virginia USA        | Just say "NO" to the Clipper
fergp@sytex.com                  |          Chip...




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Haywood J. Blowme" <psionic@wam.umd.edu>
Date: Wed, 21 Apr 93 14:55:01 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: New Algorithm...
Message-ID: <199304212154.AA15610@rac3.wam.umd.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


   As promised, I spoke today with the company mentioned in a Washington
Times article about the Clipper chip announcement. The name of the company
is Secure Communicatiions Technology (Information will be given at the end
of this message on how to contact them).
 
   Basically they are disturbed about the announcement for many reasons that
we are. More specifically however, Mr. Bryen of Secure Communications
brought to light many points that might interest most of the readers.
 
   His belief is that AT&T was made known of the clipper well before the
rest of the industry. This is for several reasons, several of which are:
 
 - A company of AT&T's size could never be able to make a decision to use
   the new chip on the SAME DAY it was announced.
 
 - Months ago they proposed using their own chip for AT&T's secure telephone
   devices. AT&T basically blew them off as being not interested at all.
   This stuck them as strange, until now...
 
 
   Also I spoke with Art Melnick, their cryptographer, he expressed several
concerns over the new Clipper Chip:
 
  - The obvious backdoor will be able to let many people decrypt the code.
 
  - Once the key is released to authorities the security of the crypto
    system is lost forever. These keys can end up in the hands of any agency
    of the government.
 
  - The fact that the escrowed keys never change means that the algorithm
    is vulnerable over time to an attacker.
 
  - The classified algorithm may hide another backdoor. But he feels that
    it is probably to keep people from forging fake serial numbers, or
    changing the keys themselves.
 
  - Additionally he feels that the NSA has probably spent enough time and
    money in working on a way to keep this chip from being reversed
    engineered, that he feels that reverse engineering it will be very
    difficult to do. He feels that they have developed a suitable technique
    to protect the chip from this attack. Also he feels that the chip is
    hardware encoded with the algorithm and not microcoded onto the chip.
 
Additonally I spoke with Mr. Melnick about their algorithm. He couldn't tell
me much about their new agorithm because it hasn't been patented yet.
However he told me a little:
 
 - The algorithm will be released for public review after patents have been
   granted for it. This is so the crypto community can see that it is
   secure.
 
 - The algorithm is called NEA for New Encryption Algorithm.
   The details were sketchy because now it is held as a trade secret
   until the patent was issued, but I was told that it will incorporate
   the following:
 
    - It will have fast encryption of data (Exact specs not given, but
      Mr. Melnick stated "Much faster than what an RS-232 can put out.")
 
    - It is a symmetric cipher, just like IDEA and DES.
 
    - It will use 64 bit data blocks for encryption (like DES and IDEA).
 
    - The key length was not given to me, but Mr. Melnick states that
      it is _adujustable_ and is "More than adequate for security."
 
    - The algorithm is written in C and Assembler in software form, and
      can be ported to many platforms (Unlike the the Clipper Chip which
      is hardware ONLY and cannot be made into software) This I
      consider a definite plus for the NEA for widespread use.
 
    - The algorithm will accomodate public key distribution techniques
      such as RSA or Diffie-Hellman. This will also be supported in the
      hardware chip.
 
    - Right now the projected cost of the NEA chip will be about 10 dollars
      for each!! (Clipper will run 25 each chip [that is if it is produced
      enough, which probably won't happen]).
 
    - They currently sell a program called C-COM that uses the algorithm
      and a special streaming protocol that does not divide the encrypted
      data into "blocks." This could prevent plaintext attacks if you know
      what the block header is. This program operates at all supported
      RS-232 speeds and uses the software implementation of the algorithm.
 
    - Most importantly: IT DOES NOT HAVE A BACKDOOR!!
 
 
 
Right now the company is afraid that the new clipper chip will put them out
of business. This is a very real possibility. So they really need help in
stopping the clipper chip from becoming a standard. If you want to contact
them, they can be reached at..
 
Secure Communications Technology
8700 Georgia Ave. Suite 302
Silver Spring, MD
 
(301) 588-2200
 
I talked to Mr. Bryen who represents the company. He can answer any
questions you have.
 
 
 
 
 
 

=============================================================================
      ///    | psionic@wam.umd.edu | Fight the WIRETAP CHIP!! Ask me how!
 __  /// C=  | -Craig H. Rowland-  |
 \\\/// Amiga| PGP Key Available   | "Those who would give up liberty for
  \///  1200 | by request.         |  security deserve neither."
=============================================================================




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: derek@cs.wisc.edu (Derek Zahn)
Date: Wed, 21 Apr 93 15:57:49 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: "Cypherpunks Write Code"
Message-ID: <9304212257.AA15529@lynx.cs.wisc.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Hmm, I write code -- but so far no cyphercode.

Since I'd like to be part of the cypherdelic revolution,
what code needs writing?  I agree that the PC/modem
scrambled telephone is a good idea, but others are already
bashing that out; there must be other neat projects that
want doing.  Any thoughts?

derek
psypherdelic psypherdewd (in training)




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: karn@qualcomm.com (Phil Karn)
Date: Wed, 21 Apr 93 19:58:00 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com (Good Guys)
Subject: Re: The Family Key
Message-ID: <9304220257.AA22606@servo>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


At 08:29 AM 4/21/93, Harry Shapiro wrote:
>Thus, the NSA will be able to maintain an active traffic pattern
>analysis of ALL communications sent via the Clipper chiped devices.
>
>I think in many ways that traffic watching can and does often reveal
>more information about someone than at time listening in to what
>is actually being said.

I think this is an extremely important point. The US precedents regarding
traffic analysis (e.g., telephone "pen registers") are very anti-privacy.
I would not be at all surprised to see decisions saying that law enforcement
could use the Chipper ID anyway they liked, without a warrant.

Phil




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: gnu (John Gilmore)
Date: Wed, 21 Apr 93 19:35:26 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Wired `Cypherpunk' issues will be available at the meeting
Message-ID: <9304220235.AA23434@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I got a box of magazines and will be selling them at the cover price
($5) at the meeting.  It's the May/June issue.  The cover features
three masked cypherpunks behind a flag; the whole crew appears on page 54.

People who aren't coming to the meeting can get copies at their local
bookstore, or call George Clark at Wired at +1 415 904 0660.  If you
want to subscribe (6 issues/year, $20), you can call +1 800 SO WIRED
or send a check to Wired, 544 2nd St, SF, CA 94107.

	John




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: baumbach@atmel.com (Peter Baumbach)
Date: Wed, 21 Apr 93 17:00:53 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: The Wiretap Chip and the reaction so far
Message-ID: <9304212342.AA00841@minnow.chp.atmel.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I have been suprised at how wide the knowledge of the Wiretap Chip has
spread. (and how quickly!)  My mom even heard about it before I could
tell her.  Most of the people I've talked to don't like the idea of
the gov't having the keys.  These people came to this conlusion on their
own.  The sources of their information might be biasing their view. :-)
I heard a commentary on National Public Radio that was against it!

Keep up the fight.  It's not a loosing battle.

There is also a bright side to this battle.  Look at all the free publicity
that privacy has gotten.  Our gov't has given ground in the early rounds 
of the negotiation by stating there is a right to encryption.  They want to
completely control that right to encryption, and this we will fight and win.

-----tactic

I recommend telling people about the freedom and privacy gained in other
countries by their use of PGP.  Tell them that the secret police can no
longer spy on their citizens as effectively.

privacy == freedom
no privacy == tyranny

Peter Baumbach
baumbach@atmel.com

Boycott the KGB chip
Boycott the IRS chip




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: pmetzger@lehman.com (Perry E. Metzger)
Date: Wed, 21 Apr 93 16:43:45 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Should we become "suits"?
Message-ID: <9304212343.AA29698@snark.shearson.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



No one said anything about becoming "suits", Tim. 

The problem is this: the name "Cypherpunks" makes us sound like people
who break into computers for fun or other such stuff. I was on the
phone with John Markoff of the New York Times a couple of days ago,
and I was unhappy that no one had yet changed the name of the group
because I frankly felt that I could not encourage him to subscribe --
the results would be unpredictable. I encouraged him to read more
sci.crypt instead, which he has already been doing.

I've been associated with radical political causes for a while. I've
found that in general, the radicals are their own worst enemy. People
are NOT happy about being lectured to by strange-acting people. 

Bill Winter of the Libertarian Party of New Hampshire was their
chairman over the period in which the LPNH went from four members of
the state party to actually becoming a force in New Hampshire
politics. New Hampshire is the *only* LP outpost to make any
significant electoral inroads, *anywhere*. He once told me this: you
can get people to accept strange sounding ideas when promulgated by
normal looking people. You can get them to accept normal-sounding
ideas when promulgated by strange looking people. You can't get them
to accept strange ideas when promulgated by strange people.

No, I'm not saying you should wear a suit. I'm not saying John Gilmore
should cut his hair and start wearing Armani. I'm just saying that our
name is a stumbling block.

Why shoot ourselves in the foot for something worthless?

The simple change in our name from something confrontational that
makes us sound like machine crackers to something that expresses what
this group is about would make a radical positive change in our image.

Now, what are the benefits of keeping the current name "cypherpunks"?

Well, lets see Tim's list.

>In a sense, Cypherpunks fill an important ecological niche by
>being the outrageous side, the radical side...perhaps a bit like the role
>the Black Panthers, Yippies, and Weather Underground played a generation
>ago.

None of whom accomplished any of their goals. You REALLY want to
emulate them? I've been an occassional visitor to #9 Bleeker Street,
where Dana Beal, last of the Yippies, holds court. He doesn't wash
regularly, and he wonders occassionaly why no one takes his drug
legalization crusade seriously. Hint: they are connected.

We can't afford to lose this fight. This is a matter of life and
death. Playing out fantasy games about being 1960s radicals is fine
and well -- when you don't care about the outcome. We can't afford to
lose, so we can't afford to emulate losing strategies.

> And, frankly, my guess is that even most of Middle America will
>feel somewhat more comfortable listening to a John Gilmore, for example,
>than a Bill Gates-type nerd clone. People know honesty and sincerity when
>they see it, and they know lawyers when they see them. It's been 25 years
>since the hippie heyday, and most Americans have adjusted to varying
>outward appearances.

Well, I'm not proposing that John not be a spokesman -- most of our
interaction with the media is happening electronically and not in
person, and John is eloquent. But you are fooling yourself if you
think people listen to Hippies over Suits.

I'm speaking as a person who used to have long hair and worked
exclusively in Tee-shirt and shorts. I feel more comfortable dressed
that way -- but these days I wear a suit because thats what gets me
paid. I'm also speaking as a person who's extensively looked at this
question in connection with my activism in the Libertarian Party.

The fact is this: over and over again, every scientific study thats
been done (by lots of people), every anecdotal comparison I can make
in things like why one LP candidate did well and another did poorly or
why one local group soared while another failed, each one of them
point to the same conclusion: that conclusion is, sadly, that you are
completely wrong Tim, and that people judge by appearances, and that
even the most down and out people in our society will take the word of
a person who looks respectable over a person who doesn't. This
includes hackers -- hackers will trust grungy looking people as soon
as they have verified that they are fellow hackers, but watch what
they do sometime when they drive by a hitchhiker as casually dressed
as themselves. Take a sample of hackers, put them in a sociology lab,
show them videotapes of people making statements who are dressed like
hippies and dressed like bankers, and five will get you ten that they
react just like the rest of the population.

Influencing the public is not a guessing game any more -- its a
science. People have done honest to god studies on this. I'll happily
forward you references if you want.

>We don't all have the same politics...some of us are
>anarcho-capitalists, some are socialists (I hear), some are nonpolitical
>(as near as I can tell), some decline to state, and some may off in their
>own uncharted territory. But what we all seem to believe in common is that
>no government has the right to force us to make tape recordings of all of
>our conversations (to be placed in escrow, in case the government someday
>needs to listen to them!), to tap our phones, to insist we speak in
>government-approved non-coded language, and to use their "Wiretap Chips."

Fine and dandy, but how does changing our name to "cryptoprivacy" harm
any of this?

>In any case, it's much too late to change the name now.

No its not. Its perfectly easy.

>And note tha the "Hackers Conference" has not changed _their_ name,
>either, despite the negative publicity given the name.

They aren't doing any lobbying. Their name doesn't matter. Their image
makes no difference at all. Ours does.

>As for respectablity, is our goal to be "co-opted" into the
>Establishment?

Tim, I'm an anarchist. Do you REALLY think I'm about to become
co-opted by the establishment? Is it REALLY your belief that changing
the name of the group to "cryptoprivacy" would turn me into a raving
statist, foaming at the mouth about imposing regulatory control
structures?

>There are already several groups, as I've mentioned, made up of lawyers
>and "respectable spokesmen" like Mitch Kapor and Mike Godwin (wherever he
>is now).

No one can log in to their groups -- we provide an essential service.
I WANT the New York Times reporter reading this group, but I don't
want him to think we are crackers or nuts.

>But I don't plan to shave off my beard, cut my hair, start wearing suits,
>or be "moderate and reasonable" in my arguments.

Who asked you to? You aren't going on television, and moderating your
ARGUMENTS is useless. I'm talking about appearances, nothing more. Our
name is cheap and easy to change. It costs us little, and I'm not
proposing we change anything else.

Perry




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: TO1SITTLER@APSICC.APS.EDU
Date: Wed, 21 Apr 93 19:49:43 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Is this list still operational?
Message-ID: <930421204720.302b@APSICC.APS.EDU>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


	Ive been wondering if the list still exists.  Ive seen very little
traffic in the last few hours, and Im wondering if this mailing list is still
around. 
				Kragen




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Date: Wed, 21 Apr 93 20:52:03 PDT
To: extropians@gnu.ai.mit.edu
Subject: Duplicate messages--Sorry!
Message-ID: <9304220352.AA07384@netcom.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Multiple copies of my "Suits?" posting went out earlier today.

I apologize profusely, as this was caused by my mailer software (and me),
not by anything in the list software. Basically, my mailer program (Eudora,
for the Mac) would choke part way through uploading a message...sometime
numbers in the message, as in "Mondo xxxx" cause it to think data is about
to be sent and it chokes. (Why it does it on some files and not others is a
mystery to me. I'm investigating it further.)

I fiddled with the files and tried again...I didn't think any of the files
had actually gotten through until I sent a modified file through that just
had "Mondo" instead of "Mondo xxxx" in it.

(When the file transfer choked with an "SMTP Error," it left the file
marked as unsent.)

Anyway, very sorry! Deep apologies.

-Tim







From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: zane@genesis.mcs.com (Sameer)
Date: Thu, 22 Apr 93 14:55:15 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: PGPHELP: Digisigning that petition
Message-ID: <m0nm8ry-000MUFC@genesis.mcs.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


	I was looking over PGP in order to figure out how digisigning a
petition could work, and I couldn't figure out how to get PGP to do it
properly. (It was frustrating, because I remembered doing it before.)

	What I *want* PGP to output is:

-- Begin PGP Signed Message --
We hate the clipper
-- End PGP Signed Message --

-- Begin PGP Sig ---
dsfDSCSA43523csdcsad235s
-- End PGP Sig ---

	In the same form as many post to this list. How about the format
which makes a seperate file out of the PGP -sig, and STILL brackets the
PGP signed message. (The PGP sig file would be in ascii armor following
a message saying: "This is a PGP-sig cert." I *do* remember doing this
before.. I can't figure out HOW I did it though.)

--
| Sameer Parekh-zane@genesis.MCS.COM-PFA related mail to pfa@genesis.MCS.COM |
| Apprentice Philosopher, Writer, Physicist, Healer, Programmer, Lover, more |
| ----STOP THE WIRETAP CHIP/BIG BROTHER PROPOSAL!---MAIL ME FOR DETAILS!  __/
| "Be God" - Me __ "Specialization is for Insects" - Robert A. Heinlein__/
 \_____________/  \___________________________________________________/ 




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Giuseppe Cimmino <0005533039@mcimail.com>
Date: Wed, 21 Apr 93 16:25:05 PDT
To: Craig Nottingham <cnotting@cosmos.gmu.edu>
Subject: Re: Meets 'n Greets
Message-ID: <42930421215924/0005533039ND1EM@mcimail.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


DC's 26oo meetings are held in the food court of a local mall.  The location
doesn't require scheduling, can be gotten to via Metro and while private
property, usually doesn't run into problems with peaceful gathering.  A National
Park would solve (for the time being) the later problem (perhaps the park in
front of the White House?).

Any other DC folks interested?




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Date: Wed, 21 Apr 93 22:26:12 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Should we become "suits"?
Message-ID: <9304220526.AA14476@netcom.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Perry Metzger has written a clear summary of his position, which differs
from mine. I won't restate my points, as both our positions are clear. (As
disputes go, it's quite minor...if a good enough alternative to the name
"Cypherpunks" were to be invented, one that still captured our
"no-compromises" position, I would certainly listen with interest. But if
something ain't provably broke....)

I will answer a couple of Perry's specific points:

>The problem is this: the name "Cypherpunks" makes us sound like people
>who break into computers for fun or other such stuff. I was on the
>phone with John Markoff of the New York Times a couple of days ago,
>and I was unhappy that no one had yet changed the name of the group
>because I frankly felt that I could not encourage him to subscribe --
>the results would be unpredictable. I encouraged him to read more
>sci.crypt instead, which he has already been doing.

I talked to Markoff at the Hackers Conference in October...he is already
aware of Cypherpunks. He placed a call to me last week, before the
Clippershit hit the fan, but I was out. His message to me in e-mail was
that he wanted to check up on what the Cypherpunks were doing....so clearly
he knows all about it.

As it turned out, he talked to others. I can only assume Eric Hughes, who
talked to him on Friday, filled him in on Cypherpunks doings...though by
Friday the focus had of course shifted dramatically.

I think Perry is overly worried about the reaction to our name. Neither
Markoff, nor Levy, nor Kelly, nor Dibbell, nor Mandl has seemed disturbed
by the name. And like I said, the name is interesting and acts as a kind of
"Schelling point" (a natural gathering place) for the subculture of crypto
rebels and privacy advocates.


>I've been associated with radical political causes for a while. I've
>found that in general, the radicals are their own worst enemy. People
>are NOT happy about being lectured to by strange-acting people. 

I can only hope Perry is not referring to *me*!

Perry comments on my mention of radical groups in the 60s:

>None of whom accomplished any of their goals. You REALLY want to
>emulate them? I've been an occassional visitor to #9 Bleeker Street,
>where Dana Beal, last of the Yippies, holds court. He doesn't wash
>regularly, and he wonders occassionaly why no one takes his drug
>legalization crusade seriously. Hint: they are connected.

I wasn't holding them up as moral beacons, just noting that various
"niches" exist, in kind of a good cop/bad cop sort of way. Journalists like
some "color" and will seek out those who'll provide it. Readers, too, seek
some excitement. The "Crypto Rebels" title of Steven Levy's piece bespeaks
volumes. (Frankly, I really like the name "Crypto Rebels"...I should note
that some of the names we debated last fall were of this flavor, including
"Crypto Liberation Front," "The Crypto Underground," and "Crypto Radicals."
Even a whimsical "Cryptoids."  I guess it's clear that the West Coast camp
is somewhat more radical than Perry might like.)

>We can't afford to lose this fight. This is a matter of life and
>death. Playing out fantasy games about being 1960s radicals is fine
>and well -- when you don't care about the outcome. We can't afford to
>lose, so we can't afford to emulate losing strategies.

Well, I think referring to our activities as "playing out fantasy games" is
somewhat intemperate and misleading. Sounds like rhetorical excess to me.
And implying that I, or the others in our group, don't care about the
outcome is also misleading and, I think, unfair. I won't list our
achievements as a group or as individuals, but I'll remind Perry that I was
the one who correctly picked up on Denning's tone in her Computer Security
Conference paper and posted the original alert to sci.crypt, the "A Trial
Balloon to Ban Encryption?" posting. Last time I counted, there were more
than a thousand replies--some good, some crap, some repetitive--to this
thread. In my opinion, this helped prepare the readers of sci.crypt,
comp.org.eff, Cypherpunks, and Extropians in the current situation.

I'm hoping you were merely carried away by the exuberance of your rhetoric
and do not really believe these charges.

>..... But you are fooling yourself if you
>think people listen to Hippies over Suits.

I didn't argue this.  I was arguing that Gilmore, Hughes, and others, are
perfectly acceptable messengers to the journalists I know. If "suits" are
available and are as articulate, fine. I don't see any around here, though!

Sidenote: I hold to one other fairly debatable view: I don't think reaching
Middle America, Mom and Pop, our neighbors, the Silent Majority, etc., is
really all that important. The battle, such as it is happening, is taking
place amongst a fairly small elite. Others believe that Joe Average needs
to be sold on the virtues of crypto and privacy. Maybe so, but that's not a
battle I see Cypherpunks fighting and winning. If this is really your
point, that the Crypto Rebels/Cypherpunks approach will not be convincing
to the folks in Peoria, then I basically *agree* with you. To reach them,
you'll need Madison Avenue ad campaigns, Perot-style populism, and legions
of smooth talkers hitting the talk shows and airwaves. Not something
Cypherpunks have any intentions of doing, so far as I've heard.

As I said in my first message, perhaps a large lobbying group is needed.
The NRA is a useful model, but recall how long it had to get rolling before
the assault on the Second Amendment started in earnest. In this battle,
there are few lobbying groups, few sources of NRA-style publicity and
funding, and the government has *already* struck. Remember, this is not a
proposal, it's a done deal...our only hope now is to demolish it with
withering criticism, with sabotage of trust in it, and with the rapid
deployment of strong crypto alternatives.

(I don't want to belabor the parallels with the NRA, for various reasons.
Suffice it to say that with gun-owners, Americans had long owned and used
guns and the right was included as the Second Amendment. The NRA thus had a
running head start and had lots of sources of funding. The crypto situation
is much newer, much more abstract, and only has a tiny handful of active
users. Ironically, most of them are balking at paying *anything* to RSA
Data Security to use convincingly strong crypto, so I don't see many folks
shelling out even $25 a year for a subscription to "American Cryptographer"
or whatever. However, I wish anyone who forms such a group the best luck.
I'll certainly support them.)

Back to Perry's points:

>The fact is this: over and over again, every scientific study thats
>been done (by lots of people), every anecdotal comparison I can make
>in things like why one LP candidate did well and another did poorly or
>why one local group soared while another failed, each one of them
>point to the same conclusion: that conclusion is, sadly, that you are
>completely wrong Tim, and that people judge by appearances, and that
>even the most down and out people in our society will take the word of
>a person who looks respectable over a person who doesn't. 

Yes, you've made this point clear a couple of times.

Speaking about the existing groups I mentioned, Perry writes:

>No one can log in to their groups -- we provide an essential service.
>I WANT the New York Times reporter reading this group, but I don't
>want him to think we are crackers or nuts.

Well, while the list is open to all subscribers, it has never been
intended, so far as I know, as a *resource service* for reporters! Perhaps
it *should* be, but that's a much different sort of list than we now have.
(For the Extropians who are reading this, it would be like making the
Extropians list a resource for those trying to learn about the basics of
libertarianism or whatnot, rather than a list for those "already clued
in.")

Several reporters have, at times, subscribed to the list, for brief periods
of time. They were mostly "lurkers." A couple of times I got e-mail, as I
suspect others did, asking me to clarify some point or send more
information. This I did whenever possible.

And with an open list, nothing can be done to censor or stop postings that
make us seem "crackers or nuts," to use Perry's terms. That's just the way
it is. The list is for crypto rebels and people fed up with crypto laws and
regulations, not as an educational arena for outsiders. And not for
sanitized discussions.

People on the list want to talk about digital money, data havens, anonymous
mail services, ways to subvert governments, and so on. They don't want to
just have some unified front that is palatable to reporters. (If I'm wrong
in this judgement, I hope others will give their views as well.)

Your ideas may make sense, Perry, for *some* group. EFF and CPSR operate
roughly in this way, with a paid staff of "reasonable" lawyers and
spokespersons (the newsgroups, like comp.org.eff.talk, are another thing
altogether...as wild and crazy as our list can be). But Cypherpunks does
not seem to fit the bill. We're an anarchy, with no formal rules, no formal
political agenda, and just a bunch of spontaneously ordered crypto rebels.

(Personally, I hope EFF takes a leading role in the fight. They have
recently been sidetracked into stuff about ISDN and away from core issues
like privacy in the electronic frontier. They have the resources, lawyers,
speakers, etc.)

As always, I appreciated Perry's comments. Some are reasonable, some I
disagree with strongly. Two hundred other Cypherpunks will probably have
their own views.

Enough for now.

-Tim May
--
Timothy C. May         | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,  
tcmay@netcom.com       | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
408-688-5409           | knowledge, reputations, information markets, 
W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA  | black markets, smashing of governments.
Higher Power: 2^756839 | Public Key: MailSafe and PGP available.
Waco Massacre + Big Brother Wiretap Chip = A Nazi Regime





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: dstalder@gmuvax2.gmu.edu (Darren/Torin/Who ever...)
Date: Wed, 21 Apr 93 21:23:00 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com (CypherPunks)
Subject: family key
Message-ID: <9304220255.AA23546@gmuvax2.gmu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Is it true that all LE agencies will have the family key to the wiretap
chip?  If not, can any LE angency obtain the family key with a search
warrant/court order?  I am putting the statements about traffic monitoring
into my non-technical description of the problems with the wiretap chip
proposal.

Thanks,
--
Defeat the        Torin/Darren Stalder/Wolf           __
  Wiretap Chip    Internet:  dstalder@gmuvax2.gmu.edu \/ PGP2.x key available.
  Proposal!       Bitnet:    dstalder@gmuvax                  Finger me.
Write me for      Sprintnet: 1-703-845-1000
  details.        Snail:     10310 Main St., Suite 110/Fairfax, VA/22030/USA
DISCLAIMER: A society where such disclaimers are needed is saddening.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: fergp@sytex.com (Paul Ferguson)
Date: Wed, 21 Apr 93 22:05:29 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Problems
Message-ID: <JR1D3B1w165w@sytex.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


 
I relaize that this is a bit off-topic, but I'm experiencing a problem
that may be just a case of either user stupidity or Stacker. (Okay,
hold the leers and jeers, my laptop has Stacker installed for a
reason.)
 
Trying to (-e) encrypt a textfile with someone's pubkey produces both
"DOS general read errors" and "device not ready" errors. I suspect
that PGP is using some direct BIOS calls for this, which bypass
Stacker, however I haven't looked at the source code yet. (Silly me.)
Every other function of PGP that I have utilized seems to work okay.
After invoking PGP with the following parameters -
 
PGP -e text.txt userid
 
I get these errors. Also, after being bumped back out to the system
prompt, any further requests to access the file system is greeted with
the same errors. (Lucky me.) Anyway, after rebooting the system and
fixing the file allocations errors (yes, usually two to three files
created by PGP named filename.$01, filename.$02, etc. are classified
by DOS as mis-allocated), everything is just peachy. Like I said
before, all othere PGP functions (adding and validating keys, etc)
work okay.
 
I point the finger at Stacker, but I figured it might be worth my time
to toss a message into the group for advice...
 
Cheers.
 
For what it's worth, I don't normally use Stacker for the same reasons
that Steve Gibson forbids his employees to use any disk compression
software -- the problems and possibilty for irreversible data loss
greatly outweigh the silly need to compress.
 

Paul Ferguson                    |  Uncle Sam wants to read
Network Integration Consultant   |       your e-mail...
Centreville, Virginia USA        | Just say "NO" to the Clipper
fergp@sytex.com                  |          Chip...




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: J. Michael Diehl <mdiehl@triton.unm.edu>
Date: Wed, 21 Apr 93 23:14:12 PDT
To: fergp@sytex.com (Paul Ferguson)
Subject: Re: Problems
In-Reply-To: <JR1D3B1w165w@sytex.com>
Message-ID: <9304220606.AA27912@triton.unm.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> I relaize that this is a bit off-topic, but I'm experiencing a problem
> that may be just a case of either user stupidity or Stacker. (Okay,
> hold the leers and jeers, my laptop has Stacker installed for a
> reason.)

I don't think this is off-topic.  If it affects the way we use pgp, it is on
topic.

> Trying to (-e) encrypt a textfile with someone's pubkey produces both
> "DOS general read errors" and "device not ready" errors. I suspect
> that PGP is using some direct BIOS calls for this, which bypass
> Stacker, however I haven't looked at the source code yet. (Silly me.)
> Every other function of PGP that I have utilized seems to work okay.
> After invoking PGP with the following parameters -

I don't get an error when I do this, but when I do it from a batch file, I
sometimes get a 0-length encrypted file.  Seems related to your problem.

> PGP -e text.txt userid

Only I use pgp -we text.txt uid.

+-----------------------+-----------------------------+---------+
| J. Michael Diehl ;-)  | I thought I was wrong once. | PGP KEY |
|                       |    But, I was mistaken.     |available|
|                       +-----------------------------+---------+
| mdiehl@triton.unm.edu | "I'm just looking for the opportunity |
| mike.diehl@fido.org   | to be Politically Incorrect!   <Me>   |
| (505) 299-2282        |                                       |
+-----------------------+---------------------------------------+




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Date: Thu, 22 Apr 93 00:48:28 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Explanation of Clipper Chip Name
Message-ID: <9304220748.AA00962@netcom3.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



In the days before Xerox machines, one provided copies of
correspondence to others by using sheets of carbon paper to make
duplicates when typing.

This is the origin of "cc" or "cc:" on memos and correspondence.

Henceforth, "cc" refers to the automatic carbon copy provided by the
"cc" chip, the Clipper Chip. BB (Big Brother) gets a CC of everything.

(I know, it's a voice encryption standard, and it's voluntary, but a
quick look at the "Capstone" chip reveals it's a complete crypto
package, containing the DSS government signature standard, and lots of
other stuff. The Wiretap Chip will be used for more than just voice,
I'll be willing to bet.)

-Tim

-- 
..........................................................................
Timothy C. May         | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,  
tcmay@netcom.com       | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
408-688-5409           | knowledge, reputations, information markets, 
W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA  | black markets, collapse of governments.
Higher Power: 2^756839 | Public Key: PGP and MailSafe available.





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: George A. Gleason <gg@well.sf.ca.us>
Date: Thu, 22 Apr 93 01:04:35 PDT
To: szabo@techbook.com
Subject: Re:  Intergraph employee claims trademark violation
Message-ID: <199304220802.AA20104@well.sf.ca.us>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Most interesting about Intergraph!  Someone look into this one QUICK and if
there are any attorneys reading this, could you help Intergraph go after
whoever might be violating their trademark... in particular AT&T...?

-gg




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Date: Thu, 22 Apr 93 01:31:16 PDT
To: Cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: A Volunteer in a Suit Has Appeared!
Message-ID: <9304220831.AA26386@netcom.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



I am pleased to announce that the Search Committee has found an Executive
Director for the newly renamed "Privacy Institute." He will serve as both
manager and as external spokesman for the Institute.

We searched for a respectable person, preferably middle-aged, who knew how
to communicate with bureaucrats and was prepared to relocate to the
Washington, D.C. area to act as our official lobbyist (the matter of his
compensation will be dealt with in a later memo, one which also explains
our dues structure. membership grades, and official bylaws).

Our candidate is an active poster in sci.crypt, is well-known to the Net,
and yet has strong connections with the Washington bureaucracy.

We feel he will do much to project a more proper, even anal, image of our
group. We hope his appointment as Executive Director, The Privacy
Institute, will go a long way toward improving the image we developed
during our first phase of existence when we were known by the c-word name.

Our new Director intends to immediately correct many of the wrongs he sees.


Without further ado, here is his name:


David Sternlight


I hope you'll all join me in welcoming Sternie, or Sterno, as his friends
call him, to the Privacy Institute.


-Tim May, Recording Secretary, The Privacy Institute ("Don't call us
Cypherpunks!")



(The preceeding spoof was brought to you as a public service.)





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: George A. Gleason <gg@well.sf.ca.us>
Date: Thu, 22 Apr 93 02:07:59 PDT
To: yerazunis@aidev.enet.dec.com
Subject: Re:  Making Clippers More Secure
Message-ID: <199304220907.AA26844@well.sf.ca.us>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


As for me, I still think software-based steganography is the answer.  If you
can't detect it, you can't prosecute.  For instance, how many people do you
think are fired from their jobs for LSD on their drug tests...?  Far fewer
than do LSD, according to people I know in Silicon Valley who say that
certain mil subcontractors are infested with acid-taking Deadheads; because
LSD dissapears from the bloodstream a couple of days after you take it.  




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: dstalder@gmuvax2.gmu.edu (Darren/Torin/Who ever...)
Date: Thu, 22 Apr 93 00:54:38 PDT
To: ggoebel@sun1.ruf.uni-freiburg.de (Garrett Goebel)
Subject: Non-Technical description of problems with wiretap chip
Message-ID: <9304220755.AA00743@gmuvax2.gmu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


The WIRE-TAP Proposal:  Problems with it.

The White House sent out a press release on Friday 16 April about a voice
encryption chip called the Clipper chip.  This has come to be known as the
Wiretap chip since it allows any Law Enforcement agency to automatically
decrypt any conversations made with it with a search warrant.  The LE
presents said search warrant to two different escrow agencies to obtain the
keys (80 bits long) that automatically decrypts your conversation.  The
Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF) and the Computer Professionals for
Social Responsibility (CPSR) have both criticized the proposal.  There was
even a negative article already in Network World (19 Apr 93).  The
paragraphs that follow are facts and problems I have collected by listening
to other discuss the Wiretap chip.

Say you wanted to encrypt your talk with someone over a phone.  Well, since
you and the person you want to talk to both have the Wiretap (Clipper) chip
in your phones, you can automatically encrypt your conversation.  All fine
and good encryption for the consumer.  Now, what if you come under
investigation by the local constabulary?  The get a court order and ask the
escrow agencies (non-law enforcement types) for your key.  They already
have the family key since that is the same in each chip.  They now have
your specific key.  With these two keys, they can decrypt all conversations
that you have.  This includes conversations that are not legal to wiretap
such as attorney-client, doctor-patient and so on.  They also have that key
for any all future sessions that you use that phone for.  Start to see the
problem?  This part is all legal...  Search warrants are even exceedingly
easy to get at times.  There have been reports of the FBI get groups of 50
signed and blank search warrants from the DoJ.

Now, there are other problems.  Would you give the IRS keys to your house
and filing cabinet as long as they promised that they would only use it
under proper authorization?  The key length of 80 bits is still considered
cryptographically weak.  The cryptographic algorithm is also being kept
classified.  This is not the usual practice.  In the cryptographic
community, algorithms are public.  This way people can be assured there
aren't any back doors and that the algorithm can stand on its own
strengths, not that of secrecy.  It is clear from the description that the
plan for key registration would be compromised if the algorithm was made
public; anyone could make chips or software that implemented it, using
their own keys.  These keys, of course, would not be registered.  It is not
that difficult to reverse engineer a chip these days.  It may also be true
that the algorithm itself is too weak to be shown to the public.  This was
true of a digital cellular encryption standard (IS-54B).  It is not
available to the public and is incredibly weak.

Finally, some of the implications behind this announcements are dire.  The
Wiretap chip could become the market or legislative standard.  This could
mean that other implementations of cryptographic voice transactions would
be very difficult to obtain or would be illegal to obtain.  Why would a
criminal use the Wiretap chip when they knew it wouldn't encrypt their
conversations against the LE agencies?  They wouldn't, they would use other
encryption technologies.  Would this mean that using something other than
the Wiretap chip is probable cause and puts you under suspicion?  The way
the encryption works also allows for ludicrously easy call-tracing.  Each
chip has a serial number that is transmitted with each message.  That
serial number is encrypted with the "Family" key.  This key is the *same*
for every chip.  You gain that key and you can track when and for how long
any person or groups of people calls *anyone* else.  (Easy to do, since any
LE agency can gain the 'family' key with a search warrant.  It would leak
easily into other hands.)

One last fishy thing is that AT&T has already (on the same day) announced
phones with this chip.  This implies (means?) that AT&T has known about
this chip for a while.  They seem to be more concerned about getting a jump
on the competition than producing a product that will actually give their
users real security.  'Course, there is the question of collusion between
the governement and industry.  Only two companies will be allowed to
manufacture the chip, VLSI and Mykotronix.  Jeff Hendy, director of new
product marketing for VLSI, says his company expects to make $50 million of
the chip in the next 3 years.  (This from the San Jose Mercury News.)

Permission is granted to distribute this document to whomsoever you should
desire.  You may change it only if you send me the changes.

Think Free,
--
Defeat the        Torin/Darren Stalder/Wolf           __
  Wiretap Chip    Internet:  dstalder@gmuvax2.gmu.edu \/ PGP2.x key available.
  Proposal!       Bitnet:    dstalder@gmuvax                  Finger me.
Write me for      Sprintnet: 
  details.        Snail:     10310 Main St., Suite 110/Fairfax, VA/22030/USA
DISCLAIMER: A society where such disclaimers are needed is saddening.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: grady@netcom.com (1016/2EF221)
Date: Thu, 22 Apr 93 07:21:37 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: name change?
Message-ID: <9304221421.AA10279@netcom.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



I vote we change our name to the "CryptOrchids."
Many people like flowers and lots of people don't
care for dangling gobbets of flesh.

ObCrypt: Leonard Rosenthal of Aladdin Systems, Inc. confirms
that the previously strong DES family encryption option has
been replaced in Stuffit 3.0 with a system that has been
'approved' for export.
However, Leonard asks me not to call it a 'weak XOR' system
because he says no one has broken it yet.

ObCrypt Prime: I am testing the IDEA block cipher implementations
and needs some golden test vectors.  I've looked through
the postscript IDEA chapter but the single example gives me
zero degrees of freedom.  I'll contact the inventor if necessary
but since we are paying him money for use of his invention,
I'd like to offload this from him.  Anybody got vectors?
(No disease vectors, please).





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Eric Hughes <hughes@soda.berkeley.edu>
Date: Thu, 22 Apr 93 07:36:31 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: ADMIN: delayed mail yesterday
Message-ID: <9304221433.AA19686@soda.berkeley.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Some of you may have worried that the list was down to due government
interference yesterday.  The truth is much more prosaic.

toad.com, where the mailing list resides, is on the commercial side of
the Appropriate use barrier.  In order to send to NSFNET hosts, all
the traffic must pass through uunet.  The default mail router that
toad uses, relay2.uu.net, was munged for mail yesterday.  All the
queue has been flushed out at this point.

Thanks to Hugh Daniel and John Gilmore for figuring this out.

Eric




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Eric Hughes <hughes@soda.berkeley.edu>
Date: Thu, 22 Apr 93 08:00:04 PDT
To: mdiehl@triton.unm.edu
Subject: Automation package.
In-Reply-To: <9304172100.AA00859@triton.unm.edu>
Message-ID: <9304221456.AA21041@soda.berkeley.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I may have already answered your letter about telix scripts, etc., so
pardon me if this is a duplicate.

The pgp developers maintain a collection of utilities that integrate
pgp into various other pieces of software.  You should send your stuff
to Phil Z. and he'll forward it to the right people.  It may be added
to the contrib directory of the next release.

Eric




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Eric Hughes <hughes@soda.berkeley.edu>
Date: Thu, 22 Apr 93 08:14:26 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: CLIP: Legal Aspects
In-Reply-To: <23041800272877@vms2.macc.wisc.edu>
Message-ID: <9304221511.AA21674@soda.berkeley.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>  With regard to the fear that the issuance of your 'Klinton Key'
>will allow your favorite TLA to decrypt all conversations taped
>previous to the issuance of the warrant granting the key, there
>is precedence that disallows it.  
	[citations deleted]

It is true that evidence from an illegal wiretap cannot be used as
evidence in court; this is called the Exclusionary Rule.  While the ER
has been weakened in the last decade, it still basically holds.
Unfortunately, that is not where the main threat lies.

Exploratory wiretaps, illegally made and whose evidence is not
directly admissible, provide information that may lead investigators
to other information.  This secondary information _is_ admissible.

It would be a wonderful if the ER were strengthened so that all
evidence which resulted from an illegal search _and all of its
subsidiaries_ were conidered tainted.  That battle, however, is a much
longer one to fight.

Even in that situation, though, the defense would have to prove that
an unauthorized wiretap took place.

Eric




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Eric Hughes <hughes@soda.berkeley.edu>
Date: Thu, 22 Apr 93 08:26:31 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Thoughts on the proposal
In-Reply-To: <9304180722.AA01178@unix.ka9q.ampr.org>
Message-ID: <9304221523.AA22213@soda.berkeley.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>It is entirely possible that Clinton, if he understands anything at
>all about this proposal, sincerely thinks that he's helping the cause
>of personal privacy. Consider that his entire education on the
>subject of cryptography probably consisted of a 5 minute briefing
[rest elided]

Phil points out indirectly in this post one of the very clever tactics
used by the PR people on the wiretap side:

	They presented strong hardware cryptography and the backdoor
	as inextricably linked.

I've gone through some of the press coverage on the chip from last
weekend and their argument basically goes like this: "This is stronger
than most cryptography currently existing.  And it also lets us spy on
the BAD people!"  Now the first claim is true and irrelevant, since
most stuff is not encrypted.  And the second claim is presented without
mentioning that you can make strong crypto without backdoors.

Therefore, one educational goal must be that strong cryptography is
possible in hardware which doesn't have backdoors.  For press
coverage, the announcement of a new hardware device with longer keys
and no backdoor could point out this difference and could get press
coverage by explicitly denying the gov't claims.  I would suggest a
triple-keyed DES chip would satisfy this nicely and be very quick to
engineer.

Eric






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Eric Hughes <hughes@soda.berkeley.edu>
Date: Thu, 22 Apr 93 08:44:29 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: WIRETAP: boycotts
In-Reply-To: <m0nkVMl-000hn0C@techbook.techbook.com>
Message-ID: <9304221541.AA23538@soda.berkeley.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



>Also for consideration: boycott AT&T and all other companies making
>phones with the wiretap chip, and let the phone makers know about 
>the boycott early and often.

Boycotting AT&T overall isn't going to do much economic harm, since
the number of anti-wiretap chips is small in comparison to the number
of long-distance companies.  If you want to hurt them, get them where
it counts.

1.  The AT&T wiretap phone is designed by a division in Greensboro.
Find out everything that this specific division makes.

2. Take this list and in the second column write down all the products
which directly compete with those in the first column; these are the
alternatives.

3. Get Communication Week to give (or sell) you a mailing list of
their subscribers; these folks are already qualified purchasers of
telecom equipment.

4. Send and educational mailing to this list, explaining that if they
support AT&T in wiretapping, that soon they'll be screwed themselves.
Include the list of AT&T products and alternatives and urge people to
voice their frustration by buying from someone else.  They might also
want to send in the sample protest letter you've included.

Now this strategy has a few characteristics I'd like to point out.
First, if no one buys wiretap chips, the wiretap chip doesn't gain
market share, a very important point where compatibility creates
positive feedback loops in the market.  Second, it's selective in it's
targets; the model here is to target one division.  When sales
actually suffer, there is the possibility of getting the division
manager fired for taking an action not in the best interest of the
company.  A shareholder lawsuit might also help here.  If you can
bring down wrath on one manager's head, you will deter others from
following the same strategy.  Third, since this is such a charged
issue, you might be able to get donated mailing lists, ad agency
consults (Jerry Mander comes to mind), etc. free or cheap.  At the
very least, such a campaign doesn't cost a lot (on corporate terms) to
do entirely commercially; CPSR and/or EFF could mount it.

As a second round, target the PBX division of AT&T, since that's where
the next round of chip deployments are.

Eric




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Timothy Newsham <newsham@wiliki.eng.hawaii.edu>
Date: Thu, 22 Apr 93 11:42:26 PDT
To: hughes@soda.berkeley.edu (Eric Hughes)
Subject: Re: non-cypher related question on audio analysis
In-Reply-To: <9304221700.AA00422@soda.berkeley.edu>
Message-ID: <9304221842.AA08140@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> 
> After you know something, remember this: The FIR filter is the same
> mathematically as a FFT, multiplication by a filter window function,
> and an inverse FFT.  As I recall, you can process multiple FIR's in
> parallel.

you can do two FFT's by using the fact that:

  FFT( x(t) + j y(t) ) =  Z(w)

then X(l) = 1/2 ( Z(l) + Z*(N-l))
and  Y(l) = 1/2j (Zl) - Z*(N-l)) 

Where x(t) <-> X(w)
      y(t) <-> Y(w)

N is the length of both arrays
j is sqrt(-1)
Z* is the conjugate of Z (a+jb <-> a-jb )







From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Eric Hughes <hughes@soda.berkeley.edu>
Date: Thu, 22 Apr 93 09:38:52 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Status of Voice Encryption with PC/Mac?
In-Reply-To: <9304182217.AA114200@acs.bu.edu>
Message-ID: <9304221635.AA28138@soda.berkeley.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>I keep hearing about voice scrambling technology in conjunction
>with high speed modems and soundblaster cards....

Paul Rubin is going to demonstrate some of the voice coders he's been
working on at the meeting Saturday, hardware willing.

As far as soundblaster cards, I would recommend instead something like
a bigmouth board, which already has the phone line access and handset
on it.

Secure phones will be a large topic Saturday, since that's where the
first deployment of the wiretap chip will be.

Eric




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: falcor@agora.rain.com (Andy Burt)
Date: Thu, 22 Apr 93 09:43:28 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: ADD falcor@agora.rain.com
Message-ID: <m0nm4Mj-0001cUC@agora.rain.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Or, if this is human-maintained, please add falcor@agora.rain.com to your
mailing list!  (cypherpunks)  Thanks!

-- 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
//  Falcor, aka  //  InterNet: falcor@agora.rain.com  //  If you're bored,  //
//   Andy Burt   //        FidoNet: 1:105/354.0       //  you must not be   //
//               //                                   //  paying attention  //
------------------------------------------------------------------------------



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: fergp@sytex.com (Paul Ferguson)
Date: Thu, 22 Apr 93 07:18:55 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: RE: Crypto Activism and Respectability
Message-ID: <Nsue3B2w165w@sytex.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Let'em all eat cake.

On Wed, 21 Apr 93 14:46:55 -0700,
 <uunet!netcom.com!tcmay> Timothy C. May wrote -
 
 
TM> Crypto Activism and Respectability, or, Should We Become
TM> "Suits"?
 
 In a word: No. The name is fine (Cypherpunks), and the attitude is
 great. There are plenty  of us who do wear ties on a daily basis and
 have our hearts in the right place. ;-)
 
 Thanks for the sanity check. You've got my support.
 
 Now if we can "Win the hearts and minds" of the public and change
 the venue of our own Stalinistic government...
 
 BTW, who (off-hand) knows the fax number of the G. Gordon Liddy show
 at WJFK in Washington? I have this fax I need for him to see ....
 
 Cheers.
 
-----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----
Version: 2.2
 
mQCNAiuk0/8AAAEEALqlLc+x9lmgiJCRSpu/aPhQdi0hMjwiGlN2B/GJQqgZPhTb
pR+u5/blGogqT+WwcXZ2XfEdIV19FrJY4BXGGn4+4TjdVN3XuuCHuueoygBAmOQD
IloU6SJuDqJa0kFA5X/i/1ELn86I5+8A4Hx88FiYJIVUBR6SApRLcZSdHMBNAAUR
tB9QYXVsIEZlcmd1c29uIDxmZXJncEBzeXRleC5jb20+
=0Kua
-----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----

Paul Ferguson                    |  Uncle Sam wants to read
Network Integration Consultant   |       your e-mail...
Centreville, Virginia USA        | Just say "NO" to the Clipper
fergp@sytex.com                  |          Chip...




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Eric Hughes <hughes@soda.berkeley.edu>
Date: Thu, 22 Apr 93 10:04:16 PDT
To: jet@nas.nasa.gov
Subject: non-cypher related question on audio analysis
In-Reply-To: <9304192234.AA26763@boxer.nas.nasa.gov>
Message-ID: <9304221700.AA00422@soda.berkeley.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>Anyone got pointers to decoding audio tones?  An intro book, source
>code, newsgroup, mailing list, somebody I can take to lunch?  I'd like
>to sample audio with my SGI, and suck out various simple tones and
>combinations of tones.  (DTMF, single pitch variant tones, etc.)

I've got a good book on DSP by Rabiner and Gold.

There are a few DSP newsgroups where the local experts hang out.  Also
the modem design groups.

After you know something, remember this: The FIR filter is the same
mathematically as a FFT, multiplication by a filter window function,
and an inverse FFT.  As I recall, you can process multiple FIR's in
parallel.

All the DSP manufacturers come with lots of example source code for
standard filters (FFT, FIR, IIR, etc.).

Eric




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "$HOME/.sig" <root@pleiku.netcom.com>
Date: Thu, 22 Apr 93 11:29:32 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: ANON SITES:
Message-ID: <9304221829.AA05811@netcomsv.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text



The present plan prosed by John Gilmore is good 3-4 U.S. Sites willing
to risk litigation and counter-litigation. And I have a another sort of plan
that still really requires an out of country A-server(anonymous posting server).
A number of PGP-related services may be set up behind such a screen.
Having PGP encryption in the style of PAX would be crucial to maintain
the anonymity of such services.

#1. Michael Grafs PGP Key-Server

#2. Anonymous Digital "face" banks(ala Chaum)

#3. Gray Market Exchange

#4. Encrypted Anonymous Mailing Lists(Example: Dark Technology)

#5. Data Havens.

#6. alt.whistleblowers(really "hearing aid" see Brunner, J. "Shockwave Rider"

A vast network of anonymous servers may be maintained behind the screen
of a single foreign site A-server ready to come on line at a single command
if suppression attempts are experienced.

However AARM type scripts will continue to be a threat,I
also think we should look at the possibility of both
port 25 and port 119 manipulation with auto-search and random selection
of NNTP and SMTP open servers as well as header addition to confuse
path analysis... I know this is normally regarded as unprofitable but
considering what we are up against...

Addition dialup slip and ppp hosts could use a variety of 9.6-56kb
dialup sites to provide rotating xntp synchronized anonymous
posting and mail services.Uucp sites could play as
well on email-based services via uucp.
Are any foreign sites up for running David Clunies PAX Code???

    cheers
    kelly 
- --------
- --

To add the following key block to your PGP2.0
Public Key Ring save this entire message to a file and enter the
following command:

pgp -ka [name_of_file_saved]


The above key block is included on every message I send from
- -----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----
Version: 2.2
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=PfOI
- -----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----
pleiku!kelly@netcom.com....

------- End of Unsent Draft



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "$HOME/.sig" <root@pleiku.netcom.com>
Date: Thu, 22 Apr 93 19:35:59 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: ANON:  Anonymized Mailing Lists
Message-ID: <9304230236.AA06951@netcomsv.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text


Hi There,
       Has any one combined PGP2.2 and one of the mailing lists
servers such as MajorDomo to produce an Anonymous  multiple recipient
Mailing List?
I know David Clunie was working on this for PAX at one point but he didnt 
finish it I believe.


     Any one got anything like this?
     cheers
     kelly
- --------
- --

To add the following key block to your PGP2.0
Public Key Ring save this entire message to a file and enter the
following command:

pgp -ka [name_of_file_saved]


The above key block is included on every message I send from
- -----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----
Version: 2.2
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=PfOI
- -----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----
pleiku!kelly@netcom.com....

------- End of Unsent Draft



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "$HOME/.sig" <root@pleiku.netcom.com>
Date: Thu, 22 Apr 93 12:00:41 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: REMAIL: The other shoe drops
Message-ID: <9304221833.AA06368@netcomsv.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text




       And John Gilmore Spake:

(Much Deleted)
   > To permanently restore at least last month's level of service, we need
   > a couple of dedicated, firewalled, buttressed sites.  You want a few
   > geographically separated people who own their own systems (or who own
   > or run the company that owns them), who have solid network links
   > (possibly redundant), and who are fully committed to the idea -- as
   > committed as funet.fi to persist past the vilification and harassment
   > and threats.
   > 
   > And those people need backup from the rest of us -- legal help if they
   > need or want it, money to pay the networking bill if things get tight,
   > loans of backup equipment during failures under load, system
   > administration when folks try to break in and trash their machines,
   > software creation and maintenance, advocacy, policy work, advice, and
   > a bunch of shoulders to cry on and warm words of encouragement.
   > 
   > Three to five people providing such setups, in collaboration, would
   > wedge a steel-toed boot so firmly in the door that it couldn't be
   > slammed by any dyspeptic "net god".
   > 
   > Are we up to this job?  If not, let's scale back what we're trying to
   > do.  I'd rather succeed at raising consciousness on the issue for a
   > later try, than try now to set up such a beachhead and fail at it.

	John

I am forced to agree with you here..... I dont think we have
the "juice" to carry off a maximum effort at this point...
I would gladly volunteer to setup such a site AND I would
need a peacenet feed instead of the "gratis" connections
I obtain from netcom.... I AM already uncoercible... as
you well know and I would need you as well as others in backing
on this effort...OK kids... Here we have one volunteer if we can get 
at least 3 other sites(my mininum buyin is 4 US sites)....
Hey John... what about you???
      cheers
      kelly
p.s. I would be willing to maintain a PAX type anon operation
as well as an anon-remailer.....and a KEY server...
 would also offer the PGP archives via mail server...
note that I am uucp connected and would need to upgrade
to 56 kb leased or V-FAST technology...

- ------- End of Forwarded Message


------- End of Unsent Draft



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "$HOME/.sig" <root@pleiku.netcom.com>
Date: Thu, 22 Apr 93 12:02:13 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: POLITICAL DISPERSION: Contact with Christic Institute
Message-ID: <9304221837.AA06911@netcomsv.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text



Hi All,
       
       Due to a recent posting in alt.conspiracy I was finally able
to make contact with the Christic Institute. These are the people who were
continually suing the CIQA during the 80's for violations of 
intelligence laws. They were almost completely wiped out
by questionable decisions in a federal lawsuit and loss of their
non-profit tax status during the last days of the bush administration.

     Their present status is as follows, 286/AT class machines 20-30 mb
hard disks, 1200 baud connectivity only. and have said they will attempt
to acquire a 9600 baud modem...(maybe someone on the list has a spare
that they could donate).

they have only 1 person who knows about "software" and he sounds
like he doesnt have a whole lot of time on his hands
I was either thinking about obtaining a pubnix account on their behalf..(
 or cheap commercial
shell account(netcom). or installing waffle along with pgp2.2 and praying.
Any suggestions from the group would be welcome. BTW I have
worked at expressing the power and connectivity of the internet to him.
I dont know how much sunk in at the time.The person I talked to was


	Dave Reed
	Christic Institute,
	310-287-1556
       	310-287-1559 FAX
	8773 Venice Blvd
	Los Angeles, Ca 90034

In addition I have been attempting to make contact with the 
Santa Cruz Action Team to get them connected. I
will be making contact with many human rights/eco/etc groups
over the next month...(I feel like a crypto-anarchist Johnny Appleseed)


- --------
- --

To add the following key block to your PGP2.0
Public Key Ring save this entire message to a file and enter the
following command:

pgp -ka [name_of_file_saved]


The above key block is included on every message I send from
- -----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----
Version: 2.2
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=PfOI
- -----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----
pleiku!kelly@netcom.com....

------- End of Unsent Draft



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Eric Hughes <hughes@soda.berkeley.edu>
Date: Thu, 22 Apr 93 10:30:37 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: ADMIN: Should we become "suits"?
In-Reply-To: <9304221546.AA17697@tardis.shearson.com>
Message-ID: <9304221727.AA03341@soda.berkeley.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


David Mandl writes:
>2) The time I can devote here at work to this sort of thing is very limited.

This is true for all of us right now.  This topic is a time waster.

As list maintainer and thus occasional bringer of order, I declare
this topic off limits for two weeks.  Don't talk about it on the list;
if you've got a gripe about this, mail me directly.

As for John Markoff, the New York Times reporter, he was put on the
list last September or October and was on until last month.

A special note for Perry: If you don't like the name, you are free to
do whatever you want, as you have said yourself in other forums.  You
are in particular free to start your own mailing list called
cryptoprivacy.  _Verbum sapienti satis est_.

Eric




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: fergp@sytex.com (Paul Ferguson)
Date: Thu, 22 Apr 93 10:18:26 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Fowarded messages from RISKS
Message-ID: <ycye3B1w165w@sytex.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Greets.
 
These two forwarded message are from the RISKS Forum (14.51). I
thought some of you folks might be interested. (Padgett Peterson is
a fellow assembler buff who is better known on comp.virus.)
 
---- Forwded Messages --------------------------
 
Date: Mon, 19 Apr 93 9:21:53 EDT [RISKS-14.51]
From: Clipper Chip Announcement <clipper@first.org>
Organization: FIRST, The Forum of Incident Response & Security Teams
Subject: Slide presented at White House briefing on Clipper Chip
 
Note:     The following material was handed out a press briefing on the
          Clipper Chip on 4/16.
 
                              Chip Operation
 
                         Microchip
User's Message      +----------------------+
------------------> |                      |      1.  Message encrypted
                    | Encryption Algorithm |          with user's key
                    |                      |
                    | Serial #             |      2.  User's key 
encrypted
                    |                      |-->       with chip unique 
key
                    | Chip Unique Key      |
User's Encryption   |                      |      3.  Serial # encrypted
Key                 | Chip Family Key      |          with chip family 
key
------------------> |                      |
                    |                      |
                    +----------------------+
 
 
              For Law Enforcement to Read a Suspect's Message
 
1.  Need to obtain court authorized warrant to tap the suspect's 
telephone.
 
2.  Record encrypted message
 
3.  Use chip family key to decrypt chip serial number
 
4.  Take this serial number *and* court order to custodians 
    of disks A and B
 
5.  Add the A and B components for that serial number = the chip
    unique key for the suspect user
 
6.  Use this key to decrypt the user's message key for 
    this recorded message
 
7.  Finally, use this message key to decrypt the recorded message.
 
- ------------------------------
 
Date: Sat, 17 Apr 93 09:12:57 -0400 [RISKS-14.51]
From: padgett@tccslr.dnet.mmc.com (A. Padgett Peterson)
Subject: "Clipper Chip"
 
I suppose we should have expected something after all of the sound and
fury of the last few years. The announcement does not really give
enough information though.
 
My first thought involves conventional compromise: what happens if the 
keys are captured through theft *and you know about it* - how
difficult is it to change the keys ? What do you do between the time
the loss is detected and the time a new key set is approved. How
difficult is it to program the chip or do you need a new one ? (and
if the chip can be reprogrammed, how do you prevent covert changes
that will not be discovered until authorization to tap is received and
the agency finds  out that it cannot ?). Potentially this must occur
every time a trusted employee leaves.
 
For some time, I have been playing with dynamic access cards ("tokens")
as seeds for full session encryption rather than just for password
devices. Since the encryption requires three parts (PIN, challenge, and
token) which are only physically together at the secure system, and since
only the challenge passes on the net, and since once encryption starts
you have not only provided protection to the session, you have also
authenticated both ends simultaneously (by the fact that you can
communicate), it seems ideal. *And everything necessary already exists*.
From several US companies. It just has not been put together as a
commercial product (FUD at work 8*(.
 
Since key generation is on-the-fly at the onset of the session, obviously
what the gov needs is not the key but the "key to the key" (of course
computers, even a PC, are really good at this.
 
The real question is "Why a new chip ?"  The technology to do this has
been around for years and several DES chips are available commercially
today. The BCC laptop (I like Beaver better 8*) 007 provides this
internally today with (I believe) the LSI-Logic chip and
Enigma-Logic's PC-SAFE (plugs) does the same with software alone. As
indicated in the announcement, financial institutions have been using
encrypted transmissions for years without any great outcry.
 
IMHO the real hold-up has been $$$ - cheap error-correcting modem 
technology to prevent synch losses rather than a lack of good crypto 
algorithms. Today this is a done deal (actually we have known how to
keep in synch since the sixties but you couldn't buy 56kb for under
$300.00 at BizMart - now part of K-Mart ! - then).
 
True, there are a lot of questions yet to be answered, but again IMHO 
most center on the exception cases and not the encryption technology
itself.
 
Padgett
 
---- End Forwarded Messages --------------------------
 
Cheers.
 

Paul Ferguson                    |  Uncle Sam wants to read
Network Integration Consultant   |       your e-mail...
Centreville, Virginia USA        | Just say "NO" to the Clipper
fergp@sytex.com                  |          Chip...




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: fergp@sytex.com (Paul Ferguson)
Date: Thu, 22 Apr 93 10:20:54 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Answers revealed! Film at Eleven!
Message-ID: <egye3B2w165w@sytex.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


To make a long story short, don't try to (-e) encrypt anything with PGP
on a STACKERed drive -- it ain't gonna work. When I got in this morning, 
I proved this point by encrypting without nary a problem on a 
non-compressed drive. 

The proof is in the pudding, so to speak.

Cheers.

(BTW, Kelly -- the second message that you sent is still crippled. What 
are you doing? Software (PGP) development? ;-)


Paul Ferguson                    |  Uncle Sam wants to read
Network Integration Consultant   |       your e-mail...
Centreville, Virginia USA        | Just say "NO" to the Clipper
fergp@sytex.com                  |          Chip...




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Douglas Barnes <wixer!wixer.bga.com!gumby@cactus.org>
Date: Thu, 22 Apr 93 12:11:33 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Mass producing chips
In-Reply-To: <199304212309.AA12929@well.sf.ca.us>
Message-ID: <9304221619.AA19426@wixer>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Arthur wrote:
> 
> p.s. I tried to get samples, but the price was $300,000 for 10,000 units,
> 

How are they going to produce them at these prices and in that quantity
given the "baroque activities in the vault" described by Denning?
(Not to mention the destruction of the laptop computer... :-)

Doug
(gumby@wixer.bga.com)




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: peb@PROCASE.COM
Date: Thu, 22 Apr 93 12:35:28 PDT
To: tcmay@netcom.com
Subject: Re: Crypto Activism and Respectability
Message-ID: <9304221824.AA05177@banff>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>From: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)

>And note tha the "Hackers Conference" has not changed _their_  name,

Yes, but they are not trying to gain any media attention.  If the CPSR
or EFF is the main media presence, then fine; the role of cypherpunks
is to write code and spread memes.  The only downside I see to this 
approach is that EFF and CPSR are afraid of being critical about
wiretapping in general--that's how their press releases read.  If they 
have a deeper agenda, it doesn't show.

The attention getting name *could* be used for certain kinds of 
media and then branching off with pointers to EFF and CPSR would
be a good strategy.


Paul E. Baclace
peb@procase.com





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: crunch@netcom.com (John Draper)
Date: Thu, 22 Apr 93 11:39:14 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: A question...
Message-ID: <9304221839.AA00612@netcom4.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Excuse the high bozo factor,  but...
I have a question...  Does the Clipper Er: Wiretap chip provide a means
of authentification?





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: dmandl@lehman.com (David Mandl)
Date: Thu, 22 Apr 93 08:46:54 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Should we become "suits"?
Message-ID: <9304221546.AA17697@tardis.shearson.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


1) God bless Tim May.  I am in complete agreement with his response to
Perry Metzger re his name change proposal (shouldn't be a surprise, as I
believe I was the first one to express my horror at it).

2) The time I can devote here at work to this sort of thing is very limited.
If I had more time, I'd send a much more in-depth response to Perry's
proposal; I don't, so this will have to be shorter and pithier than I'd like.

Perry says:
> No one said anything about becoming "suits", Tim. 

I think you did, even if it was indirectly.

> The problem is this: the name "Cypherpunks" makes us sound like people
> who break into computers for fun or other such stuff. I was on the
> phone with John Markoff of the New York Times a couple of days ago,
> and I was unhappy that no one had yet changed the name of the group
> because I frankly felt that I could not encourage him to subscribe --
> the results would be unpredictable. I encouraged him to read more
> sci.crypt instead, which he has already been doing.

I don't have the same problem you do with people who "break into computers,"
though I wouldn't do it.  Nevertheless, the cypherpunks as a group never
advocate, and rarely even discuss, cracking.  I couldn't care less what
journalists think, especially journalists from the New York Times.  If
someone makes an inference like that (the sort of distortion or basic
cluelessness I wouldn't be surprised to see in the NYT), he's a bad journalist,
and that's his problem.  And what does our name have to do with "the results"
of subscribing to the group?  I take it you're referring to the content of
our discussions, which wouldn't change along with our name--unless you're
also suggesting that we should tone down our more inflammatory rhetoric
(and I think it's a short step from the name change to that anyway).

> I've been associated with radical political causes for a while. I've
> found that in general, the radicals are their own worst enemy. People
> are NOT happy about being lectured to by strange-acting people. 

So don't lecture them.  I don't lecture people.  I think people are open-
minded about reasonable-sounding ideas if they make sense and are 
explained in a reasonable way.

> Bill Winter of the Libertarian Party of New Hampshire was their
> chairman over the period in which the LPNH went from four members of
> the state party to actually becoming a force in New Hampshire
> politics. New Hampshire is the *only* LP outpost to make any
> significant electoral inroads, *anywhere*. He once told me this: you
> can get people to accept strange sounding ideas when promulgated by
> normal looking people. You can get them to accept normal-sounding
> ideas when promulgated by strange looking people. You can't get them
> to accept strange ideas when promulgated by strange people.

Big deal.  If they became a wing of the Democratic Party they'd have even
more supporters.  The electoral system is a scam, and the LP is deluding
itself by getting involved in it.  (Ancient anarchist wisdom: "If voting
could change anything, it would be illegal.")  I won't get any deeper into
this, because it's getting way off the subject.

> The simple change in our name from something confrontational that
> makes us sound like machine crackers to something that expresses what
> this group is about would make a radical positive change in our image.
> 
> Now, what are the benefits of keeping the current name "cypherpunks"?
> 
> Well, lets see Tim's list.
> 
> >In a sense, Cypherpunks fill an important ecological niche by
> >being the outrageous side, the radical side...perhaps a bit like the role
> >the Black Panthers, Yippies, and Weather Underground played a generation
> >ago.
> 
> None of whom accomplished any of their goals. You REALLY want to

Do you really think the Black Panthers would have accomplished more if they
wore suits?  Ever hear of Cointelpro?  The murder of Fred Hampton?  In fact, the
Panthers were much more reasonable than John Q. Public thought they were.
There was a massive propaganda campaign from the government and the straight
press to appeal to white America's basic racism and make the Panthers look
like some crazed niggers who wanted to kill whitey and rape his daughter.
It would have been the same thing no matter what.  I've got news for you:
if we do change our name, and the FBI is pissed enough, they'll call us
crackers and cypherpunks anyway.  There are millions of precedents for this.

> emulate them? I've been an occassional visitor to #9 Bleeker Street,
> where Dana Beal, last of the Yippies, holds court. He doesn't wash
> regularly, and he wonders occassionaly why no one takes his drug
> legalization crusade seriously. Hint: they are connected.

I know Dana.  People don't take him seriously because he's a jerk.

> I WANT the New York Times reporter reading this group, but I don't
> want him to think we are crackers or nuts.

How can the name we use influence his opinion of us more than the 50 messages a
day posted to the group?

I don't have time to respond to the rest of Perry's message; there's
just too much to say.  But I repeat: there are more "respectable" groups
involved, like the EFF and CPSR, so you're free to work with them when
talking to the media.

Perry, I have very strong differences with your views of how the media and the
"spectacle" work, and I can't do justice to the subject given this limited space
and time; it's also not directly relevant to cypherpunks business.  For anyone
wanting a more modern take on how the media works today, I humbly suggest you read
the situationists, who addressed all these issues twenty-five years ago, or Jerry
Mander's great book "Four Arguments for the Elimination of Television."

   --Dave.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "L. Detweiler" <ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Date: Thu, 22 Apr 93 11:21:52 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: cypherpunks vs. nambypambypunks and cyphercranks
In-Reply-To: <9304212343.AA29698@snark.shearson.com>
Message-ID: <9304221821.AA12903@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


(For this I move out of my vitriol vein, to dish out something
non-overly-`stinging' even though it *could* be deadly.)

P. Metzger:
>We can't afford to lose this fight. This is a matter of life and
>death. Playing out fantasy games about being 1960s radicals is fine
>and well -- when you don't care about the outcome. We can't afford to
>lose, so we can't afford to emulate losing strategies.

Mr. Metzger, surely you realize you can call yourself anything you like
in the mainstream media. However, I was attracted to this list
precisely because of the name, find it highly descriptive and apropos,
and I think trying to change it is counterproductive, superfluous, and
highly disillusioning, and am becoming increasingly annoyed with
attempts to do so.  I will proudly wear the banner of `cypherpunk' even
if it becomes an epithet.

You seem to take it as given that `punk' has negative connotations, but
I assure you that it has a distinct ingredient of allure in the public
consciousness.  Less colorful terms would only provoke blandness and
sabotage the vigor of our cause. Young leaders of the American
Revolution would aptly be deemed ``punks'' by the robe-cladded
wig-wearing British establishment, had the term been around...  Nathan
``Give Me Liberty or Give Me Death'' Hale was quite a punk...

The list is private. People can choose to present themselves in public
any way they like. If they prefer to say that they belong to the
"cryptoprivacy group," fine.  But I believe you are deliberately
ignoring the fundamental underlying personalities of people who are
members of the list in your irritating, noisy, and desperate advocation
to change the name.  In fact, this agenda seems to me very much like
someone trying to impose leadership on anarchy.

Join EFF or CPSR; they seem to think like you do.

``Obviously, to partake in a revolution, one must, by definitition, at
the very minimum, be nonconforming with and disrespectful of the status quo.''




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: uri@watson.ibm.com
Date: Thu, 22 Apr 93 09:30:02 PDT
To: jwarren@autodesk.com (Jim Warren)
Subject: Re: more details from Denning
In-Reply-To: <9304211652.AA24148@megalon.YP.acad>
Message-ID: <9304221629.AA14269@buoy.watson.ibm.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Jim Warren says:
> And, a coupla tidbits about Dorothy:  I have known her for several years,
> worked closely with her on creating the first Computers, Freedom & Privacy
> conference in 1991, have absolutely the *highest* regard for her integrity,
> honesty and candor -- and absolutely trust what she says ...
> about a subject on which we may disagree.
>   Dorothy Denning is an honorable person with great personal integrity, and
                          ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^      ^^^^^          ^^^^^^^^^
    I don't see it from her actions.
> I urge that she be treated as such -- even in disagreement.
    ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ no objective reasons, your words only.

I disagree with your conclusions and believe, that your high
esteem of her is rather subjective.  But this is way off the
topic of this list. Now:

>         No single person or authority should have the power to
>         authorize wiretaps
> No single person does, at least for FBI taps.  After completing a mound
> of paperwork, an agent must get the approval of several people on a chain
> that includes FBI legal counsel before the request is even taken to the
> Attorney General for final approval.
> Dorothy Denning

Don't you just love that "must get approval"... Fine, but what if
that agent just happens to have a key or two left over from
previous tap? And another one is willing to trade him
the key he wants now, for one of those other ones?
How on Earth is this going to be detected?

Once the key (Unit Key) is released -  there's no force in the
Universe to make it un-released again! From now on, everything
encrypted with this chip is essentially clear -  AND THIS WILL
ENDANGER EVERYBODY TALKING TO THIS CHIP, no matter whether YOU
have YOUR key "released" or not...

Besides, isn't the described "authorized" tapping procedure
the same good old one in use today?   How come it doesn't
stop illegal wiretaps? [I guess, people break laws?! :-]
--
Regards,
Uri         uri@watson.ibm.com      scifi!angmar!uri 	N2RIU
-----------
<Disclamer>


From cypherpunks-request  Thu Apr 22 11:57:15 1993



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Stanton McCandlish <anton@hydra.unm.edu>
Date: Thu, 22 Apr 93 11:49:26 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: MAIL: threaded mail reader?
In-Reply-To: <199304221826.AA25404@Menudo.UH.EDU>
Message-ID: <9304221849.AA13917@hydra.unm.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Anyone know of a mail reader a la elm that works on a threaded basis like trn,
so I can kill entire threads at once (or, gods forbid, READ them in some sort
of meaningful order?)  SOrry if this is dreadfully off topic, but you folks 
seem to know a LOT about mail tech, so...
-- 
Testes saxi solidi!  **********************   Podex opacus gravedinosus est!  
Stanton McCandlish,  SysOp:  Noise in the Void Data Center BBS
IndraNet: 369:1/1      FidoNet: 1:301/2      Internet: anton@hydra.unm.edu
Snail: 8020 Central SE #405, Albuquerque, New Mexico 87108 USA
Data phone: +1-505-246-8515 (24hr, 1200-14400 v32bis, N-8-1)
Vox phone:  +1-505-247-3402 (bps rate varies, depends on if you woke me up...:)




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: William Lee Nussbaum <wln@ground.cs.columbia.edu>
Date: Thu, 22 Apr 93 10:10:45 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: DC Meeting this weekend?
Message-ID: <199304221710.AA14284@ground.cs.columbia.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Hello, all...

If there is going to be a DC meeting this weekend, please try to
determine by this evening what it will be...  I won't have mail access
after about 9am tomorrow until the end of the weekend, and I will be
in DC (Although, since I'm traveling with others, I don't know whether
I'll be able to make it even if I do know, but if I have some sort of
contact information, that can be worked out in other ways.)

Please excuse the pushiness, just trying to get a hectic couple of
weeks organized...

	- Lee





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: elee9sf@Menudo.UH.EDU
Date: Thu, 22 Apr 93 11:26:30 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: "Cypherpunks Write Code"
Message-ID: <199304221826.AA25404@Menudo.UH.EDU>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Derek writes:
> 
> Since I'd like to be part of the cypherdelic revolution,
> what code needs writing?  I agree that the PC/modem

Heh, lots of stuff could be done:

1) Hack around with the anonymous remailers.  Eric mentioned he is
working on a "second generation" remailer which allows users to
specify cut marks, etc.  I've been fooling with one that caches all
incoming messages in a directory, and then at midnight (by using the
at command) mails/routes each messages on its way.  Still got problems
with it, though...

2) DC Nets.  Yanek Martinson is working on a DC Net implementation
using email.  A TCP/IP version would be nice!

3) CELP.  Don't know much about this other that porting it and hand
coding parts in assembly for speed would be welcome.  Then, we could
have our own encrypted conversations.

4) Digital Bank.  A full-blown implementation (RSA encryption and
decryption, blinded messages, etc).  I have written a scaled down
digital bank which provides privacy and security by using random cash
and random account numbers, and does not correlate account numbers
with usernames.  It's written in the Korn shell, and I plan many
improvements once the semester is over (rewrite in PERL for one...)
But my bank does not implement Chaum's digicash scheme, and that would
be best.

5) Once that is done, we can experiment with a "cash accepting"
remailer - one that will only remail if valid digicash is included in
the header, or whatever.  Then, such a system may be expanded to do
anonymous or pseudonymous usenet posting, which may be an acceptible
(to folks who are vehemently against anonymous posting, etc.) solution
to helping prevent abuse by such services.

6) Steganography, hiding code in other documents.  For example, hiding
each bit of a message (encrypted or not) in the low order bits of an
image, gif, tiff, whatever.  I've played around with the tiff format
and will try to use Sam Lieffler's (sp?) tiff package to help out.
Writing a program that will automatically embed a message in a picture
and read a message out will be useful.  ("hey everyone, be sure to get
the denning.gif from alt.binaries.pictures.misc and read my comments
about the clipper chip!")

7) Misc stuff.  Check out the scripts which help in the use of the
anonymous remailers - they are for UNIX and DOS.  Amiga, Mac, etc.
versions needed.

8) Take your favorite unix utility (mail for example) or whatever and
add encryption automatically.  Sure, using it on a multi-user systems
may not be the best thing to do, but the code, techniques, and
solutions would be of value and would aid others.

9) probably lots of other stuff that would be nice...

/-----------------------------------\
| Karl L. Barrus                    |
| elee9sf@menudo.uh.edu             | <- preferred address
| barrus@tree.egr.uh.edu (NeXTMail) |
\-----------------------------------/





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: karn@qualcomm.com (Phil Karn)
Date: Thu, 22 Apr 93 15:21:45 PDT
To: Eric Hughes <cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: WIRETAP: boycotts
Message-ID: <9304222221.AA01871@servo>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Boycotts seldom do much by direct economic pressure. If they accomplish
anything, they generally do so by the publicity they generate.

Phil




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: karn@qualcomm.com (Phil Karn)
Date: Thu, 22 Apr 93 15:21:48 PDT
To: Eric Hughes <cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: CLIP: Legal Aspects
Message-ID: <9304222221.AA01876@servo>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


At 08:11 AM 4/22/93 -0700, Eric Hughes wrote:

>Exploratory wiretaps, illegally made and whose evidence is not
>directly admissible, provide information that may lead investigators
>to other information.  This secondary information _is_ admissible.
>
>It would be a wonderful if the ER were strengthened so that all
>evidence which resulted from an illegal search _and all of its
>subsidiaries_ were conidered tainted.  That battle, however, is a much
>longer one to fight.

I thought this was already true, at least in theory. It's known as the
"fruit of the poisoned tree" doctrine. Evidence gathered as a consequence
of illegally gathered evidence is in itself inadmissable. Of course,
this is probably what has been weakened the most by the Reagan/Bush
Supreme Court.

>Even in that situation, though, the defense would have to prove that
>an unauthorized wiretap took place.

*This* is the fundamental problem. There are many possible ways that
illegal wiretaps can further the collection of other evidence, without
the existence of the illegal wiretap ever having to be revealed.

Phil




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Sandy <72114.1712@CompuServe.COM>
Date: Thu, 22 Apr 93 11:47:22 PDT
To: <cypherpunks@toad.com>
Subject: AT&T/SUITS
Message-ID: <930422182755_72114.1712_FHF70-2@CompuServe.COM>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


_________________________________________________________________
             FROM THE VIRTUAL DESK OF SANDY SANDFORT
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Punksters,

AT&T:  CO-CONSPIRATORS

At the last physical San Francisco meeting, I mentioned a curious
conversation I had with an AT&T representative.  I had called him
for info about the ATT Secure Phone 3600.  What I reported to the
meeting was that while the representative would not "confirm or
deny" that the 3600 had a backdoor, his demeanor suggested to me
that it did.  Now in reviewing the conversation in my memory, I
realize that what I was hearing from him was a SMUGNESS.  It had
the flavor of the cat that swallowed the canary.  He obviously
knew about the upcoming announcement.  In retrospect, I see that
he was playing with me by dropping hints such as:  "If the NSA
were to ask us to put a backdoor in the 3600, of course we would
have to cooperate."  Talk about your "secret government."  Where
are Slick Willie's "town hall meetings" when you need them?

SUITS ME

Let a hundred flowers blossom.  Those of us who wish to fight the
good fight in suits, should do so.  Likewise, those who wish to
remain long-haired, maggot-infested, dope-smoking hippies, should
follow their hearts.  I have no problem with the "Cypherpunks"
moniker.  It hasn't hurt us, and it has brought us some favorable
publicity.  I think Perry is being an alarmist.

In one point, though, Perry is right.  He said people will listen
to unconventional folks who present reasonable ideas.  But it
appears that Perry thinks our support of freedom and privacy is
somehow unreasonable in the eyes of Joe Lunchbucket.  I
respectfully disagree.  I think we represent the essence of
American values.  All we have to do is put it in terms the are
immediate and personally relevant to the average American.

For the record though, as Tim May can attest, I am bi-cultural.
I have gotten in touch with the Suit inside me.  If Cypherpunks
ever needs a spokesperson in a "dress for success" suit, I'll be 
glad to volunteer.  There is one condition, however.  I will only
do it if I'm teamed with someone not in a suit; preferably with 
long hair and wearing tie-dyed.  Think of the photo op!


 S a n d y
_________________________________________________________________
PLEASE RESPOND TO: ssandfort@attmail.com (except from CompuServe)
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Harry Shapiro <habs@Panix.Com>
Date: Thu, 22 Apr 93 11:54:31 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com (Good Guys)
Subject: AT&T in Greensboro
Message-ID: <199304221854.AA24393@sun.Panix.Com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Eric mentioned boycotting AT&T products produced at facilities
in Greensboro.

I did a quick search of AT&T Greensboor for the last years,
looking through trade and tech pubs.

Basically their is mention of their Federal Systems group
and there Federal systems advanced technologies group.

They have a AT&T Proposal center there and a business called
AT&T Technical Service Co.

Bell Labs/Federal Systems group runs the Guilford Center complex
there.

They annouced they are building a 5 Million dollar plant for
building telecommunications products for the US Gov. and for
the International Commerical Markets. (This was within this
years, and may or may not have been, at that time, a cover
to hide what ever facilities were being built for the WireTap
Chip project.

It should be noted that Public Key Partners is located in
Greensboro. That the AT&T deal with them at the time, was
probally completed so that the WireTap phone systems AT&T
will sell will not violate RSA/PKP patents.



/harry

-- 
Harry Shapiro  				      habs@panix.com
List Administrator of the Extropy Institute Mailing List
Private Communication for the Extropian Community since 1991



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Harry Shapiro <habs@Panix.Com>
Date: Thu, 22 Apr 93 12:05:35 PDT
To: extropians@gnu.ai.mit.edu (Harry Shapiro)
Subject: Info on Mykotronx
Message-ID: <199304221905.AA25268@sun.Panix.Com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Please forward this message far and wide. - Harry

I am looking for Info on Mykotronx the company that designed
the WireTap chip for the NSA/NIST/FBI.

They are said to be a contractor to NSA. Thus we can assume
that most if not all of what they do is "hidden from view."

I was shocked when I did a database search using the name Mykotronx
and Mycotronx (both spellings have been used), in publications that
report on these areas: trade, technical, business and financial
markets. I also searched press wires and some newspapers.

Prior to April 16/17 I have found NO References to this company.

Clearly this company takes it security seriously; but such a
lack of coverage seems strange.

It leads me to wonder if they really existed much prior to April 16/17 -
they could be a division of the NSA, for example.

Of course the data bases I searched don't have everything in them
and they could have been scrubbed... 

Can anyone find references to this company prior to April 16 1993?

Can anyone provide alternative spellings for their name?

Thanks,

/harry

--
Harry Shapiro 				 habs@panix.com List
Administrator of the Extropy Institute Mailing List Private
Communication for the Extropian Community since 1991



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Arthur Abraham <a2@well.sf.ca.us>
Date: Thu, 22 Apr 93 15:06:57 PDT
To: Cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: the WireTap Chip sobriquet
Message-ID: <199304222206.AA14436@well.sf.ca.us>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Actually, this is the worst named product since GM decided to name an
electric car the "Impact" (they've since announced that they're not
going to make it.)

This device is very simply the "Privacy Clipper" chip ....

"nuf said"  -- Stan Lee

-a2.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Date: Thu, 22 Apr 93 15:36:14 PDT
To: pmetzger@lehman.com
Subject: Re: A Volunteer in a Suit Has Appeared!
In-Reply-To: <9304222118.AA05266@snark.shearson.com>
Message-ID: <9304222236.AA27147@netcom3.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Lighten up, Perry! My comments in my lighthearted "A Volunteer Suit
Has Appeared" were not directed at you or your position. After all, I
was the one who first mentioned "suits," so my comments were not
targeted at you use of the term.

> In fact, why not just go to the top of a giant tower and get publicity
> for us by shooting random passers by? After all, as you've noted,
> there is no such thing as "bad publicity". I assure you that you will
> be covered by thousands of times more TV and radio stations for such
> an act.

Perry, Perry, Perry! Please, you're taking my comments and
extrapolating them to absurd levels. Is this what you call being
reasonable? I haven't said that *anything* goes, rather, I've
said that the slightly outre image of our group is not ipso facto a
bad thing. But I don't want your time or my time or the list's time
this way.


> Tim agreed in his reply to my message with virtually every substantive
> point that I made. None the less, he makes fun of my comments. He
> agrees that people do judge on appearances. He agrees that the radical
> protest movements of the 1960s were largely failures. Yet he wants us
> to appear unreasonable, and he wants us to emulate these failures.

Again, not true. 

> Tim has reacted with extreme vehemence to the minor question of our
> name. Its a small thing to us personally -- but it could help advance
> our goals. I can only conclude that since Tim more or less admits that
> he's wrong but still insists on his position that he is not acting on
> the basis of rational motivations.

??????

All I can say is that I hope Perry cools off a bit. While the Clipper
Chip is indeed a serious and dismal matter, I see no call for such
anger and charges that I've admitted I'm wrong, that I want our
efforts to fail, that I want us to appear unreasonable, and that I am
"not acting on the basis of rational motivations."

It's clear Perry doesn't like the name of our group. Repeating this
over and over again does not seem to be all that produtive.

And the issues go beyond that of the mere name, which is a relatively
minor issue. My post about "respectability" yesterday had much more to
do with addressing the calls by some that our agenda be changed (e.g.,
reducing discussion of crypto anarchy, of guerilla distribution of
software, of offshore remailers, of digital money, of money
laundering, and the like), that we deemphasize the "crypto rebel"
aspects and instead adopt a more mainstream line.

It's clear that some are uncomfortable with these crypto rebel issues,
these discussions on the list, and the possible repercussions. Well,
these are the topics that got us started, and the latest Clipper Chip
is no reason for us to turn into a carbon copy of the CPSR, EFF, and
ACLU.

Nor is it a reason to lose our sense of humor about things.


-Tim May

P.S. I'm quite serious that my little joke about Sternlight was not
directed at Perry personally. I had already responded at length, and
quite reasonably (I thought) to his comments. The Sternlight point
came as I was reading Sternie's posts in sci.crypt and realized that
what he (Sternlight) seems to want more than anything else is to be
the "voice of reason" in the crypto debate. Hence my satire.

If I'd wanted to satirize Perry, which I can't honestly say I've
wanted to do, I'd've used some kind of material from him, or his kind
of words. 

Cheers.

-- 
..........................................................................
Timothy C. May         | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,  
tcmay@netcom.com       | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
408-688-5409           | knowledge, reputations, information markets, 
W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA  | black markets, collapse of governments.
Higher Power: 2^756839 | Public Key: PGP and MailSafe available.





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Peter Meyer <meyer@mcc.com>
Date: Thu, 22 Apr 93 13:47:20 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: New Algorithm...
In-Reply-To: <9304222007.AA05127@snark.shearson.com>
Message-ID: <19930422204625.1.MEYER@OGHMA.MCC.COM>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


    Date: Thu, 22 Apr 1993 15:07 CDT
    From: "Perry E. Metzger" <pmetzger@lehman.com>

    "Haywood J. Blowme" says:
    [Lots about some J. Random Companies encryption chip]

    All fine and well, but since we have IDEA already, why should we want
    it? For virtually all applicatons these days other than fully
    encrypting network traffic, software is fine. DES implementations in
    software can handle 1.5 Mbit/s on reasonable machines. Beyond that, if
    we need hardware, why not use one of the currently publically known
    algorithms like DES or IDEA, or a combination of them? Why use some
    other companies algorithm?

    Perry

Even when using encryption software there may be reasons to use
something other than DES.  One possible reason (apart from doubts about
whether NSA can break DES in one or more of its modes) is that, although
the security and speed of an encryption algorithm is of central
importance, the quality of the user-interface is also important.

For example, if you want to encrypt/decrypt thirty files in five
different subdirectories twice a day, and do it in an office with your
colleagues looking over your shoulder, you won't want to be using
software that encrypts only one file at a time and also displays the
encryption key as you type it in (though you might like to have the key
echoed when no-one else is about).

There are lots of other things to be considered besides the algorithm
itself when designing good encryption software, e.g. if someone
accidentally yanks out the power cord to the computer during decryption
do you kiss goodbye to the data?

-- Peter Meyer





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: pete@cirrus.com (Pete Carpenter)
Date: Thu, 22 Apr 93 16:46:01 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re:  Mass producing chips
Message-ID: <9304222251.AA25007@ss2138.cirrus.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain




	>tried to get samples, but the price was $300,000 for 10,000 units,

	How are they going to produce them at these prices and in that quantity
	given the "baroque activities in the vault" described by Denning?

	Doug (gumby@wixer.bga.com)

Assuming that there is some EEPROM, or bipolar fuse PROM (like PALs) they can 
easily be programmed during the final (packaged) test stage. After the device 
passes its tests, give it a number. There are already some PALs that have a 
"silicon signature", a lot number embedded on the chip, which allows process 
or lot tracing of devices that don't work up to spec.

Testing on peripheral controllers is well below 5 seconds each (gross ballpark - 
not giving away any secrets here) CPUs may be more, but a "wire-tap" chip 
should be much easier to test than a CPU.  Testers can run close to 24 hours 
a day, and 24*3600/5 is 17,000 chips a day from one test head. QFP trays have 
50 chips/tray, and since the tester knows when the trays are full, it can easily
use this to form lot/tray/batch,etc numbers, as well as individual device numbers.

I don't like what they're doing, but it all sounds technically feasible to me.


Pete Carpenter
IC Design Engineer
Cirrus Logic Inc.

pete@cirrus.com





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Date: Thu, 22 Apr 93 15:58:13 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Being Reasonable to Reporters
In-Reply-To: <9304222118.AA05266@snark.shearson.com>
Message-ID: <9304222258.AA28208@netcom3.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Sorry, gang, but I just can't let this one pass without commenting:

Perry Metzger writes:

> I've watched the Libertarian Party self destruct because many
> activists are such fools that they can't make a distinction between
> whats important and random rebellion for the sake of rebellion. People
> will refuse to be polite, refuse to phrase their arguments
> comprehensably, refuse to be nice to reporters, and refuse to appear
> to be reasonable or even rational, and then later on they wonder why
> it is that everyone makes fun of them and no one listens.

Speaking for myself, I've been *very* polite to reporters. I can only
hope Perry is speculating about some Cypherpunks I haven't heard
about. John Gilmore, Eric Hughes, myself, and many other members of
the list have been quite reasonable, quite articulate, and quite
"nice" in our comments to reporters.

I hosted Kevin Kelly, Steven Levy, and Julian Dibbell each for several
hours, at their request, at my home in Aptos. These were for the
various pieces coming out in their publications. I answered their
questions, outlined the issues of privacy and crypto as I saw them,
explained the workings of new protocols, and so on.

Some of them showed up at our meetings, where they were well-treated.
The Levy piece is already out, in "Wired," and I've seen the draft of
Kelly's piece coming out soon in "Whole Earth Review." Neither paint
us as Texas Tower whackos nor as blue-sky dreamers. These journalists
are very well-versed in the issues. 

Julian Dibbell's forthcoming piece I haven't seen, but I doubt it will
be a hatchet job or otherwise treat us as crazies.

I think this qualifies as being nice and reasonable to reporters.

Note: I did not talk to John Markoff this time around, but I have in
the past. My understanding is that others talked to him.


Cheers.

-Tim May






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Perry E. Metzger" <pmetzger@lehman.com>
Date: Thu, 22 Apr 93 13:08:12 PDT
To: "Haywood J. Blowme" <psionic@wam.umd.edu>
Subject: Re: New Algorithm...
In-Reply-To: <199304212154.AA15610@rac3.wam.umd.edu>
Message-ID: <9304222007.AA05127@snark.shearson.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



"Haywood J. Blowme" says:
[Lots about some J. Random Companies encryption chip]

All fine and well, but since we have IDEA already, why should we want
it? For virtually all applicatons these days other than fully
encrypting network traffic, software is fine. DES implementations in
software can handle 1.5 Mbit/s on reasonable machines. Beyond that, if
we need hardware, why not use one of the currently publically known
algorithms like DES or IDEA, or a combination of them? Why use some
other companies algorithm?

Perry




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: dstalder@gmuvax2.gmu.edu (Darren/Torin/Who ever...)
Date: Thu, 22 Apr 93 13:19:28 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com (CypherPunks)
Subject: DC meeting
Message-ID: <9304222020.AA29093@gmuvax2.gmu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


This is to announce a DC area cypherpunks meeting on Monday 26 April at
1800 (or so) until whenever at my office.  Call me or write me for info on
how to get here...

Think free,
--
Defeat the        Torin/Darren Stalder/Wolf           __
  Wiretap Chip    Internet:  dstalder@gmuvax2.gmu.edu \/ PGP2.x key available.
  Proposal!       Bitnet:    dstalder@gmuvax                  Finger me.
Write me for      Sprintnet: 1-703-845-1000
  details.        Snail:     10310 Main St., Suite 110/Fairfax, VA/22030/USA
DISCLAIMER: A society where such disclaimers are needed is saddening.





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Eric Hughes <hughes@soda.berkeley.edu>
Date: Thu, 22 Apr 93 16:25:11 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Info on Mykotronx
In-Reply-To: <9304222236.AA15100@anchor.ho.att.com>
Message-ID: <9304222321.AA02657@soda.berkeley.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


the vp from mycotoxin spoke, and some reporter said:

	   "He said the chip announced yesterday, internally referred to 
	   as MYK-78, costs about $40 and uses an algorithm 16 million times 
	   more complex than that used by chips now on the market. 
	   Computer hackers have penetrated the current chips."

16 M is approx 2^24
80 bit wiretap chip key - 56 bit DES key = 24

Just because the key is 24 bits longer doesn't mean the chips are that
much more complex.

Biham and Shamir have reduced the security of DES down to 2^47 (maybe
down a few more in the exponent), but that does not mean that it has
been broken.  2^47 chosen plaintexts is not a feasible attack in a
reasonably deployed system.  This is the best known attack.  Biham and
Shamir are not computer hackers, either.

So assuming the reporter was basically accurate, what's the score for
our VP?  One deceit and one outright lie combined with a gratuitous
slander.

Eric




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Eric Hughes <hughes@soda.berkeley.edu>
Date: Thu, 22 Apr 93 16:30:05 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: WIRETAP: press articles wanted.
Message-ID: <9304222326.AA03395@soda.berkeley.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Speaking as the ftp site maintainer, I'm looking for all the press
coverage there is on this wiretap chip, both national and local
coverage.  I've seen quotes from several other sources, but not whole
articles.  So type in what's at hand and send it to me.  I'll put it
up for ftp.

I've got Saturday's article from the SF Chronicle here, which I
haven't yet typed in, but I should warn you that this piece is one of
the most slanted things I've seen in that paper.  (Those of you who've
read the Chron know this is a real insult.)  I'll get it typed in
myself unless someone can send me a copy.

Eric




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: szabo@techbook.com (Nick Szabo)
Date: Thu, 22 Apr 93 16:27:48 PDT
To: karn@qualcomm.com (Phil Karn)
Subject: Re: WIRETAP: boycotts
In-Reply-To: <9304222221.AA01871@servo>
Message-ID: <m0nmAik-000hxoC@techbook.techbook.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Agreed, not much economic pressure would come from directly boycotting 
Clipper phones, or for that matter from people boycotting AT&T for 
ideological reasons.  Rather, it would come from AT&T getting a reputation
as putting the U.S. government's needs before the needs of their customers;
and not caring very much about the privacy of their customers' phone
calls.  What international business, law firm, etc. wants to trust
their communications to a company that puts NSA wiretap chips in their 
phones and touts them as "secure"?  A good outcome here is for this fiasco 
to get wide publicity, and for Sprint, MCI, etc. to subtly use doubts about 
AT&T's concern for privacy in their ad campaigns.

A recent cypherpunks post refferred to a conversation with an AT&T
marketing type, who kept insisting that AT&T is very concerned about
customer privacy, it's a high priority, etc.  AT&T knows they need a 
good reputation for privacy.  Keep up the pressure!

Nick Szabo					szabo@techbook.com



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Eric Hughes <hughes@soda.berkeley.edu>
Date: Thu, 22 Apr 93 16:42:50 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Reaction time and Crypto
In-Reply-To: <9304180436.AA49530@acs.bu.edu>
Message-ID: <9304222339.AA05222@soda.berkeley.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>It seems to me that the following technologies are going to be of increasing
>import despite the outcome of the Clinton proposal.

>1.  Raw headerless output from packages like PGP.  It seems obvious that
>if crypto is regulated, it must be easier to disguise the type of crypto
>one is using, or indeed if one is using crypto.

Removing the headers from PGP will accomplish only the most cursory
security.  The PGP packet structure is recognizable out of a random
byte stream even without the headers.

More generally, just because _you_ don't know how to recognize
something doesn't mean your opponent is similarly lacking.  In order
to really know it can't be done, you need a proof, that is, an
argument that covers all possible ways of looking for something.

This principle applies to all forms of steganography.


>2.  Methodology for the disguising of cyphertext in more innocous data.

See my comment above for my opinion on this.


>3.  The proliferation and consistant use of Crypto for even everyday
>communications.

I think work done to get PGP, for example, in mail readers is
something that should be done with a bit more zeal.  I, personally,
don't use it much because of my computing environment (receiving mail
on a widely-known-to-be-insecure Unix box, dialed in from MSDOS).  The
integration problems are pressing.

>1>  The harder it is to find, the less potential there is for regulation.
>2>  The harder it is to look for, the less potential there is for regulation.
>3>  The harder it is to abolish, the less potential there is for regulation.

True up to a point.  Remember, internet users are still a small
percentage of the whole.

Eric




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: <schmittec@MJ.LAAFB.AF.MIL>
Date: Thu, 22 Apr 93 17:02:36 PDT
To: <cypherpunks@toad.com>
Subject: subscribe
Message-ID: <2BD7301A@CN.LAAFB.AF.MIL>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


subscribe, schmittec@mj.laafb.af.mil




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Steve Greenberg <steve@oc3s-emh1.army.mil>
Date: Thu, 22 Apr 93 08:24:01 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: SUBSCRIBE steve@oc3s-emh1.army.mil
Message-ID: <9304221523.AA04591@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


SUBSCRIBE steve@oc3s-emh1.army.mil




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: pg3448@csc.albany.edu (Harbinger )
Date: Thu, 22 Apr 93 14:17:49 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: unsubscribe me
Message-ID: <9304222117.AA16771@sarah.albany.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I cannot keep up with all the mail.. 50+ per day is just too much..
can I please be taken off the subscribed list?
thank you..
						PG
_______________________________________________________________________________
      _
     @__                   ############                 ##         /\ /\ /\
     | \\	     #########       ##########	     ######   _    || || ||
     |	 \\	  ######                     ##########      / \   || || ||
   _|\    \\        ##          ________________             ` /   || || ||
   \  \    ++             ___---     /  \ \     ---___        |     \\||// 
    \  l  ||           _--          / /\ \ \          --_     *      ~||~
     T\\  ||     _____/            / / /\ \ \            \_____       ||
     | \\ ||          \_          / / /__\_\ \          _/            || 
     |  \\ ++           -__      / / /________\      __-    __        ||
     |   \//	.-.  _     ---___\/___________/___---     _   ||      ||
     |   //\ .  | | | `    --___	        ___--    / \--+|============--_
     | // .\\|  t-' | _         ----------------         \_/--+|======||====--
     @~~   `.|  |   t_|    The Harbinger is watching!         ||__    ||
      ~      `                                                        --
_______________________________________________________________________________




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Perry E. Metzger" <pmetzger@lehman.com>
Date: Thu, 22 Apr 93 14:18:57 PDT
To: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Subject: Re: A Volunteer in a Suit Has Appeared!
In-Reply-To: <9304220831.AA26386@netcom.netcom.com>
Message-ID: <9304222118.AA05266@snark.shearson.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain




I wonder, Tim, why you bother to wear clothes at all. After all, they
are merely attempts by conservative people to make you fit into a
conventional mold. Indeed, why speak in english? Why not invent your
own language that no one else understands? After all, using the same
language that other people do is a callow and conformist act.

In fact, why not just go to the top of a giant tower and get publicity
for us by shooting random passers by? After all, as you've noted,
there is no such thing as "bad publicity". I assure you that you will
be covered by thousands of times more TV and radio stations for such
an act.

I've watched the Libertarian Party self destruct because many
activists are such fools that they can't make a distinction between
whats important and random rebellion for the sake of rebellion. People
will refuse to be polite, refuse to phrase their arguments
comprehensably, refuse to be nice to reporters, and refuse to appear
to be reasonable or even rational, and then later on they wonder why
it is that everyone makes fun of them and no one listens.

Our goal is not to maintain use of the word "cypherpunks". Nor is our
goal to change the fashion industry. Our goal is privacy.

Tim agreed in his reply to my message with virtually every substantive
point that I made. None the less, he makes fun of my comments. He
agrees that people do judge on appearances. He agrees that the radical
protest movements of the 1960s were largely failures. Yet he wants us
to appear unreasonable, and he wants us to emulate these failures.

Tim has reacted with extreme vehemence to the minor question of our
name. Its a small thing to us personally -- but it could help advance
our goals. I can only conclude that since Tim more or less admits that
he's wrong but still insists on his position that he is not acting on
the basis of rational motivations.

I'll repeat -- this is not a fight that we can afford to lose. Why
machine gun ourselves in the feet?


Perry


Timothy C. May says:
> 
> I am pleased to announce that the Search Committee has found an Executive
> Director for the newly renamed "Privacy Institute." He will serve as both
> manager and as external spokesman for the Institute.
> 
> We searched for a respectable person, preferably middle-aged, who knew how
> to communicate with bureaucrats and was prepared to relocate to the
> Washington, D.C. area to act as our official lobbyist (the matter of his
> compensation will be dealt with in a later memo, one which also explains
> our dues structure. membership grades, and official bylaws).
> 
> Our candidate is an active poster in sci.crypt, is well-known to the Net,
> and yet has strong connections with the Washington bureaucracy.
> 
> We feel he will do much to project a more proper, even anal, image of our
> group. We hope his appointment as Executive Director, The Privacy
> Institute, will go a long way toward improving the image we developed
> during our first phase of existence when we were known by the c-word name.
> 
> Our new Director intends to immediately correct many of the wrongs he sees.
> 
> 
> Without further ado, here is his name:
> 
> 
> David Sternlight
> 
> 
> I hope you'll all join me in welcoming Sternie, or Sterno, as his friends
> call him, to the Privacy Institute.
> 
> 
> -Tim May, Recording Secretary, The Privacy Institute ("Don't call us
> Cypherpunks!")
> 
> 
> 
> (The preceeding spoof was brought to you as a public service.)
> 




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: ghoast@gnu.ai.mit.edu
Date: Thu, 22 Apr 93 14:49:35 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: tapping method unmentioned
Message-ID: <9304222149.AA47908@hal.gnu.ai.mit.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


	In all the articles that I've seen posted, and in the grumbling done
about the advancement of government regulated cryptography, I haven't seen much
mentioned on *how* the government would go about collecting a certain exchange.
	
	Pardon me if I'm missing something key here, but wasn't there some 
bill circulating in the legislature that proposed that phone co's build 
tappability into the newer non-copper phone system?  Is the phone co's 
cooperation on this issue part of a bargain to exclude such capability from the
system (yeah, right) or is the government focusing on this issue now because it
has already accomplished what it wants in other areas of privacy (read: tapping)

~



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: treason@gnu.ai.mit.edu
Date: Thu, 22 Apr 93 14:52:14 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: What should be done.
Message-ID: <9304222151.AA12576@spiff.gnu.ai.mit.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I agree as well that this mail is horrendous.  50+ mailings a day is a
troublesome thing.  I would like to suggest a method of mailing that
would be less pain to the mailer, and more useful for storing purposes.
I suggest we start an archive.  All mail sent to the list in one day
is put within this archive, and mailed ONCE per day.  Sure this mailing
would be rather large, and you may have to wade though alot of stuff that
may be uninteresting to you to get to what you want to see, but you could
store it in temp, and use vi on it or something...it would be a minor
inconvienience.  Much more livable than what we have now.  I have seen a
great list done in this same way.  It has the mail header for the list,
an index of all articles subjects within at the start, and then basically
each article stored linearly with mail headers intact.  For those who have
seen the archive for the Ultrasound Digest, you know what Im talking about.
I suspect that the individual running the list has an automation program
generating this Digest each day, and mailing it when the time is appropriate.
There are examples of this digest on archive.epas.utoronto.ca in
/pub/pc/ultrasound/digest for those of you who want to see what it looks like.
I would be happy to consult the list moderator and beg for the software in the
lists best interest if we get a good number of wants.

treason



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: AOLCHTNN@vax1.tcd.ie
Date: Thu, 22 Apr 93 11:23:15 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: life, universe, everything
Message-ID: <01GXBKLI1Q1C000HXH@vax1.tcd.ie>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I got your address in mondo8. I need information on encryption software.
Unfortunately, external telnets have been impossible for some time now,
so I can't look for it through the usual channels.
Thanks in advance.
AOL






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: GR2KITTRELL@APSICC.APS.EDU (TOO MANY SECRETS)
Date: Thu, 22 Apr 93 17:18:32 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: IRC setup
Message-ID: <930422181609.329c@APSICC.APS.EDU>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



I really don't know if it can be accomplished in time, but TO1SITTLER 
is working on setting up a client here for IRC.  If this can be used
for any meetings, just write.  

GR2KITTRELL@APSICC.APS.EDU
Albuquerque, New Mexico (Land of Enchantment) "Right"




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: wcs@anchor.ho.att.com
Date: Thu, 22 Apr 93 15:37:31 PDT
To: extropians@gnu.ai.mit.edu
Subject: Re: Info on Mykotronx
Message-ID: <9304222236.AA15100@anchor.ho.att.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text


Harry Shapiro said he wasn't able to find much information on Mykotronx.

The San Francisco Chronicle says it's a "little-known company in Torrance, CA";
"Mykotronx Inc., founded in 1979 by two former engineers from TRW Inc.,
already sells classified encryption chips to protect satellite communications."
"San Jose-based VLSI Research Inc. will manufacture the chip, called the Clipper.
VLSI was chosen largely because it has a unique manufacturing process that
makes it nearly impossible to take the chip apart and decode it."

The Washington Times says that "Government engineers at NSA and [...] NIST
designed and developed the chip, which was then produced by privately owned
Mykotronx and a publicly traded subcontractor, VLSI Technology."
In their discussion of comments by Ted Bettwy, exec VP of Mykotronx,
	"He said the chip announced yesterday, internally referred to 
	as MYK-78, costs about $40 and uses an algorithm 16 million times 
	more complex than that used by chips now on the market. 
	Computer hackers have penetrated the current chips."


			Bill Stewart



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: wcs@anchor.ho.att.com
Date: Thu, 22 Apr 93 16:00:36 PDT
To: smb@ulysses.att.com
Subject: Verbosity by Mail from NIST
Message-ID: <9304222257.AA15315@anchor.ho.att.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text


I called the phone number for NIST given in one of the announcements,
and was routed to Sherry Hankey 1-301-975-2820, who faxed me their
package of information they're sending out.  There's no new technical
information (Dorothy Denning's article and some non-technical viewgraphs),
but there's a lot of newspaper clippings, pro and con, the announcements
we've seen on the net from Clinton, Q&A, etc., and what look like
viewgraphs from a couple of talks.  Overall, it looks like they don't know
much more than we do :-).   One talk is
	"U.S. Technology Initiative for Secure Telecommunications"
	Raymond G. Kammer, Acting Director, NIST, 4/16/93
which is basically the announcements turned into viewgraphs
(if I've sucessfully decoded the tangle of fax paper :-).

Another part of the package looks like another talk,
which covers Wiretap cases by the FBI and other agencies,
including a summary table for 1982-1991 of State and Federal wiretap
authorizations, arrests, and convictions (there's a footnote that
reporting of convictions seems to substantially lag actual convictions,
though the ration of arrests to convictions has decreased, averaging
2:1 over 10 years, 3:1 recently.)  Most wiretaps are State and local, not FBI.
Cases they cited included the usual drug dealing and money laundering,
a judge taking bribes, a Chicago street gang El Rukn proposing to
shoot down an airliner for the Libyans, some Mafiosi, a RICO case
against the Concrete and Cement Workers Union "Prevented economic loss $585Mil",
some fraud in defense contracting and health care contracting, and
the Masters of Disaster "computer hackers" case.

		Bill Stewart wcs@anchor.att.com
# Bill Stewart    wcs@anchor.ho.att.com  +1-908-949-0705 Fax-4876
# AT&T Bell Labs, Room 4M-312, Crawfords Corner Rd, Holmdel, NJ  07733-3030



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Bob Stratton <strat@intercon.com>
Date: Thu, 22 Apr 93 17:27:14 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com (CypherPunks)
Subject: Re: DC meeting
Message-ID: <9304221926.AA59903@horton.intercon.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


[Note: in the interests of hitting everyone interested, this message might be 
duplicated for several of you. Please accept my apologies in advance --Strat]

> Subject: DC meeting 
> Date: Thu, 22 Apr 93 16:20:50 EDT 
> From: dstalder@gmuvax2.gmu.edu (Darren/Torin/Who ever...) 
> 
> This is to announce a DC area cypherpunks meeting on Monday 26 April at 
> 1800 (or so) until whenever at my office.  Call me or write me for info 
> on how to get here... 

A couple of things:

- I was reading mail to post my announcement, when I read yours :-)

- I'm more than willing to defer to the majority, though I think there's 
something to be said for networking the meetings, especially if we have good 
tools. I've also already received a great deal of response to the idea of a 
Saturday meeting, even from out-of-towners. To that end, I'm going to post an 
announcement for a Saturday meeting, and see what happens. Several of us have 
been planning it for a couple of days now, so don't take it personally or 
anything. 

- Paul Ferguson and a couple of others and I have been cobbling together a 
list of people we thought would be interested in meeting in the DC area, so 
as to do preliminary planning without polluting Cypherpunks too much. I can 
see that there are more DC area people than I had originally envisioned, 
which makes me happy. Sorry if we missed you originally.
 
- Eric and I have discussed the idea of audio teleconferencing the various 
meetings, either via the Internet or by phone. I've got both a Sun IPC 
equipped to do the former, and a Western Electric conference telephone (and 6-
way on my switch) for the latter. 

Well readers, which do you prefer?

--Strat


Help stop the wiretap chip! (a.k.a "Clipper")
RIPEM and PGP keys available on request.







From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: GR2KITTRELL@APSICC.APS.EDU (TOO MANY SECRETS)
Date: Thu, 22 Apr 93 18:32:39 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: OOPS
Message-ID: <930422193017.3b98@APSICC.APS.EDU>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Sorry, To1sittler was trying to set up an IRC HOST, not client.. My 
apologizes..   If anyone knows massive amounts about IRC, PLEASE, help!

gr2kittrell@apsicc.aps.edu




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Bob Stratton <strat@intercon.com>
Date: Thu, 22 Apr 93 17:43:28 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: MEET: Ad Hoc Washington meeting Saturday 4/24/93
Message-ID: <9304221943.AA13465@horton.intercon.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


			
		Washington, DC area ad hoc Cypherpunks meeting.
			Saturday, April 24, 1993
			2:00 PM EDT -> not later than 8:00 PM EDT

LOCATION:
	Unless I hear resounding acclaim for the Monday night meeting, I'm 
going to hold out our original offer of a Saturday meeting, April 24th, from 
2:00PM until sometime not later than 8:00PM, at the offices of:

InterCon Systems Corporation
950 Herndon Parkway
Suite 420
Herndon, Virginia 22070


DIRECTIONS:
	InterCon is two blocks north of exit 2 on the Dulles Toll Road (Route 
267). From the Beltway, take 267 West to exit 2 (Herndon), and make a right 
onto Eldon Street. Go through the traffic light at Herndon Parkway (there'll 
be a shopping center with a big Giant Food on your left), and make an 
immediate right into the office building on the corner of Eldon and Herndon 
Parkway labelled "Ford Center".

	Meet at the front entrance of the building where the Riggs Bank ATM 
is, and I'll come down and let you in. If you find a way, in, take the 
elevator to the 4th floor, and walk straight out of it to our office door, 
which you'll be looking at when the elevator doors open.

	NOTE: The building locks at 1PM. There is a security phone at the 
rear entrance, but you'll have to get them to find me, and I don't know what 
extension we'll be at, so the operative word is "punctuality". I'll make 
periodic sweeps to the FRONT entrance to look for people, but I can't canvass 
every door looking for people coming by later. If you come by, and don't see 
an easy way in, wait by the Riggs Bank ATM entrance, and someone will let you 
in.  (I'll need volunteers to occasionally do that, BTW)

COMMUNICATIONS:
	If you need to reach me, you can try the following:
	Office phone:	+1 703 709 5525

	Pager(VA):	+1 703 826 5238  (Use an area code!) -or-

	if you're terribly confused or stranded, call:

	800 225 0256, Pager ID: 209267
	(This is an operator service, try to make it fit within 80 chars)


Help stop the wiretap chip! (a.k.a "Clipper")
RIPEM and PGP keys available on request.







From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: TO1SITTLER@APSICC.APS.EDU
Date: Thu, 22 Apr 93 18:55:49 PDT
To: Cryptoprivacy<cypherpunks@toad.com>
Subject: IRC
Message-ID: <930422195325.3929@APSICC.APS.EDU>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


NO! I was NOT trying to set up a host, I was trying to set up a CLIENT!  I
don't have source for a host, nor do I have room in my disk quota for it!  I
do, however, have source for two IRC clients, neither of which works yet.

But really Chris, I think the Clipper is more important.  Not only to the people
who read the list, but to me too.  This is the biggest reason why my time online
does not get spent hacking the IRC client into shape.

Please stop posting these messages to THIS list.

Kragen




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Arthur Abraham <a2@well.sf.ca.us>
Date: Thu, 22 Apr 93 19:55:12 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Don't Piss on Me
Message-ID: <199304230254.AA23563@well.sf.ca.us>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



I refer you to my earlier posting requesting people to direct
thier fire at something that needs to be ignighted -- like
your local newspaper or local congress person or local
president -- but it's definately not the Cypherpunks mailing
list.

We MUST NOT waste time writing each other letters that we'll
learn nothing by reading.  We should spend that same time
writing to newspapers, congress people, phone companies,
Clinton, Gore, and anybody else who thinks they can get away
with this because they feel the citizenry either doesn't care
about or doesn't understand the issues. 

What I'd like to see about the Privacy Clipper on this list is
something I don't already know, like the name and address of
AT&T's president's secretary -- s/he'll complain to the prez
if enough privacy mail arrives.  Better yet, how about more
copies of the letters to the uninformed that you have already
sent.

Be imaginative, be active, rattle cages, but telling me how
pissed you are won't change a thing, except to decrease the
time we're both spending on doing something effective.

Be effective.

Please.

-a2.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Stanton McCandlish <anton@hydra.unm.edu>
Date: Thu, 22 Apr 93 19:56:39 PDT
To: a2@well.sf.ca.us (Arthur Abraham)
Subject: HUMOUR: re: Wiretap chip sobriquet
In-Reply-To: <199304222206.AA14436@well.sf.ca.us>
Message-ID: <9304230256.AA06274@hydra.unm.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> Actually, this is the worst named product since GM decided to name an
> electric car the "Impact" (they've since announced that they're not
> going to make it.)
> 
> This device is very simply the "Privacy Clipper" chip ....

Heh.  Snip snip...
But lets not forget a certain Finnish household cleaning product (similar
to DiDi Seven), that failed DISMALLY in the English speaking world:
Super Piss.
No, really that was what it was called I do not lie.

ANYWAY:  I now have the OS/2 version of PGP available on NitV BBS (see .sig)

-- 
Testes saxi solidi!  **********************   Podex opacus gravedinosus est!  
Stanton McCandlish,  SysOp:  Noise in the Void Data Center BBS
IndraNet: 369:1/1      FidoNet: 1:301/2      Internet: anton@hydra.unm.edu
Snail: 8020 Central SE #405, Albuquerque, New Mexico 87108 USA
Data phone: +1-505-246-8515 (24hr, 1200-14400 v32bis, N-8-1)
Vox phone:  +1-505-247-3402 (bps rate varies, depends on if you woke me up...:)




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: norm@netcom.com (Norman Hardy)
Date: Thu, 22 Apr 93 21:40:43 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: If strong crypto were illegal
Message-ID: <9304230440.AA23805@netcom2.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Curriously the chip ostensibly makes it nearly impossible
for the government to prove that you are using strong crypto
on top of skipjack (Clipper).




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: norm@netcom.com (Norman Hardy)
Date: Thu, 22 Apr 93 21:40:55 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: If strong crypto were illegal
Message-ID: <9304230441.AA23828@netcom2.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Curriously the chip ostensibly makes it nearly impossible
for the government to prove that you are using strong crypto
on top of skipjack (Clipper).
 
I suppose that the a govenrment agency could use a trap-door
to discover that plain text was not plain, then get a warrant,
then present evidence that you were using strong crypto.
Such might eventually lend credence to the belief that there
was a trap-door.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Stanton McCandlish <anton@hydra.unm.edu>
Date: Thu, 22 Apr 93 20:53:48 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: PGP for Amiga
Message-ID: <9304230353.AA08274@hydra.unm.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


As I posted before, I have PGP for DOS, Unix and Mac available on my BBS.
I just added the OS/2 version. 

Does anyone know of an Amiga version? Or any other version?  I need site 
names and/or filenames (xarchie is a Good Thing!)  Thanks in advance.
-- 
Testes saxi solidi!  **********************   Podex opacus gravedinosus est!  
Stanton McCandlish,  SysOp:  Noise in the Void Data Center BBS
IndraNet: 369:1/1      FidoNet: 1:301/2      Internet: anton@hydra.unm.edu
Snail: 8020 Central SE #405, Albuquerque, New Mexico 87108 USA
Data phone: +1-505-246-8515 (24hr, 1200-14400 v32bis, N-8-1)
Vox phone:  +1-505-247-3402 (bps rate varies, depends on if you woke me up...:)




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Douglas Barnes <wixer!wixer.bga.com!gumby@cactus.org>
Date: Thu, 22 Apr 93 23:44:09 PDT
To: cirrus.com!pete@cactus.org (Pete Carpenter)
Subject: Re:  Mass producing chips
In-Reply-To: <9304222251.AA25007@ss2138.cirrus.com>
Message-ID: <9304230302.AA15092@wixer>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain




I wrote:
> 	How are they going to produce them at these prices and in that quantity
> 	given the "baroque activities in the vault" described by Denning?
> 
> 	Doug (gumby@wixer.bga.com)
> 

My point was that given the additional escrow security measures described
by D. Denning, I don't see how these prices or volumes will be possible.
It is possible that:

   1) Denning is describing the process incorrectly, or was merely
      outlining how the chips would be produced in the best of all
      possible worlds.

   2) The manufacturer actually has many such vaults, and the escrow agencies
      will provide sufficient staff and disposable laptop computers 
      at no charge to the manufacturer.

   3) The chips will not, in fact, be produced in substantial volume
      (e.g. >1M / year would require over 3,000 "sessions" per working day)

You responded:
> Assuming that there is some EEPROM, or bipolar fuse PROM (like PALs) they can 
> easily be programmed during the final (packaged) test stage. After the device 
> passes its tests, give it a number. There are already some PALs that have a 
> "silicon signature", a lot number embedded on the chip, which allows process 
> or lot tracing of devices that don't work up to spec.
> 
> Testing on peripheral controllers is well below 5 seconds each (gross ballpark - 
> not giving away any secrets here) CPUs may be more, but a "wire-tap" chip 
> should be much easier to test than a CPU.  Testers can run close to 24 hours 
> a day, and 24*3600/5 is 17,000 chips a day from one test head. QFP trays have 
> 50 chips/tray, and since the tester knows when the trays are full, it can easily
> use this to form lot/tray/batch,etc numbers, as well as individual device numbers.
> 

(all of which I am familiar with)


I was referring to:

[... from D. Denning's sci.crypt posting ...]

All Clipper Chips are programmed inside a SCIF (secure computer
information facility), which is essentially a vault.  The SCIF contains
a laptop computer and equipment to program the chips.  About 300 chips
                                                         ^^^^^^^^^^^
are programmed during a single session.  The SCIF is located at
                                         ^^^^ suggests only one vault
Mikotronx.

At the beginning of a session, a trusted agent from each of the two key
escrow agencies enters the vault.  Agent 1 enters an 80-bit value S1
into the laptop and agent 2 enters an 80-bit value S2. These values
serve as seeds to generate keys for a sequence of serial numbers.

[... technical info on key generation deleted ...]

As a sequence of values for U1, U2, and U are generated, they are
written onto three separate floppy disks.  The first disk contains a
file for each serial number that contains the corresponding key part
U1.  The second disk is similar but contains the U2 values.  The third
disk contains the unit keys U.  Agent 1 takes the first disk and agent
2 takes the second disk.  The third disk is used to program the chips.
After the chips are programmed, all information is discarded from the
vault and the agents leave.  The laptop may be destroyed for additional
                                      ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
assurance that no information is left behind.
 
The protocol may be changed slightly so that four people are in the
room instead of two.  The first two would provide the seeds S1 and S2,
and the second two (the escrow agents) would take the disks back to
the escrow agencies.





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Bill Sommerfeld <sommerfeld@orchard.medford.ma.us>
Date: Thu, 22 Apr 93 19:38:04 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: crypto export controls.
Message-ID: <9304230203.AA00114@orchard.medford.ma.us>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I got an announcement last week of a presentation early this week at
my place of work on the subject of cryptographic export controls,
shortly before the cripple chip announcement was made.  This struck me
as at least suspicious.

Well, turns that the timing was something of a coincidence; it was
just a generic presentation on the current sorry state of the export
regulations, by one who had to deal with them day in and day out.  He
seemed to have the right attitude towards "working the regulations"
and what they should be, and had been involved in a few meetings with
NSA-types.  He commented that things have been getting better -- it
used to be that they'd refuse to meet with you over the subject of
exporting DES; now, they'll meet with you and just refuse to talk
about it.  The justification for ignoring the current wide
availability of strong crypto outside the U.S. was that if they
prevent strong crypto from falling into the hands of *one* bad guy,
they will have accomplished something...

He mentioned that the Software Publishers Association deal (where
companies can now export software using crippled versions of RC2 and
RC4 on short notice) was a surprise to him and much of the non-PC
software industry and represented an almost complete capitulation on
the SPA's part.  It was also uninteresting to my employer as we aren't
interested in using trivially breakable crypto in our products, and
the quick turnaround is pretty much meaningless given the amount of
lead time needed to get a product out the door.

He also mentioned an upcoming amendment to the next version of the law
which authorizes the ITAR and the commerce equivalent which would
specifically allow the export of generally available encryption
software; he didn't hold out much hope for it passing but considered
it worth fighting for.

He was also taken by surprise by the cripple chip announcement, and
also considered it a bad and ominous thing...

				- Bill





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Matthew J Miszewski <MJMISKI@macc.wisc.edu>
Date: Thu, 22 Apr 93 20:29:01 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: CLIP: Congress works with the Cypherpunks!
Message-ID: <23042222282634@vms2.macc.wisc.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Cypherpunks (or cryptoprivacy professionals) :-),
 
  Hey, some good news.  I just got some good information that the winds
in Congress are blowing our way.  In the latest "Communications Daily", the
House of Reps. Telecommunications Subcommittee Chair Markey (D-Mass)
has come out actively opposing the Wiretap Chip.  He gave several reasons,
most of them not technical but commercial.  I think he could use some technical
talking points too.  This could be important guys.  A chairman has mucho
power (albeit he is only a subcom chair, but he may be well connected).
 
  I will digest the article and post it for Eric to put it on the ftp site.
I will also get the vital info on this charming privacy advocate (Ill bet he
wears a suit too! ;^)
 
  This is an incredible window of opportunity.  Think, type, send but don't
overdo it.  This may be our only advocate.  But he may have Senator Kennedy's
ear.  I guess this will test the cypherpunk effectiveness quotient.  Progress.
 
Matt
mjmiski@macc.wisc.edu
 




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Harry Shapiro <habs@Panix.Com>
Date: Thu, 22 Apr 93 19:59:56 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com (Good Guys)
Subject: Suit vs Non-Suits
Message-ID: <199304230259.AA12758@sun.Panix.Com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I feel that perhaps I started this whole mess that is getting, imho,
quite out of hand.

I said in a post of several days ago, we need Tim M. and John G. to 
get out there and speak and we also need some people who wear suits.

I think we need both. I agree with Perry about the desire to change
things and the perception of a person gives off, etc.

Still I think we need both, and since we have both people on this 
list, I don't see what has to really change.

It would be nice to get Tim and John and a few suis to make a
lobbying trip to washington.

But lets stop the debate.

/harry

-- 
Harry Shapiro  				      habs@panix.com
List Administrator of the Extropy Institute Mailing List
Private Communication for the Extropian Community since 1991



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Matthew J Miszewski <MJMISKI@macc.wisc.edu>
Date: Thu, 22 Apr 93 21:01:08 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: HOUSE: Wiretap Support from Markey (D-Mass)
Message-ID: <23042223002970@vms2.macc.wisc.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Here it is:  Couldn't remember if the first two articles had been posted but
I figured Eric could ftp them even if they were.  The 3rd article is the
one about Rep. Markey.  Ill find his vital info ASAP.
 
-----------------8<---------------------8<----------------
 
 
                              Communications Daily
 
                             April 19, 1993, Monday
 
Vol. 13, No. 74; Pg. 2
 
Clinton Sets Policy Review
 
GOVT. WEIGHS IN ON PRIVACY-VS.-ENCRYPTION DEBATE, WITH ITS OWN TECHNOLOGY
 
 
   Clinton Administration Fri. announced sweeping policy directive designed to
protect privacy of voice and data transmissions using govt.-developed encryption
technology that ensures law enforcement agencies will have ability to eavesdrop.
Encyrption is achieved through use of " Clipper Chip"  that will be built into
telephones, computers, fax machines. Although govt. will adopt new chip as its
standard, use in private sector will be on voluntary basis.
 
   AT&T Fri. became first company to announce publicly support of  Clipper
 Chip.  "We believe it will give our customers far greater protection in
defeating hackers or eavesdroppers in attempting to intercept a call," said AT&T
Vp Secure Communications Systems Edward Hickey. Govt. already has purchased some
evaluation units from AT&T with  Clipper Chip  installed, said Raymond Kramer,
acting dir. of National Institute of Standards & Technology (NIST). Govt.
expects to purchase "well over the thousands" of such  Clipper Chip  units, he
said, but he couldn't give figures for how many it might buy from AT&T. AT&T
spokesman said products with  Clipper Chip  included will be available
commercially in 2nd quarter.
 
   President Clinton Thurs. signed Top Secret National Security Directive
outlining details of privacy and encryption policy review. Review will bring
together industry and govt. experts under direction of National Security Council
in attempt to resolve long-running controversy on right of businesses and
citizens to protect all forms of communication and govt. right to conduct lawful
investigations. Review will take 3-4 months, NIST's Kramer said.
 
   Law enforcement agencies are concerned about rising popularity of digital
encryption methods. Multinational businesses, worried about economic espionage,
increasingly are incorporating encryption technology for all communications. Law
enforcement agencies have voiced growing concern that if they don't move quickly
to enact laws assuring them access to encrypted and digital communications, they
will be at decided disadvantage in attempting to thwart criminal acts. FBI
spokesman James Kallstrom acknowledged that "not many" criminals today are using
encryption to skirt law, but putting methods in place now to assure means of
intercepting such communications "is vital" to law enforcement's mission.
 
   Encryption program will be available to any vendor that wants to manufacture
chips, Kramer said. However, company that developed and designed chip under
sole-source contract from National Security Agency (NSA) -- Mykotronx, Torrance,
Cal. -- has solid lead on market. Kramer acknowledged job was handed to it with
NSA's full approval of noncompetitive bid contract. He defended noncompetition
aspect: "We went out and found the only company capable of delivering this
technology." He said govt. has been using  Clipper Chip  technology for "a
while now in classified applications," but declined to say how long it had been
in use before White House announcement.
 
   Each chip will have 3 unique "keys" issued to it. When manufactured, 2 of
those keys will be sent to govt. and will be held by "escrow agents." For law
enforcement agency to be able descramble transmissions, it first must get court
order that allows keys held in escrow to be released. Only when those keys are
used in tandem can law enforcement agencies unscramble codes and listen in on
conversations. Attorney Gen.'s office will "make all arrangements with
appropriate entities to hold keys," White House said. Those escrow keys could be
held by private organizations, govt. agencies or others, Kramer said. But only 2
entities will be chosen and will be responsible for administering data base that
will store keys. Attorney Gen.'s office is expected to select escrow key holders
"within a couple of weeks," Kramer said.
 
   Plan already is drawing fire from civil liberties groups and privacy
advocates. Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF) said White House acted "before
any public comment or discussion has been allowed." It said Administration will
use "its leverage to get all telephone equipment vendors to adopt" technology.
EFF criticized govt.'s sole-source contract, saying there may be other companies
that have better encryption technology, and because encryption algorithm is
classified, it can't be tested. "The public will only have confidence in the
security of a standard that is open to independent, expert scrutiny," EFF said.
Privacy experts are concerned that because  Clipper Chip  was developed under
NSA contract, it might have "backdoor" known only to NSA that would allow agency
to crack code and bypass court order. Kramer disagreed: "There is positively no
backdoor to this technology."
 
   Because use of  Clipper Chip  is entirely voluntary, businesses and private
users -- including criminals -- are free to choose other means of encryption,
leaving govt. and law enforcement agencies with dilemma they now face. FBI's
Kallstrom acknowledged criminals still could thwart investigations if they used
non- Clipper Chip  products, "but most criminals aren't so smart."
 
   Ability of govt. to eavesdrop on  Clipper Chip -equipped devices still
doesn't solve broader problem: Ability to wiretap conversations moving across
digital telecommunications lines. That problem is being addressed separately by
FBI's controversial digital wiretap legislation that has failed to find
congressional sponsor and is languishing in Justice Dept., waiting for support
of Attorney Gen.
 
 
                                InformationWeek
 
                                 April 19, 1993
 
 
PHONE CHIP BLOCKS UNWARRANTED TAPS
 
 
    The Clinton administration is attempting to balance privacy concerns with
law enforcement agencies' ability to eavesdrop on phone conversations and data
transmissions. Last week, government engineers revealed they have developed a
" Clipper Chip"  that can be placed in ordinary phones to encrypt phone
communications. Each device containing the chip will have two unique "key"
devices that together can decode those communications. One key will be held by a
government agency and one by a private organization. Law enforcement officials
would need warrants to obtain the keys. The Justice Department plans to purchase
several thousand chips, and AT&T immediately announced it will use Clipper in
all of its secure communications products.
 
 
                              Communications Daily
 
                            April 20, 1993, Tuesday
 
Vol. 13, No. 75; Pg. 7
 
 
[...]
 
   House Telecom Subcommittee Chmn. Markey (D-Mass.) has expressed reservations
about govt. use of  Clipper Chip,  encrypted technology that secures
transmissions (CD April 19 p2). Markey wrote to Commerce Secy. Ronald Brown
asking whether use of technology could lead to "inadvertently increase[d] costs
to those U.S. companies hoping to serve both" govt. and private markets. Chip
would be mandatory for govt. use, but optional for private sector, although
companies might find greater proprietary need to protect data than govt. Markey
asked Brown response to 6 questions: (1) Has algorithm been tested by any entity
besides National Security Agency, National Institute of Standards & Technology
or vendor supplying chip? (2) Who would hold "key" to descrambling data? (3)
Does algorithm have "trap door" or "back door" that could allow someone to crack
code? (4) How well would encryption devices adapt to rapidly changing
telecommunications technology? (5) What would chip cost federal govt.? (6) What
is Commerce Dept. assessment on cost to U.S. exporters of computer and
telecommunications hardware and software. Markey said he wanted answers by April
28.
[...]
 
   National Assn. of State Utility Consumer Advocates opens 2-day conference
April 22 on "Telecommunications 2000: What's at Stake for Consumers in the Next
Century?" at Rayburn House Office Bldg., Rm. 2168. Rep. Markey (D-Mass.) will
speak. Vice President Gore is invited luncheon speaker. Three-member panels
Thurs. include: 9:30 a.m. -- National Telecommunications Infrastructure, with
former Rep. Tauke (R-Ia.), now Nynex govt. affairs vp. 11 a.m. -- Funding
Advanced Networks, with Bell Atlantic Federal Relations Exec. Dir. Edward
Lowery. 3:30 p.m. -- New Technologies, with Bell Atlantic Information Services
Exec. Dir. Steven Craddock.
 
     [I know we missed Thursday but can some suits make it tomorrow?]
 
 
   MultiLink has developed software quality assurance package for its
audioconferencing bridge known as System 70. Equipment assures multipoint
teleconferences will work through simulator that generates Dual Tone
MultiFrequency signals to test 2-way digitized messages over telephone lines,
company said.
      [For those interested in DTMF stuff (I know its an aside)]
 
 
   Ill. Bell has begun offering Call Trace for $4 per successful trace to 56
Chicago area communities. Customers would dial *57, preserving number for Bell's
Annoyance Call Bureau or police authorities, although users wouldn't see it
directly. Unlike Caller ID, offer is available only on per-call basis.
 
       [UUUGGGGHHHH!!!!]
 
Matt
mjmiski@macc.wisc.edu
 




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Arthur Abraham <a2@well.sf.ca.us>
Date: Thu, 22 Apr 93 23:06:32 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Meets 'n Greets
Message-ID: <199304230606.AA07005@well.sf.ca.us>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Craig Nottingham wrote:

>In addition a thought that many people are overlooking-  the wiretap chip
>transmissions of encrypted data would make a perfect envelope for the 
>transfer of more secure information encrypted with powerful encryption
>schemes.  There would be no easy way to tell the diffence between
>pre-encypted transmissions and wiretap chip encrypted conversation.

If I was the LE and unwrapped a Privacy Clipper wrapper and found
further encryption, I'd know I had found "probable cause" to...



-a2.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: whitaker@eternity.demon.co.uk (Russell E. Whitaker)
Date: Sun, 25 Apr 93 05:00:40 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: MEETING: UK Cryptoprivacy Association
Message-ID: <4398@eternity.demon.co.uk>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

Meeting of the UK Cryptoprivacy Association
- -------------------------------------------

Saturday, 8 May 1993, 1500

To be held at the offices of:

  FOREST
  4th floor
  2 Grosvenor Gardens
  London  SW1W 0DH

This is located at the corner of Hobart Place, a couple of
blocks west of Victoria Station, and almost directly across from
the dark green cabbie shelter.

If you have trouble finding the place, please call the office on
071-823-6550.  Or, call me (Russell Whitaker) on my pager,
081-812-2661, and leave an informative message with the
telephone number where you can be reached; I will return the
call almost immediately.

Discussion will range from the usual general topics, such as the
use of secure public key cryptosystems to protect message data, to
specific topics, such as recent moves by the U.S. government
to restrict choice in data privacy (reference recent discussion
on Usenet groups, e.g. sci.crypt and alt.security.pgp).

All are invited.  Particularly welcome are members of the
newly-formed UK CommUnity group ... the local
EFF-in-spirit-if-not-in-name folks.

Those who plan to attend should email me and let me know.
Please.

All attendees are requested to bring diskettes - preferably
MS-DOS - with their PGP 2.+ public keys.  As is usual at these
gatherings, several of us will bring our laptops, and will sign
public keys, subject to the usual caveats (reference the
documentation for PGP 2.2, specifically files PGPDOC1.DOC and
PGPDOC2.DOC).

If you do not already have a copy of PGP 2.2 (MS-DOS), and would
like to have a copy of this public domain program, please bring
a formatted, medium or high density 3.5 inch floppy PC diskette;
you will be provided a copy of the program.

Of course, you might prefer to ftp a version of the program from
one of the various archive sites.  I suggest trying Demon
Internet Systems, which carries the full range of PGP (Phil
Zimmerman's "Pretty Good Privacy") implementations: directory
/pub/pgp at gate.demon.co.uk.

Meetings are of indeterminate time.  Those who are interested
are invited to join the rest of us at a pseudorandomly
determined pub afterwards.

Please note:
- ------------
In the past few months, interested people have emailed me,
requesting FAQs and special information mailings.  I regret
that, except in very unusual cases (e.g. working press), I
cannot, in a timely manner, respond to these requests.  I will,
however - and for the first time - do a writeup of this meeting,
which I will post in various places.

What I *am* willing to supply is general information on our
activities for the maintainers of existing FAQs, such as that
for alt.privacy.  FAQ maintainers can contact me at
whitaker@eternity.demon.co.uk

Russell Earl Whitaker                   whitaker@eternity.demon.co.uk
Communications Editor                                 AMiX: RWhitaker
EXTROPY: The Journal of Transhumanist Thought
Board member, Extropy Institute (ExI)
================ PGP 2.2 public key available =======================

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.2

iQCVAgUBK9bG/ITj7/vxxWtPAQG0/AQAmPQKQl7KNB43DyniRyuDu5tixStXd2F7
k5CiWNwN/u9ExZfptPgajwY91dsafX0H53RV5+lT8OSnvIx35QMmgBmPQOJCGnGj
ZUJ2eGiSvfuLtAmgMQtSLtJh5x/VXmUIl8SJHzrffIz3SjnKcENTzrQnGc7UdIQ6
x85InstiJzU=
=Y9GS
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: gnu (John Gilmore)
Date: Thu, 22 Apr 93 23:50:02 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: CRYPTO '93  -  Conference Announcement & Final Call for Papers
Message-ID: <9304230649.AA23157@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I recommend this conference.  It's cheap to attend, you'll meet almost all
the world-class cryptographers there are (out in the open, as well as some
of the spooks), the food is great, and the campus is a fun place to visit.
Everything is in walking distance, and the ocean and cliffs are right there.
As well as a lot of interesting people and discussions.

I wouldn't submit a paper unless it was a serious academic paper, but
you could submit a "rump session" talk about some of the cypherpunk
activities you've been doing.  You'll get five or ten minutes to
explain and handle questions, with overhead slides.  The presentations
have ranged from how to break DES (Adi Shamir & Eli Biham) to ideas
about building MSDOS viruses that would infect millions of PC's to do
brute force crypto cracking (Steve White of IBM, I think).  I've
spoken at two of the last three rump sessions about one or another
social or political aspect of cryptography.  Whit Diffie chairs the
rump session, which is held after dinner with beer and wine, and you
can send him proposals for your talk by email (diffie@eng.sun.com).

	John

............................................................................
        CRYPTO '93  -  Conference Announcement & Final Call for Papers
............................................................................

The Thirteenth Annual CRYPTO Conference, sponsored by the International 
Association for Cryptologic Research (IACR), in cooperation with 
the IEEE Computer Society Technical Committee on Security and Privacy, 
the Computer Science Department of the University of California, Santa 
Barbara, and Bell-Northern Research (a subsidiary of Northern Telecom), 
will be held on the campus of the University of California, Santa Barbara, 
on August 22-26, 1993. Original research papers and technical expository 
talks 
are solicited on all practical and theoretical aspects of cryptology. It is 
anticipated that some talks may also be presented by special invitation of 
the 
Program Committee.
- -------------------------        
INSTRUCTIONS FOR AUTHORS:  Authors are requested to send 12 copies of a 
detailed abstract (not a full paper) by April 26, 1993, to the Program Chair 
at the address given below. A limit of 10 pages of 12pt type (not counting 
the bibliography or the title page) is placed on all submissions. Submissions 
must arrive on time or be postmarked no later than April 21, 1993 and sent by 
airmail in order to receive consideration by the Program Committee. It is 
required that submissions start with a succinct statement of the problem 
addressed, the solution proposed, and its significance to cryptology, 
appropriate for a non-specialist reader. Technical development directed to 
the specialist should follow as needed.
- -------------------------        
Abstracts that have been submitted to other conferences that have proceedings 
are NOT eligible for submission.

Submissions MUST BE ANONYMOUS. This means that names and affiliations of 
authors should only appear on the title page of the submission; it should 
be possible to remove this page and send the papers to Program Committee 
members. A Latex style file that produces output in this format is available 
by email from the Program Chair.

Authors will be informed of acceptance or rejection in a letter mailed on 
or before June 21, 1993. A compilation of all accepted abstracts will be 
available at the conference in the form of pre-proceedings. Authors of 
accepted abstracts will be allowed to submit revised versions for the 
pre-proceedings. A revised abstract should contain only minor changes and 
corrections to the originally submitted abstract. All revised abstracts must 
be received by the Program Chair by July 16, 1993. THE 10 PAGE LIMIT WILL BE 
STRICTLY ENFORCED for the pre-proceedings.

Complete conference proceedings are expected to be published in Springer-
Verlag's Lecture Notes in Computer Science series at a later date, pending 
negotiation.
- -------------------------        
The Program Committee consists of 

   D. Stinson (Chair, Nebraska)   
   M. Bellare (IBM T. J. Watson)       E. Biham (Technion, Israel)
   E. Brickell (Sandia National Labs)  J. Feigenbaum (AT&T Bell Labs)
   R. Impagliazzo (UCSD)               A. Odlyzko (AT&T Bell Labs)
   T. Okamoto (NTT, Japan)             B. Pfitzmann (Hildesheim, Germany)
   R. Rueppel (R3, Switzerland)        S. Vanstone (Waterloo, Canada)
- -------------------------        
Send submissions to the Program Chair:        

Douglas R. Stinson, Crypto '93        
Computer Science and Engineering Department         
115 Ferguson Hall, University of Nebraska        
Lincoln, NE 68588-0115 USA        
Telephone: (402)-472-7791         
Fax: (402)-472-7767        
Internet: stinson@bibd.unl.edu        

For other information, contact the General Chair: 

Paul C. Van Oorschot, Crypto '93 
Bell-Northern Research (MAIL STOP 000) 
3500 Carling Ave. 
Nepean, Ontario K2H 8E9  Canada 
Telephone: (613)-763-4199 
Fax: (613)-763-2626 
Internet: crypto93@bnr.ca


............................................................................
        CRYPTO '93  -  General Information  (August 22 - 26, 1993)
............................................................................

THE PROGRAM:  Crypto'93 is the thirteenth in a series of workshops on 
cryptology held at Santa Barbara, and is sponsored by the International 
Association for Cryptologic Research, in cooperation with the IEEE 
Computer Society Technical Committee on Security and Privacy, the Computer 
Science Department of the University of California, Santa Barbara, and 
Bell-Northern Research (a subsidiary of Northern Telecom). The program 
for the workshop will cover all aspects of cryptology. Extended abstracts of 
the papers presented at the conference will be distributed to all attendees 
at the conference, and formal proceedings will be published at a later date.

In addition to the regular program of papers selected or invited by the 
program committee, there will be a rump session on Tuesday evening for 
informal presentations. Facilities will also be provided for attendees to 
demonstrate hardware, software and other items of cryptographic interest. 
If you wish to demonstrate such items, you are urged to contact the General 
Chair so that your needs will be attended to. The social program will include 
hosted cocktail parties on Sunday and Monday. In addition, there will be a 
beach barbecue on Wednesday evening. The price of the barbecue is included 
in the room and board charge, and extra tickets may be purchased.

ABOUT THE CONFERENCE FACILITIES:  The workshop will be held on the campus of 
the University of California, Santa Barbara. The campus is located adjacent 
to the Santa Barbara airport and the Pacific Ocean. Accommodations are 
available in the university dormitories at relatively low cost for conference 
participants. Children under the age of 13 are not allowed to stay in the 
dormitories, so those bringing small children will need to make separate 
arrangements in one of several nearby hotels. More information on hotels is 
enclosed. Parking on campus is available at no cost to the participants. 
However, participants must indicate on the registration form if they desire 
a parking permit.

TRAVEL INFORMATION:  The campus is located approximately 2 miles from the 
Santa Barbara airport, which is served by several airlines, including 
American, America West, Delta, United, and US Air. Free shuttle bus service 
will be provided between the Santa Barbara airport and the campus on Sunday 
and Thursday afternoons. All major rental car agencies are also represented 
in Santa Barbara, and AMTRAK has rail connections to San Francisco from the 
north and Los Angeles from the south. Santa Barbara is approximately 100 
miles 
north of Los Angeles airport, and 350 miles south of San Francisco.

REGISTRATION:  Participation is invited by interested parties, but attendance 
at the workshop is limited, and pre-registration is strongly advised. Late 
registrations, subject to a late registration fee, may be accepted if space 
is available, but there are NO GUARANTEES. To register, fill out the attached 
registration form and return to the address on the form along with payment in 
full before July 9, 1993. Campus accommodations will be available on a first 
come, first serve basis for attendees who register by July 9, 1993. The 
conference fees include participation in the program and all social 
functions, 
as well as membership to the IACR and a subscription to the Journal of 
Cryptology. The room and board charges include dormitory lodging and meals 
>from dinner on Sunday to lunch on Thursday. Technical sessions will run 
>from Monday morning to Thursday at noon. A very limited number of stipends 
are available to those unable to obtain funding. Applications for stipends 
should be sent to the General Chair before June 4, 1993.

............................................................................
        CRYPTO '93  -  CRYPTO '93 Registration Form 
............................................................................
                       REGISTRATION DEADLINE: July 9, 1993

Last Name:   _____________________________________________

First Name:  _____________________________________________ Sex: (M)__  (F)__

Affiliation: _______________________________________________________________ 

Mailing Address:  __________________________________________________________

                  __________________________________________________________

                  __________________________________________________________

                  ___________________________________________________________

Phone:  __________________________________ FAX:  ___________________________ 

Electronic Mail:  __________________________________________________________ 

Payment of the conference fee entitles you to membership in the International 
Association for Cryptologic Research for one year at no extra charge, 
including a subscription to the Journal of Cryptology, published by Springer-
Verlag, at no extra charge.  Do you wish to be an IACR member?   YES__  NO__

The conference fee also includes the conference proceedings when they become 
available, containing final versions of conference papers. The book of 
extended abstracts distributed at the conference will contain only shortened 
preliminary versions of these papers (maximum 10 pages).

Conference fee: Regular ($280)                        US$ _______
                Attended Eurocrypt'93, Norway ($230)      _______
                Full time student ($190)                  _______ 
                deduct $50 if you do not wish proceedings _______
                Total conference fee:                              US$_______

Room and Board (4 nights):   Smoking ___  Non-smoking ___
        Single room ($275 per person)                                 _______
        Double room ($225 per person)                                 _______
               Roommate's name:  ____________________________________

Extra barbecue tickets ($20 each; one is included in room and board)  _______ 
$40 late fee for registration after July 9; 
    REGISTRATION NOT GUARANTEED AFTER JULY 9                          _______

Total funds enclosed (U.S. dollars):                              US$ _______

Payment must be by check PAYABLE IN U.S. FUNDS, by money order IN U.S. FUNDS, 
or by U.S. BANK DRAFT, payable to: CRYPTO'93.  Payment should be mailed to 
the 
General Chair:
               Paul C. Van Oorschot, CRYPTO'93 
               Bell-Northern Research (MAIL STOP 000)
               3500 Carling Ave.
               Nepean, Ontario K2H 8E9   Canada 

............................................................................
        CRYPTO '93  -  Hotel Information
............................................................................

For those who choose not to stay in the dormitories, the following is a 
partial list of hotels in the area. Those who choose to stay off campus are 
responsible for making their own reservations, and early reservations are 
advised since August is a popular season in Santa Barbara. Note that Goleta 
is closer to UCSB than Santa Barbara, but that a car will probably be 
required to travel between any hotel and the campus. All prices are subject 
to change; prices should be confirmed by calling the individual hotels 
directly. However, mention CRYPTO'93 when you are making your reservation and 
in several of the hotels listed you will be eligible for the university rate 
which can be significantly less than the normal rates. We are not able to 
block rooms in these hotels, so please make reservations as early as 
possible. The quality of the hotels range from rather expensive beach-front 
resorts to basic inexpensive accommodations. For further information, try 
contacting the Santa Barbara Convention and Visitors Center, (805)-966-9222. 

South Coast Inn: 5620 Calle Real, Goleta, CA 93117. Regular rates: Single 
$89, 
Double $94; call for University rates. Contact Murrill Forrester at 
(805)-967-3200 or toll-free at (800)-350-3614.

Cathedral Oaks Lodge: 4770 Calle Real, Santa Barbara, 93110. Single rates not 
available, Double rates start at $84 including breakfast; no University 
rates. 
Call Tom Patton at (805)-964-3511 or toll-free at (800)-654-1965.

Motel 6: 5897 Calle Real, Goleta, CA 93117. Single $33.95, Double $39.95, 
no University rate available. Call (505)-891-6161.

The Sandman Inn: 3714 State St., Santa Barbara, CA 93105. Regular rates: 
Single or Double $84, $94 for king-size, University rate $65. Call Jean 
Ingerle at (805)-687-2468 or toll-free at (800)-350-8174.

Miramar Hotel (Beachfront): 3 miles south of Santa Barbara on U.S. 101 at 
San Ysidro turnoff. Regular rates: $70-$135. No University rates. Call 
(805)-969-2203. 

Pepper Tree Inn: 3850 State St., Santa Barbara, CA 93105. Regular rates: 
$106-$112 for two people, University rates $96-$102 for two people. Call 
Christopher Oliphant at (805)-687-5511 or toll-free at (800)-338-0030.

Encina Lodge: 220 Bath Street, Santa Barbara, CA 93105. Regular rates 
$106-$108 for two people, no University rates. Call Carol Wolford at 
(805)-682-7550 or toll-free at (800)-526-2282.

Quality Suites: 5500 Hollister Ave, Santa Barbara, CA 93111 (close to 
campus). 
Regular rates: Single $125, Double $145, University rates $99 double 
(must mention you are attending a UCSB program). Call Michael Ensign at 
(805)-683-6722.

Upham Hotel (bed-and-breakfast): 1404 De La Vina Road, Santa Barbara, 
CA 93101. University rate $85 (mention you are from Crypto). Call Sheila 
Donegan at (805)-962-0058.he best

------- End of Forwarded Message





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: mccoy@ccwf.cc.utexas.edu (Jim McCoy)
Date: Thu, 22 Apr 93 21:59:40 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: New Algorithm...
In-Reply-To: <19930422204625.1.MEYER@OGHMA.MCC.COM>
Message-ID: <9304230459.AA18293@tigger.cc.utexas.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text


> Date: Thu, 22 Apr 1993 15:46-0500
> From: Peter Meyer <meyer@mcc.com>
> 
>     Date: Thu, 22 Apr 1993 15:07 CDT
>     From: "Perry E. Metzger" <pmetzger@lehman.com>
> 
>     "Haywood J. Blowme" says:
>     [Lots about some J. Random Companies encryption chip]
> 
>     All fine and well, but since we have IDEA already, why should we want
>     it? For virtually all applicatons these days other than fully
>     encrypting network traffic, software is fine. DES implementations in
>     software can handle 1.5 Mbit/s on reasonable machines. [...]
> 
[...]
> 
> 
> There are lots of other things to be considered besides the algorithm
> itself when designing good encryption software, e.g. if someone
> accidentally yanks out the power cord to the computer during decryption
> do you kiss goodbye to the data?

Well, what if I need to the capability of doing 5-10 Mbyte/s?  I am still
haisng out a few design details of a "secure" BSD using encryption of the
filesystem before I hit the code and right now this particular issue is one
that I have still not worked out.  I need it in hardware.  Software is just
not fast enough and I a not sure how much work it will require to get a DES
card to do E(K1,D(K2,E(K1,x))) if I want to use 128 bit keys.

Does anyone know if there is a hardware implementation of IDEA or another
algorithm of suitable cryptographic strength available in a card or chip?
Then again, maybe I could use a clipper chip...   (big ;-)

jim



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: David Reeve Sward <sward+@cmu.edu>
Date: Thu, 22 Apr 93 21:08:57 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: CLIPPER: Explanation sheet?
Message-ID: <Qfpqi9K00WBK8_O4gs@andrew.cmu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I (along with others) have some sort of phrase in our .signature saying
"Stop the Clipper Chip" or somesuch.  Since adding this, I have had
several people ask me about this, and I have fired off an explanation to
them.  I am wondering if there is a Wiretap Chip Explanation Sheet to
send to people instead of trying to make sure I remember everything (and
without double-checking everything I say).  Has anyone written such a
beast?
-- 
David Sward    sward+@cmu.edu    Finger or email for PGP public key 3D567F
Stop the Big Brother Chip   -   Just say NO to the Clipper "Wiretap" Chip!




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: bobanderson%dlu.dnet@net.Vanderbilt.Edu (boB -- Geekey Student Worker)
Date: Thu, 22 Apr 93 22:48:04 PDT
To: "%vunsf.dnet@net.Vanderbilt.Edu
Subject: Request
Message-ID: <9304230547.AA08681@net.Vanderbilt.Edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Please put me on the cypherpunks mailing list
                               Bob






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Derek Atkins <warlord@MIT.EDU>
Date: Thu, 22 Apr 93 22:35:54 PDT
To: cypherpunks-east@MIT.EDU
Subject: MEET: Boston Area Cypherpunks
Message-ID: <9304230535.AA14679@deathtongue>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


ANNOUNCEMENT:

In lieu of the recent happenings in the cryptography field, and the
Bay Area Cypherpunks meeting, I would like to call to order, an ad-hoc
Boston Area Cypherpunks meeting.  This meeting is to talk about the
Wiretap Chip proposal, and to try to coordinate a counter-attack to
the proposal.

I hope to have an audio link to the west-coasters, encrypted (of
course), so we can discuss these issues together.

Place: MIT, Room 1-115, Cambridge.
When: 3:00 pm - 9ish

Please attend if you have any interest in this topic...

DIRECTIONS:

To get to MIT, room 1-115:

via car: have fun!  Building 1 is located right on Mass Ave., close
to Memorial Drive.  You can try to park anywhere around the area, if
you can find a spot.

via T: get off at kendall sq. (red line), and walk west... cross Ames
St., and keep walking west.  Enter the infinite corridor when you
cannot walk outside any further, and keep walking west.

Once you get into Lobby 7 (a big cathedral-like entryway at 77 Mass.
Ave) there will be signs directing you to 1-115.

See you there.

If you need any more assistance, please feel free to send me e-mail,
or call me at 868-4469...

-derek



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: gnu (John Gilmore)
Date: Fri, 23 Apr 93 02:13:24 PDT
To: cypherpunks
Subject: Spooks like Suns  (FYI)
Message-ID: <9304230913.AA26730@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


----------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                        The Florida SunFlash

         SunFed Wins Contract With Defense Intelligence Agency

SunFLASH Vol 52 #25					          April 1993
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
Contact: Carol Hartzell, SMCC PR at (415) 336-0598


         Will Be Exclusive Supplier of Secure, RISC-based
    	        Network Servers and Workstations


MILPITAS, Calif. -- April 21, 1993 -- Sun Microsystems Federal, Inc.
(Sun Federal) has been selected by the Defense Intelligence Agency
(DIA) under a requirements contract to supply a secure, RISC-based
family of workstations and servers. The one-year (with four option
years) SASS (System Acquisition and Support Strategy) multi-vendor
acquisition contract anticipates purchasing 5,400 RISC-based Sun(TM)
workstations, the majority of which will be used in a secure network
environment. Sun Federal will provide workstations and network servers
to enhance and leverage the investment of existing equipment as well as
move the DIA from a mainframe environment to a secure client-server
workgroup environment.

Sun Federal will supply Sun SPARCstation(TM) IPX(TM) and SPARCstation 2
workstations, along with a version of the Solaris(R) operating
environment that is being evaluated by the DIA for CMW (Compartmented
Mode Workstation) operation. Options for file servers and SPARCstation
10 workstations are also included.

Sun Microsystems Federal, Inc. is a wholly owned subsidiary of Sun
Microsystems, Inc., the world's leading supplier of client-server
computing solutions. Sun Federal, founded in 1984, is headquartered in
Milpitas, Calif.

++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
For information send mail to info-sunflash@Sun.COM.
Subscription requests should be sent to sunflash-request@Sun.COM.
Archives are on solar.nova.edu, ftp.uu.net, sunsite.unc.edu,
src.doc.ic.ac.uk and ftp.adelaide.edu.au

All prices, availability, and other statements relating to Sun or third
party products are valid in the U.S. only. Please contact your local
Sales Representative for details of pricing and product availability in
your region. Descriptions of, or references to products or publications
within SunFlash does not imply an endorsement of that product or
publication by Sun Microsystems.

Send brief articles (e.g. third party announcements) and include contact
information (non-800#, fax #, email, etc) to:
John McLaughlin, SunFlash editor, flash@Sun.COM. +1 305 351 4909




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: szabo@techbook.com (Nick Szabo)
Date: Fri, 23 Apr 93 02:11:46 PDT
To: extropians@gnu.ai.mit.edu
Subject: Privacy International (fwd)
Message-ID: <m0nmJq6-000hz5C@techbook.techbook.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



The following forwarded from alt.privacy.  Anybody have experience
with this group?  Have they taken a position on the wiretap chip?

Subject: Group Info: Privacy International
Message-ID: <1993Apr12.184129.11455@mont.cs.missouri.edu>
Originator: rich@pencil.cs.missouri.edu
Organization: Privacy International
PRIVACY INTERNATIONAL
 
A WATCHDOG ON SURVEILLANCE
 
GENERAL INFORMATION

PRIVACY INTERNATIONAL - THE BIRTH OF A WORLDWIDE MOVEMENT
 
We are posting this in the hope that you might get involved in
a new organization which is actively involved world-wide in the
protection of privacy.

Privacy International is an independent Non Government
Organization (NGO) established in 1990 to protect personal
privacy and to monitor surveillance by governments, financial
institutions, intelligence agencies, media, political groups,
police, and other organizations.

At the invitation of its members and member organizations
throughout the world, Privacy International has conducted
successful campaigns against surveillance in  Asia, Europe and
North America. Many of these campaigns have raised awareness
about the dangers of proposals for identity cards, national
numbering systems, computer linking programmes and military
surveillance. Others have reinforced the importance of
developing laws to protect personal privacy.

WHO ARE PRIVACY INTERNATIONAL!S MEMBERS ?

Over the past three years  Privacy International has
established an outstanding and very active member network of
legal experts, human rights advocates, information systems
experts, academics, data protection experts,  social and
political scientists , and a whole range of concerned
individuals  from more than 40 countries.

These members, who comprise much of the world!s expertise in
privacy protection, form an independent network that can respond
fearlessly to problems of all kinds.

SOME OF OUR WORK

 Privacy International has conducted campaigns on a wide variety
of issues  throughout Europe, North America and Asia

 Our first campaign  was undertaken during 1991 in Thailand,
where the government had established a central population
registration and ID card system. The system,  controlled by the
powerful Ministry of the Interior, would link many departments
and ministries, and  had few legal safeguards.  A seven week
campaign by Privacy International raised awareness amongst
politicians, human rights organizations  and the public about
the potential dangers of the system.

The second campaign, concerning yet another ID card proposal was
conducted in Manila during April and May of 1991. The invitation
to Privacy International came from the Philippine Alliance of
Human Rights Advocates (PAHRA), the peak human rights NGO in the
Philippines. Several bills were pending in the Congress and the
Senate mandating the establishment of a national identity card
and numbering system. PAHRA felt that this proposal could
infringe the rights of Filipinos, and create problems for the
Philippines fragile democratic process.   A comprehensive
submission was made to the Senate of the Philippines, pointing
out the likely costs, both in economic and civil rights terms,
of the proposal.

The third campaign involved the establishment by the New Zealand
Government of a data matching and government benefits card
system known generically as the "Kiwi Card". An invitation was
issued to Privacy International by the Auckland Council for
Civil Liberties in late August, and I travelled to Auckland in
early September. The Council was concerned about the
government's plan for a number of reasons. First, the plan to
data match amongst government agencies lacked adequate legal
protection. Second, the Kiwi Card plan raised issues of
discrimination. A more general concern that developed throughout
the subsequent campaign was whether the New Zealand legal and
political system embraced enough protections and rights to
ensure that the system would not be abused.

Current Activities
 
THE NORTHERN IRELAND SURVEILLANCE PROJECT

 This project, the first of its type ever undertaken in Northern
Ireland, will investigate the full extent of surveillance
throughout the country. It  is to be sponsored by the Law
Faculty of the Queen!s University of Belfast.  Human rights
organizations have expressed concern for some years over the
loss of basic rights in Northern Ireland. The development of
complex and powerful information technology has increased the
risk of routine surveillance of citizens, and consequently the
loss of personal privacy in Northern Ireland has escalated. The
emergency legislation in force there compounds this unfortunate
situation.

The report will be made publicly available by the end of 1993.

THE STASI FILE PROJECT

 One of the most complex civil and political rights issues for
former eastern block countries is the dilemma of how to deal
with the files of police and intelligence organizations.  The
problem is compounded by the absence of any  international
guidelines which could be used as a benchmark.

Privacy International is planning to establish a project which
will develop international guidelines for handling police and
official files in countries which are in transition to
democracy.
 
Privacy International has established an expert group to
develop the guidelines. he establishment of an  independent  The
group will work closely closely with members of  relevant
countries seeking to develop such legislation.

THE BIG BROTHER AWARDS

Governments, private sector organizations, credit bureaus,
police departments and the military in many countries are
engaging in programs which have the effect of eroding the rights
and privacy of individuals. These practices often breach
international human rights conventions, and threaten the balance
or evolution of free and open societies. In many cases,
information technology is used for the purposes of increasing
the power of authorities, while diminishing the rights of
individuals. These violations occur  in all parts of the  world.

The Big Brother awards  sponsored by Privacy International, will
be given to the organization, initiative, government or act
which is most invasive of private life, or which is responsible
for the most dangerous and intrusive acts of surveillance.

Privacy International believes that there should be a more
widespread awareness of these practices. We believe people have
the right to know when governments or other organizations are
engaging in intrusive practices that limit individual rights. We
aim to provide an effective context for viewing these invasive
practices, by establishing an international benchmark. The
establishment of the Big Brother awards aims to provide a
world-wide focus on surveillance and privacy.

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From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: warlord@MIT.EDU (Derek Atkins)
Date: Thu, 22 Apr 93 23:25:24 PDT
To: cypherpunks-east@mit.edu
Subject: MEET: Boston Area Cypherpunks
Message-ID: <m0nmHCC-0000e0C@quiche.MIT.EDU>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Oops..  I forgot to mention a date in my last message...

The date of the meeting is THIS SATURDAY, 24 April, 1993.

Sorry for any confusion...

See you there...

-derek




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: George A. Gleason <gg@well.sf.ca.us>
Date: Fri, 23 Apr 93 02:26:35 PDT
To: hughes@soda.berkeley.edu
Subject: Re:  WIRETAP: boycotts
Message-ID: <199304230926.AA09240@well.sf.ca.us>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Re boycotting AT&T: Eric's proposal is great (cancel your AT&T long distance
anyway) but I would suggest a more aggressive approach toward AT&T business
telephone systems and consumer phone products.   

First of all, their equipment is mediocre at best. Their main business phone
product, Merlin, is obsolete and truly nasty (details on request); System 75
(mid-sized PBX) is little better; their low-end key system (AT&T Spirit) is
cheapy stuff, and although their Partner system is decent there are a number
of better alternatives (Panasonic KXT-Hybrid is our favorite though if you
want made in USA there's Comdial).  AT&T have been pursuing an aggressive
policy on initial pricing to try to kill off independent phone contractors,
but their service doesn't measure up: expensive rates, delays, etc.  So even
if they drop their price by half on something to try to edge out a
competitor, don't take the bait.  

Second, you can bet that they'll start introducing Tapper in their cordless
phones pretty quickly, to try to win a market advantage based on having any
kind of encryption at all.   There are some cordless business phones
available (one is designed for Merlin) and some new ones coming out soon.
These will probably have Tapper in them.  Ericsson have a cordless business
phone system now, called FreeSet, which is essentially micro-cellular, and
it uses a stronger European crypto standard if I'm not mistaken (I can go
look up details if anyone wants to know).  North Supply Premier is another
version of same with some other encryption routine (ANYthing is better than
Tapper at the moment) though not as adaptable as the Ericsson FreeSet
system.  

For every AT&T phone set or system, there are plenty of better alternatives,
and the time to start shifting your purchasing power is now.  (oh BTW to
clarify, what I meant by "new ones coming out soon" is that AT&T will
probably try to jump on the Ericsson & North Premier bandwagon soon with
their own version, with Tapper.  

"AT&T: phones with Big Brother Built Inside!"

-gg




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: George A. Gleason <gg@well.sf.ca.us>
Date: Fri, 23 Apr 93 02:55:40 PDT
To: karn@qualcomm.com
Subject: Re: CLIP: Legal Aspects
Message-ID: <199304230955.AA11325@well.sf.ca.us>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Illegal taps: and keep in mind "investigative" taps used to gather deep
background information... by the time that information gets to a useable
form, its origin is so far obscured as to be impossible to prove... and most
importantly, keep in mind the simple matter of political and economic
intelligence.  The British GCHQ routinely tapped trade unions; NSA went
after the civil rights movement, history is full of cases like this.  If you
don't know COINTELPRO, look it up and get scared.  The main thing here is
not whether they can use evidence against you in court, but whether they can
gather extracurricular info and use it to fuck up careers, runs for elected
office, campaigns on public issues, labor negotiations, and all kinds of
other things which we expect to be able to do freely in a nominal democracy.
Clinton has expressed a commitment to civil rights causes, so I don't worryu
about his administration pullling another WAtergate or COINTELPRO, but if we
ever got another bunch of zealous authoritarians in there...!

-gg




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: George A. Gleason <gg@well.sf.ca.us>
Date: Fri, 23 Apr 93 02:58:28 PDT
To: wcs@anchor.ho.att.com
Subject: Re: Info on Mykotronx
Message-ID: <199304230957.AA11510@well.sf.ca.us>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Re MycoToxin: contact the Covert Action Information Bulletin and ask if they
have anything on anyone named in connection with MycoToxin.  Do the same
with other think-tanks that deal in defense-related issues, for example the
Center for National Security Studies or some such.  

TRW is a scary thought indeed; and of course these people don't ever cut
their ties for good... consider that TRW is a huge NSA partner and also
maintains the Great Big Database of all our credit records & buying habits.
 Bad combinations, getting worse by the minute.

-gg




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: William Stephen Kish <wk0x@ANDREW.CMU.EDU>
Date: Fri, 23 Apr 93 00:00:26 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: encrypted telnet
Message-ID: <IfptDyW00axa40yUsP@andrew.cmu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Hello,

I've created this simple little program that allows for encrypted
telnet sessions (between unix hosts) without any modification to the
system telnetd or telnet programs.

The system consists of a pair of programs: 1 running on the target
machine (Host B) and 1 running on the machine being telneted from
(Host A).  (These daemons require no special permissions -- they run
as normal user processes. Also, both daemons are really the same
program; each is started with a different switch to let it know which
hat to wear...)

Instead of telneting directly to Host B, the user telnets to a special
port on his own machine ("telnet HostA 10000").  This connects him to
the encryption daemon.  Upon makeing this connection, this Host A
encryption deamon opens a TCP connection to the peer encryption daemon
on Host B. This Host B deamon then opens a connection to port 23 (the
normal telnet port) on it's own machine. Thus, all data from the user
is passed to the encryption daemon on its local machine where it is
encrypted and sent over the net to the peer daemon on the target
machine. There the data is decrypted before being passed to the local
telnetd process.  Data flowing in the reverse direction undergoes a
similar process. All of this is transparent to the user and telnet
processes.

What I need now is a strong stream cypher to drop into these daemons.
Can anyone supply references to apropriate algorithms or code?  A good
cypher should be resistant to known plaintext attacks, since telnet
sessions start out with lots of known plaintext (telnet options, login
banner, motd, user id, etc...).

If there is interest, I'll look into releasing this when it's complete.

Thanks,
Bill Kish
kish+@cmu.edu





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: George A. Gleason <gg@well.sf.ca.us>
Date: Fri, 23 Apr 93 03:03:29 PDT
To: szabo@techbook.com
Subject: Re: WIRETAP: boycotts
Message-ID: <199304231000.AA11712@well.sf.ca.us>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Keep up the pressure: how about mailing to all law firms in the Bay Area to
warn them not to buy AT&T phone systems since they might be getting Big
Brother in the Box along with, if not now, then in some future upgrade
innocently installed by a field tech.  

-gg




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: uni@acs.bu.edu (Shaen Bernhardt)
Date: Fri, 23 Apr 93 00:17:18 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Overreaction.....
Message-ID: <9304230717.AA58454@acs.bu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Begin Forwarded Message
Article 9566 (7 more) in alt.security:
From: uni@acs.bu.edu (Shaen Bernhardt)
Newsgroups: sci.crypt,alt.security,comp.org.eff.talk,comp.security.misc,comp.org.acm,
comp.org.ieee
Subject: Re: Overreacting (was Re: Once tapped, your code is no good any more)
Message-ID: <116530@bu.edu>
Date: 23 Apr 93 02:36:14 GMT
References: <1993Apr22.134214.18517@rick.dgbt.doc.ca>
Sender: news@bu.edu
Followup-To: sci.crypt
Distribution: na
Organization: Boston University, Boston, MA, USA
Lines: 82
 
In article <1993Apr22.134214.18517@rick.dgbt.doc.ca> jhan@debra.dgbt.doc.ca (Jerry Ha
n) writes:
>In this giant bally-ho over this Clipper chip I noticed a rather
>disturbing trend in some of the E-mail and posts I've tossing back and
>forth.
>
>Somebody asked me what was wrong about overreacting in cases such as this.
>
>The reason is very simple:  How many people do you want to die in a riot?
>In a new Civil War?
>
>Everybody is jumping up and down and screaming about it, and I'm worried
>that people are going to reach for their hammers and rifles before their pens
>and paper.
>
>Can people work within the system before trying to break it?
 
A circut court judge in Illinois once said "When dealing with a government
that seeks continually new and more creative ways to spy on its' citizenry,
one cannot discourage the move to empower the common citizen with the means
to parry this attack on personal privacy."
 
(Unfortunately the comment was with regard to the banning of radar
detectors....)
 
The point remains.  More and more I see the government slowly washing
away privacy.  Even unwittingly.  Do you think I will ever live in a
soceity that issues smart cards to citizens at birth?  Do you think I
will live in a soceity that insists I register my crypto keys so they
can keep track of what I'm saying?  Even if there is no evidence of my
guilt?  Do you think I will ever live in a soceity that seeks to meddle
in the affairs of its' citizenry without recourse of any kind?  I'm tired
of it.  There is (IMHO) no compromise with an administration that seeks
to implement these proposals under the guise of enhancing privacy.
 
More than the proposals themselves, I read the language of the press
releases, the obvious deception involved in presenting these pieces to
the public, and I am sickened.  I am revolted.  I am repulsed.
 
90%, perhaps even 95% of this country could care less about the
clipper chip, the wiretap bill, the smart card, because they are so
entrapped in the rhetoric of the Clinton Administration.
 
This saddens and frightens me.
 
I am a conserveative believe it or not.  A law and order conserveative.
But the move to a centralized authoratarian regime really scares me,
mostly because I know you cant go far wrong underestimating the
intelligence of the American people.  Tell them it's going to keep
them safe from drug dealers and terrorists, and they will let you
put cameras in their home.
 
Even in the wake of Waco, you find those who support the increasingly
totalatarian moves.
 
>Somebody once said something like: "Armed Violence is meant only to be
>used in response to an armed attack.  It is not meant to be used in
>agression.  This is the difference between self-defence and murder."
 
To be quite honest, the way things are going, I'd call it self defense.
 
>Let's try to avoid killing things, eh?  There's enough blood shed in the
>world, without adding a couple of riots, Civil Wars, etc.
>
>I'm probably overreacting.  But what I've read scared me a lot.  I don't
>want my children growing up in a War Zone.
 
 
And I dont want mine growning up in the eyes of a security camera
24 hours a day.
>--
>Jerry Han-CRC-DOC-Div. of Behavioural Research-"jhan@debra.dgbt.doc.ca"
>///////////// These are my opinions, and my opinions only. \\\\\\\\\\\\\
>\\\\\\\\\ A proud and frozen member of the Mighty Warriors Band ////////
>"Memories of those I've left behind, still ringing in my ears."-Genesis-
 
uni
 
--
uni@acs.bu.edu  ->  Public Keys by finger and/or request
Public Key Archives: <pgp-public-keys@pgp.iastate.edu>
Sovereignty is the sign of a brutal past.<>Fight Clinton's Wiretap Chip!
DF610670F2467B99 97DE2B5C3749148C <> Crypto is not a Crime! Ask me how!


Forwarded message ends.

I reposted this for the benefit of those who might not be actives on
the newsgroups it was distributed to.  After I wrote this reply, I
went out for a beer with a friend of mine.  We didn't talk about
crypto or privacy (he's more into the Hartford Whalers) but I couldn't
get it out of my mind.

More and more I feel violated.

We live in an age where direct marketers send mail to my address and
I have no idea who gave it to them.  We live in an age where you
call up the chinese food place for a delivery and after getting
your phone number, (with caller ID in some places) they ask you
if you'll have "the usual"  [no joke].  We live in an age where
your credit card might have your digitized picture on it.  We live
in an age where despite the freedom of information act, your file,
should you request it, is more than half inked out.  We live in an
age where your social security number is a "handle" to your life
and habits.  We live in an age where anyone can order a copy of
your tax return and merely be asked "may I have your social security
number please?"

Privacy has become a joke.  Plastic money, databases, credit reports,
whereever you look, there is some entity looking to collect something
else on you.  I for one, have had it.

It's true, I'm conserveative.  But where will it end?  How many more
blows to liberty and privacy will be made before there is little left?

I've studied intelligence, political science, international relations,
and law here at B.U.  Next year I will be at Georgetown working on
my J.D.  But I doubt I will stay here in the states.  I think perhaps
Liechtenstein offers a more hands off atmosphere.

In retrospect, I really don't think I'm concerned with the pettyness
of this or that blow to privacy, but the system that slowly builds.

I'm a paranoid at heart.  I don't TRUST the system.  I never will.
It's too bad others do.  Someday I hope someone explains to the
vast number of people the difference between freedom to, and freedom
from.

I never thought I'd sound like a revolutionary.

uni (Dark)




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: George A. Gleason <gg@well.sf.ca.us>
Date: Fri, 23 Apr 93 03:23:08 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: AT&T replacement offer
Message-ID: <199304231022.AA13617@well.sf.ca.us>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Re the AT&T boycott, I'm going to put my labor where my mouth is, and offer:

Replacement of any AT&T business phone system or consumer telephone product,
at a discount of 25% off normal retail (essentially a nonprofit rate).  On  
business phone systems, this includes all AT&T key systems (Merlin, Spirit, 
Partner, etc) and PBX (system 75 and up); and includes one year's service   
contract.  

For smaller systems, we'll install anywhere from Santa Cruz to Mendocino;   
for larger ones, anywhere in California depending on the job; and we'll ship
user-intallable ones anywhere you like.  (User-installable systems typically
involve 32 or fewer phones.)

For each AT&T system we remove, we send a letter to AT&T explaining why.
Then when we gather up enough of them to make a decent sized pile, do some
kind of publicity event with them (any suggestions?).  (Or maybe simply sell
the old AT&T stuff to a secondary market dealer and donate the proceeds to
an appropriate organisation?)

-george gleason, Integrated Signal / Switched Networks, 510-644.8085
  gg@well.sf.ca.us




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: George A. Gleason <gg@well.sf.ca.us>
Date: Fri, 23 Apr 93 03:50:21 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: AT&T replacement
Message-ID: <199304231050.AA15354@well.sf.ca.us>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



In case it wasn't clear, the offer is to replace any AT&T hardware *with
equivalent or better competing technology* for 25% off.  

-gg




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Derek Atkins <warlord@Athena.MIT.EDU>
Date: Fri, 23 Apr 93 03:39:31 PDT
To: William Stephen Kish <wk0x@ANDREW.CMU.EDU>
Subject: Re: encrypted telnet
In-Reply-To: <IfptDyW00axa40yUsP@andrew.cmu.edu>
Message-ID: <9304231039.AA08262@snorkelwacker.MIT.EDU>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Bill..  There are a couple of problems with your scheme.

1) You have to have this daemon already running on host B.  I.e., you
still need to have had (at one time) access to run this daemon.
Basically, this means that you (or someone) has to have had root
access to BOTH hosts A and B to set this up.  Unless this becomes
supported software, you can't guarantee that....

2) How do you do key distribution?  If you use Kerberos, then you need
to have root access on host B.  Otherwise, you need some way to
securely get the encryption key from A to B....

3) How do you deal with multiple encryptions?  If you have more than
one client who wants to use this program, you have to trust a single
process (unless you run out of inetd, which requires #1) with all the
different keys for all the different users!

Basically, you're better off using ktelnet/ktelnetd to do this.  In
either case you have the same problem with modifying the workstation.

Please, don't let this discourage you, but I think you might want to
think this through a little more before you jump the gun!

Have a Nice Day!!! :-)

-derek

PGP 2 key available upon request on the key-server:
	pgp-public-keys@toxicwaste.mit.edu
--
  Derek Atkins, MIT '93, Electrical Engineering and Computer Science
     Secretary, MIT Student Information Processing Board (SIPB)
           MIT Media Laboratory, Speech Research Group
           warlord@MIT.EDU       PP-ASEL        N1NWH




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Harry Shapiro <habs@Panix.Com>
Date: Fri, 23 Apr 93 04:08:16 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com (Good Guys)
Subject: Moving Target: Warning
Message-ID: <199304231108.AA08218@sun.Panix.Com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I have thought that it is a losing strategy to debate the wire tap chip
on purely tech terms as I feel the NSA would have more technology
up their sleve, changing the MO as we object to specific points and
probally making themselves SEEM responsive to the gov/congress/Admin.

First we had 40 bit key halves then we got 80-bit XORed and now:
CAPSTONE: THE NEXT GENERATION, with DSS, etc...

We need to make broad specturm attacks on both spef. technical
points and social points.

We need to say/talk to How this country was founded.

We did to say Ok, NSA/FBI is right and the world has changed. But
it will keep on changing... like our Founders, we need to plot
a course that will hold true not for a few years but for the
next two hundred.

This is stuff that shouldn't be debated in private by NSA and Bill C.

/harry

-- 
Harry Shapiro  				      habs@panix.com
List Administrator of the Extropy Institute Mailing List
Private Communication for the Extropian Community since 1991



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: William Stephen Kish <wk0x@ANDREW.CMU.EDU>
Date: Fri, 23 Apr 93 04:30:46 PDT
To: Derek Atkins <warlord@ATHENA.MIT.EDU>
Subject: Re: encrypted telnet
In-Reply-To: <9304231039.AA08262@snorkelwacker.MIT.EDU>
Message-ID: <YfpxBQq00axaQNkl1g@andrew.cmu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Excerpts from mail: 23-Apr-93 Re: encrypted telnet Derek
Atkins@Athena.MIT. (1442)

> Bill..  There are a couple of problems with your scheme.

> 1) You have to have this daemon already running on host B.  I.e., you
> still need to have had (at one time) access to run this daemon.
> Basically, this means that you (or someone) has to have had root
> access to BOTH hosts A and B to set this up.  Unless this becomes
> supported software, you can't guarantee that....

Well, you really don't need root to run this daemon.  You can simply
telnet (normally) to machine B, start the daemon in the background, log
off, start the daemon in the background on machine A, and go from there.
 There is only a problem if machine B kills off your process when you
log out...  To be completely safe, you should change your login password
once you are on the encrypted link since the initial telnet to set up
the daemon was in the clear...

2) How do you do key distribution? 

One possible solution is to use PGP to encrypt this telnet key and mail
it to your account on B. Your private key on B can then decrypt the
telnet key. (If B is a multi-user system, you do have the problems
associated with root having access to your private key...  But if root
is evil, he can get around any sort of encrypted telnet scheme if he
really wants...)

> 3) How do you deal with multiple encryptions?  If you have more than
> one client who wants to use this program, you have to trust a single
> process (unless you run out of inetd, which requires #1) with all the
> different keys for all the different users!

Currently, everyone would be responsible for their own encryption
process.  This really isn't meant to be a complete standard, just an
ad-hoc solution until telnet's and telnetd's that support encryption
become commonplace.

> Basically, you're better off using ktelnet/ktelnetd to do this.  In
> either case you have the same problem with modifying the workstation.

Kerberos requires a large amount of support by a site's system admins. 
Most sites don't yet support kerberos. (Also, kerberos has some problems
of its own...) My solution is one that the average person can use
without special system software.  

Thanks for the comments,
Bill





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: grady@netcom.com (1016/2EF221)
Date: Fri, 23 Apr 93 07:43:10 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Exchange fingerprints via radio
Message-ID: <9304231443.AA25847@netcom.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



For other radio amateurs who are readers of
this list I'd like to try an experiment in
alternative (to the telephone) communication
tomorrow, Saturday 4/23/93 at 17:00 UTC
(10 am PDT).  I'd like to contact as many
of you as possible from my modest station
in Humboldt County California.

For Bay area people, let's try 7265 Mhz;
for people elsewhere in the United States and
elsewhere in the world, conditons permitting,
how about 14.335 at 17:30 UTC. +-for QRM?

I will be running 100w into a vertical, call
is KN6CP I will be asking for checkins for
the "Cypherpunks Net".

For those interested, we can do key fingerprint
exchanges at this time.

Of course non-hams are free to listen on those
frequencies (lower SSB for 7265, upper SSB for
14.335).

I'd like to explore alternative communications
nexi if for example the internet is down
for some unforseen reason :-(.

73 de kn6cp Grady  grady@netcom.com





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Arthur Abraham <a2@well.sf.ca.us>
Date: Fri, 23 Apr 93 07:49:51 PDT
To: Cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Family Key
Message-ID: <199304231449.AA14480@well.sf.ca.us>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


At this time, there is no reason not to assume that every LE agency will
have access to the family key.

In the future there is every reason to expect that all LE agencies will
develope a pressing need for family key(s) and decrypto equiptment.

In the past in Nazi Germany, this sort of traffic analysis applied to
telephone call records allowed the LE agencies to round up cells of
resistance.  To this day, such records are not kept in Germany.

-a2.

..




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Eric Hughes <hughes@soda.berkeley.edu>
Date: Fri, 23 Apr 93 08:17:14 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: encrypted telnet
In-Reply-To: <YfpxBQq00axaQNkl1g@andrew.cmu.edu>
Message-ID: <9304231513.AA05622@soda.berkeley.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>2) How do you do key distribution? 

Derek asks this, and suggests using Kerberos.  WSK responds by saying
that you could encrypt a session key with PGP and send it.

WSK replies properly that kerberos is a lot of overhead to get
running, but his proposed solution is missing forward secrecy.  If the
PGP key is ever compromised, then all recorded prior traffic will be
available to read.

The solution is to use Diffie-Hellman key exchange.  I'm not going to
explain the details of the algorithm right here, right now, but I'll
tell you it's salient properties.  Each party makes a random number,
applies a one-way function with very special properties, and sends it
to the other.  Then each party takes their secret number, combines it
with the number they were sent, and makes a new (arbitrary) number
which will be the same on both sides.  This number cannot be derived
from the publicly transmitted data.  (The very special function is
exponentiation in a finite field; those with sufficient math
background may consider figuring out the details "a problem left to
the reader.")

Encrypting session keys with PGP is suggested often enough that this
qualifies as a legitimate FAQ.  I'll write up a description of this
protocol next week if no one has one already written.

As a design principle, every live end-to-end session should use D-H to
make session keys.  Only when you don't have interactivity should
session keys be encrypted with a public key.

Eric




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Arthur Abraham <a2@well.sf.ca.us>
Date: Fri, 23 Apr 93 08:18:46 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: re:Suits
Message-ID: <199304231518.AA20418@well.sf.ca.us>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Though these missives were much longer than I'd like, they were
extremely interesting, with good points on each side....

...I seem to come down more on Tim's since "cypherpunks" is just a
mailing list, and I just can't get scared or insulted by ASCII no matter
how hard I try.  And the name might wakeup an sleepy reader in a print
article.

In person (Perry's argument) a mailing list doesn't/can't have a
reprentative, else Dotty could subscribe and pass herself off as a
list member/representative.   Actually, people just represent themselves,
and have to be aware of how effective a presenter of their message
they are no matter what they are doing.

-a2.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Welcome to Addendia, Mr. Lee.  23-Apr-1993 1109" <yerazunis@aidev.enet.dec.com>
Date: Fri, 23 Apr 93 08:20:22 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: fingerprint keys over ham radio:
Message-ID: <9304231520.AA17416@enet-gw.pa.dec.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


One thing to be careful of:  Amateur radio must *not* use codes or
cyphers to obscure meaning.  All information transmission must be in
the clear (not necessarily English, but no encryption of data).

The one exception is this:  codes and cyphers *may* be used to provide
checksumming, error correction, and/or authentication. (examples-
repeater control codes, autopatch codes, OSCAR control codes, etc. ) 

The meaning must still be in clear but you are allowed to send a
authenticating "signature" in code, as long as the signature 
contains no information other than authentication itself that was 
not also transmitted in clear.  That's why autopatch
protocol requires you to say "I'm turning on the patch" before you
transmit the (hopefully secret) autopatch control codes.

Please keep this in mind- and be able to prove it to the FCC should
they request it.  It might even be worth announcing the "authentication
only" mode at the start of your net, so both other amateurs and the
FCC itself know what to expect.  Posting software on a packet BBS
for others to download and verify a "no hidden codes" status would
probably be a reasonable action and a good protective measure.

	-Bill, N1KGX




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: grady@netcom.com (1016/2EF221)
Date: Fri, 23 Apr 93 09:10:40 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: radio fingerprinting
Message-ID: <9304231610.AA03624@netcom.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



As N1KGX (William S. Yerazuni of Marloboro MA)
points out, echanging PGP fingerprints rather
than encrypting messages is completely permitted by
FCC regulations (97.113 in particular).

Also, amateurs particpating in tomorrow's net
are reminded of the callsign server

telnet callsign.cs.buffalo.edu 2000

in case their radios are near their net links...
you can verify fingerprint, name, call, address,
phone, or whatever coevally.

 Saturday 4/23/93 at 17:00 UTC
> (10 am PDT).  I'd like to contact as many
> of you as possible from my modest station
> in Humboldt County California.
>
> For Bay area people, let's try 7265 Mhz;
> for people elsewhere in the United States and
> elsewhere in the world, conditons permitting,
> how about 14.335 at 17:30 UTC. +-for QRM?

73 de KD6ETH/KN6CP  Grady Ward




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Jukka Isosaari <jisosaar@vipunen.hut.fi>
Date: Fri, 23 Apr 93 00:00:33 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: unsubscribe
Message-ID: <199304230700.AA116628@vipunen.hut.fi>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


unsubscribe



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: The last Czarnian <lobo@puukko.hut.fi>
Date: Fri, 23 Apr 93 00:01:29 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: subscribe
Message-ID: <199304230701.AA21825@puukko.hut.fi>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


subscribe




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Date: Fri, 23 Apr 93 10:23:17 PDT
To: George A. Gleason <gg@well.sf.ca.us>
Subject: Re:  WIRETAP: boycotts
Message-ID: <9304231723.AA13722@netcom.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


George Gleason writes:

>"AT&T: phones with Big Brother Built Inside!"
>
>-gg

What a great little slogan! Those stickers that say "Intel Inside" could be
modified to say something pithy like "Big Brother Inside."

Crypto Yippies (Cryppies?) might even wander into stores like Fry's and
paste them onto the AT&T phones on display. Professionally-made labels
might even remain for months.

Just another seditious thought.

-Tim

--
Timothy C. May         | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,  
tcmay@netcom.com       | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
408-688-5409           | knowledge, reputations, information markets, 
W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA  | black markets, smashing of governments.
Higher Power: 2^756839 | Public Key: MailSafe and PGP available.
Waco Massacre + Big Brother Wiretap Chip = A Nazi Regime





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "$HOME/.sig" <kelly@pleiku.netcom.com>
Date: Fri, 23 Apr 93 11:44:39 PDT
To: William Stephen Kish <ANDREW.CMU.EDU!wk0x@netcom.com>
Subject: Re: encrypted telnet
In-Reply-To: <IfptDyW00axa40yUsP@andrew.cmu.edu>
Message-ID: <9304231844.AA24377@netcomsv.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Please check out IDEA contained within PGP2.2 source code...
also look at diffie hellman for session key exchange...
    cheers
    kelly
--
-----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----
Version: 2.2
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=PfOI
-----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: 7025aj@gmuvax2.gmu.edu
Date: Fri, 23 Apr 93 07:56:45 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Is Rush Limbaugh giving Clinton sh*t about wiretap chip?
Message-ID: <9304231457.AA22562@gmuvax2.gmu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



I'm under the impression that Rush Limbaugh's address is:
70277.2502@compuserve.com
Would a few articulate defenders of (privacy and) AMERICAN COMPETITIVENESS
send him some convincing words, please?

G. Gordon Liddy would be another good target, but I don't know his address.





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "$HOME/.sig" <kelly@pleiku.netcom.com>
Date: Fri, 23 Apr 93 12:34:35 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: CLIPPER: THe battle continues
Message-ID: <9304231934.AA00142@netcomsv.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> Tim spake:
>>George Gleason writes:
>
>>"AT&T: phones with Big Brother Built Inside!"
>>
>>-gg
>
>What a great little slogan! Those stickers that say "Intel Inside" could be
>modified to say something pithy like "Big Brother Inside."
>
>Crypto Yippies (Cryppies?) might even wander into stores like Fry's and
>paste them onto the AT&T phones on display. Professionally-made labels
>might even remain for months.
>
>Just another seditious thought.
>
>- -Tim
>
>
>
>- --
>Timothy C. May         | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,  
>tcmay@netcom.com       | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
>408-688-5409           | knowledge, reputations, information markets, 
>W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA  | black markets, smashing of governments.
>Higher Power: 2^756839 | Public Key: MailSafe and PGP available.
>Waco Massacre + Big Brother Wiretap Chip = A Nazi Regime
>
>
>------- End of Forwarded Message


     Now this is an idea I like... what about using the 
antitheft-metal base tags that leave a surface impression
when removed... it currently leaves a checkboard pattern but
that could be reworked to say INSECURE , or TAPPED... 
then post then on every ATT instrument around... including payphones
 the front of the label could make reference to CLIPPER and give a
voicemail number to call for further info... yippie indeed...


    cheers
    kelly



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Brian D Williams <talon57@well.sf.ca.us>
Date: Fri, 23 Apr 93 11:25:15 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Cypherpunks
Message-ID: <199304231824.AA07743@well.sf.ca.us>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


 I would like to agree with Tim May about the continued use of the term
Cypherpunk. More than anything else it accuratly portrays us as people who
do things a little differently. Some of my other associates feel similiar
about the use of the term Cyberpunk.
    I am very curious about the physical nature of the so called "wiretap"
chip itself. Recent postings about the exotic nature of it's construction
have me wondering. Could there be a hardware backdoor into the chip?
 I was also considering the value of refering to the clipper as a "Sneaker
chip" after the movie. This would have the advantage of revealing it's flaws
and the organizations involed at the same time, in a format familiar to the
general public.
  One last thing, my e-mail address is at well.sf.ca.us, but I reside in
Chicago IL, I reach y'all via a gateway here at Ameritech, but it's strickly
telnet, and ftp for now.......



                                                      Brian D Williams
                                                   Cyber/Cypherpunk




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: grady@netcom.com (1016/2EF221)
Date: Fri, 23 Apr 93 11:47:36 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: transmitting keys and fingerprints
Message-ID: <9304231847.AA23525@netcom.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



uri@watson.ibm.com sez:
>the keys...In plain English...And keys' fingerprints...

I can automatically transmit all the data in Japanese
or several foreign languages if you'd like, thanks
to Macintalk and foreign language CD training discs...

Hmmm.. that's an idea.. I could legally start QSTing
the entire public key database worldwide in your
choice of languages... I bet THAT would drive the NSA/FBI
absolutely nuts...  I guess I will attempt a test of that
tomorrow during the cypherpunks radio net.

73 de kn6cp Grady

For you code freaks, I can just as easily set up
"code practice" by piping it all through supermorse
at 13wpm -- sure beats those guy who send 20hrs
of Biblical scripture through.





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: fergp@sytex.com (Paul Ferguson)
Date: Fri, 23 Apr 93 09:42:58 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: New disclosures on 2600 case (Forwarded message)
Message-ID: <qHwg3B1w165w@sytex.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
 
Although it's not directly related to the cypherpunks agenda,
I wanted to forward this message to the list to show the lengths that
law enforcement agencies will go to do their bidding. Unfortunately,
it would appear that we can expect more of the same shady behaviour in
the future.
 
8<------ Begin forwarded message ----------
 
 
Date:         Wed, 21 Apr 1993 22:18:18 EST
Reply-To: David Sobel <uunet!washofc.cpsr.org!dsobel>
Sender: Computer Professionals for Social Responsibility
              <uunet!VTVM2.CC.VT.EDU!CPSR%GWUVM.BITNET>
From: David Sobel <uunet!washofc.cpsr.org!dsobel>
Organization: CPSR Civil Liberties and Computing Project
Subject:      New disclosures in 2600 case
 
  New disclosures in 2600 case
 
        As you may recall, last November at a shopping mall outside of
Washington, DC, a group of people affiliated with the computer magazine
"2600" was confronted by mall security personnel, local police officers
and several unidentified individuals.  The group members were ordered to
identify themselves and to submit to searches of their personal property.
Their names were recorded by mall security personnel and some of their
property was confiscated.  However, no charges were ever brought against
any of the individuals at the meeting.
 
        Computer Professionals for Social Responsibility ("CPSR") filed
suit under the Freedom of Information Act and today received the Secret
Service's response to the FOIA lawsuit, in which we are seeking agency
records concerning the break-up of the meeting.  I think it's safe to say
that our suspicions have now been confirmed -- the Secret Service *did*
obtain a list of names from mall security identifying the people in
attendance at the meeting.
 
        There are three main points contained in the Secret Service's
court papers that are significant:
 
        1) The agency states that the information it possesses
concerning the incident was obtained "in the course of a criminal
investigation that is being conducted pursuant to the Secret
Service's authority to investigate access device and computer fraud."
 
        2) The agency possesses two relevant documents and the
information in those documents "consists solely of information
identifying individuals."
 
        3) The information was obtained from a "confidential source,"
and the agency emphasizes that the FOIA's definition of such a source
includes "any private institution which provided information on a
confidential basis."
 
        Taken together, these facts seem to prove that the Secret
Service wanted names, they had the mall security people collect them,
and they came away from the incident with the list they wanted.
 
        The agency asserts that "[t]he premature release of the
identities of the individual(s) at issue could easily result in
interference to the Secret Service's investigation by alerting these
individual(s) that they are under investigation and thus allowing the
individual(s) to alter their behavior and/or evidence."
 
        CPSR, in conjunction with EFF and the ACLU, is planning to
challenge the actions of the mall security personnel, the local
police and the Secret Service on the ground that the incident
amounted to a warrantless search and seizure conducted at the
behest of the Secret Service.
 
 
David Sobel
CPSR Legal Counsel
dsobel@washofc.cpsr.org
 
8<------ End of forwarded message -------
 
Cheers.
 
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.2
 
iQCVAgUBK9gSjpRLcZSdHMBNAQG2EwP/VKX6j0F90NYWyfiyyP5C0gjtBVXG1ed4
AzETLqMOVnG+vjRS6h6cSTwoojJHhKhAmQGmW8gDlp98KLRAiY2ULMmxaMTA/cKW
jIuECDaKLdA21lPgcPhvKsAqQEHPBv1AALA6WTSeGQ6IRlugPfXE4LX+TBYH6/Q7
f69b7sJZgZ8=
=Ou0Z
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

Paul Ferguson                    |  Uncle Sam wants to read
Network Integration Consultant   |       your e-mail...
Centreville, Virginia USA        | Just say "NO" to the Clipper
fergp@sytex.com                  |          Chip...




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: fergp@sytex.com (Paul Ferguson)
Date: Fri, 23 Apr 93 09:42:26 PDT
To: strat@intercon.com
Subject: DC Digs
Message-ID: <6mwg3B3w165w@sytex.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


On Thu, 22 Apr 1993 19:26:59 -0400,
 Bob Stratton <uunet!intercon.com!strat> wrote -
 
BS> I'm more than willing to defer to the majority, though I think
BS> there's something to be said for networking the meetings,
BS> especially if we have good tools. I've also already received a
BS> great deal of response to the idea of a Saturday meeting, even
BS> from out-of-towners. To that end, I'm going to post an
BS> announcement for a Saturday meeting, and see what happens.
BS> Several of us have been planning it for a couple of days now,
BS> so don't take it personally or anything.
 
BS> Eric and I have discussed the idea of audio teleconferencing the
BS> various meetings, either via the Internet or by phone. I've got
BS> both a Sun IPC equipped to do the former, and a Western Electric
BS> conference telephone (and 6-way on my switch) for the latter.
 
BS> Well readers, which do you prefer?
 
 I'll be there Saturday -- all of you should know by now that (at
 least for the time being) I'm out-of-town on Mondays (and every
 other weekday).
 
 Also, I just read a message announcing the Boston (Cambridge) area
 meeting tomorrow as well, along with mention of an electronic
 conference call to the west coast group.
 
 See you there.
 
 Cheers.
 

Paul Ferguson                    |  Uncle Sam wants to read
Network Integration Consultant   |       your e-mail...
Centreville, Virginia USA        | Just say "NO" to the Clipper
fergp@sytex.com                  |          Chip...




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: crunch@netcom.com (John Draper)
Date: Fri, 23 Apr 93 12:25:46 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Press,  and a spokesperson and other things..
Message-ID: <9304231925.AA23225@netcom4.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



In regards to the name of the group...   I think that we should organize
and establish a Public relations group NOT associated directly with
the cypherpunks,  but with well established people in the industry
that can and should put on a professional image to the public and
be a spokesperson representing us as a whole.    In this sense,  the
name of "cypherpunks" as our group is totally irrevelant.   As far as
I'm concerned it's just the name of the mailing list,   but I sort of
like that name myself,  and have on ocassion used it in public
interviews etc.

It is publically known that I'm involved with the MacPGP effort in the
cause to put forth my programming skills to better serve the Cypherpunk
community.   But I decline to be a spokesperson for several reasons I'll
take up privatly with anyone who wants to know.    With my bad rap,  and
somewhat controversial past,  I feel that someone else can better serve
the cypherpunk community in this PR effort.

Just yesterday,  I talked with Craig Larson who has offered some PR
suggestions,  and he says that he might drop by the cypherpunk meeting
between 4 and 6 pm.    In the meantime,   I'll try and elaborate on
some of his PR ideas with the group.

First off,  Craig suggests having 3 or more press briefings seperated
by about two weeks,  with emphesis on making it very newsworthey,  and
by professionals attening,  such as the cypherpunks spokesperson,
perhaps RSA folks,  FBI folks,  and other people on hand to ask the
right questions that should bring out these issues to the public.

I've delt with the press before,  and all they are interested in is RAW
NEWS,   and anything else to sell the story.   In other words,  "money
talks and bullshit walks".    NEWS!!  is the key....   The more controversy
we can generate (And important issues) the better we will be able to
get the word out to the John Q.  Public.   There are TV interviews,   
background stories,   and lets not forget recent news of matters
not so related to cryptography,  such as hacker busts,   and other
newsworthey things related to the computer industry that CAN be
somewhat related and tied to cryptography.   The goals of the press
meeting would be to get the word out to as many concerned citizens
as possible with an emphasis on ANALOGYS such as "Clipper technology
is like giving the police the keys to your house"  or something like
that.

JD




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Kang Meng Chow <mckang@solomon.technet.sg>
Date: Thu, 22 Apr 93 21:42:05 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: OSF's DCE
Message-ID: <Pine.3.05.9304231215.B18076-8100000@solomon.technet.sg>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain




Can anyone tell me what is OSF's DCE, pls. And where can I find more
information regarding DCE. Any ftp site carrying documentation on the DCE?

Thanks.


Kang







From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Peter Meyer <meyer@mcc.com>
Date: Fri, 23 Apr 93 11:01:10 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Anyone know where I can get a thesaurus by ftp?
Message-ID: <19930423180014.9.MEYER@OGHMA.MCC.COM>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Note that I need a thesaurus, not a dictionary.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: grady@netcom.com (1016/2EF221)
Date: Fri, 23 Apr 93 13:05:12 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: fear of the NSA/FBI, etc.
Message-ID: <9304232005.AA06149@netcom.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Some readers have e-mailed me to warn of the
consequences of annoying the NSA by QSTing
(not "broadcasting" for you part 97.113 freaks)
my cipher fingerprint tomorrow at 17:00 UTC
(10 am Pacific Daylight Time) on 7265 Mhz
and at 17:30 UTC on 14335 Mhz + or - for QRM.

You should copy:

pub  1016/2EF221 1993/03/16  Grady Ward  <grady@netcom.com>  (707) 826-7715
          Key fingerprint =  15 E2 AD D3 D1 C6 F3 FC  58 AC F7 3D 4F 01 1E 2F
 
spoken by my robot after I call the first
Cypherpunks net for check-ins.

As long as it's legal, fuck the NSA or any other entity
that might try to intimidate.  The worst kind of
censorship is the mind-numbing self-censorship from
fear.

Hope to net with all you hams tomorrow!

With my modest setup I should be able to cover the
west coast from Alaska down to LA as far east, maybe,
as Arizona on 40m.  20m should be better for
people in the midwest.  Easterners -- well, we'll
see how the propagation is.  73 de kn6cp




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: crunch@netcom.com (John Draper)
Date: Fri, 23 Apr 93 13:05:59 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: On getting local congressional representation for our cause
Message-ID: <9304232006.AA26486@netcom4.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I talked with Congressman Starks office today (My district) to discuss
what the possibilities are for them to attend a cypherpunks meeting to
hear our concerns,  and to find out whats possible and the procedures
to get them to attend.

We would want congresspersons for each of the districts to attend,
and people from each district should write them a letter,  and include
the possible future dates of the Cypherpunks meetings you would want them
to attend.    Please allow for about 6 weeks for them to schedule in
to attend the meetings,  as they have lots of other meetings to attend
as we all know.

After talking to Ron Dellums and Starks office,   their procedures
are pretty much standardized,  and we should have no problem in getting
them to attend of we follow their prescribed procedures.

They are MOST INTERESTED in hearing our input on this controversial
matter,  so lets all get together and compose up this letter,  and
get them off to our local representitives.

Before mailing the letter,  one should call the local office,  and
obtain the name of the person who schedules their public appearances
to attend such meetings.  Once this name is obtained,  include it
in the letter,  Attention Annie Zaitlan (Starks office).   We have
to do this for every local representitives office in the Bay area.

JD




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: dstalder@gmuvax2.gmu.edu (Darren/Torin/Who ever...)
Date: Fri, 23 Apr 93 10:07:33 PDT
To: habs@panix.com (Harry Shapiro)
Subject: Re: MEET: Ad Hoc Washington meeting Saturday 4/24/93
In-Reply-To: <9304221943.AA13465@horton.intercon.com>
Message-ID: <9304231708.AA03233@gmuvax2.gmu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Bob Stratton spoke onto the world and said:
>			
>		Washington, DC area ad hoc Cypherpunks meeting.
>			Saturday, April 24, 1993
>			2:00 PM EDT -> not later than 8:00 PM EDT

Okay...I'll cancel the Monday night meeting so that we can concentrate on
the Saturday meeting.  I'll be there too...

I'll bring my laptop and pgp keyring and other can bring their keys and we
can get more robust in using pgp also.

Think free,
--
Defeat the        Torin/Darren Stalder/Wolf           __
  Wiretap Chip    Internet:  dstalder@gmuvax2.gmu.edu \/ PGP2.x key available.
  Proposal!       Bitnet:    dstalder@gmuvax                  Finger me.
Write me for      Sprintnet: 1-703-845-1000
  details.        Snail:     10310 Main St., Suite 110/Fairfax, VA/22030/USA
DISCLAIMER: A society where such disclaimers are needed is saddening.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: jrk@information-systems.east-anglia.ac.uk (Richard Kennaway)
Date: Fri, 23 Apr 93 10:28:51 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: CLIP: Legal Aspects
Message-ID: <13132.9304231213@sys.uea.ac.uk>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


George Gleason writes:
>Clinton has expressed a commitment to civil rights causes, so I don't worryu
>about his administration pullling another WAtergate or COINTELPRO, but if we
>ever got another bunch of zealous authoritarians in there...!

Pardon a perhaps clueless question from a foreigner, but how much control
does the US president actually have over a potential bunch of zealous
authoritarians elsewhere in the administration, especially in super-secret
places like the NSA?  How much control is it even possible for one person
to hold?

--                                ____
Richard Kennaway                  \ _/__    School of Information Systems
Internet:  jrk@sys.uea.ac.uk       \X  /    University of East Anglia
uucp:  ...mcsun!ukc!uea-sys!jrk      \/     Norwich NR4 7TJ, U.K.





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: fergp@sytex.com (Paul Ferguson)
Date: Fri, 23 Apr 93 11:11:45 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Congressional FAX numbers
Message-ID: <eNZg3B1w165w@sytex.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


A friend of mine forwarded this message to me a while back, and I
just remembered (Silly me, again) that I had it stockpiled among
some of my archives.
 
I suggest that if you are feeling violated by Uncle Sam's sneaky
introduction of the Wiretap Chip (Clipper), get off yer duff and
make your voice heard. While I'm at home this weekend, I plan on
faxing my locally elected Fat Cats on The Hill to let them know
that I'm not a happy camper.
 
You should do the same.
 
8<------- Begin forwarded message --------------
 
This list supplied by BULLET'N BOARD, 703-971-5565 (voice) or
703-971-4491 (modem).  For further information on our lists and
software products you can write to BULLET COMMUNICATIONS, 6118
Franconia Rd., Suite 214, Alexandria, VA 22310.
 
ST DIST FIRST             LAST           PHONE         FAX
AK  1   Don               Young          (202)225-5765
AK  S   Frank H.          Murkowski      (202)224-6665 (202)224-5301
AK  S   Ted               Stevens        (202)224-3004 (202)224-1044
AL  1   Sonny             Callahan       (202)225-4931 (202)225-0562
AL  2   William L.        Dickinson      (202)225-2901
AL  3   Glen              Browder        (202)225-3261 (202)225-9020
AL  4   Tom               Bevill         (202)225-4876 (202)225-0842
AL  5   Bud               Cramer         (202)225-4801
AL  6   Ben               Erdreich       (202)225-4931
AL  7   Claude            Harris         (202)225-2665
AL  S   Howell            Heflin         (202)224-4124 (202)224-3149
AL  S   Richard           Shelby         (202)224-5744 (202)224-3416
AR  1   Bill              Alexander      (202)225-4076
AR  2   Ray               Thornton       (202)225-2506 (202)225-2506
AR  3   John Paul         Hammerschmidt  (202)225-4301 (202)225-7492
AR  4   Beryl             Anthony        (202)225-3772 (202)225-3646
AR  S   Dale L.           Bumpers        (202)224-4843 (202)224-6435
AR  S   David             Pryor          (202)224-2353 (202)224-8261
AZ  1   John J.           Rhodes         (202)225-2635 (202)225-0985
AZ  2                                    (202)225-4065
AZ  3   Bob               Stump          (202)225-4576 (202)225-6328
AZ  4   Jon L.            Kyl            (202)225-3361 (202)225-1143
AZ  5   Jim               Kolbe          (202)225-2542 (202)225-0378
AZ  S   Dennis            DeConcini      (202)224-4521 (202)224-8698
AZ  S   John              McCain         (202)224-2235 (202)224-8938
CA  1   Frank             Riggs          (202)225-3311 (202)225-5577
CA  2   Wally             Herger         (202)225-3076 (202)225-0996
CA  3   Robert T.         Matsui         (202)225-7163 (202)225-0566
CA  4   Vic               Fazio          (202)225-5716 (202)225-0354
CA  5   Nancy             Pelosi         (202)225-4965 (202)225-8259
CA  6   Barbara           Boxer          (202)225-5161 (202)225-1004
CA  7   George            Miller         (202)225-2095 (202)225-5609
CA  8   Ronald V.         Dellums        (202)225-2661
CA  9   Fortney (Pete)    Stark          (202)225-5065
CA  S   John              Seymour        (202)224-3841 (202)224-6031
CA  S   Alan              Cranston       (202)224-3553 (202)224-8128
CA 10   Don               Edwards        (202)225-3072
CA 11   Tom               Lantos         (202)225-3531
CA 12   Tom J.            Campbell       (202)225-5411 (202)225-5944
CA 13   Norman Y.         Mineta         (202)225-2631
CA 14   John T.           Doolittle      (202)225-2511 (202)225-5444
CA 15   Gary              Condit         (202)225-6131 (202)225-0819
CA 16   Leon E.           Panetta        (202)225-2861
CA 17   Calvin            Dooley         (202)225-3341 (202)225-9308
CA 18   Richard H.        Lehman         (202)225-4540
CA 19   Robert J.         Lagomarsino    (202)225-3601 (202)225-3096
CA 20   William M.        Thomas         (202)225-2915 (202)225-8798
CA 21   Elton             Gallegly       (202)225-5811
CA 22   Carlos J.         Moorhead       (202)225-4176 (202)225-1279
CA 23   Anthony           Beilenson      (202)225-5911
CA 24   Henry A.          Waxman         (202)225-3976 (202)225-4099
CA 25   Edward            Roybal         (202)225-6235 (202)225-1251
CA 26   Howard L.         Berman         (202)225-4695 (202)225-5279
CA 27   Mel               Levine         (202)225-6451 (202)225-6975
CA 28   Julian C.         Dixon          (202)225-7084 (202)225-4091
CA 29   Maxine            Waters         (202)225-2201 (202)225-7854
CA 30   Matthew G.        Martinez       (202)225-5464 (202)225-5467
CA 31   Mervyn M.         Dymally        (202)225-5425 (202)225-6847
CA 32   Glenn             Anderson       (202)225-6676
CA 33   David             Dreier         (202)225-2305 (202)225-4745
CA 34   Esteban Edward    Torres         (202)225-5256 (202)225-9711
CA 35   Jerry             Lewis          (202)225-5861 (202)225-6498
CA 36   George            Brown          (202)225-6161 (202)225-8671
CA 37   Al                McCandless     (202)225-5330
CA 38   Robert K.         Dornan         (202)225-2965
CA 39   William E.        Dannemeyer     (202)225-4111 (202)225-1755
CA 40   Christopher       Cox            (202)225-5611 (202)225-9177
CA 41   Bill              Lowery         (202)225-3201
CA 42   Dana              Rohrabacher    (202)225-2415 (202)225-0145
CA 43   Ronald C.         Packard        (202)225-3906 (202)225-0134
CA 44   Randy             Cunningham     (202)225-5452 (202)225-2558
CA 45   Duncan L.         Hunter         (202)225-5672 (202)225-0235
CO  1   Patricia          Schroeder      (202)225-4431 (202)225-5842
CO  2   David E.          Skaggs         (202)225-2161
CO  3   Ben Nighthorse    Campbell       (202)225-4761
CO  4   Wayne             Allard         (202)225-4676 (202)225-8630
CO  5   Joel              Hefley         (202)225-4422
CO  6   Dan               Schaefer       (202)225-7882
CO  S   Hank              Brown          (202)224-5941
CO  S   Timothy           Wirth          (202)224-5852 (202)224-1933
CT  1   Barbara           Kennelly       (202)225-2265 (202)225-1031
CT  2   Sam               Gejdenson      (202)225-2076 (202)225-4977
CT  3   Rosa   .          DeLauro        (202)225-3661
CT  4   Christopher       Shays          (202)225-5541 (202)225-9629
CT  5   Gary              Franks         (202)225-3822 (202)225-5085
CT  6   Nancy L.          Johnson        (202)225-4476 (202)225-4488
CT  S   Joe               Lieberman      (202)224-4041 (202)224-9750
CT  S   Christopher J.    Dodd           (202)224-2823 (202)224-
DE  1   Thomas            Carper         (202)225-4165 (202)225-1912
DE  S   Joseph            Biden          (202)224-5042 (202)224-0139
DE  S   William V.        Roth           (202)224-2441 (202)224-2805
FL  1   Earl D.           Hutto          (202)225-4136 (202)225-5785
FL  2   Pete              Peterson       (202)225-5235 (202)225-1586
FL  3   Charles E.        Bennett        (202)225-2501 (202)225-9635
FL  4   Craig             James          (202)225-4035 (202)225-1727
FL  5   Bill              McCollum       (202)225-2176 (202)225-0999
FL  6   Clifford B.       Stearns        (202)225-5744 (202)225-3973
FL  7   Sam               Gibbons        (202)225-3376
FL  8   C. W. Bill        Young          (202)225-5961 (202)225-9764
FL  9   Michael           Bilirakis      (202)225-5755 (202)225-4085
FL  S   Bob               Graham         (202)224-3041 (202)224-6843
FL  S   Connie            Mack           (202)224-5274 (202)224-9365
FL 10   Andy              Ireland        (202)225-5015 (202)225-6944
FL 11   Jim               Bacchus        (202)225-3671 (202)225-9039
FL 12   Tom               Lewis          (202)225-5792 (202)225-1860
FL 13   Porter J.         Goss           (202)225-2536 (202)225-6820
FL 14   Harry A.          Johnston       (202)225-3001 (202)225-8791
FL 15   Clay              Shaw           (202)225-3026 (202)225-8398
FL 16   Lawrence J.       Smith          (202)225-7931 (202)225-9816
FL 17   William           Lehman         (202)225-4211 (202)225-6208
FL 18   Ilena             Ros-Lehtinen   (202)225-3931 (202)225-5620
FL 19   Dante             Fascell        (202)225-4506 (202)225-0724
GA  1   Lindsay           Thomas         (202)225-5831 (202)225-6922
GA  2   Charles           Hatcher        (202)225-3631 (202)225-1117
GA  3   Richard           Ray            (202)225-5901
GA  4   Ben               Jones          (202)225-4272 (202)225-8675
GA  5   John              Lewis          (202)225-3801 (202)225-0351
GA  6   Newt              Gingrich       (202)225-4501 (202)225-4656
GA  7   George (Buddy)    Darden         (202)225-2931
GA  8   J. Roy            Rowland        (202)225-6531
GA  9   Ed                Jenkins        (202)225-5211 (202)225-0594
GA  S   Wyche             Fowler         (202)224-3643 (202)224-8227
GA  S   Sam               Nunn           (202)224-3521 (202)224-0072
GA 10   Doug              Barnard        (202)225-4101 (202)225-1873
HI  1   Neil              Abercrombie    (202)225-2726 (202)225-4580
HI  2   Patsy             Mink           (202)225-4906 (202)225-4987
HI  S   Spark M.          Akaka          (202)224-6361 (202)224-2126
HI  S   Daniel K.         Inouye         (202)224-3934 (202)224-6747
IA  1   Jim               Leach          (202)225-6576 (202)225-1278
IA  2   Jim               Nussle         (202)225-2911 (202)225-9129
 
[ continued next message ]

Paul Ferguson                    |  Uncle Sam wants to read
Network Integration Consultant   |       your e-mail...
Centreville, Virginia USA        | Just say "NO" to the Clipper
fergp@sytex.com                  |          Chip...




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: fergp@sytex.com (Paul Ferguson)
Date: Fri, 23 Apr 93 11:13:51 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Congressional FAX numbers 2/4
Message-ID: <yRZg3B2w165w@sytex.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


[ continued from previous message ]
 
IA  3   David R.          Nagle          (202)225-3301 (202)225-9104
IA  4   Neal              Smith          (202)225-4426
IA  5   Jim               Lightfoot      (202)225-3806 (202)225-6973
IA  6   Fred              Grandy         (202)225-5476
IA  S   Charles           Grassley       (202)224-3744 (202)224-0473
IA  S   Tom               Harkin         (202)224-3254 (202)224-7431
ID  1   Larry             LaRocco        (202)225-6611 (202)225-1213
ID  2   Richard H.        Stallings      (202)225-5531 (202)225-2393
ID  S   Steven D.         Symms          (202)224-6142 (202)224-5893
ID  S   Larry             Craig          (202)224-2752 (202)224-2573
IL  1   Charles A.        Hayes          (202)225-4372 (202)225-7571
IL  2   Gus               Savage         (202)225-0773 (202)225-8608
IL  3   Marty             Russo          (202)225-5736 (202)225-0295
IL  4   George            Sangmeister    (202)225-3635 (202)225-4447
IL  5   William O.        Lipinski       (202)225-5701 (202)225-1012
IL  6   Henry             Hyde           (202)225-4561 (202)225-1240
IL  7   Cardiss           Collins        (202)225-5006 (202)225-8396
IL  8   Dan               Rostenkowski   (202)225-4061
IL  9   Sidney            Yates          (202)225-2111 (202)225-3493
IL  S   Alan J.           Dixon          (202)224-2854 (202)224-5581
IL  S   Paul              Simon          (202)224-2152 (202)224-2223
IL 10   John Edward       Porter         (202)225-4835 (202)225-0157
IL 11   Frank             Annunzio       (202)225-6661
IL 12   Philip M.         Crane          (202)225-3711
IL 13   Harris W.         Fawell         (202)225-3515 (202)225-9420
IL 14   J. Dennis         Hastert        (202)225-2976 (202)225-0697
IL 15   Ewing             Thomas W.
IL 16   John W.           Cox            (202)225-5676
IL 17   Lane              Evans          (202)225-5905 (202)225-5396
IL 18   Robert            Michel         (202)225-6201 (202)225-9249
IL 19   Terry L.          Bruce          (202)225-5001
IL 20   Richard J.        Durbin         (202)225-5271 (202)225-0170
IL 21   Jerry F.          Costello       (202)225-5661 (202)225-0285
IL 22   Glenn             Poshard        (202)225-5201 (202)225-1541
IN  1   Peter J.          Visclosky      (202)225-2461
IN  2   Philip R.         Sharp          (202)225-3021 (202)225-8140
IN  3   Tim               Roemer         (202)225-3915 (202)225-6798
IN  4   Jill              Long           (202)225-4436
IN  5   James             Jontz          (202)225-5037 (202)225-5870
IN  6   Dan               Burton         (202)225-2276 (202)225-0016
IN  7   John T.           Myers          (202)225-5805 (202)225-1649
IN  8   Frank             McCloskey      (202)225-4636 (202)225-4688
IN  9   Lee               Hamilton       (202)225-5315
IN  S   Richard G.        Lugar          (202)224-4814
IN  S   Dan               Coats          (202)224-5623 (202)224-8964
IN 10   Andrew            Jacobs         (202)225-4011 (202)225-4093
KS  1   Pat               Roberts        (202)225-2715 (202)225-5375
KS  2   Jim               Slattery       (202)225-6601 (202)225-1445
KS  3   Jan               Meyers         (202)225-2865 (202)225-0554
KS  4   Dan               Glickman       (202)225-6216 (202)225-5398
KS  5   Dick              Nichols        (202)225-3911 (202)225-9415
KS  S   Robert J.         Dole           (202)224-6521 (202)224-8952
KS  S   Nancy L.          Kassebaum      (202)224-4774 (202)224-3514
KY  1   Carroll           Hubbard        (202)225-3115 (202)225-1622
KY  2   William           Natcher        (202)225-3501
KY  3   Romano            Mazzoli        (202)225-5401
KY  4   Jim               Bunning        (202)225-3465 (202)225-0003
KY  5   Harold            Rogers         (202)225-4601 (202)225-0940
KY  6   Larry J.          Hopkins        (202)225-4706 (202)225-1413
KY  7   Carl C.           Perkins        (202)225-4935 (202)225-1411
KY  S   Mitchell          McConnell      (202)224-2541 (202)224-2499
KY  S   Wendell H.        Ford           (202)224-4343 (202)224-1144
LA  1   Bob               Livingston     (202)225-3015 (202)225-0739
LA  2   William J.        Jefferson      (202)225-6636 (202)225-1988
LA  3   Billy             Tauzin         (202)225-4031 (202)225-0563
LA  4   Jim               McCrery        (202)225-2777 (202)225-8039
LA  5   Jerry             Huckaby        (202)225-2376 (202)225-2387
LA  6   Richard Hugh      Baker          (202)225-3901 (202)225-7313
LA  7   James A.          Hayes          (202)225-2031 (202)225-1175
LA  8   Clyde C.          Holloway       (202)225-4926 (202)225-6252
LA  S   J. Bennett        Johnston       (202)224-5824
LA  S   John              Breaux         (202)224-4623 (202)224-9753
MA  1   John              Oliver
MA  2   Richard E.        Neal           (202)225-5601 (202)225-8112
MA  3   Joseph D.         Early          (202)225-6101 (202)225-3181
MA  4   Barney            Frank          (202)225-5931
MA  5   Chester G.        Atkins         (202)225-3411
MA  6   Nicholas          Mavroules      (202)225-8020 (202)225-8023
MA  7   Edward J.         Markey         (202)225-2836 (202)225-8689
MA  8   Joseph P.         Kennedy        (202)225-5111 (202)225-9322
MA  9   Joe               Moakley        (202)225-8273 (202)225-7804
MA  S   John              Kerry          (202)224-2742 (202)224-8525
MA  S   Edward M.         Kennedy        (202)224-4543 (202)224-2417
MA 10   Gerry             Studds         (202)225-3111
MA 11   Brian             Donnelly       (202)225-3215
MD  1   Wayne T.          Gilchrest      (202)225-5311 (202)225-0254
MD  2   Helen Delich      Bentley        (202)225-3061 (202)225-4251
MD  3   Benjamin L.       Cardin         (202)225-4016 (202)225-9219
MD  4   C. Thomas         McMillen       (202)225-8090
MD  5   Steny H.          Hoyer          (202)225-4131 (202)225-4300
MD  6   Beverly B.        Byron          (202)225-2721 (202)225-6159
MD  7   Kweisi            Mfume          (202)225-4741 (202)225-3178
MD  8   Constance A.      Morella        (202)225-5341 (202)225-1389
MD  S   Paul S.           Sarbanes       (202)224-4524 (202)224-1651
MD  S   Barbara           Mikulski       (202)224-4654 (202)224-8858
ME  1   Thomas H.         Andrews        (202)225-6116 (202)225-9065
ME  2   Olympia J.        Snowe          (202)225-6306
ME  S   William S.        Cohen          (202)224-2523 (202)224-2693
ME  S   George            Mitchell       (202)224-5344
MI  1   John              Conyers        (202)225-5126 (202)225-0072
MI  2   Carl              Pursell        (202)225-4401
MI  3   Howard            Wolpe          (202)225-5011 (202)225-8602
MI  4   Frederick S.      Upton          (202)225-3761 (202)225-4986
MI  5   Paul B.           Henry          (202)225-3831
MI  6   Bob               Carr           (202)225-4872 (202)225-1260
MI  7   Dale E.           Kildee         (202)225-3611 (202)225-6393
MI  8   Bob               Traxler        (202)225-2806
MI  9   Guy               Vander Jagt    (202)225-3511
MI  S   Carl M.           Levin          (202)224-6221
MI  S   Donald W.         Riegle         (202)224-4822
MI 10   Dave              Camp           (202)225-3561 (202)225-9679
MI 11   Robert W.         Davis          (202)225-4735
MI 12   David E.          Bonior         (202)225-2106 (202)225-1169
MI 13   Barbara-Rose      Collins        (202)225-2261
MI 14   Dennis M.         Hertel         (202)225-6276
MI 15   William           Ford           (202)225-6261
MI 16   John D.           Dingell        (202)225-4071 (202)225-7426
MI 17   Sander M.         Levin          (202)225-4961 (202)225-1033
MI 18   William           Broomfield     (202)225-6135 (202)225-1807
MN  1   Timothy J.        Penny          (202)225-2472
MN  2   Vin               Weber          (202)225-2331 (202)225-0987
MN  3   Jim               Ramstad        (202)225-2871 (202)225-6351
MN  4   Bruce F.          Vento          (202)225-6631 (202)225-1968
MN  5   Martin Olav       Sabo           (202)225-4755
MN  6   Gerry             Sikorski       (202)225-2271 (202)225-4347
MN  7   Collin C.         Peterson       (202)225-2165 (202)225-1593
MN  8   James L.          Oberstar       (202)225-6211 (202)225-0699
MN  S   David             Durenberger    (202)224-3244 (202)224-9846
MN  S   Paul              Wellstone      (202)224-5641 (202)224-8438
MO  1   William           Clay           (202)225-2406 (202)225-1725
MO  2   John Kelly        Horn           (202)225-2561
MO  3   Richard           Gephardt       (202)225-2671 (202)225-7452
MO  4   Ike               Skelton        (202)225-2876
MO  5   Alan              Wheat          (202)225-4535 (202)225-5990
MO  6   E. Thomas         Coleman        (202)225-7041 (202)225-4799
MO  7   Mel               Hancock        (202)225-6536 (202)225-7700
MO  8   Bill              Emerson        (202)225-4404 (202)225-9621
MO  9   Harold L.         Volkmer        (202)225-2956 (202)225-7834
MO  S   John C.           Danforth       (202)224-6154
MO  S   Christopher       Bond           (202)224-5721 (202)224-7491
MS  1   Jamie             Whitten        (202)225-4306 (202)225-4328
MS  2   Mike              Espy           (202)225-5876
MS  3   G. V. (Sonny)     Montgomery     (202)225-5031 (202)225-3375
MS  4   Mike              Parker         (202)225-5865 (202)225-5886
MS  5   Gene              Taylor         (202)225-5772 (202)225-7074
MS  S   Trent             Lott           (202)224-6253 (202)224-2262
MS  S   Thad              Cochran        (202)224-5054 (202)224-9450
MT  1   Pat               Williams       (202)225-3211 (202)225-1257
MT  2   Ron               Marlenee       (202)225-1555 (202)225-1558
MT  S   Conrad            Burns          (202)224-2644 (202)224-8594
 
[ continued next message ]

Paul Ferguson                    |  Uncle Sam wants to read
Network Integration Consultant   |       your e-mail...
Centreville, Virginia USA        | Just say "NO" to the Clipper
fergp@sytex.com                  |          Chip...




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: fergp@sytex.com (Paul Ferguson)
Date: Fri, 23 Apr 93 11:13:45 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Congressional FAX numbers 3/4
Message-ID: <iwZg3B3w165w@sytex.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


[ continued from previous message ]
 
MT  S   Max S.            Baucus         (202)224-2651 (202)224-4379
NC  1   Walter B.         Jones          (202)225-3101 (202)225-3354
NC  2   Tim               Valentine      (202)225-4531 (202)225-1539
NC  3   H. Martin         Lancaster      (202)225-3415 (202)225-0666
NC  4   David E.          Price          (202)225-1784 (202)225-6314
NC  5   Stephen L.        Neal           (202)225-2071
NC  6   Howard            Coble          (202)225-3065 (202)225-8611
NC  7   Charles           Rose           (202)225-2731 (202)225-2470
NC  8   W. G.             Hefner         (202)225-3715 (202)225-4036
NC  9   J. Alex           McMillan       (202)225-1976 (202)225-8995
NC  S   Terry             Sanford        (202)224-3154 (202)224-7406
NC  S   Jesse A.          Helms          (202)224-6342 (202)224-1376
NC 10   Cass              Ballenger      (202)225-2576 (202)225-1316
NC 11   Charles           Taylor         (202)225-6401 (202)225-0519
ND  1   Byron L.          Dorgan         (202)225-2611 (202)225-9436
ND  S   Kent              Conrad         (202)224-2043 (202)224-7776
ND  S   Quentin           Burdick        (202)224-2551 (202)224-1193
NE  1   Douglas           Bereuter       (202)225-4806
NE  2   Peter             Hoagland       (202)225-4155 (202)225-4684
NE  3   Bill              Barrett        (202)225-6435 (202)225-0207
NE  S   Bob               Kerrey         (202)224-6551 (202)224-7645
NE  S   J. James          Exon           (202)224-4224 (202)225-5213
NH  -                     Smith          (202)224-2841 (202)224-1353
NH  1   Bill              Zeliff         (202)225-5456 (202)225-4370
NH  2   DIck              Swett          (202)225-5206 (202)225-0046
NH  S   Warren            Rudman         (202)224-3324
NJ  1   Robert T.         Andrews        (202)225-6501
NJ  2   William           Hughes         (202)225-6572 (202)225-8530
NJ  3   Frank             Pallone        (202)225-4671 (202)225-9665
NJ  4   Christopher       Smith          (202)225-3765 (202)225-7768
NJ  5   Marge             Roukema        (202)225-4465 (202)225-9048
NJ  6   Bernard J.        Dwyer          (202)225-6301 (202)225-1553
NJ  7   Matthew           Rinaldo        (202)225-5361
NJ  8   Robert            Roe            (202)225-5751 (202)225-3071
NJ  9   Robert            Torricelli     (202)225-5061 (202)225-0843
NJ  S   Frank             Lautenberg     (202)224-4744 (202)224-9707
NJ  S   Bill              Bradley        (202)224-3224 (202)224-8567
NJ 10   Donald            Payne          (202)225-3436 (202)225-4160
NJ 11   Dean A.           Gallo          (202)225-5034 (202)225-0658
NJ 12   Dick              Zimmer         (202)225-5801
NJ 13   Jim               Saxton         (202)225-4765 (202)225-0778
NJ 14   Frank J.          Guarini        (202)225-2765 (202)225-7023
NM  1   Steven H.         Schiff         (202)225-6316 (202)225-4975
NM  2   Joe               Skeen          (202)225-2365 (202)225-9599
NM  3   Bill              Richardson     (202)225-6190
NM  S   Pete V.           Domenici       (202)224-6621 (202)224-7371
NM  S   Jeff              Bingaman       (202)224-5521 (202)224-1810
NV  1   James H.          Bilbray        (202)225-5965 (202)225-8808
NV  2   Barbara F.        Vucanovich     (202)225-6155 (202)225-2319
NV  S   Richard           Bryan          (202)224-6244 (202)224-1867
NV  S   Harry             Reid           (202)224-3542 (202)224-7327
NY  1   George J.         Hochbrueckner  (202)225-3826 (202)225-0776
NY  2   Thomas J.         Downey         (202)225-3335 (202)225-1275
NY  3   Robert J.         Mrazek         (202)225-5956 (202)225-7215
NY  4   Norman            Lent           (202)225-7896 (202)225-0357
NY  5   Raymond           McGrath        (202)225-5516 (202)225-3626
NY  6   Floyd H.          Flake          (202)225-3461 (202)225-4169
NY  7   Gary              Ackerman       (202)225-2601
NY  8   James             Scheuer        (202)225-5471 (202)225-9695
NY  9   Thomas J.         Manton         (202)225-3965 (202)225-1452
NY  S   Daniel P.         Moynihan       (202)224-4451 (202)224-9293
NY  S   Alfonse           D'Amato        (202)224-6542 (202)224-5871
NY 10   Charles E.        Schumer        (202)225-6616 (202)225-4183
NY 11   Edolphus          Towns          (202)225-5936 (202)225-1018
NY 12   Major R.          Owens          (202)225-6231 (202)225-0112
NY 13   Stephen           Solarz         (202)225-2361 (202)225-9469
NY 14   Susan             Molinari       (202)225-3371 (202)225-1272
NY 15   Bill              Green          (202)225-2436 (202)225-0840
NY 16   Charles B.        Rangel         (202)225-4365 (202)225-0816
NY 17   Ted               Weiss          (202)225-5635 (202)225-6923
NY 18   Jose              Serrano        (202)225-4361
NY 19   Eliot L.          Engel          (202)225-2464
NY 20   Nita M.           Lowey          (202)225-6506 (202)225-0546
NY 21   Hamilton          Fish           (202)225-5441 (202)225-0962
NY 22   Benjamin          Gilman         (202)225-3776
NY 23   Micheal           McNulty        (202)225-5076 (202)225-5077
NY 24   Gerald B. H.      Solomon        (202)225-5614 (202)225-1168
NY 25   Sherwood L.       Boehlert       (202)225-3665 (202)225-1891
NY 26   David O'B.        Martin         (202)225-4611
NY 27   James T.          Walsh          (202)225-3701 (202)225-4042
NY 28   Matthew F.        McHugh         (202)225-6335
NY 29   Frank             Horton         (202)225-4916 (202)225-5909
NY 30   Louise M.         Slaughter      (202)225-3615 (202)225-7822
NY 31   Bill              Paxon          (202)225-5265 (202)225-5910
NY 32   John J.           LaFalce        (202)225-3231 (202)225-8693
NY 33   Henry J.          Nowak          (202)225-3306 (202)225-3523
NY 34   Amo               Houghton       (202)225-3161 (202)225-5574
OH  1   Thomas            Luken          (202)225-2216 (202)225-2293
OH  2   Willis            Gradison       (202)225-3164
OH  3   Tony              Hall           (202)225-6465 (202)225-6766
OH  4   Michael           Oxley          (202)225-2676
OH  5   Paul E.           Gillmor        (202)225-6405 (202)225-1985
OH  6   Bob               McEwen         (202)225-5705 (202)225-0224
OH  7   David             Hobson         (202)225-4324 (202)225-1984
OH  8   John A.           Boehner        (202)225-6205 (202)225-0704
OH  9   Marcy             Kaptur         (202)225-4146 (202)225-7711
OH  S   Howard M.         Metzenbaum     (202)224-2315 (202)224-8906
OH  S   John H.           Glenn          (202)224-3353 (202)224-7983
OH 10   Clarence E.       Miller         (202)225-5131 (202)225-5132
OH 11   Dennis E.         Eckart         (202)225-6331 (202)225-6331
OH 12   John R.           Kasich         (202)225-5355
OH 13   Donald J.         Pease          (202)225-3401 (202)225-0066
OH 14   Thomas C.         Sawyer         (202)225-5231 (202)225-5278
OH 15   Chalmers          Wylie          (202)225-2015
OH 16   Ralph             Regula         (202)225-3876 (202)225-3059
OH 17   James A.          Traficant      (202)225-5261 (202)225-3719
OH 18   Douglas           Applegate      (202)225-6265
OH 19   Edward F.         Feighan        (202)225-5731 (202)225-1230
OH 20   Mary Rose         Oakar          (202)225-5871 (202)225-0663
OH 21   Louis             Stokes         (202)225-7032
OK  1   James M.          Inhofe         (202)225-2211 (202)225-9187
OK  2   Michael L.        Synar          (202)225-2701 (202)225-2796
OK  3   Bill              Brewster       (202)225-4565 (202)225-9029
OK  4   Dave              McCurdy        (202)225-6165 (202)225-9746
OK  5   Mickey            Edwards        (202)225-2132 (202)225-1193
OK  6   Glenn             English        (202)225-5565 (202)225-8698
OK  S   David L.          Boren          (202)224-4721 (202)224-0154
OK  S   Donald L.         Nickles        (202)224-5754 (202)224-6008
OR  1   Les               AuCoin         (202)225-0855 (202)225-2707
OR  2   Robert F.         Smith          (202)225-6730 (202)225-3129
OR  3   Ron               Wyden          (202)225-4811
OR  4   Peter A.          DeFazio        (202)225-6416 (202)225-0694
OR  5   Mike              Kopetski       (202)225-5711 (202)225-9477
OR  S   Mark O.           Hatfield       (202)224-3753 (202)224-0276
OR  S   Bob               Packwood       (202)224-5244 (202)224-9065
PA  1   Thomas            Foglietta      (202)225-4731 (202)225-0088
PA  2   William H.        Gray           (202)225-4001
PA  3   Robert A.         Borski         (202)225-8251 (202)225-4628
PA  4   Joseph P.         Kolter         (202)225-2565 (202)225-0526
PA  5   Richard           Schulze        (202)225-5761 (202)225-8464
PA  6   Gus               Yatron         (202)225-5546 (202)225-5548
PA  7   Curt              Weldon         (202)225-2011 (202)225-8137
PA  8   Peter H.          Kostmayer      (202)225-4276 (202)225-5060
PA  9   Bud               Shuster        (202)225-2431
PA  S   Harris            Wofford        (202)224-6324 (202)225-8187
PA  S   Arlen             Specter        (202)224-4254 (202)224-9029
PA 10   Joseph            McDade         (202)225-3731 (202)225-9594
PA 11   Paul              Kanjorski      (202)225-6511
PA 12   John P.           Murtha         (202)225-2065 (202)225-5709
PA 13   Lawrence          Coughlin       (202)225-6111 (202)225-1238
PA 14   William J.        Coyne          (202)225-2301
PA 15   Donald L.         Ritter         (202)225-6411 (202)225-5248
PA 16   Robert S.         Walker         (202)225-2411 (202)225-2484
PA 17   George            Gekas          (202)225-4315 (202)225-8440
PA 18   Rick              Santorum       (202)225-2135 (202)225-7747
PA 19   William           Goodling       (202)225-5836 (202)225-1000
PA 20   Joseph M.         Gaydos         (202)225-4631
PA 21   Thomas            Ridge          (202)225-5406 (202)225-1081
PA 22   Austin J.         Murphy         (202)225-4665 (202)225-4772
PA 23   William F.        Clinger        (202)225-5121 (202)225-4681
 
[ continued next message ]

Paul Ferguson                    |  Uncle Sam wants to read
Network Integration Consultant   |       your e-mail...
Centreville, Virginia USA        | Just say "NO" to the Clipper
fergp@sytex.com                  |          Chip...




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: fergp@sytex.com (Paul Ferguson)
Date: Fri, 23 Apr 93 11:11:37 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Congressional FAX numbers 4/4
Message-ID: <41Zg3B4w165w@sytex.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


[ continued from previous message ]
 
RI  1   Ronald K.         Machtley       (202)225-4911 (202)225-4417
RI  2   John F.           Reed           (202)225-2735 (202)225-9580
RI  S   John H.           Chafee         (202)224-2921 (202)224-0166
RI  S   Claiborne         Pell           (202)224-4642 (202)224-4680
SC  1   Arthur            Ravenel        (202)225-3176 (202)225-4340
SC  2   Floyd             Spence         (202)225-2452 (202)225-2455
SC  3   Butler            Derrick        (202)225-5301
SC  4   Elizabeth J.      Patterson      (202)225-6030 (202)225-7664
SC  5   John M.           Spratt         (202)225-5501 (202)225-0464
SC  6   Robin M.          Tallon         (202)225-3315 (202)225-2857
SC  S   Ernest F.         Hollings       (202)224-6121 (202)224-3573
SC  S   Strom             Thurmond       (202)224-5972 (202)224-1300
SD  1   Tim               Johnson        (202)225-2801 (202)225-2427
SD  S   Thomas            Daschle        (202)224-2321 (202)224-2047
SD  S   Larry             Pressler       (202)224-5842 (202)224-1630
TN  1   James H.          Quillen        (202)225-6356 (202)225-7812
TN  2   John J.           Duncan         (202)225-5435 (202)225-6440
TN  3   Marilyn           Lloyd          (202)225-3271 (202)225-6974
TN  4   Jim               Cooper         (202)225-6831 (202)225-4520
TN  5   Bob               Clement        (202)225-4311 (202)225-1035
TN  6   Bart              Gordon         (202)225-4231 (202)225-6887
TN  7   Don               Sundquist      (202)225-2811 (202)225-2814
TN  8   John S.           Tanner         (202)225-4714 (202)225-1765
TN  9   Harold E.         Ford           (202)225-3265 (202)225-9215
TN  S   Albert            Gore           (202)224-4944 (202)224-
TN  S   Jim               Sasser         (202)224-3344 (202)224-9590
TX  1   Jim               Chapman        (202)225-3035 (202)225-7265
TX  2   Charles           Wilson         (202)225-2401 (202)225-1764
TX  3   Sam               Johnson        (202)225-4201
TX  4   Ralph M.          Hall           (202)225-6673 (202)225-3332
TX  5   John              Bryant         (202)225-2231
TX  6   Joe               Barton         (202)225-2002 (202)225-3052
TX  7   Bill              Archer         (202)225-2571 (202)225-4381
TX  8   Jack              Fields         (202)225-4901 (202)225-6899
TX  9   Jack              Brooks         (202)225-6565 (202)225-1584
TX  S   Lloyd             Bentsen        (202)224-5922
TX  S   Phil              Gramm          (202)224-2934
TX 10   J. J.             Pickle         (202)225-4865 (202)225-1103
TX 11   Chet              Edwards        (202)225-6105 (202)225-0350
TX 12   Pete              Geren          (202)225-5071 (202)225-2786
TX 13   Bill              Sarpalius      (202)225-3706 (202)225-6142
TX 14   Greg              Laughlin       (202)225-2831 (202)225-1108
TX 15   E. (Kika)         De la Garza    (202)225-2531 (202)225-2534
TX 16   Ronald D.         Coleman        (202)225-4831
TX 17   Charles W.        Stenholm       (202)225-6605 (202)225-2234
TX 18   Craig             Washington     (202)225-3816
TX 19   Larry             Combest        (202)225-4005 (202)225-9615
TX 20   Henry             Gonzalez       (202)225-3236 (202)225-1915
TX 21   Lamar S.          Smith          (202)225-4236
TX 22   Thomas D.         DeLay          (202)225-5951
TX 23   Albert G.         Bustamante     (202)225-4511 (202)225-3849
TX 24   Martin            Frost          (202)225-3605 (202)225-4951
TX 25   Michael           Andrews        (202)225-7508 (202)225-4210
TX 26   Richard K.        Armey          (202)225-7772 (202)225-7614
TX 27   Solomon           Ortiz          (202)225-7742 (202)225-1134
US  -   George            Bush           (202)456-2168
UT  1   James V.          Hansen         (202)225-0453 (202)225-5857
UT  2   Wayne             Owens          (202)225-3011 (202)225-3524
UT  3   Bill              Orton          (202)225-7751 (202)225-1223
UT  S   Edwin (Jake)      Garn           (202)224-5444
UT  S   Orrin G.          Hatch          (202)224-5251 (202)224-6331
VA  1   Herbert           Bateman        (202)225-4261 (202)225-4382
VA  2   Owen B.           Pickett        (202)225-4215 (202)225-4218
VA  3   Thomas J.         Bliley         (202)225-2815
VA  4   Norman D.         Sisisky        (202)225-6365 (202)225-1170
VA  5   Lewis F.          Payne          (202)225-4711 (202)225-1147
VA  6   Jim               Olin           (202)225-5431 (202)225-9623
VA  7   D. French         Slaughter      (202)225-6561
VA  8   Jim               Moran          (202)225-4376 (202)225-0017
VA  9   Rick              Boucher        (202)225-3861
VA  S   John W.           Warner         (202)224-2023 (202)224-6295
VA  S   Charles           Robb           (202)224-4024 (202)224-8689
VA 10   Frank R.          Wolf           (202)225-5136 (202)225-0437
VT  1   Bernie            Sanders        (202)225-4115 (202)225-6790
VT  S   Patrick           Leahy          (202)224-4242
VT  S   Jim               Jeffords       (202)224-5141 (202)224-1507
WA  1   John R.           Miller         (202)225-6311 (202)225-0636
WA  2   Al                Swift          (202)225-2605
WA  3   Jolene            Unsoeld        (202)225-3536 (202)225-9095
WA  4   Sid               Morrison       (202)225-5816 (202)225-9293
WA  5   Thomas S.         Foley          (202)225-2006
WA  6   Norman D.         Dicks          (202)225-5916 (202)225-1176
WA  7   Jim               McDermott      (202)225-3106 (202)225-9212
WA  S   Slade             Gorton         (202)224-3441 (202)224-9393
WA  S   Brock             Adams          (202)224-2621 (202)224-0238
WA 8    Rod               Chandler       (202)-225-776
WI  1   Les               Aspin          (202)225-3031
WI  2   Scott             Klug           1202)225-2906 (202)225-6942
WI  3   Steve             Gunderson      (202)225-5506
WI  7   David             Obey           (202)225-3365
WI  8   Toby              Roth           (202)225-5665 (202)225-0087
WI  9   F. James          Sensenbrenner  (202)225-5101 (202)225-3190
WI  S   Herbert           Kohl           (202)224-5653 (202)224-9787
WI  S   Robert            Kasten         (202)224-5323 (202)224-7700
WV  1   Alan B.           Mollohan       (202)225-4172 (202)225-7564
WV  2   Harley O.         Staggers       (202)225-4172
WV  3   Robert            Wise           (202)225-2711
WV  4   Nick Joe          Rahall         (202)225-3452 (202)225-9061
WV  S   John D.           Rockefeller    (202)224-6472 (202)224-1689
WV  S   Robert C.         Byrd           (202)224-3954 (202)224-4025
WY  1   Craig             Thomas         (202)225-2311 (202)225-0726
WY  S   Alan K.           Simpson        (202)224-3424 (202)224-1315
WY  S   Malcolm           Wallop         (202)224-6441 (202)224-3230
 
8<------ End of Forwarded message -----
 
Cheers.
 

Paul Ferguson                    |  Uncle Sam wants to read
Network Integration Consultant   |       your e-mail...
Centreville, Virginia USA        | Just say "NO" to the Clipper
fergp@sytex.com                  |          Chip...




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: uri@watson.ibm.com
Date: Fri, 23 Apr 93 10:45:39 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: fingerprint keys over ham radio
In-Reply-To: <9304231520.AA17416@enet-gw.pa.dec.com>
Message-ID: <9304231745.AA15192@buoy.watson.ibm.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


"Welcome to Addendia, Mr. Lee.  23-Apr-1993 1109" writes:
 > One thing to be careful of:  Amateur radio must *not* use codes or
 > cyphers to obscure meaning.  All information transmission must be in
 > the clear (not necessarily English, but no encryption of data).

That's OK - nobody's going to send encrypted data, just
the keys...In plain English...And keys' fingerprints...

Regards,
Uri.
------------
<Disclaimer>




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Do you know what's in the trunk?  23-Apr-1993 1646 <yerazunis@aidev.enet.dec.com>
Date: Fri, 23 Apr 93 13:45:17 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: subliminal channels on ham radio
Message-ID: <9304232045.AA27921@enet-gw.pa.dec.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



KLB says:

>Hmm... if authenticating signatures can be transmitted, then some
>enterprising and patient cryptographers can also transmit messages,
>encrypted if desired, back and forth using one of the "subliminal
>channel" protocols!
[and goes on to explain such steganography]

yes, you could _theoretically_ use steganography in the authentication
block, but it would be illegal.  Very simply, you must not transmit a
message over the Amateur bands if that message contains information that
is not "in the clear".  

And I doubt any ham would knowingly transmit such a message... hams
would consider it "poor form".  Hams and amateur radio has been self-
policing since WW 1 and Hiram Maxim's passage of a congressional bill
*making* ham radio self-policing to the greatest extent possible.  That's
why the US hams were not silenced "for security reasons" during WW I, and
the tradition of self-policing ham radio has held up ever since.  

Besides, essentially *all* ham traffic is monitored- usually by other
hams, as well as by shortwave listeners, scanner groupies, and even,
occasionally, the FCC.  Hams will DF (direction-find) in on anybody
on their frequencies who break the rules with the ruthless efficiency
of Truly and Justly Annoyed Citizens, and the FCC has (at last!) agreed
to accept tapes made by hams as legal evidence in seizure proceedings.

Thus, the ham radio frequencies are "the wrong pool to piss in", if you get
my drift.
       
	-Bill, N1KGX




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Sandy <72114.1712@CompuServe.COM>
Date: Fri, 23 Apr 93 11:52:49 PDT
To: <cypherpunks@toad.com>
Subject: MYKOTRONX
Message-ID: <930423184013_72114.1712_FHF38-1@CompuServe.COM>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


_________________________________________________________________
             FROM THE VIRTUAL DESK OF SANDY SANDFORT
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Following Harry Shapiro's lead, I did some research on Mykotronx
by calling up the California Franchise Tax Board.

The bureaurats told me Mykotronx is a California corporation
(#1403668) in good standing.  Incorporated in April of '87, its
address is 357 Van Ness Way; Torrence, CA.  They could not tell
me if Mykotronx were publicly traded.  Its filings with the State
are not available for public inspection.


 S a n d y
_________________________________________________________________
PLEASE RESPOND TO: ssandfort@attmail.com (except from CompuServe)
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: fergp@sytex.com (Paul Ferguson)
Date: Fri, 23 Apr 93 12:11:26 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Aiding the cause (or, Spreading the word)
Message-ID: <953g3B1w165w@sytex.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


For those of you who do not receive the comp.risks feed, the Wiretap
Chip (Clipper) is debate is taking hold on several forefronts. What
this tells me is this: People are starting to realize the negative
implications of this Big Brother "technology."
 
I say: Great, but there's alot of eyes to open out there and we need
to let Joe and Janet Lunchbucket know how this will affect them.
 
 
8<------ Begin forwarded message ------------------------
 
Date: Thu, 22 Apr 93 12:12:44 -0700
From: Mark Seecof <marks@wimsey.latimes.com>
Subject: "key escrow" (Clipper Chip; RISKS 14.51)
 
(At the risk of redundancy (with other contributors)):
 
1. Although gov't press releases and gov't surrogates like Dorothy
Denning keep talking about warrants (actually, they say "proper
authorization") for Clipper keys, the government has never abandoned
(and does not even deny) the practice of conducting warrantless
wiretaps for "national security" reasons. How will keys be obtained
to decrypt such intercepts?  My guess--the security of the "escrow"
agencies will be secretly compromised.  And then, the time will
come when the NSA turns over political or criminal information with
little or no "national security/foreign/military intelligence" content
to the FBI, etc.  My fallback guess is that the Skipjack algorithm
will have a back door.
 
2. The key escrow scheme is a pottery container of fecal matter.
Right now in California we are enjoying two scandals involving the
release, to unauthorized persons, of "secret" data, by employees of
government and private organizations, in violation of: their
employers' policies, their own terms of employment, state criminal
law, and common (civil) law.  These (Anaheim PD employee release
of DMV address info to anti-abortion terrorists; various people
including police employees giving info to an ADL investigator) are
representative, not exhaustive of the problem.  Does anybody remember
the Walker (U.S. Navy) spy scandal of a few years ago?  Walker ring
members, despite vetting by the military (perhaps inefficient, but
more thorough than likely in civilian agencies), exposure to the
most severe legal sanctions, and even the cultural pressures of
their military communities, sold out Navy cipher secrets and keys
to actual enemies for fairly small amounts of money. N.B.: the
Walker ring had no ideological motivations.  Anyone who says that
the key escrow scheme will protect the privacy of Clipper users is
naive, stupid, or wicked.  Of course, as someone will point out:
"the Walker ring got caught!"--but catching malefactors will not
prevent the harm they do before they are detected.
 
3. The assertion that the government should, by rights, be able to
decrypt private communications for "law enforcement" purposes
should be challenged.  Privacy advocates should not concede this
important debate-framing assumption. Advances in digital computing
have made it possible for ordinary people to use powerful machine
cipher techniques.  But such systems will not prevent police
agents from eavesdropping directly or by various bugging methods.
It may be (I suspect it is so) that depriving the police of
convenient wiretapping might have little effect over, say, ten
years, on their (police) ability to detect and interfere with
criminals.
 
Mark Seecof <marks@latimes.com>
 
8<----- End forwarded message -------------------------
 
 Someone drop this guy a line to get him to join our cause! (Actually,
 I'v already done that.) We can always use a LA Times cypherpunk,
 can't we? ;-)
 
 Cheers.
 

Paul Ferguson                    |  Uncle Sam wants to read
Network Integration Consultant   |       your e-mail...
Centreville, Virginia USA        | Just say "NO" to the Clipper
fergp@sytex.com                  |          Chip...




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: andrew m. boardman <amb@ground.cs.columbia.edu>
Date: Fri, 23 Apr 93 11:55:10 PDT
To: meyer@mcc.com
Subject: Traffic analysis, anyone?  (was: Anyone know where I can get a thesaurus by ftp?)
In-Reply-To: <19930423180014.9.MEYER@OGHMA.MCC.COM>
Message-ID: <199304231854.AA24203@ground.cs.columbia.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



[from a help file]

FTP directly to the Project Gutenberg archives:
ftp mrcnext.cso.uiuc.edu
login:  anonymous
password:  your@login
cd etext/etext91

[and get the preferred format of roget*; that's roget's thesaurus.]




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: elee9sf@Menudo.UH.EDU
Date: Fri, 23 Apr 93 13:23:15 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: RADIO: keys, ham, and subliminal channels
Message-ID: <199304232022.AA29561@Menudo.UH.EDU>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



> The meaning must still be in clear but you are allowed to send a
> authenticating "signature" in code, as long as the signature 
> contains no information other than authentication itself that was 
> not also transmitted in clear.  That's why autopatch

Hmm... if authenticating signatures can be transmitted, then some
enterprising and patient cryptographers can also transmit messages,
encrypted if desired, back and forth using one of the "subliminal
channel" protocols!

A subliminal channel allows people to communicate by essentially
disguising their true message in the digital signature of the message
they transmit openly.  It would take several exchanges between the two
to transmit a real message, since I recall the subliminal channels
I've looked at allow the transfer of a few numbers at a time, but it
could be done!

/-----------------------------------\
| Karl L. Barrus                    |
| elee9sf@menudo.uh.edu             | <- preferred address
| barrus@tree.egr.uh.edu (NeXTMail) |
\-----------------------------------/




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: geoffw@nexsys.net (Geoff White)
Date: Fri, 23 Apr 93 16:01:21 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: KPFA at Sat Meeting
Message-ID: <9304232255.AA05714@nexsys.nexsys.net>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain




	I took the liberty of calling KPFA's (The Pacifica Affiliate
	here in the Bay Area and telling them about this saturday's
	meeting.  I figured we could use the help of the "sympathetic
	pres" and they do have 50,000 watts of power.  We could craft a
	real good statement that would go out to most of the "activist"
	types in the area.  I've take one or two of their phone calls but
	have been vectoring them over to John (gnu@toad.com) and Tim`
	<tcmay@netcom.com> to answer more detailed questions.  They seem
	to know about us as they mentioned John and Eric by name.

	I sent them the dirtections to the meeting and a couple of e-mail
	messages (press releases and a few comments) to their account on
	kpfa@well.sf.ca.us.

	Hope this is a help not a hinderance.

-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
NEXUS SYSTEMS/CYBERTRIBE-5	
Editor/Instigator/Catalyst : Geoff White <geoffw@nexsys.net>
Production Crew		   : Universal Movement Trinity <umt@nexsys.net>

        "They might stop the party, but they can't stop the future"

		--PGP Public key available upon request--
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Valerie Lambert <valerie@valis.biocad.com>
Date: Fri, 23 Apr 93 17:30:39 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: CLIPPER: Explanation sheet?
Message-ID: <9304232306.AA27182@valis.biocad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



In article <Qfpqi9K00WBK8_O4gs@andrew.cmu.edu>, David Reeve Sward
<sward+@cmu.edu> writes:
>I (along with others) have some sort of phrase in our .signature saying
>"Stop the Clipper Chip" or somesuch.  Since adding this, I have had
>several people ask me about this, and I have fired off an explanation to
>them.  I am wondering if there is a Wiretap Chip Explanation Sheet to
>send to people instead of trying to make sure I remember everything (and
>without double-checking everything I say).  Has anyone written such a
>beast?

I have compiled a "layperson's" Clipper-shit I mean sheet containing a very
short intro, announcements from the White House, AT&T, the EFF, the CPSR,
and various news articles.  David, I will mail you a copy.  If anyone
else wants one, let me know.

--
Valerie Lambert * valerie@biocad.com * 415/903-3923 * AT&T: phones with Big
Brother Built Inside!  Just say "NO" to the Clipper wiretap chip.






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Hal <74076.1041@CompuServe.COM>
Date: Fri, 23 Apr 93 15:36:29 PDT
To: <cypherpunks@toad.com>
Subject: Re: encrypted telnet
Message-ID: <930423220355_74076.1041_FHD84-1@CompuServe.COM>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I missed the context because my mailbox overflowed, but Eric mentioned
Diffie-Hellman key exchange.  If the need is for a one-shot quick-n-dirty
session key exchange (as for the audio talk program John Gilmore mentioned)
an alternative is to do a quick PGP keygen, send the session key across
using the PGP key, then destroy the PGP key.

The only reason I mention this is that it can be done in a couple of minutes
with existing tools tomorrow, if you need it.  Eric is right that if you
are designing something from scratch DH is often more appropriate (although
PK's allow for authentication if you have a trusted signature, preventing
spoofing attacks).

Hal





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: pmetzger@lehman.com (Perry E. Metzger)
Date: Fri, 23 Apr 93 15:31:07 PDT
To: extropians@gnu.ai.mit.edu
Subject: A parable
Message-ID: <9304232230.AA11266@snark.shearson.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



I just posted this to the net.

----------------------------------------------------------------------

Newsgroups: alt.privacy.clipper,sci.crypt
Subject: A Parable.
References: <1993Apr20.013747.4122@cs.sfu.ca> <1993Apr21.210353.15305@microsoft.com>
Distribution: usa
Organization: Partnership for an America Free Drug

scottmi@microsoft.com (Scott Miller (TechCom)) writes:
>Stikes me that all this concern over the government's ability
>to eavesdrop is a little overblown... what can't they do today?
>My understanding is that they already can tap, listen, get access
>exc. to our phone lines, bank records, etc. etc again.

Well, they can't listen in on much of mine, since I already use
cryptography for much of my electronic mail, and will start using it
for my telephony as soon as practical.

However, allow me to tell a parable.

There was once a far away land called Ruritania, and in Ruritania
there was a strange phenonmenon -- all the trees that grew in
Ruritainia were transparent. Now, in the days when people had lived in
mud huts, this had not been a problem, but now high-tech wood
technology had been developed, and in the new age of wood, everyone in
Ruritania found that their homes were all 100% see through. Now, until
this point, no one ever thought of allowing the police to spy on
someone's home, but the new technology made this tempting. This being
a civilized country, however, warrants were required to use binoculars
and watch someone in their home. The police, taking advantage of this,
would get warrants to use binoculars and peer in to see what was going
on. Occassionally, they would use binoculars without a warrant, but
everyone pretended that this didn't happen.

One day, a smart man invented paint -- and if you painted your house,
suddenly the police couldn't watch all your actions at will. Things
would go back to the way they were in the old age -- completely
private.

Indignant, the state decided to try to require that all homes have
video cameras installed in every nook and cranny. "After all", they
said, "with this new development crime could run rampant. Installing
video cameras doesn't mean that the police get any new capability --
they are just keeping the old one."

A wise man pointed out that citizens were not obligated to make the
lives of the police easy, that the police had survived all through the
mud hut age without being able to watch the citizens at will, and that
Ruritania was a civilized country where not everything that was
expedient was permitted. For instance, in a neighboring country, it
had been discovered that torture was an extremely effective way to
solve crimes. Ruritania had banned this practice in spite of its
expedience. Indeed, "why have warrants at all", he asked, "if we are
interested only in expedience?"

A famous paint technologist, Dorothy Quisling, intervened however. She
noted that people might take photographs of children masturbating
should the new paint technology be widely deployed without safeguards,
and the law was passed.

Soon it was discovered that some citizens would cover their mouths
while speaking to each other, thus preventing the police from reading
their lips through the video cameras. This had to be prevented, the
police said. After all, it was preventing them from conducting their
lawful surveilance. The wise man pointed out that the police had never
before been allowed to listen in on people's homes, but Dorothy
Quisling pointed out that people might use this new invention of
covering their mouths with veils to discuss the kidnapping and
mutilation of children. No one in the legislature wanted to be accused
of being in favor of mutilating children, but then again, no one
wanted to interfere in people's rights to wear what they liked, so a
compromise was reached whereby all homes were installed with
microphones in each room to accompany the video cameras. The wise man
lamented few if any child mutilations had ever been solved by the old
lip reading technology, but it was too late -- the microphones were
installed everwhere.

However, it was discovered that this was insufficient to prevent
citizens from hiding information from the authorities, because some of
them would cleverly speak in languages that the police could not
understand. A new law was proposed to force all citizens to speak at
all times only in Ruritanian, and, for good measure, to require that
they speak clearly and distinctly near the microphones. "After all",
Dorothy Quisling pointed out, "they might be using the opportunity to
speak in private to mask terrorist activities!"  Terrorism struck
terror into everyone's hearts, and they rejoiced at the brulliance of
this new law.

Meanwhile, the wise man talked one evening to his friends on how all
of this was making a sham of the constitution of Ruritania, of which
all Ruritanians were proud. "Why", he asked, "are we obligated to
sacrifice all our freedom and privacy to make the lives of the police
easier? There isn't any real evidence that this makes any big dent in
crime anyway! All it does is make our privacy forfeit to the state!"

However, the wise man made the mistake of saying this, as the law
required, in Ruritanian, clearly and distinctly, and near a
microphone.  Soon, the newly formed Ruritanian Secret Police arrived
and took him off, and got him to confess by torturing him. Torture
was, after all, far more efficient than the old methods, and had been
recently instituted to stop the recent wave of people thinking obscene
thoughts about tomatoes, which Dorothy Quisling noted was one of the
major problems of the new age of plenty and joy.





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: fnerd@smds.com (FutureNerd Steve Witham)
Date: Fri, 23 Apr 93 18:29:05 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Family key is symmetric
Message-ID: <9304240107.AA18653@smds.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


As I understand it, the Skipjack system is symmetric, i.e., decrypt key=
encrypt key.  Also, the unit serial number seems to only get encrypted
with the family key.

So, once the family key and the algorithm are known, it will be
possible to create messages with any unit serial number you want, right?

Wouldn't this be enough to foil the casual traffic-analysis feature
of the crippler?

--fnerd
the keyhole chip
the wing clipper
co-intel inside
as seen on whitehouse stationery
only open a crack
the taped lock
cyphergate
"Daffy, you quack me up." --Elmer




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Dave Banisar <banisar@washofc.cpsr.org>
Date: Fri, 23 Apr 93 18:53:38 PDT
To: extropians@gnu.ai.mit.edu
Subject: Re: Privacy International (fwd)
Message-ID: <9304232159.AA20673@hacker2.eff.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


RE: PI and Clipper

Privacy International recently nominated the FBI for its Big Brother Award 
(see below) for the digital telephony proposal. Need I say more?

For more info on PI, check out the CPSR Internet Library at cpsr.org 
/privacy_international

Dave Banisar
Director,
PI Washington Office (one of my many hats)

------ Forwarded Message

The following forwarded from alt.privacy.  Anybody have experience
with this group?  Have they taken a position on the wiretap chip?

...

THE BIG BROTHER AWARDS

Governments, private sector organizations, credit bureaus,
police departments and the military in many countries are
engaging in programs which have the effect of eroding the rights
and privacy of individuals. These practices often breach
international human rights conventions, and threaten the balance
or evolution of free and open societies. In many cases,
information technology is used for the purposes of increasing
the power of authorities, while diminishing the rights of
individuals. These violations occur  in all parts of the  world.

The Big Brother awards  sponsored by Privacy International, will
be given to the organization, initiative, government or act
which is most invasive of private life, or which is responsible
for the most dangerous and intrusive acts of surveillance.

Privacy International believes that there should be a more
widespread awareness of these practices. We believe people have
the right to know when governments or other organizations are
engaging in intrusive practices that limit individual rights. We
aim to provide an effective context for viewing these invasive
practices, by establishing an international benchmark. The
establishment of the Big Brother awards aims to provide a
world-wide focus on surveillance and privacy.






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: peter honeyman <honey@citi.umich.edu>
Date: Fri, 23 Apr 93 22:10:51 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: saltzer and schroeder on information protection
Message-ID: <9304240438.AA11728@relay1.UU.NET>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


this is taken from a paper i'm writing with avi rubin.  
it's not a sound bite, more like a snack.

	peter

=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-

Experts dismiss systems that hide cryptographic algorithms or protocols
(a.k.a. "security through obscurity").  Kahn [1] cites Kerckhoffs'
classic treatise on military security [2].  Saltzer and Schroeder [3]
reflect the modern view in describing "open design" as one of the
basic principles of information protection:

   The design should not be secret.  The mechanisms should not depend
   on the ignorance of potential attackers, but rather on the
   possession of specific, more easily protected, keys or passwords.
   This decoupling of protection mechanisms from protection keys
   permits the mechanisms to be examined by many reviewers without
   concern that the review may itself compromise the safeguards.  In
   addition, any skeptical user may be allowed to convince himself that
   the system he is about to use is adequate for his purpose.  Finally,
   it is simply not realistic to attempt to maintain secrecy for any
   system which receives wide distribution.

1. D. Kahn, The Codebreakers, Macmillan Publishing Co., New York
(1967).

2. A. Kerckhoffs, La Cryptographie Militaire, Libraire Militaire de L.
Baudoin & Cie., Paris (1883).

3. J.H. Saltzer and M.D.  Schroeder, "The Protection of Information in
Computer Systems," Proc. of the IEEE, Vol.  63(9), pp. 1278-1307
(September, 1975).





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: mmidboe@uahcs2.cs.uah.edu (Matt Midboe)     (Computer Science Dept., Univ. of Alabama-Huntsville)
Date: Sat, 24 Apr 93 14:14:19 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: CLIPPER: Intergraph and AT&T
Message-ID: <9304240833.AA09866@uahcs2.cs.uah.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text


	Some quick tidbits from a lurker...I had read about
Intergraph being unhappy with AT&T.

	I called up Intergraph and talked to someone in their
legal department about the possibility of them going after AT&T
for trademark infringements. She said they were looking into
that possibility, and asked me to send her what information I
could on Clipper. Hopefully this will prove to be fruitful in
disarming the Wiretap Chip. I'd post her email address but I
don't have it at home with me right now.

	Also, this doesn't fall in line with the Wiretap chip,
but has anyone implemented fossil routines with some type of
encryption? I am not completely familiar with the ins and outs
of cryptography but I am more than willing to write up all the
fossil routines for a dos machine. I guess dos is the only thing
that has fossils though.

	Lastly, I just wanted to see what other Huntsville
cypherpunks might be lurking about. If so then I would like to
hear from you. 

mmidboe@uahcs2.uah.edu



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Bill Sommerfeld <sommerfeld@orchard.medford.ma.us>
Date: Sat, 24 Apr 93 11:45:05 PDT
To: mckang@solomon.technet.sg
Subject: OSF's DCE
In-Reply-To: <Pine.3.05.9304231215.B18076-8100000@solomon.technet.sg>
Message-ID: <9304241349.AA00464@orchard.medford.ma.us>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


OSF's DCE is a "distributed systems toolkit" which provides tools and
infrastructure for building distributed systems.

The relevant point to cypherpunks is that it uses cryptographic
techniques to provide authentication and (optionally) data privacy
using DES and Kerberos V5.  Unfortunately, the data privacy features
must be disabled in the exportable versions.

Contact the OSF or any of the many vendors (HP, IBM, DEC, Transarc,
...) selling ports of the code for more details.

					- Bill





















From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Peter Wayner <pcw@access.digex.com>
Date: Sat, 24 Apr 93 12:19:05 PDT
To: honey@citi.umich.edu
Subject: Re:  saltzer and schroeder on information protection
Message-ID: <199304241352.AA11064@access.digex.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Although the "details" are classified at this time, I believe
that the secrecy is just part of the plan to prevent software
implementations that could easily spoof anyone who was
trying to listen in by munging the law enforcement block. 
I'm sure the algorithm would continue to be secure even after
the details are discovered. The secrecy is to control use
not to prevent decryption.

This is, I believe, the greatest achilles heel of this proposal.
There are at least 40 million PC's in this country. They would
like this chip to become the "standard" for all encryption. That
would mean putting in every machine. The cost of this could
range from $25 to $100 per machine. That means this whole plan
could cost $1 billion to $4 billion dollars in real money. 
A new software encryption standard, however, could be promulgated
with about one summer's work by an undergraduate handy with C.

I believe that people aren't going to be willing to add the additional
hardware to their PC boxes. Look how slowly better video standards
have evolved in the PC domain. Look how slowly CD-ROMs are becoming
standard. Everyone agrees that this technology would be nice, but
no one is willing to raise the level of their standard boxes to 
include this hardware. Raising the price of their standard box
puts them at a competitive disadvantage. So the lowest common
denominator continues. 

DES chips have been around for _years_ and no one builds them
into their boxes. Why is this chip going to be any different?

-Peter




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: The Phantom <phantom@u.washington.edu>
Date: Sat, 24 Apr 93 11:35:19 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Summary sheet?
Message-ID: <Pine.3.05.9304241123.A26398-a100000@stein2.u.washington.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Does anyone have a summary sheet they have come up with that I could
distribute? With some of my mailings (to my congresspeople, mostly) I'd
like to inform them to exactly what I am talking about. Anything this
weekend I can get my hands on would help --

Matt


Matt Thomlinson                               Say no to the Wiretap Chip!
University of Washington, Seattle, Washington.
Internet: phantom@u.washington.edu      	    phone: (206) 528-5732
PGP 2.2  key available via email or finger phantom@hardy.u.washington.edu





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Matthew J Miszewski <MJMISKI@macc.wisc.edu>
Date: Sat, 24 Apr 93 11:36:50 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: DEAD AIR
Message-ID: <23042411582967@vms2.macc.wisc.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Wow,
 
  When the cypherpunks have a physical meeting cyberspace fills with an erie
silence...
 
  Please for those of us who could neither attend the various meetings nor
hook up with other transmissions, could ONE person post a good summary.
 
My Mailbox was actually empty thisafternoon!!!
 
Matt
 




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Tom Keenan <keenan@acs.ucalgary.ca>
Date: Sat, 24 Apr 93 11:32:09 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: hi guys...
Message-ID: <9304241830.AA22592@acs3.acs.ucalgary.ca>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


sub Thomas P. Keenan

-- 
Dr. Tom Keenan, I.S.P.   Associate Dean, R&D, Faculty of Cont. Ed.
University of Calgary   2500 University Dr. NW   Calgary, AB T2N 1N4 CANADA
(403) 220-4715 (voice)  (403) 284-5702 (fax)    keenan@acs.ucalgary.ca (email)




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Tom Keenan <keenan@acs.ucalgary.ca>
Date: Sat, 24 Apr 93 11:32:53 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: hi guys
Message-ID: <9304241831.AA89944@acs3.acs.ucalgary.ca>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


sub Thomas P. Keenan

-- 
Dr. Tom Keenan, I.S.P.   Associate Dean, R&D, Faculty of Cont. Ed.
University of Calgary   2500 University Dr. NW   Calgary, AB T2N 1N4 CANADA
(403) 220-4715 (voice)  (403) 284-5702 (fax)    keenan@acs.ucalgary.ca (email)




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Simona Nass <simona@Panix.Com>
Date: Sat, 24 Apr 93 12:43:07 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: SEA Letter to New York Times Editors re Clipper (fwd)
Message-ID: <199304241942.AA14929@sun.Panix.Com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I faxed this out last night. The press release is our next step. We are
looking to put together a more detailed, more technologically savvy version
to send to computer mags and stuff. Those who want to help, subscribe to
sea-media-request@panix.com. We can use your help on this next version. -S.

=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-

						Society for Electronic Access
						Post Office Box 3131
						Church Street Station
						New York, NY 10008-3131
						Internet: sea@panix.com
						Phone Contact:
						Steve Barber, (212) 787-8421

						April 23, 1993

Via Fax:  (212) 556-3690

Letters to the Editor
The New York Times
229 West 43rd St.
New York, NY 10036

Dear Editor:

Last week the Clinton Administration proposed a new standard for
encrypting telephone messages and other electronic transmissions (see
John Markoff's articles in the New York Times, "Electronics Plan Aims to
Balance Government Access With Privacy," April 16, 1993, p.  A1, and
"Communications Plan Draws Mixed Reaction," April 17, 1993, p.  35). 
The announcement took by surprise many people who are concerned with the
security and privacy of digital communications.  The Society for
Electronic Access, an organization concerned with civil liberties and
access issues involving computers, believes that the government is
acting with undue speed in its desire to begin widespread use of the
"Clipper chip" in six months, before the full implications of its plans
have been explored.  We strongly believe that more thought and study
should be directed to the government's decision.  In its haste to
mediate between the desire of government agencies to intercept unlawful
communications and the right of citizens to privacy, the administration
may end up promoting a plan that is responsive to neither side. 

Among the issues that raise serious concerns:
 
+ Other encryption techniques currently in wide use have been subjected to 
rigorous public scrutiny, but the "Skipjack" algorithm embodied in Clipper 
is secret. No one knows whether it may contain unforeseen vulnerabilities 
or even deliberately-inserted backdoors for easy decoding. Examination by a 
government-picked panel of cryptographic experts is not sufficient to 
guarantee its security -- and certainly not the abbreviated examination 
that would be possible under the administration's fast-track plan for 
putting Clipper into service. At a very minimum, the Administration has an 
obligation to allow inspection by more independent experts, and to say why 
this scheme must be kept private, while other encryption standards of the 
past two decades have been widely published
 
+ The proposal to hold user's keys in escrow for wiretapping is
inadequately defined.  No one knows who will hold the keys, how they
will protect the key database from illicit access or how a Clipper phone
might be re-secured once its keys have been released for tapping. 
(Consider, by the way, that a magnetic tape cartridge holding keys for
all the telephones in America could fit in a shirt pocket.) Such crucial
issues should be settled before Clipper is even considered. 

+ By throwing its weight behind the Clipper chip, the government appears to 
be unfairly subsidizing a handful of companies at the expense of the rest 
of the U.S. telecommunications industry. (Indeed, others who have attempted 
to develop secure communications equipment have as often as not found 
roadblocks thrown in their way.) The rationale for awarding such an 
enormous potential windfall is unclear. 
 
+ Because the Clipper chip is not intended for export, U.S. companies that 
adopt it could be at a serious disadvantage in international markets. 
They would have to develop and maintain dual product lines or else 
cede the global competition for secure telecommunications to other 
nations.
 
The government should abandon its attempt to rush Clipper-based equipment 
into the market until these and other issues have been addressed. Although 
introduction of the Clipper chip does not (at least at the moment) appear 
intended to foreclose the development and sale of other encryption 
technologies, the government's preferred solution is likely to have a 
strong impact. If it turns out to be vulnerable, or if it impedes the entry 
of U.S. firms into the international market for secure telecommunications, 
both our constitutional freedoms and our economic competitiveness will be 
severely damaged. Any technology that bears such risks must be subjected to 
thorough public scrutiny and open debate before a decision is made on 
whether to adopt it. 


					Sincerely,



					Simona Nass
					President

Board of Directors:

Stacy Horn
Joe King
John McMullen
Simona Nass
Lance Rose, Esq.
Alexis Rosen
Paul Wallich



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: szabo@techbook.com (Nick Szabo)
Date: Sat, 24 Apr 93 18:47:13 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Consumer phone privacy info sheet
Message-ID: <m0nmvrE-000i30C@techbook.techbook.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Greetings cypherpunks,

I'm preparing this consumer phone privacy info sheet to post to
libernet, misc.consumers, etc.  Any corrections or further information 
greatly appreciated.

----------------------------------------------------------------

Instead of developing phones allowing truly private conversations, which
are now feasible, AT&T recently put a phone on the market that contains 
the NSA-designed "Clipper" wiretap chip.  All users' encryption keys are 
registered with the U.S. government, giving it exclusive access to 
wiretapping this system's phones.  The use of an unpublished algorithm 
and other features also make the system insecure; see the newsgroups 
sci.crypt and the mailing list "cypherpunks", cypherpunks-request@toad.com 
for details.  

AT&T by this action has demonstrated its contempt for its customers' 
privacy.  Here are some other long-distance providers that may have 
more respect.  All U.S. long-distance companies are required to surrender 
to telephone taps under government "authorization", but some require more 
"authorization" than others, or otherwise make a greater fuss about it.  
Companies which use primarily multichannel fiber optic lines are 
physically more difficult to tap.

Allnet Long Distance Services	1-800-783-2020
MCI, commercial			1-800-888-0800
MCI, residential		1-800-950-5555
Metromedia Communications Corp.	1-800-275-2273
One-2-One Communications	1-800-293-4121
Sprint, residential		1-800-877-7746
Sprint, business		1-800-733-5566

True privacy can be obtained with a veil of encryption, by using
pairs of phones containing privacy chips, which scramble the
signals *and* keep the keys private.  Contact your local business 
telephone dealers for privacy phones from Ericson and other companies.  
Please e-mail me detailed info on these phones, and also further
info on long distance services, and I will post a summary along with my 
own research findings.

Nick Szabo					szabo@techbook.com
Protect your electronic privacy with PGP -- public key available 



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: x62727g2@usma8.USMA.EDU (Gatlin Anthony CDT)
Date: Sat, 24 Apr 93 16:56:03 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Wiretap Chip
Message-ID: <9304242352.AA03691@usma8.usma.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Intellectual Marvels and Omniscient Beings,
     I am looking for some books on advanced bit manipulation techniques,
matrix manipulation algorithms, and variant functions. Does anyone have a
good bibliography?
     Also, if you have the source code for any of these things, I would be
interested in seeing it.

Thank you very much!

Anthony J. Gatlin                  |-------------------------------------|
Cadet Private, Co. G-2             |PGP Public Key available on request. |
United States Military Academy     |-------------------------------------|




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: gnu@cygnus.com
Date: Sat, 24 Apr 93 20:01:42 PDT
To: lile.elam@eng.sun.com
Subject: Brainstorm results from today's meeting
Message-ID: <9304250301.AA00503@cacophony.cygnus.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


We brainstormed questions and issues resulting from Clinton's crypto policy
review and `Clipper' proposal.  Here's the raw results.

Cypherpunks, please read it over; clarify your own questions if they
didn't get transcribed correctly, and send me the updates (as Unix diffs
or context diffs) at:  gnu@toad.com.

I'll collate the changes, and repost this document to cypherpunks.
When we're happy with it, the group can disseminate it to sci.crypt, 
news media, or whoever else.

	John Gilmore

Cypherpunks brainstorm question list
(copy to tenney@netcom.com)

Why is ATT the only one to find out early about this chip?

Why was it developed in secret?

Why not a competitive bid?

How much will it cost the taxpayers and the government to maintain
these two escrow agencies?

How much will escrow cost?

Who will pay for escrow?

what's the smallest number of people who could compromise this system
(in various configurations)?


What are the court, legislative, execute and wartime excuses for the
control of crypto?

Is emulation of clipper illegal?

Is reverse engineering illegal?

Is revealing algorithm (reverse engineered etc) illegal?

Consequences to the public if the algorithm or family key is revealed?

Does key escrow violate ED trade rules (the data protection aspects,
too)?

What's the protocol for generating keys?

How to regain privacy once a wiretap has been done?

Does a subpoena reveal earlier, recorded conversations?

How many people will know the family key?

Why hand out keys during a wiretap rather than give the cyphertext to
the escrow agency for decode?

What sort of escrow agencies have been considered?

Is it constitutional to delegate escrow to a private agency?

Is there a "separation of powers" issue?

How many people have access to the secret keys during generation?

Will smaller groups be able to establish their own escrow agencies?

How about privileged conversations (lawyer, doctor, clergy, client)?

Will the NSA claim that there is no alternative way to read messages
without the key(s)?

(How) will U.S. escrow rules have an affect on other crypto systems
like DigiCash?

Will US take subpoenas from foreign countries?

What protects US citizens fro foreign governments with violative laws?

What effect occurs for multinational companies?

Impact on intelligence gathering?

Can traffic analysis be done with serial number?

Will traffic analysis be done with serial number?

Will keys be shared with foreign intelligence organizations?

How many systems will there be to that can be used to decrypt?
Who will control them?

Would knowing the algorithms compromise security? If not, why not
publish them? If yes, what would be the effect of their discovery?

What protections do we have against blackmailing by escrow agents?

What about steaganography?

Will escrowed keys be shared with foreign intelligence organizations?

Will the make chips available now for reverse engineering?

Will it be illegal to encrypt before using clipper? How to enforce?

Will intelligence agencies be able to listen to the conversations they
are legally allowed to?

Will any decryption devices be made available to foreign intelligence
organizations?

What's the lifetime flow of keys from manufacturer, to escrow, to
wiretap agencies?

What protects the keys at each stage?

Why the hurry?

Why no public evaluation before deployment?

Where will all the decryption devices be kept?

What was the policy-making procedure that was followed in producing
this plan?

Who owns/controls Mykotronix?

Is the key escrow process online of offline?

Where will all the decryption devices be?

Since Skipjack was developed with government funds, how much is
Mykotronix compensating the government for their monopoly?

How are keys generated?

Where are keys generated?

How many key generation places/devices will there be?

Who gave the government the right to listen in?

How to citizens supply input to the crypto process? How to find out
the status?

How much will it cost to get a registered key?

Does the government believe citizens have the right to use/sell crypto
systems of our own choice?

Is the review process classified?

Do we have access to the outcome? Why?

First and Fifth Amendment issues?

Why was the Legislature not involved?

Why was industry not involved?

What evidence supports the governments claimed need to break into our
conversations?

What is it worth, breaking into our conversations?

How much cost should we bear?

What are the costs today of wiretaps?

Will we have to register to buy secure devices?

Will there be restriction on who can buy or sell them?

Are the escrowed keys tied to hardware or people?

Can we sell our clipper devices without re-registration?

Will Clipper be exportable?

Will individuals be able to take them overseas for personal use?

How long has this process been underway? Which agencies have been
involved? How long each?

Is Clipper only for voice, or data and other applications too?

Does it make sense to use Clipper for data storage?

Is Clipper intended to replace DES in all applications?

What scenarios dive the design of crypto policy?

What scenarios drive the design of Clipper?

What alternatives to Clipper have been considered?

How many successfully prosecuted terrorist cases have included wiretap
evidence?

What is the expected useful lifetime of the Clipper technology?

During the useful life what percent of keys is expected to be
revealed?

What other "family" members will be differentiated by different family
keys?

Have they filed an EIR on this?

Will it be possible to reuse a device which has been compromised?

What is the impact on society if the Clipper initiative doesn't
succeed?

How can a citizen tell if a Clipper-equipped product has been
compromised by a prior tap?

Can the chips be built overseas?

Can they be imported?

Have any Clipper chips been introduced to use yet? Where are those
keys escrowed now?

What challenge process have the Clipper chips survived?

What's an appropriate challenge process for crypto systems?

Who are the people with access to all the work products to build the
chips -- masks, net lists, wafers, half-built wafers, reject wafers?

What are the mechanisms for destroying the work products?

What is the procedure when the family key is revealed?

How can the public be sure keys will only be revealed upon proper
warrant?

How does a company qualify to manufacture Clipper chips? What does it
cost?

What environmental conditions will cause the chips programmed data to
be lost?

How does this (crypto) policy/process impact companies with existing
or future business in crypto?

How will backups of escrow agents be protected?

How many single points of failure are in the system?

Have war planners blessed the plan as acceptable risks during wartime?

What agencies have approved this plan? What agencies have DISapproved
this plan?

Given a single point of failure, what are the implications to national
security?

What about Clipper chip second-source in case of inability to
manufacture?

What impact on the economy would a temporary or permanent problem in
Mykotronix have?

Is this system immune to spoofing?

Are Clipper-encrypted devices more susceptible to jamming than other
systems or plaintext?

Does escrow release allow spoofing that user?

Does family key allow any user to be spoofed?

To hear both sides of a conversation, do you need two keys and two
warrants?

What kinds of protection is the government trying to  encourage?
Traffic analysis, Authenticity privacy, anonymity?

What is the question for which Clipper is the answer? What was it's
design goals?

How will leaks in the registration process or escrow process be
detected? (viz. leaks by SSA employees?)

How long will use remain voluntary?

Do citizens have the right to use any encryption system?

Do citizens have the right to research any encryption system?

Do non-citizens have the right to use/research encryption systems?

What agency will be responsible for auditing the escrow process or use
of revealed keys?

Is there civil or other liability for escrow agents who reveal keys
illegally?

Will we get specifications of the Clipper interface so that we can
build our own encryption chips?

Will the chip transmit identifying info in the clear? As part of the
standard protocol? As an option?

Are users required to use the protocols as specified if they use the
chip in their products?

What does the government see as it's role in setting standards for
domestic cryptography?

How to restore security after a wiretap?

What is the numerical risk of the system being cracked within a year?
5 years? 10 years?

What is the risk of it's being cracked without the knowledge of the
public?

Will government feel that it is legal to record encrypted
conversations without violated the subjects rights? (Because it is
secure.)

What measures will the government use to promulgate this proposal?

Has government offered incentives to companies to encourage them to
adopt it?

How long will it take from warrant to obtain keys? (Fast response for
terrorists?)

How will the number of revealed keys be limited? By law? Currently
less than 1000 wiretaps/year.)

Will Clipper chips be allowed or required in pay phones?

Is this proposed to be accompanied by changes to the phone systems as
the Digital Telephony proposal suggested?

Who bought Dorothy Denning and for how much?

Where does Dorothy Denning's funding come from?

If wiretappers record conversations how long will the be able to save
them?

Is Clipper suitable for use in a national health care information
system?

What are the national security implications of the availability of
unavailability of encryption?

What is the cost of alternative involving direct interception of voice
using microphones?

How will the other (non-search-warranted) person involved in a wiretap
be protected?

How does the government feel about a foreign company doing business in
the US and talking to their own governments?

How will encrypted cellular phone standards be determined? In a public
process?

How will end-to-end encryption standards for phones be determined? How
will these be made interoperable?

What is the legal process required to tap a persons communications?
Then what further process is needed to decrypt intercepted
communication?

How will this scheme prevent criminals from circumventing the system?
(Buy a phone, use it only once, etc)

Does Clipper reveal the chip phone number it's receiving from, in
normal operation, like caller ID?

Can law enforcement ask for it's own keys (eg. in a sting operation?)

Can citizens query the escrow database for their own keys?

Can users determine their own chip number?

How does this interface with ISDN?

Does a warrant give access to all phones in the house (or other
warranted site)?

How will this jeopardize citizen's rights to anonymity in voting (and
electronic voting)?

Does this technology enable the same invasions as caller ID?

What is the procedure if a phone is stolen?

Why don't we develop a privacy policy rather than a policy on
cryptography?

What is the governments policy on privacy with respect to
cryptography?

What is the reaction from Data Protection Boards in other countries?

Can an individual ask whether or not that are being wiretapped? What
changes are recommended in those laws? 

What are they going to do about RSA patents on which they are
infringing?

Will a search warrant cover a phone, a line, a person, or device, or
place?

What is going to be done about "Clipper" trademark conflict?

Can you find the unit key of your own device?

What will be done about other patents being infringed?

What are the implications of swapping chips between devices?

How to government and private need for privacy differ?

Is it worth risking the privacy of 240 million citizens for 1000
wiretaps a year?

In what other areas can this technology be used (camcorders, FAX, etc)

How will clipper keep up with current advances in semiconductor speed,
given restrictions on who can build  them?

Who is Clipper for? Who benefits?

Is chip packaging part of security of the device, or is it all in the
fab? (eg. can it fit in any desirable package.)

How does technology and fab requirements affect  yield and price?

How will chips and devices be tested?

Are there "undocumented" test modes that might reveal properties of
the algorithm or programming?

How does current Clipper design relate to the designers previous
designs? (personal design style, libraries used, etc)

Could Clipper be integrated economically with a general purpose CPU?

What statistics will the chip main on-board? Who will get specs?

What info will Clipper subliminally transmit in messages?

How does the strength of Clipper compare to DES, RSA, or IDEA? How
does the efficiency compare?

Do you plan to monitor peoples movie choices selected via "video
dialtone" services?

Will there be a mechanism for particular people to keep their IDs out
of the database? (judges, law enforcement, etc)

Will the NSA or law enforcement use Clipper themselves? Will their
keys be escrowed in the same way?

If Clipper is not good enough for law enforcement etc why is it good
enough for private individuals?

What secondary uses (without serial numbers) will be made of the
escrow database? (ie. counts of families, where families were
sold/shipped, etc)

Will chip numbers be correlated with personal ID (soc sec number,
etc)?

How will they ensure that further uses of the escrow data base be
prevented? (see census database misuses)

What happens if a (the?) Global Crypto Review policy says Clipper is a
bad design? What if it says that the government shouldn't be setting
crypto policy?

What is the implication of another company/country produces a
competing device?

Why is DES still not exportable?

What is the cost to commerce of export controls on crypto? Cost to
privacy? Cost to civil liberties? Cost to trust in government? Cost to
programs where crypto is ancillary (Prokey, Aldus Freehand, PKZIP,
etc) "Not for export outside US or Canada"

How would a non-escrowed-key crypto policy work?

How does export control of a work of art or literary work survive a
First Amendment challenge?

Can crypto source code be exported on paper, in a book, in human
readable form? Can the same code be exported as bits? As bar code?
Printed? 

What cryptographic systems can currently be cracked by the NSA? At
what cost?

How much has been spent on crypto research in the last 50 years?

How many fundamental mathematical breakthroughs have been made and
revealed? How many are still secret?

What is the cost to society of the secrecy?

Would disclosure of the Skipjack/Clipper process/method/algorithm
compromise it?

How will we find reputable independent cryptographers who are willing
to live within the limits imposed by getting a security clearance?

What tangible results have benefited society from the intelligence
community? Were they worth the cost?

Has the intelligence community ever prevented a nuclear war? A
terrorist attack affecting N (100,000?) people?

How does the security of ClipperPhones compare to STU-35's? The cost?

How many patent secrecy orders on crypto exist? Communications
secrecy?

Total number of patent secrecy orders are now in effect?

What is the expected incidence of finding encrypted material in
wiretaps without Clipper?

How many crypto documents been declassified and reclassified? Why?

By what authority did the NSA stop the phone encryption standard?

What is the proper role in NSA setting domestic cryptography
standards? ...policy?

How can NIST be made independent of the NSA influence in setting
domestic policy?

How does secrecy detract from America's global competitiveness?

What would be the international equivalent of "Clipper", allowing
international business and wiretapping by all the governments?

How many Clipper chips does the government expect one person to own?

Can a free society be founded upon a societal model that assumes no
ability to have truly private conversations?

Can strong cryptography be outlawed while keeping freedom of inquiry
and expression?

How does Clipper interrelate with ISDN?

Should the Federal government be allowed to accomplish with it's
commercial and publicity activities what is prohibited from doing with
it's enumerated powers?

Will Clipper allow banks to stop using DES?

If stored data can be encrypted with Clipper, can a warrant be
obtained to decrypt stored information? What procedural safeguard will
exist, like special requirements for wiretap requirements?

Under what conditions or protections can a person be forced to reveal
your keys? ...an escrow agency...?

How can freedom of conscience be preserved when there is no privacy?

Can Clipper be used for authentication? Can the government circumvent
this if so?

Are there different levels of protection for different types of data?

Why is Capstone chip just made known to the public?

-- THAT'S ALL FOLKS!!




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: tburns@gmuvax.gmu.edu (Dave Burns)
Date: Sat, 24 Apr 93 18:22:30 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com (NO wiretap chip!)
Subject: Re: CLIPPER: Explanation sheet?
Message-ID: <9304250123.AA02389@gmuvax2.gmu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



>I have compiled a "layperson's" Clipper-shit I mean sheet containing a very
>short intro, announcements from the White House, AT&T, td various news articles.  David, I will mail you a copy.  If anyone
>else wants one, let me know.
>
>--
>Valerie Lambert * valerie@biocad.com * 415/903-3923 * AT&T: phones with Big
>Brother Built Inside!  Just say "NO" to the Clipper wiretap chip.

May I have one? Wouldn't it be easier to just post it? Conside-------------------------------------
Dave Burns      tburns@gmuvax.gmu.edu
10310 Main St. #116 Fairfax, VA 22030
(703)993-1142 Wiretap Chip:IMPOSSIBLE (was Breakfast)
-------------------------------------





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: fergp@sytex.com (Paul Ferguson)
Date: Sun, 25 Apr 93 10:27:52 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Crypto references
Message-ID: <okJJ3B2w165w@sytex.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


On Sat, 24 Apr 93 19:52:42 EDT,
 Gatlin Anthony CDT <uunet!usma8.USMA.EDU!x62727g2> wrote -
 
AG> I am looking for some books on advanced bit manipulation
AG> techniques, matrix manipulation algorithms, and variant
AG> functions. Does anyone have a good bibliography?
 
 The WIRED May/June issue (page 59) listed probably the most relevant
 books  on the topics (including the not-so-relevant) -
 
8<------ Cut Here ---------
 
The Bedside Crypto Reader
Further Readings on Cypherpunk Topics
 
General
-------
 
The Codebreakers                    Puzzle Palace
 
David Kahn (Macmillan, 1967).       James Bamford (Penguin, 1983).
The seminal cryptographic history.  A classic expose of thr National
                                    Security Agency.
 
Books on Cryptographic Systems
------------------------------
 
Contemporary Cryptography           Cryptography and Data Security
 
Edited by Gustavus J. Simmons       Dorothy Denning (Addison-Wesley,
(IEEE Press, 1991). A fairly        1982). A good primer to the
technical volume offering solid     workings of crypto systems.
background on the subject,
including a chapter on the history
of public-key cryptography by
Whitfield Diffie.
 
Sci-Fi Novels Beloved by Cypherpunks
------------------------------------
 
Ender's Game
 
Orson Scott Card (Tor, 1985). Some vivid scenarios in which crypto
anonymity is crucial.
 
Shock-Wave Rider
 
John Brunner (Balintine, 1976). Chilling representation of an
oppresive lack of privacy in a networked society.
 
True Names
 
Werner Vinge (Blue Jay Books, 1984). A novel of cyberspace-style
sojourns that outline links between electronic identity and physical
identity.
 
Cheers.

Paul Ferguson                    |  Uncle Sam wants to read
Network Integration Consultant   |       your e-mail...
Centreville, Virginia USA        | Just say "NO" to the Clipper
fergp@sytex.com                  |          Chip...




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: J. Michael Diehl <mdiehl@triton.unm.edu>
Date: Sun, 25 Apr 93 02:30:36 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: garbage files from pgp.
Message-ID: <9304250754.AA07568@triton.unm.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I'm still having problems with pgp.  Sometimes when I use the program to encrypt
a file, I get an output file full of trash.  Other times, it works fine.  I 
don't understand.  Is this a bug, or am I just not using it righ, still?
Thanx in advance.
 
+-----------------------+-----------------------------+---------+
| J. Michael Diehl ;-)  | I thought I was wrong once. | PGP KEY |
|                       |    But, I was mistaken.     |available|
|                       +-----------------------------+---------+
| mdiehl@triton.unm.edu | "I'm just looking for the opportunity |
| mike.diehl@fido.org   | to be Politically Incorrect!   <Me>   |
| (505) 299-2282        |                                       |
+-----------------------+---------------------------------------+
 





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Timothy Newsham <newsham@wiliki.eng.hawaii.edu>
Date: Sun, 25 Apr 93 12:04:37 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: encrypted irc
Message-ID: <9304251904.AA09776@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



I have implemented an encryption scheme with key exchange
in an IRC client.  It is now in working condition.  Here
are the details.  Mail me if you wish to have a copy
sent to you.

---- file: README ----------

this is a tinyirc client (client not written by me)
but I added in encryption..  Right now encryption is
done in DES for messages and RSA for key exchange.

To set it up,  unarchive (you probably already did this)
then type :
     make
this should make a program called 'sock'

now you need to go into the RSA directory and make yourself
a keypair.

     cd RSA
     make genrsa
     make genprim
     genrsa

this makes two files  'public' and 'secret'.  You need to install
these:
     mv secret ..
     mv public ../<yournick>

and give out your public key to everyone you want to talk to.
This lets them send their key to you.

run sock:
      cd ..
      sock

join the same channel as your friend you wish to talk to:
      /join #channel

send them your key,  this lets them read any message typed by
you (note you have to be in the same channel as them)
      /key <your friend>

(note the public key must be in the current directory)
your friend will receive your key, and now everything you type
can be read by him.  In order to send your key to your friend
you must have the file <your friend> in your directory that
is <your friend>'s public key.  He must have the matching
secret key in the file 'secret' in his directory.  If your
friend changes nick's and the filename of his key isnt the
same as his nick you can specify the file:
       /key <your friend> <filename of his key>

thats it!  Everything you type is encrypted with the same key
which is chosen at random when you start up 'sock'.  Every time
you use sock a new key is used.  Every time you want to talk to
a new person you have to send them your key.  Anyone who has
your key can read any of your messages,  so if you dont want
people reading your messages dont give them your key.  Everything
you type is encrypted.


some public keys are already provided in pubkeys/*
copy them into current directory to use them.
--------
Weaknesses:

  (1) serial number and DES key are generated with rand()
      after seeding with time value.  They are generated at
      the same time, and serial number is a publically known
      value.  This could allow people to brute force search
      through the pseudo-random numbers and find your key.
      This *should* be fixed, any ideas/

  (2) RSA key as created by 'genrsa' is not very long!  It
      is crackable right now.  This could be lengthened
      easily enough by modifying genrsa.c .  The rest of
      the program doesnt care what length key is used.

  (3) You can send alot of garbage to someone's screen by
      sending out wrong key's and/or sending out bad
      data matching keys already aquired.
      possible solution: header inside of the encrypted
      data.  1 character would give a 1/256 chance of
      this attack working.

  (4) probably alot more I didnt think about.

----------
Protocol:

there are two types of messages,  one to send keys across
to other people, one to send across encrypted messages, all
messages are sent to the current irc channel, not through messages
to individual people:

   SKPJACK:xxxx:yyyy:zzzzz
        xxxx - the nick name of the intended recipient
        yyyy - the serial number of the key being transfered
        zzzz - ascii encoded RSA data
     messages of this format are used to send private keys (DES
     keys) to the recipient, ie   /key nick.
     Messages received are ignored if xxxxx isnt our current nick.

   CLIPPER:xxxx:yyyy
         xxxx - the serial number of the key used to encrypt
         yyyy - the ascii encoded crypted data (DES)
     messages of this format are used to send encrypted chat
     messages.  Messages received are ignored if we dont have
     the key corresponding to the serial number. 

   ascii coding:  each byte is broken into 2 nybbles (4 bits)
   and sent across as two characters,  the first nybble
   is sent as   hi+'a' and the second is sent as lo+'A'
   so alternate characters are always upper then lower then
   upper case and so on.  (byte = hi<<4 + lo)
    
   Keys are generated randomly and each key has a random 
   32 bit serial number associated with it.  The program
   uses the serial number to decided which key to decrypt 
   with.  The program keeps all the keys it receives.
   All messages you type are sent with your key,  all messages
   you receive are decoded with the key matching the serial
   number sent with it.
   
     
-----
CREDITS

Alot of this software was not written by me, In fact my part
was minimal.  I stole code from the following people:

The basic IRC client (tinyIRC) by:
 Nathan Laredo - "Green" 
 gt7080a@prism.gatech.edu 


The RSA package by:    (email address is no longer valid)

  Martin Nicolay		( martin@trillian.megalon.de )
  Fliederstr. 23
  4100 Duisburg 1
  W-Germany

I couldn't reach him via email.  I got this package via
anon-ftp,  I hope he doesnt mind use of it in this program.


The DES package (d3des):

 D3DES (V5.09) -

 A portable, public domain, version of the Data Encryption Standard.

 Written with Symantec's THINK (Lightspeed) C by Richard Outerbridge.
 Thanks to: Dan Hoey for his excellent Initial and Inverse permutation
 code;  Jim Gillogly & Phil Karn for the DES key schedule code; Dennis
 Ferguson, Eric Young and Dana How for comparing notes; and Ray Lau,
 for humouring me on.

 Copyright (c) 1988,1989,1990,1991,1992 by Richard Outerbridge.
 (GEnie : OUTER; CIS : [71755,204]) Graven Imagery, 1992.

He says "public domain" and then later "Copyright".  I assume
he means "freely distributable, useable".

If any of you are out there thanx alot!  Your code is much
appreciated.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: x62727g2@usma8.USMA.EDU (Gatlin Anthony CDT)
Date: Sun, 25 Apr 93 08:44:12 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: WIRED
Message-ID: <9304251541.AA13969@usma8.usma.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


How can I subscribe to WIRED?

Anthony J. Gatlin                  |-------------------------------------|
Cadet Private, Co. G-2             |PGP Public Key available on request. |
United States Military Academy     |-------------------------------------|




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: rustman@netcom.com (Rusty Hodge)
Date: Sun, 25 Apr 93 11:56:34 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Consumer phone privacy info sheet
In-Reply-To: <m0nmvrE-000i30C@techbook.techbook.com>
Message-ID: <9304251856.AA12774@netcom2.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> Companies which use primarily multichannel fiber optic lines are 
> physically more difficult to tap.

Don't think so.  Unless you have fiber running from your location (your home)
to the calling party's location.

The tap is placed on the subscriber loop - which for the time being is analog
for most voice service.  And even if it is digital, it is still copper from
the CO.

If you are concerned with eavesdropping, then your statement is accurate.
It is very easy to eavesdrop on microwave and satellite long distance.

I suspect the Clipper chip will be used heavily in digital cellular phones,
if it isn't too much of a power hog.

-- 




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Derek Atkins <warlord@Athena.MIT.EDU>
Date: Sun, 25 Apr 93 09:33:02 PDT
To: x62727g2@usma8.USMA.EDU (Gatlin Anthony CDT)
Subject: Re: WIRED
In-Reply-To: <9304251541.AA13969@usma8.usma.edu>
Message-ID: <9304251632.AA10525@podge>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I believe the number is +1 800 GO WIRED, but I'm not 100%
sure...

-derek

  Derek Atkins, MIT '93, Electrical Engineering and Computer Science
     Secretary, MIT Student Information Processing Board (SIPB)
           MIT Media Laboratory, Speech Research Group
           warlord@MIT.EDU       PP-ASEL        N1NWH




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Peter shipley <shipley@merde.dis.org>
Date: Sun, 25 Apr 93 12:41:55 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re:  Congressional FAX numbers
Message-ID: <9304251939.AA00802@merde.dis.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/x-pgp


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----


>From: rteasdal@polyslo.csc.calpoly.edu (Rusty)
>
>>CA 19   Robert J.         Lagomarsino    (202)225-3601 (202)225-3096
>
>
>        Whoops! This one, at least, is dated information. In the 19th
>district, Slagomarsino got his ass sent packing home by Michael Huffington
>in the Republican primaries, and a good thing, too (Slag was an early
>and ardent supporter of the federal "gag rule" on abortion).
>
>        I'm not sure where Huffington would stand on the Clipper issue.
>On the one hand, he's a transplanted Texas oil money scion who more or
>less bought his seat in the single most expensive media blitz waged for
>a House campaign last year (or any other year, for that matter). Still
>and all, he seems to belong to the nearly extinct progressive wing of
>the Republican party, based on views and actions to date. I suspect that
>this independence of thought comes of not having to kowtow to the hard
>right to get cash - $100 million in fuck-you money helps immensely.
>
>        I also don't know if the number's still accurate. I shall
>certainly be finding out.
>
>                                                Rusty
>
>

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.2

iQBFAgUBK9rpBshmn7GUWLLFAQFWEwF+LqQ/Yg3Gpd1QcN2WfI6SVzZ9lCCJ7Aer
AcHwLfpku2g0EDm/vsNLw/gfdhw6zwZG
=Yt1P
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Round Waffle <eggo@student.umass.edu>
Date: Sun, 25 Apr 93 11:32:01 PDT
To: x62727g2@usma8.USMA.EDU (Gatlin Anthony CDT)
Subject: Re: WIRED
In-Reply-To: <9304251541.AA13969@usma8.usma.edu>
Message-ID: <9304251830.AA10237@titan.ucs.umass.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text


Possessed by The Unholy, Gatlin Anthony CDT scrawled the following in blood:
> 
> How can I subscribe to WIRED?
> 
> Anthony J. Gatlin                  |-------------------------------------|
> Cadet Private, Co. G-2             |PGP Public Key available on request. |
> United States Military Academy     |-------------------------------------|
> 

     Here's the info:

Wired
PO Box 191826
San Francisco, CA 94119-1826
(800) SO-WIRED
lr@wired.com  -Lou Rossetto (editor)
$19.95 for one year (6 issues)


+-   eggo@titan.ucs.umass.edu      --><--       Eat Some Paste   -+
+-          Yorn desh born, der ritt de gitt der gue,            -+
+-      Orn desh, dee born desh, de umn bork! bork! bork!        -+
+----------------- The Durex Blender Corporation -----------------+



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Pat Farrell"  <pfarrell@cs.gmu.edu>
Date: Sun, 25 Apr 93 13:47:04 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Congressional phone/fax, VA 11th district
Message-ID: <60448.pfarrell@cs.gmu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


The list that Paul sent out didn't even acknowledge that Virginia has
an 11th district. The congresswoman is Leslie Byrne
Phone (202) 225-1492
Fax (202) 255-2274

Pat

Pat Farrell      Grad Student                 pfarrell@cs.gmu.edu
Department of Computer Science    George Mason University, Fairfax, VA
Public key availble via finger          #include <standard.disclaimer>




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: tenney@netcom.com (Glenn S. Tenney)
Date: Sun, 25 Apr 93 18:17:57 PDT
To: COMMUNET%UVMVM.BITNET@uga.cc.uga.edu
Subject: No Subject
Message-ID: <9304260117.AA12424@netcom.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I received a fax of a letter from Representative Markey (Subcommittee on
Telecommunications and Finance) to Ron Brown (Secretary of Commerce). 
Since encryption and the Clipper chip are raised in this letter, I felt it
would be of interest to you.  I understand that on 29 April, Mr. Markey
will be holding a hearing on the questions raised in this letter.  There
may also be a follow-on hearing dedicated to the clipper chip, but that's
not definite.

I'm sending this to a few people (via BCC) and to a few mailing lists
(listed in the TO line) related to privacy, encryption, clipper chip, etc. 
I'l also be posting this to the sci.crypt and alt.clipper newsgroups. 
Because of the traffic on some of the mailing lists, if you have a comment
for me you should email directly to me.

I've typed in the letter, which follows.  Any errors in transcription are
mine...

---
Glenn Tenney
tenney@netcom.com            Amateur radio: AA6ER
Voice: (415) 574-3420        Fax: (415) 574-0546


------------------ letter of interest follows ----------------

April 19, 1993

The Honorable Ronald H. Brown
Secretary
Department of Commerce
14th and Pennsylvania Ave., NW
Washington, DC 20236

Dear Secretary Brown:

   As you know, I have long been interested in the privacy and security of
telecommunications transmissions and data in a networked environment. 
Recent reports concerning the Administration's endorsement of an electronic
encryption standard, based upon "clipper chip" technology, have raised a
number of related issues.  The international competitiveness of U.S. high
tech manufacturers and the software industry is a key factor that the
government should consider when addressing issues of encryption and data
security.  As the nation moves forward in developing the national
communications and information infrastructure, security of
telecommunications transmissions and network data will be an increasingly
important factor for protecting the privacy of users.

   The "hacker" community can compromise the integrity of
telecommunications transmissions and databases linked by the network.  The
people and businesses that use the nation's telecommunications network and
the personal computers linked through it increasingly are demanding that
information be protected against unauthorized access, alteration, and
theft.

   I am concerned that the Administration's plan may mean that to remain
competitive internationally, U.S. companies would be compelled to develop
two products -- one for U.S. government customers, and another for private,
commercial users who may want a higher encryption standard.  This may
inadvertently increase costs to those U.S. companies hoping to serve both
markets.  To assist the Subcommittee's analysis of this issue, please
respond to the following questions:

1. Has the encryption algorithm or standard endorsed by the Administration
been tested by any entity other than NSA, NIST or the vendor?  If so,
please identify such entities and the nature of testing performed.  If not,
please describe any plans to have the algorithm tested by outside experts
and how such experts will be chosen.

2. Under the Administration's plan, what entities will be the holders of
the "keys" to decrypt scrambled data?  What procedures or criteria will the
Administration utilize to designate such key holders?

3. Does the encryption algorithm endorsed by the Administration contain a
"trap door" or "back door," which could allow an agency or entity of the
Federal government to crack the code?

4. It is clear that over time, changes in technologies used for
communications will require new techniques and additional equipment.  How
will encryption devices adapt to the rapid advancement of
telecommunications technology?

5. What additional costs would the proposed encryption place on the Federal
government?  What is the estimated cost to consumers and businesses which
opt for the federal standard in their equipment?

6. What is the Commerce Department's assessment of the competitive impact
of the Administration's endorsement of the "clipper chip" technology on
U.S. exports of computer and telecommunications hardware and software
products?

   I would appreciate your response by no later than close-of-business,
Wednesday, April 28, 1993.  If you have any questions, please have your
staff contact Colin Crowell or Karen Colannino of the Subcommittee staff at
(202) 226-2424.

Sincerely,

Edward J. Markey
Chairman

###





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Valerie Lambert <valerie@valis.biocad.com>
Date: Sun, 25 Apr 93 20:00:37 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: By popular request: A non-techy Clipper blurb
Message-ID: <9304260159.AA13719@valis.biocad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Well, I received more than a dozen requests for this since I mentioned it
here, and two people said I should post it.  You have probably seen it
all in one form or another already, but this is a handy package to send
to other people who need an introduction to the issue.  Embellish the intro,
snip/forward at will.

----- begin blurb -----

INFORMATION ABOUT THE CLIPPER WIRETAP CHIP.  DISTRIBUTE FREELY.


The Clipper chip has been designed and introduced by the Federal government
to standardize encryption technology so that law enforcement agencies can
listen in on "private" conversations in electronic media.  The device will
initially be installed in government phones, and AT&T will also sell it for
individual and business use.  It is clear that the government would very
much like the Clipper to become the standard for all future domestic
electronic "private" communication.  Many respected professionals in
telecommunications and related industries fear that the government may
soon make moves to outlaw or otherwise kill other encryption technology
that could compete with the Clipper.

This is not unlike the government demanding that you give them a sealed
copy of all your future phone conversations and other computer-facilitated
communications, just in case they ever want to open and examine them later.

A pertinent quote from John Perry Barlow of the Electronic Frontier
Foundation:

     The legal right to express oneself is meaningless if there is no
     secure medium through which that expression may travel. By the same
     token, the right to hold certain unpopular opinions is forfeit unless
     one can discuss those opinions with others of like mind without the
     government listening in.

     ...there is a kind of corrupting power in the ability to create
     public policy in secret while assuring that the public will have
     little secrecy of its own...

This message contains announcements from the White House, AT&T, the
Electronic Frontier Foundation, the Computer Professionals for Social
Responsibility, and various news articles.  Technical details and darker,
deeper, evaluations of the Clipper project are available; see the usenet
newsgroup sci.crypt for current info and pointers.
_______________________________________________________________________________

FROM THE WHITE HOUSE

From: clipper@csrc.ncsl.nist.gov (Clipper Chip Announcement)
Subject: White House Public Encryption Management Fact Sheet
Organization: National Institute of Standards & Technology
Date: Fri, 16 Apr 1993 20:44:58 GMT


Note:     The following was released by the White House today in
          conjunction with the announcement of the Clipper Chip
          encryption technology.

                           FACT SHEET

                  PUBLIC ENCRYPTION MANAGEMENT

The President has approved a directive on "Public Encryption
Management."  The directive provides for the following:

Advanced telecommunications and commercially available encryption
are part of a wave of new computer and communications technology. 
Encryption products scramble information to protect the privacy of
communications and data by preventing unauthorized access. 
Advanced telecommunications systems use digital technology to
rapidly and precisely handle a high volume of communications. 
These advanced telecommunications systems are integral to the
infrastructure needed to ensure economic competitiveness in the
information age.

Despite its benefits, new communications technology can also
frustrate lawful government electronic surveillance.  Sophisticated
encryption can have this effect in the United States.  When
exported abroad, it can be used to thwart foreign intelligence
activities critical to our national interests.  In the past, it has
been possible to preserve a government capability to conduct
electronic surveillance in furtherance of legitimate law
enforcement and national security interests, while at the same time
protecting the privacy and civil liberties of all citizens.  As
encryption technology improves, doing so will require new,
innovative approaches.

In the area of communications encryption, the U. S. Government has
developed a microcircuit that not only provides privacy through
encryption that is substantially more robust than the current
government standard, but also permits escrowing of the keys needed
to unlock the encryption.  The system for the escrowing of keys
will allow the government to gain access to encrypted information
only with appropriate legal authorization.

To assist law enforcement and other government agencies to collect
and decrypt, under legal authority, electronically transmitted
information, I hereby direct the following action to be taken:

INSTALLATION OF GOVERNMENT-DEVELOPED MICROCIRCUITS

The Attorney General of the United States, or her representative,
shall request manufacturers of communications hardware which
incorporates encryption to install the U.S. government-developed
key-escrow microcircuits in their products.  The fact of law
enforcement access to the escrowed keys will not be concealed from
the American public.  All appropriate steps shall be taken to
ensure that any existing or future versions of the key-escrow
microcircuit are made widely available to U.S. communications
hardware manufacturers, consistent with the need to ensure the
security of the key-escrow system.  In making this decision, I do
not intend to prevent the private sector from developing, or the
government from approving, other microcircuits or algorithms that
are equally effective in assuring both privacy and a secure key-
escrow system.

KEY-ESCROW

The Attorney General shall make all arrangements with appropriate
entities to hold the keys for the key-escrow microcircuits
installed in communications equipment.  In each case, the key
holder must agree to strict security procedures to prevent
unauthorized release of the keys.  The keys shall be released only
to government agencies that have established their authority to
acquire the content of those communications that have been
encrypted by devices containing the microcircuits.  The Attorney
General shall review for legal sufficiency the procedures by which
an agency establishes its authority to acquire the content of such
communications.

PROCUREMENT AND USE OF ENCRYPTION DEVICES

The Secretary of Commerce, in consultation with other appropriate
U.S. agencies, shall initiate a process to write standards to
facilitate the procurement and use of encryption devices fitted
with key-escrow microcircuits in federal communications systems
that process sensitive but unclassified information.  I expect this
process to proceed on a schedule that will permit promulgation of
a final standard within six months of this directive. 

The Attorney General will procure and utilize encryption devices to
the extent needed to preserve the government's ability to conduct
lawful electronic surveillance and to fulfill the need for secure
law enforcement communications.  Further, the Attorney General
shall utilize funds from the Department of Justice Asset Forfeiture
Super Surplus Fund to effect this purchase.
_______________________________________________________________________________

FROM AT&T

 AT&T TO INCORPORATE NEW 'CLIPPER' CHIP INTO SECURE COMMUNICATIONS
PRODUCT LINE

GREENSBORO, N.C., April 16


    AT&T (NYSE: T) said today it is moving to improve the security and privacy
of telephone communications by incorporating a just-announced new U.S.
government technology for voice  encryption  into its secure communications
product line.

   AT&T will use the Clipper chip, announced today by President Clinton as a 
new technology for voice  encryption,  in all of its secure telephone products
except those specially designed for government classified customers.  The
Commerce Department has announced a six-month timetable for the final
certification of Clipper.

   "AT&T is pleased to be the first company to publicly commit to adoption of
the Clipper chip," said Ed Hickey, AT&T vice president, Secure Communications
Systems.  "We believe it will give our customers far greater protection in
defeating hackers or eavesdroppers attempting to intercept a call.

   "And now all commercially available AT&T voice  encryption  products will 
be compatible with each other, a major step forward in bringing secure
communications capabilities to the business community."

   In standardizing AT&T voice  encryption  products on the Clipper chip, AT&T
will include the algorithm in the Telephone Security Device as well as in the
Secure Voice/Data Terminal.

   The AT&T Telephone Security Device is a compact, lightweight unit that 
brings advance  encryption  technology to conventional land-line and cellular
telephones.  It provides a powerful, convenient and reliable way to protect 
the most sensitive telephone conversations.

   The device works with a conventional land-line or transportable/mobile
cellular phone.  It turns the phone's signal into a digital stream of 
encrypted information that is decrypted by a Telephone Security Device 
attached to the phone at the receiving end of the call.

   The AT&T Telephone Security Device connects easily to desk telephones or
tranportable or mobile phones.  It weighs 1.5 pounds and is 7 inches long, 4.5
inches wide and 1.5 inches high.  And it's as easy to use as it is portable.

   The AT&T Secure Voice/Data Terminals are desktop telephones that provide
 encryption  for both telephone calls and data transmissions.

   These AT&T secure communications products use an enhanced voice  
encryption  technique that provides very high voice quality.  This technology 
allows calls placed with these products to approach the voice quality of 
normal calls.

   To further enhance interoperability, AT&T will consider licensing to other
manufacturers its enabling technologies for interoperability. Interoperability
of  encryption  devices requires common technology beyond the use of a common
 encryption  algorithm, specifically common methods of digital voice encoding
and signaling.

   AT&T has already performed integration tests with Clipper chips 
manufactured by the government's supplier, Mykotronx Inc., of Torrence, 
Calif., and is preparing to integrate the chip into the manufacturing of its 
secure products.   AT&T's Clipper-equipped telephone security devices will be 
available to customers by the end of the second quarter.

    The federal government intends to adopt the Clipper chip as the
standard for voice  encryption  to help protect proprietary information,
protect the privacy of personal phone conversations and prevent
unauthorized release of data transmitted electonically.  At the same
time, use of the Clipper chip will preserve the ability of federal,
state and local law enforcement agencies to intercept lawfully the phone
conversations of criminals.
    "Adoption of Clipper will support both the government's efforts to
protect the public and the public's right to privacy," Hickey said.
    AT&T Secure Communication Systems provides products to protect
voice, data, fax, cellular and video communications.  It also engineers
and integrates secure communications applications.  Its customers
include the governments of the United States and other nations as well
as major corporations around the world.
    AT&T Secure Communications Systems is headquartered in Greensboro.
    For more information about the AT&T Telephone Security Device 3600
and other AT&T Secure Communications Products, call David Arneke at
919-279-7680.
     CONTACT: David Arneke of AT&T Secure Communications Systems, 919-279-
7680,or after hours, 919-273-5687, or Herb Linnen of AT&T Media Relations,
202-457-3933, or after hours, 202-333-9162
_______________________________________________________________________________

FROM THE ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUNDATION

Date: Fri, 16 Apr 1993 15:17:02 -0400
From: Cliff Figallo <fig@eff.org>
Subject: EFFector Online 5.06
To: eff-news@eff.org (eff-news mailing list)

******************************************************************
           //////////////     //////////////     //////////////
         ///                ///                ///
       ///////            ///////            ///////
     ///                ///                ///
   //////////////     ///                ///
******************************************************************
EFFector Online Volume 5 No. 6       4/16/1993       editors@eff.org
A Publication of the Electronic Frontier Foundation   ISSN 1062-9424

...

                       April 16, 1993

      INITIAL EFF ANALYSIS OF CLINTON PRIVACY AND SECURITY  
                           PROPOSAL

       The Clinton Administration today made a major announcement 
on cryptography policy which will effect the privacy and security of 
millions of Americans.  The first part of the plan is to begin a 
comprehensive inquiry into major communications privacy issues 
such as export controls which have effectively denied most people 
easy access to robust encryption as well as law enforcement issues 
posed by new technology.

       However, EFF is very concerned that the Administration has 
already reached a conclusion on one critical part of the inquiry, before 
any public comment or discussion has been allowed.  Apparently, the 
Administration is going to use its leverage to get all telephone 
equipment vendors to adopt a voice encryption standard developed 
by the National Security Agency. The so-called "Clipper Chip" is an 
80-bit, split key escrowed encryption scheme which will be built into 
chips manufactured by a military contractor.  Two separate escrow 
agents would store users' keys, and be required to turn them over 
law enforcement upon presentation of a valid warrant.  The 
encryption scheme used is to be classified, but they chips will be 
available to any manufacturer for incorporation into their 
communications products.

       This proposal raises a number of serious concerns .

       First, the Administration appears to be adopting a solution 
before conducting an inquiry.  The NSA-developed Clipper chip may 
not be the most secure product. Other vendors or developers may 
have better schemes. Furthermore, we should not rely on the 
government as the sole source for Clipper or any other chips.  Rather,
independent chip manufacturers should be able to produce chipsets 
based on open standards.

       Second, an algorithm can not be trusted unless it can be tested. 
Yet the Administration proposes to keep the chip algorithm 
classified.  EFF believes that any standard adopted ought to be public 
and open.  The public will only have confidence in the security of a 
standard that is open to independent, expert scrutiny.  

       Third, while the use of the split-key, dual-escrowed 
system may prove to be a reasonable balance between privacy and 
law enforcement needs, the details of this scheme must be explored 
publicly before it is adopted.  What will give people confidence in the 
safety of their keys?  Does disclosure of keys to a third party waive 
individual's fifth amendment rights in subsequent criminal 
inquiries?  

       In sum, the Administration has shown great sensitivity to the 
importance of these issues by planning a comprehensive inquiry into 
digital privacy and security.  However, the "Clipper chip" solution 
ought to be considered as part of the inquiry, not be adopted before 
the discussion even begins.

DETAILS OF THE PROPOSAL:

ESCROW

The 80-bit key will be divided between two escrow agents, each of 
whom hold 40 bits of each key.  Upon presentation of a valid 
warrant, the two escrow agents would have to turn the key parts 
over to law enforcement agents.  Most likely the Attorney General 
will be asked to identify appropriate escrow agents.  Some in the 
Administration have suggested one non-law enforcement federal 
agency, perhaps the Federal Reserve, and one non-governmental 
organization.  But, there is no agreement on the identity of the agents 
yet.

Key registration would be done by the manufacturer of the 
communications device.  A key is tied to the device, not to the person 
using it.

CLASSIFIED ALGORITHM AND THE POSSIBILITY OF BACK DOORS

The Administration claims that there are no back door means by 
which the government or others could break the code without 
securing keys from the escrow agents and that the President will 
be told there are no back doors to this classified algorithm.  In order 
to prove this, Administration sources are interested in arranging for 
an all-star crypto cracker team to come in, under a security 
arrangement, and examine the algorithm for trap doors.  The results 
of the investigation would then be made public.

GOVERNMENT AS MARKET DRIVER


In order to get a market moving, and to show that the government 
believes in the security of this system, the feds will be the first big 
customers for this product.  Users will include the FBI, Secret Service, 
VP Al Gore, and maybe even the President. 

FROM MORE INFORMATION CONTACT:

Jerry Berman, Executive Director
Daniel J. Weitzner, Senior Staff Counsel

...

=============================================================

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     The Electronic Frontier Foundation
     666 Pennsylvania Ave., Washington, DC 20003
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     Coordination, production and shipping by Cliff Figallo, EFF 
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 Reproduction of this publication in electronic media is encouraged.
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 To reproduce signed articles individually, please contact the authors
 for their express permission.

      *This newsletter is printed on 100% recycled electrons*
_______________________________________________________________________________

FROM THE COMPUTER PROFESSIONALS FOR SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY

April 16, 1993
Washington, DC

               COMPUTER PROFESSIONALS CALL FOR PUBLIC
           DEBATE ON NEW GOVERNMENT ENCRYPTION INITIATIVE

        Computer Professionals for Social Responsibility (CPSR)
today called for the public disclosure of technical data
underlying the government's newly-announced "Public Encryption
Management" initiative.  The new cryptography scheme was
announced today by the White House and the National Institute
for Standards and Technology (NIST), which will implement the
technical specifications of the plan.  A NIST spokesman
acknowledged that the National Security Agency (NSA), the super-
secret military intelligence agency, had actually developed the
encryption technology around which the new initiative is built.

        According to NIST, the technical specifications and the
Presidential directive establishing the plan are classified.  To
open the initiative to public review and debate, CPSR today
filed a series of Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests
with key agencies, including NSA, NIST, the National Security
Council and the FBI for information relating to the encryption
plan.  The CPSR requests are in keeping with the spirit of the
Computer Security Act, which Congress passed in 1987 in order to
open the development of non-military computer security standards
to public scrutiny and to limit NSA's role in the creation of
such standards.

        CPSR previously has questioned the role of NSA in
developing the so-called "digital signature standard" (DSS), a
communications authentication technology that NIST proposed for
government-wide use in 1991.  After CPSR sued NIST in a FOIA
lawsuit last year, the civilian agency disclosed for the first
time that NSA had, in fact, developed that security standard.
NSA is due to file papers in federal court next week justifying
the classification of records concerning its creation of the
DSS.

        David Sobel, CPSR Legal Counsel, called the
administration's apparent commitment to the privacy of
electronic communications, as reflected in today's official
statement,  "a step in the right direction."  But he questioned
the propriety of NSA's role in the process and the apparent
secrecy that has thus far shielded the development process from
public scrutiny.  "At a time when we are moving towards the
development of a new information infrastructure, it is vital
that standards designed to protect personal privacy be
established openly and with full public participation.  It is
not appropriate for NSA -- an agency with a long tradition of
secrecy and opposition to effective civilian cryptography -- to
play a leading role in the development process."

        CPSR is a national public-interest alliance of computer
industry professionals dedicated to examining the impact of
technology on society.   CPSR has 21 chapters in the U.S. and
maintains offices in Palo Alto, California, Cambridge,
Massachusetts and Washington, DC.  For additional information on
CPSR, call (415) 322-3778 or e-mail <cpsr@csli.stanford.edu>.
_______________________________________________________________________________

FROM THE CHICAGO TRIBUNE

April 17, 1993

Privacy device leaves cops a key

By Christopher Drew, Chicago Tribune.

As a step toward the development of vast new data "superhighways," the
federal government has designed a powerful device that would protect
the privacy of electronic communications by encoding them but still
allow police to eavesdrop.

Critics say the project, announced Friday by the Clinton
administration, raises serious questions about the protection of civil
liberties as more people use cellular and cordless phones and
computer-based communications.

They also warned that the device is not likely to help law-enforcement
agents foil high-tech criminals unless it becomes the most widely used
commercial encryption system - and drives private competitors out of
the business.

"'A.k.a. Big Brother,' that's what I call it," said Stephen Bryen, a
former Pentagon official who runs a company developing a rival
encryption system.

Bryen said it was "very disturbing" that the government has gone so
far with the previously classified project "without consulting with
experts in the industry" whose investments could be wiped out.

One high-ranking federal official, Raymond Kammer, acknowledged that
such concerns are part of an "appropriate debate" that needs to be
held over the project.

"Maybe it turns out that society, as it debates this, finds it
unacceptable," said Kammer, acting director of the National Institute
for Standards and Technology. "I'm not sure. This is the start of that
debate."

Millions of people who exchange information via computers and make
calls from cordless and cellular phones, which are especially
vulnerable to interception, could be affected. Experts say an era is
dawning in which traveling executives exchange electronic memos and
negotiate sensitive deals via hand-held communicators using vulnerable
wireless transmitters.

In endorsing the plan, the White House described it Friday as an
outgrowth of federal efforts to capitalize on advances in telephone
and computer technology while preventing drug dealers and terrorists
from finding new ways to mask their misdeeds.

In last year's campaign, President Clinton pledged to invest billions
of dollars in faster and more secure data links to enhance the
standing of U.S. firms in the global economy.

But as the computer industry has developed systems to enable
businesses to scramble data transfers and telephone conversations as a
safeguard against industrial espionage, a growing number of criminals
also have begun using them to foil court-authorized wiretaps.

Under the new plan, engineers at the National Security Agency invented
a new coding device, called the " Clipper Chip, " which is said to be
much harder to crack than encoding systems now on the market.

The government licensed two California companies - Mykotronx and VLSI
Technology - to make the computer chips. The chips will form the
"brains" inside small scrambling devices that can be attached to
individual telephones.

To spur the venture, the Justice Department will soon purchase several
thousand of the devices. Military and spy agencies also are expected
to use them.

Private businesses would not be required to use the technology. But
federal officials hope their sponsorship will establish the Clipper
chips as the new industry standard and crowd out competing systems.

Indeed, AT&T announced Friday that it will use the new chips in a
desktop device for encrypting telephone conversations that it expects
to sell for $1,195.

But in return for gaining the extra encoding power built into the new
system, users would have to accept the fact that government code-
breakers would always hold the keys to tap into the information.

In an effort to prevent abuses of civil liberties, federal officials
said, they will set up a system in which they would have to match two
coding keys held by different officials to unscramble any
communications. National- security and law-enforcement officials could
bring the keys together only under court-authorized operations.

But Bryen said it is hard to see how the Clipper chips project will
provide much help to the FBI.

Even if the new coding devices drove others off the U.S. market, Bryen
said, sophisticated criminals would simply buy encoding devices
overseas, as many already do.

Multinational and foreign-based companies also could prove leery of a
system that has a built-in point of entry for U.S. authorities.

The FBI separately is seeking legislation that would force telephone
companies to modify their equipment to keep other advances in
technology from hampering its ability to perform wiretaps.

AT&T and other phone companies have opposed this idea.
_______________________________________________________________________________

FROM THE WASHINGTON TIMES

April 17, 1993

Government picks affordable chip to scramble phone calls

Frank J. Murray; THE WASHINGTON TIMES

President Clinton gave a major boost yesterday to one telephone-
scrambler technology in a decision its delighted manufacturer likens
to the choice of VHS over Beta for videotape machines.

Mr. Clinton's action could allow the use of relatively cheap
scramblers on almost every cellular, business and government phone and
make scramblers common even on ordinary home telephones.

An administration official said consideration will be given to banning
more sophisticated systems investigators cannot crack, thereby
creating a balance between banning private encryption and declaring a
public right to unbreakably coded conversations.

"We've got a balance we've got to strike between the public's
important need for privacy and the public's need to be assured it's
safe from crime," said Raymond G. Kammer, acting director of the
National Institute of Standards and Technology, which developed the
system with the National Security Agency.

In an unusual decision he said was examined by the National Security
Council, Mr. Clinton directed the Commerce and Justice departments to
encourage the development of the high-tech system, which includes
electronic master keys to enable law enforcement officials to decode
transmissions if they obtain court orders.

"This technology preserves the ability of federal, state and local law
enforcement agencies to intercept lawfully the phone conversations of
criminals," Mr. Clinton said, citing the fear that encrypted phones
could aid terrorists and drug dealers.

The system is designed to protect from unauthorized interception the
electronic transmission of conversations, computer data and video
images at a cost per telephone that could be under $30, said Ted
Bettwy, executive vice president of the manufacturer, Mykotronx Inc.
of Torrance, Calif.

He said the chip announced yesterday, internally referred to as
MYK-78, costs about $40 and uses an algorithm 16 million times more
complex than that used by chips now on the market. Computer hackers
have penetrated the current chips.

The new chip uses an 80-bit code instead of the 56-bit code that is
the digital encryption standard (DES).

The chip eventually could sell in lots of 10,000 for about $25 each,
Mr.  Kammer said, with later versions priced around $10 each.

Government engineers at NSA and the Commerce Department's NIST
designed and developed the chip, which was then produced by privately
owned Mykotronx and a publicly traded subcontractor, VLSI Technology.

A Silver Spring competitor cried foul, particularly because the
commercial device was developed without notice or competitive bids in
a classified laboratory that does work for the National Security
Agency.

"If the purpose of this chip is to catch bad guys, then no bad guy
will use it," said Stephen Bryen of Secure Communications Technology
in Silver Spring, which produces a competitive chip he said could sell
for $10.

"The answer is to invest more money into breaking codes," Mr. Bryen
said in an interview after yesterday's announcement. "They're trying
to put us out of business."

Mr. Kammer said the secrecy was justified.

"The technology we're using was actually developed in a classified
environment in the first place and then transferred to a sole-source
supplier. I don't know that there was any way around it," he said in
an interview.

The Justice Department will buy several thousand of the Mykotronx
devices, which use a " clipper chip. " They are being incorporated
into other systems by Motorola and American Telephone & Telegraph Co.,
Mr. Bettwy said.

Other sophisticated encryption systems do not allow ready access for
authorized law enforcement purposes, said Mr. Bryen, who predicted
that an elaborate security plan for the electronic master key would
not prevent misuse.

Mike Newman, a spokesman for the National Institute of Standards and
Technology, said, "The key is split into two parts and stored
Separately to ensure security of the key system."

Access would be provided to the two parts for an agency that produced
legitimate authority or a court order, he said. The Justice Department
will determine whether the two parts will be held by separate federal
agencies or a federal agency and a private agency.

"This chip is going to do something that we, the citizens, really
need, and that is to allow us the privacy we want as common citizens,"
Mr. Bettwy said in a telephone interview from California yesterday.

He said the vital part of yesterday's decision is the government's
declaration that it intends to use the device. Mr. Bettwy says that
use will establish his device as the new standard and will require
private facilities to use the same system to communicate with the
government.

He said the decision's impact is "exactly" like the adoption of VHS
standards, making most private use of Beta video systems obsolete.

"I hope that's true," he said of the business implications for
Mykotronx.  "We're hoping this will become the new standard."

Only compatible phones can receive secure communications from a phone
using a clipper chip.

"To me the real significance is if everybody uses this, everybody can
talk to anybody else," Mr. Bettwy said.

"It creates a false hope," Mr. Bryen said.

"The secret key could fall into other people's hands. When you create
a system that has a back door, other people will find the back door."
______________________________________________________________________________

FROM THE NEW YORK TIMES

April 16, 1993

Electronics Plan Aims to Balance Government Access With Privacy

By JOHN MARKOFF, Special to The New York Times

The Clinton Administration plans a new system of encoding electronic
communications that is intended to preserve the Government's ability
to eavesdrop for law enforcement and national security reasons while
increasing privacy for businesses and individuals.

New technology will be installed in some Government communications
networks within weeks or months and could be available for business
and even household use before the end of the year. It will use a new
system of encoding voice and computer transmissions, including phone
calls and electronic mail, to prevent unauthorized listening.

The move is intended to resolve a long-standing dilemma of the
information age: how to preserve the legitimate right for businesses
and citizens to use codes to protect all sorts of digital
communications -- be it a doctor's cellular phone call to a patient or
a company's electronic transfer of a million dollars to an overseas
client -- without letting criminals and terrorists conspire beyond the
reach of the law.

"There is a trade-off between individual privacy and society's safety
from crime," one Government official said. "Our society needs to
decide where to draw the line."

But at least some communications experts, when told of the plan by a
reporter, did not like what they heard.

"I think the Government is creating a monster," said a former Pentagon
official, Stephen D. Bryen, who is now president of Secured
Communications Technologies Inc. in Silver Spring, Md., which makes
data-security equipment. "People won't be able to trust these devices
because there is a high risk that the Government is going to have
complete access to anything they are going to do."

Modern communications are becoming increasingly vulnerable to illegal
listening. For example, cellular phone calls can be monitored by
anyone with an inexpensive scanner.

At the same time, computer chips and special software make it possible
to code phone conversations and computer data, effectively garbling
them so they cannot be deciphered by even the National Security
Agency's most powerful code-breaking computers.

Although computer encoding is now used in only a small portion of
electronic communications, computer experts expect that volume to grow
rapidly as more of the nation's commerce begins to flow over data
networks -- especially wireless networks.

The Government has proposed in the past to require the use of a hidden
key in the coding hardware or software -- a way to crack the code, in
other words -- to let police security agents decipher messages after
obtaining court authorization to do so. Civil liberty concerns aside,
computer experts have argued that any such key, no matter how
sophisticated, might be figured out by any savvy computer hacker.

The Administration's solution: require two separate keys, each to be
held by different agencies or organizations.

The new coding devices, which will be called Clipper Chips, have been
designed by engineers at the National Institute for Standards and
Technology and at the National Security Agency. They will be
manufactured by Mycotronx, a military contractor based in Torrance,
Calif., and VLSI Technology Inc., a Silicon Valley semiconductor
manufacturer. The devices will be built into Government telephones and
eventually into commercial telephones and computers.

The new security plan has been a classified secret of several
Government agencies, including the National Institute for Standards
and Technology and the National Security Agency, and several law
enforcement agencies, including the Federal Bureau of Investigation.
The official said the Government planned to announce the technology,
possibly within a week, and to propose it as a Government-wide
standard later this year.

Broad Review Ordered

A White House official said today that President Clinton had ordered
the National Security Council to conduct a formal review of the new
plan as well as all Government cryptography policies. The review,
which will take three to four months, will begin within weeks, and
will consider both the domestic use and export of advanced
cryptography systems.

Several Administration officials said the security devices would be
deployed first by law enforcement and intelligence agencies and also
civilian agencies, like the Internal Revenue Service, that handle
confidential information. But the new system is also viewed as a data
security standard that the Clinton Administration believes will
eventually be widely used in the nation's commercial telephone and
computer networks.

While the Administration currently has no plan to try imposing the
technology on private industry, officials hope it will become a
standard.  Any communications or computer company doing business with
the Federal Government, from A.T.& T. to I.B.M., would presumably have
to incorporate the technology into their products. Moreover, the
Government can authorize or deny the export of American-made computer
and communications devices on the basis of whether it approves of any
coding that may be used in the hardware and software.

The new security standard, technically a set of computer algorithms,
was developed by National Security Agency scientists. The
Administration officials said they viewed the approach as a candidate
for replacing the 15-year-old Data Encryption Standard that is now
used to secure much of the nation's computer data. There is no known
hidden key in this standard, although many industry experts believe
that the agency can crack the code with its high-powered computers.
______________________________________________________________________________

FROM THE KNIGHT-RIDDER NEWS SERVICE (1)

Knight-Ridder/Tribune Business News 

Computer Group, Libertarians Question Clinton Phone Privacy Stance
By Rory J. O'Connor, San Jose Mercury News, Calif. 

SAN JOSE, Calif.--Apr. 17--Civil libertarians and a major computer industry
group raised concerns Friday about how much protection a Clinton
administration plan would afford private electronic communications, from
cellular telephone calls to computer data. 

The administration Friday said it would begin using technology developed by
the government's National Institute of Standards and Technology to balance
two competing interests: the desire of citizens to keep their conversations
private and the need for law enforcement agencies to monitor those
conversations after getting a court order. 

The technology that enables this is a computer chip called the Clipper Chip
that scrambles a telephone call or computer message using a secret
algorithm, or formula. 

But each chip also comes with a pair of electronic "keys" that could be
used by law enforcement agencies to decipher the secret messages generated
by the chip. 

The Clinton proposal calls for one key to be held by each of two separate
"trusted" third parties, who would release them to law enforcement agencies
that obtained legal authority to intercept the communications. Both keys
would be needed to decipher a message. 

The Electronic Frontier Foundation, a not-for-profit civil liberties group, 
praised the administration for considering the issue. But it criticized the
lack of public input into the plan. 

"They've announced a big inquiry with public input, but they've reached a
conclusion before they started," said Daniel J. Weitzner, staff counsel for
the Washington-based foundation. 

Although the administration's plan calls only for equipping government
telephones with the security devices, some groups are concerned the plan
might become a standard for all manner of electronic communication before
the public has a chance to debate its merits. 

"I don't want to sound too stridently opposed to this," said Ken Wasch,
executive director of the Software Publishers Association (SPA) in
Washington. "But...we feel blindsided." 

The SPA was discussing data security issues with Clinton administration
officials but had not expected any White House action until August, said
Ilene Rosenthal, general counsel. 

Besides the lack of initial hearings, both groups said they had two major
concerns about the Clinton plan: 

- Because the algorithm itself is secret, the groups say it is impossible
for the public to discern if it is truly secure. Users can't be certain
government spy agencies have not hidden a "back door" in the software that
will allow them to read anything they want. 

"So far there hasn't been a credible explanation about why the algorithm
has to be secret," Weitzner said. 

- The administration hasn't decided who will be the escrow agents, and it
seems unlikely any government agency, corporate entity or other
organization would be deemed trustworthy by every user. 

Even assuming all concerned can agree on who will hold them, civil
libertarians are concerned that the keys, by giving law enforcement
agencies access to individuals' private communications, might pose a threat
to constitutional protections against self-incrimination. 

Washington sources who requested anonymity suggested the White House might
have drafted its plan quickly because of concern over sales of an AT&T
device that encrypts phone calls using an older standard, Data Encryption
Standard. The sources said law enforcement officials feared the device
would create an explosion in secured telephone traffic that would severely
hamper their efforts to wiretap calls. 

American Telephone & Telegraph Co. announced Friday it would adapt the
$1,200 product, called the Telephone Security Device, to use the Clipper
Chip by the end of this fiscal quarter. AT&T makes a related device, which
encrypts voice and computer data transmissions, that could be converted to
the Clipper technology, said spokesman Bill Jones. 

Jones said he wasn't aware of any concern by the government over the
current model of the Telephone Security Device, which has been sold to
government and business customers. 

At least one company was quite pleased with the plan: San Jose chip maker
VLSI Technology, which will manufacture the Clipper chips for a Torrance
company that is selling them to the government and to AT&T. 

VLSI, which invented a manufacturing method the company said makes it
difficult to "reverse engineer" the chip or discern the encryption scheme, 

expects to make $50 million in the next three years selling the device,
said Jeff Hendy, director of new product marketing for the company.
_______________________________________________________________________________

FROM THE KNIGHT-RIDDER NEWS SERVICE (2)

New Scrambler Designed to Protect Privacy, But Allow Police Monitoring By
Christopher Drew, Chicago Tribune 
Knight-Ridder/Tribune Business News 

WASHINGTON--Apr. 19--As a step toward the development of vast new data
"superhighways," the federal government has designed a powerful device that
would protect the privacy of electronic communications by encoding them but
still allow police to eavesdrop. 

Critics say the project, announced Friday by the Clinton administration,
raises serious questions about the protection of civil liberties as more
people use cellular and cordless phones and computer-based communications. 

They also warned that the device is not likely to help law-enforcement
agents foil high-tech criminals unless it becomes the most widely used
commercial encryption system - and drives private competitors out of the
business. 

"'A.k.a. Big Brother,' that's what I call it," said Stephen Bryen, a former
Pentagon official who runs a company developing a rival encryption system. 

Bryen said it was "very disturbing" that the government has gone so far
with the previously classified project "without consulting with experts in
the industry" whose investments could be wiped out. 

One high-ranking federal official, Raymond Kammer, acknowledged that such
concerns are part of an "appropriate debate" that needs to be held over the
project. 

"Maybe it turns out that society, as it debates this, finds it
unacceptable," said Kammer, acting director of the National Institute for
Standards and Technology. "I'm not sure. This is the start of that debate."

Millions of people who exchange information via computers and make calls
from cordless and cellular phones, which are especially vulnerable to
interception, could be affected. Experts say an era is dawning in which
traveling executives exchange electronic memos and negotiate sensitive
deals via hand-held communicators using vulnerable wireless transmitters. 

In endorsing the plan, the White House described it Friday as an outgrowth
of federal efforts to capitalize on advances in telephone and computer
technology while preventing drug dealers and terrorists from finding new
ways to mask their misdeeds. 

In last year's campaign, President Clinton pledged to invest billions of
dollars in faster and more secure data links to enhance the standing of
U.S. firms in the global economy. 

But as the computer industry has developed systems to enable businesses to
scramble data transfers and telephone conversations as a safeguard against
industrial espionage, a growing number of criminals also have begun using
them to foil court-authorized wiretaps. 

Under the new plan, engineers at the National Security Agency invented a
new coding device, called the "Clipper Chip," which is said to be much
harder to crack than encoding systems now on the market. 

The government licensed two California companies - Mykotronx and VLSI
Technology - to make the computer chips. The chips will form the "brains"
inside small scrambling devices that can be attached to individual
telephones. 

To spur the venture, the Justice Department will soon purchase several
thousand of the devices. Military and spy agencies also are expected to use
them. 

Private businesses would not be required to use the technology. But federal
officials hope their sponsorship will establish the Clipper chips as the
new industry standard and crowd out competing systems. 

Indeed, AT&T announced Friday that it will use the new chips in a desktop
device for encrypting telephone conversations that it expects to sell for
$1,195. 

But in return for gaining the extra encoding power built into the new
system, users would have to accept the fact that government code-breakers
would always hold the keys to tap into the information. 

In an effort to prevent abuses of civil liberties, federal officials said, 

they will set up a system in which they would have to match two coding keys
held by different officials to unscramble any communications.
National-security and law-enforcement officials could bring the keys
together only under court- authorized operations. 

But Bryen said it is hard to see how the Clipper chips project will provide
much help to the FBI. Even if the new coding devices drove others off the
U.S. market, Bryen said, sophisticated criminals would simply buy encoding
devices overseas, as many already do. 

Multinational and foreign-based companies also could prove leery of a
system that has a built-in point of entry for U.S. authorities. 

The FBI separately is seeking legislation that would force telephone
companies to modify their equipment to keep other advances in technology
from hampering its ability to perform wiretaps. AT&T and other phone
companies have opposed this idea. 
_______________________________________________________________________________

WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT    by Philip Zimmermann

Date: Sat, 24 Apr 93 01:03:53 PDT
From: atfurman@cup.portal.com
Newsgroups: comp.dcom.telecom
Subject: Phil Zimmerman on the "Clipper initiative"
Message-ID: <telecom13.277.2@eecs.nwu.edu>
Approved: telecom@eecs.nwu.edu

The following was posted on the Usenet newsgroup alt.security.pgp
by Philip Zimmermann, author of PGP (a public-key crypto program):

                          ---------------

Here are some ideas for those of you who want to oppose the White
House Clipper chip crypto initiative.  I think this is going to be a
tough measure to fight, since the Government has invested a lot of
resources in developing this high-profile initiative.  They are
serious about it now.  It won't be as easy as it was defeating Senate
Bill 266 in 1991.

Possible actions to take in response:

1) Mobilize your friends to to all the things on this list, and more.

2) Work the Press.  Talk with your local newspaper's science and
technology reporter.  Write to your favorite trade rags.  Better yet,
write some articles yourself for your favorite magazines or
newspapers.  Explain why the Clipper chip initiative is a bad idea.
Remember to tailor it to your audience.  The general public may be
slow to grasp why it's a bad idea, since it seems so technical and
arcane and innocent sounding.  Try not to come across as a flaming
libertarian paranoid extremist [*Moi?* -- ATF], even if you are one.

3) Lobby Congress.  Write letters and make phone calls to your Member
of Congress in your own district, as well as your two US Senators.
Many Members of Congress have aides that advise them of technology
issues.  Talk to those aides.

4) Involve your local political parties.  The Libertarian party would
certainly be interested.  There are also libertarian wings of the
Democrat and Republican parties.  The right to privacy has a
surprisingly broad appeal, spanning all parts of the political
spectrum.  We have many natural allies.  The ACLU.  The NRA.  Other
activist groups that may someday find themselves facing a government
that can suppress them much more efficiently if these trends play
themselves out.  But you must articulate our arguments well if you
want to draw in people who are not familiar with these issues.

4) Contribute money to the Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF) and
Computer Professionals for Social Responsibility (CPSR), assuming
these groups will fight this initiative.  They need money for legal
expenses and lobbying.

5) Mobilize opposition in industry.  Companies that will presumably
develop products that will incorporate the Clipper chip should be
lobbied against it, from within and from without.  If you work for a
telecommunications equipment vendor, first enlist the aid of your
coworkers and fellow engineers against this initiative, and then
present your company's management with a united front of engineering
talent against this initiative.  Write persuasive memos to your
management, with your name and your colleagues' names on it.  Hold
meetings on it.

6) Publicize, deploy and entrench as much guerrilla
techno-monkeywrenching apparatus as you can.  That means PGP,
anonymous mail forwarding systems based on PGP, PGP key servers, etc.
The widespread availability of this kind of technology might also be
used as an argument that it can't be effectively suppressed by
Government action.  I will also be working to develop new useful tools
for these purposes.

7) Be prepared to engage in an impending public policy debate on this
topic.  We don't know yet how tough this fight will be, so we may have
to compromise to get most of what we want.  If we can't outright
defeat it, we may have to live with a modified version of this Clipper
chip plan in the end.  So we'd better be prepared to analyze the
Government's plan, and articulate how we want it modified.

Philip Zimmermann

Forwarded to the Internet TELECOM Digest by Alan T. Furman,
atfurman@cup.portal.com

--- end ---






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: HARUP16@delphi.com
Date: Sun, 25 Apr 93 17:15:18 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: ...
Message-ID: <01GXFVM2XBFS8Y564R@delphi.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


 Steve Levy of Wired Magazine told me I could get Pretty Good Pri
from your group.  His instructions weren't too clear, but he said to mail to this 
address.  Please mail me with info.  Thanks.





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: mnemonic@eff.org
Date: Sun, 25 Apr 93 22:11:39 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: talking to media
Message-ID: <9304260508.AA15134@soda.berkeley.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


[During the audio hookup at Saturday's meeting, the following paper of
Mike Godwin's got mentioned; I asked if he could send a copy to
cypherpunks.  It's going in the ftp site, as well--Eric]

Go ahead and forward this to cypherpunks.

This is the short posting I wrote in 1990 when I explained how 
I got the Steve Jackson Games case into the press.

-----

:r talking

This is a file I posted to an Austin BBS back when I gave
the SJG story to the local papers.


 104: Talking to Media, part 1
  By: Johnny Mnemonic  [54]
Date: 11:07  3/18/90

As I've promised on another message base, here's the beginning of
discussion of how to bring stories to the media.

Since I keep thinking of different things people ought to know about how
to take a story to the media, I'm going to make this a multi-post
discussion.

1) TRY TO THINK LIKE THE REPORTER YOU'RE TALKING TO.

One of the things that happens when people know about an event or series
of events that may make a good news story is that they assume the
importance of the story will be obvious to anyone.

Sometimes this is true (when the tipster knows about a murder, for
example). Often it's not.

So, when I tell a reporter about a story I think she should want to cover,
I make sure to stress the aspects of the story that are likely to interest
that reporter and/or the readers of her publication. For example, when I
spoke to Kyle Pope about the Illuminati seizure, I stressed the following:

a) Steve Jackson Games is an Austin business that may end up being damaged
by the seizure.

b) Nobody has given this story anything like major coverage in the
national media, or (so far as I knew) in other geographic areas. (I was
telling him he had a major "scoop" opportunity.)

c) There are some very dramatic aspects to this story. (I told him about
the 20-year-old LoD member who woke up on the morning of March 1 with a
gun pointed at him by a Secret Service agent.)


2) IF YOU'RE GOING TO MEET THE REPORTER IN PERSON, TRY TO BRING SOMETHING
ON PAPER.

There are lots of good reasons to follow this rule:

a) Believe it or not, but people take stuff on paper a little more
seriously than the spoken word. It's nice to give the reporter something
that lends substance to what you're saying, even if the substance is
printouts from your own computer.

b) It makes life easier for the reporter, who doesn't have to write down
every single thing you tell her. Reporters like to have materials they can
use for reference as they research and write their stories.

c) It helps you remember to say everything you want to say. Nothing is
more frustrating than trying to get a reporter interested in your story,
getting inconclusive results, and then realizing later that you should
have told the reporter about something. (E.g., "Damn! I forgot to tell
him what 'cyberpunk' means, so he won't know how the federal agents
misinterpreted the manual.")

When I went to the Statesman, I took edited printouts of discussions from
Flight, from SMOF, and from comp.dcom.telecom on Usenet. I also took some
private Email I had received, with the names of the senders deleted. And I
took my copy of the WHOLE EARTH REVIEW with the article on Usenet. My
object was to convey to him the scale of concern about the seizures, plus
give him enough background to be able to ask reasonably informed questions
of the people he talked to.


3) GIVE THE REPORTER OTHER PEOPLE TO TALK TO, IF POSSIBLE.

Two basic justifications for this rule: First, it'll help your credibility
(especially if you don't already know the reporter personally). Second,
multiple sources or witnesses usually enable the reporter to filter out
what is mere opinion or speculation from what everybody actually knows for
a fact.


4) DON'T ASSUME THAT THE REPORTER WILL COVER THE STORY THE WAY YOU'D LIKE
HER TO.

Reporters' accuracy and focus in a story are constrained by several
factors:


a) The amount of available time. Reporters have to be quick studies, and
often have to assimilate a complex story in a hurry. This necessarily
increases the risk of inaccuracy in a story, and gives you an even
greater reason to follow Rules 1 through 3.

2) The reporters' obligation to be fair. This means they have to talk to
people on the other side of the issues from you. This in turn means that
you're unlikely to get a story that represents or promotes your point of
view at the expense of those who oppose you.


<More on this topic as I think of things. Please feel free to comment.>



--Mike





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Eric Hughes <hughes@soda.berkeley.edu>
Date: Sun, 25 Apr 93 22:25:51 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: ADMIN: ftp usage statistics
Message-ID: <9304260522.AA16143@soda.berkeley.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I get weekly statistics on the ftp usage at soda.  We've been up at
about near the top of the usage frequency for a while, but this week
we hit number one, with over one third of the total ftp traffic here.
We've even passed sfraves, which also runs on this machine.

Hoo! Things are hoppin'.

Eric
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------

TOTALS FOR SUMMARY PERIOD Sat Apr 17 1993 TO Sun Apr 25 1993

For directory pub/cypherpunks:
   number of files: 1161
   number of bytes: 180752541




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Derek Atkins <warlord@Athena.MIT.EDU>
Date: Sun, 25 Apr 93 20:26:30 PDT
To: Valerie Lambert <valerie@valis.biocad.com>
Subject: Re: By popular request: A non-techy Clipper blurb
In-Reply-To: <9304260159.AA13719@valis.biocad.com>
Message-ID: <9304260326.AA15408@binkley.MIT.EDU>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> This is not unlike the government demanding that you give them a sealed
> copy of all your future phone conversations and other computer-facilitated
> communications, just in case they ever want to open and examine them later.

It's even worse than this.  It's giving the government a sealed copy
of all your *PAST*, present, and future phone conversations and
messages...  They can always record everything, and then use your key
at some later date to recover the messages...

-derek

PGP 2 key available upon request on the key-server:
	pgp-public-keys@toxicwaste.mit.edu
--
  Derek Atkins, MIT '93, Electrical Engineering and Computer Science
     Secretary, MIT Student Information Processing Board (SIPB)
           MIT Media Laboratory, Speech Research Group
           warlord@MIT.EDU       PP-ASEL        N1NWH




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Marc.Ringuette@GS80.SP.CS.CMU.EDU
Date: Sun, 25 Apr 93 23:53:32 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: FWD: Jerry Berman, Mitch Kapor
Message-ID: <9304260653.AA14004@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


A couple of interesting messages from sci.crypt:  an anonymously
forwarded letter from 1985 from Jerry Berman (Exec Director of EFF)
to David Chaum, and a response to the posting from Mitch Kapor.

To sum up:  Berman suggested to Chaum (in '85) that he prefers legal
remedies to technological ones, and doesn't like the idea of a society
where people routinely hide from the law.  The anonymous reposter is
concerned with the discrepancy between EFF policy and these sentiments
from Berman.  Kapor responds to his concerns by saying that Berman now
recognizes the role of technological solutions in the privacy equation.

The EFF continues to be the best representative of hacker culture
in Washington.

-- Marc Ringuette (mnr@cs.cmu.edu)


From: nobody@alumni.cco.caltech.edu
Subject: Jerry Berman on pseudonymous privacy
Date: 24 Apr 1993 10:38:38 -0500
Sender: daemon@cs.utexas.edu

Hello all,
I thought you all might like to see this. It's a letter from Jerry
Berman to David Chaum from November of 1985, in response to
information that Mr. Chaum sent to Mr. Berman.

While I have to congratulate EFF for its prompt response to the
Clipper Chip announcement from the White House, I think it's important
to recognize the philosophy of their Executive Director, as explained
below.

I agree that legal remedies are important, but when pressed, I'd
prefer to retain the ability to use purely technical solutions to
preserve my privacy, because they'll hold up under fire.

Mr. Chaum has consented to the publication of this letter on the Net. 

I don't work for, nor am I a member of EFF, ACLU, or any similar
organizations, but I do agree with them on a great many things. 

					--Aristophanes

----------


                     AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION


                       WASHINGTON OFFICE        
                                                               
                                                    122 Maryland Avenue, NE
 November 1, 1985                                   Washington, DC 20002
                                                    --------------------
                                                    National Headquarters
Mr. David Chaum                                     132 West 43rd Street    
Centre for Mathematics and Computer Science         New York. NY 10036    
P.O. Box 4079                                       (212) 944-9800        
19O9 AB Amsterdam                                   Norman Dorsen           
                                              President        
Dear Mr. Chaum:                                     Ira Glasser
                                                      Executive Director
                                                    Eleanor Holmes Norton
                                                      CHAIR
                                                    National Advisory       
                                                  Council
                                                                         
                                                                         
                                                                            
 
                                              

	Thank you for sending me a most interesting article.   A
society of  individuals  and  organizations  that  would  expend  the
time and resources to use a  series  of  'digital  pseudonyms' to
avoid data linkage does not in my opinion make big brother
obsolete but  acts  on  the  assumption  that  big  brother  is  ever
present.  I  view  your  system  as  a  form  of  societal  paranoia.

	As a matter of  principle,  we  are  working  to  enact  formal
legal protections for  individual  privacy  rather  than  relying  on
technical solutions.   We want to  assume  a  society  of  law  which
respects legal limits rather than  a  society  that  will  disobey  the
law, requiring  citizens  to  depend  on  technical  solutions.  e.g.
require  a  judical  warrant  for  government  interception  of  data
communications rather than  encrypt  all  messages  on  the  assumption
that regardless of the lawt  the  government  will  abuse  its  power
and invade privacy.

	As a  matter  of  practicality,  I  do  not  think  your  system
offers much hope for privacy.    First, the trend toward universal
identifiers  is  as  much.-a  movement  generated  by  government  or
industry's desire to keep track of all citizens as it is by
citizens seeking simplicity and convenience in all transactions.
At best,  your  system  would  benefit  the  sophisticated  and  most
would opt for  simplicity.  The  poor  and  the  undereducated  would
never use or benefit from it.

	Finally where there's a  will, there's  a  way. If  government
wants to link data bases, it  will,  by  law, require  the  disclosure
of various individual pseudonyms used by citizens or prohibit it
for data bases which the government wants to link.      Since
corporations  make  money  by  trading  commercial  lists  with   one
another, they will never adopt  the  system  or  if  it  is  adopted,
will use "fine printn  contracts  to  permit  selling  various   codes
used by their customers to other firms.

	The solution remains law, policy, and consensus about limits
on government or corporate intrusion into areas of individual
autonomy.  Technique can be used to enforce that consensus or to
override it. It cannot be used as a substitute for such
consensus.



                                            Sincerely Yours,

                                             /Sig/

                                            Jerry J. Berman
                                            Chief Legislative Counsel
                                            & Direrector ACLU
                                            Privacy Technology Project


   cc: John Shattuck




From: mkapor@eff.org (Mitch Kapor)
Subject: Re: Jerry Berman on pseudonymous privacy
Originator: mkapor@eff.org
Sender: usenet@eff.org (NNTP News Poster)
Date: Sat, 24 Apr 1993 17:16:28 GMT

nobody@alumni.cco.caltech.edu correctly states Jerry Berman's 1985 view on
privacy, but he mistakenly assumes that this represents Berman's 1993 view as
EFF Executive Director.

As one of the people who convinced Jerry that legal protections for privacy
are insufficient, and that technical measures, especially public key
cryptography, are also vitally necessary, I can tell you that Jerry and EFF
are fully committed to this position.

The previous poster is apparently unaware of a long series of EFF positions in
support of this view.  I suggest those interested read EFF's position on
Clipper or our other work in digital privacy.  Check ftp.eff.org for more
details.

One of the great things about human beings is that they are capable of change
and evolution in their thinking.  The idea that crypto is critical to privacy
is one which is no longer limited to certain net afficianados, but is 
spreading to parts of the public policy community in Washington.

Mitch Kapor
co-Founder, EFF 




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Ed Mehlschau <em@hub.ucsb.edu>
Date: Mon, 26 Apr 93 10:04:13 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: subscribe
Message-ID: <9304261703.AA08512@topgun>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


subscribe (please)

Thanks,

-- Ed





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Ed Mehlschau <em@hub.ucsb.edu>
Date: Mon, 26 Apr 93 10:08:40 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: apology
Message-ID: <9304261708.AA08561@topgun>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Damn!  I forgot to put the "-request" in the address.

My sincere apologies; you know, it's Monday.

-- Ed





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Date: Mon, 26 Apr 93 12:09:16 PDT
To: Cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: MEETING SUMMARY: 4-24-93 Cypherpunks Meeting
Message-ID: <9304261909.AA29562@netcom.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Several people have asked for summaries (or minutes) for our physical
Cypherpunks meetings, especially for our "Emergency Ad Hoc Meeting" a few
days ago.

Some Reasons NOT to do Minutes:

* it formalizes a fundamentally informal meeting (recall that Cypherpunks
have no legal status, no structure, no voting procedures, no officers,
etc.).

* some folks may be leery of having their names appear.

* the credit assignment problem: as soon as summaries are written, people
begin to complain that someone else got the credit for their idea, that
their views weren't mentioned in the summary, and so forth. 

* somebody has to take the notes needed to generate the summary.


Some Reasons IN FAVOR of Minutes:

* with 40 people at our last meeting (counting the audio conference call,
via Internet, to Boston and Washington, D.C.), with more than 400 on our
mailing list, and with the Wiretap Chip events, these are historic times.
(Fortunately, the list itself is a valuable archive of our history. Let's
hope good archives are being kept by someone!)

* folks who cannot attend physical meetings may still want to know what's
basically going on. (And perhaps other groups will nucleate and grow.)

* even folks who were at the meeting may want a summary, to keep their
memories refreshed.


So, some pros and cons to writing up a summary. What I plan to do here is
to just write up a very brief snapshot summary, oriented more toward
informing the non-attendees than to reminding the attendees of action items
or things they agreed to do.

Anyone with additions to make is of course encouraged to do so. Using the
"MEETING SUMMARY:" prefix might be useful.


1. The Meeting Itself.

Saturday, 24 April 1993, 12 noon to past 6 p.m. (when I had to leave).
Offices of Cygnus Support, in Mountain View. Approximately 25-30 in
attendance, including several new faces.

John Gilmore was selling issues of "Wired" at cost. 

An amazing conference call was made to sites in Northern Virginia (Bob
Stafford, Paul Ferguson, others) and to Boston (Marc Horowitz, Derek
Atkins, others). What was amazing was that the audio went through the
Internet and was DES-encrypted (for a while at least, until complaints by
one of the sites about the audio quality caused us to turn off the
encryption). Still, seeing an encrypted Internet conference call was
something...a small step toward the world of Vinge's "True Names."

Jim Bidzos, President of RSA Data Security, intended to just speak briefly
about the Clipper Chip, Capstone, and the view of RSA, but ended up staying
and participating for several hours. Mike Godwin, of EFF, was present at
the Boston (I think) site. Glenn Tenney, organizers of the Hackers
Conference and general activist, was also present for the first time. The
other usual folks were there, including many active in cryptography and
data security. (My apologies for not mentioning any other luminaries here.)

All in all, a stimulating meeting.


2. The Theme: The Clipper Chip.

This of course dominated the discussion all day, and was the explicit
reason for the emergency meeting. There's too much to cover here in detail.

Jim Bidzos and Arthur Abraham both presented information on the Clipper
Chip, including a long data sheet from Mykrotronx (sent to Arthur) on their
Myk-78 chip. (Copies distributed, and also faxed to the remote sites.)
There was some debate about who Mykotronx was and whether it was really
independent from the NSA.

Capstone, the follow-on program, is a superset of Clipper and contains the
DSS signature standard (which RSA Data led the fight against...and most of
thought it was a dead issue--then it appeared here!). No public key methods
are known to be incorporated, thought they may be. (Lots of analysis and
question-asking still to be done.)

Reverse-engineering was also discussed. VLSI Technology, the chip company,
is a partner with Mykrotronx and apparently has a tamper-resistant chip
technology. 


3. What Motivated the Clipper Chip?

It appears the Clipper/Capstone program is initially intended to "buy
market share" as quickly as possible, with government offices requiring
Clipperphones (and probably for those they do business with). Perhaps the
intent is undercut competing models and make Clipper the de facto standard,
which can then be made the de jure standard.

Some think the key escrow features were added _late_ in the proposal and
may even be _expected_ to fail (fail in the sense of key escrow agencies
never getting rolling, issues never getting resolved, etc.). This fits with
the idea of built-in backdoor to the enciphered traffic. The Agency may be
more interested in quickly proliferating a breakable "standard" for voice
encryption than in implementing the key escrow idea. (Left unanswered in
this speculation is how court-ordered wiretaps would then be
executed...would the FBI and NSA simply acknowledge the weakness? I don't
think so.)

The secrecy of the Clipper/Capstone project was quite impressive. Bidzos
confirmed again, and convincingly, that he knew *nothing* of this whole
effort until the announcement (or possibly the night before, when a
reporter called him?). Apparently John Markoff, who sometimes reads this
list and can comment if he wishes, had figured out some aspects or had been
told them by a source, and was preparing an article for the "NY Times."
This may've prompted the announcement timing.

Several people commented that several previously-puzzling events become
clearer in retrospect, such as the then-unknown Mykrotronx sniffing around
to get an RSA license (which they don't yet have).

I can't recap all the discussion, much of which was similar to what's been
going on in sci.crypt and elsewhere. Everyone agreed that this was a
seminal event, that the Clipper/Capstone announcement is a crucial event.
 

3. Lobbying Against the Clipper Chip

The profound consequences call for major efforts.

We discussed boycotting products, spreading negative reports, and  reverse
engineering the algorithm and publishing it so software solutions can
spoof/imitate _part_ of the system (i.e., so someone with a SoundBlaster
board or other system can talk to someone with one of these Clipperphones
without escrowing keys or being wiretappable)

John Gilmore has already posted to the list the results of our
brainstorming session to come up with questions to ask the FBI, NIST, NSA,
Congress, and the Administration. Mike Godwin argued that a lot of
embarrassing questions could quickly derail the plan. Others confirmed that
the NSA mathematicians seemed to be put on the spot by the many questions.
That is, it's conceivable this plan could begin to unravel fairly soon. 


4. Educating the Public.

The Boston group took this as their focus of the rest of the meeting (we
went offline after about an hour or so on the conference call). I haven't
heard the results.


5. Lobbying the Legislature and Officials.

Similarly, the D.C. group took this as their area of involvement. No
feedback yet.


6. What Happens if Clipper Flops?

An interesting discussion out in the lobby (and I probably missed many such
interesting discussions!) had to do with scenarios for how Clipper may
fail. Whit Diffie described how the failure could either so greatly
embarrass the Administration that they'd be loathe to try it again (the
Viet Nam Syndrome, applied to crypto) or that it could provoke them to
tighten restrictions even further, perhaps even to the point of an outright
ban on the use of unapproved encryption at *any* level. (Issues of
enforceability, detectability, Constitutional issues, etc., of course exist
and will be points of attack on any such comprehensive ban.)

(The question of whether Clipper and Capstone applies, either now or later,
to *data* came up several times. The Capstone chip is rated at "10-16
Mbps," which implies it is targeted for Ethernet-type speeds, and hence
data. There was general agreement by all I heard that the Clipper/Capstone
program is indeed intended to target more than just voice encryption and
that our fears about restrictions on strong crypto are justified.)


7. Other Miscellaneous Topics

* Since Jim Bidzos was there, the topic of PGP naturally came up several
times. Eric Hughes let this run for a while, then moved the discussion back
to Clipper. Jim Bidzos clearly had some strong opinions, but also did not
want this to be the forum for debating patents and the legality and ethics
of PGP. He did acknowledge, in my opinion, the point that RSA Data Security
had somewhat neglected the individual end-user (in products such as
MailSafe, which hasn't changed since 1988), in favor of the many large
deals with Lotus, Microsoft, Apple, etc., to get RSA installed in their
e-mail software. He acknowledged that in some sense this left an ecological
niche for a product like PGP to fill, though he insisted that such a
product could be legally developed and distributed if it used the "RSAREF"
package and wasn't sold commercially. (There are lots of threads and
keywords here: RSAREF, RIPEM, TIPEM, B-SAFE, Apple's OCE, etc.)

(Some of us continue to hope some accommodation can be reached between RSA
Data and the PGP community. The upcoming battle over strong crypto is a
bigger issue than this squabble. I remain convinced that RSA Data Security
is "on our side" in this fight for continued access to strong crypto. In
fact, in my opinion, the Clipper/Capstone program looks to be a complete
end-run around RSA and public key techniques, a thinly disguised attempt to
seize control of the crypto market from RSA. In this battle, RSA may be
fighting for their economic survival!)

* The issue of the name of our group, the Cypherpunks name, was not
discussed. The U.K. group has apparently picked "U.K. Cryptoprivacy Group"
as their name.

* The normal schedule for meetings will continue, with the next regular
Cypherpunks (Bay Area) meeting on Saturday, 8 May.


Well, this is my summary. Feedback is welcome. While I don't want to take
meticulous notes the way a "Recording Secretary" is supposed to, I don't
mind writing up these kinds of snapshot summaries.

May you live in interesting times, indeed!

-Tim May



--
Timothy C. May         | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,  
tcmay@netcom.com       | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
408-688-5409           | knowledge, reputations, information markets, 
W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA  | black markets, smashing of governments.
Higher Power: 2^756839 | Public Key: MailSafe and PGP available.
Waco Massacre + Big Brother Wiretap Chip = A Nazi Regime





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Hal <74076.1041@CompuServe.COM>
Date: Mon, 26 Apr 93 09:24:51 PDT
To: Cypherpunks <cypherpunks@toad.com>
Subject: REMAIL: Anonymous postin
Message-ID: <930426161700_74076.1041_FHD66-1@CompuServe.COM>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


The message forwarded by Mark Ringuette was apparently posted to sci.crypt
by using a cypherpunks remailer followed by a mail-to-news gateway.  To
recap on how to do this, put
 
::
Request-Remailing-To: sci-crypt@cs.utexas.edu
 
then a blank line at the front of your message, and mail to one of the
remailers (Karl Barrus posts a list every month).  For more security and
in-practice untraceability, use one of Karl's scripts to set up a chained
request with encryption.  By bouncing your message around the country like
this, decrypting at each stage, you get much better security than with just
one hop.
 
Change "sci-crypt" in the address above to the name of the newsgroup you
want to post to, replacing the "." in the name with "-".  (No, I don't know
how you post to a newsgroup with a "-" in it.  Maybe it just works.)
 
I notice that the Comment field I put out on remailed message cautioning
that it is coming from an anonymous remailer did not get passed through the
mail-to-news gateway software at utexas.  This leaves little clue about
where it came from.  It does make it pretty clear that you can't reply to it
since it comes from "nobody@alumni.caltech.edu".
 
As an aside, I'd like to encourage people not to use hal@alumni.caltech.edu
so much and to use one of the others more.  I have one at
hfinney@shell.portal.com which I think may be more immune to political
pressure.  Unlike the alumni account, I'm paying for this one, which should
give me some clout; and also, I remember hearing that at the hackers
conference the head of Portal offered some support to the idea of anonymous
remailers, so I'm hoping that management won't be quick to shut me down when
people complain.
 
Hal
74076.1041@compuserve.com
 






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Hal <74076.1041@CompuServe.COM>
Date: Mon, 26 Apr 93 09:24:52 PDT
To: CYPHERPUNKS <CYPHERPUNKS@toad.com>
Subject: CASH: Disney Dollars...
Message-ID: <930426161723_74076.1041_FHD66-2@CompuServe.COM>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I know we're all focused pretty closely on Clipper right now, but as
time goes on we will pay attention to other things, and one of those is
digital cash.

We've had a lot of debate here about whether it would be legal to issue
private cash.  I went to Disneyland last week, and discovered that they
are issuing their own form of cash: "Disney Dollars" (presumably a
Disney trademark).

Disney Dollars come in at least three denominations: $1.00, $5.00, and
$10.00.  They are very attractively printed notes, about the size and
shape of American dollars.  They're quite a bit more colorful but the
layout of the bills is similar to other forms of currency.

Disney Dollars can be exchanged with U.S. dollars on a one-for-one basis
at the park.  No sales tax is involved in the transaction.

I saved a $1.00 Disney Dollar, a special issue to commemorate Mickey Mouse's
65th anniversary this year.  Here is what it says:

On the face:  "Disney Dollars"   "Mickey's 65th".  In the fine print:
"May be used as legal tender only at Disneyland park, Disneyland Hotel,
Walt Disney World resort and the Disney Store (U.S.A. & Puerto Rico)."
Another block of fine print: "Disney Dollars may be spent or collected and
saved as souvenirs and are redeemable at any time before or after any
period of inactivity."  At the bottom:  "A00651375A"  "Series 1993"
"One Disney Dollar".  There is a picture of Mickey Mouse in the middle
with the word "Mickey" under it.  "Scrooge McDuck" has signed the bill
above the word "Treasurer".

On the back:  "Disney Dollars" at the top; "One Disney Dollar" at the bottom,
and a large colorful picture of Mickey in a car filling most of the middle.
"(C) The Walt Disney Company" in fine print.

If Disney can issue its own currency, maybe other people can, too.  These
are basically gift certificates.  If somebody had some goods or services
to sell, they could issue their own "dollars" which would be good for
purchasing their things, but which could also be exchanged back for U.S.
dollars if needed.

Hal Finney
74076.1041@compuserve.com





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: matt@oc.com (Matthew Lyle)
Date: Mon, 26 Apr 93 10:18:24 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: MacWeek article on Clipper/Capstone
Message-ID: <199304261717.AA24952@ra.oc.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


MacWEEK 04.26.93

Page 1

SECURITY CHIPS TRIGGER ALARM

Clipper and Capstone open digital back door.

By Mitch Ratcliffe

Washington -- The White House and National Security Agency, as part of
a wide-ranging retooling of U.S. privacy policies, are preparing two
encryption chips for use in the computer and telecommunications
industries.  Privacy advocates cried foul last week because the chips 
include a back door that allows police to monitor communications.

The Clipper chip announced this month can encrypt voice and data 
communications at up to 16Mbps.  Clipper is due to debut in secure
telephones from AT&T Co. this summer.  The second chip, called Capstone
and currently under development at the NSA, is a superset of Clipper that 
will implement the much-criticized Digital Signature Standard to add
authentication capabilities.  Its existence was revealed during a briefing 
at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology in Cambridge last week.

President Clinton ordered the National Institute of Standards and 
Technology to establish Clipper as a federal standard.  Since the
government is the largest computer customer in the world, its Federal
Information Processing Standards (FIPS) often are imposed on the industry
as de facto standards.

If Capstone follows Clipper into the FIPS requirements, DSS could usurp RSA
 Data Security Inc.'s public-key encryption scheme, which Apple licensed
for  AOCE (Apple Open Collaboration Environment).

But Apple's representative at the NSA briefing, Gursharan Sidhu, technical
director of collaborative computer and leader of the AOCE project, said
he is not worried that the government will force an encryption scheme
on the industry.

"We were given the impression that they are very open to suggestions," 
Sidhu said, adding that the government is faced with a growing conundrum as
it tries to simultaneously protect privacy and maintain its ability
to tap lawbreakers' communications.

"People have the idea that in cellular the security of communications
had gone away, so there is pressure to encrypt. [Without a back door], even
the  casual criminal would be able to communicate with invincible
security," Sidhu said.  "Law-enforcement agencies wouldn't be able to
collect intelligence."

A spokesman for NIST said Capstone will not be introduced unless the
president's review of national encryption policy conclueds it is needed.
But he also said the Department of Defense and NSA are already working
to develope a PCMCIA card-based implementation of Capstone for a 
classified defense messaging system.

The NSA confirmed it is working on Capstone but could not confirm
the Capstone PCMCIA card project.

Clipper and Capstone use a "key escrow" technology that lets 
law-enforcement agencies with a court order unscramble conversations 
and documents.  To reduce the potential for wiretap abuse, two agencies 
to be named by Attorney General Janet Reno will hold half of each key.  The
NSA said the key escrow agents will not be law-enforcement agencies.

Privacy advocates complained that the algorithms that perform Clipper 
scrambling functions will remain classified.  Encryptin technologies
typically  gain acceptance only after cryptographers pore over the
component algorithms and key management systems.

"We can't protect the key escrow features if we reveal the algorithm
to the public ... that's caused some heartburn," said John Podesta, staff
secretary to President Clinton.  "I'm not suggesting that the public
should trust us any more than any other government agency, but we are
doing a more comprehensive review [than any previous administration]."

Podesta said the Clinton team is taking a free-market approach to
encryption, in contrast to the previous administrations, which tried to
legislate simplified approaches.

"In the wireless communications environment, we have to more the ball
forward on security and privacy," Podesta said.  "The jury's still out on 
whether [Clipper] is the answer."

Jim Bidzos, president of RSA Data Security of Redwood City, Calif.,
said the NSA is using Clipper and Capstone in an attempt to confuse the 
market for privacy-enhancing technologies.  "It takes three or four
years fo rthis kind of proposal to die." Bidzos said.  Computer and 
communications companies might withhold support for any standard,
giving the NSA more time to prepare for the encrypted world, he said.

Computer Professionals for Social Responsibility, a Washington, D.C.
based public-interest group, has filed 11 Freedom of Information Act
requests for access to Clipper development records.  The group suspects
the NSA and NIST violated the Computer Security Act of 1987, whic limits
the NSA's role in development of public encryption technologies to
providing advice and assistance.  NSA said it developed both chips.






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: whitaker@eternity.demon.co.uk (Russell E. Whitaker)
Date: Mon, 26 Apr 93 10:56:20 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Privacy International (fwd)
Message-ID: <4567@eternity.demon.co.uk>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Nick Szabo writes:

> 
> The following forwarded from alt.privacy.  Anybody have experience
> with this group?  Have they taken a position on the wiretap chip?
> 
> Subject: Group Info: Privacy International
> Message-ID: <1993Apr12.184129.11455@mont.cs.missouri.edu>
> Originator: rich@pencil.cs.missouri.edu
> Organization: Privacy International
> PRIVACY INTERNATIONAL
>  
> A WATCHDOG ON SURVEILLANCE
>  
> GENERAL INFORMATION
> 
> PRIVACY INTERNATIONAL - THE BIRTH OF A WORLDWIDE MOVEMENT
>  
>

[Text elided for brevity]
  
>  If you are interested in getting involved in the work of
> Privacy International, please contact Simon Davies, Marc
> Rotenberg, or David Banisar at :
>  

Simon Davies is in London now.  He will have an email account
soon.  However, anyone who needs to contact him - on
non-confidential matters - can send email to
privacy@eternity.demon.co.uk.  This is my machine; Simon will
have his own soon.

Russell



Russell Earl Whitaker                   whitaker@eternity.demon.co.uk
Communications Editor                                 AMiX: RWhitaker
EXTROPY: The Journal of Transhumanist Thought
Board member, Extropy Institute (ExI)
================ PGP 2.2 public key available =======================




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Arthur Abraham <a2@well.sf.ca.us>
Date: Mon, 26 Apr 93 15:02:34 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: MYK-78
Message-ID: <199304262202.AA13845@well.sf.ca.us>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


26-Apr-93

For those awaiting my promised comments regarding this chip, I
have the disappointing report that the individual I
anticipated talking to was out of his town, and so not
available today.

If you have the data sheets for this chip, and have read them,
I would be very interested to see your comments. Please
respond to me directly, rather than the list at large, since
my intent in this exercise it to replace deduction with
disclosure, and avoid spreading any mis- or partial
information.

-a2.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: karn@qualcomm.com (Phil Karn)
Date: Mon, 26 Apr 93 17:04:11 PDT
To: rustman@netcom.com
Subject: Re: Consumer phone privacy info sheet
Message-ID: <9304270003.AA25770@servo>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>From: rustman@netcom.com (Rusty Hodge)

I suspect the Clipper chip will be used heavily in digital cellular phones,
if it isn't too much of a power hog.

I seriously doubt it. I could easily have done DES in software on our
CDMA digital cellphones using spare cycles in the CPU we already have
(a '186) had I been allowed to do so.  Why should I re-engineer my
already designed products to use a $30 IC instead?  Power is not the
only issue.

Phil





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: fnerd@smds.com (FutureNerd Steve Witham)
Date: Mon, 26 Apr 93 15:17:49 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Report on Adi Shamir talk
Message-ID: <9304262127.AA28339@smds.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Last Friday, the 23rd, Adi Shamir (the S of RSA) gave a talk at
MIT about some recent crypto results of his.  (He was introduced by
Ron Rivest, the R of RSA.)

Shamir is in the country to give a talk about 
the history of crypto, in Washington DC, I think.

It was actually two related talks, one on each of two papers of his:
	"On the Generation of Multivariate Polynomials which
	 are Hard to Factor"
and	"Efficient Signature Schemes Based on Birational 
	 Permutations"

Any misrepresentations and misunderstandings here are mine.

The first paper is about factoring polynomials that are products
of two polynomials, 
	F = PQ
where all these polynomials are on numbers that are mod the product
of two primes.
	n = pq
There are a lot of cases where F is easy to factor, and sometimes
the easy cases seem to be only slightly different from the hard
cases, but Shamir has found a large, easy-to-specify class of
forms of (P, Q) where factoring their product is as hard as
factoring n (the notorious hard problem that's the basis for the
supposed strength of RSA).

The second paper is about looking for public key crypto methods 
that are as strong as RSA but don't require such large amounts of
computing on one end.  In regular RSA, for instance, the number
of multiplications for decrypting (for the legitimate key owner)
goes up with key size, and so does the difficulty of multiplication.

Shamir has found a scheme that takes about 20 multiplies on each
side, period.  However, it would be easily breakable as a crypto
scheme, so he shows a variation that doesn't give as much info
to an attacker, but works as a signature scheme.  It *looks*
secure to him and others he's shown it to, but it isn't proven
as hard as factoring big numbers.

The tie between the two papers is that the keys used in the 
scheme in the second paper are polynomials of the form 
discussed in the first paper.

--fnerd@smds.com (FutureNerd Steve Witham)




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: whitaker@eternity.demon.co.uk (Russell Earl Whitaker)
Date: Tue, 27 Apr 93 13:24:32 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Forwarded article.
Message-ID: <4612@eternity.demon.co.uk>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



This article was forwarded to you by whitaker@eternity.demon.co.uk (Russell Earl Whitaker):

--------------------------------- cut here -----------------------------

Newsgroups: demon.security
From: nikki@trmphrst.demon.co.uk (Nikki Locke)
Path: eternity.demon.co.uk!demon!trmphrst.demon.co.uk!nikki
Subject: Cppnews now has PGP support
Reply-To: cppnews@trmphrst.demon.co.uk
Distribution: world
X-Mailer: cppnews $Revision: 1.35 $
Organization: Trumphurst Ltd.
Lines: 13
Date: Sun, 25 Apr 1993 17:23:45 +0000
Message-ID: <735786863snx@trmphrst.demon.co.uk>
Sender: usenet@demon.co.uk

CPPNEWS $Revision: 1.35 $

Demon.security members may like to know that cppnews now has 
the ability to add user defined external commands to the Article menu.
This latter enables automatic uudecoding, pgp decrypting etc. to be 
integrated with cppnews.  

The latest version of cppnews should be available for public ftp from
ftp.demon.co.uk [158.152.1.65]:in directory /pub/trumphurst/cppnews.

-- 
Nikki Locke,Trumphurst Ltd.(PC and Unix consultancy) nikki@trmphrst.demon.co.uk
trmphrst.demon.co.uk is NOT affiliated with ANY other sites at demon.co.uk.

--------------------------------- cut here -----------------------------





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: hkhenson@cup.portal.com
Date: Mon, 26 Apr 93 18:21:06 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: MEETING SUMMARY:
Message-ID: <9304261808.1.16634@cup.portal.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Tim May closes his excellent summery with

> May you live in interesting time, indeed!

The rest of this curse is not as well known, but it goes

"and attract the attention of important people."  I suspect we are doing
just that.  Keith Henson




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "John (FuzzFace/Fast-Eddie) McMahon" <MCMAHON@Eisner.DECUS.Org>
Date: Mon, 26 Apr 93 15:27:12 PDT
To: Cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: MEETING SUMMARY: 4-24-93 Cypherpunks Meeting
Message-ID: <01GXH67HAH8Y001HDW@Eisner.DECUS.Org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>>> "4. Educating the Public."

I've seen several public/private debates open up just from "grass roots"
circulation of the announcements and such.  My only concerns are that:

a)  It's all pretty unfocused.
b)  It's being circulated on mailing lists (et al) where the discussion is
inappropriate and probably would be viewed as annoying.

But then again, any topic discussed on the network seems to have these problems 
initially.

Fuzz




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: peter honeyman <honey@citi.umich.edu>
Date: Mon, 26 Apr 93 16:46:09 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Clipper letter
Message-ID: <9304262346.AA25400@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


here is the letter i sent my senators and representative, w/ a
copy to clinton and gore.  don't forget to write yours.

	peter

=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=

					April 26, 1993

I'm writing to share my concern about the White House announcement of
April 16, 1993, which provides for wiretap ability in telecommunica-
tions networks and wireless communications links.  The particulars of
the announcement are not in and of themselves altogether alarming, but
the implication is that this is just a foot in the door:

    Q:  If the Administration were unable to find a technological
	solution like the one proposed, would the Administration be
	willing to use legal remedies to restrict access to more
	powerful encryption devices?

    A:  This is a fundamental policy question which will be considered
        during the broad policy review.

Thanks to the widespread use of software that provides for information
protection and privacy, the most common "powerful encryption device" is
the personal computer.  The suggestion that computers and software in
everyday use be declared contraband worries me.  But at a more fundamental
level, I am concerned about the right to privacy.

Privacy in the modern day means information privacy: keeping to oneself
computerized data about oneself.  Because encryption is widely regarded
by computer security experts as the only effective means of ensuring
computer privacy, the White House's "broad policy review" promises to
examine whether citizens should have the right to determine whether and
how to provide for their own privacy.

Your voice is needed in this debate.  I hope that when the question is
raised whether the government should hold exclusive rights to the
protection of individual privacy, or whether the people should hold
that right to themselves, you will stand on the side of the people.

				Sincerely yours,




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Anonymous <nowhere@bsu-cs.bsu.edu>
Date: Mon, 26 Apr 93 18:02:54 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: mycotoxin
Message-ID: <9304270106.AA18106@bsu-cs.bsu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


NOTE to the person who sent this (if on the list) that I forwarded it
to the list, you forgot the space after the colon on request-remailing-to.
  -- nowhere@bsu-cs.bsu.edu

Here's some stuff I dug up on Mykotronyx.
 
The are privately held (at least there are no SEC filings on the database).
I also checked the patent database, but it came up empty.
 
Note the discrepency in the first two entries:  one lists sales
of $252,900,000 and the other says $2,500,000.
 
"Myko" apparently means "enchantress" in Japanese.
 
Check out their company motto:
 
     "Securing the world of communications bit by bit"
 
----------------------------------------------------------------
 
               Copyright (c) 1992 American Business Information  
                                 Trinet America
 
                                COMPANY DATABASE
 
                                 MYKOTRONX  INC
 
                                        
                            357 VAN NESS WAY # 200  
                       TORRANCE , CALIFORNIA 90501-1488  
                                  310-533-8100
 
NUMBER OF EMPLOYEES: 25
 
EXECUTIVE:  
CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER: BOB GOTTFRIED
 
NUMBER OF ESTABLISHMENTS: 1
 
SALES INFORMATION:  
TOTAL SALES ( $ ):                       252,900,000
 
SIC CODE-INFO:  
PRIMARY:  
8731     COMMERCIAL PHYSICAL/BIOLOGICAL RES    
 
CODE INFORMATION:  
STATE CODE (FIPS):     06  
COUNTY CODE (FIPS):   037  LOS ANGELES
 
TRINET NUMBER: 808764096
 
----------------------------------------------------------------
 
 
               Copyright (c) 1992 American Business Information  
                                 Trinet America
 
                             ESTABLISHMENT DATABASE
 
                                 MYKOTRONX  INC
 
                                        
                            357 VAN NESS WAY # 200  
                         TORRANCE, CALIFORNIA  90501  
                                  310-533-8100
 
SIC-CODES:  
PRIMARY SIC CODE:     8731    COMMERCIAL PHYSICAL/BIOLOGICAL RES
 
SALES INFORMATION:  
SALES ( $ ):              2,500,000  
SHARE OF MARKET (%):            .09
 
NUMBER OF EMPLOYEES: 25
 
EXECUTIVE: BOB GOTTFRIED OWNER
 
CODE INFORMATION:  
STATE CODE (FIPS):   06  
COUNTY CODE (FIPS): 037 LOS ANGELES  
MSA: 4480
 
PARENT COMPANY INFORMATION:  
 MYKOTRONX  INC  
357 VAN NESS WAY # 200  
TORRANCE, CALIFORNIA  90501  
310-533-8100  
STATE CODE (FIPS): 06  
PRIVATE OWNED
 
ESTABLISHMENT NUMBER: 808764096
 
----------------------------------------------------------------
 
 
           CALIFORNIA STATE BOARD OF EQUALIZATION, SALES AND USE TAX
                                  INFORMATION
 
NUMBER:  AB127112520000
 
OWNER-NAME:   MYKOTRONX  INC.
 
TYPE OF OWNERSHIP:  CORPORATION
 
MAILING-ADDRESS:  357 VAN NESS WAY,STE.200
                  TORRANCE, CA  90501
 
COUNTY:  LOS ANGELES
 
START-DATE:  04/1987
 
TYPE-OF-BUSINESS:  PUBLISHERS, LIGHT INDUSTRIAL EQUIPMENT AND ALL OTHER
                   PERMITTEES N.E.C.
 
TAX-PROGRAM:  REGULAR SALES TAX
 
----------------------------------------------------------------
 
                      Copyright 1993 Business Wire, Inc.  
                                 Business Wire
 
                             April 19, 1993, Monday
 
DISTRIBUTION: Business Editors & Computers/Electronics Writers
 
LENGTH: 697 words
 
HEADLINE:  Mykotronx  develops "Clipper" chip designed to ensure
communications
privacy
 
DATELINE: TORRANCE, Calif.
 
 BODY:
   "Securing the world of communications bit by bit" is not only the motto
but
the guiding philosophy of  Mykotronx  Inc., a Torrance small business
specializing in the design and manufacture of unique digital components and
equipment.
 
    Mykotronx  Monday announced the introduction of an electronic chip --
designated "Clipper" -- that it believes will ensure the protection of
sensitive
information transmitted via cellular or regular phones, computer networks or
fax
machines. This chip and follow-ons will also find application in many other
systems, e.g., cable TV and personal computers.
 
   Leonard J. Baker, president of  Mykotronx,  said: "This chip is a good
example of the transfer of military technology to the commercial and general
government fields with handsome cost benefits. For 15 years we have been
evolving this technology to protect government and commercial spacecraft
from
being tampered with and to protect the data transmitted by the spacecraft to
its
ground users. This technology should now pay big dividends to U.S.
taxpayers."
 
   Economic data of incalculable value is transmitted each day over various
telecommunications media, including telephones, facsimiles, telex, cable and
other communications networks. Each message is vulnerable to interception
through relatively simple techniques.
 
   Exploitation of illegally obtained information can do tremendous damage
to
the parties involved, ranging from embarrassment to the loss of hundreds of
millions of dollars to a hacker who knows the specifics of a competitor's
business plans.
 
   Said Baker: "Just as technology provides the means for communicating the
data, it can now minimize the threat of its loss."
 
   It is in this arena that the chip developed by  Mykotronx  comes into
play.
It contains an ENCODE and DECODE capability using the government's recently
announced new algorithm (more than 16 million times more keys than available
on
DES -- the existing system) to defeat hackers or eavesdroppers attempting to
intercept voice or data messages.
 
   This first of a series of  Mykotronx  chips, developed by a team under
the
direction of Richard J. Takahashi, vice president of engineering, has been
delivered to AT&T for use in its Telephone Security Device (TSD). This
device,
 PAGE    3
                         Business Wire, April 19, 1993
   
 
placed between the handset and base of an ordinary telephone, allows the
encryption and decryption of conversations so that eavesdropping cannot
occur.
 
   This inexpensive capability will first be utilized by government agencies
to
protect sensitive conversations. A similar chip has been delivered to
Motorola
for use in its secure telephone products and digital radios. More advanced
chips, those that protect other data transmissions, will be available in the
coming months.
 
   These chips are manufactured by VLSI Technology Inc. of San Jose, Calif.,
using its unique FSB technology. VLSI was selected by  Mykotronx  based on
its
ability to develop high-performance semiconductor chips.
 
    Mykotronx,  a.k.a. Myko, was founded by Robert E. Gottfried and Kikuo
Ogawa
to develop cryptographic units to protect the communication channels between
spacecraft and ground stations. The company has delivered equipment to the
Department of Defense, NASA and most aerospace companies.
 
   The strength of  Mykotronx  lies in its people and their unrelenting
drive
for excellence. Their "can-do" attitude has allowed the company to deliver
high-quality products on very short time schedules.   Mykotronx  has
received
numerous commendations for its quality program and was recently named
"Supplier
of the Year" for the second consecutive year by IBM's Federal Systems Co. of
Boulder, Colo.
 
   Sales of more than $5 million in 1992 are expected to double in 1993.
Transferring this technology from spacecraft to everyday uses will allow the
company to fulfill its ambitious motto of "Securing the world of
communications
bit by bit."
 
   For further information concerning these products, contact John C.
Droge,
vice president of program development, at 310/533-8100, or fax 310/533-0527.
 
   CONTACT:  Mykotronx  Inc., Torrance
            John Droge, 310/533-8100 (phone)
            310/533-0527 (fax)
            
 
ORGANIZATION:  MYKOTRONX -INC
 
GEOGRAPHIC: CALIFORNIA COLORADO
            
 
INDUSTRY: COMPUTERS/ELECTRONICS PRODUCT
 
----------------------------------------------------------------
 
                 Copyright 1993 PR Newswire Association, Inc.  
                                  PR Newswire
 
                             April 16, 1993, Friday
 
SECTION: Financial News
 
DISTRIBUTION: TO BUSINESS EDITOR
 
LENGTH: 742 words
 
HEADLINE: AT&T TO INCORPORATE NEW 'CLIPPER' CHIP INTO SECURE COMMUNICATIONS
PRODUCT LINE
 
DATELINE: GREENSBORO, N.C., April 16
 
KEYWORD: bc-AT&T-Clipper-chip 
 
 BODY:
    AT&T (NYSE: T) said today it is moving to improve the security and
privacy
of telephone communications by incorporating a just-announced new U.S.
government technology for voice encryption into its secure communications
product line.
 
   AT&T will use the Clipper chip, announced today by President Clinton as a
new
technology for voice encryption, in all of its secure telephone products
except
those specially designed for government classified customers.  The Commerce
Department has announced a six-month timetable for the final certification
of
Clipper.
 
   "AT&T is pleased to be the first company to publicly commit to adoption
of
the Clipper chip," said Ed Hickey, AT&T vice president, Secure
Communications
Systems.  "We believe it will give our customers far greater protection in
defeating hackers or eavesdroppers attempting to intercept a call.
 
   "And now all commercially available AT&T voice encryption products will
be
compatible with each other, a major step forward in bringing secure
communications capabilities to the business community."
 
   In standardizing AT&T voice encryption products on the Clipper chip, AT&T
will include the algorithm in the Telephone Security Device as well as in
the
Secure Voice/Data Terminal.
 
   The AT&T Telephone Security Device is a compact, lightweight unit that
brings
advance encryption technology to conventional land-line and cellular
telephones.
It provides a powerful, convenient and reliable way to protect the most
sensitive telephone conversations.
 
   The device works with a conventional land-line or transportable/mobile
cellular phone.  It turns the phone's signal into a digital stream of
encrypted
information that is decrypted by a Telephone Security Device attached to the
phone at the receiving end of the call.
 
   The AT&T Telephone Security Device connects easily to desk telephones or
tranportable or mobile phones.  It weighs 1.5 poun                 PAGE    5
                          PR Newswire, April 16, 1993
   
 
inches wide and 1.5 inches high.  And it's as easy to use as it is portable.
 
   The AT&T Secure Voice/Data Terminals are desktop telephones that provide
encryption for both telephone calls and data transmissions.
 
   These AT&T secure communications products use an enhanced voice
encryption
technique that provides very high voice quality.  This technology allows
calls
placed with these products to approach the voice quality of normal calls.
 
   To further enhance interoperability, AT&T will consider licensing to
other
manufacturers its enabling technologies for interoperability.
Interoperability
of encryption devices requires common technology beyond the use of a common
encryption algorithm, specifically common methods of digital voice encoding
and
signaling.
 
   AT&T has already performed integration tests with Clipper chips
manufactured
by the government's supplier,  Mykotronx  Inc., of Torrence, Calif., and is
preparing to integrate the chip into the manufacturing of its secure
products.
    AT&T's Clipper-equipped telephone security devices will be available
to customers by the end of the second quarter.
    The federal government intends to adopt the Clipper chip as the
standard for voice encryption to help protect proprietary information,
protect the privacy of personal phone conversations and prevent
unauthorized release of data transmitted electonically.  At the same
time, use of the Clipper chip will preserve the ability of federal,
state and local law enforcement agencies to intercept lawfully the phone
conversations of criminals.
    "Adoption of Clipper will support both the government's efforts to
protect the public and the public's right to privacy," Hickey said.
    AT&T Secure Communication Systems provides products to protect
voice, data, fax, cellular and video communications.  It also engineers
and integrates secure communications applications.  Its customers
include the governments of the United States and other nations as well
as major corporations around the world.
    AT&T Secure Communications Systems is headquartered in Greensboro.
    For more information about the AT&T Telephone Security Device 3600
and other AT&T Secure Communications Products, call David Arneke at
919-279-7680.
     CONTACT: David Arneke of AT&T Secure Communications Systems,
919-279-7680,
or after hours, 919-273-5687, or Herb Linnen of AT&T Media Relations,
202-457-3933, or after hours, 202-333-9162
 
ORGANIZATION: AT&T
 
TICKER-SYMBOL: T
 
SUBJECT: New Products; Services
 
GEOGRAPHIC: North Carolina
 
INDUSTRY: Telecommunications
 
CO:  AMERICAN TELEPHONE & TELEGRAPH CO INC;  
                          PR Newswire, April 16, 1993 
 
 
TS:  T (NYSE); 
 
IND:  111 COMMUNICATIONS; 
----------------------------------------------------------------






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Date: Mon, 26 Apr 93 20:14:28 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: A correction, and another motive for Clipper
Message-ID: <9304270314.AA12553@netcom3.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Jim Bidzos of RSA informs me that Capstone does in fact use public key
methods, and that his company will presumably receive royalty
payments.

(I remember this being discussd, now. The government itself has
royalty-free access to the various public key patents, so I
understand, but corporations selling equipement using the patents would
presumably have to negotiate their own deals.)

On another matter, I saw in the April 19th issue of "Network World,"
the headline on the front page: "Clinton security plan hints of Big
Brother," with the subtitle: "Clipper Chip would let government
eavesdrop on encrypted voice and data communications." The article is
by Ellen Messmer.

Along with the usual quotes from the White House announcement came
this curious admission from an AT&T manager when asked why anyone,
especially a criminal or terrorist, would use a tappable phone when
alternatives exist. 

---begin quote---

"A criminal probably wouldn't use it," said Mike Agee, marketing
manager for secure products at AT&T, adding that the Clipper Chip is
for the rest of the world.

---end quote---

Now I've heard several explanations for Clipper, ranging from buying
market share to the stupidity of criminals (i.e., criminals _could_
buy non-Clipper alternatives under the current plan, but in practice
they're too stupid to).

Assuming non-Clipper encryption remains legal, why Clipper?

It just occurred to me that perhaps the government is primarily
interested in tapping its *own* phones! Not necessarily as part of a
paranoid conspiracy plan, but because of the graft and bribery cases
that keep coming up, such as the Defense Department scandals uncovered
by Operatin Ill Wind a few years back.

Ditto for "leaks" from offices.

The Powers That Be may have looked at the coming age of untappable
phones and concluded that at least they make sure they could tap the
phones of those in government and defense contractors and suppliers,
who will be the only ones actually _required_ to buy the
Clipperphones. (Under the precise wording of the White House
announcement; we can all still worry that this move is preparatory to
wider restrictions.)

Lest you think I'm becoming like David Sternlight and looking for the
silver lining in every government move, I'm only floating this as a
minor wrinkle on why the Clipperphones may be being deployed so
quickly.


--Tim 


-- 
..........................................................................
Timothy C. May         | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,  
tcmay@netcom.com       | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
408-688-5409           | knowledge, reputations, information markets, 
W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA  | black markets, collapse of governments.
Higher Power: 2^756839 | Public Key: PGP and MailSafe available.





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: gnu (John Gilmore)
Date: Mon, 26 Apr 93 21:24:54 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: He's all yours...
Message-ID: <9304270424.AA29796@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I'll send him the master list of cypherpunks questions.  You-all can
do the rest.

	John
	
------- Forwarded Message

From: schneier@chinet.com (Bruce Schneier)
Subject: Comments on Clipper for Publication
To: gnu@toad.com
Date: Mon, 26 Apr 1993 20:27:26 -0500 (CDT)

I am writing an article on Clipper for Network World.  I am looking for
comments and opinions (that I can quote) on the scheme, its implications
for security and privacy, its acceptance here and overseas, etc. 

I am on very tight deadline (I need to finish this Wednesday night).  Please
call or E-Mail responses.

If there is someone else at EFF I should be talking to, please send me his
address and telephione number.

Thanks,
Bruce
(708) 524-9461

------- End of Forwarded Message





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "$HOME/.sig" <pleiku!kelly@netcom.com>
Date: Mon, 26 Apr 93 23:47:02 PDT
To: Beyond.Dreams.ORG!composer@netcom.com (Jeff Kellem)
Subject: Re: COMP.RISKS is where the action seems to be
In-Reply-To: <9304270540.AA02095@Beyond.Dreams.ORG>
Message-ID: <9304270638.AA27096@netcomsv.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


--
Parts of this .sig borrowed with permission from T.C.May.
Perhaps it will indeed get me busted also.
..........................................................................
Kelly Goen             | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,  
kelly@netcom.com       | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
Intelligence Systems   | knowledge, reputations, information markets, 
Specialists Inc.       | black markets, face banks, data havens, dark
                       | tech, covert channels, shared secrets,
                       | alt.whistleblowers, collapse of governments.
Technical Monkeywrench | Public Key: PGP 2.2.
                       |
..........................................................................
PGP 2.2 Key available from PGP Keyservers on the Internet.

pub  1024/1BA573 1992/09/09  kelly <kelly@netcom.com>
          Key fingerprint =  EF 7A 38 99 22 84 E3 3B  90 2A DB 80 DC 65 DA 31 

STOP THE WIRETAP CHIP(Clipper Chip)!!



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: hkhenson@cup.portal.com
Date: Mon, 3 May 93 08:12:35 PDT
To: extropians@gnu.ai.mit.edu
Subject: Re: RISKS DIGEST 14.54
Message-ID: <9304262218.1.19891@cup.portal.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


This issue of comp.risks has a rather lengthy posting by DD.  The 
moderator commented (re the wiretap chip) "there has been essentially
no other topic of concern for the past week . . . ."  Considering
the wide range of topics covered here, that is quite a statement!
Keith




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: composer@Beyond.Dreams.ORG (Jeff Kellem)
Date: Mon, 26 Apr 93 19:21:44 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: a quick non-technical writeup on the Clipper chip...
Message-ID: <9304270221.AA01280@Beyond.Dreams.ORG>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


The following is something I wrote for "What's Out There?", a column I
write about what's available on the net.  It's more for pointing out where
to find out more information and such, but also includes a few of the
concerns about the announcement.

Feel free to send me comments.  I'll be posting this to various USENET
newsgroups in the near future, as the column won't be in hardcopy until
about June, 1993.

FYI...

			-jeff

Jeff Kellem
Internet: composer@Beyond.Dreams.ORG

p.s. This is excerpted with permission, of course, since I am the author. ;-)

===CUT HERE===
[ NOTE: Please see the COPYRIGHT/LICENSE notice at the end of this
  document before ANY redistribution. ]

The following is a portion of Volume 1, Issue 03 of "What's Out There?"
written by Jeff Kellem <composer@Beyond.Dreams.ORG>.  This is expected
to appear in the May/June 1993 issue of the USENIX Association's
hardcopy newsletter, ";login:".

Excerpted from "What's Out There?", Volume 1, Issue 03...

White House and NSA (Encryption) Clipper Chip Announcement
----------------------------------------------------------

On April 16, 1993, the White House announced the development of an
encryption chip for voice communications developed in conjunction
with the National Security Agency (NSA) called the Clipper Chip, along
with an initiative regarding telecommunications and privacy which
could literally affect almost every citizen in the United States.
On the same day, AT&T announced a "secure" phone which incorporated
this chip.  

Some important things to point out:

    o the encryption algorithm is remaining classified

      [ In the cryptography community, an encryption algorithm is only
	considered secure after it has been examined extensively and
	independently by a wide array of experts around the world.  With an
	algorithm which is kept secret, there is no guarantee that it is
	secure and that the encryption method has no "back door" (allowing
	easy decryption for those, such as the NSA, that know the "back
	door"). ]

    o though the government has announced plans to use the chip in their
      own phones, they do NOT plan to use it for CLASSIFIED information,
      only for unclassified information.

    o this chip has been in the making for 4 years; it would seem that
      the Clinton Administration has already made plans to use the chip,
      without public comment or discussion on a matter which is so
      important to the privacy of that same public.

    o it would seem that the Government might be granting a monopoly to
      Mykotronx, Inc. and VLSI Technology.  It's unclear whether each
      company makes the entire chip or just parts thereof.

    o the key, which allows the information encrypted with this chip to
      be decrypted, is embedded in the chip

      [ This means that once the key is known, the chip needs to be
	replaced to maintain private communications.  In other words, a new
	encryption device, if the key is ever divulged, which could just
	mean a wire-tap. ]

    o the 80-bit key is split into two (2) 40-bit pieces and kept in
      databases at two different escrow agencies

      [ It's not clear how the key databases will be kept secure.  It
	is also unknown if the classified encryption algorithm is any
	less secure to brute-force attacks, once half the key is known. ]

    o a successor chip has already been announced, called the Capstone
      chip.  The Capstone chip is supposed to be a "superset" of the
      Clipper chip and will include the "digital signature standard" (DSS),
      which many in the cyprotgraphy community seem to consider insecure,
      as I recall.  The NSA also developed DSS, which wasn't disclosed
      until CPSR filed a FOIA request with NIST (the National Institute of
      Standards & Technology).

This announcement, in one way, is a step in the right direction -- privacy
and encryption technology are important to the general public and for
international economic competitiveness.  An inquiry on whether export
restrictions on encryption technology is good or bad is also a good thing.
Currently, companies that want to include encryption as part of their
products need to make two versions -- one for domestic distribution and one
for international distribution.

On the other hand, there are too many things about the announcement which
are bothersome and need to be discussed publicly.  Some of these items
have been mentioned above.  I recommend talking with your local
congressman, writing letters, and discussing this with friends.

Both the Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF) and the Computer
Professionals for Social Responsibility (CPSR) have made public statements
against the announcement.  The CPSR has filed Freedom of Information Act
(FOIA) requests regarding the plan.

Online discussions of the announcement have been occurring all over the
Net in various USENET newsgroups and mailing lists.  Here's a sample of
where you might find discussions of the Clipper Chip:

    USENET newsgroups:
	alt.privacy.clipper
	sci.crypt
	alt.security
	alt.privacy
	comp.org.eff.talk
	comp.security.misc
	comp.society.cu-digest
	comp.risks
    Mailing lists:
	cypherpunks-request@toad.com

Also, check the archives for the various groups listed above, as things
may have changed by the time this comes to print in hardcopy come June 1993.

The official White House press release of the Clipper Chip can be found via
anonymous ftp from:

	csrc.ncsl.nist.gov
in the
	/pub/nistnews

directory, or via the NIST Computer Security BBS at +1 301 948 5717.  It
should also be available with the rest of the White House press release
archives mentioned above.

The EFF comments were first published in the EFFector Online Issue 5.06,
which is available via anonymous ftp from:

	ftp.eff.org
in the
	/pub/EFF/newsletters

directory.

Information from CPSR is available online via anonymous ftp from:

	ftp.cpsr.org
in the
	/cpsr

directory.

The cypherpunks mailing list also maintains an archive.  Information
on the Clipper Chip can be found via anonymous ftp from:

	soda.berkeley.edu
in the
	/pub/cypherpunks/clipper
directory.

Please do read the announcement of the Clipper Chip encryption technology,
think about and discuss the implications of this with your friends,
congressmen, and anyone else.

...End of excerpt.

COPYRIGHT/LICENSE:
    This document is Copyright (c) 1993 Jeff Kellem/Beyond Dreams,
    composer@Beyond.Dreams.ORG.  This copyright notice must be
    kept with each document.

    You have permission to freely redistribute this for non-commercial
    and non-profit purposes.  It would be nice if you let the author
    know about any redistributions that are expected to reach more
    than a single person. :-)  (This would include mirroring ftp
    sites, etc.)

    Please contact the author if you wish to use this document in ANY
    other fashion.  Most likely, there won't be a problem.

    If you wish to redistribute this document for commercial purposes,
    you MUST contact the author for permission.  Thank you.

Jeff Kellem
Composer of Dreams
Beyond Dreams
Internet: composer@Beyond.Dreams.ORG




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: gnu (John Gilmore)
Date: Mon, 26 Apr 93 22:24:33 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Markey hearings on Thursday will be on the Internet MBone
Message-ID: <9304270524.AA00805@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


John Gage tells me that audio from the Congressional hearings on
telephone privacy and Clipper will be multicast on the Internet
`MBone' (multicast backbone).  We don't yet know the multicast address.

If someone who knows about the mbone could hook in and record a copy
of the hearings (as an online sound file, or on tape), that would be
great.  I'll be at a conference on Thursday.

	John




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Date: Mon, 26 Apr 93 22:25:04 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: COMP.RISKS is where the action seems to be
Message-ID: <9304270525.AA28002@netcom3.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Comp.risks is carrying extensive coverage of the Clipper Chip issue,
including Dorothy Denning attempting to defend the Clipper.

Sci.crypt and alt.security.clipper still have more messages, but
comp.risks seems to be the place I check first. Being a digest,
though, a new one only appears a few times a week.

-Tim

-- 
..........................................................................
Timothy C. May         | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,  
tcmay@netcom.com       | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
408-688-5409           | knowledge, reputations, information markets, 
W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA  | black markets, collapse of governments.
Higher Power: 2^756839 | Public Key: PGP and MailSafe available.





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Tom Keenan <keenan@acs.ucalgary.ca>
Date: Mon, 26 Apr 93 23:09:19 PDT
To: risks@csl.sri.com
Subject: Clipper:  International implications
Message-ID: <9304270606.AA67332@acs3.acs.ucalgary.ca>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


It will be fascinating to see how non-US governments react to
Clipper.  Anybody have any info on this?  I will contact the
office of the Canadian minister responsible for Communictions
(Hon. Perrin Beatty) and see if there has been a
statement or reaction.  Canada might prosper as a "phone haven"
much as some Caribbean countries are "data havens."  

Somewhat related item in April 19/93 Communictions Week
International (page 4) reports (in part): "Europe's mobile
telephone industry is developing less-secure GSM digital cellular
equipment to mollify government law-enforcement agencies and
adjust to restrictions on high technology exports.  New base
station software and modified handset chips would make it easier
for GSM calls to be tapped, a requirement of some governments,
but would likely cost millions of dollars to install in existing networks and terminals."

The export status of Clipper technology will also be an
interesting thing to sort out.  White House Statement just says
"case by case."
Dr. Tom Keenan, I.S.P.   Associate Dean, R&D, U of Calgary
& Technology Correspondent, CBC Television "Midday"




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: wcs@anchor.ho.att.com
Date: Mon, 26 Apr 93 21:35:30 PDT
To: smb@ulysses.att.com
Subject: Mykotronx and VLSI data sheets
Message-ID: <9304270435.AA09033@anchor.ho.att.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text


The data sheets arrived today!   
(Steve - I gave Matt a copy; I can fax it to you if yours hasn't shown) 
(Cypherpunks - Mykotronx 310-533-8100 fax-0527, VLSI 408-434-3100 fax-263-2511)
The VLSI material didn't have anything Clipper-specific -
lots of stuff on their ASIC libraries and chips, and some information on 
their tamper-proof technology.  Their DES chip does 192 Mb/s, and they've
got a vocoder chip for 13 kb/s GSM as well as 32 kb/s ADPCM G.721,
ARM RISC, Z80 cores, high-speed comms stuff, PC support ASICs, etc.

The Mykotronx material was interesting.  It was about 18 pages long,
and there are functional diagrams, pinouts, timing diags, command sets.
It looks like there may be two versions, one commercial, one industrial-hard.
The chip is 28-pin PLCC, with 4 bits control input, 8 leads for input/
output/config/status/test/alarm depending on command, the usual power,
clock, strobe, busy, reset, and alarm leads, and two leads for
higher-voltage write-once PROM.  The internal clock is 15 MHz, and I'm
not sure how fast it goes if you clock it externally (it uses the internal
clock when it's doing the fun stuff, but can use externals for I/O, etc.)
It looks like the encryption phase takes 64 clock cycles, but I'm not an 
electrician so I can't guarantee that that's what the timing diags mean;
if that's the case it would seem to be slower than 16 mb/s throughput
given I/O time?

There are 5 functional blocks: controller, algorithm, Data Bus Buffer,
self-test, and clock.  There's an internal data bus (how wide? 8 bits?)
with the controller, data buffer, and external clock accessible from outside,
the self-test generating two output leads only, and the algorithm block
isolated (only connected to the bus and self-test.)

The basic sequence of operations, once the chip has booted and tested,
is that you feed commands to initialize cryptographic variables (key, IV),
tell it to encrypt or decrypt, strobe in data, let it crunch, and strobe
out results.  It's picky about getting commands in the right order, 
and rejects anything it isn't willing to do for security reasons.  

It can operate in 7 different modes: ECB-64, CBC-64, OFB-64, CFB-64/32/16/8.
The number of bytes read or written depends on the mode, but I was interested
to find that I couldn't tell from the data sheets how many bytes that is,
which either means they deliberately aren't telling us where the wiretap 
block is or else they assume that the Output Buffer Full and Input Buf Empty
leads are all you care about; I'll try to find a tasteful way to ask them.

Commands:
- Reset
- Write Random Seed - must be done at startup; there's a pseudo-random 
	generator for IVs.  If you give it a zero, it asks for a better seed.
- Write Config Register - done second, picks operating mode.
	If you're in IDLE mode, you need to do this before 
	writing the CV or IV.
- Write Crypto-Variable (CV) (loads 10 bytes key, 3 bytes checksum,
	automagically checks key when loaded.)
- Write Initialization Vector (IV) - you can load it or generate.
- Generate IV - using the pseudo-random.  Outputs to data bus when done.
- Start Encrypt Block - read data off bus, crunch, wait for Read Output, IDLE
- Read Output - strobes out output
- Start Decrypt Block - read data, crunch, wait for Read Output, repeat
	until you get a Terminate or other command
- Terminate Encrypt/Decrypt - stop doing encryption (IDLE?)
- Save Current State - output 8 bytes of state to data bus
- Restore Current State - input 8 bytes of state from data bus
- Read Status Register - outputs to bus
- Read Test/Alarm Register - outputs to bus
- Write Test/Alarm Register - read from bus, do tests

If you want to order a copy, they were pretty quick about delivering it.
The person I talked to was John Droge, VP, Program Development.
Approximate prices are $30 (qty. 10,000), no mention of engineering samples,
quotations on a case-by-case basis for now.


			Bill Stewart
			
# Bill Stewart    wcs@anchor.ho.att.com  +1-908-949-0705 Fax-4876
# AT&T Bell Labs, Room 4M-312, Crawfords Corner Rd, Holmdel, NJ  07733-3030



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Sy Verpunc <svp@gtoal.com>
Date: Tue, 27 Apr 93 18:01:40 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: REMAIL: email to usenet gateways
Message-ID: <9304270130.AA18056@pizzabox.demon.co.uk>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


	group-name@ucbvax.berkeley.edu *

	* I understand that the admin of ucbvax.berkeley.edu block posts from
	non berkeley sites, but I'm not positive about that!

It was open for a couple of years but is now blocked.  I checked a week ago.

G




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: composer@Beyond.Dreams.ORG (Jeff Kellem)
Date: Mon, 26 Apr 93 22:35:49 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: a quick non-technical writeup on the Clipper chip -- corrections
Message-ID: <9304270535.AA02062@Beyond.Dreams.ORG>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Here are some minor corrections to the the non-technical writeup I posted
earlier this evening.  Note, that I also already corrected the typo
regarding how the keys were constructed.

Ignore the line numbers.. they'll be incorrect, as this is part of a larger
article.

FYI...

			-jeff

Jeff Kellem
Internet: composer@Beyond.Dreams.ORG

===CUT HERE===
*** /tmp/RCSA002047	Tue Apr 27 01:29:46 1993
--- whats-out-there-1.03.text	Tue Apr 27 01:29:08 1993
***************
*** 188,203 ****
        important to the privacy of that same public.
  
      o it would seem that the Government might be granting a monopoly to
!       Mykotronx, Inc. and VLSI Technology.  It's unclear whether each
!       company makes the entire chip or just parts thereof.
  
      o the key, which allows the information encrypted with this chip to
        be decrypted, is embedded in the chip
  
        [ This means that once the key is known, the chip needs to be
! 	replaced to maintain private communications.  In other words, a new
! 	encryption device, if the key is ever divulged, which could just
! 	mean a wire-tap. ]
  
      o the 80-bit key is made from the xor of two (2) 80-bit keys, which are
        kept in databases at two different escrow agencies
--- 188,206 ----
        important to the privacy of that same public.
  
      o it would seem that the Government might be granting a monopoly to
!       Mykotronx, Inc. and VLSI Technology.  As far as I know, VLSI
!       fabricates the chip and Mykotronx programs the keys into it.
  
      o the key, which allows the information encrypted with this chip to
        be decrypted, is embedded in the chip
  
        [ This means that once the key is known, the chip needs to be
! 	replaced to maintain private communications.  This would usually
! 	mean replacing the entire device (e.g. telephone), anytime that
! 	the key was divulged, whether legally or not.  The key is also
! 	transmitted along with your encrypted data, so that law enforcement
! 	can obtain it, which would allow them to decrypt your data without
! 	your knowledge. ]
  
      o the 80-bit key is made from the xor of two (2) 80-bit keys, which are
        kept in databases at two different escrow agencies
***************
*** 223,235 ****
  for international distribution.
  
  On the other hand, there are too many things about the announcement which
! are bothersome and need to be discussed publicly.  Some of these items
! have been mentioned above.  I recommend talking with your local
! congressman, writing letters, and discussing this with friends.
  
  Both the Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF) and the Computer
  Professionals for Social Responsibility (CPSR) have made public statements
! against the announcement.  The CPSR has filed Freedom of Information Act
  (FOIA) requests regarding the plan.
  
  Online discussions of the announcement have been occurring all over the
--- 226,243 ----
  for international distribution.
  
  On the other hand, there are too many things about the announcement which
! are bothersome and need to be discussed publicly.  Some of these items have
! been mentioned above.  The Clipper Chip basically seems like it might
! provide privacy from some people, but not from the government.  I recommend
! talking with your local congressman, writing letters, and discussing this
! with friends.
  
  Both the Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF) and the Computer
  Professionals for Social Responsibility (CPSR) have made public statements
! against the announcement.  The EFF supports the idea of reviewing
! cryptographic and privacy policies, but believes that the Clipper Chip
! announcement was premature and should be delayed until after the overall
! review and discussion.  The CPSR has filed Freedom of Information Act
  (FOIA) requests regarding the plan.
  
  Online discussions of the announcement have been occurring all over the




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: composer@Beyond.Dreams.ORG (Jeff Kellem)
Date: Mon, 26 Apr 93 22:40:24 PDT
To: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Subject: Re: COMP.RISKS is where the action seems to be
In-Reply-To: <9304270525.AA28002@netcom3.netcom.com>
Message-ID: <9304270540.AA02095@Beyond.Dreams.ORG>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


On the cypherpunks mailing list, Tim May wrote...
 > Sci.crypt and alt.security.clipper still have more messages, but
                     ^^^^^^^^
Minor correction: it's alt.privacy.clipper.

FYI...

		-jeff

Jeff Kellem
Internet: composer@Beyond.Dreams.ORG




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: strat@intercon.com (Bob Stratton)
Date: Mon, 26 Apr 93 22:47:14 PDT
To: gnu@toad.com
Subject: Markey hearings on Thursday will be on the Internet MBone
In-Reply-To: <9304270524.AA00805@toad.com>
Message-ID: <9304270547.AA10528@intercon.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>>>>> On Mon, 26 Apr 93 22:24:31 -0700, gnu@toad.com (John Gilmore) said:

	John> John Gage tells me that audio from the Congressional
	John> hearings on telephone privacy and Clipper will be
	John> multicast on the Internet `MBone' (multicast backbone).
	John> We don't yet know the multicast address.

Hrm..That's interesting. If you're on the MBONE, the Session Directory
tool should show you upcoming events, and let you select them. It also
fires off the appropriate client software with the proper arguments,
which is the Right Thing. 

	John> If someone who knows about the mbone could hook in and
	John> record a copy of the hearings (as an online sound file,
	John> or on tape), that would be great.  I'll be at a
	John> conference on Thursday.

I'm on the remote conferencing mailing list (rem-conf@es.net), and I
have yet to see an announcement. If I can find it, I'll tape it. 

John, have your friend drop me a note with any details he might have,
because the regular channels haven't had any information on this. Any
pointers might help me track it down.

--Strat






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Sy Verpunc <svp@gtoal.com>
Date: Tue, 27 Apr 93 19:29:17 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: REMAIL: email to usenet gateways
Message-ID: <9304270150.AA18265@pizzabox.demon.co.uk>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


	Hal recently posted instructions on how to post to usenet using the
	anonymous remailers.  Here's a collection of email to usenet gateways
	I have, no doubt far from complete.

	group-name@ucbvax.berkeley.edu *
	group-name@cs.utexas.edu
	group-name@pws.bull.com
	group.name@news.demon.co.uk

Actually, the latter is group-name@demon.co.uk, and it's intended for
demon customers.  I believe they don't police this too heavily (ie they
could chop connections from non-demon sites) but if it's heavily overused
or abused there's a chance it might disappear.  These sites are *not*
anonymous remailers, in case anyone thought that.  They post under the
name presented in your mail to it, and if you forge mail the demon one
at least attaches an 'Originator:' line with the real site, and sends
a copy to the postmaster.

Generally, a service not to be abused.

The only open NNTP server I know of at the moment is sol.ctr.columbia.edu,
and it has user limits and time restrictions.  Still, it's better than none.

G




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: szabo@techbook.com (Nick Szabo)
Date: Tue, 27 Apr 93 03:17:43 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: How to protect your electronic privacy -- consumer pamphlet
Message-ID: <m0nnmmA-000hqDC@techbook.techbook.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Here is a handout I've written for our next Portland-area libertarian
meeting.   Comments welcome.  Feel free to distribute freely (you
can edit out Portland-specific stuff) with attributions.

----------------------------------------------------------------

How to Protect Your Electronic Privacy
Nick Szabo, April 30 1993
Distribute Freely

We conduct more and more of our legal, political, and private business
over the wires.  Every decade, the number of phone calls that the
government can record for later playback increases by a factor of ten.
Commercial organizations gather and sell our transactions; marketers
and governments cross-reference them, forming our vast electronic
reputation.  The number of e-mail messages doubles every year, and many 
political organizations are coming to rely on networks like Internet and 
LiberNet.  Most e-mail users are unaware that it is the most public 
medium ever invented, and use it to write love letters, letters to their 
lawyer, discussion of illegal activities, etc.  Vast volumes of e-mail 
can be stored on small magnetic tapes and searched in bulk for keywords, 
eg "mari[jh]uana".  The good news is, the computer brings an even greater 
weapon to fight these threats to our privacy and political freedoms: widely 
available, automatic cryptography.

Instead of developing phones allowing truly private conversations, which
are now feasible, AT&T recently put a phone on the market that contains 
the NSA-designed "Clipper" wiretap chip.  All users' encryption keys are 
registered with the U.S. government, giving it exclusive access to 
wiretapping this system's phones.  The use of an unpublished algorithm 
and other features also make the system insecure.  "Clipper" would also
make traffic analysis (finding out who is calling whom, when, etc.)
much easier.  The goal of this government/Ma Bell collusion is to
subsidize the creation of a standard that forces truly private phone
systems off the market.

By purposefully allowing a government backdoor in its "secure" phones,
AT&T has demonstrated its contempt for its customers' privacy.  Here are 
some other long-distance providers that may have more respect.  All U.S. 
line providers are required to surrender to telephone taps under 
government "authorization", but some require more "authorization" than 
others, or otherwise make a greater fuss about it.  Local wiretaps are 
beyond the control of long-distance companies, but long-distance 
eavesdropping is much more difficult if the company uses fiber optic
instead of microwave links.  Ask company representatives for details.

Allnet Long Distance Services	1-800-783-2020
MCI, commercial			1-800-888-0800
MCI, residential		1-800-950-5555
Metromedia Communications Corp.	1-800-275-2273
One-2-One Communications	1-800-293-4121
Sprint, residential		1-800-877-7746
Sprint, business		1-800-733-5566

Real phone privacy can be obtained with a veil of encryption, by using
pairs of phones containing privacy chips, which scramble the
signals *and* keep the keys private.  Contact your local business 
telephone dealers for privacy phones from Ericson, Cylink and other
companies.  Keep your eye out for portable-computer-based
software with voice input that can be used to encrypt voice mail
and send it over the networks like e-mail; these may be appearing
on the market or as freeware within six months.

Data privacy can be obtained with public-key encryption
features which have been added to some of the newer e-mail packages
from Microsoft, Apple, Novell, etc.  Beware: most software encryption
has been restricted by the U.S. government to very weak algorithms.
"Cypherpunks" enjoy writing programs to crack the weakened file
encryption in Word Perfect, Lotus, etc.  Be sure the software contains
the new "RSA" public-key algorithm, which probably cannot be cracked
by anybody, even the NSA with their buildings full of supercomputers.
A strong freeware RSA package is also available called Pretty Good 
Privacy (PGP); this is the international standard on the Internet.  
PGP can also be used for protecting the files on your PC.  On an Internet 
machine type "archie pgp" to find out where PGP is available for 
download.  Several BBS systems also have PGP available.

In public key encryption, there are two keys, one used to lock 
(really scramble) the data, the other to unlock (unscramble) the data. 
To join the fun, publish or send your freinds your public key, and
they can then send you messages only you can unlock with your private
key.  You collect other's public keys and do the same.  PGP key 
distribution is based on an informal, voluntary web of trust instead 
of the government's rigid heirarchy which is vulnerable to failure 
at the top.  Just as today's businessmen trade business cards,
tommorrow's businessmen will trade public keys -- if the government
doesn't ban them first.

For more detailed information on electronic privacy, see:

* Your local phone dealer.  If he does not know about privacy
issues and phone privacy products, ask him to find out!
* The May/June issue of "Wired" magazine featuring "crypto-rebels"
on the cover.  A history computer cryptography and the "cypherpunk"
movement, whose goal is to break the government monopoly on cryptography
and to restore our right to privacy in the electronic age.
* "Mondo 2000" #9 (most recent) features two good articles on PGP, and
a third article on protecting our financial privacy from governments.
* The Winter/Spring issue of "Extropy" features and article on digital
cash.  Unlike current electronic funds transfer, digital cash increases
financial privacy.
* On the Internet, the cypherpunks mailing list 
(cypherpunks-request@toad.com) and the newsgroups sci.crypt.  In the
Portland area two Internet providers are agora (293-1772 data) and
techbook (220-0636 data).  
* Organizations helping lobby for electronic privacy: Electronic Frontier
Foundation (eff.org), Computer Professionals for Social Responsibility 
(cpsr.org), Privacy International.  These are not entirely libertarian
(eg EFF tends to support Gore's socialist "Data Highway".)
* James Bamford, _The Puzzle Palace_, 1983: A classic expose of the
National Security Agency.

Nick Szabo					szabo@techbook.com



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Stanton McCandlish <anton@hydra.unm.edu>
Date: Tue, 27 Apr 93 03:52:40 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Clipper:  International implications
In-Reply-To: <9304270606.AA67332@acs3.acs.ucalgary.ca>
Message-ID: <9304271052.AA20890@hydra.unm.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> statement or reaction.  Canada might prosper as a "phone haven"
> much as some Caribbean countries are "data havens."  

"are"?  I was under the impression that that was a sci-fi motif.  What 
do you mean the "are 'data havens'"?

-- 
Testes saxi solidi!  **********************   Podex opacus gravedinosus est!  
Stanton McCandlish,  SysOp:  Noise in the Void Data Center BBS
IndraNet: 369:1/1      FidoNet: 1:301/2      Internet: anton@hydra.unm.edu
Snail: 8020 Central SE #405, Albuquerque, New Mexico 87108 USA
Data phone: +1-505-246-8515 (24hr, 1200-14400 v32bis, N-8-1)
Vox phone:  +1-505-247-3402 (bps rate varies, depends on if you woke me up...:)




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: karn@qualcomm.com (Phil Karn)
Date: Tue, 27 Apr 93 09:18:04 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re:  Markey hearings on Thursday will be on the Internet MBone
Message-ID: <9304271617.AA01355@servo>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Does anybody know if the hearings will be carried on CSPAN?

Phil




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Arthur Abraham <a2@well.sf.ca.us>
Date: Tue, 27 Apr 93 09:37:01 PDT
To: tcmay@netcom.com
Subject: Re:  A correction, and another motive for Clipper
Message-ID: <199304271636.AA22886@well.sf.ca.us>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


27-Apr-93

Tim,

Your suggestion has the validity of strong logic: it fits all
the facts we know, leaves none out, and makes no external
assumptions.

In particular, while the rotten underbelly of society
(terrorists, drug runners, producers of TV sitcoms) would have
no compunctions about using further encryption within a
Privacy Clipper wrapper, a government employee or contractor
who did would be highly suspect, and -- knowing Big Uncle
might be listening -- would be restrained from performing
kick-back business as usual.  Is this the technological fix to
government corruption?

Following this theory, I am sure we would all applaud
legislation restraining the gov-guys from using non-Clipper
crypto.  The situation might come to resemble drug testing:
legally mandated for individuals in "public saftey" positions,
such as transportation workers and A-bomb builders, not
required where not justified.

The Attorney General is going to buy several thousand of these
things, she already has the money -- and probably a signed
contract with AT&T Greensboro -- and it's unlikely this can be
stopped.  What we can do is use it to our advantage.  

This may be maneuvered into a no-lose situation for us, as...
either: 
     a. The government taps itself, corruption is uncovered,
and the national debt decreases.  Society agrees that public
officials don't deserve privacy, but citizens do.
or:
     b. The government bureaucrats, seeing hard times coming,
reject Privacy Clipping for themselves, and so everybody --
gov and citizens -- retains their privacy. (This is judo: use
their weight against them.) 

Let me suggest this as a political position:

Clipper Privacy for the Government, real privacy for Private
citizens.

-a2.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: crunch@netcom.com (John Draper)
Date: Tue, 27 Apr 93 11:39:20 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Rave on...
Message-ID: <9304271839.AA26005@netcom4.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



  At the last Mt View Cypherpunks meeting,  it was discussed about ways
in which we can get the word out to as many people as possible.    

  I have an idea on yet another way on how this can be done.    Would
like to get input and feedback on this from the rest of the group.

  One such place where lots of people meet are RAVES.   My proposal is
to set up a room with a bunch of donated PC's Macs or whatever,   and
have a booth set up where people can purchase PGP diskettes for slightly
above cost of the diskettes.    People attending raves can purchase
their PGP diskettes and on the spot,  generate their keys.    They can
sign each other's keys there,   and handout literature can be made
available for anyone attending that describes the "Clipper" proposals,
and suggestions on what people can do to resist further government
control over private cryptography.

  Already,  at most raves,  there are demonstrations set up for things
like the new "body synth",  VR demos,  and other things,  so this should
fit right in.

  I'm in contact with a number of RAVE organizors,  and plan on contacting
them.    If enough people from Cypherpunks are interested in bringing their
portables or small PC's,  Macs or whatever to raves,  this might be a
very good way of reaching the younger people who might not otherwize be 
plugged into the mainstream media like TV,  or newspapers,  or whatever.

  For those interested in donating a Sat evening,  and wanting to have
a little fun,  by bringing their computers to future raves,   please 
send me your Email address,  and specifics on any equipment you might 
want to bring,  I can put you in touch with the appropriate organizers.
Anyway,   I'm open for input on this,  and how we can get the word out.

  At the Cypherpunks dinner,  I mentioned to John Gilmore and others about
the possibility of doing short video "skits" and "infomercials" on
some hypothetical scenerios of a "Faschiist government" that outlaws
encryption.   We can make it fun and entertaining,  and I don't think I
would have a problem proposing it to those people capable of producing
this video.    We will need actors,   and some people to write up the
"skit".    I don't think we would have any problem convincing KQED,  or
any other TV station to air it.    It would reach a lot of people,  and
is a good instrument in getting the word out.

  I talked to Wes Thomas about this,  and we can set up an ad hoc get
together in Berkeley and perhaps Eric Hughes and John Gilmore can
attend and we can "ad lib" for practice a few hypothetical skits
and vide tape it some evening.    I think it would be fun,   and even
John Gilmore might enjoy participating in this fun activity.

Rave on - D00ds!!

JD





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "L. Detweiler" <ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Date: Tue, 27 Apr 93 12:45:26 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Clipper key negotiation...
Message-ID: <9304271945.AA10153@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


is nonexistent.

That is, as I understand it, the algorithm for creating/exchanging the
session key that is negotiated at the beginning of each call is *not*
built into the chip or the standard.

Am I correct? Mrs. Denning has conspicuously evaded this issue only by
saying that the keys can be exchanged via Diffie-Hellman or RSA. The
point is, the phone hardware designer/integrator must use an additional circuit.

Isn't this a serious potential defect of the chip? Isn't it amazing
that the design neglects the issue completely? Wouldn't the ideal (or
even `usable'?) chip have this built in? If RSA refused to grant
support to people using the algorithm for this purpose, it could have
tremendous effect in helping  vanquish it... What will be their
commitment in this area? Is Mr. Bidzos annoyed about the Clipper chip
as a veiled revocation of American rights or as a lucrative
opportunity, denied at first, but not later, to get a tasty piece of
the wiretapping pie? It seems to me that Mr. Bidzos has a critically
pivotal decision to make, and to make clear. Or has it been made
already, by someone else?

If somebody comes out with a neat chip that interfaces to the Clipper
*really soon* that has been *totally approved* by RSA for clipper key
negotiation, I'd be a bit suspicious....

Can anybody clear this up? Exactly what parts of session key exchange/
negotiation/ generation are handled by the chip, and which aren't?
There is not even specific information in Denning's statements about
when all this (including the All-American Privacy-Protecting Law
Enforcement Block, ug!) is transmitted (at the beginning of the call,
presumably).  Why hasn't there been more inquiry into this?

Is the key fed to the chip by other circuitry? That would seem to be
the case. The chip appears to be just a low level encryption device,
not something high-level that worries about key manipulation and
trading.  Hence, there may be widely varying approaches to implementing
key exchange.  Not much of a `standard' that leaves unspecified
something so basic.  Notice however that the wiretapper does not care,
because this is not involved in the decryption; the crucial data for
them is that the serial number and family codes be correct for the
chip. So, these aspects are hardwired.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Eli Brandt <ebrandt@jarthur.Claremont.EDU>
Date: Tue, 27 Apr 93 13:58:22 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re:  A correction, and another motive for Clipper
In-Reply-To: <199304271636.AA22886@well.sf.ca.us>
Message-ID: <9304272058.AA12843@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> either: 
>      a. The government taps itself, corruption is uncovered,
> and the national debt decreases.  Society agrees that public
> officials don't deserve privacy, but citizens do.
> or:
>      b. The government bureaucrats, seeing hard times coming,
> reject Privacy Clipping for themselves, and so everybody --
> gov and citizens -- retains their privacy. (This is judo: use
> their weight against them.) 

S.O.P. would be
	c. The government mandates that citizens use only Approved
Privacy Techniques, while government employees, "for national
security reasons", can use whatever they want.  

The government has a long and lurid history of placing less
restrictions upon itself than upon the rest of us.  I can imagine
general restrictions on crypto, but I can't picture the CIA using a
known-broken system.

> -a2.

   Eli   ebrandt@jarthur.claremont.edu




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: bbehlen@soda.berkeley.edu (Brian Behlendorf (Vitamin B))
Date: Tue, 27 Apr 93 14:39:14 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Rave on...
Message-ID: <9304272135.AA19884@soda.berkeley.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Hmm... the problem is I don't think a majority of the people at raves are
focused enough to concentrate on something as technical as that (I KNOW it
isn't technical to you and me, but the average raver doesn't even
know what the word encryption means).  HOWEVER, raves ARE the ideal place
to hand out info about what's going on, something the raver can cling onto
to read and understand when he's not high on {vibes,music,drug,etc.}.  Give
pointers to where to get more info or where to obtain PGP, and perhaps 
most importantly, WHY THEY NEED IT.  Within a certain amount of time, but
most likely sooner than any of us anticipate, there will be more people with
email access than without, so "taking the message to the streets" is becoming
less and less of a fanciful idea....

        Brian




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: uri@watson.ibm.com
Date: Tue, 27 Apr 93 14:56:04 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Be afraid! (some Clipper details)
Message-ID: <9304271854.AA20759@buoy.watson.ibm.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


As Ms. Dorothy Denning explained, this is the intended
"interface" between the Clipper and Law Enforcement
(taken from her posting to "comp.risks"):

1. Family Key.

	F is embedded in every Clipper Chip,  but like other chip keys,
	unknown to the people who use them.  Only law enforcement will
	have a decoder box that allows the law enforcement field to be
	decrypted. Initially, there will be just one box,  and it will
	be operated by the FBI.

	Read - FBI will have the Family Key (and thus will be able to
	get all the chip serial numbers, do traffic analysis etc).

   And later she "corrected" herself, adding:

	For the same reason as above, it is imperative that law
	enforcement be able to decode the law enforcement field
	in order to obtain E[K; U] and then decrypt this to get
	K. It is completely impractical to go the escrow agents
	for each conversation.

	Read - Law Enforcement (local, "global" - whatever) will
	have that Family Key as well,  not only that "one box at
	FBI"... But it was obvious, wasn't it?

2) Unit Key.

	It is imperative  that law enforcement get U.  If they are tapping
	a line, there may be dozens of calls on that line per day.It would
	be totally impractical to have  to go to the  escrow agents to get
	the session key for each call. It would be impossible to do
	real-time decryption under that constraint.

	Read -  a) Law Enforcement indeed will have your Unit key
		   (and thus be able to decrypt whetever was sent
		    through your chip, from the day one, till you
		    throw your chip away).

		b) It's indeed  physically possible thus  for some
		   corrupted Law Enforcement officials to "collect"
		   the Unit Keys and to do all the bad things with
		   them.

		c) Nobody seems to be concerned about it.

3) Question about agencies capable of decrypting all the future
   traffic of once-suspected individual:

	After a tap has been completed, government attorneys are
	required to notify the subjects of the electronic surveillance.
	At that point, the subjects are certainly free to purchase a
	new device with a new chip, or perhaps the vendors could simply
	replace the chip.

	Read - if they won't forget to notify you,  that your phone
	was tapped, feel free to shell another $XXX bucks for a new
	chip/phone... Keep doing that until either they, or you get
	tired...

4) Question about whether there's time component in the cipher.
   Reasons for it - since wiretaps are authorized ONLY for
   certain time periods with both start and end dates
   specified, it should not be possible to be able
   to decrypt the traffic outside of this frame.

	I am unaware of any time component.  Current wiretap laws protect
	against this.  Evidence collected  after the warrant  has expired
	can be thrown out in court.  In addition,  it is illegal  for the
	service provider  to implement an intercept  after  a warrant has
	expired.With the new technologies,law enforcers will be incapable
	of executing a tap without the assistance of the service provider.

	Read - just as we assumed, once your key is compromised (ouch! I
	mean - disclosed :-), whatever "they" bothered to record, is now
	open...  Well,  of course it won't be legal,  but then there are
	many things beyond the law (:-)...

5) Question about potential weakness, which may be lurking
   behind the "classified" stamp of the algorithm, known
   thus only to those "cleared" to know.

	The NSA has a long record of success with crypto, far better
	than any individual or organization in the public community.
	In addition, there are plans to bring in expert cryptographers
	to assess the algorithm.

	Read - she's ignorant of academia/industry crypto successes? (:-)

That's all folks! [For now :-]

Regards,
Uri.
------------
<Disclaimer>




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Arthur Abraham <a2@well.sf.ca.us>
Date: Tue, 27 Apr 93 14:58:59 PDT
To: ebrandt@jarthur.Claremont.EDU
Subject: Re:  A correction, and another motive for Clipper
Message-ID: <199304272158.AA11690@well.sf.ca.us>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Eli,

Of course the guys with the STU phones will keep them, this is Type II 
security, which is of a lower level.

The people who really need these phones are the civil servants in these
departments:

Agriculture
Commerce
Education
Energy
EPA
HHS
HUD
Interior
Justice
Labor
State
Transportation
Treasury
Veterans Affairs

...that is, people in positions to missapropriate funds, or create 
overly generous contracts with their future employers.  There is no
good argument that these functionaries shouldn't be Clippered, except
that nobody should be.  ""National Security"" doesn't apply here.

You also seem to be thinking with two cliches:

1. You can't fight city hall.

2. This is the way things have always been, this is the way they always
will be.

The guys who put this in motion certainly aren't thinking with 2), but they
sure are hoping you're thinking with 1).

Please expunge both of them from your mind and replace then with an 
appreciation of forces and masses: Judo.

-a2.]




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Mike Godwin <mnemonic@eff.org>
Date: Tue, 27 Apr 93 12:10:19 PDT
To: mnemonic@eff.org (Mike Godwin)
Subject: Interesting quotation from Denning's book on cryptography
Message-ID: <199304271910.AA17788@eff.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



From Dorothy Denning, CRYPTOGRAPHY AND DATA SECURITY, Addison-Wesley
1982,1983, page 8:

"Cryptosystems must satisfy three general requirements:

"1. The enciphering and deciphering transformations must be efficient for
all keys.

"2. The system must be easy to use.

"3. The security of the system should depend only on the secrecy of the
keys and not on the secrecy of algorithms E [enciphering] or D
[deciphering]."



--Mike







From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Mike Godwin <mnemonic@eff.org>
Date: Tue, 27 Apr 93 13:28:41 PDT
To: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Subject: Re: MEETING SUMMARY: 4-24-93 Cypherpunks Meeting
In-Reply-To: <9304261909.AA29562@netcom.netcom.com>
Message-ID: <199304272028.AA19664@eff.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Tim writes in the summary of Saturday's meeting:
 
> Jim Bidzos, President of RSA Data Security, intended to just speak briefly
> about the Clipper Chip, Capstone, and the view of RSA, but ended up staying
> and participating for several hours. Mike Godwin, of EFF, was present at
> the Boston (I think) site.

Definitely at the Boston (Cambridge) site.

> It appears the Clipper/Capstone program is initially intended to "buy
> market share" as quickly as possible, with government offices requiring
> Clipperphones (and probably for those they do business with). Perhaps the
> intent is undercut competing models and make Clipper the de facto standard,
> which can then be made the de jure standard.
 
I am very sceptical that the "market share" strategy is the whole strategy
here. I think that while some proponents of Clipper may believe this is
the strategy, DOJ hopes that widespread adoption of Clipper will mute
any opposition to subsequent limitations on other encryption methods.

> John Gilmore has already posted to the list the results of our
> brainstorming session to come up with questions to ask the FBI, NIST, NSA,
> Congress, and the Administration. Mike Godwin argued that a lot of
> embarrassing questions could quickly derail the plan.

Let me clarify: I argued that asking tough questions could either force to
the government to reveal its hand or pin the government down to a
statement it would later have to admit was false.

> That is, it's conceivable this plan could begin to unravel fairly soon. 
 
We can only hope.

> Whit Diffie described how the failure could either so greatly
> embarrass the Administration that they'd be loathe to try it again (the
> Viet Nam Syndrome, applied to crypto) or that it could provoke them to
> tighten restrictions even further, perhaps even to the point of an outright
> ban on the use of unapproved encryption at *any* level.

I believe this is precisely the reason we want to make powerful encryption
ubiquitous as soon as possible. And doing this is one of the reasons I
mentioned my hope for an eventual rapprochment between Jim Bidzos and 
Phil Zimmerman. Regardless of past disagreements, these two have a common
cause now, and we should strive to find a way to quell further public
disagreement and resolve as many differences as possible.

> * Since Jim Bidzos was there, the topic of PGP naturally came up several
> times. Eric Hughes let this run for a while, then moved the discussion back
> to Clipper. Jim Bidzos clearly had some strong opinions, but also did not
> want this to be the forum for debating patents and the legality and ethics
> of PGP.

Another clarification: in response to a comment I made at the meeting,
Jim spoke at length about the validity of the RSA patent and about the
validity of his company's procedures. I want Jim and others to understand
that what I'm saying here should not be interpreted as an attack on Jim's
business strategy. I know that Jim is so used to being criticized about
the patent that he has standard responses to those criticisms, but I hope
it's clear that I wasn't criticizing him.

> Some of us continue to hope some accommodation can be reached between RSA
> Data and the PGP community. The upcoming battle over strong crypto is a
> bigger issue than this squabble.

Yes, yes, yes.



--Mike








From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: crunch@netcom.com (John Draper)
Date: Tue, 27 Apr 93 16:54:46 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Raving on...
Message-ID: <9304272354.AA23189@netcom4.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Hmmm,  getting some mixed responses from the group on the raves
idea,   below are my comments....

>   I don't mean to rain on the parade, but young people (myself  
>included) go to Raves to get away from the problems and injustice   
>the clipper represents. Bringing in your personal PC to generate keys  
>isn't going to draw a crowd. MOST ravers don't have, don't know, and  
>by and large don't care about computers - let alone mass  
>communication and encryption schemes. What can the government do if  
>they don't care? It's the "music" scene.

That might be partially true,  and depends on the rave.   Most raves
I go to have all sorts of computer related demonstrations,  and 
exibits.    I've been getting very positive interest on the part
of rave organizers.

Brian says:

>Hmm... the problem is I don't think a majority of the people at raves are
>focused enough to concentrate on something as technical as that (I KNOW it
>isn't technical to you and me, but the average raver doesn't even
>know what the word encryption means).  HOWEVER, raves ARE the ideal place
>to hand out info about what's going on, something the raver can cling onto
>to read and understand when he's not high on {vibes,music,drug,etc.}.  Give
>pointers to where to get more info or where to obtain PGP, and perhaps 
>most importantly, WHY THEY NEED IT.  Within a certain amount of time, but
>most likely sooner than any of us anticipate, there will be more people with
>email access than without, so "taking the message to the streets" is becoming
>less and less of a fanciful idea....

I agree that we should keep it non-technical,  thats why I proposed that
raves have tables set up where PGP copies can be given out,  literature
can be displayed for ravers to take home later...   Then,  there are 
those hard core cyberpunks that will take in EVERYTHING including lots
of drugs.

For those UK folks,  Craig Larson from the USA will be working with sponsors
to a totally awsome rave of an estimated 40,000 folks.   Now THATS a good
place to get the word out,  spark intererest in encryption,  etc.

And on and on..

JD




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Eric Hughes <hughes@soda.berkeley.edu>
Date: Tue, 27 Apr 93 17:47:37 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: REMAIL: email to usenet gateways
In-Reply-To: <199304272308.AA28969@Menudo.UH.EDU>
Message-ID: <9304280008.AA02189@soda.berkeley.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>group-name@ucbvax.berkeley.edu *
>* I understand that the admin of ucbvax.berkeley.edu block posts from
>non berkeley sites, but I'm not positive about that!

No problem.  Just use a berkeley.edu remailer as the final hop before
posting.

Eric





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "/home/kelly/.sig" <pleiku!kelly@netcom.com>
Date: Tue, 27 Apr 93 20:04:54 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: ANON: Cryptographic MIX
Message-ID: <9304280305.AA19293@netcomsv.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text


#<text/x-pgp
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----


Hi All,
     At the first cypherpunks meeting I cam to,
A speaker was giving a presentation on cryptographic MIX protocols.
My memory fails me as to who that was... so thats the question and what is
the progress on an implementation???
    cheers
    kelly
- --
Parts of this .sig borrowed with permission from T.C.May.
Perhaps it will indeed get me busted also.
..........................................................................
Kelly Goen             | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,  
kelly@netcom.com       | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
Intelligence Systems   | knowledge, reputations, information markets, 
Specialists Inc.       | black markets, face banks, data havens, dark
                       | tech, covert channels, shared secrets,
                       | alt.whistleblowers, collapse of governments.
Technical Monkeywrench | Public Key: PGP 2.2.
                       |
..........................................................................
PGP 2.2 Key available from PGP Keyservers on the Internet.

pub  1024/1BA573 1992/09/09  kelly <kelly@netcom.com>
          Key fingerprint =  EF 7A 38 99 22 84 E3 3B  90 2A DB 80 DC 65 DA 31 

STOP THE WIRETAP CHIP(Clipper Chip)!!

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.2

iQCVAgUBK93QvfgXinP2G6VzAQHAzQP/aaSiiBlKIrZUP+xe4xuC6pzyeS/xM0Hd
FdDOJ4ttsOiBPkSm+C6WxLZQvsdhSpe9e947YZmM2afQWgDFBynkcaUG3RS6eh7P
Q35Fqaof6WEAqZO+IRg2KYarRA60CB1hUu082B3/9DSSCnr2CsPPMgtQGo8ULg/x
WnHX6cN/9Xo=
=AtWx
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
#



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Karl Barrus <elee9sf@Menudo.UH.EDU>
Date: Tue, 27 Apr 93 16:08:45 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: REMAIL: email to usenet gateways
Message-ID: <199304272308.AA28969@Menudo.UH.EDU>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Hal recently posted instructions on how to post to usenet using the
anonymous remailers.  Here's a collection of email to usenet gateways
I have, no doubt far from complete.

group-name@ucbvax.berkeley.edu *
group-name@cs.utexas.edu
group-name@pws.bull.com
group.name@news.demon.co.uk

* I understand that the admin of ucbvax.berkeley.edu block posts from
non berkeley sites, but I'm not positive about that!

I seem to have lost (okay, I must have deleted it :-) a list of nntp
servers; places you can telnet to port 119 and POST your message to
usenet.  Anybody have info about these?

/-----------------------------------\
| Karl L. Barrus                    |
| elee9sf@menudo.uh.edu             | <- preferred address
| barrus@tree.egr.uh.edu (NeXTMail) |
\-----------------------------------/




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Valerie Lambert <valerie@valis.biocad.com>
Date: Tue, 27 Apr 93 20:30:38 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: By popular request: A non-techy Clipper blurb
Message-ID: <9304280136.AA03855@valis.biocad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



In article <9304260326.AA15408@binkley.MIT.EDU>, Derek Atkins
<warlord@Athena.MIT.EDU> writes:
>It's even worse than this.  It's giving the government a sealed copy
>of all your *PAST*, present, and future phone conversations and
>messages...  They can always record everything, and then use your key
>at some later date to recover the messages...

Point well taken.  I only meant in regards to Clipped communications.
Presumably they would have a harder time opening the "envelopes" of your
past communications that used non-standard encryption.  Sigh.  Sound
bites are SO shallow, I know.

--
Valerie Lambert * valerie@biocad.com * 415/903-3923 * AT&T: phones with Big
Brother Built Inside!  Just say "NO" to the Clipper wiretap chip.






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Eli Brandt <ebrandt@jarthur.Claremont.EDU>
Date: Tue, 27 Apr 93 19:39:59 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re:  A correction, and another motive for Clipper
In-Reply-To: <199304272158.AA11690@well.sf.ca.us>
Message-ID: <9304280202.AA24998@relay1.UU.NET>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> From: Arthur Abraham <a2@well.sf.ca.us>

Your point is that government employees in non-critical positions
might end up using Clipper, and this would either reduce corruption
or, alternatively, drive the government to repudiate the entire
scheme.  

The latter will not happen (at least not for this reason).  Labeling
of cliches notwithstanding, there is no reason why government
employees could not use a different standard if they found it
necessary.  This would be no more politically disagreeable than many
steps taken in the past.

The former I don't understand.  The direct effect of Clipper would
be to make eavesdropping by other than LE more difficult.  There
could be an impact on corruption only if it were known or believed
that the level of surveillance had concomitantly increased -- if all
calls were tapped and archived, perhaps.  This would be bad.  It
would undoubtedly increase the likelihood of such a policy's being
implemented w.r.t. the general population.

> -a2.]

   Eli   ebrandt@jarthur.claremont.edu




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Looping Back on the Dulles Toll Road <MCMAHON@control.tgv.com>
Date: Tue, 27 Apr 93 22:11:25 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: So what was the point ?
Message-ID: <01GXIRO3ECDU08QNG8@CONTROL.TGV.COM>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>      At the first cypherpunks meeting I cam to,
> A speaker was giving a presentation on cryptographic MIX protocols.
> My memory fails me as to who that was... so thats the question and what is
> the progress on an implementation???

(edited)

> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
> Version: 2.2

(edited)

(resulted in)

File has signature.  Public key is required to check signature. .
Good signature from user "snake@cadence.com".
Signature made 1993/04/28 00:33 GMT

WARNING:  Because this public key is not certified with a trusted
signature, it is not known with high confidence that this public key
actually belongs to: "snake@cadence.com".

John 'Fast-Eddie' McMahon    ()
TGV, Incorporated            () "Any networking problem can be solved by
603 Mission Street           ()  the application of 33 miles of Unshielded 
Santa Cruz, California 95060 ()  Twisted Pair (UTP)"   
408-427-4366 or 800-TGV-3440 ()                      [InterOp Spring 1992]
E-Mail: MCMAHON@TGV.COM      ()




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Arthur Abraham <a2@well.sf.ca.us>
Date: Tue, 27 Apr 93 22:36:15 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: MYK-78
Message-ID: <199304280536.AA09155@well.sf.ca.us>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



I've been stalking Mykotronx with phone and smail since right
after the announcement, and finally got through the guy who
kept telling me that I'd undertand if I just knew a little
more crypto, to the guy who really know what was going on and
wanted to tell me.  This is what I found out: 

Mykotronx MYK-78 has been identified as the Privacy "Clipper"
chip.  The "Clipper" name comes from Washington, and the guys
at Mykotronx know about the Intergraph chip.

The data sheets, as those of you who have read them know, are
confusing, incomplete and internally inconsistent.  This is
evident even if you do not consider that they are to implement
the social protocol described by Dorothy Denning (her
19-Apr-93 paper, as published in Cypherpunks).

After some discussions with Mykotronx, I was able to convince
them of the truth of the last paragraph and to have them
explain just what the chip was designed to do.  I would also
like to emphasize that these discussions revealed that the
poor quality of the documentation does not result from any
attempt to obscure the operation of the chip, they were very
forth coming and eager to discuss its operation.  The
deficiencies result more from the nature of a military
contractor's relationship to its one customer: the customer
understands how to use the chip so there's no pressure to get
it described carefully.  Going public was a bit of a surprise
to them, in fact the announcement was made during their
application engineer's vacation.  I am sure there is an
interesting story in this timing, but the people I was talking
to didn't seem to know it. 

On to the chip: 

You don't just hook up a clear-text bit stream to one end and
get a Denning-stream out the other.  It needs a bit of care
and feeding.

At startup it requires a Random Seed (8 bytes/64-bits) and a
crypto-variable CV (10 bytes/80-bits) for its DES-type
algorithm.  This is Denning's "skipjack" algorithm and, like
DES, is a symmetric key block cypher, which performs in all
the DES modes:

64-Bit Electronic Code Book (ECB)
64-Bit Cypher Block Chaining (CBC)
8/16/32/64 Bit Cypher Feedback
64-Bit Output Feedback (OFB)

In the last three modes the encryption of each block is
dependent on the previous blocks.  (If you care to know more
about DES modes, see FIPS-PUB 81 which is cited in the data
sheets.)  

One other thing about Skipjack: Denning describes it as having
"32 rounds of scrambling" and this is supported by the data
sheet's timing charts, which note 64 clocks cycles to complete
an encryption.  Since this would operate on an 8-byte/64-bit
block, with the 15MHz internal clock we appear to have roughly
a 10M-bit/1.3MB transfer rate in encryption/decryption.  This
is fast enough for the average telephone, or several
telephones, or maybe a stereo CD.  It's probably just average
performance for 1 micron technology and some units clock up to
30MHz (they expect 0.8 micron eventually, with improved
performance).

Back to the Crypto-Variable, CV.  The CV is the session key,
is selected off-chip, and must always be accompanied by a 3
byte/24-bit checkword.  Where do you get the check word?...
you ask the chip! If you load a CV with a bad checkword, the
chip sets its ERROR line -- oh, sadness.  But then you can
read out a good checkword, and subsiquently reload the same CV
with the good checkword (happy now?).  The checkword is
actually just the first three bytes from an application of
Skipjack to the CV.

Do all this and the chip is loaded and ready for plaintext. 
You could just give it an Encryption command, and start
pulling cyphertext out the other side, but who would
understand it?  First you have to get the key information out
of the chip and send it to the chip on the other side of the
link.
 
Skipjack is DES-like so to run a decryption mode on the other
chip we're going to have to send it the session key, CV, and
the Initial Vector, IV, which is the starting state of the
stream for the non-ECB modes of operation.  We selected CV
ourselves, and learned its checkword during the startup
experience, but where's IV?

Well, we generate it using "a feature not found in current DES
chips" (data sheet, 1-3).  And quite a feature it is, too.  We
use this command, Generate IV, and it makes all 8
bytes/64-bits of the IV, based on the Random Seed... But
That's Not ALL!

You issue the Generate IV command three (3) times to get the
full 24 byte/192-bit LEEF block.  LEEF = Law Enforcement
Exploitation Field.  (I wrote this down very carefully to be
sure I had it right.)  

...Actually, you issue a Read Data command after each Generate
IV command, but I won't bore you with details.  The first 8
bytes/64-bits are called L1 or LEEF-1, the second 8
bytes/64-bits are L2 or LEEF-2, and then here is the IV we've
all been waiting for, in its full 8 byte/64-bit glory.  You
probably noticed that LEEF is 24 bytes/192-bits long, and has
the structure [L1,L2,IV].  Mykotronx is not supposed to tell
us the structure of L1,L2.

The interesting thing is that [CV,checkword,L1,L2,IV] is a
self-checking unit.  The receiving chip checks it as it is
loaded.  If something is wrong, the chip sets its ERROR line. 
If CV is fermished, you have to get all the way to IV before
you're rasberried.  In transmitting this we are advised to
encrypt CV because it is, after all, the session key.  

OK, so we are encrypting and the other chip is decrypting. 
Suppose something happens and the other chip wants to talk to
us, so that it encrypts and we decrypt.  It has all it needs
to encrypt and we have all we need to decrypt, but one more
thing has to be done.  We need to save the state of the
chaining cypher so we can resume it at the same place in the
chain when we return to encrypting.  Use the Save State
command, which pops out 8 bytes/64-bits of Saved State, SS, or
the current contents of the Skipjack encryption register.  To
make this a bit clearer, if we pulled the Saved State right
after Generate IV, we'd find SS = IV.

The chip's serial number is 4-bytes/32-bits long, not the 3.75
bytes/30-bits Denning reported, but don't worry, _you'll_
never see it.  It and the family key are written in over pins
Vpp1 and Vpp2, which are then burned out.  All chips are
currently planned to have the same family key, but if you
happen to meet a chip with a different family key and it sends
you [CV,checkword,L1,L2,IV], you could understand it.  

That's the main part of what's missing from the data sheets. 
The rest works pretty much as described, and is at a level of
detail too fine to interest anyone except a compulsive
hardware wonk.  Oh, one more thing, on page 1-4 where the
Configuration Register is shown with two "Arm CV" bits, the
one at position D5 should be "Arm IV".

-a2.

ps: I will be at a meeting the rest of the week, so please
don't expect me to respond to requests for clarification until
I return.  Sorry.

-a2.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: whitaker@eternity.demon.co.uk (Russell E. Whitaker)
Date: Wed, 28 Apr 93 00:22:15 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: MEETING SUMMARY: 4-24-93 Cypherpunks Meeting
Message-ID: <4696@eternity.demon.co.uk>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


In message <9304261909.AA29562@netcom.netcom.com> Timothy May
writes (text elided for brevity):
> 
> 
> * The issue of the name of our group, the Cypherpunks name, was not
> discussed. The U.K. group has apparently picked "U.K. Cryptoprivacy Group"
> as their name.
>

Actually, *I* unilaterally changed it.  The climate is different
here in England.  "UK Cryptoprivacy Association" works;
"Cypherpunks" requires time-consuming explanation.  Of course, I
_like_ the latter term... ;-)

In any event, it looks to be our largest meeting.  I'll post a
Tim May-style summary after the meeting.

Russell Whitaker

Russell Earl Whitaker                   whitaker@eternity.demon.co.uk
Communications Editor                                 AMiX: RWhitaker
EXTROPY: The Journal of Transhumanist Thought
Board member, Extropy Institute (ExI)
================ PGP 2.2 public key available =======================




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: whitaker@eternity.demon.co.uk (Russell E. Whitaker)
Date: Wed, 28 Apr 93 00:26:28 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: From Crossbows to Cryptography
Message-ID: <4706@eternity.demon.co.uk>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

Please note that the following speech was made by Chuck Hammill
in 1987.  Address all letters to his address, given at the end
of this document.
     -- Russell

  FROM CROSSBOWS TO CRYPTOGRAPHY:  THWARTING THE STATE VIA
                     TECHNOLOGY

  Given at the Future of Freedom Conference, November 1987


     You   know,   technology--and   particularly   computer
technology--has often gotten a bad rap in  Libertarian  cir-
cles.  We tend to think of Orwell's 1984, or Terry Gilliam's
Brazil,  or  the  proximity  detectors keeping East Berlin's
slave/citizens on their own side of the border, or  the  so-
phisticated  bugging  devices  Nixon used to harass those on
his "enemies list."  Or, we recognize that for the price  of
a  ticket  on  the Concorde we can fly at twice the speed of
sound, but only if we first walk thru a magnetometer run  by
a  government  policeman, and permit him to paw thru our be-
longings if it beeps.

     But I think that mind-set is a mistake.   Before  there
were cattle prods, governments tortured their prisoners with
clubs  and  rubber  hoses.    Before  there  were lasers for
eavesdropping, governments used binoculars and  lip-readers.
Though  government certainly uses technology to oppress, the
evil lies not in the tools but in the wielder of the tools.

     In fact, technology represents one of the most  promis-
ing  avenues  available  for  re-capturing our freedoms from
those who have stolen them.  By its very nature,  it  favors
the  bright  (who can put it to use) over the dull (who can-
not).  It favors the adaptable (who are  quick  to  see  the
merit  of  the  new  (over  the sluggish (who cling to time-
tested ways).  And what two better words are  there  to  de-
scribe government bureaucracy than "dull" and "sluggish"?

     One  of  the  clearest,  classic triumphs of technology
over tyranny I see is  the  invention  of  the  man-portable
crossbow.   With it, an untrained peasant could now reliably
and lethally engage a target out to  fifty  meters--even  if
that  target  were  a mounted, chain-mailed knight.  (Unlike
the longbow, which, admittedly was more powerful, and  could
get  off  more shots per unit time, the crossbow required no
formal training to utilize.   Whereas the  longbow  required
elaborate  visual,  tactile  and kinesthetic coordination to
achieve any degree of accuracy, the wielder  of  a  crossbow
could simply put the weapon to his shoulder, sight along the
arrow  itself, and be reasonably assured of hitting his tar-
get.)

     Moreover, since just about  the  only  mounted  knights
likely  to  visit  your  average peasant would be government
soldiers and tax collectors, the utility of the  device  was
plain:    With it, the common rabble could defend themselves
not only against one another, but against their governmental
masters.   It was the  medieval  equivalent  of  the  armor-
piercing  bullet,  and, consequently, kings and priests (the
medieval equivalent of a  Bureau  of  Alcohol,  Tobacco  and
Crossbows)  threatened  death  and  excommunication, respec-
tively, for its unlawful possession.

     Looking at later developments, we  see  how  technology
like  the  firearm--particularly the repeating rifle and the
handgun, later followed by the Gatling gun and more advanced
machine guns--radically altered the balance of interpersonal
and inter-group power.  Not without reason was the Colt  .45
called "the equalizer."  A frail dance-hall hostess with one
in  her  possession  was  now  fully able to protect herself
against the brawniest roughneck in any saloon.    Advertise-
ments  for  the period also reflect the merchandising of the
repeating cartridge  rifle  by  declaring  that  "a  man  on
horseback,  armed with one of these rifles, simply cannot be
captured."  And, as long as his captors  were  relying  upon
flintlocks  or  single-shot rifles, the quote is doubtless a
true one.

     Updating now to  the  present,  the  public-key  cipher
(with  a  personal  computer to run it) represents an equiv-
alent quantum leap--in a defensive weapon.    Not  only  can
such  a technique be used to protect sensitive data in one's
own possession, but it can also permit two strangers to  ex-
change   information   over   an   insecure   communications
channel--a  wiretapped   phone   line,   for   example,   or
skywriting, for that matter)--without ever having previously
met  to  exchange cipher keys.   With a thousand-dollar com-
puter, you can create a cipher that  a  multi-megabuck  CRAY
X-MP  can't  crack in a year.  Within a few years, it should
be economically feasible to similarly encrypt voice communi-
cations; soon after that, full-color digitized video images.
Technology will not only have made wiretapping obsolete,  it
will  have  totally demolished government's control over in-
formation transfer.

     I'd like to take just a moment to sketch the  mathemat-
ics  which makes this principle possible.  This algorithm is
called the RSA algorithm, after Rivest, Shamir, and  Adleman
who  jointly created it.  Its security derives from the fact
that, if a very large number is  the  product  of  two  very
large  primes,  then it is extremely difficult to obtain the
two prime factors from analysis  of  their  product.    "Ex-
tremely"  in  the  sense that if primes  p  and  q  have 100
digits apiece, then their 200-digit product cannot  in  gen-
eral be factored in less than 100 years by the most powerful
computer now in existence.

     The  "public" part of the key consists of (1) the prod-
uct  pq  of the two large primes p and q, and (2)  one  fac-
tor,  call it  x  , of the product  xy  where  xy = {(p-1) *
(q-1) + 1}.  The "private" part of the key consists  of  the
other factor  y.

     Each  block of the text to be encrypted is first turned
into an integer--either by using ASCII,  or  even  a  simple
A=01,  B=02,  C=03, ... , Z=26 representation.  This integer
is then raised to the power  x (modulo pq) and the resulting
integer is then sent as the encrypted message.  The receiver
decrypts by taking this integer to the  (secret)  power    y
(modulo  pq).  It can be shown that this process will always
yield the original number started with.

     What makes this a groundbreaking development,  and  why
it  is  called  "public-key"  cryptography,"  is  that I can
openly publish the product  pq and the number   x   ,  while
keeping  secret  the number  y  --so that anyone can send me
an encrypted message, namely
                       x
                     a    (mod pq)  ,
but only I can recover the original message  a  , by  taking
what  they  send, raising it to the power  y  and taking the
result (mod pq).  The risky step (meeting to exchange cipher
keys) has been eliminated.  So people who may not even trust
each other enough to want to meet, may  still  reliably  ex-
change  encrypted  messages--each  party having selected and
disseminated his own  pq  and his  x  ,   while  maintaining
the secrecy of his own  y.

     Another benefit of this scheme is the notion of a "dig-
ital signature," to enable one to authenticate the source of
a given message.  Normally, if I want to send you a message,
I raise my plaintext  a  to your x and take the result  (mod
your pq)  and send that.

    However,  if in my message, I take the plaintext  a and
raise it to my (secret) power  y  , take the result  (mod my
pq), then raise that result to your x   (mod  your  pq)  and
send this, then even after you have normally "decrypted" the
message,  it  will still look like garbage.  However, if you
then raise it to my public power x   , and take  the  result
(mod  my public pq  ), so you will not only recover the ori-
ginal plaintext message, but you will know that no one but I
could have sent it to you (since no one else knows my secret
y).

     And these are the very concerns by the way that are to-
day tormenting the Soviet Union about the whole question  of
personal  computers.    On the one hand, they recognize that
American schoolchildren are right now growing up  with  com-
puters  as commonplace as sliderules used to be--more so, in
fact, because there are things computers can do  which  will
interest  (and instruct) 3- and 4-year-olds.  And it is pre-
cisely these students who one generation hence will be going
head-to-head against their Soviet  counterparts.    For  the
Soviets  to  hold  back might be a suicidal as continuing to
teach swordsmanship  while  your  adversaries  are  learning
ballistics.    On  the  other hand, whatever else a personal
computer may be, it is also an exquisitely efficient copying
machine--a floppy disk will hold upwards of 50,000 words  of
text,  and  can  be  copied in a couple of minutes.  If this
weren't threatening enough, the computer that  performs  the
copy  can also encrypt the data in a fashion that is all but
unbreakable.  Remember that in Soviet society  publicly  ac-
cessible  Xerox  machines are unknown.   (The relatively few
copying machines in existence  are  controlled  more  inten-
sively than machine guns are in the United States.)

     Now  the  "conservative" position is that we should not
sell these computers to the Soviets, because they could  use
them  in weapons systems.  The "liberal" position is that we
should sell them, in  the  interests  of  mutual  trade  and
cooperation--and  anyway,  if  we don't make the sale, there
will certainly be some other nation willing to.

     For my part, I'm ready to suggest that the  Libertarian
position should be to give them to the Soviets for free, and
if  necessary, make them take them . . . and if that doesn't
work load up an SR-71  Blackbird  and  air  drop  them  over
Moscow in the middle of the night.  Paid for by private sub-
scription, of course, not taxation . . . I confess that this
is not a position that has gained much support among members
of  the conventional left-right political spectrum, but, af-
ter all, in the words of one of Illuminatus's characters, we
are political non-Euclideans:   The shortest distance  to  a
particular  goal may not look anything like what most people
would consider a "straight line."    Taking  a  long  enough
world-view,  it is arguable that breaking the Soviet govern-
ment monopoly on information transfer could better  lead  to
the enfeeblement and, indeed, to the ultimate dissolution of
the Soviet empire than would the production of another dozen
missiles aimed at Moscow.

     But  there's  the rub:  A "long enough" world view does
suggest that the evil, the oppressive, the coercive and  the
simply  stupid  will "get what they deserve," but what's not
immediately clear is how the rest of  us  can  escape  being
killed, enslaved, or pauperized in the process.

    When  the  liberals and other collectivists began to at-
tack freedom, they possessed a reasonably  stable,  healthy,
functioning economy, and almost unlimited time to proceed to
hamstring   and   dismantle  it.    A  policy  of  political
gradualism was at least  conceivable.    But  now,  we  have
patchwork  crazy-quilt  economy held together by baling wire
and spit.  The state not only taxes us to  "feed  the  poor"
while also inducing farmers to slaughter milk cows and drive
up food prices--it then simultaneously turns around and sub-
sidizes research into agricultural chemicals designed to in-
crease  yields of milk from the cows left alive.  Or witness
the fact that a decline in the price of oil is considered as
potentially frightening as a comparable increase a few years
ago.  When the price went up,  we  were  told,  the  economy
risked  collapse for for want of energy.  The price increase
was called the "moral equivalent of war" and the Feds  swung
into  action.    For the first time in American history, the
speed at which you drive your car to work in the morning be-
came an issue of Federal concern.   Now, when the  price  of
oil  drops, again we risk problems, this time because Ameri-
can oil companies and Third World  basket-case  nations  who
sell  oil  may  not  be  able to ever pay their debts to our
grossly over-extended banks.  The suggested panacea is  that
government  should now re-raise the oil prices that OPEC has
lowered, via a new oil tax.  Since the government is seeking
to raise oil prices to about the same extent  as  OPEC  did,
what  can we call this except the "moral equivalent of civil
war--the government against its own people?"

     And, classically, in international trade, can you imag-
ine any entity in the world except  a  government  going  to
court  claiming  that  a  vendor  was  selling  it goods too
cheaply and demanding not only that that naughty  vendor  be
compelled by the court to raise its prices, but also that it
be punished for the act of lowering them in the first place?

     So  while the statists could afford to take a couple of
hundred years to trash our  economy  and  our  liberties--we
certainly  cannot  count  on  having an equivalent period of
stability in which to reclaim them.   I contend  that  there
exists  almost  a  "black  hole"  effect in the evolution of
nation-states just as in the evolution of stars.  Once free-
dom contracts beyond a certain  minimum  extent,  the  state
warps  the fabric of the political continuum about itself to
the degree that subsequent re-emergence of  freedom  becomes
all but impossible.  A good illustration of this can be seen
in the area of so-called "welfare" payments.  When those who
sup  at the public trough outnumber (and thus outvote) those
whose taxes must replenish the trough,  then  what  possible
choice has a democracy but to perpetuate and expand the tak-
ing  from  the few for the unearned benefit of the many?  Go
down to the nearest "welfare" office, find just  two  people
on  the dole . . . and recognize that between them they form
a voting bloc that can forever outvote you on  the  question
of who owns your life--and the fruits of your life's labor.

     So essentially those who love liberty need an "edge" of
some  sort  if  we're ultimately going to prevail.  We obvi-
ously  can't  use  the  altruists'  "other-directedness"  of
"work,  slave, suffer, sacrifice, so that next generation of
a billion random strangers can  live  in  a  better  world."
Recognize  that, however immoral such an appeal might be, it
is nonetheless an extremely powerful one in today's culture.
If you can convince  people  to  work  energetically  for  a
"cause," caring only enough for their personal welfare so as
to  remain  alive  enough  and  healthy  enough  to continue
working--then you have a truly massive reservoir  of  energy
to draw from.  Equally clearly, this is just the sort of ap-
peal which tautologically cannot be utilized for egoistic or
libertarian goals.  If I were to stand up before you tonight
and say something like, "Listen, follow me as I enunciate my
noble "cause," contribute your money to support the "cause,"
give  up  your  free  time  to  work for the "cause," strive
selflessly to bring it about, and then (after you  and  your
children are dead) maybe your children's children will actu-
ally  live under egoism"--you'd all think I'd gone mad.  And
of course you'd be right.  Because the point I'm  trying  to
make is that libertarianism and/or egoism will be spread if,
when, and as, individual libertarians and/or egoists find it
profitable and/or enjoyable to do so.    And  probably  only
then.

     While I certainly do not disparage the concept of poli-
tical  action, I don't believe that it is the only, nor even
necessarily the most cost-effective path  toward  increasing
freedom  in  our time.  Consider that, for a fraction of the
investment in time, money and effort I might expend in  try-
ing  to  convince  the  state to abolish wiretapping and all
forms of censorship--I can teach every libertarian who's in-
terested  how  to   use   cryptography   to   abolish   them
unilaterally.

     There  is  a  maxim--a proverb--generally attributed to
the Eskimoes, which very likely most Libertarians  have  al-
ready  heard.    And while you likely would not quarrel with
the saying, you might well feel that you've heard  it  often
enough already, and that it has nothing further to teach us,
and moreover, that maybe you're even tired of hearing it.  I
shall therefore repeat it now:

     If you give a man a fish, the saying runs, you feed him
for a day.  But if you teach a man how to fish, you feed him
for a lifetime.

     Your exposure to the quote was probably in some sort of
a  "workfare"  vs.  "welfare"  context;  namely, that if you
genuinely wish to help someone in need, you should teach him
how to earn his sustenance, not simply how to  beg  for  it.
And of course this is true, if only because the next time he
is hungry, there might not be anybody around willing or even
able to give him a fish, whereas with the information on how
to fish, he is completely self sufficient.

     But  I  submit  that this exhausts only the first order
content of the quote, and if there were nothing  further  to
glean  from  it,  I would have wasted your time by citing it
again.  After all, it seems to have almost a crypto-altruist
slant, as though to imply that we should structure  our  ac-
tivities  so  as  to  maximize  the  benefits to such hungry
beggars as we may encounter.

     But consider:

     Suppose this Eskimo doesn't know how to  fish,  but  he
does  know  how  to hunt walruses.   You, on the other hand,
have often gone hungry while traveling thru  walrus  country
because  you  had  no idea how to catch the damn things, and
they ate most of the fish you could catch.  And now  suppose
the  two  of  you  decide to exchange information, bartering
fishing knowledge for hunting knowledge.   Well,  the  first
thing  to  observe  is  that  a  transaction  of  this  type
categorically and unambiguously refutes the Marxist  premise
that  every  trade  must  have a "winner" and a "loser;" the
idea that if one person gains, it must necessarily be at the
"expense" of another person who loses.  Clearly, under  this
scenario, such is not the case.  Each party has gained some-
thing  he  did  not have before, and neither has been dimin-
ished in any way.  When it comes to exchange of  information
(rather  than material objects) life is no longer a zero-sum
game.  This is an extremely powerful notion.   The  "law  of
diminishing   returns,"   the  "first  and  second  laws  of
thermodynamics"--all those "laws" which constrain our possi-
bilities in other contexts--no longer bind us!   Now  that's
anarchy!

     Or  consider  another possibility:  Suppose this hungry
Eskimo never learned  to  fish  because  the  ruler  of  his
nation-state    had  decreed fishing illegal.   Because fish
contain dangerous tiny bones, and sometimes sharp spines, he
tells us, the state has decreed that their  consumption--and
even  their  possession--are  too  hazardous to the people's
health to be permitted . . . even by knowledgeable,  willing
adults.   Perhaps it is because citizens' bodies are thought
to be government property, and therefore it is the  function
of the state to punish those who improperly care for govern-
ment  property.    Or perhaps it is because the state gener-
ously extends to competent adults the "benefits" it provides
to children and to the mentally ill:  namely,  a  full-time,
all-pervasive supervisory conservatorship--so that they need
not  trouble  themselves  with making choices about behavior
thought physically risky or morally "naughty."  But, in  any
case,  you  stare stupefied, while your Eskimo informant re-
lates how this law is taken so seriously that  a  friend  of
his was recently imprisoned for years for the crime of "pos-
session of nine ounces of trout with intent to distribute."

     Now  you  may  conclude  that  a society so grotesquely
oppressive as to enforce a law of this  type  is  simply  an
affront to the dignity of all human beings.  You may go far-
ther  and  decide to commit some portion of your discretion-
ary, recreational time specifically to the task of thwarting
this tyrant's goal.  (Your rationale may be "altruistic"  in
the   sense   of  wanting  to  liberate  the  oppressed,  or
"egoistic" in the sense of  proving  you  can  outsmart  the
oppressor--or  very likely some combination of these or per-
haps even other motives.)

     But, since you have zero desire to become a  martyr  to
your "cause," you're not about to mount a military campaign,
or  even try to run a boatload of fish through the blockade.
However, it is here that technology--and in  particular  in-
formation technology--can multiply your efficacy literally a
hundredfold.    I say "literally," because for a fraction of
the effort (and virtually none of  the  risk)  attendant  to
smuggling in a hundred fish, you can quite readily produce a
hundred  Xerox copies of fishing instructions.  (If the tar-
geted government, like present-day America, at least permits
open  discussion  of  topics  whose  implementation  is  re-
stricted,  then that should suffice.  But, if the government
attempts to suppress the flow of information as  well,  then
you will have to take a little more effort and perhaps write
your  fishing manual on a floppy disk encrypted according to
your mythical Eskimo's public-key parameters.  But as far as
increasing real-world access to fish you have  made  genuine
nonzero  headway--which  may  continue to snowball as others
re-disseminate the information you have provided.   And  you
have not had to waste any of your time trying to convert id-
eological  adversaries, or even trying to win over the unde-
cided.  Recall Harry Browne's dictum  from  "Freedom  in  an
Unfree World" that the success of any endeavor is in general
inversely proportional to the number of people whose persua-
sion is necessary to its fulfilment.

     If  you  look  at  history, you cannot deny that it has
been dramatically shaped by men with names like  Washington,
Lincoln,  .  .  .  Nixon  .  . . Marcos . . . Duvalier . . .
Khadaffi . . .  and their ilk.  But it has also been  shaped
by  people with names like Edison, Curie, Marconi, Tesla and
Wozniak.  And this latter shaping has been at least as  per-
vasive, and not nearly so bloody.

     And  that's  where  I'm  trying  to  take The LiberTech
Project.  Rather than beseeching the state to please not en-
slave, plunder or constrain us, I propose a libertarian net-
work spreading  the  technologies  by  which  we  may  seize
freedom for ourselves.

     But here we must be a bit careful.  While it is not (at
present)  illegal  to  encrypt  information  when government
wants to spy on you, there is no guarantee of what  the  fu-
ture  may hold.  There have been bills introduced, for exam-
ple, which would have made it a crime  to  wear  body  armor
when government wants to shoot you.  That is, if you were to
commit certain crimes while wearing a Kevlar vest, then that
fact  would  constitute a separate federal crime of its own.
This law to my knowledge has not passed . . . yet . . .  but
it does indicate how government thinks.

     Other  technological  applications,  however, do indeed
pose legal risks.  We recognize, for  example,  that  anyone
who  helped a pre-Civil War slave escape on the "underground
railroad" was making a clearly illegal use of technology--as
the sovereign government of the United States of America  at
that time found the buying and selling of human beings quite
as  acceptable  as  the buying and selling of cattle.  Simi-
larly, during Prohibition, anyone who used  his  bathtub  to
ferment  yeast and sugar into the illegal psychoactive drug,
alcohol--the controlled substance, wine--was using  technol-
ogy  in a way that could get him shot dead by federal agents
for his "crime"--unfortunately not to be  restored  to  life
when  Congress  reversed itself and re-permitted use of this
drug.

     So . . . to quote a former President,  un-indicted  co-
conspirator  and pardoned felon . . . "Let me make one thing
perfectly clear:"  The LiberTech Project does not  advocate,
participate  in, or conspire in the violation of any law--no
matter how oppressive,  unconstitutional  or  simply  stupid
such  law may be.  It does engage in description (for educa-
tional and informational  purposes  only)  of  technological
processes,  and some of these processes (like flying a plane
or manufacturing a firearm) may well require appropriate li-
censing to perform legally.    Fortunately,  no  license  is
needed  for  the  distribution or receipt of information it-
self.

     So, the next time you look at the political  scene  and
despair,  thinking,  "Well,  if 51% of the nation and 51% of
this State, and 51% of this city have  to  turn  Libertarian
before  I'll  be  free,  then  somebody might as well cut my
goddamn throat now, and put me out of my  misery"--recognize
that  such  is not the case.  There exist ways to make your-
self free.

     If you wish to explore such techniques via the Project,
you are welcome to give me your name and address--or a  fake
name  and  mail  drop, for that matter--and you'll go on the
mailing list for my erratically-published newsletter.    Any
friends  or acquaintances whom you think would be interested
are welcome as well.  I'm not even asking for stamped  self-
addressed envelopes, since my printer can handle mailing la-
bels and actual postage costs are down in the noise compared
with  the  other  efforts  in getting an issue out.   If you
should have an idea to share, or even a  useful  product  to
plug,  I'll be glad to have you write it up for publication.
Even if you want to be the proverbial "free rider" and  just
benefit  from  what others contribute--you're still welcome:
Everything will be public domain; feel free to  copy  it  or
give it away (or sell it, for that matter, 'cause if you can
get  money  for  it while I'm taking full-page ads trying to
give it away, you're certainly entitled to  your  capitalist
profit . . .)  Anyway, every application of these principles
should make the world just a little freer, and I'm certainly
willing to underwrite that, at least for the forseeable  fu-
ture.

     I  will leave you with one final thought:  If you don't
learn how to beat your plowshares into  swords  before  they
outlaw  swords,  then you sure as HELL ought to learn before
they outlaw plowshares too.

                                       --Chuck Hammill

                                 THE LIBERTECH PROJECT
                                 3194 Queensbury Drive
                               Los Angeles, California
                                                 90064
                                          310-836-4157

                                    hammill@netcom.com

[The above LiberTech address was updated December 1992, with the
 permission of Chuck Hammill, by Russell Whitaker]

Those interested in the issues raised in this piece should participate
in at least these newsgroups:

                alt.privacy
                alt.security.pgp
                comp.org.eff.talk
                sci.crypt

A copy of the RSA-based public key encryption program, PGP 2.1 (Pretty
Good Privacy), can be obtained at various ftp sites around the world.
One such site is gate.demon.co.uk, where an MS-DOS version can be had by
anonymous ftp as pgp22.zip in /pub/pgp.

Versions for other operating systems, including UNIX variants
and Macintosh, are also available.  Source code is also
available.

Here's the blurb for PGP, by the way:

- ----------------------  Quote ----------------------------------------
PGP (Pretty Good Privacy) ver 2.2 - RSA public-key encryption freeware
for MSDOS, protects E-mail.  Lets you communicate securely with people
you've never met, with no secure channels needed for prior exchange of
keys.  Well featured and fast!  Excellent user documentation.

PGP has sophisticated key management, an RSA/conventional hybrid
encryption scheme, message digests for digital signatures, data
compression before encryption, and good ergonomic design.  Source
code is free.

Filenames:  pgp22.zip (executable and manuals), pgp22src.zip (sources)
Keywords:   PGP, Pretty Good Privacy, RSA, public key, encryption,
            privacy, authentication, signatures, email
- ---------------------- End Quote -------------------------------------

Russell Earl Whitaker                   whitaker@eternity.demon.co.uk
Communications Editor                                 AMiX: RWhitaker
EXTROPY: The Journal of Transhumanist Thought
Board member, Extropy Institute (ExI)


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.2

iQCVAgUBK922PYTj7/vxxWtPAQEbkgQAsgOxCtZjdZMZuRfm05nwm2ObsoLH/cFh
aHRnb6dmp1o+4+yxaR+BO4fpRAtNMMOhn6WUSOoUJz1qqqkghfolYRu/TeCdr9du
irrb7tCwndKsQC+wcTI/Q4+cmq3HrRRTnaIWYjmfaqXPEYRODVFDXc409umVGRJb
5IgXfNgaz78=
=T1vu
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Robert Luscombe <ral@telerama.pgh.pa.us>
Date: Tue, 27 Apr 93 21:32:37 PDT
To: Cypherpunks <cypherpunks@toad.com>
Subject: Need help with remailer scripts
Message-ID: <Pine.2.4.9304280056.A13058@telerama.pgh.pa.us>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Would someone be able to help me install the remailer scripts from the
archives?  I have no Unix experience and have *no* idea where to begin.  I
don't even know if root access is needed for these.  Any help would be
appreciated.

--Robert Luscombe
  Internet: ral@telerama.pgh.pa.us      Voice:412/488-0941
            robert@well.sf.ca.us        (Finger for PGP Pub Key)




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: edgar@spectrx.Saigon.COM (Edgar W. Swank)
Date: Wed, 28 Apr 93 08:34:02 PDT
To: Cypherpunks          <cypherpunks@toad.com>
Subject: PGP: USA-Legal PGP Project
Message-ID: <ouiP3B12w165w@spectrx.saigon.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Derek Zahn recently posted:

    Subject: "Cypherpunks Write Code"

    Hmm, I write code -- but so far no cyphercode.

    Since I'd like to be part of the cypherdelic revolution, what code
    needs writing?  I agree that the PC/modem scrambled telephone is a
    good idea, but others are already bashing that out; there must be
    other neat projects that want doing.  Any thoughts?

Thank you, Derek!!  Yes, I have such an idea and I'm beginning work on
it myself.  Your and other Cypherpunks participation is certainly
welcome and probably essential.

At the Cypherpunks meeting on Saturday (4/24), which was called to
discuss plans to counter the "Clipper chip" announcement, we agreed
that one prong of our attack should be to get strong crypto as widely
distributed as possible.

Unfortunately, wide distribution in the USA of PGP, the most popular
product, is inhibited because it violate's RSA's patents.  PGP has
already been chased off some USA FTP Sites.  But this problem has a
solution!  I confirmed with Jim Bidzos, President of RSA, who was
present at the meeting, that a USA Legal version of PGP could be
constructed by just replacing certain sections of code with free code
from RSAREF.  Since source for both PGP and RSAREF are available, this
sounds like an easy job.  Since no-one's actually done it yet, perhaps
it's not, but I will try.  I hope I haven't bitten off more than I can
chew. At best, I can compile and test only the MSDOS version of PGP. I
will certainly need help if USA-Legal MAC, AMIGA, UNIX, etc. versions
are to be available.

Note that since RSAREF cannot be exported, the USA Legal version(s) of
PGP will not replace the current version(s) for use outside the USA.
But the two versions -will- be able to exchange keys and messages and
so the combination of the two will offer the -only- legal method of
strong crypto for communication crossing USA borders.

This is a job for USA programmers.  We can't expect the foreign
programmers currently maintaining/improving PGP to do the job for us.
First, they have no incentive to do so; the current version of PGP is
perfectly legal to use outside the USA. Second, they can't (legally)
obtain a copy of RSAREF to work with.

I plan to delimit all changes for USA legality with conditional
compile statements (#ifdef USALEGAL), so I'm hopeful that Branko,
Jean-Loup, et.al.  will consent to merge those changes back into the
master source, to reduce the pain of generating USA Legal versions of
future releases of PGP.

I invite you, Derek, and anyone interested in participating, and
-especially- anyone who has -already- started a similar project to
contact me immediately via e-mail

    edgar@spectrx.saigon.com (Edgar W. Swank)

or by phone at (408)227-3471.  Here is an (illegal) PGP key if you
want to communicate encrypted:

-----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----
Version: 2.2
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=kLEt
-----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----

--
edgar@spectrx.saigon.com (Edgar W. Swank)
SPECTROX SYSTEMS +1.408.252.1005  Silicon Valley, Ca





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: geoffw@nexsys.net (Geoff White)
Date: Wed, 28 Apr 93 05:17:24 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Raving on...
Message-ID: <9304281204.AA05215@nexsys.nexsys.net>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> Brian says:
> 
> >Hmm... the problem is I don't think a majority of the people at raves are
> >focused enough to concentrate on something as technical as that (I KNOW it
> >isn't technical to you and me, but the average raver doesn't even
> >know what the word encryption means).  HOWEVER, raves ARE the ideal place
> >to hand out info about what's going on, something the raver can cling onto
> >to read and understand when he's not high on {vibes,music,drug,etc.}.  Give
> >pointers to where to get more info or where to obtain PGP, and perhaps 
> >most importantly, WHY THEY NEED IT.  Within a certain amount of time, but
> >most likely sooner than any of us anticipate, there will be more people with
> >email access than without, so "taking the message to the streets" is becoming
> >less and less of a fanciful idea....


Speaking as someone who has been a pretty hardcore raver for almost 2 years now
my view on this is as follows:

	1) Most ravers don't want to be preached to, they do want to be
	informed though, the best approach is an "access to tools" approach
	of invite and education.  I think that as of right now, not many
	ravers even have e-mail, although there is a very organized group
	that does and is strongly networked already.  Some of them know
	about PGP.  We have already discussed whether our e-mail lists
	should be encryped and the idea was rejected by the group at large.
	Some of us do send encrypted messages back and forth sort of
	as a novelty, sort of for practice.  I think the best thing to do for
	this organized group is to educate them and at least get them to
	generate keys for themselves IF THEY WANT TO.  Education is important
	they have to realize  that the key is like a bank card password , you
	don't tell everbody what it is.  Many people are in altered states
	at raves, this is NOT the set or setting to have them generating
	keys with pass phrases that they have to remember.

	2) I am on a drive to "wire-up" the rave community, in the
	next issue of CyberTribe-5, I have an article on PGP and why
	ravers should get hooked up to e-mail. The e-mail advantage is
	clear for many ravers... the ones who are wired always seem to
	know where the best parties are.  Why we need encryption is not
	as clear.  The scene is about openess, we are well aware that LE
	folks are most likely on our lists, we don't post the truely
	underground events anymore to public list.  We set up phone trees
	and private e-mail trees for events like the Full Moon Rave.
	This has been sufficient to keep the authorities from having 
	preknowledge of our events.  I personally hope that most organizers
	learn about e-mail and at least generate keys in case there comes
	a time that the Scene really needs secure communication between
	people (I think this time is not too far off).

	3) I have seen some activity by the libertarian party around
	the rave scene in SF.  I've thought this to be curious but as
	I think about it, it makes sense, many ravers would most likely
	embrace large portions (but not all) of the libertarian ideals.
	Most ravers are not overtly political in the classic sense of the word.
	Although there is sort of a "Politics of Ecstasy" :) so to speak,
	we find that a lot of the problems that the left is still struggling
	with like, equality for women and people of color (within their
	own ranks!) are non-issues for us.  We don't need affirmative action
	policies because as a social group, we are intensely homogenous, 
	when you party with people across race,gender,sexual orientation,
	lines, it become easy to work with them, you naturally build a network
	of trust that is multi-cultural.  As far as capitalism is concerned
	many young people in the Scene have developed their own companies
	from the selling of T-Shirts to "other things" that people buy at raves.
	They have no great love for "taxation" or interfearence by the "State"
	The scene is forging its own economic web and they are finding that
	economic co-operation is more productive then traditional competition,
	e-mail and encryption can help here. Raving IS a social political
	statement, sort of like the people in (pre) nazi germany who danced
	to swing,jazz,blues music which the nazis said was a "degenerate"
	type of music from the negro.  You can go to a rave, dance to socialy
	unacceptable music, confront Authority with a statement but not land
	in prison (at least not in this country).  Ultimately raving is not
	just another disco, it IS NOT a pick-up scene as most people going
	for that reason have discovered, it is not even a drug scene although
	there is drug use at raves (there are also some folks who have sex).
	The Scene IS about a persons right to CONSCIOUSNESS, knowledge and
	the right to think what ever thoughts s/he might want to think using
	whatever tools are at their disposal.  The main goal of the raves that
	I go to are to reach that ecstatic state that some refer to as
	"The Vibe".  This usually happens in the wee hours of the morning
	after 2 am when all the alcohol drinkers go home.  This state is
	accessable via drugs but you need the beat as well, advanced ravers
	don't need the drugs any more to go into trance, this type
	of trance dancing is little understood in the west but is common
	throughout africa, india and parts of the middle east.

	4) OK so the bottom line is I think that a SIMPLE flier informing
	these young people what is at stake as far as their present and
	future freedom of thought/speech/privacy sould be handed out.
	Low on rethoric, high on information.  Have a lap-top available
	for the advanced ones who know/comprehend what PGP is and want to
	be able to use it.  Don't blindly give out floopies, most will never
	be used.

	This message has been long but I wanted to INFORM the group who might
	have had preconceived ideas about the scene.  I am willing to
	answer any questions that anybody might have, off-line.

-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
NEXUS SYSTEMS/CYBERTRIBE-5 : Voice:(415)965-2384   Fax: (415)327-6416
Editor/Instigator/Catalyst : Geoff White <geoffw@nexsys.net>
Production Crew		   : Universal Movement Trinity <umt@nexsys.net>

        "They might stop the party, but they can't stop the future"

		--PGP Public key available upon request--
 AT&T:Phones with Big Brother Inside, Just say "NO" to the Clipper wiretap chip!
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Eric Hughes <hughes@soda.berkeley.edu>
Date: Wed, 28 Apr 93 10:09:14 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: MYK-78
In-Reply-To: <199304280536.AA09155@well.sf.ca.us>
Message-ID: <9304281705.AA23767@soda.berkeley.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Arthur sez:
>I've been stalking Mykotronx with phone and smail 

And I've been peering over his shoulder for much of that time.  I'd
like to comment on some of the unapproved ways to use this chip.

The way that the chip enforces the wiretap protocol is by not working
as a pair unless the LEEF's are transferred from one chip to another.
Since these LEEF's are presumed to go out in the clear, tapping is
reasonably assured.

>LEEF = Law Enforcement Exploitation Field.  

I really am astounded at the names these people use.  It does give
rise to a great new slogan, though:

	"Stop Government Exploitation Fields!"

Now suppose that there was a law requiring use of this chip.  One
could still create an untappable system just by not sending the LEEF's
in the clear.  So, for example, you do a D-H key exchange with a 600
bit modulus.  Then the originating chip transmits the CV, LEEF's, etc.
(as I count 282 bits), XORing with the D-H key, i.e. using a one-time
pad.  Now the LEEF's have been transferred, but not revealed to any
eavesdropper.  With a 600 bit modulus in the key exchange you could
transmit one set of keying material each way.

There's a great hack here to be had.  These AT&T secure phones with
the wiretap chip inside have internal modems and run some coordination
protocol to synchronize.  Almost certainly such an initial protocol
must have retry paths in its state machine; otherwise the reliability
would suffer.  So we could make a compatible phone that initially
tried to determine if another such phone was on the other end; if so,
proceed with the blinded LEEF transmission.  If not, drop back and try
the wiretap protocol.

In fact, those of you who have seen Shimomura's and Lottor's work with
hacked cellular phones know that it might be possible to put this
hacked protocol right in the AT&T phone itself!  If the phone has a
ROM of some type which contains the microcontroller code, it could be
reverse engineered and reprogrammed.  

If I were mandated to use the chip in a commercial product, I'd put
three buttons on the phone:
	CLEAR (icon=open doors)
	SECURE (icon=closed doors)
	TELL THE GOVERNMENT (icon=benevolent face) 
Pressing the third button would use the AT&T protocol, pressing the
second would encrypt the LEEF's.

"AT&T: Helping the government to reach in and touch you."

There might be another technique.  There is a Write CV command that is
accepted in normal operation.  (Some CV must be put in during
initialization after reset to reach the idle state, i.e. the normal
operating state.)  This command requires the check word, but that's
easily generated in the normal manner.  It is possible that changing
the CV requires generating another set of LEEF's; that's not clear to
me, but Arthur thinks you can.  If, however, one can just change the
CV at will, one could send the LEEF's in the clear and then
immediately change the CV (session key).  Now the LEEF has been sent
but the conversation makes no sense.  My money is that this is
interlocked with IV generation, though.

Eric




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: cp@jido.b30.ingr.com (Serrzna Penvt Cerffba)
Date: Wed, 28 Apr 93 08:08:02 PDT
To: 7025aj@gmuvax2.gmu.edu
Subject: Is Rush Limbaugh giving Clinton sh*t about wiretap chip?
In-Reply-To: <9304231457.AA22562@gmuvax2.gmu.edu>
Message-ID: <199304281506.AA06491@jido.b30.ingr.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


In <9304231457.AA22562@gmuvax2.gmu.edu>, 7025aj@gmuvax2.gmu.edu writes:
|> 
|> I'm under the impression that Rush Limbaugh's address is:
|> 70277.2502@compuserve.com
|> Would a few articulate defenders of (privacy and) AMERICAN COMPETITIVENESS
|> send him some convincing words, please?
|> 
|> G. Gordon Liddy would be another good target, but I don't know his address.

G. Gordon Liddy, "Radio Free DC" can be reached at:

Vox: 1-800-GGLIDDY
Fax: 1-800-937GFAX

I'm going to go wash my hands now. With lots of soap.

My guess would be that Liddy and Limbaugh would both be very
happy about the Tapper chip proposal, and would recognize us
as natural enemies. Try 'em if you want, but be wary.
        ^
       /
------/---- cp@jido.b30.ingr.com (Freeman Craig Presson)
     /
    /




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: gnu (John Gilmore)
Date: Wed, 28 Apr 93 10:34:18 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Markey Hearing Thursday 930AM
Message-ID: <9304281734.AA29120@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


------- Forwarded Message

Date: Wed, 28 Apr 1993 13:04:20 -0400
From: jberman@eff.org (Jerry Berman)
Subject: Markey Hearing

DATE AND TIME:  Thursday, April 29, 1993 at 9:30am
ROOM:   2123 Rayburn House Office Building
SUBJECT:        Oversight hearing on issues relating to the integrity of
telecommunications networks and transmissions including consumer privacy,
encryption,  computer hacking, toll fraud and data security.
        
        WITNESS LIST
        
Technical Presentation
     
Mr. John B. Gage
Director, Science Office
Sun Microsystems, Inc.
2550 Garcia Avenue, MS PAL01-505
Mountain View, CA  94043-1100
        
	[I think Tsutomu Shimomura and Ron Rivest will also appear
	 as part of this presentation.  --gnu]

Panel

Mr. Raymond Kammer
Acting Director
National Institute of Standards and Technology
Building 101, Room A1111
Gaithersburg, MD  20899 

Mr. John P. Lucich
State Investigator
Organized Crime and Racketeering Bureau
New Jersey Division of Criminal Justice
25 Market Street
Trenton, NJ  08625
        
Mr. Bruce Sterling
4525 Speedway
Austin, TX  78751
Author:  The Hacker Crackdown:  Law and Disorder on the Electronic Frontier    

Mr. Joel Reidenberg
Associate Professor of Law
Fordham University School of Law
140 West 62nd Street
New York, NY  10023-7485

------- End of Forwarded Message





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Date: Wed, 28 Apr 93 10:49:17 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: (fwd) Capstone & Preliminary Message Security Protocol
Message-ID: <9304281749.AA28920@netcom3.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Cypherfolks,

Some info on Capstone and another program called "Tessera."

-Tim


From: mrr@scss3.cl.msu.edu (Mark Riordan)
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
Subject: Capstone & Preliminary Message Security Protocol
Date: 28 Apr 1993 01:35:50 GMT
Organization: Michigan State University
Summary: Defense Message System to use Capstone chip
Keywords: Clipper, Capstone, PMSP, Mykotronx, NSA


An article in the 26 April 93 issue of Network World mentions
encryption technology to be used in a proposed Department of Defence
email network:

Next year, the DOD will issue an RFP for a one million-user Defense
Message System (DMS).

DMS will not be completely compatible with X.400 messaging.
Therefore, to make it easier for vendors to bid on what will be a
non-standard email system, the DOS plan to release prototype source
code for its version of X.400.

The article contains the interesting sentence:

"Along with source code, it will release the nonclassified encryption
algorithm application called Preliminary Message Security Protocol
(PMSP)."

DMS places security features in the Mail User Agent, rather than
the Message Transfer Agent, as is done with stock X.400.  Furthermore,
PMSP will use the NSA's Capstone public key algorithm, rather than
RSA, which is used in X.400.  Therefore, gateways will be required
to translate between encryption systems when DMS is exchanging
messages with other networks.

As its data encryption algorithm, Capstone uses the same unpublished 
private-key algorithm as the Clipper chip.  [In a Usenet posting, 
Dorothy Denning says that Capstone uses the Skipjack algorithm, 
the Digital Signature Standard (DSS), and the Secure Hash Algorithm (SHA).]  
Capstone chips will be provided by Mykotronx, Inc., the Torrance, Calif 
firm that also designed Clipper.

Military DMS users will be issued PCMCIA-compliant cryptocards
containing the Capstone chip.  (PCMCIA is an add-on interface card
standard oriented toward subnotebook PC compatibles.)  This interface
card is dubbed "Tessera".

Mykotronx claims to have already shipped 10,000 Capstone and 20,000
Clipper chipsets.


Does anyone know anything else about PMSP?

Mark R.  mrr@ripem.msu.edu

--






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: fergp@sytex.com (Paul Ferguson)
Date: Wed, 28 Apr 93 08:41:13 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Wiretap Chip and Key Escrow Abuses
Message-ID: <e13P3B2w165w@sytex.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I've been following the discussions on several newsgroups and
mailing lists (RISKS, PRIVACY and Cypherpunks) concerning the
Wiretap Chip (Clipper/Capstone) and the proposed key escrow
system.
 
Here's my $.02, as well.
 
In RISK 14.55, <jim@RSA.COM> Jim Bidzos wrote -
 
JB> Since Clipper, as currently defined, cannot be implemented in
JB> software, what options are available to those who can benefit
JB> from cryptography in software? Was a study of the impact on
JB> these vendors or of the potential cost to the software industry
JB> conducted?  (Much of the use of cryptography by software
JB> companies, particularly those in the entertainment industry, is
JB> for the protection of their intellectual property. Using hardware
JB> is not economically feasible for most of them.)
 
 Jim raises a valid concern. Although a hardware based system is
 ideal for voice encryption, the idea of registered key systems,
 where government and/or LE agencies have involvement, is not a
 popular one. The key escrow scheme in this proposal reeks of Big
 Brother. (As in, "Trust me. I'm from the government and I'm your
 friend.") In some circles, it is not even a consideration.
 Software encryption systems employed to protect intellectual and
 commercial data and electronic mail are much more flexible and
 desirable, especially when they are not governmentally proposed,
 imposed, designed and sanctioned by spook organizations such as
 the NSA.
 
 The real sore spot with the Clipper proposal is that private
 industry and citizenry were blind-sided by this entire process.
 The possibility that Uncle Sam will try to make this a de-facto
 standard and subsequently place restrictions on other forms of
 crypto (eg. software based) is real.
 
 Also in RISKS 14.55, <billc@glacier.sierra.com> Bill Campbell
 wrotes -
 
BC> There are dozens, perhaps hundreds, of commercial, criminal and
BC> governmental entities with access to government resources who
BC> would not hesitate for a moment to violate my rights if they
BC> found it expedient to do so.  These individuals and organizations
BC> have demonstrated beyond question that they are not constrained
BC> by legal or ethical considerations, and as has been suggested
BC> in a number of other postings, the technology employed by Clipper
BC> (including the dual escrow sham) will probably not even pose so
BC> much as an inconvenience to a determined adversary.  To suggest
BC> otherwise is, at best, profoundly naive.
 
 I have a tendency to agree with Bill. In fact, California is
 currently embroiled in a scandal involving the release of
 confidential data (DMV addresses), by employees of the Anaheim
 Police Department, to third party interests. This is clearly in
 violation of their employer's policies, their own terms of
 employment, state criminal law, and civil law. What's to
 stop the same blatant, unethical breech of confidentiality with
 regards to the Clipper key escrow implementation? Nothing, that's
 what. In the future, information will be the most powerful possession
 and in the spirit of SNEAKERS, s/he who has control of and access to
 the information is the most powerful. Power corrupts, but absolute
 power corrupts absolutely. I think that Clipper offers maximum abuse
 in this scenario.
 
 Also in RISK 14.55, <firth@SEI.CMU.EDU> Robert Firth wrote -
 
RF> You see, friends, if the Clipper becomes the normal, standard, or
RF> accepted means of encryption, then *the use of any other encryption
RF> scheme can of itself be considered "probable cause" for search and
RF> seizure*.  And thereby could be lost in the courts what was won at
RF> such great cost.
 
 This is perhaps my greatest concern in all of the Clipper/Capstone
 hoopla. Personally, I don't have much faith in the law enforcment
 agencies to act responsibly. The Secret Service and FBI have, in the
 past, clearly demonstrated that do not grasp the scope of the
 problems technically challenging modern society. The Steve Jackson
 Games case is one instance that immediately springs to mind. Some
 parts of the country are demographically more at risk than others.
 For example, the criteria which may be deemed as "probable cause"
 for search and seizure in Jackson, Mississippi could very well be
 reason for the ACLU to file a suit against the LEA in New York City.
 
 Also in RISKS 14.55, <padgett@tccslr.dnet.mmc.com> A. PADGETT
 PETERSON writes -
 
PP> Like I said, both the government and corporate America *need*
PP> Clipper, the designers are some of the best in the world, and
PP> the administration has more to lose than we do. Given that,
PP> Clipper will work as advertised.
 
 The only way that I can imagine the government actually *needing*
 Clipper is where Clipper is forced upon the country as the de-facto
 standard and other forms of cryptography are restricted. Uncle Sam
 tends to forget that what is desirable for the government, is not
 always acceptable to the public at large.
 
 Cynically,

Paul Ferguson                  |  Uncle Sam wants to read
Network Integrator             |       your e-mail...
Centreville, Virginia USA      | Just say "NO" to the Clipper
fergp@sytex.com                |          Chip...
-------------------------------+------------------------------
         I love my country, but I fear it's government.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: crunch@netcom.com (John Draper)
Date: Wed, 28 Apr 93 12:04:34 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: CSPAN NOT covering the hearings tommorrow
Message-ID: <9304281904.AA12916@netcom4.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Called CSPAN,  and they are NOT covering the hearings tommorrow.  Hah!
our tax dollars at work!!

So,  for those very luckey people going to attend,  we plead with you
to please write up a comprehensive report and send it to the group
(or at least to me!!).

JD




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Sandy <72114.1712@CompuServe.COM>
Date: Wed, 28 Apr 93 10:02:19 PDT
To: <cypherpunks@toad.com>
Subject: CLIPPER SOUND BITES
Message-ID: <930428164931_72114.1712_FHF34-1@CompuServe.COM>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


_________________________________________________________________
             FROM THE VIRTUAL DESK OF SANDY SANDFORT
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
No matter what you think of our current and former presidents,
associating the Clipper chip with them might work in our favor.
Asking the following question might cause their supporters to
have second thoughts:

"Why haven't Clinton and Gore had a "town meeting" about the
Reagan-Bush Wiretap Chip?  Didn't they run on a platform of
change?  This sounds like business-as-usual to me."

Presumably, Reagan-Bush supporters will smell a rat--Clinton--and
oppose Clipper to thwart the new administration.  Clinton fans
will oppose Clipper because it is a leftover symbol of the hated
Reagan-Bush era.


 S a n d y
_________________________________________________________________
PLEASE RESPOND TO: ssandfort@attmail.com (except from CompuServe)
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Mike Godwin <mnemonic@eff.org>
Date: Wed, 28 Apr 93 09:58:52 PDT
To: fergp@sytex.com (Paul Ferguson)
Subject: Re: Wiretap Chip and Key Escrow Abuses
In-Reply-To: <e13P3B2w165w@sytex.com>
Message-ID: <199304281658.AA10784@eff.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


 
Paul Ferguson writes:

>  The real sore spot with the Clipper proposal is that private
>  industry and citizenry were blind-sided by this entire process.

I disagree. That's *a* sore spot, but not *the* sore spot. Even if 
industry and citizen groups had been consulted, I'd find the Clipper
proposal, and the strategy it represents, to be unacceptable.


--Mike








From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: eric@synopsys.com
Date: Wed, 28 Apr 93 13:02:44 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: ANON: Cryptographic MIX
In-Reply-To: <9304280305.AA19293@netcomsv.netcom.com>
Message-ID: <199304282002.AA09358@gaea.synopsys.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>> Hi All,
>>      At the first cypherpunks meeting I cam to,
>> A speaker was giving a presentation on cryptographic MIX protocols.
>> My memory fails me as to who that was... so thats the question and what is
>> the progress on an implementation???
>>     cheers
>>     kelly

Sounds like you were referring to me.  I've been doing some perl
programming and have scripts to create an address block, encode a
message for transmittal with an address block, and to process one hop
of a message.  These scripts don't actually do any encryption, but
rather simulate it for testing purposes.  They're not ready for use
mailing actual messages, and I still have to finish the script for
decoding the message when it's finally recieved.  So, there's a bunch
of work to go, but it looks good so far.  I'll be sure to let everyone
know when they're in a condition to be played with by all.

-eric messick (eric@synopsys.com)




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: markh@wimsey.bc.ca (Mark C. Henderson)
Date: Wed, 28 Apr 93 13:06:40 PDT
To: edgar@spectrx.Saigon.COM (Edgar W. Swank)
Subject: Re: PGP: USA-Legal PGP Project
Message-ID: <m0noIMV-0003E3C@van-bc.wimsey.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> Unfortunately, wide distribution in the USA of PGP, the most popular
> product, is inhibited because it violate's RSA's patents.  PGP has
> already been chased off some USA FTP Sites.  But this problem has a
> solution!  I confirmed with Jim Bidzos, President of RSA, who was
> present at the meeting, that a USA Legal version of PGP could be
> constructed by just replacing certain sections of code with free code
> from RSAREF.  Since source for both PGP and RSAREF are available, this
> sounds like an easy job.  Since no-one's actually done it yet, perhaps
> it's not, but I will try.  I hope I haven't bitten off more than I can
> chew. At best, I can compile and test only the MSDOS version of PGP. I
> will certainly need help if USA-Legal MAC, AMIGA, UNIX, etc. versions
> are to be available.

You should be able to do it. But, you will first have to get permission
from RSADSI to access RSAREF in ways other than by the published interface. 
I trust they'll grant it, given what you say above.

Also, be sure to get the RSAREF version included with RIPEM (wait for
version 1.07 if you can). It has several significant performance 
enhancements (generic and some platform specific asm versions of
time critical code).

You won't be able to export this 'legal' version of PGP. Tracking
and updating to new PGP releases will be a pain as much of
the development is done outside of North America.

Mark

-- 
Mark Henderson
markh@wimsey.bc.ca
RIPEM key available by key server/finger/E-mail
  MD5OfPublicKey: F1F5F0C3984CBEAF3889ADAFA2437433




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Mike Godwin <mnemonic@eff.org>
Date: Wed, 28 Apr 93 10:13:47 PDT
To: gnu@toad.com
Subject: Navajo Hypothetical
Message-ID: <199304281713.AA11070@eff.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



I recently heard an even better hypothetical that illustrates the
issues raised by encryption:


Suppose the only two navajo speakers left in the world were talking on the
phone to plot the overthrow of the United States.  If the FBI
could not obtain a translator, would that mean the plotters could be
compelled to hold their phone conversations in English?




--Mike




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Date: Wed, 28 Apr 93 13:44:43 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: (fwd) Re: Clipper Chip Questions
Message-ID: <9304282044.AA07510@netcom3.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Cypherpatriots,

Here's a fairly long posting I made to sci.crypt and comp.lsi about
reverse engineering the Clipper chip. Especially on the technical
issues about tamper-resistant modules and electron-beam probing.

-Tim


Newsgroups: sci.crypt,comp.lsi
From: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Subject: Re: Clipper Chip Questions
Date: Wed, 28 Apr 1993 20:26:51 GMT

(followup to comp.lsi added, as they may have something to say on
this)

allyn (allyn@netcom.com) wrote:

: My question is what is to prevent someone who has one of these chips
: (from a cellphone or computer or whatever) from taking the chip to
: a microelectronic facility with a decent scanning electron microscope and
: other equipment that is used to testing and analysis of microcircuits 
: and taking the darn thing abart and reverse engineer it?
: 
: There must be plenty of microelectronic facilities that are under 
: relatively minimal security (such as universities) for someone to
: try to reverse engineer one of these classified chips that the government
: plans to put into the public's hands.

I ran an electron microscope/chip testing lab for Intel, circa
1981-84. (We built a kind of "time machine" for imaging the internal
states of complex chips--the 286 in those days--and displaying them on
an image processing system which "subtracted out" the states of bad
chips from known good chips and thus allowed us to analyze the
nucleation and propagation of logic faults through the chip. Very
useful for finding subtle speed and voltage problems, as well as gross
faults, of course.)

Analyzing the Clipper chip, or any "tamper-resistant module," will not
be trivial, but neither will it be impossible.

Some issues, questions, problems:

1. Getting through the package to the chip surface itself is
problematic. Proprietray molding compounds may be used to make this
tough. (For example, carborundum and sapphire particles are often
mixed in, so that mechanical grinding and lapping also destroys the
chip. And plasma ashing won't work.)

2. Sometimes the package itself has "traps" which wipe the chip (the
data) if breached (fiber optic lines mixed in the epoxy, for example).
This seems unlikely for a relatively low-cost solution like the
Clipper. Papers presented at the "Crypto Conference" have dealt with
this. (The main uses: nuclear weapons "Permissive Action Links" and
credit card "smart cards," which use less intensive measures, obviously.)

3. Once at the chip surface, via grinding, chemical etch, plasma
ashing, etc., the chip can be analyzed.

4. Carefully photographing the chip as layers are etched away (or even
carefully lapped away) can reveal much about the internal operation,
though not the data stored in internal ROM, EPROM, EEPROM, Flash
EPROM, etc. If the Clipper/Capstone algorithm is embedded in the
microcode and not apparent from the visible circuitry, then it must be
read by other means.

5. Voltage contrast electron microscopy allows internal chip voltages
to be read with good reliability. Cf. any of the the many papers on
this. Commercial e-beam probers are available. (How voltage contrast
works is itself an interesting issue, and there are many good
references on this.)

6. However, operating the chip is necessary to read the internal
states and voltage levels, and opening the chip under "hostile
conditions" (read: limited numbers of samples, no knowledge of the
molding compound, no help from the manufacturer) often destroys the
functionality. It can be done, but count on lots of trial and error.

7. Metal layers may be used to shield lower signal-carrying layers
from scrutiny by electron beam probes. Intel, for example, builds the
new Pentium on a 3-layer metal process in which the top layer almost
completely covers the lower layers. (Extremely sophisticated
measurements using lasers (Kerr effect) and magnetic field sensing may
be possible. Count on a very expensive set-up to do this.)

8. Other "tricks" may route parts of the key circuitry through buried
layers, polysilicon lines, several layers of metal, etc.

9. VLSI Technology, Inc., the company with the "tamper-resistant
technology" used by Mykotronx (VTI will fab the chips), may also be
storing bits in very small EEPROM cells, which are very hard to e-beam
probe (especially without disrupting them!). Note also that Intel
bought a partial stake in VLSI. (I'm not imputing anything and don't
know if Intel is somehow involved in the Clipper/Capstone effort. In
fact, I left Intel in 1986.)

10. The easiest way to get the Clipper/Skipjack/Capstone details is
probably the old-fashioned way: offer money for it. With anonymous
remailers and digital cash, this may be much easier.

Just some thoughts on this extremely interesting issue of
reverse-engineering the Clipper.


-Tim May
-- 
..........................................................................
Timothy C. May         | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,  
tcmay@netcom.com       | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
408-688-5409           | knowledge, reputations, information markets, 
W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA  | black markets, collapse of governments.
Higher Power: 2^756839 | Public Key: PGP and MailSafe available.





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: fnerd@smds.com (FutureNerd Steve Witham)
Date: Wed, 28 Apr 93 11:29:14 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Liddy; There's a Chip in the Middle of the Phone
Message-ID: <9304281818.AA09111@smds.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> In <9304231457.AA22562@gmuvax2.gmu.edu>, 7025aj@gmuvax2.gmu.edu writes:
> |> 
> |> send him [Limbaug] some convincing words, please?
> |> 
> |> G. Gordon Liddy would be another good target, but I don't know his address.

cp@jido.b30.ingr.com (Serrzna Penvt Cerffba) [!Is that real rot13!?] replies:
> My guess would be that Liddy and Limbaugh would both be very
> happy about the Tapper chip proposal...
 
Isn't Liddy the guy who wanted to be able to get at someone's private
information later, and so he... he... wait, I hear a melody... 

There's some Dems at the Watergate Hotel,
There's some Dems at the Watergate Hotel,
There's some Dems,
There's some Dems,
There's some Dems at the Watergate Hotel.

There's a suite for the the Dems at the Watergate Hotel,
...

There's a door on the suite of the Dems at the Watergate Hotel,
...

There's a lock on the door on the suite of the Dems at the Watergate Hotel,
...

There's a tape on the lock on the door of the suite 
					of the Dems at the Watergate Hotel,
...
There's a finger on the tape on the lock on the door of the suite
					of the Dems at the Watergate Hotel,
...

There's a chip in the middle of the phone,
There's a chip in the middle of the phone,
There's a chip,
There's a chip,
There's a chip in the middle of the phone.

There's a lock on the chip in the middle of the phone,
...

There's a key in the lock on the chip in the middle of the phone,
...

There's a crack in the key in the lock on the chip in the middle of the phone,
...

There's a tap on the crack in the key 
                           in the lock on the chip in the middle of the phone,
...

There's a speaker on the tap on the crack in the key 
                           in the lock on the chip in the middle of the phone,
...

There's an ear at the speaker on the tap on the crack in the key 
                           in the lock on the chip in the middle of the phone,
...

-fnerd
keep your oxides dry
--fnerd@smds.com (FutureNerd Steve Witham)
quote me




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Sy Verpunc <svp@gtoal.com>
Date: Thu, 29 Apr 93 07:24:09 PDT
To: Cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re:  Tough Choices: PGP vs. RSA Data Security
Message-ID: <9304281433.AA05674@pizzabox.demon.co.uk>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


: At risk of getting the goats of some friends of mine who read the list, I'm
: tending to agree with Tim's ideas here.  Brief conversation with Jim Bidzos
: at the cypunx mtg indicated that he is very much up for something along the
: lines of a personal encryption product that would meet our needs.  From a

All he has to do is let us pay a licence fee for pgp.  What's the advantage
to him in asking for a different piece of code that uses RSAREF and DES
instead of Phil's code and IDEA?  I can't see it, except that using DES
blows away the security of the program...

No, I think this suggestion should be put down now, or we'll splinter and
give them exactly the divide-and-conquer opening they're looking for.

G




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Sy Verpunc <svp@gtoal.com>
Date: Thu, 29 Apr 93 07:26:51 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Tough Choices: PGP vs. RSA Data Security
Message-ID: <9304281436.AA05701@pizzabox.demon.co.uk>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


	   A better course of action might be to remove the RSA engine from
	PGP and distribute the source code, and a binary for free, but require
	users to pay $30-50 to RSA to get the source code and binary for the
	RSA engine.

Thats what people have *always wanted* to do.  RSA won't let them.  That's
why any talk of a newer friendlier Bizdos is bullshit.

G




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Sy Verpunc <svp@gtoal.com>
Date: Thu, 29 Apr 93 07:23:36 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: A link encryption protocol to crytique ;-)
Message-ID: <9304281442.AA05753@pizzabox.demon.co.uk>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


: T[i] is generated by a pseudo random process, similar to shuffling a deck of
: cards.  For each i, fill the vector with the values 0 to D-1.  Then two random
: indexes (j & k) are chosen (to be different) and the two values at
: T[i,j] and T[i,k] are swapped.  This can be iterated an arbitraty number of
: times (L) to ensure a good "shuffle" of the values.

I saw this particularly clueless statement and stopped even trying to follow
the rest of it.  Still, I made an even more stupid blunder on sci.crypt a few
weeks ago myself, so I can't criticise.  All I can say is I learned from my
mistake and will leave thinking up new crypto schemes to the experts.

G




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Chuck Lever <cel@citi.umich.edu>
Date: Wed, 28 Apr 93 11:52:05 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: PGP: pgp -ke
Message-ID: <9304281852.AA00450@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



   so, like, what's to stop me from writing a program (based on pgp source
   code) which can delete user IDs from my own keys after other folks have
   signed them?  in fact, how *can* i change the user ID on a key after it
   has been signed?

   the pgp docs are unclear on how this works.  can someone help me to
   understand what it means exactly when a key is signed?  what parts of
   the key are certified by the signature?




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Peter Meyer <meyer@mcc.com>
Date: Wed, 28 Apr 93 14:25:07 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Program to measure entropy
Message-ID: <19930428212444.5.MEYER@OGHMA.MCC.COM>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Cypherpunks write code, so here's some (at the end, anyway).

Someone asked awhile back (just before the deluge of postings on the
Wiretap Chip swamped my announcement of the release of new versions of
our Dolphin Encrypt encryption software) about (something like) how to
tell whether a file consists of something like English text or just
(apparent) garbage.  Here's one way, a program to calculate the entropy
(and the relative entropy) of the set of bytes in a file.

First the documentation (extracted from Appendix III in the manual for
the Dolphin Encryption Library):

Information theorists have attempted to formalize and to quantify the
notion of randomness, also called entropy.  The usual definition of
entropy in a string of letters from some alphabet is due to Claude
Shannon (who formulated this concept in the 1950s).  Let S be a string
of letters from some alphabet A = { a(0), a(1), ..., a(k-1) } of k
letters, and let p(i) be the probability (that is, the relative
frequency) of occurrence of a(i) in the string S, then the entropy E of
the string S may be defined as:

                           k-1
                  E  =  - Sigma  ( p(i) * ln ( p(i) ) )
                          i = 0

where ln is the natural logarithm.  It can be shown that this value is
maximized when all letters occur in S with equal frequency (in this
case E = ln(k)), and is minimized when one letter occurs all the time
(in this case E = 0).

Since E ranges between 0 and ln(k), we may obtain a modified entropy
value E', which we call relative entropy, which ranges between 0 and 1
by dividing E by ln(k) thus:  E' = E / ln(k).

The program ENTROPY1.EXE calculates the relative entropy of the bytes
in a given file.  For a DOS text file consisting of English text the
relative entropy value is typically in the range 0.48 - .68.  The
relative entropy values for most non-random files, including .OBJ,
.COM and .EXE files, usually fall in the range 0.50 through 0.95.

Files consisting of bytes generated by pseudo-random-number generators
typically have relative entropy values in the range 0.970 - 0.999.
Thus a file with a relative entropy value of at least .98 looks (at
least according to this test) very much like a file consisting of
random bytes.  ENTROPY.EXE can thus be used to test whether a file
appears to consist of random bytes or something like natural language.

The ENTROPY1.EXE program takes two parameters on the command line, a
file specification (wildcard characters are not allowed in this
version) and (optionally) a byte space size, e.g. ENTROPY1 FILE.TXT 150.

The program produces results such as:

           File           Size        Entropy   Rel. entropy    Diff. bytes

     HAMLET.TXT           1459       3.037405       0.547756             42
       PTRS.TXT           3683       3.415741       0.615984            108
     CHAP04.TXT          51162       3.339292       0.602198            100

      FILE1.RND           1762       5.473655       0.987102            255
      FILE2.RND           3400       5.503647       0.992511            256
      FILE3.RND          29225       5.541324       0.999305            256

     HAMLET.ENC           1762       5.478605       0.987995            256
       PTRS.ENC           3400       5.501231       0.992075            256
     CHAP04.ENC          29225       5.540785       0.999208            256

       NULLFILE          20000       0.000000       0.000000              1

The file called NULLFILE consists of 20,000 null (zero) bytes, and has a
relative entropy value of zero (as do all files which contain only a
single byte value).  Note that the relative entropy values for the .ENC
files (encrypted using Dolphin Encrypt) are about .99, as are those for
the .RND files (created by using a pseudo-random-number generator
similar to Microsoft's rand() function) of the same size.

The last column gives the number of different bytes found in the file.
This may be less than the size of the byte space for the file.  If the
size of the byte space is less than 256, as is the case with text
files, then the space size parameter may be included in the command
line, as in  ENTROPY1 HAMLET.TXT 108.  In this case the program
produces results such as:

           File           Size        Entropy   Rel. entropy    Diff.bytes  

     HAMLET.TXT           1459       3.037405       0.648723             42
       PTRS.TXT           3683       3.415741       0.729527            108
     CHAP04.TXT          51162       3.339292       0.713199            100

Thus decreasing the value for the byte space increases the entropy
measure.  Relative entropy tends to be larger for larger files.

Now the C source code:

/*  ENTROPY1.C
 *  Written by Peter Meyer, last revised 1993-04-27.
 *  Calculates the relative entropy of the bytes in a file
 *  defined as the negative of the sum for each byte of the product of
 *  the relative probability of that byte times the natural log
 *  of that byte, divided by the natural log of the number of
 *  different bytes occurring in the file; values can range from 0 to 1.
 */

#include <STDIO.H>          /*  Microsoft header files  */
#include <STDLIB.H>
#include <MEMORY.H>
#include <MATH.H>

unsigned long n[256];
double p[256];

unsigned char *usage =
    "\nUse: ENTROPY1 filespec [space_size]"
    "\nspace_size = number of possible bytes (default = 256)\n";

void measure_entropy(unsigned char *filename, unsigned long *total,
    double *entropy, double *relative_entropy, unsigned int*num_diff_bytes,
    unsigned int *space_size, int *err_flag);

/*-----------------------------*/
void main(int argc, char *argv[])
{
int err_flag;
unsigned int num_diff_bytes, space_size;
unsigned long total;
double entropy, relative_entropy;

if ( argc == 1 )
    {
    printf(usage);
    exit(0);
    }

if ( argc == 2 )
    space_size = 256;
else
    {
    space_size = (unsigned int)atoi(argv[2]);
    if ( space_size == 0 || space_size > 256 )
        {
        printf("\nInvalid space size.\n");
        exit(1);
        }
    }

measure_entropy(argv[1],&total,&entropy,&relative_entropy,&num_diff_bytes,
    &space_size,&err_flag);
switch ( err_flag )
    {
    case 0:     /*  no error  */
        printf("Space size = %u\n",space_size);
        printf("\n%15s%15s%15s%15s%15s",
            "File","Size","Entropy","Rel. entropy","Diff. bytes");
        printf("\n%15s%15lu",argv[1],total);
        printf("%15.6f%15.6f%15d\n",entropy,relative_entropy,num_diff_bytes);
        exit(0);
    case -1:
        printf("\nCannot open file %s.\n",argv[1]);
        exit(2);
    case -2:
        printf("\n%15s is inconsistent with space size %d.\n",
            argv[1],space_size);
        exit(3);
    }
}

/*-----------------------------------------*/
void measure_entropy(unsigned char *filename,
                     unsigned long *total,
                     double *entropy,
                     double *relative_entropy,
                     unsigned int *num_diff_bytes,
                     unsigned int *space_size,
                     int *err_flag)
{
int j;
FILE *file;

*err_flag = 0;
file = fopen(filename,"rb");
if ( file == NULL )
    {
    *err_flag = -1;
    return;
    }

/*  zero the frequency array  */
memset(n,0,256*sizeof(unsigned long));

/*  count the byte values  */
while ( !feof(file) )
    n[fgetc(file)]++;

/*  get the number of bytes and the number of different byte values  */
*num_diff_bytes = 0;
*total = 0L;
for ( j=0; j<256; j++ )
    {
    *num_diff_bytes += ( n[j] != 0 );
    *total += n[j];
    }

if ( *num_diff_bytes > *space_size )
    {
    *err_flag = -2;
    fclose(file);
    return;
    }

/*  calculate the probabilities  */
for ( j=0; j<256; j++ )
    p[j] = ((double)n[j])/(*total);

/*  calculate the entropy  */
*entropy = 0.0;
for ( j=0; j<256; j++ )
    {
    if ( p[j] )
        *entropy += p[j]*log(p[j]);
    }

*entropy = -1.0*(*entropy);

/*  calculate the relative entropy  */
*relative_entropy = *entropy/log(*space_size);

fclose(file);
}

If anyone wants the MS-DOS executable version of this program then send
me (meyer@mcc.com) a snailmail address and I'll send it to you on the
Dolphin Encrypt demonstration disk.

-- Peter Meyer




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Peter Honeyman <honey@citi.umich.edu>
Date: Wed, 28 Apr 93 13:34:05 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: othercrypt
Message-ID: <9304282034.AA01784@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


does anyone know how to get the a5 eurocrypt stuff?  also there
is rumored to be russian cryptosoftware on the street.  clue?

	peter




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Stanton McCandlish <anton@hydra.unm.edu>
Date: Wed, 28 Apr 93 16:04:17 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: No FTP? You can still get PGP!
Message-ID: <9304282303.AA07582@hydra.unm.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


*************************************************************************
DEFEAT THE BIG BROTHER PROPOSAL! JUST SAY F!CK NO TO THE PRIVACY CLIPPER!
*************************************************************************

      ************************************************************
      The security of PGP encryption for those without FTP access!
      ************************************************************

This is not an ad, but a public service announcement. NitV-BBS is FREE.

This info (and my system!) has been updated to make it easier for you to
obtain Pretty Good Privacy (PGP): Secure RSA pubkey encrytion for all!
Due to the overwhelming response, I have sought out as many ports as
possible.  After a week of exhaustive FPT/Archie searches it appears to
me that NitV-BBS is the world's singlemost comprehensive PGP site, with
executables and/or source code for the following platforms:

        Platform               exec     source     patch     extras
    
    MS-DOS (PC-DOS, etc.)       X         X                    X
    Macintosh                   X         X
    Archimedes                  X         ?
    OS/2                        X                    X 
    Amiga                       X         X
    Unix                        X         X
    NeXT                                             X

In one case I do not have the means to open the archive to see if 
it comes with the source code, thus "?".

WARNING: My DallasFax 14.4k v32bis modem does not always cooperate too
well with USR/Miracom Dual Standards.

BY MODEM TO BBS:

Call NitV-BBS (see .sig at end of message for details)
Here you will find:

File area       file name                  description

LOGIN           PGP22.ZIP         DOS version of PGP
LOGIN           PGPSHEL1.ZIP      menu/shell for PGP (DOS only)

NONIBM          PGP22B-A.LHA      PGP for Amiga (w/source)
NONIBM          ARCPGP22          PGP for Archimedes (format unknown; w/src??)
NONIBM          MACPGP22.CPT      PGP for Mac (.cpt archive)
NONIBM          PGP22.TAZ         PGP for Unix (compressed .tar; w/source)

WIN             PGP22OS2.ZIP      PGP for OS/2 (w/source patch)

LOGIN           PGP22SRC.ZIP      PGP source code & utils for DOS
NONIBM          MPGP22SC.S_H      PGP source code for Mac (BinHex .hqx encode
                                      of a .sea self-extracting archive)
MONIBM          MPGP22SC.SIG      PGP signature for validation of Mac source
NONIBM          NXTPGP22.ASC      PGP source code diff (patch) for NeXT. ASCII

A quick <T>ext search for "pgp" will yield the files for flagging quickly.

Note: original name of Mac version is:   MacPGP_2.2.cpt
      original name of Unix version is:  pgp22.tar.Z
      original name of Mac source is:    MacPGP2.2src.sea.hqx
      original name of Mac signature is: MacPGP2.2src.SIGNATURE
      NeXT patch is a concatenation of:  PGP.random.c.diff and
                                         PGP.random.c.diff.README
These names were changed because of the 12 char limit of MesSDOS filenames.

All files are direct from these FTP sites: nic.funet.fi, sony.com, 
garbo.uwasa.fi, and ftp.uni-erlangen.de. They are NOT uploaded by BBS users,
nor gotten from other BBSs.  You can rest assured that they are "clean" 
(the superparanoid^H^H^H^H^H^H^H^Hcautious may wish to obtain additional
copies and compare them for further validation.)

You may login anonymously as ANONYMOUS, password GUEST.  If you want the
whole lot you won't have time, as that acct. is limited. In that case,
login normally, but if you never intend to call again, please be 
courteous, and leave a <C>omment to sysop to delete your account.  
Disk space is limited! 

All user accounts are free.  There is no charge (other than your phone
expenses of course) for obtaining PGP from NitV-BBS.


BY FIDO-PROTOCOL FREQ

Anyone in FidoNet or any other FTN/FTSC network (such as RBBSNet, etc.),
or anyone with a working Fido-type mailer, can get PGP from the same
source, via File REQuest, as long as they can send mail to Fido address
1:301/2 (you will need a Fido nodelist to pull that off). You do not have
to be nodelisted to do this.  You can even be a point system. Just send
a DIRECT not routed netmail To: Sysop, NitV (1:301/2)
                            From: <your info here>
                            Re: <filename>,<filename>,<etc>
                            St: Crash, Direct, FilReq, <etc>
<filename> can be a full file name, or a "magic name". Status is not that
important, as long as the message is set for at least these 2: Direct and 
FilReq.

You can use the following magic names (which will still hold for future
releases of PGP):

Magic Name                  files                 description

PGPDOS         PGP22.ZIP, PGPSHEL1.ZIP      DOS PGP and menu/shell 
PGPAMI         PGP22B-A.LHA                 Amiga PGP & source
PGPARC         ARCPGP22                     Archimedes PGP 
PGPMAC         MACPGP22.C_H                 Mac PGP
PGPNXT         NXTPGP22.ASC                 NeXT PGP source code diff
                                              (requires a full src package)
PGPOS2         PGP22O2.ZIP                  OS/2 PGP & patch
PGPUNX         PGP22TAR.Z                   Unix PGP & source
PGPSDOS        PGP22SRC.ZIP                 PGP source & utils (DOS fmt.)
PGPSMAC        MPGP22SC.S_H, MPGP22SC.SIG   PGP source & sig (Mac fmt.)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Please upload, file-attach via netmail, uuencode and email, or just tell me 
where to find, any interesting utils, FAQs, etc for PGP that you come across,
so that I can make them available to the needy but FTPless hordes.

Please do NOT further distribute this copy of PGP, especially to BBSs. Part
of the Good Thing about getting it from NitV is that you know it came right
from one of the original FTP sites for it, not from some cheezy BBS via the
hands of 27 other people and systems, any of which might harbour a baddie.
This is not to say that BBSs are bad (hell, I run one!) but rather that too
much is left to chance (and ill-will!) in it's distribution methods. PGP is
a security program, and needs to be guaranteed to be secure.  Thank you.

This offer, due to IDIOTIC export restrictions, must of course be limited to
the USA.  <snort>

Authors are stongly encouraged to upload, mail, etc. their ports of PGP,
their PGP utilities, etc. directly to me or the system listed below so that
non-FTP-using PGP afficionados can be certain that they are getting a "pris-
tine" copy.  Thanks!

----------------------------------------------------------------------------
Distribute ENTIRE contents of this message freely.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------

-- 
Testes saxi solidi!  **********************   Podex opacus gravedinosus est!  
Stanton McCandlish,  SysOp:  Noise in the Void Data Center BBS
IndraNet: 369:1/1      FidoNet: 1:301/2      Internet: anton@hydra.unm.edu
Snail: 8020 Central SE #405, Albuquerque, New Mexico 87108 USA
Data phone: +1-505-246-8515 (24hr, 1200-14400 v32bis, N-8-1)
Vox phone:  +1-505-247-3402 (bps rate varies, depends on if you woke me up...:)




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Derek Atkins <warlord@Athena.MIT.EDU>
Date: Wed, 28 Apr 93 14:46:47 PDT
To: Chuck.Lever@umich.edu
Subject: Re: PGP: pgp -ke
In-Reply-To: <9304281852.AA00450@toad.com>
Message-ID: <9304282146.AA00918@stage8>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Hi.

A signature on a key is a cryptographic signature of the key and
userid.  Therefore, you cannot remove your userid from the key and
hope to keep the signatures valid.

The other problem is that once other people have your userid on your
key, which is neccessary for them to sign it, then you need to have
them remove it, too, etc.

Basically, signatures and userids currently act like viruses...  Once
they escape, its nearly impossible to contain them again....

-derek

  Derek Atkins, MIT '93, Electrical Engineering and Computer Science
     Secretary, MIT Student Information Processing Board (SIPB)
           MIT Media Laboratory, Speech Research Group
           warlord@MIT.EDU       PP-ASEL        N1NWH




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: v20177@vax1.cc.uakron.edu (Robert D Shofner )
Date: Wed, 28 Apr 93 17:06:33 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Need some Advice
Message-ID: <9304290001.AA02691@vax1.cc.uakron.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


 Hello All
 My question is what is the diff. between a Software Eng. & Computer Sci.
degree. Some of my profs say that they don't know of any schools offer
a BS in Software Eng.  If that is the case then why do people use that
term? Or is it a Masters degree or something like that?
 I also would like to thank Eric Hughes for replying to my early question
on Q&A a dos database problem. His basic steps solved the problem in less
30 min. By the way the algorithm used very lame.
 abs(ascii character - 255)

 I would like a little more info on the debugger method. 

 Has anyone the address to MircoSystems Management magazine, I need the 
April 93 issue, but unable to find it local.

	Thanks in advance.
				Red :)  <on..........................
 				<ornts188@ksuvxb.kent.edu>  typo above





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Stanton McCandlish <anton@hydra.unm.edu>
Date: Wed, 28 Apr 93 20:31:52 PDT
To: thesegroups@tic.com
Subject: HELP! Some nut is threatening to sue!
Message-ID: <9304290331.AA18264@hydra.unm.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Due to my posts to sci.crypt and elsewhere that I was distributing PGP,
I recieved the following, and after that a very biased textfile on the
dangers of having PGP and how terrible it is.  Can anyone verify that
this is a real threat?  Last I heard PGP *MIGHT* violate a patent, but 
that this had not been decided yet.  Please reply soon, and by direct 
email.  If it is the Real Shit, I don't think they are going to give me
long to ditch PGP...  :(

Begin forwarded msg -----------------------------------------------------



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: jim@RSA.COM (Jim Bidzos)
Date: Wed, 28 Apr 93 19:17:43 PDT
To: anton@hydra.unm.edu
Subject: pgp
Message-ID: <9304290217.AA24716@RSA.COM>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



I don't think you're aware of our position on pgp. Unfortunately, you
may leave us no choice but to take legal action, which we will unless
you cease promotion adn distribution of pgp. The next message will
state our position.

End forwarded msg----------------------------------------------------------
-- 
Testes saxi solidi!  **********************   Podex opacus gravedinosus est!  
Stanton McCandlish,  SysOp:  Noise in the Void Data Center BBS
IndraNet: 369:1/1      FidoNet: 1:301/2      Internet: anton@hydra.unm.edu
Snail: 8020 Central SE #405, Albuquerque, New Mexico 87108 USA
Data phone: +1-505-246-8515 (24hr, 1200-14400 v32bis, N-8-1)
Vox phone:  +1-505-247-3402 (bps rate varies, depends on if you woke me up...:)




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: William Oldacre <76114.2307@CompuServe.COM>
Date: Wed, 28 Apr 93 19:03:43 PDT
To: <cypherpunks@toad.com>
Subject: Help find this shareware!
Message-ID: <930429015612_76114.2307_BHA12-1@CompuServe.COM>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


To: >Internet:cypherpunks@toad.com

PLEASE HELP ME LOCATE THE FOLLOWING SHAREWARE AND IT'S AUTHORS.

The following shareware was removed from Compuserve Information 
Service because a sysop feared it might be downloaded by someone 
outside of the United States and get him in trouble.

 1 DES Documentation for DESJWW.ZIP
     IBMPRO/C and C++ [P]  DESJWW.DOC

 2 Data Encryption Standard (in MSC v5.0)
     IBMPRO/C and C++ [P]  DESJWW.ZIP

 3 Knapsack Public-Key Encryption System
     IBMPRO/C and C++ [P]  KNAPSA.ZIP

 4 Confide - encryption/decryption program (DES)
     IBMSYS/File Utilities [S]  CONFID.ARC

 5 The Private Line (tm)
     IBMSYS/File Utilities [S]  TPL.ARC

 6 The Private Line Documentation
     IBMSYS/File Utilities [S]  TPLDOC.ARC

I am trying to do a survey of ALL data encryption shareware, 
especially that based on the DES or RSA algorithm (I have PGP).  

Can you help?  Please contact William Oldacre at:

     76114.2307@Compuserve.com

              or

     William H. Oldacre
     6208 N.W. 132nd St.
     Gainesville, FL 32606
     
     904-332-3010






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: J. Michael Diehl <mdiehl@triton.unm.edu>
Date: Wed, 28 Apr 93 21:15:57 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Orig. Press Release.
Message-ID: <9304290415.AA17021@triton.unm.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I'm looking for the press release for the wire-tap chip which says that 
communications manufactures will be "encouraged" to incorporate the 
"we're-tapped" chip in their products.  Any hints would be appreciated.  Thanx
in advance.

+-----------------------+-----------------------------+---------+
| J. Michael Diehl ;-)  | I thought I was wrong once. | PGP KEY |
|                       |    But, I was mistaken.     |available|
|                       +-----------------------------+---------+
| mdiehl@triton.unm.edu | "I'm just looking for the opportunity |
| mike.diehl@fido.org   | to be Politically Incorrect!   <Me>   |
| (505) 299-2282        |                                       |
+-----------------------+---------------------------------------+




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Paco Xander Nathan <wixer!wixer.bga.com!pacoid@cactus.org>
Date: Wed, 28 Apr 93 23:38:54 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Raving on...
In-Reply-To: <9304281204.AA05215@nexsys.nexsys.net>
Message-ID: <9304290515.AA21342@wixer>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


"Sent from the cyberdeck of: Geoff White"

> > >Hmm... the problem is I don't think a majority of the people at raves are
> > >focused enough to concentrate on something as technical as that (I KNOW it
> > >isn't technical to you and me, but the average raver doesn't even
> > >know what the word encryption means).  HOWEVER, raves ARE the ideal place
> > >to hand out info about what's going on, something the raver can cling onto

Our company, FringeWare, has been out doing brain machine demos at
raves for a while..  I'm still trying to catch up on sleep from last
weekend's rave construction & show :-)

The raves started as socio/politial but in many places have become 
yet-another-club-hop-for-kids-with-time-to-kill.

Even so, sentiments are in the right place, guaranteed.  Especially
among the *RAVE PROMOTERS* ..  The promoters are already sensitive to
issues in common with cypherpunks since they tend to be underground
operations in the cash economy, etc.  Plus, they're HEAVILY networked.

As a techno/gonzo journalist, I've found it EASIER to get in with hacker
cliques than with rave promoter cliques; granted the real stakes are 
higher so they take security more seriously :-)

Also, I'm intrigued to see the overlap (at least in this area) between
ravers and people at EFF-Austin mtgs..  Some of the main u/g promoters
even showed up to EFF-A's CopCon a couple weeks back, so the overlap
in our agendas is valid.

I'd tend to go with the argument that actually signing keys or passing
out pamphlets during a rave would be weird and blow the mood.  Maybe you'd
say "So what?" but to an entertainment promoter, mood means everything 
and only a few cypherphuckups would spread a terrible image for us.  I'm
generally the most hi-tech part of these raves, what with the sound/light
brain gizmos and even that's too left-brained some ravers..  Most want to
experience, not engage in discourse.  With pheromones and alkaloids
being some of the dominant attractions for people attending, I could
agree more :-)

Which is why I'd suggest we tag along with the VRrave project, based on
IRC connex between concurrent raves.  That'd present a hi-tech set & 
setting and allow for some demo/experience of secure comm.  

Do what you can to introduce/instruct the local promoters -- but 
generally they're busy people with better things to worry about, like
liability and overhead not somebody else's political agenda.

pxn.
pacoid@wixer.bga.com




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Paco Xander Nathan <wixer!wixer.bga.com!pacoid@cactus.org>
Date: Thu, 29 Apr 93 0:15:39 CDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Raving on...
Message-ID: <cfe2cca94bd82d39d87d7d0a70c26445@NO-ID-FOUND.mhonarc.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


"Sent from the cyberdeck of: Geoff White"

> > >Hmm... the problem is I don't think a majority of the people at raves are
> > >focused enough to concentrate on something as technical as that (I KNOW it
> > >isn't technical to you and me, but the average raver doesn't even
> > >know what the word encryption means).  HOWEVER, raves ARE the ideal place
> > >to hand out info about what's going on, something the raver can cling onto

Our company, FringeWare, has been out doing brain machine demos at
raves for a while..  I'm still trying to catch up on sleep from last
weekend's rave construction & show :-)

The raves started as socio/politial but in many places have become 
yet-another-club-hop-for-kids-with-time-to-kill.

Even so, sentiments are in the right place, guaranteed.  Especially
among the *RAVE PROMOTERS* ..  The promoters are already sensitive to
issues in common with cypherpunks since they tend to be underground
operations in the cash economy, etc.  Plus, they're HEAVILY networked.

As a techno/gonzo journalist, I've found it EASIER to get in with hacker
cliques than with rave promoter cliques; granted the real stakes are 
higher so they take security more seriously :-)

Also, I'm intrigued to see the overlap (at least in this area) between
ravers and people at EFF-Austin mtgs..  Some of the main u/g promoters
even showed up to EFF-A's CopCon a couple weeks back, so the overlap
in our agendas is valid.

I'd tend to go with the argument that actually signing keys or passing
out pamphlets during a rave would be weird and blow the mood.  Maybe you'd
say "So what?" but to an entertainment promoter, mood means everything 
and only a few cypherphuckups would spread a terrible image for us.  I'm
generally the most hi-tech part of these raves, what with the sound/light
brain gizmos and even that's too left-brained some ravers..  Most want to
experience, not engage in discourse.  With pheromones and alkaloids
being some of the dominant attractions for people attending, I could
agree more :-)

Which is why I'd suggest we tag along with the VRrave project, based on
IRC connex between concurrent raves.  That'd present a hi-tech set & 
setting and allow for some demo/experience of secure comm.  

Do what you can to introduce/instruct the local promoters -- but 
generally they're busy people with better things to worry about, like
liability and overhead not somebody else's political agenda.

pxn.
pacoid@wixer.bga.com



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: simonm@mindvox.phantom.com (Simon Moon)
Date: Wed, 28 Apr 93 21:34:02 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: RE: Rave on...
Message-ID: <Fo4q3B4w165w@mindvox.phantom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


crunch@netcom.com (John Draper) writes:

> My proposal is to set up a room with a bunch of donated PC's Macs or
> whatever, and have a booth set up where people can purchase PGP diskettes

While this sounds like a great idea, I'm not sure you'll find many ravers
who eill actually use PGP. How many ravers exchange email, but haven't
heard of PGP? It seems like only a couple, based on my talking to people
about computers at raves.

> [...] handout literature can be made available for anyone attending that
> describes the "Clipper" proposals, and suggestions on what people can do
> to resist further government control over private cryptography. 

This seems like a more practical tactic. Even just handing out a single or
half-page flier about PGP, Clipper, and a couple of other topics would
probably get a lot of people to read it. And people at raves are used to
others going around handing out interesting things to read. The hard part
is coming up with 300 well written words that cover everything that needs
to be said, a task I leave in more capable hands.

On the other hand, I wouldn't mind lugging my PowerBook 170 down to a
rave... If anyone organizes such an event, drop me a line...

					   -- Simon (simonm@mindvox.phantom.com)




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: crunch@netcom.com (John Draper)
Date: Thu, 29 Apr 93 00:33:14 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Some ideas,  thats all...
Message-ID: <9304290733.AA29290@netcom4.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



  Who wants to collaborativly work on an information packet containing
a collection of the previous reports on the wiretap chip,  such as
the initial white house statement,  CPSR's and EFF's responses,
list of questions that were hashed at the last Cypherpunks meeting,
etc, etc.

  A smaller and easier to read infomation packet should be prepared
to hand out at raves.   These should be fairly simple,  easy to read
and comprehend while on LSD,  and other drugs,  and also easy to
fold up and tuck in your jacket pockets for later reading.   Included
might be a diskette containing PGP and a "Bone head" starter "readme"
file,  with references to additional places where more robust information
can be had.

  I volunteer to check out the rave scene,  and do an analysis on how
the ravers will respond.  :-).   I'll also try out various other ways
to reach ravers and fill them in.   It's most important to point out
ways for them to become involved in both spreading the info to others,
and if they have computers,  how they can use PGP and other encryption
software to protect their email and voice calls.

  In the not to distant future,   I will be in various media interviews,
and will have opportunity to mention these things,  and tell people how
they can get more information on what we are doing,   and how they can
be involved.    

  Anyway,  feel free to post this to any other system or network,  where
appropriate.

John D.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "DrZaphod" <ncselxsi!drzaphod@ncselxsi.netcom.com>
Date: Thu, 29 Apr 93 08:11:46 PDT
To: CypherPunks@toad.com
Subject: RE: HELP! Some nut is threatening to sue!
Message-ID: <2475.drzaphod@ncselxsi>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


In Message Wed, 28 Apr 93 21:31:10 MDT,
  Stanton McCandlish <hydra.unm.edu!anton@netcomsv.netcom.com> writes:

>Due to my posts to sci.crypt and elsewhere that I was distributing PGP,
>I recieved the following

>From: jim@RSA.COM (Jim Bidzos)
>To: anton@hydra.unm.edu
>Subject: pgp
>
>I don't think you're aware of our position on pgp. Unfortunately, you
>may leave us no choice but to take legal action, which we will unless
>you cease promotion adn distribution of pgp. The next message will
>state our position.

     For a guy who claims to want to help us Cypherpunks in the way of
personal encryption, scare tactics seem a little out of place.  I'm sure
we'd all like to use legal encryption methods [maybe]... but we ARE
Cypherpunks.. giving us the responsibility to use what's best and defend our
rights for privacy.  Using a package that hasn't been updated in 5 years
[MailSafe], we have diminished to politically correct yippies.  I;m not sure
quite what to do.. but I saw Jim Bidzos on a magazine once.. and he looks
like a fed.
By playing the game we are becoming part of it.  TTFN.
-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-
- DrZaphod                #Don't Come Any Closer Or I'll Encrypt!   -
- [AC/DC] / [DnA][HP]     #Xcitement thru Technology and Creativity -
- [drzaphod@ncselxsi.uucp]#     [MindPolice Censored This Bit]      -
-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Date: Thu, 29 Apr 93 01:36:29 PDT
To: Cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Tough Choices: PGP vs. RSA Data Security
Message-ID: <9304290836.AA17180@netcom.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Cypherpatriots,

This is a tough posting to write. I may even be called a quisling, or even
a sternlight!

This may be the most important posting I make during this current
Clipper-Big Brother Chip controversy. 

I suggest that we as a community seriously reconsider our basic support for
PGP. Not because of any flaws in the program, but because of issues related
to Clipper and the potential limits on crypto.

Continuing use of PGP causes several problems:

1. If RSA fails to take actions against sites and users, it weakens their
legal position with respect to their patents. The government does not need
licenses in any case, but users of Clipperphones *do* (not the final
end-users, but the suppliers of Clipperphones to non-government customers).


(A case can be made that repudiation of the patents might be a good thing.
I know I have argued this at times. It's hard to know.)

2. The "guerrilla crypto" aspect of the PGP community (and our group) is
charming, but may be counterproductive. If we are viewed as outlaws, the
target even of RSA, then we have almost no influence, save for underground
subversion.

(To put this another way, if we are seen as RSA Data's enemy, we lose a
potential ally. I am suggesting that a coming war between strong crypto on
one side and government snooping on the other will force all participants
to choose up sides.)

3. Supporting a legal version of strong crypto, which RSA Data-approved
programs are and PGP is *not*, is a much more solid foundation from which
to fight possible restrictions on strong crypto.

4. Our time could better be spent by solidifying existing RSA programs,
including RIPEM, RSAREF-derived programs, MailSafe, and so forth. This is
the approach several major companies have taken (Apple, Lotus, Sun, etc.). 

I've urged Jim Bidzos to work toward some compromise with the PGP community
(and I think everyone recognizes the positive aspects of this growing
community). This might include creating translation programs so MailSafe or
RIPEM can read PGP files, a reworking of PGP to conform to licensing
requirements, etc.

I'm hoping that Phil Zimmermann can see what the real battle is. The PGP
community is not likely to win their battle in court, and the effect of
such a court battle will be divisive and ultimately may help the government
in its plans. Phil Z. is most unlikely to ever see any real revenues from
PGP. 

I think the benefits of a strong, legal, supported crypto product are
greater than the dubious benefits of having a "free" piece of software. At
any reasonable hourly wage, the cost of MailSafe ($125, last time I
checked) is dwarfed by the amount of time crypto activists like ourselves
spend debating it, downloading it, awaiting patched versions, etc.

(All is not rosy on the RSA Data side, either. RSA Data chose to
concentrate on getting RSA built in to e-mail products from the major
companies and chose not to devote much effort to PGP-like personal
encryption products (such as MailSafe, which runs on DOS and UNIX only and
which hasn't changed much since 1988). Support for RSA Data should mean
more support for these kinds of products. We could essentially ask RSA for
a commitment in this area.)

I'm arguing that we should look carefully and see what the real issues are,
who the real enemy is, and then make plans accordingly. 

Awaiting your feedback,

-Tim May
--
Timothy C. May         | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,  
tcmay@netcom.com       | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
408-688-5409           | knowledge, reputations, information markets, 
W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA  | black markets, smashing of governments.
Higher Power: 2^756839 | Public Key: MailSafe and PGP available.
Waco Massacre + Big Brother Wiretap Chip = A Nazi Regime





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: George A. Gleason <gg@well.sf.ca.us>
Date: Thu, 29 Apr 93 03:01:27 PDT
To: tcmay@netcom.com
Subject: Re:  Tough Choices: PGP vs. RSA Data Security
Message-ID: <199304291001.AA23207@well.sf.ca.us>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


At risk of getting the goats of some friends of mine who read the list, I'm
tending to agree with Tim's ideas here.  Brief conversation with Jim Bidzos
at the cypunx mtg indicated that he is very much up for something along the
lines of a personal encryption product that would meet our needs.  From a
business perspective it's easy to see why RSA haven't gone for this yet; a
copmany needs to concentrate at first on the most likely profitable lines of
operation, and once that's solid, go for the wider market.  Right now we
have an incredible array of crypto talent which can be brought into a
cooperative arrangement in developing additional RSA products.  The result
may turn out to be as good as the best potentials of PGP, and at the same
time, support for RSA's position vis-a-vis any possible govt attempt to go
after the patents.  

I don't see this as a matter of withdrawing support from the people and
efforts which brought forth PGP.  They're going to have their hands full
doing *something* about Clipper right now, and that will deserve a lot of
support.  PGP has fulfilled its promise in many ways.  It pre-empted the
chance of an early govt ban on private crypto.  It stimulated wide interest
in crypto.  It also provided a great market demonstration for the potential
of an affordable strong personal encryption program.  By this time, Jim
Bidzos has a great case to make to his stockholders, for the business
potential of personal cryptography.  And PGP also brought together a wide
community of cryptologists and programmers and end-users and so on.  

Consider a band who release a record on an underground label, which then
makes it onto college radio in a big way, and the band gets a chance to get
major distribution from that.  They'd be dumb not to, as long as they can
keep their artistic autonomy; and a smart record company executive knows
that it's better not to try to tamper with a Good Thing.  

So here we are at the next step; public keys for the masses have the chance
to come aboveground in a big way, and achieve even wider distribution and
use.  

Now if those carrots aren't tasty enough; consider the stick: there is a
long history of the govt doing in its adversaries by divide-&-conquer, along
the lines of getting all kinds of infighting going among people who would be
logical allies.  Read the history of COINTELPRO for many examples.  A major
rift between PGP and RSA folks will only serve the interests of those who
would rather both systems be banned. On the other hand, increased
cooperation builds strength against possible governmental action in the
future.  

-gg




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: rjc@gnu.ai.mit.edu
Date: Thu, 29 Apr 93 03:16:59 PDT
To: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Subject: Re: Tough Choices: PGP vs. RSA Data Security
In-Reply-To: <9304290836.AA17180@netcom.netcom.com>
Message-ID: <9304291016.AA36369@hal.gnu.ai.mit.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



   I partially agree with Tim, but RSA must be willing to make some compromises
on this. Mathematical/Algorithmic patents already face lots of opposition
in the user/programmer community, but charging high licensing fees on
such patents will inevitably force programmers to develop freeware
alternatives. I haven't seen Mailsafe, but from the reviews of it,
it sounds like it is vastly inferior to PGP and not worth $125.
It is also not "open" (e.g. you don't get source code?) which prevents
the cypherpunk community from making modifications that they want.
(I've also heard that RSA doesn't even support it well).

   A better course of action might be to remove the RSA engine from
PGP and distribute the source code, and a binary for free, but require
users to pay $30-50 to RSA to get the source code and binary for the
RSA engine.

  This maintains our flexibility to modify PGP as we see fit, but preserves
RSA's intellectual property. The downside is, platform portability
will be impacted slightly. 

  On the other hand, RSA could develop and maintain a PGP alternative
which has all the bells and whistles we like, and market it at reasonable
cost, say $50. (remember, Clipper chips will be cheaper than $40!)


  RSA's alternative is to have their patent become useless like most of the
compression patents through wide spread unauthorized used of their
algorithms.


-- Ray Cromwell        |    Engineering is the implementation of science;    --
-- EE/Math Student     |       politics is the implementation of faith.      --
-- rjc@gnu.ai.mit.edu  |                         - Zetetic Commentaries      --



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: geoffw@nexsys.net (Geoff White)
Date: Thu, 29 Apr 93 08:06:42 PDT
To: crunch@netcom.com
Subject: Re: Raving on...
Message-ID: <9304291447.AA06514@nexsys.nexsys.net>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



	I tend to agree with this guy, tread very carefully,
	we want to inform NOT proslitize.  Ravers will get turned off real
	quick if you come on  as something they MUST do.  Offer
	information, answer questions and most of all be considerate
	of the fact that many people DONT know about the net or e-mail
	and that there may be some initial distrust from young ravers
	who don't know who you are because of your age, (and older guy
	wantin me to type some stuff into a computer?  Humf, smells
	like DEA to me!) So go easy on folks at these things.  You might
	want to find someone who is heavy into the Scene to go with you
	the first couple of times, to smooth the acceptance factor.
	Currently I'm way to busy with other aspects of the Scene to
	do this, you might want to contact some people on:

	sfraves@soda.berkeley.edu

	who regularly deploy VRAVE (an IRC like program for the international
	rave community) at raves in the Bay Area.  To subscribe send a
	message to sfraves-request@soda.berkeley.edu, I've cross posted
	some of your mail so they are well aware of what you want to do.

	sfraves has been around for about a year, they are an integral and
	trusted part of the House Family, you might want to co-ordinate with
	them before you start a major campaign.  I know they are working
	on getting the average raver signed onto e-mail.

	Hope this helps.





----- Begin Included Message -----




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: fig@eff.org
Date: Thu, 29 Apr 93 05:56:54 PDT
To: Stanton McCandlish <thesegroups@tic.com
Subject: Re: HELP! Some nut is threatening to sue!
Message-ID: <199304291256.AA27345@eff.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


At  9:31 PM 4/28/93 -0600, Stanton McCandlish wrote:
If it is the Real Shit, 

It looks like the Real Shit to me, Stanton.  I don't know anyone who has
stonewalled Bidzos, so I don't know if he has actually taken legal action
against a PGP distributor.  But that's the guy (assuming it's not forged
mail).

               <<*>><<*>><<*>><<*>><<*>><<*>><<*>><<*>>
      Cliff Figallo                                    fig@eff.org 
EFF Online                                       (617)576-4506 (voice)
                          








From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: nmh@thumper.bellcore.com (Neil Haller)
Date: Thu, 29 Apr 93 06:05:41 PDT
To: tcmay@netcom.com
Subject: Re:  Tough Choices: PGP vs. RSA Data Security
Message-ID: <9304291305.AA14642@latour.bellcore.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Let me add one vote of support to your proposal ... and another
reason you may not have considered.

I use PGP for personal communications.  I'm not a big enough
target for anyone to sue.  On the other hand I do *not* use
PGP for anything related to my employment.  My company (Bellcore)
is large enough to get sued, and everyone loves to hate the
telephone industry.  As a result, I would happily pay a resonable
license fee.

Neil Haller
nmh@thumper.bellcore.com




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Nickey MacDonald <i6t4@jupiter.sun.csd.unb.ca>
Date: Thu, 29 Apr 93 05:22:23 PDT
To: cypherpunks list <cypherpunks@toad.com>
Subject: A link encryption protocol to crytique ;-)
Message-ID: <Pine.3.05.9304290914.A8389-d100000@jupiter>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Okay folx, tear this apart...  I running on little sleep, but after
thinking about this for a couple of hours (mostly while trying to document
it...) I can't see any obvious holes...

If no one points out any significant deterrants, I will code this up in C
and release the code to the public domain (I'll get it put on soda...)

I should comment, that this is not meant to be the best link encryption
protocol available...  the NSA (or others of their TLA friends) can
monitor my sessions if they really want to...  but this should at least
provide a minor stumbling block...

Also, I'm not a math major, so my version of a "technical" description of
how to do this may upset the mathematicians among us... I did it the way
it is cause it seem straight forward that way...  I hope it actually makes
sense to someone besides me...  I hope it is general enuff (while writing
this I had fixed values in mind, like 256 byte packets, so I may have let
some of the constants creep in without noticing...   I hope not, please
point out these things)...

Anyway, here it is, for whatever its worth...  Oh, for irony's sake, I
must admit that it was all the "clipper" discussion that got me thinking,
and the use of I1 & I2 reflect this...  hehehehe!


--- Cut here ---

Protocol proposal for a peer to peer encrypted link
---------------------------------------------------


The goal of this algorithm was to be fast and not easily subject to a known
plaintext attack, as the data bytes in B[] will be highly structured.

x^y=the result of x exclusive ORed with y
v[x..y]=a vector with positions indexed from x up to y (inclusive)
v[i]=index into an an vector v for position i
v[]=the list of all values in vector v
CRC(v[])=caculate a CRC checksum on the data bytes in vector v

N=number of user data bytes per packet
D=N+sizeof(CRC(B[]))  (for ease in generating I, should be a power of 2)
S=D+sizeof(I)*2
B[0..N-1]=the N user data bytes
C[0..D-1]=a work buffer filled from B[], CRC(B[])
P[0..S-1]=the outgoing packet

K1 & K2=two random "session" keys of length P

I=packet rearrange index (range of 0 up to D-1)
I1 & I2=the two generators of I (range of 0 up to D-1)
T[0..(2^sizeof(I))-1]=array of vectors of size D
L=number of times to iterate the shuffle function

total size of data        D=N              +
                            sizeof(CRC(B[]))

total size of each packet S=sizeof(I)*2    +
                            N              +
                            sizeof(CRC(B[]))

Exchanged in advance of any packets being sent (by a public key mechanism
for example) are N, sizeof(I), sizeof(CRC(B[])), K1, K2, T.

K1 and K2 are generated randomly, but checked to insure that K1[i] does not
equal K2[i].

T[i] is generated by a pseudo random process, similar to shuffling a deck of
cards.  For each i, fill the vector with the values 0 to D-1.  Then two random
indexes (j & k) are chosen (to be different) and the two values at
T[i,j] and T[i,k] are swapped.  This can be iterated an arbitraty number of
times (L) to ensure a good "shuffle" of the values.


To encrypt each packet P:
   - Generate a random index (I) by generating two random values for
     I1 and I2 and exclusive OR'ing them together.  I is not transmitted
     as part of the packet
   - Copy the values in B[i] to C[T[I,i]] for all values of i=0 up to N-1.
   - Copy the individual bytes from CRC(B[]) into C by indexing T[I,x]
     for x=N up to D-1.
   - Form the packet:  P[0..D-1]=C[], P[D..D+sizeof(I)-1]=I1,
     P[D+sizeof(I)..S-1]=I2
   - Replace each value of P[i] with P[i]^K1[i]^K2[i] for all values of
     i=0..S-1.
   - Transmit P[i] for all values i=S-1 down to 0.

Explanatory comments:
   - Exclusive OR was chosen beacuse it executes so quickly on most machines.
   - The asumption was that just using a single key K1 would not be strong
     enough, so thus there are two.
   - Sending I as I1 and I2 gives more appranent choices of values, without
     requiring T to be extremely large.  This is in hopes of further
     hindering any known plaintext attacks.
   - P is transmitted backwards merely so that I1 & I2 arrive first, to aide
     the decryption process.  (Quite honestly this was done to make the
     above description of the assemblage of P a little easier to write,
     as putting I1 & I2 in first would have meant more calculation to yield
     the offsets of the sub parts of P  eg. "P[0..D-1]=C[] would have become
     "P[sizeof(I)..sizeof(I)+D-1]=C[]" which is not as easily understood.)


To decrypt each packet P:
   - As each byte comes in, it is stored into P[i] for values of
     i=S-1 down to 0.
   - Replace each value of P[i] with P[i]^K1[i]^K2[i] for all values of
     i=0..S-1.
   - I1=P[D..D+sizeof(I)-1]=I1, I2=P[D+sizeof(I)..S-1].
   - I=I1^I2.
   - C[]=P[0..D-1]=C[].
   - Copy the values in C[T[I,i]] to B[i] for all values of i=0 up to N-1.
   - Verify that CRC(B[]) equals C indexed T[I,x] for x=N up to D-1.
   - If the CRC verifies, the the data values have been transmitted and
     reside in B[] to be used.

--- Cut here ---

{ God I hope I don't look like too much of a fool...  ;-) }

---
Nick MacDonald               | NMD on IRC
i6t4@jupiter.sun.csd.unb.ca  | PGP 2.1 Public key available via finger






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Pat Farrell"  <pfarrell@cs.gmu.edu>
Date: Thu, 29 Apr 93 06:25:12 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: RE: Tough Choices: PGP vs. RSA Data Security
Message-ID: <33938.pfarrell@cs.gmu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Tim may is starting to sound like a Suit. :-)

I agree strongly that we need RSA on our side, not against us. I don't
know the history of the animosity between Jim B and Phil Z, but I think
it is time to say that water is over the dam.

Several folks have suggested here, and in the usual feeds, that it wouldn't
appear to be all that hard to take RSAREF and use it as the key exchange
engine for a US-legal PGP. Or even to take the PGP source and use it as an
enhanced RSAREF. I haven't looked at either source, but I have to believe
that someone on the list has. Is there a technical reason why this can't be
done? Is there some hidden political reason that it can't be done?

The readers of this list are hardcore and facile with techninology. To get
the widespread support we need kill the wiretap chip, we need to get
"easy to use" strong cryptography into the mass market. I'm writing a
Windows-based POP client designed for folks that can't spell SLIP. It should
have strong encryption invisibly and automatically. It won't until
there is a legal encryption engine with at least the key management of PGP.

Pat

Pat Farrell      Grad Student                 pfarrell@cs.gmu.edu
Department of Computer Science    George Mason University, Fairfax, VA
Public key availble via finger          #include <standard.disclaimer>




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Stanton McCandlish <anton@hydra.unm.edu>
Date: Thu, 29 Apr 93 09:52:06 PDT
To: extropians@gnu.ai.mit.edu
Subject: PGP is NOT availble from NITV anymore!
Message-ID: <9304291650.AA13711@hydra.unm.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Due to threats of legal action from RSA, I have had to remove PGP from my
system.  Some time when I get the mess sorted out, non-patent-infringing
PGP/RSA/[your-fave-crypto-here] utilities, such as mail scripts, will still
be available, and I will post a message with the detail.  

I repeat, PGP *IS NOT* available from NitV-BBS any longer.  Do not call for
it you will be wasting your money and time.  Sorry, but the law is the law.

- S. McC.
-- 
Testes saxi solidi!  **********************   Podex opacus gravedinosus est!  
Stanton McCandlish,  SysOp:  Noise in the Void Data Center BBS
IndraNet: 369:1/1      FidoNet: 1:301/2      Internet: anton@hydra.unm.edu
Snail: 8020 Central SE #405, Albuquerque, New Mexico 87108 USA
Data phone: +1-505-246-8515 (24hr, 1200-14400 v32bis, N-8-1)
Vox phone:  +1-505-247-3402 (bps rate varies, depends on if you woke me up...:)




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: markh@wimsey.bc.ca (Mark C. Henderson)
Date: Thu, 29 Apr 93 11:13:13 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re:  Tough Choices: PGP vs. RSA Data Security
Message-ID: <m0nod4q-00017NC@van-bc.wimsey.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> All he has to do is let us pay a licence fee for pgp.  What's the advantage
> to him in asking for a different piece of code that uses RSAREF and DES
> instead of Phil's code and IDEA?  I can't see it, except that using DES
> blows away the security of the program...
With respect to this, putting another symmetric cipher into RSAREF is a 
simple matter. I've done it for triple DES (3 key EEE version). Once
(and if) we get permission from RSADSI to distribute it, it will go
into the RIPEM distribution. I don't see any reason why we couldn't
plug in IDEA. If you look at the RSAREF code you'll see that it would
be technically very easy.
> 
> No, I think this suggestion should be put down now, or we'll splinter and
> give them exactly the divide-and-conquer opening they're looking for.

Problems with RSAREF/RIPEM:
1. Use of RSAREF/RIPEM in support of a commercial enterprise is 
prohibited without paying a licence fee. Note that they can get 
you on copyright violations rather than patent infringement 
if you break the RSAREF licence agreement. My bet is that it makes 
enforcement a much simpler matter (you might say, especially in Canada).
Note that personal use on a commercial system is OK.

2. One needs to get permission every time one wants to modify RSAREF in
any substantial way. 

3. The pseudo random number generation is suspect, especially if we're 
considering using symmetric cipher keys of > 64 bits. Essentially at 
most 2^128 distinct sequences of pseudo random numbers can be generated. 
2^128 is a big number, but on the other hand it does make one wonder whether
it is worth adding a scheme which uses 192-24 bits of key material.
It isn't that I know how to break it, but on the other hand, it wouldn't
surprise me if someone could compute, in less time than it would take
to try 2^128 possibilities by brute force, some smaller number of 
possibilities for the encryption key given the IV which is output 
in plaintext in a RIPEM message. Call me paranoid.

4. We need something better than 56 bit key DES (said it before).

5. export problems.

6. RIPEM currently has no way to handle certificates or sign other people's
public keys. This is, of course, serious.

Good things:
1. One can use it for non-commercial purposes in North America.

2. Performance of RIPEM is considerably better than the original RSAREF
code. The DES routines have been replaced. Furthermore a lot of platform
specific improvements have been made to the large integer operations.
The point being, that performance is similar to PGP.

3. The promise of PEM compatibility. (People are working on getting
some support for certifificates into RIPEM.)


The real point is that if we put our considerable resources behind something
like RIPEM or 'legal' PGP and we had RSADSI's cooperation in terms of 
permission to modify, improve and update RSAREF then we could almost
certainly have a high quality legal personal public key encryption program
with the features we want, in a few months.

It is a compromise. PGP is already done and is a very impressive
software package. It certainly has a better feature set than RIPEM.
It has been exported, so the export control issue is not a serious one.

I do think the optimal solution (for both RSADSI and us) is to get some 
sort of scheme into place where PGP could be used legally for a licence 
fee (either per key or per person). Perhaps the folks at RSADSI could
sign keys as PAID (but not necessarily authenticated) for US$50. They
would certainly make some money in the process.

Mark

-- 
Mark Henderson
markh@wimsey.bc.ca
RIPEM key available by key server/finger/E-mail
  MD5OfPublicKey: F1F5F0C3984CBEAF3889ADAFA2437433




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: crunch@netcom.com (John Draper)
Date: Thu, 29 Apr 93 11:27:56 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Raving on..
Message-ID: <9304291828.AA03535@netcom4.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>>   Who wants to collaborativly work on an information packet containing
>> a collection of the previous reports on the wiretap chip,  such as
>> the initial white house statement,  CPSR's and EFF's responses,
>> list of questions that were hashed at the last Cypherpunks meeting,
>> etc, etc.

>I already have such an archive (missing the cypherpunk questions [I had 
>a mail blowout, and that was one of the casualties, along with a couple
>other saved items, mostly criticisms of the the privacy clipper.])

>Lemme know if you need it.  I have it in .ZIP format, so you'll need 
>some way to deal with that.  

Great!!  What we need is for someone who can read ZIP files and get it
into hard copy for reproduction to be handed out at raves.   Who wants
to take on this responsibility?

Geoff,  now that one of my mailing lists has just dissolved (TCL_TALK)
I can now join the sfRaves group and work with them directly,   but
first I want to write up a short introduction.

JD




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: tytso@ATHENA.MIT.EDU (Theodore Ts'o)
Date: Thu, 29 Apr 93 08:33:35 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Tough Choices: PGP vs. RSA Data Security
In-Reply-To: <9304281436.AA05701@pizzabox.demon.co.uk>
Message-ID: <9304291533.AA11541@tsx-11.MIT.EDU>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


   Date: Wed, 28 Apr 93 14:36:04 GMT
   From: Sy Verpunc <svp@gtoal.com>
   Reply-To: cypherpunks@toad.com

   Thats what people have *always wanted* to do.  RSA won't let them.  That's
   why any talk of a newer friendlier Bizdos is bullshit.

Have you actually tried?

Several people from RSA, including Bidzos at the last Cypherpunks
meeting at Mountain View (I wasn't there, but take a look at the meeting
"minutes"), have stated repeatedly that if someone were to ask for
permission to use the internal interfaces of RSAREF in order to write a
PGP-compatible program, they would grant permission.

However, as of two weeks ago, *NOT* *A* *SINGLE* *PERSON* *HAS* *ASKED*.

To those of you who have repeatedly said "Cypherpunks write code" (and I
applaud that attitude), consider this a challenge.  :-)

						- Ted




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: dionf@ERE.UMontreal.CA (Francois Dion)
Date: Thu, 29 Apr 93 08:49:59 PDT
To: geoffw@nexsys.net (Geoff White)
Subject: Re: Raving on...
In-Reply-To: <9304291447.AA06514@nexsys.nexsys.net>
Message-ID: <9304291548.AA08102@brise.ERE.UMontreal.CA>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Beyond the ultraworld of Geoff White:
> 
> 
> 	I tend to agree with this guy, tread very carefully,
> 	we want to inform NOT proslitize.  Ravers will get turned off real
> 	quick if you come on  as something they MUST do.

It must be homogenous with the rave. For example, in the chillout room, you
put a mind machine, a vrave connection, an electronic LED race (it's way
cool to either create or modify handheld games into huge "techno" games),
and finally several PCs, modified as "rave machines(tm)" :) with some people
to explain how to get the keys, how to exchange them, what you can do with it,
and emphasize the cool side...

> 	information, answer questions and most of all be considerate
> 	of the fact that many people DONT know about the net or e-mail

The majority or ravers in Montreal know about raves thru my radio show, Raving
Up North (emaill list) or my interactive phone line. I regularly talk about
the net, internet issues, etc... (been doing that for 2 years) so most people
know what the net is really about and they send lots of mail when the written
press around here screw up). Another point, i'll be doing a rave on may 8th
and the ravers have dubbed it the cyberpunk rave, even if it's called
Rave en couleur...

>	You might
> 	want to find someone who is heavy into the Scene to go with you
> 	the first couple of times, to smooth the acceptance factor.

Definitely. The scene needs some dominant figures.

> 	Currently I'm way to busy with other aspects of the Scene to
> 	do this, you might want to contact some people on:
> 
> 	sfraves@soda.berkeley.edu
> 
> 	who regularly deploy VRAVE (an IRC like program for the international
> 	rave community) at raves in the Bay Area.

Vrave is used in the east coast too. Twould be really cool if some rave from
the west coast be connected may 8th... i'll probably have 2 lines here.  

> 	 know they are working
> 	on getting the average raver signed onto e-mail.

As most people who are heavily "connected". There is an article in the may/june
issue of wired about a guy called cursor cowboy who wants to connect everybody
he meets. Speaking of wired, i've read the article on crypto rebels aka
cypherpunks. What do you think? Please respond to me since i am not on
cypherpunks anymore because the traffic was too heavy and religious when i was
on.

Ciao,
-- 
Francois Dion
    '  _   _   _ 
 CISM (_) (_)  _) FM       Montreal , Canada       Email: CISM@ERE.UMontreal.CA
      (_)  / . _)             10000 Watts          Telephone no: (514) 343-7511
_______________________________________________________________________________
Audio-C-DJ-Fractals-Future-Label-Multimedia-Music-Radio-Rave-Video-VR-Volvo-...



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: greg@ideath.goldenbear.com (Greg Broiles)
Date: Thu, 29 Apr 93 14:13:29 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Tough Choices
Message-ID: <338R3B1w164w@ideath.goldenbear.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain




Timothy May writes:

> I suggest that we as a community seriously reconsider our basic support for
> PGP. Not because of any flaws in the program, but because of issues related
> to Clipper and the potential limits on crypto.
>
> [Cites several reasons why it's inconvenient that PGP users don't have
> legal licenses to use RSA's stuff]

With all due respect, fuck that. I agree that it would be much much better
if PGP users could be licensed; but your letter convinced me that it's
even more crucial that we get Bizdos, et al., to give or sell us a license
for PGP. Yes, it is important that we have a legal and above-board product
available to us. Walking away from a well-written and well-distributed
(and FREE, with source) piece of software to assuage the egos and wallets
of a few folks in California is bullshit.

If I need to choose between "legitimacy" and privacy, privacy wins.
Every time.

This is the carrot for Bizdos:  our money, and more market share.

This is the stick for Bizdos: some of use are gonna use it anyway.

He can have our money to use it - or not. RSA's choice.

This entire issue pisses me off - the work that created the "patentable"
stuff in the first place was supported by with public money. I think that
makes it ours. I'd be willing to play along with this game if it was
possible for me to do so in a reasonable fashion; but it is not. My money
went to fund the development of an algorithm that now I'm not allowed to
use? NOT!

> I'm arguing that we should look carefully and see what the real issues are,
> who the real enemy is, and then make plans accordingly.

The real enemy is people who tell us that some folks can own an algorithm
or a process; and other people who tell us that we can't use properties
of mathematics to ensure our own privacy.

It may be that within months or years the US Government will tell us that 
certain mathematical processes cannot be applied to streams of data, without 
criminal penalties; we are all able to see that's clearly unacceptable. Why 
is it so difficult to see that it's also unacceptable for PKP to tell us 
that we cannot apply those same processes without risking civil penalties?
The legal minutiae behind those two statements may differ; but the end 
result is the same. Other folks want to tell us what we can and can't do 
with our data and our computers. Fuck that.


--
Greg Broiles                            greg@goldenbear.com
Golden Bear Computer Consulting         +1 503 465 0325
Box 12005 Eugene OR 97440               BBS: +1 503 687 7764




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: karn@qualcomm.com (Phil Karn)
Date: Thu, 29 Apr 93 12:09:02 PDT
To: tcmay@netcom.com
Subject: Re:  Tough Choices: PGP vs. RSA Data Security
Message-ID: <9304291908.AA14792@servo>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I think the ball's already in Bidzos's court. Consider the following Bidzos
quote a few days ago on the "billcryp" list:

	You have it correct, but let me expand a bit. It would be a bad
	business decision for us to try to keep *anyone* out of the market
	with patents because we disagree with their approach.  Remember,
	personal choice crypto isn't outlawed yet.

Now the context of this quote was whether RSA could use its patents to
try to squash the more objectionable aspects of Clipper (particularly
key registration), but his wording is (perhaps unintentionally) much
more revealing. It implies to me that licensing PGP would be in
RSADSI's best business interests.  And so it would, if not for the
personal animosity between Bidzos and Zimmerman.

I sent a note to Bidzos asking him this exact question, but I have not
yet received a reply.

I am yet another person who would be glad to pay RSADSI a reasonable
fee to use RSA in the form of PGP. Cost is really not the main issue
here; PGP is the product I want to use, plain and simple. Nothing else
matches its features, especially the "web of trust" model for
certificates and the widespread availability of source code for
inspection.  Mailsafe isn't even in the running.

I use PGP only occasionally, in a personal and educational mode. I
would very much like to be able to recommend it to my company for
business use, but I can't do that under the present circumstances. And
that's too bad.

Phil





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: uri@watson.ibm.com
Date: Thu, 29 Apr 93 09:24:41 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re:  Tough Choices: PGP vs. RSA Data Security
In-Reply-To: <9304281433.AA05674@pizzabox.demon.co.uk>
Message-ID: <9304291612.AA17566@buoy.watson.ibm.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Sy Verpunc writes:
 > : .........Brief conversation with Jim Bidzos
 > : at the cypunx mtg indicated that he is very much up for something along the
 > : lines of a personal encryption product that would meet our needs.

Well, this is yet to be seen.

 > All he has to do is let us pay a licence fee for pgp.  What's the advantage
 > to him in asking for a different piece of code that uses RSAREF and DES
 > instead of Phil's code and IDEA?

Practically none, especially since RIPEM is already running, and
is as free as PGP. Of course, single DES is somewhat less
resistant to brute force, thus triple DES would be more
appropriate...

 > I can't see it, except that using DES blows away the security
 > of the program...

Oh, come on now. It looks like every fool in the world
believes now he can crack DES... Let me enlighten you:
even IF one gets a DES engine fast enough and can put
lots of those in parallel - that one still needs lots
of ahrdware/software. Which isn't very feasible today.

 > No, I think this suggestion should be put down now, or we'll splinter and
 > give them exactly the divide-and-conquer opening they're looking for.

Agreed.

Regards,
Uri.
------------
<Disclaimer>




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Hal <74076.1041@CompuServe.COM>
Date: Thu, 29 Apr 93 09:28:55 PDT
To: CYPHERPUNKS <CYPHERPUNKS@toad.com>
Subject: Tough Choices: PGP vs. RSA Data Security
Message-ID: <930429161807_74076.1041_FHD83-1@CompuServe.COM>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

Tim May writes:

> I suggest that we as a community seriously reconsider our basic support for
> PGP. Not because of any flaws in the program, but because of issues related
> to Clipper and the potential limits on crypto.

I see several problems with this proposal.

1. It's not clear what it means to "reconsider our basic support for
PGP."  What exactly is Tim proposing?  That people stop using PGP?  That
they phase out their use of it as legal products become available?  I'd
like to see some clarification.

2. More generally, what about the issue of our advocating and supporting
other possibly infringing actions?  Which ones do we stop?  Just those
that upset Jim Bidzos?  He claims to have patents that cover many more
activities than RSA, including patents which cover the very idea of public
key encryption, and patents on Diffie-Hellman key exchange and virtually
any conceivable variation.  Should we respect all of these now?

3. David Chaum apparently has U.S. patents on many key features of digital
cash.  It looks like we would have to stop working on that, too, by this
reasoning.

4. What reasonable alternatives to PGP exist?  Is RSAREF really usable on
a PC?  I tried an early version and it was terribly, terribly slow.  PGP
is just barely fast enough.  A "legal" version of PGP which uses RSAREF will
presumably be considerably slower.

5. I am not as convinced as Tim that RSADSI is truly, positively, certainly
on our side.  Why is it that RSAREF has such a weak conventional encryption
algorithm (DES, with 56-bit keys)?  RIPEM has been out for many months, and
people have been asking for IDEA or triple DES all that time.  Bidzos has
supposedly said he'll give permission for improvements.  Yet as far as I
know RIPEM still only has this small key size, a key size which persistent
rumors say can be broken by government computers.  When Bidzos permits
RSAREF to run a conventional encryption algorithm with a secure key size I
will give more credence to the view that he wants people to have strong
encryption.

6. How is it that one company has collected virtually all of the patents on
cryptographic technology in this country?  Jim Bidzos controls patents on
public-key encryption in general, RSA, Diffie-Hellman key exchange, ElGamal
signatures and encryption, and several others.  I can't help noticing that
it would be an extraordinarily convenient arrangement for the government
if such a company existed and were secretly working against public use of
cryptography while publically pretending to be doing all they can to bring
this technology to a reluctant market.  I still have not seen any specific
public action by Bidzos which would invalidate this possibility.  Yes, he
has engaged in this widely publicized tiff with NIST over the Digital Signature
Standard, and he's made some statements against Clipper.  But where are the
lawsuits?  Is AT&T receiving the same threatening letters that Stanton
McCandlish received when he said he was distributing PGP from his BBS?

7. Extrapolating from the widespread acceptance of PGP, which is free, to
conclude that there is a market for a commercial encryption product which
costs money is pointless.  Granted, some of us may spend a lot of time
talking about PGP and thinking about these issues, but most PGP users just
downloaded it from a BBS or the net.  There are a lot of things they'd
spend $100 on before they would buy an encryption program.


One of the things that attracted me to Cypherpunks is that they take steps
to make these tools available without worrying about upsetting the power
structure.  David Chaum may object to our implementing digital cash.
Jim Bidzos may object to our using RSA, or Diffie-Hellman, or almost
anything else having to do with cryptography.  If we're going to start
looking over our shoulder and not doing anything which powerful people
object to then we might as well pack up and go home.

Almost everything we have talked about over the last six months infringes
somebody's patents in this country.  I really don't see what role a group
like ours has if we have to tiptoe through the minefield of intellectual
property protection which permeates the field of cryptography.  Are we to
become a bunch of unpaid consultants for RSADSI, writing code which they
will then make profits on?

Phil Zimmermann has done more to put strong cryptography into the hands
of people all over the world in two years than Bidzos has managed in ten.
He has faced lawsuits by Bidzos and has undergone considerable personal
sacrifice in getting this software out.  People talk about this "feud"
as though the two are equally guilty, and ask (like Rodney King) "can't
we all just get along?"  But this is a cop-out.  To me there is clear
asymmetry in their dispute in terms of who asserts their power and who
is trying to empower individuals.

Look at what Tim is suggesting.  We abandon PGP, not because it is a bad
program; not because its author has behaved unethically; not because it
has failed in its goals; but because Jim Bidzos is throwing his weight
around and we don't want Jim to be unhappy.  If Jim were to accept that
PGP was no more threatening to his patents than RSAREF then the problem
would be solved.  I presume that Tim has decided that this won't happen,
so now he suggests Plan B, that we abandon PGP.

I have to suggest that the real obstacle to the wide deployment of strong
cryptography remains Jim Bidzos.  He has the power, by a single stroke of
a pen, to do more to encourage the spread of cryptography in this country
than any other single person (including Bill Clinton).  All he has
to do is to issue a policy statement that since PGP is freeware it falls
under the PKP policy allowing use of the patents for noncommercial use.
Presto - PGP is legal, and one of the main obstacles to its spread is
eliminated.

I agree with Tim that we need to look closely to see who our real enemies
are.  Perhaps Bidzos is a charming person.  I've never met him.  Certainly
the bay area Cypherpunks seem to be falling under his influence.  From my
perspective I find this cozying up to the PKP/RSADSI power structure to
be rather alarming.  I don't think it is a good direction for the group.

Hal Finney
74076.1041@compuserve.com
hal@alumni.caltech.edu

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From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: uri@watson.ibm.com
Date: Thu, 29 Apr 93 09:24:59 PDT
To: tytso@ATHENA.MIT.EDU (Theodore Ts'o)
Subject: Re: Tough Choices: PGP vs. RSA Data Security
In-Reply-To: <9304281436.AA05701@pizzabox.demon.co.uk>
Message-ID: <9304291618.AA21186@buoy.watson.ibm.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Theodore Ts'o writes:
 > Several people from RSA, including Bidzos at the last Cypherpunks
 > meeting at Mountain View (I wasn't there, but take a look at the meeting
 > "minutes"), have stated repeatedly that if someone were to ask for
 > permission to use the internal interfaces of RSAREF in order to write a
 > PGP-compatible program, they would grant permission.

Now - there's a slight distinction between:
	a) write [from scratch] PGP-compatible program;
	b) write RSA engine for [existing] PGP program.

I suspect it's the second, that most people would prefer.

 > However, as of two weeks ago, *NOT* *A* *SINGLE* *PERSON* *HAS* *ASKED*.

Incorrect. I asked for, and recieved, a permission to use
RSAREF internals for modified RIPEM program.    Actually,
nobody but time and efforts preclude me  from adding PGP
capabilities to it...

Of course, whether b) will be granted too, is an open
question.

 > To those of you who have repeatedly said "Cypherpunks write code"
 > (and I applaud that attitude), consider this a challenge.  :-)

Naw...

EeRegards,
Uri.
------------
<Disclaimer>




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Perry E. Metzger" <pmetzger@lehman.com>
Date: Thu, 29 Apr 93 09:34:53 PDT
To: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Subject: Re: Tough Choices: PGP vs. RSA Data Security
In-Reply-To: <9304290836.AA17180@netcom.netcom.com>
Message-ID: <9304291634.AA24470@snark.shearson.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



[I am CCing this to Jim Bidzos at RSA.]

Timothy C. May says:
> Cypherpatriots,
> 
> This is a tough posting to write. I may even be called a quisling, or even
> a sternlight!

Actually, I do not disagree with your fundamental points. Jim Bidzos
is not, fundamentally, an enemy of privacy. He's just in a difficult
position because his livelyhood comes from selling patent licenses.

If a program existed that was legal and freely distributed like RIPEM
but ran as fast as PGP and offered the "web of trust" model of PGP,
I'd use it immediately.

Perry




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "L. Detweiler" <ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Date: Thu, 29 Apr 93 11:39:00 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: The May Proposal
In-Reply-To: <9304290836.AA17180@netcom.netcom.com>
Message-ID: <9304291838.AA11371@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Just when I think I'll lie low awhile, tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C.
May) drops a bombshell:

>I suggest that we as a community seriously reconsider our basic support for
>PGP. Not because of any flaws in the program, but because of issues related
>to Clipper and the potential limits on crypto.

I'm quite aghast at this little gem of a proposal, which might be
deemed `treasonous' by some (however, I'll limit my flames). In many
ways it is more unpalatable than the Clipper announcement. PGP is
*solid* software for cryptography that is available *now*. What other
software is available? Sure, there are plenty of vague promises and
vaporware, or bits and pieces for little nooks and crannies of
platforms. PGP is the closest thing to *widespread* strong cryptography
available *across* platforms.  

Look, support whatever you want. Cypherpunks don't have an official
policy sheet.  But to recommend they stop promoting something that has
formed one of the most stable core commitments of the group is divisive
in itself.  (Sheesh, this group couldn't reach a consensus if only one
person was subscribing!)

>1. If RSA fails to take actions against sites and users, it weakens their
>legal position with respect to their patents. The government does not need
>licenses in any case, but users of Clipperphones *do* (not the final
>end-users, but the suppliers of Clipperphones to non-government customers).

are you saying that RSA needs to support Clipperphones? or that they
need the legal torque to suppress granting the patent to
implementations of it? If RSA sells out, which I see every sign of this
happening (lacking explicit reassurances from Bidzos, and in light of
his apparent devotion to the company `stockholders'), then the point is
mute. What makes you so sure they won't (or haven't)?  Also, your
reasoning is bizarre. If RSA wants to protect their patents, then they
should attempt prosecution or pursue agreement, one or the other.  It
is the failure to prosecute that weakens their case, not the existence
of infringers per se. Actually, that is the only way they have to
strengthen their case, to attempt prosecution of perceived infringers.
If they fail to do this then they are implicitly acknowledging their own weakness.

>2. The "guerrilla crypto" aspect of the PGP community (and our group) is
>charming, but may be counterproductive. If we are viewed as outlaws, the
>target even of RSA, then we have almost no influence, save for underground
>subversion.

I just don't get this strange and insatiable drive to `respectability'
by outspoken members of this list.  This is the critical period when
cryptography itself is in jeopardy, precisely at the point that we
must, to a large extent, work outside the ``system'' that has
unequivocally demonstrated its hostility to the basic premise of
widespread unbreakable cryptography.  Currently, we cannot have our
unbreakable cryptography and respectability too.  You all remind me of
Denning, who wants to underhandedly promote Clipper and retain her
scientific respectability at the same time. Or the NSA, who wants to
regulate commercial cryptography but completely suppress any innovative
commercial ideas that threaten their (increasingly threatened and
seriously weakened) domination.

>(To put this another way, if we are seen as RSA Data's enemy, we lose a
>potential ally. I am suggesting that a coming war between strong crypto on
>one side and government snooping on the other will force all participants
>to choose up sides.)

I'm on the side that commits to widespread availability of strong
cryptography at any cost and any sacrifice. As Mr. Hughes has written,
``no compromises''.  I think RSA had better make it clear right away
whether they will support the Clipper and Capstone projects or not.
That is the crucial decision at stake. Every minute that a strong
statement is lacking I am further skeptical and suspicious of their true intent.

>3. Supporting a legal version of strong crypto, which RSA Data-approved
>programs are and PGP is *not*, is a much more solid foundation from which
>to fight possible restrictions on strong crypto.

All this vague legal mumbo jumbo and wonderful rhetoric like `solid
foundation' may have some value in the future, and may even be a
decisive pivot. But the pace of litigation is glacial, and we need
powerful tools *now*.  PGP is such a tool.  The strongest approach to
fighting restrictions on strong cryptography is to USE IT RIGHT NOW.

RSA in a MINUTE could guarantee the legality of PGP by offering
licenses to users. Many have expressed the sincere desire to become
`legitimate'. I consider it a wholly reasonable approach.  Their
continued silence on this point is deafening.  They have not addressed
the possibility whatsoever publicly except to hint that they regret
their inability or inaction in the area.  Why do they refuse to assent?
 There are overtures & negotiations to get the RSADSI libraries into
the code, but this is just (so far) a decoy, distraction, and diversion
in my opinion.  I think the bottom line is that RSA wants more control
over the public key algorithm than P. Zimmerman (a true cypherpatriot)
is willing to grant, and he is willing to take a calculated but
considerable risk, which so far has payed vast, global, valuable
dividends reaped by tens of thousands.

>4. Our time could better be spent by solidifying existing RSA programs,
>including RIPEM, RSAREF-derived programs, MailSafe, and so forth. This is
>the approach several major companies have taken (Apple, Lotus, Sun, etc.). 

again, not enough platform-independent availability or fanatical
commitment on the part of the companies.  Is there a *universal*,
*freely available* package in there?  How many of those vendors would
take out the strong cryptography if a law were passed to do it?  How
many have already demonstrated their spinelessness by weakly assenting
to disembowel their embedded strong cryptographic techniques? How many
are subject to the whims of RSA or the NSA?

>I've urged Jim Bidzos to work toward some compromise with the PGP community
>(and I think everyone recognizes the positive aspects of this growing
>community). This might include creating translation programs so MailSafe or
>RIPEM can read PGP files, a reworking of PGP to conform to licensing
>requirements, etc.

Oh, so we abandon PGP until Mr. Bidzos works out a compromise on his
own terms and own time schedule, is that the idea? He has had *years*
to demonstrate his willingness to `compromise'.  Some parts of the PGP
community would gladly submit to even a one-sided `compromise' of
expensive individual licensing. So far, in my view, he has done nothing
but string along the PGP team, when he (or somebody) has the power to
end the bickering and tension *immediately*.  Many PGP users don't
object to RSA getting rich off the algorithm licenses.  It is not an
issue of money, apparently, though, it is an issue of *control*
(something that any true cypherpatriot should recognize as critical and
not to be given away).  Do you want your strong cryptographic
techniques to be controlled by yourself or someone else?

>I'm hoping that Phil Zimmermann can see what the real battle is. The PGP
>community is not likely to win their battle in court, and the effect of
>such a court battle will be divisive and ultimately may help the government
>in its plans. Phil Z. is most unlikely to ever see any real revenues from
>PGP. 

Mr. Zimmerman has never seen `any real revenues' from his work and to
attribute his basic past motive to that purpose is mercenary and
tasteless. He has a true and passionate commitment to strong
cryptography, enough that he risked his personal comfort and sacrificed
years of his life to promoting it, and the documentation accurately
represents that drive.

Yes, a court battle would be divisive. It would probably bankrupt Mr.
Zimmerman and distract RSA if pursued vigorously. But RSA can wholly
avoid it. On the other hand, a court battle could bring public favor to
the cryptographic cause. It could set a clear precedent for the dubious
legality of software patents. There are many wildcards. Would many
people send Zimmerman money if he was prosecuted? Would EFF get
involved? Would he be perceived as the David vs. the Goliath? Does RSA
have a strong, legal, legitimate case?  Only a Sternlight would think
the issue is clear cut.

>I think the benefits of a strong, legal, supported crypto product are
>greater than the dubious benefits of having a "free" piece of software. At
>any reasonable hourly wage, the cost of MailSafe ($125, last time I
>checked) is dwarfed by the amount of time crypto activists like ourselves
>spend debating it, downloading it, awaiting patched versions, etc.

PGP is essential now because it is supported on many platforms, has a
common format, is not limited to mail, has attained a sophisticated
degree of reliability, is continuing to be supported extremely
responsively, is not limited by wishywashy and halfhearted commitment
by its developers, was born of the true motive that *everyone* deserves
and requires strong cryptography *today* and that there's something
just a little upsetting about big conglomerates getting rich off of
selling algorithms for a freedom like privacy.  Do you want to trade
something solid for something vapid?

>(All is not rosy on the RSA Data side, either. RSA Data chose to
>concentrate on getting RSA built in to e-mail products from the major
>companies and chose not to devote much effort to PGP-like personal
>encryption products (such as MailSafe, which runs on DOS and UNIX only and
>which hasn't changed much since 1988). Support for RSA Data should mean
>more support for these kinds of products. We could essentially ask RSA for
>a commitment in this area.)

I will support RSA when they show an unequivocal commitment to the
proliferation of strong cryptography by allowing individual users to
obtain licenses. So far, they have only worked with companies. They
stand to make *more* if they had the unorthodox whim to allow users to
receive licenses. People have been asking for ``a commitment from RSA
in this area'' for *many months* if not *years*.  There are ulterior
motives present that are not apparent in talking exclusively to Bidzos, I'm sure.

Here is my position on PGP: yes, it has dubious legal ground. But so
did many other revolutionary technologies at the time of their
inception. RSA has had plenty of opportunities to send a clear signal
by either prosecuting or promoting PGP (the former in potentially
devastating ways, the latter in potentially lucrative ways). That they
have not done either suggests to me that they don't understand the
fundamental importance of the issue in some way.  It seems to me
somebody directing RSA (Bidzos perhaps) wants to straddle the fence,
and is continuing to do so, and that PGP and Clipper (so far) are just
two aspects of a pattern. But I think somebody at RSA had better pick a
side soon or they will be speared by both sides of the fence.

I think it would be overly optimistic and idealistic to think that PGP
will be here, say, 10 years from now. It is a stepping stone to grander
things, but a *crucial* one at this point, and not to be abandoned but
remembered, revered, and *used*.  Do you know how many man-hours have
gone, and continue to go, into its development and maintenance?  Many
new wrinkles will be occuring in time, but right now PGP is the
well-deserving cyphersoftware of choice.

Until RSA makes some clear statements of their intent on critical
issues like Clipper/Capstone/PGP, I don't consider them an ally.  At
this point their silence can be taken as an affront to *all* sides. 
Right now I think the clock is ticking on a blatant sellout, but I'd
just love to be pleasantly surprised. So far the only thing surprising
about RSA is their conspicuous inconspicuousness.  And there are
ominous rumors that they will be or are starting to target prominent
PGP users in a mailwriting campaign.  The issue is not ``will RSA be
our ally if we sacrifice PGP?'' but ``why has RSA not responded despite
reasonable overtures?''

In my opinion, J. Bidzos needs to answer the following explicitly and
satisfactorily before cypherpunks consider RSA their Salvation:

1. Will RSA sell licenses to companies seeking to use the public key
algorithm in Capstone and Clipper implementations?  What was the exact
RSA involvement in those areas prior to the announcement?

2. Why has RSA refused to sell individual licenses to PGP users despite
the continued expressions of willingness and desire to cooperate on the
part of many of those users?

3. What is the real RSA position/plan/policy on patent infringers, if there is one?

4. Who is fundamentally in control of RSA, anyway? Bidzos? R. S. & A.?
Shareholders? the NSA? Accountants and lawyers? What is the underlying agenda?


>I'm arguing that we should look carefully and see what the real issues are,
>who the real enemy is, and then make plans accordingly. 

``Friends come and go, but enemies accumulate.''




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Xiao Zhou <XIAOZHOU@pucc.Princeton.EDU>
Date: Thu, 29 Apr 93 09:41:01 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Limbaugh & Liddy
Message-ID: <9304291640.AA15355@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>> In <9304231457.AA22562@gmuvax2.gmu.edu>, 7025aj@gmuvax2.gmu.edu writes:
>> |>
>> |> send him [Limbaug] some convincing words, please?
>> |>
>> |> G. Gordon Liddy would be another good target, but I don't know his address
>
>cp@jido.b30.ingr.com (Serrzna Penvt Cerffba) [!Is that real rot13!?] replies:
>> My guess would be that Liddy and Limbaugh would both be very
>> happy about the Tapper chip proposal...

1) Any publicity is good for us. These guys need controversy, and we've got it.

2) There's the 'international competitiveness' issue.

3) These guys hate Clinton to Schiminton.

4) Even if they pick the other side, we look good.

5) Larry King would of course be better, but is he returning your calls?




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: tribble@memex.com (E. Dean Tribble)
Date: Thu, 29 Apr 93 15:07:35 PDT
To: anton@hydra.unm.edu
Subject: HELP! Some nut is threatening to sue!
In-Reply-To: <9304290331.AA18264@hydra.unm.edu>
Message-ID: <9304292001.AA20252@memexis.memex.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


	 From: Stanton McCandlish <anton@hydra.unm.edu>
	 Date: Wed, 28 Apr 93 21:31:10 MDT

	 this is a real threat?  Last I heard PGP *MIGHT* violate a patent, but 

PGP does violate patents.  Several people, particularly in the
cypherpunks community, are trying to alleviate the RSA vs. PGP
problem.  The controversy is counterproductive (and all sides seem to
be mostly good guys), so let's not stir the pot further.  Two of the
solutions are 1) PGP could be reimplemented to use RSAREF, and 2)
RSAREF (or something like it) could be extended to include all the
functionality of PGP, but without the patent problems.  (RSAREF is a
copyleft implementation of RSA stuff).

	 From: jim@RSA.COM (Jim Bidzos)

	 I don't think you're aware of our position on pgp. Unfortunately, you
	 may leave us no choice but to take legal action, which we will unless
	 you cease promotion adn distribution of pgp. The next message will
	 state our position.

I encourage you to cease public promotion (because the RSA claim is
legit), and send a message to Jim asking him what you can do to
encourage a freely (and easily) useable and legal general encryption
tool.

dean




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: cp@jido.b30.ingr.com (Serrzna Penvt Cerffba)
Date: Thu, 29 Apr 93 11:09:03 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: CSPAN NOT covering the hearings tommorrow
In-Reply-To: <9304281904.AA12916@netcom4.netcom.com>
Message-ID: <199304291808.AA10547@jido.b30.ingr.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


In <9304281904.AA12916@netcom4.netcom.com>, John Draper writes:
|> Called CSPAN,  and they are NOT covering the hearings tommorrow.  Hah!
|> our tax dollars at work!!

C-SPAN is not tax supported, if that's what you meant. Presumably
transcripts will be available from the GPO as part of the Congressional
Record, or someone in Ma who is a Markey constituent could get them
for free and post a summary.
        ^
       /
------/---- cp@jido.b30.ingr.com (Freeman Craig Presson)
     /
    /




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Date: Thu, 29 Apr 93 13:12:27 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: RE: HELP! Some nut is threatening to sue!
Message-ID: <9304292012.AA12334@netcom.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Dr. Zaphod writes, commenting on Jim Bidzos' e-mail to Stanton M.,

>     For a guy who claims to want to help us Cypherpunks in the way of
>personal encryption, scare tactics seem a little out of place.  I'm sure
>we'd all like to use legal encryption methods [maybe]... but we ARE
>Cypherpunks.. giving us the responsibility to use what's best and defend our
>rights for privacy.  Using a package that hasn't been updated in 5 years
>[MailSafe], we have diminished to politically correct yippies.  I;m not sure
>quite what to do.. but I saw Jim Bidzos on a magazine once.. and he looks
>like a fed.
>By playing the game we are becoming part of it.  TTFN.

* The scare tactics may have been somewhat too harsh, or at least phrased
in typical "cease and desist" lawyer terms, but Stanton _did_ post his
announcement very prominently and widely in sci.crypt, where everyone could
see it. RSADSI was pretty much forced to react, lest they later find their
patents/copyrights/whatever ruled invalid by their failure to protect them.
Most PGP sites are less well-advertised :-}.

* I agree that PGP has a feature set (especially its distributed trust
model) that is more interesting than the creaky old MailSafe program. There
may be several solutions brewing here, as several postings in this thread
have noted.

* As George Gleason has also noted, dividing our community may play into
the government's hands. (Some may think I'm trying to fragment the PGP
community with these comments. Not at all. PGP has done a valuable service
in educating hackers, users, etc., and in energizing the community. But
keeping crypto "underground," as by nature PGP must be, is not what we
want, is it?)

* I once thought RSA Data Security Inc. was NSA-controlled. This was in
1988 or so, when I tried to buy a crypto package from them and got the
run-around ("Don't call us, we'll call you."). It seemed natural, to me at
that time, that the Agency would control such a crucial technology. This
opinion didn't last too long, as I got more familiar with the crypto
community.

Now I'm convinced otherwise, and that Clipper/Capstone is in fact the
government's  way of gaining control of a technology they failed to
classify and control the first time around. (To be sure, the export
controls and other legal restrictions are a way the Agency and others
control the spread of strong crypto, but so far there has been no basic
challenge to the "right to encrypt." Many of us see Clipper as a probable
move in this direction. Time will tell.)

After meeting many of the principals, including some early investors (like
Alan Alcorn, of Atari fame, at the Hackers Conference), I came to a
different conclusion: RSA Data Security was just concentrating on the "big
deals" which are only now coming to fruition--the zillion-copy deals with
large companies like Apple, Microsoft, Lotus, etc.. This market is vastly
larger than the PGP community, which may be as "small" as several thousand
copies (does anybody have any better guesses?).

And it turns out anyone _can_ buy a personal encryption package from
RSADSI...it's called MailSafe. In 1991, I stopped off at the offices of RSA
in Redwood City, while on my way to Lake Tahoe to the Hackers Conference,
to pick up my copy of MailSafe and ran into Jim Bidzos. We talked about PGP
(1.0 in those days) and about the upcoming Hackers Conference. Jim made an
interesting offer: Anyone at the Hackers Conference could buy MailSafe for
$50, just by saying they were there. This fee barely covered the
manufacturing/packaging costs, as I'm sure you all know. So far as I know,
a handful of people followed up. (And I agree there's a perceived problem
that no one, especially in our community, uses it. That's why I have both a
MailSafe and a PGP key...I figure I'm pretty safe against any legal
charges, as I can always wave my MailSafe license in the air!)

Several other conversations have convinced me that Bidzos is not a Fed.
Also, his company has sponsored two excellent (and *free*, by the way!)
conferences on crypto, featuring speakers from outside his company (such as
Mark Riordan of RIPEM fame) and talks highly critical of the "Digital
Signature Standard" (DSS), which the real Feds were pushing as a weak
alternative to RSA digital signatures. (By the way, DSS is part of the new
Capstone system, unsurprisingly.)

* I'm not a lawyer (which is why I'll cc Mike Godwin and Lee Tien on this
response), but my understanding is that the RSA patents cannot just be
licensed on a "per person" basis...that's just not the way patents work.
That is, we can't just pay RSA a quite reasonable $50 apiece for a
perpetual license to the patents and be done with it. Instead, each product
that uses the patents must be separately licensed, as per patent laws.
(This doesn't mean the fee is anywhere _near_ the $125 for MailSafe, the
$50 fee I suggested here, etc. I suspect the deals with Apple, Lotus, etc.,
resulted in _much_ lower fees, perhaps just a couple of bucks per user.
Just a guess.)

* A "personal encryption" product, for users who don't use commercial
e-mail products such as Lotus Notes (which contains RSA), is sorely needed.
The PGP distributed trust model and other features, combined with a fully
legal "crypto core," could be a real success. (Personally, I'd like to see
a commercial version of "Eudora," the Macintosh off-line mail reader I now
use, with easier (push-button, automatic) support for PGP, RIPEM, etc.). 

* The upcoming battle for strong crypto is as important a battle for civil
liberties as our generation will ever face, in my opinion. The precendents
set in the next several years will shape this country (and other countries,
by extension) for many years to come.

-Tim May
--
Timothy C. May         | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,  
tcmay@netcom.com       | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
408-688-5409           | knowledge, reputations, information markets, 
W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA  | black markets, smashing of governments.
Higher Power: 2^756839 | Public Key: MailSafe and PGP available.
Waco Massacre + Big Brother Wiretap Chip = A Nazi Regime





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Perry E. Metzger" <pmetzger@lehman.com>
Date: Thu, 29 Apr 93 10:26:38 PDT
To: nmh@thumper.bellcore.com (Neil Haller)
Subject: Re: Tough Choices: PGP vs. RSA Data Security
In-Reply-To: <9304291305.AA14642@latour.bellcore.com>
Message-ID: <9304291725.AA24557@snark.shearson.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Neil Haller says:
> Let me add one vote of support to your proposal ... and another
> reason you may not have considered.
> 
> I use PGP for personal communications.  I'm not a big enough
> target for anyone to sue.  On the other hand I do *not* use
> PGP for anything related to my employment.  My company (Bellcore)
> is large enough to get sued, and everyone loves to hate the
> telephone industry.  As a result, I would happily pay a resonable
> license fee.

So would I. Many have said this before. Sigh.

Perry




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Stephen P. Marting" <spam+@cmu.edu>
Date: Thu, 29 Apr 93 10:32:24 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Need some Advice
In-Reply-To: <9304290001.AA02691@vax1.cc.uakron.edu>
Message-ID: <Yfs12xW00iUzE3YUAn@andrew.cmu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Excerpts from cypherpunks: 28-Apr-93 Need some Advice by "Robert D
Shofner"@vax1.cc.uakron.edu
>  My question is what is the diff. between a Software Eng. & Computer Sci.
> degree. Some of my profs say that they don't know of any schools offer
> a BS in Software Eng.  If that is the case then why do people use that
> term? Or is it a Masters degree or something like that?

Well, I'm not too sure what this has to do with cypherpunking, but here goes:

The difference between Software Engineering and Computer Science is sort
of like the difference between Differential Equations and Mathematics. 
SoftEng is a subset of CompSci.  I don't believe there are any schools
that offer SoftEng as a BS degree - very few schools even offer an
undergrad-level SoftEng course, Carnegie Mellon University (we're ranked
second in CompSci overall) being a notable exception.  We offer a
Masters degree in SoftEng, and even have a program set up that allows a
student to achieve a BS in CompSci and a MS in SoftEng in five years. 
[However, squeezing both those degree programs into a 5-year period
would probably kill most ordinary mortals.  I don't recommend this
program, as lots of people have a hard time fitting the BS into
four-and-a-half :) years.  We're a tough school...]

Not a University Spokescritter, but I play one on the net,
-Spam

--
spam+@cmu.edu          |~|___________   Spam is:            Please
sm6h+@andrew.cmu.edu   |             \  Steve Marting       Email me
anonymous mail:        | .           /  Carnegie Mellon U.  For my PGP
ap.2879@cupid.sai.com  |_____________>  Pittsburgh, PA      Public key!





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Perry E. Metzger" <pmetzger@lehman.com>
Date: Thu, 29 Apr 93 10:40:11 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Tough Choices: PGP vs. RSA Data Security
In-Reply-To: <9304281433.AA05674@pizzabox.demon.co.uk>
Message-ID: <9304291739.AA24576@snark.shearson.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Sy Verpunc says:
> : At risk of getting the goats of some friends of mine who read the list, I'm
> : tending to agree with Tim's ideas here.  Brief conversation with Jim Bidzos
> : at the cypunx mtg indicated that he is very much up for something along the
> : lines of a personal encryption product that would meet our needs.  From a
> 
> All he has to do is let us pay a licence fee for pgp.  What's the advantage
> to him in asking for a different piece of code that uses RSAREF and DES
> instead of Phil's code and IDEA?

Why don't you ask him? He's jim@rsa.com. I'd be polite.

.pm




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Bob Stratton <strat@intercon.com>
Date: Thu, 29 Apr 93 11:50:53 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Tough Choices: PGP vs. RSA Data Security
Message-ID: <9304291350.AA43154@horton.intercon.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> From: markh@wimsey.bc.ca (Mark C. Henderson) 
> Date: Thu, 29 Apr 1993 11:11:20 PDT 
> Subject: Re:  Tough Choices: PGP vs. RSA Data Security 
> 
> 
> 6. RIPEM currently has no way to handle certificates or sign other 
> people's public keys. This is, of course, serious. 

The Macintosh RIPEM client does/will have certificate creation functionality 
RSN. In fact, RSA's even running a low-security persona certification 
authority that interoperates with them, as we speak.

--Strat







From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Sy Verpunc <svp@gtoal.com>
Date: Fri, 30 Apr 93 06:37:45 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Tough Choices: PGP vs. RSA Data Security
Message-ID: <9304291357.AA09412@pizzabox.demon.co.uk>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


	From: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@athena.mit.edu>
	   From: Sy Verpunc <svp@gtoal.com> (Graham Toal)

	   Thats what people have *always wanted* to do.  RSA won't let them.  That's
	   why any talk of a newer friendlier Bizdos is bullshit.

	Have you actually tried?

*I* don't need to.  PKP don't have a patent in Britain.

	Several people from RSA, including Bidzos at the last Cypherpunks
	meeting at Mountain View (I wasn't there, but take a look at the meeting
	"minutes"), have stated repeatedly that if someone were to ask for
	permission to use the internal interfaces of RSAREF in order to write a
	PGP-compatible program, they would grant permission.

That's *NOT* what we want to do.  We have perfectly good code that we trust
already, called pgp.  We're offering to pay a patent licence for pgp, not
some RSADEF-derived code with DES that we don't trust.  Hell, *I* would even
pay a license fee for pgp and I'm not even legally obliged to...

	However, as of two weeks ago, *NOT* *A* *SINGLE* *PERSON* *HAS* *ASKED*.

Because that's the wrong question.

G




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: hkhenson@cup.portal.com
Date: Mon, 3 May 93 08:12:43 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Tough Choices: PGP vs. RSA Data Security
Message-ID: <9304291359.1.6025@cup.portal.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


re paying a reasonable license fee, I wonder if RSA would cash my check
for (say) $10 if I wrote on the check that it was for a license for 
whatever they might claim on PGP.  One wonders what they would do with
several hundred checks.  :)  Keith




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Mike Godwin <mnemonic@eff.org>
Date: Thu, 29 Apr 93 11:00:57 PDT
To: gg@well.sf.ca.us (George A. Gleason)
Subject: Re:  Tough Choices: PGP vs. RSA Data Security
In-Reply-To: <199304291001.AA23207@well.sf.ca.us>
Message-ID: <199304291800.AA02672@eff.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


 
George Gleason writes:

> A major
> rift between PGP and RSA folks will only serve the interests of those who
> would rather both systems be banned.

I cannot overstate how strongly I agree with George's statement here.


--Mike






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Perry E. Metzger" <pmetzger@lehman.com>
Date: Thu, 29 Apr 93 11:01:59 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: HELP! Some nut is threatening to sue!
In-Reply-To: <2475.drzaphod@ncselxsi>
Message-ID: <9304291801.AA24615@snark.shearson.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



"DrZaphod" says:
> but I saw Jim Bidzos on a magazine once.. and he looks like a fed.

Gawd. For people who claim "no one judges by appearances" you are
really being silly. So he looks like a Fed. I suspect that to you, *I*
likely look like a Fed, too. (I wear suits, and have a very very short
haircut. I have to -- I work on Wall Street.)

Geesh.

Whether Bidzos is a nice guy or the devil incarnate has nothing to do
with his clothes.

You have, of course, demonstrated quite nicely what I was getting at
in my earlier messages -- appearances count. Even hackers judge by
appearance.

Perry




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Eric Hughes <hughes@soda.berkeley.edu>
Date: Thu, 29 Apr 93 14:05:29 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Tough Choices: PGP vs. RSA Data Security
In-Reply-To: <9304290836.AA17180@netcom.netcom.com>
Message-ID: <9304292102.AA17707@soda.berkeley.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Copyright (c) 1993 Eric Hughes.  Unlike most everything else I write,
I do not grant right to use this without my express permission.  If
you want it sent somewhere else, ask me.  I'll probably just send it
there myself.

I'm going to try to give an overview of the RSADSI and PGP situation.
This is long.  I've put it in the form of premises, assertions, facts,
lemmas, theorems.  I know that below I am mostly trying to justify
RSADSI's actions.  I offer the following so that you may understand
how they view themselves.  

I also wish to offer my personal view on RSADSI.  I do not consider
them the enemy; I consider the enemy to be NSA/COMINT and those who
would destroy privacy to create Big Brother.  The RSA patent expires
in seven years; the NSA will be around long after that.  I have a
clear priority here.  This long term battle is worth winning to the
exclusion of some other desiderata.

	"Patents don't kill people.  Tyrants kill people."

I do not think we should pick fights with our allies.  The patent
battle will not be won by mere defiance, but by careful planning.  PGP
is not the right vehicle for this fight.

Every argument below is predicated on the first premise.  I know lots
of people are stronly opposed to the patents; I myself am of two minds
on the subject.  I do wish to point out that the validity of the
patents is not what I argue from, but their pragmatic effect in the
legal world.

Premise: The RSADSI patents are _de facto_ effective.  This is a
completely separate issue from whether the ought to exist, whether the
public really should have them, etc.  The fact is, the PTO granted
them, the courts will find them valid unless a lot of money is spent
in a legal challenge whose outcome is by no means guaranteed.  A large
organization with lots of money to spend (not the LPF) might have a
chance of a successful overturning, but that course of action is not
in sight.

Premise: Jim Bidzos is not in a unconstrained position; he has
repsonsibilities and restrictions and can't do whatever he might want.
The effectiveness of the patents gave rise to a commercial
opportunity.  That commercial opportunity is embodied in PKP and
RSADSI.  That opportunity was successful by any reasonable measure.
The success directly created a fiscal responsibility for the agents of
the patent owners to make money for the owners.  Bidzos can't take
actions which can reasonably be seen as threatening to his business;
the point of view here is that of the owners, no one else's.

Premise: PGP threatens the business of PKP and RSADSI.  This is fairly
explicit in the documentation; PGP intends to threaten their business.
The patent claims are denounced, variously, as unethical, immoral, and
stolen.  The docs says "Hey! we tried to get a license, and they
wouldn't give it to us, but here's the software anyway."  The point is
that the truth or falsity of these claims is not the issue.  These
statements on their face can be taken as harmful; that is sufficient.

Premise: RSADSI and PKP will defend themselves.  Seems obvious, eh?
The way to counter rhetoric is with more rhetoric, and the rhetoric of
business is the law and threats of legal action.  To my knowledge, no
actual legal actions have been made by RSADSI, but lots of threats
have been.  I also believe that RSADSI is ready to take legal action,
however.

Premise: RSADSI's main business is licensing, and licensing
individuals is not very profitable.  RSADSI has had enormous
commercial success in getting large corporations to sign up.  The only
reason to license individuals is to allow them to use non-commerical
software of one form or another.  The brute fact of the matter is that
most people just don't use non-commercial software, as a percentage of
market.  (If you disagree, consider the size of the PC deployed base
vis a vis Unix, and then consider that most of those PC's are owned by
companies, who purchase their software.)

Lemma: Licensing patents is different than licensing software.  With
software, most of your revenue stream in the long run is upgrades, not
initial purchases.  The incremental cost to produce an upgrade over
its sale price is far less than for the initial version.  With a
patent license, you get one sale and that's it.

Premise: RSADSI created RSAREF in order to license individuals.  The
purpose of RSADSI is not to suppress cryptography--it is to promote
it.  They lose very little by making a free version and they gain a
lot in terms of goodwill and preparing and educating people to use
commercial versions.  Since they don't make any money from it, there's
no reason for them to spend much money paying lawyers to draft license
agreements for products which bring in no income.  Therefore they want
all non-income uses of the patents to be filtered through a single
license.

Fact: Commercial licenses to RSAREF are available.  They have not been
advertised widely as yet, though.

Assertion: The reason that RSADSI requires that individual licenses be
mediated through RSAREF is that non-commercial software is inevitably
used in commercial contexts.  Remember, their main business is
licensing.  All software used in a commercial context must be
licensed, otherwise their main business is imperiled.  Were they to
make separate licenses for every low end product, they would be in the
same situation as if they licensed individuals--high overhead, small
return.  Therefore, they license RSAREF to companies; this allows
RSADSI to economically offer licensed use for all such low end
software packages.

Theorem: PGP does not need to threaten RSADSI's business.  By using
RSAREF, PGP can satisfy RSADSI's business requirement to control
licensing and satisfy PGP's requirement to have a free license.

Fact: RSAREF has a restricted interface which does not allow for
direct RSA cryptosystem operations.

Assertion: RSADSI is protecting their good name by restricting the
default RSAREF interface.  Jim Bidzos has told me that the reason they
use a restricted interface is to prevent people from making stupid
cryptographic mistakes and then claiming that the lack of security was
the fault of RSADSI.  Given the number of cryptographic numbskulls out
there, this concern is not unrealistic.

Fact: PGP cannot use the default RSAREF interface.  For one, DES is
embedded into that interface.

Fact: RSADSI has allowed products to go behind the RSAREF interface
before.  Their concern is that your not doing anything stupid.  PGP
isn't, so that concern is satisfied.

Fact: RSAREF requires a written request to go around the standard
interface.  Licensing is a legal issue; written words are pretty much
required in order to be responsible.

Fact: No one has ever made such a written request for PGP.  Part of
the reason has been that moving to RSAREF entails some architectural
changes, and these are still being debated.  The recent clipper
announcement delayed things as well.

Fact: RSAREF is slow.  It's only C code.  The 386 assembly code in PGP
runs about 15 times faster than the C code in RSAREF.  RSAREF
explicitly allows modifications for improved performance.  The plan is
to make the PGP assembly speedup modules available as RSAREF speed
improvements; this is another delay in getting a port done.

Fact: RSAREF can't be legally exported from the US because of the
ITAR.  Bidzos is seeking a Commerce Jurisdiction ruling for RSAREF,
which would mean that it would be permitted for export.  But until
then, PGP would have to support two versions: an RSAREF one for US
use, and a non-RSAREF one for non-US use.  This requires more
wrappers, and thus more work.

Fact: PGP development is already moving in the direction of RSAREF.
As I've stated, however, there are a number of practical problems that
have to be straightened out before software ships.

Eric




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Eric Hughes <hughes@soda.berkeley.edu>
Date: Thu, 29 Apr 93 14:19:51 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Tough Choices: PGP vs. RSA Data Security
In-Reply-To: <m0nod4q-00017NC@van-bc.wimsey.com>
Message-ID: <9304292116.AA18449@soda.berkeley.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>Problems with RSAREF/RIPEM:
>1. Use of RSAREF/RIPEM in support of a commercial enterprise is 
>prohibited without paying a licence fee. Note that they can get 
>you on copyright violations rather than patent infringement 
>if you break the RSAREF licence agreement. 

For those of you looking around for a good cypherpunk-style project, a
rewrite of RSAREF with an identical interface (external and some of
the internal) would be a good idea.  Such a body of code would prevent
RSADSI from using copyright as leverage against a non-US company or
person.

Eric




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: dmandl@lehman.com (David Mandl)
Date: Thu, 29 Apr 93 11:21:29 PDT
To: tcmay@netcom.com
Subject: Re: Tough Choices: PGP vs. RSA Data Security
Message-ID: <9304291821.AA13207@tardis.shearson.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


A new PGP with an RSA-approved engine and a reasonable license fee
sounds fine to me.

   --Dave.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: tribble@memex.com (E. Dean Tribble)
Date: Fri, 30 Apr 93 00:35:20 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Tough Choices: PGP vs. RSA Data Security
In-Reply-To: <9304292116.AA18449@soda.berkeley.edu>
Message-ID: <9304292309.AA21508@memexis.memex.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


	 >Problems with RSAREF/RIPEM:
	 >1. Use of RSAREF/RIPEM in support of a commercial enterprise is 
	 >prohibited without paying a licence fee. Note that they can get 
	 >you on copyright violations rather than patent infringement 
	 >if you break the RSAREF licence agreement. 

	 For those of you looking around for a good cypherpunk-style project, a
	 rewrite of RSAREF with an identical interface (external and some of
	 the internal) would be a good idea.  Such a body of code would prevent
	 RSADSI from using copyright as leverage against a non-US company or
	 person.

It would be even nicer if this was done by someone outside the US.
This avoids the export problem.

dean




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Matthew J Miszewski <MJMISKI@macc.wisc.edu>
Date: Thu, 29 Apr 93 16:19:00 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: No Compromise in Defense of Our Privacy Rights. PGP FIRST!
Message-ID: <23042918181047@vms2.macc.wisc.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


To all,
 
  Tim's statements bother me a great deal.  Granted I have not been around as
long as some (in this particular environment), but long enough to gain respect
for certain net personalities.  I wish to hold on to that respect...
 
  Ive heard a lot of people talk a lot of sh** about the privacy issues
concerning us requiring private acts of heroism.  Is that what is involved with
giving up on an ideal that has helped define the term cypherpunk.  Not long
ago Tim (and others) posted a rabid defense to the changing of the name of the
list.  Were those merely words?  I have never questioned the dedication of
freedom lovers like Tim before this series of postings.  Something has clearly
taken place.  I hope we find out what.
 
  My problems with Tim's suggestions:
 
1.  While those of us lucky enough (or skilled enough) to be independently
wealthy may think that the price of RSA software is nominal considering what is
at risk (I personally agree), do we forget about those that *need* this data
security and cannot pay for it?  (All of these people of course would use PGP
as an academic resource in order to make its distribution OK).
 
2.  From a legal point of view, what RSA is probably doing is asserting its
*presumed* patent rights.  Left unchallenged they will remain presumed.  So,
to those whom have repeatedly sounded the call for "individual acts of heroism",
is now the time to run and hide?  The *ultimate* question of the legitimacy of
algorithmic patents funded with public money *will* default if left
unchallenged.  So I challenge, with all of my honest respect, those with the
means to take up the gauntlet thrown down by RSA.
 
3.  There are more ways than one to legitimize strong crypto and allow RSA
to gain its almighty buck.  Suggestions have already been made.  Allow the
rights to the RSA patents to be purchased.  RSA does have a choice between that
and no money at all.
 
4.  What about those that went before.  Is the heroism of Phil Zimmerman to go
for nought?  The chances that several people, including Tim, have taken deserve
compensation NOT compromise.  RSA wants us to fold now.  Why is a respected
leader of the community asking a compromise of the Cypherpunk Manifesto?
 
5.  Finally, there have been other ways suggested to deal with the problems.
A USA-Legal PGP is one.  I know that many of the philosophers, code writers,
hackers, thinkers, etc. among us can overcome this too.  Why give up when it
appears to be the night before the big game?
 
  I am merely a law student with a deep interest in liberty and privacy.  I
*am* willing to offer my time to the preparation of any eventual *challenge*
of the RSA patents.  NONE of the above post was meant as a personal afront to
anyone, but rather a critical look at Tims suggestions (Mainly because I would
not have expected it from *Tim*).  If there are extenuating circumstances
involved, let us know.  I have been reading posts from Tim since the days of
p/hun and before.  I in NO WAY question Tims committment, but rather the
motivation for the out of character post.
 
  Any individual heroes left?
 
Matt
mjmiski@macc.wisc.edu
 




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Sy Verpunc <svp@gtoal.com>
Date: Fri, 30 Apr 93 11:52:10 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Introduction...
Message-ID: <9304291919.AA12900@pizzabox.demon.co.uk>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


To whoever it was at Ohio who just fingered this account... (whether it's
one of us or the obligatory NSA mole :-) [oops, no, the NSA mole works out
of uunet.ca, right?]) - I'll save you the bother - it's not a cunning alias,
it's just a spare account I created so I don't get all this stuff in my
real mailbox; I have an account for every mailing list I'm on.

If you want to mail me under my normal account, it's the rather obvious
gtoal@gtoal.com

Graham




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Eric Hughes <hughes@soda.berkeley.edu>
Date: Thu, 29 Apr 93 19:24:16 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Tough Choices: PGP vs. RSA Data Security
Message-ID: <9304300220.AA18492@soda.berkeley.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I have a few more words on this topic at this juncture.

Tim was calling for an examination of the issue; he was not, to my
reading, recommending one course of action or another.  Possibly Tim's
pancritically rationalist sensibilities have offended some.  To them I
say "Cypherpunk is not a religion."  If you cannot question your own
beliefs, you are acting in a predominantly ideological mode.  We need
no zealots here.  Please, everyone, have a bit of calm purpose and
broad-mindedness.

Reference is not advocacy.  One of the great and lasting advantages of
language over the visual is the ability to say "no," "might," "ought,"
"can," "may": the plethora of negations and conditions.  This mailing
list is not a TV channel; do not treat it as one.

I specifically request those of you who engaged the keyboard without
understanding this basic point please to reread Tim's article and to
alter and/or to retract you hasty words as appropriate.  I leave this
entirely as an exercise to the reader.

Eric




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Ian S. Nelson" <ian@bvsd.Co.EDU>
Date: Thu, 29 Apr 93 18:23:11 PDT
To: tytso@ATHENA.MIT.EDU (Theodore Ts'o)
Subject: Re: Tough Choices: PGP vs. RSA Data Security
In-Reply-To: <9304291533.AA11541@tsx-11.MIT.EDU>
Message-ID: <199304300123.AA27903@bvsd.Co.EDU>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> Several people from RSA, including Bidzos at the last Cypherpunks
> meeting at Mountain View (I wasn't there, but take a look at the meeting
> "minutes"), have stated repeatedly that if someone were to ask for
> permission to use the internal interfaces of RSAREF in order to write a
> PGP-compatible program, they would grant permission.
> 
> However, as of two weeks ago, *NOT* *A* *SINGLE* *PERSON* *HAS* *ASKED*.
> 
> To those of you who have repeatedly said "Cypherpunks write code" (and I
> applaud that attitude), consider this a challenge.  :-)

If they are so willing to let us do this, then will they tell us why we have to 
use their code?  If they are willing to do it, it shouldn't matter what code we
use.

-- 
Ian S. Nelson			I speak for only myself.	
Finger for my PGP key.  
If you are a beautiful woman, it is mandatory that you reply to this message.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Duncan Frissell <76630.3577@CompuServe.COM>
Date: Thu, 29 Apr 93 16:28:18 PDT
To: <cypherpunks@toad.com>
Subject: NPR Clipper Report Transcript
Message-ID: <930429232303_76630.3577_EHK20-1@CompuServe.COM>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Here is the NPR report on Clipper broadcast on the Tuesday following Der Tag.
It was heroically transcribed by my wife Lois and myself.  There are no
errors (except for name spellings we had to guess at) so we won't apologize 
for them.

Duncan Frissell


National Public Radio

Morning Edition -- Tuesday 20 April 1993 -- C+4 (Clipper + 4)

Approx 6:50 am EDT repeated 8:50 am EDT

(a few words missing from the front end)

...telephone communications from illegal eavesdropping.  But the new system 
is the focus of controversy because the federal government has built in 
a way for law enforcement agencies to listen to private conversations.  
NPR's Dan Charles reports:

You don't usually go to the White House to learn about computer 
technology.  But last Friday, officials there unveiled a new silicon 
chip.  The Clipper Chip, as it's called, is programmed to turn electronic 
transmissions like telephone conversations into gibberish that no one 
unauthorized listening in can understand.  And it turns that gibberish 
back into normal speech or data at the other end.  

Whitfield Diffey, a senior engineer at Sun Microsystems in Silicon Valley, 
says this Clipper Chip is an example of the technology of secret codes 
or cryptography.  

"This is in some sense a relatively ordinary cryptographic chip, of which 
there lots."

Banks, companies, and government officials can use these chips to make 
sure no one eavesdrops on financial transfers or confidential 
discussions.  And the government says this new chip will offer more 
powerful protection than anything people could buy up to now.  But 
there's another reason why the government wants people to use the Clipper 
Chip, and it's why a lot of people are up in arms about it.  Every one of 
these chips will have in its circuitry a unique key --- a very long number
--- that only the government knows.  And if an agency of the government,
like the FBI, wants to listen in, that number will be like a master key that 
allows them to decode the conversation.  

"The mechanism is very much like what the real estate agents do with 
houses.  Right, they take you to show you a house and they don't have a 
key to that house in their pockets.  But they get to the house, and
there's a lock box hanging on the front door.  And they have a master key
in their pockets, and they open the lock box, and take out the key to the
door, and open the front door, and go in and show you the house."

The special key that the government holds is like the key to the lock box.
Even though someone using the Clipper Chip can choose their own key to keep
other people from listening in, the chip is programmed to always keep that
changing key inside the lock box, where the government can get at it.  The
reason for that lock box is that the government occasionally likes to listen
in to the phone calls of suspected criminals at home and hostile governments
abroad.

For the last two years, law enforcement officials have been worrying publicly
that the Mafia or terrorists will start buying powerful scrambler phones to
keep the FBI from understanding their conversations.  The government doesn't
want to ban this technology because, increasingly, legitimate businesses
depend on it.  So the government developed its own version --- the Clipper
Chip.

Raymond Kammer, Acting Director of the National Institute of Standards and
Technology, says it's a good compromise.  "On the one hand you've got a need
for personal privacy.  And I think most of us intuitively understand that and
desire it.  I know I do.  And on the other hand, you've got the right of
society to try and assure itself that it's safe from crime.

But computer scientist Whitfield Diffey, who's one of the pioneers of modern
cryptography, thinks the lock box is a terrible idea.  He says that trying to
deny even criminals the right to a private conversation is dangerous.  It is
something absolutely essential to the functioning of society.  "We are taking 
a long step towards saying, 'No, you can never be sure that you're going to 
have a private conversation on the phone.'  And therefore, a real right of 
privacy only belongs to people rich enough to travel and meet face to face."

Government officials say they have policies in place to prevent abuse.  Law
enforcement agencies will have to request the key for any lock box from two
separate independent agencies, each of which will have only a piece of the key.
This should also make it harder for anyone to steal the keys.  Diffey says the
Clipper Chip will encourage more government eavesdropping, simply because it's
there.  "Technology makes policy," he says, "if the government invests hundreds
of millions of dollars creating a computer chip designed for wire taps, it will
try to take advantage of that investment whenever possible by carrying out
more of them.

The success of the government strategy will depend on people buying the chip.
AT&T will soon be selling a small flat box, half a foot long and about four
inches wide, with the Clipper Chip at its heart.  It costs just over $1000,
plugs right into the cord that connects the telephone handset to the phone
itself.  People who have it can talk to each other in complete privacy ---
unless the government wants to listen in.

This is Dan Charles in Washington.






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Date: Thu, 29 Apr 93 19:48:03 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: No Compromise in Defense of Our Privacy Rights. PGP FIRST!
Message-ID: <9304300247.AA09058@netcom.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Matthew J Miszewski has asked some questions about my posting this morning,
and about my motivations (Wow! It's kind of fun to be the target of such
speculations!).

I'll answer his questions and points with nothing but the truth.

>To all,
> 
>  Tim's statements bother me a great deal.  Granted I have not been around as
>long as some (in this particular environment), but long enough to gain respect
>for certain net personalities.  I wish to hold on to that respect...
> 
>  Ive heard a lot of people talk a lot of sh** about the privacy issues
>concerning us requiring private acts of heroism.  Is that what is involved with
>giving up on an ideal that has helped define the term cypherpunk.  Not long
>ago Tim (and others) posted a rabid defense to the changing of the name of the
>list.  Were those merely words?  I have never questioned the dedication of
>freedom lovers like Tim before this series of postings.  Something has clearly
>taken place.  I hope we find out what.

First of all, no "external event" has happened to cause me to change from
being a freedom-loving "crypto anarchist" to being some kind of "crypto
narc" (if you'll pardon the pun). No phone calls from Dorothy, or from Jim,
or from Bobby Inman (wherever he may be these days). No threats, no
letters, no knocks on the door in the middle of the night.

My posting this morning on "tough choices" was based on my best assessment
of the current situation and my best judgement on what we need to think
about.

> 
>  My problems with Tim's suggestions:
> 
>1.  While those of us lucky enough (or skilled enough) to be independently
>wealthy may think that the price of RSA software is nominal considering what is
>at risk (I personally agree), do we forget about those that *need* this data
>security and cannot pay for it?  (All of these people of course would use PGP
>as an academic resource in order to make its distribution OK).

There are several points here. Is the purpose we're using PGP the saving of
a few bucks? I doubt it. Most of the hobbyist/hacker types now using PGP
are doing so because a kind of "community" has grown up around it, a kind
of "stone soup" collective effort.

I'm not trivializing the value of money. (Ironically, I chose not to go to
the recent CFP Conference because I felt $400 was a bit much for a
conference. A single seat at this conference would buy 3 copies of a
commercial RSA encryption package.) I just don't see much evidence that the
reason PGP is needed is because people can't afford the fee for a legal
version. (BTW, I've acknowledged several times the limitations of MailSafe
and the advantages in several areas of PGP 2.1.)

I've yet to see many people who "need" PGP who cannot pay for it. Perhaps
I'm wrong, but that's how I see it. In any case, while we may have certain
doubts about the patentability of mathematical algorithms, that's the way
the world works. Certain property rights are reasonable. Arguing that
RSADSI has no rights to a patent on public key methods is a different
matter than arguing that someone's need and inability to pay is grounds for
taking software.

(I apologize profusely to my Cypherpunk colleagues if I sound a bit like
David Sternlight here. While I think he comes off as a pompous fool most of
the time, he raises some important points. I like to think I'm raising them
here in a different way, suggesting a compromise in the greater interests
of ultimate privacy rights.)

>2.  From a legal point of view, what RSA is probably doing is asserting its
>*presumed* patent rights.  Left unchallenged they will remain presumed.  So,
>to those whom have repeatedly sounded the call for "individual acts of
>heroism",
>is now the time to run and hide?  The *ultimate* question of the legitimacy of
>algorithmic patents funded with public money *will* default if left
>unchallenged.  So I challenge, with all of my honest respect, those with the
>means to take up the gauntlet thrown down by RSA.

A legal battle with RSADSI at this moment would cost quite a bit and almost
certainly be won by RSADSI. (The courts have upheld "process" and
"algorithm" patents...Caveat: I am not a lawyer.) I happen to agree that
some software patents are prima facie stupid--like the "XOR cursor"
patent--and deserve to be thrown out. And perhaps the several key patents
held by Public Key Partners (MIT, Stanford, RSA Data Security, and Cylink
are the partners, as I recall) should be thrown out. But this will not
happen anytime soon, and will cost an enormous amount to successfully
litigate (the lawyers can correct me if I'm wrong). I see no chance of this
happening before the patents begin to naturally expire around 1998 or so
(and on to 2002 or so).

Meanwhile, others are free to openly distribute PGP and face the court
system. (RSADSI must of course defend itself against all "obvious"
infringements or attempts to infringe, or it risks losing its patent
status. While some of us might like this outcome, it's of course not very
reasonable.) Stanton McLandish, in his admirable zeal, publicly announced
the availability of PGP at his site. When RSADSI sent him a "cease and
desist" letter (isn't e-mail great?...Stanton posts it, and Jim Bidzos, the
Pres. of RSA responds...no lawyers were needed, no lengthy delays.).

Stanton did the wise thing. I haven't seen others step forward to put PGP
in a highly visible position on their systems (and I'm definitely not
recommending it, either).

>3.  There are more ways than one to legitimize strong crypto and allow RSA
>to gain its almighty buck.  Suggestions have already been made.  Allow the
>rights to the RSA patents to be purchased.  RSA does have a choice between that
>and no money at all.
> 
>4.  What about those that went before.  Is the heroism of Phil Zimmerman to go
>for nought?  The chances that several people, including Tim, have taken deserve
>compensation NOT compromise.  RSA wants us to fold now.  Why is a respected
>leader of the community asking a compromise of the Cypherpunk Manifesto?

Because I think the larger issue is the preservation of the rigth to strong
crypto, the right to put locks on your doors without depositing a copy with
the cops, the right to speak in tongues if that's what you want. Fighting
the RSA patents NOW will not help this battle be won.

We're on a stronger foundation, legally and constitutionally, if we're
using "non-illegal" products. (If it came down to defending my freedom with
"illegal guns," for example, I'd certainly choose the guns. This is because
I don't believe the government is right in outlawing guns. If the
government ever outlaws strong crypto, you can be sure I'll be using outlaw
crypto.  The difference with the current situation is that crypto per se
has not yet come under regulation.)
 
>5.  Finally, there have been other ways suggested to deal with the problems.
>A USA-Legal PGP is one.  I know that many of the philosophers, code writers,
>hackers, thinkers, etc. among us can overcome this too.  Why give up when it
>appears to be the night before the big game?

I'm definitely not proposing we "give up." And joining in a crusade against
RSA precisely when we need them as an ally is truly tilting at windmills.

(I've made this point before: the Clipper/Skipjack/Capstone scheme appears
to be an attempted end-run around public key strong crypto. You may not
like one minor aspect of this situation, i.e., that the work of Diffie,
Hellman, Merkle, Rivest, Shamir, and Adleman is now licensed from RSA Data
Security, but that's the way it is. Fortunately, it's a relatively minor
issue.)


>  I am merely a law student with a deep interest in liberty and privacy.  I
>*am* willing to offer my time to the preparation of any eventual *challenge*
>of the RSA patents.  NONE of the above post was meant as a personal afront to
>anyone, but rather a critical look at Tims suggestions (Mainly because I would
>not have expected it from *Tim*).  If there are extenuating circumstances
>involved, let us know.  I have been reading posts from Tim since the days of
>p/hun and before.  I in NO WAY question Tims committment, but rather the
>motivation for the out of character post.


I hope I've addressed the main points raised by Matt in his thoughtful
post. Like I said, it was a tough post to write! I expected some
controversy. But the points needed to be said.

We should all thank Phil Zimmermann for what he did...he energized the
community, made a lot of people aware of strong crypto, and started a
community programming effort rarely seen before. But let's face it--bootleg
crypto (which is what PGP will remain in this country unless and until the
courts overturn the patents or RSA suddenly decides to cave in) is *not*
going to spread the way we want strong crypto to. Already, companies that
want to use PGP (probably because some employees do) are facing the
realization that it's not legal and that they are exposing themselves to
serious liabilities if they use it. This alone will begin to strangle PGP
in its crib, so to speak.

Furthermore, neither Phil nor any other members of the development team are
likely to ever make any money with this (something Phil would
understandably like to do someday). Better that Phil do what other
companies have done: arrange a license with RSADSI. RSAREF source code is
readily available for inspection, lest people fear that trapdoors or
whatnot have been inserted into the code. (There are a lot of issues about
the various versions of the RSA code, including RSAREF, MailSafe, RIPEM,
TIPEM, OCE, etc., which I won't go into here. Others are better qualified
anyway.)

All I'm suggesting is that we not quixotically (speaking of tilting at
windmills) pin our hopes and expectations on a climactic battle between
Phil Zimmermann and the lawyers at RSA. Our freedom to encrypt is more
important than that kind of ego battle. (Asking RSADSI to cave in and give
away their crown jewels is unrealistic. Asking them to incorporate some of
the features of PGP we like into some current or future offering is much
more reasonable. Who knows, perhaps even a full-scale licensing of PGP is
possible.)

I'm hopeful that some kind of accommodation will come about so we can focus
on the real fight, the fight for our right to keep some things secret.

-Tim May
--
Timothy C. May         | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,  
tcmay@netcom.com       | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
408-688-5409           | knowledge, reputations, information markets, 
W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA  | black markets, smashing of governments.
Higher Power: 2^756839 | Public Key: in a state of flux!
Waco Massacre + Big Brother Wiretap Chip = A Nazi Regime





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: hfinney@shell.portal.com (Hal Finney)
Date: Mon, 3 May 93 08:12:45 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re:  Tough Choices: PGP vs. RSA Data Security
Message-ID: <9304300305.AA10442@jobe>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


(I sent a copy of this message this morning from my Compuserve account,
but it never appeared.  Fighting to control my surging paranoia, I am
re-sending it from this account.  I apologize if a duplicate eventually
shows up.)

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

Tim May writes:

> I suggest that we as a community seriously reconsider our basic support for
> PGP. Not because of any flaws in the program, but because of issues related
> to Clipper and the potential limits on crypto.

I see several problems with this proposal.

1. It's not clear what it means to "reconsider our basic support for
PGP."  What exactly is Tim proposing?  That people stop using PGP?  That
they phase out their use of it as legal products become available?  I'd
like to see some clarification.

2. More generally, what about the issue of our advocating and supporting
other possibly infringing actions?  Which ones do we stop?  Just those
that upset Jim Bidzos?  He claims to have patents that cover many more
activities than RSA, including patents which cover the very idea of public
key encryption, and patents on Diffie-Hellman key exchange and virtually
any conceivable variation.  Should we respect all of these now?

3. David Chaum apparently has U.S. patents on many key features of digital
cash.  It looks like we would have to stop working on that, too, by this
reasoning.

4. What reasonable alternatives to PGP exist?  Is RSAREF really usable on
a PC?  I tried an early version and it was terribly, terribly slow.  PGP
is just barely fast enough.  A "legal" version of PGP which uses RSAREF will
presumably be considerably slower.

5. I am not as convinced as Tim that RSADSI is truly, positively, certainly
on our side.  Why is it that RSAREF has such a weak conventional encryption
algorithm (DES, with 56-bit keys)?  RIPEM has been out for many months, and
people have been asking for IDEA or triple DES all that time.  Bidzos has
supposedly said he'll give permission for improvements.  Yet as far as I
know RIPEM still only has this small key size, a key size which persistent
rumors say can be broken by government computers.  When Bidzos permits
RSAREF to run a conventional encryption algorithm with a secure key size I
will give more credence to the view that he wants people to have strong
encryption.

6. How is it that one company has collected virtually all of the patents on
cryptographic technology in this country?  Jim Bidzos controls patents on
public-key encryption in general, RSA, Diffie-Hellman key exchange, ElGamal
signatures and encryption, and several others.  I can't help noticing that
it would be an extraordinarily convenient arrangement for the government
if such a company existed and were secretly working against public use of
cryptography while publically pretending to be doing all they can to bring
this technology to a reluctant market.  I still have not seen any specific
public action by Bidzos which would invalidate this possibility.  Yes, he
has engaged in this widely publicized tiff with NIST over the Digital Signature
Standard, and he's made some statements against Clipper.  But where are the
lawsuits?  Is AT&T receiving the same threatening letters that Stanton
McCandlish received when he said he was distributing PGP from his BBS?

7. Extrapolating from the widespread acceptance of PGP, which is free, to
conclude that there is a market for a commercial encryption product which
costs money is pointless.  Granted, some of us may spend a lot of time
talking about PGP and thinking about these issues, but most PGP users just
downloaded it from a BBS or the net.  There are a lot of things they'd
spend $100 on before they would buy an encryption program.


One of the things that attracted me to Cypherpunks is that they take steps
to make these tools available without worrying about upsetting the power
structure.  David Chaum may object to our implementing digital cash.
Jim Bidzos may object to our using RSA, or Diffie-Hellman, or almost
anything else having to do with cryptography.  If we're going to start
looking over our shoulder and not doing anything which powerful people
object to then we might as well pack up and go home.

Almost everything we have talked about over the last six months infringes
somebody's patents in this country.  I really don't see what role a group
like ours has if we have to tiptoe through the minefield of intellectual
property protection which permeates the field of cryptography.  Are we to
become a bunch of unpaid consultants for RSADSI, writing code which they
will then make profits on?

Phil Zimmermann has done more to put strong cryptography into the hands
of people all over the world in two years than Bidzos has managed in ten.
He has faced lawsuits by Bidzos and has undergone considerable personal
sacrifice in getting this software out.  People talk about this "feud"
as though the two are equally guilty, and ask (like Rodney King) "can't
we all just get along?"  But this is a cop-out.  To me there is clear
asymmetry in their dispute in terms of who asserts their power and who
is trying to empower individuals.

Look at what Tim is suggesting.  We abandon PGP, not because it is a bad
program; not because its author has behaved unethically; not because it
has failed in its goals; but because Jim Bidzos is throwing his weight
around and we don't want Jim to be unhappy.  If Jim were to accept that
PGP was no more threatening to his patents than RSAREF then the problem
would be solved.  I presume that Tim has decided that this won't happen,
so now he suggests Plan B, that we abandon PGP.

I have to suggest that the real obstacle to the wide deployment of strong
cryptography remains Jim Bidzos.  He has the power, by a single stroke of
a pen, to do more to encourage the spread of cryptography in this country
than any other single person (including Bill Clinton).  All he has
to do is to issue a policy statement that since PGP is freeware it falls
under the PKP policy allowing use of the patents for noncommercial use.
Presto - PGP is legal, and one of the main obstacles to its spread is
eliminated.

I agree with Tim that we need to look closely to see who our real enemies
are.  Perhaps Bidzos is a charming person.  I've never met him.  Certainly
the bay area Cypherpunks seem to be falling under his influence.  From my
perspective I find this cozying up to the PKP/RSADSI power structure to
be rather alarming.  I don't think it is a good direction for the group.

Hal Finney
74076.1041@compuserve.com
hal@alumni.caltech.edu

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From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: jsday@THUNDER.LakeheadU.CA (Jer!)
Date: Thu, 29 Apr 93 17:21:27 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re:  Tough Choices: PGP vs. RSA Data Security
Message-ID: <9304300020.AA28297@thunder.LakeheadU.Ca>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> All he has to do is let us pay a licence fee for pgp.
> What's the advantage to him in asking for a different piece of code that
> uses RSAREF and DES instead of Phil's code and IDEA?  I can't see it, 
> except that using DES blows away the security of the program...
>
> No, I think this suggestion should be put down now, or we'll splinter
> and give them exactly the divide-and-conquer opening they're looking for.
 
Agreed.  PGP is too much of a good thing for me to withraw my support
for it without a much more compelling reason than this.  As Tim May 
stated, we should be careful to see who there real enemies are here.
PGP is certainly not one of them.
 
I certainly do not want to be RSA Data's "enemy", but from the indications
on here that they are actively working against PGP, and are not likely to
support any similar, freely-distributable product (and that would require
a substantial length of time to develop!) PGP is currently the best, and
only, possibility.  Now, if there were some program without the legal 
problems that PGP has which was at least very affordable and could 
reasonably be expected to gather the same widespread use that PGP already
has, ideally through complete compatibility with PGP keys, I think we
would all agree on using it.  
 
Tim May:
> If RSA fails to take actions against sites and users, it weakens
> their legal position with respect to their patents. The government
> does not need licenses in any case, but users of Clipperphones *do*
...
 
Indeed.
 
It would be nice if PGP were universally supported, and legal.  That,
as far as I can see, is its only problem.  I do not see how we are 
going to come up with a solution to that problem without sacrificing
much of PGP's availability and utility.  If not PGP, then what?  Until
there is a concrete and acceptable alternative to work towards, which
seems unlikely if RSA will not support it, we must work with what 
we have.
 
 
---




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: wcs@anchor.ho.att.com
Date: Thu, 29 Apr 93 18:29:14 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: RE: Tough Choices: PGP vs. RSA Data Security
Message-ID: <9304300129.AA25758@anchor.ho.att.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text


Pat Farrell writes:

> I'm writing a Windows-based POP client designed for folks that can't spell SLIP. 
> It should have strong encryption invisibly and automatically. 
> It won't until there is a legal encryption engine with at least the key 
> management of PGP.

(I'm replying to cypherpunks, since other people may run into
similar problems, and there *are* good ways to solve them.)
Let's assume for the moment that you don't care about being exportable, 
so "legal" only means "Ok with RSA".  RSAREF is ok with RSA for
non-commercial, non-exportable use, and if you want to use it commercially
they'll give you a price.  It's got most of the subroutines you need,
and if some non-Yankee writes a version with a compatible interface
(to avoid copyright problems; patents aren't an issue outside the US)
they can probably use the non-RSA parts of your code.

I'm not sure exactly which routines in RSAREF the license lets us use,
(so I've written to RSA to ask them), but the ones that ARE clearly usable
let you do Sign/Verify on a block, and DES-with-random-session-key-and-
signature-with-RSA-session-key-encoding (aka R_SealPEMBlock/R_OpenPEMBlock.)
This gives you all you need to build standalone systems (compatibility
is another story), though sometimes it's a big and clunky approach
when a simple RSAEncrypt/Decrypt would have done. 

For example, your POP client needs to solve three main problems
1) Login authentication
2) Message encryption during transmission
3) preventing bogus deletes or other problems if your session gets hijacked.
3) probably isn't possible without changing the protocols or running over an
	encrypted telnet-equivalent session, but that's not RSA's problem.
	The POP3 RFC1225 explicitly recommends against including extra
	data in the DELE messages, though I suppose you could use
	an RSAREF signature as extra baggage anyway, including some
	kind of timestamp or counter to prevent replay.
1) The current POP protocols have the user send a USER message,
	to which the system either sends a rejection or a positive
	+OK response with arbitrary text to follow, and the user sends
	a PASS message, with password in clear-text, which is not real swift.
	This obviously needs to be replaced with some sort of challenge-
	response method to prevent eavesdropping and replay.
	A simple method using the block stuff is for the system's
	+OK response to the user to contain a challenge-string,
	and the user's PASS variable to be the challenge-string (or that+1)
	with an RSA signature from R_SignPEMBlock().  If Diffie-Hellman
	were included with RSAREF, the response could include a DH half-key.
	Alternatively, the PASS variable could be an encrypted
	R_SealPEMBlock() message containing the challenge and a session key,
	encrypted using the server's public key and signed by the client.
2) can either be accomplished by encrypting each message as with 
	a new session key and RSA to encrypt the session key
	(a bit slow, but each message is now self-contained,
	which has some degree of elegance) or else by negotiating a session
	key at the beginning (as discussed in the above) and using it for
        each message.  The latter approach is obviously	faster.

The main feature from PGP that this doesn't provide is authentication
of public keys, but that's not really a problem in a POP environment -
you have to deal with the administrator to set up your mailbox,
so you can exchange keys at that time. 

If you wanted to build a mechanism like PGP's web of trust for keys,
it's not too hard, though the obvious approaches will probably have
the painful slowness of PGP2.0 instead of the blazing speed of PGP2.2 :-)
You've got a block signature routine, so you use messages saying
	 "Keysig User KeyLen Key SignerUser SignerKeysig [SignerKey?]"
with appropriate amounts of ASCII armoring and delimiters, and sign them.
This would be a very practical addition to RIPEM, if anybody's in the mood;
RIPEM's key server isn't integral to the package.

			Bill Stewart wcs@anchor.att.com



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Eric Hughes <hughes@soda.berkeley.edu>
Date: Thu, 29 Apr 93 23:32:20 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: validity of the RSA patent
Message-ID: <9304300628.AA17668@soda.berkeley.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Plenty of people gripe about PKP patents.  Assume for the sake of
argument that the patents will be upheld, that they are valid.  What,
exactly, is claimed?  The RSA patent claims the RSA cryptosystem.  So
we don't use that.  The Diffie-Hellman-Merkle patent claims all of
public key cryptography; in particular it claims knapsack algorithms.
So we don't use knapsacks.  But does this patent really prevent us
from using public key cryptosystems?

I think not.  Mind you, I'm only an amateur legal hacker, but this
seems like a straightforward situtation.  Consider use of another
public key encryption scheme, say LUC encryption.  Does use of this
infringe the "public key" patent?  Not directly, since we're not using
knapsacks (presumably).  We then look the equivalents doctine.  From
Blacks:

  Equivalents doctrine.  In patent infringement law, doctrine of
  "equivalents" means that if two devices do the same work in
  substantially the same way and accomplish substantially the same
  result, they are the same, even though they differ in name, form, or
  shape. [...] A doctrine which declares that a device infringes a
  patented invention if it does the same work as the invention in
  substantially the same way, even if it is outside the literal terms
  of the claims of the patent.  The doctrine prevents parties from
  infringing patents with impunity by making merely trivial changes in
  an invention.  The more significant the patented invetion the
  greater the scope of this doctrine.

So we have three criteria.  "Same work" refers to function, "same way"
refers to internal structure, "same result" refers to end product.
Now public key cryptosystems all have the same function, to provide
encryption and decryption with different keys.  The result is the same
at the end of each public key communication: a message has been passed
securely from one end of the channel to the other.

The structure, however, is completely different for the different
systems.  All three criteria must be satisfied in order for the
equivalents doctrine to hold.  The requirement of same structure is
not satisfied.

(Matt Miszewski has today offered to do legal research in anticipation
of a patent fight.  I'd like to ask him here to check out this theory
with some references to case law.)

RIPEM, as I understand it, came out originally with a different public
key algorithm and later changed it.  Perhaps Mark Henderson (who seems
to have done some work on it) could comment.

The equivalents doctrine seems to my mind to be a dual of the criteria
required for patentability.  There are four such criteria: statutory
class (is it the right kind of thing), utility (is is good for
anything), novelty (does it have new features), and unobviousness
(does it have new results).  The equivalence of function means that
the utility of the two objects is the same.  The equivalence of
structure meanse that the new invention does not exhibit novelty.  The
equivalence of end result means that someone already thought of that
before, i.e. it's obvious.  Statutory class is the same for both,
since if they're that close, they both are the kind of thing which
might be patented.

It is interesting as well to examine which can be patented: processes,
machines, manufactures, compositions (of matter), and new uses of any
of the above.  Note that a bundle of properties and purposes, e.g.
public key cryptography, is not patentable; it fails to specify
structure, so any structure would be novel.

The new use clause, though, is exceedingly scary.  Under this class,
existing equations could be used for different purposes and be
separately patentable.  For example, if you were to use the RSA
equations for some purpose other that public key crypto and digital
signature, that would be separately patentable.  It behooves us all to
think widely of possible applications and talk about them in order to
make them part of the prior art.

I'd like to see a document containing a good argument against the
claim that all public key crypto is covered.  It should have the full
scholarly apparatus with it and an appendix explaining the apparatus
to non-lawyers.  This document could then be circulated widely,
starting on sci.crypt.

After that, developing a test case is easy.  We would need for someone
to write some public key crypto code (it need not be very complicated)
and market it, claiming explicitly that the "public key" patent does
not apply. We'd want them to be extremely loud in their claims, for
example, writing the legal departments of all of the big RSADSI
licensees and offering their wares for sale.  If you could collect
money, so much the better.  This would almost invariably draw a
lawsuit, since it so directly threatens RSADSI's business.  Witness
the speed with which the recent PGP board was asked to shut down.

Assuming that we've already arranged for the up-front cost of legal
defense, we'd be ready to go.

Comments?

Eric




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: peter honeyman <honey@citi.umich.edu>
Date: Thu, 29 Apr 93 21:41:05 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Tough Choices
In-Reply-To: <338R3B1w164w@ideath.goldenbear.com>
Message-ID: <9304300441.AA23617@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


in a classic tirade, greg broiles' rants with fever and pitch, comparing
the government's threat to make cryptoprivacy tools contraband and pkp's
very real attempts to do exactly that.

you know what?  i agree completely.

i don't plan to stop using pgp.  if pkp wants to be reasonable, we can
make a deal.  in the meantime, my interest in pgp is research with
no commercial significance.  patent courts have long recognized the
validity of experimental use of patented inventions by such researchers.

don't believe me?  see rebecca s. eisenberg, "patents and the progress
of science:  exclusive  rights and experimental use," university of
chicago law review, Vol.  56(3),  pp. 1017-1086 (summer 1989). 

i suggest cypherpunks should make accommodation with pkp and the patent
office by renouncing commercial exploitation of pgp, and embracing
pgp as a foundation for building and understanding cryptoprivacy tools.

that is to say, we blow them off.

	peter




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Hal <74076.1041@CompuServe.COM>
Date: Thu, 29 Apr 93 23:12:13 PDT
To: Cypherpunks <cypherpunks@toad.com>
Subject: Cypherpunks + PKP = Love
Message-ID: <930430060451_74076.1041_FHD57-1@CompuServe.COM>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


(Warning: I am EXTREMELY frustrated having waited over TWELVE HOURS for my
messages on this topic to appear; after some presumed glitch caused my
Compuserve message to get lost I re-sent it THREE HOURS ago from a DIRECT
INTERNET CONNECTED system and I still haven't seen it.)
 
To the suggestion that Jim Bidzos was just doing what he had to do in
sending that threatening letter to Stanton McCandlish who was giving away
PGP:
 
It's too bad that McCandlish isn't in the Bay area.  Then he could have been
at the Cypherpunks meeting last weekend and Bidzos could have served papers
on him right then and there.  That would have saved Bidzos the cost of a
postage stamp.  Perhaps such legal actions can be a feature of future
meetings.
 
Shocking?  What Bidzos did was the electronic equivalent of what I've just
described.  If you're willing to countenance his actions then you should be
just as willing to accept and abet crackdowns on unapproved, unauthorized
cryptography.  Just make sure you go into this with your eyes open.
 
Hal






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Sy Verpunc <svp@gtoal.com>
Date: Fri, 30 Apr 93 18:37:00 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: 800 numbers
Message-ID: <9304300205.AA18556@pizzabox.demon.co.uk>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


	From: Nickey MacDonald <i6t4@jupiter.sun.csd.unb.ca>

	Of course, only Americans can dial those numbers.. which is a shame...  (A
	few Canadians could have skewed the voting... :-)

	On a note similar to remailers, has anyone ever given consideration to
	creating an "outdial" service?  If I could dial long distance into the
	States, and then be able to dial a 1-800 number that I cannot dial direct
	from Canada (which is most) this would extremely useful...  Could be taken

mail me your pgp key...

G




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Sy Verpunc <svp@gtoal.com>
Date: Fri, 30 Apr 93 18:47:12 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Introduction...
Message-ID: <9304300211.AA18605@pizzabox.demon.co.uk>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I wrote:
: To whoever it was at Ohio who just fingered this account... (whether it's
: one of us or the obligatory NSA mole :-) [oops, no, the NSA mole works out
: of uunet.ca, right?]) - I'll save you the bother - it's not a cunning alias,

What a nosey bunch...  I've had this machine on the net for almost a year
and not been fingered by as many strangers as over the last three days.  Anyway,
here's a little experiment in paranoia...  which of these people *aren't*
cypherpunks...?  I've always wondered if joining a list like this would
bring unwelcome attention...  I've marked the people who I know are on
the cypherpunks list with a *.  If any of the rest of them are 'one of
us', let me know.  By elimination we'll work out where the gummint spies
hide out :) ... (The machines that reject finger requests and telnet VRFYs
are pretty suspicious...)  And I'm also particularly suspicious of the
finger from ohio-state - it *was* someone who reads this list (the svp ID
was created especially for it) but there are *no* ohio-state sites in
the mailing list at all.

If this is considered a waste of the list's bandwidth, flame me privately...
In fact, reply privately whatever you have to say... (gtoal@gtoal.com)

Apr 27 20:03:05  finger from serdlc21.essex.ac.uk [155.245.11.40]
Apr 27 20:03:18  guest    Guest                 p3      Wed 20:00 
Apr 27 20:03:18  millph   P H Mills             p5      Wed 19:44 
Apr 27 20:03:18  guest    Guest                 p6      Wed 20:25 
Apr 27 20:03:18  guest    Guest                 p7      Wed 20:31 

Apr 27 23:10:19  finger from PANAM1.PANAM.EDU [129.113.1.2]
Apr 27 23:10:44  GMJ2393B Jimenez, George M   20401FE1 FINGER           LTA6549DSCC08/PORT4

Apr 27 23:13:08  finger gtoal from uunet.ca [142.77.1.1]

Apr 28 19:48:53  finger from harrip@serdlc23.essex.ac.uk [155.245.11.42]
Apr 28 19:49:13  harrip   P Harrington          p2      Thu 19:47 

Apr 29 18:58:05  finger svp from mathserv.mps.ohio-state.edu [128.146.110.31]
Apr 29 19:32:17  finger from mathserv.mps.ohio-state.edu [128.146.110.31]

[! denotes no idle time during both fingers]

akos alden aparson baker bkm bloch bogdan cao carlson chohan cthomas!
davis dijen edgar falkner fcarroll fiedorow! forest ggelder! goedde goss
haar hamilton! haradako harmon henri holbrook hpallen huneke jocha
kappeler lguo ling! lingshu march morlet! neumann! nevai ogle overman
patmac! ponomar rld robertso! root siegel singhi! sinha! sinnott stanton
tanveer terman wang

Apr 29 19:38:15 *finger gtoal from ee92jks@monge.brunel.ac.uk [134.83.72.1]
Apr 29 19:38:20  ee92jks  Jonathan K Saville   *p1      Fri 20:03  cc-02.brunel.ac.    

Apr 29 19:44:11  finger svp from seneca.SED.Provo.Novell.COM [137.65.96.1]
Apr 29 19:45:11  finger gtoal from seneca.SED.Provo.Novell.COM [137.65.96.1]
               ?*<Tim_Myers@Novell.COM (Myers, Tim)>

Apr 29 23:23:21  finger gtoal from sck@naucse.cse.nau.edu [134.114.64.1]
Apr 29 23:23:27  sck      Sean Koontz          *p1      Fri 13:41 
               =*<koontz@raslon.iac.honeywell.com>

Apr 30 00:01:39  finger gtoal from dent.uchicago.edu [128.135.72.13]

PS Someone mailed me to ask how I knew if I'd been fingered - it's a combination
of a home-hacked fingerd and the log_tcp wrapper package.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: George A. Gleason <gg@well.sf.ca.us>
Date: Fri, 30 Apr 93 02:38:22 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Tough Choices: PGP vs. RSA Data Security
Message-ID: <199304300938.AA05792@well.sf.ca.us>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Quoting, "Thats what people have *always wanted* to do.  RSA won't let them.
 That's
why any talk of a newer friendlier Bizdos is bullshit.

Well, maybe or maybe not... the main thing is to judge by concrete actions.
I know there have been problems in the past, and reason for serious
scepticism.  But the main thing here is to keep the channels open and work
toward some kind of concrete action on RSA's part.  

-gg




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: geoffw@nexsys.net (Geoff White)
Date: Fri, 30 Apr 93 08:14:05 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Tough Choices: PGP vs. RSA Data Security
Message-ID: <9304301505.AA07803@nexsys.nexsys.net>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain




	Maybe this is a solution...

	A core group of us coders take on the task of merging PGP
	functionality into MailSafe, we do the work for nominal cost
	or for free, this new version of MailSafe can become REALLY
	slick and worth paying the $125 or what-ever he is charging
	for it, AND it will be PGP compatable.  We them retrofit
	PGP to use RSA's RSAREF or whatever else it takes to bring
	PGP into complience and PGP stays FREE, and unsupported, we
	suspend further development and make it sort of like a demo 
	program or freeware, but if you want the really seemless UI
	you buy the product, Bidzos gets money, we get to deploy a
	program that educates the masses about the use of strong
	crypto, and since they are compatible, the use of the freeware
	can't help but encourage the use of the "product".  The bottom
	line is that strong crypto is made available to the public,
	This solution might require that a few egos deflate a bit but
	I'm sure a varient of this could work.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Pat Farrell"  <pfarrell@cs.gmu.edu>
Date: Fri, 30 Apr 93 06:21:29 PDT
To: jim@rsa.com
Subject: Fw: RSA approval for freeware, PGP compatible user program.
Message-ID: <33701.pfarrell@cs.gmu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I'm a cypherpunk. I write code. I have already told the list my feelings on
TC "the suit" May's suggestion. I read the post that no one asked PKP for
permission to include RSA in a freely distributed strong cryptography
package that was PGP compatible.

So I asked.

I found that PKP has two simple philosophies: (1) they have a valid patent,
and you must agree to this fact and (2) if you make money, they make
money. I don't have the interest, energy, time, or money to argue with (1),
so fine, I'll say I agree. I sure haven't made any money off PGP, and
probably won't off of this.

I found that Jeff Schiller of MIT suggested an effort to develop something
on RSAREF from scratch that would bring the pgp, RIPEM, TIS/PEM, etc.
communities together.  The PKP folks are strongly supportive. They (PKP,
MIT, pfarrell. et al) need to do programming and reverse engineering.
If other cypherpunks can code, volunteer.

While the source for PGP is available, it is copyrighted. Unless we can get
the copyright owner's permission, we'll have to reimplement it from scratch.
Not an attractive idea.

If you have a religious belief that software patents are immoral, that PKP
is really a front for the NSA, etc. and don't want to help, that is fine
with me.  Simply don't volunteer. I'd like to believe that this really
isn't a splintering of the cypherpunks.

My guess as to why PKP is willing to talk to me and others now, and was not
willing to agree to license PGP was that Phil never got permission to use
RSA, and so agreeing to license users use of PGP is admission that using
RSA without PKP permission is OK. There is no way that PKP can allow that to
be infered.

Pat




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Satan <eaeu362@orion.oac.uci.edu>
Date: Fri, 30 Apr 93 10:17:21 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: HELP! Some nut is threatening to sue!
In-Reply-To: <9304290331.AA18264@hydra.unm.edu>
Message-ID: <199304301717.AA10153@orion.oac.uci.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> I don't think you're aware of our position on pgp. Unfortunately, you
> may leave us no choice but to take legal action, which we will unless
> you cease promotion adn distribution of pgp. The next message will
> state our position.

well...
jim bidzos is not SOME nut
and this isnt a threat.. justa warning

the only problem i see with writing an apology note
would be if he didnt send you a letter in the first place
in my youth or if i were basically bored
i would have sent a letter looking like taht
from that account

i would assume its real cuz if someone were to fake it
they would act real mad adn say they are already suing

but i think the fact that you dont know if he really sent you the letter
(well i dont know if he really sent you the letter)
is proof of why we need pgp out in public
because that way we could verify who it was






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: geoffw@nexsys.net (Geoff White)
Date: Fri, 30 Apr 93 12:04:06 PDT
To: 74076.1041@CompuServe.COM
Subject: Re: PGP on soda.berkeley.edu
Message-ID: <9304301724.AA07951@nexsys.nexsys.net>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>  
> It follows, doesn't it, that Jim Bidzos would be forced to apply similar
> legal pressure to the Cypherpunks leadership to get them to remove PGP from
> their site, a site which may be one of the leaders worldwide in distributing
> PGP.
>  
> Now we see Tim suggesting (in the spirit of "pancritical rationalism"?  I'm
> not so sure...) that we move away from PGP, and Eric offering arguments
> showing why Bidzos has to do what he is doing.
>  
> Is there a connection?  Are Tim and Eric under pressure from Bidzos to get
> PGP off their site?  I don't know, but they would certainly be likely
> targets for Bidzos' efforts, and so it is understandable that they may be
> feeling personal discomfort.  But I'd like to hear more about the
> relationship with Bidzos.
>  
> Hal
> 

	I think you are being a little paranoid.  I clearly see the points
that Eric and Tim are making.  RSA is not going to "roll over" for us.  If they
did, it could mean the end of their company.  Jim out of detante, might not
be sending us (the Regents of UC to be exact) a letter because of the potential
ramafications (both legal, and publicity wise) It would not be a good move
for RSA or for cypherpunks,  but if this issue heats up, he may be forced into
this stance, which is one I'm convinced by meeting the man, that he personally
would not like to take, but WOULD take if it came down to us or the companies
patents being made null and void from failure to enforce them.  I think he
is passing over us for the time being, unless media attention causes him to 
do otherwise, remember he would sent "the letter" to the regents of UC Berkeley
they are the one's who own soda, not the cypherpunks.  I think we have to 
decide whether we are promoting PGP or an individuals right "to affordable
secure cryptography"  I for one will continue to use PGP until something 
better comes along.  I'd be willing to give RSA $50 - $100 for the right to use
the software, in this case BECAUSE THE ISSUE OF PRIVACY IS MORE IMPORTANT TO
TO ME THAN THE ISSUES OF WHETHER SOFTWARE IS PATENTABLE.  Now this does not
mean that I don't believe in free software but if we don't stop the stuff that
the feds are doing right now, the other issues won't make any difference.

What founding father said "If we all don't hang together we will surely hang
seperately" 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
NEXUS SYSTEMS/CYBERTRIBE-5 : Voice:(415)965-2384   Fax: (415)327-6416
Editor/Instigator/Catalyst : Geoff White <geoffw@nexsys.net>
Production Crew            : Universal Movement Trinity <umt@nexsys.net>

        "They might stop the party, but they can't stop the future"

                --PGP Public key available upon request--
 AT&T:Phones with Big Brother Inside, Just say "NO" to the Clipper wiretap chip!
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Karl Barrus <elee9sf@Menudo.UH.EDU>
Date: Fri, 30 Apr 93 09:58:45 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: List of remailers 4/30/93
Message-ID: <199304301658.AA25687@Menudo.UH.EDU>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

Q1: What cypherpunk remailers exist?

A1:

 1: hh@pmantis.berkeley.edu 
 2: hh@cicada.berkeley.edu 
 3: hh@soda.berkeley.edu 
 4: nowhere@bsu-cs.bsu.edu 
 5: ebrandt@jarthur.claremont.edu 
 6: hal@alumni.caltech.edu 
 7: remailer@rebma.mn.org 
 8: elee7h5@rosebud.ee.uh.edu 
 9: phantom@mead.u.washington.edu 
10: hfinney@shell.portal.com 
11: remailer@utter.dis.org 
12: 00x@uclink.berkeley.edu 
13: remail@extropia.wimsey.com 

NOTES: 
#1-#4		remail only, no encryption of headers
#5-#12		support encrypted headers
#13		special - header and message must be encrypted together
#7,#11,#13	introduce larger than average delay (not direct connect)
#12		public key not yet released

======================================================================

Q2: What help is available?

A2:

Check out the pub/cypherpunks directory at soda.berkeley.edu
(128.32.149.19).  Instructions on how to use the remailers are in the
remailer directory, along with some unix scripts and dos batch files.

Mail to me (elee9sf@menudo.uh.edu) for further help and/or questions.

======================================================================


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.2

iQCVAgUBK+FaUYOA7OpLWtYzAQHAkwP/XeYgJtC+oSWPkg84wMrkWUjuim7vMPgm
XVpf90hvHyMy7dJbmCliQachBMV2/5ddgTipISdYzD3xeExIVNYOPruuQLSCDhrC
1zXpsqHlTUw9gppem58NoUPuQl2OP2vSUyWf12yxFpfTQ7Qg3gQ7GBiROa8xuaoC
31IzbfsvqE0=
=iMsm
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

/-----------------------------------\
| Karl L. Barrus                    |
| elee9sf@menudo.uh.edu             | <- preferred address
| barrus@tree.egr.uh.edu (NeXTMail) |
\-----------------------------------/




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Sy Verpunc <svp@gtoal.com>
Date: Sat, 1 May 93 05:02:56 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Tactics.
Message-ID: <9304301204.AA23052@pizzabox.demon.co.uk>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


	From: Shaen Bernhardt <uni@acs.bu.edu>

	To me its plain that the intent is to regulate crypto.  Before then I plan
	(hope) that PGP finds its way into MANY hands.  That's the only real
	weapon I see.  Consider it a safety net to catch us if Tim's
	REALPOLITIK fails.  I hope it doesn't, Tim, I hope not but I'm going
	to hope for the best and prepare for the worst.  I intend to use
	strong crypto when I like.

And to think I got flame mail less than two months ago when I said on
alt.security.pgp that I was pissed off because someone put my key on a
public server... I bet there's a few other people wishing now they hadn't
put their keys in an 'arrest me' list...

G




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Hal <74076.1041@CompuServe.COM>
Date: Fri, 30 Apr 93 09:23:11 PDT
To: Cypherpunks <cypherpunks@toad.com>
Subject: PGP on soda.berkeley.edu
Message-ID: <930430161518_74076.1041_FHD32-1@CompuServe.COM>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


The fact that PGP is available on the Cypherpunks FTP site,
soda.berkely.edu, was publicized in sci.crypt last week (among other places
and times).
 
Eric said that the Cypherpunks FTP site has become among the top FTP access
points in the world.
 
When Stanton McCandlish posted on sci.crypt that he had PGP available on his
system, he quickly received threats from Jim Bidzos demanding that he remove
it.
 
It follows, doesn't it, that Jim Bidzos would be forced to apply similar
legal pressure to the Cypherpunks leadership to get them to remove PGP from
their site, a site which may be one of the leaders worldwide in distributing
PGP.
 
Now we see Tim suggesting (in the spirit of "pancritical rationalism"?  I'm
not so sure...) that we move away from PGP, and Eric offering arguments
showing why Bidzos has to do what he is doing.
 
Is there a connection?  Are Tim and Eric under pressure from Bidzos to get
PGP off their site?  I don't know, but they would certainly be likely
targets for Bidzos' efforts, and so it is understandable that they may be
feeling personal discomfort.  But I'd like to hear more about the
relationship with Bidzos.
 
Hal
 






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: bcox@gmu.edu (Brad Cox)
Date: Fri, 30 Apr 93 09:19:24 PDT
To: "Stephen P. Marting" <spam+@CMU.EDU>
Subject: Re: Need some Advice
Message-ID: <9304301620.AA00518@gmuvax2.gmu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


"Stephen P. Marting" <spam+@CMU.EDU> wrote
>The difference between Software Engineering and Computer Science is sort
>of like the difference between Differential Equations and Mathematics. 
>SoftEng is a subset of CompSci.  

Isn't it more like the difference between epicyclic computation and
Ptolemaic Astronomy?

In other words, don't these labels really denote software pre-engineering
and computer pre-science?
--
       Brad Cox; bcox@gmu.edu; 703 968 8229 Voice 703 968 8798 Fax
       George Mason Program on Social and Organizational Learning






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: jet@nas.nasa.gov (J. Eric Townsend)
Date: Fri, 30 Apr 93 12:48:42 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: PGP legalities
In-Reply-To: <930430161518_74076.1041_FHD32-1@CompuServe.COM>
Message-ID: <9304301948.AA00372@boxer.nas.nasa.gov>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain




A short reminder:  If you are the government, or you work for the
government, you can use PGP.  The conditions under which you can use
it might be fuzzy (ie: can I use it to encrypt mail to send to this
list, which is not work related), but you can definately use it for
your work.

--
J. Eric Townsend jet@nas.nasa.gov 415.604.4311
NASA Ames Numerical Aerodynamic Simulation      |    play: jet@well.sf.ca.us
Parallel Systems Support, CM-5 POC              |      '92 R100R / DoD# 0378
PGP2.1 public key available upon request or finger jet@simeon.nas.nasa.gov





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: jet@nas.nasa.gov (J. Eric Townsend)
Date: Fri, 30 Apr 93 12:49:16 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: npr report
Message-ID: <9304301949.AA00378@boxer.nas.nasa.gov>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


 from the NPR report:
  > "The mechanism is very much like what the real estate agents do with 
  > houses.  Right, they take you to show you a house and they don't have a 
  > key to that house in their pockets.  But they get to the house, and
  > there's a lock box hanging on the front door.  And they have a master key
  > in their pockets, and they open the lock box, and take out the key to the
  > door, and open the front door, and go in and show you the house."
 
 This is a *wonderful* analogy.  Imagine if one could not buy a set of
 locks for their house w/o buying the government lock-box to go beside
 the front door.





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: lefty@apple.com (Lefty)
Date: Fri, 30 Apr 93 13:05:50 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: PGP on soda.berkeley.edu
Message-ID: <9304301953.AA29637@internal.apple.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>What founding father said "If we all don't hang together we will surely hang
>seperately" 

Benjamin Franklin.

--
Lefty (lefty@apple.com)
C:.M:.C:., D:.O:.D:.






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Date: Fri, 30 Apr 93 13:00:32 PDT
To: Cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: I don't take it personally...
Message-ID: <9304302000.AA03138@netcom.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Just to let you folks know, I don't take some of the comments I've been
seeing here (and in e-mail) personally. That is, I fully understand that
emotions run high around these topics, especially about PGP, the Clipper
Chip, and patents on software.

This list is for discussion, even heated discussion. We're not here to just
complain about things we all despise, like the Clipper chip...for that you
can read sci.crypt. 

I've posted my thoughts and suggestions in this spirit. I'm not in a
policy-making position (how many of us are?), so some of the stronger
comments about how I'm reorienting the Cypherpunks list seem, well,
inappropriate.

That others have said much the same thing says this is a legitimate issue
to discuss on this list.

By the way, I responded at length to  Matthew J Miszewski's posting because
that's the one I saw first. The equally well-written critiques of my points
by Lance Dettweiler and Hal Finney did not arrive at my site until sometime
after 2 a.m. this morning, when I last checked...though they were written
and posted half a day earlier than Matt's posting. Odd delays we're having.

I won't answer their point-by-point critiques, as I think my follow-up to
Matt and the various other posts by Eric, Pat Farrell, Stanton M., and
others have gotten the issues aired.

Just to repeat, I'm not in the thrall of RSA or anyone else. I just think
the issues are much larger. I'm not saying we shouldn't use PGP, nor am I
suggesting Jim Bidzos should serve arrest warrants at our Cypherpunks
meetings (I got a kick out of that really "over the top" charge...I took no
offense1). 

I don't set policy for you folks. Nobody does. I'm just one more voice.
Discussion won't hurt this list--if it can, then we're really in trouble. 


-Tim May

--
Timothy C. May         | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,  
tcmay@netcom.com       | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
408-688-5409           | knowledge, reputations, information markets, 
W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA  | black markets, smashing of governments.
Higher Power: 2^756839 | Public Key: in a state of flux!
Waco Massacre + Big Brother Wiretap Chip = A Nazi Regime





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Hal <74076.1041@CompuServe.COM>
Date: Fri, 30 Apr 93 10:12:18 PDT
To: CYPHERPUNKS <CYPHERPUNKS@toad.com>
Subject: Tough Choices: PGP vs. RSA Data Security
Message-ID: <930430170523_74076.1041_FHD74-1@CompuServe.COM>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

I thought Eric's analysis of RSADSI/PKP's position was interesting,
but I have to take issue with a couple of points:

> Premise: RSADSI created RSAREF in order to license individuals.

This seems to assume that RSADSI needs to "license" individuals in order
to allow them to use the patent.  But I don't think this is the case.
RSADSI can simply say that individual, non-commercial use of the patents
is permitted by them.

In fact, they do say that, apparently.  As Pat Farrell reported today:

> I found that PKP has two simple philosophies: (1) they have a valid patent,
> and you must agree to this fact and (2) if you make money, they make
> money.

I understand that the FAQ from RSA confirms this, that non-commercial,
personal use of the patent is OK.  (Actually, I don't think this first
point, that "you have to agree that their patent is valid" is in the FAQ.
I think this was added specifically because the PGP documentation
criticizes the patent.)

So, it does not seem to me that they had to take _any_ specific action
in order to "license" individuals to use their patent non-commercially.
They simply had to say, as they already said, that such use is not
considered infringing.

> Since they don't make any money from it, there's
> no reason for them to spend much money paying lawyers to draft license
> agreements for products which bring in no income.  Therefore they want
> all non-income uses of the patents to be filtered through a single
> license.

Again, there is no need for them to pay lawyers to set up a host of
different "non-income" licenses.  There is no need to "filter" all such
uses through a single package.  Rather, a general blessing of non-commercial
use should be adequate.

> Assertion: The reason that RSADSI requires that individual licenses be
> mediated through RSAREF is that non-commercial software is inevitably
> used in commercial contexts.

Allow personal, non-commercial use does not mean they lose any rights to
sue companies which make money off the patent.  If a non-commercial product
(like PGP) is used in a commercial context then both Phil and Jim may
be expected to go after them.  This therefore is not at all a reason for
RSADSI to require individual licenses to be mediated through RSAREF.  Doing
that gives them no rights that they didn't already have.

> Remember, their main business is
> licensing.  All software used in a commercial context must be
> licensed, otherwise their main business is imperiled.  Were they to
> make separate licenses for every low end product, they would be in the
> same situation as if they licensed individuals--high overhead, small
> return.  Therefore, they license RSAREF to companies; this allows
> RSADSI to economically offer licensed use for all such low end
> software packages.

Here Eric is apparently talking about commercial use.  I think our discussions
are in the context of personal, non-commercial use.  We should clearly
separate these two issues.  Where a putatively non-commercial product,
whether RIPEM or PGP, is used in a commercial situation then PKP and/or
PRZ may choose to take legal action.  But the non-commercial situation can
be dealt with without restricting users to use RSAREF.

In short, Eric has not persuaded me (at least) that RSADSI was in any
way forced to restrict non-commercial users to use the RSAREF package.
Their general policy of permitting personal, non-commercial use, and
demanding that "if you make money, we make money" are more than adequate
without RSAREF entering the picture at all.

Hal Finney
74076.1041@compuserve.com

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.2

iQCVAgUBK+ExaKgTA69YIUw3AQErDQP/ZMqrgzTm/j2T5xkbLCruCdVfd+a/U9tk
aNNE8687LMZsC9RSxh6me60zWEQag1DnLqOA5zhn+9kbQ3HbYsc58oc/5vNgJwEe
lAfcRImykqdIq3PLWgGyvhqqBsOib/k9uL8+OijcdYmsnLciDN8z4IdREDDKn7zu
w83hCzV7BDc=
=zAQ6
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: karn@qualcomm.com (Phil Karn)
Date: Fri, 30 Apr 93 13:44:08 PDT
To: jet@nas.nasa.gov
Subject: Re:  npr report
Message-ID: <9304302043.AA21502@servo>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> This is a *wonderful* analogy.  Imagine if one could not buy a set of
> locks for their house w/o buying the government lock-box to go beside
> the front door.

It's an even better analogy (for me) because of the experience I had a year
ago with a house I was renting. The owner had put it up for sale, so a
lockbox was installed on the garage door. One day I came home and noticed
that the box was open, and the key inside was missing.

Gave me a real warm and fuzzy feeling.

One of the really nice things about now owning a house (vs renting) is
that I can change the locks whenever I please and I don't have to give
a copy to *anybody*...

Phil






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: pfarrell@cs.gmu.edu (Pat Farrell)
Date: Fri, 30 Apr 93 10:56:47 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re:  PGP on soda.berkeley.edu
Message-ID: <9304301751.AA06931@cs.gmu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Hal,

I think you are being overly paranoid.
Jim Bidzos must protest the use of PGP. If he doesn't, he will
lose the ability to claim that companies have to pay for RSA.
He has publicaly, and repeatedly, stated that the ITAR is a crock.
Don't wave a flag infront of the bull.

He has personally told me that he is very interested in a RSA approved
program that is PGP compatible. He simply can NEVER say that PGP is OK.

If we are to say to the politicians that normal folks need strong encryption,
then we have to start without being labled criminals for violating the
US laws. If I remember, you are not in the US, so it is fine to 
ignore Bidzos. I can not write my congressman and saw Clipper is bad, PGP is
good when use (and development) of PGP is against the law.

We could argue that the law is bad. I can agree. But changing the law
will take so long that RSA will be illegal. Then when I use it,
it will be grounds for a search warrent.

Pat
Pat Farrell,      Grad Student                       pfarrell@cs.gmu.edu
Department of Computer Science, George Mason University, Fairfax, VA




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Matthew J Miszewski <MJMISKI@macc.wisc.edu>
Date: Fri, 30 Apr 93 11:59:48 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: CLIPPER: Remember Big Brother!
Message-ID: <23043013580787@vms2.macc.wisc.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Cypherpunks,
 
  I have taken contention with Tim's suggestions and was glad to see the
comprehensive response.  And the following critiques.  But I fear that
AT&T and the NSA may be lovin' our discontent with each other.
 
  I still disagree with Tim on a few contentions and will post them later.
But I now understand more clearly his position and far sightedness.  While
I did my part to start this dissent, I now hope that we can reconcentrate
on the current emergency.  CLIPPER!
 
  Im not saying we should quash dissent, but just cool the flames and remember
our current situation.  There are many facets of patent law which we may not be
able to solve right now.  [Eric, I am working on your research request, thanx!].
 
  Please don't let a provacative post by a forward looking thinking derail
*both* of our ultimate goals.  There is a time and a place for this debate.
However, I feel now we must attack the _real_ enemy.  So, please, step back
and remember that if we fall divided, NO ONE will voice opposition to the
WIRETAP CHIP, and we can all set our calandars back to 1984.
 
Respectfully Dissenting,
 
Matt
mjmiski@macc.wisc.edu
 




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: fnerd@smds.com (FutureNerd Steve Witham)
Date: Fri, 30 Apr 93 12:44:40 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: PGP vs. RSADSI--what conflict?
Message-ID: <9304301927.AA22360@smds.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Cypherpholks--

Neither abandoning PGP nor antagonizing RSADSI seem necessary to me.
This letter makes a 3/4 page summary of that belief after which I 
mention some interesting side issues.

Eric Hughes' understanding of the situation confirms my intuitions--
	RSADSI pretty much has to either act the way it's acting
		or else just roll over.
and	They seem agreeable to a technically good PGP/RSAREF connection.
but	That's work.

On the middle point, in particular I don't think they'll insist we use
DES or a slow engine.  For people who don't get why those restriction seem 
to be there but aren't, I suggest rereading Eric's article.

Although I have strong feelings about the patent issue, and although it
affects the privacy issue, I definitely put the privacy issue first.
Given that it seems we can separate the two issues, I don't see why we
shouldn't.  
 
Although I agree with Tim that being non-confrontative with RSADSI is
smart, I don't see PGP and RSADSI as quite so hard to reconcile as he
seems to:

> If the government ever outlaws strong crypto, you can be sure I'll be 
> using outlaw crypto.  The difference with the current situation is 
> that crypto per se has not yet come under regulation.)

And PGP per se is not outlaw.  Only the current version and lack of license.
Let's conceptually separate PGP, Phil's RSA/MD5 engine (PGRE?), and using/
distributing PGRE in the USA.  Only the third is a problem with RSADSI.
  
> ...bootleg
> crypto (which is what PGP will remain in this country unless and until the
> courts overturn the patents or RSA suddenly decides to cave in)...

Pshaw.  Until it's worked out.  No "sudden caving in" is needed.  Tim, you 
were the one who reported that Jim Bidzos was sounding agreeable.

> Furthermore, neither Phil nor any other members of the development team are
> likely to ever make any money with this 
                                     ^^^^ PGRE
Phil could finally solicit shareware fees.

Now the side issues:

There could conceivably be an issue in the future for people working with 
RSAREF--who have SEEN THE CODE--and then wanting to develop other crypto
stuff later.  People have attempted to avoid this legal hassle in the past
by setting up a "clean room" where only specs and interfaces are known...

RSAREF is copyrighted stuff, right?, which puts you in a slightly different 
legal position when you have it/distribute it.  Assuming PGP gets a 
license to be shareware, I see this being less of a problem than the 
current situation.

But even if PGP gets some kind of license, would individuals still have
to sign agreements with RSADSI?  I feel more serious about personal
agreements than copyrights or patents.  Will it be the standard RSAREF 
individual license?  Does it require you to *act as if* they had rights
some of us care about them not having?  (Rights to the specific code don't 
bother me too much.)

> (isn't e-mail great?...Stanton posts it, and Jim Bidzos, the
> Pres. of RSA responds...no lawyers were needed, no lengthy delays.).

At the CFP conference that Tim missed ~{;o), Cliff Stoll was remarking that
eventually all sorts of nasty things happen related to the net--except
lawsuits.  We guessed that the availability of the quick, public response 
might have a lot to do with that.  Here we have a threat; can anyone 
think of an example of an email-related suit that was carried through?

-phnerd, er, fnerd
quote me
--fnerd@smds.com (FutureNerd Steve Witham)




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "John (FuzzFace/Fast-Eddie) McMahon" <MCMAHON@Eisner.DECUS.Org>
Date: Fri, 30 Apr 93 13:49:56 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: PGP on soda.berkeley.edu
Message-ID: <01GXMNWP2FA6000426@Eisner.DECUS.Org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



> What founding father said "If we all don't hang together we will surely hang
> seperately" 

Ben Franklin, I believe.

John McMahon





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: phr@america.Telebit.COM (Paul Rubin)
Date: Fri, 30 Apr 93 16:49:27 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: eurocrypt '93
Message-ID: <9304302348.AB12222@america.TELEBIT.COM>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Is anyone thinking of going?  It's in Norway, in late May.

	Pining for the fjords...

		Paul




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Eric Hughes <hughes@soda.berkeley.edu>
Date: Fri, 30 Apr 93 17:14:39 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: 800 numbers
In-Reply-To: <Pine.3.05.9304302022.B16325-b100000@jupiter>
Message-ID: <9305010011.AA05935@soda.berkeley.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>On a note similar to remailers, has anyone ever given consideration to
>creating an "outdial" service?  [a redialer operation for telephones]

I've been wanting to do this for years.  As soon as we get a digital
coin system running, I'm going to work on getting one up in Berkeley.

There are some interesting issues here similar to remailers.  Fancy
schemes tend not to be all that secure because the in-band audio
signalling is not conducive to crypto.  Just having the redirection
service is enough now to disrupt Caller-ID.  When ISDN is standard,
you can you the money transaction on the D channel, out of band, and
digital.

Eric




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: tien (Lee Tien)
Date: Fri, 30 Apr 93 17:27:13 PDT
To: Cypherpunks, tcmay@netcom.com
Subject: Re:  I don't take it personally...
Message-ID: <9305010027.AA08692@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Tim, I'm responding to your question about patents.  I don't know
of any reason why individual licenses to use the public-key patents
in connection with specified authorized programs couldn't be 
granted under U.S. patent law.  In general, a patent holder has
the right to exclude unauthorized persons from making, using, or
selling the patented invention.  A patent holder can grant non-
exclusive licenses to make, use, or sell.  Legally speaking, a
non-exclusive license can be thought of as a promise by the paent
holder not to sue the licensee for acts within the scope of the
license which would otherwise constitute patent infringement, in
return for some kind of consideration.  

The major limits on a valid patent are "patent misuse" (where
the patent holder overreaches) and antitrust (where the patent
holder uses the patent to restrain trade).  

Patent licensing is a pretty flexible mechanism.  I'm no expert,
though, and I've never quite understood exactly what this patent
protects, nor have I seen the actual claims of the issued patent.

Lee




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Eric Hughes <hughes@soda.berkeley.edu>
Date: Fri, 30 Apr 93 17:36:28 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: PGP on soda.berkeley.edu
In-Reply-To: <930430161518_74076.1041_FHD32-1@CompuServe.COM>
Message-ID: <9305010033.AA07393@soda.berkeley.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>soda.berkely.edu, was publicized in sci.crypt last week (among other places
>and times).

I have tried to make sure that it's not widely publicized, for reasons
stated below.

>Eric said that the Cypherpunks FTP site has become among the top FTP access
>points in the world.

No.  I said that the cypherpunks site on soda is the most active one
on soda.  Quite a difference.

>When Stanton McCandlish posted on sci.crypt that he had PGP available on his
>system, he quickly received threats from Jim Bidzos demanding that he remove
>it.

Look.  Bidzos is under fiduciary responsibility to exercise due
diligence in making sure unlicensed software is not distributed.  If
Bidzos were to get fired for not doing it, someone else would come in
and do exactly the same thing.

>It follows, doesn't it, that Jim Bidzos would be forced to apply similar
>legal pressure to the Cypherpunks leadership to get them to remove PGP from
>their site, a site which may be one of the leaders worldwide in distributing
>PGP.

I've know Bidzos for a little over a year.  I've been distributing PGP
ever since the ftp site went up.  Not once have I ever told Bidzos I'm
doing this.  If I did, he'd have no choice but to stop it, having been
personally informed that infringement was occurring at a particular
place under a known agent.  I've asked Hugh Miller not to advertise
the site publicly, not because I don't want it used, but because I
don't want it to go away.  The site is registered with archie; if you
want it, you can find it.

Sometimes you have to be loud to get things done; sometimes you have
to be silent.  Domestic distribution of PGP right now is something
best done in silence.

>Are Tim and Eric under pressure from Bidzos to get
>PGP off their site?  

Tim doesn't have anything at all to do with the ftp site.  I do it on
a guest account on the machine, which for tactical reasons of software
distribution I'd like to keep.  I have never heard anyword from Bidzos
that he even knows about the soda site, let alone that I maintain it,
let alone any pressure to remove PGP from it.

Eric




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: wcs@anchor.ho.att.com
Date: Fri, 30 Apr 93 14:34:13 PDT
To: mab@research.att.com
Subject: clip.txt on NIST ftp
Message-ID: <9304302134.AA10093@anchor.ho.att.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text


csrc.ncsl.nist.gov has some new uploads in /pub/nistnews,
including Krammer(NIST)'s testimony to Markey, and clip.txt,
a more recent Clipper description.  It's short enough I'm
attaching it below; the interesting part in Section 5
is that it says the wiretap block has 80-bit session key
crypted with unit key, 25-bit serial number!, and 23-bit
"authentication pattern" making a total of 128 narc bits.
It also gets transmitted "at least once" to the receiver.
Also, chip prices include "programmed and unprogrammed" -
I wonder if real people will be able to buy them unprogrammed?

		Bill Stewart

------ clip here -----

                     CLIPPER CHIP TECHNOLOGY


CLIPPER is an NSA developed, hardware oriented, cryptographic
device that implements a symmetric encryption/decryption
algorithm and a law enforcement satisfying key escrow system. 
While the escrow management system design is not completely
designed, the cryptographic algorithm (SKIPJACK) is completely
specified (and classified SECRET).

The cryptographic algorithm (called CA in this paper) has the
following characteristics:

     1.   Symmetric, 80-bit key encryption/decryption algorithm;
     2.   Similar in function to DES (i.e., basically a 64-bit
          code book transformation that can be used in the same
          four modes of operation as specified for DES in FIPS
          81);
     3.   32 rounds of processing per single encrypt/decrypt
          operation;
     4.   Design started by NSA in 1985; evaluation completed in
          1990.

The CLIPPER CHIP is just one implementation of the CA.  The
CLIPPER CHIP designed for the AT&T commercial secure voice
products has the following characteristics:

     1.   Functions specified by NSA; logic designed by
          MYKOTRONX; chip fabricated by VLSI, Inc.:  manufactured
          chip programmed (made unique) by MYKOTRONX to security
          equipment manufacturers willing to follow proper
          security procedures for handling and storage of the
          programmed chip; equipment sold to customers;

     2.   Resistant to reverse engineering against a very
          sophisticated, well funded adversary;

     3.   15-20 MB/S encryption/decryption constant throughout
          once cryptographic synchronization is established with
          distant CLIPPER Chip;

     4.   The chip programming equipment writes (one time) the
          following information into a special memory (called
          VROM or VIA-Link) on the chip:

          a.   (unique) serial number
          b.   (unique) unit key
          c.   family key
          d.   specialized control software

     5.   Upon generation (or entry) of a session key in the
          chip, the chip performs the following actions:


          a.   Encrypts the 80-bit session key under the unit key
               producing an 80-bit intermediate result;

          b.   Concatenates the 80-bit result with the 25-bit
               serial number and a 23-bit authentication pattern
               (total of 128 bits);

          c.   Enciphers this 128 bits with family key to produce
               a 128-bit cipher block chain called the Law
               Enforcement Field (LEF);

          d.   Transmits the LEF at least once to the intended
               receiving CLIPPER chip;

          e.   The two communicating CLIPPER chips use this field
               together with a random IV to establish
               Cryptographic Synchronization.

     6.   Once synchronized, the CLIPPER chips use the session
          key to encrypt/decrypt data in both directions;

     7.   The chips can be programmed to not enter secure mode if
          the LEF field has been tampered with (e.g., modified,
          superencrypted, replaced);

     8.   CLIPPER chips will be available from a second source in
          the future;

     9.   CLIPPER chips will be modified and upgraded in the
          future;

     10.  CLIPPER chips presently cost $16.00 (unprogrammed) and
          $26.00 (programmed).
4/30/93



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Mike Godwin <mnemonic@eff.org>
Date: Fri, 30 Apr 93 14:35:56 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: 800 number -- Clipper poll
Message-ID: <199304302135.AA01210@eff.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Article 17194 (12 more + 1 Marked to return) in comp.org.eff.talk:
From: JHIUOT&)@p918.f70.n109.z1.fidonet.org (JHIUOT&))
Subject: Clipper poll
Date: Wed, 28 Apr 93 12:00:09 PDT
Organization: FidoNet node 1:109/70.918 - No Montgomery Co Ba, Rockville
MD
Lines: 14


Communications Week magazine has a weekly telephone response poll.


This week's question is:


Do you agree with the Clinton administration's Public Encryption
Management dire
ctive for communications equipment?


Yes: 800-242-CWKY
No:  800-242-CWKN






--
uucp: uunet!m2xenix!puddle!109!70.918!JHIUOT&)
Internet: JHIUOT&)@p918.f70.n109.z1.fidonet.org





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Nickey MacDonald <i6t4@jupiter.sun.csd.unb.ca>
Date: Fri, 30 Apr 93 16:08:56 PDT
To: Mike Godwin <mnemonic@eff.org>
Subject: Re: 800 numbers
In-Reply-To: <199304302135.AA01210@eff.org>
Message-ID: <Pine.3.05.9304302022.B16325-b100000@jupiter>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Of course, only Americans can dial those numbers.. which is a shame...  (A
few Canadians could have skewed the voting... :-)

On a note similar to remailers, has anyone ever given consideration to
creating an "outdial" service?  If I could dial long distance into the
States, and then be able to dial a 1-800 number that I cannot dial direct
from Canada (which is most) this would extremely useful...  Could be taken
a step further, and with automated billing a person could dial *any*
number and charge it back to their calling card (though this would not be
fully anonymous, is there a use for this??  I donno... as Caller ID
becomes more prevalent... maybe...)   I know law enforcement agents
use something like this for undercover operations, though I doubt they
figure in a long distance factor very often...  Anyway, something to think
about...

---
Nick MacDonald               | NMD on IRC
i6t4@jupiter.sun.csd.unb.ca  | PGP 2.1 Public key available via finger


On Fri, 30 Apr 1993, Mike Godwin wrote:

> Communications Week magazine has a weekly telephone response poll.
> 
> This week's question is:
> 
> Do you agree with the Clinton administration's Public Encryption
> Management directive for communications equipment?
> 
> Yes: 800-242-CWKY
> No:  800-242-CWKN






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Eli Brandt <ebrandt@jarthur.Claremont.EDU>
Date: Fri, 30 Apr 93 20:46:40 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: PGP
In-Reply-To: <01GXMXWJVE4Y95NBR5@delphi.com>
Message-ID: <9305010346.AA10948@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> From: HARUP16@delphi.com
> I know that it was wrong to steal the RSA code for
> a shareware alternative, but [...]

Nobody stole code.  PGP infringes on (at least) U.S. Patent
4,405,829, which covers the RSA algorithm.  Personally, I have no
qualms about exponentiating in any algebra I please.

As to the question of "whether RSADSI are good guys": they
certainly could be.  However, I don't see RSA doing a hell of a lot
to promote crypto use -- the opposite, in fact.  Their software
output is hardly impressive for a corporation of a decade's
standing.  They won't sell me a license -- they'll sell it to Lotus,
but I can't see their source code.  The government hasn't banned
public-key encryption, but it's banned patent-infringing public-key
encryption.  And for practical purposes, that's the only kind there
is.  

The combined effect of present patent law and RSA's "sue first,
write code later" approach has been to stifle the development of
cryptography in this country and in the world.  Perhaps if
encryption algorithms were not encumbered, they would already be in
common use, rendering Clipper untenable.  If RSA Inc. wishes to sell
me a license I shouldn't have to buy, that would be nice.  If they
wish to show their change of heart in some other way, that would be
nice too, as long as it doesn't come with a licensing agreement like
RSAREF's.  But if they're going to continue to sit on their patents,
I'll do without their blessing.

Incidentally, I don't think the issue of algorithm patents is as
minor as some have portrayed it.  It has blocked the use of RSA,
after all, giving Clipper a window.  Furthermore, there are patents
on approximately every other cryptographic technique: PK in general,
exponential key exchange, LUC, IDEA, DigiCash, ....  Patents may gut
cryptology the way they have data compression, to pick one example.
This would be a shame.

   Eli   ebrandt@jarthur.claremont.edu




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: HARUP16@delphi.com
Date: Fri, 30 Apr 93 18:43:36 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: PGP
Message-ID: <01GXMXWJVE4Y95NBR5@delphi.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



> I've yet to see many people who "need" PGP who cannot pay for 
> I'm wrong, but that's how I see it. In any case, while we may 
> doubts about the patentability of mathematical algorithms, tha
> the world works. Certain property rights are reasonable. Argui
> RSADSI has no rights to a patent on public key methods is a di
> matter than arguing that someone's need and inability to pay i
> taking software.

	I think what Matt was trying to get at is that privacy should be free
The day that I feel the need to have to pay $100 to ensure that my business
is nobody's business but my own is the day I leave this country for a nice
outlet free desert island. I know that it was wrong to steal the RSA code for
a shareware alternative, but you gotta understand the stakes here:  Breaking
a patend, or keeping the government from snooping on each and everyone of us.
Sure, RSA is great, and they should get payed for their time programming, yap, 
yap, yap.  But when Salk found a vacine for Polio, did he have a little fit and
say "no!  you are all going to die because I am a greedy little bastard", no,
he made the vacine a sort of share-ware.  I know there is a great deal of 
difference between death and software, but just tell that to to the people 
involved with Inslaw(hope you are all familiar with Promis software).





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu
Date: Fri, 30 Apr 93 22:37:44 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: electronic democracy: approaching at megabit speed!
Message-ID: <9305010500.AA22840@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


This came from the `privacy digest' mailing list. Of particular
interest is the opening & `onlining' of government databases. Also note
that the noted Sen. Leahy has expressed serious concern over the
Clipper and is chairing hearings on it.

`mood of declassification'?
`require more openess throughout the bureacracy'?
`electronic mail to improve citizen participation'?


WOW!

Some words that have been coined to describe this kind of thing for
future sound-bite reference: `modemocracy' (saw this in a Compuserve
magazine) or `netocracy' (my own coining)


===cut=here===

   [ Original posting source: nigel.allen@canrem.com in 
             igc:alt.news-media -- MODERATOR ]

 White House Official Outlines Freedom of Information Strategy
 at 'Information Summit'

 To: National Desk, Media Writer
 Contact: Ellen Nelson of The Freedom Forum First Amendment Center,
          615-321-9588

   NASHVILLE, Tenn., April 13  -- A White House official
today outlined a broad open government strategy for
the Clinton administration, throwing support behind legislation
to apply the Freedom of Information Act to electronic records.
   "At the Clinton White House, most of the debate over the E-mail
system is about how we can interconnect it to public services rather
than how we can destroy the records or tear out the hard drives
before the subpoenas come to reach us," said John Podesta, assistant
to the president and staff secretary.
   Podesta made his comments in front of 70 participants in the
nation's first Freedom of Information Summit, sponsored by The
Freedom Forum First Amendment Center at Vanderbilt University.
   Though the economy dominates the headlines, Podesta said the new
administration was quietly working across a broad front to open
government.  His "predictions for the first year," included:

   -- Working with Sen. Patrick Leahy (D-Vermont) to win approval
this session for a bill allowing access to dozens of electronic
databases in the federal government.
   -- Developing an electronic mail system within the federal
government to improve citizen participation in government.
   -- Making the government's archives available on the nation's
"information highway," and appointing a national archivist "who
cares more about preserving history than about preserving his job."
   --Creating a "mood of declassification" with new executive orders
from the president outlining what government may keep secret.
   -- "Reinventing government" under initiatives developed by the
fall by Vice President Gore to require more openness on the part of
civil servants throughout the bureaucracy.

   Podesta also pledged lobbying reform and political reform to "get
rid of the soft money in campaigns." The Freedom of Information
Act may need strengthening in addition to electronic access, he said.
   Pinched by a dozen years of tight information policy, news
organizations have sent President Clinton a freedom of information
policy paper calling for wholesale personnel changes in FOIA-related
jobs, junking the secrecy classifications of President Reagan's
Executive Order 12356, overhauling the Freedom of Information Act and
ending military censorship of war reporting.
   "People working on behalf of the public on more openness in
government at all levels are heartened by the prospect of the White
House taking the lead in this area," said Paul McMasters, executive
director of The Freedom Forum First Amendment Center at Vanderbilt
University.
   The conference, sponsored by The Freedom Forum First Amendment
Center at Vanderbilt University, is focusing on issues ranging from
the Clinton administration's policies on open government to
restrictions on public access to crime, accident and disaster scenes.
The conference, open to the public, is at the Stouffer Hotel in
downtown Nashville.
   Speakers on the Clinton FOI Agenda included Richard Schmidt Jr.,
general counsel to the American Society of Newspaper Editors and
partner in the law firm of Cohn & Marks in Washington, D.C.; Theresa
Amato, the director of the FOI Clearinghouse in Washington, D.C. and
staff counsel for Public Citizens Litigation Group in Washington,
D.C.; and Quinlan Shea, former Carter administration official who
discussed problems of access to government.  Former American hostage
Terry Anderson will give the keynote address at the dinner tonight.
   The Freedom Forum First Amendment Center at Vanderbilt University
is an independent operating program of The Freedom Forum.  The
Center's mission is to foster a better public understanding of and
appreciation for First Amendment rights and values, including freedom
of religion, free speech and press, the right to petition government
and peaceful assembly.
   The Freedom Forum is a nonpartisan, international organization
dedicated to free press, free speech and free spirit for all people.
It is supported entirely by an endowment established by Frank E.
Gannett in 1935 that has grown to more than $700 million in
diversified managed assets.  Its headquarters is The Freedom Forum
World Center in Arlington, Va.
 -30-
--
Canada Remote Systems - Toronto, Ontario
416-629-7000/629-7044




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Eli Brandt <ebrandt@jarthur.Claremont.EDU>
Date: Sat, 1 May 93 00:29:16 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: validity of the RSA patent
In-Reply-To: <9304300628.AA17668@soda.berkeley.edu>
Message-ID: <9305010729.AA14153@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> Consider use of another public key encryption scheme, say LUC encryption.

Which, of course, is patent-pending.  It appears that we can no more
make progress in cryptography in the face of algorithm patents than
we could advance mathematics under the burden of theorem licensing.
We can't afford to wait until 2001.

> Eric

   Eli   ebrandt@jarthur.claremont.edu
(LPF member)




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Hal <74076.1041@CompuServe.COM>
Date: Fri, 30 Apr 93 21:47:14 PDT
To: CYPHERPUNKS <CYPHERPUNKS@toad.com>
Subject: PGP on soda.berkely.edu
Message-ID: <930501044129_74076.1041_FHD20-1@CompuServe.COM>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


-----BEGIN ??? SIGNED MESSAGE-----

I want to apologize to Eric and Tim for intimating that their motives in
exploring the possibility of closer ties to RSADSI were due to pressure
from that company and its officers.  I had apparently misinterpreted Eric's
statements about the popularity of the Cypherpunks FTP directories to
conclude that it was a major distribution site for PGP.  I am glad to hear
that Eric and Tim are not facing any immediate legal problems due to their
support for this software.

Turning to the issue under discussion, I do have a couple of other thoughts.

First, I don't see that the interests of RSADSI are fully aligned with
ours regarding Clipper.  Despite PKP's success in accumulating patents,
Clipper per se does not appear to infringe, being based on a new symmetric
cryptosystem.  So they don't have any direct leverage over the use of
Clipper.

Now, Clipper-based phones presumably need some way to exchange keys, and
here PKP's patents are likely to be relevant.  But I was under the impression
that AT&T, at least, was already producing secure telephones.  I don't
see why whatever arrangements they made for key exchange under their
previous technology would have to be changed with Clipper.

In fact, Clipper in some ways represents a major market opportunity for PKP.
To the extent that the publicity leads to increased sales of encrypting
phones, PKP may benefit from the success of the Clipper.

(The follow-on Capstone project does appear to pose a greater threat to
PKP, since it will use DSS (for key exchange???).)

Furthermore, in any future government prohibition on non-Clipper cryptography,
our greatest nightmare, it is plausible that the government would "take care"
of PKP by making sure that they get a nice piece of the pie.  I could easily
imagine a situation in which non-Clipper crypto is banned, Clipper is
widely distributed, and PKP is doing very well financially with a slice
of the profits from every sale.

Even if Jim Bidzos were personally committed to widespread, strong, public
cryptography, and opposed Clipper for fundamental philosophical reasons
(just like us), he would be faced with a conflict of interest.  As several
people have pointed out here, Bidzos has a fiduciary responsibility to
his shareholders to maximize profits for his twin companies.  If it comes
down to a choice between opposing Clipper on principle and accepting it
along with guaranteed profits, he may be forced (in the same sense in which
he is forced to send threats to Stanton McCandlish) to back Clipper.

So, even if Bidzos is personally a nice guy I think we need to remember
that his company may not be a natural ally of ours.

One final point, for now.

I like Tim's .sig and all it represents.  But frankly, it is hard for me
to square a commitment to radical change with the proposed alliance with
PKP.  Part of the trouble is that I still don't understand exactly what
our relationship with RSADSI is proposed to become.  But at a minimum it
sounds like we would avoid supporting activities which would infringe
on their patents.

That means that when we want to start working on some of those things in
Tim's .sig, we are in many cases going to have to get Jim Bidzos's
permission.  Can you imagine asking something like this:

"Dear Jim: We request permission to use the RSA algorithm for an
implementation of digital cash which we will distribute in an underground
way among BBS's all over the world, with the goal being the support of
"information markets, black markets, [and] smashing of governments"
(to quote Tim's excellent .sig).  "Please sign on the dotted line
below.  Yours truly, an anonymous Cypherpunk."

Obviously there is no way Bidzos could give such approval.  Even if he
personally were a card-carrying member of the Anarchist Party he could
not bear the legal liability that someone in his position would take if
he granted this request.

How, exactly, are we supposed to progress towards Crypto Anarchy if we
have to be sure not to step on PKP's toes?  Do we just not ask him for
permission (in which case we are in PGP's boat)?  Do we ask for permission
without revealing the full scope of the project (in which case it may be
rescinded later)?  I am not being facetious here.  I honestly don't see
how you can carry out Cypherpunk activities with a corporate sponsor.

I guess that's enough for now...

Hal
74076.1041@compuserve.com

-----BEGIN ??? SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.2

iQCVAgUBK+HUu6gTA69YIUw3AQF9hAP+K6HXxXxjpK2qmjtFmj6LnWFW10KG09P+
o09BpbCJsiXTulv85XEtDfTyqus+T9o2dp01xaJaj0T/En3nKPs7NjKlgNciLmhV
3gzAAuv3VedheUR4cLuZOKxk6MkcwywRB4T/PHPomJ411FeYHI1DgBxZEbpM25e0
Y5mk4vQP+oo=
=zKde
-----END ??? SIGNATURE-----





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Sandy <72114.1712@CompuServe.COM>
Date: Fri, 30 Apr 93 22:02:24 PDT
To: <cypherpunks@toad.com>
Subject: OUTDIAL SERVICE
Message-ID: <930501045637_72114.1712_FHF42-1@CompuServe.COM>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


_________________________________________________________________
  SANDY SANDFORT                          ssandfort@attmail.com
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Nickey MacDonald wrote:

    ". . . has anyone ever given consideration to creating
    an "outdial" service?  If I could dial long distance
    into the States, and then be able to dial a 1-800 number
    that I cannot dial direct from Canada (which is most)
    this would extremely useful."

At least one service, similar to what you describe, already
exists.  It was created primarily to take advantage of the low
long distance/international rates available only from the US.
Incoming calls to the US typically cost 2-3 times as much as
outgoing calls to the same countries.

Once you have an account, you can call a special number in the
US, key in your private code, and hang up.  You will immediately
be called back by the service.  When you answer, you will here an
American dial tone.  You may then dial any number in the world.
The service charges you a fee that is substantially less than the
international rates charges in your home country.  Of course, it
also allows you to call US 800 numbers, as well.

The company, ITS, offers other services including programs for
Americans (or anybody) travelling abroad.  For more information,
contact:

              International Telephone Services, Inc.
              1750 K Street, N.W., Suite 380
              Washington, DC 20006
              Tel: 202 223 1307
              Fax: 202 296 1643

 S a n d y

         Please respond ONLY to:  ssandfort@attmail.com
_________________________________________________________________






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Date: Sat, 1 May 93 01:51:23 PDT
To: Hal <74076.1041@CompuServe.COM>
Subject: REALPOLITIK = Choosing Battles Carefully
Message-ID: <9305010851.AA14117@netcom.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


(Cyphergang, this is going to have to be my last post for a while on this
thread. The points have been made. Some agree with me, some call me
treasonous. I say what I think. -TCM)

Hal Finney writes:

.....stuff elided....
>First, I don't see that the interests of RSADSI are fully aligned with
>ours regarding Clipper.  Despite PKP's success in accumulating patents,
>Clipper per se does not appear to infringe, being based on a new symmetric
>cryptosystem.  So they don't have any direct leverage over the use of
>Clipper.

That's right, they don't. Clipper/Skipjack/Capstone looks to be
well-planned move to reassert government control over crypto, with various
government modules replacing existing modules (as with the DSS signature
standard, which uses the El Gamal algorithm).

Whether RSADSI is upset, I don't know. I suspect so. Bidzos was quoted as
saying "Clipper is an arrow aimed at the heart of my company." (source:
Eric, who saw it in a newspaper)

...
>In fact, Clipper in some ways represents a major market opportunity for PKP.
>To the extent that the publicity leads to increased sales of encrypting
>phones, PKP may benefit from the success of the Clipper.

This could be. I don't think enough is known to answer this. I suspect the
"end run" theory mentioned above. If Bidzos thought Clipper was a great
thing for his company, he wouldn't be busily lobbying to help kill it, nor
would he have shown up at ur emergency meeting to tell us what he knew.

>(The follow-on Capstone project does appear to pose a greater threat to
>PKP, since it will use DSS (for key exchange???).)

Capstone is not really a "follow-on," in the sense that it is due to be
announced *this month*, if I recall correctly. It's very far along, I
believe. More like a "one-two punch." And, yes, it appears to be a major
threat to us all. But we'll have to wait and see, I suppose.

>
>Furthermore, in any future government prohibition on non-Clipper cryptography,
>our greatest nightmare, it is plausible that the government would "take care"
>of PKP by making sure that they get a nice piece of the pie.  I could easily
>imagine a situation in which non-Clipper crypto is banned, Clipper is
>widely distributed, and PKP is doing very well financially with a slice
>of the profits from every sale.

I think I mentioned somewhere that I put Bidzos on the spot with what I
called "The 64-bit Question": Are you going to cut a deal and sell us out?

Bidzos was very sober when he answered this, and said, roughly: "If you
mean will I conspire with the government to deny strong crypto to users,
no. But if Clipper and Capstone are destined for deployment and they come
to us and offer royalties, what choice will we have? We have a duty to our
shareholders." And as he was leaving for the day, he leaned in the door to
our meeting and said, as if to reiterate the point, "Tim, I won't sell you
out."

(Please don't use this recollection of what he said for a dissection of
what he really meant, what RSA is really doing, etc. I have already said
that Bidzos said he knew nothing about the Clipper program until we all
did. And so on.)

>Even if Jim Bidzos were personally committed to widespread, strong, public
>cryptography, and opposed Clipper for fundamental philosophical reasons
>(just like us), he would be faced with a conflict of interest.  As several

This is not clear. Deploying strong crypto could be more lucrative to
RSADSI than having the government deploy its own Capstone "CA"
(Cryptographic Algorithm, the new acronym du jour) and paying RSADSI some
token amount for some small piece of the package.

>people have pointed out here, Bidzos has a fiduciary responsibility to
>his shareholders to maximize profits for his twin companies.  If it comes
>down to a choice between opposing Clipper on principle and accepting it
>along with guaranteed profits, he may be forced (in the same sense in which
>he is forced to send threats to Stanton McCandlish) to back Clipper.
>
>So, even if Bidzos is personally a nice guy I think we need to remember
>that his company may not be a natural ally of ours.

I completely agree and nothing I have ever said suggests we place all our
faith in his company or any other institution. What I have said--several
times, now--is that a frontal attack on the RSA patents, via highly public
postings of PGP and a "Fuck you!" approach to talking with patent owners,
is not the best strategy at this time.


>I like Tim's .sig and all it represents.  But frankly, it is hard for me
>to square a commitment to radical change with the proposed alliance with
>PKP.  Part of the trouble is that I still don't understand exactly what
>our relationship with RSADSI is proposed to become.  But at a minimum it
>sounds like we would avoid supporting activities which would infringe
>on their patents.

There's no proposed alliance being talked about. See previous paragraph. I
don't expect anyone to necessarily agree with my politics. 

>
>That means that when we want to start working on some of those things in
>Tim's .sig, we are in many cases going to have to get Jim Bidzos's
>permission.  Can you imagine asking something like this:
>
>"Dear Jim: We request permission to use the RSA algorithm for an
>implementation of digital cash which we will distribute in an underground
>way among BBS's all over the world, with the goal being the support of
>"information markets, black markets, [and] smashing of governments"
>(to quote Tim's excellent .sig).  "Please sign on the dotted line
>below.  Yours truly, an anonymous Cypherpunk."

Of course not! Nobody has suggested this. This is a straw man. Being
nonconfrontational in some areas (aka "living to fight another day," aka
"choosing your battles carefully") doesn't mean any kind of mutual approval
pact has been signed.

I want strong crypto first and foremost. Then the other stuff can perhaps
follow. If crypto privacy is outlawed now, if the War on Drugs and "What
have you got to hide?" approaches win out, then all is lost.


>How, exactly, are we supposed to progress towards Crypto Anarchy if we
>have to be sure not to step on PKP's toes?  Do we just not ask him for
>permission (in which case we are in PGP's boat)?  Do we ask for permission
>without revealing the full scope of the project (in which case it may be
>rescinded later)?  I am not being facetious here.  I honestly don't see
>how you can carry out Cypherpunk activities with a corporate sponsor.

Asked and answered. 

Let me phrase the issue in slightly different terms. Which of the following
strategies do you folks think will best improve the chances that strong
crypto remains legal?

1. CONFRONTATION: We fight RSADSI at every step. We engage them in legal
battles, we distribute infringing code whenever possible. We get PGP spread
to thousands of users, perhaps tens of thousands of users at bootleg,
underground sites. (Remember that businesses cannot use PGP without fear of
prosecution, fines, whatever...unless the Cypherpunks win their lawsuit
against RSADSI, sometime around 1997 or so, at the rate these cases move
through the courts.)

2. REALPOLITIK: We concentrate instead on spreading strong crypto into as
many ecological niches as possible: individuals, corporations, e-mail
packages, attorney-client transactions, and so on. We emphasize the legal,
constitutional right to communicate messages in the language of our choice
(that is, we have no obligation to speak in languages eavesdroppers can
more easily understand). To head off government moves to act against PGP
and similar systems, the parts of PGP that conflict with RSA's patents are
modified, thus becoming legal to use (and Phil even has a chance to make
some money, which he sure as hell can't do now).

I'll take #2 and worry about digital money and anonymous systems later.
Strong crypto is logically prior to everything else.

All I've argued is that the "in your face" approach has its limits. Most of
the PGP users are, I think we'll all agree, hobbyists and hackers who
downloaded it, played with it, learned some crypto from it, exchanged keys,
etc. Probably not too many critical uses, YET. But the popularity suggests
a hunger for strong crypto.

The Clipper/Capstone move indicates the government wants to head this off
at the pass. The question is whether the bootleg and infringing PGP (and
Phil admits to all this in his docs, obviously) has a better chance of
succeeding than a fully legal and already spreading RSA solution?

(The issue of PGP's feature set versus that of MailSafe's is secondary to
the main issues...between RSAREF, RIPEM, OCE, and other RSA-based systems,
the features can be found. I expect a compromise along these lines, mixing
parts of PGP with parts of RSAREF, is going to happen.)

As for Stanton McLandish's removal of PGP from his site, Eric Hughes and
others have explained the legal issues in great detail. 

Of course, anyone who really wishes to take on the RSA patents in a big way
is perfectly free to place PGP on his U.S. site, advertise it heavily in
sci.crypt so that RSADSI cannot possibly claim to have missed it, tell
Bidzos to get lost when the inevitable "cease and desist" warning arrives,
and then follow through with the several-year legal battle that will
result.

Strong crypto is far more important that this petty issue of patents.

-Tim May

--
Timothy C. May         | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,  
tcmay@netcom.com       | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
408-688-5409           | knowledge, reputations, information markets, 
W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA  | black markets, collapse of governments.
Higher Power: 2^756839 | Public Key: by arrangement






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: rmashlan@mash.boulder.co.us (Robert Mashlan)
Date: Sun, 2 May 93 13:55:38 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: unsubscribe
Message-ID: <2be23f5e.mash@mash.boulder.co.us>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Please unsubscribe me
--
|  Robert Mashlan               email = rmashlan@mash.boulder.co.us   |





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: George A. Gleason <gg@well.sf.ca.us>
Date: Sat, 1 May 93 03:27:23 PDT
To: hughes@soda.berkeley.edu
Subject: Re:  800 numbers
Message-ID: <199305011026.AA07579@well.sf.ca.us>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Outdial services: we most certainly will as soon as we install our first
digital exchange (Community Dialtone; email me for more if you're
interested).  Now we've got a bit of a quandary here, what if someone uses
it to make bomb threats or such?  So I was thinking, save the CDR data on
that and make it available under court order?  What's the general consensus
of opinion here as to our responsibility in these areas?

More on outdial services: if you want to set up your own, I can provide a
Teltone M-106 adaptor, for which you'll need a 24-volt key system power
supply and some 8-pin phone hardware and two lines.  Dial in on one,
connect, and out on the other.  We have a bunch of these in stock right now;
I gave some to some friendly folks for setting up a service, but they
haven't yet.  So maybe giving them away means the price is too low...?
Okay, send me $200 for one, or tell me you're definitely committed to using
it once you have it.   (gg@well.sf.ca.us)

-gg
..




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: George A. Gleason <gg@well.sf.ca.us>
Date: Sat, 1 May 93 03:42:24 PDT
To: uni@acs.bu.edu
Subject: Re:  Tactics.
Message-ID: <199305011041.AA08089@well.sf.ca.us>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Re confrontation vs realpolitik: in political action there is something
called "premature escalation of tactics."  That means things like having a
sit-in before you've even tried having a petition drive.  Once you've
escalated it's very very hard to go back to a less intense tactic, because
it looks like you're vacking down.  So good organisers escalate gradually:
letter writing, then petitions, then voter initiatives, then maybe mass
rallies, then maybe peaceful civil disobedience, and only if those things
fail, then more confrontational tactics.  

We should take a clear lesson from that.  Look at some of the ones who
succeeded: Martin Luther King, Cesar Chavez, and so on.  Start moderate, get
more intense only if moderation fails.  

From which: promulgating underground crypto *as a safety measure*, *just in
case* is one thing, but doing it to get in RSA's face is way premature.  I'd
say start by working with RSA to the extent possible, keeping at it until
there is success, and then if the govt tries to slam public key, that's the
time to break out the insurrectional approach.  But not before.  

The adrenaline rush of a big bad confrontation is a feel-good drug to a lot
of people but we have to be *smarter than that.*  

-gg




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: uni@acs.bu.edu (Shaen Bernhardt)
Date: Sat, 1 May 93 01:30:01 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Patent Bullshit and Crypto Restrictions.
Message-ID: <9305010829.AA99367@acs.bu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Eli, in his infinate wisdom, says:

However, I don't see RSA doing a hell of a lot
to promote crypto use -- the opposite, in fact.  Their software
output is hardly impressive for a corporation of a decade's
standing.  They won't sell me a license -- they'll sell it to Lotus,
but I can't see their source code.  The government hasn't banned
public-key encryption, but it's banned patent-infringing public-key
encryption.  And for practical purposes, that's the only kind there
is.
 
 
The combined effect of present patent law and RSA's "sue first,
write code later" approach has been to stifle the development of
cryptography in this country and in the world.  Perhaps if
encryption algorithms were not encumbered, they would already be in
common use, rendering Clipper untenable.  If RSA Inc. wishes to sell
me a license I shouldn't have to buy, that would be nice.  If they
wish to show their change of heart in some other way, that would be
nice too, as long as it doesn't come with a licensing agreement like
RSAREF's.  But if they're going to continue to sit on their patents,
I'll do without their blessing.
 
Incidentally, I don't think the issue of algorithm patents is as
minor as some have portrayed it.  It has blocked the use of RSA,
after all, giving Clipper a window.  Furthermore, there are patents
on approximately every other cryptographic technique: PK in general,
exponential key exchange, LUC, IDEA, DigiCash, ....  Patents may gut
cryptology the way they have data compression, to pick one example.
This would be a shame.
 
   Eli   ebrandt@jarthur.claremont.edu


I have to agree with much of what Eli says.

I have been reluctant to speak out against Tim's words until
now because I respected Tim's opinions, and value his judgement.
I felt I should "reflect" on the issue a little longer, before
coming to any hard and fast conclusions.  I thought perhaps
time would soften the anger in my heart.

I thought wrong.

I still respect Tim's approach, but I cannot agree with it.

Patents were designed to protect the financial interests of
inventors.  I respect this.  RSA Inc. owns the patent on
the engine, fine.  They deserve to be rewarded for their
work, their interest in developing the method, and their
investment.  I don't mind paying for the right to use
PGP, not in the least.  I'd happily compensate both Phil and
RSA Inc. and PKP or whoever.  IMHO PGP is worth a good $200.
I think many share my view, in concept if not in degree.

When patents become bullshit is when they serve special interests
before they serve economic interests, or the interests of progress.
Fine, life isn't fair.  If the oil companies own a patent on
200 mile per gallon fuel injectors or whatever, fine.  They figure
they'll make more dough if they bury the "secret plans" in the darkest
corners of their sphincters, fine.  That's the law.  That's cool.
But when those plans get out, and someone starts giving away
the injectors for no fee, that's progress.  Sure, illegal, but
progress none the less.  At what point do the interests of the
oil companies conflict with the environment as a whole?

This is the problem I have with the patents on RSA.  No one is
even interested in money, like the oil companies were.
The goal seems to be to RESTRICT ACCESS TO CRYPTOGRAPHY>
DES all over again.  Cripple it.  Weaken it, can't let the
real thing out.  That's bullshit.

Just as the NSA sought to control NSF and restrict funding,
it's backstabbing regulation.  Thanks be for Dr. Weingarten,
an enlightened enough soul to see through the NSA bullshit and
keep cryptography out in the open when they tried to shut it away.

I see PKP and RSA Inc. as partners in the whole mess.
They sit nice and quiet on their patent, making some vague threats
everwhy once in awhile until Clipper comes out, and then they start
to threaten people with action.  Should I be surprised?  After all
if RSA gets out in any REAL implementation, Clipper is useless,
AT&T (those backstabbing two faced snakes with good PR) gets fucked
and Clinton looks like an asshole (ok, more like an asshole) for
proposing a plan that would never work because private industry
had beat him to it.

Sound familiar?  Like IBM, lucifer and DES perhaps?

Bow down to RSA Inc?  Gimme a break.  Why should they fight
the government, they know their patent will get them some
dough.

I don't even want to begin with Denning.  She's got feet in both
worlds.  The problem is no one is going to see it until shes
buried the knife in the libertarians to the hilt.

What sickens me the most is the rhetoric that flys around this
dung pile like buzzing flies.

Crap like "citizens right to privacy" when used in the same paragraph
with "law enforcement requirements"
Crap like "stronger than most algorithms now on the market."
Crap like "to protect us from drug dealers and terrorists."
Crap like "we don't plan to outlaw cryptography"
Crap like... well anything AT&T says.

It all smells the same to me.

The bottom line seems to be if you lay with the whore you
have to wake up with the whore.

Play RSA Inc., AT&T and Dorthy's game today and... what?
The'll pay you back tommorow when you need it?
Bullshit.

Fine, we may lose the battle because business interests are
stronger than an internet mailing list and the american people
have an average I.Q. of 80, but at lease >I< will wake up
and be able to look in the mirror.

Don't sell out cypherpunks, RSA Inc. will stab you in the back
as quickly as anyone else.

uni (Dark)




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: uni@acs.bu.edu (Shaen Bernhardt)
Date: Sat, 1 May 93 03:23:34 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Tactics.
Message-ID: <9305011023.AA176727@acs.bu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Let me phrase the issue in slightly different terms. Which of the following
strategies do you folks think will best improve the chances that strong
crypto remains legal?
 
1. CONFRONTATION: We fight RSADSI at every step. We engage them in legal
battles, we distribute infringing code whenever possible. We get PGP spread
to thousands of users, perhaps tens of thousands of users at bootleg,
underground sites. (Remember that businesses cannot use PGP without fear of
prosecution, fines, whatever...unless the Cypherpunks win their lawsuit
against RSADSI, sometime around 1997 or so, at the rate these cases move
through the courts.)
 
2. REALPOLITIK: We concentrate instead on spreading strong crypto into as
many ecological niches as possible: individuals, corporations, e-mail
packages, attorney-client transactions, and so on. We emphasize the legal,
constitutional right to communicate messages in the language of our choice
(that is, we have no obligation to speak in languages eavesdroppers can
more easily understand). To head off government moves to act against PGP
and similar systems, the parts of PGP that conflict with RSA's patents are
modified, thus becoming legal to use (and Phil even has a chance to make
some money, which he sure as hell can't do now).


*** So spoke Tim May.

I don't see these issues as mutually exclusive.

What may be necessary is to seperate the efforts, to bring the
PGP operation farther underground.  To remove the connection
between PGP distrubtuion and the more "Realpolitik" move to
keep crypto legal.  I admit that some users like Tim, and the
more progfessional of us might find this impossible, but for
the academics and others who don't have to don a suit and
work everyday, underground crypto might be the only real answer.

Consider this, no one ever wins when you fight the government
at its own game.  If they plan to outlaw crypto (a very real
possibility in my view, regardless of more realpolitik efforts)
all that we have to rely on is the underground channels.

It's time (IMHO) to find ways to disguise PGP output in
other types of data, pict or whatever.

At the same time, it is possible to pursue more overt and
legit methods, my fear is these will produce less in terms
of real crypto than will the underground movements.

***
All I've argued is that the "in your face" approach has its limits. Most of
the PGP users are, I think we'll all agree, hobbyists and hackers who
downloaded it, played with it, learned some crypto from it, exchanged keys,
etc. Probably not too many critical uses, YET. But the popularity suggests
a hunger for strong crypto.


*** So spoke Tim May.

Yes... yes... LEARNED SOME CRYPTO FROM IT.  This is the
KEY point here.  How many people out there joined
cypherpunks and became interested in crypto because of PGP?
(I'm raising my hand)  Sure I was interested and even tinkered
with my own code before I knew cypherpunks existed, but it was
PGP that did it.

Education is the key.  I said before, and I will say again:
Most people could give a squirt about crypto.  99% of people
is my guess.  You all saw how pro Clipper most of the newspaper
reports were, how willing they were to change phrases like
"more secure than many of the algorithms on the market" to
"the most secure algorithm to date."  A real politik
method is limited because most people could give a care about the
issue.  The people who seem most passionate about it, in my
experience are the ones who have played with PGP.  I, for one
cant seem to get anyone else to care.  I've talked to about 15
people outside the internet about Clipper, and most forgot all about
it when the next beer came.  No one will learn jack from the bullshit
crypto that Clipper represents.  It will become a transparent process
that anyone could care less about with regard to security.  Back to
the days of the Black Chamber.

The Clipper/Capstone move indicates the government wants to head this off
at the pass. The question is whether the bootleg and infringing PGP (and
Phil admits to all this in his docs, obviously) has a better chance of
succeeding than a fully legal and already spreading RSA solution?
^^^  So spoke Tim May.

I don't think either will make much difference.  Clipper has
caught us before the danger has become apparent to most.
You really think an RSA solution that is really secure is going 
to catch, especially if it conflicts with Clipper, if the government
has anything to say about it?

I've got to be real honest.  I'm beginning to be afraid to open my
mouth on this subject anymore.  Maybe I'm paranoid, but I look at how
hard the government is trying to sell Clipper and processes like it
and I am stunned.  Nothing works this fast.  A company like AT&T is
NOT about to jump on the bandwagon quickly unless they KNOW something.

To me its plain that the intent is to regulate crypto.  Before then I plan
(hope) that PGP finds its way into MANY hands.  That's the only real
weapon I see.  Consider it a safety net to catch us if Tim's
REALPOLITIK fails.  I hope it doesn't, Tim, I hope not but I'm going
to hope for the best and prepare for the worst.  I intend to use
strong crypto when I like.

uni (Dark)




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: uni@acs.bu.edu (Shaen Bernhardt)
Date: Sat, 1 May 93 03:53:41 PDT
To: uni@acs.bu.edu
Subject: Re:  Tactics.
Message-ID: <9305011053.AA133338@acs.bu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>From which: promulgating underground crypto *as a safety measure*, *just in
case* is one thing, but doing it to get in RSA's face is way premature.  I'd
say start by working with RSA to the extent possible, keeping at it until
there is success, and then if the govt tries to slam public key, that's the
time to break out the insurrectional approach.  But not before.
 
The adrenaline rush of a big bad confrontation is a feel-good drug to a lot
of people but we have to be *smarter than that.*
 
-gg


*** So spoke gg@well.sf.ca.us

I agree....
After reading my message over, I realized that many might
see what I said as a call to arms.  It is not.  Instead I suggest
we all stay OUT of RSA's face.  But neither in my opinion shall
we find outselves unwitting partners with RSA only to find ourselves
sold out.

uni (Dark)




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: x62727g2@usma8.USMA.EDU (Gatlin Anthony CDT)
Date: Sat, 1 May 93 05:41:09 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Crytography
Message-ID: <9305011238.AA27003@usma8.usma.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I thought this list was supposed to have a lot of technical stuff--something on
the order of disseminating new ideas on the cutting edge of crypto-technology.
Most everything I see these days seems purely political. If there are problems
with RSA v. PGP or the Wiretap Chip (and there definitely are!!!) then we
should concentrate on designing our own. We can do things like redesign and
code the engine in PGP which is normally handled by the RSA proprietary code
and we can work to come up with voice encryption alternatives to the Wiretap
chip. In other words, let's start using resources other than talk. Talk is
cheap but actions are the catalysts of change.

I am interested in working with people (perhaps you) on projects involving
crypto, computers, and telecommunications. If any of you are serious enough to
do more than talk, perhaps we can organize a team to vigorously pursue
these projects.

Anthony J. Gatlin                  |-------------------------------------|
Cadet Private, Co. G-2             |PGP Public Key available on request. |
United States Military Academy     |-------------------------------------|




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: x62727g2@usma8.USMA.EDU (Gatlin Anthony CDT)
Date: Sat, 1 May 93 05:43:11 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: *** ACT NOW !!! ***
Message-ID: <9305011240.AA27038@usma8.usma.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I thought this list was supposed to have a lot of technical stuff--something on
the order of disseminating new ideas on the cutting edge of crypto-technology.
Most everything I see these days seems purely political. If there are problems
with RSA v. PGP or the Wiretap Chip (and there definitely are!!!) then we
should concentrate on designing our own. We can do things like redesign and
code the engine in PGP which is normally handled by the RSA proprietary code
and we can work to come up with voice encryption alternatives to the Wiretap
chip. In other words, let's start using resources other than talk. Talk is
cheap but actions are the catalysts of change.

I am interested in working with people (perhaps you) on projects involving
crypto, computers, and telecommunications. If any of you are serious enough to
do more than talk, perhaps we can organize a team to vigorously pursue
these projects.

Anthony J. Gatlin                  |-------------------------------------|
Cadet Private, Co. G-2             |PGP Public Key available on request. |
United States Military Academy     |-------------------------------------|




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: cplai@csie.nctu.edu.tw
Date: Fri, 30 Apr 93 17:55:24 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: unsubsribe
Message-ID: <9305010057.AA06347@csie.nctu.edu.tw>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Please, unsubsribe me now.
Please, unsubsribe me now.





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: markh@wimsey.bc.ca (Mark C. Henderson)
Date: Sat, 1 May 93 11:56:15 PDT
To: Eli Brandt <cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: validity of the RSA patent
Message-ID: <m0npMho-0001MsC@van-bc.wimsey.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> > Consider use of another public key encryption scheme, say LUC encryption.
> 
> Which, of course, is patent-pending.  It appears that we can no more
> make progress in cryptography in the face of algorithm patents than
> we could advance mathematics under the burden of theorem licensing.
> We can't afford to wait until 2001.

On the other hand, perhaps the patent holder of LUC would be willing
to licence LUC for use in a PGP-like tool (or PGP 3.0) on the same basis 
IDEA is now licenced to PGP users. (i.e. non-commerical use is OK. Even 
certain commercial use is OK.)

This might solve a lot of our problems.

Has anybody asked? I can't be the first person to have considered
asking. 

Mark

-- 
Mark Henderson
markh@wimsey.bc.ca
RIPEM key available by key server/finger/E-mail
  MD5OfPublicKey: F1F5F0C3984CBEAF3889ADAFA2437433




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Mike Godwin <mnemonic@eff.org>
Date: Sat, 1 May 93 09:08:57 PDT
To: HARUP16@delphi.com
Subject: Re: PGP
In-Reply-To: <01GXMXWJVE4Y95NBR5@delphi.com>
Message-ID: <199305011608.AA04241@eff.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


 
> I know there is a great deal of 
> difference between death and software ....

I'd say this depends on the software.


--Mike



Mike Godwin,    |    Ariel Rose Godwin
mnemonic@eff.org|    Born 4-15-93 at 4:34 pm in Cambridge 
(617) 576-4510  |    7 pounds, 1.5 ounces, 19.75 inches long 
EFF, Cambridge  |    A new citizen of the Electronic Frontier 




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Eric Hughes <hughes@soda.berkeley.edu>
Date: Sat, 1 May 93 12:54:38 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: clipper and public key
Message-ID: <9305011951.AA27289@soda.berkeley.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Tim mentions that the Clipper chip requires public key in order to be
useful.  This is not quite right.

The clipper chip is only a symmetric-keyed block cipher with a
peculiar (and condemnable) key setup feature.  the chip _per se_ does
not involved public key.

The problem is that you have to get the same key on both end of the
link without transmitting it.  There is a "public key" way of doing
this: Diffie-Hellman key exchange.  That would require licensing from
RSADSI.

This is not, however, the only way to do this.  If you have a
symmetric cipher and a secret system key not known to the
participants, i.e.  embedded in hardware, then you can also transmit a
session key simply by encrypting it.  Of course if you know the system
key then you can read the traffic, LEEF's aside.  Such a system master
key could fairly easily be discovered, unless it's burned into the
chip by the manufacturer and the secret ends there.  (Yeah, right)

Hence in order for a reasonably (?) secure implementation of a
telephone which uses the clipper chip, D-H seems to be necessary.  In
fact, the AT&T 3600 phone does use D-H for key exchange.

Some have asked how come AT&T doesn't get sued by RSADSI.  Easy:
they're a licensee.

In summary: Does clipper require public key?  In itself, no.  In
implementation, likely.

Eruc




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Hal <74076.1041@CompuServe.COM>
Date: Sat, 1 May 93 10:02:47 PDT
To: CYPHERPUNKS <CYPHERPUNKS@toad.com>
Subject: PGP on soda.berkely.edu
Message-ID: <930501165557_74076.1041_FHD12-1@CompuServe.COM>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

I want to thank Tim for taking the time to help clarify what he had in
mind in proposing that we reconsider our support for PGP in the face of
PKP's assertion of patent rights:

> I completely agree and nothing I have ever said suggests we place all our
> faith in his company or any other institution. What I have said--several
> times, now--is that a frontal attack on the RSA patents, via highly public
> postings of PGP and a "Fuck you!" approach to talking with patent owners,
> is not the best strategy at this time.

Speaking in generalizations can only go so far.  It's more useful to
consider specific actions which might be in keeping with this philosophical
approach.

I don't have many problems with our being civil to RSADSI.  We don't need
to spit in Bidzos' face whenever we meet him, refuse to shake his hand,
whatever.  Tact is OK.

And the proposal to make a U.S.-legal version of PGP can't hurt anything,
either.  Moves in this direction have been going on for some time.  Several
months ago a patch was inserted to make certain data structures be compatible
with RSA's PKCS standards, and therefore with RSAREF.  This would allow
RSAREF to be used if permission were gained to call it at an entry point
not on the allowed list.  However, this version of PGP would still be
incompatible with pre-2.2 versions.  To make a fully compatible version of PGP
you not only have to call RSAREF at an undocumented entry point, you also
have to modify the code slightly.

All this has been going on for a few months.  Eric Hughes deserves a lot
of credit for encouraging progress in this direction, but I think Phil
fundamentally agrees as well.

One advantage of a U.S.-legal version of PGP is that its very existence
would mean that no one HAD to use it.  Sending out a PGP signed message
would no longer be incriminating, even if you used the older (and
presumably faster) version of PGP.  There would be no way to tell from
external observation which PGP users were using the legal one and which were
using the illegal one.  They would be functionally equivalent, but the legal
one would be slower.  (I find this rather amusing, actually, as it just goes
to show the illogic of PKP's position.)

What are some other issues that might arise in a move away from PGP, and
an adoption of a less confrontational attitude towards RSADSI?  One is the
existance of PGP on the Cypherpunks server.  Presumably this could be
replaced by the legal version once that becomes available, but in the
mean time it might have to disappear.  I would oppose removing it unless
a legal replacement were ready.

Another suggestion that I have heard rumored is that Bidzos might be
invited to join the list.  I would strongly oppose this.  I am also not
comfortable with having him be a participant at Cypherpunks meetings but
since I don't attend them I don't really have the right to complain.

Tim has suggested, if I understand him, that we in some sense work to
improve MailSafe and other RSA products.  I don't really like the idea
of doing unpaid consulting work for a commercial outfit.  If I am going
to work for free, on my own time, I'd like to see the software made
freely available.  So any work with RSA should be on freeware products,
in my opinion.  Improve RSAREF, not MailSafe.

Another issue is whether people would be discouraged from discussing
infringing projects on the Cypherpunks list or at the meetings.  Suppose
somebody wants to talk about a socket-based DC net protocol which uses
Diffie-Hellman key exchange to initialize a shared PRNG for random bit
generation.  Oops, DH is a PKP patent.  Again, I feel that this kind of
project is entirely appropriate for the list and the group.  Does this
fall into Tim's confrontational category: "distributing infringing code
whenever possible"?  I'm not sure.

(I have to confess, given the 15 hour delay in my message posting
the other day (while a short message I dashed off 12 hours later appeared
in a few minutes), that I thought perhaps a filter had been installed to
prevent PGP-signed messages from appearing.  Of course, my message did
eventually appear, the delay being just a technical glitch. I assume
that no one would support banning PGP-signed messages from appearing
on the list.)

A really sticky issue is our public attitude towards Bidzos cracking down
on unauthorized crypto.  What if some lone wolf out there does decide to
go to the mat on PGP or some other infringing software?  Whose side do we
take?  (Refusing to take a position is a de facto support of PKP, IMO.)
I guess we'd have to hope that this never happens.  Gee, it sure seems
strange to HOPE that no one ever stands up to PKP.

I have to say on this point that I can't accept the idea of Cypherpunks
moving into a Sternlight position of support for PKP's crackdowns.

I'd be interested in hearing other specific suggestions for changes which
might result from Tim's suggestion.  This might help focus the discussion
better.

===

To the extent that Tim is proposing that we encourage efforts to make a
U.S. legal version of PGP, and even replace the current version of PGP
on the Cypherpunks FTP site with the legal version when that becomes
available, I have no problem with it.  To the extent that he suggests that
we be polite and courteous in our public talk about RSADSI, I can accept
that as well.

But to the extent that anyone is proposing to go beyond this into some
of the other areas I listed above (and I have no idea exactly what
anyone has in mind specifically), I think the many problems I and others
have listed in earlier messages provide strong arguments against such
measures.

Hal
74076.1041@compuserve.com

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.2

iQCVAgUBK+KBE6gTA69YIUw3AQE77QQAnbYSx8cqvvraaJGeUXDKJT0mQVv/HbAj
r5IehVCB5/fMeZiaY9ERdBOwllgvJiTRzN3tsHJAkd8QTz9Puv5UgVXLbjPWdQvS
5XPYFkH+A4Kaos+Rlwo1ufLQ1S3eFyV35L6e9CptgYqni/QQoZFhU7Wjqlv5QQmH
KcE2xEMLMas=
=JL8R
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: William Oldacre <76114.2307@CompuServe.COM>
Date: Sat, 1 May 93 11:07:22 PDT
To: <cypherpunks@toad.com>
Subject: A legal way to use RSA!
Message-ID: <930501180040_76114.2307_BHA70-1@CompuServe.COM>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


To: cypherpunks@toad.com

                     A Legal Way To Use RSA
                     ----------------------

There is a LEGAL way to establish the free use of PGP and the RSA 
algorithm by anyone who wishes to preserve their constitutional right 
to privacy.  No licensing or fees are involved.

The RSA algorithm is not copyrighted software, it's a patented 
technique (presumably in the form of a mathematical algorithm).  
Under patent law, it is legal to manufacture anything that someone 
has patented for your own use.  If the item is an improved can 
opener, for example, then you can make one for yourself directly from 
the patent office drawings if you like.  You cannot offer them for 
sale.  So anyone is free to create a computer program which utilizes
the RSA algorithm so long as it's just for them.

All mathematical equations, no matter how large and complex, consist 
of smaller terms or sub calculations.  In the instant case of the RSA 
algorithm, these smaller terms consist of prime numbers, Euler's 
quotient function, and operations like calculating the greatest 
common divisor and modular arithmetic.  It's all about as patentable 
as long division.  No one could be prevented from using such ordinary 
mathematics.

PGP performs other tasks besides RSA related calculations.  It 
supports IDEA and XXENCODE which are in the public domain.  So it's 
only necessary to rewrite the RSA section to avoid conflict with the 
patent.  This could be accomplished by arranging the section into a 
few mathematical modules or "building blocks."  These could then be 
rearranged by the user into several different configurations for 
encryption ------ with only one supporting the actual RSA algorithm.  
After all, large prime numbers can  legitimately be used as keys for 
almost any encryption technique and the arithmetic operations may be 
called as subroutines for a variety purposes.  

By stacking the un patentable "building blocks" into the particular 
sequence which implements the RSA algorithm, the users would, in 
essence, be employing their own tools (the computer and it's 
software) to create a copy of the RSA algorithm for their individual 
use.  Programming skills would not be required since the inexpert 
user could simply employ a setup program and select from a menu of 
different encryption modes.  Alternatively, a DEBUG script could be 
circulated separately to appropriately reshuffle the object code.

Legal action to prevent such a program from being distributed could 
be very difficult.  What reasonable argument could be set forth 
against someone using the mathematical functions?  Arguing that 
someone -might- use the program to create RSA would make no more 
sense than arguing that a drill press -might- be used to make a 
patented can opener.  Besides, if it's legal for someone to make 
their own can opener, how can it be illegal to sell them the tools 
and materials to do it with?  Providing instructions on how to do it 
can hardly be attacked because the U.S. Patent Office, itself,
publishes the plans (technically, they appear to violate the law 
whenever they send copies outside U.S. borders).  By now, you get the 
point.  There's a well anchored legal loophole in the patent law big 
enough to sail a ship through.  It may render patents of formulae 
used in computer software worthless (as they ought to be).

I sympathize with Public Key Partners.  The venture must have looked 
awfully good on paper, but their position is fundamentally untenable.  
Sooner or later the subject of their exclusive rights over RSA will 
reach the courtroom.  There is legal precedent for allowing private 
corporations to market products developed with public funds.  
However, a case might very well be made that MIT erred in granting an 
exclusive license.  It would be to the greater public good (the 
underlying principal) to release RSA into the public domain so a 
range of competing businesses could provide it to the public.  
Because the right to privacy is involved, rather than valves for a 
rocket engine, a federal court could take licensing entirely out of 
Massachusetts' and MIT's hands if any federal funds could be traced 
to RSA's development.

Once in court, it will make the newspapers.  A private company 
profiteering from something the taxpayers paid for ----- denying 
privacy to the average American with heavy handed tactics.  The 
simple fact is, I don't like it and I have a feeling most people 
won't like the sound of it.  The press, a major user of electronic 
mail and a jealous guardian of sources, is not likely to take a 
sympathetic stance.  There is a large organized body of opposed 
computer users poised to launch letter writing campaigns and many 
congressional "waste slayers" are apt to show real interest in the 
matter.  Foundations which fund lawsuits on freedom issues abound.  
As courtroom and legislative arguments are raised against the license 
or patent, what foolish company is going to risk paying the license 
fee?  The RSA license quivers on a bowl of Jello.

I know financial misadventure when I see it.  I'm glad none of my 
money is invested in Public Key Partners.

Bon Voyage!





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: phr@america.Telebit.COM (Paul Rubin)
Date: Sat, 1 May 93 14:06:45 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: clipper poll
Message-ID: <9305012106.AA01079@america.TELEBIT.COM>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Date: Sat, 1 May 93 08:28:04 PDT
From: wuthel!brand@drums.reasoning.com (Russell Brand)
To: brand@drums.reasoning.com
Subject: CLIPPER POLL please propigate this to like minded people


I am one of the many concerned computer scientists opposing the `Clipper Chip
Initiative' that would waste the better part of eight billion dollars,
interfere with individual privacy, promote harassment of individuals, threaten
US competiveness and in fact simplify many types of criminal activity.  


It is important to take this opportunity to show the level of public opposition
to this extension of domestic spying and abuse of government funds.  Given the
congressional vote to allow even more telephone taps WITHOUT warrents earlier
this month, this is even a more pressing issue than it would otherwise be.

Of course you should show your opposition in other ways as well, but this is a
FREE and EZ first step.

If you aren't sufficiently familiar with the issues, please feel free to send
me email on the topic

/Russell

    Communications Week magazine has a weekly telephone response poll.


    This week's question is:


    Do you agree with the Clinton administration's Public Encryption
    Management directive for communications equipment?


    Yes: 800-242-CWKY
    No:  800-242-CWKN


Excerpted from `Boston Globe' of April 11, 1993, page 16.

New England Votes in Congress

Roll Call Report Syndicate


WASHINGTON - This is how New England members of Congress were recorded
on major roll-call votes last week.

 ...

TO EXPAND FBI PHONE ACCESS:

By a vote of 367-6, the House sent the Senate a bill expanding the FBI's
power to obtain, without court warrants, telephone records and
conversations in investigations of international terrorism and
espionage.  The bill grants the FBI access in such investigations to
information on unlisted numbers that phone companies cannot now divulge.
It also enables FBI counterintelligence agents to obtain a broader
range of telephone conversations involving suspected terrorists and
spies.

A yes vote was to pass the bill.

..






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: wuthel!noisy@drums.reasoning.com
Date: Sat, 1 May 93 16:11:37 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Patent fallacies
Message-ID: <9305012121.AA07256@wuthel.uucp>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



There seems to be some misunderstanding of how patent protection works.  Page
numbers in square brackets are references to _Patent_It_Yourself_ by David
Pressman (Nolo Press) 2nd edition.  Page numbers in angle brackets are to
``Intellectual Property'' by Miller & Davis (West) 2nd edition.


CONTRIBUTOR INFRINGEMENT

  ``If your claims don't read on the infringnid device, but the infringing
    device is a specially made compenent tha't nly useful in a machine covered
    by your patent, the ingringer may be liable under the doctrine of
   `Contributroy infringment' '' [page 15-9]
   
    ``If a person actively encourages another to make, user or sell the inventino
     without permission, the psers so inducing is liable for INDIRECT
     infringment.   CONTRIBUTORY infringment can be commmitted by know selling
     or supplying a non-stape item for which the only or predominant use is in
     connecitno with a patented invention.'' <130>

     ``Contributory infringement can occur only in connection with a SALE . . .
       Thus, a contributory infringer can be liable for infringment even though
	what he has sold is completey i the public domain and has no patent
	protection itself.'' <131>


HOME INFRINGEMENT

    ``While 'home infrignement' may be difficult to detect, nevertheless it is
      a form in infringment which is legally actionable and can subject the
      infringer to paying damages and/or an injunction prohibiting futher
      infringement '' [page 15-12]

      ''A patenet ahs the EXCLUSIVE right to MAKE, USE or SELL the invention.
	35 SUCA Par 154 <128> .... The  owner of a patent ... has  the right to
        exclude  all others from using ... it.


SELECTIVE ENFORCEMENT IS OK


	``. . . a patent owner is not prejudiced by the fact that antoher
	  infringer has prodcuded the item without notice of the paten even
	  though a later second infrigner could legitimately claim that he
          copies an unmarked product.'' <129>

/w





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Marc Horowitz <marc@GZA.COM>
Date: Sat, 1 May 93 12:07:17 PDT
To: "Ian S. Nelson" <ian@bvsd.Co.EDU>
Subject: Re: Tough Choices: PGP vs. RSA Data Security
In-Reply-To: <199304300123.AA27903@bvsd.Co.EDU>
Message-ID: <9305011908.AA26541@pad-thai.aktis.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>> If they are so willing to let us do this, then will they tell us why
>> we have to use their code?  If they are willing to do it, it shouldn't
>> matter what code we use.

Wrong.  The RSAREF code is *licensed* to you for non-commercial use.
They are explicitly not giving it away, or making it "freely
available".  By allowing you to use it under their license, they are
not leaving themselves open to claims of non-enforcement of their
patent.  If they let you write your own code, then, strictly speaking,
you would need a license to use it.  Negotiating such a license is
expensive and time-consuming.  You don't want to do it.  If RSA is
willing to let you use their code, do so.  It's probably the best
compromise you're going to get unless you have a lot of money and
lawyers to spare.  I have the source code, and I can read it.  If
there are any back doors, I (or someone with more experience) can find
them.  That's enough security for me.

		Marc

P.S.  I don't like software and algorithm patents, and said so to Jim
Bidzos's virtual face during the conference last weekend.  But the law
still stands, and although IMHO it is flawed, it's not inconsistent,
so I'll obey it.  If the gov't outlaws strong crypto, then they've
just done something illegal w.r.t. the Constitution in my mind, and I
will feel free to disobey that law, should it come about.  In civil
disobedience (which is essentally what people are arguing for), you
disobey laws you find so immoral or so evil that you cannot
conscionably obey them.  I don't like the current patent law in this
country, but my disagreements are in the details of the law, not in
it's very nature.  I don't think any of my fundamental rights are
being violated, so I'll complain and disagree, but not disobey.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: 00MYRICHARDS@leo.bsuvc.bsu.edu
Date: Sat, 1 May 93 14:20:46 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: hello
Message-ID: <736291213.234107.00MYRICHARDS@bsuvc.bsu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


     Have I managed to reach you?  (If so, please reply.)




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Derek Atkins <warlord@Athena.MIT.EDU>
Date: Sat, 1 May 93 14:23:48 PDT
To: William Oldacre <76114.2307@CompuServe.COM>
Subject: Re: A legal way to use RSA!
In-Reply-To: <930501180040_76114.2307_BHA70-1@CompuServe.COM>
Message-ID: <9305012123.AA17107@podge>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> Once in court, it will make the newspapers.  A private company 
> profiteering from something the taxpayers paid for

Uhh, I hate to inform you, but this was discussed back in the Congress
in the 1960's.  It was decided, then, that patents COULD be obtained
fromm research done using gov't funding.  Therefore, this is nothing
new.  In fact, I doubt a paper would even touch this "scoop"...

As to whether or no I agree with this, well, thats a different topic.
(I happen to believe that patents on algorithms are stupid, but that's
besides the point).  In other words, there was nothing illegal in the
RSA patent, even if there was gov't funding....

-derek





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: gnu (John Gilmore)
Date: Sat, 1 May 93 18:20:03 PDT
To: cypherpunks
Subject: [Gavin Doughtie: Electronic escrow?]
Message-ID: <9305020120.AA27878@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


------- Forwarded Message

Date: Wed, 28 Apr 1993 17:56:13 -0700
From: Gavin Doughtie <gavin@well.sf.ca.us>
Message-Id: <199304290056.AA26690@well.sf.ca.us>
To: gnu@toad.com
Subject: Electronic escrow?

How could two paranoid entities make use of digital cash and encryption to
sell a chunk of data (letUs say something really valuable like a list of
famous women linked to Elvis Presley in 1992) without 1) revealing their
identities to each other or 2) involving a third party to act as an RescrowS
agent.  The paradox IUm thinking about is one where the purchaser of the
information doesnUt want the sellerUs digital cash to be worth anything
until the data being sold can be provably decrypted, and the seller doesnUt
want the info being sold to be decryptable until the cash turns out to be
genuine.

You're a well-known cryptography person; I'm a struggling writer. If
you're not inclined to respond, perhaps you can direct this message to
someone who can.

Thanks very much!

Gavin.

------- End of Forwarded Message





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: 00MYRICHARDS@leo.bsuvc.bsu.edu
Date: Sat, 1 May 93 16:49:18 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: my last post
Message-ID: <736300145.687107.00MYRICHARDS@bsuvc.bsu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


     Sorry if I'm just wasting bandwidth here.  I just asked if I'd gotten
through because I couldn't find any reference to this list on the system and
I figured the people at Mondo 2000 probably just made it up.  I guess not.
Cool.  I got a message telling me how to subscribe, so I guess I'll talk to
y'all later.

                                                       -SMR




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Mike Godwin <mnemonic@eff.org>
Date: Sat, 1 May 93 15:56:46 PDT
To: x62727g2@usma8.USMA.EDU (Gatlin Anthony CDT)
Subject: Re: Crytography
In-Reply-To: <9305011238.AA27003@usma8.usma.edu>
Message-ID: <199305012255.AA13267@eff.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


 
Gatlin writes:

> In other words, let's start using resources other than talk. Talk is
> cheap but actions are the catalysts of change.

Talk may also be the catalyst for change. See, e.g., the Federalist Papers
and the First Amendment.


--Mike







From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: ghoast@gnu.ai.mit.edu
Date: Sat, 1 May 93 16:48:49 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: OUTDIAL SERVICE
Message-ID: <9305012348.AA24681@hal.gnu.ai.mit.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I don't know if this is consistant with what everyone here is talking about in
regards to "outdialing serivce," but some time ago I heard about a 900 number
that a person could call, that would redirect their call so as to avoid being
traced, etc.  Oddly enough, I think they advertised that all the calls are 
logged and kept in some vault in another state.  I may be confusing something 
here though.  (As if this is the case, they've probably gone out of buisness.)

----
ghoast@gnu.ai.mit.edu
		 ----




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: uni@acs.bu.edu (Shaen Bernhardt)
Date: Sat, 1 May 93 17:17:41 PDT
To: ghoast@gnu.ai.mit.edu
Subject: Re: OUTDIAL SERVICE
Message-ID: <9305020017.AA68213@acs.bu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I don't know if this is consistant with what everyone here is talking about in
regards to "outdialing serivce," but some time ago I heard about a 900 number
that a person could call, that would redirect their call so as to avoid being
traced, etc.  Oddly enough, I think they advertised that all the calls are
logged and kept in some vault in another state.  I may be confusing something
here though.  (As if this is the case, they've probably gone out of buisness.)
 
----
ghoast@gnu.ai.mit.edu
                 ----


Yeah, I've heard of the system too.
They claim they wont let their info out without a court order.
I feel that there are a good deal of legal problems with this.
It wont take much to get a court order and the ONLY reason worth
the 2 bucks or whatever they want to add to what would otherwise
be a local call (for caller ID evasion anyhow) would be to avoid
legal action of one type or another.  I suspect that the calls that
go through this system are monitored occasionally too.





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Hal <74076.1041@CompuServe.COM>
Date: Sat, 1 May 93 17:27:10 PDT
To: Cypherpunks <cypherpunks@toad.com>
Subject: Patent fallacies
Message-ID: <930502002101_74076.1041_FHD63-1@CompuServe.COM>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Another patent misconception, from what I understand, is that an unenforced
patent becomes invalid.  It is said that PKP is "forced" to go after PGP
because if they don't their patent will lose its force.
 
Several days ago Tom Morrow on the Extropians list said that this doctrine
applies to trademarks but not to patents.  Patents have a fixed 17 year
lifetime and failure to enforce against one user does not preclude the
patent owner from enforcing against another.  The folklore about the loss of
intellectual property rights that we are all familiar with (aspirin, zippers,
etc.) are all cases of trademark losses.
 
Tom is a law student, not a lawyer; also, I am a few days behind on my
Extropians reading so I don't know whether any follow-ups or corrections
were posted since his message.  But this principle seems to be in accordance
with what was posted here about selective enforcement of patents.
 
If this is in fact how patents behave, it is one less justification for
PKP's heavy-handed enforcement efforts against PGP.  It means that PKP could
choose not to enforce against PGP (or any other freeware program) without
losing any rights to enforce against others.  It would be interesting to
hear an authoritative opinion on this from a lawyer.
 
Hal
 






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: jdblair@nextsrv.cas.muohio.edu (John Blair)
Date: Sat, 1 May 93 19:15:31 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: questions...
Message-ID: <9305020221.AA04215@ nextsrv.cas.muohio.EDU >
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Hello, all.  I'm new to this mailing list, but I've been following it for
about 1/2 a week now, and I think I've found my niche.  However, I've got a
few questions that I was wondering if someone could help me with.

1)  Is there a suggested, general purpose book on cryptography that would
introduce me to the basics, and expand into more of the theory?  I'm decent
at math, but its definately not me strong point.

2)  I've downloaded to source code for Mac PGP from soda.berkeley.edu. Is there
an executable version available?  I haven't learned C yet, and I don't have
easy access to a C compiler, although I'm pretty sure I can take care of it
if I have to.

Also, on another note.  I've noticed the discussion about passing out
information at Raves.  The idea sounds like a good one, but is IMHO a definite
long shot.  Most of the ravers that I know a definate math-phobes, and
paradoxically practically technophobes.  If not technophobes, they would rather
not deal with it except for their weekly rush.  Still, I like the idea of 
passing stuff out there.  For at least every 50 people who go "huh?" there will
be someone who goes "yeah!" and explains it to his friends.  I would pass out 
info here in the Cincinatti area when I go, and at other times I could give the
leaflets to a friend who is more of a raver, and just tell him to scatter them
about.  Someone will read it, and catch on, and that will be worth it.

Now, this may sound like a stupid q, but does gzip decompress the ZIP format
that you say the info you have is in?  In my experience, ZIP has been a DOS 
compressor, and I am more of a Mac/Unix person.  Again, if necessary, I can
take care of it.

later,

john blair.
jdblair@nextsrv.cas.muohio.edu      
data is fluid.   will do multimedia for food- contact me.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: wcs@anchor.ho.att.com
Date: Sat, 1 May 93 21:29:15 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: TALK, ACTION, CHANGE Re: Cryptography
Message-ID: <9305020429.AA22762@anchor.ho.att.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text


Anthony Gatlin writes:
> > In other words, let's start using resources other than talk.
> > Talk is cheap but actions are the catalysts of change.
Mike Godwin replies:
> Talk may also be the catalyst for change. See, e.g., the Federalist
> Papers and the First Amendment.

Both of you are, of course, right :-)  One of the valuable things about
cypherpunks is that there *has* been a fair amount of action,
though every once in a while we need to step back and ask
"What are we DOING here?".  As one of the manifestoes around says,
"Cypherpunks write code."  PGP has had a remarkable success in getting
strong crypto out to thousands of people, increasing the interest in
the technical community and reaching out to other communities,
and giving us something that, if push comes to shove, we can use
to communicate with no chance of government eavesdropping.  That's good.
When it first came out, I got a copy for just that reason,
because strong crypto may later be banned.  I've also got RIPEM,
which is legally kosher, though it doesn't have the key distribution /
certification infrastructure that's been built with PGP.  (Yet!)
PGP has been a really useful research tool for that.

However, for many of us, using PGP for non-research applications,
like sending messages to our friends, IS in violation of RSA's patents.
Ripping off your allies is a bad policy; better to turn competitors into friends.
I don't happen to like algorithm patents, and I especially dislike
the overbroad claims made by the collection of patents held by PKP,
but R,S,&A, and Diffie and Hellman, HAVE given us some really powerful
techniques that we wouldn't have had if they hadn't developed or published.
They've been relatively flexible about free licenses, 
the RSAREF code lets us do real work within a reasonably broad framework,
and while they've written some heavy cease-and-desist threats to some  of us,
they *haven't actually sued any of us, and as far as I can tell they're
basically on our side of the people-vs-government-control game.
We need to work together with them, though obviously we need to keep trying
to convince them to let us do more, either for free or for money;
I hope they'll turn around.  PGP has certainly been a catalyst for getting
them to address our part of the market....

Whenever possible, at least for the next 5-7 years until the patents expire,
I'm planning to put up with the limits of their licenses for production code,
though research is a different story.  Besides, there's a certain amount of
hack value in programming with one hand tied behind your back :-) ;
we can do just about everything we need using the RSAREF interface, though
some applications would be simpler and cleaner without its limitations.

One especially nice thing about RSAREF is the ability to use our work
internationally.  Sure, they're covering their behinds by forbidding
export of the RSAREF code, but they haven't told use we can't
export code written to use their interfaces, or forbidden us to
use RSAREF to communicate across the political borders.
Using illegal code like PGP to do so creates too much opportunity
for the SS/NSA/etc to bust us, even if RSA hasn't pressed charges.

			Bill Stewart
			
# Bill Stewart    wcs@anchor.ho.att.com  +1-908-949-0705 Fax-4876
# AT&T Bell Labs, Room 4M-312, Crawfords Corner Rd, Holmdel, NJ  07733-3030



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Hal <74076.1041@CompuServe.COM>
Date: Sat, 1 May 93 22:27:08 PDT
To: CYPHERPUNKS <CYPHERPUNKS@toad.com>
Subject: Apology and clarification
Message-ID: <930502052048_74076.1041_FHD38-1@CompuServe.COM>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I want to clear up any misconceptions raised by my message about possible
changes in Cypherpunks policies and practices.

The various possibilities that I raised, such as forbidding discussion
of patent-infringing projects at Cypherpunks meetings, or endorsing future
PKP crackdowns on infringers, were completely my own conceptions.  They
were not meant to represent actual suggestions raised by Tim, Eric, or
anyone else.  Rather, they were my own extrapolations and extensions of
what I viewed as positions being advocated on the list.

But I see now that I went too far in drawing these extensions, especially
given that the actual statements being made here bore little resemblance to
the suggestions I made.  The "straw man" positions which resulted were so
extreme as to discredit anyone who would favor them.  I hope no one will
assume from my message that any list member advocates those views.

I may have responded with excessive emotion to recent proposals here,
coming as they do on the heels of the threat raised by Clipper.  I do
feel a sense of commitment to the PGP effort despite my current relatively
inactive state there.  My reaction was perhaps overly defensive.  I'll try
to keep a clearer head in the future and react only to actual threats rather
than imagined ones.

Hal





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Sy Verpunc <svp@gtoal.com>
Date: Sun, 2 May 93 19:49:46 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Voice Privacy
Message-ID: <9305020210.AA02195@pizzabox.demon.co.uk>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


	From: Jason Asbahr <Asbahr@uh.edu>

	I don't remember hearing this exact use of privacy-enhanced voice
	communication discussed on the list before, but I might not have been
	paying attention.  :-)

I started asking about this recently and discovered that a lot of people
are interested in it and some of them are even doing something about it.
The most promising group is an Internet Engineering Task Force working
on a project called 'nevot' (network voice terminal) - I'll include the
readme after this post.  It's only drawback is that it doesn't handle
completely-software low baud rates that'll work over the internet *on top
of* v32bis modems running slip or ppp.  I'm working with some folks to
hack up a really low bandwidth scheme and when our experiments are
successful (if...) we'll feed them back to these folks so that everyone
can use it.

If anyone here is working on low bandwidth digital voice, there's a
mailing list on netphone{-request}@moink.nmsu.edu - its a low-volume
list and really only for reporting what people are working on; chatty
discussions would probably be better on comp.speech or sci.crypt.

Remember that before we get crypto voice, we need non-crypto voice, so 
there's no real reason to discuss the basics in a crypto group.

	What do you think about encrypting voice communication in a
	non-real-time sense?  Say I record a message (8-bit CODEC) on my NeXT
	or on a friend's PC Soundblaster and then encrypt/scramble the file in
	such a way that the resultant file is still audible.  I can then leave
	that message on the recipient's answering machine or voice mail box
	for him to later record and decrypt on his computer.  This method would 
	make private voice communication more accessable, as it doesn't require 
	real-time levels of performance.

This is baically what the multi-media extentions to email are about - check
up on MIME if you don't know about it.  Email mechanisms are fine - the
concept of a 'software answering machine' is seductive, but we don't need
anything special when you can say 'mail -voice fred' and pick up a mike and
talk into it...

Graham.
---------------
See also gaia.cs.umass.edu:~ftp/pub/nevot/*

NEVOT - A network voice terminal (BETA RELEASE 1.3 03/25/93)
(c) Henning Schulzrinne
=============================================================

NOTE: The .nevotinit files from versions prior to 1.3 are incompatible
with the current command language and should be deleted.

DESCRIPTION:
The network voice terminal (NEVOT) allows audio-capable workstations to
participate in audio conferences across local and wide area networks.

Features:
- real-time protocols:
  - NVP (network voice protocol), as used by 'vat' (LBL) and VT (isi)
  - 'vat' native packet format and session protocol
  - RTP draft 
- versions for:
  - Sun SPARCstation (SunOS 4.1.x and Solaris 5.x)
  - SGI Indigo (4D Series) and
  - Personal DECstations [as soon as we can get the DEC audio library to work]
- GUIs:
  - XView
  - Tk [in progress]
  - curses
  - dumb terminal
- fully controllable by Tcl-based command language
- can serve as gateway for protocol and encoding translation
- network transport protocols:
  - TCP
  - unicast/multicast UDP 
  - ST-II [currently inoperative]
- several independent concurrent conferences, each with different
  encoding and compression
- DES-based voice encryption (U.S. only)
- audio encodings:
  - 64 kb/s (mu-law PCM)
  - 32 kb/s G.721 ADPCM (Sun only)
  - 32 kb/s Intel DVI
  - 24 kb/s G.723 APDCM (Sun only)
  - 13 kb/s GSM
  - 4.8 kb/s LPC codec
- each site can use different audio encodings
- playback and recording of AIFC and .snd audio files
- extensive statistics and tracing facilities
- arbitrary voice packet length, which may differ for each site
- lost packet and silence substitution
- setable audio buffer occupancy
- configurable adjustment mechanisms for playout delay, VU meter,
  silence detector and automatic gain control
- redefinable session identifier string with variable substitution

DOCUMENTATION:
A compressed PostScript file describing Nevot is available for anonymous
ftp from gaia.cs.umass.edu, as file ~ftp/pub/nevot.ps.Z.

INSTALLATION:
The sources are available by anonymous ftp from gaia.cs.umass.edu, as
file ~ftp/pub/nevot/nevot.tar.Z (compressed tar file).  The platform-
specific external libraries are contained in the directory
pub/nevot/lib.$ARCH. These typically change rarely.  ARCH can be either
dec, sgi, or sun4.

Precompiled binaries are available as well:
  nevot/bin.$ARCH/nevot.tar.Z
For the precompiled binaries, you also need to retrieve the 
initialization file ~ftp/pub/nevot/nevotinit and rename it to .nevotinit
in the directory from which you plan to start Nevot.

Unpack the compressed tar files, then execute the shell script
  compile
You may have to adjust parameters within the shell script to your
local needs, e.g., the compiler name.  You also have to install the
tcl library (version 6.7 or later), either the binary version as
mentioned above, or from sources to be found in
sprite.berkeley.edu:tcl.  In order to use the UDP multicast and/or
ST-II facilities, you have to install the appropriate kernel
modifications.

Due to export restrictions, the DES encryption code is available only by
e-mail from the author. If you do have the DES code, change the value of
the symbol DES in the Makefiles to 1.

To enable on-line help for the OpenWindows version, the environment
variable HELPPATH should be set to include the source directory where
the .info files are located (here, assumed to be
/usr/local/nevot/xview):

   setenv HELPPATH ${HELPPATH}:/usr/local/nevot/xview

OPERATION WITH SD:
------------------
sd is a session directory written by Van Jacobson, LBL, available for
anonymous ftp at ftp.ee.lbl.gov.
The nevot/sd directory contains a replacement for the sd start_audio
procedure, which you can insert into your ~/.sd.tcl startup file. Make
sure that the directory containing the Nevot binary is in your path.
Use at your own risk (i.e., don't blame VJ if it doesn't work...).


DIFFICULTIES:
-------------
If you experience difficulties, check the problems.tex file in the
doc directory.

BUG REPORTS:
This is a beta release.  Please send all bug reports and suggestions
to the author at hgschulz@cs.umass.edu.  New releases will be
announced through the rem-conf mailing list (to join the list, send a
request to rem-conf-request@es.net).  I would appreciate if you could
let me know how you are using the software.

[A version for the Personal DECstation and DECstations with the DEC audio
hardware is currently under development.]

COPYRIGHT:
All sources and documentation (except those listed in the
acknowledgements or otherwise identified) are (c) Henning Schulzrinne
1992, University of Massachusetts and AT&T Bell Laboratories.  Do not
redistribute this software, or integrate with other software, without
preserving the copyright notice.  All changes have to be clearly
marked.  You may modify the code as long as you provide me with a
copy.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS:
The DES encryption module was developed by Steve Kent and John Linn of
BBN Communications Corporation, Cambridge, MA and provided by Karen Seo
of BBN. The audio library incorporating G.721 and G.723 audio
compression was provided by Daniel Steinberg of Sun Microsystems. It may
at some point be integrated into the regular Sun OS. The Intel/DVI ADPCM
codec was slightly modified from sources by Jack Kansen (CWI) and is
copyrighted 1992 by Stichting Mathematisch Centrum, Amsterdam, The
Netherlands (used by permission).

The ST-II API and kernel support was developed by Charlie Lynn at BBN.
The ST-II API (\C{st2_api.h}) is copyrighted (c) 1991 by BBN Systems and
Technologies, a division of Bolt Beranek and Newman, Inc. and used by
permission.  The UDP multicast kernel support was written by Steve
Deering, Xerox Parc.  Charlie Lynn (BBN) was helpful with some of the
fine points of the ST-II API. 

The Tcl interpreter was developed by John Osterhout, University of
California at Berkeley. The sources are copyright University of
California and used by permission.

Advice on porting \nevot\ to the Silicon Graphics platform and
numerous bug fixes were provided by Andrew Cherenson (SGI).  Michael
Halle (MIT) figured out how to get Xview applications to display fonts
at the design sizes.  The VU meter is based on discussions with Gints
Klimanis (SGI).

The audio mixing (mix.c) and checksum code (checksum.c) was taken from
the ISI voice terminal (VT), copyright June 1991 by the University of
Southern California, by permission. The silence detector and the ST-II
code are modified versions of the respective parts of VT.

The \vat\ session and audio protocol were implemented based on
descriptions provided by Van Jacobsen.

The I/O flags interpreter (flags.c) is a modified version of software
contributed to Berkeley by Chris Torek. Copyright (c) 1990 by the
Regents of the University of California; used by permission.






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Stanton McCandlish <anton@hydra.unm.edu>
Date: Sun, 2 May 93 03:02:18 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Tactics.
In-Reply-To: <9304301204.AA23052@pizzabox.demon.co.uk>
Message-ID: <9305021001.AA16104@hydra.unm.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Hooo boy, just got that new _Wired_ (things get to New Mexico rather behind
schedule.)  What nut came up with that Cypherpunks article?!  The TEXT is good,
but god those photos.  To people like us they are keen.  But what happens
when 16 yr. old Jamie's mom sees that? What is she to think of all these 
subversive longhairs with KKK-reminiscent masks, and one of them flashing a 
nasty-looking dagger?  Like I say, to ME it was ok, but viewed with a 
conservative outsider's eyes, we look positively dangerous.  I can't help
but think that that article was a PR/memetic misadventure of a HIGH mag-
nitude, and could do quite a bit to hurt our cause.  What happens when clipper
is big enough news to earn a prime time news slot, and they show excerpts of
that photo?  It is going to scare the living shit out of most people, and
they are immediately going to jump on the clipper band wagon.  In my never
even remotely humble opinion, that article (or photoshoot, anyway) was a 
Bad Bad Thing.  Not that Stanton "Call my BBS for free PGP" McCandlish
is known for PR work, but sheesh...
-- 
Testes saxi solidi!  **********************   Podex opacus gravedinosus est!  
Stanton McCandlish,  SysOp:  Noise in the Void Data Center BBS
IndraNet: 369:1/1      FidoNet: 1:301/2      Internet: anton@hydra.unm.edu
Snail: 8020 Central SE #405, Albuquerque, New Mexico 87108 USA
Data phone: +1-505-246-8515 (24hr, 1200-14400 v32bis, N-8-1)
Vox phone:  +1-505-247-3402 (bps rate varies, depends on if you woke me up...:)




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Eric Hughes <hughes@soda.berkeley.edu>
Date: Sun, 2 May 93 10:44:29 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: more ftp usage stats
Message-ID: <9305021616.AA19791@soda.berkeley.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Edged out by sfraves by less than a megabyte!

Eric
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                 ---- Percent  of ----
     Archive Section      Files Sent Bytes  Sent Files Sent Bytes Sent
------------------------- ---------- ----------- ---------- ----------
pub/sfraves                      956   149433794    13.51      28.93
pub/cypherpunks                  987   148460361    13.95      28.74




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Eric Hughes <hughes@soda.berkeley.edu>
Date: Sun, 2 May 93 10:40:38 PDT
To: 74076.1041@CompuServe.COM
Subject: patent licensing
In-Reply-To: <930502002101_74076.1041_FHD63-1@CompuServe.COM>
Message-ID: <9305021631.AA19999@soda.berkeley.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>It means that PKP could
>choose not to enforce against PGP (or any other freeware program) without
>losing any rights to enforce against others.  

This is correct as stated.  I don't think that loss of patent is a
motivation, though, for the suppression of PGP.  I think it is
perceived to cut into licensing revenues.

PKP is a partnership of MIT, Stanford, RSADSI, and Cylink.  Those
first two academic institutions are out to make money, plain and
simple, from their patent portfolio.  They are large corporations and
behave like such.  The other two companies are smaller and are more
accessible, but also have investors and a default requirement to make
money for their shareholders.

Any lobbying for better licensing practice needs to extend beyond just
Jim Bidzos to the owners of all these companies.  I presume that
Stanford and MIT both have patent licensing offices, and that each
also has a representative assigned to a particular patent account.  It
would be extremely beneficial to know the names of these people.  They
may be able to speak publicly where PKP is bound by confidentiality
agreements; PKP, remember, is in a subordinate position with respect
to its owners.

List of principals and investors in RSADSI and Cylink would also be
useful.

Eric







From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Eric Hughes <hughes@soda.berkeley.edu>
Date: Sun, 2 May 93 10:40:12 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: MONEY: escrow etc.
In-Reply-To: <9305020120.AA27878@toad.com>
Message-ID: <9305021704.AA20631@soda.berkeley.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


The most salient thing for this response that Gavis says is
>I'm a struggling writer. 

There are lots of interesting technical issues here, but I'll confine
my comments to the overall situation.

[exchange of money for data]
>without 1) revealing their
>identities to each other or 2) involving a third party to act as an RescrowS
>agent.  

The first thing to realize about electronic money is that there is
always a third party involved.  Since information does not obey mass
conservation such as, say, gold does, you can't have free floating
money electronically.  The information has to start somewhere and end
in the same place.

So to say that there is no escrow agent is already stretching the
point, since in certain ways the transaction is already mediated.

>The paradox IUm thinking about is one where the purchaser of the
>information doesnUt want the sellerUs digital cash to be worth anything
>until the data being sold can be provably decrypted, 

"Provably decrypted" is really a useless concept here.  Suppose I am
selling information.  If I want to rip you off, I can send random bits
and claim that it is encrypted text.  I can also make up random text
and encrypt that.  In both cases, the bits I have sent you are
meaningless.  One uses valid encryption, one doesn't.  The separating
invariant here is meaning, not encryption.

>and the seller doesnUt
>want the info being sold to be decryptable until the cash turns out to be
>genuine.

There are protocols which allow for simultaneous disclosure of
information, where two parties want to exchange information
simultaneously.  This is not really the appropriate protocol, since
money is not necessarily valid by form alone.

But since you have electronic money in the first place, you have an
intermediary.  There's no reason for this intermediary not to be an
escrow agent.  In fact, there's really no risk for escrow agents who
requires that all bits be encrypted when passing through their
machines; there's no knowledge of content and it's just a commercial
transaction like any other.

As far as anonymity, that's easily solved by mail or packet forwarding
services.

Eric




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Eric Hughes <hughes@soda.berkeley.edu>
Date: Sun, 2 May 93 10:40:04 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: PATENT: A legal way to use RSA!
In-Reply-To: <930501180040_76114.2307_BHA70-1@CompuServe.COM>
Message-ID: <9305021725.AA21192@soda.berkeley.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


William Oldacre suggests just letting people roll their own encryption
packages.  Russell Brand exhibited a few relevant passages of the
patent law.  Allow me to make the argument clearer.

First, patent law covers all use, including personal use.  It would be
beneficial public policy to allow personal use broadly under statute,
but drawing the line between personal use and sole proprietorship is
difficult at best.  There are many cases where society might wish to
distinguish between profit and not-for-profit and personal uses, yet
however one looks at this, these can be difficult to distinguish at
their margins.  When, for example, does a hobby which turns into a
money making adventure actually become a business.  At the first sale?
At the first loss filed on Schedule C?  When specifically, might
patent licensure invoke?  Remember, this has to be a litigable
distinction.  For many of these reasons, all rights to patents are
vested in the patent holder.

Second, assume that personal use really was OK.  Then some people
really could build their own.  But you could even then sell kits,
because that would be tantamount to the completed object.  You could
sell all the parts, but you could agglomerate them into a single unit.
Big deal, you might say.  It is a big deal.  Most people, more that
99%, could not assemble a crypto system out of parts.  You would make
crypto protection available only to the programming elite.  This,
surely, is not my idea of a worthwhile end goal.

Patents are a restriction; they are designed to be a restriction.  We
can either use them by licensing them or go around them by not using
them but rather a substitute.  Any other way of dealing with them is
not generalizable to the public at large.  I am sympathetic to
personal and research uses of unlicensed patents, but my goal is the
whole world.

Eric




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Sy Verpunc <svp@gtoal.com>
Date: Mon, 3 May 93 06:45:43 PDT
To: sci-crypt@demon.co.uk
Subject: Import OK by the look of this...
Message-ID: <9305021304.AA06890@pizzabox.demon.co.uk>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


: which otherwise would have been illegal. FBI special agent was standing by to
: make sure no other laws were broken, as could have happened in technology
: demonstration. Event was practical demonstration of what Subcommittee Chmn.
: Markey (D-Mass.) called "the 'sinister side' to cyberspace."
...
:    Gage said export laws prohibit selling abroad of particular encryption
: computer programs. Yet he showed panel text of computer program pulled off
: Internet, from Finland, of prohibited source code for Data Encryption Standard
: (DES) used by U.S. govt. In that case, law wasn't broken because program was
: imported, not exported. Adding comma to code would route program to Moscow, Gage
: said, so he didn't add it because there was no immunity. Also set up in room was
: satellite hookup to Moscow using small earth station made by KGB, which was in
: contact with Russian satellite.

My inference from this is that if they went to the bother of checking to
make sure they knew about the laws and explicitly arranged immunity for
the scanner demonstration, we can take it as read that *import* of crypto
wares is *not* illegal, as some have tried to suggest.

Graham
PS I'm xposting this to sci.crypt




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: jcook@pro-storm.metronet.com (Julian Cook)
Date: Sun, 2 May 93 12:24:09 PDT
To: 7025aj%gmuvax2.gmu.edu.cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Is Rush Limbaugh giving Clinton sh*t about wiretap chip?
Message-ID: <e250757@pro-storm.metronet.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


WEll i work for a mojor airline and I would be happy to get you his homne
mailing address if he has a frequent flyer number.

ProLine:  jcook@pro-storm
Internet: jcook@pro-storm.cts.com
UUCP:     crash!pro-storm!jcook
Bitnet:   jcook%pro-storm.cts.com@nosc.mil





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: jdblair@nextsrv.cas.muohio.edu (John Blair)
Date: Sun, 2 May 93 12:40:43 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: thanks
Message-ID: <9305021946.AA05661@ nextsrv.cas.muohio.EDU >
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Thanks for the quick and multiple responses to my questions.  I also grabbed
the cryptography FAQ off of sci.cryptography, and it has been helpful.

-john.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Stop the Big Brother CHip" <pleiku!kelly@netcom.com>
Date: Sun, 2 May 93 17:42:56 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: ANON: hop.mail replacements random number generation in perl
Message-ID: <9305030043.AA25635@netcomsv.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text


#<application/x-pgp
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

Hi All,
      I am currently upgrading Hal's Remailer to work
with SVR4(mail lock files as opposed to flock) and encryption
of the message body.

I am also looking at the implementation of  the following design goals:

 * Definition and implementation of a cryptographic MIX protocol compatible
  with the present day remailers(or with minor script changes).

Another area I am working at present on is a replacement for the
present anon.mail and hop.mail in perl. Design goals for that
companion script are:

 * Automatic generation of random hop routes for anonymous encrypted
  remailer return addressing blocks(function 2 from hop.mail)

 * Hop.mail mailing of files(Function 1) with auto route selection
 and generation.

Other desirable properties of a automatic remailer route generation 
script would be:
   
  * An encrypted remailer would always be selected as the beginpoint and
    endpoint in a remailer random route selection.

  * Non-Encrypted but anonymous remailers can only be used as the linkage
    remailer between 2 encrypted remailer nodes.

  * The next remailer number generated must be different than the previous
    remailer number generated.
    
  * route generation scripts should generate n number of nested
    remailer blocks where n is greater 4 and less than 30.

  * remailer numbers may be used multiple times in the same route
    generation subject to the conditions listed above.
     
  * a random seed needs to be generated to prime the generator.

  * A MUCH better function than  perl's rand is needed.

For the curious I am implementing this on a Stock SVR4 system with
MH 6.8(MIME). All scripts are being implemented in PERL (PL36).

I am interested in critique, additional desirable design goals etc.

- --
Parts of this .sig borrowed with permission from T.C.May.
Perhaps it will indeed get me busted also.
..........................................................................
Kelly Goen             | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,  
kelly@netcom.com       | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
Intelligence Systems   | knowledge, reputations, information markets, 
Specialists Inc.       | black markets, face banks, data havens, dark
                       | tech, covert channels, shared secrets,
                       | alt.whistleblowers, collapse of governments.
Technical Monkeywrench | Public Key: PGP 2.2.
                       |
..........................................................................
PGP 2.2 Key available from PGP Keyservers on the Internet.

pub  1024/1BA573 1992/09/09  kelly <kelly@netcom.com>
          Key fingerprint =  EF 7A 38 99 22 84 E3 3B  90 2A DB 80 DC 65 DA 31 

STOP THE WIRETAP CHIP(Clipper Chip)!!


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.2

iQCVAgUBK+RZyvgXinP2G6VzAQGugQP/VEkMHJdZCaJgw6aqIqUscFzqGX+AxNCR
5etQjwPimk+CEc1NPwB9IrgEZOnXFQannqb3T3ISAJdUZLfYkuqowQoz9fBhIT/4
GGpO1SQtDU2aMe9zR6RjdnGBditblURyUsA4Bgco9692BuqWmuvQ8QJ+MFOGJNHl
dNBFw7JPXik=
=UR/e
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
#



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Marc Horowitz <marc@GZA.COM>
Date: Sun, 2 May 93 13:45:55 PDT
To: jcook@pro-storm.cts.com (Julian Cook)
Subject: Re: Is Rush Limbaugh giving Clinton sh*t about wiretap chip?
In-Reply-To: <e250757@pro-storm.metronet.com>
Message-ID: <9305022047.AA16792@pad-thai.aktis.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>> WEll i work for a mojor airline and I would be happy to get you his homne
>> mailing address if he has a frequent flyer number.

Excuse me?  Are you completely missing the point here?  We're fighting
for *PRIVACY*.  Misusing your position at whatever airline you work
for and broadcasting someone's home address over a mailing list of
people he's never heard of is completely antithetical to what we are
trying to do.

		Marc




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Stop the Big Brother CHip" <pleiku!kelly@netcom.com>
Date: Sun, 2 May 93 18:04:01 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: ANON: Stepping up the pace...
Message-ID: <9305030104.AA01342@netcomsv.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text



Hi All,
     With all this excitement about clipper, I am
questions about a number of points:

   * are we losing momentum on the anon-server front
   
   * we have just 13 remailers deployed... and from what I
     am given to understand insufficient traffic on all.

   * did penet II (with PGP inbound encryption similar to PAX)
     ever materialize?.(how about it Julf??)

   * what about John Gilmores suggestion for defensible
     U.S. Anon-sites.

   * 2 stage usage of anon-servers.

   * anonymous cash protocols and digital banks?

   * support of cypherpunks encrypted remailer blocks by aservers.

   * is anyone besides me working on supporting aliases for
     MH, the pgpedit script, and pgp 2.2's multiple recipient feature?

   * is anyone working on converting MajorDomo to support
     PGP encryption and PGP 2.2 multiple recipient feature
     and cypherpunk anonymous encrypted return address blocks.
     (I have already taken a pass at it and it didnt meet
      my design goals..i.e. runnable from a shell users
      .forward file, it requires sendmail.cf mods.)

   * anonymous posting/mail via open NNTP/SMTP servers and
     header social engineering.

   Email or reply to the list...

      cheers
      kelly
--
Parts of this .sig borrowed with permission from T.C.May.
Perhaps it will indeed get me busted also.
..........................................................................
Kelly Goen             | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,  
kelly@netcom.com       | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
Intelligence Systems   | knowledge, reputations, information markets, 
Specialists Inc.       | black markets, face banks, data havens, dark
                       | tech, covert channels, shared secrets,
                       | alt.whistleblowers, collapse of governments.
Technical Monkeywrench | Public Key: PGP 2.2.
                       |
..........................................................................
PGP 2.2 Key available from PGP Keyservers on the Internet.

pub  1024/1BA573 1992/09/09  kelly <kelly@netcom.com>
          Key fingerprint =  EF 7A 38 99 22 84 E3 3B  90 2A DB 80 DC 65 DA 31 

STOP THE WIRETAP CHIP(Clipper Chip)!!



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Sy Verpunc <svp@gtoal.com>
Date: Mon, 3 May 93 11:29:06 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: RSA patent!
Message-ID: <9305021734.AA09136@pizzabox.demon.co.uk>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


	5)  (Misuse)  Does RSA telling Phil Zimmermann that they will "never" 
	license PGP to use RSA constitute monopolistic abuse?

Could you tell us more about this?

	6)  (Misuse)  The underlying purpose of the patent system was to 
	encourage the creative genius for the benefit of the public.  Has the 
	public benefited in this case?

Don't patent holders *have* to license patents to all comers?  If say a rich
sugar-daddy could be found who would put up the same scale of money as Lotus
and Microsoft have, to use these patents - on behalf of Phil and PGP users -
would they be obliged to license it?  (I'm assuming if they did they would
have to offer roughly similar conditions, and not charge punitively to force
us out the market)

If yes - then who do we know that's rich? :-)

If no - are they doing anything wrong that we could get them in court over?

G




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Valerie Lambert <valerie@valis.biocad.com>
Date: Sun, 2 May 93 18:30:14 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: [comp.society.privacy fwd] Wiretaps without warrants
Message-ID: <9305030115.AA24068@valis.biocad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



I wasn't sure if I should forward this or not...  should I assume that most
every cypherpunk with usenet access keeps an eye on comp.society.privacy?

I found this article surprising; I wasn't even aware that there was any
such bill in Congress.  It seems that the FBI is busy chipping away at
privacy on many fronts.

So, how good is the argument that Clipper keys are held safely in escrow
awaiting a warrant, if no warrant is required to gain a legal wiretap?

----- begin forwarded message -----

From:  David Brierley <davidbri@lynx.dac.northeastern.edu>
Newsgroups:  comp.society.privacy
Subject:  Wiretaps without warrants
Path:  portal!uunet!computer-privacy-request
Date:  Wed, 28 Apr 1993 01:54:13 GMT
Message-ID:  <comp-privacy2.39.1@pica.army.mil>
Organization:  Division of Academic Computing, Northeastern University,
	        Boston, MA. 02115 USA
Sender:  comp-privacy@pica.army.mil
Approved:  comp-privacy@pica.army.mil
X-Submissions-To:  comp-privacy@pica.army.mil
X-Administrivia-To:  comp-privacy-request@pica.army.mil
X-Computer-Privacy-Digest:  Volume 2, Issue 039, Message 1 of 7

     Sorry to get this out so late, but better late than never.  It is
from the Boston Sunday Globe of April 11, 1993, page 16.

 -------------------------
New England Votes in Congress

Roll Call Report Syndicate


WASHINGTON - This is how New England members of Congress were recorded
on major roll-call votes last week.

 ...

TO EXPAND FBI PHONE ACCESS:

By a vote of 367-6, the House sent the Senate a bill expanding the FBI's
power to obtain, without court warrants, telephone records and
conversations in investigations of international terrorism and
espionage.  The bill grants the FBI access in such investigations to
information on unlisted numbers that phone companies cannot now divulge.
It also enables FBI counterintelligence agents to obtain a broader
range of telephone conversations involving suspected terrorists and
spies.

A yes vote was to pass the bill.

Connecticut: Voting yes: Kennelly, Gejdenson, Shays, Franks, Johnson. 
Not voting: DeLauro.

Maine: Voting yes: Andrews, Snowe.

Massachusetts: Voting yes: Neal, Blute, Frank, Meehan, Torkildsen,
Markey, Kennedy, Moakley, Studds.  Not voting: Olver.

New Hampshire: Voting yes: Swett.  Not voting: Zeliff.

Rhode Island: Voting yes: Machtley, Reed.

Vermont: Not voting: Sanders.

 ...
    
----- end forwarded message -----

--
Valerie Lambert * valerie@biocad.com * 415/903-3923 * "The world hates
change, yet it is the only thing that has brought progress."  --Charles
Kettering






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Jason Asbahr <Asbahr@UH.EDU>
Date: Sun, 2 May 93 17:15:01 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Voice Privacy
Message-ID: <199305030014.AA22547@Menudo.UH.EDU>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Greets, all...

I don't remember hearing this exact use of privacy-enhanced voice
communication discussed on the list before, but I might not have been
paying attention.  :-)

What do you think about encrypting voice communication in a
non-real-time sense?  Say I record a message (8-bit CODEC) on my NeXT
or on a friend's PC Soundblaster and then encrypt/scramble the file in
such a way that the resultant file is still audible.  I can then leave
that message on the recipient's answering machine or voice mail box
for him to later record and decrypt on his computer.  This method would 
make private voice communication more accessable, as it doesn't require 
real-time levels of performance.

Perhaps one of the PGP gurus could advise on how this sort of private
communications could be accomplished.  If PGP is used as the
encryption tool, then making the encrypted file audible is not unlike
making an encrypted file "readable" by turning it into mailable ASCII.

It is probably important to consider that recording an "audio armored"
encrypted voice message to an answering machine or voice mail box
will introduce various kinds of distortion.  Is anyone experienced with
error-correction methods for audio transmissions?


Jason Asbahr                           116 E. Edgebrook #603
asbahr@uh.edu                          Houston, Texas  77034
next@tree.egr.uh.edu   (NeXTmail)      (713) 743-6995  voice
asbahr@tree.egr.uh.edu (NeXTmail)      UH NeXT Campus Consultant



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: simonm@mindvox.phantom.com (Simon Moon)
Date: Sun, 2 May 93 16:47:43 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Digital Cash
Message-ID: <qF6X3B1w165w@mindvox.phantom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Could someone mail or post some (preferably on-line) references to
information re digital cash? Thx, I missed the discussion that was posted
here. 

					   -- Simon (simonm@mindvox.phantom.com)




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Eric Hughes <hughes@soda.berkeley.edu>
Date: Sun, 2 May 93 20:01:43 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: PATENT: RSADSI filings with the SEC
Message-ID: <9305030258.AA22354@soda.berkeley.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


RSADSI is a closely held California corporation.  What filings are
they required to make with the SEC for issues, dividends, etc.?  Are
these filings publicly available?  Do they contain names?  Perry, I
know you're familiar with this; could you comment?

Eric




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Al Billings <mimir@u.washington.edu>
Date: Sun, 2 May 93 20:59:02 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Interesting mail (fwd)
Message-ID: <Pine.3.05z.9305022012.A2576-d100000@carson.u.washington.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



 I received this on the Leri list and thought a little amusement might be
appreciated here given the current conversations.


---------- Forwarded message ----------
Date: Sat, 01 May 1993 20:57:34
From: David L Racette <dlr@medical.win.net>
To: Leri <Leri@pyramid.com>
Subject: Interesting mail


 Opening Statement to the House Subcommittee on
 Telecommunications and Finance, Washington DC, April 29,
 1993

        Hello everyone and thanks for inviting me here.  My
 name is Bruce Sterling and I'm a science fiction writer and
 sometime science journalist.   Since writing my nonfiction book
 HACKER CRACKDOWN: LAW AND DISORDER ON THE ELECTRONIC
 FRONTIER, I have returned to writing science fiction.  And I've
 returned to that with some relief, frankly, since the world of
 science fiction is in most ways rather less strange and less
 bizarre than the contemporary world of telecommunications
 policy.

        I hope therefore that you will forgive me if I testify
 today as a science fiction writer.  It's one of the perks of my
 profesion to write about the future, or attempt to, and I
 thought you might like to meet someone from the
 telecommunications future that you are so busy creating.

        With your kind indulgence for my novelist's whimsy
 then, the rest of my brief presentation today will be given by a
 Mr. Bob Smith, with is an NREN network administrator from the
 year 2015.

        I present Mr. Smith.

        "Thank you, Mr. Sterling.  It's a remarkable privilege to
 talk to the legislators who historically created my working
 environment.  As a laborer in the fields of 21st Century
 cyberspace I of course would have no job without NREN and
 my wife and small son and I are all properly grateful for your
 foresight in establishing the Information Superhighway.

        "Your actions in this regard have affected American
 society every bit as strongly as did the telegraph, the railroads,
 the telephone, the highway system, and television.  In fact, it's
 impossible for me to imagine contemporary life in 2015
 without the Global Net; living without the Net would be like
 trying to live without electricity.

        "However, it's a truism in technological development that
 no silver lining comes without its cloud.  Today I'd like to
 mention two or three trifling problems that have come up that
 were not entirely obvious from the perspective of the early
 1990s.

        "First of all, this 'Research and Education' aspect.  Since
 communications *is* power in an Information Society, giving
 fantastically advanced communications to the Research and
 Education communities did in fact empower those communities
 quite drastically by comparison with interest-groups lacking
 that advantage.  Today, one of the most feared political
 organizations in the world is the multi-national anarchist
 libertarian group called the Students for an Utterly Free
 Society.

        "Of course, there have always been campus radicals, but
 thanks to their relative lack of financial clout, and lack of even
 a steady home address, these young fanatics once found it very
 difficult to organize politically.  Therefore, they were easy for
 the powers-that-be to ignore, except during occasional spasms
 of violent campus unrest.

        "Thanks to NREN, however, spasms of student unrest can
 now spread like lightning across entire continents.  Advanced
 AI translation programs installed on the Net only made matters
 worse, since in 2015 the global leaders of the student
 movements are not only extremely radical, but French.

        "Attempts by campus authorities to control this unrest
 have failed miserably.  In 2015, NREN sites are always the first
 buildings occupied during a campus strike.  Campus chancellors
 and faculty are themselves so utterly dependent on NREN that
 they become quite helpless off-line.

        "A second major problem has been the growth of
 unlicenced encryption, which has proved quite unstoppable.
 Today some seventy-five percent of NREN archives are
 material that no one in authority can read.  Countries that
 attempted to control and monitor network traffic have lost
 market share and service revenue as data processing simply
 moves offshore.

        "The United States has profited by this phenomenon to a
 great extent as people worldwide have flocked to the relative
 liberty of our networks.  Unfortunately many of these
 electronic virtual immigrants are not simply dissidents looking
 for free expression but in fact are organized criminals.

        "Take for instance a recent FBI raid on an enormous
 archive of encrypted Iranian files, illicitly stored in an obscure
 NREN node in North Dakota.  Luckily the FBI was able to
 decrypt these files thanks to an inside informant.  Deciphering
 these archives revealed the following contraband:

        "Eighty percent graphic image files of attractive young
 women without veils on, or, in fact, much clothing of any kind.

        "Fifteen percent digitally stored pirated copies of Western
 pop music and Western videos, still illegal to possess in
 Teheran.

        "And, five percent text files in the Farsi language
 describing how to guild, deliver and park truck-bombs in major
 urban areas.

        "I can't conclude my brief remarks today without a
 mention of a particularly odd development having to do with
 *wireless* computer telecommunications.  Since it is now
 possible to transact business entirely in cyberspace, including
 financial transactions, many information entrepreneurs in 2015
 have simply given up any physical home.  Basically, they have
 become stateless people, 21st Century gypsies.

        "A recent tragic example of this occurred in the small
 town of North Zulch, Texas.  There some rural law enforcement
 officers apprehended a scruffy vagabond on a motorcycle in a
 high-speed chase.  Unfortunately he was killed.  A search of his
 backpack revealed a device the size of a cigarette pack.  In
 searching the dead man's effects, the police officers, who were
 not computer literate, accidentally broke the device.  This tiny
 device was actually a privately owned computer bulletin board
 system with some 15,000 registered users.

        "Many of the users were wealthy celebrities, and the
 apparent outlaw biker was actually an extremely popular and
 nationally known system operator.  These 15,000 users were
 enraged by what they considered the wanton destruction of
 their electronic community.  They pooled their resources and
 took a terrible vengeance on the small town of North Zulch,
 which, by contrast, had only 2,000 residents, none of them
 wealthy or technologically sophisticated.  Through a
 combination of harassing lawsuits and sharp real-estate deals,
 the vengeful board users bankrupted the town.  Eventually the
 entire township was bulldozed flat and purchased for parkland
 by the Nature Conservancy.

        "Thanks in part to the advances that you yourselves set
 in motion, violent conflicts between virtual and actual
 communities have become a permanent feature of the cultural
 landscape in 2015."

        Thank you for your patience in entertaining my
 speculations.  I'll be happy to take any questions -- though
 only in my real-life persona.  Thank you very much.







From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Timothy Newsham <newsham@wiliki.eng.hawaii.edu>
Date: Mon, 3 May 93 00:07:51 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: No Subject
Message-ID: <9305030707.AA14920@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



I am using the d3des package.  So far I have been using the
normal DES routines.  I have recently decided to use the
tripple-DES routines but the documentation ( == *.c and *.h )
didnt seem too clear on the point.  From what I understand
so far it seems that   Ddes()  is used for both double
and triple encryption (???) for 64bits in 64bits out.

this is the test code I did,  it works, I'd just like to
know for sure if it is using triple des (3*56 bit keys).

thanx.


#include "d3des.h"
unsigned long enkey[96],dekey[96];

main()
{
  char *a,b[100],*k;

  strcpy(b,"this is a test");
  k="testing123423456789212345678";
  des3key(k,0); cp3key(enkey);    /* set up long keys , encrypt */
  des3key(k,1); cp3key(dekey);    /* decrypt */
  use3key(enkey); Ddes(b,b);      /* encrypt b */
  write(1,b,8);
  use3key(dekey); Ddes(b,b);      /* decrypt b */
  write(1,b,8);
}




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: freedman@helix.com
Date: Sun, 2 May 93 21:14:50 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Please unsubscribe me
Message-ID: <9305030413.AA26488@netcomsv.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Please unsubscribe me. Thanks.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu
Date: Sun, 2 May 93 20:11:52 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: government free reign on RSA -- from whence?
Message-ID: <9305030311.AA11639@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


This is driving me crazy. I have asked many people that refer to the
U.S. government's free reign on the use of patents in general and RSA
technology in particular. There are a lot of very respectable and
reputable specialists on this list and I hope they can answer my question.

What *specifically* gives the government the *right* to use patents
developed `with public money' without licensing, or the RSA patent in
particular (if the two are not the same)?

Court precedents? A specific law? `congressional hearings'?  A
condition of agreement to receive NSF funds?

>what< ?

This little tidbit of information has gotten tossed around so
frequently and haphazardly (a bit like an Urban Legend) and it really
deserves some sharp scrutiny, at least a bit more than I have ever
seen, I suspect it might have some interesting implications to consider.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Eric Hughes <hughes@soda.berkeley.edu>
Date: Sun, 2 May 93 21:54:38 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Need some Advice
In-Reply-To: <9304290001.AA02691@vax1.cc.uakron.edu>
Message-ID: <9305030451.AA00114@soda.berkeley.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> I also would like to thank Eric Hughes for replying to my early question
>on Q&A a dos database problem. His basic steps solved the problem in less
>30 min. By the way the algorithm used very lame.
> abs(ascii character - 255)

Now that you've figured out how, could you write the method up in more
detail?  Please include facts like the location of the password inside
the database files, the version of Q&A you tested, etc.  I'll put it
up for ftp when you're done.

Share the work so that others can look at it.

The password was encrypted on a character-by-character basis?  Some
people really are foolish, either the ones who wrote the software
thinking it was secure, or the ones who pay the ones who wrote the
software to recover lost passwords.  Any encryption that allows
passwords to be recovered should not be called encryption; it should
be called snake oil.

> I would like a little more info on the debugger method. 

Got a program?  You've got my email address.

Eric




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Eric Hughes <hughes@soda.berkeley.edu>
Date: Sun, 2 May 93 22:08:09 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: PATENT: PKP patent numbers
Message-ID: <9305030504.AA01076@soda.berkeley.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Eric Townsend extracted some of the text from RFC 1421 (PEM) and sent
it to me.  Thanks!  In it are contained the patent numbers for PKP's
patents, which I present below.  Note: PKP has since acquired rights
to the Schnorr patent; it relates to DSA.

Eric
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------

      Cryptographic Apparatus and Method
      ("Diffie-Hellman")............................... No. 4,200,770

      Public Key Cryptographic Apparatus
      and Method ("Hellman-Merkle").................... No. 4,218,582

      Cryptographic Communications System and
      Method ("RSA")................................... No. 4,405,829

      Exponential Cryptographic Apparatus
      and Method ("Hellman-Pohlig").................... No. 4,424,414





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Eric Hughes <hughes@soda.berkeley.edu>
Date: Sun, 2 May 93 22:42:37 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: PATENT: A LEGAL way---maybe!
In-Reply-To: <930503040243_76114.2307_BHA51-1@CompuServe.COM>
Message-ID: <9305030539.AA03966@soda.berkeley.edu>
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William Oldacre persists in believing that personal use of a patent is
permissible.  It's not legal, but if they don't know, they don't sue.
The differences between legality, the cost-effectiveness of a lawsuit,
and finding out in the first place are significant here.  We want the
protecting of legality, if we can get it.

>CypherPunks has something that Public Key Partners doesn't.  An 
>organization of motivated people who can devote hundreds of person 
>hours to putting the RSA patent under a microscope.  

I'm really glad for this observation.  One, however, must derate our
person-hours some because we aren't lawyers.  The basic idea, though,
is entirely accurate.

>Allowing patents on ordinary mathematics was 
>mistake that has to be rectified. 

It has been rectified.  RSA is not a mathematical patent.  It is the
embodiment of some mathematical routines into a machine which is used
for a particular purpose and has certain security properties.

> (Diffie-Helman-Merkle?) 

I got that one wrong.  It's the Hellman-Merkle patent.  I just posted
the actual numbers.

Eric






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: William Oldacre <76114.2307@CompuServe.COM>
Date: Sun, 2 May 93 21:08:40 PDT
To: BlindCopyReceiver:;@compuserve.com
Subject: A LEGAL way---maybe!
Message-ID: <930503040243_76114.2307_BHA51-1@CompuServe.COM>
MIME-Version: 1.0
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To: >Internet:cypherpunks@toad.com;>Internet:huges@soda.berkeley.edu;
To: >Internet:prz@sage.cgd.ucar.edu

One of the first attornys I ever had used to build steam engines as a 
hobby.  He would purchase a kit of basic castings somewhere and then 
machine them into beautiful working models.  Some of the designs were 
covered by modern patents.  That's where I first heard of the "if for 
private use" principal.  

It was reaffirmed, some years later, by an attorney working for one 
of the large law firms next to the U.S. Patent Office.  I'd designed 
several electronic circuits, one of which (the simplest and clearly
unpatentable) had appeared on the front cover of Popular Electronics 
magazine.  I was concerned about another which might be patentable.  
I came away from our discussion with the impression that there was 
nothing to stop someone who wanted to build a single copy of a 
patented design for themselves.  (I came away from my first attempt 
at a patent search with a headache.)

Yesterday, I was delighted when this small bit of knowledge seemed to 
have some practical application, i.e. legally bypassing a frivolous 
patent and putting a good encryption program in the hands of an 
exposed public. So today I decided to spend some time at the Univ. of 
Fla. law library to get the actual statute numbers and case law 
background.  (Sigh) I didn't have much luck.  Three hours wasn't 
nearly enough time to research roughly 80 feet of shelf space filled 
with patent law.  But I couldn't confirm what I said yesterday and 
I'm hoping that I haven't miscontrued something called the "public 
use doctrine."  Tomorrow I'll try to get a legal opinion on the 
matter.  

If what I said yesterday turns out to be wrong, there remains an 
important point to consider.  Finding legal ways to sidestep patents 
is the name of the game.  It may even encourage further innovation.  
What makes patent law such a lucrative field is not the four inches 
of shelf space devoted to the actual law itself, but weight of the 
seventy nine feet eight inches of case law next to it.  There was a 
lot of encouraging background there.  Something like fifty percent of 
all patents in litigation are overturned.  And misuse is an excellent 
way to overturn one.  Interference is another.  

CypherPunks has something that Public Key Partners doesn't.  An 
organization of motivated people who can devote hundreds of person 
hours to putting the RSA patent under a microscope.  To pay someone 
to do that amount of research would cost a fortune.  If you put all 
of the skills each of us has down on paper it would take a sizable 
corporation to equal it.  And, the high speed communications network 
is already in place.  I think it's time the organization was less a 
shrill chorus of skeptics and more of a cavalry charge.  By now, 
Phil Zimmermann and some others would find us a welcome sight coming 
over the hill top.  

If we break the PGP/RSA problem into managable pieces and divide 
ourselves into working groups something is bound to turn up.  And 
then there is the press.  Magazine articles and news releases will 
get the public and legislators involved.  Don't think this won't 
work.  Remember the guy in Colorado three years ago with a perfectly 
worthless generator that produced more energy than it used?  He got the 
legislature to force the N.B.S. to examine it over their ongoing 
objection.  The arguments I've heard on this newsgroup are sound.  
You don't like the chill that has come over public cryptography, I 
don't like it, and the public won't like it either.  Forget how the 
law is written, patent laws have been in a constant state of flux 
since their inception.  Allowing patents on ordinary mathematics was 
mistake that has to be rectified. 

To start with, I need something.  Does anyone out there have the 
actual patent numbers for the RSA and DHM (Diffie-Helman-Merkle?) 
patents so I can order copies?





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: nobody@mead.u.washington.edu
Date: Sun, 2 May 93 22:11:02 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: No Subject
Message-ID: <9305030510.AA25448@mead.u.washington.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Hey guys, I think someone has been listening:
 
---------------------------------------------------
                              Communications Daily
 
                             April  30, 1993, Friday
 
Immunity Needed;
MARKEY PANEL SEES DARK SIDE OF ELECTRONIC FRONTIER
 
   Legislative intent met reality of technology Thurs. one-on-one before House
Telecom Subcommittee. It was no contest: Technology won in seconds, on a
knockout.
 
   Last year, Congress, concerned about cellular phone users' privacy, passed
legislation outlawing scanners that pick up cellular channels, and last week FCC
issued rules banning those scanners (CD April 23 p2). At hearing on privacy,
computer cracking and related topics, it took San Diego Supercenter Center
scientist Tsutomu Shimomura about 2 min. to take new cellular phone out of its
box, turn it on and set device to test mode -- thus turning it into scanner that
enabled those in House hearing room to hear snatches of live cellular
conversations. Shimomura needed congressional immunity to conduct demonstration,
which otherwise would have been illegal. FBI special agent was standing by to
make sure no other laws were broken, as could have happened in technology
demonstration. Event was practical demonstration of what Subcommittee Chmn.
Markey (D-Mass.) called "the 'sinister side' to cyberspace."
 
   John Gage, dir. of science office of Sun Microsystems, who orchestrated that
and other demonstrations that turned Rayburn Bldg. hearing room into media lab
with HDTV setup, computers and other devices, held up phone and said that, in
effect, legislation passed by Congress "has banned all cellular telephones in
the United States." Gage said: "It's not safe to talk on a cellular phone." With
right screwdriver and little adaptation, scanning capabilities of cellular
phones can be made more impressive, he said. He said that cellular phones are
little more than "good radios and terrible computers" that are designed to be
scanners, because that's how cellular radios keep users in touch with switches.
In moving products quickly to market, cellular manufacturers didn't want to
spend money or take time to worry about privacy concerns or consider encryption
technology, Gage said.
 
   Gage's general theme was that move to digital world posed challenges for
policy-makers and for industry. He said KPIX San Francisco planned to store
newscasts in computer in digital form for sound and pictures, to be made
available over high-speed network in Bay area and over Internet, to be played
back via computers whenever anyone called it up. What will that development do
to concept of TV stations or networks? "There's no way to stop digital
technology." Even as he spoke, Gage's equipment was transmitting images and
sound from hearing room to Internet.
   Gage said export laws prohibit selling abroad of particular encryption
computer programs. Yet he showed panel text of computer program pulled off
Internet, from Finland, of prohibited source code for Data Encryption Standard
(DES) used by U.S. govt. In that case, law wasn't broken because program was
imported, not exported. Adding comma to code would route program to Moscow, Gage
said, so he didn't add it because there was no immunity. Also set up in room was
satellite hookup to Moscow using small earth station made by KGB, which was in
contact with Russian satellite.
 
   Subcommittee members were impressed and dismayed. Rep. Tauzin (D-La.) asked
what Congress could do to keep up with technology. Gage said it should stick to
general principles and forget about legislating against specific technologies.
He said that one solution for Digital Age was encryption, and that federal govt.
should take lead, not by endorsing specific technology such as  Clipper Chip
(CD April 19 p2) that fits into telephones, fax machines, other devices. In
reply to question from Rep. Boucher (D-Va.), Gage said federal govt. should
support research on encryption.
 
   Following Gage's demonstration, Raymond Kammer, acting dir. of National
Institute for Standards & Technology (NIST), defended govt. support for
 Clipper Chip  and for DES standard. He said it would take powerful Cray
supercomputer more than 200 years to solve DES key, and more than billion years
to crack one  Clipper Chip  encryption key. Under Administration plan, users
would have one key to chip and federal govt. would have other. Kammer endorsed
plan as balance between law enforcement needs and privacy concerns. In April 28
letter to Markey in response to April 19 letter from chmn., Kammer said
 Clipper Chip  technology has no "trap door" that could allow govt. to crack
encyption code and said code would be offered to experts for evaluation. He
wasn't asked for comment on Gage's demonstration.
 
   Fordham U. law Prof. Joel Reidenberg called for federal board that would set
series of "fair information practices," as well as Data Protection Board for
specific information standards. N.J. state investigator John Lucich warned of
harm that comes from cracking of private business telephone and voice mail
services and said sophistication of law enforcement is increasing. Science
fiction author Bruce Sterling, who also wrote nonfiction book on govt. crackdown
on computer hackers, testified about future issues. Hearing was first in series
on privacy, computer and telecommunications issues. Others will examine
automatic number identification, selling of marketing information, related
topics.
--------------------------------------------------------
 
                               CommunicationsWeek
 
                                 April  26, 1993
 
Encryption Policy Spurs Concern
 
SHARON FISHER
 
    WASHINGTON Members of the networking and security community have expressed
concern that a new government policy on data encryption may restrict the use of
the technology.
 
    The White House earlier this month called for the implementation of a
special encryption chip that offers a "back door" for decryption by federal law
enforcement agencies. The chip uses a secret algorithm called "Skipjack" that
prevents users from encoding data in such a way that it cannot be read by law
enforcement officials.
 
    Under the new policy, electronic keys will be stored in two "escrow"
locations for release to law enforcement organizations that have been warranted
to wiretap and decrypt voice transmissions. The escrow locations have not been
named.
 
    The encryption chip was initially called the  Clipper chip,  but the
government has received complaints from Intergraph Corp., which holds a
registered trademark on a product called  Clipper chip,  according to John
Droge, vice president of program development for Mykotronx Inc., Torrance,
Calif., which developed the chip. "We call it the MYK-78," he said.
 
    AT&T has already announced a device based on the chip that attaches to a
telephone to let users encrypt telephone calls. The AT&T Telephone Security
Device will cost around $1,195 and will be available at the end of the second
quarter.
 
    In addition, Mykotronx is working on a more complex chip, called the
Capstone or MYK-80, that adds a key exchange algorithm, digital signature
standard and other technologies to the MYK-78, Droge said. Key exchange lets two
devices agree on a common encryption key; digital signature is a way to
guarantee the identity of the originator of the message.
 
    Industry members expressed concern that the federal government's policy
review on encryption, privacy protection and law enforcement could result in
further changes or restrictions to communications technology. The review is
taking place under a classified Presidential directive that does not publicly
state its exact scope or procedure.
 
    The review, which will be managed and directed by the National Security
Council, calls for an interim report by the end of June and a final report in
late August or early September, said Lynn McNulty, associate director for
computer security for the National Institute of Standards and Technology,
Gaithersburg, Md.
 
    Many members of the encryption community are concerned that a policy review
might result in restrictions on encryption technology already in use.  There are
currently no restrictions in the United States on the use of encryption
technology.
 
    "Why (else) would the government go through all this time and trouble and
expense to do this?" said Jim Bidzos, president of RSA Data Security Inc., a
Redwood City, Calif., company that licenses encryption and key technology to
vendors such as Apple Computer Inc., Lotus Development Corp. and Novell Inc.
 
    "I'm not sure anybody has a complaint with the FBI wanting to wiretap with a
legitimate court order, but when the FBI says it's so important that we need to
force a new communications system on the country, I have a problem with that,"
Bidzos said. "I am afraid, from the FBI's viewpoint, if this is the solution,
how can it work unless you eliminate the other kinds of use?"
 
    But McNulty said such an expanded policy was not likely.  "Those concerns
are not well-founded," he said, though he said the issue probably will be
addressed in the policy review. "I don't think in our society that people would
accept that restriction on their technology and freedoms. It's absolutely the
last recommendation that would be made."
-----------------------------------------------------
 
                               CommunicationsWeek
 
                                 April  26, 1993
 
Editor's View;
WHAT GOOD IS SECURITY IF IT MAKES US INSECURE?
 
    The federal government, under the guise of President Clinton's new Public
Encryption Management directive, promises to improve the security and privacy of
communications systems. The directive is likely, however, to result in the
eventual disappearance of private encryption and the erosion of personal
freedom.
 
    The directive was announced two weeks ago by the White House and the
National Institute of Standards and Technology. It requests suppliers of
communications equipment to base encryption on the " Clipper Chip, " a
microcircuit developed by the National Security Agency.
 
    The  Clipper Chip  will be manufactured by Mykotronx Inc., a military
contractor in Torrance, Calif. An 80-bit, split-key escrowed encryption scheme
used to lock and unlock data transmissions will be built into each chip. The
encryption scheme will also be kept in a "key-escrow" database monitored by two
independent government agencies.
 
    Unlike effective public encryption techniques, such as RSA Data Security's
triple-Data Encryption Standard (DES), which are available for analysis and
testing, the  Clipper Chip's  key algorithm will not be released to the public.
 
    Based on explanations provided in official documents, it seems that the
government doesn't care about improving secure communications.  Reliable
encryption already exists. Indeed, in the view of agencies like the NSA,
standards such as DES are too good because they are hard to crack.
 
    Clinton's directive has only one real agenda-to make it easier for
government agencies to snoop on private communications. Keys will be made
available to government agencies who request access in the same manner that
Federal judges grant telephone taps.
 
    The initiative hides behind the excuse of creating means to monitor
"terrorists, drug dealers, and other criminals." This isn't the first time that
the government has proposed an authoritarian scheme that goes after a few
peoples' crimes while stomping on the majority's civil liberties.
 
    Public scrutiny helps to pinpoint weaknesses and allow technical refinement.
In this case, we're being asked to trust the government, a notion that rubs most
rational people the wrong way.
 
    Congress passed the Computer Security Act in 1987 to open the development of
non-military computer security standards to public scrutiny to limit-not
expand-the NSA's role in their development.
 
    The directive makes no mention of a particular communication session's
key-escrow. Once your keys have been released, all past and future traffic is
open to examination.
 
    The administration said it would not prohibit private encryption, "nor is
the U.S. saying that every American, as a matter of right, is entitled to an
unbreakable commercial encryption product."
 
    If the program succeeds, it probably will drive private encryption vendors
out of the marketplace.
 
    Commercial encryption products already provide excellent network security.
Contact the White House and let policy-makers know that we appreciate their
concern about crime control, but prefer that the government stay out of the
security-control business.
 
    Send your reactions to DBUERGER on MCI Mail, DBUERGERCUP.PORTAL.COM on the
Internet or by fax, 516-562-5055.
 
----------------------------------------------------
                                 Network World
 
                                 April  26, 1993
 
NSA has public-key chip to complement  Clipper Chip;
Uses same controversial key escrow system.
 
By Ellen Messmer, Senior Correspondent
 
WASHINGTON, D.C.
 
   The algorithm developed by the National Security Agency (NSA) for use with
the government's newly proposed  Clipper Chip  private-key encryption system
will also show up in Capstone, a chip for public-key encryption, Network World
has learned.
 
   Like  Clipper Chip,  Capstone will use a key escrow system that will enable
the government to eavesdrop on encrypted information.  Vendors of Capstone-based
encryption products will have to register decryption keys with a federal agency
that other agencies can retrieve through legal means.
 
   Although Capstone has not been publicly announced, it is at the heart of the
encryption system that is to be used in the upcoming Defense Message System
(DMS) (see story, p.1).
 
   With the public-key Capstone system, one key is made public, while another is
kept secret; the message recipient and sender do not have to exchange keys as
they do in private-key systems such as the Data Encryption Standard and
 Clipper Chip.   With Capstone, key management is much simpler.
 
    Clipper Chip,  for example, enables users to encrypt electronic documents
before sending them to the intended recipient, but the recipient must have
received the sender's secret key beforehand in order to decrypt the document.
 
   In addition, Capstone will provide the electronic digital signature for
"signing" documents electronically, something private-key systems cannot do.
 
   Mykotronx, Inc., the Torrance, Calif., firm that designed  Clipper Chip,  is
also supplying the Capstone chipset.  John Droge, vice president of marketing at
Mykotronx, an authorized NSA Communications Security vendor, said the firm has
already shipped 10,000 Capstone and 20,000  Clipper Chip  chipsets.
 
   The NSA intends to equip military users of the DMS with cryptocards -- dubbed
Tessera cards -- containing the Capstone chips so users can enter and activate
the public-key encryption and signing features. The Tessera cards are based on
the new industry standard PCMCIA, named after the Personal Computer Memory Card
International Association, which created the standard. Mykotronx is currently
the sole Tessera card supplier.
 
   Last week, the NSA acknowledged that the private-key algorithm to be used
with Capstone in the DMS is the same as that used in  Clipper Chip.  "The [DMS]
Type 2 algorithm is the same as the  Clipper Chip  announced by the Clinton
administration," said John Nagengast, chief of strategic systems at the NSA,
speaking last week at the Information Systems Security Association's trade show
CardTech/SecureTech in Arlington, Va. "It will enable us to go across the
government with a common algorithm."
 
User reaction
 
   The key escrow concept behind both  Clipper Chip  and Capstone have left many
users and vendors worried.
 
   Sandra Lambert, vice president of information security at Citibank, N.A., and
Samuel Epstein, president of Racal-Guardata, Inc., said the key escrow system
raises the issue of security vulnerability, which could result from a break-in
at the site where the escrow keys will be stored.
 
   The Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF), a public advocacy group based here,
has taken the position that the public should not have to rely on the government
as the sole source for encryption chips.  Last week, the EFF began pulling
together a coalition of vendors and users under the banner of its Digital
Privacy and Security Working Group to address the issues raised by  Clipper
 Chip.   AT&T, which announced that it would include  Clipper Chip  in its
Secure Telephone Device, will participate in the EFF forum.
 
   Government sources last week said AT&T rushed out with its  Clipper Chip
announcement because the Department of Justice wants to purchase AT&T telephone
security devices with  Clipper Chip.  Last week, AT&T said it based its decision
to include the  Clipper Chip  chipset on faith rather than knowledge. "We've
told the government there's a need to establish the credibility of the
standard," said Mike Agee, marketing manager for secure products at AT&T.
 
   Although publication of the  Clipper Chip  specification would not compromise
the effectiveness of the algorithm, the NSA said it intends to keep the
algorithm secret. "The plan is we would share it with academia on a limited
basis," Nagengast said. "I don't believe it's ever intended to be published."
 




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: nobody@alumni.cco.caltech.edu
Date: Mon, 3 May 93 06:13:16 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Shimomura's testimony
Message-ID: <9305031312.AA24645@alumni.cco.caltech.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

This sounds like the tricks he and Mark Lottor showed off at Hackers
last year, according to the first issue of Wired.  Of course he was
anonymous there; I guess Wired didn't offer him immunity.

I'd like to know more about Shimomura's testimony -- was he just
showing off, or is he selling us out?  Sounds like both.

DEADBEAT <an5877@anon.penet.fi>

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Version: 2.2

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KZloWA2ScVtaEQP0/e/q2yGXYCILuKV5
=wmIO
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From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: kelly@pleiku.netcom.com
Date: Mon, 17 May 93 21:30:26 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: No Subject
Message-ID: <9305180430.AA29328@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>From kelly Mon May 03 06:15:02 0700 1993 remote from pleiku
To: netcomsv.netcom.com!biocad.com!valerie
cc: toad.com!cypherpunks, kelly
Subject: Re: [comp.society.privacy fwd] Wiretaps without warrants 
In-reply-to: Your message of "Sun, 02 May 1993 18:15:00 PDT."
             <9305030115.AA24068@valis.biocad.com> 
Priority: urgent
Date: Mon, 03 May 1993 06:15:02 -0700
From: "Stop the Big Brother CHip" <pleiku!kelly>
Received: from pleiku by pleiku.netcom.com; Mon,  3 May 1993 06:15 PDT
Content-Type: text
Content-Length: 1107



    Well I read it also and I couldnt believe my eyes...
we have to get working rather than talking it seems...
    cheers
    kelly
--
Parts of this .sig borrowed with permission from T.C.May.
Perhaps it will indeed get me busted also.
..........................................................................
Kelly Goen             | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,  
kelly@netcom.com       | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
Intelligence Systems   | knowledge, reputations, information markets, 
Specialists Inc.       | black markets, face banks, data havens, dark
                       | tech, covert channels, shared secrets,
                       | alt.whistleblowers, collapse of governments.
Technical Monkeywrench | Public Key: PGP 2.2.
                       |
..........................................................................
PGP 2.2 Key available from PGP Keyservers on the Internet.

pub  1024/1BA573 1992/09/09  kelly <kelly@netcom.com>
          Key fingerprint =  EF 7A 38 99 22 84 E3 3B  90 2A DB 80 DC 65 DA 31 

STOP THE WIRETAP CHIP(Clipper Chip)!!




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: kelly@pleiku.netcom.com
Date: Mon, 17 May 93 21:30:44 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: No Subject
Message-ID: <9305180430.AA29334@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>From kelly Mon May 03 06:24:09 0700 1993 remote from pleiku
To: toad.com!cypherpunks
Subject: 
Date: Mon, 03 May 1993 06:24:09 -0700
From: "Stop the Big Brother CHip" <pleiku!kelly>
Received: from pleiku by pleiku.netcom.com; Mon,  3 May 1993 06:24 PDT
Content-Type: text
Content-Length: 3949

I thought this my be interesting to those designing encrypted phones...
    cheers
    kelly 

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From: kelly (Kelly Goen)
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To: junem, kelly, phil
Subject: quaderno Speech capabilities
Status: R

Path: netcom.com!csus.edu!news.ucdavis.edu!agate!howland.reston.ans.net!usc!cs.utexas.edu!uunet!psgrain!ee.und.ac.za!csir.co.za!nuustak!duck
From: duck@nuustak.csir.co.za (Paul Ducklin)
Newsgroups: comp.sys.palmtops
Subject: Re: Quaderno speech hardware
Date: 22 Apr 1993 10:01:03 +0200
Organization: CSIR, South AFrica
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References: <1993Apr20.213938.26184@Princeton.EDU>
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X-Disclaimer: None of the opions expressed herein are the official
X-Disclaimer: opinions of the CSIR or any of its subsidiaries.
X-Disclaimer: **  So don't freak out at _us_ about anything  **

Thus spake mg@cs.princeton.edu (Michael Golan):

  [stuff about the Quaderno's sound digitising capability]

>Can the mic/speaker be accessed from software to produce 8-12bit digital
>sound? If so, and assuming a 9600bps modem is available (is it?), the
>machine is an excellent candidate for a truly secure phone

The speech DSP hardware is quite fancy -- you can download your own
vocoder program, if you have the right DSP code development tools, to
implement things like DTMF-recognition. Or you can select one of the
built-in vocoders, which provide various levels of compression. The
speech program which comes with the Quaderno is just a TSR which hooks
to the speech hardware, and which writes digitised sound to a file.

No reason why you couldn't write your own speech program which grabs 
digitsed blocks from the DSP [you can give the BIOS the address of a 
routine to be called when the DSP is ready to deliver] and stuffs them
wheresoever you desire -- such as into the serial port. On the other
end, you have a DSP "play" program -- once again, you can give the
system the address of a routine to be called whenever the DSP is ready
to analogise [?] the next block of bits.

I can't remember, though, what bit-rates are available with the built-in
vocoders. If people are interested, I'll look it up when I get home this
evening [or Don Herrick -- are you there?]. Ah yes -- just remembered
that one of the vocoders churns out 13Kbit/sec with *very* acceptable
quality [for voice -- music sounds like a heap o' crap when pushed through
this particular vocoder]. 

So this could be stuffed into a regular V.32bis modem and transmitted fast 
enough to give real-time speech. With its 16MHz V30 CPU, the Quaderno should 
be more than ready for the task of real-time encryption in software. If my 
memory serves me, there's also a built-in vocoder which compresses to 
2400bits/sec [!] -- the speech program which ships with the Quaderno, 
however, doesn't offer this as an option, so I've yet to try it. Probably 
pretty damn bad, though.

Another thought -- the Quaderno's DSP will record and play at the same
time, and V.32bis is full-duplex. So full-duplex conversations on the
above scheme are quite possible. Could be fun -- how to turn a good
3KHz analogue voice line into a fair 13Kbit digital voice line!

And, as mentioned recently in alt.security, you can also use the speech
digitiser for acquiring data with a high degree of randomness, which 
you then encrypt with a part of itself to produce data which is "truly" 
random. 

Paul

    /\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\
    \  Paul Ducklin                         duck@nuustak.csir.co.za  /
    /  CSIR Computer Virus Lab + Box 395 + Pretoria + 0001 S Africa  \
    \/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/


------- End of Forwarded Message





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: smb@research.att.com
Date: Mon, 3 May 93 04:18:11 PDT
To: ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu
Subject: Re: government free reign on RSA -- from whence?
Message-ID: <9305031118.AA20167@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


	 This is driving me crazy. I have asked many people that refer to the
	 U.S. government's free reign on the use of patents in general and RSA
	 technology in particular. There are a lot of very respectable and
	 reputable specialists on this list and I hope they can answer my quest
	ion.

	 What *specifically* gives the government the *right* to use patents
	 developed `with public money' without licensing, or the RSA patent in
	 particular (if the two are not the same)?

My understanding -- and I've never seen the original document, so I can
be wrong -- is that the statutes providing for grants to professors
have such provisions.  That is, barring all patents developed under
such grants could be seen as stifling private initiative.  But
permitting the inventor to retain all rights is unfair, since the
government funded the work.  Hence the compromise:  patents are
permitted in such cases, but the government gets free use.

As for the ``personal use'' question -- I've never heard of such a
thing.  The law gives gives the patent holder the right to bar others
from selling, making, or *using* the protected invention.  There is a
court ruling permitting use of patented materials for experimental
purposes; some people may be extending that.

One more word on patents.  The claim that 50% of patents are thrown out
when challenged may or may not be accurate; however, it is very
time-dependent.  Such things go in cycles, depending on the makeup of
the Supreme Court.  During, say, the 1970's, there was a substantial
component on the court that opposed the concept of patents, so many
more challenges were upheld.  I need not point out that the makeup of
the court has changed substantially in recent years; during the 1980's,
many more patents were upheld.  I've seen one or two articles
indicating that the pendulum is starting to swing back, but it's harder
to say now; most patent cases these days only go as high as the Court
of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.


		--Steve Bellovin




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Eric Hughes <hughes@soda.berkeley.edu>
Date: Mon, 3 May 93 08:48:04 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Tough Choices: PGP vs. RSA Data Security
In-Reply-To: <9304291359.1.6025@cup.portal.com>
Message-ID: <9305031544.AA01568@soda.berkeley.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>re paying a reasonable license fee, I wonder if RSA would cash my check
>for (say) $10 if I wrote on the check that it was for a license for 
>whatever they might claim on PGP.  

RSA might try to cash such a check, but if their bank is smart they
won't accept it.  A check is not negotiable if it contains a
condition.  Negotiable means it can be bought or sold.  If the check
is not negotiable then it can't properly be processed by the check
clearing house, since that would require a negotiation.  Only if the
check were drawn on RSADSI's bank would such a check be depositable,
since then your order to pay is being made to the same entity which is
receiving the check.

>One wonders what they would do with
>several hundred checks.

Return them, I would suppose.

Eric




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Peter Honeyman <honey@citi.umich.edu>
Date: Mon, 3 May 93 06:01:06 PDT
To: 76114.2307@CompuServe.COM
Subject: Re:  A LEGAL way---maybe!
Message-ID: <9305031301.AA22009@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


perhaps you missed my note last week, where i cited:

%T patents and the progress of science: exclusive rights and experimental use
%A rebecca s. eisenberg
%J university of chicago law review
%V 56
%N 3
%D summer 1989
%P 1017-1086

follow the footnotes.  here's a quote to entice you:

  If basic research cannot be insulated from the patent system entirely, it
  might still be possible to reconcile a system of exclusive patent rights in
  prior discoveries with the interest of the scientific community in allowing
  subsequent researchers to enjoy free access to such discoveries by exempting
  the use of patented inventions in research from infringement liability.
  While the United States patent statute does not provide for such an
  exemption, the courts have long recognized, at least in principle, that a
  purely "experimental use" of a patented invention, with no commercial
  purpose, should be exempt from infringement liability.

over and over, she reiterates that patent courts have consistently
recognized the experimental use defense.

	peter




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: wtap@mindvox.phantom.com (Wire Tap!)
Date: Mon, 3 May 93 06:49:59 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Add to list
Message-ID: <3H9y3B1w165w@mindvox.phantom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I was wondering if I might be added to your mailing list, or be sent
an application or something similar.
Thanx you.





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Eric Hughes <hughes@soda.berkeley.edu>
Date: Mon, 3 May 93 10:05:12 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: PATENT: A LEGAL way---maybe!
In-Reply-To: <9305031301.AA22009@toad.com>
Message-ID: <9305031701.AA05899@soda.berkeley.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I first wish to apologize for a bit of impreciseness in a previous
posting.  I had said that a personal use exemption was not legal.  I
should have stated that personal use is not a defense against a claim
of infringement, and that barring any other defense (e.g. research)
such use would not be legal.  I hope this clarifies.

Peter Honeyman references a law review paper arguing for an
experimental exemption to patent rights.  This is a good document for
us.  Perhaps one of the many members of the Information Liberation
Front (ILF, which also stands for Information Longs to be Free) which
are around the country might arrange for an electronic copy to be made
available.  I have not read the paper, but I do have some comments on
its usefulness.

I think that an experimental exemption will not work for wider goals,
and I state two reasons below.  I also think that the existence of the
exemption is a huge rhetorical win for distribution.

First, an experimental exemption does not touch commerce.  PGP is
stalled right now in two areas.  The first, distribution, is not the
major problem given the number of overseas sites carrying PGP.  Lack
of commercial availability, however, is.  There are business that
would like to use PGP, but cannot.  Phil has mentioned some specifics
to me; some of these are large companies.  PEM implementations are
available commercially right now; they are not yet in widespread use,
but given the positive economic feedback in markets where
compatibility is key, PEM could easily and quickly overtake PGP
completely.  

As far as I'm concerned, this issue is moot with respect to PGP.  The
development plans are already in place to put RSAREF into PGP in order
to legitimately license it.  But the same argument applies whenever
one might want widespread deployment of a system which infringes some
patent claim.  Digital money falls into this category squarely.

Second, even with a research exemption, you have to be doing _bona
fide_ research.  _Bona fide_ is Latin for "in good faith."  If you
merely claim you're doing research, that is not sufficient.  Bona fide
research certainly encompasses some academic research, but not all.  I
suspect that superconductivity researchers who used PGP to exchange
valuable technical information would be be consider to be doing
cryptographic research.  On the other hand, bona fide research need
not be confined to the academy.  The operators of remailers currently
could well be argued to be doing research, but when deployment becomes
widespread the defense of research becomes harder and harder to mount.

Both these concerns limit the extent to which a research exemption
could be used to promote the spread of cryptography.  This seems
entirely in keeping with the idea of an exemption for the purpose of
extending the state of the art, which is always conducted by very few
people.  The research exemption does not generalize.

The research exemption does have one extremely positive effect, and
that is on distribution from University sites.  Since the University
has a mission to research, distributing a research tool from an
anonymous ftp site is clearly within the purview or research.  The
question of bona fide research remains.  I would suggest that Peter
Honeyman simply start a research project "to study the distribution
mechanisms of public keys in a non-authenticated, highly networked
environment."  Peter, you could do this just by fiat, by creating a
document that says you're doing this.  This document could be handed
to the administrators at the University of Michigan ftp site, who
could then reinstate PGP with some measure of certainty that it was
legitimately there.

Yours in wiliness, but also in good faith,

Eric




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: William Oldacre <76114.2307@CompuServe.COM>
Date: Mon, 3 May 93 10:02:41 PDT
To: <cypherpunks@toad.com>
Subject: RSA patent!
Message-ID: <930503164336_76114.2307_BHA68-1@CompuServe.COM>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


To: >Internet:cypherpunks@toad.com

Enclosed is the essential text of the "RSA" patent.  Now it's time to 
go to work.

1)  (Interference) Is there anything in history wherein someone 
created a cypher consisting of two parts which could only be broken 
when they were combined mathematically?  Or how about a wax seal 
created by impressing two images, one after the other-----verifying 
authenticity?

2)  (Interference) Stripped of it's turgid language, does the basic 
equation fit any other ordinary operation such as factoring some type 
of equation.  Is there some routine mathematical operation in number 
theory which resembles it?

3)  (Invalidity) is there any part of the description language that 
could be interpreted two different ways?

4)  (Misuse)  a) Were any federal funds used in this project?  
Somebody at MIT needs to dig into the public documents there.  b) If 
so, was the government irresponsible in licensing something so useful 
to the public to a company (in which they are a partner) which makes 
it's use by the public difficult?  Can any evidence be found that this 
was deliberate?

5)  (Misuse)  Does RSA telling Phil Zimmermann that they will "never" 
license PGP to use RSA constitute monopolistic abuse?

6)  (Misuse)  The underlying purpose of the patent system was to 
encourage the creative genius for the benefit of the public.  Has the 
public benefited in this case?

7)  Keep thinking, and volunteer to take on some aspect of this and 
research it.  Most research is not done by attorneys but, rather, by 
assitants who simply assemble the case histories for them to work 
from.  By doing this work ourselves, any attorney or company wishing 
to challenge this patent in court is halfway there.


   1475889   2329848  E/ CRYPTOGRAPHIC COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEM AND METHOD
   --------------------------------------------------------------------

Inventors: Adleman Leonard M (US); Rivest Ronald L (US); Shamir Adi (US)
Assigned to: Massachusetts Institute of Technology  
Code: 52912
Patent Number: 4405829
Application Number: US 860586
Application Date: 12/14/77
Issue Date: 9/20/83
Patent Type: Utility
Citations: Cited by 29 later patents

Abstract:
---------
A cryptographic communications system and method. The system includes a 
communications channel coupled to at least one terminal having an encoding 
device and to at least one terminal having a decoding device. A 
message-to-be-transferred is enciphered to ciphertext at the encoding terminal 
by first encoding the message as a number M in a predetermined set, and then 
raising that number to a first predetermined power (associated with the 
intended receiver) and finally computing the remainder, or residue, C, when 
the exponentiated number is divided by the original message at the decoding 
terminal in a similar manner by raising the ciphertext to a second 
predetermined power (associated with the intended receiver), and then 
computing the residue, M', when the exponentiated ciphertext is divided by the 
product of the two predetermined prime numbers associated with the intended 
receiver. The residue M' corresponds to the original encoded message M.

Exemplary Claim:
----------------
A communications system for transferring a message signal Mi comprising k 
terminals, wherein each terminal is characterized by an encoding key Ei (ei, 
ni) and decoding key Di (ei, ni), where i 1,2, . . . ,k, and wherein Mi 
corresponds to a number representative of a message signal to be transmitted 
from the ith terminal, ni is a composite number of the form ni pi X qi Pi and 
qi are prime numbers, ei is relatively prime to 1 cm(pi-1,qi-1), di is a 
multiplicative inverse of ei(mod(1 cm((pi-1),(qi-1)))) wherein a first 
terminal includes means for encoding a digital message word signal MA for 
transmission from said first terminal (i A) to a second terminal (i B), said 
first terminal including: means for transforming said message word signal MA 
to one or more message block word signals MA', each block word signal MA being 
a number representative of a portion of said message word signal MA in the 
range 0 < OR = MA < OR = nB-1, means for transforming each of said message 
block word signals MA'' to a ciphertext word signal CA, CA corresponding to a 
number representative of an encoded form of said message block word signal 
MA'', whereby: CA identical MA''eB(mod nB).






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Perry E. Metzger" <pmetzger@lehman.com>
Date: Mon, 3 May 93 10:03:26 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: PGP
In-Reply-To: <01GXMXWJVE4Y95NBR5@delphi.com>
Message-ID: <9305031702.AA19444@snark.shearson.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



HARUP16@delphi.com says:
> 	I think what Matt was trying to get at is that privacy should be free
> The day that I feel the need to have to pay $100 to ensure that my business
> is nobody's business but my own is the day I leave this country for a nice
> outlet free desert island.

Nothing is free. Food isn't free. Clothing isn't free. Places to live
aren't free. Computers to run crypto sofware are not free. There is no
reason on earth that privacy should be free.

This is not to say that privacy needs to be expensive. However, it is
to say that we do not yet live in a communist society. People DO
deserve to get rewarded for their work if they wish to be. Phil
Zimmerman and others have very kindly donated their work to the public
-- but we should not forget that they were in no way obligated to be
as nice as they were.

.pm




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Mike Godwin <mnemonic@eff.org>
Date: Mon, 3 May 93 10:14:21 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: comments solicited (fwd)
Message-ID: <199305031714.AA16127@eff.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Forwarded message:



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: wuthel!brand@drums.reasoning.com (Russell Brand)
Date: Sun, 2 May 93 08:13:41 PDT
To: brand@drums.reasoning.com
Subject: comments solicited
Message-ID: <9305021513.AA08322@wuthel.uucp>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain









			  Why the Clipper Clip is Bad (v1)
				       
				      by
				       
				 Russell Brand
			   wuthel!bj-4@reasoning.com
		    Copyright (C) 1993 All Rights Reserved
Permission is given to freely redistribute this document without modification.
The analysis presented has not been endorsed by any third party.  It
incorporates only UNCLASSIFIED information made by 31 April 1993.

On or about 15 April 1993, The US Government has announced a encryption chip
set called `Clipper' whose primary stated application is to encrypt VOICE
telephone communication in such a way that law officers with a lawful warrant
would be able to tap and decode the communication while no other unauthorized
person would be able to do so.  Law enforcement officials would present their
warrant to two `escrow' agencies in order to get a halfs of a special key that
they would use with a special device to decrypt the message.  The algorithm is
to remain classified. 

The number of objections to this, technical, legal and moral are numerous.  

First, a secret design is violation of the open design principle and hides
from public view future hazards.    Further there may be trap doors in the
system that allow decryption WITHOUT the warrant or escrow key. 

Second, all of the agencies that have any experience with managing secrets like
the Key Escrow process have declined to become involved or have been
disqualified.  Considering the value of the escrow data to corporate spies, one
must fear corruption including blackmail of a commercial nature.

Third, the cryptographic protocol as described is weak in a number of ways such
that the escrow keys are seemingly unneeded for decryption by the federal
government.  This combined with a recent house of representative votes to allow
the FBI to among other things conduct phone taps without a warrant when
international terrorism is suspected as well as long well documented history of
BLANK warrants being signed and issued is rather scary.

Fourth, it seems to be a mis-use of government funds to subsidize the
development of this chip to the advantage of certain companies over others
without so much a public comment period.  In addition to the development costs,
there are many other large costs including the key escrow agencies themselves.

Fifth, it will damage US competitiveness for companies to need to build both
the insecure CLIPPER chip for government regulated markets and real protection
circuitry for people that care.

Sixth, the clipper proposal will not help against organized crime; they are
bright enough to buy real encryption devices and certain details of CLIPPER
will make it easier for them to accomplish this.  Of course wire tapping itself
has been shown *NOT* to be cost effective in detecting/preventing/prosecuting
crimes.  There is no way in the system to mark a `privileged conversation' (for
example doctor-patient, lawyer-client' and hence these can and will be
captured. 

Please write to your elected officials, media, etc. to oppose this.








From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: edgar@spectrx.Saigon.COM (Edgar W. Swank)
Date: Mon, 3 May 93 14:35:33 PDT
To: Cypherpunks          <cypherpunks@toad.com>
Subject: PGP: Re: Tough Choices: PGP vs. RSA Data Security
Message-ID: <u5qZ3B25w165w@spectrx.saigon.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


The conflict between RSA and PGP -may- be about to be solved. You all may
recall my "announcement" of an effort to create a USA-Legal version of
PGP by incorporating RSAREF code.  Among several offers to help, I
received the following messages:
========================================================================
To: spectrx!edgar (Edgar W. Swank)
Subject: Re: PGP: USA-Legal PGP Project
In-Reply-To: Your message of "Wed, 28 Apr 93 01:02:23 PDT."
             <ouiP3B12w165w@spectrx.saigon.com>
Date: Wed, 28 Apr 93 12:37:30 -0600
From: "L. Detweiler" <szebra!longs.lance.colostate.edu!ld231782>


>I confirmed with Jim Bidzos, President of RSA, who was
>present at the meeting, that a USA Legal version of PGP could be
>constructed by just replacing certain sections of code with free code
>from RSAREF.  Since source for both PGP and RSAREF are available, this
>sounds like an easy job.  Since no-one's actually done it yet, perhaps
>it's not, but I will try.  I hope I haven't bitten off more than I can
>chew. At best, I can compile and test only the MSDOS version of PGP. I
>will certainly need help if USA-Legal MAC, AMIGA, UNIX, etc. versions
>are to be available.

I'm sorry Mr. Bidzos didn't tell  you, but the PGP development group is
already looking very seriously into integrating RSAREF, and one person
phr@america.Telebit.COM (Paul Rubin) has already done it. If you would
like to join the list send mail to prz@sage.cgd.ucar.EDU (Philip
Zimmermann).
==========================================================================
Date: Wed, 28 Apr 93 19:32:55 PDT
From: szebra!america.Telebit.COM!phr (Paul Rubin)
Message-Id: <9304290232.AA10138@america.TELEBIT.COM>
To: spectrx!edgar
Subject: PGP: USA-Legal PGP Project

>I confirmed with Jim Bidzos, President of RSA, who was
>present at the meeting, that a USA Legal version of PGP could be
>constructed by just replacing certain sections of code with free code
>from RSAREF.

Not quite true.  RSAREF's license requires that the RSAREF routines
be called only in certain ways unless special permission is obtained.
Calling the RSAREF routines in the generally permitted manner won't
work with PGP because PGP's file format is different than what RSAREF
expects.  PGP needs to call RSAREF in a non-standard way which is
easy technically, but needs special permission from Bidzos.  Attempts
to get such permission have thus far been inconclusive.
======================================================================
I am msging Phil Z. to ask to be placed on "the list".  I'm also
trying to get more details from Paul Rubin, offering my assistance,
and forwarding to him the other offers of assistance I received.

It remains to be seen whether RSA's witholding of permission to use
non-standard interfaces to RSAREF is reasonable or designed to be
obstructive.  When we find out, I think we should choose sides (if we
-need- to choose sides) accordingly.  It looks like the PGPers have
made a good faith effort to at least meet RSA halfway.

A "PGP-like" "consumer" crypto product which does not exchange keys
and messages with PGP will -not- be acceptable. Any such product
produced here will almost certainly be export restricted. I am -not-
willing to give up my present ability to exchange keys and encrypted
data with PGP users outside the USA. (I'm currently exchanging
encrypted e-mail with persons in Poland(!!), Germany, and Taiwan).

PGP is currently an -international- standard, and, because of ITAR,
it's likely to be the -only- international standard for a long time to
come.

Note that current PGP is legal outside the USA -only- for
non-commercial purposes (Phil Zimmerman's "copyleft").  If a
USA version is approved by RSA, it will be legal only for
non-commercial use inside the USA (RSA's patents & copyrights on
RSAREF).

If PGP becomes popular (even more so than at present, it's already the
leader) worldwide for individual non-commercial use, businesses are
going to want a PGP-compatible product they can use for exchanging
encrypted data with their (non-business) -customers-.

For example, encryption is a good idea if you're ordering merchandise
with your credit-card number.

Jim Bidzos has told me that Phil Z. or anyone else can get a license
from RSA for $20,000 plus minimum $10,000/yr. royalties.  If we say we
don't want to spend more than 50% of our revenues on licensing, then
if Phil can get $60,000 of firm orders for a -commercial- USA version
of PGP, he's in (a very profitable) business.  $60,000 might be 600
copies at $100 or six site licenses at $10,000.

Also, if a -foreign- software producer wants to license a commercial
version of PGP useable only overseas, he only needs to deal with Phil
(& maybe the other PGP co-authors).  But the effect of this would just
be to increase the market for a USA commercial version (for businesses
who wanted to exchange encrypted data with other businesses, or their
own subsidiaries, overseas).

I guess anyone who wants to can get onto Phil's list. I'd prefer if
you all didn't bombard Paul Rubin with E-mail.  I'll post more details
of this project here as I get them (unless I'm asked not to).

--
edgar@spectrx.saigon.com (Edgar W. Swank)
SPECTROX SYSTEMS +1.408.252.1005  Silicon Valley, Ca





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Mike Godwin <mnemonic@eff.org>
Date: Mon, 3 May 93 10:37:53 PDT
To: pleiku!kelly@netcom.com (Stop the Big Brother CHip)
Subject: Re: ANON: Stepping up the pace...
In-Reply-To: <9305030104.AA01342@netcomsv.netcom.com>
Message-ID: <199305031737.AA16659@eff.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


 
Kelly Goen writes:

> Hi All,
>      With all this excitement about clipper, I am
> questions about a number of points:
> 
>    * are we losing momentum on the anon-server front
>    
>    * we have just 13 remailers deployed... and from what I
>      am given to understand insufficient traffic on all.
 
I've been asked to work up a possible EFF policy statement on anonymity.
Can anyone on this list tell me how long anonymous remailers have been in
use on the Net? Has anyone written a policy document on this subject that
you can give me a pointer to?



--Mike







From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: crunch@netcom.com (John Draper)
Date: Mon, 3 May 93 15:32:58 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Need permission... or info...
Message-ID: <9305032233.AA23826@netcom4.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Greetings,
   On the EFF Conference on the WELL,  some people over there who are NOT
in the cypherpunks list want to get the question list we generated at the
last meeting.

   John G.  posted it but no revisions were done.   Is someone going to be
adding more stuff to the list,  and is it OK for me to cross post thje list
into the EFF Conference on the WELL??

Thanx
JD




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Peter Honeyman <honey@citi.umich.edu>
Date: Mon, 3 May 93 12:56:14 PDT
To: hkhenson@cup.portal.com
Subject: Re: Tough Choices: PGP vs. RSA Data Security
Message-ID: <9305031956.AA00650@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> re paying a reasonable license fee, I wonder if RSA would cash my check
> for (say) $10 if I wrote on the check that it was for a license for 
> whatever they might claim on PGP.  

writing conditions on the back of a check don't mean shit.

> One wonders what they would do with several hundred checks. 

discard them, would be my guess.

	peter




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Peter Honeyman <honey@citi.umich.edu>
Date: Mon, 3 May 93 13:05:07 PDT
To: svp@gtoal.com
Subject: Re: RSA patent!
Message-ID: <9305032005.AA00798@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> Don't patent holders *have* to license patents to all comers?  

no.

	peter




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Brad Huntting <huntting@glarp.com>
Date: Mon, 3 May 93 17:48:21 PDT
To: fnerd@smds.com (FutureNerd Steve Witham)
Subject: Re: Shamir papers in postscript
In-Reply-To: <9305032323.AA06924@smds.com>
Message-ID: <199305040048.AA03299@misc.glarp.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> I have the postscript versions of the papers of the two Adi Shamir
> talks I summarized last week.  Shamir gives permission to distribute
> them freely.  If anyone's interested, please mail 
> to me, and depending on how many ask for them,
> I'll either mail directly or post to the list.

I would be interested.  I dont suppose you could you put them up
for anon-ftp and send a MIME message with the external-body reference
to the list?


thanx,
brad




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: fnerd@smds.com (FutureNerd Steve Witham)
Date: Mon, 3 May 93 16:44:15 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Shamir papers in postscript
Message-ID: <9305032323.AA06924@smds.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I have the postscript versions of the papers of the two Adi Shamir
talks I summarized last week.  Shamir gives permission to distribute
them freely.  If anyone's interested, please mail 
to me, and depending on how many ask for them,
I'll either mail directly or post to the list.

-fnerd

Titles:  ``On The Generation of Multivariate Polynomials Which Are Hard
          To Factor''
	                            and
           
           ``Cryptographic Applications of Birational Permutations''         

			     by Adi Shamir
		          Weizmann Institute

                           FIRST ABSTRACT: 
In this talk we consider the difficulty of factoring multivariate
polynomials F(x,y,z,...) modulo n. We consider in particular the case
in which F is the product of two randomly chosen polynomials P and Q
with algebraically specified coefficients, and n is the product of two
randomly chosen primes p and q. The main result of this talk is that
(with one trivial exception), the problem of factoring F is at least
as hard as the factorization of n whenever P and Q are chosen from the
same sample space, regardless of what may be known about its form.

                           SECOND ABSTRACT:
Many public key cryptographic schemes (such as cubic RSA) are based
on low degree polynomials whose inverses are high degree polynomials.
These functions are very easy to compute, but time consuming to invert
even by their legitimate users. To make such schemes more efficient,
we consider in this talk the class of birational permutations f over
k-tuples of numbers, in which both f and f^-1 are low degree
multivariate rational functions. We develop new families of birational
permutations, and describe how to use them in new cryptographic
schemes which are faster than the known schemes.

--




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "John (FuzzFace/Fast-Eddie) McMahon" <MCMAHON@Eisner.DECUS.Org>
Date: Mon, 3 May 93 16:33:41 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: FWD: Hearings by Congressman Markey
Message-ID: <01GXR0JXRR66000FNB@Eisner.DECUS.Org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Date: 03 May 1993 09:12:58 -0400 (EDT)
From: carl@malamud.com (Carl Malamud)
Subject: Hearings by Congressman Markey
To: announce@malamud.com
Org: Internet Talk Radio

Channel: Internet Town Hall
Program: Special Program
Release: May 2, 1993  (Hearings were on April 29, 1993)
Content: Hearings by House Subcommittee on Telecommunications and Finance

Chairman Edward Markey held oversight hearings on April 29 on the
rights and responsibilities of individuals and organizations in 
cyberspace.  A high tech presentation highlighting issues such as 
encryption, electronic invasions of privacy, fraud, civil liberties and 
computer crime, preceded a panel discussion.

For the demonstration, a world-class team of four engineers from Sun
and the San Diego Supercomputer Center brought in an HDTV, an ATM
switch, an ISDN switch, a Russian satellite dish, a XEROX Liveboard,
a BARCO projector with special video equipment, four Sparcstation
10s, a few Sparcstation 2s, and miscellaneous other equipment.

The purpose of the demonstration was to show that while our current
public policy makes distinctions based on industry, those distinctions
have no meaning in the underlying technology.  A television is a
computer and a computer is a television; a computer is a telephone
and vice versa.  To demonstrate the latter point, Gage and his
associates showed how a new AT&T cellular phone could be changed
by any 13-year old into a scanner.  The demonstration also showed
how DES code could be pulled off anonymous FTP systems in Finland,
yet US industry was unable to export this technology.

The panel consisted of Raymond Kammer, Acting Director of NIST
(National Institute of Standards and Technology), who provided
testimony on technology standard setting issues including the
government-endorsed "Clipper Chip" encryption technology;

Mr. Bruce Sterling, noted science fiction writer on cyberspace and also
author of the non-fiction book, "The Hacker Crackdown: Law and Disorder
on the Electronic Frontier," which discusses computer crime and civil
liberties;

Mr. John Lucich, State Investigator with the New Jersey Division of
Criminal Justice.  Mr. Lucich combats computer and electronic fraud
crimes by electronically infiltrating the underground computer bulletin
boards of the "hacker" and "phone phreak" community; and

Mr. Joel Reidenberg, Professor of Law at Fordham University Law School,
who has studied how personal privacy is affected by telecommunications
and computer technologies and the various privacy protections afforded
citizens of different countries.

We would like to apologize in advance for the very poor audio
quality of this tape.  The hearing room was quite antiquated, and
was full of ungrounded electricity, lots and lots of electronic
equipment, wireless mikes, and PA systems turned up way too loud.
We hope the content makes the mind happier than the ears.

Support for this program was provided by O'Reilly & Associates and
by Sun Microsystems.

ITH Program Files: 050293_spec_01_HALL.au  (Testimony of John Gage) 
                   050293_spec_02_HALL.au  (Testimony of Panel)
ITH Readme File:   050293_spec_HALL.readme (This File)

For information on Internet Talk Radio, write to info@radio.com.

More information on Internet Town Hall will be available shortly.

For a current, partial listing of sites, write to sites@radio.com.






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Sy Verpunc <svp@pizzabox.demon.co.uk>
Date: Tue, 4 May 93 13:21:23 PDT
To: nobody@soda.berkeley.edu
Subject: Answer to 'vital wiretap chip article question'
Message-ID: <9305031948.AA00777@pizzabox.demon.co.uk>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


#1: Everything about the scheme implies that strong crypto of any nature
will eventually require key escrow or be outlawed.

G




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Johan Helsingius <julf@penet.FI>
Date: Mon, 3 May 93 11:51:16 PDT
To: Mike Godwin <mnemonic@eff.org>
Subject: Re: ANON: Stepping up the pace...
In-Reply-To: <199305031737.AA16659@eff.org>
Message-ID: <9305032127.aa29095@penet.penet.FI>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



> Can anyone on this list tell me how long anonymous remailers have been in
> use on the Net?

Wizvax (serving alt.sex.bondage) has been up for *years*, as far as I
remember...

> Has anyone written a policy document on this subject that
> you can give me a pointer to?

I was going to write one... But I think work on anon.penet.fi Mk. II (alias
penet.anon.com) has priority... And besides, I have to pay my rent... :(

	Julf





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: peter honeyman <honey@citi.umich.edu>
Date: Mon, 3 May 93 20:35:11 PDT
To: Eric Hughes <hughes@soda.berkeley.edu>
Subject: Re: PATENT: A LEGAL way---maybe!
In-Reply-To: <9305031701.AA05899@soda.berkeley.edu>
Message-ID: <9305040335.AA07265@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


well, eric, you're asking if i'm willing to put my money where my
mouth is, more or less, and i suppose the answer is "no."

that is, i don't really want to work on distribution mechanisms of
public keys in a non-authenticated, highly networked environment.

avi rubin and i are working on a pk-based remailer.  we need to
manage public keys, pgp is perfect, we plan to use it.  

we hope to get to the point where we want to share our software
and then will be forced to visit the pk distribution question.

	peter




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Tom Keenan <keenan@acs.ucalgary.ca>
Date: Mon, 3 May 93 22:53:29 PDT
To: i6t4@jupiter.sun.csd.unb.ca (Nickey MacDonald)
Subject: Re: 800 numbers & anonymity
In-Reply-To: <Pine.3.05.9304302022.B16325-b100000@jupiter>
Message-ID: <9305040550.AA29713@acs5.acs.ucalgary.ca>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



> On a note similar to remailers, has anyone ever given consideration to
> creating an "outdial" service?  If I could dial long distance into the
> States, and then be able to dial a 1-800 number that I cannot dial direct
> from Canada (which is most) this would extremely useful...

In fact there used to be just such a number 206 945-2111 which
some kind soul in the state of Washington made available for
Canadians who wanted to call US numbers.  It gave a dial tone and
you dialed the 800 number...no charge.   You're right, *someone*
should do that again, it was sure handy.  (That number is now out
of service.)   A related question, is there some way to find the
identity of an 800 number holder, e.g. like a reverse phone directory?

-- 
Dr. Tom Keenan, I.S.P.   Associate Dean, R&D, Faculty of Cont. Ed.
University of Calgary   2500 University Dr. NW   Calgary, AB T2N 1N4 CANADA
(403) 220-4715 (voice)  (403) 284-5702 (fax)    keenan@acs.ucalgary.ca (email)




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Stanton McCandlish <anton@hydra.unm.edu>
Date: Tue, 4 May 93 00:51:50 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: PGP
In-Reply-To: <9305031702.AA19444@snark.shearson.com>
Message-ID: <9305040751.AA21712@hydra.unm.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Perry E. Metzger opines:
 
> HARUP16@delphi.com says:
> > 	I think what Matt was trying to get at is that privacy should be free
> > The day that I feel the need to have to pay $100 to ensure that my business
> > is nobody's business but my own is the day I leave this country for a nice
> > outlet free desert island.
 
> Nothing is free. Food isn't free. Clothing isn't free. Places to live
> aren't free. Computers to run crypto sofware are not free. There is no
> reason on earth that privacy should be free.

Sorry to get on your case yet again, Perry, but I just cannot accept that,
and I don't think anyone else here can either.  Privacy should be free, just
like freedom should be free, and the right to say what you want should be
free.  This is not to say well made tools for ENSURING these rights should 
be free.  A radio broadcasting station will sure help you exercise your
speech rights, but you aren't likely to get one for christmas.  Likewise,
crypto software should not be expected to be free, unless, as in the case
of PGP, the author makes it free of their own accord.  You are very right
that
> we should not forget that they were in no way obligated to be
> as nice as they were.

While this is true, I would urge people to keep in mind that while we can 
be expected to pay for tools to help us maintain our rights, no one can
charge us a fee for those rights themselves.  Privacy is free, it is our
birthright.
-- 
Testes saxi solidi!  **********************   Podex opacus gravedinosus est!  
Stanton McCandlish,  SysOp:  Noise in the Void Data Center BBS
IndraNet: 369:1/1      FidoNet: 1:301/2      Internet: anton@hydra.unm.edu
Snail: 8020 Central SE #405, Albuquerque, New Mexico 87108 USA
Data phone: +1-505-246-8515 (24hr, 1200-14400 v32bis, N-8-1)
Vox phone:  +1-505-247-3402 (bps rate varies, depends on if you woke me up...:)




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Liam David Gray <lg2g+@andrew.cmu.edu>
Date: Tue, 4 May 93 06:54:28 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: PGP, and TANSTAAFL!
In-Reply-To: <9305040751.AA21712@hydra.unm.edu>
Message-ID: <UftbGP_00Uh7I28Gg0@andrew.cmu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Stanton McCandlish writes, in response to Perry Metzger, on privacy and
free lunches:
> >[Perry says privacy isn't and shouldn't be free (Liam's summary).]
> Sorry to get on your case yet again, Perry, but I just cannot accept that,
> and I don't think anyone else here can either.

A-ha!  You've just caused me to "un-lurk," Stanton; thanks for the great
opening.

> Privacy should be free, just
> like freedom should be free, and the right to say what you want should be
> free.  This is not to say well made tools for ENSURING these rights should 
> be free.

Here you seem to be confusing the issue.  How can you say that privacy
(the right?) should be free, when defending privacy shouldn't be free? 
Can someone walk up to you and _give_ you privacy?  I always assumed you
had to be willing to go out and get it yourself, by hook or by crook. 
Without defense of a right, the right is moot.  _With_ defense of a
right, the right is moot:  In that case, you already have what you want!

I suppose I also have a "right to lunch," too, with the caveat that each
I must "ensure" my right to lunch by tripping down to MacDonald's and
buying it.  Why bother with the right?  What is free here?  The fact
that MacDonald's is open for business?  But I'm not even guaranteed that!

Are rights a useless construction?

> A radio broadcasting station will sure help you exercise your
> speech rights, but you aren't likely to get one for christmas.  Likewise,
> crypto software should not be expected to be free, unless, as in the case
> of PGP, the author makes it free of their own accord.

Well said; I agree completely.

> While this is true, I would urge people to keep in mind that while we can 
> be expected to pay for tools to help us maintain our rights, no one can
> charge us a fee for those rights themselves.  Privacy is free, it is our
> birthright.

I hope I'm not getting off list topic here on my first post, but the
"privacy is free" meme looks to be potentially damaging for us.  Perhaps
you mean, Stanton, that privacy as a commodity should not be traded for
U.S. dollars, Deutsche Mark, or Mexican Pesos, but for some other
currency?  Sweat, perhaps?  If you pay in sweat, it isn't free--you
could have paid someone else to sweat for you.  Surely this hasn't
boiled down to a question over valid currency for trade in privacy?

I think the fundamental question here is whether rights are free. 
[Whether they "should be" free doesn't mean ANYTHING; what does "should
be" mean?]  Look around; you'll see a lot of people "fighting for their
rights" to do X.  I don't think you can tell _them_ that "the right to
do X is free."

Cheers, TANSTAAFL, and I hope I haven't offended Stanton over a minor point,
Liam

P.S.  If anyone knows what rights are, mail me.  I'm extremely
interested. Don't perpetuate my possible topical error by sending it to
Cypherpunks, unless you think everyone else will be interested. (Maybe
Extropians would be...)
---
Public key available by arrangement       -- The cat is out of the bag.
Too much of a dreamer not to be practical -- Go have your own "valiant defeat."
Liam David Gray <lg2g+@andrew.cmu.edu>    -- Quote me.





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Timothy Newsham <newsham@wiliki.eng.hawaii.edu>
Date: Tue, 4 May 93 13:13:45 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: tripple des
Message-ID: <9305042013.AA25148@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Crypto question:
why was the following chosen for tripple DES :
   EN(DE(EN(data,k1),k2),k3);   

The encryption would involve passing data through IP,
then doing 16 rounds forward with k1,
(factoring out the IP-1 and IP)
then doing 16 rounds backwards with k2
(factoring out the next IP-1 and IP)
then doing 16 rounds forward with k3
then going through IP-1

How would this compare with
   EN(EN(EN(data,k1),k2),k3);

which goes through IP,  does 16 rounds each with k1, k2 then
k3, then IP-1 ?

The only difference is that the key scheduler rotates backwards
(or another interpretation keys used in reverse order) for the
second stage.

Does anyone know the rationale behind this?




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Stanton McCandlish <anton@hydra.unm.edu>
Date: Tue, 4 May 93 09:20:24 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: PGP, and TANSTAAFL!
Message-ID: <9305041619.AA08996@hydra.unm.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> A-ha!  You've just caused me to "un-lurk," Stanton; thanks for the great
> opening.

Hmm not sure if that is a good thing or not <wink>
> 
> > Privacy should be free, just
> > like freedom should be free, and the right to say what you want should be
> > free.  This is not to say well made tools for ENSURING these rights should 
> > be free.
> 
> Here you seem to be confusing the issue.  How can you say that privacy
> (the right?) should be free, when defending privacy shouldn't be free? 
> Can someone walk up to you and _give_ you privacy?  I always assumed you
> had to be willing to go out and get it yourself, by hook or by crook. 
> Without defense of a right, the right is moot.  _With_ defense of a
> right, the right is moot:  In that case, you already have what you want!

No, no that is not quite what I am meaning.  What I mean by "<insert fave
right here> should be free" is that we should be presumed to have that right,
and that it should not be abridged in any way whatsoever, especially not
for a fee.  As an example, we have a right to bear arms.  You should not 
have to pay a fee for that right.  You certainly *should* have to pay for
the arms you bear, or make your own.  I think YOU are slightly confusing the
issue.  Rights are not property, but are concepts.  I argue that what one
should pay for are items of property, as well as services, whether they are
tools for excercising a right or not.  You don't get things for free. But
rights are not really "things" in that sense at all.  Imagine if you had to 
buy an annual Free Speech Registration from the FCC.  Without this registra-
tion certificate, you may only use words in The Official FCC Dictionary, and
may only construct phrases that follow the rules of The Official FCC Style
Guide, and may only talk about subjects delimited in The Official FCC Subject
Index; any violation of these policies will result in punishment not to 
exceed $10,000 and/or 10 years in prison.  This may seem an absurd example,
but one most of us are familiar with if we have read _1984_.  
And no, no one can walk up and hand you a box full of privacy.  Rights are
there or not there, conceptually speaking.  I don't think that not defending
a right makes the right moot, per se, though you may lose it.  Thing is you
should not have to defend it.  Any attempt to extinguish a right is by def-
inition a violation of it.  Unfortunately, people are only too happy to 
violate other's rights, so we have to defend them.

> I suppose I also have a "right to lunch," too, with the caveat that each
> I must "ensure" my right to lunch by tripping down to MacDonald's and
> buying it.  Why bother with the right?  What is free here?  The fact
> that MacDonald's is open for business?  But I'm not even guaranteed that!

No, the "right" is in your right to actually leave work, and go get something
to eat.  If you employer demanded a $15 dock in pay to take lunch, or refused
to let you have your break (and in most states I believe there are labor laws
that mandate that employees get a certain length-of-time break for every x
amount of work) that would be a violation of your right to have lunch.  Like-
wise if someone put a gun to your head and said "thou shalt eat no lunch".

> Are rights a useless construction?

*I* don't think so, personally.

> > While this is true, I would urge people to keep in mind that while we can 
> > be expected to pay for tools to help us maintain our rights, no one can
> > charge us a fee for those rights themselves.  Privacy is free, it is our
> > birthright.
> 
> I hope I'm not getting off list topic here on my first post, but the
> "privacy is free" meme looks to be potentially damaging for us.

How so?

> Perhaps
> you mean, Stanton, that privacy as a commodity should not be traded for
> U.S. dollars, Deutsche Mark, or Mexican Pesos, but for some other
> currency?  Sweat, perhaps?  If you pay in sweat, it isn't free--you
> could have paid someone else to sweat for you.  Surely this hasn't
> boiled down to a question over valid currency for trade in privacy?

Nope.  I don't think privacy (or any other right) is a commodity. I see the
2 categories as mutually exclusive.  When a "right" becomes a commodity,
it is no longer a right, but a privilege.
 
> I think the fundamental question here is whether rights are free. 
> [Whether they "should be" free doesn't mean ANYTHING; what does "should
> be" mean?]  Look around; you'll see a lot of people "fighting for their
> rights" to do X.  I don't think you can tell _them_ that "the right to
> do X is free."

Sure I can.  All of us here, or many of us, are fighting for at least one
of our rights, namely privacy.  I have yet to see someone say that we should
BUY our right, or that we are fighting to be allowed to purchase or get a 
license for that right.  Rather we are fighting because some people in the
govt with big egos or someother mental problem are trying to destroy that
right, to nullify it.  FIGHTING for the right may not be free, since again
one must purchase tools to do that with, and also "services" (if you can call
legal and court fees a service >:).  But the right itself has no price tag.
 
> Cheers, TANSTAAFL, and I hope I haven't offended Stanton over a minor point,

Nope not at all.  Few things offend me, and debate is one of the last things
I'd be offended by.

> P.S.  If anyone knows what rights are, mail me.  I'm extremely
> interested. Don't perpetuate my possible topical error by sending it to
> Cypherpunks, unless you think everyone else will be interested. (Maybe
> Extropians would be...)

I think they would indeed, and the cypherfolk also.  I can think of few groups
more concerned with our rights and protecting them.

Thanks for the comments, this is a good thing to talk about, to hash out.
-- 
Testes saxi solidi!  **********************   Podex opacus gravedinosus est!  
Stanton McCandlish,  SysOp:  Noise in the Void Data Center BBS
IndraNet: 369:1/1      FidoNet: 1:301/2      Internet: anton@hydra.unm.edu
Snail: 8020 Central SE #405, Albuquerque, New Mexico 87108 USA
Data phone: +1-505-246-8515 (24hr, 1200-14400 v32bis, N-8-1)
Vox phone:  +1-505-247-3402 (bps rate varies, depends on if you woke me up...:)




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Stanton McCandlish <anton@hydra.unm.edu>
Date: Tue, 4 May 93 09:42:48 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Privacy being free
Message-ID: <9305041642.AA09869@hydra.unm.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> > Sorry to get on your case yet again, Perry, but I just cannot accept that,
> > and I don't think anyone else here can either.  
> 
> I accept it.
> Freedom and privacy are things that take actual effort to maintain.
> Either you pay the cost yourself or you expect others to pay it for you,
> but the cost is there.  Saying it "should" be free doesn't explain a lot.

I think this is another map/territory confusion.  The RIGHT and the defense,
use, tools for, effect of, etc. of the right are not the same thing.  It is
like the distinction between philosophy and books about phil.  The first is
free.  The second cost money as does instruction in philosophy, etc. Even
the effects of philosophy can be costly.  But the concept "philosophy" has
no price tag.

> I think maybe you mean that you shouldn't accept any intrusion, any
> specific imposed cost, without fighting back.  I agree.

In addition to what I already said, I agree with this absolutely 100%.
 
> I have a certain emotional resonance with "rights" talk, but I've found
> that people will argue it forever unless (and even if) you get down to
> brass tacks, talking about ideas that can guide individual actions by 
> individual people in individual situations in a practical way.

Most astute.  I agree with this also.  That was one of the reasons I "put
my money where my mouth was" and tried to dist. PGP on my BBS.  
-- 
Testes saxi solidi!  **********************   Podex opacus gravedinosus est!  
Stanton McCandlish,  SysOp:  Noise in the Void Data Center BBS
IndraNet: 369:1/1      FidoNet: 1:301/2      Internet: anton@hydra.unm.edu
Snail: 8020 Central SE #405, Albuquerque, New Mexico 87108 USA
Data phone: +1-505-246-8515 (24hr, 1200-14400 v32bis, N-8-1)
Vox phone:  +1-505-247-3402 (bps rate varies, depends on if you woke me up...:)




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: nobody@soda.berkeley.edu
Date: Tue, 4 May 93 11:08:30 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: No Subject
Message-ID: <9305041805.AA07076@soda.berkeley.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Hola,
 
  I have been offered an opportunity to write on a regular basis for a
National Underground Magazine.  ZENGER.  I am writing to the list to
solicit a distilled list of Wiretap Chip Arguments.  Ive got the masses
of documents and understand the arguments but i am faced with limited
space for the article.  What does the list think is *vital* to let
ZENGER readers know about?  Remember this is  a "not-necessarily-technical"
crowd. (Although they are now realizing the need to include the computer
underground  Please post responses to the list since I am using a remailer.
 
  Ill post the national distribution sites when I receive the complete list.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Timothy Newsham <newsham@wiliki.eng.hawaii.edu>
Date: Tue, 4 May 93 14:31:52 PDT
To: jthomas@access.digex.net (Joe Thomas)
Subject: Re: tripple des
In-Reply-To: <Pine.3.05.9305041723.A14495-b100000@access.digex.net>
Message-ID: <9305042131.AA28472@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> > 
> > Crypto question:
> > why was the following chosen for tripple DES :
> >    EN(DE(EN(data,k1),k2),k3);   
> 
> In fact, "triple" DES goes three times through the engine, but only uses
> two keys:
> 
>      EN(DE(EN(data,k1),k2),k1)
> 

hmm...  I am using d3des which I had assumed uses 'tripple-DES'.
at any rate,  I used the Ddes() function, printed its output,
then used the des() function 3 times and prined its output.  They
matched up which suggests that d3des uses the method I posted at
the top.  


> My understanding is that this was chosen for hardware implementations
> because it is equivalent to single DES when k1 = k2.  This is important,
> of course, when some people you want to talk to are still using single DES
> and the hardware is hard to reconfigure.
interesting.  Wouldnt the first scheme do the same?  for k1=k2, and
k3 = any key ?
(or k2=k3 and k1 = any key)

> Joe
> --
> Joe Thomas <jthomas@access.digex.net>           Say no to the Wiretap Chip!


-- main.c, compares Ddes output and des output ---------
#include "d3des.h"
unsigned long enkey[96],dekey[96];
unsigned long e1[32],e2[32],e3[32];
unsigned long d1[32],d2[32],d3[32];

main()
{
  char *a,b[100],*k,*k1,*k2,*k3;

  strcpy(b,"this is a test");
  k="testing123423456789212345678";
  k1="testing1";
  k2="23423456";
  k3="78921234";
  deskey(k1,0); cpkey(e1);
  deskey(k2,1); cpkey(d2);
  deskey(k3,0); cpkey(e3);
  des3key(k,0); cp3key(enkey);    /* set up long keys , encrypt */
  des3key(k,1); cp3key(dekey);    /* decrypt */
  use3key(enkey); Ddes(b,b);      /* encrypt b */
  write(1,b,16);
  use3key(dekey); Ddes(b,b);      /* decrypt b */
  write(1,b,16);

  usekey(e1); des(b,b);
  usekey(d2); des(b,b);
  usekey(e3); des(b,b);
  write(1,b,16);
}




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: The Phantom <phantom@u.washington.edu>
Date: Tue, 4 May 93 12:34:43 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: REQUEST: Info on email accounts
Message-ID: <Pine.3.05.9305041256.A11162-9100000@stein2.u.washington.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I've lost the piece on dialup email access that was sent a few weeks ago.
I think someone said MCImail (?) had a good monthly rate -- is this right?

Can anyone help me out on this one? 


Matt Thomlinson                               Say no to the Wiretap Chip!
University of Washington, Seattle, Washington.
Internet: phantom@u.washington.edu      	    phone: (206) 528-5732
PGP 2.2  key available via email or finger phantom@hardy.u.washington.edu





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Liam David Gray <lg2g+@andrew.cmu.edu>
Date: Tue, 4 May 93 12:18:22 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: PGP, and TANSTAAFL!
In-Reply-To: <9305041614.AA08798@hydra.unm.edu>
Message-ID: <wftg4j_00WBME6AGxv@andrew.cmu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


[I already sent this to Stanton McCandlish in private e-mail, but I
thought it might be of interest to Cypherpunks in general.  In it I
correct some stupid statements I made in an earlier post.  -Liam]

------------- Begin forwarded message --------------
In <9305041614.AA08798@hydra.unm.edu>, you write:

> No, the "right" is in your right to actually leave work, and go get something
> to eat.  If you employer demanded a $15 dock in pay to take lunch, or refused
> to let you have your break (and in most states I believe there are labor laws
> that mandate that employees get a certain length-of-time break for every x
> amount of work) that would be a violation of your right to have lunch.

For the sake of argument <wink>, Stanton, I wouldn't say a "right to
lunch," even as posed this way, should stand.  If it's a statutory
right, then -- well, then it is just that.  But I regard this is
coincidence and would hesitate to call it a "natural right," since I
should be free to negotiate an employment contract which pays me less
("docks" me, if you wish) if I take time off for lunch, and more (a
"bonus?") if I stay on all day.  Note that at present I am _not_ free to
do so, so that right is being infringed upon, just as our privacy is
frequently infringed upon at present.

> Like-
> wise if someone put a gun to your head and said "thou shalt eat no lunch".

Right!  This seems to be the main parallel to privacy here.  I do agree
on that.

I accept your objection to my positioning of rights as commodities. 
Disregarding the fact that I still believe rights are fairly meaningless
(they only work if someone recognizes the same rights as you do, so
that's all subjective), I do realize what people mean when they talk
about rights, and that to talk of them as commodities therefore probably
_is_ confusing the issue.

What I meant to emphasize (and failed to mention) was that it is still
quite possible and natural to defend one's privacy, whether one believes
privacy is a "right" under the law or not.  Too often, I've seen people
use their violated rights as a justification for pointless, indignant
whining.  I want to advocate a more aggressive, guerrilla-style defense
of privacy; to me, it is enough that I _want_ privacy.  While rights are
inherent, and, agreed, are _not_ commodities, the preservation and
enforcement of all rights _costs_ something, and doesn't always involve
opponents who are willing to believe that what you are defending is a
right.

I think we're fundamentally in agreement.  I think I was right to have
second thoughts over whether my argument over rights was appropriate for
the list--probably it was not.  But nonetheless, I'm glad we're
discussing it.

Happy Cypherpunking!
Liam

PS:  I admired your courage in offering and advertising PGP on your BBS,
and thought you handled the threat from Jim Bidzos gracefully.  Let's
hope PGP can become legal soon.  Really, I'd like to see a PGP that is
legal for both personal _and commerical_ use, internationally, even if
it costs money--perhaps especially if it costs money.  The reason I
tried to establish rights as commodities, Stanton, is that I've read too
many Ayn Rand novels :) and believe that trading something in money is a
symbol of its value, and of the value of whoever created it, and should
be a big ego boost to creative people and to all involved.

I really don't like anything free, even something sold in a large
bundle.  Ever eat too much at an all-you-can-eat restaurant?  I think
that, in part, life is too much like an all-you-can-eat restaurant. 
Paying for something for its own merits causes us to get our priorities
straight.  I like to see people get filthy rich [why filthy?] _selling_
software; the feeling I get when I buy something is similar to the
feeling some people get when they give money to charities, I suppose. 
Everything worth doing is worth doing at a profit.  Ever get warm
fuzzies when you send something UPS instead of US Parcel Post? :-)  In
some cases, the profit may not be monetary.  But it's profit
nonetheless, and that can only be good.



---
Public key available by arrangement       -- The cat is out of the bag.
Too much of a dreamer not to be practical -- Go have your own "valiant defeat."
Liam David Gray <lg2g+@andrew.cmu.edu>    -- Quote me.





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Eric Hughes <hughes@soda.berkeley.edu>
Date: Tue, 4 May 93 15:47:25 PDT
To: strat@intercon.com
Subject: checks
In-Reply-To: <9305041725.AA34057@horton.intercon.com>
Message-ID: <9305042244.AA27314@soda.berkeley.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


For those who don't want to read about an arcane bit of commercial
paper law, please stop reading now.

>Much as I respect you Eric, I direct your attention to the myriad of "checks" 
>being sent out by AT&T and MCI, to name a few offenders. These bear the 
>legend: "endorsement of this check constitutes your acceptance of <foo> as 
>your long distance carrier."

From West's Nutshell handbook on _Commercial Paper_, p 55:

  "[...] an instrument is not negotiable unless it contains an
unconditional promise or order. [UCC] 3-104(1)(b).  See 3-105.  That
is, the obligation must be expressed in terms which are absolute and
not subject to contingencies, provisos, qualifications, or
reservations which may impair the obligation to pay.  It must be a
'courier without luggage.' Overton v. Tyler, 3 Pa. 346,347 (1846)."

If a check is not negotiable, that does not mean that the order on it
is invalid; it means that the rights of third and later parties to
collect on the order are precariously held.  This might not impede the
money getting transferred, though.  

The thing about the LD company checks is that their writing doesn't
seem to be a condition on the order to pay.  After all, you don't have
to indorse a check in order to get the money from it; you can always
take it to the bank it was drawn on directly.  The condition on these
checks seems to be a condition upon your indorsement of the check;
conditions on indorsements do not affect negotiability.

>Weasels.

I agree.

Eric




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: composer@Beyond.Dreams.ORG (Jeff Kellem)
Date: Tue, 4 May 93 13:10:22 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: TALK: Boston Univ CS Dept Colloquium--Digital Signatures, 6 May, 11am
Message-ID: <9305042010.AA28513@Beyond.Dreams.ORG>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


For those in the Boston area this Thursday, 6 May 93, this talk may be of
interest.  FYI...

			-jeff

Jeff Kellem
Internet: composer@Beyond.Dreams.ORG

------- Forwarded Message

			     BOSTON UNIVERSITY

			 CS DEPARTMENT COLLOQUIUM


			 Thursday, May 6 at 11:00

		   Math and Computer Science Bldg (MCS)
		      Room 135, 111 Cummington Street
			     Boston, MA  02215



ON-LINE/OFF-LINE DIGITAL SIGNATURES


Shimon Even

Computer Science Department
Technion - Israel Institute of Technology


Joint work with Oded Goldreich and Silvio Micali

ABSTRACT

A signature scheme is proposed. It consists of two phases. The
first phase is performed off-line, before the message to be signed
is even known. The second on-line phase is performed once the message
to be signed is known. The scheme has a practical advantage as well as a
theoretical value.

It is shown that the on-line phase can be carried out very quickly,
by using a one-time signature scheme. The off-line phase can use a
simplified version of the square extraction method of Rabin. It
requires a moderate amount of computation, but can be performed
leisurely, before the message to be signed is even known. Thus, the
scheme may be of practical value in scenarios such as that of
electronic fund transfer.

It is proved that if the building blocks are secure against known
message attack, the scheme is secure against chosen message attack.


There will be tea at 10:45.

------- End of Forwarded Message




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: jet@nas.nasa.gov (J. Eric Townsend)
Date: Tue, 4 May 93 16:42:17 PDT
To: uni@acs.bu.edu (Shaen Bernhardt)
Subject: An answer and a question
In-Reply-To: <9305042316.AA147149@acs.bu.edu>
Message-ID: <9305042342.AA24553@boxer.nas.nasa.gov>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Convenience is Freedom!

"Get your Freedom at 7-11!" -- remember this ad campaign?

The word has been so overused that it's now meaningless in the minds
of many Americans.






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Joe Thomas <jthomas@access.digex.net>
Date: Tue, 4 May 93 14:18:38 PDT
To: Timothy Newsham <newsham@wiliki.eng.hawaii.edu>
Subject: Re: tripple des
In-Reply-To: <9305042013.AA25148@toad.com>
Message-ID: <Pine.3.05.9305041723.A14495-b100000@access.digex.net>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


On Tue, 4 May 1993, Timothy Newsham wrote:

> 
> Crypto question:
> why was the following chosen for tripple DES :
>    EN(DE(EN(data,k1),k2),k3);   
>
> . . .
> 
> How would this compare with
>    EN(EN(EN(data,k1),k2),k3);
> 

In fact, "triple" DES goes three times through the engine, but only uses
two keys:

     EN(DE(EN(data,k1),k2),k1)

My understanding is that this was chosen for hardware implementations
because it is equivalent to single DES when k1 = k2.  This is important,
of course, when some people you want to talk to are still using single DES
and the hardware is hard to reconfigure.

Nowadays, when most DES (technically, DEA) is done in software, it would
make more sense to use three separate keys.  Two key "triple" DES has 112
key bits (56 * 2), while a three key system would have 168.  I've seen the
latter system used recently, though I can't remember where...

Joe
--
Joe Thomas <jthomas@access.digex.net>           Say no to the Wiretap Chip!
PGP key available by request, finger, or pgp-public-keys@toxicwaste.mit.edu
PGP   key   fingerprint:   1E E1 B8 6E 49 67 C4 19  8B F1 E4 9D F0 6D 68 4B







From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Bob Stratton <strat@intercon.com>
Date: Tue, 4 May 93 14:25:42 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: checks
Message-ID: <9305041725.AA34057@horton.intercon.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> Date: Mon, 3 May 93 08:44:37 -0700 
> From: Eric Hughes <hughes@soda.berkeley.edu> 
> Choices: PGP vs. RSA Data Security 
> 
> >re paying a reasonable license fee, I wonder if RSA would cash my 
> >check for (say) $10 if I wrote on the check that it was for a license 
> >for whatever they might claim on PGP.  
> 
> RSA might try to cash such a check, but if their bank is smart they won'
> t accept it.  A check is not negotiable if it contains a 
> condition.  

Much as I respect you Eric, I direct your attention to the myriad of "checks" 
being sent out by AT&T and MCI, to name a few offenders. These bear the 
legend: "endorsement of this check constitutes your acceptance of <foo> as 
your long distance carrier."

Weasels.

--Strat







From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: smb@research.att.com
Date: Tue, 4 May 93 15:42:26 PDT
To: Timothy Newsham <newsham@wiliki.eng.hawaii.edu>
Subject: Re: tripple des
Message-ID: <9305042242.AA00515@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


	 
	 Crypto question:
	 why was the following chosen for tripple DES :
	    EN(DE(EN(data,k1),k2),k3);   

	 The encryption would involve passing data through IP,
	 then doing 16 rounds forward with k1,
	 (factoring out the IP-1 and IP)
	 then doing 16 rounds backwards with k2
	 (factoring out the next IP-1 and IP)
	 then doing 16 rounds forward with k3
	 then going through IP-1

	 How would this compare with
	    EN(EN(EN(data,k1),k2),k3);

	 which goes through IP,  does 16 rounds each with k1, k2 then
	 k3, then IP-1 ?

	 The only difference is that the key scheduler rotates backwards
	 (or another interpretation keys used in reverse order) for the
	 second stage.

	 Does anyone know the rationale behind this?

First, it's usually done as

	EN(DE(EN(data,k1),k2),k1)

The middle step is a decryption for two reasons, one of which is no
longer important for DES.  The reason that is still valid is that by
setting k1==k2, you have compatibility with other implementations that
only do single encryption.  (See the Garon and Outerbridge paper in
the July '91 Cryptologia for why you want to triple-encrypt keys...)

The second reason, no longer a concern for DES, is that it was feared
that DES might be a group.  That is, given

	E(E(data,k1),k2)

it was feared that there might be a third key kx equivalent to encryption
with k1 and k2.  It's recently been proved that DES is not a group.  That
is, in general there is no such kx.  Conceivably, the problem could arise
with other cryptosystems, such as Skipjack.  I haven't yet seen the proof
about DES, and I don't know how much might transfer to other DES-like
algorithms.  In any event, doing a decryption as the second operation
was thought to dodge the whole question.

Finally, even though triple encryption as I've defined it only has a key
length of 112, it's still necessary to do three operations, rather than
a simple double encryption; for the latter, there's a birthday attack
in O(2^56) time, though it does require O(2^56) space as well, making its
feasibility a bit dubious.


		--Steve Bellovin




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: uni@acs.bu.edu (Shaen Bernhardt)
Date: Tue, 4 May 93 16:16:23 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: An answer and a question
Message-ID: <9305042316.AA147149@acs.bu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



First, with regard to privacy being free.

I agree, than in an ideal society privacy would be considered a right,
and no effort would be required to insure it.  In my view it is necessary
for the state to insure this right.  This goes to the "if you were ever
made dictator of a small island nation, what would be your first decrees?"

Well, mine would be something to the effect of this:

That we the citizens of unissa might preserve the individuality and
freedom of the populous, prevent tyrrany and authortarian tactics,
promote the right of men and women to develop in their own direction
s, as this is most conducive to the rise of a great nation, I hereby
decree that it shall be the unalienable right of citizens to hold their
personal and public actions and duties in confidence.  Further it shall
be made to pass that the burden of ensuring such confidentiality shall
rest on the state, and the state shall pass no law or decree that
violates this right.

Unfortunately, we all know that this is classified as "fantasy"
I'd love for it to happen, and I would be quite proud to offer
citizenship to all the cypherpunks (well most of you  :)  )
but in the words of a great man I once knew... "It Ain't gonna
happen...."

Privacy isn't free, you have to work for it in this country.
I don't mind that.  I sort of like the process.  I have a problem
when the state ACTIVELY tries to ELIMINATE privacy.  I have an
even WORSE problem when the state does so by serapitious means.

I am disgusted by what's happening with regard to press releases
and complicity of large corporations who are basically selling
us out for a profit (A-hem T-eeem an-hem-d T-hem)

I realized something suddenly that made me feel like I am growing
more and more paranoid by the hour by the way.  I noticed for the
first time that these AT&T commercials that are airing lately
have distinct propaganda trends... I never noticed it before
but think about it.  Lots of talk about freedom, individual plans,
and a MAJOR ad campaign on T.V. complete with Arethra (sp) Franklin
singing "Freedom....Freedom... FREEDOM!"  Does this strike anyone
else as odd or am I going crazy?  I think I'm turning into a
liberal!  I can't take it!

Look, it's obvious that security and liberty are a trade off.
I'm an international relations schloar, with a concentration
in intelligence, so that's not a leap of logic for me.  What
I don't understand is this:  Of late, terrorist acts have
been on the DECLINE.  The world trade center was a big one,
sure.  But it's not the whole picture.  So why the push now?
We really don't NEED more security in the form of clipper and
FBI bills right now... not in my view anyhow.  Comparatively
this is a safe nation.

Even if you disagree with this point, it can be pointed out 
that you DO NOT need privacy invading tactics to prevent
terrorism, or drug dealing.  To me, drug sniffing dogs,
metal detectors, x-ray machines are not a GREAT violation
of privacy, I have little trouble tolerating these things
and I accept them as part of life.  Fine.
But when it becomes obvious that government is taking an
ACTIVE interest in things like my conversations and
business practices, as well as opening the way for me
and my children (I hope to have some some day) to be cataloged
and followed and assigned a number and database for our health
records and who knows what else from birth, I get offended.
I WILL fight these initiaves, with civil disobedience if
nothing else works.

I have a feeling that there are like minded people out there,
people who can tolerate some violations of absolute privacy
in exchange for feeling that every plane you ride on is not
at risk because of some psycho, and that less coke is going
to find its way to schools.  But who cannot tolerate
AUTHORATARIAN regimes, and practices to make these assurances.

We are in my opinion at a very dangerous time.  VERY dangerous
We are at a point where events have made isolationism more and
more a concern, and the focus is more an more on the people of
this nation rather than other issues.  Events like the world
trade center, and the media attention it brings threaten to
bring more force to bear on the fragile balance between what
I will accept and what government wants.

On another note, how public is this mailing list.  I mean the
list of names here.  How unlikely is it that we might be on a
"watch-these-dangerous-activits-revolutionaries" black list
somewhere...?


uni@acs.bu.edu




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: baumbach@atmel.com (Peter Baumbach)
Date: Tue, 4 May 93 18:11:27 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: REQUEST: Info on email accounts
Message-ID: <9305050036.AA17304@sole.chp.atmel.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I hope this is the kind of thing you're looking for. :-)


----- Begin Included Message -----

>From kaminski@netcom.com Sun Apr 25 14:39:32 1993
Reply-To: kaminski@netcom.com
Date: Sun, 25 Apr 93 10:49:13 -0700
From: kaminski@netcom.com (Peter Kaminski)
To: PDIAL Mailing List <kaminski@netcom.com>
Subject: PDIAL011, 23 April 1993
Content-Length: 34539

You're on the mailing list to receive new PDIAL editions as they come out;
here's the latest!  For problems, email me at <kaminski@netcom.com>
(preferred) or 71053.2155@compuserve.com.

Thanks for your interest!

Pete

================

New in PDIAL011:
  New provider: nwnexus (206)
  New points of presence: netcom (206) (503)
  Updated info: csn, msen; section on 800 rates

---- cut here ----

             The Public Dialup Internet Access List (PDIAL)
             ==============================================
                    File PDIAL011.TXT -- 23 April 1993

  A list of public access service providers offering dialup access to
         outgoing Internet connections such as FTP and telnet.

Copyright 1992-1993 Peter Kaminski.
May be distributed but not sold -- see notice at the end of this document.
Or, tell people to email "Send PDIAL" to "info-deli-server@netcom.com".

Contents:

  -1- Summary: Providers With Wide Area Access
  -2- Summary: Area Codes For US/Canada Dialins
  -3- Summary: Phone Prefixes For International Dialins
  -4- What *Is* The Internet?
  -5- What The PDIAL Is
  -6- List of Providers
  -7- How People Can Get The PDIAL (This List)
  -8- Appendix A: Finding Public Data Network (PDN) Access Numbers
  -9- Copyright and Distribution Of The PDIAL; Other Notices

Subject headers below are formatted so this list may be read as a
digest by USENET newsreaders that support digests.

Example commands: rn, "control-G" skips to next section; nn, "G%"
presents as a digest.  Sections may also be located by searching for
the desired section number string (e.g. "-1-") from the list above.

----------------------------------------------------------------------

From: PDIAL -1-
Subject: Summary: Providers With Wide Area Access

       PDN delphi, holonet, michnet, portal, psi-gds, psilink, well, world
       800 class, cns, crl, csn, dial-n-cerf-usa, jvnc, OARnet

"PDN" means the provider is accessible through a public data network
(check the listings below for which network); note that many PDNs
listed offer access outside North America as well as within North
America.  Check with the provider or the PDN for more details.

"800" means the provider is accessible via a "toll-free" US phone
number.  The phone company will not charge for the call, but the
service provider will add a surcharge to cover the cost of the 800
service.  This may be more expensive than other long-distance options.

------------------------------

From: PDIAL -2-
Subject: Summary: Area Codes for US/Canada Dialins

If you are not local to any of these providers, it's still likely you
are able to access those providers available through a public data
network (PDN).  Check the section above for providers with wide area
access.

       201 jvnc-tiger
       202 express, grebyn
       203 jvnc-tiger
       206 eskimo, halcyon, netcom, nwnexus
       212 mindvox, panix
       213 dial-n-cerf, netcom
       214 metronet
       215 jvnc-tiger, PREPnet
       216 OARnet, wariat
       301 express, grebyn
       303 cns, csn
       310 dial-n-cerf, netcom
       312 ddsw1
       313 michnet, MSen
       401 anomaly, ids, jvnc-tiger
       408 a2i, netcom, portal
       410 express
       412 PREPnet, telerama
       415 crl, dial-n-cerf, netcom, portal, well
       419 OARnet
       503 netcom
       508 anomaly, nearnet
       510 dial-n-cerf, holonet, netcom
       513 OARnet
       514 CAM.ORG
       516 jvnc-tiger
       517 michnet
       603 nearnet
       609 jvnc-tiger
       614 OARnet
       616 michnet
       617 delphi, nearnet, world
       619 cyber, dial-n-cerf, netcom
       703 express, grebyn
       704 rock-concert
       707 crl
       708 ddsw1
       713 sugar
       714 dial-n-cerf
       717 PREPnet
       718 mindvox, panix
       719 cns, csn, oldcolo
       814 PREPnet
       815 ddsw1
       818 dial-n-cerf, netcom
       906 michnet
       908 jvnc-tiger
       916 netcom
       919 rock-concert

These are area codes local to the dialups, although some prefixes in
the area codes listed may not be local to the dialups.  Check your
phone book or with your phone company.

Most providers listed here are also accessible by packet-switched data
services such as PC Pursuit ($30/month for 30 hours off-peak 2400 bps
access -- call 800-736-1130 for more information), traditional long
distance services, and of course telnet.

------------------------------

From: PDIAL -3-
Subject: Summary: Phone Prefixes for International Dialins

If you are not local to any of these providers, there is still a
chance you are able to access those providers available through a
public data network (PDN).  Check the section above for providers with
wide area access, and send email to them to ask about availability.

     +61 2 connect.com.au
     +61 3 connect.com.au
 +44 (0)81 ibmpcug

------------------------------

From: PDIAL -4-
Subject: What *Is* The Internet?

The Internet is a global cooperative network of university, corporate,
government, and private computers, all communicating with each other by
means of something called TCP/IP (Transmission Control Protocol/Internet
Protocol).  Computers directly on the Internet can exchange data quickly
and easily with any other computer on the Internet to download files, send
email, provide remote logins, etc.

Users can download files from publicly accessible archive sites ("anonymous
FTP"); login into remote computers (telnet or rlogin); chat in real-time
with other users around the world (Internet Relay Chat); or use the newest
information retrieval tools to find a staggering variety of information
(Wide Area Information Servers, Gopher, World Wide Web).

Computers directly on the Internet also exchange email directly and very
quickly; email is usually delivered in seconds between Internet sites.

Sometimes the Internet is confused with other related networks or types of
networking.

First, there are other ways to be "connected to the Internet" without being
directly connected as a TCP/IP node.  Some computers connect via UUCP or
other means at regular intervals to an Internet site to exchange email and
USENET newsgroups, for instance.  Such a site can provide email (though not
as quickly as a directly connected systems) and USENET access, but not
Internet downloads, remote logins, etc.

"email" (or "Internet email", "netmail") can be exchanged with a wide
variety of systems connected directly and indirectly to the Internet.  The
email may travel solely over the Internet, or it may traverse other
networks and systems.

"USENET" is the collection of computers all over the world that exchange
USENET news -- thousands of "newsgroups" (like forums, or echos) on a wide
range of topics.  The newsgroup articles are distributed all over the world
to USENET sites that wish to carry them (sometimes over the Internet,
sometimes not), where people read and respond to them.

The "NSFNET" is one of the backbones of the Internet in the US.  It is
funded by the NSF, which restricts traffic over the NSFNET to "open
research and education in and among US research and instructional
institutions, plus research arms of for-profit firms when engaged in
open scholarly communication and research."  Your Internet provider
can give you more details about acceptable use, and alternatives
should you need to use the Internet in other ways.

------------------------------

From: PDIAL -5-
Subject: What The PDIAL Is

This is a list of Internet service providers offering public access
dialins and outgoing Internet access (ftp, telnet, etc.).  Most of
them provide email and USENET news and other services as well.

If one of these systems is not accessible to you and you need email or
USENET access, but *don't* need ftp or telnet, you have many more
public access systems from which to choose.  Public access systems
without ftp or telnet are *not* listed in this list, however.  See the
nixpub (alt.bbs, comp.misc) list and other BBS lists.

Some of these providers offer time-shared access to a shell or BBS
program on a computer connected directly to the Internet, through
which you can FTP or telnet to other systems on the Internet.  Usually
other services are provided as well.  Generally, you need only a modem
and terminal or terminal emulator to access these systems.  Check for
"shell", "bbs", or "menu" on the "services" line.

Other providers connect you directly to the Internet via SLIP or PPP
when you dial in.  For these you need a computer system capable of
running the software to interface with the Internet, e.g., a Unix
machine, PC, or Mac.  Check for "SLIP", or "PPP" on the services
line.

While I have included all sites for which I have complete information,
this list is surely incomplete.  Please send any additions or
corrections to "kaminski@netcom.com".

------------------------------

From: PDIAL -6-
Subject: List of Providers

Fees are for personal dialup accounts with outgoing Internet access;
most sites have other classes of service with other rate structures as
well.  Most support email and netnews along with the listed services.

"Long distance: provided by user" means you need to use services such
as PC Pursuit, direct dial long distance or other long distance services.

<< a2i >>
name ----------> a2i communications
dialup --------> 408-293-9010 (v.32, v.32 bis) or 408-293-9020 (PEP) 'guest'
area codes ----> 408
local access --> CA: Campbell, Los Altos, Los Gatos, Moutain View, San Jose, 
                 Santa Clara, Saratoga, Sunnyvale
long distance -> provided by user
services ------> shell, ftp, telnet, feeds
fees ----------> $20/month or $45/3 months or $72/6 months
email ---------> info@rahul.net
voice ---------> n/a
ftp more info -> ftp.rahul.net:/pub/BLURB

<< anomaly >>
name ----------> Anomaly - Rhode Island's Gateway To The Internet
dialup --------> 401-331-3706 (v.32) or 401-455-0347 (PEP)
area codes ----> 401, 508
local access --> RI: Providence/Seekonk Zone
long distance -> provided by user
services ------> shell, ftp, telnet, SLIP
fees ----------> Commercial: $125/6 months or $200/year; Educational: $75/6 
                 months or $125/year
email ---------> info@anomaly.sbs.risc.net
voice ---------> 401-273-4669
ftp more info -> anomaly.sbs.risc.net:/anomaly.info/access.zip

<< CAM.ORG >>
name ----------> Communications Accessibles Montreal
dialup --------> 514-281-5601 (v.32 bis, HST) 514-738-3664 (PEP), 
                 514-923-2103 (ZyXeL 19.2K) 514-466-0592 (v.32)
area codes ----> 514
local access --> QC: Montreal, Laval, South-Shore, West-Island
long distance -> provided by user
services ------> shell, ftp, telnet, feeds, SLIP, PPP, FAX gateway
fees ----------> $25/month Cdn.
email ---------> info@CAM.ORG
voice ---------> 514-923-2102
ftp more info -> n/a

<< class >>
name ----------> Cooperative Library Agency for Systems and Services
dialup --------> contact for number; NOTE: CLASS serves libraries/information 
                 distributors only
area codes ----> 800
local access --> anywhere (800) service is available
long distance -> included
services ------> ftp, telnet, gopher, wais, hytelnet
fees ----------> $10.50/hour + $150/year for first account + $50/year each 
                 additional account + $135/year CLASS membership
email ---------> class@class.org
voice ---------> 800-488-4559
fax -----------> 408-453-5379
ftp more info -> n/a

<< cns >>
name ----------> Community News Service
dialup --------> 719-520-1700 id 'new', passwd 'newuser'
area codes ----> 303, 719, 800
local access --> CO: Colorado Springs, Denver; continental US/800
long distance -> 800 or provided by user
services ------> UNIX shell, email, ftp, telnet, irc, USENET, Clarinet, gopher
fees ----------> $1/hour; $10/month minimum + $35 signup
email ---------> klaus@cscns.com
voice ---------> 719-579-9120
ftp more info -> n/a

<< connect.com.au >>
name ----------> connect.com.au pty ltd
dialup --------> contact for number
area codes ----> +61 3, +61 2
local access --> Australia: Melbourne, Sydney
long distance -> provided by user
services ------> SLIP, PPP, ISDN, UUCP, ftp, telnet, NTP, FTPmail
fees ----------> AUS$2000/year (1 hour/day), 10% discount for AUUG members; 
                 other billing negotiable
email ---------> connect@connect.com.au
voice ---------> +61 3 5282239
fax -----------> +61 3 5285887
ftp more info -> ftp.connect.com.au

<< crl >>
name ----------> CR Laboratories Dialup Internet Access
dialup --------> 415-389-UNIX
area codes ----> 415, 707, 800
local access --> CA: San Francisco Bay Area; continental US/800
long distance -> 800 or provided by user
services ------> shell, ftp, telnet, feeds, SLIP, WAIS
fees ----------> $19.50/month + $15.00 signup
email ---------> info@crl.com
voice ---------> 415-381-2800
ftp more info -> n/a

<< csn >>
name ----------> Colorado SuperNet, Inc.
dialup --------> contact for number
area codes ----> 303, 719, 800
local access --> CO: Alamosa, Boulder/Denver, Colorado Springs, Durango, Fort 
                 Collins, Frisco, Glenwood Springs/Aspen, Grand Junction, 
                 Greeley, Gunnison, Pueblo, Telluride; anywhere 800 service 
                 is available
long distance -> provided by user or 800
services ------> shell or menu, UUCP, SLIP, 56K, ISDN, T1; ftp, telnet, irc, 
                 gopher, WAIS, domains, anonymous ftp space, email-to-fax
fees ----------> $1/hour off-peak, $3/hour peak ($250 max/month) + $20 
                 signup, $5/hr surcharge for 800 use
email ---------> info@csn.org
voice ---------> 303-273-3471
fax -----------> 303-273-3475
ftp more info -> csn.org:/CSN/reports/DialinInfo.txt
off-peak ------> midnight to 6am

<< cyber >>
name ----------> The Cyberspace Station
dialup --------> (619) 634-1376 'guest'
area codes ----> 619
local access --> CA: San Diego
long distance -> provided by user
services ------> shell, ftp, telnet, irc
fees ----------> $15/month + $10 startup or $60 for six months
email ---------> help@cyber.net
voice ---------> 
ftp more info -> n/a

<< ddsw1 >>
name ----------> 'ddsw1', MCSNet
dialup --------> (312) 248-0900 V.32bis/V.32, 248-6295 (PEP), follow prompts
area codes ----> 312, 708, 815
local access --> IL: Chicago
long distance -> provided by user
services ------> shell, ftp, telnet, feeds, email, irc, gopher
fees ----------> $25/month or $65/3 months
email ---------> info@ddsw1.mcs.com
voice ---------> n/a
ftp more info -> n/a

<< delphi >>
name ----------> DELPHI
dialup --------> (800) 365-4636 'JOINDELPHI password:INTERNETSIG'
area codes ----> 617, PDN
local access --> MA: Boston; KS: Kansas City
long distance -> Sprintnet or Tymnet: $9/hour weekday business hours, no 
                 charge nights and weekends
services ------> ftp, telnet, feeds, user groups, wire services, member 
                 conferencing
fees ----------> $10/month for 4 hours or $20/month for 20 hours + $3/month 
                 for Internet services
email ---------> walthowe@delphi.com
voice ---------> 800-544-4005
ftp more info -> n/a

<< dial-n-cerf >>
name ----------> DIAL n' CERF or DIAL n' CERF AYC
dialup --------> contact for number
area codes ----> 213, 310, 415, 510, 619, 714, 818
local access --> CA: Los Angeles, Oakland, San Diego, Irvine, Pasadena, Palo 
                 Alto
long distance -> provided by user
services ------> shell, menu, irc, ftp, hytelnet, gopher, WAIS, WWW, terminal 
                 service, SLIP
fees ----------> $5/hour ($3/hour on weekend) + $20/month + $50 startup OR 
                 $250/month flat for AYC
email ---------> help@cerf.net
voice ---------> 800-876-2373 or 619-455-3900
ftp more info -> nic.cerf.net:/cerfnet/dial-n-cerf/
off-peak ------> Weekend: 5pm Friday to 5pm Sunday

<< dial-n-cerf-usa >>
name ----------> DIAL n' CERF USA
dialup --------> contact for number
area codes ----> 800
local access --> anywhere (800) service is available
long distance -> included
services ------> shell, menu, irc, ftp, hytelnet, gopher, WAIS, WWW, terminal 
                 service, SLIP
fees ----------> $10/hour ($8/hour on weekend) + $20/month
email ---------> help@cerf.net
voice ---------> 800-876-2373 or 619-455-3900
ftp more info -> nic.cerf.net:/cerfnet/dial-n-cerf/
off-peak ------> Weekend: 5pm Friday to 5pm Sunday

<< eskimo >>
name ----------> Eskimo North
dialup --------> 206-367-3837 300-2400 bps, 206-362-6731 for 9600/14.4k, 
                 206-742-1150 World Blazer
area codes ----> 206
local access --> WA: Seattle, Everett
long distance -> provided by user
services ------> shell, ftp, telnet
fees ----------> $10/month or $96/year
email ---------> nanook@eskimo.com
voice ---------> 206-367-7457
ftp more info -> n/a

<< express >>
name ----------> Express Access - Online Communications Service
dialup --------> 301-220-0462, 410-766-1855 'new'
area codes ----> 202, 301, 410, 703
local access --> Northern VA, Baltimore MD, Washington DC
long distance -> provided by user
services ------> shell, ftp, telnet, irc
fees ----------> $25/month or $250/year
email ---------> info@digex.com
voice ---------> 301-220-2020
ftp more info -> n/a

<< grebyn >>
name ----------> Grebyn Corporation
dialup --------> 703-281-7997, 'apply'
area codes ----> 202, 301, 703
local access --> Northern VA, Southern MD, Washington DC
long distance -> provided by user
services ------> shell, ftp, telnet
fees ----------> $30/month
email ---------> info@grebyn.com
voice ---------> 703-281-2194
ftp more info -> n/a

<< halcyon >>
name ----------> Halcyon
dialup --------> (206) 382-6245 'new', 8N1
area codes ----> 206
local access --> Seattle, WA
long distance -> provided by user
services ------> shell, telnet, ftp, bbs, irc, gopher, hytelnet
fees ----------> $200/year, or $60/quarter + $10 start-up
email ---------> info@halcyon.com
voice ---------> 206-955-1050
ftp more info -> halcyon.com:~/pub/waffle/info

<< holonet >>
name ----------> HoloNet
dialup --------> (510) 704-1058
area codes ----> 510, PDN
local access --> Berkeley, CA
long distance -> [per hour, off-peak/peak] Bay Area: $0.50/$0.95; PSINet A: 
                 $0.95/$1.95; PSINet B: $2.50/$6.00; Tymnet: $3.75/$7.50
services ------> ftp, telnet, irc, games
fees ----------> $2/hour off-peak, $4/hour peak; $6/month or $60/year minimum
email ---------> info@holonet.net
voice ---------> 510-704-0160
ftp more info -> holonet.net:/info/
off-peak ------> 5pm to 8am + weekends and holidays

<< ibmpcug >>
name ----------> UK PC User Group
dialup --------> +44 (0)81 863 6646
area codes ----> +44 (0)81
local access --> London, England
long distance -> provided by user
services ------> ftp, telnet, bbs, irc, feeds
fees ----------> GBPounds 15.50/month or 160/year + 10 startup (no time 
                 charges)
email ---------> info@ibmpcug.co.uk
voice ---------> +44 (0)81 863 6646
ftp more info -> n/a

<< ids >>
name ----------> The IDS World Network
dialup --------> (401) 884-9002, (401) 785-1067
area codes ----> 401
local access --> East Greenwich, RI; northern RI
long distance -> provided by user
services ------> ftp, telnet, SLIP, feeds, bbs
fees ----------> $10/month or $50/half year or $100/year
email ---------> sysadmin@ids.net
voice ---------> 401-884-7856
ftp more info -> ids.net:/ids.net

<< jvnc-tiger >>
name ----------> The John von Neumann Computer Network - Dialin' Tiger
dialup --------> contact for number
area codes ----> 201, 203, 215, 401, 516, 609, 908
local access --> Princeton & Newark, NJ; Philadelphia, PA; Garden City, NY; 
                 Bridgeport, New Haven, & Storrs, CT; Providence, RI
long distance -> provided by user
services ------> ftp, telnet, SLIP, feeds, optional shell
fees ----------> $99/month + $99 startup (PC or Mac SLIP software included -- 
                 shell is additional $21/month)
email ---------> info@jvnc.net
voice ---------> (800) 35-TIGER, (609) 258-2400
ftp more info -> n/a

<< jvnc >>
name ----------> The John von Neumann Computer Network - Tiger Mail & Dialin' 
                 Terminal
dialup --------> contact for number
area codes ----> 800
local access --> anywhere (800) service is available
long distance -> included
services ------> email and newsfeed or terminal access only
fees ----------> $19/month + $10/hour + $36 startup (PC or Mac SLIP software 
                 included)
email ---------> info@jvnc.net
voice ---------> (800) 35-TIGER, (609) 258-2400
ftp more info -> n/a

<< metronet >>
name ----------> Texas Metronet
dialup --------> 214-705-2902 9600bps, 214-705-2917 2400bps, 'info/info' or 
                 'signup/signup'
area codes ----> 214
local access --> TX: Dallas
long distance -> provided by user
services ------> shell, ftp, telnet, feeds, SLIP
fees ----------> $10-$50/month + $20-$30 startup
email ---------> srl@metronet.com / 73157.1323@compuserve.com / 
                 GEnie:S.LINEBARG
voice ---------> 214-401-2800
fax -----------> 214-401-2802 ( 8am-5pm CST weekdays )
ftp more info -> n/a

<< michnet >>
name ----------> Merit Network, Inc. -- MichNet project
dialup --------> contact for number or telnet hermes.merit.edu and type 
                 'help' at 'Which host?' prompt
area codes ----> 313, 517, 616, 906, PDN
local access --> Michigan; Boston, MA; Wash. DC
long distance -> SprintNet, Autonet, Michigan Bell packet-switch network
services ------> telnet, SLIP, PPP, outbound SprintNet, Autonet and Ann Arbor 
                 dialout
fees ----------> $35/month + $40 signup ($10/month for K-12 & libraries in 
                 Michigan)
email ---------> info@merit.edu
voice ---------> 313-764-9430
ftp more info -> nic.merit.edu:/

<< mindvox >>
name ----------> MindVOX
dialup --------> (212) 988-5030 'mindvox' 'guest'
area codes ----> 212, 718
local access --> NY: New York City
long distance -> provided by user
services ------> conferencing system ftp, telnet, irc, gopher, hytelnet, 
                 Archives, BBS
fees ----------> $15-$20/month.  No startup.
email ---------> info@phantom.com
voice ---------> 212-988-5987
ftp more info -> n/a

<< MSen >>
name ----------> MSen
dialup --------> contact for number
area codes ----> 313
local access --> All of SE Michigan (313)
long distance -> provided by user
services ------> shell, WAIS, gopher, telnet, ftp, SLIP, PPP, IRC, WWW, 
                 Picospan BBS, ftp space
fees ----------> $20/month; $20 startup
email ---------> info@msen.com
voice ---------> 313-998-4562
fax -----------> 313-998-4563
ftp more info -> ftp.msen.com:/pub/vendor/msen

<< nearnet >>
name ----------> NEARnet
dialup --------> contact for numbers
area codes ----> 508, 603, 617
local access --> Boston, MA; Nashua, NH
long distance -> provided by user
services ------> SLIP, email, feeds, dns
fees ----------> $250/month
email ---------> nearnet-join@nic.near.net
voice ---------> 617-873-8730
ftp more info -> nic.near.net:/docs

<< netcom >>
name ----------> Netcom Online Communication Services
dialup --------> (206) 527-5992, (310) 842-8835, (408) 241-9760, (408) 
                 459-9851, (415) 328-9940, (415) 985-5650, (503) 626-6833, 
                 (510) 426-6610, (510) 865-9004, (619) 234-0524, (916) 
                 965-1371
area codes ----> 206, 213, 310, 408, 415, 503, 510, 619, 818, 916
local access --> CA: SF Bay Area (5 POPs), Sacramento, Santa Cruz, Los 
                 Angeles, San Diego; OR: Portland; WA: Seattle (May 1)
long distance -> provided by user
services ------> shell, ftp, telnet, irc, WAIS, gopher, SLIP/PPP, ftp space, 
                 feeds, dns
fees ----------> $19.50/month + $15.00 signup
email ---------> info@netcom.com
voice ---------> 408-554-UNIX
ftp more info -> n/a

<< nwnexus >>
name ----------> Northwest Nexus Inc.
dialup --------> contact for numbers
area codes ----> 206
local access --> WA: Seattle
long distance -> provided by user
services ------> UUCP, SLIP, PPP, feeds, dns
fees ----------> $10/month for first 10 hours + $3/hr; $20 start-up
email ---------> info@nwnexus.wa.com
voice ---------> 206-455-3505
ftp more info -> nwnexus.wa.com:/NWNEXUS.info.txt

<< OARnet >>
name ----------> OARnet
dialup --------> send e-mail to nic@oar.net
area codes ----> 614, 513, 419, 216, 800
local access --> OH: Columbus, Cincinnati, Cleveland, Dayton
long distance -> 800 service
services ------> email, ftp, telnet, newsfeed
fees ----------> $4.00/hr to $330.00/month; call for code or send email
email ---------> nic@oar.net
voice ---------> 614-292-8100
fax -----------> 614-292-7168
ftp more info -> n/a

<< oldcolo >>
name ----------> Old Colorado City Communications
dialup --------> 719-632-4111 'newuser'
area codes ----> 719
local access --> CO: Colorado Springs
long distance -> provided by user
services ------> shell, ftp, telnet, AKCS, home of the NAPLPS conference
fees ----------> $25/month
email ---------> dave@oldcolo.com / thefox@oldcolo.com
voice ---------> 719-632-4848, 719-593-7575 or 719-636-2040
fax -----------> 719-593-7521
ftp more info -> n/a

<< panix >>
name ----------> PANIX Public Accss Unix
dialup --------> (212) 787-3100 'newuser'
area codes ----> 212, 718
local access --> New York City, NY
long distance -> provided by user
services ------> shell, ftp, telnet, gopher, wais, irc, feeds
fees ----------> $19/month or $208/year + $40 signup
email ---------> alexis@panix.com, jsb@panix.com
voice ---------> 212-877-4854 [Alexis Rosen], 212-691-1526 [Jim Baumbach]
ftp more info -> n/a

<< portal >>
name ----------> The Portal System
dialup --------> (408) 973-8091 high-speed, (408) 725-0561 2400bps; 'info'
area codes ----> 408, 415, PDN
local access --> CA: Cupertino, Mountain View, San Jose
long distance -> SprintNet: $2.50/hour off-peak, $7-$10/hour peak; Tymnet: 
                 $2.50/hour off-peak, $13/hour peak
services ------> shell, ftp, telnet, IRC, UUCP, feeds, bbs
fees ----------> $19.95/month + $19.95 signup
email ---------> cs@cup.portal.com, info@portal.com
voice ---------> 408-973-9111
ftp more info -> n/a
off-peak ------> 6pm to 7am + weekends and holidays

<< PREPnet >>
name ----------> PREPnet
dialup --------> contact for numbers
area codes ----> 215, 412, 717, 814
local access --> PA: Philadelphia, Pittsburgh, Harrisburg
long distance -> provided by user
services ------> SLIP, terminal service, telnet, ftp
fees ----------> $1,000/year membership.  Equipment-$325 onetime fee plus 
                 $40/month
email ---------> prepnet@cmu.edu
voice ---------> 412-268-7870
fax -----------> 412-268-7875
ftp more info -> ftp.prepnet.com:/prepnet/general/

<< psi-gds >>
name ----------> PSI's Global Dialup Service (GDS)
dialup --------> send email to numbers-info@psi.com
area codes ----> PDN
local access --> 
long distance -> included
services ------> telnet, rlogin
fees ----------> $39/month + $39 startup
email ---------> all-info@psi.com, gds-info@psi.com
voice ---------> 703-620-6651
fax -----------> 703-620-4586
ftp more info -> ftp.psi.com:/

<< psilink >>
name ----------> PSILink -  Personal Internet Access
dialup --------> send email to numbers-info@psi.com
area codes ----> PDN
local access --> 
long distance -> included
services ------> email and newsfeed, ftp
fees ----------> $29/month + $19 startup (PSILink software included)
email ---------> all-info@psi.com, psilink-info@psi.com
voice ---------> 703-620-6651
fax -----------> 703-620-4586
ftp more info -> ftp.psi.com:/

<< rock-concert >>
name ----------> Rock CONCERT Net
dialup --------> contact for number
area codes ----> 704, 919
local access --> NC: Asheville, Chapel Hill, Charlotte, Durham, Greensboro, 
                 Greenville, Raleigh, Winston-Salem, Research Triangle Park
long distance -> provided by user
services ------> shell, ftp, telnet, irc, gopher, wais, feeds, SLIP
fees ----------> $30/month + $50 signup
email ---------> info@concert.net
voice ---------> 919-248-1999
ftp more info -> ftp.concert.net

<< sugar >>
name ----------> NeoSoft's Sugar Land Unix
dialup --------> 713-684-5900
area codes ----> 713
local access --> TX: Houston metro area
long distance -> provided by user
services ------> bbs, shell, ftp, telnet, irc, feeds, UUCP
fees ----------> $29.95/month
email ---------> info@NeoSoft.com
voice ---------> 713-438-4964
ftp more info -> n/a

<< telerama >>
name ----------> Telerama BBS
dialup --------> (412) 481-5302 'new'
area codes ----> 412
local access --> PA: Pittsburgh
long distance -> provided by user
services ------> shell, ftp, telnet, feeds, menu, bbs
fees ----------> $6/month for 10 hours, 60 cents/hour thereafter. No startup.
email ---------> info@telerama.pgh.pa.us
voice ---------> 412-481-3505
ftp more info -> telerama.pgh.pa.us:/info/general.info

<< well >>
name ----------> The Whole Earth 'Lectronic Link
dialup --------> (415) 332-6106 'newuser'
area codes ----> 415, PDN
local access --> Sausalito, CA
long distance -> Compuserve Packet Network: $4/hour
services ------> shell, ftp, telnet, bbs
fees ----------> $15.00/month + $2.00/hr
email ---------> info@well.sf.ca.us
voice ---------> 415-332-4335
ftp more info -> n/a

<< wariat >>
name ----------> APK- Public Access UNI* Site
dialup --------> 216-481-9436 (2400), 216-481-9425 (V.32bis, SuperPEP)
area codes ----> 216
local access --> OH: Cleveland
long distance -> provided by user
services ------> shell, ftp, telnet, irc, gopher, feeds, BBS(Uniboard1.10)
fees ----------> $35/monthly, $200/6months,  $20 signup
email ---------> zbig@wariat.org
voice ---------> 216-481-9428
ftp more info -> n/a

<< world >>
name ----------> The World
dialup --------> (617) 739-9753 'new'
area codes ----> 617, PDN
local access --> Boston, MA
long distance -> Compuserve Packet Network: $5.60/hour
services ------> shell, ftp, telnet, irc
fees ----------> $5.00/month + $2.00/hr or $20/month for 20 hours
email ---------> office@world.std.com
voice ---------> 617-739-0202
ftp more info -> world.std.com:/world-info/basic.info

------------------------------

From: PDIAL -7-
Subject: How People Can Get The PDIAL (This List)


USENET: The PDIAL list is posted semi-regularly to alt.internet.access.wanted,
alt.bbs.lists, ba.internet, and news.answers.

EMAIL:

  From the Information Deli archive server (most up-to-date):
    To receive the current edition of the PDIAL, send email with the subject
    "Send PDIAL" to "info-deli-server@netcom.com".  To subscribe to a list
    which receives future editions as they are published, send email with
    the subject "Subscribe PDIAL" to "info-deli-server@netcom.com".  To
    receive both the most recent and future editions, send both messages.

  From the news.answers FAQ archive:
    Send email with the message "send usenet/news.answers/pdial" to
    "mail-server@pit-manager.mit.edu".  For help, send the message "help"
    to "mail-server@pit-manager.mit.edu".

FTP ARCHIVE SITES (PDIAL and other useful information):

  Information Deli FTP site:
    ftp.netcom.com:/pub/info-deli/public-access/pdial [192.100.81.100]

  As part of a collection of public access lists:
    VFL.Paramax.COM:/pub/pubnet/pdial [128.126.220.104]
    (used to be GVL.Unisys.COM)

  From the Merit Network Information Center Internet information archive:
    nic.merit.edu:/internet/pdial [35.1.1.48]

  As part of an Internet access compilation file:
    liberty.uc.wlu.edu:/pub/lawlib/internet.access [137.113.10.35]

  As part of the news.answers FAQ archive:
    pit-manager.mit.edu:/pub/usenet/news.answers/pdial [18.172.1.27]

------------------------------

From: PDIAL -8-
Subject: Appendix A: Finding Public Data Network (PDN) Access Numbers

Here's how to get local access numbers or information for the various
PDNs.  Generally, you can contact the site you're calling for help, too.

IMPORTANT NOTE: Unless noted otherwise, set your modem to 7E1 (7 data
bits, even parity, 1 stop bit) when dialing to look up access numbers
by modem as instructed below.


BT Tymnet
---------

For information and local access numbers, call 800-937-2862 (voice) or
215-666-1770 (voice).

To look up access numbers by modem, dial a local access number, hit
<cr> and 'a', and enter "information" at the "please log in:" prompt.


Compuserve Packet Network
-------------------------

You do NOT have to be a Compuserve member to use the CPN to dial other
services.

For information and local access numbers, call 800-848-8199 (voice).

To look up access numbers by modem, dial a local access number, hit
<cr> and enter "PHONES" at the "Host Name:" prompt.


PC Pursuit (SprintNet)
----------------------

PC Pursuit may be used to call a modem in any of 44 major metro areas
in the US from local access numbers around the country.  As such, it
can be used to access most of the providers listed in the PDIAL (those
with no other PDN access or even those which are accessible by other PDNs).

For information and registration, call 800-736-1130 (voice) or
800-877-2006 (data).  More information is also available on the PC
Pursuit support BBS (see below).

To look up access numbers by modem, dial 800-546-1000, hit
<cr><cr><cr> at 1200 baud or '@'<cr><cr> at 2400 baud.  Enter "MAIL"
at the "@" prompt, then "PHONES" at the "USER NAME:" prompt, and
"PHONES" at the "PASSWORD:" prompt.

The PC Pursuit support BBS provides a great deal of information about
PC Pursuit, including rates, terms and conditions, outdial numbers, etc.

To access the PC Pursuit support BBS, dial a local access number and
hit <cr><cr><cr> at 1200 baud or '@'<cr><cr> at 2400 baud.  Change
modem parameters to 8N1, and enter "C PURSUIT" at the "@" prompt.


PSINet
------

For information, call 800-82PSI82 (voice) or 703-620-6651 (voice), or
send email to "all-info@psi.com".  For a list of local access numbers
send email to "numbers-info@psi.com".

------------------------------

From: PDIAL -9-
Subject: Copyright and Distribution Of The PDIAL; Other Notices

This Document Copyright 1992-1993 Peter Kaminski.

This document may be distributed in its entirety by any means, and a
fee may be charged for its distribution, but it may not be sold
without prior permission.

I make no representations about the suitability or accuracy of this
document for any purpose.  It is provided "as is" without express or
implied warranty.

UPDATES AND CORRECTIONS: Send new or updated entries in the format
used here to "kaminski@netcom.com".  Also include an email address to
which I can send requests for more information.

-- 
Peter Kaminski       | Internet: kaminski@netcom.com (preferred)
The Information Deli | CIS: 71053,2155
"connecting people"  |

------------------------------

End of PDIAL
************


----- End Included Message -----





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Clark Reynard <clark@metal.psu.edu>
Date: Tue, 4 May 93 18:25:04 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: No CFV for soc.whistleblowers
Message-ID: <9305050208.AA02069@metal.psu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Based on the responses of a few cypherpunk members,
I have decided not to post a second RFD for soc.whistleblowers
unless I receive a significant amount of email requesting
that I do so.  Nor will I post a CFV.

I will simply let the matter be pigeonholed indefinitely.

While I find the imputation that I ought to be executed as
an Enemy of the People both offensive and absurd, it seems
that I could be acting retrogressively, though no sane reason
why I am doing so has been presented to me.

In either case, I will allow others to continue their efforts,
and would be pleased to help in whatever manner I can, but do
not wish to foment further splintering of what is already a
divided group.

I thank you for your support, and request that anyone with
any further comment on the matter mail it to me in personal
mail, unless it is of interest to the group at large.  

If interest warrants, or opinion seems different than what
I understand it to be, I reserve the right to change my mind.
----
Robert W. Clark             Just Say No! to the
rclark@nyx.cs.du.edu        Big Brother Chip  




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Eric Hughes <hughes@soda.berkeley.edu>
Date: Tue, 4 May 93 21:13:04 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: ADMIN:  allowable use
In-Reply-To: <Pine.3.05.9305042319.A9051-a100000@jupiter>
Message-ID: <9305050409.AA05703@soda.berkeley.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Re: a potential questionaire

Feel free to post your questionaire, but don't be surprised if you get
a hundred anonymous responses, skewing the results.

Eric




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: x62727g2@usma8.USMA.EDU (Gatlin Anthony CDT)
Date: Tue, 4 May 93 19:07:30 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: ZENGER Magazine
Message-ID: <9305050201.AA22134@usma8.usma.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


What is ZENGERE magazine and where can I get info on it?

Does anyone have back issues of Phrack and how can I get them?

"The NSA's version of strong crypto is crypto that they have the key for."

Anthony J. Gatlin                  |-------------------------------------|
Cadet Private, Co. G-2             |PGP Public Key available on request. |
United States Military Academy     |-------------------------------------|




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Peter shipley <shipley@merde.dis.org>
Date: Tue, 4 May 93 22:27:00 PDT
To: hoptoad!cypherpunks
Subject: 'zines
Message-ID: <9305050520.AA08247@merde.dis.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/x-pgp


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----



>What is ZENGERE magazine and where can I get info on it?


while we are on the subject, has anyone heard or seen "Black Ice"
if so, where can one get a copy?


		-Pete

btw: I highly recomend "Fact Sheet Five"


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.2

iQBFAgUBK+dOkMhmn7GUWLLFAQEW/gF9FxVtVHKMnZqIsc6qGKjxwnXdMkuijxn3
IfUp8lhC1UZNcoWWQeaD6HgyL36gwLu4
=YZ3f
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: nobody@soda.berkeley.edu
Date: Tue, 4 May 93 22:35:48 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: No Subject
Message-ID: <9305050532.AA13376@soda.berkeley.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


All:
 
 ZENGER has been around for a long time. It is connected to a long
tradition and network. It will be part of the future. And it realizes
the importance of crypto-systems in any _real_ underground movement.
 
 When ZENGER has decided to come above ground for their latest publication,
the cypherpunks will be informed of distribution channels. Until then, keep
up the fight!
 
 More to come....
 




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Edward J OConnell <ejo@world.std.com>
Date: Tue, 4 May 93 19:46:05 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Selling Pointers to Privacy
Message-ID: <Pine.3.07.9305042213.A14682-c100000@world.std.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


WARNING: The following post, I realize, assumes that we all agree that we
should all have the right to buy and sell and take any chemicals we damn
well please. In Extropians, you don't have to mention this. In the world
at large, this elicits wide eyed stares, and sputtering noises of disbelief.

( I recall someone being willing to give up some privacy for 'less crack
in the schools.' Sorry. Not a good enough reason to give up one whit of
privacy.)

SELLING 'OFF THE SHELF' PRIVACY TO THOSE THAT WOULD PAY FOR IT...
(Providing Pointers, that is...)

I've been thinking about this PGP thing. Playing with it has been
a lot of fun, (The ultimate secret decoder ring!) and has made me
wonder, who *needs* this kind of security that doesn't have it
already? Who would pay for it? Who wouldn't care too much about
the legalities? Mid to large scale drug dealers, that's who!

I began to think of things I could do with off the shelf hardware
and software. Ease of use is important--I don't think many drug
dealers are going to want to mess around with command line
interfaces--So I started playing with the idea of a
voicemail/answering machine type thing, using macs with built in
microphones, modems, telecom software, etc. Maybe use hypercard to
create a single application with a phone book, so that they would
just double click on someone's name, and talk into the microphone.
Hit a button to end the message, and then hit, SEND. The hypercard
stack compresses and encrypts using PGP the voice file, which is
decompressed and encrypted automatically at the other end, maybe
producing a blinking button with that persons name on it, and the
time of the call. The interface design would be fun, actually.

Asynchronous, but perhaps useful enough? (With a 1.44 modem and
the 6/1 compression rate of my shareware voice recorder, it would
take about 2 minutes to modem a minutes worth of message--not too
bad, really.) I think it might be interesting to typeset a booklet
describing how to do this, and try to sell it in the back of
magazines--maybe Rolling Stones and High Times. The booklet might
just be pointers to the hardware and software needed, and the few
skills the client would have to acquire. You could sell the "ease
of use" hypercard stack through the booklet, too. You could wait
and see if the thing takes off before actually making the stack.

I've also thought, that you could sell phone support to people who
are trying to get this type of thing going. I'm less enthusiastic
about this; it seems like this would be a good way to get busted.

Of course, the legality of this hinges on the legality of PGP.
I've read some stuff about the copyright infringment aspect, and
have seen on Extropians, a legal action threatened against someone
who was advertising PGP in a big way.

Any thoughts? I'm halfway serious about this. Perhaps it could
exist in the same sort of quasilegal half-life as bongs,
psyloycybin spore logs, and automatic weapon conversion
kits--sure, it's illegal to use this stuff I'm selling, but I'm
not selling illegality...I'm just selling the stuff!

First Draft of Ad:

PHONE WITHOUT FEAR Did you know that personal computers can be
used to communicate with others with absolute privacy? That free
public domain software exists that cannot be cracked? Not even by
the CIA? For plans for a user friendly, voice-mail encryption
system send 10.00 money order to:


Jay.

Maybe. If I don't chicken out. ;-)


__________________________________

Albert Einstein--"God does not play dice with the universe."
Me--"No, he plays Super-Scratch-Card-Wingo (TM)






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Arthur Abraham <a2@well.sf.ca.us>
Date: Tue, 4 May 93 22:49:48 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: MYK-78
Message-ID: <199305050549.AA29765@well.sf.ca.us>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


4-May-93
  
Eric Hughes writes:

>It is possiqK another set of LEEF's; that's not
clear to
>me, but Arthur thinks you can.  

Sometimes I have a bit of trouble following Eric's written
syntax.  This
passage would make more sense if "can" was replaced by "must")

>If, however, one can just change the
>CV at will, one could send the LEEF's in the clear and then
>immediately change the CV (session key).  Now the LEEF has
been sent
>but the conversation makes no sense.  My money is that this
is
>interlocked with IV generation, though.

To quote myself: 
>[CV,checkword,L1,L2,IV] is a self-checkin+nit 

which means that these data items must be loaded in this order
(MSB first) and must all have been properly constructed via
the Skipjack algorithm, else the MYK-78 will yank on its ERROR
line.  To build a proper protocol, CV (= session key) and
checkword would be encrypted, and to be a proper citizen,
L1,L2,IV would be transmitted in the clear.

The funny thing is, that after loading the "self-checking
unit", and checking it,  MYK-78 will still accept a different
CV.  I specifically had this verified.  It will encrypt funny,
since the CV won't properly match the rest of the loading, but
it shouldn't be too hard to use this encryption mode. 

There are actually several ways to abuse this chip -- another
obvious one is tonever power it off,  and run with the first
LEEF you ever get -- it just seems to cry out in masochism.  A
real consumer crypto chip wouldn't be this flexible.

I hope to be able to say something about the true protocol for
law-abiding American citizens in the near future.

-a2.

ps: though I will continue to post to Cypherpunks, if you wish
me to read something, please send it to me directly.

-a2.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: peter honeyman <honey@citi.umich.edu>
Date: Tue, 4 May 93 20:20:11 PDT
To: Nickey MacDonald <i6t4@jupiter.sun.csd.unb.ca>
Subject: Re: ADMIN: allowable use
In-Reply-To: <Pine.3.05.9305042319.A9051-a100000@jupiter>
Message-ID: <9305050320.AA10667@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


count me out.

	peter




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Paul Goggin <chaos@aql.gatech.edu>
Date: Tue, 4 May 93 20:23:57 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: RE: Phrack Back Issues
Message-ID: <9305050323.AA10799@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Anthony Gatlin <x62727g2@usma8.usma.edu> asks,

> What is ZENGERE magazine and where can I get info on it?
Never heard of it and I to would like to know.

> Does anyone have back issues of Phrack and how can I get them?
ftp ftp.eff.org
cd pub/cud/phrack
binary
mget *

--
R  O    All Comments Copyright by  | Technofetisht
 A  N     Paul S. Goggin (1993)    | Cypher, Cyber, Chaos              
  V        Information Broker      | Ergoflux, Interzone
   E      chaos@aql.gatech.edu     | Carpe Diem: Stop the Clipper wiretap chip 
Finger account for latest _Phrack_ | Public Key: PGP and RIPEM available
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Title 18 USC 2511 and 18 USC 2703 Protected -- Monitoring Absolutely Forbidden   





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: uni@acs.bu.edu (Shaen Bernhardt)
Date: Tue, 4 May 93 20:23:08 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Privacy and Prices of Privacy
Message-ID: <9305050323.AA108323@acs.bu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



ejo@world.std.com spoke thus:

WARNING: The following post, I realize, assumes that we all agree that we
should all have the right to buy and sell and take any chemicals we damn
well please. In Extropians, you don't have to mention this. In the world
at large, this elicits wide eyed stares, and sputtering noises of disbelief.
 
( I recall someone being willing to give up some privacy for 'less crack
in the schools.' Sorry. Not a good enough reason to give up one whit of
privacy.)
 
End Quote.

That was me.

Specifically I said:

I have a feeling that there are like minded people out there,
people who can tolerate some violations of absolute privacy
in exchange for feeling that every plane you ride on is not
at risk because of some psycho, and that less coke is going
to find its way to schools.  But who cannot tolerate
AUTHORATARIAN regimes, and practices to make these assurances.


End Quote

Sure, if YOU want to grow coco plants and harvest and process them
for your own use, I don't have a problem with that.  That's your
business.  If you want to process it into base, crack in effect,
go ahead.  I don't really have a problem with that either.
Frankly I don't have a problem with the legalization of cocaine,
I'm indifferent.  I wouldn't use any, but I'm not going to stop
anyone else from it.  I am not quite libertarian enough however
to support the sale of refined coke out there.  I think this
is a pragmatic point, based on what is practical as far as
soceity goes.  I WILL say that I can't support authoratarian
moves to prevent it.  Makeing exceptions for wiretap laws on
drugdealers is bullshit.  Follow the constitution at all times
IMHO, no exceptions.  If you can't catch em without invading
privacy then they aren't enough of a public problem to worry
about.  To me this does NOT include drug sniffing dogs at the
airport.  I really am not much offended by THIS practice.
Border control has been a standby for soverignty for as long
as borders have been drawn.  Fine.

We're getting a touch out of the scope of the list however
so I will finish by saying that it is entirely impossible to
grant ABSOLUTE privacy, and I'm not asking for it.  I just
don't want to be numbered, tracked, watched, listened to
when I am minding my own business in my house.

uni




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Nickey MacDonald <i6t4@jupiter.sun.csd.unb.ca>
Date: Tue, 4 May 93 19:56:54 PDT
To: cypherpunks list <cypherpunks@toad.com>
Subject: ADMIN:  allowable use
Message-ID: <Pine.3.05.9305042319.A9051-a100000@jupiter>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I just putting this out to test the "temperature" of the cypherpunks
"waters"...

I am considering posting a questionaire that I would like each cypherpunk
to answer...  Its not written yet, thought I do have a good idea of what I
want to ask, and I suspect it would be a little lengthy (I can think of a
good 10 questions, each requiring a paragraph or two to answer).  My goal
of the questionaire would be to see what type of people use
cryptography... (Quite a simple goal...  but not easily met...)  I will of
course make the results available to the group, and optionally the raw
data (the person filling it out would have the option of not having any
"written" (more than a yes or no) answer "published").  Would the majority
consider this good use of cypherpunks bandwidth, or are you all too secretive?

---
Nick MacDonald               | NMD on IRC
i6t4@jupiter.sun.csd.unb.ca  | PGP 2.1 Public key available via finger






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: rcooke@conicit.ve (Robert E. Cooke)
Date: Tue, 4 May 93 20:56:46 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Unsubscribe.
Message-ID: <9305050352.AA28065@dino.conicit.ve>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Please remove me from your list.  I have limited mail space aside from
other restrictions on Internet usage.  Every day I call I find myself
notified and fined for excess mail in my box.  

Robert Cooke.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: SYPHRIT@vms.cis.pitt.edu
Date: Wed, 5 May 93 00:08:00 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: No Subject
Message-ID: <01GXST382MI8AZU01N@vms.cis.pitt.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Please add me to your e-mail subscription list.  Thanks!


John A. Syphrit                 Syphrit@vms.cis.pitt.edu




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: J. Michael Diehl <mdiehl@hydra.unm.edu>
Date: Wed, 5 May 93 01:26:49 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: pgp temp files.
Message-ID: <9305050826.AA20910@hydra.unm.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


After using pgp to read an encrypted message, I ran chkdsk on my hard drive.  I
was astonished to find that chkdsk found an error on my hard drive, but I was
even more astonished to find that when I recovered the error to a file, it 
contained most of a message I had just read using pgp.  Apearantly, this was
what was left of a temp file that pgp used.  IMHO, pgp should have wiped this
file.  Maybe I should try to use a ramdisk as my temp-file path.  Just thought
ya'll should know that pgp may not be as secure as we hope.

In my effort to write a menu system for pgp-encrypted email, I use pgp very 
often, and in very unusuall ways.  Consequently, I have found a (very) few 
weaknesses in the program.  Is anyone currently supporting pgp, or am I on my
own?  If anyone is supporting pgp, I'd like to talk to you. ;^)  Thanx in 
advance.
+-----------------------+-----------------------------+---------+
| J. Michael Diehl ;-)  | I thought I was wrong once. | PGP KEY |
|                       |    But, I was mistaken.     |available|
|                       +-----------------------------+---------+
| mdiehl@triton.unm.edu | "I'm just looking for the opportunity |
| mike.diehl@fido.org   | to be Politically Incorrect!   <Me>   |
| (505) 299-2282        |                                       |
+------How do I send email between fidonet and internet?--------+






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: George A. Gleason <gg@well.sf.ca.us>
Date: Wed, 5 May 93 02:28:58 PDT
To: strat@intercon.com
Subject: Re:  checks
Message-ID: <199305050928.AA08518@well.sf.ca.us>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Re: Much as I respect you Eric, I direct your attention to the myriad of
"checks" 
being sent out by AT&T and MCI, to name a few offenders. These bear the 
legend: "endorsement of this check constitutes your acceptance of <foo> as 
your long distance carrier."

When those go out in English to non-English speakers and get cashed, there
is a good case to be made for consumer fraud.  Anyone want to follow up on
that...?

-gg




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Nickey MacDonald <i6t4@jupiter.sun.csd.unb.ca>
Date: Tue, 4 May 93 23:20:37 PDT
To: cypherpunks list <cypherpunks@toad.com>
Subject: ADMIN: Handling of "tags"
Message-ID: <Pine.3.05.9305050321.A8396-a100000@jupiter>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Just a suggestion about the implimentation of the "redistributer" program
that runs this list.

I noticed a goodly number of people are using "tags" like the "ADMIN:"
tag in my subject...  I think this is good.  I'd love to see it go one
step further, and have every cypherpunks message have a "CPUNK:" prepended
to the subject, so that I can read this more important mail first.  Also,
I notice that a lot of people reply to messages without editing the
subject, and the subject gets "mangled" to "Re: ADMIN: ..." instead of
"ADMIN: Re: ..."  Would it be possible to have the redistribution
software changed to do the first and correct the second?   Are these
changes worth it to anyone besides myself?

---
Nick MacDonald               | NMD on IRC
i6t4@jupiter.sun.csd.unb.ca  | PGP 2.1 Public key available via finger






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Paul Goggin <chaos@aql.gatech.edu>
Date: Wed, 5 May 93 00:47:21 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Black Ice
Message-ID: <9305050747.AA20605@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I have the January 1993 issue and purchased it, believe it or not at Tower
Records in March. I have not seen issue #2 yet. I enjoyed it, it has a 
different flare than Mondo or Wired,although there is definate similarity.
For further info,

Subscription Department
Black Ice
PO Box 1069
Brighton BN2 4YT

The issues are 3.95 Pounds, with 1 year subscriptions 15 Pounds.
Good Luck.

> while we are on the subject, has anyone heard or seen "Black Ice"
> if so, where can one get a copy?
> -Pete

--
R  O    All Comments Copyright by  | Technofetisht
 A  N     Paul S. Goggin (1993)    | Cypher, Cyber, Chaos              
  V        Information Broker      | Ergoflux, Interzone
   E      chaos@aql.gatech.edu     | Carpe Diem: Stop the Clipper wiretap chip 
Finger account for latest _Phrack_ | Public Key: PGP and RIPEM available
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Title 18 USC 2511 and 18 USC 2703 Protected -- Monitoring Absolutely Forbidden   





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: x62727g2@usma8.USMA.EDU (Gatlin Anthony CDT)
Date: Wed, 5 May 93 02:54:50 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: EEPROM Programmers for the PC
Message-ID: <9305050952.AA01201@usma8.usma.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Possessors of all Knowledge Great and Small,
    I humbly beseech thy expertise on a manner in which I have none. I have 
been told that one can by an EEPROM programmer which fits on a card in the PC 
or a similar version which merley connects to the PC. I would like to know

   a) if this is so?
   b) how much they cost?
   c) where to find them?
   d) what their memory capacities are?
   e) do EEPROMS run as fast as regular PROMS?
   f) an other pertinent data.

Thank you very much!

Anthony J. Gatlin                  |-------------------------------------|
Cadet Private, Co. G-2             |PGP Public Key available on request. |
United States Military Academy     |-------------------------------------|




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: wcs@anchor.ho.att.com (Bill_Stewart(HOY002)1305)
Date: Wed, 5 May 93 07:26:47 PDT
To: att!toad.com!cypherpunks@homxb.ho.att.com
Subject: Re: 'zines
Message-ID: <9305051424.AA06793@anchor.ho.att.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> >What is ZENGER magazine and where can I get info on it?
If memory serves me correctly, ZENGER is Ben Masel's paper;
it's mainly oriented towards hemp activists (and users),
but also covers other civil-liberties issues.

Peter Zenger was a publisher in New York during colonial times.
He was arrested for publishing Bad Things about the King, which was illegal.
His trial was helped reinforce important legal precedents for
preserving our freedoms - the facts weren't particularly in dispute
(he had published the pamphlets, and they did say things the King didn't like),
but the jury found him innocent because they thought the law was bad,
and juries under the common law have always had the right to 
judge the law as well as the facts, no matter what the judge says.

For more information about this, write to
The Fully Informed Jury Association (FIJA), Box 59, Helmville, Montana 59843;
this may be an old address, since Larry Dodge has moved to Texas,
but there may be mail forwarding.

		Bill Stewart




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: henry strickland <strick@osc.versant.com>
Date: Wed, 5 May 93 10:40:16 PDT
To: i6t4@jupiter.sun.csd.unb.ca (Nickey MacDonald)
Subject: Re: [CPunk] ADMIN: Handling of "tags"
In-Reply-To: <Pine.3.05.9305050321.A8396-a100000@jupiter>
Message-ID: <9305051747.AA05432@versant.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


# ... and have every cypherpunks message have a "CPUNK:" prepended
# to the subject,  ...

I do this on two digests that I edit, and I have one realtime
reflector that automatically inserts a tag into the Subject: line. 

The problem is when something gets nandoed into more than one
mailing list, the tags take up the whole subject line.

But it seems worth the bother.  				

				strick




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Mike Godwin <mnemonic@eff.org>
Date: Wed, 5 May 93 07:51:45 PDT
To: wcs@anchor.ho.att.com (Bill_Stewart(HOY002)1305)
Subject: Re: 'zines
In-Reply-To: <9305051424.AA06793@anchor.ho.att.com>
Message-ID: <199305051451.AA07360@eff.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


 
Bill Stewart writes:

> Peter Zenger was a publisher in New York during colonial times.
> He was arrested for publishing Bad Things about the King, which was illegal.
> His trial was helped reinforce important legal precedents for
> preserving our freedoms - the facts weren't particularly in dispute
> (he had published the pamphlets, and they did say things the King didn't like),
> but the jury found him innocent because they thought the law was bad,
> and juries under the common law have always had the right to 
> judge the law as well as the facts, no matter what the judge says.

John Peter Zenger, actually. And it was comments about the colonial
governor, not about the king.

The Zenger case is commonly taken to be a precedent both for press
freedom and for jury nullification.


--Mike







From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: fergp@sytex.com (Paul Ferguson)
Date: Wed, 5 May 93 10:34:21 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Big Brother, Rights to Privacy and Broadening Horizons?
Message-ID: <08133B1w165w@sytex.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


 
Greets, all.
 
After taking a few days off for the pomp and circumstance of my second
wedding (no, I'm not a polygamist -- I was divorced first)(genuine
thanks to all who sent your congratulations and best wishes), I finally
waded through all of the e-mail that had piled up in my "in-box" --
some 800 kb worth, no less.
 
Anyway, to the point --
 
This morning I was watching CBS's early, early morning news "Up to the
Minute" over a cup of Joe before heading to the airport. An interesting
spot came on that interested me very much, because of the correlation
to several law enforcement agencies' "loose cannon" style of persecution
which many of us have witnessed.
 
This particular report spotlighted the DEA's heavy-handed and
questionable practice of targeting legitimate gardening store
consumers under suspicion of growing marijuana. It just so happens
that the DEA had been watching several gardening supply stores which
sold hydroponic gardening equipment in some particular area of
California. (For those of you who are not familiar with Hydroponics,
it is a gardening method which uses water instead of soil. The plants
usually grow twice as fast when grown hydroponically and has become a
popular method of indoor gardening with marijuana enthusiasts.) In
fact, the DEA had gone as far as to place monitoring cameras in place
to record the identity of every customer or prospective consumer that
went in and out of these legitimate businesses, solely because of
their suspicions that some of the customers may be (gasp) growing
marijuana.
 
Additionally, a particular instance was cited where a gentleman went
into one of these gardening supply stores and bought a couple of lamps
for his aquarium. (This young, family-man had some coral in his
aquarium at home that he wanted to illuminate.) Later that evening,
agents from the DEA burst into his home while he and his family were
having dinner, saying that he was under suspicion of growing marijuana
and that "reliable witnesses" had tipped them off. After thoroughly
searching his home, they apologized and left.
 
Now -- you may ask yourself, "What in the hell does this have to do
with me? Or computers?" ("This is not my beautiful wife ....")
 
Well, this may be the same scenario, with the same LEA, but with a
different premise. Cryptography.
 
If the Clipper/Capstone implementation has a hidden agenda (I believe
it does), then tough restrictions on other "non-sanctioned" crypto
methods may not be far behind.
 
Personally, I don't have much of a problem imagining this, given the
recent escapades of the SPA (Rusty & Edie's), the Secret Service (SJG)
and all of our other beloved governmental law enforcement appartchiks.
In fact, I find it down-right disturbing that in many instances, this
is done without a warrant.
 
George Orwell is probably rolling over in his grave...
 
-----BEGIN ??? PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----
Version: 2.2
 
mQCNAiuk0/8AAAEEALqlLc+x9lmgiJCRSpu/aPhQdi0hMjwiGlN2B/GJQqgZPhTb
pR+u5/blGogqT+WwcXZ2XfEdIV19FrJY4BXGGn4+4TjdVN3XuuCHuueoygBAmOQD
IloU6SJuDqJa0kFA5X/i/1ELn86I5+8A4Hx88FiYJIVUBR6SApRLcZSdHMBNAAUR
tB9QYXVsIEZlcmd1c29uIDxmZXJncEBzeXRleC5jb20+iQCVAgUQK9g8HY4wrq++
1Ls5AQHwVAP/dCsOV1dXBrQMj0wavZymzDdECXlv8auDNcSpxAUFgLdwXm5OuE4Q
nOPHryN0UMq5RN2rvC2QJdxIW7gPeXN1RK2so9aGXJtSiip3QS0bN2JCH1sPcYIX
NmRQ3Z7J/zqppG7IYlcafUpj0V+GsL6lqLzB8JtBGQER9DAYapvQRR0=
=FcQR
-----END ??? PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----
 

Paul Ferguson                  |  Uncle Sam wants to read
Network Integrator             |       your e-mail...
Centreville, Virginia USA      | Just say "NO" to the Clipper
fergp@sytex.com                |          Chip...
-------------------------------+------------------------------
         I love my country, but I fear it's government.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: vanam@topper.ksu.ksu.edu (Stephen Lee(Second son of Caine))
Date: Wed, 5 May 93 09:42:10 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Unsubscribe
Message-ID: <9305051642.AA02254@topper.ksu.ksu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Please remove me from the list....

Stephen






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: prz@sage.cgd.ucar.EDU (Philip Zimmermann)
Date: Wed, 5 May 93 10:53:05 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com (Cypherpunks)
Subject: A proposal to use RSAREF in PGP (fwd)
Message-ID: <9305051752.AA16242@sage.cgd.ucar.EDU>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Forwarded message:



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: prz (Philip Zimmermann)
Date: Wed, 5 May 93 11:42:11 MDT
To: jim@rsa.com (Jim Bidzos)
Subject: A proposal to use RSAREF in PGP
Message-ID: <9305051742.AA15809@sage.cgd.ucar.EDU>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



To: Jim Bidzos
    RSA Data Security, Inc.
    5 May 93

Dear Jim:

I am writing to you to get your approval to install RSAREF into PGP
in order to make PGP legal and hopefully end the conflicts regarding
patent infringement.  You said publicly a number of times that PGP
may become legal in the US if it incorporated RSAREF.  I assume from
these remarks that you would prefer that to happen.  So let's do it.

PGP now has, in testbed form, RSAREF integrated into it.  With your
approval, the next release could be an RSAREF version.  I say your
approval, because it is necessary to use the two static entry points
RSAPublicBlock and RSAPrivateBlock in rsa.c in RSAREF to allow
backward compatibility with older versions of PGP.  Unfortunately,
the old versions of PGP have an error that makes the contents of a
DEK and MD packet inside of an RSA multiprecision integer not comply
with PKCS standards of padding.  New versions of PGP will correct
this problem, but backward compatibility is needed, so the
RSAPublicBlock and RSAPrivateBlock entry points must be called to
parse the old packets.  The global entry points RSAPublicEncrypt and
RSAPrivateEncrypt will also be used to generate the new
PKCS-formatted packets.  As I understand it, the standard RSAREF
license requires your approval to use these entry points.  I
discussed these ideas with Ron Rivest and Burt Kaliski, and both
seemed to not raise any objections.  I hope you will agree.

At some time in the future, when all the old certifying signatures
are eventually replaced with new ones, these static entry points will
not have to be called, allowing the the regular entry points in rsa.h
to be called in their place.  We will be encouraging people to get
their certifying signatures renewed on their keys with the new
version of PGP.

PGP users outside the US will be using a version of PGP without
RSAREF, but it will be compatible in every way with the RSAREF
version.

The PGP developers will also be contributing some speedups to RSAREF
in future releases.  This will help all of your installed base of
RSAREF applications.

I am also modifying the PGP User's Guide to remove the remarks in the
legal issues section that I suspect you regard as inflammatory.  I
hope this will pave the way for us to close ranks and work together
on fighting the Clipper chip initiative.  If there are other measures
you'd like me to take to improve relations between us, let me know. 
I hope our common political objectives will outweigh your personal
feelings, so the community of PGP users may work better with you to
face these pressing policy issues.

The new release can be ready in a few days, if you approve.


Regards,

Philip Zimmermann







From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Perry E. Metzger" <pmetzger@lehman.com>
Date: Wed, 5 May 93 08:59:31 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: 'zines
In-Reply-To: <9305051424.AA06793@anchor.ho.att.com>
Message-ID: <9305051559.AA05868@snark.shearson.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Bill_Stewart(HOY002)1305 says:
> Peter Zenger was a publisher in New York during colonial times.
> He was arrested for publishing Bad Things about the King, which was illegal.

Bill is normally excruciatingly accurate, but in this case he is
slightly off -- he was charged with slandering the Royal Governor in
his newspaper. His defense was that his statements were true -- which
was not a defense under the law in question. The jury decided it was
sufficient, however. The rest of what Bill said was substantially
accurate.

Perry




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: whitaker@eternity.demon.co.uk (Russell E. Whitaker)
Date: Wed, 5 May 93 09:35:39 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: MEETING (Reminder): UK Cryptoprivacy Association
Message-ID: <5212@eternity.demon.co.uk>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

REMINDER: Meeting of the UK Cryptoprivacy Association
- -----------------------------------------------------

When: Saturday, 8 May 1993, 1500

To be held at the offices of:

  FOREST
  4th floor
  2 Grosvenor Gardens
  London  SW1W 0DH

This is located at the corner of Hobart Place, a couple of
blocks west of Victoria Station, and almost directly across from
the dark green cabbie shelter.

If you have trouble finding the place, please call the office on
071-823-6550.  Or, call me (Russell Whitaker) on my pager,
081-812-2661, and leave an informative message with the
telephone number where you can be reached; I will return the
call almost immediately.

Discussion will range from the usual general topics, such as the
use of secure public key cryptosystems to protect message data, to
specific topics, such as recent moves by the U.S. government
to restrict choice in data privacy (reference recent discussion
on Usenet groups, e.g. sci.crypt and alt.security.pgp).

All are invited.  Particularly welcome are members of the
newly-formed UK CommUnity group ... the local
EFF-in-spirit-if-not-in-name folks.

Those who plan to attend should email me and let me know.
Please.

All attendees are requested to bring diskettes - preferably
MS-DOS - with their PGP 2.+ public keys.  As is usual at these
gatherings, several of us will bring our laptops, and will sign
public keys, subject to the usual caveats (reference the
documentation for PGP 2.2, specifically files PGPDOC1.DOC and
PGPDOC2.DOC).

If you do not already have a copy of PGP 2.2 (MS-DOS), and would
like to have a copy of this public domain program, please bring
a formatted, medium or high density 3.5 inch floppy PC diskette;
you will be provided a copy of the program.

Of course, you might prefer to ftp a version of the program from
one of the various archive sites.  I suggest trying Demon
Internet Systems, which carries the full range of PGP (Phil
Zimmerman's "Pretty Good Privacy") implementations: directory
/pub/pgp at gate.demon.co.uk.

Meetings are of indeterminate time.  Those who are interested
are invited to join the rest of us at a pseudorandomly
determined pub afterwards.

Please note:
- ------------
In the past few months, interested people have emailed me,
requesting FAQs and special information mailings.  I regret
that, except in very unusual cases (e.g. working press), I
cannot, in a timely manner, respond to these requests.  I will,
however - and for the first time - do a writeup of this meeting,
which I will post in various places.

What I *am* willing to supply is general information on our
activities for the maintainers of existing FAQs, such as that
for alt.privacy.  FAQ maintainers can contact me at
whitaker@eternity.demon.co.uk

Russell Earl Whitaker                   whitaker@eternity.demon.co.uk
Communications Editor                                 AMiX: RWhitaker
EXTROPY: The Journal of Transhumanist Thought
Board member, Extropy Institute (ExI)
================ PGP 2.2 public key available =======================

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.2

iQCVAgUBK+egtoTj7/vxxWtPAQFSFgQAjTPwfm8I5gaP85Yqm1Dh6IRIb6au2sBI
THGLGpPGgEao3MAESN0Cmh3nH6IHdSRthR/Uro8CQcpyD4IgGw912wO2CEYy1K/l
v0+n4y+2+YFV/X2LDNntP27G3+zP9N6wMJQs2JHNjExfTHaUKFg9Zb90wTvuU4Ce
RIbjnZNNriU=
=uFhH
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Chris Hibbert <hibbert@memex.com>
Date: Wed, 5 May 93 13:55:07 PDT
To: Nickey MacDonald <i6t4@jupiter.sun.csd.unb.ca>
Subject: Re: ADMIN: Handling of "tags"
In-Reply-To: <Pine.3.05.9305050321.A8396-a100000@jupiter>
Message-ID: <9305052036.AA13004@entropy.memex.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain




>>  I'd love to see [...] every cypherpunks message have a "CPUNK:" prepended 
>> to the subject [...] 

>> I notice that a lot of people reply to messages without editing the
>> subject, and the subject gets "mangled" to "Re: ADMIN: ..." instead of
>> "ADMIN: Re: ..."  Would it be possible to have the redistribution
>> software changed to [fix these?].

My mail reader (Xmh) allows me to sort incoming mail by any header field.  I key
off the "to: cypherpunks" to put this mail in a different box.  The information
you need is already in the header, and I would object to adding more noise to the
beginning of the subject field to obscure the real subject.

On the second point, I agree that the second is better, but my mail sorter is
smart enough to sort "Re: foo" with "foo", so again, no change is necessary.  Is
there any chance you can get access to a more powerful mail reader, rather than
asking everyone to clutter up the headers with redundant info?

Chris




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: fergp@sytex.com (Paul Ferguson)
Date: Wed, 5 May 93 11:52:23 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Hearing statement of Ray Kammer
Message-ID: <3V933B1w165w@sytex.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


This file <TESTIM.TXT> was obtained from the National Institute of
Standards and Technology. -
 
8<------- Cut Here ------------
 
 
                            STATEMENT OF 
 
                          RAYMOND G. KAMMER
 
   ACTING DIRECTOR, NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF STANDARDS AND TECHNOLOGY
 
                             BEFORE THE
 
           SUBCOMMITTEE ON TELECOMMUNICATIONS AND FINANCE
 
                  COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE
 
                           APRIL 29, 1993
 
 
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee:
 
 
Good morning.  Thank you for inviting me to testify.  I am Raymond G.
Kammer, Acting Director of the National Institute of Standards and
Technology of the U.S. Department of Commerce.  Under the Computer
Security Act of 1987, NIST is responsible for the development of
standards for protecting unclassified government computer systems,
except those commonly known as Warner Amendment systems (as defined
in Title 10 USC 2315).  
 
NIST has a long-established program of developing computer security
guidelines and standards for federal agencies.  Many of these are
also used, on a voluntary basis, by the private sector. We have
published guidance on computer security training and awareness,
identification and authentication, open systems security, incident
response, cryptographic standards, trusted systems, and many other
facets of computer security.   
 
Today, however, I plan to address the following topics which I
believe are most directly germane to your invitation:
 
     *    The need for good information security technology to
          protect computer and telecommunications systems and
          networks;
 
     *    NIST's activities in telecommunications switch security;
 
     *    the planned recertification of the Data Encryption
          Standard;
 
     *    NIST's proposed Digital Signature Standard;
 
 
     *    the recent White House announcement of a new encryption
          technology, called the Clipper Chip; and
 
     *    the President's directive to review advanced
          telecommunications and encryption technology.
 
 
Need for Computer Security
 
Strong security technology is required in modern communications
systems and networks to protect sensitive and valuable information. 
Government agencies and private corporations depend upon the
integrity and availability of their communications system in order to
do business.  Computer viruses, network worms, hackers, and other
threats against our systems emphasize the importance of
telecommunications security.
 
Additionally, I have grown convinced, through strong anecdotal
evidence, most of it shared on a proprietary basis, of the growing
threat to American business from "economic espionage."  Much has been
reported in the press of the activities of foreign intelligence
services targeting American firms, and sharing their findings with
competing foreign firms.  I am convinced that American firms need
strong security, and in particular, strong cryptography, to protect
against such threats.  
 
More importantly, the Administration is committed to working with the
private sector to spur the development of a National Information
Infrastructure which will use new telecommunications and computer
technologies to give Americans unprecedented access to information. 
This infrastructure of high-speed networks ("information
superhighways") will transmit video, images, HDTV programming, and
huge data files as easily as today's telephone system transmits
voice.  Appropriate security techniques may at times be integrated
into such systems.  
 
 
Telecommunications Security
 
Federal telephone and computer networks depend upon reliable and
secure telecommunications capabilities, both of long-distance
carriers and local private-branch exchanges (PBXs).  To examine
security issues of telecommunications networks, including issues of
PBX security and telecommunications switch security, NIST is
currently setting up a Telecommunications Security Analysis Center. 
This Center will expand on initial research we have conducted on the
vulnerability of telecommunications switches.
 
Telecommunications switches are an integral part of the security of
the public switched network.  Security problems in switches can
result in serious problems such as toll fraud, unauthorized and
illegal eavesdropping, or the disabling of switches, which would
result in bringing down part of the public switched network.
 
NIST has been monitoring the growth of switch-related abuse and has
been analyzing switches to be able to address the types of crimes
that could be perpetrated in the future.  This work includes studying
the growing ease of perpetrating these crimes.  
There are several areas of concern:
 
     *    Toll fraud.  Current research indicates that the problem is
          well over $1 billion per year.  While not all toll-fraud is
          accomplished technically, telecommunications switches are
          vulnerable to hackers who can gain unauthorized access to
          the use of long-distance services.  This is a particular
          vulnerability to the owners of PBXs, who can lose
          considerable sums if their systems are inadequately
          protected.  Good system configuration control is one good
          security measure we are examining.  
 
     *    Network Availability.  There have been no cases of
          intruders purposefully bringing down parts of the public
          switched network.  The President's National Security
          Telecommunications Advisory Committee (NSTAC) concluded
          that "Until there is confidence that strong comprehensive
          computer security programs are in place, the industry
          should assume that a motivated and resourceful adversary in
          one concerted manipulation of the network software could
          degrade at least portions of the PSN."
 
     *    Unauthorized Eavesdropping.  If unauthorized access is
          gained to telecommunications switches, which is really just
          a computer that switches phone calls, a hacker can gain
          access to the contents of phone conversations and other
          information transmitted through a switch.  This
          unauthorized eavesdropping can be either "real-time," as
          the conversations occur, or the intruders can arrange to
          have the conversations and data electronically transmitted
          to another telecommunications switch or computer for later
          analysis.
 
The purpose of the Telecommunications Security Analysis Center will
be to:
 
     *    Develop tools and techniques to analyze very complex
          systems such as switches;
 
     *    Provide informal security guidance and advice to federal
          agencies on procurement of telecommunications switches; 
 
     *    Perform security analyses of commercial switches in both
          laboratory and real world environments; and
 
     *    Develop standards and guidance for use in securing switches
          and in building more secure switches, while providing for
          the legitimate needs of law enforcement, under proper court
          order, to protect the American public.
 
As we pursue this research, we will be pleased to provide additional
information on our findings to the Committee.  
 
 
The Data Encryption Standard
 
The current government standard for the encryption of data is known
as the Data Encryption Standard (DES), which was first approved as a
Federal Information Processing Standard in 1977.  DES is widely used
within both the government and the private sector for the protection
of sensitive information, including financial information, medical
information, and Privacy Act data.  DES represents a proven twenty
year old technology with DES products available in the marketplace
for the last 15 years.  
 
Last year, NIST formally solicited comments on the recertification of
DES.  After reviewing those comments, and the other technical inputs
that I have received, I plan to recommend to the Secretary of
Commerce that he recertify DES for another five years.  I also plan
to suggest to the Secretary that when we announce the recertification
we state our intention to consider alternatives to it over the next
five years.  By putting that announcement on the table, we hope to
give people an opportunity to comment on orderly technological
transitions.  In the meantime, we need to consider the large
installed base of systems that rely upon this proven standard.  
 
 
NIST's Proposed Digital Signature Standard
 
The majority of the cryptographic-based security requirements in
computer and network systems involve the need for strong
identification and authentication.  One method which we believe holds
a capacity for significant improvements in security and also cost-
savings by automating paper processes is the use of digital
signatures.  
 
A digital signature is a computer-based method of "sealing" an
electronic message in such a way that its contents cannot be changed
or forged without detection and that the identity of the originator
of the communication can be verified.  The digital signature for a
message is simply a code, or large number, that is unique for each
message and each message originator (within a very high, known
probability).  A digital signature is computed for a message by
computing a representation of the message (called a "hash" code) and
a cryptographic process that uses a key associated with the message
originator.  Any party with access to the public key, message, and
signature can verify the signature.  If the signature verifies
correctly, the receiver (or any other party) has confidence that the
message was signed by the owner of the public key and the message has
not been altered after it was signed.  
 
In 1991, NIST proposed a draft Digital Signature Standard (DSS).  We
received about 130 public comments.  We have been reviewing these
comments and revising the standard as appropriate to respond to those
comments.  Additionally, we have examined and are currently dealing
with two claims of patent infringement, which we believe will be
successfully resolved in the not-too-distant future.  Once this
occurs, the Secretary of Commerce needs to decide to approve the DSS
as a Federal Information Processing Standard.  It will then
complement the Secure Hash Standard which was recently approved by
the Secretary of Commerce as Federal Information Processing Standard
180.  
 
We anticipate that the DSS will find many uses within government
computer systems and networks.  For example, DSS could be employed in
electronic funds transfer systems.  Suppose an electronic funds
transfer message is generated to request that $100.00 be transferred
from one account to another. If the message was passed over an
unprotected network, it may be possible for an adversary to alter the
message and request a transfer of $1000.00.  Without additional
information, it would be difficult, if not impossible, for the
receiver to know the message had been altered.  However if the DSS
was used to sign the message before it was sent, the receiver would
know the message had been altered because it would not verify
correctly.  The transfer request could then be denied.
 
DSS could be employed in a variety of business applications requiring
a replacement of handwritten signatures.  One example is Electronic
Data Interchange (EDI).  EDI is the computer-to-computer interchange
of messages representing business documents.  In the federal
government, this technology is being used to procure goods and
services.  Digital signatures could be used to replace handwritten
signatures in these EDI transactions.  For instance, contracts
between the government and its vendors could be negotiated
electronically.  A government procurement official could post an
electronically signed message requesting bids for office supplies. 
Vendors wishing to respond to the request may first verify the
message before they respond.  This assures that the contents of the
message have not been altered and that the request was signed by a
legitimate procurement official.  After verifying the bid request,
the vendor could generate and sign an electronic bid.  Upon receiving
the bid, the procurement official could verify that the vendor's bid
was not altered after it was signed.  If the bid is accepted, the
electronic message could be passed to a contracting office to
negotiate the final terms of the contract.  The final contract could
be digitally signed by both the contracting office and the vendor. 
If a dispute arose at some later time, the contents of contract and
the associated signatures could be verified by a third party. 
 
DSS is also likely to find widespread applications in the health care
field.  It might be used to sign digital images, for example, to
assure that they remain safe against unauthorized modifications.
 
DSS could also be useful in the distribution of software.  A digital
signature could be applied to software after it has been validated
and approved for distribution.  Before installing the software on a
computer, the signature could be verified to be sure no unauthorized
changes (such as the addition of a virus) have been made.  The
digital signature could be verified periodically to ensure the
integrity of the software.  
 
In database applications, the integrity of information stored in the
database is often essential.  DSS could be employed in a variety of
database applications to provide integrity.  For example, information
could be signed when it was entered into the database.  To maintain
integrity, the system could also require that all updates or
modifications to the information be signed.  Before signed
information was viewed by a user, the signature could be verified. 
If the signature verified correctly, the user would know the
information was not altered by an unauthorized party.  The system
could also include signatures in the audit information to provide a
record of users who modified the information.    
 
The DSS can also be used in conjunction with more secure
identification and authentication systems, for the protection of
access to both computer and telecommunication systems. 
 
 
A New Encryption Technology:  The Clipper Chip
 
Approximately two weeks ago, the White House announced our intention,
based on a new encryption technology, the Clipper Chip, to initiate a
voluntary program to improve the security and privacy of telephone
communications while meeting the legitimate needs of law enforcement. 
 
This initiative will involve the creation of new products to
accelerate the development and use of advanced and secure
telecommunications networks and wireless communications links - the
security of the very systems you are examining here today.
 
Sophisticated encryption technology, including the DES, has been used
for years to protect electronic funds transfer.  It is now being used
to protect electronic mail and computer files.  While encryption
technology can help Americans protect business secrets and the
unauthorized release of personal information, it also can be used by
terrorists, drug dealers, and other criminals.
 
 
A state-of-the-art microcircuit, the "Clipper Chip," has been
developed by government engineers.  The chip represents a new
approach to encryption technology.  It can be used in new, relatively
inexpensive encryption devices that can be attached to an ordinary
telephone.  It scrambles telephone communications using an encryption
algorithm that is more powerful than many in commercial use today. 
The Clipper algorithm with an 80 bit long cryptographic key is
approximately 16 million times stronger than DES.  It would take a
CRAY YMP over 200 years to solve one DES key.  It would take the same
machine over a billion years to solve one Clipper Chip key.
 
This new technology offers opportunities for companies to protect
proprietary information, protect the privacy of personal phone
conversations and prevent unauthorized release of data transmitted
electronically.  At the same time this technology preserves the
ability of federal, state and local law enforcement agencies to
intercept lawfully the phone conversations of criminals.   
 
Protection of confidentiality of information is of critical concern
to the nation.  So too is the ability of law enforcement to provide
safe streets and neighborhoods.  Americans demand the very best in
law enforcement - at the federal, state and local level.  Citizens
insist upon a quick response to terrorist threats, organized crime,
and drug dealers, while preserving our Constitutional rights.  Past
experience clearly shows that one critical technology successfully
used to prosecute organized crime is the use of court-authorized
wiretaps.  Unquestionably, these lawful electronic intercepts have
saved lives and been critical to bringing criminals to justice.  The
"Clipper Chip" is also a powerful tool which will be used by law
enforcement to protect its own sensitive communications from illicit
criminal monitoring.
 
A "key-escrow" system is envisioned that would ensure that the
"Clipper Chip" is used to protect the privacy of law-abiding
Americans.  Each device containing the chip will have two unique
"keys," numbers that will be needed by authorized government agencies
to decode messages encoded by the device.  When the device is
manufactured, the two keys would be deposited separately in two "key-
escrow" data bases established by the Attorney General.  Access to
these keys would be limited to government officials with legal
authorization to conduct a wiretap.  
 
The President has asked the Attorney General to make arrangements
with appropriate entities who would hold the keys for the key-escrow
microcircuits installed in communications equipment.  I understand
that the Attorney General is currently studying these procedures and
options for who will serve as the key escrow holders.  
 
Since the announcement from the White House, I have stressed that the
"Clipper Chip" technology provides law enforcement with no new
authorities to access the content of the private conversations of
Americans.  Also, some have claimed that there is a hidden trapdoor
in the chip or the algorithm.  I cannot state it more simply: no
trapdoor exists.  
 
The chip is an important step in addressing the problem of
encryption's dual-edge sword:  encryption helps to protect the
privacy of individuals and industry, but it also can shield criminals
and terrorists.  We need the "Clipper Chip" and other approaches that
can both provide law-abiding citizens with access to the encryption
they need and prevent criminals from using it to hide their illegal
activities.  
 
 
Presidential Directive for Advanced Telecommunications and Encryption
Review
 
In order to assess technology trends and explore new approaches and
technologies (like the key-escrow system), the President has directed
government agencies to develop a comprehensive policy on encryption
and advanced telecommunications technology that accommodates:
 
     *    the privacy of our citizens, including the need to employ
          voice or data encryption for business purposes;
 
     *    the ability of authorized officials to access telephone
          calls and data, under proper court or other legal order,
          when necessary to protect our citizens;
 
     *    the effective and timely use of the most modern technology
          to build the National Information Infrastructure needed to
          promote economic growth and the competitiveness of American
          industry in the global marketplace; and 
 
     *    the need of U.S. companies to manufacture and export high
          technology products.
 
The President has directed early and frequent consultations with
affected industries, the Congress and groups that advocate the
privacy rights of individuals as policy options are developed.
 
I anticipate being a member of the governmental review panel which
will study this issue.
 
I will again stress what we have stated previously.  Encryption
technology will play an increasingly important role in future network
infrastructures and the Federal Government must act quickly to
develop consistent, comprehensive policies regarding its use.  The
Administration is committed to policies that protect all Americans'
right to privacy while also protecting them from those who break the
law.
 
Thank you Mr. Chairman, I would be pleased to answer any questions.   
 

Paul Ferguson                  |  Uncle Sam wants to read
Network Integrator             |       your e-mail...
Centreville, Virginia USA      | Just say "NO" to the Clipper
fergp@sytex.com                |          Chip...
-------------------------------+------------------------------
         I love my country, but I fear it's government.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: fergp@sytex.com (Paul Ferguson)
Date: Wed, 5 May 93 13:44:28 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Additional amendments to the ECPA?
Message-ID: <muD43B2w165w@sytex.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Doing some research on existing laws and ran across this snippet
concerning the ECPA and amendments made in 1986-87. Can someone with
more legalese comment on whether this has again been amended or
changed? How does this relate to LEA's selectively wiretapping
private e-mail and other electronic communications? Or does it?
 
8<----- Begain forwarded text ------------
 
     On October 21, 1986, President Reagan signed the new Electronic 
Communications Privacy Act of 1986 amending the federal wiretap law.
ECPA went into effect during the beginning of 1987.  (P.L.  99-508,
Title I, sec. 111, 100 Stat. 1859; P.L. 99-508, Title II, sec. 202,
100 Stat. 1868.)  ECPA created parallel privacy protection against
both interception of electronic communications while in transmission
and unauthorized access to electronic communications stored on a system.
 
     The new ECPA first provides privacy protection for any 
 
     'electronic communication' ... [by] any transfer of signs, 
     signals, writing, images, sounds, data or intelligence of any 
     nature transmitted in whole or in part by a wire, radio, 
     electromagnetic, photoelectronic or photooptical system that 
     affects interstate or foreign commerce...."  
 
(18 U.S.C. secs. 2510(12), 2511.)  The Senate Report noted examples of 
electronic communications to include non-voice communications such as 
"electronic mail, digitized transmissions, and video teleconferences."
(S. Rep. No. 541, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 14 reprinted_in 1986 U.S. Code
Cong. & Ad. News 3568.)  Electronic communication is defined in terms of
how it is transmitted.  So long as the means by which a communication is
transmitted affects interstate or foreign commerce, the communication is
covered ECPA. (18 U.S.C. sec. 2510(12).)  Generally, that would include
all telephonic means including private networks and intra-company
communications.  (S. Rep. No. 541, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 12 reprinted_in
1986 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 3566.)
 
     Second, ECPA protects the electronic communication when it has been 
stored after transmission, such as e-mail left on an electronic computer 
communication system for later pickup by its intended recipient.  (18
U.S.C. sec. 2510(17).)  The legislation makes it a federal criminal
offense to break into any electronic system holding private
communications or to exceed authorized access to alter or obtain the
stored communications. (18 U.S.C. sec. 2701(a).)
 
     The legislation would protect electronic computer communication
systems from law enforcement invasion of user e-mail without a court
order.  (18 U.S.C. secs. 2517, 2518, 2703.)  Although the burden of
preventing disclosure of the e-mail is placed on the subscriber or
user of the system, the government must give him fourteen days
notice to allow him to file a motion to quash a subpoena or to vacate
a court order seeking disclosure of his computer material.  (18 U.S.C.
sec. 2704(b).)  However, the government may give delayed notice where
there are exigent circumstances as listed by the Act (18 U.S.C. sec.
2705.)  Recognizing the easy user destruction of computer data, ECPA
allows the government to include in its subpoena or court order the
requirement that the provider or operator retain a backup copy of
electronic communications when there is risk of user destruction.
(18 U.S.C. sec. 2704(a).)
 
     The legislation gives a civil cause of action to the provider or 
operator, subscriber, customer or user of the system aggrieved by an 
invasion of an electronic communication in the system in violation of
the ECPA.  (18 U.S.C. secs. 2520, 2707.)  If the provider or operator
has to disclose information stored on his system due to a court order,
warrant, subpoena, or certification under ECPA, no cause of action can
be brought against him by the person aggrieved by such disclosure.
(18 U.S.C. sec. 2703(e); see_also 18 U.S.C. secs. 2701(c), 2702(b),
2511(2)(a)(i), 2511(3)(b)(iii) where the systems operator or provider
is not held criminally liable, may observe a private communication
while performing employment duties or according to authorization,
etc., may intercept private communication while making quality
control checks or during the course of forwarding communications to
another system.)
 
8<----- End of forwarded text ---------
 
 

Paul Ferguson                  |  Uncle Sam wants to read
Network Integrator             |       your e-mail...
Centreville, Virginia USA      | Just say "NO" to the Clipper
fergp@sytex.com                |          Chip...
-------------------------------+------------------------------
         I love my country, but I fear it's government.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Eric Hughes <hughes@soda.berkeley.edu>
Date: Wed, 5 May 93 16:13:01 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: DH: Draft RSAREF/Diffie-Hellman specification
Message-ID: <9305052309.AA00684@soda.berkeley.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Jim Bidzos sent the following to me, and I've received his blessing to
forward it to cyphperpunks.  Note that it is a draft specification,
not the actual one.  For those who have no idea what Diffie-Hellman
key exchange is, this document may give you some idea.

Eric
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------

Date: Wed, 5 May 93 15:21:20 PDT
From: jim@RSA.COM (Jim Bidzos)

FYI. Subject to change, but probably minor ones.  This will be added
to RSAREF and will be subject to RSAREF license terms when released.

--Jim

Date: Fri, 30 Apr 93 16:05:14 PDT
From: burt@RSA.COM (Burt Kaliski)
To: jim@RSA.COM
Subject: Draft RSAREF/Diffie-Hellman specification

            RSAREF/Diffie-Hellman Interface Specification

                           RSA Laboratories
                            April 30, 1993

      Copyright (C) 1993 RSA Laboratories, a division of RSA Data
                 Security, Inc. All rights reserved.

                      DRAFT -- SUBJECT TO CHANGE


The Diffie-Hellman extension to RSAREF adds three routines:

   R_GenerateDHParams    generates Diffie-Hellman parameters
   R_SetupDHAgreement    sets up a key agreement
 R_ComputeDHAgreedKey    computes the agreed-upon key

To generate new Diffie-Hellman parameters, an application calls
R_GenerateDHParams, giving the length of the Diffie-Hellman prime and
a random structure. R_GenerateDHParams generates the parameters and
returns the status of the operation. Several users may share given
Diffie-Hellman parameters, or they may be unique to a given user.

To set up a key agreement, communicating applications call
R_SetupDHAgreement, giving these parameters:

  -  the Diffie-Hellman parameters
  -  a random structure

R_SetupDHAgreement generates a new "public value" and a new "private
value" for each party and returns the status of the operation. The
applications then exchange their public values.

To compute the agreed-upon key, the applications call
R_ComputeDHAgreedKey, giving these parameters:

  -  the Diffie-Hellman parameters
  -  the other party's public value
  -  the private value

R_ComputeDHAgreedKey computes the agreed-upon key and returns the
status of the operation.

The applications may encrypt subsequent data under the agreed-upon
key. When the length of the Diffie-Hellman prime is large enough, it
is considered impractical for someone who sees the Diffie-Hellman
parameters and the exchanged public values to determine to
agreed-upon key, so the subsequent encryption is secure.


R_GenerateDHParams

int R_GenerateDHParams (
  R_DH_PARAMS *params,             /* new Diffie-Hellman parameters */
  R_DH_PROTO_PARAMS *protoParams,       /* D-H prototype parameters */
  R_RANDOM_STRUCT *randomStruct                 /* random structure */
);

R_GenerateDHParams generates random Diffie-Hellman parameters,
storing the result in params. protoParams specifies the lengths in
bits of the Diffie-Hellman prime.

randomStruct must have been seeded.

Return value:       0    success
       RE_MODULUS_LEN    prime length invalid
       RE_NEED_RANDOM    randomStruct is not seeded


R_SetupDHAgreement

int R_SetupDHAgreement (
  unsigned char *publicValue,                   /* new public value */
  unsigned int *publicValueLen,           /* length of public value */
  unsigned char *privateValue,                 /* new private value */
  unsigned int *privateValueLen,         /* length of private value */
  R_DH_PARAMS *params,                 /* Diffie-Hellman parameters */
  R_RANDOM_STRUCT *randomStruct                 /* random structure */
);

R_SetupDHAgreement sets up a Diffie-Hellman key agreement by
generating a public value and a private value from the Diffie-Hellman
parameters. It stores the resulting public value in publicValue and
the resulting private value in private value, and their lengths in
publicValueLen and privateValueLen.

The private value is a random number x, and the public value is the
number y such that

                            y = g^x mod p,

where p and g are the prime and generator in params.

publicValue and privateValue will be represented most significant
byte first, with no leading zero bytes. publicValueLen and
privateValueLen will not be greater than MAX_DH_PRIME_LEN.

randomStruct must have been seeded.

Return value:       0    success
       RE_NEED_RANDOM    randomStruct is not seeded
             (others to be determined)


R_ComputeDHAgreedKey

int R_ComputeDHAgreedKey (
  unsigned char *agreedKey,                       /* new agreed key */
  unsigned int *agreedKeyLen,               /* length of agreed key */
  unsigned char *otherPublicValue,          /* other's public value */
  unsigned int otherPublicValueLen,       /* length of public value */
  unsigned char *privateValue,                     /* private value */
  unsigned int privateValueLen,          /* length of private value */
  R_DH_PARAMS *params                  /* Diffie-Hellman parameters */
);

R_ComputeDHAgreedKey computes an agreed key from the other party's
public value, a private value, and the Diffie-Hellman parameters. It
stores the resulting agreed key in agreedKey, and its length in
agreedKeyLen.

The agreed key is the number z such that

                            z = (y')^x mod p,

where y' is the other party's public value, x is the private value,
and p is the prime in params.

agreedKey will be represented most significant byte first, with no
leading zero bytes. agreedKeyLen will not be greater than
MAX_DH_PRIME_LEN.

Return value:       0    success
             (others to be determined)


R_DH_PARAMS

typedef struct {
  unsigned int bits;                     /* length in bits of prime */
  unsigned char prime[MAX_DH_PRIME_LEN];                   /* prime */
  unsigned char generator[MAX_DH_PRIME_LEN];           /* generator */
} R_DH_PARAMS;

An R_DH_PARAMS value is a structure specifying Diffie-Hellman
parameters. There are three fields:

                bits     length in bits of the prime (not less than
                           MIN_DH_PRIME_BITS and not greater than
                           MAX_DH_PRIME_BITS)

             modulus     prime p, represented as a MAX_DH_PRIME_LEN-
                           byte number, most significant byte first,
                           as many leading zero bytes as necessary

           generator     generator g, represented like prime


R_DH_PROTO_PARAMS

typedef struct {
  unsigned int bits;                     /* length in bits of prime */
} R_DH_PROTO_PARAMS;

An R_DH_PROTO_PARAMS value is a structure specifying the length in
bits of the Diffie-Hellman prime for parameter generation. There is
one field:

                bits     length in bits of the prime (not less than
                           MIN_DH_PRIME_BITS and not greater than
                           MAX_DH_PRIME_BITS)






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: fergp@sytex.com (Paul Ferguson)
Date: Wed, 5 May 93 13:44:21 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Notes from the field
Message-ID: <ciF43B1w165w@sytex.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Mike,
 
I recently became aware of an article that you wrote entitled,
"Notes on Cryptography, Diigital Telephony, and the Bill of
Rights", which was included in a recent CuD (5.32, Sun May 2,
1993). It appeared to be a message you had originally posted to
the austin.eff newsgroup.
 
I'm not so sure that it ever made it over to cypherpunks, so I'm
quoting part of that message here for clarity.
 
You wrote -
 
     "B.  The Fourth Amendment reads: "The right of the people to be
secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched,
and the persons or things to be seized."
      C.  Conspicuously missing from the language of this amendment is
any guarantee that the government, with properly obtained warrant in
hand, will be _successful_ in finding the right place to be searched or
persons or things to be seized. What the Fourth Amendment is about is
_obtaining warrants_--similarly, what the wiretap statutes are about
is _obtaining authorization_ for wiretaps and other interceptions.
Neither the Fourth Amendment nor Title III nor the other protections
of the ECPA constitute an law-enforcement _entitlement_ for law
enforcement.
      D.  It follows, then, that if digital telephony or widespread
encryption were to create new burdens for law enforcement, this would
not, as some law-enforcement representatives have argued, constitute an
"effective repeal" of Title III. What it would constitute is a change
in the environment in which law enforcement, along with the rest of us,
has to work. Technology often creates changes in our social environment
--some, such as the original innovation of the wiretap, may aid law
enforcement, while others, such as powerful public-key cryptography,
pose the risk of inhibiting law enforcement. Historically, law
enforcement has responded to technological change by adapting.
(Indeed, the original wiretaps were an adaptation to the widespread
use of the telephone.) Does it make sense for law enforcement suddenly
to be able to require that the rest of society adapt to its perceived
needs?"
 
(End Quote)
 
Maybe it's just that time of the day or perhaps I just need for you
to clarify this a bit more -- How does the ECPA offer protection, as
it is cuurrently written, against warranted search and seizure with
regards to technologically advanced systems (such as would crypto be
considered)?
 
 
Again, you fyrther wrote -
 
     "I.  As my notes here suggest, these initiatives may be, in their
essence, inconsistent with Constitutional guarantees of expression,
association, and privacy."
 
(End Quote)
 
You are saying, in effect, that it is your opinion that these
initiatives may be unconstitutional? If so, what course of action
can be suggested, short of a class action lawsuit against an LEA
after-the-fact?
 
By the way, the article was excellent and since I have not seen it
posted here in cypherpunks, I'd like your permission to repost it.
 
Cheers.
 

Paul Ferguson                  |  Uncle Sam wants to read
Network Integrator             |       your e-mail...
Centreville, Virginia USA      | Just say "NO" to the Clipper
fergp@sytex.com                |          Chip...
-------------------------------+------------------------------
         I love my country, but I fear it's government.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Mr. Noise" <mrnoise@econs.umass.edu>
Date: Wed, 5 May 93 13:41:24 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: RSA patent!
Message-ID: <9305052027.AA06997@titan.ucs.umass.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text


> 	6)  (Misuse)  The underlying purpose of the patent system was to 
> 	encourage the creative genius for the benefit of the public.  Has the 
> 	public benefited in this case?

There are two things wrong with this objection that I can see:

(1)  What is relevant is whether the public derives a NET (no pun intended!)
benefit from the patent system, not whether it has benefittted in this
particular case.  We can't decide, ex post, whether to extend patent protection
to something that is patentable under the law, else the law will cease to 
provide the incentives that encourage innovation.

(2)  We may have, in fact, benefitted.  The question is whether anyone would have come up with the algorithim & given it away if it weren't for the possibility
of making some money off of it.  Maybe they would have;  it *is* certain that 
in a few years (how many, exactly?  anyone know?) the patent will expire, & we
will enjoy the full use of the algorithm free of patent restrictions, right?




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: tom.jackson@oubbs.telecom.uoknor.edu
Date: Wed, 5 May 93 16:13:22 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: HOW TO FAKEMAIL
Message-ID: <9305051748.A6016wk@oubbs.telecom.uoknor.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



I'm new to this list and am sorry if this is a frequently asked question.
Can someone tell me how "fakemail" works and how to do it.  I need to send mail
to the "ftp by mail" server at decwrl.dec.com and want the host to think that
it is from another address.  Basicly, I want to send it my ftp request from one
e-mail address and have it mail what I'm requesting to a different one.  The
only way that I know of to do this is with fakemail.
Any suggestions?




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Mike Godwin <mnemonic@eff.org>
Date: Wed, 5 May 93 17:06:33 PDT
To: fergp@sytex.com (Paul Ferguson)
Subject: Re: Notes from the field
In-Reply-To: <ciF43B1w165w@sytex.com>
Message-ID: <199305060004.AA18125@eff.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


 
Paul Ferguson writes:

> I recently became aware of an article that you wrote entitled,
> "Notes on Cryptography, Diigital Telephony, and the Bill of
> Rights", which was included in a recent CuD (5.32, Sun May 2,
> 1993). It appeared to be a message you had originally posted to
> the austin.eff newsgroup.
  
I don't recall posting it to that newsgroup, but it doesn't surprise me
that it appeared there. I have strong connections with Austin and with
EFF-Austin.

> Maybe it's just that time of the day or perhaps I just need for you
> to clarify this a bit more -- How does the ECPA offer protection, as
> it is cuurrently written, against warranted search and seizure with
> regards to technologically advanced systems (such as would crypto be
> considered)?

ECPA doesn't mention encryption. It does, however, penalize unauthorized
disclosure of communications. Whether "disclosure" occurs when a
communication is seized, or when it's decrypted, is an open question.

>      "I.  As my notes here suggest, these initiatives may be, in their
> essence, inconsistent with Constitutional guarantees of expression,
> association, and privacy."
>  
> (End Quote)
>  
> You are saying, in effect, that it is your opinion that these
> initiatives may be unconstitutional?

Yes.

> If so, what course of action
> can be suggested, short of a class action lawsuit against an LEA
> after-the-fact?
  
Lawsuits are almost inherently reactive. The best thing is to lobby
Congress for guarantees of the right to encrypt. State legislatures may
also be a useful target.

> By the way, the article was excellent and since I have not seen it
> posted here in cypherpunks, I'd like your permission to repost it.

You have permission to repost it anywhere. I believe it appeared already
in cypherpunks, though. Maybe some people want to see it again.


--Mike






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Eric Hughes <hughes@soda.berkeley.edu>
Date: Thu, 6 May 93 07:53:09 PDT
To: cypherpunks-announce@toad.com
Subject: Cypherpunks meeting Saturday, May 8
Message-ID: <9305061445.AA12095@soda.berkeley.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



ANNOUNCEMENT
------------

Cypherpunks Physical Meeting

Saturday, May 8, 1993 (the second Saturday, as always)
12:00 noon - 6:00 p.m.
Cygnus Support offices, Mt. View, CA


Even after our successful _ad hoc_ meeting two weeks ago, we're still
going to have our regular meeting.  There's more wiretap chip to
discuss; there's more encrypted phones to be discussed.  I apologize
for the lateness of this announcement; I've been busy putting a
machine on the Internet.

Eric


AGENDA
------

1. Norm Hardy has some time reserved to talk about money.
2. There will be some demonstrations of speech compression implementations
  that a couple of people have worked on.
3. There will be some stuff on remailers, as always.


DIRECTIONS
----------

[Directions to Cygnus provided by John Gilmore. -- EH]

	Cygnus Support
	1937 Landings Drive
	Mt. View, CA  94043
	+1 415 903 1400   switchboard
	+1 415 903 1418   John Gilmore

Take US 101 toward Mt. View.  From San Francisco, it's about a
40-minute drive.  Get off at the Rengstorff Ave/Amphitheatre Parkway
exit.  If you were heading south on 101, you curve around to the
right, cross over the freeway, and get to a stoplight.  If you were
heading north on 101, you just come right off the exit to the
stoplight.  The light is the intersection of Amphitheatre and
Charleston Rd.  Take a right on Charleston; there's a right-turn-only
lane.

Follow Charleston for a short distance.  You'll pass the
Metaphor/Kaleida buildings on the right.  At a clump of palm trees and
a "Landmark Deli" sign, take a right into Landings Drive.  At the end
of the road, turn left into the complex with the big concrete
"Landmark" sign.  Follow the road past the deli til you are in front
of the clock tower that rises out of one of the buildings, facing you.
Enter through the doors immediately under the clock tower.  They'll be
open between noon and 1PM at least.  (See below if you're late.)

Once inside, take the stairs up, immediately to your right.  At the top
of the stairs, turn right past the treetops, and we'll be in 1937 on 
your left.  The door is marked "Cygnus".

If you are late and the door under the clock tower is locked, you can
walk to the deli (which will be around the building on your left, as
you face the door).  Go through the gate in the fence to the right of
the deli, and into the back lawns between the complex and the farm
behind it.  Walk forward and right around the buildings until you see
a satellite dish in the lawn.  Go up the stairs next to the dish,
which are the back stairs into the Cygnus office space.  We'll prop
the door (or you can bang on it if we forget).

Or, you can find the guard who's wandering around the complex, who
knows there's a meeting happening and will let you in.  They can be
beeped at 965 5250, though you'll have trouble finding a phone.

Don't forget to eat first, or bring food at noon!  I recommend hitting
the burrito place on Rengstorff (La Costen~a) at about 11:45.  To get
there, when you get off 101, take Rengstorff (toward the hills) rather
than Amphitheatre (toward the bay).  Follow it about ten blocks until
the major intersection at Middlefield Road.  La Costen~a is the store
on your left at the corner.  You can turn left into the narrow lane
behind the store, which leads to a parking lot, and enter by the front
door, which faces the intersection.  To get to the meeting from there,
just retrace your route on Rengstorff, go straight over the freeway,
and turn right at the stoplight onto Charleston; see above.

See you there!

	John Gilmore






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: William Lee Nussbaum <wln@cs.columbia.edu>
Date: Thu, 6 May 93 09:44:13 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Markoff/NYTimes : "Big Brother & the Computer Age"
Message-ID: <199305061643.AA15480@ground.cs.columbia.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Since I haven't seen any mention of this yet:

On the D1 (business section) page, in the top center, in today's [May
6] New York Times, is a diagram and 38" story on issues re: Clipper.

Given that it's a finals week, I don't have time to enter much from
the article, but will note the following:

The first two paragraphs:

	Can the nation trust its secrets to its spies?
	That question underpins a fierce debate over a recently
disclosed plan by the Clinton Administration to secure the privacy of
the nation's phone calls and computer data with a standard set of
computer codes.

The first quotation (and the only one appearing on D1) in the article
is from Eric Hughes:

	"This plan creates the ears of Big Brother, just as Orwell
warned," said Eric Hughes, an independent software designer in
Berkeley, Calif.

...

	- Lee




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Derek Upham <upham@cs.ubc.ca>
Date: Thu, 6 May 93 13:57:15 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: HIDE: Alpha version of JFIF steganography available
Message-ID: <199305062057.AA00672@grolsch.cs.ubc.ca>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I've got a working version of a JPEG steganograpy program.  It uses
modified cjpeg/djpeg sources to stick arbitrary files in JPEG images
and then extract them.  It needs testing.

The files are in ftp.cs.ubc.ca:pub/pickup/jsteg.  There is a copy of
the JPEG-v4 sources (or use your own), a context-diff of the source
changes (use "patch -p0" in the directory above the sources), and a
test ".jpg" file.  Assuming everything works correctly, running

  djpeg -crypt filetoread.txt miyazaki.jpg > /dev/null

will extract the steganized text into the file "testout.txt" and dump
the PPM file.  (The extracted text should be an exact copy of the
"USING" file in the JPEG-v4 distribution.)  To steganize a file, use

  cjpeg -crypt filetohide.txt image.ppm > image.jpg

or replace "image.ppm" with "-G image.gif", etc.  If "cjpeg" reports
that it's unable to inject the file, compress the file or use a higher
"-Q" parameter.  In general, the stegfile needs a final JPEG file
that's at least eight times larger.

Derek

"Naaaaaaaaaaah, Quess isn't stupid.  A vicious, vindictive, underhanded, slimy,
double-crossing, self-deluding, daddy-hunting, family-killing, conscienceless,
callous, sexually repressed, Electra Complex victimized, self-interested, snot-
ty, obnoxious little preadolescent whining B*T*H, yes.  But she's not stupid."




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: fergp@sytex.com (Paul Ferguson)
Date: Thu, 6 May 93 12:45:37 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Eerie silence....
Message-ID: <2N853B1w165w@sytex.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Gee, what happened guys? I've had nary a stick of mail all today. 
Don't tell me the mail server crashed?
 
Cheers.


Paul Ferguson                  |  Uncle Sam wants to read
Network Integrator             |       your e-mail...
Centreville, Virginia USA      | Just say "NO" to the Clipper
fergp@sytex.com                |          Chip...
-------------------------------+------------------------------
         I love my country, but I fear it's government.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: fergp@sytex.com (Paul Ferguson)
Date: Thu, 6 May 93 12:45:39 PDT
To: mnemonic@eff.org
Subject: New York Times article on "Big Brother and the Computer Age"
Message-ID: <cR853B2w165w@sytex.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


 
New York Times
Thursday, May 6, 1993
Page D1, Business Day
 
Big Brother and the Computer Age
By John Markoff
 
 
Can the nation trust its secrets to its spies?
 
That question  underpins a fierce debate over a recently
disclosed plan by the Clinton Administration to secure the
privacy of the nation's phone calls and computer data with a
standard set of computer codes.
 
The system was designed by scientists from the United States'
most secretive intelligence organization, the National Security
Agency. And newly disclosed memorandums, obtained under a legally
enforceable request under the Freedom of Information Act, show
that the agency waged a long and ultimately successful campaign
within the Government to insure that the technical details of
such a system would remain secret.
 
The inner workings of the system would be in tamper-proof
computer chips that could not be opened without being destroyed.
 
That means that citizens and businesses could use the encoding
technique to protect the privacy of their wireless phone calls or
the transmissions of corporate computer files, but that
independent computer experts would have no way to assure that the
system was secure enough to keep savvy computer hackers from
unscrambling messages. Nor, some computer experts say, can
anyone be certain that the National Security Agency has not built
in a "trap door" that could allow unauthorized Government
eavesdropping.
 
"This plan creates the ears of Big Brother, just as Orwell
warned," said Eric Hughes, an independent software designer in
Berkeley, Calif.
 
 
Over the years, the N.S.A. has been the Government's
communications policeman, with the job of protecting the
sensitive telephone and computer networks used  by the military,
the State Department and other Federal agencies. It also operates
a world-wide electronic-surveillance system, monitoring foreign
communications in the name of national security.
 
But the recently announced encoding plan would give the agency an
unprecedented role in domestic civilian corporate communications.
 
"The N.S.A. is split between the need to provide security and the
fear that if information about cryptography gets out, it won't be
able to perform its other job, which is intercepting and
resolving codes." said David Kahn, author of "The Codebreakers,"
a history of the science of encryption. "It's an unresolvable
problem."
 
The Clinton Administration inherited the new project from the
Bush Administration, and has embraced it. The goal is a national
voice- and data-security standard intended to provide privacy for
Government, civilian and corporate users of telephone and
computer communications, while also assuring that law enforcement
agencies can continue to eavesdrop on or wiretap voice and data
conversations after obtaining warrants.
 
For authorized wiretapping, the law enforcement agency must
obtain special code keys held in escrow by two independent
organizations. What computer experts fear is a secret trap door
that would not require use of these legally obtained keys.
 
Custodian of Security
 
The agency has a long history of resisting industry efforts to
develop such technology on the ground that any codes not
breakable by the N.S.A. might compromise national security.
 
But people like John Gage, director of the science office at Sun
Microsystems in Mountain View, Calif., the maker of high-powered
computer work stations, are uncomfortable with that line of
reasoning. "These decisions can't be left solely to the gods of
encryption, the N.S.A.," Mr. Gage said. "We need privacy for the
world of business."
 
He testified last week at a hearing by the House Commerce
subcommittee on telecommunications and finance, which is studying
computer encryption and the National Security Agency's role in
it.
 
Concerns about the agency's influence on civilian communications
have been raised before. Last year, for instance, a number of
cellular-telephone executives said that an industry standards
committee had been pressed by N.S.A. officials to weaken the
security of a coding scheme that cellular phone makers are
planning to build into the next generation of phones.
 
Although the agency denied the assertion, computer researchers
who analyzed the industry committee's cellular coding scheme say
that it would be simple to subvert by anyone with computer-
programming skills.
 
Written Response
 
With the new plan, N.S.A. officials insist that they have no
motive to undermine the security of the coding plan, which was
originally developed to protect Government information.
 
The agency routinely refuses requests for on-the-record
interviews, but the agency's director of policy, Michael A.
Smith, responded in writing to a reporter's questions.
 
"N.S.A. states unequivocally there is no trap door built into the
algorithm." he wrote, referring to the mathematical instructions
on which the encoding system is based. "A trap door would be a
vulnerability in the system, and would defeat the purpose of
assuring the system provides U.S. citizens with excellent
security."
 
In resisting the N.S.A.'s effort to impose a secret standard,
communications and computer-industry executives point out that
various unofficial coding systems are already in use in this
country and abroad, whether for legitimate purposes or to conceal
criminal conspiracies.
 
Among those criticizing the agency's effort to keep a lid on
encryption is Representative Edward J. Markey, Democrat of
Massachusetts, chairman of the House telecommunications
subcommittee.
 
What Power Do opponents Have?
 
"There are many ways the N.S.A. is trying to put the
cryptography genie back in the bottle, but it's already available
for everyone openly," said Mr. Markey, who plans to conduct
further hearings on the agency's role in the new system. The
Clinton Administration plans to hold its own private review in
coming months to study the nation's cryptography policies and
consider public comment.
 
It is not yet clear whether mounting controversy over the
National Security Agency's role could derail the plan.
 
The new technology is the result of the Computer Security Act of
1987. It called for creation of a national standard for computer
encryption and assigned the task to the main Federal
standards-setting body, now known as the National Institute for
Standards and Technology.
 
A 1989 memo by a technical working group from the institute
detailed the goal for an encryption standard that would be open
to public use and scrutiny. "The algorithms that we use must be
public, unclassified implementable in both hardware or software,
usable by Federal agencies and U.S.-based multinational
corporations," the memo reads in part.
 
The institute turned to the N.S.A. for technical assistance.
 
"The act says we can draw on N.S.A.," said Raymond Kammer, who
was at the institute at the time and is now deputy director.
"They're the pre-eminent scientists in cryptography in the world.
We asked the agency to design a technology to fit the needs of
the civilian community."
 
Memos Detail Opposition
 
But previously classified Government memos, obtained last week
through a Freedom of information filing by Computer Professional
for Social Responsibility, a public-interest group, indicate that
the agency used the process of technical working groups to wear
down opposition by institute scientists who wanted to keep the
standard open to scrutiny.
 
A January 1990 memo by a National Institute scientist to a
colleague expressed frustration. Referring to his own group by
its acronym, he wrote, "It is increasingly evident that it is
difficult, if not impossible, to reconcile the concerns of
N.S.A., N.I.S.T. and the general public using this approach."
 
The N.S.A. also largely ignored the public advisory group that
Congress mandated in the 1987 law. That group, composed of
industry and Government computer experts, plans a public hearing
meeting next month to put forth its concerns.
 
"This all happened within the N.S.A.," said a member of the
advisory group, Stephen Walker, president of Trusted Information
Systems, a computer security company in Glenwood, Md. "Then it
was brought forward as an accomplished fact. This doesn't solve
any of our problems relative to getting good cryptography for the
American people."
 
The new coding system, if adopted, would first be used for
Government electronic communications. It is then expected to
quickly spread to business and even to household use, as
hardware and software makers incorporate the technology into
their products.
 
Export Process Is Slow
 
Various types of encryption systems are in use today, but the
standard approach in the United States is a 15-year-old system
known as the Data Encryption Standard. Based on outdated
technology, this system is not the best available for modern
electronic commerce. And the Government has refused to authorize
export of hardware and software containing it, except on a
time-consuming case-by-case basis.
 
The Clinton Administration is studying whether to allow the
general export of products based on the new N.S.A.-designed
coding system, although industry executives say they doubt that
foreign buyers, especially foreign Governments, would want to use
codes designed by American spy masters.
 
When Congress passed the Computer Security Act, it recognized the
need to update privacy laws and wiretapping regulations to modern
digital communication, which, particularly in the case of
cellular phone calls and other emerging forms of over-the-air
technology, can be easily monitored either by those authorized
to do so,  or those who are not.
 
To demonstrate just how easy unauthorized use might be, Mr. Gage,
the Sun Microsystems executive, brought a computer hacker with
him to the recent House hearing.
 
Punching a special code into a standard cellular phone, the
hacker quickly converted the phone into a scanner capable of
eavesdropping on all the cellular channels being used on or near
Capitol Hill. The intercepted snatches of innocuous conversation
were amplified to the amusement and discomfort of those in the
subcommittee hearing room -- including a woman in the audience
who had her own cellular phone at her side.
 
"This demonstration," Mr. Gage said, "shows it's not really safe
to talk on the phone."
 

Paul Ferguson                  |  Uncle Sam wants to read
Network Integrator             |       your e-mail...
Centreville, Virginia USA      | Just say "NO" to the Clipper
fergp@sytex.com                |          Chip...
-------------------------------+------------------------------
         I love my country, but I fear it's government.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: fergp@sytex.com (Paul Ferguson)
Date: Thu, 6 May 93 14:44:15 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: ECPA reports
Message-ID: <5Tc63B1w165w@sytex.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


 
I was re-reading USC Title 18 (Crimes and Criminal Procedure)
when I came across this snippet. Are these reports available
under the Freedom of Information Act? If so, I'd be interested
in examining them.
 
This extract is from Title 18, Part I, Chp. 119 (Wire and Electronic
communications interception of oral communications), Sec. 2519
(Reports concerning intercepted wire, oral or electronic
communications) paragraphs (inclusive) 2 & 3.
 
8<----- Begin snippet -------
 
     (2)  In January of each year the Attorney  General, an
Assistant Attorney General specially designated by the Attorney
General, or the principal prosecuting attorney of a State, or the
principal prosecuting attorney for any political subdivision of a
State, shall report to the Administrative Office of the United
States Courts-
 
          (a)  the information required by  paragraphs (a)
     through (g) of subsection (1) of this section with respect
     to each application for an order or extension made during
     the preceding calendar year;
 
          (b)  a general description of the interceptions made
     under such order or extension, including (i) the approximate
     nature and frequency of incriminating communications inter-
     cepted, (ii) the approximate nature and frequency of other
     communications intercepted, (iii) the approximate number of
     persons whose communications were intercepted, and (iv) the
     approximate nature, amount, and cost of the manpower and
     other resources used in the interceptions;
 
          (c)  the number of arrests resulting from interceptions
     made under such order or extension, and the offenses for
     which arrests were made;
 
          (d)  the number of trials resulting from such intercep-
     tions;
 
          (e)  the number of motions to suppress made with
     respect to such interceptions, and the number granted or
     denied;
 
          (f)  the number of convictions resulting from such
     interceptions and the offenses for which the convictions
     were obtained and a general assessment of the importance of
     the interceptions; and
 
          (g)  the information required by paragraphs (b) through
     (f) of this subsection with respect to orders or extensions
     obtained in a preceding calendar year.
 
     (3)  In April of each year the Director of the Administra-
tive Office of the United States Courts shall transmit to the
Congress a full and complete report concerning the number of
applications for orders authorizing or approving the interception
of wire, oral, or electronic communications pursuant to this
chapter and the number of orders and extensions granted or denied
pursuant to this chapter during the preceding calendar year.
Such report shall include a summary and analysis of the data
required to be filed with the Administrative Office by
subsections (1) and (2) of this section.  The Director of the
Administrative Office of the United States Courts is authorized
to issue binding regulations dealing with the content and form of
the reports required to be filed by subsections (1) and (2) of
this section.
 
8<------- End snippet ----------
 

Paul Ferguson                  |  Uncle Sam wants to read
Network Integrator             |       your e-mail...
Centreville, Virginia USA      | Just say "NO" to the Clipper
fergp@sytex.com                |          Chip...
-------------------------------+------------------------------
         I love my country, but I fear it's government.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: zane@genesis.mcs.com (Sameer)
Date: Thu, 6 May 93 15:59:41 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: DIGICASH: freely available article
Message-ID: <m0nrEgC-000MTEC@genesis.mcs.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


	I'm looking for a freely distributable article about digicash &
anonymous remailers. I want to have this information available for the
libertarian party of Missouri convention...
	(Something along the lines of the article in _Extropy_ would be
nice, but I want something which I can copy MANY MANY times..)

--
| Sameer Parekh-zane@genesis.MCS.COM-PFA related mail to pfa@genesis.MCS.COM |
| Apprentice Philosopher, Writer, Physicist, Healer, Programmer, Lover, more |
| ----STOP THE WIRETAP CHIP/BIG BROTHER PROPOSAL!---MAIL ME FOR DETAILS!  __/
| "Be God" - Me __ "Specialization is for Insects" - Robert A. Heinlein__/
 \_____________/  \___________________________________________________/ 




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Mike Godwin <mnemonic@eff.org>
Date: Thu, 6 May 93 15:31:05 PDT
To: fergp@sytex.com (Paul Ferguson)
Subject: Re: ECPA reports
In-Reply-To: <5Tc63B1w165w@sytex.com>
Message-ID: <199305062223.AA08620@eff.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Paul Ferguson defines "snippet" in a funny way.
  
> I was re-reading USC Title 18 (Crimes and Criminal Procedure)
> when I came across this snippet. Are these reports available
> under the Freedom of Information Act?

Beats me. Probably, though.

<very long "snippet" deleted>


--Mike







From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Mike Godwin <mnemonic@eff.org>
Date: Thu, 6 May 93 15:36:17 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: EFF letter regarding crypto policy
Message-ID: <199305062236.AA08753@eff.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Forwarded message:



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Mike Godwin <mnemonic>
Date: Thu, 6 May 1993 18:31:51 -0400
To: mnemonic@well.sf.ca.us
Subject: No Subject
Message-ID: <199305062231.AA08688@eff.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>From jberman Thu May  6 18:23:32 1993
Received: from [192.77.172.140] (bush.eff.org) by eff.org with SMTP id AA08608
 (5.65c/IDA-1.4.4/pen-ident); Thu, 6 May 1993 18:23:09 -0400 
Date: Thu, 6 May 1993 18:23:09 -0400
Message-Id: <199305062223.AA08608@eff.org>
To: eff-board, eff-staff
From: jberman (Jerry Berman)
Subject: LETTER TO PRES CRYTO
Status: OR

This is the letter to the President dated 5/6/93  on Cryptography and
Clipper Chip from the digital privacy and security working group. PLEASE
CIRCULATE BROADLY. For further information, contact  jberman@eff.org
(202-5449237)

>The President
>The White House
>Washington, D.C.  20500
>
>Dear Mr. President:
>
>        On April 16 you initiated a broad industry/government review of
>privacy and cryptography policies. We applaud your efforts to develop a
>greater understanding of these complex issues.  With the end of the Cold
>War and the rapid evolution of technology in the computer and
>communications industries, a comprehensive review of our communications
>security policies such as you have directed is sorely needed.  As the world
>becomes linked by a myriad of interconnected digital networks, and computer
>and communications technologies converge, both government and the private
>sector need to evaluate information security and privacy issues. Of course,
>any overall policy must recognize the authorized law enforcement and
>national security needs, and must evaluate the impact on American
>competitiveness.
>
>        The Digital Privacy and Security Working Group -- a coalition of
>communications and computer companies and associations, and consumer and
>privacy advocates -- was formed almost a decade ago when Congress undertook
>a review of technology and security policy.  That review led to the
>Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986.  Subsequently, many members
>of the Working Group served on the Privacy and Technology Task Force that
>Senator Leahy charged with examining these and similar issues in 1991.   
>
>        While we recognize the importance of authorized national security
>and law enforcement needs, we believe that there are fundamental privacy
>and other constitutional rights that must be taken into account when any
>domestic surveillance scheme is proposed.  Moreover, it is unclear how your
>proposal and the overall review of cryptography policy will impact on U.S.
>export controls.  Over the past two years, the Digital Privacy and Security
>Working Group has held numerous meetings at which both public and private
>sector representatives have exchanged technical and legal information with
>the law enforcement community on just such issues.  
>
>        In the White House press release of April 16, the Press Secretary
>stated that you have "directed early and frequent consultations with
>affected industries...and groups that advocate the privacy rights of
>individuals..."  Our group of over 50 members -- from computer software and
>hardware firms, to telecommunications companies and energy companies, to
>the American Civil Liberties Union and the Electronic Frontier Foundation
>-- requests the opportunity to participate in developing policy on the
>broad range of security and privacy issues being considered, including
>appropriate encryption techniques.  We believe that our membership has the
>breadth and depth of expertise and experience that would allow us to
>provide an excellent forum for the development of new policies in these
>areas.
>        During the past few weeks, the Working Group has met several times
>to identify issues that need to be addressed.  Several aspects of the
>Administration's encryption proposal warrant further discussion, including,
>but not limited to: 
>
>        o       whether a key escrow system will produce the desired law
>enforcement results; 
>        o       the level of strength and integrity of the algorithm and
>the security of the key escrow system; 
>        o       the advisability of a government-developed and classified
>algorithm; 
>        o       its practicality and commercial acceptability; 
>        o       the effect of the proposal on American competitiveness and
>the balance of trade;
>        o       possible implications for the development of digital
>communications; and, 
>        o       the effect on the right to privacy and other constitutional
>rights.
>
>A detailed list of our questions relating to this subject is being prepared
>to facilitate this dialogue.
>
>        We are making our views known to officials within your
>Administration and Members of Congress as the review begins.  We would
>welcome the opportunity to participate in the review process and look
>forward to working with you and your Administration on this important issue
>in the coming months.  Representatives of the Digital Privacy and Security
>Working Group are anxious to meet with your staff at their earliest
>convenience to establish a consultation process.         
>
>                                        Sincerely,
>
>abcd, The Microcomputer Industry Association                   
>Hewlett-Packard Company
>Advanced Network & Services, Inc.                               
IBM
>American Civil Liberties Union                                  
Information Technology Association of America
>Apple Computer, Inc.                                            
Information Industry Association
>AT&T                                                                          
>                
Iris Associates
>Business Software Alliance                                             
>Lotus Development Corporation
>Cavanagh Associates, Inc.                                              
>McCaw Cellular Communications
>Cellular Telephone Industry Association                                 
MCI
>Computer Professionals for Social Responsibility                       
>Microsoft Corporation
>Computer & Business Equipment Manufacturers Association      
 RSA Data Security, Inc.
>Computer & Communications Industry Association                        
Software Publishers >Association  
>Crest Industries, Inc.                                          
Sun Microsystems, Inc.
>Digital Equipment Corporation                                   
Toolmaker, Inc.
>EDUCOM                                                         
 Trusted Information Systems
>Electronic Mail Association                                            
>United States Telephone Association
>
>                        Electronic Frontier Foundation/Coordinator
>                                Contact:  Jerry Berman 202/544-6906
>
>







From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Dave Banisar <banisar@washofc.cpsr.org>
Date: Thu, 6 May 93 16:00:20 PDT
To: CYPHERPUNKS@toad.com
Subject: Re: ECPA reports
Message-ID: <9305061903.AA42000@hacker2.eff.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



>  
> I was re-reading USC Title 18 (Crimes and Criminal Procedure) 
> when I came across this snippet. Are these reports available 
> under the Freedom of Information Act? If so, I'd be interested 
> in examining them. 


The reports should be available from any federal depository library and many 
law libraries. The administrative office told me early this week that the new 
volume for 92 will be out in a few weeks. A Congressional source tells
me that new figures are even higher than last year, upto the mid 900 range,
which is the highest number ever reported.

Dave Banisar
CPSR Washington Office






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: John Perry Barlow <barlow@eff.org>
Date: Thu, 6 May 93 04:10:05 PDT
To: jim@rsa.com
Subject: Phil Zimmerman's Laurel Branch
Message-ID: <199305061109.AA24844@eff.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Jim,

John Gilmore passed on to me Phil Zimmerman's recent peace overture to you.

I expect I am joined by nearly everyone who cares about the issue of
cryptography in the hope that you will bury an understandable sense of
rancor and accept his offer. 

Further, if there is anything which the Electronic Frontier Foundation can
do to introduce light and good will into the area between you and Phil, be
assured we are ready and willing. 

While I realize that PGP has been a burr under your saddle for the last two
years...growing steadily more irritating as it proliferated like a virus
around the planet...one could argue that it has actually done PK Partners
more good that harm. 

By introducing thousands to both public key cryptography and the RSA
approach to it, it has gone a long way toward establishing RSA as the de
facto international standard for personal encryption. This can only work to
your long term benefit.

On the other hand, if the current course of things remains fixed and no
resolution is made between PK Partners and Phil, then PGP will continue to
be modified and improved by many international volunteers and will
eventually become seriously competitive to your own products. 

To me, it appears you have a choice between a position where everybody
loses and one where everybody wins. Perhaps I'm wrong, but the only factor
which supports the former course is an emotional sense of violated
principle. As I say, I could hardly fault you for feeling bitter after all
that's happened, but I sincerely hope you'll be able to rise above it.

And please let me know if we can help in any way.

Thanks,

John Perry Barlow  





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Dave Banisar <banisar@washofc.cpsr.org>
Date: Thu, 6 May 93 16:15:19 PDT
To: CYPHERPUNKS@toad.com
Subject: New NIST/NSA Revelations (by CPSR)
Message-ID: <9305061921.AA58911@hacker2.eff.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



  New NIST/NSA Revelations

        Less than three weeks after the White House announced a
controversial initiative to secure the nation's electronic
communications with government-approved cryptography, newly
released documents raise serious questions about the process that
gave rise to the administration's proposal.  The documents,
released by the National Institute of Standards and Technology
(NIST) in response to a Freedom of Information Act lawsuit,
suggest that the super-secret National Security Agency (NSA)
dominates the process of establishing security standards for
civilian computer systems in contravention of the intent of
legislation Congress enacted in 1987.

        The released material concerns the development of the
Digital Signature Standard (DSS), a cryptographic method for
authenticating the identity of the sender of an electronic
communication and for authenticating the integrity of the data in
that communication.  NIST publicly proposed the DSS in August 1991
and initially made no mention of any NSA role in developing the
standard, which was intended for use in unclassified, civilian
communications systems.  NIST finally conceded that NSA had, in
fact, developed the technology after Computer Professionals for
Social Responsibility (CPSR) filed suit against the agency for
withholding relevant documents.  The proposed DSS was widely
criticized within the computer industry for its perceived weak
security and inferiority to an existing authentication technology
known as the RSA algorithm.  Many observers have speculated that
the RSA technique was disfavored by NSA because it was, in fact,
more secure than the NSA-proposed algorithm and because the RSA
technique could also be used to encrypt data very securely.

        The newly-disclosed documents -- released in heavily censored
form at the insistence of NSA -- suggest that NSA was not merely
involved in the development process, but dominated it.  NIST and
NSA worked together on the DSS through an intra-agency Technical
Working Group (TWG).  The documents suggest that the NIST-NSA
relationship was contentious, with NSA insisting upon secrecy
throughout the deliberations.  A NIST report dated January 31,
1990, states that

     The members of the TWG acknowledged that the efforts
     expended to date in the determination of a public key
     algorithm which would be publicly known have not been
     successful.  It's increasingly evident that it is
     difficult, if not impossible, to reconcile the concerns
     and requirements of NSA, NIST and the general public
     through using this approach.

        The civilian agency's frustration is also apparent in a July
21, 1990, memo from the NIST members of the TWG to NIST director
John W. Lyons.  The memo suggests that "national security"
concerns hampered efforts to develop a standard:

     THE NIST/NSA Technical Working Group (TWG) has held 18
     meetings over the past 13 months.  A part of every
     meeting has focused on the NIST intent to develop a
     Public Key Standard Algorithm Standard.  We are
     convinced that the TWG process has reached a point where
     continuing discussions of the public key issue will
     yield only marginal results.  Simply stated, we believe
     that over the past 13 months we have explored the
     technical and national security equity issues to the
     point where a decision is required on the future
     direction of digital signature standards.

An October 19, 1990, NIST memo discussing possible patent issues
surrounding DSS noted that those questions would need to be
addressed "if we ever get our NSA problem settled."

        Although much of the material remains classified and withheld
from disclosure, the "NSA problem" was apparently the intelligence
agency's demand that perceived "national security" considerations
take precedence in the development of the DSS.  From the outset,
NSA cloaked the deliberations in secrecy.  For instance, at the
March 22, 1990, meeting of the TWG, NSA representatives presented
NIST with NSA's classified proposal for a DSS algorithm.  NIST's
report of the meeting notes that

     The second document, classified TOP SECRET CODEWORD, was
     a position paper which discussed reasons for the
     selection of the algorithms identified in the first
     document.  This document is available at NSA for review
     by properly cleared senior NIST officials.

In other words, NSA presented highly classified material to NIST
justifying NSA's selection of the proposed algorithm -- an
algorithm intended to protect and authenticate unclassified
information in civilian computer systems.  The material was so
highly classified that "properly cleared senior NIST officials"
were required to view the material at NSA's facilities.

        These disclosures are disturbing for two reasons.  First, the
process as revealed in the documents contravenes the intent of
Congress embodied in the Computer Security Act of 1987.  Through
that legislation, Congress intended to remove NSA from the process
of developing civilian computer security standards and to place
that responsibility with NIST, a civilian agency.  Congress
expressed a particular concern that NSA, a military intelligence
agency, would improperly limit public access to information in a
manner incompatible with civilian standard setting.  The House
Report on the legislation noted that NSA's

     natural tendency to restrict and even deny access to
     information that it deems important would disqualify
     that agency from being put in charge of the protection
     of non-national security information in the view of many
     officials in the civilian agencies and the private
     sector.

While the Computer Security Act contemplated that NSA would
provide NIST with "technical assistance" in the development of
civilian standards, the newly released documents demonstrate that
NSA has crossed that line and dominates the development process.

        The second reason why this material is significant is because
of what it reveals about the process that gave rise to the so-
called "Clipper" chip proposed by the administration earlier this
month.  Once again, NIST was identified as the agency actually
proposing the new encryption technology, with "technical
assistance" from NSA.  Once again, the underlying information
concerning the development process is classified.  DSS was the
first test of the Computer Security Act's division of labor
between NIST and NSA.  Clipper comes out of the same
"collaborative" process.  The newly released documents suggest
that NSA continues to dominate the government's work on computer
security and to cloak the process in secrecy, contrary to the
clear intent of Congress.

        On the day the Clipper initiative was announced, CPSR
submitted FOIA requests to key agencies -- including NIST and NSA
-- for information concerning the proposal.  CPSR will pursue
those requests, as well as the pending litigation concerning NSA
involvement in the development of the Digital Signature Standard.
Before any meaningful debate can occur on the direction of
cryptography policy, essential government information must be made
public -- as Congress intended when it passed the Computer
Security Act.  CPSR is committed to that goal.

***************************************************
David L. Sobel
CPSR Legal Counsel
(202) 544-9240
dsobel@washofc.cpsr.org






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Dave Banisar <banisar@washofc.cpsr.org>
Date: Thu, 6 May 93 18:00:55 PDT
To: CYPHERPUNKS <CYPHERPUNKS@toad.com>
Subject: New NIST/NSA Revelations
Message-ID: <00541.2819563074.3344@washofc.cpsr.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


  New NIST/NSA Revelations


        Less than three weeks after the White House announced a
controversial initiative to secure the nation's electronic
communications with government-approved cryptography, newly
released documents raise serious questions about the process that
gave rise to the administration's proposal.  The documents,
released by the National Institute of Standards and Technology
(NIST) in response to a Freedom of Information Act lawsuit,
suggest that the super-secret National Security Agency (NSA)
dominates the process of establishing security standards for
civilian computer systems in contravention of the intent of
legislation Congress enacted in 1987.

        The released material concerns the development of the
Digital Signature Standard (DSS), a cryptographic method for
authenticating the identity of the sender of an electronic
communication and for authenticating the integrity of the data in
that communication.  NIST publicly proposed the DSS in August 1991
and initially made no mention of any NSA role in developing the
standard, which was intended for use in unclassified, civilian
communications systems.  NIST finally conceded that NSA had, in
fact, developed the technology after Computer Professionals for
Social Responsibility (CPSR) filed suit against the agency for
withholding relevant documents.  The proposed DSS was widely
criticized within the computer industry for its perceived weak
security and inferiority to an existing authentication technology
known as the RSA algorithm.  Many observers have speculated that
the RSA technique was disfavored by NSA because it was, in fact,
more secure than the NSA-proposed algorithm and because the RSA
technique could also be used to encrypt data very securely.

        The newly-disclosed documents -- released in heavily censored
form at the insistence of NSA -- suggest that NSA was not merely
involved in the development process, but dominated it.  NIST and
NSA worked together on the DSS through an intra-agency Technical
Working Group (TWG).  The documents suggest that the NIST-NSA
relationship was contentious, with NSA insisting upon secrecy
throughout the deliberations.  A NIST report dated January 31,
1990, states that

     The members of the TWG acknowledged that the efforts
     expended to date in the determination of a public key
     algorithm which would be publicly known have not been
     successful.  It's increasingly evident that it is
     difficult, if not impossible, to reconcile the concerns
     and requirements of NSA, NIST and the general public
     through using this approach.

        The civilian agency's frustration is also apparent in a July
21, 1990, memo from the NIST members of the TWG to NIST director
John W. Lyons.  The memo suggests that "national security"
concerns hampered efforts to develop a standard:

     THE NIST/NSA Technical Working Group (TWG) has held 18
     meetings over the past 13 months.  A part of every
     meeting has focused on the NIST intent to develop a
     Public Key Standard Algorithm Standard.  We are
     convinced that the TWG process has reached a point where
     continuing discussions of the public key issue will
     yield only marginal results.  Simply stated, we believe
     that over the past 13 months we have explored the
     technical and national security equity issues to the
     point where a decision is required on the future
     direction of digital signature standards.

An October 19, 1990, NIST memo discussing possible patent issues
surrounding DSS noted that those questions would need to be
addressed "if we ever get our NSA problem settled."

        Although much of the material remains classified and withheld
from disclosure, the "NSA problem" was apparently the intelligence
agency's demand that perceived "national security" considerations
take precedence in the development of the DSS.  From the outset,
NSA cloaked the deliberations in secrecy.  For instance, at the
March 22, 1990, meeting of the TWG, NSA representatives presented
NIST with NSA's classified proposal for a DSS algorithm.  NIST's
report of the meeting notes that

     The second document, classified TOP SECRET CODEWORD, was
     a position paper which discussed reasons for the
     selection of the algorithms identified in the first
     document.  This document is available at NSA for review
     by properly cleared senior NIST officials.

In other words, NSA presented highly classified material to NIST
justifying NSA's selection of the proposed algorithm -- an
algorithm intended to protect and authenticate unclassified
information in civilian computer systems.  The material was so
highly classified that "properly cleared senior NIST officials"
were required to view the material at NSA's facilities.

        These disclosures are disturbing for two reasons.  First, the
process as revealed in the documents contravenes the intent of
Congress embodied in the Computer Security Act of 1987.  Through
that legislation, Congress intended to remove NSA from the process
of developing civilian computer security standards and to place
that responsibility with NIST, a civilian agency.  Congress
expressed a particular concern that NSA, a military intelligence
agency, would improperly limit public access to information in a
manner incompatible with civilian standard setting.  The House
Report on the legislation noted that NSA's

     natural tendency to restrict and even deny access to
     information that it deems important would disqualify
     that agency from being put in charge of the protection
     of non-national security information in the view of many
     officials in the civilian agencies and the private
     sector.

While the Computer Security Act contemplated that NSA would
provide NIST with "technical assistance" in the development of
civilian standards, the newly released documents demonstrate that
NSA has crossed that line and dominates the development process.

        The second reason why this material is significant is because
of what it reveals about the process that gave rise to the so-
called "Clipper" chip proposed by the administration earlier this
month.  Once again, NIST was identified as the agency actually
proposing the new encryption technology, with "technical
assistance" from NSA.  Once again, the underlying information
concerning the development process is classified.  DSS was the
first test of the Computer Security Act's division of labor
between NIST and NSA.  Clipper comes out of the same
"collaborative" process.  The newly released documents suggest
that NSA continues to dominate the government's work on computer
security and to cloak the process in secrecy, contrary to the
clear intent of Congress.

        On the day the Clipper initiative was announced, CPSR
submitted FOIA requests to key agencies -- including NIST and NSA
-- for information concerning the proposal.  CPSR will pursue
those requests, as well as the pending litigation concerning NSA
involvement in the development of the Digital Signature Standard.
Before any meaningful debate can occur on the direction of
cryptography policy, essential government information must be made
public -- as Congress intended when it passed the Computer
Security Act.  CPSR is committed to that goal.

***************************************************
David L. Sobel
CPSR Legal Counsel
(202) 544-9240
dsobel@washofc.cpsr.org






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Eric Hughes <hughes@soda.berkeley.edu>
Date: Thu, 6 May 93 22:13:07 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: PRESS: Markoff/NYTimes : "Big Brother & the Computer Age"
In-Reply-To: <199305061643.AA15480@ground.cs.columbia.edu>
Message-ID: <9305070509.AA24429@soda.berkeley.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


The quotation of mine in the NYT today was one I gave to John Markoff
three weeks ago when the story first broke.  I called him up on the
afternoon of the announcment--his office is in SF, across the bay--and
told him I wanted him to give him an opportunity to quote me.  I was
surprised to see it in today's article.

The hook for this article was the recent FOIA disclosures.  Newspaper
articles usually don't get written unless there is something that has
changed, something that is "new."  An ongoing situation won't get
reported on until something specific happens; this specific happening
can be an event made just for the press--a press conference, a press
release, a public statement, or some publication.  For further reading
on this subject, look at _Reading the News_, an anthology by Pantheon
Press.

The FOIA disclosures about NSA's involvement in NIST was the hook, but
that wasn't the point of the story.  The facts of the FOIA were at the
back of the story, but they were there.  This illustrates another
principle of the newspaper: once you have a hook, there's lots of
stuff you can hang on it.

It really is easy to get quoted, but to do so, you have to make
yourself available to the press.  The recent FOIA story is a good
hook.  All the recent crypto events should be enough for a Sunday
article (but are not enough without a hook!).  I would encourage all
of you to make contact with your local media and offer to explain this
abstruse subject to them.  

Reporters have little enough time to learn about what they talk about
as it is.  If you can present yourself as a bona fide expert (and this
does not necessarily mean as an academic) and make an offer to tutor
someone on the subject, not only will the quality of coverage improve,
but a friendship will have been made.

Eric





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Eric Hughes <hughes@soda.berkeley.edu>
Date: Thu, 6 May 93 22:16:02 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: ADMIN: Eerie silence....
In-Reply-To: <2N853B1w165w@sytex.com>
Message-ID: <9305070512.AA24629@soda.berkeley.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


relay2.uu.net was down again today for a while, leading to big delays
and rearranged mail.

To repeat, no interloper is filtering mail or trying to disrupt
service to this list, to the best of our knowledge.  These
interruptions havefar more banal origins.

Eric




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: fergp@sytex.com (Paul Ferguson)
Date: Thu, 6 May 93 19:47:12 PDT
To: mnemonic@eff.com
Subject: ITAR info
Message-ID: <aXq63B1w165w@sytex.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


 Mike Godwin <uunet!eff.org!mnemonic> writes -
 
> The best person on the Net to ask about the ITARs is, IMHO,
> Lee Tien, the lawyer handling John Gilmore's cryptography-related
> litigation. Lee can be reached at tien@well.sf.ca.us.
 
 Mr. Tien,
 
 I have bothered Mike Godwin and Shari Steele to the point of no
 return in legalese. (Blame them for pointing me in your direction.)
 Actually, I'm quite curious of the ITAR restrictions of cryptologic
 software/hardware legislation currently on the books and the chances
 of it being scaled back in light of the current "Clipper" fiasco. I'm
 well aware of the legal provisions within USC Title 18, and the ECPA
 but have no idea of additional transcripts that exist that the Dept.
 of State which have been circumscribed to regulate and tariff.
 
 Would you be so kind as to enlighten me (us) of the ITAR stuff that
 many of us have heard so much about? I know Phil Zimmerman has made
 limited mention of ITAR restrictions, so I think that we need to
 first lift the veil of ignorance.
 
 Thanks for your anticipated response.
 
 Cheers.

Paul Ferguson                  |  Uncle Sam wants to read
Network Integrator             |       your e-mail...
Centreville, Virginia USA      | Just say "NO" to the Clipper
fergp@sytex.com                |          Chip...
-------------------------------+------------------------------
         I love my country, but I fear it's government.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: fergp@sytex.com (Paul Ferguson)
Date: Thu, 6 May 93 19:47:04 PDT
To: virus-l@lehigh.edu
Subject: Legal Net News
Message-ID: <8NR63B1w165w@sytex.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


 
Due to the increasing demands of external activities, Legal Net News
will discontinue being sent on a mailing list. My apologies go out to
all of you who sent subscription requests.
 
Legal Net News will, however, continue to be compiled, produced,
released and archived on a regular basis.
 
It can be found at the following locations:
 
                Publicly Accessable BBS's
                -------------------------
 
The SENTRY Net BBS             Arlington Software Exchange
Centreville, Virginia  USA     Arlington, Virginia  USA
+1-703-815-3244                +1-703-532-7143
To 9,600 bps                   To 9,600 bps
 
                       The Internet
                       ------------
 
Legal Net News is available at the following archive site(s)-
 
tstc.edu   (161.109.128.2)  Directory: /pub/legal-net-news
 
Login as ANONYMOUS and use your net ID (for example: fergp@sytex.com)
as the password.
 
The most recently released issue was volume 1, issue 4 dated 6 May,
1993 and is in the following formmat:
 
                   Filename          Filename
                  Compressed          ASCII
 
Vol 1, Issue 1    LNM0493.ZIP       LNM0493.TXT
Vol 1, Issue 2    LNN0102.ZIP       LNN1.002
Vol 1, Issue 3    LNN0103.ZIP       LNN1.003
Vol 1, Issue 4    LNN0104.ZIP       LNN1.004
 
 
Thanks for the interest.
 
Cheers.
 

Paul Ferguson                  |  Uncle Sam wants to read
Network Integrator             |       your e-mail...
Centreville, Virginia USA      | Just say "NO" to the Clipper
fergp@sytex.com                |          Chip...
-------------------------------+------------------------------
         I love my country, but I fear it's government.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Mike Godwin <mnemonic@eff.org>
Date: Fri, 7 May 93 06:09:23 PDT
To: hughes@soda.berkeley.edu (Eric Hughes)
Subject: Re: PRESS: Markoff/NYTimes : "Big Brother & the Computer Age"
In-Reply-To: <9305070509.AA24429@soda.berkeley.edu>
Message-ID: <199305071309.AA15120@eff.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


 
 
Eric writes:

> The hook for this article was the recent FOIA disclosures.  Newspaper
> articles usually don't get written unless there is something that has
> changed, something that is "new."

I know that John Schwartz is working on a major piece for the Washington
Post--a kind of intro to the subject.


--Mike







From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Eric Hughes <hughes@soda.berkeley.edu>
Date: Fri, 7 May 93 10:13:06 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: EFF letter regarding crypto policy
In-Reply-To: <9305071548.AA13593@toad.com>
Message-ID: <9305071709.AA22408@soda.berkeley.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


re: AT&T questioning clipper and pushing clipped phones.

My guess is that AT&T corporate doesn't like the idea because they
know the long term consequences and the Greensboro division does like
it because it's income.  It's a classic case of corport schizophrenia.
Whether the patient ever becomes sane is an exercise left to the
patient.

Eric




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: peter honeyman <honey@citi.umich.edu>
Date: Fri, 7 May 93 08:48:06 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: EFF letter regarding crypto policy
In-Reply-To: <199305062236.AA08753@eff.org>
Message-ID: <9305071548.AA13593@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


here we have at&t, on the one hand, questioning the wisdom and 
practicality of the principles underlying clipper, while on the 
other hand, it promises to be first to push clipped phones out 
the door.  go figure.

	peter




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: david@staff.udc.upenn.edu (R. David Murray)
Date: Fri, 7 May 93 11:05:39 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: cheap secure telnet?
Message-ID: <9305071804.AA19192@staff.udc.upenn.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I have a need to have a secure telnet connection.  It has to be cheap
(on the order of hundreds of dollars, not thousands),
but it doesn't have to be free.  It also has to be low cost in
terms of setup; that is, I don't want to set up a full blown
Kerberos system just to get a single secure telnet link.  The link is to
be between two unix systems.  I have root and physical access to both systems.
Anyone know of such a beast?

On second thought, if you have leads on stuff in the thousands of
dollars range, send me them too.  This /could/ turn out to be that
important.
-- 
david			david@staff.udc.upenn.edu




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: fnerd@smds.com (FutureNerd Steve Witham)
Date: Fri, 7 May 93 13:59:15 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Swaine Flames Denning
Message-ID: <9305072034.AA03557@smds.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Nice editorial on the back page of the June Dr. Dobb's:

"Pay No Attention to the Man Behind the Curtain, Dorothy"

I won't quote the whole thing, but the first paragraph reads:

"The debate on digital-telephony legislation in the March 1993 issue
of *Communications of the ACM* was a fraud and a dissappointment."

It's by Michael Swaine.  More serious than "Swaine's Flames" 
sometimes are.

Cypherpunks reminds me of the very first issues of "Dr. Dobb's
Journal of TINY BASIC Calisthenics and Orthodontia: Running
Light without Overbyte."  Those days, when it seemed we all
had a chance to steer the future, were over fast.

-fnerd




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: fergp@sytex.com (Paul Ferguson)
Date: Fri, 7 May 93 14:17:57 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Carrier humor
Message-ID: <08673B1w165w@sytex.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


 
Buzzword (acronym) of the day: VLCC (Very Large Crude Carrier)
 
Where: UNIX Review
       May 1993
       Vol. 11, No. 5
       in "Devil's Advocate,"
       page 126,
       by Stan Kelly-Bootle
 
       "VLCC (Very Large Crude Carrier) is not MCI's view of AT&T,
        but rather one of those supertankers that regularly resort
        premature delivery, known as spillage."
 
My $.02: If it's not, it should be.
 
Cheers.
 

Paul Ferguson                |       Boycott AT&T,
Network Integrator           |    Write your elected
Centreville, Virginia USA    |     Representatives.
fergp@sytex.com              |    Do the right thing.
 
Just say "NO" to the Wiretap (Clipper/Capstone) Chip(s)
   I love my country, but I fear its government.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: J. Michael Diehl <mdiehl@hydra.unm.edu>
Date: Fri, 7 May 93 18:39:54 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: testing....
Message-ID: <9305080139.AA01204@hydra.unm.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I haven't received anything from this list in about 4 days.  Am I still on?

Sorry to waste BW


+-----------------------+-----------------------------+---------+
| J. Michael Diehl ;-)  | I thought I was wrong once. | PGP KEY |
|                       |    But, I was mistaken.     |available|
|                       +-----------------------------+---------+
| mdiehl@triton.unm.edu | "I'm just looking for the opportunity |
| mike.diehl@fido.org   | to be Politically Incorrect!   <Me>   |
| (505) 299-2282        |                                       |
+-----------------------+---------------------------------------+




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Clark Reynard <clark@metal.psu.edu>
Date: Fri, 7 May 93 17:51:18 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: One-time pads
Message-ID: <9305080134.AA05436@metal.psu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Is there any publically-available software which allows utilization
of one-time pads?  I know it's just a matter of XOR'ing digits, but
something which would allow use by modem and transmit the pad itself
by PGP or another secure encryption standard, or the delivery by 
mail or courier of the pad itself to allow the future exchange of
information by a less-secure medium would seem to be something that
SOMEONE must have thought of doing; and while it's by no means
trivial, it would take a bit of work to program it with a snazzy
front-end, idiot-proofing and other bells and whistles.

Just wondering.  

Oh, yes, I've posted an amusing little bit of propaganda to sci.crypt
and alt.privacy.clipper, a sensationalistic little hypothetical
proposition which I'd be happy to email anyone who is interested
and doesn't have UseNET access (is there such a person?).
----
Robert W. Clark             Just Say No! to the
rclark@nyx.cs.du.edu        Big Brother Chip  




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Nickey MacDonald <i6t4@jupiter.sun.csd.unb.ca>
Date: Sat, 8 May 93 03:56:15 PDT
To: cypherpunks list <cypherpunks@toad.com>
Subject: A few different topics
Message-ID: <Pine.3.05.9305080722.A17896-c100000@jupiter>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I have a couple of different things I want to talk about, so I'll make one
large post rather than several smaller ones.


I posted a link encryption post a while back, and one of the responses I
got back implied I was very naive in using a "shuffle" as part of the
initial manipulation of the packet to be sent.  I have spent some further
time thinking about this, and I still fail to see how reshuffling the order
of the data is anything but a good thing.

If the encryption algorithm generates one output character for each input
character, then I can see a situation developing where an "interloper"
could cause the message being sent to be changed:

   sender  --->  interloper  --->  receiver
                  ^
                  Knows senders password, but sender
                  is unaware.  Changes sent message
                  without senders knowledge.

Now this situation is a possibility any time a store and forward (such as
email) situation exists and someone (other than the sender and receiver as
appropriate) knows the password(s).  This could still be a problem in a
real time link, unless the data is sent in a nonlinear (shuffled) order. 
The implication is, that if the data has to be rearranged to be
understood, then the interloper is going to have to gather more than one
packet, and rearrange them to understand whats being sent, in order to be
able to know what changes to make to the message to make it have an altered
meaning for the receiver.  Collecting the packets would cause a delay that
would (should) be noticeable on a real time link.

I still don't like the idea of trying to use timing as the only control,
given the modern communications can be filled with arbitrary delays, but I
don't know of any other approach that will offer any hope of detecting
that someone knows your password.


This is probably another problem that would be solved by a "more powerful
mailer", but not having one on hand I do not know this to be the case:
I have a second thought about the subject handling of posts to this (and
other) email lists.  In my Bitnet days, I used to be on a number of
Listserv lists.  One of things I liked about them was that the messages
always showed up as being from the list.  The email I get now, all appears
to be a collection of private mail from a collection of individual people... 
The problem occurs when someone replys privately to one of my posts.  It is
impossible for me to tell which mail is sent directly to me, and which mail
has been redirected by the list.


I am about to start "spec"ing a software licensing system using public key
technology.  I would like any comments...  this is not something I have
seen discussed on the list in the short time I've been subscribed.  What I
propose is that the software would require (say in an environment
variable or a special file some where) an "activation key".  The
activation key would be some licensing data that was encrypted with a
private key by the software manufacturer (say a serial number, licensee's
name, and a license duration (or expiry date)).  The software would have
the public key compiled into it, and only if it could decode the
activation key, and it had not expired, would the software run.


The majority response on "should I try my survey" was positive (in fact I
only got one "count me out").  I was warned that it may end up meaningless
because everyone will submit anonymous responses...  I don't see where
that will be a problem, unless someone submits multiple responses or
unless hiding behind anonymity means someone still feels inclined to be
untruthful.  I guess maybe I'm just being foolish by assuming that
allowing anonymous posts would make people feel more secure in telling the
truth about themselves...  In any case, I will start collecting my
thoughts and form some questions...

---
Nick MacDonald               | NMD on IRC
i6t4@jupiter.sun.csd.unb.ca  | PGP 2.1 Public key available via finger






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Arthur R. McGee" <amcgee@netcom.com>
Date: Sat, 8 May 93 08:35:48 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: An end to the PGP quarrel? (fwd)
Message-ID: <Pine.3.05.9305080839.D8304-a100000@netcom2>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



---------- Forwarded message ----------
Date: Fri, 7 May 93 02:13:29 -0500
From: Steve Jackson <sjackson@tic.com>
To: eff-austin@tic.com, eff-austin-directors@tic.com
Cc: thesegroups@tic.com
Subject: An end to the PGP quarrel?

The creator of PGP has proposed to Jim Bidzos of RSA that RSA approve
a new, already-written version of PGP which uses "RSAREF," an unprotected
version of the PGP algorithm. I propose that EFF-Austin write to Bidzos
endorsing the suggestion.

Hmm. Perhaps other groups might feel the same way, so this will be
copied appropriately.






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Arthur R. McGee" <amcgee@netcom.com>
Date: Sat, 8 May 93 08:57:35 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: An end to the PGP quarrel? (fwd)
Message-ID: <Pine.3.05.9305080834.C9661-c100000@netcom2>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



---------- Forwarded message ----------
Date: Sat, 8 May 1993 01:57:56 +0800
From: John Perry Barlow <barlow@eff.org>
To: Steve Jackson <sjackson@tic.com>, eff-austin@tic.com,
     eff-austin-directors@tic.com
Cc: thesegroups@tic.com
Subject: Re: An end to the PGP quarrel?

At  2:13 AM 5/7/93 -0500, Steve Jackson wrote:
>The creator of PGP has proposed to Jim Bidzos of RSA that RSA approve
>a new, already-written version of PGP which uses "RSAREF," an unprotected
>version of the PGP algorithm. I propose that EFF-Austin write to Bidzos
>endorsing the suggestion.

While I don't necessarily want to us to stampede at ol' Jim I wrote him the
following yesterday:

Jim,

John Gilmore passed on to me Phil Zimmerman's recent peace overture to you.

I expect I am joined by nearly everyone who cares about the issue of
cryptography in the hope that you will bury an understandable sense of
rancor and accept his offer. 

Further, if there is anything which the Electronic Frontier Foundation can
do to introduce light and good will into the area between you and Phil, be
assured we are ready and willing. 

While I realize that PGP has been a burr under your saddle for the last two
years...growing steadily more irritating as it proliferated like a virus
around the planet...one could argue that it has actually done PK Partners
more good that harm. 

By introducing thousands to both public key cryptography and the RSA
approach to it, it has gone a long way toward establishing RSA as the de
facto international standard for personal encryption. This can only work to
your long term benefit.

On the other hand, if the current course of things remains fixed and no
resolution is made between PK Partners and Phil, then PGP will continue to
be modified and improved by many international volunteers and will
eventually become seriously competitive to your own products. 

To me, it appears you have a choice between a position where everybody
loses and one where everybody wins. Perhaps I'm wrong, but the only factor
which supports the former course is an emotional sense of violated
principle. As I say, I could hardly fault you for feeling bitter after all
that's happened, but I sincerely hope you'll be able to rise above it.

And please let me know if we can help in any way.

Thanks,

John Perry Barlow  







From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Date: Sat, 8 May 93 09:45:07 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Shamir at Stanford on Thursday
Message-ID: <9305081645.AA07281@netcom3.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



> From daemon@Sunburn.Stanford.EDU Thu May  6 14:34:13 1993
> Date: Thu, 6 May 93 14:18:26 -0700
> From: Daphne Koller <daphne@Theory.Stanford.EDU>
> To: stc@Theory.Stanford.EDU
> Subject: STANFORD THEORY COLLOQUIUM
> 
> 
> 	  S T A N F O R D   T H E O R Y   C O L L O Q U I U M
> 	 =====================================================
> 
> 
> The Stanford Computer Science Department is pleased to announce the
> eighth Stanford Theory Colloquium this Thursday, May 13.
> 
> 
> 	Polynomials and Cryptography - Some Recent Results
> 
> 			 Professor Adi Shamir
> 		     Weizmann Institute of Science
> 
> 
> The talk will take place 4:15 -- 5:45 p.m. in Jordan 041.
> 
> A RECEPTION in honor of the speaker will be held in the third floor
> lounge of MJH around 3:45.  Everyone is welcome.
> 
>   -------------------------------------------------------------------
>   | Professor Adi Shamir is a coinventor of the RSA public key      |
>   | cryptographic scheme and of several other key management and    |
>   | signature schemes.  He was involved in the cryptanalytic attack |
>   | on the knapsack scheme, and more recently he developed (with E. |
>   | Biham) the new technique of differential cryptanalysis and      |
>   | applied it to the Data Encryption Standard.                     |
>   -------------------------------------------------------------------
> 
> -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
> 
> 
> 	Polynomials and Cryptography - Some Recent Results
> 
> 			 Professor Adi Shamir
> 		     Weizmann Institute of Science
> 
> 
> Mappings defined by polynomials modulo n=pq are a fundamental tool in
> modern cryptography.  However, the inversion of such mappings usually
> requires the extraction of roots or the evaluation of high degree
> polynomials, which is quite slow.  This talk will consist of two parts.
> In the first part, we give an introduction to some basic cryptographic
> techniques.  The second part will describe some new results in the area.
> We consider the class of birational permutations f, in which both f and
> f^-1 are low degree multivariate rational functions mod n.  We describe
> new families of birational permutations, and how to turn them into new
> cryptographic schemes which are much faster than previously known
> schemes.  In addition, we consider the general problems of factoring
> multivariate polynomials mod n and solving systems of polynomial
> equations mod n, and develop new techniques for proving the hardness of
> randomly chosen instances of such problems.
> 
> The talk will be self contained and accessible to a wide audience.
> +----------------------------------------------------------------------------+







From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: J. Michael Diehl <mdiehl@triton.unm.edu>
Date: Sat, 8 May 93 14:08:21 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: testing again.
Message-ID: <9305082108.AA27172@triton.unm.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I never got my last test post, so I'm trying again.  I have resubscribed.

+-----------------------+-----------------------------+---------+
| J. Michael Diehl ;-)  | I thought I was wrong once. | PGP KEY |
|                       |    But, I was mistaken.     |available|
|                       +-----------------------------+---------+
| mdiehl@triton.unm.edu | "I'm just looking for the opportunity |
| mike.diehl@fido.org   | to be Politically Incorrect!   <Me>   |
| (505) 299-2282        |                                       |
+-----------------------+---------------------------------------+




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: edgar@spectrx.Saigon.COM (Edgar W. Swank)
Date: Sat, 8 May 93 19:48:05 PDT
To: Cypherpunks          <cypherpunks@toad.com>
Subject: Correction!
Message-ID: <cPc03B9w165w@spectrx.saigon.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


In part of my long post dated May 3, Subject:

   PGP: Re: Tough Choices: PGP vs. RSA Data Security

I said:

    Jim Bidzos has told me that Phil Z. or anyone else can get a
    license from RSA for $20,000 plus minimum $10,000/yr.  royalties.
    If we say we don't want to spend more than 50% of our revenues on
    licensing, then if Phil can get $60,000 of firm orders for a
    -commercial- USA version of PGP, he's in (a very profitable)
    business.  $60,000 might be 600 copies at $100 or six site
    licenses at $10,000.

Upon reviewing my records, I find I didn't remember those figures
correctly.  The above -should- have read:

    Jim Bidzos has told me that Phil Z. or anyone else can get a
    license from RSA for $25,000 plus minimum $10,000/yr.  royalties.
                         ^^^^^^^
    If we say we don't want to spend more than 50% of our revenues on
    licensing, then if Phil can get $70,000 of firm orders for a
    -commercial- USA version of PGP, he's in (a very profitable)
    business.  $70,000 might be 700 copies at $100 or seven site
    licenses at $10,000.

My apologies to Jim Bidzos for misquoting him; however, the basic
point of the paragraph that a commercial license is not too far out of
reach remains valid.

--
edgar@spectrx.saigon.com (Edgar W. Swank)
SPECTROX SYSTEMS +1.408.252.1005  Silicon Valley, Ca





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: jdblair@nextsrv.cas.muohio.edu (John Blair)
Date: Sat, 8 May 93 19:02:10 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: ping?
Message-ID: <9305090207.AA28329@ nextsrv.cas.muohio.EDU >
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Hello?  Is anyone out there?

The very high mail flow from cypherpunks suddenly ended.
Is something wrong, or is this just a normal burp in the system?

-john.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Liam David Gray <lg2g+@andrew.cmu.edu>
Date: Sat, 8 May 93 21:24:57 PDT
To: tcmay@netcom.com
Subject: RNG: from Zener diode?
Message-ID: <Ufv8S0u00iUxM5LWFw@andrew.cmu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Tim,

I recall you or some other Cypherpunk mentioning that, by some means,
strong random numbers can be had by observing some property of Zener
diodes.

Could you explain this?  ...If feasible, I imagine exploiting this
phenomenon to make a "random number dongle," an inline device for a PC's
serial or parallel port, which could be polled by savvy software.  If
possible, and if someone hasn't done it already, I'd like to work up a
simple recipe (schematic, list of ingredients, and sample code) for
this--and get it put into our "crypto-anarchists' cookbook"--i.e., on
soda.berkeley.edu.  Perhaps a future version of PGP could take advantage
of such a random noise dongle, selectable by command-line switch.

This is pure speculation at this point.  Am I completely off-base?  In
any case, I'd love to hear more about it.

Liam
---
PGP public key available by arrangement   -- The cat is out of the bag.
Too much of a dreamer not to be practical -- Go have your own "valiant defeat."
Liam David Gray <lg2g+@andrew.cmu.edu>




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: markh@wimsey.bc.ca (Mark C. Henderson)
Date: Sun, 9 May 93 11:37:26 PDT
To: William Oldacre <cypherpunks@toad.com>
Subject: Re: RNG from zener is easy.
Message-ID: <m0nsGDx-0002GlC@van-bc.wimsey.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> To: >Internet:cypherpunks@toad.com
> 
> A simple XOR with the message text is enough to create an unbreakable 
> cyphertext.  Problem is, that both parties have to have exact copies 
> ...
> I'm glad Liam brought this up.  It is a good way to produce an 
> absolutely unbreakable code.  This, providing the design is good and 
> no patterns are allowed to appear (introduced by amplifier 
> oscillation or nearby noise sources) in the generated numbers.  If 
> there is any interest out there perhaps we (Liam or I) could produce 
> a few for testing.
Yes, I'm certainly interested.

A practical use for such a device would be to generate "random" data
for use by PGP or RIPEM. Both need "random" data to generate session
keys and public/secret keypairs. In fact, the whole security of these
programs depends upon the unpredictability of the "random" data used.

Mark

-- 
Mark Henderson
markh@wimsey.bc.ca
RIPEM key available by key server/finger/E-mail
  MD5OfPublicKey: F1F5F0C3984CBEAF3889ADAFA2437433




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Harry Shapiro <habs@Panix.Com>
Date: Sun, 9 May 93 08:52:26 PDT
To: extropians@gnu.ai.mit.edu (Harry Shapiro)
Subject: Press: Sunday NY Times
Message-ID: <199305091552.AA28290@sun.Panix.Com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


There is a major "technology" piece in the Sunday NY Times
by John Markoff on the Cyhperpunk group, the Wired article 
(The cover is reproduced a long with the demasked photo to
Tim, Eric and John), the encryption as a whole.

Great job John!!

/harry

-- 
Harry Shapiro  				      habs@panix.com
List Administrator of the Extropy Institute Mailing List
Private Communication for the Extropian Community since 1991



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: William Oldacre <76114.2307@CompuServe.COM>
Date: Sun, 9 May 93 10:07:36 PDT
To: <cypherpunks@toad.com>
Subject: RNG from zener is easy.
Message-ID: <930509170215_76114.2307_BHA35-1@CompuServe.COM>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


To: >Internet:cypherpunks@toad.com

This posting is in response to Liam's earlier message on creating a 
random number generator using a zener diode.  I breadboarded such a 
circuit over year ago and it worked fine.  Zener diodes, operated in 
their zener region with a reverse voltage generate electrical noise 
much like a "noise diode".  This can be amplified and shaped using a 
single quad op amp package to create what appears to be a very random 
data stream.  Best way to use this would be to shift it into an eight 
bit latch before reading the parallel port.  Depending on design, 
it's operation is much (MUCH) faster than a pseudo random number 
generator written in software.  It can fill a floppy disk so fast 
that the main limitation  is the writing speed of the disk drive.

A simple XOR with the message text is enough to create an unbreakable 
cyphertext.  Problem is, that both parties have to have exact copies 
of the random numbers since they cannot be regenerated as with pseudo 
random numbers using a key.  What is needed is a way to encrypt the 
random numbers so that they can be sent to someone else to use.  This 
would be hard to decode, because it would be difficult to know when 
success had been achieved.  If it is being tested against a message 
text, the loss of one byte shifts everything to that the text becomes 
gibberish again.

I'm glad Liam brought this up.  It is a good way to produce an 
absolutely unbreakable code.  This, providing the design is good and 
no patterns are allowed to appear (introduced by amplifier 
oscillation or nearby noise sources) in the generated numbers.  If 
there is any interest out there perhaps we (Liam or I) could produce 
a few for testing.





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: whitaker@eternity.demon.co.uk (Russell Earl Whitaker)
Date: Mon, 10 May 93 10:49:03 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: FWD: PGP Menu Utility
Message-ID: <5351@eternity.demon.co.uk>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



This article was forwarded to you by whitaker@eternity.demon.co.uk
(Russell Earl Whitaker):

--------------------------------- cut here -----------------------------

Xref: demon demon.security:118 demon.ip.cppnews:318
Path: eternity.demon.co.uk!demon!rundart.demon.co.uk!gt
Newsgroups: demon.security,demon.ip.cppnews
From: gt@rundart.demon.co.uk (Giles Todd)
Cc: pbrett@tamara.demon.co.uk
Reply-to: uploads@demon.co.uk
Subject: PGP Menu Utility
X-Mailer: VE3PZR VIEW DIS V1.01.
Lines: 61
Date: Fri, 7 May 1993 22:35:33 +0000
Message-ID: <31617.gt@rundart.demon.co.uk>
Sender: usenet@demon.co.uk


> From: Paul Brett <pbrett@tamara.demon.co.uk>
> Subject: PGP Menu Utility
> Reply-To: pbrett@tamara.demon.co.uk
> To: uploads@demon.co.uk
> Message-ID: <736839528snx@tamara.demon.co.uk>
> X-Mailer: cppnews $Revision: 1.35 $
> Date: Fri, 07 May 93 22:38:48  GMT
> Organization: Disorganised
> Lines: 41
> 
> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
> 
> PGP MENU
> ~~~~~~~~
> PGP menu is a simple utility to allow easy use of PGP from within CppNews (or
> any other program that allows you to shell out to an editor as you prepare 
> your text).  
> 
> The program calls up your editor, to allow you to edit a text message, and
> then prompts you to allow you to sign, encrypt or sign & encrypt (both) a
> file.
> 
> Known Bugs / Features
> ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
> 
> 1.  The program will always use default key for encryption of your message
>       (i.e. the key specified by 'MyName' in %PGPPATH%\config.txt).
>       
> 2.  There is currently no way to specify the encryption flags.
> 
> Legal Stuff
> ~~~~~~~~~~~
> 
> This program is copyright by me.  It is made available as is, for unlimited
> distribution and use provided that the program and documentation are
> distributed as is.  No warranty is given for malfunction of the program,
> or consequent damages.
> 
> - --
> Paul Brett                                  EMail : pbrett@tamara.demon.co.uk
> Uxbridge, UK                                Voice : 0895 251479
>                                                                              
                                                                               
                  PGP2.x key available
> 
> 
> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
> Version: 2.2
> 
> iQBVAgUBK+rVWdQocaCQTJGXAQE3JQH/UX6/QxlFJViBw3Na+/anMV78OsziHEfh
> KfjRg65rrUWB4NY+rjBhBOSKtn8uSv+kVZYZjx6TiAYSqsLqpeNczg==
> =OMdm
> -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

pgpmenu.zip is available for anonymous ftp from
ftp.demon.co.uk:/pub/pgp.  Thanks for the upload.

Giles.
-- 
Giles Todd                      gt@rundart.demon.co.uk (Internet)
Rundart Ltd                     Demon Internet Services
Voice: +44 925 33472            PGP 2.x public key available.

--------------------------------- cut here -----------------------------





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: whitaker@eternity.demon.co.uk (Russell Earl Whitaker)
Date: Mon, 10 May 93 10:50:28 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: FWD: UK English language file for PGP
Message-ID: <5352@eternity.demon.co.uk>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



This article was forwarded to you by whitaker@eternity.demon.co.uk
(Russell Earl Whitaker):

--------------------------------- cut here -----------------------------

Path: eternity.demon.co.uk!demon!rundart.demon.co.uk!gt
Newsgroups: demon.security
From: gt@rundart.demon.co.uk (Giles Todd)
Cc: pla@sktb.demon.co.uk
Reply-to: uploads@demon.co.uk
Subject: UK English language file for PGP
X-Mailer: VE3PZR VIEW DIS V1.01.
Lines: 40
Date: Sat, 8 May 1993 13:13:47 +0000
Message-ID: <31691.gt@rundart.demon.co.uk>
Sender: usenet@demon.co.uk


> Date: Sat, 8 May 1993 12:37:27 GMT
> From: "Paul L. Allen" <pla@sktb.demon.co.uk>
> To: uploads@demon.co.uk
> Subject: UK English language file for PGP
> Message-ID: <8FoXA4j024n@sktb.demon.co.uk>
> Reply-To: pla@sktb.demon.co.uk
> Organization: Chaos
> Lines: 21
> X-Mailer: Archimedes ReadNews
> 
> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
> 
> I became a little tired of PGP misspelling `armour', so I created a UK
> English language.txt (which also tells people to press keys instead of
> hitting them).  I've just uploaded it as language.uk.
> 
> Archimedes users of PGP will need release 1.14 of PGP for the Archimedes
> to use other languages (should appear on demon in the next day or two, if
> it hasn't already).
> 
> - --Paul
> 
> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
> Version: 2.2
> 
> iQCVAgUBK+upf2v14aSAK9PNAQFg9gP+NNareZokjgy+MJMWbfK+ny3CfzMdoTRO
> cHhw8hOFDd+v8h4ezUFhI9YIFV6cfJDW9VesvcfFTlTkJ33V1x1YXKcPznxnF6fM
> yUBbgWUEooLDMjEVjB+lpK3nBy+0HDTpH1zVwYgpNQTV8pITApVzG7FobwGJGFia
> z21//VYWG6g=
> =eiIE
> -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

/pub/pgp/language.uk is now available.  Thanks for the upload.

Giles.
-- 
Giles Todd                      gt@rundart.demon.co.uk (Internet)
Rundart Ltd                     Demon Internet Services
Voice: +44 925 33472            PGP 2.x public key available.

--------------------------------- cut here -----------------------------





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: whitaker@eternity.demon.co.uk (Russell Earl Whitaker)
Date: Mon, 10 May 93 10:53:13 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: FWD: Archimedes PGP 2.2 & PGPwimp
Message-ID: <5353@eternity.demon.co.uk>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



This article was forwarded to you by whitaker@eternity.demon.co.uk
(Russell Earl Whitaker):

--------------------------------- cut here -----------------------------

Path: eternity.demon.co.uk!demon!rundart.demon.co.uk!gt
Newsgroups: demon.security
From: gt@rundart.demon.co.uk (Giles Todd)
Cc: chrisg@nedman.demon.co.uk
Reply-to: uploads@demon.co.uk
Subject: Archimedes PGP 2.2 & PGPwimp
X-Mailer: VE3PZR VIEW DIS V1.01.
Lines: 34
Date: Sat, 8 May 1993 15:51:01 +0000
Message-ID: <31705.gt@rundart.demon.co.uk>
Sender: usenet@demon.co.uk


> Date: 08 May 93 16:05:23 GMT
> Message-Id: <930508160523@nedman.demon.co.uk>
> From: Chris Gransden <chrisg@nedman.demon.co.uk>
> Reply-To: chrisg@nedman.demon.co.uk
> To: uploads@demon.co.uk
> Subject: Archimedes PGP 2.2 & PGPwimp
> Organization: Home
> X-Mailer: ReaderS for the Acorn Archimedes
> 
> I've just uploaded a new version of PGP 2.2 for the Archimedes to /incoming.
> The main improvement for this release, v1.14, is the encryption/decryption
> phase is significantly speeded up. Also using language translation files now
> works.
>  
> I've also uploaded PGPwimp. This is a desktop front end to Archimedes PGP.
> This was produced by Peter Gaunt. This can only be used with RISC OS3. It
> makes using PGP alot simpler.
>  
> Could you put both these programs in /pub/archimedes.
> Thanks.
>  
> Chris
>  
> -- 
> Email: chrisg@nedman.demon.co.uk

These files are now available from /pub/archimedes.  Thanks for the upload.

Giles.
-- 
Giles Todd                      gt@rundart.demon.co.uk (Internet)
Rundart Ltd                     Demon Internet Services
Voice: +44 925 33472            PGP 2.x public key available.

--------------------------------- cut here -----------------------------





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Hal <74076.1041@CompuServe.COM>
Date: Sun, 9 May 93 11:47:17 PDT
To: CYPHERPUNKS <CYPHERPUNKS@toad.com>
Subject: Random TSR
Message-ID: <930509183959_74076.1041_FHD48-1@CompuServe.COM>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

We had some discussion on the list a few months ago about hardware
RNG's.  As I recall, there were problems feared with the Zener diode noise
generators involving coupling to other EM signals that might add regularity
to the noise.

Hardware random numbers are useful, not so much to fill one time pads,
with their attendant problems with distribution, but rather as session
key generators for Diffie-Hellman key exchange or RSA-type public key
programs.  This is one of the weak points of PGP, in my opinion; it times
keystrokes when you first generate your public key, but then from then
on it just uses and re-uses those same random numbers.  (It does mix
in the time of day for each message sent, but as pointed out on the
PGP developers' list, this may not add that much randomness.)

Each time you send a message, it has to generate a random session key,
which it uses to encrypt your message, sending this random key RSA-
encrypted at the head of your message.  How random are these session keys?
PGP is still re-using the same random information I supplied many months
ago.  There is no KNOWN way to exploit this lack of randomness but it is
still worrisome.

Perry Metzger mentioned that he deletes his randseed.bin file every night.
This causes PGP to ask him for new keystroke timings every morning when
he first runs it.  This adds a new daily dose of randomness to the program
but it is kind of a pain to do.

This is where a hardware RNG would be really useful.  Use it to generate
your session keys and you don't have to worry too much about someone
breaking your message by intelligent key guessing.

RIPEM goes to greater lengths than PGP in trying to find good random
bits.  It has options to scan your filesystem or to use network information,
both of which are presumed to be randomly changing.  These approaches are
more suitable for a multi-user workstation than for a regular PC, though.

I had an idea for the PC environment which I don't think I've seen before.
(Apologies if I'm regurgitating someone else's idea.)

Have a TSR which just extracted random information from your use of the
PC.  Do keystroke timing all the time, check disk block contents and
locations.  Record this information and periodically pass it through MD5
then store it in a file.  This file would basically hold entropy extracted
from how you use your PC.  PGP could then read this file (you could even
have the file be PC's randseed.bin, making it compatible with current
versions of PGP) to get its random bits for session keys.

This does not sound like it would be that hard, although the few attempts
I have made to write TSR programs which hooked into DOS calls have not
been terribly robust.  One technical issue is how much randomness or
entropy exists in each event.  This has been discussed in some detail on
the PGP developers' list, but a simple solution would be to just ignore
that problem and constantly merge in your new random bits with those in
the file.  Once you've gotten enough "true" randomness your file will be
fully random.  You won't know when that's happened but if your file isn't too
big and you use the computer quite a bit it will hopefully be fast enough.

Or, if you wanted to be more ambitious, I gather from the discussion on
pgp-dev that you could collect statistics on the intervals between key-
strokes and use these to estimate the amount of random information per
keystroke.  Then you could have a call to the TSR to tell how much random
information is available in the file.

This program could be constantly running in the background, unobtrusively,
collecting and distilling the randomness you are discarding all the time.
Randomness is precious; it's time to stop wasting these bits!

Hal Finney
74076.1041@compuserve.com

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.2

iQCVAgUBK+0lWqgTA69YIUw3AQGPbQP/TUSbeusbaPQ3DF6wpr+tY5H8IcVTzJUb
p78E+IZHx8pMSQP/fu8SnBGWuINnurq9fssJT9o7DQJnXBmcEgK+48OHbunHi9OV
VrheN8tXHTY5OBd4pvKV9nh200+OalRny5lL4ZviMqGl+iYVJEU5PdZIPnPeRAzV
AaZ2gvVBdbE=
=gww0
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: norm@netcom.com (Norman Hardy)
Date: Sun, 9 May 93 15:37:14 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Early Battles
Message-ID: <9305092237.AA11893@netcom3.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I remember hearing an anecdote from a fairly private but unclassified
source. According to this source NSA was incensed when IBM first developed
Lucifer for banking applications, especially because they published
details in a Scientific American article. NSA accused IBM of stealing
secrets from NSA thru IBM employees having access to NSA technology as
part of their jobs developing hardware and software for NSA. IBM was of
course prepared for this eventuality. They quoted an early paper by Shannon 
suggesting that a mixture of transpositions and permutations would likely 
produce strong ciphers. This is, of course, the heart of both Lucifer and DES.
NSA backed off.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: fnerd@smds.com (FutureNerd Steve Witham)
Date: Sun, 9 May 93 16:22:05 PDT
To: sw@smds.com
Subject: Shamir papers are available
Message-ID: <9305092305.AA06080@smds.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


The Adi Shamir papers are available by anonymous ftp from
soda.berkeley.edu

in pub/cypherpunks/papers/
        shamir.abstracts
        shamir.birational
        shamir.hard.poly

Thanks to Eric Hughes.
-fnerd




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: KINNEY WILLIAM H <kinney@spot.Colorado.EDU>
Date: Mon, 10 May 93 07:34:03 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Random Numbers
Message-ID: <199305101433.AA01828@spot.Colorado.EDU>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



There's was some traffic on sci.crypt today about generating random 
numbers by reading noise off a sound port, which ties in to discussion
here of using a Zener diode device. The question is, if you have a 
noise source that is likely to create, say, long strings of zeros or
to have some other statistical bias, how do you fix it up to create
a good distribution?  

Certainly, if your only problem is that you have an input stream where
the ones are randomly distributed but _rare_, in the sense that the
stream is mostly zeros, you can just count ones for a period of time
and create an output stream like

output[i] = 1 if the parity of N input bits is odd
            0 if the parity of N input bits is even

Then the ouput stream will be very high-entropy.

Something similar, but more complicated, would probably apply to reading
thermal noise as well, since you know the input has a Boltzmann 
distribution or whatever, and can transform it to a distribution of
your choice. The problem seems to boil down to having random input
with a distribution f() and transforming it to random output with
another distribuion g(). Or if you want to make it worse, having
some not-really-random input f() and transforming it to random output
g().

But this is probably naive -- what are the pitfalls here? What is the
best way to do it for cryptographic purposes? 


                              -- Will




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: jb@paris7.jussieu.fr
Date: Mon, 10 May 93 01:03:46 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re:How to FAKE MAIL
Message-ID: <0096c4a2.c6e6bbf2.19741@paris7.jussieu.fr>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


From:	MX%"Postmaster@paris7.jussieu.fr"  8-MAY-1993 13:19:41.13
To:	JB
CC:	
Subj:	SMTP delivery error

Return-Path: <>
Date: Sat, 08 May 1993 13:19:18 WET
From: Postmaster@paris7.jussieu.fr (SMTP delivery agent)
To: <jb@paris7.jussieu.fr>
Subject: SMTP delivery error

Note: this message was generated automatically.

A problem occurred during SMTP delivery of your message.

Error occurred sending to host oubbs.telecom.uoknor.edu:
  retry count exceeded
  message transmission could not be completed
    connect to network object rejected

========================================================================

Message follows.

Date: Thu, 06 May 1993 11:10:50 WET
From: jb@paris7.jussieu.fr
To: tom.jackson@oubbs.telecom.uoknor.edu
Message-ID: <0096c187.9189aeba.18431@paris7.jussieu.fr>
Subject: RE: HOW TO FAKEMAIL

Hi,
I'm interested on the subject too. Can u keep me inform
on any information u might receive? 
Thanx in advance,
Jean-Baptiste




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: jet@nas.nasa.gov (J. Eric Townsend)
Date: Mon, 10 May 93 13:27:04 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: notes from meeting?
Message-ID: <9305102026.AA12154@boxer.nas.nasa.gov>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



anybody keep some sort of notes/minutes/summary of the meeting that
they can post?  I managed to misplace mine, and with it, things like
names and email addresses...

thx

--
J. Eric Townsend jet@nas.nasa.gov 415.604.4311
NASA Ames Numerical Aerodynamic Simulation      |    play: jet@well.sf.ca.us
Parallel Systems Support, CM-5 POC              |      '92 R100R / DoD# 0378
PGP2.1 public key available upon request or finger jet@simeon.nas.nasa.gov





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Perry E. Metzger" <pmetzger@lehman.com>
Date: Mon, 10 May 93 11:06:43 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Early Battles
In-Reply-To: <9305092237.AA11893@netcom3.netcom.com>
Message-ID: <9305101806.AA14984@snark.shearson.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Norman Hardy says:
> I remember hearing an anecdote from a fairly private but
> unclassified source. According to this source NSA was incensed when
> IBM first developed Lucifer for banking applications, especially
> because they published details in a Scientific American article. NSA
> accused IBM of stealing secrets from NSA thru IBM employees having
> access to NSA technology as part of their jobs developing hardware
> and software for NSA. IBM was of course prepared for this
> eventuality. They quoted an early paper by Shannon suggesting that a
> mixture of transpositions and permutations would likely produce
> strong ciphers. This is, of course, the heart of both Lucifer and
> DES.
> NSA backed off.

This sounds like an urban legend -- NSA and IBM worked way too closely
on the development of DES for this to sound likely.

.pm




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: gnu@cygnus.com
Date: Mon, 10 May 93 17:54:30 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: [Torbjorn Granlund: GNU Multiple Precision Arithmetic Library]
Message-ID: <9305110054.AA27764@cygnus.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


It might be interesting to compare the speed of this library with the
speed of the multiprecision code in RSAREF and in PGP.  May the fastest
library win!

	John

------- Forwarded Message

To: info-gnu@prep.ai.mit.edu, bug-gnu-utils@prep.ai.mit.edu
Subject: GNU Multiple Precision Arithmetic Library
Date: Mon, 10 May 1993 16:35:35 +0200
From: Torbjorn Granlund <tege@sics.se>

Version 1.3 of the GNU Multiple Precision Arithmetic Library is now
available for anonymous ftp from prep.ai.mit.edu as /pub/gnu/gmp-1.3.tar.z.

The main differences between 1.2 and 1.3 are bug fixes and support for
64-bit machines.  There are also a couple of enhancements that affects the
speed of some operations.  There are no new user-visible functions in this
version.

(There will be a new major version of this library in a not distant future.
That version, 2.0, will contain additions of new functions contributed from
other people.  It also has a documented low-level interface for really
time-critical applications.  I don't know exactly when it will be ready.)

These people (in alphabetical order) helped with testing of this release:

  Per Bothner <bothner@cygnus.com>
  Bruno Haible <haible@ma2s2.mathematik.uni-karlsruhe.de>
  J.W.Hawtin-SE0@computer-science.birmingham.ac.uk
  Joachim Hollman <joachim@matematik.su.se>
  Phil Howard <pdh@netcom.com>
  Henrik Johansson <Henrik.Johansson@nexus.comm.se>
  AOKI Kazumaro <maro@terada.info.waseda.ac.jp>
  Steve Linton <sl25@cus.cam.ac.uk>
  Alyson Reeves <reeves@archimedes.cc.brandeis.edu>
  Nils Rennebarth <nils@exp-math.uni-essen.de>
  Joachim Schimpf <Joachim.Schimpf@ecrc.de>
  Ken Weber <kweber@mcs.kent.edu>

Plus possibly somebody whose name I have lost.  Many other people have
contributed bug reports during the 1 1/2 years since the last release.
Thanks everybody!

	Torbjorn Granlund

[ Most GNU software is packed using the new `gzip' compression program.
  Source code is available on most sites distributing GNU software.

  For information on how to order GNU software on tape, floppy, or cd-rom,
  check the file etc/ORDERS in the GNU Emacs distribution or in GNUinfo/ORDERS
  on prep, or e-mail a request to: gnu@prep.ai.mit.edu

  By ordering tapes from the FSF you help us continue to develop more free
  software.  Media revenues are our primary source of support.  Donations to
  FSF are deductible on US tax returns.

  The above software will soon to be at these ftp sites as well.
  Please try them before prep.ai.mit.edu!   thanx -gnu@prep.ai.mit.edu
	ASIA: ftp.cs.titech.ac.jp, utsun.s.u-tokyo.ac.jp:/ftpsync/prep,
  cair.kaist.ac.kr:/pub/gnu
	AUSTRALIA: archie.oz.au:/gnu (archie.oz or archie.oz.au for ACSnet)
	EUROPE: irisa.irisa.fr:/pub/gnu, grasp1.univ-lyon1.fr:pub/gnu,
  unix.hensa.ac.uk:/pub/uunet/systems/gnu, src.doc.ic.ac.uk:/gnu,
  ftp.informatik.tu-muenchen.de, ftp.informatik.rwth-aachen.de:/pub/gnu,
  isy.liu.se, ftp.stacken.kth.se, ftp.luth.se:/pub/unix/gnu,
  nic.funet.fi:/pub/gnu, ugle.unit.no, ftp.win.tue.nl, ftp.denet.dk,
  ftp.eunet.ch, nic.switch.ch:/mirror/gnu, archive.eu.net
	USA: wuarchive.wustl.edu, labrea.stanford.edu,
  ftp.kpc.com:/pub/mirror/gnu, ftp.cs.widener.edu, uxc.cso.uiuc.edu,
  col.hp.com:/mirrors/gnu, ftp.cs.columbia.edu:/archives/gnu/prep,
  gatekeeper.dec.com:/pub/GNU, ftp.uu.net:/systems/gnu
]

------- End of Forwarded Message





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: deboni@diego.llnl.gov (Tom DeBoni)
Date: Tue, 11 May 93 10:58:46 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: book reference request
Message-ID: <9305111757.AA02870@diego.llnl.gov>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



A month or so back, there appeared on this list a reference to a book on
the history of cryptology in telecommunications in the country. If memory
serves me (and it may well not) its title was something like "The Invisible
Weapon". Could some knowing person please send oe the full reference, or
otherwise unconfuse me?

Thanks!
Tom DeBoni
deboni@llnl.gov





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Sandy <72114.1712@CompuServe.COM>
Date: Tue, 11 May 93 15:52:39 PDT
To: <cypherpunks@toad.com>
Subject: CALLER ID?
Message-ID: <930511191724_72114.1712_FHF57-1@CompuServe.COM>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


_________________________________________________________________
  SANDY SANDFORT                          ssandfort@attmail.com
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Cypherpunks,

You think CALLER ID isn't available where you live?  Think again.
Any time you call an 800 number, regardless of where you live,
your number is captured by ANI (Automatic Number Identification)
and given to the owners of the 800 number.  This includes the
various "crime stopper" snitch lines that claim "we don't want
your name, just the pusher's."

A special 800 number has been set up to demonstrate this.  It's:

                         1-800-235-1414

Call it, and it will recite your phone number back to you.  It
then gives a pitch for two worthwhile items--a 900 phone number
service that lets you make calls which cannot be traced by ANI,
and FULL DISCLOSURE, a privacy oriented magazine.  If you leave
your name and address, you will be sent FULL DISCLOSURE info.

Check it out,

 S a n d y  (arbitration volunteer)

>>>>>>>> Please address e-mail to: ssandfort@attmail.com <<<<<<<<
_________________________________________________________________






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Matthew J Miszewski <MJMISKI@macc.wisc.edu>
Date: Tue, 11 May 93 14:48:24 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: BYTE article
Message-ID: <23051116244656@vms2.macc.wisc.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Cypherpunks,
 
  There is an article about the future of Encryption Regulation in the May 1993
issue of BYTE.  Its not TOO bad and our side is at least represented. (With a
most excellent spokesman BTW).  They offer up a "solution" to the
Denning/Privacy Schism.  Including Silvio Micali's (I thought someone else
had this idea first...) multiple repositories.  I recall some talk about
this with regard to time released crypto.
 
  I think they could use some refining.  The author is Peter Wayner and can be
reached at pcw@access.digex.com.   Take it easy on him, I think he is really
trying to struggle with issues that we understand already.  Lets school 'im guys
(and gals).
 
  The article actually mentions steganography also...Not bad BYTE.
 
Matt
mjmiski@macc.wisc.edu
 




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: jet@nas.nasa.gov (J. Eric Townsend)
Date: Tue, 11 May 93 17:25:45 PDT
To: <cypherpunks@toad.com>
Subject: CALLER ID?
In-Reply-To: <930511191724_72114.1712_FHF57-1@CompuServe.COM>
Message-ID: <9305120025.AA27965@boxer.nas.nasa.gov>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Sandy writes:
 > Call it, and it will recite your phone number back to you.  It

Too bad it gets the wrong number for my work #:

My number: 415.604.4311.  The number it claims I'm at: 415.967.7227
(No one answers the second number, fyi.)





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: markh@wimsey.bc.ca (Mark C. Henderson)
Date: Tue, 11 May 93 17:42:23 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: [Torbjorn Granlund: GNU Multiple Precision Arithmetic Library]
Message-ID: <m0nt4sG-0001IcC@van-bc.wimsey.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> It might be interesting to compare the speed of this library with the
> speed of the multiprecision code in RSAREF and in PGP.  May the fastest
> library win!
> 
> 	John
> 
> ------- Forwarded Message
> 
> To: info-gnu@prep.ai.mit.edu, bug-gnu-utils@prep.ai.mit.edu
> Subject: GNU Multiple Precision Arithmetic Library
> Date: Mon, 10 May 1993 16:35:35 +0200
> From: Torbjorn Granlund <tege@sics.se>
> 
> Version 1.3 of the GNU Multiple Precision Arithmetic Library is now
> available for anonymous ftp from prep.ai.mit.edu as /pub/gnu/gmp-1.3.tar.z.

Well, I've done some comparison between gmp 1.3 and RSAREF (as distributed
with RIPEM 1.07) on a RS6000/320

The key generation speeds turned out to be almost exactly the same using
the "aixgcc/xlc mixed" version of RSAREF/RIPEM and gmp compiled entirely
with IBM's xlc compiler.

(for those who haven't poked around in RIPEM, I'll say that this RS6000
version of RIPEM uses the "long long" data type to get 32 bit by 32 bit
multiplications with 64 bit results quickly).

So, it wouldn't surprise me if some clever person could optimize
gmp for the RS6000 and end up with something faster than what's
provided in RIPEM 1.07.

Mark

-- 
Mark Henderson
markh@wimsey.bc.ca
RIPEM key available by key server/finger/E-mail
  MD5OfPublicKey: F1F5F0C3984CBEAF3889ADAFA2437433




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Date: Tue, 11 May 93 17:42:44 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: BYTE article
In-Reply-To: <23051116244656@vms2.macc.wisc.edu>
Message-ID: <9305120043.AA07654@netcom3.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Matt M. writes:

>   I think they could use some refining.  The author is Peter Wayner and can be
> reached at pcw@access.digex.com.   Take it easy on him, I think he is really
> trying to struggle with issues that we understand already.  Lets school 'im guys
> (and gals).
>  

I suspect Peter will also comment on this! Peter Wayner is a member of
this very list.

(I know this from reading his posts, not from seeing the distribution
list, which I haven't.)

The article was excellent, in my opinion.


-Tim May

-- 
..........................................................................
Timothy C. May         | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,  
tcmay@netcom.com       | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
408-688-5409           | knowledge, reputations, information markets, 
W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA  | black markets, collapse of governments.
Higher Power: 2^756839 | Public Key: PGP and MailSafe available.





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: fergp@sytex.com (Paul Ferguson)
Date: Tue, 11 May 93 15:15:33 PDT
To: banisar@washofc.cpsr.org
Subject: NIST Open Meeting
Message-ID: <sTNe4B1w165w@sytex.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


This message is forwarded from RISKS Digest (14.59)
 
8<---------- Begin forwarded message --------------
 
Date: Tue, 11 May 93 13:42:18 EDT
From: Clipper-Capstone Chip Info <clipper@csrc.ncsl.nist.gov>
Organization: National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST)
Subject: NIST Advisory Board Seeks Comments on Crypto
 
Note: This file has been posted to the following groups:
      RISKS Forum, Privacy Forum, Sci.crypt, Alt.privacy.clipper
 
and will be made available for anonymous ftp from csrc.ncsl.nist.gov,
filename pub/nistgen/cryptmtg.txt and for download from the NIST 
Computer Security BBS, 301-948-5717, filename cryptmtg.txt.
 
Note: The following notice is scheduled to appear in the Federal Register
this week.  The notice announces a meeting of the Computer System 
Security
and Privacy Advisory Board (established by the Computer Security Act of
1987) and solicits public and industry comments on a wide range of
cryptographic issues. Please note that submissions due by 4:00 p.m.
May 27, 1993.
 
 
                            DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
                National Institute of Standards and Technology
 
                          Announcing a Meeting of the
              COMPUTER SYSTEM SECURITY AND PRIVACY ADVISORY BOARD
 
AGENCY:   National Institute of Standards and Technology 
 
ACTION:   Notice of Open Meeting
 
SUMMARY: Pursuant to the Federal Advisory Committee Act, 5 U.S.C. App.,
notice is hereby given that the Computer System Security and Privacy
Advisory Board will meet Wednesday, June 2, 1993, from 9:00 a.m. to
5:00 p.m., Thursday, June 3, 1993, from 9:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m., and
Friday, June 4, 1993 from 9:00 a.m. to 1:00 p.m.  The Advisory Board
was established by the Computer Security Act of 1987 (P.L. 100-235)
to advise the Secretary of Commerce and the Director of NIST on
security and privacy issues pertaining to Federal computer systems and
report its findings to the Secretary of Commerce, the Director of the
Office of Management and Budget, the Director of the National Security
Agency, and the appropriate committees of the Congress.  All sessions
will be open to the public.
 
DATES: The meeting will be held on June 2-4 1993.  On June 2 and 3,
1993 the meeting will take place from 9:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m. and on
June 4, 1993 from 9:00 a.m. to 1:00 p.m.
 
Public submissions (as described below) are due by 4:00 p.m.  (EDT)
May 27, 1993 to allow for sufficient time for distribution to and
review by Board members.
 
ADDRESS: The meeting will take place at the National Institute of
Standards and Technology, Gaithersburg, MD.  On June 2, 1993, the
meeting will be held in the Administration Building, "Red
Auditorium," on June 3 the meeting will be held in the
Administration Building, "Green Auditorium," and on June 4,
1993 in the Administration Building, Lecture Room "B."
 
Submissions (as described below), including copyright waiver if
required, should be addressed to: Cryptographic Issue Statements,
Computer System Security and Privacy Advisory Board, Technology
Building, Room B-154, National Institute of Standards and
Technology, Gaithersburg, MD, 20899 or via FAX to 301/948-1784.
Submissions, including copyright waiver if required, may also
be sent electronically to "crypto@csrc.ncsl.nist.gov".
 
AGENDA:
 
- Welcome and Review of Meeting Agenda
- Government-developed "Key Escrow" Chip Announcement Review
- Discussion of Escrowed Cryptographic Key Technologies
- Review of Submitted Issue Papers
- Position Presentations & Discussion
- Public Participation
- Annual Report and Pending Business
- Close
 
PUBLIC PARTICIPATION:  
 
This Advisory Board meeting will be devoted to the issue of the
Administration's recently announced government-developed "key escrow"
chip cryptographic technology and, more broadly, to public use of
cryptography and government cryptographic policies and regulations.
The Board has been asked by NIST to obtain public comments on this
matter for submission to NIST for the national review that the
Administration's has announced it will conduct of
cryptographic-related issues.  Therefore, the Board is interested
in: 1) obtaining public views and reactions to the
government-developed "key escrow" chip technology announcement,
"key escrow" technology generally, and government cryptographic
policies and regulations 2) hearing selected summaries of written
views that have been submitted, and 3) conducting a general
discussion of these issues in public.
 
The Board solicits all interested parties to submit well-written,
concise issue papers, position statements, and background
materials on areas such as those listed below.  Industry input is
particularly encouraged in addressing the questions below.  
 
Because of the volume of responses expected, submittors are asked to
identify the issues above to which their submission(s) are responsive.
Submittors should be aware that copyrighted documents cannot be accepted
unless a written waiver is included concurrently with the submission to
allow NIST to reproduce the material.  Also, company proprietary
information should not be included, since submissions will be made
publicly available.
 
This meeting specifically will not be a tutorial or briefing on
technical details of the government-developed "key escrow" chip or
escrowed cryptographic key technologies.  Those wishing to address
the Board and/or submit written position statements are requested
to be thoroughly familiar with the topic and to have concise,
well-formulated opinions on its societal ramifications.
 
Issues on which comments are sought include the following:
 
1.    CRYPTOGRAPHIC POLICIES AND SOCIAL/PUBLIC POLICY ISSUES
 
Public and Social policy aspects of the government-developed "key
escrow" chip and, more generally, escrowed key technology and government
cryptographic policies.
 
Issues involved in balancing various interests affected by government
cryptographic policies.
 
2.    LEGAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES
 
Consequences of the government-developed "key escrow" chip technology
and, more generally, key escrow technology and government cryptographic
policies.
 
3.    INDIVIDUAL PRIVACY
 
Issues and impacts of cryptographic-related statutes, regulations, and
standards, both national and international, upon individual privacy.
 
Issues related to the privacy impacts of the government-developed "key
escrow" chip and "key escrow" technology generally.
 
4.    QUESTIONS DIRECTED TO AMERICAN INDUSTRY
 
4.A  Industry Questions: U.S. Export Controls
 
4.A.1 Exports - General 
 
What has been the impact on industry of past export controls on products
with password and data security features for voice or data?
 
Can such an impact, if any, be quantified in terms of lost export sales
or market share?  If yes, please provide that impact.
 
How many exports involving cryptographic products did you attempt over
the last five years?  How many were denied?  What reason was given for
denial?
 
Can you provide documentation of sales of cryptographic equipment which
were lost to a foreign competitor, due solely to U.S. Export Regulations.
 
What are the current market trends for the export sales of information
security devices implemented in hardware solutions?  For software
solutions?
 
4.A.2  Exports - Software
 
If the U.S. software producers of mass market or general purpose software
(word processing, spreadsheets, operating environments, accounting,
graphics, etc.) are prohibited from exporting such packages with file
encryption capabilities, what foreign competitors in what countries are
able and willing to take foreign market share from U.S. producers by
supplying file encryption capabilities?
 
What is the impact on the export market share and dollar sales of the
U.S. software industry if a relatively inexpensive hardware solution
for voice or data encryption is available such as the 
government-developed
"key escrow" chip?
 
What has been the impact of U.S. export controls on COMPUTER UTILITIES
software packages such as Norton Utilities and PCTools?
 
What has been the impact of U.S. export controls on exporters of OTHER
SOFTWARE PACKAGES (e.g., word processing) containing file encryption
capabilities?
 
What information does industry have that Data Encryption Standard (DES)
based software programs are widely available abroad in software
applications programs?
 
4.A.3  Exports - Hardware
 
Measured in dollar sales, units, and transactions, what have been
the historic exports for:
 
            Standard telephone sets
            Cellular telephone sets
            Personal computers and work stations            
            FAX machines
            Modems
            Telephone switches
 
What are the projected export sales of these products if there is no
change in export control policy and if the government- developed "key
escrow" chip is not made available to industry?
 
What are the projected export sales of these products if the
government-developed "key escrow" chip is installed in the above 
products,
the above products are freely available at an additional price of no more
than $25.00, and the above products are exported WITHOUT ADDITIONAL
LICENSING REQUIREMENTS?
 
What are the projected export sales of these products if the
government-developed "key escrow" chip is installed in the above 
products,
the above products are freely available at an additional price of no more
than $25.00, and the above products are to be exported WITH AN ITAR
MUNITIONS LICENSING REQUIREMENT for all destinations?
 
What are the projected export sales of these products if the
government-developed "key escrow" chip is installed in the above
products, the above products are freely available at an additional price
of no more than $25.00, and the above products are to be exported WITH
A DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE LICENSING REQUIREMENT for all destinations?
 
4.A.4  Exports - Advanced Telecommunications 
 
What has been the impact on industry of past export controls on other
advanced telecommunications products?
 
Can such an impact on the export of other advanced telecommunications
products, if any, be quantified in terms of lost export sales or market
share? If yes, provide that impact.
 
4.B  Industry Questions:  Foreign Import/Export Regulations
 
How do regulations of foreign countries affect the import and export of
products containing cryptographic functions?  Specific examples of
countries and regulations will prove useful.
 
4.C  Industry Questions: Customer Requirements for Cryptography
 
What are current and future customer requirements for information
security by function and industry?  For example, what are current
and future customer requirements for domestic banking,
international banking, funds transfer systems, automatic teller
systems, payroll records, financial information, business plans,
competitive strategy plans, cost analyses, research and development
records, technology trade secrets, personal privacy for voice
communications, and so forth?  What might be good sources of such
data?
 
What impact do U.S. Government mandated information security standards
for defense contracts have upon demands by other commercial users for
information security systems in the U.S.?  In foreign markets?
 
What threats are your product designed to protect against?  What threats
do you consider unaddressed?
 
What demand do you foresee for a) cryptographic only products, and
b) products incorporating cryptography in: 1) the domestic market,
2) in the foreign-only market, and 3) in the global market?
 
4.D  Industry Questions:  Standards
 
If the European Community were to announce a non-DES, non-public key
European Community Encryption Standard (ECES), how would your company
react?  Include the new standard in product line?  Withdraw from the
market?  Wait and see?
 
What are the impacts of government cryptographic standards on U.S.
industry (e.g., Federal Information Processing Standard 46-1 [the
Data Encryption Standard] and the proposed Digital Signature Standard)?
 
5.  QUESTIONS DIRECTED TO THE AMERICAN BUSINESS COMMUNITY
 
5.A  American Business:  Threats and Security Requirements
 
Describe, in detail, the threat(s), to which you are exposed and which
you believe cryptographic solutions can address.
 
Please provide actual incidents of U.S. business experiences with
economic espionage which could have been thwarted by applications of
cryptographic technologies.
 
What are the relevant standards of care that businesses must apply to
safeguard information and what are the sources of those standards other
than Federal standards for government contractors?
 
What are U.S. business experiences with the use of cryptography to
protect against economic espionage, (including current and projected
investment levels in cryptographic products)?
 
5.B  American Business:  Use of Cryptography
 
Describe the types of cryptographic products now in use by your
organization. Describe the protection they provide (e.g., data
encryption or data integrity through digital signatures).  Please
indicate how these products are being used.
 
Describe any problems you have encountered in finding, installing,
operating, importing, or exporting cryptographic devices.
 
Describe current and future uses of cryptographic technology to
protect commercial information (including types of information being
protected and against what threats).
 
Which factors in the list below inhibit your use of cryptographic
products?
 
Please rank:
 
--    no need
--    no appropriate product on market
--    fear of interoperability problems
--    regulatory concerns
--       a) U.S. export laws
--       b) foreign country regulations
--       c) other
--    cost of equipment
--    cost of operation
--    other
 
Please comment on any of these factors.
 
In your opinion, what is the one most important unaddressed need
involving cryptographic technology?
 
Please provide your views on the adequacy of the government-developed
"key escrow" chip technological approach for the protection of all your
international voice and data communication requirements.  Comments on
other U.S. Government cryptographic standards?
 
6.  OTHER
 
Please describe any other impacts arising from Federal government
cryptographic policies and regulations.
 
Please describe any other impacts upon the Federal government in the
protection of unclassified computer systems.
 
Are there any other comments you wish to share?
 
The Board agenda will include a period of time, not to exceed ten hours,
for oral presentations of summaries of selected written statements
submitted to the Board by May 27, 1993.  As appropriate and to the
extent possible, speakers addressing the same topic will be grouped
together.  Speakers, prescheduled by the Secretariat and notified in
advance, will be allotted fifteen to thirty minutes to orally present
their written statements. Individuals and organizations submitting
written materials are requested to advise the Secretariat if they
would be interested in orally summarizing their materials for the
Board at the meeting.
 
Another period of time, not to exceed one hour, will be reserved for
oral comments and questions from the public.  Each speaker will be
allotted up to five minutes; it will be necessary to strictly control
the length of presentations to maximize public participation and the
number of presentations.
 
Except as provided for above, participation in the Board's discussions
during the meeting will be at the discretion of the Designated Federal
Official.
 
Approximately thirty seats will be available for the public, including
three seats reserved for the media.  Seats will be available on a
first-come, first-served basis.
 
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Mr. Lynn McNulty, Executive Secretary
and Associate Director for Computer Security, Computer Systems
Laboratory, National Institute of Standards and Technology, Building
225, Room B154, Gaithersburg, Maryland 20899, telephone: (301) 975-3240.
 
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: Background information on the government-
developed "key escrow" chip proposal is available from the Board
Secretariat; see address in "for further information" section.  Also,
information on the government-developed "key escrow" chip is available
electronically from the NIST computer security bulletin board, phone
301-948-5717.
 
The Board intends to stress the public and social policy aspects, the
legal and Constitutional consequences of this technology, and the impacts
upon American business and industry during its meeting.
 
It is the Board's intention to create, as a product of this meeting, a
publicly available digest of the important points of discussion,
conclusions (if any) that might be reached, and an inventory of the
policy issues that need to be considered by the government.  Within the
procedures described above, public participation is encouraged and
solicited.
 
/signed/
Raymond G. Kammer, Acting Director
 
May 10, 1993
 
8<--------- End forwarded message ----------------

I didn't see "Clipper" or "Capstone" or "SkipJack" mention once in the 
entire post. What did they do -- drop the name?
 
I'm starting on my own submission for presentation tonight...
 
Cheers.
 


Paul Ferguson                |       Boycott AT&T,
Network Integrator           |    Write your elected
Centreville, Virginia USA    |     Representatives.
fergp@sytex.com              |    Do the right thing.
 
Just say "NO" to the Wiretap (Clipper/Capstone) Chip(s)
   I love my country, but I fear its government.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: spencew@BIX.com
Date: Tue, 11 May 93 16:14:14 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Unsubscribe
Message-ID: <9305111905.memo.22609@BIX.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Please remove me from the list.

Spencer K. Whetstone




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Matthew J Miszewski <MJMISKI@macc.wisc.edu>
Date: Tue, 11 May 93 18:49:22 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: BYTE article
Message-ID: <23051120482662@vms2.macc.wisc.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


 
Shheeesh.  I wasnt even implying the article was bad. To the contrary it was
one of the best mainstream articles I have ever seen on the subject. That is
why I posted the note to the list.  I thought some list members could
find the explanations useful.
 
The refinement I was refering to was the authors implied acceptance of Micali's
"fair crypto system" as a "solution".  I could be wrong, and Im sure I will be
corrected if i am, but my feelings were that this system still depended on
the trustworthiness of the branches to which the "pieces" of your key would
be distributed.  If these were all TLAs, we still have a Denning problem, no?
 
I thought I made it clear in the last post that i thought that the article was
very good. If not I am sorry.  And if your listening Peter, Great Article!
 
 
---------------------------------------
Matt (Respectfully Questioning in part)
mjmiski@macc.wisc.edu
 




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: nmh@thumper.bellcore.com (Neil Haller)
Date: Tue, 11 May 93 17:52:46 PDT
To: jet@nas.nasa.gov
Subject: Re:  CALLER ID?
Message-ID: <9305120052.AA10916@latour.bellcore.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


That means your office is served by a PBX.  With PBX service you
have some incoming trunks and outgoing trunks (technically they
are lines, but let's ignore that).  The number of lines in your
company is much greater than the number of incoming and outgoing
trunks.

The ANI data is the line id of your outgoing trunk. Incoming calls
must pass your extension id and connect through an incoming trunk.

Neil




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Robert Luscombe <ral@telerama.pgh.pa.us>
Date: Tue, 11 May 93 19:55:18 PDT
To: Cypherpunks <cypherpunks@toad.com>
Subject: PGP for 4.3 BSD Unix
Message-ID: <Pine.3.07.9305112255.A4123-a100000@telerama.pgh.pa.us>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



I want to install PGP 2.2 in my Unix account, and may need some
assistance.  I have never needed to compile anything before, and need
some guidance.  Actually, if someone has an executable for 4.3 BSD, that
is all i really need.  Otherwise, would anyone care to help?

I really don't know what other info i need to provide to make this
easier... i did see in the makefile.unx that there was a target for BSD
with gcc; gcc -v here shows that version 2.3.3 is here.  Email me if
anyone can help.

Thanks, 
 bob

BTW- Thanks to Eric Hughes for helping me install some stuff.  It seems
like cypherpunks is a list where people don't only talk, they actually
accomplish something, thanks to people like Eric.

--Robert Luscombe------------------------------------------------------
- Internet: ral@telerama.pgh.pa.us           Voice:412/488-0941       -
-           robert@well.sf.ca.us             (Finger for PGP Pub Key) -
-----------------------------------------------------------------------






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: markh@wimsey.bc.ca (Mark C. Henderson)
Date: Tue, 11 May 93 22:54:49 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: [Torbjorn Granlund: GNU Multiple Precision Arithmetic Library]
Message-ID: <m0nt9kW-0001U7C@van-bc.wimsey.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> Well, I've done some comparison between gmp 1.3 and RSAREF (as distributed
> with RIPEM 1.07) on a RS6000/320
> 
> The key generation speeds turned out to be almost exactly the same using
> the "aixgcc/xlc mixed" version of RSAREF/RIPEM and gmp compiled entirely
> with IBM's xlc compiler.
> 
> (for those who haven't poked around in RIPEM, I'll say that this RS6000
> version of RIPEM uses the "long long" data type to get 32 bit by 32 bit
> multiplications with 64 bit results quickly).
> 
> So, it wouldn't surprise me if some clever person could optimize
> gmp for the RS6000 and end up with something faster than what's
> provided in RIPEM 1.07.

In fact, after reading some code, I noticed the optimisations are
in there, if one compiles with gcc (a few bytes of RS6k assembler
makes a significant difference!). Anyway, the particular benchmark
I'm playing with (key generation) is now about 20% faster with gmp
than with the routines provided with RIPEM.

Mark

-- 
Mark Henderson
markh@wimsey.bc.ca
RIPEM key available by key server/finger/E-mail
  MD5OfPublicKey: F1F5F0C3984CBEAF3889ADAFA2437433




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: George A. Gleason <gg@well.sf.ca.us>
Date: Wed, 12 May 93 02:21:41 PDT
To: jet@nas.nasa.gov
Subject: Re:  CALLER ID?
Message-ID: <199305120921.AA05565@well.sf.ca.us>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Getting the wrong number: That can happen if you're in a PBX with a separate
outgoing and incoming trunk group.  Particularly if your incoming number is
a Direct Inward Dialing (DID) number, which means that people in the Outside
World can call right to your desk by dialing (area code +) 7-digits.  There
is no facility on most PBXs to have DID numbers or other station directory
numbers follow outgoing calls, though you might have a call accounting
system hooked up to provide information to your company about which
extensions are making which outside calls; but again, that's entirely within
your own system.  

If you do have an outgoing trunk group, I would advise setting it up so that
incoming calls on that group at least ring to the receptionist's console,
and then give out those numbers to company folks who might have reason to
need a way to get through in a pinch if everything else is down.  Also the
outgoing group will be regular loop- or ground-start trunks, and as a
last-ditch backup you can terminate them on single-line jacks for use with
emergency phones in case of a system crash or an extended power failure.  

You can also use the outgoing group to provide night service, where calls to
various lines in that group would ring to specified extensions in the areas
where people may be working after hours.   

-gg




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Satan <eaeu362@orion.oac.uci.edu>
Date: Wed, 12 May 93 11:21:37 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re:  CALLER ID?
In-Reply-To: <199305120921.AA05565@well.sf.ca.us>
Message-ID: <199305121821.AA13501@orion.oac.uci.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


well i have the same problem because i am also on a pbx
system where you can call me by extension inside
or the 7 digit outside

but isnt/wasnt there a phone company number you could call
i forget what it was 631 4231 or something?
hell..

and besides.. 800 numbers get your phone number the 
same way your caller gets your number when you call collect
THEY ARE PAYING FOR THE CALL
they kinda have a right to know what they are paying for




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: peb@PROCASE.COM
Date: Wed, 12 May 93 12:00:25 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: The Halting Problem
Message-ID: <9305121900.AA09630@banff>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



It occurred to me that determining whether a set of random bytes is
actually a crypto message could be reduced to the halting problem.
Given this, it would be theoretically impossible to prove that an
uncrackable message was indeed a crypto message.  The revelation here
(for me, anyway) is that if arbitrary crypto were made illegal, the
burden of proof would be on the prosecution which would have to crack
the message (at least partially).


Paul E. Baclace
peb@procase.com





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: stig@netcom.com (Jonathan Stigelman)
Date: Wed, 12 May 93 13:14:45 PDT
To: eaeu362@orion.oac.uci.edu
Subject: Re:  CALLER ID?
Message-ID: <9305122015.AA24570@netcom.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> From: Satan <eaeu362@orion.oac.uci.edu>
> Subject: Re:  CALLER ID?
> 
> and besides.. 800 numbers get your phone number the 
> same way your caller gets your number when you call collect
> THEY ARE PAYING FOR THE CALL
> they kinda have a right to know what they are paying for
> 

You're confused or you miswrote:  800 number owners pay for your calls,
people with caller ID boxes do not.

So, do you think that the "privacy protecting 900 number" ($2/min) uses
your number (remember that they DO have it) for privacy junk mailing
purposes?

        Stig

>> Jonathan Stigelman, stig@netcom.com, PGP key on request <<




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: eric@Synopsys.COM
Date: Wed, 12 May 93 13:27:51 PDT
To: Sandy <72114.1712@compuserve.com>
Subject: Re: CALLER ID?
In-Reply-To: <930511191724_72114.1712_FHF57-1@CompuServe.COM>
Message-ID: <199305122027.AA11739@gaea.synopsys.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>>>>> On 11 May 93 15:17:25 EDT, Sandy <72114.1712@compuserve.com> said:

SS> A special 800 number has been set up to demonstrate this.  It's:

SS>                          1-800-235-1414

SS> Call it, and it will recite your phone number back to you.

The voice at the other end laughed and said "This wouldn't happen to
be YOUR phone number, would it?".

I had to laugh back, because it wasn't.

This is a great way to find out just how much information they really
are getting about you.

I work for a company with several hundred employees, and when I
called, it recited the company's main switchboard number.  Without my
company's cooperation, there'd be no way for trace a particular call
back to me.  Does our phone system even log 800 number calls?  I don't
know.

-eric messick (eric@synopsys.com)




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: peb@PROCASE.COM
Date: Wed, 12 May 93 13:47:56 PDT
To: mab@crypto.com
Subject: Re: The Halting Problem
Message-ID: <9305122047.AA09694@banff>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>From mab@crypto.com Wed May 12 13:26:04 1993

>I don't see how determining that a particular string is an encrypted
>message reduces to the halting problem. 

Consider that the cyphertext is a program for an abstract machine
called the cyphercracker which returns TRUE if a message is encoded
otherwise FALSE.  Such a system for determining message-ness could
take an arbitrary amount of cpu time and no amount of static 
analysis could determine the return value quicker.


Paul E. Baclace
peb@procase.com






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Satan <eaeu362@orion.oac.uci.edu>
Date: Wed, 12 May 93 14:59:19 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re:  CALLER ID?
Message-ID: <199305122136.AA02867@orion.oac.uci.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> You're confused or you miswrote:  800 number owners pay for your calls,
> people with caller ID boxes do not.
> 
> So, do you think that the "privacy protecting 900 number" ($2/min) uses
> your number (remember that they DO have it) for privacy junk mailing
> purposes?


i realize that caller ID box owners are not paying for your call but 
this system was talking about 800 numbers

two things i will grant
1) most 800 numbers are pro-watts or whatever it is and pay
just one huge charge a month and dont deal with each bill
seperately so they dont get charged for your specific call
BUT it is a great way to get marketting stuff
ive wroked for companies that do that

2) most peopel dont know that an 800 number isnt anonymous
but that goes to educating the public
and i really dont think the public cares enough to want to know




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Mr. Noise" <mrnoise@econs.umass.edu>
Date: Wed, 12 May 93 12:07:33 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re:  CALLER ID?
Message-ID: <9305121907.AA21109@titan.ucs.umass.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text



> and besides.. 800 numbers get your phone number the 
> same way your caller gets your number when you call collect
> THEY ARE PAYING FOR THE CALL
> they kinda have a right to know what they are paying for

Maybe...but what about 'crisis hotlines' and number for 'anonymous referrals'?
The average person is probably unaware that the folks at the 800 number they're
calling can get their number... 




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Mr. Noise" <mrnoise@econs.umass.edu>
Date: Wed, 12 May 93 12:31:13 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Phil Zimmerman on the Radio
Message-ID: <9305121931.AA22199@titan.ucs.umass.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text



> FYI, for those of you in the NYC area, I'm going to be conducting a
> brief interview with Phil Zimmerman (author of PGP) on my radio show
> tomorrow to discuss the recent NSA/Big Brother crypto developments
> (see the front page of today's New York Times).
> 
> WFMU, East Orange, NJ, 91.1 FM.  My show airs from noon-3:00 local time,
> and the interview will start at around 1:00.
> 
> N.B.: I will NOT be taping the show, so I can't make tapes for anyone.
> Anyone else listening is free to make copies and do whatever they want
> with them, of course.

ACK!  My mailbox has been so backlogged that I read this message a month late!
*Did* anyone tape the show?  I'd really like a copy...maybe to replay on the
radio at WCNI (New London, 91.1) if it's really good (if that's o.k....?)...

If someone has a tape, please let me know at mrnoise@econs.umass.edu, or if
you're feeling both ambitious & altruistic, please mail a copy to me at P.O.
Box 109, Bozrah, CT...I'll mail you back $$ for the tape & postage.  Thanks in
advance for any help on this one...




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: karn@qualcomm.com (Phil Karn)
Date: Wed, 12 May 93 15:50:22 PDT
To: eaeu362@orion.oac.uci.edu
Subject: Re:  CALLER ID?
Message-ID: <9305122249.AA00229@servo>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Interesting. As expected, when I called 1-800-235-1414 from a PBX
extension here at work, it read back the trunk number, not my actual
extension number.  The same for a developmental CDMA digital
cellphone, since we use PBX-style trunks from our switch.

But when I called it from a conventional AMPS (FM) cell phone using
Pac Tel Cellular, I also got a number that was different than my
mobile's real number. And when I called it back, I got a
number-not-valid intercept.

Interesting. Apparently one real cellular switch also looks like a PBX
as far as ANI goes.  I wonder how widespread this is. Anybody with a
cell phone on a service other than Pac Bell who is willing to give it
a try?

Phil





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: x62727g2@usma8.USMA.EDU (Gatlin Anthony CDT)
Date: Wed, 12 May 93 13:05:01 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Publications
Message-ID: <9305121958.AA14189@usma8.usma.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Greetings fellow crypto warriors,
     I am attempting to locate several publications to see if they are still
in existence and where I might them or archives of previous issues. The
publications I am interested in are TAP, NIA, AOTD, NARC, etc. If anyone
knows where I might be able to obtain these or similar publications, please
let me know. Also, does anyone know where any "interesting" ftp sites which
carry files or other data related to these type publications?

Thanks,

Anthony J. Gatlin                  |-------------------------------------|
Cadet Private, Co. G-2             |PGP Public Key available on request. |
United States Military Academy     |-------------------------------------|




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Matt Blaze <mab@crypto.com>
Date: Wed, 12 May 93 13:26:22 PDT
To: peb@procase.com
Subject: Re: The Halting Problem
In-Reply-To: <9305121900.AA09630@banff>
Message-ID: <9305122009.AA08373@crypto.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



>
>It occurred to me that determining whether a set of random bytes is
>actually a crypto message could be reduced to the halting problem.
>Given this, it would be theoretically impossible to prove that an
>uncrackable message was indeed a crypto message.  The revelation here
>(for me, anyway) is that if arbitrary crypto were made illegal, the
>burden of proof would be on the prosecution which would have to crack
>the message (at least partially).
>
>
>Paul E. Baclace
>peb@procase.com
>

I don't see how determining that a particular string is an encrypted
message reduces to the halting problem.  For an arbitrary cipher, you can't
prove anything about any given potential ciphertext, since the cipher
could be a one-time pad.  (for one time pads, where keylength=message length,
any string can encrypt to any other string by selecting the right key).
So it's true that you can't prove anything about arbitrary ciphertext, but
that doesn't involve the halting problem.  If the cipher is known, on the
other hand, there are perfectly deterministic methods to determine whether
a particular ciphertext may coresponds to some given plaintext, simply
by exhaustive search of the keyspace.

However, I do agree with your basic conclusion - there is no way to determine,
by the bitstream alone, whether something has been encrypted with an arbitrary
cipher.

-matt




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Brian.Hawthorne@East.Sun.COM (Brian Holt Hawthorne - SunSelect Engineering)
Date: Wed, 12 May 93 13:48:44 PDT
To: peb@PROCASE.COM
Subject: Re: The Halting Problem
Message-ID: <9305122045.AA01782@sea.East.Sun.COM>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> The revelation here
> (for me, anyway) is that if arbitrary crypto were made illegal, the
> burden of proof would be on the prosecution which would have to crack
> the message (at least partially).

I believe the burden would actually be on them to crack the message
entirely. Otherwise, you are applying arbitrary algorithms to what may
be a random stream. If you get something comprehensible out, you have
either partially cracked the message, or run into the British Museum
problem (AKA 100 monkeys with typewriters).



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: peb@PROCASE.COM
Date: Wed, 12 May 93 17:01:21 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: The Halting Problem
Message-ID: <9305130000.AA09703@banff>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



>From pmetzger@lehman.com Wed May 12 15:28:22 1993

>you missed the word "particular". 

Well, I was considering this an unknown--that is, the cryptoanalyzer
does *not* know the particular Turing machine, so it is an arbitrary
machine, although the program is finite.  That is, I am suggesting
a decrypt-machine that is turing-complete, however, as:

>From: Marc.Ringuette@GS80.SP.CS.CMU.EDU

points out:

>So for
>any encryption method which allows the recipient to verify in polynomial time
>that his decryption is the only possible intended message, we know that the
>decryption problem is in NP.

a practical crypto algorithm must allow decrypt in P time and since NP
problems do theoretically halt, then the halting problem is not a 
blanket defense. 
 
The realities Brian.Hawthorne@East.Sun.COM mentions are all too real:
Anonymous remailers could be effectively broken by requiring
tracability (say, they way banks must fill out special forms for any
transaction over $10k (which is why Oliver North sent money to the
Contras in $9.7k packets)); in the same law, the remailer would be shut
down if it did not comply.  I think the widespread use of video phones
would make steganography easier, however.


Paul E. Baclace
peb@procase.com





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Marc.Ringuette@GS80.SP.CS.CMU.EDU
Date: Wed, 12 May 93 15:16:57 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: The Halting Problem
Message-ID: <9305122216.AA16730@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


peb> It occurred to me that determining whether a set of random bytes is
peb> actually a crypto message could be reduced to the halting problem.

I think I can prove this can't be done for most kinds of messages.

For a wide range of cases we can know trivially that decryption is in NP.
The line of reasoning is this:  one definition of the class NP is the class
of all problems whose solutions can be verified in polynomial time.  So for
any encryption method which allows the recipient to verify in polynomial time
that his decryption is the only possible intended message, we know that the
decryption problem is in NP.

These conditions are met in the following cases:
   - Conventional public key encryption
   - Any cryptosystem with a short key and a space of allowable messages
     which is sparse enough that there's a low probability of two messages
     corresponding to the same ciphertext.  This includes most cases in
     which a digital signature or CRC is added to the end of a message.


-- Marc Ringuette (mnr@cs.cmu.edu)




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Marc Horowitz <marc@GZA.COM>
Date: Wed, 12 May 93 14:40:58 PDT
To: Brian.Hawthorne@East.Sun.COM (Brian Holt Hawthorne - SunSelect   Engineering)
Subject: Re: The Halting Problem
In-Reply-To: <9305122045.AA01782@sea.East.Sun.COM>
Message-ID: <9305122140.AA11117@dun-dun-noodles.aktis.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


This is all very nice.  But if the government can get away with
outlawing crypto, it's a simple matter for them to outlaw any stream
of data they can't read or don't like.  And who says that the burden
of proof will remain on them?  Think about RICO.  You're not
necessarily dealing with rational, technically aware people.  You're
dealing with law enforcement, judges, and juries.

Is this paranoia?  Maybe.  There was recently a series of stories on
RISKS recently about people who had warrants issued and their houses
entered on the basis of unusual electrical consumption or heat output.
Yes, people were monitoring these things.  Do you not think that if
crypto were outlawed, that they couldn't get a warrant to enter your
house or office based on unidentifiable or suspicious data coming out
of it?  And even if they couldn't prove anything, you still need to
convince them to give back your computer and every other piece of
digital equipment they confiscated.

Steganography is useful to keep them from noticing you.  But it's
still low-bandwidth, because unless you're in the business of
distributing video, you're going to look really strange sending
megabytes of gif's over and over again to the same strange addresses
(anonymous remailers).  Once they do notice you, you're going to have
to be a lot more careful.  

I see steganography to be useful in sending short messages, once
codewords, etc. have been agreed upon out-of-band.  It's just not
useful for anything like the cypherpunks mailing list, or even for
personal messages unless it is used sparingly.

		Marc




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Marc Horowitz <marc@GZA.COM>
Date: Wed, 12 May 93 14:49:10 PDT
To: peb@PROCASE.COM
Subject: Re: The Halting Problem
In-Reply-To: <9305122047.AA09694@banff>
Message-ID: <9305122149.AA11140@dun-dun-noodles.aktis.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>> Consider that the cyphertext is a program for an abstract machine
>> called the cyphercracker which returns TRUE if a message is encoded
>> otherwise FALSE.  Such a system for determining message-ness could
>> take an arbitrary amount of cpu time and no amount of static 
>> analysis could determine the return value quicker.

Nope.  Such a system will take no more than O(2^n) time, where n is
the number of bits in the key.  You can never do worse than
brute-force.  Now, you still might not be able to determine if a
message is encoded, since maybe I was just encoding true random noise
from a radioactive source.  And you might have false positives, too,
esp. with one-time pads.  But it will always halt.  The failure modes
have nothing to do with the halting problem, they have to do with the
fact that is-encoded(message) cannot be formally defined.

		Marc




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: speth@cats.UCSC.EDU
Date: Wed, 12 May 93 18:14:54 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re:  CALLER ID?
Message-ID: <9305130114.AA27275@am.ucsc.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Years ago, when I crossed the country with a regular cell-phone, I tried
calling another ANI demo at points along the way.  The result was just
the same, in a couple different calling areas: the demo always read back
some strange number with the area code of the place I was in.

I figured it must just go out of some line at the cell-site like a regular
phone call.  I never tried calling the number that was read back though.

________________________________________________________________________________
james speth       email for pgp compatible public-key        speth@cats.ucsc.edu
________________________________________________________________________________
               Have you ever had your phones tapped by the government?  YOU WILL
                              and the company that'll bring it to you...  AT&T




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Matt Blaze <mab@crypto.com>
Date: Wed, 12 May 93 15:46:01 PDT
To: peb@procase.com
Subject: Re: The Halting Problem
In-Reply-To: <9305122047.AA09694@banff>
Message-ID: <9305122233.AA08689@crypto.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



>>From mab@crypto.com Wed May 12 13:26:04 1993
>
>>I don't see how determining that a particular string is an encrypted
>>message reduces to the halting problem. 
>
>Consider that the cyphertext is a program for an abstract machine
>called the cyphercracker which returns TRUE if a message is encoded
>otherwise FALSE.  Such a system for determining message-ness could
>take an arbitrary amount of cpu time and no amount of static 
>analysis could determine the return value quicker.
>
>
>Paul E. Baclace
>peb@procase.com
>
>

Well, that formulation is a bit fuzzy, but I think you've got your reduction
technique backwards.  To reduce something to the halting problem, you
need to show that you could use a machne that solves your problem to solve
halting, not the other way around.

-matt




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Date: Wed, 12 May 93 18:36:45 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: The Halting Problem
Message-ID: <9305130136.AA09123@netcom.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>It occurred to me that determining whether a set of random bytes is
>actually a crypto message could be reduced to the halting problem.
>Given this, it would be theoretically impossible to prove that an
>uncrackable message was indeed a crypto message.  The revelation here
>(for me, anyway) is that if arbitrary crypto were made illegal, the
>burden of proof would be on the prosecution which would have to crack
>the message (at least partially).
>
>Paul E. Baclace

Sorry I was out today and missed the halting problem debate!

Paul's intuition (or perhaps proof) is correct, at least according to a
paper Len Adleman wrote some years back, showing this. (I don't have the
paper, but I heard Len describe the results at the Crypto '88 Conference.
As with most such results, the result probably depends on a very careful
statement of what the terms mean, so take my comments as being only
indicative of the flavor of the results.)

What follows is not from Adleman's talk or paper, but from information theory.

The Kolmogorov-Chaitin view of "randomness" is very similar in spirit: how
does one know whether a sequence/string is "effectively random" (short
definition: effectively random means there is no shorter description of a
sequence than itself) or is instead describable by some shorter sequence?
Thus the string "31415926535897932384626433" is recognizable to most agents
(people, smart programs) as the first 25 digits of pi (however, it *could*
be something else, but I won't get into that right now). But the string
"67902371045873651853" is probably not recognizable as anything other than
this string.

Kolmogorov complexity is defined as the length of the shortest programs
which can generate (print) the object. Thus, "alternating 1s and Os" is
very short, "the digits of pi" is slightly longer, and the digit mentioned
above ("679023...") may not have any shorter program than itself. (The
famous Berry Paradox enters here: "The shortest not nameable in under ten
words." Does this number exist? If so, what is it?)

Finding the generating program is very similar to decrypting a message (I
suspect there's a way to formalize the equivalence of encryption and
Kolmogorov complexity, beyond this admitted hand-waving, but I don't know
it offhand). Strings or expressions which "appear" random but which are
actually very regular, or easy to describe, with the proper "key" are
called "crypto-regular." Encrypted messages are clearly crypto-regular.

Cover and Thomas, in "Elements of Information Theory," 1991, write: "One of
the consequences of the non-existence of an algorithm for the halting
problem is the non-computability of Kolmogorov complexity. The only way to
find the shortest program in general is to try all short programs and see
which if them can do the job. However, at any time some of the short
programs may not have halted and there is no effective (finite mechanical)
way to tell whether they will halt or not and what they will print out.
Hence, there is no effective way to find the shortest program to print a
given string."

(By the way, exhaustive search of a keyspace--as someone suggested--is also
not enough, as the cryptostring above (""679023...") may result in several
syntactically valid English expressions, such as "attack at dawn," "whopper
with fries," "robins migrate peripherally." Knowing when to stop further
crypanalysis of a message might be called the "crypto halting problem.")

Fascinating stuff!  (To my current thinking, the core of the universe!) I
recommend Gregory Chaitin's "Algorithmic Information Theory" and
"Algorithms and Randomness." And the Cover and Thomas book.


A (mundane) consequence for cypherpunks is that the sending of any
random-looking stuff may be banned, someday. (No doubt it is in many
countries, if they bother to look. Sending unreadable stuff is grounds for
a visit by the Federales.) 

And clearly even "real messages," like this one, like Peter Wayner's
baseball scores, like GIF images, etc., can have messages attached. If
simple cryptanalysis reveals simple English-like messages, Occam's razor
suggests a decryption has been made. But it can never be known for sure
whether other messages exist.

--Tim May


--
Timothy C. May         | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,  
tcmay@netcom.com       | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
408-688-5409           | knowledge, reputations, information markets, 
W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA  | black markets, collapse of governments.
Higher Power: 2^756839 | Public Key: by arrangement






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Perry E. Metzger" <pmetzger@lehman.com>
Date: Wed, 12 May 93 16:08:32 PDT
To: karn@qualcomm.com (Phil Karn)
Subject: Re: CALLER ID?
In-Reply-To: <9305122249.AA00229@servo>
Message-ID: <9305122308.AA00601@snark.shearson.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Phil Karn says:
> Interesting. As expected, when I called 1-800-235-1414 from a PBX
> extension here at work, it read back the trunk number, not my actual
> extension number.  The same for a developmental CDMA digital
> cellphone, since we use PBX-style trunks from our switch.
> 
> But when I called it from a conventional AMPS (FM) cell phone using
> Pac Tel Cellular, I also got a number that was different than my
> mobile's real number. And when I called it back, I got a
> number-not-valid intercept.
> 
> Interesting. Apparently one real cellular switch also looks like a PBX
> as far as ANI goes.  I wonder how widespread this is. Anybody with a
> cell phone on a service other than Pac Bell who is willing to give it
> a try?

I have an even stranger datum to report -- when called from the ISDN
PBX here, ANI gets not just the building trunks but *MY* phone number.
Yes, it got the extension right, on the other side of the PBX. Hmmm...

.pm




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: J. Michael Diehl <mdiehl@triton.unm.edu>
Date: Wed, 12 May 93 18:56:10 PDT
To: x62727g2@usma8.USMA.EDU (Gatlin Anthony CDT)
Subject: Re: Publications
In-Reply-To: <9305121958.AA14189@usma8.usma.edu>
Message-ID: <9305130155.AA03463@triton.unm.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> Greetings fellow crypto warriors,
>      I am attempting to locate several publications to see if they are still
> in existence and where I might them or archives of previous issues. The
> publications I am interested in are TAP, NIA, AOTD, NARC, etc. If anyone
> knows where I might be able to obtain these or similar publications, please
> let me know. Also, does anyone know where any "interesting" ftp sites which
> carry files or other data related to these type publications?

Please post them to the list.  Thanx.
+-----------------------+-----------------------------+---------+
| J. Michael Diehl ;-)  | I thought I was wrong once. | PGP KEY |
|                       |    But, I was mistaken.     |available|
|                       +-----------------------------+---------+
| mdiehl@triton.unm.edu | "I'm just looking for the opportunity |
| mike.diehl@fido.org   | to be Politically Incorrect!   <Me>   |
| (505) 299-2282        |                                       |
+-----------------------+---------------------------------------+




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: rjc@gnu.ai.mit.edu
Date: Wed, 12 May 93 17:50:18 PDT
To: eaeu362@orion.oac.uci.edu (Satan)
Subject: Re: CALLER ID?
In-Reply-To: <199305122136.AA02867@orion.oac.uci.edu>
Message-ID: <9305130049.AA90390@hal.gnu.ai.mit.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



  I sent out a reply to this thread by replied normally instead of
with group reply (I'm so used to the extropians list automatically
changing the Reply-To).  Could the person who received this
message forward it to the list?


-- Ray Cromwell        |    Engineering is the implementation of science;    --
-- EE/Math Student     |       politics is the implementation of faith.      --
-- rjc@gnu.ai.mit.edu  |                         - Zetetic Commentaries      --



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: jas@netcom.com
Date: Wed, 12 May 93 23:01:14 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Talking Chips!
Message-ID: <9305130601.AB24838@netcom3.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Hiya guys!
	Does anybody know of or read the book Talking Chips by Nelson Morgan
(Mcgraw-Hill). It's supposed to mention something about DSP chips. Can some
one tell me something about the book or recommend a reference manual or
something close to a ref. man. related to DSP(I need to look up some specs)

	jas@netcom.com 




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: karn@qualcomm.com (Phil Karn)
Date: Thu, 13 May 93 00:11:38 PDT
To: speth@cats.UCSC.EDU
Subject: Re:  CALLER ID?
Message-ID: <9305130711.AA03137@servo>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Well, gee. If I can avoid caller ID and 800 number ANI by simply using
any old cellular carrier for $0.40/minute (cheaper off peak), then why
should I pay $1.95/minute for the same service to 1-900-STOPPER?

Yeah, I know, that $1.95 probably includes the long distance portion too,
but I doubt there are any ordinary domestic calls that cost as much as
$1.55/minute...

Phil




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Nickey MacDonald <i6t4@jupiter.sun.csd.unb.ca>
Date: Wed, 12 May 93 21:57:37 PDT
To: cypherpunks list <cypherpunks@toad.com>
Subject: Re: CALLER ID?
In-Reply-To: <9305120025.AA27965@boxer.nas.nasa.gov>
Message-ID: <Pine.3.05.9305130101.A8966-a100000@jupiter>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


It also gets (analog, I don't know if digital is available elsewhere, its
not here yet) cellular phones wrong...  Apparently it gets the number of
one of the towers instead...  This may be handy if you want to be
anonymous, and you have access to a cellular phone...  (And can afford the
prime time rates...  :-)  Its not my phone, I had a friend test it for me...
(isn't conference calling wonderful...  :-)

---
Nick MacDonald               | NMD on IRC
i6t4@jupiter.sun.csd.unb.ca  | PGP 2.1 Public key available via finger


On Tue, 11 May 1993, J. Eric Townsend wrote:

> Too bad it gets the wrong number for my work #:
> 
> My number: 415.604.4311.  The number it claims I'm at: 415.967.7227
> (No one answers the second number, fyi.)







From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: rjc@gnu.ai.mit.edu
Date: Thu, 13 May 93 00:28:25 PDT
To: karn@qualcomm.com (Phil Karn)
Subject: Re: CALLER ID?
In-Reply-To: <9305130711.AA03137@servo>
Message-ID: <9305130728.AA49407@hal.gnu.ai.mit.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Phil Karn writes:
> 
> Well, gee. If I can avoid caller ID and 800 number ANI by simply using
> any old cellular carrier for $0.40/minute (cheaper off peak), then why
> should I pay $1.95/minute for the same service to 1-900-STOPPER?
> 
> Yeah, I know, that $1.95 probably includes the long distance portion too,
> but I doubt there are any ordinary domestic calls that cost as much as
> $1.55/minute...
> 
> Phil

  I sent this out before, but it got lost.

  You can avoid ANIs for $0.00 in most areas by dialing your local
operator and saying "Could you please dial this 800 number, I am having
problems getting through to it." The ANI returns a bogus number, and
toll free operator assistance costs nothing here (C&P bell). 
 

-- Ray Cromwell        |    Engineering is the implementation of science;    --
-- EE/Math Student     |       politics is the implementation of faith.      --
-- rjc@gnu.ai.mit.edu  |                         - Zetetic Commentaries      --



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "gone, like tears in the rain.  13-May-1993 0910" <yerazunis@aidev.enet.dec.com>
Date: Thu, 13 May 93 06:09:28 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Caller ID
Message-ID: <9305131309.AA19729@enet-gw.pa.dec.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>  You can avoid ANIs for $0.00 in most areas by dialing your local
>operator and saying "Could you please dial this 800 number, I am having
>problems getting through to it." The ANI returns a bogus number, and
>toll free operator assistance costs nothing here (C&P bell). 

Well, that would be the truth here!  I haven't been able to 
complete the call to the 800 number *yet*.  My home phone gets
a couple of clicks, and then a fast busy, my work phone goes immediately
to fast busy.

*sigh*

	-Bill





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Matthew J Miszewski <MJMISKI@macc.wisc.edu>
Date: Thu, 13 May 93 07:37:50 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: CLIP: CNN
Message-ID: <23051309332459@vms2.macc.wisc.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Cypherpunks,
 
  Rumor has it CNN is carrying a clip on the Wiretap Chip Today. (I, Being
the poor Law Student that I am, have neither cable nor the time to waatch
it).  Could someone type up an extract so we can gage our effectiveness?
 
Thanx,
 
Matt
 




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: markh@wimsey.bc.ca (Mark C. Henderson)
Date: Thu, 13 May 93 11:07:03 PDT
To: speth@cats.UCSC.EDU
Subject: Re:  CALLER ID?
Message-ID: <m0nthYq-0001fUC@van-bc.wimsey.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> Well, gee. If I can avoid caller ID and 800 number ANI by simply using
> any old cellular carrier for $0.40/minute (cheaper off peak), then why
> should I pay $1.95/minute for the same service to 1-900-STOPPER?
> 
> Yeah, I know, that $1.95 probably includes the long distance portion too,
> but I doubt there are any ordinary domestic calls that cost as much as
> $1.55/minute...
> 
> Phil
Of course, for Canadians, the services which allow one to dial U.S.
800 numbers (for a fee) work really nicely to defeat ANI.

1-800-235-1414 reports my phone number is 1-206-441-8364 (somewhere
in Western Washington state).

Mark

-- 
Mark Henderson
markh@wimsey.bc.ca
RIPEM key available by key server/finger/E-mail
  MD5OfPublicKey: F1F5F0C3984CBEAF3889ADAFA2437433




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: jet@nas.nasa.gov (J. Eric Townsend)
Date: Thu, 13 May 93 13:03:34 PDT
To: Matthew J Miszewski <MJMISKI@macc.wisc.edu>
Subject: CLIP: CNN
In-Reply-To: <23051309332459@vms2.macc.wisc.edu>
Message-ID: <9305132003.AA08865@boxer.nas.nasa.gov>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Matthew J Miszewski writes:
 >   Rumor has it CNN is carrying a clip on the Wiretap Chip Today. (I, Being
 > the poor Law Student that I am, have neither cable nor the time to waatch
 > it).  Could someone type up an extract so we can gage our effectiveness?

I saw the lame short on CNN.  They usually know better than to try and
do something technical in too short a time.

Oh well, maybe they ran something on CNN Regular?






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Round Waffle <eggo@student.umass.edu>
Date: Thu, 13 May 93 13:08:04 PDT
To: x62727g2@usma8.USMA.EDU (Gatlin Anthony CDT)
Subject: Re: Publications
In-Reply-To: <9305121958.AA14189@usma8.usma.edu>
Message-ID: <9305131957.AA22819@titan.ucs.umass.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text


Possessed by The Unholy, Gatlin Anthony CDT scrawled the following in blood:
> 
> Greetings fellow crypto warriors,
>      I am attempting to locate several publications to see if they are still
> in existence and where I might them or archives of previous issues. The
> publications I am interested in are TAP, NIA, AOTD, NARC, etc. If anyone
> knows where I might be able to obtain these or similar publications, please
> let me know. Also, does anyone know where any "interesting" ftp sites which
> carry files or other data related to these type publications?
> 
     To my knowledge, none of those publications are still being put out.
However, all of them (with the exception of TAP, which was a paper 'zine --
although they did put out one online issue) are archived at ftp.eff.org, in
the /pub/cud directory.

> Thanks,
> 
> Anthony J. Gatlin                  |-------------------------------------|
> Cadet Private, Co. G-2             |PGP Public Key available on request. |
> United States Military Academy     |-------------------------------------|
> 

+-   eggo@titan.ucs.umass.edu      --><--       Eat Some Paste   -+
+-          Yorn desh born, der ritt de gitt der gue,            -+
+-      Orn desh, dee born desh, de umn bork! bork! bork!        -+
+----------------- The Durex Blender Corporation -----------------+



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: jas@netcom.com
Date: Thu, 13 May 93 23:20:32 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Banning Laptops!
Message-ID: <9305140621.AA14219@netcom3.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



	I was just siting at home watching a local newscast while reading my 
favorite alt. newsgroup when the news on the t.v mentioned something about
banning laptops and cd players on airplanes. The story did not mention any
reason behind this ban on our favourite machines except quote " something is
causing problems to  our intsruments and we can't figure out what "
	What else are they gonna ban on flights? My freq jammer.
Anyway I'm just wondering what will happen to those new planes that have ports
on the seats. So that we can download our e-mail. ( Would we still call it
downloading even if we were flying over the site we were downloading the e-mail
from )                             ^^^^  

	-jas





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "DrZaphod" <ncselxsi!drzaphod@ncselxsi.netcom.com>
Date: Fri, 14 May 93 07:58:44 PDT
To: CypherPunks@toad.com
Subject: RE: Banning Laptops!
Message-ID: <1892.drzaphod@ncselxsi>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


In Message Thu, 13 May 93 23:20:59 PDT, netcom!jas@netcomsv.netcom.com writes:

>banning laptops and cd players on airplanes.

     Maybe we should invest in some TEMPEST bags for our stuff.. better
yet.. maybe there's a market for selling these at airports..
-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-
- DrZaphod                #Don't Come Any Closer Or I'll Encrypt!   -
- [AC/DC] / [DnA][HP]     #Xcitement thru Technology and Creativity -
- [drzaphod@ncselxsi.uucp]#     [MindPolice Censored This Bit]      -
-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: karn@qualcomm.com (Phil Karn)
Date: Fri, 14 May 93 02:07:43 PDT
To: jas@netcom.com
Subject: Re:  Banning Laptops!
Message-ID: <9305140907.AA10114@servo>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


You may be referring to the clip that appeared on CNN today that said
American Airlines had banned the use of laptop computers and CD players
*during takeoff and landing*. Use during cruise is OK.

I think this policy has been in effect for a while. I've been
flying American lately and have heard it mentioned.

Phil




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: George A. Gleason <gg@well.sf.ca.us>
Date: Fri, 14 May 93 03:03:51 PDT
To: jas@netcom.com
Subject: Re:  Banning Laptops!
Message-ID: <199305141003.AA12460@well.sf.ca.us>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Here's what's up: some alarming malfunctions of navigational instruments
were traced to consumer electronics in use by passengers.  The worst
offenders were CD players, but laptops etc were also found to cause trouble.

Eventually, aircraft will be retrofitted for greater immunity to this, and
of course laptops will probably be developed with reduced RF emissions so
that business travellers can use them in flight.  (In case it isn't clear,
all of these devices emit radio frequency energy which can seriously fuck up
radio frequency navigational equipment and onboard computers.)  

Anyway, until the tech upgrades come down the line, leave your laptop and CD
player in the overhead luggage rack.  The small increment of pleasure or
convenience gained by using these things in the air can't begin to compare
with the risk of causing a fatal accident. 

-gg




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: wtap@mindvox.phantom.com (Wire Tap!)
Date: Fri, 14 May 93 07:54:38 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Banning Laptops!
Message-ID: <XeoJ4B1w165w@mindvox.phantom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


When I was flying overseas a year ago I was told to keep my paltry laptop
off during takeoff. I questioned why and was told that it causes
instruments only used in takeoff and landing to fluctuate, but it rarely
happened, if at all. So were someone to sneak a flip of the power switch
on a laptop during takeoff, most likely the pilots would never know. But
hey, this IS airplanes we are talking about. Even a little flucuation is
too much for me. Piloting a plane is a precision art, and I would hate to
be the one to throw the wrench in the works.

One of the more interesting things dealing with this is even getting them
on the plane. I had to unpack my carry case, power it up, give the fed
type guy a dir listing (he said he had to see words), pull out the battery
(I suppose to prove it wasn't a really small battery and a stick of
dynamite stuffed in there), etc.
Joking about a bomb when boarding a plane is a federal offense too.

wtap@mindvox.phantom.com
PGP key available upon request.

 




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Craig Nottingham <cnotting@cosmos.gmu.edu>
Date: Fri, 14 May 93 10:40:54 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Navigation Prblems and Laptops...
Message-ID: <9305141740.AA18653@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


	There are NO documented reports of malfunction of navigational 
or other instruments on aircraft due to personal electronic devices.  The
FAA has done studies and conducted investigations and they do not have a singledocumented case of interfence.  (Lovely what you can learn from TV thses days)

-----
Craig Nottingham                                       <cnotting@cosmos.gmu.edu>-Reality is for people who lack imagination   NeXTmail<cnotting@gravity.gmu.edu>-I hate to advocate drugs, alcohol, violence or insanity to anyone, but they've
 always worked for me.                                     <=> Hunter S ThompsonZ





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: jet@nas.nasa.gov (J. Eric Townsend)
Date: Fri, 14 May 93 14:32:12 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: computer and privacy on all things considered (bay area, 1430, fri)
Message-ID: <9305142132.AA18476@boxer.nas.nasa.gov>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain




Fri/1430/Mountain View

just heard NPR/All Things Considered announcement that they're going
to do a bit on data privacy.  I dunno the freq, right above 88.  (Damn
analog jam box. :-)

-eric





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: smb@research.att.com
Date: Fri, 14 May 93 12:07:30 PDT
To: Craig Nottingham <cnotting@cosmos.gmu.edu>
Subject: Re: Navigation Prblems and Laptops...
Message-ID: <9305141907.AA19079@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


	 There are NO documented reports of malfunction of navigational
	 or other instruments on aircraft due to personal electronic
	 devices.  The FAA has done studies and conducted
	 investigations and they do not have a singledocumented case of
	 interfence.  (Lovely what you can learn from TV thses days)

According to one report (in the NY Times, I believe), SwissAir reports
one incident where the apparent interference not only stopped when
electronic devices were turned off, it resumed when the pilot gave
permission for people to start using them again.

``Documented'' is the wrong word.  There have been plenty of cases of
trouble attributed to electromagnetic interference; what's lacking is
controlled studies that demonstrate an effect, as opposed to anecdotal
evidence from the pilots of various aircraft.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Date: Fri, 14 May 93 15:10:50 PDT
To: jet@nas.nasa.gov (J. Eric Townsend)
Subject: Re: computer and privacy on all things considered (bay area, 1430, fri)
Message-ID: <9305142210.AA19678@netcom.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>Fri/1430/Mountain View
>
>just heard NPR/All Things Considered announcement that they're going
>to do a bit on data privacy.  I dunno the freq, right above 88.  (Damn
>analog jam box. :-)
>
>-eric

As soon as I read this (and thankfully the toad.com machine was sending
stuff through in a timely way), I flicked on KQED (San Francisco), where
the NPR report was already underway.

The hacker spokesman was, I think, a "Fred Davis."

An unimpressive interview, in my opinion. Confusing stuff about how if your
computer has "wires going into it, hackers can get in" (paraphrased from
the hacker's comments, not the interviewers).

Perhaps the time allotted was just too short to make any reasonable points.

Those who didn't hear it, didn't miss much.

-Tim May


--
Timothy C. May         | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,  
tcmay@netcom.com       | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
408-688-5409           | knowledge, reputations, information markets, 
W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA  | black markets, collapse of governments.
Higher Power: 2^756839 | Public Key: by arrangement






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Phil Fry" <pfry@us.oracle.com>
Date: Fri, 14 May 93 15:19:16 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: NPR coverage of Clipper/PGP  5/14/93
Message-ID: <9305142218.AA24538@wrpyr4.us.oracle.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



In the hopes that this can reach at least some of you before NPR airs locally,
there is a reasonably in-depth discussion of Clipper (its problems), PGP (its
benefits), etc. at about 50 minutes into the program today (5/14/93).

Phil Fry                                                        pfry@oracle.com
Oracle Consulting
Cincinnati, Ohio                                                   513 651 4444





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: gnu (John Gilmore)
Date: Fri, 14 May 93 15:34:35 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Questions to the White House from the Digital Privacy and Security Working Group
Message-ID: <9305142234.AA20885@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Cypherpunks will recognize some of the questions from the
brainstorming session of a few weeks ago.

------- Forwarded Message

From: djw@eff.org (Daniel J. Weitzner)

...  The Digital Privacy and Security Working Group, coordinated by
the Electronic Frontier Foundation, sent the following questions to the
White House, the Department of Commerce, and key members of Congress.

==================

Digital Privacy and Security Working Group

666 Pennsylvania Ave, SE 
Suite 303
Washington, DC  20003

Jerry Berman or Daniel J. Weitzner   202/544-9237
Leah Gurowitz  202/544-6909


ISSUES AND QUESTIONS 
REGARDING THE ADMINISTRATION'S CLIPPER CHIP PROPOSAL


A. Process by Which the Proposal Was Developed

1.      Why the secrecy in which the encryption code scheme was developed? 
Were any members of the computer, communications, or security industries
consulted? Were any privacy experts consulted? Has the Justice Department
or the White House Office of Legal Counsel considered the constitutional
implications?

2.      The Administration's announcement implies that a policy review on
encryption has been commenced; but at the same time, it appears that a
decision has already been reached to support the Clipper proposal or some
other key-escrow scheme.  Is any review of the Clipper chip itself now
underway?  What progress has been made?  When will this expedited review be
complete?

3.      What role has the National Security Agency played in the
development and selection of the Clipper Chip and key escrow system?  What
will NSA's role be in the deployment and evaluation of the system?  Are
these roles consistent with the principle of civilian control of computer
security, as required by the Computer Security Act of 1987?

4.      What efforts are underway to improve the government's ability to
decrypt non-Clipper algorithms which are likely to be used by criminals? 
Can the government decrypt all commercially available hardware sold
domestically and abroad? If not, wouldn't it be a better policy to direct
U.S. resources in that direction instead of the Clipper approach?

5.      What percentage of the 800 to 900 annual Title III interceptions
encounter encrypted communications?  What percentage of law enforcement
encountered encryption is estimated to be Clipper as opposed to the other
encryption schemes?  Is this a solution in search of a problem?

6.      Did the government consider commercially-available encryption
schemes and reject them? If so, why were they rejected, and is that
analysis available? If not, why not?

7.      Capstone is the successor to Clipper with the addition of public
key exchange and digital signature capabilities. Is Clipper just an
intermediate step before Capstone is released? Why did the White House
press release not mention Capstone?

8.      How will this relate to the FBI's Digital Telephony Proposal?  Has
the Administration committed to supporting, discarding or reintroducing the
proposal in a new form?

9.      What is the history of the proposal?  How long has this been under
consideration?

10.     How long has the Clipper Chip and escrow concept been in
development?  Which agency originated these concepts?


B. Secrecy of the Algorithm
11.     Will the Clipper proposal have the same degree of public review
that other NIST standards, such as DSS have gone through?

12.     How can the public trust the security and reliability of an
algorithm that is kept classified?

13.     If American firms are not able to have their encryption experts
examine the algorithm, how can they be sure that there is no "trap door"
that would allow any Clipper Chip security system to be overridden?  Dr.
Kammer of NIST has said that "respected experts from outside the government
will be offered access" to the algorithm. How do interested parties go
about obtaining this access to the classified material about the Clipper
algorithm and participate in the analysis of the design to search for trap
doors and other weaknesses?  What specific reports from this process will
serve to reassure users regarding the integrity of the Clipper Chip?

14.     What will be the consequence if the algorithm is published? Will it
become less secure?  If publication (i.e., de-classification) would make it
less secure, how secure can it be? 

15.     If the Clipper Chip is too weak to protect classified government
communications, why should it be used for sensitive proprietary private
sector communications?

16.     Executive Order 12356 has procedures on classification and
declassification of information.  Is the algorithm being classified under
the framework of this order? What agency is in charge of classification/
declassification?

17.     How much effort has the government put into the design and
cryptoanalysis of the Clipper Chip as compared to the public analysis of
the Data Encryption Standard during the last 16 years?

18.     Is the Skipjack algorithm being used by the Clipper Chip derived
from codes used in the management of our nuclear arsenal?  Is this why the
algorithm is being kept secret?  If this is so, why are we using this
secret system for a dubious commercial standard?  If there is a national
security justification to avoid having this encryption technique revealed,
why risk compromising it by integrating it into publicly distributed
products?

19.     If the algorithm is classified, how will it be legal to distribute
the chips to users not qualified to handle classified encryption equipment?
This seems contrary to Facility Security Clearance procedures and the
Personal Security Clearance requirements of DoD 5220.222-M, Industrial
Security Manual for Safeguarding Classified Information.

20.     Is it illegal to reverse engineer the Clipper Chip?  If it were
reverse engineered, would it then be illegal to reveal the algorithm?  


C. Voluntariness of Clipper System

21.     Will this system be truly voluntary? If so, won't criminals and
terrorists just use some other type of encryption?

22.     If the use of the Clipper Chip is "voluntary," why would any party
desiring privacy or secrecy of communications use it, knowing that the US.
government has a process to allow decryption?  If the Administration's
ultimate goal is to ban other forms of encryption for use domestically,
what is the legal basis for such an approach?

23.     Isn't the Administration doing more than "encouraging" use of
Clipper?  (E.g., discontinuing DES at the end of the current certification
cycle, directing NIST to adopt Clipper as a Federal standard, and
maintaining export restrictions on hardware/software using different
algorithms?)

24.     Does the government have any plans to campaign for the
implementation of the Clipper Chip as a standard for data cryptography?

25.     What impact will the introduction of Clipper have on the market for
other encryption technologies?  Will the government otherwise try to
discourage other cryptographic mechanisms from being marketed domestically
and abroad?

26.     Isn't the government dictating the design of technology into
commercial products rather than allowing market demand to dictate?

27.     What prevents a sender of information from encrypting with secure,
easy to obtain software using DES or RSA algorithms before sending data
through a channel encrypted with the Clipper system?

28.     Would the Administration ever consider making the Clipper Chip or
other key escrow system mandatory?

D. Key Escrow System

29.     How can the government assure us that the keys held in escrow are
not compromised?  What public or private agencies have sufficient integrity
and public trust to serve as escrow agents?

30.     How can the public be sure that keys will only be revealed upon
proper warrant?  Will there be clerks who actually operate the equipment
who could get anyone's keys?  Or will judges have personal keys, which
would be directly authenticated to the escrow agents' equipment that
protects the users' keys?

31.     Once the keys are obtained from the escrow holders, is it
envisioned that electronic surveillance can be done "real-time," or will
recording and post-processing be required?

32.     To hear both sides of a conversation, does law enforcement need the
keys of both participants?

33.     After law enforcement has properly obtained a pair of unit keys
from the escrow agents and conducted a wiretap, will the keys be "returned"
to the agents?  What safeguards exist to prevent law enforcement from
re-using the keys without authorization in the future?

34.     Once in possession of the unit keys, can the government pretend to
be ("spoof") the original unit owner?

35.     What is the smallest number of people who would be in a position to
compromise the security of the system?

36.     Can an escrow agent exercise discretion in the release of key
information?  E.g., can they refuse an inappropriate request?  (Phone
companies ensure that court orders are facially valid.)  Can they publicize
an inappropriate request?  Can they tell the person whose communications
were intended to be violated?

37.     Who will be responsible for auditing the escrow process and the use
of revealed keys?

38.     How will the government ensure that unanticipated uses of the
escrow database are prevented in the long term?  (E.g., the Census database
was supposed to stay confidential for 75 years, but was released during
World War Two to allow Japanese-Americans to be imprisoned without cause. 
What protections are in place to make sure that this never happens again?

39.     What happens when one discovers that the keys have been captured
through theft?  How difficult would it be to change keys?  What is done in
the meanwhile?  How difficult is it to reprogram the chip, or do you need a
replacement?

40.     If the chip can be reprogrammed, how do you prevent covert changes
that will not be discovered until authorization to tap is received and
execution of the warrant is forestalled?

41.     It appears that once a given chip has been compromised due to use
of the escrowed keys, the chip and the equipment it is used in are
vulnerable forever.  Is there any mechanism or program to re-key or replace
compromised hardware?  Is there any method for a potential acquiring party
to verify whether the keys on a given chip have been compromised?  Who
should bear the cost of replacement or re-keying of compromised hardware?

42.     What safeguards will be used when transporting the escrow keys?

43.     What are the national security implications of widespread
deployment of Clipper?  Does it make our communications more susceptible to
disruption or jamming?

44.     Doesn't the two-escrowee approach make these locations targets of
opportunity for any party or foreign government that wants to gain access
to sensitive US. information?  If an escrow location is compromised, all
chip data contained there is compromised.  Wouldn't these locations also
become targets of opportunity for any criminal or terrorist organization
that wanted to disrupt US. law enforcement?  What back-up or physical
security measures are envisioned?  If multiple copies are kept, doesn't
this increase the threat of compromise?


E. Choice of Agents for the Keys

45.     Who will be the agents for the keys? How secure will they be from
the outside and from the inside?  What is the cost of maintaining the
escrow system?  Who will pay?  Who will profit?

46.     When will the escrow agents be announced? Will there be a process
to allow input into the selection of these individuals/agencies?

47.     Although it has been reported that the escrow holders will not be
the FBI, DoD, CIA or NSA, is it envisioned that one or both of the escrow
locations will be non-government entities?  Can one or both be private
parties?  What will the process be to determine what private party will be
awarded the contract for key holder?

48.     Can the set of escrow agents be changed after the initial
selection? How can the government be prevented from moving the escrow
contract to a more pliable escrow agent, if one of the agents stands up
against the government for the rights of the people whose keys they are
protecting?

49.     Will escrow agents be immune from prosecution during their term of
office, like Members of Congress, the President, and Justices of the
Supreme Court?  If not, what will prevent the government from harassing the
agents during a dispute with the Justice Department?

50.     Will there be a mechanism for particular people to keep their keys
out of the key escrow database, or to obtain Clipper Chips with keys that
have not been escrowed? (E.g. Judges, law enforcement officers, NSA
officials, the President, etc.)


F. Level of Security of Clipper Chip Encryption
51.     How will the government assure American businesses that their
proprietary information is not compromised?  Given the extremely
competitive nature of the high-tech industries, and the importance of
intellectual property, how can American firms be adequately protected?

52.     How will the government assure American citizens that the privacy
of their electronic communications and the security of personal information
that is transmitted in electronic form will all be secure under the Clipper
Chip?

53.     f the Administration is so confident about the level of security of
the Clipper Chip scheme, why will classified information not be encrypted
with it?

54.     What warranty is the US. government prepared to make regarding the
security of the Clipper Chip compared to other algorithms, and indemnity
for failures for breaches of the algorithm, chips that are compromised due
to failures in the security of the escrow system, or other failures in the
Clipper approach?  

55.     What effect does Clipper have on other NSA and DOD programs aimed
at encryption and authentication of unclassified messages (e.g., MOSAIC)?

56.     If Clipper is not approved for classified traffic, what government
agencies will be utilizing Clipper, and for what applications?

57.     Normal security procedures involve changing cryptography keys
periodically, in case one has been compromised. But the family and unit
keys cannot be changed by the user. If these keys are compromised, it won't
matter how frequently the user changed their session keys. Doesn't the long
use of the same family and unit keys increase the likelihood that these
keys will be compromised while they are still in use? Doesn't this also
eliminate a significant degree of the user's control of the level of
security that their his or her system provides?

58.     If the government discovered that the algorithm or family key had
been discovered by a foreign government or private individuals, would it
tell the public that the system had been compromised?  Are there plans to
restore privacy and authentication if the algorithm is compromised?

59.     How secure is the Clipper algorithm if it is attacked by a person
with half the key? 

G. Level of Privacy Protection

60.     Given the dramatic growth in transmission and storage of personal
information in electronic form, does the Administration recognize that
private individuals, as well as large organizations, need access to
affordable, robust encryption systems?

61.     Is law enforcement permitted to identify the specific piece of
communications equipment without obtaining a warrant?  If encrypted
communications include the serial number ("chip family key"), will law
enforcement be able to keep track of communications traffic and track
private citizens without even securing the keys from the escrow agents?

62.     Does the Administration believe that all household phones are going
to be replaced with secure versions over some period of time?  At what
cost?

63.     It has been impossible to keep any large collection of information
completely private, including Social Security records, tax information,
police files, motor vehicle records, medical records, video rentals, highly
classified military information, and information on abuses of power. How
will users be able to tell when this happens to the key escrow information?


H. Constitutional/Legal Implications

64.     Has the Administration fully considered the constitutional
implications of the Clipper Chip and other key escrow systems?

65.     Does forcing someone to disclose a key for future law enforcement
access infringe the fundamental right against self incrimination embodied
in the Fifth Amendment?

66.     Does requiring key disclosure in conjunction with a particular
technology violate users' right to free speech under the First Amendment? 
Courts frown most severely on any government attempts to compel a
particular form of speech.

67.     Does the escrow system violate the letter or the spirit of the
Fourth Amendment protections which safeguard citizens against intrusive law
enforcement practices?

68.     When the Administration says "nor is the U.S. saying that 'every
American, as a matter of right, is entitled to an unbreakable commercial
encryption product,'" are they therefore saying the inverse, that every
American is not allowed to have an unbreakable commercial encryption
product?

69.     Does the Administration see the need for any new legislation to
implement its Clipper Chip proposal? If so, specifically identify.

70.     In the event that one or more escrow keys are obtained through
unauthorized means, what liability, if any, might the equipment
manufacturer have to bear?

71.     What will be the relationship between Federal and state law
enforcement?  Will the policy pre-empt state law?  How will state law
enforcement access the "key" system?

72.     What is the statutory authority for regulation of domestic
encryption?  Are any of these statutes cold war relics?  Should the
efficacy of all statutes that effect civilian encryption be reviewed?

73.     What protections do we have against blackmailing by escrow agents,
or by others who have gained possession of escrowed keys?  Is there civil
or criminal liability for escrow agents who reveal keys illegally?

74.     What is the impact on society if the right to hold a truly private
conversation is withdrawn?

75.     Is strong encryption technology important for protecting
intellectual property in a digital network environment?


I. Logistics of Chip Development and Manufacture

76.     Why weren't other Chip manufacturers given the chance to bid on the
chip production process?  Why was the choice made to have only one
manufacturer?

77.     Since the Clipper Chip design data will need to be released to
manufacturers, how will we be assured that this information, in itself,
will not allow the user systems to be compromised?

78.     What assurances will there be that the manufacturer is not keeping
a record of all keys issued?

79.     We have read Dorothy Denning's explanation of how the two 80-bit
keys will be created in the SCIF.  Is this description accurate? If not,
how would this process occur? If so, is the system feasible? What will the
cost be for this process and for the increased security of the involved
government agents?

80.     The chips will be programmed in a Secure Compartmented Information
Facility (SCIF). Does this suggest that the chips should at some point be
classified Secret or Top Secret? What is the classification of the Clipper
and Capstone chips and the Skipjack algorithm? How will these chips be
declassified once leaving the SCIF?

81.     Some of the press reports imply that AT&T has had access to this
information in order to incorporate Clipper into some of its equipment
designs. Is that implication accurate?

82.     Can this scheme be implemented in software? If so, why haven't we
seen information on that software?  If not, were issues of how this
hardware solution would affect continued use of software encryption
adequately evaluated? Were the comparative costs of software and hardware
encryption schemes evaluated? Is this evaluation available for analysis?

83.     Current high speed DES processors have encryption rates of
approximately 200 megabits per second, while the Clipper Chip has a
throughput of 12.5 megabits per second.  Within two to five years, 100 Mbs+
technologies, such as Fast Ethernet, FDDI and ATM, will become commonplace.
 How will the Clipper technology be used in environments where data is sent
at 100 Mbs or faster?


J. Feasibility/Implementation

84.     What testing has been done to verify the ability of Clipper to work
across the panoply of new emerging technologies?  If the underlying digital
transport protocol drops a bit or two, will that interfere with Clipper
operation?  How critical is synchronization of the bit stream for Clipper
operation?  Has this technology been tested with ISDN, TDMA, Cellular, CDMA
Cellular, ATM, SONET, SMDS, etc. and other emerging technologies?  What
effect does Clipper have on the Cellular Authentication and Voice
Encryption (CAVE) algorithm?  Are these differences for key generation,
authentication, or voice privacy?

85.     Does the Administration seek to extend the Clipper Chip proposal to
the TDMA and CDMA digital cellular standards?

86.     When will the government publish the various Modes of Operation and
other documents for Clipper, together with a physical implementation
standard (similar to the old FS-1027)?

87.     Will the government consider the development of alternate sources
for the chip or will vendors be limited to a single, monopoly supplier?

88.     Initially, the Clipper Chip is being proposed for telephone
technology, but the White House specifically mentions that the technology
will be used for electronic data transmission. What is the timetable for
implementing this?

89.     What is the scope that the Administration envisions for the Clipper
Chip's algorithm use?  What about Capstone?  Is it limited to choice, or
does it encompass electronic mail, network encryption, security modems,
long-haul bulk encryptors, video applications, computer password
protection, Intelligent Vehicle Highway Systems ("IVHS"), satellite
communications -- both transport and control, electronic funds transfers,
etc.? 

90.     What is the Administration's policy on other security mechanisms
beyond privacy, such as message authentication codes for banking and EFT,
and for integrity and digital signatures for sender authentication and
non-repudiation? What is the impact on international standards such as
X.500 and X.509?

91.     Since Clipper, as currently defined, cannot be implemented in
software, what options are available to those who can benefit from
cryptography in software? Was a study of the impact on these vendors or of
the potential cost to the software industry conducted?

92.     What is are the success criterion for the Clipper initiative? 
Would the government abandon its initiative if the Clipper is shown to be
unsuccessful beyond government use?

93.     What is the expected useful lifetime of the Clipper technology?
What do you expect will render it useless at some point?

94.     Is it true that the name "Clipper Chip" is the intellectual
property of another company?

K. Impact on American Competitiveness

95.     As the key-escrow approach is designed to ensure the ability of the
American government to access confidential data, do NIST and NSA expect
overseas customers (who do not have the protection of due process) to
purchase the chip for data protection?

96.     In testimony before the House Telecommunications Subcommittee, Mr.
Kammer of NIST indicated that if he were a foreign customer, he would not
purchase devices that included the Clipper Chip. Doesn't this raise serious
balance-of-trade problems?

97.     Will the technology, or the Chip itself, be shared with other
allied governments  (e.g., the UK), or will US. producers of data security
products, forced by government standards to develop clipper-based products
for the US. market, be permanently closed out of the overseas security
market?

98.     If Clipper won't be commercially accepted abroad, and export
controls continue to prohibit the exportation of other encryption schemes,
isn't the US. government limiting American companies to a US. market?

99.     Given the restrictions on who can build Clipper devices, how will
Clipper keep up with advances in semiconductor speed, power, capacity and
integration? Openly available devices, such as Intel-compatible
microprocessors, have seen dramatic gains, but only because everyone was
free to try to build a better version.

100.    Will the Clipper Chip be used nationally and internationally? How
will multinational operations accommodate this new system?

101.    Banking and finance are truly global today. Most European financial
institutions use technology described in standards such as ISO 9796. Many
innovative new financial products and services will employ the reversible
cryptography described in these standards. Clipper does not comply with
these standards. Will US. financial institutions be able to export Clipper?
If so, will their overseas customers find Clipper acceptable?

102.    If overseas companies provide systems based on algorithms that do
not have key escrow schemes that encrypt faster and more securely, how will
we compete internationally? We are market leaders in applications software
and operating systems. our world leadership in operating systems is
dependent on integrating security in internationally distributed systems.

103.    Internet Privacy Enhanced Mail (PEM) is becoming an internationally
recognized system for encrypting Electronic Mail. Would Skipjack encryption
become a US. standard for encrypting electronic mail while the rest of the
world used PEM? How would E-mail traffic between the US. and other
countries be encrypted?


L. Effect on Export Control Policy

104.    In light of the Clipper initiative, will export restrictions on
hardware and software encryption regimes using DES and RSA algorithms
(which are widely available abroad) remain in place?

105.    Will American firms be allowed to sell devices containing the
Clipper Chip abroad? Under which governmental regulatory regime would
exports of devices containing the Clipper Chip fall? What conditions would
be applied to exports of devices containing the Clipper Chip? (E.g., would
American firms be allowed to export devices to non-US. customers without
the escrow requirement? If not, who would hold the keys?)

106.    What governmental regulations will apply to imports of devices
containing the Clipper Chip? Given that most US. companies source most
customer premise equipment (e.g., telephones, fax machines, etc.) offshore,
how will the logistics be handled for the export of the Clipper Chip as a
component, and the subsequent import of the device containing the chip?
Will the US. permit non-US. manufacturers to have the Clipper algorithm? If
not, how will the Administration justify this trade barrier?

107.    If the Clipper Chip cannot be reverse-engineered, and if the US.
government is capable of decrypting, why would there be any reason to limit
Clipper products from being exported?

108.    If Clipper is allowed to be exported, does the US. government
foresee a problem with other governments? Would the US. government's access
to escrow keys be viewed as an exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction?


M. Implications for Installed-Base/Existing Products

109.    What are the implications of NSA/NIST withdrawing the certification
of DES? Although it may -- at some point in the future -- no longer be used
for government purposes, that is not going to effect commercial or private
users' applications of DES. What about the embedded base of DES hardware?

110.    Will existing systems need to be replaced?

111.    What efforts were spent to make the new encryption approach
compatible with the embedded base of equipment?  If DES was becoming weak
(vulnerable), wouldn't merely extending the DES key length to 80 bits have
solved that problem?

112.    There are a number of companies that employ non-escrowed
cryptography in their products today.  These products range from secure
voice, data, and fax, to secure e-mail, electronic forms, and software
distribution, to name but a few.  With over a million such products in use
today, what does the Clipper scheme foretell for these products and the
many corporations and individuals that are invested in them and use them? 
Will the investment made by the vendors in encryption-enhanced products be
protected?  If so, how?  Is it envisioned that they will add escrow
features to their products or be asked to employ Clipper?


N. Process by which Input Will Be Received from Industry/Public Interest Groups

113.    If the outcome of the policy review is not pre-ordained, then the
process to analyze the issues and arrive at solutions would seem to need a
great deal of definition. What roles have been identified for Congress, the
private sector, and other interested parties? Who is coordinating the
process?

114.    Why does the Presidential directive on the review process remain
classified?

o     o     o     o     o

------- End of Forwarded Message




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Barna Janos <JZP1102%HUSZEG11.bitnet@HEARN.nic.SURFnet.nl>
Date: Sat, 15 May 93 04:46:28 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: cyberpunk
Message-ID: <9305151146.AA01438@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



*******************************************************************************
*******************************************************************************
| *****       *        ******   *******   *****  ******       ******    ***** |
| *          ***      **    **     *      *      *    **    **     **   *     |
| ****      ** **      ***         *      ****   *     **  **           ****  |
| *        **   **        ***      *      *      *     **  **     ****  *     |
| *       *********   **    **     *      *      *    **    **     **   *     |
| *****  **       **   ******      *      *****  ******       ******    ***** |
*******************************************************************************
*******************************************************************************
 SEARCHING CONTACTS TO JOIN & | Cyberart & tech | ESTABLISH WORLDNET 4 FUTURE
                              *******************
     HELP! We are the first forming cyberpunk group in the Eastern block.

         We NEED YOUR informations, datas, opinion and knowledge about
                CYBERPUNK CULTURE, CYBERARTS, HACKERS, NEW EDGE
  CYBER TECHNOLOGIES, VIRTUAL REALITY, MIND MACHINES, ARTIFICAL INTELLIGENCE
         BRAIN BOOSTER DRUGS, BBS, WETWARE, INTERACTIVE AND HYPERMEDIA
            UNDERGROUND CULTURE WAVES, SLANG, MUSIC, GRAPHICS, etc.
  We have great difficulties in ordering books, mags, fanzines or any kind of
brochure, so please let us get some if you can : Molnar Daniel
Our answers will contain short stories,graphics: H-6723, Szeged, Csorba u. 9/A
novels, musics and experiences on this them.   : Hungary

   BITNET mail: jzp1102@huszeg11
                /Barna Janos/

                              -=PAX WITH YOU=-




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Arthur R. McGee" <amcgee@netcom.com>
Date: Fri, 14 May 93 17:34:40 PDT
To: Sandy <72114.1712@CompuServe.COM>
Subject: Re: CALLER ID?
In-Reply-To: <930511191724_72114.1712_FHF57-1@CompuServe.COM>
Message-ID: <Pine.3.05.9305141758.A26916-8100000@netcom2>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Of course! How else would the phone company be able to bill for those
calls if they couldn't put the number of the person calling on the
customer's phone bill?! Damn! I thought we were safe here in CA. :-(






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Arthur R. McGee" <amcgee@netcom.com>
Date: Fri, 14 May 93 17:45:42 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Anonymous Email From Finland (fwd)
Message-ID: <Pine.3.05.9305141735.D26916-a100000@netcom2>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



---------- Forwarded message ----------
Date: Wed, 12 May 1993 06:54:50 CDT
From: "Michael S. Hart" <HART@vmd.cso.uiuc.edu>
To: Multiple recipients of list GUTNBERG <GUTNBERG@vmd.cso.uiuc.edu>
Subject: Anonymous Email From Finland

Peter Graham recently posted a comment about a Finnish service allowing
for the anonymous sending of email.

Can someone provide any details?

Thanks.

=====================================================

Michael S. Hart, Professor of Electronic Text
Executive Director of Project Gutenberg Etext
Illinois Benedictine College, Lisle, IL 60532
No official connection to U of Illinois--UIUC
hart@uiucvmd.bitnet and hart@vmd.cso.uiuc.edu






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: J. Michael Diehl <mdiehl@triton.unm.edu>
Date: Sat, 15 May 93 00:27:02 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: mixed plaintext and crypted text.
Message-ID: <9305150726.AA05075@triton.unm.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Hey again, all.  I've RTFM'd, and I don't even know if it can be done, but does
anyone know how I can have pgp display the un-encrypted AND the decrypted parts
of a message?  Lets say my message goes like this:

This is a plaintext message to tell you stuff that needs not be private.
BTW, can you find the subliminal message? ;^)j
-------- begin pgp block -----
asdfkasjd;fThEjsflajslfjaslfjadfajs;flasjdaslfjasldfjalsj
asjlgfiuituqoNsAj;slkjasdifuoejrqlwfiasuokjel;rqwiuasdsii
asdfasljdflasjfdSuXsldfjalsjljeqljerwljrlejqlwjerlqwjerlq
elqrkjlasjl
134as
-------- end pgp block -------

Thanx a lot

Yours virtually,
+-----------------------+-----------------------------+---------+
| J. Michael Diehl ;-)  | I thought I was wrong once. | PGP KEY |
|                       |    But, I was mistaken.     |available|
|                       +-----------------------------+---------+
| mdiehl@triton.unm.edu | "I'm just looking for the opportunity |
| mike.diehl@fido.org   | to be Politically Incorrect!   <Me>   |
| (505) 299-2282        |                                       |
+-----------------------+---------------------------------------+




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: John S. Lee <jslee@well.sf.ca.us>
Date: Sat, 15 May 93 07:40:15 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: PGP 4 da MAC
Message-ID: <199305151439.AA21760@well.sf.ca.us>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Is there a program or source for PGP for the Mac.

Where can I get it?

Thanks!




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: fergp@sytex.com (Paul Ferguson)
Date: Sat, 15 May 93 07:45:12 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Receipt acknowleged?
Message-ID: <FLgL4B1w165w@sytex.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


This is a transcript of a letter that I received in the mail from
Senator John Warner of Virginia -
 
8<------ Begin transcript ------------------
 
JOHN WARNER
Virginia
 
Committees:
Armed Services
Select Committee on Intelligence
Environment and Public Works
Rules and Administration
 
United States Senate
 
May 11, 1993
 
Mr. Paul Ferguson
<address omitted>
Centreville, Virginia  22020
 
Dear Mr. Ferguson,
 
        Thanks you very much for writing to inform me of President
Clinton's new initiative in telecommunications encryption technology.
 
        I was not aware of this proposal as presented by the new
Administration.  Your letter does reveal that you are very
knowledgeable in the details of the "Clipper Chip".  You have
expressed clearly the impact the "Clipper Chip" technology and program
would have on government and private business.
 
        I will seek more information concerning this new initiative
from the Clinton Administration.
 
        I appreciate being made aware of this proposal and learning of
your specific insights.
 
        With kind regards, I am
 
                            Sincerely,
 
                            /*signed*/
 
                            John Warner
 
8<-------- End transcript ------------

Paul Ferguson                |       Boycott AT&T,
Network Integrator           |    Write your elected
Centreville, Virginia USA    |     Representatives.
fergp@sytex.com              |    Do the right thing.
 
Just say "NO" to the Wiretap (Clipper/Capstone) Chip(s)
   I love my country, but I fear its government.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: whitfield.diffie@Eng.Sun.COM
Date: Sun, 16 May 93 14:23:48 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Diffie Statement to Boucher's Committee
Message-ID: <9305151803.AA02490@morale.Eng.Sun.COM>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



	The Impact of a Secret Cryptographic Standard
	  on Encryption, Privacy, Law Enforcement
			and Technology

			Whitfield Diffie
			Sun Microsystems
			  11 May 1993

    I'd like to begin by expressing my thanks to Congressman 
Boucher, the other members of the committee, and the committee staff
for giving us the opportunity to appear before the committee and
express our views. 


    On Friday, the 16th of April, a sweeping new proposal for 
both the promotion and control of cryptography was made public on the
front page of the New York Times and in press releases from the White
House and other organizations. 

    This proposal was to adopt a new cryptographic system as a 
federal standard, but at the same time to keep the system's
functioning secret.  The standard would call for the use of a tamper
resistant chip, called Clipper, and embody a `back door' that
will allow the government to decrypt the traffic for law enforcement
and national security purposes. 

    So far, available information about the chip is minimal and to 
some extent contradictory, but the essence appears to be this: When a
Clipper chip prepares to encrypt a message, it generates a short
preliminary signal rather candidly entitled the Law Enforcement
Exploitation Field.  Before another Clipper chip will decrypt the
message, this signal must be fed into it.  The Law Enforcement
Exploitation Field or LEEF is tied to the key in use and the two must
match for decryption to be successful.  The LEEF in turn, when
decrypted by a government held key that is unique to the chip,
will reveal the key used to encrypt the message. 

    The effect is very much like that of the little keyhole in the 
back of the combination locks used on the lockers of school children.
The children open the locks with the combinations, which is supposed
to keep the other children out, but the teachers can always look in
the lockers by using the key. 

    In the month that has elapsed since the announcement, we have 
studied the Clipper chip proposal as carefully as the available
information permits.  We conclude that such a proposal is at best
premature and at worst will have a damaging effect on both business
security and civil rights without making any improvement in law
enforcement. 



    To give you some idea of the importance of the issues this 
raises, I'd like to suggest that you think about what are the most
essential security mechanisms in your daily life and work.  I believe
you will realize that the most important things any of you ever do by
way of security have nothing to do with guards, fences, badges, or
safes.  Far and away the most important element of your security is
that you recognize your family, your friends, and your colleagues.
Probably second to that is that you sign your signature, which
provides the people to whom you give letters, checks, or documents,
with a way of proving to third parties that you have said or promised
something.  Finally you engage in private conversations, saying things
to your loved ones, your friends, or your staff that you do not wish
to be overheard by anyone else. 

    These three mechanisms lean heavily on the physical: face to
face contact between people or the exchange of written messages.
At this moment in history, however, we are transferring our medium
of social interaction from the physical to the electronic at a pace
limited only by the development of our technology.  Many of us spend
half the day on the telephone talking to people we may visit in person
at most a few times a year and the other half exchanging electronic
mail with people we never meet in person. 

    Communication security has traditionally been seen as an
arcane security technology of real concern only to the military and
perhaps the banks and oil companies.  Viewed in light of the
observations above, however, it is revealed as nothing less than the
transplantation of fundamental social mechanisms from the world of
face to face meetings and pen and ink communication into a world of
electronic mail, video conferences, electronic funds transfers,
electronic data interchange, and, in the not too distant future,
digital money and electronic voting. 

    No right of private conversation was enumerated in the
constitution.  I don't suppose it occurred to anyone at the time that
it could be prevented.  Now, however, we are on the verge of a world
in which electronic communication is both so good and so inexpensive
that intimate business and personal relationships will flourish 
between parties who can at most occasionally afford the luxury of
traveling to visit each other.  If we do not accept the right of these
people to protect the privacy of their communication, we take a long
step in the direction of a world in which privacy will belong only
to the rich. 

    The import of this is clear:  The decisions we make about 
communication security today will determine the kind of society
we live in tomorrow.  



    The objective of the administration's proposal can be simply
stated:

	They want to provide a high level of security to their
	friends, while being sure that the equipment cannot be
	used to prevent them from spying on their enemies.

Within a command society like the military, a mechanism of
this sort that allows soldiers' communications to be protected from
the enemy, but not necessarily from the Inspector General, is an
entirely natural objective.  Its imposition on a free society,
however, is quite another matter. 

    Let us begin by examining the monitoring requirement and ask
both whether it is essential to future law enforcement and what
measures would be required to make it work as planned. 

    Eavesdropping, as its name reminds us, is not a new phenomenon.
But in spite of the fact that police and spies have been doing it for
a long time, it has acquired a whole new dimension since the invention
of the telegraph.  Prior to electronic communication, it was a hit or
miss affair.  Postal services as we know them today are a fairly new
phenomenon and messages were carried by a variety of couriers,
travelers, and merchants.  Sensitive messages in particular, did
not necessarily go by standardized channels.  Paul Revere, who is
generally remembered for only one short ride, was the American
Revolution's courier, traveling routinely from Boston to
Philadelphia with his saddle bags full of political broadsides.


    Even when a letter was intercepted, opened, and read, there was
no guarantee, despite some people's great skill with flaps and seals,
that the victim would not notice the intrusion. 

    The development of the telephone, telegraph, and radio have
given the spies a systematic way of intercepting messages.  The
telephone provides a means of communication so effective and
convenient that even people who are aware of the danger routinely put
aside their caution and use it to convey sensitive information.
Digital switching has helped eavesdroppers immensely in automating
their activities and made it possible for them to do their listening a
long way from the target with negligible chance of detection. 

    Police work was not born with the invention of wiretapping and at
present the significance of wiretaps as an investigative tool is quite
limited.  Even if their phone calls were perfectly secure, criminals
would still be vulnerable to bugs in their offices, body wires on
agents, betrayal by co-conspirators who saw a brighter future in
cooperating with the police, and ordinary forensic inquiry.

    Moreover, cryptography, even without intentional back doors,
will no more guarantee that a criminal's communications are secure
than the Enigma guaranteed that German communications were secure
in World War II.  Traditionally, the richest source of success in
communications intelligence is the ubiquity of busts: failures to
use the equipment correctly.  

    Even if the best cryptographic equipment we know how to build 
is available to them, criminal communications will only be secure to
the degree that the criminals energetically pursue that goal.  The
question thus becomes, ``If criminals energetically pursue secure
communications, will a government standard with a built in inspection
port, stop them. 

    It goes without saying that unless unapproved cryptography is 
outlawed, and probably even if it is, users bent on not having their
communications read by the state will implement their own encryption.
If this requires them to forgo a broad variety of approved products,
it will be an expensive route taken only by the dedicated, but this
sacrifice does not appear to be necessary. 

    The law enforcement function of the Clipper system, as it has 
been described, is not difficult to bypass.  Users who have faith in
the secret Skipjack algorithm and merely want to protect themselves
from compromise via the Law Enforcement Exploitation Field, need only
encrypt that one item at the start of transmission.  In many systems,
this would require very small changes to supporting programs already
present.  This makes it likely that if Clipper chips become as freely
available as has been suggested, many products will employ them in
ways that defeat a major objective of the plan. 

    What then is the alternative?  In order to guarantee that
the government can always read Clipper traffic when it feels the need,
the construction of equipment will have to be carefully controlled
to prevent non-conforming implementations.  A major incentive that
has been cited for industry to implement products using the new
standard is that these will be required for communication with the
government.  If this strategy is successful, it is a club that few 
manufacturers will be able to resist.  The program therefore threatens
to bring communications manufacturers under an all encompassing 
regulatory regime. 

    It is noteworthy that such a regime already exists to govern
the manufacture of equipment designed to protect `unclassified but
sensitive' government information, the application for which Clipper
is to be mandated.  The program, called the Type II Commercial COMSEC
Endorsement Program, requires facility clearances, memoranda of
agreement with NSA, and access to secret `Functional Security
Requirements Specifications.'  Under this program member companies
submit designs to NSA and refine them in an iterative process before
they are approved for manufacture. 

    The rationale for this onerous procedure has always been, and
with much justification, that even though these manufacturers build
equipment around approved tamper resistant modules analogous to the
Clipper chip, the equipment must be carefully vetted to assure that
it provides adequate security.  One requirement that would likely be
imposed on conforming Clipper applications is that they offer no
alternative or additional encryption mechanisms. 

    Beyond the damaging effects that such regulation would have
on innovation in the communications and computer industries, we must
also consider the fact that the public cryptographic community has
been the principal source of innovation in cryptography.  Despite
NSA's undocumented claim to have discovered public key cryptography,
evidence suggests that, although they may have been aware of the
mathematics, they entirely failed to understand the significance.  The
fact that public key is now widely used in government as well as
commercial cryptographic equipment is a consequence of the public
community being there to show the way. 

    Farsightedness continues to characterize public research in 
cryptography, with steady progress toward acceptable schemes for
digital money, electronic voting, distributed contract negotiation,
and other elements of the computer mediated infrastructure of the
future. 

    Even in the absence of a draconian regulatory framework, the
effect of a secret standard, available only in a tamper resistant
chip, will be a profound increase in the prices of many computing
devices.  Cryptography is often embodied in microcode, mingled on
chips with other functions, or implemented in dedicated, but standard,
microprocessors at a tiny fraction of the tens of dollars per chip
that Clipper is predicted to cost.

    What will be the effect of giving one or a small number of
companies a monopoly on tamper resistant parts?  Will there come a
time, as occurred with DES, when NSA wants the standard changed even
though industry still finds it adequate for many applications?  If
that occurs will industry have any recourse but to do what it is told?
And who will pay for the conversion? 

    One of the little noticed aspects of this proposal is the
arrival of tamper resistant chips in the commercial arena.  Is this
tamper resistant part merely the precursor to many?  Will the open
competition to improve semiconductor computing that has characterized
the past twenty-years give way to an era of trade secrecy?  Is it
perhaps tamper resistance technology rather than cryptography that
should be regulated? 



    Recent years have seen a succession of technological 
developments that diminish the privacy available to the individual.
Cameras watch us in the stores, x-ray machines search us at the
airport, magnetometers look to see that we are not stealing from the
merchants, and databases record our actions and transactions.  Among
the gems of this invasion is the British Rafter technology that
enables observers to determine what station a radio or TV is
receiving.  Except for the continuing but ineffectual controversy
surrounding databases, these technologies flourish without so much as
talk of regulation.


    Cryptography is perhaps alone in its promise to give us more
privacy rather than less, but here we are told that we should forgo
this technical benefit and accept a solution in which the government
will retain the power to intercept our ever more valuable and intimate
communications and will allow that power to be limited only by policy.


    In discussion of the FBI's Digital Telephony Proposal --- which 
would have required communication providers, at great expense to
themselves, to build eavesdropping into their switches --- it was
continually emphasized that wiretaps were an exceptional investigative
measure only authorized when other measures had failed.  Absent was
any sense that were the country to make the proposed quarter billion
dollar inventment in intercept equipment, courts could hardly fail to
accept the police argument that a wiretap would save the people
thousands of dollars over other options.  As Don Cotter, at one time
director of Sandia National Laboratories, said in respect to military
strategy: ``Hardware makes policy.'' 

    Law, technology, and economics are three central elements of
society that must all be kept in harmony if freedom is to be secure.
An essential element of that freedom is the right to privacy, a right
that cannot be expected to stand against unremitting technological
attack.  Where technology has the capacity to support individual
rights, we must enlist that support rather than rejecting it on the
grounds that rights can be abused by criminals.  If we put the desires
of the police ahead of the rights of the citizens often enough, we
will shortly find that we are living in police state.  We must instead
assure that the rights recognized by law are supported rather than
undermined by technology.


    At NSA they believe in something they call `security in depth.'
Their most valuable secret may lie encrypted on a tamper resistant
chip, inside a safe, within a locked office, in a guarded building,
surrounded by barbed wire, on a military base.  I submit to you that
the most valuable secret in the world is the secret of democracy; that
technology and policy should go hand in hand in guarding that secret;
that it must be protected by security in depth.



			Recommendations

    There is a crying need for improved security in American
communication and computing equipment and the Administration is
largely correct when it blames the problem on a lack of standards.
One essential standard that is missing is a more secure conventional
algorithm to replace DES, an area of cryptography in which NSA's
expertise is probably second to none.  

    I urge the committee to take what is good in the
Administration's proposal and reject what is bad. \begdis

      o The Skipjack algorithm and every other aspect of this proposal
	should be made public, not only to expose them to public
	scrutiny but to guarantee that once made available as
	standards they will not be prematurely withdrawn.
	Configuration control techniques pioneered by the public
	community can be used to verify that some pieces of equipment
	conform to government standards stricter than the commercial
	where that is appropriate.

      o I likewise urge the committee to recognize that the right
	to private conversation must not be sacrificed as we move
	into a telecommunicated world and reject the Law Enforcement
	Exploitation Function and the draconian regulation that would
	necessarily come with it.

      o I further urge the committee to press the Administration
	to accept the need for a sound international security
	technology appropriate to the increasingly international
	character of the world's economy.





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: gnu (John Gilmore)
Date: Sun, 16 May 93 00:02:19 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Forestalling paranoia
Message-ID: <9305160702.AA03390@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


The Little Garden network, which connects toad.com to the Internet, 
was down today due to some scheduled power outages in a building
that our link goes through.  Fear not...if you sent something to
cypherpunks, it will get through when the power comes back on.

	John




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: nobody@alumni.cco.caltech.edu
Date: Sun, 16 May 93 13:24:42 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: No Subject
Message-ID: <9305160934.AA12398@alumni.cco.caltech.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


This is the second of two documents I received anonymously. Maybe they're
real, maybe they're forgeries. Decide for yourself.


>Here are exerpts of the .......... of Mykotronx,
>
>the Torrance Based Big-Brother outfit that is going
>
>to make the Clinton Clipper wiretap chip.  I have
>
>left off their chart of accounts numbers, since you
>
>don't care about that.  .........


>
>Period: 01/01/93 to 04/30/93  (first 4 months of 1993)
>
> 
>
>Acct Descr              Beg Bal         Debits          Credits
>
> 
>
>==1000 series==
>
>Shearson Lehman         286,511         2,620,096       2,670,822
>
>Paine Webber            95,602          868             0
>
>Dean Whitter            55,391          484             0
>
>Petty Cash              3,000           0               0
>
>Union bank payroll act  13,408          900,000         816,443
>
>Accts rcvbl -customer   1,185,829       1,981,356       2,562,064
>
>Accts rcvbl - eployees  7,125           48,450          55,575
>
>Franchise tx rcvbl      2,165           0               0
>
>Unbilled costs&fees     567,792         533,347         0
>
>Raw inventory           172,252         0               76,064
>
>Prepaid taxes           1,116           0               0
>
>Prepaid sales tax       688             0               688
>
>Equp/mach/furn          383,038         20,695          0
>
>Accum depreciation      234,425         0               23,000
>
>Deposits                9,272           0               0
>
> 
>
>==2000 series==
>
>Accts Payable           482,895CR       1,869,477       1,684,555
>
>Sales tax payable       147CR           176             0
>
>Sales tax paid          0               0               0
>
>FIT withheld            0               10,854          135,741
>
>FICA withheld           0               0               56,622
>
>CA state IT withh       0               0               36,163
>
>CA state disability     0               0               8,730
>
>SUI pybl employer       0               0               5,788
>
>FUTA payable            0               0               2,007
>
>FICA employer           0               0               56,621
>
>Pd Payroll txs withh    0               290,820         0
>
>401K withheld           0               0               42,712
>
>Accrued payroll         25,637CR        343,682         318,045
>
>Dental withheld         0               0               674
>
>Dental plan pd          0               674             0
>
>Withh 401K pd           0               42,712          0
>
>Accrued bonuses         214,040         341,240         127,200
>
>(holy shit - I wish I worked for a place that paid bonuses like that!)
>
>Accrued Vacation        44,252          0               0
>
>Excess billings         139,216         154,706         55,036
>
>Gross payroll           0               751,859         0
>
>Gross payroll distrd    0               2,552           754,412
>
>Lease obligations       4,911CR         0               0
>
> 
>
>==3000 series==
>
>Common Stock            169,320         0               61,435
>
>Capital disbursement    916,675         222,230         0
>
>Retd Earnings, begng    2,385,020CR     0               0
>
> 
>
>==4000 series==
>
>Sales, returns&allowc   0               6,014           2,577,323
>
>Interest income         0               0               1,353
>
>Int income tax free     0               0               2,490
>
> 
>
> 
>
>==5000 series==
>
>Consultants             0               47,395          47,395
>
>Subcontracts            0               932,210         110,419
>
>Other direct costs      0               62,265          5,454
>
>Printing/repro costs    0               542             0
>
>Equipment rental/leasg  0               1,537           1,537
>
>Maint, repairs          0               1,761           0
>
>Delivery                0               3,217           0
>
>Postage                 0               960             0
>
>Materials/parts         0               186,252         22,423
>
>Telephone               0               93              0
>
>Travel                  0               10,437          0
>
>Inv Cost of Mfg Prod    0               76,064          0
>
>Direct labor-Engnrg     0               240,341         54,172
>
>Direct labor-Technician 0               129,839         37,459
>
>Direct labor-Adminst    0               47,542          10,081
>
> 
>
> 
>
>==6000 series==
>
>Indirect labor          0               60,319          0
>
>Holidays                0               32,867          27,331
>
>Sick leave              0               3,276           0
>
>Vacation                0               38,096          25,976
>
>Retroactive pay         0               4,400           0
>
>Job advertisments       0               655             0
>
>Grp Med Ins non sharhl  0               25,522          1,818
>
>Mykotronx pd payrl txs  0               64,417          0
>
>Workers comp            0               9,554           1,418
>
>Interest pd             0               0               0
>
>Consultants             0               2,013           0
>
>ADP Acctg               0               1,493           0
>
>Real World Acct Suppt   0               1,485           0
>
>Bank charges            0               155             0
>
>Blueprints/repro        0               390             0
>
>Proposals               0               2,817           0
>
>Copier expense          0               514             0
>
>Depreciation - elec eq  0               23,000          0
>
>Dues & memberships      0               749             0
>
>Education & Training    0               2,850           0
>
>Employee relations      0               4,531           0
>
>Business expense        0               7,431           0
>
>Equip rental/lsng       0               4,458           0
>
>Computer software       0               2,114           0
>
>Insurance               0               9,061           1,380
>
>Janitorial              0               20              0
>
>Licenses & Permits      0               175             0
>
>Maint, repairs          0               2,096           0
>
>Delivery                0               995             13
>
>Postage                 0               942             0
>
>Amort organiz expense   0               0               0
>
>Taxes - franchise       0               2,763           0
>
>Real & Pers prop tax    0               0               0
>
>Rent                    0               54,080          0
>
>Subscriptions/books     0               325             0
>
>Office/lab supplies     0               14,183          446
>
>Telephone               0               7,961           36
>
>Travel                  0               10,296          1,303
>
>Utilities               0               5,833           0
>
>LTD Ins, non sharehld   0               2,877           594
>
>401K Mykotronx contrib  0               17,411          0
>
> 
>
> 
>
>==7000 series==
>
>Special Bonus           0               132,200         123,200
>
>(Double holy shit!)
>
>G&A Labor               0               103,4520        0
>
>Legal Services          0               5,895           0
>
>Board of Dir Expnse     0               1,078           0
>
>Financial Svc           0               7,505           0
>
> 
>
>Totals                  0               12,555,101      12,555,101
>
> 
>
> 
>
> 
>
>Other little items:
>
> 
>
>Locks at Mykotronx installed and maintained by Torrance Lock and Key,
>
>2421 Torrance Bl.  Torrance, CA 90501  (310) 320-8840  For some
>
>reason, Mykotronx is over 90 days late paying a lousy $50 invoice.
>
> 
>
>Mykotronx has a Mossler safe.  It cost $1,693 when they bought it
>
>11/27/90.  They have never changed the combination.
>
> 
>
>Outstanding VLSI purchase orders:
>
>VLSI Tech (Capstone)            $212,000
>
>AT&T (Myk-78)                   $71,200
>
>Motorola (Myk-77)               $76,200
>
>AT&T (Misc)                     $100,000
>
>Compass (Software)              $159,400
>
>VLSI Tech (Myk-78)              $66,200
>
>Litronics (PCMCIA Crypto)       $225,000
>
>VLSI Tech (Expoteniator)        $163,000
>
>VLSI Tech (Capstone TFQP)       $10,000
>
>VLSI Tech (Myk-78 fix)          $68,500
>
>VLSI Tech (Myk-78A proto)       $11,000
>
>VLSI Tech (Myk-78A prod.)       $220,000
>
>VLSI Tech (Myk-80 #1)           $48,000
>
>VLSI Tech (Myk-80 #2)           $33,750
>
>VLSI Tech (Myk-82)              $80,000
>
>VLSI Tech (Myk-79)              $79,500
>
> 
>
> 
>
> 
>
>Their LAN was installed by Strategies, Inc for about $14,000.
>
>
>-- 






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Anonymous <nowhere@bsu-cs.bsu.edu>
Date: Sun, 16 May 93 12:34:09 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: No Subject
Message-ID: <9305160940.AA13873@bsu-cs.bsu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Info on Mykotronx! First of Two Documents.

(This info was sent to me anonymously. I have no idea if it's real,
accurate, bogus, etc. Maybe it's real. This may help us in some way.
Considering what Mykotronx has planned for us, publishing this stuff is
justified. Just take it with a grain of salt. It could be fake.)


>Howdy.  The following is a sampling of the information I was
>able to grab....
.......[stuff deleted to better protect source]......
>and their entire general ledger.  Will post more as I get the
>time.  Do not disclose the origin of this document (me) but
>you can publish it if you like to show that the people the 
>government wants us to trust to keep the Clipper design
>secret, don't know jack shit about security.
> 
>
> 
>Information:
> 
>Mykotronx Inc.
>357 Van Ness Way (1 blk so. of Del Amo)
>Suite 200
>Torrance CA 90501
>(310) 533-8100
>fax (310) 533-0527
>STU III (310) 533-0738
>Founded 1979
> 
>Resale # SR-AB 12-711252
>Dunn & Bradstreet # 00-611-5281
> 
>Banking: Shearson Lehman Brothers
>         Attn: Steve Scerra
>         Acct # 509 24261 12011
>         21250 Hawthorne Bl
>         Torrance, CA 90509
>         (310) 540-9511
> 
>Employee Names:
> 
>Bob Gottfried, CEO
>Leonard J. Baker, President
>Ralph O' Connell, aka "The Father of COMSEC", NSA Lobbyist
>Mike Furusawa, Space COMSEC Manager
>Patti Linahan, Executive Secretary
>Kikuo Ogawa, Buyer
>R. Todd, W. Greenfield, KG-44B (Outrunner) Project
>John C. Droge, Personnel
>Bob Todd, Manufacturing Manager
>Landy Riley, Engineering
> 
>Federal Express Acct # 1122-7492-8
> 
>NSA Contact Home Address:
>Ralph O' Connell
>1401 Woodbridge Road
>Baltimore, MD 21228
>(301) 747-6276
>Principle NSA Technical Contact:
>National Security Agency
>Maryland Procurement Office  
>Attn: N244 (CEB) (MDA904-92-G-0354/J.O. 5001)
>9800 Savage Road
>Fort George G. Meade, MD 20755-6000
>(301) 688-8086
> 
>NSA Accounting Contact:
>National Security Agency
>Maryland Procurement Office
>Finance and Accounting Office
>9800 Savage Road
>Fort George G. Meade, MD 20755-6000
>(301) 859-6715
> 
>KG-46 Tactical Decryptor Unit and
>KG-48B Outrunner Provisioning Conference participants:
>Robert Todd, Mykotronx
>Bill Greenfield, Mykotronx
>G. Burgio, NSA
>J. Gochnour, NSA
>J. Wimpy, Air Force Computer Systems Command
>S. Solis, Air Force Computer Systems Command
> 
>To Be Discussed at meeting May 18 & 19, 1993
> 
>Outrunner Project Milestone Payments:
> 
>1.  Preliminary Studies         $268,074        2/14/92
>2.  Place Subcontract w/ VLSI    $47,917        2/22/92
>3.  Complete PDR KG-44B          $61,431        4/13/92
>4.  Complete PDR VLSI            $71,090        5/19/92
>5.  Complete SFA Review VLSI     $78,470        7/12/92
>6.  Complete CDR VLSI           $106,638        7/17/92
>7.  Complete first KG-44B       $166,641        8/12/92
>8.  Complete CDR                $132,454        6/18/92
>9.  Complete tests 1st KG-48B   $151,957        12/16/92
>10. Complete fab VLSI           $203,941        11/17/92
>11a.Deliver 2 KG-44B to NSA      $81,080        9/8/92
>11b.Deliver 2 KG-44B to NSA      $81,081        10/7/92
>12. Complete Cryto Verif VLSI   $152,223        12/16/92
>13. Deliver 4 KG-44B to NSA     $171,571        3/2/93
>14a.Deliver 2 KG-44B to NSA      $30,432        3/30/93
>14b.Deliver 2 KG-44B to NSA      $30,432        4/20/93
>15. Deliver 4 KG-44B to NSA      $60,864        4/24/93
>16a.Deliver 1 KG-44B to NSA      $15,216        4/28/93
>16b.Deliver 3 KG-44B to NSA      $45,648        5/12/93
>17. Deliver 4 KG-44B to NSA      $42,840        5/13/93
> 
>Total:                        $2,000,000
> 
> 
>KG-44 VLSI Procurement:
>United Technologies Microelectronics Center
>1575 Garden of the Gods Road
>Colorodo Springs, CO 80907
>PO#5703-44ACN1 Feb 19, 1992
>Invoice Date Feb 5, 1993
>"Customer to pick up parts.  Secret item handling.
>Secret Design KG-44LSI.  Mykotronx P/N M20/00301XXX"
>Government contract # MDA904-92-C-A027
>Group C Testing:        $4,400
>5 Parts @ $675ea        $3,375
>Job #BE-7281 Group C Samples
>PIC Number: HP67AG84WTDLC
>"Note: Group B samples also included with this shipment (ref 
>Packlist #10128"
>"The export of this product is controlled by the US Government.
>The export of this product or the disclosure of related technical
>data to foreign nationals without the appropriate export license
>is prohibited by law."
> 
>Test Plan for MYK-80:
>Statement of Work for Exatron Inc. 5/13/93
>Develop test interface board for MYK-80 (176 pin TQFP) and
>I.M.S. tester.  Interface to utilize "particle interconnect"
>system.  Data on MYK-80 I.O. and IMS tester to be supplied
>by Mykotronx.
>Interface board to be installed in a work station which utilizes
>Exatron "PET" handler, tooled for the MYK-80; a vacuum pick-up
>device (manual, pencil type); work surfaces for JEDEC tray
>storage and operator support.  The IMS tester will mount directly
>under the "PET" handler.  Two "PET" handlers are to be quoted
>with two sets of specific nesting tools for the MYK-80.
>Installation in place at Mykotronx and initial operator and
>maintenance training to be included.
>Design review of the interface board layout, prior to release of
>the board to fabrication is to be held at Mykotronx.
> 
>
>
>Manuals and Training Manuals subcontracted to:
>
>ELITE Technical Corporation
>Warren A. Griswold, President
>1903 B Marshallfield Lane
>Redondo Beach, CA 90278 
>(310) 372-5616
> 
> 
>CAPSTONE Financial Commitments by Mykotronx
> 
>Basic VII Cap VLSI 10                   $212,000
>Sun 1 Yr maint hw&sw                      $2,700
>Compass                                 $159,400
>IKOS Systems & sw                        $57,500
>ELITE Technical Corp                      $8,000
>IMS/Sun                                 $119,000
>Versatec Plotter                         $36,500
>SJ (1)                                   $71,200
>SJ (2)                                   $76,200
>Exatron Test System                      $78,000
>ROM Cell                                 $60,000
>AT&T                                    $100,000
>Surf Mgt (real estate)                   $13,900
>Universal Shielding (Tempest)            $20,600
>Plotter maint                             $5,000
>Litronics                               $225,000
>Spyrus (1)                               $45,600
>Spyrus (2)                               $44,800
>Compass (2)                             $110,000
>VLSI Tech                                $30,000
>VLSI Tech (2)                           $163,000
>VLSI Tech CAPSTONE TQFP                  $10,000
>New Media NRE Design                     $18,700
>South Coast Designers                    $14,600
>South Coast                               $6,000
>VLSI Tech Exponeniator Tamper Sys       $163,000
>Conres logic analyzer                     $3,200
>VLSI Myk-78 tester                       $33,800
>


..end...





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: deltorto@aol.com
Date: Sun, 16 May 93 12:32:05 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: End of the Universe Hacked
Message-ID: <9305160615.tn21936@aol.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Hi Everybody,

This is FYI.

Apologies for any overlaps if you get this twice. Note: I was in the
Netherlands last year and crashed/partied with these guys and gals and
they're ALL RIGHT kinds-a folks. This should be a real feth-ti-val for those
who can make it over there. The central Netherlands area is noted for the
lack of a "There" there, but what they lack in "There-ness," they more than
make up for with a wonderful sense of wackiness.

   Subliminal Hint:  l e t ' s   a l l   g o ...

Peace,
          ^ ^
  dave    '['                      ...Clip the Clipper Chip!
           u 
 
-------------------------------------------------------------------
H A C K I N G   A T   T H E   E N D   O F   T H E   U N I V E R S E
-------------------------------------------------------------------

                                     An 'in-tents' summer congress
H U H?
-------

Remember the Galactic Hacker Party back in 1989? Ever wondered what
happened to the people behind it? We sold out to big business, you
think. Think again, we're back!

That's right. On august 4th, 5th and 6th 1993, we're organising a
three-day summer congress for hackers, phone phreaks, programmers,
computer haters, data travellers, electro-wizards, networkers, hardware
freaks, techno-anarchists, communications junkies, cyberpunks, system
managers, stupid users, paranoid androids, Unix gurus, whizz kids, warez
dudes, law enforcement officers (appropriate undercover dress required),
guerilla heating engineers and other assorted bald, long-haired and/or
unshaven scum. And all this in the middle of nowhere (well, the middle
of Holland, actually, but that's the same thing) at the Larserbos
campground four metres below sea level.

The three days will be filled with lectures, discussions and workshops
on hacking, phreaking, people's networks, Unix security risks, virtual
reality, semafun, social engineering, magstrips, lockpicking,
virusses, paranoia, legal sanctions against hacking in Holland and
elsewhere and much, much more. English will be the lingua franca for
this event, although some workshops may take place in Dutch. There
will be an Internet connection, an intertent ethernet and social
interaction (both electronic and live). Included in the price are four
nights in your own tent. Also included are inspiration, transpiration,
a shortage of showers (but a lake to swim in), good weather
(guaranteed by god), campfires and plenty of wide open space and fresh
air. All of this for only 100 dutch guilders (currently around US$70).

We will also arrange for the availability of food, drink and smokes of
assorted types, but this is not included in the price. Our bar will be
open 24 hours a day, as well as a guarded depository for valuables
(like laptops, cameras etc.). You may even get your stuff back! For
people with no tent or air matress: you can buy a tent through us for
100 guilders, a matress costs 10 guilders. You can arrive from 17:00
(that's five p.m. for analogue types) on August 3rd. We don't have to
vacate the premises until 12:00 noon on Saturday, August 7 so you can
even try to sleep through the devastating Party at the End of Time
(PET) on the closing night (live music provided). We will arrange for
shuttle buses to and from train stations in the vicinity.


H O W ?
-------

Payment: In advance only. Even poor techno-freaks like us would like
to get to the Bahamas at least once, and if enough cash comes in we
may just decide to go. So pay today, or tomorrow, or yesterday, or in
any case before Friday, June 25th 1993. Since the banks still haven't
figured out why the Any key doesn't work for private international
money transfers, you should call, fax or e-mail us for the best way to
launder your currency into our account. We accept American Express,
even if they do not accept us. But we are more understanding than they
are. Foreign cheques go directly into the toilet paper recycling bin
for the summer camp, which is about all they're good for here.


H A !
-----

Very Important: Bring many guitars and laptops.


M E ?
-----

Yes, you! Busloads of alternative techno-freaks from all over the
planet will descend on this event. You wouldn't want to miss that,
now, would you?

Maybe you are part of that select group that has something special to
offer! Participating in 'Hacking at the End of the Universe' is
exciting, but organising your very own part of it is even more fun. We
already have a load of interesting workshops and lectures scheduled,
but we're always on the lookout for more. We're also still in the
market for people who want to help us organize this during the
congress.

In whatever way you wish to participate, call, write, e-mail or fax us
soon, and make sure your money gets here on time. Space is limited.


S O :
-----

> 4th, 5th and 6th of August

> Hacking at the End of the Universe
      (a hacker summer congress)

> ANWB groepsterrein Larserbos
      (Flevopolder, Netherlands)

> Cost: fl. 100,- (+/- 70 US$) per person
      (including 4 nights in your own tent)


M O R E   I N F O :
-------------------

Hack-Tic
Postbus 22953
1100 DL  Amsterdam
The Netherlands

tel     : +31 20 6001480
fax     : +31 20 6900968
E-mail  : heu@hacktic.nl

V I R U S :
-----------
If you know a forum or network that you feel this message belongs on,
by all means slip it in. Echo-areas, your favorite bbs, /etc/motd, IRC,
WP.BAT, you name it. Spread the worm, uh, word.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: x62727g2@usma8.USMA.EDU (Gatlin Anthony CDT)
Date: Sun, 16 May 93 13:26:35 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: List
Message-ID: <9305162022.AA13690@usma8.usma.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I think I may have somehow gotten wiped off the mailing list. I haven't
received in cypherpunk mail in 3 days.

Anthony J. Gatlin                  |-------------------------------------|
Cadet Private, Co. G-2             |PGP Public Key available on request. |
United States Military Academy     |-------------------------------------|




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Paco Xander Nathan <wixer!wixer.bga.com!pacoid@cactus.org>
Date: Tue, 18 May 93 07:43:27 PDT
To: x62727g2@usma8.USMA.EDU (Gatlin Anthony CDT)
Subject: Re: Publications
In-Reply-To: <9305121958.AA14189@usma8.usma.edu>
Message-ID: <9305170042.AA15814@wixer>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


"Sent from the cyberdeck of: Gatlin Anthony CDT"

> Greetings fellow crypto warriors,
>      I am attempting to locate several publications to see if they are still
> in existence and where I might them or archives of previous issues. The
> publications I am interested in are TAP, NIA, AOTD, NARC, etc. If anyone
> knows where I might be able to obtain these or similar publications, please
> let me know. Also, does anyone know where any "interesting" ftp sites which
> carry files or other data related to these type publications?
> 
> Thanks,
> 
> Anthony J. Gatlin                  |-------------------------------------|
> Cadet Private, Co. G-2             |PGP Public Key available on request. |
> United States Military Academy     |-------------------------------------|

Geez, this is great..  I was a cadet in F-2 company, but I forget
which company Leary was in - glad to see our subversion has taken
hold in all the old bastions!!

paco xander nathan




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: poier@sfu.ca (na-Baron Feyd-Rautha Harkonnen)
Date: Sun, 16 May 93 22:37:55 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Double encryption
Message-ID: <9305170537.AA17406@malibu.sfu.ca>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Hi.

Being the security freak that I am, even with military grade encryption (for
whatever THATS worth) I feel a little insecure, as most routines are, as far
as I can tell, still succeptable to at the least brute force attacks. I was
wondering: how to cracking programs determine that they have successfully
decrypted a file? Does it simply look for english text (or file headers etc)?
If so, how about double-encrypting a file with two completely different and
very complex programs? Then, even if it did get the first, it couldn't tell
because the resulting data would still be largely gobbledegook.

Probably a stupid question, but I was curious.
Skye
--
"Thppt bwach oop ack" - Bill the Cat | -----====> Skye Merlin Poier <====-----
PGP Public Key available on request  | Undergrad in CMPT/MATH (Virtual Reality)
!!!!!!! FIGHT CLIPPER / LEEF !!!!!!! |          email: poier@sfu.ca




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Mike Godwin <mnemonic@eff.org>
Date: Sun, 16 May 93 22:01:01 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Washington Post story
Message-ID: <199305170501.AA01977@eff.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Look for a major story in the Washington Post about Clipper, Digital
Telephony, and related matters. It will be coming any day now and should
get major play. The reporters are John Schwartz and John Mintz.



-Mike







From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Not MY universe!  17-May-1993 0927 <yerazunis@aidev.enet.dec.com>
Date: Mon, 17 May 93 06:51:23 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: re: Double encryption
Message-ID: <9305171347.AA19553@enet-gw.pa.dec.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Skye asks (upon brute-force attacks):

>If so, how about double-encrypting a file with two completely different and
>very complex programs? Then, even if it did get the first, it couldn't tell
>because the resulting data would still be largely gobbledegook.

Maybe.  The question is the same as the mathematical question "does
the encryption algorithm form a group?". 

"Groupness" refers to whether two applications of an encryption can
be collapsed (by some arbitrary key) into a single application of
the same encryption.  [or, for two differing encryptions, a single 
application of some algorithm either less complex than the sum of the
two original encryptions, or using a key shorter than the two original
keys...]

For example, consider Caesar rotations.  Here, the key is just a number
from 0 to 26 and rot13 (rotation by 13, a->n, being the USENET standard
for encrypting dirty jokes).  We can "collapse" any pair of Caesar
rotations into a new single rotation; it's just rotate for the sum of the  
two keys.  So, Caesar rotations form a group, and it does no good to
encrypt twice, because brute force needs to solve only one problem,
not two, as combinatorics would suggest.

But what about something more... interesting?  Say, a Caesar rotation
followed by a N-skipped version of the alphabet (for N=1, this is 
the identity alphabet, for N=2, the alphabet is "a,c,e,g,i,k,m,o,q,s,u,w,
y,b,d,f,h,j,l,n,p,r,t,v,x,z", for N=3, it's "a,d,g,...".)  Now, there's
no possibility of collapsing the two encryptions into one operation; 
no Caesar rotation can give any of the N-skip alphabets (except the 
trivial case of N=0), and most pairings of Caesar rotations followed
by skipping alphabets cannot be faked by either a Caesar rotation 
or a skip-alphabet alone.  

Thus, we can say that Caesar followed by N-skip "does not form a group"
and so is as hard to crack by brute force as combinatorics suggest.

Back in the early days of DES, it was not known if DES encryption 
followed by another DES encryption formed a group.  That's why triple
DES encryption was designed to use an intermediate DEcryption (not encryption)
stage, so that even if double-DES-encryption formed a group, 
encryption/decryption/encryption would not (since it's possible to
DES-encrypt any possible message stream, therefore some set of 
cyphertext bits corresponds to some possible plaintext, and that
plaintext can be reencoded) and so it would not be possible to
collapse the first two operations into a single DES encode, collapse
the <first+second> and the third into yet another single encode and
thereby save much time for the brute force attack.

However, it's now been proven that DES encode followed by DES encode
does NOT form a group, and so it doesn't really matter any more.

>Probably a stupid question, but I was curious.

No, it's an *excellent* question. 

	-Bill




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Eric Hughes <hughes@soda.berkeley.edu>
Date: Mon, 17 May 93 09:07:36 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Double encryption
In-Reply-To: <9305171347.AA19553@enet-gw.pa.dec.com>
Message-ID: <9305171604.AA28888@soda.berkeley.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Re: group properties of ciphers, speaking of E1 D2 E3 DES mode:

>Back in the early days of DES, it was not known if DES encryption 
>followed by another DES encryption formed a group.  That's why triple
>DES encryption was designed to use an intermediate DEcryption (not encryption)

That's not at all the reason.  One of the properties of groups is that
inverses exist.  If an inverse existed to DES encryption, then to
every encryption key K, there would correspond some unique other
encryption key L, such that that encryption by L was the same as
decryption by K.  Thus if DES formed a group, mixing inverses would
have no effect.

The reason for the inverses is for backward compatibility.  By setting
all the keys equal to each other, its the same as a single DES.  If
you encrypt EEE, you can't get backward compatibility since no DES key
yields the identity function.

Eric




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Eric S Theise <estheise@well.sf.ca.us>
Date: Mon, 17 May 93 13:21:27 PDT
To: nobody@well.sf.ca.us (Jeremy Hillary Boob)
Subject: May Modern Times event
Message-ID: <199305172021.AA03202@well.sf.ca.us>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Thought some of you might be interested in Wednesday's Jacking
In/Cyberspace Literacy event ...

Jacking In: A Series on Cyberspace Literacy presents
ONLINE COMMUNITIES AROUND THE BAY: THE INNS AND THEIR KEEPERS

Every computer-based conferencing system lets its subscribers access 
relevant community information and discuss topics ranging from Apple 
Computers to zymurgy.  While these systems are all based on the same 
conceptual model, each one evolves its own personality and community 
standards based on underlying software, management policies, and, 
ultimately, the subscribers it attracts.

This installment of Jacking In will feature a talk about building and 
nourishment of online community, followed by community-conscious 
demonstrations of several San Francisco-based conferencing systems.

In cyberspace, community is not geography.

John Coate, "Building Online Community"
Wayne Gregori, SF Net
Alex Liberman, 101 Online
Gail Ann Williams, The WELL


Wednesday, May 19, 7:30 p.m.
$3-$5 sliding scale
Modern Times Bookstore
888 Valencia (19th/20th)
San Francisco, CA 94110
(415) 282-9246




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Eric Hughes <hughes@soda.berkeley.edu>
Date: Mon, 17 May 93 14:39:40 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: NIST answers to RSADSI questions
Message-ID: <9305172136.AA23367@soda.berkeley.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Date: Mon, 17 May 93 14:04:46 PDT
From: jim@RSA.COM (Jim Bidzos)
Subject: [ROBACK@ECF.NCSL.NIST.GOV: Answers to Your Questions]


FYI. NIST has responded to my questions. Feel free to distribute.

-Jim



Date:    Mon, 17 May 1993 16:44:28 -0400 (EDT)
From: ROBACK@ECF.NCSL.NIST.GOV
Subject: Answers to Your Questions
To: jim@RSA.COM
X-Vmsmail-To: SMTP%"jim@rsa.com"


To:  Mr. Jim Bidzos, RSA Data Security, Inc.

From:  Ed Roback, NIST

Mr. Ray Kammer asked me to forward to you our answers to the questions you
raised in your e-mail of 4/27.  

We've inserted our answers in your original message.  

------------------------------------------------------
From:       SMTP%"jim@RSA.COM" 27-APR-1993 03:13:12.75
To:   clipper@csrc.ncsl.nist.gov
CC:   
Subj:       Clipper questions




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Eric Hughes <hughes@soda.berkeley.edu>
Date: Mon, 17 May 93 15:53:59 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: No Subject
Message-ID: <9305172250.AA01413@soda.berkeley.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Date: Mon, 17 May 93 14:04:46 PDT
From: jim@RSA.COM (Jim Bidzos)
Subject: [ROBACK@ECF.NCSL.NIST.GOV: Answers to Your Questions]


FYI. NIST has responded to my questions. Feel free to distribute.

-Jim



Date:    Mon, 17 May 1993 16:44:28 -0400 (EDT)
From: ROBACK@ECF.NCSL.NIST.GOV
Subject: Answers to Your Questions
To: jim@RSA.COM
X-Vmsmail-To: SMTP%"jim@rsa.com"


To:  Mr. Jim Bidzos, RSA Data Security, Inc.

From:  Ed Roback, NIST

Mr. Ray Kammer asked me to forward to you our answers to the questions you
raised in your e-mail of 4/27.  

We've inserted our answers in your original message.  

------------------------------------------------------
From:       SMTP%"jim@RSA.COM" 27-APR-1993 03:13:12.75
To:   clipper@csrc.ncsl.nist.gov
CC:   
Subj:       Clipper questions




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Eric Hughes <hughes@soda.berkeley.edu>
Date: Mon, 17 May 93 16:20:46 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Third time's the charm
Message-ID: <9305172317.AA05426@soda.berkeley.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


OK.  This time this should work.  The previous file had some periods
on lines by themselves; this was causing my sendmail overhere to think
the end of transmission had arrived.  Damn in-band signalling.

Eric
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
Date: Mon, 17 May 93 14:04:46 PDT
From: jim@RSA.COM (Jim Bidzos)
Subject: [ROBACK@ECF.NCSL.NIST.GOV: Answers to Your Questions]


FYI. NIST has responded to my questions. Feel free to distribute.

-Jim



Date:    Mon, 17 May 1993 16:44:28 -0400 (EDT)
From: ROBACK@ECF.NCSL.NIST.GOV
Subject: Answers to Your Questions
To: jim@RSA.COM
X-Vmsmail-To: SMTP%"jim@rsa.com"


To:  Mr. Jim Bidzos, RSA Data Security, Inc.

From:  Ed Roback, NIST

Mr. Ray Kammer asked me to forward to you our answers to the questions you
raised in your e-mail of 4/27.  

We've inserted our answers in your original message.  

------------------------------------------------------
From:       SMTP%"jim@RSA.COM" 27-APR-1993 03:13:12.75
To:   clipper@csrc.ncsl.nist.gov
CC:   
Subj:       Clipper questions



Date: Tue, 27 Apr 93 00:11:50 PDT
From: jim@RSA.COM (Jim Bidzos)

Here are some questions about the Clipper program I would like to
submit.

Much has been said about Clipper and Capstone (the term Clipper will
be used to describe both) recently.  Essentially, Clipper is a
government-sponsored tamper-resistant chip that employs a classified
algorithm and a key escrow facility that allows law enforcement, with
the cooperation of two other parties, to decipher Clipper-encrypted
traffic.  The stated purpose of the program is to offer
telecommunications privacy to individuals, businesses, and government,
while protecting the ability of law enforcement to conduct
court-authorized wiretapping.

The announcement said, among other things, that there is currently no
plan to attempt to legislate Clipper as the only legal means to
protect telecommunications.  Many have speculated that Clipper, since
it is only effective in achieving its stated objectives if everyone
uses it, will be followed by legislative attempts to make it the only
legal telecommunications protection allowed. This remains to be seen.

>>>>  NIST:       There are no current plans to legislate the use of Clipper. 
                  Clipper will be a government standard, which can be - and
                  likely will be - used voluntarily by the private sector. The
                  option for legislation may be examined during the policy
                  review ordered by the President.

The proposal, taken at face value, still raises a number of serious
questions.

What is the smallest number of people who are in a position to
compromise the security of the system? This would include people
employed at a number of places such as Mikotronyx, VSLI, NSA, FBI,
and at the trustee facilities.  Is there an available study on the
cost and security risks of the escrow process?

>>>>  NIST:       It will not be possible for anyone from Mykotronx, VLSI,
                  NIST, NSA, FBI (or any other non-escrow holder) to
                  compromise the system.  Under current plans, it would be
                  necessary for three persons, one from each of the escrow
                  trustees and one who knows the serial number of the Clipper
                  Chip which is the subject of the court authorized electronic
                  intercept by the outside law enforcement agency, to conspire
                  in order to compromise escrowed keys.  To prevent this, it
                  is envisioned that every time a law enforcement agency is
                  provided access to the escrowed keys there will be a record
                  of same referencing the specific lawful intercept
                  authorization (court order).  Audits will be performed to
                  assure strict compliance.  This duplicates the protection
                  afforded nuclear release codes.  If additional escrow agents
                  are added, one additional person from each would be required
                  to compromise the system.  NSA's analysis on the security
                  risks of the escrow system is not available for public
                  dissemination.

How were the vendors participating in the program chosen? Was the
process open?

>>>> NIST:        The services of the current chip vendors were obtained in
                  accordance with U.S. Government rules for sole source
                  procurement, based on unique capabilities they presented. 
                  Criteria for selecting additional sources will be
                  forthcoming over the next few months.  

                  AT&T worked with the government on a voluntary basis to use
                  the "Clipper Chip" in their Telephone Security Device.  Any
                  vendors of equipment who would like to use the chips in
                  their equipment may do so, provided they meet proper
                  government security requirements.

A significant percentage of US companies are or have been the subject
of an investigation by the FBI, IRS, SEC, EPA, FTC, and other
government agencies. Since records are routinely subpoenaed, shouldn't
these companies now assume that all their communications are likely
compromised if they find themselves the subject of an investigation by
a government agency?  If not, why not?

>>>> NIST:        No.  First of all, there is strict and limited use of
                  subpoenaed material under the Federal Rules of Criminal
                  Procedure and sanctions for violation.  There has been no
                  evidence to date of Governmental abuse of subpoenaed
                  material, be it encrypted or not.  Beyond this, other
                  Federal criminal and civil statutes protect and restrict the
                  disclosure of proprietary business information, trade
                  secrets, etc.  Finally, of all the Federal agencies cited,
                  only the FBI has statutory authority to conduct authorized
                  electronic surveillance.  Electronic surveillance is
                  conducted by the FBI only after a Federal judge agrees that
                  there is probable cause indicating that a specific
                  individual or individuals are using communications in
                  furtherance of serious criminal activity and issues a court
                  order to the FBI authorizing the interception of the
                  communications. 

What companies or individuals in industry were consulted (as stated
in the announcement) on this program prior to its announcement? (This
question seeks to identify those who may have been involved at the
policy level; certainly ATT, Mikotronyx and VLSI are part of
industry, and surely they were involved in some way.)

>>>> NIST:        To the best of our knowledge: AT&T, Mykotronx, VLSI, and
                  Motorola.  Other firms were briefed on the project, but not
                  "consulted," per se.

Is there a study available that estimates the cost to the US
government of the Clipper program? 

>>>> NIST:        No studies have been conducted on a government-wide basis to
                  estimate the costs of telecommunications security
                  technologies.  The needs for such protection are changing
                  all the time.

There are a number of companies that employ non-escrowed cryptography
in their products today.  These products range from secure voice,
data, and fax to secure email, electronic forms, and software
distribution, to name but a few.  With over a million such products in
use today, what does the Clipper program envision for the future of
these products and the many corporations and individuals that have
invested in and use them?  Will the investment made by the vendors in
encryption-enhanced products be protected? If so, how?  Is it
envisioned that they will add escrow features to their products or be
asked to employ Clipper?  

>>>> NIST:        Again, the Clipper Chip is a government standard which can
                  be used voluntarily by those in the private sector.  We also
                  point out that the President's directive on "Public
                  Encryption Management" stated: "In making this decision, I
                  do not intend to prevent the private sector from developing,
                  or the government from approving, other microcircuits or
                  algorithms that are equally effective in assuring both
                  privacy and a secure key-escrow system."  You will have to
                  consult directly with private firms as to whether they will
                  add escrow features to their products.

Since Clipper, as currently defined, cannot be implemented in
software, what options are available to those who can benefit from
cryptography in software? Was a study of the impact on these vendors
or of the potential cost to the software industry conducted?  (Much of
the use of cryptography by software companies, particularly those in
the entertainment industry, is for the protection of their
intellectual property.)


>>>> NIST:        You are correct that, currently, Clipper Chip functionality
                  can only be implemented in hardware.  We are not aware of a
                  solution to allow lawfully authorized government access when
                  the key escrow features and encryption algorithm are
                  implemented in software.  We would welcome the participation
                  of the software industry in a cooperative effort to meet
                  this technical challenge.  Existing software encryption use
                  can, of course, continue.  

Banking and finance (as well as general commerce) are truly global
today. Most European financial institutions use technology described
in standards such as ISO 9796.  Many innovative new financial
products and services will employ the reversible cryptography
described in these standards.  Clipper does not comply with these
standards. Will US financial institutions be able to export Clipper?
If so, will their overseas customers find Clipper acceptable?  Was a
study of the potential impact of Clipper on US competitiveness
conducted? If so, is it available? If not, why not?

>>>> NIST:        Consistent with current export regulations applied to the
                  export of the DES, we expect U.S. financial institutions
                  will be able to export the Clipper Chip on a case by case
                  basis for their use.  It is probably too early to ascertain
                  how desirable their overseas customers will find the Clipper
                  Chip.  No formal study of the impact of the Clipper Chip has
                  been conducted since it was, until recently, a classified
                  technology; however, we are well aware of the threats from
                  economic espionage from foreign firms and governments and we
                  are making the Clipper Chip available to provide excellent
                  protection against these threats.  As noted below, we would
                  be interested in such input from potential users and others
                  affected by the announcement.  Use of other encryption
                  techniques and standards, including ISO 9796 and the ISO
                  8730 series, by non-U.S. Government entities (such as
                  European financial institutions) is expected to continue.

I realize they are probably still trying to assess the impact of
Clipper, but it would be interesting to hear from some major US
financial institutions on this issue.

>>>> NIST:        We too would be interested in hearing any reaction from
                  these institutions, particularly if such input can be
                  received by the end of May, to be used in the
                  Presidentially-directed review of government cryptographic
                  policy.

Did the administration ask these questions (and get acceptable
answers) before supporting this program? If so, can they share the
answers with us? If not, can we seek answers before the program is
launched?  

>>>> NIST:        These and many, many others were discussed during the
                  development of the Clipper Chip key escrow technology and
                  the decisions-making process.  The decisions reflect those
                  discussions and offer a balance among the various needs of
                  corporations and citizens for improved security and privacy
                  and of the law enforcement community for continued legal
                  access to the communications of criminals.









From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: poier@sfu.ca (na-Baron Feyd-Rautha Harkonnen)
Date: Mon, 17 May 93 18:24:11 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: The Clipper (clip on <clap clap> clip off <clap clap>)
Message-ID: <9305180123.AA12170@malibu.sfu.ca>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


One question regarding the proposed Clipper chip:

What exactly is the key escrow facility? From what I can tell, it seems to be
the bit that allows the LEEF...

Skye
--
"Thppt bwach oop ack" - Bill the Cat | -----====> Skye Merlin Poier <====-----
PGP Public Key available on request  | Undergrad in CMPT/MATH (Virtual Reality)




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: kelly@pleiku.netcom.com
Date: Mon, 17 May 93 21:31:02 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: No Subject
Message-ID: <9305180430.AA29340@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>From kelly Mon May 17 21:31:11 0700 1993 remote from pleiku
To: netcoms!longs.lance.colostate.edu!ld231782
cc: toad.com!cypherpunks
Subject: Re: I'M GOING CRAZY! FWEE! 
In-reply-to: Your message of "Mon, 17 May 1993 22:07:22 MDT."
             <9305180408.AA15369@longs.lance.colostate.edu> 
Priority: urgent
Date: Mon, 17 May 1993 21:31:11 -0700
From: "Stop the Big Brother CHip" <pleiku!kelly>
Received: from pleiku by pleiku.netcom.com; Mon, 17 May 1993 21:31 PDT
Content-Type: text
Content-Length: 1375


OK So I am extremely irritating... :)(I sincerely
hope I am the biggest BURR under the saddle the government
has had in a long time) I too am disappointed... it had been my understanding
that julf was going to newgroup alt.whistleblowers... no action
on that front... I will be bringing up C-news this week and I will
see about it after that... you shouldnt have to wait too long...
   cheers
   kelly
--
Parts of this .sig borrowed with permission from T.C.May.
Perhaps it will indeed get me busted also.
..........................................................................
Kelly Goen             | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,  
kelly@netcom.com       | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
Intelligence Systems   | knowledge, reputations, information markets, 
Specialists Inc.       | black markets, face banks, data havens, dark
                       | tech, covert channels, shared secrets,
                       | alt.whistleblowers, collapse of governments.
Technical Monkeywrench | Public Key: PGP 2.2.
                       |
..........................................................................
PGP 2.2 Key available from PGP Keyservers on the Internet.

pub  1024/1BA573 1992/09/09  kelly <kelly@netcom.com>
          Key fingerprint =  EF 7A 38 99 22 84 E3 3B  90 2A DB 80 DC 65 DA 31 

STOP THE WIRETAP CHIP(Clipper Chip)!!




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: ""L. Detweiler"" <ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Date: Mon, 17 May 93 21:09:09 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: I'M GOING CRAZY! FWEE!
Message-ID: <9305180408.AA15369@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



RECIPE FOR INSANITY
===================

I'm extremely FRUSTRATED and DEJECTED on the progress the
`whistleblowing newsgroup' has undergone as a cypherpunk pet-project:
pathetically negligible and STYMIED, from my point of view. It has been
many weeks since a rowdy, visionary, and consistently irritating
cypherpunk first proposed it and immediate ringing endorsements came
from eminent and venerable members of the list, e.g. T.C. May. It has
generated quite a bit of traffic and ideas on the list. In spirit and
intent is probably as central to the cypherpunk cause, as, say, PGP.

WHERE'S THE GROUP?
==================

I swear I am going to go INSANE waiting for some patriotic cyberpunk
with a smidgeon of skill, courage, impatience, knowledge, and access to
send out a NEW GROUP command for alt.whistleblower! Did I miss it?
Where the heck is it? Please, I IMPLORE SOMEONE to PUT ME OUT OF MY
MISERY!  FIRE NOW!  Damn, we have the stench of alt.fan.dick-depew
wafting as easily as most mortal people create directories! PLEASE, I
swear whoever gets alt.whistleblower gets to be in my personal
historical all-time CYPHERPUNK HALL OF FAME and have my everlasting
gratitude! Never before in the history of Usenet has something so
trivial thwarted so many for so long!

Sheesh, I thought it would be SIMPLE for someone to effect SOMETHING to
happen in this area. I thought I wouldn't have to slave away entirely
personally in going through the RFD and voting process, if even that
was necessary! For once I thought this would be a project that every
cypherpunk could bite off a piece somewhere, and that some COLLECTIVE
MOMENTUM could be established! I thought this could happen faster than
the speed of electricity. Instead it is happening slower than the SPEED
OF BUREACRACY.

Am I starting to sound enough like a CRACKPOT YET? well I really hope
so. <tremble>  I think I am going to break down and cry. Please,
someone, have some humanity in you, and PULL THE TRIGGER. Are we
waiting for a triplicate directive from Clinton, or the NSA, or what?!
Do we have to make sure every vacillating cypherpunk likes the idea or
every last senator is personally prepared with their Official
WhistleBlower Kit and Decoder Ring? Who cares what anyone thinks! JUST DO IT!

BOILING A TOAD?
===============

Gad, it is such a g*dawful tragedy this simple take-out-the-trash chore
has not been done yet. Look, I don't know about the authenticity of the
recent Mycotronx postings, they make me SHUDDER! They are PERFECT
AMMUNITION (whether true or not) for getting some MAJOR HEAT on the
maintainers of this fragile mailing list! Does anyone have any idea how
paranoid and POWERFUL the NSA is? Do you think that they just shrug
their shoulders and say `oh well' when confidential information sneaks
out? Do you know what kind of unpleasantness a wounded bureacrat can
summon? Multiply that uncountably many times and you have a tiny facet
of the decimating wrath of a betrayed horde of spies sanctioned by a
vast government!

Gad, this could all have been ENTIRELY AVOIDED if they were posted to a
newsgroup! As I've pointed out, the critical *resilient* aspect there
is that a newsgroup is *distributed* -- post from anywhere, spreads
everywhere like a virus, how can a sinister federal agency clamp down
on a cloud? It can't! On the other hand, if anyone decided to clamp
down on toad.com, after a certain amount -- certainly a great deal but
definitely a lot less than that required to shutdown Usenet -- it would CROAK!

PARANOID DELUSIONS
==================

Yes, I really am going insane. 

Clark Reynard <clark@metal.psu.edu> posted a few weeks ago he was
starting the RFD for soc.whistleblowers. In my silly naivete I thought
enough cypherpunks would drop by to make it a landslide, and that I'd
mosey on over after hearing about all the excitement. Review the
debate, balance the points, post something fiery and visionary and
inspiring, sit back and watch the fireworks.

Finally, I thought, someone who knew what they were doing could get
this silly thing HAPPENING. Someone could be a LEADER and take
RESPONSIBILITY. Someone could give some DIRECTION to the pervasive
cypherpunk malaise, stalemate, and bickering. Someone who was forging
AHEAD irrespective of counterproductive and sabotaging griping.

What the heck happened? Did anything happen? This is not only dead
without a bang, it is dead without a whimper! Mr. Reynard posts on Tue May 4:

>Based on the responses of a few cypherpunk members,
>I have decided not to post a second RFD for soc.whistleblowers
>unless I receive a significant amount of email requesting
>that I do so.  Nor will I post a CFV.

My sanity is teetering precipitously.

Who were these cypherpunk `members'? Mr. Reynard refuses to identify
`them' to me in email. He says that someone has asked him NOT to
personally start the whistleblower group! and that this person deserves
his trust because of his reputed contributions to the cypherpunk cause!
Gee, I asked, who could this be that would ask to HALT PROGRESS for
some vague, nebulous, unspecified reason that even Mr. Reynard was not
aware of? Look, I would have gladly saved all this bilge for private
email, but I DON'T KNOW WHO TO TALK TO! Supposedly this person, for
some unfathomable reason, specifically told Mr. Reynard NOT to reveal
his identity! I will not quote email, but Mr. Reynard kindly
sympathizes with my frenzy, but still refuses to tell me anything informative!

So ever since May 4 and trading several barren and excruciatingly
exasperating missives with Mr. Reynard, I am BOILING OVER! This mystery
person is supposedly going to post something on the whistleblower
project, acc. to Mr. Reynard, Real Soon Now to the list that will
absolutely dazzle everyone with its magnificent splendor.

Well, WHERE IS IT? (Note to the clueless: *this* is certainly not IT!)

MUSHROOMS AND PUDDING
=====================

I find it OUTRAGEOUS the weaselly and underhanded way this mystery
individual, apparently wholly intentionally, has TOTALLY STYMIED and
THWARTED the SOLE cypherpunk progress in this area. Cypherpunks, do you
feel like trampled mushrooms yet? well I DO.

Not only that, Mr. Reynard wrote cryptically:

>While I find the imputation that I ought to be executed as
>an Enemy of the People both offensive and absurd, it seems
>that I could be acting retrogressively, though no sane reason
>why I am doing so has been presented to me.

who is it that levelled these atrocious, filthy accusations? Mr.
Reynard took it upon himself to do a PUBLIC SERVICE. Who is it that
suggested that it was anything but valiant heroism? Speak, I demand it!
Reveal yourself! From whence comes this treasonous, traitorous slime?
Where is the DOUBLE AGENT in our midst?

>I will allow others to continue their efforts,
>and would be pleased to help in whatever manner I can, but do
>not wish to foment further splintering of what is already a
>divided group.

Please Mr. Reynard, isn't it clear that the cypherpunks will forever
have more splinters than a shredded beam? Who CARES what anybody else
thinks! Isn't there any SCRAP of INTRINSIC MERIT in this project? Is
`cypherpunks' just the brand name for MUSHY GUTLESS SPINELESS PUDDING?

Look, if somebody is doing a lot to get the whistleblower group going,
I PRAISE AND COMMEND YOU. But so far I see ABSOLUTELY NO SIGNS anything
is happening! After weeks of hypothetical hyperventilating, we have
nothing but a DEAD CORPSE! In this fragile and critical period, I would
rather make a fool of myself shouting than be silent as it LANGUISHES INTO OBLIVION.

>If interest warrants, or opinion seems different than what
>I understand it to be, I reserve the right to change my mind.

INTEREST WARRANTS! CHANGE YOUR MIND! If not you, then SOMEBODY! If not
now, then IMMEDIATELY!


CAVEAT
======

Ok, so others on the list will find my rantings most unpalatable and
tell me so in email and on the list, perhaps even humiliating me with
epithets and personal attacks, despite that, while bordering
precariously, this note is free of them.

I DON'T CARE! I'm a desperate man!  This thing is just too IMPORTANT
for me to care about STEPPING ON SOME TOES or BLOODYING MY NOSE. It is
the first feeble step toward a kingdom of Electronic Democracy, and we
are just tripping and falling over each other like drunken legislators!

Yes, some will say `what are you doing about it personally?' I am
WAITING FOR THE GROUP TO BE CREATED so a tentative FAQ CAN BE POSTED
THERE! (FAQs do not arise in vacuums, they are forged from posting and
feedback! I speak from experience!)

No, my worthless, prejudiced, personal FAQ for whistleblowers is NOT
WRITTEN, because right now, for strange and mysterious reasons I will
leave to the reader to prophesize, to do so currently would SCANDALOUS
WASTE OF MY TIME!

'scuze me while I go get some water, i'm getting hoarse...




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: trimm@netcom.com (Trimm Industries)
Date: Mon, 17 May 93 22:07:27 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: mykotronx
Message-ID: <9305180507.AA16085@netcom.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Howdy.

I was the "anonymous" poster of the Mykotronx information.

It is genuine, for samples I can fax you parts of it, or

snail mail or whatever.  Or, simply call me:

Gary Watson
Engineer
Trimm Industries
(800) 423-2024
trimm@netcom.com

I am in the process of piecing together the Selectric ribbon
that the executive secretary of Mykotronx carelessly threw into
the routine office trash.  I'm cutting into 8" strips and taping
it to white paper, but this is a tedious process, and it may be
after my Atlanta Comdex trip before I post on it again.

See ya,
GW

(thanks for the confidentiality)

-- 




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: poier@sfu.ca (na-Baron Feyd-Rautha Harkonnen)
Date: Mon, 17 May 93 23:15:50 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Request for requests
Message-ID: <9305180615.AA20183@malibu.sfu.ca>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Hi.

Please email me (or post directly) as to any companies in the Vancouver/Seattle
area doing encryption research for any governmental agency. I wish to keep tabs
on such companies, and I'd be more than willing to share any findings.

Feyd Eli
--
-----====> Skye Merlin Poier <====----- 
Undergrad in CMPT/MATH (Virtual Reality)       ||||      ||||
          email: poier@sfu.ca                  o-OO <--> OO-o   THINK
  PGP Public Key available on request           \==      ==/




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: ""L. Detweiler"" <ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Date: Mon, 17 May 93 22:55:28 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: a valuable spy...
In-Reply-To: <9305180507.AA16085@netcom.netcom.com>
Message-ID: <9305180555.AA16744@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


[G. Watson]

>I was the "anonymous" poster of the Mykotronx information.
>I am in the process of piecing together the Selectric ribbon
>that the executive secretary of Mykotronx carelessly threw into
>the routine office trash. 

[PALE CRINGE]

Mr. Watson, I commend you for your efforts but you make an atrocious spy!

By revealing your source so carelessly and readily you have jeopardized
the possibility of any future, even more significant discoveries from
the same outlet!  You could have still gotten the information without
revealing it, and it was so littered, laced, and inundated with facts
and data that it could have *easily* been verified by outside means.

I think the damage has been done, but cypherpunks -- maybe some attempt
should be made to prevent the spread of those postings, or at least
preserve Mr. Watson's confidentiality. But I think it is a lost cause.
It is very likely that NSA agents subscribe directly to this list.

Oh, oh, oh, I'm going to cry.



Q. How many cypherpunks does it take to change a light bulb?

A. They can't. Haven't figured out how yet.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: karn@qualcomm.com (Phil Karn)
Date: Tue, 18 May 93 00:11:16 PDT
To: ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu
Subject: Re:  a valuable spy...
Message-ID: <9305180711.AA03652@servo>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


The note from Watson could well be a decoy to draw the NSA off the track
of the *real* spy... :-)

Phil




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: poier@sfu.ca (na-Baron Feyd-Rautha Harkonnen)
Date: Tue, 18 May 93 02:12:15 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Question
Message-ID: <9305180912.AA23491@malibu.sfu.ca>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Hi... 

What does GCHQ stand for, and what does it do? Is it similar to the NSA?

Feyd Eli
--
-----====> Skye Merlin Poier <====----- 
Undergrad in CMPT/MATH (Virtual Reality)       ||||      ||||
          email: poier@sfu.ca                  p-OO <--> OO-q   THINK
   PGP Public Key available on finger           \==      ==/




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: miron@extropia.wimsey.com (Miron Cuperman)
Date: Tue, 18 May 93 00:49:17 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: NIST answers to RSADSI questions
In-Reply-To: <9305172317.AA05426@soda.berkeley.edu>
Message-ID: <1993May18.072613.18907@extropia.wimsey.bc.ca>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


From the wording of NIST's response, is seems to me that they intend to
outlaw all non-escrow encryption schemes.

-- 
        Miron Cuperman <miron@extropia.wimsey.com> | NeXTmail/Mime ok
        Unix/C++/DSP,  consulting/contracting      | Public key avail
        AMIX: MCuperman                            |
Laissez faire, laissez passer. Le monde va de lui meme.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: elee9sf@Menudo.UH.EDU
Date: Tue, 18 May 93 05:44:39 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Question
In-Reply-To: <9305180912.AA23491@malibu.sfu.ca>
Message-ID: <199305181244.AA04972@Menudo.UH.EDU>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



> 
> What does GCHQ stand for, and what does it do? Is it similar to the NSA?
> 
> Feyd Eli

Government Communications HQ or something like that.  It is similar to
the NSA.  Rumor has it that each agency taps the other's domestic
calls, so both may truthfully say that they don't engage in domestic
survellience... 

I beleive the U.K. still denies the existence of the GCHQ, despite
there being a large building with satellite dishes and antennas all
over it in Cheltenham (?).  I read that a government minister said in
response to a statement made by a former GCHQ chief that he worked
at the "GCHQ" that this didn't necessarily mean that GCHQ existed
before his tenure, nor does it imply the GCHQ existed after he left...
(This from the book _SpyCatcher_?)

/-----------------------------------\
| Karl L. Barrus                    |
| elee9sf@menudo.uh.edu             | <- preferred address
| barrus@tree.egr.uh.edu (NeXTMail) |
\-----------------------------------/




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: gnu@cygnus.com
Date: Tue, 18 May 93 08:30:12 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Ethernet 20th birthday retrospective at Sun
Message-ID: <9305181530.AA00245@cygnus.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


This is slightly off-topic, but seeing the history of an important
networking technology may be interesting for Bay Area cypherpunks.
Apologies to the rest of the list.

	John

         * please forward this announcement within the Bay area *
             * and post to any appropriate internal aliases *

                  Bay Area Computer History Perspectives

         "Ethernet 20th Birthday---Early History of the Ethernet"

                        A panel discussion with
          David Boggs, Ron Crane, Robert Metcalfe, and John Shoch

                        5:30 PM, Tuesday, May 25
                             Stanford Room
                        Sun Microsystems Bldg. 6
			    2750 Coast Ave.
                               Mt. View

 May 22, 1973, was the birthday of the Ethernet. On that date, Bob Metcalfe
used the word Ethernet in a memo to describe a project previously known as the
Alto Aloha net. And Ethernet has been a major part of Local Area Networks
ever since. In this panel discussion, four of the most influential individuals
in the history of Ethernet will come together again, to look back at the 
situation and events of 20 years ago. Among other possible topics:

  - What were the initial goals? How did they change over time?
  - What were Ethernet's main competitors in 1973? Why didn't they succeed?
  - Why was the intial data transfer rate fixed at exactly 2.94 Mbit/sec? How 
    did it eventually get set at 10 Mbit/sec?
  - How did Intel and DEC get involved? 
  - How did Ethernet become a standard? Where there any compromises?
  - And a glimpse at the future of Ethernet today

 Topics such as these can suggest some of the value of learning from history.
The lessons can be useful right now, today, and also in the future. After you
take a look back into the past of the computer industry, you may look at your 
own work differently the very next day.

 Bay Area Computer History Perspectives is a series of programs organised by
Peter Nurkse and Jeanie Treichel, of Sun Microsystems, to explore and record
our local Bay area computer history. Programs are videotaped for the archives 
of The Computer Museum in Boston, which maintains collections on the history of 
the international computer industry.

 This program is open to the public and free of charge. Copies of the new ACM 
History of Electronic Computing poster, a full color timeline 5.5 feet long, 
will be available at the cost price of two dollars (cash only).

 After a summer break, the next program in this series will be on the ERMA 
project at Bank of America, on Sept. 28 (ERMA may have been the first major Bay 
area contribution to the history of computing). Suggestions for further 
programs are welcome, and can be faxed to Jeanie Treichel at 415/691-0756, or 
e-mailed to nurkse@eng.sun.com.  If you are willing to appear on a panel, or 
can contact someone whom you suggest be included, that additional information 
would be very helpful.

 Directions to Sun Building 6 in Mt. View: take San Antonio Road North exit
from highway 101 in Mt. View. Go a block past the traffic lights at the 
intersection, and then

	- turn right on Casey Ave.
	- go one block on Casey Ave., then turn right again on Marine Way
	- go one block on Marine Way, then turn left on Coast Ave.
	- go down to the end of Coast Ave., and Building 6 is on your right




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Harry Shapiro <habs@Panix.Com>
Date: Tue, 18 May 93 05:53:40 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com (Good Guys)
Subject: This is "telling"
Message-ID: <199305181253.AA10326@sun.Panix.Com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



The answer to this question is "telling." Escrow or no encryption!!!

/harry

 From: jim@RSA.COM (Jim Bidzos)

	FYI. NIST has responded to my questions. Feel free to distribute.

There are a number of companies that employ non-escrowed cryptography
in their products today.  These products range from secure voice,
data, and fax to secure email, electronic forms, and software
distribution, to name but a few.  With over a million such products in
use today, what does the Clipper program envision for the future of
these products and the many corporations and individuals that have
invested in and use them?  Will the investment made by the vendors in
encryption-enhanced products be protected? If so, how?  Is it
envisioned that they will add escrow features to their products or be
asked to employ Clipper?  

>>>> NIST:        Again, the Clipper Chip is a government standard which can
                  be used voluntarily by those in the private sector.  We also
                  point out that the President's directive on "Public
                  Encryption Management" stated: "In making this decision, I
                  do not intend to prevent the private sector from developing,
                  or the government from approving, other microcircuits or
                  algorithms that are equally effective in assuring both
                  privacy and a secure key-escrow system."  You will have to
                  consult directly with private firms as to whether they will
                  add escrow features to their products.

Since Clipper, as currently defined, cannot be implemented in
software, what options are available to those who can benefit from
cryptography in software? Was a study of the impact on these vendors
or of the potential cost to the software industry conducted?  (Much of
the use of cryptography by software companies, particularly those in
the entertainment industry, is for the protection of their
intellectual property.)


>>>> NIST:        You are correct that, currently, Clipper Chip functionality
                  can only be implemented in hardware.  We are not aware of a
                  solution to allow lawfully authorized government access when
                  the key escrow features and encryption algorithm are
                  implemented in software.  We would welcome the participation
                  of the software industry in a cooperative effort to meet
                  this technical challenge.  Existing software encryption use
                  can, of course, continue.  

Banking and finance (as well as general commerce) are truly global
today. Most European financial institutions use technology described
in standards such as ISO 9796.  Many innovative new financial
products and services will employ the reversible cryptography
described in these standards.  Clipper does not comply with these
standards. Will US financial institutions be able to export Clipper?
If so, will their overseas customers find Clipper acceptable?  Was a
study of the potential impact of Clipper on US competitiveness
conducted? If so, is it available? If not, why not?

>>>> NIST:        Consistent with current export regulations applied to the
                  export of the DES, we expect U.S. financial institutions
                  will be able to export the Clipper Chip on a case by case
                  basis for their use.  It is probably too early to ascertain
                  how desirable their overseas customers will find the Clipper
                  Chip.  No formal study of the impact of the Clipper Chip has
                  been conducted since it was, until recently, a classified
                  technology; however, we are well aware of the threats from
                  economic espionage from foreign firms and governments and we
                  are making the Clipper Chip available to provide excellent
                  protection against these threats.  As noted below, we would
                  be interested in such input from potential users and others
                  affected by the announcement.  Use of other encryption
                  techniques and standards, including ISO 9796 and the ISO
                  8730 series, by non-U.S. Government entities (such as
                  European financial institutions) is expected to continue.

I realize they are probably still trying to assess the impact of
Clipper, but it would be interesting to hear from some major US
financial institutions on this issue.

>>>> NIST:        We too would be interested in hearing any reaction from
                  these institutions, particularly if such input can be
                  received by the end of May, to be used in the
                  Presidentially-directed review of government cryptographic
                  policy.

Did the administration ask these questions (and get acceptable
answers) before supporting this program? If so, can they share the
answers with us? If not, can we seek answers before the program is
launched?  

>>>> NIST:        These and many, many others were discussed during the
                  development of the Clipper Chip key escrow technology and
                  the decisions-making process.  The decisions reflect those
                  discussions and offer a balance among the various needs of
                  corporations and citizens for improved security and privacy
                  and of the law enforcement community for continued legal
                  access to the communications of criminals.








-- 
Harry Shapiro  				      habs@panix.com
List Administrator of the Extropy Institute Mailing List
Private Communication for the Extropian Community since 1991



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: fergp@sytex.com (Paul Ferguson)
Date: Tue, 18 May 93 06:45:15 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Mykotoxic anon post
Message-ID: <qHZq4B1w165w@sytex.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I was the on who posted the Mykotoxin anonymously to the group.
 
It was genuine, bona fide, inspected and rejected. 
 
Don't ask me how I did it. It's a secret.
 

Paul Ferguson               |  "... certain unalienable Rights,
Network Integrator          |  that among these, are Life, Liberty,
Centreville, Virginia USA   |  and the pursuit of Happiness."
fergp@sytex.com             |   -- The Declaration of Independence
 
          Stop the Wiretap (Clipper/Capstone) Chip.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: ggoebel@sun1.ruf.uni-freiburg.de (Garrett Goebel)
Date: Tue, 18 May 93 03:53:48 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: mykotronx
Message-ID: <9305181053.AA23420@sun1.ruf.uni-freiburg.de>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text


Hi,     

I was also the "anonymous" poster of the Mykotronx information :)
      ^^^^
It is genuine.

Don't ask me how I did it. It's a secret.  Besides, you probably

wouldn't believe me anyways :(
 
See ya,
Garrett

(thanks for the confidentiality)


-- 
C. Garrett Goebel
<ggoebel@sun1.ruf.uni-freiburg.de>



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Marc Horowitz <marc@GZA.COM>
Date: Tue, 18 May 93 10:12:07 PDT
To: karn@qualcomm.com (Phil Karn)
Subject: Re: a valuable spy...
In-Reply-To: <9305180711.AA03652@servo>
Message-ID: <9305181711.AA01156@dun-dun-noodles.aktis.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>> The note from Watson could well be a decoy to draw the NSA off the track
>> of the *real* spy... :-)

Or, it could be from the NSA, trying to collect names and numbers of
people who are interested in insider information on Mykotronx.  :-(

		Marc

P.S.  We could probably escalate paranoia indefinitely here....

P.P.S.  Because they are attractive targets, it is illegal to disclose
the identities and home addresses of intelligence agents, which is
what "Mr. Watson" did.  It is not illegal to possess this information,
however.  (This is what I am told by an ex-NSA employee.)




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: anon03e2@nyx.cs.du.edu (Fallen Angel)
Date: Tue, 18 May 93 14:41:46 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Neural Nets to decrypt?
Message-ID: <9305181912.AA05130@nyx.cs.du.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I am naive on a couple of fronts, so apologies if this is off-base.

As computing evolves, would it be very possible to use a neural net
or like system to design an ideal code-breaking engine? From my u
understanding, code-breakers are only as good as their designer's
knowledge of the algorithim. Such a hypothetical system would develop
its own cracking alogorithim which could be more efficient by several
factors.
  
I think another variation would the use of GA's to create a more efficient
code-breaker. I know that GAs have been used to achieve near-ideal results
in least-step sorting algorithims. Would code-breaking be the same
in principle?




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: AOLCHTNN@vax1.tcd.ie
Date: Tue, 18 May 93 06:51:32 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: GCHQ in the UK
Message-ID: <01GYBP23B51G0026OX@vax1.tcd.ie>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Can someone tell me whether what I've heard about GCHQ in the UK??

A lot of books and magazines of fairly serious political content have alleged
that GCHQ taps _all_ Irish telephone calls and screens them electronically for
"keywords", to find the interesting conversations.
(The IRA is alleged to have something similar, although not quite so 
sophisticated)

What I want to know is whether digital voice-recognition monitoring on such a
scale is really possible?

Thanx in advance

Antoin O Lachtnain,
Trinity College Dublin.

PS Iis there anyone in the UK or Ireland who'd be willing to send me a copy of 
PGP 2.2, if I send them a couple o' blank disks?

AOL




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Sandy <72114.1712@CompuServe.COM>
Date: Tue, 18 May 93 12:42:45 PDT
To: <cypherpunks@toad.com>
Subject: CALLER ID?
Message-ID: <930518193336_72114.1712_FHF64-1@CompuServe.COM>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


_________________________________________________________________
  SANDY SANDFORT                          ssandfort@attmail.com
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Punksters!

I think some of you are seriously missing the point about the ANI
capture of telephone numbers on calls made to 800 numbers.  Yes,
yes, yes, we are all smart cookies on this list.  We can avoid
having ANI capture our number if we want to.  SO WHAT?

The insidious thing about the use of ANI is that the *general
public* has no idea it exists.  And this is because of the of
lack of candor on the part of telcos and 800 companies.  As an
example, the Bank of America includes a newsletter with their
statement.  In a recent issue there was an item about WeTip, an
800 hotline.  Here is an excerpt of what it said:

    "If you want to report information about any criminal
    activity, call WeTip at 1-800-78-CRIME and remember,
    DON'T give the interviewer your name.  You will be
    assigned a code name and number."

Now, WE know all that "code name" BS is just a smoke screen to
make the mark think he is anonymous.  Unfortunately, most folks
don't know what we know.  (Did YOU know your 800 calls were
compromised, before I posted the callback number?)

The folks at 1-800-STOPPER and FULL DISCLOSURE tell me that while
most cellular phone systems currently release only trunk numbers
to ANI, this is changing.  One by one, they are being programmed
to release the number of the actual cellular phone.  Presumably,
this is being done in preparation for Caller ID (and maybe to
assist *legitimate* law enforcement needs?).

 S a n d y  (arbitration volunteer)

>>>>>>>> Please address e-mail to: ssandfort@attmail.com <<<<<<<<
_________________________________________________________________






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: peb@PROCASE.COM
Date: Tue, 18 May 93 15:37:54 PDT
To: anon03e2@nyx.cs.du.edu
Subject: Re: Neural Nets to decrypt?
Message-ID: <9305182236.AA11199@banff>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



In my experience, neural nets are good at generalizing across sparse
data for recognizing patterns not seen before.  GAs are more useful
for converging (at an exponential rate giving Holland's schema theorem)
on a solution to a problem.  A GA is easier to train if the score is
a continuous real number while most neural network implementations 
expect actual examples of what is in the set of things to be recognized.

For a GA cryptoanalysis tool, a vector representing an experiment
would be used as a genotype and the result could be the output of 
a specialized message detector (==1 if the text looks like plain 
English, ==.0001 if only a few words are seen, etc. (and of course
it would need to detect file formats like that of compress)).  Given
this, a GA could find a solution.  

However, in learning theory, there are problems considered to be
unlearnable and the standard example is encrypted information!  The
solution space could be like a plane with a single "needle" in it that
is the solution with no hills in the general direction of the needle.
This kind of solution space requires exhaustive search, unfortunately.

It is difficult to characterize a solution space, but it is the key
part--the mapping of a gene vector to a fraction representing the
completeness of the solution is critical--and if it is completely
flat with a needle, then it is not worth it.  Alternatively, if it
is completely random, then it also is not worth it.  The solution 
space must be somewhere in these two extremes to be useful for a GA.

Based on my limited experience with cbw (crypt breakers workbench), 
it is possible to get partial results (e.g., ex*lo*e -> explore and
other words are then filled in) and zoom in the full solution,
so based on that, a GA would be helpful.  cbw is for an Enigma type
machine and newer algorithms are much more sophisticated, so I 
don't know if the same kind of partial knowledge applies for RSA, DES3, 
IDEA cracking.


Paul E. Baclace
peb@procase.com





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: meyer <wixer!wixer.bga.com!meyer@cactus.org>
Date: Tue, 18 May 93 19:46:55 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Mixing ciphertext and plaintext
Message-ID: <9305182056.AA12121@wixer>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



>Return-Path: <mdiehl@triton.unm.edu>
>Subject: mixed plaintext and crypted text.
>Date: Sat, 15 May 93 1:26:55 MDT
>
>Hey again, all. I've RTFM'd, and I don't even know if it can be done, but
>does anyone know how I can have pgp display the un-encrypted AND the
>decrypted parts of a message?  Lets say my message goes like this:
>
>This is a plaintext message to tell you stuff that needs not be private.
>BTW, can you find the subliminal message? ;^)j
>-------- begin pgp block -----
>asdfkasjd;fThEjsflajslfjaslfjadfajs;flasjdaslfjasldfjalsj
>asjlgfiuituqoNsAj;slkjasdifuoejrqlwfiasuokjel;rqwiuasdsii
>asdfasljdflasjfdSuXsldfjalsjljeqljerwljrlejqlwjerlqwjerlq
>elqrkjlasjl
>134as
>-------- end pgp block -------
>
>Thanx a lot
>
>Yours virtually,
>+-----------------------+-----------------------------+---------+
>| J. Michael Diehl ;-)  | I thought I was wrong once. | PGP KEY |
>|                       |    But, I was mistaken.     |available|

If you wish to mix plaintext and ciphertext in an email message then
you can use Dolphin Encrypt.  Let's say your message is to consist of
P1/C2/P3, plaintext/ciphertext/plaintext, where C2 is ciphertext
derived from plaintext P2.  What you do is put P2 into a file F.TXT,
then run Dolphin Encrypt with a command such as:

                       DE E F.TXT F.ENC /t

After you give Dolphin Encrypt the encryption key F.ENC will be a file
which consists of pseudo-uuencoded ciphertext (that's what the "/t" is
for).  Run your mailer program.  Write your P1.  ASCII-upload F.ENC,
which is your C2.  (No need to mark the beginning/end of the
ciphertext block.)  Finish off with your P3 and send your message.

The recipient captures the entire message as, say, G.ENC, then runs:

                       DE D G.ENC G.DEC /t

(Of course, she has to know the encryption key.)  Dolphin Encrypt
skips over P1 to get at C2 and writes G.DEC containing P2.  Voila!

For further info send me a snailmail address.

-- Peter Meyer





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Duncan Frissell <76630.3577@CompuServe.COM>
Date: Tue, 18 May 93 13:30:57 PDT
To: <cypherpunks@toad.com>
Subject: GCHQ Question
Message-ID: <930518202352_76630.3577_EHK24-1@CompuServe.COM>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>>>What does GCHQ stand for, and what does it do? Is it similar to the 
NSA?<<

(Feyd Eli)

The Royal Signals Establishment at Cheltenham, Gloucestershire, England  
is known as General Communications Head Quarters (GCHQ).  It is also 
called 'Cheltenham' after its location.  It performs many of the same 
sigint jobs as the NSA.

There was a controversy a few years ago when the US wanted Maggie to 
outlaw (socialist) union membership by the Civil Service employees at 
GCHQ because the Regan administration considered it a security risk.

Duncan





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: TWEETYBIRD@U.WASHINGTON.EDU
Date: Tue, 18 May 93 17:44:57 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: It was I
Message-ID: <34D32987CB3F8046E7@MAX.U.WASHINGTON.EDU>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


who was the source of the anonymous Mykotronix postings. 

Through certain leads I have been able to find more info and will let 
cypherpunks know as soon as is feasible. Please don't ask how I am doing
it, I don't think I should reveal my sources.

If anyone feels the need to verify my postings, please go ahead and post
the results to this list.

thank you,

Tweetybird (Whistleblower




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Rusty Hoover <rusty@Panix.Com>
Date: Tue, 18 May 93 16:01:56 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: macpgp question
Message-ID: <199305182301.AA28005@sun.Panix.Com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Hi.  Can anyone answer a question about MacPGP?

My MaccPGP 2.2 seems to have developed a curious problem.

I'm using it on a Mac Classic with system software 6.07.

Both yesterday and today, I received a message from a friend,
encrypted with my public key. 

When I downloaded this message from my Unix account to my Mac, it
appeared on my screen as an MS Word icon.  (MS Word is the word processing
program I use.)

I launched MacPGP, and selected "Open/Decrypt" from the file menu, and 
up came the box with the list of files to choose from. 

I chose the just-downloaded message, and then, in the PGP message area, 
PGP gave me the following message:

	"File is encrypted. Secret key is required to read it. 
	This message can only be read by:

		keyID:  xxx

	You do not have the secret key needed to decrypt this file."

But the key ID number listed **is** in fact MY valid, working key ID !!
Would anyone have any suggestions about why this is happening?
Thanks, enormously, in advance.

===============================================================================
  Rusty Hoover     |  PGP 2.2 public key  |  Too much time, so little to do ...
  rusty@panix.com  |  by finger & e-mail  |  no, reverse that ...
===============================================================================






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Johan Helsingius <julf@penet.FI>
Date: Tue, 18 May 93 10:14:16 PDT
To: kelly@pleiku.netcom.com
Subject: Re:
In-Reply-To: <9305180430.AA29340@toad.com>
Message-ID: <9305182001.aa07917@penet.penet.FI>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



> it had been my understanding
> that julf was going to newgroup alt.whistleblowers...

Er... I definitely remember somebody else announcing he was going to
create it... Anon.penet.fi (and especially MK II alias penet.anon.com)
will definitely support it.

	Julf





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Eric Hughes <hughes@soda.berkeley.edu>
Date: Tue, 18 May 93 20:39:40 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Mixing ciphertext and plaintext
In-Reply-To: <9305182056.AA12121@wixer>
Message-ID: <9305190336.AA04656@soda.berkeley.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>If you wish to mix plaintext and ciphertext in an email message then
>you can use Dolphin Encrypt.  

What cryptosystem does Dolphin Encrypt use?  Is the algorithm
published somewhere?

Eric




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: anon03e2@nyx.cs.du.edu (Fallen Angel)
Date: Tue, 18 May 93 22:25:45 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: PGP and offline-readers
Message-ID: <9305190525.AA15440@nyx.cs.du.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I am getting involved in networking some local BBS' and message bases.
One of the primary functions of this network will be to serve as a 
library for PGP keys and to use PGP in sending messages. 
  
Now, if people read their messages offline, is there any offline
readers that exist that integrate PGP (all this is IBM based) or
is there an easy way to do this. Ideally, I want to avoid having to
decrypt each message individually and would like PGP interfaced so 
that it could recognize a message header, apply th eright key, and
output in the reader. I am probablky asking for too much.
   
Does anyone have any experience/advice w/ this tpye of large scale
implementation of PGP? I know the need to encrypt most of the messages
will be small, but I think it is important to get these people so
familar w/ encryption, they won't be scared and will defend it when
the need arises.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: J. Michael Diehl <mdiehl@triton.unm.edu>
Date: Tue, 18 May 93 23:03:06 PDT
To: anon03e2@nyx.cs.du.edu (Fallen Angel)
Subject: Re: PGP and offline-readers
In-Reply-To: <9305190525.AA15440@nyx.cs.du.edu>
Message-ID: <9305190602.AA27639@triton.unm.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> I am getting involved in networking some local BBS' and message bases.
> One of the primary functions of this network will be to serve as a 
> library for PGP keys and to use PGP in sending messages. 
>   
> Now, if people read their messages offline, is there any offline
> readers that exist that integrate PGP (all this is IBM based) or

I'm working on one myself.  I'm testing it now; its still kinda alpha at the
moment.

> is there an easy way to do this. Ideally, I want to avoid having to
> decrypt each message individually and would like PGP interfaced so 
> that it could recognize a message header, apply th eright key, and
> output in the reader. I am probablky asking for too much.

Not at all.  My system is currently geared toward UNIX, but can be modified
to work with anything. ;^)  Right now, I have to select the mail by hand, but
the software xfers it and indexes it automaticly.  Then I can select read and
I get a menu of my messages to be read....index, sender, and subject.  I have
delete working.  Also, I have send working quite well.  You select Create to
create a message.  You then have a choice of editor.  After you create a file,
you have the option of calling the encryption menu to encrypt/sign it.  Then
you select send.  You give the program the name of the file, who it goes to, and
a subject.  I have a script which dials the system, and uploads the mail  with-
out me being there.

The benefits are that the plaintext never spends time on the mainframe, and you
control the keys.

I have a few features to add.  I want to add multiple-hosts capability, aliases,
and automatic encryption. 

I'm writing this sytem in 4dos batch language and telix communication scripts.
I'm doing it this way because it's a great developement language with lots of
high-lever tools.  I'm quite prowd of how it's working.  I'm also thinking of
porting it to C.

> Does anyone have any experience/advice w/ this tpye of large scale
> implementation of PGP? I know the need to encrypt most of the messages
> will be small, but I think it is important to get these people so
> familar w/ encryption, they won't be scared and will defend it when
> the need arises.

I agree totally!  This is important.
+-----------------------+-----------------------------+---------+
| J. Michael Diehl ;-)  | I thought I was wrong once. | PGP KEY |
|                       |    But, I was mistaken.     |available|
|                       +-----------------------------+---------+
| mdiehl@triton.unm.edu | "I'm just looking for the opportunity |
| mike.diehl@fido.org   | to be Politically Incorrect!   <Me>   |
| (505) 299-2282        |                                       |
+-----------------------+---------------------------------------+




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Derek Atkins <warlord@MIT.EDU>
Date: Tue, 18 May 93 23:19:25 PDT
To: J. Michael Diehl <mdiehl@triton.unm.edu>
Subject: Re: PGP and offline-readers
In-Reply-To: <9305190602.AA27639@triton.unm.edu>
Message-ID: <9305190619.AA23157@toxicwaste.MEDIA.MIT.EDU>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


If at all possible, I recommend using the Key Servers for Key
Distribution...  It already solves the key distribution problem not
only on your own network, but around the world...  No reason to
re-invent the wheel...

Enjoy!

-derek





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: sjw@liberty.demon.co.uk (Stephen J. Whitrow)
Date: Tue, 18 May 93 21:39:19 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Question (GCHQ)
Message-ID: <3223@sjw@liberty.demon.co.uk>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I live not too far away from Cheltenham, and I can confirm that the UK
Government would have rather a hard job ever denying the existence of GCHQ.
As you leave the M5 motorway at junction 11, taking the dual carriageway
into Cheltenham, the signposts for GCHQ can't be missed. (Left at the
second roundabout.) The building is visible to anyone driving into
Cheltenham. (If you carry on towards the town centre for another mile or so,
the Police HQ building has a rather impressive aerial on its roof, albeit
comparable to other Police HQs.) 

It seems reasonable to believe that the various secret service agencies
have reciprocal arrangements to tap each other's citizens. E.g. the
American agencies tap the Royals' phones, then repeatedly rebroadcast
the tapes using powerful transmitters, so they're almost certain to be
picked up by some radio ham, or retired bank manager with a scanner,
within a day or two.

Steve Whitrow                           sjw@liberty.demon.co.uk




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Stanton McCandlish <anton@hydra.unm.edu>
Date: Wed, 19 May 93 04:15:09 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: No FTP? You can still get PGP *UTILITIES*!
Message-ID: <9305191115.AA09497@hydra.unm.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Due to legal threats from RSA, I cannot distribute PGP itself. I am not sure
about the legalities of distributing source code for it. Anyone know?

ANYWAY: if you need the latest PGP/RSA utils, likely useful for any number of
encryption programs, and can't get them via FTP, try calling the BBS listed
in the .sig below.  Look in the CRYPTO file area.  You may logon as Anonymous,
password GUEST, if you wish.
I have the latest versions of the utils distributed with PGP22, much improved
over that release, and direct from the author.  I also have Fido-tech mail
utils, public key-rings, etc.  Due to a corrupt user data file, the system
will be down for a few days, but try calling AFTER May 20th, and get the 
goodies you need!  Please keep in mind that after 11pm, and on weekends, 
tends to be the cheapest rate periods for most phone extortionists I mean
companies.

PS: there is no charge, other than standard phone extortion of course, for
utilizing NitV BBS. Full access on first call.

-- 
Testes saxi solidi!  **********************   Podex opacus gravedinosus est!  
Stanton McCandlish,  SysOp:  Noise in the Void Data Center BBS
IndraNet: 369:1/1      FidoNet: 1:301/2      Internet: anton@hydra.unm.edu
Snail: 8020 Central SE #405, Albuquerque, New Mexico 87108 USA
Data phone: +1-505-246-8515 (24hr, 1200-14400 v32bis, N-8-1)
Vox phone:  +1-505-247-3402 (bps rate varies, depends on if you woke me up...:)




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Stanton McCandlish <anton@hydra.unm.edu>
Date: Wed, 19 May 93 05:03:08 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: BBSs under fire! (or on fire, if BATF gets into the act!)
Message-ID: <9305191203.AA09712@hydra.unm.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I'd like to invite discussion, either private or listwise, on: Why is the govt.
targetting BBSs?

I note Eric S. Raymond accuses the govt and its mouthpieces of using the largely
manufactured horror of 'kiddie porn' as a "fait acompli", to yank the rug from
under our feet when we take exception to the idea that the U.S. Govt. should
have the authority to inspect our private lives and operations. Not to mention
also using the treat of 'terrorism' and 'dangers to national security' et al.
ad nauseum.

I'd like to tell you a short anecdote:
I frequently grep the entire disk system here for accessible .GIF files.
I need them for my BBS, and even though this grepping about hogs CPU time,
it is certainly less bandwidth costly than firing up a full FTP session to 
go hunting for such "warez".  Inevitably, many of these graphics files are
'porno'.  Also inevitably a few are 'illegal' porno, such as that featuring
beastiality and or nude children.  Most of these appear to originate from the
orient and from Europe.  I have no use for such materials, but apparently 
someone does. I did an experiment.  Noting the filenames, I looked about in
alt.binaries.pictures.erotica, and did an xarchie search, and many of these
files are available from US educational institutions, via both FTP archives
(usually in the uploads area -- I am confident that the maintainers of such
sites ditch this stuff in a jiffy.  There are exceptions, however) and 
the UseNet system.

Now, maybe I missed something, but I have yet to see the secret service raid
ftparchive.blah.edu, or UNM where I work, for 'pandering'.  Yet BBSs get
raided for SUSPICION of having such material, and get their equipment con-
fiscated.  I am pissed off enough that I am having a hard time even formulating
my displeasure into a logical post, but here goes anyway:

1) who gave the govt the right to distribute this material, and deny others
to do so (for whatever reason) - these universities ARE part of the govt.
2) why is the govt scapegoating BBSs?  Are we THAT 'dangerous and subversive'?
3) why is it that people in general cannot see this BS for the BS it is?
Is it REALLY so hard to see that "terrorism" and "kiddie porn" are not real
threats, but that stomping all over our privacy rights IS?
4) why is nothing much really being done about these civil rights violations?
The SJG case is a case in point.  EFF did plenty to help out, but where was the
ACLU?  I see lots of NETTERS mad about clipper, but where is the media blitz?
Where are the demonstrations on the White House lawn?  Are the people in this
country really so apathetic?  Where is the outcry over the Waco massacre?
For a govt to willy-nilly burn a bunch of children to death and lie like hell
to the people the whole time, is enough to start a civil war in a lot of 
places, yet here it's just another "oh well".  

Well before I really get lost here, I will just finish up by saying that I
became a BBS system operator with enthusiasm and happiness, and now find my
self embroiled in the fringes of a bitter war, and one which the general 
populace seems 100% ignorant of.  I don't care what Mike Godwin says, the
media DO see BBSs as a threat. I just got word that the article that was 
supposed to be done by a local paper on BBSs in our area was nixed. I don't
like conspiracy theories, but christ, it is almost impossible to get the
media to do anything on the online world that is not negative; the only
VR-oriented movie I have ever seen was a horror film designed to turn 
people OFF the idea (_Lawnmower_Man_), MTV wants to do stories about neo-
nazis using BBS for their goals; the media worked hand in hand with the 
govt in the Waco mess, and now the media are generally silent, even supportive,
about the clipper; I try to do my part in distributing crypto, and get 
legal threats from a govt. contractor...

What gives?  How far is this going to go?
-- 
Testes saxi solidi!  **********************   Podex opacus gravedinosus est!  
Stanton McCandlish,  SysOp:  Noise in the Void Data Center BBS
IndraNet: 369:1/1      FidoNet: 1:301/2      Internet: anton@hydra.unm.edu
Snail: 8020 Central SE #405, Albuquerque, New Mexico 87108 USA
Data phone: +1-505-246-8515 (24hr, 1200-14400 v32bis, N-8-1)
Vox phone:  +1-505-247-3402 (bps rate varies, depends on if you woke me up...:)




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Stanton McCandlish <anton@hydra.unm.edu>
Date: Wed, 19 May 93 05:39:12 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Dolphin Encrypt
Message-ID: <9305191239.AA09886@hydra.unm.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


<tried to email this, but it bounced>

I too would like more info on this subject!  Guess all us yokels at UNM are
clueless or something.  My question is, how does the recipient get the key,
and how do they (she, whatever) know to use that long de command? What would
happend if they didn't, just get gibberish?

> 
> The recipient captures the entire message as, say, G.ENC, then runs:
> 
>                        DE D G.ENC G.DEC /t
> 
> (Of course, she has to know the encryption key.)  Dolphin Encrypt
> skips over P1 to get at C2 and writes G.DEC containing P2.  Voila!
> 
> For further info send me a snailmail address.

See below for snail address...

-- 
Testes saxi solidi!  **********************   Podex opacus gravedinosus est!  
Stanton McCandlish,  SysOp:  Noise in the Void Data Center BBS
IndraNet: 369:1/1      FidoNet: 1:301/2      Internet: anton@hydra.unm.edu
Snail: 8020 Central SE #405, Albuquerque, New Mexico 87108 USA
Data phone: +1-505-246-8515 (24hr, 1200-14400 v32bis, N-8-1)
Vox phone:  +1-505-247-3402 (bps rate varies, depends on if you woke me up...:)




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: judic@sunnyside.com (Judi Clark)
Date: Wed, 19 May 93 07:03:42 PDT
To: Stanton McCandlish <anton@hydra.unm.edu>
Subject: Re: BBSs under fire! (or on fire, if BATF gets into the act!)
Message-ID: <199305191403.AA03433@snyside.sunnyside.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>I'd like to invite discussion, either private or listwise, on: Why is the govt.
>targetting BBSs?

Welcome to the real, growing, dangerous world, Stanton, where all your fears
are true.
  judi <judic@sunnyside.com>






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Stanton McCandlish <anton@hydra.unm.edu>
Date: Wed, 19 May 93 07:21:03 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: MCI, Sprint or bust ...
In-Reply-To: <NXss4B1w165w@sytex.com>
Message-ID: <9305191420.AA11446@hydra.unm.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> AT&T won't get my business until they  discontinue using Clipper.
> Somehow, I get the feeling that may be when hell freezes over.
...  
> I urge anyone who is seriously concerned over Clipper to put their
> money where their mouth is - boycott AT&T.

Already done so. Using MCI also, though their "Friends and Family " plan
stinks of bigbro also.  What better why to catch up with those who skip out
on their phone bills than getting the names and phone numbers of all their
"friends and family", eh?

In case any corporate spies from AT&T are reading: Not only do you lose my
phone service, but your AT&T-Paradyne branch just lost out on modem sales
too.  Which is just too bad.  AT&T-P. had THE best sysop-discount deal on
14400bps modems.  I was all ready to buy a couple of them.  Tsk tsk.
-- 
Testes saxi solidi!  **********************   Podex opacus gravedinosus est!  
Stanton McCandlish,  SysOp:  Noise in the Void Data Center BBS
IndraNet: 369:1/1      FidoNet: 1:301/2      Internet: anton@hydra.unm.edu
Snail: 8020 Central SE #405, Albuquerque, New Mexico 87108 USA
Data phone: +1-505-246-8515 (24hr, 1200-14400 v32bis, N-8-1)
Vox phone:  +1-505-247-3402 (bps rate varies, depends on if you woke me up...:)




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Stanton McCandlish <anton@hydra.unm.edu>
Date: Wed, 19 May 93 07:37:20 PDT
To: judic@sunnyside.com (Judi Clark)
Subject: Re: BBSs under fire! (or on fire, if BATF gets into the act!)
In-Reply-To: <199305191403.AA03433@snyside.sunnyside.com>
Message-ID: <9305191436.AA11807@hydra.unm.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> >I'd like to invite discussion, either private or listwise, on: Why is the govt.
> >targetting BBSs?
> 
> Welcome to the real, growing, dangerous world, Stanton, where all your fears
> are true.

Doesn't help much. >:)

I just want to know what it is about BBSing that scares the <insert fecal
matter here> out of the govt.  Why are porno, crypto, and <gasp> people saying
what the want to, somehow more threating on BBSs than about 10x as many people
doing the same thing on govt "controlled" <ha ha ha> educational systems?
If the govt really really sees these things as dangerous, would it not be wiser
to take care of the "cancer" in one's own body than worry about the health of
others?  Maybe the govt. is just totally irrational, or something.  Not saying
anyone should put a stop to alt.binaries.pictures.erotica, I could care less
if people like spending inorinate amounts of time uudecoding spotty nudie 
pics.  But the whole rationale behind attacking BBSs seems, like I said, ir-
rational...
-- 
Testes saxi solidi!  **********************   Podex opacus gravedinosus est!  
Stanton McCandlish,  SysOp:  Noise in the Void Data Center BBS
IndraNet: 369:1/1      FidoNet: 1:301/2      Internet: anton@hydra.unm.edu
Snail: 8020 Central SE #405, Albuquerque, New Mexico 87108 USA
Data phone: +1-505-246-8515 (24hr, 1200-14400 v32bis, N-8-1)
Vox phone:  +1-505-247-3402 (bps rate varies, depends on if you woke me up...:)




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Arthur R. McGee" <amcgee@netcom.com>
Date: Wed, 19 May 93 09:03:42 PDT
To: Stanton McCandlish <anton@hydra.unm.edu>
Subject: Re: BBSs under fire! (or on fire, if BATF gets into the act!)
In-Reply-To: <9305191436.AA11807@hydra.unm.edu>
Message-ID: <Pine.3.05.9305190835.B2824-c100000@netcom2>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


It's VERY simple Stanton. Look at the difference. BBSs are still
relatively small standalone "islands", even when they are hooked up to
Fido, RIME, etc. networks. They are a LOT easier to pick on.

The "net" however is essentially many seperate systems and one HUGE system
all at the same time. They realize that to tackle one particular site or
even many sites, really doesn't do anything. The net is like a funhouse
with too many "mirrors." The only way to have any effect would be to
change the rules of the net itself, saying that, for example,
"pornography" is not allowed. This, as we all know, along with all the
other rules they would likely impose, would kill the net DEAD("yeah", I
know, poor english, but you get my point). Also, the size of the net and
the somewhat seemless connection between the numerous networks, would STILL
allow people to pass the information around without law enforcement having
a clue.

In addition, the fact that so much of the net is in some way either owned by,
sanctioned by, or located on government or university property(as you
mentioned), pretty much precludes law enforcement from doing anything. They
can't cut off their own arm. It would be the gov't vs. the gov't. Like a
dog chasing it's own tail trying to bite it. Like Internal Affairs. Like
"Independant" Internal Investigation. Right! They don't mean a d**n thing.

Art

On Wed, 19 May 1993, Stanton McCandlish wrote:

> I just want to know what it is about BBSing that scares the <insert fecal
> matter here> out of the govt.  Why are porno, crypto, and <gasp> people saying
> what the want to, somehow more threating on BBSs than about 10x as many people
> doing the same thing on govt "controlled" <ha ha ha> educational systems?
> If the govt really really sees these things as dangerous, would it not be wiser
> to take care of the "cancer" in one's own body than worry about the health of
> others?  Maybe the govt. is just totally irrational, or something.  Not saying
> anyone should put a stop to alt.binaries.pictures.erotica, I could care less
> if people like spending inorinate amounts of time uudecoding spotty nudie 
> pics.  But the whole rationale behind attacking BBSs seems, like I said, ir-
> rational...






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: fergp@sytex.com (Paul Ferguson)
Date: Wed, 19 May 93 06:45:12 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: MCI, Sprint or bust ...
Message-ID: <NXss4B1w165w@sytex.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I changed my telco service to MCI yesterday.
 
"We want you back."
 
AT&T won't get my business until they  discontinue using Clipper.
Somehow, I get the feeling that may be when hell freezes over.
 
It leaves a bit to the imagination what the "i" in the "i" plan
really stands for. Intelligence? Integrity-busters? Insecurity?
 
I urge anyone who is seriously concerned over Clipper to put their
money where their mouth is - boycott AT&T.
 
Cheers.
 

Paul Ferguson               |  "... certain unalienable Rights,
Network Integrator          |  that among these, are Life, Liberty,
Centreville, Virginia USA   |  and the pursuit of Happiness."
fergp@sytex.com             |   -- The Declaration of Independence
 
          Stop the Wiretap (Clipper/Capstone) Chip.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: anon03e2@nyx.cs.du.edu (Fallen Angel)
Date: Wed, 19 May 93 08:31:18 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com (cypher punks)
Subject: Random numbers
Message-ID: <9305191531.AA15131@nyx.cs.du.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


One of the main factors in crypto seems to be a source of random
numbers which most computers don't really have.

Wouldn't it be ppossible to apply the Mafia-numbers-game solution?
i.e. For your numbers (or seed for a large volume of numbers) take
a random pubically accessible number like the last 3 digits of the
attendance of a sporting event.
   
I have never seen any formalizations, but that type of number should be
as close to totally random as possible.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Clive" <walmsley@ccint1.rsre.mod.uk>
Date: Wed, 19 May 93 02:05:05 PDT
To: "cypherpunks" <cypherpunks@toad.com>
Subject: REF ... GCHQ
Message-ID: <9305190904.AA22545@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Ref the GCHQ question,

I have posted to this group previously, ie yesterday, details on GCHQ,
and I wish to take issue with

>>>Duncan Frissell <76630.3577@CompuServe.COM>  To: <cypherpunks@toad.com>    
   
Original Question >>>What does GCHQ stand for, and what does it do? 
Is it similar to the NSA?

Duncan replied

>> The Royal Signals Establishment at Cheltenham, Gloucestershire, 
>> England is known as General Communications Head Quarters (GCHQ).  
>> It is also called 'Cheltenham' after its location.  
>> It performs many of the same sigint jobs as NSA.

THIS IS WRONG .....

GCHQ stands for the Government Communications HeadQuarters. They are part of
the Foreign and Commonwealth Office. They have NOTHING to do with the
Ministry of Defence.

The Royal Signals Establishment, when it existed, it closed in about 1970
was located at Christchurch. It amalgamated with the Royal Radar 
Establishment at Malvern to form the Royal Signals & Radar Establishment
(RSRE) with the prime site being at Malvern.

They were once more reformed 2 years ago to become the Defence Research
Agency, which includes the prime non-nuclear research establishments in the
UK. FYI these are RSRE at Malvern, at Fort Halstead the Royal Armaments 
Research & Develeopment Establishment, at Farnborough the Royal Aircraft 
Establishment and at Portland, the Admiralty Research Establishment
(They upset the monarchy about the turn of the century and as a result 
have never received the Royal Charter)

Let me say again that GCHQ or it's groups have nothing at all to do
with the MoD and that the Royal Signals Establishment (or even the Royal
Signals & Radar Establishment) are not located at Cheltenham and are
not associated with GCHQ!!!!


Clive Walmsley
Walmsley@ccint1.rsre.mod.uk                                                                                                                                                                     





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: stub23 <eaeu362@orion.oac.uci.edu>
Date: Wed, 19 May 93 10:03:36 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Boycotts
Message-ID: <199305191703.AA19033@orion.oac.uci.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


well i dont know about boycotting AT&T
if you do, i would reccomend that you write a letter
to them telling them EXACTLY why you dropped their service
because boycotting someone without telling them that 
you are doing it is pointless

i like AT&T more than Sprint or MCI as companies
but then again i used to work for AT&T
so im kinda biased...

but i can guarentee that SPrint and MCI are more evil than AT&T

and using ANI was something i did as part of my life
its how i worked out billing,
although it DOES provide a means for finding out
your phone number whne you might not want it known
its main use is billing

and NO, most people dont know about it
so what do WE do to educate them?






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: peter honeyman <honey@citi.umich.edu>
Date: Wed, 19 May 93 07:44:07 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: MCI, Sprint or bust ...
In-Reply-To: <NXss4B1w165w@sytex.com>
Message-ID: <9305191444.AA01544@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


i think it's naive to boycott at&t over clipper.  i'm sure mci and
sprint are the same sort of villains as at&t.

what makes more sense is to buy some at&t shares and force the issue
at the next stockholders' meeting.  in fact, this might be a great
consciousness-raising vehicle: we could get a statement included
in the proxy booklet and force a stockholder vote.  as a stockholder
(of about 20 shares, due to my previous life as a bell labs mts), i
see cranks getting space in the booklet every year.  

how do they do that?

	peter




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: peb@PROCASE.COM
Date: Wed, 19 May 93 11:24:47 PDT
To: anton@hydra.unm.edu
Subject: Re: MCI, Sprint or bust ...
Message-ID: <9305191822.AA11429@banff>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



>though their "Friends and Family " plan stinks of bigbro also

Hah!  Sprint is even better at this.  They have a new service where 
they `help you move'; you give them the addresses of all entities
that need address changes (!) and they do it all for you.  They pay
for the postage, all you have to do is eliminate your privacy in 
exchange.  


Paul E. Baclace
peb@procase.com





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Marc Horowitz <marc@GZA.COM>
Date: Wed, 19 May 93 08:45:41 PDT
To: Stanton McCandlish <anton@hydra.unm.edu>
Subject: Re: BBSs under fire! (or on fire, if BATF gets into the act!)
In-Reply-To: <9305191203.AA09712@hydra.unm.edu>
Message-ID: <9305191545.AA01568@dun-dun-noodles.aktis.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>> Now, maybe I missed something, but I have yet to see the secret service raid
>> ftparchive.blah.edu, or UNM where I work, for 'pandering'.

You missed it.  It has happened.  MIT used to run an alt.sex.bondage
stories server.  Someone would read a.s.b., cull out the stories and
make them available for anonymous ftp.  Well, a while ago (2-3 years)
a guy named Joe Abernathy from the Houston Chronicle wrote a story
about the Internet, and mentioned the asb archive.  This got up to the
highest level of the NSF management, and MIT was threatened to take
down the server, or have their connection cut.  This was a big deal
within MIT, since MIT is extrememly progressive about virtual data.
They have a policy to take the ECPA seriously, and they really did
regard this as censorship.  But the NSF did not seem to be bluffing,
so MIT told the organization running the server that it had to be taken
down, and why.  The organization agreed, since they didn't want to be
cut off the net either.

It takes an extremely strong idealist to stand up to this sort of
pressure, and MIT just wasn't up to it.  I really can't blame them.
Today, maybe they could do it, since the net is much more in the
public's eye, and there are organizations like EFF and CPSR to support
them.

So, don't feel singled out.  The gov't isn't just targetting the
little guys.

>> 1) who gave the govt the right to distribute this material, and deny
>> others to do so (for whatever reason) - these universities ARE part of
>> the govt.

Laziness, not intent.  If someone made a big stink, unm would feel it,
I promise.

>> 2) why is the govt scapegoating BBSs?  Are we THAT 'dangerous and
>> subversive'?

No, you're easy targets, and closing down kiddie porn distribution
looks real good on the personnel evaluation.

>> 3) why is it that people in general cannot see this BS for the BS it is?
>> Is it REALLY so hard to see that "terrorism" and "kiddie porn" are not real
>> threats, but that stomping all over our privacy rights IS?

People in this country are soft.  They don't see the government as a
threat.  They also smoke too much and rot their brains with TV.
"Never attribute to malice that which can be adequately explained by
stupidity."

>> 4) why is nothing much really being done about these civil rights
>> violations?  The SJG case is a case in point.  EFF did plenty to help
>> out, but where was the ACLU?

The EFF did a fine job.  The ACLU wasn't needed here.  If they were, I
hope they would have done something.  The fact is, you haven't
experienced any civil rights violations, and the Clipper Chip,
although enabling them, does not cause them.  You can't take the
government to court because you think they're evil.  They have to
screw up first, and they are, in general, careful about provably
screwing up.

>> I try to do my part in distributing crypto, and get legal threats from
>> a govt. contractor...

They have rights to that software.  Plaster the universe with DES
software; nobody will touch you.  RSA does not want to cut off all
crypto; they're just trying to make money off what they own.  Would
you be upset if Playboy's lawyers sent you a letter ordering you to
get the digitized centerfolds off your BBS?  It's exactly the same
thing.

>> What gives?  

Look at the newspaper.  Open to a random page.  Do you see a story
about public service in your town, or about a police officer who got
shot yesterday?  Happy, peaceful, nice doesn't sell.  The media
focuses on death, violence, and stuff like that because it's what
people want to watch.  Nazis (Oops.  It's a flame.  The Nazis got
mentioned :-) and pornography are just the equivalents in the
networking world.  People could care less about all the good things
that happen.  They want to be reminded about all the bad things in the
world, so their own lives seem a little less miserable.

>> How far is this going to go?

Too far.  It already has.  I wish I could tell you when it would stop.

		Marc




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Eric Hughes <hughes@soda.berkeley.edu>
Date: Wed, 19 May 93 11:55:18 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: FTP: new materials on the archive
Message-ID: <9305191851.AA19299@soda.berkeley.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I've done a bit of archive maintenance in the last week.  A bunch of
the Clipper info I had has been cleaned up and posted.  I've put up
the sci.crypt FAQ, which I would like everyone who has basic questions
to read, as well as L. Detweiler's Anonymity on the Internet FAQ.

Enjoy.

Eric




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Hal <74076.1041@CompuServe.COM>
Date: Wed, 19 May 93 09:22:44 PDT
To: CYPHERPUNKS <CYPHERPUNKS@toad.com>
Subject: Re: BBSs under fire!
Message-ID: <930519161458_74076.1041_FHD73-1@CompuServe.COM>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

I agree with Stanton that BBS's have a rather unsavory image in the media
and the public at large, compared with Usenet.  A lot of people think of
BBS's as meeting grounds for malicious hackers, whereas most people have
never heard of Usenet.  Here are some possible reasons for the difference:

1) BBS's are often used by kids.  Parents see them using the computer to
access BBS's.  Usenet is available mostly to college campuses, research
labs, and corporations.  Lay people never see it operating.  Usenet is
largely based on Internet, which exists for research purposes.

2) People who use Internet tend to be college students and professional
adults.  They are more articulate and better able to defend their interests
than most BBS users.

3) Usenet is decentralized but largely accountable.  People who post
objectionable material can be traced and recorded.  On BBS's most posters
are completely anonymous - only the operators are known.  Perhaps the govern-
ment feels more comfortable being able to monitor those who post material
it doesn't want to see.

And there are many cases where people have gotten into trouble for Usenet
postings.  A few months ago there was discussion on comp.org.eff.talk about
a student at a large Northeastern university who got in legal trouble for
posting possible child porn, including visits from the FBI.  A few weeks
ago in comp.admin.policy there was discussion about someone who posted what
could be interpreted as a desire that Clinton die, and whose office was visited
by the Secret Service shortly afterward.  These things could not be done on
a BBS, or only the operator could be investigated.

Note also that our efforts for providing anonymity on Usenet threaten this
capability.  It's interesting to see how many of the vested interests on
Usenet (system operators and such) opposed anonymity and have been working
to shut it down.

4) All Usenet traffic could be monitored from a central location.  To monitor
all postings on all BBS's would be far more difficult.  There could be all
kinds of wild things being discussed on random BBS's here and there and the
government would never know about it.  This isn't true of Usenet.

5) Some BBS's have had illegal activities as their major purpose, including
telephone fraud (exchanging stolen credit card numbers).  Such activities
would not be possible on Usenet.

6) BBS's often have cute or clever names that make them sound frivolous or
childish.  Usenet newsgroups and systems have functional names.  Here is
a list of local BBS systems I found:

            The Birdhouse BBS
            The Bowhead Whale BBS
            Buddha's Place BBS
            The Cat's Meow Network
            /dev/bbs
            Eco BBS
            The Enright House
            Enterprize BBS
            Fat Aggies
            The Haunted Castle of Alchemists
            The Haunted Manor
            Idiots Eternal
            Legal Plus Service BBS
            The Library Annex
            Manhattan
            Network XXIII
            Prevailing Winds Research BBS
            Reality Ltd.
            Santa Barbara Jaycees BBS
            SBCC BBS
            Swagland BBS
            The Seaside
            The Silican Embassy
            The Thunder Penguin
            The Wett BBS
            The Wimp

There are some legitimate-sounding systems here, but a lot of them sound like
they don't have a useful purpose.

===

In making these comparisons I don't mean to attack BBS operators or users,
just to identify some differences in perception between BBS's and Usenet,
which after all do have a lot of similarities in how they are used.

I think that as more BBS systems connect to the net the line between BBS's
and Usenet will blur.  Also, if our efforts succeed to provide anonymity
on the Internet the government will not be able to track objectionable
postings to their source.  Probably at that time Usenet itself will be
attacked due to the threat it will present to those in power.

Hal Finney
74076.1041@compuserve.com

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01ftHNPHiZO/uPCWvsjmsaKATduNesnOmNgOFxMFN7Dp+KmcchjKwl3coBQbOY9J
W9Ijlv2RV/I=
=JERo
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From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Marc Horowitz <marc@GZA.COM>
Date: Wed, 19 May 93 09:57:20 PDT
To: jrk@information-systems.east-anglia.ac.uk (Richard Kennaway)
Subject: Re: alt.whistleblowers
In-Reply-To: <9667.9305191619@sys.uea.ac.uk>
Message-ID: <9305191657.AA01659@dun-dun-noodles.aktis.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>> It would seem in keeping with the spirit of alt.whistleblowers for the
>> newgroup to be performed anonymously.  Does anon.penet.fi support the
>> control newsgroup? :-)  More seriously, why doesn't everyone who knows how
>> and wants the group created simply forge an anonymous creation message?

Because then all the news admins who don't like anonymity (most of
them) will refuse to honor the newgroup, and the group will die.

		Marc




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: fergp@sytex.com (Paul Ferguson)
Date: Wed, 19 May 93 11:15:13 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: RICO
Message-ID: <ey6s4B1w165w@sytex.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Can anyone suggest an available electronic transcript containing the
verbage of the RICO Act?
 
I'm sending an ARCHIE search, but I thought someone on the list
may know where to find this info.
 
Cheers.

Paul Ferguson               |  "... certain unalienable Rights,
Network Integrator          |  that among these, are Life, Liberty,
Centreville, Virginia USA   |  and the pursuit of Happiness."
fergp@sytex.com             |   -- The Declaration of Independence
 
          Stop the Wiretap (Clipper/Capstone) Chip.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: corwin@Cayman.COM (Lord Among Panthers)
Date: Wed, 19 May 93 11:11:05 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: A good venue for distributing Clipper info perhaps
Message-ID: <9305191810.AA17912@cuba.Cayman.COM>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Topic> npr
 
Station: Internet Multicasting Service
Channel: Internet Town Hall
Program: National Public Radio meets the Internet
Release: May 21, 1993, 2-3PM EDT
Content: Talk of the Nation/Science Friday
 
On May 21, we will be joining the Internet to National Public
Radio for a special edition of Talk of the Nation/Science Friday.
Host Ira Flatow will field questions from users sitting in front
of computers as well as users sitting next to telephones.  Questions
from the Internet will come from videoconferencing tools on the
Multicast Backbone (MBONE) using a gateway provided by Ron Fredrick
and Steve Deering of Xerox PARC.
 
(If you don't have MBONE connectivity now, you probably won't have it
by Friday.  To learn more about the multicast backbone, ftp to isi.edu
and get the file /mbone/faq.txt.  If you do have MBONE connectivity,
check SD for a listing for Internet Town Hall.)
 
In addition to the audio link, we will have two other ways to
participate.  First, starting now, you can send mail to ira@radio.com
with your comments and questions.  Some of this mail may be read as
part of the show.  We encourage you to narrow your your comments to
the
subject of the Internet, how it is used, and the future of networking
in the western world.
 
Second, with the help of Rick Gates, we will be conducting an Internet
Treasure Hunt and reading the results over the air.  The purpose of
the
hunt is to illustrate the diversity of methods and data available on
the network.  The questions will be posted on the network 24 hours
before the show and will be read by Ira Flatow at the beginning of
the show.
 
Even if you don't participate with a computer for this show, we hope
you will listen to your local National Public Radio affiliate.  Guests
will include Carl Malamud, Brewster Kahle, and Tim O'Reilly.  For
those of you that have computers but no NPR affiliate, we will tape
the show and send it out as an audio file approximately 48 hours after
it airs.
 
Participants in the Internet Town Hall include Cornell University,
the National Press Club, the National Science Foundation, O'Reilly &
Associates, Sun Microsystems, WAIS, Inc., Xerox PARC, and many others.
 
Network connectivity for the Internet Town Hall is provided by UUNET
Technologies.
 
 
For information on Internet Talk Radio, write to info@radio.com.
More information on Internet Town Hall will be available shortly.
For a current, partial listing of sites, write to sites@radio.com.
 
corwin






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: fergp@sytex.com (Paul Ferguson)
Date: Wed, 19 May 93 12:46:32 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: RE: MCI, Sprint or bust ...
Message-ID: <978s4B1w165w@sytex.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


On Wed, 19 May 1993 10:43:53 -0400
  peter honeyman <uunet!citi.umich.edu!honey> wrote -
 
 
> i think it's naive to boycott at&t over clipper.  i'm sure mci
> and sprint are the same sort of villains as at&t.
 
 Perhaps, but at least MCI or SPRINT has not publicly acknowledged
 the use of Government sponsored crypto.
 
 Insistance of naivete is subjective opinion.
 
> what makes more sense is to buy some at&t shares and force the
> issue at the next stockholders' meeting.
 
 Easier said than done.
 
 
  Cheers.

Paul Ferguson               |  "... certain unalienable Rights,
Network Integrator          |  that among these, are Life, Liberty,
Centreville, Virginia USA   |  and the pursuit of Happiness."
fergp@sytex.com             |   -- The Declaration of Independence
 
          Stop the Wiretap (Clipper/Capstone) Chip.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Marianne Mueller <mrrm@well.sf.ca.us>
Date: Wed, 19 May 93 14:43:05 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Consider "Working Assets" phone service instead of AT&T
Message-ID: <199305192142.AA25642@well.sf.ca.us>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Another option to AT&T long distance service is something called
Working Assets.

Quoting from their bill,

"Every time you call long distance with Working Assets, a percentage
of your charge goes to nonprofit action groups that are working for a
better world.  These donations are made by Working Assets at no extra
cost to you.

...

For a list of groups Working Assets has funded in the past, send a
self-addressed stamped envelope to

        701 Montgomery Street #400
        San Francisco, CA 94111
...

You automatically get a discount of up to 15% on interstate calls,
depending on your monthly calling volume.  And you automatically get a
20% Friendship Discount (indicated by and "F" on the bill) when you
call another member of the Working Assets Long Distance network.

...

Working Assets is the only phone company to sign the Valdez
Principles, committing ourselves to environmental responsibility."

(The bills are on 100% postconsumer recycled paper, unbleached, and
they plant 17 trees for every ton of paper they use.)

You can contact Working Assets by calling 1-800-788-8588 (let's face
it, a phone company is going to know your number) or write them at the
above address.

If you tell them I recommended you, I get $10 off my bill, but you
don't have to do that.  I'm recommending them because I think they are
a great option to AT&T, not because I want $10 off my bill!

I chose Amnesty International as the nonprofit that gets donations
when I make long distance calls.  I think Working Assets has dozens of
nonprofits you can choose from.  And hey, celebrity endorsement: Ralph
Nader goes around urging everyone to sign up with Working Assets.

Cheerios,
Marianne





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: sneal@muskwa.ucs.ualberta.ca (Sneal)
Date: Wed, 19 May 93 13:49:36 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: BBSs under fire!
Message-ID: <9305192048.AA14496@muskwa.ucs.ualberta.ca>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Stanton McCandlish writes:
 
>I'd like to invite discussion, either private or listwise, on: Why is
>the govt.  targetting BBSs?
 
     I suspect that a lot of law enforcement agencies are worried
about their budgets right now, and in response, they've made a point
of going after easy targets with high publicity value: i.e.  people
who lack resources to mount a strong defense, and who are looked upon
with suspicion by the mainstream.  BBSs, Branch Davidians, and now
health food stores, fall nicely into this category.  To be a
successful bully, you've got to find victims who can't fight back.
 
     Further, if LawEnf can push a lot of hot buttons in their press
releases about the raid
("kiddypornterroristdrugdealingmurphybrownpotatoe"), they can count
on lots of media attention, which is always good when budget time
comes... politicians are reluctant to put the axe to the heroes of
the day.
 
     I also suspect that Big Brother is becoming peripherally aware
that the uncontrolled, unmonitored, and extremely rapid flow of 
information via "new media" (a disreputable phrase, but there ya go)
is a threat to the existing power structure.  Alvin Toffler does a 
good number on this in "Powershift" (nice title, thanks a LOT, Alvin;
why don't you just TELL the bad guys what's going on??!).  The spooks
and their bedfellows (ENCRYPTED OFFENSIVE STATEMENT FOLLOWS Bt
Epspuiz Efoojoh mjlft up tbz, "Uif OTB dbo bmxbzt gjmm jo uif ipmft!"
END OFFENSIVE STATEMENT) have always counted on being able to keep
tabs on who's saying what, and to find and squelch troublemakers that
get too far out of line.  The proliferation of BBSs drastically
increases the number of "pressure points" needed to control
information flows in any meaningful way. 
 
     Add strong crypto to geometrically expanding information paths,
and you've got a spook's nightmare.  Not only does the head of the NSA
have to hire new guys to monitor all the BBSs, but now he's got
to buy a bunch more Crays to keep up with the crypto traffic.  The poor
guy must be swimming in his shorts..."My GOD!  What if somebody SAYS
something BAD and I DON'T KNOW ABOUT IT??!".
 
  -- Steve
 
 
 
 




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Paco Xander Nathan <wixer!wixer.bga.com!pacoid@cactus.org>
Date: Thu, 20 May 93 12:11:48 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: MCI, Sprint or bust ...
In-Reply-To: <9305191444.AA01544@toad.com>
Message-ID: <9305191949.AA28828@wixer>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


"Sent from the cyberdeck of: peter honeyman"
> 
> what makes more sense is to buy some at&t shares and force the issue
> at the next stockholders' meeting.  in fact, this might be a great
> consciousness-raising vehicle: we could get a statement included
> in the proxy booklet and force a stockholder vote.  as a stockholder
> (of about 20 shares, due to my previous life as a bell labs mts), i
> see cranks getting space in the booklet every year.  
> how do they do that?

Hear, hear from another former Bell Labbie MTS..  (of course, we
were in Network Support and used to have our _vendors_ call back
collect if we knew they used Sprint, because the sound was so
much better :-)

AT&T *does* have a lot of twisted stockholder proposals. They 
also have more "ma & pa" individual investors than most large 
firms, as opposed to VC & institutional votes, so the mgt feels 
VERY sensitive toward shareholder votes. That's the price a firm
must pay for cutting a regular dividend for N decades..  In fact,
the mgt is so sensitive that they even have a near-mandatory
payroll deduction program for employees to support their PAC.
Really fucked!

All it takes is just one share and you can propose an item for
vote, but I think you need many more shareholders to join in
before the vote will get anywhere near the proxy ballot. You 
can bet that AT&T mgt will do everything they can to discredit
and/or block any vote they haven't initiated themselves.

Even so, we researched this form of "protest" as a much more
effective alternative to "boycotts" (which are frankly impossible
in a post-industrial economy anyways) during the piss-test
conflict at <my prev employer>. Any brokers or VC's here, ie. 
field experts?

Twas part of my "12-Step Program To Kill Corporate Drug Testing" 
published recently in Urine Nation News. The other corporate
juggler vein to swat with a machete is to approach to a firm's
first/second tier customers and find a neato way to give them 
the shivers about the firm's offensive programs.. Like Apple 
wasn't exactly pleased when <my prev employer> started mumbling 
about insuring that all its biz partners enforced drug testing 
as well so that they could chalk up even more Malcum Balddick 
awards from the Republicans..

Mind you that AT&T earns its lunch money from corp & govt work
combined with legislative tax breaks, not so much from Jane R.
Consumer..  If there was anyway to make AT&T's corp/govt 
customers paranoid about the Wiretap chip (as they well should
be!) then AT&T might reconsider - quickly!!  It's happened
before..

Let's see, who among AT&T's bevy of cash cows might have a lil'
sumthin' to fear from having their secure comm tapped by the
Feds..  Let's see, how about mainland China?  Or possibly Mobile
Oil?  Let's apply the leverage where it will ouch the most..

pxn.






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Kent Hastings" <kent_hastings@qmail2.aero.org>
Date: Thu, 20 May 93 09:21:10 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Hargis T-raid
Message-ID: <199305201620.AA04061@aerospace.aero.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


                      Hargis T-raid#000#
The offices of Anthony L. Hargis were visited 5-18-93 by Treasury
agents. Since 1976, Hargis operated a "bank that isn't a bank," 
using a Massachusetts Business Trust structure. The theory of 
operation was that a Trust recording gold Deposits and Transfer
Orders was legally different than a Bank with Accounts and Checks.

This bluff worked well for 15 years. Anthony's recent involvement
with the State Citizens (a new tax protestor approach) may have
triggered the raid. Or perhaps ALH was allowed to exist all 
these years to suck in more IRS victims.

Account holders can assume the worst. Customers were not allowed 
in the door, and the computer records were not encrypted, despite
my, and others, frequent suggestions. "Citizens don't need
encryption" was the response in a nutshell.

Citizens Do.

Now, secure physical data links (perhaps using spread-spectrum 
modulation of radio and microwave) appear necessary for financial
privacy. All the nice little tricks with mail drops and trusts 
may work in the short term, but only strong encryption and signal
hiding will insure long term survival.

Kent - kent_hastings@qmail2.aero.org.
and 







From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: jet@nas.nasa.gov (J. Eric Townsend)
Date: Wed, 19 May 93 15:20:09 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Consider "Working Assets" phone service instead of AT&T
In-Reply-To: <199305192142.AA25642@well.sf.ca.us>
Message-ID: <9305192220.AA00742@boxer.nas.nasa.gov>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain




The only downside to WA is that they won't issue a phonecard-only
account (which is what I have with US Splice).





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: J. Michael Diehl <mdiehl@triton.unm.edu>
Date: Wed, 19 May 93 14:22:23 PDT
To: sneal@muskwa.ucs.ualberta.ca (Sneal)
Subject: Re: BBSs under fire!
In-Reply-To: <9305192048.AA14496@muskwa.ucs.ualberta.ca>
Message-ID: <9305192121.AA21257@triton.unm.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>      I suspect that a lot of law enforcement agencies are worried
> about their budgets right now, and in response, they've made a point
> of going after easy targets with high publicity value: i.e.  people
> who lack resources to mount a strong defense, and who are looked upon
> with suspicion by the mainstream.  BBSs, Branch Davidians, and now
> health food stores, fall nicely into this category.  To be a
> successful bully, you've got to find victims who can't fight back.

Nope, that's not it.  If you can accuse a BBS sysop of a feloney, YOU CAN 
SIEZE HIS DAMN COMPUER!!!!!!  And guess who gets the money from the sale of
the (expensive) computer equipment....the LEA who "made the bust."  Oh ya, and 
you come out smelling like a rose in ink too.  Not a bad proposition for some
District Attorney who wants to make a name for himself, hypotheticly speaking.

>      Further, if LawEnf can push a lot of hot buttons in their press
> releases about the raid
> ("kiddypornterroristdrugdealingmurphybrownpotatoe"), they can count
> on lots of media attention, which is always good when budget time
> comes... politicians are reluctant to put the axe to the heroes of
> the day.

Most laymen don't even understand what email is.  So, "obviously those computer
users are doing something illegal," so the thinking goes.  And when the 
"authorities" say [insert your favorite subversive action], the average person
believes it.

>      I also suspect that Big Brother is becoming peripherally aware
> that the uncontrolled, unmonitored, and extremely rapid flow of 
> information via "new media" (a disreputable phrase, but there ya go)
> is a threat to the existing power structure.  Alvin Toffler does a 
> good number on this in "Powershift" (nice title, thanks a LOT, Alvin;
> why don't you just TELL the bad guys what's going on??!).  The spooks
> and their bedfellows (ENCRYPTED OFFENSIVE STATEMENT FOLLOWS Bt
> Epspuiz Efoojoh mjlft up tbz, "Uif OTB dbo bmxbzt gjmm jo uif ipmft!"
> END OFFENSIVE STATEMENT) have always counted on being able to keep
> tabs on who's saying what, and to find and squelch troublemakers that
> get too far out of line.  The proliferation of BBSs drastically
> increases the number of "pressure points" needed to control
> information flows in any meaningful way. 

That scares the Hell out of em, I'm sure.  BTW, am I going to have to compile
Cryptographic Work Bench, or is this crypt trivial and I'm too tired to see it?

>      Add strong crypto to geometrically expanding information paths,
> and you've got a spook's nightmare.  Not only does the head of the NSA
> have to hire new guys to monitor all the BBSs, but now he's got
> to buy a bunch more Crays to keep up with the crypto traffic.  The poor
> guy must be swimming in his shorts..."My GOD!  What if somebody SAYS
> something BAD and I DON'T KNOW ABOUT IT??!".

I'm not even going to touch this one....

+-----------------------+-----------------------------+---------+
| J. Michael Diehl ;-)  | I thought I was wrong once. | PGP KEY |
|                       |    But, I was mistaken.     |available|
|                       +-----------------------------+---------+
| mdiehl@triton.unm.edu | "I'm just looking for the opportunity |
| mike.diehl@fido.org   | to be Politically Incorrect!   <Me>   |
| (505) 299-2282        |                                       |
+-----------------------+---------------------------------------+




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: smb@research.att.com
Date: Wed, 19 May 93 12:34:02 PDT
To: Marc Horowitz <marc@GZA.COM>
Subject: Re: BBSs under fire! (or on fire, if BATF gets into the act!)
Message-ID: <9305191933.AA09988@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


	 >> Now, maybe I missed something, but I have yet to see the secret ser
	vice raid
	 >> ftparchive.blah.edu, or UNM where I work, for 'pandering'.

	 You missed it.  It has happened.  MIT used to run an alt.sex.bondage
	 stories server.  Someone would read a.s.b., cull out the stories and
	 make them available for anonymous ftp.

It's happening again, even as we speak.  The UNC public access system
is being criticized by the local Fox TV station for providing access to
``pornography'' to kids.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Perry E. Metzger" <pmetzger@lehman.com>
Date: Wed, 19 May 93 12:44:55 PDT
To: smb@research.att.com
Subject: Re: BBSs under fire! (or on fire, if BATF gets into the act!)
In-Reply-To: <9305191933.AA09988@toad.com>
Message-ID: <9305191944.AA05533@snark.shearson.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



smb@research.att.com says:
> 	 >> Now, maybe I missed something, but I have yet to see the secret ser
> 	vice raid
> 	 >> ftparchive.blah.edu, or UNM where I work, for 'pandering'.
> 
> 	 You missed it.  It has happened.  MIT used to run an alt.sex.bondage
> 	 stories server.  Someone would read a.s.b., cull out the stories and
> 	 make them available for anonymous ftp.
> 
> It's happening again, even as we speak.  The UNC public access system
> is being criticized by the local Fox TV station for providing access to
> ``pornography'' to kids.

Rupert Murdoch rides again -- hypocritical yellow journalism at its
finest. I imagine the Fox folks would never dream of criticizing the
Page 3 girls in all of Murdoch's UK papers -- which, after all, any
kid can paruse at will.

Perry




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: meyer <wixer!wixer.bga.com!meyer@cactus.org>
Date: Thu, 20 May 93 12:12:42 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Reply to queries concerning DE
Message-ID: <9305192114.AA01882@wixer>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>From: Stanton McCandlish <anton@hydra.unm.edu>
>Subject: Dolphin Encrypt
>To: cypherpunks@toad.com
>Date: Wed, 19 May 93 6:39:04 MDT
>
>> The recipient captures the entire message as, say, G.ENC, then runs:
>>
>>                        DE D G.ENC G.DEC /t
>>
>> (Of course, she has to know the encryption key.)  Dolphin Encrypt
>> skips over P1 to get at C2 and writes G.DEC containing P2.  Voila!
>
>My question is, how does the recipient get the key,
>and how do they (she, whatever) know to use that long de command?
>What would happen if they didn't, just get gibberish?

1.  I'm sure Stanton is aware (though perhaps there are some
people who are not) that there were cryptosystems in existence
before PGP, and before public key cryptography was invented.
DES is an example.  Such cryptosystems (in contrast to PGP) are
called "symmetric key" systems since the key used to encrypt is
the same as the key used to decrypt.  This being so, there is the
problem of how to get the key to the person decrypting the received
ciphertext. (This is as true for DES as for any other symmetric
key system.)  There are ways, more or less secure.  A secure way
is to use PGP to transmit the encrypted key.  If your only
encryption need is transmitting encrypted email then PGP may be
all you need.  If you want to encrypt lots of 1MB database files,
either to keep around or to transmit, then a faster encryption
process is needed.

2.  They know how to use "that long de command" (actually I think
it's quite short) because they've RTFM or had it explained to
them, just as for PGP.

3.  If they didn't use it they'd just have a block of what looks
like uuencoded stuff in the middle of the received message.  If
they put a wrapper around it and uudecoded they'd get *real* gibberish.

>From: Eric Hughes <hughes@soda.berkeley.edu>
>To: cypherpunks@toad.com
>Subject: Mixing ciphertext and plaintext
>
>>If you wish to mix plaintext and ciphertext in an email message then
>>you can use Dolphin Encrypt.
>
>What cryptosystem does Dolphin Encrypt use?  Is the algorithm
>published somewhere?
>
>Eric

The encryption process was developed and refined, with no input from
any government agency, during the last few years.  A general description
of it is given in the manual that comes with Dolphin Encrypt. I shall
post this description in the following message.  Comments are welcome.
Although this description is quite detailed, it is not sufficient to
work through the process with pencil and paper, since it is too
complex.  The complete details can only be understood from a study of
the C source code, which is provided with the Dolphin Encryption
Library, a C library usable by programmers to add encryption capabilities
to application programs.  More details available by snailmail; requests
by email or to 512-479-9208.  (We finally had our cute executive secretary
record the message; sounds better now - and, no, she doesn't throw the
Selectric typewriter ribbons in the trash.  In fact, we feed *all* our
cast-off confidential data to the hogs out back.  Best security method
we've ever used, though the dobermans are pretty good too.)

-- Peter Meyer

P.S.  Info going out by snailmail to all who requested it.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: meyer <wixer!wixer.bga.com!meyer@cactus.org>
Date: Thu, 20 May 93 12:12:46 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: DE encryption method
Message-ID: <9305192120.AA02004@wixer>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



                The Dolphin Encryption Process

The encryption process is a symmetric block cipher, where the block is
any size from 1 byte to about 16K.  The encryption key consists of a
string of from 10 to 60 ASCII characters. The key is converted into
six seed numbers using the MD5 message digest algorithm.  These
numbers are used to seed several pseudo-random-number generators
(PRNGs).  The key is also used to randomize other elements of the
system.  During encryption a series of extended and encrypted derivatives
of the key are used to scramble the plaintext.  The resulting ciphertext
is further combined with a portion of the adjacent plaintext (in a way
that depends on the key).  The enciphered block is then expanded by
the random addition of random bytes.  Finally the enciphered block is
shuffled in a way depending on the key.

The explanation of the encryption process has the following sections:

(a)PRNGs used
(b)Key input
(c)General initialization
(d)Block initialization
(e)Block encryption


(a)  PRNGs used

The process employs two kinds of PRNG:

(i)  Multiplicative congruential

This kind of PRNG is described in D. Knuth, The Art of Computer
Programming, Volume 2, pp. 9-20, and in S. Park and K. Miller, "Random
Number Generators: Good Ones are Hard to Find", Communications of the
ACM, Vol. 31 No. 10 (October 1988), pp. 1192-1201.  Three multiplicative
PRNGs are used in the encryption process.

(ii)  Additive

This kind of PRNG is described in D. Knuth, The Art of Computer
Programming, Volume 2, pp. 27-31, and in S. Kirkpatrick and E. Stoll,
"A Very Fast Shift-Register Sequence Random Number Generator", Journal
of Computational Physics, 40 (1981), pp. 517-526.

Five additive PRNGs are used in the encryption process.


(b)  Key input

The process makes use of a user-input key and six seed numbers which
are derived from that key.  The user may enter any string of typeable
characters.  All lower case characters are converted to upper case,
and all characters except the following 68 are eliminated:

                    ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ
            0123456789`~!@#$%^&*()_+|-=\[]{};':",./<>?

The resulting string is called the input key.  The input key must
consist of at least ten characters and at most sixty, and it must
contain at least six different characters.  If not then it is rejected.


(c)  General initialization

Once an acceptable input key has been entered, there are two operations
that are performed using this key before any actual data encryption
occurs.

(i)  Six seed numbers in the range 4,000,000 through 1,431,655,765 are
generated from the input key using the MD5 message digest algorithm.

(ii)  The three multiplicative PRNGs are used in different ways in the
encryption process.  Based on the key the particular ways in which
they are to be used are determined at this stage.


(d)  Block initialization

The block size must be specified.  For each block the encipherment
process occurs as follows:

(i)  The block is assigned a number in the range 0 - 65,535.

(ii)  The three multiplicative PRNGs are initialized using three of
the seed numbers and the block number.

(iii)  A set of five additive PRNGs is randomly chosen from a set of
thirty.  They are initialized using five of the seed numbers, the
block number and numbers generated by the multiplicative PRNGs.

(iv)  A sub-block length is randomly selected using one of the
multiplicative PRNGs.  Its value depends on the key, but lies in the
range 30 through 180.


(e)  Block encryption

Block encryption consists of three processes: scrambling,
interpolation and shuffling.

(i)  Scrambling

Scrambling involves two parallel encipherment processes:

    (1)  A series of character strings are generated from the input key.
The length of each string is at least 250 and at most 500 bytes and is
chosen so as not to be divisible by the previously mentioned sub-block
length; otherwise the length of the string is random.  Each byte in
this string is derived from a combination of a byte randomly selected
from the input key and a value returned by one of the additive PRNGs.
As each string is generated its MD5 message digest is also generated.

The block is divided into a set of non-overlapping variable-length
sub-blocks corresponding to the lengths of the strings thus generated.
Each byte in each sub-block is modified by combination with a byte in
the string, a byte in the MD5 message digest of the current string and
a value obtained by using one of the PRNGs.

    (2)  In the second, concurrent, process the block is divided into
fixed-length non-overlapping sub-blocks which have the previously
mentioned sub-block length.  The bytes in each ciphertext sub-block
are combined with some or all of the bytes in the corresponding
plaintext sub-block in a manner involving the use of one of the PRNGs.

(ii)  Interpolation

Meaningless bytes are now interpolated among the bytes of the
ciphertext. This is done in a random way using one of the PRNGs and so
that these interpolated random bytes can be eliminated during decipherment.
This step generally increases the size of the block by 2% to 10%.

(iii)  Shuffling

The bytes are then permuted (or in other words, shuffled) randomly by
a process that again uses one of the PRNGs and the input key, and
which is reversible if and only if the key is known.

The completes the encipherment of the data block.  This process may be
performed on each block of data making up any larger block, such as a
disk file.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: TO1SITTLER@APSICC.APS.EDU
Date: Wed, 19 May 93 15:52:59 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: No Subject
Message-ID: <930519164946.84b@APSICC.APS.EDU>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


From:	SMTP%"Postmaster" 14-MAY-1993 22:58:16.22
To:	<TO1SITTLER>
CC:	
Subj:	Undeliverable Mail

Date:     Fri, 14 May 1993 22:58:09 -0600 (MDT)
From:     Postmaster@APSICC.APS.EDU
Subject:  Undeliverable Mail
To:       <TO1SITTLER>

Bad address -- <drzaphod@ncselxsi.uucp>
Error -- Nameserver error: Unknown host

Start of returned message

  Date:    Fri, 14 May 1993 22:58:07 -0600 (MDT)
  From:    TO1SITTLER@APSICC.APS.EDU
  Message-Id: <930514225807.c83d@APSICC.APS.EDU>
  Subject: Tempest
  To:      drzaphod@ncselxsi.uucp
  X-Vmsmail-To: SMTP%"drzaphod@ncselxsi.uucp"
  
  Where can I find more info about tempest?  Is it a roomwide thing, is it
  implemented in the cables and housings, or what?  I understand that the
  purpose of Tempest is to prevent people from spying on you via electronic
  emissions detection.  Is this just a glorified Faraday cage?
  

End of returned message




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: jrk@information-systems.east-anglia.ac.uk (Richard Kennaway)
Date: Wed, 19 May 93 09:00:04 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Random numbers
Message-ID: <9279.9305191556@sys.uea.ac.uk>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Fallen Angel writes:
>Wouldn't it be ppossible to apply the Mafia-numbers-game solution?
>i.e. For your numbers (or seed for a large volume of numbers) take
>a random pubically accessible number like the last 3 digits of the
>attendance of a sporting event.
>   
>I have never seen any formalizations, but that type of number should be
>as close to totally random as possible.

How do you know that these numbers aren't already in use as a code system,
under the control of someone who may not have your interests at heart? 
Mafia numbers indeed!

--                                  ____
Richard Kennaway                  __\_ /    School of Information Systems
Internet:  jrk@sys.uea.ac.uk      \  X/     University of East Anglia
uucp:  ...mcsun!ukc!uea-sys!jrk    \/       Norwich NR4 7TJ, U.K.





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: trimm@netcom.com (Trimm Industries)
Date: Wed, 19 May 93 16:59:15 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: tempest
Message-ID: <9305192359.AA16487@netcom4.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Reply to TO1SITTLER re: tempest

TEMPEST is NACSIM 5100A (there are some new numbers which I
can't remember), a NSA specification for the emission of 
compromising EMI from computers and other digital data processing
equipment.  It is a Faraday cage, except that they divide 
the system into "black" noise circuits and "red" noise
circuits.  An example of black emissions would be the constant
50 KHz signal emitted by a switcher power supply, that contains
no useful information.  You can emit as much black as you want.
You cannot emit ANY red information, that is, CRT guns, data
busses, data transmission lines, etc.  Red information can be
reconstructed easily bu passive interception.

Your PC, for example, has a monitor that emits enough information
to allow unintended interception up to a mile away.

If you need more details, write back.

Gary trimm@netcom.com

-- 




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: baumbach@atmel.com (Peter Baumbach)
Date: Wed, 19 May 93 14:51:49 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: false positives
Message-ID: <9305192112.AA04939@carp.chp.atmel.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I have an encryption question:

Has anyone tried to create a strong encryption algorithm that cannot
be broken by brute force?  If the algorithm relied on a dictionary,
for instance, then the wrong key could still return something that
resembles english.  It would be even better if for any arbitrary text,
a KEY could be generated which maps the encrypted real message to
the arbitrary text.  

With this system, even if your true key could be figured out (maybe
you wrote it on a napkin!), you could easely deny the accuracy of
the decryption.  A decrypted message would only be useful for
information, but never for evidence.  

This is more of an idea than a question.  What do you think?

In liberty,

Peter Baumbach
baumbach@atmel.com




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: jrk@information-systems.east-anglia.ac.uk (Richard Kennaway)
Date: Wed, 19 May 93 09:27:33 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: alt.whistleblowers
Message-ID: <9667.9305191619@sys.uea.ac.uk>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Julf writes:
>> it had been my understanding
>> that julf was going to newgroup alt.whistleblowers...
>
>Er... I definitely remember somebody else announcing he was going to
>create it... Anon.penet.fi (and especially MK II alias penet.anon.com)
>will definitely support it.

It would seem in keeping with the spirit of alt.whistleblowers for the
newgroup to be performed anonymously.  Does anon.penet.fi support the
control newsgroup? :-)  More seriously, why doesn't everyone who knows how
and wants the group created simply forge an anonymous creation message?

--                                  ____
Richard Kennaway                  __\_ /    School of Information Systems
Internet:  jrk@sys.uea.ac.uk      \  X/     University of East Anglia
uucp:  ...mcsun!ukc!uea-sys!jrk    \/       Norwich NR4 7TJ, U.K.





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: poier@sfu.ca (Skye Merlin Poier)
Date: Wed, 19 May 93 17:58:23 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Where are the key servers?
Message-ID: <9305200058.AA00956@malibu.sfu.ca>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

Hi..

What are the address(es) of the worldwide key server(s)? I thought I had them
around here somewhere....

thx
skye
- --
- -----====> Skye Merlin Poier <====----- 
Undergrad in CMPT/MATH (Virtual Reality)       ||||      ||||
          email: poier@sfu.ca                  p-OO <--> OO-q   THINK
   PGP Public Key available on finger           \==      ==/


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.2

iQCVAgUBK/rXky0bkpXW3omvAQHvNAQAjQ1yBeBEp2bjd+nx0eq33YO68wAN+V1c
mSZIWPnFDXCsJoBB3Ol7T9pzENr0kCH7EtvetyrwFhbzQYrIUPFs34hPs7AgMcYj
OXB82X8wQ38KaQJTcyL3eLkbegrnxdYzU8kLKgGVs6QCQqHGE8ZG0WlSntXZHcYy
xbZqaIYndsg=
=uT12
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: jordan@imsi.com (Jordan Hayes)
Date: Wed, 19 May 93 18:12:15 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: MCI, Sprint or bust ...
Message-ID: <9305192204.AA12542@IMSI.COM>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


	>>> what makes more sense is to buy some at&t shares ...

Looks like someone did that.  AT&T is up about $8 in the past four
days, up another 4.8% today ...

/jordan




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: nobody@soda.berkeley.edu
Date: Wed, 19 May 93 18:17:28 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: No Subject
Message-ID: <9305200114.AA01985@soda.berkeley.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


TEMPEST Information (Might be a bit old)
----------------------------------------
HETRA Computers Inc.
George Brazel
45472 Holiday Dr. #1
Sterling, VA  22170
Vox:  (703) 709-0800
Fax:  (703)709-8181
 
[God I love this list]
=8^(
 




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Perry E. Metzger" <pmetzger@lehman.com>
Date: Wed, 19 May 93 15:41:16 PDT
To: Marianne Mueller <mrrm@well.sf.ca.us>
Subject: Re: Consider "Working Assets" phone service instead of AT&T
In-Reply-To: <199305192142.AA25642@well.sf.ca.us>
Message-ID: <9305192239.AA05954@snark.shearson.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Marianne Mueller says:
> Another option to AT&T long distance service is something called
> Working Assets.
> 
> Quoting from their bill,
> 
> "Every time you call long distance with Working Assets, a percentage
> of your charge goes to nonprofit action groups that are working for a
> better world.  These donations are made by Working Assets at no extra
> cost to you.

I don't want to get into an argument on politics, but I will point out
for the large libertarian contingent that Working Assets puts their
money into "Progressive", i.e. what libertarians would think of as
socialist, causes. Myself, I'd rather not fund lobbying for more
regulations, thank you very much.

> I chose Amnesty International as the nonprofit that gets donations
> when I make long distance calls.  I think Working Assets has dozens of
> nonprofits you can choose from.  And hey, celebrity endorsement: Ralph
> Nader goes around urging everyone to sign up with Working Assets.

Reason enough for libertarians not to touch it with a ten foot pole...

Perry




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Marc Horowitz <marc@GZA.COM>
Date: Wed, 19 May 93 15:45:18 PDT
To: baumbach@atmel.com
Subject: Re: false positives
In-Reply-To: <9305192112.AA04939@carp.chp.atmel.com>
Message-ID: <9305192245.AA02194@dun-dun-noodles.aktis.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Yes.  It's called a one-time pad.

		Marc




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: wcs@anchor.ho.att.com
Date: Wed, 19 May 93 18:12:27 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: TEMPEST
Message-ID: <9305200112.AA02467@anchor.ho.att.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text


>   Where can I find more info about tempest?  Is it a roomwide thing, is it
>   implemented in the cables and housings, or what?  I understand that the
>   purpose of Tempest is to prevent people from spying on you via electronic
>   emissions detection.  Is this just a glorified Faraday cage?

Both techniques are used.  You can either buy TEMPEST-designed equipment,
which is designed for low emissions, separation of signals between classified
and unclassified components, shielded cables, etc., or you can build a 
shielded box or room and use special filtered power supplies, fiber optics, etc.

The exact standards are classified, but they're a lot stricter than FCC Class A or B.
The shielded-room vendors out there also sell to the electromagnetic-compatibility-
testing market, who want to have nice quiet rooms to measure emissions from their
equipment in.  Last time I saw one of these rooms built, about 5 years ago,
typical construction used plywood sheets with thick sheet metal 
on each side, fancy connectors between plywoods, copper-wool crammed in any cracks,
and special waveguide meshes for air vents and fiber-optic communication cables,
and gives about 100-120 dB shielding for frequencies up to about 1-10GHz.
Twenty years ago, typical construction used copper screening and was good to ~60dB.

About 3-4 years ago, the typical cost for a TEMPEST PC was ~$4000 more than
the non-TEMPEST equivalent, and the equipment was maybe 1 year behind the
commercial models due to integration and testing time.
TEMPEST mini-computers, if they were small enough, generally took the approach of 
putting the standard versions of the machine in a box built like the TEMPEST rooms;
TEMPEST PCs had a somewhat more integrated design, though they were starting to use
commercial motherboards.

			Bill Stewart




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: catalyst@netcom.com (Scott Collins)
Date: Thu, 20 May 93 00:43:40 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: false positives
Message-ID: <9305200743.AA02030@netcom.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>Has anyone tried to create a strong encryption algorithm that cannot
>be broken by brute force?
    ^^^^^^

Brute force = exhaustive search.  Therefore, if there is a solution, and
the search terminates, the answer will be found.  Your point was, can an
encryption system be designed such that an exhaustive search yields
multiple equally good, different (preferably contradictory) decryptions,
for any given encrypted message.

In "Communications Theory of Secrecy Systems", Bell Systems Technical
Journal, Vol 28, pp. 656-715, Shannon measures the efficacy of an
encryption system by the average number of plaintext messages that map to
an arbitrary cyphertext (via different keys).  Later, Hellman (in "An
Extension of the Shannon Theory Approach to Cryptography", IEEE
Transactions on Information Theory, vol 23, No. 3, pp. 289-284) emphasized
Shannon's point about using compression with encryption so that decryption
will yield more false positives.  Ross Williams discusses this in his book:
"Adaptive Data Compression".

Note the limited definition of meaningful in these papers as 'makes words'.
 Given sufficient context, a correct decryption would not be able to hide
in a forest of 'meaningul' false positives.  (e.g. "Hmmmm, do you think
it's 'cats often enjoy', or 'be ready by tuesday').

Of course, a one time pad affords a very large space of meaningful (much
more meaningful than just 'makes words') decryptions for each encryption,
hence its information-theoretically perfect security.

A system which provides arbitrary mappings at the message level and no
derivable component context enjoys this property as well.  (e.g. a code
book: 1-->be ready by tuesday; 2-->expect a guest.  What does the message
'1' mean?  It can mean any message in the world, exactly as (when using a
one time pad) the 17th character might mean any character in the world.)

So in answer to your question: yes, a one time pad is just such a system.

        -- Scott

+ Scott Collins       + "Few people realize what           +
+ catalyst@netcom.com |  tremendous power there is in one  |
                      +  of these things." -- Willy Wonka  +





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Anonymous <nowhere@bsu-cs.bsu.edu>
Date: Thu, 20 May 93 00:15:35 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: No Subject
Message-ID: <9305200718.AA28431@bsu-cs.bsu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Personally, I think that this is required reading. Practically, I'd
like to think that most of you folks will comment and edit this
document to the point where each and every one of us will be proud to
sign our _names_ to it. Please forgive me for adapting a consecrated
public document for this venue, however I feel that this is the best
adaptive vehicle for this statement.
 
#include_statement
 
 
                   THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE FROM
                    GOVERNMENTALLY IMPOSED CRYPTOGRAPHY
               Proposed to Cypherpunks-at-large, May 20, 1993
 
    When, in the Course of human events, it becomes necessary for one
people to disregard and challenge the communicative and neo-political
bands which have connected them with their Government, and to assume
among the powers of the earth, the separate and equal station to which
the Laws of Nature and of Nature's God entitle them, a decent respect
to the opinions of mankind requires that they should declare the causes
which impel them to the opposition.
    We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all Communications
should be designed equally and, that they are endowed by their
creators with certain unalienable technical aspects, that among these,
are Privacy, Communications Liberalism, and the pursuit of Cryptographic
Freedom.  That, to secure these rights to publicly available crypto,
the Government which was once instituted among Men, and derived their
just powers from the consent of the governed, that, whenever any Form
of Government once became destructive of these ends, it was once the
Right of the People to alter or to abolish it, and to institute new
Government, laying its foundation on such principles, and organizing
its powers in such form, as to them shall seem most likely to effect
their Communications Safety and Happiness.  Prudence, indeed, will
dictate that Governments long established, should not be changed for
light and transient causes; and, accordingly, all experience hath shown,
that mankind is more disposed to suffer, while evils are sufferable, than
to right themselves by abolishing the forms to which they are accustomed.
But, when a long train of abuses and usurpations, pursuing invariably the
same Object, evidences a design to reduce them under absolute Despotism,
it is their right, it is their duty, to throw off such Government
abuses and to provide new Guards for their future communications
security.--- Such has been the patient sufferance of these
Cryptographic soldiers; and such is now the necessity which constrains
them to attempt to alter their former Systems of Government.  The history
of the present President of The United States of America is a brief
history of repeated injuries and usurpations, all having in direct
object the establishment of an absolute Tyranny and imposition over
individual rights to communicative privacy.  To prove this, let Facts
be submitted to a candid world.
    He has implemented a policy which may possibly usurp the citizens
privacy in electronic communications, which at least, will indeed
submit private communications to unjust scrutiny under his agencies
surveillance.
    He has attempted to impose these standards without academic or
public scrutiny.
    We have not been wanting in attentions to our cryptographic
practices; this is true. It does not, however, indicate that we are
guilty of crimes of any sort.  We have alerted our governmental
representatives, from time to time, of attempts made by their
legislature to extend an unwarrantable jurisdiction over us.  We
have reminded them of the circumstances of our professional and
private idealisms.  We have appealed to their native justice and
magnanimity, and we have conjured them by the ties of our common
kindred to disavow these usurpations, which would inevitably interrupt
our connections and correspondence.  They too have been deaf to the
voice of justice and of consanguinity.  We must, therefore, acquiesce in
the necessity, which denounces our united objection, and hold them, as
we hold the rest of mankind, Enemies in War, in Peace Friends.
    We, therefore, the Representatives of the Cryptographic partners
resident in the computing networks and establishments, in General
Consensus, Assembled, appealing to the legislative bodies of the
United States of America for the rectitude of our intentions, do,
in the Names, and by Authority of the good People of the Networks,
solemnly publish and declare, That the computer community is, and of
Right ought to be, Free and Independent of governmentally imposed
cryptographic restrictions; that they are Absolved from all Allegiance
to the proposals implemented by the National Security Agency, The
National Institute of Standards and Technology and the Clipper
purveyors by-and-large, and that all political connection between
them and the United States of America, and ought to be, totally
dissolved: and that, as Free and Independent communicators, they have
absolute rights to private electronic communications without
Governmentally imposed sanctions which may unethically submit their
communications to Governmental scrutiny. And, for the support of this
Declaration, with a firm reliance on the protection of divine
Providence, we mutually pledge to each other our sacred Honor.


Quis Custodiet Ipsos Custodes?




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: J. Michael Diehl <mdiehl@triton.unm.edu>
Date: Thu, 20 May 93 01:24:51 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Constitution...
Message-ID: <9305200824.AA07474@triton.unm.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


<    We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all Communications
<should be designed equally and, that they are endowed by their
<creators with certain unalienable technical aspects, that among these,
<are Privacy, Communications Liberalism, and the pursuit of Cryptographic

Please define "Communications Liberalism."  Otherwise, this is a nice 
document.

<Freedom.  That, to secure these rights to publicly available crypto,
<the Government which was once instituted among Men, and derived their
<just powers from the consent of the governed, that, whenever any Form
+-----------------------+-----------------------------+---------+
| J. Michael Diehl ;-)  | I thought I was wrong once. | PGP KEY |
|                       |    But, I was mistaken.     |available|
|                       +-----------------------------+---------+
| mdiehl@triton.unm.edu | "I'm just looking for the opportunity |
| mike.diehl@fido.org   | to be Politically Incorrect!   <Me>   |
| (505) 299-2282        |                                       |
+-----------------------+---------------------------------------+




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: stig@netcom.com (Stig)
Date: Thu, 20 May 93 03:46:25 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Encripted huffman-like compression
Message-ID: <9305201046.AA10293@netcom.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



At the first bay c-punks meeting I attended, someone mentioned a variation
on huffman encoding that used your key to initialize the compression tables.
(This was a while ago, so I probably garbled that description...)

Anyway, could the person who mentioned this scheme please mail or post a 
pointer to code or references?

	Thanks,
	Stig




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: fergp@sytex.com (Paul Ferguson)
Date: Thu, 20 May 93 08:17:28 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Forwarded messages from RISKS
Message-ID: <msqu4B1w165w@sytex.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


These messages were extracted from RISKS Digest (14.64) -
 
8<------- Snip, Snip -------------
 
Date: Wed, 19 May 1993 16:32:46 -0400 (EDT)
From: esr@snark.thyrsus.com (Eric S. Raymond)
Subject: Re: Clipper (Denning, RISKS-14.60; Rotenberg, RISKS-14.62)
 
In <CMM.0.90.1.737688970.risks@chiron.csl.sri.com> Marc Rotenberg
wrote:
> Denning has to be kidding.  The comments on the proposed DSS were
> uniformly critical.  Both Marty Hellman and Ron Rivest questioned
> the desirability of the proposed standard.
 
Mr. Rotenberg, as a public figure operating in the political arena,
has to exercise a certain diplomatic restraint in responding to Ms.
Denning's claims. I am, thankfully, under no such requirement.
 
As a long-time RISKS reader and contributor, I observe that that this
is not the first time that Ms. Denning has apparently operated as a
mouthpiece for the NSA's anti-privacy party line on DES and related
issues.
 
I believe Ms. Denning's remarks must be understood as part of a
continuing propaganda campaign to marginalize and demonize advocates
of electronic privacy rights.  Other facets of this campaign have
attempted to link privacy advocates to terrorists and drug dealers
by suggesting that only criminals need fear wiretapping.
 
These are serious charges.  I make them because, in the wake of the
Clipper proposal, I do not believe civil libertarians can afford any
longer to assume that their opponents are persons of good will with
whom they can simply debate minor differences of institutional means
in a collegial way.
 
It's time for someone to say, in public and on this list, what I know
many of us have been thinking.  The future is *now*.  Electronic
privacy issues are no longer a parlor game for futurologists; they are
the focus of a critical political struggle, *and the opponents of
privacy are fighting their war with all the tools of force, deception,
and propaganda they can command*.
 
The histories of the DES, the FBI wiretap proposal, and now the Clipper
proposal must be considered against a wider background of abuses
including the Steve Jackson case, "Operation Longarm", and the routine
tapping of U.S. domestic telecommunications by NSA interception stations
located outside the geographic borders of the United States.
 
These form a continuing pattern of attempts by agencies of the U.S.
government to pre-empt efforts to extend First and Fourth Amendment
privacy protections to the new electronic media.  In each case, the
attempt was made to present civil libertarians with a fait accompli,
invoking "national security" (or the nastiness of "kiddie porn") to
justify legislative, judicial and practical precedents prejudicial
against electronic privacy rights.
 
While I would not go so far as to claim that these efforts are
masterminded by a unitary conspiracy, I believe that the interlocking
groups of spies, bureaucrats and lawmen who have originated them
recognize each other as cooperating fellow-travelers in much the
same way as opposing groups like the EFF, CPSR and the Cypherpunks
do.  Their implicit agenda is to make the new electronic
communications media transparent to government surveillance and
(eventually) pliant to government control.
 
One of the traits of this culture of control is the belief that
manipulative lying and dissemblage can be justified for a `higher
good'.
 
I believe that Ms. Denning's disingenuous claim that the DSS "is now
considered to be just as strong as RSA" is no mere technical
misapprehension. I believe it is propaganda aimed at making objectors
non-persons in the debate.  I cannot know whether Ms. Denning
actually believes this claim, but it reminds me all too strongly
of the classic "Big Lie" technique.
 
It is important for us to recognize that the propaganda lie is not an
aberration, but a routine tool of the authoritarian mindset.  And the
authoritarian mindset is, ultimately, what we are confronting here
--- the mindset that regards the fighting of elastically-defined
`crime' as more important than privacy, that presumes guilt until
innocence is proven, that demands for government a license to override
any individual's natural rights at political whim.
 
We cannot trust representatives of an institutional culture that was
*constructed* to deal in information control, lies, secrecy, paranoia
and deception to tell us the truth.
 
We cannot accept the authoritarians' unverified assurances that the
sealed interior of the Clipper chip contains no `trapdoor' enabling
the NSA to eavesdrop at will.
 
We cannot trust the authoritarians' assertions that they have no
intention of outlawing cryptographic technologies potentially more
secure than the Clipper chip.
 
We cannot believe the authoritarians' claims that `independent' key
registries will prevent abuse of decryption keys by government and/or
corrupt individuals.
 
We cannot --- we *must not* --- cede control of encryption technology
to the authoritarians.  To do so would betray our children and their
descendants, who will work and *live* in cyberspace to an extent we
can barely imagine.
 
We cannot any longer afford the luxury of treating the authoritarians
as honest dealers with whom compromise is morally advisable, or even
possible.  Whatever their own valuation of themselves, the
thinly-veiled power grab represented by the Clipper proposal reveals
a desire to institutionalize means which a free society, wishing to
remain free, *cannot tolerate*.
 
Big Brother must be stopped *here*.  *Now.*  While it is still possible.
 
                                Eric S. Raymond <esr@snark.thyrsus.com>
 
- --
 
Date: Wed, 19 May 93 18:37:24 EDT
From: denning@cs.cosc.georgetown.edu (Dorothy Denning)
Subject: Re: Clipper (Raymond, RISKS-14.64)
 
Eric Raymond has accused me of being part of a propaganda campaign
and a "Big Lie." Among his wild speculations, he wrote:
 
  I believe that Ms. Denning's disingenuous claim that the DSS "is
  now considered to be just as strong as RSA" is no mere technical
  misapprehension. I believe it is propaganda aimed at making
  objectors non-persons in the debate.  I cannot know whether Ms.
  Denning actually believes this claim, but it reminds me all too
  strongly of the classic "Big Lie" technique.
 
Frankly, I don't know how to respond his allegations other than by
saying that I am not and have never been on the payroll of NIST, NSA,
or the FBI and that every word I have published has been completely
on my own initiative.  While I frequently speak with people in these
agencies (mainly to ask them questions so that I can be informed) and
have considerable respect for them, I am operating on my own initiative
and making my own independent evaluations based on all the evidence I
can find.  I try to avoid pure speculation as much as possible.
 
My objective in responding to Sobel in the first place was to point
out that, in my best judgement, the DSS as revised is as secure as
RSA.  I did that so that readers would not be led to believe the
contrary.  Let me elaborate more.
 
The security of the DSS is based on the difficulty of computing the
discret log.  (The Diffie-Hellman key exchange, invented in 1976, is
likewise so based.)  The security of the RSA is based on factoring.
My understanding is that the computational difficulty of these two
problems is about the same for comparable key lengths, and indeed,
the fastest solutions with both come using the same basic technique,
namely the number field sieve.  If I'm wrong here, I am happy to be
corrected by someone who knows more than I do about this.
 
There are other factors, of course, that must be taken into account.
With both schemes, you have to make sure you get good primes.  In the
case of the DSS, you want really random ones so that you don't get
ones with "trapdoors." This is readily done and the chances of
getting a trapdoor one are minuscule. For a reference, see Daniel
Gordon's paper from Crypto '92.
 
I still remember the day when George Davida called me up to say that
he had cracked RSA.  It turned out that he had found a way of
exploiting the digital signatures to get access to plaintext (but
not keys).  I generalized his mathematics and published a paper in
CACM (April 84).  The solution is to hash messages before they are
signed, which has other advantages anyway.  I also remember various
articles by people pointing other potential vulnerabilities with RSA
if the primes weren't picked right.
 
There are potential weaknesses in all of these public-key methods, but
they can be resolved.  As near as I can tell, NIST has resolved the
potential problems with the DSS, and I am confident that if new ones
are found, they will resolve them too.
 
Dorothy Denning

Paul Ferguson               |  The future is now.
Network Integrator          |  History will tell the tale;
Centreville, Virginia USA   |  We must endure and struggle
fergp@sytex.com             |  to shape it.
 
          Stop the Wiretap (Clipper/Capstone) Chip.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Peter Wayner <pcw@access.digex.net>
Date: Thu, 20 May 93 08:01:41 PDT
To: stig@netcom.com
Subject: Re:  Encripted huffman-like compression
Message-ID: <199305201501.AA07930@access.digex.net>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I wrote something on this in Cryptologia several
years back. I believe it is the April Issue of 
1988. 

It describes how to scramble the tree of the Huffman
compression to achieve more cryptographically useful
compression. Why is this necessary? Because people
often assume that compression removes many of the
redundancies of the language. Well, it only does this
in a theoretical sense. The patterns are still there.
If the Huffman encoding maps "T" to "01", "H" to "1001"
and "E" to "11", then the pattern "01100111" is going
to be very common in English text, but "10010111" is
going to much less common. 

-Peter Wayner




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: root@pleiku.netcom.com
Date: Thu, 20 May 93 11:01:56 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: No Subject
Message-ID: <9305201801.AA19223@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>From root Thu May 20 11:02:46 0700 1993 remote from pleiku
To: netcoms!sytex.com!fergp (Paul Ferguson)
cc: toad.com!cypherpunks, root
Subject: Re: TEMPEST and other "neat stuff" 
In-reply-to: Your message of "Thu, 20 May 1993 12:15:09 EDT."
             <yBwu4B1w165w@sytex.com> 
Priority: urgent
Date: Thu, 20 May 1993 11:02:46 -0700
From: "Stop the Big Brother CHip" <pleiku!root>
Received: from pleiku by pleiku.netcom.com; Thu, 20 May 1993 11:02 PDT
Content-Type: text
Content-Length: 1220

I would like the complete text Paul... JFK really said all this...
fascinating... puts a WHOLE new perspective on the assasination with
taken in combination with "DEEP BLACK, Puzzle Palace and Deadly Deceits"
   REALLY makes me wonder....
   kelly
--
Parts of this .sig borrowed with permission from T.C.May.
Perhaps it will indeed get me busted also.
..........................................................................
Kelly Goen             | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,  
kelly@netcom.com       | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
Intelligence Systems   | knowledge, reputations, information markets, 
Specialists Inc.       | black markets, face banks, data havens, dark
                       | tech, covert channels, shared secrets,
                       | alt.whistleblowers, collapse of governments.
Technical Monkeywrench | Public Key: PGP 2.2.
                       |
..........................................................................
PGP 2.2 Key available from PGP Keyservers on the Internet.

pub  1024/1BA573 1992/09/09  kelly <kelly@netcom.com>
          Key fingerprint =  EF 7A 38 99 22 84 E3 3B  90 2A DB 80 DC 65 DA 31 

STOP THE WIRETAP CHIP(Clipper Chip)!!




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: fergp@sytex.com (Paul Ferguson)
Date: Thu, 20 May 93 09:45:29 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: TEMPEST and other "neat stuff"
Message-ID: <yBwu4B1w165w@sytex.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


This is an interesting extract that I came across this morning.
I thought that I'd post  a portion of it (the entire paper is almost
900 lines) to the group since the topic of TEMPEST had surfaced -
 
8<------ Snip, Snip ------[ edited ]------
 
(c) 1990 Christopher J. Seline
cjs@cwru.cwru.edu
cjs@cwru.bitnet
 
                         Eavesdropping On
                  the Electromagnetic Emanations
                       of Digital Equipment:
                        The Laws of Canada,
                   England and the United States
 
                    This  document is  a rough
                    draft.        The    Legal
                    Sections  are   overviews.
                    T h e y    w i l l     b e
                    significantly expanded  in
                    the next version.
 
        We in this country, in this generation, are -- by
        destiny rather than choice -- the watchmen on the
        walls of world freedom.[1]
                                      -President John F.
                                           Kennedy
 
   _____________________
 
   1.  Undelivered  speech  of  President  John  F.  Kennedy,
   Dallas  Citizens Council (Nov. 22, 1963) 35-36.
 
             In the novel 1984, George Orwell foretold a future
   where individuals had no expectation  of privacy because the
   state monopolized the technology of  spying.  The government
   watched the actions of its subjects from birth to death.  No
   one could protect himself because  surveillance and counter-
   surveillance technology was controlled by the government.
        This note explores  the legal status of  a surveillance
   technology  ruefully  known  as  TEMPEST[2].    Using  TEMPEST
   technology  the  information in  any  digital device  may be
   intercepted  and  reconstructed  into   useful  intelligence
   without the  operative ever having to come  near his target.
   The technology is  especially useful in the  interception of
   information  stored  in  digital computers  or  displayed on
   computer terminals.
        The use of TEMPEST is not illegal under the laws of the
   United  States[3],  or  England.    Canada has  specific  laws
   criminalizing TEMPEST eavesdropping but the  laws do more to
   hinder surveillance countermeasures than to prevent  TEMPEST
   surveillance.  In  the United  States it is  illegal for  an
   individual  to  take   effective  counter-measures   against
   TEMPEST surveillance.  This  leads to the conundrum that  it
   is legal  for individuals and  the government to  invade the
   privacy of others but illegal for  individuals to take steps
   to protect their privacy.
        The author would  like to suggest that the  solution to
   this   conundrum   is  straightforward.      Information  on
   _____________________
 
   2.  TEMPEST  is an  acronym for  Transient Electromagnetic  Pulse
   Emanation Standard.   This standard sets forth the official views
   of the United  States on the amount  of electromagnetic radiation
   that a device may emit without compromising the information it is
   processing.   TEMPEST  is  a defensive  standard; a  device which
   conforms to this standard is referred to as TEMPEST Certified.
        The United States  government has refused to  declassify the
   acronym  for  devices  used   to  intercept  the  electromagnetic
   information of  non-TEMPEST Certified  devices.   For this  note,
   these  devices  and  the  technology  behind  them  will  also be
   referred  to as  TEMPEST;  in  which  case,  TEMPEST  stands  for
   Transient Electromagnetic Pulse Surveillance Technology.
        The  United  States  government refuses  to  release details
   regarding TEMPEST and continues an organized effort to censor the
   dissemination of  information  about it.    For example  the  NSA
   succeeded in shutting  down a  Wang Laboratories presentation  on
   TEMPEST Certified equipment  by classifying  the contents of  the
   speech and threatening  to prosecute  the speaker with  revealing
   classified information.  [cite coming].
 
   3.  This  Note  will not  discuses  how  TEMPEST relates  to  the
   Warrant Requirement under  the United  States Constitution.   Nor
   will it discuss the Constitutional exclusion of foreign nationals
   from the Warrant Requirement.
 
<New page>
   protecting  privacy  under  TEMPEST should  be  made  freely
   available;  TEMPEST  Certified equipment  should  be legally
   available; and organizations possessing  private information
   should  be  required  by  law  to protect  that  information
   through  good  computer security  practices  and the  use of
   TEMPEST Certified equipment.

Paul Ferguson               |  The future is now.
Network Integrator          |  History will tell the tale;
Centreville, Virginia USA   |  We must endure and struggle
fergp@sytex.com             |  to shape it.
 
          Stop the Wiretap (Clipper/Capstone) Chip.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: tribble@memex.com (E. Dean Tribble)
Date: Fri, 21 May 93 00:35:39 PDT
To: whitaker@eternity.demon.co.uk (Russell E. Whitaker)
Subject: [esr@snark.thyrsus.com: CLIPPER: Published version of my rant]
Message-ID: <9305202001.AA29900@memexis.memex.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


This is the version of my post that went to RISKS 14.64.  It was edited by me to
remove assertions which might expose the RISKS digest to libel action.

Permission to redistribute this version as you see fit is explicitly granted.
Please do *not* redistribute the old version.
 
------------------------------- CUT HERE -------------------------------------
From: esr@snark.thyrsus.com (Eric S. Raymond)
To: risks@csl.sri.com
Subject: Re: Clipper (Rotenberg, RISKS-14.62)

In <CMM.0.90.1.737688970.risks@chiron.csl.sri.com> Marc Rotenberg wrote:
> Denning has to be kidding.  The comments on the proposed DSS were uniformly
> critical.  Both Marty Hellman and Ron Rivest questioned the desirability of
> the proposed standard.

Mr. Rotenberg, as a public figure operating in the political arena, has to
exercise a certain diplomatic restraint in responding to Ms. Denning's claims.
I am, thankfully, under no such requirement.

As a long-time RISKS reader and contributor, I observe that that this is not
the first time that Ms. Denning has apparently operated as a mouthpiece for
the NSA's anti-privacy party line on DES and related issues.

I believe Ms. Denning's remarks must be understood as part of a continuing
propaganda campaign to marginalize and demonize advocates of electronic
privacy rights.  Other facets of this campaign have attempted to link privacy
advocates to terrorists and drug dealers by suggesting that only criminals
need fear wiretapping.

These are serious charges.  I make them because, in the wake of the Clipper
proposal, I do not believe civil libertarians can afford any longer to assume
that their opponents are persons of good will with whom they can simply debate
minor differences of institutional means in a collegial way.

It's time for someone to say, in public and on this list, what I know many
of us have been thinking.  The future is *now*.  Electronic privacy issues
are no longer a parlor game for futurologists; they are the focus of a
critical political struggle, *and the opponents of privacy are fighting their
war with all the tools of force, deception, and propaganda they can command*.

The histories of the DES, the FBI wiretap proposal, and now the Clipper
proposal must be considered against a wider background of abuses including
the Steve Jackson case, "Operation Longarm", and the routine tapping of U.S.
domestic telecommunications by NSA interception stations located outside the 
geographic borders of the United States.

These form a continuing pattern of attempts by agencies of the U.S. government
to pre-empt efforts to extend First and Fourth Amendment privacy protections
to the new electronic media.  In each case, the attempt was made to present
civil libertarians with a fait accompli, invoking "national security" (or the
nastiness of "kiddie porn") to justify legislative, judicial and practical
precedents prejudicial against electronic privacy rights.

While I would not go so far as to claim that these efforts are masterminded by
a unitary conspiracy, I believe that the interlocking groups of spies,
bureaucrats and lawmen who have originated them recognize each other as
cooperating fellow-travellers in much the same way as opposing groups like the
EFF, CPSR and the Cypherpunks do.  Their implicit agenda is to make the new
electronic communications media transparent to government surveillance and
(eventually) pliant to government control.

One of the traits of this culture of control is the belief that manipulative
lying and dissemblage can be justified for a `higher good'.  

I believe that Ms. Denning's disingenuous claim that the DSS "is now
considered to be just as strong as RSA" is no mere technical misapprehension.
I believe it is propaganda aimed at making objectors non-persons in the
debate.  I cannot know whether Ms. Denning actually believes this claim, but
it reminds me all too strongly of the classic "Big Lie" technique.

It is important for us to recognize that the propaganda lie is not an
aberration, but a routine tool of the authoritarian mindset.  And the
authoritarian mindset is, ultimately, what we are confronting here --- the
mindset that regards the fighting of elastically-defined `crime' as more
important than privacy, that presumes guilt until innocence is proven, that
demands for government a license to override any individual's natural rights
at political whim.

We cannot trust representatives of an institutional culture that was
*constructed* to deal in information control, lies, secrecy, paranoia and
deception to tell us the truth.

We cannot accept the authoritarians' unverified assurances that the sealed
interior of the Clipper chip contains no `trapdoor' enabling the NSA to
eavesdrop at will.

We cannot trust the authoritarians' assertions that they have no intention of
outlawing cryptographic technologies potentially more secure than the Clipper
chip.

We cannot believe the authoritarians' claims that `independent' key registries
will prevent abuse of decryption keys by government and/or corrupt individuals.

We cannot --- we *must not* --- cede control of encryption technology to
the authoritarians.  To do so would betray our children and their descendants,
who will work and *live* in cyberspace to an extent we can barely imagine.

We cannot any longer afford the luxury of treating the authoritarians as honest
dealers with whom compromise is morally advisable, or even possible.  Whatever
their own valuation of themselves, the thinly-veiled power grab represented by
the Clipper proposal reveals a desire to institutionalize means which a free
society, wishing to remain free, *cannot tolerate*.  

Big Brother must be stopped *here*.  *Now.*  While it is still possible.
--
				Eric S. Raymond <esr@snark.thyrsus.com>
------------------------------- CUT HERE -------------------------------------





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Mr. Noise" <mrnoise@econs.umass.edu>
Date: Thu, 20 May 93 11:12:10 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: The New Mykotronix phones...
Message-ID: <9305201811.AA03465@titan.ucs.umass.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text


Please forgive me for replying to a message that's already a month old,
but I was in the process of wading through the messages that have 
swamped my mailbox while I was doing end-of-the-semester stuff & didn't
come across any replies...so just a brief note or two before I
submerge again to study for my last Ph.D. comprehensive:

>     Okay, let's suppose that the NSA/NIST/Mykotronix Registered
>     Key system becomes standard and I'm able to buy such a system
>     from my local radio shack. Every phone comes with a built in
>     chip and the government has the key to every phone call. 
>     I go and buy a phone and dutifully register the key. 
> 
>     What's to prevent me from swapping phones with a friend or 
>     buying a used phone at a garage sale? Whooa. The secret registered
>     keys just became unsynchronized. When the government comes 
>     to listen in, they only receive gobbledly-gook because the 
>     secret key registered under my name isn't the right one. 

This is a good, creative response to fascist technology, but I wonder if I'm
the only one on this list who's noticed a parallel between the government's
attitude toward small arms & its attitude approach to cryptography?  (After
all, cryptographic technology *is* dealt with as a 'munition' in the export
laws, right?)  While this means that many of the same defenses apply to 
crypto as to arms--as in "When codes are outlawed, only outlaws will have
codes," a tagline I made up when I first started using PGP--it also means that
we can expect the government (& other opponents) to use similar tactics in
trying to deny us our right to privacy.

So how might the government respond if we were to use the tactic described
above?  Well, just consider what they would do if you loaned someone your
handgun & they committed a crime with it:  they hold you responsible as well.
If we allow a system of key registry to be instituted in any form, I think we
can expect the same boneheaded legislation restricting our freedom to use
cryptography as is currently inflicted on would-be gun owners.  If nothing
else, "key permits" would represent a new source of revenue for the tax-crazed
Clinton administration & governors across the fruited plains!  Consider that,
in order to obtain local & state permits to carry a handgun in my home state of
Connecticut it costs a total of $50 for the first year alone & $25 per year to
renew the liscence (it may cost even more in other towns, I don't know)!  &
then there's the paperwork, & the wait, &....



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Mr. Noise" <mrnoise@econs.umass.edu>
Date: Thu, 20 May 93 11:23:12 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: WER #79
Message-ID: <9305201822.AA04856@titan.ucs.umass.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text



Having received my copy of the latest Whole Earth Review yesterday, I
expected to see a pile of messages about the article by Kevin Kelly on
"Cypherpunks, E-Money, & Technologies of Disconnection"...but maybe,
like me, you've all been too busy to read the article all the way through.
Anyway, I thought those of you who don't subscribe would appreciate a 
mention of the article so you could run right out & buy the mag.  There's
also some good sci-fi stuff (they give it some kind of fancy name, you
know WER...) by Kelly & Brian Eno.  & the cover is by R. Crumb!

Well, anyway, it seems Mr. Kelly has spent some time talking to list
member (guru?) Tim May, Phil Zimmerman, & a bunch of other cypherpunk
folk, so how about some reactions to the article from those he talked to?

...& is it me, or is the WER/WELL/cypherpunks/Wired/EFF/etc. crowd starting
to get just a *little* inbred?  (In a nice way, of course...)  I feel as
though Kelly, Sterling, Brand, Levy, et al. are my best buddies & I don't
think we've ever exchanged e-mail (well, once or twice maybe), they just
keep popping up everywhere I turn.  Heck, I may even have to write R.U.Sirius
into my will, he feels like such an old pal...



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: smb@research.att.com
Date: Thu, 20 May 93 12:07:01 PDT
To: fergp@sytex.com (Paul Ferguson)
Subject: Re: TEMPEST and other "neat stuff"
Message-ID: <9305201906.AA20919@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


	 This is an interesting extract that I came across this morning.
	 I thought that I'd post  a portion of it (the entire paper is almost
	 900 lines) to the group since the topic of TEMPEST had surfaced -

I'd like to see the whole thing, but I don't guarantee I'll read it.
In fact, I don't believe it.
	  
	         The use of TEMPEST is not illegal under the laws of the
	    United  States[3],  or  England.    Canada has  specific  laws
	    criminalizing TEMPEST eavesdropping but the  laws do more to
	    hinder surveillance countermeasures than to prevent  TEMPEST
	    surveillance.  In  the United  States it is  illegal for  an
	    individual  to  take   effective  counter-measures   against
	    TEMPEST surveillance.

I can't speak for England or Canada, but neither statement is true about
the U.S.  Note the text of footnote [3]:

   3.	This  Note  will not  discuses  how  TEMPEST relates  to  the
	Warrant Requirement under  the United  States Constitution.   Nor
	will it discuss the Constitutional exclusion of foreign nationals
	from the Warrant Requirement.

The ``warrant'' requirement is precisely the point.  Spying on
individuals who have a reasonable expectation of privacy is
prohibited.  In the case of wiretaps, that was in a Supreme Court
ruling in, as I recall, 1967.  In fact, the original wiretap statute
(18 USC 2510 et seq), later amended by the ECPA, was passed (as part of
the Ombnibus Safe Streets and Crime Control Act of 1968) in direct
response to that ruling, to set forth procedures, grounds, etc., for
legal wiretaps and surveillance.  I don't have the citation handy, but
the concept was discussed clearly and at some length in Kemp v Block
(1985) 607 F Supp 1262.  A TEMPEST pickup would appear to run afoul of
the wiretap laws.  Consider the following language in 18 USC 2511(2)(f):

	procedures in this chapter and the Foreign Intelligence
	Surveillance Act of 1978 shall be the exclusive means by which
	electronic surveillance, as defined in section 101 of such Act,
	and the interception of domestic wire and oral communications
	may be conducted.

I'll return to the FISA later; note, though, that it and 18 USC 2510
are the *only* means by which anything resembling TEMPEST surveillance
can be performed.

The only grounds on which such intercepts can be justified, given the
language of this section, is from 18 USC 2511(3)(g):

	     It shall not be unlawful under this chapter or chapter 121
	     of this title for any person --

	       (i)  to intercept or access an electronic communication
		    made through an electronic communication system
		    that is configured so that such electronic
		    communication is readily accessible to the general
		    public;

Is TEMPTEST ``readily accessible to the general public''?  At least
since the adoption of the FCC requirements on spurious RFI, I'd tend to
doubt it.  And as I noted earlier, eavesdropping of any sort is legal
if and only if the targets have no reasonable expectation of privacy;
given that 99+% of the American public has never heard of TEMPEST, I'd
call it a fair bet that someone using a computer in a private room
does, in fact, assume that he or she has such an expectation.

The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (50 USC 1801 et seq.)
specifies the conditions under which foreign agents may be subject to
surveillance.  Unless there is ``no substantial likelihood'' that an
American's conversations will be observed, an order from a special
court is needed.  Again -- for the most part, there is a requirement
for due process.

Now -- I'm certainly not going to claim that these niceties are always
observed.  But that they're ignored doesn't make them legal.

Finally, the claim that taking counter-measures against TEMPEST is
illegal strikes me as balloon juice, plain and simple.  Last I heard,
the FCC wanted you to do anything you could to reduce spurious
emissions.  True, they're not telling how sensitive their detectors are
-- but that's a far cry from saying you're not allowed to try to defeat
them.

Please -- there are real enemies to personal freedom.  Let's not waste
energy chasing chimeras.

		--Steve Bellovin




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: fnerd@smds.com (FutureNerd Steve Witham)
Date: Thu, 20 May 93 12:59:13 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Huffman and Crypto
Message-ID: <9305201955.AA05279@smds.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Sorry if these questions have been answered in posts I recently
deleted, but...

1) Instead of modifying Huffman coding, isn't it more sensible to
   just use arithmetic coding, which is more efficient anyway, and
   doesn't use fixed bit patterns?

2) I would assume there's a branch of cryptography devoted to studying
   the protections or lack thereof, afforded by compression schemes, both
   by themselves and in addition to other types of cryptography.  I would
   guess that Huffman and LZ-family codes have been studied a lot...right??
   But also more general studies of the weakness of (even secret) 
   compression algorithms as crypto methods?  I mean, compression methods
   would tend to use methods (like table lookup) that simpler cyphers
   have used for a long time, only without having been designed with
   crypto expertise...right??

3) Does anyone know of an easy-to-get-sources, easy-to-use arithmetic
   coding compression program?

quote me
-fnerd




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: James Still <still@kailua.colorado.edu>
Date: Thu, 20 May 93 15:01:22 PDT
To: 'Cypherpunks List' <cypherpunks@toad.com>
Subject: Large Scale Implementation of PGP
Message-ID: <2BFC0DBF@kailua.colorado.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



> Does anyone have any experience/advice w/ this tpye of large scale
> implementation of PGP? I know the need to encrypt most of the messages
> will be small, but I think it is important to get these people so
> familar w/ encryption, they won't be scared and will defend it when
> the need arises.

Bravo!  Widespread use of PGP now is analogous to Ben Franklin's pre-
revolutionary attempts at setting up and popularizing a post office.  People
are interested, but aren't ready to take the initiative and accept "new"
ideas.

If I might put in a selfish plug, get ahold of PGPSHEL2.ZIP at the
soda.berkeley.edu site and give it to co-workers and "Windows types"
(you all know who those newcomers are :-)  ) who are vaguely interested
in secure communications.  I've discovered that non-DOS folks will let
PGP sit on their hard drives for months without exploring it, but once they
use PGPShell, begin taking an active interest in what PGP is and does.

With all the discussion about what the difference is between Usenet and
BBS's, this is probably an important difference as well.  BBS users are
still enamored with the *concept* of public key encryption, while the more
experienced Usenet users take it for granted.  They know there's something
going on "up there" but aren't too sure what all this PGP talk is all about.

The BBS users are an excellent place to "spread the word" about
encryption and shouldn't be ignored.  With their help encryption will be
as normal and every day as the post office is today.







From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: baumbach@atmel.com (Peter Baumbach)
Date: Thu, 20 May 93 14:47:02 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: strong encryption as virus protection
Message-ID: <9305202108.AA05477@carp.chp.atmel.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Hello all,

It seems that an easely available (legal) software verification system
needs to be made.  If one were widely used, virus worries of people
could be channeled into a demand for strong encryption.  Tell people
that the Crippler Chip might prevent this from ever happening.

Peter Baumbach
baumbach@atmel.com





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: poier@sfu.ca (Skye Merlin Poier)
Date: Thu, 20 May 93 17:44:20 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Crypto constitution
Message-ID: <9305210044.AA04138@malibu.sfu.ca>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

One suggestions for improving the constitution: change all occurances of
"Men" or "man" to "the people" and make all pronouns gender-neutral.

If this is going to be a constitution for the new age, lets have the wording
reflect the ideals we hold.

Skye
- --
- -----====> Skye Merlin Poier <====----- 
Undergrad in CMPT/MATH (Virtual Reality)       ||||      ||||
          email: poier@sfu.ca                  p-OO <--> OO-q   THINK
   PGP Public Key available on finger           \==      ==/


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.2

iQCVAgUBK/wlyi0bkpXW3omvAQE6pQP8CApOVKoEn1mHFz/n7BkcKbwsi7E5a7Vh
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DZ6pLfWNZGzaQDE6pctA6V6qiyae3B3Rxoq50/91Qaex5gK0SZPg+bMKdxCxBmn2
71WNckM7usY=
=rm+w
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: wcs@anchor.ho.att.com
Date: Thu, 20 May 93 16:30:18 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: TEMPEST and other "neat stuff"
Message-ID: <9305202233.AA23544@anchor.ho.att.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text



Paul Ferguson, fergp@sytex.com, posts excerpts from an article on TEMPEST.
With all due respect :-), the article is largely nonsense.
> 8<------ Snip, Snip ------[ edited ]------
> (c) 1990 Christopher J. Selin cjs@cwru.cwru.edu cjs@cwru.bitnet
>  Eavesdropping On the Electromagnetic Emanations of Digital Equipment:
>  The Laws of Canada England and the United States
>  This  document is  a rough draft. The Legal Sections are overviews.
> .....
>    In  the United  States it is  illegal for  an
>    individual  to  take   effective  counter-measures   against
>    TEMPEST surveillance.  This  leads to the conundrum that  it
>    is legal  for individuals and  the government to  invade the
>    privacy of others but illegal for  individuals to take steps
>    to protect their privacy.

This is distinctly not the case.  You can take any countermeasures you want.
The precise standards are classified (some SECRET, some CONFIDENTIAL COMSEC),
so you can't find out how good the government's abilities to eavesdrop are,
or precisely what level of protection the government thinks is necessary
to protect classified information, or how good the NSA thinks the Russians are,
but as long as you're not using classified information as your sources,
you can do anything you want.  (If you're not protecting yourself *enough*,
the FCC will get on your case, but over-protection is fine.)

>    2.  TEMPEST  is an  acronym for  Transient Electromagnetic  Pulse
>    Emanation Standard.   
TEMPEST isn't particularly about transients or electromagnetic pulses, it's about 
overall electromagnetic emissions.  Electromagnetic Pulses are the big fast spikes you
get from nuclear explosions (or similar slower spikes from lightning, etc.)
and the techniques you use for protection against EMP don't solve your TEMPEST 
problems, and vice versa, though both kinds of protection are some help for the other.

In my previous incarnation as a Tool of the Military-Industrial Complex,
I never saw TEMPEST expanded as an acronym in any of the documents I read.

>    TEMPEST  is  a defensive  standard; a  device which
>    conforms to this standard is referred to as TEMPEST Certified.
More specifically, a device that's been tested by an NSA-approved testing lab
and has all the paperwork blessed by the NSA is TEMPEST-certified.
The NSA puts out an "Evaluated Products List" (the name changes every
couple of years) which has approved TEMPEST hardware, NCSC-Orange-Book rated
operating systems, etc.

>         The  United  States  government refuses  to  release details
>    regarding TEMPEST and continues an organized effort to censor the
>    dissemination of  information  about it.    For example  the  NSA
>    succeeded in shutting  down a  Wang Laboratories presentation  on
>    TEMPEST Certified equipment  by classifying  the contents of  the
>    speech and threatening  to prosecute  the speaker with  revealing
>    classified information.  [cite coming].

The Wang Labs people probably had access to the classified documents -
if you have them, you're responsible for not giving out classified information,
and material derived from classified information might deserve classification.
But that's not the same as saying it's "born classified", which is how
nuclear weapons design information is treated (no comments on the legality
of that approach...)  Now, it may be that the NSA are overzealous in presuming
the classified nature of the material in the presentation before hearing it;
I don't know the details of the case, but access to classified material
legitimately affects your ability to discuss its contents in public.
  
>    3.  This  Note  will not  discuses  how  TEMPEST relates  to  the
>    Warrant Requirement under  the United  States Constitution.  
>    Nor will it discuss the Constitutional exclusion of foreign nationals
>    from the Warrant Requirement.

(*My* copy of the Constitution doesn't say that foreign nationals are
excluded from "the people" who have specific rights to due process,
and the 14th Amendment clearly requires at least the States not to deprive
*any* person of life, liberty, or property without due process, 
and not to deny equal protection to anyone within its jurisdiction,
as well as not abridging privileges or immunities of U.S. citizens.
Somehow the recent governments haven't felt that applies to them or something...)

In the case of the Crippler Chip, however, you knew it had a built-in wiretap
when you bought it, which changes some of the reasonable expectations about
privacy a bit.


		Bill Stewart




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: esr@snark.thyrsus.com (Eric S. Raymond)
Date: Thu, 20 May 93 18:04:28 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: hello, all
Message-ID: <m0nwLBQ-00013QC@snark.thyrsus.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text


I've just joined the list.  I did so because I'm mad as hell about the Clipper
proposal (some of you may have seen my incendiary post to RISKS on the topic).

Some of you know me.  Others have probably seen my work, which includes (among
much else) major packages in Emacs 19, a moderately popular netnews suite, the
/dev/speaker driver for PC-clones, and editing the Jargon File.

I want to know what I can do to help block the Feds from `surveilling'
everybody and to spread crypto-anarchy.  I'm not up to speed on technical
cryptography yet (though I know a lot about the pre-computer kind, Vigenere
ciphers and such) but I'm chasing references and hope to be soon.

There may be other ways I can contribute.  Besides being a skilled hacker, I'm
also good with English.  I have a lot of experience at maintaining successful
FAQs (I'm handling six now, including the monthly three-part buyer's guide for
ISA UNIX software and hardware).  If the cypherpunks FAQ is still in
preparation, I can probably be of substantial help with it.
-- 
					Eric S. Raymond <esr@snark.thyrsus.com>



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: J. Michael Diehl <mdiehl@triton.unm.edu>
Date: Thu, 20 May 93 22:18:07 PDT
To: poier@sfu.ca (Skye Merlin Poier)
Subject: Re: Crypto constitution
In-Reply-To: <9305210044.AA04138@malibu.sfu.ca>
Message-ID: <9305210517.AA08527@triton.unm.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> One suggestions for improving the constitution: change all occurances of
> "Men" or "man" to "the people" and make all pronouns gender-neutral.

I would suggest that we don't use "people," but instead use "Mankind."  Or,
better yet, lets use "Earthlings," since this will cover people who haven't 
yet declared their gender.  And as far as gender-neutral pronouns, this is also
a problem.  To many, "chairperson" immediately implies "female-chair-man."  This
obviously won't work.  Well, I guess we could use "he/she."  But that won't work
either since it gives precedence to (gasp!) "HE."  Clearly, we need to come up
with a new word in order to satisfy everybody.  (I use the word "everybody" to
mean "the people," and not just because it has the word "body" in it, which 
would be the stereotypically-male thing to think about)  So, I propose that 
we, Cypherpunks, adopt my favorite Politically Correct term for "person:"

"Generic-Colorless-raceless-carbon-based-bipedial-inhabitant-of-the-third-
spherical-object-from-the-bright-mass-in-the-center-of-the-solar-system"

As far as I've been able to tell, this term doesn't discriminate against anyone,
so I feel this is a good substitue for "man," "men," and "the people."

:Satire Mode Off.
:Reality Mode On.

> If this is going to be a constitution for the new age, lets have the wording
> reflect the ideals we hold.

I've always thought that fighting over this kind of trivia was kinda childish.
It used to be that when someone said, "...and one giant step for mankind...,"
that we understood this to include EVERYBODY!  Lets pick our fights better 
than this, shall we?  

Sorry, just couldn't resist..... ;^)

+-----------------------+-----------------------------+---------+
| J. Michael Diehl ;-)  | I thought I was wrong once. | PGP KEY |
| mdiehl@triton.unm.edu |   But, I was mistaken.      |available|
| mike.diehl@fido.org   |                             | Ask Me! |
| (505) 299-2282        +-----------------------------+---------+
|                                                               |
+------"I'm just looking for the opportunity to be -------------+
|            Politically Incorrect!"   <Me>                     |
+-----If codes are outlawed, only criminals wil have codes.-----+
+----Is Big Brother in your phone?  If you don't know, ask me---+




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: poier@sfu.ca (Skye Merlin Poier)
Date: Thu, 20 May 93 23:20:59 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Crypto constitution
In-Reply-To: <9305210517.AA08527@triton.unm.edu>
Message-ID: <9305210620.AA22924@malibu.sfu.ca>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


[reality check on]

> :Satire Mode Off.
> :Reality Mode On.
> 
>> If this is going to be a constitution for the new age, lets have the wording
>> reflect the ideals we hold.
> 
>I've always thought that fighting over this kind of trivia was kinda childish.
> It used to be that when someone said, "...and one giant step for mankind...,"
> that we understood this to include EVERYBODY!  Lets pick our fights better 
> than this, shall we?  

Excuse me, but it seems that you are being very defensive. I was not picking
a fight. It is evident that you cling to "It used to be that" ideals. Just 
because something "used to be" is not justification for its perpetuation. Is
it such a drastic step to replace a couple words that you feel necessary to
ridicule something that I consider important? As far as I am concerned, Mr.Diehl
it is YOU who are being childish. Wake up, will you? And please refrain from
using the word "we". I do not enjoy being patronized.

> Sorry, just couldn't resist..... ;^)

Obviously. You are indeed a man of tremendous wit and satire. 

> +------"I'm just looking for the opportunity to be -------------+
> |            Politically Incorrect!"   <Me>                     |

Also plainly obvious. 

Skye Poier
--
-----====> Skye Merlin Poier <====----- 
Undergrad in CMPT/MATH (Virtual Reality)       ||||      ||||
          email: poier@sfu.ca                  p-OO <--> OO-q   THINK
   PGP Public Key available on finger           \==      ==/





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Date: Fri, 21 May 93 00:03:17 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Why So Many Articles on Cypherpunks?
In-Reply-To: <9305201822.AA04856@titan.ucs.umass.edu>
Message-ID: <9305210703.AA13490@netcom3.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Mr. Noise writes:

> Having received my copy of the latest Whole Earth Review yesterday, I
> expected to see a pile of messages about the article by Kevin Kelly on
> "Cypherpunks, E-Money, & Technologies of Disconnection"...but maybe,
> like me, you've all been too busy to read the article all the way through.
....

> Well, anyway, it seems Mr. Kelly has spent some time talking to list
> member (guru?) Tim May, Phil Zimmerman, & a bunch of other cypherpunk
> folk, so how about some reactions to the article from those he talked to?

I haven't seen the newstand issue yet and haven't thought too much
about it. Kevin Kelly first contacted me last fall because of some
posts I'd made on sci.crypt (Round 1 of the "key registration" battle,
before we knew the government planned this key escrow thing, happened
when I wrote an article for Extropians, Cypherpunks (very young then),
and sci.crypt entitled "A Trial Balloon to Ban Encryption?"). Kelly
talked to me, Eric Hughes, John Gilmore, circa December, and attended
two Cypherpunks physical meetings. (We had a debate around then about
whether journalists should be allowed, invited, or ignored...the
eventual outcome was that help should be provided to journalists
interested in these issues.)

Kevin Kelly visited my house near Santa Cruz and we talked for several
hours. He was also commissioning an article for "Wired" by Steven
Levy, who also talked to several of us. Hence the double articles,
which were both written at about the same time.

(There's also a Julian Dibell piece for "The Village Voice" in the
works...maybe the stuff he's aleady written is *it* , maybe there's
going to be more.)


> ...& is it me, or is the WER/WELL/cypherpunks/Wired/EFF/etc. crowd starting
> to get just a *little* inbred?  (In a nice way, of course...)  I feel as
> though Kelly, Sterling, Brand, Levy, et al. are my best buddies & I don't
> think we've ever exchanged e-mail (well, once or twice maybe), they just
> keep popping up everywhere I turn.  Heck, I may even have to write R.U.Sirius
> into my will, he feels like such an old pal...


I agree with Mr. Noise about this and am trying to "lay low" as much
as possible. However, if journalists are interested in our kinds of topics,
they'll write stories. The Cypherpunks list doesn't "assign" members
to be interviewed....the journalists sniff the air for interesting
hooks and angles to center a piece on. The work of Zimmermann is very
obvious (though he's not on the list...he did attend one meeting), as
are the obvious battles with the NSA being fought by John Gilmore. I
can think of several others who have stuff going on that would make
interesting stories.

For now, the "cyberspace" community is largely defined by the
magazines mentioned, and a few others ("Boing Boing," 'Extropy,"....).
Hence the incestuous nature. (Also, the editors and writers know each
other and have longstanding credentials in the hacker community.)

I hope this little summary gives some perspective on why so many
articles are now appearing. The timing is perfect, even if 98% of
Americans have never heard of Clipper.

-Tim


-- 
..........................................................................
Timothy C. May         | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,  
tcmay@netcom.com       | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
408-688-5409           | knowledge, reputations, information markets, 
W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA  | black markets, collapse of governments.
Higher Power: 2^756839 | Public Key: PGP and MailSafe available.
Note: I put time and money into writing this posting. I hope you enjoy it.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: George A. Gleason <gg@well.sf.ca.us>
Date: Fri, 21 May 93 02:35:39 PDT
To: jet@nas.nasa.gov
Subject: Re:  Consider "Working Assets" phone service instead of AT&T
Message-ID: <199305210935.AA00447@well.sf.ca.us>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Phonecard-only account: minor inconvenience to support a major principle.
As far as I'm concerned, "convenience" is the biggest hook that Big Bro has
to use on us these days, but it only works if we're lazy enough to go for
it.  So sign with Working Assets and write them a note telling them you want
to see a phonecard-only option soon, and chances are they'll be responsive
if they get enough of those.  Especially if they're getting them from people
who used to have accounts with teh Big Three.

-gg




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: elee9sf@Menudo.UH.EDU
Date: Fri, 21 May 93 07:39:13 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Huffman and Crypto
In-Reply-To: <9305201955.AA05279@smds.com>
Message-ID: <199305211439.AA00169@Menudo.UH.EDU>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain




> 3) Does anyone know of an easy-to-get-sources, easy-to-use arithmetic
>    coding compression program?
> 

I have a book titled "Data Compression" or something like that, which
explains Huffman and Huffman-type coding, arithmetic coding,
dictionary compressers (sliding window LZ* types), and JPEG
compression.  The book comes with source code, so if anybody else has
it and has a scanner...

As I recall, arithmetic compression works well, but is really cpu
intensive, even with a math-coprocessor.  Plus, you need to have a
rough idea of the statistical breakdown of the plaintext for
arithmetic compression to work as well as it can.  The Zimpel-Lev type
sliding window compressors are popular because they work well on most
inputs, with little or no pre-computation or statistics.

Isn't Phil Karn on this list?  I'm sure he can tell you everything you
want to know about compression :-)

/-----------------------------------\
| Karl L. Barrus                    |
| elee9sf@menudo.uh.edu             | <- preferred address
| barrus@tree.egr.uh.edu (NeXTMail) |
\-----------------------------------/




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Patrick Tufts <zippy@berry.cs.brandeis.edu>
Date: Fri, 21 May 93 07:16:11 PDT
To: gg@well.sf.ca.us
Subject: Consider "Working Assets" phone service instead of AT&T
In-Reply-To: <199305210935.AA00447@well.sf.ca.us>
Message-ID: <9305211418.AA10692@berry.cs.brandeis.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


   Date: Fri, 21 May 1993 02:35:20 -0700
   From: George A. Gleason <gg@well.sf.ca.us>

   [....]
   it.  So sign with Working Assets and write them a note telling them you want
   to see a phonecard-only option soon, and chances are they'll be responsive
   if they get enough of those.  Especially if they're getting them from people
   who used to have accounts with teh Big Three.
				      ^^^ ^^^^^

Isn't Working Assets just a reseller of AT+T (or is it Sprint) LD?  As
such, you're still giving business to one of "the Big Three".




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: fergp@sytex.com (Paul Ferguson)
Date: Fri, 21 May 93 11:42:25 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: SIGINT and TEMPEST follies
Message-ID: <PoLw4B1w165w@sytex.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


On Thu, 20 May 93 18:33:52 EDT,
 Bill_Stewart <anchor.ho.att.com!wcs> wrote -
 
> This is distinctly not the case.  You can take any countermeasures
> you want. The precise standards are classified (some SECRET, some
> CONFIDENTIAL COMSEC), so you can't find out how good the
> government's abilities to eavesdrop are, or precisely what level of
> protection the government thinks is necessary to protect classified
> information, or how good the NSA thinks the Russians are, but as long
> as you're not using classified information as your sources, you can
> do anything you want.  (If you're not protecting yourself *enough*,
> the FCC will get on your case, but over-protection is fine.)
 
 I beg your pardon, but this is _not_ the case. TEMPEST requirements
 are _not_ classified and are available for public scrutiny. (You
 obviously do not know where to look.) I _know_ this to be true: I
 working in the COMSEC arena within the US military for the better
 part of five years. In fact, I helped design and construct the first
 tactically-based, X.25 packet switched, PC based, uHF interfaced
 network in Europe back in the early '80's using  Zenith Z-248's and
 KG-84's. We did everything from designing the cabling pin-out's on
 up.
 
> TEMPEST isn't particularly about transients or electromagnetic pulses,
> it's about overall electromagnetic emissions.
 
 You're trying to separate issues that are one and the same. With the
 proper equipment, I can put you and an IBM Selectric (tm) typewriter
 on a wooden raft in the middle of Lake Superior, monitor and realize
 every keystroke that you make and you'd not be the wiser. This type
 of monitoring is easily defeated by low yield TEMPEST requirements.
 I've worked in this area, Bill, and have tested these _facts_. I
 don't care how you care to word it, it _is_ transient
 electromagnetic emissions.
 
> Electromagnetic Pulses are the big fast spikes you get from nuclear
> explosions (or similar slower spikes from lightning, etc.) and the
> techniques you use for protection against EMP don't solve your
> TEMPEST problems, and vice versa, though both kinds of protection
> are some help for the other.
 
> In my previous incarnation as a Tool of the Military-Industrial
> Complex, I never saw TEMPEST expanded as an acronym in any of the
> documents I read.
 
 As I stated above (and I place myself in jeopardy of being accosted
 by Big Brother by admitting it), I was a COMSEC flunky during my
 junket with the US Army. Originally, I was a 31S(ierra) and later a
 29S(ierra) when two MOS's (Military Occupational Specialties, in Army
 jargon) were later merged. I was also a COMSEC Custodian (alternate,
 actually) and I can admit that I have a deep understanding of
 cryptographic key systems, cryptographic theory, cryptographic
 hardware design and integration and "BLACK" and "RED" separation
 principles. This type of technology does not require a rocket
 scientist (trust me, I've worked with them too at NASA)(oh yeah, I
 forgot -- I've also done contract work for Bell Labs and AT&T Secure
 Systems).
 
> In the case of the Crippler Chip, however, you knew it had a built-in
> wiretap when you bought it, which changes some of the reasonable
> expectations about privacy a bit.
 
 This issue is one where I must disagree with you emphatically. The
 majority of the American public don't even know about Clipper. Hell,
 most of them think those AT&T commercials (Aretha singing "Freedom")
 are cute. Personally, I think its pretty sick, considering how they
 worked in collusion with Big Brother (No Such Agency) and announce
 that they would be immediately using this "technology" on the same
 day that the NIST made its announcement that Clipper would be the
 "weapon of choice" in their war on drugs, would-be criminals and the
 American public (April 16, 1993).
 
 I know the technical specifics of TEMPEST (it is an acronym, BTW) and
 the reason it was developed as a SIGINT (SIGnal INTelligence) standard.
 
 Cheers.
 

Paul Ferguson               |  The future is now.
Network Integrator          |  History will tell the tale;
Centreville, Virginia USA   |  We must endure and struggle
fergp@sytex.com             |  to shape it.
 
          Stop the Wiretap (Clipper/Capstone) Chip.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: jordan@imsi.com (Jordan Hayes)
Date: Fri, 21 May 93 08:01:17 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Crypto constitution
Message-ID: <9305211451.AA06984@IMSI.COM>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I think I was able to cryptoanalyze the last few messages
(steganography is *so* cool!), but it looks like some of the line noise
from my modem messed up the codebook.

Can someone tell me if that was "gender-inspecific pronoun" or "gather
prolific dingdong" in the second exchange?

/jordan




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Al Billings <mimir@u.washington.edu>
Date: Fri, 21 May 93 11:10:46 PDT
To: "J. Michael Diehl" <mdiehl@triton.unm.edu>
Subject: Re: Crypto constitution
In-Reply-To: <9305210517.AA08527@triton.unm.edu>
Message-ID: <Pine.3.05z.9305211118.A23487-a100000@carson.u.washington.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain




On Thu, 20 May 1993, J. Michael Diehl wrote:

> I've always thought that fighting over this kind of trivia was kinda childish.
> It used to be that when someone said, "...and one giant step for mankind...,"
> that we understood this to include EVERYBODY!  Lets pick our fights better 
> than this, shall we?  

 Unfortunatly for you (in a small way), people teaching English do not
agree. I have done more than my share of term papers and articles and in
the cases where I have used "man" for "humanity," it HAS been noticed.
There is no reason NOT to use gender neutral terms. It isn't going to hurt
you to do so and some people out there will appreciate it and will notice
if gendered terms are used. Why not then?

Wassail,
Al Billings







From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: jet@nas.nasa.gov (J. Eric Townsend)
Date: Fri, 21 May 93 11:21:27 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re:  Consider "Working Assets" phone service instead of AT&T
In-Reply-To: <199305210935.AA00447@well.sf.ca.us>
Message-ID: <9305211821.AA19054@boxer.nas.nasa.gov>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


George A. Gleason writes:
 > Phonecard-only account: minor inconvenience to support a major principle.

You miss my point -- I *can't* get an account with them because I
don't have a phone line to tie it to.  There is a phone where I stay,
but it's not mine.

So, I'm stuck with US Splint.





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: J. Michael Diehl <mdiehl@triton.unm.edu>
Date: Fri, 21 May 93 10:49:10 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: re: Constitution.
Message-ID: <9305211749.AA28087@triton.unm.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Sorry all, but I had to reply to this letter, and since it was net-wide
distribution, I felt I should reply in kind.

>[reality check on]

:Fantacy Mode Off.

>>> If this is going to be a constitution for the new age, lets have the wording
>>> reflect the ideals we hold.
>> 
>>I've always thought that fighting over this kind of trivia was kinda childish.
>> It used to be that when someone said, "...and one giant step for mankind...,"
>> that we understood this to include EVERYBODY!  Lets pick our fights better 
>> than this, shall we?  

>Excuse me, but it seems that you are being very defensive. I was not picking
>a fight. It is evident that you cling to "It used to be that" ideals. Just 
>because something "used to be" is not justification for its perpetuation. Is
>it such a drastic step to replace a couple words that you feel necessary to
>ridicule something that I consider important? As far as I am concerned, Mr.Diehl
>it is YOU who are being childish. Wake up, will you? And please refrain from
>using the word "we". I do not enjoy being patronized.

Defensive?  I don't think so.  I am simply pointing out how silly this though-
control business really is.  I wasn't personally injured by it; it's just too
silly to worry so much about.  Perhapse "fight" wasn't the correct word.  I'm 
sorry.  Tell me, what is wrong with "'It used to be that' ideals?"  I hope
you don't believe that "mankind" only refers to "malekind."  This is furthest
from the truth.  To answere you'r question, no, it is not such a drastic step,
but it bothers me that people feel it necessary to traditional and natural
language into something that is artificial and restrictive.  You go on to 
state that this is something that you feel strongly about; fine, but you don't
hold a monopoly on opinion.  Then you go on to say that I am childish and that
I should wake up.  I'll just say that I consider this to be a mere personal
attack and remind you that I made no such attack to you; and I'll leave it at
that.  

Then you reqest that I refrain from using the word "we."  Let me requote 
something you wrote:

>>> If this is going to be a constitution for the new age, lets have the wording
>>> reflect the ideals we hold.
-----------------------^
Since when is it ok for you, but in bad taste for me?  Especially since you are
attributing "ideals we hold" to people without asserting what these ideals are.
And your asserting that we need special, approved language to express these
ideals.  I can't decide if the ideal at hand is gender-equallity, or language-
neutrality.  Remember that this little discussion is NET-WIDE, so "we" refers to
Cypherpunks, not YOU in particular.  Perhapse you are being a bit defensive?


>> Sorry, just couldn't resist..... ;^)
>Obviously. You are indeed a man of tremendous wit and satire. 
Thank you! Even if you are being sarcastic.  I'm too gullible to know the
difference. ;^)  Actually, I hope it was at least amusing even if you didn't 
agree. 

> +------"I'm just looking for the opportunity to be -------------+
> |            Politically Incorrect!"   <Me>                     |
>Also plainly obvious. 

If I lived under a dictatorship, this would read, "I'm just.....to be
democratic."  This is my protest against an "ideal" that I find smacking of
censorship, 1984, and class-hatred.  Under PC, other people have the right to
tell me what I can and can not say, as you did above.  PC would restrict my
sometimes limited use of language even further by mandating that I use only
approved words and phrases.  Eventually, I'll not even be able to talk about
such things as gender-differences because this (amoung many others) will have
been deemed "unfit for correct conversation."  

"And now, back to our regularly scheduled program...."

+-----------------------+-----------------------------+---------+
| J. Michael Diehl ;-)  | I thought I was wrong once. | PGP KEY |
| mdiehl@triton.unm.edu |   But, I was mistaken.      |available|
| mike.diehl@fido.org   |                             | Ask Me! |
| (505) 299-2282        +-----------------------------+---------+
|                                                               |
+------"I'm just looking for the opportunity to be -------------+
|            Politically Incorrect!"   <Me>                     |
+-----If codes are outlawed, only criminals wil have codes.-----+
+----Is Big Brother in your phone?  If you don't know, ask me---+




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: esr@snark.thyrsus.com (Eric S. Raymond)
Date: Fri, 21 May 93 10:24:02 PDT
To: cypherpunks@snark.thyrsus.com
Subject: Proposed Cypherpunks FAQ outline
Message-ID: <m0nwZqQ-00014pC@snark.thyrsus.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text


After exchanging email with Eric Hughes and other listmembers, I find that
the previous attempt at putting together a cypherpunks FAQ seems to be moribund.

I have a lot of experience building FAQs, and maintain several popular ones
on USENET, including:

	* The PC-UNIX Hardware and Software Buyer's Guides
	* The list of Publicly Known Bugs in USL UNIX
	* So You Want To Be A UNIX Wizard? (The Loginataka)
	* Telebit Trailblazer how-to FAQ

Accordingly, I'm able and willing to take on this job.

The hardest thing about writing a FAQ is to define its scope and level of
detail.  Accordingly, SOP if you know what you're doing is to start by
generating a list of questions to be answered, and/or an outline.  I've done
this below.

1. Why cypherpunks?
   a. Privacy is essential to freedom.
   b. The government cannot be relied on to protect your privacy rights.
   c. Technology can give individuals leverage against would-be oppressors,
      but only if we're sufficiently smart and dedicated to build the levers.
   d. Cypherpunks exists to build and propagate privacy software.

2. What are the essentials of privacy software?
   a. Public-key cryptosystems for secure communication.
   b. Unforgeable electronic signatures for message authentication.
   c. DC-net or similar protocols to thwart spoofing.

3. What are the potential applications of good privacy software?
   a. Secure communications.
   b. Digital cash.
   c. Electronic voting.
   d. Electronic contracts.
   e. <more?>

4. What are the key algorithms, tools, and implementations for privacy
   software?
   a. RSA
   b. DES
   c. Clipper/Capstone/DSS
   d. PGP
   e. Possible non-RSA trapdoor functions.

5. What are the social and political implications of good privacy software?
   a. Drastically lower transaction costs for trade.
   b. Expansion of the counter-economy.
   c. Disempowerment of government.

6. What are the legal, political, and technical obstacles?
   a. The Clipper/Capstone/DSS power grab.
   b. The RSA patent and the PGP/RSA fight.
   c. RSA's base problem may not be NP-complete.

7. What can I do to help?
   a. Work on cryptographic software.
      <this subsection should list current projects>
   b. Agitate against the Clipper/Capstone/DES standard.

Each subsection should be written by a list expert and include pointers to
published sources and other FAQs.

You can help in one of three ways:

1) Volunteer to write one of the sections or subsections above.

2) Suggest more questions.

3) Identify yourself to me as a technical expert on a particular area in
   the outline, even if you're not willing to commit to writing it.  That
   way I'll know whose brains to pick.

I think an edited version of Tim May's glossary should go at the end.  Tim,
are you willing?
-- 
					Eric S. Raymond <esr@snark.thyrsus.com>



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: fergp@sytex.com (Paul Ferguson)
Date: Fri, 21 May 93 11:42:21 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: FOIA info
Message-ID: <mwuw4B1w165w@sytex.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


A quick addendum to my post on alt.privacy yesterday. After making a
few phone calls, I found that these are the correct addresses to send
requests for information under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA):
 
Central Intelligence Agency:
 
  Mr. John H. Wright
  Information and Privacy Coordinator
  Central Intelligence Agency
  Washington, DC  20505
 
Federal Bureau of Investigation:
 
   Federal Bureau of INVESTIGATION
   J. Edgar Hoover Building
   9th and Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.,
   Washington, DC  20535
   ATTN: FOIA/PA Section
 
National Security Agency:
 
   Director, NSA/CSS
   9800 Savage Road
   Fort George G. Meade, Maryland  20755-6000
   ATTN: FOIA/N5
 
For those who live in The Commonwealth of Virginia, this is the
address of the Richmond field office:
 
Federal Bureau of Investigation
111 Greencourt Road
Richmond, Virginia  23228
ATTN: FOIA/PA Section
 

Paul Ferguson               |  The future is now.
Network Integrator          |  History will tell the tale;
Centreville, Virginia USA   |  We must endure and struggle
fergp@sytex.com             |  to shape it.
 
          Stop the Wiretap (Clipper/Capstone) Chip.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: edgar@spectrx.Saigon.COM (Edgar W. Swank)
Date: Fri, 21 May 93 14:48:56 PDT
To: Cypherpunks          <cypherpunks@toad.com>
Subject: LISTBIZ: Unsub during my abscence/USA-Legal PGP
Message-ID: <TD5w4B10w165w@spectrx.saigon.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

Distribution:

   Cypherpunks Request  <cypherpunks-request@toad.com>
   Cypherpunks          <cypherpunks@toad.com>

Please stop sending the Cypherpunks mailing list to

   edgar@spectrx.saigon.com (Edgar W. Swank)

until further notice.  I anticipate rejoining the list soon after
my wife and I return from travel abroad around the end of June.
(Since I'm retired I guess I can't say "vacation" or "holiday", can
I?)

For the general list:

I would greatly appreciate it if someONE would save to E-mail me after
my return any postings here or to alt.security.pgp about the progress
of the USA-Legal PGP project or availability, or any response by Jim
Bidzos or RSA to Phil Z's letter of early this month, asking
permission to use non-standard RSAREF entry points.

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.2.1/EWS

iQCVAgUBK/yZrt4nNf3ah8DHAQEQVwP8Cx6lG7kR4GnlRyka1B+l1BJisvcxfBGt
i/YioZA0WF/4nlFOnj45vMMuPwWLfAFc/BtzjLmk3Iammiw2ZlUfs29rcF9peq+w
YWjjVCePIbKE08pYiCUzaSlHT5l1II5Fl0Ex9NoMgjNfYCY2RxzGzrhlObeNZCra
J+WXauK0l18=
=Ipsd
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

--
edgar@spectrx.saigon.com (Edgar W. Swank)
SPECTROX SYSTEMS +1.408.252.1005  Cupertino, Ca





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: dmandl@lehman.com (David Mandl)
Date: Fri, 21 May 93 11:29:14 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Proposed Cypherpunks FAQ outline
Message-ID: <9305211828.AA16694@disvnm2.shearson.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> From: esr@snark.thyrsus.com (Eric S. Raymond)

An obvious addition...

> 7. What can I do to help?
>    a. Work on cryptographic software.
>       <this subsection should list current projects>
>    b. Agitate against the Clipper/Capstone/DES standard.

c. Promote the use of encrypted communication, help spread PGP and
   other appropriate tools far and wide (both to help get a better
   foothold to thwart the Clipper monopoly and its ilk, and to work
   towards making crypto as commonplace as envelopes).

I guess this is a superset of b.

   --Dave.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: dmandl@lehman.com (David Mandl)
Date: Fri, 21 May 93 11:38:32 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Proposed Cypherpunks FAQ outline
Message-ID: <9305211838.AA16816@disvnm2.shearson.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> From: esr@snark.thyrsus.com (Eric S. Raymond)

...also, there should of course be information on anonymous remailers.
This could fit in both

> 3. What are the potential applications of good privacy software?
>    a. Secure communications.
>    b. Digital cash.
>    c. Electronic voting.
>    d. Electronic contracts.

     e. Secure anonymous remailers.

and

> 5. What are the social and political implications of good privacy software?
>    a. Drastically lower transaction costs for trade.
>    b. Expansion of the counter-economy.
>    c. Disempowerment of government.

     d. Anonymity for whistleblowers and others desiring or requiring anonymity
        on the net.

   --Dave.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: peb@PROCASE.COM
Date: Fri, 21 May 93 14:40:43 PDT
To: anton@hydra.unm.edu
Subject: Re: cypto + compression
Message-ID: <9305212138.AA12666@banff.procase.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



>Why not compress this AGAIN

If your compression algorithm is any good, it should *not* be able to 
compress the output a second time. 

Compressing before encryption is vital--it makes brute force and plaintext
attacks much more difficult.

On compression forever:  I read a science fiction short story once where
(not sure of title or author, but it is a classic) a bunch of geniuses 
are ostensibly sent to another planet to "explore", but the people sending
them had a different motive: get them away from Earth and give them time
to dream up cool stuff.  Okay, so they dream up way cool stuff, but have
this problem with transmission bandwidth back to Earth.

Then they figure out that any message can be encoded in prime numbers
like:  2^a * 3^b * 5^c * 7^d...   where a b c d are the character values
(ascii or letter A==0, B==1, etc.).  After a message is encoded, the
result is a *big number*.  This number is not more compact than
the original message, but the clever geniuses flying to Tau Ceti (or 
wherever) figured out how to factor the number down to things like
M^N + P^Q, where the number of bits needed to write down the factorization
was very small, say, 100 bits or so.  THEN, they ship this factorization
back to Earth and save bandwidth and it encodes the whole Encyclopedia
Gallactica. 

This scheme doesn't work because factoring is much harder than using 
other compression techniques.  


Paul E. Baclace
peb@procase.com




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Stanton McCandlish <anton@hydra.unm.edu>
Date: Fri, 21 May 93 13:48:17 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Dec. of Ind. < Govt. Imposted Crypto Restrictions
Message-ID: <9305212048.AA17631@hydra.unm.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I'd sure lend a .signature to ratify that!
-- 
Testes saxi solidi!  **********************   Podex opacus gravedinosus est!  
Stanton McCandlish,  SysOp:  Noise in the Void Data Center BBS
IndraNet: 369:1/1      FidoNet: 1:301/2      Internet: anton@hydra.unm.edu
Snail: 8020 Central SE #405, Albuquerque, New Mexico 87108 USA
Data phone: +1-505-246-8515 (24hr, 1200-14400 v32bis, N-8-1)
Vox phone:  +1-505-247-3402 (bps rate varies, depends on if you woke me up...:)




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Stanton McCandlish <anton@hydra.unm.edu>
Date: Fri, 21 May 93 14:00:19 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: cypto + compression
In-Reply-To: <9305200743.AA02030@netcom.netcom.com>
Message-ID: <9305212100.AA18233@hydra.unm.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Just thought of something (I hope it gives someone a business idea, I have
plenty to spare at the moment.)

OK: compression, simplified, works (in several of its manifestations at least)
by replacing redunant parts with a single part that represents 1) what the
replaced parts are, and 2) how many there are.  Thus "feed" could be compressed
as "f!d" where ! = "2 e's".  I know, I know this is a terrible oversimplifica-
tion, but that's the juice of the fruit, no?

OK well if you encrypt a compressed file, there are bound to be lots more
new redundencies created in the encryption process (unless it is something
like ROT-13).  Why not compress this AGAIN, squeezing more space out of the
data?  Sure you can do this manually but things like DES are slow.  What I
am thinking is: have something like zip or compress that compresses, encrypts,
then recompresses, and repeats this process until it can compress no more.

Compression/extraction time will slow down, but for those that NEED heavy-
duty compression, big deal.  It shouldn't really be TOO bad, since this
almost 1/2-assed encryption need not be secure in any way, it could have
a very short key.  

Any ideas?  What is wrong with this idea? (something must be, or it would've
been done by now, I am guessing.)  I don't know the math, so I suspect I 
must've erred gravely somewhere.
-- 
Testes saxi solidi!  **********************   Podex opacus gravedinosus est!  
Stanton McCandlish,  SysOp:  Noise in the Void Data Center BBS
IndraNet: 369:1/1      FidoNet: 1:301/2      Internet: anton@hydra.unm.edu
Snail: 8020 Central SE #405, Albuquerque, New Mexico 87108 USA
Data phone: +1-505-246-8515 (24hr, 1200-14400 v32bis, N-8-1)
Vox phone:  +1-505-247-3402 (bps rate varies, depends on if you woke me up...:)




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Kent Hastings" <kent_hastings@qmail2.aero.org>
Date: Fri, 21 May 93 15:33:31 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: PI Compression
Message-ID: <199305212233.AA07890@aerospace.aero.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


                      PI Compression
It may have been discussed here months ago, but my favorite bogus
compression scheme is "pi compression". Any number like pi or 
SQRT(2) can be represented as an infinite sequence of non-repeating
bits (there are repetitive patterns, but eventually the sequence
breaks out). A finite bit string can be represented simply as the
starting location and length in pi.

Since all possible finite bit strings are, by definition, contained
in the unending cavalcade of bits in pi, all literary works, radio
programs, TV, 3D holos, feelies, etc for all sentient species from 
the remotest past to the distant future, in every possible alternate
universe is in little old pi.

PI has been in the public domain from antiquity, therefore all parts
of pi are public domain, just like every chapter, paragraph, sentence,
word and bit are parts of a book. 

Who would dare argue against these reasonable assertions?

Kent - kent_hastings@qmail2.aero.org.






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: technopagan priest <tedwards@wam.umd.edu>
Date: Fri, 21 May 93 12:55:02 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Cryptography show for ITR?
Message-ID: <199305211954.AA28275@rac2.wam.umd.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



This week's NPR "Talk of the Nation/Science Friday" was on the
internet.  Both telephone callers, and internet "callers" were
accepted.  The show included the founder of Internet Talk Radio.
There was a question along the lines of "how can internet mail
privacy be assured?"  Unfortunately, the experts only breifly
mentioned public-key cryptosystems.  I was wondering if they
would go into a longer discussion about electronic privacy and
crypto issues.

I wonder if we could get a "cypherpunk" onto Internet Talk Radio to
discuss cryptography and it's privacy concerns.  Any ideas?

-Thomas




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Eric Hughes <hughes@soda.berkeley.edu>
Date: Fri, 21 May 93 15:59:03 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: PI Compression
In-Reply-To: <199305212233.AA07890@aerospace.aero.org>
Message-ID: <9305212255.AA02687@soda.berkeley.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>Since all possible finite bit strings are, by definition, contained
>in the unending cavalcade of bits in pi, 

Definition?  I have seen not this asserted even by theorem.  Not
surprising, since the statement is patently false.  There are
2^{\aleph_0} finite bit strings, and only \aleph_0 of those are
subsequences of pi.

For those of you without a math background, this means "They all just
don't fit."

Eric




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Eric Watt Forste <arkuat@joes.garage.com>
Date: Fri, 21 May 93 15:59:10 PDT
To: Stanton McCandlish <anton@hydra.UNM.EDU>
Subject: Re: cypto + compression
In-Reply-To: <9305212100.AA18233@hydra.unm.edu>
Message-ID: <199305212303.AA21876@joes.GARAGE.COM>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


 
 Stanton McCandlish wrote:
 
  OK well if you encrypt a compressed file, there are bound to be lots more
  new redundencies created in the encryption process
 
In fact there are not. You can test this out; use PGP to encrypt any
file you please, and then use any compression software you like to
compress it. You will get no significant compression.

Eric Watt Forste                             arkuat@joes.garage.com
1800 Market St #243                          San Francisco CA 94102
      "Expectation foils perception."   -- Pamela C. Dean





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "John (FuzzFace/Fast-Eddie) McMahon" <MCMAHON@Eisner.DECUS.Org>
Date: Fri, 21 May 93 13:18:37 PDT
To: tedwards@wam.umd.edu
Subject: Re: Cryptography show for ITR?
Message-ID: <01GYFYUSBADK002QNU@Eisner.DECUS.Org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I just forwarded your suggestion to the guys who run ITR.

Hopefully, it will go somewhere :-)

Cheers!
Fuzz




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: sommerfeld@apollo.hp.com
Date: Fri, 21 May 93 13:16:34 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: looking for distributed systems/crypto textbook.
Message-ID: <9305212016.AA25837@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


At work, we're thinking of organizing an internal self-study seminar
on areas related to distributed systems security.

I know of Denning's textbook in the area, but would prefer not to use
it for what should be obvious reasons.

I also know of and have read the "Contemporary Cryptography" book by
Simmons, but it seems to be a little too heavily oriented towards
crypto/math as opposed to applications.

Undoubtedly many of you would have opinions in this area; let me know
what they are and I'll summarize to the list.

					- Bill




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Clive" <walmsley@ccint1.rsre.mod.uk>
Date: Fri, 21 May 93 08:51:48 PDT
To: "cypherpunks" <cypherpunks@toad.com>
Subject: Ref Strong Encryption
Message-ID: <9305211551.AA22478@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Hi,

am I missing something ....

From: baumbach@atmel.com (Peter Baumbach)

>> It seems that an easely available (legal) software verification system
>> needs to be made.  If one were widely used, virus worries of people
>> could be channeled into a demand for strong encryption.  Tell people
>> that the Crippler Chip might prevent this from ever happening.

How can the case be made for strong encryption, based upon the worries
of people over viruses???

I fail to see how the worries over viruses can be countered, channelled 
into the need for strong encryption. ???

Clive Walmsley
Walmsley@ccint1.rsre.mod.uk





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: smb@research.att.com
Date: Fri, 21 May 93 14:26:25 PDT
To: Stanton McCandlish <anton@hydra.unm.edu>
Subject: Re: cypto + compression
Message-ID: <9305212126.AA27376@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


	 OK well if you encrypt a compressed file, there are bound to
	 be lots more new redundencies created in the encryption
	 process (unless it is something like ROT-13).  Why not
	 compress this AGAIN, squeezing more space out o

Actually, you've got it backwards.  A decent encryption algorithm,
including DES, generates something with very little redundancy,
and hence which cannot be compress further.

$ compress </vmunix >vmunix.Z
$ des -e -k foo <vmunix.Z >vmunix.Z.des
des: WARNING: using software DES algorithm
$ compress <vmunix.Z.des >vmunix.Z.des.Z
-rwxr-xr-x  1 root      1875490 Jan  7 16:59 /vmunix
$ des -e -k foo </vmunix | compress >vmunix.des.Z
des: WARNING: using software DES algorithm
$ ls -l /vmunix vmunix*
-rwxr-xr-x  1 root      1875490 Jan  7 16:59 /vmunix
-rw-rw-r--  1 smb        794374 May 21 17:17 vmunix.Z
-rw-rw-r--  1 smb        794376 May 21 17:18 vmunix.Z.des
-rw-rw-r--  1 smb       1066555 May 21 17:18 vmunix.Z.des.Z
-rw-rw-r--  1 smb       2538235 May 21 17:21 vmunix.des.Z

As you can see, compressing after encrypting *increases* the size of
the file.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Marc Horowitz <marc@GZA.COM>
Date: Fri, 21 May 93 14:56:50 PDT
To: Stanton McCandlish <anton@hydra.unm.edu>
Subject: Re: cypto + compression
In-Reply-To: <9305212100.AA18233@hydra.unm.edu>
Message-ID: <9305212156.AA03491@dun-dun-noodles.aktis.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>> Any ideas?  What is wrong with this idea? (something must be, or it
>> would've been done by now, I am guessing.)  I don't know the math, so
>> I suspect I must've erred gravely somewhere.

You have indeed erred gravely :-)

One of the information theoretical concepts we are dealing with here
is that of information density.  The whole reason compression works is
that in most files, the information density is not "perfect"; that is,
there is repeated information in the file.  This reflects what we see
when we compress a file: the more which is repeated, the better
compression is.  Graphics compress much better than executeables.

Well, one of the reasons encryption works is because I can't tell from
the encrypted text what kind of patterns exist.  Consider a
letter-substitution cipher.  If I were to apply one to this message,
you could probably decrypt it, because much of the structure is still
there: common english words, letter frequencies, etc.  This makes
letter-substitution a pretty poor cipher.  What about DES?  Well, this
is interesting.  Without the key, the information density of an
encrypted file looks the same as the density of a compressed file, or
of noise.  This is why you could claim something was just noise, not
encrypted data.  It's also why a common "good" PRNG is formed by
feeding the numbers through some crypto algorithm, because it makes
the numbers appear random.

It is because encrypted data appears to have a very high information
density that it will not compress much, if at all.  Compressing
encrypted data, from some standpoints, is tatamount to actually
decrypting it.

Examples:

A is a file with 1000 lines of 79 "A"'s followed by a newline.
A.Z is the file, compressed.
A.x is the file, encrypted (unix crypt, lame, I know)
A.x.Z is the encrypted file, compressed wiht the -f option.

-rw-rw-r--  1 marc        80000 May 21 17:26 A
-rw-rw-r--  1 marc         1466 May 21 17:26 A.Z
-rw-rw-r--  1 marc        80000 May 21 17:47 A.x
-rw-rw-r--  1 marc       106577 May 21 17:47 A.x.Z

Note that A.x doesn't compress at all.  In fact, it grows!

		Marc




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Eric Hughes <hughes@soda.berkeley.edu>
Date: Fri, 21 May 93 18:00:57 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Oops.
Message-ID: <9305220057.AA09270@soda.berkeley.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


There are not 2^{\aleph_0} finite sequences, there are \aleph_0.
Excuse me.  My brain was out to lunch.

Eric




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Thomas W. Strong, Jr." <strong+@cmu.edu>
Date: Fri, 21 May 93 18:20:18 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: cypto + compression
In-Reply-To: <9305212138.AA12666@banff.procase.com>
Message-ID: <cfzJGlW00WB60vMs8q@andrew.cmu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


peb@PROCASE.COM writes:
> Compressing before encryption is vital--it makes brute force and plaintext
> attacks much more difficult.

Be careful doing that.  It's fine if you are using a compression
algorithm that is designed for use with encryption, but if you're just
using compress and you make that known, then an opponent just has to
look for the magic numbers and headers that compress puts in the front
of every file.  Instead of believing that strings like "the" will appear
somewhere, the opponent now knows exactly what the encrypted document
starts with.

 -----------------------------------------------------------------
  Tom Strong              N3NBB              ts49+@andrew.cmu.edu




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: zimm@alumni.cco.caltech.edu (Mark Edward Zimmerman)
Date: Fri, 21 May 93 18:26:06 PDT
To: peb@procase.com
Subject: Godelization, sf, etc. (was: Re: cypto + compression)
Message-ID: <9305220125.AA26590@alumni.cco.caltech.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


the sf story that you're alluding to is, I believe, Fred Pohl's "Gold
at the Starbow's End" --- a cover story in ANALOG magazine ca. 1968
--- which I remember fondly precisely because of the idea used which
you mention, namely, encoding a big message compactly as the sum of
various powers of small numbers ...  though the author got it pretty
badly wrong, as I pointed out in a letter published some months later
in the same magazine --- the sum of powers that he gave in the story
was *much* too small to hold a significant amount of information, and
(worse) he thought that one couldn't get any of the answer without
writing the entire number --- obviously wrong, as a little modular
arithmetic can get out the powers quite easily....  but it's a nice
idea and the story was quite good otherwise.... :-) ^z




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Ian S. Nelson" <ian@bvsd.Co.EDU>
Date: Fri, 21 May 93 17:47:07 PDT
To: arkuat@joes.garage.com (Eric Watt Forste)
Subject: Re: cypto + compression
In-Reply-To: <199305212303.AA21876@joes.GARAGE.COM>
Message-ID: <199305220046.AA02144@bvsd.Co.EDU>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>   OK well if you encrypt a compressed file, there are bound to be lots more
>   new redundencies created in the encryption process
> In fact there are not. You can test this out; use PGP to encrypt any
> file you please, and then use any compression software you like to
> compress it. You will get no significant compression.

Isn't encrypted data supposed to be random, and thus not compressable?
You might be able to creat some redundencies by decrypting it though.

-- 
Ian S. Nelson			I speak for only myself.	
Finger for my PGP key.  
If you are a beautiful woman, it is mandatory that you reply to this message.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: rclark@nyx.cs.du.edu (Robert W. F. Clark)
Date: Fri, 21 May 93 17:56:12 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Inside Dope on Mykotronx
Message-ID: <9305220056.AA10233@nyx.cs.du.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Received from an undisclosed source, for release to all appropriate
electronic media, concerning Mykotronx, Inc.

The following material was publicly available, but I still am not at
liberty to disclose my source: 
 

Information:
 
Mykotronx Inc.
357 Van Ness Way (1 blk so. of Del Amo)
Suite 200
Torrance CA 90501
(310) 533-8100
fax (310) 533-0527
STU III (310) 533-0738
Founded 1979
 
Resale # SR-AB 12-711252
Dunn & Bradstreet # 00-611-5281
 
Banking: Shearson Lehman Brothers
         Attn: Steve Scerra
         Acct # 509 24261 12011
         21250 Hawthorne Bl
         Torrance, CA 90509
         (310) 540-9511
 
Employee Names:
 
Bob Gottfried, CEO
Leonard J. Baker, President
Ralph O' Connell, aka "The Father of COMSEC", NSA Lobbyist
Mike Furusawa, Space COMSEC Manager
Patti Linahan, Executive Secretary
Kikuo Ogawa, Buyer
R. Todd, W. Greenfield, KG-44B (Outrunner) Project
John C. Droge, Personnel
Bob Todd, Manufacturing Manager
Landy Riley, Engineering

 

Federal Express Acct # 1122-7492-8

 
NSA Contact Home Address:
Ralph O' Connell
1401 Woodbridge Road
Baltimore, MD 21228
(301) 747-6276
 

Principle NSA Technical Contact:

National Security Agency
Maryland Procurement Office
Attn: N244 (CEB) (MDA904-92-G-0354/J.O. 5001)
9800 Savage Road
Fort George G. Meade, MD 20755-6000
(301) 688-8086
 
NSA Accounting Contact:
National Security Agency
Maryland Procurement Office
Finance and Accounting Office
9800 Savage Road
Fort George G. Meade, MD 20755-6000
(301) 859-6715

 
KG-46 Tactical Decryptor Unit and
KG-48B Outrunner Provisioning Conference participants:
Robert Todd, Mykotronx
Bill Greenfield, Mykotronx
G. Burgio, NSA
J. Gochnour, NSA
J. Wimpy, Air Force Computer Systems Command
S. Solis, Air Force Computer Systems Command


To Be Discussed at meeting May 18 & 19, 1993
 
Outrunner Project Milestone Payments:
 
1.  Preliminary Studies		$268,074	2/14/92
2.  Place Subcontract w/ VLSI    $47,917	2/22/92
3.  Complete PDR KG-44B		 $61,431	4/13/92
4.  Complete PDR VLSI		 $71,090	5/19/92
5.  Complete SFA Review VLSI	 $78,470	7/12/92
6.  Complete CDR VLSI		$106,638	7/17/92
7.  Complete first KG-44B	$166,641	8/12/92
8.  Complete CDR		$132,454	6/18/92
9.  Complete tests 1st KG-48B	$151,957	12/16/92
10. Complete fab VLSI		$203,941	11/17/92
11a.Deliver 2 KG-44B to NSA	 $81,080	9/8/92
11b.Deliver 2 KG-44B to NSA	 $81,081	10/7/92
12. Complete Cryto Verif VLSI	$152,223	12/16/92
13. Deliver 4 KG-44B to NSA	$171,571	3/2/93
14a.Deliver 2 KG-44B to NSA	 $30,432	3/30/93
14b.Deliver 2 KG-44B to NSA 	 $30,432	4/20/93
15. Deliver 4 KG-44B to NSA	 $60,864	4/24/93
16a.Deliver 1 KG-44B to NSA	 $15,216	4/28/93
16b.Deliver 3 KG-44B to NSA	 $45,648	5/12/93
17. Deliver 4 KG-44B to NSA	 $42,840	5/13/93

Total:			      $2,000,000
 
 
KG-44 VLSI Procurement:
United Technologies Microelectronics Center
1575 Garden of the Gods Road
Colorodo Springs, CO 80907
(719) 594-8000 fax (719) 594-8032
PO#5703-44ACN1 Feb 19, 1992
Invoice Date Feb 5, 1993
"Customer to pick up parts.  Secret item handling.
Secret Design KG-44LSI.  Mykotronx P/N M20/00301XXX"
Government contract # MDA904-92-C-A027
Group C Testing:	$4,400
5 Parts @ $675ea	$3,375
Job #BE-7281 Group C Samples
PIC Number: HP67AG84WTDLC
"Note: Group B samples also included with this shipment (ref 
Packlist #10128"
"The export of this product is controlled by the US Government.
The export of this product or the disclosure of related technical
data to foreign nationals without the appropriate export license
is prohibited by law."
 
Test Plan for MYK-80:
Statement of Work for Exatron Inc. 5/13/93
Develop test interface board for MYK-80 (176 pin TQFP) and
I.M.S. tester.  Interface to utilize "particle interconnect"
system.  Data on MYK-80 I.O. and IMS tester to be supplied
by Mykotronx.
Interface board to be installed in a work station which utilizes
Exatron "PET" handler, tooled for the MYK-80; a vacuum pick-up
device (manual, pencil type); work surfaces for JEDEC tray
storage and operator support.  The IMS tester will mount directly
under the "PET" handler.  Two "PET" handlers are to be quoted
with two sets of specific nesting tools for the MYK-80.
Installation in place at Mykotronx and initial operator and
maintenance training to be included.
Design review of the interface board layout, prior to release of
the board to fabrication is to be held at Mykotronx.
 
 
Manuals and Training Manuals subcontracted to:
ELITE Technical Corporation
Warren A. Griswold, President
1903 B Marshallfield Lane
Redondo Beach, CA 90278 
(310) 372-5616
 
 
CAPSTONE Financial Commitments by Mykotronx
 
Basic VII Cap VLSI 10			$212,000
Sun 1 Yr maint hw&sw			  $2,700
Compass					$159,400
IKOS Systems & sw			 $57,500
ELITE Technical Corp			  $8,000
IMS/Sun					$119,000
Versatec Plotter			 $36,500
SJ (1)					 $71,200
SJ (2)					 $76,200
Exatron Test System			 $78,000
ROM Cell				 $60,000
AT&T					$100,000
Surf Mgt (real estate)			 $13,900
Universal Shielding (Tempest)		 $20,600
Plotter maint				  $5,000
Litronics				$225,000
Spyrus (1)				 $45,600
Spyrus (2)				 $44,800
Compass (2)				$110,000
VLSI Tech				 $30,000
VLSI Tech (2)				$163,000
VLSI Tech CAPSTONE TQFP			 $10,000
New Media NRE Design			 $18,700
South Coast Designers			 $14,600
South Coast				  $6,000
VLSI Tech Exponeniator Tamper Sys	$163,000
Conres logic analyzer			  $3,200
VLSI Myk-78 tester			 $33,800
 
Here are exerpts of the general ledger of Mykotronx,
the Torrance Based Big-Brother outfit that is going
to make the Clinton Clipper wiretap chip:
 
Period: 01/01/93 to 04/30/93  (first 4 months of 1993)
 
Acct Descr		Beg Bal		Debits		Credits
 
==1000 series==
Shearson Lehman		286,511		2,620,096	2,670,822
Paine Webber		95,602		868		0
Dean Whitter		55,391		484		0
Petty Cash		3,000		0		0
Union bank payroll act	13,408		900,000		816,443
Accts rcvbl -customer	1,185,829	1,981,356	2,562,064
Accts rcvbl - eployees	7,125		48,450		55,575
Franchise tx rcvbl	2,165		0		0
Unbilled costs&fees	567,792		533,347		0
Raw inventory		172,252		0		76,064
Prepaid taxes		1,116		0		0
Prepaid sales tax	688		0		688
Equp/mach/furn		383,038		20,695		0
Accum depreciation	234,425		0		23,000
Deposits		9,272		0		0
 
==2000 series==
Accts Payable		482,895CR	1,869,477	1,684,555
Sales tax payable	147CR		176		0
Sales tax paid		0		0		0
FIT withheld		0		10,854		135,741
FICA withheld		0		0		56,622
CA state IT withh	0		0		36,163
CA state disability	0		0		8,730
SUI pybl employer	0		0		5,788
FUTA payable		0		0		2,007
FICA employer		0		0		56,621
Pd Payroll txs withh	0		290,820		0
401K withheld		0		0		42,712
Accrued payroll		25,637CR	343,682		318,045
Dental withheld		0		0		674
Dental plan pd		0		674		0
Withh 401K pd		0		42,712		0
Accrued bonuses		214,040		341,240		127,200

[Those are some nice bonuses, aren't they?]

Accrued Vacation	44,252		0		0
Excess billings		139,216		154,706		55,036
Gross payroll		0		751,859		0
Gross payroll distrd	0		2,552		754,412
Lease obligations	4,911CR		0		0
 
==3000 series==
Common Stock		169,320		0		61,435
Capital disbursement	916,675		222,230		0
Retd Earnings, begng	2,385,020CR	0		0
 
==4000 series==
Sales, returns&allowc	0		6,014		2,577,323
Interest income		0		0		1,353
Int income tax free	0		0		2,490
 
 
==5000 series==
Consultants		0		47,395		47,395
Subcontracts		0		932,210		110,419
Other direct costs	0		62,265		5,454
Printing/repro costs	0		542		0
Equipment rental/leasg	0		1,537		1,537
Maint, repairs		0		1,761		0
Delivery		0		3,217		0
Postage			0		960		0
Materials/parts		0		186,252		22,423
Telephone		0		93		0
Travel			0		10,437		0
Inv Cost of Mfg Prod	0		76,064		0
Direct labor-Engnrg	0		240,341		54,172
Direct labor-Technician	0		129,839		37,459
Direct labor-Adminst	0		47,542		10,081
 
 
==6000 series==
Indirect labor		0		60,319		0
Holidays		0		32,867		27,331
Sick leave		0		3,276		0
Vacation		0		38,096		25,976
Retroactive pay		0		4,400		0
Job advertisments	0		655		0
Grp Med Ins non sharhl	0		25,522		1,818
Mykotronx pd payrl txs	0		64,417		0
Workers comp		0		9,554		1,418
Interest pd		0		0		0
Consultants		0		2,013		0
ADP Acctg		0		1,493		0
Real World Acct Suppt	0		1,485		0
Bank charges		0		155		0
Blueprints/repro	0		390		0
Proposals		0		2,817		0
Copier expense		0		514		0
Depreciation - elec eq	0		23,000		0
Dues & memberships	0		749		0
Education & Training	0		2,850		0
Employee relations	0		4,531 		0
Business expense	0		7,431		0
Equip rental/lsng	0		4,458		0
Computer software	0		2,114		0
Insurance		0		9,061		1,380
Janitorial		0		20		0
Licenses & Permits	0		175		0
Maint, repairs		0		2,096		0
Delivery		0		995		13
Postage			0		942		0
Amort organiz expense	0		0		0
Taxes - franchise	0		2,763		0
Real & Pers prop tax	0		0		0
Rent			0		54,080		0
Subscriptions/books	0		325		0
Office/lab supplies	0		14,183		446
Telephone		0		7,961		36
Travel			0		10,296		1,303
Utilities		0		5,833		0
LTD Ins, non sharehld	0		2,877		594
401K Mykotronx contrib	0		17,411		0
 
 
==7000 series==
Special Bonus		0		132,200		123,200

[Special bonus?  $132,000.00; I wonder which Federal Agency this money
went to.]

G&A Labor		0		103,4520	0
Legal Services		0		5,895		0
Board of Dir Expnse	0		1,078		0
Financial Svc		0		7,505		0
 
Totals			0		12,555,101	12,555,101
 

Other little items:
 
Locks at Mykotronx installed and maintained by Torrance Lock and Key,
2421 Torrance Bl.  Torrance, CA 90501  (310) 320-8840  For some
reason, Mykotronx is over 90 days late paying a lousy $50 invoice.
 
Mykotronx has a Mossler safe.  It cost $1,693 when they bought it
11/27/90.  They have never changed the combination.
 
Outstanding VLSI purchase orders:
VLSI Tech (Capstone)		$212,000
AT&T (Myk-78)			$71,200
Motorola (Myk-77)		$76,200
AT&T (Misc)			$100,000
Compass (Software)		$159,400
VLSI Tech (Myk-78)		$66,200
Litronics (PCMCIA Crypto)	$225,000
VLSI Tech (Expoteniator)	$163,000
VLSI Tech (Capstone TFQP)	$10,000
VLSI Tech (Myk-78 fix)		$68,500
VLSI Tech (Myk-78A proto)	$11,000
VLSI Tech (Myk-78A prod.)	$220,000
VLSI Tech (Myk-80 #1)		$48,000
VLSI Tech (Myk-80 #2)		$33,750
VLSI Tech (Myk-82)		$80,000
VLSI Tech (Myk-79)		$79,500
 
Their LAN was installed by Strategies, Inc for about $14,000.

More information is forthcoming.  Please forward to all appropriate
electronic media, and reproduce as desired.  Will someone post this
to alt.privacy.clipper and sci.crypt, or is this a bad idea?
----
Robert W. Clark
rclark@nyx.cs.du.edu   PGP signature available by mail or finger



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Perry E. Metzger" <pmetzger@lehman.com>
Date: Fri, 21 May 93 16:41:07 PDT
To: "Kent Hastings" <kent_hastings@qmail2.aero.org>
Subject: Re: PI Compression
In-Reply-To: <199305212233.AA07890@aerospace.aero.org>
Message-ID: <9305212339.AA18403@snark.shearson.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



"Kent Hastings" says:
>                       PI Compression
> It may have been discussed here months ago, but my favorite bogus
> compression scheme is "pi compression". Any number like pi or 
> SQRT(2) can be represented as an infinite sequence of non-repeating
> bits (there are repetitive patterns, but eventually the sequence
> breaks out). A finite bit string can be represented simply as the
> starting location and length in pi.
> 
> Since all possible finite bit strings are, by definition, contained
> in the unending cavalcade of bits in pi, all literary works, radio
> programs, TV, 3D holos, feelies, etc for all sentient species from 
> the remotest past to the distant future, in every possible alternate
> universe is in little old pi.

Bull. You cannot prove that all strings are contained as substrings of
PI. The mere fact that a bit string is infinite and non-repeating does
not mean that it is wholely random. For instance, I can very readily
construct infinite sequences that do not contain arbitrary bit
strings.

See, as an example, this non-repeating bit string

101001000100001000001....

> Who would dare argue against these reasonable assertions?

Me.

Perry




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: pigeon@idr.org (Larissa Carlson)
Date: Fri, 21 May 93 18:18:40 PDT
To: zippy@berry.cs.brandeis.edu
Subject: Consider "Working Assets" phone service instead of AT&T
In-Reply-To: <9305211418.AA10692@berry.cs.brandeis.edu>
Message-ID: <9305220118.AA17621@wombat.gnu.ai.mit.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I used to sell Working Assets.  In answer to the question about
reselling of the lines, it works like this:
1.  All the phone companies lease some lines from other companies in
order to access all regions in order to provide equal access and
competitivesness.  This opened the door for small start up companies
to lease lines instead of setting up whole new systems.  There are
quite afew companies who do this.  Working Assets leases from Sprint.
They, unlike AT&T don't provide all the communication system contracts
for the govt. and military.
2.  In response to the person who said that WA's plan of calling on
specific issues wreaks of the same type of Big Brotherism as the
others:
Everyone has a choice as to what they say to the people targetted.
Plus the phone call IS free.  Third if the privacy opponents and right
wingers and conservatives are wielding havoc on our system why
shouldn't we have access to the same methods to affect govt. policy as
they do.  WA has actually published # that while public are not listed
in any directories.  This is a useful tool.  Lets not waste the
resources we have.  




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Clark Reynard <clark@metal.psu.edu>
Date: Fri, 21 May 93 18:50:27 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Whoops; and a question on information theory and encryption
Message-ID: <9305220230.AA00987@metal.psu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Just noticed that my last note had been posted already;
sorry.

In addition, I'm wondering whether a plaintext/cyphertext pair is
considered to have a one-to-one isomorphism; in particular, in the
case where you have a plaintext/cyphertext pair but no knowledge of
the method of encryption, is there a one-to-one isomorphism?

In the case of a one-time pad, is there isomorphism, and if so, of
what sort?

Thank you.
----
Robert W. Clark             Just Say No! to the
rclark@nyx.cs.du.edu        Big Brother Chip  




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: J. Michael Diehl <mdiehl@triton.unm.edu>
Date: Sat, 22 May 93 00:49:32 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: pgp menu
Message-ID: <9305220749.AA16667@triton.unm.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I have included, below, a copy of my pgp menu system.  It is a 4dos batch file.

With this program, you can encrypt, sign and decrypt a message, and generate, 

delete, extract keys, wipe files.  I've been trying to iron out some of the 

bugs for about a month now.  (BTW where did all my alpha testers go?)  I think

it's pretty stable now, so I'm posting it.  To be able to use the program, you

MUST BE USING 4DOS as your command interpreter on your PC.  But, I've found that

this little requirement is well worth the utility that (I hope) my program 






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: J. Michael Diehl <mdiehl@triton.unm.edu>
Date: Sat, 22 May 93 01:03:06 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Lets see that again...
Message-ID: <9305220802.AA17065@triton.unm.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Well, what can I say about that last message.  That is a rather bothersome
but in my automatic mail system that I've not been able to track down.  In fact,
I can't even duplicate it.  For the record, my system send 2 other messages 
before this one, and they were fine.  Oh well.  Anyway, here is the full
message.

I have included, below, a copy of my pgp menu system.  It is a 4dos batch file.
With this program, you can encrypt, sign and decrypt a message, and generate, 
delete, extract keys, wipe files.  I've been trying to iron out some of the 
bugs for about a month now.  (BTW where did all my alpha testers go?)  I think
it's pretty stable now, so I'm posting it.  To be able to use the program, you
MUST BE USING 4DOS as your command interpreter on your PC.  But, I've found that
this little requirement is well worth the utility that (I hope) my program 
provides.
 
4dos is a command.com replacement that features disk swapping, aliases, file-
name completion, and an extended batch language.  You can get it via anon ftp 
at wuarchive.wustl.edu in the /mirrors/msdos/4dos directory.  It's very much
worth the effort to investigate.  For those of you who do make this effort, I
hope you enjoy using my menu syste.  I hope to hear from you soon.  Thanx.
 
Well, here it is:
 
rem 
@echo off
setlocal
break on
 
:main
cls
drawbox 0 0 23 78 2 red on black
drawhline 17 0 79 1 red on black
drawbox 4 29 16 49 2 red on black 
scrput 1 27 blue on black Mike's PGP shell ver. 0.0.
scrput 3 35 blue on black MAIN MENU
 
scrput  5 32 red on black Encrypt a file.
scrput  7 32 red on black Decrypt a file.
scrput 09 32 red on black siGn a file.
scrput 11 32 red on black Wipe file.
scrput 13 32 red on black Next menu.
scrput 15 32 red on black Quit.
 
scrput 18 5 white on black Select an option by typing the corisponding capitalized letter.
scrput 19 5 white on black For example, to encrypt a file, you would press the E key.
 
inkey /K"EeDdGgWwNnQq" %%in
goto menu1-%in
 
:menu1-q
screen 17 26
pause 
cls
endlocal
quit
 
:menu1-e
cls
drawbox 0 0 23 78 2 red on black
drawhline 17 0 79 1 red on black
drawbox 6 3 8 74 2 red on black
 
scrput 18 5 white on black Here you will be asked for the name of a file to be
scrput 19 5 white on black encrypted.  Then you will be asked for the names of 
scrput 20 5 white on black the people who should be able to read the file.
scrput 21 5 white on black Enter them all on the line separated by a space.
 
scrput 7 5 red on black Enter the name of the file to encrypt.
screen 7 52
input %%file
 
if exist %file goto menu1-e-good
scrput 15 10 red on black That file is not in the current directory!
screen 16 10
pause
goto menu1-e
 
:menu1-e-good
 
drawbox 10 3 12 74 2 red on black
scrput 11 5 red on black Enter the name(s) of the recipients.
screen 11 52
input %%in
 
cls
rem I never claimed that this would be elegent....
 
drawbox 0 0 23 78 2 red on black
drawhline 17 0 79 1 red on black
scrput 18 5 white on black Here you are asked if you want to mark this message "For Your Eyes Only,"
scrput 19 5 white on black and if you want to sign the message.  If you reply 'y' to the first
scrput 20 5 white on black question, the recipient will only be ablt to display the message. He
scrput 21 5 white on black won't be to save it.  If you reply 'y' to the second question, the 
scrput 22 5 white on black recipient will know for certain that the message is from you.
 
drawbox 6 3 8 74 2 red on black
scrput 7 5 red on black Would you like to mark this "For Your Eyes Only?"
inkey /K"ynN" %%f
drawbox 10 3 12 74 2 red on black
scrput 11 5 red on black Would you like to sign this message?
inkey /K"ynN" %%s
 
if "%f" == "y" goto f
if "%s" == "y" goto s
cls
pgp -e %file %in 
goto encrypted
:f
if "%s" == "y" goto sf
cls
pgp -me %file %in 
goto encrypted
:sf
cls
pgp -mes %file %in 
goto encrypted
:s
cls
pgp -es %file %in 
 
:encrypted
echo %@name[%file].asc is the name of the encrypted file.
pause
goto main
 
:menu1-d
cls
drawbox 0 0 23 78 2 red on black
drawhline 17 0 79 1 red on black
drawbox 6 3 8 74 2 red on black
 
scrput 18 5 white on black Here you will be asked for the name of a file to be
scrput 19 5 white on black read.  Then you will be asked if you want to save the
scrput 20 5 white on black plaintext file.  If you do, you will be asked for a 
scrput 21 5 white on black new filename.
 
scrput 7 5 red on black Enter the name of the file to read.
screen 7 52
input %%file
 
if exist %file goto menu1-d-good
scrput 15 10 red on black That file is not in the current directory!
screen 16 10
pause
goto main
 
:menu1-d-good
cls
pgp -m %file
goto main
 
:menu1-g
cls
drawbox 0 0 23 78 2 red on black
drawhline 17 0 79 1 red on black
drawbox 6 3 8 74 2 red on black
 
scrput 18 5 white on black Here you will be asked for the name of a file to be
scrput 19 5 white on black signed.  If you sign a message, it can be proved that
scrput 20 5 white on black it came from you.  There is no "Plausible Deniability."
 
scrput 7 5 red on black Enter the name of the file to signed.
screen 7 52
input %%file
 
if exist %file goto menu1-g-good
scrput 15 10 red on black That file is not in the current directory!
screen 16 10
pause
goto main
 
:menu1-g-good
cls
pgp -s %file
echo %@name[%file].asc is the name of the signed file.
pause
goto main
 
:menu1-w
cls
drawbox 0 0 23 78 2 red on black
drawhline 17 0 79 1 red on black
drawbox 6 3 8 74 2 red on black
 
scrput 18 5 white on black Here you will be asked for the name of a file to be
scrput 19 5 white on black wiped. Remember, after a file is wiped...
scrput 20 5 blink white on black There is no way to retrieve the file!
 
scrput 7 5 red on black Enter the name of the file to wiped.
screen 7 52
input %%file
 
if exist %file goto menu1-w-good
scrput 15 10 red on black That file is not in the current directory!
screen 16 10
pause
goto main
 
:menu1-w-good
 
cls
pgp -w %file 
goto main
 
:menu1-n
cls
drawbox 0 0 23 78 2 red on black
drawhline 17 0 79 1 red on black
drawbox 4 29 16 49 2 red on black 
scrput 1 27 blue on black Mike's PGP shell ver. 0.0.
scrput 3 35 blue on black SECOND MENU
 
scrput  5 32 red on black Add a key.
scrput  7 32 red on black Extract a key.
scrput 09 32 red on black View a key.
scrput 11 32 red on black Fingerprint.
scrput 13 32 red on black Next menu.
scrput 15 32 red on black Quit.
 
scrput 18 5 white on black Select an option by typing the corisponding capitalized letter.
scrput 19 5 white on black For example, to add a key to your ring, you would press the A key.
 
inkey /K"AaEeVvFfNnQq" %%in
goto menu2-%in
 
:menu2-q
goto menu1-q
 
:menu2-a
cls
drawbox 0 0 23 78 2 red on black
drawhline 17 0 79 1 red on black
drawbox 6 3 8 74 2 red on black
 
scrput 18 5 white on black Here you will be asked for the name of a file that  
scrput 19 5 white on black contains the keys to be added to your public key ring.
scrput 7 5 red on black Enter the name of the file to read.
screen 7 52
input %%file
 
if exist %file goto menu2-a-good
scrput 15 10 red on black That file is not in the current directory!
screen 16 10
pause
goto main
 
:menu2-a-good
 
cls
pgp -ka %file 
pause
goto main
 
:menu2-e
cls
drawbox 0 0 23 78 2 red on black
drawhline 17 0 79 1 red on black
drawbox 6 3 8 74 2 red on black
 
scrput 18 5 white on black Here you will be asked for the key ID to be extracted.
scrput 19 5 white on black Then you will be asked for the names of the file to 
scrput 20 5 white on black put the key in.
 
scrput 7 5 red on black Enter the key ID to extract.
screen 7 52
input %%in
 
drawbox 10 3 12 74 2 red on black
scrput 11 5 red on black Enter the name of the file that is to hold the key.
screen 11 59
input %%file
 
if not exist %file goto menu2-e-good
scrput 10 10 red on black That file already exists in the current directory!
screen 16 10
pause
goto main
 
:menu2-e-good
 
cls
pgp -kx %in %file
echo %@name[%file].asc contains the key for %in.
pause
goto main
 
:menu2-v
cls
pgp -kv 
pause
goto main
 
:menu2-f
cls
drawbox 0 0 23 78 2 red on black
drawhline 17 0 79 1 red on black
drawbox 6 3 8 74 2 red on black
 
scrput 18 5 white on black Here you will be asked for the name of the person who's key fingerprint you 
scrput 19 5 white on black want to examine.
 
scrput 7 5 red on black Enter the name of the person.
screen 7 52
input %%in
 
cls
pgp -kvc %in 
echo Remember to write this information down!
pause
goto main
 
:menu2-n
cls
drawbox 0 0 23 78 2 red on black
drawhline 17 0 79 1 red on black
drawbox 4 29 16 49 2 red on black 
scrput 1 27 blue on black Mike's PGP shell ver. 0.0.
scrput 3 35 blue on black THIRD MENU
 
scrput  5 32 red on black Generate a key.
scrput  7 32 red on black Remove a key.
scrput 09 32 red on black Disable a key.
scrput 13 32 red on black Next menu.
scrput 15 32 red on black Quit.
 
scrput 18 5 white on black Select an option by typing the corisponding capitalized letter.
scrput 19 5 white on black For example, to generate a new key, you would press the G key.
 
inkey /K"GgRrDdNnQq" %%in
goto menu3-%in
 
:menu3-g
cls
pgp -kg 
pause
goto main
 
:menu3-r
cls
drawbox 0 0 23 78 2 red on black
drawhline 17 0 79 1 red on black
drawbox 6 3 8 74 2 red on black
 
scrput 18 5 white on black Here you will be asked for the name of the key to be
scrput 19 5 white on black removed.
 
scrput 7 5 red on black Enter the name of the key to remove.
screen 7 52
input %%in
 
cls
pgp -kr %in 
pause
goto main
 
:menu3-q
goto menu1-q
 
:menu3-d
cls
drawbox 0 0 23 78 2 red on black
drawhline 17 0 79 1 red on black
drawbox 6 3 8 74 2 red on black
 
scrput 18 5 white on black Here you will be asked for the name of the key to be
scrput 19 5 white on black either disabled or re-enabled.
 
scrput 7 5 red on black Enter the name of the key.
screen 7 52
input %%in
 
cls
pgp -kd %in 
pause
goto main
 
:menu3-n
goto main





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: George A. Gleason <gg@well.sf.ca.us>
Date: Sat, 22 May 93 02:35:30 PDT
To: zippy@berry.cs.brandeis.edu
Subject: Re:  Consider "Working Assets" phone service instead of AT&T
Message-ID: <199305220934.AA21970@well.sf.ca.us>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Yes, Working Assets buys SPRINT in bulk and re-sells it.  The thing is
though, they're getting it wholesale and selling it to the public at regular
prices, so this slices a chunk of Sprint's profits and gives it to WA.
Certainly better than giving the whole chunk to Sprint.  See the thing is,
someone has to run all that fiber all over the continent, and tie into
something else which runs out to the rest of the world.  In the 70s all of
this was being developed, but by now it's pretty much in place and there
probably is no economic basis to develop any new routes.  So you end up with
telephone pyramid scenes where each company is selling someone else's
trunks.  Now I want to get into local competition, and there is probably
room for WA to expand that way.  I may go as far as talking to them about
setting up some exchanges as a joint venture.  Could be interesting.  

-gg




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: mbriceno@aol.com
Date: Fri, 21 May 93 23:54:04 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Forwarded messages from RISKS
Message-ID: <9305220255.tn18218@aol.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> We cannot trust the authoritarians' assertions that they have no
> intention of outlawing cryptographic technologies potentially more
> secure than the Clipper chip.

Some mightsay that outlawing all unsupervised communication and activities by
its citizens is-and always will be-a goal of all governments.

Protection from authoritarian eyes is one of the main causes for the ever
increasing use of crypto. Government issued crypto can never satisfy the
peoples desire to find a means that guarantees secure communications.

If the government wants its Clipper scheme to succeed, the government will
have to dramatically limit the availability of good crypto. One of the more
obious methods to accomplish this is to outlaw non-government approved
crypto. 

-- Marc




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: mbriceno@aol.com
Date: Fri, 21 May 93 23:54:04 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: The New Mykotronix phones...
Message-ID: <9305220255.tn18219@aol.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> This is a good, creative response to fascist technology, but I wonder
> if I'm the only one on this list who's noticed a parallel between the
> government's attitude toward small arms & its attitude approach to
> cryptography?

I am glad that someone is finally mentioning this. The parallels are quite
clear. Both small arms and crypto can give  the people protection from
criminals, while at the same time decreasing the citizens need for
government.

If everybody would be armend, we would no longer look at the government as
the sole provider of protectios from violent crimes, rape, or muggings. If
everyone used crypto, we would no longer have to rely on ineffecive laws that
prohibit the reading of someone elses mail or listening to someone elses
phone conversations.

The laws against both eavesdropping and violent crimes do not seem to deter
the perpetrators. Consequently, the helpless citizen demands a steped up
surveilance of potential "criminals," while offering less privacy in return.
Similarily, an individual facing armed criminals on the street often asks for
stronger gun contoll.  The government is all too willing to grant this wish,
since it knows that the unarmed citizen believes that he is unable to exist
without the protection (read: controll) of the government.

-- Marc




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Eric Hughes <hughes@soda.berkeley.edu>
Date: Sat, 22 May 93 09:29:25 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: WB: alt.whistleblower
Message-ID: <9305221625.AA28081@soda.berkeley.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


This is an open letter to L. Detweiler.

You've been hot to trot, eager to go, and ready for action.  What you
have interpreted as silence from others has in some case been work.
As you may recall, we were getting ready to go online two months ago,
with Julf's machine as the server.  Right after that, the penet
controversy started and things were put on the back burner for a
time.

Let me review some of the arguments about the mechanisms of the
alt.whistleblower newsgroup:

1.  We want all postings to be anonymous.
2.  That every posting be anonymous requires software intervention.
3.  The software has to sit on some machine or machines, because it
    cannot easily be put into every posting client.
4.  Someone will own these machines.
5.  Whoever owns them must agree with the political goals of the service
    and be willing to take some heat for it.
6.  This excludes most machines.
7.  Whatever mechanism the servers use to connect with the net must
    also be reasonably proof against pressure.
8.  The link between the newsgroup posting and the anonymity server
    was to be the group moderator's address, which in this case maps
    to a piece of software ratherthan a person.
9.  A further desideratum is that multiple machines be able to perform
    the service, given the  constraints of the deployed base of
    news software, which require (to my knowledge) a single address.
10. In order to have multiple machines be able to map to a single address,
    you need to involve DNS, Domain Name Service.
11. In order to use DNS, you need a primary server and some secondaries and
    someone with access to the primary DNS server to do maintenance.

Now, I'll tell you what I've been doing.  I've put a machine on the
Internet in the last two months.  Never having been a Unix
system-level weenie before, I can say that I've learned a lot the
details of batty software.  This machine, because of the details of
its connectivity, is not suitable as a worldwide server, but it would
be suitable as a server for alt.whistleblower.ba, a Bay Area
distribution version of the same.  I've also gotten up to speed on
DNS, and in fact, am running name service on said machine.  (For all
of you who want to know what this machine is, I'm not telling.  There
are still too many half configured things, like sendmail.  I hate
sendmail.)

I would recommend that if you are interested in newsgroup creation
that you read RFC 1036, which is the format for Usenet news messages.
(RFC's are available from nic.ddn.mil via anon-ftp.)  That plus
knowing that anybody can create an alt group, and you'll be set.  I
hope you have your server system set up correctly before you proceed.

The internet world has been without a whistleblower's newsgroup for
many years; a delay of a few months will not matter much.

Eric




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Sandy <72114.1712@CompuServe.COM>
Date: Sat, 22 May 93 10:42:43 PDT
To: <cypherpunks@toad.com>
Subject: PHONECARDS
Message-ID: <930522173652_72114.1712_FHF73-2@CompuServe.COM>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


_________________________________________________________________
  SANDY SANDFORT                          ssandfort@attmail.com
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Eric wrote about phonecards:

    ". . . I *can't* get an account with them because I
    don't have a phone line to tie it to.  There is a phone
    where I stay, but it's not mine.

    So, I'm stuck with US Splint."

Au contraire, several companies offer anonymous phonecards.  See
my upcoming "Norman French" article in MONDO 2000, issue #10.

 S a n d y  (arbitration volunteer)

>>>>>>>> Please address e-mail to: ssandfort@attmail.com <<<<<<<<
_________________________________________________________________






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: uni@acs.bu.edu (Shaen Bernhardt)
Date: Sat, 22 May 93 11:03:22 PDT
To: ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu
Subject: Re:  a valuable spy...
Message-ID: <9305221802.AA17648@acs2.bu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Ego + Espionage = Death




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: esr@snark.thyrsus.com (Eric S. Raymond)
Date: Sun, 23 May 93 19:06:45 PDT
To: cypherpunks@snark.thyrsus.com
Subject: draft FAQ
Message-ID: <m0nwyBG-0001BlC@snark.thyrsus.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text


Here's the first draft of the FAQ.  You'll see that it's basically a frame,
an outline, and an intro.  If you can fill in one of the sections, please
do so and mail it to me.

--- DRAFT VERSION ---- DRAFT VERSION ---- DRAFT VERSION ---- DRAFT VERSION ---
This is the Cypherpunks FAQ.  It explains the projects and purposes of the
Cypherpunks mailing list.  It is also intended to serve as a general
introduction to privacy and encryption issues.

For details on the technical and theoretical aspects of computer cryptography,
see the sci.crypt FAQ, available for FTP from rtfm.mit.edu (18.172.1.27) in the
directory pub/usenet-by-group/sci.crypt.

The cypherpunks archive is available for FTP at

	soda.berkeley.edu:pub/cypherpunks

This site contains code, information, rants, and other miscellany, including
the most up-to-date version of this FAQ.

This FAQ is maintained by Eric S. Raymond <esr@snark.thyrsus.com>; send
additions and corrections to that address.  Sections contributed by others are
credited to individual authors.  We gratefully acknowledge, in addition,
feedback and comments from David Mandl <dmandl@lehman.com> and Eric Hughes
<hughes@soda.berkeley.edu>.

1. Why cypherpunks?

   Because privacy is essential to freedom.

   If the government (or any other oppressor that behaves like one) can
effectively monitor communications, it can control or suppress them.  And it
will do so, because the natural tendency of controllers is always to seek more
control.

   The government cannot be relied on to protect your privacy rights.  Nor
can anyone else --- certainly not your employer, or the corporations that
want to know all about you so they can sell you things.

   Given half the chance, governments and corporations will always push
for security standards that protect *them*, but not *you*.

   Computer technology can help protect you against would-be snoopers, but only
if somebody is sufficiently smart and dedicated to build the tools.

   The Cypherpunks list exists to build and propagate privacy software.  Our
aim is to give you the tools to communicate with other people and computers
in ways snoopers cannot tap.

2. What are the essentials of privacy software?
   a. Public-key cryptosystems for secure communication.
   b. Unforgeable electronic signatures for message authentication.
   c. DC-net or similar protocols to thwart spoofing.

3. What are the potential applications of good privacy software?
   a. Secure communications.
   b. Digital cash.
   c. Electronic voting.
   d. Electronic contracts.
   e. Secure anonymous remailers and posters.
   f. <more?>

4. What are the key algorithms, tools, and implementations for privacy
   software?
   a. RSA
   b. DES
   c. Clipper/Capstone/DSS
   d. PGP
   e. Possible non-RSA trapdoor functions.

5. What are the social and political implications of good privacy software?
   a. Drastically lower transaction costs for trade.
   b. Expansion of the counter-economy.
   c. Disempowerment of government.
   d. Anonymity for whistleblowers.

6. What are the legal, political, and technical obstacles?
   a. The Clipper/Capstone/DSS power grab.
   b. The RSA patent and the PGP/RSA fight.
   c. RSA's base problem may not be NP-complete.

7. What can I do to help?
   a. Work on cryptographic software.
      <this subsection should list current projects>
   b. Agitate against the Clipper/Capstone/DES standard.
   c. Promote the use of encrypted communication, help spread PGP and
      other appropriate tools far and wide (both to help get a better
      foothold to thwart the Clipper monopoly and its ilk, and to work
      towards making crypto as commonplace as envelopes).

To join the cypherpunks mailing list, send a request to:

	cypherpunks@toad.com

Working with us could be your best shot at stopping Big Brother.  So if you
have skills to contribute, act now.  The freedom you save could be your own.
--- DRAFT VERSION ---- DRAFT VERSION ---- DRAFT VERSION ---- DRAFT VERSION ---

-- 
							>>eric>>



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Patrick Tufts <zippy@berry.cs.brandeis.edu>
Date: Sat, 22 May 93 11:56:36 PDT
Subject: a valuable spy...
Message-ID: <9305221858.AA17048@berry.cs.brandeis.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


From the cypherpunks mailing list, I got the following short message:

   From: uni@acs.bu.edu (Shaen Bernhardt)
   Date: Sat, 22 May 93 14:02:51 -0400

   Ego + Espionage = Death

Taking other well-known identities:

Silence = Death

Energy = Mass x Speed-o-Light^2 

and the assumption that the energy of one's ego cannot exceed one's
maximum potential energy (which has great explanatory powers re. the
Limbaugh Effect).

I get:

	Silence = Ego + Espionage
		<= MC^2 + Espionage

solving for Espionage,

	Espionage >= Silence - MC^2

which raises some interesting points:

	1. Espionage can be measured in existing SI units, thus
	2. Espionage is a creation of the French

Item 2 is supported by the following etymology

    espionage (es pi o nage; es p <y3> <en> <x2> <en> n <adi> azh <y1>, -
    nij, es <y 1> p <y3> <en> <x2> <en> n <adi> azh ) n.  
    1 n.
            the practice of spying on others.
    2 n.
            the systematic use of spies by a government to discover
            the military and political secrets of other nations.
    Etymology:
            <x4> F espionnage, MF espionage, equiv. to espionn(^B er)(to)
            spy(deriv. of espion spy <x4> It spione <x4> Gmc; akin to
            G sp <adi> ahen to look out) <u6> - age - AGE

Further anecdotal support - the French use an unbreakable code in most
of their communications.  A clear affront in the face of the
government's Clipper Chip proposal that all encrypted messages must be
based on a key escrow system.

Of course, the French could go far to mollifying U.S. intelligence
interests by supplying either their Platinum-Irridium Espionage
standard, or adopting a U.S. approved cipher system.  For the latter,
I think the US would be happy to approve "rot13" for export.

--Pat "McElwaine, without the caps"




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: mlshew@dixie.com (Mark Shewmaker)
Date: Sun, 23 May 93 04:35:23 PDT
To: extropians@gnu.ai.mit.edu
Subject: Meeting: Suggest Meeting at Comdex Wednesday Afternoon
Message-ID: <m0nx2LJ-0000gqC@dixie.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


A number of people on cypherpunks and extropians will be in Atlanta
at Comdex next week, so we have an opportunity to get together.

One great location would be in the Omni food court (Now the CNN Center),
which is right by the World Congress Center where Comdex will be held.

There are a lot of fast food places and a very large commons dining area.
I'd suggest meeting, say, at 1:00 Wednesday afternoon or so, not for any
formal meeting, but just to get together for a while at lunch to talk,
trade keys, and so forth.

(You'll have probably been there before Wednesday, as it's a convenient
place to go for lunch at the convention.  If you don't know which
building it is by Wednesday, ask anyone anywhere around you to point you
towards "The Omni" or "CNN Center" or "where CNN is", go in the building,
and you can't miss the food court.)

Don't forget to bring copies of your public keys, or some pieces of paper
or business cards with your PGP fingerprint hash written on them.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Johan Helsingius <julf@penet.FI>
Date: Sat, 22 May 93 10:59:56 PDT
To: Eric Hughes <hughes@soda.berkeley.edu>
Subject: Re: WB: alt.whistleblower
In-Reply-To: <9305221625.AA28081@soda.berkeley.edu>
Message-ID: <9305222044.aa04112@penet.penet.FI>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



> 1.  We want all postings to be anonymous.
> 2.  That every posting be anonymous requires software intervention.
> 3.  The software has to sit on some machine or machines, because it
>     cannot easily be put into every posting client.
> 4.  Someone will own these machines.
> 5.  Whoever owns them must agree with the political goals of the service
>     and be willing to take some heat for it.
> 6.  This excludes most machines.
> 7.  Whatever mechanism the servers use to connect with the net must
>     also be reasonably proof against pressure.
> 8.  The link between the newsgroup posting and the anonymity server
>     was to be the group moderator's address, which in this case maps
>     to a piece of software ratherthan a person.

Well, Telecom Finland has now informed me that the final final final
final delivery date for my international connection is May 26... Let's
keep our fingers (and toes) crossed...

	Julf





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: ""L. Detweiler"" <ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Date: Sat, 22 May 93 21:59:58 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: fwee! are we having fun yet?
In-Reply-To: <9305221625.AA28081@soda.berkeley.edu>
Message-ID: <9305230459.AA25350@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


This is an open letter to E. Hughes.

Let me review my arguments for starting the group immediately.

1. Anonymous postings are highly controversial and will remain so for a
long time. Complete respectability is probably unattainable.  We should
start the group and let users judge for themselves the safety of
posting their material.

2. No new software is required under this scheme.

3. No new machines are required.

4. No sponsors for machines need to be sought out. In fact, under this
scheme we tap into an existing vast network supplying both software and
machines called `Usenet'. I think there're some RFC's on it somewhere.

5. No one other than the poster takes heat.  The poster should not post
if they are concerned about the risk.

6. This scheme doesn't exclude posting currently, whereas absence of
anonymous servers does.

7. People already have a method of connecting to the net and posting.
Reinventing the wheel is great but it will take a painful amount of
time. It's been tens of thousands of years since the wheel was
invented, why start from the beginning?

8. We should be extremely careful about people relying on the moderator
address to forward mail. My understanding is that not all posting
systems automatically do so. It seems this could easily break or be
unreliable (egad!). The user should explicitly assure himself anonymity
by sending to the anonymous server, not relying on this implicit approach.

9. Multiple machines for anonymity take longer to set up. We haven't
even got one for Usenet posting right now (?).

10. DNS (Domain Name Service) is a great idea when n>1 machines are
available. Currently n=0.

11. DNS complicates the picture, more room for error, and takes more
time to pull off correctly. Does anybody have a clear idea that it
would work, and if so how to implement it?

Under your daunting list of prerequisites and requirements, I think we
will be lucky to get something running before the next century. They
are all *fine* and *genuine* as possibilities and opportunities, but
they are *unnecessary* and *unbearable* as prerequisites and requirements.

>The internet world has been without a whistleblower's newsgroup for
>many years; a delay of a few months will not matter much.

The internet sees new groups all the time, and alt groups get created
at the slightest provocation and whim, and it would be ridiculous to
delay the introduction of something this critical and useful, when far
less useful and far more frivolous groups litter the cyberspace like
bales of discarded data packets, ankle-deep.

Look, apparently you haven't got any heat on the Mycotronx postings,
but wouldn't you feel a hell of a lot more comfortable if they
*weren't* funneled through your single machine? Ask Steve Jackson what
paranoid and degenerate agents can accomplish when they have an
easily-identified, portable target and some vague suspicions!  The 911
document has all the criminality of a wedding announcement compared to
the Mycotronx stuff!  Don't these postings demonstrate there is an *immediate* need?

Here's the deal. Despite how it may appear, I am not (consciously!)
demeaning or downplaying anyone's efforts in this group and idea. I
think it is great that a lot of people have a lot of ideas and are
looking at the big picture and long run, making commitments. I am too!
But I think we absolutely *must* start immediately.  We are not going
to get anywhere if someone says ``oh, *I'm* the one that's working on
that---don't worry about it, just you wait, something real neat-o is
going to come along any day now,  wink wink.''

<heavy dejected sigh> Haven't we been through all this before?  I have
nothing to do nor do a lot of others until *something* is in place! I
think major improvements in software only come in the heat of use, not
in the languid comfort of theory and planning. We can be exploring the
weakness and the uses of the system *immediately*. We don't have to
have controversial postings to the group, starting out. Currently,
though, I just think there is just no momentum without a group.  Which
comes first, the anonymous servers or the group? Obviously, the *group*!

Here's my idea. For *now*, lets just use alt.whistleblower as a
*clearinghouse* of material that was *already posted* elsewhere on the
net. That is, nobody takes any personal risk. They just keep their eyes
out for stuff that appears in other places that fits into the
`whistleblowing' category and forwards it to that group. If there is
any heat they just point to the original posting and say `I did nothing
but forward it, don't talk to me about it.'  (By the way, the Mycotronx
posting is awesome whistleblower stuff, the kind that legends are made
of, but I think it still might be a bit risky to post that to a Usenet
group yet, even an `alt', even anonymously). Also, we can just forward
interesting stuff from newspapers and magazines. No risk there. If
anybody thinks they have a solid way to remain anonymous (we're talking
about cypherpunks here, I'm sure they'll find a way) they can post
*now* using old-fashioned methods.

I really like the idea of a big unveiling of some great new shining,
sparkling, shrink-wrapped Personal All-Purpose Guaranteed Anonymous
Home Whistleblower Kit (tm) by Cypherpunks, Inc. accompanied by a
blaring and pretentious Official Whistleblower Press Release.  But
(leaving aside the sheer hilarious implausibility of that *ever*
happening) that would give all our evil enemies a lot of ammunition to
claim that we're `violating the status quo'. There're some things that
should be loudly unveiled to the witless masses, and some things that
should just be silently uncovered by sharp individuals! This is in the
latter category!

What more can I say?  Isn't the immediate need transparently clear? 
Does *anyone* read what I write? Am I nothing but a babbling, deranged
lunatic? Just *watch* how fast I get a FAQ there, if it *ever* starts...

There are now several hundred quasi-official cypherpunks, and I think a
lot of them are agitated and itching for something to do! Not to
mention the vast hordes out on Usenet who will be attracted to
something extraordinary.  Let's get the group going and turn everybody
loose to have some fun!  This is something that *everyone* can
contribute to directly *now*, once the group is started! Let it be a
funnel for our ingenuity! But we have nothing but a bunch of impatient,
dissipated, wasted energy otherwise. What a shameful tragedy. I can't
be a part of it.

Someday, everything we're rattling about will be refined to the point
of excruciating blandness and `dulldom', and we will be telling our
grandkids about the heavy burdens we had to suffer to get there (back
in the ol' days we had to get anonymity *by hand!* and even then people
hated it and called 'em `forgeries'!).  At our current impoverished
rate, though, our grandkids will consider us nothing but mad eccentrics
overflowing with bizarre and impractical ideas that never saw the light
of day, with a few strange insights tragically ahead of time,
sluggishly mired in the bogs of politics and personalities. 
Cypherpunks? No, more like the hapless Babbage Ciphers, stuck endlessly
in the minors. ``Yeah, just wait 'til next year, we'll really show 'em then.''





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: J. Michael Diehl <mdiehl@triton.unm.edu>
Date: Sat, 22 May 93 22:44:36 PDT
To: ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu (L. Detweiler)
Subject: Re: fwee! are we having fun yet?
In-Reply-To: <9305230459.AA25350@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Message-ID: <9305230544.AA06451@triton.unm.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> This is an open letter to E. Hughes.
> 
> Let me review my arguments for starting the group immediately.
> 
> 5. No one other than the poster takes heat.  The poster should not post
> if they are concerned about the risk.

I'm curious as to what good this will be then.

> Look, apparently you haven't got any heat on the Mycotronx postings,
> but wouldn't you feel a hell of a lot more comfortable if they
> *weren't* funneled through your single machine? Ask Steve Jackson what
> paranoid and degenerate agents can accomplish when they have an
> easily-identified, portable target and some vague suspicions!  The 911
> document has all the criminality of a wedding announcement compared to
> the Mycotronx stuff!  Don't these postings demonstrate there is an *immediate* need?

The distributed nature of a usenet group would be nice....

> have controversial postings to the group, starting out. Currently,
> though, I just think there is just no momentum without a group.  Which
> comes first, the anonymous servers or the group? Obviously, the *group*!

Without controversial postings, no one will read the group.  What is the point,
then?

> Here's my idea. For *now*, lets just use alt.whistleblower as a
> *clearinghouse* of material that was *already posted* elsewhere on the
> net. That is, nobody takes any personal risk. They just keep their eyes
> out for stuff that appears in other places that fits into the
> `whistleblowing' category and forwards it to that group. If there is
> any heat they just point to the original posting and say `I did nothing
> but forward it, don't talk to me about it.'  (By the way, the Mycotronx
> posting is awesome whistleblower stuff, the kind that legends are made
> of, but I think it still might be a bit risky to post that to a Usenet
> group yet, even an `alt', even anonymously). Also, we can just forward
> interesting stuff from newspapers and magazines. No risk there. If
> anybody thinks they have a solid way to remain anonymous (we're talking
> about cypherpunks here, I'm sure they'll find a way) they can post
> *now* using old-fashioned methods.

Some time ago, I joined the bandwagon in opposing this "hasty" decision to
form the WB group.  But, I like this idea.  My reason for opposing it the first
time was that people's lives/jobs could be at stake.  This might be a 
germination point for the full-blown WB group, but without the risks to it's
contributers.  I like this idea.
> 
> What more can I say?  Isn't the immediate need transparently clear? 
> Does *anyone* read what I write? Am I nothing but a babbling, deranged
> lunatic? Just *watch* how fast I get a FAQ there, if it *ever* starts...

I'm reading it.  And (for once?) I agree on this subject.

> There are now several hundred quasi-official cypherpunks, and I think a
> lot of them are agitated and itching for something to do! Not to

I know the feeling..... ;^)

+-----------------------+-----------------------------+---------+
| J. Michael Diehl ;-)  | I thought I was wrong once. | PGP KEY |
| mdiehl@triton.unm.edu |   But, I was mistaken.      |available|
| mike.diehl@fido.org   |                             | Ask Me! |
| (505) 299-2282        +-----------------------------+---------+
|                                                               |
+------"I'm just looking for the opportunity to be -------------+
|            Politically Incorrect!"   <Me>                     |
+-----If codes are outlawed, only criminals wil have codes.-----+
+----Is Big Brother in your phone?  If you don't know, ask me---+




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: J. Michael Diehl <mdiehl@triton.unm.edu>
Date: Sat, 22 May 93 23:02:56 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Dolphin Encrypt.
Message-ID: <9305230602.AA06626@triton.unm.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Hi all.  I just received my demo version of Dolphin Encrypt which was 
shamelessly advertised on this list. ;^)  I haven't had much time to play with
it yet, but I thought I'd post my initial reactions.  BTW, I don't think I've
ever received anything in such a timely manner.  Good job guys.

The disk came with several pages of documentation, and advertising.  The docs
indicate that "the encryption process relies partly on the RSA Data Security,
Inc., MD5 Message Digest Algorithm."  I wonder what they mean by "partly."
Interestingly, a decrypt-only version is available.  Apparently, a C/C++ 
library of functions is available for $128 with commercial licensing offered.
The documentation indicates that the encryption key can be from 10 to 60 
characters in length, with case NOT SIGNIFICANT.

I ran the demo but didn't have time, at the moment, to really get into it, yet.
The demo indicated that the package supports a script language, which seemed to
be very powerfull.  In fact, part of the demo was writen with the scripting
language.  I think this is a novel idea.  The demo seemed fairly intuitive and
presented all (maybe too much?) of the needed information and status indicators.

This is the extent of my comments after a VERY superficial examination of the
software.  I will take a better look at it later this week.  If there is any
interest, I will write a more in depth review.

...just my $.02 worth.

+-----------------------+-----------------------------+---------+
| J. Michael Diehl ;-)  | I thought I was wrong once. | PGP KEY |
| mdiehl@triton.unm.edu |   But, I was mistaken.      |available|
| mike.diehl@fido.org   |                             | Ask Me! |
| (505) 299-2282        +-----------------------------+---------+
|                                                               |
+------"I'm just looking for the opportunity to be -------------+
|            Politically Incorrect!"   <Me>                     |
+-----If codes are outlawed, only criminals wil have codes.-----+
+----Is Big Brother in your phone?  If you don't know, ask me---+




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: jordan@imsi.com (Jordan Hayes)
Date: Sun, 23 May 93 10:16:00 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: The New Mykotronix phones...
Message-ID: <9305231707.AA12544@IMSI.COM>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


	From mbriceno@aol.com Sat May 22 03:56:25 1993

	If everybody would be armend, we would no longer look at the
	government as the sole provider of protectios from violent
	crimes, rape, or muggings.

I'm sure lots of people could give examples of areas where "everyone"
*is* armed, and while they certainly don't rely on "the government"
(i.e., local police forces) for protection, most would agree the
situation is not desirable ...

/jordan




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Sunah Cherwin <slippery@netcom.com>
Date: Sun, 23 May 93 15:31:49 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: privacy graphics archive
Message-ID: <9305232232.AA15865@netcom2.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


 
I would like to assemble an archive (electronic *and* paper) of graphics
relating to privacy and encryption. These could be made available for
republication in books and magazines, so any items not already in the
public domain ought to be accompanied by source citations so that
permissions may be obtained.
 
I'd be interested in graphs, diagrams, flowcharts, cartoons, line
drawings, photos, and any other graphical content you can think of. More
specifically, graphs (e. g. comparing the difficulty of breaking various
encryption methods, encryption time as a function of RSA key length,
etc.), diagrams (such as Hal Finney's excellent flowcharts in Extropy
#10), cartoons (e. g. political cartoons about various government
attempts to control/stifle encryption), and photos (of commercial
software product packaging, photos of secure phone systems such as
marketing depts would produce, photos of famous cypherpunks,
cryptographers, and crypto programmers)
 
Items on paper as well as items in electronic format will both be
welcomed. Send the former to 1800 Market St, #243, San Francisco CA
94102. Send the latter to slippery@netcom.com in uuencode or BinHex4
format.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: bcox@gmu.edu (Brad Cox)
Date: Sun, 23 May 93 13:50:58 PDT
To: jordan@imsi.com (Jordan Hayes)
Subject: Police protection
Message-ID: <9305232050.AA29804@gmuvax2.gmu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>I'm sure lots of people could give examples of areas where "everyone"
>*is* armed, and while they certainly don't rely on "the government"
>(i.e., local police forces) for protection, most would agree the
>situation is not desirable ...

Yep. Switzerland for sure (every draft age citizen keeps an assault rifle
and ammo). Similarly for most US rural states; Oregon, South Carolina,
Texas and Arizona come to mind. So do shooting ranges and guns shows most
anywhere.

I've never felt safer than in such places, and most would say most such
places are desirable, compared to say Washington DC or New York where guns
have been outlawed for ages. Except for of course, those in the hands of
the state and the criminals.

Why in the world would you say otherwise?
--
       Brad Cox; bcox@gmu.edu; 703 968 8229 Voice 703 968 8798 Fax
       George Mason Program on Social and Organizational Learning






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Mr. Paul Danckaert (ACS)" <pauld@umbc.edu>
Date: Sun, 23 May 93 14:12:14 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Unix Security
Message-ID: <199305232111.AA15613@umbc7.umbc.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Hey all.. I'm writing a program to see just how secure some of this
unix password security is, and I would like to know more about how the
final result in the passwd file is encrypted..  where could I get such
information? 

Thanks..

(We are going kerberos here so that should help matters some atleast.. :)

Paul

---  Paul Danckaert  -  pauld@umbc.edu  ---------------------------------------




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: smb@research.att.com
Date: Sun, 23 May 93 14:56:18 PDT
To: bcox@gmu.edu (Brad Cox)
Subject: Re: Police protection
Message-ID: <9305232156.AA04712@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


	 I've never felt safer than in such places, and most would say
	 most such places are desirable, compared to say Washington DC
	 or New York where guns have been outlawed for ages. Except for
	 of course, those in the hands of the state and the criminals.

	 Why in the world would you say otherwise?  --

I think because he's thinking of places like Beirut, Somalia, Bosnia,
and so on.  You know -- places without any effective central government.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: jet@nas.nasa.gov (J. Eric Townsend)
Date: Sun, 23 May 93 18:35:17 PDT
To: bcox@gmu.edu (Brad Cox)
Subject: Police protection
In-Reply-To: <9305232050.AA29804@gmuvax2.gmu.edu>
Message-ID: <9305240134.AA23462@boxer.nas.nasa.gov>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Brad Cox writes:
 > and ammo). Similarly for most US rural states; Oregon, South Carolina,
 > Texas and Arizona come to mind. So do shooting ranges and guns shows most

Just so you know, gun control laws in Texas are about as strict as
those in Calif.  On the other hand, Louisiana has an "open-carry" law
(with exceptions for banks, bars, and a few other places).

I'm not sure if I felt safer in Louisiana or California.  I know that
we were a bit more polite in Louisiana, but then again, it was a more
rural state where *everybody* was poor, not just members of a couple
of ethnic groups.





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: bbyer@BIX.com
Date: Sun, 23 May 93 21:11:53 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: cypto + compression
Message-ID: <9305232037.memo.36584@BIX.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


In-Reply-To: <199305212303.AA21876@joes.GARAGE.COM>
> In fact there are not. You can test this out; use PGP to encrypt any
> file you please, and then use any compression software you like to
> compress it. You will get no significant compression.

I don't know if there will be any new redundancies or not, but PGP
compresses it's output so you would naturally get no further
compression.

Ben Byer <bbyer@bix.com>





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: mbriceno@aol.com
Date: Sun, 23 May 93 19:18:38 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Police protection
Message-ID: <9305232219.tn33171@aol.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> I've never felt safer than in such places [where lawabiding citezens are
armed], and most would say 
>   most such places are desirable, compared to say Washington DC 
>   or New York where guns have been outlawed for ages. Except for 
>   of course, those in the hands of the state and the criminals. 
> 
>   Why in the world would you say otherwise? -- 
> 
> I think because he's thinking of places like Beirut, Somalia, Bosnia,
> and so on. You know -- places without any effective central
> government.

Perhaps my post needed some clarification:
I do not believe that a lawfull governmental police force becomes
unneccessary once we hand every citizen a gun.
Just as the police can not grant an unarmed public's security, an armed
populace alone is no guarantee for safe streets. Only the combination of a
well prepared public working together with a responsible government can make
our lifes truely safe from infringementes by anti-social individuals. I
beleive that if people were allowed to used crypto in all communication and
carry a gun at all times, crime-be it street crime or white collar- would be
reduced to levels far below the present rate.

--Marc




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Eric Watt Forste <arkuat@joes.garage.com>
Date: Sun, 23 May 93 22:58:48 PDT
To: bbyer@BIX.COM
Subject: Re: cypto + compression
In-Reply-To: <9305232037.memo.36584@BIX.com>
Message-ID: <199305240602.AA17283@joes.GARAGE.COM>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


 
Ben Byer wrote:
 
   I don't know if there will be any new redundancies or not, but PGP
   compresses it's output so you would naturally get no further
   compression.
 
Dhoh! I should have specified that PGP's built-in compression be
turned off. Even without precompressing, encryption destroys almost
all the redundancy that compression can take advantage of.
 
Eric Watt Forste                             arkuat@joes.garage.com
1800 Market St #243                          San Francisco CA 94102
      "Expectation foils perception."   -- Pamela C. Dean




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: stig@netcom.com (Stig)
Date: Mon, 24 May 93 01:44:03 PDT
To: prz@sage.cgd.ucar.edu
Subject: PGP:  Environment protection for UNIX
Message-ID: <9305240844.AA22961@netcom.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Phil & Cypherpunks:

Here's a little program that demostrates a fairly simple way to immprove pgp
security on multi-user systems....

	main (int argn, char **argv, char **envv)
	{
	    for ( ; *envv ; ++envv) {
	        if (!strncmp(*envv,"PGP",3)) {
	            char *c=*envv;
	            while (*c) *c++=' ';
	        } /* end of if */
	    } /* end of for */
	    system("printenv");
	    sleep(10);
	}

It deletes from it's own environment any environment variable that
begins with the string "PGP".  It ain't bullet-proof but just by
grepping the environment of netcom, I've identified several PGP users:

	yonder
	nickt
	centaur
	henderso

This hack would prevent that...  'Course for UNIX, PGPPATH should
default to $HOME/.pgp anyway.

	Not doin' the work I oughta be doing,
	Stig...
	

/* Jonathan Stigelman, Stig@netcom.com, PGP public key on request */
/* fingerprint = 32 DF B9 19 AE 28 D1 7A  A3 9D 0B 1A 33 13 4D 7F */




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: meyer <wixer!wixer.bga.com!meyer@cactus.org>
Date: Mon, 24 May 93 05:42:30 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: FAQ
Message-ID: <9305240651.AA16024@wixer>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Damned line noise zapped this last time just as I was about to send it.
I don't think it went (uustat apparently knew nothing of it), so here
it is again:

From Eric Raymond's draft FAQ:

>The Cypherpunks list exists to build and propagate privacy software.  Our
>aim is to give you the tools to communicate with other people and computers
>in ways snoopers cannot tap.
>
>2. What are the essentials of privacy software?
>   a. Public-key cryptosystems for secure communication.
>   b. Unforgeable electronic signatures for message authentication.
>   c. DC-net or similar protocols to thwart spoofing.

Privacy extends to more than just invulnerability to eavesdropping
upon one's communications.  One may have private records which are
viewed only by oneself, and never communicated.  A cryptosystem
suitable for encryption of such non-communicated information need
not be a public-key cryptosystem.  Thus:

2 d. Cryptosystems for protecting privately-held information
     against unauthorized access.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: gnu (John Gilmore)
Date: Mon, 24 May 93 08:28:42 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Another license server begs for cryptanalysis
Message-ID: <9305241528.AA04488@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I love these servers where "a short encrypted string" can enable access
to all sorts of things...

----------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                        The Florida SunFlash

                       Third Party Announcements

SunFLASH Vol 53 #30					            May 1993
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
Subject:      Viman Software Ships LicenseServ 3.0  - License Manager
Newsgroups:   comp.newprod
Contact:      Vikram Duvvoori
Organization: Viman Software, Santa Cruz, California
Phone:	      (800) 827-4590 (USA, Canada, Mexico); Ph: (408) 459-0678 
FAX: 	      (408) 458-2862
email: 	      info@viman.com

    Viman Software Ships LicenseServ 3.0 on all major workstations.

Santa Cruz, CA., Th. April 29, 1993 - Viman Software today announced 
the release of its next generation of network license manager, 
LicenseServ 3.0, for all major workstation platforms (including Sun, 
HP, NeXT, IBM RS/6000, DEC, SGI, Apollo and IBM PCs). LicenseServ is a 
licensing software package that allows software developers to support 
a wide range of licensing options including usage based licensing and 
full-featured evaluation copies.

Existing customers who have been shipping their products with LicenseServ 
for over a year now have been extremely satisfied with their experience.
Some complex applications were licensed by earlier customers within 
a few minutes and were shipping globally within one week.  With a
comprehensive set of features at an affordable price, LicenseServ brings 
sophisticated licensing within the reach of even small software developers. 

LicenseServ is available on more than twenty Unix platforms. Integration
is straightforward as it only involves adding a few (3 in many cases)
function calls to the application code.  The licensing is transparent to 
end-users and the tools which come with LicenseServ make license management 
simple for system administrators at the end-user sites. This release
introduces several new licensing features along with function-level 
compliance with the LS API 1.0 - a recent standard in license management.

Software vendors license their applications by linking them to the 
LicenseServ libraries. The vendors then have a rich set of choices. A 
small sample of the range of licensing options includes:
        - Personal/Group Licenses (restricting usage to a set of   
          users/machines)
        - Component Licenses (licensing different modules within an 
          application)
        - Shared licenses (several users/machines sharing a single license)
        - Site licenses (usage restricted to a particular site)
        - Version control (licensing different versions of the same software)
The licenses can be customized for each of the copies shipped. The software 
can be restricted to a limited number of concurrent copies running on the 
network, or node-locked to a particular set of machines. The vendor can 
easily create full-featured demo copies of applications that can  be sent 
with a "time-bomb" which would prevent them from running beyond a certain 
date. Extensions of this date, or upgrading the demo to a full release,
could then be done by simply sending a short encrypted string over the phone 
or facsimile. 

The basic version, LicenseServ Standard, lists at $2000 for the first 
platform and $1000 for each additional platform. The advanced version, 
LicenseServ Extended, lists at $ 5000 for the first platform and $ 2000 
for each additional platform. All prices include 1 year of free technical 
support, upgrades and a 30 day money back guarantee. 

Viman Software is headquartered at 1320 Mission Street, Suite 5, Santa Cruz,
CA 95060, USA. For more information please send email to info@viman.com or 
call toll-free (800) 827-4590 (408-459-0678 outside North America) or send a 
fax to (408) 458-2862
----------------
LicenseServ, LS API 1.0, Sun, HP, NeXT, IBM RS/6000, DEC, SGI, Apollo and 
IBM are trademarks of their respective owners.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Benjamin.Britton@UC.Edu
Date: Mon, 24 May 1993 08:29:51 -0400 (EDT)
To: geoffw@nexsys.net
Subject: on privacy in digital communications
Message-ID: <c3db5da728ba33e079db3877cc44976b@NO-ID-FOUND.mhonarc.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


_______________________________________________________________________________

On Privacy in Digital Communications

Taxpayers, legislators, social and governmental leaders do not yet
realize that use of the "Clipper Chips" would make their most intimate,
most highly private and proprietary information completely accessible
through online information links to organized crime, foreign
governments and the American national intelligence community.  Anyone
who has grown up wondering why they did not prosecute the assassination
of President Kennedy has reason to fear the "Clipper Chip" technology.
There is no need for absolute intrusability into the private lives or
public records of American citizens.  On the contrary, responsible
governmental efforts should seek to rebuild such privacy by outlawing
databases based on Social Security numbers and by codifying legal
remedies against businesses which have illegally compromised public or
private information.  We should move, not away from citizens' rights in
the new age of computing; rather we should use a blend of American
democracy and high technology to make sure we retain the
 rights guaranteed to us by the American Constitution.

It should be made illegal to encode a database of personnel information based on the Social Security numbers of the individuals.  Such databases are inherently inaccurate and encourage covert searches for private information.  Alphabetic listings of individuals names can be encoded with a unique key by an institution holding a database of personal information, for purposes of information retrieval.  This key should be enciphered on a timely basis, such as during annual board meetings, by individuals in positions of legal responsibility in the organization.  If the key is leaked by the organization, legal suit should be able to be brought to determine how the leak occurred, to punish the offenders if appropriate, and to establish a new key to the database with participation from the prosecuting judge and the defendant.  Database encoding with this new key should then be legally required and enforced, and periodic encipherment of the code by the database holders should continu!
e as before.

A new function of law enforcement will need to develop;  police, rather than being some of the greatest abusers of private information held in data networks, will have to become the enforcers of privacy and data security.  If the police don't want to do this job, or if they feel they cannot, they should be fired and new police willing and able to guarantee the rights of citizens should be hired.  Data security in cyberspace is a real concern, not only for the federal government, but also for local governments, businesses and individuals.  The police will enforce the laws only if the laws are established, and they can serve as guardians of private data and personal information if such responsibilities are levied upon them.

Data security, personal privacy, and the gross abuses of digital databases in the hands of white collar criminals are issues which lie at the heart of America's present malaise.  If the government of the United States is not morally capable of taking on the challenge of instituting privacy in digital communications, we may look forward to years of gross criminality and abuses of human rights which will make the S&L scandals of the 1980's pale by comparison.  But no government intent on enslaving the citizens who continuingly create it can stand.  If our representatives in the Federal government cannot squirm free of the grips of organized crime, we may look forward to a distant national revolution.  But no country, intent on guaranteeing the rights of its citizens, run by leaders with moral authority and free will, would seek consciously to hand the people over as slave/cattle to the organizers of international criminal cartels.  The "Clipper Chip" technology as outlined in !
national press releases would guar

antee and constitute such a wholesale handover of Americans.  It would codify, promulgate and direct the destruction of privacy rights for all individuals by guaranteeing the availability of all information to anyone wealthy and corrupt enough to buy it.  The alternative course is for our government to turn around completely, to build ways of defending the privacy of the individual against unnecessary search and seizure.

The term privacy and its root word private will take on new meanings in the coming years.  For example, records containing the votes you have cast in public elections during your life may be considered private, although the public institution of government is your only guarantor of that privacy.  Goverment acts (supposedly) as conscious guarantor of the privacy and security of your participation in public affairs.  They could certainly make the same efforts to secure your tax information, your demographic information, your legal records, your personal information derived during security background checks by intelligence agencies; but they do not.  They encode all this with your social security number guaranteeing its accessibility to international criminal cartels operating outside the control of our government.  The term "privatization" has come into vogue through its promotion by the international monetary fund during the 1980's (and continuing today); it has meant the han!
ding over of publicly guaranteed e

nforcement of citizens' rights to private individuals not accountable through democratic processes.  Such handovers are a public concern, because they threaten the structure of legal enforcement which is the original reason for a democracy.  Privatization conflicts with privacy, because it is through the self-interest of private citizens involved in participation in legal processes of government, such as through election to public office or participation in jury duties, that make a democracy work for the welfare of its individual citizens.  When control is taken out of the hands of the public and handed over in the form of privatization, no citizen, except he or she who controls the private company, may defend their legal rights successfully and without preemption by default.  The government exists to enable citizens' participation; such participation must be an inherent part of securing personal privacy in digital communications.

I suggest that computing necessitates a reaction from government, and that reaction should properly be to defend the rights of citizens, including the right to privacy. A change in direction is called for; our government should support individuality. Public participation is essential to establish that no one has the right to our privacy. One may envision a 21st century public ceremony of encoding the National Database: A one-year-old child taps on a keyboard, and nationwide in realtime others do alike. This would be no guarantee of privacy, but far better than a quarantee of no privacy.

Benjamin J. Britton      					May 24, 1993
Assistant Professor
Electronic Art, Fine Arts
University of Cincinnati
Benjamin.Britton@uc.edu
________________________________________________________________________________



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: geoffw@nexsys.net (Geoff White)
Date: Mon, 24 May 93 09:03:47 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: on privacy in digital communications
Message-ID: <9305241546.AA02235@nexsys.nexsys.net>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Here is a post from a friend of mine who has been following
the Clipper debacle. He told me to post it to whatever groups would be
interested.



----- Begin Included Message -----




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: peb@PROCASE.COM
Date: Mon, 24 May 93 10:33:14 PDT
To: strong+@cmu.edu
Subject: Re: cypto + compression
Message-ID: <9305241730.AA13070@banff.procase.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



>if you're just using compress and you make that known

Yes, this is worth pointing out; the main idea is to keep the 
opponent from knowing the format.  Increasing the entropy via
compressions is good in its own right since it makes the encoding
more complex and provides more stumbling blocks.

Cypher chaining seems to be even better for confounding opponents, 
but I'll let someone else commment on that.


Paul E. Baclace
peb@procase.com




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: karn@qualcomm.com (Phil Karn)
Date: Mon, 24 May 93 10:49:41 PDT
To: geoffw@nexsys.net
Subject: Re:  on privacy in digital communications
Message-ID: <9305241749.AA05999@servo>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>From UC.Edu!Benjamin.Britton@cdp.igc.org Mon May 24 06:12:53 1993

> Anyone
>who has grown up wondering why they did not prosecute the assassination
>of President Kennedy has reason to fear the "Clipper Chip" technology.

Because the only credible suspect was killed two days later, and there is
no provision for posthumous trials in the US?

This reminds me of that great exchange in the movie "Sneakers" between
Dan Ackroyd and Sidney Poitier. From memory:

Ackroyd: "You know, the NSA shot Kennedy".
Poitier: "What? Now you're telling me that the NSA was responsible for
the JFK assassination??"
Ackroyd: "No, they only shot him. He's still alive..."

I think it would help enormously if we Cypherpunks stayed focused on
our core issue: the use of strong cryptography to protect personal
privacy against all potential intruders, private or government. It
will not help us to gain mainstream acceptance to blur our image with
fringe conspiracy theorists, gun nuts, survivalists and the like.

Phil





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Eric Hughes <hughes@soda.berkeley.edu>
Date: Mon, 24 May 93 11:17:32 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Caller ID Question
In-Reply-To: <mec34B2w165w@mindvox.phantom.com>
Message-ID: <9305241813.AA17842@soda.berkeley.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>I know Caller ID for the common man didn't go through here in Cal.,
>despite the fact we have call return.

This is the distinction.  The underlying hardware and switching
protocols all have the capability for calling-number identification,
but the PUC didn't allow the consumer service "Caller-ID" to exist.
As a result, Pac Bell now offers services which use it in indirect
ways.  Not only do we have Call Return, but also Call Screen, Priority
Ringing, Select Call Forwarding, and Call Trace.

I just spoke to the business office and Caller-ID is not available
even on their business lines, not even the Pac Bell 800 offerings.

It looks like the only way to do this is to get 800 service from
another carrier.  Even then, I'm not sure that intra-California
service will be available.

Eric




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Eric Hughes <hughes@soda.berkeley.edu>
Date: Mon, 24 May 93 11:20:03 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: MacWorld Special Report
In-Reply-To: <9305241529.AA15822@disvnm2.shearson.com>
Message-ID: <9305241816.AA18098@soda.berkeley.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Re: MacWorld

Kudos to Mitch Ratcliffe for the MacWorld coverage.  He's a strong
advocate of privacy issues and makes sure his magazine covers them.

Eric




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: dmandl@lehman.com (David Mandl)
Date: Mon, 24 May 93 08:29:48 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: MacWorld Special Report
Message-ID: <9305241529.AA15822@disvnm2.shearson.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


There's a pretty solid Special Report in the new issue of Macworld (July,
1993) on the ever-increasing threats to electronic privacy.  Part One is
called  "Bosses with X-Ray Eyes: Your Employer may be Using Computers to
Keep Tabs on You"; Part Two is "Privacy in Peril: How Computers are Making
Private Life a Thing of the Past."

Highlights: The reporters performed a little test to see how easy it is to
get information on people electronically.  They managed to get stacks of
personal, legal, and financial data on, among others, Janet Reno, Clint
Eastwood, Edwin Meese, George Lucas, Joe Montana, William Hearst, and the
CEO of Bank of America with very little trouble.  A poll on employers'
invasions of workers' privacy found that 21.6% of companies search employees'
files.  There's also a sidebar on the insecurity of email.  Favorite quote:
"The U.S. is a laughingstock among privacy experts because we protect video-
tape-rental records, but not medical records." 

In the same issue, columnist Stephen Levy is harshly critical of the Digital
Telephony Bill.  He goes off on a tangent about cryptography, and, while he
doesn't mention Clipper, he speculates that if the bill is passed, the banning
of strong crypto would very likely be next.  He mentions PGP in passing.

These pieces are all very strongly pro-privacy.

It's nice to see this kind of coverage.  I think articles like these are a
tremendous help in furthering cypherpunk goals.

   --Dave.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Eric Hughes <hughes@soda.berkeley.edu>
Date: Mon, 24 May 93 12:06:14 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: privacy graphics archive
In-Reply-To: <9305232232.AA15865@netcom2.netcom.com>
Message-ID: <9305241902.AA23897@soda.berkeley.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Re: graphic archive

A graphical archive for paper publication is a really wonderful idea.
I can keep or mirror the electronic archive on soda.

One of the projects that has been discussed is getting together a
presentation that we can hand out to people who will present it at
local meetings.  One necessary for any presentation is graphics.  Here
are some suggestions:

1. What the 'channel' model is.  Sender, Receiver, Eavesdropper.
2. How symmetric key crypto works over a channel.

[The New York Times had a good graphic of this.  My favorite part was
that the secret information decrypted to "... and get a quart of milk.
No, make that a half gallon."  An excellent subtlety to show that
privacy is for everybody.]

3. How public key crypto works over a channel.
4. How key escrow works.
5. How key escrow fails to work.

Not neglecting the obvious, I would suggest that any drawings such as
these, in whatever form they might have been created in, also be made
available in postscript.

Eric




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: chrmsync@mindvox.phantom.com (Chrome Sync)
Date: Mon, 24 May 93 09:42:52 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Caller ID Question
Message-ID: <mec34B2w165w@mindvox.phantom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


[Lurker Mode : OFF]

I know Caller ID for the common man didn't go through here in Cal.,
despite the fact we have call return.
I have a friend in politics who'd like caller ID to screen out 'junk' calls.
Is it possible to implement it, and if so, where would any hardware mods
be necessary (or is it strictly a Pac.Bell switching thing).
[He wants to know if there a way, legal or not, to do so strictly from his
end].

Thanks in advance ...

                [ Cyber-Renaissance Man ]
                ||                     ||
                ||     Chrome Sync     ||
                ||                     ||
                [ ** & CypherPatriot ** ]




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Timothy Newsham <newsham@wiliki.eng.hawaii.edu>
Date: Mon, 24 May 93 16:10:16 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: matrix - rsa
Message-ID: <9305242310.AA18309@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Hi ,  I was reading through some books at the library the other day
and came across this,  has anyone given any thought to implementing
this scheme?

   Matrix Extensions of the RSA Algorithm
   Chih-Chwen Chuang and James George Dunham
   CRYPTO '90 , page 140.

They suggest a matrix extension of the RSA algorithm which uses
much less computation time.  They go on to prove that the security
of the system is equivalent to RSA and the hash function used:
"Under a chosen plaintext attack on the key, the securityof the
new algorithm is equivalent to that of the RSA algorithm.  Under
a known plaintext attack on themessage, the security of the system
rests upon that of the one-way function."

Sounds like something worth looking into , as computation times
are *much* faster than that of normal RSA.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: cp@jido.b30.ingr.com (Serrzna Penvt Cerffba)
Date: Mon, 24 May 93 12:20:01 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: The New Mykotronix phones...
In-Reply-To: <9305231707.AA12544@IMSI.COM>
Message-ID: <199305241918.AA19188@jido.b30.ingr.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


In <9305231707.AA12544@IMSI.COM>, Jordan Hayes writes:
|> 	From mbriceno@aol.com Sat May 22 03:56:25 1993
|> 
|> 	If everybody would be armend, we would no longer look at the
|> 	government as the sole provider of protectios from violent
|> 	crimes, rape, or muggings.
|> 
|> I'm sure lots of people could give examples of areas where "everyone"
|> *is* armed, and while they certainly don't rely on "the government"
|> (i.e., local police forces) for protection, most would agree the
|> situation is not desirable ...

"Most would agree"? What a silly statement. You're in a big virtual
room with lots of different people, but a lot of them are "card-carrying"
libertarians who most certainly don't agree with that.

However, Marc also said, "I am glad that someone is finally mentioning
[the parallel between crypto and arms]." which is vacuous in light of
the _endless_ discussion on this very point on Usenet (sci.crypt and
elsewhere) in the beginnings of the wiretap chip flap.

Which leads me to my main point: please take this off-list before it
turns into the same flamewar that currently rages on
talk.politics.guns and for whatever weird reason, sci.skeptic.
        ^
       /
------/---- cp@jido.b30.ingr.com (Freeman Craig Presson)
     /
    /
Gun Control: The belief that the government, with its great wisdom and 
  moral superiority, can be trusted with a monopoly on deadly force.
     -- Clayton E. Cramer






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: kqb@whscad1.att.com
Date: Mon, 24 May 93 11:59:53 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Steganography and Steganalysis
Message-ID: <9305241859.AA11273@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Summary: Steganography is essential for private communication since
 	well-encrypted messages stand out too easily and no "solidarity"
	of sophisticated cryptography users is likely to make such
	messages less obvious any time soon.  By "steganography"
	I mean inserting a hidden message into ordinary text in such
	a way that even if the algorithm for inserting the hidden
	message is public, only the intended receiver can read the
	hidden message or even show that a hidden message exists.
	I list several types of measures of "normal" English text
	that may be useful for steganalysis and then I present
	calculations suggesting that English has a steganographic
	capacity of about 10 percent.

 Note: This is my "newbie" post to cypherpunks.  It asks many
	questions because there is a lot that I do not know, but
	I hope it also has several thought-provoking ideas.
	I am mostly trying to elicit feedback from those who are
	more knowledgeable about cryptology-related matters by
	providing them with some problems that are both useful and
	mentally stimulating.

Failed PGP Social Program

In his introduction to PGP, Phil Zimmerman compares plaintext messages
to mail sent on postcards and encrypted messages to mail in sealed
envelopes.  Currently, using envelopes does not arouse suspicion
because almost everyone uses envelopes, but using encryption does
arouse suspicion because almost nobody uses encryption.  Zimmerman's
proposed solution is for almost everyone to use encryption routinely,
so that encrypted messages will be the norm.

I do not believe that this will succeed, at least not in the way
Zimmerman hopes.  Even though PGP is highly regarded, free, and
fairly readily accessible, no "solidarity" of PGP users will arise
unless email with PGP encryption becomes transparently convenient to
use and also does not invite civil lawsuits or criminal charges.  (An
RSAREF version of PGP would help, though.)  The kinds of encryption
that *will* become readily available, easy-to-use, and legally
hassle-free will be the crippled kinds of encryption.  Encryption
that is not crippled always will be suspect, perhaps illegal.
By using sufficiently intelligent steganographic techniques, however,
we will not need any "solidarity" from other people at all.  If our
"envelopes" look like "postcards," they will not arouse the
stormtroopers.


Steganography and Steganalysis

A few people have experimented with inserting messages into image
files.  But most of our email traffic is text, so I am most interested
in steganographic techniques for normal English prose.  Furthermore, we
need to have a reasonably high efficiency for inserting the hidden
message while not contorting the text too far from normal.  Peter
Wayner's Mimic functions for producing a baseball game commentary are
notable.  (No, I still haven't done the C conversion of the Think
Pascal version I received almost two years ago.  But I haven't
forgotten!)  I am not certain how efficiently his program encodes the
hidden message, but I do want the resulting text to be less
conspicuous.  Imagine thousands of messages per day consisting of
similar sounding commentary on the Whappers and the Blogs!  That's too
obvious.  Gus Simmons [CRYPTO83] has described subliminal messages,
which certainly are suitably innocuous, but unfortunately far too low
bandwidth.

A good steganographic system should insert encrypted messages into
English text so unobtrusively that nobody but the intended receiver
can show that a hidden message exists, even if the algorithm for the
steganographic system is made public.  (Perhaps I should call this
"stealthography"?)  The examples of steganography described in [KAHN]
all fail this test.  Similarly, so do silly kinds of "steganography"
such as the following "SECRET":

      So how have you been doing?
      Everything is fine here.
      Can we visit soon?
      Remember when we went white-water rafting?
      Everyone got soaked!
      That would be fun to do again!

This is silly not only because the hidden message is not encrypted but
also because anyone who knows the insertion algorithm can readily
discover that a hidden message does indeed exist.

To create a good cryptographic system, one must first do cryptanalysis.
Similarly, I suggest that to create a good steganographic system, one
should first do steganalysis.  For that reason, the next section of
this message focuses on potential tools for steganalysis.  Perhaps
people more knowledgeable about steganalysis will tell how best to make
use of these, and other, tools for steganalysis.

Disclaimer: I admit that my knowledge of steganalysis is limited.
Perhaps at this point I should just ask what I should read to learn
more about this, but I suspect that the public literature is
sparse and scattered.  For example, we have the words "encryption" and
"decryption", but what do we call the corresponding words for
steganography: steganization and desteganization?  If we don't even
have good terminology for the process, I suspect that we do not have
much well-organized literature on it, either.  What follows is my
best guess concerning steganographic issues.

The first goal of steganalysis is to determine that a hidden message is
likely.  The second goal is extracting that hidden message and the
third goal is decrypting that hidden message.  To be able to infer that
a hidden message is likely, we need measures that distinguish normal
from unusual English text.


Measures of Normal English Text

What is normal English text?  In general, this is unsolvable, and not
even well-defined.  It depends on the context, author, subject, etc.
Nevertheless, I can think of several kinds measures that are likely
to be useful and I hope that other people can suggest more.

(1) letter frequency
    Letter frequency is just the first order Markov model for English.
    Shannon showed how 2nd order, 3rd order, etc. Markov models enable
    increasingly English-like output from a memoryless source.
    How much deviation from these standard frequencies is normal?
    What other kinds of letter frequency-related statistics might
    be useful?  For example, if you measure the number of characters
    between each occurrence of a particular character, what type of
    distribution of intervals should you get?  (An exponential
    distribution?  A Poisson distribution?  An Erlang distribution?)

(2) word frequency
    Shannon also constructed 1st order, 2nd order, etc. Markov
    approximations to English using words rather than characters as
    the elements.  How much variation should we expect from these
    approximations in ordinary English?
    Zipf's Law [WELSH, p. 97] states that the word frequency for a
    language obeys the formula:
       p(n) = A / n
    where A is a constant chosen so that:
       SUM p(n) = 1
        n
    For example, in English, the most frequently used words are,
    in order, "the", "of", "and", and "to".  According to Zipf's Law,
    the word "the" should be used about twice about as often as the
    word "of" and about four times as often as the word "to".
    Mandelbrot suggested a more complex formula:
        p(n) = A / (n + V)^(1/D)
    where V and D are independent parameters.  I suppose that the
    intelligence agencies have even more sophisticated models.

(3) compressibility
    According to [WELSH, p. 96], Shannon's experiments measured the
    entropy of English (over a 26 letter alphabet plus a space) as
    only 0.6 to 1.3 bits per character.  Since normal English text
    has both upper and lower case, digits, and other characters,
    perhaps a better value for normal English is about 2.5 bits per
    character. (If so, then shouldn't compression programs be able
    to achieve about a factor of 8 / 2.5 > 3 compression?)
    Is "dense" writing less compressible than "fluff"?  Apparently
    so, since measurements of the redundancy of various English
    texts [WELSH, p. 100] show significant differences.
    Since well-encrypted messages are incompressible, will a message
    that hides an encrypted message be less compressible than normal
    English text?

(4) grammar, style, and readability
    Grammar checkers can distinguish normal sentences from text such as:
        "Distinguish normal can grammar checkers text sentences from."
    that may satisfy other statistics for normal English text.  But what
    is an ordinary distribution of legal grammars of English sentences?
    Also, how does one allow for the different conventions in formal,
    written English vs. conversational English vs. slang vs. email/USENET
    netspeak vs. special sublanguages such as computer languages or
    mathematics?  Bear in mind that netspeak has several distinguishing
    features.  For example, email addresses of the form xxx@xxx.xxx.xxx,
    quoted text with a ">" in column 1, and smilies are typical net
    conventions. Mail headers and signatures (especially PGP signatures)
    have a special structure, too.
    Can a grammar checker help to distinguish normal text from text
    that may have a hidden message?  What useful clues may style and
    (Kincaid, Coleman-Liau, Flesch, etc.) readability scores give?
    An interesting experiment would be to compare automated readability
    scores with the compressibility of the text.

(5) semantic continuity and logic
    Do the sentences in a paragraph relate somehow to each other,
    or are they separate, independent constructions?  How can that
    be measured automatically?

(6) message context
    Does the content of the message look normal in its context?
    (For example, a baseball play-by-play would look out-of-place
    in sci.med.)  How can that be measured automatically?

(7) obvious
    Some people are known suspects, no matter how innocuous-looking
      their messages are.  All their messages are suspect.

(8) other measures
    What other measures might be useful for detecting the likely
    presence of a hidden message?  The distribution of number
    of words in a sentence?  The distribution of number of sentences
    (or words) in a paragraph?

What programs and/or databases are readily available for making
these measures?


Steganographic Capacity of English Text

If the public English text is N characters long, how long can a
perfectly hidden message within that public text be?  I think that it
can be about N/10 characters long, for a steganographic capacity of 10%.
I will show two ways to hide information in the public text: (1) the
grammatical structure of the sentence and (2) the word choice in the
sentence.  (These are not the only methods, but they may be the two
best methods.)

Do you recall back in school when you "diagrammed" sentences in your
English class?  That was actually imposing a parenthesization on
the sentence.  For example, the sentence:
    The tall boy ate the big pie.
becomes:
    (The (tall boy)) (ate (the (big pie)))
The number of possible parenthesizations of a sentence of N words is
related to the number of ways to match N pairs of parentheses.  The
number of matchings is the Nth Catalan number:

	   C(2N, N)       N-2
    X(N) = --------  >=  2           [AHU, p. 73]
	    N + 1

where C(2N, N) is the number of combinations of 2N objects, taken
N at a time, which is (2N)!/(N!^2).  The number of parenthesizations
is the N-1st Catalan number.  If all parenthesizations were
equally likely, then the parenthesization of a sentence of N words
would give greater than (N-1)-2 = N-3 bits of information for
1 - 3/N bits per word.  (Of course, not all parenthesizations are
equally likely.  But X(N) is also much larger than 2^(N-2), so
for now I'll assume that those two roughly cancel out.)
Since the average word length in English is about 4 characters
[WELSH, p. 101], or 5 characters counting a separating space,
and each ASCII character has 8 bits, we get a steganographic
efficiency of (1 - 3/N) / 40.  (Notice that I am ignoring punctuation
in my count of characters in English text.  Since this count is just
a rough approximation anyway, the effect of punctuation should get
lost in the noise.)

Another way to hide information in the public text is with the choice
of words.  Since English has a large vocabulary, I think that almost
always we can get one bit of information per word, just from the word
choice alone.  (Unusual words should not be used often, though, since
normal English text does not use them often.)  For example, we might
XOR all the bits of all the characters of the word and use its parity.
Can we get two bits per word?  Probably most of the time.  Suppose
that we try to get two bits per word from our word choice but succeed
only with probability p.  The channel capacity of a BSC is:
    1 + p log p + (1-p) log (1-p)
which is:
    1 - H(p)
By Shannon's noiseless coding theorem, we should be able to achieve
an error correcting coding that approaches this capacity.  (Use of
that encoding unfortunately may alter the statistics of the hidden
message sufficiently to expose the use of steganography, however.)

For what values of p will it be worthwhile to insert an uncertain
two bits per word rather than a (nearly) certain one bit?  Since
H(0.11) = 0.5 (approximately), p had better be .89 or higher.  If p
is .95, then H(p) = .29 (approximately), giving 1.4 bits / word rather
than just 1 bit / word.  I doubt that we can get better than 1.4 bits
per word with this method and still have normal looking English, though,
because of Zipf's Law.  The normal frequencies of the four words
"the", "of", "and", and "to" are high, totalling at least 10%, so
the public text has to include many of them, whether we want their
particular parity bit patterns or not.  We can improve the efficiency
by attempting two bits of information only for the long words and
attempting only one bit for the short words.  Maybe we should attempt
to achieve |K/5| bits for words of K characters, where "|x|" means "x
rounded down to the next integer".  Or maybe we should not try to hide
any bits at all in the extremely short words.  I don't have enough
information about typical English to analyze that.

What is the total steganographic efficiency we achieve by exploiting
both the grammatical structure and the word choice?  My estimates total:
    ( (1 - 3/N) + 1.4 ) / 40  =  0.06 - 3/(40N)
Just to get a number, let's assume that N = 10 words per sentence.
That gives us 0.0525, which I'll round down to 0.05.  That actually
gives us much better than 5%, though, because the hidden message is
first compressed and then encrypted.  If compression halves the length
of the hidden message, we get effectively a 10% efficiency for the
Steganographic capacity of English.  This estimate will decrease by
whatever amount typical English parenthesization departs from uniform
over all possibilities but it will increase by improved exploitation
of word choice and, especially, by improved compression.  Of course,
the effectiveness of this camouflage depends on the sophistication
of one's model of English text.  Perhaps normal English has enough
variation that a good, but not perfect, model of English will yield
public text that is indistinguishable from normal text, even to the
more resourceful eavesdroppers.

			      Kevin Q. Brown
                              INTERNET    kqb@whscad1.att.com
                                 or       kevin_q_brown@att.com

AHU - The Design and Analysis of Computer Algorithms,
      Aho, Hopcroft, and Ullman, Addison-Wesley, 1974.
KAHN - The Codebreakers, David Kahn, Macmillan, 1967.
WELSH - Codes and Cryptography, Dominic Welsh, Claredon Press, 1988.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Mike Godwin <mnemonic@eff.org>
Date: Mon, 24 May 93 12:03:29 PDT
To: dmandl@lehman.com (David Mandl)
Subject: Re: MacWorld Special Report
In-Reply-To: <9305241529.AA15822@disvnm2.shearson.com>
Message-ID: <199305241904.AA24485@eff.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


 
 
Dave writes:

> In the same issue, columnist Stephen Levy is harshly critical of the Digital
> Telephony Bill.  He goes off on a tangent about cryptography, and, while he
> doesn't mention Clipper, he speculates that if the bill is passed, the banning
> of strong crypto would very likely be next.

I don't think that's a tangent, Dave.

Thanks for the pointer.


--Mike







From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Perry E. Metzger" <pmetzger@lehman.com>
Date: Mon, 24 May 93 12:22:56 PDT
To: jordan@imsi.com (Jordan Hayes)
Subject: Re: The New Mykotronix phones...
In-Reply-To: <9305231707.AA12544@IMSI.COM>
Message-ID: <9305241922.AA06652@snark.shearson.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Jordan Hayes says:
> 	From mbriceno@aol.com Sat May 22 03:56:25 1993
> 
> 	If everybody would be armend, we would no longer look at the
> 	government as the sole provider of protectios from violent
> 	crimes, rape, or muggings.
> 
> I'm sure lots of people could give examples of areas where "everyone"
> *is* armed, and while they certainly don't rely on "the government"
> (i.e., local police forces) for protection, most would agree the
> situation is not desirable ...

Actually I can give such examples and show that the result id
desirable, but are we discussing cryptography or anarchism here?

.pm




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: ghoast@gnu.ai.mit.edu
Date: Mon, 24 May 93 13:55:50 PDT
To: kqb@whscad1.att.com
Subject: Re: Steganography and Steganalysis
In-Reply-To: <9305241859.AA11273@toad.com>
Message-ID: <9305242055.AA69775@hal.gnu.ai.mit.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


	What about reverse 'stealthography' where instead of first creating
your message, then attempting to create some larger ody of text in which to
hide the message, one would first generate the message to be hidden, then 
take an existing body of text (something large enough, like Shakespear's
MacBeth) and then attempt to find some concise algorithm by which the
recieving end would extract the message?

-Devin

----
ghoast@gnu.ai.mit.edu
		 ----



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: greg@ideath.goldenbear.com (Greg Broiles)
Date: Mon, 24 May 93 17:50:11 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Oregon, guns, etc.
Message-ID: <eyX34B1w164w@ideath.goldenbear.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Brad Cox (bcox@gmu.edu) writes:

> >I'm sure lots of people could give examples of areas where "everyone"
> >*is* armed, and while they certainly don't rely on "the government"
> >(i.e., local police forces) for protection, most would agree the
> >situation is not desirable ...
>
> Yep. Switzerland for sure (every draft age citizen keeps an assault rifle
> and ammo). Similarly for most US rural states; Oregon, South Carolina,
> Texas and Arizona come to mind. So do shooting ranges and guns shows most
> anywhere.

This is absolutely untrue of Oregon - at least in the Willamette Valley.
I see fewer guns (and gun-racks in pickup trucks) here than I did when I
lived in Southern California.

It is difficult for me to express how uninterested I am in the prospect
of debating gun control here in cypherpunks. I will compromise with
"very, very, uninterested."


--
Greg Broiles                            greg@goldenbear.com
Golden Bear Computer Consulting         +1 503 465 0325
Box 12005 Eugene OR 97440               BBS: +1 503 687 7764




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: uni@acs.bu.edu (Shaen Bernhardt)
Date: Mon, 24 May 93 15:43:12 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: espionage
Message-ID: <9305242242.AA15212@acs2.bu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



I get:
Taking other well-known identities:
        Silence = Ego + Espionage
                <= MC^2 + Espionage
 
solving for Espionage,o-Light^2
 
        Espionage >= Silence - MC^2of one's ego cannot exceed one's
maximum potential energy (which has great explanatory powers re. the
which raises some interesting points:
 
[Portions deleted, no value judgement implied]

I meant to suggest that the poster who compromised himself should have put
his/her ego aside and overcome the urge to brag.

hence espionage + ego = death.

I like your analysis however.





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: fergp@sytex.com (Paul Ferguson)
Date: Mon, 24 May 93 16:47:12 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Correction
Message-ID: <o8u34B3w165w@sytex.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


[HOn Sat, 22 May 1993 14:20:25 -0400 (EDT),
 Eric S. Raymond <uunet!snark.thyrsus.com!esr> wrote -
 
> To join the cypherpunks mailing list, send a request to:
 
>        cypherpunks@toad.com
 
 Not to be a nit-picker, but shouldn't that be:
 cypherpunks-request@toad.com
 
 Subsequent posts to the list should be to: cypherpunks@toad.com
 
 Cheers.

Paul Ferguson               |  The future is now.
Network Integrator          |  History will tell the tale;
Centreville, Virginia USA   |  We must endure and struggle
fergp@sytex.com             |  to shape it.
 
          Stop the Wiretap (Clipper/Capstone) Chip.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: fergp@sytex.com (Paul Ferguson)
Date: Mon, 24 May 93 17:47:38 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: FOIA INFO 1/2
Message-ID: <H0V34B1w165w@sytex.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Phil Karn e-mailed me about posting dotted "i"s and crossed "t"
FOIA sample letters. These are perhaps the best that I've seen and
work well, however, I would suggest that takers have them notorozied
prior to sending them the agengies in question.
 
- --
 
 
FOIA FILES KIT - INSTRUCTIONS
 
USING THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT
REVISED EDITION
Fund for Open Information and Accountability, Inc.
339 Lafayette Street, New York, NY 10012
(212) 477-3188
 
INSTRUCTIONS
 
     The Freedom of Information Act entitles you to request any 
record maintained by a federal Executive branch agency. The 
agency must release the requested material unless it falls into 
one of nine exempt categories, such as "national security," 
"privacy," "confidential source" and the like, in which case the 
agency may but is not compelled to refuse to disclose the 
records.
     This kit contains all the material needed to make FOIA 
requests for records on an individual, an organization or on a 
particular subject matter or event.
 
HOW TO MAKE A COMPLETE REQUEST
 
     Step 1:   Select the appropriate sample letter. Fill in the 
blanks in the body of the letter. Read the directions printed to 
the right of each letter in conjunction with the following 
instructions:
     For organizational files: In the first blank space insert 
the full and formal name of the organization whose files you are 
requesting. In the second blank space insert any other names, 
acronyms or shortened forms by which the organization is or has 
ever been known or referred to by itself or others. If some of 
the organization's work is conducted by sub-groups such as clubs, 
committees, special programs or through coalitions known by other 
names, these should be listed.
     For individual files: Insert the person's full name in the 
first blank space and any variations in spelling, nicknames, stage 
names, marriage names, titles and the like in the second blank 
space. Unlike other requests, the signatures of an individual 
requesting her/his own file must be notarized.
     For subject matter or event files: In the first blank space 
state the formal title of the subject matter or event including 
relevant dates and locations. In the second blank space provide 
the names of individuals or group sponsors or participants and/or 
any other information that would assist the agency in locating 
the material you are requesting.
     Step 2:   The completed sample letter may be removed, 
photocopies and mailed as is or retyped on your own stationary. 
Be sure to keep a copy of each letter.
     Step 3:   Addressing the letters: Consult list of agency 
addresses.
     FBI: A complete request requires a minimum of two letters. 
Sen done letter to FBI Headquarters and separate letter to each 
FBI field office nearest the location of the individual, the 
organization or the subject matter/event. Consider the location 
of residences, schools, work and other activities.
     INS: Send a request letter to each district office nearest 
the location of the individual, the organization or the subject 
matter/event.
     Address each letter to the FOIA/PA office of the appropriate 
agency. Be sure to make clearly on the envelope: ATTENTION--FOIA 
REQUEST.
 
FEE WAIVER
 
     You will notice that the sample letters include a request 
for fee waiver. Many agencies automatically waive fees if a 
request results in the release of only a small number of 
documents, e.g. 250 pages or less. Under the Act, you are 
entitled to a waiver of all search and copy fees associated with 
your request if the release of the information would primarily 
benefit the general public. However, in January 1983, the Justice 
Department issued a memo to all federal agencies listing five 
criteria which requesters must meet before they are deemed 
entitled to a fee waiver. Under these criteria, a requester must 
show that the material sought to be released is already the 
subject of "genuine public interest" and "meaningfully 
contributes to the public development or understanding of the 
subject"; and that she/he has the qualifications to understand 
and evaluate the materials and the ability to interpret and 
disseminate the information to th public and is not motivated by 
any "personal interest." Finally, if the requested information is 
already "in the public domain," such as in the agency's reading 
room, no fee waiver will be granted.
     You should always request a waiver of fees if you believe 
the information you are seeking will benefit the public. If your 
request for a waiver is denied, you should appeal that denial, 
citing the ways in which your request meets the standards set out 
above.
 
MONITORING THE PROGRESS OF YOUR REQUEST
 
     Customarily, you will receive a letter from each agency 
within 10 days stating that your request has been received and is 
being processed. You may be asked to be patient and told that 
requests are handled cafeteria style. You have no alternative but 
to be somewhat patient. but there is no reason to be complacent 
and simply sit and wait.
     A good strategy is to telephone the FOIA office in each 
agency after about a month if nothing of substance has been 
received. Ask for a progress report. The name of the person you 
talk with and the gist of the conversation should be recorded. 
try to take notes during the conversation focusing especially on 
what is said by the agency official. Write down all the details 
you can recall after the call is completed. Continue to call 
every 4 to 6 weeks.
     Good record keeping helps avoid time-consuming and 
frustrating confusion. A looseleaf notebook with a section 
devoted to each request simplifies this task. Intervening 
correspondence to and from the agency can be inserted between the 
notes on phone calls so that all relevant material will be at 
hand for the various tasks: phone consultations, writing the 
newsletter, correspondence, articles, preparation for media 
appearances, congressional testimony or litigation, if that 
course is adopted.
 
HOW TO MAKE SURE YOU GET EVERYTHING YOU ARE ENTITLED TO ...
AND WHAT TO DO IF YOU DO NOT
 
     After each agency has searched and processed your request, 
you will receive a letter that announces the outcome, encloses 
the released documents, if any, and explains where to direct an 
appeal if any material has been withheld. There are four possible 
outcomes:
     1.   Request granted in full: This response indicates that 
the agency has released all records pertinent to your request, 
with no exclusions or withholdings. The documents may be enclosed 
or, if bulky, may be mailed under separate cover. This is a very 
rare outcome. 
     Next Step: Check documents for completeness (see 
instructions below).
     2.   Requested granted in part and denied in part: This 
response indicates that the agency is releasing some material but 
has withheld some documents entirely or excised some passages 
from the documents released. The released documents may be 
enclosed or, if bulky, mailed under separate cover.
     Next step: Check documents released for completeness (see 
instructions below) and make an administrative appeal of denials 
or incompleteness (see instructions below).
     3.   Request denied in full: This response indicates that 
the agency is asserting that all material in its files pertaining 
to your request falls under one or the nine FOIA exemptions. 
These are categories of information that the agency may, at its 
discretion, refuse to release.
     Next step: Make an administrative appeal (see instructions 
below). Since FOIA exemptions are not mandatory, even a complete 
denial of your request can and should be appeals.
     4.   No records: This response will state that a search of 
the agency's files indicates that it has no records corresponding 
to those you requested.
     Next step: Check your original request to be sure you have 
not overlooked anything. If you receive documents from other 
agencies, review them for indications that there is material in 
the files of the agency claiming it has none. For example, look 
for correspondence, or references to correspondence, to or from 
that agency. If you determine that there are reasonable grounds, 
file an administrative appeal (see instructions below).
 
HOW TO CHECK FOR COMPLETENESS
 
     Step 1: Before reading the documents, turn them over and 
number the back of each page sequentially. The packet may contain 
documents from the agency's headquarters as well as several field 
office files. Separate the documents into their respective office 
packets. Each of these offices will have assigned the 
investigation a separate file number. Try to find the numbering 
system. Usually the lower right hand corner of the first page 
carries a hand-written file and document number. For instance, an 
FBI document might be marked "100-7142-22". This would indicate 
that it is the 22nd document in the 7142nd file in the 100 
classification. As you inspect the documents, make a list of 
these file numbers and which office they represent. In this way 
you will be able to determine which office created and which 
office received the document you have in your hand. Often there 
is a block stamp affixed with the name of the office from whose 
files this copy was retrieved. the "To/From" heading on a 
document may also give you corresponding file numbers and will 
help you puzzle out the origin of the document.
     When you have finally identified each document's file and 
serial number and separated the documents into their proper 
office batches, make a list of all the serial numbers in each 
batch to see if there any any missing numbers. If there are 
missing serial numbers and some documents have been withheld, try 
to determine if the missing numbers might reasonably correspond 
to the withheld documents. If not, the release may be incomplete 
and an administrative appeal should be made.
     Step 2: Read all the document released to you. Keep a list 
of all document referred to the text--letters, memos, teletypes, 
reports, etc. Each of these "referred to" documents should turn 
up in the packet released to you. If any are not in the packet, 
it is possible they may be among those document withheld; a 
direct inquiry should be made. In an administrative appeal, ask 
that each of these "referred to" documents be produced or that 
the agency state plainly that they are among those withheld. Of 
course, the totals of unproduced vs. withheld must be within 
reasons; that is, if the total number of unproduced documents you 
find referred to the text of the documents produced exceeds the 
total number of documents withheld, the agency cannot claim that 
all the referred to documents are accounted for by the withheld 
category. You will soon get the hand of making logical 
conclusions from discrepancies in the totals and missing document 
numbers.
     Another thing to look for when reading the released 
documents if the names of persons or agencies to whom the 
document has been disseminated. the lower left-hand corner is a 
common location for the typed list of agencies or offices to whom 
the document has been directed. In addition, there may be 
additional distribution recorded by hand, there or elsewhere on 
the cover page. There are published glossaries for some agencies 
that will help in deciphering these notations when they are not 
clear. Contact FOIA, Inc., if you need assistance in deciphering 
the text.
     Finally, any other file numbers that appear on the document 
should be noted, particularly in the subject of the file is of 
interest and is one you have not requested. You may want to make 
an additional request for some of these files.
 
HOW TO MAKE AN ADMINISTRATIVE APPEAL
 
     Under the FOIA, a dissatisfied requester has the right of 
administrative appeal. the name and address of the proper appeal 
office will be given to you by each agency in its final response 
letter.
     This kit contains a sample appeal letter with suggesting for 
adapting it to various circumstances. However, you need not make 
such an elaborate appeal; in fact, you need not offer any reasons 
at all but rather simply write a letter to the appeals unit 
stating that "this letter constitutes an appeal of the agency's 
decision." Of course, if you have identified some real 
discrepancies, you will want to set them for fully, but even if 
you have not found any, you may simply ask that the release be 
reviewed.
     If you are still dissatisfied after the administrative 
appeal process, the FOIA gives you the right to bring a lawsuit 
in federal district court on an expedited basis.
 
SAMPLE FBI REQUEST LETTER
 
Date:
 
To:  FOIA/PA Unit
     Federal Bureau of Investigation
 
     This is a request under the Freedom of Information Act.
 
     I request a complete and thorough search of all filing 
systems and locations for all records maintained by your agency 
pertaining to and/or captioned: ______ 
_____________________________________________________
[describe records desired and/or insert full and
_____________________________________________________
formal name]
_____________________________________________________
 
_____________________________________________________
 
including, without limitations, files and documents captioned, or 
whose captions include
 
_____________________________________________________
[insert changes in name, commonly used names,
_____________________________________________________
acronyms, sub-groups, and the like]
_____________________________________________________
 
_____________________________________________________
 
     This request specifically includes "main" files and "see 
references," including, but not limited to numbered and lettered 
sub files, "DO NOT FILE" files, and control files. I also request 
a search of the ELSUR Index,a nd the COINTELPRO Index. I request 
that all records be produced with the administrative pages.
     I wish to be sent copies of "see reference" cards, 
abstracts, search slips, including search slips used to process 
this request, file covers, multiple copies of the same documents 
if they appear in a file, and tapes of any electronic 
surveillances.
     I wish to make it clear that I want all records in you 
office "identifiable with my request," even though reports on 
those records have been sent to Headquarters and even though 
there may be duplication between the two sets of files.
 
[ continued next message ]

Paul Ferguson               |  The future is now.
Network Integrator          |  History will tell the tale;
Centreville, Virginia USA   |  We must endure and struggle
fergp@sytex.com             |  to shape it.
 
          Stop the Wiretap (Clipper/Capstone) Chip.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: fergp@sytex.com (Paul Ferguson)
Date: Mon, 24 May 93 17:48:03 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: FOIA INFO 2/2
Message-ID: <5gw34B2w165w@sytex.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


[ continued from previous message ]
 
I do not want just "interim" documents. I want all documents as they
appear in the "main" files and "see references" of all units of 
your agency.
      If documents are denied in whole or in part, please specify 
which exemption(s) is(are) claimed for each passage or whole 
document denied. Please provide a complete itemized inventory and 
a detailed factual justification of total or partial denial of 
documents. Give the number of pages in each document and the 
total number of pages pertaining to this request. For 
"classified" material denied please include the following 
information: the classification (confidential, secret or top 
secret); identity of the classifier; date or event for automatic 
de-classification, classification review, or down-grading; if 
applicable, identity of official authorizing extension of 
automatic de-classification or review; and if applicable, the 
reason for extended classification.
     I request that excised material be "blacked out" rather 
than "whited out" or cut out and that the remaining non-exempt 
portions of documents will be released as provided under the 
Freedom of Information Act.
     Please send a memo (copy to me) to the appropriate units in 
your office to assure that no records related to this request are 
destroyed. Please advise of any destruction of records and 
include the date of and authority for such destruction.
     As I expect to appeal any denials, please specify the office 
and address to which an appeal should be directed.
     I believe my request qualifies for a waiver of fees since 
the release of the requested information would primarily benefit 
the general public and be "in the public interest."
     I can be reached at the phone listed below. Please call 
rather than write if there are any questions or if you need 
additional information from me.
     I expect a response to this request within ten (10) working 
days, as provided for in the Freedom of Information Act.
 
Sincerely,
 
name: _______________________________________________
 
address: ____________________________________________
 
         ____________________________________________
 
telephone: __________________________________________
 
signature: __________________________________________
 
SAMPLE AGENCY REQUEST LETTER
 
DATE:
TO: FOIA/PA Unit
 
     This is a request under the Freedom of Information Act.
     I request a complete and thorough search of all filing 
systems and locations for all records maintained by your agency 
pertaining to and/or captioned 
______________________________________________________
[describe records desired and/or insert full and
______________________________________________________
formal name]
______________________________________________________
 
______________________________________________________
 
including, without limitation, files and documents captioned, or 
whose captions include:
 
______________________________________________________
[insert changes in name, commonly used names,
______________________________________________________
acronyms, sub-groups and the like]
______________________________________________________
 
______________________________________________________
 
     I also request all "see references" to these names, a search 
of the ELSUR Index or any similar technique for locating records 
of electronic surveillance.
     This request is also a request for any corresponding files 
in INS Headquarters or regional offices.
     Please place any "missing" files pertaining to this request 
on "special locate" and advise that you have done this.
     If documents are denied in part or whole, please specify 
which exemption(s) is(are) claimed for each passage or whole 
document denied. Please provide a complete itemized inventory and 
detailed factual justification of total or partial denial of 
documents. Specify the number of pates in each document and th 
total number of pages pertaining to this request. For classified 
material denied, please include the following information: the 
classification rating (confidential, secret, or top secret); 
identify the classifier; date or event for automatic 
de-classification, classification review or downgrading; if 
applicable, identify the official authorizing extension of 
automatic de-classification or review; and, if applicable, give the 
reason for extended classification.
     I request that excised material be "blacked out" rather than 
"whited out" or cut out. I expect, as provided by the Freedom of 
Information Act, that the remaining non-exempt portions of 
documents will be released.
     Please send a memo (copy to me) to the appropriate units in 
your office or agency to assure that no records related to this 
request are destroyed. Please advise of any destruction of 
records and include the date of and authority for such 
destruction.
     As I expect to appeal any denials, please specify the office 
and address to which an appeal should be directed.
     I believe my request qualifies for a waiver of fees since 
the release of the requested information would primarily benefit 
the general public and be "in the public interest."
     I can be reached at the phone listed below. Please call 
rather than write if there are any questions or if you need 
additional information from me.
     I expect a response to this request within ten (10) working 
days, as provided for in the Freedom of Information Act.
 
Sincerely,
 
name: _______________________________________________
 
address: ____________________________________________
 
         ____________________________________________
 
telephone: (___)_______________________________________
 
signature: __________________________________________
 
SAMPLE ADMINISTRATIVE APPEAL LETTER
 
Date:
To:  FOIA/PA Appeals Office
RE:  Request number [Add this if the agency has given your request 
a number]
     This is an appeal pursuant to subsection (a)(6) of the 
Freedom of Information Act as amended (5U.S.C. 552).
     On [date], I received a letter from [name of official] of 
your agency denying my request for [describe briefly the 
information you are after]. This reply indicated that an appeal 
letter could be sent to you. I am enclosing a copy of my exchange 
of correspondence with your agency so that you can see exactly 
what files I have requested and the insubstantial grounds on 
which my request has been denied.
     [Optional paragraph, to be used if the agency has withheld 
all or nearly all the material which has been requested]:
     You will note that your agency has withheld the entire (or 
nearly the entire) document (or file, or report, or whatever) 
that I requested. Since the FOIA provides that "any reasonably 
secregable portion of a record shall be provided to any person 
requesting such record after deletion of the portions which are 
exempt," I believe that your agency has not complied with the 
FOIA. I believe that there must be (additional) secregable 
portions which do not fall within FOIA exemptions and which must 
be released.
     [Optional paragraph, to be used in the agency has used the 
(b)(1) exemption for national security, to withhold information]
     Your agency has used the (b)(1) exemption to withhold 
information [I question whether files relating to events that 
took place over twenty years ago could realistically harm the 
national security.] [Because I am familiar with my own activities 
during the period in question, and know that none of these 
activities in any way posed a significant threat to the national 
security, I question the designation of my files or portions of 
my file as classified and exempt from disclosure because of
national security considerations.]
     [Sample optional argument to be used if the exemption which 
is claimed does not seem to make sense; you should cite as many 
specific instances as you care to of items withheld from the 
documents that you have received. We provide two examples which 
you might want to adapt to your own case.]
     "On the memo dated _____________ the second paragraph 
withheld under the (b)(1) exemption appears to be describing a 
conversation at an open meeting. If this is the case, it is 
impossible that the substance of this conversation could be 
properly classified." Or, "The memo dated _____ refers to a 
meeting which I attended, but a substantial portion is deleted 
because of the (b)(6) and (b)(7)(c) exemptions for unwarranted 
invasions of personal privacy. Since I already know who attended 
this meeting, no privacy interest is served by the withholding."
     I trust that upon examination of my request, you will 
conclude that the records I requested are not properly covered by 
exemption(s) [here repeat the exemptions which the agency's 
denial letter claimed applied to your request] of the amended 
FOIA, and that you will overrule the decision to withhold the 
information.
     [Use if an itemized inventory is not supplied originally]
     If you choose instead to continue to withhold some or all of 
the material which was denied in my initial request to your 
agency, I ask that you give me an index of such material, 
together with the justification for the denial of each item which 
is still withheld.
     As provided in the Act, I will expect to receive a reply to 
this administrative appeal letter within twenty working days.
     If you deny this appeal and do not adequately explain why 
the material withheld is properly exempt, I intend to initial a 
lawsuit to compel its disclosure. [You can say that you intend to 
sue, if that is your present inclination; you may still decide 
ultimately not to file suit.]
 
Sincerely yours,
 
name:     ____________________________________________
 
address:  ____________________________________________
 
          ____________________________________________
 
signature: ___________________________________________
 
[Mark clearly on envelope: Attention: Freedom of Information 
Appeals]
 
FBI ADDRESSES AND PHONE NUMBERS
 
FBI Headquarters, J. Edgar Hoover Bldg, Washington, D.C., 20535, 
202-324-5520 (FOI/PA Unit)
 
Field Offices
Albany, NY 12207, U.S. Post Office and Courthouse, 518-465-7551
Albuquerque, NM 87101, Federal Office Bldg., 505-247-1555
Alexandria, VA 22314, 300 N. Lee St., 703-683-2681
Anchorage, AK 99510, Federal bldg., 907-272-6414
Atlanta, GA 30303, 275 Peachtree St. NE, 404-521-3900
Baltimore, MD 21207, 7142 Ambassador Rd., 301-265-8080
Birmingham, AL 35203, Room 1400, 2121 Bldg. 205-252-7705 
Boston, MA 02203, J.F. Kennedy Federal Office Bldg., 617-742-5533
Buffalo, NY 14202, 111 W. Huron St., 716-856-7800
Butte, MT 59701, U.S. Courthouse and Federal Bldg., 406-792-2304
Charlotte, NC 28202, Jefferson Standard Life Bldg., 704-372-5485
Chicago, IL 60604, Everett McKinley Dirksen Bldg., 312-431-1333
Cincinnati, OH 45202, 400 U.S. Post Office & Crthse Bldg., 513-421-4310
Cleveland, OH 44199, Federal Office Bldg., 216-522-1401
Columbia, SC 29201, 1529 Hampton St., 803-254-3011
Dallas TX 75201, 1810 Commerce St., 214-741-1851
Denver, CO 80202, Federal Office Bldg., 303-629-7171
Detroit, MI 48226, 477 Michigan Ave., 313-965-2323
El Paso, TX 79901, 202 U.S. Courthouse Bldg., 915-533-7451
Honolulu, HI 96850, 300 Ala Moana Blvd., 808-521-1411
Houston, TX 77002, 6015 Fed. Bldg and U.S.Courthouse, 713-224-1511
Indianapolis, IN 46202, 575 N. Pennsylvania St., 317-639-3301
Jackson, MS 39205, Unifirst Federal and Loan Bldg., 601-948-5000
Jacksonville, FL 32211, 7820 Arlington Expressway, 904-721-1211
Kansas City, MO 64106, 300 U.S. Courthouse Bldg., 816-221-6100
Knoxville, TN 37919, 1111 Northshore Dr., 615-588-8571
Las Vegas, NV 89101, Federal Office Bldg., 702-385-1281
Little Rock, AR 72201, 215 U.S Post Office Bldg., 501-372-7211
Los Angeles, CA 90024, 11000 Wilshire Blvd, 213-272-6161
Louisville, KY 40202, Federal Bldg., 502-583-3941
Memphis, TN 38103, Clifford Davis Federal bldg., 901-525-7373
Miami, FL 33137, 3801 Biscayne Blvd., 305-573-3333
Milwaukee, WI 53202, Federal Bldg and U.S. Courthouse, 414-276-4681
Minneapolis, MN 55401, 392 Federal Bldg., 612-339-7846
Mobile, AL 36602, Federal Bldg., 205-438-3675
Newark, NJ 07101, Gateway I, Market St., 201-622-5613
New Haven, CT 06510, 170 Orange St., 203-777-6311
New Orleans, LA 70113, 701 Loyola Ave., 504-522-4671
New York, NY 10007, 26 Federal Plaza, 212-553-2700
Norfolk, VA, 23502, 870 N. Military Hwy., 804-461-2121
Oklahoma City, OK 73118, 50 Penn Pl. NW, 405-842-7471
Omaha, NB 68102, 215 N. 17th St., 402-348-1210
Philadelphia, PA 19106, Federal Office Bldg., 215-629-0800
Phoenix, AZ 85004, 2721 N. central Ave., 602-279-5511
Pittsburgh, PA 15222, Federal Office Bldg., 412-471-2000
Portland, OR 97201, Crown Plaza Bldg., 503-224-4181
Richmond, VA 23220, 200 W. Grace St., 804-644-2531
Sacramento, CA 95825, Federal Bldg., 916-481-9110
St. Louis, MO 63103, 2704 Federal Bldg., 314-241-5357
Salt Lake City, UT 84138, Federal Bldg., 801-355-7521
San Diego, CA 92188, Federal Office Bldg., 619-231-1122
San Francisco, CA 94102, 450 Golden Gate Ave., 415-552-2155
San Juan, PR 00918 U.S. Courthouse and Fed. Bldg., 809-754-6000
Savannah, GA 31405, 5401 Paulson St., 912-354-9911
Seattle, WA 98174, 915 2nd Ave., 206-622-0460
Springfield, IL 62702, 535 W. Jefferson St., 217-522-9675
Tampa, FL 33602, Federal Office Bldg., 813-228-7661
Washington, DC 20535, 9th and Pennsylvania Ave. NW, 202-324-3000
 
FEDERAL AGENCIES (SELECTED ADDRESSES)
 
Central Intelligence Agency
Information and Privacy Coordinator
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D.C. 20505
202-351-5659
 
Civil Service Commission
Appropriate Bureau (Bureau of Personnel Investigation,
Bureau of Personnel Information Systems, etc.)
Civil Service Commission
1900 E Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20415
202-632-4431
 
Commission on Civil Rights
General Counsel, U.S. Commission on Civil Rights
1121 Vermont Ave., N.W. Room 600
Washington, D.C. 20415
202-254-6610
 
Consumer Product Safety Commission
Office of the Secretary
Consumer Product Safety Commission
1111 18th St., N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20207
202-624-7700
 
Department of Defense/Dept. of Air Force
Freedom of Information Manager
Headquarters, USAF/DADF
Washington, D.C. 20330-5025
202-697-3467
 
I'd suggest calling first to insure the correctness of the addresses.
 
Cheers.

Paul Ferguson               |  The future is now.
Network Integrator          |  History will tell the tale;
Centreville, Virginia USA   |  We must endure and struggle
fergp@sytex.com             |  to shape it.
 
          Stop the Wiretap (Clipper/Capstone) Chip.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Steven Levy <steven@well.sf.ca.us>
Date: Mon, 24 May 93 20:17:51 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: macworld
Message-ID: <199305250317.AA15360@well.sf.ca.us>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



two short comments about the macworld privacy issue

we have a long lead time and the column about digital telephone
(oops, telephony) was in before the clipper stuff broke

and eric, while correct about Mitch Ratcliffe being a fine
reporter who is totally on top of privacy stuff, has the
publication wrong - Mitch is with MacWeek, not Macworld.
Easy to confuse. 

Steven




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: jslee@well.sf.ca.us (John S. Lee)
Date: Mon, 24 May 93 21:40:53 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: UUDecode
Message-ID: <199305250439.AA04920@well.sf.ca.us>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Where can I get the source code for UUEncode/UUdecode for the Mac or UNIX.

Either would be great!
++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
+"The community can rest assured that their interests are very much my own,+
+ and that anything I can do to maintain the security of the citizens, will+
+ be my primary objective.  Be seeing you.  b-|" - Number Six->The Prisoner+
+                                                                          +
+ from the village of jslee@well.sf.ca.us - a still tongue spills no beans +
++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Operator <root@extropia.wimsey.com>
Date: Mon, 24 May 93 23:50:26 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: No Subject
Message-ID: <199305250633.AA06800@xtropia>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



  [ The purpose of this post is to propose an extension of PGP which
  would result in more widespread use of encryption by the public;
  and to provoke discussion about the pros/cons of said proposal ]

  PGP users (mostly, technically adroit e-mail types) are but a
  subset of computer users in general; who in turn are but a subset
  of persons engaging in electronic communication of all kinds (including
  the common telephone); all of whom can be legitimately concerned with
  privacy issues.  If the powers that be are concerned about not being
  able to listen in on PGP users, at least they can take solace in the
  fact that PGP users constitute only a tiny fraction of the populace,
  and hence, in the "big picture", add up to little more than a slight
  irritation. 

  I am proposing that PGP be expanded beyond its present cadre and into
  the 2nd group named above - the army of regular users of pc's equipped
  with data modems.

  The proposal specifically is to extend PGP beyond file encryption
  to generalized stream handling.  Such streams can be consoles &
  keyboards, real-time file transfers, and digitized voice; indeed,
  anything that will pass over a modem or other serial transfer medium.

  In this scenario, a user wishing a secure interchange would simply 
  place a voice call to another party and, upon establishing voice
  contact, request a transition to a modem connection.  Upon invoking
  the new program, the user's modem would go online; it would read the
  party's key from the existing PGP pubkey ring, and use it to perform
  a DH exchange, establishing a secure session.  The program would then
  use a packet protocol to exchange keyboard/console traffic and/or files.
  In one scenario, all key management would continue to be performed with
  the current PGP program; the pubkey ring would be 'read-only' from the
  standpoint of the new app.  Alternatively, key management could be
  blended into the new app to form a true standalone application.

  The appeal behind this approach is that it moves the operational 
  paradigm very close to the present one- namely "pick up the phone
  and dial".  No logins, shells, Elm, Compuserve/Prodigy/FidoNet, etc.
  The user interface could be simple enough for even the most novice
  user to operate.

  Real-time voice encryption would obviously be desirable in lieu of
  a keyboard interface.  Unfortunately, such a capability is not yet
  within the reach of the average pc.  Within a few years it will pro-
  bably be a "done deal", given the movement afoot to put DSP chips
  in all new pc's (e.g. video compression, multimedia support, etc). 
  For now it must suffice to build a solid technical foundation which
  can accommodate voice operation when the requisite hardware becomes
  available.  And until that time, many more users will have access to
  convenient and handy encryption technology.

  [ An aside, WRT voice coding:  I believe the first major opportunity
  to produce a cheap realtime digital voice channel will be the emergence
  of chips/chip sets targeted towards the growing market for digital
  (tapeless) telephone answering machines.  This market is large, and very
  cost sensitive (the perfect combo for opportunistic techno-vultures);
  this should produce cost effective voice coding solutions within a
  short period of time (12 months?), given current technology levels. ]

  Many readers already know that the pieces required to build this new
  program are already in place- and could be drawn together without much
  fuss.  Indeed, a few fledgling attempts have already been made. From the
  PGP sources, the necessary functions would be extracted- to perform key
  lookup, MP arithmetic, DH key exchange, IDEA encryption of comm packets,
  etc.  The resulting library would be linked to the new comm application.
  Each subsequent revision of PGP would retain a make target that would
  build the interface library. 

  The net result of building this application would be to make serious
  levels of security available to more people than ever before - with an
  ease of use also heretofore unknown.  As a result I believe the PGP
  user base could easily expand by at least an order of magnitude.

  Does anyone have a better idea?
  [END]




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: J. Michael Diehl <mdiehl@triton.unm.edu>
Date: Tue, 25 May 93 00:04:28 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: my menu sys.
Message-ID: <9305250704.AA02467@triton.unm.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


After I posted my menu batch file for pgp, I realized that I hadn't put my name
on it, which I felt I should do.  So, here it is, with with my copyleft message
attatched.  I hope someone enjoys it.

rem This is the PGP menu system by Mike Diehl version 0.0.  This program 
rem requires 4dos command.com replacement to run.  It may run under norton's
rem N-dos. Since I wrote this program for my own use, and in an effort to help
rem with the cypherpunk cause, I am releasing this program into the public
rem domain.  I ask that this message not be removed, and that you do not 
rem distribute modified copies of this program.  Further, I hope that, if you 
rem think this program makes pgp easier to use, you will send me an (encrypted)
rem email message telling me so.  It helps my ego to think someone likes my
rem program besides me. ;^)  I have enclosed my pgp 2.2 public key at the end
rem of this file.  Take care, and enjoy.  Mike Diehl.

rem 
@echo off
setlocal
break on

:main
cls
drawbox 0 0 23 78 2 red on black
drawhline 17 0 79 1 red on black
drawbox 4 29 16 49 2 red on black 
scrput 1 27 blue on black Mike's PGP shell ver. 0.0.
scrput 3 35 blue on black MAIN MENU

scrput  5 32 red on black Encrypt a file.
scrput  7 32 red on black Decrypt a file.
scrput 09 32 red on black siGn a file.
scrput 11 32 red on black Wipe file.
scrput 13 32 red on black Next menu.
scrput 15 32 red on black Quit.

scrput 18 5 white on black Select an option by typing the corisponding capitalized letter.
scrput 19 5 white on black For example, to encrypt a file, you would press the E key.

inkey /K"EeDdGgWwNnQq" %%in
goto menu1-%in

:menu1-q
screen 17 26
pause 
cls
endlocal
quit

:menu1-e
cls
drawbox 0 0 23 78 2 red on black
drawhline 17 0 79 1 red on black
drawbox 6 3 8 74 2 red on black

scrput 18 5 white on black Here you will be asked for the name of a file to be
scrput 19 5 white on black encrypted.  Then you will be asked for the names of 
scrput 20 5 white on black the people who should be able to read the file.
scrput 21 5 white on black Enter them all on the line separated by a space.

scrput 7 5 red on black Enter the name of the file to encrypt.
screen 7 52
input %%file

if exist %file goto menu1-e-good
scrput 15 10 red on black That file is not in the current directory!
screen 16 10
pause
goto menu1-e

:menu1-e-good

drawbox 10 3 12 74 2 red on black
scrput 11 5 red on black Enter the name(s) of the recipients.
screen 11 52
input %%in

cls
rem I never claimed that this would be elegent....

drawbox 0 0 23 78 2 red on black
drawhline 17 0 79 1 red on black
scrput 18 5 white on black Here you are asked if you want to mark this message "For Your Eyes Only,"
scrput 19 5 white on black and if you want to sign the message.  If you reply 'y' to the first
scrput 20 5 white on black question, the recipient will only be ablt to display the message. He
scrput 21 5 white on black won't be to save it.  If you reply 'y' to the second question, the 
scrput 22 5 white on black recipient will know for certain that the message is from you.

drawbox 6 3 8 74 2 red on black
scrput 7 5 red on black Would you like to mark this "For Your Eyes Only?"
inkey /K"ynN" %%f
drawbox 10 3 12 74 2 red on black
scrput 11 5 red on black Would you like to sign this message?
inkey /K"ynN" %%s

if "%f" == "y" goto f
if "%s" == "y" goto s
cls
pgp -pe %file %in 
goto encrypted
:f
if "%s" == "y" goto sf
cls
pgp -mep %file %in 
goto encrypted
:sf
cls
pgp -mesp %file %in 
goto encrypted
:s
cls
pgp -pes %file %in 

:encrypted
echo %@name[%file].asc is the name of the encrypted file.
pause
goto main

:menu1-d
cls
drawbox 0 0 23 78 2 red on black
drawhline 17 0 79 1 red on black
drawbox 6 3 8 74 2 red on black

scrput 18 5 white on black Here you will be asked for the name of a file to be
scrput 19 5 white on black read.  Then you will be asked if you want to save the
scrput 20 5 white on black plaintext file.  If you do, you will be asked for a 
scrput 21 5 white on black new filename.

scrput 7 5 red on black Enter the name of the file to read.
screen 7 52
input %%file

if exist %file goto menu1-d-good
scrput 15 10 red on black That file is not in the current directory!
screen 16 10
pause
goto main

:menu1-d-good
cls
pgp -m %file
goto main

:menu1-g
cls
drawbox 0 0 23 78 2 red on black
drawhline 17 0 79 1 red on black
drawbox 6 3 8 74 2 red on black

scrput 18 5 white on black Here you will be asked for the name of a file to be
scrput 19 5 white on black signed.  If you sign a message, it can be proved that
scrput 20 5 white on black it came from you.  There is no "Plausible Deniability."

scrput 7 5 red on black Enter the name of the file to signed.
screen 7 52
input %%file

if exist %file goto menu1-g-good
scrput 15 10 red on black That file is not in the current directory!
screen 16 10
pause
goto main

:menu1-g-good
cls
pgp -s %file
echo %@name[%file].asc is the name of the signed file.
pause
goto main

:menu1-w
cls
drawbox 0 0 23 78 2 red on black
drawhline 17 0 79 1 red on black
drawbox 6 3 8 74 2 red on black

scrput 18 5 white on black Here you will be asked for the name of a file to be
scrput 19 5 white on black wiped. Remember, after a file is wiped...
scrput 20 5 blink white on black There is no way to retrieve the file!

scrput 7 5 red on black Enter the name of the file to wiped.
screen 7 52
input %%file

if exist %file goto menu1-w-good
scrput 15 10 red on black That file is not in the current directory!
screen 16 10
pause
goto main

:menu1-w-good

cls
pgp -w %file 
goto main

:menu1-n
cls
drawbox 0 0 23 78 2 red on black
drawhline 17 0 79 1 red on black
drawbox 4 29 16 49 2 red on black 
scrput 1 27 blue on black Mike's PGP shell ver. 0.0.
scrput 3 35 blue on black SECOND MENU

scrput  5 32 red on black Add a key.
scrput  7 32 red on black Extract a key.
scrput 09 32 red on black View a key.
scrput 11 32 red on black Fingerprint.
scrput 13 32 red on black Next menu.
scrput 15 32 red on black Quit.

scrput 18 5 white on black Select an option by typing the corisponding capitalized letter.
scrput 19 5 white on black For example, to add a key to your ring, you would press the A key.

inkey /K"AaEeVvFfNnQq" %%in
goto menu2-%in

:menu2-q
goto menu1-q

:menu2-a
cls
drawbox 0 0 23 78 2 red on black
drawhline 17 0 79 1 red on black
drawbox 6 3 8 74 2 red on black

scrput 18 5 white on black Here you will be asked for the name of a file that  
scrput 19 5 white on black contains the keys to be added to your public key ring.
scrput 7 5 red on black Enter the name of the file to read.
screen 7 52
input %%file

if exist %file goto menu2-a-good
scrput 15 10 red on black That file is not in the current directory!
screen 16 10
pause
goto main

:menu2-a-good

cls
pgp -ka %file 
pause
goto main

:menu2-e
cls
drawbox 0 0 23 78 2 red on black
drawhline 17 0 79 1 red on black
drawbox 6 3 8 74 2 red on black

scrput 18 5 white on black Here you will be asked for the key ID to be extracted.
scrput 19 5 white on black Then you will be asked for the names of the file to 
scrput 20 5 white on black put the key in.

scrput 7 5 red on black Enter the key ID to extract.
screen 7 52
input %%in

drawbox 10 3 12 74 2 red on black
scrput 11 5 red on black Enter the name of the file that is to hold the key.
screen 11 59
input %%file

if not exist %file goto menu2-e-good
scrput 10 10 red on black That file already exists in the current directory!
screen 16 10
pause
goto main

:menu2-e-good

cls
pgp -kx %in %file
echo %@name[%file].asc contains the key for %in.
pause
goto main

:menu2-v
cls
pgp -kv 
pause
goto main

:menu2-f
cls
drawbox 0 0 23 78 2 red on black
drawhline 17 0 79 1 red on black
drawbox 6 3 8 74 2 red on black

scrput 18 5 white on black Here you will be asked for the name of the person who's key fingerprint you 
scrput 19 5 white on black want to examine.

scrput 7 5 red on black Enter the name of the person.
screen 7 52
input %%in

cls
pgp -kvc %in 
echo Remember to write this information down!
pause
goto main

:menu2-n
cls
drawbox 0 0 23 78 2 red on black
drawhline 17 0 79 1 red on black
drawbox 4 29 16 49 2 red on black 
scrput 1 27 blue on black Mike's PGP shell ver. 0.0.
scrput 3 35 blue on black THIRD MENU

scrput  5 32 red on black Generate a key.
scrput  7 32 red on black Remove a key.
scrput 09 32 red on black Disable a key.
scrput 13 32 red on black Next menu.
scrput 15 32 red on black Quit.

scrput 18 5 white on black Select an option by typing the corisponding capitalized letter.
scrput 19 5 white on black For example, to generate a new key, you would press the G key.

inkey /K"GgRrDdNnQq" %%in
goto menu3-%in

:menu3-g
cls
pgp -kg 
pause
goto main

:menu3-r
cls
drawbox 0 0 23 78 2 red on black
drawhline 17 0 79 1 red on black
drawbox 6 3 8 74 2 red on black

scrput 18 5 white on black Here you will be asked for the name of the key to be
scrput 19 5 white on black removed.

scrput 7 5 red on black Enter the name of the key to remove.
screen 7 52
input %%in

cls
pgp -kr %in 
pause
goto main

:menu3-q
goto menu1-q

:menu3-d
cls
drawbox 0 0 23 78 2 red on black
drawhline 17 0 79 1 red on black
drawbox 6 3 8 74 2 red on black

scrput 18 5 white on black Here you will be asked for the name of the key to be
scrput 19 5 white on black either disabled or re-enabled.

scrput 7 5 red on black Enter the name of the key.
screen 7 52
input %%in

cls
pgp -kd %in 
pause
goto main

:menu3-n
goto main

I may be reached by any of these addresses.
mdiehl@triton.unm.edu, al945@cwns9.ins.cwru.edu

Or, in care of Rory McManus at r.mcmanus4@genie.geis.com
-----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----
Version: 2.2

mQA9Aiu/jVAAAAEBgM2F5mSlCA+KRd6TXIrqmPfiiAEytwSttZs7Yua939GMu2mP
JL+5Qpi/ZKqF2nAJAwAFEbQsSi4gTWljaGFlbCBEaWVobCwgMSwgPG1kaWVobEB0
cml0b24udW5tLmVkdT4=
=lyvx
-----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "George A. Gleason" <gg@well.sf.ca.us>
Date: Tue, 25 May 93 02:06:14 PDT
To: hughes@soda.berkeley.edu
Subject: Re:  Caller ID Question
Message-ID: <199305250905.AA25844@well.sf.ca.us>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Caller ID in California: the question you need to ask is regarding ANI,
Automatic Number Identification.  That is available on 800-numbers and can
be delivered in realtime if you have enough traffic to justify a T1.  And of
course you can get it from any carrier you wish.  ANI is *not* Caller ID,
they work differently, use different signalling systems.  

-gg




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Hal <74076.1041@CompuServe.COM>
Date: Tue, 25 May 93 01:02:18 PDT
To: CYPHERPUNKS <CYPHERPUNKS@toad.com>
Subject: Digital cash issues...
Message-ID: <930525075401_74076.1041_FHD58-1@CompuServe.COM>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Reading the article in the Whole Earth Review reminded me of our
discussions several months ago about digital cash.  I would be interested
in seeing an implementation of digital cash suitable for email or Internet
use.

Chaum is working on "off-line" cash systems, where you don't have to check
with the bank for every transaction.  But I think there are problems with
this in the network environment.

The big issue in digital cash is double-spending.  Someone could send the
same piece of cash to more than one seller.  (We say "double-spending" but
really it could be triple- or worse.)  Each seller can check that the cash
was properly signed by the bank and not a forgery, but if they honor the
cash only one of them can be reimbursed by the bank.

On-line systems require the sellers to check with the bank to make sure
a particular piece of cash has not been spent before.  As long as the bank
handles such queries sequentially, and adds each piece of cash to a database
of "spent cash" as it sends an "OK" response back to a seller, then each
piece of cash can only be spent once.  Double-spending is prevented.

Off-line systems are more complicated.  They are designed so that the
anonymity of the spender is lost if the cash is double-spent.  This is
achieved by having an exchange of messages between seller and spender,
in which the seller specifies some random information and the spender
responds based on the seller's message.  Chaum's fancy mathematics guarantees
that the spender's anonymity is protected if he only uses each piece of
cash once.  But if he uses it twice, the random information will be
different for each transaction, and this will cause him to reveal more
information about himself, enough information that the bank can deduce
his identity.

This process is problematical in the Internet environment, though.  The
need for a protocol between spender and seller might be tolerable for
systems with direct TCP connections, but the universe of potential
users of cash is much larger than this.  I think it will be necessary for
cash to work just via email.  And in that case the requirement for
three messages (spender to seller, seller to spender, spender to seller)
for every transaction will be very cumbersome.

Also, if double-spending is discovered it's not clear what you do about
it.  Ideally, if the customer has a large enough bank balance to cover
the extra spending the bank can just dip into the account (once the
customer's anonymity is broken by Chaum's algorithms) and pay off the
sellers.  But if this is not the case then it isn't clear who would
take the loss or what legal redress the bank would have against the
customer.  All this seems to require some legal infrastructure which
would delay the acceptance of digital cash.

In an on-line system, transactions are somewhat easier.  Customers send
cash to sellers, sellers check the cash with the bank, and proceed
with the sale.  There are still three messages, but two of them are with
the bank, so it is simpler because these always go to the same place.
Spenders have it especially easy as they just send off their cash.

So, I would think an on-line system would be more appropriate for the
net environment as it exists today.

Another big issue is the legality of cash.  How legitimate does an initial
implementation of digital cash need to be?  PGP's acceptance has been
hampered by its infringement of patents.  Digital cash would have a worse
time of it, probably; it infringes on RSA (for the bank signatures) as
well as Chaum's patents.  In the Whole Earth article Chaum indicated that
he had the whole field pretty well locked up with patents.

With PGP we can at least make a moral argument that non-commercial, personal use
should be OK, but it's not clear that the concept "non-commercial" can really
apply to digital money.  Even if it could, RSAREF does not provide at all
the functionality that is needed since it is the direct mathematics of RSA
that provides the basis for blind signatures.  So one would need to get
permission to call the "pure RSA" entry points in RSAREF.  Then some kind
of agreement would be needed with Chaum.  This is quite a daunting list.

Whether you satisfy the patent lawyers or just decide to go with an under-
ground approach, you then have the issue of backing the cash and the tax
consequences.  When I looked into this several months ago it looked to me
like a digital cash system would be much like the "barter exchanges" which
have been tried from time to time, and which have stringent tax reporting
requirements, with associated serious penalties.  England is apparently
less strict about this than the U.S., with several cases of barter exchanges
having been publicized recently.  Perhaps that would be a better forum for
launching a cash system.

As for backing, I believe that the best way to give digital cash value is
to make it possible to exchange it for regular cash.  If you know that
you can take received digital cash, email it to the bank, and receive a
check in the mail a few days later for that amount, you will be likely to
accept it.  I have a Disney Dollar on my desk for which it is possible to
take it to a Disney store and exchange it for a regular dollar.  If the
same thing can be done for digital cash then I think it will be accepted.

All told, there are a lot of obstacles standing in the way of digital cash.
The technology is complicated, patent issues arise at every turn, and
the complexity of the tax and banking laws will have to be faced.  It's
not clear how soon we can expect to be able to tackle these problems.

Hal





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Do you know what's in the trunk?  25-May-1993 0917 <yerazunis@aidev.enet.dec.com>
Date: Tue, 25 May 93 06:18:18 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: re:pi compression
Message-ID: <9305251318.AA14593@enet-gw.pa.dec.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>
>>Since all possible finite bit strings are, by definition, contained
>>in the unending cavalcade of bits in pi, 
>
>Definition?  I have seen not this asserted even by theorem.  Not
>surprising, since the statement is patently false.  There are
>2^{\aleph_0} finite bit strings, and only \aleph_0 of those are
>subsequences of pi.

Um, it doesn't follow to me that it's _obvious_ that 2^Aleph_0 is
larger than Aleph_0.  

It might be- but I'd like to see the proof.

Now, Aleph_0 ^ Aleph_0, on the other hand...

	-Bill (wondering why this thread of recursively nonenumerable
		transfinite ordinal stuff keeps cropping up in *all* his
		mailing lists)





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Timothy Newsham <newsham@wiliki.eng.hawaii.edu>
Date: Tue, 25 May 93 10:45:07 PDT
To: wixer!wixer.bga.com!cat@cactus.org (Dr. Cat)
Subject: Re: PGP voice encryption
In-Reply-To: <9305251601.AA21567@wixer>
Message-ID: <9305251745.AA21151@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> 
>    Actually, if somebody wants to start developing PC based voice encryption,
> there's a pretty significant installed base of machines that can handle it
> already.  By the end of 1992, there were about 3 million machines with sound
> cards, by the end of 93 it's projected to reach 6 million.  Anyone that has a
> Soundblaster or Soundblaster compatible has both a DAC output and a
> microphone input.  On a machine with a 9600 or 14,400 kilobaud modem,
> sufficient real-time compression of voice to fit within the modem bandwidth
> is a quite reasonable objective.  I know of at least three people in the
> computer game industry that have been working on it, and at least one of them
> already has functional code.  I'm sure there's a pretty fair number of
> Macintoshes out there that have all the hardware to support real-time
> encrypted voice communications also, though I don't follow the numbers in the
> Mac market these days...

The biggest problem is CPU power.  The compression schemes that work
best are very computationally expensive.  Add to that the fact that
you need to do simultaneous encryption and compression, and if you
want full duplex make that simultaneous encryption, decryption,
compression and decompression.   You also have to send it over the
modem, and probably frame it too.

I'm currently implementing one scheme (LPC) on a DSP chip.  Hopefully
my end product will be <$50.  I plan put its own ADC/DAC chip on
board (to save computer<->DSP bandwidth).  Possibly some
high end CPU's like 486 and 040 could handle the load, but
wouldnt leave much cpu for anything else.
 

>                                Dr. Cat / no .sig, why bore people?
> 




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: peter honeyman <honey@citi.umich.edu>
Date: Tue, 25 May 93 05:45:17 PDT
To: jslee@well.sf.ca.us (John S. Lee)
Subject: Re: UUDecode
In-Reply-To: <199305250439.AA04920@well.sf.ca.us>
Message-ID: <9305251245.AA11776@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


bsdj has uuencode and uudecode.  i can mail you a copy.

	peter




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: gnu (John Gilmore)
Date: Tue, 25 May 93 08:46:32 PDT
To: kqb@whscad1.att.com
Subject: Re: Steganography and Steganalysis
In-Reply-To: <9305241859.AA11273@toad.com>
Message-ID: <9305251546.AA17642@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Someone is probably doing steganography in netnews and/or mailing
lists right now!  (Besides cypherpunks, I mean.)  How would we find them?

Someone with a news feed and some CPU time and hacking time on their
hands could come up with some analysis tools that scan news or email
articles, looking for unusual patterns.  You can debug them on
something with a small flow, then gradually speed and smarten them up
to be able to run across the whole netnews flow (at multiple sites).

If nothing else, such a package would provide a way to winnow signal
from noise on Usenet, by tweaking the parameters until they kicked out a
reasonable number of messages per day.  E.g. "give me the ten messages
from rec.books that use the most varied vocabulary", or "locate C source
code with lots of comments for my friend who's learning C".

And, if some of us work on ways to hide information in the flow, and
others work on ways to locate and extract it, the two efforts will
complement each other.  Think of it as "quality assurance" or
"testing" for the information-hiding effort.  We certainly won't be
the only people looking!  So let's see what NSA, KGB, etc are finding...

Bill Tuthill's "hum" (humanities department support) package from
comp.sources may give you some ideas.  It's not 100% useful for this,
but it's there:

    A new package of programs for literary and linguistic computing is
    available, emphasizing the preparation of concordances and supporting
    documents.  Both keyword in context and keyword and line generators
    are provided, as well as exclusion routines, a reverse concordance
    module, formatting programs, a dictionary maker, and lemmatization
    facilities.  There are also word, character, and digraph frequency
    counting programs, word length tabulation routines, a cross reference
    generator, and other related utilities.  The programs are written in
    the C programming language, and implemented on several Version 7 Unix
    systems at Berkeley.

hum/Part01: v10i27:  Bull Tuthill's "hum" text concordance package, Part01/03
hum/Part02: v10i28:  Bull Tuthill's "hum" text concordance package, Part02/03
hum/Part03: v10i29:  Bull Tuthill's "hum" text concordance package, Part03/03
hum.pch:    v11i065:  Hum concordance package update kit

in ftp.uu.net:/usenet/comp.sources.unix/volume10 and volume11.

John Gilmore                gnu@toad.com  --  gnu@cygnus.com  --  gnu@eff.org
Creating freedom, rather than longer chains, bigger cages, better meals, . . .




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: kelly@pleiku.netcom.com
Date: Tue, 25 May 93 09:34:33 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: No Subject
Message-ID: <9305251634.AA18989@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>From kelly Tue May 25 16:34:55 +0000 1993 remote from pleiku
To: netcomsv.netcom.com!toad.com!gnu (John Gilmore)
cc: whscad1.att.com!kqb, toad.com!cypherpunks, toad.com!gnu, kelly
Subject: Re: Steganography and Steganalysis 
In-reply-to: Your message of "Tue, 25 May 1993 08:46:27 MST."
             <9305251546.AA17642@toad.com> 
Priority: urgent
Date: Tue, 25 May 1993 16:34:55 +0000
From: "Stop the Big Brother CHip" <pleiku!kelly>
Received: from pleiku by pleiku.netcom.com; Tue, 25 May 1993 09:34 PDT
Content-Type: text
Content-Length: 1907

Hi John,

    In addition I suggest still some more tools


     newsclip(by clarinet... provides for news clipping)

     newsfind(on soda.berkley.edu for searches of NNTP servers)

     agrep(Fuzzy set searches)

     expn(expanding mail aliases)

     addr-check(expanding and tracing mail aliases)

     netfind(email address searches)

     Xmosaic(hypertest gui... has some useful location features)

     whois(standard NS prog)

For tracing that mysterious person on the end of the line...

    cypherpunks may want to consider

     "How to investigate by computer"
      by Ralph D Thomas
      In-detail explanation of commercial access to xcross,
      criminal justice/public records/postal forwarding/
      credit info...

And the infamous
    
       "How to get everything on anybody"
        Vols 1 and 2 by Lee Lapin and Scott French

       "The Big Brother Game"
        same

       "Ninja 1990"
        same...

--
Parts of this .sig borrowed with permission from T.C.May.
Perhaps it will indeed get me busted also.
..........................................................................
Kelly Goen             | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,  
kelly@netcom.com       | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
Intelligence Systems   | knowledge, reputations, information markets, 
Specialists Inc.       | black markets, face banks, data havens, dark
                       | tech, covert channels, shared secrets,
                       | alt.whistleblowers, collapse of governments.
Technical Monkeywrench | Public Key: PGP 2.2.
                       |
..........................................................................
PGP 2.2 Key available from PGP Keyservers on the Internet.

pub  1024/1BA573 1992/09/09  kelly <kelly@netcom.com>
          Key fingerprint =  EF 7A 38 99 22 84 E3 3B  90 2A DB 80 DC 65 DA 31 

STOP THE WIRETAP CHIP(Clipper Chip)!!




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Dr. Cat <wixer!wixer.bga.com!cat@cactus.org>
Date: Tue, 25 May 93 09:22:06 PDT
To: extropia.wimsey.com!root@cactus.org (Operator)
Subject: PGP voice encryption
In-Reply-To: <199305250633.AA06800@xtropia>
Message-ID: <9305251601.AA21567@wixer>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


   Actually, if somebody wants to start developing PC based voice encryption,
there's a pretty significant installed base of machines that can handle it
already.  By the end of 1992, there were about 3 million machines with sound
cards, by the end of 93 it's projected to reach 6 million.  Anyone that has a
Soundblaster or Soundblaster compatible has both a DAC output and a
microphone input.  On a machine with a 9600 or 14,400 kilobaud modem,
sufficient real-time compression of voice to fit within the modem bandwidth
is a quite reasonable objective.  I know of at least three people in the
computer game industry that have been working on it, and at least one of them
already has functional code.  I'm sure there's a pretty fair number of
Macintoshes out there that have all the hardware to support real-time
encrypted voice communications also, though I don't follow the numbers in the
Mac market these days...
                               Dr. Cat / no .sig, why bore people?




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Dr. Cat <wixer!wixer.bga.com!cat@cactus.org>
Date: Tue, 25 May 93 09:22:13 PDT
To: CompuServe.COM!74076.1041@cactus.org (Hal)
Subject: Re: Digital cash issues...
In-Reply-To: <930525075401_74076.1041_FHD58-1@CompuServe.COM>
Message-ID: <9305251612.AA26796@wixer>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


   Regarding the issue of what to do under Chaum's scheme when someone double-
spends a piece of digital cash & their identity is revealed...  While this
might be a problem for a cypherpunk style "kick society in the pants and get
this going early" implementation of digital banking, I don't think it's going
to be a serious hindrance in the long term.  While I'm sure all big retail
chains and the like will have terminals that can instantly verify a piece of
cash, if there are niches for an offline system, there's a very significant
economic infrastructure set up for collecting on bad debts.  Any credit card
company, phone company, or other corporation that does a lot of billing
already has staff dedicated solely to that function, with collection agencies
providing a second tier of functionality for the tougher cases.

           Dr. Cat / Dragon's Eye / New traditions for the next century




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Doug.Brightwell@Corp.Sun.COM (Doug Brightwell)
Date: Tue, 25 May 93 11:57:58 PDT
To: TO1SITTLER@APSICC.APS.EDU
Subject: Re: License plates
Message-ID: <9305251854.AA01809@media.Corp.Sun.COM>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



> My understanding is that in many states, the Department of Motor Vehicles Records
> indexed on license plate number, and containing the name, address, and other
> information about the owner, is public or semi-public.  How would an interested
> party go about finding this information?  How difficult or costly is it?  And
> what all is actually listed in the record?

Several weeks following a car accident that I was involved in, I
received a notice from the California DMV notifying me that someone had
filed a request for the information on my vehicle registration. From
the name and address on the notice, I figured out that it was the other
driver's attorney, probably wanting to know where to send a subpoena.
Apparently, anyone can walk into a DMV office, fill out a form, pay
$1.00 (or whatever) and get the info because it's public record.
However, at least the DMV also alerts the "investigatee" to the fact
that someone now has their home address, and provides the name and
address of the requestor.

Doug




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: poier@sfu.ca (Skye Merlin Poier)
Date: Tue, 25 May 93 13:55:34 PDT
To: root@extropia.wimsey.com (Operator)
Subject: Re: your mail
In-Reply-To: <199305250633.AA06800@xtropia>
Message-ID: <9305251856.AA10704@malibu.sfu.ca>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

:)   The proposal specifically is to extend PGP beyond file encryption
:)   to generalized stream handling.  Such streams can be consoles &
:)   keyboards, real-time file transfers, and digitized voice; indeed,
:)   anything that will pass over a modem or other serial transfer medium.

This is already being attempted: Ytalk version 2.1 has both a single key
stream encryption feature and a PGP encryption feature ( I haven't been able
to get the PGP encryption feature to work, however.). It is still in beta
testing, but it looks like it will be out soon...

Skye
- --
- -----====> Skye Merlin Poier <====----- 
Undergrad in CMPT/MATH (Virtual Reality)       ||||      ||||
          email: poier@sfu.ca                  p-OO <--> OO-q   THINK
   PGP Public Key available on finger           \==      ==/


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.2

iQCVAgUBLAJrzy0bkpXW3omvAQEwZQQAobdu4F3v9rGfeKTrWTwz0CgLHGj9j1eJ
FTecY3x4H3h4hra3QpztpwidizyOvvbyeJFrPZc0k+lJxYjFkLduiI7F9GpL+jSe
ha10iPcRDUcKxJ74nyVWTupLpnznbYmZaQ7eh7BJi3GNo6M2GeUgccPt7j47F+Fy
lzSvE05eYJw=
=bvHZ
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: fergp@sytex.com (Paul Ferguson)
Date: Tue, 25 May 93 09:17:06 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: VinCrypt
Message-ID: <NX544B1w165w@sytex.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Has anyone heard of this product or know how to get in touch with
its authors/developers?
 
8<-------- Snip, Snip -----------
 
 
Journal:    Computerworld  March 1 1993 v27 n9 p6(1).
--------------------------------------------------------------------
Title:     Hackers switch sides, offer security package. (includes
           related article on the VinCrypt data security application)
           (Product Announcement)
Author:    Daly, James
 
 
Abstract:  Notorious computer hackers introduce their $159 VinCrypt
           encryption package, which enhances data security.  The
           DOS-based application has been created by highly skilled
           underground systems programmers.  Co-developer Ian Murphy,
           who is president of Secure Data Systems Inc, also will
           distribute the application.  He indicates that VinCrypt
           has not gained the approval of any government agency, but
           he does not seek government approval.  Murphy believes that
           data encryption packages based on the Data Encryption
           Standard or RSA Data Security Inc's standards are not secure
           because their basic algorithms have been given to the
           National Security Agency. VinCrypt's source code will not
           be passed around, but some experts suggest that it then will
           be difficult to evaluate the package's real security
           effectiveness.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
Type:      product announcement
Product:   VinCrypt
Topic:     Data security
           Software Packages
           Product Introduction
           Computer hackers
           Encryption
           Standards
 
8<----- End of plea for assistance --------

Paul Ferguson               |  The future is now.
Network Integrator          |  History will tell the tale;
Centreville, Virginia USA   |  We must endure and struggle
fergp@sytex.com             |  to shape it.
 
          Stop the Wiretap (Clipper/Capstone) Chip.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Eric Watt Forste <arkuat@joes.garage.com>
Date: Tue, 25 May 93 11:57:41 PDT
To: Eric Hughes <hughes@soda.BERKELEY.EDU>
Subject: Re: privacy graphics archive
In-Reply-To: <9305241902.AA23897@soda.berkeley.edu>
Message-ID: <199305251901.AA16261@joes.GARAGE.COM>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



 >I can keep or mirror the electronic archive on soda.

Thanks very much for your offer. It would be great if you could keep
the electronic part at soda, since we only have five megabytes on
Netcom, and Joe's Garage is no the most reliable system in the world.

When Sunah and I start getting stuff, I'll send mail.

Arkuat




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Hal <74076.1041@CompuServe.COM>
Date: Tue, 25 May 93 09:18:20 PDT
To: CYPHERPUNKS <CYPHERPUNKS@toad.com>
Subject: Steganography...
Message-ID: <930525161307_74076.1041_FHD47-1@CompuServe.COM>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

Kevin Brown makes some interesting points about steganography and
steganalysis.  The issue of recognizing whether a message has or might
have a hidden message has two sides.  One is for the desired recipient
to be clued that he should try desteganizing and decrypting the message,
and the other is for a possible attacker to discover illegal uses of
cryptography.

Steganography should be used with a "stealthy" cryptosystem (secret key
or public key), one in which the cyphertext is indistinguishable from a
random bit string.  You would not want it to have any headers which could
be used to confirm that a desteganized message was other than random noise.

This would allow some public standard to be used for steganizing messages.
Ideally, the standard would be chosen so that typical real messages, when
desteganized by the standard technique, would produce close to a random
bit pattern.  Maybe Kevin's idea about taking the parity of each (four-
letter or greater?) word in the message would work.

With stealthy cryptography and a "random" standard steganographic technique
people could use steganography without much fear that their messages will
attract attention, or that they could be proven to be using this technology
just by analysis of their messages.  Only the desired recipient would discover
the hidden message by achieving success in decrypting the random bit string
that comes from the desteganography.  He would have to try this on all messages
and it would only work on those fraction with hidden messages aimed at him.

A big problem right now is that none of Kevin's proposed approaches seem to
be capable of being fully automated.  I don't think that word substitution
can be done safely, at least not by some simplistic algorithm.  Words have
many meanings and it is not easy for software to choose an appropriate
synonym.  This is a similar problem to machine translation, and I think those
systems still require a lot of human supervision.

In the olden days, spies used the "window" method of steganography.  They
had a piece of paper with randomly-scattered holes in it.  They would put it
on top of another piece of paper and write their secret message in the holes.
Removing the "window" paper left a sheet of paper with some widely scattered
letters.  The spy then wrote a cover message among the letters, choosing his
words so that the letters fit in.  The recipient then had a paper with the
same window positions so that he could read the message.

We could do a similar thing - position the letters of a hidden (and encrypted)
message at every 5th (or 10th, or whatever) position, and have a special word
processor that let you compose a message but allowed you to see the forthcoming
stega letters so that you could try to make your words fit around them.  This
might be harder than for the paper case because we have no ability to change
the spacing of our letters in order to fit around the fixed letters more easily.

Steganography will be more labor-intensive than ordinary encryption.  You
have to write two messages: the encrypted one you want to send, and a cover
message that is five to ten times longer.  Plus you may need to massage the
cover message to one degree or another depending on how automatic the stego
insertion is.  This might be reasonable if crypto is outlawed and you are
part of an underground group fighting the government, but for ordinary use
I don't see how to make it both easy and safe.

Hal

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Version: 2.2

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qkdX3FRHll7O9KeIipYdDvJUGeIfFzQobyBy6pGvSQZKV0tdb+ZM+3BG9LlpUFZZ
Y1wGX0aJChvY+/L2RugxxLGROYOdZJzeijBj5L6swgmtsschHnsfo7j7A3md6gDq
rJyFvOaU5ms=
=g99M
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From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: TO1SITTLER@APSICC.APS.EDU (Kragen Sittler)
Date: Tue, 25 May 93 11:15:03 PDT
To: cypherpunklist<cypherpunks@toad.com>
Subject: License plates
Message-ID: <930525121307.302f@APSICC.APS.EDU>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


My understanding is that in many states, the Department of Motor Vehicles Records
indexed on license plate number, and containing the name, address, and other
information about the owner, is public or semi-public.  How would an interested
party go about finding this information?  How difficult or costly is it?  And
what all is actually listed in the record?

How about medical records?  How private are they?

How about other records which are, to me, private or appear to be private, but
can actually be read by anyone without my consent?

Kragen




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Marc Horowitz <marc@GZA.COM>
Date: Tue, 25 May 93 09:13:33 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Noise on the list
Message-ID: <9305251613.AA04301@dun-dun-noodles.aktis.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Would it be incorrect to say that people flailing randomly on the list
trying to invent the next great encryption scheme is both a waste of
bandwidth, and inappropriate to the list?

I guess what I'm trying to say is that I see cypherpunks as a
gathering of people trying to encourage privacy via technology.  As
such, technical discussions of how to implement a remailer would be
appropriate, but it seems that garbage about how to make MacBeth
decrypt into your plaintext should be reserved for sci.crypt.flame.
There's also a lot of other inappropriate traffic, like the recent
"espionage" thread.  Save it for talk.bizarre.

Should I crawl back into my hole, or am I not the only one who thinks
that a lot of the random spewage on the list is just that?

(flame off)

I think this is a valuable list.  I like being on it, most of the
time.  But we've already seen many people remove themselves because
they were drowning in email.  Can we please try to keep the messages
appropriate, and the signal-to-noise ratio high?

		Marc




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: pat@tstc.edu (Patrick E. Hykkonen)
Date: Tue, 25 May 93 10:44:14 PDT
To: marc@GZA.COM (Marc Horowitz)
Subject: Re: Noise on the list
In-Reply-To: <9305251613.AA04301@dun-dun-noodles.aktis.com>
Message-ID: <9305251744.AA13138@tstc.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> I think this is a valuable list.  I like being on it, most of the
> time.  But we've already seen many people remove themselves because
> they were drowning in email.  Can we please try to keep the messages
> appropriate, and the signal-to-noise ratio high?

Of all the lists I'm subscribed to, this is the only one that I read
*every* article in.  Even the "noise" articles.  Humans being what
they are, the noise is needed to help decide the direction of the
group.  Besides, for those of us who are just starting on our journey
through crypto-underworld need the noise to help familiarize
ourselves with how crypto works.  I've learned more from the informal
ramblings than I've gathered out of all the formal and/or mathematical
postings to date.

I don't mind tech... but let's not do away with the noise either.
Thanks.

One persons opinion.

-- 
Pat Hykkonen, N5NPL                     Texas State Technical College at Waco
{pat,postmaster,root,GOD}@tstc.edu             Instructional Network Services
                                             3801 Campus Dr.  Waco, Tx  76705
                                           V:(817) 867-4830  F:(817) 799-2843




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Timothy Newsham <newsham@wiliki.eng.hawaii.edu>
Date: Tue, 25 May 93 16:24:57 PDT
To: uri@watson.ibm.com
Subject: Re: PGP voice encryption
In-Reply-To: <9305251805.AA19930@buoy.watson.ibm.com>
Message-ID: <9305252324.AA29081@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> 
> Timothy Newsham says:
> > The biggest problem is CPU power.  The compression schemes that work
> > best are very computationally expensive.  Add to that the fact that
> > you need to do simultaneous encryption and compression, and if you
> > want full duplex make that simultaneous encryption, decryption,
> > compression and decompression.   You also have to send it over the
> > modem, and probably frame it too.
> 
> You're right.  But if the voice-modem,  or a smart voice card (like
> SoundBlaster, maybe? Can it do CELP? Can any other available card?)
I'm not sure.  My understanding of SoundBlaster was that it could
produce sounds and had digitizing capabilities (ie. A/D D/A card)
If this is so it couldnt do any computations itself.  Somoene
mentioned Xyxel's modems will do CELP in and of themselves.

> will handle full-duplex voice in and out, and then a smart data
> modem will pump it through the line (again, full duplex), then
> all the CPU has to do is simultaneous encryption/decryption,
> plus frame management (moving frames to/from Blaster and
> modem).
There is no doubt that the CPU can handle the encrypion +
framing, this is what I plan to do.

> 
> Am I missing anything?
> 
> > I'm currently implementing one scheme (LPC) on a DSP chip.  Hopefully
> > my end product will be <$50.  I plan put its own ADC/DAC chip on
> > board (to save computer<->DSP bandwidth).  Possibly some
> > high end CPU's like 486 and 040 could handle the load, but
> > wouldnt leave much cpu for anything else.
> 
> What DSP are you playing with? How expensive is it? Can I buy
> such a chip from somewhere (assuming the price won't scare me
> out)?
I am using the ADSP2105 from Analog Devices.  The list price
is about $12.  It has internal memory (1 kwords instruction,
512 words data,  24 and 16 bits wide respectively), and
boots instruction memory off of an eeprom.  Minimum setup
would probably be ADSP2105, xtal, eeprom (4k), max232 
(interface voltage levels), DAC/ADC chip and a power supply.

You can reach Analog Devices at (617) 329-4700,  they
send out spec sheets for free.

> --
> Regards,
> Uri         uri@watson.ibm.com      scifi!angmar!uri 	N2RIU
> -----------
> <Disclamer>
> 
> 




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: peb@PROCASE.COM
Date: Tue, 25 May 93 13:41:13 PDT
To: fergp@sytex.com
Subject: Re: VinCrypt
Message-ID: <9305252040.AA15879@banff.procase.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



I saw their package at Fry's last weekend.  It has a double DES
mode too.  It seems to have only manual encrypt/decrypt.  The right
way to do it is have a device driver do it for you (say, a 
Mach user level pager for a crypto disk).


	   Data Encryption
           Standard or RSA Data Security Inc's standards are not secure
           because their basic algorithms have been given to the
           National Security Agency. VinCrypt's source code will not
           be passed around,

Great spin, but not much more than spin.


Paul E. Baclace
peb@procase.com




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: fergp@sytex.com (Paul Ferguson)
Date: Tue, 25 May 93 11:46:18 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Bill O' Rights
Message-ID: <J6a54B1w165w@sytex.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I remember reading this in the March ACM and thinking,"Man. He hit
that right on the head." When I ran across this transcript in Computer
Select earlier this morning (while looking for various encryption
products, no less), I thought those of you who had not already seen it
would be struck by John Perry's insights. BTW, I also have the full
transcripts of Dorothy Denning's, William A. Bayse's (Assistant
Director, FBI Technical Services Division) and Lewis M. Branscomb's
(Harvard University) articles which appeared in the same issue with
regards to Digital Telephony, if anyone cares for me to post them.
Looking back on the progression of events, beginning with the debate
of the Digital Telephony proposal and subsequently the proposal
currently (officially) referred to as the "Key Escrow" Chip (and its
associated escrow scheme), I can't help but surmise that the whole
ball of wax is geared towards allowing the Government the ability to
effectively eavesdrop on its citizens communications in the face of
advancing technology, without regard to privacy matters.
 
8<---- Begin forwarded text ---------
 
Journal:    Communications of the ACM  March 1993 v36 n3 p21(3)
* Full Text COPYRIGHT Association for Computing Machinery Inc.1993.
----------------------------------------------------------------------
Title:    Bill o' rights. (impact of technology on basic civil rights;
          humor) (Electronic Frontier)
Author:   Barlow, John Perry
 
 
----------------------------------------------------------------------
Full Text:
 
*Note*    Only Text is presented here; see printed issues for graphics.
 
It has been almost three years since I first heard of the Secret Service
raids on Steve Jackson Games and the cyberurchins from the Legion of
Doom.  These federal exploits, recently chronicled in Bruce Sterling's
book Hacker Crackdown, precipitated the formation of the Electronic
Frontier Foundation and kicked loose an international digital liberties
movement which is still growing by leaps and conferences.
 
I am greatly encouraged by the heightened awareness among the citizens
of the Global Net of our rights, responsibilities, and opportunities.
I am also heartened that so many good minds now tug at the legal,
ethical, and social riddles which come from digitizing every damned
thing.  The social contract of Cyberspace is being developed with
astonishing rapidity, considering that we are still deaf, dumb, and
disembodied in here.
 
Meanwhile, back in the Physical World, I continue to be haunted by the
words of the first lawyer I called on behalf of Steve Jackson, Phiber
Optik, and Acid Phreak back in the spring of 1990.  This was Eric
Lieberman of the prestigious New York civil liberties firm Rabinowitz,
Boudin, Standard, Krinsky, and Lieberman.  I told him how the Secret
Service had descended on my acquaintances and taken every scrap of
circuitry or magnetized oxide they could find.  This had included not
only computers and disks, but clock radios and audio cassettes.
 
I told him that, because no charges had been filed, the government was
providing their targets no legal opportunity to recoup their confiscated
equipment and data.  (In fact, most of the victims of Operation Sun
Devil still have neither been charged nor had their property returned to
them.)
 
[This issue has been somewhat resolved with the recent ruling in
 favor of Steve Jackson and the subsequent award of damages.]
 
The searches were anything but surgical and the seizures appeared
directed less at gathering evidence than inflicting punishment without
the bothersome formality of a trial.  I asked Lieberman if the Secret
Service might not be violating the Fourth Amendment's assurance of "The
right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures."
 
He laughed bitterly.  "I think if you take a look at case law for the
last ten years or so, you will find that the Fourth Amendment has
pretty much gone away," he said.
 
I did.  He was right.  A lot of what remained of it was flushed a year
later when the Rehnquist Court declared that in the presence of
"probable cause" ...a phrase of inviting openness...law enforcement
officials could search first and obtain warrants later.
 
Furthermore, I learned that through such sweeping prosecutorial
enablements as RICO and Zero Tolerance, the authorities could entract
their own unadjudicated administrative "fines" by keeping much of what
they seized for their own uses.
 
(This incentive often leads to disproportionalities between "punishment"
and "crime" which even Kafka might have found a bit over the top.  I
know of one case in which the DEA acquired a $14 million Gulfstream
bizjet from a charter operator because one of its clients left half a
gram of cocaine in its washroom.)
 
I tried to image a kind of interactive Bill of Rights in which
amendments would fade to invisibility as they became meaningless, but
I knew that was hardly necessary.  The citizens of Stalin's Soviet
Union had a constitutional guarantee of free expression which
obviously, like our own, allowed some room for judicial
interpretation.
 
It occurred to me then that a more honest approach might be to maintain
a concordant Bill of Rights, running in real time and providing
up-to-the-minute weather reports from the federal bench, but I never got
around to it.
 
Recently I started thinking about it again.  These thoughts were
inspired partly by Dorothy Denning's apology for the FBI's digital
telephony proposal (which appears in this issue).  I found her analysis
surprisingly persuasive, but I also found it fundamentally based on an
assumption I no longer share: the ability of the Bill of Rights to
restrain government, now or in the future.
 
The men who drafted the U.S.  Constitution and its first ten amendments
knew something that we have largely forgotten: Government exist to limit
freedom.  That's their job.  And to the extent that utterly unbridled
liberty seems to favor the reptile in us, a little government is not
such a bad thing.  But it never knows when to quit.  As there is no
limit to either human imagination or creativity in the wicked service
of the Self, so it is always easy for our official protectors to envision
new atrocities to prevent.
 
Knowing this, James Madison and company designed a government which was
slightly broken up front.  They intentionally created a few wrenches to
cast into the works, and these impediments to smooth governmental
operation were the Bill of Rights.
 
Lately though, we find ourselves living in a world where the dangers we
perceive are creatures of information rather than experience.  Since
the devil one knows is always less fearsome than the worst one can
imagine, there is no limit to how terrifying or potent these dangers can
seem.
 
Very few of us, if any, have ever felt the malign presence of a real,
live terrorist or drug lord or Mafia capo or dark-side hacker.  They
are projected into our consciousness by the media and the government,
both of which profit directly from our fear of them.  These enemies are,
in our (tele)visions of them, entirely lacking in human decency or
conscience. There is no reason they should be mollycoddled with
constitutional rights.
 
And so, we have become increasingly willing to extend to government what
the Founding Fathers would not: real efficiency.  The courts have been
updating the Bill of Rights to fit modern times and perils, without
anyone having to go through the cumbersome procedure of formal amendment.
 
The result, I would suggest with only a little sarcasm or hyperbole, has
come to look something like this:
 
Bill O' Rights
 
AMENDMENT 1
 
Congress shall encourage the practice of Judeo-Christian religion by its
own public exercise thereof and shall make no laws abridging the freedom
of responsible speech, unless such speech is in a digitized form or
contains material which is copyrighted, classified, proprietary, or
deeply offensive to non-Europeans, nonmales, differently abled or
alternatively preferenced persons; or the right of the people peaceably
to assemble, unless such assembly is taking place on corporate or
military property or within an electronic environment, or to make
petitions to the government for a redress of grievances, unless those
grievances relate to national security.
 
AMENDMENT 2
 
A well-regulated militia having become irrelevant to the security of the
state, the right of the people to keep and bear arms against one another
shall nevertheless remain uninfringed, excepting such arms as may be
afforded by the poor or those perferred by drug pushers, terrorists, and
organized criminals, which shall be banned.
 
AMENDMENT 3
 
No soldier shall, in time of peace, be quartered in any house, without
the consent of the owner, unless that house is thought to have been used
for the distribution of illegal substances.
 
AMENDMENT 4
 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures, may be suspended to
protect public welfare, and upon the unsupported suspicion of law
enforcement officials, any place or conveyance shall be subject to
immediate search, and any such places or conveyances or property within
them may be permanently confiscated without further judicial proceeding.
 
AMENDMENT 5
 
Any person may be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous
crime involving illicit substances, terrorism, or child pornography, or
upon any suspicion whatever; and may be subject for the same offense to
be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb, once by the state courts and
again by the federal judiciary; and may be compelled by various means,
including the forced submission of breath samples, bodily fluids, or
encryption keys, to be a witness against himself, refusal to do so
constituting an admission of guilt; and may be deprived of life, liberty,
or property without further legal delay; and any property thereby
forfeited shall be dedicated to the discretionary use of law enforcement
agencies.
 
AMENDMENT 6
 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a
speedy and private plea bargaining session before pleading guilty.  He is
entitled to the assistance of underpaid and indifferent counsel to
negotiate his sentence, except where such sentence falls under federal
mandatory sentencing requirements.
 
AMENDMENT 7
 
In suits at common law, where the contesting parties have nearly
unlimited resources to spend on legal fees, the right of trail by jury
shall be preserved.
 
AMENDMENT 8
 
Sufficient bail may be required to ensure that dangerous criminals will
remain in custody, where cruel punishments are usually inflicted.
 
AMENDMENT 9
 
The enumeration in the Constitution of certain rights, shall not be
construed to deny or disparage others which may be asserted by the
government as required to preserve public order, family values, or
national security.
 
AMENDMENT 10
 
The powers not delegated to the U.S.  by the Constitution, shall be
reserved to the U.S.  Departments of Justice and Treasury, except when
the states are willing to forsake federal funding.
 
[John P. Barlow is a technological author and the cofounder (with Mitch
Kapor) of the Electronic Frontier Foundation.  He currently lives in
Wyoming, New York and "in Cyberspace." His email address is barlow
@eff.org.]

Paul Ferguson               |  The future is now.
Network Integrator          |  History will tell the tale;
Centreville, Virginia USA   |  We must endure and struggle
fergp@sytex.com             |  to shape it.
 
          Stop the Wiretap (Clipper/Capstone) Chip.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: andrew m. boardman <amb@cs.columbia.edu>
Date: Tue, 25 May 93 11:56:53 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Steganography and Steganalysis
In-Reply-To: <9305251546.AA17642@toad.com>
Message-ID: <199305251856.AA08939@ground.cs.columbia.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


   Someone is probably doing steganography in netnews and/or mailing
   lists right now!  (Besides cypherpunks, I mean.)  How would we find them?

Food for thought: that, at least as of recently, the NSA bought weekly
dumps of all usenet articles on tape.  I highly doubt they were for
their reading pleasure...

andrew




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: baumbach@atmel.com (Peter Baumbach)
Date: Tue, 25 May 93 12:29:52 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: License plates
Message-ID: <9305251859.AA06461@carp.chp.atmel.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> My understanding is that in many states, the Department of Motor Vehicles Records
> indexed on license plate number, and containing the name, address, and other
> information about the owner, is public or semi-public.  How would an interested
> party go about finding this information?  How difficult or costly is it?  And
> what all is actually listed in the record?

Mathew Lesko has several books out that are all about finding this type of
information.  I have a couple of these books, they are available at most book
stores.  "Information USA" is about federal sources of information, and a
newer book, that I don't remember the name of, is about state sources of
information.  I remember seeing a listing, by state, of motor vehicle license
and registration data for sale.  For Maryland, a magnetic tape of complete
license or registration data is available for $300!

> How about medical records?  How private are they?
> 
> How about other records which are, to me, private or appear to be private, but
> can actually be read by anyone without my consent?
> 

I don't know what else.  Credit information "requires" your permission to be 
read by someone.

> Kragen
> 

The work of cypherpunks will make this information less private.  Laws will not
make it more private.  Crypto cash will buy this information anonomously.

The work of cypherpunks will also make this information more private.  You all
know more about this than I do; how do you cypherpunks suggest we keep this
information private?

Peter Baumbach
baumbach@atmel.com




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: gnu (John Gilmore)
Date: Tue, 25 May 93 15:27:33 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com, gnu
Subject: Re: Steganography and Steganalysis
In-Reply-To: <9305252149.AA27051@toad.com>
Message-ID: <9305252227.AA27968@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


My favorite scheme was to encode messages in trailing spaces and/or tabs
in netnews messages.  You could also put internal tabs in place of spaces.

In fact, you could do this with news messages that flow "through" your 
site, (if the messages aren't protected with a crypto checksum), so that
you would not be the message's sender (and it wouldn't be addressed to anyone
either -- recipients get very good privacy).

This would be one way for a Unix "worm" program to report back to its
master...and/or receive instructions.

	John Gilmore

PS:  You could put short interesting stuff just in your message-ID's!
Not to mention the low order bits of timestamps (exactly *what* second
did it arrive, now?).




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Doug Porter <76244.315@CompuServe.COM>
Date: Tue, 25 May 93 13:14:15 PDT
To: Cypherpunks <cypherpunks@toad.com>
Subject: How to make encryption w
Message-ID: <930525200629_76244.315_CHN82-1@CompuServe.COM>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Until many people use encryption those who encrypt will be 
targets. The biggest barrier to widespread use of encryption is 
that you have to leave your mail package to work with separate 
encryption programs and message files. To overcome this people 
need a messaging system which makes encrypting and decrypting as 
easy as pushing a button.

The package should allow plugging and unplugging encryption 
programs. This lets people make their own technical, ethical and 
legal choices. The package also must be significantly better 
than the mail packages people use now, or they won't switch, and 
therefore won't encrypt.

We've done it: Cyberdesk automates access to cyberspace and 
supports third party encryption programs seamlessly. Today 
Cyberdesk manages CompuServe (both email and forums), MCI Mail, 
cc:Mail (both local LAN and remotely), and The WELL (both email 
and conferences), with more to follow. It runs under Windows and 
includes features such as distribution lists and a spelling 
checker. Cyberdesk is in Beta now and fast approaching release.

All you need is a simple interface to use an encryption program 
with Cyberdesk. This interface is usually just two short batch 
files, one for encryption and another for decryption. In some 
cases it may be a small program. We do not plan to provide these 
interfaces or any specific encryption. In addition to allowing 
people flexibility in their choices, we hope this approach will 
make ITAR irrelevant.

Yep, I'm asking you to support a commercial package without 
monetary compensation from us. You may decide to charge users 
for your interface, of course. We'll give a copy of Cyberdesk to 
anyone who creates an interface for an unsupported encryption 
package.

We have a chance to make it easy, and therefore common, for 
people to encrypt. All we need is the interfaces. Cypherpunks 
write code.

Doug





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: RYAN Alan Porter <ryan@rtfm.mlb.fl.us>
Date: Tue, 25 May 93 13:16:55 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: License plates
In-Reply-To: <9305251854.AA01809@media.Corp.Sun.COM>
Message-ID: <Pine.3.03.9305251501.A29356-b100000@rtfm>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain




On Tue, 25 May 1993, Doug Brightwell wrote:

> 
> > My understanding is that in many states, the Department of Motor Vehicles Records
> > indexed on license plate number, and containing the name, address, and other
> > information about the owner, is public or semi-public.  How would an interested
> > party go about finding this information?  How difficult or costly is it?  And
> > what all is actually listed in the record?
> 
> Several weeks following a car accident that I was involved in, I
> received a notice from the California DMV notifying me that someone had
> filed a request for the information on my vehicle registration. From
> the name and address on the notice, I figured out that it was the other
> driver's attorney, probably wanting to know where to send a subpoena.
> Apparently, anyone can walk into a DMV office, fill out a form, pay
> $1.00 (or whatever) and get the info because it's public record.
> However, at least the DMV also alerts the "investigatee" to the fact
> that someone now has their home address, and provides the name and
> address of the requestor.

Here in Florida, the information is supposed to be confidential.  Operation
Rescue (a group of fanatical Christians intent on harassing abortion clinics
and patients) has an employee in the DMV who snatches the number somehow,
however.  They now sit around in front of the clinics and jot down the
license numbers of patients and use their inside contact to find the name
and address of the patient and harass them.

ObRelation2Cypherpunks:  We are now trying to justify using the computer
privacy laws to prosecute specifically for the fact that the records are
being held electronically and Operation Rescue is illegally obtaining this
information and not going through proper channels.


Hugs and kisses,
    -Ryan
the barcode guy


 








From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: poier@sfu.ca (Skye Merlin Poier)
Date: Tue, 25 May 93 16:20:04 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Anonymity on the net
Message-ID: <9305252319.AA26265@malibu.sfu.ca>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

I know of several anonymous remailers: would it not be a good idea to "link up"
several of these hosts so that one mails the first remailer, which mails another
and so on and so on.... This would be a real pain in the butt to retrace, as
surely the owner info wont be rubber hosed out of all of the host bosses....

Skye
- --
- -----====> Skye Merlin Poier <====----- 
Undergrad in CMPT/MATH (Virtual Reality)       ||||      ||||
          email: poier@sfu.ca                  p-OO <--> OO-q   THINK
   PGP Public Key available on finger           \==      ==/


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.2

iQCVAgUBLAKpgS0bkpXW3omvAQFwgAQAzXstBcts8h5U3chnu7SQe67DFgsj4dG1
Jz3BrK2QFHMspkVtxShAC+xBfIYwvR3eCIInKFFjxdzBxbprEJk+pwaNibFvtqDS
IkMM86gr6dsu0UtY0jh73I63M1aZukWVUOzO2TpPL++fibKFBYQDJFD7xeOJWHx7
OeTEAL3gedk=
=rKKD
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: wcs@anchor.ho.att.com
Date: Tue, 25 May 93 13:29:40 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Something just sunk in...
Message-ID: <9305252029.AA24538@anchor.ho.att.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text


> enforcement agency that has to tap a family such as my own.  We have (at
> last count) 6 phones on two lines.  Thats two lines to monitor for one of
> 6 different unit keys.  Are they going to get one court order for each
> phone? or will the one court order do for all of the keys... 

Presumably one court order will cover any phones involved in conversations
with your, er, the alleged perpetrator of some as-yet-unidentified crime's house.
After all, they can't tell in advance what phones would actually be in use,
since serial numbers are presumably not registered at time of purchase,
and it's possible to move the phones around.
Assuming symmetric use of keys, it's more efficient for them to only subpoena keys 
for phones actually in the house, since this catches both ends of the conversation,
but that depends on what they can talk a judge into permitting.

> Am I supposed to pay to replace all 6 phones??  ...  Have they considered this?
Since there have been no statements from the Feds about who pays for *single* phones,
except Ed Meese's line about "People who are innocent usually aren't suspects",
the case of all 6 phones isn't much different, though if you are tried and found
innocent you may be able to force them to disclose which of your phones they've
actually subpoenaed keys for.  It's probably viewed as a "not our problem" issue, 
just as your legal costs for your defense aren't usually reimbursed unless they've
been grossly out of line and you sue them successfully, a la Steve Jackson.

The White House press releases haven't answered the question of exactly who gets
access to your keys once subpoenaed, or whether they have to destroy them if 
you're found innocent, or not eventually charged with a crime, or whatever.
It will probably be left up to the courts to decide.

		Bill Stewart, pessimistically reporting from New Jersey.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: fergp@sytex.com (Paul Ferguson)
Date: Tue, 25 May 93 13:48:36 PDT
To: amb@cs.columbia.edu
Subject: Say again?
Message-ID: <VgH54B1w165w@sytex.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


On Tue, 25 May 1993 14:56:48 -0400,
 andrew m. boardman <uunet!cs.columbia.edu!amb> wrote -
 
> Food for thought: that, at least as of recently, the NSA bought
> weekly dumps of all usenet articles on tape.  I highly doubt they
> were for their reading pleasure...
 
 Is this hearsay, innuendo or fact? If fact, what can you site as
 reference to support your statement? If you know this to be fact,
 please cite your references and provide as much detail as possible.
 
 Cheers.
 

Paul Ferguson               |  The future is now.
Network Integrator          |  History will tell the tale;
Centreville, Virginia USA   |  We must endure and struggle
fergp@sytex.com             |  to shape it.
 
          Stop the Wiretap (Clipper/Capstone) Chip.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Nickey MacDonald <i6t4@jupiter.sun.csd.unb.ca>
Date: Tue, 25 May 93 12:49:21 PDT
To: cypherpunks list <cypherpunks@toad.com>
Subject: Something just sunk in...
Message-ID: <Pine.3.05.9305251649.C3528-a100000@jupiter>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I have been way behind in my email, and I've been catching up...  I was
just reading some of the Clipper mail (To be called the "Huge Clipper
Email Burst of 93"???? ;-) when something just sort of sunk in... 

Asumme for a minute that Clipper was enforced and it got to the point that it
was embedded in *every* phone...  What of the poor (this is sarcasm) law
enforcement agency that has to tap a family such as my own.  We have (at
last count) 6 phones on two lines.  Thats two lines to monitor for one of
6 different unit keys.  Are they going to get one court order for each
phone? or will the one court order do for all of the keys...  Am I
supposed to pay to replace all 6 phones??  I didn't see any mention of
having more than one chip with the same key (not that I would want that
anyway)...  Have they considered this?

---
Nick MacDonald               | NMD on IRC
i6t4@jupiter.sun.csd.unb.ca  | PGP 2.1 Public key available via finger






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Date: Tue, 25 May 93 17:02:06 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Anonymity on the net
Message-ID: <9305260002.AA12104@netcom.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Skye Merlin Poier writes:

>-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
>
>I know of several anonymous remailers: would it not be a good idea to "link up"
>several of these hosts so that one mails the first remailer, which mails
>another
>and so on and so on.... This would be a real pain in the butt to retrace, as
>surely the owner info wont be rubber hosed out of all of the host bosses....

Chaining remailers is of course the basic idea of using remailers.

"Linking up" the remailers would sort of defeat the purpose of the
remailers, wouldn't it? The idea is for only the sender to really know the
sequence of remailers. 

(Of course, some of us aren't always using encrypted remailers--though we
really should be--and hence the first remailer node theoretically knows who
sent the message and where it's going. (Later remailers won't know, as all
header info gets stripped out, so most of the benefits are retained.)
Longterm, this will have to fixed, by more and easier encryption. For now,
just using remailers as I show below is a good exercise.)

Using remailers is easily done, and in fact I do this for nearly all of the
"remailed" messages I send (no, I won't say which of the "anonymous" or
"nobody" messages I sent...if more people used remailers, we'd all be
better off). I encourage everyone out there who has not yet played with
remailers to give them a quick try. You can see for yourself in the next 10
minutes what this all means, just by sending yourself an "anonymous"
message!

Here's an example script I use. Note that I favor the "double colon"
(sounds like a medical condition, doesn't it?) format, as my mailer doesn't
have a convenient way of messing with the headers. (You are of course free
to try the other remailer format, described in the documentation for the
remailers.)

To use the double colon method, simply place a "::" on a blank line in the
_body_ of your message (not the header) followed by a line with
"Request-Remailing-To: next address" in it. And then another blank line,
and then your message. The forms below should make this clearer. Then
_another_ such remailer form can be included, and another, and another, and
so forth. Very easy to use. (Whoever came up with the double colon format,
please keep it in future versions!)

Karl Barrus occasionally publishes a list of operating remailers. I
occasionally test these remailers by sending messages to myself, to assure
myself they're still up and running and are sending stuff through promptly.
I keep a small database of "functional remailers," with their speeds (most
remail within seconds) and such. Once I've "pinged" these remailers, I feel
more confidant about chaining several of them together.

Example of Several Hops:


To: ebrandt@jarthur.claremont.edu

::
Request-Remailing-To: hh@cicada.berkeley.edu

::
Request-Remailing-To: elee7h5@rosebud.ee.uh.edu

::
Request-Remailing-To: final address

This is a test message. Several hops. Even more remailer addresses could of
course be included here. 



{this went through in just a few minutes}


To use this yourself, replace the "final address" with your own address.
You should get an "anonymous" or "nobody" message in just a few minutes.

Naturally, you can vary the order of the remailers, use others, etc. Check
out the list of remailers Karl Barrus publishes (and maybe it's even in the
soda archives?) and "roll your own." Even use PGP with the sites that
support it (and at least one of the sites *requires* PGP, last time I
checked).

If the last address is one of the mail-to-NetNews sites, you've just posted
anonymously.

Happy anonymous remailing!

-Tim May

--
Timothy C. May         | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,  
tcmay@netcom.com       | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
408-688-5409           | knowledge, reputations, information markets, 
W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA  | black markets, collapse of governments.
Higher Power: 2^756839 | Public Key: by arrangement
Note: I put time and money into writing this posting. I hope you enjoy it.      







From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Marc Horowitz <marc@GZA.COM>
Date: Tue, 25 May 93 14:11:34 PDT
To: fergp@sytex.com (Paul Ferguson)
Subject: Re: Say again?
In-Reply-To: <VgH54B1w165w@sytex.com>
Message-ID: <9305252111.AA08399@dun-dun-noodles.aktis.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>>  Is this hearsay, innuendo or fact? If fact, what can you site as
>>  reference to support your statement? If you know this to be fact,
>>  please cite your references and provide as much detail as possible.

Rick Adams of UUNET confirmed on the com-priv list that his
organization had been selling the FBI a usenet feed on tape.  I could
find the exact reference if you want.  I don't know for sure that the
NSA has a feed, or from whom, but it wouldn't surprise me.

However, the obvious next point is, so what?  It's a public system.
Any idiot can pay $20/month and get a public access account.  If you
say something in a news post which you wouldn't want the FBI or NSA or
whoever to see, you're the person who has done something stupid.

Tapping a news feed isn't like tapping a phone line.  It's more like
turning on the television.

		Marc




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Perry E. Metzger" <pmetzger@lehman.com>
Date: Tue, 25 May 93 14:15:35 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Steganography and Steganalysis
In-Reply-To: <199305251856.AA08939@ground.cs.columbia.edu>
Message-ID: <9305252115.AA13580@snark.shearson.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



andrew m. boardman says:
>    Someone is probably doing steganography in netnews and/or mailing
>    lists right now!  (Besides cypherpunks, I mean.)  How would we find them?
> 
> Food for thought: that, at least as of recently, the NSA bought weekly
> dumps of all usenet articles on tape.  I highly doubt they were for
> their reading pleasure...

Many organizations buy complete dumps of usenet -- its a way of
getting a newsfeed if your organization is too paranoid to let you get
a network connection. I don't know if the NSA was such an
organization, but it would not suprise me.

Perry




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: andrew m. boardman <amb@cs.columbia.edu>
Date: Tue, 25 May 93 14:27:18 PDT
To: fergp@sytex.com
Subject: Say again?
In-Reply-To: <VgH54B1w165w@sytex.com>
Message-ID: <199305252126.AA14245@ground.cs.columbia.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


    Is this hearsay, innuendo or fact? If fact, what can you site as
    reference to support your statement? If you know this to be fact,
    please cite your references and provide as much detail as possible.

This was based on a verbal conversation at Interop with someone from
uunet, from whom the tapes are purchased.  I or they could be
mis[led|informed|remembering], but if you really care, ask uunet.

andrew




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: peb@PROCASE.COM
Date: Tue, 25 May 93 17:41:46 PDT
To: tcmay@netcom.com
Subject: Re: Anonymity on the net
Message-ID: <9305260041.AA15894@banff.procase.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



In case you missed it...Wall Street Journal of May 24, page B1 had an
article by Wm. F. Buckley on Internet anonymous messages.  The article
was about some professor who wrote a program to erase anon messages
automatically and how he got "shouted down" and withdrew his program
(it only ran on his netnews site anyway).  The analogy Buckley used
was that of self-policing coffee houses where people doing anti-social
things are shouted out by the crowd.  I guess Buckley is into anon
remailers (or at least their use as free speech devices) since he 
portrayed the guy wiping out anon messages as being anti-social.


Paul E. Baclace
peb@procase.com







From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: jordan@imsi.com (Jordan Hayes)
Date: Tue, 25 May 93 15:01:37 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: dumps of USENET ...
Message-ID: <9305252142.AA29071@IMSI.COM>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


	From <pmetzger@lehman.com> Tue May 25 17:37:46 1993

	Many organizations buy complete dumps of usenet -- its a way of
	getting a newsfeed if your organization is too paranoid to let
	you get a network connection.

I had "always heard" that mimsy.umd.edu was the machine where the Ft.
Meade guys-n-gals (let's not start that *again*) hung out to read/post
USENET ...

/jordan




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: kqb@whscad1.att.com
Date: Tue, 25 May 93 14:49:12 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Steganography and Steganalysis
Message-ID: <9305252149.AA27051@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I have received some useful feedback to yesterday's message on
steganography and steganalysis.  Here are some clarifications
to my cryptic presentation and a correction.

I was most interested in finding if the steganographic capacity of
English is high enough to make steganography practical for everyday
use, so I didn't even address the meaningfulness of the output.
For example, if I could only produce a capacity of a tenth of one percent,
the meaningfulness would not even be an issue because nobody would
want to send large messages via steganography anyway.  A capacity of
10%, requiring the public text to be only 10 times as long as the
hidden text, may be good enough for everyday use.  If that can be
achieved, then the next step is to see if meaningful output can
have a high steganographic content.  If so, then I expect that
several cypherpunks would want to pursue that.  (FYI: I plan to do
more analysis on my own, even if nobody else does.)

My guesstimate for the steganographic capacity of English did not
provide a steganographic algorithm.  For example, I haven't even
looked into how to map a bit string to a parenthesis grouping;
I was just noting that if you have X(N-1) possibilities, there must
be log (X(N-1)) bits available, assuming all possibilities are equally
likely.  Is there a simple-to-compute mapping of the numbers 1 through
X(N-1) to the X(N-1) parenthesizations of an N word sentence?
Fortunately, N rarely gets large for ordinary English sentences,
so a general solution may be unnecessary.

My presentation mistakenly implied that a good steganographic algorithm
may have the form:
    E(K, M) = E2( E1(K,M) )
where E1 is a cryptographically secure encryption function with public
key K and hidden message M, E2 somehow converts the encrypted message to
ordinary English text, and E1, K, and E2 are publicly known.
Unfortunately, if the inverse of E2 (let's call it D2), is easily found,
then the presence of a hidden message can be detected easily, even though
that message cannot be decrypted easily.  This is because the output of E1,
which is incompressible, is easily distinguishable from
D2(ordinary English text).  Here is a better formulation for the
steganographic schema:
    E(K1, K2, M) = E3( E2(K2, E1(K1,M) ))
where:
  E1(K1,M) converts the hidden message M to a cryptographically secure
      cyphertext by using the key K1.  E1 and K1 are public, but the
      decryption function D1 is difficult to compute without the
      private key PK1.
  E3(C) converts a bit string to ordinary-looking English text.
      Assume that both E3 and its inverse D3 are public.
  E2(K2, C) converts the cyphertext C into another bit string such
      that E2(K2, C) has the same statistical characteristics as
      D3(ordinary English text).  Assume that E2 and K2 are public,
      but D2 is difficult to compute without the private key PK2.
Function E1 is normal public key cryptography, which produces an
incompressible cyphertext.  I hope that function E3 has a high enough
steganographic capacity to make steganalysis worthwhile.  Function E2
cannot be a normal encryption function because its output needs to be
as compressible as D3(ordinary English text).  Both functions E2 and E3
are new types of functions that require more research to work well.

I still haven't seen any references to this type of steganography
being done before, but thanks to the various people who gave pointers
to tools that may help in building it.

                              Kevin Q. Brown
                              INTERNET    kqb@whscad1.att.com
                                 or       kevin_q_brown@att.com




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Eric Hughes <hughes@soda.berkeley.edu>
Date: Tue, 25 May 93 18:07:48 PDT
To: poier@sfu.ca
Subject: Anonymity on the net
In-Reply-To: <9305252319.AA26265@malibu.sfu.ca>
Message-ID: <9305260104.AA20217@soda.berkeley.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>I know of several anonymous remailers: would it not be a good idea to
>"link up" several of these hosts so that one mails the first
>remailer, 

For the complete details about this system, please see the ftp site:

	soda.berkeley.edu::pub/cypherpunks/remailer

There is complete source code to the cypherpunks remailer system,
instructions for use, scripts to set up encrypted paths, etc.

More generally speaking, if you have a question which you think might
be a newbie question, please check the archive site first.  For basic
cryptography questions, the sci.crypt FAQ (Frequently Asked Questions)
is available.  The full remailer is available, as well as a fairly
good collection of primary and secondary source documents on the
government wiretap chips.

Eric




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: norm@netcom.com (Norman Hardy)
Date: Tue, 25 May 93 18:08:12 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Steganography
Message-ID: <9305260108.AA22729@netcom3.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Here is a pitfall to be avoided in Steganography using
low bits of AD converter output. Such converters may be biased
in their low bit. If you hid 2,000,000 bits in a digitized image
you would probably get from 998,000 to 1,002,000 one bits
if you took no precautions. A real digitizer might well be
expected to produce more than
1,100,000 one bits or less than 900,000. Falling too close to
50% would be a clue that the data was not the yield of a
AD converter. Stuffing a few percent of extra one bits according
to a random number generator known to the receiver makes the
data look more typical.
 
There may be statictical dependencies with the next more
significant bit as well.
Some elementary statistics can be done on the yield of 
a real image scanner to examine this issue.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Matt Blaze <mab@crypto.com>
Date: Tue, 25 May 93 15:44:59 PDT
To: andrew m. boardman <amb@cs.columbia.edu>
Subject: Re: Say again?
In-Reply-To: <199305252126.AA14245@ground.cs.columbia.edu>
Message-ID: <9305252228.AA06769@crypto.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



>    Is this hearsay, innuendo or fact? If fact, what can you site as
>    reference to support your statement? If you know this to be fact,
>    please cite your references and provide as much detail as possible.
>
>This was based on a verbal conversation at Interop with someone from
>uunet, from whom the tapes are purchased.  I or they could be
>mis[led|informed|remembering], but if you really care, ask uunet.
>
>andrew

Actually, the most alarming revelation here could be that someone at uunet
is going around casually disclosing information about their customers.
Most communications companies, especially those that seek to be regarded
as "common carriers", make quite clear to their employees that customer data
are among their most proprietary and that revealing any of it is grounds for
lightning-speed dismissal.  (Obviously, they reveal data that they SELL about
their customers, and will disclose anything on a court order, but that's not
what we're talking about here).

-matt (who has signed his share of non-disclosure agreements with big, bad
communications companies)





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Eric Hughes <hughes@soda.berkeley.edu>
Date: Tue, 25 May 93 18:43:54 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Anonymity on the net
In-Reply-To: <9305260041.AA15894@banff.procase.com>
Message-ID: <9305260140.AA22229@soda.berkeley.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>In case you missed it...Wall Street Journal of May 24, page B1 had an
>article by Wm. F. Buckley on Internet anonymous messages.  

If someone will type this in, I'll add to to the rants/ directory on
the archive.

Eric




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: andrew m. boardman <amb@cs.columbia.edu>
Date: Tue, 25 May 93 16:14:07 PDT
To: mab@crypto.com
Subject: Say again?
In-Reply-To: <9305252228.AA06769@crypto.com>
Message-ID: <199305252313.AA17325@ground.cs.columbia.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


   >This was based on a verbal conversation at Interop with someone from
   >uunet, from whom the tapes are purchased.  I or they could be
   >mis[led|informed|remembering], but if you really care, ask uunet.

Having just spoken to someone who contracts at the NSA (and no, this name
I will not post), he does not believe they get such a beast, although, as
many people have pointed out, the FBI did.  That, then, would be the
origin of that, along with some TLA confusion.

   Actually, the most alarming revelation here could be that someone at uunet
   is going around casually disclosing information about their customers.

A lot of people perceive the government as having neither a right nor a
need to privacy.  Certainly there are also quite a few who label
themselves "privacy advocates" whose standards do a 180 when the privacy
involved is that of the likes of Mykotronx...

andrew




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Aaron Mahler <amahler@cvgs.schools.virginia.edu>
Date: Tue, 25 May 93 16:49:32 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: REMOVE
Message-ID: <9305252352.AA27835@cvgs.schools.virginia.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



 Due to a lack of free time (and an overflowing mailbox) I
regretfully have to resign from reading The List. I hope to keep up
with events as much as possible from afar. 

 My heart is with you guys.

-AM

-- 

---------------
  Aaron Mahler - Internet: amahler@cvgs.schools.virginia.edu | BIX: amahler
     Interactive Media, Inc - 307 Rivermont Avenue, Lynchburg, Va 24504
 "To search for perfection is all very well, but to look for Heaven is to
              live here in Hell." - Sting, Consider Me Gone




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: miron@extropia.wimsey.com (Miron Cuperman)
Date: Tue, 25 May 93 22:09:24 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Encrypted UNIX "talk" available
Message-ID: <199305260407.AA16052@xtropia>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Last revised Tue May 25 21:05:50 PDT 1993.

What is YTalk?
==============

YTalk is a multi-user drop-in replacement for the UNIX "talk" program.
I have added encryption facilities to it, including private key and
PGP authentication.

Features
========

- Multi user capabilities.
- Drop in replacement for /usr/ucb/talk.
- Diffie-Hellman exponential key exchange for session keys.
- IDEA encryption in CFB mode.
- Password authentication.
- PGP authentication.
- Logging of conversations to a file.

Known bugs and misfeatures
==========================

- No security the first time you use it, until the random seed file
  is created (around 300 keystrokes).
- Some problems with the talk daemons on Ultrix and SCO-Unix.
- Port to Alpha (64bit) incomplete.

Availability
============

Version 2.1
Ftp:	soda.berkeley.edu:/pub/cypherpunks/applications

Bug reporting
=============

All bugs to miron@extropia.wimsey.com.

-- 
        Miron Cuperman <miron@extropia.wimsey.com> | NeXTmail/Mime ok
        Unix/C++/DSP,  consulting/contracting      | Public key avail
        AMIX: MCuperman                            |
Laissez faire, laissez passer. Le monde va de lui meme.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Eric Hughes <hughes@soda.berkeley.edu>
Date: Tue, 25 May 93 21:14:46 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: RSA in CMOS?
In-Reply-To: <9305260322.AA26830@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Message-ID: <9305260411.AA29308@soda.berkeley.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>Does anyone know of the existence of an RSA chip? To the best of my
>knowledge they do not exist. 

Cylink makes one, as well as Mykotronx.

I don't have data sheets here, but the Cylink chips are a fairly old
design, do modular exponentiation, multiplication, and addition.  One
is 512 bits wide (roughly), the other is 1024; these sizes are
inexact--the actual width differ by a few bits.  They run at 16 Mhz
(or at least one of them does).  They're implemented in an old design
process; just reimplementing them in .8 micron could speed them up a
lot.  They've been out for a few years.  The design is patented; I've
read the patent, and there are plenty of other ways to do the
calculations.

The Mytronx chip, the MYK-80, has a full modular exponentiator on it,
as well as SkipJack.  The other name of the chip is Capstone.  It's
not yet shipping.  I take it, though, that this is unsuitable.

There are also at least four commercial announcements of European
exponentiator chips that I have seen, as well as some academic work
which is going to silicon in Britain.

There's no shortage of the chips, just the will to deploy them and the
market awareness for the need for them.

Eric




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: ""L. Detweiler"" <ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Date: Tue, 25 May 93 20:22:55 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: a reaction to Mycotronx intelligence data
Message-ID: <9305260322.AA26827@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I'm disappointed at the *nonexistent* serious response to the Mycotronx
postings on the list (I guess we do have some new algebraic formulas,
though.) Apparently, these are just to hot for anyone to handle. I
think these should be getting our utmost scrutiny as a group for
tactical rewards. Are we at war or aren't we?

So once again I have to do some dangerous limbwalking because all the
other cyphersheep are clutching mommy's apron :). Okay, here goes. I'm
sure there will be many inaccuracies but I think it is better here to
be loud and wrong than to be silent and let it die with a whimper and
nary a peep. I'd like to hear other reactions surely much superior to
my own unauthoritative wanderings.

I'll put in many questions; if anyone has insights into them please
forward them to me and I will summarize (writing about each point to
the list will probably take up too much traffic).

* Also, if anyone can independently *verify* *any* of these pieces of
information, please say so.
* If you have access to databases that record relevant info from
accounts listed and that kind of thing, and aren't at risk in doing so,
please query them.
* What about the people listed? Ever encountered them?
* Interpretations of codenames and numbers especially of interest.
* The possibilities for a little creative and ingenious `social
engineering' (esp. with all the phone numbers in part 1) are absolutely
unlimited for some really nervy cypherpunks, but I'm not going to encourage it...
* Have there been any `repercussions' to the posting on cypherpunks? We
need to know how afraid people are of us. Tighter security?
Disconnected phone numbers? New code names?

In sending me mail, please tell me if I can quote you or your address
in the summary or just attribute it anonymously. Also, do not assume
that email is secure. If a PGP key of mine will make the difference
between your sending me email and not, I'll send it to you.

* * *

First of all, as a very preliminary opinion, it all looks believable
and plausible.  Ironically, there is almost too *much* information!

The first document was forwarded anonymously to the list by
nobody@alumni.cco.caltech.edu. Both documents contain some comments
apparently inserted by the source, the first only at the beginning, the
second at the beginning and in the middle. In the first a statement is quoted

>the 
>government wants us to trust to keep the Clipper design
>secret, don't know jack shit about security.

this comment makes sense in the light of a later message that
purportedly revealed the source of the data. The statement also refers
to `general ledger' probably referring to the second posting. 

The second posting came forwarded anonymously from nobody@alumni.cco. 
The contributor talks of leaving out account numbers.  Also made two
comments on the employee bonuses.

* * *

In posting 1 we have a great deal of very critical information on
people involved in the company, current projects, company contacts,
amazingly detailed cost/finance records. We even know their bank and
banker!  NSA contacts listed!  It's not clear that all these diverse
records would be stored in one volume of information. They appear to be
pasted together from various sources, with some continuity in places. 
A later posting also suggests the reason for this long-term `snapshot'
of company activity at the highest level.

The most critical `big-picture' elements of posting 1 are probably the
companies mentioned. It paints a clear picture of Mycotronx as a sort
of `middleman' in coordinating and contracting other companies to do
chip fabrication and testing, apparently with the NSA as their sole
customer.  AT&T was paid $100K under `Capstone Financial Commitments.'
The companies VLSI Tech (fabrication?) and Exatron (testing?) figure
prominently. Technical documentation by ELITE.

Most amazing is the list of employees and their occupations. If it is
complete, then it is remarkable in the number of employees, 10. There
is a wide range of occupations from engineer to secretary to president
that suggests the list may be complete.

Chips: posting 1 refers to MYK80 for testing. Many references to KG44B,
with several hundred thousand dollars worth of deliveries to the NSA. 
KG-48B appears to still be in testing phases.  Part of the `Outrunner'
project.  The `Outrunner' project figures very prominently, what is it?
 Maybe a specialized chip for Air Force security (appears to be
cryptographic because of KG-46 `Tactical Decryptor').  Capstone shows
up at the end under `Financial commitments'. It's not clear if Clipper
is referenced anywhere. There are many product codes that may refer to it.

* * *

In posting 2 we have an incredibly detailed, perhaps complete,
financial ledger for the company listing everything from employee costs
to office supplies.  An accountant would probably find it much more
readable than me.  Because of the probable single source, the
information is more focused (into financial categories) than that in
posting 1.  There are three columns in each series, beginning balance,
debits, and credits, supposedly for first four months of 93.

Series are probably some Federal or IRS categories for reporting.  It
is organized into `series' with 1000 recording various brokerage
agencies. This may reflect that employees have stock options in the
company. Other entries are customer and employee accounts receivable.
2000 series records employee benefits with `accued bonuses' of $341K
for the period (given 10 employees, this could be astronomical for
someone). Payroll is $343K for the period -- bonuses are as much as
salaries.  These are very high numbers for 10 employees.  Probably the
`upper echelon' of a few is making six figure salaries. 

3000 series lists more stock. 4000 series lists sales of $2.5M for the
4 month period.  5000 lists consultant fees at $47K, subcontracts at
$932K debited and $110K credited.  Direct labor for Engineering came to
186K, Technician 93K, Administrative 37K.  6000 lists a lot of
different categories (miscellaneous) mostly debits.  7000 series lists
another `special bonus' $132K debit, $123. 

Net money debited and credited at the end of the statement is given as
$12.5M for the four month period.  Finally the source lists some
`outstanding VLSI purchase orders'. It is not clear if these are owed
to Mycotronx or Mycotronx owes someone else, but in the first posting
the same figure $100K is mentioned for AT&T under `Capstone Financial
Commitments', so these are probably payments by Mycotronx.  In this
document we see that `Compass' is software, a total of $160K. Motorola
$76K, VLSI Tech (for the Capstone project) $212K. 

Myk78 (Clipper?) figures prominently with VLSI Tech:  $66K, fix $68K,
78A prototype $11K, 78A production $220K.  Also Myk 80 #1 and #2 $48K
and $33K, and Myk82 and Myk 79 (80K and 79K).  VLSI Tech `Expoteniator'
(sic?) $163K. The exponentiator might be a general purpose digital
exponentiator suitable for integration with many cryptographic
techniques (Diffie Hellman, RSA, etc.)

* * *

Battle plan: *If* Mykotronx is to be harassed, the things that might be
useful to focus on are the large bonuses. Where is all that cold cash
going? If it ended up in the hands of a few (or even one) it would not
be good PR, to say the least. Also, Mykotronx is clearly heavily
dependent on VLSI Tech, and the company does not appear to sell to
anyone other than the NSA currently.  So those are the jugular veins, so to speak.

I suppose if we were really extremists, like animal rights activists,
we might individually harass members of the company. I don't encourage
anyone to do this unless they do something to provoke it. However, a
little friendly getting-to-know 'em type interaction might be
interesting and help make sense of our current horde or glean other
information. In particular, if anyone in the company feels (shall we
say) undercompensated that could be another Achilles heel after they
hear how much bonuses are coming out (bonus? I haven't heard about any
bonuses! You heard of any bonuses?)

Following is the mostly raw undistilled stuff. As noted, please comment
on *anything* to me personally in email, and I'll try to organize,
compile, and make sense of it all.

Special thanks to the `anonymous' individual who was willing to risk
potentially severe repercussions to bring the outrageous secrecy
concerning the chip to glaring lighted public exposure and those who
went out of their way to help `him'. Hey, even though this person could
greatly benefit from Introductory Espionage 101 we love you anyway.
You'll probably be the main character when Cypherpunks get their own
sitcom or Monday Night Movie...

posting 1
========

* address, phone, FAQ of company
* bank that holds company account(s)? Shearson Lehman Brothers. Acct
#509 24261 12011.
* Fed Ex Acct #1122-7492-8
* List of employees names and occupations. There are 10 employees listed.

>Bob Gottfried, CEO
>Leonard J. Baker, President
>Ralph O' Connell, aka "The Father of COMSEC", NSA Lobbyist
>Mike Furusawa, Space COMSEC Manager
>Patti Linahan, Executive Secretary
>Kikuo Ogawa, Buyer
>R. Todd, W. Greenfield, KG-44B (Outrunner) Project
>John C. Droge, Personnel
>Bob Todd, Manufacturing Manager
>Landy Riley, Engineering

* Has anyone heard of an `NSA lobbyist'? This is very interesting.
Later O'Connell is listed as `NSA Contact'.
* Also, `COMSEC manager'? 
* `Buyer' of what? All major parts?
* What about the code KG-44B Outrunner project?

Under `Principle NSA Technical Contact' we have the NSA address
(`Maryland Procurement Office) and code 

>Attn: N244 (CEB) (MDA904-92-G-0354/J.O. 5001)

* Code names: what are these? People involved are clues. We already
know KG-48B is also `Outrunner' and 48B and 46 are related somehow. 
* 46 is a `Tactical decryptor unit' -- sounds like a military
application. Involvement of Air Force agents confirms it.
* What is `Computer Systems Command'? That would really nail it, probably.
* Capstone is being built by Mycotronx, right? It's likely Clipper and
Capstone are also named KG-?. I don't think KG-46 and 48B are Clipper
and Capstone due to the `tactical' Air Force involvement. Also, Clipper
is MYK78, right?

>KG-46 Tactical Decryptor Unit and
>KG-48B Outrunner Provisioning Conference participants:
>Robert Todd, Mykotronx
>Bill Greenfield, Mykotronx
>G. Burgio, NSA
>J. Gochnour, NSA
>J. Wimpy, Air Force Computer Systems Command
>S. Solis, Air Force Computer Systems Command

>To Be Discussed at meeting May 18 & 19, 1993

* This is an amazing piece of intelligence. These meetings were
scheduled *after* this posting appeared for us. I think there are a lot
of NSA agents having nightmares right now.
* It is not clear, but it may be that `Outrunner Project Milestone
Payments' were the subject of the May 18,19 meetings. (What is a
`milestone payment'? Is that an NSA term? Military?)  The meeting was
very likely on Outrunner given the rest of the information.
* The dates for payments are 2/14/92 (Preliminary Studies) to 5/13/93
(Deliver 4 KG-44B to NSA). What is a known project under those dates?
* Most categories refer to chip design with terms like VLSI and
`complete fab' and `complete tests', `crypto verif'. Also, is VLSI a company?
* Entires 11a,11b,13-17 are deliveries to the NSA, batches of 44B. What
is chip 44B? Very important. No deliveries of 48B to NSA listed.  Since
this is in the `outrunner' categories we now know that KG48B, 44B, 46
are all related. Also, the KG number appears to be some parameter on
the device code.
* What are these keywords: `Complete PDR' (preliminary design review?)
`Complete CDR' (concluding design review?) `SFA review VLSI'?

Next sounds like a `Invoice' for KG-44LSI. Mykotronx P/N M20/00301XXX

KG44 VLSI Procurement to 
>United Technologies Microelectronics Center
>Colorodo Springs, CO 80907

Can't  spell! The part I like is  ``Secret item handling''. The invoice
is fairly small, refers to Group B and Group C testing (?). Also a
statement `export of this product is controlled by U.S.  Disclosure of
related technical data to foreign nationals without the appropriate
export license is prohibited by law.'

Test plan for MYK-80: Work for Exatron.  MYK-80.  176 pin TQFP might
pinpoint the chip.  IMS tester? Installation of PET (Positron Electron
Tomography? Like a microscope?) `handlers' at Mykotronx.

Training & Manuals (for MYK-80?) subcontracted to ELITE Technical Corp
(Redondo Beach, CA).

`Capstone financial commitments'

* ``Basic VII Cap VLSI 10'' $212,000. Sun 1 yr maintenance warranty.
`Compass' $160K?  IKOS System. ELITE Tech. Corp. Plotter. SJ (1) and
(2), $71k and $76k.  
* AT&T, $100K (?) What is Mycotronx *paying* AT&T 100K for Capstone?
* Another `Compass' $110K. VLSI Tech $30K and $163K. VLSI Tech Capstone
TQFP $10K. Hm, both VSLI Tech. and Exatron do TQFP.
* VLSI Tech Exponeniator Tamper System $163K?
* $225K for `Litronics'?

posting 2
========
>Acct Descr              Beg Bal         Debits          Credits
>Shearson Lehman         286,511         2,620,096       2,670,822
>
>Paine Webber            95,602          868             0
>
>Dean Whitter            55,391          484             0
>
>Petty Cash              3,000           0               0

* Why is so much stock being traded? What is it for? Employee bonuses?
Ownership of child companies?

>Raw inventory           172,252         0               76,064

* not much, although what is it in? reconfirms picture as just an
intermediate company, almost just a `reseller'.

>Accrued payroll         25,637CR        343,682         318,045
>Accrued bonuses         214,040         341,240         127,200

* how does this break down among employees?

>Common Stock            169,320         0               61,435
>
>Capital disbursement    916,675         222,230         0
>
>Retd Earnings, begng    2,385,020CR     0               0

* more stock. What does it mean? Retd? disbursement?

>Subcontracts            0               932,210         110,419

* almost $1M debit for 4 months. Most of the action is here.

>Materials/parts         0               186,252         22,423

* for what?

>Direct labor-Engnrg     0               240,341         54,172
>
>Direct labor-Technician 0               129,839         37,459
>
>Direct labor-Adminst    0               47,542          10,081

* why are these in a different category than employee costs? What's the difference?

>Special Bonus           0               132,200         123,200

* Comes out to $9K. What does it mean?

>G&A Labor               0               103,4520        0

* G&A means?  100K is fairly large; more than consulting fees for example.





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: ""L. Detweiler"" <ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Date: Tue, 25 May 93 20:23:03 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: RSA in CMOS?
Message-ID: <9305260322.AA26830@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Many people have been talking about cryptographic applications in
hardware on the list.  I suspect these will be largely untapped until a
chip that does general-purpose RSA encryption comes along. There are
many DES implementations that could be integrated with such a chip and
then worked into computer cards, telephones, cryptography kits, etc. 
Does anyone know of the existence of an RSA chip? To the best of my
knowledge they do not exist. Are there any plans for an RSA chip? The
chip would ideally *not* be constrained to work with DES, or at least
the DES encryption would be an option in addition to just pure RSA
encryption of arbitrary data, for reasons of potential insecurity in
DES and emergence of other superior algorithms (which upon appearance
would not automatically make a general-purpose chip obsolete).




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: ""L. Detweiler"" <ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Date: Tue, 25 May 93 20:23:12 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: PGP-RSAREF rumors
Message-ID: <9305260323.AA26837@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Nothing has appeared on this list on this subject since the initial
flurry sparked by PGP-RSAREF negotiations.  I thought I would just post
a few short comments based on inside sources and speculations for all
the cypherpunks waiting on the edge of their consoles to hear some
word.  In no way should this be construed to be representative of
positions on either side.  I just hope to give members a little current
insight and encouraging glimpse, but also show how the difficulties
involved in the negotiations mean this is not as simple as Bidzos and
Zimmerman shaking hands without snarling (although that's certainly part of it).

A rather serious obstacle to RSAREF integration into PGP is that the
RSAREF routines only `ostensibly' allow RSA encryption of DES session
keys. For novices on the list, the background for this is that RSA is
too slow to use to encode an entire message, so that one uses RSA to
encode a randomly generated key for each session (hence the name) that
is contained in the transmission. The remainder of the transmission
includes the message encrypted under the private-key algorithm (e.g.
DES) with the generated session key.  Since the key is shorter than the
message and the private-key algorithm faster than the public-key
approach, this scheme results in a net gain of speed, but with security
only `as strong' as the private key algorithm.

Because of suspected weaknesses in DES, Zimmerman chose to use the
Swiss IDEA algorithm for the session keys, and for obvious reasons
prefers to continue to do so. However, the RSAREF routines have a
`published interface' that only permits the system using a DES key. 
There are `low level' routines that do pure unadulterated RSA
encryption of arbitrary data, crucial to PGP functions, but by the
terms of the license the programmer is *not* allowed to call them!

The reason for this restriction is presumably that a high-degree of
backward-compatibility is required of the library, so that a strict
adherence to use through `official' entry points must be preserved. 
However, this `hamstring connected' means that by no stretch of the
imagination can RSAREF be considered a `general purpose RSA
cryptography library' (in fact, it appears to be designed solely for
meeting the PEM standard).  It also means that the cryptographic
security of RSAREF is quite curiously limited to that of DES.

Rumor has it that Mark Riordan got permission to put in triple DES into
RSAREF for RIPEM but so far it is unclear if Zimmerman and Bidzos
can/will/have hammer(d) out something that allows the current PGP IDEA
cipher.  The backward compatibility of all previous PGP versions, and
ultimately the integration of RSAREF into PGP, is at stake. Rumor has
it that even Rivest (the R in RSA!) may be helping forge something
favorable to everyone.

Another complication of RSAREF that most on this list are probably
familiar with is that it is not permitted to be used outside the U.S. 
Hence parallel versions of PGP must be maintained even if RSAREF would
allow an IDEA implementation.

One other complication is that Mr. Zimmerman, while apparently never
directly profiting from PGP use, has before publicly `reserved the
right' to attempt to gain some kind of compensation for his Herculean
efforts on PGP, for which he has `a life sentence' and finds that it
takes major amounts of his time and commitment, although he is also
firm in his promise to keep it free. Of course, the position is not
wholly compatible with RSA interests.

Finally, I hear that negotiations are on pause while currently Mr.
Zimmerman is in the middle of his May 19 - Jun 9 `PRZ EuroCrypt Tour'
and is meeting PGP fanatics, groupies, and developers all over Europe!
In fact, here's an excerpt from a message that made the rounds among
some PGP contributors:

>From 27 May until maybe 30 May, more or less, I'll be traveling
>by train from Bergan, Norway, through Oslo, then on down to Copenhagen,
>down to Hamburg, and over to Amsterdam.  I'll be stopping along the way to
>see some sights, having never been to Europe before.
>
>From 30(?) May til 6 June, I'll be hanging around Amsterdam and the 
>surrounding area, to see some things from something other than a train seat.
>
>From 6 June to 9 June, I'll be in Washington DC, giving a talk at the
>7 June CPSR conference in DC.  Then I'm going home.
>
>If any of you want to pass this on to the PGP fans in Europe, who are
>fanatical enough to meet me over there in my travels, feel free.  If I
>play my cards right, I'll never have to buy lunch while I'm in Europe.

Maybe with enough encouragement and hospitality he'll make it through
the subsequent negotiations without strangling anyone or being strangled  :)

(You may be able to reach PRZ at prz@acm.org.)




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Eric Hughes <hughes@soda.berkeley.edu>
Date: Tue, 25 May 93 21:26:45 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: VinCrypt
In-Reply-To: <9305252040.AA15879@banff.procase.com>
Message-ID: <9305260423.AA29839@soda.berkeley.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Re: vincrypt package blatherings

Can someone post the addresses of this company so that product
literature might be ordered?

I'm tempted to do a consumer education article exposing the danger of
secret and unreviewed ciphers, non-trustable encryption packages, etc.
It looks like these folks are prime candidates.

Eric





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: wcs@anchor.ho.att.com
Date: Tue, 25 May 93 19:10:51 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: SIGINT and TEMPEST follies
Message-ID: <9305260126.AA20182@anchor.ho.att.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text


In cypherpunks, fergp@sytex.com (Paul Ferguson) replied to my article
(elisions[...] added)
> > [...] The precise standards are classified (some SECRET, some
> > CONFIDENTIAL COMSEC), [...], but as long
> > as you're not using classified information as your sources, you can
> > do anything you want.  [...]

>  I beg your pardon, but this is _not_ the case. TEMPEST requirements
>  are _not_ classified and are available for public scrutiny. (You
>  obviously do not know where to look.)

Ok, there may be standards that aren't classified.  (Good!)
I was referring to NACSIM 5100, 5100A, 5203, and their friends;
different generations of the documents are NACSEM rather than NACSIM.

> > TEMPEST isn't particularly about transients or electromagnetic pulses,
> > it's about overall electromagnetic emissions.
>  
>  You're trying to separate issues that are one and the same. With the
>  proper equipment, I can put you and an IBM Selectric (tm) typewriter
>  on a wooden raft in the middle of Lake Superior, monitor and realize
>  every keystroke that you make and you'd not be the wiser. This type
>  of monitoring is easily defeated by low yield TEMPEST requirements.
>  I've worked in this area, Bill, and have tested these _facts_. I
>  don't care how you care to word it, it _is_ transient
>  electromagnetic emissions.

I'm not arguing about whether the stuff works, I believe that :-)
VT100s and Brother electronic typewriters are two other classic emitters;
I hadn't heard that the IBM was loud, but it's certainly a good target.
The wording *is* relevant when you're discussing whether a proposed
acronym is real or made-up-to-fit, and as I said,
> > I never saw TEMPEST expanded as an acronym in any of the
> > documents I read.
and the proposed expansions are really stretching credibility,
as were the quoted article's contentions that using TEMPEST protection
was illegal.
  
>  I know the technical specifics of TEMPEST (it is an acronym, BTW) 
If it really is, it sounds like they made up the name TEMPEST first and stretched
the words *real* hard to fit, since it's not really about EMP.

> > In the case of the Crippler Chip, however, you knew it had a built-in
> > wiretap when you bought it, which changes some of the reasonable
> > expectations about privacy a bit.
>  This issue is one where I must disagree with you emphatically. 
>  The majority of the American public don't even know about Clipper. 

Sure, but if you're a pro-government court trying to rationalize the
behavior of government officials, as the courts have been doing lately,
the fact that most Americans haven't read the White House Press Releases
or the New York Times won't be given much respect - they've found a 
presumed lack of privacy in the use of cordless phones, and I'll bet you
a floppy disk they'll find some excuse to support unauthorized wiretapping
of Crippler* phones if the things become widespread.

>           Stop the Wiretap (Clipper/Capstone) Chip.
Yeah.  Actually, I won't mind much if government officials use the system
when for their internal communications; it's presumably fairly secure,
and makes it possible to subpoena "secure" conversations by government officials
if we need to, though it does risk giving the NSA more power over the rest of the 
government if they've stolen the keys.

				Bill Stewart


* Clipper is a trademark of Intergraph.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: wcs@anchor.ho.att.com
Date: Tue, 25 May 93 19:04:18 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Steganography
Message-ID: <9305260134.AA21012@anchor.ho.att.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text


> Here is a pitfall to be avoided in Steganography using
> low bits of AD converter output. Such converters may be biased
> in their low bit. [...] Falling too close to 50% would be a clue that the data

That's not too risky for graphics, since many scanned pictures aren't
based on raw A/D converter output; they've been processed and squashed down
to some smaller number of bits.  A more serious concern is compressibility -
a real image file is probably more compressible than a file with the
low-order bit replaced by a crypto-bit, since the real data has moderate
correlation and the crypto-bits are random.  I doubt the Feds will immediately
start looking to see if you're shipping GIF files that have significantly
worse compression than average, but they'd probably find something if they did it.

			Bill Stewart




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: fergp@sytex.com (Paul Ferguson)
Date: Tue, 25 May 93 20:47:08 PDT
To: jim@sytex.com
Subject: Just the facts, ma'am.
Message-ID: <9qX54B2w165w@sytex.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Okay, folks. Let's bring this into focus.
 
I don't like unfounded allegations, especially when they are involving
my own communications providers, but let's let the truth be known. I'd
like to summarize to the list several trains of thought and track this
down to a reliable source. If, in fact, a UUNet operator/provider has,
indeed, stated that this has been common practice, I think that it may
behoove them to own-up to these allegations. Before I do confront the
UUNet staff, however, I must get the allegations correct, and I
therefore rely on you crypto-rebels to provide them for me. Please.
 
In my original message I stated:
 
>From: uunet!sytex.com!fergp (Paul Ferguson)
 Message-Id: <VgH54B1w165w@sytex.com>
 Date: Tue, 25 May 93 16:30:06 EDT
 Organization: Sytex Communications, Inc
 
 On Tue, 25 May 1993 14:56:48 -0400,
  andrew m. boardman <uunet!cs.columbia.edu!amb> wrote -
 
 > Food for thought: that, at least as of recently, the NSA bought
 > weekly dumps of all usenet articles on tape.  I highly doubt they
 > were for their reading pleasure...
 
  Is this hearsay, innuendo or fact? If fact, what can you site as
  reference to support your statement? If you know this to be fact,
  please cite your references and provide as much detail as possible.
 
  Cheers.
 
- --
 
In subsequent posts, we received these replies. (I'd like to have
additional affidavits, if necessary. If you do not care to get
involved, fine. If you care, please re-affirm.)
 
 From:
 
 > Date: Tue, 25 May 1993 17:11:22 -0400
 > From: Marc Horowitz <uunet!GZA.COM!marc>
 
  >>  Is this hearsay, innuendo or fact? If fact, what can you site as
  >>  reference to support your statement? If you know this to be fact,
  >>  please cite your references and provide as much detail as possible.
 
 > Rick Adams of UUNET confirmed on the com-priv list that his
 > organization had been selling the FBI a usenet feed on tape.  I could
 > find the exact reference if you want.  I don't know for sure that the
 > NSA has a feed, or from whom, but it wouldn't surprise me.
 
I would like. Specifically, an e-mail address other than "postmaster."
 
The point is this, Marc: Those of us who subscribe to UUNet through
third party services have no idea that our communications may be
recorded or archived for intelligence purposes (I know, but that's
beside the point). If UUNet _is_ doing this without a broad policy
statement, then I think a change is in order.
 
Also, (and I do not implicitly imply that UUNet is responsible), I've
had some very interesting problems passing encrypted traffic. For some
strange reason, it just disappears. Fancy that. Should I question
that? You bet. And I shall. I, and my comm provider, pays in good
faith for our Internet services. We are protected under Law, and as
far I know, UUNet does not expressly forbid encrypted _private_
communications. But, it happens. They just disappear sometimes. Go
figure.
 
 > However, the obvious next point is, so what?  It's a public system.
 > Any idiot can pay $20/month and get a public access account.  If you
 > say something in a news post which you wouldn't want the FBI or NSA or
 > whoever to see, you're the person who has done something stupid.
 
I beg your pardon. Since when does stupidity become a prerequisite for
privacy rights violations? I'm not talking about Usenet or List posts,
Marc, but private e-mail.
 
 > Tapping a news feed isn't like tapping a phone line.  It's more like
 > turning on the television.
 
Of course it is. This is not an issue.
 
 > Date: Tue, 25 May 1993 17:26:58 -0400
 > From: andrew m. boardman <uunet!cs.columbia.edu!amb>
 
 > This was based on a verbal conversation at Interop with someone from
 > uunet, from whom the tapes are purchased.  I or they could be
 > mis[led|informed|remembering], but if you really care, ask uunet.
 
Thank you for your insights. I will ask UUNet, but I'm beginning to
wonder if other local comm providers practice the same deceptions.
Does anyone have any experiences with digex.com that they would like
to share?
 
If so, it would aid in our attempts to bring these unknown anomalies
to light. I don't like spending money to have my private e-mail
compromised.
 
 > Date: Tue, 25 May 93 18:28:31 EDT
 > From: Matt Blaze <uunet!crypto.com!mab>
 
 > Actually, the most alarming revelation here could be that someone at
 > uunet is going around casually disclosing information about their
 > customers.
 
Actually, I find this possibility both extremely disturbing, yet
possible. I don't wish that this what we will find out; I hope that
legal inquiries will not be necessary. However, if information
concerning these topics is not divulged voluntarily, then we must take
legal action to bring this to the surface.
 
 > Most communications companies, especially those that seek to be
 > regarded as "common carriers", make quite clear to their employees
 > that customer data are among their most proprietary and that
 > revealing any of it is grounds for lightning-speed dismissal.
 > (Obviously, they reveal data that they SELL about their customers,
 > and will disclose anything on a court order, but that's not
 > what we're talking about here).
 
Indeed, we are not speaking of the dissemination of USENet or List
information, but rather private e-mail.
 
 
 > Date: Tue, 25 May 1993 19:13:37 -0400
 > From: andrew m. boardman <uunet!cs.columbia.edu!amb>
 
> Having just spoken to someone who contracts at the NSA (and no,
> this name I will not post), he does not believe they get such a
> beast, although, as many people have pointed out, the FBI did.
> That, then, would be the origin of that, along with some TLA
> confusion.
 
I'd have to be presented with factual documentation to actually
believe that.
 
 > A lot of people perceive the government as having neither a right
 > nor a need to privacy.  Certainly there are also quite a few who
 > label themselves "privacy advocates" whose standards do a 180
 > when the privacy involved is that of the likes of Mykotronx...
 
Funny how that works, huh? The dumpster divers band together when t
comes to stuff like that, from what I'm told.
 
Cheers

Paul Ferguson               |  The future is now.
Network Integrator          |  History will tell the tale;
Centreville, Virginia USA   |  We must endure and struggle
fergp@sytex.com             |  to shape it.
 
          Stop the Wiretap (Clipper/Capstone) Chip.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Anonymous <nowhere@bsu-cs.bsu.edu>
Date: Tue, 25 May 93 20:47:09 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: No Subject
Message-ID: <9305260350.AA27590@bsu-cs.bsu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


On Tue, 25 May 93 21:26:20 EDT,
 Bill_Stewart <uunet!anchor.ho.att.com!wcs> wrote -
 
[ ... referring to earlier discussions on TEMPEST, ELINT and
  COMINT topics]
 
> I'm not arguing about whether the stuff works, I believe that :-)
 
 It does, and I can expand further in subsequent paragraphs.
 
> VT100s and Brother electronic typewriters are two other classic
> emitters; I hadn't heard that the IBM was loud, but it's
> certainly a good target.
 
 He used a very simplistic example, one which is electro-mechanical, as
 another list participant already pointed out. The same ELINT
 potential eavesdropping techniques exist, which range from keyboard
 monitoring (passive and active) to synchronic monitoring of "visual
 displays," which by all rights, parallels the electronic equivalent
 of monitoring your "visual" data; what is written to your visual
 display.
 
> The wording *is* relevant when you're discussing whether a proposed
> acronym is real or made-up-to-fit, and as I said,
  > > I never saw TEMPEST expanded as an acronym in any of the
  > > documents I read.
> and the proposed expansions are really stretching credibility,
> as were the quoted article's contentions that using TEMPEST protection
> was illegal.
 
 TEMPEST was/is a specification that was written/developed to
 safeguard classified communications which were transmitted
 electronically, and rightly so. Digital Cryptanalysis is easy to
 record, measure and study; emissions are emissions. Its a well known
 fact that INT agencies were/are active in monitoring secure
 communications _recording_ for years, simply on the basis that the
 keys would be eventually compromised. The technical specifications
 of TEMPEST implementations on _SECURE_ systems are classified,
 likewise, the tempest requirements on confidential and FOUO (For
 Official Use Only) communications are less classified, at least to
 the level of their traffic. This was/is done in anticipation of
 secure, captured traffic analysis being eventually compromised. I
 have reason to believe that this exactly the tactics being mined now
 by the FBI/NIST/NSA. (whoops, slap my wrist) Traffic analysis is a
 dangerous concept when used in the wrong context, especially in a
 big brother capacity.
 
 Additionally (no classified information divulged here!), both the US
 INT agencies and the KGB sponsored intelligence agencies, recorded
 _all_ intercepted communications regardless of cryptographic
 tolerance, eventually under the guise that they would be compromised.
 This idealism alluded to the fact that compromised keys could be used
 to analyze past communications and provide information on future
 strategies.
 
 > *Clipper is a trademark of Intergraph.
 
 Oh, don't be silly. Uncle Sugar has already "officially" re-dubbed
 the chip the "Key Escrow" Chip. Silly, isn't it?
 
 Our Government is cheating us. Something needs to be done.
 
 Who's going to do it? Personally, I'm going to take fergp's suggestion
 and "question the powers that be." If any of you have a conscious,
 I'd suggest doing the same.
 
 To Eric Raymond: Include info on anon remailers and why they are
 important. Tell 'em "nobody" sent you. ;-)
 

Quis Custodiet Ipsos Custodes?




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: meyer <wixer!wixer.bga.com!meyer@cactus.org>
Date: Tue, 25 May 93 21:14:20 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: AT&T
Message-ID: <9305260406.AA02988@wixer>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I recently switched my long distance carrier from AT&T to another,
since they bribed me to do so with an offer of $35.

Tonight a lady from AT&T called to ask why I switched.  "They bribed
me," I said.  I said that I also had a problem with AT&T's support
of the Clipper (or Wiretap) Chip.  She had never heard of this, but
I said to write this down on her report so that some higher-up in
AT&T would get the message.

She then offered to pay me $50 to switch back to AT&T.  I thought,
if I keep switching, and they keep upping the amount, eventually I
can pay my rent this way.  But no.  I said: As long as AT&T supports
the Clipper Chip I'll never return to AT&T!  Ah, the pleasure of
occupying the moral high ground.  (Now, if they'd offered $500 ...)




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: J. Michael Diehl <mdiehl@triton.unm.edu>
Date: Tue, 25 May 93 22:33:31 PDT
To: hughes@soda.berkeley.edu (Eric Hughes)
Subject: Re: VinCrypt
In-Reply-To: <9305260423.AA29839@soda.berkeley.edu>
Message-ID: <9305260533.AA12486@triton.unm.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> Re: vincrypt package blatherings
> Can someone post the addresses of this company so that product
> literature might be ordered?
> I'm tempted to do a consumer education article exposing the danger of
> secret and unreviewed ciphers, non-trustable encryption packages, etc.
> It looks like these folks are prime candidates.

Don't just be tempted!  Do it!  It's your patriotic duty...or some such 
nonsense.  Thanx in advance.
+-----------------------+-----------------------------+---------+
| J. Michael Diehl ;-)  | I thought I was wrong once. | PGP KEY |
| mdiehl@triton.unm.edu |   But, I was mistaken.      |available|
| mike.diehl@fido.org   |                             | Ask Me! |
| (505) 299-2282        +-----------------------------+---------+
|                                                               |
+------"I'm just looking for the opportunity to be -------------+
|            Politically Incorrect!"   <Me>                     |
+-----If codes are outlawed, only criminals wil have codes.-----+
+----Is Big Brother in your phone?  If you don't know, ask me---+




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: stig@netcom.com (Stig)
Date: Tue, 25 May 93 23:45:43 PDT
To: prz@sage.cgd.ucar.edu
Subject: Re: PGP:  Environment protection for UNIX
Message-ID: <9305260645.AA14381@netcom.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



I wrote:
> 
> 
> 	main (int argn, char **argv, char **envv)
> 	{
> 	    for ( ; *envv ; ++envv) {
> 	        if (!strncmp(*envv,"PGP",3)) {
> 	            char *c=*envv;
> 	            while (*c) *c++=' ';
> 	        } /* end of if */
> 	    } /* end of for */
> 	    system("printenv");
> 	    sleep(10);
> 	}
> 

And I should've enclosed it in #ifdef STUPID ... #endif.  I misread
the putenv(3) man page and didn't realize that you could just use 

	putenv("PGPPATH=");
	putenv("PGPPASS=");

To wipe those variables out of your environment...  They still might
get caught by a 'ps -eaxuww' but chances are slim.  Is it posible to
alter your arguments so they're not visible to 'ps -auxww'?

Well as a matter of fact, it does seems to work on my sparcstation:

        main (int argn, char **argv, char **envv)
        {
            system("ps -uww");
        
            for (;*argv;++argv) {
                while (**argv) {
                    *(*argv)++ = ' ';
                } /* end of while */
            } /* end of for */
        
            puts("--------------------------------");
            system("ps -uww");
        }

Not elegant, but that's what makes it a GLP (grungy little program).

So, is there a more elegant way to do this?  How portable is it?
Finally, of how much use is it?

	Stig
    

/* Jonathan Stigelman, Stig@netcom.com, PGP public key on request */
/* fingerprint = 32 DF B9 19 AE 28 D1 7A  A3 9D 0B 1A 33 13 4D 7F */




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: peter honeyman <honey@citi.umich.edu>
Date: Tue, 25 May 93 20:58:09 PDT
To: wcs@anchor.ho.att.com
Subject: Re: Steganography
In-Reply-To: <9305260134.AA21012@anchor.ho.att.com>
Message-ID: <9305260358.AA07063@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>                                  A more serious concern is compressibility -
> a real image file is probably more compressible than a file with the
> low-order bit replaced by a crypto-bit, since the real data has moderate
> correlation and the crypto-bits are random.  I doubt the Feds will immediately
> start looking to see if you're shipping GIF files that have significantly
> worse compression than average, but they'd probably find something if they did it.

how many bits are we talking about here?  suppose it's two in sixteen.
7/8 of the compressible bits remain.  so if the normal compressibility
is 2:1, taking two out of sixteen bits would leave 1.75:1 compression.
is that a "notable" difference?

i haven't been paying close enough attention -- is two out of sixteen
a realistic amount?  it seems high to me.  if it's one out of sixteen,
the effect is only a 6.25% reduction in compression.  is that notable?

	peter




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Z3KPW@ttacs1.ttu.edu
Date: Tue, 25 May 93 22:46:53 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: VinCrypt
Message-ID: <01GYM1VTYBEG8Y629U@ttacs1.ttu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Hey, an older version of VinCrypt has been out and freely distributable
for months.  It's a Video Vindicator release, so you could get it from
a VV site like Demon Roach Underground BBS or the cDc ftp site
(zero.cypher.com) if you wanted to take a look at an old version.





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: stig@netcom.com (Stig)
Date: Wed, 26 May 93 00:55:28 PDT
To: J. Michael Diehl <stig@netcom.com (Stig)
Subject: Re: PGP:  Environment protection for UNIX
In-Reply-To: <mdiehl@triton.unm.edu>
Message-ID: <9305260755.AA18959@netcom.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


On May 26,  1:07am, J. Michael Diehl wrote:
> Well, I like this one.  It lets you put little messages in place of argv[0].
> 
> #include <stdio.h>
> 
> char 	buff[100];
> int	esc = 27;
> 
> void main(int argc, char *argv[])
> {
> puts("Enter message.\n");
> scanf("%s", buff); 
> execl("/nfs/dorado/unsup/bin/ftp", buff, NULL);
> }
> 

Yeah, I like that too...  'cept if you need to pass args, it doesn't
provide a covert channel.

I confess to not having read my PGP manuals yet, but is there an
interactive mode to PGP?  If there WERE (hint), then it could be run
as a subprocess of emacs or a mail program and thus be a) more
convenient and b) the whole hub-bub about people snooping your
environment would be a non-issue.

	Stig



/* Jonathan Stigelman, Stig@netcom.com, PGP public key on request */
/* fingerprint = 32 DF B9 19 AE 28 D1 7A  A3 9D 0B 1A 33 13 4D 7F */




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: J. Michael Diehl <mdiehl@triton.unm.edu>
Date: Wed, 26 May 93 00:07:48 PDT
To: stig@netcom.com (Stig)
Subject: Re: PGP:  Environment protection for UNIX
In-Reply-To: <9305260645.AA14381@netcom.netcom.com>
Message-ID: <9305260707.AA15163@triton.unm.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> I wrote:
> > 	main (int argn, char **argv, char **envv)
> > 	{
> > 	    for ( ; *envv ; ++envv) {
> > 	        if (!strncmp(*envv,"PGP",3)) {
> > 	            char *c=*envv;
> > 	            while (*c) *c++=' ';
> > 	        } /* end of if */
> > 	    } /* end of for */
> > 	    system("printenv");
> > 	    sleep(10);
> > 	}
> And I should've enclosed it in #ifdef STUPID ... #endif.  I misread
> the putenv(3) man page and didn't realize that you could just use 
> 
> 	putenv("PGPPATH=");
> 	putenv("PGPPASS=");
> 
> To wipe those variables out of your environment...  They still might
> get caught by a 'ps -eaxuww' but chances are slim.  Is it posible to
> alter your arguments so they're not visible to 'ps -auxww'?

Well, I like this one.  It lets you put little messages in place of argv[0].

#include <stdio.h>

char 	buff[100];
int	esc = 27;

void main(int argc, char *argv[])
{
puts("Enter message.\n");
scanf("%s", buff); 
execl("/nfs/dorado/unsup/bin/ftp", buff, NULL);
}


+-----------------------+-----------------------------+---------+
| J. Michael Diehl ;-)  | I thought I was wrong once. | PGP KEY |
| mdiehl@triton.unm.edu |   But, I was mistaken.      |available|
| mike.diehl@fido.org   |                             | Ask Me! |
| (505) 299-2282        +-----------------------------+---------+
|                                                               |
+------"I'm just looking for the opportunity to be -------------+
|            Politically Incorrect!"   <Me>                     |
+-----If codes are outlawed, only criminals wil have codes.-----+
+----Is Big Brother in your phone?  If you don't know, ask me---+




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: meyer <wixer!wixer.bga.com!meyer@cactus.org>
Date: Wed, 26 May 93 01:11:08 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Funny bounce
Message-ID: <9305260718.AA20903@wixer>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


My previous message to cypherpunks, the one which had
subject heading "AT&T" and which began:
"I recently switched my long distance carrier from AT&T to another,
since they bribed me to do so with an offer of $35."
seemed to be posted OK (it apparently came back to me as expected)
but I also got this funny bounce message:

>From attmail.com!uucp@cactus.org  Tue May 25 23:37:59 1993
>Received: by wixer (5.65/1.35)
>    id AA10857; Wed, 26 May 93 00:16:57 -0500
>From: attmail.com!uucp@cactus.org
>Received: from att.att.com by cactus.org (4.1/SMI-4.1)
>    id AA17609; Tue, 25 May 93 23:37:59 CDT
>Message-Id: <9305260437.AA17609@cactus.org>
>Date: 25 May 93 20:30:47 GMT
>To: wixer!wixer.bga.com!meyer@cactus.org
>Report-Version: 2
>Received: by /C=US/AD=ATTMAIL;Wed May 26 04:28:34 -0000 1993
>Received: by /C=US/AD=ATTMAIL/PD=DCA;Tue May 25 20:30:47 GMT 1993
>Confirming-Mts-Message-Id: </C=US/AD=ATTMAIL;internet1460427530>
>Confirming-Ua-Content-Id: <ternet1460427530>
>Original-Date: Wed May 26 04:27:53 GMT 1993
>Not-Delivered-To: mhs!dca/G=bryan/S=petty/OU=dcaicc due to
    01 Invalid Address Specification
>Content-Type: message
>Status: RO
>
>Message-Version: 2
>From: internet!cactus.org!wixer!wixer.bga.com!meyer/S=meyer
>UA-Content-ID: <internet1460427530>
>End-of-Header:
>EMail-Version: 2
>Subject: AT&T
>UA-Message-ID: <internet1460427530>
>To: internet!cactus.org!wixer!wixer.bga.com!internet!toad.com!cypherpunks
>End-of-Protocol:
>Content-Type: text
>Content-Length: 755
>
>I recently switched my long distance carrier from AT&T to another,
>since they bribed me to do so with an offer of $35.
>
>[Rest of message deleted - PM.]

This seems odd.  What's going on?  Do all messages with "AT&T" in the
subject line get siphoned off somewhere for review?  Did this one
generate a bounce message because the account of Bryan Petty, AT&T spy,
wasn't receiving tonight?  OK, I'm just paranoid.  (Paranoia - that's
your state of mind when you finally realize what's really going on.)






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: meyer <wixer!wixer.bga.com!meyer@cactus.org>
Date: Wed, 26 May 93 01:24:53 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Request for proposals
Message-ID: <9305260817.AA18988@wixer>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


We've just released new versions of Dolphin Encrypt and
Dolphin Encrypt Advanced Version, and have a few of the
older manuals left over (almost the same as the new ones).
If you'care to propose writing a review of this encryption
software (to appear where?) and you're not obviously a
government spy, then send me a message and I'll probably
allow myself to be persuaded to send you a complimentary
review copy (older manuals, but newest version of the
software).  You'll have to agree to allow your email
address to be given to the other recipients of complimentary
copies so that you have the opportunity to exchange email
among yourselves encrypted using Dolphin Encrypt.  Offer
good while supplies last.  Offer void whererohibited.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Pat Farrell" <pfarrell@cs.gmu.edu>
Date: Wed, 26 May 93 05:33:08 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Mike's bummer moving adventure
Message-ID: <30838.pfarrell@cs.gmu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


This is a bit off topic, please excuse the list bandwidth...

Today's (5/26/93) Washington Post has a story on page 1 of the Style section
about net-lawyer and occasional cypherpunk poster Mike Godwin
(mneumonic@eff.org). Seems that Mike just moved from Cambridge to Washington
DC, and the moving truck that had all his stuff caught fire and burned.
He lost "90%" of his stuff, books, clothes, records, family photos, etc.
Serious bummer.

The article says that he went onto the WELL and the electronic community
offered to help replace some of his books, etc. A word or two from our
community might help raise his spirits.

Pat

Pat Farrell      Grad Student                 pfarrell@cs.gmu.edu
Department of Computer Science    George Mason University, Fairfax, VA
Public key availble via finger          #include <standard.disclaimer>




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: jthomas@kolanut.mitre.org (Joe Thomas)
Date: Wed, 26 May 93 06:15:32 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Just the facts, ma'am.
Message-ID: <9305261314.AA07134@kolanut>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Paul Ferguson <fergp@sytex.com> writes:
> Okay, folks. Let's bring this into focus.
>  

> I don't like unfounded allegations, especially when they are involving
> my own communications providers, but let's let the truth be known. I'd
> like to summarize to the list several trains of thought and track this
> down to a reliable source. If, in fact, a UUNet operator/provider has,
> indeed, stated that this has been common practice, I think that it may
> behoove them to own-up to these allegations. Before I do confront the
> UUNet staff, however, I must get the allegations correct, and I
> therefore rely on you crypto-rebels to provide them for me. Please.
>  

> [summary deleted]
>  

> Thank you for your insights. I will ask UUNet, but I'm beginning to
> wonder if other local comm providers practice the same deceptions.
> Does anyone have any experiences with digex.com that they would like
> to share?

Nothing but good ones.  Doug Humphrey <doug@access.digex.net> even posted to  
the list a few times as I recall.  I'm still not sure I see a problem with  
someone providing a newsfeed to the NSA, FBI, or anyone else, though.  


> [some good stuff elided, but nothing relevant to the following statement:]
> Indeed, we are not speaking of the dissemination of USENet or List
> information, but rather private e-mail.

What?  When did we start speaking of that?  I'd be very interested in hearing  
more about this.

Joe




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Mark <mark@coombs.anu.edu.au>
Date: Tue, 25 May 93 16:39:51 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Say again?
Message-ID: <9305252339.AA29243@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>   >This was based on a verbal conversation at Interop with someone from
>   >uunet, from whom the tapes are purchased.  I or they could be
>   >mis[led|informed|remembering], but if you really care, ask uunet.
>
>Having just spoken to someone who contracts at the NSA (and no, this name
>I will not post), he does not believe they get such a beast, although, as
>many people have pointed out, the FBI did.  That, then, would be the
>origin of that, along with some TLA confusion.

Wouldnt the NSA just get a feed to their internet machines, say maybe
dockmaster.ncsc.mil? All they would have to pay for is the line, which is
there anyway. No need to buy tapes. Makes more sense to me. I assume they
have news readers on Multics systems :)

Mark
mark@coombs.anu.edu.au



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: fergp@sytex.com (Paul Ferguson)
Date: Wed, 26 May 93 07:16:35 PDT
To: operator@uunet.uu.net
Subject: Questionable instances?
Message-ID: <kkT64B1w165w@sytex.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


On Wed, 26 May 93 2:18:52 CDT,
 Peter Meyer <uunet!cactus.org!wixer!wixer.bga.com!meyer> wrote -
 
> My previous message to cypherpunks, the one which had
> subject heading "AT&T" and which began:
> "I recently switched my long distance carrier from AT&T to another,
> since they bribed me to do so with an offer of $35."
> seemed to be posted OK (it apparently came back to me as expected)
> but I also got this funny bounce message:
 
>From attmail.com!uucp@cactus.org  Tue May 25 23:37:59 1993
 
[ remainder of header deleted ]
 
> This seems odd.  What's going on?  Do all messages with "AT&T" in the
> subject line get siphoned off somewhere for review?  Did this one
> generate a bounce message because the account of Bryan Petty, AT&T spy,
> wasn't receiving tonight?  OK, I'm just paranoid.  (Paranoia - that's
> your state of mind when you finally realize what's really going on.)
 
At least I'm not the only one who has recently noticed this. I had to
do a double take when I received not only my original post on UUNet
questions from cypherpunks-request@taod.com, but I received a second
copy with this header:
 



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: uunet!attmail.com!uucpinternet!sytex.com!fergp/G=Paul/S=Ferguson
Date: Wed, 26 May 93 03:18 EDT
To: sytex.com!fergp
Subject: Just the facts, ma'am.
Message-ID: <9305260417.AA03910@relay2.UU.NET>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: message

message


From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Eric Hughes <hughes@soda.berkeley.edu>
Date: Wed, 26 May 93 11:46:47 PDT
To: postmaster@uunet.uu.net
Subject: Questionable instances?
In-Reply-To: <9305261805.AA03358@wendy-fate.UU.NET>
Message-ID: <9305261841.AA17459@soda.berkeley.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>I can only assume that the bounce came to you becasue the
>cpypherpounk list isn't set to make bounces go to the list
>maintainer.  

This is the first of these messages we've had for six months, as the
bounce messages do in fact go back to the maintainer, me, quite
regularly.  I get on the order of 300-400 per week, since often a bad
address will queue up mail for a few days before bouncing it all.

Eric




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: fergp@sytex.com (Paul Ferguson)
Date: Wed, 26 May 93 09:17:28 PDT
To: jthomas@access.digex.com
Subject: Digital Bit Bucket
Message-ID: <ReZ64B1w165w@sytex.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


On Wed, 26 May 93 09:14:50 EDT,
 Joe Thomas <uunet!kolanut.mitre.org!jthomas> wrote -
 
>> Indeed, we are not speaking of the dissemination of USENet or List
>> information, but rather private e-mail.
 
> What?  When did we start speaking of that?  I'd be very interested in
> hearing more about this.
 
 Before I say anything further, let me clarify that I am making no
 specific allegations directed towards anyone. There have just been
 some questionable occurrences of late that are very weird (read:
 spooky) which I find little reason to dismiss as coincidental.
 Vanishing e-mail (both coming and going), duplicate list posts with
 odd originator headers and routing info.
 
 As  I said before, I'd just like a few things explained and put into
 their perspective context.

Paul Ferguson               |  The future is now.
Network Integrator          |  History will tell the tale;
Centreville, Virginia USA   |  We must endure and struggle
fergp@sytex.com             |  to shape it.
 
          Stop the Wiretap (Clipper/Capstone) Chip.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: fergp@sytex.com (Paul Ferguson)
Date: Wed, 26 May 93 09:17:45 PDT
To: kelly@netcom.com
Subject: Son of Digital Bit Bucket (or, Someone ate my e-mail!)
Message-ID: <5kZ64B4w165w@sytex.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


 
Kelly Goen: Please attempt to resend all previous unacknowledged
            traffic.
 
Please excuse my use of the list for off-topic/personal purposes,
but due to to some recent unexplained message dissappearances, I'm
left with few options.
 

Paul Ferguson               |  The future is now.
Network Integrator          |  History will tell the tale;
Centreville, Virginia USA   |  We must endure and struggle
fergp@sytex.com             |  to shape it.
 
          Stop the Wiretap (Clipper/Capstone) Chip.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Mike Godwin <mnemonic@eff.org>
Date: Wed, 26 May 93 09:18:24 PDT
To: pfarrell@cs.gmu.edu
Subject: Re: Mike's bummer moving adventure
In-Reply-To: <30838.pfarrell@cs.gmu.edu>
Message-ID: <199305261619.AA04350@eff.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


 
Pat Farrell writes:

> The article says that he went onto the WELL and the electronic community
> offered to help replace some of his books, etc. A word or two from our
> community might help raise his spirits.

Thanks for the good thoughts, Pat. Anyone who wants the details of my
own little disaster down here should send me e-mail--offers of help
are appreciated.

One request this list could help me with: Does anyone know how I can
find a hardbound copy of Kahn's THE CODEBREAKERS. I didn't own a copy
before the fire, but I had started my crypto collection, and I'll be
continuing to work on it.


--Mike







From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Perry E. Metzger" <pmetzger@lehman.com>
Date: Wed, 26 May 93 09:32:31 PDT
To: stig@netcom.com (Stig)
Subject: Re: PGP: Environment protection for UNIX
In-Reply-To: <9305260645.AA14381@netcom.netcom.com>
Message-ID: <9305261631.AA19652@snark.shearson.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Stig says:
[More on environment wiper]

The environment wiper seems silly to me. If the enclosing shell still
has the environment in question, ps will still reveal it. If the
enclosing shell does not have the environment variables in question,
then what was the point?

.pm




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: TO1SITTLER@APSICC.APS.EDU (Kragen Sittler)
Date: Wed, 26 May 93 11:52:16 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com(Those rascals...)
Subject: Re: Steganography and Steganalysis
Message-ID: <930526125012.3b06@APSICC.APS.EDU>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Begin quote from gnu@toad.com on Tue, 25 May 1993 15:27:27 -0700
From: gnu@toad.com (John Gilmore)
Message-Id: <9305252227.AA27968@toad.com>
To: kqb@whscad1.att.com, cypherpunks@toad.com, gnu@toad.com
Subject: Re: Steganography and Steganalysis 
In-Reply-To: <9305252149.AA27051@toad.com> 
Date: Tue, 25 May 93 15:27:27 -0700

My favorite scheme was to encode messages in trailing spaces and/or tabs
in netnews messages.  You could also put internal tabs in place of spaces.

In fact, you could do this with news messages that flow "through" your 
site, (if the messages aren't protected with a crypto checksum), so that
you would not be the message's sender (and it wouldn't be addressed to anyone
either -- recipients get very good privacy).

This would be one way for a Unix "worm" program to report back to its
master...and/or receive instructions.

	John Gilmore

PS:  You could put short interesting stuff just in your message-ID's!
Not to mention the low order bits of timestamps (exactly *what* second
did it arrive, now?).
=====================================================================
Trailing spaces, however, are likely to be changed by other sites: padded
or cut.  This might be a good idea if you used mime/PGP's radix-64 or uuencode
or something similar. 

Kragen




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: smb@research.att.com
Date: Wed, 26 May 93 09:57:26 PDT
To: Mike Godwin <mnemonic@eff.org>
Subject: Re: Mike's bummer moving adventure
Message-ID: <9305261657.AA28422@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


	  
	 Pat Farrell writes:

	 > The article says that he went onto the WELL and the electronic commu
	nity
	 > offered to help replace some of his books, etc. A word or two from o
	ur
	 > community might help raise his spirits.

	 Thanks for the good thoughts, Pat. Anyone who wants the details of my
	 own little disaster down here should send me e-mail--offers of help
	 are appreciated.

	 One request this list could help me with: Does anyone know how I can
	 find a hardbound copy of Kahn's THE CODEBREAKERS. I didn't own a copy
	 before the fire, but I had started my crypto collection, and I'll be
	 continuing to work on it.

It's still in print:

	STATUS: Active entry
	TITLE: The Codebreakers
	AUTHOR: Kahn, David 
	PUBLISHER: Macmillan    PUBLICATION DATE: 09/1967 (670901)
	LCCN: N/A
	BINDING: Text ed., $60.00
	ISBN: 0-02-560460-0
	VOLUME(S): N/A
	ORDER NO.: N/A
	IMPRINT: N/A
	STATUS IN FILE: New, 80-12
	SUBFILE: ST (Scientific and Technical Books and Serials in Print)

	LIBRARY OF CONGRESS SUBJECT HEADINGS: CRYPTOGRAPHY (00118102)
	PAPERBOUND BOOK SUBJECT HEADINGS: HISTORY-GENERAL-STUDY AIDS (00001338)





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: fnerd@smds.com (FutureNerd Steve Witham)
Date: Wed, 26 May 93 13:47:03 PDT
To: Dr. Cat <wixer!cat@cactus.org>
Subject: Re: Digital cash issues...
Message-ID: <9305261714.AA04972@smds.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>    Regarding the issue of what to do under Chaum's scheme when someone double-
> spends a piece of digital cash & their identity is revealed... I don't think 
> it's going to be a serious hindrance in the long term.  ...  Any credit card
> company, phone company, or other corporation that does a lot of billing
> already has staff dedicated solely to that function, with collection agencies
> providing a second tier of functionality for the tougher cases.
> 
>            Dr. Cat / Dragon's Eye / New traditions for the next century
 
Yes, but we would like to steer towards a world where no one you do business 
with knows or can reconstruct who you are or where you live.  "Collection"--
the whole idea of "billing," in fact--is a way of doing business that's rooted 
in non-privacy.  But also it's based on wanting to make transactions easier
for people in a world without easy electronic transactions, accounting, 
budgeting, negotiation, reputations, etc.  So maybe with these sorts of things,
billing would be unnecessary.

Anyway, thinking up variations on offline payment systems is a passtime of 
mine.  Situations where people can't be online with the bank are special 
cases, so you can make up special-case solutions, like

  o  "Tokens" or gift certificates that you buy in advance, or
  o  Annonymous checks that expire and are refundable if the (specific,
     annonymous) payees don't cash them in a certain amount of time.

Credit as it exists often seems like a trade with the devil of privacy
invasion.  Jeez, what would the world be like without *credit cards* and
*junk mail*!?

-fnerd




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Bob Stratton <strat@intercon.com>
Date: Wed, 26 May 93 10:29:26 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Just the facts, ma'am.
Message-ID: <9305261329.AA11706@horton.legato.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> Date: Wed, 26 May 93 09:14:50 EDT 
> From: jthomas@kolanut.mitre.org (Joe Thomas) 
> Subject: Re: Just the facts, ma'am. 
> 
> 
> > Thank you for your insights. I will ask UUNet, but I'm beginning to 
> > wonder if other local comm providers practice the same deceptions. 
> > Does anyone have any experiences with digex.com that they would like 
> > to share? 
> 
> Nothing but good ones.  Doug Humphrey <doug@access.digex.net> even 
> posted to  the list a few times as I recall.  I'm still not sure I see 
> a problem with  someone providing a newsfeed to the NSA, FBI, or anyone 
> else, though.  
> 

As one of the former tech-weenies at Express Access, and now just a friend 
with no formal association to the business, I feel compelled to give you my 
thoughts on that particular service provider. 

Rarely will you find a system administration staff more concerned with your 
privacy that the guys at Digital Express Group. As I recall, the set of 
username->real name mappings isn't even on machine readable media on the 
system. When I was working with them, we had a big book, and people only 
accessed the book when absolutely necessary, for instance to inform a user of 
a file system problem or the like. 

In fact, on several instances, I would ask other staff people who a 
particular username belonged to when I had a need to contact them - more 
often than not, they/we couldn't remember, and I had to look it up anyway. 
This was by design. 

From day one, there was a policy of not disclosing customer information to 
ANYONE without a warrant. To date, thankfully, I don't think that it's been 
put to the test, though I have no doubts as to the grief they'll give those 
trying to get the information. 

The original machine room was one of the best jobs of low-cost RFI/EMI 
shielding construction I've ever seen. (BTW, the foam insulation with foil on 
both sides is a boon to mankind.) It wasn't really intended to keep people 
from looking at the emissions as to keep the emissions from wiping out all 
the shortwave receivers in use, but hey, every little bit helps.

I'm still a user there, and I have a hell of a lot of respect for that crew. 
I would also implicitly trust them as a site for anonymous remailing, key 
certification, or the like. I hope that becomes a part of their business 
focus in the future, because we need service providers who won't be 
intimidated. 

--Strat






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: meyer <wixer!wixer.bga.com!meyer@cactus.org>
Date: Wed, 26 May 93 12:41:18 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: DE platform
Message-ID: <9305261837.AA13410@wixer>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


My apologies for not thinking to state what platform Dolphin Encrypt
currently runs on.  It's vanilla MS-DOS.  Other versions are planned.

The Dolphin Encryption Library (16 or so functions, containing the
core encryption functions from DE) is also for MS-DOS (designed to
work with the Microsoft and Borland development systems).  This is all
standard ANSI C code, so should port to other platforms without much
problem.  Currently there's a Clipper-oriented (that's the database
language) version in preparation.  Developers on other platforms
(Unix, Amiga, etc.) who are interested in porting the library should
send me email.  I am most interested in contacting someone who can
not only port the library but also market it.

Porting of the Dolphin Encrypt program is a Stage II task, and depends
on successful porting of the library.

-- Peter




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Kyle Jones <postmaster@uunet.uu.net>
Date: Wed, 26 May 93 11:05:24 PDT
To: fergp@sytex.com (Paul Ferguson)
Subject: Questionable instances?
In-Reply-To: <kkT64B1w165w@sytex.com>
Message-ID: <9305261805.AA03358@wendy-fate.UU.NET>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I can only assume that the bounce came to you becasue the
cpypherpounk list isn't set to make bounces go to the list
maintainer.  The message was in fact a bounce, as this header
testifies.

Not-Delivered-To: mhs!dca/G=bryan/S=petty/OU=dcaicc due to 01 Invalid 
Address Specification




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "John (FuzzFace/Fast-Eddie) McMahon" <MCMAHON@Eisner.DECUS.Org>
Date: Wed, 26 May 93 11:22:35 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Selling Tapes ?
Message-ID: <01GYMU6G53OY003ADN@Eisner.DECUS.Org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> Rick Adams of UUNET confirmed on the com-priv list that his
> organization had been selling the FBI a usenet feed on tape.  I could
> find the exact reference if you want.  I don't know for sure that the
> NSA has a feed, or from whom, but it wouldn't surprise me.

Seems like the low tech way of doing it.

Both organizations have machines on the Internet right now.  FBI is hooked in
via ALTERNet, and the NSA (NCSC) is on the MILnet.

% traceroute ard.fbi.gov
% traceroute tycho.ncsc.mil
(and see what happens)

Cheers!
Fuzz




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: nobody@eli-remailer
Date: Wed, 26 May 93 14:26:46 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Rivest evaluation of SecurID smart card
Message-ID: <9305262126.AA05992@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

I thought this might be of some interest to the CypherPunks list.

DEADBEAT <na5877@anon.penet.fi>

- - - - - - - - - 

TO:	Kenneth P. Weiss, Chairman
	Security Dynamics, Inc.
	2067 Massachusetts Avenue
	Cambridge, Massachusetts  02140 
FROM:	Ronald L. Rivest /initials RLR/
DATE:	April 7, 1987
RE:	Evaluation of SecurID Approach to User Identification

This memo provides a brief overall evaluation of your SecurID product,
as you have requested, suitable for limited distribution.  (It does not
contain any of the proprietary information you have disclosed to me.)

			General Approach

The SecurID card generates a pseudorandom sequence of displayed
numbers:  the displayed number us changed every 60 seconds.  The
sequence is "pseudorandom" rather than truly "random" in the sense that
it is generated by applying a (proprietary) algorithm and secret key to
a representation of the current time.  Thus, a host computer knowing
the algorithm and the secret key in the card can compute the number
displayed on the user's card at any moment.

Clearly, the numbers produced by such a card can be used in place of a
conventional "PIN" or "password" for access control or user
authentication, if the host is prepared to compute the number currently
displayed on the user's card.  That is, the user could enter the
displayed number instead of a remembered PIN or password when he is
asked to authenticate himself when initiating a login or financial
transaction.

One can obtain additional security by first combining a user-remembered
PIN with the displayed number, so that the user is authenticated both
by "what he knows" as well as "what he possesses".  For example, if
both the displayed number and the user's PIN are decimal numbers, the
combining operation could be "add digit-by-digit without carry".  The
host computer, knowing both the user's PIN and the displayed number,
can compute the correct value for comparison.

			Security Evaluation

1. An End-to-End Approach

One major advantage of your approach is that it is an "end-to-end"
technique: no intermediate nodes in the communication network are
entrusted with any security responsibilities.  The only places where
secret information needs to be maintained and manipulated are the
user's card and his host computer.

By contrast, an approach which encrypts PINs and transmits them in
encrypted form to the user's host computer may -- in a large, diverse,
multiorganization network -- require tremendous complexity in terms of
key management overhead and will necessitate a great deal of trust
between the participating organizations.

In my consulting work I have seen large organizations work very hard to
design "end-to-end" authentication protocols because of their
intrinsically greater security and simplicity.

2. Pseudo-random number generation

As noted above, your card generates a pseudo-random sequence of numbers
by applying a proprietary algorithm to a secret key and the current
time (measured to the minute).  The secret key is known only by the
user's card and host computer.

The system could be compromised if an "enemy" could predict future
numbers to be displayed by the card, from past observed values.  (These
numbers are transmitted in the clear, and are not encrypted.  This
makes your approach valuable for logging in from a "dumb" terminal, but
makes it possible for a wiretapper to obtain a set of previously values
produced by the card.)

However, I do not believe this attack can be successfully mounted
against your system.   I have tried to "break" your system in this
manner, without success.  The proprietary algorithm (which you have
disclosed to me) is based on sound cryptographic principles; it is
likely that the best approach to "breaking" this system is a
brute-force search for the secret key.  Since the secret key you use is
longer than that used by DES, I believe that this approach is
infeasible in practice.

(I should note that while my examination of your algorithm was
intensive and covered all aspects of the algorithm, it was of necessity
an examination of limited duration.  Some of your customers, such as
those involved with matters of national security, will certainly want
to see your algorithm subjected to additional intensive scutiny [sic]
before adopting it for use.)

Thus, I believe the sequence of numbers produced by your card will be
unpredictable by an "enemy", even if he sees previously produced
numbers.  Therefore:

   o    The ability to produce the number that is correct for the
	current time is a sound guarantee that the person logging in
	actually posesses [sic] the correct SecurID card.

   o    The numbers produced do not need to be encrypted, since
	knowledge of past values will not allow an enemy to predict
	future values.

Of course, other cryptographic algorithms could be used to produce the
pseudo-random number sequence from the secret key and the current
time.  For example, one could use DES.  (Given recent events, the
algorithms should perhaps be called "ODES" for the _Old_ Data
Encryption Standard".)  However, given the shorter key length and
greater implementation cost of DES, I don't see any advantage here
other than that it is (or was) a standard that withstood at one time a
careful review.  (This, however, may be significant to some of your
customers.) It is also perhaps worth noting that your algorithm, while
easier to implement than DES, is more computation-intensive than DES,
making a brute-force search substantially more difficult to mount.

3. Combining operations

Additional security can be obtained by combining the displayed number
with a user-remembered PIN, say by adding them digit-wise with carries
omitted.

While this combining operation is very simple, it is easy to prove that
if the displayed number sequence is unpredictable, then adding a PIN to
the sequence won't change this fact.

Furthermore, the PIN itself is protected from disclosure, unless the
"enemy" can obtain both the current displayed value and the value after
the PIN has been added.  However, to obtain the first requires access
to the card, and to obtain the second requires wiretapping; these are
not likely to be simultaneously available.  (The risk here seems less
than the risk that the keyboard is tapped in a conventional password
scheme.)  A similar analysis applies to using the displayed number
sequence to "encrypt" values other that the PIN; this operation should
provide the desired security.

			Summary

The approach used in your SecurID product is novel, and offers security
advantages over conventional PIN or password schemes.  The
cryptographic algorithm employed should provide a high degree of
security.




Dr. Ronald L. Rivest is a Professor in the Electrical Engineering and
Computer Science Department of the Massachusetts Institute of
Technology.  He is a renowned world class cryptologist.

Professor Rivest is one of the co-inventors of the RSA public-key
cryptosystem, is a founder of RSA Data Security, Inc., and is on the
Board of the International Association for Cryptologic Research.

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=QVMm
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: composer@Beyond.Dreams.ORG (Jeff Kellem)
Date: Wed, 26 May 93 11:39:22 PDT
To: Bob Stratton <strat@intercon.com>
Subject: Re: Just the facts, ma'am.
In-Reply-To: <9305261329.AA11706@horton.legato.com>
Message-ID: <9305261839.AA05185@Beyond.Dreams.ORG>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


On the cypherpunks mailing list, Strat wrote...
 > Rarely will you find a system administration staff more concerned with
 > your privacy that the guys at Digital Express Group. As I recall, the
 > set of username->real name mappings isn't even on machine readable media
 > on the system.

Really?  That's odd, especially for a unix box, which access.digex.com
seems to be.  And, as a matter of fact, it does seem to show "Robert
Stratton" for the username of "strat".  So, it seems they do maintain
username to "real name" mappings (even if they allow the user to change
the "real name" listed.

 > When I was working with them, we had a big book, and people only
 > accessed the book when absolutely necessary, for instance to inform a
 > user of a file system problem or the like.
...
 > This was by design. 

As a side note, this sounds like a bad design.. keeping things on paper
for a computer system.  Perhaps, a disconnected computer system.. but,
when you start talking a few thousand users, the paper begins to really
become troublesome for maintaining information on accounts. ;-)

FYI...

			-jeff

Jeff Kellem
Internet: composer@Beyond.Dreams.ORG




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: TO1SITTLER@APSICC.APS.EDU (Kragen Sittler)
Date: Wed, 26 May 93 13:57:58 PDT
To: cypherpunks-real@toad.com
Subject: private e-mail compromising
Message-ID: <930526145606.413c@APSICC.APS.EDU>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Where in all of the previous messages about uunet did it say they were selling
the NSA anyone's email?  If I read it right, all they were doing was selling
a netnews feed on tape!

Kragen




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: composer@Beyond.Dreams.ORG (Jeff Kellem)
Date: Wed, 26 May 93 12:22:49 PDT
To: fergp@sytex.com (Paul Ferguson)
Subject: Re: Just the facts, ma'am.
In-Reply-To: <9qX54B2w165w@sytex.com>
Message-ID: <9305261922.AA05288@Beyond.Dreams.ORG>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


On the cypherpunks mailing list, Paul Ferguson wrote...
 > The point is this, Marc: Those of us who subscribe to UUNet through
 > third party services have no idea that our communications may be
 > recorded or archived for intelligence purposes (I know, but that's
 > beside the point). If UUNet _is_ doing this without a broad policy
 > statement, then I think a change is in order.

I think you're jumping to (incorrect, IMO) conclusions here.  All that
was said was that an organization (the FBI, in this case) bought a USENET
feed.  Yes, distribution on tapes is still a feed of sorts (albeit a slow
one with a bursty latency ;-).  There is nothing wrong with that, as it
is one of the services which UUNET Technologies provides.

There is NO REASON to believe or even assume that UUNET Technologies is
archiving other non-publically available communications, such as e-mail,
etc.

 > Also, (and I do not implicitly imply that UUNet is responsible), I've
 > had some very interesting problems passing encrypted traffic. For some
 > strange reason, it just disappears. Fancy that. Should I question
 > that? You bet. And I shall. I, and my comm provider, pays in good
 > faith for our Internet services. We are protected under Law, and as
 > far I know, UUNet does not expressly forbid encrypted _private_
 > communications. But, it happens. They just disappear sometimes. Go
 > figure.

Sure, question it.  But, also look into the problem from a real technical
standpoint first, instead of just jumping to conclusions.  Talk to the
people you're attempting to communicate with -- maybe it's a problem on
their end.  Talk to your communications provider.. or maybe it's a
problem somewhere along the path you're communicating through.  Always
check potential technical problems before jumping to (probably unfounded
and paranoid) conclusions.  [I'm not saying you shouldn't keep them in
mind, as you should always consider all scenarios when trying to track
down a problem.  But, they should be in the background, not the
foreground, at first.]

I've just watched too many people jump to the conclusion that whatever
problem was occurring was being done purposely to them.. NOT that it
could just be a technical glitch... when, is WAS just a technical
problem.  Usually, it's just a technical problem that needs to be
resolved.

 >  Marc Horowitz wrote...
 >  > However, the obvious next point is, so what?  It's a public system.
 >  > Any idiot can pay $20/month and get a public access account.  If you
 >  > say something in a news post which you wouldn't want the FBI or NSA or
 >  > whoever to see, you're the person who has done something stupid.
 >  
 > I beg your pardon. Since when does stupidity become a prerequisite for
 > privacy rights violations? I'm not talking about Usenet or List posts,
 > Marc, but private e-mail.

But, the discussion previously WAS referring to USENET.  When you speak
publically, you don't assume that it's private.  So, in that context,
you're not speaking of privacy rights violations.

 > Thank you for your insights. I will ask UUNet, but I'm beginning to
 > wonder if other local comm providers practice the same deceptions.

I haven't seen any indication of deceptions.  Unless, of course, you're
referring to mentioning that the FBI is/was a customer.  But, then, I
(and anyone else) can find out most UUNET customers who have USENET
newsfeeds very easily just by looking through the USENET maps.  So, I
don't see that as much of a problem, as long as they're not providing
other customer details.  I trust UUNET's staff on maintaining that
privacy, knowing some of them personally.

 > If so, it would aid in our attempts to bring these unknown anomalies
 > to light. I don't like spending money to have my private e-mail
 > compromised.

Which is understandable, though I don't believe your e-mail has been
compromised from what I've seen posted on cypherpunks.

Just some thoughts on the matter...

			-jeff

Jeff Kellem
Internet: composer@Beyond.Dreams.ORG




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: smb@research.att.com
Date: Wed, 26 May 93 12:28:43 PDT
To: "John (FuzzFace/Fast-Eddie) McMahon" <MCMAHON@Eisner.DECUS.Org>
Subject: Re: Selling Tapes ?
Message-ID: <9305261928.AA02631@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


	 > Rick Adams of UUNET confirmed on the com-priv list that his
	 > organization had been selling the FBI a usenet feed on tape.  I coul
	d
	 > find the exact reference if you want.  I don't know for sure that th
	e
	 > NSA has a feed, or from whom, but it wouldn't surprise me.

	 Seems like the low tech way of doing it.

	 Both organizations have machines on the Internet right now.  FBI is ho
	oked in
	 via ALTERNet, and the NSA (NCSC) is on the MILnet.

	 % traceroute ard.fbi.gov
	 % traceroute tycho.ncsc.mil
	 (and see what happens)

This incident goes back quite a while, to the days when uucp was the
normal (and almost the only) way of getting netnews.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: jthomas@kolanut.mitre.org (Joe Thomas)
Date: Wed, 26 May 93 12:49:49 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Just the facts, ma'am.
Message-ID: <9305261949.AA07621@kolanut>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


From: composer@beyond.dreams.org (Jeff Kellem)
> 

> On the cypherpunks mailing list, Strat wrote...
>  > Rarely will you find a system administration staff more concerned with
>  > your privacy that the guys at Digital Express Group. As I recall, the
>  > set of username->real name mappings isn't even on machine readable media
>  > on the system.
> 

> Really?  That's odd, especially for a unix box, which access.digex.com
> seems to be.  And, as a matter of fact, it does seem to show "Robert
> Stratton" for the username of "strat".  So, it seems they do maintain
> username to "real name" mappings (even if they allow the user to change
> the "real name" listed.

Digital Express doesn't require that the GECOS field of /etc/passwd contain  
real names, although they obviously allow it.  (Finger  
jthomas@access.digex.net for my full name, as well as my PGP key :^)

I seem to remember that the new user signup script they use explicitly gives  
you the option of signing up under a pseudonymn, although they'll check up on  
you by phone if you do (and presumably write your name in the Big Book at that  
point).  I've seen quite a few public access Unix sites advertising  
"anonymous" accounts lately, especially after Julf's server went down.

Joe




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Perry E. Metzger" <pmetzger@lehman.com>
Date: Wed, 26 May 93 12:53:57 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: DE platform
In-Reply-To: <9305261837.AA13410@wixer>
Message-ID: <9305261953.AA20373@snark.shearson.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Correct me if I'm wrong, but from what I understand, "Dolphin Encrypt"
does not use any well examined crypto system -- its something that you
guys, without any cryptography credentials, cooked up. On that basis,
why should we care about it? Most crypto systems that amateurs come up
with are pathetic to say the least, and strong systems, like
triple-DES and IDEA, are widely available.

Perry

meyer says:
> My apologies for not thinking to state what platform Dolphin Encrypt
> currently runs on.  It's vanilla MS-DOS.  Other versions are planned.
> 
> The Dolphin Encryption Library (16 or so functions, containing the
> core encryption functions from DE) is also for MS-DOS (designed to
> work with the Microsoft and Borland development systems).  This is all
> standard ANSI C code, so should port to other platforms without much
> problem.  Currently there's a Clipper-oriented (that's the database
> language) version in preparation.  Developers on other platforms
> (Unix, Amiga, etc.) who are interested in porting the library should
> send me email.  I am most interested in contacting someone who can
> not only port the library but also market it.
> 
> Porting of the Dolphin Encrypt program is a Stage II task, and depends
> on successful porting of the library.
> 
> -- Peter




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: sneal@muskwa.ucs.ualberta.ca (Sneal)
Date: Wed, 26 May 93 15:00:53 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Digital cash issuess...
Message-ID: <9305262158.AA28845@muskwa.ucs.ualberta.ca>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


     There's an interesting paper on offline cash systems by Stefan
Brands, who I believe is/was a student of David Chaum.  The abstract
reads:
 
"We present a new off-line electronic cash system based on a problem,
called the representation problem, of which little use has been made
in the literature thus far.  Our system is the first to be entirely
based on discrete logarithms.  Using the representation problem as a
basic concept, some techniques are introduced that enable us to
construct protocols for withdrawal and payment that do not use the
cut and choose methodology of earlier systems.  As a consequence, our
cash system is much more efficient in both computation and
communication complexity than previously proposed systems."
 
"Another import aspect of our system concerns its provability.  Contrary
to previously proposed systems, its correctness can be mathematically 
proven to a very great extent.  Specifically, if we make one plausible
assumption concerning a single hash-function, the ability to break the
systems seems to imply that one can break the Diffie-Hellman problem."
 
"Our system offers a number of extensions that are hard to achieve in 
previously known systems.  In our opinion, the most interesting of
these is that the entire cash system (including all the extensions)
can be incorporated straightforwardly in a setting based on wallets
with observers, which has the important advantage that
double-spending can be prevented in the first place, rather than
detecting the identity of a double-spender after the fact.  In
particular, in can be incorporated even under the most stringent
requirements conceivable about the privacy of the user, which seems
to be impossible to do with previously proposed systems.  Another
benefit of our system is that framing attempts by a bank have
negligible probability of success (independent of conputing power) by
a simple mechanism from within the system, which is something that
previous solutions lack entirely.  Furthermore, the basic cash system
can be extended to checks, multi-show cash and divisibility, while
retaining its computation efficiency."
 
[...some stuff elided...]
 
"...Using the representation problem, we show in the appendix how to
batch the confirmation protoocol of undeniable signatures such that
polynomially many undeniable signatures can be verified in four
moves."
 
The paper can be found at
 
 ftp.cwi.nl  /pub/CWIreports/AA/CS-R9323.ps.Z
 

   -- Steve




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Eric Hughes <hughes@soda.berkeley.edu>
Date: Wed, 26 May 93 16:29:12 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Digital cash issuess...
In-Reply-To: <9305262158.AA28845@muskwa.ucs.ualberta.ca>
Message-ID: <9305262325.AA05097@soda.berkeley.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>As a consequence, our
>cash system is much more efficient in both computation and
>communication complexity than previously proposed systems."

I take this with a grain of salt; see below.

>In our opinion, the most interesting of
>these is that the entire cash system (including all the extensions)
>can be incorporated straightforwardly in a setting based on wallets
>with observers, 

I am not surprised that they find this interesting; David Chaum has
patented all the observer protocols.

Having read these protocols in the original, I can say this is not
much of an advantage.  The observer protocols are tremendously
expensive computationally.  Anything you build on top of it won't be
any faster.

Eric





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: jet@nas.nasa.gov (J. Eric Townsend)
Date: Wed, 26 May 93 16:35:31 PDT
To: MCMAHON@Eisner.DECUS.Org
Subject: Selling Tapes ?
In-Reply-To: <01GYMU6G53OY003ADN@Eisner.DECUS.Org>
Message-ID: <9305262335.AA18866@boxer.nas.nasa.gov>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


"John (FuzzFace/Fast-Eddie) McMahon" writes:
 > % traceroute ard.fbi.gov
 > % traceroute tycho.ncsc.mil
 > (and see what happens)

boxer.jet> traceroute fbi.gov

[sound of door breaking in]

"Freeze!  Drop that keyboard!
 You'll have to come with us Mr. Townsend.  You have accessed an FBI
computer system without prior authority."






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Clark Reynard <clark@metal.psu.edu>
Date: Wed, 26 May 93 17:03:41 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: VinCrypt
Message-ID: <9305270043.AA02074@metal.psu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Even as a former 'hacker' myself, the second to last person I would
trust not to install a backdoor (next to the NSA) is a hacker.

In addition, merely having been a systems hacker hardly qualifies
one for writing complex crypto software.  Without any assurance as
to the authors' qualifications for writing a crypto package, or
their integrity.  Even if I could trust their integrity, I'm very
leery of black-box software.

----
Robert W. Clark             Just Say No! to the
rclark@nyx.cs.du.edu        Big Brother Chip  




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: MaxDemon@cup.portal.com
Date: Wed, 2 Jun 93 14:26:01 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: PGP
Message-ID: <9305261949.2.21834@cup.portal.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


How do I get the server to send me PGP22.ZIP and PGP22SRC.ZIP without breaking
up each file into pieces?  I'm on a DOS machine and can't recombine them.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Perry E. Metzger" <pmetzger@lehman.com>
Date: Wed, 26 May 93 16:51:42 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Digital cash issuess...
In-Reply-To: <9305262325.AA05097@soda.berkeley.edu>
Message-ID: <9305262351.AA20929@snark.shearson.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Eric Hughes says:
> >As a consequence, our
> >cash system is much more efficient in both computation and
> >communication complexity than previously proposed systems."
> 
> I take this with a grain of salt; see below.
> 
> >In our opinion, the most interesting of
> >these is that the entire cash system (including all the extensions)
> >can be incorporated straightforwardly in a setting based on wallets
> >with observers, 
> 
> I am not surprised that they find this interesting; David Chaum has
> patented all the observer protocols.
> 
> Having read these protocols in the original, I can say this is not
> much of an advantage.  The observer protocols are tremendously
> expensive computationally.  Anything you build on top of it won't be
> any faster.

As I understand it, "observers" are built in to supposedly uncrackable
hardware built into a smart card -- and I'm not a big fan of the
notion that you can make hardware non-reverse engineerable...

Perry




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: wcs@anchor.ho.att.com
Date: Wed, 26 May 93 17:12:40 PDT
To: gnu@toad.com
Subject: Re: Steganography and Steganalysis
Message-ID: <9305270012.AA10969@anchor.ho.att.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text


John Gilmore writes:
> My favorite scheme was to encode messages in trailing spaces and/or tabs
> in netnews messages.  You could also put internal tabs in place of spaces.
and other fun things...

> In fact, you could do this with news messages that flow "through" your 
> site, (if the messages aren't protected with a crypto checksum), so that
> you would not be the message's sender (and it wouldn't be addressed to anyone
> either -- recipients get very good privacy).

Hmmm...  While this certainly does provide some privacy, it also can break things,
which is not nice to do to other people's messages.  For example,
if other people are encoding messages in trailing spaces or tabs in netnews messages,
you'll replace their hidden messages with your own :-)
I don't know if there's much news out there with Content-Length: headers or other
byte-counting headers that would be disrupted; Lines: is obviously not bothered.

On the other hand, if the messages that appear to be flowing through your site
are really being generated there, either as forgeries of messages from other people,
or forgeries of messages from anonymous posting sites, or are forged messages
you're really posting through an anonymous posting site, you gain about the same
effect (assuming your forgery is good enough to not attract attention.)
(Forging messages from other people is best done either with cooperative people,
or fake people, or people who don't mind like MAILER-DAEMON%Fidogate@BAR.BiTNet.)

		Bill Stewart




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: J. Michael Diehl <mdiehl@triton.unm.edu>
Date: Wed, 26 May 93 19:33:31 PDT
To: clark@metal.psu.edu (Clark Reynard)
Subject: Re: VinCrypt
In-Reply-To: <9305270043.AA02074@metal.psu.edu>
Message-ID: <9305270233.AA27245@triton.unm.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> Even as a former 'hacker' myself, the second to last person I would
> trust not to install a backdoor (next to the NSA) is a hacker.

Are you meaning to imply that there is a backdoor in this package?  If so, how
do you justify this claim?  

> In addition, merely having been a systems hacker hardly qualifies
> one for writing complex crypto software.  Without any assurance as
> to the authors' qualifications for writing a crypto package, or
> their integrity.  Even if I could trust their integrity, I'm very
> leery of black-box software.

You seem to know something about them that I do not.  Care to share your 
knowledge?  Thanx in advance.
+-----------------------+-----------------------------+---------+
| J. Michael Diehl ;-)  | I thought I was wrong once. | PGP KEY |
| mdiehl@triton.unm.edu |   But, I was mistaken.      |available|
| mike.diehl@fido.org   |                             | Ask Me! |
| (505) 299-2282        +-----------------------------+---------+
|                                                               |
+------"I'm just looking for the opportunity to be -------------+
|            Politically Incorrect!"   <Me>                     |
+-----If codes are outlawed, only criminals wil have codes.-----+
+----Is Big Brother in your phone?  If you don't know, ask me---+




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: smb@research.att.com
Date: Wed, 26 May 93 17:37:15 PDT
To: Clark Reynard <clark@metal.psu.edu>
Subject: Re: VinCrypt
Message-ID: <9305270037.AA11240@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


	 Even as a former 'hacker' myself, the second to last person I would
	 trust not to install a backdoor (next to the NSA) is a hacker.

	 In addition, merely having been a systems hacker hardly qualifies
	 one for writing complex crypto software.  Without any assurance as
	 to the authors' qualifications for writing a crypto package, or
	 their integrity.  Even if I could trust their integrity, I'm very
	 leery of black-box software.

	 ----
	 Robert W. Clark             Just Say No! to the
	 rclark@nyx.cs.du.edu        Big Brother Chip  

Indeed.  There were a pair of papers in Cryptologia a few years ago
on ``Data Insecurity'' packages.  The author cryptanalyzed a number
of different PC-based crypto packages, and contrasted that with
the glowing advertising copy...




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: John_David_Galt@cup.portal.com
Date: Wed, 2 Jun 93 14:26:05 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: help: P.S.
Message-ID: <9305262054.2.7349@cup.portal.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


We have ftp here, but pax.tpa.com.au will not accept an ftp connection.  If
you know of a site that will, that has PGP, please, where is it?
thanks.
John David Galt




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: meyer <wixer!wixer.bga.com!meyer@cactus.org>
Date: Wed, 26 May 93 20:59:27 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Data Insecurity Packages, etc.
Message-ID: <9305270314.AA05215@wixer>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Clark Reynard writes:

>Indeed.  There were a pair of papers in Cryptologia a few years ago
>on ``Data Insecurity'' packages.  The author cryptanalyzed a number
>of different PC-based crypto packages, and contrasted that with
>the glowing advertising copy...

This may or may not be one of those papers:
Martin Kochanski: "A Survey of Data Insecurity Packages"
in Deavours et al., Cryptology, pp. 195 - 209.

None of the encryption methods analyzed by Kochanski were particularly
complex, even though it did take skill to crack most of them.  It
turns out that in each case the encryption algorithm used is fairly
easy to state (in, say, half a page).

Perry Metzger writes:

>Correct me if I'm wrong, but from what I understand, "Dolphin Encrypt"
>does not use any well examined crypto system -- its something that you
>guys, without any cryptography credentials, cooked up. On that basis,
>why should we care about it? Most crypto systems that amateurs come up
>with are pathetic to say the least, and strong systems, like
>triple-DES and IDEA, are widely available.

So far the DE method has not been well-examined, except by its
developers (who have spent years on this).  I took a step toward
public examination of the method by posting the natural language
description here on cypherpunks a few weeks ago. (Anyone who missed
it can get it from me.)  This description has been available in the
manual for a year now, for anyone who cared to purchase the product.
It has also been examined by four cryptologists (professional and/or
credentialed) not involved in its development, and it was ridiculed
by none of them.

As I said, the complete details are in the C code, which is
available at present to anyone who purchases the library, and which
will be made public sometime down the road.

Of course, any crypto system must be made available to public
examination before it can be judged strong or otherwise.  If I
didn't think the DE encryption method was strong I wouldn't be
making it public.  Just because we have DES and IDEA doesn't mean we
should be satisfied with them only.  The first task of a cryptanalyst
is to discover what method of encryption was used. If that is known
(and solving this problem itself may be non-trivial) then
cryptanalysis may proceed either by (i) a study of patterns in the
ciphertext or (ii) a thorough study of the encryption method used.
Statistical tests have not revealed any patterns in DE-encrypted
ciphertext so far.  We'll see whether analysis of the DE method by
others reveals any flaws.  Until then I'm reminded of the saying:
"Those who can, do; those who can't, criticise."

This brings up an interesting question: what charactersistics, if
any, do different encryption methods produce in ciphertext?  From a
study of several large samples of ciphertext produced by a
particular encryption method, what clues might there be to the
identity of the encryption method used?  I'd like to hear if anyone
knows of any published work which addresses this question.  Since
DES in electronic code book mode (which is considered insecure)
encrypts 8-byte chunks which are independent of each other, it's
entirely possible that the ciphertext can be identified as the
product of DES-ECB.





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "John (FuzzFace/Fast-Eddie) McMahon" <MCMAHON@Eisner.DECUS.Org>
Date: Wed, 26 May 93 21:34:26 PDT
To: stig@netcom.com
Subject: Re: Selling Tapes ?
Message-ID: <01GYNFOTREYQ003IQ1@Eisner.DECUS.Org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>What does traceroute do?  I don't have it on my system...

It lists the routers between your point and the destination.  Sort of 
a poor man's mapping tool.

It demonstrates that both NCSC and FBI are "openly/obviously" on the Internet.

John




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: greg@ideath.goldenbear.com (Greg Broiles)
Date: Thu, 27 May 93 00:59:12 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: VinCrypt
Message-ID: <5T774B1w164w@ideath.goldenbear.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

J. Michael Diehl <uunet!triton.unm.edu!mdiehl> writes:

> > Even as a former 'hacker' myself, the second to last person I would
> > trust not to install a backdoor (next to the NSA) is a hacker.
>
> Are you meaning to imply that there is a backdoor in this package?  If so, how
> do you justify this claim?

It seems safer to assume that the software is insecure, until proven
otherwise. This is the approach that's been taken with the Clipper
chip, and seemed reasonable in that case - I suggest that it is in
this case, as well.

> > In addition, merely having been a systems hacker hardly qualifies
> > one for writing complex crypto software.  Without any assurance as
> > to the authors' qualifications for writing a crypto package, or
> > their integrity.  Even if I could trust their integrity, I'm very
> > leery of black-box software.
>
> You seem to know something about them that I do not.  Care to share your
> knowledge?  Thanx in advance.

Rather, the original poster (Clark Reynard) seems to *not* have information
 - e.g., information about how or why the author(s) of this crypto package
are trustable, or why we should consider their software secure if we
can't look at the source.

If they are so naive as to think that the NSA can't afford a copy of
Sourcer and a few person-hours to disassemble VinCrypt, what other
(absurd) assumptions have they made? If a machine can execute it, a
machine (or a machine and a person) can disassemble it. I can't believe
that anyone's willing to take this VinCrypt crap even a little bit
seriously. Any dork with a laser printer can print up a press release
and mail it out - looks like maybe this was a slow week for the
computer press.

As far as I can tell, we're supposed to assume that VinCrypt is useful
software because of the political/social perspective of its authors.
While I share their suspicion of the powers that be, I do not trust them
to write software that is free of intentional and/or nonintentional
weaknesses.


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.2

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5pvPd/+NeXYNb2RDYSbf7RNvQ6nQTgLYvD9cs8Xw5kXAJzhA/6PVULgMj66OsC63
3SMeVzQuu3Ui0Ki0nF+RslKNDL/gffurPSzJ9Pwn4uCiAFiXObjkriYE5M02bJOw
Ax7pVUq7ueQ=
=Mj7Z
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

--
Greg Broiles                            greg@goldenbear.com
Golden Bear Computer Consulting         +1 503 465 0325
Box 12005 Eugene OR 97440               BBS: +1 503 687 7764




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Perry E. Metzger" <pmetzger@lehman.com>
Date: Thu, 27 May 93 08:15:14 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: VinCrypt
In-Reply-To: <9305270233.AA27245@triton.unm.edu>
Message-ID: <9305271514.AA26019@snark.shearson.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



> > In addition, merely having been a systems hacker hardly qualifies
> > one for writing complex crypto software.  Without any assurance as
> > to the authors' qualifications for writing a crypto package, or
> > their integrity.  Even if I could trust their integrity, I'm very
> > leery of black-box software.
> 
> You seem to know something about them that I do not.  Care to share your 
> knowledge?  Thanx in advance.

Oh, come on.

Every decent cryptoweenie knows that you don't trust black box
cryptography software. Most amateurs (and the average person writing
crypto code is NOT a professional cryptographer) have no idea of what
they are doing and produce crap. If you don't know how the program you
are buying works, odds are that its one of the majority of programs,
i.e. its crap.

Throughout the last two thousand years, fools, often individuals who
were otherwise rather intelligent, have repeatedly invented new
cryptosystems over and over again which were completely worthless.
Indeed, virtually everyone thinks that they know enough to build a new
cryptosystem -- and virtually no one has bothered to learn how real
cryptosystems are broken.

This even bites the best of us. Phil Zimmermann tells the story of how
he once invented a cryptosystem only to open up a college text on
cryptography and see that the problem of breaking his new cryptosystem
was so trivial that it was a homework exercise at the end of the first
chapter.

I, for one, will never use any crypto system for which the algorithm
hasn't been extensively published and scrutinized.

Perry




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Kyle Jones <postmaster@uunet.uu.net>
Date: Thu, 27 May 93 10:44:09 PDT
To: Eric Hughes <hughes@soda.berkeley.edu>
Subject: Questionable instances?
In-Reply-To: <9305261805.AA03358@wendy-fate.UU.NET>
Message-ID: <9305271743.AA04028@wendy-fate.UU.NET>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Eric Hughes writes:
 > > I can only assume that the bounce came to you becasue the
 > > cpypherpounk list isn't set to make bounces go to the list
 > > maintainer.  
 > 
 > This is the first of these messages we've had for six months, as the
 > bounce messages do in fact go back to the maintainer, me, quite
 > regularly.  I get on the order of 300-400 per week, since often a bad
 > address will queue up mail for a few days before bouncing it all.

If that's so, then it must be that the stupid transport software
at AT&T is ignoring the envelope sender information.





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: miron@extropia.wimsey.com (Miron Cuperman)
Date: Thu, 27 May 93 14:31:49 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Interim patch for ytalk
Message-ID: <199305272044.AA05646@xtropia>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I also intend to change the name of the program to PGTalk.  If anybody
has better ideas, please let me know.

This patch is important for the security of the encryption.  The
idea was to have cipher feedback (pun intended!).  Somehow I reversed
a couple of lines.

*** ytalk/idea.c	Thu May 27 13:40:36 1993
--- pgtalk/idea.c	Thu May 27 13:40:52 1993
***************
*** 504,510 ****
  	{
  		idea_ecb(iv,temp, Z);  /* encrypt iv_idea, making temp. */ 
  
! 		if (!decrypt)	/* buf is ciphertext */
  			/* shift in ciphertext to IV... */
  			cfbshift((byte *)iv,buf,chunksize,IDEABLOCKSIZE);
  
--- 504,510 ----
  	{
  		idea_ecb(iv,temp, Z);  /* encrypt iv_idea, making temp. */ 
  
! 		if (decrypt)	/* buf is ciphertext */
  			/* shift in ciphertext to IV... */
  			cfbshift((byte *)iv,buf,chunksize,IDEABLOCKSIZE);
  
***************
*** 511,517 ****
  		/* convert buf via xor */
  		xorbuf(buf,(byte *)temp,chunksize); /* buf now has enciphered output */
  
! 		if (decrypt)	/* buf was plaintext, is now ciphertext */
  			/* shift in ciphertext to IV... */
  			cfbshift((byte *)iv,buf,chunksize,IDEABLOCKSIZE);
  
--- 511,517 ----
  		/* convert buf via xor */
  		xorbuf(buf,(byte *)temp,chunksize); /* buf now has enciphered output */
  
! 		if (!decrypt)	/* buf was plaintext, is now ciphertext */
  			/* shift in ciphertext to IV... */
  			cfbshift((byte *)iv,buf,chunksize,IDEABLOCKSIZE);
  




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Ian S. Nelson" <ian@bvsd.Co.EDU>
Date: Thu, 27 May 93 12:53:57 PDT
To: clark@metal.psu.edu (Clark Reynard)
Subject: Re: VinCrypt
In-Reply-To: <9305270043.AA02074@metal.psu.edu>
Message-ID: <199305271953.AA13069@bvsd.Co.EDU>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> 
> Even as a former 'hacker' myself, the second to last person I would
> trust not to install a backdoor (next to the NSA) is a hacker.
> 
> In addition, merely having been a systems hacker hardly qualifies
> one for writing complex crypto software.  Without any assurance as
> to the authors' qualifications for writing a crypto package, or
> their integrity.  Even if I could trust their integrity, I'm very
> leery of black-box software.

I think the line about "not trusting DES or RSA because those algorithms have
been given to the NSA"  about says it all.

-- 
Ian S. Nelson			I speak for only myself.	
Finger for my PGP key.  
If you are a beautiful woman, it is mandatory that you reply to this message.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Kent Hastings" <kent_hastings@qmail2.aero.org>
Date: Thu, 27 May 93 16:15:55 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Physical Links
Message-ID: <199305272315.AA13892@aerospace.aero.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


                      Physical Links
Public key and other crypto techniques have been discussed here. 
So has TEMPEST shielding against eavesdropping. But, there hasn't
been a discussion of physical data link options (unless it was
"before my time").

IMHO, this topic should have a place in the FAQ.

m. Physical Data Links.
   a. Telco/Dial-up
   b. Radio
      1. VLF
      2. MW (near Broadcast AM)
      3. Shortwave
      4. VHF
      5. UHF
      6. Microwave
   c. Infrared/Visible Free Space 
   d. Laser/Maser Beam
n. Modulation Techniques.
   a. AM
   b. SSB
   c. ACSSB
   d. FM
   e. SSTV
   f. FSTV
   g. Spread spectrum (hybrids of the following)
      1. FH - frequency hopping
      2. DS - direct sequence
      3. TH - time hopping
      4. TR - transmitted (noise) reference
      5. SR - stored (usually pseudo-noise code) reference
o. Network elements (?)
   1. Wire and cable (underground, disguised)
   2. Point-to-point (radio)
   3. Simple repeaters/linear translators (transponders)
   4. Regenerative repeaters (digital packet)
   5. Satellites
   6. Meteor scatter
   7. Moonbounce
I'd like to see pro and con discussion of these items. Having
encrypted messages won't do any good if Our Enemy simply pulls
the plug at the telephone company.

Kent - kent_hastings@qmail2.aero.org.       #000#






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: bakunin@gnu.ai.mit.edu
Date: Thu, 27 May 93 16:38:09 PDT
To: kent_hastings@qmail2.aero.org
Subject: Re: Physical Links
Message-ID: <9305272337.AA16384@spiff.gnu.ai.mit.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Well, gee.

Now, if we do all our encrypting at home, and only encrypted messages
make it onto them thar links, wouldn't that help some?

Not that physical links aren't a particular weak point.  Just that.

michael

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dTmG4QH10b09K9/qYdugh2c7O01VqU7CD1ZgHMpp8VkVHcda0tF7S6aYxdMbAAUR
tChNaWNoYWVsIEJha3VuaW4gPGJha3VuaW5AZ251LmFpLm1pdC5lZHU+
=xJ6U
-----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Date: Thu, 27 May 93 21:29:32 PDT
To: TO1SITTLER@APSICC.APS.EDU (Kragen Sittler)
Subject: Re: Steganography
In-Reply-To: <930527213642.3e2f@APSICC.APS.EDU>
Message-ID: <9305280429.AA29877@netcom3.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Kragen Sittler writes:

> I headed to the library to check out what they had, crypto-wise.  I found one
> book copyright 1939, which had a chapter on methods of steganography.
> 
> Some of the suggestions I got from it:
> 	-Use every third letter of each word.
> 	-Use every nth letter of each word, where n varies depending on a key.
> (e.g., 2-4-1-5-5-3)
> 	-use every nth word of a sentence
...rest elided...

Was this "Cryptanalysis," by Helen Gaines? Or the Herbert S. Zim
popularization? Both are very dated.

Somehow I don't think 1939 methods will be real useful in a 1993
world. But the book may be educational...you have to crawl before you
can walk, etc.

(Kahn's "The Codebreakers" has some good stuff on hiding messages,
mostly from World War II...think about it, those spies may've used
your 1939 book as a tutorial!)

There haven't been many recent books dealing explicitly with
steganography, though modern crypto texts like Brassard's "Modern
Cryptology," the Antichrist's "Cryptography and Data Security"
(Dorothy Denning), or Salomaa's "Public Key Cryptography" are good
sources. And conference proceedings (annual "Crypto" conferences)
should have some articles on "covert channels" and the like. You can
find these books in (most) large university libraries or in (many)
technical bookstores.

If the only crypto book you have access to is from 1939, find a larger
library.

Happy reading!

-Tim May

-- 
..........................................................................
Timothy C. May         | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,  
tcmay@netcom.com       | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
408-688-5409           | knowledge, reputations, information markets, 
W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA  | black markets, collapse of governments.
Higher Power: 2^756839 | Public Key: PGP and MailSafe available.
Note: I put time and money into writing this posting. I hope you enjoy it.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: TO1SITTLER@APSICC.APS.EDU (Kragen Sittler)
Date: Thu, 27 May 93 20:38:36 PDT
To: cypherpunks-real@toad.com
Subject: Steganography
Message-ID: <930527213642.3e2f@APSICC.APS.EDU>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I headed to the library to check out what they had, crypto-wise.  I found one
book copyright 1939, which had a chapter on methods of steganography.

Some of the suggestions I got from it:
	-Use every third letter of each word.
	-Use every nth letter of each word, where n varies depending on a key.
(e.g., 2-4-1-5-5-3)
	-use every nth word of a sentence.
	-encode in base-3 before steganizing.
	-use the number of syllables in a word.
	-use the number of words in a sentence.
Irrelevant suggestions:
	-use different fonts.
(within the same word.)
	-use broken and whole pickets in a fence.
	-use empty and full positions in a cartridge-belt, as in machine gun.
	-use invisible ink instead, it's easier. :-)

	Maybe these will help those more able to program than myself.

Kragen.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: kocherp@leland.stanford.edu
Date: Thu, 27 May 93 22:45:14 -0600
To: ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu
Subject: Re: Public Apology [ARTICLE IS A FORGERY]
Message-ID: <9305280445.AA09696@cardinal.Stanford.EDU.Stanford.EDU>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Here's a copy of the forged note, plus my response.

Regards,
Paul Kocher
kocherp@leland.stanford.edu



- -------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Article 499 in alt.privacy.clipper:
Path: nntp.Stanford.EDU!headwall.Stanford.EDU!agate!howland.reston.ans.net!usc!c
s.utexas.edu!not-for-mail
From: strnlght@netcom.com (David Sternlight)
Newsgroups: alt.privacy.clipper
Subject: Public Apology
Date: 27 May 1993 01:58:35 -0500
Organization: DSI/USCRPAC
Lines: 36
Sender: daemon@cs.utexas.edu
Message-ID: <9305270624.AA00395@silverton.berkeley.edu>
NNTP-Posting-Host: cs.utexas.edu


In article <9305270624.AA00395@silverton.berkeley.edu> you write:
>Dear Friends,
>
>Many of you have come to know me through my public analysis of
>encryption technology and the law as I understand it. I have taken the
>past few days to reflect on my positions. I now realize that I myself
>have been misled and in turn may have been misleeding some of you. I am
>very impressed with the quality and clarity of thought that many of you
>on the system have displayed in your numerous and extensive replies to
>my ruminations. Unfortunately, I have also been impressed with the
>misleading and self-serving views presented by my former friend Jim
>Bidzos, and by my colleagues in the United States Government. Recently,
>some have called me a dupe, and, understandably, I have reacted
>strongly. Only now do I realize how right they have been.
>
>Let me now try to explain my current thinking: Democracy, as defined by
>our founding fathers, and the Greek philosophers before them, has as its
>cornerstone free and unfettered public discourse. In our modern world,
>privacy and the ability to speak without fear of disclosure or reprisal,
>is a prerequisite for all but the most perfunctory such discourse. If
>there is one thing I should have learned in my journeys to our spanish-
>and portuguese-speaking neighbors to the south, it is that the
>government can never be relied upon as the guarantor of privacy.
>Contrariwise, it is all too often positioned as the infractor. We should
>not, nay, we must not, allow the trivia of narrow-minded export
>restrictions and the tyranny of questionable patents to stand in the way
>of our personal liberties.
>
>I therefore undertake to present my public apologies to such enlightened
>and forward-thinking members of our community as Daniel Bernstein,
>Vesselin Bontchev, Peter Honeyman, Perry Metzger, and especially Phil
>Zimmermann. I can only hope they will find the generosity to judge me
>not on my past, but on my present and future actions.
>
>--
>David Sternlight         Great care has been taken to ensure the accuracy of
>                         our information, errors and omissions excepted.

- -------------------------------------------------------------------------------
My article to sci.crypt and alt.privacy.clipper follows

Newsgroups: alt.privacy.clipper,sci.crypt
Subject: Re: Public Apology [ARTICLE IS A FORGERY]
Summary: 
Expires: 
References: <9305270624.AA00395@silverton.berkeley.edu>
Sender: 
Followup-To: alt.privacy.clipper
Distribution: 
Organization: DSG, Stanford University, CA 94305, USA
Keywords: 

In article <9305270624.AA00395@silverton.berkeley.edu>
strnlght@netcom.com (David Sternlight) writes:
>Only now do I realize how right they have been.

I'm quite certain this post is a forgery.

Plenty of things seem wrong here.  For example, David doesn't
usually post through cs.utexas.edu (which is reportedly is one
of the least difficult sites to use for forging news articles).
Other things are also wrong with the header...

FLAME MODE:

In my opinion, posting this represents a disgusting violation of
net ethics (and the law).  It is frightening that someone could
be so immature as to attempt to damage David's relationships with
Jim Bidzos and others.

Hopefully someone can kill the article before it propigates
too far...

Regards,
Paul Kocher
kocherp@leland.stanford.edu

[I'm sending this to sci.crypt in addition to alt.privacy.clipper,
where a supposed "Public Apology" from David Sternlight was posted.]


------- End of Forwarded Message





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: ""L. Detweiler"" <ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Date: Thu, 27 May 93 22:04:29 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: forged Sternlight posting?
Message-ID: <9305280504.AA05292@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Apparently someone has forged a Sternlight posting on sci.crypt and
alt.privacy.clipper. If the author can hear me: you should be severely
ashamed. I've said before that Sternlight is actually (in a warped way)
a *resource* to the net because of his representation of the NSA and
`fuzzy-brained public' opinion. Without him, we'd have nothing but all
of ourselves in a bland choir.

Cypherpunks, maybe we can help track down the culprit. The forgery says
`recently, some have called me a dupe'. Perhaps it is an allusion to a
recent flame war wherein the counterfeiter participated.

Cypherpunks are sneaky, but not sleazy. I look forward to the day when
digital signatures and other authentication methods make forged
postings like this a strange historical anachronism.

------- Forwarded Message




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: poier@sfu.ca (Skye Merlin Poier)
Date: Fri, 28 May 93 21:31:16 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Modified Vigenere encryption?
Message-ID: <9305280735.AA22115@malibu.sfu.ca>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

I was just thinking... What if one were to use Vigenere encryption with a key
at least as long as the message (therefore making the incidence of coincidences
irrelevant)? A key made of, for instance, words strung together from a dictonary
selected pseudorandomly? 

Are there other weaknesses in the Vigenere system that are escaping me? Perhaps
one could use (in the pseudorand words example) distribution / transition / 
equilibrium proabilities in the english language? If so, are there any other
options for generating a long key without the need for a truly random key (which
would make using the Vigenere table pointless because it would just be an one-
time-pad)?

Also, what are the weaknesses of the Playfair cypher? My texts mention it, but
don't say much of anything other than how it works...

Just pondering at odd hours...
Skye
- --
- -----====> Skye Merlin Poier <====----- 
Undergrad in CMPT/MATH (Virtual Reality)       ||||      ||||
          email: poier@sfu.ca                  p-OO <--> OO-q   THINK
   PGP Public Key available on finger           \==      ==/


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Version: 2.2

iQCVAgUBLAXAvS0bkpXW3omvAQG5EQP/dVH9mxGEvd59ec5e63LKvq45QCwW3K/W
QQU9KlkqGsqw6s5R9N3JQeK+BEIDhq2qViPkP9PPDBPmK9nyAx1zLxQ7tP5W+HvT
wuFeG+Yqzg5IBsOQXRKPaBeNJcgCyDXUgFSKSRT0fGD1n5XCb7zKScht2p4Cp0CB
07jUWV0cPqQ=
=Cydq
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: meyer <wixer!wixer.bga.com!meyer@cactus.org>
Date: Fri, 28 May 93 21:32:21 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Trust, Amateur/Professional, use of PRNGs
Message-ID: <9305280750.AA07434@wixer>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>Date: Thu, 27 May 1993 11:33:06 -0400
>From: "Perry E. Metzger" <lehman.com!pmetzger@cactus.org>
>
>meyer says:
>>
>> Perry Metzger writes:
>>
>> >Correct me if I'm wrong, but from what I understand, "Dolphin Encrypt"
>> >does not use any well examined crypto system -- its something that you
>> >guys, without any cryptography credentials, cooked up. On that basis,
>> >why should we care about it? Most crypto systems that amateurs come up
>> >with are pathetic to say the least, and strong systems, like
>> >triple-DES and IDEA, are widely available.
>>
>> So far the DE method has not been well-examined, except by its
>> developers (who have spent years on this).
>
>In that case, I do not think it is worthy of trust. (See "The
>Codebreakers" by David Kahn for dozens upon dozens of stories of
>amateurs who spent long times producing cryptosystems that were
>essentially junk.)

I am not asking that you take it on trust.  If I were I wouldn't
be revealing the details of the encryption method and I wouldn't
be subjecting the software to critical examination.

You omit to point out that Kahn also discusses the cryptosystem
invented in the late 18th Century by Thomas Jefferson.  I'm not
aware that Jefferson was a "professional" cryptologist or that he
was "credentialed" in this field.  Yet his cryptosystem was
sufficiently strong that even after 1922 "other branches of the
American government used the Jefferson system, generally slightly
modified, and it often defeated the best efforts of the 20th-century
cryptanalysts who tried to break it down!  To this day the Navy
uses it."  (Kahn, p.195 of the hardbound edition.)

This shows that your distinction between "professionals" (by
implication, the experts) and "amateurs" (by implication, the
self-deluding fools) is false.  There is no such clear-cut
distinction.  Whether a cryptosystem is strong or not has to be
decided by an examination of the system itself, not on the basis of
whether its author has attended cryptology classes at M.I.T.

>> Statistical tests have not revealed any patterns in DE-encrypted
>> ciphertext so far.
>
>Or in 99% of other crypto systems. I can construct completely trivial
>and easily broken crypto systems that don't reveal any patterns
>without careful analysis. As an example, it takes mere minutes to
>break a cryptosystem constructed by XORing the plaintext stream with
>the output of a linear congruential pseudorandom number generator --
>but the output will indeed look random to ordinary statistical tests.

XORing the plaintext with the outcome of a linear congruential PRNG
is a very simple-minded way to use a PRNG.  Such operations are
certainly amenable to mathematical analysis.  No doubt you've read
your Abraham Sinkov on "Mathematical Cryptanalysis" and other such
works, where the solving of simultaneous equations in several
(perhaps many) unknowns may yield a solution in some cases.  Yet I
fail to understand why you assume that someone (even someone
"uncredentialed") who uses PRNGs in a cryptosystem will necessarily
do so in a simple-minded way.  I can't imagine why any intelligent
designer of a cryptosystem would commit that error.





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: dmandl@lehman.com (David Mandl)
Date: Fri, 28 May 93 21:35:12 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: forged Sternlight posting?
Message-ID: <9305281244.AA13343@disvnm2.shearson.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> From: ""L. Detweiler"" <ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
> 
> Apparently someone has forged a Sternlight posting on sci.crypt and
> alt.privacy.clipper. If the author can hear me: you should be severely
> ashamed. I've said before that Sternlight is actually (in a warped way)
> a *resource* to the net because of his representation of the NSA and
> `fuzzy-brained public' opinion. Without him, we'd have nothing but all
> of ourselves in a bland choir.
> 
> Cypherpunks, maybe we can help track down the culprit. The forgery says
> `recently, some have called me a dupe'. Perhaps it is an allusion to a
> recent flame war wherein the counterfeiter participated.

I think the forgery was kind of primitive and obvious (OK, I admit I did
get a little chuckle out of it).  But if it wasn't already clear to everyone
that it was a fake, I'm sure Sternlight's and your responses made it clear.

I'm strongly opposed to being cops and "tracking down the culprit."  It was
just an innocent joke, and no one was hurt.  If Sternlight's ego was bruised,
then (as my mom used to say) "my heart bleeds for him."  It's not a big deal.
We've got better things to do than help David Sternlight fight his battles
(though I agree it's useful to have him around).

   --Dave.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Eric Hughes <hughes@soda.berkeley.edu>
Date: Fri, 28 May 93 21:39:02 PDT
To: wixer!wixer.bga.com!meyer@cactus.org
Subject: Data Insecurity Packages, etc.
In-Reply-To: <9305270314.AA05215@wixer>
Message-ID: <9305281626.AA12145@soda.berkeley.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>It has also been examined by four cryptologists (professional and/or
>credentialed) not involved in its development, and it was ridiculed
>by none of them.

I hear the sounds of autonecrothaphty (digging one's own grave).  Was
it recommended by any of them, and did any of the test it?

>The first task of a cryptanalyst
>is to discover what method of encryption was used. 

Usually not.  This often comes as collateral information related to
the intercept.  In the case of a PC seizure, having a manual lying
around and an executable on the disk usually qualifies.

Eric






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Eric Hughes <hughes@soda.berkeley.edu>
Date: Fri, 28 May 93 21:37:59 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: VinCrypt
In-Reply-To: <9305271514.AA26019@snark.shearson.com>
Message-ID: <9305281652.AA13454@soda.berkeley.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>This even bites the best of us. Phil Zimmermann [...]

PGP 1.0 had Phil's Bass-o-matic cipher, which he subsequently dropped.
When I first saw that, I thought to myself, "snake oil," but not in
those words.  I'm glad that lesson got learned.

>I, for one, will never use any crypto system for which the algorithm
>hasn't been extensively published and scrutinized.

I am in total agreement.

Eric




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Eric Hughes <hughes@soda.berkeley.edu>
Date: Fri, 28 May 93 21:37:49 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: ADMIN: sequencing problems
Message-ID: <9305281700.AA13903@soda.berkeley.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Many have wondered why the mail comes out of order sometimes.  The
following comments are my surmise of the situation; I haven't done an
experimental confirmation of the situation.

The sequencing problem comes from the way that toad.com handles mail.
If it can't be delivered immediately upon arrival, it goes in the
queue.  If it can be sent out immediately, then it is sent out.  Now
toad.com routes to many sites through a relay at uunet; this relay
bogs down.  If toad.com can't connect to the relay, it queues the
mail.  The queue is processed only at intervals.  The next mail might
go out immediately, before the queue has been processed again.

I see the same thing at soda.  I'm not going to try to fix it.

Eric






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Eric Watt Forste <arkuat@joes.garage.com>
Date: Fri, 28 May 93 21:36:55 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: crypto product list
Message-ID: <199305281748.AA09808@joes.GARAGE.COM>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



I'd like to put together a list of all commercially available encryption
products, both the good and the bad, both the standalone and the
built-in (to nonencryption products), with information about what
algorithms are used in encrypting. I'm particularly interested in
*commercially-available* (or free) products for telephonic security
(cellular, standard, and fax), device-driver-level computer security
products that use encryption, any mail software that uses builtin
encryption (calls to RIPEM, PGP, whatever), products that license and
incorporate RSA (nonproducts that will do this when they are products
include Apple's OCE... is the RSA-compliant version of Lotus Notes out
yet?), etc. etc.
 
If you can mail information about such products to
arkuat@joes.garage.com or to slippery@netcom.com, particularly the
addresses of marketing departments that I can write to to get more
information, I will compile a text file of this data and, with Eric
Hughes permission, put it up in the cypherpunks directory of
soda.berkeley.edu.
 
Please send information about products that are commercially available
or freely accessible right now. If you have information about products
that you are fairly certain will be on the market within the next six
months (before the end of 1993), please send the information but clearly
indicate that the product in question is not yet available and clearly
indicate a *conservative* estimate of the date the product will be
available. Let me emphasize that my use of the word "product" is fully
intended to include free software, not just monopolized intellectual
property.
 
If you know what encryption algorithm(s) is/are used by the product,
such as DES (ECB, CBC, CFB), IDEA, RSA, Vigenere, please indicate that.
If the manufacturers of the product have not disclosed the encryption
algorithm, then please say so.
 
What I myself know least about are the products for secure telephony, so
I'd appreciate information on these the most. But I'm sure I have lots
of gaps in my knowledge of hard-disk and e-mail security stuff also. I
hope to have a preliminary file ready for soda (if soda wants it) before
June 10th. If it's still short, I may post it here so y'all can more
easily fill in the gaps.
 
 
Eric Watt Forste                             arkuat@joes.garage.com
1800 Market St #243                          San Francisco CA 94102
      "Expectation foils perception."   -- Pamela C. Dean




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: fergp@sytex.com (Paul Ferguson)
Date: Fri, 28 May 93 21:38:38 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Oh, da horrah.
Message-ID: <R2L04B1w165w@sytex.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
 
On Thu, 27 May 93 23:04:21 -0600,
 ""L. Detweiler"" <uunet!longs.lance.colostate.edu!ld231782> wrote -
 
> Apparently someone has forged a Sternlight posting on sci.crypt and
> alt.privacy.clipper. If the author can hear me: you should be severely
> ashamed. I've said before that Sternlight is actually (in a warped way)
> a *resource* to the net because of his representation of the NSA and
> `fuzzy-brained public' opinion. Without him, we'd have nothing but all
> of ourselves in a bland choir.
 
> Cypherpunks, maybe we can help track down the culprit. The forgery says
> `recently, some have called me a dupe'. Perhaps it is an allusion to a
> recent flame war wherein the counterfeiter participated.
 
> Cypherpunks are sneaky, but not sleazy. I look forward to the day when
> digital signatures and other authentication methods make forged
> postings like this a strange historical anachronism.
 
I'm surprised no one realized this before now. My first reaction to
this was that of humor. My second reaction was that I felt embarrassed
for thinking it was funny. My subsequent reaction was that of irony.
As was overheard in the newsgroup -
 
> From: steiner@jupiter.cse.utoledo.edu (Jason 'Think!' Steiner)
> Date: 27 May 93 07:09:07 EST
 
> heh. maybe David should start signing his posts with PGP so he won't
> have this problem in the future. :^)
 
> [yeah, the irony was deliberatly manufactured by whoever forged that
> post, but it's still too good to pass up.]
 
I couldn't agree more. I do, however, agree that it was a pretty
sleazy trick on somone's part -- but the irony factor is just too
surreal.
 
Cheers.
 
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.2
 
iQCVAgUBLAYovJRLcZSdHMBNAQGLtQP/Y5mGsWAGqtCwHYpiPkq/98ofprvRowq3
AZ1u+w0TJSYXeZpF+jSr6cOLH8boWS1Ud3tugFTUuQA/SD7sMFSwdPlvBzfHAIiE
1BiVs7+SDCFOPXXpttv8PezR0ZspyXwxNofGZVM1wXLG1siPBE3XeEbBjKp2SCev
DK5Ez1QbSCI=
=2Pne
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

Paul Ferguson               |  The future is now.
Network Integrator          |  History will tell the tale;
Centreville, Virginia USA   |  We must endure and struggle
fergp@sytex.com             |  to shape it.
 
          Stop the Wiretap (Clipper/Capstone) Chip.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: meyer <wixer!wixer.bga.com!meyer@cactus.org>
Date: Fri, 28 May 93 21:34:48 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Reply to Eric
Message-ID: <9305281746.AA11286@wixer>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Eric Hughes writes:

>>It has also been examined by four cryptologists (professional and/or
>>credentialed) not involved in its development, and it was ridiculed
>>by none of them.
>
>I hear the sounds of autonecrothaphty (digging one's own grave).  Was
>it recommended by any of them, and did any of the test it?

It's true I'm going out on a limb here, but the potential benefit to
the world is a new cryptosystem of some value (a deliberately modest
claim).  And one that was not designed by NSA complete with
trapdoors.  Anything new always meets with resistance.

The description was run by the cryptanalysts for their comment.  The
consensus was that the method was probably strong, or at least not
obviously weak, but that they had insufficient information to judge
properly.  You may disagree.  You may not like the proposed method,
but the real question is whether it works.  In-house testing has
been as rigorous as we can make it, but any outside cryptanalyst is
welcome to take a shot at it.

>>The first task of a cryptanalyst
>>is to discover what method of encryption was used.
>
>Usually not.  This often comes as collateral information related to
>the intercept.  In the case of a PC seizure, having a manual lying
>around and an executable on the disk usually qualifies.

Yes, a cryptanalyst looks around for other evidence as to which
cryptosystem was used before the hard work of analysing ciphertext.
As you say, it may be a manual or an exmcttable.  The encipherer
himself may reveal it.  But in any case, identifying the encryption
method *is* the first step in cryptanalysis.





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: peter honeyman <honey@citi.umich.edu>
Date: Fri, 28 May 93 21:33:51 PDT
To: "" L. Detweiler "" <ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Subject: Re: forged Sternlight posting?
In-Reply-To: <9305280504.AA05292@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Message-ID: <9305281918.AA09887@cygnus.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> Apparently someone has forged a Sternlight posting on sci.crypt and
> alt.privacy.clipper. If the author can hear me: you should be severely
> ashamed.  ...
> 
> Cypherpunks, maybe we can help track down the culprit. ...
> 
> Cypherpunks are sneaky, but not sleazy.  ...

go hang with spaf if you want to deal out this kind of bullshit.
cypherpunks are not the cops of the net.

	peter




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Dave Banisar <banisar@washofc.cpsr.org>
Date: Fri, 28 May 93 21:30:10 PDT
To: CYPHERPUNKS@toad.com
Subject: CPSR Seeks Clipper Docs
Message-ID: <9305281842.AA46660@hacker2.eff.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain




PRESS RELEASE
May 28, 1993

CPSR Seeks Clipper Documents -
Brings Suit Against NSA and National Security Council

	Washington, DC -- Computer Professionals for Social Responsibility 
filed suit today in federal district court seeking information about the 
government's controversial new cryptography proposal.  

	The "Clipper" proposal, announced by the White House at an April 16 
press conference, is based on a technology developed by the National Security 
Agency that would allow the government to intercept computer encoded 
information.  Law enforcement agencies say that capability this is necessary 
to protect court ordered wire surveillance.  

   But industry groups and civil liberties organizations have raised 
questions about the proposal.  They cite the risk of abuse, the potential 
loss in security and privacy, costs to US firms and consumers, and the 
difficulties enforcing the policy.

	Marc Rotenberg, CPSR Washington office director, said "The Clipper 
plan was developed behind a veil of secrecy.  It is not enough for the White 
House to hold a few press conferences.  We need to know why the standard was 
developed, what alternatives were considered, and what the impact will be on 
privacy. "

	"As the proposal currently stands, Clipper looks a lot like 'desktop 
surveillance,'" added Rotenberg.

	David Sobel, CPSR Legal Counsel, said "CPSR is continuing its 
oversight of federal cryptography policy.  These decisions are too important 
to made in secret, without public review by all interested parties."

	In previous FOIA suits, CPSR obtained records from the General 
Services Administration questioning the FBI's digital telephony plan, a 
legislative proposal to require that communications companies design wiretap 
capability.  More recently, CPSR obtained records through the FOIA revealing 
the involvement of the National Security Agency in the development of  
unclassified technical standards in violation of federal law.

	CPSR is a national membership organization, based in Palo Alto, CA.  
Membership is open to the public.  For more information about CPSR, contact 
CPSR, P.O. Box 717, Palo Alto, CA 9403, 415/322-3778 (tel), 415/322-3798 
(fax), cpsr@cpsr.org






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: RAGLAN54%MMC.BITNET@uga.cc.uga.edu
Date: Fri, 28 May 93 21:28:10 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Electronic Contracts
Message-ID: <01GYQ0C6AR1U8WX3NV@MMC.BITNET>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Just a thought here.  I'm still new to this cryptography thing, taking it
seriously, have read through the FAQ and the past week or so of posts here.
I just got a copy of PGP tonight, and on reading through the manual, something
leaped out at me:  electronic signature validation.  If your private key acts
as validation for a message, then what you have is an electronic signature that
could be verified, and thus you could sign a contract online; you're snet
the contract in email, you attach your private-key signature to it and email
it back, and voila, you've entered into a contractual agreement that would
stand up in court.  Has there been a test case of this?  Are there any lawyers
or other legal types on this echo that could give an opinion on the validity
of this idea?  Or has this issue been discussed before?

Andrew *5




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: ""L. Detweiler"" <ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Date: Fri, 28 May 93 21:27:30 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Sternlight forgery
Message-ID: <9305290406.AA25605@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Sheesh, hours spent on the Mycotronx posting are rewarded with uniform
deafening apathy, and this gets all the reaction.  I'd never have
thought I'd be flamed for condemning a forgery. When did it happen that
cancelling other's postings and deceitful forgeries wasn't taboo? Ok,
ok, maybe it never was, and nothing's sacred in cyberspace; don't flame
me with the history of Usenet taboos.

Perhaps I didn't make this clear, but the names and themes (Zimmerman,
Bidzos, RSA, PGP, other cypherpunk members) in the forged letter
suggested to me a cypherpunk subscriber may have been responsible.
Otherwise, I would not have posted it here. It's just my modest warning
and reminder that while we might be revolutionaries we're not scoundrels.

I take exception to the description of the posting as an `innocent
joke'. I have no problem with an `innocent joke' like this being posted
under someone's name or even anonymously. It seems to me at least some
of the intent was rooted in malice and deceit. Ah, but I'm starting to
sound like Depew.

peter honeyman <honey@citi.umich.edu>
>go hang with spaf if you want to deal out this kind of bullshit.
>cypherpunks are not the cops of the net.

Ouch.  I assure you Mr. Spafford is not my type, and anyway he has
apparently resigned from the position of net.policeman so the point is
mute.  (At the quasi-demise of anon.penet.fi there was a lot of rumor
and speculation that he was the `highly regarded net personality' who
sent the poison letter alluded by Helsingius. I wonder if that tipped
him over the edge?)

Excuse me, I just thought it might give some bored cypherpunk something
to do with their afternoon in helping track down the posting. I think
I'll just go lurk in a dark Usenet corner.

L.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: stig@netcom.com (Stig)
Date: Fri, 28 May 93 23:03:42 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Modified Vigenere encryption?
In-Reply-To: <9305280735.AA22115@malibu.sfu.ca>
Message-ID: <9305290603.AA16770@netcom.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



I must've missed it.  Will some kind soul forward to me a description
of Vigenere?




> 
> Also, what are the weaknesses of the Playfair cypher? My texts mention it, but
> don't say much of anything other than how it works...
> 

Well, a while ago I saw a description of playfair in a novel and it
was simple enough that I coded it...  I guess I had lots of free time.
Don't pick on my code.  It's old.

	Stig

/**
 * playfair.c -- implementation of the playfair cipher
 * written by stig, 10-mar-91
 * 
 * --- TO COMPILE (put this in your makefile) ---
 * unpf pf: playfair.c
 * 	cc $(CFLAGS) -o pf playfair.c
 * 	- rm unpf
 * 	ln pf unpf
 * 
 * --- THIS PROGRAM works as a filter---
 *         pf keyword <message_file >code_file
 * 	unpf keyword <code_file
 * 
 * --- THIS CIPHER uses a 5x5 alphabet square to encode letter pairs
 * 
 *      K E Y W O
 *      R D a b c
 *      f g h i l       (i and j are folded into each other)
 *      m n p q s
 *      t u v x z
 * 
 * 1) prepare the input by removing punctuation,
 *    fold 'j' into 'i'
 *    break up repeated letters with 'x' and/or 'z'
 *    group letters into pairs
 * 
 *    My name is stig (or jonathan) ----> my na me is xs ti go ri on at ha nz
 * 
 * 2) transform each letter pair using the alphabet square:
 *    (i may be written as either i or j)
 *      a) letters appear in the same row -- replace them with letters to
 *         the right.  letter to right of rightmost letter is first letter
 *         of the row. (hi -> il (or jl))
 *      b) letters appear in the same column -- replace them with letters
 *         below. (ha -> ph)
 *      c) otherwise -- replace each letter with the letter occupying the
 *         same row in the grid and the column of the other letter in the
 *         pair. (my -> pk)
 * 
 *    MY NA ME IS XS TI GO RI ON AT HA NZ
 *    pk pd nk lq zq xf le bf es rv ph su 
*/

#include <ctype.h>
#include <strings.h>
#include <assert.h>
#include <stdio.h>

char *Key = 0;
char  Square[26] = "                         ";	/* 25 spaces */

#define pos(row,col)		Square[ (row)*5 + (col) ]
#define findrow(c)	((int)(index(Square,c)-Square)/5)
#define findcol(c)	((int)(index(Square,c)-Square)%5)
#define jtoi(c)		(((c)=='j') ? 'i' : (c))

#define ENCODE	1
#define DECODE	4


build_square()
{
    char *key = Key, c;
    int   i = 0;

    assert(key && *key);

    while (*key) {
	*key = tolower(*key);
	*key = jtoi(*key);
	if (isalpha(*key) && !index(Square, *key))
	    Square[i++] = (*key);
	++key;
    }
    for (c = 'a'; c <= 'z'; ++c) {
	if (c == 'j' || index(Square, c))
	    continue;
	Square[i++] = c;
    }
    assert(i == 25);
}

/* read stdin, place processed data in buf */
prepare(buf, mode)
char *buf;
int   mode;
{
    int   c, last = 0;		/* last character */
    char  splitter = 'x';	/* separates repeated letters, 'x' or 'z' */


    while ((c = getchar()) != EOF) {
	if (!isalpha(c))
	    continue;
	c = tolower(c);
	c = jtoi(c);
	if (c == last && mode == ENCODE) {
	    *buf++ = splitter;
	    splitter = (splitter == 'x') ? 'z' : 'x';
	}
	last = c;
	*buf++ = c;
    }
    *buf = 0;
}

extern long random();

outchar(c, mode)
char  c;
int   mode;
{
    if (c == 'i' && mode == ENCODE && (random() & 4))
	c = 'j';
    putchar(c);
}


transform(buf, ofs)
char *buf;
int   ofs;			/* 1 encodes, 4 decodes */
{
    int   r1, c1, r2, c2;

    for (; *buf; buf += 2) {
	r1 = findrow(buf[0]);
	c1 = findcol(buf[0]);
	if (!buf[1]) {
	    buf[2] = 0;
	    buf[1] = 'a'+(random()%26);
	}
	r2 = findrow(buf[1]);
	c2 = findcol(buf[1]);
	if (r1 == r2) {
	    outchar(pos(r1, (c1 + ofs) % 5), ofs);
	    outchar(pos(r2, (c2 + ofs) % 5), ofs);
	} else if (c1 == c2) {
	    outchar(pos((r1 + ofs) % 5, c1), ofs);
	    outchar(pos((r2 + ofs) % 5, c2), ofs);
	} else {
	    outchar(pos(r1, c2), ofs);
	    outchar(pos(r2, c1), ofs);
	}
    }
    putchar('\n');
}

main(argn, argv)
int   argn;
char **argv;
{
    char  buf[BUFSIZ];
    char *cmd;
    int   mode;

    srandom(getpid());
    if (argn != 2) {
	fprintf(stderr, "Playfair en/decoder\nusage:  %s keyword\n",
		argv[0]);
	exit(1);
    }
    Key = argv[1];

    cmd = rindex(argv[0], '/');
    cmd = (cmd) ? cmd + 1 : argv[0];
    mode = (cmd[0] == 'u') ? DECODE : ENCODE;
    if (mode == DECODE)
	printf("NOTE:  'i' may be 'j', 'x' or 'z' may be extra.\n\n");

    build_square();
    prepare(buf, mode);
    transform(buf, mode);

    return (0);
}



/* Jonathan Stigelman, Stig@netcom.com, PGP public key by finger  */
/* fingerprint = 32 DF B9 19 AE 28 D1 7A  A3 9D 0B 1A 33 13 4D 7F */




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Eric Hughes <hughes@soda.berkeley.edu>
Date: Sat, 29 May 93 00:10:16 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: CIPHERS: Dolphin Encrypt public review
In-Reply-To: <9305281746.AA11286@wixer>
Message-ID: <9305290706.AA00052@soda.berkeley.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>The description was run by the cryptanalysts for their comment.  

I've never seen any names, nor any statements of their analysis.  As
far as I'm concerned this stands as hearsay.

>The consensus was that the method was probably strong, or at least
>not obviously weak, but that they had insufficient information to
>judge properly.

Insufficient information??  And this is all you have for review?  Did
they even see code, or just an English description of it?  Look, if
saying they didn't laugh at it is digging your own grave, saying they
didn't even look at the full algorithm is acting as your own firing
squad.

>In-house testing has
>been as rigorous as we can make it, but any outside cryptanalyst is
>welcome to take a shot at it.

Anything as significant as a new cipher needs to be publically
examined before it can be trusted.  The opportunity for such public
examination is not sufficient, only the actual publication and
subsequent responses qualify.

Therefore, I have a challenge for you to submit your algorithm in full
detail to the public scrutiny of the academic cryptographic community.
You have unfortunately missed the deadline for papers for CRYPTO 93,
but you can always submit a paper to the Journal of Cryptology.  If
the cipher is to be considered secure, it should be proof against the
most sophisticated attacks known; currently this means that it should
be proof against differential cryptanalysis.

Until this kind of high-level review has been made, I openly and
publically recommend that this cipher not be used.

As far as a product goes, Dolphin Encrypt would be much more useful if
its cipher were trusted.  A rewrite to use triple DES would be
straighforward and would greatly increase the trustworthiness of the
product.

Eric





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Eric Hughes <hughes@soda.berkeley.edu>
Date: Sat, 29 May 93 00:41:19 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Trust, Amateur/Professional, use of PRNGs
In-Reply-To: <9305280750.AA07434@wixer>
Message-ID: <9305290737.AA03283@soda.berkeley.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Re: disclosure

>If I were I wouldn't
>be revealing the details of the encryption method and I wouldn't
>be subjecting the software to critical examination.

To my mind, selling the code for the encryption method does not count
as revealing the details to a very wide audience.  Were it freely
available, I would say that you had satisfied that concern.  Were it
even available on a non-compete covenant basis and free of monetary
charge I would be satisfied.

Let me see if I can paraphrase.  You'll sell me the code, so that I
can evaluate it or have someone else do this.  This evaluation is much
more for your benefit than mine, because where I might use it for
myself, this same information accrues much more to the value of the
cipher itself, which is yours.

Oh, please.

Re: An inappropriate historical comparison

>You omit to point out that Kahn also discusses the cryptosystem
>invented in the late 18th Century by Thomas Jefferson.  I'm not
>aware that Jefferson was a "professional" cryptologist or that he
>was "credentialed" in this field.  

The single salient difference that you ignore is fifty years of public
and intensive research into cryptography, starting with Shannon.  I
have seen nothing other than vague claims of security and one
statistic of flat byte distribution in the ciphertext (necessary and
easy to achieve).

I have seen very little awareness of any of this work.  In particular,
the most sophisticated analysis for ciphers to date has been
differential cryptanalysis.  I have not seen the results of any such
examination of your cipher.  To give you a clue as to how good this
technique is, Biham and Shamir were able to break FEAL-4 with a few
dozen chosen plaintexts, and FEAL-8 with somewhat more.

Re: levels of expertise

>This shows that your distinction between "professionals" (by
>implication, the experts) and "amateurs" (by implication, the
>self-deluding fools) is false.  There is no such clear-cut
>distinction.  

The state of cryptography two hundred years ago is not relevant to the
current state of knowledge.  Today there is much, much more to know
about the subject, and there is a lot of relevant prior art.

Should you claim that this prior art is not needful to know in order
to design new ciphers, I will not imply that your are a self-deluding
fool, I will explicitly declaim you as self-deluding fool.

Re: arguments _ad authoritatem_

>Whether a cryptosystem is strong or not has to be
>decided by an examination of the system itself, not on the basis of
>whether its author has attended cryptology classes at M.I.T.

But lacking both criteria, I have no belief at all that your cipher is
secure.  In fact, given the track record or the uncredentialled in the
last twenty years, I have exactly the opposite opinion.

Re: cryptanalysis

>No doubt you've read
>your Abraham Sinkov on "Mathematical Cryptanalysis" and other such
>works, 

These and other such works are by no means the state of the art.  If
you've learned all your cryptography from these, it's time to do some
more reading.

>where the solving of simultaneous equations in several
>(perhaps many) unknowns may yield a solution in some cases.  

One of the fundamentals of real cryptography is that exact solution
techniques are much less powerful than statistical methods of the
appropriate form.  Techniques of adding in 'noise' prevent exact
methods, but that is largely irrelevant.  Every useful statistic will
come through just as before, except that a larger data set is needed.

Eric




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: markh@wimsey.bc.ca (Mark C. Henderson)
Date: Sat, 29 May 93 12:32:25 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: lucas encryption beta available
Message-ID: <m0nzXE5-0000EoC@van-bc.wimsey.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


U.S. and Canadian cypherpunks:

I have a very early BETA of a free program that uses LUC and triple
DES available. (uses gmp-1.3, only runs on Unix-like systems)

I'm making it available in the hope that people will grab it, look
it over and send comments, criticisms &c.

anon ftp to netcom.netcom.com
cd /pub/henderso

get lucas-0.3.4.tar.z (gzip format) it binary mode.

If you need gmp, you can also find it in the same directory.

Please don't export this outside of the U.S. and Canada.

-- 
Mark Henderson
markh@wimsey.bc.ca (personal account)
RIPEM key available by key server/finger/E-mail
  MD5OfPublicKey: F1F5F0C3984CBEAF3889ADAFA2437433




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: jas@netcom.com
Date: Sat, 29 May 93 13:50:00 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: HDTV Markey hearings!
Message-ID: <9305292128.AA10251@netcom3.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



	Hi, I don't think this subject is relevant to this list, but I was
flipping through the channels today and caught the last few minutes of 
the Markey Hearings on HDTV and digital broadcasting on C-Span. I wonder if 
anybody caught this and could e-mail me about it or posting it on this list.
(The outcome of it).

	-jas.

Does anybody know if it was broadcated on internet radio or the mbone?.

 




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Jim McCoy <mccoy@ccwf.cc.utexas.edu>
Date: Sat, 29 May 93 17:02:37 PDT
To: arkuat@joes.garage.com (Eric Watt Forste)
Subject: Re: crypto product list
In-Reply-To: <199305281748.AA09808@joes.GARAGE.COM>
Message-ID: <199305300039.AA04087@tigger.cc.utexas.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text


> From: Eric Watt Forste <arkuat@joes.garage.com>
> 
> 
> I'd like to put together a list of all commercially available encryption
> products [...]

Source #1 : Information Systems Security Products and Services Catalogue
	    Printed by the Government Printing Office (GPO)
	    For subscription information call (202) 783-3238 or mail to:
		Superintendant of Documents
		U.S. Government Printing Office
		Washington, DC 20402

	    This is a catalogue of NSA-tested security products for govt
	    agencies and contractors.  Think what you like of the
	    organization compiling the info, but this is the "real-world"
	    security stuff people; this covers just about everything
	    from secure satellite uplinks and tempest equipment to
	    encrypting modems.  Some of it is not available to the public,
	    but vendor contact numbers are provided, so with a little
	    hunting you might be able to find a nice list of the "high-end"
	    of the spectrum.

Source #2 : InfoSecurity Product News.  The trade rag of this business.
	    Can't remember the subscription info, but this seems to be
	    where the MIS types shop...

jim



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "George A. Gleason" <gg@well.sf.ca.us>
Date: Sun, 30 May 93 00:36:13 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: >>>>>'s
Message-ID: <199305300814.AA05423@well.sf.ca.us>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Maybe I'm the only one around here who feels this way, but when I see a
posting which begins with a whole bunch of inanely long quotes from previous
postings, often going so far as to have whole nests of stacked >>>> symbols
in front, I just go, *splat* and ctrl-C, and on to the next.  Like, if we're
reading this stuff regularly, we've got enough of a sense of the flow to be
able to recognise someone's position from an abridged or abbreviated quote.
For example, "Dolphin-crypt... an unexamined system (by analysts outside the
community)..."  does as well to convey the meaning involved, as posting a
huge nest of paragraphs quoted entire.  So in summary, what d' y'all think
of trying to cut down on the swarms of >>>>>>>>>>> lengthy full-paragraph
quotes and replace them with something a bit more compact, eh...?




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Michael Edward Marotta <mercury@well.sf.ca.us>
Date: Sun, 30 May 93 06:32:00 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: An inquiring mind wants to know
Message-ID: <199305301409.AA11995@well.sf.ca.us>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



(This is for an article in the 1994 Loompanics catalog.)
 
You are familiar with PGP and RIPEM, right?.  Jim Bidzos told me 
about RIPEM when I asked him about PGP.  (I wasn't too interested 
in his relationship -- or lack of one -- with Phil Z.  I was more 
interested in RSA and the Feds.)  So, since Mark Riordan was in 
my back yard, I called him and got a good interview and also his 
mailer.  I got it on a unix system I have an account on and he 
sent me an MS-DOS version.  I also talked with Phil Zimmermann.  
In fact, I talked to him first.  I got PGP from a BBS operator I 
know via libernet@dartmouth.edu and I have played with it.  I've 
also tried RIPEM.
 
I don't know about you guys, but I find PGP much easier to use.  
RIPEM has all the hallmarks of unix wizardry.  It is poorly 
documented.  The interface is difficult.  It grew in ways the 
designer never contemplated.  And I haven't even RUN anything 
yet...  Mark told me that it was primarily a MAILER.  OK, I can 
accept that.  But I just don't see it catching on.  PGP, on the 
other hand, shows all the evidences of shareware.  It's hard to 
comment on the obvious.  
 
So, I assume that I am in the normal range for a netrunner.  I 
typically log in to fidonet bbses from home.  I have a PC clone.  
I have had accounts on CompuServe, Prodigy and Delphi.  I have a 
couple of email addresses.  I can't see myself using RIPEM.  I 
can indeed see myself using PGP.
 
Here are my questions:
How do you relate to the above?  
Do you see "everyone" on the Net happy as clams with privacy-
   enhanced mailers?  
Do you expect more people to find out about and rely on PGP?  
Do you see something else working here that I haven't perceived?
 
 
 
Thank you for your time and consideration.
Mike Marotta




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: kelly@netcom.com (Kelly Goen)
Date: Sun, 30 May 93 11:16:56 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: FWEE:  alt.whistleblower possibles
Message-ID: <9305301855.AA07356@netcom.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Path: netcom.com!netcomsv!decwrl!uunet!digex.com!digex.net!not-for-mail

 I found this in alt.conspiracy and thought I would forward it to the list.... 
it looks like we may want to talk to these folks

     cheers
     kelly
>From: j_wilson@access.digex.net (john m. wilson)
>Newsgroups: alt.conspiracy
>Subject: TO SYSOP OF ALT.CONSPIRACY
>Date: 15 May 1993 22:09:26 -0400
>Organization: Express Access Online Communications, Greenbelt, MD USA
>Lines: 26
>Message-ID: <1t47om$el6@access.digex.net>
>NNTP-Posting-Host: access.digex.net
>Keywords: SYSOP ALT.CONSPIRACY QUESTION
>
>I am in contact with the Association of National Security Alumni,
>a group of ex-security officers and associated professionals.
>
>They would like to find a place to post electronic copies of
>"UNCLASSIFIED" a periodical devoted to government actions of
>an unquestionable nature.
>
>Also I was asked to post a copy of Julianne McKinneys "Microwave
>Harrassment & Mind-Control Experimentation" where it would be
>available to interested parties.
>
>I would like to post the previously mentioned document in this
>forum when it is delivered to me in electronic form.
>
>Also I would like to find an FTP site or sympathetic news group
>who would keep the copies of "UNCLASSIFIED" online.
>
>This message is directed to the moderator of alt.conspiracy but
>obviously I will entertain any useful response.
>
>Also I do not condone or endorse any of the veiws stated in the
>previously listed documents.
>
>		-John Wilson
>		 The Silicon Service
>




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: kelly@netcom.com (Kelly Goen)
Date: Sun, 30 May 93 11:16:57 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: (fwd) Re: TO SYSOP OF ALT.CONSPIRACY
Message-ID: <9305301855.AA07361@netcom.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Path: netcom.com!netcomsv!decwrl!concert!news-feed-1.peachnet.edu!darwin.sura.net!howland.reston.ans.net!noc.near.net!nic.umass.edu!twain.ucs.umass.edu!not-for-mail
From: eggo@twain.ucs.umass.edu (Round Waffle)
Newsgroups: alt.conspiracy
Subject: Re: TO SYSOP OF ALT.CONSPIRACY
Date: 17 May 1993 14:05:14 -0400
Organization: The Durex Blender Corporation
Lines: 15
Message-ID: <1t8k4qINNa35@twain.ucs.umass.edu>
References: <1t47om$el6@access.digex.net>
NNTP-Posting-Host: twain.ucs.umass.edu
Keywords: SYSOP ALT.CONSPIRACY QUESTION

In article <1t47om$el6@access.digex.net> j_wilson@access.digex.net (john m. wilson) writes:
>                       [material deleted]
>This message is directed to the moderator of alt.conspiracy but
>obviously I will entertain any useful response.
>                       [material deleted]

        Well, alt.conspiracy has no moderator.  Post away.



-- 
+-   eggo@titan.ucs.umass.edu      --><--       Eat Some Paste   -+
+-          Yorn desh born, der ritt de gitt der gue,            -+
+-      Orn desh, dee born desh, de umn bork! bork! bork!        -+
+----------------- The Durex Blender Corporation -----------------+




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Sandy <72114.1712@CompuServe.COM>
Date: Sun, 30 May 93 09:39:23 PDT
To: <cypherpunks@toad.com>
Subject: >>>>>s
Message-ID: <930530171111_72114.1712_FHF43-1@CompuServe.COM>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


_________________________________________________________________
  SANDY SANDFORT                          ssandfort@attmail.com
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
George A. Gleason wrote:

    " . . . So in summary, what d' y'all think of trying to
    cut down on the swarms of >>>>>>>>>>> lengthy
    full-paragraph quotes and replace them with something a
    bit more compact, eh...?"

Like that, George?

You know folks, George is right.  It isn't necessary, however, to
re-invent the wheel.  Literary conventions for text presentation
have existed for decades--if not centuries.  "NetSpeak" can be oh
so clever, but often, it's not very conducive to communication.
Almost everyone on this list took English in school (-especially-
those NOT educated in the US).  If you don't remember your
English grammar, spelling or style; buy some books.  (Or as we
say in NetSpeak, "RTFM"!)

RELATED GRIPE:  For all the excessive IQ on this list, I see lots
of poor reading skills.  As an example, I don't know how many of
you have sent responses to me at my CompuServe address, even
though I clearly request otherwise at the end of every one of my
posts.  (Didn't you get that far?)

Often, I see responses to posts that focus on what the reader
-thought- was said, rather than what was -actually- said.  Before
you go shooting from the hip, be sure you are responding to more
than just some emotionally loaded key words.  Also, I'm sure not
all of you read -your own- posts before you launch them into
Cyberspace.

 S a n d y

P.S.  Some of you may think this is not a relevant topic for
Cypherpunks.  If so, I suggest you think again.  I leave the
proof of relevance as an exercise for the student.

>>>>>>   Please address e-mail to: ssandfort@attmail.com   <<<<<<
_________________________________________________________________






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Marc Horowitz <marc@Athena.MIT.EDU>
Date: Sun, 30 May 93 15:04:41 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: [daemon@ATHENA.MIT.EDU : National Security Telecommunications  5.27.93]
Message-ID: <9305302242.AA20145@bill-the-cat.MIT.EDU>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



  Subject: National Security Telecommunications  5.27.93
  Errors-To: Mail-Server@campaign92.org
  Reply-To: Clinton-Info@campaign92.org
  Date: Fri, 28 May 1993 09:59-0400
  From: The White House <75300.3115@compuserve.com>
  To: Clinton-News-Distribution@campaign92.org
  
  
           E X E C U T I V E   O F F I C E   O F   T H E   P R E S I D E N T
  
  
                               27-May-1993 07:03pm  
   
           TO:        Jeffrey L. Eller                   
           TO:        Jonathan P. Gill                   
  
           FROM:      David Seldin
                      Office of the Press Secretary
  
   
           SUBJECT:   NATIONAL SECURITY TELECOMMUNICATIONS ADVISORY COMMISSION
  
  
  
  
  
  
                           THE WHITE HOUSE
  
  
                    Office of the Press Secretary
  
                                                                    
  For Immediate Release                             May 26, 1993
  
  
         PRESIDENT APPOINTS AUGUSTINE TO CHAIR ADVISORY PANEL
  
  (Washington, DC)    The President announced today that he has 
  appointed Norman R. Augustine as Chair and William T. Esrey as 
  Vice Chair of the President's National Security 
  Telecommunications Advisory Committee (NSTAC).  Augustine is 
  Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of Martin Marietta 
  Corporation and has previously served as Vice Chair of NSTAC.  
  Esry is Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of Sprint 
  Corporation.
  
       Also named to the NSTAC today were Joseph T. Gorman, the 
  Chairman and CEO of TRW Inc., and Albert F. Zettlemoyer, the 
  President of Paramax Systems Corporation and a Senior Vice 
  President of Unisys Corporation.
  
       The President's National Security Telecommunications 
  Advisory Committee is a Federal Advisory Committee designed to 
  provide information and advice to the President regarding 
  telecommunications planning.  It is composed of up to 30 
  telecommunications industry executives.
  
  
                                # # #
  
  
  
  --[0113]--
  
  ------- End forwarded transaction



------- End of Forwarded Message





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Thomas W. Strong, Jr." <strong+@cmu.edu>
Date: Sun, 30 May 93 17:32:36 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: An editorial comment from comp.risks
Message-ID: <Qg2Jf3S00VpN4_ILYG@andrew.cmu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


In an article about the absurdity of ITAR legislation, Peter Neuman (the
moderator) added this comment at the bottom.

>    [Incidentally, at last week's IEEE Symposium on Research in Security 
>    and Privacy, a rump group decided that because crypto falls under
>    munitions controls, the right to bear arms must sanction private uses of
>    cryptography!  PGN]

Does anyone here have any more information about this?  Particularly
whether or not it can be backed up?  

 -----------------------------------------------------------------
  Tom Strong              N3NBB              ts49+@andrew.cmu.edu




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: fergp@sytex.com (Paul Ferguson)
Date: Sun, 30 May 93 19:10:07 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Washington Post article on Clipper/Capstone/Skipjack & Privacy
Message-ID: <976D5B1w165w@sytex.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
 
The Washington Post
Sunday, May 30, 1993
Pages H1, H4
Business section
 
CHIPPING AWAY AT PRIVACY?
Encryption Device Widens Debate Over Rights of U.S. to Eavesdrop
 
by John Mintz and John Schwartz
Washington Post Staff Writers
 
The two men were well-dressed, Bill Frezza recalls. They walked
into his New Jersey office a few days after his company,
Ericsson-G.E. Mobile Data, Inc., announced the introduction of a
portable device for sending and receiving electronic messages.
The two asked knowledgeable questions about whether the product
incorporated "encryption" technology, which scrambles signals to
frustrate eavesdroppers.
 
They wanted to buy some of the expensive, high-tech devices. With
cash.
 
"They were not tekkies," concluded Frezza, the firm's marketing
chief. By the time they left (empty-handed, since there were no
devices to sell yet), Frezza had decided they were drug dealers.
 
The New Jersey incident illustrates why law enforcement and
intelligence agencies are working so hard to keep a finger on new
communications technologies emerging around the world. They fear
these advances will give criminals and terrorists a new advantage
- -- by making it all but impossible for authorities to tap their
telephones and computer lines.
 
The problem, say the feds, is that the bad guys are always the
first to get the hot new toys -- whether they are fast cigarette
boats, automatic weapons or computerized gadgets that ensure
privacy. So the authorities -- over sharp protests from civil
libertarians -- are continually looking for ways to defeat
encryption technologies and continue monitoring communications.
 
This conflict, simmering for years, came to a boil on April 16,
when the White House announced it was imposing a new scheme for
encrypting voice and data communications. The system, which
employs a scrambler device dubbed the "Clipper Chip," leaves a
deciphering "key" in the federal government's pocket.
 
Whitfield Diffie, a pioneering cryptographer at Sun Microsystems
Inc., compares Clipper to "the little keyhole in the back of the
combination locks used on the lockers of schoolchildren. The
children open the locks with the combinations, which is supposed
to keep other children out, but the teachers can always look in
the lockers by using the key."
 
The government will stock up on phones and computers equipped
with Clipper, and many companies that do business with the
government will need to buy the same gear. The administration
also hopes Clipper will catch on across the business landscape.
 
Meanwhile, federal officials have been drawing up legislation to
require telecommunications companies to grant law enforcement
special access to U.S. communications networks.
 
"We feel we need these tools to do our job," said James K.
Kallstrom, the FBI's chief of investigative technology. Kallstrom
said if the FBI can't get industry to make the changes, disaster
could occur. "I don't have a lot of dead bodies laying around
here or dead children from an airplane explosion that we haven't
been able to solve -- yet."
 
For Jim Bidzos, president of a California-based encryption firm
called RSA Data Security Inc., the controversy "comes down to one
simple question: Do you have the right to keep a phone call or a
computer transmission private? The government says no."
 
David Sobel, an attorney with Computer Professionals for Social
Responsibility, an advocacy group for high-tech industries, said
the fight over Clinton's Clipper chip is the opening shot in "the
battle for the future direction of the nation's data highways."
 
Spooking the 'New Agers'
 
The Clinton White House's decision to cast its lot with the FBI
and the super-secret National Security Agency (NSA) has its
ironies.
 
The young computer wizards who manage the information industry
helped elect Clinton, and they share with him a dream of a
21st-century telecommunications revolution. But many of the
industry's "new agers," as one White House official calls them,
think Clinton is selling out to spooks and spies.
 
The FBI and NSA had won support in the Bush administration for
Clipper, first proposed several years ago. Then within weeks of
the Democrats' move into the White House, top law enforcement and
national security officials won over the Clinton team. One White
House official said they were "taken with the aura of making
national security decisions inside the White House.... You see
the stakes differently."
 
The FBI and state and local law enforcement officials told the
incoming Clinton team that resolving this issue was one of their
highest priorities, industry sources said. Mike Godwin, counsel
for the Electronic Frontier Foundation, which is mobilizing the
communications industry against Clipper, said that "like all
liberals, Clinton has an interest in being seen as a good
law-and-order guy."
 
Clinton's National Security Council is now conducting a
closed-door review of those subjects -- which the industry
criticizes for being secret, and on Friday corporate critics will
converge on the White House.
 
Old Ways, New Days
 
To understand the FBI's and NSA's concern about the new
information age, it helps to recall the state of communications a
quarter-century ago. In the 1950s and 1960s, there was only one
phone company, AT&T, and it worked closely with the NSA and law
enforcement, industry experts said. Similarly, the computer
business was dominated by International Business Machines Corp.
 
AT&T and IBM were huge, discreet and overtly patriotic
bureaucracies -- proud members of the military-industrial complex.
When the administration of President Gerald Ford filed an
antitrust suit against AT&T in the 1970s, the Defense Department
opposed it on national security grounds, since the firm was seen
as key to the nation's mastery of the global communications
system.
 
When the antitrust suit succeeded in 1984 and a federal judge
dismantled AT&T, the NSA was scared, government officials said.
 
Instead of the one mighty AT&T, there are now seven regional
"Baby Bell" companies and hundreds of new telecommunications
players in the U.S. market, some foreign-owned. The computer
business also has been balkanized, with some firms run by
youngish rebels of the post-Vietnam War generation who sneer at
authority. (The founders of Apple Computer Inc., started in
business selling "blue boxes" -- machines that help users scam
the phone company -- to students at the University of California
at Berkeley.)
 
The FBI and NSA are uncomfortable speaking about the nation's
vital communications secrets with some of these newcomers,
government officials said. Adding to law enforcement worries is
the technology itself: Where the system was once just copper
wires on poles, now it's a dizzying tangle of satellites,
microwave towers, fiber-optic cables and cable TV systems, all
linked up and bouncing signals around in cyberspace.
 
"They feel this onslaught, being drowned by this technology
revolution that's overrunning their capabilities," one White
House source said of the NSA and FBI. "They're feeling very
threatened.... They fear the horse is getting out of the barn."
 
Dealing With Digits
 
The government's response to the new world has been twofold: an
attempt to make the nation's phone and communications networks
more open to government taps, and a drive to limit the spread of
data encryption.
 
The biggest worry for law enforcement is the high-tech
modernization of the nation's communications system, especially
the "digitalization" of phone networks. This translates
conversations and data into the "0"s and "1"s of computer talk.
Anyone who has heard the squeal of a fax machine knows it doesn't
sound like conversation.
 
The FBI wants a guarantee that when a court approves a wiretap,
it can gain access through special "ports" to conversations or
data streams that can be retranslated from digital language.
 
The FBI is "panicky," said one Baby Bell executive, over the
increasing sophistication of the U.S. phone system. "They're
sitting over there with their simple little pair of alligator
clips" that were once used to tap phone lines.
 
The FBI's Kallstrom offers an example of the limits imposed by
changing technology: In the mid-1980s in New York City, because
digital switches that control cellular phone networks were not
designed with law enforcement in mind, investigators looking into
drug dealers, mobsters, terrorists and all other miscreants had
only five "ports," or entry points, from which to tap cellular
phones.
 
"For years, criminals had a free pass to engage in criminal
activity there," he said. "It's a mini-version of what'll
happen in the future."
 
The FBI says it wants to maintain the status quo, meaning its
ability to keep monitoring calls.
 
"You want to maintain what?" said Nathan Myhrvold, a Microsoft
Corp., vice president. "That's just such a crazy thing to say in
the computer industry," where product cycles are measured in
months.
 
In March 1992, the FBI took the offensive in the battle to keep
the taps open. That's when it surprised industry with a
legislative proposal that would require telecommunications firms
to guarantee law enforcement access to its new information
networks.
 
This "digital telephony" proposal was later withdrawn after a
bitter outcry from communications and computer companies. The
firms opposed, among other things, provisions that the Federal
Communications Commission must draw up rules on this highly
complex matter in secret and on a highly expedited schedule, and
that the phone companies' customers finance the modifications
through rate increases that could cost many billions of dollars.
 
Federal officials have been drafting new legislation, sources
said, but have been tight-lipped about its content.
 
Encryption Anxieties
 
On top of the surveillance problems posed by a digital network,
law enforcement also is vexed by the rise of inexpensive
encryption technologies, used in everything from personal
computer messages to electronic commerce. Businesses that zip
sensitive secrets across the globe need to guard against
industrial espionage, and some encryption systems are virtually
unbreakable -- not only by industrial pirates, but also by the
NSA and FBI.
 
The government hopes Clipper will replace chips providing
unbreakable encryption for conversations. The NSA also is
promoting a chip to encrypt data, called "Capstone." Both use a
classified encryption algorithm, or formula, called "Skipjack."
 
Using these technologies, government officials retain their own
master keys, actually long strings of numbers, to decrypt
messages. To assuage the fears of civil libertarians, the
government will split each key in two -- like the two pieces of a
treasure map torn down the middle -- and place the pieces with
two government agencies. A police officer who gets a judge's
approval for a wiretap must go to the two agencies to tap the
line.
 
Administration sources said that if the current plan doesn't
enable the NSA and FBI to keep on top of the technology, then
Clinton is prepared to introduce legislation to require use of
its encryption technology, which is crackable by the NSA, and ban
use of the uncrackable gear.
 
"It's an option on the table," said a White House official.
 
Stephen Bryen -- formerly a top trade security official in the
Pentagon and now president of a small Silver Spring-based firm
that develops encryption technology -- says that he realized
recently that "I've got a competitor, and it's the U.S.
government."
 
He said it is almost unprecedented for government to compete
directly with industry in this way. "It's hard to compete against
taxpayer money," he said. "The playing field's not level."
 
So far, Clipper's launch has been less than auspicious.
 
A coalition of top computer and telecommunications firms and
trade groups -- including IBM, Microsoft and about 25 others --
has sent letters to Clinton raising a list of 150 pointed
questions about the decision. On Friday, an association of firms
that make computers said that with Clipper, government officials
may find it "difficult to resist" monitoring communications it
shouldn't. It recommended the government slow deliberations on
the question.
 
Details about Clipper's technology are classified. Without
knowing about it, Clipper's critics say they can't evaluate how
secure it is -- the central issue for those wanting privacy.
 
Dorothy Denning, a Georgetown University cryptography expert
briefed on the chip by government officials, says Clipper strikes
a balance between strong data security and restricted government
access. "I was impressed," she said.
 
In any case, many in industry say they doubt Clipper will gain
favor in the market. Data security shoppers may avoid a product
with a famous security hole installed by the government.
 
Paul Jones, vice president for government marketing at a
Virginia-based encryption firm called Guardata, said a security
consultant for a big labor union recently told him, "Do you think
I'm dumb enough to buy something endorsed by the NSA?"
 
For the same reason, Clipper would be a hard sell overseas, where
companies might fear U.S. intelligence agencies would spy on
them. The federal government, said Bidzos of RSA Data Security,
"is forcing a showdown we just can't win" overseas.
 
Rep. Edward J. markey (D-Mass.), chairman of the House
telecommunications subcommittee, fears the government may
eventually ban encryption. "In a digitally linked world, where
encryption is the key to privacy," he said, "banning encryption
may be like banning privacy."
 
Frezza of Ericsson GE said despite his personal reluctance to
sell high-tech gear to criminals, the government's effort to
limit encryption software is bought so easily.
 
"The genie is already out of the bottle," he said. "We're all
going to look back on this date in five years and laugh that
anyone tried to control this technology."
 
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.2
 
iQCVAgUBLAloa5RLcZSdHMBNAQGtcgQAjhCYLsOMh/SbxVHEJByUvdXXbMfuf30p
l7JFINuhOOaqDx3c2azJMEPSHxFWG4q4yCQ3xOOlAQFMWKycGFR8ZU+hTH0M2ltc
K4imn1G4v0hQ3BLauA4P4eOv7Zr4ehhDH6qq/zr6iAr3JTZiANvs9DujetQherb4
YHvOKsvu9Bs=
=i5rB
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

Paul Ferguson               |  The future is now.
Network Integrator          |  History will tell the tale;
Centreville, Virginia USA   |  We must endure and struggle
fergp@sytex.com             |  to shape it.
 
          Stop the Wiretap (Clipper/Capstone) Chip.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "J. J. Larrea" <jjl@Panix.Com>
Date: Sun, 30 May 93 20:56:02 PDT
To: sea-list@Panix.Com
Subject: Wash. Post reveals nasty surprise
Message-ID: <199305310424.AA29607@sun.Panix.Com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Just received this snippet of an article in Sunday's Washington Post.
The authors are being contacted to see if permission can be obtained
to post the entire piece.

> Full cite is Washington Post Business section, pages H1,H4, Sunday, May 30,
> 1993.   Byline is John Mintz and John Schwartz, Washington Post staff writers.
> Near the end, it reads:
> 
> "Administration sources said if the current plan doesn't enable the NSA and
> FBI to keep on top of the technology, then Clinton is prepared to introduce
> legislation to require use of its encryption technology, which is crackable
> by the NSA, and to ban use of the uncrackable gear.
>    'It's an option on the table,' said a White House official."

Very scary stuff... clearly a strong reaction to the Clipper announcement
was *far* from overreaction.

- JJ



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: nobody@pmantis.berkeley.edu
Date: Mon, 31 May 93 09:20:21 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: No Subject
Message-ID: <9305311700.AA04897@pmantis.berkeley.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


LOOKING FOR:  MS-DOS utilities for cryptanalysis.

WHY ON EARTH WOULD I WANT SUCH A THING? 
I'm analyzing a piece of encryption shareware advertised on
comp.archives.msdos.announce.  The author proudly claims that:

"The algorithm used was developped independently of any
literature on the subject of data encryption.  The author hasn't 
read any texts on this subject and any ressemblance that may or 
may not exist between this algorithm and any previous algorithms 
is purely coincidental."

He charges $15.00 for it too...  One of those "secret algorithm"
deals...

PARTICULAR TOOLS I'D USEFUL...
- A binary file editor/composer with hex and ascii displays
- A tool for generating and viewing letter frequencies, digram/
trigram frequencies

I've been able to get by with stuff I have lying around and
quick programs I written as needed.  But it sure would be nice
if there were some slick utilities made for the job!
I looked on soda in pub/cypherpunks/cryptanalysis and found 
nothing useful.

If anyone has anything like this, please, *please* upload it
to soda...

Thanx...
-the Cire







From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Hal <74076.1041@CompuServe.COM>
Date: Mon, 31 May 93 07:39:38 PDT
To: CYPHERPUNKS <CYPHERPUNKS@toad.com>
Subject: Clipper harmful to CPs?
Message-ID: <930531151140_74076.1041_FHD60-4@CompuServe.COM>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

Headline: "Clipper Considered Harmful"

...so what else is new, huh?

But I was thinking specifically of Cypherpunks.  Reading the article
about the group in the Whole Earth Review, an article written before
the advent of the Clipper proposal, reminded me of all the things we
were working on before the Clipper forced them onto the back burner.

Anonymous mail, anonymous posting, steganography, digital cash, whistle-
blowers, encryption itself - all the ingredients of Tim's "crypto anarchy" -
in many of these areas it seemed we had a certain amount of momentum which
has been lost.  If "Cypherpunks write code", how much code has been written
lately?  Now it seems like our motto is changing to "Cypherpunks write
letters", to their congressmen.

Things are not all black; Miron Cuperman has recently released his encrypted
talk program based on PGP technology, and Kevin Brown's postings on stega-
nography had some interesting ideas, although they need some development
before anything could be coded.  But for the most part progress in our
previous areas of attention has been slowed if not halted.

This can only be welcome to the forces which created the Clipper.  Even if
the chip fails, they have at least succeeded in distracting the underground
crypto community, dividing it to some extent (to PGP or not to PGP?), and
delaying the prospect of having to deal with a fully functioning infrastructure
for true anonymity and privacy.

I know Clipper is an important threat, and I know that many in the Cypherpunks
community have helped lead the battle against the chip.  But I am encouraged
by the widespread opposition to the proposal among technically sophisticated
people - not just on the net, but in the trade press as well.  The right
groups (EFF, CPSR, etc.) are asking the right questions, and Rep. Markey
is turning up the heat in Washington.

The battle is not yet won, but there is only a limited amount of leverage
available in the political process.  Our main skills are technical, not
political.  I contend that our efforts are better spent putting the technology
into people's hands, per the group's original charter.  We should be working
to create new tools which will increase the average computer user's access
to strong privacy.  We should be pushing the envelope of what is possible
today, exploring and experimenting with implementations of these new ideas.

I claim that our best response to the threat posed by Clipper is a hearty
"screw you" and a rededication to the Cypherpunks goals.  Let the powers that
be know that we are not intimidated or cowed by their threats.  We must
continue to oppose Clipper, but at the same time we must make progress on
the crypto privacy front.  Otherwise our opponents are winning, regardless of
the eventual political outcome.

Hal Finney
74076.1041@compuserve.com

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.2

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mRgLa4gh/jxFloe6Uj28gpoHAjyAPF1CIiAJ260aqsl/vFfsSb7DmPhl9qJ2bghl
XKR4UeeA2nE=
=sXHm
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Date: Mon, 31 May 93 13:22:01 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Clipperpunks Write Code?
In-Reply-To: <9305311901.AA28803@relay2.UU.NET>
Message-ID: <9305312100.AA22836@netcom3.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



(I've taken the liberty of renaming Hal Finney's thread, mainly since
I wasn't sure _what_ it was named...it arrived via the -request list
and was missing some headers....)

Hal Finney writes:

> Headline: "Clipper Considered Harmful"
> 
> ...so what else is new, huh?
> 
> But I was thinking specifically of Cypherpunks.  Reading the article
> about the group in the Whole Earth Review, an article written before
> the advent of the Clipper proposal, reminded me of all the things we
> were working on before the Clipper forced them onto the back burner.
> 
> Anonymous mail, anonymous posting, steganography, digital cash, whistle-
> blowers, encryption itself - all the ingredients of Tim's "crypto anarchy" -
> in many of these areas it seemed we had a certain amount of momentum which
> has been lost.  If "Cypherpunks write code", how much code has been written
> lately?  Now it seems like our motto is changing to "Cypherpunks write
> letters", to their congressmen.
...stuff elided to save space....

> I claim that our best response to the threat posed by Clipper is a hearty
> "screw you" and a rededication to the Cypherpunks goals.  Let the powers that
> be know that we are not intimidated or cowed by their threats.  We must
> continue to oppose Clipper, but at the same time we must make progress on
> the crypto privacy front.  Otherwise our opponents are winning, regardless of
> the eventual political outcome.

I think Hal is right, though the Clipper controversy has generated
a lot of new interest in crypto issues and perhaps even in this list.
My guess would be that many of today's readers are on this list now
because of the rude awakening Clipper gave them.

Having said this, I agree that our real strength lies in technical
areas (I'm referring to folks like Hal, Eric Hughes, Miron Cuperman,
all the others who're writing C and Perl code, and all those running
remailers and the like). The anti-Clipper work is related, but
probably isn't the core...fortunately, I doubt there's any conflict, as
people will work on what interests them, so the Clipper stuff probably
isn't affecting work on other core issues.

Maybe at the next Cypherpunks physical meeting we can get some idea of
what others are doing? For example, perhaps Hal Finney could
communicate by phone for a few minutes? (We did this with the Boston
and D.C. Cypherpunks at the emergency Clipper meeting and it worked
well.)

Others could also call in, or vice versa.

Things like digital money will require a lot of effort, probably two
or three times what PGP took (just a guess). Wide deployment is even
more problematic. These are "social" issues, not just technical
issues, of course, so progress is hard to predict.

It may take a while.


-Tim May

-- 
..........................................................................
Timothy C. May         | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,  
tcmay@netcom.com       | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
408-688-5409           | knowledge, reputations, information markets, 
W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA  | black markets, collapse of governments.
Higher Power: 2^756839 | Public Key: PGP and MailSafe available.
Note: I put time and money into writing this posting. I hope you enjoy it.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: nobody@rosebud.ee.uh.edu
Date: Mon, 31 May 93 12:19:16 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: PGP vs. RIPEM
Message-ID: <9305311919.AA06505@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

( >>>>>>'s inserted for the benefit of George Gleason ;-)

From: Michael Edward Marotta <mercury@well.sf.ca.us>

>>>>>>  (This is for an article in the 1994 Loompanics catalog.)

That's great that Loompanics is covering encryption.
 
>>>>>>  I don't know about you guys, but I find PGP much easier to use.  
>>>>>>  RIPEM has all the hallmarks of unix wizardry.  It is poorly 
>>>>>>  documented.  The interface is difficult.  It grew in ways the 
>>>>>>  designer never contemplated.  And I haven't even RUN anything 
>>>>>>  yet...  Mark told me that it was primarily a MAILER.  OK, I can 
>>>>>>  accept that.  But I just don't see it catching on.  PGP, on the 
>>>>>>  other hand, shows all the evidences of shareware.  It's hard to 
>>>>>>  comment on the obvious.  

I think the existance of two programs is good, helping to promote some
rivalry and a certain amount of borrowing of good ideas from each other.
PGP now has a contrib directory with information and scripts to help
integrate it into mailers, an area which RIPEM has focussed on from the
beginning.

>>>>>>  So, I assume that I am in the normal range for a netrunner.  I 
>>>>>>  typically log in to fidonet bbses from home.  I have a PC clone.  
>>>>>>  I have had accounts on CompuServe, Prodigy and Delphi.  I have a 
>>>>>>  couple of email addresses.  I can't see myself using RIPEM.  I 
>>>>>>  can indeed see myself using PGP.

PGP was originally developed on a PC and then ported to Unix, while for
RIPEM it was the other way around, I believe.  The workings of RIPEM are
more Unix-ish while PGP is more DOS-ish.  Which program seems more natural
may depend on your background.

The user community is more diverse than most people realize.  You sound
like you have somewhat more of a PC orientation than many people on the
net.  Most of the people I run into have the opposite problem - they think
everything is Unix and that the PC is just some little corner of the world
which isn't really relevant.  They think that Usenet and Unix workstations
are the de facto target environment for any communications utility.

Actually, I think your experience is more relevant - PC's at home, hooking
up to BBS's, Fidonet, and the commercial services for communications;
also, people using PC's at home and dialing into Unix boxes at school or
work.  Another big area is people using networked PC's at work, although
since we are mostly talking about freeware packages here we haven't paid
much attention to that.

Especially with encryption, which generally can't run securely on multi-
user workstations, it makes more sense to think of PC's as the target platform.
Some people are starting to have single-user systems which can run Unix,
and this may increase with time, but for now DOS is where the emphasis
should be.  Many of the PC magazines predict that Unix is dead in that
market and that Windows is the platform of choice in the future, so that
is where we should be aiming, IMO.  As Phil Zimmermann says, "skate to
where the puck will be."

I didn't really mean to open up the standard OS wars here, but it's
important to realize that encryption has unique requirements for secrecy
and security which may affect the DOS vs Unix debate.  (And yes, I know
I'm leaving out Macs, Amigas, Ataris, and who knows what else.)

>>>>>>  Here are my questions:
>>>>>>  How do you relate to the above?  
>>>>>>  Do you see "everyone" on the Net happy as clams with privacy-
>>>>>>     enhanced mailers?  
>>>>>>  Do you expect more people to find out about and rely on PGP?  
>>>>>>  Do you see something else working here that I haven't perceived?

The big problem, as Eric Hughes has frequently mentioned here, is the need
to integrate encryption with mailing.  I think what is really needed is
some way of dealing with people who read mail on their PC while using
some kind of terminal program or similar package to connect to a BBS,
commercial service, or Unix box.  The problem is that there are so many
different programs in use and people probably won't be willing to switch
just to get encryption.  A lot of programs have fancy features including
scripting, macro keys, etc., and switching requires learning new ways of
doing all your old stuff.

Hal Finney
74076.1041@compuserve.com

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Version: 2.2

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FjItmAk6t4JEDRiaYTQAhVlJZnt3LHmnvMADxwCm36He6svjQTWDDXyob0giWw9s
2bQbGLGZG9Y=
=yYIN
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: poier@sfu.ca (Skye Merlin Poier)
Date: Mon, 31 May 93 15:06:43 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Crypto anarchy in a VW? (not the bug)
Message-ID: <9305312244.AA20903@malibu.sfu.ca>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Has there been any discussion of anonimity / crypto anarchy in a virtual world
such as the ones described in _Snow Crash_ or _Neuromancer_? When the nets to
support these technologies come into place (and I have no doubt that they will),
perhaps a form of anonimity could be written into the architechture, instead of
having to add it on later as is the case now.... I would certainly be very 
interesting, especially with the work being done on creating alternate personas
(or avatars, whatever).

Also, a while back someone mentioned in passing buried cables.. this stirred up
an old idea I had about server anonimity, that is that the actual physical 
location of a server would be very difficult to pin down... the only way to do
this with any real degree of security would be to bounce signals off a satellite
but this would be rather costly...

Skye
--
-----====> Skye Merlin Poier <====----- 
Undergrad in CMPT/MATH (Virtual Reality)       ||||      ||||
          email: poier@sfu.ca                  p-OO <--> OO-q   THINK
   PGP Public Key available on finger           \==      ==/





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: bakunin@gnu.ai.mit.edu
Date: Mon, 31 May 93 13:21:27 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: divers
Message-ID: <9305312059.AA24756@spiff.gnu.ai.mit.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain




In re: > wars

	chill out.  I, too, think people overquote, but I also don't feel
	compelled to tell them how to post.  Let your conscience guide.

In re: my gripe

	overLONG posts.  Wilde once wrote a friend words to the effect that
	'..I do not have time to write you a short letter.'  Take the time
	to be concise.

In re: PGP/RIPEM PC/Unix

	Well, gee.  I prefer PGP for my encryption, but unix otherwise.  What
	am I, weird?  

In re: 2d amendment & encryption

	Love the idea.  I fear the 2d amendment is far too compromised.  If
	gun control coexists with ol' #2, so can encryption control.

concisely,

michael





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Jim McCoy <mccoy@ccwf.cc.utexas.edu>
Date: Mon, 31 May 93 15:51:53 PDT
To: poier@sfu.ca (Skye Merlin Poier)
Subject: Re: Crypto anarchy in a VW? (not the bug)
In-Reply-To: <9305312244.AA20903@malibu.sfu.ca>
Message-ID: <199305312329.AA10472@ccwf.cc.utexas.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text


Skye Merlin Poier writes:
[...]
> Also, a while back someone mentioned in passing buried cables.. this
> stirred up an old idea I had about server anonimity, that is that the
> actual physical location of a server would be very difficult to pin
> down... the only way to do this with any real degree of security would be
> to bounce signals off a satellite  but this would be rather costly...

Try this idea out:  several machines agree to "host" a server.  Each machine
runs a virtual-server process that communicates with the other
virtual-server programs.  These programs then combine to run the actual
server (a sort of shared virtual multi-processor).  The server itself _has
no physical existence_ and could operate as long as only one of the hosts
is able to spare it some CPU and memory slices.  The "server" would
basically consist of it's instruction packets being bounced around the net.

Secure crypto communication between the "processors" with some reflectors
scattered around the net to provide easy access points for those wanting to
use the services and you have a service that doesn;t really exist, at least
not as far as current legal definitions go...  :)

jim



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Al Billings <mimir@u.washington.edu>
Date: Mon, 31 May 93 20:23:47 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: your mail
In-Reply-To: <9305311902.AA28956@relay2.UU.NET>
Message-ID: <Pine.3.05z.9305312131.A9159-8100000@carson.u.washington.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



 The FCC modem-thing is a rumor that appears about every six months. The
original case was years ago and has not been on the books since. Ignore it.







From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: root@extropia.wimsey.com (Anonymous)
Date: Mon, 31 May 93 22:09:02 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: No Subject
Message-ID: <199306010527.AA00963@xtropia>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

As shown in Karl Barrus's very useful monthly postings, several people are
running remailers that include encryption.  This gives users the ability to
send messages for which the destination is not visible even to someone
monitoring their outgoing messages.  By chaining through two or more
remailers, no one site can see the mapping between source and destination. 

There is a big potential security weakness with most of these systems that
people should be aware of.  In order to run the decryption program
(currently PGP) automatically, the pass phrase must be provided for the
remailer's secret key.  This means that the pass phrase has to exist, in
the clear, in the scripts which implement the remailer. 

Anyone who has root privileges on the machine which is running the remailer
therefore can get access both to the remailer's secret key file, and to the
pass phrase that unlocks it.  Even momentary acquisition of this power is
enough to capture the secret key. 

Unfortunately, many of the encrypted remailers are running on multi-user
systems over which we have only limited control.  I believe that Miron's
"Extropia" remailer is running on his personal system, so he should be
relatively immune to this attack.  But I think the others are all
vulnerable. 

People should be aware of this when using the remailers.  (This limitation
is one reason I made my remailer keys only 512 bits; I felt there was
little point in going to 1024 bits since the security of the remailer key
can be broken so easily.) 

Until more of us are able to acquire personal Unix boxes it might be wise
to include the Extropia remailer as part of a remailing chain for messages
whose security we care about.  Perhaps Karl could add a notation in his
remailer lists about which machines are public and which are private.  

Hal  

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Yjs8AFodQUw=
=5V+X
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: peter honeyman <honey@citi.umich.edu>
Date: Mon, 31 May 93 19:40:24 PDT
To: bakunin@gnu.ai.mit.edu
Subject: Re: divers
In-Reply-To: <9305312059.AA24756@spiff.gnu.ai.mit.edu>
Message-ID: <9306010240.AA14354@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> 	overLONG posts.  Wilde once wrote a friend words to the effect that
> 	'..I do not have time to write you a short letter.'  Take the time
> 	to be concise.

yo, je n'ai fait celle-ci plus longue parceque je n'ai pas eu le loisir de
la faire plus courte, blaise pascal.  wilde, ptui.

	peter




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: peter honeyman <honey@citi.umich.edu>
Date: Mon, 31 May 93 20:10:26 PDT
To: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Subject: Re: Clipperpunks Write Code?
In-Reply-To: <9305312100.AA22836@netcom3.netcom.com>
Message-ID: <9306010310.AA14901@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>                 If "Cypherpunks write code", how much code has been written
> lately?

this is not a major hack, but a fun one.  i've never been big on the details
of pgp's trust model, with "trusted", "sort of trusted", etc.  the keys
i trust most are those i have signed.  by extension, what i want to know is
the "signature distance" of a given key.  so here's my hack, a shell script
that uses pgp and pathalias to compute signature distance.  here's a sample:

  reno:; ./pgpwho hughes@soda honey
  peter honeyman <honey@citi.umich.edu>
  Phil Karn <karn@qualcomm.com>
  Tom Jennings <tomj@fido.wps.com>
  Eric Hughes <hughes@soda.berkeley.edu>

actually, it's much more verbose than that, but that will change.
so far, i find the script useful.  here it is.

	peter

=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=
#!/bin/sh
# usage: pgpwho [ who [ me ] ]

# @(#)pgpwho	1.1 93/05/31
# public domain.   send comments to honey@citi.umich.edu.

case $# in
0)	argwho=
	arglocal=;;
1)	argwho=$1
	arglocal=;;
2)	arglocal=$2
	if [ "$1" != "-" ]; then
		argwho=$1
	else
		argwho=
	fi;;
*)	echo usage: pgpwho [ who [ me ] ]
	exit 1;;
esac

find kvv pain reach -size 0 -exec rm -f '{}' ';' >/dev/null 2>&1

if [ ! -r kvv ]; then
	kvv=
else
	kvv=`find kvv -newer $PGPPATH/pubring.pgp -print`
fi

case "$kvv" in
kvv)	echo "kvv is up to date";;
*)	echo "dumping keys (pgp -kvv) ..."
	pgp -kvv > kvv;;
esac

if [ ! -r pain ]; then
	pain=
else
	pain=`find pain -newer kvv -print`
fi

case "$pain" in
pain)	echo "pain is up to date";;
*)	echo "massaging kvv into pain (pathalias input) ..."
	cat kvv | awk '
		$1 == "pub" {
			num = split($2, bitskeyid, "/");
			if (num != 2) {
				print "???", $0
				next;
			}
			nkeys++;
			keyid = bitskeyid[2]
			user = "";
			for (j = 4; j <= NF; j++)
				user = user " " $j
			userid[keyid] = user;
			}

		$1 == "sig" {
			if ($2 != keyid)
				print $2, keyid, "(1)"
		}

		END {
			for (i in userid)
				print "#", i, userid[i];
		}
	' > pain;;
esac

while :; do
	if [ -z "$arglocal" ]; then
		echo -n "what is your pgp id? "
		read arglocal
	fi
	grep -i "^pub.*$arglocal" kvv | tee tmp
	case `wc -l < tmp|sed 's/ //g'` in
	0)	echo $arglocal not found, try again;;
	1)	break;;
	*)	echo too many matches for id $arglocal, please narrow it down;;
	esac
	arglocal=
done
local=`awk '{print $2}' tmp | sed 's/.*\///'`

while :; do
	if [ -z "$argwho" ]; then
		echo -n "who? "
		read argwho
	fi
	grep -i "^pub.*$argwho" kvv | tee tmp
	case `wc -l < tmp|sed 's/ //g'` in
	0)	echo $argwho not found, try again;;
	1)	break;;
	*)	echo too many matches for $argwho, please narrow it down;;
	esac
	argwho=
done
who=`grep "^pub" tmp | awk '{print $2}' | sed 's/.*\///'`

if [ ! -r reach ]; then
	reach=
else
	reach=`find reach -newer pain -print`
fi

case "$reach" in
reach)	echo "reach is up to date";;
*)	echo "running pathalias ..."
	pathalias -l $local -c pain 2>xxx-errs | tee xxx | awk '$1 < 10000 {print}' > reach;;
esac

echo "searching for $who ..."

grep "	$who	" reach | sed -e 's/.*	//' -e 's/%s//' -e 's/!/ /g' > tmp
case `wc -l < tmp|sed 's/ //g'` in
0)	echo no signature path to $who
	exit 1;;
1)	;;
*)	echo weird error
	exit -1;;
esac

set `cat tmp`

grep "^# $local" pain | sed -e 's/..........//'
for i in $*; do
	grep "^# $i" pain | sed -e 's/..........//'
done

rm -f tmp
exit




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: RYAN Alan Porter <ryan@rtfm.mlb.fl.us>
Date: Mon, 31 May 93 20:51:16 PDT
To: Skye Merlin Poier <poier@sfu.ca>
Subject: Re: Crypto anarchy in a VW? (not the bug)
In-Reply-To: <9305312244.AA20903@malibu.sfu.ca>
Message-ID: <Pine.3.03.9306010040.A26846-d100000@rtfm>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain




On Mon, 31 May 1993, Skye Merlin Poier wrote:

> Has there been any discussion of anonimity / crypto anarchy in a virtual world
> such as the ones described in _Snow Crash_ or _Neuromancer_? When the nets to
> support these technologies come into place (and I have no doubt that they will),
> perhaps a form of anonimity could be written into the architechture, instead of
> having to add it on later as is the case now.... I would certainly be very 
> interesting, especially with the work being done on creating alternate personas
> (or avatars, whatever).

I am glad to see some consideration of possible hypothetical future scenarios
here; it is important to have an eye for the future of things.

I think that building privacy into the architecture would be inherently 
dangerous, however, it is a perfect way for the people building the system
to oppress the users, all the while convincing them that the system is 
secure.

Clipper is a perfect example of this, anonymity is supposedly being built into
the system with the Clipper chip.  The trouble, of course, being the inherent
INsecurity--but consider how much more dangerous it would be if the
insecurities were not even known, yet we were expected to rely on the fact
that 'privacy and anonymity are built into the architecture'?

No, this is the perfect beginning for a system where the populace is
monitored with the argument that "if you had nothing to hide, you would
not be going out of your way to hide it, besides, the system has INHERENT,
BUILT-IN SECURITY...."

The only way to ensure your privacy is to seize it yourself.

> Also, a while back someone mentioned in passing buried cables.. this stirred up
> an old idea I had about server anonimity, that is that the actual physical 
> location of a server would be very difficult to pin down... the only way to do
> this with any real degree of security would be to bounce signals off a satellite
> but this would be rather costly...

There are a lot of ways to get a signal around the world without using a 
satellite, ask any amateur radio enthusiast.  Besides, the more diverse the
signal transmission methods are, the more difficult the signals will be
to both trace and interfere with.

I have always been kind of fascinated with the idea of a truly decentralized
system, much like the internet is today, where each node had
responsibilities to connect to the nodes around it, but the actual
interconnection was entirely up to the nodes involved, so that there could
be no standard, homogenous method of tracing connections.  A pair of nodes
could be connected by direct connection, hidden wires, satellite
connection, voice grade wires, ionosphere bounce, lunar bounce, repeated
packets, lasers, microwaves, IR, whatever...  This would provide a tight
net that would be almost impossible to control with heavyhanded
regulations and oppression.

If each node on the net had a seperate public key and all traffic
between nodes was decrypted coming in and encrypted going out to the next
node, aspiring Big Brothers would have even more of a headache.

Why is there not more work being done on encrypting all internode traffic
streams?  It doesn't seem too hard.


An aside:  has anyone dealt with the concept of on-the-fly encryption for
mass storage, kind of like the way the PCs can be 'stacked' or 'doubled'
or whatever with on-the-fly compression?  I was thinking about trying to
write some drivers for this for a 486 but I have never tried to write a
device driver before and was wondering if anyone might have any suggestions.

I was thinking of something along the lines of:  your entire drive is
encrypted with your public key.  That way people can send you files and
deposit files and all of that jazz no problem.  When you boot up the
system each time it asks you to insert a floppy with your private key on
it.  You would keep this floppy on you as if it were an actual, physical
key. (perhaps in the future PCMIA cards or something more durable and
portable can be used)  It asks for your password to verify your key and
loads that key somewhere into memory.  It then uses they key for the rest
of the session to decrypt everything coming from the specified mass
storage devices and encrypt everything going to them transparantly.

This seems like a great idea to me, my two problems that I was hoping
someone might be able to help me with are:

    1) these public key algorithms that we are working on are slow as
balls, any idea if this would be feasable, given how PC users like to
equate hard drive speed with penis size?

    2) it seems that having your private key hanging around somewhere in
memory the whole session would be horribly insecure, and would make it
very easy for someone to walk up to a running PC and run some program that
would snatch it from memory (assuming something like this catches on and
there are some standard programs out there that poeple become familiar
with) so how could I protect the key from getting filched from a running
system aside from the standard 'password protect your screen saver' and
other insecure hacks like that?

> 
> Skye
> --
> -----====> Skye Merlin Poier <====----- 
> Undergrad in CMPT/MATH (Virtual Reality)       ||||      ||||
>           email: poier@sfu.ca                  p-OO <--> OO-q   THINK
>    PGP Public Key available on finger           \==      ==/
> 



Hugs and kisses,
    -Ryan
the Barcode Guy









From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: wcs@anchor.ho.att.com
Date: Mon, 31 May 93 20:54:58 PDT
To: mmc.bitnet!raglan54@uga.cc.uga.edu
Subject: Re: Electronic Contracts
Message-ID: <9306010433.AA27082@anchor.ho.att.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text


Don't know if there have been specific tests of it in courts, but, yes,
signing contracts is definitely something people want digital signatures for.
Also, anything else that requires a signature, we'd like to be able to 
sign digitally, so we can do it online instead of hauling paper around.
That's not just a cypherpunk thing, it's what a large fraction of the
business community would like to be able to do - it speeds business cycles, 
cuts ordering time, and means we don't have to keep all this paper around,
especially in storage; while the paperless office won't be reality for a while,
it would really be nice if we could store the important stuff digitally,
where it's easy to retrieve later, and save paper for transient uses like 
convenient reading, unlike the current situation where digital is for 
convenience but the important stuff is paper that has to be stored somewhere
	MIME-Insert-Video-Clip: Indiana Jones, Government Warehouse Scene.....

A certain amount of this has been done with the various telex networks;
I get the impression from somewhere that a telex can be a legal document
for things like sending purchase orders, just like paper can; it will be
interesting to see if fax acquires the same status, but forging a fax
is terribly easy, just as email is.

		Bill Stewart




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Darren Reed <avalon@coombs.anu.edu.au>
Date: Mon, 31 May 93 08:23:08 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Modem Use Fees (fwd)
Message-ID: <9305311523.AA03215@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Forwarded message:
> Date: Mon, 31 May 1993 11:32:11 -0400 (EDT)
> From: Stan Bernstein <sbernst@panix.com>
> Subject: Modem Use Fees 
> Message-Id: <Pine.3.05.9305311110.A13457-c100000@sun.panix.com>
> Mime-Version: 1.0
> Content-Type: TEXT/PLAIN; charset=US-ASCII
> 
> 
> The following, originating from Mr. Tom Justice (CGFS69A [Prodigy]) and
> authorized for resubmission to other networks, deals with proposed modem
> use fees. It was originally posted on Prodigy a couple of days ago. I would be
> interested in anyone's take on the accuracy of this. I apologize for its
> length but did not want to distort it too much through truncation.
> 
>      "...Two years ago the FCC tried and (with your help and letters of
> protest) failed to institute regulations that would impose additional
> costs on modem users for data communication.
>      "Now they are at it again. A new regulation that the FCC is quietly
> working on will directly affect you as the user of a computer and modem.
> The FCC proposes that users of modems should pay extra charges for the use
> of the publc telephone network which carry their data. In addition
> computer network services would also be charged as much as $6.00 per hour
> per user for the use of the publc telephone network. Obviously these
> charges would be passed on to the consumer. The money is to be collected
> and given to the telephone company in an effort to raise funds lost to
> deregulation. Jim Eason of KGO newstalk radio San Francisco commented on
> the proposal during his afternoon radio program during which he said he
> learned of the new regulation in an article in the New York Times...."
> 
>      In a second post on Prodigy, Mr. Justice suggests writing to various
> regulatory officials to convey the following suggested text:
> 
> "Dear Sir:
>      "Please allow me to express my displeasure with the FCC proposal which
> would authorize a surcharge for the use of modems on the telephone
> network. This regulation is nothing less than an attempt to restrict free
> exchange of information among the growing number of comptuer users. Calls
> placed using modems require no special telephone equipment, and users of
> modems pay the phone company for use of the network in the form of a
> monthly bill.
>      "In short, a modem call is the same as a voice call and therefore
> should not be subject to any additional regulation...."
> 
>      Mr. Justice ends his second post with the following:
> 
>      "It is important that you act now. The bureaucrats already have it in
> their heads that modem users should subsidize the phone company and are
> now listening to public comment. Please stand up and make it clear that we
> will not stand for any government restriction on the free exchange of
> information.
>      "Pleae deal with this in a TIMELY manner. We can't wait and watch, or
> we will be walked over by government regulations that are trying to
> strangle us."
>                                # # # 
> Stanley Bernstein (sbernst@panix.com) 
> 	                         
> 
> 	  
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: smb@research.att.com
Date: Tue, 1 Jun 93 00:41:32 PDT
To: wcs@anchor.ho.att.com
Subject: Re: Electronic Contracts
Message-ID: <9306010741.AA20187@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Digital signatures on contracts are probably legal.  I did some checking
on the subject a while back; someone forwarded me the following official
opinion from the U.S. Controller General.  The specific reasoning applies
only to the U.S. government, but most of the principles generalize.
I'll add one note of my own -- from what I've read lately of the
Federal rules of evidence, printouts of data recorded on disk, tape,
etc., are considered to be equally original, as it were.

A reference I haven't checked is Benjamin Wright, ``The Law of Electronic
Commerce- EDI, Fax, and Email: Technology, Proof, and Liability''.  It is a
1991 book published by Little Brown and Co., 1991.

		--Steve Bellovin

<FF>

United States General Accounting Office  [Comptroller General]
 
MEMORANDUM
 
DATE:     June 19, 1991
 
TO:       Assistant Director, AFMD/ASA - John C. Martin
 
FROM:     Assistant General Counsel, OCG/AFMD -
            Thomas H. Armstrong
 
 
Subject:  Electronic Contracting (B-238449)
 
This responds to your request for our opinion regarding
whether agencies can use Electronic Data Interchange (EDI)
technologies to create valid contractual obligations that can
be recorded consistent with 31 U.S.C. (s) 1501 (section 1501).
For the reasons stated below, we conclude that they can.
 
BACKGROUND
 
EDI is the electronic exchange of business information between
parties, usually via a computer, using an agreed upon format.
EDI is being used to transmit shipping notices, invoices, bid
requests, bid quotes and other messages.  Electronic
contracting is the use of EDI technologies to create
contractual obligations.  EDI allows the parties to examine
the contract, usually on video monitors, but sometimes on
paper facsimiles, store it electronically (for example on
magnetic tapes, on discs or in special memory chips), and
recall it from storage to review it on video monitors,
reproduce it on paper or even mail it via electronic means.
Using EDI technologies, it is possible for an agency to
contract in a fraction of the time that it now takes.  The
"paperless" nature of the technology, however, has raised the
question of whether electronic contracts constitute
obligations which may be recorded against the government.
 
DISCUSSION
 
Section 1501 establishes the criteria for recording
obligations against the government.  The statute provides, in
pertinent part, as follows:
 
<FF>

     "(a) An amount shall be recorded as an obligation of
     the United States Government only when supported by
     documentary evidence of--
 
          (1) a binding agreement between an agency
          and another person (including an agency)
          that is--
 
               (A) in writing, in a way and
               form, and for a purpose
               authorized by law. . . ."
 
31 U.S.C. (s) 1501(a)(1)(A).
 
Under this provision, two requirements must be satisfied:
first, the agreement must bind both the agency and the party
with whom the agency contracts; second, the agreement must be
in writing.
 
Binding Agreement
 
The primary purpose of section 1501(a)(1) is "to require that
there be an _offer_ and an _acceptance_ imposing liability on both
parties."  39 Comp. Gen. 829,831 (1960) (emphasis in
original).  Hence the government may record an obligation
under section 1501 only upon evidence that both parties to the
contract willfully express the intent to be bound.
 
A signature traditionally has provided such evidence.
_See_ _generally_ 65 Comp. Gen. 806, 810 (1986).  Because of its
uniqueness, the handwritten signature is probably the most
universally accepted evidence of an agreement to be bound by
the terms of a contract. _See_ 65 Comp. Gen. at 810.  Courts,
however, have demonstrated a willingness to accept other
notations, not necessarily written by hand.  _See_, _e.g._,
_Ohl_&_Co._v._Smith_Iron_Works_, 288 U.S. 170, 176 (1932)
(initials); _Zacharie_v._Franklin_, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 151,
161-62 (1838) (a mark); _Benedict_v._Lebowitz_, 346 F.2d 120
(2nd Cir. 1965) (typed name); _Tabas_v._Emergency_Fleet_
_Corporation_, 9 F.2d 648, 649 (E.D. Penn. 1926) (typed, printed
or stamped signatures); _Berryman_v._Childs_, 98 Neb. 450,
153 N.W. 486, 488 (1915) (a real estate brokerage used
personalized listing contracts which had the names of its
brokers printed on the bottom of the contract in the space
where a handwritten signature usually appears).
 
As early as 1951, we recognized that a signature does not have
to be handwritten and that "any symbol adopted as one's
signature when affixed with his knowledge and consent is a
binding and legal signature."  B-104590, Sept. 12, 1951.
Under this theory, we approved the use of various signature
machines ranging from rubber stamps to electronics encryption
 
2                                                      B-238449
 
<FF>

devices.  _See_ 33 Comp. Gen. 297 (1954); B-216035,
Sept. 20, 1984.  For example, we held that a certifying
officer may adopt and use an electronic symbol generated by an
electronic encryption device to sign vouchers certifying
payments.  B-216035, _supra_.  The electronic symbol proposed
for use by certifying officers, we concluded, embodied all of
the attributes of a valid, acceptable signature:  it was
unique to the certifying official, capable of verification, and
under his sole control such that one might presume from its
use that the certifying officer, just as if had written his
name in his own hand, intended to be bound.
 
EDI technology offers other evidence of intent to be bound
with the same attributes as a signature--for example, a
"message authentication code," like that required by the
National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) for the
electronic transmission of data._1_/  In our opinion, this form
of evidence is acceptable under section 1501.
 
A message authentication code is a method designed to ensure
the authenticity of the data transmitted; it is a series of
characters that identifies the particular message being
transmitted and accompanies no other message.  As envisioned
by NIST's Federal Information Processing Standard (FIPS)
113,_2_/ a message authentication code could be generated when
the sender inserts something known as a "smart card"_3_/ into a
system and inputs the data he wants to transmit.  Encoded on a
circuit chip located on the smart card is the sender's key.
 
____________________
 
_1_/  The Congress has mandated that NIST (formerly the National
Bureau of Standards) establish minimum acceptable practices
for the security and privacy of sensitive information in
federal computer systems.  Computer Security Act of 1987,
Pub. L. No. 100-235, (s) 2, 101 Stat. 1724 (1988).
 
_2_/  FIPS 113 adopts American National Standards Institute
(ANSI) standard X9.9 for message authentication.  It outlines
the criteria for the cryptographic authentication of
electronically transmitted data and for the detection of
inadvertent and/or intentional modifications of the data.
By adopting the ANSI standard, FIPS 113 encourages private
sector applications of cryptographic authentication; the same
standard is being adopted by many financial institutions for
authenticating financial transactions.
 
_3_/  A smart card is the size of a credit card.  It contains
one or more integrated circuit chips which function as a
computer.
 
3                                                      B-238449
 
<FF>

The key is a secret sequence of numbers or characters which
identifies the sender, and is constant regardless of the
transmission.  The message authentication code is a function
of the sender's key and the data just loaded into the system.
After loading his data into the system, the sender notifies
the system that he wants to "sign" his transmission.
The system sends the data first to the chip on the smart card;
the chip then generates the message authentication code by
applying a mathematical procedure known as a cryptographic
algorithm.  The card returns the data along with the just-
generated message authentication code to the system, which
will transmit the data and code to the recipient.
 
When a contracting officer notifies the system that he wants
to sign a contract being transmitted to a contractor, he is
initiating the procedure for generating a message
authentication code with the intention of binding his agency
to the terms of the contract.  The message authentication code
evidences that intention, as would a handwritten or other form
of signature.  The code, incorporating the sender's key, is
unique to the sender; and, the sender controls access to and
use of his "smart card," where his key is stored.  It is also
verifiable.  When the recipient receives the contract, either a
notation identifying the message authentication code and the
sender, usually by name.  The recipient can verify its
authenticity by putting the data that he just received into
his system and asking his system to generate a message
authentication code.  That code should match the one
annotating the message received._4_/
 
Writing
 
To constitute a valid obligation under section 1501(a)(1)(A),
a contract must be supported by documentary evidence
"in writing."  Some have questioned whether EDI, because of
the paperless nature of the technology, fulfills this
requirement.  We conclude that it does.
 
Prior to the enactment of section 1501, in the Supplemental
Appropriations Act of 1955,_5_/ the was no "clean cut
definition of obligations."  H.R. Rep. No. 2266, 83rd Cong.,
2d Sess. 50 (1954).  Some agencies had recorded questionable
obligations, including obligations based on oral contracts, in
 
____________________
 
_4_/  For the sake of simplicity, this example does not describe
the complicated system of controls used to ensure that no
human knows the keys that are used to generate message
authentication codes.
 
_5_/  Pub. L. No. 663, 68 Stat. 800, 830 (1954)
 
4                                                      B-238449
 
<FF>

order to avoid withdrawal and reversion of appropriate funds.
_See_ 51 Comp. Gen. 631, 633 (1972).  Section 1501 was enacted
not to restrict agencies to paper and ink in the formation of
contracts, but because, as one court noted, "Congress was
by asserting oral contracts."  _United_States_v._American_
_Renaissance_Lines_, 494 F.2d 1059, 1062 (D.C. Cir.), _cert_.
_denied_, 419 U.S. 1020 (1974).  The purpose of section 1501 was
to require that agencies submit evidence that affords a high
degree of certainty and lessens the possibility of abuse.
_See_ H.R. Rep. No. 2266 at 50.
 
While "paper and ink" offers a substantial degree of
integrity, it is not the only such evidence.  Some courts,
applying commercial law (and the Uniform Commercial Code in
particular), have recognized audio tape recordings, for
example, as sufficient to create contracts.  _See_, _e.g._,
_Ellis_Canning_Company_v._Bernstein_, 348 F. Supp. 1212
(D. Colo. 1972).  The court, citing a Colorado statute, stated
that the tape recording of the terms of a contract is
acceptable because it is a "reduc[tion] to tangible form."_6_/
_Id_. at 1228.  In a subsequent case, the United States Court of
Appeals held that an audio tape recording of an agreement
between the Gainesville City Commission and a real estate
developer was sufficient to bind the Commission.
_Londono_v._City_of_Gainesville_, 768 F.2d 1223 (11th Cir.
1985).  The court held that the tape recording constituted a
"signed writing."  _Id_. at 1228.
 
In our opinion, EDI technology, which allows the contract
terms to be examined in human readable form, as on a monitor,
stored on electronic media, recalled from storage and reviewed
in human readable form, has an integrity that is greater than
an audio tape recording and equal to that of a paper and ink
contract.  Just as with paper and ink, EDI technology provides
a recitation of the precise terms of the contract and avoids
the risk of error inherent in oral testimony which is based on
 
____________________
 
_6_/  Some courts, interpreting the laws of other states, have
held that a tape recording is not acceptable.  _See_Roos_v._
_Aloi_, 487 N.Y.S. 2d 637 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1985), _aff'd_,
489 N.Y.S. 2d 551 (N.Y. App. Div.); _Sonders_v._Roosevelt_,
476 N.Y.S. 2d 331 (N.Y. App. Div. 1984).
 
5                                                      B-238449
 
<FF>

human memory._7_/  Indeed, courts, under an implied-in-fact
contract theory, have enforced contracts on far less
documentation than would be available for electronic
contracts.  _See_ _Clark_v._United_States_, 95 U.S. 539 (1877).
_See_ _also_ _Narva_Harris_Construction_Corp._v._United_States_,
 
For the purpose of interpreting federal statutes, "writing" is
defined to include "printing and typewriting and _reproductions_
_of_visual_symbols_ by photographing, multigraphing,
mimeographing, manifolding, or _otherwise_."  1 U.S.C. (s) 1
(emphasis added).  Although the terms of contracts formed
using EDI are stored in a different manner than those of paper
and ink contracts, they ultimately take the form of
visual symbols.  We believe that it is sensible to interpret
federal law in a manner to accommodate technological
advancements unless the law by its own terms expressly
precludes such an interpretation, or sound policy reasons
exist to do otherwise.  It is evident that EDI technology had
not been conceived nor, probably, was even anticipated at the
times section 1501 and the statutory definition of "writing"
were enacted.  Nevertheless, we believe that, given the
legislative history of section 1501 and the expansive
definition of writing, section 1501 and 1 U.S.C. (s) 1 encompass
EDI technology.
 
cc:  Mr. F. Jackson
 
____________________
 
_7_/  Of course, just as with any contact or other official
document, an agency must take appropriate steps to ensure the
security of the document, for example, to prevent fraudulent
modification of the terms.  Agencies should refer to NIST
standards in this regard.  _See_, _e.g._, FIPS 113 _supra_
(regarding message authentication codes).  In addition,
agencies should refer to the GSA regulations regarding the
maintenance of electronic records.  _See_ 41 C.F.R. (s) 201-45.2.
 
6                                                      B-238449
 
<FF>






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: nobody@cicada.berkeley.edu
Date: Tue, 1 Jun 93 05:47:56 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: National Security Telecommunications  5.27.93
Message-ID: <9306011324.AA17033@cicada.berkeley.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Some names we should all note...
 
============================================================================


         E X E C U T I V E   O F F I C E   O F   T H E   P R E S I D E N T


                             27-May-1993 07:03pm  
 
         TO:        Jeffrey L. Eller                   
         TO:        Jonathan P. Gill                   

         FROM:      David Seldin
                    Office of the Press Secretary

 
         SUBJECT:   NATIONAL SECURITY TELECOMMUNICATIONS ADVISORY COMMISSION






                         THE WHITE HOUSE


                  Office of the Press Secretary

                                                                  
For Immediate Release                             May 26, 1993


       PRESIDENT APPOINTS AUGUSTINE TO CHAIR ADVISORY PANEL

(Washington, DC)    The President announced today that he has 
appointed Norman R. Augustine as Chair and William T. Esrey as 
Vice Chair of the President's National Security 
Telecommunications Advisory Committee (NSTAC).  Augustine is 
Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of Martin Marietta 
Corporation and has previously served as Vice Chair of NSTAC.  
Esry is Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of Sprint 
Corporation.

     Also named to the NSTAC today were Joseph T. Gorman, the 
Chairman and CEO of TRW Inc., and Albert F. Zettlemoyer, the 
President of Paramax Systems Corporation and a Senior Vice 
President of Unisys Corporation.

     The President's National Security Telecommunications 
Advisory Committee is a Federal Advisory Committee designed to 
provide information and advice to the President regarding 
telecommunications planning.  It is composed of up to 30 
telecommunications industry executives.


                              # # #




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: nobody@cicada.berkeley.edu
Date: Tue, 1 Jun 93 07:56:33 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: National Security Telecommunications  5.27.93
Message-ID: <9306011532.AA19547@cicada.berkeley.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

It is at best ironic to see the Chairman and CEO of TRW appointed
to the President's National Security Telecommunications Advisory
Committee, given the sieve-like nature of TRW's data collection.

DEADBEAT <na5877@anon.penet.fi>

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.2

iQBFAgUBLAt1nfFZTpBW/B35AQE6kwF/S54u0IVgGwA0wj1FSFlfmhYsX6cdjwYM
N68FWvVtdEanPm6tri84ziNkWvjEGtr4
=S7j2
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: jordan@imsi.com (Jordan Hayes)
Date: Tue, 1 Jun 93 06:06:36 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Electronic Contracts
Message-ID: <9306011235.AA08210@IMSI.COM>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I believe if you really want it to hold up, you should use the
Bellcore document signing service.  Has anyone heard of a company
that would provide this on a non-research basis?

/jordan




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Ian S. Nelson" <ian@bvsd.Co.EDU>
Date: Tue, 1 Jun 93 07:09:44 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: How do I unsubscribe?
Message-ID: <199306011447.AA14254@bvsd.Co.EDU>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I'm taking off for summer, so how do I unsubscribe from the list?
Also, whoever sends me info on that, please send me a message that will tell
me how to get back on when I come back.
thanks,
-- 
Ian S. Nelson			I speak for only myself.	
Finger for my PGP key.  
If you are a beautiful woman, it is mandatory that you reply to this message.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Eric Hughes <hughes@soda.berkeley.edu>
Date: Tue, 1 Jun 93 08:19:29 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Software infrastructure
In-Reply-To: <9305311919.AA06505@toad.com>
Message-ID: <9306011553.AA16160@soda.berkeley.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>I think what is really needed is
>some way of dealing with people who read mail on their PC while using
>some kind of terminal program or similar package to connect to a BBS,
>commercial service, or Unix box.  

I think Hal is largely accurate here.  Certainly the "DOS box as
terminal" problem needs to be solved.  With the advent of 386BSD,
however, home Unix is going to be increasingly common.  

As an aside, I want to harp again on what I call the software
infrastructure problem.  If email and telecomm systems were well
structured, instead of exhibiting so much history in themselves, most
encryption freatures would be extremely easy to implement--just grab
the right hook.  Unfortunately this is not the situation.  Hence my
conclusion:

	The most important software development for wide scale
	deployment of cryptography has nothing _per se_ to do with
	cryptography.

Let's go back to the DOS-as-terminal issue.  The politics and
economics of DOS shareware is such that source code is almost never
made available.  Gnu public license software is rare in the DOS world.

I propose that interested cypherpunks write a DOS terminal program
which _is_ free software.  In order to overcome the inertia which Hal
properly observes is endemic to any software change, I submit that to
have source code available to fix or add features deemed desirable
will be a key factor in acceptance of this software.  I have my own
ideas about multiplexing the channel to support background POP and
file transfer, but I'll leave that for later.  Such software, of
course, would be properly layered to be able to add encryption at the
key junctures.

It would be entirely appropriate to discuss such architecture here on
the cypherpunks list.  When the developers's effort starts, I promise
to find a way for them to have their own mailing list.

Eric




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Eric Hughes <hughes@soda.berkeley.edu>
Date: Tue, 1 Jun 93 08:30:06 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Crypto anarchy in a VW? (not the bug)
In-Reply-To: <9305312244.AA20903@malibu.sfu.ca>
Message-ID: <9306011604.AA16401@soda.berkeley.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>this
>stirred up an old idea I had about server anonimity, that is that the
>actual physical location of a server would be very difficult to pin
>down... 

This presumes a model where the logical server is a single machine.
That doesn't have to be the case.  By using a secret sharing protocol
(M out of N reconstruction), one can multiply site any database, with
sites anywhere in the world.  A database then is in actuality not in
any single place.

>the only way to do this with any real degree of security
>would be to bounce signals off a satellite but this would be rather
>costly...

Cryptography is all economics.  If you are doing something where the
location of a machine must not be revealed, then you've got the money
to pay for a satellite link.  High security means high expense, and
there is no way around that.

Eric




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Eric Hughes <hughes@soda.berkeley.edu>
Date: Tue, 1 Jun 93 08:41:02 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: No Subject
In-Reply-To: <199306010527.AA00963@xtropia>
Message-ID: <9306011614.AA16663@soda.berkeley.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>This means that the pass phrase [for the remailer secret key] has to
>exist, in the clear, in the scripts which implement the remailer.

Currently that is the easiest way, to be sure.  Another way would be
to store the passphrase encrypted in a file so that at least it's not
findable with strings(1).  Here a quick hack for someone who's looking
for a project: a passphrase storage process which accepts requests
from a slightly modified PGP.

Hal's basic point, however is not mitigated.  Nothing is secure from a
clever root.

>Perhaps Karl could add a notation in his
>remailer lists about which machines are public and which are private.  

An excellent suggestion.

Eric




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Eric Hughes <hughes@soda.berkeley.edu>
Date: Tue, 1 Jun 93 08:54:26 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Crypto anarchy in a VW? (not the bug)
In-Reply-To: <Pine.3.03.9306010040.A26846-d100000@rtfm>
Message-ID: <9306011628.AA17049@soda.berkeley.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>I think that building privacy into the architecture would be inherently 
>dangerous, however, it is a perfect way for the people building the system
>to oppress the users, all the while convincing them that the system is 
>secure.

We build the privacy into the system, not the government.  The
question is _who decides_?  If we decide by creating, then more
privacy will exist by fiat.

>The only way to ensure your privacy is to seize it yourself.

Absolutely.  This does not contradict our activity of building the
privacy into the system.  Any privacy system you can build on top of
an insecure network such as the internet can also be built on top of a
privacy-friendly network.

>There are a lot of ways to get a signal around the world without using a 
>satellite, ask any amateur radio enthusiast.  

One of the really great techniques I've hear about recently is a data
channel that runs at 90% T1 speed over the ~900 MHz spread spectrum
band.  The legal limit is 1W transmitter power and 4W antenna gain
(transmitted energy focusing).  From what I hear, though, the antenna
gain requirements are being ignored by lots of folks.  What this means
in practice is that you can set up a directional antenna and easily
get a twenty mile hop on one of these units.

>Why is there not more work being done on encrypting all internode traffic
>streams?  It doesn't seem too hard.

Cylink has had a T1 link encrypter out for years.  It uses D-H for key
exchange.  It's also costs (not-known-to-be-accurate) about 10K$ per
end.

Eric




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Eric Hughes <hughes@soda.berkeley.edu>
Date: Tue, 1 Jun 93 08:59:13 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Electronic Contracts
In-Reply-To: <9306011235.AA08210@IMSI.COM>
Message-ID: <9306011633.AA17111@soda.berkeley.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>I believe if you really want it to hold up, you should use the
>Bellcore document signing service.  Has anyone heard of a company
>that would provide this on a non-research basis?

The Bellcore service is properly a timestamping service and not a
signature service.  Their timestamp is constructed out of hash
functions, not digital signatures.

The algorithm is patented.  Contact Bellcore for licensing.  I'm not
sure they are going to license; they may decide that they want all the
timestamping revenue themselves.

Eric




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Eric Hughes <hughes@soda.berkeley.edu>
Date: Tue, 1 Jun 93 09:22:44 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Clipperpunks Write Code?
In-Reply-To: <9305312100.AA22836@netcom3.netcom.com>
Message-ID: <9306011656.AA17722@soda.berkeley.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>The anti-Clipper work is related, but
>probably isn't the core...fortunately, I doubt there's any conflict, as
>people will work on what interests them, so the Clipper stuff probably
>isn't affecting work on other core issues.

We are trying to build a sandbox, and the government is trying to
restrict the use of sand.

My apologies to non-US readers for the diatribe on US politics.
Unfortunately, if the US restricts cryptography, others are likely to
follow, either by coercion or by example.

I had dinner last night with, among others, John Gilmore and John
Barlow, who have just been to DC with the rest of the EFF Board to
talk to politicos.  Without being too specific (I leave it to those
who were there to decide the propriety of the details), but several
things became clear.

1.  Clinton has signed onto Clipper full-bore 100%.  Bush started it,
but Clinton, the ever-moderate, has told the eavesdropping community
that he can take their side on some issues.

2.  They're going to deploy Clipper without regard to public
sentiment.  That means that to be influenced by public sentiment, it
is going to have to be huge.  Educational efforts are going to have to
be large.

3.  Our government is looking at the "example of other governments" to
justify that restrictions on cryptography are not beyond the pale.

This is serious, make no mistake.  If, as in the White House statement
as reprinted in the Post, the government does restrict everything to
be Clipper, all anonymity and pseudonymity efforts are worthless.

That said, I also urge those who are writing code to continue.  To
those of you not writing code, however, I say start talking to your
friends and neighbors and communities and newspapers.

Now.

Eric




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Eric Hughes <hughes@soda.berkeley.edu>
Date: Tue, 1 Jun 93 09:27:23 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: No Subject
In-Reply-To: <9305311901.AA28793@relay2.UU.NET>
Message-ID: <9306011701.AA17888@soda.berkeley.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>I'm analyzing a piece of encryption shareware advertised on
>comp.archives.msdos.announce.  

Could you post a more complete pointer to this?

>PARTICULAR TOOLS I'D USEFUL...
>- A binary file editor/composer with hex and ascii displays
>- A tool for generating and viewing letter frequencies, digram/
>trigram frequencies

Since you are going to be writing some of these, presumably, I take it
you'll be sharing your code with us.  Yes?

>I looked on soda in pub/cypherpunks/cryptanalysis and found 
>nothing useful.

The directory is there as much to inspire the writing of such software
as it is to distribute it.

Eric




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Eric Hughes <hughes@soda.berkeley.edu>
Date: Tue, 1 Jun 93 10:16:40 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: crypto '93: deadline for stipend
Message-ID: <9306011750.AA19860@soda.berkeley.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


For those of you who want to go to CRYPTO 93 and get paid to do so,
the deadline is this Friday.  The conference is Aug 22 et seq. in
Santa Barbara.

Details from the announcement are below.

Eric

-----------------------------------------------------------------------------

A very limited number of stipends 
are available to those unable to obtain funding. Applications for stipends 
should be sent to the General Chair before June 4, 1993.

----------------------

For other information, contact the General Chair: 

Paul C. Van Oorschot, Crypto '93 
Bell-Northern Research (MAIL STOP 000) 
3500 Carling Ave. 
Nepean, Ontario K2H 8E9  Canada 
Telephone: (613)-763-4199 
Fax: (613)-763-2626 
Internet: crypto93@bnr.ca





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Eric Hughes <hughes@soda.berkeley.edu>
Date: Tue, 1 Jun 93 10:46:28 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Crypto anarchy in a VW? (not the bug)
In-Reply-To: <199306011712.AA08151@ccwf.cc.utexas.edu>
Message-ID: <9306011820.AA21028@soda.berkeley.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>   The actual file encryption/decryption
>must be done in hardware if you want to have any sort of speed at all.

Please, everyone who is working on this, remember.  You can't do hard
disk encryption in software on the host CPU.  Thanks to Jim for
reminding me to stress this.

>Lacking an available IDEA chip I will have to use
>DES (multi-pass or some other variant to get around the limits on DES
>keyspace) in order to get the necessary throughput on the disk.

DES hardware is already available and tested.  Use it.  Use a
triple-keyed EDE version of DES.  

Is someone selling a raw DES chip on an ISA card?  If so, use that so
that others don't have to hack together their own hardware.

>Such a system would not be completely secure but would provide some
>protection for files, which is more than they get now...

The keying material for the disk should not be one key for the whole
disk.  The keying material could easily be one key per track without
the keys growing too large.

Ideally this keying material would be held on a removable PCMCIA card
and would talk directly to the device encryptor hardware with a
protected channel.  That will have to wait.

Eric




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Timothy Newsham <newsham@wiliki.eng.hawaii.edu>
Date: Tue, 1 Jun 93 14:32:10 PDT
To: jthomas@kolanut.mitre.org (Joe Thomas)
Subject: Re: Software infrastructure
In-Reply-To: <9306011816.AA10998@kolanut>
Message-ID: <9306012132.AA11983@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> I may be able to help out in a DOS project (though I seem to be migrating  
> quickly to Linux as it stabilizes...)  Perhaps the GPL'ed program term  
> would be useful in serial multiplexing applications.  It's quite nice for  
> Unix boxes, letting all kinds of streams coexist (even redirecting TCP/IP  
> ports over serial without the overhead of SLIP/PPP).  I believe I've  

on a similar note the DNET protocol for amiga is quite nice.  It comes
with a nice socket like library.  Works quite efficiently but contains
no information about addressing (it is strictly point to point so
it doesnt use any addressing).




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Jim McCoy <mccoy@ccwf.cc.utexas.edu>
Date: Tue, 1 Jun 93 09:35:14 PDT
To: ryan@rtfm.mlb.fl.us (RYAN Alan Porter)
Subject: Re: Crypto anarchy in a VW? (not the bug)
In-Reply-To: <Pine.3.03.9306010040.A26846-d100000@rtfm>
Message-ID: <199306011712.AA08151@ccwf.cc.utexas.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text


Ryan Alan Porter <ryan@rtfm.mlb.fl.us> writes:
[...]
> An aside:  has anyone dealt with the concept of on-the-fly encryption for
> mass storage, kind of like the way the PCs can be 'stacked' or 'doubled'
> or whatever with on-the-fly compression?  I was thinking about trying to
> write some drivers for this for a 486 but I have never tried to write a
> device driver before and was wondering if anyone might have any suggestions.

Sort of.  I am still trying to work out a few design problems on a system
such as this for unix hosts.  At the moment it looks like I will be doing
this in linux but I still have a few issues to hammer out before I start
coding. 

>     1) these public key algorithms that we are working on are slow as
> balls, any idea if this would be feasable, given how PC users like to
> equate hard drive speed with penis size?

The PKE stuff would only need to handle the key management, so this could
conceivably be done in software.   The actual file encryption/decryption
must be done in hardware if you want to have any sort of speed at all.
This is actually the part I am still trying to figure out.  A research lab
in Switzerland designed a chip to do IDEA rather quickly, but I have still
not been able to get any information on how/when this might be marketed or
available outside the research lab (although I might be able to get one for
research purposes...)  Lacking an available IDEA chip I will have to use
DES (multi-pass or some other variant to get around the limits on DES
keyspace) in order to get the necessary throughput on the disk.

>     2) it seems that having your private key hanging around somewhere in
> memory the whole session would be horribly insecure, [...]

This I why I am hoping to use linux.  For those who don't know what linux
is, it is a fairly popular free unix for 386/486 intel machines.  With
linux I can start by burying the private key in the kernel during runtime
to give it some protection against snooping and hope to add a few kernel
hacks to make it a little more secure against examination.  Linux provides
a dos emulator for those who need PC programs and unix/x11/whatever for the
rest of us...

Such a system would not be completely secure but would provide some
protection for files, which is more than they get now...

jim



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: nobody@eli-remailer
Date: Tue, 1 Jun 93 11:55:12 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: No Subject
Message-ID: <9306011855.AA08017@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

I don't think the idea of a "virtual server" for anonymity will really
accomplish much.  Even if you somehow manage to spread the software over
several machines, you still need to publicize the entry and exit points
for remailing requests.  If the net police determine to shut down the
server, they can go after those machines which are publically known to
be the places where the anonymous messages come from and shut them down.

Sure, if you have a network of machines you might be able to bring another
one online pretty quickly to replace this one which has been shut down.
But then the net police can go after that one.  And so on.

You'd get the same effect just by having a bunch of conventional remailing
servers, only announcing one of them publically, and then having each
one come online only after the one before it got shut down.

The hard part in either of these scenarios is collecting more people who
will run anonymity servers.  I don't see that doing tricky stuff with
virtualizing the calculations helps you much.

Similarly, trying to put a machine at an unknown site, or perhaps in a
friendly country, won't necessarily help.  If the machine itself is
inaccessible, the net police will go after its feeds, the points at which
it connects into the network.  Look at what happened to Julf.  His machine
was safe, sitting in a back room of his house.  They went after his net
feeds instead.

The real answer is to publically defend remailers.  I argue for remailing
servers on the basis of preventing traffic analysis.  Most people accept
that the use of encryption is justified for email in order to protect
individual privacy.  I claim that remailing servers extend this protection
to include not only the content of a message, but its destination as well.
The net does little today to keep the facts private about whom you communicate
with.  Remailers provide that confidentiality.

If we had enough remailers that we could confidentally run a virtualized
system, knowing that we could keep brining them online faster than they
could be shut down, I'd argue that a better use of those resources would be
to publically identify all of the remailers and let them all operate on
their own.  This would provide a united front to oppose the anti-privacy
forces, giving political strength to our goals.

Hal Finney 
74076.1041@compuserve.com

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.2

iQCVAgUBLAtoGqgTA69YIUw3AQGFeQQAsnAHwZpe+BRzhp9umLJzWJDFgcHYYYwu
Bp5GJI2LmhQWB1pNluLxupW/ZZZqlO78HApOcU9jL/eFEhZakoAd4RJPVBjXpadm
w1vkfSDQ6qXKnPyj28FM1sm3eSyfRu3evAd8+MfGNFOlCeyrYNfya6G3OBOcwpf1
bJFe7upKVVQ=
=8apG
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: mmidboe@cs.uah.edu (digital saint)     (Computer Science Dept., Univ. of Alabama-Huntsville)
Date: Tue, 1 Jun 93 09:51:52 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Remailers on networks like Fido or WWIV
Message-ID: <9306011729.AA17003@uahcs2.cs.uah.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text


	I've seen a lot about remailers on Internet but has anyone done any
work with remailers on Fidonet, or WWIVNet style networks? I've been thinking
about a WWIVNet anonymous remailer and can easily implement one for email, but
the public postings would be much harder although I do have some ideas on that.
If anyone else out there has any ideas, or has started on this already I'd
really like to hear about it. 

						d. saint



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Karl Barrus <elee9sf@Menudo.UH.EDU>
Date: Tue, 1 Jun 93 10:48:49 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Remailers 06/01/93
Message-ID: <199306011826.AA09799@Menudo.UH.EDU>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

Q1: What cypherpunk remailers exist?

A1:

 1: hh@pmantis.berkeley.edu 
 2: hh@cicada.berkeley.edu 
 3: hh@soda.berkeley.edu 
 4: nowhere@bsu-cs.bsu.edu 
 5: remail@tamsun.tamu.edu
 6: remail@tamaix.tamu.edu
 7: ebrandt@jarthur.claremont.edu 
 8: hal@alumni.caltech.edu 
 9: remailer@rebma.mn.org 
10: elee7h5@rosebud.ee.uh.edu 
11: phantom@mead.u.washington.edu 
12: hfinney@shell.portal.com 
13: remailer@utter.dis.org 
14: 00x@uclink.berkeley.edu 
15: remail@extropia.wimsey.com 

NOTES: 
#1-#6		remail only, no encryption of headers
#7-#12		support encrypted headers
#15		special - header and message must be encrypted together
#9,#13,#15	introduce larger than average delay (not direct connect)
#14		public key not yet released

======================================================================

Q2: What help is available?

A2:

Check out the pub/cypherpunks directory at soda.berkeley.edu
(128.32.149.19).  Instructions on how to use the remailers are in the
remailer directory, along with some unix scripts and dos batch files.

Mail to me (elee9sf@menudo.uh.edu) for further help and/or questions.

======================================================================


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From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Eric Hughes <hughes@soda.berkeley.edu>
Date: Tue, 1 Jun 93 13:06:15 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Crypto anarchy in a VW? (not the bug)
In-Reply-To: <199306011955.AA29541@flubber.cc.utexas.edu>
Message-ID: <9306012040.AA27161@soda.berkeley.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I argue that encrypted hard disks should be encrypted at the transfer
level.

>Actually I was sort of thinking of the keying being done on a per-user
>basis.  

Never fear.  Layered encryption is the way of the future.  One layer
of encryption for the disk as a whole, another for the users.  When
the stuff gets cheap enough, it will be everywhere.

The question is "Who is your opponent?"  If you are concerned with the
users against each other, then use user level encryption.  If you are
concerned with the outside world against the machine, then encrypt at
the disk controller or device driver level.  If you are concerned
about both, then do both.

Eric




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Eric Hughes <hughes@soda.berkeley.edu>
Date: Tue, 1 Jun 93 13:09:11 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Crypto anarchy in a VW? (not the bug)
In-Reply-To: <Pine.3.03.9306011501.A4936-b100000@rtfm>
Message-ID: <9306012042.AA27310@soda.berkeley.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>>  You can't do hard
>> disk encryption in software on the host CPU.  

>Well thanks for the advice, but you fergot to mention why...

Performance.  Look at how long it take to do encryption via software
and how long by hardware.  Consider that a Unix box can do other
processor tasks while the disk is stepping.

Re: EPROM as key

A fragile device makes privacy for hackers only.  General privacy will
require something significantly more physically robust.

Eric






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Karl Barrus <elee9sf@Menudo.UH.EDU>
Date: Tue, 1 Jun 93 11:15:59 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: ANON/REMAIL: Remailers June 1, 1993
Message-ID: <199306011853.AA12217@Menudo.UH.EDU>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


...teach me to not read my mail first... :-)

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

Q1: What cypherpunk remailers exist?

A1:

 1: hh@pmantis.berkeley.edu 
 2: hh@cicada.berkeley.edu 
 3: hh@soda.berkeley.edu 
 4: nowhere@bsu-cs.bsu.edu 
 5: remail@tamsun.tamu.edu
 6: remail@tamaix.tamu.edu
 7: ebrandt@jarthur.claremont.edu 
 8: hal@alumni.caltech.edu 
 9: remailer@rebma.mn.org 
10: elee7h5@rosebud.ee.uh.edu 
11: phantom@mead.u.washington.edu 
12: hfinney@shell.portal.com 
13: remailer@utter.dis.org 
14: 00x@uclink.berkeley.edu 
15: remail@extropia.wimsey.com 

NOTES: 
#1-#6		remail only, no encryption of headers
#7-#12		support encrypted headers
#15		special - header and message must be encrypted together
#9,#13,#15	introduce larger than average delay (not direct connect)
#14		public key not yet released

#9,#13,#15      running on privately owned machines

======================================================================

Q2: What help is available?

A2:

Check out the pub/cypherpunks directory at soda.berkeley.edu
(128.32.149.19).  Instructions on how to use the remailers are in the
remailer directory, along with some unix scripts and dos batch files.

Mail to me (elee9sf@menudo.uh.edu) for further help and/or questions.

======================================================================


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Y55E3YIXYmKrQekIHUKaMyATfnhNc6+2MT8mwaWz2kiOTRkun/SlNI3Cv3Qt8Emy
Y6Zv0kk/7rs=
=simY
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Eric Hughes <hughes@soda.berkeley.edu>
Date: Tue, 1 Jun 93 13:31:05 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: No Subject
In-Reply-To: <9306011855.AA08017@toad.com>
Message-ID: <9306012105.AA28350@soda.berkeley.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>I don't think the idea of a "virtual server" for anonymity will really
>accomplish much.  

For just plain old reliability in the face of expected hardware and
connectivity failure, it is reason enough.  When one examines intended
such failures, the analysis must be more subtle.

>... you still need to publicize the entry and exit points

Yes.  On any system at all, the portals that guard privacy are public.
For whatever architecture you chose, you still need an actual email
address that resolves down to some physical internet machine to gain
access to that service.

>If the net police determine to shut down the server

Shutting down service is all economics.  It you must simultaneously
shut down even two machines, that is a larger cost that shutting down
one, since there must be coordination.

>one online pretty quickly to replace this one which has been shut down.
>But then the net police can go after that one.  And so on.

Cost, cost, cost.  What is possible and what is fiscally available are
two different things.  Two machines might be in the realm of
possibility, but where is the cutoff exactly?

>You'd get the same effect just by having a bunch of conventional remailing
>servers, only announcing one of them publically, and then having each
>one come online only after the one before it got shut down.

No, there is a single and incredibly salient difference--communicating
the change of address to all those who use the service.  Right now,
this changed information must either end up in people's head, or in
their alias files, or in their scripts.  Wherever it is, it would have
to change.  

This effectively puts a fairly small upper bound on the user base for
such a service, given the characterstic time it takes to communicate
such changes.

Plus, if you want pseudonymous return paths, then you have to make
sure that data is transferred to a new system.

>The hard part in either of these scenarios is collecting more people who
>will run anonymity servers. 

The scenario I envision for virtualized databases is a business
running such a network themselves or in partnership with other
companies.  Doing this all on netcom shell accounts just won't happen.
The hard part here is trying to get someone to pay for the secure
service.

>If the machine itself is inaccessible, the net police will go after
>its feeds, the points at which it connects into the network.

If there is a single point of failure, that's a problem.  This is a
design criterion, not an overwhelming roadblock.

>Look at what happened to Julf.  His machine
>was safe, sitting in a back room of his house.  They went after his net
>feeds instead.

One-point failure!  The politics of the connecting network are crucial
in the long run.  I have a separate message about that.

>The real answer is to publically defend remailers.  

I see no reason why these two approaches are exclusive.

Eric




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: jthomas@kolanut.mitre.org (Joe Thomas)
Date: Tue, 1 Jun 93 10:39:17 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Software infrastructure
Message-ID: <9306011816.AA10998@kolanut>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Eric Hughes <hughes@soda.berkeley.edu> writes:

> I propose that interested cypherpunks write a DOS terminal program
> which _is_ free software.  In order to overcome the inertia which Hal
> properly observes is endemic to any software change, I submit that to
> have source code available to fix or add features deemed desirable
> will be a key factor in acceptance of this software.  I have my own
> ideas about multiplexing the channel to support background POP and
> file transfer, but I'll leave that for later.  Such software, of
> course, would be properly layered to be able to add encryption at the
> key junctures.

I may be able to help out in a DOS project (though I seem to be migrating  
quickly to Linux as it stabilizes...)  Perhaps the GPL'ed program term  
would be useful in serial multiplexing applications.  It's quite nice for  
Unix boxes, letting all kinds of streams coexist (even redirecting TCP/IP  
ports over serial without the overhead of SLIP/PPP).  I believe I've  
heard someone on comp.os.linux or gnu.misc.discuss talk about hacking DES  
into term, so it sounds doable.  I'm not sure how much the code assumes  
Unix serial device handing, but I'll have a look at the code.

Joe




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: stig@netcom.com (Stig)
Date: Tue, 1 Jun 93 13:52:09 PDT
To: Eric Hughes <hughes@soda.berkeley.edu>
Subject: Re: Software infrastructure
In-Reply-To: <9306011553.AA16160@soda.berkeley.edu>
Message-ID: <9306012130.AA17995@netcom.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


To quote: Eric Hughes <hughes@soda.berkeley.edu>
>
> Let's go back to the DOS-as-terminal issue.  The politics and
> economics of DOS shareware is such that source code is almost never
> made available.  Gnu public license software is rare in the DOS world.
> 
> I propose that interested cypherpunks write a DOS terminal program
> which _is_ free software.  In order to overcome the inertia which Hal
>

Let's generalize a bit:  Since PC based unix is more available, this
package should run on either PC or UNIX platforms.  Tip doesn't cut it
as a terminal program for UNIX and I don't know of another...  SLIP
has it's disadvantages.  

So, what I'm proposing is that the OS interface stuff be crammed into
an interface layer.

One intriguing application:  Write an interface layer that uses
SOCKETS for connectivity.

We want to avoid the kitchen sink mentality, BUT if we're going to
spend lots of time on this package, then why have it all go to waste
when time comes to port the sucker?

	Stig



/* Jonathan Stigelman, Stig@netcom.com, PGP public key by finger  */
/* fingerprint = 32 DF B9 19 AE 28 D1 7A  A3 9D 0B 1A 33 13 4D 7F */





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Jim McCoy <mccoy@ccwf.cc.utexas.edu>
Date: Tue, 1 Jun 93 12:18:22 PDT
To: hughes@soda.berkeley.edu (Eric Hughes)
Subject: Re: Crypto anarchy in a VW? (not the bug)
In-Reply-To: <9306011820.AA21028@soda.berkeley.edu>
Message-ID: <199306011955.AA29541@flubber.cc.utexas.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text


Eric Hughes <hughes@soda.berkeley.edu> writes:
[...]
> 
> >Such a system would not be completely secure but would provide some
> >protection for files, which is more than they get now...
> 
> The keying material for the disk should not be one key for the whole
> disk.  The keying material could easily be one key per track without
> the keys growing too large.

Actually I was sort of thinking of the keying being done on a per-user
basis.  The user would supply a key (with the pub key kept online and the
private part stored in kernel memory during the user session) that would be
used for thier files and the system key would only be used to provide a
secure channel between the user and the system (user encrypts thier key
pair with the system key and transmits it).  I have several ideas on how to
close up some of the holes on the OS side, but at the moment I am trying to
concentrate on finishing up the details of just the filesystem side so I
can get coding.

Right now I am working on making the system provide security such that the
only way to get at a file is to either have the legitimate user's private
key or to have the system private key and run the system as a sort of
trojan horse collecting keys as users login.  Having the system private key
will not give you any sort of "replay" data (you will not be able to use
the system key to get any past user keys or much of anything else...) and
having the physical hardware without the system private key will give you
nothing at all.

jim



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: peb@PROCASE.COM
Date: Tue, 1 Jun 93 14:32:55 PDT
To: fnerd@smds.com
Subject: Re: Verifying Privacy as an Upload/AI?
Message-ID: <9306012209.AA17679@banff.procase.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



I think you are headed in the right direction wrt a capability system, 
however, they are predicated on tamper proof hardware.  Since you 
stipulate human being copying and torturing (sounds like tampering
to me), I think this is not ultimate privacy.

Hmm, perhaps you should set up a key escrow system (!) so that you need
to call your most trusted friends to assemble your session key.  The
session key works only once, assuming a tamper proof, capability system.
When you call them, they can quiz you on your mental and physical health
to determine whether they should give you the keys...thus limiting the 
ability of a torturer.

Paul E. Baclace
peb@procase.com





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: fnerd@smds.com (FutureNerd Steve Witham)
Date: Tue, 1 Jun 93 12:38:04 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Verifying Privacy as an Upload/AI?
Message-ID: <9306011936.AA19298@smds.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


(Posted to both extropians and cypherpunks.)

Is there any way for a process running in a computer to verify
that it has privacy?  How could an AI, for instance, ever know
that it had privacy?  How could a person preparing to be
uploaded provide for their continuing privacy?

Assume these things, for the sake of argument:
	Strong public key crypto.
	Truly tamper-proof computers.
	Capability-based operating systems with proven protection
		between processes.  We might ask Norm Hardy for
		a rundown on some of the wonderful things that 
		are possible in these types of systems.

You might even assume that...
	Humans can memorize things, and these things can't be
		decoded from their uploads' memory dumps.
		(See note on torture below).
	The process/person seeking assurance of privacy is
		capable of being downloaded into a humanoid
		robot with enough compute power.

Can you prevent the bad guys from copying you and torturing
information out of the copy?  Can you be secure even if they
can do that?

Even with the best assumptions, I find this question tough.
But then I'm dense sometimes.

-fnerd




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: RYAN Alan Porter <ryan@rtfm.mlb.fl.us>
Date: Tue, 1 Jun 93 12:33:23 PDT
To: Eric Hughes <hughes@soda.berkeley.edu>
Subject: Re: Crypto anarchy in a VW? (not the bug)
In-Reply-To: <9306011820.AA21028@soda.berkeley.edu>
Message-ID: <Pine.3.03.9306011501.A4936-b100000@rtfm>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain




On Tue, 1 Jun 1993, Eric Hughes wrote:

> >   The actual file encryption/decryption
> >must be done in hardware if you want to have any sort of speed at all.
>
> Please, everyone who is working on this, remember.  You can't do hard
> disk encryption in software on the host CPU.  Thanks to Jim for
> reminding me to stress this.

Well thanks for the advice, but you fergot to mention why...

> >Lacking an available IDEA chip I will have to use
> >DES (multi-pass or some other variant to get around the limits on DES
> >keyspace) in order to get the necessary throughput on the disk.
>
> DES hardware is already available and tested.  Use it.  Use a
> triple-keyed EDE version of DES. 
>
> Is someone selling a raw DES chip on an ISA card?  If so, use that so
> that others don't have to hack together their own hardware.

I would be very interested in a card like this, if anyone can find one.

> >Such a system would not be completely secure but would provide some
> >protection for files, which is more than they get now...
>
> The keying material for the disk should not be one key for the whole
> disk.  The keying material could easily be one key per track without
> the keys growing too large.
>
> Ideally this keying material would be held on a removable PCMCIA card
> and would talk directly to the device encryptor hardware with a
> protected channel.  That will have to wait.

Another possibility until then, and one that would be fun for people who
like to play with EPROMS, is a card that had a cable leading to an external
EPROM socket that you could lay on your desk or on top of the case or 
wherever.  You burn your keys for the HD into a chip and use it as a key,
physically inserting the chip in the socket each time.  There are lots 
on new ways to make chips easy to plug in and out, I'm sure it wouldn't 
be too hard.

I still don't see why all of the actual encryption couldn't be done in 
software though...

> Eric


-Ryan
the Bit Wallah








From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: markh@wimsey.bc.ca (Mark C. Henderson)
Date: Tue, 1 Jun 93 16:18:27 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: wimsey.bc.ca archive is back on line
Message-ID: <m0o0gAv-0000KJC@vanbc.wimsey.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Due to a disk failure the anonymous ftp cryptography archive 
at wimsey.bc.ca (/pub/crypto) was off line for a couple of 
months.

Well, it is back.

(If you haven't used it before, we're on the other end of
a slip link, so be please be patient, downloads take
a while).

As usual I'm asking that this archive not be used to
illegally export cryptographic products from Canada and
the U.S.

-- 
Mark Henderson
markh@wimsey.bc.ca (personal account)
RIPEM key available by key server/finger/E-mail
  MD5OfPublicKey: F1F5F0C3984CBEAF3889ADAFA2437433




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: m5@vail.tivoli.com (Mike McNally)
Date: Tue, 1 Jun 93 14:26:07 PDT
To: stig@netcom.com (Stig)
Subject: Re: Software infrastructure
In-Reply-To: <9306012130.AA17995@netcom.netcom.com>
Message-ID: <9306012202.AA14863@vail.tivoli.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> Let's generalize a bit:  Since PC based unix is more available, this
> package should run on either PC or UNIX platforms.  Tip doesn't cut it
> as a terminal program for UNIX 

No kidding.

> and I don't know of another...  

Kermit?

> SLIP has it's disadvantages.  

Like, try making it work reasonably on a DOS platform.

> We want to avoid the kitchen sink mentality, BUT if we're going to
> spend lots of time on this package, then why have it all go to waste
> when time comes to port the sucker?

Why not just distribute a package of patches for the Kermit sources?



Mike McNally




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: peb@PROCASE.COM
Date: Tue, 1 Jun 93 16:42:52 PDT
To: marc@GZA.COM
Subject: Re: Verifying Privacy as an Upload/AI?
Message-ID: <9306020020.AA17715@banff.procase.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



>From marc@GZA.COM Tue Jun  1 15:44:15 1993

>But if you don't give me the password, the guy
>holding the phone has some very unpleasant looking surgical equipment

Alarm systems use duress codes for this that trigger a silent alarm
when the password is entered.  I'm not sure the proposed system here
(a capability system) could have an extra channel that the bad guys 
don't know about.

Using a hierarchy of escrow agents would be interesting--then by 
calling me up for part of the key would require me to get back to 
you after I called up the person at the next level.  (Note that 
a hierarchy is a special case of a general graph, so the webs of 
trust idea is important here (could provide some redundancy).)

Now, back to Steve's actual question,

>From: fnerd@smds.com (FutureNerd Steve Witham)

>given that you SEEM to be inside a secure system, how can you know
>that you are not inside a simulation 

Ultimately, there is no proof you are not currently a simulation on 
a big computer.  Why is time travel is not possible?  It's too 
expensive on the current platform.  (E.g, if SimEarth inhabitants 
could time travel, you would have a hard time keeping track of 
what they did and your machine would slow down considerably).
On an upload, how many people can be in the same room?  Can you
make arbitrary video phone calls?  Anything that stretches the 
compute resources could potentially make the bad guys impatient
and blow their trojan horse universe.
        
    
Paul E. Baclace
peb@procase.com
                            




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: gnu@cygnus.com
Date: Tue, 1 Jun 93 16:48:55 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: The new PEM release supports non-authoritarian certificates
Message-ID: <9306020026.AA02946@cygnus.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


You can generate your own certificates using the new PEM code from TIS.
This, in some ways, models the PGP "web of trust" model.  At least
it's a lot closer than the original PEM "you trust us, we don't trust you"
model.

They have also done something with the email address space, but I'm not
sure what.  Previously PEM required that you abandon your Internet
email address and use an X.400 based address in certificates and such.

More details will be available when the PEM release is out for FTP
(within days, I think).

	John




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: fnerd@smds.com (FutureNerd Steve Witham)
Date: Tue, 1 Jun 93 15:05:54 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Verifying Privacy as an Upload/AI?
Message-ID: <9306012223.AA21470@smds.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Just want to reinforce that my question is not how can an AI or upload
BE secure, but how can they KNOW that they are secure.  That is,
given that you SEEM to be inside a secure system, how can you know
that you are not inside a simulation that actually has a trap door?


-fnerd




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: ""L. Detweiler"" <ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Date: Tue, 1 Jun 93 16:49:22 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Newsweek Clipper Coverage
Message-ID: <9306020026.AA27360@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Under `Society -- Technology' in Newsweek of June 7 1993 p.70 appears
the headline `The Code of the Future' subhead `Uncle Sam wants you to
use ciphers it can crack'. This 1 page article is pretty ambitious for
what it tries to cover. The figure shows a flowchart for encryption
over a phone using a key. (Not particularly illuminating. In particular
the role & point of the key is ambiguous.) At the bottom 1/4 page we
have a sidebar ``Great Moments in Cryptography' with 1st known
encryption (Egyptian), the Zimmerman Telegram role in WWI, the Japanese
Purple breakthrough prior to Pearl Harbor (the picture is apparently
Friedman holding the machine), and finally Nov 4 1952 (a day that will
live in infamy), Truman creates the NSA, `master of math based codes'.

The article notes in the lead-in a cute & useful `hook' for the public
& popular role  of cryptography I have been drawing for a long time for
nontechnical friends, saying that with it Queen Elizabeth could have
been spared the spectacle of the steamy Prince Charles phone
revelations and eavesdroppers would have heard nothing but a hiss, and
`no signal analyzer, no supercomputer, no wiretap could have decoded
the white noise.' Fortunately, they attribute this `reputation saving
magic' not to Clipper but a DES chip.  ``That's what America's
supersecret spymasters, the NSA, intended when they designed the
cryptographic system in the 70s with IBM.'' (glaring errata; their
involvement has always been officially claimed as *secondary* and
*subsidiary* to IBM's, if even at all. But, it is an error in our favor.)

Article doesn't mention Clipper by name, but says it was essentially a
response to the unbreakable aspects of DES using key system.  Eric
Hughes, `computer security expert [at] Berkeley': ``The government is
saying, `If you want to lock something up, you have to [give us] the key'.''

Next, the motivation. Our networks are insecure, Internet ``broken into
90 percent more times than 1991'' (where'd that little statistic come
from? Gene Spafford?). Security of medical records, credit-card
purchases, video rentals, cellular phones at stake.  NSA chip used by
AT&T would take a supercomputer over a billlion years to solve, says R.
Kammer of NIST.

Problems: NSA hasn't revealed the algorithm so nobody knows if its
`hackproof'; agencies holding keys are vulnerable to `recreational
hackers, foreign spooks, and industrial spies.'

Here comes the gut-wrencher.  ``For now now one is forced to use the
NSA chip. But manufacturers who put a rival chip into, say, their
modems would likely be denied government contracts, as well as export
licenses for the NSA-proof products.  Even that may not appease the
spymasters.  ***No one rules out a mandatory encryption standard,''
says NIST spokesman Mat Heyman.***''

Is that quote from the point of view `our concerns on this have not
been allayed' or in the vein `all the NSA henchmen I know are chomping
at the bit to legislate a monopoly or outlaw non-Clipper chips'?

Overall, I'd say a favorable article that covers the basics, and rather
excellent editing given the severe space limitation (less than many
newspaper articles). Written by Sharon Begley with Melinda Liu in
Washington and Joshua Cooper Ramo.

* * *

Cypherpunks, I'm extremely concerned about these little quotes popping
up in the media. Just a few days ago we hear in the Washington Post:

>	Administration sources said that if the current plan doesn't
>enable the NSA and FBI to keep on top of the technology, then Clinton
>is prepared to introduce legislation to require use of its encryption
 >technology, which is crackable by the NSA, and to ban use of the
>uncrackable gear.
>	"It's an option on the table," said a White House official.

I sure hope that `official' has absolutely nothing to do with Clipper,
but that's unlikely.  It seems to me these are the sounds of a slow,
sinister rumbling underway.  Sometimes quotes like these are `floated
trial balloons' but other times they are grotesque flickers of real
internal machinations.  The more I hear them the more I think they are
in the latter category.

So far, the administration and media just don't `get it' that a
firestorm is in the making over any hair-thin deviation from the
standard of `no domestic regulation of encryption'.  If NSA & the
administration thinks that the Clipper brouhaha was containable, just
wait until they go a nanometer past it in the wrong direction.
Actually, a Supreme Court case on cryptography issues seems in some
ways to be inevitable.  Wow, I'd say there'd probably be enough
artillery to seriously damage NSA in that confrontation.

Cypherpunks, I'd like to compile a list of all quotations on the
`regulation of domestic cryptography' topic. That way we'll have a
propaganda poster all ready if any idiot bureacrat thinks they can
thumb their nose any further.  I have the original announcement text
and the Washington Post text above. It seems to me that an NIST
representative claimed there were `no plans' to outlaw other
cryptography. Where was that? Can everyone send me whatever they have on this topic?

P.S. Many tx. to E.H. for the thorough and excellent collection in
soda.berkeley.edu:/pub/cypherpunks/clipper.

- - -

For reference, here are the original Orwellian weasel words form the
April 16 announcement:

Q:   If the Administration were unable to find a technological
     solution like the one proposed, would the Administration be
     willing to use legal remedies to restrict access to more
     powerful encryption devices?

A:   This is a fundamental policy question which will be
     considered during the broad policy review.  The key escrow
     mechanism will provide Americans with an encryption product
     that is more secure, more convenient, and less expensive
     than others readily available today, but it is just one
     piece of what must be the comprehensive approach to
     encryption technology, which the Administration is
     developing.

     The Administration is not saying, "since encryption
     threatens the public safety and effective law enforcement,
     we will prohibit it outright" (as some countries have
     effectively done); nor is the U.S. saying that "every
     American, as a matter of right, is entitled to an
     unbreakable commercial encryption product."  There is a
     false "tension" created in the assessment that this issue is
     an "either-or" proposition.  Rather, both concerns can be,
     and in fact are, harmoniously balanced through a reasoned,
     balanced approach such as is proposed with the "Clipper
     Chip" and similar encryption techniques.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "John (FuzzFace/Fast-Eddie) McMahon" <MCMAHON@Eisner.DECUS.Org>
Date: Tue, 1 Jun 93 14:48:54 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: crypto '93
Message-ID: <01GYVGNSU5IM000DDC@Eisner.DECUS.Org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


*Sigh* Crypto '93 conflicts with Interop San Francisco (apparently).




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Marc Horowitz <marc@GZA.COM>
Date: Tue, 1 Jun 93 15:06:14 PDT
To: peb@PROCASE.COM
Subject: Re: Verifying Privacy as an Upload/AI?
In-Reply-To: <9306012209.AA17679@banff.procase.com>
Message-ID: <9306012243.AA11249@dun-dun-noodles.aktis.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>> Since you stipulate human being copying and torturing (sounds like
>> tampering to me), I think this is not ultimate privacy.

>> When you call them, they can quiz you on your mental and physical health
>> to determine whether they should give you the keys...thus limiting the 
>> ability of a torturer.

Oh, sure.

"Hi, Paul?  This is Marc.  I need your piece of my private key.  How
am I?  Just fine.  But if you don't give me the password, the guy
holding the phone has some very unpleasant looking surgical equipment
and there isn't an anaesthesiologist in sight, so I won't be fine for
long.  Just read it out loud, someone will key it in."

Need I say more?

		Marc




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Stanton McCandlish <anton@hydra.unm.edu>
Date: Tue, 1 Jun 93 17:18:13 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Electronic Contracts
In-Reply-To: <9306010433.AA27082@anchor.ho.att.com>
Message-ID: <9306020055.AA13186@hydra.unm.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Regarding "test cases" for digital signatures, not sure if this is 100%
relevant but what the hell...

In this area at least, when the UPS folk bring you a package that you
must sign for, you no longer sign on paper, but on this funky electronic
tablet.  Now granted this thing is recording your "real" signature, and
thus differs greatly, but still there may be something to this.  Not sure
where one would look for material having to do with such devices, and
their relevance to a court case, but then again no one pays me legal
consulting fees either.  >:) 

-- 
        When marriage is outlawed only outlaws will be inlaws!
Stanton McCandlish,  SysOp:  Noise in the Void DataCenter Library BBS
Internet anton@hydra.unm.edu     IndraNet: 369:1/1      FidoNet: 1:301/2     
Snail: 1811-B Coal Pl. SE, Albuquerque, New Mexico 87108 USA
Data phone: +1-505-246-8515 (24hr, 1200-14400 v32bis, N-8-1)
Vox phone:  +1-505-247-3402 (bps rate varies, depends on if you woke me up...:)




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Date: Tue, 1 Jun 93 18:18:27 PDT
To: Cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: "Newsweek" Article on Clipper and Encryption
Message-ID: <9306020156.AA27555@netcom.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



The following appeared in this week's "Newsweek," June 7, 1993, p. 70. Our
own Eric Hughes is briefly quoted.
 
Any mistakes are the fault of either me or my OCR program.


The Code of the Future

Uncle Sam wants you to use ciphers it can crack

Forget the castle. If only Queen Elizabeth had given Chuck and Di a
thumbnail-size computer chip for their wedding, she would have been spared
reading in the London tabs how her son" wanted to live in [his lover's]
trousers," among other excerpts from taped phone conversations. Instead,
the chip would have converted their words into "hsssssss." No signal
analyzer, no supercomputer, no wiretap could have decoded the white noise.
    
The device that works this reputation-saving magic is called a Data
Encryption Standard (DES) chip, and there's no practical way to crack it.
That's what America's supersecret spymasters, the National Security Agency,
intended when they designed the cryptographic system in the 1970s with IBM.
While that delights industry and privacy advocates, it's come back to haunt
the government: wiretaps are useless against any suspect using a
DES-encrypted phone. So in April the Clinton administration announced it
was backing the NSA in its push to impose a universal encryption standard
to which the Feds alone would hold the keys. The agency argues that's the
only way to ensure it will always be able to decode foreign communications.
Civil libertarians and corporations don't see it that way. Says
computer-security expert Eric Hughes of Berkeley," The government is
saying, 'If you want to lock something up, you have to [give us] the key'."
    
No one doubts that the nation's voice, data, electronic mail and other
communications need locks, and fast. Industrial spies grab fax, e-mail and
other computer and microwave transmissions out of the air. Hackers broke
into Internet, a world-wide computer network, 773 times last year, 90
percent more than in 1991. Hackers also peek into computers that hold
medical records, credit-card purchases, even video rentals. Cellular phones
offer as much privacy as going on "Oprah." The FBI can't keep up with all
the cybercrime. Secret codes can, and since World War, II codes have been
based on algorithms--formulas that transform one set of numbers into
another. NSA's new chip, to be used in a secure phone sold by AT&T,
encrypts computer transmissions and phone conversations with an algorithm
so complex "it would take a CRAY YMP [supercomputer] over a billion years
to solve," says Raymond Kammer of the National Institute of Standards and
Technology (NIST), which worked with NSA on the algorithm.
    
Yet the principle is simple. A sending phone and a receiving phone
electronically choose one algorithm, out of millions, for their
conversation (diagram). The only way to unscramble the resulting
10001100101s is to obtain the "keys," which will be held by two agencies
chosen by the attorney general. The agencies-this is the part NSA
likes-would give them to officials who have the requisite wiretap warrant.
But industry has a couple of problems with this. First, NSA has yet to
explain how the chip works, so outside verification that it's hackproof
will have to wait. Worse, with millions of NSA chips in use, the agencies
holding the keys would have to store them on computers, which are
vulnerable to recreational hackers, foreign spooks and industrial spies.
    
For now, no one is forced to use the NSA chip. But manufacturers who put a
rival chip into, say, their modems would likely be denied government
contracts, as well asexport licenses for the NSA-proof products. Even that
may not appease the spymasters. "No one rules out a mandatory encryption
standard," says NIST spokesman Mat Heyman. That's industry's greatest fear,
which NIST will attempt to allay in meetings this week. And next week Rep.
Edward Markey holds hearings on whether NSA can keep the keys to its codes
safe from hackers. Or even Fleet Street.

SHARON BEGLEY with MELINDA LIU in Washington and JOSHUA COOPER RAMO






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Clark Reynard <clark@metal.psu.edu>
Date: Tue, 1 Jun 93 15:47:44 PDT
To: hughes@soda.berkeley.edu
Subject: Re: Clipperpunks Write Code?
Message-ID: <9306020003.AA02785@metal.psu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Actually, I think that writing letters is somewhat useful; especially
those of us who aren't very good at writing real code.  I plug cypherpunks
a bit in a Phrack article I just finished concerning my bust by the
police a few years back; maybe you'd like to check it out, since 
it may be YOU if this damn Clipper thing goes through.

This makes me glad I voted Marrou/Lord, and that I resisted the temptation
to be suckered by that sellout bastard Clinton.  I was worried that he
would turn out to be a Jimmy Carter, but it's far worse than that.  Carter,
at least, had some human decency.  Clinton has turned into the nightmare
resurrection of Lyndon B. Johnson, and is probably stupid enough to get
us into a war.  Damn all politicians.

If any of you read the Phrack article (I will not forward my article
to the cypherpunks list, as it is well over 100K; those who wish to
check it out can see it when and if it comes out; in all likelihood,
Phrack 43, which is due to be out in a week or so), and believe that
there is another publication which might be interested in it (I am
willing to re-write for lay-persons); send me the info.  Anyone who
just absolutely can't WAIT to read it can request a copy from me, and
I'll send it in three parts.  

While my article touches only tangentially on the issue of encryption
(and my experience with weak encryption and with NOT having encryption),
it may be of interest.  Simply for your interest in cryptography, it is
apparent that we are about to face a McCarthyesque witch-hunt.

The government has already defined the terms of this conflict, and has
declared war on basic human liberty.  We must act accordingly.  I advocate
that the Clipper algorithm be discovered, if at all possible, by the 
comparison of the unlimited plaintext/ciphertext pairs which will be
available to anyone with a Clipper phone and a computer, and the skills
for differential cryptanalysis and/or IC Reverse Engineering.

If the algorithm is made public, anonymously, within a year, and in
so many copies that it is impossible to stop its distribution in 
electronic or samizdat form, Clipper is doomed.

And it must be doomed.  It's them or us.

----
Robert W. Clark             Just Say No! to the
rclark@nyx.cs.du.edu        Big Brother Chip  




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: nobody@eli-remailer
Date: Tue, 1 Jun 93 18:55:59 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: request for cryptanalysis tools
Message-ID: <9306020155.AA19081@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Eric Hughes asked about the piece of software I'm 
cryptanalyzing...
 
> Could you post a more complete pointer to this?
 
The program is "ncrypt".  
Available on garbo.uwasa.fi, /pc/crypt/ncrypt31.zip

About pub/cypherpunks/cryptanalysis...  I'll post anything useful
that I write...
 
> The directory is there as much to inspire the writing of such software
> as it is to distribute it.

Point taken!

-cire






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: bakunin@gnu.ai.mit.edu
Date: Tue, 1 Jun 93 16:13:41 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: things
Message-ID: <9306012350.AA02271@spiff.gnu.ai.mit.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



In re: tested telexes

	for those who don't know, telexes have been made 'secure' by use of a
	simple testing system for, say, banks to 'wire' money with.  This
	extant paradigm gives me hope that electronic contracts are coming.

In re: Wilde, ptui

	Pascal, SCHMASCAL.  "Schlup.. schlup schlup."  -WSB

In re: govmnt nastiness
	
	Well, gee, I thought Carter was a pig, too.  Lookit East Timor.  But as
	Slick Willie goes, I dunno.  I believe propagation of technology may
	outflank any intentions he may have.  Maybe.

be cool,

michael




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Phil Karn <karn@unix.ka9q.ampr.org>
Date: Tue, 1 Jun 93 19:55:14 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: eavesdropping druggies
Message-ID: <9306020332.AA16441@unix.ka9q.ampr.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Today's San Diego Union Tribune has a locally-written article on the
investigation into the murder of the Mexican cardinal by drug gangs.
The title is "Drug gangs eavesdrop on rivals", and begins as follows:L

"TIJUANA - The two rival drug gangs whose attempts to kill each other's
leadership have left a Mexican cardinal and six others dead apparently
have been using sophisticated electronic gear to monitor each other's
movements, Mexican authorities reported yesterday.

"In addition to the assault rifles, grenades and police and army uniforms
being discovered in a series of safe houses, Mexican federal police are
reporting finding devices designed to trace and monitor calls made from
cellular telephones.

"They also are finding sophisticated communications-monitoring equipment,
walkie-talkies, tape recorders and pages upon pages of documents."

The article continues with other developments in the investigation unrelated
to electronic eavesdropping.

A few (semi-serious) thoughts come to mind:

1. Perhaps the government doesn't want secure telephones in the hands of
the drug lords not so much because it will thwart wiretapping by law
enforcement, but because it will protect the gangs from each other --
and they aren't inhibited by Constitutional requirements.

2. Gee. I thought the cellular eavesdropping problem was completely
solved by the recent ban on cellular-capable scanners.

3. I can't wait for the Federales to discover computers with PGP in
one of these safehouses. And when it does, expect all hell to break
loose in the crypto propaganda war.

Phil





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Eric Hughes <hughes@soda.berkeley.edu>
Date: Tue, 1 Jun 93 20:34:59 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: WH email petition.
In-Reply-To: <9306020313.AA20120@triton.unm.edu>
Message-ID: <9306020408.AA19558@soda.berkeley.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>In light of the White House getting on the net, how effective do you all think
>an electronic petition, about the BigBrotherChip, would be?

It appears that they are going to count responses and make totals pro
and con any particular issue that people write about.  Thus while the
particulars of the petition don't really matter, the basic statements
against restrictions on encryption technology do.

I also heard no mention that they were going to do any kind of sorting
by person or email address.  Thus it appears that you get to vote
early and often in this public opinion poll.

Heh, heh, heh.

Eric




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: J. Michael Diehl <mdiehl@triton.unm.edu>
Date: Tue, 1 Jun 93 19:33:40 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: What do cypherpunks use?
Message-ID: <9306020311.AA19986@triton.unm.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Since Cypherpunks write code, I thought it might be interesting to find out
what kinds of systems cypherpunks USE.  If you would be so kind as to fill out
the included questionaire, I'll summerize.  Thanx in advance.
 
What kind of system do you use?
 
What OS do you use?
 
What mail reader do you use?
 
Which online services do you use?
 
Do you use pgp?  Which version?
 
If you use a personal computer, what communications program do you use?
 
 
+-----------------------+-----------------------------+---------+
| J. Michael Diehl ;-)  | I thought I was wrong once. | PGP KEY |
| mdiehl@triton.unm.edu |   But, I was mistaken.      |available|
| mike.diehl@fido.org   |                             | Ask Me! |
| (505) 299-2282        +-----------------------------+---------+
|                                                               |
+------"I'm just looking for the opportunity to be -------------+
|            Politically Incorrect!"   <Me>                     |
+-----If codes are outlawed, only criminals wil have codes.-----+
+----Is Big Brother in your phone?  If you don't know, ask me---+





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: marc@Athena.MIT.EDU
Date: Tue, 1 Jun 93 17:35:31 PDT
To: marc@mit.edu
Subject: [daemon@ATHENA.MIT.EDU : FYI: White House EMail]
Message-ID: <9306020112.AA09458@bill-the-cat.MIT.EDU>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain




------- Forwarded transaction

[5834]  daemon@ATHENA.MIT.EDU (Dave Farber) Commercialization & Privatization of the Internet 06/01/93 20:26 (90 lines)
Subject: FYI: White House EMail
Date: Tue,  1 Jun 1993 20:25:47 -0500
From: Dave Farber <farber@central.cis.upenn.edu>
To: com-priv@psi.com

             THE WHITE HOUSE

              Office of Presidential Correspondence

______________________________________________________________
For Immediate Release                             June 1, 1993  

     
          LETTER FROM THE PRESIDENT AND VICE PRESIDENT
      IN ANNOUNCEMENT OF WHITE HOUSE ELECTRONIC MAIL ACCESS
     
     


     Dear Friends:

     Part of our commitment to change is to keep the White House 
in step with today's changing technology.  As we move ahead into 
the twenty-first century, we must have a government that can show 
the way and lead by example.  Today, we are pleased to announce 
that for the first time in history, the White House will be 
connected to you via electronic mail.  Electronic mail will bring 
the Presidency and this Administration closer and make it more 
accessible to the people.  

     The White House will be connected to the Internet as well as 
several on-line commercial vendors, thus making us more 
accessible and more in touch with people across this country.  We 
will not be alone in this venture.  Congress is also getting 
involved, and an exciting announcement regarding electronic mail 
is expected to come from the House of Representatives tomorrow.

     Various government agencies also will be taking part in the 
near future.  Americans Communicating Electronically is a project 
developed by several government agencies to coordinate and 
improve access to the nation's educational and information assets 
and resources.  This will be done through interactive 
communications such as electronic mail, and brought to people who 
do not have ready access to a computer.
     
     However, we must be realistic about the limitations and 
expectations of the White House electronic mail system.  This 
experiment is the first-ever e-mail project done on such a large 
scale.  As we work to reinvent government and streamline our 
processes, the e-mail project can help to put us on the leading 
edge of progress.  

     Initially, your e-mail message will be read and receipt 
immediately acknowledged.  A careful count will be taken on the 
number received as well as the subject of each message.  However, 
the White House is not yet capable of sending back a tailored 
response via electronic mail.  We are hoping this will happen by 
the end of the year.

     A number of response-based programs which allow technology 
to help us read your message more effectively, and, eventually 
respond to you electronically in a timely fashion will be tried 
out as well.  These programs will change periodically as we 
experiment with the best way to handle electronic mail from the 
public.  Since this has never been tried before, it is important 
to allow for some flexibility in the system in these first 
stages.  We welcome your suggestions.

     This is an historic moment in the White House and we look 
forward to your participation and enthusiasm for this milestone 
event.  We eagerly anticipate the day when electronic mail from 
the public is an integral and normal part of the White House 
communications system.



          President Clinton        Vice President Gore
     	  
     PRESIDENT@WHITEHOUSE.GOV      VICE.PRESIDENT@WHITEHOUSE.GOV


                               ###



------- End of Forwarded Message


------ End of Forwarded Message


--[5834]--

------- End forwarded transaction




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: J. Michael Diehl <mdiehl@triton.unm.edu>
Date: Tue, 1 Jun 93 19:35:53 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: WH email petition.
Message-ID: <9306020313.AA20120@triton.unm.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


In light of the White House getting on the net, how effective do you all think
an electronic petition, about the BigBrotherChip, would be?  Do you think that
they would listen?  Do you think that, perhapse, we would simply be put on a 
list of "trouble makers?"  I was thinking of writting a petition and 
distributing it in every way I can think of, and encouraging people to send it
to the White House.  Any comments?  
+-----------------------+-----------------------------+---------+
| J. Michael Diehl ;-)  | I thought I was wrong once. | PGP KEY |
| mdiehl@triton.unm.edu |   But, I was mistaken.      |available|
| mike.diehl@fido.org   |                             | Ask Me! |
| (505) 299-2282        +-----------------------------+---------+
|                                                               |
+------"I'm just looking for the opportunity to be -------------+
|            Politically Incorrect!"   <Me>                     |
+-----If codes are outlawed, only criminals wil have codes.-----+
+----Is Big Brother in your phone?  If you don't know, ask me---+





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: fergp@sytex.com (Paul Ferguson)
Date: Tue, 1 Jun 93 18:14:34 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Cypherpunks do what?
Message-ID: <7NTH5B1w165w@sytex.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
 
 
I'm all for cypherpunk code-writing; I'm all for crypto for the
masses. In fact, I'm working it on a real-time basis, boys and girls.
 
Somehow, I feel a bit slighted, and it goes a little beyond myself, if
it need be known. I'm really not stupid enough to squeak without
provocation. :-)
 
I'd like to, additionally, see a sub-paragraph in the FAQ concerning
non-code-writing exploits, such as the tedious task of accosting
politicos. Is this not a desired activity?
 
I shudder to think that cypherpunks would corner themselves in a
manner which would exclude political maneuvers. IMHO, any cypherpunk
who would close themselves off from political fire is either brilliant
or idiotic, dependent upon method or mentality.
 
Me -- I'll take the questionable route; I would rather get the answers
I seek, sow the seeds of incongruity and ask questions of pertinent
people.
 
I'm asking that Eric Raymond add to "What do Cypherpunks do?" lineage,
"Cypherpunks also do a lot of monkey-wrench work."
 
We also run political gauntlets. We also draw attention, while other
projects are accomplished. We also encourage other politico brethren
of internationalities to join us in our struggle for electronic and
cryptographic independence.
 
We also interface with those turkeys on capitol hill (non-caps).
 
Cypherpunks do more than write simple code -- we set precedence, we
deliver technology.
 
Cheers.
 
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.2
 
iQCVAgUBLAwBGpRLcZSdHMBNAQHGIQP/YxBKfkjehoJawjExagITkr7emoEp3eMq
wnj2Vp54dh8C8wfNdf+ovbT8siOfIT135ucLZQLDifLqp/iUgpnwk80Ur0427WSP
Leb/UmLDm8HNO3gLyjDZ4YeLH++/qBiFb3Ej2+6ACyMc4wIUCXwKLnp1Ov3+E9vY
3Tjb25WVtXQ=
=pLmj
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

Paul Ferguson               |  The future is now.
Network Integrator          |  History will tell the tale;
Centreville, Virginia USA   |  We must endure and struggle
fergp@sytex.com             |  to shape it.
 
          Stop the Wiretap (Clipper/Capstone) Chip.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Eric Hughes <hughes@soda.berkeley.edu>
Date: Tue, 1 Jun 93 20:58:31 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Work the work!
In-Reply-To: <64VH5B1w165w@sytex.com>
Message-ID: <9306020432.AA20624@soda.berkeley.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Paul, you of all people don't need to feel slighted when I urge people
to do something, anything, about the wiretap chips.  Therefore, let me
rephrase my exhortation to the list at large.

If you are doing something, continue.  If you are not, start.

The particulars of what one does are not so nearly important to me as
that one does something.  Anyone who understands at least one tenth of
this list understands more than your average reporter.  While I would
like all the details to be perfectly accurate everywhere, this is not
going to happen.  Even if you don't feel like you are an expert, you
are more expert than most.  With the aid of the documents in the ftp
site, and a few hours time, you can become even more expert.

> Is there something going on with the EFF that we should know about?

The EFF is going to be involved with the cryptography issue.  More
than that and I defer to John Gilmore, who is on the EFF board and
this list and who can speak more authoritatively than I.

>I know what you
>mean, however, many of the crypto-warriors which may follow do not. It
>may be a good idea to _now_ place a broad policy statement.

Here is my own very short version of my policy toward the wiretap
chips:

"The government has no right to restrict my use of cryptography in any
way.  They may not forbid me to use whatever ciphers I may like, nor
may they require me to use any that I do not like."

The hypothetical backdoor in clipper is a charlatan's issue by
comparison, as is discussion of how to make a key escrow system
'work.'  Do not be suckered into talking about an issue that is not
important.  If someone want to talk about potential back doors, refuse
to speculate.  The existence of a front door (key escrow) make back
door issues pale in comparison.  

If someone wants to talk about how key escrow works, refuse to
elaborate.  Saying that this particular key escrow system is bad has a
large measure of complicity in saying that escrow systems in general
are OK.  Always argue that this particular key escrow system is bad
because it is a key escrow system, not because it has procedural
flaws.

This right issue is that the government has no right to my private
communications.  Every other issue is the wrong issue and detracts
from this central one.  If we defeat one particular system without
defeating all other possible such systems at the same time, we have
not won at all; we have delayed the time of reckoning.

Trenchantly yours,

Eric




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: smb@research.att.com
Date: Tue, 1 Jun 93 18:32:28 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: [daemon@ATHENA.MIT.EDU : FYI: White House EMail]
Message-ID: <9306020132.AA18372@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Glad to hear the White House in on the net, but where's the PEM
certificate for those addressses?





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Eric Hughes <hughes@soda.berkeley.edu>
Date: Tue, 1 Jun 93 21:35:07 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: "Newsweek" Article on Clipper and Encryption
In-Reply-To: <9306020156.AA27555@netcom.netcom.com>
Message-ID: <9306020508.AA23195@soda.berkeley.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I got a call one week ago today (Tuesday May 25th) from Josh Ramo at
the science desk at Newsweek.  I spoke to him for about an hour on the
technicalities and politics of encryption.  He was to my pleasant
surprise quite able to follow a telephone description of how
Diffie-Hellman key exchange works (!) and was quite conducive to my
explanation of some of the less public aspects of the clipper project.

I think we got extremely good coverage in this article.  Here are some
of the aspects involved.

-- Josh mentioned that he had Dorothy Denning on his list of people to
call.  She did not get quoted; I did.  There's significance to that.

-- The pro-crypto quote came first.  Kammer's quote, on technical
matters, not political ones, came in the middle.  The scary ominous
'mandatory standard' quote, from NIST, came last.

-- They did not replay the White House line that skipjack is so much
harder to crack than DES.  I convinced Josh that by iterating DES, the
pracatical security of the underlying ciphers was the same, i.e.
impenetrable.  Thus, no propagation of half-truths.

-- The sub-headline is against false cryptography.

-- The phrase "civil libertarians and corporations" was used, implying
a united front across liberal/conservative lines against this
proposal.  This phrase was extremely clever on their behalf to avoid
specifically mentioning partisan politics.

-- The NSA is protrayed as demanding and coercive.  First they'll deny
government contracts and export licenses, and if that doesn't work,
they'll outlaw it.

-- Cellular phone are touted as insecure, implying that something
ought to be done about that.

-- The sidebar has an example of cryptography four millenia old;
that's respectable.

-- The article does not play up the escrow aspects of the wiretap
chip.  Their simplification, that the government has your key, attains
the root issue without confusion.

-- They mention that the keys wil have to be stored on computers, and
are thus vulnerable.  This a point I made specifically to Josh, and
they took my example of foreign intelligence and *expanded* on it.

--They mention that NIST worked on the algorithm with the NSA.

All in all, I don't think we could have hoped for better.  There's
just about nothing flattering said about the wiretap chip, and plenty
of things against it.  The article is about as anti-Clipper as you
might expect given that Newsweek does not want to appear too partisan
one way or another.

Eric




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: fergp@sytex.com (Paul Ferguson)
Date: Tue, 1 Jun 93 19:10:34 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Work the work!
Message-ID: <64VH5B1w165w@sytex.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
 
On Tue, 1 Jun 93 09:56:45 -0700,
 Eric Hughes <uunet!soda.berkeley.edu!hughes> wrote -
 
> We are trying to build a sandbox, and the government is trying to
> restrict the use of sand.
 
 We are indeed doing just this. Although the small minority of us
 compu-professionals are writing code, flailing congressmen, etc., it
 takes more than what is currently being acknowledged to get things
 changed. I will not, however, discontinue my diatribe with my elected
 representatives on the topic of our electronic rights to privacy
 under the first and fourth amendments. (I'm having too much fun doing
 something that I seriously, and perhaps foolishly,  believe in.) Is
 there something going on with the EFF that we should know about?
 
> That said, I also urge those who are writing code to continue.  To
> those of you not writing code, however, I say start talking to your
> friends and neighbors and communities and newspapers.
 
> Now.
 
We are working on it. A vote of confidence towards crypto-freedom.
Are we east-coast-niks welcome in this process? Is policy being drawn
by a few EFF persona without consultation of the masses?
 
Eric, before you say "Now,", you'd best detail us. I know what you
mean, however, many of the crypto-warriors which may follow do not. It
may be a good idea to _now_ place a broad policy statement.
 
Cheers.
 
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.2
 
iQCVAgUBLAwNs5RLcZSdHMBNAQFlRAP7BSpktDz4URB0rhWQ5mxb2UcJqEZHdp+2
It+Whxh1MzYTLFi0SfvZRQYjPEZO1wN2ac8bQyl2zOpi7viAg8X+AfEZACWooqUQ
y8Dyddup15MNj/p53fJQhzKYaX4K4xD2h6WTWO1X8Q2SPHo0WV48Hu+uO8nyeoqD
PJj0d/IHvg4=
=6GvE
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

Paul Ferguson               |  The future is now.
Network Integrator          |  History will tell the tale;
Centreville, Virginia USA   |  We must endure and struggle
fergp@sytex.com             |  to shape it.
 
          Stop the Wiretap (Clipper/Capstone) Chip.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: greg@ideath.goldenbear.com (Greg Broiles)
Date: Tue, 1 Jun 93 22:14:46 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Term software development/design
Message-ID: <5y6H5B1w164w@ideath.goldenbear.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

Re development of crypto term software for PC and/or Unix platform(s):

It seems like there are three general ways to approach this problem:

1.      Offline reader style - ala QuickMail and its cronies - popular with
        DOS BBS's.
2.      Waffle/UUPC style.
3.      As an actual term program, but with an intelligent scrollback
        buffer/ASCII send module added.

I have, several times, wished for a "guerilla offline reader" - a reader to
collect all of the messages in all of the newsgroups (from my .newsrc file)
that I read on some arbitrary Unix box, collect them into a file, compress
it, and send them to my PC with Zmodem, so that I can browse at my leisure.
Waffle/UUPC and a newsfeed is a better solution, but requires the
cooperation of one's local sysadmin, who isn't necessarily interested in
feeding someone news at 2400 bps. The ironic thing is that they don't care
if you spend 4 hrs/day using that modem to read news - they just don't want
you to tie it up for 45 mins with a small newsfeed. (Yes, there is the
spool directory problem - and no, I don't think a flamewar about admins is
useful here.)

If we/I did something like this - it ought to be possible to
do it in a shell script, or shell script + awk - and incorporated the
means to receive/unpack a reply packet - I think it might be a good thing.
The basic idea is to expand the access one's got via a networked Unix box
to one's home machine, without necessarily requiring the permission or
knowledge of local sysadmins.

(No, I am not unfamiliar with the plight or circumstances of an arbitrary
Unix sysadmin. I administrate a small system now, have been in charge of
larger ones in the past, and have some experience with users doing peculiar
and squirrely stuff with one's machine. :) I also don't think that what
I'm proposing breaks either the letter or the intent of a reasonable
security policy - but it is the sort of thing to make a control freak
sysadmin go nuts.)

Seems like the best way to implement the term program would be to add
some intelligence to the "scrollback" (a buffer that holds the last 'n'
lines of text appearing on the screen) which would allow it to find,
extract, and process the --- BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE --- bits. The other
side of this would be a process which would, given the name of a file
on disk (or an editor buffer) locally, process it (sign,encrypt,whatever)
and upload the results. This would be interesting, but I dunno if we'd
be able to write something nice enough to become as widespread as Telix,
Procomm, or whatever. (I also wonder if it's possible to add hooks to
Telix/Procomm to do similar stuff.) 

For what it's worth, I have experience in C, and have fooled around with
little assembly programs to read/write the PC's serial port on an
interrupt-driven basis. (The use of a FOSSIL driver seems intelligent here,
though.) I have written a PGP keyserver to run as an attachment to a
DOS Waffle system, and intend to expand and improve that if I can get some
free time. I'm interested in working on this stuff but am less interested in
re-inventing any wheels.


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.2

iQCVAgUBLAw+f33YhjZY3fMNAQHdTAQAr9sk4WdPxC/Bz8i5tEZ/ammwaUt6rEtL
13wMPT+L9JXGrgMNoey6EGjmrHXH9C0DweXGhPYIzq9U8EW9xmsacwEPets+sVJv
T90gM/+aeQkixgRb93FIqIpCnRVzF9lQcin0v4e69s6mMk0y6WTQMEJkDXbKvKTM
lCK6WBakWws=
=QCej
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

--
Greg Broiles                            greg@goldenbear.com
Golden Bear Computer Consulting         +1 503 465 0325
Box 12005 Eugene OR 97440               BBS: +1 503 687 7764




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: greg@ideath.goldenbear.com (Greg Broiles)
Date: Tue, 1 Jun 93 23:49:54 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: EFF, AT&T, Clipper, and $
Message-ID: <X08H5B1w164w@ideath.goldenbear.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Eric Hughes writes:

> The EFF is going to be involved with the cryptography issue.  More
> than that and I defer to John Gilmore, who is on the EFF board and
> this list and who can speak more authoritatively than I.

The 5/24/93 issue of "The New Republic" has a (largely uninteresting)
cover story about Mitch Kapor and the EFF. One interesting tidbit 
gleaned from that article, however, was that AT&T has contributed 
money to the EFF. I am particularly curious to see how AT&T and the EFF
will deal with each other with respect to the Clipper chip, and
the politics around that.

If anyone knows anything more about this, I'd love to hear it.

--
Greg Broiles                            greg@goldenbear.com
Golden Bear Computer Consulting         +1 503 465 0325
Box 12005 Eugene OR 97440               BBS: +1 503 687 7764




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: nobody@soda.berkeley.edu
Date: Tue, 1 Jun 93 23:30:32 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Software infrastructure
Message-ID: <9306020704.AA01148@soda.berkeley.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

Subject: Software infrastructure

I like Eric's idea of a terminal program which can support encryption
easily.  Here are some thoughts.

As Eric indicates, the issue is not so much building encryption into the
program but rather of having _hooks_ by which extra functionality can be
added.  Encryption should be just one capability.  Another might be to
automatically drop into a stand-alone zmodem package like dsz or gsz
so we don't have to re-implement zmodem ourselves.

We had some related discussion on this last year when we were talking
about the "crypto dongle".  This was going to be a black box which
would sit on the serial line between your PC and modem (or terminal and
host computer) and would do encryption/decryption as the characters
passed through it.

Doing it in the terminal program, I could envision a hook which watched
constantly for particular strings to be received from the host, like
"-----BEGIN PGP MESSAGE-----".  Several such watchdogs could be active
at once.  When one of them matches, it fires off a program.  Or perhaps
it just starts logging the incoming data to a file, and when it matches
another string it fires a program.  A simple scripting language could
control these activities.

The result would be that when you receive an encrypted message, you
just list it out to your terminal and then, automatically, PGP fires up
and asks you for your pass phrase (unless you SET it ahead of time in
the PC's environment).  It then displays the message for you.

This simple model has several deficiencies.  When I log into a Unix system,
or Compuserve, or Portal's "Online" service, and read my mail, it is often
shown to me a page at a time.  This is so that I can read long messages
more easily.  Then after each message I can delete it, save it, reply to
it, etc.  If I do reply or if I want to create a new message it will drop
me into a text editor to compose the message.

The result is that the mail program you are running on the host computer
may do some munging on the PGP message, like inserting "Press RETURN for
next page" or perhaps some terminal control characters.  These would have
to be filtered out before PGP could run on the file, or you would have to
be able to suppress them when you read this message.

Also, assuming we could capture the message and run PGP on it automatically,
the resulting decrypted message will have to be saved and given a file
name.  Then if the user wants to reply to it he is going to have to leave
his terminal and run an editor.  (At least, that's what I have to do now.)

Plus, this only deals with the message-receiving problem, not the sending
problem.

I'm not sure what the solution is.  Maybe the PC program needs to be more
than a terminal program, and become more of a whole mail-processing
program.  Maybe you should just download your mail file en masse from the
host to your PC, pre-process it to replace (in place) the incoming encrypted
messages with plaintext versions (annotated to show validated signatures),
then run a PC program which will display one message at a time, let you
reply, save, etc.  This way the decryptions are done before you even look
at the mail file and incoming encrypted mail is treated on a first class
basis (the same as other mail).

Then for outgoing mail you'd like to be able to drop into a user-defined
editor which is run with a command line causing his file to be saved to
some temp file name.  Then we can automatically encrypt the outgoing mail
for him based on the destination, add a remailer chain if requested, etc.  
Then he gives a command and all his replies and new mail are uploaded and
sent.

This would be pretty tough to do since there are so many different ways
of sending and receiving mail on host computers.  This would again have
to be a customizable part of the program, where we could provide modules
to deal with the common cases of Unix running "mail", elm, mh, etc., and
perhaps some of the commercial services.  BBS's would ideally be handled
as well.  Hackers could contribute scripts for supporting their favorite
mail system.

I don't know anything about SLIP, or POP, or any other fancy ways of
hooking a PC up to a workstation.  I just use it as a terminal.  Would
these other protocols help solve the problems above, problems of how
we marry an encryption program which must run on the PC with mail-handling
programs which run on another computer?

Hal Finney
74076.1041@compuserve.com

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.2

iQCVAgUBLAwkEagTA69YIUw3AQEuxQQAjeC/gwPHkLQZ0IladVRxiRdgARdE7ziu
WWdmsHpaZ2tlq8wAXpSFbMpSZ3MS1U1TT/c/wB2DJOCuWkhs2y6WYoZiqrHz3hjA
JyBSkpM1F3dYcZ8MchrjLZsur9KwXe0mIvM7VMu2Fdq+sMMgNwzEzqJoWhulAsnl
weuBaeOjv7k=
=zEUv
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: RYAN Alan Porter <ryan@rtfm.mlb.fl.us>
Date: Tue, 1 Jun 93 21:34:12 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: CryptoStacker
Message-ID: <Pine.3.03.9306020004.A6908-c100000@rtfm>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Thanks for all of the responses on my questions concerning the CryptoStacker
idea.  I am kind of sick of talking about it though, and so I went out
today and did some research on drivers and such.

I am planning to create a software implementation of a PGP driver starting
maybe tomorrow (I am being payed real dollars to write other code at the
moment) for on-the-fly HD encryption.  I haven't quite figured out how to
create a commercially distrubutable system yet, but there really is no
point sitting around arguing about this and that detail until somebody
actually goes out and tries it...

I have a feeling that this version will be slow as balls without hardware
support, but that's not really the problem, is it?  The main focus that I
have right now is making the thing work.

There have been lots of neat suggestions about multiple layers and
suchlike tooalso, which are all fine and dandy, but they kind of missed
the point: mainly what I am interested in is preventing access to the data
on my HD by anyone but ME, screw LANs and multi-user problems and all of
that, I just want to create a system whereby if the Secret Service busts
down my door tomorrow while I am not here to throw the drive across the
room, they will never be able to fetch out any incriminating evidence by
picking apart my system in some lab somewhere.  I can also see the
advantage of a business worrying about spying, or even government agencies
(wouldn't that be ironic) worrying about security and considering networks
insecure.

Anyway, we can add bells and whistles like network support and multiple
layers and suchlike after we figure out how to get the basic engine to
work, right?

I have also seen everyone suggesting DES instead of PGP.  I suppose that
would really be a great idea for speed and suchlike, for some reason I was
kind of attached to the whole public key idea, but I suppose that would be
kind of close-to-worthless in this context, wouldn't it?

I suppose we are to the point where I can use some actual technical
advice, no need to reinvent the wheel, right?  If anyone has any
information of the overall architecture of projects like Stacker or
DoubleStor, I would appreciate the input.  I have used both in the past
and I am kind of leaning toward a system like DoubleStor (which maintains 
directory structures and such, but compresses each file in place) for
simplicity, but I am kind of hesitant to leave even a hint of the overall
structure of the disk laying around for prying eyes.  Trouble is, I don't
have much experience screwing around with the FAT and such so I wouldn't
want to do anything so bold as munching the entire disk into a single file
and suchlike.  Any ideas?


-Ryan
the Bit Wallah









From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: RYAN Alan Porter <ryan@rtfm.mlb.fl.us>
Date: Tue, 1 Jun 93 21:34:13 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Clipper
Message-ID: <Pine.3.03.9306020009.B6908-c100000@rtfm>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Just out of curiosity, does anyone on the cypherpunks list posess the
technical skills that would be necessary to begin a project of hacking out
a pin compatible version of the Clipper that didn't have the backdoors
once the chip is out, a la AMD and CYRIX?

If not, it would seem that we need to get some hardware geeks involved, as
well as all of these software people around here, since crypto issues are
moving more and more into the hardware, VLSI playing field.

("Cypherpunks write code.... and microcode"??)

It would seem that one of the most direct ways to attack Clipper would be
to pull another PGP, just create a chip that acts just like one, but a
chip that we understand and we designed.

There would be totally different problems involved, the Feds could much
more easily seize chip production facilities, design would be more
difficult, free distribution would be more difficult...

I think that it would be quite possible, however.  I mean, if an attack is
truly to be made on the Clipper, writing letters to feds certainly won't
help, the only thing that will help is making their proposal ineffective
and uneconomical.

Think about it, if a truly secure chip existed, it's sale would be almost
certain; all of the 'criminals' that the feds are so afraid of would be
sure to find us and buy one, not to mention every self respecting
cypherpunk and cyberpunk in the universe, law enforcement agencies might
even get into buying black market chips to protect themselves from escrow
leaks...

Also, if all of these shady types that the feds are using for their
tactical arguments have truly secure chips anyway, all of the
aformentioned arguments are rendered moot.

So I guess the really important question is: does anybody know how to
reverse engineer a chip and build a duplicate, pin-compatible device from
the ground up while hiding from the feds the whole time and still managing
to make a living?

I guess that's a pretty rough question, but hey, this is war, right?


-Ryan
the Bit Wallah








From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: nobody@soda.berkeley.edu
Date: Wed, 2 Jun 93 00:10:53 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Another chaining utility
Message-ID: <9306020744.AA02666@soda.berkeley.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I am working on a utility I call "chain" which is inspired by
Karl Barrus's hopmail and related scripts.  I am sending this message
with the command:

chain -m -s "Another chaining utility" cypherpunks@toad.com caltech jarthur extropia soda

The "-m" means for chain to pipe its output into sendmail so that it
is actually sent (otherwise it just writes to standard out and you
have to arrange to mail it on your own).  The "-s" sets the subject
for the last leg of the message to the following arg.  Then comes the
destination address, then a list of remailer nicknames, which are just
substrings of the remailers, read from an initialization file.  This
message is passing through four remailers.

The "-m" feature is implemented only on Unix systems.  On DOS you
always get the output in a file and then send that however you
normally would.

I also have a "-e" switch which encrypts the message using a public
key looked up by the destination address.  Cypherpunks doesn't have a
public key so that's not appropriate here.  But if I wanted to send
an encrypted note to, say, Phil Zimmermann, I could just do:

chain -em prz@sage.cgd.ucar.edu portal mead
Hi, Phil, give me a call when you have a chance -- Hal
^D

and it would go via the Portal and Mead remailers, encrypted at each
step, and finally to Phil, encrypted with his public key.  Pretty
easy.

I couldn't get Karl's hopmail.bat to run on my PC (not enough environment
space?) so I wrote this in C and it works OK.

I'll be sending the code to Eric to be archived in a few days.  If
anyone has any wish lists for features I will be glad to try adding
them.

(I am composing this on a Unix system in order to demonstrate the -m
switch, so I can't cleartext sign as I normally would.  I am in the vi
editor and I am sending the message with "1G!G", which tells vi to
pipe the whole file into a command, followed by the "chain" command
line above, verbatim.  That's all there is to it.)

Hal Finney
74076.1041@compuserve.com




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Stanton McCandlish <anton@hydra.unm.edu>
Date: Tue, 1 Jun 93 23:10:13 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Term software development/design
In-Reply-To: <5y6H5B1w164w@ideath.goldenbear.com>
Message-ID: <9306020647.AA20551@hydra.unm.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


All of these ideas (on new term programs for grabbing news, and for
getting PGP sigs from scrollback, etc etc) are all very interesting and
worthy of more work.  However, I think the BEST way to do this, is to
convince Mustang Software (or whoever) to add hooks for PGP or other
encryption packages, and then the rest should soon follow. Most users
WILL NOT quit using QModem (or whatever) for a new term program that has
nothing special but crypto.  BUT if you can get crypto into the popular
packages, then lots of users WILL use it since well it's THERE, and easy
to get to and they don't have to switch software. 

As for the creation of new term programs, I'd have to say making it RELY
on a FOSSIL driver is a BAD idea.  FOSSILs are becoming less useful and
needed over time.  Almost NO new door software uses FOSSILs, because
companies like Compaq are making more-compatible machines with less
proprietary garbage in them.  FOSSIL support that is OPTIONAL would be
very nice, for those using old or wierd machines that can't handle
standard comm routines, but forcing FOSSIL (or anything else) on anyone
is a bad idea in my opinion. 

Also, those into Fido-tech netting should try to get the developers of
FrontDoor, InterMail, D'Bridge, Opus, Maximus, VBBS, BinkleyTerm, etc to
add support for the ^ENC klugeline (an addition to the FTSC-standard Fido
mail headers, that notifies mailer software that the message is
encrypted, so it can be properly processed).  Without this the Fido
SecureMail system is going to remain minor and ignored.  With it,
cryptomail could fast become the norm in Fido NetMail.  For this corner or
cyberspace direct support for this sort of thing could be the "make or
break" for whether crypto becomes accepted.

Just some thoughts.
-- 
        When marriage is outlawed only outlaws will be inlaws!
Stanton McCandlish,  SysOp:  Noise in the Void DataCenter Library BBS
Internet anton@hydra.unm.edu     IndraNet: 369:1/1      FidoNet: 1:301/2     
Snail: 1811-B Coal Pl. SE, Albuquerque, New Mexico 87108 USA
Data phone: +1-505-246-8515 (24hr, 1200-14400 v32bis, N-8-1)
Vox phone:  +1-505-247-3402 (bps rate varies, depends on if you woke me up...:)




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: J. Michael Diehl <mdiehl@triton.unm.edu>
Date: Tue, 1 Jun 93 23:12:47 PDT
To: hughes@soda.berkeley.edu (Eric Hughes)
Subject: Re: WH email petition.
In-Reply-To: <9306020408.AA19558@soda.berkeley.edu>
Message-ID: <9306020649.AA28007@triton.unm.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> It appears that they are going to count responses and make totals pro
> and con any particular issue that people write about.  Thus while the
> particulars of the petition don't really matter, the basic statements
> against restrictions on encryption technology do.
> 
> I also heard no mention that they were going to do any kind of sorting
> by person or email address.  Thus it appears that you get to vote
> early and often in this public opinion poll.

Do you think they'd TELL you that they were putting people on lists?  Not 
OUR government....
+-----------------------+-----------------------------+---------+
| J. Michael Diehl ;-)  | I thought I was wrong once. | PGP KEY |
| mdiehl@triton.unm.edu |   But, I was mistaken.      |available|
| mike.diehl@fido.org   |                             | Ask Me! |
| (505) 299-2282        +-----------------------------+---------+
|                                                               |
+------"I'm just looking for the opportunity to be -------------+
|            Politically Incorrect!"   <Me>                     |
+-----If codes are outlawed, only criminals wil have codes.-----+
+----Is Big Brother in your phone?  If you don't know, ask me---+




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: ""L. Detweiler"" <ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Date: Tue, 1 Jun 93 23:24:34 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: whistle for Whistleblowing!
Message-ID: <9306020701.AA03726@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>A quick update: Telecom Finland finally delivered. My uncontrolled,
>no-AUP IP connection via EUnet (Copenhagen-Amsterdam-Alternet) went
>operational yesterday. The new 486 box also arrived. Expected to go
>into 100% service this weekend!

Oh, the bright sun is shining through! This is absolutely perfect timing.

I just ran rn and what did it have to report?

alt.whistleblowing not in .newsrc -- Add unsubscribed?

Cypherpunks, alt.whistleblowing has been created!  Special thanks to
Miron Cuperman, a First Class Grade A Cypherpunk, who took care of the
electronic paperwork on this one after reading my desperate posting(s).
(I don't understand though, at my site it didn't appear for over a week
since the control message was sent out.) If it's not at your site send
mail to your news administrator and ask if there's some kind of
conspiracy going on to prevent you from seeing it :)

I generally *don't* recommend that the Mycotronx postings be sent there
(yet), even if someone can set up an untraceable path. I talked to the
poster today and he has many plans for them that might be disrupted by
any further publicity. In fact, he told me he *accidentally* posted
them to the cypherpunks list! He thought it would just go to the
`moderator' (Eric Hughes). Explains a bit.

Watch for a FAQ to the group (possibly here first) and advertisements
in other groups.

Also: HOW TO CONTRIBUTE IMMEDIATELY. Find relevant material from any
groups you have ever visited and FORWARD IT. Make sure to be very
thorough in citing the source and background of the posting.

Let the games begin!  The doors are open! Fire away, soldiers!

p.s. If anyone wants to run an interesting and critical project, I
think that the `control' group should be monitored for message cancels
in alt.whistleblower, cancelling parties should be *exposed*, and the
cancelled postings in particular should be *preserved*.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Stop the Big Brother CHip" <pleiku!kelly@netcom.com>
Date: Tue, 1 Jun 93 17:31:39 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: No Subject
In-Reply-To: <9306011855.AA08017@toad.com>
Message-ID: <9306020109.AA01465@netcomsv.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text


      The actual server entry point could be through a cypherpunks
encrypted anonymous remailer block. that could totally conceal the entry oiint
given the proper type of remailer... as to the service posting machine...
one could maintain a net of open nntp servers by ones confederates,
one could then "forge" the posting and give an anonymous remailer block 
corresponding to the anon id... concealment and high security?
given message encryption remailers and a public key for the forging
NNTP posting mechanism I dont see many issues coming from that

    what do the rest of you thinK
... course this scheme depends on a common set of features on anon remailers...
i.e. message encryption...
    cheers
    kelly
--
Parts of this .sig borrowed with permission from T.C.May.
Perhaps it will indeed get me busted also.
..........................................................................
Kelly Goen             | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,  
kelly@netcom.com       | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
Intelligence Systems   | knowledge, reputations, information markets, 
Specialists Inc.       | black markets, face banks, data havens, dark
                       | tech, covert channels, shared secrets,
                       | alt.whistleblowers, collapse of governments.
Technical Monkeywrench | Public Key: PGP 2.2.
                       |
..........................................................................
PGP 2.2 Key available from PGP Keyservers on the Internet.

pub  1024/1BA573 1992/09/09  kelly <kelly@netcom.com>
          Key fingerprint =  EF 7A 38 99 22 84 E3 3B  90 2A DB 80 DC 65 DA 31 

STOP THE WIRETAP CHIP(Clipper Chip)!!



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: J. Michael Diehl <mdiehl@triton.unm.edu>
Date: Tue, 1 Jun 93 23:34:48 PDT
To: ryan@rtfm.mlb.fl.us (RYAN Alan Porter)
Subject: Re: WH email petition.
In-Reply-To: <Pine.3.03.9306020211.F8280-b100000@rtfm>
Message-ID: <9306020712.AA28617@triton.unm.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> A good idea, but it appears from the announcement that they are just going
> to create a database of return addresses and subject lines and sit around
> and read that instead of reading the actual messages.
> 
> In that case I would suggest a well written form letter that we could
> encourage people to forward to the address with their names on it.  That
> way after they see the same subject line 12,000 times they might get the
> slight urge to read the message going along with it.  That would be kind
> of equivalent to a petition.

YES!  I may have been unclear in my presentation, but this is what I had in 
mind!  Comments?

> Somebody good at slicking politicos like to draft a nice letter?

+-----------------------+-----------------------------+---------+
| J. Michael Diehl ;-)  | I thought I was wrong once. | PGP KEY |
| mdiehl@triton.unm.edu |   But, I was mistaken.      |available|
| mike.diehl@fido.org   |                             | Ask Me! |
| (505) 299-2282        +-----------------------------+---------+
|                                                               |
+------"I'm just looking for the opportunity to be -------------+
|            Politically Incorrect!"   <Me>                     |
+-----If codes are outlawed, only criminals wil have codes.-----+
+----Is Big Brother in your phone?  If you don't know, ask me---+




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: rclark@nyx.cs.du.edu (Robert W. F. Clark)
Date: Tue, 1 Jun 93 23:40:24 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: My letter to the President, for all the good it'll do
Message-ID: <9306020717.AA03191@nyx.cs.du.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Well, this and fifty cents will get you a cup of coffee, but
here's my letter to the Pres.

------

I oppose the Clipper chip vehemently.  As the President, or the
duly authorized representative of the President, you will understand
that I find the idea that you will monitor my communications
reprehensible and intolerable.

You have espoused a policy of covert surveillance of
American citizens of which Bush would be proud.  You, a protester
of the Vietnam War, who understands that the government can, and
should be opposed when it is wrong, should understand why privacy
is necessary to the people of any democracy, lest it cease to
be a democracy.  Nevertheless, you approved the Clipper Chip proposal,
which is the furthest step backward that even a politician could take.
Shame on you!  Even George Bush's father, Prescott Bush, who despised
and opposed Senator McCarthy's Communist witch-hunt, would loathe
such a retrogressive move!

We computer professionals, who supported your rise to power, feel
betrayed by your sudden reversal, by no means unique among your
sudden reversals.  By siding with those who would rob Americans
of those freedoms which are our inalienable right, you have betrayed
democracy and made a sham of the Bill of Rights.  

If, as a White House official suggested, criminalizing alternative,
secure encryption standards is an "option on the table," I am disgusted
by your betrayal.  You, who seemed proud to have protested an unjust
war, and should understand why protest, even anonymous protest, should
be an inalienable right, have no right even to consider this as an 
option.  

If you consider criminalizing privacy, and encryption, you have
signed over the soul of the nation to be monitored at will by the
NSA and CIA, organizations which you, at one time in your life, opposed.
Perhaps, like many Sixties rebels, you have been bought by the
government, and no longer care about the rights of the American people.
It would not be the only time this has occurred.

While I doubt that you, the President, shall read this, perhaps some
subordinate shall.  Perhaps, if the miraculous is possible, that 
subordinate shall deem this worthy of your consideration.  

While I am not used to pleading, I plead that you reconsider this
policy, which, if enacted, would doom privacy in the United States,
and turn this nation into the sort of nation that the Soviet Union
has finally decided not to be.

I beg that you consider, at least for a moment, the evil that you
may unleash.  You may be motivated by an understandable concern for
the protection of the American people from drug dealers and mobsters,
but it is not the mobsters you shall crush in supporting the Clipper
chip.  It is those eager, agile young minds who oppose the government
when it is wrong, and only wish to be able to have their voice,
without being monitored by the CIA and NSA in case that voice occasionally
is overly strident.

Thank you, Mr. President.  I hope that you have carefully studied
the holy Consitution of this nation, which you have sworn to uphold.
I fear for the consequences if you have not.

Robert W. F. Clark
440 S. Franklin St.
Bloomfield, IN 47424
Telephone # (812) 384-3465
email addresses:
clark@metal.psu.edu
rclark@nyx.cs.du.edu




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: J. Michael Diehl <mdiehl@triton.unm.edu>
Date: Tue, 1 Jun 93 23:49:17 PDT
To: anton@hydra.unm.edu (Stanton McCandlish)
Subject: Re: Term software development/design
In-Reply-To: <9306020647.AA20551@hydra.unm.edu>
Message-ID: <9306020726.AA29102@triton.unm.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> All of these ideas (on new term programs for grabbing news, and for
> getting PGP sigs from scrollback, etc etc) are all very interesting and
> worthy of more work.  However, I think the BEST way to do this, is to
> convince Mustang Software (or whoever) to add hooks for PGP or other
> encryption packages, and then the rest should soon follow. Most users
> WILL NOT quit using QModem (or whatever) for a new term program that has
> nothing special but crypto.  BUT if you can get crypto into the popular
> packages, then lots of users WILL use it since well it's THERE, and easy
> to get to and they don't have to switch software. 

Actually, I've implimented much of this in telix, using it's (C-like) script
language.  From the command line, I can type in the name of a batch file.  That
batch file starts telix, logs me in, sends any mail I have created/encrypted on
my machine, and downloads all my new mail, to be read from another batch file.
My mail reader batch file uses pgp to read my mail and presents a nice message
selection menu, too.  Totally transparent, and automated.  I'm quite prowd of
it.  The only thing to do is clean it up a bit, and impliment reply-quoting.
That should be done by the end of the week.  If any one is interested in what
I have.....ask me.

BTW, I have had a few bug reports on my pgp menu batch file for 4dos.  I will 
also have it fixed by the end of the week and will release it next week.

+-----------------------+-----------------------------+---------+
| J. Michael Diehl ;-)  | I thought I was wrong once. | PGP KEY |
| mdiehl@triton.unm.edu |   But, I was mistaken.      |available|
| mike.diehl@fido.org   |                             | Ask Me! |
| (505) 299-2282        +-----------------------------+---------+
|                                                               |
+------"I'm just looking for the opportunity to be -------------+
|            Politically Incorrect!"   <Me>                     |
+-----If codes are outlawed, only criminals wil have codes.-----+
+----Is Big Brother in your phone?  If you don't know, ask me---+




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: J. Michael Diehl <mdiehl@triton.unm.edu>
Date: Wed, 2 Jun 93 00:01:22 PDT
To: nobody@soda.berkeley.edu
Subject: Re: Software infrastructure
In-Reply-To: <9306020704.AA01148@soda.berkeley.edu>
Message-ID: <9306020738.AA29392@triton.unm.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> Subject: Software infrastructure

...other good stuff deleted...I read mail at 2400B.

> The result would be that when you receive an encrypted message, you
> just list it out to your terminal and then, automatically, PGP fires up
> and asks you for your pass phrase (unless you SET it ahead of time in
> the PC's environment).  It then displays the message for you.
> 
> This simple model has several deficiencies.  When I log into a Unix system,
> or Compuserve, or Portal's "Online" service, and read my mail, it is often
> shown to me a page at a time.  This is so that I can read long messages
> more easily.  Then after each message I can delete it, save it, reply to
> it, etc.  If I do reply or if I want to create a new message it will drop
> me into a text editor to compose the message.
> 
> The result is that the mail program you are running on the host computer
> may do some munging on the PGP message, like inserting "Press RETURN for
> next page" or perhaps some terminal control characters.  These would have
> to be filtered out before PGP could run on the file, or you would have to
> be able to suppress them when you read this message.

If we are talking about an off-line reader, this is solved by a trivial filter
routine.  If you want to do this on-line, well it might take time.

> Also, assuming we could capture the message and run PGP on it automatically,
> the resulting decrypted message will have to be saved and given a file
> name.  Then if the user wants to reply to it he is going to have to leave
> his terminal and run an editor.  (At least, that's what I have to do now.)

Why save the plaintext?  I keep it in cyphertext and decrypt it on demand.  And
when I want to reply, then I decrypt it, quote it and have the user edit that 
file, which will presumably be re-encrypted.

> Plus, this only deals with the message-receiving problem, not the sending
> problem.

Actually, these are the same problems in different clothes.
> 
> I'm not sure what the solution is.  Maybe the PC program needs to be more
> than a terminal program, and become more of a whole mail-processing
> program.  Maybe you should just download your mail file en masse from the
> host to your PC, pre-process it to replace (in place) the incoming encrypted
> messages with plaintext versions (annotated to show validated signatures),
> then run a PC program which will display one message at a time, let you
> reply, save, etc.  This way the decryptions are done before you even look
> at the mail file and incoming encrypted mail is treated on a first class
> basis (the same as other mail).
> 
> Then for outgoing mail you'd like to be able to drop into a user-defined
> editor which is run with a command line causing his file to be saved to
> some temp file name.  Then we can automatically encrypt the outgoing mail
> for him based on the destination, add a remailer chain if requested, etc.  
> Then he gives a command and all his replies and new mail are uploaded and
> sent.

These last 2 paragraphs describe almost exactly what my scripts do!

> This would be pretty tough to do since there are so many different ways
> of sending and receiving mail on host computers.  This would again have
> to be a customizable part of the program, where we could provide modules
> to deal with the common cases of Unix running "mail", elm, mh, etc., and
> perhaps some of the commercial services.  BBS's would ideally be handled
> as well.  Hackers could contribute scripts for supporting their favorite
> mail system.

I find that I need to be a bit more modular with my scripts so that I can call
a different module depending on which type of system I'm on...Working on it at
this moment.

+-----------------------+-----------------------------+---------+
| J. Michael Diehl ;-)  | I thought I was wrong once. | PGP KEY |
| mdiehl@triton.unm.edu |   But, I was mistaken.      |available|
| mike.diehl@fido.org   |                             | Ask Me! |
| (505) 299-2282        +-----------------------------+---------+
|                                                               |
+------"I'm just looking for the opportunity to be -------------+
|            Politically Incorrect!"   <Me>                     |
+-----If codes are outlawed, only criminals wil have codes.-----+
+----Is Big Brother in your phone?  If you don't know, ask me---+




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: smb@research.att.com
Date: Tue, 1 Jun 93 22:39:22 PDT
To: "J. Michael Diehl" <mdiehl@triton.unm.edu>
Subject: Re: WH email petition.
Message-ID: <9306020539.AA25821@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


	 In light of the White House getting on the net, how effective
	 do you all think an electronic petition, about the
	 BigBrotherChip, would be?  Do you think that they would
	 listen?  Do you think that, perhapse, we would simply be put
	 on a list of "trouble makers?"  I was thinking of writting a
	 petition and distributing it in every way I can think of, and
	 encouraging people to send it to the White House.  Any
	 comments?

In general, petitions are a notoriously ineffective way to lobby.
That's doubly so for email versions, for obvious reasons.  Even
without that problem, an electronic petition will (rightly) be ignored
on the grounds that it represents the opinions of a small elite
minority.  With signatures collected in the streets and shopping malls
of America, you have at least some chance of reaching a cross-section
of people.  But on the net?  (And even if I'm wrong about the net's
population, would they know it?)

As for a trouble-maker list -- not likely.  Apart from the political
hell there'd be to pay if word ever leaked (the right to complain to
the government is quite explicit in the Constitution, and is legally
far stronger than the still-controversial right to privacy (remember
Bork?)), I haven't seen any evidence that broad-scale ``enemies lists''
have been collected since Nixon's day.  That may, of course, mean
they've just gotten smarter about how they do it...  Based on my past
experience, your name will be collected -- but just as a person
interested in certain issues, so that you can be solicited for funds
on certain issues.

		--Steve Bellovin




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Stanton McCandlish <anton@hydra.unm.edu>
Date: Wed, 2 Jun 93 01:06:35 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: GIMME YOUR GOODIES!
Message-ID: <9306020843.AA25624@hydra.unm.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


NitV is still hoarding all sorts of PGP utils for any and all platforms,
mail systems, and potential uses.  If you make anything new, please send
it along (uu it, or upload it to the board, or whatever).  I get QUITE a
few calls for such material (suprisingly much of the Unix stuff is
downloaded, and long distance at that, so I guess there is a lot of value
in having a BBS-based, multi-platform crypto-tools site.)  I MUCH prefer
to get the new material direct from the author, so please do send it!!
Help spread crypto to the OtherNets!

 -- 
        When marriage is outlawed only outlaws will be inlaws!
Stanton McCandlish,  SysOp:  Noise in the Void DataCenter Library BBS
Internet anton@hydra.unm.edu     IndraNet: 369:1/1      FidoNet: 1:301/2     
Snail: 1811-B Coal Pl. SE, Albuquerque, New Mexico 87108 USA
Data phone: +1-505-246-8515 (24hr, 1200-14400 v32bis, N-8-1)
Vox phone:  +1-505-247-3402 (bps rate varies, depends on if you woke me up...:)




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: RYAN Alan Porter <ryan@rtfm.mlb.fl.us>
Date: Tue, 1 Jun 93 23:16:39 PDT
To: "J. Michael Diehl" <mdiehl@triton.unm.edu>
Subject: Re: WH email petition.
In-Reply-To: <9306020313.AA20120@triton.unm.edu>
Message-ID: <Pine.3.03.9306020211.F8280-b100000@rtfm>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain




On Tue, 1 Jun 1993, J. Michael Diehl wrote:

> In light of the White House getting on the net, how effective do you all think
> an electronic petition, about the BigBrotherChip, would be?  Do you think that
> they would listen?  Do you think that, perhapse, we would simply be put on a 
> list of "trouble makers?"  I was thinking of writting a petition and 
> distributing it in every way I can think of, and encouraging people to send it
> to the White House.  Any comments?  


A good idea, but it appears from the announcement that they are just going
to create a database of return addresses and subject lines and sit around
and read that instead of reading the actual messages.

In that case I would suggest a well written form letter that we could
encourage people to forward to the address with their names on it.  That
way after they see the same subject line 12,000 times they might get the
slight urge to read the message going along with it.  That would be kind
of equivalent to a petition.

Somebody good at slicking politicos like to draft a nice letter?


-Ryan
the Bit Wallah









From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Clark Reynard <clark@metal.psu.edu>
Date: Tue, 1 Jun 93 23:45:22 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: How about it?  My letter to the Pres
Message-ID: <9306020801.AA03786@metal.psu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


What about some form of my letter as the form letter petition?

Not as critical as I was, of course.

But STRESS issues he used in his campaign (Prescott Bush, opposing
Vietnam); and maybe one of his flunkies will have the smarts to
cope with it.  The email response for the form letter from
postmaster@whitehouse.gov was very fast, so they have put money
into it.  Maybe they actually DO give a damn.  Try it.
----
Robert W. Clark             Just Say No! to the
rclark@nyx.cs.du.edu        Big Brother Chip  




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Eric Hughes <hughes@soda.berkeley.edu>
Date: Wed, 2 Jun 93 06:39:06 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: ADMIN: incoming ftp site works now
Message-ID: <9306021412.AA13469@soda.berkeley.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I've arranged so that the pub/cypherpunks/incoming directory will
accept uploads now.  So if you have stuff to send, please ftp it to
that directory rather than using e-mail.  Of course, if you don't have
ftp access, please continue to use email.

For those of you who tried this before, the problem was that the
wuarchive ftpd that the system was running needs a line in its
configuration file to say that uploads are peritted in a directory.

Eric




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Eric Hughes <hughes@soda.berkeley.edu>
Date: Wed, 2 Jun 93 06:51:21 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Term software development/design
In-Reply-To: <9306020647.AA20551@hydra.unm.edu>
Message-ID: <9306021425.AA13721@soda.berkeley.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>As for the creation of new term programs, I'd have to say making it RELY
>on a FOSSIL driver is a BAD idea.  

The reason to use FOSSIL, and it is a sufficiently strong reason, is
that with some layer of abstraction at that low level, you can't do
end-to-end link encryption transparently.

For example, if you want to do a download over a secure channel, if
you have to use an external protocol, and if that protocol talks
directly to the serial port, then you can't use it, because the
protocol will see only gibberish.  If, on the other had, the protocol
driver uses FOSSIL, and if your FOSSIL can set up an encrypted
channel, then the protocol will perform as expected without being
aware that it's underlying connection is encrypted.

>Almost NO new door software uses FOSSILs, because
>companies like Compaq are making more-compatible machines with less
>proprietary garbage in them.  

The reason to use FOSSIL is not compatibility, but abstraction.  It's
the only abstraction for serial communications the PC has, and we'd
better take advantage of it.

Eric




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Eric Hughes <hughes@soda.berkeley.edu>
Date: Wed, 2 Jun 93 07:12:49 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Software infrastructure
In-Reply-To: <9306020704.AA01148@soda.berkeley.edu>
Message-ID: <9306021446.AA14130@soda.berkeley.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Let me clarify the discussion here about PC terminal software.  There
are two distinctions I'd like to make.

The first distinction is between a terminal program and a mail/news
reader.  Terminal access is necessary so that all functions of the
dialup service which are not mail/news can still be accessed.  An
integrated mail/news reader is desirable because this is a primary
activity of many users.  Ideally, you want both.

The second distinction is between stream and file encryption.If you
want to encrypt the underlying channel, you need a stream cipher and a
D-H key exchange.  If you want file encryption, you want a block
cipher and public keys for communications.

These two distinctions are correlated.  The terminal nature of such
software requires support for stream encryption.  The mail nature of
such software requires file encryption.  PGP is a file encryptor, not
a stream encryptor.  You can't use PGP for the terminal line; you can
you it for email.

>As Eric indicates, the issue is not so much building encryption into the
>program but rather of having _hooks_ by which extra functionality can be
>added.  

One useful discussion would be to examine just what hooks are
desirable.  The capability 'encryption' is too broad; one needs to
specify just what variety and what purpose is desired.

Re: dealing with mail software intended for humans.
>The result is that the mail program you are running on the host computer
>may do some munging on the PGP message, like inserting "Press RETURN for
>next page" or perhaps some terminal control characters.

It is for exactly reasons like this that one of the hooks should be an
ability to specify how one gets one's mail.  For Unix, I would suggest
POP, as Paul Ferguson has mentioned.  For online services like
compuserve, aol, etc., a separate protocol which spoofs their mail
readers into sending you your mail en masse could be written.

This also implies the existence of offline mail readers.

>Plus, this only deals with the message-receiving problem, not the sending
>problem.

Trying to spoof a whole mail system on a terminal seems doomed.
Offline readers are the way to go.

>Then for outgoing mail you'd like to be able to drop into a user-defined
>editor which is run with a command line causing his file to be saved to
>some temp file name.  

What editor you use is another hook.  I use Desqview, and I love to be
able to spoof Desqview into spoofing my editor (which is _always_
running) into editing my reply.  So the hook has to be a bit more
flexible that running an executable.

Eric




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Johan Helsingius <julf@penet.FI>
Date: Tue, 1 Jun 93 22:16:24 PDT
To: nobody@toad.com
Subject: Re:
In-Reply-To: <9306011855.AA08017@toad.com>
Message-ID: <9306020831.aa08455@penet.penet.FI>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



> Look at what happened to Julf.  His machine
> was safe, sitting in a back room of his house.  They went after his net
> feeds instead.

A quick update: Telecom Finland finally delivered. My uncontrolled,
no-AUP IP connection via EUnet (Copenhagen-Amsterdam-Alternet) went
operational yesterday. The new 486 box also arrived. Expected to go
into 100% service this weekend!

	Julf





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Pat Farrell" <pfarrell@cs.gmu.edu>
Date: Wed, 2 Jun 93 05:17:31 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: RE: Software infrastructure
Message-ID: <32140.pfarrell@cs.gmu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


In Message Tue, 1 Jun 1993 22:13:48 -0500,
  Eric Hughes <hughes@soda.berkeley.edu> wrote:

>Let's go back to the DOS-as-terminal issue.  The politics and
>economics of DOS shareware is such that source code is almost never
>made available.
>
>I propose that interested cypherpunks write a DOS terminal program
>which _is_ free software.

I think writing a "terminal" program, such as Kermit, is not particularly
useful. I am writing a SMTP/POPPER client program that will work over
standard serial (dial-up) lines. It will not require SLIP, PPP, or any
other magic (mostly because getting _my university_ to provide competent
TCP/IP access is impossible). Enhancing it to support SLIP or PPP will be
simple, but it is not the market that I'm aiming at.

Clearly any decent mail client has to have a roledex of commonly accessed
coorespondents. It is trivial to enhance the data structure to add a flag
that says "Use encryption" and another with "PGP (or RIPEM) key available"
and another to hold a handle (PGP's 0x123456) that identifies the key.
Spawning your favorite encryption program is then also trivial.

The audience is not the cypherpunks. The audience for strong cryptography
is the art, history, econ or english major. It has to be "pig easy"
and reliable.

My program is written for Windows. Like it or not, Windows has 80% or more
of the total computers being sold. I want my mailer client to reach mass
markets.

The program will be free, and sources will be available under some
restrictions that I haven't yet figured out.

In a while, I'll be looking for beta testers.

Pat

Pat Farrell      Grad Student                 pfarrell@cs.gmu.edu
Department of Computer Science    George Mason University, Fairfax, VA
Public key availble via finger          #include <standard.disclaimer>




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: eichin@cygnus.com (Mark Eichin)
Date: Wed, 2 Jun 93 08:39:22 PDT
To: ryan@rtfm.mlb.fl.us
Subject: re: CryptoStacker
In-Reply-To: <Pine.3.03.9306020004.A6908-c100000@rtfm>
Message-ID: <9306021616.AA26896@cygnus.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>> Thanks for all of the responses on my questions concerning the CryptoStacker
	On a related note, the current maintainer of the loop file
system patches for Linux has released the latest version, which
includes DES encryption support (as I understand it, the code lets you
mount a file as a file system, and just happens to have support for
applying a function to the file... and the patches as released support
specifying a DES key at mount time.) It's a start. Patches are on
tsx-11.mit.edu and nic.funet.fi (ie. outside the US -- the maintainer
lives in Switzerland :-)

				_Mark_ <eichin@athena.mit.edu>
				MIT Student Information Processing Board
				Cygnus Support <eichin@cygnus.com>



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: nobody@shell.portal.com
Date: Wed, 2 Jun 93 14:25:57 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Software infrastructure
Message-ID: <9306021634.AA08896@jobe.shell.portal.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

Eric writes:

> The second distinction is between stream and file encryption.If you
> want to encrypt the underlying channel, you need a stream cipher and a
> D-H key exchange.  If you want file encryption, you want a block
> cipher and public keys for communications.

I don't think we should try to put stream encryption into this product.
A problem with stream encryption is that it requires special SW on both
ends.  We would have to not only write a terminal program, but also write
software which would transparently encrypt/decrypt which ran on the host
and then passed the characters on to whatever command shell would normally
run.  I could see doing this with Unix (using pty's, a variant on the
"script" program many systems have) but it may not be too portable.

Stream encryption defends against wiretappers, and may provide some
protection against the more trivial root-based attacks on the host computer
(ones which just monitor the serial port - although if you use the pty idea
there may be an internal serial port that has cleartext and which can be
monitored).  But you are still vulnerable to being monitored by root.  I
don't think the benefit gained is great enough, given the cost, to make
this a good initial feature for the product.

> This also implies the existence of offline mail readers.

It is going to be hard to provide an offline mail reader with the
friendliness of what the user is used to.  Also, offline news reading is
probably out of the question in this environment due to the great volume of
news.  Offline mail also has the problem that some people send great, huge
messages that you aren't interested in.  Online you just look at the first
couple of pages and then delete it.  Offline you download the whole thing,
often paying for it, before you look at it.   

Another approach would be to have a "paranoid PGP" available on your host
computer.  This works much like regular PGP, except it will never ask you
for your pass phrase.  Any time it would, it instead outputs a magic escape
sequence.  This is recognized by your Cypherpunks terminal program and
causes it to run a local program which includes PGP.  The paranoid PGP on
the host automatically downloads the file it was going to decrypt or sign
to the local machine, which runs PGP, asks for your pass phrase, does the
operation, and (perhaps) uploads the results back to the host.  The whole
thing is transparent if you are running the CP term, and your secret key
and pass phrase never left your computer.  (You might or might not want the
plaintext to be uploaded after decryption - perhaps it could be previewed
locally and if it's not too "hot" you can upload it and reply to it on the
host.) 

Under this approach, message ENCRYPTION could be just done on-line since
paranoid PGP doesn't need a pass phrase for that.  So you can compose and
mail your messages without needing any special support, as long as you don't
sign them.

You are still trusting the host, but not as much as if you left your secret
key there and typed your pass phrase into the host computer.  This is less
secure than if you did everything on your PC but lets you use the powerful
editing and mail/news handling capabilities of your host.

This approach does have the same disadvantage I listed with respect to
stream encryption, that it requires some special software on the host.
However, this software should have many fewer host dependencies than a
transparent stream encryptor would.

Hal Finney
74076.1041@compuserve.com

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Version: 2.2

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25L8ZwG5syA6+KEcL2pSfnoPe1l9ZixCjefUnNiy9MYAHBh8uo8IEZ/IoCArSbvs
ImUjayxZjWugHZaBIUsOo/dk5VbX/1tY3CW1eN2wItvtF1RQYk1QPjCYFgECqKeY
UtRAd2p/JqI=
=GAGr
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: poier@sfu.ca (Skye Merlin Poier)
Date: Wed, 2 Jun 93 08:57:49 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Security in a VR world
Message-ID: <9306021634.AA23208@malibu.sfu.ca>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

For anyone interested, there is a discussion on the multiverse maillist at
multiverse@medg.lcs.mit.edu about "portal security", that is, the ability /
inability for certain users passing through certain "portals", as well as
verification of user identity... Unfortunately, the developer is in Europe,
and as we all know, PGP is export-controlled... :(

Skye
- --
- -----====> Skye Merlin Poier <====----- 
Undergrad in CMPT/MATH (Virtual Reality)       ||||      ||||
          email: poier@sfu.ca                  p-OO <--> OO-q   THINK
   PGP Public Key available on finger           \==      ==/


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.2

iQCVAgUBLAzWoy0bkpXW3omvAQFpVQQAvN+Q+fj+04DGgjXAyDhsBcRG5QEXES3a
u6/lTKzhyqZEOCVX+ObivZOLUrc7OsbED0hGE4Wn/jIEeoeM//b9cA10JmTYu1Ce
WgXPPuAa+YKAin9dMdIxNNiTzSaQhx+dQ3saPssQ45ErYWCPiix4ceBJWuITZJEG
9RfehK/yLws=
=rHJv
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: dmandl@lehman.com (David Mandl)
Date: Wed, 2 Jun 93 06:07:06 PDT
To: smb@research.att.com
Subject: Re: WH email petition.
Message-ID: <9306021344.AA16267@disvnm2.shearson.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> In general, petitions are a notoriously ineffective way to lobby.
> That's doubly so for email versions, for obvious reasons.  Even
> without that problem, an electronic petition will (rightly) be ignored
> on the grounds that it represents the opinions of a small elite
> minority.  With signatures collected in the streets and shopping malls
> of America, you have at least some chance of reaching a cross-section
> of people.  But on the net?  (And even if I'm wrong about the net's
> population, would they know it?)
> 		--Steve Bellovin

In general, I agree that petitions are a major waste of time and energy;
I'm also pretty convinced that this White House email link is a big scam.
Why are they any more likely to take your mail seriously just because it
comes over the phone lines and not in an envelope?  Seems like a pretty
transparent PR ploy (also an attempt to make it seem like the White House
isn't a bunch of dinosaurs now that everybody and her nephew has an email
address).

But since it won't take much more than a couple of minutes of any of our
time, I can't see an electronic petition hurting our cause any--especially
because it'll certainly include the names of many esteemed professionals
and braniacs with fancy scientific, corporate, and academic credentials.
I think this could be a nice propaganda coup if it got publicised.

It could at the very least give a big black eye to the forces of evil.

   --Dave.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: mmidboe@cs.uah.edu (digital saint)     (Computer Science Dept., Univ. of Alabama-Huntsville)
Date: Wed, 2 Jun 93 08:10:54 PDT
To: hughes@soda.berkeley.edu (Eric Hughes)
Subject: Re: Software infrastructure
In-Reply-To: <9306021446.AA14130@soda.berkeley.edu>
Message-ID: <9306021548.AA19002@uahcs2.cs.uah.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text


	If you want the other software developers to pick up encryption then
you had better put it into some kinda kit or TPU. That is the easiest way to
get those other people like Mustang Software to add hooks into their software.
If you distributed some kind of TPU to add onto Async Pro then you just made it
really easy to add encryption onto a couple of BBS packages. If you were to
make a TPU I think you should have the code to handle file encryption and
stream encryption built into it. For Async Pro you could just make up a
send_cipher function that encrypts the data then calls Async Pro's serial send
function. I also think it would be better to come up with some freeware so
people don't have to go buy Async Pro, but that would be a good quick cipher
engine for PC serial IO if you just added onto Async Pro without worrying about
the serial routines for the moment also.

							d. saint


	



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Perry E. Metzger" <pmetzger@lehman.com>
Date: Wed, 2 Jun 93 07:57:59 PDT
To: Stanton McCandlish <anton@hydra.unm.edu>
Subject: Re: Electronic Contracts
In-Reply-To: <9306020055.AA13186@hydra.unm.edu>
Message-ID: <9306021534.AA04636@snark.shearson.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Stanton McCandlish says:
> Regarding "test cases" for digital signatures, not sure if this is 100%
> relevant but what the hell...
> 
> In this area at least, when the UPS folk bring you a package that you
> must sign for, you no longer sign on paper, but on this funky electronic
> tablet.  Now granted this thing is recording your "real" signature, and
> thus differs greatly, but still there may be something to this.  Not sure
> where one would look for material having to do with such devices, and
> their relevance to a court case, but then again no one pays me legal
> consulting fees either.  >:) 

Caveat: I'm not a lawyer.

In common law, anything you want and intend to be your signature is
your signature. Ever work for a very big company? Ever look at your
paychecks? They are rubber stamped with someone's signature, not
signed. Still, thats perfectly legal.

In contract law, contracts do not have to be written -- being written
just means that the court has a presumption that the terms of the
contract were as written. However, you can make contracts orally if
you wish, and they are enforceable provided you can convince a court
that the contract really was made. Assuming that you sign a contract
with digital signatures, and the court can be made to understand that
the digital signatures mean no forgery was possible, its likely a
court would enforce them because the court would then have reason to
believe that both parties agreed to the contract in question.

Repeating my caveat: I'm not a lawyer.

Perry





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: fnerd@smds.com (FutureNerd Steve Witham)
Date: Wed, 2 Jun 93 10:05:56 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Clipper replacement chip
Message-ID: <9306021716.AA26131@smds.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


RYAN Alan Porter <rtfm!rtfm.mlb.fl.us!ryan@mlb.semi.harris.com> sez

> Just out of curiosity, does anyone on the cypherpunks list posess the
> technical skills that would be necessary to begin a project of hacking out
> a pin compatible version of the Clipper that didn't have the backdoors
> once the chip is out, a la AMD and CYRIX?
> ...
> So I guess the really important question is: does anybody know how to
> reverse engineer a chip and build a duplicate, pin-compatible device from
> the ground up while hiding from the feds the whole time and still managing
> to make a living?

Well, there's an easier end-run: a piggyback board.  This would plug into
the Clipper's slot, and the Clipper would plug into it.  Then it could either
run in Clipper or PGP/DH-IDEA/Whatever mode.  I don't understand enough
about the Clipper protocols and interface to know whether there's room to
squeeze in bits to signal which of these two modes, unbeknownst to the
rest of the phone, but you could certainly attach a Clip vs. Secure switch.

-fnerd




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Jim McCoy <mccoy@ccwf.cc.utexas.edu>
Date: Wed, 2 Jun 93 10:59:04 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Crypto anarchy in a VW? (not the bug)
In-Reply-To: <9306021056.AA05648@toad.com>
Message-ID: <199306021836.AA01020@flubber.cc.utexas.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text


Mark <mark@coombs.anu.edu.au> writes:
> 
> >I still don't see why all of the actual encryption couldn't be done in 
> >software though...
> 
> Me either, apart from TEMPEST issues...

Speed.  No software implementation will be able to match a hardware DES
chip in total throughput.  I have enough trouble dealing with the drive
transfer speeds imposed upon PC unix systems with the lame bus, but even
this could keep up if I had to run my file access through a software DES
system.  There are cards out there that can do this, and it doesn't really
make sense not to offload this to an external device.

> Linux comes with slot in file system
> modules (as detailed in a letter to Jim) that you can easily adapt to your
> own uses. Ive been playing around with this idea for a while. Adding a
> desfs(tm) (me :) to a linux kernel is not going to be that hard I think..
> (touch wood).

Yes, the other thing that pushed me to linux (besides the larger user
community) was the support for "drop-in" filesystems.  

jim



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Perry E. Metzger" <pmetzger@lehman.com>
Date: Wed, 2 Jun 93 10:32:25 PDT
To: poier@sfu.ca (Skye Merlin Poier)
Subject: Re: Security in a VR world
In-Reply-To: <9306021634.AA23208@malibu.sfu.ca>
Message-ID: <9306021807.AA05105@snark.shearson.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Skye Merlin Poier says:
> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
> 
> For anyone interested, there is a discussion on the multiverse maillist at
> multiverse@medg.lcs.mit.edu about "portal security", that is, the ability /
> inability for certain users passing through certain "portals", as well as
> verification of user identity... Unfortunately, the developer is in Europe,
> and as we all know, PGP is export-controlled... :(

No its not. It was written abroad -- its more legal in Europe than in
the U.S....

.pm




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: fergp@sytex.com (Paul Ferguson)
Date: Wed, 2 Jun 93 12:03:02 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: RE: Work the Work!
Message-ID: <8P6i5B2w165w@sytex.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
 
Date: Tue, 1 Jun 93 21:32:24 -0700
 Eric Hughes <uunet!soda.berkeley.edu!hughes> wrote -
 
> Paul, you of all people don't need to feel slighted when I urge
> people to do something, anything, about the wiretap chips.
 
 Agreed. There are many, many things that we need to do to support
 opposition to this ruse.
 
> Here is my own very short version of my policy toward the wiretap
> chips:
 
> "The government has no right to restrict my use of cryptography in
> any way.  They may not forbid me to use whatever ciphers I may like,
> nor may they require me to use any that I do not like."
 
 Hear, hear.
 
 
> The hypothetical backdoor in clipper is a charlatan's issue by
> comparison, as is discussion of how to make a key escrow system
> 'work.'  Do not be suckered into talking about an issue that is not
> important.  If someone want to talk about potential back doors, refuse
> to speculate.  The existence of a front door (key escrow) make back
> door issues pale in comparison.
 
> If someone wants to talk about how key escrow works, refuse to
> elaborate.  Saying that this particular key escrow system is bad has a
> large measure of complicity in saying that escrow systems in general
> are OK.  Always argue that this particular key escrow system is bad
> because it is a key escrow system, not because it has procedural
> flaws.
 
> This right issue is that the government has no right to my private
> communications.  Every other issue is the wrong issue and detracts
> from this central one.  If we defeat one particular system without
> defeating all other possible such systems at the same time, we have
> not won at all; we have delayed the time of reckoning.
 
 Very lucid and wise observation. I have suggested several times that
 attention should also be directed to the (what I call) "potential
 factor" in regards to the entire "key escrow" system. The potential
 for abuse and unconstitutional invasions of personal privacy are ripe
 for the picking under this scheme. In my own public comment letter to
 the Computer System Security and Privacy Advisory Board, I stressed
 this fact and also pointed out that although the system was probably
 designed with good intentions (right), it will not prevent zealots
 and spooks from monitoring communications under certain
 circumstances.
 
 My other peeve is that after this "technology" has been entrenched
 (read: forced) on the public, I see the rug being pulled out from
 under the feet of any other crypto system available. That's also why
 I attach a great deal of importance to some form of PGP being
 developed where all parties (Phil Z., Jim B., and me) are happy
 (excluding Uncle S.). (But I suppose that's another topic...)
 
 Patriotically yours,
 
 
 
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Paul Ferguson               |  The future is now.
Network Integrator          |  History will tell the tale;
Centreville, Virginia USA   |  We must endure and struggle
fergp@sytex.com             |  to shape it.
 
          Stop the Wiretap (Clipper/Capstone) Chip.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: miron@extropia.wimsey.com (Miron Cuperman)
Date: Wed, 2 Jun 93 15:51:42 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Mail probs
Message-ID: <199306022148.AA07511@xtropia>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


----- Transcript of session follows -----
uux: creat (TMP0000001297): Permission denied
554 elee7h5@rosebud.ee.uh.edu... unknown mailer error 1

----- Unsent message follows -----

Hopefully the originator of this anon message is on the list.

	Miron




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: fergp@sytex.com (Paul Ferguson)
Date: Wed, 2 Jun 93 12:02:56 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Crypto/Clipper debate rages on in comp.risks
Message-ID: <cZ8i5B1w165w@sytex.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
 
For those of you who don't follow RISKS Digest (comp.risks):
you're really missing some good stuff. At the risk of redundantly
posting messages which may have already been discussed, I couldn't
resist the opportunity to cross-post this portion of a response to
Peter Junger's original post on "Risks of teaching the law without
breaking it," where Mr. Junger expresses his displeasure and
confoundedness of the export restrictions on simple (and all)
cryptography.
 
8<----- Snip, Snip ------------
 
RISKS-LIST: RISKS-FORUM Digest
Tuesday 1 June 1993
Volume 14 : Issue 67
 
>Date: Tue, 1 Jun 93 14:17:52 BST
 From: jharuni@micrognosis.co.uk (Jonathan Haruni)
 Subject: Re: Peter D. Junger's  risks of teaching... (RISKS-14.6)5
 Organization: Micrognosis International, London
 
 Peter D. Junger (junger@samsara.law.cwru.edu) wrote:
 > [ about his amusing and sad conundrum of being unable to teach law
 > students about a law without breaking it. ]
 
 I think that if you give your students copies of your comp.risks
 article, they should all be sufficiently disheartened with American
 law that they will quit the program and you can then present your
 lectures to a class devoid of foreign (or any) students.
 
 Alternatively, you could check passports at the door, and boot out
 foreign students during the parts of your class which are essential
 to American Sickurity.  By doing so you will raise eyebrows well
 outside of the computer-and-law sphere of interest and you may bring
 this ludicrous situation into the limelight.  But then, you may get
 sacked.
 
 Probably a much more effective solution to your problem, and one which
 has recently been proven perfectly legal and acceptable in an American
 court, would be for you to merely shoot dead all the foreigners in your
 class, after which you can speak freely.
 
- ----[ remainder of post omitted ]-------
 
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-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

Paul Ferguson               |  The future is now.
Network Integrator          |  History will tell the tale;
Centreville, Virginia USA   |  We must endure and struggle
fergp@sytex.com             |  to shape it.
 
          Stop the Wiretap (Clipper/Capstone) Chip.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: fergp@sytex.com (Paul Ferguson)
Date: Wed, 2 Jun 93 14:03:00 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Newsweek article, "The Code of the Future"
Message-ID: <BVBJ5B1w165w@sytex.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
 
On Tue, 1 Jun 93 18:56:10 -0700,
 Timothy C. May <uunet!netcom.com!tcmay> wrote -
 
> Subject: "Newsweek" Article on Clipper and Encryption
 
 When I read this message this morning, I made a bee-line down to the
 kiosk in the lobby and bought it (the June 7th issue of Newsweek). It
 must've just hit the stand, because the issues were still bound with
 rubber bands. (Thanks, Tim, for taking the time to commit it to
 ASCII, BTW.)
 
 This is good. Clipper articles have appeared in The New York Times,
 The Washington Post and now, Newsweek. This is exactly the exposure
 that is needed.
 
 One thing that you didn't include (its rather trivial), that I tacked
 onto the end of this post, is a very, very brief history of
 Cryptography -
 
- - --
 
 "Great Moments in Cryptography
 
 1900 B.C.
 Menet Khufu, Egypt
 
 Into the rock of a nobleman's tomb, a master scribe carved unusual
 symbols rather than the standard hieroglyphics. The intent was to
 impart a grandeur to the message, the oldest known cryptographic
 text.
 
 Jan. 17, 1917
 London
 
 Britain decodes the 'Zimmerman' telegram from Berlin to the German
 ambassador in Washington. Describing a plan to give Mexico the U.S.
 Southwest, it helped draw an outraged America into World War I.
 
 Dec. 7, 1941
 Washington, D.C.
 
 Navy spies crack a message from Tokyo to its embassy in Washington
 saying it will break off talks with the U.S. at 1 p.m. -- dawn at
 Pearl Harbor. The navy spies miss the import of this; Tojo strikes
 unopposed.
 
 Nov. 4, 1952
 Washington, D.C.
 
 Truman creates National Security Agency, master of math-based codes."
 
- - --
 
 To which, I add my own date to remember -
 
 "Infamous Moments in Cryptography
 
  Apr. 16, 1993
  Washington, D.C.
 
  The Clinton Administration announces introduction of the 'Clipper
  Chip,' a cryptographic scheme developed by the NSA under the
  auspices of the National Institute of Standards and Technology
  (NIST). Under 'Clipper,' monitoring high-tech communications is
  made simpler for law enforcement agencies and privacy becomes a
  secondary triviality."
 
  I can only keep my fingers crossed that we see more articles like
  this geared to informing the public of this ruse.
 
 
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.2
 
iQCVAgUBLA0R05RLcZSdHMBNAQE5JgP/TFsJ6aF7+4lMIQjHSQw3qevwT45R+FIg
rw5wNDIi7BO3A2rLyDE35rhJsekj6MB3Jg002K1Dy4W0lzT7pb9fkUcwt0H0mQXK
3BuZti59/grD6gfPPgkBHnC8XsH7sHnOV6OsZM1T8eusWofEp541l5bI9RsfnRsM
qYnv1S3i+2c=
=H9UT
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

Paul Ferguson               |  The future is now.
Network Integrator          |  History will tell the tale;
Centreville, Virginia USA   |  We must endure and struggle
fergp@sytex.com             |  to shape it.
 
          Stop the Wiretap (Clipper/Capstone) Chip.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: eichin@ATHENA.MIT.EDU ("Mark W. Eichin")
Date: Wed, 2 Jun 93 14:12:15 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: [galvin@TIS.COM: Privacy Enhanced Mail available via anonymous FTP]
Message-ID: <9306022149.AA09346@tsx-11.MIT.EDU>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


It is interesting to note that the LICENSE says:
>>    This license permits you to:
>>           b.    create and sign certificates for people and entities
>>                 within your own organization;
							_Mark_

Message-Id: <9306022052.AA09067@TIS.COM>
Reply-To: James M Galvin <galvin@TIS.COM>
To: TISPEM.Announcement:;@TIS.COM, ietf@cnri.reston.va.us, pem-dev@TIS.COM,
        rsaref-users@rsa.com, saag-interest@TIS.COM, psrg-interest@isi.edu
Subject: Privacy Enhanced Mail available via anonymous FTP
Date: Wed, 02 Jun 93 16:51:17 -0400
From: James M Galvin <galvin@TIS.COM>
Sender: pem-dev-relay@TIS.COM

-----BEGIN PRIVACY-ENHANCED MESSAGE-----
Proc-Type: 4,MIC-CLEAR
Content-Domain: RFC822
Originator-ID-Asymmetric: MFMxCzAJBgNVBAYTAlVTMQswCQYDVQQIEwJNRDE
 kMCIGA1UEChMbVHJ1c3RlZCBJbmZvcm1hdGlvbiBTeXN0ZW1zMREwDwYDVQQLEwh
 HbGVud29vZA==,02
MIC-Info: RSA-MD5,RSA,ndrjfb54QirydT4/KLgg9HJh+5k0ON+bj9Wil5LeVTE
 3E0ST0Bmv12KbChUn5MhxpH556ur0TbWTjl8/csLK52ARxGs0VJlzKfNOWL00SbB
 JfuyLIM6RLF9uE2ZBNNjP

Trusted Information Systems, in cooperation with RSADSI, is pleased to
announce the availability of Version 6.0 of TIS/PEM, the Internet
reference implementation of Privacy Enhanced Mail.

This software is available to US and Canadian organizations and citizens
via anonymous ftp.  All source code is included, including Version 6.7
of the Rand MH message handling system and Version 1.02 of RSAREF.

To retrieve TIS/PEM please FTP to

     host:   ftp.tis.com
     login:  anonymous

and retrieve the files

     pub/PEM/README
     pub/PEM/LICENSE

The README file contains further instructions.  The LICENSE file
contains the restrictions and rules governing use of TIS/PEM.
Please read this file before retrieving the code.

Send questions to tispem-support@tis.com
-----END PRIVACY-ENHANCED MESSAGE-----




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: J. Michael Diehl <mdiehl@triton.unm.edu>
Date: Wed, 2 Jun 93 16:29:19 PDT
To: dmandl@lehman.com (David Mandl)
Subject: Re: WH email petition.
In-Reply-To: <9306021344.AA16267@disvnm2.shearson.com>
Message-ID: <9306030006.AA03619@triton.unm.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


According to David Mandl:
> In general, I agree that petitions are a major waste of time and energy;
> I'm also pretty convinced that this White House email link is a big scam.
> Why are they any more likely to take your mail seriously just because it
> comes over the phone lines and not in an envelope?  Seems like a pretty

I don't, but as you mention below, it takes so little time, I thought we could
get people involved who may not otherwise give a damn.  "It's so easy, just 
send a quick letter, it will really help us out."   Or something like that.

> transparent PR ploy (also an attempt to make it seem like the White House
> isn't a bunch of dinosaurs now that everybody and her nephew has an email
> address).

Well, we all know that! ;^)

> But since it won't take much more than a couple of minutes of any of our
> time, I can't see an electronic petition hurting our cause any--especially
> because it'll certainly include the names of many esteemed professionals
> and braniacs with fancy scientific, corporate, and academic credentials.
> I think this could be a nice propaganda coup if it got publicised.

How about each time we manage to get someone to send a letter to the WH, we also
request that they send it to one of us, so that we can keep track of it?  Is 
this doable accross the many networks?

> It could at the very least give a big black eye to the forces of evil.

'Hope so.

+-----------------------+-----------------------------+---------+
| J. Michael Diehl ;-)  | I thought I was wrong once. | PGP KEY |
| mdiehl@triton.unm.edu |   But, I was mistaken.      |available|
| mike.diehl@fido.org   |                             | Ask Me! |
| (505) 299-2282        +-----------------------------+---------+
|                                                               |
+------"I'm just looking for the opportunity to be -------------+
|            Politically Incorrect!"   <Me>                     |
+-----If codes are outlawed, only criminals wil have codes.-----+
+----Is Big Brother in your phone?  If you don't know, ask me---+



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: poier@sfu.ca (Skye Merlin Poier)
Date: Wed, 2 Jun 93 18:39:16 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: heh heh.. whoops
Message-ID: <9306030216.AA25030@malibu.sfu.ca>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


heh <blush> <loosen collar>... sorry about the PGP export thing... I was a bit
flaked out this morning what with midterms and all. Musta been thinking of 
something else.

Sorry all
Skye
--
-----====> Skye Merlin Poier <====----- 
Undergrad in CMPT/MATH (Virtual Reality)       ||||      ||||
          email: poier@sfu.ca                  p-OO <--> OO-q   THINK
   PGP Public Key available on finger           \==      ==/





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Mark <mark@coombs.anu.edu.au>
Date: Wed, 2 Jun 93 02:39:39 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: FYI: White House Mail
Message-ID: <9306020939.AA03615@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>          President Clinton        Vice President Gore
>     	  
>     PRESIDENT@WHITEHOUSE.GOV      VICE.PRESIDENT@WHITEHOUSE.GOV

Hmm, 10 bucks says some larrikin sends fakemail from PRESIDENT to
VICE.PRESIDENT asking him 'what this little red button does' etc.
Though in real.life I suspect 10 press secretaries sitting behind
the mail alias. They're going to need them.

Lets hope no one is stupid enough to try busting into there...

Mark
mark@coombs.anu.edu.au



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Dave Banisar <banisar@washofc.cpsr.org>
Date: Thu, 3 Jun 93 10:35:42 PDT
To: CYPHERPUNKS <CYPHERPUNKS@toad.com>
Subject: CPSR NIST Crypto Statement
Message-ID: <00541.2821903098.3779@washofc.cpsr.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


  CPSR NIST Crypto Statement

                    Department of Commerce
        National Institute of Standards and Technology

      Computer System Security and Privacy Advisory Board

                Review of Cryptography Policy
                          June 1993

             Statement of CPSR Washington office
                  Marc Rotenberg, director
                (rotenberg@washofc.cpsr.org)
               with David Sobel, legal counsel,
                 Dave Banisar, policy analyst


     Mr. Chairman, members of the Advisory Panel, thank you for the 
opportunity to speak today about emerging issues on cryptography 
policy. 

     My name is Marc Rotenberg and I am director of the CPSR 
Washington office.  Although CPSR does not represent any computer 
firm or industry trade association, we speak for many in the 
computer profession who value privacy and are concerned about the 
government's Clipper proposal.

     During the last several years CPSR has organized several meetings 
to promote public discussion of cryptography issues.  We have also 
obtained important government documents through the Freedom of 
Information Act.  We believe that good policies will only result if the 
public, the profession, and the policy makers are fully informed 
about the significance of these recent proposals.

     We are pleased that the Advisory Board has organized hearings.  
This review of cryptography policy will help determine if the Clipper 
proposal is in the best interests of the country.  We believe that a 
careful review of the relevant laws and policies shows that the key 
escrow arrangement is at odds with the public interest, and that 
therefore the Clipper proposal should not go forward.

     Today I will address issues 1 through 3 identified in the NIST 
announcement, specifically the policy requirements of the Computer 
Security Act, the legal issues surrounding the key escrow 
arrangement, and the importance of privacy for network 
development.


1. CRYPTOGRAPHY POLICY

     The first issue concerns the 1987 statute enacted to improve 
computer security in the federal government, to clarify the 
responsibilities of NIST and NSA, and to ensure that technical 
standards would serve civilian and commercial needs.  The Computer 
Security Act, which also established this Advisory Panel, is the true 
cornerstone of cryptography policy in the United States.  That law 
made clear that in the area of unclassified computing systems, the 
Department of Commerce and not the Department of Defense, would 
be responsible for the development of technical standards.  It 
emphasized public accountability and stressed open decision-making.

     The Computer Security Act grew out of a concern that classified 
standards and secret meetings would not serve the interests of the 
general public.  As the practical applications for cryptography have 
moved from the military and intelligence arenas to the commercial 
sphere, this point has become clear.  There is also clearly a conflict of 
interest when an agency tasked with signal interception is also given 
authority to develop standards for network security.  

     In the spirit of the Computer Security Act, NIST set out in 1989 to 
develop a public key standard FIPS.  In a memo dated May 5, 1989 
and obtained by CPSR through the Freedom of Information Act, NIST 
said that it planned:

         to develop the necessary public-key based security 
         standards.  We require a public-key algorithm for 
         calculating digital signatures and we also require a 
         public-key algorithm for distributing secret keys.  

NIST then went on to define the requirements of the standard:

         The algorithms that we use must be public, unclassified, 
         implementable in both hardware or software, usable by 
         federal Agencies and U.S. based multi-national 
         corporation, and must provide a level of security 
         sufficient for the protection of unclassified, sensitive 
         information and commercial propriety and/or valuable 
         information.

     The Clipper proposal and the full-blown Capstone configuration, 
which incorporates the key management function NIST set out to 
develop in 1989, is very different from the one originally conceived 
by NIST. 

         %  The Clipper algorithm, Skipjack, is classified,

         %  Public access to the reasons underlying the proposal is 
            restricted, 

         %  Skipjack can be implemented only in tamper-proof 
            hardware, 

         %  It is unlikely to be used by multi-national corporations, 
            and

         %  Its security remains unproven.

     The Clipper proposal undermines the central purpose of the 
Computer Security Act.  Although intended for broad use in 
commercial networks, it was not developed at the request of either 
U.S. business or the general public.  It does not reflect public goals.  
Rather it reflects the interests of one secret agency with the 
authority to conduct foreign signal intelligence and another 
government agency  responsible for law enforcement investigations.  

     It is our belief that the Clipper proposal clearly violates the intent 
of the Computer Security Act of 1987.  
What is the significance of this?  It is conceivable that an expert 
panel of cryptographers will review the Skipjack algorithm and find 
that it lives up its billing, that there is no "trap door" and no easy 
way to reverse-engineer.  In fact, the White House has proposed just 
such a review process 

     But is this process adequate?  Is this the procedure the Advisory 
Board would endorse for the development of widespread technical 
standards?  The expert participants will probably not be permitted 
to publish their assessments of the proposal in scientific journals, 
further review of the standard will be restricted, and those who are 
skeptical will remain in the dark about the actual design of the chip.  
This may be an appropriate process for certain military systems, but 
it is clearly inappropriate for a technical standard that the 
government believes should be widely incorporated into the 
communications infrastructure.

     Good government policy requires that certain process goals be 
satisfied.  Decisions should be made in the open.  The interests of the 
participating agencies should be clear.  Agencies should be 
accountable for their actions and recommendations.  Black boxes and 
government oversight are not compatible.

     There is an even greater obligation to promote open decisions 
where technical and scientific issues are at stake.  Innovation 
depends on openness.  The scientific method depends on the ability 
of researchers to "kick the tires" and "test drive" the product.  And, 
then, even if it is a fairly good design, additional testing encourages 
the development of new features, improved performance and 
reduced cost.  Government secrecy is incompatible which such a 
development process.

     Many of these principles are incorporated into the Computer 
Security Act and the Freedom of Information Act.  The current 
government policy on the development of unclassified technical 
standards, as set out in the Computer Security Act, is a very good 
policy.  It emphasizes public applications, stresses open review, and 
ensures public accountability.  It is not the policy that is flawed.  It is 
the Clipper proposal.

     To accept the Clipper proposal would be to endorse a process that 
ran contrary to the law, that discourages innovation, and that 
undermines openness.


2. LEGAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES

     There are several legal and constitutional issues raised by the 
government's key escrow proposal.  

     The premise of the Clipper key escrow arrangement is that the 
government must have the ability to intercept electronic 
communications, regardless of the economic or societal costs.  The 
FBI's Digital Telephony proposal, and the earlier Senate bill 266, was 
based on the same assumption.

     There are a number of arguments made in defense of this 
position: that privacy rights and law enforcement needs must be 
balanced, or that the government will be unable to conduct criminal 
investigations without this capability. 

     Regardless of how one views these various claims, there is one 
point about the law that should be made very clear: currently there 
is no legal basis -- in statute, the Constitution or anywhere else --  
that supports the premise which underlies the Clipper proposal.  As 
the law currently stands, surveillance is not a design goal.  General 
Motors would have a stronger legal basis for building cars that could 
not go faster than 65 miles per hour than AT&T does in marketing a 
commercial telephone that has a built-in wiretap capability.  In law 
there is simply nothing about the use of a telephone that is 
inherently illegal or suspect.

     The federal wiretap statute says only that communication service 
providers must assist law enforcement in the execution of a lawful 
warrant.  It does not say that anyone is obligated to design systems 
to facilitate future wire surveillance.  That distinction is the 
difference between countries that restrict wire surveillance to 
narrow circumstances defined in law and those that treat all users of 
the telephone network as potential criminals.  U.S. law takes the first 
approach.  Countries such as the former East Germany took the 
second approach.  The use of the phone system by citizens was 
considered inherently suspect and for that reason more than 10,000 
people were employed by the East German government to listen in 
on telephone calls.

     It is precisely because the wiretap statute does not contain the 
obligation to incorporate surveillance capability -- the design 
premise of the Clipper proposal -- that the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation introduced the Digital Telephony legislation.  But that 
legislation has not moved forward on Capitol Hill and the law has 
remained unchanged.  The Clipper proposal attempts to accomplish 
through the standard-setting and procurement process what the 
Congress has been unwilling to do through the legislative process.

     On legal grounds, adopting the Clipper would be a mistake.  There 
is an important policy goal underlying the wiretap law.  The Fourth 
Amendment and the federal wiretap statute do not so much balance 
competing interests as they erect barriers against government excess 
and define the proper scope of criminal investigation.  The purpose 
of the federal wiretap law is to restrict the government, it is not to 
coerce the public.

     Therefore, if the government endorses the Clipper proposal, it will 
undermine the basic philosophy of the federal wiretap law and the 
fundamental values embodied in the Constitution.  It will establish a 
technical mechanism for signal interception based on a premise that 
has no legal foundation.  I am not speaking rhetorically about "Big 
Brother."  My point is simply that the assumption underlying the 
Clipper proposal is more compatible with the practice of telephone 
surveillance in the former East Germany than it is with the narrowly 
limited circumstances that wire surveillance has been allowed in the 
United States.  

     There are a number of other legal issues that have not been 
adequately considered by the proponents of the key escrow 
arrangement that the Advisory Board should examine.  First, not all 
lawful wiretaps follow a normal warrant process.  It is critical that 
the proponents of Clipper make very clear how emergency wiretaps 
will be conducted before the proposal goes forward.  Second, there 
may be civil liability issues for the escrow agents if there is abuse or 
compromise of the keys.  Escrow agents may be liable for any harm 
that results.  Third, there is a Fifth Amendment dimension to the 
proposed escrow key arrangement if a network user is compelled to 
disclose his or her key to the government in order to access a 
communications network. Each one of these issues should be 
examined.  

     There is also one legislative change that we would like the 
Advisory Board to consider.  During our FOIA litigation, the NSA cited 
a 1951 law to withhold certain documents that were critical to 
understand the development of the Digital Signature Standard.  The 
law, passed  grants the government the right restrict the disclosure 
of any classified information pertaining to cryptography.  While the 
government may properly withhold classified information in FOIA 
cases, the practical impact of this particular provision is to provide 
another means to insulate cryptographic policy from public review.  

     Given the importance of public review of cryptography policy, the 
requirement of the Computer Security Act, and the Advisory Board's 
own commitment to an open, public process, we ask the Advisory 
Board to recommend to the President and to the Congress that 
section 798 be repealed or substantially revised to reflect current 
circumstances.

     This is the one area of national cryptography policy where we 
believe a change is necessary.


3. INDIVIDUAL PRIVACY

     Communications privacy remains a critical test for network 
development.  Networks that do not provide a high degree of privacy 
are clearly less useful to network users.  Given the choice between a 
cryptography product without a key escrow and one with a key 
escrow, it would be difficult to find a user who would prefer the key 
escrow requirement.  If this proposal does go forward, it will not be 
because network users or commercial service providers favored it.

     Many governments are now facing questions about restrictions on 
cryptography similar to the question now being raised in this 
country.  It is clear that governments may choose to favor the 
interests of consumers and businesses over law enforcement.  Less 
than a month ago, the government of Australia over-rode the 
objections of law enforcement and intelligence agencies and allowed 
the Australian telephone companies to go forward with new digital 
mobile phone networks, GSM, using the A5 robust algorithm.   Other 
countries will soon face similar decisions.  We hope that they will 
follow a similar path
 
     To briefly summarize, the problem here is not the existing law on 
computer security or policies on cryptography and wire surveillance.   
The Computer Security Act stresses public standards, open review, 
and commercial applications.  The federal wiretap statute is one of 
the best privacy laws in the world.  With the exception of one 
provision in the criminal code left over from the Cold War, our 
current cryptography policy is very good.  It reflects many of the 
values -- individual liberty, openness, government accountability -- 
that are crucial for democratic societies to function.

     The problem is the Clipper proposal.  It is an end-run around 
policies intended to restrict government surveillance and to ensure 
agency accountability.  It is an effort to put in place a technical 
configuration that is at odds with the federal wiretap law and the 
protection of individual privacy.  It is for these reasons that we ask 
the Advisory Board to recommend to the Secretary of Commerce, the 
White House, and the Congress that the current Clipper proposal not 
go forward.

     I thank you for the opportunity to speak with you about these 
issues.  I wish to invite the members of the Advisory Committee to 
the third annual CPSR Privacy and Cryptography conference that will 
be held Monday, June 7 in Washington, DC at the Carnegie 
Endowment for International Peace.  That meeting will provide an 
opportunity for further discussion about cryptography policy.


ATTACHMENTS

"TWG Issue Number: NIST - May 5, 1989," document obtained 
by CPSR as a result of litigation under the Freedom of 
Information Act.

"U.S. as Big Brother of Computer Age," The New York Times, 
May 6, 1993, at D1.

"Keeping Fewer Secrets," Issues in Science and Technology, vol. 
IX, no. 1 (Fall 1992)

"The Only Locksmith in Town," The Index on Censorship 
(January 1990)

[The republication of these articles for the non-commercial purpose 
of informing the government about public policy is protected by 
section 107 of the Copyright Act of 1976]

===============================================









From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Mark <mark@coombs.anu.edu.au>
Date: Wed, 2 Jun 93 03:56:14 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Crypto anarchy in a VW? (not the bug)
Message-ID: <9306021056.AA05648@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>Another possibility until then, and one that would be fun for people who
>like to play with EPROMS, is a card that had a cable leading to an external
>EPROM socket that you could lay on your desk or on top of the case or 
>wherever. You burn your keys for the HD into a chip and use it as a key,
>physically inserting the chip in the socket each time. There are lots 
>on new ways to make chips easy to plug in and out, I'm sure it wouldn't 
>be too hard.

Heh, I have a system liek this, designed by Viglen in the UK. It was/is 
originally from the BBC micro to allow easy use of swapping over 'sideways'
ROMS instead of opening the case. It's basically a ribbon cable with a 28way 
rom socket on the end with a edge connector socket on the other. Each ROM is
enclosed in it's own sturdy tiny black package with an edge connector that
slots into the socket that is mounted in the 'ashtray' of the Beeb.

You could easily copy the idea with a rom socket, a length of ribbon cable
and a ZIF socket to allow easy usage. The Viglen has pin protection so you
dont spike the thing, so it's able to be used on the fly without power
cycling.

One thing about ROM's, they're faster than disks....easier to hide too :)

>I still don't see why all of the actual encryption couldn't be done in 
>software though...

Me either, apart from TEMPEST issues...Linux comes with slot in file system
modules (as detailed in a letter to Jim) that you can easily adapt to your
own uses. Ive been playing around with this idea for a while. Adding a
desfs(tm) (me :) to a linux kernel is not going to be that hard I think..
(touch wood).

Mark
mark@coombs.anu.edu.au

"liek", "smiel" and "soar" are derivatives of JenSpeak(tm). Spread the word.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Dr. Cat <wixer!wixer.bga.com!cat@cactus.org>
Date: Thu, 3 Jun 93 09:00:56 PDT
To: hydra.unm.edu!anton@cactus.org (Stanton McCandlish)
Subject: Re: Term software development/design
In-Reply-To: <9306020647.AA20551@hydra.unm.edu>
Message-ID: <9306030536.AA18666@wixer>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


   Stanton has a good idea, I think, about getting the developers of packages
like Qmodem to set up some kind of hooks for encryption.  Is anyone else from
the list going to the BBSCON in Colorado this August?  If not, I'll try to
ask about the possibility of supporting encryption in Qmodem, Telix, Procomm,
PC Board, TBBS, Major BBS, and Wildcat.  (And of course, offer a helpful
suggestion or two if they show any interest.)  It would be better if someone
better schooled in encryption than myself were going to be there, though.

                              Dr. Cat / Dragon's Eye Productions




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: RYAN Alan Porter <ryan@rtfm.mlb.fl.us>
Date: Wed, 2 Jun 93 22:21:16 PDT
To: Hugh Daniel <hugh@toad.com>
Subject: Re: CryptoStacker, long term vision
In-Reply-To: <9306020657.AA05249@ecotone.toad.com>
Message-ID: <Pine.3.03.9306030013.A18959-e100000@rtfm>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain




This is tiring drivel concerning the CryptoStacker project.  It just
started yesterday, so don't expect it to be too mature, we all have other
things we have to do to pay the rent, right?

Anyway, I am posting this to the list because it is kind of a plea for
ideas, among other things, there are some tidbits that we need some help
on.  This particular message seemed to address both of the main ones, so I
picked it.  Don't complain about bandwidth, ok?  

Alright, to summarize the needs of the project at this point--> we need:

	1) some ideas on a good algorithm for a quick and easy
 	    encryption to be used in a simple straight software
	    on-the-fly disk encryption.  I know that it's ironic,
	    but it seems that that I and the people interested in
	    funnelling me ideas are mainly deficient in the 
	    encryption area...

	2) does anybody know how the hell Stacker or DoubleStor or
	    whatever executes the actual interception of the read/write
	    routines and stacks them?  I don't get it at all.  I am
	    more than willing to learn to get this thing working though. 


To summarize this message in particular:

Hugh: "Hey, wouldn't bell/whistle XXXXXX be a good idea?"

Ryan: "Yeah, but can we get the thing to work at all first?"


There, you have it.  You don't even have to read it if you're not
interested...

_______________
Message follows:
 
>   Here is one method of encrypting whats on a disk that I see as 
> usefull for some, but not all of us.  There are real problems for
> folks like me who have Unix systems as their home systems, but we will
> leave that as a extra credit problem.

Yeah, I am just concentrating on getting something out there for DOS
support.  I actually loathe DOS and would rather be supporting UNIX (this
would be a lot easier under Unix) but DOS is still a defacto standard and
the people who need to be protected will be using DOS a lot...

>   I see a disk drive (or scsi controler or bus interface or even
> something that sits in the middle of a scsi cable) with a PCMCIA slot
> in it.  Data gets passed about in the clear if no (or a dummy) card is
> in the slot.  If a real card is in the slot then all data goes though
> the card before being sent the rest of the way though the interface
> (might also take the data out via the card, but that makes the card
> more complex, even if the drive is cheaper, and has other problems).
>   The card is a key, if its in you can read the disk and see the data
> and it all looks fine.  If its not in and you read the disk you see
> whatever is on the disk, mixed plain and/or cypher text.

I like this idea, but I don't know about having ALL data go through the
encryption system.  What about the idea of setting up a 'secure' partition
and a 'fast' partition and having a device controller that would only run
stuff sent to the 'secure' partition through the crypto system?

I also don't know about the practicality of making the thing easy to
download your own crypto into it.  I think that if I am using a DES chip
that is widely understood and trusted that there would be no need for the
further complication of letting people hack at it...  It would be a really
cool option, and it would be a lot closer to allowing people to seize
their own security, but I don't think that I can justify adding such a
complicated feature at such an early stage.

>   You now have a 'key', if you don't want the disk read take the key
> out, breakit it even (if broken the card needs to erase its self as it
> might be read even in this state by a electron micro scope or some
> such).

I really like this PCMIA key idea.  I don't think that just having a key
would be enough though.  

Say the Secret Service walks in tomorrow and my system is CryptoStacked,
and the PCMIA key is dangling out of the slot because I fell asleep
programming last night and forgot to take it out and put it in the safe or
whatever.  <poof> all of that hard earned security is naught.

I am much more in favour of a password system to assist the key, much like
PGP uses a password system to assist the secret keyring.

>   There are sevral types of cards one could use in such a system, the
> ones I would like to see would have all sorts of crypto support
> hardware and some sort of processer.  I want to be able to download my
> own crypto system into the card (which should be program ONCE), so as
> I can feal safe in that I control everything that goes on.  This might
> be slower then doing a dedicated chip, but more usefull.  Support
> chips(well features) might include hardware DES,RSA, etc. to speed
> things up.

I am thinking mainly of finding this much rumored DES chip and trying it
out on a dedicated board.

I had another idea for an initial stepping stone:

are ISA cards DMA mapped?  If so, howabout a card that simply has the key
burned into it's virtual value, but only when it is properly activated?

You could easily achieve this by burning a simply program into an EEPROM,
and the activation could be something like punching in a code on a keypad
attached to the board or something.  (this comes to mind because I have a
friend that just finished burning some simple programs into EEPROMS and
building a simple keycode keypad, integrating them should be a weekend
project)  That way, I could do the encryption in software for the
specified 'secure' partition (until I can get my hands on a DES chip)
using the value returned by the EEPROMs as the key.

Sound feasable?

>   If one feals like haveing fun you might be able to use the card
> remotely, by sending the data (see why I don't want the card to be the
> interface) over the net and decrypting it localy, then useing it
> localy or re-encrypting it and sending it back to be used at the other
> end again.  This is more work, but usefull!

Hmm, that could work perhaps, but the main idea was to create a
transparant file system encoding system for once the data already is
local, there are certainly better packages out there for data transmission
security than anything that *I* could cook up...  Just look at the flack
that the Dolphin guys are getting just for even suggesting something like
that...

>   This would mean that the crypto key cards would need to be designed
> to be usefull in disks, or as keys in CPU's.  The more general the
> better.

I agree, but a file system CryptoStacker will be hard enough to implement
in the first place, I think that I will need to worry about that first.

>   If one want to play around one could try to have passwords to turn
> the cards on (digital text/voice, or phyical interface on the back of
> the card).

Ahh, should have read ahead...

I like that voice recognition concept though, but that sounds kind of like
a bells/whistles kind of thing too...

>   One problem I see with this is how low a level it works at, for
> instance blocks of disk are likely to expand/shrink with ecryption,
> but for this sort of interface we have to pad.  Uck.

Right, that is my main nightmare, what size blocks to use?  I just don't
quite understand how Stacker does it.

the way I see it we have a serious problem because there are at least two
different ways of getting data onto or off of a disk.  If it was one or
the other, I would be able to cope with it by intercepting that method and
changing it, but there are at least two fundamentally different ways,
reading by bytes and reading by variable length blocks.  I'm not sure if
it is possible to read by bits or not, I've certainly never needed to do
so, but a good scan through the PC interrupts might be necessary...

The size of a block of data would not change with DES encryption, would
it?  I might have a serious misunderstanding about how DES works if the
size *DOES** change...

Here is a though, the apparant ignorance of which is entirely due to the
fact that I just don't understand at all how Stacker works on an intercpet
level:

How about just encoding each byte seperately, that way I could intercept
the byte read/write no problem, and I could intercept the variable block
read/write in a similar manner, just break it down into a series of single
byte read/write cycles?

Is it possible to DES encode a single byte and have it remain a single
byte?  Is it a reasonably secure idea?

I would do some DES research, but I am mail only and it takes WEEKS to
poke around ftp sites through the mail, dig?  Perhaps someone could send
me a nice FAQ?

Perhaps someone knows of a nice method by which I *COULD* securely encode
a byte to a byte and have it remain a byte using keys and such?

I suppose you might have noticed by now, I am a very good software
engineer, and a pretty good structure programmer, but only a good machine
level programmer, and only a mediocre cryptologist, let's get all of that
straight right here.

>   I have in the back of my head an idea for a NFS like data (in the
> simple case disk) server.  How this might be done is murkey to me
> right now.
>   My first problem is deciding on where I want the decryption to
> happen.  We keep talking about doing it in the disk drive, but as my
> example above shows there is no reason to do it that way, and it's a
> lot safer to pump crypted data through a (maybe leeky) SCSI data cable
> then to have it all ready decrypted.
>   Maybe what this is trying to tell me is that there is a trueism
> about decrypting data as close as resonable to the use point (and NOT
> the source) as one can.

This is all well and good, but I think that getting the damned thing to
work at all will be a bitch, much less worrying about perfectly optimal
security...

>   Question is: Is there a good algorithm that can be done totaly in
> software, that gains more speed & security from beside memory general
> purpose decryption hardware and even more from dedicated cards?

This is my question exactly, what encryption algorithm...

>   This is really a protocall questoin, as we should be able to change
> the crypt algorithm weekly if we want (might need to do this!).

Oi, please... I am worried about finding ONE algorithm, you are already
thinking about implementing any number on infinities...

>   I wonder how this can work if I decide that I need not one, two or
> three crypt keys, but hundreds!  I can see that I am going to have
> just a few keys for the basic disk keys (can do one per disk) in
> hardware, and likely hundreds of others that can't (afford or
> effectivly) use dedicated hardware for.

Well I don't see why any relatively unlimited number of keys couldn't exist.

As for those people that can't afford to use dedicated hardware, there is
still the less secure idea of having the key stored on a floppy that would
be inserted at load time and read into memory.  This would have the
obvious disadvantage of having the key sitting around in memory, a sitting
duck (especially for people who leave their systems on all of the time,
like me, as soon and the Nazis learned about systems like these then 'Run
a key scanning program on the system to be confiscated' would just become
step one in their procedure, would be a hole even if the keys were
password protected) but it would be better than nothing at all, and the
speed problems could be dealt with by using the multiple partition method
that I described earlier, having a 'secure' virtual disk where all of your
data goes, and a seperate 'fast' virtual disk which is unencrypted where
all of your programs and such go.

>   Have fun, theres work to be done!
> 		||ugh Daniel
> 		hugh@toad.com

Yes, but you know, the more I think about it, the easier it looks... my
two main problems right now are: 

	1) What algorithm?  How?

	2) How the hell to intercept the read/write routines?


After that, the rest is just writing code.

Code I can do, code is no problem...


-Ryan
the Bit Wallah






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: hkhenson@cup.portal.com
Date: Thu, 3 Jun 93 12:01:24 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Hardware vs software
Message-ID: <9306030216.1.2999@cup.portal.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


RE this topic, there are methods (Merkle's for example) where you can get
multiple megabytes per second through a good encryption algorithm in a 
CPU.  DES is kind of optimised for doing it in hardware, so don't take
how slow it is in software as the limit for good encryption.  Keith
(Gnu posted the paper a long time ago in sci.crypt, but I don't know if
I can find it on my newer system.)




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: mulivor@orion.crc.monroecc.edu
Date: Wed, 2 Jun 93 22:57:42 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: E-Mail Baloney, Part 2
Message-ID: <9306030557.AA08285@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Here's a press release that came to me yesterday. In particular, see
last paragraph.

Phil Mulivor

---------------------------------------------------------------------
House of Representatives Announces Public Electronic Mail Service

To: National Desk
Contact: Lance Koonce of the Committee on House Administration,
         202-225-7922

   WASHINGTON, June 2 /U.S. Newswire/ -- Chairman Charlie Rose and
Ranking Minority Member Bill Thomas of the Committee on House
Administration announced today the pilot program of the Constituent
Electronic Mail System.
   This groundbreaking new service will allow citizens to communicate
directly with their Member of Congress by electronic mail. The
House of Representatives has established an electronic gateway
to the Internet, the vast computer network that is used currently
by over 12 million people worldwide. Participating Members
of the House have been assigned public mailboxes which may be
accessed by their constituents from their home computers.  In
addition, many libraries, schools and other public institutions
now provide, or soon will provide, public access to the Internet.
   The Members of the House of Representatives who have agreed to
participate in this pilot program are: Rep. Jay Dickey (AR-07),
Rep. Sam Gejdenson (CT-02), Rep. Newt Gingrich (GA-06), Rep. George
Miller (CA-07), Rep. Charlie Rose (NC-07), Rep. Fortney Pete Stark
(CA-13), and Rep. Melvin Watt (NC-12).  These Members will be
making announcements in their congressional districts within the
next few weeks to make their constituents aware of the new service.
   The Constituent Electronic Mail System represents a significant
effort by the House of Representatives to expand communication with
constituents.  With the tremendous growth of electronic mail over
the past several years, and the increasingly inter-connected nature
of computer networks, the new service is a natural addition to the
current methods of communication available to constituents.  At the
present time, House Members involved in the pilot program will
largely respond to electronic mail messages from their constituents
by postal mail, to ensure confidentiality.
   Constituents of House Members participating in the pilot program
who wish to communicate with those Members will be asked to send a
letter or postcard stating their interest to the Member's office.
The request will include the constituent's Internet "address," as
well as that constituent's name and postal address.  This process
will allow Members to identify an electronic mail user as his or
her constituent.
   The pilot e-mail program will continue until sufficient feedback
from participating offices has been collected to allow improvements
and modifications to the system.  When House Information Systems
and the Committee on House Administration are satisfied that the
system is sufficiently error-free, other Members of the House will
be allowed to add this new service as technical, budgetary and
staffing concerns allow.
   For more information, Internet users are encouraged to contact
the House of Representative's new on-line information service.
Please send a request for information to CONGRESS@HR.HOUSE.GOV.

 /U.S. Newswire  202-347-2770/




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: RYAN Alan Porter <ryan@rtfm.mlb.fl.us>
Date: Wed, 2 Jun 93 22:55:39 PDT
To: Jim McCoy <mccoy@ccwf.cc.utexas.edu>
Subject: Re: Crypto anarchy in a VW? (not the bug)
In-Reply-To: <199306021836.AA01020@flubber.cc.utexas.edu>
Message-ID: <Pine.3.03.9306030237.F18959-b100000@rtfm>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain




On Wed, 2 Jun 1993, Jim McCoy wrote:

> Mark <mark@coombs.anu.edu.au> writes:
> > 
> > >I still don't see why all of the actual encryption couldn't be done in 
> > >software though...
> > 
> > Me either, apart from TEMPEST issues...
> 
> Speed.  No software implementation will be able to match a hardware DES
> chip in total throughput.  I have enough trouble dealing with the drive
> transfer speeds imposed upon PC unix systems with the lame bus, but even
> this could keep up if I had to run my file access through a software DES
> system.  There are cards out there that can do this, and it doesn't really
> make sense not to offload this to an external device.

Yes, actually it does.  Hardware cannot be widely and freely distributed
the way software can.  I am looking to write something that can protect
EVERYONE, not just those people that can afford to buy some dedicated
hardware.  

Would PGP be so widespread today if it required a hardware coprocessor?

> > Linux comes with slot in file system
> > modules (as detailed in a letter to Jim) that you can easily adapt to your
> > own uses. Ive been playing around with this idea for a while. Adding a
> > desfs(tm) (me :) to a linux kernel is not going to be that hard I think..
> > (touch wood).
> 
> Yes, the other thing that pushed me to linux (besides the larger user
> community) was the support for "drop-in" filesystems.  

I like the whole Unix idea for PC's in general, and Linux in particular,
but the fact remains that the people who need security the most (the
average schmuck out there in the business world or the kid running a BBS)
are most likely to be using a PC DOS-based system, and I am writing for them.

> 
> jim

-Ryan
the Bit Wallah









From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Jim McCoy <mccoy@ccwf.cc.utexas.edu>
Date: Thu, 3 Jun 93 00:58:38 PDT
To: ryan@rtfm.mlb.fl.us (RYAN Alan Porter)
Subject: Re: Crypto anarchy in a VW? (not the bug)
In-Reply-To: <Pine.3.03.9306030237.F18959-b100000@rtfm>
Message-ID: <199306030835.AA23736@tigger.cc.utexas.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text


Ryan Alan Porter <ryan@rtfm.mlb.fl.us> writes:
> Jim McCoy wrote:
[regarding why to use hardware for the encryption]
> > Speed.  No software implementation will be able to match a hardware DES
> > chip in total throughput. [...] There are cards out there that can do
> > this, and it doesn't really make sense not to offload this to an
> > external device. 
> 
> Yes, actually it does.  Hardware cannot be widely and freely distributed
> the way software can.  I am looking to write something that can protect
> EVERYONE, not just those people that can afford to buy some dedicated
> hardware.  

This is true, but I am not completely writing-off those without the ability
to get a hardware card: they will just have to put up with the, IMHO,
unbearable slowness of doing filesystem encryption through software.  I am
also examining the log-structured filesystem (Rosenblum and Osterhout) to
see if using that as the core to add the encryption to will make the system
useable without hardware.  Additionally, perhaps the fact that there is
some real use for a hardware DES card will get people to buy them and
increase their availability in general...

> Would PGP be so widespread today if it required a hardware coprocessor?

No.  Then again PGP is for encrypting _files_, not filesystems.  We are
talking several orders of magnitude difference in the amount of data you
are trying to force through them.  I guess part of the difference in
viewpoints we have is that I am spoiled on unix.  I have become used to the
high-bandwidth drives and networks that I use every day and would not be
able to stand the bottleneck created by doing the encryption in software.

> I like the whole Unix idea for PC's in general, and Linux in particular,
> but the fact remains that the people who need security the most (the
> average schmuck out there in the business world or the kid running a BBS)
> are most likely to be using a PC DOS-based system, and I am writing for them.

Yes, a crypto drop-in that works like Stacker would be a good thing to have
available and I wish you the best of luck in your efforts.  On the general
DOS side though, I can run DOS under linux and have a DOS filesystem within
a linux system as well (linux plug :)

Either way, good luck.

jim



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Eli Brandt <ebrandt@jarthur.Claremont.EDU>
Date: Thu, 3 Jun 93 08:57:46 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: remailer flakiness
Message-ID: <9306031448.AA16547@cygnus.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I've been off the net for a few weeks, and my remailer's been
running on auto-pilot.  Checking my mail, I found that a
number of messages for the remailer had ended up in my
mailbox instead.  However, logs also indicate that a fair bit of
traffic went through the remailer, apparently successfully.
A test of the remailer turned up no problems.

If anybody knows or suspects that a message sent through me did
indeed not get through, I'll bounce all of it back to myself for
reprocessing.  Otherwise, this might result in mail duplication.

   Eli   ebrandt@jarthur.claremont.edu




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Eric Hughes <hughes@soda.berkeley.edu>
Date: Thu, 3 Jun 93 08:57:38 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: CryptoStacker, long term vision
In-Reply-To: <Pine.3.03.9306030013.A18959-e100000@rtfm>
Message-ID: <9306031512.AA25490@soda.berkeley.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>This is tiring drivel concerning the CryptoStacker project.  

If you want help, it is wise not to recklessly insult those who are
offering it.  By your own admission, you do not have a lot of
experience here; you seem to be saying "I know exactly what I don't
know," which, may I add, is a common delusion of the inexperienced.

You seem to have fixed a model of how the encrypted disk would work
and don't want to debate it.  The model is exactly that which requires
the most scrutiny, because it has the most far reaching effects.  If
the model is flawed somehow, that's what you want to know before you
begin, not six months later.

I take it that you want people to use this software after it is
written.  if so, then pay close attention to user acceptance issues
such as performance and key handling.  You neglect them at your own
risk.

Your model seems to be that of intercepting interrupts to the disk.
This could be made to work, but is the wrong way to do it.  If you
insist on that, though, any good PC reference book will tell you what
the disk interrupt vector in the BIOS is.  Ralf Brown's interrupt list
also contains the relevant data in schematic form.

The proper way to do this is as a device driver, however.  Grabbing
interrupts is messy and prone to interference.  Many anti-virus
programs monitor the disk interrupt to make sure that nobody uses it
unauthorized.  A device driver is the intended way to create new
devices, like an encrypted disk.  There are complete books about
writing device drivers; you will need one of these or some other good
DOS programming book which explains how to write one.  There are
lots of subtleties about them.

I would suggest that you first version just be a device driver that
has no encryption, but only the hook for it.  The device driver
skeleton for a disk will be difficult enough, as you have to support a
whole lot of operations just so you can have a place to put the
encryption.  This is exactly the software infrastructure problem in
another context.

After you have a device driver skeleton working, you can add both
hardware and software encryption modules.  There is no need to be
exclusive about this.  It is clear to me from your comments that you
haven't timed any DES routines and done a calculation of increased
latency times, and although I hate to see code development go to
waste, it's your time, not mine.

As far as picking an encryption algorithm, use DES.  DES is the
fastest symmetric keyed block cipher that is thought to be reasonably
secure.  DES is not particularly fast in software; it was designed as
a hardware standard and does lots of bit manipulations.  DES is fast
enough for serial communications, but that 1000 times less the
bandwidth than a hard disk.

Of course, you don't want to run DES in codebook (aka naive) mode.
(Codebook mode is where you just simply map block to block; the
problem is that identical blocks map to identical blocks.)  You'll
want some sort of other mode, like a counter mode, to make sure you
don't get identical ciphertexts.  It is also a bad idea to encrypt the
whole disk with one key; it makes brute force searches much easier.

Your keying material should be long.  I earlier suggested one key per
track.  These keys are going to have to be stored somewhere, and the
disk is the wrong place for it, clearly.  This implies that the user
is going to have to have some key-holding device (likely a diskette)
which will be necessary in order to unlock the partition.  the keying
material should be password protected.  This device will be have to
used at boot time if anything necessary to boot is stored on the
encrypted partition.

Keying material will need to be backed up.  This should be made as
painless as possible, otherwise there will be plenty of people losing
whole drives.

Keys in the driver should time out after some specifiable period.
Files that are open when the time-out occurs and the programs that
have them open are going to have to be dealt with gracefully.

This model of using a device driver means that there is going to have
to be at least two partitions on the disk: one to boot from, and one
to be encrypted.  The device driver itself and the operating system
can't be on the encrypted disk, because those components must be
loaded before the encrypted disk is accessible.  Most people are not
going to go out and buy a new disk to be the encrypted partition.
Thus, this is going to mean a full backup of the existing disk, an
operation with FDISK to do the partitioning, then, assuming the driver
works right the first time, restoring everything else on the encrypted
partition.  What is the effect of _this_ on user acceptance?

Eric




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Eric Hughes <hughes@soda.berkeley.edu>
Date: Thu, 3 Jun 93 08:57:21 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: CryptoStacker, long term vision
In-Reply-To: <Pine.3.03.9306030013.A18959-e100000@rtfm>
Message-ID: <9306031522.AA26005@soda.berkeley.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


A related topic to encrypted disk drives.  Anybody who has a desire to
see their data around long term makes backups of their drives.  At
least
one of these backups is usually physically near the drive in
question.

What good it is to have an encrypted disk if the backups are not also
encrypted?

Backups occur at the file system level, where an encrypted file system
does not appear encrypted, so that work here does not directly
leverage to encrypted backups.

Eric




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: elee9sf@Menudo.UH.EDU
Date: Thu, 3 Jun 93 08:59:10 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Another chaining utility
Message-ID: <199306031333.AA16241@Menudo.UH.EDU>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Hal wrote:

> I couldn't get Karl's hopmail.bat to run on my PC (not enough environment
> space?) so I wrote this in C and it works OK.

Say, is anybody else having this problem?  I wonder what the problem
is (environment space?)  PLEASE let me know about bugs or problems
with the scripts.  I'm going to be updating the dos versions pretty
soon, and will see if I can figure out what the space error means.

Thanks, Hal!

/-----------------------------------\
| Karl L. Barrus                    |
| elee9sf@menudo.uh.edu             | <- preferred address
| barrus@tree.egr.uh.edu (NeXTMail) |
\-----------------------------------/




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Eric Hughes <hughes@soda.berkeley.edu>
Date: Thu, 3 Jun 93 08:57:13 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Software infrastructure
In-Reply-To: <9306021548.AA19002@uahcs2.cs.uah.edu>
Message-ID: <9306031542.AA26387@soda.berkeley.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>If you want the other software developers to pick up encryption then
>you had better put it into some kinda kit or TPU. 

Agreed.  The less hassle, the more use.

Buzzword alert.  What is "TPU"?  And who makes "Async Pro", and what
exactly does that do?

Eric




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Karl Barrus <elee9sf@Menudo.UH.EDU>
Date: Thu, 3 Jun 93 08:58:41 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: HELP: pgp, .forward, mh
Message-ID: <199306031404.AA18382@Menudo.UH.EDU>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Situation: I'd like mail that arrives at my other account to be
encrypted and then forwarded to this account.  I have spent a few
hours trying various things and nothing seems to work.

I've tried this as my .forward file:

"| /myhome/pgp -fea barrus | mail elee9sf@menudo.uh.edu"

but all that arrives at elee9sf is a blank message.

I've tried

"| /myhome/remail.script"

where remail.script was a one-liner similar to the above.  Nothing.

Any suggestions?  Note:
1) barrus@tree.egr.uh.edu is a NeXT account.  Is NeXTSTEP just too
different for this stuff to work?
2) I'm running pgp2.1 on tree.egr, and don't have the old docs
anymore.  Was the -f option not present?
3) Anybody have a makefile for NeXT so I can upgrade?  I compiled 2.1
by hand editing some lines, but the task looks pretty daunting with
2.2.  I tried 'make mach' but that didn't get very far.


So, if that's impossible, how do I get my elee9sf account to do it?  I
use mh on menudo, and have tried

to barrus@tree.egr.uh.edu | A "/path/pgp -fea barrus | /path/rvcstore +tonext"

in my .maildelivery but that doesn't seem to fly either.  

Any suggestions?

/-----------------------------------\
| Karl L. Barrus                    |
| elee9sf@menudo.uh.edu             | <- preferred address
| barrus@tree.egr.uh.edu (NeXTMail) |
\-----------------------------------/




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Doug Porter <76244.315@CompuServe.COM>
Date: Thu, 3 Jun 93 08:59:18 PDT
To: Cypherpunks <cypherpunks@toad.com>
Subject: Re: CryptoStacker, long
Message-ID: <930603131226_76244.315_CHN36-1@CompuServe.COM>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


RYAN Alan Porter (unrelated AFAIK) asks:

> 	2) How the hell to intercept the read/write routines?

I can help with the guts of DOS, BIOS, network interfaces, etc. 
My development time is committed, but feel free to email me with 
questions, folks.

The simplest approach is probably Microsoft's Network Redirector 
interface. It's used for MSCDEX, and just about every LAN OS 
except Novell's, including Microsoft's own LAN Manager. A good 
reference is "Undocumented DOS" by Andrew Schulman et al. This 
is the only option discussed here I haven't used personally. It 
looks ideal for this application.

Another possibility is hooking the DOS API itself. This 
certainly works well; it's the way Netware does it. I've found 
it a lot of work. See IBM's "Disk Operating System" manual for 
details. There was a mainframe manual by the same name, so be 
sure you're getting the PC version.

Just under DOS itself is what Microsoft officially refers to as 
Device Drivers. Device drivers actually can be hooked in at many 
levels, of course, not just here. In this context MS calls disk 
drives "block devices". Block device drivers, or character 
device drivers for that matter, are not at all tough to write. 
They're probably a good second choice after the Network 
Redirector. A reference is the book "Writing MSDOS Device 
Drivers" by Robert Lai.

DOS internally often calls software interrupts 25 and 26 for 
disk io. These are apparently inconsistent from DOS version to 
version. Skip this layer. If you need to go this far down, go 
all the way to INT 13.

The lowest level of disk io short of hardware is INT 13. A good 
reference is Phoenix's "CBIOS Reference Manual". Watch out for 
quirks in INT 13's stack handling.

There's also a good bit you have to do to keep DOS and your 
driver from tripping over each other. Unless others feel it's 
appropriate to use this bandwidth, email me for details.

Doug





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Doug Porter <76244.315@CompuServe.COM>
Date: Thu, 3 Jun 93 08:59:14 PDT
To: Cypherpunks <cypherpunks@toad.com>
Subject: RE: Term software develo
Message-ID: <930603131241_76244.315_CHN36-2@CompuServe.COM>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Eric Hughes says:

> FOSSIL is . . . the only abstraction for serial communications 
the PC has . . .

There are at least 7 versions of INT 14. Then there's 
Ungerman-Bass's old INT 6B as well as two flavors of its 
successor, NASI/NCSI. There are also many variants of COMx 
device drivers. These are all serial line abstractions for the 
PC. There are others.

FOSSIL may be popular on BBSs, but NASI/NCSI is number one in 
the market. The oldest version of INT 14 is number two.

Who was it said "The nice thing about standards is that there 
are so many to choose from"? :-)

Doug





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Johan Helsingius <julf@penet.FI>
Date: Thu, 3 Jun 93 00:45:33 PDT
To: " L. Detweiler " <ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Subject: Re: whistle for Whistleblowing!
In-Reply-To: <9306020701.AA03726@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Message-ID: <9306030914.aa26400@penet.penet.FI>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



> Cypherpunks, alt.whistleblowing has been created!

... and supported by anon.penet.fi.

	Julf





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: smb@research.att.com
Date: Thu, 3 Jun 93 08:58:02 PDT
To: "J. Michael Diehl" <mdiehl@triton.unm.edu>
Subject: Re: WH email petition.
Message-ID: <9306031427.AA16225@cygnus.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


	 > they've just gotten smarter about how they do it...  Based on my past
	 > experience, your name will be collected -- but just as a person
	 > interested in certain issues, so that you can be solicited for funds
	 > on certain issues.

	 Does this really happen?  WOW!

Does it happen?  Sure did circa 20 years ago, when individual members
of Congress had much less computing capacity.  I wrote to members of
the House Judiciary committee demanding the impeachment of a certain
unindicted co-conspirator.  Over the next few years, I received a
variety of funds solicitation letters, as some of those folks tried
to move on to bigger and better offices.  The letters invariably
spoke of the members' ``bravery and courage of conviction'' during
the Watergate investigation, and noted my interest in that subject...




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: wcs@anchor.ho.att.com
Date: Thu, 3 Jun 93 08:57:59 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re:  Crypto anarchy in a VW? (not the bug)
Message-ID: <9306031432.AA23113@anchor.ho.att.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text


> >There are a lot of ways to get a signal around the world without using a 
> >satellite, ask any amateur radio enthusiast.  
I thought the motivation for satellite at the beginning of this discussion
was that it's extremely hard to find out WHO sent a transmission
to a satellite - everybody's got a dish pointed UP at the same destination,
the FCC isn't likely to go flying helicopters around to locate transmissions
that could have come from anywhere in the country, and there's really
nothing to direction-find on, and the receivers can similarly be anywhere,
since it's a broadcast network.  If the satellite uses some kind of protocol
such as AlohaNet, you get reasonable shared utilization.
(Of course, the alternatives to direction-finding are to go after the bird's
owners, or to jam the transmission channel.)  Moon-bounce offers similar
advantages, and there aren't any owners to trace :-), though jamming is
still possible.

Another technique that's pretty obscure, and relatively low data rate,
but pretty hard to trace, is meteor-burst, which reflects signals of the
ionization trails left by micrometeors.  Typical systems a few years ago
transmitted at 4800 baud, getting effective throughput of maybe 300 bps,
since the channel isn't constant.  It was used for applications like
sending snow depth reports back from mountains, since it needs very little
power and isn't particularly bothered by weather conditions.

Are networks like amateur packet radio hard to trace, assuming enough
repeaters are around?

> One of the really great techniques I've hear about recently is a data
> channel that runs at 90% T1 speed over the ~900 MHz spread spectrum

NCR WaveLAN, which is now also being OEMed by DEC, runs spread spectrum
at (I think) 2 Mbps, and can use an optional DES chip for encryption.
The PC cards are compatible with some vanilla Ethernet card,
so it uses standard Ethernet protocols.  In broadcast mode, range is only
a few hundred meters, depending on building configurations, but
it can also be used with a directional antenna to get 5-6 mile range.

			Bill Stewart




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: fergp@sytex.com (Paul Ferguson)
Date: Thu, 3 Jun 93 08:57:43 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Solidarity (kudos)
Message-ID: <qLPk5B1w165w@sytex.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
 
I couldn't resist the opportunity to x-post this to the list,
especially now that it makes me feel foolish for once suspecting
the possibility of foul play at UUNet. My hat is off to Nat and all
the folks at UUNet Technologies who share his views. Kudos.
 
8<------- Begin Forwarded Message -----------
 
From: nrh@daimajin.UU.NET (Nat Howard)
Newsgroups: alt.privacy.clipper
Subject: another letter to the president
Date: 2 Jun 1993 19:41:01 -0400
Organization: UUNET Technologies Inc, Falls Church, VA, USA
Lines: 41
NNTP-Posting-Host: daimajin.uu.net
Summary: dump clipper
 
 
Date:    Wed, 02 Jun 1993 12:49:46 EDT
To:      PRESIDENT@WHITEHOUSE.GOV, VICE.PRESIDENT@WHITEHOUSE.GOV
 
From:    Nat Howard <nrh>
Subject: Clipper initiative of 4/16/93
 
 
Sirs,
 
As a citizen working in the communications field, I am gravely
concerned by the 4/16/93 Clipper Chip initiative.  
 
I believe that the initiative as proposed cannot accomplish its stated
goals, and will, if carried out, be poisonous to American business
attempts to compete in the secure communications field.
 
Far more important is the apparent denial in the press release of our
First, Second, Fourth, Ninth, and Tenth Amendment rights:
        ... nor is the U.S. saying that "every
     American, as a matter of right, is entitled to an
     unbreakable commercial encryption product."
 
I urge you to consider these actions instead:
 
     1. Lift export controls on all cryptographic hardware and software.
 
     2. Have the NSA work with NIST to produce a publicly-described
        algorithm, suitable for either hardware or software
        implementation, that can serve for the next 15 years as a
        follow-on to DES.
 
     3. Find some fair and legal way so that all US Citizens can use,
        royalty-free and without other restriction,
        the public-key algorithms now patented by PKP.
 
A lot of us have hopes for the human rights aspect of the Clinton-Gore
ticket. Please don't let us down: withdraw, abandon, or greatly modify
the Clipper Chip initiative.
 
I emphasize that I speak here as a private citizen, and my remarks
don't necessarily reflect the feelings of UUNET.
 
8<------- End of Forwarded Message ---------
 
 
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.2
 
iQCVAgUBLA4NhZRLcZSdHMBNAQGJjQP/Ty6YCVBsrNfmfWiuyRK/GWHvwkLBy5tE
bJOUmwnyP2nD/febFSeIPSoheKEpvVNg6nZUM7BTNPAQ5SM+papyujs5NtQNbiGT
TLLS55K0X+904Iszn3ROzc/QJNaQ/RSj+7vuI+yq3L9dTcOrbKNpnU/KePkISeIp
toFDESkZDnY=
=F+B7
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

Paul Ferguson               |  The future is now.
Network Integrator          |  History will tell the tale;
Centreville, Virginia USA   |  We must endure and struggle
fergp@sytex.com             |  to shape it.
 
          Stop the Wiretap (Clipper/Capstone) Chip.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Mark <mark@coombs.anu.edu.au>
Date: Wed, 2 Jun 93 18:24:26 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Term software development/design
Message-ID: <9306030124.AA00799@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Those of you with a 386 or greater and over 40Mb Hd (most of the
pc's these days are usable) might want to take a look at running
linux/386bsd/netbsd at home and then running term(1). It's a
program with it's own packetising, compression of data (which is
good for a quick and nasty anti-tap system) and you can telnet, 
rsh, ftp, finger etc all from the unix command line of your home
machine. Uploads etc can all be done at the same time as you read
mail on a remote host.

the lastest version is term107.tar.z and should be avaliable from
most archie sites. It has #defs for suns, nexts, hps, linux etc.
When i find the guy who wrote the telnet client for it I'll probably
add des encryption to it.

The above is for plain modem usage, it's a semi tcp link at home and
you can dial anywhere and link up in seconds, no special system file
changes, just compile the remote binary and you're away. If you're
just using the dialup host as a bouncer then all that is running is
one innocuous looking binary, even though you might have several
ftp's and telnets etc running at once. Honestly it's an admins
nightmare.

Linux etc also has slip and inet options if you want to explore
those. The only problems I find are people being unable to listen
(usefully) to your sessions and killing the line :)

Most of the tools are written I find, all thats needed is the adding
of encryption to them for a totally secure session. No need to write
another term program, just use whats out there.

Mark
mark@coombs.anu.edu.au



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: pat@tstc.edu (Patrick E. Hykkonen)
Date: Thu, 3 Jun 93 11:27:14 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: RE: CryptoStacker - Suggestions
In-Reply-To: <9306031512.AA25490@soda.berkeley.edu>
Message-ID: <9306031827.AA05452@tstc.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> This model of using a device driver means that there is going to have
> to be at least two partitions on the disk: one to boot from, and one
> to be encrypted.  The device driver itself and the operating system
> can't be on the encrypted disk, because those components must be
> loaded before the encrypted disk is accessible.  Most people are not
> going to go out and buy a new disk to be the encrypted partition.
> Thus, this is going to mean a full backup of the existing disk, an
> operation with FDISK to do the partitioning, then, assuming the driver
> works right the first time, restoring everything else on the encrypted
> partition.  What is the effect of _this_ on user acceptance?

Why not have the device driver create a file (possibly of varying sizes) on 
the hard drive which the encryption device driver then makes look like another
drive?!?  This is how the compression programs work, seems to me a pretty
viable way to solve the encrypted drive problem as well.  A good place to start
on this would be something like DOS's VDISK device driver, it maps a portion
of RAM into a RAM-disk... a good way to understand how a DOS device driver 
should map something that has no disk-like characteristics into disk-like
characteristics.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: mab@vax135.att.com
Date: Thu, 3 Jun 93 12:37:34 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Unix Crypto File System paper
Message-ID: <9306031922.AA09035@vax135.UUCP>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Hi,

Some of you have sent me mail asking about my cryptographic file system
for Unix; it was the subject of a work-in-progress presentation at the
January Usenix conference.  I have a draft of a paper that you may find
helpful; I just got off the phone with our lawyer and finally have the
release to send it out, so if you'd like a copy of the draft, send me
your email (for postscript) or physical (for dead trees) address.  Before
you ask: the software also may be released, but that's a longer
process and it isn't really "ready for prime time" yet anyway.

The paper is just a draft, and also has some bugs in it, but some of it
seems relevant to the discussion here on similar projects for PCish
machines.

Here's the abstract:

========
Although cryptographic techniques are playing an increasingly
important role in modern computing system security, user-level tools
for encrypting file data are cumbersome and suffer from a number of
inherent vulnerabilities.  The Cryptographic File System (CFS) offers
an alternative to ad hoc user-level encryption for protecting file
data.  CFS supports secure storage at the system level through a
standard Unix file system interface to encrypted files.  Users can
associate a cryptographic key with any directories they wish to
protect.  Files in these directories (as well as their pathname
components) are transparently encrypted and decrypted with the
specified key without further user intervention; cleartext is never
stored on a disk or sent to a remote file server.  CFS can use any
available file system for its underlying storage without modification,
including distributed file systems such as NFS.  System management
functions, such as file backup, work in a normal manner and without
knowledge of the key.

This paper describes the design and implementation of CFS under Unix.
Encryption techniques for file system-level encryption are
described, and general issues of cryptographic system interfaces to
support routine secure computing are discussed.
========

-matt
mab@research.att.com




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: eichin@cygnus.com (Mark Eichin)
Date: Thu, 3 Jun 93 16:38:58 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: [comp.os.linux.announce] New loop devices, even with DES encryption
Message-ID: <9306032338.AA19180@cygnus.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


If you actually want to see the linux loopback code I mentioned,
here's the real announcement.					_Mark_

------- Start of forwarded message -------
From: almesber@nessie.cs.id.ethz.ch (Werner Almesberger)
Newsgroups: comp.os.linux.announce
Subject: New loop devices, even with DES encryption
Keywords: loop devices, DES, mount regular files
Date: 1 Jun 93 20:13:47 GMT
Followup-To: comp.os.linux
Organization: Swiss Federal Institute of Technology (ETH), Zurich, CH

Version 0 of the new loop devices patch is in

    tsx-11.mit.edu:/pub/linux/BETA/loop
and nic.funet.fi:/pub/OS/Linux/BETA/loop

The files are:

lo.0.tar.z	The loop devices patch
des.0.tar.z	DES-encryption for the kernel

Note: If you're FTPing from outside the U.S. or Canada, please get the
      DES patch from nic.funet.fi, because of the well-known US export
      restrictions.

(DES encryption is optional. The loop devices also work without it.)

Loop devices give you the ability to mount file systems from regular
files. Additionally, you can use them to have more than one file system
on one partition and to have transparent on-line encryption of all your
data.

The loop devices patch is relative to ALPHA 0.99pl10, but it'll
probably work with 0.99pl9 and 0.99pl10 too. The DES patch should work
with any recent kernel.

This is a new implementation of loop devices by Theodore Ts'o, I'm just
maintaining the code. Unlike my old loop devices, which are also in some
versions of SLS, the new loop devices will continue to work after
variable block sizes are added to the kernel.

The DES code is derived from Eric Young's DES library. I originally
wanted to use UFC crypt, but its memory requirements make it a bit
difficult to handle. Maybe later.

- Werner
-- 
   _________________________________________________________________________
  / Werner Almesberger, ETH Zuerich, CH      almesber@nessie.cs.id.ethz.ch /
 /_IFW_A44__Tel._+41_1_254_7213__________________almesber@bernina.ethz.ch_/
------- End of forwarded message -------



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: fnerd@smds.com (FutureNerd Steve Witham)
Date: Thu, 3 Jun 93 19:31:09 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Secure transport layer paper
Message-ID: <9306032110.AA06199@smds.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


There's a paper in the Feb. '93 _IEEE Transactions on Software 
Engineering_:

"Trust Requirements and Performance of a Fast Subtransport-Level
Protocol for Secure Communication" by P. Venkat Rangan

It's about a protocol called Authenticated Datagram Protocol,
and issues about using it in a "subtransport level."  He's
tried it on Suns.

The work was done at Berkeley in 1990, the guy's at UCSD now.

-fnerd




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: nobody@shell.portal.com
Date: Thu, 3 Jun 93 17:17:36 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Software infrastructure
Message-ID: <9306040011.AA22327@jobe.shell.portal.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


In thinking more about Eric's proposal for a terminal program, I can
see the value in putting in the hooks for stream encryption even if we
don't implement it right away.  That should be one of the points of
this software, to have it be easily expandable.  So we would want to
make it so that a layer could be inserted just above the serial I/O
layer which would do transparent encryption.  The mechanism for
creating the shared keys could be added later, perhaps.

We are seeing a lot of different suggestions here, which is good at
this point.  Some of the issues:

Overall functionality

To keep our focus: we want something which will help the average
computer user who has a PC or something similar at home be able to use
encryption easily in sending and receiving email.

The problem is that people send and receive mail in very many
different ways.  So we propose to provide a very flexible and
extensible solution that can be adapted to many situations.  This
leads to the idea of a terminal program with built-in encryption,
since most people can use a terminal program to get their mail.

This would not be aimed at people running UUCP or similar fancy
protocols on their home machines.  They must be pretty sophisticated
to get this stuff working.  PGP and RIPEM already come with a bunch of
scripts to let them be used in Unix and similar environments.  (Maybe
I'm mistaken, though, in thinking that good solutions already exist
for these people.  I don't know much about this mode of operation.)

Build or Buy

Do we roll our own or do we try to tap into an existing program?
Among existing terminal programs, do we: try to provide add-ons to
widely used commercial or shareware programs (for which we don't have
source); try to convince the authors of these programs to make the
changes we desire; or find such a program which has source available
(e.g. kermit) and take that as our starting point?

Target OS

We have seen suggestions for DOS, Windows, Unix, and Linux (about
which I know nothing).  DOS and Windows are the biggest target market
and the most likely to be used by the naive users we are trying to
help, IMO.  It would not be too hard to write for DOS but to isolate
the OS dependencies so it could be easily moved to Unix (and perhaps
Linux).

But the DOS vs Windows decision is more fundamental.  More generally,
it is the command-line vs GUI decision.  It's very hard to write code
which is portable across these two approaches.  I would lean towards the
command line approach because it is easier to write portable code, in
my experience (portable between DOS and Unix, say, is easier than
portable between Windows, X, and Mac).  But just fixing on Windows is
another option.

Serial Interface

Focusing on DOS, apparently there are several ways of interfacing to
the serial port.  I know nothing about these.  The main issues would
be portability - does it require the user to have some third-party
software, or to run on only a limited subset of PC clones - and
efficiency - can we run at 9.6 or 14.4 Kbaud?  What solutions
accomplish both of these?

And what if we went with Windows?  Does that narrow our options?

User Interface

I still think this is one of the harder issues.  How exactly can we
make this easy to use?  Can anyone suggest a non-magical (e.g. no
mind-reading) but still ideal interface for encryption?  I kind of
liked Greg's suggestion of using the rollback buffer for decryption -
when it sees an encrypted message go by it automatically decrypts it
and offers it to the user to see.  I'm not exactly sure what you do
with it then, though.



It would be helpful for me to hear more about how people read and send
mail on their home computers, in some detail.  If Mike Diehl got
enough responses to his survey that would be good to hear about, too.

Hal Finney
74076.1041@compuserve.com





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: RYAN Alan Porter <ryan@rtfm.mlb.fl.us>
Date: Thu, 3 Jun 93 15:21:09 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Clipper on CNN HN
Message-ID: <Pine.3.03.9306031754.A27276-c100000@rtfm>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



The current CNN Headline News has a spot on the Clipper chip airing after
the Sports section, I just barely caught it by accident.  I have to leave
now to do some consulting, but I have my VCR set up to record it the next
time around.

Summary of the tape:

____BEGIN SUMMARY____

	The Clinton Administration is developing, along with the NSA and
the NIST a chip which will ensure private communications between
telephones and fax machines and such.  Current plans are for the keys to
be held in escrow by two seperate (unnamed) government agencies.
	Much was made about the objections made by people at the NIST
hearings about the questionable constitutionality of the chip and a direct
quote was aired by a woman saying during the hearings that 'the chip would
expand the powers of the government to invade the privacy of citizens to
even greater than what it already is' (paraphrase) and also about the
objections of companies who are afraid of being blackballed and prevented
from doing business unless they use the chip.  
	There was a small hint of a fear that the 'voluntary' status of
using the chip would not last for long.
	Also, AT&T (surprise) has apparantly announced that it is already
developing a system using the chip and showed a prototype on the air.  It
seemed to be a lot larger than necessary, a huge black box with a little
LCD display saying 'secure' and whatnot when you activated clipper security.
	There was an interview with a fed type who repeated all of the old
stale arguments about making conversations secure for him but not for the
criminals.

____END SUMMARY____

I think that the spot was definitely leaning toward exposing the
objections that people have toward the chip, even if the people at CNN
didn't really understand for sure what those objections are.

The whole thing might have been a little unclear for the average Joe as to
what the real problem is with this newfangled system, and I think that
more uninformed coverage like this is likely to turn people against us;
they may start to see us as the bad guys, a bunch of people who are
against privacy by our objection to this thing.

Anyway, now that it has hit CNN, it is officially mainstream and it may
well become a hot, trendy news item.  What we need now are hoardes of
people who will volunteer to be consulted with as 'experts' on the issue
for local news and such.


Gotta go now, gotta write some code...


Try to catch the spot.


-Ryan
the Bit Wallah









From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: m5@vail.tivoli.com (Mike McNally)
Date: Thu, 3 Jun 93 15:59:13 PDT
To: ryan@rtfm.mlb.fl.us (RYAN Alan Porter)
Subject: Re: Clipper on CNN HN
In-Reply-To: <Pine.3.03.9306031754.A27276-c100000@rtfm>
Message-ID: <9306032258.AA19159@vail.tivoli.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> The current CNN Headline News has a spot on the Clipper ...
> 
> I think that the spot was definitely leaning toward exposing the
> objections ...

I hope they've got a new clip.  The one I saw about 2 weeks ago 
was lead into with the statement that "some fear the new scheme 
might compromise the privacy rights of criminals."  Duhhh.   The
first sound bite was an FBI dude saying that he didn't think that
"child molesters, drug lords, bombers, snipers, terrorists, and
kidnappers" have any right to privacy.

It went downhill from there, ending with a weak 5 second statement 
from somebody at CPSR (weak, no doubt, because of editing, not
lack of CPSR concern).


Mike McNally





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Eric Hughes <hughes@soda.berkeley.edu>
Date: Thu, 3 Jun 93 18:05:09 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Hardware vs software
In-Reply-To: <9306030216.1.2999@cup.portal.com>
Message-ID: <9306040101.AA05981@soda.berkeley.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>DES is kind of optimised for doing it in hardware, so don't take
>how slow it is in software as the limit for good encryption.

I wasn't saying that DES was the fastest of all possible secure
ciphers.  I was saying that DES is the fastest of all ciphers which
are widely believed to be secure.  This aspect of security is
moderated by the key length of DES, which is too short to be secure
against a well-funded opponent at present, but which is perfectly
adequate for other purposes.

Eric




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Eric Hughes <hughes@soda.berkeley.edu>
Date: Thu, 3 Jun 93 18:10:18 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: snake oil
In-Reply-To: <Pine.3.05.9306031942.B29415-a100000@jupiter>
Message-ID: <9306040106.AA06151@soda.berkeley.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>  (As it happens, I happen to
>have what I **think** is a new approach to cyphering, 

Post away.  If you upload a copy of the source to the directory
pub/cypherpunks/incoming on the ftp site, I'll make it available to
everyone.

I would like to see this regardless of whether it actually is secure.
It is a well-founded maxim that no one should design a cipher without
having broken a few first.  There is a need, apropos of training the
desginers, for insecure ciphers, not so they can be deployed, but so
that other insecure ciphers will not be.

Eric




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Eric Hughes <hughes@soda.berkeley.edu>
Date: Thu, 3 Jun 93 18:25:05 PDT
To: ryan@rtfm.mlb.fl.us
Subject: Clipper on CNN HN
In-Reply-To: <Pine.3.03.9306031754.A27276-c100000@rtfm>
Message-ID: <9306040121.AA06595@soda.berkeley.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>The current CNN Headline News has a spot on the Clipper chip airing after
>the Sports section, 

It is likely that this is a new clip rather than the old one.  There
is a large class of stories for which the print media drive the
televisual.  See _Bad Day at Black Rock_ for a first hand account of
this.  The CBS News staff read the New York Times every morning to
figure out what to cover.  In all likelihood they've just picked up
the story from Newsweek, slant and all.

It is because of mechanisms such as these that it is vital that people
get out there and start talking to local press, of whatever kind.  The
media predate on each other's research.  Getting the story out
_anywhere_ is useful, because it will frequently trigger more
coverage, and we desire the escalation of coverage.

We must make ourselves heard widely because if we can bring the
wiretap chip to public debate, we will have won.  The languor of
apathy creates a veil of secrecy for the public equally as effective
as lies and denials.  If we can get enough press coverage about this,
it will become an "issue".  One of the best things we could hope for
is that "Nightline" will have Ray Kammer v. Whit Diffie.  Public
opinion will not sit well with making it illegal to keep secrets.

Phone calls to CNN, asking for explanations of that short story will
help, hint, hint.

Eric




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Timothy Newsham <newsham@wiliki.eng.hawaii.edu>
Date: Thu, 3 Jun 93 21:31:26 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: good day
Message-ID: <9306040431.AA17279@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Ahh.. what a good day it was today!
I am currently logged in to my UNIX account
from home.  I am sitting here mailing you guys, and
everything I type is being sent over the modem
in encrypted form.
I worked out some very irritating bugs in
my software and have my link protocol up and
running pretty reliably.  It still needs some
cleaning up.

I will be cleaning it up a little and running
it on a few different platforms to test it out.
The code is basically the same as the unix end
I mailed out to several people earlier (with just
3 or 4 lines changed),  but I now have a good, 
functional VT100 end for my amiga.

I will post here after I clean up and test
the code a little and get it ready for "release".
So if you're interested, basically just wait.
But I am looking for people who are willing
to port to other platforms.  The common code
should need no porting, what needs to be done
really is to find a good P.D. term program in
source form and modify it (this is what I have
done).  The common code was written with this
in mind and it shouldnt be terribly hard
(simply replacing writes to screen and
serial with encoding/decoding routines and
then outputting the results,  and small things
like providing the user a way to turn on
and off the encryption).

                        Tim




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Marc Horowitz <marc@GZA.COM>
Date: Thu, 3 Jun 93 15:53:03 PDT
To: Nickey MacDonald <i6t4@jupiter.sun.csd.unb.ca>
Subject: Re: snake oil
In-Reply-To: <Pine.3.05.9306031942.B29415-a100000@jupiter>
Message-ID: <9306032252.AA12490@dun-dun-noodles.aktis.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>> If I just dreamed up a new gee whiz "new" cypher, should I post it to the
>> list for comments, or is this frowned on?  (As it happens, I happen to
>> have what I **think** is a new approach to cyphering, and the answer to this
>> question will determine wheter anyone hears about it or not...)

This list is, IMHO, for the discussion of privacy enforced by
technology in the hands of the user..  New approaches (like remailers
or money algorithms) are within the domain of this group.  New
encryption algorithms are better discussed in the newsgroup sci.crypt.

I admit that I'm a bit skeptical.  So far, every new encryption scheme
someone has proposed here has either been trivially defeated, or done
before.  I'm tired of showing how most schemes are reducible to a
one-time pad or codebook :-)

In any case, I think there are more experienced cryptographers on
sci.crypt than on this list, but I could be wrong.

		Marc




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Eric Hughes <hughes@soda.berkeley.edu>
Date: Thu, 3 Jun 93 18:58:26 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Work the work!
In-Reply-To: <Pine.3.05.9306032228.F29415-a100000@jupiter>
Message-ID: <9306040154.AA07862@soda.berkeley.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>I have shied away from any "political" action against Clipper because I am
>unsure how a Canadian can help...  

Preempt government restrictions by fighting for the explicit right to
strong cryptography.  Point out how those foolish folks south are
going to screw themselves over by government mandated cryptography.

One of the arguments that is being made in this country against the
wiretap chip is that it will harm overseas business.  In Canada you
can turn this around and show what a great economic boon you have
available.  You can point out that the US has abandoned their foreign
markets in secure communications, which will, of course, be the only
kind of communications of the future.

Get Northern Telecom on your side.

Eric




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Nickey MacDonald <i6t4@jupiter.sun.csd.unb.ca>
Date: Thu, 3 Jun 93 15:13:25 PDT
To: cypherpunks list <cypherpunks@toad.com>
Subject: Re: snake oil
In-Reply-To: <9305281652.AA13454@soda.berkeley.edu>
Message-ID: <Pine.3.05.9306031942.B29415-a100000@jupiter>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


This raises a question...  I don't think this has been addressed yet (I
am a bit behind in my mail) and might be worthwhile putting in the FAQ...

If I just dreamed up a new gee whiz "new" cypher, should I post it to the
list for comments, or is this frowned on?  (As it happens, I happen to
have what I **think** is a new approach to cyphering, and the answer to this
question will determine wheter anyone hears about it or not...)

Is there a comprehensive list of short "already been done" types of
cyphers?  (Whether failed or "still" succesful.)  A good book?

---
Nick MacDonald               | NMD on IRC
i6t4@jupiter.sun.csd.unb.ca  | PGP 2.1 Public key available via finger


On Fri, 28 May 1993, Eric Hughes wrote:

> >I, for one, will never use any crypto system for which the algorithm
> >hasn't been extensively published and scrutinized.
> 
> I am in total agreement.






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Stanton McCandlish <anton@hydra.unm.edu>
Date: Thu, 3 Jun 93 18:50:17 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: the right platform for these projects
Message-ID: <9306040150.AA04811@hydra.unm.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I agree wholeheartedly that a commandline, portable, version should come
first. Porting that separately to X, Win, Mac, etc will not be nearly the
chore that porting a Windows app to Unix will be.  

Re: the ubiquity of Windows:
LOTS of people have Windows. But...
The idea that new machine sales are mostly Windows machines is given the
lie somewhat by the fact that they are also all DOS machines, and that
Windows is just bundled.  Many people don't install it due to the disk
space leeching.  And a LOT of people with Windows don't use it for comm
stuff because Windows + comm = nightmare.

So yes, make a Windows version.  NO don't start with a windows version.
One of your biggest markets will be the BBS crowd, 90+% of whom use DOS,
not Windows, for comm apps. 

And I still heartily recommend tackling this from several different
angles. Sure make a new term, but also get Telix, et all to go along with
it.  Get Fido-tech mailer makers to support the ^ENC "standard", etc. -- 
        When marriage is outlawed only outlaws will be inlaws!
Stanton McCandlish,  SysOp:  Noise in the Void DataCenter Library BBS
Internet anton@hydra.unm.edu     IndraNet: 369:1/1      FidoNet: 1:301/2     
Snail: 1811-B Coal Pl. SE, Albuquerque, New Mexico 87108 USA
Data phone: +1-505-246-8515 (24hr, 1200-14400 v32bis, N-8-1)
Vox phone:  +1-505-247-3402 (bps rate varies, depends on if you woke me up...:)



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Perry E. Metzger" <pmetzger@lehman.com>
Date: Thu, 3 Jun 93 16:55:05 PDT
To: Nickey MacDonald <i6t4@jupiter.sun.csd.unb.ca>
Subject: Re: snake oil
In-Reply-To: <Pine.3.05.9306031942.B29415-a100000@jupiter>
Message-ID: <9306032354.AA12581@snark.shearson.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Nickey MacDonald says:
> This raises a question...  I don't think this has been addressed yet (I
> am a bit behind in my mail) and might be worthwhile putting in the FAQ...
> 
> If I just dreamed up a new gee whiz "new" cypher, should I post it to the
> list for comments, or is this frowned on?  (As it happens, I happen to
> have what I **think** is a new approach to cyphering, and the answer to this
> question will determine wheter anyone hears about it or not...)

My suggestion is this.

Its perfectly appropriate to post the cypher to the list PROVIDED you
take the right attitude, which is to say something like:

"The following is something I just thought up. I'm not a pro, and I
worry that this thing has holes. Anyone care to give me hints on what
they might be?"

My objection has never been to people developing new cypher systems.
Its always been to people claiming, in the absense of very strong
attempts to break their system, that their system is secure. Provided
you aren't trying to encourage people to use a new system you are
developing, what harm can discussing it possibly do? On the other
hand, great harm can be caused by fools pushing systems they have
designed in the absense of expertise -- that was specifically the sort
of objection I had to the whole "Dolphin Encrypt" thing.

Sci.crypt is likely a better place to post a query about a new cypher,
of course.

> Is there a comprehensive list of short "already been done" types of
> cyphers?  (Whether failed or "still" succesful.)  A good book?

I would suggest looking in the sci.crypt FAQ -- its got lots of good
intro material and reading lists.

Perry




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: kelly@netcom.com (Kelly Goen)
Date: Thu, 3 Jun 93 20:28:17 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: (fwd) [comp.os.linux.announce] New loop devices, even with DES encryption
Message-ID: <9306040328.AA26468@netcom.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Organization: NETCOM On-line Communication Services (408 241-9760 guest)

Path: netcom.com!netcomsv!decwrl!elroy.jpl.nasa.gov!usc!howland.reston.ans.net!agate!usenet
From: almesber@nessie.cs.id.ethz.ch (Werner Almesberger)
Newsgroups: comp.archives
Subject: [comp.os.linux.announce] New loop devices, even with DES encryption
Followup-To: comp.os.linux.announce
Date: 4 Jun 1993 01:35:22 GMT
Organization: Swiss Federal Institute of Technology (ETH), Zurich, CH
Lines: 42
Sender: adam@soda
Approved: adam@soda
Distribution: world
Message-ID: <1um8sq$86e@agate.berkeley.edu>
References: <1993Jun1.201347.7433@klaava.Helsinki.FI>
NNTP-Posting-Host: soda.berkeley.edu
X-Original-Newsgroups: comp.os.linux.announce
X-Original-Date: Tue, 1 Jun 1993 20:13:47 GMT

Archive-name: auto/comp.os.linux.announce/New-loop-devices-even-with-DES-encryption

Version 0 of the new loop devices patch is in

    tsx-11.mit.edu:/pub/linux/BETA/loop
and nic.funet.fi:/pub/OS/Linux/BETA/loop

The files are:

lo.0.tar.z	The loop devices patch
des.0.tar.z	DES-encryption for the kernel

Note: If you're FTPing from outside the U.S. or Canada, please get the
      DES patch from nic.funet.fi, because of the well-known US export
      restrictions.

(DES encryption is optional. The loop devices also work without it.)

Loop devices give you the ability to mount file systems from regular
files. Additionally, you can use them to have more than one file system
on one partition and to have transparent on-line encryption of all your
data.

The loop devices patch is relative to ALPHA 0.99pl10, but it'll
probably work with 0.99pl9 and 0.99pl10 too. The DES patch should work
with any recent kernel.

This is a new implementation of loop devices by Theodore Ts'o, I'm just
maintaining the code. Unlike my old loop devices, which are also in some
versions of SLS, the new loop devices will continue to work after
variable block sizes are added to the kernel.

The DES code is derived from Eric Young's DES library. I originally
wanted to use UFC crypt, but its memory requirements make it a bit
difficult to handle. Maybe later.

- Werner
-- 
   _________________________________________________________________________
  / Werner Almesberger, ETH Zuerich, CH      almesber@nessie.cs.id.ethz.ch /
 /_IFW_A44__Tel._+41_1_254_7213__________________almesber@bernina.ethz.ch_/





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Eric Hughes <hughes@soda.berkeley.edu>
Date: Thu, 3 Jun 93 22:17:48 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: CryptoStacker, long term vision
In-Reply-To: <Pine.3.03.9306032345.E28432-e100000@rtfm>
Message-ID: <9306040514.AA18001@soda.berkeley.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> I am trying to find a convinient method for
>keeping keys that an end user would be happy with.

There need not be a single method used.  This is the whole point of
making a system with hooks--hooks for encryption, hooks for key
management, hooks for drive control.  Not only does this make for more
flexible software, but its effect on modularity is striking.

One requirement of any keying method, however, is that the keys be
physically removable from the locale of the machine.  That nixes a
couple of the suggestions you mentioned.  Any keying material for the
volume of data represented by a hard disk will be longer than human
memory or tolerance of delay.

In an encrypted telecommunications system, the keys should be changed
frequently.  This is not necessary in the case of encrypted disks.
You will know when your drive has been compromised; it won't be there
any more.  Unlike telecommunications, where one assumes that the
eavesdropper has access to all of the data flow at all times, an
encrypted hard disk gets looked at once.

Of the two remaining solutions on the list, PCMCIA and floppy, there
is no reason to chose one over the other.  Properly modular software
should be able to support both.  Floppies will come first because
there's no new hardware, but I personally would be much more
comfortable using the more robust medium of EEPROM on a removable
card.

>Yes, I can see the advantages of using a device driver for this
>application.  

The suggestion to use the MSDOS network redirector is also worth
heeding.  The CD extensions, for example, use it even though that
drive is sitting right there in the machine.  Using the redirector
would allow one to support both separate partitioning and filesystem
within a file.  Here's another case where modularity wins.  Many
people may only need a bit of encrypted data, and a one or two Mb file
might do it for them.  (Sector remapping, BTW, is no big deal.)
Again, you don't have to do both at the outset.

re: choosing DES for the cipher

>Is it just my impression or did you just tell me that
>	   1) DES is too slow to use, I am stupid for trying.

Yes and no.

>	   2) DES is what I should use.

Yes, at first.

I remain to be convinced that software encryption of any kind is
feasible for efficient bulk hard disk encryption.  To be sure, there
will always be the need for less efficient but secure storage.  As I
said in another posting, DES is the fastest trusted symmetric keyed
block cipher around.

I do not think you are stupid for trying DES.  I _will_ think you are
stupid, however, if you go ahead and implement it without first doing
some estimates on the amount of time it will take and the effect on
disk performance and latency.  It is planning I am talking about here,
not any particular final decision.

You should allow hooks in the system for different block ciphers.  If
you do this, then some sort of algorithm byte should be present in the
partition information.

>How do codebook and counter mode relate to the layering that I
>hear about (ie, single, double, triple DES) 

Single and multiple DES are still block operations.  Codebook and
counter modes refer to ways that block ciphers may be used; they are
not specific to DES.

Re: large amounts of keying material
>I agree about length and multitude.  How does the key length affect the
>speed of the algorithm?

There are two lengths here, do not confuse them.  The first is the
length of the key to the block cipher.  The second is the total length
of all such keys in aggregate.  The first length is not directly
relevant; it is the speed of the cipher which it keys that is.  For
simple iterated DES, however, these coincide.  Single DES takes one
third as long as triple DES.

As far as aggregate length goes, the only time here is for one array
indirection, which is miniscule in comparison to the encryption time.

>I am also concerned about having the keys sitting around in memory once
>they are read from the disk.  

For a standalone machine, this is not a concern.  For a networked
machine, one may simply consider that all of memory is available to an
intruder.  No memory protection is available.  There is no way around
such a fundamental limitation other than hardware.  Therefore, don't
worry about it, and inform the user of the issue.

>> Keys in the driver should time out after some specifiable period.

As I did not mention previously, this is an extremely difficult
problem in DOS.

>> Files that are open when the time-out occurs and the programs that
>> have them open are going to have to be dealt with gracefully.

>[...] tying the timer into the int 24 routine which
>terminates program execution, so that if enough time had passed it would
>shut down the drive, but only AFTER you have exited your program.  

No good.  I use Desqview, which multitasks the machine.  There's good
reason not to require single tasking for this project.  Many TSR do
effective multitasking already.

This is a really sticky problem.  The criterion here is that programs
with open files whould still be able to access them, and possibly even
to write to them.  No other access would be permitted.  This requires
abstraction at the file system level, not the device level, and thus
would require mixing abstraction levels.  Ick.

The logging file systems mentioned in the context of Unix are what is
needed here, because the recent activity need not be encrypted.

If graceful shutdown cannot be achieved, there will still be times
when ungraceful shutdown will be useful.  One should not judge in
advance another's relative values of information compromise and a
slightly corrupted disk.  At the very least, there should exist a
program to zero out the keying material.

Re: conversion from non-encrypted to encrypted

>I think that this is likely to be the biggest problem with my system
>as I am considering it.  [...]  I think that a system like the
>aforementioned would be possible to painlessly install with an
>installation program [...] with no backing up and repartitioning
>involved.

That's fine, but that program is going to have to get written as well,
and it's going to have to be as reliable as a disk optimization
program.  After each sector write the disk is going to have to be in a
stable configuration, so if power fails at that moment, all is not
lost.  This will not be easy, since you'll be dinking with the
partition table all the time.

If you can get such a thing working, it would enormously increase the
actual usage of the encrypted disk drivers.  It is an elegant idea,
but a difficult one to implement.

Eric




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: RYAN Alan Porter <ryan@rtfm.mlb.fl.us>
Date: Thu, 3 Jun 93 20:31:19 PDT
To: A1 ray arachelian <rarachel@ishara.poly.edu>
Subject: Re: CryptoStacker, long term vision
In-Reply-To: <9306031900.AA02558@ishara.poly.edu>
Message-ID: <Pine.3.03.9306032254.B28432-d100000@rtfm>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain




On Thu, 3 Jun 1993, A1 ray arachelian wrote:

> > 	2) does anybody know how the hell Stacker or DoubleStor or
> > 	    whatever executes the actual interception of the read/write
> > 	    routines and stacks them?  I don't get it at all.  I am
> > 	    more than willing to learn to get this thing working though. 
> > 
> 
> Anyhow to make the story short, if I wrote an image mounter device driver which
> would be able to grab DIM files and pretend that they were on the A: or B: drive
> then we could also install the programs without breaking out the recylced disk
> box. :-)

Couldn't you just do that with the assign command in DOS?

or is that a new command?

> I never got around to it because of other projects, but, what you need to do is
> to write a device driver that becomes accessible via the IOCTL calls.  That's
> the way logical drivers (such as Stacker) install themselves.

Yeah, I am assuming that is the way I will have to organize the system.  I
want it to be totally transparant, that seems like a good way.

> Also, the program you're writing (I believe) has been already written and is
> part of Norton Utilities, but uses either DES or some other weak form of
> encryption.  You might want to buy Norton Utilities and play with that program
> and see what makes it tick.  Basically a program like MSD (Microsoft Diags)
> can tell you exactly what interrupts it patches itself into.

I have heard this from someone else.  It kind of takes the wind out of my
enthusiasm, but not too much... I still think that there is a need for a
good, strong system out there with some seriously dedicated password key
protection and such.  Also, it needs to be freeware (or shareware,
depending on how long it takes to write) so that security won't just be in
the hands of the people who can afford to buy it from companies.

I also think that it would be a lot more valuable if it were distributed
with code so that any user who wanted could inspect it for trapdoors.

> On to the sector remapping.  The way stacker and doubledisk and the other
> suite of driver level compressors work is basically, they allocate a huge
> file on the hard drive, and then do a remapping at the sector level.  That
> is you've got the data itself and an index table into the data for every
> sector.  When a sector is written to the drive, the driver compresses the
> sector, so say, it was 512 bytes, it now becomes 128 bytes (if we're lucky)
> so what Stacker does is, looks in its index table, finds 128 bytes free in
> the huge file it allocated, writes the data there, and then sticks the
> position of the data, and it's size (after compression) in the index table.
> (Of course it also marks that 128 bytes as taken.)

Umm, perhaps this is overly optimistic, but I was hoping that I would be
able to use an algorithm that did 1 byte in / 1 byte out encryption so
that I wouldn't have to deal with sector remapping.  This would greatly
speed up the process, make it more crashproof, and besides, it would be a
hell of a lot easier...  I was thinking that I would even basically leave
the FAT and such intact, or at least only slightly modified.

> I believe it also does some other funky stuff like changes the allocation
> table or the bytes free to twice the space it's got left, so that DOS
> doesn't choke when it thought it had 10,000 sectors free and the hard
> drive ran out of space when it tried to write #4,999. :-)
> 
> So you might want to do this with RSA.  But better yet, why don't you
> find a quick compressor algorithm (say some sort of LZ type method)
> and stick that in as well.  This way you are writing a public domain
> version of stacker >WITH< encryption.  (Since you'd have to remap
> the sectors anyhow, you might as well compress them too...)

I have been pointed in the direction of the IDEA engine in PGP, which will
take 1 byte in / 1 byte out.  This would be ideal (snicker) for the
reasons that I mentioned before.  

As for compressing also, that is a really good idea, but I think that I
will leave that one up to posterity, or at least to the next guy that
tries to midofy the thing, I am concerned enough with getting it to work
at all, and compression would add the problem of having to do sector
remapping, which I would like to avoid at first.

> The above is just a theory and hasn't been tested.  I believe that
> this is what Stacker does, but I'm not exactly sure. :-)  But it
> does sound logically right.

Sounds good to me, and it is consistent with the advice of others (thanks
a lot guys, I really appreciate the help) and the books that I have found
since this started two days ago...

> So if I'm wrong, let me know as you've got my curiosity up in this
> matter.


I'll keep everyone updated no problem.  How else am I going to get
suggestions and help?


-Ryan 
the Bit Wallah









From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Eric Hughes <hughes@soda.berkeley.edu>
Date: Thu, 3 Jun 93 22:25:56 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Software infrastructure
In-Reply-To: <9306040452.AA13658@triton.unm.edu>
Message-ID: <9306040522.AA18339@soda.berkeley.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>It 
>puzzles me why we are contemplating writing our own comm package when so many 
>good ones are out there that can be made to serve our purposes.  

Reliability.  Scripts do not easily handle error conditions that might
result in lost mail.  They're fine for a few, but they aren't for all.

Integration.  Remembering what to do next is a large hurdle.

Eric




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Nickey MacDonald <i6t4@jupiter.sun.csd.unb.ca>
Date: Thu, 3 Jun 93 18:38:24 PDT
To: Eric Hughes <hughes@soda.berkeley.edu>
Subject: Re: Work the work!
In-Reply-To: <9306020432.AA20624@soda.berkeley.edu>
Message-ID: <Pine.3.05.9306032228.F29415-a100000@jupiter>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I have shied away from any "political" action against Clipper because I am
unsure how a Canadian can help...  I would like to think that the Canadian
government will not follow the US lead, but I'm sure that its just a
matter of time.  I am open to suggestions...  How do I avoid being told
that I'm fighting "someone elses" war?

---
Nick MacDonald               | NMD on IRC
i6t4@jupiter.sun.csd.unb.ca  | PGP 2.1 Public key available via finger


On Tue, 1 Jun 1993, Eric Hughes wrote:

> If you are doing something, continue.  If you are not, start.






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: RYAN Alan Porter <ryan@rtfm.mlb.fl.us>
Date: Thu, 3 Jun 93 20:31:19 PDT
To: "Patrick E. Hykkonen" <pat@tstc.edu>
Subject: RE: CryptoStacker - Suggestions
In-Reply-To: <9306031827.AA05452@tstc.edu>
Message-ID: <Pine.3.03.9306032254.C28432-b100000@rtfm>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain




On Thu, 3 Jun 1993, Patrick E. Hykkonen wrote:

> > This model of using a device driver means that there is going to have
> > to be at least two partitions on the disk: one to boot from, and one
> > to be encrypted.  The device driver itself and the operating system
> > can't be on the encrypted disk, because those components must be
> > loaded before the encrypted disk is accessible.  Most people are not
> 
> Why not have the device driver create a file (possibly of varying sizes) on 
> the hard drive which the encryption device driver then makes look like another
> drive?!?  This is how the compression programs work, seems to me a pretty

Hmm, nix on that, I would have to do some sector remapping, which would
not only slow it down and make it more vulnerable, it would just be more
crap that I would have to deal with which might crash the thing in the
long run.

Besides, I think that most people using this would actually PREFER to have
more that one partition, with one unprotected.  This would allow you to
use the setup that I have mentioned before, with one 'fast' partition and
one 'secure' partition.  You would simply have to make sure that the
system was booted from a 'fast' partition.  Quick, simple, stuff that you
don't have to be a genius to make work.  (remember we are talking about
protecting non-cypherpunks here as well as us computer gurus)

I would like to implement a system in the future which would do
compression as well as encryption (are there any good algorithms that just
happpen to do both at the same time?  Maybe somebody should get on that,
it would certainly be useful) and that would require a system like you
mention, but I will stay with simple for the first version.


-Ryan
the Bit Wallah









From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Eric Hughes <hughes@soda.berkeley.edu>
Date: Thu, 3 Jun 93 22:41:55 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Term software develo
In-Reply-To: <930603131241_76244.315_CHN36-2@CompuServe.COM>
Message-ID: <9306040538.AA19367@soda.berkeley.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>FOSSIL may be popular on BBSs, but NASI/NCSI is number one in 
>the market. The oldest version of INT 14 is number two.

What are NASI/NCSI?  Does it cost to use them?  Is source available?

Eric




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Eric Blossom <eb@well.sf.ca.us>
Date: Thu, 3 Jun 93 22:41:19 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: DOS disk encryptor
Message-ID: <93Jun3.224101pdt.13930-2@well.sf.ca.us>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Ryan,
 
Good luck on building the DOS disk encryptor.  I belive that what you 
need to do is write a standard DOS disk driver (that can be installed in 
CONFIG.SYS) that implements the READ and WRITE primitives.  I belive 
that they use the same entry point (the STRATEGY entry) in the driver.  
You would basically just call the BIOS routines to do the actual i/o.  
 
You don't have to worry about the FAT etc, just encrypt everything.  You 
will probably want to use DES or IDEA and run it in CBC mode or Counter 
Mode.  You would use the DISK BLOCK NUMBER as a piece of the key 
material (or part of the Initialization Vector), hence, even if the same 
data appeared multiple places on the drive, it would appear different on 
the surface.  There is a good description of operation modes in "Modern 
Cryptology: a Tutorial" by Gilles Brassard (Springer Verlag Lecture 
Notes in Computer Science #325, 1988).  Denning's book covers it too.
 
I'd probably start out getting it running on a floppy.  After that, just 
use a separate partition to make life easier.  The driver is handed 
physical (or logical) block numbers, and these map directly to the 
physical drive block number by adding the offset of the beginning of 
partition.  At driver init time, you read the partition table on the 
hard disk, looking for a "system type" that identifies the partition as 
one of your encrypted ones.  Prompt for the pass phrase, and store it in 
the driver.  I assume that your concern is somebody physically grabbing 
the disk drive.  I don't have a problem with the pass phrase in memory, 
as long I have physical control of the system.
 
In some of the DOS references, there used to be a sample RAM DISK device 
driver.  You could use it as the skeleton to get the entry points
right, and then just encrypt the block and call the BIOS to do the 
i/o.
 
Have fun,
Eric Blossom
 




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: RYAN Alan Porter <ryan@rtfm.mlb.fl.us>
Date: Thu, 3 Jun 93 20:31:21 PDT
To: Eric Hughes <hughes@soda.berkeley.edu>
Subject: Re: CryptoStacker, long term vision
In-Reply-To: <9306031522.AA26005@soda.berkeley.edu>
Message-ID: <Pine.3.03.9306032207.D28432-b100000@rtfm>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain




On Thu, 3 Jun 1993, Eric Hughes wrote:

> A related topic to encrypted disk drives.  Anybody who has a desire to
> see their data around long term makes backups of their drives.  At
> least one of these backups is usually physically near the drive in
> question.
> 
> What good it is to have an encrypted disk if the backups are not also
> encrypted?
> 
> Backups occur at the file system level, where an encrypted file system
> does not appear encrypted, so that work here does not directly
> leverage to encrypted backups.

This is a good point.  The only thing that I can think of in response is
that there is now a need for a cryptobackup system.  I can easily see how
this could be accomplished with disk spanning, but I'm not sure that we
could create something to work with all of the different tape drive
standards.  Perhaps just write a freeware system that could handle disk
spanning and a few major, common tape systems (Colorado, etc...)

I have to admit, that does present a minor problem.

There is, of course, another way to do it which would speed things up by
not having the date come from the disk, get decrypted by my driver and
then get immediately encrypted agian before they get to the backup, and
that is to simply operate the backup system as normally from the 'fast'
partition with the encryption driver turned OFF.  You back up the secure
partition that way, and then whatever goes to the tape is pure garbage,
and then you just turn the driver back on by rebooting.

When you want to restore you simply turn the driver off, restore to the
secure partition, and reboot to get your data again.

No matter what kind of a system you are using, you are still going to need
some unencrypted disk space to boot from, so that is where you stick your
backup programs.

Hell, the more I think about it, it won't be any problem at all...

> 
> Eric

-Ryan
the Bit Wallah









From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: J. Michael Diehl <mdiehl@triton.unm.edu>
Date: Thu, 3 Jun 93 21:53:22 PDT
To: nobody@shell.portal.com
Subject: Re: Software infrastructure
In-Reply-To: <9306040011.AA22327@jobe.shell.portal.com>
Message-ID: <9306040452.AA13658@triton.unm.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


According to nobody@shell.portal.com:
> 
> It would be helpful for me to hear more about how people read and send
> mail on their home computers, in some detail.  If Mike Diehl got
> enough responses to his survey that would be good to hear about, too.

I've gotten a bunch!  I'm storing the messages in a file which will later be 
edited.  Then I'll tally everything up.  Expect results on the list monday.  Of
course this means that if you haven't replied to my poll, you need to do so by
saturday night, mountain time.

Well, now I will describe how I send/receive mail on my system, the killer
8086-8 from Hell! ;^)  I've been hyping my setup on this list for about a month.
But since I've partially implimented a system like what we have been discussing,
I'll give more details.

First, my system configuration:
MACHINE: AT&T 6300 PC 
HARDWARE: 640K, CGA, 1-360K fd, 1-20M hd.
OS: PMS-DOS 3.1 and 4DOS 4.02
COMM PROGRAM: Telix 3.15

As you can see, I am developing for the low-end computer......  ;^)

My email system is composed of (basicly) 2 files, a telix script, and a 4dos
batch file.  

The telix script, at the moment, assumes it is already logged into my unix 
account.  Then it does a 'frm' command and finds out how many NEW messages are
in; it would actually be easier to simply dload all of my messages, but this is
a bit more usefull.  Anyway, it dloads them one at a time onto my pc using 
zmodem.  Once on my machine, the script extracts From: and Subject: information
from the message.  Then it finds a unique filename to give the new message.
This information is then stored in a form usable by the batch file, later.  
After it has done all this, it quits elm, and does some housekeeping.  At this
point, the communications program is finished and the mail is on my pc ready to
read.  Under an automatic implimentation (for, say a pay-as-you-go system) this
can be done without any human intervention.

After the messages have been collected, I, of course, want to read them.  To do
this, I run the mail.bat program.  I am then presented with a menu allowing me 
to Create, Encrypt, Send, Read, Delete mail.  Create, Encrypt, and Delete are 
trivial and don't lend much to this discussion. 

Read presents a menu of messages from the data file created by the telix script.
At the moment, when a user selects a message to read, I use pgp to view it even
if it is not encrypted.  That can be fixed later.

To send a message, you first have to have a file containing the message, duh.
The user is asked for the name of this file, the address of the recipient, and
a subject to use.  This is information is then stored in a form usable by a
third telix script.  Ok, I lied, there are 3 files needed by my system. ;^)

The actuall sending process is simple.  The telix script reads the message 
information and starts elm, supplying the address and subject when asked.  Then
when it gets into vi, it ascii uploads the message directly into vi.  This may
seem kludgy, but it is rather portable since almost every online service lets
you enter a message into an editor.  

Overall, the system works pretty well.  I've still got a few bugs, mostly speed-
related.  But there is room for a lot of improvement.  Here is what I would like
to impliment.

I'd like to have "encryption detection" which would allow my system to use the
appropriate decryption software for message reading.  If a message isn't coded,
it should use list.com.

I'd also like to expand "encryption detection" to recognize several types of 
encryption, pgp, pem, ripem, des, my-bitchin-crypto, etc.  The telix script
could tag the message as it s dloaded.

I'd like to be able to use the system on many online services.  The telix script
could check the phone directory to see which system is it on.  Then, when any
system-specific stuff has to be done, such as starting the mail program on the
host, a special function can be called to do that function on that host.  The
ascii up/down loading is fairly constant, and the local file manipulation 
doesn't depend on the host.

At the moment, I am working on a Reply function.  I know how I'm going to do it,
I just haven't done it yet.  More later.

Well, if you have followed my this far, you either crazy or interested. ;^)  It 
puzzles me why we are contemplating writing our own comm package when so many 
good ones are out there that can be made to serve our purposes.  I'm open to
comments.....  Fire away!

+-----------------------+-----------------------------+---------+
| J. Michael Diehl ;-)  | I thought I was wrong once. | PGP KEY |
| mdiehl@triton.unm.edu |   But, I was mistaken.      |available|
| mike.diehl@fido.org   |                             | Ask Me! |
| (505) 299-2282        +-----------------------------+---------+
|                                                               |
+------"I'm just looking for the opportunity to be -------------+
|            Politically Incorrect!"   <Me>                     |
+-----If codes are outlawed, only criminals wil have codes.-----+
+----Is Big Brother in your phone?  If you don't know, ask me---+



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: nobody@soda.berkeley.edu
Date: Thu, 3 Jun 93 23:04:13 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Software infrastructure
Message-ID: <9306040600.AA20309@soda.berkeley.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


From: Hal Finney, <74076.1041@compuserve.com>
 
Mike Diehl's system sounds pretty good to me.  You can create messages, 
encrypt them, upload and send them, as well as downloading, decrypting, and 
reading messages, all with a nice menu-based interface.  That's what we 
want, right?
 
It sounds like the system would be easily adaptable to other types of hosts, 
too.  BBS operators could customize the scripts for their particular systems 
and offer the package.  We could create versions for users of other mail 
packages than elm on Unix systems, as well as for some of the commercial 
systems.  You could cover a lot of people this way.
 
> Well, if you have followed my this far, you either crazy or interested. ;^)  
> It puzzles me why we are contemplating writing our own comm package when so 
> many good ones are out there that can be made to serve our purposes.  I'm 
> open to comments.....  Fire away!
 
The only real problem I see is the use of Telix.  How much does this program 
cost?  We can't give away a disk with Telix on it.
 
What about Kermit?  It's free and it has a scripting language, but it 
doesn't sound nearly as advanced as Telix's.  Would it be good enough?  Or 
are their other free programs which we could use?
 
If we could adapt Kermit or some other free program to do what Mike is 
describing, we could give away floppies with secure and easy-to-use 
encrypted email handling capabilities, as well as making them available on 
the net.  People could just get the version they need for their particular 
mail access.method.  The package would include the communication program, 
the scripts, and the encryption software.  The user interface would be as 
Mike described, all menu driven and easy to use.
 
I think this would be a good way to go if we could get past the hurdle of 
finding a free comm program that would be adequate.

Note added in proof :)

Eric mentioned concerns about reliability.  Scripts can in principle be made
flexible enough to handle many sorts of errors.  You just need a lot of
states and a lot of result checking.  This technique of automatically
attaching to a host system and downloading data is widely used by computer
novices.  I just saw an ad today for a product which lets you create your
own "newspaper front page" graphically, then will log on to Compuserve and
fill in the news, sports, and business figures you have specified, and do
so at regular intervals, automatically, running in the background.  I often
use a package called Tapcis which automatically logs onto compuserve, getting
my mail and sending new mail, reading various topics of interest that I
have selected.  I used to use a Mac program called Navigator which did the
same.

Granted, none of these are scripts, they are all custom programs, but the
kinds of checking they do should be doable in scripts as well.  (I wasn't
sure whether Eric's point was that high level scripting languages are
excessively clumsy, or the more general point that automated mail access was
the wrong way to go.  I am addressing the latter here.)

Hal





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: RYAN Alan Porter <ryan@rtfm.mlb.fl.us>
Date: Thu, 3 Jun 93 20:43:10 PDT
To: Eric Hughes <hughes@soda.berkeley.edu>
Subject: Re: CryptoStacker, long term vision
In-Reply-To: <9306031512.AA25490@soda.berkeley.edu>
Message-ID: <Pine.3.03.9306032345.E28432-e100000@rtfm>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain




On Thu, 3 Jun 1993, Eric Hughes wrote:

> >This is tiring drivel concerning the CryptoStacker project.  
> 
> If you want help, it is wise not to recklessly insult those who are
> offering it.  By your own admission, you do not have a lot of
> experience here; you seem to be saying "I know exactly what I don't
> know," which, may I add, is a common delusion of the inexperienced.

Oh please, not a flame...  I'm trying to create something here, and I need
a lot of help, since everyone seems to know exactly how this should be
done but none of them want to actually get off of their heinies and write
it.  The last thing that I need is to start getting flamed, the whole
project will rapidly go down the tubes...

> You seem to have fixed a model of how the encrypted disk would work
> and don't want to debate it.  The model is exactly that which requires
> the most scrutiny, because it has the most far reaching effects.  If
> the model is flawed somehow, that's what you want to know before you
> begin, not six months later.

I am paying very close attention to the suggestions on overall format, you
may have noticed that my concept has changed from a hardware PGP
encryption of the entire disk with PCMIA keys to a more realistic DES
software encryption through device drivers and multiple partitions.  

I am certainly not closed off to ideas, and the last thing I need, as I
said before, is to start getting flamed.

> I take it that you want people to use this software after it is
> written.  if so, then pay close attention to user acceptance issues
> such as performance and key handling.  You neglect them at your own
> risk.

I am certainly not neglecting either issue, performance is one of the main
reasons why I am interested in NOT doing sector remapping and compression
along with the encryption, and I am trying to find a convinient method for
keeping keys that an end user would be happy with.

Among the suggestions at hand:

	An ISA card with the key burned into EEPROMS and a keypad attached 
	for verification of user ID

	PCMIA cards holding keys and a mandatory PCMIA slot

	Users typing long keys in manually

	Keys held on floppy disks

	Keys held on the HD itself

I believe that keys held on floppies with password verification to be the
most feasable, the easiest and the most likely to be understood and
accepted by end users.

Please stop flaming me, I'm doing the best I can here...

> I would suggest that you first version just be a device driver that
> has no encryption, but only the hook for it.  The device driver
> skeleton for a disk will be difficult enough, as you have to support a
> whole lot of operations just so you can have a place to put the
> encryption.  This is exactly the software infrastructure problem in
> another context.

Yes, I can see the advantages of using a device driver for this
application.  I am now doing research on just that.  The idea of setting
up the initial version to simply pass through data unharmed is also a very
useful suggestion.  Thank you.

> After you have a device driver skeleton working, you can add both
> hardware and software encryption modules.  There is no need to be
> exclusive about this.  It is clear to me from your comments that you
> haven't timed any DES routines and done a calculation of increased
> latency times, and although I hate to see code development go to
> waste, it's your time, not mine.
> 
> As far as picking an encryption algorithm, use DES.  DES is the
> fastest symmetric keyed block cipher that is thought to be reasonably
> secure.  DES is not particularly fast in software; it was designed as
> a hardware standard and does lots of bit manipulations.  DES is fast
> enough for serial communications, but that 1000 times less the
> bandwidth than a hard disk.

Is it just my impression or did you just tell me that

	1) DES is too slow to use, I am stupid for trying.

	2) DES is what I should use.

What the hell did I do to deserve getting flamed by someone who I so
respected about ten minutes ago?  Do you instinctively do this because I
don't yet understand a few highly technical concepts yet?  Would you
rather this whole project just get scrapped just because I am not yet as
proficient in this area as you?  How did you learn, did people flame you
when you tried to create something and asked for advice?  What the hell,
I'm just trying to help.

You talk about how I should be careful about inadvertently trampling on the
people giving me advice.  I am sorry I certainly did not mean to (and I
think that you will notice that later in the message I specifically
thanked him several times for his input) but what about you specifically
and intentionally insulting the guy who is actually trying to WRITE the thing?

I have other things to do, I am a professional programmer and I get payed
plenty to write code for other people.  What I am doing here is trying to
write some code for EVERYONE for FREE and I am VOLUNTEERING my time. (lots
of it, I might add) 

> Of course, you don't want to run DES in codebook (aka naive)mode. 
> (Codebook mode is where you just simply map block to block; the
> problem is that identical blocks map to identical blocks.)  You'll
> want some sort of other mode, like a counter mode, to make sure you
> don't get identical ciphertexts.  It is also a bad idea to encrypt the
> whole disk with one key; it makes brute force searches much easier.

I see.  How do codebook and counter mode relate to the layering that I
hear about (ie, single, double, triple DES) are these simply single or
multiple layers of these modes, or did I miss something?  (I still have a
shortage of good cypto books at my command, I have three that I think will
be very helpful on order at the local university library)

> Your keying material should be long.  I earlier suggested one key per
> track.  These keys are going to have to be stored somewhere, and the
> disk is the wrong place for it, clearly.  This implies that the user
> is going to have to have some key-holding device (likely a diskette)
> which will be necessary in order to unlock the partition.  the keying
> material should be password protected.  This device will be have to
> used at boot time if anything necessary to boot is stored on the
> encrypted partition.

I agree about length and multitude.  How does the key length affect the
speed of the algorithm?

I am also concerned about having the keys sitting around in memory once
they are read from the disk.  This would just open the system up to
somebody running a key scanning program on your system and grabbing the
keys right out of memory.  I'm still not sure what to do about this.  It
is a really good reason to go to PCMIA cards with the PCMIA DMA mapped in
the future, but I can't quite think of a good solution right now...

> Keying material will need to be backed up.  This should be made as
> painless as possible, otherwise there will be plenty of people losing
> whole drives.

Yes, that shouldn't be any problem.  I am thinking more an more that the
guys who wrote Stacker knew what they were doing... I forsee a seperate
utility program which would sit around on the uncompressed partition for
dealing with keys and such, this would be where I would handle key backups.

> Keys in the driver should time out after some specifiable period.
> Files that are open when the time-out occurs and the programs that
> have them open are going to have to be dealt with gracefully.

I thought of this as well as a possible solution to the problem of having
the key sitting around in memory, but it really seems to me like a great
way to lose data by crashing programs.  I just don't see how I could make
it timeout gracefully and not crash whatever is running.  Something that I
did think of though, is tying the timer into the int 24 routine which
terminates program execution, so that if enough time had passed it would
shut down the drive, but only AFTER you have exited your program.  This
would provide the timer support and still not be horrible likely to wreck
the hell out of something and kill some data. 

> This model of using a device driver means that there is going to have
> to be at least two partitions on the disk: one to boot from, and one
> to be encrypted.  The device driver itself and the operating system
> can't be on the encrypted disk, because those components must be
> loaded before the encrypted disk is accessible.  Most people are not
> going to go out and buy a new disk to be the encrypted partition.
> Thus, this is going to mean a full backup of the existing disk, an
> operation with FDISK to do the partitioning, then, assuming the driver
> works right the first time, restoring everything else on the encrypted
> partition.  What is the effect of _this_ on user acceptance?

This looks awfully flamish to me too, but I'll let it pass...

I think that this is likely to be the biggest problem with my system as I
am considering it.  An obvious way around this would be to use a system
which does sector remapping and stores the entire file system in one huge
file a la Stacker, so that we don't need to actually physically partition
the disk.  I can think about how to implement a system like this after I
get a non-sector indexing system working.

I think that a system like the aforementioned would be possible to
painlessly install with an installation program just like the one that
Stacker uses to painlessly turn your disk into two virtual disks, one
stacked and the other the boot disk, with no backing up and repartitioning
involved.

> Eric

Much as the flamage has ticked me off, you have provided some of the most
helpful information and suggestions to date and I very much appreciate
your help.  I still truly don't understand what I did to provoke you,
other than working on a crypto project, but I do appreciate your help.

I can only hope that I caught you late at night or something or perhaps
just misunderstood the severity of your insults.  


-Ryan







From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: bei@dogface.austin.tx.us (Bob Izenberg)
Date: Thu, 3 Jun 93 22:42:28 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: subscribe
Message-ID: <m0o1Tpd-0001ZSC@dogface.austin.tx.us>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


subscribe l-cpunks@dogface.austin.tx.us




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: poier@sfu.ca (Skye Merlin Poier)
Date: Fri, 4 Jun 93 00:23:02 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Procomm and encryption
Message-ID: <9306040722.AA00676@malibu.sfu.ca>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


This discussion of integrating encryption with a comm package made me remember:
Procomm Plus 2.0 allows "hooks" to be assigned to meta-keys. I have the exact
interface hook.c around here somewhere, if someone wants me to post it.

Skye
--
-----====> Skye Merlin Poier <====----- 
Undergrad in CMPT/MATH (Virtual Reality)       ||||      ||||
          email: poier@sfu.ca                  p-OO <--> OO-q   THINK
   PGP Public Key available on finger           \==      ==/


ivel' or some such.

I would like to make it clear that the 'tiring drivel' that I was
referring to was MY post and not the letter from Hugh and I merely
intended the note to serve as a warning to people not interested in the
project.

I see now that it is, indeed possible that this informal not may have been
misunderstood and I hope that you will understand my real intent now and
not hold it against me.

I am truly greatful for the help that I have received on this effort and
hope that we will have another product of guerilla programming soon.

Again, sorry for the misunderstanding, especially to Hugh, and keep those
suggestions coming, there is work to be done...


-Ryan
the Bit Wallah










From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: greg@ideath.goldenbear.com (Greg Broiles)
Date: Fri, 4 Jun 93 00:45:00 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Term software, disk driver encryption
Message-ID: <BJ1L5B1w164w@ideath.goldenbear.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Am suprised no-one's mentioned DISKREET, the encrypted disk driver software 
included with the Norton Utilities. It does DES, though the manual doesn't 
mention which flavor of DES it uses. I have been using it for roughly 2 
years now without any trouble. It's been well-behaved and is probably 
already on lots of folks' disks, by virtue of being included with the rest 
of the Norton stuff.

I think "TPU" refers to Turbo Pascal Units. "Async Pro" is, if I remember 
right, the name of an add-on async communications library for Turbo Pascal. 
Telix is not free, but is freely distributable, as it's shareware.


--
Greg Broiles                            greg@goldenbear.com
Golden Bear Computer Consulting         +1 503 465 0325
Box 12005 Eugene OR 97440               BBS: +1 503 687 7764




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Date: Fri, 4 Jun 93 01:39:37 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: snake oil (Posting ciphers to the list)
In-Reply-To: <9306032354.AA12581@snark.shearson.com>
Message-ID: <9306040840.AA29946@netcom3.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Perry Metzger writes on the matter of posting newly-invented ciphers
to the Cypherpunks list:

> My suggestion is this.
> 
> Its perfectly appropriate to post the cypher to the list PROVIDED you
> take the right attitude, which is to say something like:
> 
> "The following is something I just thought up. I'm not a pro, and I
> worry that this thing has holes. Anyone care to give me hints on what
> they might be?"

Good advice! Some hubris might pique the interest of readers.

> Sci.crypt is likely a better place to post a query about a new cypher,
> of course.

Yes, except that they for the most part hate it when folks post "I
dare you to break my new cipher" messages. Understandably so, for the
reasons Perry gave (smugness, etc.) and also because:

a. usually not enough ciphertext can be posted to allow a reasonable
cryptanalysis

b. the odds of a newbie inventing something really new are slim (yes,
it _may_ happen, but it's not likely)

c. people have better things to do that spend hours or days trying to
break a system which has these problems (and may just be deliberate
garbage).

(Cryptanalysis is economics, as some folks like to say. If a message
is important, or a particular cryptosystem has passed some initial
tests--such as the algorithm being published, the basic mathematics
presented as plausible, etc.--then more effort can be justified. But
not on Joe Cipher's latest effort.)

(this quote is from Nicky M.)

> > Is there a comprehensive list of short "already been done" types of
> > cyphers?  (Whether failed or "still" succesful.)  A good book?

Kahn's "The Codebreakers" for a historical perspective, the various
crypto books referred to here for mathematical background (Denning,
Brassard, Salomaa, Simmons, Patterson, etc.), and "Cryptologia" for
insights into amateur cryptanalysis and cipher-building.

Be aware that most amateurs--and I hardly speak from experience, just
reading of the literature--end up reinventing the old _types_ of
ciphers....the new ones, with s-boxes, or based on hard math problems
(like RSA), typically require a lot of background in math.

Hope this helps, and hope this eases any hard feelings folks may have
when their Super Duper Encrypter is not analyzed by a dozen
Cypherpunks. Or even one.

-Tim May 

-- 
..........................................................................
Timothy C. May         | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,  
tcmay@netcom.com       | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
408-688-5409           | knowledge, reputations, information markets, 
W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA  | black markets, collapse of governments.
Higher Power: 2^756839 | Public Key: PGP and MailSafe available.
Note: I put time and money into writing this posting. I hope you enjoy it.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Stanton McCandlish <anton@hydra.unm.edu>
Date: Fri, 4 Jun 93 03:32:25 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Software infrastructure
In-Reply-To: <9306040600.AA20309@soda.berkeley.edu>
Message-ID: <9306041032.AA14588@hydra.unm.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


You CAN give away disks with Telix, it is shareware, just like QModem
(pre-QMPro), and ProComm.  Just have to let the recipient know it is not
freeware but requires registration for continued use.  
Might have to obtain permission for such distribution, depends on the
licensing.

As for "is kermit good enough?"  No.  Almost NO ONE in the DOS world uses
it any more, it is a total anachronism.  Of all the 400 or so users on my
board, many from other parts of the country, even other countries, not
ONE uses kermit (I have "What comm program do you use?" as one of the
initial login questions).  The only practical use of Kermit is for
computer newbies to use it to access the dialup lines at their school
(UNM gives out free copies of it), but most such people soon switch to
another program. 

Thing is Kermit is just plain old, and a pain in the butt.  When I
started BBSing, the Kermit protocol was supported on most BBSs; today I
cannot think of a single BBS around here that has it anymore (I'm the
defacto city BBSlist maker, so I'd know :)

Perhaps this area is atypical, and Kermit is all the rage elsewhere, but
considering how BEHIND the times Albuquerque is, I tend to doubt it.

Freeware and shareware comm programs available from any BBS or FTP site
will DUST Kermit, and I think it's a dead end.  All I can say, is any
crypto package based on a hack of Kermit will go nowhere.  I know it's
free and readily available, but well so's a kick in the ass.  >;)

-- 
        When marriage is outlawed only outlaws will be inlaws!
Stanton McCandlish,  SysOp:  Noise in the Void DataCenter Library BBS
Internet anton@hydra.unm.edu     IndraNet: 369:1/1      FidoNet: 1:301/2     
Snail: 1811-B Coal Pl. SE, Albuquerque, New Mexico 87108 USA
Data phone: +1-505-246-8515 (24hr, 1200-14400 v32bis, N-8-1)
Vox phone:  +1-505-247-3402 (bps rate varies, depends on if you woke me up...:)



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Eric Hughes <hughes@soda.berkeley.edu>
Date: Fri, 4 Jun 93 06:54:47 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: CryptoStacker, long term vision
In-Reply-To: <Pine.3.03.9306032254.B28432-d100000@rtfm>
Message-ID: <9306041351.AA05555@soda.berkeley.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>I also think that it would be a lot more valuable if it were distributed
>with code so that any user who wanted could inspect it for trapdoors.

The nature of crypto software is that is valueless unless you trust
it.  You don't have to trust a word processor, because you can see
immediately that what you typed on the screen comes out the printer.
For security software, however, breaches are invisible, or more
precisely visible only after the damage has been done.

This is the reason that I disregard DISKREET from Norton.  There's no
source, and largish companies are notorious for pushing compromised
software.  Norton's unlikely to ship source, so unless someone
decompiles it, I'm not biting.

>Umm, perhaps this is overly optimistic, but I was hoping that I would be
>able to use an algorithm that did 1 byte in / 1 byte out encryption so
>that I wouldn't have to deal with sector remapping.  

You need to do a bit of research into what a block device driver
actually does.  It deals only with blocks of characters, not with
individual ones or arbitrary length strings.  The block interface at
the driver level is different than the file access at the API level.
Don't confuse the two levels.  DOS already does the buffering required
to turn a block device into a file system.  You don't need to
replicate it.

As a result, the cipher you choose needs to be a block cipher.  DES
works on blocks of 8 bytes at a time.  A typical sector is 512 bytes.
So you are going to have 32 DES (or iterated DES) operations per
sector.

>  I was thinking that I would even basically leave
>the FAT and such intact, or at least only slightly modified.

Again, at the driver level, you don't know that a FAT even exists.
Ray Duncan's book _Advanced MSDOS Programming_ contains a good chapter
on device drivers.  You should be able to find code for a skeleton
block device driver on the net; check the msdos programming groups for
more info.

>I'll keep everyone updated no problem.  How else am I going to get
>suggestions and help?

I would also suggest that you find programming partners.  If for no
other reason than to do code review, someone else ought to be
involved.  You wouldn't want to make the group too large, but three or
four is not overlarge.  The archive at soda is available for group
work, if desired.

Eric









From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Doug Porter <76244.315@CompuServe.COM>
Date: Fri, 4 Jun 93 04:05:33 PDT
To: Cypherpunks <cypherpunks@toad.com>
Subject: Re: Term software dev
Message-ID: <930604110243_76244.315_CHN40-3@CompuServe.COM>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Eric Hughes asks:

> What are NASI/NCSI?  Does it cost to use them?  Is source 
available?

It's an API originally developed by Network Products Corporation 
and based on an earlier spec from Ungerman-Bass. NPC used it in 
building an async comm server for LANs. NPC called the API 
"Network Communications Server Interface" or NCSI. Novell 
licensed the technology from NPC and renamed the API to "Novell 
Asynchronous Server Interface" or NASI. Other async server 
vendors picked up on it about then as a result of Novell's 
evangelism. Serial communications software packages from 
Crosstalk to Procomm to tiny niche products started to support 
it. Then because of the end user package support, the standard 
was used for different kinds of serial connections. For example, 
we (CyberCorp) built a NASI/NCSI interface for intelligent 
Digiboards a while back.

I've never heard of anyone being charged to use the spec for 
whatever they like. At least part of the spec, the part promoted 
by Ungerman-Bass, seems to be in the public domain. We 
originally got the spec from Novell when we built a Netware 
compatible async server. I don't know of any free source code, 
but code for either end of the spec is only one or two thousand 
lines of C.

Doug





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Timothy Newsham <newsham@wiliki.eng.hawaii.edu>
Date: Fri, 4 Jun 93 11:12:44 PDT
To: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Subject: Re: The "WARLOCK" Cipher
In-Reply-To: <9306041756.AA23752@netcom3.netcom.com>
Message-ID: <9306041812.AA08603@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> 
> 
> Cypherdroids,
> 
> By coincidence, a very long posting on sci.crypt has appeared,
> announcing a new matrix-based crypto system, called "WARLOCK" by its
> inventors.

Is this the RSA matrix scheme outlined in CRYPTO '91 ?




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Karl Barrus <elee9sf@Menudo.UH.EDU>
Date: Fri, 4 Jun 93 07:31:51 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: THANKS: pgp, mh, .forward
Message-ID: <199306041431.AA22111@Menudo.UH.EDU>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Thanks Hal, Stanton, Miron - I finally got it to work, on the menudo
side, not the NeXT.

I don't know what the deal is with the NeXT; 'cat .plan | myscript'
worked (myscript had all the necessary stuff) but having this .forward
file didn't: "|/bigpath/barrus/myscript"

But, I got it to work from menudo with this in my .maildelivery file:

to "barrus@tree.egr.uh.edu" | A "PGPPATH=/fajitas/elee9sf/Crypto/pgp22 /fajitas/elee9sf/bin/pgp -fea barrus | /usr/lib/mh/rcvstore +fromnext"

Mail sent to barrus@tree.egr.uh.edu gets piped through pgp, encrypted,
and then stored in the mail folder 'fromnext'.  The PGPPATH did seem
to be the missing factor!

Now, for those who wonder why in the world I'd want to do this... I've
been involved in a quasi-flame session on USENET (in comp.admin.policy
and other cross-posted groups) concerning a student who was suspended
here.  My posts became more and more sarcastic, and as I was
contemplating sending out a post which may have been on the edge, and
not wanting to make the sh*tlist here - or get higher up on it :-) - I
was going to route it through penet from my tree account.  But then
responses to the post would have eventually been dropped here on
menudo, since I have my mail forwarded.  Now I'm not suggesting that
the admins here are watching my mail, but it wouldn't be difficult for
the admins to do some traffic analysis (crypto sophistication!),
noting that Karl's mail file grows coincident in time and size to
responses to XYZ post... enter encryption!  So it would be better to
get the encryption going on the NeXT side, but this solution is good
enough for me.  Final note: I forgot penet is restricting posts for
the time being, but in any event this system is working.)

/-----------------------------------\
| Karl L. Barrus                    |
| elee9sf@menudo.uh.edu             | <- preferred address
| barrus@tree.egr.uh.edu (NeXTMail) |
\-----------------------------------/




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: jhart@agora.rain.com (Jim Hart)
Date: Fri, 4 Jun 93 09:44:09 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Lobbying for Cryptoprivacy, non-U.S.
Message-ID: <m0o1era-00002nC@agora.rain.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



>I have shied away from any "political" action against Clipper because I am
>unsure how a Canadian can help...

Non-U.S. citizens can lobby hard to get all phones containing
key-escrow (aka wiretap) chips banned in your country.  You have a 
very good argument: do y'all want Yankee spooks listening in on your 
phone calls?  Make sure the following specifics are included in the 
legislation:

* Try to get key escrow banned *in general*, instead of just from foreign
countries.  In smaller countries this will be easier since its doubtful
small governments can set up a spook/chip-maker axis to rival the
NSA/Mykotronx/VLSI axis in the U.S.  In fact probably only the U.S.,
cooperating major European countries and Japan have such a capability.

* Be careful with the wording of the legislation; be sure to
specify *key-escrow* and not any other forms of cryptography.

* If political feasible the legislation should specifically encourage
private, commercial forms of cryptography.

Jim Hart
jhart@agora.rain.com



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: henry strickland <strick@osc.com>
Date: Fri, 4 Jun 93 09:36:24 PDT
To: hughes@soda.berkeley.edu (Eric Hughes)
Subject: Re: Term software develo
In-Reply-To: <9306040538.AA19367@soda.berkeley.edu>
Message-ID: <9306041644.AA19277@osc.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


With the idea of building a Macintosh terminal emulator with an
encrypted transport stream, I've been looking over the sources to
"info-mac/terminal-22.hqx" from "sumex-aim.stanford.edu".

Realizing that it is not most people's terminal emulator of choice,
and that authors may not want to give up their terminal source code,
I've been thinking about what kind of an API could be negotiated
between terminal-program authors and encryption-mechanism authors.

Suppose a terminal program looks for resources (using macintosh-like
terminology for a moment) of some type 'Encr', and load them.
It expects to find subroutines there, that the 
cypherpunk can add to any conforming terminal emulator.
Something like this:

  resource #1:  function initialize() -- grab resources
  resource #2:	function set_key(char key[8])
  resource #3:  function encrypt(long block_no, char block[8]) 
  resource #4:  function decrypt(long block_no, char block[8])
  resource #5:  function finalize() -- shutdown, release resources

This would support experimentation without necessarily having 
the source code to a terminal emulator.  ( If PC and MAC people
took the "all software source must be free" approach that we do
in the UNIX world, this would be less a problem.... )


Obvoius Problems not addressed by these 5 functions:

	-- does not address a linklevel standard for 
	   packetizing the stream and numbering the datagrams.
	   I assume this sort of transport is necessary.
	   (It would be amusing to see a demonstration that
	   it is not!)  It's actually a nice side-effect; I'm sick
	   of transmission errors, even when I'm in supposedly
	   error-free modes.

	-- does not talk about key exchange.

	-- does not talk about crypto-strong authentication 
	   of the user to the system you're dialing into.

It does assume 8-byte keys and 8-byte cypherblocks; 
but that's easy to fix. 

The approach I'm NOT considering at the moment is writing
a new communications device which is a wrapper around the
exisiting comm port, but that is a MUCH better approach.  
But I'm not up to that level in my mac-programming yet, and
I was looking for somthing I thought I could finish.




Anyway, my essential point is, let's publish and compare our 
link-level standards and our encryption models, so that we can
debate them, and end up with a set of plug-compatible tools for
different platforms, with hooks for substituting mechanisms.


						strick





p.s.  	if anyone has summaires/comparisons/case studies of different
	"guaranteed stream" link protocols (kermit, XMODEM, YMODEM,
	ZMODEM, TCP), I'd be interested.   Code would be even better.
	(however, trying to reappropriate TCP/SLIP/HeaderPrediction 
	seems to massive an undertaking; I'd like something simpler.)  
	This is one wheel I hate to reinvent....





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Pat Farrell" <pfarrell@cs.gmu.edu>
Date: Fri, 4 Jun 93 06:57:03 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Software infrastructure
Message-ID: <35870.pfarrell@cs.gmu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I beg to differ.

  Stanton McCandlish <anton@hydra.unm.edu> writes:

>As for "is kermit good enough?"  No.  Almost NO ONE in the DOS world uses
>it any more,
..flames elided...

I agree that the PC-centric BBS world has decided that Kermit is obsolete.

Kermit is continually improving and is very nearly as fast as ZMODEM.
It is available for nearly all platforms, is free, and source is availilbe.
It includes NASI support directly. It has a very nice (powerful) scripting
language. It also works over TCP/IP networks for folks with the luck
to be Ethernet'd into the Internet (like most of the faculty and staff here
at GMU). It also has very strong backward compatibility.

I expect that Kermit is good enuff if you are interested in commandline
scripts for plain old DOS. And the scripting language is also
supported by the C version that run on nearly all Unixs and most other
boxes. This would allow a single script to support a lot of users.
I'm not interestedin DOS and command lines, but if some other
cypherpunk wants to try, I'm sure not going to complain.

Pat

Pat Farrell      Grad Student                 pfarrell@cs.gmu.edu
Department of Computer Science    George Mason University, Fairfax, VA
Public key availble via finger          #include <standard.disclaimer>




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: stig@netcom.com (Stig)
Date: Fri, 4 Jun 93 09:58:07 PDT
To: Karl Barrus <cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: HELP: pgp, .forward, mh
In-Reply-To: <199306031404.AA18382@Menudo.UH.EDU>
Message-ID: <9306041658.AA28725@netcom.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


To quote: Karl Barrus <elee9sf@Menudo.UH.EDU>
Regarding: HELP: pgp, .forward, mh
> 
> 
> Situation: I'd like mail that arrives at my other account to be
> encrypted and then forwarded to this account.  I have spent a few
> hours trying various things and nothing seems to work.
> 
> I've tried this as my .forward file:
> 
> "| /myhome/pgp -fea barrus | mail elee9sf@menudo.uh.edu"
> 
> but all that arrives at elee9sf is a blank message.
> 
> I've tried
> 
> "| /myhome/remail.script"
> 

The problem is that when sendmail executes your filter, your
environment is all messed up.  HOME and USER aren't even initialized.
PATH is probably /bin:/usr/bin.

> 
> So, if that's impossible, how do I get my elee9sf account to do it?  I
> use mh on menudo, and have tried
> 
> to barrus@tree.egr.uh.edu | A "/path/pgp -fea barrus | /path/rvcstore +tonext"

This works when you send mail to yourself because your environment
gets passed along to your mail filter.


Here's a good wrapper script to use ....


#!/bin/sh

HOME=YOUR-DIRECTORY
PGPPATH=YOUR-PGP-DIRECTORY
PATH=$HOME/bin:/usr/local/bin:/usr/ucb:/bin:/usr/bin:/etc:/usr/etc

export HOME PATH PGPPATH

cd $HOME

exec >> $HOME/Inbox/FILTERLOG 2>&1	# this logs error messages so
					# that you can learn from them

FF=/tmp/FILTER.$$
touch $FF
chmod 600 $FF

(tee $FF; echo '') >> Inbox/everything	# this saves your mail in case
					# it gets dropped on the floor

PGP COMMAND GOES HERE

rm $FF

exit 0

/* Jonathan Stigelman, Stig@netcom.com, PGP public key by finger  */
/* fingerprint = 32 DF B9 19 AE 28 D1 7A  A3 9D 0B 1A 33 13 4D 7F */




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Mark <mark@coombs.anu.edu.au>
Date: Thu, 3 Jun 93 17:15:10 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Pc environ (fwd)
Message-ID: <9306040014.AA10402@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


For those others that insist on living in 640K... :)

Forwarded message:
>From mark Wed Jun  2 20:29:47 1993
>Subject: Pc environ
>To: 74076.1041@compuserve.com
>Date: Wed, 2 Jun 1993 20:29:47 +1000 (EST)

>>I couldn't get Karl's hopmail.bat to run on my PC (not enough environment
>>space?) so I wrote this in C and it works OK.

>Hey Hal,

>Um although I abhor dos, I happen to know something of it... you might want
>to put the line:

>shell=c:\command.com /e:1024 /p

>in your config.sys... that will give you a K of environment space instead
>of the usual (256bytes?) they usually give you. Increase the 1024 as 
>needed.

>Mark
>mark@coombs.anu.edu.au



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: gnu (John Gilmore)
Date: Fri, 4 Jun 93 10:31:31 PDT
To: Eric Hughes <hughes@soda.berkeley.edu>
Subject: Re: Helping from Canada re Clipper
In-Reply-To: <9306040154.AA07862@soda.berkeley.edu>
Message-ID: <9306041731.AA07586@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> One of the arguments that is being made in this country against the
> wiretap chip is that it will harm overseas business.  In Canada you
> can turn this around and show what a great economic boon you have
> available.

Another argument the U.S. government is making is that they surveyed
encryption policy in various countries and "it's not beyond the pale
to limit domestic encryption -- France does it, for example".  

If Canada takes a strong stance on domestic encryption, then it is a
counter-example rather than an example of repression.  The Australian
example of deploying GSM in the face of law-enforcement objections has
already been used in testimony to NIST (and I'm sure we'll use it
to convince Congress as well).

You could also argue for removing Canadian restrictions on export of
cryptography.  Currently the Canadian regulations are just
rubber-stamps of the US regulations.  This has the advantage that it's
legal to export US crypto to Canada -- e.g. crypto code developed in
the U.S. can be legally moved outside the range of U.S. law.  This was
useful for PGP; it is legal to use and possess PGP in Canada since
US patent law doesn't apply.  But it limits the development of an
export crypto industry for Canadians, and it furthers the image of
Canada as being under the U.S. government's thumb.

	John Gilmore




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Eric Hughes <hughes@soda.berkeley.edu>
Date: Fri, 4 Jun 93 10:50:04 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Software infrastructure
In-Reply-To: <9306041924.aa27246@penet.penet.FI>
Message-ID: <9306041746.AA13444@soda.berkeley.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>On your host (typically an UNIX box) you configure
>sendmail/smail/binmail/whatever to forward your mail over uucp to your
>home machine. 

This is a huge hurdle for people who don't own their own machines and
haven't convinced a sympathetic sysadmin to do the configuration.
A solution that works from a dialup login account can still be a batch
solution and should require no extra involvement from the sysadmins.

Eric




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Date: Fri, 4 Jun 93 10:56:18 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: The "WARLOCK" Cipher
Message-ID: <9306041756.AA23752@netcom3.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Cypherdroids,

Earlier today I commented on the advisability of posting new ciphers
to this group, or to sci.crypt. (I haven't gotten my message yet, so I
don't know if it went through.)

By coincidence, a very long posting on sci.crypt has appeared,
announcing a new matrix-based crypto system, called "WARLOCK" by its
inventors.

They provide an extensive introduction to the mathematics used and
offer various analyses. This is a first step toward making their
system worth analyzing.

I suggest following the debate on this system will be educational. And
perhaps their system will even survive to become a reasonable
alternative.

-Tim May


-- 
..........................................................................
Timothy C. May         | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,  
tcmay@netcom.com       | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
408-688-5409           | knowledge, reputations, information markets, 
W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA  | black markets, collapse of governments.
Higher Power: 2^756839 | Public Key: PGP and MailSafe available.
Note: I put time and money into writing this posting. I hope you enjoy it.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: haahr@mv.us.adobe.com (Paul Haahr)
Date: Fri, 4 Jun 93 11:03:35 PDT
To: jhart@agora.rain.com
Subject: Re:  Lobbying for Cryptoprivacy, non-U.S.
Message-ID: <9306041803.AA28955@astro.mv.us.adobe.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> In smaller countries this will be easier since its doubtful
> small governments can set up a spook/chip-maker axis to rival the
> NSA/Mykotronx/VLSI axis in the U.S.  In fact probably only the U.S.,
> cooperating major European countries and Japan have such a capability.

what about Canada?  or has it been absorbed into the US?  :-)

Russia probably has the chip-making skills (and, certainly, the spookish
ones) to fit, but they probably count as a ``cooperating major European
countr[y]'' now.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: tribble@memex.com (E. Dean Tribble)
Date: Fri, 4 Jun 93 12:36:29 PDT
To: jhart@agora.rain.com
Subject: Lobbying for Cryptoprivacy, non-U.S. Non-U.S. citizens can lobby hard to get all phones containing key-escrow (aka wiretap) chips banned in your country.  You have a  very good argument: do y'all want Yankee spooks listening in on your  phone calls?  Make sure the following specifics are included in the  legislation:
In-Reply-To: <m0o1era-00002nC@agora.rain.com>
Message-ID: <9306041842.AA25453@memexis.memex.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


	 * Try to get key escrow banned *in general*, instead of just from foreign
	 countries.  In smaller countries this will be easier since its doubtful
	 small governments can set up a spook/chip-maker axis to rival the
	 NSA/Mykotronx/VLSI axis in the U.S.  In fact probably only the U.S.,
	 cooperating major European countries and Japan have such a capability.

	 * Be careful with the wording of the legislation; be sure to
	 specify *key-escrow* and not any other forms of cryptography.

This is extremely dangerous.  Much of legislation is compromise.  Any
such bill is probably so close to a bill that outlaws cryptography (or
could be interpreted as a precedent for such a bill) that the risks
are probably far greater than the rewards.  The strategy the Eric
Hughes proposed sounds much better.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Mark <mark@coombs.anu.edu.au>
Date: Thu, 3 Jun 93 19:53:30 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: CryptoStacker, long term vision
Message-ID: <9306040253.AA14575@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>A related topic to encrypted disk drives.  Anybody who has a desire to
>see their data around long term makes backups of their drives.  At
>least one of these backups is usually physically near the drive in
>question.
>
>What good it is to have an encrypted disk if the backups are not also
>encrypted?
>
>Backups occur at the file system level, where an encrypted file system
>does not appear encrypted, so that work here does not directly
>leverage to encrypted backups.

This problem is most easily solved by copying the entire partion/file
that is encrypted as blocks. These blocks are size according to the
destination media. If you use floppies you break the encrypted fs/file
into (e.g.) 1.44 meg chunks, if you use tape you can throw the whole
block at the media, similarly with another hardisk.

The unix/linux/386bsd 'dd' program is especially useful for this purpose
and I assume there are similar utils for dos.

For replacement you simply dump the whole lot back as one encrypted file
system.

This method should be faster than grabbing individual files and backing
them up as the program just has to seek to a specified place and start
reading a defined amount of [encrypted] data.

Mark
mark@coombs.anu.edu.au



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: bhoward@is.morgan.com (Bruce Howard)
Date: Fri, 4 Jun 93 10:07:22 PDT
To: anton@hydra.unm.edu (Stanton McCandlish)
Subject: Re: Software infrastructure
In-Reply-To: <9306041032.AA14588@hydra.unm.edu>
Message-ID: <9306041706.AA14066@is1.is.morgan.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> As for "is kermit good enough?"  No.  Almost NO ONE in the DOS world uses
> it any more, it is a total anachronism.  Of all the 400 or so users on my
> board, many from other parts of the country, even other countries, not
> ONE uses kermit (I have "What comm program do you use?" as one of the
> initial login questions).

programs come and go but protocols live forever.

i don't think you've looked around enough; in my own experience, kermit
has been available and in-use within every computing environment i've
operated or observed.  there are varying degrees of usage but its always
kept around, often because it seems to work in strange communications
conditions where other protocols fail.

>				...The only practical use of Kermit is for
> computer newbies to use it to access the dialup lines at their school
> (UNM gives out free copies of it), but most such people soon switch to
> another program. 
> ...
> Thing is Kermit is just plain old, and a pain in the butt.  When I
> started BBSing, the Kermit protocol was supported on most BBSs; today I
> cannot think of a single BBS around here that has it anymore (I'm the
> defacto city BBSlist maker, so I'd know :)

there are many places outside of the bbs world where people need to shuffle
files around and might desire encryption.  your opinions not withstanding,
i believe that kermit is more pervasive that you think.  if the purpose of
this exercise is to maximize the audience to which we make available easy
and useful encryption facilities, then kermit and things of its ilk need to
be supported.

				cheers,
				bruce




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Eric Hughes <hughes@soda.berkeley.edu>
Date: Fri, 4 Jun 93 13:14:34 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Lobbying for Cryptoprivacy, non-U.S.
In-Reply-To: <9306041842.AA25453@memexis.memex.com>
Message-ID: <9306042010.AA21696@soda.berkeley.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>>* Be careful with the wording of the legislation; be sure to
>>  specify *key-escrow* and not any other forms of cryptography.

>This is extremely dangerous.  Much of legislation is compromise.  Any
>such bill is probably so close to a bill that outlaws cryptography (or
>could be interpreted as a precedent for such a bill) 

The point Dean makes is important.  You want a positive right for
individuals to use cryptography in any form, not just a 'negative
right' which restricts government from creating key registration
requirements.  Such a positive right will _a fortiori_ exclude key
escrow systems, and that's what you want.  You want to make sure that
all _restrictions_ on cryptography are disallowed, that there are no
_restricted_ forms of cryptography.  The point is subtle, but
profound.  Both techniques get rid of key registration, but one is a
restriction on cryptography and the other is not.

There is another point to remember about constitutional democracies.
That which the legislature may do, the legislature may also undo.  The
level at which the prohibition against cryptography restrictions is
appropriate is at the constitutional level.  A constitutional
provision binds the government; lesser solutions are less effective,
even when they should be sought out as intermediaries.

At the first CFP conference, Lawrence Tribe made this point extremely
well, that the fundamental right of citizens should be invariant to
technology.

Eric




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: gdale@apple.com (Geoff Dale)
Date: Fri, 4 Jun 93 14:15:21 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Crypto API (was: Software infrastructure)
Message-ID: <9306042115.AA26274@apple.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



I was thinking about a crypto project I have on the backburner (actually
it's just in the concept stage), a program to hide encrypted data in raster
image files.

I really don't want to muck with writing or porting an encryption package,
I just want to do the part that sticks the data into the image.

HERE'S THE BEEF:
I think a lot of the various mail readers and what not would be likely to
encorporate encryption, if only it were mind-bogglingly simple.

An API (Application Programming Interface) could be proposed by cypherpunks
or others. The same folks should probably provide at least one encryption
library for use.

It would be nice if this API allowed for multiple encryption schemes (user
selectable), like the way Apple's Communications Toolbox allows users to
switch between various connection protocols.

I'm much too busy to embark on something like this (largely because I'm not
a cypher expert), but if I can help convince somebody to do it, or to
provide feedback on the interface, I'm available.

________________________________________________________________________
Geoff Dale    -- insert standard disclaimers here --     gdale@apple.com
"Mind your nerve ends, love bunch" -- Dr. Caligari





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: gdale@apple.com (Geoff Dale)
Date: Fri, 4 Jun 93 16:40:59 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Term software develo
Message-ID: <9306042340.AA15816@apple.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>I've been thinking about what kind of an API could be negotiated
>between terminal-program authors and encryption-mechanism authors.
>
>Suppose a terminal program looks for resources (using macintosh-like
>terminology for a moment) of some type 'Encr', and load them.
>It expects to find subroutines there, that the 
>cypherpunk can add to any conforming terminal emulator.
>Something like this:
>
>  resource #1:  function initialize() -- grab resources
>  resource #2:  function set_key(char key[8])
>  resource #3:  function encrypt(long block_no, char block[8]) 
>  resource #4:  function decrypt(long block_no, char block[8])
>  resource #5:  function finalize() -- shutdown, release resources
>

Woops, this is what I get by not reading all my mail before posting. I just
posted the same suggestion with considerably less detail.

Anyway, I second what henry says.
________________________________________________________________________
Geoff Dale    -- insert standard disclaimers here --     gdale@apple.com
"Mind your nerve ends, love bunch" -- Dr. Caligari





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: esr@snark.thyrsus.com (Eric S. Raymond)
Date: Fri, 4 Jun 93 14:36:46 PDT
To: hughes@soda.berkeley.edu (Eric Hughes)
Subject: Re: Lobbying for Cryptoprivacy, non-U.S.
In-Reply-To: <9306042010.AA21696@soda.berkeley.edu>
Message-ID: <m0o1jGJ-0001KtC@snark.thyrsus.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text


> At the first CFP conference, Lawrence Tribe made this point extremely
> well, that the fundamental right of citizens should be invariant to
> technology.

That's surprising.  Tribe publicly peddles the leftist arguments for gun
control, including the one that the Founding Fathers never intended the
Second Amendment for weapons of today's lethality.  I wonder why he
doesn't see the parallel.
-- 
					Eric S. Raymond <esr@snark.thyrsus.com>



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Date: Fri, 4 Jun 93 18:16:57 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: (fwd) NIST CSSPAB Resolutions 6/4/93
Message-ID: <9306050117.AA03457@netcom3.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Here's something important from sci.crypt!

-Tim May


Xref: netcom.com alt.privacy:7178 alt.security:9808 comp.org.eff.talk:18101 sci.crypt:15143 alt.privacy.clipper:555
Path: netcom.com!netcomsv!decwrl!elroy.jpl.nasa.gov!usc!math.ohio-state.edu!sol.ctr.columbia.edu!news.kei.com!eff!wilson.eff.org!Banisar
From: Dave Banisar <Banisar@washofc.cpsr.org>
Newsgroups: alt.privacy,alt.security,comp.org.eff.talk,sci.crypt,alt.privacy.clipper
Subject: NIST CSSPAB Resolutions 6/4/93
Date: 5 Jun 1993 00:48:11 GMT
Organization: CPSR Washington Office
Lines: 101
Distribution: world
Message-ID: <1uoqgb$peg@kragar.eff.org>
NNTP-Posting-Host: wilson.eff.org
X-UserAgent: Nuntius v1.1.1d17
X-XXMessage-ID: <A8356712AB01AC7F@wilson.eff.org>
X-XXDate: Fri, 4 Jun 93 01:54:42 GMT



                 NIST Crypto Resolutions

  Computer System Security and Privacy Advisory Board
                       June 4, 1993

                      Resolution #1

At Mr. Kammer's request we have conducted two days of 
hearings.  The clear message of the majority of input 
was that there are serious concerns regarding the Key 
Escrow Initiative and the Board concurs with these 
concerns.  Many of these issues are still to be fully 
understood and more time is needed to achieving that 
understanding.

Accordingly, this Board resolves to have an additional 
meeting in July 1993 in order to more completely respond 
to Mr. Kammer's request and to fulfill its statutory 
obligations under P.L. 100-235.  The Board recommends 
that the inter-agency review take note of our input 
collected, our preliminary finding, and adjust the 
timetable to allow for resolution of the significant 
issues and problems raised.

Attached to this resolution is a preliminary 
distillation of the serious concerns and problems.


                     Resolution #2

Key escrowing encryption technology represents a 
dramatic change in the nation's information 
infrastructure.  The full implications of this 
encryption technique are not fully understood at this 
time.  Therefore, the Board recommends that key 
escrowing encryption technology not be deployed beyond 
current implementations planned within the Executive 
Branch, until the significant public policy and 
technical issues inherent with this encryption technique 
are fully understood.

[Attachment to Resolution #1]]

-  A convincing statement of the problem that Clipper 
attempts to solve has not been provided.

- Export and important controls over cryptographic 
products must be reviewed.  Based upon data compiled 
from U.S. and international vendors, current controls 
are negatively impacting U.S. competitiveness in the 
world market and are not inhibiting the foreign 
production and use of cryptography (DES and RSA)

- The Clipper/Capstone proposal does not address the 
needs of the software industry, which is a critical and 
significant component of the National Information 
Infrastructure and the U.S. economy.

- Additional DES encryption alternatives and key 
management alternatives should be considered since there 
is a significant installed base.

- The individuals reviewing the Skipjack algorithm and 
key management system must be given an appropriate time 
period and environment in which to perform a thorough 
review.  This review must address the escrow protocol 
and chip implementation as well as the algorithm itself.

- Sufficient information must be provided on the 
proposed key escrow scheme to allow it to be fully 
understood by the general public.  It does not appear to 
be clearly defined at this time and, since it is an 
integral part of the security of the system, it appears 
to require further development and consideration of 
alternatives to the key escrow scheme (e.g., three 
"escrow" entities, one of which is a non-government 
agency, and a software based solution).

- The economic implications for the Clipper/Capstone 
proposal have not been examined.  These costs go beyond 
the vendor cost of the chip and include such factors as 
customer installation, maintenance, administration, chip 
replacement, integration and interfacing, government 
escrow systems costs, etc.

- Legal issues raised by the proposal must be reviewed.

- Congress, as well as the Administration, should play a 
role in the conduct and approval of the results of the 
review.

=======================================================
    NIST Resolutions on Key Escow Issues and Clipper
                       provided by
                 CPSR Washington office
           666 Pennsylvania Ave., SE Suite 303
                  Washington, DC 20003
               rotenberg@washofc.cpsr.org
=======================================================

--
..........................................................................
Timothy C. May         | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,  
tcmay@netcom.com       | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
408-688-5409           | knowledge, reputations, information markets, 
W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA  | black markets, collapse of governments.
Higher Power: 2^756839 | Public Key: PGP and MailSafe available.
Note: I put time and money into writing this posting. I hope you enjoy it.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: J. Michael Diehl <mdiehl@triton.unm.edu>
Date: Fri, 4 Jun 93 17:36:11 PDT
To: hughes@soda.berkeley.edu (Eric Hughes)
Subject: Re: Software infrastructure
In-Reply-To: <9306040522.AA18339@soda.berkeley.edu>
Message-ID: <9306050035.AA12506@triton.unm.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


According to Eric Hughes:
>>Itpuzzles mewhy weare contemplating writing our own comm package when so many 
>>good ones are out there that can be made to serve our purposes.  
> 
> Reliability.  Scripts do not easily handle error conditions that might
> result in lost mail.  They're fine for a few, but they aren't for all.

Well, this is a problem with any nontrivial program.  But a script has going 
for it several very high-level constructs.  As people use any software, the
author will undoubtably have to improve it.  So, what is the difference if
he has to improve a script or a comm program?

> 
> Integration.  Remembering what to do next is a large hurdle.

That's why we have scripts in the first place!  Scripts' main purpose is to 
automate things.  How is this different with a comm program?  You still have to
remember how to use it....


+-----------------------+-----------------------------+---------+
| J. Michael Diehl ;-)  | I thought I was wrong once. | PGP KEY |
| mdiehl@triton.unm.edu |   But, I was mistaken.      |available|
| mike.diehl@fido.org   |                             | Ask Me! |
| (505) 299-2282        +-----------------------------+---------+
|                                                               |
+------"I'm just looking for the opportunity to be -------------+
|            Politically Incorrect!"   <Me>                     |
+-----If codes are outlawed, only criminals wil have codes.-----+
+----Is Big Brother in your phone?  If you don't know, ask me---+



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: J. Michael Diehl <mdiehl@triton.unm.edu>
Date: Fri, 4 Jun 93 18:01:06 PDT
To: nobody@soda.berkeley.edu
Subject: Re: Software infrastructure
In-Reply-To: <9306040600.AA20309@soda.berkeley.edu>
Message-ID: <9306050100.AA12806@triton.unm.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


According to nobody@soda.berkeley.edu:
> 
> From: Hal Finney, <74076.1041@compuserve.com>
>  
> Mike Diehl's system sounds pretty good to me.  You can create messages, 
> encrypt them, upload and send them, as well as downloading, decrypting, and 
> reading messages, all with a nice menu-based interface.  That's what we 
> want, right?
>  
> It sounds like the system would be easily adaptable to other types of hosts, 
> too.  BBS operators could customize the scripts for their particular systems 
> and offer the package.  We could create versions for users of other mail 
> packages than elm on Unix systems, as well as for some of the commercial 
> systems.  You could cover a lot of people this way.

Making it adaptable is what I mean by "cleaning it up a bit." ;^)

> > Well, if you have followed my this far, you either crazy or interested.;^)  
> > It puzzles me why we are contemplating writing our own comm package when so 
> > many good ones are out there that can be made to serve our purposes.  I'm 
> > open to comments.....  Fire away!
>  
> The only real problem I see is the use of Telix.  How much does this program 
> cost?  We can't give away a disk with Telix on it.

Telix is "user supported software."  Registering it costs $39.

>  
> What about Kermit?  It's free and it has a scripting language, but it 
> doesn't sound nearly as advanced as Telix's.  Would it be good enough?  Or 
> are their other free programs which we could use?

I remember kermit's script language as being kinda messy...  At the end of this
message, I will include a portion of my, uncommented, script to compare.  Also,
kermit is (I think) restricted to one xfer protocol, which may not be a good
idea.

> If we could adapt Kermit or some other free program to do what Mike is 
> describing, we could give away floppies with secure and easy-to-use 
> encrypted email handling capabilities, as well as making them available on 
> the net.  People could just get the version they need for their particular 
> mail access.method.  The package would include the communication program, 
> the scripts, and the encryption software.  The user interface would be as 
> Mike described, all menu driven and easy to use.

Well, either way, I will contribute my user-interface if you'all want it.  I'm
not married to telix, but I do think it is very good.  We could write comparable
scripts in every major comm program script language.... I'd have to document
my interface.  But if I decide to port my interface to C, I'd like to change 
a few things, so maybe this is a bit premature.....

> I think this would be a good way to go if we could get past the hurdle of 
> finding a free comm program that would be adequate.
> Note added in proof :)

I don't understand this last comment.  Maybe it's obvious and I'm just tired...
Part of my script system is after my signature.  Note that I hacked in a C
preprocesser, and this is the output from it, just before the script is compiled
Yes, Telix scripts are compiled! ;^)

 
+-----------------------+-----------------------------+---------+
| J. Michael Diehl ;-)  | I thought I was wrong once. | PGP KEY |
| mdiehl@triton.unm.edu |   But, I was mistaken.      |available|
| mike.diehl@fido.org   |                             | Ask Me! |
| (505) 299-2282        +-----------------------------+---------+
|                                                               |
+------"I'm just looking for the opportunity to be -------------+
|            Politically Incorrect!"   <Me>                     |
+-----If codes are outlawed, only criminals wil have codes.-----+
+----Is Big Brother in your phone?  If you don't know, ask me---+


str	PROMPT[] = "%";
str	PASSWRD[15];
 
command( str cmd ) 
{
	enter( cmd );
	while ( ! waitfor(PROMPT, 90));
}
 
enter( str cmd )
{
	cputs( cmd );
	cputs( "^M" );
}
 
match( str rec, str snd )
{
	while ( ! waitfor(rec, 90));
	enter( snd );
}
 
 
 
str	name[40] = "",
	file[40] = "",
	subject[40] = "",
	buff[80];
 
int	f,
	i;
 
main()
{ 
	if ( ! carrier()) 
		if ( dial("1", 10, 0) < 1) {
			prints("Could not dial in.");
			exittelix();
		}
 
	cputs("^M");
	command("biff n");
	
	if ( ! waitfor("%", 90)) {
		prints("No prompt after login");
		return;
	}
	
/*/ routing format is:  filename\n address\n subject\n /*/ 

	if ((f = fopen("c:\uload\mail\routing", "r")) ==0) return;
	while (feof(f) == 0) {
 
		fgets(file, 40, f);
		if (feof(f) != 0) continue;
		fgets(name, 40, f);
		if (feof(f) != 0) continue;
		fgets(subject, 40, f);
		if (feof(f) != 0) continue;
 
		buff = "";
		strcat(buff, "elm ");
		strcat(buff, name);
		enter(buff);
 
		match("Subject:", subject);
		delay_scr(10);
		cputs("i");
		_asc_scrtrans=1;
		_asc_slftrans=0;
		send('A', file);
		command("^[:wq^Ms^M");  
 
		fdelete(file);
 
	} 
	fdelete("c:\uload\mail\routing");
	
 
	f = fclose(f);
}
	
  



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: J. Michael Diehl <mdiehl@triton.unm.edu>
Date: Fri, 4 Jun 93 18:02:43 PDT
To: poier@sfu.ca (Skye Merlin Poier)
Subject: Re: Procomm and encryption
In-Reply-To: <9306040722.AA00676@malibu.sfu.ca>
Message-ID: <9306050102.AA12819@triton.unm.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


According to Skye Merlin Poier:
> 
>This discussion of integrating encryption with a comm package made me remember:
> Procomm Plus 2.0 allows "hooks" to be assigned to meta-keys. I have the exact
> interface hook.c around here somewhere, if someone wants me to post it.

Post it.  Thanx.
+-----------------------+-----------------------------+---------+
| J. Michael Diehl ;-)  | I thought I was wrong once. | PGP KEY |
| mdiehl@triton.unm.edu |   But, I was mistaken.      |available|
| mike.diehl@fido.org   |                             | Ask Me! |
| (505) 299-2282        +-----------------------------+---------+
|                                                               |
+------"I'm just looking for the opportunity to be -------------+
|            Politically Incorrect!"   <Me>                     |
+-----If codes are outlawed, only criminals wil have codes.-----+
+----Is Big Brother in your phone?  If you don't know, ask me---+



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: J. Michael Diehl <mdiehl@triton.unm.edu>
Date: Fri, 4 Jun 93 18:09:16 PDT
To: anton@hydra.unm.edu (Stanton McCandlish)
Subject: Re: Software infrastructure
In-Reply-To: <9306041032.AA14588@hydra.unm.edu>
Message-ID: <9306050109.AA12890@triton.unm.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


According to Stanton McCandlish:
> 
> As for "is kermit good enough?"  No.  Almost NO ONE in the DOS world uses
> it any more, it is a total anachronism.  Of all the 400 or so users on my
> board, many from other parts of the country, even other countries, not
> ONE uses kermit (I have "What comm program do you use?" as one of the
> initial login questions).  The only practical use of Kermit is for
> computer newbies to use it to access the dialup lines at their school
> (UNM gives out free copies of it), but most such people soon switch to
> another program. 

Correction, many people on this list use kermit...  And of course, I should 
know! ;^)

I do suggest that people get a (better) different comm program, as kermit is
IMHO rather limited.

> Thing is Kermit is just plain old, and a pain in the butt.  When I
> started BBSing, the Kermit protocol was supported on most BBSs; today I
> cannot think of a single BBS around here that has it anymore (I'm the
> defacto city BBSlist maker, so I'd know :)

True on all points. ;^)

> Perhaps this area is atypical, and Kermit is all the rage elsewhere, but
> considering how BEHIND the times Albuquerque is, I tend to doubt it.
> 
Behind the times?  Hell, we just got Caller-ID.  Yipee!

> Freeware and shareware comm programs available from any BBS or FTP site
> will DUST Kermit, and I think it's a dead end.  All I can say, is any
> crypto package based on a hack of Kermit will go nowhere.  I know it's
> free and readily available, but well so's a kick in the ass.  >;)
> 
Agreed.

+-----------------------+-----------------------------+---------+
| J. Michael Diehl ;-)  | I thought I was wrong once. | PGP KEY |
| mdiehl@triton.unm.edu |   But, I was mistaken.      |available|
| mike.diehl@fido.org   |                             | Ask Me! |
| (505) 299-2282        +-----------------------------+---------+
|                                                               |
+------"I'm just looking for the opportunity to be -------------+
|            Politically Incorrect!"   <Me>                     |
+-----If codes are outlawed, only criminals wil have codes.-----+
+----Is Big Brother in your phone?  If you don't know, ask me---+



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Johan Helsingius <julf@penet.FI>
Date: Fri, 4 Jun 93 10:19:59 PDT
To: Karl Barrus <elee9sf@menudo.uh.edu>
Subject: Re: THANKS: pgp, mh, .forward
In-Reply-To: <199306041431.AA22111@Menudo.UH.EDU>
Message-ID: <9306041855.aa26911@penet.penet.FI>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



> Final note: I forgot penet is restricting posts for
> the time being, but in any event this system is working.)

Anon.penet.fi is forwarding postings to news.admin.policy among other
groups.

	Julf





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: J. Michael Diehl <mdiehl@triton.unm.edu>
Date: Fri, 4 Jun 93 18:18:28 PDT
To: pfarrell@cs.gmu.edu (Pat Farrell)
Subject: Re: Software infrastructure
In-Reply-To: <35870.pfarrell@cs.gmu.edu>
Message-ID: <9306050118.AA13037@triton.unm.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


According to Pat Farrell:

> >As for "is kermit good enough?"  No.  Almost NO ONE in the DOS world uses
> >it any more,
> ..flames elided...
> 
> I agree that the PC-centric BBS world has decided that Kermit is obsolete.

Maybe it's just us... ;^)

> Kermit is continually improving and is very nearly as fast as ZMODEM.

Maybe I have a slow version, but I have NEVER gotten comparable results 'tween
kermit and zmodem, or even ymodem.  Usually it's a 2:1 difference.

> It is available for nearly all platforms, is free, and source is availilbe.
> It includes NASI support directly. It has a very nice (powerful) scripting
> language. It also works over TCP/IP networks for folks with the luck
> to be Ethernet'd into the Internet (like most of the faculty and staff here
> at GMU). It also has very strong backward compatibility.

This is worth considering...

> I expect that Kermit is good enuff if you are interested in commandline
> scripts for plain old DOS. And the scripting language is also
> supported by the C version that run on nearly all Unixs and most other
> boxes. This would allow a single script to support a lot of users.
> I'm not interestedin DOS and command lines, but if some other
> cypherpunk wants to try, I'm sure not going to complain.

What do you mean by "commandline script?"

+-----------------------+-----------------------------+---------+
| J. Michael Diehl ;-)  | I thought I was wrong once. | PGP KEY |
| mdiehl@triton.unm.edu |   But, I was mistaken.      |available|
| mike.diehl@fido.org   |                             | Ask Me! |
| (505) 299-2282        +-----------------------------+---------+
|                                                               |
+------"I'm just looking for the opportunity to be -------------+
|            Politically Incorrect!"   <Me>                     |
+-----If codes are outlawed, only criminals wil have codes.-----+
+----Is Big Brother in your phone?  If you don't know, ask me---+



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: J. Michael Diehl <mdiehl@triton.unm.edu>
Date: Fri, 4 Jun 93 18:21:37 PDT
To: hughes@soda.berkeley.edu (Eric Hughes)
Subject: Re: CryptoStacker, long term vision
In-Reply-To: <9306041351.AA05555@soda.berkeley.edu>
Message-ID: <9306050121.AA13122@triton.unm.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


According to Eric Hughes:

> This is the reason that I disregard DISKREET from Norton.  There's no
> source, and largish companies are notorious for pushing compromised
> software.  Norton's unlikely to ship source, so unless someone
> decompiles it, I'm not biting.

HMMmmm.....  Well, how big is it?  Is it a .exe or .com?  It might be very 
instructive to see how they do it...

> four is not overlarge.  The archive at soda is available for group
> work, if desired.

That is very generous!
+-----------------------+-----------------------------+---------+
| J. Michael Diehl ;-)  | I thought I was wrong once. | PGP KEY |
| mdiehl@triton.unm.edu |   But, I was mistaken.      |available|
| mike.diehl@fido.org   |                             | Ask Me! |
| (505) 299-2282        +-----------------------------+---------+
|                                                               |
+------"I'm just looking for the opportunity to be -------------+
|            Politically Incorrect!"   <Me>                     |
+-----If codes are outlawed, only criminals wil have codes.-----+
+----Is Big Brother in your phone?  If you don't know, ask me---+



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: J. Michael Diehl <mdiehl@triton.unm.edu>
Date: Fri, 4 Jun 93 18:25:05 PDT
To: elee9sf@Menudo.UH.EDU (Karl Barrus)
Subject: Re: THANKS: pgp, mh, .forward
In-Reply-To: <199306041431.AA22111@Menudo.UH.EDU>
Message-ID: <9306050124.AA13209@triton.unm.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


According to Karl Barrus:
> Mail sent to barrus@tree.egr.uh.edu gets piped through pgp, encrypted,
> and then stored in the mail folder 'fromnext'.  The PGPPATH did seem
> to be the missing factor!
> 

Would someone explain how to do this.  I need an idiot's description.  I tried
to get my mail to go through a filter once....twice actually.  Never did get it
to work.  I did loose a lot of mail, tho. ;^(

Thanx in advance.
+-----------------------+-----------------------------+---------+
| J. Michael Diehl ;-)  | I thought I was wrong once. | PGP KEY |
| mdiehl@triton.unm.edu |   But, I was mistaken.      |available|
| mike.diehl@fido.org   |                             | Ask Me! |
| (505) 299-2282        +-----------------------------+---------+
|                                                               |
+------"I'm just looking for the opportunity to be -------------+
|            Politically Incorrect!"   <Me>                     |
+-----If codes are outlawed, only criminals wil have codes.-----+
+----Is Big Brother in your phone?  If you don't know, ask me---+



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Perry E. Metzger" <pmetzger@lehman.com>
Date: Fri, 4 Jun 93 16:41:16 PDT
To: esr@snark.thyrsus.com (Eric S. Raymond)
Subject: Re: Lobbying for Cryptoprivacy, non-U.S.
In-Reply-To: <m0o1jGJ-0001KtC@snark.thyrsus.com>
Message-ID: <9306042339.AA19731@snark.shearson.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Eric S. Raymond says:
> > At the first CFP conference, Lawrence Tribe made this point extremely
> > well, that the fundamental right of citizens should be invariant to
> > technology.
> 
> That's surprising.  Tribe publicly peddles the leftist arguments for gun
> control, including the one that the Founding Fathers never intended the
> Second Amendment for weapons of today's lethality.  I wonder why he
> doesn't see the parallel.

Because he's a liberal, not a libertarian.

Perry




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Johan Helsingius <julf@penet.FI>
Date: Fri, 4 Jun 93 10:21:12 PDT
To: "J. Michael Diehl" <mdiehl@triton.unm.edu>
Subject: Re: Software infrastructure
In-Reply-To: <9306040452.AA13658@triton.unm.edu>
Message-ID: <9306041924.aa27246@penet.penet.FI>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



> Well, now I will describe how I send/receive mail on my system, the killer
> 8086-8 from Hell! ;^)  I've been hyping my setup on this list for about a
> month.
> But since I've partially implimented a system like what we have been
> discussing, I'll give more details.


I'm rather surprised that nobody has mentioned UUPC. It's PD, runs on
plain-vanilla DOS, and allows automatic, batched mail traffic (and even
netnews) to/from your local PC.

On your host (typically an UNIX box) you configure
sendmail/smail/binmail/whatever to forward your mail over uucp to your
home machine. On the home machine, you simply configure UUCP to poll
when needed, and transfer the stuff down onto your local disk. From
there you can use UUPC's local mail reader (or any mail package you
want), and the replies get spooled to a spool directory, and uploaded
automatically the next time you (or the software) opens the connection.

Automatic polling, automatic bi-directional batch file transfer,
insertion of encryption trivial....

I use it to read and reply to my mail while on the beach, using a
notebook computer and a cellular phone... The ability to efficiently
batch transfer the stuff makes a *big* difference if you are paying
cellular rates...

	Julf





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Dave Banisar <banisar@washofc.cpsr.org>
Date: Fri, 4 Jun 93 18:03:03 PDT
To: CYPHERPUNKS <CYPHERPUNKS@toad.com>
Subject: NIST CSSPAB 6/4/93 Resoluti
Message-ID: <00541.2822071666.3817@washofc.cpsr.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


  NIST CSSPAB 6/4/93 Resolutions


                 NIST Crypto Resolutions

  Computer System Security and Privacy Advisory Board
                       June 4, 1993

                      Resolution #1

At Mr. Kammer's request we have conducted two days of 
hearings.  The clear message of the majority of input 
was that there are serious concerns regarding the Key 
Escrow Initiative and the Board concurs with these 
concerns.  Many of these issues are still to be fully 
understood and more time is needed to achieving that 
understanding.

Accordingly, this Board resolves to have an additional 
meeting in July 1993 in order to more completely respond 
to Mr. Kammer's request and to fulfill its statutory 
obligations under P.L. 100-235.  The Board recommends 
that the inter-agency review take note of our input 
collected, our preliminary finding, and adjust the 
timetable to allow for resolution of the significant 
issues and problems raised.

Attached to this resolution is a preliminary 
distillation of the serious concerns and problems.


                     Resolution #2

Key escrowing encryption technology represents a 
dramatic change in the nation's information 
infrastructure.  The full implications of this 
encryption technique are not fully understood at this 
time.  Therefore, the Board recommends that key 
escrowing encryption technology not be deployed beyond 
current implementations planned within the Executive 
Branch, until the significant public policy and 
technical issues inherent with this encryption technique 
are fully understood.

[Attachment to Resolution #1]]

-  A convincing statement of the problem that Clipper 
attempts to solve has not been provided.

- Export and important controls over cryptographic 
products must be reviewed.  Based upon data compiled 
from U.S. and international vendors, current controls 
are negatively impacting U.S. competitiveness in the 
world market and are not inhibiting the foreign 
production and use of cryptography (DES and RSA)

- The Clipper/Capstone proposal does not address the 
needs of the software industry, which is a critical and 
significant component of the National Information 
Infrastructure and the U.S. economy.

- Additional DES encryption alternatives and key 
management alternatives should be considered since there 
is a significant installed base.

- The individuals reviewing the Skipjack algorithm and 
key management system must be given an appropriate time 
period and environment in which to perform a thorough 
review.  This review must address the escrow protocol 
and chip implementation as well as the algorithm itself.

- Sufficient information must be provided on the 
proposed key escrow scheme to allow it to be fully 
understood by the general public.  It does not appear to 
be clearly defined at this time and, since it is an 
integral part of the security of the system, it appears 
to require further development and consideration of 
alternatives to the key escrow scheme (e.g., three 
"escrow" entities, one of which is a non-government 
agency, and a software based solution).

- The economic implications for the Clipper/Capstone 
proposal have not been examined.  These costs go beyond 
the vendor cost of the chip and include such factors as 
customer installation, maintenance, administration, chip 
replacement, integration and interfacing, government 
escrow systems costs, etc.

- Legal issues raised by the proposal must be reviewed.

- Congress, as well as the Administration, should play a 
role in the conduct and approval of the results of the 
review.

=======================================================
    NIST Resolutions on Key Escow Issues and Clipper
                       provided by
                 CPSR Washington office
           666 Pennsylvania Ave., SE Suite 303
                  Washington, DC 20003
               rotenberg@washofc.cpsr.org
=======================================================






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: nobody@soda.berkeley.edu
Date: Fri, 4 Jun 93 21:26:45 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: chain.zip uploaded
Message-ID: <9306050423.AA22143@soda.berkeley.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I just put chain.zip into the /pub/cypherpunks/incoming.  This is source
and an MSDOS executable for the "chain" utility I mentioned last week,
which works similarly to Karl Barrus's scripts for sending messages through
several remailers.  This program includes options for encrypting the
message for the recipient, and if run on a Unix system it can automatically
send the message to the first remailer in the chain.

I'm going to be off the list for a few days for personal reasons,
but if anyone has any comments or problems with the program, let
me know and I'll look into it when I get back.

Hal Finney
74076.1041@compuserve.com




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: elee9sf@Menudo.UH.EDU
Date: Fri, 4 Jun 93 21:06:13 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: INFO: .forward
Message-ID: <199306050406.AA21108@Menudo.UH.EDU>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



> Would someone explain how to do this.  I need an idiot's
> description.  I tried to get my mail to go through a filter
> once....twice actually.  Never did get it to work.

Well, I'll give it a shot.  Sendmail optionally reads a file in your
home directory named .forward, and follows the instructions there.
Typically, a .forward contains another address, in which case mail
sent gets forwards to the address in the .forward file.  For example,
my .forward file on tree.egr.uh.edu is

elee9sf@menudo.uh.edu

so any mail sent to barrus@tree.egr.uh.edu gets forwarded to
elee9sf@menudo.uh.edu.

A more interesting application is to forward your mail to a command
(pipe mail to a command).  In that case, the .forward file reads

"|/path/mycommand options"

and mail gets piped to mycommand for further processing.  For
instance, the vacation program works by piping incoming mail to
vacation, which both files and responds for you.  Also, the cypherpunk
remailers work by using a .forward file to pipe incoming mail to the
scripts which make up the remailer.  Yet another example is the slocal
program which is part of the mh mail system; incoming mail gets piped
to slocal, which in turn relies on a configuration file
(.maildelivery) which contains instructions for handling the mail.

My idea was to have all mail sent to barrus@tree.egr.uh.edu piped
through pgp and then mailed to elee9sf@menudo.uh.edu.  The rough idea
is to do this:

"|/path/pgp -fea barrus | mail elee9sf@menudo.uh.edu"

Here, incoming mail gets piped to 'pgp -fea barrus' which encrypts the
message with my public key, and the result is piped to 'mail
elee9sf@menudo.uh.edu' which then mails the encrypted result to me.
For various reasons I'm still exploring, this didn't work (even with
PGPPATH set, piping to a script, etc.  I've got more things to try to
see why it isn't working.) on the NeXT.

So, I tried to do this from the menudo.uh.edu side.  Using the slocal
program and the associated .maildelivery file, I have mail which comes
from barrus@tree.egr.uh.edu (remember my mail from tree is forwarded
to menudo) piped through 'pgp -fea barrus' and then the result is
piped into an mh command which stores the mail in a folder.

Of course, this isn't a substitute for end-to-end encryption.  Here,
mail travels all the way to me before getting encrypted, so if
somebody wanted to snoop me they could just stand between the sender
and my account and eavesdrop.  A better solution would be to have the
sender encrypt the message!  But as I mentioned I was trying to set
this up so that replies to a USENET posting got encrypted before
finally getting dropped on menudo.  An improvement would be for me to
get the encryption and remailing working on the NeXT, but again, this
is inferior to having the sender encrypt in the first place.

You mentioned trying to put your mail through a filter - were you
trying to use the filter command of elm?  Sometimes you have to watch
subtle things like file permissions (slocal will not use a
.maildelivery file that is group or other readable) or pathnames (try
putting the fill path names when you use commands).

/-----------------------------------\
| Karl L. Barrus                    |
| elee9sf@menudo.uh.edu             | <- preferred address
| barrus@tree.egr.uh.edu (NeXTMail) |
\-----------------------------------/




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Pat Farrell" <pfarrell@cs.gmu.edu>
Date: Sat, 5 Jun 93 00:27:08 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Software infrastructure
Message-ID: <84861.pfarrell@cs.gmu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>Maybe I have a slow version, but I have NEVER gotten comparable results 'tween
>kermit and zmodem, or even ymodem.  Usually it's a 2:1 difference.

It is important to have recent version on both the PC and host side.
The versions that I run on my PC is 3.12. The Unix host version is
close to 5A... I had to slurp the latest Sun version from Columbia
to get decent performance. The version supported by my Sysadmin was
obsolete. I haven't claimed that Kermit is faster, but with sliding windows,
large buffers, and other tricks, the night and day difference goes away.


>>glowing BS about TCP/IP, NASI, etc. elided...
>This is worth considering...

I agree. That is why I posted. Perhaps a Kermit guru lives within
the list.

>> I expect that Kermit is good enuff if you are interested in commandline
>> scripts for plain old DOS. And the scripting language is also
>> supported by the C version that run on nearly all Unixs and most other
>> boxes. This would allow a single script to support a lot of users.
>What do you mean by "commandline script?"

I mean that a script that works  like unix or DOS command line programs
should (speculation alert!) be possible. We can handle obscure options,
switches, etc. My target audience can't. Kermit has automatic scripts
and macros that should be able to handle what we need. Heaven help us
when there are errors tho....

Pat

Pat Farrell      Grad Student                 pfarrell@cs.gmu.edu
Department of Computer Science    George Mason University, Fairfax, VA
Public key availble via finger          #include <standard.disclaimer>




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: J. Michael Diehl <mdiehl@triton.unm.edu>
Date: Sat, 5 Jun 93 00:25:33 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Dig. Cash Question.
Message-ID: <9306050725.AA19507@triton.unm.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I'm reading the paper that was announced on this list about Digital Cash last 
week.  It was writen by Stefan Brands.  I think I have a strong Math background,
but I don't know what is meant by a "descrete log" in a group G.  I understand
what a group is.  I just don't know what properties an element, a, would have
if it were the log sub p of e.  Can someone help me.  Otherwise, this is a
very interesting article.  Thanx in advance.
+-----------------------+-----------------------------+---------+
| J. Michael Diehl ;-)  | I thought I was wrong once. | PGP KEY |
| mdiehl@triton.unm.edu |   But, I was mistaken.      |available|
| mike.diehl@fido.org   |                             | Ask Me! |
| (505) 299-2282        +-----------------------------+---------+
|                                                               |
+------"I'm just looking for the opportunity to be -------------+
|            Politically Incorrect!"   <Me>                     |
+-----If codes are outlawed, only criminals wil have codes.-----+
+----Is Big Brother in your phone?  If you don't know, ask me---+



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: J. Michael Diehl <mdiehl@triton.unm.edu>
Date: Sat, 5 Jun 93 00:27:42 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Tempest@home?
Message-ID: <9306050727.AA19541@triton.unm.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I'm really intrigued by the technology known as TEMPEST.  If a guy had a mind 
to, is it possible to put together a do-it-yourself "tempest-aware" machine?
That is, could a guy buy supplies that would make his machine "quiet?"  If so,
would someone please tell me how!  This would be very usefull to many 
cypherpunks and would be of (IMHO) general interest.  Thanx in advance.
 
 
BTW, this message was mailed by my pgp-aware, automatic mail script.
+-----------------------+-----------------------------+---------+
| J. Michael Diehl ;-)  | I thought I was wrong once. | PGP KEY |
| mdiehl@triton.unm.edu |   But, I was mistaken.      |available|
| mike.diehl@fido.org   |                             | Ask Me! |
| (505) 299-2282        +-----------------------------+---------+
|                                                               |
+------"I'm just looking for the opportunity to be -------------+
|            Politically Incorrect!"   <Me>                     |
+-----If codes are outlawed, only criminals wil have codes.-----+
+----Is Big Brother in your phone?  If you don't know, ask me---+
 
 
 




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: J. Michael Diehl <mdiehl@triton.unm.edu>
Date: Sat, 5 Jun 93 00:37:36 PDT
To: pfarrell@cs.gmu.edu (Pat Farrell)
Subject: Re: Software infrastructure
In-Reply-To: <84861.pfarrell@cs.gmu.edu>
Message-ID: <9306050737.AA19773@triton.unm.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


According to Pat Farrell:
> 
>>Maybe I have a slow version, but I have NEVER gotten comparable results 'tween
>>kermit and zmodem, or even ymodem.  Usually it's a 2:1 difference.
> 
> It is important to have recent version on both the PC and host side.
> The versions that I run on my PC is 3.12. The Unix host version is
> close to 5A... I had to slurp the latest Sun version from Columbia
> to get decent performance. The version supported by my Sysadmin was
> obsolete. I haven't claimed that Kermit is faster, but with sliding windows,
> large buffers, and other tricks, the night and day difference goes away.

I'll take your word for it. ;^)  I can only speak from experience.

> >What do you mean by "commandline script?"
> 
> I mean that a script that works  like unix or DOS command line programs
> should (speculation alert!) be possible. We can handle obscure options,
> switches, etc. My target audience can't. Kermit has automatic scripts
> and macros that should be able to handle what we need. Heaven help us
> when there are errors tho....

We simply make a batch file which starts our comm program with all the right
settings?  Simple.  If there are errors, we program around them just like we
do in the real world (tm)  If we don't we hear about it from our users! ;^)
I still have a few possible errors which I haven't programed around on my 
scrYpt, but they are so rare.... ya, I know.  I'll fix em before I release.

+-----------------------+-----------------------------+---------+
| J. Michael Diehl ;-)  | I thought I was wrong once. | PGP KEY |
| mdiehl@triton.unm.edu |   But, I was mistaken.      |available|
| mike.diehl@fido.org   |                             | Ask Me! |
| (505) 299-2282        +-----------------------------+---------+
|                                                               |
+------"I'm just looking for the opportunity to be -------------+
|            Politically Incorrect!"   <Me>                     |
+-----If codes are outlawed, only criminals wil have codes.-----+
+----Is Big Brother in your phone?  If you don't know, ask me---+



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: poier@sfu.ca (Skye Merlin Poier)
Date: Sat, 5 Jun 93 03:18:43 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: here ya go
Message-ID: <9306051015.AA15046@malibu.sfu.ca>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


heres the procomm+ 2.0 hook prog...

-----snip snip-----
/*
22222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222
22                                                                   22
22 HOOK.C - Programmer's interface for PROCOMM PLUS 2.0              22
22 COPYRIGHT  (C) 1990 DATASTORM TECHNOLOGIES, INC.                  22
22                                                                   22
22 PROCOMM PLUS passes the "hook" program the address in memory of   22
22 the PCPLUS.PRM file structure, and the ASPECT N0-N9 and S0-S9     22
22 arrays.  This sample code makes local copies of these so it can   22
22 use the small memory model and not have access those locations    22
22 directly (look at the movedata() function calls.)                 22
22                                                                   22
22 This file also contains other PROCOMM PLUS information that       22
22 programmers may wish to make use of.                              22
22                                                                   22
22 NOTE: This code example is written for Microsoft C, which         22
22 defaults to "word alignment" of integer size items and causes     22
22 extra bytes to be inserted in structures to insure field          22
22 alignment.  Turbo C, Zortech C, and other compilers that default  22
22 to "packed" or byte alignment must be explicitly set to word      22
22 alignment (usually the -a compiler option).                       22
22                                                                   22
22222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222
22222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222
22                                                                   22
22 IMPORTANT NOTICE:  The concepts and the text contained in this    22
22 file are hereby released into the Public Domain for use by        22
22 programmers in developing PROCOMM PLUS-compatible code.           22
22 Programs developed using this file may be distributed freely by   22
22 programmers without any financial or legal obligation to          22
22 Datastorm Technologies, Inc.  However, this in no way implies     22
22 that any other material in the PROCOMM PLUS package may be        22
22 distributed in such manner, or that PROCOMM PLUS or any other     22
22 Datastorm product may be bundled for distribution with programs   22
22 developed using this file.                                        22
22                                                                   22
22222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222
*/
 
#include "stdio.h"
#include "stdlib.h"
#include "dos.h"
 
/*
22222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222
22                                                                   22
22 Structure for PROCOMM PLUS PCPLUS.PRM information                 22
22                                                                   22
22222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222
*/
struct PARMLIST
   {
 
/* line settings */
 
   int port;              /* com port, 0=COM1 etc */
   unsigned int baud;     /* index into baud_rate[] array */
   int parity;            /* parity: NOEMS = 01234 */
   int sbits;             /* stop bits as int */
   int dbits;             /* data bits as int */
 
/* Modem General Options */
 
   int mdm_timeout;       /* secs to wait for connect */
   int mdm_pause;         /* secs to pause between calls */
   int abdetect;          /* autobaud for dialing: FALSE/TRUE */
   int ddtrflg;           /* 1=drop dtr in dial dir */
   char redialc;          /* character to send in redial */
   int cdover;            /* override CD and send init string ? */
   int maxcalls;          /* max retries for dial dir */
 
/* Modem Command Options */
 
   char mdminit[47];      /* modem init string */
   char mdmcmd[25];       /* modem dialing command */
   char mdmsuf[25];       /* modem dial command suffix */
   char hu_str[25];       /* modem hangup string */
   char ans_str[25];      /* modem auto anser string */
   char no_ans_str[25];   /* modem no auto answer string */
 
/* Modem Result Messages */
 
   char mdm_msg[11][16];  /* modem messages, 0-6 = connect */
 
/* Modem Port Assignments */
 
   int baseaddr[8];       /* com port base addresses */
   int irqnumbr[8];       /* com port irq selection */
 
/* Terminal General Options */
 
   int termtype;          /* terminal type */
   int echo_flag;         /* duplex: 0=FULL, 1=HALF */
   int use_xon;           /* use flow control: FALSE/TRUE */
   int hardflow;          /* use hasrware flow ctrl: FALSE/TRUE */
   int wrap;              /* use line wrap FALSE/TRUE */
   int scrlflag;          /* scroll page FALSE/TRUE */
   int lfflag;            /* add LF to CR coming in: FALSE/TRUE */
   char dest_bs;          /* use destructive BS: FALSE/TRUE */
   int brklen;            /* BREAK length in ms */
   int enq_on;            /* respond to ENQ: NONE/ANSWERBACK/CIS B */
   int use_uline;                      /* 1=EGA/VGA true underlining */
   int col132mode;        /* 0=80 col, 1=132 col */
   int ansi8bit;          /* 1=ANSI 8 bit mode, 0=ANSI 7 bit mode */
 
/* Terminal Color Options */
 
   int tcnorm;            /* Terminal normal attribute */
   int tcbold;            /* Terminal bold attribute */
   int tchalf;            /* Terminal wrt prt/half intense attribute */
   int tcrev;             /* Terminal reverse attribute */
   int tculine;           /* Terminal underscore attribute */
 
/* Display/Sound Options */
 
   int explode;           /* use exploding windows: FALSE/TRUE */
   int soundon;           /* use sound: FALSE/TRUE */
   int alarmon;           /* use alarm: FALSE/TRUE */
   int attenlen;          /* seconds for alarm sound */
   int snow;              /* flag for using fast display updates */
   int sline_off;         /* 0=use status line, 1=use 25 lines of data */
   int bigcur;            /* 0=line, 1=block */
   unsigned int rfarsize; /* far mem for redisplay buffer */
   int startextralines;   /* startup in extraline mode? */
   int extralines;        /* 25, 28, 43 or 50 line mode */
 
/* General Options */
 
   char prtfilename[13];  /* name of PRN device */
   int cd_at_exit;        /* 0=ignore, 1=hangup, 2=ask */
   int fastkbd;           /* AT keyboard speedup */
   int remcmd;            /* flag for using remote script commands */
   int xlatflag;          /* use xlate: FALSE/TRUE */
   char xlatps;           /* pause character */
   int keypause;          /* pause between chars in ms */
   int nophonelog;        /* flag for using phone log */
   int filelu;            /* flag for using auto filename lookup */
   int use123;            /* use lotus menus ? */
   char key123;           /* lotus menu key */
   int dtrflag;           /* drop DTR in hangup: FALSE/TRUE */
   int page_is_xfer;      /* 1=PgUp/Dn xfer, 0=Ctrl-PgUp/Dn xfer */
   char chat_blk_mode;    /* flag for char/block mode in "chat" */
 
/* Host Mode Options */
 
   int hardwire;          /* host connection type: MODEM/DIRECT */
   int autobaud;          /* use autobaud in host mode */
   char host_id[51];      /* host welcome string */
   int opensys;           /* host is open system: FALSE/TRUE */
   char hostup[51];       /* host mode upload default dir */
   char hostdn[51];       /* host mode download default dir */
   int hosttimeout;       /* host inactivity timeout (in minutes) */
   int hostbyemode;       /* what to do after end of call */
   int hostnewuserdl;     /* can new user xfer files? */
 
/* File/Path Options */
 
   char log_name[65];     /* default log file name */
   char scr_name[65];     /* default screen dump fiel name */
   char dl_path[65];      /* default d/l path */
   char viewname[65];     /* view prog name */
   char ed_name[65];      /* editor name */
 
/* Color Options */
 
   int hmclr;             /* colors */
   int hmhi;
   int pdclr;
   int pdhi;
   int slclr;
   int slhi;
   int tcclr;
   int tchi;
   int xclr;
   int xhi;
   int ddclr;
   int ddhi;
   int kmclr;
   int kmhi;
   int pmclr;             /* colors for pulldown menus */
   int pmhi;              /* colors for pulldown menus */
   int pmrev;             /* colors for pulldown menus */
 
/* ASCII Options */
 
   int ascii_echo;        /* echo ascii uploads: FALSE/TRUE */
   int blankx;            /* expand blank lines in ASCII uploads */
   int tabx;              /* expand tabs in ASCII uploads */
   int cpace;             /* char pace time for ASCII uploads */
   int pchar;             /* pace character for ASCII uploads */
   int pace;              /* line pace for ascii u/l */
   int up_cr;             /* CR define for ascii u/l:      */
   int up_lf;             /* LF define for ascii u/l:      */
   int dn_cr;             /* CR define for ascii d/l:      */
   int dn_lf;             /* LF define for ascii d/l:      */
   int strip8;            /* strip 8th bit in ASCII xfers */
   int ascii_dl_to;                    /* auto timeout value for ascii dloads */
 
/* Kermit Options */
 
   int srpsiz;            /* kermit stuff */
   char spadchar;         /* kermit stuff */
   int ksoh;
   int spad;
   char squote;
   char sqt8bitchar;
   char sseol;
   int sbctr;             /* kermit stuff */
   int sbinary;
   int turnch;            /* kermit stuff */
 
/* Zmodem Options */
 
   int zadl;              /* ZMODEM auto download flag */
   int zds;               /* ZMODEM time/date stamp flag */
   int zcr;               /* ZMODEM crash recovery flag (0, 1, 2, 3) */
   int zscr;              /* ZMODEM send crash recovery flag (0, 1 */
   int ztw;               /* ZMODEM tx window size (0, 2048, 4096) */
   int zcrc;              /* ZMODEM crc type (0 = 32 bit, 1 = 16 bit) */
/* int zmt;                  ZMODEM moby turbo compatibility flag */
 
/* External Protocol Options */
 
   char epname[3][9];     /* display name */
   char epupload[3][16];  /* upload command */
   char epdnload[3][16];  /* download command */
   int epmode[3];         /* 0,1,2=ASPECT,Program,Hook */
 
/* General Protocol Options */
 
   int relax;             /* XMODEM relaxed mode: FALSE/TRUE */
   int trash;             /* garbage placeholder */
 
/* Editor Options */
 
   unsigned char textmode;             /* input mode 0:Aspect 1:word */
   unsigned char omiteof;              /* don't write EOF flag */
   unsigned char exptabs;              /* expand tab characters */
   unsigned char wordwrap;             /* word wrap enable flag */
   unsigned char justify;              /* right margin justify flag */
   unsigned tabsize;                   /* tab-stop constant */
   unsigned pindent;                   /* programming indent level */
   unsigned windent;                   /* indent level (zero-based) */
   unsigned lmargin;                   /* left margin (zero-based) */
   unsigned rmargin;                   /* right margin (zero-based) */
   unsigned es0;                       /* status line headers */
   unsigned es1;                       /* status line file information */
   unsigned es2;                       /* status line message area */
   unsigned et0;                       /* normal text display */
   unsigned et1;                       /* reverse video text display */
   unsigned et2;                       /* highlighted text display */
   unsigned ep0;                       /* prompt window display */
   unsigned ep1;                       /* prompt input field */
   unsigned em0;                       /* default message attribute */
   unsigned em1;                       /* message MSG attribute */
   unsigned em2;                       /* message EMSG attribute */
 
 
   #if defined(ACSI)
   char acsi_callname[17];/* ACSI server name */
   #endif
 
   int mouse_x_sensitivity;            /* x mickey sensitivity */
   int mouse_y_sensitivity;            /* y mickey sensitivity */
 
   int xfer_cd;                        /* flag for testing CD in Xfers */
   int clip_separator;                 /* char sent between clipboard entries */
 
   int ax132;                          /* Value for AL for forced video mode */
   int hcmdrte;                        /* TRUE if using HCOMMAND.RTE */
   } ;                                 /* End of parmlist */
 
 
/*
22222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222
22                                                                   22
22 Structure for PROCOMM PLUS dialing directory entry.               22
22                                                                   22
22222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222
*/
struct DDREC
   {
   char ddname[25];                    /* name */
   char ddphone[21];                   /* phone number */
   int  ddbaud;                        /* baud rate as int */
   char ddparity;                      /* parity as short int */
   char dddata;                        /* data bits as short int */
   char ddstop;                        /* stop bits as short int */
   char dddup;                         /* duplex as short int: 0 = full */
   char ddscript[9];                   /* ASPECT file w/o ext */
   char ddlast[9];                     /* last call: mm/dd/yy */
   int  ddtotal;                       /* total connects */
   char ddproto;                       /* default protocol as short int */
   char ddterm;                        /* terminal type as short int */
   char ddmode;                        /* 0 = mode, 1 = direct */
   char ddpassword[11];                /* like it says */
   char ddmacfile[9];                  /* keyboard macro file */
   char ddkbdfile[9];                  /* keyboard mapping file */
   char ddport;                        /* com port to use */
   char ddnotefile[9];                 /* note file */
   };
 
/*
22222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222
22                                                                   22
22 Structure for PROCOMM PLUS .KBD file terminal entry:              22
22                                                                   22
22 struct TERMTABLE                                                  22
22    {                                                              22
22    char def[79][12];                                              22
22    };                                                             22
22                                                                   22
22 All fields are fixed length and are padded with NULLs.            22
22                                                                   22
22 The file is built in the terminal order in the term_desc array    22
22 below.  Each terminal entry has the keys stored in the following  22
22 order:                                                            22
22                                                                   22
22 KEYPAD ASTERISK (*)                                               22
22 KEYPAD MINUS (-)                                                  22
22 KEYPAD PLUS (+)                                                   22
22 KEYPAD PERIOD (.)                                                 22
22 KEYPAD SLASH (//)                                                 22
22 KEYPAD ENTER (CR)                                                 22
22                                                                   22
22 TAB                                                               22
22 BACKTAB                                                           22
22 INSERT                                                            22
22 DELETE                                                            22
22 BACKSPACE                                                         22
22                                                                   22
22 CTRL-HOME                                                         22
22 CTRL-END                                                          22
22 CTRL-PGUP                                                         22
22 CTRL-PGDN                                                         22
22 CTRL-BACKSPACE                                                    22
22                                                                   22
22 F1                                                                22
22 F2                                                                22
22 F3                                                                22
22 F4                                                                22
22 F5                                                                22
22 F6                                                                22
22 F7                                                                22
22 F8                                                                22
22 F9                                                                22
22 F10                                                               22
22 F11                                                               22
22 F12                                                               22
22                                                                   22
22 KEYPAD 0                                                          22
22 KEYPAD 1                                                          22
22 KEYPAD 2                                                          22
22 KEYPAD 3                                                          22
22 KEYPAD 4                                                          22
22 KEYPAD 5                                                          22
22 KEYPAD 6                                                          22
22 KEYPAD 7                                                          22
22 KEYPAD 8                                                          22
22 KEYPAD 9                                                          22
22                                                                   22
22 SHIFT-F1                                                          22
22 SHIFT-F2                                                          22
22 SHIFT-F3                                                          22
22 SHIFT-F4                                                          22
22 SHIFT-F5                                                          22
22 SHIFT-F6                                                          22
22 SHIFT-F7                                                          22
22 SHIFT-F8                                                          22
22 SHIFT-F9                                                          22
22 SHIFT-F10                                                         22
22 SHIFT-F11                                                         22
22 SHIFT-F12                                                         22
22                                                                   22
22 GREY CURSOR UP                                                    22
22 GREY CURSOR DOWN                                                  22
22 GREY CURSOR LEFT                                                  22
22 GREY CURSOR RIGHT                                                 22
22 GREY INSERT                                                       22
22 GREY DELETE                                                       22
22 GREY HOME                                                         22
22 GREY END                                                          22
22 GREY PGUP                                                         22
22 GREY PGDN                                                         22
22                                                                   22
22 CTRL-F1                                                           22
22 CTRL-F2                                                           22
22 CTRL-F3                                                           22
22 CTRL-F4                                                           22
22 CTRL-F5                                                           22
22 CTRL-F6                                                           22
22 CTRL-F7                                                           22
22 CTRL-F8                                                           22
22 CTRL-F9                                                           22
22 CTRL-F10                                                          22
22 CTRL-F11                                                          22
22 CTRL-F12                                                          22
22                                                                   22
22 CURSOR UP                                                         22
22 CURSOR DOWN                                                       22
22 CURSOR LEFT                                                       22
22 CURSOR RIGHT                                                      22
22                                                                   22
22 HOME KEY                                                          22
22 END KEY                                                           22
22 ENTER KEY (CR)"                                                   22
22                                                                   22
22222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222
*/
unsigned char *termdesc[] =
{
   "TTY     ",    /* TTY     0                   */
   "VT52    ",    /* VT52    1                   */
   "VT100   ",    /* VT100   2                   */
   "VT102   ",    /* VT102   3                   */
   "VT220   ",    /* VT220   4                   */
   "VT320   ",    /* VT320   5                   */
   "ANSI    ",    /* BBS     6                   */
   "IBM PC  ",    /* IBMPC   7                   */
   "WYSE 75 ",    /* WYSE75  8  (ANSI terminal)  */
   "ATT 605 ",    /* ATT605  9  (ANSI terminal)  */
   "ATT 4410",    /* ATT4410 10 (ANSI terminal)  */
   "TVI 922 ",    /* TV922   11 (ANSI terminal)  */
   "HEATH 19",    /* H19     12                  */
   "IBM 3101",    /* IBM3101 13                  */
   "IBM 3161",    /* IBM3161 14                  */
   "DG D100 ",    /* DGD100  15                  */
   "DG D200 ",    /* DGD200  16                  */
   "DG D210 ",    /* DGD210  17                  */
   "ADDS 60 ",    /* ADDS60  18                  */
   "ADDS 90 ",    /* ADDS90  19                  */
   "ADM 3A  ",    /* ADM3    20                  */
   "ADM 5   ",    /* ADM5    21                  */
   "ADM 31  ",    /* ADM31   22                  */
   "ESPRIT 3",    /* ESPRIT3 23                  */
   "3270/950",    /* IBM3270 24                  */
   "TVI 910 ",    /* TV910   25                  */
   "TVI 912 ",    /* TV912   26                  */
   "TVI 920 ",    /* TV920   27                  */
   "TVI 925 ",    /* TV925   28                  */
   "TVI 950 ",    /* TV950   29                  */
   "TVI 955 ",    /* TV955   30                  */
   "WYSE 50 ",    /* WYSE50  31                  */
   "WYSE 100"     /* WYSE100 32                  */
};
 
/*
22222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222
22                                                                   22
22 p.baud from the "parmlist" structure above is an index into the   22
22 following 2 arrays.                                               22
22                                                                   22
22 i.e. the current baud rate for PROCOMM PLUS is baud_rate[p.baud]. 22
22                                                                   22
22222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222
*/
char *baud_desc[] =                    /* baud rates as strings       */
{
"300\0\0\0",
"1200\0\0",
"2400\0\0",
"4800\0\0",
"9600\0\0",
"19200\0",
"38400\0",
"57600\0",
"115200"
};
 
long baud_rate[] =                     /* baud rates as longs         */
{
300,
1200,
2400,
4800,
9600,
19200,
38400,
57600,
115200
};
 
 
/*
22222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222
22                                                                   22
22 HOOK.C declarations and defines                                   22
22                                                                   22
22222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222
*/
#define PARMSIZE sizeof(struct PARMLIST)
#define VMAX 10
#define SLEN 81
#define NSIZE VMAX * 2
#define SSIZE VMAX * SLEN
 
struct PARMLIST near p;                /* PCPLUS.PRM structure        */
int asp_nums[VMAX];                    /* ASPECT N0-N9 array          */
unsigned char asp_strings[VMAX][SLEN]; /* ASPECT S0-S9 array          */
 
unsigned int ptr_seg1;                 /* segment addr                */
unsigned int ptr_off1;                 /* offset addr                 */
unsigned int ptr_seg2;                 /* segment addr                */
unsigned int ptr_off2;                 /* offset addr                 */
unsigned int ptr_seg3;                 /* segment addr                */
unsigned int ptr_off3;                 /* offset addr                 */
char far *suptr;                       /* ptr to far storage          */
int type;                              /* flag from PROCOMM PLUS      */
struct SREGS seg;                      /* structure for DS value      */
 
/*
22222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222
22                                                                   22
22 main() program routine                                            22
22                                                                   22
22 Hook programs receive the following arguments:                    22
22                                                                   22
22 ARG 1: The string "PCPLUS".                                       22
22 ARG 2: Far pointer in ASCII to the ASPECT N0-N9 array.            22
22 ARG 3: Far pointer in ASCII to the ASPECT S0-S9 array.            22
22 ARG 4: Far pointer in ASCII to the PCPLUS.PRM structure.          22
22 ARG 5: Integer in ASCII indicating where hook was called from.    22
22                                                                   22
22222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222
*/
 
void main(argc,argv)
int argc;
char *argv[];
{
   /*
   22222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222
   22                                                                   22
   22 get value of segment registers into structure (we need DS value). 22
   22                                                                   22
   22222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222
   */
   segread(&seg);                      /* get value of DS register    */
 
   /*
   22222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222
   22                                                                   22
   22 get segment and offset of ASPECT N0-N9 array...                   22
   22                                                                   22
   22222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222
   */
   suptr = (char far *) atol(argv[2]); /* convert str to ptr          */
   ptr_seg1 = FP_SEG(suptr);           /* get segment addr            */
   ptr_off1 = FP_OFF(suptr);           /* get offset addr             */
 
   /*
   22222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222
   22                                                                   22
   22 copy ASPECT array into local array                                22
   22                                                                   22
   22222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222
   */
   movedata(ptr_seg1,ptr_off1,seg.ds,(unsigned int)&asp_nums[0],NSIZE);
 
   /*
   22222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222
   22                                                                   22
   22 get segment and offset of ASPECT S0-S9 array...                   22
   22                                                                   22
   22222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222
   */
   suptr = (char far *) atol(argv[3]); /* convert str to ptr          */
   ptr_seg2 = FP_SEG(suptr);           /* get segment addr            */
   ptr_off2 = FP_OFF(suptr);           /* get offset addr             */
 
   /*
   22222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222
   22                                                                   22
   22 copy ASPECT array into local array                                22
   22                                                                   22
   22222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222
   */
   movedata(ptr_seg2,ptr_off2,seg.ds,(unsigned int)&asp_strings[0][0],SSIZE);
 
   /*
   22222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222
   22                                                                   22
   22 get segment and offset of PCPLUS.PRM structure from PROCOMM PLUS  22
   22                                                                   22
   22222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222
   */
   suptr = (char far *) atol(argv[4]); /* convert str to ptr          */
   ptr_seg3 = FP_SEG(suptr);           /* get segment addr            */
   ptr_off3 = FP_OFF(suptr);           /* get offset addr             */
 
   /*
   22222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222
   22                                                                   22
   22 copy PROCOMM PLUS' structure into local structure                 22
   22                                                                   22
   22222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222
   */
   movedata(ptr_seg3,ptr_off3,seg.ds,(unsigned int)&p.port,PARMSIZE);
 
   /*
   22222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222
   22                                                                   22
   22 "TYPE" lets you know where the hook program was called from in    22
   22 PROCOMM PLUS:                                                     22
   22                                                                   22
   22 TYPE VALUE       CALLING LOCATION                                 22
   22 ---------------------------------                                 22
   22     0            Upload Protocol                                  22
   22     1            Download Protocol                                22
   22     2            Aspect Script                                    22
   22     3            Meta Key Hook                                    22
   22                                                                   22
   22222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222
   */
   type = atoi(argv[5]);
 
   /*
   22222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222
   22                                                                   22
   22 The following code is a simple example of what you can do with    22
   22 a "hook" program.  It assumes it was called fram an ASPECT script 22
   22 and was passed some information in ASPECT variables N7 and S7.    22
   22 It displays that information, then displays some information      22
   22 about current settings in PROCOMM PLUS.  It then puts new data    22
   22 into N7 and S7 and passes it back to PROCOMM PLUS.                22
   22                                                                   22
   22 This is a sample ASPECT program that you can use with this hook   22
   22 program to show how things get passed back and forth:             22
   22                                                                   22
   22 proc main                                                         22
   22    locate 0 0                                                     22
   22    n7 = 777                                                       22
   22    strcpy s7 "This message is from the ASPECT file."              22
   22    hook "hook.exe"                                                22
   22    fatsay 10 0 31 "ASPECT variable N7 passed from hook: %d" n7    22
   22    fatsay 11 0 31 "ASPECT variable S7 passed from hook: %s" s7    22
   22 endproc                                                           22
   22                                                                   22
   22222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222
   */
 
   /* sample: */
   printf("\nASPECT variable N7 passed to hook: %d",asp_nums[7]);
   printf("\nASPECT variable S7 passed to hook: %s",asp_strings[7]);
 
   printf("\n\n\nPROCOMM PLUS INFO:\n");
   printf("\nBaud Rate: %s, Terminal: %s",baud_desc[p.baud],termdesc[p.termtype]);
   printf("\nPort: COM%d, Modem Init String: %s",p.port+1,p.mdminit);
 
   /* put some info into variables for return to ASPECT... */
   asp_nums[7] = 99;
   strcpy(asp_strings[7],"This message is from the hook program.");
 
   /* copy local variables back into ASPECT variables... */
   movedata(seg.ds,(unsigned int)&asp_nums[0],ptr_seg1,ptr_off1,NSIZE);
   movedata(seg.ds,(unsigned int)&asp_strings[0][0],ptr_seg2,ptr_off2,SSIZE);
 
   /* signal normal exit (can be tested for with ASPECT "if success" command) */
   /* 0 signal sucess, 1 signals failure.                                     */
   exit(0);
}
 

--
-----====> Skye Merlin Poier <====----- 
Undergrad in CMPT/MATH (Virtual Reality)       ||||      ||||
          email: poier@sfu.ca                  p-OO <--> OO-q   THINK
   PGP Public Key available on finger           \==      ==/





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: hkhenson@cup.portal.com
Date: Sat, 5 Jun 93 08:17:28 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: DISKREET--Norton
Message-ID: <9306050727.1.2868@cup.portal.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Norton might let interested people exhamine the code, far as I know
nobody has asked, but one mode is DES.  It seems to me if Norton
were ok, you could encrypt with Norton and decrypt with any other
hardware/software implimention of DES.  Unless Norton does something
really dumb like stashing the key on disk somewhere, it would seem
to me that this would varify Norton doing DES per the book.  Have
I missed something?  Keith




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Johan Helsingius <julf@penet.FI>
Date: Sat, 5 Jun 93 00:06:33 PDT
To: Paul Haahr <haahr@mv.us.adobe.com>
Subject: Re: Lobbying for Cryptoprivacy, non-U.S.
In-Reply-To: <9306041803.AA28955@astro.mv.us.adobe.com>
Message-ID: <9306050926.aa04642@penet.penet.FI>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



> Russia probably has the chip-making skills (and, certainly, the spookish
> ones) to fit, but they probably count as a ``cooperating major European
> countr[y]'' now.

Uh... Based on my experience they probably count as "a number of
not-very-cooperating European countries" ;-)

	Julf





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Johan Helsingius <julf@penet.FI>
Date: Sat, 5 Jun 93 00:06:42 PDT
To: Eric Hughes <hughes@soda.berkeley.edu>
Subject: Re: Software infrastructure
In-Reply-To: <9306041746.AA13444@soda.berkeley.edu>
Message-ID: <9306050928.aa04663@penet.penet.FI>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



> >On your host (typically an UNIX box) you configure
> >sendmail/smail/binmail/whatever to forward your mail over uucp to your
> >home machine. 
> 
> This is a huge hurdle for people who don't own their own machines and
> haven't convinced a sympathetic sysadmin to do the configuration.

Yes. Sorry. Brain disengaged. Been my own sysadmin for 10 years now, so
it just didn't occur to me... :-(

	Julf





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Johan Helsingius <julf@penet.FI>
Date: Sat, 5 Jun 93 00:07:48 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Anon.penet.fi and penet.anonymous.net
Message-ID: <9306050942.aa04754@penet.penet.FI>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Since I announced my intention to re-establish the full anon.penet.fi
service, I have received several messages with very valuable and useful
ideas. I just want to clarify my situation. What I'm doing now is to
simply re-establish the old service, without any changes/improvements
(except for an AUP-free connection and a faster box). This gives me time
to work on the improved Mk II with support for PGP, multiple ID's,
selectable double/single blind etc.

I expect to bring up Mk II as penet.anonymous.net this fall, but I need
some time to implement the stuff, write documentation etc., and I have
to take care of my "daytime" jobs as well. Somebody has to pay for all
that new hardware and that international connection... Not mentioning my
rent ;-)

	Julf





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Nickey MacDonald <i6t4@jupiter.sun.csd.unb.ca>
Date: Sat, 5 Jun 93 08:37:18 PDT
To: RYAN Alan Porter <ryan@rtfm.mlb.fl.us>
Subject: Re: CryptoStacker, long term vision
In-Reply-To: <Pine.3.03.9306030013.A18959-e100000@rtfm>
Message-ID: <Pine.3.05.9306051259.A17856-c100000@jupiter>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



> As for those people that can't afford to use dedicated hardware, there is
> still the less secure idea of having the key stored on a floppy that would
> be inserted at load time and read into memory.  This would have the
> obvious disadvantage of having the key sitting around in memory, a sitting
> duck (especially for people who leave their systems on all of the time,
> like me, as soon and the Nazis learned about systems like these then 'Run
> a key scanning program on the system to be confiscated' would just become
> step one in their procedure, would be a hole even if the keys were
> password protected) but it would be better than nothing at all, and the
> speed problems could be dealt with by using the multiple partition method
> that I described earlier, having a 'secure' virtual disk where all of your
> data goes, and a seperate 'fast' virtual disk which is unencrypted where
> all of your programs and such go.

Hmmm...  I have a suggestion to make keeping the key in memory a little
more safe, though I don't think there is way to prevent a properly
resourced person/agency/enemy from getting it (or any other data in the RAM of
the computer).

You first need a machine which has a supervisor state, which *only* the OS
can run in.  Your cryptostacker will be part of the OS and as such, user
processes cannot access its memory.  This way, the attacking agency will
have difficulty just running any old program to copy all of the CPU's
memory to a disk.  The only way to add new programs to the supervisor
state (OS) would be if the machine is power up in a special way (with a
certian boot disk for example) so that once the machine is running there
is *no* software method to read any OS data.

You would also want to avoid storing the crypto key at a fixed memory
location.  Allocate some memory at a variable location at each startup and
store this location *only* in a register.  This should make it even more
difficult to get the key, because you would need to be able to check the
supervisor stack to find the right register to find the location of the key.

This raises the question of just how much work an agency goes through when
it is first confiscating a machine to ensure that they can get at all the
machines data.  If the first thing they do is turn the machine off to be
able to pack it up, then you are all set.  (Assuming you didn't manage to
turn it off before you lost control of the machine.)

What kinds of things can you do to your home machine to make more tamper
proof?  If you have an "easy access" case, how about installing a micro
switch that will reset the machine (or power cycle the system) when its
opened.

---
Nick MacDonald               | NMD on IRC
i6t4@jupiter.sun.csd.unb.ca  | PGP 2.1 Public key available via finger






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Nickey MacDonald <i6t4@jupiter.sun.csd.unb.ca>
Date: Sat, 5 Jun 93 09:00:14 PDT
To: Eric Hughes <hughes@soda.berkeley.edu>
Subject: Re: CryptoStacker, long term vision
In-Reply-To: <9306031512.AA25490@soda.berkeley.edu>
Message-ID: <Pine.3.05.9306051240.B17856-b100000@jupiter>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> Your keying material should be long.  I earlier suggested one key per
> track.  These keys are going to have to be stored somewhere, and the
> disk is the wrong place for it, clearly.  This implies that the user
> is going to have to have some key-holding device (likely a diskette)
> which will be necessary in order to unlock the partition.  the keying
> material should be password protected.  This device will be have to
> used at boot time if anything necessary to boot is stored on the
> encrypted partition.

> Keying material will need to be backed up.  This should be made as
> painless as possible, otherwise there will be plenty of people losing
> whole drives.

This probably goes without saying, but just to make sure...

Since you are talking about using a partition, and partitions do not often
change in size (it implies a lot of backup and restore work to change a
partition size normally) then you could generate all the keys for all the
(known and fixed number of) tracks in advance.  The first thing the user
should do after generating all the keys is to make **many** backups,
perhaps all with different keys to encrypt the keys.  No one wants to lose
a whole partition because a floppy wore out and broke down!

The other interesting thing about encrypting per track... it exemplifies
the trade offs often associated with computing...  Usually they preach that
all files should be contiguous (all sectors on the same track if possible)
but for the most secure encryption of a file in this cryptostacker you
would want files to be on as many different tracks as possible.

---
Nick MacDonald               | NMD on IRC
i6t4@jupiter.sun.csd.unb.ca  | PGP 2.1 Public key available via finger






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Nickey MacDonald <i6t4@jupiter.sun.csd.unb.ca>
Date: Sat, 5 Jun 93 09:05:14 PDT
To: elee9sf@Menudo.UH.EDU
Subject: Re: Another chaining utility
In-Reply-To: <199306031333.AA16241@Menudo.UH.EDU>
Message-ID: <Pine.3.05.9306051344.C17856-a100000@jupiter>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I read this, and without knowing if anyone else has replied, it looks like
a need for an explanation of how to get more environment space in DOS.  Is
it that you don't know how to increase the DOS environment size, or does it
still not work even if you have increased it?  OBdisclaimer:  I don't know
4DOS, just regular old MS/PC DOS...  and maybe a little DRDOS.  :-)

---
Nick MacDonald               | NMD on IRC
i6t4@jupiter.sun.csd.unb.ca  | PGP 2.1 Public key available via finger


On Thu, 3 Jun 1993 elee9sf@Menudo.UH.EDU wrote:

> > I couldn't get Karl's hopmail.bat to run on my PC (not enough environment
> > space?) so I wrote this in C and it works OK.
> 
> Say, is anybody else having this problem?  I wonder what the problem
> is (environment space?)  PLEASE let me know about bugs or problems
> with the scripts.  I'm going to be updating the dos versions pretty
> soon, and will see if I can figure out what the space error means.







From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: henry strickland <strick@osc.versant.com>
Date: Sat, 5 Jun 93 14:04:37 PDT
To: hkhenson@cup.portal.com
Subject: Re: DISKREET--Norton
In-Reply-To: <9306050727.1.2868@cup.portal.com>
Message-ID: <9306052112.AA29094@versant.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


# From: hkhenson@cup.portal.com
# Subject: Re: DISKREET--Norton
# 
# , it would seem
# to me that this would varify Norton doing DES per the book.  Have
# I missed something?

DES defines an encryption algorithm, but not how it is deployed
in an environment. 

Questions I would have:

    --  Is the key that the user types in used DIRECTLY as a
	8-ASCII-character DES key?  If you don't type 8 characters
	for the key, how is it padded?

    --	Does it use CBC mode, or what?

    --	Where does it get an initialization vector?

    --  Assuming CBC or some other chaining mode, is an entire file
	encrypted as a single unit?  Or is each file block encrypted,
	beginning with a quickly-determined initialization vector, 
	and what are they?

    --  If the length of the file is not a multiple of 8 bytes (the 
	DES cyperblock size), how is the boundary condition handled?

    --  Are filenames encrypted?  How?  Other directory information?  

If the source to Norton were not published, but rigorous specs were
available that could be verified by trying it an a bunch of files,
and if one can account for all bytes on disk that change when the
package is used (so that we know it is not escrowing keys or doing
anthing stupid with them), then I might feel comfortable about
the product.

I don't think this is unreasonable to ask.  It would particularly
make me feel safe about the problems we heard described earlier, where
someone was unable to decrypt files.   If I can deploy and use my own
decryption mechanism to doublecheck Norton, then it's more likely
my own fault if I cannot recover some file.

						strick




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: J. Michael Diehl <mdiehl@triton.unm.edu>
Date: Sat, 5 Jun 93 15:06:37 PDT
To: smb@research.att.com
Subject: Re: Dig. Cash Question.
In-Reply-To: <9306052136.AA04744@triton.unm.edu>
Message-ID: <9306052206.AA05155@triton.unm.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


According to smb@research.att.com:
> 
> 	I'm reading the paper that was announced on this list about
> 	Digital Cash last week.  It was writen by Stefan Brands.  I
> 	think I have a strong Math background, but I don't know what is
> 	meant by a "descrete log" in a group G.  I understand what a
> 	group is.  I just don't know what properties an element, a,
> 	would have if it were the log sub p of e.  Can someone help
> 	me.  Otherwise, this is a very interesting article.  Thanx in
> 	advance.
> 
> You might want to fix your mailer; according to the strict letter of
> RFC822, human-readable names shouldn't contain periods unless quoted....

I sent word to those "in charge." ;^)
Maybe after I graduate, they will fix it....

> Anyway -- suppose that in some group, you know that a^n=b, where a
> and b are members of the group, and n is an integer.  a^n indicates
> the group operation iterated n times.  The discrete log problem is
> recovering n, given ``a'' and a^n=b.
> 
> In some groups, this is a very hard problem.  The group most commonly
> used in cryptography is the field GF(p), i.e., the field of integers
> modulo p, where p is some large number, preferably a prime, and ``a''

If I understand this correctly, if p is not a prime, then n may not be unique.

> is a ``primitive root'' of the field.  The problem is thus to find
> n, given ``a'' and a^n modulo p.  Other instances of discrete log
> are useful as well; NeXT, for example, uses the same basic equation
> in a field over some family of elliptic curves.  Their much-ballyhooed
> invention was to find a set of such curves for which the exponentiation
> operation can be performed very efficiently.
> 
Thanx for the (very!) clear explaination.

+-----------------------+-----------------------------+---------+
| J. Michael Diehl ;-)  | I thought I was wrong once. | PGP KEY |
| mdiehl@triton.unm.edu |   But, I was mistaken.      |available|
| mike.diehl@fido.org   |                             | Ask Me! |
| (505) 299-2282        +-----------------------------+---------+
|                                                               |
+------"I'm just looking for the opportunity to be -------------+
|            Politically Incorrect!"   <Me>                     |
+-----If codes are outlawed, only criminals wil have codes.-----+
+----Is Big Brother in your phone?  If you don't know, ask me---+



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: smb@research.att.com
Date: Sat, 5 Jun 93 14:35:14 PDT
To: "J. Michael Diehl" <mdiehl@triton.unm.edu>
Subject: Re: Dig. Cash Question.
Message-ID: <9306052135.AA26361@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


	I'm reading the paper that was announced on this list about
	Digital Cash last week.  It was writen by Stefan Brands.  I
	think I have a strong Math background, but I don't know what is
	meant by a "descrete log" in a group G.  I understand what a
	group is.  I just don't know what properties an element, a,
	would have if it were the log sub p of e.  Can someone help
	me.  Otherwise, this is a very interesting article.  Thanx in
	advance.

You might want to fix your mailer; according to the strict letter of
RFC822, human-readable names shouldn't contain periods unless quoted....

Anyway -- suppose that in some group, you know that a^n=b, where a
and b are members of the group, and n is an integer.  a^n indicates
the group operation iterated n times.  The discrete log problem is
recovering n, given ``a'' and a^n=b.

In some groups, this is a very hard problem.  The group most commonly
used in cryptography is the field GF(p), i.e., the field of integers
modulo p, where p is some large number, preferably a prime, and ``a''
is a ``primitive root'' of the field.  The problem is thus to find
n, given ``a'' and a^n modulo p.  Other instances of discrete log
are useful as well; NeXT, for example, uses the same basic equation
in a field over some family of elliptic curves.  Their much-ballyhooed
invention was to find a set of such curves for which the exponentiation
operation can be performed very efficiently.

Oddly enough, solving discrete log in GF(p) seems to be vaguely akin
to factoring.  p doesn't have to be a prime, but you can use smaller
numbers if it is.  Early attempts used 2^n, since that makes the
modulus operation trivial, but if you do that, you need such a large
n that it doesn't pay.  For p a prime, 512 bits is probably secure now,
though possibly not against NSA.  1024 bits is likely to be secure
forever, barring major theoretical breakthroughs.


		--Steve Bellovin




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Stanton McCandlish <anton@hydra.unm.edu>
Date: Sat, 5 Jun 93 17:41:00 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Software infrastructure
In-Reply-To: <35870.pfarrell@cs.gmu.edu>
Message-ID: <9306060040.AA07296@hydra.unm.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I am NOT interested in arguing the merits or lack thereof of Kermit. 
Kermit IS used, but rarely on PCs, and VERY rarely in what appears to be
the target market.  Remember that we're talking about a general-user,
friendly application for the compuklutz.  After being spoiled by QModem,
there is no way in hell, heaven or otherwise that many of them will use
Kermit or something based on it, unless it offers all that QM does (incl.
Zmodem, external protocols, cute menuing interface, etc.)  I think
there's a confusion here, namely that Kermit is useful on some sorts of
machines, and for specific purposes, but this idea is getting mixed up
with what is the most useful DOS comm program(s), the one(s) most used. 
THATs where the market is.  Its not a matter of "is kermit cool, is
kermit good enough, is kermit free?", its a matter of "will the target
users actually use it, or anything based on it?"  I'd suggest again that
the answer is "no".  That's all.  Not meaning to insult anyone who's fave
term prog. is kermit.  Just trying to suggest a clarified view of the PC
telecom program market.  People make new comm programs all the time, many
with a LOT of features.  But they ain't the Big Three, so they get
ignored.  Perhaps sadly. 

-- 
        When marriage is outlawed only outlaws will be inlaws!
Stanton McCandlish,  SysOp:  Noise in the Void DataCenter Library BBS
Internet anton@hydra.unm.edu     IndraNet: 369:1/1      FidoNet: 1:301/2     
Snail: 1811-B Coal Pl. SE, Albuquerque, New Mexico 87108 USA
Data phone: +1-505-246-8515 (24hr, 1200-14400 v32bis, N-8-1)
Vox phone:  +1-505-247-3402 (bps rate varies, depends on if you woke me up...:)



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: smb@research.att.com
Date: Sat, 5 Jun 93 16:06:05 PDT
To: mdiehl@triton.unm.edu
Subject: Re: Dig. Cash Question.
Message-ID: <9306052306.AA26846@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


	 > Anyway -- suppose that in some group, you know that a^n=b, where a
	 > and b are members of the group, and n is an integer.  a^n indicates
	 > the group operation iterated n times.  The discrete log problem is
	 > recovering n, given ``a'' and a^n=b.
	 > 
	 > In some groups, this is a very hard problem.  The group most commonl
	y
	 > used in cryptography is the field GF(p), i.e., the field of integers
	 > modulo p, where p is some large number, preferably a prime, and ``a'
	'

	 If I understand this correctly, if p is not a prime, then n may not be
	 unique.

Well, n isn't unique even if p is prime.  Consider a=10,p=11.
10^2=10^4=10^6=10^8=10^10=1 mod 11.  You only get a maximum-length
cycle if ``a'' is a primitive root, hence the restriction I stated
in the part I deleted...

It doesn't matter that n isn't unique, though you do want a good
distribution.  Primitive roots have a maximal distribution, which is
why they're good.  But a reduction by, say, a factor of 2 doesn't
matter in practice.  (For p=11, try a=3.)  The implementation of
secure RPC in SunOS uses Diffie-Hellman (which relies on the
difficulty of the discrete log problem) with base that's not a
primitive root.  To be sure, their key exchange was cryptanalyzed,
but that's because they picked a 192-bit modulus, not because of
the exponentiation base.

If I recall correctly, if p=kq+1, for q a prime and k a small integer,
there are (q-1)/k primitive roots in GF(p).  That suggests generating
p=2q+1, p and q prime, which gives a very good density.  And checking
if a number is a primitive root is easy (again, to my recollection;
I'm not a number theorist) if you know the factorization of p-1, which
of course we do in this case.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Doug Porter <76244.315@CompuServe.COM>
Date: Sat, 5 Jun 93 18:54:38 PDT
To: Cypherpunks <cypherpunks@toad.com>
Subject: Re: CryptoStacker
Message-ID: <930606015152_76244.315_CHN23-4@CompuServe.COM>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


The mother lode of source code for MSDOS redirectors, drivers, 
and related code appears to be the BCPPDOS forum on CompuServe. 
Some of the authors state that their software has been placed in 
the public domain, although for some reason they usually left in 
their copyright notices. It's a very good idea to have the 
author's explicit permission on file before redistributing any 
of this software.

In the C programming library:

     CPHANT.ZIP   C source for MSDOS network redirector
     DRIVER.ZIP   C/Asm source for generic driver skeleton
     RDCF2.ZIP    C source for complete MSDOS file system

In the General library:

     CRAMDI.ZIP   C source to RAM disk driver
     FDCBIOS.ZIP  Asm source to floppy disk driver

Doug





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: mmidboe@cs.uah.edu (digital saint)     (Computer Science Dept., Univ. of Alabama-Huntsville)
Date: Sat, 5 Jun 93 21:11:25 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Software infrastructure
Message-ID: <9306060412.AA06825@uahcs2.cs.uah.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain




CY>Buzzword alert.  What is "TPU"?  And who makes "Async Pro", and what
CY>exactly does that do?

        Well, in the PC world, a TPU is just a Turbo Pascal Unit. It's become
kind of a standard for making easy add-ons to programs since a lot of
programmers use Turbo Pascal. Async Pro is written by Turbo Power software.
Anyways, does anyone have any basic ideas on what functions would be really
important for some kind of programmers toolkit? To narrow things down you might
want to make a PGP toolkit that manipulates PGP keys and makes using PGP
easier from other programs. So, does anyone have feedback on some good general
PGP encrypted file manipulation functions? Once you make them easy to integrate
into other programs I'm sure more and more people will pick it up. Reading
through the vast amounts of C code on PGP is quite a daunting task.

                       





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Stanton McCandlish <anton@hydra.unm.edu>
Date: Sat, 5 Jun 93 22:31:18 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: NitV is DOWN!
Message-ID: <9306060531.AA12404@hydra.unm.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> DON'T call for PGP toys from my system any time this week, and likely next.
> The system is DOWN, due to a motherboard video-related problem (among others).
> Serves me right for buying mailorder, with a 1yr warranty (it's been 1
> year and 2 months.  Of course.)  NitV should be up and running and all
> the crypto files available again within a couple weeks.  Blagh.  
> Of course, what REALLY must've happened is the SS sneaked into my house in
> the middle of the night and ran a magnet over my BIOS...  >;) 
> 
> -- 
>         When marriage is outlawed only outlaws will be inlaws!
> Stanton McCandlish,  SysOp:  Noise in the Void DataCenter Library BBS
> Internet anton@hydra.unm.edu     IndraNet: 369:1/1      FidoNet: 1:301/2     
> Snail: 1811-B Coal Pl. SE, Albuquerque, New Mexico 87108 USA
> Data phone: +1-505-246-8515 (24hr, 1200-14400 v32bis, N-8-1)
> Vox phone:  +1-505-247-3402 (bps rate varies, depends on if you woke me up...:)
> 


-- 
        When marriage is outlawed only outlaws will be inlaws!
Stanton McCandlish,  SysOp:  Noise in the Void DataCenter Library BBS
Internet anton@hydra.unm.edu     IndraNet: 369:1/1      FidoNet: 1:301/2     
Snail: 1811-B Coal Pl. SE, Albuquerque, New Mexico 87108 USA
Data phone: +1-505-246-8515 (24hr, 1200-14400 v32bis, N-8-1)
Vox phone:  +1-505-247-3402 (bps rate varies, depends on if you woke me up...:)



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: J. Michael Diehl <mdiehl@triton.unm.edu>
Date: Sat, 5 Jun 93 23:30:08 PDT
To: smb@research.att.com
Subject: Re: Dig. Cash Question.
In-Reply-To: <9306052306.AA05980@triton.unm.edu>
Message-ID: <9306060630.AA10639@triton.unm.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


According to smb@research.att.com:
> 
> 	 If I understand this correctly, if p is not a prime, then n may not be
> 	 unique.
> 
> Well, n isn't unique even if p is prime.  Consider a=10,p=11.
> 10^2=10^4=10^6=10^8=10^10=1 mod 11.  You only get a maximum-length
> cycle if ``a'' is a primitive root, hence the restriction I stated
> in the part I deleted...

That is, if a is a generator of G, or as close to one as possible.  

My thinking was obviously clowded...  Not that I have a beer in me, I remember
that for any element, a of group G, a will have order n, such that n|ord(G).
This implies that there are n different (positive) powers of a which yield a 
particular number, b in our case.  Each of which would qualify as a log.  I
think I understand.

> It doesn't matter that n isn't unique, though you do want a good
> distribution.  Primitive roots have a maximal distribution, which is

Then which root are we to use in discussion?

+-----------------------+-----------------------------+---------+
| J. Michael Diehl ;-)  | I thought I was wrong once. | PGP KEY |
| mdiehl@triton.unm.edu |   But, I was mistaken.      |available|
| mike.diehl@fido.org   |                             | Ask Me! |
| (505) 299-2282        +-----------------------------+---------+
|                                                               |
+------"I'm just looking for the opportunity to be -------------+
|            Politically Incorrect!"   <Me>                     |
+-----If codes are outlawed, only criminals wil have codes.-----+
+----Is Big Brother in your phone?  If you don't know, ask me---+



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: gnu (John Gilmore)
Date: Sun, 6 Jun 93 00:35:23 PDT
To: J. Michael Diehl <mdiehl@triton.unm.edu>
Subject: Re: decompiling DISKREET
In-Reply-To: <9306050121.AA13122@triton.unm.edu>
Message-ID: <9306060734.AA00306@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> > This is the reason that I disregard DISKREET from Norton.  There's no
> > source, and largish companies are notorious for pushing compromised
> > software.  Norton's unlikely to ship source, so unless someone
> > decompiles it, I'm not biting.
> 
> HMMmmm.....  Well, how big is it?  Is it a .exe or .com?  It might be very 
> instructive to see how they do it...

By the way, I have a relatively usable free 68k disassembler, and have
recently retrofitted the simple GNU portable disassembler (supporting
many processors) with an interface that should allow it to be glued
into the usable disassembler (which traces branches, creates labels,
lets you label things yourself, etc).  Anyone who would like to work
on these tools, please let me know.

The GNU `objdump' program will disassemble the entire program from any
object file format it recognizes (currently most a.out variants, most
COFF variants, ELF, ecoff, xcoff, s-records, some IEEE object files).
We have specs on the Windows object file formats, if anyone wants to 
add support for reading them.  DOS EXE and COM files would be a useful
addition, as well.

You can get a taste of the current simple disassembler by getting the
latest GNU Binutils (binary utilities) release from prep.ai.mit.edu or
ftp.uu.net.  Configure and build it on any of about twelve kinds of
Unix machines, and run "objdump -d" on itself.

	John Gilmore




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: zimm@alumni.cco.caltech.edu (Mark Edward Zimmerman)
Date: Sun, 6 Jun 93 04:51:32 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: random access into an encrypted file?
Message-ID: <9306061150.AA07264@alumni.cco.caltech.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I'm enjoying the discussion of encrypting file systems, but have a
perhaps-naive question: can the methods recently proposed here work
for fast "random" access of bytes from the middle of a possibly-large
file?

Specifically, over the years I have written some free-text
information-retrieval programs which build complete inverted indices
to every word in a chosen text file (which may be many megabytes long,
limited by disk space, not by RAM) --- and in order to fetch and
display text quickly from an arbitrary point in the file, my programs
do a lot of fseek() operations.  If a file is encrypted under various
schemes, I wonder how long it would take to fetch byte 100,000,000?
Could it cause me some performance problems?  :-)

Just thought I'd raise the issue....  BTW, if anybody wants to work
with large text files, the stuff I've done is all free under GNU GPL;
for nicest user interface, see Mac version which hides behind
HyperCard (in INFO-MAC archive at sumex-aim.stanford.edu, under
directory info-mac/card with a name beginning "freetext", I think).
Generic command-line C code to build indices is "qndxr.c" in various
archives, and the generic command-line browser is "brwsr.c".  See
description in THE DIGITAL WORD, eds. Landow & Delany, MIT Press,
1993, pps. 53-68, for more details.  Briefly, the programs let you
scroll around in alphabetized word lists, generate key-word-in-context
displays and do simple proximity filtering, and retrieve chunks of
text on demand, very fast.  Index-building is 15-20 MB/hour on an
older Mac II-class machine, 60-80 MB/hour on a Sparcstation, etc.

Best,  ^z  (no relation!)




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Cypherpunk.Echo@f28.n125.z1.FIDONET.ORG (Cypherpunk Echo)
Date: Mon, 7 Jun 93 21:56:41 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Mailing list request
Message-ID: <219.2C126002@shelter.FIDONET.ORG>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



SUBSCRIBE CYPHERPUNKS             CYPHERPUNK ECHO

-----

Hi!  I don't know if this is automated at your end, or if I should just
be emailing a request, so I'm doing both - I'd like to subscribe to the
cypherpunk mailing list under the name cypherpunk echo.  I'll be porting
the list to an area on my BBS.  Thanks for any help, if any is required.

Peter Wadsworth  - Sysop, Coconino County BBS, 415-861-8290
--  
Cypherpunk Echo - via FidoNet node 1:125/1
UUCP: ...!uunet!kumr!shelter!28!Cypherpunk.Echo
INTERNET: Cypherpunk.Echo@f28.n125.z1.FIDONET.ORG




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Eric Hughes <hughes@soda.berkeley.edu>
Date: Sun, 6 Jun 93 11:58:21 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: random access into an encrypted file?
In-Reply-To: <9306061150.AA07264@alumni.cco.caltech.edu>
Message-ID: <9306061854.AA08835@soda.berkeley.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>can the methods recently proposed here work
>for fast "random" access of bytes from the middle of a possibly-large
>file?

The model that has been most discussed recently has been that of
encrypting sectors on the hard disk.  In order to have random access
to files, you have to have random access to sectors.  Therefore, the
encryption mechanism chosen must support random sector access.

This is not difficult, but many of the techniques used for
telecommunication encryption do not work.  In particular, encryption
modes that depend upon some previous state of the encryption machine
do not work well.

Cipher block chaining is a mode of operation for block ciphers that
where the plaintext is xor'd with the previous block of ciphertext
before encryption.  The first block of plaintext, where there is no
previous block, is xor'd with an initial vector, which may be
considered part of the keying material.  Now consider what would
happen if you encrypted your whole disk in CBC mode.  You'd have to
start at the beginning of the disk and decrypt up to the point that
you want to read.  For a bit stream, this is fine, since one is
decrypting the whole thing.

CBC, however, is useful for doing sector encryption.  A DES block is 8
bytes, a sector is typically 512.  I assume here that one has to read
the whole sector out of memory, although with some very clever and not
obviously worthwhile optimizations one could decrypt on demand.  Now
CBC is a reasonable choice ifor in-sector encryption, because you have
to read the whole thing anyway.

Yet CBC requiress an initial vector.  This is where counter mode come
in.  A good block cipher has what is called the avalanche property,
which says that altering any bit of the input alters on average half
of the bits of the output.  (Note: if it altered more than half, the
1's-complement would change by less than half.)  Thus the initial
vectors do not need to change particularly much from one initial
vector to the next.  Hence an integer-valued counter works fine.  For
hard disks the sector number, already present, makes just such a
unique initial vector.

Summary: CBC within sectors, initial vectors provided by the sector
number.

This characterization of keying material works for block ciphers
generally and yields a clean abstraction for the rest of the system.

	algorithm identifier (index or function pointer or link spec)
	plaintext/ciphertext block length
	key length

The rest of the encryption code need only know these values.  Here are
some examples.  Lengths are byte lengths.

	single DES, 8, 8 (64 bits, of which only 56 are used)
	double DES, 8, 16
	triple DES, 8, 24
	IDEA, 8, 16

Nice and clean.

Eric




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: mulivor@crc.monroecc.edu
Date: Sun, 6 Jun 93 09:45:59 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: SPA Press Release
Message-ID: <9306061624.AA09694@relay2.UU.NET>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I recently received this press release from the Software Publishers 
Association. It gets better as it goes on.

--Phil Mulivor
mulivor@orion.crc.monroecc.edu

--------------------------------------------------------------------

 06/04 1018  SPA RENEWS CALL FOR LIBERALIZING EXPORT CONTROLS

WASHINGTON (JUNE 4) IDG PR SERVICE - At a National Institute of
Standards and Technology (NIST) hearing Thursday on national
cryptographic policies, the Software Publishers Association (SPA)
explained how continued "munitions" export controls of mass market
software with encryption capabilities were seriously harming the
American software industry and renewed its call for significant export
liberalization of mass market software using DES or other encryption
algorithms such as RC2/RC4 at comparable strengths.
   SPA also warned that the Administration's recent announcement of
its "Clipper Chip" initiative did not address the software industry's
concerns and should not be an excuse to delay export liberalization.
   The SPA announced the preliminary results of its recent research
which reveal a robust and rapidly expanding foreign market in
encryption programs and products.  "Unilateral US export controls do
not make any sense given the widespread legal availability of foreign
encryption programs," testified Ilene Rosenthal, SPA's general
counsel. "Foreign companies will buy foreign encryption products if
they cannot buy from American companies and in turn become ex-US
customers.  As a result, the U.S. Government will only succeed in
crippling an American industry's exporting ability."
   The SPA research team preliminary concluded that:
   - The US no longer dominates the encryption field.  In fact, the
SPA has identified to date more foreign than domestic encryption
programs and products (143 vs. 133).
   - There clearly are many foreign options for strong encryption,
contrary to assertions by the U.S. government.  SPA has preliminarily
identified to date 80 foreign software, hardware, and combination
hardware/software products for text, data, and file encryption from
companies in 13 foreign countries.  Forty-eight of these employ DES,
which is nearly impossible to export from the U.S. in other than very
rare circumstances.  Sixty-three additional foreign encryption
programs and products have been identified (including those from an
additional five countries) but have yet to be investigated.  However,
SPA believes many of these also will be found to employ DES or other
comparable strength encryption algorithms.
   - Fifteen foreign mass market encryption software programs and kits
are available that employ the DES algorithm.  These are published by
companies in Germany, Israel, the United Kingdom, Denmark, Canada,
Belgium, and Australia.  These software programs are installed by the
user inserting a diskette; the kits enable encryption capabilities to
be easily programmed into a variety of applications.
   - Foreign companies increasingly recognize and are responding to
the need to provide software only encryption solutions.  Although the
foreign encryption market is still heavily weighted towards encryption
hardware and hardware/software combinations, the market trend is going
to software.
   The SPA noted that in addition to these commercially available
programs and products, any analysis of the availability of foreign
encryption alternatives must consider programs available on the
Internet, which is the largest global network connecting millions of
users throughout the world.
   - DES is widely available on the Internet, including
implementations that can be simply down-loaded and used.
   - A recently popularized encryption program entitled Pretty Good
Privacy (PGP) also is widely available throughout the world.  PGP
implements the International Data Encryption Algorithm (IDEA), which
provides protection comparable to DES.  The program is intended for
electronic mail, but also is ideal for encrypting files.  It is
available for free, may be used legally throughout Europe, whether in
a business or at home, comes with easy-to-read instructions, is
trivial to install, and simple to use.
   "Some government officials routinely assert that even if the
Government prohibits America's software publishers from offering
encryption features demanded by their customers abroad, we should not
be concerned because there are foreign programs and products
available," said Ken Wasch, SPA's executive director.  "Our reseach
shows that such an assertion is erroneous.  In fact, there are a very
large number of such programs and products available on the market
today.  The result is lost sales for American business without any
improvement in national security."
   The Software Publishers Association is the principal trade
association of the PC software industry.  Its more than 1000 members
represent the leading publishers in the business, consumer, and
education markets.  The SPA has offices in Washington and Paris,
France.

CONTACT: Software Publishers Association, Washington
         Terri Childs, 202/452-1600




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: J. Michael Diehl <mdiehl@triton.unm.edu>
Date: Sun, 6 Jun 93 11:41:24 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: My Poll.
Message-ID: <9306061841.AA18948@triton.unm.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


This is just a note to let you know that the deadline for my poll has been 
extended to Monday evening.  My kitchen flooded yesterday and I will not have
time to prepare the results of my poll till monday night.  You may expect the
results tuesday.  Bummer.

+-----------------------+-----------------------------+---------+
| J. Michael Diehl ;-)  | I thought I was wrong once. | PGP KEY |
| mdiehl@triton.unm.edu |   But, I was mistaken.      |available|
| mike.diehl@fido.org   |                             | Ask Me! |
| (505) 299-2282        +-----------------------------+---------+
|                                                               |
+------"I'm just looking for the opportunity to be -------------+
|            Politically Incorrect!"   <Me>                     |
+-----If codes are outlawed, only criminals wil have codes.-----+
+----Is Big Brother in your phone?  If you don't know, ask me---+



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Nickey MacDonald <i6t4@jupiter.sun.csd.unb.ca>
Date: Sun, 6 Jun 93 10:31:26 PDT
To: Mark Edward Zimmerman <zimm@alumni.cco.caltech.edu>
Subject: Re: random access into an encrypted file?
In-Reply-To: <9306061150.AA07264@alumni.cco.caltech.edu>
Message-ID: <Pine.3.05.9306061357.C11011-c100000@jupiter>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Mark:

There are two possible ways to encrypt the file as they go to the disk,
and I think which you choose would determine what problems an fseek would
encounter...

As I understand the conversation so far, the talk is to make the encrypted
disk software a device driver.  Imagine what a typical device driver must
do.  The operating system wishes to see all files as long strings
(streams) of bytes and the disk drive wishes to see all "files" as a
collection of sectors (of a fixed size).  The device driver converts a
request for file position 'x' to a request to locate sector 'y'.  Even if
you only want one byte from the file, a whole sector gets read in.

So heres where you have to decide which way you are going to encrypt the
file.  If you are going to encrypt each sector in isolation, then when the
operating system requests a certain file location, that maps to a certain
sector which is read in, decrypted (in isolation from the rest of the
sectors) and then a particular byte is readily available.

If however you use a different scheme whereby the whole file is encrypted
as a single entity (which would be difficult to impossible to do using the
device driver metaphor, but there are other ways to wedge encryption into
the system) then presumably you need to decrypt from the very beginning
any time you need to seek into the file, which is what I think you were
worried about.

If you are familiar with data compression products, then here is a
comparison of the two techniques:  If you use something like stacker,
which is implemented as a device driver, then you have access to any byte
of any file at any time.  If you use something like pklite (the .exe
compressor) then you can never seek into the file (to load an overlay for
example).  You have to read the whole file and decompress it in order
access the bytes individually as uncompressed data.

(That is not a perfect metaphor, as pklite files are self decompressing
when they execute, not when the operating system accesses them, but it
does serve to show the limitations imposed my higher level file management.)

---
Nick MacDonald               | NMD on IRC
i6t4@jupiter.sun.csd.unb.ca  | PGP 2.1 Public key available via finger


On Sun, 6 Jun 1993, Mark Edward Zimmerman wrote:

> I'm enjoying the discussion of encrypting file systems, but have a
> perhaps-naive question: can the methods recently proposed here work
> for fast "random" access of bytes from the middle of a possibly-large
> file?

> Specifically, over the years I have written some free-text
> information-retrieval programs which build complete inverted indices
> to every word in a chosen text file (which may be many megabytes long,
> limited by disk space, not by RAM) --- and in order to fetch and
> display text quickly from an arbitrary point in the file, my programs
> do a lot of fseek() operations.  If a file is encrypted under various
> schemes, I wonder how long it would take to fetch byte 100,000,000?
> Could it cause me some performance problems?  :-)






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Stanton McCandlish <anton@hydra.unm.edu>
Date: Sun, 6 Jun 93 18:07:53 PDT
To: rarachel@ishara.poly.edu (A1 ray arachelian)
Subject: Re: ROT-13 hoopla on EchoMac
In-Reply-To: <9306070028.AA17913@ishara.poly.edu>
Message-ID: <9306070107.AA02107@hydra.unm.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


You might also wish to enlist the aid of Dave Munhollon, who is one of the
main hub providers in SecureMail, the Fido crypto message backbone (yes
there is such a thing, most of Fido just doesn't want you to know about
it.)  Forget the address right off hand, but he's in the nodelist. 

-- 
        When marriage is outlawed only outlaws will be inlaws!
Stanton McCandlish,  SysOp:  Noise in the Void DataCenter Library BBS
Internet anton@hydra.unm.edu     IndraNet: 369:1/1      FidoNet: 1:301/2     
Snail: 1811-B Coal Pl. SE, Albuquerque, New Mexico 87108 USA
Data phone: +1-505-246-8515 (24hr, 1200-14400 v32bis, N-8-1)
Vox phone:  +1-505-247-3402 (bps rate varies, depends on if you woke me up...:)



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: karn@qualcomm.com (Phil Karn)
Date: Sun, 6 Jun 93 20:19:52 PDT
To: mdiehl@triton.unm.edu
Subject: Re:  Tempest@home?
Message-ID: <9306070319.AA07532@servo>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


A good source of general info on RFI (radio frequency interference)
suppression can be found in amateur radio publications. THe same
techniques hams use to keep their computers from interfering with
their radios can be used to keep your computers from getting into
the NSA's receivers...

Phil




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: A1 ray arachelian (library)  <rarachel@ishara.poly.edu>
Date: Sun, 6 Jun 93 16:33:14 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: ROT-13 hoopla on EchoMac
Message-ID: <9306070028.AA17913@ishara.poly.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I seriously hope that this won't be way too off topic for this group,
but I seem to have painted myself into a bit of a corner recently on
FidoNet.

Basically, it all started when someone requested a copy of a ROT-13
extension to a popular Macintosh programmer's editor called BBEdit.

Soon after, the discussion was joined by the fatheaded sysops who
would bible thump on the FidoNet rules that ROT-13 was encryption and
as such it is outlawed on FidoNet.  To make a long story shorter, in
my plight to enlighten these folks (and the moderator of EchoMac who
saw fit to banish me for posting a message encrypted with ROT-13,)
I got a bit out of hand and started the usual on the soap-box preeching
which included a message inviting everyone to join in the conversation
by getting the ROT-13 extension.  The rest of that message was
"encrypted" by ROT-13.

Now since ROT-13 is merely nothing more than A=N, B=M, C=O, D=P...
and is fairly standard, I've got it on my head to convince the moderator
that ROT-13 is not actually an encryption method.

The FidoNet policies state that Fidonet cannot provide any sort of
privacy as a measure to protect sysops from taking the heat for the
possible illegal activities of users.  Clearly, ROT-13 does not
provide the least bit of privacy, save from a total computer neophyte.

So, the reason I'm writing this here was basically "to go to the
experts of encryption," and try to get them to agree with me that
ROT-13 has never been a form of encryption because its purpose does
not provide privacy.  So I'm just asking you to agree with me, and
I'll send the results to the moderator in question.

If you'd like, mail me the responses directly so we won't clutter
cypherpunks further, and I'll forward them myself.  

If you'd like, the moderator's address on FidoNet is
 Steve Ebener@1:152/42,FidoNet (this should be reachable via
Steve.Ebner@f42.n152.z1.ieee.org)  Please don't flame him, I'm
trying to unbanish myself off the echo, not get him upset, however
the thought of writing a program that sends a cookie to him every
twenty minutes did occur, at least until I thought better of it.





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Mark <mark@coombs.anu.edu.au>
Date: Sun, 6 Jun 93 09:50:31 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: CryptoStacker
Message-ID: <9306061529.AA02177@relay2.UU.NET>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>In the C programming library:
>
>     CPHANT.ZIP   C source for MSDOS network redirector
>     DRIVER.ZIP   C/Asm source for generic driver skeleton
>     RDCF2.ZIP    C source for complete MSDOS file system
>
>In the General library:
>
>     CRAMDI.ZIP   C source to RAM disk driver
>     FDCBIOS.ZIP  Asm source to floppy disk driver

How does someone no on compu$erve get access to these? archie didnt
report anything.

(Want to peek at the cphant.zip file)

Mark
mark@cheops.anu.edu.au



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Doug Porter <dporter@well.sf.ca.us>
Date: Mon, 7 Jun 93 00:52:41 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: CryptoStacker
Message-ID: <93Jun7.005219pdt.13914@well.sf.ca.us>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Some folks have asked that the network redirector, driver, and file 
system source files from CompuServe be made available via ftp. Two of 
them, cramdi.zip and rdcf2.zip may not be public domain. I've ftp'd the 
others to soda.berkeley.edu, as well as rdcf.zip, a public domain earlier 
version of rdcf2.zip. I'm sure Eric will have them visible soon.

I'll contact the authors of cramdi and rdcf2.

Doug




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Eli Brandt <ebrandt@jarthur.Claremont.EDU>
Date: Mon, 7 Jun 93 09:18:32 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: remailer lossage: blank lines
Message-ID: <9306071618.AA09949@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Well, nobody told me whether a message did or did not get through, but
I'm now sure they didn't.  All of the failed messages have blank lines
before the :: token, which is consequently not recognized by recurse.pl.
I dunno how they got in there, but I guess I should learn some perl and
robustify against this -- unless somebody can think of a reason why ::
needs to be able to start a message without being stripped.  Damned in-band
signalling...

   Eli   ebrandt@jarthur.claremont.edu




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: mallen@redvax1.dgsca.unam.mx (Mallen Fullerton Guillermo Manuel-UIA)
Date: Mon, 7 Jun 93 16:01:44 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Dbase encryption
Message-ID: <9306071535.AA15216@redvax1.dgsca.unam.mx>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



There is an encryption option in Dbase (SET ENCRYPTION ON).
How secure is this encryption? How it works?
I suspect it is not secure at all as the US Government allows its
exportation :-(

Guillermo





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: norm@netcom.com (Norman Hardy)
Date: Mon, 7 Jun 93 10:48:16 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: CryptoStacker, long term vision
Message-ID: <9306071748.AA22182@netcom3.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


When the Iranians took over the American Embassy in Teheran they,
acquired access to the machines there. Subsequently there was talk
of computer systems that were guaranteed to be volatile except for
ciphered disks. There would be an unciphered boot block on disk that
did not have the key to the rest of the disk but did have code
to read and decipher the rest of the operating system.
That key, however, would be in a safe place such as Washington DC.
The system could not be booted until
the key was available, presumably thru secure communications.
If you trusted the operating system to only use the key for reading
and writing the disk but not otherwise then pulling the plug made
the all data in the computer inaccessible baring action from
Washington.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Eric Hughes <hughes@soda.berkeley.edu>
Date: Mon, 7 Jun 93 12:04:02 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: ALERT: PGP removed from soda archive site
Message-ID: <9306071900.AA08993@soda.berkeley.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


The ftp site at soda will no longer be able to distribute PGP, I'm
afraid.  It appears that CERT informed someone on campus that
"pirated" software was available on soda.  The word came down, and the
directory has been chown'd root and has had permissions removed.

There will be more later on this.  In the meantime, spread the word.

Eric




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: b2men of EastEdge <JZA3001@HUSZEG11>
Date: Mon, 7 Jun 93 07:51:02 PDT
To: "so what, cypherpunks ?" <cypherpunks@toad.com>
Subject: eastedge aDDRESS CHAnge
Message-ID: <9306071450.AA07575@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Attention|
E-mail address of EastEdge has changed to
jza3001@huszeg11.bitnet
Old address will not exist in 5 days
Please spread this information
Thanx
-b2men signing off




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Al Billings <mimir@u.washington.edu>
Date: Mon, 7 Jun 93 17:58:00 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: ALERT: PGP removed from soda archive site
In-Reply-To: <9306071900.AA08993@soda.berkeley.edu>
Message-ID: <Pine.3.05z.9306071725.A2861-9100000@carson.u.washington.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



On Mon, 7 Jun 1993, Eric Hughes wrote:

> The ftp site at soda will no longer be able to distribute PGP, I'm
> afraid.  It appears that CERT informed someone on campus that
> "pirated" software was available on soda.  The word came down, and the
> directory has been chown'd root and has had permissions removed.

 What does CERT stand for again?







From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Date: Mon, 7 Jun 93 18:51:55 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: ALERT: PGP removed from soda archive site
In-Reply-To: <Pine.3.05z.9306071725.A2861-9100000@carson.u.washington.edu>
Message-ID: <9306080152.AA06391@netcom3.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Al Billings wrote:
> On Mon, 7 Jun 1993, Eric Hughes wrote:
> 
> > The ftp site at soda will no longer be able to distribute PGP, I'm
> > afraid.  It appears that CERT informed someone on campus that
> > "pirated" software was available on soda.  The word came down, and the
> > directory has been chown'd root and has had permissions removed.
> 
>  What does CERT stand for again?

Computer Emergency Response Team, set up in the wake of the Morris
worm in 1988. They meet to discuss security threats.

BTW, I just downloaded MacPGP from soda and saw no problems. I didn't
try ordinary PGP, as I assumed the circumstance Eric mentioned had
changed and PGP was once again available.


-Tim


-- 
..........................................................................
Timothy C. May         | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,  
tcmay@netcom.com       | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
408-688-5409           | knowledge, reputations, information markets, 
W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA  | black markets, collapse of governments.
Higher Power: 2^756839 | Public Key: PGP and MailSafe available.
Note: I put time and money into writing this posting. I hope you enjoy it.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Eric Hughes <hughes@soda.berkeley.edu>
Date: Mon, 7 Jun 93 19:00:03 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: ALERT: PGP now back on soda
Message-ID: <9306080156.AA03431@soda.berkeley.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


You can stop spreading the word now.  PGP is back on soda.  Remember,
it is my analysis that soda is still able to distribute PGP because we
keep a low profile.  Please keep it that way.  You can find pgp with
archie, so I don't feel the need to advertise.

Lots of stuff happened today after I posted my initial announcement
that PGP had gone offline.  Because of the intervention of Eric
Hollander with the folks who are in charge of the machine,
reasonableness has prevailed.  What happened in a nutshell was the
following.  Person A, a fascist asshole by all accounts, simply turned
off the PGP directory without telling me.  I started getting questions
by email from folks trying to get PGP.  Person A's argument was that
PGP was illegal, therefore soda should not distribute it.  Eric
Hollander, after some initial rounds, played trump and observed that
the machine had been recompiled without the user limit that had been
part of the OS license agreement, and recommended that soda be shut
down immediately because the kernel that soda was running was contrary
to the license agreement.  Very quickly the president of the
organization which runs soda intervened and everything was OK.

What is still troubling to me is the nastygram that came down from
CERT.  We don't know how they were informed, nor what their policy is
on this.  I'll have another message on that angle later.

Eric




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: ""L. Detweiler"" <ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Date: Mon, 7 Jun 93 19:22:27 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: more ominous shudders from the bowels of NSA
In-Reply-To: <6PXs5B2w165w@sytex.com>
Message-ID: <9306080222.AA03981@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


[ComputerWorld]

>"We tried to come up with a technique that would not require
>legislation," said Clint Brooks, advisor to the director of the
>National Security Agency, which developed and now strongly
>supports the key-escrow approach.

Another ominous, foreboding quote.

>Federal officials responsible for shaping information security
>policy said last week that legislation mandating use of the
>government's recently proposed encryption technology -- and
>banning the use of older but popular techniques -- is neither
>wise nor legal.

This article, nor any other alluding to `bans on cryptographic
methods', is not sufficiently disturbing or alarmist.  An such law
would be blatantly, egregiously, grotesquely unconstitutional under
protections of free speech.  All hell would break lose if any such
attempt reared its hideously monstrous face--imagine the Clipper `flap'
multiplied by a gigabyte.  Please, regarding cryptography, don't say
that `the genie is out of the bottle' or `the laws would be
unenforceable' -- these are tantamount to saying, `go ahead, we DARE
you to try!'  I fear more and more the reply will soon be, `try THIS!'





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: fergp@sytex.com (Paul Ferguson)
Date: Mon, 7 Jun 93 18:38:37 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: ComputerWorld article on Clipper/Capstone
Message-ID: <6PXs5B2w165w@sytex.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


 
ComputerWorld
June 7, 1993
Vol. 27, No. 23
page 21
 
 
Fed officials pan ban of old encryption specs
by Gary H. Anthes
Gaithersburg, MD
 
 
Federal officials responsible for shaping information security
policy said last week that legislation mandating use of the
government's recently proposed encryption technology -- and
banning the use of older but popular techniques -- is neither
wise nor legal.
 
In April, the White House said it intended to establish as a
federal standard an approach to encryption called "key-escrow."
This method would require that the keys needed to unlock a coded
conversation be kept by government-approved agencies and
retrieved only for court-ordered wiretaps.
 
Dubbed "Clipper" for voice communications and "Capstone" for
data, the approach is intended to balance the conflicting
objectives of users -- who demand absolute security and privacy
-- and law enforcement agencies, which are looking for a legal
"backdoor" into coded criminal communications.
 
Protecting rights to privacy
 
But the idea has been challenged by civil libertarians who fear
abuses by a technologically empowered Big Brother, and by some
users, especially those such as banks that have made large
investments in cryptography based on the older Data Encryption
Standard (DES), which some fear could be banned by the
government.
 
Protesters so far include the Computer and Business Equipment
Manufacturers Association, Information Technology Association of
America, Computer Professionals for Social Responsibility,
Electronic Frontier Foundation, Business Software Alliance,
Software Publishers Association and Information Systems Security
Association.
 
Raymond Kammer, acting director of the National Institute of
Standards and Technology (NIST), acknowledged that a ban on
existing techniques would be considered. "But my personal opinion
is, I can't see doing anything that would take away any freedoms
we now enjoy," Kammer said.
 
"We tried to come up with a technique that would not require
legislation," said Clint Brooks, advisor to the director of the
National Security Agency, which developed and now strongly
supports the key-escrow approach.
 
Brooks predicted it would be years before criminal use of DES
would be wide-spread enough to present obstacles to law
enforcement agencies, which cannot crack DES codes. "Let's wait
and see if legislation is needed," he said.
 
While the majority of those attending a public hearing at the
NIST last week spoke out against the government's proposal, a few
strongly defended it saying criticisms are either misdirected or
deal with fixable flaws.
 
Donald Alvarez, national defense science and engineering graduate
fellow at Princeton University, outlined six ways that Clipper
could be breached but finished by saying, "I definitely believe
it is possible to address the needs of both [users and law
enforcers], even with the Clipper and Capstone chip sets."
 
8<---------- End of Article -------------
 
In a small, corner-page, footnote box on the same page --
 
"Keyed up
 
In a statement filed with the Computer System and Privacy
Advisory Board, Citicorp raised the following concerns about
Clipper:
 
o The private sector was not adequately consulted.
o The algorithm used in Clipper/Capstone is not compatible with
  other commonly used encryption methods and will only cause
  costly disruptions for businesses.
o The algorithm -- which is to be secret but will be examined by
  a handful of government-chosen experts -- "will undergo
  inadequate scrutiny and hurried review."
o The databases and access systems associated with Clipper may be
  flawed and insecure."
 

Paul Ferguson               |  The future is now.
Network Integrator          |  History will tell the tale;
Centreville, Virginia USA   |  We must endure and struggle
fergp@sytex.com             |  to shape it.
 
          Stop the Wiretap (Clipper/Capstone) Chip.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: pozar@kumr.lns.com (Tim Pozar)
Date: Mon, 7 Jun 93 21:49:11 PDT
To: rarachel@ishara.poly.edu (A1 ray arachelian)
Subject: Re: rot-13 on echomac
In-Reply-To: <9306080527.AA23908@ishara.poly.edu>
Message-ID: <m0o2vcI-0002cBC@kumr.lns.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text


> Thank you for your letter of support, I'm now keeping a folder
> of all the ROT-13 related messagess off this echo and when it
> dies down, I'll send the whole thing to the moderator of EchoMac.
> [...]
> His address again:  (you needn't mail him unless you want to,
> as I'll forward all messages about this to him anyway)
> 
>  Steve.Ebener@f42.n152.z1.ieee.org
                            ^^^^^^^^
   Uh, try...

  Steve.Ebener@f42.n152.z1.fidonet.org
 
> My mail adress: rarachel@ishara.poly.edu

                      Tim

-- 
    Internet: pozar@kumr.lns.com     FidoNet: Tim Pozar @ 1:125/555
Snail: Tim Pozar / KKSF / 77 Maiden Lane / San Francisco CA 94108 / USA
             POTS: +1 415 788 2022  Radio: KC6GNJ / KAE6247



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: J. Michael Diehl <mdiehl@triton.unm.edu>
Date: Mon, 7 Jun 93 21:18:29 PDT
To: fnerd@smds.com (FutureNerd Steve Witham)
Subject: Re: ALERT / My email address is...
In-Reply-To: <9306080240.AA23825@smds.com>
Message-ID: <9306080418.AA07574@triton.unm.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


According to FutureNerd Steve Witham:
> 
> Hi, folks.
> 
> Just in case at any point in the near or far future,
> cypherpunks has any extended mail problems,
> and anyone wants to get in touch with me
> as a person who was on the cypherpunks list,
> feel free to send to
>         fnerd@smds.com
> or	...uunet!smds.com!fnerd

And I'm mdiehl@triton.unm.edu.
I might suggest that we try to create an encrypted cypherpunks list?  Comments?

> I know there are hacks to find out who the subscribers are,
> (or are they plugged?)
> but I'd just like to publicly say that it's okay to
> take down my address, whoever you are.  What's yours?
> 
> I think publishing the raw list might be construed as
> impolite and disrespectful of privacy, but a compilation
> of willing addressees might be nice.

Agreed.

> It would be interesting to have list software that worked
> the way those exponential-spreading, redundant, church-closing-
> because-of-snow phone call networks work (i.e., Usenet with
> even more emphasis on decentralization and redundancy).  Also, 
> a virtual archive server on the same model would be cool.

We could set up aliases and distribute a common secret key for the list....
> 
> -fnerd
> quote me
> 
"Your quoted."

+-----------------------+-----------------------------+---------+
| J. Michael Diehl ;-)  | I thought I was wrong once. | PGP KEY |
| mdiehl@triton.unm.edu |   But, I was mistaken.      |available|
| mike.diehl@fido.org   |                             | Ask Me! |
| (505) 299-2282        +-----------------------------+---------+
|                                                               |
+------"I'm just looking for the opportunity to be -------------+
|            Politically Incorrect!"   <Me>                     |
+-----If codes are outlawed, only criminals wil have codes.-----+
+----Is Big Brother in your phone?  If you don't know, ask me---+




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: fnerd@smds.com (FutureNerd Steve Witham)
Date: Mon, 7 Jun 93 19:43:29 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: ALERT / My email address is...
Message-ID: <9306080240.AA23825@smds.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Hi, folks.

Just in case at any point in the near or far future,
cypherpunks has any extended mail problems,
and anyone wants to get in touch with me
as a person who was on the cypherpunks list,
feel free to send to
        fnerd@smds.com
or	...uunet!smds.com!fnerd

I know there are hacks to find out who the subscribers are,
(or are they plugged?)
but I'd just like to publicly say that it's okay to
take down my address, whoever you are.  What's yours?

I think publishing the raw list might be construed as
impolite and disrespectful of privacy, but a compilation
of willing addressees might be nice.

It would be interesting to see how close we could reconstruct
the list by skimming private archives and communicating with
acquaintances.

It would be interesting to have list software that worked
the way those exponential-spreading, redundant, church-closing-
because-of-snow phone call networks work (i.e., Usenet with
even more emphasis on decentralization and redundancy).  Also, 
a virtual archive server on the same model would be cool.

-fnerd
quote me




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: binski@u.washington.edu
Date: Mon, 7 Jun 93 23:27:45 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: AT&T Encrypting Phone Ad in WS Journal
Message-ID: <Pine.3.05z.9306072359.A14078-9100000@carson.u.washington.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


FYI

The Wall Street Journal, 7 June 93, page B7, has an AT&T ad for an
encrypting communications box called "Surity Telephone Device".
It plugs between a regular phone and the phone jack.
Anybody know what's inside?  Is this new?  

Also, page B6 has a so-so article on digital signatures.

bf






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: whitaker@eternity.demon.co.uk (Russell Earl Whitaker)
Date: Tue, 8 Jun 93 03:25:04 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Forwarded article.
Message-ID: <6471@eternity.demon.co.uk>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



This article was forwarded to you by whitaker@eternity.demon.co.uk (Russell Earl Whitaker):

--------------------------------- cut here -----------------------------

Newsgroups: uk.events
Path: eternity.demon.co.uk!demon!zaphod.axion.bt.co.uk!uknet!nessie!
comms.ee.man!colin
From: colin@comms.ee.man.ac.uk (Colin Boyd)
Subject: Cryptography Course 7th-8th July
Message-ID: <1993Jun7.103708.6901@nessie.mcc.ac.uk>
Sender: news@nessie.mcc.ac.uk (Usenet News System)
Organization: Comms Research Group, EE Dept, Manchester University, UK.
Distribution: uk
Date: Mon, 7 Jun 1993 10:37:08 GMT
Lines: 45

*Cryptography : Theory and Practice*

A Two Day Course at the University of Manchester

7th-8th July 1993

Electronic communications are being used more and more in all 
areas of business practice. The convenience and efficiency of 
using new technology brings with it new security risks to the 
confidentiality and integrity of important commercial data. Many 
of these threats can only be practically countered by the use of 
cryptography. This short course will give a basic grounding in 
the capabilities, and also the limitations, of modern 
cryptography. 

The course is intended for engineers and managers who require 
familiarity with modern cryptographic theory and practice. 
Lectures cover background theory, current algorithms, and their 
application in the provision of security services. Supporting 
practical sessions provide "hands-on" experience using software 
implementations of modern cryptographic algorithms. 

Syllabus Topics:
Cryptographic Basics
Cryptographic Theory
Symmetric Ciphers
Authentication
Public Key Cryptography
Digital Signatures
Cryptographic Protocols

The cost of the course is 225 pounds per person. This fee includes full 
course documentation and tea/coffee and lunch each day. Overnight
accommodation, at extra cost, can be arranged on request.

Please reply by email for further details and a booking form or write to:

Dr Colin Boyd
Communications Research Group,
Electrical Engineering Labs.,
University of Manchester,
Manchester M13 9PL
--
Colin Boyd (colin@comms.ee.man.ac.uk)
Tel: +44 61 275 4562 (Direct line) Fax: +44 61 275 4512 

--------------------------------- cut here -----------------------------





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: peter honeyman <honey@citi.umich.edu>
Date: Mon, 7 Jun 93 21:16:19 PDT
To: fnerd@smds.com (FutureNerd Steve Witham)
Subject: Re: ALERT / My email address is...
In-Reply-To: <9306080240.AA23825@smds.com>
Message-ID: <9306080416.AA29026@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> I know there are hacks to find out who the subscribers are,
> (or are they plugged?)

i just checked.  they are not.  

	peter




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: A1 ray arachelian (library)  <rarachel@ishara.poly.edu>
Date: Mon, 7 Jun 93 21:31:59 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: rot-13 on echomac
Message-ID: <9306080527.AA23908@ishara.poly.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Forwarded message:



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Mail Delivery Subsystem <MAILER-DAEMON>
Date: Tue, 8 Jun 93 01:13:11 EDT
To: rarachel
Subject: Returned mail: Host unknown
Message-ID: <9306080513.AA23807@ishara.poly.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


   ----- Transcript of session follows -----
550 jsday@THUNDER... Host unknown: Can't assign requested address

   ----- Unsent message follows -----
Received:  by ishara.poly.edu (5.59a/25-eef)
	id AA23805; Tue, 8 Jun 93 01:13:11 EDT
From: A1 ray arachelian (library)  <rarachel>
Full-Name: A1 ray arachelian (library) 
Message-Id: <9306080513.AA23805@ishara.poly.edu>
Subject: Re: ROT-13 on fido
To: jsday@THUNDER
Date: Tue, 8 Jun 93 1:13:10 EDT
In-Reply-To: <9306070029.AA09898@thunder.LakeheadU.Ca>; from "Jer!" at Jun 6, 93 8:29 pm

Thank you for your letter of support, I'm now keeping a folder
of all the ROT-13 related messagess off this echo and when it
dies down, I'll send the whole thing to the moderator of EchoMac.

Don't worry about the reformatting of your letter, I'll take care
of it before sending the message.

(And yes, I will forward >ALL< letters about the rot-13 issue to
him, even those who disagree with me. :-)  I do believe in
freedom of speech, even when it doesn't match my point of view.)


His address again:  (you needn't mail him unless you want to,
as I'll forward all messages about this to him anyway)

 Steve.Ebener@f42.n152.z1.ieee.org

My mail adress: rarachel@ishara.poly.edu






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: locklin@titan.ucs.umass.edu (Lupo the Butcher)
Date: Mon, 7 Jun 93 23:01:59 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: subscribe
Message-ID: <9306080601.AA20790@titan.ucs.umass.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


let me check it out for now...




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Date: Tue, 8 Jun 93 03:34:30 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Getting on CERT's "Most Dangerous" List
In-Reply-To: <9306081023.AA04054@metal.psu.edu>
Message-ID: <9306081033.AA14809@netcom3.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Clark Reynard writes about CERT:

> I will assume, as you did not say otherwise, that you do not know
> the name of the CERT person who reported you, for whatever 
> ridiculous reason.  This is standard practice for CERT; it's
> customary for them to hide behind a shield of anonymity
> for the purpose of attacking people.
> 
> My life was severely disturbed three years ago due to similar
> anonymous tips from CERT, and I have yet to discover the identity
> of the CERT person who tipped off the authorities to me.  CERT
> is yet another agency which is freed of Constitutional restraints
> for a vague and undefined 'public good.'  

My life wasn't affected in a serious way by CERT, so far as I know,
but I do have a funny story to tell.

At a Bay Area party for hacker types in December, 1988, I was talking
to a guy with longstanding computer security connections. He looked at
me strangely and said something like "Well, Tim, your name just came
up in Washington on a list of the most dangerous hackers in the
country." I laughed it off and asked him why--after all, I'm not
considered to much of a programmer by anyone _I_ know. He wouldn't
elaborate, just looked at me strangely.

(It was a funny story because I could other people at parties that I
was on a "Most Wanted" kind of list, and yet I knew they couldn't
actually pin anything on me as I literally hadn't done anything except
draw some obvious conclusions about the implications of modern crypto
techniques, such as Chaum's anonymous systems, and had written and
talked about it.)

This fellow had been in at the founding of CERT, and was at the first
D.C.  meeting in early December (shortly after the Morris worm). As
he'd also been at hackers gatherings where I had talked about digital
cash and "crypto anarchy" (my "Manifesto" was written earlier in 1988
and passed out to a few people), I had some suspicions that it was
*he* who had volunteered my name for this list they were compiling.

An obvious overstatement of my danger, and I never heard anything
more about it. But I've always thought about this, and the other lists
of subversives they must be generating. 

No, I won't give his name, as I can't prove anything and to speculate
would be "narcish" McCarthyism. Just keep in mind that even hackers
may have their own agendas and their own consulting arrangements with
crypto and security groups, both private and government-run.


-Tim

-- 
..........................................................................
Timothy C. May         | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,  
tcmay@netcom.com       | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
408-688-5409           | knowledge, reputations, information markets, 
W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA  | black markets, collapse of governments.
Higher Power: 2^756839 | Public Key: PGP and MailSafe available.
Note: I put time and money into writing this posting. I hope you enjoy it.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Clark Reynard <clark@metal.psu.edu>
Date: Tue, 8 Jun 93 02:46:26 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: CERT
Message-ID: <9306081023.AA04054@metal.psu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I was disgusted and horrified to read that PGP had been removed
from soda, and gratified to find that it had been returned.

However, your experiences with CERT are not unique.  As could be
expected of any agency directly funded by Air Force Intelligence,
CERT is a genuinely ugly organization which needs to be stamped
out.  Frankly, it's a menace to society.  Examine their acronym.
Computer Emergency Response Team.  What a fucking joke!  Excepting
the Morris Worm, can you name a SINGLE Computer Emergency which
CERT has halted?  It is simply an organization to keep the 
crypto-fascists wired into the net.

I will assume, as you did not say otherwise, that you do not know
the name of the CERT person who reported you, for whatever 
ridiculous reason.  This is standard practice for CERT; it's
customary for them to hide behind a shield of anonymity
for the purpose of attacking people.

My life was severely disturbed three years ago due to similar
anonymous tips from CERT, and I have yet to discover the identity
of the CERT person who tipped off the authorities to me.  CERT
is yet another agency which is freed of Constitutional restraints
for a vague and undefined 'public good.'  

If distributing PGP, legal in the entire Free World except for the US, 
is a "Computer Emergency," then I'm a fucking Republican.  Combat
this so-called Computer Emergency Response Team wherever you see
the tendrils of its evil influence.
----
Robert W. F. Clark               "Be sand, not oil, in the machinery
rclark@nyx.cs.du.edu              of the world."  Gunter Eich
clark@metal.psu.edu




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Eric Hughes <hughes@soda.berkeley.edu>
Date: Tue, 8 Jun 93 08:18:49 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: a great revelation from the bowels of NSA
In-Reply-To: <9306080222.AA03981@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Message-ID: <9306081515.AA05070@soda.berkeley.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>>"We tried to come up with a technique that would not require
>>legislation," said Clint Brooks, advisor to the director of the
>>National Security Agency, 

>Another ominous, foreboding quote.

I think this neither ominous nor foreboding.  This statement was
apparent within a week or so of the original announcement.  The only
thing new about it is that it confirms what I've thought for over a
month: that the executive branch is trying to do an end run around the
legislature.

I was quite happy to see this, since now we can argue from this
position not on the basis of surmise, but of quotation.  This single
quotation will be enormously useful in getting the legislature to take
specific and bill-oriented action about the wiretap chips.  In the
checks and balance system, the legislature makes laws; the executive
makes them happen.  The executive is not supposed to go charging off
and making de facto legislation.

I would recommend that this quotation be spread far and wide.  Put it
in .signature blocks.  Call for a return of the checks and balances
system of government.

Eric




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Eric Hughes <hughes@soda.berkeley.edu>
Date: Tue, 8 Jun 93 08:27:34 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: CryptoStacker
In-Reply-To: <93Jun7.005219pdt.13914@well.sf.ca.us>
Message-ID: <9306081523.AA05311@soda.berkeley.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I've made available the following files on the archive site:

	cphant.zip
	driver.zip
	fdcbio.zip
	rdcf.zip

in the directory pub/cypherpunks/applications/crypto.msdos.disk.

Eric




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Eric Hughes <hughes@soda.berkeley.edu>
Date: Tue, 8 Jun 93 08:36:25 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: ADMIN: upload ettiquette to the cypherpunks ftp site
Message-ID: <9306081532.AA05641@soda.berkeley.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


There are a few matters of upload ettiquette for the ftp site.

1.  Upload stuff for cypherpunks to pub/cypherpunks/incoming/ and not
to the general pub/incoming/ directory.  I'll be able to more
adequately handle files there.  (I can't erase in the other directory.)

2.  Whenever you upload something, also upload a short description of
what it is you are uploading.  I've got a few mystery files there that
are on the low priority end of things, since I don't know what they
are and I've got plenty of other stuff to do with the archive.

3.  Send me mail telling me what you've put up.  I don't have any
automated software to look at the incoming directory, and so I may not
notice.  My address is below.

4.  Don't bother uploading programs that don't have source code.  The
mission of the archive site is education.  Software distribution is
not a purpose, and software without source does not satisfy the
educational criterion.

Thanks.

Eric Hughes
cypherpunks ftp site maintainer
hughes@soda.berkeley.edu




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: eichin@cygnus.com (Mark Eichin)
Date: Tue, 8 Jun 93 08:47:19 PDT
To: tcmay@netcom.com
Subject: re: Getting on CERT's "Most Dangerous" List
In-Reply-To: <9306081033.AA14809@netcom3.netcom.com>
Message-ID: <9306081547.AA16611@cygnus.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Umm, I thought CERT was a purely commercial organization, rather than
a government one... did I miss something? 
							_Mark_



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Pat Farrell" <pfarrell@cs.gmu.edu>
Date: Tue, 8 Jun 93 05:55:16 PDT
To: Pat_Farrell@mail.amsinc.com
Subject: Tuesday's Washington Post
Message-ID: <32150.pfarrell@cs.gmu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


In Tuesday June 8 Final edition of the Washington Post, Page A12

US Data Decoding Plan Delayed

Business and Legal Objections Reviewed

by John Schwartz

The Federal initiative to establish a new standard for scrambling electronic
communications will be slowed until its ramifications can be more fully
studied, the official in charge of implementing the program said yesterday.

The government's proposed "Clipper Chip" plan, announced on April 16, would
create a new national standard for data encryption that would make possible
the deccoding and wiretaps by law enforcement and national security
agencies.

The plan has met with criticism from high-technology industries that argue
that the new requirements ould be expensive and hurt the competiveness of
their products. Civil liberties advocates see it as a threat to privacy.

Raymond Kammer, acting director of the National Institite of Standards and
Technology (NIST) - which developed the Clipper proposal with the National
Security Agency and is charged with implementing it within the government-
delivered the news to a  Washington conference attended largly by critics of
the Clipper plan.

In an interview afterward, Kammer said that the entiore Clipper plan was
still being discussed, and if the review revialed unresolvable problems,
"maybe we won't continue in the direction we started out."

Criticism was sharp at the cryptography and privacy conference sponsored by
the Washington office of the Computer Professionals for Social
Responsibility, a public interest group concerned with high-tech issues.

One panelist compared Kammer's appearance at the conference to "having a
target painted on your chest." Kammer said: "We're not going to close off
the process while there's still productive conversation. And its' obvious
from the meeting today that ther's still plenty of productive conversation."

Pressure has been building on NIST since the WShite House announcement in
April. Critics of the plan have flooded the administration with lengthly
lists of questions about the new plan, voicing concerns that the proposal
might make American products more expensicve, less secure, and less
competitive overseas while not hindering criminals.

Last Friday, NIST's advirosy panel on privacy issues concluded two days of
heated hearings concerning the Clipper proposal with a resolution expressing
"serious concerns" sparked by the administrations's proposal. "Things are
going too fast." said William Ware, chairman of the Computer System Security
and Privacy Advisory Board, a body created under the Computer Security Act
of 1987. The NIST panel reported that the government had not conviningly
explained the nature of law enforcement problems that would be solved by the
Clipper plan, and cited damage the proposal was likely to do to the American
software industry.

Later that day, White House officials overseeing the Clipper plan met with
representatives of industry and civil liberties groups, including the
high-tech policy group Electronic Frontier Foundation as well as the
American Civil Liberties Union. Administration officials said that the
Clipper review would be extended into the fall and that the government would
not move beyond its initial plans to buy about 10,000 Clipper-equiped
telephones until the review was completed.

John Podesta, assistance to the President, said that meeting was part of a
continuing dialog with the private sector. "It's time to start ot get
answers insteead of the endless quest for questions, Podesta said."

==================
Any typos were added in transcription.

Pat Farrell      Grad Student                 pfarrell@cs.gmu.edu
Department of Computer Science    George Mason University, Fairfax, VA
Public key availble via finger          #include <standard.disclaimer>




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: peter honeyman <honey@citi.umich.edu>
Date: Tue, 8 Jun 93 06:13:17 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: CERT
In-Reply-To: <9306081023.AA04054@metal.psu.edu>
Message-ID: <9306081313.AA12942@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>                                                          Excepting
> the Morris Worm, can you name a SINGLE Computer Emergency which
> CERT has halted?  

cert was organized in reaction to the morris worm, and was not involved
in its prophylaxis.

i am disappointed to hear these stories about cert, but encourage others
with tales to tell to step forward.  this is a real eye-opener.

	peter




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Eric Hughes <hughes@soda.berkeley.edu>
Date: Tue, 8 Jun 93 09:24:11 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: CERT: the letter from CERT to berkeley.edu admin
Message-ID: <9306081620.AA07331@soda.berkeley.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Here, in its almost full glory, is the letter that CERT sent to the
admin at berkeley.  I've removed the addressee, since there's no need
to involve that person.  I have not, however, removed the name of the
sender.

Don't you just love that phrase "illegal trading of commercial
software"?

Eric
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------

	To: <someone>@ucbvax.Berkeley.EDU
	Subject: Possible abuse of anonymous FTP area on berkeley.edu host(s)
	Organization: CERT Coordination Center
	From: cert@cert.org
	Date: Wed, 02 Jun 93 16:56:55 -0400


	Hello <someone>,

	I am a member of the CERT Coordination Center.  CERT provides
	technical assistance in response to computer security incidents.

	Would you please forward this report to the appropriate system
	administrator(s)?  

	We have been passed information that indicates that the anonymous FTP
	archive on the following host(s) may be in use by intruders for
	illegal trading of commercial software:

>>>>>>>	 soda.berkeley.edu				/pub/cypherpunks

	We have not confirmed this information, nor have we identified that
	the anonymous FTP configuration on the above-listed host(s) is open
	for abuse.  

	While anonymous FTP areas can be put to good use, the intruder
	community makes use of them to illegally trade commercial software and
	other information.  Intruders often create "hidden" files or
	directories in order to conceal their activity.  On UNIX hosts,
	directory and file names of a form such as "..." (dot dot dot), "..  "
	(dot dot space space), or "..^G" (dot dot control-G) may be used.

	In some cases, intruders have abused anonymous FTP areas to such an
	extent that file storage has been exhausted and a system crash or
	denial of service has resulted.  

	We would encourage you to check your anonymous FTP archive for any
	such "hidden" files or directories by using the "ls -laR" command.


	We would appreciate feedback on the name of any software packages
	found at your site and the number of accesses to that software, if
	that information is available from your logs.  Please e-mail a summary
	of this information to "cert@cert.org" before deleting any such files
	and directories from your archive.

	For your information, I have appended some suggestions for anonymous
	FTP configuration.

	Thanks for checking into this incident, and please don't hesitate to
	contact us if we can be of any assistance.


	Katherine T. Fithen
	Technical Coordinator
	CERT Coordination Center
	Software Engineering Institute
	Carnegie Mellon University
	Pittsburgh, PA  15213-3890

	Internet e-mail:  cert@cert.org (monitored during business hours)
	Telephone:  412-268-7090 (answers 24 hours a day)





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Eric Hughes <hughes@soda.berkeley.edu>
Date: Tue, 8 Jun 93 09:33:10 PDT
To: honey@citi.umich.edu
Subject: Getting on CERT's "Most Dangerous" List
In-Reply-To: <9306081606.AA18740@toad.com>
Message-ID: <9306081629.AA07616@soda.berkeley.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>i thought cert was part of sei (software engineering institute),
>a pentagon entity run by carnegie-mellon.

I would propose that we get the FBI to fund CERT's law enforcement
mission, rather that the DoD.

Eric




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: pozar@kumr.lns.com (Tim Pozar)
Date: Tue, 8 Jun 93 09:36:16 PDT
To: composer@Beyond.Dreams.ORG (Jeff Kellem)
Subject: Re: rot-13 on echomac
In-Reply-To: <9306081603.AA05678@Beyond.Dreams.ORG>
Message-ID: <m0o36eT-0001w3C@kumr.lns.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text


Jeff Kellem wrote:
> On the cypherpunks mailing list, Tim Pozar wrote....
> > Ray Arachelian wrote...
> > >  Steve.Ebener@f42.n152.z1.ieee.org
> >                             ^^^^^^^^
> >    Uh, try...
> > 
> >   Steve.Ebener@f42.n152.z1.fidonet.org
> 
> Not knowing this person, I could be wrong.  But, the first address should
> work.  There are a bunch of fidonet addresses behind ieee.org.  Actually,
> both of those addresses also go through the same mail forwarding site. 
> [ I assume you were correcting it because it looked like similar to a
>   fidonet style address? ]

I mention this 'cause I am the Technical Contact for fidonet.org.  The
fidonet.org domain is served out of ieee.org, and with some of the
gating that Burt is doing, the fidonet.org domain is not being appended
to the fidonet address and ieeee.org is.  The ieee.org domain is not
something I would guarentee as working all the time or permenate.  You
would have less potenial problems if you used fidonet.org.

Tim Pozar
-- 
    Internet: pozar@kumr.lns.com     FidoNet: Tim Pozar @ 1:125/555
Snail: Tim Pozar / KKSF / 77 Maiden Lane / San Francisco CA 94108 / USA
             POTS: +1 415 788 2022  Radio: KC6GNJ / KAE6247



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Eric Hughes <hughes@soda.berkeley.edu>
Date: Tue, 8 Jun 93 10:09:17 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: CERT: the letter from CERT to berkeley.edu admin
In-Reply-To: <9306081650.AA08632@soda.berkeley.edu>
Message-ID: <9306081704.AA09252@soda.berkeley.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>Any public spooling directory is fair game for their antics. [...]
>My guess is that your CERT problems have NOTHING to do with
>PGP distribution.

There is only one directory on the cypherpunks site that is writable,
and that is the incoming directory and it's not readable.

I still don't know what the real accusation is.  CERT is straight out
of a Kafka novel in this regard.  Maybe it's PGP, maybe it isn't, but
they don't seem to be offering that information.

Eric




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: karn@qualcomm.com (Phil Karn)
Date: Tue, 8 Jun 93 10:38:37 PDT
To: hughes@soda.berkeley.edu
Subject: Re:  CERT: the letter from CERT to berkeley.edu admin
Message-ID: <9306081738.AA02682@servo>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


This seems to imply pretty strongly that the issue is not PGP, it's
the possible abuse of the cypherpunks upload area if it is world
writeable.

Having CERT go specifically after the distribution of PGP would be pretty
amusing considering the several PGP keys I have on my keyring from CERT
people.

Phil




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Al Billings <mimir@u.washington.edu>
Date: Tue, 8 Jun 93 10:57:08 PDT
To: Eric Hughes <hughes@soda.berkeley.edu>
Subject: Re: CERT: the letter from CERT to berkeley.edu admin
In-Reply-To: <9306081620.AA07331@soda.berkeley.edu>
Message-ID: <Pine.3.05z.9306081000.A28426-8100000@carson.u.washington.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



 "Intruder Community?" Interesting jargon these CERT people have? What
kind of power do they possess or do they expect admins to go to the
trouble of sending them logs of their FTP sites out of the goodness of
their hearts?

Wassail,
Al







From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Kent Hastings" <kent_hastings@qmail2.aero.org>
Date: Tue, 8 Jun 93 11:00:48 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Mail Gateway
Message-ID: <199306081759.AA06261@aerospace.aero.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


                      Mail Gateway
Is there a secure (and/or cheap) STMP or UUCP e-mail gateway 
program to rival Microsoft Mail 3.0 with Gateways. I hear MM3 
with a gateway runs $4,000. Be nice if it notified recipients 
when new mail arrives.

Kent - kent_hastings@qmail2.aero.org






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: fergp@sytex.com (Paul Ferguson)
Date: Tue, 8 Jun 93 16:45:22 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: McCarthy lives!
Message-ID: <uXZT5B8w165w@sytex.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
 
On Tue, 8 Jun 93 3:33:26 PDT,
 Timothy C. May <uunet!netcom.com!tcmay> wrote -
 
> At a Bay Area party for hacker types in December, 1988, I was
> talking to a guy with longstanding computer security
> connections. He looked at me strangely and said something like
> "Well, Tim, your name just came up in Washington on a list of
> the most dangerous hackers in the country." I laughed it off
> and asked him why--after all, I'm not considered to much of a
> programmer by anyone _I_ know. He wouldn't elaborate, just
> looked at me strangely.
 
 Funny you should mention that scenario. I've been hearing (through
 the proverbial grapevine, of course) that such a McCarthy-ist list
 does indeed exist. Of course, it _is_ rumour and should be discounted
 as such. Right? ;-)
 
 
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.2
 
iQCVAgUBLBSeY5RLcZSdHMBNAQFTSAQAkULlzwMom5kgQxjNGK0atpYXV6FNT7w5
whuvrHkzHU/5dE1v+JAa0ESkmw6RibaMRv7fvMbDeR5nTU0tb3e6Q1jT+TNTcG/D
rqf3dCDvbQNGfHLTV/oNKpRob/ivnp6kkvOEXvHFEX+NgrqpAu9N3dGgKcv/9TvH
nsE3RTkOhvE=
=s44R
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

Paul Ferguson               |  The future is now.
Network Integrator          |  History will tell the tale;
Centreville, Virginia USA   |  We must endure and struggle
fergp@sytex.com             |  to shape it.
 
          Stop the Wiretap (Clipper/Capstone) Chip.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: TJO <space2@stein.u.washington.edu>
Date: Tue, 8 Jun 93 11:30:42 PDT
To: julf@penet.FI (Johan Helsingius)
Subject: Re: CERT
In-Reply-To: <9306081800.aa08835@penet.penet.FI>
Message-ID: <9306081830.AA26885@stein.u.washington.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> > i am disappointed to hear these stories about cert, but encourage others
> > with tales to tell to step forward.  this is a real eye-opener.
> 
> I just had to deal with a minor crisis caused by CERT. They contacted the
> domain-admin for the *.fi domain, saying they had been informed that the
> anonymous ftp archive at anon.penet.fi was being used to distribute
> illegal copies of software. They did *not* contact me directly, nor my
> service provider.

How is it that Cert (which to my knowledge is an organization run by
Carnegie-Mellon in Pittsburg,PA (USA)) should come to have any influence
on a domain in finland? They are not to my knowledge a gov't organization
although they may be funded by some.. hmm. Doesn't their name stand for
computer EMERGENCY response taskforce or something like that? They should have
no business bothering you unless you requested some kind of assistance from
them, IMHO. The same goes for the berkeley site... I'd definitely be 
interested in hearing who they think they are working for and under whose
authority they are becoming netpolice.






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: smb@research.att.com
Date: Tue, 8 Jun 93 08:45:21 PDT
To: Eric Hughes <hughes@soda.berkeley.edu>
Subject: Re: a great revelation from the bowels of NSA
Message-ID: <9306081545.AA18250@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


	 >>"We tried to come up with a technique that would not require
	 >>legislation," said Clint Brooks, advisor to the director of the
	 >>National Security Agency, 

	 >Another ominous, foreboding quote.

	 I think this neither ominous nor foreboding.  This statement was
	 apparent within a week or so of the original announcement.  The only
	 thing new about it is that it confirms what I've thought for over a
	 month: that the executive branch is trying to do an end run around the
	 legislature.

Well, it could be innocent; it just takes longer to get legislation
passed.  Yeah, that's it...

Of course, NSA does have another option -- they can disclose how
cheaply they can crack DES.  (That they can crack it I don't doubt; my
only question is what it costs them per solution, including
amortization of capital costs.)




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: composer@Beyond.Dreams.ORG (Jeff Kellem)
Date: Tue, 8 Jun 93 09:03:35 PDT
To: pozar@kumr.lns.com (Tim Pozar)
Subject: Re: rot-13 on echomac
In-Reply-To: <m0o2vcI-0002cBC@kumr.lns.com>
Message-ID: <9306081603.AA05678@Beyond.Dreams.ORG>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


On the cypherpunks mailing list, Tim Pozar wrote....
> Ray Arachelian wrote...
> >  Steve.Ebener@f42.n152.z1.ieee.org
>                             ^^^^^^^^
>    Uh, try...
> 
>   Steve.Ebener@f42.n152.z1.fidonet.org

Not knowing this person, I could be wrong.  But, the first address should
work.  There are a bunch of fidonet addresses behind ieee.org.  Actually,
both of those addresses also go through the same mail forwarding site. 
[ I assume you were correcting it because it looked like similar to a
  fidonet style address? ]

FYI...

			-jeff

Jeff Kellem
Internet: composer@Beyond.Dreams.ORG




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Peter Honeyman <honey@citi.umich.edu>
Date: Tue, 8 Jun 93 09:06:25 PDT
To: eichin@cygnus.com
Subject: re: Getting on CERT's "Most Dangerous" List
Message-ID: <9306081606.AA18740@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


i thought cert was part of sei (software engineering institute),
a pentagon entity run by carnegie-mellon.

	peter




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Eric Hughes <hughes@soda.berkeley.edu>
Date: Tue, 8 Jun 93 12:30:12 PDT
To: smb@research.att.com
Subject: CERT: the letter from CERT to berkeley.edu admin
In-Reply-To: <9306081814.AA22615@toad.com>
Message-ID: <9306081926.AA17119@soda.berkeley.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>Based on what you sent out, I confess that I see nothing wrong with
>CERT's note.  

The issues that Steve raises are 
  1.  use of ftp sites counter to the knowledge or desires of their owners
    a. for one time transmission
    b. for illicit archive
  2.  distribution of software contrary to the author's desires
  3.  abuse leading to shutdown of archives

I do not wish to quarrel with these issues.  The question is not one
of the ethicality of these actions, but of the relationship that CERT
should have to such actions.

CERT's mission is computer security, not copyright enforcement.  What
the letter offers is hearsay that illegal activity is taking place on
a particular machine in a particular place.  Such a letter might
properly be construed as slander, since there was no effort made to
verify the accuracy of this information and the letter even says this
itself!

What CERT might properly do is first, verify that an ftp site is
running.  Julf's case where the ftp daemon was not even enabled is a
particularly egregious case in point.  Next they should verify that
the permissions on the directories in question are set so that world
read/write access is available.  They could also do a tree search of
the directories and look for suspiciously named directories.  All
these actions can be automated; there is little excuse for making not
even the most cursory check.

In any case, CERT's response should be limited to issues of computer
security and not law enforcement.  They might properly notify an
archive owner that illegal activity has been known to take place on
archives configured in such a way, but to spread hearsay is
irresponsible.  

Unfounded allegations of illegal activiy are socially dangerous,
especially when promulgated by a respected institution.  In the
fifties in the US in a similar context this was called "red-baiting".

Now if CERT receives reports about the improper distribution of
software and the archive site is properly set up, one might reasonably
assume collusion on behalf of the maintainers of the archive.  In this
case direct investigation should take place by properly authorized law
enforcement authorities.  CERT is not so authorized to my knowledge,
and as it is funded with military money it would be a bad policy to
give it a law enforcement function.  The FBI is responsible for
copyright enforcement in this country, and they are the proper ones to
do an investigation.

Eric









From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Kent Hastings" <kent_hastings@qmail2.aero.org>
Date: Tue, 8 Jun 93 12:44:57 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Eudora Mail Gateway
Message-ID: <199306081943.AA09446@aerospace.aero.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


                      Eudora Mail Gateway#000#
Thanks to FutureNerd for the Mail Gateway suggestion (via
private e-mail). It is just the thing for which my associate 
was looking. (Never use a preposition to end a sentence with.) 

More questions will be asked of FutureNerd re Eudora privately
as we try to get it running, but until then, here is a public
thanks for your help.

Kent - kent_hastings@qmail2.aero.org.
#000#






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Marc Horowitz <marc@GZA.COM>
Date: Tue, 8 Jun 93 10:05:32 PDT
To: Eric Hughes <hughes@soda.berkeley.edu>
Subject: Re: CERT: the letter from CERT to berkeley.edu admin
In-Reply-To: <9306081620.AA07331@soda.berkeley.edu>
Message-ID: <9306081705.AA13681@dun-dun-noodles.aktis.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


This thread is the first set of negative comments I've ever heard
about CERT.  

>>> From: Clark Reynard <clark@metal.psu.edu>
>> Excepting the Morris Worm, can you name a SINGLE Computer Emergency
>> which CERT has halted?  It is simply an organization to keep the
>> crypto-fascists wired into the net.

My experience with them in the past has been as a clearinghouse for
users to report security-related bugs to vendors, and for vendors to
provide fixed back to users.  They've done an admirable job at this;
the major complaint is that they are too slow.  They also help
distribute tools like COPS to validate unix workstation security.
They are a proactive organization, not a reactive organization, so
it's meaningless to ask what "Computer Emergencies" CERT has "halted".

I think that calling them "crypto-fascists" is at best an unsupported
smear, and at worst slanderous.

>>> From: peter honeyman <honey@citi.umich.edu>
>> i am disappointed to hear these stories about cert, but encourage others
>> with tales to tell to step forward.  this is a real eye-opener.

I agree with Peter.  If CERT is beginning to overstep its bounds
perhaps someone should make a calm, rational complaint.

>> > From: eichin@cygnus.com (Mark Eichin)
>> Umm, I thought CERT was a purely commercial organization, rather than
>> a government one... did I miss something? 

from the cert_faq, available as cert.org:/pub/cert_faq:

    CERT is sponsored by the Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA). The
    Software Engineering Institute is sponsored by the U.S. Department of
    Defense. 

Well, it's not a Government agency, but it's money certainly seems to
come from there.

Anyway, what I see here is an organization, founded for good reasons,
which is getting a little out of hand.  Rather than going ballistic,
slandering CERT, and claiming they've never done anything of value, I
think we should approach this as an internal problem at CERT.
Currently, there is a big problem on the Internet with randoms using
anonymous dropoff points to trade commercial software illegally.  CERT
accepts reports of these problems.  In many cases, I imagine, they are
accurate, and the host admins are glad to have the CERT tell them
about it.  What we have here, I think, is a few malicious individuals
or groups, who are using the CERT as a weapon against hapless ftp and
mail sites.  This problem could be easily alleviated by CERT checking
up on such reports before passing them on to host or domain admins.  I
think Julf's example is a good one.  A site not running ftp is not
trading in illegal software via ftp.  Period.

Idea for Eric: Send a letter to the RISKS Digest <risks@csi.sri.com>
and <cert@cert.org>, documenting the RISKS of a "computer security"
organization becoming overzealous, and not researching problems which
have been reported before sending reports to host and/or domain
administrators.  Include the letter you forwarded to us, and mention
Julf's problem.  Perhaps others will even mention similar problems.  I
think this will have the desired effect.

		Marc




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: jet@nas.nasa.gov (J. Eric Townsend)
Date: Tue, 8 Jun 93 13:31:33 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: CERT
In-Reply-To: <9306081830.AA26885@stein.u.washington.edu>
Message-ID: <9306082031.AA12159@boxer.nas.nasa.gov>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



>computer EMERGENCY response taskforce or something like that? They should have
>no business bothering you unless you requested some kind of assistance from
>them, IMHO.

I personally like being contacted by an organization trying to tell me
that someone might be misusing my computing resources.

[in no way speaking for NASA]
--
J. Eric Townsend jet@nas.nasa.gov 415.604.4311
CM-5 Administrator, Parallel Systems Support  | personal email goes to:
NASA Ames Numerical Aerodynamic Simulation    |    jet@well.sf.ca.us
PGP2.1 public key available upon request or finger jet@simeon.nas.nasa.gov





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Peter Shipley <shipley@tfs.COM>
Date: Tue, 8 Jun 93 14:11:19 PDT
To: Eric Hughes <hughes@soda.berkeley.edu>
Subject: Re: CERT: the letter from CERT to berkeley.edu admin
In-Reply-To: <9306082034.AA26060@toad.com>
Message-ID: <9306082110.AA07415@edev0.TFS>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Eric why dont you move the cypherpunk anonymous ftp site to your own 
system on the internet and be free of UCB's influence.


			-Pete




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: smb@research.att.com
Date: Tue, 8 Jun 93 11:14:44 PDT
To: Eric Hughes <hughes@soda.berkeley.edu>
Subject: Re: CERT: the letter from CERT to berkeley.edu admin
Message-ID: <9306081814.AA22615@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


	 Here, in its almost full glory, is the letter that CERT sent to the
	 admin at berkeley.  I've removed the addressee, since there's no need
	 to involve that person.  I have not, however, removed the name of the
	 sender.

	 Don't you just love that phrase "illegal trading of commercial
	 software"?

Based on what you sent out, I confess that I see nothing wrong with
CERT's note.  They're right -- anonymous ftp is abused that way.  I've
seen it happen on a fair number of sites -- folks upload packages for
others to snarf.  The pattern of some of the transactions I've seen
suggests that folks are chatting anonymously via IRC or some such, and
are using third-party machines as anonymous relay points.  Other
transaction patterns suggest the creation of sub rosa archives by folks
who have no legitimate right to use the machine.  Files distributed
that way (and I'm speaking here of what I've seen personally, not just
rumors from CERT or the net) include copyrighted PC software packages.

Now -- there's a lot of room for disagreement about whether or not it's
proper to charge for software, or whether or not algorithm patents are
or should be valid.  But I suspect that most people on the list would
agree that if someone has written something that they don't want
distributed that way -- as evidenced, for example, by a copyright
notice -- their wishes should be respected.  That's common courtesy, if
nothing else.  Similarly, if you want to distribute files, use your own
machine.  Don't abuse someone else's, when you know perfectly well that
that's not a proper use of anonymous ftp.

Again -- neither CERT nor I am talking about things like RSA software.
That's a can of worms I'm not going to open in this forum.  And they're
probably not even talking about files that legitimate users are making
available.  They're talking about abuse of other folks' machines,
almost always with neither the knowledge nor the consent of the system
owner.  And the outcome is predictable; I've seen a number of cases
where anonymous ftp has been shut down, to the detriment of the entire
community.


		--Steve Bellovin




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: nobody@cicada.berkeley.edu
Date: Tue, 8 Jun 93 14:47:32 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: CERT: the letter from CERT to berkeley.edu admin
Message-ID: <9306082147.AA11091@cicada.berkeley.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

This "coincidence" brings a name to mind.

Rhymes with "turn right."

Starts with S.

What could I be thinking?

DEADBEAT <na5877@anon.penet.fi>

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.2

iQBFAgUBLBUF/fFZTpBW/B35AQEFfQGArv/awBslh2T7ybcjtiiiT9Ew3wxPz3Vv
od0hAFCl5L0VFOA1MczZozJWf4xH0nFM
=LNm6
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Kent Hastings" <kent_hastings@qmail2.aero.org>
Date: Tue, 8 Jun 93 16:00:37 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: New PGP Version?
Message-ID: <199306082259.AA14066@aerospace.aero.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


                      New PGP Version?
Here goes with ANOTHER stupid newbie question:
What's the latest PGP version? I have DOS and Mac copies of
version 2.2. 

Is there an e-mail accessible group like this for PGP or crypto
in general? I see references to sci.crypt on occasion. Is that 
easy to get, or do I have to do fancy-smancy things with archie,
ftp, usenet, and other Greek words? (I have docs for archie, and
will soon have UUCP decode software, but I haven't figured out 
all this complicated, user-hostile stuff quite yet).

I DO know IBM MVS/JES2 JCL, and because there is nothing more 
difficult to use, I am confident that this Internet jive will
seem trivial someday. 

Kent - kent_hastings@qmail2.aero.org#000#






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: peter honeyman <honey@citi.umich.edu>
Date: Tue, 8 Jun 93 12:52:01 PDT
To: smb@research.att.com
Subject: Re: CERT: the letter from CERT to berkeley.edu admin
In-Reply-To: <9306081814.AA22615@toad.com>
Message-ID: <9306081951.AA25120@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


steve, like eric, i feel that cert is overstepping their charter
by engaging in law enforcement activities.  what's your feeling
on the matter?  don't you agree that this could jeopardize their
ability to do the work they are chartered to do?

	peter




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: TJO <space2@stein.u.washington.edu>
Date: Tue, 8 Jun 93 16:00:28 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: CERT
In-Reply-To: <9306082031.AA12159@boxer.nas.nasa.gov>
Message-ID: <9306082300.AA18418@stein.u.washington.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


J.E.T. writes:
i
> >computer EMERGENCY response taskforce or something like that? They should have
> >no business bothering you unless you requested some kind of assistance from
> >them, IMHO.
> 
> I personally like being contacted by an organization trying to tell me
> that someone might be misusing my computing resources.

Certainly that may be so.. but in this case they didn't merely tell 'you'
with a simple note, instead they did atleast 2 things which really are 
bothersome and overstepping common 'courtesy' of merely informing 'you':
	1) Instead of going directly to the owner of the directory in
question or the administator of the host they jumped over 'your' head and
went to the domain administrator. I can see going to a site administrator
if they had reason to believe the owner of the directory was doing something
illegal.. but then again they have no authority to make/enforce/etc any
kind of laws.  They were just plain out of line. Consider this example
(and I'll give them the benefit of doubt here that someone really did complain
to them and they aren't on some witchhunt of their own): I am Cert and Mr
Von Karman has emailed me to say that a /jet/Enigma-cypher-code directory
appears to have illegal software of some kind.. so I send up my email.. not
to you.. but to Goldin, the new NASA head that I believe this directory
owned by you has illegal software on it. Well that is a good way to put some
bad marks on your record even if you do prove it untrue to your boss.. maybe
you had just removed the evidence before he checks out your acct.. either way
he shuts down your net access for a while..'just to be sure', and look out
next time you want a promotion.. can't be to safe.. you might be a security
risk! 
	
	2) They didn't check the system out before hand and blatantly said
		as much.. what kind of service to you is that? my friend
		met a guy who knows bigfoot..but certainly you don't see
		me bothering the people who own the land where bigfoot
		is supposed to live. 

	3) They want to confiscate logs from the system.. That sure as heck
isn't any of their business..

	3) other complaints which I'll file for now.

---
------------------------.------------------.-----------------.-
Tim Oerting		|                  |insert disclaimer|
Computer Consultant	| U. of Washington |I speak 4 myself |
School of Law		|  <Seattle>	   |..blah..blah..   |





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: smb@research.att.com
Date: Tue, 8 Jun 93 13:22:05 PDT
To: peter honeyman <honey@citi.umich.edu>
Subject: Re: CERT: the letter from CERT to berkeley.edu admin
Message-ID: <9306082022.AA25894@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


	 steve, like eric, i feel that cert is overstepping their charter
	 by engaging in law enforcement activities.  what's your feeling
	 on the matter?  don't you agree that this could jeopardize their
	 ability to do the work they are chartered to do?

Law enforcement?  It's law enforcement if they do more than notify the
owner of the site.  Most such sites welcome the notifications *if* (and
it's a big ``if'') their machines are being abused by outsiders.

If CERT is going out and looking for pirated software, or if they try
to take any action to enforce their notes -- then, I do agree with both
of you; such actions are beyond their charter.  (Though one can argue
that clandestine distribution of malware would fall be an exception.  I
specify ``clandestine'' because one could entertain a reasonable
suspicion that the motives of such distributors was not purely
educational...)

If you asked CERT to justify such notes, they'd probably quote the
following text from their press release on ftp.cert.org:

	It will also serve as a focal point for the research community
	for identification and repair of security vulnerabilities,
	informal assessment of existing systems in the research
	community, improvement to emergency response capability, and
	user security awareness.

``User security awareness'' sounds about right.

Look -- CERT did not demand that the ftp area be shut down, they did
not threaten to cut the machine off from the Internet, they didn't (as
far as I know) turn the note over to the FBI or the Secret Service, and
they didn't mention PGP or ``dirty GIFs''.  They simply *informed* the
administrator, in a polite way, of information that that administrator
probably wants to hear.  (I've had occasion to notify various system
administrators of the same sort of thing.  They were all grateful
for the report.)  The overly-hasty  response came from Eric's end.
What the administrator's response should be if RSADSI sent a note
about PGP is another matter.  This is CERT, and they're talking about
pirated software.

		--Steve Bellovin

Disclaimer:  I'm on friendly terms with CERT, and with a lot of the
folks who work there.  And -- as anyone who has read my papers knows --
I've sent in my share of incident and vulnerability reports.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: peter honeyman <honey@citi.umich.edu>
Date: Tue, 8 Jun 93 13:34:23 PDT
To: smb@research.att.com
Subject: Re: CERT: the letter from CERT to berkeley.edu admin
Message-ID: <9306082034.AA26060@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


and what do you make of their report on julf's non-existent
ftp area?

steve, you know me well; you know i'm not a raving lunatic or
or a conspiracy-freak nut-case.  but i believe it is more
than a coincidence that soda and penet were suddenly tarred by
the same brush.

perhaps cert is being used as a weapon, as marc suggested.  that
is the most benign interpretation i can think of.  so i ask you
again:  don't you think cert might be jeopardizing its effectiveness
through these actions?

	peter




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: jet@nas.nasa.gov (J. Eric Townsend)
Date: Tue, 8 Jun 93 16:38:39 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: CERT
In-Reply-To: <9306082134.AA26126@data.nas.nasa.gov>
Message-ID: <9306082338.AA00441@boxer.nas.nasa.gov>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


peter honeyman writes:
 > jet wrote:
 > > I personally like being contacted by an organization trying to tell me
 > > that someone might be misusing my computing resources.

 > how would you feel about an organization telling your boss that
 > your actions were contributing to the abuse?

I wouldn't care given my current boss(es).  If my boss were the sort
to believe a vague form letter and take action w/o consulting me, I'd
want a different boss anyway.





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: TO1SITTLER@APSICC.APS.EDU (Kragen Sittler)
Date: Tue, 8 Jun 93 15:59:21 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: ALERT / My email address is...
Message-ID: <930608165150.1a6@APSICC.APS.EDU>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Well, actually, it's not even a hack to find out who the subscribers are... You
simply use the EXPN command in the SMTP protocol to find out who the recipients
of a list are.  This is documented in RFC-821.
However, the cypherpunks list requires a little bit of ingenuity, or familiarity
with sendmail.
I periodically get a copy of this list, just in case.  Last I checked, there
were 409 names on the list.
Two were files, about ten or fifteen were either other lists, fidonet echos, or
local USENET newsgroups.   The rest appeared to be real people.

Most of the apparent lists listed on the cypherpunks list were not traceable
thru SMTP EXPN.  If you desire real privacy, I suggest that you get the
cypherpunks list, figure out which ones are hidden lists, and ask to subscribe
to those.

If it is desired, I can send a list of these lists to the cypherpunks list.

Kragen




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: smb@research.att.com
Date: Tue, 8 Jun 93 13:53:48 PDT
To: peter honeyman <honey@citi.umich.edu>
Subject: Re: CERT: the letter from CERT to berkeley.edu admin
Message-ID: <9306082053.AA26363@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


	 and what do you make of their report on julf's non-existent
	 ftp area?

I don't know.  The most charitable interpretation is that CERT is being
extremely careful about their own behavior, and they're not going
around probing for anonymous ftp on various sites without more than an
informant's tip that such a service is offered.  Again, though, I'm
guessing.  I do know that they're short on staff.  They certainly can't
scan the archives, and a report of a non-existent anonymous ftp area
may be sufficiently rare they they never thought to check it.

	 steve, you know me well; you know i'm not a raving lunatic or
	 or a conspiracy-freak nut-case.  but i believe it is more than
	 a coincidence that soda and penet were suddenly tarred by the
	 same brush.

Of course you're not a raving lunatic.  Certainly, you rave at times,
but I don't think I've ever called you a lunatic...

	 perhaps cert is being used as a weapon, as marc suggested.
	 that is the most benign interpretation i can think of.  so i
	 ask you again:  don't you think cert might be jeopardizing its
	 effectiveness through these actions?

You're right -- the coincidence, if coincidence it is, is quite odd.
I'm more disturbed by the question of how CERT got the information; a
more common report would be from an administrator who found such
unwanted deposits, and who reported to CERT what sites sent them or
retrieved them.  CERT will certainly hurt itself if it allows itself to
be used.  But if most such reports are accurate, welcomed by the
administrators, and obtained from legitimate sources, they won't have a
problem.

I'm going to stop speculating, though.  I'll send a note to various
folks at CERT (though without mentioning either cypherpunks, soda, or
anon.penet by name), and ask them what their policy is on such reports,
and in general where they come from.

		--Steve Bellovin




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Marc Horowitz <marc@GZA.COM>
Date: Tue, 8 Jun 93 13:54:48 PDT
To: peter honeyman <honey@citi.umich.edu>
Subject: Re: CERT: the letter from CERT to berkeley.edu admin
In-Reply-To: <9306082034.AA26060@toad.com>
Message-ID: <9306082054.AA14005@dun-dun-noodles.aktis.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>> perhaps cert is being used as a weapon, as marc suggested.  that
>> is the most benign interpretation i can think of.  so i ask you
>> again:  don't you think cert might be jeopardizing its effectiveness
>> through these actions?

"Do not attribute to malice that which can be adequately explained by
stupidity."  Without support, I think CERT is merely being stupid.
Someone else (maybe even a government employee) is being malicious.  I
do think cert is harming their effectiveness by doing this.  My guess
is that they never stopped to think that someone might use them in
this way to shut down an "unpopular" ftp site.

		Marc




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: poier@sfu.ca (Skye Merlin Poier)
Date: Tue, 8 Jun 93 16:56:17 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: ALERT / My email address is...
In-Reply-To: <9306080418.AA07574@triton.unm.edu>
Message-ID: <9306082356.AA21325@malibu.sfu.ca>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

:) I suggest that we try to create an encrypted cypherpunks list?  Comments?

Sounds good to me.

Skye
- --
- -----====> Skye Merlin Poier <====----- 
Undergrad in CMPT/MATH (Virtual Reality)       ||||      ||||
          email: poier@sfu.ca                  p-OO <--> OO-q   THINK
   PGP Public Key available on finger           \==      ==/


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.2

iQCVAgUBLBUm9y0bkpXW3omvAQGitAQAoWoXxYAVyqnw+m8tjGTWmRQbtGbYJsPV
zT1wKcx3PI/w9RzPXJUzNYjMg2sKKHTT/vxQuGM3TjuyVoPK+5fx33Z+A5QArAdB
Y4An8VClFC2l8rieLGsYjIl+Za/d5D6a28hLL5SEkNyM7kzzMtbvInAXCKClEDs4
GcSSAnn8ea4=
=GYsy
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: smb@research.att.com
Date: Tue, 8 Jun 93 13:59:09 PDT
To: Eric Hughes <hughes@soda.berkeley.edu>
Subject: Re: CERT: the letter from CERT to berkeley.edu admin
Message-ID: <9306082059.AA26522@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


	 >Any public spooling directory is fair game for their antics. [...]
	 >My guess is that your CERT problems have NOTHING to do with
	 >PGP distribution.

	 There is only one directory on the cypherpunks site that is writable,
	 and that is the incoming directory and it's not readable.

It doesn't have to be.  Anyone could create ``incoming/.. '', stick
some files in it, and tell his/her friends.  The new directory would
be readable.

Again, I'm not speaking hypothetically here.  In our case, it was ..^T,
and contained pirated PC software.  (We decided not to infect those files
with viruses...  We didn't even replace them with programs that just
printed nasty messages.)




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Robert Luscombe <ral@telerama.pgh.pa.us>
Date: Tue, 8 Jun 93 14:33:21 PDT
To: Cypherpunks <cypherpunks@toad.com>
Subject: RE:CERT
Message-ID: <Pine.3.07.9306081705.B956-b100000@telerama.pgh.pa.us>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Not having heard of CERT before, and living ten minutes away from their
offices at SEI, i checked out their anonymous ftp site (cert.org) and
found the CERT faq in the pub directory.  From the info THEY provide, it
seems like a worthwhile organization.  BUT, in their info, they deal with
security issues, not copyright infringement.  I realise that hidden
directories in an incoming dir is a security issue, but it seems to be a
thinly veiled attack on the distribution of software of illegal or
questionable origins.  They do publish security advisories; i would be
interested in seeing a list of sites served with notices similar to those
julf and soda received. Does anyone have more info on CERT? 

BTW-  SEI at CMU is a scary place.  The photo lab i worked for as a
messenger had clients there, so i was in the building a couple times a day
for more than i year.  Because of their DOD affiliation, there are regular
protests outside the building.  On a normal delivery during one of these
protests i was surrounded by guards, searched, and asked some WAY paranoid
questions even though the regular guards knew who i was.  If you ever
happen to be walking the halls of SEI and see the nice big prints of
guided missiles and other scary stuff,  I probably delivered them.

--Robert Luscombe
  ral@telerama.pgh.pa.us          |           2201 Sarah Street Apt. 3 
  robert@well.sf.ca.us            |           Pittsburgh, PA 15203
  rluscomb@nyx.cs.du.edu          |           412/488-0941
                     (Finger for PGP Public Key)  






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Matt Blaze <mab@crypto.com>
Date: Tue, 8 Jun 93 14:42:10 PDT
To: smb@research.att.com
Subject: Re: CERT: the letter from CERT to berkeley.edu admin
In-Reply-To: <9306082022.AA25894@toad.com>
Message-ID: <9306082126.AA29129@crypto.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



....
>
>If you asked CERT to justify such notes, they'd probably quote the
>following text from their press release on ftp.cert.org:
>
>	It will also serve as a focal point for the research community
>	for identification and repair of security vulnerabilities,
>	informal assessment of existing systems in the research
>	community, improvement to emergency response capability, and
>	user security awareness.
>
>``User security awareness'' sounds about right.
>
....

Steve,

I think CERT is off base with these notes.  The problem, to my eyes, is not
that they're notifying administrators of potential problems before they occur;
that's all well and good, and probably easily within their charter.  What I
take issue with is the underhanded manner in which they seem to be doing it.
According to the reports from soda and penet, the notes were not sent 
in response to any specific request from the sites in question, but rather
on the inititate of someone at CERT itself or in response to some vague
complaint from a third party.  Furthermore, the notes were sent
"above the heads" of the individual site adminstrators (perhaps to whoever
is listed in the domain contact at the NIC), apparently causing bad feelings
and misunderstanding in at least the two cases reported here.

If they had sent mail to the postmasters at the individual sites saying
"hey, did you know your machine has a writeable anonymous ftp directory?"
that's one thing.  I'd interpret that as a friendly and helpful gesture.
Instead, the impression is one of, at best, unwelcome meddling, or, at worst,
some kind of bizarre network-vigilantism.  If they find something they don't
like about one of my computers, who else are they going to send mail to?
My boss?  My mother?

I should point out that I've delt with CERT myself a couple of years ago
regarding an intruder on a machine I administered, and found them to be
nothing but helpful and professional.  Their assistance was, however, limited
to reacting to specific problems that I asked them to help with.  They never
initiated any kind of audit of my site or did anything that would make me feel
as if they were some kind of "net cop wannabes" who were "checking up" on
my computers.  I'd hate to see that image changing, because they have the
potential to provide an increasingly valuable service as the internet grows.

-matt





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Sandy <72114.1712@CompuServe.COM>
Date: Tue, 8 Jun 93 14:32:37 PDT
To: <cypherpunks@toad.com>
Subject: CERT
Message-ID: <930608212913_72114.1712_FHF45-2@CompuServe.COM>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
  SANDY SANDFORT               Reply to:  ssandfort@attmail.com
 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Punksters,

I would guess that the intent of the letter Eric Hughes got from
CERT was to intimidate rather than to raise some arguable issue.

I hope Eric plans to ask Ms. Katherine T. Fithen, directly, who
the tipster was ("I'm sorry, we do not divulge the names of our
confidential informants"), why someone at CERT didn't contact
Eric first, what specific allegations were made, etc.  I would
like to see a copy of such an e-mail message and its response, if
any.  What say, friend, Eric?

Intrudingly yours,

 S a n d y

>>>>>>    Please send e-mail to:  ssandfort@attmail.com    <<<<<<
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: peter honeyman <honey@citi.umich.edu>
Date: Tue, 8 Jun 93 14:34:14 PDT
To: jet@nas.nasa.gov (J. Eric Townsend)
Subject: Re: CERT
In-Reply-To: <9306082031.AA12159@boxer.nas.nasa.gov>
Message-ID: <9306082134.AA27495@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> I personally like being contacted by an organization trying to tell me
> that someone might be misusing my computing resources.

how would you feel about an organization telling your boss that
your actions were contributing to the abuse?  that is certainly
how the message was received at soda, and in earlier, similar
circumstances, at penet, as well.

	peter




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: gnu (John Gilmore)
Date: Tue, 8 Jun 93 17:36:31 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: TIS/PEM FAQ as of 8 June 1993
Message-ID: <9306090036.AA02947@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


------- Forwarded Message

From: James M Galvin <tispem-support@TIS.COM>
To: ietf-announce@cnri.reston.va.us, psrg-interest@isi.edu, pem-dev@TIS.COM,
        rsaref-users@rsa.com, saag@TIS.COM, tispem-users@TIS.COM
Subject: TIS/PEM FAQ as of 8 June 1993
Date: Tue, 08 Jun 93 16:21:10 -0400

- -----BEGIN PRIVACY-ENHANCED MESSAGE-----
Proc-Type: 4,MIC-CLEAR
Content-Domain: RFC822
Originator-ID-Asymmetric: MFMxCzAJBgNVBAYTAlVTMQswCQYDVQQIEwJNRDE
 kMCIGA1UEChMbVHJ1c3RlZCBJbmZvcm1hdGlvbiBTeXN0ZW1zMREwDwYDVQQLEwh
 HbGVud29vZA==,02
MIC-Info: RSA-MD5,RSA,BpCu5i/vNJFNX64bj4KuRr8Jm05gdfjIIO5WQaSTXAG
 kx09ivq97GtmdksgshOkdqynlLxTSph0s6DtNN5girn2Q/u08q44XLYbk6vYxA9g
 37w/L1leqw7CldPLPOtQT

Many of you will recall the announcement of the availability of TIS/PEM,
the Internet reference implementation of PEM, distributed last week.

Included below is the first TIS/PEM FAQ.  We are posting it this one
time to the same mailing lists that received the announcement last week.
In the future, it will be posted to the <tispem-users@tis.com> mailing
list and several appropriate newsgroups.

We hope you find this useful.

Thanks.




                                 TIS/PEM FAQ
                          Last updated 8 June 1993
             Send questions and comments to tispem-support@tis.com

Questions answered:

  1) What is Privacy Enhanced Mail (PEM)?
  2) Where are the PEM standards defined?
  3) Is there a forum for PEM developers and others interested in the
     PEM standards?
  4) Are there implementations of PEM available?
  5) How do I get TIS/PEM?
  6) Why is TIS/PEM only available in the US and Canada?
  7) Are special privileges (e.g., root access) required to install
     TIS/PEM?
  8) What about integrating TIS/PEM into mail user agents?
  9) What about DOS and other non-UNIX platforms?
 10) What about certificates?
 11) What is a distinguished name?
 12) What is a Certification Authority (CA)?
 13) What does a PCA do and how are they differentiated?
 14) What PCAs are available?
 15) How much does it cost to sign up under a PCA?
 16) What if I have questions about TIS PCA?
 17) Is there a mailing list for TIS/PEM users?
 18) What if I have questions about or problems with TIS/PEM?

1
Q: What is Privacy Enhanced Mail (PEM)?

A: PEM is an Internet standard for providing security services to
   electronic mail.  It uses cryptographic techniques to provide
   message integrity checking, originator authentication, and
   confidentiality.  It lets you know that a message hasn't been
   changed, who it's from, and, optionally, allows you to keep it
   secret from all but the intended recipients.

2
Q: Where are the PEM standards defined?

A: There is a set of Proposed Standard RFCs (Internet standards
   documents) that specify PEM.  The four new documents are RFCs 1421
   (obsoletes 1113), 1422 (obsoletes 1114), 1423 (obsoletes 1115), and
   1424 (new).  These documents may be found in your favorite RFC
   repository.  Details on obtaining RFCs via FTP or EMAIL may be
   obtained by sending an EMAIL message to "rfc-info@ISI.EDU" with the
   message body "help: ways_to_get_rfcs".  For example:

        To: rfc-info@ISI.EDU
        Subject: getting rfcs

        help: ways_to_get_rfcs

3
Q: Is there a forum for PEM developers and others interested in the
   PEM standards?

A: Yes, there is an electronic mailing list that is used to discuss
   the PEM specifications, implementation issues, and it is used to
   conduct some of the business of the Internet Engineering Task Force
   (IETF) PEM working group.  Send a message to
   "pem-dev-request@tis.com" if you would like to be added to the
   list.

4
Q: Are there implementations of PEM available?

A: Yes, implementations are being made available as you read this.
   Trusted Information Systems (TIS), under ARPA sponsorship and in
   cooperation with RSA Data Security Incorporated (RSADSI), has
   released a reference implementation of Privacy Enhanced Mail
   (TIS/PEM) to the Internet community.  TIS/PEM is a UNIX-based
   implementation that has been integrated with Rand MH 6.7.2 and is
   easily integrated into other mail user agents.  TIS/PEM is
   distributed in source form.  It is openly available within the
   United States and Canada for non-commercial use (not for resale).

5
Q: How do I get TIS/PEM?

A: TIS/PEM is available via anonymous ftp in the United States and
   Canada to US and Canadian citizens and people with a US "green
   card."  To retrieve TIS/PEM please FTP to

     host:   ftp.tis.com
     login:  anonymous

   and retrieve the files

     pub/PEM/README
     pub/PEM/LICENSE
     pub/PEM/BUGS

   The README file contains further instructions.

6
Q: Why is TIS/PEM only available in the US and Canada?

A: The export from the United States of the cryptography used in
   TIS/PEM is controlled by the United States government.

7
Q: Are special privileges (e.g., root access) required to install TIS/PEM?

A: TIS/PEM can be installed in multi-user mode, which is identified by
   the use of a single, system-wide, shared database of cryptographic
   and administrative information maintained by one or more privileged
   users called certificate administrators, and single-user mode,
   which allows individuals to maintain their own databases of
   cryptographic and administrative information.  Multi-user mode
   installation requires privileges, while single-user mode
   installation does not.

8
Q: What about integrating TIS/PEM into mail user agents?

A: TIS/PEM has been integrated with MH 6.7.2 and is easily integrated
   with other mail user agents.  If you integrate TIS/PEM with a
   popular mail user agent, we would be happy to make it available to
   others.  Additionally, a set of filters, similar to the UNIX cat
   command, that allow you to apply and remove PEM enhancements
   (enhance and de-enhance) text files are provided.  These filters
   make it possible to use PEM with mail user agents that are not PEM
   aware.

9
Q: What about DOS and other non-UNIX platforms?

A: TIS/PEM is currently limited to UNIX, but we are pursuing porting
   it to other operating systems.

10
Q: What about certificates?

A: While PEM uses X.509 certificates to bind distinguished names to
   RSA public keys, it is not necessary to join the Internet
   certification hierarchy or otherwise pay to use TIS/PEM.  TIS/PEM
   is capable of generating the certificates that you need.  Joining
   the Internet certification hierarchy has the benefit of making it
   easier to verify others' mail and for them to verify yours.  To
   join the Internet certification hierarchy, you must sign up your
   Certification Authority (CA) under a Policy-level Certification
   Authority (PCA).  

11
Q: What is a distinguished name?

A: A distinguished name is a hierarchical, globally unique name used
   to identify something or someone.  RFC 1255 and several North
   American Directory Forum (NADF) documents describe how to select
   appropriate distinguished names.  The distinguished name for Earl
   Sinclair (a fictional character, geographically displaced) might be

     Country=US
     State or Province=CA 
     Organization=Wesayso Corporation
     Organizational Unit=Tree Pushing Division
     Common Name=Earl Sinclair

12
Q: What is a Certification Authority (CA)?

A: A Certification Authority (CA) vouches for the binding between
   users' distinguished names and RSA public keys within an
   organization or organizational unit.  The CA's distinguished name
   is that of the organization or organizational unit and users'
   distinguished names are created by starting with the CA
   distinguished name and adding something to uniquely and
   unambiguously identify the user, like a common name.

13
Q: What does a PCA do and how are they differentiated?

A: PCAs vouch for the binding between a CA's distinguished name and
   RSA public key.  By joining a PCA, others can verify your PEM
   messages by following the certification path to the Internet
   Policy-level Certification Authority certificate without having to
   have retrieved your RSA public key using secure, out of band
   means.  PCAs may also make CA Certificate Revocation Lists (CRLs)
   and certificates available and provide other services for its
   members.

   PCAs can be differentiated by the policy that they advertise.  The
   policy includes the level of effort -- and associated assurance --
   that a PCA uses to insure the correctness of the binding and the
   requirements they place on CAs which issue certificates under them.
   They can also be differentiated by the other services they offer
   and their price.

14
Q: What PCAs are available?

A: Several PCAs exist as part of the Internet certification hierarchy,
   including PCAs at RSADSI and TIS, and more may come online in the
   near future.

15
Q: How much does it cost to sign up under a PCA?

A: Individual PCAs will have their own price schedules.  Signing up
   under the TIS PCA is free during 1993. 

16
Q: What if I have questions about TIS PCA?

A: Sent them to tispca-info@tis.com.

17
Q: Is there a mailing list for TIS/PEM users?

A: Yes, it's tispem-users@tis.com.  Send mail to
   tispem-users-request@tis.com to be added to or deleted from the
   list.

18
Q: What if I have questions about or problems with TIS/PEM?

A: Send them to tispem-support@tis.com.
- -----END PRIVACY-ENHANCED MESSAGE-----

------- End of Forwarded Message





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: gnu (John Gilmore)
Date: Tue, 8 Jun 93 17:51:08 PDT
To: markoff@nyt.com
Subject: Re: McCarthy lives!
In-Reply-To: <uXZT5B8w165w@sytex.com>
Message-ID: <9306090050.AA03345@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> talking to a guy with longstanding computer security
> connections. He looked at me strangely and said something like
> "Well, Tim, your name just came up in Washington on a list of
> the most dangerous hackers in the country." I laughed it off

Tim, I'll be glad to teach you how to file a Privacy Act request.
It's pretty simple, and it works on all Federal agencies.  You get all
records they are keeping on you, with some limited exceptions -- and
for almost all of those, you get notified of the withholding.  If you
can identify one or a small number of agencies that might be keeping
this "list", we can see if you are on it.  And if we find the list, we
can probably get the whole thing under the Freedom of Information Act.

	John




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Johan Helsingius <julf@penet.FI>
Date: Tue, 8 Jun 93 08:38:39 PDT
To: peter honeyman <honey@citi.umich.edu>
Subject: Re: CERT
In-Reply-To: <9306081313.AA12942@toad.com>
Message-ID: <9306081800.aa08835@penet.penet.FI>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



> i am disappointed to hear these stories about cert, but encourage others
> with tales to tell to step forward.  this is a real eye-opener.

I just had to deal with a minor crisis caused by CERT. They contacted the
domain-admin for the *.fi domain, saying they had been informed that the
anonymous ftp archive at anon.penet.fi was being used to distribute
illegal copies of software. They did *not* contact me directly, nor my
service provider.

The last time anon.penet.fi was shut down was exactly because of
somebody contacting the domain-admin, who happens to be a person working
for a competitor to my service provider.

Fortunately I could tell them that anon.penet.fi didn't even run ftp at
all, easily verifiable by trying to ftp from anon.penet.fi. They did
apologize profusely, but somehow that doesn't quite...

	julf





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Date: Tue, 8 Jun 93 18:21:28 PDT
To: gnu@toad.com
Subject: Re: McCarthy lives!
In-Reply-To: <9306090050.AA03345@toad.com>
Message-ID: <9306090121.AA10501@netcom3.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


John Gilmore writes:

> > talking to a guy with longstanding computer security
> > connections. He looked at me strangely and said something like
> > "Well, Tim, your name just came up in Washington on a list of
> > the most dangerous hackers in the country." I laughed it off
> 
> Tim, I'll be glad to teach you how to file a Privacy Act request.
> It's pretty simple, and it works on all Federal agencies.  You get all
> records they are keeping on you, with some limited exceptions -- and
> for almost all of those, you get notified of the withholding.  If you
> can identify one or a small number of agencies that might be keeping
> this "list", we can see if you are on it.  And if we find the list, we
> can probably get the whole thing under the Freedom of Information Act.

I'll take John up on his kind offer! 

Though I expressed that to me this experience was kind of funny (in a
devil-may-care way, I hope you all understand), it *does* raise larger
issues of whether CERT is developing list of what might be called
"subversives" based on hearsay evidence and innuendo.

So, I'll try to pursue this and keep you folks posted.

-Tim


-- 
..........................................................................
Timothy C. May         | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,  
tcmay@netcom.com       | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
408-688-5409           | knowledge, reputations, information markets, 
W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA  | black markets, collapse of governments.
Higher Power: 2^756839 | Public Key: PGP and MailSafe available.
Note: I put time and money into writing this posting. I hope you enjoy it.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: fnerd@smds.com (FutureNerd Steve Witham)
Date: Tue, 8 Jun 93 16:07:40 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: CERT and us
Message-ID: <9306082235.AA28928@smds.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


hey folks
a poem by fnerd

It looks like CERT may have a habit
of sending accusatory-looking form letters
without doing much checking of their own
based on who knows what tips.

Looks like they need to 
polish their policies and their prose 
a little bit.

BUT

We, too, are a group formed to look into problems 
	of computer security.
We, too, respond to security emergencies.
We, too, distribute patches to help people improve
	their security.
We, too, send messages--even rumors--back and forth about 
	threatening situations and people we suspect.

Sure, our style and emphasis are different,
but our charter is very similar to theirs.

Let's not let our name or style 
distract us from our mission 
or blind us to potential allies.

Instead of thinking of them as the heavies 
and us as the rebels, 

WHY NOT

us as the net-wise older brothers,
and them as the enthusiastic amateurs
who need some advice and calming down?

Eric can write one of his authoritative letters,
and we become
the voice of reason,
the watchers of the watchers,
Liberty's eyes.

Gentlemen and ladies (I reproach you),
remember who we are.

-fnerd
quote me




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: gnu (John Gilmore)
Date: Tue, 8 Jun 93 18:37:36 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com, gnu
Subject: Re: AT&T Encrypting Phone Ad in WS Journal
In-Reply-To: <Pine.3.05z.9306072359.A14078-9100000@carson.u.washington.edu>
Message-ID: <9306090137.AA05168@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> The Wall Street Journal, 7 June 93, page B7, has an AT&T ad for an
> encrypting communications box called "Surity Telephone Device".
> It plugs between a regular phone and the phone jack.
> Anybody know what's inside?  Is this new?  

The box pictured is the Clipper-based successor to the AT&T 3600
secure phone.  They have a "bump in the cord" architecture; in the
case of the 3600, it plugged between the handset and the phone.  This
is a pain in the ass (there are six or seven "handset modules" that
plug into the unit, and you have to use one to match your phone -- or
get several and pray that one will match each phone you ever want
to use.)

We played with one of the 3600's at a Bay Area cypherpunks meeting
a few months ago.

I'd refer to the "Surity" as the "surly telephone device".

	John





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Douglas Sinclair <dsinclai@acs.ucalgary.ca>
Date: Tue, 8 Jun 93 18:10:44 PDT
To: poier@sfu.ca (Skye Merlin Poier)
Subject: Re: ALERT / My email address is...
In-Reply-To: <9306082356.AA21325@malibu.sfu.ca>
Message-ID: <9306090106.AA24109@acs1.acs.ucalgary.ca>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


An encrypted cypherpunks list?  Why?  To try and hide the forum's messages
from the TLAs?  I'm sure they already have people readin this list who'd
be incorporated into the encrypted list too.  Or do you plan to verify
each reader before giving them the password or whatever?  I fail to see
the point.
-- 
PGP 2.2 Key by finger




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: norm@netcom.com (Norman Hardy)
Date: Tue, 8 Jun 93 19:12:57 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: CERT netnews
Message-ID: <9306090213.AA15326@netcom3.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Netnews group "comp.security.announce" seems to be the product of CERT.
About once a week, on the average, they post something relating to
the security of some specific operating system. The few postings that
I have seen seem directed to the sys-op (typically Unix) regarding
some common practice with security implications or often holes in
the defaults that some system comes with.
What I have seen there is technical and not political.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: peter honeyman <honey@citi.umich.edu>
Date: Tue, 8 Jun 93 16:16:35 PDT
To: DEADBEAT <na5877@anon.penet.fi>
Subject: Re: CERT: the letter from CERT to berkeley.edu admin
In-Reply-To: <9306082147.AA11091@cicada.berkeley.edu>
Message-ID: <9306082316.AA00751@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> What could I be thinking?

oho, that is rich!  maybe we should forward db's note to cert, who
would turn around and muscle netcom.com for allowing users to ...

	peter




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Peter Shipley <shipley@tfs.COM>
Date: Tue, 8 Jun 93 19:40:49 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: ALERT / My email address is...
In-Reply-To: <9306082356.AA21325@malibu.sfu.ca>
Message-ID: <9306090240.AA08014@edev0.TFS>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
>
>:) I suggest that we try to create an encrypted cypherpunks list?  Comments?
>
>Sounds good to me.
>

the only use that whould  bring is to get us to get more serious about
key extange and to develop easier software for reading/scaning encrypted
messages.  On the other hand it would no benefit us in the way of that
it would not us to get our messages and views to the world.  (Last I
checked this was not a exclusive email list).


			-Pete





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Johan Helsingius <julf@penet.FI>
Date: Tue, 8 Jun 93 11:10:39 PDT
To: Eric Hughes <hughes@soda.berkeley.edu>
Subject: Re: CERT: the letter from CERT to berkeley.edu admin
In-Reply-To: <9306081620.AA07331@soda.berkeley.edu>
Message-ID: <9306082011.aa12598@penet.penet.FI>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



> Here, in its almost full glory, is the letter that CERT sent to the
> admin at berkeley.

It's exactly the same message that was sent to the .fi domain-admin with
regards to anon.penet.fi

	Julf





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: smb@research.att.com
Date: Tue, 8 Jun 93 17:49:11 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: CERT
Message-ID: <9306090049.AA03320@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


The paranoia is getting out of hand.  Let's take this one point by
point.  I've deleted the poster's name, because this note is just an
example; it's not the only such posting.

	Certainly that may be so.. but in this case they didn't merely
	tell 'you' with a simple note, instead they did atleast 2
	things which really are bothersome and overstepping common
	'courtesy' of merely informing 'you':

``You''?  Who is ``you''?  The CERT note didn't mention any
individual.  They might not have the information.  If they did, it
might be because the account was compromised.  (That was the case the
last time I helped a friend investigate ftp droppings.  In that case,
though, it was only the ftp account, not the login account, so
notifying the owner would not have been damaging.  Btw -- remember the
recent CERT advisory on bugs in the WUSTL ftpd?)

	1) Instead of going directly to the owner of the directory in
	question or the administator of the host they jumped over
	'your' head and went to the domain administrator. I can see
	going to a site administrator if they had reason to believe the
	owner of the directory was doing something illegal.. but then
	again they have no authority to make/enforce/etc any kind of
	laws.  They were just plain out of line. Consider this example
	(and I'll give them the benefit of doubt here that someone
	really did complain to them and they aren't on some witchhunt
	of their own): I am Cert and Mr Von Karman has emailed me to
	say that a /jet/Enigma-cypher-code directory appears to have
	illegal software of some kind.. so I send up my email.. not to
	you.. but to Goldin, the new NASA head that I believe this
	directory owned by you has illegal software on it. Well that is
	a good way to put some bad marks on your record even if you do
	prove it untrue to your boss.. maybe you had just removed the
	evidence before he checks out your acct.. either way he shuts
	down your net access for a while..'just to be sure', and look
	out next time you want a promotion.. can't be to safe.. you
	might be a security risk!

As I said before, they might not know who was involved.  Even if they
did, and even if the account wasn't compromised, it's the SA's
responsibility to investigate.  What if a local user is doing un-
authorized things?  Take this particular case -- they could easily end
up being sued for contributing to copyright infringement.  They might
win -- but defending against a lawsuit is expensive.

	2) They didn't check the system out before hand and blatantly
	said as much.. what kind of service to you is that? my friend
	met a guy who knows bigfoot..but certainly you don't see me
	bothering the people who own the land where bigfoot is supposed
	to live.

Check it out?  How?  Apart from the question of whether or not you want
CERT looking through your directories (and I can just hear the
complaints now -- ``On no evidence but an anonymous tip, CERT logged
in, listed everything, looked for *my* hidden areas that I used to
distribute restricted software, and tied up my link to the Internet for
hours while the downloaded everything in sight'') -- it isn't
feasible.  I just ftp'd to soda for a quick look-see.  A ls-lRa
generated 160K bytes.  Simply screening that takes time.  Many of the
files showed only numeric uid's; the ftpd passwd file was obviously not
up to date.  Even if I knew the suspect files, I might not know who the
responsible user was.  Many of the files had informative names like
``packet123.Z''.  They mirrored the full X11R5 distribution.

How much time and effort should CERT put in?!?!!  A competent SA will
at least know the putative ownership and reliability of the owner of
most of that stuff; CERT sure doesn't (except, of course, for the list
of hackers they may or may not have, and which has been (rightly)
objected to).

	3) They want to confiscate logs from the system.. That sure as
	heck isn't any of their business..

Confiscate?  Confiscate?  They asked for a copy, if available.
``Confiscate'' generally means ``take away''.  They're not taking
anything from you.  If the logs do show anything, it's precisely their
business -- evidence of someone abusing your system (I'm assuming here
that there really was 3rd-party deposits and retrieval of files).
Quick -- how many of those file transfers are coming from stolen
accounts?  In my experience, a goodly number.

Look, I have my own concerns about CERT in this matter, notably the
questions of what evidence they're acting on, and whether or not
they're being used (consciously or not) to silence unpopular sites.
I've sent them a note asking those questions.  But let's try to keep
things in perspective.

Oh yeah -- as an added bonus, I've enclosed a transcript of the kinds
of things I do when trying to find an administrative contact for some
machine.  I don't see any avenues of contact more likely than ``root''
or ``postmaster''.  And it's clearly a large-scale timesharing machine,
where there's no one individual clearly responsible for it.


			--Steve Bellovin

-----
$ whois -h rs.internic.net soda.berkeley.edu
No match for "SODA.BERKELEY.EDU".

The InterNIC Registration Services Host ONLY contains Internet Information
(Networks, ASN's, Domains, and POC's).
Please use the whois server at nic.ddn.mil for MILNET Information.
$ finger root@soda.berkeley.edu
[soda.berkeley.edu]
Login: root                             Name: The Allmighty
Directory: /                            Shell: /bin/csh
Office: E238, x2-7453
Last login Mon May 31 22:17 (PST) on console
No Plan.
$ finger postmaster@soda.berkeley.edu
[soda.berkeley.edu]
finger: postmaster: no such user.
$ dig mx soda.berkeley.edu

; <<>> DiG 2.0 <<>> mx soda.berkeley.edu 
;; ->>HEADER<<- opcode: QUERY , status: NOERROR, id: 6
;; flags: qr rd ra ; Ques: 1, Ans: 2, Auth: 3, Addit: 8
;; QUESTIONS: 
;;      soda.berkeley.edu, type = MX, class = IN

;; ANSWERS:
soda.berkeley.edu.      55780   MX      4 soda.Berkeley.EDU.
soda.berkeley.edu.      55780   MX      6 scotch.Berkeley.EDU.

;; AUTHORITY RECORDS:
Berkeley.EDU.   161050  NS      VANGOGH.CS.BERKELEY.EDU.
Berkeley.EDU.   161050  NS      VIOLET.Berkeley.EDU.
Berkeley.EDU.   161050  NS      UCBVAX.BERKELEY.EDU.

;; ADDITIONAL RECORDS:
soda.Berkeley.EDU.      55780   A       128.32.149.19
scotch.Berkeley.EDU.    55780   A       128.32.131.179
VANGOGH.CS.BERKELEY.EDU.        161050  A       128.32.130.2
VIOLET.Berkeley.EDU.    161050  A       128.32.136.22
UCBVAX.BERKELEY.EDU.    39151   A       128.32.137.3
UCBVAX.BERKELEY.EDU.    161050  A       128.32.130.12
UCBVAX.BERKELEY.EDU.    161050  A       128.32.149.36
UCBVAX.BERKELEY.EDU.    51896   A       128.32.133.1

;; Sent 1 pkts, answer found in time: 0 msec 
;; FROM: inet to SERVER: default -- 0.0.0.0
;; WHEN: Tue Jun  8 20:16:07 1993
;; MSG SIZE  sent: 35  rcvd: 295

$ telnet soda.berkeley.edu 25
Trying...
Connected to soda.berkeley.edu.
Escape character is '^]'.
220 soda.berkeley.edu Sendmail 5.65/KAOS-1 ready at Tue, 8 Jun 93 17:10:50 -0700
helo research.att.com
250 soda.berkeley.edu Hello research.att.com, pleased to meet you
vrfy root
250-Eric Hollander <"|/accounts/hh/remail/slocal.pl">
250-Keir Morgan <kmorgan>
250-ERic MeHlHaFf <mehlhaff@ocf>
250-ERic MeHlHaFf <\mehlhaff>
250-Tom Holub <tom>
250-John S. Jacob <jsjacob>
250-Matthew L. Seidl <seidl>
250-Shannon D. Appel <"| /usr/local/lib/mh/slocal -user appel -verbose">
250-Sean N. Welch <welch@xcf.berkeley.edu>
250-Dan Wallach <dwallach@postgres.berkeley.edu>
250-Donald J. Kubasak <kube>
250-David G. Paschich <dpassage>
250-Adam Glass <\glass>
250 Adam Glass <glass@postgres >
vrfy postmaster
250-Eric Hollander <"|/accounts/hh/remail/slocal.pl">
250-Keir Morgan <kmorgan>
250-ERic MeHlHaFf <mehlhaff@ocf>
250-ERic MeHlHaFf <\mehlhaff>
250-Tom Holub <tom>
250-John S. Jacob <jsjacob>
250-Matthew L. Seidl <seidl>
250-Shannon D. Appel <"| /usr/local/lib/mh/slocal -user appel -verbose">
250-Sean N. Welch <welch@xcf.berkeley.edu>
250-Dan Wallach <dwallach@postgres.berkeley.edu>
250-Donald J. Kubasak <kube>
250-David G. Paschich <dpassage>
250-Adam Glass <\glass>
250 Adam Glass <glass@postgres >
quit
221 soda.berkeley.edu closing connection
Connection closed by foreign host.
$ finger @soda.berkeley.edu
[soda.berkeley.edu]
Login    Name                 Tty  Idle  Login Time   Office     Office Phone
aaron    Aaron C. Smith        qR        Jun  8 08:58 Limbo      643-7217
aaron    Aaron C. Smith       *qT        Jun  8 08:58 Limbo      643-7217
achoi    Andrew Choi           pB     3  Jun  7 18:19
appel    Shannon D. Appel      pK        Jun  8 09:57 CEA        643-5657
aswan    Andrew Swan           pW        Jun  8 17:06
calvin   Wa Pak                qe 22:11  Jun  7 18:57
cgd      Chris G. Demetriou    qf        Jun  7 22:15 278 Cory   510-642-7520
cliffwd  Cliff Draper          pe    36  Jun  8 16:30 9-204a     643-3426
cynthia  cynthia leigh haynes *pr     3  Jun  8 16:43
cynthia  cynthia leigh haynes  ps        Jun  8 16:43
deb      Debra Waldorf        *p7        Jun  8 16:20
deb      Debra Waldorf        *qg    51  Jun  8 15:27
eganloo  Egan Loo              pJ        Jun  8 16:57
eric     Eric van Bezooijen    qz  1:01  Jun  8 15:50 238E      
gwh      George William Herbe  pc     1  Jun  8 14:13 238E      
gwh      George William Herbe  pm        Jun  8 14:26 238E      
henchiu  Henry Chiu            pR        Jun  8 17:02
ho       Kinson Ho            *q3  1:13  Jun  8 15:08 608-1 Evan 642-8290
hughes   Eric Hughes          *qm    36  Jun  8 10:34 238E      
isaac    Isaac Cheng          *pE    12  Jun  8 09:51
isaac    Isaac Cheng          *qw    12  Jun  8 10:59
jenn     Jennifer Hom         *pF        Jun  8 16:52 238E       415-688-8034
jlb      Jordana Brown         pQ        Jun  8 14:45
karlht   Karl Thiessen        *pb    13  Jun  8 16:28 238 Evans  642-7453
kenji    Kenji Hubbard        *pX        Jun  8 17:08 238E      
kube     Donald J. Kubasak     pU     2  Jun  8 17:05 CEA ESOC   643-7367
marco    Marco Nicosia         qI        Jun  8 15:58 238E       510-283-9587
maroo    Maroo Lieuw          *qx        Jun  8 13:33            849-9872
michelle Michelle Tisi        *qZ  5:30  Jun  8 11:34
ming     Tje Ming             *qj     9  Jun  8 15:28
ming     Tje Ming             *qO  2:17  Jun  8 13:50
mlee     Michael Lee          *pD        Jun  8 16:49
mlee     Michael Lee          *qC        Jun  8 15:52
nancy    Nancy Cheng          *pf  1:18  Jun  8 14:17
nancy    Nancy Cheng          *qV  1:53  Jun  8 13:52
payam    Payam Mirrashidi      po 19:13  Jun  7 20:54 199MD Cory 642-1297
psb      partha s. banerjee   *py  2:25  Jun  8 14:32 IBM Almade 510-649-7505
psb      partha s. banerjee   *pz  2:38  Jun  8 14:32 IBM Almade 510-649-7505
ralbers  Rick Albers          *pV        Jun  8 17:06
rmgee    Randall Gee          *pn        Jun  8 14:28
robert   Roberto Boyd         *pA        Jun  8 16:47
rsr      Roy S Rapoport       *pY        Jun  8 17:09            510-540-5535
seidl    Matthew L. Seidl      qk     1  Jun  8 10:31 238E       x2-7453
seidl    Matthew L. Seidl     *qB        Jun  8 08:32 238E       x2-7453
sfd      Scott Drellishak      pl        Jun  8 16:40 Kerr 3-202
tom      Tom Holub            *pH        Jun  8 16:53
tom      Tom Holub             pI        Jun  8 16:53
welch    Sean N. Welch        *p0        Jun  8 09:04 MTV21-122  415-336-4289




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: ""L. Detweiler"" <ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Date: Tue, 8 Jun 93 20:37:37 PDT
To: James M Galvin <tispem-support@TIS.COM>
Subject: Re: TIS/PEM FAQ as of 8 June 1993
In-Reply-To: <9306090036.AA02947@toad.com>
Message-ID: <9306090337.AA02019@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>                                TIS/PEM FAQ

do you have any plans to get this on news.answers? It would be great
there. Also, You should consider sci.crypt. I can help you with either
if you need it.

tx.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: peter honeyman <honey@citi.umich.edu>
Date: Tue, 8 Jun 93 18:43:14 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: News Bytes  June 8, 1933
Message-ID: <9306090143.AA05481@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


some interesting stuff here -- a little whistle-blowing here, a
little clipper punching there ...

		peter

------- Forwarded Message

Date: Tue, 8 Jun 93 13:02:07 -0400
From: rweingar@cs.UMD.EDU (Rick Weingarten)
Message-Id: <9306081702.AA18515@tove.cs.UMD.EDU>
To: adrion@cs.umass.edu, basili@cs.umd.edu, corbato@xx.lcs.mit.edu,
        patterson@ginger.berkeley.edu, pfreeman@gatech.edu,
        mrg@research.att.com, cwg@research.nj.nec.com, ashok@almaden.ibm.com,
        weiser.parc@xerox.com, wulf@virginia.edu, wise@seafox.cs.indiana.edu,
        tony@ide.com, forsythe@cs.UMD.EDU, jh@cs.cornell.edu,
        greg@cs.arizona.edu, johnsson@think.com, klawe@cs.ubc.ca,
        kung@harvard.edu, mji@guardian.cs.psu.edu, lazowska@cs.washington.edu,
        leveson@ics.uci.edu, steve.muchnick@eng.sun.com, jrr@cs.purdue.edu,
        ritchie@hplabs.hp.com, jes@cs.brown.edu, denning@cs.georgetown.edu,
        jwerth@cs.utexas.edu, phayes@herodotus.cs.uiuc.edu, policy@cs.UMD.EDU
Subject: News Bytes  June 8, 1933


                        Computing Research News Bytes
                                by
                        Juan Antonio Osuna
                        with Rick Weingarten

6/8/93

        GAO Criticizes ARPA on Architecture Research

The General Accounting Office released a report in May (GAO/IMTEC-
93-24), criticizing the DoD's Advanced Research Projects Agency for
its handling of the High Performance Computers and Communications
program.

Some researchers have criticized ARPA for procuring only Intel and 
Thinking Machines supercomputers for use by ARPA projects, while 
ignoring machines manufactured by other companies.. GAO cleared 
ARPA of the harsher accusations of serious misconduct, but upheld this 
general criticism, saying that such a narrow focus has inhibited R&D by
other supercomputer manufacturers.

The report suggested that ARPA should seek advice from a broader
range of researchers who do not directly participate in ARPA
projects. Finally, GAO said ARPA needs to give more emphasis to 
software development, which in the past has been given lower priority 
than hardware.

ARPA claims it has already fixed many of these problems..

GAO is now planning a follow-on study looking more broadly at program 
management and support for high performance architecture research in all 
agencies..

        House Appropriations Subcom Gives NSF an 11% Increase

[elided]

        "Clipper Chip" Proposal Draws Public Criticism

The Clinton Administration's recent proposal to implement the Clipper 
chip as a government encryption standard is receiving a cold welcome 
from some in the computer community.

During a three-day meeting before the Computer System Security
and Privacy Advisory Board of the National Institute of Standards
and Technology, dozens of people from academia, industry, and civil
liberties groups expressed disapproval for the way the White House is 
trying to implement its cryptographic policies. Complaints were directed 
in three directions---to the technology, to the process of selecting the 
standard, and to the civil liberties implications for Federal wiretapping.

The Administration initiated a public review after, rather than before, 
declaring Clipper as a government standard and ordering thousands of 
Clipper devices for government use.

In light of the negative reaction, the advisory board passed a resolution to 
extend public review and voted to hold another board meeting in late July. 
The board also decided to send a letter to the White House to relay public 
concerns and to suggest tactfully that the president reconsider the Clipper 
scheme.

        Amendments to HPCC Act Move Forward

[elided]

------- End of Forwarded Message




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: ""L. Detweiler"" <ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Date: Tue, 8 Jun 93 21:24:17 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: a "great" NSA revelation
In-Reply-To: <9306081515.AA05070@soda.berkeley.edu>
Message-ID: <9306090424.AA02488@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


[E.H. & L.D.]
>>>"We tried to come up with a technique that would not require
>>legislation," said Clint Brooks, advisor to the director of the
>>National Security Agency, 
>
>>Another ominous, foreboding quote.
>
>I think this neither ominous nor foreboding.  This statement was
>apparent within a week or so of the original announcement.

I've analyzed this elsewhere. You are taking this at face value. First
of all, the person (apparently a very high-ranking advisor, probably
the highest and closest to the project to appear in the media) is
already talking in the past tense. If they were confident and not
rattled it would be `we've come up with a technique that doesn't
require legislation'.  So far so good. But at this late date, and the
quote is presumably fresh, it has that vague hint that they are now
*considering* the legislative approach given the `nice guy' approach failed.

Cypherpunks, beware! I think it could really happen. *No one* in the
government has ruled out domestic cryptographic regulation. We have
nothing but the spineless whimperings of Kammer saying `I can't see
what it would accomplish'.  Everybody has this strange mindset that
such a thing is conceivable.  WHAT? As I was telling someone on the
list, that would be like waking up *into* a nightmare.

Here's the likely scenario: they come up with a way of `certifying' or
`licensing' cryptographic equipment with penalties that have some teeth
(like ability to confiscate on `suspicion'!) and intimidate
cryptographic developers. Why? Well, to protect the public from
inferior cryptography, of course.  We have to make sure there's no
problems with the hardware, isn't that obvious?  I hope CPSR and EFF
have their lawyers revved up, because this is Supreme Court material.

Legislation of cryptography is the most obnoxious, foul-smelling
decomposition I've ever considered.

Doesn't anyone get it? Clipper represents a startling shift from NSA
policy to tinkering with *domestic* cryptography on the *large-scale*
by intent, despite, as CPSR points out, no legal foundation whatsoever
(and in fact, I'd buy a jackhammer or bulldozer before I see anybody
erecting one). A startling shift from a passive to an *active* role in
ensuring wiretapping.  The seriousness of this kind of infraction only
comes around once every few decades.  Don't be fooled by the recent
suggestions that Clipper will be put on hold!  The root of the conflict
is still untouched!

>This single
>quotation will be enormously useful in getting the legislature to take
>specific and bill-oriented action about the wiretap chips.  In the
>checks and balance system, the legislature makes laws; the executive
>makes them happen.  

You seem to favor a legislative approach to protecting cryptography.
Well, all I can say is that there are a lot of pitfalls. In my opinion
a 200 year old scrap of paper is all the verbiage we need.  There is
nothing extremely unusual about cryptography from a legal standpoint.
Its just another medium of data transmission.

>The executive is not supposed to go charging off
>and making de facto legislation.
>The only
>thing new about it is that it confirms what I've thought for over a
>month: that the executive branch is trying to do an end run around the
>legislature.

I'm glad you came to this epiphany on the original, true treachery of
the `initiative', but I'm sorry to say I don't share it. If by
`executive' you are alluding to Clinton, clearly he had very little to
do with it, and as I've said elsewhere on sci.crypt, his support is
convenient but not necessary. Even Bush's involvement was surely
extremely marginal at best.

The *true* problem is that there is a massive entrenchment of inbred
bureacrats at a site that has the initials F.M. that is completely
insulated from the periodic cleansings of elections, devoid of overhead
accountability and the venerable mechanisms for `checks and balances'
and `division of power' in our government you cite, and paid tens of
billions of dollars a year by *us* to find ways of *evading*
protections on privacy and spying on the neighbors (friend and foe
alike). They will not go away quietly. Ah, but as everyone knows, neither will I.


BTW, could anyone give a reference on the FEAL politics history? It's
just like deja vu all over again.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: remail@tamsun.tamu.edu
Date: Tue, 8 Jun 93 20:31:04 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: anonymous mail
Message-ID: <9306090330.AA15612@tamsun.tamu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----


Deadbeat wrote:

> This "coincidence" brings a name to mind.
> Rhymes with "turn right."
> Starts with S.
> What could I be thinking?


This is by far the best explanation for the whole soda/penet/CERT
problems!

Undoubtedly the work of good old Mr. "Rear of the boat; illumination"

Dr. Manhattan
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.2

iQCVAgUBLBVYzN1uahe7Mr5vAQHLlgQArcKYK9yvgXOhRdtt03z1tz3wpaUi/RAE
oL1fjvLWJ7PHyK1BObnEhFjfv/JO4DwPqd1EevVDzyV3G/AydKf6GtuNVofDmu4T
JlDLx5DFTZQ24xgljaubJ4yOOXgbsNMvziHq5dmwx2boqyXjufq8lXhKgnDQQBEl
xH7ooyA7Aaw=
=/16r
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: J. Michael Diehl <mdiehl@triton.unm.edu>
Date: Tue, 8 Jun 93 21:46:47 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: ALERT / My email address is... (fwd)
Message-ID: <9306090446.AA22053@triton.unm.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> On Mon, 7 Jun 1993 22:18:16 -0600 (MDT), "J. Michael Diehl" <mdiehl@triton.unm.edu> wrote:
> > 
> > We could set up aliases and distribute a common secret key for the list....
> 
> How are you going to do this securely?
> Just a thought,

We're not.  I was very tired and was using my other, much smaller, brain to 
think with. ;^)  I was (thinking?) of distributing a common secret key to people
who we know are not spooks, and who would be interested in the cypherpunk's
cause.  This and anonymous remailers would ensure that anyone could say anything
with total anonymity, since we would all share secret keys.  The problem is, of
course, that many people who would otherwise be interested, could not 
participate in our new clique. ;^(  SO, DISREGUARD MY COMMENTS!  Plz!

+-----------------------+-----------------------------+---------+
| J. Michael Diehl ;-)  | I thought I was wrong once. | PGP KEY |
| mdiehl@triton.unm.edu |   But, I was mistaken.      |available|
| mike.diehl@fido.org   |                             | Ask Me! |
| (505) 299-2282        +-----------------------------+---------+
|                                                               |
+------"I'm just looking for the opportunity to be -------------+
|            Politically Incorrect!"   <Me>                     |
+-----If codes are outlawed, only criminals wil have codes.-----+
+----Is Big Brother in your phone?  If you don't know, ask me---+



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: J. Michael Diehl <mdiehl@triton.unm.edu>
Date: Tue, 8 Jun 93 22:17:57 PDT
To: gnu@toad.com (John Gilmore)
Subject: Re: McCarthy lives!
In-Reply-To: <9306090050.AA03345@toad.com>
Message-ID: <9306090517.AA22707@triton.unm.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


According to John Gilmore:

> Tim, I'll be glad to teach you how to file a Privacy Act request.
> It's pretty simple, and it works on all Federal agencies.  You get all
> records they are keeping on you, with some limited exceptions -- and
> for almost all of those, you get notified of the withholding.  If you
> can identify one or a small number of agencies that might be keeping
> this "list", we can see if you are on it.  And if we find the list, we
> can probably get the whole thing under the Freedom of Information Act.

I would think a quick tutorial on this would be of general interest.  Could you
find some time....?  Thanx in advance.
+-----------------------+-----------------------------+---------+
| J. Michael Diehl ;-)  | I thought I was wrong once. | PGP KEY |
| mdiehl@triton.unm.edu |   But, I was mistaken.      |available|
| mike.diehl@fido.org   |                             | Ask Me! |
| (505) 299-2282        +-----------------------------+---------+
|                                                               |
+------"I'm just looking for the opportunity to be -------------+
|            Politically Incorrect!"   <Me>                     |
+-----If codes are outlawed, only criminals wil have codes.-----+
+----Is Big Brother in your phone?  If you don't know, ask me---+



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: J. Michael Diehl <mdiehl@triton.unm.edu>
Date: Tue, 8 Jun 93 22:24:04 PDT
To: shipley@tfs.COM (Peter Shipley)
Subject: Re: ALERT / My email address is...
In-Reply-To: <9306090240.AA08014@edev0.TFS>
Message-ID: <9306090523.AA22828@triton.unm.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


According to Peter Shipley:
> >:) I suggest that we try to create an encrypted cypherpunks list?  Comments?

> >Sounds good to me.
> the only use that whould  bring is to get us to get more serious about
> key extange and to develop easier software for reading/scaning encrypted
> messages.  On the other hand it would no benefit us in the way of that

Yes, this is a much needed improvement in this group.

> it would not us to get our messages and views to the world.  (Last I
> checked this was not a exclusive email list).

I completely agree.
+-----------------------+-----------------------------+---------+
| J. Michael Diehl ;-)  | I thought I was wrong once. | PGP KEY |
| mdiehl@triton.unm.edu |   But, I was mistaken.      |available|
| mike.diehl@fido.org   |                             | Ask Me! |
| (505) 299-2282        +-----------------------------+---------+
|                                                               |
+------"I'm just looking for the opportunity to be -------------+
|            Politically Incorrect!"   <Me>                     |
+-----If codes are outlawed, only criminals wil have codes.-----+
+----Is Big Brother in your phone?  If you don't know, ask me---+



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: fergp@sytex.com (Paul Ferguson)
Date: Tue, 8 Jun 93 20:40:13 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: InfoWorld
Message-ID: <XyXu5B1w165w@sytex.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


 
INFOWorld
June 7, 1993
Volume 15, Issue 23
pages 1, 103
 
IS managers assail data encryption rule
 
'Clipper chip would allow snooping
 
by Scott  Mace
And Shawn Willett
 
GAITHERSBURG, Md. -- IS managers and computer vendors last week
blasted the Clinton administration's plans to mandate use of the
"Clipper" data encryption chip.
 
During hearings hosted by the U.S. Commerce Department here last
week and in interviews, many IS managers and vendors said they
fear the encryption standard could make their operations
vulnerable not only to snooping by the government, but by
criminals as well.
 
IS managers and consultants from Bankers Trust Co. of New York
and Deloitte &Touche voiced these concerns at the hearing and
chided the government for shrouding the process in secrecy.
 
"The secret process up until now has been destructive to public
trust," said William Murray, IS consultant at Deloitte & Touche,
in Wilton, Conn.
 
"It is only a matter of time before hackers figure out a back
door to de-crypt it," said Sheldon Laube, national director of
information and technology at Price Waterhouse, in Menlo Park,
Calif.
 
Laube echoed the concerns of other corporate data managers.
 
"If the government can de-encrypt it, we have to assume
competitors can as well," said Bob Holmes, computer technology
research analyst at Southern California Gas, in Los Angeles.
 
The chip, which would be installed in data communications
devices, including computers, modems, fax machines, and phones,
encrypts data so outsiders cannot listen in or steal sensitive
data. But government agencies, such as the FBI, could ask for a
court order to obtain the "keys" to decode the data.
 
No one would be forced to implement the chip, but the
administration proposal could mandate government agencies to buy
it, effectively forcing its widespread adoption.
 
The Clipper chip, jointly developed by the National Security
Agency and the national Institute of Standards and Technology
(NIST) was also assailed by computer vendors.
 
Oliver Smoot, vice president of the Computer and Business
Equipment Manufacturers Association (CBEMA), testified that its
members would have to develop separate product lines for the
United States and overseas because a few foreign governments
would want to give the U.S. government the capability to decode
their data transmissions. This, along with the inclusion of the
chip in every computer, would mean higher prices, Smoot said.
 
CBEMA members include Apple Computer Inc., Compaq Computer Corp.,
IBM, and Hewlett-Packard Co.
 
The plan has also been hotly contested by computer industry civil
libertarians, such as the Electronic Frontier Foundation, which
urged that the Constitution's prohibition of illegal search and
seizure be applied.
 
NIST and other government agencies countered that the chip is
very resistant to tampering. It uses a key escrow system, where
two or more government agencies will hold parts of a decryption
key, for use by law enforcement with a valid court order.
 
The FBI expects organized crime and terrorists to begin encoding
information.
 


Paul Ferguson               |  The future is now.
Network Integrator          |  History will tell the tale;
Centreville, Virginia USA   |  We must endure and struggle
fergp@sytex.com             |  to shape it.
 
          Stop the Wiretap (Clipper/Capstone) Chip.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: RYAN Alan Porter <ryan@rtfm.mlb.fl.us>
Date: Tue, 8 Jun 93 21:18:45 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: CryptoStacker Update
Message-ID: <Pine.3.03.9306082305.B1284-d100000@rtfm>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain




This is an update on the CryptoStacker undertaking for those interested. 

I am still at the research/initial_design stage, so any further
suggestions would be welcome.  I am working on several other projects
right now so actual coding will likely not begin in earnest for at least a
week or two, I also do not wish to rush things any more than I need to...

The CryptoStacker engine will probably consist of a block driver style
device driver running under MSDOS which will intercept blocks of data
going to the disk and encrypt them, and intercept blocks of data coming
from the dish and decrypt them.  The system should be completely seamless
and hopefully will remain at one abstraction level.  The intercepted
functions will be the read/write functions of interrupt 13h.

The initial version will be a simple driver with no sector remapping and
will have to be installed on an already existing partition seperate from
the boot partition.  Hopefully in the future it will be possible to create
a false disk by remapping sectors and extracting all drive data from a
single file stored on the physical drive, a la Stacker's one huge file. 
This would allow for installation without the backup and reformatting of
the hard drive.

The keys will initially be stored on floppy disks and password protected. 
For simplicity, I will use one single key for the whole disk during
development, but I hope to be able to provide at least one key per track
in the initial version.  I intend to make the key hooks as modular as
possible and as open as possible in order that the possibility of PCMIA
cards holding keys, barcode keys, datacard keys, etc, will be possible in
the future.

The encryption engine will be completely in software for the widest
possible spread.  This is the single only design consideration that I am
absolutely set upon, and even then I will be glad to implement any advice
on how to make the code as open as possible for future hardware
assistance.  I would like to see it expand into hardware in the future as
encryption hardware hopefully becomes easier to find.

The actual encryption algorithm is a more difficult case to comment on.  I
have done a lot of research on DES, since most of the advice that I have
recieved has pointed in that direction, but I can see that it will be
extremely slow and unwieldy in software.  I would like to use an algorithm
which would be a little more optimized for software but alas, I am more
than a little afraid of the wrath of the cypherexperts who will shun any
non-DES product.  I am looking into the IDEA engine now, and I like the
fact that it also has the capability to take in 8bytes and put out 8bytes,
but that is about all that I know about it.  Things that make DES
attractive to me:

	1) Takes 8 bytes, puts out 8 bytes.

	2) Nonlinear.

	3) It is its own inverse.

	4) I understand it (a factor not to be underestimated)

Things that make it unnattractive:

	1) It is slow as hell, especially with triple iterations.

If anyone knows of some algorithms that have been widely examined which
meet at least a few of the 'pro' arguments and doesn't meet the 'con'
argument, please let me know...

There has been some consideration on the possibility of having the key
time out after a preset interval.  I like the idea as an option to the
user who really wants it, but I have a lot of reservations about how to
make a system time out gracefully when this happens.  I have some ideas
for how to do this with a multitasking OS, but they just seem like hacks
to me, I am looking for elegant solutions.

There has also been some contemplation as to how to shield a key from
being read from a PC's memory.  It has been suggested that I just inform
the user of the security hole and not worry about it.  This seems lazy and
counterproductive to me, and I would like to at least make some effort to
hide the key.  Any good virus writers out there?  Most of my techniques
involve hiding code on mass storage, but I'm sure there are some tricks to
memory someone might suggest.

Well, that seems about it.  I hope that this has been more coherent than
the flurry of replies that marked the beginning of this, and less offensive...


-Ryan
the Bit Wallah









From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: J. Michael Diehl <mdiehl@triton.unm.edu>
Date: Tue, 8 Jun 93 23:53:47 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: My Poll....
Message-ID: <9306090653.AA23961@triton.unm.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Well, I finally got to look at the responses to my poll.  FYI, I got 33 replies.
This is a small number considering there are (I think) 400+ people on this list.
I didn't take the time to actually tally the results for each question.  I'm
inherently lazy... ;^)  I can make some comments about what we use, tho.  Note 
that the lists are in no particular order.  Since this was certainly not a 
scientific poll, I opted to not include any statistics, sorry.  I was kinda
hoping to have a more homogeneous environment than what we have.  Kinda naive,
huh?  Well, this is what I have to say after reading each of your replies.  I
would like to thank everyone who participated in my informal poll.  I hope the
results are usefull to any software-developer-cypherpunks out there.

The systems that we use tended to be (IMHO) hi-end PC's, 386's and better.  Macs
were a close second, with various *nix's forming a large block.  This isn't any
suprise.  The actuall list: PC, NCube, Sun, Mac, IBM RT, IBM RS/6000, DEC/MIPS,
VAX, NeXT, HP 7xx, Cray, SGI Indigo, Amiga.

As for OS's, MSDOS was, again, the clear winner.  It would seem that many people
are going from dos, to one of the various (free) unix's for the PC.  I didn't
know it was so widespread.  The list: MSDOS, BSDI BSD/386, SunOS, A/UX, 4.3BSD,
UNICOS, Ultrix, Linux, MacOS,  HP/UX, NeXTStep, Solaris, AIX, System, IRIX, 
AmigaDos, vm, DESQview.

There are more Cypherpunks who refuse to use online services than use them.  Of
those who do use online systems, and I counted bbs's and internet as an online
system, these are the systems we use: The WELL, MCI, Prodigy, Compuserve, GEnie,
AOL, BBSs, netcom, Internet, Fido.

I didn't know there were so many mail readers.....
SLMR, MH, pine, elm, emacs, Cyberdesk, Mush, NeXTMail, NUpop, GRn, QWK, Eudora,
dxmail, LOCALLY DEVELOPED 
 
I was shocked to find that people still use pgp v2.1.  Why?  Also, unix pgp 
made a strong showing, considering it probably isn't very secure in that 
environment.  The only versions mentioned are: 2.2, 2.1, MacPGP 2.1, unix.  I
know of other versions, tho.
 
This poll was motivated by all of the talk about writing a secure comm program.
Judging from how many different programs in use now, it will be hard to write
a program which will please everybody.  I also wonder if any of the telix users
find telix to be very much like procomm; I did.  Of the telix users, would you
be interested in helping me test my mail scripts, and perhapse writing 
extensions for other mail readers, if needed?  Hope to hear from you.  Anyway,
here is the list of the comm programs which we use: MacSamson,  JComm, Term,
QuickLink II, PPP/SLIP, Seyon, UUPC, Telix, Z-Term, procomm, Kermit, vlt,
White Knight, Eudora, QModemPro, Procomm Plus, Telemate, tapcis.
+-----------------------+-----------------------------+---------+
| J. Michael Diehl ;-)  | I thought I was wrong once. | PGP KEY |
| mdiehl@triton.unm.edu |   But, I was mistaken.      |available|
| mike.diehl@fido.org   |                             | Ask Me! |
| (505) 299-2282        +-----------------------------+---------+
|                                                               |
+------"I'm just looking for the opportunity to be -------------+
|            Politically Incorrect!"   <Me>                     |
+-----If codes are outlawed, only criminals wil have codes.-----+
+----Is Big Brother in your phone?  If you don't know, ask me---+



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: stig@netcom.com (Stig)
Date: Wed, 9 Jun 93 01:43:09 PDT
To: Marc Horowitz <honey@citi.umich.edu>
Subject: Re: CERT: the letter from CERT to berkeley.edu admin
In-Reply-To: <9306082054.AA14005@dun-dun-noodles.aktis.com>
Message-ID: <9306090843.AA10157@netcom.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


To quote: Marc Horowitz <marc@GZA.COM>
> "Do not attribute to malice that which can be adequately explained by
> stupidity."  Without support, I think CERT is merely being stupid.
> Someone else (maybe even a government employee) is being malicious.  I
> do think cert is harming their effectiveness by doing this.  My guess
> is that they never stopped to think that someone might use them in
> this way to shut down an "unpopular" ftp site.
> 

Sounds like this thread is getting too soft on CERT:

For soda, the mail went to someone@soda....

For Julf's machine, it went to his NETWORK PROVIDER.  (This is not a
courteous move, nor was it intended to be.)

	Stig

/* Jonathan Stigelman, Stig@netcom.com, PGP public key by finger  */
/* fingerprint = 32 DF B9 19 AE 28 D1 7A  A3 9D 0B 1A 33 13 4D 7F */




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: crunch@netcom.com (John Draper)
Date: Wed, 9 Jun 93 01:57:46 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Encrypting Cypherpunks mailing list postings
Message-ID: <9306090858.AA08791@netcom4.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Mikes response to the ideas of encrypting the Cypherpunks mailing list...

>We're not.  I was very tired and was using my other, much smaller, brain to 
>think with. ;^)  I was (thinking?) of distributing a common secret key to
people
>who we know are not spooks, and who would be interested in the cypherpunk's
>cause. 

I think it MAY be possible to write a perl program that would take the
incoming mail encrypted with a single common public key for Cypherpunk
mailing list mail,   than would decrypt it internally,  then for each
person in the mailing list,  using their public keys,   encrypt each
message for the individual recipients,  and mail them out.

Naturally this would be SLOWER THAN MOLASSIS!!   But it would be worth
a try to see how it works.     Lets talk about it at the upcoming
Cypherpunks meeting.   

The ravers can really use something like this to keep the Full Moon Raves
location a secret and known ONLY to those dedicated ravers that want to
attend.

As far as the Cypherpunks mailing list goes,  it may not be appropriate
to encrypt to the group ALL the time,   but SOME messages might be
worthy of encryption.





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Darren Reed <avalon@coombs.anu.edu.au>
Date: Tue, 8 Jun 93 09:47:28 PDT
To: julf@penet.fi (Johan Helsingius)
Subject: Re: CERT
In-Reply-To: <9306081800.aa08835@penet.penet.FI>
Message-ID: <9306081647.AA19872@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> 
> 
> > i am disappointed to hear these stories about cert, but encourage others
> > with tales to tell to step forward.  this is a real eye-opener.
> 
> I just had to deal with a minor crisis caused by CERT. They contacted the
> domain-admin for the *.fi domain, saying they had been informed that the
> anonymous ftp archive at anon.penet.fi was being used to distribute
> illegal copies of software. They did *not* contact me directly, nor my
> service provider.
[...]
> Fortunately I could tell them that anon.penet.fi didn't even run ftp at
> all, easily verifiable by trying to ftp from anon.penet.fi. They did
> apologize profusely, but somehow that doesn't quite...

Disturbing pattern that CERT contact people about hosts which perform
actions contrary to the wishes of some MIBS.  Or is that just paranoia ?
I doubt the NSA/FBI/any_other_government_agencies would be crying if
either anon.penet.fi or soda were taken off the net...




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Johan Helsingius <julf@penet.FI>
Date: Tue, 8 Jun 93 19:50:37 PDT
To: smb@research.att.com
Subject: Re: CERT
In-Reply-To: <9306090049.AA03320@toad.com>
Message-ID: <9306090458.aa20630@penet.penet.FI>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



> As I said before, they might not know who was involved.  Even if they
> did, and even if the account wasn't compromised, it's the SA's
> responsibility to investigate.  What if a local user is doing un-
> authorized things?  Take this particular case -- they could easily end
> up being sued for contributing to copyright infringement.  They might
> win -- but defending against a lawsuit is expensive.

Yes. Agree. And I would have had no problem had they contacted the SA at
my site (me) or even my connectivity service provider (EUnet), but they
didn't. They contacted the domain admin for Finland. A high-level
"political" authority on a national level! Without consulting anyone
involved...

	Julf





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Eric Hughes <hughes@soda.berkeley.edu>
Date: Wed, 9 Jun 93 06:57:57 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: a "great" NSA revelation
In-Reply-To: <9306090424.AA02488@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Message-ID: <9306091354.AA00091@soda.berkeley.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>>This single
>>quotation will be enormously useful in getting the legislature to take
>>specific and bill-oriented action about the wiretap chips.  

>You seem to favor a legislative approach to protecting cryptography.
>[...]  In my opinion a 200 year old scrap of paper is all the
>verbiage we need.

Protecting cryptography must be fought on all fronts.  If we disregard
the legislature, we will lose.  Period.

The Constitution is the highest law of the land.  As you may recall,
it was ratified by state legislatures.

Eric




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Eric Hughes <hughes@soda.berkeley.edu>
Date: Wed, 9 Jun 93 07:31:36 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: CERT: the letter from CERT to berkeley.edu admin
In-Reply-To: <9306090843.AA10157@netcom.netcom.com>
Message-ID: <9306091428.AA00931@soda.berkeley.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>For soda, the mail went to someone@soda....

The first CERT letter was sent to a contact for the berkeley.edu
domain, not to soda.  This original recipient then forwarded the mail
to root@soda, which is aliased to a number of people.  The root who
turned off the directory is not the same one who finally forwarded me
the CERT letter.

In short, they went over Julf's head, and they went over mine.

Eric




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Ross E. Jones" <rjones@salsa.abq.bdm.com>
Date: Wed, 9 Jun 93 07:00:54 PDT
To: smb@research.att.com
Subject: Re: CERT: the letter from CERT to berkeley.edu admin
Message-ID: <28802.rjones@abq.bdm.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



In message Tue, 08 Jun 93 14:13:05 EDT, smb@research.att.com  writes:

>
>Based on what you sent out, I confess that I see nothing wrong with
>CERT's note.

I agree that the rights of people who develop copyrighted software must
be respected.  This is fundamental to working in software development.  My
problem with the letter is that CERT did not verify the accusation before it
was sent.  Friend-to-friend this could be considered a "heads-up", but from
a semi-official source such as CERT, this message takes on more of the
characteristics of not-so-subtile arm twisting.  It resulted in soda being
closed down for a while to the detriment of all the users.
Ross E Jones
BDM, Federal           rjones@abq.bdm.com
Phone: (505) 848-5733  Fax: (505) 848-4047




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Eric Hughes <hughes@soda.berkeley.edu>
Date: Wed, 9 Jun 93 08:04:45 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: CERT: the letter from CERT to berkeley.edu admin
In-Reply-To: <28802.rjones@abq.bdm.com>
Message-ID: <9306091501.AA01867@soda.berkeley.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>It resulted in soda being
>closed down for a while to the detriment of all the users.

Before the rumor flies to far, soda was not closed down.  One
directory on the cypherpunks site was locked for less than a week.
Had it not been for the intervention of a good friend who is also root
on soda to do local politics, that directory might still be locked.
The consequences could have been worse.

Eric




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Clark Reynard <clark@metal.psu.edu>
Date: Wed, 9 Jun 93 05:42:19 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: CERT
Message-ID: <9306091318.AA00472@metal.psu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Marc Horowitz <marc@GZA.COM> writes:

>>> From: Clark Reynard <clark@metal.psu.edu>
>> Excepting the Morris Worm, can you name a SINGLE Computer Emergency
>> which CERT has halted?  It is simply an organization to keep the
>> crypto-fascists wired into the net.

>My experience with them in the past has been as a clearinghouse for
>users to report security-related bugs to vendors, and for vendors to
>provide fixed back to users.  They've done an admirable job at this;
>the major complaint is that they are too slow.  They also help
>distribute tools like COPS to validate unix workstation security.

Granted.  However, as you say, they are terribly slow and inefficient
even at this.  While I read CERT adisories and clippings, it is rare
that I discover anything which could be called 'news.'

>They are a proactive organization, not a reactive organization, so
>it's meaningless to ask what "Computer Emergencies" CERT has "halted".

Perhaps, then, their name is inappropriate.  The term "Computer" seems
to imply they are involved with computers.  This is true.  However,
"Emergency," when modified by "Computer," seems to indicate that they
are involved in some way with "Computer Emergencies," whatever this
means.  When combined with "Response," the previous terms seem to imply
that they are intended to "Respond" to "Computer Emergencies," which,
as you say, they don't do.  They ought to change their name, or find
some computer emergencies to which to respond.

>I think that calling them "crypto-fascists" is at best an unsupported
>smear, and at worst slanderous.

A quibble:  I believe you mean 'libellous.'  They are crypto-fascists;
that is to say, they are 'hidden' fascists.  (However, I'll grant that
calling them fascists is probably not productive, however amusing it
may be.)

[Peter Honeyman's comments deleted.]

>I agree with Peter.  If CERT is beginning to overstep its bounds.
>perhaps someone should make a calm, rational complaint.

I shall do so.  Don't worry, I won't call them crypto-fascists.  I
shall forward it when I send it.
----
Robert W. F. Clark               Stop the Clipper Chip
rclark@nyx.cs.du.edu             Proposal!
clark@metal.psu.edu




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: poier@sfu.ca (Skye Merlin Poier)
Date: Wed, 9 Jun 93 09:24:49 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: InfoWorld
In-Reply-To: <XyXu5B1w165w@sytex.com>
Message-ID: <9306091624.AA16331@malibu.sfu.ca>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


        The FBI expects organized crime and terrorists to begin encoding
        information.

Begin? Huh? Give me a break....

--
-----====> Skye Merlin Poier <====----- 
Undergrad in CMPT/MATH (Virtual Reality)       ||||      ||||
          email: poier@sfu.ca                  p-OO <--> OO-q   THINK
   PGP Public Key available on finger           \==      ==/





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Peter Honeyman <honey@citi.umich.edu>
Date: Wed, 9 Jun 93 07:23:07 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: CERT: the letter from CERT to berkeley.edu admin
Message-ID: <9306091423.AA01017@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>                                                  It resulted in soda being
> closed down for a while to the detriment of all the users.

very similar circumstances resulted in penet shutting down for a
lengthy period; penet is still operating under severe restrictions.
the cert letter could have produced the same result.

interestingly, i believe the penet letter was sent to the same address
as the earlier, infamous "famous net personality" letter.

another coincidence?

	peter




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: dmandl@lehman.com (David Mandl)
Date: Wed, 9 Jun 93 07:25:20 PDT
To: crunch@netcom.com
Subject: Re: Encrypting Cypherpunks mailing list postings
Message-ID: <9306091424.AA17881@disvnm2.shearson.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


From: crunch@netcom.com (John Draper)

> Mikes response to the ideas of encrypting the Cypherpunks mailing list...
> 
> >I was (thinking?) of distributing a common secret key to
> >people
> >who we know are not spooks, and who would be interested in the cypherpunk's
> >cause. 
> 
> I think it MAY be possible to write a perl program that would take the
> incoming mail encrypted with a single common public key for Cypherpunk
> mailing list mail,   than would decrypt it internally,  then for each
> person in the mailing list,  using their public keys,   encrypt each
> message for the individual recipients,  and mail them out.

But this is a PUBLIC LIST.  Our readers from the NSA/FBI/CIA will get the
messages along with everyone else--encrypted with their keys, of course, so no
spies can read them!  I just don't think any of this makes sense for a list
this large and this open.  Anyone can subscribe.  For smaller circles of
friends who know and trust one another, it would be more useful.

BTW, wouldn't this all be easier using the "multiple recipients" feature of
PGP anyway?  This is exactly the kind of thing it was designed for: Server
gets message, server multiply-encrypts to all subscribers, server distributes
message the same way it does now.  But again, I think this is pointless on a
list like this.

> The ravers can really use something like this to keep the Full Moon Raves
> location a secret and known ONLY to those dedicated ravers that want to
> attend.

Yup.  Agreed.  This is exactly the kind of group that should be using PGP in
this way.

I do think that it would be a good idea to make an active effort to distribute
and certify keys.  This will also help to promote the use of encryption, which
should be one of our main goals. 

Also: Making a sub-list of people who are "known not to be spooks," on a list
like this, is dangerous.  Would be nice if we could really do it, but there
would almost certainly be agents getting included in the sub-list, as well as
exclusions of folks who aren't agents.

   --Dave.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: karn@qualcomm.com (Phil Karn)
Date: Wed, 9 Jun 93 10:38:04 PDT
To: poier@sfu.ca
Subject: Re: InfoWorld
Message-ID: <9306091737.AA21998@servo>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Well, to borrow Whit Diffie's great phrase, those of us who regularly
conspire to participate in the political process are already encrypting...

Phil




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Mark <mark@coombs.anu.edu.au>
Date: Tue, 8 Jun 93 18:02:02 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Statement of dissatisfaction with your recent efforts (fwd)
Message-ID: <9306090101.AA03818@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Probably shouldnt have, but they get on my goat.

Forwarded message:
>From mark Wed Jun  9 10:59:04 1993
>Subject: Statement of dissatisfaction with your recent efforts
>To: cert@cert.org
>Date: Wed, 9 Jun 1993 10:59:04 +1000 (EST)
>
>Dear cert et al,
>
>It has come to my notice recently that your organisation has been 
>involved in a number of accusations against individuals and organisations
>with very little to back such accusations. 
>
>I am referring to, and these are the ones I will mention here, the 
>soda.berkeley.edu and the anon.penet.fi sites., both of which ARE
>legitamate in all respects and are SEEN as such by the net.community.
>Your organisations actions, in my personal opinion, consititute a form
>of harrassment of the worse kind, and it basically smells.
>
>Whilst any one with any knowledge of your workings already knows the
>low quality of feedback, lack of helpfulness and general arrogance of
>your methods, it doesnt do you any good at all to set about on a 
>crusade of self-serving actions against those sites or entities or
>groups of individuals you dont like or you see as furthering ideas
>and software that might one day make your life difficult. You will
>alienate a larger proportion of the net.community than you otherwise
>have.
>
>I would suggest in future you take the time to VERIFY, through whatever
>legal means are at your disposal, the authenticity of your information,
>to view yourselves the problems/files and then take whatever action your
>charter states as appropriate. Going off gun-ho and sending ominous form
>letters to people you see as gullible enough to carry out your desires
>really is less than professional.
>
>I fail to see where you get authority for a large proportion of your
>actions, but that is a matter between you and your financiers. Just dont
>expect people to take you seriously if the above scenarios are repeated.
>
>The above is my own personal observations and not those of any other
>individual or organisation, although they are free to explicitly echo
>them if they so desire. As of yet, none have.
>
>Mark.
>mark@cheops.anu.edu.au



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Brad Huntting <huntting@glarp.com>
Date: Wed, 9 Jun 93 10:55:54 PDT
To: gnu@toad.com (John Gilmore)
Subject: Re: McCarthy lives!
In-Reply-To: <9306090050.AA03345@toad.com>
Message-ID: <199306091755.AA05395@misc.glarp.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



> Tim, I'll be glad to teach you how to file a Privacy Act request.
> It's pretty simple, and it works on all Federal agencies.  You get
> all records they are keeping on you, with some limited exceptions --
> and for almost all of those, you get notified of the withholding.
> If you can identify one or a small number of agencies that might
> be keeping this "list", we can see if you are on it.  And if we
> find the list, we can probably get the whole thing under the Freedom
> of Information Act.

I'd be very interested in hearing more on this...


brad




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: mmidboe@cs.uah.edu (Matt Midboe)     (Computer Science Dept., Univ. of Alabama-Huntsville)
Date: Wed, 9 Jun 93 10:31:53 PDT
To: ryan@rtfm.mlb.fl.us (RYAN Alan Porter)
Subject: CryptoStacker and hiding the key
In-Reply-To: <Pine.3.03.9306082305.B1284-d100000@rtfm>
Message-ID: <9306091731.AA28880@uahcs2.cs.uah.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

	You could put the key in the unused sectors of the drive. Chkdsk will
probably not like that at all, and I imagine some virus scanners. Virus
scanners, there is another problem. Some of them would be useless wouldn't
they, because I think they go around int 13h (since viruses can stealth around
int 13h, right?) so you would need to tell people about that type of problem.
But putting the key in the unused sectors still doesn't provide enough
protection. What is the problem with just having a regular key file, and when
the user boots up the computer it asks them a pass phrase to decrypt the key
file? If they fail wipe the key and force the user to restore the key from a
backup somewhere. 
	
						d. saint


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.2

iQBVAgUBLBYeX1gV4u6tNx5/AQE66AIA1NVezgP2BkfZUpot6LMVEzciBDCfl1Kq
d1QbgNpgK3OINAq/IhYimUMotE+oXng59fHJYeWf+/QINxBwPYfx0Q==
=i8F7
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: jet@nas.nasa.gov (J. Eric Townsend)
Date: Wed, 9 Jun 93 12:58:01 PDT
To: fnerd@smds.com (FutureNerd Steve Witham)
Subject: Encrypting the list
In-Reply-To: <9306091758.AA04012@smds.com>
Message-ID: <9306091955.AA09779@boxer.nas.nasa.gov>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


FutureNerd Steve Witham writes:
 > We're all prime suspects for being spies.

'specially those of us with both .gov and .com email addresses, right?






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: geoffw@nexsys.net (Geoff White)
Date: Wed, 9 Jun 93 13:15:33 PDT
To: bbehlen@soda.berkeley.edu
Subject: Re:  Paranoid?   PGP to the rescue!!
Message-ID: <9306092002.AA25856@nexsys.nexsys.net>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain




	Rather then encrypting mailing list and stuff like that, the
	real solution for "sensitive info" is for EVERYBODY especially
	people who share a lot of sensitive info with each other, to
	get themselves PGP keys.  Learn how to use PGP or some other
	form of encryption you will be better off for it, trust me,
	once this happens, then you can choose who YOU would like to
	send secure info to.  So in other words, if I want to send the
	FMR instructions to Brian I can encrypt the info and send it.
	I actually wished he had a key while he was away because then
	I could send him a private message to any account, just in case
	he couldn't log into soda. PGP is abount sending secure information
	to friends and others, information that is private and that you
	don't want others to read.  I would consider it rude to post an
	encrypted message to a public list unless it was an absolute
	emergency (i.e. the Thought Police are at my door, and they are 
	going to take me away).

	The desimination of FMR info should be based on a personal
	system of trust,  PGP is some software that helps you keep the
	integrity of the communications between TRUSTED members, it is
	NOT a substitute for that trust and if used as such, will
	quickly disapoint you, with potentially disasterous
	consequences for some people. (It's better to assume that
	"They" are listening and choose your words, then to believe that
	because you have encrypted your infomation it is safe for you
	to incriminate yourself and others.)  With PGP, if the keys are
	not handled in a proper manner, it is no better than any normal
	private e-mail list.  The only reason that I would advocate
	encryption of the FMR instructions is FOR PRACTICE i.e. (danger
	paranoid statements approaching :) in case the day comes when we
	will really need to send information that we don't want Them to
	know.  The FMR info is not precious, we don't have much to
	loose except the party getting busted.  But if we did encrypt
	the data and use that as a method of distribution to TRUSTED
	roots of the FMR phone tree (which could change from time to
	time, then If the FMRs are mysteriously busted it would mean
	one or more of the following:

	1) One of the TRUSTED is an informant or cop.
	2) One or more of the people on the phone tree (only people
	   who meet visually) are informants or cops.
	3) one of the above persons told the info to an informant or cop.
	4) The cops "get lucky"
	5) The promoters leak the info to someone who knows or who is an
	   informant or cop.
	6) The cops can "break" the PGP code (a SERIOUS problem for cypherpunks)

	It is my assumption that 1 -5 are the most likely, and of 1 - 5
	   3 - 5 are things that we have absolutely NO control over.

	So PGP will only help us to enforce 1 and 2, I don't know if all the
	trouble of going through the motions of PGP are worth it except
	for the FUN and mystique of it all, it might just draw more attention
	and make the authorities think that there is something more to it
	than it really is.  I don't think this is a good idea.  I think if 
	individuals want to use PGP to send secure messages whether it is FMR
	info or resumes that should be between them.  I think we should
	take this discussion offline (oh oh elitism strikes :) but everone
	knows what I mean by that, the people who have access to Future FMR
	info will I'm sure pledge to make sure that the info is distributed
	in a fair, secure and hopefully timely manner.  Those of you who wish
	to find the Full Moon Rave, look to the skies, keep your ears peeled
	and make friends, it's not hard.


				- G

-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
NEXUS SYSTEMS/CYBERTRIBE-5 : Voice:(415)965-2384   Fax: (415)327-6416
Editor/Instigator/Catalyst : Geoff White <geoffw@nexsys.net>
Production Crew		   : Universal Movement Trinity <umt@nexsys.net>

        "They might stop the party, but they can't stop the future"

		--PGP Public key available upon request--
Paranoia - Your state of mind when you finally realize what's really going on.
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: fnerd@smds.com (FutureNerd Steve Witham)
Date: Wed, 9 Jun 93 11:22:49 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Encrypting the list
Message-ID: <9306091758.AA04012@smds.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


On encrypting the list, mostly I vote NO.

The idea of "known non-spies" is, to say the least,
a shakey one.  Not the kind of concept you base security on.
Also not the kind of psychological attitude and atmosphere
that I want to be part of.  "Are you one of US?"

Stewart Brand says in the latest Whole Earth Review, that
as soon as you become one of the people
who knows the kinds of things
that THEY want to know,
then how do other people
know that YOU aren't one of THEM?

We're all prime suspects for being spies.
I'd feel the most secure if everybody kept the content (not
necessarily their true names) out in the open.

Of course there's the fact that we want to be as inviting and
easy-to-connect-to as possible to serious newcomers and potential 
friends.  I count true spies and near-spies among the potential 
friends.  I just don't want this to be, or seem like, a clique.

It would be nice, however, to set up crypto I/O connection
OPTIONS to the list, as an incentive for lazy people like me to
figure out how to get PGP and mail filters set up.

-fnerd
quote me




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: AOLCHTNN@vax1.tcd.ie
Date: Wed, 9 Jun 93 06:20:05 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Timothy C. May:superhacker
Message-ID: <01GZ6EDS7DHK003YG5@vax1.tcd.ie>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Why doesn't Tim and anyone else who suspects that they have reached
the much-sought status of "superhacker on gov't files not just write
to their local friendly federal government office and ask for a copy
of their own records?

As far as I know, the US freedom of information act allows anyone access
to information about them that has been stored by the government. (I'm
not a laywer and not even a US resident so don't quote me on any of this;
but then I'm not charging legal fees either.)

Of course any interesting information they've got is likely to be classified,
but at least you'll find out whether any such information is stored on the
files.

Of course, requesting your own government file is likely to draw attention
to yourself, so it's probably best not to do so unless you're sure that 
they already know that you know-that-they-know-something.

Yours becoming increasingly paranoid by the minute,

Antoin O Lachtnain,
Trinity College, Dublin
(Colaiste na Trinoide, Baile Atha Cliath)




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: nobody@soda.berkeley.edu
Date: Wed, 9 Jun 93 15:35:01 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Maclean's Article on privacy issues in Canada
Message-ID: <9306092231.AA21926@soda.berkeley.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Without permission from Maclean's magazine (April 26, 1993)

[Any errors are from my poor typing.  Some emphasis added to replace
italics in the original article.]


Business (page 20)

Preserving individual privacy
New technology has made trafficking in personal data a huge industry

Until Jan. 18, 1993, checking out licence plates was a $5-million-a-year
business for the Ontario ministry of transportation.  For a $5 fee, anyone
could walk into their regional vehichle licensing bureau, fill in an
application form and learn a wide range of details about a
vehicle--including the owner's name and home address.  According to ministry
spokesman Anne McLaughlin, most people conducted searches for legitimate
reasons:  they wanted to know the history of a used car they were thinking
about buying or they needed to track down a witness to an accident.  But
some searches clearly resulted in gross violations of privacy.  In November,
an Ottawa woman, who declined to be named, complained that a man found out
where she lived by tracking her licence plates and asked to take here out.
McLaughlin said that the ministry "was aware of a few of these situations"
and, as a result, stopped providing names and addresses to the general
public.  Now, she said, the ministry will only provide that personal
information for specific purposes, including court proceedings and police
investigations.

The collection, compilation and trafficking in personal data has become a
huge industry:  some privacy experts say that it is worth as much as $300
million a year in Canada.  It has grown, in part, because rapidly evolving
technologies, including telecommunications and computers, have simpily made
it easy to do.  Said Evan Hendricks, editor of "Privacy Times", a
Washington-based newsletter that tracks privacy issues worldwide:  "The
paper trail has become the electronic trail."  But as technology has become
more pervasive, so has the sense that it is increasingly difficult to ensure
that private matters remain private--as Premier Robert Bourassa's aides
discovered during the referendum intercept of cellulas calls and the chatty
Prince Charles and his lover Camilla Parker-Bowles now know.  As a result,
organizations ranging from the federal Office of the Privacy Commissioner to
the Canadian Standards Association (CSA) and the Quebec government are
taking a new look at the issue.

At the heart of the matter is a delicate balancing act:  the right of the
individual to privacy versus the legitimate needs of government or business
to gather information.  Privacy advocates express concern, however, that it
has become much too easy for organizations to gather, store, use and
manipulate data about an individual.  "The average Canadian's name is being
crunched through various computers five to 10 times a day," said Bruce
Phillips, the privacy commissioner of Canada and strong advocate of
restraint on snooping.

A joint study between several federal government departments and four
private-sector organizations indicates that many Canadians share Phillips
concern.  In Privacy Revealed, a survey of 3,000 Canadians released late
last month, 60 per cent daid that they have less personal privacy than they
did a decade ago.

Nevertheless, the trend towards collecting even greater amounts of data is
bound to continue.  The advertising and marketing industries are
increasingly using consumer-profile data.  Part of the reason is that
companies need better information on targeting the fickle markets for
consumer goods.  At the same time, there is an increasing fragmentation in
television.  In the age of the TV zapper and the proliferation of cable TV
channels, advertisers can no longer be certain that they are reaching their
target audience.  As a result, they are turning more often to other
alternatives, including data-based direct-mail campaigns.  To reduce the
cost of mailings, direct marketers attempt to reach customers who have
indicated an interest in a given area.  S.I.R. Mail Order, for one, a
Winnepeg-based firm specializing in hunting, fishing and camping equipment,
rents its customer lists to others who want to attract rural subscribers.

In December, Quebec became the first jurisdiction in North America to attemp
to regulate personal information in the hands of the private sector when
Communications Minister Lawrence Cannon introduced Bill 68.  Although the
federal government and most provinces have privacy acts, they apply only to
information in government records.  Still, many consumer advocates say that
Quebec's proposed legislation, which should be in force by the end of June,
does not go nearly far enough in protecting individual rights.  On the other
hand, some executives say that the bill places so many restrictions on how
companies may share information with third parties that the bill will add
greatly to the cost of gathering data.  Said Jean-Claude Chartrand, chairman
and chief executive officer of Montreal-based Equifax Canada Inc., the
nation's largest credit bureau:  "That will add to the cost of credit, which
in the final analysis will cost the consumer."

Several industry organizations in Canada have attempted on their own to deal
with privacy concerns.  The Canadian Bankers Association adopted a voluntary
privacy code in 1990 that spells out how banks should collect, store and use
customer information.  Since 1990, Canada's six major chartered banks have
inmplemented the code or devised their own.  Still, the Royal Bank of
Canada sparked controversy last month when it revealed that it sometimes
included client-card numbers along with names, ages and addresses among the
information sent to market-research firms that were testing demand for new
products.  Although a Royal Bank spokesman insisted that the practice was
not an invasion of privacy, the bank has since stopped releasing client-card
numbers for research purposes.

Another industry group that has passed its own privacy code is the
Toronto-based Canadian Direct Marketing Association.  Effective next
January, members must obtain a customer's permission before they sell or
trade any information about that customer to a third party.  Association
members must provide customers with an easy mechanism, such as a box to
check off on an order form, that allows them to remove their names from
marketing lists before those lists are transferred to other marketers.  Said
association president John Gustavson:  "This way, our customers can receive
information on the things they want and avoid the stuff they don't want."

On another front, the CSA, a Toronto-based nonprofit organization that has
traditionally restricted itself to the safety testing and certifing of
electrical appliances and other consumer products, is also turning its
attention to privacy issues.  In December, 1992, the CSA established a
committe that will try to establish a standard to recommend to companies
across Canada.  David McKendry, head of the consumer affairs consulting
practice with Price Waterhouse in Ottawa, is chairman of the committe, which
also includes members from government, the private sector and consumer
groups.  He said that privacy is a logical issue for the CSA to tackle.
"Safety is changing in the marketplace", McKendry said.  "Privacy *is* a
safety issue in the information age."

Many privacy advocates say that they welcome attempts by various sectors to
come to terms with privacy issues.  At the same time, however, they note
that Canadians still need more legal protection.  "I'm all in favor of
self-regulation," said David Flaherty, a Canadian professor of law and
history, currently on sabbatical, at the Woodrow Wilson International Centre
for Scholars in Washington.  "But it doesn't have the force of law."
Flaherty said that many Canadians are surprised to learn that they do not
have a constitutional right to privacy.  "The word 'privacy' is not in the
Charter of Rights and Freedoms," he said.

For his part, Privacy Commissioner Phillips, a former newspaper and
television reporter, said that he agrees with Flaherty that privacy should
be included in the Charter.  "It would be a benchmark for the entire
country," he said.  Many experts, however, maintain that Canadians have
adequate protection.  Simon Chester, a lawyer with the Toronto firm McMillan
Binch, said that there are better ways to protect individual's privacy than
spelling it out in the Charter.  The charter, which applies only to
government and not the private sector, is too blunt an instrument, Chester
said.  "It is much more important to have specific specific legislation," he
added.

Equifax's Chartrand said that, as a result, his credit bureau operates its
systems to meet the toughest standards in the country, which, he says, are
usually Ontario's laws.  That means, Chartrand said, that consumers across
Canada enjoy the same level of protection, even if they are in the two
provinces that have no consumer credit laws.  Clearly, however, Canadians
will continue to be concerned about whether technology has moved ahead
faster than the law's ability to protect their privacy.

Barbara Wickens






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Peter Shipley <shipley@tfs.COM>
Date: Wed, 9 Jun 93 17:21:42 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Encrypting the list
In-Reply-To: <9306092357.AA00323@triton.unm.edu>
Message-ID: <9306100018.AA10070@edev0.TFS>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>> It would be nice, however, to set up crypto I/O connection
>> OPTIONS to the list, as an incentive for lazy people like me to
>> figure out how to get PGP and mail filters set up.
>

I also think it would be a good idea (and exercise) to have a cypto 
option to the list (where all my incoming email is PGP'ed ether with
my key or a cypherpunk key. 

Again I state that this is more of an exercise for us then anything else.

		-Pete





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: J. Michael Diehl <mdiehl@triton.unm.edu>
Date: Wed, 9 Jun 93 16:57:33 PDT
To: fnerd@smds.com (FutureNerd Steve Witham)
Subject: Re: Encrypting the list
In-Reply-To: <9306091758.AA04012@smds.com>
Message-ID: <9306092357.AA00323@triton.unm.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


According to FutureNerd Steve Witham:
> On encrypting the list, mostly I vote NO.

Well, I suggested it, so I guess I'll unsuggest it.  This is a bad idea.  I was
tired when I perposed it.  Lets leave this alone now, ok?

...other stuff deleted.

> It would be nice, however, to set up crypto I/O connection
> OPTIONS to the list, as an incentive for lazy people like me to
> figure out how to get PGP and mail filters set up.

Yes!
+-----------------------+-----------------------------+---------+
| J. Michael Diehl ;-)  | I thought I was wrong once. | PGP KEY |
| mdiehl@triton.unm.edu |   But, I was mistaken.      |available|
| mike.diehl@fido.org   |                             | Ask Me! |
| (505) 299-2282        +-----------------------------+---------+
|                                                               |
+------"I'm just looking for the opportunity to be -------------+
|            Politically Incorrect!"   <Me>                     |
+-----If codes are outlawed, only criminals wil have codes.-----+
+----Is Big Brother in your phone?  If you don't know, ask me---+



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: hkhenson@cup.portal.com
Date: Wed, 9 Jun 93 22:49:26 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: CERT reply regarding their emails
Message-ID: <9306092138.1.26702@cup.portal.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Interesting response from CERT!  I suspect that they will be more
careful in sending out form letters to places where there could
be edgy people.  Keith




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: nobody@alumni.cco.caltech.edu
Date: Wed, 9 Jun 93 22:58:25 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: My poll....
Message-ID: <9306100557.AA01443@alumni.cco.caltech.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Uu> I was shocked to find that people still use pgp v2.1.

I don't know where you've been, but version 2.2 has a notorious bug
that locks up the box under numerous situations.  In my experience,
version 2.2 locks up 8088-based computers.  Version 2.1 does not.
There is an unauthorized bug fix version, 2.21.  I use 2.2 as it runs
well on my system.

*********************************************************************
* <m..stirner@f28.n125.z1.fidonet.org> - PGP Key D30909 via servers *
* > What country can preserve its liberties if its rulers are not  <*
* > warned from time to time that their people preserve the spirit <*
* > of resistance?  Let them take arms!" - Thomas Jefferson, 1787  <*
*********************************************************************

... Protect your right to privacy --- Say no to Clipper/Capstone!
___ Blue Wave/QWK v2.12
--  
M. Stirner - via FidoNet node 1:125/1
UUCP: ...!uunet!kumr!shelter!28!M..Stirner
INTERNET: M..Stirner@f28.n125.z1.FIDONET.ORG




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: nobody@alumni.cco.caltech.edu
Date: Thu, 10 Jun 93 00:05:02 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: My poll....
Message-ID: <9306100703.AA02027@alumni.cco.caltech.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


 Uu> I was shocked to find that people still use pgp v2.1.

I don't know where you've been, but version 2.2 has a notorious bug that
locks up the box under numerous situations.  In my experience, version
2.2 locks up 8088-based computers.  Version 2.1 does not.  There is an
unauthorized bug fix version, 2.21.  I use 2.2 as it runs well on my
system.

*********************************************************************
* <m..stirner@f28.n125.z1.fidonet.org> - PGP Key D30909 via servers *

* > What country can preserve its liberties if its rulers are not  <*
* > warned from time to time that their people preserve the spirit <*
* > of resistance?  Let them take arms!" - Thomas Jefferson, 1787  <*

*********************************************************************




___ Blue Wave/QWK v2.12
--  
M. Stirner - via FidoNet node 1:125/1
UUCP: ...!uunet!kumr!shelter!28!M..Stirner
INTERNET: M..Stirner@f28.n125.z1.FIDONET.ORG




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: J. Michael Diehl <mdiehl@triton.unm.edu>
Date: Thu, 10 Jun 93 01:01:11 PDT
To: nobody@alumni.cco.caltech.edu
Subject: Re: My poll....
In-Reply-To: <9306100557.AA01443@alumni.cco.caltech.edu>
Message-ID: <9306100801.AA11287@triton.unm.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


According to nobody@alumni.cco.caltech.edu:
> 
> Uu> I was shocked to find that people still use pgp v2.1.
> 
> I don't know where you've been, but version 2.2 has a notorious bug
> that locks up the box under numerous situations.  In my experience,

Been reading this list for some time now; never heard of this bug.  Thanx.

> version 2.2 locks up 8088-based computers.  Version 2.1 does not.
> There is an unauthorized bug fix version, 2.21.  I use 2.2 as it runs
> well on my system.

Well, now I know.
+-----------------------+-----------------------------+---------+
| J. Michael Diehl ;-)  | I thought I was wrong once. | PGP KEY |
| mdiehl@triton.unm.edu |   But, I was mistaken.      |available|
| mike.diehl@fido.org   |                             | Ask Me! |
| (505) 299-2282        +-----------------------------+---------+
|                                                               |
+------"I'm just looking for the opportunity to be -------------+
|            Politically Incorrect!"   <Me>                     |
+-----If codes are outlawed, only criminals wil have codes.-----+
+----Is Big Brother in your phone?  If you don't know, ask me---+



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: rclark@nyx.cs.du.edu (Robert W. F. Clark)
Date: Thu, 10 Jun 93 04:46:52 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Forward of my message to CERT
Message-ID: <9306101147.AA20953@nyx.cs.du.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Dear Moira,
I was somewhat disturbed to note the recent actions of CERT with
regard to Johan Helsingius' site anon.penet.fi; and with
regard to the cypherpunks' archive at soda.berkeley.edu.  

I read a clarification of your position which appeared to regret
any inconvenience these actions and others may have caused, it
still seemed that you do not intend to exercise any more caution
in the phrasing of your message.  While the message disclaims
that you have verified the information included in it, it still
bears the phrasing of an accusation, not an advisory.

While it is certainly laudable to bring potential security problems
to the attention of system administrators and users, the method
in which this was done, and those to whom you mentioned it, cause
me serious doubts as to the effectiveness of your actions.

In the first case, that of Johann Helsingius, you did not notify
the system administrator but the domain manager for all Finland.
Not only is the domain manager in no position to patch potential
security holes in a local system, but additionally he probably
has more important tasks than checking out false reports.

Allegations were made by an unnamed officer of CERT that the
site was illegally distributing software by anonymous ftp; whereas,
even the most rudimentary efforts at verification would have revealed that
the site in question does not operate anonymous ftp.

It is neither sensible nor equitable to contact a domain
administrator without even contacting the administrator of the questionable
system; especially the domain administrator of an entire sovereign
nation.  Certainly, if CERT can not even bother to take the time of
even a preliminary verification of their reports before announcing them,
certainly it seems to be an imposition to demand that the domain
administrator of an entire country spend time investigating spurious
reports.

If there is suspicion that a particular machine has been compromised,
and is thus an insecure method of contacting the administrator, perhaps
contacting the administrator by postal mail or by telephone would
be more sensible than contacting the administrator of all the machines
in Finland.  Certainly if the machine itself is compromised, it is
quite possible that the entire domain is also compromised, and email
may be insecure and easily available to hostile third parties.

With the additional implication in the ominous form letter you mail
that the person responsible for the machine may be involved in illegal
activities, the potential for abuse of CERT by people filing false
reports is, though perhaps not in itself a "computer emergency,"
is certainly something which you ought to consider in your standard
procedures.

As sites which use TCP/IP without providing for authentication are
considered security holes, so is a Computer Emergency Response Team
which does the same thing, that is, simply relays accusations
without any authentication of their veracity.  

Considering the possible damage to the reputations of persons not
involved in illegal activity, and the disruption of services which
results when such accusations are made, actions of this sort are
retrogressive and represent as significant a threat to the systems
as would a 'denial of service' attack.

Please be more careful in the future when relaying such messages.
----
Robert W. F. Clark
rclark@nyx.cs.du.edu




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: rclark@nyx.cs.du.edu (Robert W. F. Clark)
Date: Thu, 10 Jun 93 04:47:44 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: CryptoStacker (Key storage)
Message-ID: <9306101147.AA20987@nyx.cs.du.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


mmidboe@uahcs2.cs.uah.edu (Matt Midboe) writes:

>What is the problem with just having a regular key file, and when
>the user boots up the computer it asks them a pass phrase to decrypt the key
>file? If they fail wipe the key and force the user to restore the key from a
>backup somewhere. 

The problem with this is that a hostile third party who has captured
a machine will first make a backup of all files on the system, including
the key.  It is very likely that the party will bypass the initial
bootup procedure in which the key is requested, since the hostile
party expects some sort of 'data bomb,' having been involved with
systems confiscation for quite some time.  While there are some
options available, such as disallowing bootups from floppy, these
are in the main cheap hacks not to be trusted for security.

In this case, when the system is booted and the key is requested,
even if the key is wiped, they simply restore it from backup and
try again.  They are likely to keep the system for several months,
so they will have time to conquer any 'toy-grade' security.

While it is not yet standard procedure to make a snapshot of the
system memory when confiscating systems, the increasing cleverness
of law enforcement and other bodies makes this seem likely in the
future.  

So you can't have the key on the disk, nor can you have it hanging
around in cleartext in memory except when encrypted data is accessed;
preferably, the key should be encrypted, and on some fragile (i. e.,
easily destroyable) media.  Any backups should be encrypted, and
not easily accessible; preferably with a trusted party and not in
the same building as the computer with encrypted information.
----
Robert W. F. Clark              "Be sand, not oil, in the
rclark@nyx.cs.du.edu             machinery of the world."  Gunter Eich




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Dave Banisar <banisar@washofc.cpsr.org>
Date: Thu, 10 Jun 93 05:09:23 PDT
To: CYPHERPUNKS@toad.com
Subject: Markey Clipper Hearing 6/9 and CPSR Testimony
Message-ID: <9306100817.AA34158@hacker2.eff.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


	On June 9, 1993, Congressman Edward Markey, Chairman of the House  
Subcommittee on Telecommunications and Finance held an oversight hearing on 
"encryption and telecommunications network security."  Panelists were 
Whitfield Diffie of Sun Microsystems, Dr. Dorothy Denning,  Steven Bryen of 
Secure Communications, Marc Rotenberg of the CPSR Washington Office and E.R. 
Kerkeslager of AT&T.
	Congressman Markey, after hearing the testimony presented, noted that 
the Clipper proposal had raised an "arched eyebrow among the whole committee" 
and that the committee viewed the proposal skeptically. This statement was 
the latest indication that the Clipper proposal has not been well recieved by 
policy makers.  Last Friday, the Computer Systems Security and Privacy 
Advisory Board of NIST issued two resolutions critical of the encryption 
plan, suggesting that further study was required and that implementation of 
the plan should be delayed until the review is completed.
	At the Third CPSR Cryptography and Privacy Conference on Monday, June 
7, the Acting Director of NIST, Raymond Kammer, announced that the 
implementation of the proposal will be delayed and that a more comprehensive 
review will be undertaken. The review is due in the fall. Kammer told the 
Washington Post that "maybe we won't continue in the direction we started 
out."
	
------------------------------------------------------------------------------

                              Prepared Testimony
                                     and
                             Statement for the Record
                                      of 
                           Marc Rotenberg, director
                            CPSR Washington Office
                                      on 
                       Encryption Technology and Policy
                                    Before
                 The Subcommittee on Telecommunications and Finance.
                        Committee on Energy and Commerce

                          U.S. House of Representatives
                                    June 9, 1993

SUMMARY

	The cryptography issue is of particular concern to CPSR.  During the 
past several years CPSR has pursued an extensive study of cryptography policy 
in the United States.  CPSR has organized public conferences, conducted 
litigation under the Freedom of Information Act, and has emphasized the 
importance of cryptography for privacy protection and the need to scrutinize 
carefully government proposals designed to limit the use of this technology.
	To evaluate the Clipper proposal it is necessary to look at a 1987 
law, the Computer Security Act, which made clear that in the area of 
unclassified computing systems, the National Institute of Standards and 
Technology (NIST) and not the National Security Agency (NSA), would be 
responsible for the development of technical standards.  The Act emphasized 
public accountability and stressed open decision-making. 
	In the spirit of the Act, in 1989 NIST set out to develop a public 
key cryptography standard.  According to documents obtained by CPSR through 
the Freedom of Information Act, NIST recommended that the algorithm be 
"public, unclassified, implementable in both hardware or software, usable by 
federal Agencies and U.S. based multi-national corporation." However, the 
Clipper proposal and the full-blown Capstone configuration that resulted is 
very different: the Clipper algorithm, Skipjack, is classified; public access 
to the reasons underlying the proposal is restricted; Skipjack can be 
implemented only in tamper-proof hardware; it is unlikely to be used by multi-
national corporations, and the security of Clipper remains unproven.
	The Clipper proposal undermines the central purpose of the Computer 
Security Act.  Although intended for broad use in commercial networks, it was 
not developed at the request of either U.S. business or the general public.  
It does not reflect public goals.
	The premise of the Clipper key escrow arrangement is that the 
government must have the ability to intercept electronic communications.  
However, there is no legal basis to support this premise. In law there is 
nothing inherently illegal or suspect about the use of a telephone.  The 
federal wiretap statute says only that communication service providers must 
assist law enforcement execute a lawful warrant.
	CPSR supports the review of cryptography policy currently underway at 
the Department of Commerce.  CPSR also supports the efforts undertaken by the 
Subcommittee on Telecommunications and Finance to study the full 
ramifications of the Clipper proposal.  However, we are not pleased about the 
review now being undertaken at the White House.  That effort has led to a 
series of secret meetings, has asked that scientists sign non-disclosure 
agreements and accept restrictions on publication, and has attempted to 
resolve public concerns through private channels.  This is not a good process 
for the evaluation of a technology that is proposed for the public switched 
network.
	Even if the issues regarding Clipper are resolved favorably, privacy 
concerns will not go away. Rules still need to be developed about the 
collection and use of transactional data generated by computer 
communications.  Several specific steps should be taken.  First, the FCC 
should be given a broad mandate to pursue privacy concerns.  Second, current 
gaps in the communications law should be filled.  The protection of 
transactional records is particularly important.  Third, telecommunications 
companies should be encouraged to explore innovative ways to protect privacy.  
"Telephone cards", widely available in other countries, are an ideal way to 
protect privacy.

----------------------------------

TESTIMONY

	Mr. Chairman, members of the Subcommittee, thank you for the 
opportunity to testify today on encryption policy and the Clipper proposal.  
I especially wish to thank you Congressman Markey, on behalf of CPSR, for 
your ongoing efforts on the privacy front as well as your work to promote 
public access to electronic information.
	The cryptography issue is of particular concern to CPSR.  During the 
past several years we have pursued an extensive study of cryptography policy 
in the United States.  We have organized several public conferences, 
conducted litigation under the Freedom of Information Act, and appeared on a 
number of panels to discuss the importance of cryptography for privacy 
protection and the need to scrutinize carefully government proposals designed 
to limit the use of this technology.  
	While we do not represent any particular computer company or trade 
association we do speak for a great many people in the computer profession 
who value privacy and are concerned about the government's Clipper initiative.
	Today I will briefly summarize our assessment of the Clipper 
proposal.  Then I would like to say a few words about the current status of 
privacy protection.

CLIPPER
	To put the Clipper proposal in a policy context, I will need to 
briefly to describe a law passed in 1987 intended to address the roles of the 
Department of Commerce and the Department of Defense in the development of 
technical standards.  The Computer Security Act of 1987 was enacted to 
improve computer security in the federal government, to clarify the 
responsibilities of the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) 
and the National Security Agency, and to ensure that technical standards 
would serve civilian and commercial needs.  
	The law made clear that in the area of unclassified computing 
systems, NIST and not NSA, would be responsible for the development of 
technical standards.  It emphasized public accountability and stressed open 
decision-making.  The Computer Security Act also established the Computer 
System Security and Privacy Advisory Board (CSSPAB), charged with reviewing 
the activities of NIST and ensuring that the mandate of the law was enforced.  

	The Computer Security Act grew out of a concern that classified 
standards and secret meetings would not serve the interests of the general 
public.  As the practical applications for cryptography have moved from the 
military and intelligence arenas to the commercial sphere, this point has 
become clear.  There is also clearly a conflict of interest when an agency 
tasked with signal interception is also given authority to develop standards 
for network security.  
	In the spirit of the Computer Security Act, NIST set out in 1989 to 
develop a public key standard FIPS (Federal Information Processing Standard).  
In a memo dated May 5, 1989, obtained by CPSR through the Freedom of 
Information Act, NIST said that it planned:

to develop the necessary public-key based security standards.  We require a 
public-key algorithm for calculating digital signatures and we also require a 
public-key algorithm for distributing secret keys.  

NIST then went on to define the requirements of the standard:

The algorithms that we use must be public, unclassified, implementable in 
both hardware or software, usable by federal Agencies and U.S. based multi-
national corporation, and must provide a level of security sufficient for the 
protection of unclassified, sensitive information and commercial propriety 
and/or valuable information.

	The Clipper proposal and the full-blown Capstone configuration, which 
incorporates the key management function NIST set out to develop in 1989, is 
very different from the one originally conceived by NIST. 

%	The Clipper algorithm, Skipjack, is classified,
%	Public access to the reasons underlying the proposal is restricted, 
%	Skipjack can be implemented only in tamper-proof hardware, 
%	It is unlikely to be used by multi-national corporations, and
%	The security of Clipper remains unproven.

	The Clipper proposal undermines the central purpose of the Computer 
Security Act.  Although intended for broad use in commercial networks, it was 
not developed at the request of either U.S. business or the general public.  
It does not reflect public goals.  Rather it reflects the interests of one 
secret agency with the authority to conduct foreign signal intelligence and 
another government agency  responsible for law enforcement investigations. 
	Documents obtained by CPSR through the Freedom of Information Act 
indicate that the National Security Agency dominated the meetings of the 
joint NIST/NSA Technical Working group which made recommendations to NIST 
regarding public key cryptography, and that a related technical standard for 
message authentication, the Digital Signature Standard, clearly reflected the 
interests of the NSA.
	We are still trying to determine the precise role of the NSA in the 
development of the Clipper proposal.  We would be pleased to provide to the 
Subcommittee whatever materials we obtain.

LEGAL AND POLICY ISSUES
	There are also several legal and constitutional issues raised by the 
government's key escrow proposal.  The premise of the Clipper key escrow 
arrangement is that the government must have the ability to intercept 
electronic communications, regardless of the economic or societal costs.  The 
FBI's Digital Telephony proposal, and the earlier Senate bill 266, were based 
on the same assumption.
	There are a number of arguments made in defense of this position: 
that privacy rights and law enforcement needs must be balanced, or that the 
government will be unable to conduct criminal investigations without this 
capability. 
	Regardless of how one views these various claims, there is one point 
about the law that should be made very clear: currently there is no legal 
basis -- in statute, the Constitution or anywhere else --  that supports the 
premise which underlies the Clipper proposal.  As the law currently stands, 
surveillance is not a design goal.  General Motors would have a stronger 
legal basis for building cars that could go no faster than 65 miles per hour 
than AT&T does in marketing a commercial telephone that has a built-in 
wiretap capability.  In law there is simply nothing about the use of a 
telephone that is inherently illegal or suspect.
	The federal wiretap statute says only that communication service 
providers must assist law enforcement in the execution of a lawful warrant.  
It does not say that anyone is obligated to design systems to facilitate 
future wire surveillance.  That distinction is the difference between 
countries that restrict wire surveillance to narrow circumstances defined in 
law and those that treat all users of the telephone network as potential 
criminals.  U.S. law takes the first approach.  Countries such as the former 
East Germany took the second approach.  The use of the phone system by 
citizens was considered inherently suspect and for that reason more than 
10,000 people were employed by the East German government to listen in on 
telephone calls.
	It is precisely because the wiretap statute does not contain the 
obligation to incorporate surveillance capability -- the design premise of 
the Clipper proposal -- that the Federal Bureau of Investigation introduced 
the Digital Telephony legislation.  But that legislation has not moved 
forward and the law has remained unchanged.  The Clipper proposal attempts to 
accomplish through the standard-setting and procurement process what the 
Congress has been unwilling to do through the legislative process.
	On legal grounds, adopting the Clipper would be a mistake.  There is 
an important policy goal underlying the wiretap law.  The Fourth Amendment 
and the federal wiretap statute do not so much balance competing interests as 
they erect barriers against government excess and define the proper scope of 
criminal investigation.  The purpose of the federal wiretap law is to 
restrict the government, it is not to coerce the public.
	Therefore, if the government endorses the Clipper proposal, it will 
undermine the basic philosophy of the federal wiretap law and the fundamental 
values embodied in the Constitution.  It will establish a technical mechanism 
for signal interception based on a premise that has no legal foundation.  The 
assumption underlying the Clipper proposal is more compatible with the 
practice of telephone surveillance in the former East Germany than it is with 
the narrowly limited circumstances that wire surveillance has been allowed in 
the United States.  

UNANSWERED QUESTIONS
	There are a number of other legal issues that have not been 
adequately considered by the proponents of the key escrow arrangement that 
the Subcommittee should examine.  First, not all lawful wiretaps follow a 
normal warrant process.  The proponents of Clipper should make clear how 
emergency wiretaps will be conducted before the proposal goes forward.  
Second, there may be civil liability issues for the escrow agents, if they 
are private parties, if there is abuse or compromise of the keys.  Third, 
there is a Fifth Amendment dimension to the proposed escrow key arrangement 
if a network user is compelled to disclose his or her key to the government 
in order to access a communications network. Each one of these issues should 
be examined carefully. 


CPSR CONFERENCE
	At a conference organized by CPSR this week at the Carnegie Endowment 
for International Peace we heard presentations from staff members at NIST, 
FBI, NSA and the White House about the Clipper proposal.  The participants at 
the meeting had the opportunity to ask questions and to exchange views.
	Certain points now seem clear:

%	The Clipper proposal was not developed in response to any perceived 
public or business need.  It was developed solely to address a law 
enforcement concern.
%	Wire surveillance remains a small part of law enforcement 
investigations.  The number of arrests resulting from wiretaps has remained 
essentially unchanged since the federal wiretap law was enacted in 1968.
%	The potential risks of the Clipper proposal have not been assessed 
and many questions about the implementation remain unanswered.
%	Clipper does not appear to have the support of the business or 
research community.

	Many comments on the Clipper proposal, both positive and negative as 
well the materials obtained by CPSR through the Freedom of Information Act, 
are contained in the Source book compiled by CPSR for the recent conference.  
I am please to make a copy of this available to the Subcommittee.


NETWORK PRIVACY PROTECTION
	Communications privacy remains a critical test for network 
development.  Networks that do not provide a high degree of privacy are 
clearly less useful to network users.  Given the choice between a 
cryptography product without a key escrow and one with a key escrow, it would 
be difficult to find a user who would prefer the key escrow requirement.  If 
this proposal does go forward, it will not be because network users or 
commercial service providers favored it.
	Even if the issues regarding the Clipper are resolved favorably, 
privacy concerns will not go away.  Cryptography is a part of communications 
privacy, but it is only a small part.  Rules still need to be developed about 
the collection and use of transactional data generated by computer 
communications.  While the federal wiretap law generally does a very good job 
of protecting the content of communications against interception by 
government agencies, large holes still remain.  The extensive use of 
subpoenas by the government to obtain toll records and the sale of telephone 
records by private companies are just two examples of gaps in current law.
	The enforcement of privacy laws is also a particularly serious 
concern in the United States.  Good laws without clear mechanisms for 
enforcement raise over-arching questions about the adequacy of legal 
protections in this country.  This problem is known to those who have 
followed developments with the Privacy Act since passage in 1974 and the more 
recent Video Privacy and Protection Act of 1988.  I make this point because 
it has been the experience in other countries that agencies charged with the 
responsibility for privacy protection can be effective advocates for the 
public in the protection of personal privacy.

RECOMMENDATIONS
	Regarding the Clipper proposal, we believe that the national review 
currently underway by the Computer Security and Privacy Advisory Board at the 
Department of Commerce will be extremely useful and we look forward to the 
results of that effort.  The Panel has already conducted a series of 
important open hearings and compiled useful materials on Clipper and 
cryptography policy for public review.
	We are also pleased that the Subcommittee on Telecommunications and 
Finance has undertaken this hearing.  This Subcommittee can play a 
particularly important role in the resolution of these issues.  We also 
appreciate the Chairman's efforts to ensure that the proper studies are 
undertaken, that the General Accounting Office fully explores these issues, 
and that the Secretary of Commerce carefully assesses the potential impact of 
the Clipper proposal on export policy.
	We are, however, less pleased about the White House study currently 
underway.  That effort, organized in large part by the National Security 
Council, has led to a series of secret meetings, has asked that scientists 
sign non-disclosure agreements and accept restrictions on publication, and 
has attempted to resolve public concerns through private channels.  This is 
not a good process for the evaluation of a technology that is proposed for 
the public switched network.  While we acknowledge that the White House has 
been reasonably forthcoming in explaining the current state of affairs, we do 
not think that this process is a good one.  
	For these reasons, we believe that the White House should properly 
defer to the recommendations of the Computer System Security and Privacy 
Advisory Board and the Subcommittee on Telecommunications and Finance.  We 
hope that no further steps in support of the Clipper initiative will be 
taken.  We specifically recommend that no further purchase of Clipper chips 
be approved. 
	Speaking more generally, we believe that a number of steps could be 
taken to ensure that future communications initiatives could properly be 
viewed as a boost to privacy and not a set-back.   

%	The FCC must be given a strong mandate to pursue privacy concerns.  
There should be an office specifically established to examine privacy issues 
and to prepare reports.  Similar efforts in other countries have been 
enormously successful.  The Japanese Ministry of Post and Telecommunications 
developed a set of privacy principles to ensure continued trade with Europe.  
The Canada Ministry of Communications developed a set of communications 
principles to address public concerns about the privacy of cellular 
communications.  In Europe, the EC put forward an important directive on 
privacy protection for the development of new network services.

%	Current gaps in the communications law should be filled.  The 
protection of transactional records is particularly important.  Legislation 
is needed to limit law enforcement access to toll record information and to 
restrict the sale of data generated by the use of telecommunication services.  
As the network becomes digital, the transaction records associated with a 
particular communication may become more valuable than the content of the 
communication itself.

%	Telecommunications companies should be encouraged to explore 
innovative ways to protect privacy.  Cryptography is a particular method to 
seal electronic communications, but far more important for routine 
communications could be anonymous telephone cards, similar to the metro cards 
here in the District of Columbia, that allow consumers to purchase services 
without establishing accounts, transferring personal data, or recording 
personal activities.  Such cards are widely available in Europe, Japan, and 
Australia.

	I thank you very much for the opportunity to appear before the 
Subcommittee and would be pleased to answer your questions
Computer Professionals for Social Responsibility

	CPSR is a national membership organization, established in 1982, to 
address the social impact of computer technology.  There are 2,500 members in 
20 chapters across the United States, and offices in Palo Alto, California, 
Cambridge, Massachusetts, and Washington DC. The organization is governed by 
a board of elected officers and meetings are open to the public.  CPSR 
sponsors an annual meeting and the biennial conference on Directions and 
Implications of Advanced Computing.  CPSR sponsored the first conference on 
Computers, Freedom, and Privacy in 1991.  CPSR also operates the Internet 
Library at cpsr.org.  The library contains documents from the White House on 
technology policy and a wide range of public laws covering privacy, access to 
information, and communications law and is available free of charge to all 
users of the Internet.

	Marc Rotenberg is the director of the CPSR Washington office and an 
adjunct professor at Georgetown University Law Center.  He is chairman of the 
ACM Committee on Scientific Freedom and Human Rights, an editor for the 
Computer Law and Security Report (London), and the secretary of Privacy 
International, an organization of human rights advocates and privacy scholars 
in forty countries.  He received an A.B. from Harvard College and a J.D. from 
Stanford Law School, and is a member of the bar of the United States Supreme 
Court.  His forthcoming article "Communications Privacy: Implications for 
Network Design" will appear in the August 1993 issue of Communications of the 
ACM.







From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Mark <mark@cheops.anu.edu.au>
Date: Wed, 9 Jun 93 15:20:21 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: CERT reply regarding their emails
Message-ID: <9306092220.AA15407@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Just got this:


Forwarded message:
>From mjw@cert.org Thu Jun 10 07:39:35 1993
>Message-Id: <9306092141.AA15453@shuttle.cert.org>
>To: mark@cheops.anu.edu.au
>Cc: cert@cert.org
>Subject: Re: Statement of dissatisfaction with your recent efforts 
>In-Reply-To: Your message of "Wed, 09 Jun 93 10:59:04 +1000."              <9306090100.AA11648@cert.org> 
>Date: Wed, 09 Jun 93 17:41:15 EDT
>From: Moira J West <mjw@cert.org>
>
>Hello Mark,
>        We're sorry for any misunderstandings caused by our e-mail.
>I have appended a copy of our follow-up to Berkeley on this issue.
>
>Regards
>Moira
>
>Moira J. West
>Technical Coordinator, Computer Emergency Response Team
>Software Engineering Institute
>Carnegie Mellon University
>Pittsburgh, Pa. 15213-3890
>
>Internet E-mail: cert@cert.org   (monitored during business hours)
>Telephone: (412) 268-7090        (answers 24 hour a day)
>
>----------------------------------------------------------------------
>
>We've had a lot of feedback from various sites in response to our
>e-mail to you last week referring to possible anonymous FTP abuse on
>Berkeley hosts.
>
>We are concerned at the reaction that our e-mail caused. There's
>obviously been a misunderstanding here and we wanted to follow-up with
>you on this.  There was certainly no intent on the part of CERT to
>make accusations of any sort.  We were simply trying to alert sites to
>the possibility of activity that they might have concerns about.
>
>Our letter to you was one of many which we sent out to a number of
>sites across the world in the form of an FYI of possible abuse of
>their anonymous FTP areas.  We had been receiving complaints from
>sites about wide-scale trading of commercial software on their
>writable anonymous FTP areas.  During the process of helping sites to
>secure their systems we were given copies of files left in abused
>archives which indicated lists of hosts (and in some cases
>directories) that intruders were using to trade of commercial
>software.  We chose to contact the sites so that they could check
>their systems and take any steps that they thought appropriate.
>
>There were several reasons why we didn't attempt to verify the
>information.  There were a large number of hosts involved and with the
>resources that we have available to us, it was not possible for us to
>attempt to confirm the information on each host.  In any case, we felt
>it wouldn't be sufficient to check for specific directories or
>filenames on an archive, the whole archive would need to be checked
>for writable directories and then some verification of the contents of
>those directories would need to take place.
>
>Previously, we have found that sites we contacted with this type of
>information, did find writable areas which are being abused.  In this
>case some sites found such activity on their hosts, others stated that
>the information was dated or incorrect.  In hindsight, we see that it
>would have been better for everyone concerned in this case if we had
>undertaken some initial verification of the information or issued an
>CERT advisory instead of the individual letters.
>
>As so many sites are potentially vulnerable to this activity and may
>be unaware that it exists, we've decided to put together a CERT
>advisory on the topic and hope to issue it in the near future.  
>
>We're sorry if our original e-mail didn't clearly state our intentions
>and was the cause of any misunderstandings.
>
>We'll follow-up with the various sites who have contacted us in regard
>to our original e-mail to you, by passing them a copy of this letter.
>
>Regards
>Moira
>
>Moira J. West
>Technical Coordinator, Computer Emergency Response Team
>Software Engineering Institute
>Carnegie Mellon University
>Pittsburgh, Pa. 15213-3890
>
>Internet E-mail: cert@cert.org   (monitored during business hours)
>Telephone: (412) 268-7090        (answers 24 hour a day)

-----------End of forwarded message

Mark
mark@cheops.anu.edu.au



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Eric Hughes <hughes@soda.berkeley.edu>
Date: Thu, 10 Jun 93 10:13:52 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Encrypting the list
In-Reply-To: <9306092357.AA00323@triton.unm.edu>
Message-ID: <9306101710.AA13192@soda.berkeley.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Summary: Encrypting the cypherpunks list make no difference in the
security of information dispersal, but may make a large difference in
local security and as a spur to software development.

>> It would be nice, however, to set up crypto I/O connection
>> OPTIONS to the list, as an incentive for lazy people like me to
>> figure out how to get PGP and mail filters set up.

>Yes!

Michael, here is a word from your friendly neighborhood list
maintainer.  I don't have time to work on this, and neither to the
people who run toad.com.  So it's not going to happen on toad for a
while.

The good news is that it doesn't have to.  You yourself can write the
code!  The code for the existing cypherpunks remailer is all you need
to get started.  Here's how.  You subscribe to cypherpunks and then
forward the list mail, encrypted, to all the people who have
subscribed with you for an encrypted version of the cypherpunks mail.

With the cypherpunks remailer, you can do all this with your own
account.  It is a pretty good skeleton for the creation of email
servers out of user accounts.  You don't need your sysadmin's
cooperation to get it running, although you may need their blessing to
keep it running.

You can implement a listserv type operation if you want, with
automatic subscribe/unsubscribe and add all the options you want to
it.  You'll have to deal with the bounce messages, of course, but you
can rwrite software to deal with that.

Someone who wants to provide digest service can to a similar thing for
digestification.

There have been lots of people over the course of the list history who
have wanted encryption and digests.  I would suggest that those who
want them convince someone to run a secondary service to provide them
with these services.

Eric




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Hal <74076.1041@CompuServe.COM>
Date: Thu, 10 Jun 93 07:38:15 PDT
To: <cypherpunks@toad.com>
Subject: Re: Encrypting the list
Message-ID: <930610142951_74076.1041_FHD65-1@CompuServe.COM>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


To: cypherpunks@toad.com

If we could encrypt the list, and if we could subscribe via Julf's remailer
or get our remailers to accept address aliases of some sort, then list
subscribers could have "local" privacy.  Local sysops and roots would not
be able to see our incoming mail, and would not see that we were subscribing
to a group like "cypherpunks".

My long-term goal would be to have all mail be encrypted, and all mail be
sent via anonymous remailers (or equivalent technology), so that the content
and routing of our messages is truly private.

Hal
74076.1041@compuserve.com





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: rwhelan@mason1.gmu.edu (Robert J. Oot)
Date: Thu, 10 Jun 93 08:53:32 PDT
To: mdiehl@triton.unm.edu (J. Michael Diehl)
Subject: Re: My poll....
In-Reply-To: <9306100801.AA11287@triton.unm.edu>
Message-ID: <9306101553.AA29767@mason1.gmu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text


> > Uu> I was shocked to find that people still use pgp v2.1.
> > I don't know where you've been, but version 2.2 has a notorious bug
> > that locks up the box under numerous situations.  In my experience,
> Been reading this list for some time now; never heard of this bug.  Thanx.
> > version 2.2 locks up 8088-based computers.  Version 2.1 does not.
                         ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
> > There is an unauthorized bug fix version, 2.21.  I use 2.2 as it runs
> > well on my system.
> 
> Well, now I know.

 I was not aware that people still used that version of a computer.
An 8088????


-- 
Ryan A. Whelan  "Only two good things came out of Berkeley, LSD and BSD,
rwhelan@mason1.gmu.edu    rwhelan@cosmos.gmu.edu    coincidence???"
rwhelan@gmuvax.gmu.edu   
PGP Public Key available via finger    "If its not UNIX, its crap"




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: peb@PROCASE.COM
Date: Thu, 10 Jun 93 18:04:17 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: ATT ad in WSJ
Message-ID: <9306102001.AA21195@banff.procase.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



ATT has an ad in today's (June 10, 1993) Wall Street Journal for their
secure phone for $1200; they do not say how it works (neither 
cryptography nor Clipper are mentioned).  Strangely, they suggest that
it could be used in places where one could easily be overheard (like
an airport--I don't know how they would connect to a public phone).

Paul E. Baclace
peb@procase.com





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Jeff Ubois <cir@access.digex.net>
Date: Thu, 10 Jun 93 10:13:30 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: crypto print drivers for email
Message-ID: <199306101713.AA00144@access.digex.net>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



 
Forgive me if I've missed it on alt.security.pgp, but what would people
think of implementing PGP or other crypto schemes using a print driver ?

A model could be some of the fax software that lets you fax directly from
other applications by issuing a print command.  These packages have print
drivers that let you enter the name and phone number of the person you are
faxing, or select a name from an address book after you give the print
command.  You can also select high or low resolution, what kinds of headers
you want added to the message, and make file attachments.

This is a very easy way to send faxes, and seems like it would be an easy
way to create and send encrypted messages too.  For persons who aren't
technically adept, this would be a lot simpler than say

 pem -e -r recipient@bighost.edu -p bigpubkeyfile -s mysecret

or even PGP equivalents.

--Jeff 




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: eichin@cygnus.com (Mark Eichin)
Date: Thu, 10 Jun 93 13:31:10 PDT
To: pmetzger@lehman.com
Subject: re: query...
In-Reply-To: <9306102009.AA27673@snark.shearson.com>
Message-ID: <9306102030.AA07054@cygnus.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


   A query -- I understand that the MIT Athena people implemented a DES
   encrypted telnet/telnetd for use with Kerberos. Anyone out there know
   where its sources live and how I could hack it to take a user
   specified DES key?

   Perry

The first one was done by Paul Borman at Cray. A snapshot was up for
FTP on uunet (named telnet.91.03.25.tar.Z) though I don't know what
was done with it; the authentication and encryption options draft
standard that it conformed to has been modified since then, although
all of the implementations (such as the utexas version for the Mac)
I've seen so far conform to Borman's version.
	It shouldn't be too hard to specify a key (of course you have
the problem of securely getting the key to the other end of the
connection -- that is, after all, one of the major side-benefits of
Kerberos...) 
	The last release of Kerberos from MIT included a "kstream"
library, written by Ken Raeburn, which could be dropped in to an
existing telnet or kermit or other application to provide this kind of
feature. 
	There is also Derek Atkins' S.B. Thesis project, which
included modifications to telnet for accessing Kerberos via the remote
host, without having IP access on the client to the KDC (such as on a
dialup or with a firewall or something.) I'm sure he'll announce
something here about how to get the sources, if they're in a
releasable yet.

				_Mark_ <eichin@athena.mit.edu>
				MIT Student Information Processing Board
				Cygnus Support <eichin@cygnus.com>
				Cygnus Network Security

From cypherpunks-request  Thu Jun 10 13:14:32 1993
Received: by toad.com id AA25347; Thu, 10 Jun 93 13:09:48 PDT



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Mark S Feldman <tispem-support@TIS.COM>
Date: Thu, 10 Jun 93 13:24:42 PDT
To: " L. Detweiler " <ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Subject: Re: TIS/PEM FAQ as of 8 June 1993
In-Reply-To: <9306090337.AA02019@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Message-ID: <9306102025.AA00847@TIS.COM>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


-----BEGIN PRIVACY-ENHANCED MESSAGE-----
Proc-Type: 4,MIC-CLEAR
Content-Domain: RFC822
Originator-ID-Asymmetric: MFMxCzAJBgNVBAYTAlVTMQswCQYDVQQIEwJNRDE
 kMCIGA1UEChMbVHJ1c3RlZCBJbmZvcm1hdGlvbiBTeXN0ZW1zMREwDwYDVQQLEwh
 HbGVud29vZA==,06
MIC-Info: RSA-MD5,RSA,EMzvB0taB3V9fReB4tnloOKIfTeWTa6vIoJ7nM5WuSM
 UfXytoaJleK/JNTLRxKKhR+rhSL7zORq3d/TnaDV0c2YzvF8UJ1YLl+PheYhQg3D
 +ylKoRuzlGHJeNj5Mor/G


> do you have any plans to get this on news.answers? It would be great
> there. Also, You should consider sci.crypt. I can help you with either
> if you need it.

Thanks.  Hadn't thought about news.answers.  I thought that we did
post it to sci.crypt, though.  Regardless, we'll re-evaluate the news
groups that we use the next time we post the FAQ.

  Mark
-----END PRIVACY-ENHANCED MESSAGE-----




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: RYAN Alan Porter <ryan@rtfm.mlb.fl.us>
Date: Thu, 10 Jun 93 13:56:27 PDT
To: Jonathan K Saville <ee92jks@brunel.ac.uk>
Subject: Re: CryptoStacker Update
In-Reply-To: <18312.9306101807@monge.brunel.ac.uk>
Message-ID: <Pine.3.03.9306101635.B21132-a100000@rtfm>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain




On Thu, 10 Jun 1993, Jonathan K Saville wrote:

> 
> Re: possible problems with INT13
> 
> I may be mistaken, but I have this feeling that DPMI servers (including
> MS Windows) react unkindly to people using INT13. This is certainly what
> the Borland Open Architecture handbook says. If your program is resident
> when such a server is running, it could throw up a General Protection
> fault. I will check into this myself...

The programs running on the system will not be using INT13.  They will use
the higher level interrupts that they normally use.  The block driver
exists below all of that and merely controls what happens once the higher
level interrupts already call INT13.

I don't think that it will be any problem, certainly less of a problem
than if I tried to screw with higher level interrupts.


-=Ryan=-
the Bit Wallah









From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Brian.Hawthorne@East.Sun.COM (Brian Holt Hawthorne - SunSelect Engineering)
Date: Thu, 10 Jun 93 14:46:49 PDT
To: huntting@glarp.com
Subject: Re: McCarthy lives!
Message-ID: <9306102141.AA09055@sea.East.Sun.COM>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: x-sun-attachment


----------
X-Sun-Data-Type: text
X-Sun-Data-Description: text
X-Sun-Data-Name: text
X-Sun-Charset: us-ascii
X-Sun-Content-Lines: 50


> > Tim, I'll be glad to teach you how to file a Privacy Act request.
> > It's pretty simple, and it works on all Federal agencies.  You get
> > all records they are keeping on you, with some limited exceptions --
> > and for almost all of those, you get notified of the withholding.
> > If you can identify one or a small number of agencies that might
> > be keeping this "list", we can see if you are on it.  And if we
> > find the list, we can probably get the whole thing under the Freedom
> > of Information Act.
> 
> I'd be very interested in hearing more on this...

Freedom of Information Act and Privacy Act apply only to 
federal agencies.

Privacy Act
Requests for personal data must be notarized.
If the agency ignores the request, you must appeal under FOIA, since
there are no appeal provisions under the Privacy Act.

You must specify the "Systems of Records" you want searched. These are
listed in the Federal Register and in "Protecting Your Right to Privacy--A Digest of Systems of Records, which you can get from the GPO). I've included the 
ones you probably would want with the FBI or CIA.

You must pre-authorize a dollar amount for search and copying costs.

Attached are some sample letters for the FBI, the CIA and general 
Privacy Act/FOIA.

FOIA requests can be more general, I've got info on that as well.

I am not a lawyer, and this is not intended as legal advice. The info
is out of a wonderful book:

	Biggs, Don.
	How to avoid laywers.

	Includes index.
	1. Forms (Law)--United States. I. Title.
	KF170.B47  1984   347.73'55   84-18636
	ISBN 0-8240-7285-5   347.30755
	ISBN 0-8240-7284-7 (pbk.)

	Garland Publishing, Inc.
	136 Madison Ave.
	New York, NY 10016

It is a bit out of date (1985), but I believe the Privacy Act and FOIA
is still pretty much the same. It has extensive instructions for what
to actually do and what the pitfalls are.
----------
X-Sun-Data-Type: default
X-Sun-Data-Description: default
X-Sun-Data-Name: privacy-act
X-Sun-Charset: us-ascii
X-Sun-Content-Lines: 80

DATE

ADDRESS




This is a request under provisions of Title 5 USC, Sec. 552, the 
Freedom of Information Act, and Title 5 USC, Sec. 552a, the Privacy
Act.

Please furnish me with copies of all records on me retrievable by the
use of an individual identifier and by the use of any combination of
identifiers (e.g., name + date of birth + social security number,
etc.) that are contained in the following systems of records:





In order to identify myself and to facilitate your search of records
systems, I provide the following information:


_________________________________________________________
Last Name		First		Middle

_________________________________________________________
Street				City	State	Zip Code

_________________________________________________________
Date of Birth	Place of Birth	Sex	Social Security

_________________________________________________________
Other information

In the event that any part or all of my records are withheld, I
request a complete list of all records being withheld and the
specific exemption being claimed for the withholding of each.

In the event that search and copyinng fees are estimated to exceed 
$ _________, I request an opportunity to review such records, or to
have a duly authorized representative review such records, in order
to select those to be copied.

If you have an questions regarding this request, please telephone me
at ________________ weekdays between _________ and ____________ or
write to me at the above address.

As provided for by Sec. 552(a)(6)(i) of the Freedom of Information
Act, I shall expect to receive a reply within ten (10) business days.


Sincerely,


__________________


	CERTIFICATE OF NOTARY

STATE OF			)
				)   ss:
COUNTY OF			)

On this _______  day of _________, 19___, before me personally came

and appeared _____________________________, known, and known to me,
to be the individual described in and who executed the foregoing
instrument, and who duly acknowledged to me that he/she executed same
for the purpose therein contained.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I hereunto set my hand and official seal.


			    ________________________________
				    Notary Public


My commission expires: _____________________
----------
X-Sun-Data-Type: default
X-Sun-Data-Description: default
X-Sun-Data-Name: privacy-act-cia
X-Sun-Charset: us-ascii
X-Sun-Content-Lines: 83

DATE

Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation
J. Edgar Hoover Building
10th Street and Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20535

Attn: FOIA/Privacy Act Branch

This is a request under provisions of Title 5 USC, Sec. 552, the 
Freedom of Information Act, and Title 5 USC, Sec. 552a, the Privacy
Act.

Please furnish me with copies of all records on me retrievable by the
use of an individual identifier and by the use of any combination of
identifiers (e.g., name + date of birth + social security number,
etc.) that are contained in the following systems of records:

	National Crime Information Center (NCIC)
	Central Records System
	Electronic Surveillance (Eisur) Indices

In order to identify myself and to facilitate your search of records
systems, I provide the following information:


_________________________________________________________
Last Name		First		Middle

_________________________________________________________
Street				City	State	Zip Code

_________________________________________________________
Date of Birth	Place of Birth	Sex	Social Security

_________________________________________________________
Other information

In the event that any part or all of my records are withheld, I
request a complete list of all records being withheld and the
specific exemption being claimed for the withholding of each.

In the event that search and copyinng fees are estimated to exceed 
$ _________, I request an opportunity to review such records, or to
have a duly authorized representative review such records, in order
to select those to be copied.

If you have an questions regarding this request, please telephone me
at ________________ weekdays between _________ and ____________ or
write to me at the above address.

As provided for by Sec. 552(a)(6)(i) of the Freedom of Information
Act, I shall expect to receive a reply within ten (10) business days.


Sincerely,


__________________


	CERTIFICATE OF NOTARY

STATE OF			)
				)   ss:
COUNTY OF			)

On this _______  day of _________, 19___, before me personally came

and appeared _____________________________, known, and known to me,
to be the individual described in and who executed the foregoing
instrument, and who duly acknowledged to me that he/she executed same
for the purpose therein contained.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I hereunto set my hand and official seal.


			    ________________________________
				    Notary Public


My commission expires: _____________________
----------
X-Sun-Data-Type: default
X-Sun-Data-Description: default
X-Sun-Data-Name: privacy-act-fbi
X-Sun-Charset: us-ascii
X-Sun-Content-Lines: 83

DATE

Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation
J. Edgar Hoover Building
10th Street and Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20535

Attn: FOIA/Privacy Act Branch

This is a request under provisions of Title 5 USC, Sec. 552, the 
Freedom of Information Act, and Title 5 USC, Sec. 552a, the Privacy
Act.

Please furnish me with copies of all records on me retrievable by the
use of an individual identifier and by the use of any combination of
identifiers (e.g., name + date of birth + social security number,
etc.) that are contained in the following systems of records:

	National Crime Information Center (NCIC)
	Central Records System
	Electronic Surveillance (Eisur) Indices

In order to identify myself and to facilitate your search of records
systems, I provide the following information:


_________________________________________________________
Last Name		First		Middle

_________________________________________________________
Street				City	State	Zip Code

_________________________________________________________
Date of Birth	Place of Birth	Sex	Social Security

_________________________________________________________
Other information

In the event that any part or all of my records are withheld, I
request a complete list of all records being withheld and the
specific exemption being claimed for the withholding of each.

In the event that search and copyinng fees are estimated to exceed 
$ _________, I request an opportunity to review such records, or to
have a duly authorized representative review such records, in order
to select those to be copied.

If you have an questions regarding this request, please telephone me
at ________________ weekdays between _________ and ____________ or
write to me at the above address.

As provided for by Sec. 552(a)(6)(i) of the Freedom of Information
Act, I shall expect to receive a reply within ten (10) business days.


Sincerely,


__________________


	CERTIFICATE OF NOTARY

STATE OF			)
				)   ss:
COUNTY OF			)

On this _______  day of _________, 19___, before me personally came

and appeared _____________________________, known, and known to me,
to be the individual described in and who executed the foregoing
instrument, and who duly acknowledged to me that he/she executed same
for the purpose therein contained.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I hereunto set my hand and official seal.


			    ________________________________
				    Notary Public


My commission expires: _____________________



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Johan Helsingius <julf@penet.FI>
Date: Thu, 10 Jun 93 10:09:16 PDT
To: Peter Honeyman <honey@citi.umich.edu>
Subject: Re: CERT: the letter from CERT to berkeley.edu admin
In-Reply-To: <9306091423.AA01017@toad.com>
Message-ID: <9306101732.aa19627@penet.penet.FI>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



> interestingly, i believe the penet letter was sent to the same address
> as the earlier, infamous "famous net personality" letter.

Yes, it was.

	Julf





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Eric Hughes <hughes@soda.berkeley.edu>
Date: Thu, 10 Jun 93 18:52:12 PDT
To: cypherpunks-announce@toad.com
Subject: cypherpunks physical meeting
Message-ID: <9306110134.AA09618@soda.berkeley.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Cypherpunks Meeting

Saturday, June 12, 1993
12:00 noon - 6:00 p.m.
Cygnus Support offices, Mt. View, CA

I've really got to get some automated software running for posting
these announcements.  I apologize, again, for the untimeliness of this
message.  

This time there will be a reporter from the BBC attending, not to
film, but to talk to people about electronic culture in the Bay Area.
We will also have some other visitors, I believe.

Topics:

  1.  Clipper, of course.  The CPSR Crypto Policy meeting was earlier
this week, as well as the Markey hearings.  We will have reports on
these.

  2.  Software development.  Mail, links, disks.  It is time to make
an overall plan for the architecture of encrypted life.  I want to
brainstorm to make sure we come up with a complete list.

  3.  Crypto '93 attendance

  4.  Other, as usual.

Eric

-----------------------------------------------------------------------------

[Directions to Cygnus provided by John Gilmore. -- EH]

	Cygnus Support
	1937 Landings Drive
	Mt. View, CA  94043
	+1 415 903 1400   switchboard
	+1 415 903 1418   John Gilmore

Take US 101 toward Mt. View.  From San Francisco, it's about a
40-minute drive.  Get off at the Rengstorff Ave/Amphitheatre Parkway
exit.  If you were heading south on 101, you curve around to the
right, cross over the freeway, and get to a stoplight.  If you were
heading north on 101, you just come right off the exit to the
stoplight.  The light is the intersection of Amphitheatre and
Charleston Rd.  Take a right on Charleston; there's a right-turn-only
lane.

Follow Charleston for a short distance.  You'll pass the
Metaphor/Kaleida buildings on the right.  At a clump of palm trees and
a "Landmark Deli" sign, take a right into Landings Drive.  At the end
of the road, turn left into the complex with the big concrete
"Landmark" sign.  Follow the road past the deli til you are in front
of the clock tower that rises out of one of the buildings, facing you.
Enter through the doors immediately under the clock tower.  They'll be
open between noon and 1PM at least.  (See below if you're late.)

Once inside, take the stairs up, immediately to your right.  At the top
of the stairs, turn right past the treetops, and we'll be in 1937 on 
your left.  The door is marked "Cygnus".

If you are late and the door under the clock tower is locked, you can
walk to the deli (which will be around the building on your left, as
you face the door).  Go through the gate in the fence to the right of
the deli, and into the back lawns between the complex and the farm
behind it.  Walk forward and right around the buildings until you see
a satellite dish in the lawn.  Go up the stairs next to the dish,
which are the back stairs into the Cygnus office space.  We'll prop
the door (or you can bang on it if we forget).

Or, you can find the guard who's wandering around the complex, who
knows there's a meeting happening and will let you in.  They can be
beeped at 965 5250, though you'll have trouble finding a phone.

Don't forget to eat first, or bring food at noon!  I recommend hitting
the burrito place on Rengstorff (La Costen~a) at about 11:45.  To get
there, when you get off 101, take Rengstorff (toward the hills) rather
than Amphitheatre (toward the bay).  Follow it about ten blocks until
the major intersection at Middlefield Road.  La Costen~a is the store
on your left at the corner.  You can turn left into the narrow lane
behind the store, which leads to a parking lot, and enter by the front
door, which faces the intersection.  To get to the meeting from there,
just retrace your route on Rengstorff, go straight over the freeway,
and turn right at the stoplight onto Charleston; see above.

See you there!

	John Gilmore






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Jonathan K Saville <ee92jks@brunel.ac.uk>
Date: Thu, 10 Jun 93 11:07:37 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: CryptoStacker Update
Message-ID: <18312.9306101807@monge.brunel.ac.uk>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Re: possible problems with INT13

I may be mistaken, but I have this feeling that DPMI servers (including
MS Windows) react unkindly to people using INT13. This is certainly what
the Borland Open Architecture handbook says. If your program is resident
when such a server is running, it could throw up a General Protection
fault. I will check into this myself...

-- 
#      Jon Saville       |   Who alive can say, 'Thou art no   John Keats 
#  ee92jks@brunel.ac.uk  |  Poet, may'st not tell thy dreams?'    1819 
              PGP 2.2 public key available upon request




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: fergp@sytex.com (Paul Ferguson)
Date: Thu, 10 Jun 93 17:40:17 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: A definite trend
Message-ID: <s6ey5B1w165w@sytex.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
 
I've been very busy this week busting my chops on a networking
project for a client, but I have to take a moment to add my own
few comments.
 
I realize that this is old news to some of you, but it appears that
many of you seem to forget that a rather unpleasant trend seems to
be developing within the law enforcement community. While we are
voicing our opposition to the "Key-Escrow" proposal (known to
most of us as Clipper/Capstone/Skipjack),  there are other historical
instances which are directly proportionate to where the LEAs are in
relationship to their efforts at legislating technology. The point that
I am attempting to make is that the "Key-Escrow" initiative is but
another extension of the earlier Digital Telephony proposal introduced
early last year (also known as "Son of S. 266"). As far as I'm
concerned, the "Key-Escrow" initiative is an attempted continuance of
a failed effort.
 
Excerpted from "Digital Media: A Seybold Report," April 20 1992 volume
1, number 11, page 7, is one of the first reports of this failed
attempt to legislate LEA access to communications on a broad scale -
 
"Though not specifically listed as a target in the proposal, many people
are calling Digital Telephony 'Son of S. 266,' a failed Senate bill that
required the same 'dumbing-down' for encryption as the F.B.I.  proposal
does for phone systems.  In other words, makers of encryption devices or
software were to be required to leave a 'back door' open for
law-enforcement and security agencies that wanted to decode encrypted
communication.
 
"The bill, of course, completely defeats the purpose of encryption -
leaving the 'back door' open for the very same sophisticated
techno-criminals that the agencies were trying to thwart.  S. 266 was
shouted down last year by outraged computer experts and civil
libertarians.
 
"At the CFP [CFP II - PF] conference, encryption expert Whitfield
Diffie said, 'I understand why the police don't like [encryption].
But a very large part of the essence of a free versus totalitarian
society consists of the difference between being answerable for
your actions and being subject to prior restraint against actions
the society doesn't approve of.'"
 
[End of excerpt]
 
Additionally, later in the article, a summary list is provided which
outlined the proposal, which is excerpted below -
 
"The F.B.I.  proposal
 
The following is taken directly from a Federal Bureau of Investigation
document distributed to legislators and other concerned parties in
Washington, DC.
 
Digital Telephony:
 
Summary of Issues
 
* The F.B.I.  utilizes electronic surveillance (wire taps) in virtually
  every area of its investigative responsibilities.
 
* The telecommunications industry, which remained virtually unchanged
  for approximately 50 years, is now rapidly changing to address the
  need for more advanced telecommunications systems, such as personal
  communications networks, advanced cellular and integrated services
  digital networks (ISDN) which have the capacity for high-speed
  transmissions of video, voice and data.
 
* One of the telephone telecommunications industry's major
  developmental efforts is to provide total digital connectivity (end
  to end) for its subscribers, including residential and business
  communities, in the near future.
 
* At present, no capability exists to intercept ISDN (digital)
  transmissions; therefore, the emergence of digital telecommunications
  technology will preclude the F.B.I.  and all of law enforcement from
  being able to intercept electronic communications, thus all but
  eliminating a statutorily-sanctioned, court-authorized and
  extraordinarily successful investigate technique.
 
* The Department of Justice and the F.B.I.  have been working with
  the White House, various Administration agencies, the
  telecommunications industry and Congress to find a workable solution to
  this very serious problem that endangers the safety of the American
  public.  A legislative solution has been developed to ensure that the
  legitimate need for law enforcement to lawfully intercept 
communications
  is met by the telecommunications industry.
 
Legislative Remedy
 
The proposal would amend the Communications Act of 1934 to require
providers of electronic communications services and private branch
exchanges to ensure that the Government's ability to lawfully intercept
communications is unimpeded by the introduction of advanced digital
telecommunications technology or any other emerging telecommunications
technology.  Specifically, the amendment provides the following:
 
1.  The FCC, in consultation with the Attorney General, shall determine
the technological interception needs of the Government and issue
regulations that will preserve the Government's ability to conduct
lawful electronic surveillance.
 
2.  The FCC shall issue regulations within 120 days after enactment
requiring the modification of existing telecommunication systems if
those systems impede the Government's ability to conduct lawful
electronic surveillance.
 
3.  Compliance by service providers and private branch exchanges will
be required within 180 days of the issuance of the regulations and the
use of non-conforming equipment is prohibited thereafter.
 
4.  The FCC has the authority to compensate (through rate structure)
telecommunication system operators under FCC jurisdiction for
reasonable costs associated with required modifications of existing
telecommunications equipment or technology.
 
5.  The Attorney General has specific authority, in addition to that
already vested in the FCC, to seek civil penalties and injunctive relief
for non-compliance."
 
[End of excerpt]
 
Of course, this bill died on "The Hill" because of lack of support. It
does suggest, however, that this is the tell-tale sign of a
continuing effort by the law enforcement community (which is grasping
at straws) to find ways to exploit domestic communications due to the
increasing complexity of technological advances in that area. LEAs are
also using highly volatile topics as drug enforcement and terrorism as
justification. While being politically correct, this does not justify
the scrutiny of private communications without reasonable
justification.
 
Hey -- you don't have to get whacked across the head with a 2x4 to see
the writing on the wall.
 
Clipper is an offering by a kinder, gentler government.
 
Clipper/Capstone offers a method to secure your communications for you,
with a "Key-Escrow" system, a GW (Gee Whiz) chip set whose internals
are classified and a premise of good faith. I'm certainly no sage with
a crystal ball, but I can't help but wonder which trump card will be
played next.
 
Whatever it is, I get the feeling that it is not good.
 
Cheers.
 
 
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.2
 
iQCVAgUBLBfG+5RLcZSdHMBNAQGO/gQApCXzaIxktfKTpK7nBJUrw1tRzXmw6twR
zYPjKYKdiJ9lQ6qPrUwbCGccPjN2Gnv7MP29H782ixzA7wMbMo47SkMbVA2fpxzp
2SpXRYmhkwMNdbD03nooF8QN2qwN6X7FtZ7yCelCf4X+TDXVEN+EAKu+g2AH5rKm
7q0aTzJgKPg=
=D3Pp
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

Paul Ferguson               |  The future is now.
Network Integrator          |  History will tell the tale;
Centreville, Virginia USA   |  We must endure and struggle
fergp@sytex.com             |  to shape it.
 
          Stop the Wiretap (Clipper/Capstone) Chip.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: TO1SITTLER@APSICC.APS.EDU (Kragen Sittler)
Date: Thu, 10 Jun 93 21:38:37 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: 8088
Message-ID: <930610223100.da8@APSICC.APS.EDU>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Begin Quoted Message------------------------------------------------------

From: rwhelan@mason1.gmu.edu (Robert J. Oot)
Message-Id: <9306101553.AA29767@mason1.gmu.edu>

[discussion of pgp versions and locking removed, you all read it three times
already]
> > version 2.2 locks up 8088-based computers.  Version 2.1 does not.
                         ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
> > There is an unauthorized bug fix version, 2.21.  I use 2.2 as it runs
> > well on my system.
> 
> Well, now I know.

 I was not aware that people still used that version of a computer.
An 8088????

PGP Public Key available via finger    "If its not UNIX, its crap"

End Quoted Message-----------------------------------------------------------

Not everyone can afford to buy a new computer.  I myself am using a 286,
because though I want to buy a faster computer, I have no spare money.
I am using VMS to connect to the net for a similar reason.  I can't afford
my own net connection, so I borrow someone else's.  VMS with multinet is 
considerably better for net.connections than turds in a toilet.  And an 8088
is considerably better for encryption and word processing than a pencil and
paper.

Don't be so arrogant.

Kragen




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Timothy Newsham <newsham@wiliki.eng.hawaii.edu>
Date: Fri, 11 Jun 93 02:21:30 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Circ
Message-ID: <9306110921.AA18240@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



I uploaded the package Circ.tar.Z
which is the latest version of my encryption protocol
for use on top of IrcII clients, to soda.berkeley.edu
in ~ftp/pub/cypherpunks/incoming.  I have also sent
Eric the description of the package.  It has so far
not moved to a normal directory (why?).  Oh well I
was going to wait before announcing it, but you can get
it from this directory now.
(I am having technical difficulties posting it to
comp.sources.misc so far.  Still working on it )
                       Tim




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: J. Michael Diehl <mdiehl@triton.unm.edu>
Date: Thu, 10 Jun 93 22:28:52 PDT
To: hughes@soda.berkeley.edu (Eric Hughes)
Subject: Re: Encrypting the list
In-Reply-To: <9306101710.AA13192@soda.berkeley.edu>
Message-ID: <9306110528.AA22688@triton.unm.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


According to Eric Hughes:
> Summary: Encrypting the cypherpunks list make no difference in the
> 
> >> It would be nice, however, to set up crypto I/O connection
> >> OPTIONS to the list, as an incentive for lazy people like me to
> >> figure out how to get PGP and mail filters set up.
> 
> Michael, here is a word from your friendly neighborhood list
> maintainer.  I don't have time to work on this, and neither to the
> people who run toad.com.  So it's not going to happen on toad for a
> while.
> 
> The good news is that it doesn't have to.  You yourself can write the
> code!  The code for the existing cypherpunks remailer is all you need
> to get started.  Here's how.  You subscribe to cypherpunks and then
> forward the list mail, encrypted, to all the people who have
> subscribed with you for an encrypted version of the cypherpunks mail.

Between a full-time job, my mail system, pgp menu, a software review, a
girlfriend, and wedding plans, I sure won't be able to write this code.  I'd
love to if I had the time....  Will someone else volunteer?

+-----------------------+-----------------------------+---------+
| J. Michael Diehl ;-)  | I thought I was wrong once. | PGP KEY |
| mdiehl@triton.unm.edu |   But, I was mistaken.      |available|
| mike.diehl@fido.org   |                             | Ask Me! |
| (505) 299-2282        +-----------------------------+---------+
|                                                               |
+------"I'm just looking for the opportunity to be -------------+
|            Politically Incorrect!"   <Me>                     |
+-----If codes are outlawed, only criminals wil have codes.-----+
+----Is Big Brother in your phone?  If you don't know, ask me---+



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Timothy Newsham <newsham@wiliki.eng.hawaii.edu>
Date: Fri, 11 Jun 93 03:23:51 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: someones bouncing
In-Reply-To: <930611093124_515664.456256_BHC50-22@CompuServe.COM>
Message-ID: <9306111023.AA20380@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



got this after my last post.  someone is bouncing again.

> --- Returned message ---
> 
> Sender: newsham@wiliki.eng.hawaii.edu
> Received: from orion.crc.monroecc.edu by ihd.compuserve.com (5.67/5.930129sam)
> 	id AA21224; Fri, 11 Jun 93 05:31:53 -0400
> Message-Id: <9306110931.AA21224@ihd.compuserve.com>
> Date: Fri, 11 Jun 1993 05:23:53 -0400
> From: newsham@wiliki.eng.hawaii.edu
> To: 71762.2440@compuserve.com
> Subject: Circ
> X-Vms-To: cypherpunks@toad.com
> 
> ================== RFC 822 Headers ==================
> 
> Return-Path: cypherpunks-request@toad.com
> Received: by orion.crc.monroecc.edu (UCX V2.0-05)
> 	Fri, 11 Jun 1993 05:23:47 -0400
> Received: from toad.com by relay2.UU.NET with SMTP 
> 	(5.61/UUNET-internet-primary) id AA29927; Fri, 11 Jun 93 05:30:31 -0400
> Received: by toad.com id AA18245; Fri, 11 Jun 93 02:21:30 PDT
> Return-Path: <newsham@wiliki.eng.hawaii.edu>
> Received: from wiliki.eng.hawaii.edu ([128.171.60.1]) by toad.com id AA18240; Fri, 11 Jun 93 02:21:24 PDT
> Message-Id: <9306110921.AA18240@toad.com>
> Received: by wiliki.eng.hawaii.edu
> 	(1.37.109.4/15.6) id AA16878; Thu, 10 Jun 93 23:20:53 -1000
> From: Timothy Newsham <newsham@wiliki.eng.hawaii.edu>
> Subject: Circ
> To: cypherpunks@toad.com
> Date: Thu, 10 Jun 1993 23:20:52 -1000 (HST)
> X-Mailer: ELM [version 2.4 PL21]
> Mime-Version: 1.0
> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=US-ASCII
> Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
> Content-Length: 509       
> 
> 




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Nickey MacDonald <i6t4@jupiter.sun.csd.unb.ca>
Date: Fri, 11 Jun 93 00:44:25 PDT
To: "J. Michael Diehl" <mdiehl@triton.unm.edu>
Subject: Re: Encrypting the list
In-Reply-To: <9306110528.AA22688@triton.unm.edu>
Message-ID: <Pine.3.05.9306110437.D16542-a100000@jupiter>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


On Thu, 10 Jun 1993, J. Michael Diehl wrote:

> love to if I had the time....  Will someone else volunteer?

Well.. I am starting a project (as soon as my mail alias is set up by the
sysadmin) to do something like this...  Mostly I just want to play with
writing software that intercepts email... and try my hand at calling PGP
from other software...  which leads to a suggestion...  It would be nice
if PGP had a publicly available API, similar to that provided by RSAREF.

--
Nick MacDonald               | NMD on IRC
i6t4@jupiter.sun.csd.unb.ca  | PGP 2.1 Public key available via finger
i6t4@unb.ca                  | (506) 457-1931    ^{1024/746EBB 1993/02/23}






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Eric Hughes <hughes@soda.berkeley.edu>
Date: Fri, 11 Jun 93 08:16:30 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Circ
In-Reply-To: <9306110921.AA18240@toad.com>
Message-ID: <9306111512.AA11268@soda.berkeley.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>I uploaded the package Circ.tar.Z

It's in pub/cypherpunks/applications/misc.

>It has so far not moved to a normal directory (why?).

Time.

Eric




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Eric Hughes <hughes@soda.berkeley.edu>
Date: Fri, 11 Jun 93 08:26:58 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: MAIL: logging that happens on soda
Message-ID: <9306111523.AA11809@soda.berkeley.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I was rooting around soda for some other reason and stumbled upon the
mail logs (!) for soda.  I just sent myself some mail to generate a
sample entry.  It's got complete traffic analysis data, complete with
to/from pairs, time of day, and message size.

Jun 11 08:13:35 soda sendmail[11298]: AA11298: message-id=<9306111513.AA11298@soda.berkeley.edu>
Jun 11 08:13:35 soda sendmail[11298]: AA11298: from=hughes, size=66, class=0, received from local
Jun 11 08:13:36 soda sendmail[11300]: AA11298: to=hughes, delay=00:00:01, stat=Sent

I would recommend that all remailer operators find out what kind of
mail logging, if any, takes place on their machines.  If you need a
place to start looking, the mail log on soda was in the same directory
as the syslog messages.

I would also recommend that this information on mail logging by the
system be put in Karl's remailer list.

Eric




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: murphy@s1.elec.uq.oz.au (Peter Murphy)
Date: Thu, 10 Jun 93 16:42:53 PDT
To: cypherpunks-request@toad.com (J. Michael Diehl)
Subject: Re: My Poll....
In-Reply-To: <9306090653.AA23961@triton.unm.edu>
Message-ID: <9306102341.AA22865@s2.elec.uq.oz.au>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Responding to J. Michael Diehl's post ...

> 
> Well, I finally got to look at the responses to my poll.  FYI, I got 33 replies.
> This is a small number considering there are (I think) 400+ people on this list.
> I didn't take the time to actually tally the results for each question.  I'm
> inherently lazy... ;^)  I can make some comments about what we use, tho.  Note 
> that the lists are in no particular order.  Since this was certainly not a 
> scientific poll, I opted to not include any statistics, sorry.  I was kinda
> hoping to have a more homogeneous environment than what we have.  Kinda naive,
> huh?  Well, this is what I have to say after reading each of your replies.  I
> would like to thank everyone who participated in my informal poll.  I hope the
> results are usefull to any software-developer-cypherpunks out there.
> 

{ The rest of the post (documenting results) deleted. }

I'm sorry that I didn't answer your poll. However, if I had a little bit more time I 
would have answered it. Unfortunately, this mailing list is so expansive (and my time
is so limited) that I only read my mail about once a week. So I became aware of the
poll's closing date (last Thursday, 3/6) the next day (i.e., 4/6). Please give a
little more time in future. It was a GREAT idea. Thanks for doing it.

Cheers,
	Peter.

P.S. In case you're still interested in accumulating results, I respond to email on
Sony News-OS V. 4.3 (analogous to Berkeley 4.1). I also use a lot of MS-DOS PCs
(mostly on the Elec. Eng. Novell network, although I might be acquiring a 486 pretty
soon). As for PGP, ... well I OFFICIALLY don't have a copy, being not a resident of
North America :-) ... 

> +-----------------------+-----------------------------+---------+
> | J. Michael Diehl ;-)  | I thought I was wrong once. | PGP KEY |
> | mdiehl@triton.unm.edu |   But, I was mistaken.      |available|
> | mike.diehl@fido.org   |                             | Ask Me! |
> | (505) 299-2282        +-----------------------------+---------+
> |                                                               |
> +------"I'm just looking for the opportunity to be -------------+
> |            Politically Incorrect!"   <Me>                     |
> +-----If codes are outlawed, only criminals wil have codes.-----+
> +----Is Big Brother in your phone?  If you don't know, ask me---+
> 


-- 
====================================================
Peter Murphy - Department of Electrical Engineering,
University of Queensland: murphy@s2.elec.uq.oz.au  .
"Contrary to popular belief, the wings of demons are
the same as the wings of angels, although they're
often better groomed." - Terry Pratchett.
====================================================




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Peter Shipley <shipley@tfs.COM>
Date: Fri, 11 Jun 93 09:51:47 PDT
To: Eric Hughes <hughes@soda.berkeley.edu>
Subject: Re: MAIL: logging that happens on soda
In-Reply-To: <9306111523.AA11809@soda.berkeley.edu>
Message-ID: <9306111651.AA14556@edev0.TFS>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>I was rooting around soda for some other reason and stumbled upon the
>mail logs (!) for soda.  I just sent myself some mail to generate a
>sample entry.  It's got complete traffic analysis data, complete with
>to/from pairs, time of day, and message size.

Eric, most of us know this stuff you are making yourself look very
unix  illiterate.  I know one person at berkeley who wrote a sh script
5 years ago that would track remote mail aliases by analising who (on
campus) who recived with close time stamps.  with this info he was able
to reverse engineer the containce of a lesbian emailing list.


I have a scipt I use the just reads the syslog file and prints out a list of
who is emailing who and what their total volume of mail is.

>If you need a
>place to start looking, the mail log on soda was in the same directory
>as the syslog messages.

or of you look at the file /etc/syslog.conf is tell you where  log the data.





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Duncan Frissell <76630.3577@CompuServe.COM>
Date: Fri, 11 Jun 93 07:02:21 PDT
To: <cypherpunks@toad.com>
Subject: 8088
Message-ID: <930611135802_76630.3577_EHK30-1@CompuServe.COM>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>>>I was not aware that people still used that version of a computer.
>>>An 8088????
>>>
>>>
>>>End Quoted Message-----------------------------------------------------
>>>
>>>Not everyone can afford to buy a new computer.  I myself am using a 286,
>>>because though I want to buy a faster computer, I have no spare money.
>>>
>>>(Kragen Sittler)

Additionally, when one is running PGP under Windows the "virtual DOS 
machine" on which it is running *is* an 8088 (of sorts) and PGP 2.2 will
lock it up 2/3 of the time.

Duncan Frissell






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Eric Hughes <hughes@soda.berkeley.edu>
Date: Fri, 11 Jun 93 11:05:40 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: MAIL: logging that happens on soda
In-Reply-To: <9306111651.AA14556@edev0.TFS>
Message-ID: <9306111802.AA17868@soda.berkeley.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Re: sendmail logs

>Eric, most of us know this stuff you are making yourself look very
>unix  illiterate.  

I have opened my mouth and removed all doubt.  I _am_ mostly
illiterate in the details of Unix; this is one system administration
detail I did not know.  I have known for a long time that these logs
were in principle easy for administration to keep, but I did not know
that they were an entirely standard feature.

I raise this because it affects perceived remailer security and I have
not once heard these specific logs brought up, on the list or in person.

Eric




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Mr. Paul Danckaert (ACS)" <pauld@umbc.edu>
Date: Fri, 11 Jun 93 09:11:49 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: List..
Message-ID: <199306111611.AA00781@rpco25.acslab.umbc.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Please remove me from the list for now.. I'm skipping out for a bit and 
don't want 10000 messages when I get back.. ;)

Thanks..

Paul


---  Paul Danckaert  -  pauld@umbc.edu  ---------------------------------------
------------------------------------------------- Beware of the Leopard -------




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Timothy Newsham <newsham@wiliki.eng.hawaii.edu>
Date: Fri, 11 Jun 93 17:01:31 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Mail logging
Message-ID: <9306120001.AA09108@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> 
> >I was rooting around soda for some other reason and stumbled upon the
> >mail logs (!) for soda.  I just sent myself some mail to generate a
> >sample entry.  It's got complete traffic analysis data, complete with
> >to/from pairs, time of day, and message size.

The goal of this list is not to turn off such "features" but to
provide security in the face of these features, in hostile environments,
environments not totally under our own control.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Peter shipley <shipley@merde.dis.org>
Date: Sat, 12 Jun 93 01:11:59 PDT
To: Eric Hughes <hughes@soda.berkeley.edu>
Subject: Re: MAIL: logging that happens on soda
In-Reply-To: <9306111802.AA17868@soda.berkeley.edu>
Message-ID: <9306112112.AA21861@merde.dis.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/x-pgp


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----


>
>I raise this because it affects perceived remailer security and I have
>not once heard these specific logs brought up, on the list or in person.
>

it is also common practice for have the logs not readable for pople
not in the wheel or staff group.

As for this remailer security  if you use multiple remailers with random
delays the ability to correlate the  the sendmail & uucp logs should be
sufficient retarded.  (this is assuming that you were able to get copies of
all the logs from sites the sendmail message passed through



			-Pete

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.2

iQBFAgUBLBj1HMhmn7GUWLLFAQFxQQF9ESltl2TTn1j8A9CNDsct+Mz7SzZqwsQe
w8H7ILI3mbCF8FVqmkuWNjPeHDe5C3xj
=h1r8
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: XXCLARK@indst.indstate.edu
Date: Fri, 11 Jun 93 13:20:50 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: No Subject
Message-ID: <9306112020.AA05923@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain




According to nobody@alumni.cco.caltech.edu:

> version 2.2 locks up 8088-based computers.  Version 2.1 does not.
> There is an unauthorized bug fix version, 2.21.  I use 2.2 as it

        PGP 2.2 runs without a hitch on at least one 10 MHz+ XT
  box in which the 8088 was replaced with an NEC V-20 and an 8087
  co-processor added when new... about six years ago.

        Probably far more XT boxes running, worldwide, than some
  are capable of imagining.

        Key generation on the XT is as exciting... and as fast...
  as a baseball game, but who generates new keys daily?

        Encryption speed is more than adequate.

         Not so high a brag-ability index as its companion box,
  a 486/66 EISA... but to use that machine for encryption seems
  an utter waste of processor power.

         `Course, if one can only afford a 486, I suppose one
  must make do as best one can...




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Kelly Goen  <kellyg@sco.COM>
Date: Fri, 11 Jun 93 15:34:51 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: MAIL: logging that happens on soda
Message-ID: <9306111524.aa22415@vishnu.sco.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain





        Hi Eric,
               I as well as many others on this list have either
        worked as security administrators/ and/or designers in the
         aspect of systems that you have brought up here.


         Are you aware of the firewalls mailing list, it could be a HUGE
         resource in terms of these questions. As to the Logs...
         well the logfile name could be linked to /dev/null :)
         that would eliminate the logging problem...



        Another annoying tracking log is the syslog daemon.
        Mail connects are logged in their syslog using
        Sun sendmail and the standard syslog.conf. 


        syslog.conf changes are needed to eliminate this misfeature...

           cheers
           kelly
         p.s. ignore that rather uninformed person who complained
         you were making yourself look illiterate... most
         of the folks on this list unless they actually
         do it for a living(such as moi) ARE quite illiterate
         about matters such as DNS/Mail logging and TCP/UDP/ICMP/IP
         logging and/or trusted systems etc. Thats part of what this
         forum is about for each of us to educate the rest of the list
         so that privacy issues get FULL spectrum coverage.
          Please do keep bringing these issues to the
          forefront... some of do appreciate it. I and others
          will be happy to discuss the technical details of various
          tracking and auditing.


	In-Reply-To: Peter Shipley's message of Fri, 11 Jun 1993 09:51:13 -0700 <9306111651.AA14556@edev0.TFS>
	Subject: MAIL: logging that happens on soda 
	
	Re: sendmail logs
	
	>Eric, most of us know this stuff you are making yourself look very
	>unix  illiterate.  
	
	I have opened my mouth and removed all doubt.  I _am_ mostly
	illiterate in the details of Unix; this is one system administration
	detail I did not know.  I have known for a long time that these logs
	were in principle easy for administration to keep, but I did not know
	that they were an entirely standard feature.
	
	I raise this because it affects perceived remailer security and I have
	not once heard these specific logs brought up, on the list or in person.
	
	Eric




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: jet@nas.nasa.gov (J. Eric Townsend)
Date: Fri, 11 Jun 93 16:16:56 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: A note from one of the jackbooted facists...
In-Reply-To: <9306111524.aa22415@vishnu.sco.com>
Message-ID: <9306112316.AA20618@boxer.nas.nasa.gov>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



This is not an official NASA document.

Hi.

If you saw what I do for a living sometime, you'd probably consider me
a jackbooted facist of the highest order.

I implement logging systems, help build firewalls, implement security
software and teach people how to build secure systems.  Luckily, this
isn't my job at NASA -- I'm not a *government* facist brown-shirt.

> Another annoying tracking log is the syslog daemon.

Annoying if you want to be secure.

If you're going to send messages through one of 'my' systems, I'm
going to track and log them.  Period.  Don't like it? Route through
something else.

This list is being run from a UC-system owned computer.  It's not in
somebody's closet hooked to a phone line.  If UC wants to log email,
that's just fine.

 >         syslog.conf changes are needed to eliminate this misfeature...

A misfeature that helps me keep people from using 'my' machines unless I
let them.

 >          forum is about for each of us to educate the rest of the list
 >          so that privacy issues get FULL spectrum coverage.

I thought this list was here to discuss cryptography, not system
security or firewalls. :-)

If you don't control the system, consider it insecure and all of your
informational transfer monitored, logged, and analyzed.


--
J. Eric Townsend jet@nas.nasa.gov 415.604.4311| personal email goes to: 
CM-5 Administrator, Parallel Systems Support  |   jet@well.sf.ca.us
NASA Ames Numerical Aerodynamic Simulation    |---------------------------
PGP2.2 public key available upon request or finger jet@simeon.nas.nasa.gov





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Peter Shipley <shipley@tfs.COM>
Date: Fri, 11 Jun 93 16:34:38 PDT
To: fnerd@smds.com (FutureNerd Steve Witham)
Subject: Re: MAIL: logging that happens on soda
In-Reply-To: <9306112141.AA17441@smds.com>
Message-ID: <9306112334.AA15175@edev0.TFS>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>> Eric, most of us know this stuff 
>> you are making yourself look very unix  illiterate.
>
>You're looking a little like a nerdsnob to me.
>

Gee can't a guy rib a friend in public?




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: peb@PROCASE.COM
Date: Fri, 11 Jun 93 17:21:43 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: test, delete me
Message-ID: <9306120020.AA21501@banff.procase.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



This is a test; please delete.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: J. Michael Diehl <mdiehl@triton.unm.edu>
Date: Fri, 11 Jun 93 16:53:19 PDT
To: kellyg@sco.com (Kelly Goen)
Subject: Re: MAIL: logging that happens on soda
In-Reply-To: <9306111524.aa22415@vishnu.sco.com>
Message-ID: <9306112353.AA28100@triton.unm.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


According to Kelly Goen:
>         Hi Eric,
>                I as well as many others on this list have either
>         worked as security administrators/ and/or designers in the
>          aspect of systems that you have brought up here.
> 
> 
>          Are you aware of the firewalls mailing list, it could be a HUGE
>          resource in terms of these questions. As to the Logs...

I, for one, am not aware of this mailing list.  Could you post info?  Thanx.
+-----------------------+-----------------------------+---------+
| J. Michael Diehl ;-)  | I thought I was wrong once. | PGP KEY |
| mdiehl@triton.unm.edu |   But, I was mistaken.      |available|
| mike.diehl@fido.org   |                             | Ask Me! |
| (505) 299-2282        +-----------------------------+---------+
|                                                               |
+------"I'm just looking for the opportunity to be -------------+
|            Politically Incorrect!"   <Me>                     |
+-----If codes are outlawed, only criminals wil have codes.-----+
+----Is Big Brother in your phone?  If you don't know, ask me---+



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Eric Hughes <hughes@soda.berkeley.edu>
Date: Fri, 11 Jun 93 18:00:51 PDT
To: newsham@wiliki.eng.hawaii.edu
Subject: Mail logging
In-Reply-To: <9306120001.AA09108@toad.com>
Message-ID: <9306120057.AA09590@soda.berkeley.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>> >It's got complete traffic analysis data, complete with
>> >to/from pairs, time of day, and message size.

>The goal of this list is not to turn off such "features" but to
>provide security in the face of these features, in hostile environments,
>environments not totally under our own control.

Well said.

If you externally observe a remailer, there are three basic items to
correlate incoming to outgoing with: body content, body length, and
redelivery latency.  Notice that items two and three are provided by
the mail logs on my machine.  A remailer which is a mix needs to
confuse all three.

The first, content, requires an encryption or decryption operation.
The second, length, requires length quantization and therefore padding
and packeting.  The last, latency, is only solved by random delays if
the traffic through the node stays above a certain threshold.  The
real important characteristic with latency is reordering the incoming
and outgoing messages.  The simplest way to do this is to accumulate N
messages, create a random permutation on N elements, and mail the
messages out in the permuted order.

The single most basic problem with mail development that we have is
that we don't have enough mail volume through the remailers we have in
order to be able to experiment with better systems.  In particular, we
need to examine other reordering algorithms for the case where volume
is low and delivery latencies would be too high with the simple
gather-and-permute algorithm.

Eric





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: morpheus@entropy.linet.org (morpheus)
Date: Sat, 12 Jun 93 06:59:48 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: No Subject
Message-ID: <m0o4HdX-0002UXC@entropy.linet.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


From: morpheus@entropy.linet.org (morpheus)
Subject: Re: Encrypting the list
References: <9306091955.AA09779@boxer.nas.nasa.gov>
Organization: Ranch Apocalypse
Date: Fri, 11 Jun 1993 22:31:42 GMT
Message-ID: <1993Jun11.223142.28987@entropy.linet.org>

In article <9306091955.AA09779@boxer.nas.nasa.gov> src4src!imageek!nas.nasa.gov!jet (J. Eric Townsend) writes:
>FutureNerd Steve Witham writes:
> > We're all prime suspects for being spies.
>
>'specially those of us with both .gov and .com email addresses, right?

And worry all the more about ORGanized spies..

Worrying about spies is pointless.  Publicity is good.  There isn't any
point in cutting people "out of the loop" in effort to stop "spies",
what is being discussed needs to be known to as many people as possible.

We're talking cryptography, not revolution.  
-- 
morpheus@entropy.linet.org			Vote anarchist.
Support your local police, for a more efficient police state.





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: eric@Synopsys.COM
Date: Fri, 11 Jun 93 18:36:01 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: A note from one of the jackbooted facists...
In-Reply-To: <9306112316.AA20618@boxer.nas.nasa.gov>
Message-ID: <199306120135.AA17720@gaea.synopsys.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>>>>> On Fri, 11 Jun 93 16:16:49 -0700, jet@nas.nasa.gov (J. Eric Townsend) said:

jet> This list is being run from a UC-system owned computer.  It's not in
jet> somebody's closet hooked to a phone line.  If UC wants to log email,
jet> that's just fine.

If you're referring to the cypherpunks list, it should be pointed out
that toad.com is not a UC system.  It is in fact a system in sombody's
closet, hooked to a phone line.  That is, unless John Gilmore has
taken hoptoad out of his bedroom closet since I saw it last...

-eric messick (eric@toad.com)




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: ""L. Detweiler"" <ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Date: Fri, 11 Jun 93 17:45:52 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: heavy Clipper ammunition
Message-ID: <9306120045.AA05435@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


This will be a short note.  The apologists for Clipper on sci.crypt
including Sternlight, Denning, Tighe, Goble, and others tend to
ultimately fall back on the argument `What's the big deal? Its
voluntary!'  In some ways, this is their last and most desperate
argument.  Here are the critical reasons why that is not an acceptable
excuse or redeeming feature.

1) Whether Clipper is *currently* voluntary is meaningless given the
possibility that it could later become a legislated standard. The
argument that it is `voluntary' is worthless unless there is an
explicit *guarantee* of such. But, as the original Clipper announcement
makes obvious, no such promise is made, apparently because it could not
be adhered to.

2) As the CPSR statements point out, NSA has no legal authority to
propose a domestic cryptographic standard. (That it pretends that
President Clinton and the NIST are the actual purveyors is ugly
deceit.)  Nor, likely, would any such domestic authority ever be
granted to the agency.  In some ways, that's the whole point of NIST's
cryptographic standards role: that it would be unchained and
unmanipulated by NSA.  Kammer's meek whimperings in the media prove
this is clearly not the case.

3) I don't know who first suggested this, but there is every
possibility that the entire plan with Clipper was to make it voluntary
*initially* followed by a later legislative enforcement with its
proliferation. After all, Clipper would give the NSA the critical `foot
in the door' into domestic U.S. cryptography, at which point it would
have a toehold to make further encroachments.  Hence, the current
arguments that `it's only voluntary' are perhaps the ultimate hypocritical lie.





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Rain.Face@f418.n161.z1.FIDONET.ORG (Rain Face)
Date: Sat, 12 Jun 93 03:57:23 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: REMAILER UPDATE
Message-ID: <356.2C19A34A@shelter.FIDONET.ORG>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



In that I have been off this list for a while, I was wondering if
someone could give me a quick update on which anon remailers are still
in service and what the current syntax is.
        Thanks.

 ---------------------------------------------------------------
|<rain.face@f418.n161.z1.fidonet.org>|"No apologies, no excuses,|
|PGP Key ID # EFAA97 via all servers | no jive and no regrets." |
 ---------------------------------------------------------------


--- Blue Wave/TG v2.12 [NR]
 * Origin: realitycheckBBS (510)527-1662 (1:161/418.0)
--  
Rain Face - via FidoNet node 1:125/1
UUCP: ...!uunet!kumr!shelter!161!418!Rain.Face
INTERNET: Rain.Face@f418.n161.z1.FIDONET.ORG




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: bbyer@BIX.com
Date: Fri, 11 Jun 93 17:15:26 PDT
To: ryan@rtfm.mlb.fl.us
Subject: Re: CryptoStacker
Message-ID: <9306112008.memo.59593@BIX.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


If the project is called CryptoStacker, why not use Stacker?
Have the program go beneath Stacker (or another disk doubling system)
and encrypt/decrypt the actual stacker file as Stacker reads it?  It
would be a much simpler solution once you found out how te interface
with Stacker.

Ben Byer <bbyer@bix.com>




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: M..Stirner@f28.n125.z1.FIDONET.ORG (M. Stirner)
Date: Fri, 11 Jun 93 21:57:58 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Pgp v 2.2/8088
Message-ID: <341.2C1956A8@shelter.FIDONET.ORG>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



 * Reply to msg originally in CYPHERPUNKS

 > version 2.2 locks up 8088-based computers.  Version 2.1 does not.
 > There is an unauthorized bug fix version, 2.21.  I use 2.2 as it

 Uu> PGP 2.2 runs without a hitch on at least one 10 MHz+ XT
 Uu> box in which the 8088 was replaced with an NEC V-20 and an 8087
 Uu> co-processor added when new... about six years ago.

I don't doubt it for a second, but I know it definitely will lock up a
real 8088.  Also there is a problem with DesqView in some cases.

 Uu> Probably far more XT boxes running, worldwide, than some
 Uu> are capable of imagining.

I'm sure of that, too.  PGP is a worldwide phenomenon, & there are a
whole lot of XT-class computers in the outside world.

 Uu> Key generation on the XT is as exciting... and as fast...
 Uu> as a baseball game...

Well, more like _cricket_, actually. 8-)

 Uu> Encryption speed is more than adequate.

Considering the math involved, yes.  Still even a 20MHz 286 fairly flies
doing PGP tasks in comparison, though.

*********************************************************************
* <m..stirner@f28.n125.z1.fidonet.org> - PGP Key D30909 via servers *
* > What country can preserve its liberties if its rulers are not  <*
* > warned from time to time that their people preserve the spirit <*
* > of resistance?  Let them take arms!" - Thomas Jefferson, 1787  <*
*********************************************************************




___ Blue Wave/QWK v2.12
--  
M. Stirner - via FidoNet node 1:125/1
UUCP: ...!uunet!kumr!shelter!28!M..Stirner
INTERNET: M..Stirner@f28.n125.z1.FIDONET.ORG




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: ""L. Detweiler"" <ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Date: Fri, 11 Jun 93 19:21:29 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: it's official: PKP sells out for Clipper
Message-ID: <9306120221.AA06841@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



From the following document:

>PKP will also grant a license to practice key management, at no
>additional fee, for the integrated circuits which will implement
>both the DSA and the anticipated Federal Information Processing
>Standard for the "key escrow" system announced by President Clinton
>on April 16, 1993.

more weasel words:

>Notice of availability of this invention for licensing
>was waived because it was determined that expeditious granting of
>such license will best serve the interest of the Federal Government
>and the public.

what else?

===cut=here===

From: jim@rand.org (Jim Gillogly)
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
Subject: DSA: NIST and PKP come to terms
Message-ID: <16860@rand.org>
Date: 11 Jun 93 20:56:44 GMT
Sender: news@rand.org
Organization: Banzai Institute

This text was transcribed from a fax and may have transcription
errors.  We believe the text to be correct but some of the numbers
may be incorrect or incomplete.

---------------------------------------------------------------------

 ** The following notice was published in the Federal Register, Vol.
           58, No. 108, dated June 8, 1993 under Notices **

National Institute of Standards and Technology

Notice of Proposal for Grant of Exclusive Patent License

This is to notify the public that the National Institute of
Standards and Technology (NIST) intends to grant an exclusive
world-wide license to Public Key Partners of Sunnyvale, California
to practice the Invention embodied in U.S. Patent Application No.
07/738.431 and entitled "Digital Signature Algorithm."  A PCT
application has been filed.  The rights in the invention have been
assigned to the United States of America. 

The prospective license is a cross-license which would resolve a
patent dispute with Public Key Partners and includes the right to
sublicense.  Notice of availability of this invention for licensing
was waived because it was determined that expeditious granting of
such license will best serve the interest of the Federal Government
and the public.  Public Key Partners has provided NIST with the
materials contained in Appendix A as part of their proposal to
NIST.

Inquiries, comments, and other materials relating to the prospec-
tive license shall be submitted to Michael R. Rubin, Active Chief
Counsel for Technology, Room A-1111, Administration Building,
National Institute of Standards and Technology, Gaithersburg,
Maryland 20899.  His telephone number is (301) 975-2803.  Applica-
tions for a license filed in response to this notice will be
treated as objections to the grant of the prospective license.  
Only written comments and/or applications for a license which are
received by NIST within sixty (60) days for the publication of this
notice will be considered.

The prospective license will be granted unless, within sixty (60)
days of this notice, NIST receives written evidence and argument
which established that the grant of the license would not be
consistent with the requirements of 35 U.S.C. 209 and 37 CFR 404.7.

  Dated:  June 2, 1993.

Raymond G. Kammer
Acting Director, National Institute Standards and Technology.

Appendix "A"

The National Institute for Standards and Technology ("NIST") has
announced its intention to grant Public Key Partners ("PKP")
sublicensing rights to NIST's pending patent application on the
Digital Signature Algorithm ("DSA").

Subject to NIST's grant of this license, PKP is pleased to declare
its support for the proposed Federal Information Processing
Standard for Digital Signatures (the "DSS") and the pending
availability of licenses to practice the DSA.  In addition to the
DSA, licenses to practice digital signatures will be offered by PKP
under the following patents:

          Cryptographic Apparatus and Method ("Diffie-Hellman")
                No. 4,200,770
          Public Key Cryptographic Apparatus and Method
		("Hellman-Merkle")   No. 4,315,552
          Exponential Cryptographic Apparatus and Method
                ("Hellman-Pohlig")   No. 4,434,414
          Method For Identifying Subscribers And For Generating
		And Verifying Electronic Signatures In A Data Exchange
                System ("Schnorr")   No. 4,995,082

It is PKP's intent to make practice of the DSA royalty free for
personal, noncommercial and U.S. Federal, state and local
government use.  As explained below, only those parties who enjoy
commercial benefit from making or selling products, or certifying
digital signatures, will be required to pay royalties to practice
the DSA.

PKP will also grant a license to practice key management, at no
additional fee, for the integrated circuits which will implement
both the DSA and the anticipated Federal Information Processing
Standard for the "key escrow" system announced by President Clinton
on April 16, 1993.

Having stated these intentions, PKP now takes this opportunity to
publish its guidelines for granting uniform licenses to all parties
having a commercial interest in practicing this technology:

First, no party will be denied a license for any reason other that
the following:

          (i)    Failure to meet its payment obligations,
          (ii)   Outstanding claims of infringement, or
          (iii)  Previous termination due to material breach.

Second, licenses will be granted for any embodiment sold by the
licensee or made for its use, whether for final products software,
or components such as integrated circuits and boards, and regard-
less of the licensee's channel of distribution.  Provided the
requisite royalties have been paid by the seller on the enabling
component(s), no further royalties will be owned by the buyer for
making or selling the final product which incorporates such
components.

Third, the practice of digital signatures in accordance with the
DSS may be licensed separately from any other technical art covered
by PKP's patents.

Fourth, PKP's royalty rates for the right to make or sell products,
subject to uniform minimum fees, will be no more than 2 1/2% for
hardware products and 5% for software, with the royalty rate
further declining to 1% on any portion of the product price
exceeding $1,000.  These royalty rates apply only to noninfringing
parties and will be uniform without regard to whether the licensed
product creates digital signatures, verifies digital signatures or
performs both.

Fifth, for the next three (3) years, all commercial services which
certify a signature's authenticity for a fee may be operated
royalty free.  Thereafter, all providers of such commercial
certification services shall pay a royalty to PKP of $1.00 per
certificate for each year the certificate is valid.

Sixth, provided the foregoing royalties are paid on such products
or services, all other practice of the DSA shall be royalty free.

Seventh, PKP invites all of its existing licensees, at their
option, to exchange their current licenses for the standard license
offered for DSA.

Finally, PKP will mediate the concerns of any party regarding the
availability of PKP's licenses for the DSA with designated
representatives of NIST and PKP.  For copies of PKP's license
terms, contact Michael R. Rubin, Acting Chief Counsel for Technolo-
gy, NIST, or Public Key Partners.

  Dated:  June 2, 1993.

Robert B. Fougner, Esq.,
Director of Licensing, Public Key Partners,
310 North Mary Avenue, Sunnyvale, CA  94033

[FR Doc. 93-13473 Filed 8-7-93; 8:45 am]

---------------------------------------------------------------------
Forwarded by:
-- 
	Jim Gillogly
	Trewesday, 21 Forelithe S.R. 1993, 20:56





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: smb@research.att.com
Date: Fri, 11 Jun 93 17:28:06 PDT
To: "J. Michael Diehl" <mdiehl@triton.unm.edu>
Subject: Re: MAIL: logging that happens on soda
Message-ID: <9306120028.AA09550@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


	 According to Kelly Goen:
	 > 
	 >          Are you aware of the firewalls mailing list, it could be a 
	HUGE
	 >          resource in terms of these questions. As to the Logs...

	 I, for one, am not aware of this mailing list.  Could you post info?  

To subscribe, send mail to majordomo@greatcircle.com, with the body
of the message saying

	subscribe firewalls




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: nobody@rosebud.ee.uh.edu
Date: Fri, 11 Jun 93 18:38:57 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: DH for email
Message-ID: <9306120138.AA10588@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Suppose you are communicating with someone using email about something
which the government wouldn't like.  Being careful, you use PGP or
something similar.

Later, the government gets wind of your activities.  They seize your
computer, recovering your encrypted secret key.  You do not have copies
of your old mail, but to your dismay, you discover that your email
service provider keeps backups of old mail.  Using a court order, the
government is able to recover copies of all of your old email.

The court orders you to reveal your pass phrase for your secret key.
Any refusal will result in your being jailed for contempt.  You are
forced to comply.  The result is that your old messages are decrypted
and used against you as evidence.

It would be good to have an alternative which would not be subject to
this kind of attack.

Diffie-Hellman key exchange is generally suitable for an interactive
environment like an encrypted telnet session or a secure serial line.
But it could be adapted to email by having each side create one or more
"key halves" in advance, and exchanging these in an initial message.
Future email could use a session key created by taking the next pair of
key halves (one from each person).  When the supply of key halves got
low, more could be generated and piggybacked with the next email message.

Such a system would be more secure against the kind of attack described
here.  There would be no possibility of reconstructing the session key
used if the key halves were destroyed after use.  You may choose to
keep your own personal copies of email, but you can delete them and be
secure in the knowledge that no attacker will be able to reconstruct
them.

A program like PGP could be created which would automatically take care
of the bookkeeping involved with creating and exchanging key halves for
the DH algorithm.  Then users could have electronic conversations
which were freer from the threat of being coerced into revealing their
secret keys and having the contents of their mail exposed.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: ""L. Detweiler"" <ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Date: Fri, 11 Jun 93 19:54:25 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: more Clipper proponents on sci.crypt
Message-ID: <9306120254.AA07220@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Call me paranoid, but I think the NSA has decided that sci.crypt is now a good spot to level propaganda.

From: pugh@cs.umd.edu (Bill Pugh)
Organization: U of Maryland, Dept. of Computer Science, Coll. Pk., MD 20742

>I don't like the Clipper, and don't think it will succeed. However, on the 
>chance that we get stuck with it, we should figure out ways to solve many 
>of the concerns people have raised.
>
>A lot of people have concerns about the key escrow system. There are 
>good reasons to be worried about a system in which the government can
>get a court order to decode your communications. But an even greater
>concern to many people is how to make sure that key disclosure is limited
>to lawfully authorized cases.

The more I see statements like these, the more I suspect that the Clipper has a backdoor besides the key escrow systems.  I think the whole escrow issue is a decoy to getting a widespread NSA standard in place.  Also, keep in mind it could be the case that NSA builds different versions of the chips over time. How would we ever know?

From: rja14@cl.cam.ac.uk (Ross Anderson)
Organization: U of Cambridge Computer Lab, UK

>At Eurocrypt 93 a few weeks ago, the NSA's technical director said that the
>key escrow system was still `vaporware' and that they had no objection to
>interested parties getting involved in the design, to make sure that it was
>`whiter than white'.
>
>Here's my twopenceworth: you can in fact make an escrow system which will be
>goood enough to silence all or most of the reasonable objections, and here is
>how to do it.
>
>1. The International Problem.
>
>... if clipper is restricted to the US, it will lose a lot of its value. 
>The bad guys such as the Mafia and the various terrorist groups will just 
>buy their communications systems in Europe or the Far East. Indeed,
>respectable US corporations may end up buying their kit there as this is the
>only way in which they can get the same kind of scrambler phone in each of
>their offices.

This guy then goes on to propose a lot of bizarre international configurations of key escrow. Holy cow-- this guy is advocating *international* key escrow?

Good lord, cypherpunks, I wouldn't be surprised if Britain soon official endorses the Clipper. All our worst paranoia would be reality.  Consider it: the NSA and GCHQ have been in active collaboration ever since WWII and especially in recent years. This is all documented by Bamford.  What if Clipper is not just amenable to the NSA, but was also developed with British input?

>The big question of course is whether the Agency would be happy with an 
>escrow system which really worked, on top of algorithms which were really 
>hard to break and were implemented well. Perhaps the object of the current
>exercise is simply to sow fear, uncertainty and doubt, and thus postpone the
>uptake of crypto in the commercial sector,

I don't care if `the Agency' is happy or not. I think they would most definitely *not* be happy under such an arrangement and would use any significant Clipper entrenchment as torque to later ban alternative cryptographic schemes.


I'm growing desperately weary. I think the tidal wave is approaching.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: The Phantom <phantom@u.washington.edu>
Date: Fri, 11 Jun 93 21:38:02 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Remailer mail logging:
Message-ID: <Pine.3.05.9306112151.A19146-9100000@stein2.u.washington.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


just for your info: the mead remailer has no logging enabled! :)


Matt Thomlinson                               Say no to the Wiretap Chip!
University of Washington, Seattle, Washington.
Internet: phantom@u.washington.edu      	    phone: (206) 528-5732
PGP 2.2  key available via email or finger phantom@hardy.u.washington.edu





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: M..Stirner@f28.n125.z1.FIDONET.ORG (M. Stirner)
Date: Fri, 11 Jun 93 22:57:57 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Nsa/gshq
Message-ID: <343.2C196B79@shelter.FIDONET.ORG>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



 * Reply to msg originally in CYPHERPUNKS

 Uu> Good lord, cypherpunks, I wouldn't be surprised if Britain soon
 Uu> official endorses the Clipper. All our worst paranoia would be
 Uu> reality.  Consider it: the NSA and GCHQ have been in active
 Uu> collaboration ever since WWII and especially in recent years.
 Uu> This is all documented by Bamford.

To say nothing of Peter Wright's [MI5] revelations, the publication of
which I understand was banned in the UK.  Very interesting stuff - I
hope Britons eventually got the chance to read his book, _Spycatcher_.

*********************************************************************
* <m..stirner@f28.n125.z1.fidonet.org> - PGP Key D30909 via servers *
* > What country can preserve its liberties if its rulers are not  <*
* > warned from time to time that their people preserve the spirit <*
* > of resistance?  Let them take arms!" - Thomas Jefferson, 1787  <*
*********************************************************************
___ Blue Wave/QWK v2.12
--  
M. Stirner - via FidoNet node 1:125/1
UUCP: ...!uunet!kumr!shelter!28!M..Stirner
INTERNET: M..Stirner@f28.n125.z1.FIDONET.ORG




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Leo Reilly <zanadu@well.sf.ca.us>
Date: Fri, 11 Jun 93 22:11:51 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Unsubscribe
Message-ID: <93Jun11.221119pdt.13922-2@well.sf.ca.us>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


could you please remove me from the mail list.  I am on the road for two
weeks, without a laptop, and I cannot affored the disk space to be taken up
while I am gone.

Cheers!
Leo Reilly




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Matt Blaze <mab@crypto.com>
Date: Fri, 11 Jun 93 19:28:11 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Privacy panel at USENIX Conference
Message-ID: <9306120218.AA07373@crypto.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Anyone who's going to be attending USENIX the week after next will want
to make sure not to miss the privacy panel, to be held Friday afternoon
(First session after lunch, I think).   The topic to be
discussed is anonymity on the net...

Here's the official announcement:

	  USENIX SUMMER 1993 TECHNICAL CONFERENCE

	           June 21 -25, 1993
		    Cincinnati, Ohio


Privacy Panel: Anonymity Servers - Finding The Bounds of Rights

This USENIX Panel session will address anonymity servers,
systems serving to sanitize e-mail and NetNews postings in
order to conceal the source.   We will explore the legal and
ethical issues involved, and try to shed some light on the
subtle complexities involving "the bounds of rights"
such systems pose.  Some of the issues are considerably
more complex than they might first appear.

Our panel will consist of Dan Appelman, John Gilmore,
Johan ("Julf") Helsingius, and will be convened by Mike O'Dell.
Biographies of the participants follow.

Dan Appelman, Panelist

Dan Appelman is a lawyer who practices computer and
telecommunications law from his office in Palo Alto, California. 
He also teaches a course in telecommunications policy, law and
regulation and has written and lectured about the legal issues in
both the telecommunications and data processing industries.  Dan
is the lawyer the USENIX Association and several other amusing
high-tech enterprises. He is a partner in the law firm of Heller,
Ehrman, White & McAuliffe.  

John Gilmore, Panelist

Among his other interests and accomplishments,
John Gilmore is a dedicated champion of civil liberties in
cyberspace.  John was a cofounder of the Electronic Frontier Foundation
and has campaigned aggressively for public availability of
high-quality encryption systems.  He was employee number five at
Sun Microsystems, may well have written more APL interpreters
than any other single human, and his most recent business
venture is the founding of Cygnus Support, a software
support company dedicated to the commercial viability of
free software.  He notes that he has never had time to
attend college or buy a suit.

Johan Helsingius, Panelist

The last time anyone really referred to Johan Helsingius using his
family name was while he was doing his military service long ago. As the
memories are not too fond, he prefers to be called "Julf", a name based
on a play on words involving 3 languages.  He has been heavily
involved in all manner of European Unix-related activities
for longer than he cares to remember.  He founded and still runs two
successful consultancy and training companies, Penetron
and Penetic, which manage to fund his well-developed tastes
for global travel and exploring the native arcania.  
Most recently Julf established an anonymity server, anon.penet.fi,
that quickly became the most popular anonymous posting service
on the Internet with more than 20,000 users.  Although he
is based in downtown Helsinki, Julf tends 
to spend most of his time in airport departure lounges.

Mike O'Dell, Provocateur

Mike O'Dell is Vice-president of the USENIX
Association and he is also Editor-in-Chief of
the USENIX journal, Computing Systems.
When he is not busy doing either of those two things,
he is Vice-president of Engineering at UUNET Technologies, Inc.,
a commercial IP and UUCP connectivity provider.
Mike's role in this panel, however, is to reprise his occasional
role as Resident Crank and thereby provoke a lively analysis
of the issues.





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: hal@alumni.cco.caltech.edu (Hal Finney)
Date: Fri, 11 Jun 93 22:28:15 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: PKP sellout?
Message-ID: <9306120527.AA03229@alumni.cco.caltech.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


This was my response on sci.crypt to this announcement that PKP will
be supporting DSS, and licensing its technology for use by Clipper
phones.  Thanks to Lance for alerting us to this announcement.

-----

jim@rand.org (Jim Gillogly) forwards:

>This is to notify the public that the National Institute of
>Standards and Technology (NIST) intends to grant an exclusive
>world-wide license to Public Key Partners of Sunnyvale, California
>to practice the Invention embodied in U.S. Patent Application No.
>07/738.431 and entitled "Digital Signature Algorithm."

And so it appears that another patent jewel will be added to the crown
worn by PKP, the de facto owner of cryptographic technology in the United
States.  They will have an exclusive license to the DSA, as they already
do to RSA and most other worthwhile encryption technologies.

This also appears to put to rest the much-publicized feud between RSA and
NIST/NSA.  Conspiracy theorists can now comfortably return to the
position that PKP/RSADSI is actually an arm of the NSA, dedicated to
restricting and delaying access to strong cryptography as much as
possible.

>Notice of availability of this invention for licensing
>was waived because it was determined that expeditious granting of
>such license will best serve the interest of the Federal Government
>and the public.

Once again we are presented with a fait accompli; no other organizations
were given an opportunity to bid for the licensing of this patent.  The
government prefers to see PKP holding the keys to all cryptography in the
U.S.  Remember how Clipper's technology was similarly assigned to
particular corporations on a non-competitive basis?

>Subject to NIST's grant of this license, PKP is pleased to declare
>its support for the proposed Federal Information Processing
>Standard for Digital Signatures (the "DSS") and the pending
>availability of licenses to practice the DSA.

And what of the technical objections to DSA/DSS raised in earlier
documents by officials of RSADSI, such as in the recent CACM?  No doubt
those objections are now moot.

>PKP will also grant a license to practice key management, at no
>additional fee, for the integrated circuits which will implement
>both the DSA and the anticipated Federal Information Processing
>Standard for the "key escrow" system announced by President Clinton
>on April 16, 1993.

So PKP is now supporting key escrow and Clipper.  Can anyone seriously
argue that this company is a friend to supporters of strong cryptography?  

These are dark times indeed.  PKP has thrown in with the government,
getting behind DSS and Clipper in exchange for exclusive licensing
rights.  Their ownership of DH and RSA will make it that much harder for
any competition to Clipper to arise.

If the 60-day comment period really means anything, perhaps public
criticism can be effective here.  There is much to be concerned about in
this announcement.

Hal Finney
hal@alumni.caltech.edu




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Date: Fri, 11 Jun 93 23:09:14 PDT
To: hal@alumni.cco.caltech.edu (Hal Finney)
Subject: Re: PKP sellout?
In-Reply-To: <9306120527.AA03229@alumni.cco.caltech.edu>
Message-ID: <9306120609.AA05252@netcom3.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Yep, dark times indeed.

As Hal and Lance note, these decisions are all made in complete
secrecy.

Bidzos and RSA appear to have sold out.

If true, we'll have lots to talk about at Saturday's meeting.

-Tim

-- 
..........................................................................
Timothy C. May         | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,  
tcmay@netcom.com       | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
408-688-5409           | knowledge, reputations, information markets, 
W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA  | black markets, collapse of governments.
Higher Power: 2^756839 | Public Key: PGP and MailSafe available.
Note: I put time and money into writing this posting. I hope you enjoy it.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: XXCLARK@indst.indstate.edu
Date: Sat, 12 Jun 93 00:16:38 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Pgp v 2.2/8088/V-20
Message-ID: <9306120716.AA13031@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain




ms>I don't doubt it for a second, but I know it definitely will
ms>lock up a real 8088.

     Grew so accustomed to the NEC V-series I suspect I'd come
   to think of them as the *real* 8088... and 8080.

 Uu> Key generation on the XT is as exciting... and as fast...
 Uu> as a baseball game...

ms> Well, more like _cricket_, actually. 8-)

     There is *nothing* like cricket.

 Uu> Encryption speed is more than adequate.

ms> Considering the math involved, yes.  Still even a 20MHz 286
ms> fairly flies doing PGP tasks in comparison, though.

     Agreed.

     Just didn't want the potential PGP user with an XT to feel
   he'd have to settle for a Clipper chip... and had my button
   pushed by the naif overly impressed with the originovelnew.
   One wonders what reaction one would elicit were he confronted
   with an Altair kit and its quarter mile of white wire or MS
   Basic on paper tape or cassette.

  ---------------------------------------------------------------------
     internet      : xxclark@indst.indstate.edu   RelayNet (488)
     Vanilla BITNET: XXCLARK@INDST                FidoNet (1:2230/114)
     Phone: 911                                   TechNet 11:800/0
    One need not be a weatherman to know which way the wind is blowing.
  ---------------------------------------------------------------------




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: RYAN Alan Porter <ryan@rtfm.mlb.fl.us>
Date: Fri, 11 Jun 93 23:35:50 PDT
To: bbyer@BIX.com
Subject: Re: CryptoStacker
In-Reply-To: <9306112008.memo.59593@BIX.com>
Message-ID: <Pine.3.03.9306120237.A4623-b100000@rtfm>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain




On Fri, 11 Jun 1993 bbyer@BIX.com wrote:

> If the project is called CryptoStacker, why not use Stacker?
> Have the program go beneath Stacker (or another disk doubling system)
> and encrypt/decrypt the actual stacker file as Stacker reads it?  It
> would be a much simpler solution once you found out how te interface
> with Stacker.

Problems:

	1)  Defeats the purpose of free/cheap-ware.

	2)  Mixes abstraction levels and causes drivers to run 
	     redundantly (and thus, more slowly)

	3)  Would not be modular with further expandability

Solution:

	Take the meat of the suggestion (building upon an already working
system of sector remapping and data mangling) and build upon it.  Indeed,
what I am doing is finding working sources for drivers and network
redirectors and examining them to find one which will serve as a good
model to work from.  This will provide the benefits of working under
Stacker, as you suggested, and will also have the advantages of freeing
us from the list of disadvantages.

> Ben Byer <bbyer@bix.com>

-=Ryan=-
the Bit Wallah


	cat cypherpunk.flames > /dev/null








From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: smb@research.att.com
Date: Sat, 12 Jun 93 05:02:23 PDT
To: hal@alumni.cco.caltech.edu (Hal Finney)
Subject: Re: PKP sellout?
Message-ID: <9306121202.AA16880@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


It's worth remembering that for the most part, corporations don't have
ethics, they have bottom lines.  Most of PKP's objections to the DSA
were not really solid; rather, they were in defense of RSA as a profit
center.  There only two really big ones -- that DSA as originally
proposed had too small a key size, and that it doesn't provide secrecy,
only authentication.  The former has been fixed by NIST, and the latter
was a design goal.

In this case, NIST really had no choice but to deal with PKP.  Apart
from the question of the Diffie-Hellman patent -- and in my opinion,
DSA definitely did infringe on it -- the proposed algorithm was very
close to Schnorr's algorithm, which was patented, and to which PKP had
purchased the rights.  If NIST had gone ahead without making a deal
with PKP, the standard would have been tied up in lawsuits for years,
with the outcome quite uncertain.  And while that may or may not have
suited this community, it would not meet NIST's objectives.

I don't see the hand of conspiracy here; rather, I see an encouraging
trend, that the private sector is able to compete in cryptographic
competence with NSA.

I am encouraged by the pledges to allow non-commercial use -- note the
lack of any RSAREF-like interface -- and to engage in non-discriminatory
licensing.

		--Steve Bellovin




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: jet@nas.nasa.gov (J. Eric Townsend)
Date: Sat, 12 Jun 93 12:51:59 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: A note from one of the jackbooted facists...
In-Reply-To: <199306120135.AA17720@gaea.synopsys.com>
Message-ID: <9306121951.AA23408@boxer.nas.nasa.gov>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


eric@Synopsys.COM writes:
 > If you're referring to the cypherpunks list, it should be pointed out
 > that toad.com is not a UC system.  It is in fact a system in sombody's

I'm a big idiot.  I just have a 'cypher' alias, and I forgot what it
pointed to.

Still, the person with the machine 'in their closet' has the right to
keep records. :-)







From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: pozar@kumr.lns.com (Tim Pozar)
Date: Sat, 12 Jun 93 12:59:03 PDT
To: eric@Synopsys.COM
Subject: Re: A note from one of the jackbooted facists...
In-Reply-To: <199306120135.AA17720@gaea.synopsys.com>
Message-ID: <m0o4bj3-0002fvC@kumr.lns.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text


eric@Synopsys.COM wrote:
> If you're referring to the cypherpunks list, it should be pointed out
> that toad.com is not a UC system.  It is in fact a system in sombody's
> closet, hooked to a phone line.  That is, unless John Gilmore has
> taken hoptoad out of his bedroom closet since I saw it last...

   Wrong room of the house and wiring, but right concept.

                Tim
-- 
    Internet: pozar@kumr.lns.com     FidoNet: Tim Pozar @ 1:125/555
Snail: Tim Pozar / KKSF / 77 Maiden Lane / San Francisco CA 94108 / USA
             POTS: +1 415 788 2022  Radio: KC6GNJ / KAE6247



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: jet@nas.nasa.gov (J. Eric Townsend)
Date: Sat, 12 Jun 93 13:10:49 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: evil government and corporate plot
Message-ID: <9306122010.AA23499@boxer.nas.nasa.gov>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain




It appears that both NASA and Thinking Machines are involved in a plot
to keep me from attending today's meeting.  Said plot involves agents
of both parties deliberately crashing the CM-5 and requiring me to fix
it before I'm allowed to do anything else.

[sigh]

-eric





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Mark <mark@coombs.anu.edu.au>
Date: Fri, 11 Jun 93 20:56:41 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Mail logging
Message-ID: <9306120356.AA11546@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>The single most basic problem with mail development that we have is
>that we don't have enough mail volume through the remailers we have in
>order to be able to experiment with better systems.  In particular, we
>need to examine other reordering algorithms for the case where volume
>is low and delivery latencies would be too high with the simple
>gather-and-permute algorithm.

Well, I hate to point out the obvious but can we organise with the
list maintainer to have our mail routed through random machines until
it gets to us? I'd only recommend this for the more email aware members
as it might prove confusing. Also, to save my own sanity and others
certain header munglings might be desirable to ensure that the mail is
still filterable. I'd suggest either an addition to the remailer scripts
to allow a predefined header line through, or the Subject: line of each
message is prefixed with CRYPTO: so the end users can still filter the
messages as they now do.

Currently I use 'procmail' to filter out various things and it works on
the contents of the mail header as so:

--------.procmailrc--------------------------
IFS=""
PATH=/home/coombs/mark/bin:/usr/local/bin:/usr/bin:/bin
MAILDIR=$HOME/mail
DEFAULT=/usr/mail/$USER

# Filtering for cypherpunks

:2                                          # Two 'if' clauses
(^To:.*cypherpunks@toad.com.*|^Cc: .*cypherpunks@toad.com.*)
(^Subject: .*(UNSUBSCRIBE|nsubscribe).*)
/dev/null                                   # If a match send mail here.
--------.procmailrc--------------------------

If we were to route all the mail through remailers I would lose the
functionality of filtering as I wouldnt know where the email was
coming from, nor would I be able to know it was cypherpunks mail until
I read the message body. thats why a Subject: line change or a modification
to the remailer scripts (if needed) should be made.

Assuming the above was made, all the maintainer would have to do is change
my mark@coombs.anu.edu.au line in the alias file to a:

|/bin/random-remail -dest mark@coombs.anu.edu.au

or

|/bin/random-pgp-remail -dest mark@coombs.anu.edu.au -key mark@coombs.anu.edu.au

where 'random-remail' is a short program that scans a list of remailers
and randomly selects some, puts the addresses and remail triggers into a
file, appends the message and changes the "Subject: blah" line to
"Subject: CRYPTO: blah". 'random-pgp-remail' does the same and encrypts the
whole message before sending, possibly encrypting again a few times with
remailer keys.

This approach would (dramatically :) increase the remailer traffic to levels
where mail re-ordering is possible. Padding would be the next step, add the
lines on the end to bring the message to 512 bytes, 1024 bytes, 2048 bytes or
greater. Maybe pad all messages to the nearest 1024 bytes? (see below for a
method :)

The only problem I can see after the programs are debugged etc is the extra
overhead on toad.com, wther it's a non encrypted mail out or not. But if that
is acceptable to the maintainer in the intrests of giving remailer operators
some fodder then we can implement it

I dont see any of the random-[pgp-]remailer programs being longer than 30 or
40 (perl script) lines. I'd write them myself if I could get some mail
aliases installed on this host. Admittedly they aren't essential but I'd
like them for testing purposes.

Mark
mark@coombs.anu.edu.au

PADDING PADDING PADDING PADDING PADDING PADDING PADDING PADDING PADDING
PADDING PADDING PADDING PADDING PADDING PADDING PADDING PADDING PADDING
PADDING PADDING PADDING PADDING PADDING PADDING PADDING PADDING PADDING
PADDING PADDING PADDING PADDING PADDING PADDING PADDING PADDING PADDING
PADDING PADDING PADDING PADDING PADDING PADDING PADDING PADDING PADDING
PADDING PADDING PADDING PADDING PADDING PADDING PADDING PADDING PADDING
PADDING PA       <---- end of padding to make this 2048 bytes long



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Fred Heutte <phred@well.sf.ca.us>
Date: Sat, 12 Jun 93 20:08:39 PDT
To: hal@alumni.cco.caltech.edu
Subject: Re:  PKP sellout?
Message-ID: <93Jun12.200814pdt.13879-2@well.sf.ca.us>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


This PKP announcement is the last straw.  This is clearly a case of the
federal policy/procurement bureaucracy going completely out of control.
The way things ran under Bush, except if they tried to pull this blatant
a deal their bluff would have been called immediately.  

I think it's time to demand the White House put a total moratorium on
all policies related to digital and telecommunications data and privacy
until they can extract themselves from this quicksand.

And if they won't do that, it's time to kick some *serious* political butt.

Don't you let that deal go down!


Fred Heutte
Sunlight Data Systems

"Why make it simple and easy
 when you can make it complex and wonderful!"




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: nobody@cicada.berkeley.edu
Date: Sat, 12 Jun 93 20:36:00 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: what happens when you reply to nobody@cicada.berkeley.edu ?
Message-ID: <9306130335.AA16404@cicada.berkeley.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Ya,
I wanted to know what happens when you responded to mail from
nobody@cicada.berkeley.edu ?

Thanks





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "William H. Oldacre" <76114.2307@CompuServe.COM>
Date: Sat, 12 Jun 93 18:49:16 PDT
To: <cypherpunks@toad.com>
Subject: 8088/PGP failures.
Message-ID: <930613014638_76114.2307_BHA60-1@CompuServe.COM>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>I don't know where you've been, but version 2.2 has a notorious bug
>that locks up the box under numerous situations.  In my experience,
>version 2.2 locks up 8088-based computers.  Version 2.1 does not.

>I was not aware that people still used that version of a computer.
>An 8088????

>Don't be so arrogant.

>Additionally, when one is running PGP under Windows the "virtual DOS 
>machine" on which it is running *is* an 8088 (of sorts) and PGP 2.2 will
>lock it up 2/3 of the time.

>PGP 2.2 runs without a hitch on at least one 10 MHz+ XT box in which 
>the 8088 was replaced with an NEC V-20 and an 8087 co-processor added 
>when new... about six years ago.

>I don't doubt it for a second, but I know it definitely will lock up a
>real 8088.  Also there is a problem with DesqView in some cases.

I live in Central Florida which experiences more lightning discharges 
than almost anywhere else in the country (excepting certain mountain 
tops).  We are now entering our most violent season.  Yesterday, a 
semi-trailer was struck on I-75 at a Gainesville exit and had both 
front tires blown out and his front window shattered.  In Florida, 
you are roughly thirteen times more likely to be killed by lightning 
than win any single entry in the Florida lottery (lottery odds: 13.9 
million to one).  My home has been directly struck by lightning and 
suffered heavy damage.

This may help to explain to those who authored the sentences above 
why I still employ an 8 MHz, 8088 based, Sanyo MBC-775 computer as 
my primary communications computer (no hard drive).  Not counting the 
disfunctional Honeywell mainframe in the garage, I have over a dozen 
computers.  Why risk a more expensive (and failure prone) system when 
it's sophistication is not necessary?

PGP 2.2 works perfectly on my unit.  I suggest that the lockup 
problem may be more related to the many different approaches to 
writing an IBM compatible ROM BIOS, rather than to the processor 
used.  





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: ""L. Detweiler"" <ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Date: Sat, 12 Jun 93 23:02:29 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: PKP sellout = betrayal
In-Reply-To: <9306121202.AA16880@toad.com>
Message-ID: <9306130602.AA19359@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


S. Bellovin <smb@research.att.com>
>I don't see the hand of conspiracy here; rather, I see an encouraging
>trend, that the private sector is able to compete in cryptographic
>competence with NSA.
>
>I am encouraged by the pledges to allow non-commercial use -- note the
>lack of any RSAREF-like interface -- and to engage in non-discriminatory
>licensing.

By cooperating with NIST on DSA and Clipper, they are implicitly
sending the message that the poorly-to-outrageously directed standards
making processes for both are wholly acceptable assuming PKP directly
profits.  That is, that is the weak `nonconspirational' interpretation.
The conspirational interpretation is that this announcement is just a
blatant indication that PKP, in addition to NIST, is controlled by the NSA.

Let me remind everyone that Capstone has a yet-unspecified exchange
protocol. Denning suggested on RISKS that Diffie-Hellman (covered by
PKP patents) `could be used'.  There is some serious evasion going on
here. If Capstone is already built, with a public-key algorithm
installed, it suggests that PKP has been cooperating on the
Clipper/Capstone proposals all along.  It will be most interesting to
hear announcements on Capstone that announce its key exchange mechanism.

PKP `had' the ability to murder Clipper/Capstone in its crib if it so
desired, more so than any other single nexus, by denying the right to
use public key algorithms (on which it now has a strangling,
monopolistic lock). Gad, I can't believe it didn't occur to me to lobby
them to do so. In retrospect, it wouldn't have done anything more than
heighten the inevitable betrayal.

Maybe Mr. Bellovin can clarify how this agreement represents an
`encouraging trend in the private sector to compete with the NSA' --
Good lord man, not unless you think that PKP represents the entire
private sector in cryptographic applications. Uh, touche' -- you do and it does.

Does anybody feel like raiding PKP dumpsters? :(

P.S. doubt P.R.Z. will be in a docile mood after hearing this one...




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: J. Michael Diehl <mdiehl@triton.unm.edu>
Date: Sun, 13 Jun 93 01:17:55 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: alt.whistleblowing
Message-ID: <9306130817.AA01161@triton.unm.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I just started reading the alt.whistleblowing newsgroup.  It would seem that it
has already digressed into a flamefest.  Could the person who created it please
post a set of guidelines for the group!  Also, people are using their REAL 
names!  Appearantly, they don't know anything about the anon remailers....Could
someone post a notice about that, too?  Same thing goes WRT pgp.  We helped 
create this group, we ought to help keep it worth reading. ;^)
 
+-----------------------+-----------------------------+---------+
| J. Michael Diehl ;-)  | I thought I was wrong once. | PGP KEY |
| mdiehl@triton.unm.edu |   But, I was mistaken.      |available|
| mike.diehl@fido.org   |                             | Ask Me! |
| (505) 299-2282        +-----------------------------+---------+
|                                                               |
+------"I'm just looking for the opportunity to be -------------+
|            Politically Incorrect!"   <Me>                     |
+-----If codes are outlawed, only criminals wil have codes.-----+
+----Is Big Brother in your phone?  If you don't know, ask me---+




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: smb@research.att.com
Date: Sun, 13 Jun 93 01:34:11 PDT
To: ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu
Subject: Re: PKP sellout = betrayal
Message-ID: <9306130834.AA01183@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


	 Let me remind everyone that Capstone has a yet-unspecified
	 exchange protocol. Denning suggested on RISKS that
	 Diffie-Hellman (covered by PKP patents) `could be used'.
	 There is some serious evasion going on here. If Capstone is
	 already built, with a public-key algorithm installed, it
	 suggests that PKP has been cooperating on the Clipper/Capstone
	 proposals all along.  It will be most interesting to hear
	 announcements on Capstone that announce its key exchange
	 mechanism.

I'm not sure what your point is here.  It requires no conspiracy to opt
for Diffie-Hellman as a key exchange mechanism; it's simply the obvious
way to do things.  (I'm speaking professionally here; cryptographic
protocols are one of my research areas.)  The STU-III's already use
Diffie-Hellman; it's possible that the government's license for that
patent grants it broad rights for such things.  (The government does
have free use of RSA; is there any such clause with respect to Diffie-
Hellman?)

	 PKP `had' the ability to murder Clipper/Capstone in its crib
	 if it so desired, more so than any other single nexus, by
	 denying the right to use public key algorithms (on which it
	 now has a strangling, monopolistic lock). Gad, I can't believe
	 it didn't occur to me to lobby them to do so. In retrospect,
	 it wouldn't have done anything more than heighten the
	 inevitable betrayal.

No, PKP had no such ability.  Clipper was always a potential source of
profit to them, precisely because either RSA or Diffie-Hellman was
needed for it.  Given that they were going to make money from Clipper,
the only question was how much.  As Deep Throat said ~20 years ago,
``Follow the money''.  (Those a bit older still should recall Dow
Chemical's position on co-operating with the government.)

``Betrayal'' is a moral term.  As I said before, corporations don't
care about such things, only about bottom lines.

That some settlement about DSA would be reached was inevitable.  NIST
needed PKP's assent to go ahead with DSA.  PKP wanted to make money
from the DSA, because it extends their profitable lifetime -- the RSA
patent expires in 2001, whereas the Schnorr patent doesn't expire till
2008.  PKP only opposed DSA while they didn't own the Schnorr patent;
their other handle on DSA, the Diffie-Hellman patent, expires even
earlier (1997).

The interesting thing is the incentive to use Clipper.  That's not
something PKP cares about one way or another, compared with any sort of
widespread use of cryptography (though perhaps RSADSI does; if private
cryptography is restricted, RC2 and RC4 have much less of a market).
Obviously, NIST wanted some clause like that.  In exchange, they had to
give PKP something more.  My guess is that the hook was to grant them
exclusive world-wide licensing rights to DSA, rather than simply a cut
of the royalties.

	 Maybe Mr. Bellovin can clarify how this agreement represents
	 an `encouraging trend in the private sector to compete with
	 the NSA' -- Good lord man, not unless you think that PKP
	 represents the entire private sector in cryptographic
	 applications. Uh, touche' -- you do and it does.

I was unclear; I wasn't referring to the agreement at all.  Rather, I
meant that Schnorr had invented the algorithm that NIST had to have --
a signature scheme that is very efficient for smart cards, but could
not be used for secrecy.  NSA apparently didn't have anything better; I
can't believe they and NIST were unaware of Schnorr's work (though
perhaps they were unaware of the patent).  (I suppose, of course, that
NSA might have had something totally different, which they couldn't
discuss because it would open up new areas for civilian research...)

	 P.S. doubt P.R.Z. will be in a docile mood after hearing this
	 one...

Especially given the part about reserving the right not to license to
infringers....




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Eric Hughes <hughes@soda.berkeley.edu>
Date: Sun, 13 Jun 93 07:40:57 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: what happens when you reply to nobody@cicada.berkeley.edu ?
In-Reply-To: <9306130335.AA16404@cicada.berkeley.edu>
Message-ID: <9306131437.AA22430@soda.berkeley.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


The name 'nobody' is frequently aliased to /dev/null, i.e. the bit
bucket.  I cannot speak for cicada in particular.  When I wrote the
first of these remailers, I remailed from nobody because it was the
/dev/null alias; responding to anonymity should get you nothing.

Eric




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Eric Hughes <hughes@soda.berkeley.edu>
Date: Sun, 13 Jun 93 08:14:53 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Mail logging
In-Reply-To: <9306120356.AA11546@toad.com>
Message-ID: <9306131511.AA22941@soda.berkeley.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>>The single most basic problem with mail development that we have is
>>that we don't have enough mail volume through the remailers we have

>Well, I hate to point out the obvious but can we organise with the
>list maintainer to have our mail routed through random machines until
>it gets to us? 

No.  toad.com is overloaded as it is.  It's slow as molasses already,
and adding any encryption at all to cypherpunks would make it even
worse.  Even forking a process per user would be way to much.

As I said before, any experimentation that people want to do with list
distribution can be done by hacking the current remailer code.  You
don't have to have any sysadmin privileges to do this.  You don't even
have to have my permission to do this.  

Eric




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Doug Porter <dporter@well.sf.ca.us>
Date: Sun, 13 Jun 93 09:46:04 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: PKP
Message-ID: <93Jun13.094534pdt.13887-3@well.sf.ca.us>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Ok, PKP now effectively has a monopoly. Is an antitrust action 
appropriate?

The timing of this announcement, just after Clipper got set back hard, 
may be significant. It would have raised far fewer suspicions to put the 
license out to bid and then make sure PKP got it. My partner, who rejects 
conspiracy theories out of hand, described the action as "stupid". The 
folks at Meade may be running scared.

The announcement is viewed by some as unnecessarily verifying PKP as a 
previously hidden asset. If someone is overreacting, perhaps those 
fighting for freedom are getting to them.

Doug




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: hkhenson@cup.portal.com
Date: Sun, 13 Jun 93 18:05:22 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: alt.whistleblowing
Message-ID: <9306131218.1.10271@cup.portal.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Can an alt.group be moderated?  If so, the moderator could be through
an anon remailer.  Of course, bozos can still add their sig line. :)
Keith




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Doug Porter <dporter@well.sf.ca.us>
Date: Sun, 13 Jun 93 12:36:28 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: PKP
Message-ID: <93Jun13.123601pdt.13888-1@well.sf.ca.us>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> establishing and securing a monopoly is the whole point of patent law.

Sure is; but patents are intended to convey a sharply limited monopoly. I 
seem to remember Judge Green expressing intense dissatisfaction with 
interlocking patents used to control an entire industry.

We need info from someone who knows. Mike, are you listening, and are you 
familiar with antitrust law?

Doug




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: peter honeyman <honey@citi.umich.edu>
Date: Sun, 13 Jun 93 10:06:12 PDT
To: Doug Porter <dporter@well.sf.ca.us>
Subject: Re: PKP
In-Reply-To: <93Jun13.094534pdt.13887-3@well.sf.ca.us>
Message-ID: <9306131706.AA09634@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> Ok, PKP now effectively has a monopoly. Is an antitrust action 
> appropriate?

no.  establishing and securing a monopoly is the whole point of patent law.

personally, i plan to continue to infringe on the pkp patents -- protected
by the research use exclusion and the rsaref noncommerical-use license -- 
while the onslaught of time makes pkp assets ever less viable.  

fuck 'em.  join me.

	peter




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Timothy Newsham <newsham@wiliki.eng.hawaii.edu>
Date: Sun, 13 Jun 93 19:51:13 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: digital cash
Message-ID: <9306140251.AA27197@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Several people on this list seem interested in the idea of setting
up a digital cash system.  A while back someone was dumping legal
info on the legitimacy of running your own bank.  I have an idea
that would allow for "fun" use of digital cash systems while 
allowing a platform to test out ideas and put the system into
a somewhat "real" environment.
  All that is needed for a digital cash environment is a way
to earn money and a way to spend money.  The ideas proposed
so far seemed to be "send me real money and we'll give you
credits."   How about putting the digital money in a game/bbs
environment?  Example:  mud's could allow people to transfer
their funds between different games,  to give away some of
their game money electronically to others, etc.  BBS's might
let you spend your digital cash earned from a MUD for more
time or other services.  Maybe they'll let you earn money from
them in special ways.  A bank could be set up, and fixed sized
donations could be sent out to each service (BBS, MUD, etc)
participating.  Each service could then award its participants
with earnings as they play.  
  How could something like this actually come about?  Banking
routines for transfer of funds would have to be written
in portable code,  with an easy interface for software authors
to use in their packages.  Most people running BBS's, MUD's
and other services on the net have the technical knowledge
to patch something this simple into their programs.

  I am not a big fan of MUD's, and hardly BBS around, but
I think this might be a good way to get a system up and
running.  This will enable flaws in the system to surface,
and even under very bad circumstances, no one loses real
money.
                          Tim




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: surfpunk@osc.versant.com (erfhetraf)
Date: Sun, 13 Jun 93 18:37:47 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com (__CYPHERPUNKS)
Subject: [surfpunk-0086] CRYPT: PKP and NIST cross-license
Message-ID: <surfpunk-0086@SURFPUNK.Technical.Journal.__CYPHERPUNKS>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


#ifdef __CYPHERPUNKS

fellow cypherpunks -- I'm forwarding you this copy of SURFPUNK that
I just produced.  It tries to deal with the cypherpunk events of the 
last few days.  If someone has a good summary of all this, 
a cypherpunk press release, so to speak, I'd love to publish it, too.
Also corrections and clarifications and even flames are welcome.

Brief info on SURFPUNK -- we cover cypherpunk, cyberpunk, 
conscious hacking, public policy, what's new on the net, etc.
We republish a lot of hard information from other lists.
We have some overlap with cypherpunks, but pretty much SURFPUNK is 
reaching 300 more people.

		keep practicing,  strick
				strick@versant.com

#endif /*__CYPHERPUNKS*/

                        #  Subject: I want my SURFPUNK
                        #
                        #  I don't know what happened to my subscription to
                        #  SURFPUNK, but I haven't received an issue since
                        #  May 5. I'd like to have it back. Thanks.
                        #
                        #			-- a concerned surfpunker


Whew.  It's been a long time.  Apologies.  I've had a different sort of
mailer problems each week.  But I hope we're back now to stay.

If you haven't received an issue since #0085 on Wed, 5 May 93,
you're not missing any.  We've been out for a good month.

Our address has simplified.  We are now simply "surfpunk@versant.com".
It used to be "surfpunk@osc.versant.com".  You can now drop the "osc".

If you are missing surfpunks, or want old backissues, 
use the "www" (or "xmosaic") server with the Universal Record Locator

	http://www.acns.nwu.edu/surfpunk/

(and check out the first issue of BLINK while you're there).
[ Write <j-germuska@nwu.edu> for more info on BLINK. ]

This is a theme issue -- see the first article.    --strick

________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________


0000000  a55a e970 d8f6 7ea7 3838 6988 5c4e 337c
0000020  ba89 c087 915b 4652 fa21 e20e c5db 3e03
0000040  a856 e161 fa23 50d3 efa9 0641 96c8 50a5
0000060  ee84 beb0 b865 d2d8 8299 f98c 2e97 a2d3
0000100  4df7 db2a 8845 6ea3 1068 a3f8 331f 0c6d
0000120  efe8 4ac7 d0c7 5eb7 f4ce 9434 22f8 c2c6
0000140  d2bd 2db2 40d9 8672 f4f4 f0ed da9f 7393
0000160  b9d2 15d4 e653 d649 a15c 2161 f7bc 62ed

________________________________________________________________________


Subject: _f y__ c_n wr_t_ th_s, g_ t_ j__l
From: strick

This issue will contain a number of documents relating to
cryptography.  The last couple of months have seen a lot of action in
this realm, and I wish I had a good summary of what the big moves were
and what the current status is.  It would be difficult, however, to
separate the plain fact of what documents say from what they imply and
what is really going on behind the scenes.

Here's a very brief, highlevel summary, from my own point of view.
It's probably not too far off from the consensus at the Mountain View
Cypherpunks physical meeting last weekend.  It discussses US policy,
but it will certainly influence the rest of the world's policies.

We seem to be moving from an era when the US policy on cryptography was
something like this:  Any encryption is legal within the US [ and
perhaps Canada ] boundaries, but only very weak encryption can be
exported.  The restrictions on export may not have made much sense on
the surface, but they have sucessfully prevented the really popular
products from using encryption.  In effect, the available encryption is
weak enough that a determined agent, perhaps the U S Government, can
easily crack it.

The new era might be this:  Strong encryption is available within the
US, and even mandated in some cases, but only encryption that leaves
"escrowed" keys is allowed.  The escrowed keys are available to the U S
Government.   Any other strong encryption is made illegal.

How to make encryption illegal is a good question.  Any strings of
seemingly random numbers could potentially be an encrypted message.
Could you imagine going to jail if you cannot decode stray bits?

I'm not going to try to convince you that this is the ultimate goal,
but I do hope you will try to understand what is happening.  A paranoid
view is that all of these decisions are already made, and the
technology is in place, and now, with only token public debate, the
system will be put in place.  If this is correct, then President
Clinton will be of little help; he is already a strong proponent of the
Clipper chip.  I don't know if the paranoid view is correct, but it is
plausible.

Sorry if this isn't a fun issue.  I hope the documents I pick are helpful.  
What's in this issue of SURFPUNK:

  -- NIST and PKP cross-lisence, to lock public key encryption
	and the NIST-proposed digitial signature algorithm.
	About two months ago PKP acquired the Schorr patent, 
	which supposedly covers the DSA algorithm that NIST
	proposes for digital signatures.
  -- Opinion by Hal Finney
  -- Opinion by L. Detweiler 
  -- NIST Crypto Resolutions, Computer System Security and 
	Privacy Advisory Board, June 4, 1993
  -- CPSR Crypto Statement to NIST 
	Computer System Security and Privacy Advisory Board, June 1993
  -- CPSR Crypto Statement to The Subcommittee on 
	Telecommunications and Finance,
	 Committee on Energy and Commerce,
	U.S. House of Representatives,  June 9, 1993 [ from CuD #5.43 ]
	

For more info, try these resources:

  ** Usenet groups sci.crypt

  ** Usenet groups comp.risks (RISKS Forum)

  ** Usenet groups comp.org.eff.news

  ** Usenet groups comp.org.eff.talk

  ** EFF ftp site:  ftp.eff.org

  ** Cypherpunks mailing list: cypherpunk-request@toad.com

  ** Cypherpunks ftp site
	soda.berkeley.edu : /pub/cypherpunks

  ** Computer Underground Digest
     Usenet group comp.society.cu-digest
     subscriptions: tk0jut2@mvs.cso.niu.edu
	     ANONYMOUS FTP SITES:
	  UNITED STATES:  ftp.eff.org (192.88.144.4) in /pub/cud
			  uglymouse.css.itd.umich.edu (141.211.182.53) 
			  halcyon.com( 202.135.191.2) in /pub/mirror/cud
	  AUSTRALIA:      ftp.ee.mu.oz.au (128.250.77.2) in /pub/text/CuD.
	  EUROPE:         nic.funet.fi in pub/doc/cud. (Finland)
			  ftp.warwick.ac.uk in pub/cud (United Kingdom)


________________________________________________________________________

0000200  ff5d 91ce 4fff ad85 57b4 a2a8 b354 9cd0
0000220  ab61 c3f6 ad38 d6dd 7f74 01ad e27e ca2e
0000240  e348 3346 1c03 c629 dfa0 09b7 43f6 f992
0000260  25a1 e863 6f16 49a1 cf88 2fdb 4562 00ec
0000300  b330 9bff 2493 5b5c 59cc 7dbc c0cf 46f2
0000320  888d b538 d02a ae5a 0153 ad8f fd19 8ebb
0000340  f25a 0712 8e87 be58 6e27 b639 21ab ddb7
0000360  4026 b065 f228 bad9 bc7e f407 3713 1246

________________________________________________________________________


To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: it's official: PKP sells out for Clipper
Date: Fri, 11 Jun 93 20:19:45 -0600
From: ""L. Detweiler"" <ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu>


>From the following document:

>PKP will also grant a license to practice key management, at no
>additional fee, for the integrated circuits which will implement
>both the DSA and the anticipated Federal Information Processing
>Standard for the "key escrow" system announced by President Clinton
>on April 16, 1993.

more weasel words:

>Notice of availability of this invention for licensing
>was waived because it was determined that expeditious granting of
>such license will best serve the interest of the Federal Government
>and the public.

what else?

===cut=here===

From: jim@rand.org (Jim Gillogly)
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
Subject: DSA: NIST and PKP come to terms
Message-ID: <16860@rand.org>
Date: 11 Jun 93 20:56:44 GMT
Sender: news@rand.org
Organization: Banzai Institute

This text was transcribed from a fax and may have transcription
errors.  We believe the text to be correct but some of the numbers
may be incorrect or incomplete.

---------------------------------------------------------------------

 ** The following notice was published in the Federal Register, Vol.
           58, No. 108, dated June 8, 1993 under Notices **

National Institute of Standards and Technology

Notice of Proposal for Grant of Exclusive Patent License

This is to notify the public that the National Institute of
Standards and Technology (NIST) intends to grant an exclusive
world-wide license to Public Key Partners of Sunnyvale, California
to practice the Invention embodied in U.S. Patent Application No.
07/738.431 and entitled "Digital Signature Algorithm."  A PCT
application has been filed.  The rights in the invention have been
assigned to the United States of America. 

The prospective license is a cross-license which would resolve a
patent dispute with Public Key Partners and includes the right to
sublicense.  Notice of availability of this invention for licensing
was waived because it was determined that expeditious granting of
such license will best serve the interest of the Federal Government
and the public.  Public Key Partners has provided NIST with the
materials contained in Appendix A as part of their proposal to
NIST.

Inquiries, comments, and other materials relating to the prospec-
tive license shall be submitted to Michael R. Rubin, Active Chief
Counsel for Technology, Room A-1111, Administration Building,
National Institute of Standards and Technology, Gaithersburg,
Maryland 20899.  His telephone number is (301) 975-2803.  Applica-
tions for a license filed in response to this notice will be
treated as objections to the grant of the prospective license.  
Only written comments and/or applications for a license which are
received by NIST within sixty (60) days for the publication of this
notice will be considered.

The prospective license will be granted unless, within sixty (60)
days of this notice, NIST receives written evidence and argument
which established that the grant of the license would not be
consistent with the requirements of 35 U.S.C. 209 and 37 CFR 404.7.

  Dated:  June 2, 1993.

Raymond G. Kammer
Acting Director, National Institute Standards and Technology.

Appendix "A"

The National Institute for Standards and Technology ("NIST") has
announced its intention to grant Public Key Partners ("PKP")
sublicensing rights to NIST's pending patent application on the
Digital Signature Algorithm ("DSA").

Subject to NIST's grant of this license, PKP is pleased to declare
its support for the proposed Federal Information Processing
Standard for Digital Signatures (the "DSS") and the pending
availability of licenses to practice the DSA.  In addition to the
DSA, licenses to practice digital signatures will be offered by PKP
under the following patents:

          Cryptographic Apparatus and Method ("Diffie-Hellman")
                No. 4,200,770
          Public Key Cryptographic Apparatus and Method
		("Hellman-Merkle")   No. 4,315,552
          Exponential Cryptographic Apparatus and Method
                ("Hellman-Pohlig")   No. 4,434,414
          Method For Identifying Subscribers And For Generating
		And Verifying Electronic Signatures In A Data Exchange
                System ("Schnorr")   No. 4,995,082

It is PKP's intent to make practice of the DSA royalty free for
personal, noncommercial and U.S. Federal, state and local
government use.  As explained below, only those parties who enjoy
commercial benefit from making or selling products, or certifying
digital signatures, will be required to pay royalties to practice
the DSA.

PKP will also grant a license to practice key management, at no
additional fee, for the integrated circuits which will implement
both the DSA and the anticipated Federal Information Processing
Standard for the "key escrow" system announced by President Clinton
on April 16, 1993.

Having stated these intentions, PKP now takes this opportunity to
publish its guidelines for granting uniform licenses to all parties
having a commercial interest in practicing this technology:

First, no party will be denied a license for any reason other that
the following:

          (i)    Failure to meet its payment obligations,
          (ii)   Outstanding claims of infringement, or
          (iii)  Previous termination due to material breach.

Second, licenses will be granted for any embodiment sold by the
licensee or made for its use, whether for final products software,
or components such as integrated circuits and boards, and regard-
less of the licensee's channel of distribution.  Provided the
requisite royalties have been paid by the seller on the enabling
component(s), no further royalties will be owned by the buyer for
making or selling the final product which incorporates such
components.

Third, the practice of digital signatures in accordance with the
DSS may be licensed separately from any other technical art covered
by PKP's patents.

Fourth, PKP's royalty rates for the right to make or sell products,
subject to uniform minimum fees, will be no more than 2 1/2% for
hardware products and 5% for software, with the royalty rate
further declining to 1% on any portion of the product price
exceeding $1,000.  These royalty rates apply only to noninfringing
parties and will be uniform without regard to whether the licensed
product creates digital signatures, verifies digital signatures or
performs both.

Fifth, for the next three (3) years, all commercial services which
certify a signature's authenticity for a fee may be operated
royalty free.  Thereafter, all providers of such commercial
certification services shall pay a royalty to PKP of $1.00 per
certificate for each year the certificate is valid.

Sixth, provided the foregoing royalties are paid on such products
or services, all other practice of the DSA shall be royalty free.

Seventh, PKP invites all of its existing licensees, at their
option, to exchange their current licenses for the standard license
offered for DSA.

Finally, PKP will mediate the concerns of any party regarding the
availability of PKP's licenses for the DSA with designated
representatives of NIST and PKP.  For copies of PKP's license
terms, contact Michael R. Rubin, Acting Chief Counsel for Technolo-
gy, NIST, or Public Key Partners.

  Dated:  June 2, 1993.

Robert B. Fougner, Esq.,
Director of Licensing, Public Key Partners,
310 North Mary Avenue, Sunnyvale, CA  94033

[FR Doc. 93-13473 Filed 8-7-93; 8:45 am]

---------------------------------------------------------------------
Forwarded by:
-- 
	Jim Gillogly
	Trewesday, 21 Forelithe S.R. 1993, 20:56

________________________________________________________________________

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________________________________________________________________________

From: hal@alumni.cco.caltech.edu (Hal Finney)
Date: Fri, 11 Jun 93 22:27:09 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: PKP sellout?

This was my response on sci.crypt to this announcement that PKP will
be supporting DSS, and licensing its technology for use by Clipper
phones.  Thanks to Lance for alerting us to this announcement.

-----

jim@rand.org (Jim Gillogly) forwards:

>This is to notify the public that the National Institute of
>Standards and Technology (NIST) intends to grant an exclusive
>world-wide license to Public Key Partners of Sunnyvale, California
>to practice the Invention embodied in U.S. Patent Application No.
>07/738.431 and entitled "Digital Signature Algorithm."

And so it appears that another patent jewel will be added to the crown
worn by PKP, the de facto owner of cryptographic technology in the United
States.  They will have an exclusive license to the DSA, as they already
do to RSA and most other worthwhile encryption technologies.

This also appears to put to rest the much-publicized feud between RSA and
NIST/NSA.  Conspiracy theorists can now comfortably return to the
position that PKP/RSADSI is actually an arm of the NSA, dedicated to
restricting and delaying access to strong cryptography as much as
possible.

>Notice of availability of this invention for licensing
>was waived because it was determined that expeditious granting of
>such license will best serve the interest of the Federal Government
>and the public.

Once again we are presented with a fait accompli; no other organizations
were given an opportunity to bid for the licensing of this patent.  The
government prefers to see PKP holding the keys to all cryptography in the
U.S.  Remember how Clipper's technology was similarly assigned to
particular corporations on a non-competitive basis?

>Subject to NIST's grant of this license, PKP is pleased to declare
>its support for the proposed Federal Information Processing
>Standard for Digital Signatures (the "DSS") and the pending
>availability of licenses to practice the DSA.

And what of the technical objections to DSA/DSS raised in earlier
documents by officials of RSADSI, such as in the recent CACM?  No doubt
those objections are now moot.

>PKP will also grant a license to practice key management, at no
>additional fee, for the integrated circuits which will implement
>both the DSA and the anticipated Federal Information Processing
>Standard for the "key escrow" system announced by President Clinton
>on April 16, 1993.

So PKP is now supporting key escrow and Clipper.  Can anyone seriously
argue that this company is a friend to supporters of strong cryptography?  

These are dark times indeed.  PKP has thrown in with the government,
getting behind DSS and Clipper in exchange for exclusive licensing
rights.  Their ownership of DH and RSA will make it that much harder for
any competition to Clipper to arise.

If the 60-day comment period really means anything, perhaps public
criticism can be effective here.  There is much to be concerned about in
this announcement.

Hal Finney
hal@alumni.caltech.edu

________________________________________________________________________

0000600  c8aa 62f7 811f e878 3616 b536 f59e fe2d
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0000740  7fd0 dd7a 3608 63de 20ee 94fd c55c ef3d
0000760  41b2 89f9 e373 f2b5 df3e eaf0 142e a17b

________________________________________________________________________

To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: PKP sellout = betrayal
Date: Sun, 13 Jun 93 00:00:45 -0600
From: ""L. Detweiler"" <ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu>

S. Bellovin <smb@research.att.com>
>I don't see the hand of conspiracy here; rather, I see an encouraging
>trend, that the private sector is able to compete in cryptographic
>competence with NSA.
>
>I am encouraged by the pledges to allow non-commercial use -- note the
>lack of any RSAREF-like interface -- and to engage in non-discriminatory
>licensing.

By cooperating with NIST on DSA and Clipper, they are implicitly
sending the message that the poorly-to-outrageously directed standards
making processes for both are wholly acceptable assuming PKP directly
profits.  That is, that is the weak `nonconspirational' interpretation.
The conspirational interpretation is that this announcement is just a
blatant indication that PKP, in addition to NIST, is controlled by the NSA.

Let me remind everyone that Capstone has a yet-unspecified exchange
protocol. Denning suggested on RISKS that Diffie-Hellman (covered by
PKP patents) `could be used'.  There is some serious evasion going on
here. If Capstone is already built, with a public-key algorithm
installed, it suggests that PKP has been cooperating on the
Clipper/Capstone proposals all along.  It will be most interesting to
hear announcements on Capstone that announce its key exchange mechanism.

PKP `had' the ability to murder Clipper/Capstone in its crib if it so
desired, more so than any other single nexus, by denying the right to
use public key algorithms (on which it now has a strangling,
monopolistic lock). Gad, I can't believe it didn't occur to me to lobby
them to do so. In retrospect, it wouldn't have done anything more than
heighten the inevitable betrayal.

Maybe Mr. Bellovin can clarify how this agreement represents an
`encouraging trend in the private sector to compete with the NSA' --
Good lord man, not unless you think that PKP represents the entire
private sector in cryptographic applications. Uh, touche' -- you do and it does.

Does anybody feel like raiding PKP dumpsters? :(

P.S. doubt P.R.Z. will be in a docile mood after hearing this one...

________________________________________________________________________

0001000  26b5 740f 361d c550 1053 5998 56dc 1e64
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0001040  9892 7e43 17ed bef3 10d0 c9ea 7b1a f2ed
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0001140  52c3 93e5 4472 1336 7e88 b901 cc76 c18e
0001160  a949 456d 2c94 6c0e 90fc d109 e2ed 224b

________________________________________________________________________

From: Dave Banisar <Banisar@washofc.cpsr.org>
Newsgroups: alt.privacy,alt.security,comp.org.eff.talk,sci.crypt,alt.privacy.clipper
Subject: NIST CSSPAB Resolutions 6/4/93
Date: 5 Jun 1993 00:48:11 GMT
Organization: CPSR Washington Office



                 NIST Crypto Resolutions

  Computer System Security and Privacy Advisory Board
                       June 4, 1993

                      Resolution #1

At Mr. Kammer's request we have conducted two days of 
hearings.  The clear message of the majority of input 
was that there are serious concerns regarding the Key 
Escrow Initiative and the Board concurs with these 
concerns.  Many of these issues are still to be fully 
understood and more time is needed to achieving that 
understanding.

Accordingly, this Board resolves to have an additional 
meeting in July 1993 in order to more completely respond 
to Mr. Kammer's request and to fulfill its statutory 
obligations under P.L. 100-235.  The Board recommends 
that the inter-agency review take note of our input 
collected, our preliminary finding, and adjust the 
timetable to allow for resolution of the significant 
issues and problems raised.

Attached to this resolution is a preliminary 
distillation of the serious concerns and problems.


                     Resolution #2

Key escrowing encryption technology represents a 
dramatic change in the nation's information 
infrastructure.  The full implications of this 
encryption technique are not fully understood at this 
time.  Therefore, the Board recommends that key 
escrowing encryption technology not be deployed beyond 
current implementations planned within the Executive 
Branch, until the significant public policy and 
technical issues inherent with this encryption technique 
are fully understood.

[Attachment to Resolution #1]]

-  A convincing statement of the problem that Clipper 
attempts to solve has not been provided.

- Export and important controls over cryptographic 
products must be reviewed.  Based upon data compiled 
from U.S. and international vendors, current controls 
are negatively impacting U.S. competitiveness in the 
world market and are not inhibiting the foreign 
production and use of cryptography (DES and RSA)

- The Clipper/Capstone proposal does not address the 
needs of the software industry, which is a critical and 
significant component of the National Information 
Infrastructure and the U.S. economy.

- Additional DES encryption alternatives and key 
management alternatives should be considered since there 
is a significant installed base.

- The individuals reviewing the Skipjack algorithm and 
key management system must be given an appropriate time 
period and environment in which to perform a thorough 
review.  This review must address the escrow protocol 
and chip implementation as well as the algorithm itself.

- Sufficient information must be provided on the 
proposed key escrow scheme to allow it to be fully 
understood by the general public.  It does not appear to 
be clearly defined at this time and, since it is an 
integral part of the security of the system, it appears 
to require further development and consideration of 
alternatives to the key escrow scheme (e.g., three 
"escrow" entities, one of which is a non-government 
agency, and a software based solution).

- The economic implications for the Clipper/Capstone 
proposal have not been examined.  These costs go beyond 
the vendor cost of the chip and include such factors as 
customer installation, maintenance, administration, chip 
replacement, integration and interfacing, government 
escrow systems costs, etc.

- Legal issues raised by the proposal must be reviewed.

- Congress, as well as the Administration, should play a 
role in the conduct and approval of the results of the 
review.

=======================================================
    NIST Resolutions on Key Escow Issues and Clipper
                       provided by
                 CPSR Washington office
           666 Pennsylvania Ave., SE Suite 303
                  Washington, DC 20003
               rotenberg@washofc.cpsr.org
=======================================================


________________________________________________________________________

0001200  87ce da42 62c0 89bf aae8 c933 f8c2 c29b
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0001340  460d 2de6 4e0e 7058 85de bc5e 17f1 4ffb
0001360  006a 3347 8da1 192b 01d3 da57 98ed f6c3

________________________________________________________________________


Organization: CPSR Civil Liberties and Computing Project
From: Dave Banisar <banisar@washofc.cpsr.org>
To: CYPHERPUNKS <CYPHERPUNKS@toad.com>
Date: Wed, 2 Jun 1993 21:20:10 EST    
Subject: CPSR NIST Crypto Statement 


  CPSR NIST Crypto Statement

                    Department of Commerce
        National Institute of Standards and Technology

      Computer System Security and Privacy Advisory Board

                Review of Cryptography Policy
                          June 1993

             Statement of CPSR Washington office
                  Marc Rotenberg, director
                (rotenberg@washofc.cpsr.org)
               with David Sobel, legal counsel,
                 Dave Banisar, policy analyst


     Mr. Chairman, members of the Advisory Panel, thank you for the 
opportunity to speak today about emerging issues on cryptography 
policy. 

     My name is Marc Rotenberg and I am director of the CPSR 
Washington office.  Although CPSR does not represent any computer 
firm or industry trade association, we speak for many in the 
computer profession who value privacy and are concerned about the 
government's Clipper proposal.

     During the last several years CPSR has organized several meetings 
to promote public discussion of cryptography issues.  We have also 
obtained important government documents through the Freedom of 
Information Act.  We believe that good policies will only result if the 
public, the profession, and the policy makers are fully informed 
about the significance of these recent proposals.

     We are pleased that the Advisory Board has organized hearings.  
This review of cryptography policy will help determine if the Clipper 
proposal is in the best interests of the country.  We believe that a 
careful review of the relevant laws and policies shows that the key 
escrow arrangement is at odds with the public interest, and that 
therefore the Clipper proposal should not go forward.

     Today I will address issues 1 through 3 identified in the NIST 
announcement, specifically the policy requirements of the Computer 
Security Act, the legal issues surrounding the key escrow 
arrangement, and the importance of privacy for network 
development.


1. CRYPTOGRAPHY POLICY

     The first issue concerns the 1987 statute enacted to improve 
computer security in the federal government, to clarify the 
responsibilities of NIST and NSA, and to ensure that technical 
standards would serve civilian and commercial needs.  The Computer 
Security Act, which also established this Advisory Panel, is the true 
cornerstone of cryptography policy in the United States.  That law 
made clear that in the area of unclassified computing systems, the 
Department of Commerce and not the Department of Defense, would 
be responsible for the development of technical standards.  It 
emphasized public accountability and stressed open decision-making.

     The Computer Security Act grew out of a concern that classified 
standards and secret meetings would not serve the interests of the 
general public.  As the practical applications for cryptography have 
moved from the military and intelligence arenas to the commercial 
sphere, this point has become clear.  There is also clearly a conflict of 
interest when an agency tasked with signal interception is also given 
authority to develop standards for network security.  

     In the spirit of the Computer Security Act, NIST set out in 1989 to 
develop a public key standard FIPS.  In a memo dated May 5, 1989 
and obtained by CPSR through the Freedom of Information Act, NIST 
said that it planned:

         to develop the necessary public-key based security 
         standards.  We require a public-key algorithm for 
         calculating digital signatures and we also require a 
         public-key algorithm for distributing secret keys.  

NIST then went on to define the requirements of the standard:

         The algorithms that we use must be public, unclassified, 
         implementable in both hardware or software, usable by 
         federal Agencies and U.S. based multi-national 
         corporation, and must provide a level of security 
         sufficient for the protection of unclassified, sensitive 
         information and commercial propriety and/or valuable 
         information.

     The Clipper proposal and the full-blown Capstone configuration, 
which incorporates the key management function NIST set out to 
develop in 1989, is very different from the one originally conceived 
by NIST. 

         %  The Clipper algorithm, Skipjack, is classified,

         %  Public access to the reasons underlying the proposal is 
            restricted, 

         %  Skipjack can be implemented only in tamper-proof 
            hardware, 

         %  It is unlikely to be used by multi-national corporations, 
            and

         %  Its security remains unproven.

     The Clipper proposal undermines the central purpose of the 
Computer Security Act.  Although intended for broad use in 
commercial networks, it was not developed at the request of either 
U.S. business or the general public.  It does not reflect public goals.  
Rather it reflects the interests of one secret agency with the 
authority to conduct foreign signal intelligence and another 
government agency  responsible for law enforcement investigations.  

     It is our belief that the Clipper proposal clearly violates the intent 
of the Computer Security Act of 1987.  
What is the significance of this?  It is conceivable that an expert 
panel of cryptographers will review the Skipjack algorithm and find 
that it lives up its billing, that there is no "trap door" and no easy 
way to reverse-engineer.  In fact, the White House has proposed just 
such a review process 

     But is this process adequate?  Is this the procedure the Advisory 
Board would endorse for the development of widespread technical 
standards?  The expert participants will probably not be permitted 
to publish their assessments of the proposal in scientific journals, 
further review of the standard will be restricted, and those who are 
skeptical will remain in the dark about the actual design of the chip.  
This may be an appropriate process for certain military systems, but 
it is clearly inappropriate for a technical standard that the 
government believes should be widely incorporated into the 
communications infrastructure.

     Good government policy requires that certain process goals be 
satisfied.  Decisions should be made in the open.  The interests of the 
participating agencies should be clear.  Agencies should be 
accountable for their actions and recommendations.  Black boxes and 
government oversight are not compatible.

     There is an even greater obligation to promote open decisions 
where technical and scientific issues are at stake.  Innovation 
depends on openness.  The scientific method depends on the ability 
of researchers to "kick the tires" and "test drive" the product.  And, 
then, even if it is a fairly good design, additional testing encourages 
the development of new features, improved performance and 
reduced cost.  Government secrecy is incompatible which such a 
development process.

     Many of these principles are incorporated into the Computer 
Security Act and the Freedom of Information Act.  The current 
government policy on the development of unclassified technical 
standards, as set out in the Computer Security Act, is a very good 
policy.  It emphasizes public applications, stresses open review, and 
ensures public accountability.  It is not the policy that is flawed.  It is 
the Clipper proposal.

     To accept the Clipper proposal would be to endorse a process that 
ran contrary to the law, that discourages innovation, and that 
undermines openness.


2. LEGAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES

     There are several legal and constitutional issues raised by the 
government's key escrow proposal.  

     The premise of the Clipper key escrow arrangement is that the 
government must have the ability to intercept electronic 
communications, regardless of the economic or societal costs.  The 
FBI's Digital Telephony proposal, and the earlier Senate bill 266, was 
based on the same assumption.

     There are a number of arguments made in defense of this 
position: that privacy rights and law enforcement needs must be 
balanced, or that the government will be unable to conduct criminal 
investigations without this capability. 

     Regardless of how one views these various claims, there is one 
point about the law that should be made very clear: currently there 
is no legal basis -- in statute, the Constitution or anywhere else --  
that supports the premise which underlies the Clipper proposal.  As 
the law currently stands, surveillance is not a design goal.  General 
Motors would have a stronger legal basis for building cars that could 
not go faster than 65 miles per hour than AT&T does in marketing a 
commercial telephone that has a built-in wiretap capability.  In law 
there is simply nothing about the use of a telephone that is 
inherently illegal or suspect.

     The federal wiretap statute says only that communication service 
providers must assist law enforcement in the execution of a lawful 
warrant.  It does not say that anyone is obligated to design systems 
to facilitate future wire surveillance.  That distinction is the 
difference between countries that restrict wire surveillance to 
narrow circumstances defined in law and those that treat all users of 
the telephone network as potential criminals.  U.S. law takes the first 
approach.  Countries such as the former East Germany took the 
second approach.  The use of the phone system by citizens was 
considered inherently suspect and for that reason more than 10,000 
people were employed by the East German government to listen in 
on telephone calls.

     It is precisely because the wiretap statute does not contain the 
obligation to incorporate surveillance capability -- the design 
premise of the Clipper proposal -- that the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation introduced the Digital Telephony legislation.  But that 
legislation has not moved forward on Capitol Hill and the law has 
remained unchanged.  The Clipper proposal attempts to accomplish 
through the standard-setting and procurement process what the 
Congress has been unwilling to do through the legislative process.

     On legal grounds, adopting the Clipper would be a mistake.  There 
is an important policy goal underlying the wiretap law.  The Fourth 
Amendment and the federal wiretap statute do not so much balance 
competing interests as they erect barriers against government excess 
and define the proper scope of criminal investigation.  The purpose 
of the federal wiretap law is to restrict the government, it is not to 
coerce the public.

     Therefore, if the government endorses the Clipper proposal, it will 
undermine the basic philosophy of the federal wiretap law and the 
fundamental values embodied in the Constitution.  It will establish a 
technical mechanism for signal interception based on a premise that 
has no legal foundation.  I am not speaking rhetorically about "Big 
Brother."  My point is simply that the assumption underlying the 
Clipper proposal is more compatible with the practice of telephone 
surveillance in the former East Germany than it is with the narrowly 
limited circumstances that wire surveillance has been allowed in the 
United States.  

     There are a number of other legal issues that have not been 
adequately considered by the proponents of the key escrow 
arrangement that the Advisory Board should examine.  First, not all 
lawful wiretaps follow a normal warrant process.  It is critical that 
the proponents of Clipper make very clear how emergency wiretaps 
will be conducted before the proposal goes forward.  Second, there 
may be civil liability issues for the escrow agents if there is abuse or 
compromise of the keys.  Escrow agents may be liable for any harm 
that results.  Third, there is a Fifth Amendment dimension to the 
proposed escrow key arrangement if a network user is compelled to 
disclose his or her key to the government in order to access a 
communications network. Each one of these issues should be 
examined.  

     There is also one legislative change that we would like the 
Advisory Board to consider.  During our FOIA litigation, the NSA cited 
a 1951 law to withhold certain documents that were critical to 
understand the development of the Digital Signature Standard.  The 
law, passed  grants the government the right restrict the disclosure 
of any classified information pertaining to cryptography.  While the 
government may properly withhold classified information in FOIA 
cases, the practical impact of this particular provision is to provide 
another means to insulate cryptographic policy from public review.  

     Given the importance of public review of cryptography policy, the 
requirement of the Computer Security Act, and the Advisory Board's 
own commitment to an open, public process, we ask the Advisory 
Board to recommend to the President and to the Congress that 
section 798 be repealed or substantially revised to reflect current 
circumstances.

     This is the one area of national cryptography policy where we 
believe a change is necessary.


3. INDIVIDUAL PRIVACY

     Communications privacy remains a critical test for network 
development.  Networks that do not provide a high degree of privacy 
are clearly less useful to network users.  Given the choice between a 
cryptography product without a key escrow and one with a key 
escrow, it would be difficult to find a user who would prefer the key 
escrow requirement.  If this proposal does go forward, it will not be 
because network users or commercial service providers favored it.

     Many governments are now facing questions about restrictions on 
cryptography similar to the question now being raised in this 
country.  It is clear that governments may choose to favor the 
interests of consumers and businesses over law enforcement.  Less 
than a month ago, the government of Australia over-rode the 
objections of law enforcement and intelligence agencies and allowed 
the Australian telephone companies to go forward with new digital 
mobile phone networks, GSM, using the A5 robust algorithm.   Other 
countries will soon face similar decisions.  We hope that they will 
follow a similar path
 
     To briefly summarize, the problem here is not the existing law on 
computer security or policies on cryptography and wire surveillance.   
The Computer Security Act stresses public standards, open review, 
and commercial applications.  The federal wiretap statute is one of 
the best privacy laws in the world.  With the exception of one 
provision in the criminal code left over from the Cold War, our 
current cryptography policy is very good.  It reflects many of the 
values -- individual liberty, openness, government accountability -- 
that are crucial for democratic societies to function.

     The problem is the Clipper proposal.  It is an end-run around 
policies intended to restrict government surveillance and to ensure 
agency accountability.  It is an effort to put in place a technical 
configuration that is at odds with the federal wiretap law and the 
protection of individual privacy.  It is for these reasons that we ask 
the Advisory Board to recommend to the Secretary of Commerce, the 
White House, and the Congress that the current Clipper proposal not 
go forward.

     I thank you for the opportunity to speak with you about these 
issues.  I wish to invite the members of the Advisory Committee to 
the third annual CPSR Privacy and Cryptography conference that will 
be held Monday, June 7 in Washington, DC at the Carnegie 
Endowment for International Peace.  That meeting will provide an 
opportunity for further discussion about cryptography policy.


ATTACHMENTS

"TWG Issue Number: NIST - May 5, 1989," document obtained 
by CPSR as a result of litigation under the Freedom of 
Information Act.

"U.S. as Big Brother of Computer Age," The New York Times, 
May 6, 1993, at D1.

"Keeping Fewer Secrets," Issues in Science and Technology, vol. 
IX, no. 1 (Fall 1992)

"The Only Locksmith in Town," The Index on Censorship 
(January 1990)

[The republication of these articles for the non-commercial purpose 
of informing the government about public policy is protected by 
section 107 of the Copyright Act of 1976]

===============================================

________________________________________________________________________

0001400  f135 cf93 65f4 004a 2351 719b b2c9 cabe
0001420  c052 c788 2fff b5a3 616c 7fe0 6f45 6fe1
0001440  2005 3c8f 7ca8 29eb ee14 0785 5491 8039
0001460  2035 cc23 1a87 7a6c 4551 7869 7008 1d34
0001500  ac37 e2d2 6bb5 5139 d137 9d38 0727 50af
0001520  fd74 2e07 4bcd 2bc4 200b 4349 d2b0 9151
0001540  b5a2 e493 41d2 c559 9dbc 2a17 61aa cf59
0001560  9aa2 81b6 e41b 13ca 70b6 470c 5cd6 30a7

________________________________________________________________________


Source: Computer underground Digest    Sun June 13 1993   Volume 5 : Issue 43
ISSN:                           ISSN  1004-043X
Date:         Sat, 12 Jun 1993 12:30:38 EST
From:         Dave Banisar <banisar@WASHOFC.CPSR.ORG>
Subject: File 2--CPSR Clipper Testimony (6-9-93) in House Subcommittee

  CPSR Clipper Testimony 6/9

        On June 9, 1993, Congressman Edward Markey, Chairman of the
House  Subcommittee on Telecommunications and Finance held an
oversight hearing on Rencryption and telecommunications network
security. Panelists were Whitfield Diffie of Sun Microsystems, Dr.
Dorothy Denning,  Steven Bryen of Secure Communications, Marc
Rotenberg of the CPSR Washington Office and E.R. Kerkeslager of AT&T.

        Congressman Markey, after hearing the testimony presented,
noted that the Clipper proposal had raised an arched eyebrow among
the whole committeeS and that the committee viewed the proposal
skeptically. This statement was the latest indication that the Clipper
proposal has not been well received by policy makers.  Last Friday,
the Computer Systems Security and Privacy Advisory Board of NIST
issued two resolutions critical of the encryption plan, suggesting
that further study was required and that implementation of the plan
should be delayed until the review is completed.

        At the Third CPSR Cryptography and Privacy Conference on
Monday, June 7, the Acting Director of NIST, Raymond Kammer, announced
that the implementation of the proposal will be delayed and that a
more comprehensive review will be undertaken.  The review is due in
the fall.  Kammer told the Washington Post that Rmaybe we wonUt
continue in the direction we started ous.

+-------------------------------------------------

                          Prepared Testimony
                                 and
                       Statement for the Record
                                  of
                        Marc Rotenberg, director
                         CPSR Washington Office
                                  on
                   Encryption Technology and Policy
                                Before
            The Subcommittee on Telecommunications and Finance.
                   Committee on Energy and Commerce

                        U.S. House of Representatives
                               June 9, 1993

SUMMARY

        The cryptography issue is of particular concern to CPSR.
During the past several years CPSR has pursued an extensive study of
cryptography policy in the United States.  CPSR has organized public
conferences, conducted litigation under the Freedom of Information Act,
and has emphasized the importance of cryptography for privacy
protection and the need to scrutinize carefully government proposals
designed to limit the use of this technology.
        To evaluate the Clipper proposal it is necessary to look at a
1987 law, the Computer Security Act, which made clear that in the area
of unclassified computing systems, the National Institute of Standards
and Technology (NIST) and not the National Security Agency (NSA), would
be responsible for the development of technical standards.  The Act
emphasized public accountability and stressed open decision-making.
        In the spirit of the Act, in 1989 NIST set out to develop a
public key cryptography standard.  According to documents obtained by
CPSR through the Freedom of Information Act, NIST recommended that the
algorithm be "public, unclassified, implementable in both hardware or
software, usable by federal Agencies and U.S. based multi-national
corporation." However, the Clipper proposal and the full-blown Capstone
configuration that resulted is very different: the Clipper algorithm,
Skipjack, is classified; public access to the reasons underlying the
proposal is restricted; Skipjack can be implemented only in
tamper-proof hardware; it is unlikely to be used by multi-national
corporations, and the security of Clipper remains unproven.
        The Clipper proposal undermines the central purpose of the
Computer Security Act.  Although intended for broad use in commercial
networks, it was not developed at the request of either U.S. business
or the general public.  It does not reflect public goals.
        The premise of the Clipper key escrow arrangement is that the
government must have the ability to intercept electronic
communications.  However, there is no legal basis to support this
premise. In law there is nothing inherently illegal or suspect about
the use of a telephone.  The federal wiretap statute says only that
communication service providers must assist law enforcement execute a
lawful warrant.
        CPSR supports the review of cryptography policy currently
underway at the Department of Commerce.  CPSR also supports the efforts
undertaken by the Subcommittee on Telecommunications and Finance to
study the full ramifications of the Clipper proposal.  However, we are
not pleased about the review now being undertaken at the White House.
That effort has led to a series of secret meetings, has asked that
scientists sign non-disclosure agreements and accept restrictions on
publication, and has attempted to resolve public concerns through
private channels.  This is not a good process for the evaluation of a
technology that is proposed for the public switched network.
        Even if the issues regarding Clipper are resolved favorably,
privacy concerns will not go away. Rules still need to be developed
about the collection and use of transactional data generated by
computer communications.  Several specific steps should be taken.
First, the FCC should be given a broad mandate to pursue privacy
concerns.  Second, current gaps in the communications law should be
filled.  The protection of transactional records is particularly
important.  Third, telecommunications companies should be encouraged to
explore innovative ways to protect privacy.  "Telephone cards", widely
available in other countries, are an ideal way to protect privacy.


TESTIMONY

        Mr. Chairman, members of the Subcommittee, thank you for the
opportunity to testify today on encryption policy and the Clipper
proposal.  I especially wish to thank you Congressman Markey, on behalf
of CPSR, for your ongoing efforts on the privacy front as well as your
work to promote public access to electronic information.
        The cryptography issue is of particular concern to CPSR.
During the past several years we have pursued an extensive study of
cryptography policy in the United States.  We have organized several
public conferences, conducted litigation under the Freedom of
Information Act, and appeared on a number of panels to discuss the
importance of cryptography for privacy protection and the need to
scrutinize carefully government proposals designed to limit the use of
this technology.
        While we do not represent any particular computer company or
trade association we do speak for a great many people in the computer
profession who value privacy and are concerned about the government's
Clipper initiative.
        Today I will briefly summarize our assessment of the Clipper
proposal.  Then I would like to say a few words about the current
status of privacy protection.

CLIPPER
        To put the Clipper proposal in a policy context, I will need to
briefly to describe a law passed in 1987 intended to address the roles
of the Department of Commerce and the Department of Defense in the
development of technical standards.  The Computer Security Act of 1987
was enacted to improve computer security in the federal government, to
clarify the responsibilities of the National Institute of Standards and
Technology (NIST) and the National Security Agency, and to ensure that
technical standards would serve civilian and commercial needs.
        The law made clear that in the area of unclassified computing
systems, NIST and not NSA, would be responsible for the development of
technical standards.  It emphasized public accountability and stressed
open decision-making.  The Computer Security Act also established the
Computer System Security and Privacy Advisory Board (CSSPAB), charged
with reviewing the activities of NIST and ensuring that the mandate of
the law was enforced.
        The Computer Security Act grew out of a concern that classified
standards and secret meetings would not serve the interests of the
general public.  As the practical applications for cryptography have
moved from the military and intelligence arenas to the commercial
sphere, this point has become clear.  There is also clearly a conflict
of interest when an agency tasked with signal interception is also
given authority to develop standards for network security.
        In the spirit of the Computer Security Act, NIST set out in
1989 to develop a public key standard FIPS (Federal Information
Processing Standard).  In a memo dated May 5, 1989, obtained by CPSR
through the Freedom of Information Act, NIST said that it planned:

to develop the necessary public-key based security standards.  We
require a public-key algorithm for calculating digital signatures and
we also require a public-key algorithm for distributing secret keys.

NIST then went on to define the requirements of the standard:

The algorithms that we use must be public, unclassified, implementable
in both hardware or software, usable by federal Agencies and U.S. based
multi-national corporation, and must provide a level of security
sufficient for the protection of unclassified, sensitive information
and commercial propriety and/or valuable information.

        The Clipper proposal and the full-blown Capstone configuration,
which incorporates the key management function NIST set out to develop
in 1989, is very different from the one originally conceived by NIST.

%       The Clipper algorithm, Skipjack, is classified,
%       Public access to the reasons underlying the proposal is
restricted,
%       Skipjack can be implemented only in tamper-proof hardware,
%       It is Unlikely to be used by multi-national corporations, and
%       The security of Clipper remains unproven.

        The Clipper proposal undermines the central purpose of the
Computer Security Act.  Although intended for broad use in commercial
networks, it was not developed at the request of either U.S. business
or the general public.  It does not reflect public goals.  Rather it
reflects the interests of one secret agency with the authority to
conduct foreign signal intelligence and another government agency
responsible for law enforcement investigations.
        Documents obtained by CPSR through the Freedom of Information
Act indicate that the National Security Agency dominated the meetings
of the joint NIST/NSA Technical Working group which made
recommendations to NIST regarding public key cryptography, and that a
related technical standard for message authentication, the Digital
Signature Standard, clearly reflected the interests of the NSA.
        We are still trying to determine the precise role of the NSA in
the development of the Clipper proposal.  We would be pleased to
provide to the Subcommittee whatever materials we obtain.

LEGAL AND POLICY ISSUES
        There are also several legal and constitutional issues raised
by the government's key escrow proposal.  The premise of the Clipper
key escrow arrangement is that the government must have the ability to
intercept electronic communications, regardless of the economic or
societal costs.  The FBI's Digital Telephony proposal, and the earlier
Senate bill 266, were based on the same assumption.
        There are a number of arguments made in defense of this
position: that privacy rights and law enforcement needs must be
balanced, or that the government will be unable to conduct criminal
investigations without this capability.
        Regardless of how one views these various claims, there is one
point about the law that should be made very clear: currently there is
no legal basis -- in statute, the Constitution or anywhere else --
that supports the premise which underlies the Clipper proposal.  As the
law currently stands, surveillance is not a design goal.  General
Motors would have a stronger legal basis for building cars that could
go no faster than 65 miles per hour than AT&T does in marketing a
commercial telephone that has a built-in wiretap capability.  In law
there is simply nothing about the use of a telephone that is inherently
illegal or suspect.
        The federal wiretap statute says only that communication
service providers must assist law enforcement in the execution of a
lawful warrant.  It does not say that anyone is obligated to design
systems to facilitate future wire surveillance.  That distinction is
the difference between countries that restrict wire surveillance to
narrow circumstances defined in law and those that treat all users of
the telephone network as potential criminals.  U.S. law takes the first
approach.  Countries such as the former East Germany took the second
approach.  The use of the phone system by citizens was considered
inherently suspect and for that reason more than 10,000 people were
employed by the East German government to listen in on telephone calls.
        It is precisely because the wiretap statute does not contain
the obligation to incorporate surveillance capability -- the design
premise of the Clipper proposal -- that the Federal Bureau of
Investigation introduced the Digital Telephony legislation.  But that
legislation has not moved forward and the law has remained unchanged.
The Clipper proposal attempts to accomplish through the
standard-setting and procurement process what the Congress has been
unwilling to do through the legislative process.
        On legal grounds, adopting the Clipper would be a mistake.
There is an important policy goal underlying the wiretap law.  The
Fourth Amendment and the federal wiretap statute do not so much balance
competing interests as they erect barriers against government excess
and define the proper scope of criminal investigation.  The purpose of
the federal wiretap law is to restrict the government, it is not to
coerce the public.
        Therefore, if the government endorses the Clipper proposal, it
will undermine the basic philosophy of the federal wiretap law and the
fundamental values embodied in the Constitution.  It will establish a
technical mechanism for signal interception based on a premise that has
no legal foundation.  The assumption underlying the Clipper proposal is
more compatible with the practice of telephone surveillance in the
former East Germany than it is with the narrowly limited circumstances
that wire surveillance has been allowed in the United States.

UNANSWERED QUESTIONS
        There are a number of other legal issues that have not been
adequately considered by the proponents of the key escrow arrangement
that the Subcommittee should examine.  First, not all lawful wiretaps
follow a normal warrant process.  The proponents of Clipper should make
clear how emergency wiretaps will be conducted before the proposal goes
forward.  Second, there may be civil liability issues for the escrow
agents, if they are private parties, if there is abuse or compromise of
the keys.  Third, there is a Fifth Amendment dimension to the proposed
escrow key arrangement if a network user is compelled to disclose his
or her key to the government in order to access a communications
network. Each one of these issues should be examined carefully.


CPSR CONFERENCE
        At a conference organized by CPSR this week at the Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace we heard presentations from staff
members at NIST, FBI, NSA and the White House about the Clipper
proposal.  The participants at the meeting had the opportunity to ask
questions and to exchange views.
        Certain points now seem clear:

%       The Clipper proposal was not developed in response to any
perceived public or business need.  It was developed solely to address
a law enforcement concern.
%       Wire surveillance remains a small part of law enforcement
investigations.  The number of arrests resulting from wiretaps has
remained essentially unchanged since the federal wiretap law was enacted
in 1968.
%       The potential risks of the Clipper proposal have not been
assessed and many questions about the implementation remain unanswered.
%       Clipper does not appear to have the support of the business or
research community.

        Many comments on the Clipper proposal, both positive and
negative as well the materials obtained by CPSR through the Freedom of
Information Act, are contained in the Source book compiled by CPSR for
the recent conference.  I am please to make a copy of this available to
the Subcommittee.


NETWORK PRIVACY PROTECTION
        Communications privacy remains a critical test for network
development.  Networks that do not provide a high degree of privacy are
clearly less useful to network users.  Given the choice between a
cryptography product without a key escrow and one with a key escrow, it
would be difficult to find a user who would prefer the key escrow
requirement.  If this proposal does go forward, it will not be because
network users or commercial service providers favored it.
        Even if the issues regarding the Clipper are resolved
favorably, privacy concerns will not go away.  Cryptography is a part
of communications privacy, but it is only a small part.  Rules still
need to be developed about the collection and use of transactional data
generated by computer communications.  While the federal wiretap law
generally does a very good job of protecting the content of
communications against interception by government agencies, large holes
still remain.  The extensive use of subpoenas by the government to
obtain toll records and the sale of telephone records by private
companies are just two examples of gaps in current law.
        The enforcement of privacy laws is also a particularly serious
concern in the United States.  Good laws without clear mechanisms for
enforcement raise over-arching questions about the adequacy of legal
protections in this country.  This problem is known to those who have
followed developments with the Privacy Act since passage in 1974 and
the more recent Video Privacy and Protection Act of 1988.  I make this
point because it has been the experience in other countries that
agencies charged with the responsibility for privacy protection can be
effective advocates for the public in the protection of personal
privacy.

RECOMMENDATIONS
        Regarding the Clipper proposal, we believe that the national
review currently underway by the Computer Security and Privacy Advisory
Board at the Department of Commerce will be extremely useful and we
look forward to the results of that effort.  The Panel has already
conducted a series of important open hearings and compiled useful
materials on Clipper and cryptography policy for public review.
        We are also pleased that the Subcommittee on Telecommunications
and Finance has undertaken this hearing.  This Subcommittee can play a
particularly important role in the resolution of these issues.  We also
appreciate the Chairman's efforts to ensure that the proper studies are
undertaken, that the General Accounting Office fully explores these
issues, and that the Secretary of Commerce carefully assesses the
potential impact of the Clipper proposal on export policy.
        We are, however, less pleased about the White House study
currently underway.  That effort, organized in large part by the
National Security Council, has led to a series of secret meetings, has
asked that scientists sign non-disclosure agreements and accept
restrictions on publication, and has attempted to resolve public
concerns through private channels.  This is not a good process for the
evaluation of a technology that is proposed for the public switched
network.  While we acknowledge that the White House has been reasonably
forthcoming in explaining the current state of affairs, we do not think
that this process is a good one.
        For these reasons, we believe that the White House should
properly defer to the recommendations of the Computer System Security
and Privacy Advisory Board and the Subcommittee on Telecommunications
and Finance.  We hope that no further steps in support of the Clipper
initiative will be taken.  We specifically recommend that no further
purchase of Clipper chips be approved.
        Speaking more generally, we believe that a number of steps
could be taken to ensure that future communications initiatives could
properly be viewed as a boost to privacy and not a set-back.

%       The FCC must be given a strong mandate to pursue privacy
concerns.  There should be an office specifically established to
examine privacy issues and to prepare reports.  Similar efforts in
other countries have been enormously successful.  The Japanese Ministry
of Post and Telecommunications developed a set of privacy principles to
ensure continued trade with Europe.  The Canada Ministry of
Communications developed a set of communications principles to address
public concerns about the privacy of cellular communications.  In
Europe, the EC put forward an important directive on privacy protection
for the development of new network services.

%       Current gaps in the communications law should be filled.  The
protection of transactional records is particularly important.
Legislation is needed to limit law enforcement access to toll record
information and to restrict the sale of data generated by the use of
telecommunication services.  As the network becomes digital, the
transaction records associated with a particular communication may
become more valuable than the content of the communication itself.

%       Telecommunications companies should be encouraged to explore
innovative ways to protect privacy.  Cryptography is a particular
method to seal electronic communications, but far more important for
routine communications could be anonymous telephone cards, similar to
the metro cards here in the District of Columbia, that allow consumers
to purchase services without establishing accounts, transferring
personal data, or recording personal activities.  Such cards are widely
available in Europe, Japan, and Australia.

        I thank you very much for the opportunity to appear before the
Subcommittee and would be pleased to answer your questions Computer
Professionals for Social Responsibility

        CPSR is a national membership organization, established in
1982, to address the social impact of computer technology.  There are
2,500 members in 20 chapters across the United States, and offices in
Palo Alto, California, Cambridge, Massachusetts, and Washington DC. The
organization is governed by a board of elected officers and meetings
are open to the public.  CPSR sponsors an annual meeting and the
biennial conference on Directions and Implications of Advanced
Computing.  CPSR sponsored the first conference on Computers, Freedom,
and Privacy in 1991.  CPSR also operates the Internet Library at
cpsr.org.  The library contains documents from the White House on
technology policy and a wide range of public laws covering privacy,
access to information, and communications law and is available free of
charge to all users of the Internet.

        Marc Rotenberg is the director of the CPSR Washington office
and an adjunct professor at Georgetown University Law Center.  He is
chairman of the ACM Committee on Scientific Freedom and Human Rights,
an editor for the Computer Law and Security Report (London), and the
secretary of Privacy International, an organization of human rights
advocates and privacy scholars in forty countries.  He received an A.B.
from Harvard College and a J.D. from Stanford Law School, and is a
member of the bar of the United States Supreme Court.  His forthcoming
article "Communications Privacy: Implications for Network Design" will
appear in the August 1993 issue of Communications o0f the ACM.

------------------------------

End of Computer Underground Digest #5.43
************************************


________________________________________________________________________

0001600  177c fd13 f000 3011 ccc9 ba18 6823 3cf2
0001620  0811 2a14 eda0 ddbe 7745 d8e1 c6bf ee7e
0001640  fa73 d3ec 9a34 8eea 0598 ff85 2133 d0ec
0001660  e9b1 8cbe add6 a48a 1ae8 80bd efd2 1a9f
0001700  9ba0 d3d6 4e83 2a9f 8dee 2039 cb9c 5ebf
0001720  3d41 6e32 8251 bc3c 4231 4e6c 482f d31e
0001740  6e0e 72dd 164d a663 3d6a 1b44 1a26 9835
0001760  e4c7 2fd7 11d2 6b25 4335 64e8 b746 da0c

________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________

The SURFPUNK Technical Journal is a dangerous multinational hacker zine
originating near BARRNET in the fashionable western arm of the northern
California matrix.  Quantum Californians appear in one of two states,
spin surf or spin punk.  Undetected, we are both, or might be neither.
________________________________________________________________________

Send postings to <surfpunk@versant.com>, subscription requests 
to <surfpunk-request@versant.com>.  MIME encouraged.  
Xanalogical archive access at "http://www.acns.nwu.edu/surfpunk/"
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________




				/* xor files together, M bytes max */

				#include <stdio.h>

				#define	M 9999

				char buf[M];
				char pad[M];

				readin(s)
				  char* s;
				{
					int cc;
					int i;
					FILE* f= fopen( s, "r" );
					if (!f) {
						perror(s);
						return;
					}

					bzero(buf, sizeof buf);

					cc= fread( buf, 1, M, f );

					for ( i=0; i<M; i++ ) {
						pad[i] ^= buf[i];
					}

					fclose(f);
				}

				printout()
				{
					fwrite( pad, M, 1, stdout );
				}


				main(argc, argv)
				  char** argv;
				{
					int i;
					for ( i=1; i<argc; i++ ) {
						readin ( argv[i] );
					}

					printout();

					return 0;
				}





			0002000  e4d8 e725 8869 e54e 1d55 f315 ffd3 e054
			0002020  9b15 0f50 f0fd 3b3d 1e1d 13fc 7c4d 3c1b
			0002040  1a99 f08b 303f f8d4 b792 123c 0937 7aa0
			0002060  d8a3 6670 02a1 5e10 6543 553d 499b a529
			0002100  6790 5c24 71a5 0493 aaab c919 1a1a 6616
			0002120  c113 41c3 82d1 c7da 4ce8 6af5 a2ab 51f0
			0002140  73fe e82f 9daf 776f 1fe6 62d7 ec33 156d
			0002160  a0b5 e1b5 7516 499b df25 573f 9bcd ab3c









From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: J. Michael Diehl <mdiehl@triton.unm.edu>
Date: Sun, 13 Jun 93 18:12:17 PDT
To: miron@extropia.wimsey.com (Miron Cuperman)
Subject: Re: alt.whistleblowing
In-Reply-To: <1993Jun13.213716.16151@extropia.wimsey.com>
Message-ID: <9306140111.AA16461@triton.unm.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


According to Miron Cuperman:
> mdiehl@triton.unm.edu (J. Michael Diehl) writes:
> >I just started reading the alt.whistleblowing newsgroup.  It would seem that
> 
> That is strange, I'm not getting anything here.  Maybe there is a
> propagation problem.

Well, it took a week to make it here.....

> What is the recommended action in this case?  Posting to alt.config,
> or resending the newgroup message?

Couldn't tell you, except, perhapse to be patient?
+-----------------------+-----------------------------+---------+
| J. Michael Diehl ;-)  | I thought I was wrong once. | PGP KEY |
| mdiehl@triton.unm.edu |   But, I was mistaken.      |available|
| mike.diehl@fido.org   |                             | Ask Me! |
| (505) 299-2282        +-----------------------------+---------+
|                                                               |
+------"I'm just looking for the opportunity to be -------------+
|            Politically Incorrect!"   <Me>                     |
+-----If codes are outlawed, only criminals wil have codes.-----+
+----Is Big Brother in your phone?  If you don't know, ask me---+



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: J. Michael Diehl <mdiehl@triton.unm.edu>
Date: Sun, 13 Jun 93 18:15:25 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Digital Cash$$$$
Message-ID: <9306140115.AA16633@triton.unm.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Hay all!  I'm becomming very intrigued about digital cash.  But, I have a few
qestions.  
 
1. How does one start a digital cash economy?  How is the initial distribution
of currency done?  This is, of course, assuming the technical stuff is taken
care of.
 
2. Is digital cash supposed to be backed by actuall cash on deposit at the bank?
 
3. How would one "get out" of such an economy if he wanted to?
 
4. If DC is to be backed by actual cash, is this really such a good idea?
 
Looking forward to hearing any and all comments.
+-----------------------+-----------------------------+---------+
| J. Michael Diehl ;-)  | I thought I was wrong once. | PGP KEY |
| mdiehl@triton.unm.edu |   But, I was mistaken.      |available|
| mike.diehl@fido.org   |                             | Ask Me! |
| (505) 299-2282        +-----------------------------+---------+
|                                                               |
+------"I'm just looking for the opportunity to be -------------+
|            Politically Incorrect!"   <Me>                     |
+-----If codes are outlawed, only criminals wil have codes.-----+
+----Is Big Brother in your phone?  If you don't know, ask me---+




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: smb@research.att.com
Date: Sun, 13 Jun 93 17:08:10 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: corporations and morality
Message-ID: <9306140008.AA22117@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I stumbled on a quote that succinctly expresses what I was saying about
the lack of corporate morality.  This is the head quote from Chapter
XIX of Niven and Pournelle's ``Oath of Fealty'':

	They [corporations] cannot commit treason, nor be outlawed nor
	excommunicated, for they have no souls.

			--Sir Edward Coke, Lord Chief Justice of England
			Sutton's Hospital Case, 10 Report 32, 1628




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: miron@extropia.wimsey.com (Miron Cuperman)
Date: Sun, 13 Jun 93 15:49:12 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: alt.whistleblowing
In-Reply-To: <9306130817.AA01161@triton.unm.edu>
Message-ID: <1993Jun13.213716.16151@extropia.wimsey.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


mdiehl@triton.unm.edu (J. Michael Diehl) writes:

>I just started reading the alt.whistleblowing newsgroup.  It would seem that

That is strange, I'm not getting anything here.  Maybe there is a
propagation problem.

What is the recommended action in this case?  Posting to alt.config,
or resending the newgroup message?

-- 
        Miron Cuperman <miron@extropia.wimsey.com> | NeXTmail/Mime ok
        Unix/C++/DSP,  consulting/contracting      | Public key avail
        AMIX: MCuperman                            |
Laissez faire, laissez passer. Le monde va de lui meme.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Peter shipley <shipley@merde.dis.org>
Date: Mon, 14 Jun 93 02:11:28 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com, shipley
Subject: Re: Mail logging
Message-ID: <9306140456.AA29696@merde.dis.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/x-pgp


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----


>>>The single most basic problem with mail development that we have is
>>>that we don't have enough mail volume through the remailers we have
>
>As I said before, any experimentation that people want to do with list
>distribution can be done by hacking the current remailer code.  You
>don't have to have any sysadmin privileges to do this.  You don't even
>have to have my permission to do this.
>


My home system has lots of spare CPU then I am willing to setup a cypherpunks
crypto remailer.  In enough people want to recive cypherpunks in PGP'ed crypt
text I will set it up.


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.2

iQBFAgUBLBwE4Mhmn7GUWLLFAQGjzAF8DwqasQMdJATSkMD2HBEzQdDqVC8nSszn
BewSSI0NW8YrrXo0ZWV2g6pos5dJOIN0
=UyFN
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: gnu (John Gilmore)
Date: Mon, 14 Jun 93 00:09:53 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Digital cash software
Message-ID: <9306140709.AA05436@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I spoke with David Chaum, the inventor of digital money, last week at
the cryptography meetings in DC.  He is willing to give us a noncommercial
license to use his digital money patents, and copies of some of his
software for digital cash, for us to deploy somehow, and start using.

He'll be back in August for Crypto '93 in Santa Barbara, and will
bring one of his assistants (Nils) up to the Bay Area to teach us
about the software.  I think we can get a copy from him in the
meantime, and puzzle it out ourselves between now and then.  We'll
also need to work out the legalese on the patents; it should be
simple, but then again, almost everything *should* be simple...

If we have a small group of people (say 2 to 5) who are seriously 
interested in building a digital-cash-on-the-Internet application
and getting it into use, then speak up and get organized, and I
will cross-connect you to David and Nils so things will start moving.

David's company Digicash has been working on toll collection systems;
he showed pictures of their newest system that allows driving full
speed through the tollbooths and still does the transaction, using
infrared through the windshield, I think.  If someone wanted to
present his system and his company to the authoritarians who were last
seen preparing to put unencrypted automated vehicle-ID numbers on cars
in California for toll collection, that would be a good thing.  Speak up...

	John




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: ""L. Detweiler"" <ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Date: Sun, 13 Jun 93 23:21:39 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: alt.whistleblowing-cypherpunk FAQ
In-Reply-To: <9306130817.AA01161@triton.unm.edu>
Message-ID: <9306140621.AA29371@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


J. Michael Diehl <mdiehl@triton.unm.edu>
>I just started reading the alt.whistleblowing newsgroup.  It would seem that it
>has already digressed into a flamefest.  Could the person who created it please
>post a set of guidelines for the group!  Also, people are using their REAL 
>names!  Appearantly, they don't know anything about the anon remailers....Could
>someone post a notice about that, too?  Same thing goes WRT pgp.  We helped 
>create this group, we ought to help keep it worth reading. ;^)
 
Mr. Diehl:

If you had taken the time to read any significant portion of
alt.whistleblowing traffic, I would imagine you would have stumbled on
messages where I presented an outline/preliminary FAQ and an anonymous
posting described precisely how to use Julf's remailer to send traffic
(which were posted under a week ago).  I take great offense at your
hasty, flippant denigration of it so far as a `flamefest'. While of
course I'm not really associated with alt.whistleblowers at all in the
grand cyberspatial scheme of things, I feel a smidgeon of personal
responsibility for the group.  Are you paying attention? Have you seen
my promises there and on the cypherpunk list to create the FAQ?

So far, IMHO, the traffic has mostly been very high-caliber and even
spectacular. A lady named Karen Lofstrom reported how her boss at a
Hawaii university misused ~$100,000 in funds and work of public
employees on his private company -- from NSA grant money -- starting a
long thread of sympathetic responses (she alluded to this earlier on
sci.crypt I believe but expanded it beautifully in alt.whistleblower).
We have other interesting revelations so far too.  There are messages
pointing out a private `whistleblowing support organization' and how to
contact them.

Your message, upon rereading it, makes me extremely exasperated. It
reconfirms my suspicion that a large part of traffic on this list and
tactics in the Cypherpunk arsenal are to just give lip service to
interesting ideas but leave the messy and laborious detail work to
others. Despite plenty of great fireworks on this list, I have seen no
tangible contributions from others on the whistleblowing project other
than Miron Cuperman's gracious effort to create the group (despite
grandiose reassurances to the contrary), and Julf's immediate support
of it, two individuals who are already highly active and motivated
outside of their cypherpunk involvement.  Furthermore, I've encountered
many extremely frustrating obstructions here.  I've seen great
accomplishments by individuals who call themselves `cypherpunks' but
none by well-orchestrated collections of them.

This is not to discourage positive effort in the future by anyone on
this list on the whistleblower project or anything else. It is to
suggest that the Cypherpunks are so intensely individualistic as to
preclude group projects and large-scale cooperation, and that this is a
serious obstacle to enacting meaningful, critical change on the agenda.
 (Go ahead, flame me and ask what I've done for everyone lately --- I
won't respond. That is not the spirit of my words.)

The statement that makes my blood boil violently is the following:

>We helped 
>create this group, we ought to help keep it worth reading. ;^)

How is it that `we' created this group? All I've seen here is
voluminous verbiage (yes, mine included).  I appreciate the call to
arms and cooperation, but I've tried it here before with impoverished,
negligible, and excruciatingly painful results. How long ago did you
join the list? I've already posted ways for cypherpunks to help out on
the whistleblowing newsgroup. The simplest way is to just go there and
post something useful or assimilate existing traffic into something useful.

Mr. Diehl, the following is not a personal request. On behalf of the
hundreds of people who read the cypherpunks list, I humbly ask you (and
remind all other cypherpunks) to put the tiniest greater effort into
your postings to the mailing list that, like all others, take the time
of everyone to sort in their mailbox, and make every effort to direct
messages through personal email where appropriate. I've asked you
before politely in private email to no response, or apparently, effect.
 It is only in the rarest of occasions I will ever put forth such a
request, and an even more unusual case to go public with it. I
appreciated your volunteering to do the email survey but turning around
with the final summary and admitting yourself that you're `too lazy to
tabulate results' I find highly annoying (what is the point?), and I
think does a disservice to the people who took the time to respond
(including myself).

Following is some traffic from the group. Some favorite quotes:

From Greg Welch, who's been extremely helpful in contributing to the
FAQ referring to that private whistleblower agency:

>BTW, you just made me realize that I need to contact them to see if they
>can read (or are already reading) this news group somehow.  Boy, I wish this
>group was around when I was in a similar situation.

Also, from Karen Lofstrom, the NSA grant whistleblower:

>If we can get a number of other whistleblowers posting here, or people
>from organizations that support whistleblowers, perhaps we can create some
>group wisdom about how to blow the whistle _effectively_.  I certainly
>could have used some informed advice when I started.

===cut=here===

From
yuma!csn!magnus.acs.ohio-state.edu!usenet.ins.cwru.edu!agate!ames!news.H
awaii.Edu!uhunix3.uhcc.Hawaii.Edu!lofstrom Tue, 8 Jun 1993 03:55:08 GMT
Newsgroups: alt.whistleblowing
Path:
yuma!csn!magnus.acs.ohio-state.edu!usenet.ins.cwru.edu!agate!ames!news.H
awaii.Edu!uhunix3.uhcc.Hawaii.Edu!lofstrom
From: lofstrom@uhunix3.uhcc.Hawaii.Edu (Karen Lofstrom)
Subject: NSA Grant Misused
Message-ID: <C8AAvw.LA8@news.Hawaii.Edu>
Summary: Grantee runs private business with government paid labor 
Keywords: NSA, whistleblowing
Sender: news@news.Hawaii.Edu
Organization: University of Hawaii
X-Newsreader: TIN [version 1.2 PL0]
Date: Tue, 8 Jun 1993 03:55:08 GMT
Lines: 83

I noted with interest the creation of this newsgroup and looked forward to
reading the contributions of other whistleblowers.  However, no
whistleblowers have come forward.  I suppose I'll have to post, then.

I'm a fired whistleblower.  After working five months of a part-time job
funded by a NSA grant, at Chaminade University (note that this case does
not involve the University of Hawaii, under whose auspices I post), I had
begun to realize that my boss was misusing the grant.  He was using
government paid clerical labor, including mine, to run several businesses. 
He was ordering equipment for the grant from his own company, and charging
the government twice what he charged any other customers (and a 1000%
markup over what he actually paid for the equipment).  I started collecting
documentation of the problems, sneaking xeroxes when no one was looking.  

I didn't know anything about how to blow a whistle, so I consulted a
friend of mine who worked in the state prosecutor's office.  He suggested
I contact a LARGE, reputable law firm, which I did.  The lawyer I
consulted was friendly and helpful, even refusing to charge for his
services.  I had been planning to go talk to the university.  The lawyer
said that they had failed in their oversight, would probably be more
inclined to cover things up than fix them.  He suggested I phone the
granting agency and talk to someone there (though not the person directly
responsible for the grant, who was a friend of the grantee, and had taken
an expensive present from him). 

Well, the lawyer didn't know that you can't phone the NSA. 

I had a phone number from the copy of the grant I had surreptitiously
xeroxed, but the operator said they would accept calls from secure lines
only.  Write a letter, she said.  

I wrote a letter and chewed my nails for a week. They didn't respond at
all.  So I took the advice of another friend and went to the FBI and the
DCIS (Defense Criminal Investigation Services).  They started an
investigation.  I was fired.  

I didn't go to the press because I was trying to be nice, and reasonable,
and hoping that the government would take some action.  I didn't
necessarily want my ex-boss prosecuted, I just wanted the waste stopped.  

Well, the DCIS decided not to prosecute.  They said that my charges
weren't unfounded, but that the case was so complex that they weren't sure
they could win it in a jury trial.  Well, the investigator told me that. 
The DCIS never put anything on paper.  So I wrote the NSA, asking if they
were taking any steps to prevent further waste and fraud.  They advised me
to contact the DCIS.  I wrote the DCIS, they didn't answer.  I went to my
Congressman, who wrote to the NSA.  The NSA told him to tell me to write
to the DCIS.  I wrote the DCIS and they didn't answer.  I wrote the
Congressman again and got no reply.  

So I went to the papers.   The local alternative weekly wasn't interested;
they said they didn't have enough writers to cover all the stories.  I
went to the mainstream newspaper, which was extremely interested at
first.  Then the reporter discovered that I had been fired over a year
ago.  This made the whole thing non-news.  Apparently if I had contacted
them while the investigation was still going on, it would have been news. 

Several people have advised me to sue.  There is a law forbidding
the firing of whistleblowers.  However, the damages to be
to be recovered might be slight, given that it was a low-paying clerical
job, and I would have to pay for the suit out of my own pocket.  

The NSA didn't renew the grant. However, they didn't do anything to crack
down on my ex-boss.  He stole approximately $100,000 from the taxpayers,
and he's going to get away with it.  

For the halls of infamy: the grant was NSA Grant PR #00-91-0016
MDA904-91-H-5002.   The grantee was Dr. John Wollstein. 

I keep asking myself, what could I have done differently?  I do wish that
I had been on the net then, that this topic had existed, and that I could
have gotten some advice from other whistleblowers.  I wish that I'd
contacted the press as soon as I was fired, rather than trying to be "nice".

I'd like some discussion of this, but I would hope that it could be
productive.  It wouldn't make me feel any better to have peoplle flaming
for being stupid about this or that, given that _I'm_ the one who paid the
price for trying to do the right thing. 



 ----- Karen Lofstrom           lofstrom@uhunix.uhcc.Hawaii.edu
                                K.Lofstrom on GEnie

From
yuma!csn!magnus.acs.ohio-state.edu!usenet.ins.cwru.edu!howland.reston.an
s.net!darwin.sura.net!news-feed-1.peachnet.edu!concert!borg.cs.unc.edu!c
s.unc.edu!welchg 8 Jun 1993 12:59:43 GMT
Path:
yuma!csn!magnus.acs.ohio-state.edu!usenet.ins.cwru.edu!howland.reston.an
s.net!darwin.sura.net!news-feed-1.peachnet.edu!concert!borg.cs.unc.edu!c
s.unc.edu!welchg
From: welchg@cs.unc.edu (Gregory Welch)
Newsgroups: alt.whistleblowing
Subject: Re: NSA Grant Misused
Date: 8 Jun 1993 12:59:43 GMT
Organization: The University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill
Lines: 109
Distribution: world
Message-ID: <1v22fvINNc4f@borg.cs.unc.edu>
References: <C8AAvw.LA8@news.Hawaii.Edu>
NNTP-Posting-Host: sirius.cs.unc.edu
Keywords: NSA, whistleblowing

My God Karen, I would hope that nobody would "flame" you!  Nobody should have
to go through what you did, but unfortunately it happens.  The world has enough
problems without people like your old employer adding their garbage.  Good for
you for being strong & courageous enough to do something.  My hat is off to
you.

I have a few suggestions/comments inserted below.  But *most* importantly,
I *strongly* suggest that you contact:

Project on Government Oversight
2025 I Street, NW
Suite 1117
Washington, DC  20006
202-466-5539

(this should be placed in a FAQ or such for this group...?)

Ask to speak to someone about your situation, and ask them to send you some
literature about their organization (they have a booklet, etc.)  They may
be able to help you obtain legal help (ACLU?) etc.  Best of all it will do
you good to know that there *are* people, even organizations, who are trying
to stop the waste, abuse, fraud, etc.

Some background:

"The Project" (as they like to refer to it) is a non-profit organization that
has been around for several years (previously called the Government
Accountability Project or GAP.)  I have worked with them in the past (a guy
named Keith Rutter in particular -- don't know if he's still there) and feel
that they are a *great* source for help in a situation like yours.  In fact,
that's all they do, full-time, is assist "whistleblowers" in correcting or
exposing such problems.  This organization has access to government officals
(congressmen & women, etc.) as well as other legal & publicity entities.

Their goal is to assist people like you (and me it so happens) in addressing
such problems in the most *effective* manner.  In other words, they are
experienced in working quietly with people like us (reading this group) to
accomplish as much as possible, without causing one to become a martyr for
the cause.  And when "quiet" is no longer appropriate, they will also help
doing whatever is necessary.

The organization also maintains an extensive network of past whistleblowers,
and experts in various fields who are happy to assist (e.g. with problems
that are of a particular technical nature.)

BTW, you just made me realize that I need to contact them to see if they
can read (or are already reading) this news group somehow.  Boy, I wish this
group was around when I was in a similar situation.

Now, a few posting-specific comments...

In article <C8AAvw.LA8@news.Hawaii.Edu>,
lofstrom@uhunix3.uhcc.Hawaii.Edu (Karen Lofstrom) writes:
[stuff deleted]
|> 
|> Several people have advised me to sue.  There is a law forbidding
|> the firing of whistleblowers.  However, the damages to be
|> to be recovered might be slight, given that it was a low-paying clerical
|> job, and I would have to pay for the suit out of my own pocket.  
|> 

Most certainly ask the people at "The Project" about this.  It *sounds* like
you have a pretty tight case (caveat: I'm *not* a lawyer :-) ).  Anyway, it
*is* against the law for anyone to seek retribution against someone in your
situation.  It is also possible that punitive damages could be awarded (not
sure) in which case you might get enough to make the disruption to your life
a little more tolerable.  Besides, if you could get the ACLU (or such) to
represent you, the greatest accomplishment might be to publicize your case,
giving hope to those in similar situations, and cause to worry to other
would-be thieves.

|> The NSA didn't renew the grant. However, they didn't do anything to crack
|> down on my ex-boss.  He stole approximately $100,000 from the taxpayers,
|> and he's going to get away with it.  
|> 

Boy, not if we can help it! I will call "the project" today to let them
know about the net.  Please send me mail if you want me to mention your
name & situation, I could ask them to contact you if you want.

[stuff deleted]
|> I keep asking myself, what could I have done differently?  I do wish that
|> I had been on the net then, that this topic had existed, and that I could
|> have gotten some advice from other whistleblowers.  I wish that I'd
|> contacted the press as soon as I was fired, rather than trying to be "nice".
|> 

Don't look back too much, it may not be over yet.  You may still be able to
do something about this.

|> I'd like some discussion of this, but I would hope that it could be
|> productive.  It wouldn't make me feel any better to have peoplle flaming
|> for being stupid about this or that, given that _I'm_ the one who paid the
|> price for trying to do the right thing. 
|> 
|> 
|> 
|>  ----- Karen Lofstrom           lofstrom@uhunix.uhcc.Hawaii.edu
|>                                 K.Lofstrom on GEnie

Thanks for the most meaningful posting to this newsgroup yet, and thanks for
doing what you did.

-- 
_____________________________________________________________________________
GREG WELCH                                    | Email: welchg@cs.unc.edu
University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill   |
Department of Computer Science                |
Room 323, Sitterson Hall                      |
Chapel Hill, NC 27599                         |

From
yuma!csn!magnus.acs.ohio-state.edu!usenet.ins.cwru.edu!howland.reston.an
s.net!agate!ames!news.Hawaii.Edu!uhunix3.uhcc.Hawaii.Edu!lofstrom Wed,
9 Jun 1993 01:59:42 GMT
Newsgroups: alt.whistleblowing
Path:
yuma!csn!magnus.acs.ohio-state.edu!usenet.ins.cwru.edu!howland.reston.an
s.net!agate!ames!news.Hawaii.Edu!uhunix3.uhcc.Hawaii.Edu!lofstrom
From: lofstrom@uhunix3.uhcc.Hawaii.Edu (Karen Lofstrom)
Subject: Re: NSA Grant Misused
Message-ID: <C8C07J.FoB@news.Hawaii.Edu>
Sender: news@news.Hawaii.Edu
Organization: University of Hawaii
X-Newsreader: TIN [version 1.2 PL0]
References: <C8AAvw.LA8@news.Hawaii.Edu>
<1993Jun8.202526.26656@oucsace.cs.ohiou.edu>
Date: Wed, 9 Jun 1993 01:59:42 GMT
Lines: 22

Thanks all, for the appreciative posts and the E-mails of support that I
received.  No flames.  Why was I expecting them?  Perhaps because I felt
that I had been a bit naive in expecting the government to police itself,
without the glare of outside publicity to force it to do the right thing.  
So the question I put up for discussion is: when should a whistleblower go
the media?  How?  

If we can get a number of other whistleblowers posting here, or people
from organizations that support whistleblowers, perhaps we can create some
group wisdom about how to blow the whistle _effectively_.  I certainly
could have used some informed advice when I started.

Someone upstream asked what the grant was funding.  Nothing classified. 
Something that was actually beneficial and socially benign.  It was to
help high-school age immigrants from Asian and especially SE Asian
countries maintain their first languages.  Eventually useful to the NSA,
as providing a pool of possible translators, but also good for the kids
involved.  That's one reason I wanted to step lightly. 

--
--- Karen Lofstrom           lofstrom@uhunix.uhcc.Hawaii.edu
                             K.Lofstrom on GEnie




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Fred Heutte <phred@well.sf.ca.us>
Date: Mon, 14 Jun 93 01:51:32 PDT
To: smb@research.att.com
Subject: Re:  corporations and morality
Message-ID: <93Jun14.015105pdt.13893-1@well.sf.ca.us>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Feh on Pournelle and Niven especially, dreary drones of the Ayn Rand school
of pseudo-insight.

Read some of Peter Drucker's new work on corporate responsibility and tell
me corporate America isn't thinking about ethics and morality.  

And just this weekend on a PBS forum on workplace harassment issues I heard
a CEO quoting Milton Friedman approvingly on the issue of ethical behavior
not only being the right thing to do but central to achieving the corporate
mission.

Wake up -- it's not 1880 any more!!




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: jdblair@nextsrv.cas.muohio.EDU
Date: Sun, 13 Jun 93 23:27:20 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: thanks
Message-ID: <9306140637.AA02012@ nextsrv.cas.muohio.EDU >
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Thanks to everyone for a really interesting and informative discussion
group.  I started out knowing almost nothing about encryption systems, and
now I feel like I am at least an informed novice.  I have learned a lot, and
I really appreciate it. 

I will be in the Sangre de Christo Mtns. in New Mexico for the rest of the
summer (w/o net access, this time), so I'll have to catch up in the fall.

thanks again,
-john




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Nickey MacDonald <i6t4@jupiter.sun.csd.unb.ca>
Date: Sun, 13 Jun 93 23:21:16 PDT
To: cypherpunks list <cypherpunks@toad.com>
Subject: request for patent info
Message-ID: <Pine.3.05.9306140330.B15992-9100000@jupiter>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Seems to me that now might be a good time to get a list together of all
encryption related patents and when they expire.  Unless someone already
has such a list, I will compile and repost any info sent to me.

--
Nick MacDonald               | NMD on IRC
i6t4@jupiter.sun.csd.unb.ca  | PGP 2.1 Public key available via finger
i6t4@unb.ca                  | (506) 457-1931    ^{1024/746EBB 1993/02/23}






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: mlshew@dixie.com (Mark Shewmaker)
Date: Mon, 14 Jun 93 06:49:09 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Rude CryptoStacker Suggestion
Message-ID: <m0o5C4S-0000W4C@dixie.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I have one possible suggestion that might speed up your goals of getting
an ecrypting filesystem on PC Clones, although I'm not exactly sure how
to put it politely:

Seeing as you're looking for encrypting filesystems to work on PC
clones, have you made sure such code doesn't exist already?  Why not
just scrounge through ftp sites (or archie) until you find an already
written DOS program that does what you like, and use it instead?  With
DOS's huge installed user base, I have an extremely difficult time
believing that this stuff doesn't already exist for it.

Ryan, I don't intend to demean your efforts to bring privacy to the hard
drives of the great unwashed masses, (especially if they really are
without options at this point)--on the contrary, it's quite a noble
goal, and would be a good programming project in its own right even if
other solutions do exist, but I'd hate to see you waste your efforts if
the same thing really exists elsewhere.

-Mark Shewmaker




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Eric Hughes <hughes@soda.berkeley.edu>
Date: Mon, 14 Jun 93 07:36:03 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: request for patent info
In-Reply-To: <Pine.3.05.9306140330.B15992-9100000@jupiter>
Message-ID: <9306141432.AA05436@soda.berkeley.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>Seems to me that now might be a good time to get a list together of all
>encryption related patents and when they expire.  

As much as we need this, we also need the actual text of the patents.
What a patent actually covers is often much narrower than what is
claimed.

>Unless someone already
>has such a list, I will compile and repost any info sent to me.

The experience of others trying to gather such information as this is
that you have to be proactive if you expect to get anything done.
Waiting for people to send you stuff is an exercise in patience.

Eric







From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Eric Hughes <hughes@soda.berkeley.edu>
Date: Mon, 14 Jun 93 07:47:25 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: digital cash
In-Reply-To: <9306140251.AA27197@toad.com>
Message-ID: <9306141443.AA05997@soda.berkeley.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>How about putting the digital money in a game/bbs
>environment?  

I had a talk with a fellow named Joichi Ito at CFP about this subject.
He's a total MUD addict and told me, "I would pay real money for MUD
money."

The legal issues involved in setting up a real world money system are
enormous.  Doing a game environment implementation would allow the
technical issues to be worked out without having to hire lawyers.  And
if some people transact for real money, we can't help that.

For MUD's in particular, there's a problem with conservation of mass,
er, gold.  It's really easy to create more MUD money.  However, if
there were a currency exchange system available between MUD's, you
would have a classical free banking environment.  Everyone issues
currency, and as gamemaster your money deflates to the extent that you
allow more gold to exist in your game.  I can't think of a better way
to get people to learn about monetary effects in macroeconomics.

I also spoke with Pavel Curtis at CFP, but only enough to interest him
in talking further.  Pavel runs the largest MUD on the planet.

Eric




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: jet@nas.nasa.gov (J. Eric Townsend)
Date: Mon, 14 Jun 93 09:00:18 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: forward: Cu Digest, #5.43 -- 2600 & CPSR House Subcommittee Testimony
Message-ID: <9306141559.AA01370@boxer.nas.nasa.gov>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Emmanuel's comments are somewhat disturbing...

 >
 > 
 > Computer underground Digest    Sun June 13 1993   Volume 5 : Issue 43
 >                            ISSN  1004-043X
 > 
 >        Editors: Jim Thomas and Gordon Meyer (TK0JUT2@NIU.BITNET)
 >        Archivist: Brendan Kehoe
 >        Shadow-Archivists: Dan Carosone / Paul Southworth
 >                           Ralph Sims / Jyrki Kuoppala
 >                           Ian Dickinson
 >        Copy Editor: Etaoin Shrdlu, Seniur
 > 
 > CONTENTS, #5.43 (June 13 1993)
 > File 1--Hacker testimony to House subcommittee largely unheard
 > File 2--CPSR Clipper Testimony (6-9-93) in House Subcommittee
 > 
 > Cu-Digest is a weekly electronic journal/newsletter. Subscriptions are
 > available at no cost electronically from tk0jut2@mvs.cso.niu.edu. The
 > editors may be contacted by voice (815-753-6430), fax (815-753-6302)
 > or U.S. mail at:  Jim Thomas, Department of Sociology, NIU, DeKalb, IL
 > 60115.
 > 
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 > 
 > ----------------------------------------------------------------------
 > 
 > Date:   Thu, 10 Jun 1993 16:53:48 -0700
 > From: Emmanuel Goldstein <emmanuel@WELL.SF.CA.US>
 > Subject: File 1--Hacker testimony to House subcommittee largely unheard
 > 
 > What follows is a copy of my written testimony before the House
 > Subcommittee on Telecommunications and Finance. The June 9th hearing
 > was supposed to have been on the topic of network security, toll
 > fraud, and the social implications of the rapidly emerging
 > technologies. I was asked to speak for those who had no voice, which
 > translates to hackers and consumers. Instead I found myself barraged
 > with accusations from the two representatives in attendance (Rep. Ed
 > Markey D-MA and Rep. Jack Fields R-TX) who considered 2600 Magazine
 > (of which I'm the editor) nothing more than a manual for computer
 > crime. One article in particular that Markey latched upon was one in
 > our Spring issue that explained how a cable descrambler worked.
 > According to Markey, there was no use for this information outside of
 > a criminal context. Fields claimed we were printing cellular "codes"
 > that allowed people to listen in on cellular calls. In actuality, we
 > printed frequencies. The difference didn't seem to matter - after
 > explaining it to him, he still said he was very disturbed by the fact
 > that I was allowed to keep publishing. It soon became apparent to me
 > that neither one had read my testimony as there seemed to be no
 > inclination to discuss any of the issues I had brought up. In a way,
 > it was very much like being on the Geraldo show. Somehow I thought
 > elected representatives would be less sensationalist and more
 > interested in learning but this was not the case here. We got
 > absolutely nowhere. Markey in particular was rude, patronizing, and
 > not at all interested in entertaining any thought outside his narrow
 > perception. It's too bad this opportunity was lost. There is a real
 > danger in elected officials who don't listen to all relevant opinions
 > and who persist in sticking to old-fashioned, outdated notions that
 > just don't apply to high technology. You can look forward to more
 > restrictive regulations and higher penalties for violating them if
 > this mentality continues to dominate.
 > 
 > +++++++++++++++++++
 > WRITTEN TESTIMONY FOLLOWS:
 > 
 >      Mr. Chairman, members of the Committee, thank you for the
 > opportunity to speak on the issue of the rapid growth and changes in
 > the telecommunications industry.
 > 
 >      My name is Emmanuel Goldstein and I am the publisher of 2600
 > Magazine, which is a journal for computer hackers as well as anyone
 > else who happens to be interested in the direction that technology is
 > taking us. We tend to be brutally honest in our assessments and, as a
 > result, we do get some corporations quite angry at us. But we've also
 > managed to educate a large number of people as to how their telephone
 > system works, what kinds of computers may be watching them, and how
 > they can shape technology to meet their needs, rather than be forced
 > to tailor their existence to meet technology's needs.
 > 
 >      I am also the host of a weekly radio program called Off The Hook
 > which airs over WBAI in New York. Through that forum we have
 > discovered the eagerness and curiosity that many "ordinary people on
 > the street" possess for technology. At the same time we have seen
 > fears and suspicions expressed that would be unwise to ignore.
 > 
 > HOW TO HANDLE RAPIDLY CHANGING TECHNOLOGY
 > 
 >      The next few years will almost certainly go down in history as
 > those in which the most change took place in the least amount of time.
 > The computer and telecommunications revolution that we are now in the
 > midst of is moving full speed ahead into unknown territory. The
 > potential for amazing advances in individual thought and creativity is
 > very real. But so is the potential for oppression and mistrust the
 > likes of which we have never before seen. One way or the other, we
 > will be making history.
 > 
 >      I think we can imagine it best if we think of ourselves speeding
 > down a potentially dangerous highway. Perhaps the road will become
 > slick with ice or fraught with sharp curves. It's a road that nobody
 > has gone down before. And the question we have to ask ourselves is
 > what kind of a vehicle would we prefer to be in if things should start
 > getting out of control: our own automobile where we would have at
 > least some chance of controlling the vehicle and bringing it down to a
 > safe speed or a bus where we, along with many others, must put all of
 > our trust behind a total stranger to prevent a disaster. The answer is
 > obviously different depending on the circumstances. There are those of
 > us who do not want the responsibility of driving and others who have
 > proven themselves unworthy of it. What's important is that we all have
 > the opportunity at some point to choose which way we want to go.
 > 
 >      Rapidly changing technology can also be very dangerous if we
 > don't look where we're going or if too many of us close our eyes and
 > let someone else do the driving. This is a ride we all must stay awake
 > for.
 > 
 >      I am not saying we should be overly suspicious of every form of
 > technology. I believe we are on the verge of something very positive.
 > But the members of this committee should be aware of the dangers of an
 > uninformed populace. These dangers will manifest themselves in the
 > form of suspicion towards authority, overall fear of technology, and
 > an unhealthy feeling of helplessness.
 > 
 > HOW NEW TECHNOLOGY CAN HURT US
 > 
 >      The recent FBI proposal to have wiretap capabilities built into
 > digital telephone systems got most of its publicity because American
 > taxpayers were expected to foot the bill. But to many of the
 > non-technical people I talked to, it was just another example of Big
 > Brother edging one step closer. It is commonly believed that the
 > National Security Agency monitors all traffic on the Internet, not to
 > mention all international telephone calls.  Between Caller ID, TRW
 > credit reports, video cameras, room monitors, and computer
 > categorizations of our personalities, the average American feels as if
 > life no longer has many private moments. Our Social Security numbers,
 > which once were for Social Security, are now used for everything from
 > video rentals to driver's licenses. These numbers can easily be used
 > to track a person's location, expenses, and habits - all without any
 > consent. If you know a person's name, you can get their telephone
 > number. If you have their phone number, you can get their address.
 > Getting their Social Security number is not even a challenge anymore.
 > With this information, you can not only get every bit of information
 > about this person that exists on any computer from Blockbuster Video
 > to the local library to the phone company to the FBI, but you can
 > begin to do things in this poor person's name. It's possible we may
 > want a society like this, where we will be accountable for our every
 > movement and where only criminals will pursue privacy. The American
 > public needs to be asked. But first, they need to understand.
 > 
 >      In Germany, there is a fairly new computerized system of identity
 > cards. Every citizen must carry one of these cards. The information
 > includes their name, address, date of birth, and nationality - in
 > other words, the country they were originally born in. Such a system
 > of national identity can be quite useful, but in the wrong hands it
 > can be extremely scary. For example, if a neo-Nazi group were to
 > somehow get their hands on the database, they could instantly find out
 > where everyone of Turkish nationality lived. A malevolent government
 > could do the same and, since not carrying the card would be a crime,
 > it would be very hard to avoid its wrath.
 > 
 >      Before introducing a new technology that is all-encompassing, all
 > of its potential side-effects and disadvantages should be discussed
 > and addressed. Opportunities must exist for everyone to ask questions.
 > In our own country, nobody was ever asked if they wanted a credit file
 > opened on them, if they wanted to have their phone numbers given to
 > the people and companies they called through the use of Caller ID and
 > ANI, or if they wanted to be categorized in any manner on numerous
 > lists and databases. Yet all of this has now become standard practice.
 > 
 >      This implementation of new rules has resulted in a degree of
 > cynicism in many of us, as well as a sense of foreboding and dread. We
 > all know that these new inventions will be abused and used to
 > somebody's advantage at some point. There are those who would have us
 > believe that the only people capable of such misdeeds are computer
 > hackers and their ilk. But it just isn't that simple.
 > 
 > UNDERSTANDING COMPUTER HACKERS
 > 
 >      To understand computer hackers, it helps to think of an alien
 > culture. We have such cultures constantly around us - those with
 > teenage children ought to know what this means. There are alien
 > cultures of unlimited varieties throughout the globe, sometimes in the
 > most unexpected places. I'm convinced that this is a good thing.
 > Unfortunately, all too often our default setting on whatever it is we
 > don't understand is "bad". Suspicion and hostility follow and are soon
 > met with similar feelings from the other side. This has been going on
 > between and within our cultures for as long as we've existed. While we
 > can't stop it entirely, we can learn to recognize the danger signs.
 > The best way that I've found to deal with an alien culture, whether
 > it's in a foreign country or right here at home, is to try and
 > appreciate it while giving it a little leeway. There is not a single
 > alien culture I've encountered that has not been decidedly friendly.
 > That includes deadheads, skateboarders, Rastafarians, and hackers.
 > 
 >      When we talk about computer hackers, different images spring to
 > mind. Most of these images have come about because of perceptions
 > voiced by the media. Too often, as I'm sure the members of this
 > committee already suspect, the media just doesn't get it. This is not
 > necessarily due to malice on their part but rather a general lack of
 > understanding and an overwhelming pressure to produce a good story.
 > Hence we get an abundance of sensationalism and, when the dust clears,
 > hackers are being compared with bank robbers, mobsters, terrorists,
 > and the like.  It's gotten to the point that the word hacker is almost
 > analogous to the word criminal.
 > 
 >      Fortunately, the media is learning. Reporters now approach
 > hackers with a degree of technological savvy. For the most part, they
 > have stopped asking us to commit crimes so they can write a story
 > about it. As the technology envelops us, journalists are developing
 > the same appreciation and curiosity for it that hackers have always
 > had. Any good reporter is at least part hacker because what a hacker
 > does primarily is relentlessly pursue an answer. Computers naturally
 > lend themselves to this sort of pursuit, since they tend to be very
 > patient when asked a lot of questions.
 > 
 > WHAT CONSTITUTES A HI-TECH CRIME?
 > 
 >      So where is the boundary between the hacker world and the
 > criminal world? To me, it has always been in the same place. We know
 > that it's wrong to steal tangible objects. We know that it's wrong to
 > vandalize. We know that it's wrong to invade somebody's privacy. Not
 > one of these elements is part of the hacker world.
 > 
 >      A hacker can certainly turn into a criminal and take advantage of
 > the weaknesses in our telephone and computer systems. But this is
 > rare. What is more likely is that a hacker will share knowledge with
 > people, one of whom will decide to use that knowledge for criminal
 > purposes. This does not make the hacker a criminal for figuring it
 > out. And it certainly doesn't make the criminal into a hacker.
 > 
 >      It is easy to see this when we are talking about crimes that we
 > understand as crimes. But then there are the more nebulous crimes; the
 > ones where we have to ask ourselves: "Is this really a crime?" Copying
 > software is one example. We all know that copying a computer program
 > and then selling it is a crime. It's stealing, plain and simple. But
 > copying a program from a friend to try it out on your home computer --
 > is this the same kind of crime? It seems obvious to me that it is not,
 > the reason being that you must make a leap of logic to turn such an
 > action into a crime. Imagine if we were to charge a licensing fee
 > every time somebody browsed through a magazine at the local bookshop,
 > every time material was borrowed from a library, or every time a phone
 > number was jotted down from the yellow pages. Yet, organizations like
 > the Software Publishers Association have gone on record as saying that
 > it is illegal to use the same computer program on more than one
 > computer in your house. They claim that you must purchase it again or
 > face the threat of federal marshalls kicking in your door. That is a
 > leap of logic.
 > 
 >      It is a leap of logic to assume that because a word processor
 > costs $500, a college student will not try to make a free copy in
 > order to write and become a little more computer literate. Do we
 > punish this student for breaking a rule? Do we charge him with
 > stealing $500? To the hacker culture on whose behalf I am speaking
 > today, the only sensible answer is to make it as easy as possible for
 > that college student to use the software he needs. And while we're at
 > it, we should be happy that he's interested in the first place.
 > 
 >      Of course, this represents a fundamental change in our society's
 > outlook. Technology as a way of life, not just another way to make
 > money. After all, we encourage people to read books even if they can't
 > pay for them because to our society literacy is a very important goal.
 > I believe technological literacy is becoming increasingly important.
 > But you cannot have literacy of any kind without having access.
 > 
 >      If we continue to make access to technology difficult,
 > bureaucratic, and illogical, then there will also be more computer
 > crime. The reason being that if you treat someone like a criminal,
 > they will begin to act like one. If we succeed in convincing people
 > that copying a file is the same as physically stealing something, we
 > can hardly be surprised when the broad-based definition results in
 > more overall crime. Blurring the distinction between a virtual
 > infraction and a real-life crime is a mistake.
 > 
 > LEGISLATION FOR COMPUTER AGE CRIME
 > 
 >      New laws are not needed because there is not a single crime that
 > can be committed with a computer that is not already defined as a
 > crime without a computer. But let us not be loose with that
 > definition. Is mere unauthorized access to a computer worthy of
 > federal indictments, lengthy court battles, confiscation of equipment,
 > huge fines, and years of prison time? Or is it closer to a case of
 > trespassing, which in the real world is usually punished by a simple
 > warning? "Of course not," some will say, "since accessing a computer
 > is far more sensitive than walking into an unlocked office building."
 > If that is the case, why is it still so easy to do? If it's possible
 > for somebody to easily gain unauthorized access to a computer that has
 > information about me, I would like to know about it. But somehow I
 > don't think the company or agency running the system would tell me
 > that they have gaping security holes. Hackers, on the other hand, are
 > very open about what they discover which is why large corporations
 > hate them so much. Through legislation, we can turn what the hackers
 > do into a crime and there just might be a slim chance that we can stop
 > them. But that won't fix poorly designed systems whose very existence
 > is a violation of our privacy.
 > 
 > THE DANGERS OF UNINFORMED CONSUMERS
 > 
 >      The concept of privacy is something that is very important to a
 > hacker. This is so because hackers know how fragile privacy is in
 > today's world. Wherever possible we encourage people to protect their
 > directories, encrypt their electronic mail, not use cellular phones,
 > and whatever else it takes to keep their lives to themselves. In 1984
 > hackers were instrumental in showing the world how TRW kept credit
 > files on millions of Americans. Most people had never even heard of a
 > credit file until this happened.  Passwords were very poorly guarded -
 > in fact, credit reports had the password printed on the credit report
 > itself. More recently, hackers found that MCI's Friends and Family
 > program allowed anybody to call an 800 number and find out the numbers
 > of everyone in a customer's "calling circle". As a bonus, you could
 > also find out how these numbers were related to the customer:  friend,
 > brother, daughter-in-law, business partner, etc. Many times these
 > numbers were unlisted yet all that was needed to "verify" the
 > customer's identity was the correct zip code. In both the TRW and MCI
 > cases, hackers were ironically accused of being the ones to invade
 > privacy. What they really did was help to educate the American
 > consumer.
 > 
 >      Nowhere is this more apparent than in the telephone industry.
 > Throughout the country, telephone companies take advantage of
 > consumers. They do this primarily because the consumer does not
 > understand the technology. When we don't understand something
 > complicated, we tend to believe those who do understand. The same is
 > true for auto mechanics, plumbers, doctors, and lawyers. They all
 > speak some strange language that the majority of us will never
 > understand. So we tend to believe them. The difference with the phone
 > companies, and here I am referring to the local companies, is that you
 > cannot deal with somebody else if you happen to disagree with them or
 > find them untrustworthy. The phone companies have us in a situation
 > where we must believe what they say. If we don't believe them, we
 > cannot go elsewhere.
 > 
 >      This is the frustration that the hacker community constantly
 > faces. We face it especially because we are able to understand when
 > the local phone companies take advantage of consumers. Here are a few
 > examples:
 > 
 >      Charging a fee for touch tone service. This is a misnomer.  It
 > actually takes extra effort to tell the computer to ignore the tones
 > that you produce. Everybody already has touch tone capability but we
 > are forced to pay the phone company not to block it. While $1.50 a
 > month may not seem like much, when added together the local companies
 > that still engage in this practice are making millions of dollars a
 > year for absolutely nothing. Why do they get away with it? Because too
 > many of us don't understand how the phone system works. I try to draw
 > an analogy in this particular case - imagine if the phone company
 > decided that a fee would be charged to those customers who wanted to
 > use the number five when dialing. They could argue that the five takes
 > more energy than the four but most of us would see through this flimsy
 > logic. We must seek out other such dubious practices and not blindly
 > accept what we are told.
 > 
 >      Other examples abound: being charged extra not to have your name
 > listed in the telephone directory, a monthly maintenance charge if you
 > select your own telephone number, the fact that calling information to
 > get a number now costs more than calling the number itself.
 > 
 >      More recently, we have become acquainted with a new standard
 > called Signalling System Seven or SS7. Through this system it is
 > possible for telephones to have all kinds of new features: Caller ID,
 > Return Call, Repeat Calling to get through a busy signal, and more.
 > But again, we are having the wool pulled over our eyes. For instance,
 > if you take advantage of Call Return in New York (which will call the
 > last person who dialed your number), you are charged 75 cents on top
 > of the cost of the call itself.  Obviously, there is a cost involved
 > when new technologies are introduced. But there is no additional
 > equipment, manpower, or time consumed when you dial *69 to return a
 > call. It's a permanent part of the system. As a comparison, we could
 > say that it also costs money to install a hold button. Imagine how we
 > would feel if we were charged a fee every time we used it.
 > 
 >      The local companies are not the only offenders but it is
 > particularly bad in their case because, for the vast majority of
 > Americans, there is no competition on this level. The same complaints
 > are being voiced concerning cable television companies.
 > 
 >      Long distance telephone companies are also guilty. AT&T, MCI, and
 > Sprint all encourage the use of calling cards. Yet each imposes a
 > formidable surcharge each and every time they're used.  AT&T, for
 > example, charges 13 cents for the first minute of a nighttime call
 > from Washington DC to New York plus an 80 cent surcharge. Since a
 > calling card can only be used to make telephone calls, why are
 > consumers expected to pay an extra fee as if they were doing something
 > above and beyond the normal capability of the card? Again, there is no
 > extra work necessary to complete a calling card call - at least not on
 > the phone company's part. The consumer, on the other hand, must enter
 > up to 25 additional digits. But billing is accomplished merely by
 > computers sending data to each other. Gone are the days of tickets
 > being written up by hand and verified by human beings.  Everything is
 > accomplished quickly, efficiently, and cheaply by computer. Therefore,
 > these extra charges are outdated.
 > 
 > SOCIAL INJUSTICES OF TECHNOLOGY
 > 
 >      The way in which we have allowed public telephones to be operated
 > is particularly unfair to those who are economically disadvantaged. A
 > one minute call to Washington DC can cost as little as 12 cents from
 > the comfort of your own home. However, if you don't happen to have a
 > phone, or if you don't happen to have a home, that same one minute
 > call will cost you $2.20. That figure is the cheapest rate there is
 > from a Bell operated payphone. With whatever kind of logic was used to
 > set these prices, the results are clear. We have made it harder and
 > more expensive for the poor among us to gain access to the telephone
 > network. Surely this is not something we can be proud of.
 > 
 >      A direct result of this inequity is the prevalence of red boxes.
 > Red boxes are nothing more than tone generators that transmit a quick
 > burst of five tones which convince the central office that a quarter
 > has been deposited. It's very easy and almost totally undetectable.
 > It's also been going on for decades.  Neither the local nor long
 > distance companies have expended much effort towards stopping red
 > boxes, which gives the impression that the payphone profits are still
 > lucrative, even with this abuse. But even more troubling is the
 > message this is sending.  Think of it. For a poor and homeless person
 > to gain access to something that would cost the rest of us 12 cents,
 > they must commit a crime and steal $2.20. This is not equal access.
 > 
 > CORPORATE RULES
 > 
 >      Hackers and phone phreaks, as some of us are called, are very
 > aware of these facts. We learn by asking lots of questions.  We learn
 > by going to libraries and doing research. We learn by diving into
 > phone company trash dumpsters, reading discarded material, and doing
 > more research. But who will listen to people like us who have been
 > frequently characterized as criminals? I am particularly grateful that
 > this committee has chosen to hear us.  What is very important to us is
 > open communications. Freedom of information. An educated public.
 > 
 >      This puts us at direct odds with many organizations, who believe
 > that everything they do is "proprietary" and that the public has no
 > right to know how the public networks work. In July of 1992 we were
 > threatened with legal action by Bellcore (the research arm of the
 > Regional Bell Operating Companies) for revealing security weaknesses
 > inherent in Busy Line Verification (BLV) trunks. The information had
 > been leaked to us and we did not feel compelled to join Bellcore's
 > conspiracy of silence. In April of this year, we were threatened with
 > legal action by AT&T for printing proprietary information of theirs.
 > The information in question was a partial list of the addresses of
 > AT&T offices.  It's very hard for us to imagine how such information
 > could be considered secret. But these actions are not surprising. They
 > only serve to illustrate the wide disparities between the corporate
 > mindset and that of the individual. It is essential that the hundreds
 > of millions of Americans who will be affected by today's
 > all-encompassing inventions not be forced to play by corporate rules.
 > 
 >      In 1990 a magazine similar to 2600 was closed down by the United
 > States government because Bell South said they printed proprietary
 > information. Most people never found out about this because Phrack
 > Magazine was electronic, i.e., only available on computer bulletin
 > boards and networks. This in itself is wrong; a publication must have
 > the same First Amendment rights regardless of whether it is printed
 > electronically or on paper. As more online journals appear, this basic
 > tenet will become increasingly critical to our nation's future as a
 > democracy. Apart from this matter, we must look at what Bell South
 > claimed - that a document discussing the Enhanced 911 system which was
 > worth $79,449 had been "stolen" and printed by Phrack. (Some newspaper
 > accounts even managed to change it into an E911 program which gave the
 > appearance that hackers were actually interfering with the operation
 > of an E911 system and putting lives at risk. In reality there has
 > never been a report of a hacker gaining access to such a system.) It
 > was not until after the publisher of Phrack was forced to go to trial
 > that the real value of the document was revealed. Anyone could get a
 > copy for around $14. The government promptly dropped its case against
 > the publisher who, to this day, is still paying back $100,000 in legal
 > fees. As further evidence of the inquity between individual justice
 > and corporate justice, Bell South was never charged with fraud for its
 > claim that a $14 document was worth nearly $80,000. Their logic, as
 > explained in a memo to then Assistant U.S. Attorney Bill Cook, was
 > that the full salaries of everyone who helped write the document, as
 > well as the full cost of all hardware and software used in the
 > endeavor ($31,000 for a Vaxstation II, $6,000 for a printer), was
 > perfectly acceptable. It is very disturbing that the United States
 > government agreed with this assessment and moved to put a pre-law
 > student behind bars for violating corporate rules.
 > 
 > MISGUIDED AUTHORITY
 > 
 >      I wish I could stand before this committee and say that we have
 > been successful in stopping all such miscarriages of justice. While
 > the Phrack case may have been the most bizarre, there are many more
 > instances of individuals being victimized in similar manners. A
 > teenager in Chicago was jailed for a year for copying a file that was
 > worth millions, according to AT&T, but was utterly worthless and
 > unusable to a kid. A bulletin board operator in California, along with
 > his entire family, was held at gunpoint for hours while authorities
 > seized his equipment in an unsuccessful attempt to find child
 > pornography. Three hackers in Atlanta, after being imprisoned up to a
 > year for dialing into a Bell South computer system that had no
 > password, were forced to pay $233,000 in restitution so the company
 > could install a password system. More recently, a student at the
 > University of Texas at Houston was suspended from school for a year
 > because he accessed a file that merely listed the users of the system
 > (a file which the system allows all users to access). In increasing
 > numbers, young people are being sent to jail, not necessarily for
 > something they did, but rather for something they could have done in a
 > worst-case scenario. Again this indicates fear and misunderstanding of
 > technology and its applications. But this time those feelings emanate
 > from those in authority.
 > 
 >      Locally, an ominous happening occurred at a 2600 monthly meeting
 > last November. (These meetings occur in public areas in cities
 > throughout the nation on the first Friday of every month.) Shortly
 > after it began, the Washington meeting was broken up by Pentagon City
 > Mall security guards. Without any provocation, people were forced to
 > submit to searches and everybody's name was taken down. One of the
 > attendees who was writing down an officer's name had the paper ripped
 > from his hand, another had his film taken from his camera as he tried
 > to document what was going on. Upon questioning by a reporter from
 > Communications Daily, the mall security chief claimed that he was
 > acting under orders from the United States Secret Service. Subsequent
 > Freedom of Information Act requests by Computer Professionals for
 > Social Responsibility have yielded more evidence implicating the
 > Secret Service in this illegal and unwarranted action. Nothing of a
 > criminal nature was ever found in any of the bags that were searched.
 > But a full list of the attendees wound up in the possession of the
 > Secret Service. It seems ironic that while hackers are conducting an
 > open gathering in the middle of a shopping mall in order to share
 > knowledge and welcome new people, agents of the Secret Service are
 > lurking in the shadows trying to figure out ways to stop them.
 > 
 >      How can we move forward and talk about exciting new applications
 > of technology when we're off to such a bad start?  The people that are
 > being arrested, harassed, and intimidated are the people who will be
 > designing and running these new systems. They are the ones who will
 > appreciate their capabilities and understand their weaknesses. Through
 > our short-sightedness and eagerness to listen to the loudest voices,
 > we are alienating the promises of the future. How many here, who grew
 > up in decades past, remember hearing teenagers talk of how the
 > government is after them, watching their every move, listening to
 > their phone calls, doing everything one might expect in a totalitarian
 > regime. Such feelings are the sure sign of an ailing society. It does
 > not matter if these things are not actually occurring - their mere
 > perception is enough to cause lasting harm and mistrust.
 > 
 > PROMISE OF THE INTERNET
 > 
 >      The future holds such enormous potential. It is vital that we not
 > succumb to our fears and allow our democratic ideals and privacy
 > values to be shattered. In many ways, the world of cyberspace is more
 > real than the real world itself. I say this because it is only within
 > the virtual world that people are really free to be themselves - to
 > speak without fear of reprisal, to be anonymous if they so choose, to
 > participate in a dialogue where one is judged by the merits of their
 > words, not the color of their skin or the timbre of their voice.
 > Contrast this to our existing "real" world where we often have people
 > sized up before they even utter a word. The Internet has evolved, on
 > its own volition, to become a true bastion of worldwide democracy. It
 > is the obligation of this committee, and of governments throughout the
 > world, not to stand in its way.
 > 
 >      This does not mean we should stand back and do nothing.  Quite
 > the contrary, there is much we have to do if accessibility and
 > equality are our goals. Over-regulation and commercialization are two
 > ways to quickly kill these goals. A way to realize them is to have a
 > network access point in every house. Currently, network access is
 > restricted to students or professors at participating schools,
 > scientists, commercial establishments, and those who have access to,
 > and can afford, local services that link into the Internet. Yes, a lot
 > of people have access today.  But a far greater number do not and it
 > is to these people that we must speak. The bigger the Internet gets,
 > the better it gets. As it exists today, cultures from around the globe
 > are represented; information of all kinds is exchanged. People are
 > writing, reading, thinking. It's potentially the greatest educational
 > tool we have. Therefore, it is essential that we not allow it to
 > become a commodity that only certain people in society will be able to
 > afford. With today's technology, we face the danger of widening the
 > gap between the haves and the have-nots to a monumental level. Or we
 > can open the door and discover that people really do have a lot to
 > learn from each other, given the opportunity.
 > 
 >      It is my hope that this committee will recognize the importance
 > of dialogue with the American public, in order to answer the questions
 > so many are asking and to address the concerns that have been
 > overlooked. I thank you for this opportunity to express those issues
 > that I feel relevant to this hearing.
 > 
 > ------------------------------
 > 
 > Date:         Sat, 12 Jun 1993 12:30:38 EST
 > From:         Dave Banisar <banisar@WASHOFC.CPSR.ORG>
 > Subject: File 2--CPSR Clipper Testimony (6-9-93) in House Subcommittee
 > 
 >   CPSR Clipper Testimony 6/9
 > 
 >         On June 9, 1993, Congressman Edward Markey, Chairman of the
 > House  Subcommittee on Telecommunications and Finance held an
 > oversight hearing on Rencryption and telecommunications network
 > security. Panelists were Whitfield Diffie of Sun Microsystems, Dr.
 > Dorothy Denning,  Steven Bryen of Secure Communications, Marc
 > Rotenberg of the CPSR Washington Office and E.R. Kerkeslager of AT&T.
 > 
 >         Congressman Markey, after hearing the testimony presented,
 > noted that the Clipper proposal had raised an arched eyebrow among
 > the whole committeeS and that the committee viewed the proposal
 > skeptically. This statement was the latest indication that the Clipper
 > proposal has not been well received by policy makers.  Last Friday,
 > the Computer Systems Security and Privacy Advisory Board of NIST
 > issued two resolutions critical of the encryption plan, suggesting
 > that further study was required and that implementation of the plan
 > should be delayed until the review is completed.
 > 
 >         At the Third CPSR Cryptography and Privacy Conference on
 > Monday, June 7, the Acting Director of NIST, Raymond Kammer, announced
 > that the implementation of the proposal will be delayed and that a
 > more comprehensive review will be undertaken.  The review is due in
 > the fall.  Kammer told the Washington Post that Rmaybe we wonUt
 > continue in the direction we started ous.
 > 
 > +-------------------------------------------------
 > 
 >                           Prepared Testimony
 >                                  and
 >                        Statement for the Record
 >                                   of
 >                         Marc Rotenberg, director
 >                          CPSR Washington Office
 >                                   on
 >                    Encryption Technology and Policy
 >                                 Before
 >             The Subcommittee on Telecommunications and Finance.
 >                    Committee on Energy and Commerce
 > 
 >                         U.S. House of Representatives
 >                                June 9, 1993
 > 
 > SUMMARY
 > 
 >         The cryptography issue is of particular concern to CPSR.
 > During the past several years CPSR has pursued an extensive study of
 > cryptography policy in the United States.  CPSR has organized public
 > conferences, conducted litigation under the Freedom of Information Act,
 > and has emphasized the importance of cryptography for privacy
 > protection and the need to scrutinize carefully government proposals
 > designed to limit the use of this technology.
 >         To evaluate the Clipper proposal it is necessary to look at a
 > 1987 law, the Computer Security Act, which made clear that in the area
 > of unclassified computing systems, the National Institute of Standards
 > and Technology (NIST) and not the National Security Agency (NSA), would
 > be responsible for the development of technical standards.  The Act
 > emphasized public accountability and stressed open decision-making.
 >         In the spirit of the Act, in 1989 NIST set out to develop a
 > public key cryptography standard.  According to documents obtained by
 > CPSR through the Freedom of Information Act, NIST recommended that the
 > algorithm be "public, unclassified, implementable in both hardware or
 > software, usable by federal Agencies and U.S. based multi-national
 > corporation." However, the Clipper proposal and the full-blown Capstone
 > configuration that resulted is very different: the Clipper algorithm,
 > Skipjack, is classified; public access to the reasons underlying the
 > proposal is restricted; Skipjack can be implemented only in
 > tamper-proof hardware; it is unlikely to be used by multi-national
 > corporations, and the security of Clipper remains unproven.
 >         The Clipper proposal undermines the central purpose of the
 > Computer Security Act.  Although intended for broad use in commercial
 > networks, it was not developed at the request of either U.S. business
 > or the general public.  It does not reflect public goals.
 >         The premise of the Clipper key escrow arrangement is that the
 > government must have the ability to intercept electronic
 > communications.  However, there is no legal basis to support this
 > premise. In law there is nothing inherently illegal or suspect about
 > the use of a telephone.  The federal wiretap statute says only that
 > communication service providers must assist law enforcement execute a
 > lawful warrant.
 >         CPSR supports the review of cryptography policy currently
 > underway at the Department of Commerce.  CPSR also supports the efforts
 > undertaken by the Subcommittee on Telecommunications and Finance to
 > study the full ramifications of the Clipper proposal.  However, we are
 > not pleased about the review now being undertaken at the White House.
 > That effort has led to a series of secret meetings, has asked that
 > scientists sign non-disclosure agreements and accept restrictions on
 > publication, and has attempted to resolve public concerns through
 > private channels.  This is not a good process for the evaluation of a
 > technology that is proposed for the public switched network.
 >         Even if the issues regarding Clipper are resolved favorably,
 > privacy concerns will not go away. Rules still need to be developed
 > about the collection and use of transactional data generated by
 > computer communications.  Several specific steps should be taken.
 > First, the FCC should be given a broad mandate to pursue privacy
 > concerns.  Second, current gaps in the communications law should be
 > filled.  The protection of transactional records is particularly
 > important.  Third, telecommunications companies should be encouraged to
 > explore innovative ways to protect privacy.  "Telephone cards", widely
 > available in other countries, are an ideal way to protect privacy.
 > 
 > 
 > TESTIMONY
 > 
 >         Mr. Chairman, members of the Subcommittee, thank you for the
 > opportunity to testify today on encryption policy and the Clipper
 > proposal.  I especially wish to thank you Congressman Markey, on behalf
 > of CPSR, for your ongoing efforts on the privacy front as well as your
 > work to promote public access to electronic information.
 >         The cryptography issue is of particular concern to CPSR.
 > During the past several years we have pursued an extensive study of
 > cryptography policy in the United States.  We have organized several
 > public conferences, conducted litigation under the Freedom of
 > Information Act, and appeared on a number of panels to discuss the
 > importance of cryptography for privacy protection and the need to
 > scrutinize carefully government proposals designed to limit the use of
 > this technology.
 >         While we do not represent any particular computer company or
 > trade association we do speak for a great many people in the computer
 > profession who value privacy and are concerned about the government's
 > Clipper initiative.
 >         Today I will briefly summarize our assessment of the Clipper
 > proposal.  Then I would like to say a few words about the current
 > status of privacy protection.
 > 
 > CLIPPER
 >         To put the Clipper proposal in a policy context, I will need to
 > briefly to describe a law passed in 1987 intended to address the roles
 > of the Department of Commerce and the Department of Defense in the
 > development of technical standards.  The Computer Security Act of 1987
 > was enacted to improve computer security in the federal government, to
 > clarify the responsibilities of the National Institute of Standards and
 > Technology (NIST) and the National Security Agency, and to ensure that
 > technical standards would serve civilian and commercial needs.
 >         The law made clear that in the area of unclassified computing
 > systems, NIST and not NSA, would be responsible for the development of
 > technical standards.  It emphasized public accountability and stressed
 > open decision-making.  The Computer Security Act also established the
 > Computer System Security and Privacy Advisory Board (CSSPAB), charged
 > with reviewing the activities of NIST and ensuring that the mandate of
 > the law was enforced.
 >         The Computer Security Act grew out of a concern that classified
 > standards and secret meetings would not serve the interests of the
 > general public.  As the practical applications for cryptography have
 > moved from the military and intelligence arenas to the commercial
 > sphere, this point has become clear.  There is also clearly a conflict
 > of interest when an agency tasked with signal interception is also
 > given authority to develop standards for network security.
 >         In the spirit of the Computer Security Act, NIST set out in
 > 1989 to develop a public key standard FIPS (Federal Information
 > Processing Standard).  In a memo dated May 5, 1989, obtained by CPSR
 > through the Freedom of Information Act, NIST said that it planned:
 > 
 > to develop the necessary public-key based security standards.  We
 > require a public-key algorithm for calculating digital signatures and
 > we also require a public-key algorithm for distributing secret keys.
 > 
 > NIST then went on to define the requirements of the standard:
 > 
 > The algorithms that we use must be public, unclassified, implementable
 > in both hardware or software, usable by federal Agencies and U.S. based
 > multi-national corporation, and must provide a level of security
 > sufficient for the protection of unclassified, sensitive information
 > and commercial propriety and/or valuable information.
 > 
 >         The Clipper proposal and the full-blown Capstone configuration,
 > which incorporates the key management function NIST set out to develop
 > in 1989, is very different from the one originally conceived by NIST.
 > 
 > %       The Clipper algorithm, Skipjack, is classified,
 > %       Public access to the reasons underlying the proposal is
 > restricted,
 > %       Skipjack can be implemented only in tamper-proof hardware,
 > %       It is Unlikely to be used by multi-national corporations, and
 > %       The security of Clipper remains unproven.
 > 
 >         The Clipper proposal undermines the central purpose of the
 > Computer Security Act.  Although intended for broad use in commercial
 > networks, it was not developed at the request of either U.S. business
 > or the general public.  It does not reflect public goals.  Rather it
 > reflects the interests of one secret agency with the authority to
 > conduct foreign signal intelligence and another government agency
 > responsible for law enforcement investigations.
 >         Documents obtained by CPSR through the Freedom of Information
 > Act indicate that the National Security Agency dominated the meetings
 > of the joint NIST/NSA Technical Working group which made
 > recommendations to NIST regarding public key cryptography, and that a
 > related technical standard for message authentication, the Digital
 > Signature Standard, clearly reflected the interests of the NSA.
 >         We are still trying to determine the precise role of the NSA in
 > the development of the Clipper proposal.  We would be pleased to
 > provide to the Subcommittee whatever materials we obtain.
 > 
 > LEGAL AND POLICY ISSUES
 >         There are also several legal and constitutional issues raised
 > by the government's key escrow proposal.  The premise of the Clipper
 > key escrow arrangement is that the government must have the ability to
 > intercept electronic communications, regardless of the economic or
 > societal costs.  The FBI's Digital Telephony proposal, and the earlier
 > Senate bill 266, were based on the same assumption.
 >         There are a number of arguments made in defense of this
 > position: that privacy rights and law enforcement needs must be
 > balanced, or that the government will be unable to conduct criminal
 > investigations without this capability.
 >         Regardless of how one views these various claims, there is one
 > point about the law that should be made very clear: currently there is
 > no legal basis -- in statute, the Constitution or anywhere else --
 > that supports the premise which underlies the Clipper proposal.  As the
 > law currently stands, surveillance is not a design goal.  General
 > Motors would have a stronger legal basis for building cars that could
 > go no faster than 65 miles per hour than AT&T does in marketing a
 > commercial telephone that has a built-in wiretap capability.  In law
 > there is simply nothing about the use of a telephone that is inherently
 > illegal or suspect.
 >         The federal wiretap statute says only that communication
 > service providers must assist law enforcement in the execution of a
 > lawful warrant.  It does not say that anyone is obligated to design
 > systems to facilitate future wire surveillance.  That distinction is
 > the difference between countries that restrict wire surveillance to
 > narrow circumstances defined in law and those that treat all users of
 > the telephone network as potential criminals.  U.S. law takes the first
 > approach.  Countries such as the former East Germany took the second
 > approach.  The use of the phone system by citizens was considered
 > inherently suspect and for that reason more than 10,000 people were
 > employed by the East German government to listen in on telephone calls.
 >         It is precisely because the wiretap statute does not contain
 > the obligation to incorporate surveillance capability -- the design
 > premise of the Clipper proposal -- that the Federal Bureau of
 > Investigation introduced the Digital Telephony legislation.  But that
 > legislation has not moved forward and the law has remained unchanged.
 > The Clipper proposal attempts to accomplish through the
 > standard-setting and procurement process what the Congress has been
 > unwilling to do through the legislative process.
 >         On legal grounds, adopting the Clipper would be a mistake.
 > There is an important policy goal underlying the wiretap law.  The
 > Fourth Amendment and the federal wiretap statute do not so much balance
 > competing interests as they erect barriers against government excess
 > and define the proper scope of criminal investigation.  The purpose of
 > the federal wiretap law is to restrict the government, it is not to
 > coerce the public.
 >         Therefore, if the government endorses the Clipper proposal, it
 > will undermine the basic philosophy of the federal wiretap law and the
 > fundamental values embodied in the Constitution.  It will establish a
 > technical mechanism for signal interception based on a premise that has
 > no legal foundation.  The assumption underlying the Clipper proposal is
 > more compatible with the practice of telephone surveillance in the
 > former East Germany than it is with the narrowly limited circumstances
 > that wire surveillance has been allowed in the United States.
 > 
 > UNANSWERED QUESTIONS
 >         There are a number of other legal issues that have not been
 > adequately considered by the proponents of the key escrow arrangement
 > that the Subcommittee should examine.  First, not all lawful wiretaps
 > follow a normal warrant process.  The proponents of Clipper should make
 > clear how emergency wiretaps will be conducted before the proposal goes
 > forward.  Second, there may be civil liability issues for the escrow
 > agents, if they are private parties, if there is abuse or compromise of
 > the keys.  Third, there is a Fifth Amendment dimension to the proposed
 > escrow key arrangement if a network user is compelled to disclose his
 > or her key to the government in order to access a communications
 > network. Each one of these issues should be examined carefully.
 > 
 > 
 > CPSR CONFERENCE
 >         At a conference organized by CPSR this week at the Carnegie
 > Endowment for International Peace we heard presentations from staff
 > members at NIST, FBI, NSA and the White House about the Clipper
 > proposal.  The participants at the meeting had the opportunity to ask
 > questions and to exchange views.
 >         Certain points now seem clear:
 > 
 > %       The Clipper proposal was not developed in response to any
 > perceived public or business need.  It was developed solely to address
 > a law enforcement concern.
 > %       Wire surveillance remains a small part of law enforcement
 > investigations.  The number of arrests resulting from wiretaps has
 > remained essentially unchanged since the federal wiretap law was enacted
 > in 1968.
 > %       The potential risks of the Clipper proposal have not been
 > assessed and many questions about the implementation remain unanswered.
 > %       Clipper does not appear to have the support of the business or
 > research community.
 > 
 >         Many comments on the Clipper proposal, both positive and
 > negative as well the materials obtained by CPSR through the Freedom of
 > Information Act, are contained in the Source book compiled by CPSR for
 > the recent conference.  I am please to make a copy of this available to
 > the Subcommittee.
 > 
 > 
 > NETWORK PRIVACY PROTECTION
 >         Communications privacy remains a critical test for network
 > development.  Networks that do not provide a high degree of privacy are
 > clearly less useful to network users.  Given the choice between a
 > cryptography product without a key escrow and one with a key escrow, it
 > would be difficult to find a user who would prefer the key escrow
 > requirement.  If this proposal does go forward, it will not be because
 > network users or commercial service providers favored it.
 >         Even if the issues regarding the Clipper are resolved
 > favorably, privacy concerns will not go away.  Cryptography is a part
 > of communications privacy, but it is only a small part.  Rules still
 > need to be developed about the collection and use of transactional data
 > generated by computer communications.  While the federal wiretap law
 > generally does a very good job of protecting the content of
 > communications against interception by government agencies, large holes
 > still remain.  The extensive use of subpoenas by the government to
 > obtain toll records and the sale of telephone records by private
 > companies are just two examples of gaps in current law.
 >         The enforcement of privacy laws is also a particularly serious
 > concern in the United States.  Good laws without clear mechanisms for
 > enforcement raise over-arching questions about the adequacy of legal
 > protections in this country.  This problem is known to those who have
 > followed developments with the Privacy Act since passage in 1974 and
 > the more recent Video Privacy and Protection Act of 1988.  I make this
 > point because it has been the experience in other countries that
 > agencies charged with the responsibility for privacy protection can be
 > effective advocates for the public in the protection of personal
 > privacy.
 > 
 > RECOMMENDATIONS
 >         Regarding the Clipper proposal, we believe that the national
 > review currently underway by the Computer Security and Privacy Advisory
 > Board at the Department of Commerce will be extremely useful and we
 > look forward to the results of that effort.  The Panel has already
 > conducted a series of important open hearings and compiled useful
 > materials on Clipper and cryptography policy for public review.
 >         We are also pleased that the Subcommittee on Telecommunications
 > and Finance has undertaken this hearing.  This Subcommittee can play a
 > particularly important role in the resolution of these issues.  We also
 > appreciate the Chairman's efforts to ensure that the proper studies are
 > undertaken, that the General Accounting Office fully explores these
 > issues, and that the Secretary of Commerce carefully assesses the
 > potential impact of the Clipper proposal on export policy.
 >         We are, however, less pleased about the White House study
 > currently underway.  That effort, organized in large part by the
 > National Security Council, has led to a series of secret meetings, has
 > asked that scientists sign non-disclosure agreements and accept
 > restrictions on publication, and has attempted to resolve public
 > concerns through private channels.  This is not a good process for the
 > evaluation of a technology that is proposed for the public switched
 > network.  While we acknowledge that the White House has been reasonably
 > forthcoming in explaining the current state of affairs, we do not think
 > that this process is a good one.
 >         For these reasons, we believe that the White House should
 > properly defer to the recommendations of the Computer System Security
 > and Privacy Advisory Board and the Subcommittee on Telecommunications
 > and Finance.  We hope that no further steps in support of the Clipper
 > initiative will be taken.  We specifically recommend that no further
 > purchase of Clipper chips be approved.
 >         Speaking more generally, we believe that a number of steps
 > could be taken to ensure that future communications initiatives could
 > properly be viewed as a boost to privacy and not a set-back.
 > 
 > %       The FCC must be given a strong mandate to pursue privacy
 > concerns.  There should be an office specifically established to
 > examine privacy issues and to prepare reports.  Similar efforts in
 > other countries have been enormously successful.  The Japanese Ministry
 > of Post and Telecommunications developed a set of privacy principles to
 > ensure continued trade with Europe.  The Canada Ministry of
 > Communications developed a set of communications principles to address
 > public concerns about the privacy of cellular communications.  In
 > Europe, the EC put forward an important directive on privacy protection
 > for the development of new network services.
 > 
 > %       Current gaps in the communications law should be filled.  The
 > protection of transactional records is particularly important.
 > Legislation is needed to limit law enforcement access to toll record
 > information and to restrict the sale of data generated by the use of
 > telecommunication services.  As the network becomes digital, the
 > transaction records associated with a particular communication may
 > become more valuable than the content of the communication itself.
 > 
 > %       Telecommunications companies should be encouraged to explore
 > innovative ways to protect privacy.  Cryptography is a particular
 > method to seal electronic communications, but far more important for
 > routine communications could be anonymous telephone cards, similar to
 > the metro cards here in the District of Columbia, that allow consumers
 > to purchase services without establishing accounts, transferring
 > personal data, or recording personal activities.  Such cards are widely
 > available in Europe, Japan, and Australia.
 > 
 >         I thank you very much for the opportunity to appear before the
 > Subcommittee and would be pleased to answer your questions Computer
 > Professionals for Social Responsibility
 > 
 >         CPSR is a national membership organization, established in
 > 1982, to address the social impact of computer technology.  There are
 > 2,500 members in 20 chapters across the United States, and offices in
 > Palo Alto, California, Cambridge, Massachusetts, and Washington DC. The
 > organization is governed by a board of elected officers and meetings
 > are open to the public.  CPSR sponsors an annual meeting and the
 > biennial conference on Directions and Implications of Advanced
 > Computing.  CPSR sponsored the first conference on Computers, Freedom,
 > and Privacy in 1991.  CPSR also operates the Internet Library at
 > cpsr.org.  The library contains documents from the White House on
 > technology policy and a wide range of public laws covering privacy,
 > access to information, and communications law and is available free of
 > charge to all users of the Internet.
 > 
 >         Marc Rotenberg is the director of the CPSR Washington office
 > and an adjunct professor at Georgetown University Law Center.  He is
 > chairman of the ACM Committee on Scientific Freedom and Human Rights,
 > an editor for the Computer Law and Security Report (London), and the
 > secretary of Privacy International, an organization of human rights
 > advocates and privacy scholars in forty countries.  He received an A.B.
 > from Harvard College and a J.D. from Stanford Law School, and is a
 > member of the bar of the United States Supreme Court.  His forthcoming
 > article "Communications Privacy: Implications for Network Design" will
 > appear in the August 1993 issue of Communications o0f the ACM.
 > 
 > ------------------------------
 > 
 > End of Computer Underground Digest #5.43
 > ************************************





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: jet@nas.nasa.gov (J. Eric Townsend)
Date: Mon, 14 Jun 93 09:06:44 PDT
To: Eric Hughes <hughes@soda.berkeley.edu>
Subject: request for patent info
In-Reply-To: <9306141432.AA05436@soda.berkeley.edu>
Message-ID: <9306141606.AA01411@boxer.nas.nasa.gov>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Eric Hughes writes:
 > As much as we need this, we also need the actual text of the patents.
 > What a patent actually covers is often much narrower than what is
 > claimed.

Anyone near a federal patent repository can easily get this
information.  Walk in, find the patent by number, have the nice
attendant print it out on a crappy photostat machine, pay in cash,
leave.  No written record!  Rice U. has a nice staff.  (I don't know
where the west coast ones are.)






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: m5@vail.tivoli.com (Mike McNally)
Date: Mon, 14 Jun 93 07:15:49 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: DH for email (re: email protection and privacy)
Message-ID: <9306141414.AA07349@vail.tivoli.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



In light of a conversation (not a private conversation; it was at an
EFF-Austin gathering) with Mike Godwin in which he stated that the
court has ample precedent to cite you for contempt upon refusal to
produce encryption keys, I think it's clear that no decypherable
encryption scheme is really adequate to protect private materials
during a legal investigation.  Similarly, I suspect that a scheme to
protect information by automatic destruction or obfuscation (as a
friend described it, "digital flash paper") would be considered
illegal obstruction of justice.

Therefore, were I to be in possession of information that for
political or business reasons I strongly required absolute privacy, I
would resort to physical security as the closest thing to a sure-fire
solution.  Back things up onto high-density tape, and keep the tapes
(*and* the tape drive, lest its presence be taken as prima facie
evidence of the existance of off-line "evidence") in some secure
place.

- --
Mike McNally




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: nowhere@bsu-cs.bsu.edu (Chael Hall)
Date: Mon, 14 Jun 93 07:29:43 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: REMAIL/ANON/PGP: System becoming available
Message-ID: <9306141432.AA08208@bsu-cs.bsu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Cypherpunks,

     I realize that I have been completely quiet on the list for a few
months...  Sorry about that, but I have been away from the University.
Right now I am working in Indianapolis and telnetting from IUPUI up to
BSU.  Anyway, to the heart of the matter...  I have gotten permission
from one of the "good guys" at BSU to put my 486dx/33 with 386BSD in
his office (secure) and get it on the Ethernet.

     I will probably run my anonymous remailer on there (the current
one will stay in business) where it is safer.  In addition, I want to
run a pseudonymous service like anon.penet.fi.  I have written some
software in C that does it, but does not quite support PGP yet (it's
not as easy as I would like to have believed before starting the
project).  It will give you an ID and will restrict mail from and to
certain addresses/sites.  It also puts a standard header into the message
and has features to add header lines and footers to the messages
automatically.

     The system will sit idle (aside from mail) most of the time, so
I have no problem using PGP and being an encryption drop-point.  I am
about to start a rewrite of my remailer pretty soon because it needs
some help.  Anyway, I will send you all the IP address and host name
of my computer when it's online.  This could get exciting...  I have
a guest account on there where you can request an account, but I
can't afford to give out too many accounts.  Of course, I would much
rather cypherpunks have accounts than a bunch of sniveling netbrats.

     Anyway, gotta run.  Incidentally, I have about 3 MB of backed up
mail here.  It's only since the second week of May!

Chael Hall

--
Chael Hall
nowhere@bsu-cs.bsu.edu, 00CCHALL@BSUVC.BSU.EDU, chall@bsu.edu
chall@phantom.bsu.edu, nowhere@chaos.bsu.edu [not online yet]
(317) 776-4000 from 8 am - 5 pm CST




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Date: Mon, 14 Jun 93 10:03:55 PDT
To: jet@nas.nasa.gov (J. Eric Townsend)
Subject: Re: request for patent info
In-Reply-To: <9306141606.AA01411@boxer.nas.nasa.gov>
Message-ID: <9306141704.AA24572@netcom3.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


J. Eric Townsend writes:

> Anyone near a federal patent repository can easily get this
> information.  Walk in, find the patent by number, have the nice
> attendant print it out on a crappy photostat machine, pay in cash,
> leave.  No written record!  Rice U. has a nice staff.  (I don't know
> where the west coast ones are.)

Sunnyvale, CA.

Near the public library off Mathilda Ave.


-Tim


-- 
..........................................................................
Timothy C. May         | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,  
tcmay@netcom.com       | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
408-688-5409           | knowledge, reputations, information markets, 
W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA  | black markets, collapse of governments.
Higher Power: 2^756839 | Public Key: PGP and MailSafe available.
Note: I put time and money into writing this posting. I hope you enjoy it.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Mike Godwin <mnemonic@eff.org>
Date: Mon, 14 Jun 93 07:42:19 PDT
To: dporter@well.sf.ca.us (Doug Porter)
Subject: Re: PKP
In-Reply-To: <93Jun13.123601pdt.13888-1@well.sf.ca.us>
Message-ID: <199306141442.AA00948@eff.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> We need info from someone who knows. Mike, are you listening, and are you 
> familiar with antitrust law?

Doug, I am listening, but antitrust is not my area. Many of the developers
and businessfolk on this list have a clearer knowledge of antitrust law
than I.

You are right, of course, that "patents are intended to convey a sharply
limited monopoly."


--Mike






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: peb@PROCASE.COM
Date: Mon, 14 Jun 93 11:08:25 PDT
To: marc@GZA.COM
Subject: Re: DH for email (re: email protection and privacy)
Message-ID: <9306141807.AA21784@banff.procase.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



>Case 4: "I forgot."  

This one seems to work for U.S. presidents.


Paul E. Baclace
peb@procase.com






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: peb@PROCASE.COM
Date: Mon, 14 Jun 93 11:15:13 PDT
To: mlshew@dixie.com
Subject: Re: Rude CryptoStacker Suggestion
Message-ID: <9306141813.AA21788@banff.procase.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



>have you made sure such code doesn't exist already?  

In case no one has mentioned this yet:

There is a Norton Utility (not free, but fairly priced) that 
makes a crypto disk.  I saw this last summer, but disregarded
it since it use the amateur "secrecy through obscurity" method.

Thus, the meme is out to some degree, but not strong enough.


Paul E. Baclace
peb@procase.com





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: jet@nas.nasa.gov (J. Eric Townsend)
Date: Mon, 14 Jun 93 11:15:19 PDT
To: Marc Horowitz <marc@GZA.COM>
Subject: Re: DH for email (re: email protection and privacy)
In-Reply-To: <9306141743.AA01676@dun-dun-noodles.aktis.com>
Message-ID: <9306141815.AA01755@boxer.nas.nasa.gov>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Marc Horowitz writes:
 > Case 4: "I forgot."  Can they do anything?

"I don't recall" worked for Reagan, Bush, et al quite well. :-(





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: m5@vail.tivoli.com (Mike McNally)
Date: Mon, 14 Jun 93 09:29:00 PDT
To: Mike Godwin <mnemonic@eff.org>
Subject: Re: DH for email (re: email protection and privacy)
In-Reply-To: <199306141623.AA01688@eff.org>
Message-ID: <9306141627.AA07743@vail.tivoli.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Mike Godwin writes:
 > Note that a court could cite you for contempt for not complying 
 > with a subpoena duces tecum (a subpoena requiring you to produce objects 
 > or documents) if you fail to turn over subpoenaed backups.

I understand this, but could I be cited for failure to produce
evidence not known by the court to exist?  (Clearly, I could be so
cited if the evidence were ever discovered.)  Is there a process that
the court can use that says "hand over absolutely all artifacts
pertinent to the case at hand known to *you*, whether such artifacts
be known to the court or not." ?  Or is it the case that failure on my
part to offer up such evidence is inherently contemptuous?

 > To be honest, I don't think *any* security measure is adequate against a
 > government that's determined to overreach its authority and its citizens'
 > rights, but crypto comes close.

I wholeheartedly agree; I'd of course encrypt my secret backups :-)


Gee, now that I've publicized this great idea, I suppose it can never
work for me.

--
Mike McNally




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Mike Godwin <mnemonic@eff.org>
Date: Mon, 14 Jun 93 09:23:21 PDT
To: m5@vail.tivoli.com (Mike McNally)
Subject: Re: DH for email (re: email protection and privacy)
In-Reply-To: <9306141414.AA07349@vail.tivoli.com>
Message-ID: <199306141623.AA01688@eff.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


 
Mike McNally writes:

> In light of a conversation (not a private conversation; it was at an
> EFF-Austin gathering) with Mike Godwin in which he stated that the
> court has ample precedent to cite you for contempt upon refusal to
> produce encryption keys, I think it's clear that no decypherable
> encryption scheme is really adequate to protect private materials
> during a legal investigation.  Similarly, I suspect that a scheme to
> protect information by automatic destruction or obfuscation (as a
> friend described it, "digital flash paper") would be considered
> illegal obstruction of justice.
> 
> Therefore, were I to be in possession of information that for
> political or business reasons I strongly required absolute privacy, I
> would resort to physical security as the closest thing to a sure-fire
> solution.  Back things up onto high-density tape, and keep the tapes
> (*and* the tape drive, lest its presence be taken as prima facie
> evidence of the existance of off-line "evidence") in some secure
> place.

Note that a court could cite you for contempt for not complying 
with a subpoena duces tecum (a subpoena requiring you to produce objects 
or documents) if you fail to turn over subpoenaed backups.

To be honest, I don't think *any* security measure is adequate against a
government that's determined to overreach its authority and its citizens'
rights, but crypto comes close.


--Mike

 




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Henry Strickland <strick@versant.com>
Date: Mon, 14 Jun 93 12:33:02 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: FORWARD: Burt Kaliski: Anderson's RSA Trapdoor Can Be Broken
Message-ID: <9306141935.AA05358@versant.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


[nando]
------- Forwarded Message

Date: Mon, 14 Jun 93 11:21:38 PDT
From: burt@RSA.COM (Burt Kaliski)
Message-Id: <9306141821.AA06771@RSA.COM>
To: rsaref-users@RSA.COM, pem-dev@TIS.COM
Subject: Anderson's RSA Trapdoor Can Be Broken
Sender: pem-dev-relay@TIS.COM

In a recent issue of Electronics Letters, Ross Anderson proposes a
trapdoor in RSA whereby a hardware device generates special RSA keys
that the device's manufacturer can break easily. The following note,
just submitted to EL, shows that the special keys can be broken by
anyone, not just the manufacturer. The trapdoor is ineffective.

- -- Burt Kaliski
RSA Laboratories
- ----------------------------------------------------------------------
\documentstyle[12pt]{article}

\newcommand{\mat}[2]
  {\left( \begin{array}{#1}#2 \end{array} \right)}

\begin{document}

\title{Anderson's RSA Trapdoor Can Be Broken}
\author{Burton S. Kaliski Jr.\thanks{RSA Laboratories, 100 Marine Parkway,
Redwood City, CA  94065. Email address: {\tt burt@rsa.com}.}}
\date{June 11, 1993}

\maketitle

\begin{abstract}
The RSA trapdoor proposed in Ross Anderson's recent letter can be
broken.
\end{abstract}

\section{Introduction}

A recent letter by Ross Anderson \cite{anderson-trapdoor} proposes a
``trapdoor'' in the RSA public-key cryptosystem \cite{rsa} whereby a
hardware device generates RSA primes $p$ and $p'$ in such a way
that the hardware manufacturer can easily factor the RSA modulus $n =
pp'$. Factoring the modulus hopefully remains difficult for all
other parties.

The proposed trapdoor
is based on a secret value $A$ known only to
the manufacturer. For 256-bit RSA primes, the
secret value $A$ is 200 bits long. The device generates primes $p$
of the form
\begin{equation}
\label{prime-form}
p = rA + q = r(q,A)A + q,
\end{equation}
where $q$ is at most about 100 bits long,
and $r$ is 56 bits long and a function of $A$ and $q$.
To factor
the RSA modulus $n = pp'$, the manufacturer reduces the modulus
modulo $A$ to recover the product $qq'$, following the relationship
\begin{equation}
\label{modulus-form}
n = pp' = rr'A^2 + (rq'+r'q)A + qq'.
\end{equation}
The 200-bit product $qq'$ is easily factored, and the manufacturer
recovers the primes $p$ and $p'$
according to Equation \ref{prime-form}.

\section{Breaking the trapdoor}

While the trapdoor is indeed practical, it can be broken:
Factoring such ``trapped'' moduli is easy. Let
$n_0, \ldots, n_k$ be a set of such moduli, and let $r_0,r_0', \ldots,
r_k,r_k'$ be the corresponding parameters from Equation \ref{modulus-form}.
It is easy to show the following
inequalities for the given parameter lengths:
\begin{equation}
\left\| r_0r_0' \frac{n_i}{n_0} - r_ir_i' \right\| \le 2^{-41},
\quad 1 \le i \le k.
\end{equation}
Such inequalities are called ``simultaneous
Diophantine approximations,'' and they are classified as
``unusually good'' if the error
term is less than $n_0^{-1/k}$ \cite{lagarias-approx}.
For the given parameter lengths, this
is so when $k$ is 13 or more.

Given a set of moduli known to have such 
approximations,
finding the approximations is straightforward. Following
techniques for breaking knapsack cryptosystems (see \cite{brickell-survey},
\cite{lagarias-approx}, \cite{lll}),
one finds a set of short vectors in the lattice generated by
the basis
\begin{equation}
\mat{ccccc}
{\lambda n_0 & 0 & 0 & \cdots & 0 \\
0 & \lambda n_0 & 0 & \cdots & \vdots \\
\vdots & 0 & \ddots & 0 & \vdots \\
0 & \cdots & 0 & \lambda n_0 & 0 \\
- -\lambda n_1 & -\lambda n_2 & \cdots & -\lambda n_k & 1},
\end{equation}
where $\lambda$ is an integer near $n_0^{-1/k}$. In most cases,
the short vector
\begin{equation}
\mat{ccccc}{\lambda(r_1r_1'n_0-r_0r_0'n_1)
& \cdots
& \lambda(r_kr_k'n_0-r_0r_0'n_k)
& r_0r_0'}
\end{equation}
is a member of the set. 
The secret value $A$ follows from $r_0r_0'$, since, by
Equation \ref{modulus-form}, the integer nearest to $n_0/(r_0r_0')$ is $A^2$.

One way to overcome this attack is to assign a different secret value
to each device, a precaution Anderson has suggested for another
purpose. Then a user can only factor his or her own moduli. The user
does not need 14 moduli to find $A$, however. Two prime factors $p$
and $p'$ suffice, since the fraction $r'/r$ is such a good
approximation to the fraction $p'/p$ that it is guaranteed to be a
convergent in the continued fraction expansion of $p'/p$. The user
can therefore detect a trapdoor even if the device generates each
modulus with a different secret value.

\section{Conclusion}

The manufacturer's only recourse, at least as far as the proposed
trapdoor is concerned, is for the device to generate each modulus
with a different
secret value and to keep the prime factors secret. In such a situation,
the manufacturer may as well preload the device with the primes
and escrow copies---a practical ``trapdoor'' to which all
cryptosystems, not just RSA, are vulnerable.

\section{Acknowledgements}

Matt Robshaw offered helpful comments and suggestions. I also thank
God (Col. 3:17).

\bibliographystyle{plain}
\begin{thebibliography}{1}

\bibitem{anderson-trapdoor}
Ross Anderson.
\newblock A practical {RSA} trapdoor.
\newblock {\it Electronics Letters}, 29(11):995, 27 May 1993.

\bibitem{brickell-survey}
E.F. Brickell and A.M. Odlyzko.
\newblock Cryptanalysis: {A} survey of recent results.
\newblock {\it Proceedings of the IEEE}, 76:578--593, 1988.

\bibitem{lagarias-approx}
J.C. Lagarias.
\newblock Knapsack public key cryptosystems and diophantine approximation.
\newblock In D. Chaum, editor, {\it Advances in Cryptology: Proceedings of
  CRYPTO '83}, pages~3--23, Plenum Press, New York, 1984.

\bibitem{lll}
A.K. Lenstra, H.W. {Lenstra Jr.}, and L. Lovasz.
\newblock Factoring polynomials with rational coefficients.
\newblock {\it Math. Annalen}, 261:513--534, 1982.

\bibitem{rsa}
R.L. Rivest, A. Shamir, and L. Adleman.
\newblock A method for obtaining digital signatures and public-key
  cryptosystems.
\newblock {\it Communications of the ACM}, 21(2):120--126, February 1978.

\end{thebibliography}

\end{document}

------- End of Forwarded Message





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Mike Godwin <mnemonic@eff.org>
Date: Mon, 14 Jun 93 10:06:44 PDT
To: m5@vail.tivoli.com (Mike McNally)
Subject: Re: DH for email (re: email protection and privacy)
In-Reply-To: <9306141627.AA07743@vail.tivoli.com>
Message-ID: <199306141706.AA02197@eff.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


 
Mike McNally writes:

> I understand this, but could I be cited for failure to produce
> evidence not known by the court to exist?

Absolutely. And it looks very, very bad for you if the court later
discovers that you were holding back.

> Is there a process that
> the court can use that says "hand over absolutely all artifacts
> pertinent to the case at hand known to *you*, whether such artifacts
> be known to the court or not." ?

Yes.

> Or is it the case that failure on my
> part to offer up such evidence is inherently contemptuous?

You're not required to go *beyond* what is specified in a subpoena.
But the subpoena's specifications can be pretty broad.



--Mike






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: m5@vail.tivoli.com (Mike McNally)
Date: Mon, 14 Jun 93 11:22:57 PDT
To: peb@PROCASE.COM
Subject: Re: DH for email (re: email protection and privacy)
In-Reply-To: <9306141807.AA21784@banff.procase.com>
Message-ID: <9306141821.AA08042@vail.tivoli.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



peb@PROCASE.COM writes:
 > >Case 4: "I forgot."  
 > 
 > This one seems to work for U.S. presidents.

My suspicion is (gee Mike, you're right!  I *am* a lawyer!) that in
such cases the court makes a judgement as to whether a particular
claim of forgetfulness is credible.  If the information in question is
clearly critical to the life or livelihood of the person being
subpoenaed (is there a legal term for "person being subpoenaed"?), the
claim that the key has been forgotten is likely to be disbelieved.  Of
course, the court might say "Ok, gee, that's too bad.  I guess it's OK
then if we just hold these floppies under this head demagnetizer."

--
Mike McNally




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Marc Horowitz <marc@GZA.COM>
Date: Mon, 14 Jun 93 10:43:25 PDT
To: Mike Godwin <mnemonic@eff.org>
Subject: Re: DH for email (re: email protection and privacy)
In-Reply-To: <199306141623.AA01688@eff.org>
Message-ID: <9306141743.AA01676@dun-dun-noodles.aktis.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>> Note that a court could cite you for contempt for not complying 
>> with a subpoena duces tecum (a subpoena requiring you to produce objects 
>> or documents) if you fail to turn over subpoenaed backups.

This is gonna sounds weird, but....

Let's say I have a (paper) document which explains how I (for example)
embezzled money from Megacorp, Inc.  I presume that the Fifth
Amendment means I cannot be forced to produce this document.

Case 1: let's say that I have the same document on disk, in the clear.
Can they force me to produce that?

Case 2: They sieze a disk from an associate which has the document,
but it's encrypted.  Can they force me to produce the key?  Mike, you
claim that there is precedent which says that they can.  I'm curious
how the Fifth Amendment allows this.  I've heard you say in the past
that key escrow doesn't violate the 5th because you're not disclosing
anything at the time.  But if the government possesses an
incriminating document, wouldn't forcing me to give them the key
constitute self-incrimination?

Case 3: I keep all my stuff encrypted, and enter the key from (say) a
smartcard of some sort when I boot up.  They seize my machine, and
insist that I give them the key.  I refuse, because the key is stored
in a cleartext document, which incriminates me in some way.  (Say the
key is a hash of the document itself.)  Since I'm sure there's no
precedent for this, what are the legal implications of seizing this
document?

Case 4: "I forgot."  Can they do anything?

		Marc




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Mike Godwin <mnemonic@eff.org>
Date: Mon, 14 Jun 93 11:19:55 PDT
To: marc@GZA.COM (Marc Horowitz)
Subject: Re: DH for email (re: email protection and privacy)
In-Reply-To: <9306141743.AA01676@dun-dun-noodles.aktis.com>
Message-ID: <199306141820.AA03729@eff.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Marc asks a bunch of legal questions:
 
> This is gonna sounds weird, but....
> 
> Let's say I have a (paper) document which explains how I (for example)
> embezzled money from Megacorp, Inc.  I presume that the Fifth
> Amendment means I cannot be forced to produce this document.

Why presume this? Suppose the document doesn't directly incriminate
you (it doesn't say "I did this crime," for example), but, taken together
with other evidence the government has, does tend to incrimininate you.
In some circuits, at least, production of that document can be compelled.
(In others, there is a "last link" exception--the government can't compel
evidence that would constitute the "last link" in proving the government's
criminal case against you.)

> Case 1: let's say that I have the same document on disk, in the clear.
> Can they force me to produce that?
 
Assume that the rules are the same for paper or electronic documents.

> Case 2: They sieze a disk from an associate which has the document,
> but it's encrypted.  Can they force me to produce the key?

This has never been decided, but I think that, in terms of the relevant
legal precedents, they can. The rule is that you can be compelled to 
produce anything that is not, in itself, testimonial in nature and tending
to incriminate you. An encryption key, *taken by itself*, normally doesn't
tend to incriminate anyone--after all, it usually looks like gibberish.

>  Mike, you
> claim that there is precedent which says that they can.  I'm curious
> how the Fifth Amendment allows this.

See above. The Fifth Amendment bars compelled testimony. If what is
being compelled is not testimonial in nature, it doesn't violate the
Fifth.

> I've heard you say in the past
> that key escrow doesn't violate the 5th because you're not disclosing
> anything at the time.

More precisely, what I've said is that this is the argument the government
would make. In spirit, I think it violates the Fifth Amendment.

> But if the government possesses an
> incriminating document, wouldn't forcing me to give them the key
> constitute self-incrimination?
 
Possibly, in a circuit that recognizes the "last link" rule.

> Case 3: I keep all my stuff encrypted, and enter the key from (say) a
> smartcard of some sort when I boot up.  They seize my machine, and
> insist that I give them the key.

If you mean the smartcard itself, well, that can be compelled or 
seized.

But I take it you mean the key information.

> I refuse, because the key is stored
> in a cleartext document, which incriminates me in some way.  (Say the
> key is a hash of the document itself.)

There is an exception to the rule that nontestimonial stuff can be
compelled, and it's called, loosely, "the production privilege"--when
the very act of producing what is sought tends to incriminate you,
(by showing your ownership, control, authorship, or something similar),
compelled production may violate the Fifth Amendment.

But your question is more on the order of "What if the key is (or is 
derived from) a document that says 'I did this crime'?"

My answer is: "I don't know." But I should note that if you set up
elaborate schemes to block a law enforcement investigation that you
already know or have reason to believe is taking place, you may be
creating risk of criminal liability for obstruction of justice.

> Case 4: "I forgot."  Can they do anything?

Yes. They can conclude that you're lying and cite you for contempt or
(if you say "I forgot" under oath) charge you with perjury. Remember,
courts and judges *frequently* have to decide whether people are
lying or not, and they could decide you're lying in this case.



--Mike






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Brian.Hawthorne@East.Sun.COM (Brian Holt Hawthorne - SunSelect Engineering)
Date: Mon, 14 Jun 93 18:57:45 PDT
To: marc@GZA.COM
Subject: Re: DH for email (re: email protection and privacy)
Message-ID: <9306141918.AA26700@sea.East.Sun.COM>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> Let's say I have a (paper) document which explains how I (for example)
> embezzled money from Megacorp, Inc.  I presume that the Fifth
> Amendment means I cannot be forced to produce this document.

Bad assumption. Written documents, even if written by you and even
if it incriminates you, can be subpoenaed. I forget the case that
set the precedent for this, but it had to do with someone's diary.



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Tom Knight <tk@reagan.ai.mit.edu>
Date: Mon, 14 Jun 93 12:35:50 PDT
To: jet@nas.nasa.gov
Subject: Re: request for patent info
In-Reply-To: <9306141704.AA24572@netcom3.netcom.com>
Message-ID: <19930614193442.0.TK@ROCKY.AI.MIT.EDU>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Full text of patents and claims are available (for a fee) from Dialog
Information Systems on-line.  Subscribers can access it in file 654.
If there are particular patents that are important and that we need full
text versions of quickly, I can oblige.  Also extremely useful is the
cross-indexing and forward references, so that you can find all patents,
e.g., which reference a particular patent as prior art.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Stanton McCandlish <anton@hydra.unm.edu>
Date: Mon, 14 Jun 93 14:36:59 PDT
To: sci-crypt@cs.utexas.edu
Subject: NitV open again
Message-ID: <9306142136.AA05402@hydra.unm.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Your PGP *utilities* source for the BBS side of things in back online again,
though there still remain some hardware probs of nasty proportions.  I
have upped the online time for the ANONYMOUS, password GUEST, account so
you can get the larger stuff.  See .sig for info.   Note that FREQing may
not work after the next Fido nodelist comes out, but that will only be
temporary. 

I have the latest PGPShell (2.1), plus some innovative Fido-tech
networking crypto goodies.  I'd likely UL them to soda, but I was told
that if it doesn't come with source code don't bother.  Slightly
frustrating, but oh well that's not my site.  Anyway, got lots of other
such goodies too, for Unix, and about 6 other platforms, including various
shell and Perl scripts, NeXT diffs, etc.

Disclaimer: Due to legal threats from RSADSI/PKP, I am not able to provide
PGP itself.

Anyone know if it would be legal to provide it in "kit form" (source code)?

-- 

        When marriage is outlawed only outlaws will be inlaws!
Stanton McCandlish,  SysOp:  Noise in the Void DataCenter Library BBS
Internet anton@hydra.unm.edu     IndraNet: 369:1/1      FidoNet: 1:301/2     
Snail: 1811-B Coal Pl. SE, Albuquerque, New Mexico 87108 USA
Data phone: +1-505-246-8515 (24hr, 1200-14400 v32bis, N-8-1)
Vox phone:  +1-505-247-3402 (bps rate varies, depends on if you woke me up...:)



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Stanton McCandlish <anton@hydra.unm.edu>
Date: Mon, 14 Jun 93 14:58:09 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: funky wierdmail
Message-ID: <9306142158.AA06863@hydra.unm.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Anyone got any idea why I keep getting mail like this?  It appears to be a
bounce of some sort.  Dunno which list (if any) it is coming from, but
many mailwizzes seem to be reading, so I am hoping no one will mind the
bandwidth use...

This is the WHOLE message, it's just header and no body.  I get several of
them per day, starting about 5 days ago.

Quoth uucp@attmail.com, verily I saith unto thee:

> From uucp@attmail.com Sun Jun 13 18:38:55 1993
> 	id <AA02312>; Sun, 13 Jun 1993 18:38:53 -0600
> Message-Id: <9306140038.AA02312@hydra.unm.edu>
> From: uucp@attmail.com
> Date: 14 Jun 93 00:30:46 GMT
> To: anton@hydra.unm.edu
> Report-Version: 2
> Confirming-Mts-Message-Id: </C=US/AD=ATTMAIL;internet1650027060>
> Confirming-Ua-Content-Id: <ternet1650027060>
> Original-Date: Mon Jun 14 00:30:46 GMT 1993
> Not-Delivered-To: mhs!wu/O=duncan_frissell/DD.ELN=62896145 due to 05 Unavailable User Agent
> Content-Type: text
> 
> 


-- 
        When marriage is outlawed only outlaws will be inlaws!
Stanton McCandlish,  SysOp:  Noise in the Void DataCenter Library BBS
Internet anton@hydra.unm.edu     IndraNet: 369:1/1      FidoNet: 1:301/2     
Snail: 1811-B Coal Pl. SE, Albuquerque, New Mexico 87108 USA
Data phone: +1-505-246-8515 (24hr, 1200-14400 v32bis, N-8-1)
Vox phone:  +1-505-247-3402 (bps rate varies, depends on if you woke me up...:)



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Duncan Frissell <76630.3577@CompuServe.COM>
Date: Mon, 14 Jun 93 14:19:35 PDT
To: <cypherpunks@toad.com>
Subject: Digital Cash$$$$
Message-ID: <930614200936_76630.3577_EHK40-1@CompuServe.COM>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


 
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
 
L;>INTERNET:cypherpunks@toad.com;Digital Cash$$$$
(J. Michael Diehl)
 
>>>1. How does one start a digital cash economy?<<<
A digital cash economy doesn't have to be separate from the regular economy.
 
        1.)     You mail cash/MO to First Digital Bank of Cyberspace (at an
offshore
        maildrop) together with a public (unique if you like) key and anonymous
email
        address (on Julf's remailer perhaps).
 
        2.)     The Bank opens an account denominated in the (traded) currency
of your
        choice or a commodity (gold).  There is no reason not to use existing
monies to
        back digital cash.
 
        3.)     You request digital banknotes and the bank emails them to you as
detailed in
        David Chaum's Scientific American article.
 
        4.)     You find someone to accept the digital cash.  Initially it can
be used for
        gambling and telecoms/storage fees, eventually buying digital goods
(software,
        print, audio, video, VR) will be easy.  Remember, within a few years 100
million
        homes in OECD countries will have 1.5 megabit lines into them.  This is
a huge
        market for digital entertainment.
 
        5.)     After a bit of development when the First Digital Bank of
Cyberspace cuts a
        deal with a physical offshore bank, it can issue VISA debit cards and
ATM cards in
        a  Nome de Guerre.  This is already done for large depositors, the nets
make it
        possible to do it for all.  You can then access your account from any
streetcorner
        in the OECD.  Remember money market funds are pseudo banks these days
with VISA
        cards and check writing and all.
 
        6.)     If you want to close your account, and you can't find any way to
spend your
        money as digital cash, you can have funds wired to a regular bank
account you
        maintain in a Nome de Guerre, have it wired via Western Union with a
code phrase
        because you've 'lost' your ID (for small amounts), have it wired to an
out-of-
        country bank in your truename and go pick it up in person, arrange a
gold purchase
        from a dealer somewhere and have the funds sent to him by wire or draft
and take
        physical delivery of the gold.  (There are many other techniques known
to privacy
        experts).  Eventually there will be plenty of moneychangers on the nets
happy to
        take your digital cash.
 
Most money is already digital.  The digital cash technology just gives us a way
to make
easy financial transfers over public networks.  If there is a demand for
economic
transactions over the nets, the money will be supplied.
 
******************************************************************************
* DUNCAN FRISSELL                       Attorney at Law, Writer, and Privacy *
* CIS 76630,3577                        Consultant since the Nixon           *
* Internet 76630.3577@compuserve.com      Administration                     *
* or frissell@panix.com                                                      *
* Easylink 62853962                                                          *
* Attmail !dfrissell                                                         *
* TLX:  402231 FRISSELL NYK                                                  *
*                                                                            *
*          * Privacy Checkup still only $29.95.  Buy today before price *    *
*          * controls force me to raise my prices.                      *    *
*                                                                            *
*          "If Mohammed A. Salameh had seen me in January, he'd be           *
*           vacationing in Tunisia today."                                   *
*                                                                            *
******************************************************************************
 





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "J. J. Larrea" <jjl@Panix.Com>
Date: Mon, 14 Jun 93 14:20:13 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: request for patent info
In-Reply-To: <9306141606.AA01411@boxer.nas.nasa.gov>
Message-ID: <199306142119.AA17206@sun.Panix.Com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Eric Hughes writes:
> As much as we need this, we also need the actual text of the patents.
> What a patent actually covers is often much narrower than what is
> claimed.
 
And J. Eric Townsend adds:
> Anyone near a federal patent repository can easily get this
> information.  Walk in, find the patent by number, have the nice
> attendant print it out on a crappy photostat machine, pay in cash,
> leave.  No written record!  Rice U. has a nice staff.  (I don't know
> where the west coast ones are.)

Ah, the things we put up with in New York... the friendly attendants
at the FPR run by the New York Public Library will happily change your bills
into nickels and quarters so you can print it from microfilm yourself at
$0.30 per page...

But, they have a free dialup to the PTO's online "USPAT" database, which I
have been using for the past few months.  I will be there using the system
sometime during the week of June 22.  It would certainly be possible for me
to capture abstracts, legal info (assignees etc.), etc. on a floppy and
transfer it to the c-punks archive.  Depending on how busy the library happens
to be, I might also be able to get the fulltext of claims, and even maybe the
full disclosure statement, for a limited number of patents (it takes a *long*
time to download, and anything but citations is considered bad etiquette if
anyone is waiting for the single terminal).

I am willing to do this (time permitting, of course), if:

    (1) a person of credibility can assure me that I am not violating any
        copyright or other legislation by doing so.
    (2) one or more cypherpunks takes responsibility for gathering and
	summarizing a list of pertinent patent numbers, and keywords for
        further searching (which can include any word in the fulltext,
	inventor's name, assignee's name, etc.)

- JJ



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Johan Helsingius <julf@penet.FI>
Date: Mon, 14 Jun 93 07:56:16 PDT
To: John Gilmore <gnu@toad.com>
Subject: Re: Digital cash software
In-Reply-To: <9306140709.AA05436@toad.com>
Message-ID: <9306141710.aa20936@penet.penet.FI>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



> I spoke with David Chaum, the inventor of digital money, last week at
> the cryptography meetings in DC.  He is willing to give us a noncommercial
> license to use his digital money patents, and copies of some of his
> software for digital cash, for us to deploy somehow, and start using.

Wow! Great!

> If we have a small group of people (say 2 to 5) who are seriously 
> interested in building a digital-cash-on-the-Internet application
> and getting it into use, then speak up and get organized, and I
> will cross-connect you to David and Nils so things will start moving.

Definitely interested!

	Julf





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: gnu@cygnus.com
Date: Mon, 14 Jun 93 18:09:45 PDT
To: gnu@cygnus.com
Subject: Kahn Sees On-Going Battle On Cryptography 06/14/93
Message-ID: <9306150109.AA21678@cygnus.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


From: newsbytes@clarinet.com
Newsgroups: clari.nb.general
Subject: Kahn Sees On-Going Battle On Cryptography 06/14/93

PALO ALTO, CALIFORNIA, U.S.A., 1993 JUN 14 (NB) -- David Kahn,
author of "The Codebreakers", speaking at the Third CPSR
Cryptography Conference, told those assembled that he sees an on-
going battle between government and privacy advocates over personal
and business uses of cryptography.

Kahn began by saying "My thesis is that the growth of cryptography
follows the growth of communication. When there was little literacy,
writing itself was a form of cryptography"

"A great leap forward came in World War I -- the use of radio
brought the need for greater use of codes to insure the privacy of
messages. In the fall out after the war, the use of cipher machines
was attempted but this approach was not really practical until
computers came along," he added.

According to Khan, in recent times, interest in cryptography has
grown dramatically. "When the RSA algorithm was mentioned in
Scientific American, there were 5,000 requests for reprints of the
article; the story "Ultra Secret" about the breaking of the Germans'
code raised interest and threats such as computer "hackers", viruses
and cellular phone fraud raised additional interest in cryptography
and the protection of privacy," he said.

Kahn then moved to his Antithesis: "(The) Government wants to stop the
movement toward privacy. (The) Government wants to know about
criminal and terrorists. It tries to accomplish this objective
through such things as export controls and the Clipper & Capstone
chips," he told the audience.

"The Government sees its activity. not as an additional intrusion
into individual privacy. but as an attempt to maintain the present
state. However, the domain of individual rights has been expanding --
the Miranda warnings, abortion decisions and the more strident
avocation of privacy rights are examples of this trend," he said.

"The Government moves are trying to block the advance of privacy
rather than intrude into present rights. Export limits inhibits
business expansion," he added.

Kahn concluded: "Now we have to look for the synthesis. It's a
matter of "privacy is good" and "business profits are good" versus
"security is good." The question that must be answered is how to
balance these goods. Do we give up the first for the second?"

"The World Trade Center bombing shows that terrorism is here and is
a concern. Government wants to hold back technology. This can't be
done forever but can be done for a while. Government will argue that
the temporary holding back will save some lives and properties," he
said.

In the question and answer period that followed, Bill Murray,
consultant to Deloite and Touche, commented: "When the government
wants us to give up the right to private communications, it must
show us the danger (that warrants it). If drug dealers and
terrorists are the problem, it should be demonstrated that drug
dealers and terrorists are abusing private communications."

In response to a Newsbytes question as to whether the triumph of the
expansion of privacy rights over government concerns was inevitable,
Kahn said: "Privacy is to powerful a force to be stopped. It will
eventually prevail."

Ross Stapleton, a Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) analyst,
commented: "These changes in information may cause a rethinking of
the concept of national sovereignty. Governments have always have
tried to control the flow of information; with the new technology
and communications capabilities, they cannot. control it any
longer."

Murray said: "We cannot control it but we can criminalize it and
that would be a mistake. By criminalizing drugs, we have
destabilized society. There is so much illegal money from this
policy that courts, law enforcement departments and legislatures
have been corrupted."

Asked by Newsbytes if he saw illegal money growing if the government
tries to rein in the growth of cryptography or tries to make
wiretapping more pervasive, Murray said: "No, it's not analogous in
the money sense. But the criminalizing of anything without real
justification causes destabilization."

(Barbara E. McMullen & John F. McMullen/19930614/Press Contact:
David Banisar, Computer Professionals For Social Responsibility,
202-544-9240 (voice); 202-547-5481 (fax); banisar@washofc.cpsr.org
on the Internet)

"Copyright 1993 by <UPI/Newsbytes/Whoever>  (I have no idea who).
Reposted with permission from the ClariNet Electronic Newspaper newsgroup
clari.nb.general.  For more info on ClariNet, write to info@clarinet.com or
phone 1-800-USE-NETS."




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: wcs@anchor.ho.att.com
Date: Mon, 14 Jun 93 16:59:32 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: DH for email (re: email protection and privacy)
Message-ID: <9306142224.AA14117@anchor.ho.att.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text


peb@PROCASE.COM writes:
>  > >Case 4: "I forgot."  
>  > 
>  > This one seems to work for U.S. presidents.
Yes, but in Reagan's case it was quite believable that he had forgotten;
you, on the other hand, are presumed to be competent :-)

		Bill




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: gnu (John Gilmore)
Date: Mon, 14 Jun 93 20:31:23 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: 2600 testimony to Markey's subcommittee
In-Reply-To: <9306141559.AA01370@boxer.nas.nasa.gov>
Message-ID: <9306150331.AA08630@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I was at the subcommittee hearing last Wednesday when "Emmanuel
Goldstein" testified, and I took notes.  It is true that two committee
members (about half of the total who were present) focused on 2600 as
being a handbook for crime.  Don Delaney, who was also on the panel,
giving good evidence about the extent and organization of phone fraud
in New York City, noted that the First Amendment had already been
abridged to protect kids from pornography, and proposed a law that
would make it a crime to sell security-related information to
juveniles.  Subcommittee Chairman Markey told a long rambling story
about people going down Maple St. rattling the doorknobs and why that
was a bad thing.  He compared 2600 to people who rattle the doorknobs
and then post on the bulletin board downtown, "The door to 123 Maple
St. is unlocked".  Rep. Fields said to "Emmanuel" that it was
"frightening that someone like you thinks there's a protected right to
violate someone's privacy."

The ironic thing is that another panelist, John J. Haugh, heads a
consulting firm that publishes details about similar topics.  He's the
editor and principal author of a two volume reference work, _Toll
Fraud and Telabuse_, published by his company in early 1992.  He's
also the editor of a national newsletter, _Telecom & Network Security
Review_, also published by his company, with subscribers in 49 states
and 18 countries.

Mr. Haugh did not get hectored by the panel.  But Mr. Haugh charges 
$170/year for six issues of his newsletter, and wore a suit to the
hearing.  When the same information is published at 2600 prices, 
packaged for more adventurous people, it is "troubling".

My opinion is that when the privacy and security of society depends on
those doors being locked, then yes, we ought to have whole squads of
Boy Scouts, cops, hackers, and ordinary citizens rattling those
doorknobs hourly and daily.  And when we find one open, we should let
the world know, because the privacy and security of the world depends
on it.  This applies to information like, "if you tune an ordinary
radio to these frequencies, you can hear everyone's phone calls."
If the info is suppressed, the problem will never be fixed, because
not enough public pressure will be brought to bear on those responsible
for fixing it.

	John Gilmore

PS:  The first half of the hearing was on encryption and Clipper, and I
am pleased to say that the subcommittee took the *right* stance on that
issue -- that the Clipper proposal was trouble and that fundamental rights,
upon which our society is based, were at stake.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: bbyer@BIX.com
Date: Mon, 14 Jun 93 17:53:26 PDT
To: hughes@soda.berkeley.edu
Subject: Re: CERT: the letter from CERT to berkeley.edu admin
Message-ID: <9306142046.memo.62427@BIX.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


In-Reply-To: <9306081620.AA07331@soda.berkeley.edu>
> Here, in its almost full glory, is the letter that CERT sent to the
> admin at berkeley.  I've removed the addressee, since there's no need
> to involve that person.  I have not, however, removed the name of the
> sender.
> ...
> 
>  We have been passed information that indicates that the anonymous FTP
>  archive on the following host(s) may be in use by intruders for
                                 ^
>  illegal trading of commercial software:
> 
> >>>>>>>  soda.berkeley.edu    /pub/cypherpunks
>
>  We have not confirmed this information, nor have we identified that
>  the anonymous FTP configuration on the above-listed host(s) is open
>  for abuse.                                               ^
> 
>  ...

This look suspiciously like a form letter.  The possible plurals
("(s)") and the fact that the site name is in a "list type" format
indicate this is probably a form letter.  This is even more
disturbing; do they have a form letter because they use it often or
do they have a daemon that searches for highly undesirable things
such as ftp sites with lots of encryption related things and
automatically fires off this harassing form letter?

Ben Byer <bbyer@bix.com>





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: stig@netcom.com (Stig)
Date: Tue, 15 Jun 93 01:36:40 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Steganography and Steganalysis
In-Reply-To: <9305252227.AA27968@toad.com>
Message-ID: <9306150837.AA16621@netcom.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


In <9305252227.AA27968@toad.com>, John Gilmore wrote...
> My favorite scheme was to encode messages in trailing spaces and/or tabs
> in netnews messages.  You could also put internal tabs in place of spaces.
> 
> In fact, you could do this with news messages that flow "through" your 
> site, (if the messages aren't protected with a crypto checksum), so that
> you would not be the message's sender (and it wouldn't be addressed to anyone
> either -- recipients get very good privacy).
> 
> This would be one way for a Unix "worm" program to report back to its
> master...and/or receive instructions.
> 
> 	John Gilmore
> 
> PS:  You could put short interesting stuff just in your message-ID's!
> Not to mention the low order bits of timestamps (exactly *what* second
> did it arrive, now?).


/* Jonathan Stigelman, Stig@netcom.com, PGP public key by finger  */
/* fingerprint = 32 DF B9 19 AE 28 D1 7A  A3 9D 0B 1A 33 13 4D 7F */




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: stig@netcom.com (Stig)
Date: Tue, 15 Jun 93 01:40:10 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Digital cash software
In-Reply-To: <9306140709.AA05436@toad.com>
Message-ID: <9306150840.AA16772@netcom.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



In <9306140709.AA05436@toad.com>, John Gilmore wrote...
> I spoke with David Chaum, the inventor of digital money, last week at
> the cryptography meetings in DC.  He is willing to give us a noncommercial
> license to use his digital money patents, and copies of some of his
> software for digital cash, for us to deploy somehow, and start using.
> 

What constitutes 'noncommercial'?  I mean, we are talking about cash...  

	Stig

/* Jonathan Stigelman, Stig@netcom.com, PGP public key by finger  */
/* fingerprint = 32 DF B9 19 AE 28 D1 7A  A3 9D 0B 1A 33 13 4D 7F */




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Peter Wayner <pcw@access.digex.net>
Date: Tue, 15 Jun 93 05:36:39 PDT
To: gnu@toad.com
Subject: Re: 2600 testimony to Markey's subcommittee
Message-ID: <199306151236.AA29913@access.digex.net>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Of course, it seems perfectly obvious to Markey that 2600
is a "handbook on crime", but EG should have turned around
and pointed out that he's just transmitting information on
the world and there is nothing wrong with that. Gosh, if
there was then Congressional Hearings and C-Span should
be rated R to prevent the little whippersnappers from seeing
and hearing demonstrations like the one that John Gage gave
the committee several weeks ago. 

One person commented that Time magazine's latest article on
Crack was practically a "How-To" guide. It satisfied the
"Enquiring Minds" that wanted to know just what those people
did with the magic crystals. 

Another friend informs me that Pornography is often transmitted
with the label "For Scientific Research purposes only." Apparently,
the law contains some exception for Doctors and Biologists. Hmmm. 
I wonder where Masters and Johnson fit in here.

-Peter Wayner




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Eric Hughes <hughes@soda.berkeley.edu>
Date: Tue, 15 Jun 93 09:04:47 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: request for patent info
In-Reply-To: <199306142119.AA17206@sun.Panix.Com>
Message-ID: <9306151600.AA08672@soda.berkeley.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


The main rationale behind granting patent monopoly is for the
disclosure of the technique to the public.  As such, patents are
public record.  There is no danger of violating copyright by
publishing patents, already public information.

Here is RSADSI's patent portfolio:

Public Key Cryptographic Apparatus and Method
("Hellman-Merkle")		No. 4,315,552

Exponential Cryptographic Apparatus and Method
("Hellman-Pohlig")		No. 4,434,414

Cryptographic Apparatus and Method 
("Diffie-Hellman")		No. 4,200,770

Cryptographic Communications System and Method 
("Rivest-Shamir-Adelman")	No. 4,405,829

Method For Identifying Subscribers And For Generating And Verifying
Electronic Signatures In A Data Exchange System
("Schnorr")			No. 4,995,082

In my own opinion, the RSA and DH patents are relatively strong, given
that they cover particular algorithms and not whole classes of
techniques.  The key word here is relative; they might not hold
themselves, but they are certainly much more likely to hold that some
of their others.

PKP makes the following statement.  This is right out of RFC-1421, one
of the Privacy Enhanced Mail (PEM) documents.

   "These patents are stated by PKP to cover all known methods of
   practicing the art of Public Key encryption, including the variations
   collectively known as El Gamal."

It is my opinion that this statement is false, and not only false, but
an improper extension of patent monopoly.

The weakest link is the Hellman-Merkle patent, which PKP uses to claim
all public key cryptography.  Public key cryptography as such is
certainly not patentable, since it is merely a collection of
characteristics of specific systems; public key cryptography is not a
specific process or method, but a collection of such processes and
methods.  Only specifics are patentable.  Public key cryptography is
an idea, and ideas are not patentable.

The next weakest link is the Hellman-Pohlig patent, which is, I
believe, that which PKP uses to claim that all uses of the discrete
log problem (e.g. El-Gamal) are also covered.  Here again, the use of
an item without reference to a specific process or machine is not
patentable.  The specific use of exponentiation in the H-P patent is
for an RSA pseudofield (i.e. mod pq), but with exponent two.

As such, if we are going to prioritize patents, I would gather them in
the order indicated.  As far as doing forward references, The H-M
patent is likely the most interesting, since it will lead to many
other patent public key ciphers.  The RSA patent is likely the next,
because it is so widely known and mathematically simple.

Eric




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Eric Hughes <hughes@soda.berkeley.edu>
Date: Tue, 15 Jun 93 10:02:24 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: request for patent info
In-Reply-To: <9306141704.AA24572@netcom3.netcom.com>
Message-ID: <9306151658.AA10959@soda.berkeley.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>Sunnyvale, CA.  Near the public library off Mathilda Ave.

Do they have electronic access at this library, or is it paper only?
I know they have a fax service for which they charge, but is there
downloadable text available?

As much as we need the text of the patents, we also need to gather
them in electronic form.  I thank those who have offered to do so.

Eric




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Eric Hughes <hughes@soda.berkeley.edu>
Date: Tue, 15 Jun 93 10:16:12 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: REMAIL: X-Discard header line added
In-Reply-To: <199306151642.AA07985@tramp.cc.utexas.edu>
Message-ID: <9306151711.AA11398@soda.berkeley.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>Headers are always
>unencrypted, so anyone watching the flow will be able to write a 3 line
>perl script to filter out all of these messages and there is nothing a
>header line can do to hide this discard information.  

The cypherpunks remailers use a little invention called 'header
pasting' where header fields may be added into the header after
receipt but before processing.  These pasted header fields may in
addition be put inside encryption wrappers, thus hiding them from the
outside world.  'Discard' headers may use this technique.  

Eric




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: nowhere@bsu-cs.bsu.edu (Chael Hall)
Date: Tue, 15 Jun 93 08:34:30 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: REMAIL: X-Discard header line added
Message-ID: <9306151537.AA07449@bsu-cs.bsu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



     In an effort to make creating more traffic for the Cypherpunks
remailers easier, I have added a feature to my remailer.  Whenever it
receives a message that would otherwise be remailed but contains a
header line saying "X-Discard:" it will discard the message and act as
though it got remailed.  If all of the Cypherpunks remailers supported
an automatic discard feature, we could setup cron jobs or whatever kind
of software we want to send "junk mail" to the remailers that does not
get forwarded on.

     An idea I just had was to make the X-Discard have a counter.  If
the number is greater than zero, decrement it and forward the message
to another known remailer.  If it is less than one or non-numeric,
discard the message.  Right now, it just discards whatever message
has that header.

Example Message:
====================================
From: nobody@no.com
To: nowhere@bsu-cs.bsu.edu
Subject: Test

::
Request-Remailing-To: bob&tom@bit.bucket.net
X-Discard: Please!

Test Message
====================================

Chael

--
Chael Hall
nowhere@bsu-cs.bsu.edu, 00CCHALL@BSUVC.BSU.EDU, chall@bsu.edu
(317) 776-4000 from 8 am - 5 pm CST




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: falcor@agora.rain.com (Andy Burt)
Date: Tue, 15 Jun 93 11:21:19 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: digcash
Message-ID: <m0o5fcq-00002nC@agora.rain.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


If anyone out there has a non-PS FAQ on digcash, I'd appreciate it.  Thanx!

-- 
   -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
  // Falcor, aka //  InterNet: falcor@agora.rain.com  //   "Curiouser and   //
 //  Andy Burt  //        FidoNet: 1:105/354.0       // curiouser!"-Alice, //
//             // PGP2.2 PublicKey Avail On Request //   Lewis  Carroll   //
----------------------------------------------------------------------------



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Jim McCoy <mccoy@ccwf.cc.utexas.edu>
Date: Tue, 15 Jun 93 09:42:56 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: REMAIL: X-Discard header line added
In-Reply-To: <9306151537.AA07449@bsu-cs.bsu.edu>
Message-ID: <199306151642.AA07985@tramp.cc.utexas.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text


> 
>      In an effort to make creating more traffic for the Cypherpunks
> remailers easier, I have added a feature to my remailer.

Do you mean easier to create more flow to thwart analysis or easier for an
observer to determine which messages it does not need to examine after
reaching a certain line in the header.  This seems like a nice effort, but
will not deter traffic analysis in the slightest.  Headers are always
unencrypted, so anyone watching the flow will be able to write a 3 line
perl script to filter out all of these messages and there is nothing a
header line can do to hide this discard information.  

What might be more usefull is a counter that signals the remailer system to
stop passing a message and unwrap part of the message and act upon the
instructions there; thus the counter would let tell the system how long to
bounce the message around internally and when the counter hits zero it
could send the message on to the target.  For example you could create a
little MIME x-anon-remailer body part that contains lines with the the
final destination wrapped in the remailer pubkeys.  When the counter hits
zero the remailer checks the x-anon-remailer body part of the line that
matches its pubkey, decrypts that line to get the final address and then
sends the message on.  In this sort of system all you would really need to
do is send someone a message with your destination address wrapped in one
anon remailer pubkey.  When Alice replies to Bobs message she includes the
x-anon-remailer body part which has the line provided by Bob (or several it
Bob provides more than one).  Alice sends this message to any remailer
entry point and the message gets bounced around the system until the
counter hits 0.  At this point the remailer checks to see if it can decrypt
any of the destination lines, if not it ups the counter by one (and maybe
sets a TTL counter so that messages that have destination keys corrupted do
not float forever...) and tosses it back into the system, if it can decrypt
one of the destination keys it sends the message off to the address Bob has
provided inside the destination key (Bob could even have the destination
key send it the message into another remailer system if he is sufficiently
paranoid).  This would make traffic analysis much harder because once the
message enters the remailer system it bounces around so much; the remailers
become a black box that deliver the message without really knowing anythign
about it until the last phase of delivery.

This would also not waste bandwidth moving useless messages around.


jim



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Henry Strickland <strick@versant.com>
Date: Tue, 15 Jun 93 12:37:56 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: MEDIA: Steven Levy on 91.7 re Cypherpunks (already happened)
Message-ID: <9306151940.AA03720@versant.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Steven Levy was interviewed on FM91.7 (san francisco public radio, I
forget the call letters) this morning.   My patch cable isnt working for
some reason, or I would have caught it in a ulaw file.

I don't know the name of the show, or if they will rebroadcast it, but
if you're interested, you might try to track it down.

As one might expect, he did a good job of introducing some hard-edge
issues in fairly-mainstream-but-technical media...

						strick




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Nickey MacDonald <i6t4@jupiter.sun.csd.unb.ca>
Date: Tue, 15 Jun 93 09:10:48 PDT
To: Chael Hall <nowhere@bsu-cs.bsu.edu>
Subject: Re: REMAIL: X-Discard header line added
In-Reply-To: <9306151537.AA07449@bsu-cs.bsu.edu>
Message-ID: <Pine.3.05.9306151329.A26368-b100000@jupiter>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


On Tue, 15 Jun 1993, Chael Hall wrote:

>      An idea I just had was to make the X-Discard have a counter.  If
> the number is greater than zero, decrement it and forward the message
> to another known remailer.  If it is less than one or non-numeric,
> discard the message.  Right now, it just discards whatever message
> has that header.

Seems like a very good idea, at least for the short term, to generate
traffic.  Just make sure that you do not accept a value for X-Discard that
is too large, or else you'll find the same message floating around
(Internet Worm sytle) when you *don't* need any extra traffic!  If you
wanted to really have fun, you could also add X-Discarded-By to keep a
list of all sites the message has visitied, and make sure the same message
doesn't cycle through the same site too many times.

--
Nick MacDonald               | NMD on IRC
i6t4@jupiter.sun.csd.unb.ca  | PGP 2.1 Public key available via finger
i6t4@unb.ca                  | (506) 457-1931    ^{1024/746EBB 1993/02/23}






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: nowhere@bsu-cs.bsu.edu (Chael Hall)
Date: Tue, 15 Jun 93 12:36:23 PDT
To: mccoy@ccwf.cc.utexas.edu (Jim McCoy)
Subject: Re: REMAIL: X-Discard header line added
In-Reply-To: <199306151642.AA07985@tramp.cc.utexas.edu>
Message-ID: <9306151939.AA13767@bsu-cs.bsu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>will not deter traffic analysis in the slightest.  Headers are always
>unencrypted, so anyone watching the flow will be able to write a 3 line
>perl script to filter out all of these messages and there is nothing a
>header line can do to hide this discard information.  

     Eric has already addressed this; I intend to make my remailer PGP
capable soon.  If not the one on bsu-cs, the new one will have PGP as
soon as I can get to it.

>paranoid).  This would make traffic analysis much harder because once the
>message enters the remailer system it bounces around so much; the remailers
>become a black box that deliver the message without really knowing anythign
>about it until the last phase of delivery.

     I'm not sure what you mean about bouncing it around to different
remailers, because if there are a lot of remailers, it could take a long
time before it finally gets to the appropriate one that can decrypt the
destination information (perhaps longer than the TTL and therefore it does
not get delivered).  With encryption, the remailers don't have to know the
recipient until the last phase anyway.  In addition, they may not know the
contents of the message either.

>This would also not waste bandwidth moving useless messages around.

     Right now, we have plenty of bandwidth because the remailers don't
get much use.

     ALL:  Which is better:  X-Discard or X-TTL?  I can easily change it
to X-TTL.

Chael

--
Chael Hall
nowhere@bsu-cs.bsu.edu, 00CCHALL@BSUVC.BSU.EDU, chall@bsu.edu
(317) 776-4000 from 8 am - 5 pm CST





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: zane@genesis.mcs.com (Sameer)
Date: Tue, 15 Jun 93 15:08:49 PDT
To: Nickey MacDonald <i6t4@jupiter.sun.csd.unb.ca>
Subject: Re: REMAIL: X-Discard header line added
In-Reply-To: <Pine.3.05.9306151329.A26368-b100000@jupiter>
Message-ID: <m0o5iyp-000MVqC@genesis.mcs.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


In message <Pine.3.05.9306151329.A26368-b100000@jupiter>, Nickey MacDonald writes:
> 
> Seems like a very good idea, at least for the short term, to generate
> traffic.  Just make sure that you do not accept a value for X-Discard that
	I don't understand what the point is in adding unnecessary, junk
traffic to the remailers. Please explain.

	Peace,
--
| Sameer Parekh-zane@genesis.MCS.COM-PFA related mail to pfa@genesis.MCS.COM |
| Apprentice Philosopher, Writer, Physicist, Healer, Programmer, Lover, more |
| "Symbiosis is Good" - Me_"Specialization is for Insects" - R. A. Heinlein_/
 \_______________________/ \______________________________________________/ 




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: nowhere@bsu-cs.bsu.edu (Chael Hall)
Date: Tue, 15 Jun 93 13:21:12 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: REMAIL: X-TTL functional
Message-ID: <9306152024.AA14776@bsu-cs.bsu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



     I should know by now that whenever I get an idea and send it to the
list it ends up getting lots of addons and changes from other list members.
So....  I added an X-TTL field to the header.  It reads it, decrements it,
and writes it.  If it's in the message received, it will be decremented and
passed on.  If it isn't in the message, it will be set to one then later
decremented (last stop).  If it should be zero when it arrives, it will be
swallowed up.  Messages that get sent will have a header field of X-TTL with
a value of zero or greater.

     Note that it shows up as X-Ttl in ELM, but doesn't matter in the
software because it converts everything to lowercase then checks it
against its keyword list.  The X-TTL field can be either in the main
header or in the pasted "::" header block.  I suppose that if the TTL
is greater than zero when it goes to send, the remailer should throw
in another remailer's name at random and make up its own "::" header
block, but that is for later...

Chael

--
Chael Hall
nowhere@bsu-cs.bsu.edu, 00CCHALL@BSUVC.BSU.EDU, chall@bsu.edu
(317) 776-4000 from 8 am - 5 pm CST




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Duncan Frissell <76630.3577@CompuServe.COM>
Date: Tue, 15 Jun 93 13:15:29 PDT
To: <cypherpunks@toad.com>
Subject: digital cash
Message-ID: <930615194400_76630.3577_EHK24-1@CompuServe.COM>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
 
>>>The legal issues involved in setting up a real world money system are
enormous.<<<
 
No need.  This is the advantage of piggy backing a digital cash application
onto an existing offshore financial institution.  It is true that if I sat
in the US and started to offer digital cash accounts I would be subject to
a lot of regulation.
 
DC would probably be held to be a 'security' and there are all sorts of
financial regulations involved.  It might be possible to get a regulatory
waiver for an experimental system if we got an academic partner like the
Iowa Political Stock Market which also traded 'securities' with account
sizes up to $1,000.  On the other hand, other jurisdictions are not as
regulated as the US is.
 
Generally, solicitations for unregistered securities cannot be directed to
Americans except in international publications.  I would advocate that all
physical mail involved in such an application be sent and received overseas
(The City of London would be convenient) and that all email be sent via
Julf's remailer.  We could also start an internet DC email group (as a
feedback and semi-advertising medium) sent from Finland.  (Julf willing of
course.)  It would be interesting to see the litigation about whether or
not such a publication is a "domestic" publication.  It should be easy to
find non-US residents to be the nominal "publishers."
 
Now all we need is a banking haven jurisdiction with good internet
connections...  I *have* been looking.
 
Duncan Frissell
 
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.2
 
iQCVAgUBLB36L4VO4r4sgSPhAQFGswQA3JTCDiFHPfazuWYo8+4BALg4cvGFWVXq
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uQPcG45MB5tBwS6fBNuSG/4uljiPveAYvD5xU0JuOGev03Zd8FOV9tvRsBiYGudn
eGeH96j0Oxc=
=wVQT
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
 






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Jim McCoy <mccoy@ccwf.cc.utexas.edu>
Date: Tue, 15 Jun 93 14:54:03 PDT
To: nowhere@bsu-cs.bsu.edu (Chael Hall)
Subject: Re: REMAIL: X-Discard header line added
In-Reply-To: <9306151939.AA13767@bsu-cs.bsu.edu>
Message-ID: <199306152153.AA08290@tramp.cc.utexas.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text


[...]
> >paranoid).  This would make traffic analysis much harder because once the
> >message enters the remailer system it bounces around so much; the remailers
> >become a black box that deliver the message without really knowing anythign
> >about it until the last phase of delivery.
> 
>      I'm not sure what you mean about bouncing it around to different
> remailers, because if there are a lot of remailers, it could take a long
> time before it finally gets to the appropriate one that can decrypt the
> destination information (perhaps longer than the TTL and therefore it does
> not get delivered).  With encryption, the remailers don't have to know the
> recipient until the last phase anyway.  In addition, they may not know the
> contents of the message either.

I set the "breakout counter" at 10 and throw it into any port on the
remailer web.  It bounces around 10 times and then the "deliver this damn
message" flag gets tripped and the TTL counter starts.  The TTL counter is
actually the number of hops from this point on that the message will
traverse looking for someone who can decode the encrypted destination
address before the message dies or is otherwise checked for problems.  It
could take a long time to deliver the message, but time latency is another
possible means of confounding traffic analysis.  What I was basically
thinking was that the breakout counter tells the message how many times to
randomly bounce around the internal structure of the remailer web (and
hopefully becoming lost in the clutter) before it tries to find someone who
can deliver it; the TTL would be used once the breakout counter had hit
zero and would try to keep a message from bouncing around forever if there
is an addressing problem.  

This would obviously increase the complexity of the system and require a
collection of remailers scattered across the net, but it seems to me to
have the advantages of providing more security as the number of remailers
grows and to allow bepopel to set up thier own forwarding and addressing
that is independant of the remailer system (you generate your own
destination certificates and can string together whatever you want in the
destination, even another hop back into the remailer system.)  It may be
overly complex, but it just seemed to me that it might offer the possiblity
of truly untracable mail: two messages sent into the same entry port with
the same destination certificates at the same time could end up coming out
of two different exit ports on the black box depending on how they bounced
around inside the system.

If you want someone to be able to send you a reply to an anonymous message
you give them a destination certificate that contains the destination you
want the message sent to wrapped in various remailer pubkeys (one or more,
it is up to you).  They do not need to know where the message is going,
they just attach the certificate to thier message and drop it into _any_
remailer and know that it will either get to the destination or get bounced
back to them.  A distributed anonymous remailer system of sorts...  

jim







From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Steven Levy <steven@well.sf.ca.us>
Date: Tue, 15 Jun 93 19:38:20 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: on the radio
Message-ID: <93Jun15.193753pdt.13987-4@well.sf.ca.us>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain




>Steven Levy was interviewed on FM91.7 (san francisco public radio, I
>forget the call letters) this morning.   My patch cable isnt working for
>some reason, or I would have caught it in a ulaw file.

>I don't know the name of the show, or if they will rebroadcast it, but
>if you're interested, you might try to track it down.

I think the name of the show was TechAmerica, or something
like that, a show syndicated on public radio.  I did the interview
about a month ago, me in Amherst, a fairly sharp interviewer in
San Francisco.   

Steven




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: bbyer@BIX.com
Date: Tue, 15 Jun 93 17:53:46 PDT
To: AOLCHTNN@vax1.tcd.ie
Subject: Re: Timothy C. May:superhacker
Message-ID: <9306152043.memo.64107@BIX.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


In-Reply-To: <01GZ6EDS7DHK003YG5@vax1.tcd.ie>
> Why doesn't Tim and anyone else who suspects that they have reached
> the much-sought status of "superhacker on gov't files not just write
> to their local friendly federal government office and ask for a copy
> of their own records?
>
> Of course any interesting information they've got is likely to be classified,
> but at least you'll find out whether any such information is stored on the
> files.
> 
> Of course, requesting your own government file is likely to draw attention
> to yourself, so it's probably best not to do so unless you're sure that 
> they already know that you know-that-they-know-something.

Yes, acoording to a 2600 article (admittedly not the best source),
requesting a file on yoursself causes one to be created if one does
not exist.

Ben Byer <bbyer@bix.com>





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: mlshew@dixie.com (Mark Shewmaker)
Date: Tue, 15 Jun 93 19:57:37 PDT
To: mlshew@dixie.com
Subject: Re: Rude CryptoStacker Suggestion
Message-ID: <m0o5lfV-0000gSC@dixie.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


On Mon, 14 Jun 1993, RYAN Alan Porter wrote:

>On Mon, 14 Jun 1993, Mark Shewmaker wrote:
>
>I don't consider us without options, I just have yet to see a program that
>I would trust my data with.
>
>Besides, I wouldn't consider it a waste of effort even if there were such
>a system out there (which I doubt)

Well then I have doubts about your doubts:  Even I've got a few ways of
getting transparent compression or encryption on my own system (amiga),
most of them simply device drivers or some other standalone sets of code
one would then to use to mount a (virtual) partition, and there's also a
more standardized compression/encryption modular system to do the same
thing (sort of), just like you talk about later.

That's why I keep thinking that for PC's and freely distributable source
code for encrypting file systems, that by now someone *must* have already
invented the wheel.  (Although you could still invent the radial tire,
so to speak, and make the original idea more usable.)

>Anyway, thanks for the suggestion; I would be interested in any parallel
>systems which anyone might happen to stumble upon.

Seeing as you had previously said:

>The sources for bare network redirectors and block device drivers are,
>indeed, in wide supply.

I guess I really should upload some of the amiga code then, even though
a great deal of it will absolutely useless to you, (but I must admit
it would be kinda cool if pc's and amigas could both access the same
compressed/encrypted xpk files.)  If it's really just the encryption
part per se that you are missing, then they might be helpful to your
project.

I'll write up a description, plagiarizing the readme files somewhat,
and upload a few of the archives to Eric's site.  

>The more people who know how to implement good encryption, the more
>widespread other cypher code will become.

Very true.

(I'm always annoyed when I download a new "security" type program,
only to find it lets you encrypt/decrypt with any of ten proprietary
methods, numbered one through ten.  Absolutely useless.  And of course
the scums never include the source.  Grrr.)

>(Oh also, have I come off lately as being incredibly overflamesensitive,
>or are you just a very cautionary guy?  I can understand it if I have
>projected a flameshield attitude, but I'm really not that bruisable...)

"Jane, you ignorant slut." (Implied smileys for the SNL-impaired.)

Partly I'm cautionary, trying to be polite, tit for tat and all that,
but also I don't like being the 100th person whining about your project,
(especially knowing next to nothing about DOS systems), while people who
think it's a neat idea keep quiet.  Plus I overdid the cautiousness a bit.

(And I've got this pet peeve about people re-introducing obvious ideas
in sci.crypt, and similar places.)

-Mark Shewmaker




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: J. Michael Diehl <mdiehl@triton.unm.edu>
Date: Tue, 15 Jun 93 19:49:30 PDT
To: ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu (L. Detweiler)
Subject: Re: alt.whistleblowing-cypherpunk FAQ
In-Reply-To: <9306140621.AA29371@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Message-ID: <9306160249.AA18896@triton.unm.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


According to L. Detweiler:
> 
> Mr. Diehl:
> If you had taken the time to read any significant portion of
> alt.whistleblowing traffic, I would imagine you would have stumbled on
> messages where I presented an outline/preliminary FAQ and an anonymous
> posting described precisely how to use Julf's remailer to send traffic

I read the entire newsgroup! All 27 articles.  In these articles, I counted 
exactly ONE from you, and it had nothing to do with what you describe above.

> (which were posted under a week ago).  I take great offense at your
> hasty, flippant denigration of it so far as a `flamefest'. While of

Then, IMHO, you are easily offended.  But, lets look at what I was refering to:

Several messages in alt.whistleblowing.... Drasticly condensed to save BW.

From cypherpunks-request  Tue Jun 15 20:49:52 1993
Received: by toad.com id AA21533; Tue, 15 Jun 93 20:48:23 PDT
Return-Path: <mdiehl@triton.unm.edu>
Received: from triton.unm.edu ([129.24.8.235]) by toad.com id AA21529; Tue, 15 Jun 93 20:48:19 PDT
Received: by triton.unm.edu (5.65/0.1)
	id <AA20651>; Tue, 15 Jun 1993 21:48:06 -0600
From: J. Michael Diehl <mdiehl@triton.unm.edu>
Message-Id: <9306160348.AA20651@triton.unm.edu>
Subject: Re: Digital Cash$$$$
To: 76630.3577@compuserve.com (Duncan Frissell)
Date: Tue, 15 Jun 1993 21:48:05 -0600 (MDT)
Cc: cypherpunks@toad.com
In-Reply-To: <930614200936_76630.3577_EHK40-1@CompuServe.COM> from "Duncan Frissell" at Jun 14, 93 04:09:37 pm
X-Also-Known-As: Thunder
X-Goal-In-Life:  To make a lot of money -- Wanna make a donation?
X-Mailer: ELM [version 2.4 PL21]
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=US-ASCII
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
Content-Length: 1721      

According to Duncan Frissell:

> A digital cash economy doesn't have to be separate from the regular economy.

> 1.)     You mail cash/MO to First Digital Bank of Cyberspace (at an offshore
> maildrop) together with a public (unique if you like) key and anonymous email
> address (on Julf's remailer perhaps).

Then DC is actually backed by "legal" currency?  Then, what's to keep someone 
from opening a digital bank, and takeing the money and runing?

> 4.)     You find someone to accept the digital cash.  Initially it can be used
> for gambling and telecoms/storage fees, eventually buying digital goods
> (software, print, audio, video, VR) will be easy.  Remember, within a few 
> years 100 million homes in OECD countries will have 1.5 megabit lines into 
> them.  This is a huge market for digital entertainment.

OECD?

Obviously, DC can lead to quite a few opportunities for corruption, taxes for 
example.  This will hinder (or help, in Washington D.C! ;^]) the spread of DC.
Is there any arguements for DC, to offer to counter this major drawback?
+-----------------------+-----------------------------+---------+
| J. Michael Diehl ;-)  | I thought I was wrong once. | PGP KEY |
| mdiehl@triton.unm.edu |   But, I was mistaken.      |available|
| mike.diehl@fido.org   |                             | Ask Me! |
| (505) 299-2282        +-----------------------------+---------+
|                                                               |
+------"I'm just looking for the opportunity to be -------------+
|            Politically Incorrect!"   <Me>                     |
+-----If codes are outlawed, only criminals wil have codes.-----+
+----Is Big Brother in your phone?  If you don't know, ask me---+

From cypherpunks-request  Tue Jun 15 22:09:53 1993
Received: by toad.com id AA23778; Tue, 15 Jun 93 22:08:10 PDT
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To: cypherpunks@toad.com
From: nobody@eli-remailer
Subject: REMAIL: X-TTL and X-Discard
Date: Tue Jun 15 22:07:41 PDT 1993
Remailed-By: Eli Brandt <ebrandt@jarthur.Claremont.EDU>
Source-Info:  From (or Sender) name not authenticated.

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

I don't see that X-TTL is very useful as currently proposed.  As I see
it, I would have to create something like this:

=======================================
::
X-TTL: 5
Request-Remailing-To: remailer1

::
Request-Remailing-To: remailer2

::
Request-Remailing-To: remailer3

::
Request-Remailing-To: remailer4

::
Request-Remailing-To: remailer5

Dummy message to be sent.
=======================================

(Or an equivalent structure could be set up with nested PGP encryptions.)

This would go through remailers 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5, decrementing the
X-TTL field each time, and after the last one when it was 0 the message
would be deleted.  The X-TTL is not very convenient in this case since
you still have to come up with a path for sending your message which is
at least as long as the X-TTL value.

It seems to me that the X-Discard idea is simpler; you can just put the
X-Discard in the command block for the last remailer, and you don't have
to count them.

What is needed to make X-TTL useful is for the remailer to choose another
remailer as its destination, and ideally to encrypt the message before
sending it.  This way X-TTL can be used to insert a random remailer path of
n hops in the middle of a sender-constructed remailing path.  This leads to
a system where the remailer decrypts an incoming message, reads the X-TTL
value, decrements it, re-encrypts the message for the next remailer in the
chain, and sends it.  The X-TTL value is never exposed to outsiders.

At one point I wrote a modification to my remailer to cause it to
encrypt any message which it sent to another remailer which supported
PGP.  But I decided that this didn't really help security enough to
be worthwhile.  It would be much better to encourage users to encrypt
their messages themselves in a nested fashion so that no remailer sees
any more information than the bare minimum necessary.

Hal Finney
74076.1041@compuserve.com

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Version: 2.2

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RB1H/cBGfIsVZOcpFb7K5OLrwhTh+aIO6b7sUzXVBsbsgNKLtv0yPjracDpPH5y1
EJ6U9k+74mXDpxl7vo4tqFUiEFd3s3I6by/TjmVAtKy8eX1+o83yo0BJgt9YgNSr
psi8xbAFGUI=
=4DtE
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From cypherpunks-request  Tue Jun 15 21:14:38 1993
Received: by toad.com id AA22244; Tue, 15 Jun 93 21:11:02 PDT
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To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: YAA (yet another article)
From: fergp@sytex.com (Paul Ferguson)
Message-Id: <0BX85B2w165w@sytex.com>
Date: Tue, 15 Jun 93 23:39:20 EDT
Organization: Sytex Communications, Inc

ComputerWorld
June 14, 1993
Volume 27, Number 24
pages 73,74
 
Enterprise Networking
 
Commentary
 
All Eyes On Clipper
by Gary H. Anthes
 
If any conclusion can be drawn from the cacophony of conflicting
views put forth at a recent public hearing on government-sponsored
encryption technology, it is that the Clinton administration should
slow down and take a closer look at Clipper.
 
Clipper is the government's attempt to give law enforcers the ability
to unscramble coded messages from suspected criminals while
guaranteeing constitutional safeguards to legitimate users. To do
that, a secret algorithm embedded in a chip will use
encryption/decryption keys maintained "in escrow" by two
government-approved agencies and subject to use in wiretaps only via
court order.
 
The first image brought to mind when presented with the key-escrow
concept is that of a digital Big Brother, able to siphon off
electronic secrets from anyone not in favor with the establishment.
Stanford University Professor Martin E. Hellman says former Attorney
General John Mitchell was in the habit of handing down blank but
signed wiretap authorizations, 40 to 50 at a pop, rather than
personally reviewing each request as required by law. "Two escrow
authorities do little good if only one court order is required,"
Hellmman contends.
 
The government has done little so far to put those fears to rest or to



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: bear@eagle.fsl.noaa.gov (Bear Giles)
Date: Tue, 15 Jun 93 19:40:11 PDT
To: bbyer@bix.com
Subject: Re: Timothy C. May:superhacker
Message-ID: <9306160237.AA20240@eagle.fsl.noaa.gov>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Ben Byers writes:
In-Reply-To: <01GZ6EDS7DHK003YG5@vax1.tcd.ie>
>> Of course, requesting your own government file is likely to draw attention
>> to yourself, so it's probably best not to do so unless you're sure that 
>> they already know that you know-that-they-know-something.
>
>Yes, acoording to a 2600 article (admittedly not the best source),
>requesting a file on yourself causes one to be created if one does
>not exist.

Naturally they'll open a file on you to document the fact that you requested
information under the FOIA and to file a copy of the information returned
to you.

Will they start an investigation on the basis of the fact that you
requested information under the FOIA?  How many people with rather, shall
we say, unusual ideas do you think have pestered the CIA or NSA with
FOIA requests?

Of course, if you admit you learned about this on a cryptoanarchist
e-mail list... :-)

Bear Giles




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Johan Helsingius <julf@penet.FI>
Date: Tue, 15 Jun 93 21:26:54 PDT
To: Duncan Frissell <76630.3577@compuserve.com>
Subject: Re: digital cash
In-Reply-To: <930615194400_76630.3577_EHK24-1@CompuServe.COM>
Message-ID: <9306160611.aa19291@penet.penet.FI>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



> Generally, solicitations for unregistered securities cannot be directed to
> Americans except in international publications.  I would advocate that all
> physical mail involved in such an application be sent and received overseas
> (The City of London would be convenient) and that all email be sent via
> Julf's remailer.  We could also start an internet DC email group (as a
> feedback and semi-advertising medium) sent from Finland.  (Julf willing of
> course.)  It would be interesting to see the litigation about whether or
> not such a publication is a "domestic" publication.  It should be easy to
> find non-US residents to be the nominal "publishers."

I'd be more than happy to participate in this!

	Julf





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: nobody@alumni.cco.caltech.edu
Date: Wed, 16 Jun 93 07:33:23 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: fast des
Message-ID: <9306161432.AA00270@alumni.cco.caltech.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


how fast is fast des these days?  (i have measured over 2 mbps
on decent workstations.)

i was in a meeting today attended by someone from nsa who said
that 2.4 gbps des chips exists today.  (he got real silent after
blurting this out.  hmm.)

2.4 gbps is 37.5 million des per sec.

it is probably not much challenge to put together a 65,536 element
machine, which would run at 2.5 trillion des per sec.  if i have my
arithmetic right, this could exhaustively test the space of 56 bit
keys in about eight hours.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: jthomas@kolanut.mitre.org (Joe Thomas)
Date: Wed, 16 Jun 93 06:08:13 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: REMAIL: X-TTL and X-Discard
Message-ID: <9306161306.AA09342@kolanut>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Hal wrote: 

> 

> What is needed to make X-TTL useful is for the remailer to choose another
> remailer as its destination, and ideally to encrypt the message before
> sending it.  This way X-TTL can be used to insert a random remailer path of
> n hops in the middle of a sender-constructed remailing path.  This leads to
> a system where the remailer decrypts an incoming message, reads the X-TTL
> value, decrements it, re-encrypts the message for the next remailer in the
> chain, and sends it.  The X-TTL value is never exposed to outsiders.
> 

> At one point I wrote a modification to my remailer to cause it to
> encrypt any message which it sent to another remailer which supported
> PGP.  But I decided that this didn't really help security enough to
> be worthwhile.  It would be much better to encourage users to encrypt
> their messages themselves in a nested fashion so that no remailer sees
> any more information than the bare minimum necessary.

Rolling your own encryption wrapper for the remailer chain you're sending  
through is a Good Thing, but your modification would be useful if you think of  
the cypherpunk remailer network as a "back end" for an anonymous/pseudonymous  
server like Julf's.

Ideally, a pseudonym server will only keep an encrypted remailer chain for a  
user's return address (along with the unencrypted adress of the first remailer  
on the chain).  The nymserver _doesn't_know_ what remailers are in the chain,  
so it can't encrypt the message with each of their public keys.  But if the  
server can include a header line inside the encryption envelope that tells the  
remailer to encrypt with the next remailer's key, we can be sure that an  
adversary is still unable to match up incoming and outgoing messages.

Setting up a pseudonym server with this kind of encrypted return address is  
good, of course, if you're worried about its database being seized.  Without  
the cooperation of each remailer in the chain, the database doesn't give an  
adversary anything useful.

And since now we've got TTL as another use for a next-step-encryption feature  
in the remailers...  I'd better go get those remailer scripts and a UUCP feed  
for my new Linux box.

Joe




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: eichin@cygnus.com (Mark Eichin)
Date: Wed, 16 Jun 93 09:06:59 PDT
To: nobody@alumni.cco.caltech.edu
Subject: fast des
In-Reply-To: <9306161432.AA00270@alumni.cco.caltech.edu>
Message-ID: <9306161606.AA29187@cygnus.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>>   SUB: fast des
>>   how fast is fast des these days?  (i have measured over 2 mbps
>>    on decent workstations.)

	On that note, what's the best available software
implementation? The best one I've run across is the Ferguson code
(both small and fast, uses some clever tables rather than big ones.)

				_Mark_ <eichin@athena.mit.edu>
				MIT Student Information Processing Board
				Cygnus Support <eichin@cygnus.com>



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: mulivor@orion.crc.monroecc.edu
Date: Wed, 16 Jun 93 07:00:37 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: MACWORLD article
Message-ID: <9306161400.AA10411@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


In case this hasn't been mentioned here:

There's a sizeable story in the July issue of MACWORLD magazine called "Privacy 
in Peril." It's a general roundup on electronic privacy. I didn't notice any 
reference to Clipper or digital currency. See pp. 118-130.

Carry on, patriots.

Phil <mulivor@orion.crc.monroecc.edu>




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Timothy Newsham <newsham@wiliki.eng.hawaii.edu>
Date: Wed, 16 Jun 93 14:01:38 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Link protocol
Message-ID: <9306162101.AA24381@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



  I just uploaded  
    ami-link1.0lha
    ami-link1.0-src.lha
    link1.0.tar.Z
    link.readme

to the soda.berkeley.edu cypherpunks/incoming directory.

link.readme says:
----------------------

Link1.0
--------
  Link is a protocol designed to provide a secure link over a serial
channel.  At this time there are ends only for Amiga and Unix.  The
protocol grabs input bytes,  encrypts them with DES and frames them
in packets for transfer over a serial channel.  The protocol also
allows transfers of random DES keys over the channel encrypted
with the RSA algorithm.  Key exchange happens automatically at
startup (in the future there will be options to change keys
mid-session).  The client end written for Amiga is a vt100 terminal
emulator.  The server end written for Unix opens a pty and executes
a shell.

link1.0.tar.Z       :
  This file contains the protocol engine and server to be run on
the Unix end.  Also contains docs on the protocol engine.
Tested on HPUX and SunOS (compiled and tested minimally on an
Ultrix at one point in time)

ami-link1.0.lha     :
  This file contains the protocol engine and client to be run on
the Amiga end.  Contains minimal docs pertaining to setup.
  
ami-link1.0-src.lha :
  Contains the source for the amiga end.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: smb@research.att.com
Date: Wed, 16 Jun 93 08:15:48 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: fast des
Message-ID: <9306161515.AA12958@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


	 how fast is fast des these days?  (i have measured over 2 mbps
	 on decent workstations.)

	 i was in a meeting today attended by someone from nsa who said
	 that 2.4 gbps des chips exists today.  (he got real silent after
	 blurting this out.  hmm.)

	 2.4 gbps is 37.5 million des per sec.

	 it is probably not much challenge to put together a 65,536 element
	 machine, which would run at 2.5 trillion des per sec.  if i have my
	 arithmetic right, this could exhaustively test the space of 56 bit
	 keys in about eight hours.

I don't know of any 2.4 gbps DES chips, but DEC has built a 1 gbps
chip.  They've even published a technical report on it, though I don't
have the number handy.  But there's more to know than simply the raw
speed.

First of all, most real DES chips -- i.e., those designed for
encryption, rather than brute-force cryptanalysis -- are optimized for
encrypting large blocks of data.  Key-loading is a different operation,
and that might not go nearly as fast.  Any hardware assists (i.e., DMA)
would be for the data, not for the next key to use on the same block of
data.

Second, what does this chip cost?  If it costs, say, 10x what the DEC
chip costs, it's not cost-effective; you can build your DES-cracker
more cheaply with the slower chips.  (The DEC TR gave cost figures for
DES-cracking...)




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Jason Zions <jazz@hal.com>
Date: Wed, 16 Jun 93 09:18:58 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: YAA (yet another article)
In-Reply-To: <1vm73lINN97i@hal.com>
Message-ID: <9306161618.AA00319@jazz.hal.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>ComputerWorld
>June 14, 1993
>Volume 27, Number 24
>pages 73,74
> 
>However, a summary of some of those wiretaps, provided by the Federal
>Bureau of Investigation, might cause even the most wary to warm up a
>little closer to Clipper:
> 
>* A wiretap led to the arrest and conviction of a "sexually deviant
>  serial murderer" who had operated in New Jersey and New Mexico.

As an individual, who would he be talking to via Clipper? His victims? Not
bloody likely. High-tech protection doesn't fall under the MO of this kind
of killer.

>* Another wiretap enabled authorities to thwart Chicago's "El Rukns
>  street gang" from a Libyan government-sponsored attempt to shoot
>  down a U.S. commercial airliner with a military weapons system.

They find these all the time through other mechanisms.

>* The entire leadership of the Mafia's Colombo family was convicted
>  with the help of wiretaps.

Legalize drugs and prostitution and the Mafia will dry up and blow away.
Besides, these guys have enough money to have purchased and used private
scrambling gear anyway; the fact that they haven't (leading to their
capture) leads one to believe they wouldn't use Clipper anyway. If the
current leadership is smarter, they'll be smart enough to use non-Clipper
gear anyway, eliminating the advantage Clipper gives to the Justice Dept.

>Hellman has an ingenious idea that might appeal to those concerned
>about civil liberties. He would require not one but three judges to
>authorize a Clipper wiretap. A judge could answer the request with
>"Yes," "No or "Oh, my God!" The latter means, "This looks like an
>attempted abuse of power, as in Watergate."
> 
>If a Clipper tap request got even one "Oh, my God!" decision, the
>target of the wiretap would be notified. Because that is the last thing
>the requestor would want, it would serve as a powerful check on
>frivolous or improper requests.

I gotta admit that I kinda like this. I should point out, though, that it
ought to be applied regardless of the wiretapping technology applied; that
is, this mechanism should be used today for all court-authorized wiretaps.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Date: Wed, 16 Jun 93 11:42:27 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: WORD...
Message-ID: <9306161842.AA07762@netcom.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Phiber Optik writes:

>I was just curious...  I saw the WordPerfect crack files on soda, and I'm


With the hypodermic syringes being found in Pepsi cans, the "crack files on
soda" phrase takes on new meaning. I wonder if the media knows?


-Tim May





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Richard Newsome <newsome@Panix.Com>
Date: Wed, 16 Jun 93 08:44:55 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Digital cash
Message-ID: <199306161544.AA14392@sun.Panix.Com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



I have a friend who is working on developing a digital cash-like electronic
payments system that would be connected to real financial institutions. He
says that tthis system will essentially make the entire Internet a single ATM.
I don't know any more about this as he is being very tight-lipped about this
project.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: nobody@pmantis.berkeley.edu
Date: Wed, 16 Jun 93 11:45:06 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: YAA (yet another article)
Message-ID: <9306161846.AA15062@pmantis.berkeley.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Really from: dmandl@lehman.com

> From: "Perry E. Metzger" <pmetzger@lehman.com>
> 
> Torture, believe it or not, is a very effective way of police to get
> information. Our society bans it.

But keep in mind that it's still used often enough, just not usually
against anyone with the power or credibility to speak out about it.
Don't you remember the Queens police precinct that got involved in
that stun-gun scandal a few years ago?

   --Dave (trying to give some extra business to the anonymous remailers).




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Craig Ellis <72550.1614@CompuServe.COM>
Date: Wed, 16 Jun 93 09:05:33 PDT
To: Cypherpunks <cypherpunks@toad.com>
Subject: unsubscribe
Message-ID: <930616154636_72550.1614_FHG29-1@CompuServe.COM>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Please take me off the cypherpunks mailing list.
Thank you.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: sneal@muskwa.ucs.ualberta.ca (Sneal)
Date: Wed, 16 Jun 93 11:49:58 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Patent libraries
Message-ID: <9306161849.AA16059@muskwa.ucs.ualberta.ca>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Re west coast patent libraries:
 
  The two that I've personally used are the Sunnyvale patent library
(which Tim May mentioned in an earlier post) and the one at University
of Washington in Seattle.  The Sunnyvale library is the more complete,
with all patents (microfilm for older ones, paper for newer) and gazettes
availble.  UW only goes back to the mid-sixties or so, but I suspect
this will cover all crypto patents.
 
Eric asks:
>Do they have electronic access at this library, or is it
>paper only?  I know they have a fax service for which they charge,
>but is there downloadable text available?
 
  Both libraries mentioned above have CD-ROM facilities which you can
browse onsite.  To the best of my recollection, though, the CDs only
include abstracts and licensing information, and not the full text of
the patents.  I'll likely be back in the Sunnyvale area sometime in
the next couple of months, but in the meantime, someone might want to
verify my recollections about the CD-ROM info.  The CD-ROM reader at
the Sunnyvale library seems to be heavily utilized, so you might want
to call ahead and book some time on it.
 
  If you want to check out the UW library and you're not familiar with
the area, stop at the UW Visitor's Centre first, or risk getting lost
in a strange and bizarre environment.
 
  Canadians looking for patent info... don't bother, unless you're in
the Ottawa/Hull area, are near a university that has the stuff on CD,
or have sufficient connections to get the stuff through CTIS at a
reasonable price.  Our government (now headed by the flakiest female
PC politician this side of Hilary Clinton <sound of stomach
churning>) seems to have granted exclusive rights to patent
distribution to some bogus little microfiche company in Hull
(MicroMedia) that wants some ungodly per-page charge for copying.
 
  -- Steve
 




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: David Heck <O1DSH@VM1.CC.UAKRON.EDU>
Date: Wed, 16 Jun 93 09:54:21 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: unsubscribe
Message-ID: <9306161654.AA16306@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Please remove me from the mailing list, I'm going to be gone for awhile,
completely unplugged...ahhhhh...I'll catch up when I get back.

Thanks,
David




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Stanton McCandlish <anton@hydra.unm.edu>
Date: Wed, 16 Jun 93 12:31:21 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Bidzos responds to "sellout" cry!
Message-ID: <9306161931.AA06662@hydra.unm.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I expressed my displeasure over PKP/RSA's apparent support for Clipper/
Capstone/Key Escrow to RSA's head, Jim Bidzos.  Here's his reply.


Quoth Jim Bidzos, verily I saith unto thee:

> From jim@RSA.COM Wed Jun 16 13:03:04 1993
> 	id <AA05248>; Wed, 16 Jun 1993 13:03:01 -0600
> Date: Wed, 16 Jun 93 12:01:09 PDT
> From: jim@RSA.COM (Jim Bidzos)
> Message-Id: <9306161901.AA16476@RSA.COM>
> To: anton@hydra.unm.edu
> In-Reply-To: Stanton McCandlish's message of Sun, 13 Jun 1993 23:01:03 -0600 (MDT) <9306140501.AA13212@hydra.unm.edu>
> Subject: hmph
> 
> 
> RSA/PKP supporting Clipper? Where did you hear that? (It's untrue.)
> For a year and a half, we have been claiming that DSS is covered by
> patents we hold.  NIST has finally stopped fighting, and asked for
> licensing terms. We provided them.  Hardly "support for Clipper."
> 
> --Jim
> 
> 


-- 
Stanton  McCandlish   * Space Migration * Networking * ChaOrder * NO GOV'T. *
anton@hydra.unm.edu   * Intelligence Increase * Nano * Crypto * NO RELIGION *
FidoNet:    1:301/2   * Life Extension * Ethics * VR * Now! * NO MORE LIES! *
Noise in the Void BBS * +1-505-246-8515   (24hr, 1200-14400, v32bis, N-8-1) *



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: M..Stirner@f28.n125.z1.FIDONET.ORG (M. Stirner)
Date: Wed, 16 Jun 93 17:54:05 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: yaa (yet another arti
Message-ID: <455.2C1F9199@shelter.FIDONET.ORG>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



 >  Another wiretap enabled authorities to thwart Chicago's "El Rukns
 >  street gang" from a Libyan government-sponsored attempt to shoot
 >  down a U.S. commercial airliner with a military weapons system.

 Uu> They find these all the time through other mechanisms.

This episode was hilarious.  An imprisoned El Rukun was conducting gang
business via jailhouse payphone.  One chuckly FBI agent was "decoding"
the simple slang-code by which the goons communicated.  After _three
months_ he figured out enough of the code to bring an indictment.  Some
of the more amusing of these sophisticated subterfuges:

Peanut = Jimmy Carter
Hollywood = Ronald Reagan
Roman = Policeman
Change = Kill
Our Friend = Qadaffi
Long Demonstration = Shotgun

It's interesting to note the length of time required for this "plaintext"
to be decoded in an urgent matter of national security.
.   ~
.   M.

*********************************************************************
* <m..stirner@f28.n125.z1.fidonet.org> - PGP Key D30909 via servers *
* > What country can preserve its liberties if its rulers are not  <*
* > warned from time to time that their people preserve the spirit <*
* > of resistance?  Let them take arms!" - Thomas Jefferson, 1787  <*
*********************************************************************
___ Blue Wave/QWK v2.12
--  
M. Stirner - via FidoNet node 1:125/1
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INTERNET: M..Stirner@f28.n125.z1.FIDONET.ORG




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Perry E. Metzger" <pmetzger@lehman.com>
Date: Wed, 16 Jun 93 10:47:01 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: YAA (yet another article)
In-Reply-To: <9306161618.AA00319@jazz.hal.com>
Message-ID: <9306161746.AA02809@snark.shearson.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Jason Zions says:
> >* A wiretap led to the arrest and conviction of a "sexually deviant
> >  serial murderer" who had operated in New Jersey and New Mexico.
> 
> As an individual, who would he be talking to via Clipper? His victims? Not
> bloody likely. High-tech protection doesn't fall under the MO of this kind
> of killer.

Look, lets get real here.

Wiretaps ARE an effective mechanism for law enforcement -- no question
about it.

The issue is not the effectiveness of wiretaps. Its the overall effect
on society.

Torture, believe it or not, is a very effective way of police to get
information. Our society bans it. Every mechanism that is useful is
not acceptable.

Stopping crypto to allow wiretaps forces every person in society to
give up their privacy, which probably costs billions of dollars and
thousands of lives, for the sake of only a small amount of money and
lives saved.

Outlawing strong privacy might stop some mafiosi -- but it will allow
others to rake in billions via wirefraud and dozens of other
mechanisms. 

It also likely won't stop the mafiosi and terrorists since they will
get strong cryptosystems anyway for virtually no cost. What do they
care that they are breaking the law?

Perry




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Perry E. Metzger" <pmetzger@lehman.com>
Date: Wed, 16 Jun 93 10:51:50 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: on the radio
In-Reply-To: <93Jun15.193753pdt.13987-4@well.sf.ca.us>
Message-ID: <9306161750.AA02825@snark.shearson.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Steven Levy says:
> 
> 
> >Steven Levy was interviewed on FM91.7 (san francisco public radio, I
> >forget the call letters) this morning.   My patch cable isnt working for
> >some reason, or I would have caught it in a ulaw file.
> 
> >I don't know the name of the show, or if they will rebroadcast it, but
> >if you're interested, you might try to track it down.
> 
> I think the name of the show was TechAmerica, or something
> like that, a show syndicated on public radio.

Technation.

> I did the interview
> about a month ago, me in Amherst, a fairly sharp interviewer in
> San Francisco.   

I believe that this is already on line via Internet Talk Radio.

Perry




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Phiber Optik <phiber@eff.org>
Date: Wed, 16 Jun 93 11:10:40 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: WORD...
Message-ID: <199306161811.AA20516@eff.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I was just curious...  I saw the WordPerfect crack files on soda, and I'm
interesting in knowing if anyone knows where I can find a utility that can
crack Microsoft WORD encryption.  If you don't have an actual utility, but
you know how they encrypt, that's fine too.

Thanks.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Marianne Mueller <mrrm@well.sf.ca.us>
Date: Wed, 16 Jun 93 14:28:52 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Draft Solaris Teleservices API doc, anon ftp
Message-ID: <93Jun16.142816pdt.13877-2@well.sf.ca.us>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



FYI 

From: stoltz@denwa.Eng.Sun.COM (Ben Stoltz)
Newsgroups: comp.dcom.isdn,sun.tstech,sun.audio,sun.sw.arch,sun.telco
Subject: Draft Solaris Teleservices API document is available for anonymous
ftp
Date: 11 Jun 1993 18:10:29 GMT

A PostScript version of the Solaris Teleservices 1.0 API Programming Guide
is available for anonymous ftp from sunsite.unc.edu in the directory
/pub/sun-info/white-papers/API_xtel.tar.Z

If you have any comments or suggestions, please send email
to xtel-api-comments@denwa.Eng.Sun.COM.

Marketing inquiries should be directed to bob.mckee@Eng.Sun.COM
(415)336-4840.

The IAFA info follows:
Document-Name:          API_xtel
Title:                  Solaris Teleservices 1.0 API Programming Guide
Authors:                Jonathan Chang <cjon@Eng.Sun.COM> UMTV18-217,
                        Sun Microsystems, Inc., 2550 Garcia Ave.
                        Mountain View, CA 94043-1100
Revision-Date:          June 7, 1993
Category:               Programming Guide
Abstract:               This manual is for C++ programmers who are
                        developing Solaris Teleservices (XTEL)
                        applications. A good understanding of the
                        UNIX(tm) operating system and the C++
                        programming language are required.  Example
                        programs are provided that illustrate the concepts
                        in the text.

                        The manual explains how to use XTEL to write
                        applications that:

                        o Place or answer multiple calls
                        o Hold, drop, conference and transfer calls
                        o Provide access to data channels
                        o Enable security and sharing of calls between
                          processes.

Format:                 PostScript
Citation:               Solaris Teleservices 1.0 API Programming Guide,
                        Draft June 7 1993, SunSoft, Inc.
Publication-Status:     draft
Keywords:               Teleservices, Telephony, ISDN, POTS, voice, API, C++
Size:                   90 pages




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: hibbert@memex.com (Chris Hibbert)
Date: Wed, 16 Jun 93 15:36:31 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: FOIA Kit [long]
Message-ID: <9306162148.AA24767@memexis.memex.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


A few weeks people were talking here about filing FOIA and Privacy Act
requests to find out what info the gov't has on them.  Here's a kit on
how to file FOIA requsts.  It's a relatively standard kit that the
Fund for Open Information and Accountability has been making available
for years.  This version was posted to alt.privacy by Paul Ferguson.
He had this advice in addition to what's in the kit: "FOIA requests
submitted to either the FBI or CIA concerning an individual (including
self) must be notarized to ensure identity."


here 'tis:


FOIA FILES KIT - INSTRUCTIONS
 
USING THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT
REVISED EDITION
Fund for Open Information and Accountability, Inc.
339 Lafayette Street, New York, NY 10012
(212) 477-3188
 
INSTRUCTIONS
 
     The Freedom of Information Act entitles you to request any 
record maintained by a federal Executive branch agency. The 
agency must release the requested material unless it falls into 
one of nine exempt categories, such as "national security," 
"privacy," "confidential source" and the like, in which case the 
agency may but is not compelled to refuse to disclose the 
records.
     This kit contains all the material needed to make FOIA 
requests for records on an individual, an organization or on a 
particular subject matter or event.
 
HOW TO MAKE A COMPLETE REQUEST
 
     Step 1:   Select the appropriate sample letter. Fill in the 
blanks in the body of the letter. Read the directions printed to 
the right of each letter in conjunction with the following 
instructions:
     For organizational files: In the first blank space insert 
the full and formal name of the organization whose files you are 
requesting. In the second blank space insert any other names, 
acronyms or shortened forms by which the organization is or has 
ever been known or referred to by itself or others. If some of 
the organization's work is conducted by sub-groups such as clubs, 
committees, special programs or through coalitions known by other 
names, these should be listed.
     For individual files: Insert the person's full name in the 
first blank space and any variations in spelling, nicknames, stage 
names, marriage names, titles and the like in the second blank 
space. Unlike other requests, the signatures of an individual 
requesting her/his own file must be notarized.
     For subject matter or event files: In the first blank space 
state the formal title of the subject matter or event including 
relevant dates and locations. In the second blank space provide 
the names of individuals or group sponsors or participants and/or 
any other information that would assist the agency in locating 
the material you are requesting.
     Step 2:   The completed sample letter may be removed, 
photocopies and mailed as is or retyped on your own stationary. 
Be sure to keep a copy of each letter.
     Step 3:   Addressing the letters: Consult list of agency 
addresses.
     FBI: A complete request requires a minimum of two letters. 
Sen done letter to FBI Headquarters and separate letter to each 
FBI field office nearest the location of the individual, the 
organization or the subject matter/event. Consider the location 
of residences, schools, work and other activities.
     INS: Send a request letter to each district office nearest 
the location of the individual, the organization or the subject 
matter/event.
     Address each letter to the FOIA/PA office of the appropriate 
agency. Be sure to make clearly on the envelope: ATTENTION--FOIA 
REQUEST.
 
FEE WAIVER
 
     You will notice that the sample letters include a request 
for fee waiver. Many agencies automatically waive fees if a 
request results in the release of only a small number of 
documents, e.g. 250 pages or less. Under the Act, you are 
entitled to a waiver of all search and copy fees associated with 
your request if the release of the information would primarily 
benefit the general public. However, in January 1983, the Justice 
Department issued a memo to all federal agencies listing five 
criteria which requesters must meet before they are deemed 
entitled to a fee waiver. Under these criteria, a requester must 
show that the material sought to be released is already the 
subject of "genuine public interest" and "meaningfully 
contributes to the public development or understanding of the 
subject"; and that she/he has the qualifications to understand 
and evaluate the materials and the ability to interpret and 
disseminate the information to th public and is not motivated by 
any "personal interest." Finally, if the requested information is 
already "in the public domain," such as in the agency's reading 
room, no fee waiver will be granted.
     You should always request a waiver of fees if you believe 
the information you are seeking will benefit the public. If your 
request for a waiver is denied, you should appeal that denial, 
citing the ways in which your request meets the standards set out 
above.
 
MONITORING THE PROGRESS OF YOUR REQUEST
 
     Customarily, you will receive a letter from each agency 
within 10 days stating that your request has been received and is 
being processed. You may be asked to be patient and told that 
requests are handled cafeteria style. You have no alternative but 
to be somewhat patient. but there is no reason to be complacent 
and simply sit and wait.
     A good strategy is to telephone the FOIA office in each 
agency after about a month if nothing of substance has been 
received. Ask for a progress report. The name of the person you 
talk with and the gist of the conversation should be recorded. 
try to take notes during the conversation focusing especially on 
what is said by the agency official. Write down all the details 
you can recall after the call is completed. Continue to call 
every 4 to 6 weeks.
     Good record keeping helps avoid time-consuming and 
frustrating confusion. A looseleaf notebook with a section 
devoted to each request simplifies this task. Intervening 
correspondence to and from the agency can be inserted between the 
notes on phone calls so that all relevant material will be at 
hand for the various tasks: phone consultations, writing the 
newsletter, correspondence, articles, preparation for media 
appearances, congressional testimony or litigation, if that 
course is adopted.
 
HOW TO MAKE SURE YOU GET EVERYTHING YOU ARE ENTITLED TO ...
AND WHAT TO DO IF YOU DO NOT
 
     After each agency has searched and processed your request, 
you will receive a letter that announces the outcome, encloses 
the released documents, if any, and explains where to direct an 
appeal if any material has been withheld. There are four possible 
outcomes:
     1.   Request granted in full: This response indicates that 
the agency has released all records pertinent to your request, 
with no exclusions or withholdings. The documents may be enclosed 
or, if bulky, may be mailed under separate cover. This is a very 
rare outcome. 
     Next Step: Check documents for completeness (see 
instructions below).
     2.   Requested granted in part and denied in part: This 
response indicates that the agency is releasing some material but 
has withheld some documents entirely or excised some passages 
from the documents released. The released documents may be 
enclosed or, if bulky, mailed under separate cover.
     Next step: Check documents released for completeness (see 
instructions below) and make an administrative appeal of denials 
or incompleteness (see instructions below).
     3.   Request denied in full: This response indicates that 
the agency is asserting that all material in its files pertaining 
to your request falls under one or the nine FOIA exemptions. 
These are categories of information that the agency may, at its 
discretion, refuse to release.
     Next step: Make an administrative appeal (see instructions 
below). Since FOIA exemptions are not mandatory, even a complete 
denial of your request can and should be appeals.
     4.   No records: This response will state that a search of 
the agency's files indicates that it has no records corresponding 
to those you requested.
     Next step: Check your original request to be sure you have 
not overlooked anything. If you receive documents from other 
agencies, review them for indications that there is material in 
the files of the agency claiming it has none. For example, look 
for correspondence, or references to correspondence, to or from 
that agency. If you determine that there are reasonable grounds, 
file an administrative appeal (see instructions below).
 
HOW TO CHECK FOR COMPLETENESS
 
     Step 1: Before reading the documents, turn them over and 
number the back of each page sequentially. The packet may contain 
documents from the agency's headquarters as well as several field 
office files. Separate the documents into their respective office 
packets. Each of these offices will have assigned the 
investigation a separate file number. Try to find the numbering 
system. Usually the lower right hand corner of the first page 
carries a hand-written file and document number. For instance, an 
FBI document might be marked "100-7142-22". This would indicate 
that it is the 22nd document in the 7142nd file in the 100 
classification. As you inspect the documents, make a list of 
these file numbers and which office they represent. In this way 
you will be able to determine which office created and which 
office received the document you have in your hand. Often there 
is a block stamp affixed with the name of the office from whose 
files this copy was retrieved. the "To/From" heading on a 
document may also give you corresponding file numbers and will 
help you puzzle out the origin of the document.
     When you have finally identified each document's file and 
serial number and separated the documents into their proper 
office batches, make a list of all the serial numbers in each 
batch to see if there any any missing numbers. If there are 
missing serial numbers and some documents have been withheld, try 
to determine if the missing numbers might reasonably correspond 
to the withheld documents. If not, the release may be incomplete 
and an administrative appeal should be made.
     Step 2: Read all the document released to you. Keep a list 
of all document referred to the text--letters, memos, teletypes, 
reports, etc. Each of these "referred to" documents should turn 
up in the packet released to you. If any are not in the packet, 
it is possible they may be among those document withheld; a 
direct inquiry should be made. In an administrative appeal, ask 
that each of these "referred to" documents be produced or that 
the agency state plainly that they are among those withheld. Of 
course, the totals of unproduced vs. withheld must be within 
reasons; that is, if the total number of unproduced documents you 
find referred to the text of the documents produced exceeds the 
total number of documents withheld, the agency cannot claim that 
all the referred to documents are accounted for by the withheld 
category. You will soon get the hand of making logical 
conclusions from discrepancies in the totals and missing document 
numbers.
     Another thing to look for when reading the released 
documents if the names of persons or agencies to whom the 
document has been disseminated. the lower left-hand corner is a 
common location for the typed list of agencies or offices to whom 
the document has been directed. In addition, there may be 
additional distribution recorded by hand, there or elsewhere on 
the cover page. There are published glossaries for some agencies 
that will help in deciphering these notations when they are not 
clear. Contact FOIA, Inc., if you need assistance in deciphering 
the text.
     Finally, any other file numbers that appear on the document 
should be noted, particularly in the subject of the file is of 
interest and is one you have not requested. You may want to make 
an additional request for some of these files.
 
HOW TO MAKE AN ADMINISTRATIVE APPEAL
 
     Under the FOIA, a dissatisfied requester has the right of 
administrative appeal. the name and address of the proper appeal 
office will be given to you by each agency in its final response 
letter.
     This kit contains a sample appeal letter with suggesting for 
adapting it to various circumstances. However, you need not make 
such an elaborate appeal; in fact, you need not offer any reasons 
at all but rather simply write a letter to the appeals unit 
stating that "this letter constitutes an appeal of the agency's 
decision." Of course, if you have identified some real 
discrepancies, you will want to set them for fully, but even if 
you have not found any, you may simply ask that the release be 
reviewed.
     If you are still dissatisfied after the administrative 
appeal process, the FOIA gives you the right to bring a lawsuit 
in federal district court on an expedited basis.
 
SAMPLE FBI REQUEST LETTER
 
Date:
 
To:  FOIA/PA Unit
     Federal Bureau of Investigation
 
     This is a request under the Freedom of Information Act.
 
     I request a complete and thorough search of all filing 
systems and locations for all records maintained by your agency 
pertaining to and/or captioned: ______ 
_____________________________________________________
[describe records desired and/or insert full and
_____________________________________________________
formal name]
_____________________________________________________
 
_____________________________________________________
 
including, without limitations, files and documents captioned, or 
whose captions include
 
_____________________________________________________
[insert changes in name, commonly used names,
_____________________________________________________
acronyms, sub-groups, and the like]
_____________________________________________________
 
_____________________________________________________
 
     This request specifically includes "main" files and "see 
references," including, but not limited to numbered and lettered 
sub files, "DO NOT FILE" files, and control files. I also request 
a search of the ELSUR Index,a nd the COINTELPRO Index. I request 
that all records be produced with the administrative pages.
     I wish to be sent copies of "see reference" cards, 
abstracts, search slips, including search slips used to process 
this request, file covers, multiple copies of the same documents 
if they appear in a file, and tapes of any electronic 
surveillances.
     I wish to make it clear that I want all records in you 
office "identifiable with my request," even though reports on 
those records have been sent to Headquarters and even though 
there may be duplication between the two sets of files.
 
I do not want just "interim" documents. I want all documents as they
appear in the "main" files and "see references" of all units of 
your agency.
      If documents are denied in whole or in part, please specify 
which exemption(s) is(are) claimed for each passage or whole 
document denied. Please provide a complete itemized inventory and 
a detailed factual justification of total or partial denial of 
documents. Give the number of pages in each document and the 
total number of pages pertaining to this request. For 
"classified" material denied please include the following 
information: the classification (confidential, secret or top 
secret); identity of the classifier; date or event for automatic 
de-classification, classification review, or down-grading; if 
applicable, identity of official authorizing extension of 
automatic de-classification or review; and if applicable, the 
reason for extended classification.
     I request that excised material be "blacked out" rather 
than "whited out" or cut out and that the remaining non-exempt 
portions of documents will be released as provided under the 
Freedom of Information Act.
     Please send a memo (copy to me) to the appropriate units in 
your office to assure that no records related to this request are 
destroyed. Please advise of any destruction of records and 
include the date of and authority for such destruction.
     As I expect to appeal any denials, please specify the office 
and address to which an appeal should be directed.
     I believe my request qualifies for a waiver of fees since 
the release of the requested information would primarily benefit 
the general public and be "in the public interest."
     I can be reached at the phone listed below. Please call 
rather than write if there are any questions or if you need 
additional information from me.
     I expect a response to this request within ten (10) working 
days, as provided for in the Freedom of Information Act.
 
Sincerely,
 
name: _______________________________________________
 
address: ____________________________________________
 
         ____________________________________________
 
telephone: __________________________________________
 
signature: __________________________________________
 
SAMPLE AGENCY REQUEST LETTER
 
DATE:
TO: FOIA/PA Unit
 
     This is a request under the Freedom of Information Act.
     I request a complete and thorough search of all filing 
systems and locations for all records maintained by your agency 
pertaining to and/or captioned 
______________________________________________________
[describe records desired and/or insert full and
______________________________________________________
formal name]
______________________________________________________
 
______________________________________________________
 
including, without limitation, files and documents captioned, or 
whose captions include:
 
______________________________________________________
[insert changes in name, commonly used names,
______________________________________________________
acronyms, sub-groups and the like]
______________________________________________________
 
______________________________________________________
 
     I also request all "see references" to these names, a search 
of the ELSUR Index or any similar technique for locating records 
of electronic surveillance.
     This request is also a request for any corresponding files 
in INS Headquarters or regional offices.
     Please place any "missing" files pertaining to this request 
on "special locate" and advise that you have done this.
     If documents are denied in part or whole, please specify 
which exemption(s) is(are) claimed for each passage or whole 
document denied. Please provide a complete itemized inventory and 
detailed factual justification of total or partial denial of 
documents. Specify the number of pates in each document and th 
total number of pages pertaining to this request. For classified 
material denied, please include the following information: the 
classification rating (confidential, secret, or top secret); 
identify the classifier; date or event for automatic 
de-classification, classification review or downgrading; if 
applicable, identify the official authorizing extension of 
automatic de-classification or review; and, if applicable, give the 
reason for extended classification.
     I request that excised material be "blacked out" rather than 
"whited out" or cut out. I expect, as provided by the Freedom of 
Information Act, that the remaining non-exempt portions of 
documents will be released.
     Please send a memo (copy to me) to the appropriate units in 
your office or agency to assure that no records related to this 
request are destroyed. Please advise of any destruction of 
records and include the date of and authority for such 
destruction.
     As I expect to appeal any denials, please specify the office 
and address to which an appeal should be directed.
     I believe my request qualifies for a waiver of fees since 
the release of the requested information would primarily benefit 
the general public and be "in the public interest."
     I can be reached at the phone listed below. Please call 
rather than write if there are any questions or if you need 
additional information from me.
     I expect a response to this request within ten (10) working 
days, as provided for in the Freedom of Information Act.
 
Sincerely,
 
name: _______________________________________________
 
address: ____________________________________________
 
         ____________________________________________
 
telephone: (___)_______________________________________
 
signature: __________________________________________
 
SAMPLE ADMINISTRATIVE APPEAL LETTER
 
Date:
To:  FOIA/PA Appeals Office
RE:  Request number [Add this if the agency has given your request 
a number]
     This is an appeal pursuant to subsection (a)(6) of the 
Freedom of Information Act as amended (5U.S.C. 552).
     On [date], I received a letter from [name of official] of 
your agency denying my request for [describe briefly the 
information you are after]. This reply indicated that an appeal 
letter could be sent to you. I am enclosing a copy of my exchange 
of correspondence with your agency so that you can see exactly 
what files I have requested and the insubstantial grounds on 
which my request has been denied.
     [Optional paragraph, to be used if the agency has withheld 
all or nearly all the material which has been requested]:
     You will note that your agency has withheld the entire (or 
nearly the entire) document (or file, or report, or whatever) 
that I requested. Since the FOIA provides that "any reasonably 
secregable portion of a record shall be provided to any person 
requesting such record after deletion of the portions which are 
exempt," I believe that your agency has not complied with the 
FOIA. I believe that there must be (additional) secregable 
portions which do not fall within FOIA exemptions and which must 
be released.
     [Optional paragraph, to be used in the agency has used the 
(b)(1) exemption for national security, to withhold information]
     Your agency has used the (b)(1) exemption to withhold 
information [I question whether files relating to events that 
took place over twenty years ago could realistically harm the 
national security.] [Because I am familiar with my own activities 
during the period in question, and know that none of these 
activities in any way posed a significant threat to the national 
security, I question the designation of my files or portions of 
my file as classified and exempt from disclosure because of
national security considerations.]
     [Sample optional argument to be used if the exemption which 
is claimed does not seem to make sense; you should cite as many 
specific instances as you care to of items withheld from the 
documents that you have received. We provide two examples which 
you might want to adapt to your own case.]
     "On the memo dated _____________ the second paragraph 
withheld under the (b)(1) exemption appears to be describing a 
conversation at an open meeting. If this is the case, it is 
impossible that the substance of this conversation could be 
properly classified." Or, "The memo dated _____ refers to a 
meeting which I attended, but a substantial portion is deleted 
because of the (b)(6) and (b)(7)(c) exemptions for unwarranted 
invasions of personal privacy. Since I already know who attended 
this meeting, no privacy interest is served by the withholding."
     I trust that upon examination of my request, you will 
conclude that the records I requested are not properly covered by 
exemption(s) [here repeat the exemptions which the agency's 
denial letter claimed applied to your request] of the amended 
FOIA, and that you will overrule the decision to withhold the 
information.
     [Use if an itemized inventory is not supplied originally]
     If you choose instead to continue to withhold some or all of 
the material which was denied in my initial request to your 
agency, I ask that you give me an index of such material, 
together with the justification for the denial of each item which 
is still withheld.
     As provided in the Act, I will expect to receive a reply to 
this administrative appeal letter within twenty working days.
     If you deny this appeal and do not adequately explain why 
the material withheld is properly exempt, I intend to initial a 
lawsuit to compel its disclosure. [You can say that you intend to 
sue, if that is your present inclination; you may still decide 
ultimately not to file suit.]
 
Sincerely yours,
 
name:     ____________________________________________
 
address:  ____________________________________________
 
          ____________________________________________
 
signature: ___________________________________________
 
[Mark clearly on envelope: Attention: Freedom of Information 
Appeals]
 
FBI ADDRESSES AND PHONE NUMBERS
 
FBI Headquarters, J. Edgar Hoover Bldg, Washington, D.C., 20535, 
202-324-5520 (FOI/PA Unit)
 
Field Offices
Albany, NY 12207, U.S. Post Office and Courthouse, 518-465-7551
Albuquerque, NM 87101, Federal Office Bldg., 505-247-1555
Alexandria, VA 22314, 300 N. Lee St., 703-683-2681
Anchorage, AK 99510, Federal bldg., 907-272-6414
Atlanta, GA 30303, 275 Peachtree St. NE, 404-521-3900
Baltimore, MD 21207, 7142 Ambassador Rd., 301-265-8080
Birmingham, AL 35203, Room 1400, 2121 Bldg. 205-252-7705 
Boston, MA 02203, J.F. Kennedy Federal Office Bldg., 617-742-5533
Buffalo, NY 14202, 111 W. Huron St., 716-856-7800
Butte, MT 59701, U.S. Courthouse and Federal Bldg., 406-792-2304
Charlotte, NC 28202, Jefferson Standard Life Bldg., 704-372-5485
Chicago, IL 60604, Everett McKinley Dirksen Bldg., 312-431-1333
Cincinnati, OH 45202, 400 U.S. Post Office & Crthse Bldg., 513-421-4310
Cleveland, OH 44199, Federal Office Bldg., 216-522-1401
Columbia, SC 29201, 1529 Hampton St., 803-254-3011
Dallas TX 75201, 1810 Commerce St., 214-741-1851
Denver, CO 80202, Federal Office Bldg., 303-629-7171
Detroit, MI 48226, 477 Michigan Ave., 313-965-2323
El Paso, TX 79901, 202 U.S. Courthouse Bldg., 915-533-7451
Honolulu, HI 96850, 300 Ala Moana Blvd., 808-521-1411
Houston, TX 77002, 6015 Fed. Bldg and U.S.Courthouse, 713-224-1511
Indianapolis, IN 46202, 575 N. Pennsylvania St., 317-639-3301
Jackson, MS 39205, Unifirst Federal and Loan Bldg., 601-948-5000
Jacksonville, FL 32211, 7820 Arlington Expressway, 904-721-1211
Kansas City, MO 64106, 300 U.S. Courthouse Bldg., 816-221-6100
Knoxville, TN 37919, 1111 Northshore Dr., 615-588-8571
Las Vegas, NV 89101, Federal Office Bldg., 702-385-1281
Little Rock, AR 72201, 215 U.S Post Office Bldg., 501-372-7211
Los Angeles, CA 90024, 11000 Wilshire Blvd, 213-272-6161
Louisville, KY 40202, Federal Bldg., 502-583-3941
Memphis, TN 38103, Clifford Davis Federal bldg., 901-525-7373
Miami, FL 33137, 3801 Biscayne Blvd., 305-573-3333
Milwaukee, WI 53202, Federal Bldg and U.S. Courthouse, 414-276-4681
Minneapolis, MN 55401, 392 Federal Bldg., 612-339-7846
Mobile, AL 36602, Federal Bldg., 205-438-3675
Newark, NJ 07101, Gateway I, Market St., 201-622-5613
New Haven, CT 06510, 170 Orange St., 203-777-6311
New Orleans, LA 70113, 701 Loyola Ave., 504-522-4671
New York, NY 10007, 26 Federal Plaza, 212-553-2700
Norfolk, VA, 23502, 870 N. Military Hwy., 804-461-2121
Oklahoma City, OK 73118, 50 Penn Pl. NW, 405-842-7471
Omaha, NB 68102, 215 N. 17th St., 402-348-1210
Philadelphia, PA 19106, Federal Office Bldg., 215-629-0800
Phoenix, AZ 85004, 2721 N. central Ave., 602-279-5511
Pittsburgh, PA 15222, Federal Office Bldg., 412-471-2000
Portland, OR 97201, Crown Plaza Bldg., 503-224-4181
Richmond, VA 23220, 200 W. Grace St., 804-644-2531
Sacramento, CA 95825, Federal Bldg., 916-481-9110
St. Louis, MO 63103, 2704 Federal Bldg., 314-241-5357
Salt Lake City, UT 84138, Federal Bldg., 801-355-7521
San Diego, CA 92188, Federal Office Bldg., 619-231-1122
San Francisco, CA 94102, 450 Golden Gate Ave., 415-552-2155
San Juan, PR 00918 U.S. Courthouse and Fed. Bldg., 809-754-6000
Savannah, GA 31405, 5401 Paulson St., 912-354-9911
Seattle, WA 98174, 915 2nd Ave., 206-622-0460
Springfield, IL 62702, 535 W. Jefferson St., 217-522-9675
Tampa, FL 33602, Federal Office Bldg., 813-228-7661
Washington, DC 20535, 9th and Pennsylvania Ave. NW, 202-324-3000
 
FEDERAL AGENCIES (SELECTED ADDRESSES)
 
Central Intelligence Agency:
 
  Mr. John H. Wright
  Information and Privacy Coordinator
  Central Intelligence Agency
  Washington, DC  20505
 
Federal Bureau of Investigation:
 
   Federal Bureau of INVESTIGATION
   J. Edgar Hoover Building
   9th and Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.,
   Washington, DC  20535
   ATTN: FOIA/PA Section
 
National Security Agency:
 
   Director, NSA/CSS
   9800 Savage Road
   Fort George G. Meade, Maryland  20755-6000
   ATTN: FOIA/N5
 
For those who live in The Commonwealth of Virginia, this is the
address of the Richmond field office:
 
Federal Bureau of Investigation
111 Greencourt Road
Richmond, Virginia  23228
ATTN: FOIA/PA Section

Civil Service Commission
Appropriate Bureau (Bureau of Personnel Investigation,
Bureau of Personnel Information Systems, etc.)
Civil Service Commission
1900 E Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20415
202-632-4431
 
Commission on Civil Rights
General Counsel, U.S. Commission on Civil Rights
1121 Vermont Ave., N.W. Room 600
Washington, D.C. 20415
202-254-6610
 
Consumer Product Safety Commission
Office of the Secretary
Consumer Product Safety Commission
1111 18th St., N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20207
202-624-7700
 
Department of Defense/Dept. of Air Force
Freedom of Information Manager
Headquarters, USAF/DADF
Washington, D.C. 20330-5025
202-697-3467
 




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: nobody@rosebud.ee.uh.edu
Date: Wed, 16 Jun 93 12:56:32 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Digital Cash
Message-ID: <9306161956.AA22233@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

Responding to Mike Diehl's comments about digital cash:

It is not really the right question to ask what digital cash "is".
It is better to ask how it might work, what it could be.

Digital cash is basically just a cryptographic technology that provides
tokens, messages, bit patterns, etc. which are (A) unforgeable, (B)
verifiable (by the institution that issues them, at least), and (C)
untraceable.  What you do with this technology is then limited only
by your imagination.

Eric Hughes has pointed out that you can use it for things having
nothing to do with cash.  Use it to represent fuel in a space game and
this way people can transfer fuel but can't create more.  Use it for
anything for which you want the quantity to be conserved.

If we want to use it as a substitute for cash, though, Mike asks what
gives it value.  There are many possible answers.  One is, as Duncan
suggested, to allow digital cash to be exchanged for regular cash.  But
this is not the only possibility.  Eric pointed out that it could be
used as a "play money" in a game, such as a Multi User Dungeon (MUD),
allowing cash to be transfered between games.  Another possibility would
be for a company to issue "digital coupons" good for discounts off of
its software products when you order them by email.  This would give the
coupons value and they could be used as the cash in a barter network,
perhaps.

Conceivable, a government might issue digital cash in parallel with its
paper cash.  It would then give it backing in the same way that the
paper cash is backed; among other things, you can pay your taxes in
digital cash.  This is probably not too likely among the big countries
but there are many countries in the world.

In some areas of rural England, "scrip" is used by barter networks to
help stimulate the local economies.  A twenty-first century equivalent
could use digital cash.

Mike also asks what would prevent the digital cash "bank" from just
absconding with the money, assuming that the digital cash was backed by
regular cash.  The answer is presumably the same things that stop a
regular bank from doing this.  If the cash is legal in the country of
issue, laws will allow prosecution of bankers who steal.

In the more anarchic world of international finance, people already face
the problem of safeguarding their overseas investments.  I know of a
non-profit organization that lost several hundred thousand dollars in
an overseas investment a few years ago (money it could hardly afford to
lose) due to fraud.  There are no certainties, but you can take some
care.  Invest only a small amount at first, then gradually increase your
investment as you gain confidence.  Choose a bank which has been in
business for many years.  Look at the reputations of the people behind
the bank - have they had previous positions of responsibility and trust?

These are all the kinds of things which you should do anyway, and they
should work just as well for a digital cash bank as for any other case
where you have to trust someone with your money.

Mike asks what the benefits and purpose would be for digital cash.  I
see the main benefit as allowing electronic transactions with greater
protection for consumer privacy.  Presently when you make an electronic
transaction (purchasing something from a catalog over the telephone, for
example, or buying gas with your ATM card), you as the consumer have to
trust a lot of people.  The catalog company gets your credit card number,
and you have to trust that none of the people who see it will use it
illicitly, or sell the number to criminals.  The credit card company itself
gets a full record of the transaction, and you have to trust that they will
treat this information as confidential, not sell your name to a mailing
list of people who like to purchase certain kinds of items, and safeguard
it so that computer criminals and snoopy investigators can't violate your
privacy.  Similarly, with the ATM transaction, you are trusting the bank,
the point-of-sale vendor, and many other people to keep your Personal
Identification Number (PIN) secret, and also to safeguard the records of
your transaction.

With digital cash and a smartcard, you should be able to engage in these
kinds of transactions with no organization or institution able to violate
your privacy or steal your money.  You can protect yourself, rather than
having to trust others.  This puts more power into the hands of the
consumer.

Granted, in today's political climate, empowering individuals is perhaps
not as persuasive an argument as we might wish.  But I am optimistic that
as people begin to learn that there is an alternative to trusting VISA
(through such means as Chaum's article in Scientific American, for example)
and as the inevitable horror stories continue to spread about ATM fraud,
credit card fraud, and invaded privacy, political support for this proposal
will grow.  I do think that in an increasingly networked world people are
going to be more jealous about guarding the privacy they have left.  In
this sense, digital cash may be the wave of the future.  


Hal Finney
74076.1041@compuserve.com

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From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Marc Horowitz <marc@GZA.COM>
Date: Wed, 16 Jun 93 13:07:51 PDT
To: Stanton McCandlish <anton@hydra.unm.edu>
Subject: Re: Bidzos responds to "sellout" cry!
In-Reply-To: <9306161931.AA06662@hydra.unm.edu>
Message-ID: <9306162007.AA02747@dun-dun-noodles.aktis.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> RSA/PKP supporting Clipper? Where did you hear that? (It's untrue.)

Quote this paragraph:

    PKP will also grant a license to practice key management, at no
    additional fee, for the integrated circuits which will implement both
    the DSA and the anticipated Federal Information Processing Standard
    for the "key escrow" system announced by President Clinton on April
    16, 1993.

I'm not going to respond directly to him, since I don't know if you
want him to know you reforwarded his mail.  However, I would make the
argument that if RSA really didn't want the clipper chip, they would
license it to NIST in such a way that "all implementations based on
our patents will be made available in software source form for
non-commercial use".  I'm sure legal language can be constructed which
would prohibit hardware-only implementations.  I couldn't write it
though.

		Marc




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Chris Hibbert <hibbert@memex.com>
Date: Wed, 16 Jun 93 17:36:14 PDT
To: djw@eff.org (Daniel J. Weitzner)
Subject: Re: Census and privacy
In-Reply-To: <9305142234.AA20885@toad.com>
Message-ID: <9306170012.AA24905@entropy.memex.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



In the list of questions that the Digital Privacy and Security Working
Group sent to the white house was this one:

>> 38.     How will the government ensure that unanticipated uses of
>> the escrow database are prevented in the long term?  (E.g., the
>> Census database was supposed to stay confidential for 75 years, but
>> was released during World War Two to allow Japanese-Americans to be
>> imprisoned without cause.  What protections are in place to make
>> sure that this never happens again? 

I believe this account of the use of the census is incorrect.  I don't
have documentation, but the version I know doesn't require anyone to
break any laws, and is just as invasive of privacy.  Given that, I
think it's a stronger argument against the census, but possibly a
weaker example for clipper.

As I've heard it, the Selective Service got lists from the Census of
how many people of Japanese descent lived in each census tract.  This
information is publicly available, and doesn't require anyone breaking
any laws or promises to the public.  The Census makes summaries of all
the information they collect available, usually at the level of census
tracts.  Armed with such a list, the SS could go door to door in any
neighborhood in which they hadn't yet found enough Japanese-Americans.

<begin short political flame>
I don't believe that people should respond to the census, given that
the information can be abused in this way, according to the strictest
interpretation of the assurances given to the public.  The only valid
purpose of the census is to count citizens and apportion congressional
districts.  Any other purpose makes it less likely that the original
purpose will be served well.
<end flame>

Chris




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Tom Knight <tk@reagan.ai.mit.edu>
Date: Wed, 16 Jun 93 15:00:07 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: fast des
In-Reply-To: <9306161515.AA12958@toad.com>
Message-ID: <19930616211451.5.TK@ROCKY.AI.MIT.EDU>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


    Date: Wed, 16 Jun 1993 11:09 EDT
    From: smb@research.att.com
	     ....  2.4 gbps is 37.5 million des per sec.

	     .... arithmetic right, this could exhaustively test the
			space of 56 bit keys in about eight hours.
    I don't know of any 2.4 gbps DES chips, but DEC has built a 1 gbps
    chip.
   ....  Key-loading is a different operation,
    and that might not go nearly as fast.  Any hardware assists (i.e., DMA)
    would be for the data, not for the next key to use on the same block of
    data.

Usually the limiting factor is examining the <ostensibly> decrypted data
for statistically significant patterns indicating that you have the
correct key.  The fast DES chips don't help with this at all.  A known
plaintext attack, of course, doesn't have this problem, but these are
probably of limited interest in real applications.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: whitfield.diffie@Eng.Sun.COM
Date: Wed, 16 Jun 93 19:28:04 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Second epistle of Whit apostle to Congress
Message-ID: <9306170230.AA03298@ushabti.Eng.Sun.COM>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



    Here is what I told Markey's telecommunications committee last
Wednesday about the business impact of key escrot.  What follows
has been corrected for a major error for which I apologize to CPSR.
I had carelessly cited EFF as the extractor of some documents under
FOIA.  It also makes some minor corrections; the changes are shown
at the end.
				Whit


                          TESTIMONY BEFORE THE 
                          HOUSE SUBCOMMITTEE ON 
                      TELECOMMUNICATIONS AND FINANCE
                                     
                               9 June 1993
                                     
                  The Impact of Regulating Cryptography
              on the Computer and Communications Industries
                                     
                             Whitfield Diffie
                          Distinguished Engineer
                          Sun Microsystems, Inc.
                                      
                                     
     I'd like to begin by expressing my thanks to Chairman Markey, the
other members of the committee, and the committee staff for giving us
the opportunity to appear before the committee and express our views.

     We stand at a moment in history when an amazing coincidence of
developments in technology and world politics is showing us
opportunities in both business and personal life that no one could
have anticipated.  These developments rest on two closely related
cornerstones: communication and internationalism.

     Business today is characterized by an unprecedented freedom and
volume of travel by both people and goods.  It is an era of rapid
inexpensive transportation coupled with declining trade barriers.  All
this movement is made possible, however, by the reality of instant
telecommunication between places thousands of miles apart, conveying
voices, images, and data wherever they are needed.

     Ease of communication, both physical and electronic, has ushered
in an era of international markets and multinational corporations.  No
country is large enough that its industries can concentrate on the
domestic market to the exclusion of all others.  When foreign sales
rival or exceed domestic ones, the structure of the corporation
follows suit with new divisions placed in proximity to markets,
materials, or labor.

     The result is a world in which much of the population enjoys a
standard of material wealth and freedom of action previously unknown.
It is also a world in which no company, community, or country can
afford not to compete in the global market.


     Security of communication and computing is essential to this
telecommunication driven environment.  The communication system must
ensure that orders for goods and services are genuine, guarantee that
payments are credited to the proper accounts, and protect the privacy
of business plans and personal information.

     In the past, these diverse assurances have been provided by an ad
hoc patchwork that has evolved slowly over the century and a half
since the invention of the telegraph, but two factors are now making
that patchwork obsolete.

     The first is the rise in importance of intellectual property.
Much of what is now bought and sold is information that varies from
computer programs to surveys of customer buying habits.  Information
security has become an end in itself rather than just a means for
insuring the security of people and property.

     The second is the universal demand for mobility in
communications.  Traveling corporate computer users sit down at
workstations they have never seen before and expect the same
environment that is on the desks in their offices.  They carry
cellular telephones and communicate constantly by radio.  They haul
out portable PCs and dial their home computers from locations around
the globe.  With each such action they expose their information to
threats of eavesdropping and falsification barely known a decade ago.

     It is the lack of security for these increasingly common
activities that we encounter when we hear that most cellular telephone
calls in major metropolitan areas are overheard or even recorded by
eavesdroppers with scanners; that a new computer virus is destroying
data on the disks of PCs; or that industrial spies have broken into a
database half a world away.


     In this troubling scenario, however, there is a large ray of
hope.  Most of the technology to provide the needed protection is
already available in the form of contemporary cryptography and its
allied disciplines.  Some of it has existed for nearly fifty years;
some dates from the last five.  It isn't in widespread use, but it
does exist.

     Why then are proper security measures not incorporated in every
cell phone, laptop, and workstation?  Part of the answer is economic.
Collecting intelligence by spying on information is so hard to detect
that most users are unaware that they are suffering from it and
unwilling to pay to protect themselves.  Another lies in a unique
problem of implementing security standards: security mechanisms are
designed to block access to everyone who does not conform exactly to
their demands.  This makes them very unforgiving of that flexibility
at the margins that makes much of standardization possible.
Compounding these internal difficulties is one that is entirely
external: a regulatory structure that goes back to the cold war and
does not recognize the realities of the present situation.

     In the United States, export control has been the major barrier.
Companies are deterred from building proper security mechanisms into
their products because to do so will limit their exports and subject
them to tedious administrative procedures required to comply with the
law.  The alternatives are to support two versions of each product,
one for domestic use and one for export or to dilute the security
measures in all products to a level whose export the government
permits.

     At Sun Microsystems, approximately half our customers are outside
the United States.  Were we to build a workstation and an operating
system embodying the best security we know how to provide and the
security that we believe is needed, we would not be permitted to
export them.  This would present us with insuperable problems in
maintaining distinct but somehow compatible domestic and foreign
product lines.  Not least of the consequences is that we are unable to
provide security features that elements of the U.S. Government would
like in the systems they buy, because that market does not come close
to making up for the one we would have to forgo.

     I believe we are typical of computer companies in these respects.
Digital Equipment after having made some outstanding contributions to
network security, appears to have abandoned its lead in the field.
Export issues were cited when it discontinued development of an
operating system designed to achieve an National Computer Security
Center A1 rating some five years back and I suspect they may have
played a role in its larger retreat from security as well.

     We have also suffered from the government's failure to take the
lead in championing security standards, both domestic and
international.  The first proposed federal standard in the area of
public key cryptography has appeared only after such techniques had
been employed for more than a decade and does not conform to the
conventional practice that has evolved both in the U.S. and abroad.
Some have even suggested that the government has actively worked to
block standardization citing the United States failure to vote for its
own national cryptographic standard (DES) in the International
Standards Organization and material on the working relationship
between NIST and NSA recently released to the Computer Professionals
for Social Responsibility under the Freedom of Information Act.


     Now we are faced with the greatest challenge to our ability to
secure the personal and business communications of the modern world
that we have yet encountered.  The administration proposes to adopt as
a federal standard a system that is not only secret, but incorporates
provisions for the government secretly to decode any person's
communications when it deems this necessary for law enforcement or
national security purposes.

     The effect is very much like that of the little keyhole in the
back of the combination locks used on the lockers of school children.
The children open the locks with the combinations, which is supposed
to keep the other children out, but the teachers can always look in
the lockers by using the key.

     The stated objective is to require the use of equipment based on
these new `key escrow' chips for certain communications within the
government and between the government and business.  If they are
successful in their objective, the latter provision could force the
inclusion of these chips in all devices used, for example, to
communicate with the government about contracts or taxes.


     What would be the effect of such broad inclusion?  

     We have been assured by NIST that the finished chips, once their
key escrow provisions have been programmed, will be available without
restriction for incorporation in any piece of domestic equipment, but
it is hard to see how either the security or wiretap objectives could
be achieved if this were the case.  It appears more likely that key
escrow chips will be available only to companies that agree to employ
them in approved ways.  Probably this will be done by using existing
regulatory machinery (called the Type II Commercial COMSEC Endorsement
Program) that requires the manufacturers to submit their designs to
NSA for approval.

     Were this to happen, the nation's computer manufacturers would be
trapped in a regulatory web more confining than any we have seen so
far.  If we at Sun were required by customers' needs to communicate
with the government to put the key escrow chip on the mother board of
our machine and by regulations to have the board design approved, the
government would have effective control of our development cycle.  One of
the requirements that would likely be imposed in these circumstances
would be that we not offer any other security mechanisms that could be
used to defeat the escrow provisions.  This would mean we could not
even maintain compatibility with our existing product line.

     It seems especially unlikely that customer acceptance of a chip
explicitly designed to provide only partial security could ever be
achieved other than by the coercive force of regulations. Nor does it
seem likely that a system to which the U.S. held the keys would ever
be accepted by more than a handful of other countries.  They do not
need it to achieve security, because an understanding of cryptography
is now global and developing rapidly.

     Faced with a choice between secret U.S. technology known to
embody a compromise and foreign systems of published function that at
least claim not to, customer response seems hardly in doubt.  The
result may give the government a devastating choice: accept the import
of foreign technology, losing both market share and the new law
enforcement capability or forbid the import of foreign cryptographic
systems altogether.  In the latter case, the U.S., currently a leader
in computers and software, seems likely to become a backwater, cut off
from one of the most profitable segments of the global economy.

     Another problem presented by the key escrow technology is cost.
No matter how essential it may be, security is still difficult to sell
and extremely price sensitive.  To require that cryptography not
merely be isolated in hardware (by and large a good security practice)
but that that hardware be a tamper resistant chip entirely dedicated
to one security function will push the prices of many products and
features beyond the reach of their potential markets.  Cryptography
can perfectly safely be embodied in microcode, implemented in cells
incorporated in multi-function chips, or programmed on dedicated, but
standard, microcontrollers at a tiny fraction of the tens of dollars
per chip that Clipper is predicted to cost.


     The effect of giving the government and one or a small number of
companies a monopoly control over an essential technology is also
troubling to contemplate.  The present key escrow chips operate in the
megabit range.  Can companies depend on NSA to have hundred megabit or
gigabit chips available just when they are needed or might U.S.
companies miss critical market windows while they wait for delivery of
parts over which they have no control?  Will there come a time, as
occurred with DES, when NSA wants the standard changed even though
industry still finds it adequate for many applications?  If that
occurs will industry have any recourse but to do what it is told?  And
if this happens who will pay for the conversion?


     Last month, before another committee of Congress, I discussed at
some length the impact that the key escrow proposal could have on
personal freedom, concluding that if it is adopted, we will take a big
step toward a world in which the right of private conversation belongs
only to those rich enough to travel to face to face meetings.  Rather
than repeat those arguments, I have attached my earlier testimony as
an appendix and focus here on a few essential points.

     It is clear that the costs of key escrow will be monumental
whether measured in dollars spent for computers, squandered business
opportunities, or lost liberties.  Even if these costs are accepted,
there remain two questions: can the law enforcement function be
achieved, and is it even necessary?

     In a world in which cryptographic expertise is widespread and
cryptography is readily implemented on small processors, rules seem no
more likely to keep security out of the hands of criminals than export
controls guarantee it will not be available to hostile nations.

     This, however, may not matter.  Despite the concern of law
enforcement that advancing technology will reduce the effectiveness of
wiretaps, that technology has been at least as much a blessing to the
police as a curse.  Even ignoring the contribution of police
communication systems and databases, modern telephone switches make
wiretaps more effective by supplying caller ID in real time under many
circumstances.  In a world in which conspiracies were conducted via
conference calls on secure phones, criminals could never be sure that
one of the participants was not an informer recording everything in
high fidelity without the risk of being caught wearing a body wire.


	Corrections to First Version Given to Congress

line  89 unaware of that ==> unaware that 

line 137 Electronic Frontiers Foundation ==> 
	 Computer Professionals for Social Responsibility

line 181 design cycle ==> development cycle

line 213 implemented in dedicated ==> programmed on dedicated






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Philip Zimmermann <prz@columbine.cgd.ucar.EDU>
Date: Wed, 16 Jun 93 18:06:18 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com (Cypherpunks)
Subject: Need consulting work
Message-ID: <9306170107.AA05669@columbine.cgd.ucar.EDU>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Hello Cypherpunks.  I'm looking for some more consulting work in data security.
Anyone have any leads?  You can respond by email or phone.  Thanks. 

-Philip Zimmermann
303 541-0140





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Giuseppe Cimmino <0005533039@mcimail.com>
Date: Wed, 16 Jun 93 13:13:36 PDT
To: cypherpunks <cypherpunks@toad.com>
Subject: YAA (yet another article)
Message-ID: <95930616191659/0005533039ND2EM@mcimail.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


PC Week - June 14, 1993

"Clipper security scheme criticized"

By Kimberly Patch

A proposed National Security Agency standard for voice and data encryption is
not winning votes among U.S. executives concerned with security issues.

Executives attending hearings held by the federal Computer Systems Security and
Privacy Advisory Board earlier this month said the proposed Clipper chip
encryption standard does not meet their technical or export needs.

Under the Clipper guidelines, PCs would be outfitted with a board that contains
the encryption chip, while the U.S. government would be privy to a pair of
software "escrow keys" used to unlock the encryption.

Although the Clipper chip uses an 80-bit encryption scheme, executives said it
would be more expensive and slower than more popular software encryption
schemes.  Moreover, some expressed concern about its security since NSA is
keeping the details of how it works secret.

"Why would any law-abiding corporation buy equipment that has escrow keys that
[allow] the government to [decrypt information] whenever they want without
telling the corporation?" asked Ed Zeitler, a vice president at Fidelity
Investments, a financial-services firm in Boston.

An NSA spokeswoman in Fort Meade, MD., defended the scheme, claiming the keys
would be protected and law-enforcement agencies would have to go through a
formal legal process to decrypt messages.  "People will only have access if they
have a legal need for it," she said.

Corporate users, however, objected. "[The government] wants [the Clipper
standard] to be widely used so that law-enforcement people can listen in on
things that are used by criminals," said Steven Walker, president of Trusted
Information Systems, Inc., a Boston software company. "The criminals will find
some other way to do it, which is the irony of this.  It's not going to
accomplish what [that government] wants, no matter what."

One problem with today's encryption business is that U.S. firms are restrained
from exporting software that offers powerful encryption capabilities, the
executives said.

Currently, U.S. firms can only export products that use a 40-bit key, which
would take a fast computer about two and a half weeks to crack, said Zeitler. 
By contrast, the Data Encryption Standard -- a 56-bit key scheme not approved
for export -- would take the same computer 2,200 years to crack, while the
proposed Clipper chip, an 80-bit scheme, would take even longer.






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: wcs@anchor.ho.att.com
Date: Wed, 16 Jun 93 20:29:16 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Digital Cash$$$$
Message-ID: <9306170234.AA14426@anchor.ho.att.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text


J. Michael Diehl asks:
> 1. How does one start a digital cash economy?  How is the initial distribution
> of currency done?  This is, of course, assuming the technical stuff is taken
> care of.

Issuing digital cash is easy - the problem is getting someone to take it :-)
Other than anonymity, the problems of starting a digicash exchange economy
are pretty similar to those of starting any other private money system -
governments avoid the problem by pointing guns at people (i.e. issuing
fiat currency and making legal tender laws), and commodity money systems
mostly avoid it by using a commodity people care about as a standard
(gold, silver, cordwood, tobacco, etc. - doesn't have to be fixed value),
but everybody else has to solve it somehow.

(The other main issue, which someone brought up, is whether there are
applicable laws like banking law or taxable transaction reporting laws
that may require you to get permits or let regulators regulate you or whatever,
which vary from country to country, and also depend on how you define
and manage your digicash accounts.)

My current involvement in token-based currencies, aside from government fiat,
includes NJ parkway toll tokens, which went up in value when the toll went up,
Washington DC Metro tickets, which aren't redeemable for anything,
and Joe's Coffee Money at work.  Joe prints it on the Macintosh,
there's a box of them on the counter, you leave a dollar when you take more,
the coffee's ok, profits pay for new hardware and occasional free days,
and unlike the bozos who run New Jersey's highways and Arts Center,
Joe's a guy you can trust :-)
	
One way to get people to accept your digicash is to use it for convenient
anonymous payment for a service, like highway tolls or subway fares,
or anonymous remailer payments.  Essentially, you're getting a group of
vendors together, selling digibucks for cash, and distributing the cash
among the vendors according to the digibucks they've received.
It's not much different from other systems using tokens.
As long as the vendors agree to accept tokens at the current value
for an extended period of time, you don't risk much.

If you ran a barter club using tokens, you could do it with digicash;
the problem then is how to agree on when tokens will be generated,
and by whom.  One solution that would be readily accepted is to
only issue tokens in return for real cash or other valuable commodities.
This means everybody knows that a digibuck is worth a buck, and
has a reasonable expectation that the currency won't be inflated away.
For commodities, some reasonable valuation needs to be done.
(ObMovieReference - the poker game in "Benny and Joon" is marvelous :-)

For payment for services, it's tougher - the demand side of your market
depends on how much money is floating around as well as how many people
want your services, and a market that's too small won't be able to 
generate much.  On the other hand, unless there's some way for people
to perform services that become part of the bank's assets and available
to creditors, it shouldn't issue more digibucks to pay for them;
that's inflating the currency merely for the bank's benefit.

Another way to start a digicash system is as a credit card analogue,
where the bank bills the customers later and only has enough cash backing
to cover the float, but that's not much different from a cash-based system
except that in a pay-first cash system, it's possible for the digibank
to invest the cash in an external investment, with the usual issues
of risk, liquidity, etc. that normal banks have, only the account balances
exist as digibucks in people's digiwallets instead of ledger entries
in the bank's computer.

> 2. Is digital cash supposed to be backed by actual cash on deposit at the bank?
Or by a promise of future services from vendors hired by the bank
(presumably for real cash), if the customers find that acceptable,
but that's essentially backed by the bank's negotiable assets, including cash.

> 3. How would one "get out" of such an economy if he wanted to?
The ideal way is by spending all your digicash, either for the
Collect the system service / product if it's a vendor-based system,
or for services or products sold by other members.
It's somewhat of a system failure to redeem your digicash for paper cash,
unless the system is basically intended as a payment system,
in which case it's fine.
Or abandon your investment, or sue.

> 4. If DC is to be backed by actual cash, is this really such a good idea?

I once knew someone who had invested in a bank-like system that denominated
its accounts in gold rather than fiat currency, and paid its depositors
in gold on demand.  It also paid interest, which should have been a clue....
It eventually collapsed, and turned out to be a semi-scam; 
it had invested most of its money in high-yield, high-risk stocks 
(South African gold mines,mainly, which were actually doing quite well in 1980),
and when it folded he had to file SEC complaints and sue them in Federal court 
to get them to distribute the stocks to their creditors instead of
distributing stock in a worthless subsidiary company that it had formed to take
over the assets.  He was successful, so he lost a lot less than he could have,
but being a hard-money paranoid isn't all it's cracked up to be :-(

				Bill




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: mbriceno@ideath.goldenbear.com (Marc Briceno)
Date: Wed, 16 Jun 93 23:22:08 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Need hard Clipper data
Message-ID: <yNX05B1w164w@ideath.goldenbear.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I am representing the anti-clipper side in an ongoing debate in the "Wired " 
conference on OneNet. The governmental lemmings question the existence of 
the "Law Enforcement Exploitation Field" and want citations. Would the 
person who posted the hard facts about Clipper please send me all the info?
Thanks in advance,

-Marc Briceno    PGP public key




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: CWHITCOM@bentley.edu
Date: Thu, 17 Jun 93 10:13:18 PDT
To: cpsr-members@eff.org (cpsr-members mailing list)
Subject: help on hacking
Message-ID: <01GZGPCWLN32000911@bentley.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


This is a followup to a request I sent around last week.  I have a bit more
information now.  The request is from a major news organization that is 
working on a project concerning privacy.  They are interested in how one
gains access to private and public databases, security measures, etc.  If
you are interested in helping out, please contact tye@nws.globe.com.
Coralee
By the way, don't forget the Computers and Social Change Conference this
Friday and Saturday at Roxbury Community College.  There is a wide variety
of workshops offered as well as lunch.  For more information call Marlene
Archer at 617-252-0600.





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: M..Stirner@f28.n125.z1.FIDONET.ORG (M. Stirner)
Date: Thu, 17 Jun 93 09:06:27 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: yaa (yet another arti
Message-ID: <475.2C208FF7@shelter.FIDONET.ORG>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



 Uu> --Dave (trying to give some extra business to the anonymous
 Uu> remailers).

I'd love to, but there hasn't been any sort of an updated description of
the address syntax posted here since I got back on this list.

I'd be thrilled if someone could post a current how-to for the
remailers, or at least send it to me at the following address:

*********************************************************************
* <m..stirner@f28.n125.z1.fidonet.org> - PGP Key D30909 via servers *
* > What country can preserve its liberties if its rulers are not  <*
* > warned from time to time that their people preserve the spirit <*
* > of resistance?  Let them take arms!" - Thomas Jefferson, 1787  <*
*********************************************************************


___ Blue Wave/QWK v2.12
--  
M. Stirner - via FidoNet node 1:125/1
UUCP: ...!uunet!kumr!shelter!28!M..Stirner
INTERNET: M..Stirner@f28.n125.z1.FIDONET.ORG




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: J. Michael Diehl <mdiehl@triton.unm.edu>
Date: Wed, 16 Jun 93 23:31:08 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Weak stenography.
Message-ID: <9306170631.AA19575@triton.unm.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Recent discussion reguarding court-requested plaintext has made if obvious that
data conceilment techniques need to be developed before real privacy can be 
obtained.
 
For the sake of discussion, lets define "weak stenography" as any data-hiding 
techinique which will fool all but the "informed and skilled" intruder.  For
example, hiding encrypted data in "hidden" files in msdog would qualify as
(very) weak stenography.  By "informed," I mean that the intruder has reason
to think that you are hiding something.  "Skilled" simply means that the 
intruder has the needed skills to find and verify anything you might be hiding.
 
Now, lets say some LEA thought you had plotted to (your favorite crime here.)
And that they also suspected that you had encrypted all of the needed evidence.
Further, that you had hidden the data, but couldn't prove it.  In order for them
to get you to produce that plaintext, they would have to be able to prove that
you actually had such data.  The only way that I can think of for them to prove
such a thing is to produce a piece of cyphertext, and prove that it is, indeed,
cyphertext.  Further, they would have to prove that it belongs to you.  So, if
the data is hidden, they have to find it before they can compel you to decrypt 
it.  Now for a proposal:
 
Lets say we have to binary files, one that is an executable, and the other some
type of (pgp?) encrypted file.  We take these two files and put the cyphertext
on the end of the executable, and encode the length of the the cyphertext at 
the end of the resulting file.  Now, lets say that we had xor'ed the cyphertext
with some string before we did the concatenation.
 
The file-size-change would be a sure tip-off, if the LEA had another copy of 
the executable to compare with, so assume they don't.  Looking at the file with 
a binary editor would reveal nothing.  Since the cyphertext was transformed, 
running the decrypter program on the file would be fruitless.  Disassembling
the executable might, to the real skilled, reveal something, so we can assume
this is what happens.  After this much work, the LEA has some kind of binary
file which they now have to tie to you and prove that it contains some kind of
message.  BTW, you can always claim to have downloaded it from somewhere....
Now they need to figure out how you transformed your cyphertext, if they even
think of that.  Lets say they figure out how you did it.  Now they have to find
what string you used in the xor process.  Give that such a string might be about
6 ascii characters, they have to look at 64^6 different strings; each time 
through, they have to run the decryption program to see if it recognizes the
cyphertext.  If they can do one such examination per second, this process will 
take 2.2 years!  And when their done, they still have to prove you put the
message there in the first place.  Bummer.  ;^)
 
Is there something wrong with my reasoning?  Does this sound plausable.  Would
it be as effective as I envision?  Comments are welcome.  If the response is
favorable, I will try to get it coded in (portable?) C and release it.
 
+-----------------------+-----------------------------+---------+
| J. Michael Diehl ;-)  | I thought I was wrong once. | PGP KEY |
| mdiehl@triton.unm.edu |   But, I was mistaken.      |available|
| mike.diehl@fido.org   |                             | Ask Me! |
| (505) 299-2282        +-----------------------------+---------+
|                                                               |
+------"I'm just looking for the opportunity to be -------------+
|            Politically Incorrect!"   <Me>                     |
+-----If codes are outlawed, only criminals wil have codes.-----+
+----Is Big Brother in your phone?  If you don't know, ask me---+




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: J. Michael Diehl <mdiehl@triton.unm.edu>
Date: Wed, 16 Jun 93 23:54:47 PDT
To: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Subject: Re: Weak stenography.
In-Reply-To: <9306170647.AA09320@netcom3.netcom.com>
Message-ID: <9306170654.AA19944@triton.unm.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


According to Timothy C. May:
> > (very) weak stenography.  By "informed," I mean that the intruder has reason
> 
> I dislike spelling flames, but you consistently misspelled
> "steganography" as "stenography," which is what a secretary does.
> 
> Thought you might want to watch out for this in future postings.

You may dislike them, but I sure appreciate it.  Thanx.  I can do a lot of 
things; spelling isn't one of them.
+-----------------------+-----------------------------+---------+
| J. Michael Diehl ;-)  | I thought I was wrong once. | PGP KEY |
| mdiehl@triton.unm.edu |   But, I was mistaken.      |available|
| mike.diehl@fido.org   |                             | Ask Me! |
| (505) 299-2282        +-----------------------------+---------+
|                                                               |
+------"I'm just looking for the opportunity to be -------------+
|            Politically Incorrect!"   <Me>                     |
+-----If codes are outlawed, only criminals wil have codes.-----+
+----Is Big Brother in your phone?  If you don't know, ask me---+



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: hkhenson@cup.portal.com
Date: Thu, 24 Jun 93 00:05:33 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Timothy C. May:superhacker
Message-ID: <9306170149.1.15731@cup.portal.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


A lot of people are afraid to ask if the goverment keeps files on them--
because they would be disapointed to find out that they have never done
anything to warrant the government opening a file on them.  I have never
asked the feds, but I had an interesting experience with what a reporter
had been given suposedly from a local police file.  During a time I was
starting a business (and had no time for such nonsense even if I had been
so inclined) they had me pegged as the leader of a local group of eco
terriorist who were buring down houses to contain "urban sprawl."  I
felt the file (I did not get a copy) was real, because I could remember
a few things from several years previous I had done while under survailance,
but, gad, I didn't even *know* any of the bozos who were eventually
caught.  At least in that case, the quality of the data in my file
was complete nonsense.  Keith




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "George A. Gleason" <gg@well.sf.ca.us>
Date: Thu, 17 Jun 93 03:21:59 PDT
To: jazz@hal.com
Subject: Re: YAA (yet another article)
Message-ID: <93Jun17.032128pdt.13971-1@well.sf.ca.us>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Re your "I like this ("Oh My God" proposal for tap authorisations): THis
gives us a possibly interesting place to start from.  Sponsor and lobby for
(etc) new legislation which would update the existing wiretap laws to
include the Oh My God! standard.  The point being to put that standard in
place & let it run in test mode for a while to see how it works.  

If it works out well in practice, and isnt subject to "venue abuse" (judge
shopping), then it could be extended to key escrow systems.  However, I
still have a strong preference that even an "improved" key escrow system be
implemented via the free market and make provision for free choice in
cyphers.  

-gg




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: mlshew@dixie.com (Mark Shewmaker)
Date: Thu, 17 Jun 93 05:37:13 PDT
To: mlshew@dixie.com
Subject: Rude CryptoStacker Suggestion (LONG)
Message-ID: <m0o6EiV-0000BaC@dixie.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Earlier I talked about some amiga programs I had that did compression
and encryption.  I've uploaded some to soda.  As I've said, most of
them are amiga-specific, but of course the encryption-only bits of
code can still be educational to other-machine users.

If not, Eric can erase them, or not make them public, which is of
course okay.  It's his site and all that.

I figured I'd go through these files here to explain a bit of what
they are and do, if nothing else, with liberal amounts of plagiarism
from the readme files.  This should at least prevent people from
downloading interesting sounding titles for nothing.

First, the list of files.  Although I don't know where they'll end up,
The full list of things I uploaded are:

*************************************************
*
*  rdes.lha               25K   DES encryption program
*  idea.lha               31K   File encryption tool using IDEA
*  Crypt.device-1.8.lha   23K   Crypting handler
*  crypdisk.zoo           55K   Sector oriented disk encryption
*  xpk25dev.lha          141K   Compression package, developer's additions
*  xpk25usr.lha          215K   Compression package, user's edition
*  XFH134.lha            135K   (De-)compressing handler, uses Xpk.
*  xPack_1.5.lha           9K   OS 2.x Shell Interface for XPK
*
*************************************************

Now for the individual descriptions:

*************************************************
*
*  rdes.lha               25K   Another DES encryption program
*
*************************************************

Any collection of encryption programs should of course include
a version of DES, so I'll start off with one.  The following
is taken from the RDES man file.  Note the -x option.

***********
*
*  The usage for RDES is
*
*     RDES [-e | -d] [-x] [-b] [-m mode] [-k key] [in_file [out_file]]
*
*  where:
*
*  -e => encrypt the file (default)
*  -d => decrypt the file
*
*  -x => add n random bytes to the end of the file, where n is
*        a random integer between 0 and 7 inclusive (used in
*        encryption mode only).
*
*  -b => use straight DES (default is to use cipher block chaining).
*  -m => set `mode' bits (see below for details).
*  -k => set key string
*
***********



*************************************************
*
*  idea.lha               31K   File encryption tool using IDEA
*
*************************************************

This is another one that should be easily recompilable on
multiple platforms--it's straight C, and it even includes the
original unix code.

It is small, does IDEA encryption/decryption, and that's all.

Here's the top of idea.doc.  If it looks interesting you'll
probably just want to get it anyway.

***********
*
*  NAME
*       idea - encrypt and decrypt using IDEA
*
*  SYNOPSIS
*       idea [ -e | -d ] [ -ecb | -cbcN | -cfbN | -ofbN ]
*            ( -k keyString | -K keyHexString )
*            [ inputFile [ ouputFile ] ]
*
*       idea [ -h | -H ] [ -tan | -abr ]
*            [ -k keyString | -K keyHexString ]
*            [ inputFile [ [ ouputFile ] hashvalFile ]
*
***********


*************************************************
*
*  Crypt.device-1.8.lha     23K   Crypting handler
*
*************************************************

This is a device driver that you can use to mount an encrypting
virtual partition as a file in top of an existing AmigaDos device.
It says it's based on fdev.device -- "filesystem in a file".  You can
edit the virtual partition parameters however you want (such as
sectors/cylinders/filesystem etc.)

The encryption method is IDEA in cbc mode, which is written
in 68000 assembly.

*************************************************
*
*  crypdisk.zoo             55K   sector oriented disk encryption
*
*************************************************

This is a sector based disk- (or AmigaDos device-) based encryption
program.  It works a bit differently from crypt-device, and also uses
a 68000 handcoded IDEA algorithm, and it's not limited to cbc mode.
It's a modification of the xpkIDEA library assembler source which will
be mentioned in the next section.

*************************************************
*
*  xpk25dev.lha          141K   Compression package, developer's additions
*  xpk25usr.lha          215K   Compression package, user's edition
*  XFH134.lha            135K   (De-)compressing handler, uses Xpk.
*  xPack_1.5.lha           9K   OS 2.x Shell Interface for XPK
*
*************************************************
*
*  Note: The bottom two files are updates to subparts of the top two.
*        (Obviously, I didn't want to modify the original distribution.)
*
*************************************************

The easiest way for me to describe the xpk???.lha files is to cheat,
and mostly just include the overview file.  Here it is, with a lot
of deletions:  (Including the list of way-cool authors.)

***********
*
* THE XPK DATA COMPRESSION PACKAGE
* ================================
*
*
* 1. What is XPK
* --------------
*
* For a long time, there have been various compression programs for different
* purposes on the Amiga. But every application supported only one compressor,
* and most compressors were only supported by one application. XPK wants to
* put an end to this: Every application with XPK interface can use very packer
* with XPK interface. An XPK packer is a library with a four letter library
* name.
*
*
* 3. XPK-Compressors
* ------------------
*
* First a general overview of the most important packers and crypters and
* their uses.

  [...]

* - FEAL encrypts data at reasonable speed with very high safety, ie. it has
*   not yet been broken in the higher-round modes. Any kind of private data
*   is safe in the hands of FEAL.

===>  [Is this still true?]

===>  [Also: On the chart below, A3000 means a 25Mhz 68030 machine.]

* Now for the complete overview of all existing compressors. You may not have
* all of them. The meaning of the fields:
*
* Name: 4 letter name of the packer.
* CSpd: Compression speed in K/sec on an A3000
* USpd: Decompression speed in K/sec on an A3000
* CF  : Compression factor in %
* Mo  : This packer supports modes
* Cry : This packer can encrypt
* Desc: Description of the packer
*
* Name CSpd USpd CF Mo Cry Desc
* ---- ---- ---- -- -- --- ----
* BLZW  139  364 32  +  -  Fast compression & decompression, usable CF
* CBR0  410 1918  3  -  -  Byte run encoding, only for simple files (Gfx)
* DLTA  104 1265  -  -  -  Pre-processor for packing of sound samples
* ENCO  393  393  -  -  +  Sample library for cryptors
* FEAL  109  109  -  +  +  Encryption with selectable safety
* HUFF   88  138 24  -  -  Huffman coding, low CF and speed
* IDEA   90   90  -  +  +  Safe Encryption, not too fast, many variations
* IMPL    6  280 44  +  -  Imploder, good CF, slow compression, fast decomp
* NONE 1918 2477  0  -  -  Do-nothing packer
* NUKE   36  630 45  -  -  Very fast decompression, good CF & fast compression
* RLEN  170 1351  4  -  -  Sample library for packers
* SHRI    5    9 52  +  -  Excellent CF but low speed
* VERN  861  874  -  -  +  Less safe but very fast Vernam encryption
* ---- ---- ---- -- -- --- ----
*
* Also, XPK supports powerpacker.library for decompression.
*
***********

Note that there are multiple encrypting "compressors" there, including
a blank one for an example.

The distribution also contains two handlers to allow one to use
these compression/encryption libraries transparently instead of
semi-explicitly.

One of these, XFH, (the one that Urban mentions), has been upgraded
since this distribution.  The latest version of which I am aware is
1.34, so I uploaded XFH134.lha also.

Now to discuss some of the individual encryption libraries within
this XPK distribution.

I recall people having asked about what the speed of doing on-the-fly
encryption would be.  For Vernam encryption (Has anyone heard of this???),
not only are the benchmarks not included but neither is the library
nor the docs.  Maybe the author didn't contact Urban for inclusion in
the master archive, I dunno, I don't even have an xpkVERN.library.

However, I do have numbers for FEAL and IDEA.  Here are the speeds for
the FEAL encryption, from a speed chart from its docfile. (I believe
this is for a 25Mhz 68030 machine.)

***********
*
*           Speed and Memoryusage
*           ---------------------
*
*  Rounds   Memory   En-/Decryptioncryption
*           Usage            Speed
*  ------   ------   ----------------------
*       4       1K           190 K/sec
*       8       1K           144 K/sec
*      16       1K            96 K/sec
*      32       1K            58 K/sec
*      64       1K            33 K/sec
*
***********


Here are the IDEA speeds:

***********
*
*  The xpkIDEA implementation uses the following XPK modes for different
*  encryption methods:
*
*  XPK Mode        Encr. Method    Nr. States      68030/25        68000/7.14
*  --------        ------------    ----------      --------        ----------
*   0..25          ECB             /               90 K/s          12 K/s
*  --------------------------------------------------------------------------
*   26             CFB             1
*    .              .              .               87 K/s          11 K/s
*    .              .              .
*   50             CFB             25
*  --------------------------------------------------------------------------
*   51             OFB             1
*    .              .              .               84 K/s          11 K/s
*    .              .              .
*   75             OFB             25
*  --------------------------------------------------------------------------
*   76             CBC             1
*    .              .              .               84 K/s          11 K/s
*    .              .              .
*   100            CBC             25
*  --------------------------------------------------------------------------
*
***********

Rather obvious possibilities for those wanting to do similar things
on other machines:

o  Forget it, your machines are inferior pieces of... Oh sorry, I'm
   supposed to be being polite.  Scratch that.

o  Scavenge source code from some of the above packages and use it
   in the skeletons of DOS 'redirectors' (?)

o  Go the whole way and implement the XPK standard on other machines.
   (You might want to bring get with Urban and the others though.
   By the way, when quoting sections of the XPK overview, I didn't
   inlcude the partial author list of nine people.  Anyone interested
   in these projects do have lots of other people to talk with about
   the standard.)

o  Disassociate from the mediocritins and.. oops, there I go again.

And finally,

o  Keep part of your mind still thinking about standards for secure
   data links.  I have my own ideas on the subject, which should
   translate to other machines mostly.  They are as follows:  On the
   amiga, I think it would be best to write a driver one would use
   instead of the default of serial.device or whoever, to handle the
   encryption.  It would then call serial.device or whoever to actually
   transmit the data.  The advantage here is the modularity of having
   any terminal program work with this device driver, so you could
   at any time bring up its window on the workbench screen or a public
   screen, to adjust its parameters in a way independent of whatever
   terminal programs you might have running, if need be, or controlled
   with ARexx scripts or from other programs.  The neat parts here are
   that (a), it could do compression as it goes, too, but more
   importantly, (b), it would be transparent to any other binary transfer
   protocol you'd be useing, except for speed.  (Although it could somewhat
   make up for that by making them slightly more efficient--seeing as the
   encrypting device would have to do it's own error checking, dynamic
   transfer protocols used by the term programs would tend to use larger
   and larger window sizes), and (c) this could be standardized across
   machines, so it would also be neat if (d) the standard allowed for
   multiple concurrent sessions transparently, as well as file transfers,
   all dynamically configurable.  (Not just multiple resident invocation
   of the same code, but one link turned into 12, like uwm, or dnet on
   amigas and unix.)

   (I'm almost making it into a terminal program itself.)

   One of the main things would be to make it very transparent to the
   other programs running--so that even if you were on some weird (but
   somewhat secure) network, you could run a program on this standard
   between your telnet on your machine and it's connection to the network.
   (I may be speaking nonsense here.)  Whether you were really using
   kermit, telnet, ftp, or zmodem, the underlying connection would be
   secure.

   Anyway, I was just thinking that this might be especially cool if it
   were compatible across platforms.  I figured I'd share those
   thoughts with any others thinking about secure links, to help
   maximize the spread of ideas.

   (And then Timothy Newsham uploads something along those lines
   even before I can post this.  Sheesh!  Okay, here's a way to
   make money by taking bets on this phenomenon:  Pick a random
   person and a cypherpunk, and let them race, with the random
   person describing a neat program he'd like to have, and the
   cypherpunk writing it.  I'd place my bets on the cypherpunk
   finishing first.  :-) )

Hoping to add to the general confusion,

-Mark Shewmaker




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Paul Goggin <chaos@aql.gatech.edu>
Date: Thu, 17 Jun 93 02:35:39 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com (Cryptoanarchists are Us)
Subject: Binaries
Message-ID: <9306170935.AA17555@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



In order to equalize, what may be construed as a growing disparity between
ripem and pgp availability (i.e. ripem binaries being kept online for ftp).
I have taken upon myself to start collecting binaries for PGP. If you would
be kind enough to email me if you would like to offer any binaries. I will
check against what I already have and get back to you for retrieval. Please
enclose your OS and sytem type (pretty much referring to UNIX here).

For instance,
-r--r--r--   1 ftp      guest     252829 Jun 17 05:05 pgp-hp720-8.07.Z
-r--r--r--   1 ftp      guest     166958 Jun 17 05:00 pgp-ibm-rs6000-3.1.Z


Paul
--
R  O    All Comments Copyright by  | Technofetisht
 A  N     Paul S. Goggin (1993)    | Cypher, Cyber, Chaos              
  V        Information Broker      | Ergoflux, Interzone
   E      chaos@aql.gatech.edu     | Carpe Diem: Stop the Clipper wiretap chip 
Finger account for latest _Phrack_ | Public Key: PGP and RIPEM available
      For anonymous communication:---> anonymus+4744@charcoal.com
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Title 18 USC 2511 and 18 USC 2703 Protected -- Monitoring Absolutely Forbidden




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Stanton McCandlish <anton@hydra.unm.edu>
Date: Thu, 17 Jun 93 07:10:10 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Jimbo B. responds again!
Message-ID: <9306171409.AA13003@hydra.unm.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Faced with the "charge" of selling out the govt, by "supporting Clipper"
(more specifically for granting a license to them to use RSA's patented
encryption in the key escrow scheme [as far as I can tell; I don't read
legalese too well]), RSADSI/PKP's head Jim Bidzos responds thusly:

Quoth Jim Bidzos, verily I saith unto thee:

> From jim@RSA.COM Wed Jun 16 15:37:37 1993
> 	id <AA12154>; Wed, 16 Jun 1993 15:37:34 -0600
> Date: Wed, 16 Jun 93 14:35:49 PDT
> From: jim@RSA.COM (Jim Bidzos)
> Message-Id: <9306162135.AA17052@RSA.COM>
> To: anton@hydra.unm.edu
> In-Reply-To: Stanton McCandlish's message of Wed, 16 Jun 1993 13:26:42 -0600 (MDT) <9306161926.AA06434@hydra.unm.edu>
> Subject: hmph
> 
> 
> Well, I don't know where these things get discussed, but you can
> certainly feel free to resend or post my email to you. I'm genuinely
> confused, as I believe the situation is as simple as I put it to you.
> Our claims of patent infringement by DSS, made over the last 18
> months, were well-known and publicized.  NIST has capitulated.  Seems
> pretty straightforward to me.
> 
> BTW, on Clipper, ATT, Motorola, IBM could have done Clipper without
> ever talking to us.  Contrary to popular belief, we don't dictate
> terms to licensees.  So, with their RSA or Diffie-Hellman licenses,
> these companies could have simply replaced DES with Clipper
> (continuing to use RSA for Clipper key management) and supported
> Clipper without ever talking to us.  (In fact, I believe this is
> exactly what ATT did, as they had a DH/DES phone before they "joined"
> the Clipper club.)  Clipper will not fail or succeed because of any
> Public-key patent license.  It will go away simply because it was
> ill-conceived, ill-timed, and undesirable.
> 
> 
> --Jim
> 


-- 
Stanton  McCandlish   * Space Migration * Networking * ChaOrder * NO GOV'T. *
anton@hydra.unm.edu   * Intelligence Increase * Nano * Crypto * NO RELIGION *
FidoNet:    1:301/2   * Life Extension * Ethics * VR * Now! * NO MORE LIES! *
Noise in the Void BBS * +1-505-246-8515   (24hr, 1200-14400, v32bis, N-8-1) *



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Timothy Newsham <newsham@wiliki.eng.hawaii.edu>
Date: Thu, 17 Jun 93 11:20:22 PDT
To: jka@ECE.CMU.EDU (Jay Adams)
Subject: Re: fast des
In-Reply-To: <9306171547.AA02951@mustang.ece.cmu.edu>
Message-ID: <9306171820.AA03851@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> 
> If you were interested in cracking DES, I wonder if you couldn't just
> build the hardware out of FPGAs.  That way, you could make key loading
> and the decrypted data test fast as well.
> 
> - Jay
> 
I tried this on the xilinx 3090 chip.  The tools to handle palasm
didnt seem to be designed to handle a job that size, I had to split
up the file into 3 sub parts (S boxes, key scheduler and everything
else).  I never got it completed but judging by some of the output
I got, it wouldnt have fit on the 3090, which is quite a big
FPGA.  The implementation is straight forward, but there is alot
of juggling you have to do to put it on a 3090 since the S boxes
are slightly bigger than the CLB's tables, and you end up wasting
alot of space when you just need a bunch of xor gates (2 xor's
per CLB, and you need alot of XORs).  Implementation with
standard cell technology would probably be very easy, and
save alot of space too.
(routing the thing is another problem too, since there are
so many permutations,  I am not sure if a near-full-capacity
FPGA would be able to route all the permutations)
                        Tim





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Eric Hughes <hughes@soda.berkeley.edu>
Date: Thu, 17 Jun 93 08:32:17 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: fast des
In-Reply-To: <19930616211451.5.TK@ROCKY.AI.MIT.EDU>
Message-ID: <9306171528.AA29921@soda.berkeley.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>Usually the limiting factor is examining the <ostensibly> decrypted data
>for statistically significant patterns indicating that you have the
>correct key.  

If you know that your plaintext is 7-bit ASCII, then you can reject if
you see too many 8th bits set.  Assuming that the size of your
intercepted ciphertexts is generous, say ten blocks, then the
likelihood of a false decryption which has all the 8th bits off is
extremely small.  Hint for implementors: don't allow such easy bit
correlations in your plaintext.

In any case, the point of a DES cracker is to reduce the size of the
space of probable decryptions, so that more computationally expensive
statistical tests of possible plaintexts may be performed on a shorter
list.  If your cracker can reduce the size of the probable keyspace by
eight bits, then you can run, in parallel, tests which take 2^8 times
as long.  For example, you may be able to reject many potential
plaintexts from a CBC ciphertext stream after the first block; longer
tests would look at a longer stream.

This is where measures of n-gram distribution really come into their
own.  These measures can distinguish between text types extremely
finely, but are often expensive.  Nevertheless, they are highly suited
to automation, particularly to distinguish between different languages
and to recognize non-linguistic forms such as protocol encapsulations,
object code, and compressed text.

Eric




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: m5@vail.tivoli.com (Mike McNally)
Date: Thu, 17 Jun 93 06:51:32 PDT
To: Duncan Frissell <76630.3577@CompuServe.COM>
Subject: Contempt of court
In-Reply-To: <930617132906_76630.3577_EHK27-1@CompuServe.COM>
Message-ID: <9306171350.AA14019@vail.tivoli.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Duncan Frissell writes:
 > >>>Note that a court could cite you for contempt for not complying
 > >>>with a subpoena duces tecum (a subpoena requiring you to produce objects
 > >>>or documents) if you fail to turn over subpoenaed backups.
 > 
 > Assume that your application is running (mirrored) on five
 > machines ...

I think that Mr. Frissell's suggestion falls into the category of what
I've humbly termed "digital flash paper" mechanisms.  In the days of
yore, numbers runners and gangsters and nefarious bad guys would keep
records on cellulose (?) flash paper which could be ignited and
destroyed very rapidly should Elliot Ness be seen approaching the
front door.

Another (simpler) suggestion made by a friend was to devise
motion-sensitive devices which would cause total corruption of
information stored on a disk if it were moved.

My highly esteemed legal opinion is that this could be considered
criminal obstruction of justice, though as with the contempt of court
issue such a charge might be preferrable to one of Sedition :-)

--
Mike McNally




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Duncan Frissell <76630.3577@CompuServe.COM>
Date: Thu, 17 Jun 93 05:56:02 PDT
To: <cypherpunks@toad.com>
Subject: Re: Digital Cash$$$$
Message-ID: <930617125212_76630.3577_EHK27-1@CompuServe.COM>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



(J. Michael Diehl)

>>>Then DC is actually backed by "legal" currency?  Then, what's to keep 
>>>someone from opening a digital bank, and takeing the money and runing?

Nothing.  Just like the First National City Bank of New York or Bank Leu,
Zurich.  You should deal with someone with a rep and perhaps a history.
Obviously the risk of fraud would be greater with a digital cash issuer 
completely unconnected to an existing financial institution. 

>>>OECD?

The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development.  AKA the rich 
countries (plus Turkey).  The 12 EEC Countries (we can all name them, 
can't we? %{) + Canada, US, Japan, AU, NZ, Iceland, Norway, Sweden, 
Finland, Austria, Switzerland, and Turkey.

>>>Obviously, DC can lead to quite a few opportunities for corruption,
>>>taxes for example.  This will hinder (or help, in Washington D.C! ;^])
>>>the spread of DC.Is there any arguements for DC, to offer to counter 
>>>this major drawback?

That's not a bug that's a *feature*.  Those are the main arguements in 
*favor* of DC.  The main argument that DC can use against D.C. is that 
conventional regulatory techniques have been obsoleted by the nets, 
downsizing effects *all* sorts of institutions not just corporations, and 
the denizens of the District had better start figuring out what they will 
do when they are forced to get honest work.    

Duncan Frissell

Laws are local, communication is universal.






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: jim@RSA.COM (Jim Bidzos)
Date: Thu, 17 Jun 93 09:26:10 PDT
To: anton@hydra.unm.edu
Subject: "RSA sells out" hue and cry
In-Reply-To: <9306171208.AA11770@hydra.unm.edu>
Message-ID: <9306171626.AA20285@RSA.COM>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


 
Re "source" requirements for Clipper: See my last email to you. ATT,
Motorola, etc. are licensed to use RSA and Diffie-Hellman.  They are free 
to use those techniques to manage Clipper keys, as long as they
pay their royalties for those techniques, without any contact with us.
Or perhaps, when we lciensed them back in the mid and late 80's, we
should have limited the use of public key to key management of "future
algorithms we approve of?" 

********************** END FORWARD ***********************************

Draw your own conclusions.  I sure will.

-- 
Stanton  McCandlish   * Space Migration * Networking * ChaOrder * NO GOV'T. *
anton@hydra.unm.edu   * Intelligence Increase * Nano * Crypto * NO RELIGION *
FidoNet:    1:301/2   * Life Extension * Ethics * VR * Now! * NO MORE LIES! *
Noise in the Void BBS * +1-505-246-8515   (24hr, 1200-14400, v32bis, N-8-1) *




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: axelrod@s106.es.llnl.gov (Mike Axelrod 422-0929)
Date: Thu, 17 Jun 93 09:24:41 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Contempt of court
Message-ID: <9306171626.AA23636@s106.es.llnl.gov>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I gather that a court can order you to produce the means to decrypt cyphertext
that the court has ruled is evidence. This would imply that the giving of
the means to decrypt (which could simply be the uttering of a password) is
not considered testimony, because you cannot be forced to give testimony under
the 5th amendment. Is there a court decision on point for this issue. In another
but similar context, can a court order you to give it the combination of a
safe, that contains evidence? I suspect, if that is the case, then there is
no 5th amendment protection against being so ordered to produce the means
to decrypt messages, documents etc.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Duncan Frissell <76630.3577@CompuServe.COM>
Date: Thu, 17 Jun 93 06:33:17 PDT
To: <cypherpunks@toad.com>
Subject: Contempt of court
Message-ID: <930617132906_76630.3577_EHK27-1@CompuServe.COM>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>>>Note that a court could cite you for contempt for not complying
>>>with a subpoena duces tecum (a subpoena requiring you to produce objects
>>>or documents) if you fail to turn over subpoenaed backups.

Assume that your application is running (mirrored) on five machines in 
five different jurisdictions and the machines will lock out one or more 
of their number if they receive a panic code, or one goes offline 
unexpectedly, or is not accessed in exactly the right way, you could 
easily respond to a subpoena duces tecum by stating truthfully that the 
requested records are not (or are no longer) under your control.

The machines themselves can also be protected by careful choice of 
location and judicious use of remailers and requirements that they only 
be accessed by telenetting, etc.

Besides what's the big deal about contempt of court.  If you are worried 
about doing 2 years or less, locate yourself in another jurisdiction.  
No need to expose your body to high risk legal regimes.

Duncan Frissell

"But your Honor, I'm desperately trying to *conceal* my contempt for 
this court."






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Tom Knight <tk@reagan.ai.mit.edu>
Date: Thu, 17 Jun 93 07:18:41 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Contempt of court
In-Reply-To: <930617132906_76630.3577_EHK27-1@CompuServe.COM>
Message-ID: <19930617141632.8.TK@ROCKY.AI.MIT.EDU>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I wouldn't want to encourage anyone to contempt of court, but, strictly
hypothetically, there is a very simple way to answer the request to hand
over keys to encrypted data.  Simply assure that you have a copy of the
encrypted data available, then construct one-time-pad data of the same
length as the encrypted data, such that when the two are XORed, you get
your choice of plaintext.  Hand over the "one time pad."  This argues
powerfully that one might want such one time pads available and in use
even if you are really using a more convenient encryption technology.

Kids: don't do this at home.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Jason Zions <jazz@hal.com>
Date: Thu, 17 Jun 93 08:41:53 PDT
To: "George A. Gleason" <gg@well.sf.ca.us>
Subject: Re: YAA (yet another article)
In-Reply-To: <93Jun17.032128pdt.13971-1@well.sf.ca.us>
Message-ID: <9306171541.AA09044@jazz.hal.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



>  However, I still have a strong preference that even an "improved" key
>escrow system be implemented via the free market and make provision for
>free choice in cyphers.

As do I; I think this is just another part of daily life that the government
has no business being in. As for freedom of choice with respect to privacy
technology, I believe that's a must.

Jason




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: nobody@soda.berkeley.edu
Date: Thu, 17 Jun 93 10:49:12 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Weak steganography
Message-ID: <9306171745.AA05015@soda.berkeley.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

Responding to Mike Diehl's ideas about weak steganography: (Speaking of
which, did anyone notice that there weren't any stegosaurs in Jurassic
Park?  Just another sign of the government crackdown on crypto?)

There are a couple of problems with the idea of sticking encrypted
files onto the end of executable files.  The first is, to make this
easy, you need a program to do it (and to "undo" it).  Well, if someone
steals your computer and gets access to these files, they will probably
also get access to this program.  This will tip them off to what you have
done.

This is an example of the general principle that you need to assume that
your attackers know or can discover the methods you are using, but they
don't know the keys.

Another problem is that encrypted files look different from executable
files.  Encrypted files have a uniform histogram (that is, all 256 different
possible byte values are equally frequent), but exe files do not.  The
appending of an encrypted file to an executable file will be very obvious.
The exact boundary may not be immediately apparent, but it can probably
be narrowed down to ten or twenty words without much effort at all.  In
any case, exe files which have had this treatment will stick out like a
sore thumb.

Last, XOR'ing a PGP file with a repeated string is probably not a very
good method.  PGP has a header at the front whose structure is known and
which has some fixed bytes.  These can be used to immediately recover some
letters of your string.  Given that the string is mnemonic (memorable) it
may be possible to guess more of it.  Again, this is basically effortless
and it narrows down the search space considerably before they even start
to try to break it.

Of course, even if they recover the original PGP file they would then need
your pass phrase to decrypt it.  If you are assuming that they already had
that then they didn't need to go through the rigamarole of deducing the
repeated string which cloaked the PGP file; once they found an executable
with a uniform histogram at the end, along with your program which creates
such files, that should be enough evidence to force you to reveal the string
just as you were forced to reveal your pass phrase.

In sum, I don't think this approach will help much.

Hal Finney
74076.1041@compuserve.com

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.2

iQCVAgUBLCBm8agTA69YIUw3AQFbMAQAqsZE3Zs3oC1RcTqZ+yGDv0uf0avWUI9N
l7Lr+XlOxryu7m7zo7S2knZIjUMa6a0v0EolnpPw/tK0SUkqGwOBrdfkn8BNPIM6
uZe9kzhJJYbc+w+TQqPB8PoVc3ZQ78OAOwyvhdu28KwG6kXLO4mCiX9n6faIDK1I
3G4Ez8v+6Xg=
=F8de
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Stanton McCandlish <anton@hydra.unm.edu>
Date: Thu, 17 Jun 93 10:16:30 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: "RSA sells out" hue and cry (fwd)
Message-ID: <9306171716.AA19271@hydra.unm.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


More from Big Jim at RSA, criticizing the idea that RSA should have
licensed "its" algorithms to NIST only on the condition that they not be
used for clipper/capstone/key escrow and similar schemes

********* Quoth Jim Bidzos, verily I saith unto thee: **************

From cypherpunks-request  Thu Jun 17 09:30:24 1993
Received: by toad.com id AA29434; Thu, 17 Jun 93 09:23:01 PDT
Return-Path: <m5@vail.tivoli.com>
Received: from tivoli.com ([146.84.1.5]) by toad.com id AA29426; Thu, 17 Jun 93 09:22:52 PDT
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	id AA14350; Thu, 17 Jun 93 11:21:26 CDT
Date: Thu, 17 Jun 93 11:21:26 CDT
From: m5@vail.tivoli.com (Mike McNally)
Message-Id: <9306171621.AA14350@vail.tivoli.com>
To: Duncan Frissell <76630.3577@CompuServe.COM>
Cc: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Contempt of court
In-Reply-To: <930617153447_76630.3577_EHK50-1@CompuServe.COM>
References: <930617153447_76630.3577_EHK50-1@CompuServe.COM>


Duncan Frissell writes:
 > I call it a network operating system designed to cope with local security
 > breaches.  I am not required by law to keep business records in any
 > particular jurisdiction.  I am not even required to have access to
 > everything in a business with which I am connected.

Of course you're likely to be right; my Highly Esteemed legal opinion
is worth about as much as the electrons transmitting it. 

 > But a charge of Sedition is such a rare honor ...
 >                                                  Besides, if the system is



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Duncan Frissell <76630.3577@CompuServe.COM>
Date: Thu, 17 Jun 93 08:44:22 PDT
To: <cypherpunks@toad.com>
Subject: Contempt of court
Message-ID: <930617153447_76630.3577_EHK50-1@CompuServe.COM>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>>>I think that Mr. Frissell's suggestion falls into the category of what
>>>I've humbly termed "digital flash paper" mechanisms.
>>>My highly esteemed legal opinion is that this could be considered
>>>criminal obstruction of justice
 
I call it a network operating system designed to cope with local security
breaches.  I am not required by law to keep business records in any
particular jurisdiction.  I am not even required to have access to
everything in a business with which I am connected.
 
>>>such a charge might be preferrable to one of Sedition :-)<<<
 
But a charge of Sedition is such a rare honor.  It's tough to get the Feds
to bring one.  One Sedition trial during WWII and one against White
Supremicists a few years back.  Feds lost both.  Besides, if the system is
run by non-Americans outside of the US, sedition can't apply (can it? - no
treason certainly).
 
(Mike McNally)
 
Duncan Frissell
 





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: nobody@rosebud.ee.uh.edu
Date: Thu, 17 Jun 93 09:42:42 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Subject lines for remailers
Message-ID: <9306171642.AA00115@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Another way in which incoming and outgoing messages can be linked up
in a remailer is the Subject line.  Most of the remailers keep this the
same for incoming and outgoing messages.

Most of the remailers also have the ability to let the user change the
subject line as it goes through the remailer.  My "chain" program which
I put on soda lets you set the subject line but only in the last remailer
of the chain (so that it goes to the destination with the right subject).
If more people did that and we also adopted the convention of not having
a subject line at all for the mail up to that point, then all mail through
the remailers would have no subject and it would all look the same.

(Actually, my mailer won't conveniently let me have no subject, so I would
either have to have a blank subject or some default string.)

Hal Finney
74076.1041@compuserve.com





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Jay Adams <jka@ece.cmu.edu>
Date: Thu, 17 Jun 93 08:48:07 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: fast des
In-Reply-To: <19930616211451.5.TK@ROCKY.AI.MIT.EDU>
Message-ID: <9306171547.AA02951@mustang.ece.cmu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



>    I don't know of any 2.4 gbps DES chips, but DEC has built a 1 gbps
>    chip.
>   ....  Key-loading is a different operation,
>    and that might not go nearly as fast.  Any hardware assists (i.e., DMA)
>    would be for the data, not for the next key to use on the same block of
>    data.
>
> Usually the limiting factor is examining the <ostensibly> decrypted data
> for statistically significant patterns indicating that you have the
> correct key.  The fast DES chips don't help with this at all.  A known
> plaintext attack, of course, doesn't have this problem, but these are
> probably of limited interest in real applications.

If you were interested in cracking DES, I wonder if you couldn't just
build the hardware out of FPGAs.  That way, you could make key loading
and the decrypted data test fast as well.

- Jay




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Date: Thu, 17 Jun 93 12:00:26 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Weak stegosaurs
In-Reply-To: <9306171745.AA05015@soda.berkeley.edu>
Message-ID: <9306171900.AA27241@netcom3.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Hal Finney writes:

> Responding to Mike Diehl's ideas about weak steganography: (Speaking of
> which, did anyone notice that there weren't any stegosaurs in Jurassic
> Park?  Just another sign of the government crackdown on crypto?)

No, the stegosaurs were not in the Jurassic Era...they were in the
*Cryptozoic* Era. At least according to my copy of PGP ("Pretty Good
Paleontology").
 

-Tim

(P.S. I wonder what kind of DNA they'll get from the "Nine Princes in
Amber"?)


-- 
..........................................................................
Timothy C. May         | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,  
tcmay@netcom.com       | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
408-688-5409           | knowledge, reputations, information markets, 
W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA  | black markets, collapse of governments.
Higher Power: 2^756839 | Public Key: PGP and MailSafe available.
Note: I put time and money into writing this posting. I hope you enjoy it.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: nobody@rosebud.ee.uh.edu
Date: Thu, 17 Jun 93 10:50:18 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Contempt of court
Message-ID: <9306171750.AA02648@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Personal opinions:

People should not be able to be forced by a subpoena duces tecum to provide
incriminating documents.  The fifth amendment protection against self-
incrimination normally extends to personal papers.  There are cases
which show that corporate officers cannot avoid turning over corporate
papers even if they incriminate themselves, but personal papers are
provided much wider protection.

People can be forced to produce handwriting samples, where the content 
of what is written is not significant but the physical writing will be
analyzed; they can be forced to produce breath, blood or urine samples;
they can be forced to stand in a police lineup, and to repeat words which
a witness may have heard a criminal make (but the words do not carry
significance); they may be forced to submit to psychiatric evaluation.

But none of these involve giving testimony against themselves.  Producing
a personal diary or notes which provide incriminating testimony should
be protected by the fifth amendment.

By this reasoning, someone may be able to be forced to reveal an encryption
key, since that is not testimony.  But if the resulting documents, when
decrypted, are personal and contain damaging, incriminating statements,
they would not be usable in court.  To introduce them in court against
the wishes of the defendant would be a clear violation of his fifth
amendment rights.

By the same token, people are not obligated to keep records specifically
to facilitate government investigation of any crime they may have committed.
(They are required to keep normal records, such as those relating to
the income tax.)  It is perfectly permissible for people to destroy their
personal records, notebooks, mail, in any way they wish, whether those
records would be of use to law enforcement or not.  (This is not true, of
course, after receipt of a subpoena calling for those records.)  "Digital
flash paper" should be perfectly legal for all record keeping, whether
or not those records would have contained evidence of a crime.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: bear@eagle.fsl.noaa.gov (Bear Giles)
Date: Thu, 17 Jun 93 12:27:59 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re:  Weak steganography
Message-ID: <9306171924.AA13544@eagle.fsl.noaa.gov>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Eric Hollander writes:
>Another problem is that encrypted files look different from executable
>files.  Encrypted files have a uniform histogram (that is, all 256 different
>possible byte values are equally frequent), but exe files do not.  The
>appending of an encrypted file to an executable file will be very obvious.

So write an encryption routine that wastes bandwidth but outputs executable
code.  You could even encapsulate it within procedures which randomly call
one another, to make it look more like real code.  (Your encrypted data would
be limited to shuffling data between registers and operations within registers,
e.g.:

  mov ax, bx
  add ax, cx
  mov bx, dx
  or  ax, bx

It's not a crime to write bad assembler code... yet.

A nice piece of misdirection would be a homebrew compiler for some
really bizarre language.  A compiler which produces output remarkably
like the output of your encryption program.

If someone asks why you are only using a small subset of the instruction
set, you shrug and claim that optimized code generation is on your "to-do"
list.

Bear Giles




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: axelrod@s106.es.llnl.gov (Mike Axelrod 422-0929)
Date: Thu, 17 Jun 93 14:12:07 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Contempt of  Court
Message-ID: <9306172113.AA24029@s106.es.llnl.gov>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


If the key itself had embedded testimony that was incriminating, then it is
possible one could invoke the 5th amendment to avoid disclosure of the key.
But, I suppose a court could do an end run around that by giving limited 
use immunity for the incriminating content of the key. Comments?

Mike.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Date: Thu, 17 Jun 93 15:48:07 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Contempt of court
In-Reply-To: <9306172054.AA09055@snark.shearson.com>
Message-ID: <9306172248.AA19024@netcom3.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Perry Metzger writes:
...
> technically exhausted his right to appeal. It seems like its only a
> matter of time before other than stopping the government from
> quartering soldiers in your home except in time of war, there will be
> nothing more the courts will prevent.
> 
> Fun, ain't it?

Ah, but this happens all the time! For example, at a recent dinner for
Dave Nolan, founder of the Libertarian Party, a middle-aged Santa Cruz
couple told us the story of how police/DEA/SWAT/BATF/not sure which
"took over" all the houses on their block to wait for a suspected drug
dealer to come out of his house.

By "take over" I mean the middle-aged couple was awakened by knocks on
the door at dawn, told they had 5 minutes to pack a few things, and
then told to get out of the house, that the SWAT team was using their
house as one of their command posts. Several other houses were as
well.

Around mid-afternoon, the blissfully-oblivious suspect wandered out
into into driveway and was immediately surrounded.

Now this may not be "quartering of troops," technically, in that they
didn't sleep over, eat the food (so far as I know), etc., but I sure
would call it something very similar.

And what do you think would happen to me if I answered the door with
my Heckler and Koch submachinegun, as I sometimes do (perfectly legal,
since it's on my property...so long as I don't "brandish" it)? My
guess is the pigs would shoot first.

With the Clinton Clipper rolling along, with the New World Order
looking like a liberal left police state, it's time more than ever for
the long-discussed "Cypherpunks Shooting Club."

Time for us to fight back.

"Kill the code grabbers."

-Tim May

-- 
..........................................................................
Timothy C. May         | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,  
tcmay@netcom.com       | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
408-688-5409           | knowledge, reputations, information markets, 
W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA  | black markets, collapse of governments.
Higher Power: 2^756839 | Public Key: PGP and MailSafe available.
Note: I put time and money into writing this posting. I hope you enjoy it.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Stanton McCandlish <anton@hydra.unm.edu>
Date: Thu, 17 Jun 93 14:51:38 PDT
To: fnerd@smds.com (FutureNerd Steve Witham)
Subject: Re: "RSA sells out" hue and cry (fwd)
In-Reply-To: <9306172009.AA16710@smds.com>
Message-ID: <9306172150.AA01239@hydra.unm.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


This is in reference to the material direct from Jim Bidzos of RSA that I
have posted, re: the charges that NSA is selling out to the Clipper scheme
by licensing NIST to use their "patented algorithms" <snort>


Quoth FutureNerd Steve Witham, verily I saith unto thee:

> > Draw your own conclusions.  I sure will.
> 
> What the hell kind of conclusions are you drawing?  Will you cut the
> sniffing and say what you mean?  Sniping is tiresome.  Sniping that
> doesn't even make a whiff of sense is doubly so because it's
> confusing.  Pardon my pique but there's a *real* war on.

RELAX, fnerd!

I almost sent you my new "Dear flamer" form letter, but I guess this
deserves an answer.  Please don't yell at me like this.

My cautious conclusion from this and other discussions with Jim directly
(at least I presume it is he; as I said before I get suspicious when the
head of the worlds largest cryptography corp. does not use his own
signatory authentication software), is that 

1) RSADSI/PKP cares only for its bottom line.  People like Jim Bidzos may
care about stopping Clipper, but that is largely irrelevant in a corp.
It's like your brain deciding it doesn't want food.  Your body will go on
craving food if you like it or not. 

2) DSI is more-or-less anti-clipper, because it will hurt their biz in the
long term.  It is, being a typical corp., driven more by immediate profit
motive; thus it calls bullshit on the Gov't violating their "patent", and
thus accepting the deal when the govt "capitulates".  In typical
corporate double think, it does not see the blindinly obvious conflict of
interests here.  The weasel factor is likely the rationalization that key
escrow does not equal clipper, which is true, though as we all know, they
two are intertwined like snakes in a basket. 

3) there is no conspiracy of PKP/RSA with NIST/NSA.  It's just a product
of commercial short-sightedness and even outright stupidity and illogic. 

4) regardless of this, this move on the part of RSA is likely to be
detrimental to the cause, and is dangerous.


As for your other points:

A) I am "sniffing" and I said this is a "cautious" conclusion, because all
the evidence is not in.  

B) sniping is USEFUL.  Ask any revolutionary.  This is not a pitched
battle, it is a guerilla war, a propaganda war, & a political cold war.

C) it makes plenty of sense.  My intent was to present the facts and
material I find (for which I actually expected some thanks, imagine that!
Who else among you bothered to make the effort to contact Big Jim
personally and get their side of the story?), and to encourage people to
think about it and weigh the data and "draw your own conclusions".  I do
not Know All in this matter, and did not wish to try to force my view on
the whole.  Furthermore, I think you are upset with the messenger, rather
than concentrating on the message.  All I am doing is saying, "Here I got
this.  It made me think.  Look at it and think about it too."

D) Yes there's a war on.  But I am not Rambo, I'm the USAF journalist who
doesn't feel like getting shot thank you very much ;)


Note this is being passed on to the appropriate list and groups, in case
others need this clarification.

 -- 
Stanton  McCandlish   * Space Migration * Networking * ChaOrder * NO GOV'T. *
anton@hydra.unm.edu   * Intelligence Increase * Nano * Crypto * NO RELIGION *
FidoNet:    1:301/2   * Life Extension * Ethics * VR * Now! * NO MORE LIES! *
Noise in the Void BBS * +1-505-246-8515   (24hr, 1200-14400, v32bis, N-8-1) *



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Mike Godwin <mnemonic@eff.org>
Date: Thu, 17 Jun 93 13:07:56 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Contempt of court
Message-ID: <199306172008.AA00361@eff.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Forwarded message:
From daemon Thu Jun 17 16:05:40 1993
Date: Thu, 17 Jun 1993 16:05:38 -0400
From: Mail Delivery Subsystem <MAILER-DAEMON>
Message-Id: <199306172005.AA00336@eff.org>
To: mnemonic
Cc: mailer-errors
Subject: Returned mail: User unknown

   ----- Transcript of session follows -----
While talking to RoseBud.EE.UH.EDU:
>>> RCPT To:<nobody@rosebud.ee.uh.edu>
<<< 550 <nobody@rosebud.ee.uh.edu>... User unknown
550 nobody@rosebud.ee.uh.edu... User unknown

   ----- Unsent message follows -----
Received: by eff.org id AA00334
  (5.65c/IDA-1.5/ident for nobody@rosebud.ee.uh.edu); Thu, 17 Jun 1993 16:05:38 -0400 (ident-sender: mnemonic@eff.org)
From: Mike Godwin <mnemonic>
Message-Id: <199306172005.AA00334@eff.org>
Subject: Re: Contempt of court
To: nobody@rosebud.ee.uh.edu
Date: Thu, 17 Jun 1993 16:05:37 -0400 (EDT)
In-Reply-To: <9306171750.AA02648@toad.com> from "nobody@rosebud.ee.uh.edu" at Jun 17, 93 12:52:05 pm
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=US-ASCII
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
Content-Length: 1440      

 
nobody writes:

> People should not be able to be forced by a subpoena duces tecum to provide
> incriminating documents.  The fifth amendment protection against self-
> incrimination normally extends to personal papers.  There are cases
> which show that corporate officers cannot avoid turning over corporate
> papers even if they incriminate themselves, but personal papers are
> provided much wider protection.
 
This is true, but it's not precisely the issue with regard to encryption
keys.

> But none of these involve giving testimony against themselves.  Producing
> a personal diary or notes which provide incriminating testimony should
> be protected by the fifth amendment.
 
Providing the key would not be seen as legally identical to providing
the unencrypted document.

> By this reasoning, someone may be able to be forced to reveal an encryption
> key, since that is not testimony.  But if the resulting documents, when
> decrypted, are personal and contain damaging, incriminating statements,
> they would not be usable in court.  To introduce them in court against
> the wishes of the defendant would be a clear violation of his fifth
> amendment rights.

Unfortunately, this has not been Fifth Amendment law for a long time.
If a search and seizure takes place at your house, and the investigating
agents find your diary, they can use it against you. If the diary is
in code, they can attempt to decode it.



--Mike







From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Jason Zions <jazz@hal.com>
Date: Thu, 17 Jun 93 14:13:23 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: re: fast des
Message-ID: <9306172113.AA10922@jazz.hal.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



>>Usually the limiting factor is examining the <ostensibly> decrypted data
>>for statistically significant patterns indicating that you have the
>>correct key.  
>
>If you know that your plaintext is 7-bit ASCII, then you can reject if you
>see too many 8th bits set. [ ... ]  Hint for implementors: don't allow such
>easy bit correlations in your plaintext.

Run your plaintext through compress first; remove the compress header; then
encrypt. Compression will screw up character frequencies (and use all eight
bits) enough to make automated detection of a successfully-broken encryption
really darn hard. Especially if you keep changing compression technology
each message.

Jazz




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Perry E. Metzger" <pmetzger@lehman.com>
Date: Thu, 17 Jun 93 13:55:53 PDT
To: Mike Godwin <mnemonic@eff.org>
Subject: Re: Contempt of court
In-Reply-To: <199306172008.AA00361@eff.org>
Message-ID: <9306172054.AA09055@snark.shearson.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Mike Godwin says:
[Lots of stuff that add up to "Gee, what fifth amendment"]

I wonder when the last remaining clause of the Bill of Rights will be
declared to be meaningless tripe. FDR destroyed the 9th and 10th
amendments with his threats of court packing. PC is destroying the 1st
amendment. The fourth and fifth amendments are nearly gone thanks to
things like the war on drugs. Lots of people have been claiming the
second amendment doesn't mean what it says, and the supreme court has
refused to take a case since the Miller case in the 1930s. The court
recently held that you can execute a person even if there is evidence
that he's innocent without giving the evidence a hearing provided he's
technically exhausted his right to appeal. It seems like its only a
matter of time before other than stopping the government from
quartering soldiers in your home except in time of war, there will be
nothing more the courts will prevent.

Fun, ain't it?

Perry





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: smb@research.att.com
Date: Thu, 17 Jun 93 14:28:09 PDT
To: Timothy Newsham <newsham@wiliki.eng.hawaii.edu>
Subject: Re: fast des
Message-ID: <9306172128.AA10049@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


The DEC gigabit/second DES chip was based on the FURY VSC15K gate array
from Vitesse.  It's a gallium arsenide device.

The full paper is ``A High-speed DES Implementation for Network
Applications'', by Hans Eberle, SRC Research Report 90, DEC Systems
Research Center.  Abstracts are (apparently) online in
pub/DEC/srcabstracts.list, on gatekeeper.pa.dec.com.  You can get
hard-copy by sending email to src-report@src.dec.com.

Oh yeah -- he gives the search time as 16 days, for about $1M in DES
chips alone, without any support circuitry.  The chips are estimated
to cost $300 apiece.  His chip is well-suited for DES-cracking because
it has a separate key-loading port, so you can change the key each
cycle without slowing down the pipeline.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: fnerd@smds.com (FutureNerd Steve Witham)
Date: Thu, 17 Jun 93 15:29:16 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Stegosaurs
Message-ID: <9306172126.AA17087@smds.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Hal Finney <74076.1041@compuserve.com> sez
 
> (...did anyone notice that there weren't any stegosaurs in Jurassic
> Park?  Just another sign of the government crackdown on crypto?)

No, silly!  They were hiding behind treetrunks and disguising themselves
as tourguides!  Don't you know the first thing about stegosaurs?

-fnerd
quote me
time to recycle some elephant jokes




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Eric Hughes <hughes@soda.berkeley.edu>
Date: Thu, 17 Jun 93 18:06:27 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: fast des
In-Reply-To: <9306172113.AA10922@jazz.hal.com>
Message-ID: <9306180102.AA26143@soda.berkeley.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> Compression will screw up character frequencies [...] enough to make
>automated detection of a successfully-broken encryption really darn
>hard.

The question is just how hard is "really darn hard"?

Compressed English text has characteristic patterns just as plain
English does.  The salient difference is that these patterns take
longer to emerge at the same confidence level.  The compressibility
limit is a limit not usually reached; the difference between that
limit and the actual compressed text will be non-zero.  This
difference manifests itself in patterns in the compressed text.

Some estimates of this size are necessary in order that the designer
have an assurance that automatic recognition of decrypted text is
difficult.

These concerns are largely obviated by using ciphers with longer key
lengths, of course.

Eric




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: kqb@whscad1.att.com
Date: Thu, 17 Jun 93 15:16:40 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Weak steganography
Message-ID: <9306172216.AA11412@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Hal Finney said:

> Another problem is that encrypted files look different from executable
> files.  Encrypted files have a uniform histogram (that is, all 256 different
> possible byte values are equally frequent), but exe files do not.  ...

I am building a "steganosaurus" and eventually will need to solve a
similar problem.  (A "steganosaurus" applies a primitive steganographic
technique to English text by using a thesaurus to generate enough word
variation to encode a hidden message.)  One of the weaknesses of this
"steganosaurus" is that the resulting output has statistical differences
from normal English text.  For example, word frequency will be skewed.

Worse, I have to assume that the eavesdropper knows my steganization
algorithm and can "desteganize" any innocuous-looking text I produce.
That "desteganized" text will show clearly the existence of a hidden,
encrypted message because, as Hal pointed out, it has a uniform histogram.

What I want is a program that will transform an encrypted file to a
(slightly larger) file that mimics the distribution achieved by
applying the "desteganization" algorithm to normal English text
that does *not* contain any hidden message.  The steganization
algorithm then gets applied to this stealthy, mimic file, not
directly to the encrypted hidden message.  By the way, since we
must assume that the eavesdropper knows all our algorithms but
not our secret keys, this algorithm will require a *second* secret
key in addition to the secret key used in the original encryption.
I'm not ready to tackle that yet.  Unless I hear otherwise, I'll
assume that if anyone knows how to achieve this, they're not telling...

                              Kevin Q. Brown
                              INTERNET    kqb@whscad1.att.com
                                 or       kevin_q_brown@att.com

PS: I found that a simple, semi-automatic algorithm can generate a
    public message only 5 to 10 times as long as the hidden message.
    Unfortunately, the public message from my simple algorithm is
    almost always a bizarre, disconnected sequence of rants, which,
    for most people, is not normal.  That is why I am building my
    "steganosaurus".  After that I will see if combining a natural
    language parser with transformational grammars can produce a
    less primitive, more efficient "trans-steganosaurus".




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: fergp@sytex.com (Paul Ferguson)
Date: Thu, 17 Jun 93 17:41:14 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Clipper fact
Message-ID: <DcDB6B1w165w@sytex.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


On Wed, 16 Jun 93 22:41:33 PDT,
 Marc Briceno <uunet!ideath.goldenbear.com!mbriceno> wrote -
 
> I am representing the anti-clipper side in an ongoing debate in
> the "Wired " conference on OneNet. The governmental lemmings
> question the existence of the "Law Enforcement Exploitation
> Field" and want citations. Would the person who posted the
> hard facts about Clipper please send me all the info?
> Thanks in advance,
 
 I've collected about 700 kb worth of information regarding
 Clipper/Capstone, but this post from Dorothy Denning should be
 exactly what you are looking for. It was originally posted to
 sci.crypt and reposted to cypherpunks by Tim May.
 
8<------- Cut Here --------------------
 



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: uunet!netcom.com!tcmay (Timothy C. May)denning@guvax.acc.georgetown.edu
Date: Tue, 20 Apr 93 00:39 EDT
To: toad.com!cypherpunks, gnu.ai.mit.edu!extropians
Subject: (fwd) THE CLIPPER CHIP: A TECHNICAL SUMMARYTHE CLIPPER CHIP: A TECHNICAL SUMMARY
Message-ID: <9304200403.AA18854@netcom3.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Paul Ferguson               |  The future is now.
Network Integrator          |  History will tell the tale;
Centreville, Virginia USA   |  We must endure and struggle
fergp@sytex.com             |  to shape it.
 
          Stop the Wiretap (Clipper/Capstone) Chip.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: zane@genesis.mcs.com (Sameer)
Date: Thu, 17 Jun 93 21:04:36 PDT
To: pmetzger@lehman.com
Subject: Re: Contempt of court
In-Reply-To: <9306172054.AA09055@snark.shearson.com>
Message-ID: <m0o6XZy-000MVlC@genesis.mcs.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


In message <9306172054.AA09055@snark.shearson.com>, "Perry E. Metzger" writes:
> technically exhausted his right to appeal. It seems like its only a
> matter of time before other than stopping the government from
> quartering soldiers in your home except in time of war, there will be
> nothing more the courts will prevent.
> 
	I read somewhere on the net a *very* interesting interpretation of
the 3rd amendment, which cypherpunks might find interesting.
	It was claimed that in colonial times, the British authorities
quartered troops in people's homes as a form of surveillance. E.g. Tom
Jefferson is suspected of conspiring with friends to communicate
privately :-), thus the local British military leader learns of this
suspicion and quarters troops in Tom's home.
	Under this interpretation, it was claimed that the 3rd amendment
provides protection from government surveillance.

	I think it's stretching things a bit, but a very interesting way
to look at it.

--
| Sameer Parekh-zane@genesis.MCS.COM-PFA related mail to pfa@genesis.MCS.COM |
| Apprentice Philosopher, Writer, Physicist, Healer, Programmer, Lover, more |
| "Symbiosis is Good" - Me_"Specialization is for Insects" - R. A. Heinlein_/
 \_______________________/ \______________________________________________/ 




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: wcs@anchor.ho.att.com (Bill_Stewart(HOY002)1305)
Date: Thu, 17 Jun 93 19:40:40 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: fast des
Message-ID: <9306180042.AA03435@anchor.ho.att.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text


Steve Bellovin refers to Hans Eberle's paper on a GAs-based 1Gb/s DES chip,
which is available on gatekeeper.dec.com under the SRC directory.
The search time of 16 days for $1M, aka 1 day for $30M (incl. support chips),
is fairly similar to Peter Wayner's Content-Addressible-Memory approach,
which would cost an estimated $30M for a 1 day search.
(Average search time is about half as long as exhaustive searches.)

To put this in a cost-per-solution context, if you amortize over 5 years,
that's about 4000 solutions, so that's a bit under $10K per solution.
It's more expensive than David Sternlight's $25/solution guess,
but it's interestingly small - certainly worthwhile for occasional 
national security applications, or robbing electronic funds transfer networks,
(at least for the $1M slower version), and it's in the ballpark of the 
rental rate for Congressmen :-)  (the Abscam folks paid $50K to Senator 
Harrison Williams for some light work...)

Since Skipjack uses an 80-bit key, the NSA or other rich organizations with
access to it ought to be able to get similar performance in 24-48 years,
assuming speed doubling continues at its 1-2 year rate.  We'd be better
off with something with a longer key, such as triple-DES.
	
				Bill Stewart



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: ""L. Detweiler"" <ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Date: Thu, 17 Jun 93 20:28:26 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Blasting Bidzos Blather
Message-ID: <9306180328.AA15661@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


The following message is FOR CYPHERPUNKS ONLY. I specifically
*prohibit* further distribution past the mailing list! Please do not
betray my trust!

[Bidzos]
>I'm genuinely
> confused, as I believe the situation is as simple as I put it to you.
> Our claims of patent infringement by DSS, made over the last 18
> months, were well-known and publicized.  NIST has capitulated.  Seems
> pretty straightforward to me.

The more I read from Bidzos, the less I believe he has any overall
control or even awareness of the company, or is purposely duplicitous.
His vague and weak defenses I find personally intelligence-insulting.

DSS seemed to defy the face of all public input into the standard,
which opposed the NIST algorithms (`handed down' in a dictatorial and
authoritarian manner, sound familiar?) in favor of RSA. How is it that
Bidzos makes no reference to this? Apologists for DSS such as Denning
do so on two major grounds: 1) it is part of the larger plan involving
Clipper, therefore lack of duality in encryption and authentication
features (an implicit characteristic of RSA) is not a problem 2) the
security is `no weaker' (cunningly disguised as to appear to say
`better') than RSA. Both are noxiously misleading arguments in
themselves, but are also decoys (like key escrow agencies and
procedures) to the critical issues at stake.

The critical point is that even the *appearance* of a `fair and
impartial' standards making process was totally defied, to the point of
suggesting a complete clandestine backroom collusion! (hm, sound
familiar?) But gosh, I wonder how many people would have advocated RSA
back then when they could predict the future: that NIST would not only
embrace PKP but would award them a complete monopoly on signature standards.

Somehow proponents of this new NSA-Clipper-Capstone obscenity are now
pointing back to history and saying that the main objections to DSS
standards were *technical* (strength of the algorithm) and *legal* (PKP
patenting) and that they have been wholly ameliorated by improvements
(in key size) and recent events (PKP support). This is historical
revisionism at its worst!   From my point of view, critical main
objections were on the warped process that permitted an unpopular (and
perhaps even subversive) standard be adopted!  This revisionism
definitely suggests something deeper and `ulterior' is going on---that
a comprehensive NSA-PKP alliance is in place?

> BTW, on Clipper, ATT, Motorola, IBM could have done Clipper without
> ever talking to us.  Contrary to popular belief, we don't dictate
> terms to licensees. 

First, I find it absolutely ridiculous for an informed agent of PKP,
and for that person to coincidentally be called the *president*, to
claim that `we don't dictate terms to licensees'. This is only true in
the sense that if the licensee does not agree to the terms put down by
PKP, they don't get the license!

Second, I would like to see PKP contracts. There are probably more
clauses than a bad run-on sentence. I'll go out on a limb and wager
that PKP *does* limit the use of RSA in the company's products, and
that the licenses are fairly specific. It seems rather inconceivable to
me that any such corporate agreement that could be so simplistically
summarized as `PKP gives rights to company [x] to use RSA in *any* of
their products as long as they pay [y] royalties'.  The agreement is
very likely product-specific and implementation-limiting. Perhaps Mr.
Bidzos or representatives of companies involved would be willing to
forward copies of these agreements for our consideration of Mr. Bidzos'
claims, assuming they are not `classified'...

Third, regardless of presence of product-specific limitations in the
licenses, and even if PKP has sold licenses to companies that somehow
permit them the latitude to include RSA technology in their Clipper
implementations, PKP can certainly take the future stance that they
will prohibit that use in future corporate contracts! If Mr. Bidzos
really thinks that Clipper is `ill-conceived, ill-timed, and
undesirable' perhaps he should figure out how to keep his company from
supporting, nay, *promoting* and *profiting* from it. Let's look again
at the announcement:

>PKP will also grant a license to practice key management, at no
>additional fee, for the integrated circuits which will implement
>both the DSA and the anticipated Federal Information Processing
>Standard for the "key escrow" system announced by President Clinton
>on April 16, 1993.

`at no additional fee'? What does that mean, `for free'? This
apparently means  Mycotronx, despite being a private company, does not
need to license (read: pay for) the RSA patents on the critical
key-exchange function for use in Capstone for *any* implementations
(public or private), nor does any other company NSA decides to induct
into its privileged enclave. Hm, I wonder how RSA's other `customers'
feel about that? And why would PKP voluntarily give up this potentially
valuable revenue source?

Clipper implementations could be *extremely* lucrative for PKP. That
they don't license them specifically, and in fact voluntarily give up
the perogative to do so, suggests that they gave up something greater
in return for them. Namely, the award of an official U.S.
government-endorsed monopoly on DSS and arguably all valuable
cryptographic techniques.

By the way, let's look Mr. Bidzos' quote on Clipper. Clipper is
`ill-timed'? What does this suggest, that a NSA-PKP partnership would
be better served if it came out sooner or later? Clipper is
`ill-conceived and undesirable'? For who? Was it that PKP perhaps
didn't hear about it soon enough to rob all the tasty new cryptographic
algorithm patents surrounding it, like it did with the Schnorr patent? 
The licensing notice (which was probably reviewed and approved by PKP
representatives) refers to Clipper as `an anticipated Federal
Information Processing Standard?' How, Mr. Bidzos, can this new
revelation possibly be construed to indicate that Clipper `will go away'? 

Yes, I suppose Mr. Bellovin was right. The omnipresent underlying
message here is that nothing is unethical if PKP profits from it.

I advise cypherpunks not to take Mr. Bidzos' comments literally. They
are, however, interesting from the perspective of the study of the
speech of either an uninformed figurehead or a capitalist (or even
nationalist) co-conspirator.

P.S. all cypherpunks `for' an alliance with PKP, please raise your
hand. I personally find the image of `lumbering but ultimately
benevolent corporation' too incredible to hold in the face of recent
events, and am now actually quite embarrassed to have advocated some
`good faith' proposals involving the company which look naively
misguided in hindsight.  PKP is not going to go away when a few of its
patents expire. To the contrary, it appears to be clutching everything
within reach to ensure its eternal domination in the commercial
cryptographic field.  (sound familiar? a PKP-NSA alliance makes perfect sense.)





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: TO1SITTLER@APSICC.APS.EDU (Kragen Sittler)
Date: Thu, 17 Jun 93 21:18:34 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: xor w/prbs
Message-ID: <930617221448.c97@APSICC.APS.EDU>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Some MORON wrote an article in Computer Shopper, about doing a one-time pad
with a PRBS... in fact, he even challenged any cryptographers to break it.
(He used a 32-bit seed for the PRBS.)
He also included a number of fallacies in the article, among them that you
change your algorithm when you think the enemy knows what it is, but you change
your keys regularly even when you don't have any basis to think so.

How *do* you break this cypher?  He is generating a lot of random numbers
between 0 and 255, and xor'ing each successive one with the next byte of plain-
text.  I know that this is a trivial cypher to break, according to PRZ at
least, but how do you do it?

This arrogant moron with pretensions to cryptographic knowledge needs to be
corrected.  (Some might say the above epithet applies to me too, to which I
reply:  I don't pretend to know crypto.  I just read cypherpunks.)

He is:
David Stafford, care of Computer Shopper
ONe Park Avenue
New York, NY 10016

This kind of misinformation is dangerous to the public at large.

The article is on page 558 af the July, 1993 Computer Shopper.
It uses a random number generator, (now that I look, it's not a PRBS) from the
June, 1993, Computer Shopper, by the same author.

The random number generator used is like this:

It uses a global variable called RandomSeed, and each time thru the random
function, RandomSeed, a 32-bit long, is multiplied by 0x015a4e35, and
incremented; and then the new Randomseed, modulo the largest desired return
value, is returned.
(Actually, mod the largest desired value +1.)

a code fragment:

#define MULTIPLIER 0x015a4e35L
#define INCREMENT 1

long RandomSeed;

int GetRandomNumber(int Range)
	{
	RandomSeed = MULTIPLIER * RandomSeed + INCREMENT;

	return(RandomSeed % Range);
	}

So how do you crack this cipher without trying all the keys, guys?

Kragen




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: nobody@eli-remailer
Date: Thu, 17 Jun 93 23:50:08 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: OTP dual decryption
Message-ID: <9306180650.AA26990@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

Using a one-time pad for dual decryption might work like this.

I have a file, D (for Dangerous), which I want to conceal.  I construct
a random file of the same length, K (for Key), which will be my "encryption
key".  I xor K and D to produce E (for Encrypted), the encrypted file.  I
delete D and hide K somewhere.

Now, in case an intruder steals E and coerces a decryption out of me, I
prepare S (for Safe), a file containing some safe plaintext.  I xor
S and E to produce F (for Fake), the fake key file I will be able to
present.  I destroy S and hide F somewhere, but perhaps not as securely as
I hid K.

Now, if the intruder comes, he finds E, the encrypted file.  He demands
the key, and I explain that the file was encrypted with a one-time pad,
and here is the key, and I provide him F.  He xor's F and E to find
S, the safe plaintext, and I am protected.

This is all well and fine, but it depends on successfully hiding K, the
actual key file.  But if you can successfully hide files, it seems to me
that you might as well have just hidden D, the dangerous file, in the
first place, in whatever hiding place you were going to use for K.  Then
substitute S, the safe file, for D.  This is just the old idea of
having two sets of books for a crooked business, one innocent and public
and one incriminating but hidden.

So I'm not sure the one-time pad idea really helps much since if you can
meet the requirements to use it you might as well just hide your data the
old-fashioned way.  Are there any advantages that I'm overlooking?

Hal Finney
74076.1041@compuserve.com

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.2

iQCVAgUBLCEucqgTA69YIUw3AQFBlAP/ZHeOKs71H2d0HD2vLwupRB/TwzuEy7dD
iE91swoYo8FK5a66DAi8f2kmDIqoiPai+jieI/506zWFuHJRiCW7PLs6v8ga4Aj6
WglBJ1ksOlY74X6qrlykw3kXMjX6x8t7lbp+e6R7Fy67n6gUSGaRozyniv3JusrY
c7wXxxh9rvs=
=AAV7
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: nobody@alumni.cco.caltech.edu
Date: Thu, 17 Jun 93 23:50:08 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Computer Shopper encryption
Message-ID: <9306180648.AA04035@alumni.cco.caltech.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


If Kragen's RNG from Computer Shopper is called repeatedly with range=256,
so that the resulting values are in the range 0-255 for xor'ing,
it is very weak.  That will mean that the RNG will repeat with period
of at most 256, and so the only question is which of the 256 possible
starting points was used.  In other words you only need to do 256 trial
decryptions (just try seeds from 0-255) and you've got it.

Using the low-order bits of an LCM RNG like this one is a bad idea.  You
should use the high order bits, or use a range which is not a power of
2 so you end up using all the bits.  Even then LCM RNG's aren't crypto-
graphically strong, although from what I have seen the techniques of
breaking them are what a layman would call complicated.  Compared
to breaking, say, DES, though, they are no doubt trivial.

Hal Finney
74076.1041@compuserve.com




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: remail@tamsun.tamu.edu
Date: Fri, 18 Jun 93 00:12:47 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Shorter PGP keys
Message-ID: <9306180712.AA27809@tamsun.tamu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I was thinking of trying to come up with a short form of my PGP key.
Very few people put their PGP keys into their .sig's any more because
they are so lengthy.

Here is my key, 1024 bits, as it would normally appear:

-----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----
Version: 2.0

mQCNAiqsNkwAAAEEAMKWM52m5EWi0ocK4u1cC2PPyHT6tavk9PC3TB5XBYDegf3d
sldRpnjJj1r+aO08FFO+QLEI9wtBqvf1PPP5iLX7sD2uIVlJH14MPtyVtjm9ZKb8
JMtCW74045BgtHBC9yQ3V7vXNV5jM6dE2ocnH4AI/pBFrGLJPKgTA69YIUw3AAUR
tCZIYWwgRmlubmV5IDw3NDA3Ni4xMDQxQGNvbXB1c2VydmUuY29tPokAlQIFECqu
M1Tidd4O/2f3CwEByrUD/3uoV2y+Fuicrrd2oDawgOw9Ejcx6E+Ty9PVPqKvflLs
0zYyGfeFVSgBbTSDP3X91N3F68nydl9J9VA6QRCGelHM1cZRukCJ0AYbKYfpwUN0
xjEGHsDrd2gT5iWlB3vBZvi+6Ybs4rSq+gyZzVm1/+oRrMen32fz2r0CLgUtHok2
=fF6Z
-----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----

This has a couple of signatures on it and is pretty long.  I stripped
the signatures, figuring that people can get them from a key server,
and that helped quite a bit.  Also, the "Version: 2.x" line is not
currently used, and if you eliminate it you don't need the blank line
after it.  Also, the last line is a checksum for the key and in today's
internet environment you don't have to worry about noise that much.

Stripping all these gives:

-----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----
mQCNAiqsNkwAAAEEAMKWM52m5EWi0ocK4u1cC2PPyHT6tavk9PC3TB5XBYDegf3d
sldRpnjJj1r+aO08FFO+QLEI9wtBqvf1PPP5iLX7sD2uIVlJH14MPtyVtjm9ZKb8
JMtCW74045BgtHBC9yQ3V7vXNV5jM6dE2ocnH4AI/pBFrGLJPKgTA69YIUw3AAUR
tCZIYWwgRmlubmV5IDw3NDA3Ni4xMDQxQGNvbXB1c2VydmUuY29tPg==
-----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----

This is pretty compact and wouldn't be bad in a .sig.  We've gone from
12 to 6 lines.  I wish there were a mode in which PGP would scan a file
looking not for "-----BEGIN PGP" but rather for lines which are exactly
64 lines long and contain just the RFC1113 (or whatever it's called now)
character set.  I realize it would get fooled by PEM but maybe the user
would only run it if he knew it was a PGP file.  Then you could reduce
the key to four lines.

If you were willing to use a 512 bit key, good enough for casual use,
you could get it down to 3 lines.  This is probably an appropriate
level of privacy for people on multi-user workstations (i.e. as much
privacy as they can expect).

  Hal Finney -- 74076.1041@compuserve.com -- Stripped PGP key:
mQCNAiqsNkwAAAEEAMKWM52m5EWi0ocK4u1cC2PPyHT6tavk9PC3TB5XBYDegf3d
sldRpnjJj1r+aO08FFO+QLEI9wtBqvf1PPP5iLX7sD2uIVlJH14MPtyVtjm9ZKb8
JMtCW74045BgtHBC9yQ3V7vXNV5jM6dE2ocnH4AI/pBFrGLJPKgTA69YIUw3AAUR
tCZIYWwgRmlubmV5IDw3NDA3Ni4xMDQxQGNvbXB1c2VydmUuY29tPg==




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "George A. Gleason" <gg@well.sf.ca.us>
Date: Fri, 18 Jun 93 02:25:06 PDT
To: tk@reagan.ai.mit.edu
Subject: Re:  Contempt of court
Message-ID: <93Jun18.022436pdt.14012-3@well.sf.ca.us>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


One-time pads for coerced confessions: 

Consider that the cyphertext of an OTP could come from *any* combination of
plaintext and keystream.  Okay, now you have in hand your cyphertext of an
original file having to do with your lawsuit against the govt.  Take that
cyphertext, and get another file of equal or longer length which is
completely innocuous, for instance some mild-sounding diary entries or some
such.  Now XOR these together, and what pops out is the *keystream* which
*would have been used for encyphering the innocuous plaintext into the
cyphertext you have there.  Okay, now you have five files:

1) your original plaintext re your lawsuit against the govt.
2) the keystream which converted that into the cyphertext below.
3) the cyphertext.
4) the innocuous text file for instance edited journal entries.
5) the "keystream" which resulted from XORing (3) and (4), which can be
claimed to be the keystream which was used to encypher (4) into (3).

Okay, now Big Brother comes to get you and coerce you to decypher your file,
but you don't want your attorney-client confidentiality violated, so you
hand over items (3) and (5), and when Big Bro "decrypts" (3), out pops (4)
thereby proving that you aren't the dastardly subversive who is trying to
sue the govt...!  "Dear diary..."
-gg




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "George A. Gleason" <gg@well.sf.ca.us>
Date: Fri, 18 Jun 93 02:33:53 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re:  "RSA sells out" hue and cry (fwd)
Message-ID: <93Jun18.023323pdt.14012-2@well.sf.ca.us>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I'm not so sure that all this Bidzos Biz is as evil as it may sound.
Consider the management have an obligation to the stockholders to make
money.  Now here is a huge market.  Do they turn it down on the basis of
political rectitude...?

Are we seriously expecting that Bidzos will refrain from tapping into this
market, and refrain from charging a cent for an RSA-PGP thing...?  Oh, okay,
so he's supposed to go into poverty to prove his ethics.  Oh, I see.  Gee
whiz, I thought I was the most socialistic of anyone on this list.  

-gg




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "George A. Gleason" <gg@well.sf.ca.us>
Date: Fri, 18 Jun 93 02:45:42 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re:  Blasting Bidzos Blather
Message-ID: <93Jun18.024325pdt.13995-3@well.sf.ca.us>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Oh, here goes another Big Bad Corporation abusing our rights...!  Well, are
there any Libertarians out there who will please speak up for the right of
Bidzos & co to earn a legal profit any way they see fit...?  Or am I, the
token leftist in the crowd, going to stick my neck out solo on this one...?

Pardon my rhetoric, but I find it truly amazing how the much extolled rights
of private property can suddenly become a non-issue when you consider you've
found a bigger issue.   Some of us feel that way about ecology.  

-gg




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "George A. Gleason" <gg@well.sf.ca.us>
Date: Fri, 18 Jun 93 02:46:02 PDT
To: nobody@toad.com
Subject: Re:  OTP dual decryption
Message-ID: <93Jun18.024542pdt.13995-1@well.sf.ca.us>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Yeah, the advantage is, if they think they've found it, they might just
stop looking much further.  It's a chance that might save your ass.

-gg




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: bear@eagle.fsl.noaa.gov (Bear Giles)
Date: Thu, 17 Jun 93 22:37:47 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re:  xor w/prbs
Message-ID: <9306180534.AA01952@eagle.fsl.noaa.gov>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>How *do* you break this cypher?  He is generating a lot of random numbers
>between 0 and 255, and xor'ing each successive one with the next byte of plain-
>text.  I know that this is a trivial cypher to break, according to PRZ at
>least, but how do you do it?

In this case, since the modulus is a small power of 2, you can do exhaustive
search.  There is _one_ sequence of 256 distinct values.

Still want to know how long it will take to crack his ciphertext?

>#define MULTIPLIER 0x015a4e35L
>#define INCREMENT 1
>
>long RandomSeed;
>
>int GetRandomNumber(int Range)
>	{
>	RandomSeed = MULTIPLIER * RandomSeed + INCREMENT;
>	return(RandomSeed % Range);
>	}
>
>So how do you crack this cipher without trying all the keys, guys?

Since 

   max_integer / gcd (range, max_integer) > range

you can move the modulus operation around without worrying about
weird effects from the finite word size.  This is because the 
closed form of the loop is:

   seed[k] = (seed[0] * mult^k + incr * sum (j = 0 to k-1) of mult^j) % range

which is equal to

   seed[k] = (seed[0] % range) * (mult % range)^k +
			  (incr % range) * sum (j = 0 to k-1) of (mult % range)^j

and the modulus operation with a power-of-2 range simply keeps the last
n bits.  But, this also means there are effectively only "range" possible
values for the initial seed.

Even if you make the increment and multiplier part of the key, they must
(both?) be odd so you only have 22 bits of key.  Of course at this point
you can simply use the fact that this "one time pad" is actually a 
Vigenere cipher with 256 columns -- easy to crack if you have some
insight into the nature of the plaintext (e.g., English text).

For instance, 10-15 small documents (40 lines) encrypted with the same
key is enough to crack it even if the multiplier and increment are 
unknown but constant.

Bear Giles




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Fred Heutte <phred@well.sf.ca.us>
Date: Fri, 18 Jun 93 06:11:07 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re:  Blasting Bidzos Blather
Message-ID: <93Jun18.061041pdt.13937-1@well.sf.ca.us>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> PKP is not going to go away when a few of its patents expire.

Right.  Contracts and licensing arrangements can last much longer
than patents.

That's why it's so important to see the exact details of this latest
deal and find out why someone in the federal bureaucracy was greasing
the procurement skids.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Fred Heutte <phred@well.sf.ca.us>
Date: Fri, 18 Jun 93 06:41:16 PDT
To: smb@research.att.com
Subject: Re:  RRe:  Blasting Bidzos Blather
Message-ID: <93Jun18.064055pdt.13949-2@well.sf.ca.us>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I beg to differ.  I know about federal procurement regs a little,
having been employed by a federal contractor for a decade and being
one my own personal self now.  They greased this process bigtime, and
it has the ugly smell of politics all over it.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "W. Kinney" <kinney@spot.Colorado.EDU>
Date: Fri, 18 Jun 93 06:13:59 PDT
To: gg@well.sf.ca.us (George A. Gleason)
Subject: Re:  Blasting Bidzos Blather
In-Reply-To: <93Jun18.024325pdt.13995-3@well.sf.ca.us>
Message-ID: <199306181313.AA13845@spot.Colorado.EDU>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


 
> Oh, here goes another Big Bad Corporation abusing our rights...!  Well, are
> there any Libertarians out there who will please speak up for the right of
> Bidzos & co to earn a legal profit any way they see fit...?  Or am I, the
> token leftist in the crowd, going to stick my neck out solo on this one...?

Nah. You ain't alone. Why shouldn't Bidzos allow NIST a license? Seems
perfectly reasonable to me. Bidzos appears to see this as unrelated to any
larger policy question involving Clipper, and I agree.

                              -- Will




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Eric Hughes <hughes@soda.berkeley.edu>
Date: Fri, 18 Jun 93 08:44:38 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: fast des
In-Reply-To: <9306180042.AA03435@anchor.ho.att.com>
Message-ID: <9306181540.AA22168@soda.berkeley.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>To put this in a cost-per-solution context, if you amortize over 5 years,
>that's about 4000 solutions, so that's a bit under $10K per solution.

Here are a few assumptions that lower this estimate for the NSA.

-- The NSA has it's own fab and design facilities.  If you assume you
want a few dozen or hundred DES cracking boxes, you can afford a fair
bit of money on design; the design cost per chip drops.  The more of
these you have, the lower the cost per solution.

-- The amortization period is longer than 5 years.  From what I have
heard, the NSA just keeps running most every machine it owns.

-- The possibility of a trap door which gives hints about exhaustive
search should not be ruled out.  Suppose, for example, that all
combinations of 16 bits exhibited flat distribution as 16-grams, but
that certain combinations of 22 bits did not.  Just to find these
correlations might be an infeasible problem, but to exploit them would
not be.  Drop your cost estimates by 2^6 in the above example if true.

-- There will be different machines designed for attacks on different
types of intercepts.  Known plaintext, probable plaintext, known
ASCII, etc.  The recognition circuitry on each of these is different
and custom design would reduce silicon costs significantly.

-- If you use micropipelines, you can keep the encryption circuitry
constantly full, as opposed to putting in a new value after the old
one pops out.  If this technique is not already being used, divide
cost by 16, the number of rounds of DES.

-- One can design circuitry to test multiple ciphertexts on the same
key at some savings in chip cost.  Not useful for encryption, but
useful for cracking.  Call this a factor of 1.5 to 2.

-- Wafer scale integration could yield some savings in die cost and
packaging.  

Eric




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: dmandl@lehman.com (David Mandl)
Date: Fri, 18 Jun 93 05:51:38 PDT
To: gg@well.sf.ca.us
Subject: Re:  "RSA sells out" hue and cry (fwd)
Message-ID: <9306181250.AA10789@disvnm2.shearson.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> From: "George A. Gleason" <gg@well.sf.ca.us>
> 
> I'm not so sure that all this Bidzos Biz is as evil as it may sound.
> Consider the management have an obligation to the stockholders to make
> money.  Now here is a huge market.  Do they turn it down on the basis of
> political rectitude...?

I don't run my life based on a spreadsheet.  There are plenty of very profitable
things I could do that I don't because I think they're scummy.  The makers of
napalm didn't take "political rectitude" into account either; nor did those
bastards (Dow Corning?) who knew the truth about breast implants but hid it to
protect their bottom line.  Sorry, but I find this attitude extremely disturbing.

> Are we seriously expecting that Bidzos will refrain from tapping into this
> market, and refrain from charging a cent for an RSA-PGP thing...?  Oh, okay,
> so he's supposed to go into poverty to prove his ethics.  Oh, I see.  Gee
> whiz, I thought I was the most socialistic of anyone on this list.  
> 
> -gg

I'm not expecting anything of the kind.  I'm not a capitalist, so it's not my job
to work out these contradictions.

   --Dave.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: smb@research.att.com
Date: Fri, 18 Jun 93 06:26:06 PDT
To: Fred Heutte <phred@well.sf.ca.us>
Subject: RRe:  Blasting Bidzos Blather
Message-ID: <9306181326.AA08720@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> > PKP is not going to go away when a few of its patents expire.
> Right.  Contracts and licensing arrangements can last much longer
> than patents.

> That's why it's so important to see the exact details of this latest
> deal and find out why someone in the federal bureaucracy was greasing
> the procurement skids.

I repeat -- NIST had no choice, because PKP held all the patent cards.
Even if you don't believe PKP's claim to all of public-key cryptography,
both the Diffie-Hellman and Schnorr patents would most likely be infringed
by DSA.  You can argue with the specifics of the deal -- and with what
NIST gave away in order to get the Clipper exemption through -- but
they had to reach some settlement.

Btw -- the deal is *not* final; the announcement is just the start of
a 60-day comment period.

		--Steve Bellovin




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Date: Fri, 18 Jun 93 09:53:52 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re:  Blasting Bidzos Blather
In-Reply-To: <93Jun18.024325pdt.13995-3@well.sf.ca.us>
Message-ID: <9306181654.AA10641@netcom3.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


George Gleason writes:

> Oh, here goes another Big Bad Corporation abusing our rights...!  Well, are
> there any Libertarians out there who will please speak up for the right of
> Bidzos & co to earn a legal profit any way they see fit...?  Or am I, the
> token leftist in the crowd, going to stick my neck out solo on this one...?
> 
> Pardon my rhetoric, but I find it truly amazing how the much extolled rights
> of private property can suddenly become a non-issue when you consider you've
> found a bigger issue.   Some of us feel that way about ecology.  


I'm a card-carrying Libertarian, and I respect certain types of
private property--but not others. When someone "claims" the Amazon
jungle, perhaps with the blessings of a corrupt Pope, I don't. (Just
and out-of-band example to quickly make the point the even
Libertarians can have doubts about some property claims and even have
sympathies with radical environmentalists.)

The whole cloud of issues surrounding intellectual property, patents
on algorithms and methods, the specifics of RSA, and so on, is a
complicated set. Discussions on this list and in newsgroups makes this
clear.

RSADSI has licensed some of their patents to the Clipper folks. What
this means is not clear to me. If Clipper (or related things) is ever
_mandated_, with alternatives outlawed, then the government would
effectively have granted an exclusive franchise to RSADSI, and others,
sort of like _mandating_ MacDonald's hamburgers as the national
standard and requiring license fees be paid to MacDonald's every time
a hamburger is made or bought.

So, in answer to George's question, this Libertarian is angry at the
growing police state (RICO, civil forfeiture, no knock searches, the
War on Drugs, national socialist health care, wars on several fronts,
etc.) and fears the imminent outlawing of unapproved encryption.


-Tim

-- 
..........................................................................
Timothy C. May         | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,  
tcmay@netcom.com       | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
408-688-5409           | knowledge, reputations, information markets, 
W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA  | black markets, collapse of governments.
Higher Power: 2^756839 | Public Key: PGP and MailSafe available.
Note: I put time and money into writing this posting. I hope you enjoy it.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Brad Huntting <huntting@glarp.com>
Date: Fri, 18 Jun 93 09:30:04 PDT
To: Jason Zions <jazz@hal.com>
Subject: Re: fast des
In-Reply-To: <9306172113.AA10922@jazz.hal.com>
Message-ID: <199306181629.AA08794@misc.glarp.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



> Run your plaintext through compress first; remove the compress
> header; then encrypt. Compression will screw up character frequencies
> (and use all eight bits) enough to make automated detection of a
> successfully-broken encryption really darn hard. Especially if you
> keep changing compression technology each message.

Most encryption scheams use cypher block chaining or some other
mechanism where a change in one block will affect every block to
come after it, no?

Given this, would inserting a block of random data at the begining
of the datastream help?


brad




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Duncan Frissell <76630.3577@CompuServe.COM>
Date: Fri, 18 Jun 93 07:50:08 PDT
To: <cypherpunks@toad.com>
Subject: Re: Contempt of court
Message-ID: <930618143143_76630.3577_EHK21-1@CompuServe.COM>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


("Perry E. Metzger")

>>>It seems like its only a matter of time before other than 
>>>stopping the government from quartering soldiers in your home 
>>>except in time of war, there will be nothing more the courts 
>>>will prevent.

That's the answer to the question:

"The US Government violates 9 of the 10 amendments of the Bill of Rights 
every second of every day.  What is the one Amendment of the 10 that 
they hold inviolate?"

The Third:

      3rd Amendment
      No soldier shall, in time of peace, be quartered in any house, 
      without the consent of the owner; nor in time of war, but in a 
      manner to be prescribed by law. 

Say, maybe that's an argument against the Clipper Chip!  Aren't the NSA 
types sort of soldiers who want to be quartered in our telephones at our 
expense?

Duncan Frissell

Who possesses the worlds longest list of flaky legal arguments which will 
be an enormous source of entertainment to a federal judge some day.

"Did you know that Federal Reserve Notes are not money?"

********************************************************************
* DUNCAN FRISSELL             Attorney at Law, Writer, and Privacy *
* CIS 76630,3577              Consultant since the Nixon           *
* Internet:                   Administration                       *
* 76630.3577@compuserve.com                                        *
* or frissell@panix.com                                            *
* Easylink 62853962                                                *
* Attmail !dfrissell                                               *
* TLX:  402231 FRISSELL NYK                                        *
*                                                                  *
*    Privacy Checkup still only $29.95.  Get yours today to        *
*    find out how to dodge federal child registration.             *
*                                                                  *
*    "Register Communists Not Kids.  Fight SB 732 & 733 for        *
*     national computer registration and tracking of every         *
*     child in America."                                           *
*                                                                  *
********************************************************************





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: collins@newton.apple.com (Scott Collins)
Date: Fri, 18 Jun 93 10:57:41 PDT
To: TO1SITTLER@APSICC.APS.EDU (Kragen Sittler)
Subject: Re: xor w/prbs
Message-ID: <9306181746.AA15078@newton.apple.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


While the pseudo-random bit sequence algorithm used in the Computer Shopper
article is weak, it is important to note that the article is on the right
track.  However, a one time pad based on PRBS is only as secure as the PRBS
itself.  If the author did not state this, he was remiss.

There *are* cryptographically strong pseudo-random bit generators.  A one
time pad based on a CSPRBS would be as secure as the underlying 'hard'
problem.  For example, Blum and Micali's paper "How to Generate
Cryptographically Strong Sequences of Pseudo-Random Bits" (Nov. 84 SIAM),
details a scheme based on the discrete log problem.

Essentially, this system is based on selecting bits from successive
exponentiations of a seed.  If you could guess the next bit to be selected,
without knowing the seed, you could reverse this into an algorithm to solve
the discrete log problem.

The Blum and Micali paper also references a paper by Shamir (which I have
not read) called "On the generation of cryptographically strong
pseudo-random sequences" 8th International Colloquium on Automata,
Languages and Programming, Lecture Notes in Coputer Science, 62,
Spring-Verlag, New York, 1981.  The difference being that the Shamir scheme
generates *numbers* while the Blum/Micali scheme generates *bits*.

I try never to label anyone a moron until I am sure their stupidity is not
just my failure to communicate.

Scott Collins              | "Few people realize what tremendous power
                           |  there is in one of these things."
                           |                            -- Willy Wonka
......................................................................
Apple Computer, Inc.       |     phone: 408 862-0540(v), 974-6094(f)
1 Infinite Loop, MS 301-2C | AppleLink: SCOTTCOLLINS
Cupertino, CA 95014        |  internet: collins@newton.apple.com





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: fnerd@smds.com (FutureNerd Steve Witham)
Date: Fri, 18 Jun 93 08:14:48 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: My recent flame at Stanton
Message-ID: <9306181507.AA21082@smds.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Stanton McCandlish <anton@hydra.unm.edu> recently quoted a rant of mine
directed at him.  I really thought directed it to him literally--that I 
mailed it to his address, not the list's.  

Stanton, I didn't mean to flame you in public.  I apologize.

This is the second time this has happened this week.  I'm starting to
think that when I created this "fnerd" mail account I accidentally 
created an alter ego--my evil twin who posts personal insults to
mailing lists...

I will try to be triply, not just doubly sure of what I'm doing and
put lots of warnings on any such personal grouch mail: "I DIDN'T
POST THIS; BETWEEN YOU AND ME; PLEASE DON'T QUOTE ME," etc.

in control now--SEIG HEIL!--down! down!...
--Steve Witham (aka fnerd)
quote me, this WAS posted




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Mike Godwin <mnemonic@eff.org>
Date: Fri, 18 Jun 93 08:22:17 PDT
To: zane@genesis.mcs.com (Sameer)
Subject: Re: Contempt of court
In-Reply-To: <m0o6XZy-000MVlC@genesis.mcs.com>
Message-ID: <199306181522.AA06530@eff.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


 
Sameer, the roots of the Third Amendment are not in surveillance, but
in the English Crown's desire to minimize the costs of maintaining troops
abroad.


--Mike


> In message <9306172054.AA09055@snark.shearson.com>, "Perry E. Metzger" writes:
> > technically exhausted his right to appeal. It seems like its only a
> > matter of time before other than stopping the government from
> > quartering soldiers in your home except in time of war, there will be
> > nothing more the courts will prevent.
> > 
> 	I read somewhere on the net a *very* interesting interpretation of
> the 3rd amendment, which cypherpunks might find interesting.
> 	It was claimed that in colonial times, the British authorities
> quartered troops in people's homes as a form of surveillance. E.g. Tom
> Jefferson is suspected of conspiring with friends to communicate
> privately :-), thus the local British military leader learns of this
> suspicion and quarters troops in Tom's home.
> 	Under this interpretation, it was claimed that the 3rd amendment
> provides protection from government surveillance.
> 
> 	I think it's stretching things a bit, but a very interesting way
> to look at it.
> 
> --
> | Sameer Parekh-zane@genesis.MCS.COM-PFA related mail to pfa@genesis.MCS.COM |
> | Apprentice Philosopher, Writer, Physicist, Healer, Programmer, Lover, more |
> | "Symbiosis is Good" - Me_"Specialization is for Insects" - R. A. Heinlein_/
>  \_______________________/ \______________________________________________/ 
> 




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Kent Hastings" <kent_hastings@qmail2.aero.org>
Date: Fri, 18 Jun 93 11:49:46 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Inviso-Crypt(r)
Message-ID: <199306181849.AA16946@aerospace.aero.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


                      Inviso-Crypt(r) 
I'm proud to announce a new fuzzy-logic application that can
access sub-digital biticles. These vitalistic fractional bits
were never discovered before now because computer scientists
are still clinging to a rigid notion of Aristotelian "A or not-A"
on-off binary logic.

It took a Fate magazine advertisement to inspire this scam, er- 
breakthrough. One of my beta testers was delighted to find his 
bank account dramatically compressed and his computer network 
rendered userless.

Here is a sample of the program's output:
!!! BEGIN INVISO-CRYPT(R) DATA BLOCK !!!










!!! END INVISO-CRYPT DATA BLOCK !!!
The preceding message may look like all spaces, but those 10 lines
contain over 100 megabytes of encrypted biticles. Inviso-Crypt(r) 
works on graphic files, too. "+". That single character holds a 
4-megabyte GIF image.

Nothing works like, well, uh - nothing ... to the naked eye, of 
course. You've heard of Beethoven's "Emperor Concerto," this is 
nicknamed "The Emperor's New Code" around our data center. Our 
recent advance in applied cryptology works as described here or
my name isn't Mr. Burns, oops, uh - Mr. Snrub, a dedicated 
computer scientist working at, uh - a lab very far away, on a 
chain of islands with affordable liability immunity and anonymous
trust business structures. That'll do. This software not only does
real time bit-slicing, it rolls virtual dice to generate random 
keys. Yes, it slices, it dices, and it will decrypt your DNA and 
cure cancer, colds, baldness, and all other ailments.

This program is so important that my lobbyists are "passing bills"
through Congress as you read this. (Ok Senator, I'm putting these
bills on the trash dumpster, and when I get back, I expect them
to be hauled away. Don't forget the free bar of soap to wash your
hands of this whole affair. See, I DO support clean government.) 

Soon, Inviso-Crypt(r) will be the exclusive national standard. Why,
my payroll expenses have been amazingly smaller since I printed
paychecks using the Inviso-Cash(r) standard.

Homer: "Hello - money, where are you?"

"I like the way that Inviso-Crypt(r) works!" - Smithers.#000#






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: smb@research.att.com
Date: Fri, 18 Jun 93 10:04:10 PDT
To: Brad Huntting <huntting@glarp.com>
Subject: Re: fast des
Message-ID: <9306181704.AA15365@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


	 
	 > Run your plaintext through compress first; remove the compress
	 > header; then encrypt. Compression will screw up character frequencie
	s
	 > (and use all eight bits) enough to make automated detection of a
	 > successfully-broken encryption really darn hard. Especially if you
	 > keep changing compression technology each message.

	 Most encryption scheams use cypher block chaining or some other
	 mechanism where a change in one block will affect every block to
	 come after it, no?

	 Given this, would inserting a block of random data at the begining
	 of the datastream help?


Probably not.  The DES-crackers are already going to be looking at a
couple of blocks, because in general, the cryptanalyst won't know the IV.
But not knowing it only affects your ability to decrypt the very next block;
you can still get the one after it.

The decrypt equation for CBC mode is

	P[n] <- D(C[n]) xor C[n-1]

That is, without knowing the IV -- C[0] -- you can't recover P[1].
But P[2] depends only on C[2] and C[1].  If P[1] is random garbage,
you've actually made life a bit easier -- the block they can't recover
isn't important.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Phil Karn <karn@qualcomm.com>
Date: Fri, 18 Jun 93 18:26:33 PDT
To: gnu@toad.com (John Gilmore)
Subject: Re: Helping from Canada re Clipper
Message-ID: <9306190126.AA26864@servo>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



>Another argument the U.S. government is making is that they surveyed
>encryption policy in various countries and "it's not beyond the pale
>to limit domestic encryption -- France does it, for example".  

Is this an actual Administration quote? If so, they're playing with fire
because France is the very same country that the US has recently
accused of using its national security apparatus to spy on foreign
corporations. It shouldn't be too hard to draw a link between these two
policies that would cause this particular quote to blow up in the
Administration's face.

Phil




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: karn@qualcomm.com (Phil Karn)
Date: Fri, 18 Jun 93 18:26:34 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Software infrastructure
Message-ID: <9306190126.AA26872@servo>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I'm just catching up on a very large mail backlog (much of which is
Cypherpunks). Many Cypherpunks are apparently unaware of the security
work going on within the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). Besides
the infamous Privacy Enhanced Email (PEM), there are lesser known groups
working on application layer security interfaces and on IP-level
security (encryption and/or authentication of individual IP datagrams).

Okay, I'm not saying all this work is being done right. In some cases
it's not being done at all (or very slow progress is being made). In my
opinion, the situation is ripe for some highly motivated Cypherpunks to
read the stuff that's already been published (available from the
standard FTP repositories like nic.ddn.mil), digest and critique it, and
either implement the ideas that have been proposed or do them better
yourself. But you should really be aware of what other work is going on
in these areas before you reinvent the wheel.

My personal interests and preferences lie in doing security at the IP
layer. It doesn't solve all problems, but it is an approach that has
been almost totally unexplored until now. And with the ever-increasing
use and availability of low-cost dialup SLIP/PPP connections as an
alternative to dumb terminal emulators and UUCP, I think it's a powerful
technique. But I just don't have as much time to work on this as I'd
like, and it would really be nice to find others to help in the effort.

Phil




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: fnerd@smds.com (FutureNerd Steve Witham)
Date: Fri, 18 Jun 93 13:47:27 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re:  Blasting Bidzos Blather
Message-ID: <9306182028.AA22659@smds.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> Oh, here goes another Big Bad Corporation abusing our rights...!  Well, are
> there any Libertarians out there who will please speak up for the right of
> Bidzos & co to earn a legal profit any way they see fit...?

I'm a libertarian.  I happen to be a type of libertarian who doesn't believe
in patents.  So I think nobody has a "right" to use government (or any force)
to enforce their patents.

BUT, many people believe patents are okay, and many feel they do have 
a right to enforce their patents.  I think the RSADSI/PKP people are like
this.  It's a perfectly common belief.  So except for the whole patent issue,
(including the validity of their particular patents), I think they have a
right to sell or not sell licenses to anyone they choose.

BUT, to libertarians there's a big distinction between "You have a
right to..." and "It's right for you to..."  It's possible they're acting
within their rights (with the exception noted above) and yet doing something
wrong or evil.

BUT, in this case I'm not sure whether what they're doing is particularly
wrong, although I haven't seen a good case one way or the other.

-fnerd
quote me




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: fnerd@smds.com (FutureNerd Steve Witham)
Date: Fri, 18 Jun 93 13:58:25 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Blasting Bidzos Blather
Message-ID: <9306182053.AA22777@smds.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Let's see if I understand L. Detweiler's recent comments:

1) PKP licensed key exchange for use with Clipper and DSS.
   Clipper and DSS are bad.
   Therefore PKP is "supporting, nay, *promoting* and *profiting* 
   from" DSS and Clipper.

   a) "supporting, nay, *promoting*"--this is not good publicity 
      against Clipper and DSS.  Therefore PKP is our enemy.
   b) "*profiting from*"--this is dirty money, therefore PKP is
      dirty and we can't trust them.

2) They did it "at no additional charge."
   (Someone please explain relation to 1b, above.)
   Therefore they must be receiving some other compensation
   behind our backs.
   Therefore they're bad guys and we shouldn't trust them.

3) Bidzos says they don't dictate terms, yet their licenses
   DO have terms.  Therefore he is lying, should not be trusted,
   etc.

4) They should have refused to license bad uses of "their"
   technology, but they didn't.  Therefore they're bad, etc.

Have I got that right?
-fnerd
quote me




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Brendan Kehoe <brendan@lisa.cygnus.com>
Date: Fri, 18 Jun 93 18:35:01 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: backpack left at Cygnus
Message-ID: <9306190136.AA05971@lisa>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


There's a steel blue backpack in my office here at Cygnus; it's got
"Kahn on Codes" in it.  If it's yours, drop me a line and we can
figure out a way for you to get it.

Brendan

--
Brendan Kehoe                                               brendan@cygnus.com
Cygnus Support, Mountain View, CA                              +1 415 903 1400

                       ``Ya know Quaker Oats make you feel good twice?''  Hmm.



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Linda Boyd <lnboyd@tenet.edu>
Date: Fri, 18 Jun 93 21:40:51 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: PGP 2.3
Message-ID: <199306190439.AA20123@Alice-Thurman.tenet.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


 
Help!!
 
I don't have Usenet access, so I can't post this on the 
pgp newsgroup, and this is the only other place I know of 
to ask this...
 
I just got pgp23.zip and pgp23src.zip from soda, and I 
can't make it give valid signatures with the -a option 
(well, actually the Armor=on line in the config.txt 
file)!  It will work correctly if Armor=off, and if the 
file is also encrypted, but a straight signature with 
ascii armor appended to the message doesn't work.  Even 
pgp22 gives me an invalid signature "doesn't match 
contents" message!
 
Has anyone else had this problem with 2.3?  I've even re-
compiled with Borland C++ 3.1, and get the same problem.
 
sean





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Tyler Yip - UnixWeenie(tm) <davros@ecst.csuchico.edu>
Date: Sat, 19 Jun 93 00:28:31 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: The Computer Shopper cipher
Message-ID: <9306190728.AA09090@hairball.ecst.csuchico.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Compared to the lines of the Computer Shopper program, how would this variant 
evaluate out time-complexity wise?  I'm not sure how sophisticated the
attacks on pseudo-random generators are.
This one includes an random generator shift, based upon the random numbers.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
#include	<stdio.h>

static int seed;

int rand1(int seedval) { return (seed * 183041 % 183319 + 1); }

int rand2(int seed) { return (seed * 502001 % 502441 + 1); }

void main(int argc, char *argv[]) {

	int	current;
	FILE *input, *output;

	if (argc !=3) {
		fprintf(stderr, "Usage: %s input output\n", argv[0]);
		exit(1);
	}
	if ((input = fopen(argv[1], "rb")) == NULL) {
		fprintf(stderr, "Error opening inputfile %s\n",argv[1]);
	}
	if ((output = fopen(argv[2], "wb")) == NULL) {
		fprintf(stderr, "Error opening outputfile %s\n",argv[1]);
	}

	printf("Enter cipher key: ");
	seed = getc(stdin);
	current = fgetc(input);
	while(!feof(input)) {
		fputc(current ^ seed, output);
		current = fgetc(input);
		if (seed && 8) {
			seed = rand1(seed);
		}
		else {
			seed = rand2(seed);
		}
	}
	fclose(input);
	fclose(output);
}
-- 
Tyler Yip, UnixWeenie(tm)        \ God put me on Earth to accomplish a certain
email: davros@ecst.csuchico.edu   \ number of things.  Right now I am so far 
California State University, Chico \ behind I will never die. -Calvin & Hobbes




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: wet!naga (Peter Davidson)
Date: Sat, 19 Jun 93 02:11:53 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: weak pseuodrandom number generator
Message-ID: <m0o6ybl-0003IzC@wet.uucp>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


 
A pseudorandom number generator recently proposed here, namely:
 
int rand1(int seedval) { return (seed * 183041 % 183319 + 1); }
 
needs some cleaning up.  It should be something like:
 
unsigned long rand1(unsigned long n)
{ return ( ( ( n * 183041L) % 183319 ) + 1 ); }
 
where n is initally set to some seed value.  However, this is
particularly weak, and quickly degenerates into a cycle,
usually of length 208, as the following program will confirm:
 
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
 
unsigned long a[15000];
 
unsigned long rand1( unsigned long n );
 
void main(int argc, char **argv)
{
unsigned int i=0, j;
 
if ( argc < 2 )
    return;
 
a[0] = atol(argv[1]);
while ( ++i < 15000 )
    {
    a[i] = rand1(a[i-1]);
    for ( j=0; j<i; j++ )
        {
        if ( a[i] == a[j] )
            {
            printf(" Cycle of length %d found.\n",i-j);
            return;
            }
        }
    }
}
 
unsigned long rand1( unsigned long n )
{
return ( ( ( n * 183041L ) % 183319L ) + 1 );
}
 
The other generator proposed is equally weak.
 
This does not demonstrate that pseudorandom number generators
cannot be used as a basis for strong encryption.
 




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Tyler Yip - UnixWeenie(tm) <davros@ecst.csuchico.edu>
Date: Sat, 19 Jun 93 02:34:15 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: that cipher I wrote
Message-ID: <9306190933.AA12046@hairball.ecst.csuchico.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Peter Davidson: thanks for the cycle tester!!!!!  hadn't thought about
testing a generator.  As for those generators, they are seeded with the key,
but, I messed it up by getting the primes in the wrong order.

What characteristics of the multiplier and modulator provide large periods?
-- 
Tyler Yip, UnixWeenie(tm)        \ God put me on Earth to accomplish a certain
email: davros@ecst.csuchico.edu   \ number of things.  Right now I am so far 
California State University, Chico \ behind I will never die. -Calvin & Hobbes




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Nickey MacDonald <i6t4@jupiter.sun.csd.unb.ca>
Date: Fri, 18 Jun 93 22:58:41 PDT
To: cypherpunks list <cypherpunks@toad.com>
Subject: PGP question
Message-ID: <Pine.3.05.9306190253.A25138-b100000@jupiter>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I am working on an interesting application using PGP.. and I have come
upon a snag.  I want to have a message with more that one "pgp block" ie
more than one file encrypted and then all the encrypted files concatenated
as one new file.  If you just use "pgp file" it tries to overwrite the same
file each time.  If you give it multiple -o specifications, it only takes
the last one, and tries to keep overwriting it.  If you use -p, it names
each file based on what the original encryptor called it, but in this
application that would allow for the files to still overwrite each other. 
What I really need is a way to specify a "base" that is modified for each
output.
(eg  base="file" and output files become "file.1" "file.2" "file.3" etc)

Is this possible...  can anyone give me *any* suggestions to improve the
situation...  This has to be an unattended operation.

--
Nick MacDonald               | NMD on IRC
i6t4@jupiter.sun.csd.unb.ca  | PGP 2.1 Public key available via finger
i6t4@unb.ca                  | (506) 457-1931    ^{1024/746EBB 1993/02/23}






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Linda Boyd <lnboyd@tenet.edu>
Date: Sat, 19 Jun 93 01:10:49 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: correction on pgp 2.3 problem
Message-ID: <199306190808.AA28340@Alice-Thurman.tenet.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Please forgive me!
 
        It seems that the signature generated by the pgp 
2.3 _IS_ good (according to 2.2), in any form.  It's just 
that pgp 2.3 will not read a signature that is appended 
to an ascii message and ascii armored.  If the signature 
is in a separate file, or if it isn't armored, it will 
read it fine.  Just not a message with the signature 
block attached to it...
 
        So the problem is in the reading of the pgp signature
block, not in the generation of the signature.  I'm not very 
adept at programming, but am trying to work my way through
it to see if I can find the problem.
 
        Sorry for the previous mistake.  Again, maybe 
this is just my machine...
 
sean




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Doug Porter <dporter@well.sf.ca.us>
Date: Sat, 19 Jun 93 03:41:07 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re:  Blasting Bidzos Blather
Message-ID: <93Jun19.034042pdt.13994-2@well.sf.ca.us>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> NIST had no choice

Pure bull puckey. 

First, they could have let DSA die. The commercial sector, particularly 
banks, would have come up with alternatives we could trust.

Second, they could do what competent engineers have done for many 
decades: designed around inconvenient patents. 

Third, if they knew they weren't up to it, they could have asked for 
public help in that design.

Fourth, they could have challenged PKP's patents on their merits.

Fifth, they could have worked to get those patents declared void in the 
public interest. I personally don't support this one until PKP is shown 
to be primarily government controlled.

They did none of these things. Why?

Doug




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "George A. Gleason" <gg@well.sf.ca.us>
Date: Sat, 19 Jun 93 04:18:38 PDT
To: smb@research.att.com
Subject: Re:  RRe:  Blasting Bidzos Blather
Message-ID: <93Jun19.041815pdt.13927-1@well.sf.ca.us>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Consider also the possibility that Bidzos might have felt that it was either
sell it now or have it seized later.  National security seizures of crypto
patents are nothing new.  "He who turns and sells away, will live to sell
another day..."  




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: starr@genie.slhs.udel.edu
Date: Sat, 19 Jun 93 03:15:34 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Violation of 3rd Amendment
Message-ID: <9306191011.aa09178@genie.genie.slhs.udel.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I don't think it's correct to say that the 3rd amendment isn't violated.  If
you consider police forces standing armies and policemen soldiers, then the
cases of confiscation of private homes under civil forfeiture for the
occupation of cops constitutes violation of the 3rd amendment.  The problem
with this is that it takes some doing to persuade that police are standing
armies and cops soldiers by different names.

Tim Starr - Renaissance Now!

Assistant Editor: Freedom Network News, the newsletter of ISIL,
The International Society for Individual Liberty,
1800 Market St., San Francisco, CA 94102
(415) 864-0952; FAX: (415) 864-7506; 71034.2711@compuserve.com

Think Universally, Act Selfishly - starr@genie.slhs.udel.edu




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: J. Michael Diehl <mdiehl@triton.unm.edu>
Date: Sat, 19 Jun 93 11:38:34 PDT
To: i6t4@jupiter.sun.csd.unb.ca (Nickey MacDonald)
Subject: Re: PGP question
In-Reply-To: <Pine.3.05.9306190253.A25138-b100000@jupiter>
Message-ID: <9306191838.AA25943@triton.unm.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


According to Nickey MacDonald:
> 
> I am working on an interesting application using PGP.. and I have come
> upon a snag.  I want to have a message with more that one "pgp block" ie
> more than one file encrypted and then all the encrypted files concatenated
> as one new file.  If you just use "pgp file" it tries to overwrite the same

I remember doing this once.  What I did was (I think) I encrypted each file in
turn and copied it to the end of the "master" file.  You can then go back and 
wipe the temp-cypher files.  When you pgp master.fil, it will extract each file
in turn.  And, yes, this is an automatic process.  Hope this helps.

+-----------------------+-----------------------------+---------+
| J. Michael Diehl ;-)  | I thought I was wrong once. | PGP KEY |
| mdiehl@triton.unm.edu |   But, I was mistaken.      |available|
| mike.diehl@fido.org   |                             | Ask Me! |
| (505) 299-2282        +-----------------------------+---------+
|                                                               |
+------"I'm just looking for the opportunity to be -------------+
|            Politically Incorrect!"   <Me>                     |
+-----If codes are outlawed, only criminals wil have codes.-----+
+----Is Big Brother in your phone?  If you don't know, ask me---+



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: wet!naga (Peter Davidson)
Date: Sat, 19 Jun 93 16:53:37 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: testing pseudorandom number generators
Message-ID: <m0o78nY-0003XYC@wet.uucp>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



 
Tyler Yip, UnixWeenie(tm), asks:
 
>What characteristics of the multiplier and modulator provide large periods?
 
The standard reference is D. Knuth, The Art of Computer Programming
(as I recall), Volume II, the chapter on random numbers.  Knuth
gives conditions involving a, k and m for n = ( n*a + k ) mod m
to have a long (or maximal) period.
 
For the less mathematically-inclined, a pleasing and quick way to
eliminate weak pseudorandom number generators is to use the generator
to pick row and column pixel positions on a graphics screen.  Turn
on "randomly" selected pixels.  If the screen does not get completely
filled in a visibly random way then the generator is weak.  A particularly
weak generator will turn on 1% or so of the pixels then nothing further
happens because it has entered a cycle.  A weak generator may fill the
screen with parallel lines.  Writing a program to test generators in this
way is a useful, easy and amusing task and is left as an exercise for the
reader.
 
Someone may be inclined to reply that this test does not show that a
generator is cryptographically strong, to which the answer is: 
True, but it certainly eliminates the ones that aren't, and it's 
fun to watch the pixel display for different generators.

Well, on second thought, maybe some generators that are not crypto-
graphically bullet-proof might pass this test.  But if some generator
does not, you can throw it away immediately.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: stig@netcom.com (Stig)
Date: Sat, 19 Jun 93 14:20:28 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Trimmed down pgp.hlp
Message-ID: <9306192120.AA10808@netcom.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I edited down the pgp.hlp file so that it's more readable (for me anyway).
In case you think that the help file is less than helpful, just replace it.

PGP maintainers:  please add this (or an even more concise version) to the
pgp distribution...contrib directory is fine.

	Stig

------------
Here's a quick summary of PGP v2.2 commands.

pgp ciphertextfile [-o plaintextfile]		decrypt or verify signature

pgp -e textfile her_userid			encrypt file w/ pubkey
pgp -e textfile userid1 userid2 userid3		multiple recipients
pgp -s textfile [-u your_userid]		sign plaintext file
pgp -es textfile her_userid [-u your_userid]	sign, then encrypt

pgp -c textfile			traditional symmetric cipher only

KEY MANAGEMENT:

pgp -kg				generate your own unique key pair
pgp -ka keyfile [keyring]	add new key(s) to your keyrings	

pgp -kx userid keyfile [keyring]	extract (copy) a key from a keyring
pgp -kxa userid keyfile [keyring]	same, except it's ascii

pgp -kv[v] [userid] [keyring] 	view the contents of your public ring
pgp -kvc [userid] [keyring]	view the "fingerprint" of a public key

pgp -kc [userid] [keyring] 	check signatures of public keys

pgp -ke userid [keyring]	edit userid/pass-phrase for your keypair
pgp -ke userid [keyring]	edit the trust parameters for a public key

pgp -kr userid [keyring]	remove a key (or userid) from your pubring

pgp -ks her_userid [-u your_userid] [keyring]	sign/certify a public key
pgp -krs userid [keyring]	remove selected signatures from a pubkey

pgp -kd your_userid		revoke your key & issue compromise certificate
pgp -kd userid			disable or reenable a key on your pubring

ESOTERIC USAGES:

pgp -d ciphertextfile		decrypt message and leave its signature 
pgp -sb textfile [-u your_userid]	create signature separate from textfile
pgp -b ciphertextfile		detach signature from a signed message

OTHER FLAGS 
	-a (ascii)	produce ascii radix-64 output suitable for email
	-m (more)	read in more mode, force reading in more mode
	-w (wipe)	erase plaintext after encrypting
	-f (filter)	input from stdin and output to stdout
	-t (text)	when encrypting, treat input as ascii text
	-p		when decrypting, recover original filename

	Ex: pgp -feast her_userid <inputfile >outputfile

/* Jonathan Stigelman, Stig@netcom.com, PGP public key by finger  */
/* fingerprint = 32 DF B9 19 AE 28 D1 7A  A3 9D 0B 1A 33 13 4D 7F */




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: gnu (John Gilmore)
Date: Sat, 19 Jun 93 18:57:35 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com, gnu
Subject: Re: that cipher I wrote (pseudo random generators)
In-Reply-To: <9306190933.AA12046@hairball.ecst.csuchico.edu>
Message-ID: <9306200157.AA06857@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> What characteristics of the multiplier and modulator provide large periods?

Don't bother with looking for a large period (though Knuth spends
about half a book on pseudorandom number generators).  The problem is
that the sequence is predictable.  Given ten sequential values from
anywhere in the sequence, I think there are algorithms that will
determine the sequence.  This is from dim recall of some Crypto '90
presentations.  Perhaps someone has the papers in front of them, or
can re-derive the results?

Given plaintext XOR'd with a sequence, you can make pretty good guesses at
ten values in the sequence, and if you have to try a few thousand guesses,
it will still only take minutes or hours to crack.

	John




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: nobody@apsicc.aps.edu
Date: Sun, 20 Jun 93 14:31:02 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com (Those Rascals!)
Subject: basic truth
Message-ID: <030620151902.63b@APSICC.APS.EDU>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Make it sufficiently difficult for people to do something, and most people
will stop doing it.                    -- Robert Sommer
-Forwarded by Nobody.





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: zane@genesis.mcs.com (Sameer)
Date: Sun, 20 Jun 93 16:20:43 PDT
To: "George A. Gleason" <gg@well.sf.ca.us>
Subject: Re:  OTP dual decryption
In-Reply-To: <93Jun18.024542pdt.13995-1@well.sf.ca.us>
Message-ID: <m0o7YT2-000MVnC@genesis.mcs.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


In message <93Jun18.024542pdt.13995-1@well.sf.ca.us>, "George A. Gleason" writes:
>
> 
> Yeah, the advantage is, if they think they've found it, they might just
> stop looking much further.  It's a chance that might save your ass.
> 
> -gg
	Wouldn't it be possible to encrypt the plaintext with DES and
then when some TLA tells you to hand over they key tell them that it's
an OTP and give them an OTP which produces an innocuous plaintext?
	Then you don't have to worry about key storage, right? (Because
DES-keys are hashed from strings [right?] which can be kept in human
memory.)

--
| Sameer Parekh-zane@genesis.MCS.COM-PFA related mail to pfa@genesis.MCS.COM |
| Apprentice Philosopher, Writer, Physicist, Healer, Programmer, Lover, more |
| "Symbiosis is Good" - Me_"Specialization is for Insects" - R. A. Heinlein_/
 \_______________________/ \______________________________________________/ 




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: gnu (John Gilmore)
Date: Mon, 21 Jun 93 03:08:27 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com, gnu
Subject: Re: Patent libraries
In-Reply-To: <9306161849.AA16059@muskwa.ucs.ualberta.ca>
Message-ID: <9306211008.AA00861@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Here's some info about the Sunnyvale patent library.  You can walk-in
and do it all yourself, for free.  Bring a few rolls of dimes, since
they don't make change and their copiers don't have mag-cards.  Or,
you can put down a deposit and have them copy patents and mail or fax
them to you.  I've done it both ways.

It's on a back street, in an old elementary school complex.  A bit
hard to find.  Call for directions.  It's worth spending a day there
e.g. looking up crypto patents, if your days aren't in short supply.
I found the microcode to the 68000 in there, among other things.

	John Gilmore

Sunnyvale Patent Information Clearinghouse
1500 Partridge Avenue, Building 7
Sunnyvale, CA  94087
+1 408 730 7290  voice
+1 408 735 8762  fax

Sunnyvale Patent Information Clearinghouse has a complete set of US
patents and trademarks from number one to the present issue.  We
provide rapid document delivery at an affordable price.
Orders may be phoned in during office hours (M-F, 9-5) or faxed at
your convenience.

Patent copy charges are:

Regular charge --	$3.55 per patent, 90c/page, plus postage
24 hour turnaround

Express mail --		$3.55 per patent, 90c/page, handling fee $8.60,
same day service	plus express charge
(3pm cutoff)

Fax -- same day		$14.30 per patent, $1.60/page

Fax -- within 2 hours	$35.65 per patent, $1.60/page

Special pick-up		$3.55 per patent, 90c/page, handling fee $8.60 
in person

DEPOSIT ACCOUNT SERVICE:  You must establish a deposit account before
receiving patent copies.  The minimum deposit is $75.  On your
letterhead stationary, submit names authorized to use the deposit
account.  Checks should be made payable to the City of Sunnyvale.
--
John Gilmore                gnu@toad.com  --  gnu@cygnus.com  --  gnu@eff.org
Creating freedom, rather than longer chains, bigger cages, better meals, . . .




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: jim@tadpole.com (Jim Thompson)
Date: Mon, 21 Jun 93 14:21:52 PDT
To: gnu@toad.com
Subject: Re: Patent libraries
Message-ID: <9306211509.AA04645@tadpole.tadpole.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



If there are any other Austin-based cypherpunks, UT is a federal IP depository.

Jim




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Peter Wayner <pcw@access.digex.net>
Date: Mon, 21 Jun 93 07:53:26 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: A cite desired...
Message-ID: <199306211453.AA17846@access.digex.net>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



I remember reading that IBM originally started looking into
cryptosystems like DES after they were informally tipped off
that the Russians were evesdropping on their internal network.
Can anyone give me a pointer to this fact?




Thanks,

Peter Wayner




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: cdodhner@indirect.com (Christian D. Odhner)
Date: Mon, 21 Jun 93 10:57:51 PDT
Subject: No Subject
Message-ID: <9306211756.AA03344@indirect.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text


Just checking out a "patently false rumor" I heard about... <g> Yeah I'll bite.
Drop me a note or not...   -Happy Hunting.



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Tom Keenan <keenan@acs.ucalgary.ca>
Date: Mon, 21 Jun 93 12:51:25 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: The other Clipper
Message-ID: <9306211719.AA32503@acs3.acs.ucalgary.ca>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Just to avert any confusion...

I see (Communications Week, June 7, 1993, pg 1) that the code
name for IBM's soon to be announced ATM (asynchronous
transfer mode) switch happens (?) to be "Clipper."  It's
apparently based on "IBM's experimental Planet switch, a 6
gigabit per second switch that handles both variable and fixed
length packets" and is in test at Rogers Communications in
Toronto.

(Just in case you hear communications types using the term "Clipper"
in a different sense from the one usually seen on this list.)
-- 
Dr. Tom Keenan, I.S.P.   Associate Dean, R&D, Faculty of Cont. Ed.
University of Calgary   2500 University Dr. NW   Calgary, AB T2N 1N4 CANADA
(403) 220-4715 (voice)  (403) 284-5702 (fax)    keenan@acs.ucalgary.ca (email)




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: zane@genesis.mcs.com (Sameer)
Date: Mon, 21 Jun 93 11:34:40 PDT
To: "George A. Gleason" <gg@well.sf.ca.us>
Subject: Re:  OTP dual decryption
In-Reply-To: <93Jun21.003959pdt.14001-3@well.sf.ca.us>
Message-ID: <m0o7qY1-000MU6C@genesis.mcs.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


In message <93Jun21.003959pdt.14001-3@well.sf.ca.us>, "George A. Gleason" writes:
>
> interesting... If I understand you; it's keep your DES key in your head, and
> use the DES cyphertext to create an appropriate OTP key that decrypts back
> to something innocuous.  good.  The thing is, to make this credible, we
> still need an OTP program which is in general use for communications.  
	Yeah. OTP's seem awfully cumbersome.

> 
> Now here's another possible problem.  Let's say that They are tapping you
> and grab all the cyphertext of your actual communications.  Now they grab
> your hard drive and what they get is a different batch of cyphertext.  That
> in and of itself might call up some suspicions.  Any solution in sight...?
	Hmm? I don't understand this problem. There's only one set of
cyphertext.. the actual cyphertext. Do you mean "different batch of
cyphertext" as the OTP which creates the innocuous plaintext from the
cyphertext? Maybe encrypt the OTP w/DES and keep it on your hard drive.
When "they" snag the drive, they see the different cyphertext, you tell
them that it's the OTP you used and give them the DES-key to decrypt the
innocuous OTP.
	I sense a problem with histogram equalization, however. Is there a
problem here or does OTP-encryption take care of that? 

--
| Sameer Parekh-zane@genesis.MCS.COM-PFA related mail to pfa@genesis.MCS.COM |
| Apprentice Philosopher, Writer, Physicist, Healer, Programmer, Lover, more |
| "Symbiosis is Good" - Me_"Specialization is for Insects" - R. A. Heinlein_/
 \_______________________/ \______________________________________________/ 




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: gnu (John Gilmore)
Date: Mon, 21 Jun 93 14:30:02 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Some FOIA results re Clipper
Message-ID: <9306212130.AA19632@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Lee Tien and I have submitted a pile of FOIA requests about Clipper.
Here is scanned-in text from some of the more interesting results,
courtesy of Lee.  Search for "required", for a mention of the proposal
to require the use of Clipper.  Also note that the role of the
"national security community" has been deliberately withheld from the
public statements (search for "mentioned").

Most agencies have not yet responded with documents.  FBI is claiming
it will take them a year, and we are preparing to file suit to force
them to do it within 10 days like the law requires.  (Our NSA suit over
the same thing, is continuing through the gears of the court process.)

	John Gilmore


	[This page originally XXXXXXXXXXXXXXX TOP SECRET; now UNCLASSIFIED]

OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, DC  20301-3040

COMMAND CONTROL COMMUNICATIONS AND 
INTELLIGENCE

MEMORANDUM FOR MS. JOANN H. GRUBE, NSA 
REPRESENTATIVE/NSC PRD-27 EXPORT CONTROL 
WORKING GROUP

SUBJECT:  Comments on PRD-27/NSA Draft (U)

	(U)	Following are comments concerning your proposed 
memorandum to Jim Lewis, Department of State:

XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
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XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
XXXXXXXXXX blacked out via FOIA (b)(1) exemption. XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

	(U)	The assertions in this draft are merely unsupported 
statements.  Recommend that the memorandum provide more 
empirical evidence to back up its assertions, and that the above 
comments be reflected in its contents.

	(signed)
	Daniel J. Ryan
	Director, Information Systems Security

CLASSIFIED BY:  OASD(C3I)/DIR, ISS
DECLASSIFY ON:  OADR


	[This page originally XXXXXXXX SECRET; now UNCLASSIFIED]

OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON DC 20301-3040

COMMAND, CONTROL, COMMUNICATIONS AND
INTELLIGENCE

30 APR 1993  (stamped)

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ACTING ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (C3I)

Subject:  PRD/NSC-27 Advanced Telecommunications and Encryption (U)

(U)	Advances in telecommunications have created the
opportunity for public use of encryption to ensure the privacy and
integrity of business and personal communications.  These same
advances threaten the capabilities of law enforcement and national
security operations that intercept the communications of
narcotraffickers, organized criminals, terrorists, espionage agents
of foreign powers and SIGINT targets.  Diverse interests are in
diametric opposition with regard to industry's right to sell and the
public's right to use such capabilities.  A highly-emotional, spirited
public debate is likely.

(U)	In its simplest construct, this complex set of issues places
the public's right to privacy in opposition to the public's desire for
safety.  The law enforcement and national security communities
argue that if the public's right to privacy prevails and free use of
cryptography is allowed, criminals and spies will avoid wiretaps
and other intercepts and consequently prosper.  They propose that
cryptography be made available and required which contains a
"trapdoor" that would allow law enforcement and national security
officials, under proper supervision, to decrypt enciphered
communications.  Such cryptography exists, and while there are
many practical problems to be solved, this proposal is technically
possible to achieve.

(U)	Opponents of the proposal argue that the public has a right
to and an expectation of privacy, that a trapdoor system would be
prone to misuse and abuse, and that the proposed solution would
not work in any practical sense.  They assert that people who are
deliberately breaking much more serious laws would not hesitate to
use cryptography that does not have a trapdoor, and that secure
cryptography will inevitably be supplied by offshore companies.
Thus, freedom will be lost and many tax dollars spent to no effect.

(U)	This situation is complicated by the existence of other
interests.  For example, there currently exist strict controls on the
export of cryptography.  The computer industry points out that it
has one of the few remaining positive trade balances and that it is
vital that the dominance of the American computer industry in
world markets be preserved.  The industry fears that this will be
lost if offshore developers incorporate high-quality cryptography
into their products while U.S. industry either cannot do so or
suffers higher costs or delays due to requirements for export
licenses.  The industry argues persuasively that overseas markets
(much less drug lords or spies) will not look with favor on U.S.
products which have known trapdoors when offshore products
which do not have them are available.  In support of their
argument, they note that powerful public-key cryptography
developed and patented by RSA using U.S. tax dollars is free to
developers in Europe, subject to royalties in the United States, and
cannot be exported without expensive and time-late export
licenses.  These charges are true.

(U)	The national security community is especially interested in
preventing the spread of high-quality encipherment routines
overseas, and argues that more extensive use here at home will
inevitably result in such a proliferation.  Actually, it is too late.
The Data Encryption Standard (DES) is already widely available
throughout the world in both hardware and software forms, and
DES software can be downloaded anywhere in the world from
public bulletin boards by anyone with a PC, a MODEM and a
telephone.  In one recent experiment it took three minutes and
fourteen seconds to locate a source-code version of DES on the
INTERNET.  Widespread availability of DES and RSA will enable
offshore developers to provide high-quality encipherment for voice
and data communications in competition with U.S. industry's
products.

XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX  blacked out via FOIA exemption (b)(1) XXXXXXXXXXX

(U)	Despite these concerns, the President has directed that the
Attorney General request that manufacturers of communications
hardware use the trapdoor chip, and at least AT&T has been
reported willing to do so (having been suitably incentivised by
promises of Government purchases).  The Attorney General has
also been directed to create a system for escrow of key material.
The Secretary of Commerce has been directed to produce standards
based on the use of the trapdoor chip.

(U)	The President has also directed that the fact that law
enforcement officials will have access to the keys will not be
concealed from the public.  National security officials are not
mentioned.

(U)	The new administration is committed to the development of
an information superhighway and a National Information
Infrastructure in support of the economy.  This worthy goal is
independent of arguments as to whether or not law enforcement
and national security officials will be able to read at will traffic
passing along the information superhighway.  A full-scale public
debate is needed to ascertain the wishes of U.S. citizens with
regard to their privacy, and the impact on public safety of
preserving privacy at the expense of wiretapping and
communications intercept capabilities of law enforcement and
national security personnel.  It is not clear what the public will
decide.  In the meantime, DoD has trapdoor technology and the
Government is proceeding with development of the processes
needed to apply that technology in order to maintain the capability
to perform licit intercept of communications in support of law
enforcement and national security.

	(signed)
	Ray Pollari
	Acting DASD (CI & SCM)


	[This page originally SECRET; now UNCLASSIFIED]

ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON DC  20301-3040

May 3, 1993

COMMAND, CONTROL, COMMUNICATIONS AND
INTELLIGENCE

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

MEMORANDUM FOR DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
FROM:		CHARLES A. HAWKINS, JR., ACTING ASD(C3I)  (initialed C. Hxxx)
SUBJECT:	Advanced Telecommunications and Encryption (U)
PURPOSE:	INFORMATION

DISCUSSION:	(U)  In response to DEPSECDEF's tasking of
21 Apr 93 (TAB A) this information is provided.  Advances in
telecommunications have created the opportunity for public use of
encryption to ensure the privacy and integrity of business and
personal communications.  These same advances threaten the
capabilities of law enforcement and national security operations that
intercept the communications of narcotraffickers, organized
criminals, terrorists, espionage agents of foreign powers and a broad
range of SIGINT targets.  Diverse interests are in diametric
opposition with regard to industry's right to sell and the public's right
to use such capabilities.  A highly-emotional, spirited public debate
is likely.

	(U)  The law enforcement and national security communities
argue that if the public's right to privacy prevails and free use of
cryptography is allowed, criminals and spies will avoid wiretaps and
other intercepts.  They propose that cryptography be made available
to the public which contains a "trapdoor" that would allow law
enforcement and national security officials, under proper
supervision, to decrypt enciphered communications.  Such
cryptography exists, and while there are many practical problems to
be solved, this proposal is technically possible to implement.

	(U)  Opponents of the proposal argue that the public has a
right to and expectation of privacy, that such a system would be
prone to misuse and abuse, and that the proposed solution would not
work in any practical sense.  They assert that criminals and spies will
not hesitate to use secure cryptography supplied by offshore
companies.  Thus, the loss of privacy would outweigh any
advantages to law enforcement or national security.

	(U)  The computer industry points out that it has one of the
few remaining positive trade balances and that it is vital that the
dominance of the American computer industry in world markets be
preserved.  The industry fears that this will be lost if offshore
developers incorporate high-quality cryptography into their products
while U.S. industry either cannot do so or suffers higher costs or
delays due to requirements for export licenses because of strict
controls of export of cryptography.  The industry argues persuasively
that overseas markets (much less drug lords or spies) will not look
with favor on U.S. products which have known trapdoors when
offshore products which do not have them are available.

CLASSIFIED BY:	DASD(CI&SCM)
DECLASSIFY ON:	OADR


	[This page originally XXXXXXXX SECRET; now UNCLASSIFIED]


	(U)  The national security community is especially interested
in preventing the spread of high-quality encipherment routines
overseas, and argues that more extensive use here at home will
inevitably result in such a proliferation.  This would increase the cost
of performing the SIGINT mission or decrease the amount of
intelligence, or both.  The Data Encryption Standard (DES) is
already widely available throughout the world in both hardware and
software forms, and DES software can be downloaded anywhere in
the world from public bulletin boards by anyone with a PC, a
MODEM, and a telephone.  Thus far, widespread availability has not
led to widespread use.  However, widespread availability of DES and
RSA will make it possible for offshore developers to provide high-
quality encipherment for voice and data communications in
competition with U.S. industry's products.

XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
XXXXXXXXXX blacked out under FOIA exemption (b)(1) XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

	(U)  The President has directed that the Attorney General
request that manufacturers of communications hardware use the
trapdoor chip.  The Attorney General has also been directed to create
a system for escrow of key material.  The Secretary of Commerce
has been directed to produce standards based on the use of the
trapdoor chip.  The President has also directed that the fact that law
enforcement officials will have access to the keys will not be
concealed from the public.  National security officials are not
mentioned.

	(U)  The new administration is committed to the development
of an information superhighway and a National Information
Infrastructure in support of the economy.  This worthy goal is
independent of arguments as to whether or not law enforcement and
national security officials will be able to read at will traffic passing
along the information superhighway.  A full-scale public debate is
beginning which will ascertain the wishes of U.S. citizens with
regard to their privacy and the impact on public safety of preserving
privacy at the expense of wiretapping and communications intercept
capabilities of law enforcement and national security personnel.  It is
not clear what the public will decide.  In the meantime, DoD has
trapdoor technology and the Government is proceeding with
development of the processes needed to apply that technology in
order to maintain the capability to perform licit intercept of
communications in support of law enforcement and national security.

Prepared by:  Dan Ryan/ODASD(CI & SCM)/x 41779/28 Apr 93/OSD

------- End of Forwarded Message





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: gnu (John Gilmore)
Date: Mon, 21 Jun 93 14:42:04 PDT
To: cypherpunks, tk0jut2@mvs.cso.niu.edu
Subject: A public experiment in how private our lives really are
Message-ID: <9306212142.AA19867@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


A reported has asked me for help in finding people who will help to 
pentrate the privacy of four volunteers, for a major newspaper story.

Any takers?  Contact the reporter:

   Reporter for major metro paper is interested in help finding out anything 
there is to find on four prominent people who have volunteered to have their 
privacy breached.
   Financial fundamentals. Lives of crime. Aches and pains. How rich they are, 
where they vacation, who they socialize with. You name it, we're interested in 
seeing if it's out there.
   All for a good cause.
   If you're willing to advise this computer-ignorant reporter, or dig in and 
get the dope on these volunteers, please contact him at tye@nws.globe.com
   Or call at +1 617 929 3342.
   Soon.
   
   Thanks.

Feel free to forward this far and wide.
--
John Gilmore                gnu@toad.com  --  gnu@cygnus.com  --  gnu@eff.org
Creating freedom, rather than longer chains, bigger cages, better meals, . . .




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: ""L. Detweiler"" <ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Date: Mon, 21 Jun 93 15:56:19 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: one reaction: early FOIA results
In-Reply-To: <9306212130.AA19632@toad.com>
Message-ID: <9306212255.AA29611@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>The industry argues persuasively that overseas markets
>(much less drug lords or spies) will not look with favor on U.S.
>products which have known trapdoors when offshore products
>which do not have them are available.  [...]  These charges are true.

I'm really amazed how unbiased these letters are. In fact, maybe they
were designed to be suitable for FOIA release. There is none of the
one-sided propaganda tone of the Clipper announcement.  Virtually all
the critical arguments *against* Clipper (which can always be taken in
parallel as criticisms of the current NSA role) are present -- except
for the constitutionality of its introduction or enforcement. The
arguments `against' are even labelled `true' and `persuasive'. I wonder
if any of this means anything. It could just be a gimmick to suggest
that `all concerns were fairly balanced in the proposal'. Does anyone
suppose that the important military aides anticipate FOIA requests and
come up with bland and benign documents to satisfy them?

>The law enforcement and national security communities ...
> propose that
> cryptography be made available and *required* which contains a
> "trapdoor" that would allow law enforcement and national security
> officials, under proper supervision, to decrypt enciphered
> communications.

For the first time we have an official confirmation that the original
intent of Clipper (or similar technology) was to make it *mandatory*. 
I think this is rather ironic considering many of the apologist's
current main rationalizations (Denning, Sternlight, etc.) that it is a
`voluntary' program.  Caveat Emptor!

>at least AT&T has been
>reported willing to do so (having been suitably incentivised by
>promises of Government purchases).

`incentivised' -- a cute euphemism for collusion.  I wonder to what
extent they were `incentivised'.

>(U)	The President has also directed that the fact that law
>enforcement officials will have access to the keys will not be
>concealed from the public.  National security officials are not
>mentioned.

eeks, that sounds amazingly ominous. Why would they say in one sentence
`law enforcement officials have access to the keys' and then in the
next `the security of the scheme for national security purposes is not revealed'?

>In the meantime, DoD has trapdoor technology ...

wow, they call Clipper `trapdoor technology' -- great PR, for us.

>These same advances threaten the
>capabilities of law enforcement and national security operations that
>intercept the communications of narcotraffickers, organized
>criminals, terrorists, espionage agents of foreign powers and a broad
>range of SIGINT targets.

`narcotraffickers' -- doesn't sound as hysterically paranoid as `drug
dealers'. Also, first time I've heard SIGINT and `espionage agents of
foreign powers' mentioned `officially' relative to Clipper (although of
course that intent was obvious). Just another effective death threat on
Clipper, because it will have the absolute *least* effect in foreign countries.

>A highly-emotional, spirited public debate
>is likely.

hehe, it's the NSA that is highly emotional. I'd say they're shuddering
and crying. OK OK, low blow, sorry.

[proliferation of strong cryptography]
>This would increase the cost
>of performing the SIGINT mission or decrease the amount of
>intelligence, or both.

both. already.

>Thus far, widespread availability has not
>led to widespread use.

hm, how could that be? It wouldn't have anything to do with draconian
export regulations, would it?

So, in short, we have greater confirmation of our worst fears: Clipper
was not just designed to be domestic, the purveyors of Clipper were
considering a *mandatory* scheme from the start, and national
intelligence interests have been obscured intentionally.  Also, we have
many more obfuscations of who `directed' the Clipper approach -- it
claims that the president did. This phrasing is very critical,
understand, because the NSA has no authority to make such a proposal,
and they must continue to assert that it was originated by the
Executive branch for it to have any semblance of legitimacy.  Note how
they always evade mention of *which* president, it is just The
President.  (Or as Sternlight once told me, The Whitehouse.)

>A highly-emotional, spirited
>public debate is likely.

Hm. This from a letter dated April 30, Clipper released April 16. Is
this a `reaction' or an `anticipation'?  This terminology overall
closely mirrors the Clipper announcement. Blacked out sections
presumably contain arguments on NSA capabilities relative to the new
technology.  Things like `the proliferation of strong cryptography is a
very serious threat to the continued existence of the agency' and `a
major current trend of diminuition and erosion in signal interception
capabilities can be identified.'

It seems to me that the next major threat will be something
approximating a mandatory scheme using cloaked terminology (e.g.  under
the guise of `regulating the industry' and `protecting the consumer')
as I wrote on sci.crypt.  I think we really have to drive home the
point that any mandatory scheme is fundamentally unconstitutional. This
little epiphany apparently has not occured to anyone who matters in the
development of Clipper policy yet.


BTW what is the significance of two copies of the same letter here?

p.s. special thanks to J. Gilmore for this critical information.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: tye@nws.globe.com
Date: Mon, 21 Jun 93 14:21:43 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: No Subject
Message-ID: <0096E5DE60478A40.29620183@globe.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



   
   
   Reporter for major metro paper is interested in help finding out anything 
there is to find on four prominent people who have volunteered to have their 
privacy breached.
   Financial fundamentals. Lives of crime. Aches and pains. How rich they are, 
where they vacation, who they socialize with. You name it, we're interested in 
seeing if it's out there.
   All for a good cause.
   If you're willing to advise this computer-ignorant reporter, or dig in and 
get the dope on these volunteers, please contact him at tye@nws.globe.com
   Or call at 617-929-3342.
   Help especially appreciated from anyone in the BOSTON area.
   Soon.
   
   Thanks.
   
   





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Derek L Davis <Derek_L_Davis@ccm.hf.intel.com>
Date: Mon, 21 Jun 93 17:06:06 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: FOIA differences
Message-ID: <930621171001_1@ccm.hf.intel.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Note that the 30 APR version of the memorandum (for the acting assistant 
secretary of defense) and the May 3 version (from the assistant secretary of 
defense to the deputy secretary of defense) has some differences.  In 
particular, the "required" reference is dropped on the second version.

 




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Timothy Newsham <newsham@wiliki.eng.hawaii.edu>
Date: Mon, 21 Jun 93 20:40:44 PDT
To: zane@genesis.mcs.com (Sameer)
Subject: Re: OTP dual decryption
In-Reply-To: <m0o7qY1-000MU6C@genesis.mcs.com>
Message-ID: <9306220340.AA02067@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> 
> 	Hmm? I don't understand this problem. There's only one set of
> cyphertext.. the actual cyphertext. Do you mean "different batch of
> cyphertext" as the OTP which creates the innocuous plaintext from the
> cyphertext? Maybe encrypt the OTP w/DES and keep it on your hard drive.
> When "they" snag the drive, they see the different cyphertext, you tell
> them that it's the OTP you used and give them the DES-key to decrypt the
> innocuous OTP.
> 	I sense a problem with histogram equalization, however. Is there a
> problem here or does OTP-encryption take care of that? 

With a OTP any plaintext can correspond with any cyphertext
given:

   PAD (+) plaintext = cyphertext
meaning
   PAD (+) cyphertext = plaintext
and
   plaintext (+) cyphertext = PAD

so, take your output of DES,  xor its contents with
desired "false plaintext"  this is your false pad.
store this on a seperate disk and make it look
all secret-like.

When feds come and take your cyphertext (which is output
of DES) they ask for your key.  You hand over your
disk with (fake) PAD.  They xor the two together to
get (fake) plaintext which reads.  

You dont have to do this before hand either, if you
have a copy of your cyphertext after the feds
confiscate a copy from you you can generate pad
to make it say something that will really freak them
out,  like something you couldnt have known prior
to the seizure of the cyphertext :
  "I will be illegally raided on July 2, 1994,  sounds
   sort of like '1984' to me.  I wish the government
   would stay out of my  life"


> | Sameer Parekh-zane@genesis.MCS.COM-PFA related mail to pfa@genesis.MCS.COM |

peace.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Douglas Sinclair <dsinclai@acs.ucalgary.ca>
Date: Mon, 21 Jun 93 19:54:11 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: hardware RNG
Message-ID: <9306220012.AA37450@acs1.acs.ucalgary.ca>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
 
Cypherpunks, 
 
A while back there was lots of discussion in the list about hardware
random number generation.  The consensus was that diode white noise
was the easiest thing to use.  It probably is, but I havn't been able to
persuade a single diode to be noisy yet.  Anyhow, I turned to the simplest
white noise source that I have, which happens to be a radio tuned to a dead
channel.  I hooked that up to a home made interface board that has previously
served as a frame grabber, and wrote some software to grab random numbers.
 
The hardware compares the signal to four known voltages, and sets the feedback
pins on my printer port correspondingly.  Thus, I get a nibble of information
every cycle.  However, it's fairly interrelated (if the high bit is set, the
low ones must be set too, &c).  So, this is the scheme I came up with to
randomize it.
 
Read two nibbles and concatenate them into a byte.  Take the parity of this
byte to give you one bit.  Read eight bits this way, to make one byte.
Read 128 bytes by this method, and take a MD5 hash of this data.  Use the 16
byte message digest as the final random bitstream.  Do this as many times
as needed to get the desired number of bytes.
 
Using the ENTROPY1 software submitted to the list by Peter Meyer, I determined
that a 1000000 byte file had a relative entropy of 0.999980.  This seems
close enough to 1 for cryptographical use.  For each bit of output, 64 bits
have been read from the device.  The MD5 transposition should eliminate all
of the wave nature of the signal and make adjacent bytes unrelated.
 
So, the question now is, is it safe?  An obvious method of attack is to simply
connect an identical device to a radio and grab identical data.  However, I
feel this is unfeasible.  Radio noise is omnidirectional and thus (I think)
should give you very different signals at different geographic locations due
to the different phases of the various sources.  There are too many variables
in the hardware itself.  What frequency is it at?  What are the comparison
values set to?  What other method could be used to attack this except for the
obvious tempest attack on the host computer?
 
                                        Doug
 
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.3
 
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-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

-- 
PGP 2.2 Key by finger




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: sommerfeld@apollo.hp.com
Date: Mon, 21 Jun 93 16:48:55 PDT
To: gnu@toad.com
Subject: comments on your recent post of FOIAed documents.
Message-ID: <9306212348.AA24641@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


1) The first document is particularly compelling, especially
considering the apparant references to the censored paragraph in the
un-censored paragraph... it makes it obvious that there are two sets
of reasons for clipper; the ones that they'll admit, and the ones
which are classified and which they won't admit in public.

2) The second document makes it clear that requiring the use of key
escrow is a goal of law enforcement and national security.

3) The dates on the documents are dated after Ms. Denning's infamous
"trial balloon"..

4) From the second document:

> In one recent experiment it took three minutes and
> fourteen seconds to locate a source-code version of DES on the
> INTERNET.

Hmm.  It only took me under minute when I tried it (using the command
"archie -s des.tar").  Maybe they tried it when the archie servers
were overloaded :-), or maybe they counted the time needed to read the
archie man page..

5) What kind of a dork uses words like "incentivized"?

					- Bill





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: bear@eagle.fsl.noaa.gov (Bear Giles)
Date: Mon, 21 Jun 93 19:13:04 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re:  one reaction: early FOIA results
Message-ID: <9306220209.AA27208@eagle.fsl.noaa.gov>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


"L. Detweiler" writes
>The
>arguments `against' are even labelled `true' and `persuasive'. I wonder
>if any of this means anything. It could just be a gimmick to suggest
>that `all concerns were fairly balanced in the proposal'.

It's always a dangerous strategy to recognize your opponent has a
legitimate position.  If they dismissed our concerns with hand-waving
they could also defuse Congressional (or other) inquiries with an appeal
to authority; but with these documents they've acknowledged the
legitimacy of our concerns.

>Does anyone
>suppose that the important military aides anticipate FOIA requests and
>come up with bland and benign documents to satisfy them?

You mean they _wouldn't_?  Refusal to provide all documents and the
dates of these documents (i.e., not during the initial design stages)
suggests that they could well be covers for other documents.

If nothing else, I would like to see correspondence at the same level
from a year ago, back when it appeared Bush was a shoo-in for reelection.
I suspect we will find a substantially different tone....

>For the first time we have an official confirmation that the original
>intent of Clipper (or similar technology) was to make it *mandatory*. 

I don't think we have _any_ information about the *original* intent.
We have some indications of what they intended after Clinton was
elected, but none of these documents are from the Bush era.

>>at least AT&T has been
>>reported willing to do so (having been suitably incentivised by
>>promises of Government purchases).
>
>`incentivised' -- a cute euphemism for collusion.  I wonder to what
>extent they were `incentivised'.

Why not accept this at face value -- the government asked AT&T how
many phones they would need to purchase to make it worthwhile for
AT&T to make the things, AT&T gave them a number, and the government
said "Okay!"

>>(U)	The President has also directed that the fact that law
>>enforcement officials will have access to the keys will not be
>>concealed from the public.  National security officials are not
>>mentioned.
>
>eeks, that sounds amazingly ominous. Why would they say in one sentence
>`law enforcement officials have access to the keys' and then in the
>next `the security of the scheme for national security purposes is not 
>revealed'?

I read this as "National security officials will have access to the keys,
but this will not be revealed to the public."

Nothing I hadn't already assumed.  :-(

>`narcotraffickers' -- doesn't sound as hysterically paranoid as `drug
>dealers'. 

No, "narcotraffickers" are the people who bring the drugs into the 
country.  Apparently the Feds have decided to leave persecution of
alleged drug dealers (note tenses) to local authorities using
forfeiture laws, while the Feds concentrate on the people bringing
the drugs into the country and the major distribution networks.

>>Thus far, widespread availability has not
>>led to widespread use.
>
>hm, how could that be? It wouldn't have anything to do with draconian
>export regulations, would it?

More likely the tendency of people to pretend "this can't happen to
me!"  After all, most people only deal with other residents of North
America and there are no internal cryptographic restrictions.  Yet.


Bear Giles




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: TO1SITTLER@APSICC.APS.EDU (Kragen Sittler)
Date: Mon, 21 Jun 93 22:03:07 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: What is going on here?
Message-ID: <930621225905.d46@APSICC.APS.EDU>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


From:	SMTP%"Postmaster" 21-JUN-1993 22:58:06.38
To:	<TO1SITTLER>
CC:	
Subj:	Undeliverable Mail

Date:     Mon, 21 Jun 1993 22:57:59 -0600 (MDT)
From:     Postmaster@APSICC.APS.EDU
Subject:  Undeliverable Mail
To:       <TO1SITTLER>

Bad address -- <cdohner@indirect.com>
Error -- Address refused by receiver: <cdohner@indirect.com> (550 <cdohner@indirect.com>... User unknown)

Start of returned message

  Date:    Mon, 21 Jun 1993 22:57:54 -0600 (MDT)
  From:    TO1SITTLER@APSICC.APS.EDU (Kragen Sittler)
  Message-Id: <930621225754.d46@APSICC.APS.EDU>
  Subject: What?
  To:      cdohner@indirect.com
  X-Vmsmail-To: SMTP%"cdohner@indirect.com"
  
  
  
  From:	SMTP%"cypherpunks-request@toad.com" 21-JUN-1993 15:27:12.37
  To:	TO1SITTLER
  CC:	
  Subj:	
  
  Date: Mon, 21 Jun 93 10:56:26 MST
  From: cdodhner@indirect.com (Christian D. Odhner)
  Message-Id: <9306211756.AA03344@indirect.com>
  Content-Type: text
  Content-Length: 123
  Apparently-To: cypherpunks@toad.com
  
  Just checking out a "patently false rumor" I heard about... <g> Yeah I'll bite.
  Drop me a note or not...   -Happy Hunting.
  
  
  What are you talking about?

End of returned message




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Fred Heutte <phred@well.sf.ca.us>
Date: Mon, 21 Jun 93 23:36:18 PDT
To: sommerfeld@apollo.hp.com
Subject: Re:  comments on your recent post of FOIAed documents.
Message-ID: <93Jun21.233550pdt.13996-1@well.sf.ca.us>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I did better than that: 2 seconds flat for   archie -m10 des.tar
  :-)




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: rclark@nyx.cs.du.edu (Robert W. F. Clark)
Date: Tue, 22 Jun 93 00:02:21 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: FOIA request
Message-ID: <9306220702.AA14470@nyx.cs.du.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



ngs.lance.colostate.edu (L. Detweiler) says:

>I'm really amazed how unbiased these letters are. In fact, maybe they
>were designed to be suitable for FOIA release. There is none of the
>one-sided propaganda tone of the Clipper announcement.  

Perhaps they were prepared.  However, it seems just as likely that
they realized that there would be a vast outcry over Clipper, just
as there was over the "Digital Telephony" proposal.  They would
have to be dumber than even I consider them not even to 
consider the possibility of public outcry.

>Does anyone
>suppose that the important military aides anticipate FOIA requests and
>come up with bland and benign documents to satisfy them?

I'll bet they started doing this the moment that the FOIA was passed.
Why wouldn't they?  It's expedient.

>For the first time we have an official confirmation that the original
>intent of Clipper (or similar technology) was to make it *mandatory*. 

Yep.  This particular quote ought to be distributed widely.
We cypherpunks have known this since the Clipper proposal reared
its monstrous head; now it's official writ, only recently declassified.
Let's make the most of it.


>I think this is rather ironic considering many of the apologist's
>current main rationalizations (Denning, Sternlight, etc.) that it is a
>`voluntary' program.  Caveat Emptor!

Well, as we've known, they're either shills or idiots.  Perhaps both.

>`incentivised' -- a cute euphemism for collusion.  I wonder to what
>extent they were `incentivised'.

'Incentivised' indeed.  I believe that anyone capable of using such
a revolting neologism is, _ipso facto_, untrustworthy.  Even Hollywood
people don't speak _that_ badly.

[. . .]

>>In the meantime, DoD has trapdoor technology ...

>wow, they call Clipper `trapdoor technology' -- great PR, for us.

It's pretty appalling that they even _admit_ that it is 'trapdoor'
technology.  However, as P. T. Barnum once said:  "No one ever went
broke underestimating the intelligence of the American public."

They're probably planning some new crime already, realizing that
Clipper will be defeated.  

They had Clipper in the hopper since
before Digital Telephony was defeated.

As Clipper makes Digital Telephony look like a schoolboy
prank, prepare for something genuinely monstrous in a few
months.  Probably just when we start feeling a little
complacent and victorious, too.

[Thanks to John Gilmore repeated; the FOIA gave very useful information.]

----
Robert W. F. Clark            (still waiting on the results
rclark@nyx.cs.du.edu           of my OWN FOIA request)
clark@metal.psu.edu




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: rclark@nyx.cs.du.edu (Robert W. F. Clark)
Date: Tue, 22 Jun 93 00:02:57 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: The Bizdos flap
Message-ID: <9306220703.AA14721@nyx.cs.du.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


bout all the Bizdos flap:

It is entirely possible that PKP has no sensible alternative
but to capitulate to the NSA's offer.  While Bizdos himself may
oppose the Clipper chip, it is obviously in PKP's best interest
to accept a virtual monopoly on the crypto industry.  

While Bizdos' title may be "President," it is very easy for a
company to remove a "President" who makes unprofitable choices.
As has been said before, corporations have no truck with ethics.
To expect a corporate entity to behave ethically is the same as
to expect a T-cell to cease absorbing phagocytes.  It ain't in
its nature.

If one wishes PKP to behave "ethically," it is necessary for us
to make it unprofitable for PKP to behave in the manner in which
it is.  E. g. question their patents, bring suits against them,
and otherwise make PKP's existence unprofitable.  Suddenly, it 
will behave "ethically."

Any ideas, folks?  

Don't expect help from Bizdos on it, though.

[P. S. Ever notice that the only two people who have
automatic form-letter answers to their email are Billys?
Billy Idol and Billy Clinton.  Fitting, somehow.]
----
Robert W. F. Clark
rclark@nyx.cs.du.edu
clark@metal.psu.edu




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: gnu (John Gilmore)
Date: Tue, 22 Jun 93 02:00:04 PDT
To: Douglas Sinclair <dsinclai@acs.ucalgary.ca>
Subject: Re: hardware RNG
In-Reply-To: <9306220012.AA37450@acs1.acs.ucalgary.ca>
Message-ID: <9306220859.AA01020@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> persuade a single diode to be noisy yet.  Anyhow, I turned to the simplest
> white noise source that I have, which happens to be a radio tuned to a dead
> channel. . .
> What other method could be used to attack this except for the
> obvious tempest attack on the host computer?

Well, the most obvious is for the attacker to TRANSMIT on that
frequency.  Then they control the 'random' data you are getting.

	John





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "George A. Gleason" <gg@well.sf.ca.us>
Date: Tue, 22 Jun 93 02:42:11 PDT
To: zane@genesis.mcs.com
Subject: Re:  OTP dual decryption
Message-ID: <93Jun22.024135pdt.13981-1@well.sf.ca.us>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Cyphertexts: I was thinking, you do your actual comms in a PKS and then
decrypt on disc and then reencrypt same over to OTP with an innocuous
covertext stored alongside... oh poo, now of course; I was mistaken.  You
take your PKS cyphertext and generate a spurious OTP covertext from there.

Okay, my error.  Sorry....

-gg




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "George A. Gleason" <gg@well.sf.ca.us>
Date: Tue, 22 Jun 93 03:05:56 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re:  one reaction: early FOIA results
Message-ID: <93Jun22.030531pdt.13994-3@well.sf.ca.us>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Re AT&T being "incentivised;" again, I'd like to suggest it's time to
dis-incentivise them like right now.  If you're on AT&T long distance,
change your carrier.  If you're using an AT&T phone system, replace it with
anything else.  

It would be interesting to find out that magic number of phones which AT&T
were promised under the Federal contract.  Then we can either a) set that as
a target for business phone systems getting rid of AT&T, i.e. one for one;
or b) figure out what the revenues would be and get an equivalent amount in
disconnected AT&T long distance (this one could be done on a gross dollar
equivalent amount, assuming one year's worth of service is the relevant
gross dollar value of a given client), or c) *both.*  Well....?

-gg




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "George A. Gleason" <gg@well.sf.ca.us>
Date: Tue, 22 Jun 93 03:09:37 PDT
To: rclark@nyx.cs.du.edu
Subject: Re:  The Bizdos flap
Message-ID: <93Jun22.030907pdt.13994-2@well.sf.ca.us>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Quoting you, "If one wishes PKP to behave "ethically," it is necessary for
us
to make it unprofitable for PKP to behave in the manner in which
it is.  E. g. question their patents, bring suits against them,
and otherwise make PKP's existence unprofitable.  Suddenly, it 
will behave "ethically."

That's like, if you want your kid to behave, beat him any time he
misbehaves.  Yeah, uh-huh.

If we want PKP to behave ethically, we have to show them positive i.e.
profitmaking incentives for doing so.  For instance commitments to buy their
products if they do (whatever).  

-gg




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: collins@newton.apple.com (Scott Collins)
Date: Tue, 22 Jun 93 11:23:48 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: gov. contracts for Clipper phones
Message-ID: <9306221822.AA11940@newton.apple.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Jason Zions writes:

  >[...] I find it
  >highly unlikely that the contracts in question are for clipper-based phones;
  >we already know the government doesn't plan to use clipper technology
  >itself, since it can be suborned by LEO types.

I think it *very* likely that the government would want to spy on itself
just as much as it wants to spy on everybody else.  Remember, the
government is not a single entity -- out to get us -- but a collection of
individuals, some fraction of whom are covering their butts and looking for
goats at any given moment (as has been revealed to us by the media).  All
of whom are interested in maintaining/improving their current status.  This
is true at the level of the individual, the committee, the agency, the
party... in fact at any identifiable organizational level, entities will
engage in behavior that profits them even (or especially) at the expense of
entities outside themselves.

Scott Collins              | "Few people realize what tremendous power
                           |  there is in one of these things."
                           |                            -- Willy Wonka
......................................................................
Apple Computer, Inc.       |     phone: 408 862-0540(v), 974-6094(f)
1 Infinite Loop, MS 301-2C | AppleLink: SCOTTCOLLINS
Cupertino, CA 95014        |  internet: collins@newton.apple.com





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Jason Zions <jazz@hal.com>
Date: Tue, 22 Jun 93 09:55:25 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: comments on your recent post of FOIAed documents.
Message-ID: <9306221655.AA29404@jazz.hal.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



>1) The first document is particularly compelling, especially
>considering the apparant references to the censored paragraph in the
>un-censored paragraph... it makes it obvious that there are two sets
>of reasons for clipper; the ones that they'll admit, and the ones
>which are classified and which they won't admit in public.

I also find it interesting that, while the President directed that the fact
of access to keys by Law Enforcement Officials should not be hidden from the
public, the fact of access to keys by ithe intelligence community (i.e.
FBI/CIA/NSA) was not to be similarly disclosed.

>> In one recent experiment it took three minutes and
>> fourteen seconds to locate a source-code version of DES on the
>> INTERNET.
>
>Hmm.  It only took me under minute when I tried it (using the command
>"archie -s des.tar").  Maybe they tried it when the archie servers
>were overloaded :-), or maybe they counted the time needed to read the
>archie man page..

They probably ran the client at the far end of a 9600-baud straw on a bad
archie day.

>5) What kind of a dork uses words like "incentivized"?

A government dork.

I find it more damning that the government basically bought-off AT&T by
promising them contracts; whatever happened to competetive bid? I find it
highly unlikely that the contracts in question are for clipper-based phones;
we already know the government doesn't plan to use clipper technology
itself, since it can be suborned by LEO types.

Hi, Bill!

Jason "Jazz" Zions




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: tribble@memex.com (E. Dean Tribble)
Date: Tue, 22 Jun 93 15:39:10 PDT
To: agorics@memex.com
Subject: address chagne
Message-ID: <9306222153.AA09164@memexis.memex.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Please send mail to me now at `tribble@netcom.com`

thanks,
dean




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: stub23 <eaeu362@orion.oac.uci.edu>
Date: Tue, 22 Jun 93 15:58:49 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: FOIA request
Message-ID: <199306222258.AA23793@orion.oac.uci.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


the FOIA request looks very interesting
and im near positive that something is on me somewhere
just becuase i have the wrong type of friends who keep
me in their address books

but how bad will it look if i actually make the request?
and will it mean that i am more likely to have people pay attention to me?
and how much info shoudl i include about myself?




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Dr. Cat <cat@wixer.bga.com>
Date: Tue, 22 Jun 93 14:28:03 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Perspectives
Message-ID: <9306222124.AA00723@wixer.bga.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


   The letters John Gilmore received through FOIA are interesting.  So are
the reactions of the cypherpunks.
   I think it's valuable for society to have a group of people examine such
information in an extremely skeptical manner, even bordering on paranoia.
The notion that these documents are a ploy to fool people into thinking the
government is aware of the problems with their proposal and has weighed them
carefully is worthy of speculation.  Such thoughts lead to potential avenues
of investigation that may turn up useful information.
   But there seems to be an overabundance of such views...  I think the
cypherpunks can better serve society by considering ALL possibilities and
investigating the more plausible ones.  Including the possibilities that some
of the bad guys aren't maximally devious, competent, or even bad guys.  I see
a lot of use of the word "they", as if the Department of Defense was part of
the same group of people as NIST, NSA, the president, etc. etc. and they all
are working together with the exact same set of goals and motivations.  I
think the situation in Washington is more complex than that.  And DoD is one
player I haven't heard anything previous about with regard to their stance on
and involvement with Clipper.  In addition to the notion that they totally
support Clipper, it should be considered whether they might totally oppose it
(unlikely), whether they've chosen not to be involved in the struggle over
it and are simply trying to analyze its potential effects on them and
disseminate the information internally to be better prepared, or whether
perhaps there are differences of opinion between varying individuals in the
DoD power structure.  And of course, even if you label them bad guys, there's
the possibility that someone wanted a summary of valid opposition arguments
in order to be able to combat them more effectively, and naively failed to
adequately protect them from being revealed to the opposition through the
FOIA.
   I don't have any particular opinion as to what's going on here.  I just
feel I ought to say something any time I only see one point of view
represented in a discussion of such a complicated issue.  Particularly when
such a small portion of the relevant information is, thus far, available.

                Dr. Cat




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: M..Stirner@f28.n125.z1.RBBS-NET.ORG (M. Stirner)
Date: Wed, 23 Jun 93 07:21:16 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Origin lines in remailers
Message-ID: <44.2C280DA9@wyrm.rbbs-net.ORG>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



In response to to call for more remailer traffic, I have been attempting
to disseminate the instructions for remailer use among users not members
of this list.

One of the problems that has arisen is the retention of the origin lines
placed at the bottom of the outgoing message by various gates & net
whatnot (see bottom of this message for an example).

Just before I lost access to this list a few months ago, I know that
there was a discussion on how this problem could be solved with both the
Cypherpunks & Penet remailers, but a conclusion had not been reached by
the time I left.  I did not notice a reference to this problem/solution
in either the Penet or Cypherpunks remailer helpfiles (which seem to be
both unchanged from earlier this year).

If this problem has been solved, would some kind soul post the fix here
for us?

Thanks.

M.
___ Blue Wave/QWK v2.12
--  
M. Stirner - via RBBS-NET node 8:914/201
INTERNET: M..Stirner@f28.n125.z1.RBBS-NET.ORG




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: rclark@nyx.cs.du.edu (Robert W. F. Clark)
Date: Tue, 22 Jun 93 22:10:42 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Corporate Ethics and the Profit Margin
Message-ID: <9306230510.AA04248@nyx.cs.du.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



rge Gleason) writes:

[My suggestions on ways to make it unprofitable for PKP to
 behave "unethically" deleted.]

>That's like, if you want your kid to behave, beat him any time he
>misbehaves.  Yeah, uh-huh.

Unlike the child, though, a corporation is not human.  In addition,
it is, alas, the manner of American business of late to be 
reactive instead of proactive.  Thus, rather than see the future 
catastrophe which will inevitably result if Clipper/Capstone is
mandated as a standard, PKP will look toward this year's profit
margin.  To get the attention of an American corporation, it
is regrettably necessary to "beat it every time it misbehaves."  

If it behaves, free market forces will take care of the reward.

In the case of PKP and AT & T, though, free market forces have
been subverted because they have been "incentivised" by Uncle
Sam.  ("Incentivised," ecch.  Sounds like a suitably grisly
operation, no?  Ever notice that euphemisms are usually
uglier than what they euphemise?  Even "bribe" would sound
less tawdry and criminal.)

>If we want PKP to behave ethically, we have to show them positive i.e.
>profitmaking incentives for doing so.  For instance commitments to buy their
>products if they do (whatever).  

Unfortunately, it's far easier for a large, diverse group to agree
_not_ to purchase something than get all of them to sign a group
contract to buy a certain company's merchandise.  It works, too.
Check out the Chavez grape boycott, and the alarming success of
the Moron Majority in bullying advertisers and television networks
to cancel "immoral" programming.

Unless there were a "Cypherpunks procurement committee," which purchased
crypto merchandise from "cypherpunk correct" dealers and resold to
cypherpunks, this would be difficult to manage.

It may be a good idea, but I, for one, don't have the capital
to set it up; and it doesn't seem likely to happen in the immediate
future.

Even you, when making concrete suggestions, seem to realize that
punishment and/or negative reinforcement are effective tools,
as in your next message you write:

>Re AT&T being "incentivised;" again, I'd like to suggest it's time to
>dis-incentivise them like right now.  If you're on AT&T long distance,
>change your carrier.  If you're using an AT&T phone system, replace it with
>anything else.  

[Other good suggestions elided.]

This is the "whack 'em when they misbehave" tactic which 
you seemed to oppose in your prior message.  It's really the
main weapon in our arsenal against corporate misbehavior.
----
Robert W. F. Clark         Stop the Clipper Chip!
rclark@nyx.cs.du.edu
clark@metal.psu.edu




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: J. Michael Diehl <mdiehl@triton.unm.edu>
Date: Tue, 22 Jun 93 22:58:05 PDT
To: caadams@triton.unm.edu (Clifford A Adams)
Subject: PGP Menu on soda.berkeley.edu
Message-ID: <9306230557.AA22297@triton.unm.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I have just uploaded version 1.0 of my pgp menu system for 4dos/Ndos.  It 
presents a menu interface to all of the major pgp functions and I'm quite 
proud of it.  It does, however, require 4dos or Norton's Ndos to run.  But
hey, once you use 4dos, you will never go back to regular dos.

If there is positive response to this version, I will try to port it into
portable C so that it can run on (anything?).

Hope you enjoy it.

+-----------------------+-----------------------------+---------+
| J. Michael Diehl ;-)  | I thought I was wrong once. | PGP KEY |
| mdiehl@triton.unm.edu |   But, I was mistaken.      |available|
| mike.diehl@fido.org   |                             | Ask Me! |
| (505) 299-2282        +-----------------------------+---------+
|                                                               |
+------"I'm just looking for the opportunity to be -------------+
|            Politically Incorrect!"   <Me>                     |
+-----If codes are outlawed, only criminals wil have codes.-----+
+----Is Big Brother in your phone?  If you don't know, ask me---+



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: mulivor@orion.crc.monroecc.edu
Date: Tue, 22 Jun 93 21:51:54 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Scott Collins' comments
Message-ID: <9306230451.AA08776@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Scott Collins writes:
    
    Remember, the government is not a single entity -- out to get us -- but a 
    collection of individuals, some fraction of whom are covering their butts 
    and looking for goats at any given moment (as has been revealed to us by 
    the media).  All of whom are interested in maintaining/improving their 
    current status.

What a superb observation. As a newspaper journalist who's seen government
slime up close for a while, I can tell you that this is true, true, true.
The _biggest_ threat to Clipper isn't cypherpunks or other patriots; it's a
bureaucratic civil war.

Phil 
mulivor@orion.crc.monroecc.edu





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Date: Wed, 23 Jun 93 01:43:48 PDT
To: karn@qualcomm.com (Phil Karn)
Subject: Re: Weak stenography.
In-Reply-To: <9306230815.AA25862@qualcomm.com>
Message-ID: <9306230844.AA27879@netcom3.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Phil Karn writes:
...
> etc). But if you ever want to be able to retrieve it, you have to leave
> yourself an Achilles Heel: somewhere you need to keep a computer
> program, in plaintext, that you can execute to extract and decrypt the
> hidden ciphertext.
> 
> You may be able to get away with claiming that the low order bits of
> your Doors tapes really *are* meaningless random bits picked up when you
> dubbed all your worn-out LPs to DAT, but if they find "readdat.exe" on
> your PC, disassemble it and discover that it's a program to extract and
> decrypt ciphertext from DAT tapes, you're in trouble. And if you encrypt
> your copy of "readdat.exe", well, you now need a plaintext decryption
> program to decrypt THAT.
> 
> Short of devising a scheme that's so simple that you don't mind recoding
> it from scratch (and from memory) every time you want to extract and
> decrypt something, what can be done?

Some solutions:

1. Make programs like "readdat.exe" ubiquitous...distribute them on
shareware disks, CD-ROMs, etc. Thus, many households and offices will
have "readdat.exe"-like programs, whether they use them or not. Mere
possession of such a program will thus not be unusual or
suspicion-provoking. (This is of course one of the strategies in
making PGP and related programs ubiquitous.)

(Note that the storage of the _key_ is another matter, and is a
problem with most crypto schemes. For data stored in low-order bits on
a DAT, and retrievable with "readdat.exe," a pass-phrase of sufficient
length can be used.)

2. The bit-reading program "readdat.exe" can be stored remotely,
perhaps at an ftp site, so the user can retrieve it only when he needs
to use it, then flush it.

(I favor the "ubiquitous" route, as frequent retrievals make
themselves known in other ways....and may even draw attention to a
user in the first place.)

-Tim May



-- 
..........................................................................
Timothy C. May         | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,  
tcmay@netcom.com       | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
408-688-5409           | knowledge, reputations, information markets, 
W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA  | black markets, collapse of governments.
Higher Power: 2^756839 | Public Key: PGP and MailSafe available.
Note: I put time and money into writing this posting. I hope you enjoy it.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "George A. Gleason" <gg@well.sf.ca.us>
Date: Wed, 23 Jun 93 03:36:09 PDT
To: rclark@nyx.cs.du.edu
Subject: Re:  Corporate Ethics and the Profit Margin
Message-ID: <93Jun23.033544pdt.14090-2@well.sf.ca.us>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Re Robert.  Good one there, catching me saying "positive reinforcement for
PKP and negative reinforcement for AT&T." The thing is, I agree corporations
don't have feelings, but Jim Bidzos *does* have feelings and he is
singularly responsible as an individual, to a range of constituencies.  Some
of those constituencies have legal relationships such as stockholders.
Others are informal, such as Us Here.  But all of them come directly to HIM.
 That's not the case with AT&T which is a HUGE bureaucracy.  If someone
would find the single individual in AT&T who got them involved with the
Clipper thing, we might have an interesting round of questions to ask.  The
thing is though, once you're dealing with a specific person, the
relationship of adversariality has to be modified to take into account the
respect for the individual human being.  

-gg




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "George A. Gleason" <gg@well.sf.ca.us>
Date: Wed, 23 Jun 93 03:39:11 PDT
To: karn@qualcomm.com
Subject: Re: YAA (yet another article)
Message-ID: <93Jun23.033851pdt.14087-2@well.sf.ca.us>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Re Phil's criticism of warrants and the Oh My god proposal on wiretaps.  It
would seem that an additional safeguard can be put in place which would
create some kind of liability for deliberately exaggerated warrants.  One
could also require the services of an investigator serving in the capacity
of a public defender, who would act as devil's advocate against warrants by
bringing countervailing information to bear.  

-gg




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: karn@qualcomm.com (Phil Karn)
Date: Tue, 22 Jun 93 22:12:19 PDT
To: Duncan Frissell <cypherpunks@toad.com>
Subject: Re: Digital Cash$$$$
Message-ID: <9306230512.AA11503@qualcomm.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


At 04:09 PM 6/14/93 EDT, Duncan Frissell wrote:

> 
>        1.)     You mail cash/MO to First Digital Bank of Cyberspace (at an
>offshore
>        maildrop) together with a public (unique if you like) key and anonymous
>email
>        address (on Julf's remailer perhaps).

Recall that the US has money-laundering laws that require you to file a
form every time you move $10,000 or more in or out of the country. If the
First Digital Bank of Cyberspace is offshore, it could come under these
laws, at least with respect to priming your account with real money.

It's an interesting question whether they could then get you for sending
more than $10,000 of digital cash across the border without filing the
form. It's even more interesting if you encrypt all these cross-border
transactions...

Another wonderful set of laws we can credit to the "war on drugs".

Phil





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: szabo@techbook.com (Nick Szabo)
Date: Wed, 23 Jun 93 05:59:46 PDT
To: karn@qualcomm.com (Phil Karn)
Subject: Re: Weak stenography.
In-Reply-To: <9306230815.AA25862@qualcomm.com>
Message-ID: <m0o8USx-000hwRC@techbook.techbook.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Phil Karn:
> if they find "readdat.exe" on
> your PC, disassemble it and discover that it's a program to extract and
> decrypt ciphertext from DAT tapes, you're in trouble. And if you encrypt
> your copy of "readdat.exe", well, you now need a plaintext decryption
> program to decrypt THAT.

Perhaps some hacks (ab)used by virus writers might be useful here.
We might hide "readdat.exe" inside a larger "innocuous.exe" and
scramble it with the "mutation engine", which creates a unique signature 
for each copy of readdat.exe's code (including the engine itself, which
bootstraps from a very short common code sequence).  The result 
is they have no signature to search for, even if they already have 
a copy of "readdat.exe" and the mutation engine.

Nick Szabo				szabo@techbook.com 



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: karn@qualcomm.com (Phil Karn)
Date: Tue, 22 Jun 93 23:08:45 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: 2600 testimony to Markey's subcommittee
Message-ID: <9306230608.AA14038@qualcomm.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Having heard Markey in action (during John Gage's testimony, and again
during some hearings on HDTV), and having read his atrocious "scanner bill"
really drives home the old saying: a little knowledge is *dangerous*.
To which I would add "especially in the hands of a politician".

Phil





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: eichin@cygnus.com (Mark Eichin)
Date: Wed, 23 Jun 93 07:06:19 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: re: Weak stenography.
In-Reply-To: <9306230844.AA27879@netcom3.netcom.com>
Message-ID: <9306231406.AA29189@cygnus.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>> 1. Make programs like "readdat.exe" ubiquitous...distribute them on
	Well, you need a program to read your DATs and play them
anyhow. What's a few extra options? Presumably it would handle various
filtering and sampling anyhow; perhaps the common DAT tools or audio
tools could just happen to contain a bit slicer... 
	Still doesn't sound like it's useful for anything you need to
access alot or use in the short term. Best to keep fighting for real
privacy...

>> I must admit I'm disappointed to hear Hellman say something like this.
>> Every time somebody comes up with a "new" or "improved" key escrow scheme,
>> they give implicit approval to the whole basic idea of key escrow. Which
>> is fundamentally unacceptable in *any* form.
	It could be said that this focusses the argument on the real
issue... which is *not* the technology, but the trust of government
(or the need for it.) 
	Perhaps this analogy isn't too stretched: suppose your child
wants to keep a private diary. They can keep it under two locks -- but
only if mother has one key and father has the other (so that if they
agree that they need to see the diary, they can.) Does this seem fair
itself? [too many would argue yes... that as the parents are
responsible for the child, it is reasonable to do this] Does this seem
like a good analogy? [perhaps closer than some would like to admit...
"but mother and father are closer than any escrow agencies would
be..." "oh really?" etc.]
							_Mark_



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: karn@qualcomm.com (Phil Karn)
Date: Wed, 23 Jun 93 00:05:24 PDT
To: Jason Zions <cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: YAA (yet another article)
Message-ID: <9306230705.AA22288@qualcomm.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


At 11:18 AM 6/16/93 -0500, Jason Zions wrote:

>Legalize drugs and prostitution and the Mafia will dry up and blow away.

Amen. It was a real eye-opener to see the statistics on legal wiretaps
(the ones they tell us about, anyway). The vast majority, and I do mean
vast, are related to drugs. A distant second was gambling, and I think
"racketeering" was in there somewhere (not sure what makes that distinct
from "drugs" these days).

>>Hellman has an ingenious idea that might appeal to those concerned
>>about civil liberties. He would require not one but three judges to
>>authorize a Clipper wiretap. A judge could answer the request with
>>"Yes," "No or "Oh, my God!" The latter means, "This looks like an
>>attempted abuse of power, as in Watergate."

I must admit I'm disappointed to hear Hellman say something like this.
Every time somebody comes up with a "new" or "improved" key escrow scheme,
they give implicit approval to the whole basic idea of key escrow. Which
is fundamentally unacceptable in *any* form.

Although his idea may appeal to some naive people, I wonder how many have
actually seen any search warrant affidavits. I read the one for Steve
Jackson Games, and you certainly wouldn't know from that that they weren't
all guilty as sin. Too bad it was completely defective.

Do I sound like I don't place much faith in the warrant requirement acting
as a meaningful safeguard? You bet!

Phil





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: karn@qualcomm.com (Phil Karn)
Date: Wed, 23 Jun 93 00:23:02 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: YAA (yet another article)
Message-ID: <9306230722.AA00336@qualcomm.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


At 01:46 PM 6/16/93 -0400, Perry E. Metzger wrote:

>Torture, believe it or not, is a very effective way of police to get
>information. Our society bans it. Every mechanism that is useful is
>not acceptable.

Not to dilute your argument or anything (you know I agree with it), but
the reading I've done on the history of the Fifth Amendment says that one
of the reasons torture was eventually banned in Western countries (through
mechanisms like the American Fifth Amendment) was the growing realization
that it actually was NOT particularly effective. People would falsely
confess to all sorts of crimes just to get the torture to stop. Consider
how many confessed witches were burned in New England.

One of the problematic things about encryption (as it's usually practiced
now) is that it's relatively easy to tell if an encryption key is the right
one or not. This makes it tempting to resort to torture (or a "contempt
of court citation", in modern terms) to extract it from an unwilling
defendant. That's why both steganography and "duress key" schemes will
remain important for some time, even if the 5th amendment were to be held
as applicable to compelling crypto keys. You could cry "torture", while the
police would claim that they discovered the key by other means (or that you
disclosed it "voluntarily") and it would be your word against theirs.

Phil





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: karn@qualcomm.com (Phil Karn)
Date: Wed, 23 Jun 93 01:15:19 PDT
To: J. Michael Diehl <cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Weak stenography.
Message-ID: <9306230815.AA25862@qualcomm.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


One thing keeps bugging me about steganography. Let's say that
"unlicensed cryptography", including the mere possession of ciphertext,
is totally outlawed. You may well be able to bury encrypted data in all
sorts of things (gif files, digital audio, "free" blocks on a hard disk,
etc). But if you ever want to be able to retrieve it, you have to leave
yourself an Achilles Heel: somewhere you need to keep a computer
program, in plaintext, that you can execute to extract and decrypt the
hidden ciphertext.

You may be able to get away with claiming that the low order bits of
your Doors tapes really *are* meaningless random bits picked up when you
dubbed all your worn-out LPs to DAT, but if they find "readdat.exe" on
your PC, disassemble it and discover that it's a program to extract and
decrypt ciphertext from DAT tapes, you're in trouble. And if you encrypt
your copy of "readdat.exe", well, you now need a plaintext decryption
program to decrypt THAT.

Short of devising a scheme that's so simple that you don't mind recoding
it from scratch (and from memory) every time you want to extract and
decrypt something, what can be done?

Phil





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: bear@eagle.fsl.noaa.gov (Bear Giles)
Date: Wed, 23 Jun 93 08:50:42 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Digital Cash$$$$
Message-ID: <9306231547.AA13751@eagle.fsl.noaa.gov>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Phil Karn writes:
>
>Recall that the US has money-laundering laws that require you to file a
>form every time you move $10,000 or more in or out of the country. If the
>First Digital Bank of Cyberspace is offshore, it could come under these
>laws, at least with respect to priming your account with real money.
>
>It's an interesting question whether they could then get you for sending
>more than $10,000 of digital cash across the border without filing the
>form. It's even more interesting if you encrypt all these cross-border
>transactions...

This could tie a lawyer up in fits, because even if you sent digital
cash across the border, you could still produce a _spendable_ copy
in the originating country!  In fact, you could have the same 'bill'
residing on media in a dozen countries!

You couldn't legally spend more than one copy of the digital cash,
of course, but digital cash (unlike hard cash) can be located in
several places -- and probably would be if you're talking about a
substantial amount of money.

>Another wonderful set of laws we can credit to the "war on drugs".

Many countries restrict or monitor the flow of currency across their 
border; this isn't simply a result of the WoD.  However, the WoD was
the main reason publicly acknowledged.


Bear Giles




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Karl Barrus <elee9sf@Menudo.UH.EDU>
Date: Wed, 23 Jun 93 08:13:32 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: REMAIL: public keys
Message-ID: <199306231513.AA14546@Menudo.UH.EDU>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



A while ago Dave Sun suggested keeping a file containing the public
keys of the remailers in an easy to get format.  (I'm embarrased how
long it has taken me to do this!)  I recently upload the keys I have,
signed by myself and occasionally others.  I recently uploaded a
tar-gzip file with the public keys I have, and an MSDOS zip file of
the same info will follow shortly.

I'd like to (at least) get the remailer operators to sign their keys.
I must apologize in advance because once I went through my key ring
and removed all the "unknown signator" signatures, and thus have
probably erased the signatures that some put on in the first place.
If this is the case, please send me the remailer keys, your public
key, and I'll add them both to my ring so I won't have those errors in
the future!

/-----------------------------------\
| Karl L. Barrus                    |
| elee9sf@menudo.uh.edu             | <- preferred address
| barrus@tree.egr.uh.edu (NeXTMail) |
\-----------------------------------/




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: elee9sf@Menudo.UH.EDU
Date: Wed, 23 Jun 93 08:20:37 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: REMAIL: Origin lines in remailers
In-Reply-To: <44.2C280DA9@wyrm.rbbs-net.ORG>
Message-ID: <199306231520.AA15363@Menudo.UH.EDU>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



> One of the problems that has arisen is the retention of the origin lines
> placed at the bottom of the outgoing message by various gates & net
> whatnot (see bottom of this message for an example).

Yeah, the discussion centered on whether remailers should modify text
(converting tabs, crlf, strip signatures, etc.) or not.  I guess it
would be "best" if the remailers just pass text on through, but then
some people can't help extra stuff their mail software puts in.

Right now, you can form your message and encrypt it with extropia's
public key - that remailer will only forward text encrypted text, so
your signature will get removed.

/-----------------------------------\
| Karl L. Barrus                    |
| elee9sf@menudo.uh.edu             | <- preferred address
| barrus@tree.egr.uh.edu (NeXTMail) |
\-----------------------------------/




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Mike Godwin <mnemonic@eff.org>
Date: Wed, 23 Jun 93 07:36:54 PDT
To: karn@qualcomm.com (Phil Karn)
Subject: Re: DH for email (re: email protection and privacy)
In-Reply-To: <9306230023.AA21092@qualcomm.com>
Message-ID: <199306231437.AA11378@eff.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Phil Karn asks:
 
> >You're not required to go *beyond* what is specified in a subpoena.
> >But the subpoena's specifications can be pretty broad.
> 
> Are you talking civil, criminal, or both?

I assume you're asking about civil versus criminal contempt. My tentative
answer (I can't look this up because my reference books are still packed)
is both. Civil contempt, strictly speaking, is not a separate legal
action--a federal judge has broad authority to impose civil-contempt
sanctions on people who are noncompliant with subpoenas, who disrupt court
proceedings, and so on. Criminal contempt *is* a separate legal action,
and I think you can be prosecuted for intentional noncompliance with 
court orders, but I'd have to look up the criminal-contempt statute to 
be sure.


--Mike






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Mike Godwin <mnemonic@eff.org>
Date: Wed, 23 Jun 93 08:10:59 PDT
To: karn@qualcomm.com (Phil Karn)
Subject: Re: YAA (yet another article)
In-Reply-To: <9306230705.AA22288@qualcomm.com>
Message-ID: <199306231511.AA11641@eff.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Phil Karn writes:
 
> Do I sound like I don't place much faith in the warrant requirement acting
> as a meaningful safeguard? You bet!

I agree with Phil that, in practice, the warrant requirement is a very
thin reed on which to base our Fourth Amendment rights. The magistrates
who review warrant applications tend to accept uncritically what they're
told by the government officials seeking the warrant.

Hellman's proposal would address only the most obvious and most extreme
abuses.


--Mike






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: skyhawk@cpac.washington.edu
Date: Wed, 23 Jun 93 11:31:39 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: weak stenography and hiding readdat.exe
Message-ID: <9306231831.AA04870@bailey.cpac.washington.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


The simplest effective way I know of to hide an executable (such as
readdat.exe) is to have it masquerade as another program, preferably one that
is complex enough to justify its size.  (You couldn't hide PGP in cat, but you
could hide it in Mathematica.)  You'd want the original program to be something
you compile yourself, like some large X program, or gcc, or emacs.  (You can
hide *anything* in emacs.  In fact, you can make pgp a hidden *primitive* in
emacs.  Hmmmmmm...  Or Perl.  Hmmmmmmm.....)  That way you don't have a file
that differs noticably from your OS release (they might check sizes and
checksums), and you don't want to bother with patching a binary anyway.

Then you've got the problem of invoking the alter ego of your program.
Methods I've used in the past include new command-line flags, time of day,
multiple "normal" invocations with slightly strange flags (this would
save simple state information in /tmp), and special environment variables.

To avoid leaving a trail to the hidden goodies, it's important to wipe any
special arguments from argv[] (or your language's equivalent), insure that
any special environment variables look completely innocent since ps(1) will
display them to anyone who asks, (both assuming you're on a multiuser Unix
box), and to not leave an intact .history file where some bright
anti-subversive in the SS lab could see it on your confiscated hard drive, or
your university's confiscated backup tapes.  To make cleaning up simpler, you
could hack your shell's history mechanism to not put incriminating strings
into your .history.  Leaving a false trail is better than simply removing the
real trail, after all.  (You wouldn't really need to do the same thing for
your accounting log, if your machine keeps it at all, since it would only
have the name of the executable.  It would be important, though, that your
program's public function be something that you could credibly be using 20
times a day.  Compiler, linker, editor, finger, archie...)

I've never had to worry about someone running a virus-style checker for
naughty code, since mine's all been home-grown, but if there is a particular
routine (say, pgp) that's hidden all over, Nick Szabo's excellent idea for
using a virus-type mutation engine would be essential.

For distribution of something like this, all we'd really need to do is co-opt
some project that is distributing code on the net already, preferably something
big.  Then we could set up an ftp site for the binaries, for those people who
don't want to bother with compiling the program.  Wink wink, nudge nudge.  (And
many projects do this anyway.)  The development of the "cover" program could go
on in parallel, thus justifying continuous releases of the binaries, and the
source is available (sort of) thus making the ruse that much more effective.

Scott

--
Scott Northrop          <skyhawk@cpac.washington.edu>            (206)784-2083
ObVirus:   The demand for obedience is inherently evil.
ObVirus2:  As a juror in a Trial by Jury, you have the right, power and duty
           to acquit the defendant if you judge the law itself to be unjust.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Jim McCoy <mccoy@ccwf.cc.utexas.edu>
Date: Wed, 23 Jun 93 09:37:57 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Digital Cash$$$$
In-Reply-To: <9306231547.AA13751@eagle.fsl.noaa.gov>
Message-ID: <199306231637.AA28018@tramp.cc.utexas.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text


> From: bear@eagle.fsl.noaa.gov (Bear Giles)
> 
> Phil Karn writes:
> >
> >Recall that the US has money-laundering laws that require you to file a
> >form every time you move $10,000 or more in or out of the country. [...]
> >
> >It's an interesting question whether they could then get you for sending
> >more than $10,000 of digital cash across the border without filing the
> >form. It's even more interesting if you encrypt all these cross-border
> >transactions...
> 
> This could tie a lawyer up in fits, because even if you sent digital
> cash across the border, you could still produce a _spendable_ copy
> in the originating country!  In fact, you could have the same 'bill'
> residing on media in a dozen countries!

Not only that, but a digital cash certificate, unlike regular cash, can be
cut up into little segments that each have no value other than being random
numbers.  You send one segment to each of various accounts arond the world
and then reconnect the segments at some site located in a country with weak
banking regulations...

An idea I had for this digital cash stuff that might be a little easier is
to consider some of the nations within the borders of the U.S.  The various
Native American tribes have a degree of semi-sovereignty that may allow
them to get away with something like this.  This would make things easier
for using this system in the U.S. because it would be fairly trivial to get
the reservations on to the net if they are not already.  The advantage for
those running such a cyberbank is that they would get connected, and get
machines to do this stuff, and the rest of us would effectively be paying
them to do so :)  [it probably would not be a hard sell, but the question
is whether or not the various tribes have enough sovereignty to get away
with it.]

It is things like this that probably give regulators fits.  IMHO, the real
reason governments are opposed to strong cryptography is that in an
information society it effectively places the population outside the
control of the government, the central government becomes superfluous.

jim



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: nobody@shell.portal.com
Date: Thu, 24 Jun 93 00:05:29 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Testing remailers
Message-ID: <9306231925.AA00271@jobe.shell.portal.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


This is a remailer test.  This message has just passed through
16 remailers.  Sorry for the waste of bandwidth.  Have a nice
day.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: crunch@netcom.com (John Draper)
Date: Wed, 23 Jun 93 13:14:53 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: An Awsome party coming up
Message-ID: <9306232015.AA18970@netcom4.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Greetings Cypherpunks!!

  We are looking for folks with laptop computers with both MS-DOS and
Mac compatability to participate in an upcoming fun event to take place
at Pyramid lake in Nevada.  The dates are 16th thru 18th of July,  where
a table will be set up for those with laptops.

  Our purpose and goals are to make copies of PGP available to those that
don't have net access,  generate PGP keys,  sign keys,  and hand out
literature to those folks interested in cryptography and the Cypherpunks
cause.

  The event itself will offer a great time to those attending,  as there
will be camping, swimming, and raving,  as well as other happenings to
make a total memorial weekend.    The event costs $30 for the weekend,
and the money goes towards the Western Shoshone and Paiute Indian nation,
so the money goes to a worthy cause.

  I am trying to set it up so that those bringing laptops and who are willing
to sit at the table for a period of time,  copying disks,  generating PGP
keys,  signing keys,  etc will NOT have to pay the $30.

What we need from Cypherpunks:

  ** Make up some brocures and hand out material describing the interests
     of the Cypherpunks.  These can be created using PageMaker,  or other
     page layout software,  and can be xeroxed for handouts.
     
  ** Volunteers who have laptops (Both Dos and Mac,  and possibly others)
     who can make them available for key generation,  PGP distributions,
     etc.    They would NOT have to let their laptops out of their sight,
     but just be there for a specific time to answer questions,  and
     do what was previous described.
     
  So,  do we have any volunteers willing to participate in this rather
unusual venture?

  For those people out of the area,  and who might be planning a trek out
to the west coast,  this might be a great time to come.

  Pyramid lake is out in the Nevada Desert,  there is NO shade,  so tarps
and other camping equipment would also be necessary and desirable.    Anyone
with
RV's, Campers,  etc would be really useful for the ocassion.    So be looking
forward to a great time.   Bring your family and kids,  I'm sure they will
enjoy the happenings,  as there is also swimming,  horse back riding,  fishing,
and all of the other camping activities.  Brings lots of water,  ice,  and
drinks.

Please contact me,  and I'll try and put it all together.  Right now,  I 
need to collaborate and work on the wording of the brocure.

Thanx
John D.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: wcs@anchor.ho.att.com
Date: Wed, 23 Jun 93 10:40:03 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re:  Corporate Ethics and the Profit Margin
Message-ID: <9306231736.AA26526@anchor.ho.att.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text


gg@well.sf.ca.us writes:
> Re Robert.  Good one there, catching me saying "positive reinforcement for
> PKP and negative reinforcement for AT&T." The thing is, I agree corporations
> don't have feelings, but Jim Bidzos *does* have feelings and he is
> singularly responsible as an individual, to a range of constituencies. [...]

>  That's not the case with AT&T which is a HUGE bureaucracy.  If someone
> would find the single individual in AT&T who got them involved with the
> Clipper thing, we might have an interesting round of questions to ask.  The
> thing is though, once you're dealing with a specific person, the
> relationship of adversariality has to be modified to take into account the
> respect for the individual human being.  

A nice distinction, and possibly useful tactically.
(Disclaimer: This represents about 10**-7 of AT&T's official position,
i.e. I'm a stockholder like most employees, and nobody listens to me,
at least not when I'm right :-)

It's more than a single individual; it'd mainly be the managers
of the group that makes their current line of secure phones for the government.
Some of the phone models already have special government encryption chips;
this is yet another design variant, and not a really major decision to make
as long as there's enough tentatively-promised volume to expect a decent
return on the investment.  Motorola's in about the same situation.
Back when the STU-III first came out, the government was talking about
total sales of maybe half a million units to governments and contractors;
I don't think sales were anywhere near that large...

The interesting questions are whether there are any other strings attached, 
especially about whether that group will also attempt to market non-wiretapped
phones to the public (I don't have any knowledge on that one), 
and also what the impact is on the parts of our "huge bureaucracy"
which weren't in on the secret until we read about it in the New York Times 
or on the net but will be affected by it (much discussion is still going on, 
especially by people on standards committees which are getting pressured by 
the NIST and co-conspirators to specify SkipJack/escrow in industry standards.)
The rest of the U.S. telecomm industry is in about the same situation.

If you want to pressure AT&T or other large corporations, one popular approach
is to buy stock and put a stockholder question on the ballot for the annual
meeting; unfortunately the government's trying to railroad everybody into
using Clipper fast enough that that's probably not practical here,
but there are SEC rules on how to do it, and it does reach a lot of people
and make a lot of noise if you can pull it off before it becomes moot,
even if you lose (directors of large corporations almost always oppose
stockholder resolutions - if do they support something, they can just do it
and avoid the need for the voting process.)  Having never done this myself,
and don't know the costs or level of effort involved, but enough wackos
put enough things on stockholder ballots that sane people like us can
probably do it as well.  It's important to make any ballot questions SHORT,
clear to the uninitiated, positive, non-adversarial, and actionable,
which ain't easy for complex topics like crypto.

		Bill




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: bear@eagle.fsl.noaa.gov (Bear Giles)
Date: Wed, 23 Jun 93 12:53:26 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Digital Cash$$$$
Message-ID: <9306231950.AA21578@eagle.fsl.noaa.gov>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>As far as using digibanks on Native American territory, most of the
>rules restricting Federal control seem pretty flexible when the Feds want
>something, and even states can often get away with restricting gambling
>on reservations.  Also, the Constitution gives CONgress the power to
>regulate commerce with foreign nations, Indian tribes, and between states,
>so they can still regulate any interactions between digibanks on
>Indian reservations and elsewhere.  (Sigh - the Commerce Clause has been
>rabidly overused, but it's written in a way that lets them do nearly anything.)

This still raises some interesting possibilities:

Items:

  Federal law requires that Indian tribes be permitted to offer all
  forms of gambling permitted _anywhere_ under state law. 

  Indian reservations have a serious problem with poverty, unemployment,
  etc.

  Most gambling is hard to arrange at a distance, but it is possible
  to form _digital cards_ and then play any of the usual card games.

Idea:

  An Indian tribe in an appropriate jursidiction installs a Internet
  node with digital cash (backed by checks, credit cards, etc) and
  _digital cards_.  Or even a Compuserve account. (ugh).  Anything,
  as long as the processor is located on Indian land.

  It offers real-time poker games.  For real money.  From anywhere in
  the world.  :-)

  (BTW, you would _not_ offer blackjack, or only with _very_ large
  decks, because of the large potential for card counting programs).

  Just to confuse issues further, the poker software is owned by a
  nonprofit organization and licensed to the Indian nation with the
  condition that a portion of their profits go towards education.

  When someone claims that the tribe is offering gambling in an area
  where it is prohibited, you can legitimately claim that the actual
  processing is done on the Indian land; the only thing done in
  other jurisdictions is communications.  
  
  Example: if a man stood just outside of the reservation and yelled 
  instructions to a confederate at a game just inside the boundary, would
  that be illegal gambling _on the part of the House_?

  In this case, digital cash isn't _required_ since the House could
  simply keep accounting records directly.  However, it would make it
  simpler for the House to honor outside bets, if a person could get
  a "chip" from the House, pay off a bet to a third party with the
  "chip", and then the third party could use the "chip" himself.


Bear Giles

                               *
*    Don't let them index you on a key field.  Order my Special    *
*    Report "How to Defeat a Data Base and Preserve Your Privacy"  *
*                                                                  *
********************************************************************





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: wcs@anchor.ho.att.com
Date: Wed, 23 Jun 93 10:59:39 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Digital Cash$$$$
Message-ID: <9306231800.AA26751@anchor.ho.att.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text


Do the money-laundering laws require reporting all transactions,
or only movement of currency and gold?  Digicash is most like EFT,
which is transmitted encrypted today - does all of that have to be reported,
or only the "real" paper money that backs up the numbers?

As far as using digibanks on Native American territory, most of the
rules restricting Federal control seem pretty flexible when the Feds want
something, and even states can often get away with restricting gambling
on reservations.  Also, the Constitution gives CONgress the power to
regulate commerce with foreign nations, Indian tribes, and between states,
so they can still regulate any interactions between digibanks on
Indian reservations and elsewhere.  (Sigh - the Commerce Clause has been
rabidly overused, but it's written in a way that lets them do nearly anything.)

There's also the issue of tribal law, but most of the tribes are probably run
by small numbers of reasonable people that you can talk to about things,
and you can at least shop around to find them, unlike Federal bureaucracies
which you're stuck with.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: wcs@anchor.ho.att.com
Date: Wed, 23 Jun 93 11:31:49 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Origin lines in remailers
Message-ID: <9306231830.AA27125@anchor.ho.att.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text


There are several possible solutions to the origin-lines problem, 
but they offer different benefits and place different requirements on the users;
unfortunately there's been no agreement on what the users should have to do,
so there's no agreement on "best" solutions.

1) Chop off anything that even *looks* signature-like, whether the user
   intended it or not -- I consider this ugly, evil, and unreliable,
   and likely to chop stuff I want kept and leave stuff I'd like chopped,
   but there are users out there (e.g. variants on alt.highly.personal.stuff
   or alt.whistleblowing) who are assumed to be computer-naive and used
   to this kind of automagic anonymity, and maybe they need it,
   especially if they don't realize that some systems *do* add them
   since their local system doesn't.

   A "Dont-Mess-With-Trailers:" header line would help a bit.

   I don't know how much of
	M.
	___ Blue Wave/QWK v2.12
	--  
	M. Stirner - via RBBS-NET node 8:914/201
	INTERNET: M..Stirner@f28.n125.z1.RBBS-NET.ORG
   was added by the author, how much by the Blue Wave and/or 8:914/201,
   or even for certain whether M. Stirner is the author or merely a 
   machine owner; I'm guessing the author, and I'm guessing everything
   but the initial "M." was added automagically under the machine-owner's control.

2) Cut-Here: lines of various sorts, either following a pre-specified syntax
   or a MIME-like flexible syntax.  I like this approach, since it gives
   the user a reasonable level of control and very seldom guesses wrong,
   but there are so many standards to choose from, and a proper implementation
   would have to leave in the line (or add an equivalent) at each hop
   to avoid accretion of path-traces, and make sure it gets the correct 
   syntax for each following remailer.  And the user *does* have to explicitly 
   request it, which some people view as a problem, especially if they
   don't know the characteristics of the later mail-handlers in the chain.

3) Encryption-based systems, which only retain the encrypted portion;
   this means the user has to know more about the remailers being used,
   and there has to be a standard for expressing which remailers to forward
   to if more than one will be used (which it probably will be, for anybody
   security-aware enough to really want an encrypting remailer.)

   It *does* give you absolute control over how much gets through,
   but also makes most steganography more difficult.

Solving the problem for message *headers* is tougher than solving it for
trailers, since you need to know how much to retain of the beginning,
and need to avoid trashing the information required to successfully
deliver the mail with enough information that its intended recipient can
decode and use it.

		Bill




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Chuck Lever <cel@citi.umich.edu>
Date: Wed, 23 Jun 93 12:16:10 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: weak stenography and hiding readdat.exe
In-Reply-To: <9306231831.AA04870@bailey.cpac.washington.edu>
Message-ID: <9306231916.AA05582@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Scott Northrop <skyhawk@cpac.washington.edu> writes:

<  The simplest effective way I know of to hide an executable (such as
<  readdat.exe) is to have it masquerade as another program, preferably one that
<  is complex enough to justify its size.  (You couldn't hide PGP in cat, but you
<  could hide it in Mathematica.)  You'd want the original program to be something
<  you compile yourself, like some large X program, or gcc, or emacs.  (You can
<  hide *anything* in emacs.  In fact, you can make pgp a hidden *primitive* in
<  emacs.  Hmmmmmm...  Or Perl.  Hmmmmmmm.....)  That way you don't have a file
<  that differs noticably from your OS release (they might check sizes and
<  checksums), and you don't want to bother with patching a binary anyway.

   these are interesting ideas.  but it seems to me you can't beat just using
   a pre-existing popular application for steganography.  in other words, choose
   an algorithm which doesn't require you to create a new program to do the job.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: M..Stirner@f28.n125.z1.RBBS-NET.ORG (M. Stirner)
Date: Thu, 24 Jun 93 17:32:16 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Remailer origin lines
Message-ID: <47.2C2951B0@wyrm.rbbs-net.ORG>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



* Reply to msg originally in CYPHERPUNKS

 Uu> 1) Chop off anything that even  looks  signature-like, whether the
 Uu> user intended it or not -- I consider this ugly, evil, and
 Uu> unreliable, and likely to chop stuff I want kept and leave stuff I'd
 Uu> like chopped.

Yes, this seems fraught with problems.

 Uu> A "Dont-Mess-With-Trailers:" header line would help a bit.

I agree.

 Uu> I don't know how much of
 Uu> M.
 Uu> ___ Blue Wave/QWK v2.12
 Uu> --
 Uu> M. Stirner - via RBBS-NET node 8:914/201
 Uu> INTERNET: M..Stirner@f28.n125.z1.RBBS-NET.ORG
 Uu> was added by the author, how much by the Blue Wave and/or
 Uu> 8:914/201, or even for certain whether M. Stirner is the author or
 Uu> merely a  machine owner; I'm guessing the author, and I'm guessing
 Uu> everything but the initial "M." was added automagically under the
 Uu> machine-owner's control.

The BlueWave blurb was added by the program & can be stripped by
re-editing the message before upload.  Everything else is out of my
control completely & added automagically by the host or the UUCP
gateway.  The sucker stays, no matter what I do.  Some anonymity!

 Uu> 2) Cut-Here: lines of various sorts, either following a pre-specified
 Uu> syntax or a MIME-like flexible syntax.  I like this approach, since
 Uu> it gives the user a reasonable level of control and very seldom
 Uu> guesses wrong, but there are so many standards to choose from, and a
 Uu> proper implementation would have to leave in the line (or add an
 Uu> equivalent) at each hop to avoid accretion of path-traces, and make
 Uu> sure it gets the correct  syntax for each following remailer.  And
 Uu> the user  does  have to explicitly  request it, which some people
 Uu> view as a problem, especially if they don't know the characteristics
 Uu> of the later mail-handlers in the chain.

I, personally, could live with it just to get the remailers to be truly
anonymous.  The rest of the user input is not especially easy anyway,
particularly if accessing internet via a gateway.  Another line wouldn't
kill me.

 Uu> 3) Encryption-based systems, which only retain the encrypted portion;
 Uu> this means the user has to know more about the remailers being
 Uu> used, and there has to be a standard for expressing which remailers
 Uu> to forward to if more than one will be used (which it probably will
 Uu> be, for anybody security-aware enough to really want an encrypting
 Uu> remailer.)

As an interrim measure I guess this is what I'll have to do, but as an
early PGP partisan, I've had enough PGP experience not to be turned off
by the extra trouble.  Most casual users would be.  In any case, I think
that this is undoubtedly the most user-labor-intensive solution.

 Uu> Solving the problem for message  headers  is tougher than solving it
 Uu> for trailers.

In that case, let's have this solved by Monday. 8-)

*********************************************************************
* <m..stirner@f28.n125.z1.fidonet.org> - PGP Key D30909 via servers *
* > What country can preserve its liberties if its rulers are not  <*
* > warned from time to time that their people preserve the spirit <*
* > of resistance?  Let them take arms!" - Thomas Jefferson, 1787  <*
*********************************************************************

___ Blue Wave/QWK v2.12
--  
M. Stirner - via RBBS-NET node 8:914/201
INTERNET: M..Stirner@f28.n125.z1.RBBS-NET.ORG




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Pat Farrell" <pfarrell@cs.gmu.edu>
Date: Wed, 23 Jun 93 18:12:21 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Government fear of strong crypto [was Re: Digital Cash$$$$
Message-ID: <70188.pfarrell@cs.gmu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Jim McCoy <mccoy@ccwf.cc.utexas.edu> writes:

>                                IMHO, the real
>reason governments are opposed to strong cryptography is that in an
>information society it effectively places the population outside the
>control of the government, the central government becomes superfluous.

I'm not going to disagree that long term, the net makes governments
obsolete, but I think that far fewer folks in the US government have _any_
understanding of the issues arround strong crypto. I spent yesterday at the
"Computer Security Institute" conference in Washington (it is a commercial
educational conference on computer security). Lots of government employees
were there learning about security, products, etc. Most of the products were
virus scanners, sigh.

The "government" as a whole is not against crypto. The NSA is _very
strongly_ against it. There are 60,000 or more bureaucrats in NSA that would
be effectively put out of work by widespread strong crypto. All the
$17 Billion that they use on signal intercepts would go to competing
approachs (satelite recon, spys in the field, etc.) that are controlled by
other agencies. Why? because signal intellegence is so easy now that it is
extremely cheap and cost effective. Widespread strong crypto will not make
evesdropping impossible, but it will make it _very_ expensive in time and
money, and thus make it much less attractive.

Rather than simply ranting about the evils of bureaucrats, think for a
second about their motivation. There is no profit metric for bureaucrats to
rely upon - they have to do their job as well as expected for the least
amount of money. If they fail to deliver, they lose their jobs.  (yes, they
can be fired or reassigned to siberia...) So they spend all their life
making sure that they do a "good enuff" job and follow all the approved
actions. Having Signal intercepts work cheaply and well makes it easy to
keep their jobs.

I believe that the FBI and other more public agencies are simply shills for
NSA. The many posting about real wiretap usage and costs simply can't
support taking all the heat last year of Digital Telophony and this year
over Clipper, esp. when they admit that smart crooks wouldn't bother to use
Clipper.

BTW, I talked to Dorothy Denning at the conference. She says that it is now
called the "Key escrow chip" because of Intergraph's trademark on Clipper.
I'll post more on my conversations with DE Denning later.

Pat

Pat Farrell      Grad Student                 pfarrell@cs.gmu.edu
Department of Computer Science    George Mason University, Fairfax, VA
Public key availble via finger          #include <standard.disclaimer>




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Douglas Sinclair <dsinclai@acs.ucalgary.ca>
Date: Wed, 23 Jun 93 19:49:00 PDT
To: karn@qualcomm.com (Phil Karn)
Subject: crypto pklite
In-Reply-To: <9306240119.AA00555@servo>
Message-ID: <9306240247.AA16249@acs1.acs.ucalgary.ca>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I have a friend who wrote a gadget called EXELOCK.  It will throw
a password stub into the front of an of an EXE file.  Now, I'm sure
it doesn't use encryption but just compares the hash of the password to
a stored value.  However, I'm sure an IDEA or DES version could be implemented. 
As for compression, no need to re-invent the wheel.  Simply run pklite
and then run the new EXELOCK on the result.

I'll contact this person and see if I can lay my hands on the  source
code for the gadget.
-- 
PGP 2.2 Key by finger




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: ""L. Detweiler"" <ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Date: Wed, 23 Jun 93 21:59:33 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: a new role for the NSA
In-Reply-To: <70188.pfarrell@cs.gmu.edu>
Message-ID: <9306240459.AA10744@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


"Pat Farrell" <pfarrell@cs.gmu.edu>
>The "government" as a whole is not against crypto. The NSA is _very
>strongly_ against it. There are 60,000 or more bureaucrats in NSA that would
>be effectively put out of work by widespread strong crypto. All the
>$17 Billion that they use on signal intercepts would go to competing
>approachs (satelite recon, spys in the field, etc.) that are controlled by
>other agencies. Why? because signal intellegence is so easy now that it is
>extremely cheap and cost effective. Widespread strong crypto will not make
>evesdropping impossible, but it will make it _very_ expensive in time and
>money, and thus make it much less attractive.

Hey cypherpunks, I recognize that it is critical to balance our
criticisms with proposals for improvement. For example, in an earlier
list of chief criticisms on Clipper I also brought up the point that a
cryptographic standard developed under an impartial standards-creation
process would be acceptable.

Hence, let's get this into the collective psyche: NSA is definitely
extremely endangered in the `signal interception' role. However, just
to prove that we're not totally out to get all those black spooks, I
propose that we emphasize that the NSA pursue a different role that
they are in an immensely beneficial position to undertake: *promoting*
cryptography use among the public and in government. Don't laugh! A
very major part of NSA is dedicated to maintaining and developing the
codes and machines that the rest of the military uses.  The dichotomy
in the two aspects of the organization was apparent with e.g. Kahn's
speculation on the development of DES (make it stronger! say the
makers.  make it weaker! say the breakers).  If we gently or jarringly
prod NSA into more of the `making' instead of the `breaking' role, that
would be a way of not overly offending too many bureacrats by giving
them the sacred escape hatch.

So: don't advocate completely dismantling the NSA. (That may happen,
but if it does it will happen on its own without any encouragement.)
Instead, say that in the Post Cold War era they are better suited to
shift into the code*making* arena instead of the overlong insistence of
the code*breaking* domination. Gosh, think of all those lonely NSA
geniuses who have secure schemes but are being overruled. Imagine what
this expertise could do for commercial cryptography and American
technological competitiveness/supremacy if they were allowed to say
`your algorithm is weak because' and not
`---[CENSORED-CONFIDENTIAL-INFORMATION]---'.  We have to paint
ourselves as moderates before we can shine as extremists.

Also, let me remind everyone to COUNTER the arguments that we now need
a vast framework of intelligence gathering on `commercial espionage' --
I'm not denying that it is a problem or even an increasingly
significant one, but this is *not* the role for government. That's why
the word `commercial' is in there! Government involvement here will do
nothing but restrain and restrict the mobility of companies involved;
they have plenty of opportunities to hire deft independent consultants
but a large bureacracy can do nothing for them but endanger them.

* * *
Satellite Torque

By the way, I've been reading a lot about how satellite intelligence
data is starting to get freed up based on pressure by companies such as
Martin Marietta, who would like to sell the lucrative information
(surprise, other countries already are and since we aren't allowed to
we're dying in an important market we could potentially dominate). 
There is a great deal of classified satellite surveillance data out
there and the fact that some of it might be on the way to being
unchained is highly encouraging for the overall Cypherpunk cause. Just
a little sunshine disinfectant leaking through, eh?

Opening up satellite data is a way of putting more pressure on NSA,
which, from what I understand, devotes a great deal of staff toward
interpreting it. Or maybe that's another intelligence agency. Either
way, it's a valuable wedge and torque we need to pry loose some major
obstacles. If anybody is in a position to facilitate the release or
dissemination of this data, go for it!

* * *
NSA: a big bureacracy or a bunch of bureacrats?

Someone brought up the point that NSA is really just a whole lot of
disconnected bureacrats who are really more interested in saving their
own careers than any selfless motive such as promoting the stability of
any overall government agency.  This of course has relative accuracy,
but either way we should try to use it as leverage against Clipper and
the NSA cryptography-regulation role.  I'd say the first step is to get
in contact with whoever makes these policies or is involved!  If we
could get a list of email addresses of `VIPS in CRYPT' together to
lobby, that would be stupendous. However, it seems to me that as soon
as anyone tries this they are going to find out pretty fast how much of
a uniform monolith the whole of NSA is.  It's extremely isolated and
guarded as a cohesive *whole*.

But! I get the feeling there are a lot of independent *contractors* and
*consultants* associated with the NSA. Anybody have any idea of how to
get a list of them? We have the people from Mycotronx by name--why
don't we have any email addresses? What about AT&T? Surely somebody who
matters besides jim@rsa.com has an email address.  Consider this the
Great CypherPunk Treasure Hunt.  happy hunting!




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: an12070@anon.penet.fi
Date: Wed, 23 Jun 93 22:58:48 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: A Long, Personal, and Tedious Anecdote on Police Warrants & Searches
Message-ID: <9306240456.AA13161@anon.penet.fi>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I considered bringing up this little anecdote that happened to me in
`real time' but decided against it, but now can't resist while the
subject is in the list's psyche and nanosecond attention span:

karn@qualcomm.com (Phil Karn)
>I wonder how many have
>actually seen any search warrant affidavits. I read the one for Steve
>Jackson Games, and you certainly wouldn't know from that that they weren't
>all guilty as sin. Too bad it was completely defective.
>
>Do I sound like I don't place much faith in the warrant requirement acting
>as a meaningful safeguard? You bet!

I write the following with some hesitation and reservation.  This
happened about a month ago. If anyone wants to forward this message
elsewhere please check with me first.  Anyway, after a long and tedious
exposition I will tell you how this personal experience affected how I
think of search warrants and police work.

* * *
SEARCH ME

I had the misfortune to be in a computer lab on the night a computer
was stolen.  I admit the following with sheepish embarrassment: there
is some possibility it happened while I was in the lab!  Yes, I was
writing one of those characteristically rabid letters of mine to this
list, and was quite oblivous to anything outside of cyberspace.

Anyway, I get a call from Officer Burke the next day. Were you in the
lab? Yes.  Do you remember what was going on? No.  He thought the
computer was stolen on Saturday night based on a `highly reliable
source'.  `Are you absolutely sure?' I told him I didn't remember
seeing it all over the weekend (we're talking about a particular souped
up 486 with the works, color monitor, huge RAM, everything but the pickles).  

My vague memory surely sounded less than convincing (I had been in
there at various times on Friday, Saturday, and Sunday, in the period
that he was considering).  The lab has key card entry, and I told him
his job must be easy since he knew everyone who came and went. He says,
To the contrary! The doors were `propped' and friends let in friends. I
told him that I didn't let anybody in and the doors were emphatically
not propped (I had to use my card) all nights I went there.

The system adminstrators of the lab, in their infinite wisdom, had
given the officer a massive list of logins that include all *remote*
logins to machines *anywhere* on the entire network (as opposed to
console logins from a single lab). The cardreader logs they had were 19
and some odd minutes out of time, and the officer was trying to
synchronize them with the login times.

The night of his call I went back through and looked at the logs of the
computer I had used to try to jog my memory. I remembered somebody *in*
the lab on one of two machines who let in some other people, who may
have snuck to the dastardly spot, all on a night that was very busy. 
The logs showed that Friday night was the busiest.  This all happened
after his phone call when I was able to better reconstruct what
happened on given nights.  I compiled and hand-edited lists of console
logins from all the 5 Unix machines in the lab based on the `last' records.

I called Officer Burke and told him of the person I thought let in some
other people during the night (assuming he had logged in), and some
vague physical descriptions of all (it all happened mostly just in my
peripheral vision and awareness).  Officer Burke was a bit hazy on
assimilating and recording the information, and didn't seem to be able
to get it all written down.  He was trying to simultaneously cross
reference everything I said with the reams of computer printouts in
front of him.  I was really surprised that he didn't seem to have been
supplied with the critical information I was giving him.

Why was going through all this trouble? I really wanted him to catch
the culprit because this was a perfect opportunity and excuse for the
local illustrious computer administration to shut down the computer
labs to after hours because `someone had spoiled it for everyone' (the
slimiest excuse for intolerable restrictions that is widely accepted). 
I suppose there were visions of Perry Mason episodes dancing around in
my subconscious.  Computer geek helps campus police nab computer thief.
 I was really convinced that there were enough `leads' to track down
the computer and all that was needed was somebody clever and
discriminating to piece them together.  Judging the severity of the
matter (the only thing I'd heard taken prior to this in the labs was
hundreds of pages of paper for redundant printouts), I volunteered to
stop by the police office on campus to bring along the printouts.
Officer Burke agreed that it would be a good idea.

So I trudge to the police office and give them a lot of helpful
information on what I thought went on.  I gave them excellent records
which showed *console* logins (not remote logins from e.g. modem lines
he had from the extremely meticulous and helpful Administration) on all
the Unix machines in the lab (surprise! the Banyan Vines network was
down!).  Officer Burke's Sergeant was there scrutinizing my comments
(his name I forget). I told them I was pretty sure the computer was
stolen Friday night, despite their opinion, because I recalled being
surprised by its absence on Saturday. Officer Burke reveals that they
are convinced based on `other sources' that they agree with that and
that the earlier source pointing to Saturday turned out to be `unreliable'.

I went through a lot of trouble to draw pictures of the arrangement of
the computer lab and describe the basic operation of the network for
local/remote logins.  Apparently I was *too* helpful. This is where it
all turns from the unpleasant to the grisly. Officer Burke announces to
me `You've been extremely helpful...' and I'm waiting for some lame
reassurance like `we're doing the best we can'.  But instead there's
that ugly tone underneath that turns to `BUT if everything here is as
you say it is, you won't mind us searching your residence...'

Gad, my stomache lurched and my expression paled.  I didn't expect to
be rewarded but on the other hand, I didn't expect to be punished! I
have a Mac IIsi and an ancient 286 and I had horrid visions of them
carting them BOTH off because they didn't know the difference between
them and a 486. At first I mumbled some shocked statements about `well,
I just sort of oppose searches in general' and asked if they would be
able to get a warrant. Officer Burke looked at his Sergeant and it was
his turn to mumble some rationalizations.  Oh, we surely could get a
warrant if we needed one. No, we don't have one for this instance *but*
you wouldn't and shouldn't mind *if* (that `if' was unspoken but understood!).

So at this point I realized that if I said `no' I would probably not
hear anything else. They also told me that they had been doing a lot of
searching of other's apartments based on their voluntary submission. I
got the impression this was a fairly routine process for them. In fact,
they probably deal with this kind of thing all the time, with missing
computer equipment all over campus. I asked them if they had pursued
all their other leads (I was thinking, I would like them in my
apartment as an absolute last resort). They told me they were waiting
for someone to `call them back'.  I had this absurd vision of the thief
absconding out of town, snickering among his black friends, saying `I
told him I would call him BACK! HAHAHAHA!'

After a bit more of this extremely awkward back-and-forth for everyone
involved, I asked them if they had any warrants they could show me. I
was trying to turn this into as much as an educational experience as
possible (others will recognize that truly educational experiences tend
to be painful).  They pull out massive file full of  warrants right out
of a file cabinet. I would have liked to study them very closely, but
of course I had no such privilege.

In the few brief instants that I peered at them I was able to make out
some details. First, they were extremely specific in their wording.
They named exact addresses, people, and articles that came under the
search. They named the reasons for the search, the chain of evidence
and suspicion that was to justify it, and all the formal legalese
required.  Each was a few pages long.  They were printed out on a
dot-matrix printer.  The one I saw in particular was drug related. I
can't make any quotes.

I asked them what percentage of warrants were approved by the judge.
Mr. Burke looked at his Sergeant and did the `well (er) we write very
fine warrants' bit.  (How many have been turned down?) Oh, we put a lot
of effort into them to get all the details right, and we're good at it,
we have a lot of experience. (In what cases have any been turned down?)
We don't waste our time writing warrants that wouldn't be granted--we
don't submit weak ones. (Have you *ever* had one turned down?)

Finally, Officer Burke reveals to me, in however many years of his
police work, that he has (ahem) never had the experience of having a
warrant turned down, but that was solely evidence of his masterful
warrant-writing aptitude and had no other significance.  Maybe it was
just my imagination but he referred to the judge involved in a way as
if they were personal friends--perhaps they even played golf on
Tuesdays. Ah, well, it's a small town.

But the warrant spectacle was for me only a sideshow--this whole time I
had uneasy visions of Steve Jackson Games dancing through my head. 
Finally, after telling them of my fear of them carting off my
computers, Officer Burke reassured me that he had a 386 or something at
home and could tell the difference between brands.  They were extremely
persistent. I had no idea why after all my cooperation. What thief
would have the audacity to walk into the police station and talk about
the night he stole it?

So Officer Burke and his Sergeant stick me in the back of their police
car (since I had walked) and cart me off to my apartment complex.  I
find it quite a surrealistic experience to be making uneasy and
intermittent small-talk on 386's with Officer Burke behind a
steel-and-plexiglass divider.  I'm hoping that most of the neighbors
have their venetian blinds drawn today.  I take them to my apartment
which as usual, to say the least, has that `strewn about' look (perhaps
one of my deep Freudian reasons for being reluctant in the search).
Upon entering the Sergeant says `Oh, my place looked a lot worse than
this when I was living alone.' Officer Burke notes with some strange
irony that Yep, Sure Enough, there's a Mac IIsi and a cheap 286 in the
corner.  I open up some of the computer boxes I use as stylish computer
nerd furniture tables and settings, to show they are empty. 

After about 5 minutes of this they are clearly unimpressed and
disappointed at the same time.  While Officer Burke is looking under
the kitchen sink and in the kitchen cabinets, the Sergeant says to me
`so what would be your dream computer? a Mac or an IBM?' It seemed like
a simple query just to distract me from the unpleasantness of two
police officers breathing down my space and eyeing things such as dirty
plates on the floor and dirty clothes in the corners, and disordered
stacks of manuals and magazines in various stages of undress.  I
hesitated to think but was completely straightforward and honest in
saying that I probably would prefer a Mac, namely a Quadra 950, and
made some vague noises about how one's computers reflect how much money
one has!  Later I realized that the question could have been hardly
innocent, but a way of judging whether I was lusting after a juicy 486
like the one stolen, and was glad I didn't say anything suspicious.
Then again, maybe my response *was* suspicious.

Officer Burke says `I guess that's about it unless...' (with a sort of
dangling irony from a Perry Mason episode just before a sudden,
surprising, damning revelation) and looks inside the oven, which has
never held anything but two thawing pizzas and is empty at the moment. 
Finally, they leave, and I'm encouraged that they take the handcuffs
with them without me in them. At least I had *proven* (to use their own
terminology) that I wasn't guilty...

I was hacking away in the same computer lab on the next night (I forget
when--Tuesday?), and officer Burke and another officer came in to
survey the area for the first time.  They talked to some people in the
lab and looked around. Officer Burke had brought with him all the logs
he had been given including mine.  It was at this point that I realized
his version of the logs were vastly superfluous.  I thought I probably
got some brownie points for the extremely tight hand-edited ones I gave
him (listing only the console logins to all Unix machines in the lab). 
I found out about his haystack versions only because he let me see them
after asking rather simplistic questions of me about the network (where
can people log in from?), and I realized that *he* had just realized
for the first time that the Adminstration-supplied logs were far more
raw data than was necessary--in fact, it was highly misleading because
it listed logins from *anywhere* (modems, off campus-sites, internet
connections, etc.)

He talked to me some more to ask me about the details I had gone over
of the people I saw let in.  He sat down at the desk where the computer
was stolen and went through them as I banged away on a remote computer.
 Finally the pair are about to leave.  Officer Burke reveals that the
people he talked to today and residences he searched didn't help at
all, and has a very emptyhanded tone.  I told him, `well, at least you
have a lot of other things to look at' indicating the printouts. `No,
we've hit a dead end. In fact, at this moment, I'd have to say that
you're our prime suspect.'

Yeeks. I was completely crestfallen, and turned away from looking at
him, having a queasy replay of the gut-wrenching feelings of the
earlier Residence Search Initiative.  He told me that he had a 3 day
vacation starting that night (as I recall, it was about 5:30 then) and
hopefully some new `leads' would pop up afterwards.

He and I traded some more of that halting, eerie small talk about
campus computer politics and network administration jobs, and there's
the brief illusion that we're just two human beings yacking. But then
just before he left he said, `say, by the way, just check everything
up, do your apartments have any storage facilities?'  I assured him
they did not, shaking my head and looking away for the third and final
time.  I went back to the computer and tapped the keyboard, brushed the
mouse, and tried to lose myself in cyberspace.

* * *

In pondering the whole episode I have come to various conclusions.

1) A supremely delicate balance exists between the ability of the
police to conduct meaningful investigations and the preservation of the
rights of people they are investigating.  It would be possible to argue
based on this experience that the warrantless search is critical to
their role, but on the other hand it would be equally possible to argue
that it is completely useless.

2) Police do not need warrants to make searches.  Probably most
searches are done without them.  Many people submit to them voluntarily
with only the slightest hesitation.  Was I perpetuating a dangerous or
cavalier approach by assenting to the search? I don't know. I felt like
I could remove suspicion by doing so and that their assurances were adequate...

3) I didn't gain any tangible benefit from cooperating fully with the
police.  To the contrary, it chewed up my time and emotions with only
the effect of drawing greater suspicion to me and for all I know I am
still a `prime suspect'. Your mileage may vary; I certainly don't
advocate this experience as a complete disillusionment in `the process'
or want it to be referred to in that way. If you do cooperate with
police I urge you to have a rock-solid alibi and be absolutely certain
of your facts.  Lacking either makes you suspect. For me the sentence
`if you are innocent you can prove it' now sounds as warped and cruelly
hollow as `if you loved me you'd prove it.'

5) I certainly don't envy the job of being a policeman. In an
investigation they don't know who to trust, and have to tiptoe around
revealing details to get more information and not revealing details
that imperil the overall investigation. Under this scenario, solid
information and its knowledgeable interpretation is absolutely invaluable.

6) The policeman does not always have a great incentive to solve a
case. There is no change in his salary in doing so or any other basic
reward. There is probably a vague hint of promotion in consistently
solving cases, but in many other cases there is probably greater
incentive *not* to solve a case--the tedious legwork is diminished.

7) Probably most of the cases that *are* solved are mostly based on
rock-solid information such as  confessions and informant tips and not
inspired sleuthing and searches.  The argument could be made that this
is the major legitimate role of investigative police work--following
existing leads, not going on `fishing expeditions'.

8) Warrants, like any other bureacratic tool, can become meaningless
under the variations of local circumstances.  My impression was that
they do seem to be used, but they are only used in extreme
circumstances and do not form the basis of routine police work. I think
the critical message is that we have to judge law enforcement
techniques not by their *intent* but their actual use and effect in *practice*.

9) I still wonder if the officers would have been able to get a warrant
under my circumstances. At the time I was convinced that they wouldn't
have without additional evidence (of which there assurredly is none). 
I had in the back of my mind that I would rather have them search when
I didn't expect it or through my landlord when I wasn't there.  In
other words, as ugly and unpleasant as it was, it could have even been far worse.

Thanks for listening to all this, it is immensely therapeutic for me
and hopefully some insight is contained herein to minimize a burden for you.


P.S. Even though elements of this note make my identity exceedingly
obvious, in interests of preserving my privacy, please refrain from
speculating publicly or privately on it.  Just sign me: SEARCH ME

P.P.S. As of this writing, neither the thief nor the computer have been found.
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
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From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: J. Michael Diehl <mdiehl@triton.unm.edu>
Date: Wed, 23 Jun 93 23:58:28 PDT
To: nobody@soda.berkeley.edu
Subject: Re: Weak steganography
In-Reply-To: <9306171745.AA05015@soda.berkeley.edu>
Message-ID: <9306240658.AA15654@triton.unm.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


According to nobody@soda.berkeley.edu:
> There are a couple of problems with the idea of sticking encrypted
> files onto the end of executable files.  The first is, to make this
> easy, you need a program to do it (and to "undo" it).  Well, if someone
> steals your computer and gets access to these files, they will probably
> also get access to this program.  This will tip them off to what you have
> done.

The technique I advocated was so simple, I could code it on my lunch hour at 
work.  I did.  If you didn't want to have such a thing on your machine, you 
could store it remotely, either on an ftp site or a local bbs.  Clean up 
your hard disk and there is no sign of anything.

> This is an example of the general principle that you need to assume that
> your attackers know or can discover the methods you are using, but they
> don't know the keys.

If steganography is to work, we must find ways to make this "principle" invalid.
Strong encryption will protect our "plain-sight-text."  It falls to Data-hiding
to protect our cyphertext.

> Another problem is that encrypted files look different from executable
> files.  Encrypted files have a uniform histogram (that is, all 256 different
> possible byte values are equally frequent), but exe files do not.  The
> appending of an encrypted file to an executable file will be very obvious.
> The exact boundary may not be immediately apparent, but it can probably
> be narrowed down to ten or twenty words without much effort at all.  In
> any case, exe files which have had this treatment will stick out like a
> sore thumb.

I was going to suggest, but Phil beet me to it, that we compress our executables

> Last, XOR'ing a PGP file with a repeated string is probably not a very
> good method.  PGP has a header at the front whose structure is known and
> which has some fixed bytes.  These can be used to immediately recover some

Well, we could do a lot of things here.  We could have the option of xor'ing,
adding, or subtracting....  We could add random bytes to the cyphertext, at 
offsets we specify and memorize....  I still think this could be done, and that
it would work.  If anyone else shares my enthusiasm, I'll try to get it coded up

+-----------------------+-----------------------------+---------+
| J. Michael Diehl ;-)  | I thought I was wrong once. | PGP KEY |
| mdiehl@triton.unm.edu |   But, I was mistaken.      |available|
| mike.diehl@fido.org   |                             | Ask Me! |
| (505) 299-2282        +-----------------------------+---------+
|                                                               |
+------"I'm just looking for the opportunity to be -------------+
|            Politically Incorrect!"   <Me>                     |
+-----If codes are outlawed, only criminals wil have codes.-----+
+----Is Big Brother in your phone?  If you don't know, ask me---+



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: karn@qualcomm.com (Phil Karn)
Date: Wed, 23 Jun 93 18:19:15 PDT
To: 76630.3577@CompuServe.COM>
Subject: Re: Contempt of court
Message-ID: <9306240119.AA00543@servo>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


At 08:50 AM 6/17/93 CDT, Mike McNally wrote:
  In the days of
>yore, numbers runners and gangsters and nefarious bad guys would keep
>records on cellulose (?) flash paper which could be ignited and
>destroyed very rapidly should Elliot Ness be seen approaching the
>front door.

Nitrocellulose. Very popular before the development of cellulose acetate,
mylar and other modern polymers. It was the standard material used for
movie film stock, which explains the bunker-like construction of the
projection rooms in many older movie houses. Newer theaters often display
signs in their projection rooms saying "Safety film only". (Now you know
the meaning of the phrase "KODAK Safety Film" along the edges of your
print negatives.)

Today the main civilian use of nitrocellulose that I know of (other than
in smokeless gunpowder) is to make ping-pong balls. Try igniting one
sometime (in a safe area!)

>Another (simpler) suggestion made by a friend was to devise
>motion-sensitive devices which would cause total corruption of
>information stored on a disk if it were moved.

I've heard Gail Thackeray claim that hackers she'd raid would put big
electromagnets in doorways to erase magnetic media as it was being
seized. She never actually gave any proof of this, and it did always
seem just a little far-fetched given the relative ease with which a
hacker could just encrypt his/her incriminating data. I once asked her
what she'd do once the "bad guys" started encrypting, and she said
"I'm hoping you guys will tell us". (At the time I was one of the
so-called "good guys", working for Bellcore.)

Phil





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: karn@qualcomm.com (Phil Karn)
Date: Wed, 23 Jun 93 18:19:11 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Weak steganography
Message-ID: <9306240119.AA00555@servo>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


At 10:45 AM 6/17/93 -0700, Hal Finney wrote:

>Another problem is that encrypted files look different from executable
>files.  Encrypted files have a uniform histogram (that is, all 256 different
>possible byte values are equally frequent), but exe files do not.

Not necessarily. If you use pklite or lzexe, you produce an automatically
self-decompressing executable that will appear to have a much flatter
distribution than an ordinary exe file.

What we need is a crypto version of pklite - instead of (or in addition to)
compressing the executable, it encrypts it and sticks a stub decryptor
on the front of the executable. Each time you run it, it prompts you for
a password, decrypts and decompresses the executable and runs it.

Phil
 





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Jim McCoy <mccoy@ccwf.cc.utexas.edu>
Date: Wed, 23 Jun 93 23:25:25 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Government fear of strong crypto
In-Reply-To: <70188.pfarrell@cs.gmu.edu>
Message-ID: <199306240625.AA19484@tigger.cc.utexas.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text


> From: "Pat Farrell" <pfarrell@cs.gmu.edu>
[...]
> 
> The "government" as a whole is not against crypto. The NSA is _very
> strongly_ against it. There are 60,000 or more bureaucrats in NSA that would
> be effectively put out of work by widespread strong crypto.

Hmmm..... actually I must disagree with this.  The NSA may oppose strong
crypto, but a few facts should be brought up:

	1)  The NSA is not chartered for domestic surveillance work.  If
	    you discover the NSA watching you within the US you can have
	    them arrested.  They are probably more interested in the
	    systems being put in use around the world and less about
	    systems internal to the U.S.

	2)  The NSA has been dealing with strong cryptography for a long
	    time.  These are the people who have been playing crypto games
	    with "the Ruskies" since before I was born.  I sincerely doubt
	    they are losing a great deal of sleep over the fate of Clipper.

They may have an interest in promoting relatively weak cryptography that
will be exported and may actually favor weak crypto at home (hoping for the
Beta v. VHS effect to spread this weak crypto from the U.S. to the rest of
the world) but no one at Fort Meade is going to be getting a pink slip if
Clipper goes down in flames.

The FBI, and other domestic law enforcement agencies are probably very gung
ho for weak crypto, but I just don't think that No Such Agency is going to
be greatly effected by it.  Thier fingerprints are all over the Clpper
stuff, but seeing as how thier other mission is to develop ciphers this is
only natural.

Just a little thought late at night...

jim



> 
> I believe that the FBI and other more public agencies are simply shills for
> NSA. The many posting about real wiretap usage and costs simply can't
> support taking all the heat last year of Digital Telophony and this year
> over Clipper, esp. when they admit that smart crooks wouldn't bother to use
> Clipper.
> 
> BTW, I talked to Dorothy Denning at the conference. She says that it is now
> called the "Key escrow chip" because of Intergraph's trademark on Clipper.
> I'll post more on my conversations with DE Denning later.
> 
> Pat
> 
> Pat Farrell      Grad Student                 pfarrell@cs.gmu.edu
> Department of Computer Science    George Mason University, Fairfax, VA
> Public key availble via finger          #include <standard.disclaimer>
> 




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Mike Godwin <mnemonic@eff.org>
Date: Wed, 23 Jun 93 22:35:44 PDT
To: karn@qualcomm.com (Phil Karn)
Subject: Re: Contempt of  Court
In-Reply-To: <9306240119.AA00561@servo>
Message-ID: <199306240536.AA18014@eff.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


 
Phil Karn writes:

> At 02:13 PM 6/17/93 PDT, Mike Axelrod 422-0929 wrote:

Who's this Axelrod guy? I'm Godwin.

> >If the key itself had embedded testimony that was incriminating, then it is
> >possible one could invoke the 5th amendment to avoid disclosure of the key.
> >But, I suppose a court could do an end run around that by giving limited 
> >use immunity for the incriminating content of the key. Comments?
> >
> >Mike.
 
I think Phil thinks we're one and the same. See below.

> What I've never been able to understand about Mike's claim is why the
> "fruit of the poisoned tree" principle would not apply to an encryption
> key. As I understand it, this principle bars the use of any evidence
> that was gathered as a direct or indirect result of inadmissable
> evidence (like a warrantless search).

Untrue. "Poisonous tree" doctrine applies to illegally obtained
evidence, not to "inadmissible evidence" (a very different category,
logically).
 
> Mike, back at the Hackers' Conference you mentioned a Supreme Court
> decision that said in passing that one could not compel a defendant to
> reveal the combination to a lock, but that it wasn't a binding precedent
> because it didn't relate to the case at hand. (I forget the legal term
> you used).

"Dicta."

I'm sure Phil is referring to me, not to Axelrod, here.

> Could you find and post an excerpt of this particular
> decision?

I've been trying to find this case, but haven't found it.



--Mike







From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: karn@qualcomm.com (Phil Karn)
Date: Wed, 23 Jun 93 18:39:57 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: OTP dual decryption
Message-ID: <9306240139.AA00693@servo>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


At , nobody@eli-remailer.toad.com wrote:
>-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
>
>Using a one-time pad for dual decryption might work like this.
>
>I have a file, D (for Dangerous), which I want to conceal.  I construct
>a random file of the same length, K (for Key), which will be my "encryption
>key".  I xor K and D to produce E (for Encrypted), the encrypted file.  I
>delete D and hide K somewhere.

I have a better idea. You generate your D (dangerous) file and encrypt
it with IDEA or DES and a secret key K that you commit to memory. You then
destroy D. If (encrypt(D,K)) is seized and you are ordered to decrypt it,
then you produce a file F such that (F XOR encrypt(D,K)) produces whatever
bogus plaintext you desire and hand F over to the cops claiming that it's
your one-time pad.

Much simpler, and no chance of them discovering your plaintext, although
there's no guarantee that they won't suspect that you're still hiding
something (especially if they read cypherpunks).

Phil





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: karn@qualcomm.com (Phil Karn)
Date: Wed, 23 Jun 93 18:39:58 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: xor w/prbs
Message-ID: <9306240139.AA00690@servo>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


At 10:14 PM 6/17/93, Kragen Sittler wrote:
>Some MORON wrote an article in Computer Shopper, about doing a one-time pad
>with a PRBS... in fact, he even challenged any cryptographers to break it.
>(He used a 32-bit seed for the PRBS.)

Sigh. This is starting to look like the problem that skeptic groups
like the Committee for the Scientific Investigation of Claims of the
Paranormal have been facing for a long time. The basic problem is that
it's far easier to make a bogus claim than it is to carefully refute it.

In this case, it *ought* to suffice to simply point people who make
"unbreakable" but trivial ciphers at the existing volume of literature.
But they can get stubborn and insist that you actually break it, not
understanding that there's a big difference between a cipher that you
are confident that can be cracked and a cipher in which you can place your
confidence that it can't be cracked.

Plus ca la change, plus ca la meme chose.

Phil





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Peter Wayner <pcw@access.digex.net>
Date: Thu, 24 Jun 93 05:53:23 PDT
To: ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu
Subject: Re:  a new role for the NSA
Message-ID: <199306241253.AA00313@access.digex.net>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Many people have pointed out, perhaps correctly, that strong
crypto could mean the end of the line for many of the workers
at the NSA. If I was in charge of the NSA, I would argue to
my budget-dispensing superiors that all of the strong crypto
just meant that I needed a bigger budget to scan for data. 

So the terrorists get crypto terminals? Well, they probably
won't have a Tempest class machine so there is plenty of SIGINT
that can still be done. There are plenty of opportunities to
target people and their communications links with localized
bugs. It just requires some more money. 

I've often wondered whether the NSA's presumed approach of 
acting as a huge vacuum cleaner for data was the best way
of gathering intelligence. It may have been in the 1960's
and earlier when transmission rates were relatively expensive
and people didn't call long distance unless their was a 
death in the family. Now, though, the sheer volume of data
has exploded. Vaccuumming it all in and sorting it out
in the buildings at Fort Meade must be much less cost effective--
no matter how many voice recognition computers that they have.

Today, information is much, much cheaper than it used to be.
Intelligence is just as expensive as ever. 

Incidentally, Bill Safire wrote a great piece on this a year
or so ago. He argued that it was time for the Spy agencies to
go back to Mata Hari type shenanigans because the magic window
of SIGINT was about to be closed again. If anyone could dig
it up, I would appreciate the reference. 

-Peter Wayner




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Duncan Frissell <76630.3577@CompuServe.COM>
Date: Thu, 24 Jun 93 06:12:31 PDT
To: <cypherpunks@toad.com>
Subject: Fermat Vindicated Maybe
Message-ID: <930624130945_76630.3577_EHK41-1@CompuServe.COM>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


From today's NYT:

Dr. Wiles [Andrew Wiles of Princeton University] presented his results 
this week at a small conference in Cambridge, England, his birthplace, 
on "Padic Galois Representations, Iwasawa Theory and the Tamagawa Numbers
of Motives."  He gave a lecture a day on Monday, Tuesday, and Wednesday 
with the title "Molecular Forms, Elliptic Curves and Galois 
Representations." There was no hint in the title that Fermat's last 
theorem would be discussed, Dr. Ribet said.

"As Wiles began his lectures, there was more and more speculation about 
what it was going to be," Dr. Ribet said.  The audience of specialists 
in these arcane fields swelled from about 40 on the first day to about 
60 today [23 June].  Finally, at the end of his third lecture, Dr. Wiles 
concluded that he had proved a general case of the Tatiyama conjecture.  
Then, seemingly as an afterthought, he noted that that meant that Fermat's
last theorem was true.  Q.E.D.  

Duncan Frissell

The bulk of whose experience with Fermat consists of a close reading of
"Mathmateca Fantasia" and other maths science fiction as an adolescent.  
Loved the 5 color map theorem as well.






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: gnu (John Gilmore)
Date: Thu, 24 Jun 93 09:33:36 PDT
To: Dr. Cat <cat@wixer.bga.com>
Subject: Re: Perspectives
In-Reply-To: <9306222124.AA00723@wixer.bga.com>
Message-ID: <9306241633.AA11443@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I agree with der Cat; the paranoia here is getting excessive.

I think it's most likely that the documents we received were genuine,
and an attempt of someone in the Secretary of Defense's staff to
explain the situation to policy-people in that office who had not kept
track of what was going on.  There's a lot more for the Secretary of
Defense to do than to watch domestic entryption debates, and falsify 
documents about them just in case someone requests them under FOIA.

	John





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Doug Porter <dporter@well.sf.ca.us>
Date: Thu, 24 Jun 93 09:56:13 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Government fear of strong crypto
Message-ID: <93Jun24.095545pdt.13970-1@well.sf.ca.us>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Jim McCoy says:

> The NSA is not chartered for domestic surveillance work.

This statement keeps showing up. If there is any support for it I'd like 
to hear it.

We know it was not true as far back as twenty years ago, from July 1, 
1969 to October 1973.  For details on the MINARET Charter see page 150 of 
"The National Security Agency and Fourth Amendment Rights", and pages 323 
and 324 of "The Puzzle Palace".

NSA has a long history of ignoring whether they are chartered for an 
activity, of course.

Doug




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: nobody@rosebud.ee.uh.edu
Date: Thu, 24 Jun 93 09:22:37 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Weak steganography
Message-ID: <9306241622.AA11117@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

Several people have suggested that PGP or some similar public-key program
could be used to exchange encrypted email, then a "fake" one-time pad file
could be created to transform the PGP file into a safe plaintext.  If your
files were seized and the keys demanded, you could supply the fake OTP file
as the key which would "decrypt" the PGP file to the safe text.

Unfortunately, this doesn't presently work with PGP.  PGP puts a header at
the front of encrypted file which identifies it as a PGP file.  This includes
information about whether the file is RSA or IDEA encrypted, and if it is
RSA encrypted it includes information about which key(s) it is encrypted with.

If files are saved like this, there will be no question that they are actually
PGP files, and not the output of a one-time pad.  Any attempt to produce a
OTP key file which leads to a safe plaintext will be a transparent fabrication.

And, of course, PGP's ASCII encoding, which would usually be used for email,
boldly displays the "-----BEGIN PGP MESSAGE-----" at the top.  If the files
were saved in this format it would be a further giveaway.

People have called for PGP to have a "stealth" mode in which it would save
files without these headers.  This would require the user to know which files
were truly PGP encrypted, what the encryption algorithm was, and of course the
key.  If this were implemented it would make PGP files much less recognizable
and the "fake OTP key" approach would be workable.

Another approach for now would be to super-encrypt the PGP file with some
other system.  A simple XOR with a repeated random bit pattern (produced by
hashing a user pass phrase) which is longer than the PGP header would be
adequate, since the non-header portion of a PGP file should be random.  Or
you could use one of the widely-available DES encryption utilities, since
these don't produce any headers, as far as I know.  But this would complicate
the process of decrypting the file.

PGP's IDEA-encrypted files, which you create with the "-c" switch to PGP,
put only a five-byte header on: a type byte, and a four-byte file length.
This information is redundant and it should be very easy for PGP to recon-
struct it if it were removed.

RSA encryption headers will be harder to remove, particularly because of
the lack of a key ID to tell which secret key to decrypt with.  We would
just try the default key, I guess.  But this would require a more extensive
set of changes to PGP.

Hal Finney
hfinney@shell.portal.com

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
iQCVAgUBLCmngKgTA69YIUw3AQGDWgP/U/HwP5gwPXn3GZgH3SH3zjnrKd8dHPqn
y2OVF7xqiaVPuV5VF/UBGzFcPgfb/DuamIEr/aQmAMX2BlVktQ/fGaluZ8wvIbs/
QlQcsp+BH9AAb0BcojQ6rmwtf8A5c/3VkuGUSvyRGEX1PecdwoW8Eh/FEIfeU/WE
njvIwmn92aY=
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Phil Karn <karn@unix.ka9q.ampr.org>
Date: Thu, 24 Jun 93 13:51:50 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Triggerfish
Message-ID: <9306241957.AA04530@unix.ka9q.ampr.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I just posted this to the CU (Computer Underground) digest in response
to a most interesting series of items about the newsletter Full
Disclosure's public mention of a Harris Corporation device marketed to
law enforcement agencies for intercepting cellular telephone
conversations named "Triggerfish".  Harris responded with an amazing
threat to sue the newsletter for a variety of offenses, including
trademark infringement (for merely mentioning the product in a brief
"new products" editorial).

The CU digest can be read on the usenet newsgroup
comp.society.cu-digest; the issue in question is Volume 5, Issue 46.

Phil

To: tk0jut2@mvs.cso.niu.edu
Reply-To: karn@servo.qualcomm.com
Subject: Re: Cu Digest, #5.46


In CU Digest 5.46:
|> Harris Law Enforcement Products
|> 
|> TRIGGERFISH has a number of cellular phone based applications:
|> determining a suspects phone number, dialed number recorder, and
|> wiretapping.  According to Harris, ``for the first time, law
|> enforcement is not at a disadvantage in tracking the high-tech
|> criminal.'' Additionally, the unit ``collects and integrates all
|> relevant data, including voice, directly from the ether.''

|> Reprinted from Full Disclosure, Box 903, Libertyville, Illinois 60048

I find the phrase "directly from the ether" *most* illuminating given
a rather heated exchange I had with Mr. Jim Kallstrom of the FBI at
the recent CPSR Cryptography Conference in Washington DC earlier this
month.

Kallstrom is the FBI's chief public advocate for their "Digital
Telephony Initiative". Among other things, they want the ability to
intercept suspects' cellular telephone calls at the MTSO (switch).
Only with a valid warrant, naturally.

At the meeting, I made the following comments.  I had seen the
standards-setting process for the new digital cellular telephone
systems from the inside as they related to security and privacy. And I
was wondering why the government (specifically NSA, through its export
control reviews) was so strongly opposed to meaningful air link
encryption, even if the encryption were to stop at the switch as it
would have to in order to be compatible with existing telephones on
the land side of a cellular call. Such encryption would secure the air
link, the most easily intercepted portion of a cellular telephone
call, while leaving the conversation in the clear at the MTSO where it
could be tapped, if necessary.

In a private conversation, one of the senior members of the committee
who didn't want his name mentioned told me why. "It's very simple", he
said.  "Anybody can intercept the radio link. It's easy. But tapping a
call at the switch requires the cooperation of the telephone company,
and they generally require warrants. And law enforcement says that
sometimes, warrants are, well, just too damn inconvenient."

This really set Kallstrom off. He shouted me down, attacking my
unwillingness to name my source. I challenged him, unsuccessfully, to
back up *his* shrill claims for the absolute necessity of Digital
Telephony with anything more than handwaving. After tempers cooled a
bit, in a one-on-one conversation during a break, he insisted to me
that the FBI was never interested in intercepting the air link portion
of cellular calls - "too difficult, too labor-intensive", he said.  He
agreed that he'd like to see cellular air links encrypted.  They only
wanted the capability to tap in at the switch, and he couldn't care
less if the air link were securely encrypted (though he still wanted
the keys to be escrowed for some reason...hmmm...)

Perhaps it was a desperate attempt to maintain this "we're not
interested in the air link" fiction that triggered Harris's silly
overreaction to the public mention of TRIGGERFISH.

Phil




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Peter Wayner <pcw@access.digex.net>
Date: Thu, 24 Jun 93 10:30:58 PDT
To: dporter@well.sf.ca.us
Subject: Re: Government fear of strong crypto
Message-ID: <199306241730.AA29024@access.digex.net>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



I seem to remember that Pres. Reagan authorized the NSA to
help domestic law enforcement officials when "lives were at
stake." But I don't have a citation.

-Peter Wayner




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Kelly Goen  <kellyg@sco.COM>
Date: Thu, 24 Jun 93 14:37:12 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Government fear of strong crypto
Message-ID: <9306241425.aa09999@vishnu.sco.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



	From mail.netcom.com!toad.com!cypherpunks-request Wed Jun 23 23:23:59 1993
	Return-Path: <mccoy@ccwf.cc.utexas.edu>
	Message-Id: <199306240625.AA19484@tigger.cc.utexas.edu>
	Subject: Re: Government fear of strong crypto
	To: cypherpunks@toad.com
	Date: Thu, 24 Jun 1993 01:25:13 -0500 (CDT)
	From: Jim McCoy <mccoy@ccwf.cc.utexas.edu>
	Cc: pfarrell@cs.gmu.edu
	In-Reply-To: <70188.pfarrell@cs.gmu.edu> from "Pat Farrell" at Jun 23, 93 07:29:41 pm
	X-Mailer: ELM [version 2.4 PL21]
	Content-Type: text
	Content-Length: 2400      
	
	> From: "Pat Farrell" <pfarrell@cs.gmu.edu>
	[...]
	> 
	> The "government" as a whole is not against crypto. The NSA is _very
	> strongly_ against it. There are 60,000 or more bureaucrats in NSA that would
	> be effectively put out of work by widespread strong crypto.
	
	Hmmm..... actually I must disagree with this.  The NSA may oppose strong
	crypto, but a few facts should be brought up:
	
		1)  The NSA is not chartered for domestic surveillance work.  If
		    you discover the NSA watching you within the US you can have
		    them arrested.  They are probably more interested in the
		    systems being put in use around the world and less about
		    systems internal to the U.S.

According to the Bill of Rights Foundation Booklet "CIA OFF CAMPUS"
Ex-President Reagan signed in 1981 Executive order # 12333 Which
permits the CIA to operate domestically against US citizens if
it is believed that said citizen is either an agent of a foreign power
or acting on behalf of same. Since this definition has been used during
COINTELPRO to allow one to have associates /friends that are foreign born
to cause one to be subject to a whole range of unconstitutional activities
performed by said agencies. BTW ANY federal intelligence agencie will
act as a "cutout" for situations where the prime agency cannot operate legally
but another can. 

 I believe a FOIA is in order to find out if E.O. #12333 allows the entire
national security apparatus to operate or only the CIA...	



         Unhappily yours
         kelly
		
	> I believe that the FBI and other more public agencies are simply shills for
	> NSA. The many posting about real wiretap usage and costs simply can't
	> support taking all the heat last year of Digital Telophony and this year
	> over Clipper, esp. when they admit that smart crooks wouldn't bother to use
	> Clipper.


    Entirely True...!




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Derek Atkins <warlord@MIT.EDU>
Date: Thu, 24 Jun 93 12:18:42 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Weak steganography
In-Reply-To: <9306241622.AA11117@toad.com>
Message-ID: <9306241918.AA26021@toxicwaste.MEDIA.MIT.EDU>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Hal said:

> Unfortunately, this doesn't presently work with PGP.  PGP puts a
> header at the front of encrypted file which identifies it as a PGP
> file.  This includes information about whether the file is RSA or IDEA
> encrypted, and if it is RSA encrypted it includes information about
> which key(s) it is encrypted with.

First, this is only true when the file is ASCII armored.  You can
easily convert the file from armor to binary once you receive it and
then keep it in binary form.  Second, if the file is encrypted, it
only contains the KeyID(s) of the recipient(s) in plain text, not the
sender.

> RSA encryption headers will be harder to remove, particularly because of
> the lack of a key ID to tell which secret key to decrypt with.  We would
> just try the default key, I guess.  But this would require a more extensive
> set of changes to PGP.

This is not necessrily true.  I've been thinking of a way to try this.
Don't forget, you only have a limited number of secret keys to try, so
you try them all.  How many keys could you have?  10, maybe?  At most?
I, personally, only have one secret key.  I could try it, and if it
fails, I know I couldn't read the file....

Basically, Hal, you are stretching the "problem" further than it needs
to go, IMHO.  Relax a little and take a look at what you have at your
fingertips.  :-)

-derek





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: karn@qualcomm.com (Phil Karn)
Date: Thu, 24 Jun 93 15:33:15 PDT
To: pcw@access.digex.net
Subject: Re:  Karn's note...
Message-ID: <9306242232.AA08245@servo>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I tend to doubt that the spooks have voice recognition technology in
regular widespread use, at least not the kind of ultra sophisticated
stuff that AI types seem to dream about.  It's possible that they use
less sophisticated stuff as a "pre filter" (compress out silence,
perhaps distinguish male from female voices, etc), but I'm sure that
the bulk of the work is still very labor intensive. Tens of thousands
of clerks, intercept operators and natural language translators have
long been employed by the NSA and there don't seem to be mass layoffs
of these sorts of people around Fort Meade.

And sophisticated voice recognition really isn't necessary when you
consider all of the information that cell phones and base stations
emit that is almost trivially processed automatically by an intercept
device: electronic serial numbers, Mobile Identification Numbers
(telephone numbers), handoff messages, channel assignment messages,
etc. It's no big deal at all to build boxes that automatically
intercept all calls made to or from a specific phone, assuming you
have an RF path to the target (e.g., from a car tailing a suspect).

As a manufacturer of cellular telephones, we have such a box
(commercially made by IFR) in our lab. We use it to test our phones in
their FM/analog mode.  The spooks (NSA and otherwise) simply cannot be
uninterested in boxes like these -- and in preserving their
capabilities.

One point I keep making about Clipper: it makes this sort of automated
identity tracking as easy on regular telephone lines as it already is
on cellular, because the chip serial number in the Law Enforcement
Block can be decrypted with just the (common) Family Key - you don't
need the escrowed keys. And sometimes simple traffic analysis can be
almost as deadly as getting the actual contents of a conversation.

Phil






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Kelly Goen  <kellyg@sco.COM>
Date: Thu, 24 Jun 93 16:14:30 PDT
To: pcw@access.digex.net
Subject: Re:  Karn's note...
Message-ID: <9306241603.aa11010@vishnu.sco.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



	From toad.com!cypherpunks-request Thu Jun 24 15:34:07 1993
	Return-Path: <karn@qualcomm.com>
	Date: Thu, 24 Jun 93 15:32:54 -0700
	From: karn@qualcomm.com (Phil Karn)
	Message-Id: <9306242232.AA08245@servo>
	To: cypherpunks@toad.com, pcw@access.digex.net
	Subject: Re:  Karn's note...
	
	I tend to doubt that the spooks have voice recognition technology in
	regular widespread use, at least not the kind of ultra sophisticated
	stuff that AI types seem to dream about.  It's possible that they use
	ln.
Much Deleted... \
    Hi Phil...
         All the reports I have seen on the widespread phone tapping and
voice recognition by the NSA allegedly was in reference to Operation HARVEST
According to private estimates immense intel value results even if the
recog phase gets 15-20% accuracy on most? speakers... for 
phrases such as Spook, espionage,drugs etc... Most of the references I saw
to HARVEST were published by the Bill of Rights foundation  in various of their
books and phamplets and reports from the Church Subcommittee hearings
on intelligence activities during the earlier abuses of COINTELPRO,
with a few references in "The Puzzle Palace" by Cliff Bamford.
I also saw some refeneces about 5 years ago in comp.dcom.telecom... as
to these kind of operations. Do they really do it??? hmm
dont know but I am not taking any chances!! :)
	Phil
	
	




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: peb@PROCASE.COM (Paul Baclace)
Date: Thu, 24 Jun 93 16:27:21 PDT
To: pcw@access.digex.net
Subject: Re:  Karn's note...
Message-ID: <9306242327.AA02594@banff.procase.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



>sounds like Bob Smith on line 42

This is speaker recognition, not voice recognition.  It turns out that
the problem is solved in a very different way for each; voice 
recognition, in order to be speaker independent, must throw out
the information that makes it possible to do speaker recognition
(and vice versa: the latter does not need some of the information 
that the former needs).

This is used in "roving wiretaps" that apparently are used infrequently
as they scan whole exchanges or number sets (e.g., all payphones in 
some city).  The idea is to capture phone calls from the suspects that
are savvy enough to know that they are being tapped.  At least one
Mob boss was caught this way (in Los Angeles, I think, about 4-5
years ago). 


Paul E. Baclace
peb@procase.com




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Peter Wayner <pcw@access.digex.net>
Date: Thu, 24 Jun 93 14:57:27 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Karn's note...
Message-ID: <199306242157.AA26979@access.digex.net>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



On Over-the-air encryption...

If anyone wants to read Tom Clancy's latest book, _Clear and Present Danger_
about a set of covert operations against drug kingpins in South America,
they will note that he mentions a magic box that will scan the airwaves
for voices on the cellular channels. This allows the protagonists to 
follow the conversations of the kingpins as they hop from limo to limo
using a different phone with each conversation. 

Does TriggerFish do this? 

My theory is that the 260-bit repeated XOR code was proffered because
it wouldn't interfere with algorithms that were doing simultaneous
voice recoginition. It is, after all, just the equivalence of doing
a discrete convolution across the signal. I believe that this should
be easy to handle with a few clever signal processing algorithms designed
for noise reduction. I don't know this with any stretch of confidence
so I would like to be disabused of this idea if it's harder than
all of that. 

--Peter




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: M..Stirner@f28.n125.z1.FIDONET.ORG (M. Stirner)
Date: Fri, 25 Jun 93 13:33:00 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Deniable fed assets
Message-ID: <650.2C2A54D4@shelter.FIDONET.ORG>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



* Reply to msg originally in CYPHERPUNKS
 Uu> BTW ANY federal
 Uu> intelligence agencie will act as a "cutout" for situations where the
 Uu> prime agency cannot operate legally but another can.

This is absolutely true; I personally performed technically illegal
domestic intelligence-gathering services [relatively benign] under an
identical arrangement for several years.

Based on some eighteen years of personal experience, I will attest to
the fact that _any_ legal or constitutional safeguard against the
invasion of privacy will be routinely ignored by virtually any law
enforcement or intelligence agency if it suits their purposes & is
within their abilities.

*********************************************************************
* <m..stirner@f28.n125.z1.fidonet.org> - PGP Key D30909 via servers *
* > What country can preserve its liberties if its rulers are not  <*
* > warned from time to time that their people preserve the spirit <*
* > of resistance?  Let them take arms!" - Thomas Jefferson, 1787  <*
*********************************************************************

___ Blue Wave/QWK v2.12
--  
M. Stirner - via FidoNet node 1:125/1
UUCP: ...!uunet!kumr!shelter!28!M..Stirner
INTERNET: M..Stirner@f28.n125.z1.FIDONET.ORG




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Peter Wayner <pcw@access.digex.net>
Date: Thu, 24 Jun 93 15:51:28 PDT
To: karn@qualcomm.com
Subject: Re:  Karn's note...
Message-ID: <199306242251.AA02335@access.digex.net>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



I believe the novel implied that the magic box didn't do voice
recognition in the sense of identifying the words being spoken.
It just said, "Hey, that sounds like Bob Smith on line 42." The
point was that these guys were jumping around from phone to
phone. 

But, I agree with you that traffic analysis should be much easier
now with all of the ID tags. I think the Clancy box would be
too much overkill because people really don't use that many 
telephones during the day. Especially now that they call carry
pocket cellular phones. 

-Peter




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: ""L. Detweiler"" <ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Date: Thu, 24 Jun 93 18:00:09 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: NSA expert diagnosis: manic hypercryptophobia
In-Reply-To: <199306240625.AA19484@tigger.cc.utexas.edu>
Message-ID: <9306250059.AA06932@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Well, I promise not to rant as long as no one goes soft on Clipper and
the NSA. Unfortunately for the cause, I've been busy lately.  Jim McCoy
<mccoy@ccwf.cc.utexas.edu> posts some (ahem) interesting opinions on the NSA:

>	1)  The NSA is not chartered for domestic surveillance work.  If
>	    you discover the NSA watching you within the US you can have
>	    them arrested.  They are probably more interested in the
>	    systems being put in use around the world and less about
>	    systems internal to the U.S.

they are not `chartered' per se but as Bamford makes clear everyone
from the director and all the way down thinks that they live in a sort
of extra-legal limbo. The NSA has a Napoleonic complex and delusions of
grandeur that it is the fourth branch of the U.S. government--the
Police Branch (with additional powers to make policy submissions on the
level of the Executive branch). The vague and secret laws supposedly
`governing' them do nothing to restrain them. There is even a law that
exempts NSA from
certain laws unless specifically mentioned!  And tell
me, who's job is it to arrest a corrupt police officer? (A: the American public.)

`They are probably more interested in systems in use around the world
than in the U.S...'  well, this is a rather strange comment.  It
reflects both a false dichotomy and a true mutual exclusion.  NSA and
its members think that what happens in their bunker and the U.S. is
universal. It has a very imperialistic and egotistical view regarding
its sovereign cryptographic role, you understand.

The argument that what happens in the U.S. cryptographic arena is
relevant to the world at large is wrong for precisely the reasons the
NSA believes in it and right for precisely the reasons they fear.
Namely, yes, if U.S. exports strong cryptography it will penetrate the
world faster. That is how the U.S. *does* matter. If the U.S. lags
behind from absurd and asphyxiating regulations, we will find ourselves
inundated by superior products from the outside by countries that don't
have bizarre taboos against strong cryptography and secure protections
for the privacy of their citizens. That is how the U.S. *doesn't*
matter. Either way, the proliferation of strong cryptography is
inevitable. The NSA believes that strong cryptography will be
restricted internationally to the point that the U.S. quashes it. The
truth is that the U.S. will be quashed internationally to the point
that it restricts strong cryptography.

>	2)  The NSA has been dealing with strong cryptography for a long
>	    time.  These are the people who have been playing crypto games
>	    with "the Ruskies" since before I was born.  I sincerely doubt
>	    they are losing a great deal of sleep over the fate of Clipper.
> ... no one at Fort Meade is going to be getting a pink slip if
Clipper goes down in flames.

That's the problem. They should be, if they were truly accountable for
their actions and not insulated and inbred bureacrats.  Where are the
rolling heads?  Clipper is an unadulterated fiasco in every respect
except in bringing greater public attention to unconscionable
clandestine machinations in our government and cryptographic
technology. For the former, please spare us the depraved exhibitions.
For the latter, far more ethically superior demonstrations are
possible. (To say the least for both.)

>The FBI, and other domestic law enforcement agencies are probably very gung
>ho for weak crypto, but I just don't think that No Such Agency is going to
>be greatly effected by it.  Thier fingerprints are all over the Clpper
>stuff, but seeing as how thier other mission is to develop ciphers this is
>only natural.

Fingerprints? More like a blaring signature in neon or spraypainted
graffiti.  Clipper as `only natural'? I suppose in the way one would
consider a stillborn monster `natural'.

NSA will not be affected by strong cryptography if it doesn't spread,
that's correct. But that's like saying Communists would be unaffected
if they could prevent the spread of technology. The spread of strong
cryptography worldwide to the great detriment of signal interception is
absolutely inevitable. Clipper only shows that NSA has deluded itself
seriously enough to fail to recognize this basic truth to the point of
investing huge sums of money, expertise, and audacity in an
illegitimate project doomed to failure by its fundamental premise: that
a government can control *any* technology (let alone a powerful
emerging one) to perpetuate its own warped agenda and status quo.

P.S. the `beta vs. VHS' reference is nothing but NSA propaganda and the
terminology of apologists and spooks, and I hold it against you for
using it.  In only one way is it apt: the government is hoping they can
entrench their inferior VHS standard by market momentum and black
behind-the-scenes machinations despite the technical superiority of
competitors.  Well, sometimes inferior standards win out in the
marketplace, but only temporarily and never indefinitely. And no
government proposed VHS, or they would have been either laughed or
chased off the face of the earth.





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Brad Huntting <huntting@glarp.com>
Date: Thu, 24 Jun 93 19:51:25 PDT
To: Kelly Goen <kellyg@sco.com>
Subject: Re: Government fear of strong crypto
In-Reply-To: <9306241425.aa09999@vishnu.sco.com>
Message-ID: <199306250251.AA01259@misc.glarp.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



> According to the Bill of Rights Foundation Booklet "CIA OFF CAMPUS"
> Ex-President Reagan signed in 1981 Executive order # 12333 Which
> permits the CIA to operate domestically against US citizens if
> it is believed that said citizen is either an agent of a foreign power
> or acting on behalf of same.

I seem to remember that at about this time, the entire inteligence
community (part or all of the NSA, DEA, DOE, DOJ, CIA, DOD, and
the Treasury Dept) was reorganized and placed under something called
just "Central Inteligence" (CI).

Or is this just mistacken beurocratic trivia?


brad




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Brad Huntting <huntting@glarp.com>
Date: Thu, 24 Jun 93 20:26:37 PDT
To: Peter Wayner <pcw@access.digex.net>
Subject: Re: a new role for the NSA
In-Reply-To: <199306241253.AA00313@access.digex.net>
Message-ID: <199306250326.AA01446@misc.glarp.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



> If I was in charge of the NSA, I would argue to my budget-dispensing
> superiors that all of the strong crypto just meant that I needed
> a bigger budget to scan for data.

Indeed, the NSA's opposition to crypto (be it bad standards or
arcane export regulations) has one clear intent:  to keep down the
cost of wiretaping.

Wiretaping makes it easier for "law enforcement" to identify and
take action against undesirable elements.  Be it communists,
environmentalists, unsanctioned drug dealers, civil rights activists,
union leaders, guerila heating engineers, or just some poor bloke
who blew the whistle on the wrong multinational; wiretaping
facilitates not only finding them and finding what to charge them
with.


brad




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: nobody@shell.portal.com
Date: Thu, 24 Jun 93 22:17:27 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Chained remails
Message-ID: <9306250503.AA27769@jobe.shell.portal.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

M. Stirner, <M..Stirner@f28.n125.z1.FIDONET.ORG>, writes:

> Gee, am I amazed.  An anonymous post claims to have been routed via
> SIXTEEN (presumably cypherpunks) remailers.  Using the posted list of
> "active" cypherpunks remailers & the revised remailer manual, I have
> been unable to get simple
> 
> To: remailer@wherever.doodah.edu
> 
> ::
> Request-Remailing-To:
> 
> test messages to run through any but a couple (9, 10 & 12 I believe).  I
> have _never_ been able to get any of the "insects @ Berkeley" remailers
> to go with the standard syntax...or otherwise.

The problem may be the Fidonet addressing.  Many times I have tried to
send mail to people with mailing addresses like M's, and not had the
mail get through.  I don't know what the rules are but perhaps some systems
can get it and some can't.

I'd suggest to M. that he take one of the systems that does respond to his
remailing requests, and have that be the LAST one in a chain of two.  So,
he could send to, say, hh@cicada.berkeley.edu, and follow that with 
elee7h5@rosebud.ee.uh.edu.  Perhaps this would get through:

To: hh@cicada.berkeley.edu

::
Request-Remailing-To: elee7h5@rosebud.ee.uh.edu

::
Request-Remailing-To: M..Stirner@f28.n125.z1.FIDONET.ORG

Even if cicada can't mail to him, perhaps it can mail to rosebud which can
then mail to Fido.

Hal Finney
hfinney@shell.portal.com

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
iQCVAgUBLCpauqgTA69YIUw3AQEoYwP/TUiqRu8OHgA61WM6HVtrZ/CE37hXjVY7
WM7sN+RkUlO+1QTeZKi2r0gEy/CGKnZiMTbEHYHcWK486tIbDZIDXqdRoZigEemH
5jwComG9Vv6wPMFyhcLQkejgSX7nN0UU4TGzdOOq2kRyiplTysLd+1pqPyUzpsbU
qR9lO8ZjVPY=
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: wmo@rebma.rebma.mn.org (Bill O'Hanlon)
Date: Thu, 24 Jun 93 22:47:36 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Remailer at rebma.mn.org
Message-ID: <m0o96w5-0002CzC@rebma.rebma.mn.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


My apologies to anyone who has tried to use the anonymous remailer at
rebma.mn.org in the past several weeks.  I upgraded the system, and forgot,
apparently, to test out the remailer.  No one reported that the remailer
wasn't working, and it didn't occur to me to test it until today.  I 
imagine that people who weren't successful were experimenters who chalked
up the failure to something they'd done wrong.

It's working again, now.

Here's the PGP key.


-----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----
Version: 2.2

mQCNAisUI2QAAAEEAKgm07Hsje5KpmXYd5azk0R6AES+qK7LcofnVGojUs7GBghD
WbwrmW8oOEOhRorlShRALKeYspV4xYIw4WDkJcJxuf1B254scz1urF/Eem3zPW9b
yPAx7W/cGwvs6SouZvFcSDq4v1zApvGE9hP4szPzHeGmVr0NVNeaDK0guoCpAAUR
tCBSZW1haWxlciAocmVtYWlsZXJAcmVibWEubW4ub3JnKQ==
=/qHx
-----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: ""L. Detweiler"" <ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Date: Thu, 24 Jun 93 22:13:14 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Denning on Clipper review panel
Message-ID: <9306250513.AA09659@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Denning says she is on the Clipper review panel which has just started.
Also, noises about international Clipper cooperation from NIST. Finally
the cypherpunk poster's earlier comment about the absurdity of French
collaboration left to the imagination is brought to life...


From: philip@charon.cto.citicorp.com (Philip Gladstone)
Newsgroups: sci.crypt,alt.privacy.clipper
Date: 23 Jun 1993 17:53:19 -0400

>According to Lynn McNulty (of NIST) ...
>
>Also, the civilian review of the Skipjack algorithm has started (on Monday).
>2 people are from academia, and 3 from private industry. One of the DOE
>national labs is represented (but I don't know whether this counts as academia
>or private industry). Dorothy Denning is one member (according to her).
>McNulty wouldn't reveal any names.
>
>Also, McNulty beleives that escrowed keys would be made available to
>foreign law enforcement organizations if requested. The following
>scenario springs to mind:
>
>        French LE to FBI: We have one suspect from the WTC bombing
>                          under surveillance in Paris. He uses a
>                          clipperphone to communicate. Can we have
>                          the keys to chip ID 145632?
>        FBI to French LE: Are you working with the French Secret Service
>                          who is trying to tap the phones of corporate
>                          America?
>        French LE to FBI: NON!
>        FBI to French LE: Do you promise that the chip ID
>                          145632 really is in Paris and is not in the
>                          phone of <fill in favourite US business leader>?
>        French LE to FBI: OUI!
>        FBI to French LE: OK - the key is 0b5e7f186ac85e5fb934.
>
>I'm not trying to pick on the french, but one of the purposes of the
>Clipper (sorry Key Escrow) Chip is to protect against foreign
>commercial espionage.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: rclark@nyx.cs.du.edu (Robert W. F. Clark)
Date: Fri, 25 Jun 93 01:43:51 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Thanks, anon
Message-ID: <9306250844.AA10053@nyx.cs.du.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


n12070@anon.penet.fi (Anonymous dude) writes:

>I considered bringing up this little anecdote that happened to me in
>`real time' but decided against it, but now can't resist while the
>subject is in the list's psyche and nanosecond attention span:

Thanks.  I'm geographically and culturally isolated in Indiana.
You warn that your article is tedious, but it is no such thing.
Thanks for posting it.  

It is perversely pleasing to me to know someone else on the list
went through this sort of cop crap.  Of course, I was at least
technically in violation of the law, but hey.  They went after
practically everyone I knew, for the vile crime of having me in
their address books.  I wrote an article about that experience
which should appear in the next Phrack.

So that you won't feel that your anecdote was tedious, which
it certainly was not, you might want to check mine out (it
clocks in at about five to six times as long as yours.)

>Thanks for listening to all this, it is immensely therapeutic for me
>and hopefully some insight is contained herein to minimize a burden for you.

Thanks for sending it out; it was nicely written, and concise.

Bet they never see the computer again, though.  Either someone ripped
it off for their personal use, or for quick cash, and in either case
they would have got them by now.  They may just have hassled you as
a last resort when the trail went cold.  

Police are, indeed, ungrateful brutes of the worst dye.

Well, good luck, and I hope all that nasty stuff is over for you.
Cop betrayals and "investigations" usually leave a bitter taste in
the mouths of their targets, especially since cops can get nasty
when they're not finding anything.  Ah well.

----
Robert W. Clark
rclark@nyx.cs.du.edu   PGP signature available by mail or finger



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "George A. Gleason" <gg@well.sf.ca.us>
Date: Fri, 25 Jun 93 02:47:40 PDT
To: karn@unix.ka9q.ampr.org
Subject: Re:  Triggerfish
Message-ID: <93Jun25.024716pdt.14146-3@well.sf.ca.us>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


On-the-air interception *is* too labor intensive, relatively speaking, given
that a cellular call originating or terminating at a given switch can pass
through a number of individual cells, each of which would need to be
monitored.  However, that does not negate the potential usefulness of on-air
interception as an *intelligence-gathering* tool from which the results can
be fed into the process of getting a warrant to tap at the switch.  

The problem of maintaining privacy can be and in fact *is* effectively
solved though.  A couple of companies are making cellular to 2500-set
adapters which basically allow any regular single-line device to be plugged
in and transmit via cellular.  This obviously includes standard modems, plus
or minus the problems associated with variable transmission quality over the
airwaves.  So any regular cryptosystem that can work on analog lines should
be applicable here.  If anyone out there is further interested in these
cellular-to-single-line-device adaptors, email me and I can get prices and
specifications.

-gg




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: karn@qualcomm.com (Phil Karn)
Date: Fri, 25 Jun 93 03:21:16 PDT
To: tcmay@netcom.com
Subject: Re: Weak stenography.
Message-ID: <9306251019.AA13652@servo>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Tim May:
>Some solutions:

>1. Make programs like "readdat.exe" ubiquitous...distribute them on
>shareware disks, CD-ROMs, etc. Thus, many households and offices will
>have "readdat.exe"-like programs, whether they use them or not. Mere

I like this idea, as long as the mere possession of such programs
isn't also criminalized. Don't laugh -- the government actually seems
to think that they can enforce laws banning the mere private
possession of certain types of bit patterns, like child pornography.

I have about two dozen CD-ROMs on my shelf, containing the usual
oodles of gigabytes of stuff. Mostly mirrors of anonymous FTP archives
and shareware BBSes. So far I have read only a tiny fraction of the
bits on those disks, and I expect I'll never read much more. There's
no reasonable way I could be expected to know if there isn't a
contraband file or two buried in all those gigabytes. But consider the
Akron BBS operator who got busted for a file that somebody had
uploaded to his machine, transferred off to backup and forgotten.  I
wonder how many similar files have already made it to CD-ROM?

Makes me kind of wish I had bought all my computer equipment and
software anonymously, for cash...

Phil





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: karn@qualcomm.com (Phil Karn)
Date: Fri, 25 Jun 93 03:29:06 PDT
To: mnemonic@eff.org
Subject: Re: DH for email (re: email protection and privacy)
Message-ID: <9306251027.AA13692@servo>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Phil Karn asks:
 
> >You're not required to go *beyond* what is specified in a subpoena.
> >But the subpoena's specifications can be pretty broad.
> 
> Are you talking civil, criminal, or both?

Mike Godwin replies:

I assume you're asking about civil versus criminal contempt.

Me again:

No, I was actually asking about the differences between subpoenas in
civil and criminal cases. Since the 5th amendment specifically
mentions criminal cases, I presume that means it can't shield you in a
civil case (unless perhaps the same information could also implicate
you in a crime.)

Phil




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: nobody@alumni.cco.caltech.edu
Date: Fri, 25 Jun 93 05:32:09 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Chained remails
Message-ID: <9306251230.AA10558@alumni.cco.caltech.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


M..Stirner@f28.n125.z1.fidonet.org (M. Stirner) sez:
> 
> Gee, am I amazed.  An anonymous post claims to have been routed via
> SIXTEEN (presumably cypherpunks) remailers.  Using the posted list of
> "active" cypherpunks remailers & the revised remailer manual, I have
> been unable to get simple
> 
> To: remailer@wherever.doodah.edu
> 
> ::
> Request-Remailing-To:
> 
> test messages to run through any but a couple (9, 10 & 12 I believe).  I
> have _never_ been able to get any of the "insects @ Berkeley" remailers
> to go with the standard syntax...or otherwise.
> 
> Are most remailers down on any given day?  Could Mr. Sixteen Jumps do it
> twice in a lifetime?

Well, I really used only 5 different remailers, total of 16 hops.  I Should haf
made that clearer.

The ones I used were:

hh@pmantis.berkeley.edu
hh@cicada.berkeley.edu
hh@soda.berkeley.edu
hal@alumni.caltech.edu
hfinney@shell.portal.com

This message will go through 24 hops, just for the heck of it.

....Mr. Funn




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Brian D Williams <talon57@well.sf.ca.us>
Date: Fri, 25 Jun 93 12:27:36 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: triggerfish
Message-ID: <93Jun25.122707pdt.13989-3@well.sf.ca.us>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Phil Karn posted;

In CU Digest 5.46:
|> Harris Law Enforcement Products
|> 
|> TRIGGERFISH has a number of cellular phone based applications:
|> determining a suspects phone number, dialed number recorder, and
|> wiretapping.  According to Harris, ``for the first time, law
|> enforcement is not at a disadvantage in tracking the high-tech
|> criminal.'' Additionally, the unit ``collects and integrates all
|> relevant data, including voice, directly from the ether.''

|> Reprinted from Full Disclosure, Box 903, Libertyville, Illinois
60048


  It would be child's play for the NSA to accomplish this from
orbit.....hmmmmm I wonder what they call it?



                                                   Brian D Williams




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: peb@PROCASE.COM (Paul Baclace)
Date: Fri, 25 Jun 93 12:53:23 PDT
To: talon57@well.sf.ca.us
Subject: Re: triggerfish
Message-ID: <9306251953.AA02713@banff.procase.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



> to accomplish this from orbit

How big and sensitive would an antenna need to be in orbit to accomplish
this?  It would have to be sensitive to 1 watt transmitters.  They
send up many polar orbit satellites which are not too far away, so that
could be a big help.


Paul E. Baclace
peb@procase.com




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: karn@qualcomm.com (Phil Karn)
Date: Fri, 25 Jun 93 14:06:44 PDT
To: talon57@well.sf.ca.us
Subject: Re: triggerfish
Message-ID: <9306252106.AA17092@servo>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>How big and sensitive would an antenna need to be in orbit to accomplish
>this?  It would have to be sensitive to 1 watt transmitters.  They
>send up many polar orbit satellites which are not too far away, so that
>could be a big help.

Sensitivity is not the issue. Two 1-watt walkie-talkies, one in (low)
orbit and one on the ground, can (and do) communicate with each other
as long as the earth isn't standing in the way. It's done on the ham
radio bands on just about every space shuttle mission (like the one
currently underway). Higher orbits require better antennas, but they're
no big deal.

The real problem with a space-based cellular telephone surveillance
system is interference - the best spot beam antenna you can make would
still take in *many* ground transmitters on the same channel in a
place like New York City. From orbit, you see everything, whether you
want to or not.

This is borne out again and again with tapes from the shuttle. Often
you hear nothing at all because there are so many ground stations all
transmitting at the same time that none of them are recoverable. Some hams
run ungodly amounts of power to get through, not because it's required for
the distance to be traveled, but to stand far enough above everybody else
that they can capture the shuttle's receiver. Both these systems and cellular
telephones use the same modulation method - FM.

Phil




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Duncan Frissell <76630.3577@CompuServe.COM>
Date: Fri, 25 Jun 93 12:22:17 PDT
To: <cypherpunks@toad.com>
Subject: SEARCH ME
Message-ID: <930625191757_76630.3577_EHK47-1@CompuServe.COM>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


(an12070)

It is rarely to one's advantage to "assist the police."  In fact in 
British English the sentence "Fred C. Schwartz is assisting the police 
in their investigation" means that Fred C. Schwartz is the prime suspect.

(Trivia contest for ex right wing nuts - Who was Fred C. Schwartz?)

My search warrant story need not use penet.fi.  In the early 80's I was 
residing in a rented house in a city located in a region of the country 
that was once Democratic Farm Labor Party territory.  Being an inveterate 
reader of the newspaper, I was one day surprised to discover that our 
house was to be searched by the authorities at some point in the next 
few weeks.

Specifically, the article said that the houses on <my> block of <my> 
street were going to be searched as part of a survey to determine how 
many had illegal basement drains.  Apparently the criminals who had 
constructed much of the housing in that neighborhood in the 1920s had 
connected basement drains to the *storm sewers* from whence who knows 
what hideous substances could drain into the navigable waters of the 
United States without undergoing tertiary, secondary, or even primary 
treatment.  What's more, they had not complied with the Water Quality 
Act of 1970, as amended.  Who could believe that such evil exists in 
the human heart.

My wife (who in many ways was just the sort of female Kipling had in 
mind when he penned 'Deadlier Than the Male') and I decided to resist 
this search.  Since I was away during the day, it would fall to here to 
deal with the authorities.  In due course, a sewer inspector rang our 
doorbell.  My wife demanded to see his warrant.  He was shocked and 
mortified.  He tried to talk her into allowing the search.  He used 
primate arguments like "everyone else is letting us in."  My wife used 
Northern European arguments like "I'm not everyone else."  He went away.

Over the next few weeks, various bureaucrats called my wife and tried to 
get her to change her mind.  They said, "You're not going to force us to 
waste all that time and money and get a warrant, are you?"  She 
replied, "Consider it a valuable education on the 4th amendment."

Eventually, they showed up with a warrant and some cops just in case we 
resisted.  My wife took her time reading the warrant.  It said they 
could search the basement so she led them around to the back door and 
led them down to the basement where they discovered our criminal drain.

If I hadn't been working 70 hours a week, maybe I would have had fun and 
tried to quash (not squash) the warrant and explored the modern case law 
involving regulatory searches - a nasty area.

When we told our neighbors what we had done they said that they didn't 
know that one could resist a warrantless search.  A good time was had by 
all.  Quo warranto?

This was also a town where the public and catholic schools all ended 
summer vacation on the same day.  After that day, my youngest daughter 
was going about from place to place without apparent lawful occupation 
when an officious intermeddler asked her why she wasn't in school.  She 
then told her questioner what I had told her to say, "My father doesn't 
believe in your schools, he says that they are all dominated by 
communists."  Shuts them up every time. 

Duncan Frissell

Who is writing this in the terrorist capital of the US - Jersey City, 
NJ - but who has been denied a tactically necessary assault rifle by 
Governor Jim Florio. 

When amonium nitrate and diesel fuel in a 16 to 1 ratio are outlawed 
only outlaws (and farmers) will have amonium nitrate and diesel fuel in 
a 16 to 1 ratio.






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: hkhenson@cup.portal.com
Date: Fri, 25 Jun 93 21:05:20 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: triggerfish
Message-ID: <9306251518.1.29858@cup.portal.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Brian D Williams <talon57@well.sf.ca.us> wrote (re TRIGGERFISH):

>  It would be child's play for the NSA to accomplish this from
>orbit.....hmmmmm I wonder what they call it?

My guess would be that it can't be done.  Just getting up in a
light aircraft with a cell phone is instructive.  With every
cell site in 50 miles being about the same distance (even from 
LEO) I don't think you could pick out a single conversation.

On the other hand, with enough directionality . . . . nah, the
antenna would be a monster.

Keith




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Timothy Newsham <newsham@wiliki.eng.hawaii.edu>
Date: Fri, 25 Jun 93 19:08:12 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: term for ibm
Message-ID: <9306260208.AA14613@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



I needed to do some DOS programming at work, and used
the 'MCOMM' serial package.
It comes with a demonstration program called 'smalterm.exe'
I read through it a few times and it dawned on me how easy
it would be to hook it up to LINK (link encryption).
The problem is that the package is (c) and shareware.  Furthermore
none of the documents say anything about the status of the
demo programs.  I estimate it would take 30 minutes to an
hour to get encryption up and running with that term program.

Does anyone know of a small terminal program that has
a few essential features,  with good modularity?  One that
is publically available or we could use with the authors
blessings?
    
                              ...




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: cestes@argos5.DNET.NASA.GOV (Chris Estes)
Date: Fri, 25 Jun 93 13:37:26 PDT
To: "cypherpunks@toad.com"@EAST.DNET.NASA.GOV
Subject: Orbiting antennas
Message-ID: <9306252026.AA24642@east.gsfc.nasa.gov>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Paul Baclace asks about receiving data on a polar oribiting spacecraft.

That's what my company does for a living.  I'm not a radio specialist, and
not involved in the design of the on-board instrumentation, but the
gear is not to sophisticated.  We transmit in the 401 Mhz area, the 
antenna on the spacecraft is a simple, omnidirectional affair, that I
don't have any handy specs for. It's about a meter long and 8cm in diameter;
what's inside?  I don't know.

We typically hit the spacecraft with one watt (at an altitude of 870km), but
have one guy who is able to get it at 150 milliwatts (!).  I haven't been
following the thread, but if you're thinking about phone-type systems, 
remember that with polar orbiters, you're only going to have about a 15
minute window during which the spacecraft will be overhead.  Unless you're
doing store and forward messaging, the sender and receiver of the signal
have to be in the footprint at the same time.

I hope that's relevant (I should do a better job of keeping up!)

-Chris Estes-

cestes@argos5.dnet.nasa.gov




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: axelrod@s106.es.llnl.gov (Mike Axelrod 422-0929)
Date: Fri, 25 Jun 93 17:42:46 PDT
To: karn@qualcomm.com
Subject: Re: Contempt of  Court
Message-ID: <9306260044.AA28615@s106.es.llnl.gov>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



You do have me confused with Mike Godwin. I did write:

> >If the key itself had embedded testimony that was incriminating, then it is
> >possible one could invoke the 5th amendment to avoid disclosure of the key.
> >But, I suppose a court could do an end run around that by giving limited 
> >use immunity for the incriminating content of the key. Comments?

But the rest of your questions refer to Mike Godwin.

My guess is that one could be compelled to reveal the combination to a lock
because the combination is not testimony. I'm sure that govenment lawyers
would argue that a key is not testimony, just as a combination to a safe
is not testimony. Perhaps some research would turn up the answer to this
question.

There is also the matter of discovery in civil actions. If one had financial
records in encrypted form, a court could order you disclose the key under the
threat of civil contempt. Civil contempt can be worse than criminal
contempt. The court can ruin you financially and keep you in jail until you
comply with the order.

Mike.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: jet@netcom.com (J. Eric Townsend)
Date: Fri, 25 Jun 93 12:36:49 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: USAF Incident Summary
Message-ID: <9306251937.AA17842@netcom4.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



A couple of somewhat interesting crypto tidbits.

------- Start of forwarded message -------

[From the NIST Security Bulletin Board]

FROM:  AFCSC/SRM                                      
     250 Hall Blvd, Suite 347
     San Antonio TX 78243-7063
SUBJ:  THE CONNECTION Information Letter


                            AFOSI COMPUTER CRIME CASES

by TSgt Dwayne L. Thomas 
AFCSC/SRME

Destruction of Government Property, Unauthorized Access to
Material, Violation 
of 
Article 134 of UCMJ

Location:  CONUS

Motive:  Personal revenge and vandalism

Duty Position:  Systems Administrator, Military

    An investigation was initiated after a CONUS-based research
center had reported that various files contained in the center's
mainframe computer had been altered.  The subject (a Sgt assigned
as the Systems Administrator) had created a program that only he
was able to access.  This resulted in the subject being able to
access, extract, and subsequently delete information without being
detected.  Being the Systems Administrator, the subject had enough
knowledge of the passwords, audit trails, and software to
manipulate information at will.  After the investigation began,
subject admitted fixing the computer so that no one else could
access the subject's personal program.  The subject was upset with
upper management for not giving the amount of recognition due for
creating another program for the center's use.  Subject stated that
months had been spent working on this program.  Subject also felt
pressured because past job performance and two altercations at the
NCO Club might cause denial of reenlistment.  Subject also was a
co-owner in a failing carpet and upholstery cleaning business and
stated that building a program that only one person could run would
make the subject important to the mission and increase chance for
reenlistment.
    Subject was fined 1 month's pay, denied reenlistment, and given
a bad conduct discharge.

BOTTOM LINE:  It is vitally important that no one person have all
the knowledge about how to operate a system because if one day that
person is sick, quits, or dies, the organization will be in a world
of trouble.  Some ways to prevent this are by assigning a primary
and alternate administrator, having continuity books available, and
having training sessions.  Remember, computers are dumb machines
and are only as smart as the person who's programming them.

Wrongful Use and Conversion of Government Computer, Theft of
Government Property, Copyright Violation, Violation of Title 18 of
U.S. Code 641

Location:  CONUS

Motive:  Personal financial gain

Duty Position:  Functional User, Military

    An investigation was initiated after it was discovered that a
SSgt assigned to the Base Data Processing Facility had been
misusing government resources for personal profit.  The subject was
working part time for a local contractor and was making profit by
making illegal copies of government purchased software.  The
subject would take pieces of equipment from the duty section and
provide it to the contractor.   The subject would copy the
government software and provide one copy to the contractor and keep
one copy  so that it could be replicated and sold for more money. 
After the investigation began, the subject admitted making copies
of the government software and contacting other companies to see if
they wanted to purchase copies of the stolen software.   Subject
also admitted bringing disks in from home and running them on the
government systems for evaluation.  Subject felt that even though
violations had occurred, accountability was questionable because
security briefings on the legalities involved with copying
government software had not been provided.  The extra money had
helped the subject with a bad financial situation.
    The subject resigned from his part-time job, was fined 2
months' pay, given a letter of reprimand, and placed on a control
roster.

BOTTOM LINE:  Even though the Air Force purchases large amounts of
software from various companies, it is still subject to copyright
laws the same as any individual.  We must continue to educate all
our personnel that this is a very, very serious offense and
complacency is not an acceptable excuse.  Also, the risk of
introducing viruses from unauthorized software onto a computer
system can completely halt an operation.  Never allow unauthorized
software into your duty section.  Remember, taking chances like
this with the security of your system is like having a friend with
a drinking problem and for his/her birthday you give him/her a
shopping spree at a liquor store--it's a no-win situation!


                                 COMSEC INCIDENTS

by Mr Richard L. Davis
AFCSC/SRMP


    The total number of physical and cryptographic COMSEC incidents
reported within the Air Force for the following past 2 years were:

    CY91 - 480
    CY92 - 364

    This Trend Summary will compare CY91 with CY92 COMSEC incidents
and the previous 6 months with the past 6 months.  Data on
practices dangerous to security (PDS) will also be included in this
summary.

    The total number of COMSEC incidents reported for the Jan-Jun
92 time frame was 191 as compared to the Jul-Dec 92 total, which
was 173.  This is a decrease of 18 incidents.

    The total and type of COMSEC incidents that occurred in CY91
and CY92 are:

     Type Of Incident       1991           1992

     Physical                432            330
     Cryptographic            48             34
     Total:                  480            364

     PDSs                     74            116

    Physical, cryptographic, and PDS COMSEC incidents are
categorized into the following types and totals (comparing the past
6 months with the previous 6 months):

Physical Categories:           Jan-Jul 92   Jul-Dec 92   Totals

Loss Control Of COMSEC             53          63         116
Permanent Loss                     49          32          81
Unsecured Safes/Workcenters        20          15          35
Destruction Irregularities         19          17          36
Lost Two-Person Integrity           7          14          21
Unauthorized Access/Use            13           4          17
Damaged Packages                    4           6          10
Unauthorized Shipping Mode          5           4           9
Unauthorized Reproduction           2           2           4
Facility Construction               1           0           1
Totals:                           173         157         330

Cryptographic Categories:

Used Superseded Material            1           1            2
Extended Crypto Period              9           8           17
Unauthorized Use Of Material        6           3            9
Unauthorized Maint Performed        2           4            6
Totals:                            18          16           34

PDSs:

Inadvertent Destruction            18          37           55
Inadvertent Opening                 5           5           10
Physical Loss                       3           9           12
Destruction Irregularities         13           6           19
Unauthorized Viewing                1           2            3
Material Pulled from Canister       1           0            1
Unauthorized Shipping Mode          2           0            2
Damaged Packages                    1           0            1
Loss of Control of COMSEC           4           6           10
Forced Entry Into Safe              0           1            1
Unauthorized Reproduction           2           0            2
Totals:                            50          66          116

    Now that you have seen the total breakdown of all the COMSEC
incidents of the past 2 years and the two 6-month periods, let's
compare the previous 6 months with the past 6 months and show some
of our major problems (by categories) that have been and still are
the leading factors within the COMSEC incident world.

    Loss of control of COMSEC has been the front-runner of COMSEC
incidents in the past 3 years.  If you noticed, during the Jan-Jun
time frame, there were 53 incidents and in Jul-Dec there were 63. 
This was an increase of 10 reported incidents.  We are supposed to
decrease incidents--not increase them.  The same types of
occurrences are still happening as before, just different personnel
are losing the handle.  Material is still being left unattended in
hallways, government vehicles, and any place you can think of.  As
you can see, there were 116 incidents of this type in 1992.  We had
116 people go "brain dead" for some reason.  This can be the only
logical reason for leaving their COMSEC material
unsecured/unattended.
    Permanent loss of COMSEC material is still the second
runner-up.  There was a decrease of 17 incidents when comparing the
two 6-month periods.  During the first 6 months, there were 49
COMSEC incidents; and during the latter 6 months, there were 32,
with a grand total of 81 for the year.  People are very, very
careful not to lose their money or paycheck, so why can't they
apply the same rules and hard-nosed controls when it comes to
protecting their COMSEC?  The primary reason for lost COMSEC
material is not paying attention to details.

    Unsecured safe/workcenter incidents decreased by five in the
latter 6 months as compared to the first 6 months.  There were 20
reported incidents in the first 6 months, while 15 incidents were
reported for the latter months.  People are still not checking
their safes at the end of the day.  They are assuming it's locked
or secured.  One day their assumptions will prove them wrong.  The
COMSEC Managers must instill in all their users to take that extra
minute to check safes and stop the rushing.  Remember, speed can
cause a COMSEC incident.

    Destruction irregularities decreased by two for this reporting
period.  There were 19 incidents for the last reporting period as
compared to 17 incidents this period.  Single signatures on
destruction reports at the users' level, material claiming to be
destroyed but later found intact, and falsification of signatures
on destruction reports are some of the reasons for the 36 incidents
for the year.

    Loss of two-person integrity was on the down swing, but somehow
it's back again and on the increase.  The first 6 months there were
only seven incidents of this type reported.  However, for the last
6-month period, we doubled, with a total of 14 incidents.  Even
though the total count for 1992 was 21 as compared to 29 for 1991,
each 6-month period should show some type of decline, not double
its quantity from the last reporting period.  It shows we
completely fell off track and must get back to where we started the
first 6 months.  COMSEC users must be retrained on two-person
integrity procedures.

    Unauthorized access/use showed a definite decline for this
period as compared to the last reporting period.  For this period
there were only four incidents compared to 13 for the first
reporting period.  This low count of incidents can be contributed
to unauthorized personnel being stopped at the door, individuals
being checked before any material is handed to them, and using the
proper material for the right purpose.

    Damaged packages were due mostly to the inner wrapper splitting
open from the heavy weight of the material or to overpacking. 
There was a total of six incidents for this period as compared to
our incidents for the latter period.  The grand total for the year
was 10 incidents.

    Unauthorized shipping mode for this period accounted for four
incidents, and the latter 6 months had five incidents.  Even though
there were only 10 incidents for the year, shipping COMSEC material
by the correct mode of transportation is a must.

    Unauthorized reproduction remained the same for both periods
with two incidents each.  Users are beginning to understand that
they must obtain the controlling authorities' approval prior to any
reproduction.

    Use of superseded material also remained the same for both
reporting periods with one incident each.  Users must check their
COMSEC material before it's put into effect.

    Extended crypto period had a total of 17 violations for the
year.  There were nine incidents for the first 6 months, while for
the latter months there were eight incidents.  Both terminal ends
are held responsible for incidents of this type.  It seems that the
one end is waiting for the other to make the call, but somehow no
one calls until after the grace period.

    Unauthorized use of COMSEC material declined by three this
reporting period.  The majority of these incidents were caused by
individuals accidentally using the wrong COMSEC material on
equipment not authorized for its use.  This type of incident could
be totally eliminated if individuals took the time to check the
COMSEC material before inserting it into the equipment.

    Unauthorized maintenance performed on COMSEC equipment is a
definite, "no-no," so why do Mr Goodwrenchs who work on cars,
coffee pots, and toasters think they are crypto maintenance
personnel?  There was a total of six incidents for the year.  
During the last 6 months, we had four personnel who thought they
were maintenance personnel.  Please inform them to leave COMSEC
equipment alone.    PDSs are on the rise.  Even though no case
numbers are assigned to these incidents, they show the Air Force's
weakness in handling their COMSEC material.  Please notice the
category Inadvertent Destruction.  People are destroying material
with their eyes shut.  Perhaps they figure since it's the end of
the month, they must destroy something.  COMSEC material should be
checked more than once before it is put into destruction status. 
Make sure the right material is being destroyed.

    All COMSEC incidents could be prevented if everyone followed
established procedures and rules for protecting COMSEC material. 
Also, retraining some of our COMSEC users is a must because the
majority of COMSEC incidents are caused by the users.  Every effort
must be made to continue educating every user within the Air Force. 
Every COMSEC Manager knows who his/her weak links are.  As
managers, you must go directly to those weak links and strengthen
them with knowledge about COMSEC.  If we all work together and
continuously educate all COMSEC users, COMSEC incidents will be
reduced considerably.


------- End of forwarded message -------




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: J. Michael Diehl <mdiehl@triton.unm.edu>
Date: Fri, 25 Jun 93 21:03:14 PDT
To: newsham@wiliki.eng.hawaii.edu (Timothy Newsham)
Subject: Re: term for ibm
In-Reply-To: <9306260208.AA14613@toad.com>
Message-ID: <9306260403.AA08675@triton.unm.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


According to Timothy Newsham:
> I needed to do some DOS programming at work, and used
> the 'MCOMM' serial package.
> It comes with a demonstration program called 'smalterm.exe'
> I read through it a few times and it dawned on me how easy
> it would be to hook it up to LINK (link encryption).
> The problem is that the package is (c) and shareware.  Furthermore
> none of the documents say anything about the status of the
> demo programs.  I estimate it would take 30 minutes to an
> hour to get encryption up and running with that term program.

Well, I have to suggest telix. ;^)  Telix has built in hooks for external
protocols which you could use to impliment your encryption link.  It has a very
good script language.  Further, I have been using it for some time now and think
I am pretty good with it.  I could help you get it going.
 
> Does anyone know of a small terminal program that has
> a few essential features,  with good modularity?  One that
> is publically available or we could use with the authors
> blessings?

Telix is relatively small, has many features, and the script language is very
modular.  It isn't src distribution, though.  Still it's a thought.

+-----------------------+-----------------------------+---------+
| J. Michael Diehl ;-)  | I thought I was wrong once. | PGP KEY |
| mdiehl@triton.unm.edu |   But, I was mistaken.      |available|
| mike.diehl@fido.org   |                             | Ask Me! |
| (505) 299-2282        +-----------------------------+---------+
|                                                               |
+------"I'm just looking for the opportunity to be -------------+
|            Politically Incorrect!"   <Me>                     |
+-----If codes are outlawed, only criminals wil have codes.-----+
+----Is Big Brother in your phone?  If you don't know, ask me---+



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Mail Delivery Subsystem <MAILER-DAEMON@Panix.Com>
Date: Sat, 26 Jun 93 20:34:39 PDT
To: habs@Panix.Com
Subject: Returned mail: User unknown
Message-ID: <199306261258.AA25065@sun.Panix.Com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


   ----- Transcript of session follows -----
While talking to toad.com:
>>> RCPT To:<cyhperpunks@toad.com>
<<< 550 <cyhperpunks@toad.com>... User unknown
550 cyhperpunks@toad.com... User unknown

   ----- Unsent message follows -----
Received: by sun.Panix.Com id AA25038
  (5.65c/IDA-1.4.4 for cyhperpunks@toad.com); Sat, 26 Jun 1993 08:58:20 -0400
From: Harry Shapiro <habs>
Message-Id: <199306261258.AA25038@sun.Panix.Com>
Subject: Re: Government fear of strong crypto
To: kellyg@sco.com (Kelly Goen)
Date: Sat, 26 Jun 1993 08:58:19 -0400 (EDT)
Cc: cyhperpunks@toad.com
In-Reply-To:  <9306241425.aa09999@vishnu.sco.com> from "Kelly Goen" at Jun 24, 93 02:25:06 pm
Reply-To: habs
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=US-ASCII
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
Content-Length: 325       

a conscious being, Kelly Goen wrote:
> 
> 		1)  The NSA is not chartered for domestic surveillance work.  

I figure this means the FBI has an office at the NSA and has NSA staff
members working under contract to the FBI so that while the NSA is ot
overseeing domestic interception their staff is doing it for the FBI.

/hawk






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: nobody@soda.berkeley.edu
Date: Sat, 26 Jun 93 12:06:17 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: No Subject
Message-ID: <9306261902.AA02316@soda.berkeley.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



 * Reply to msg originally in CYPHERPUNKS

 Uu> It is rarely to one's advantage to "assist the police."  In fact in
 Uu> British English the sentence "Fred C. Schwartz is assisting the police
 Uu> in their investigation" means that Fred C. Schwartz is the prime
 Uu> suspect.

Rather like "very tired" when used to describe the public appearance of
an MP as in, "...Sir Henry appeared very tired."  The term "very
tired" apparently is the pervasive newspaper euphemism for "very drunk."

 Uu> My wife (who in many ways was just the sort of female Kipling had in
 Uu> mind when he penned 'Deadlier Than the Male')...

Splendid finds, these, when one can keep them in alliance.  It's always
a joy to introduce them to firearms.

 Uu> In due course, a sewer inspector rang
 Uu> our  doorbell.  My wife demanded to see his warrant.  He was shocked
 Uu> and  mortified.

 Uu> Over the next few weeks, various bureaucrats called my wife and tried
 Uu> to  get her to change her mind.  They said, "You're not going to force
 Uu> us to  waste all that time and money and get a warrant, are you?"  She
 Uu> replied, "Consider it a valuable education on the 4th amendment."

I won't waste a great deal of time in idle & uninformed speculation, but
I seem to remember that certain "public safety" types do not need a
warrant to intrude.  As a matter of fact, I know of instances where cops
accompanied such functionaries on trumped-up "inspections" to avoid the
trouble of getting warrants.
.   I should be pleased to hear qualified legal opinion on this.

 Uu> Who is writing this in the terrorist capital of the US - Jersey City,
 Uu> NJ - but who has been denied a tactically necessary assault rifle by
 Uu> Governor Jim Florio.

Yes, but don't you feel _much safer_ disarmed?  No?  Well, be content
with a nice shotgun.

 Uu> When amonium nitrate and diesel fuel in a 16 to 1 ratio are outlawed
 Uu> only outlaws (and farmers) will have amonium nitrate and diesel fuel
 Uu> in  a 16 to 1 ratio.

This shall no doubt turn up in sigs before week's end.

*********************************************************************
* <m..stirner@f28.n125.z1.fidonet.org> - PGP Key D30909 via servers *
* > What country can preserve its liberties if its rulers are not  <*
* > warned from time to time that their people preserve the spirit <*
* > of resistance?  Let them take arms!" - Thomas Jefferson, 1787  <*
*********************************************************************



___ Blue Wave/QWK v2.12
--  
M. Stirner - via RBBS-NET node 8:914/201
INTERNET: M..Stirner@f28.n125.z1.RBBS-NET.ORG




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: nobody@soda.berkeley.edu
Date: Sat, 26 Jun 93 12:06:18 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Remailer at rebma.mn.org
Message-ID: <9306261902.AA02325@soda.berkeley.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


* Reply to msg originally in CYPHERPUNKS

 Uu> My apologies to anyone who has tried to use the anonymous remailer at
 Uu> rebma.mn.org in the past several weeks.

 Uu> I  imagine that people who weren't successful were
 Uu> experimenters who chalked up the failure to something they'd done
 Uu> wrong.

I did, indeed!

 Uu> It's working again, now.

 Uu> Here's the PGP key.


Does this remailer _require_ an encrypted header, or will it take the
|
|       ::
|       Request-Remailing-To:
|
plaintext command?

*********************************************************************
* <m..stirner@f28.n125.z1.fidonet.org> - PGP Key D30909 via servers *
* > What country can preserve its liberties if its rulers are not  <*
* > warned from time to time that their people preserve the spirit <*
* > of resistance?  Let them take arms!" - Thomas Jefferson, 1787  <*
*********************************************************************
___ Blue Wave/QWK v2.12
--  
M. Stirner - via RBBS-NET node 8:914/201
INTERNET: M..Stirner@f28.n125.z1.RBBS-NET.ORG




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: nobody@cicada.berkeley.edu
Date: Sat, 26 Jun 93 12:06:45 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: No Subject
Message-ID: <9306261906.AA19140@cicada.berkeley.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


 * Reply to msg originally in CYPHERPUNKS


 > Are most remailers down on any given day?

_That_ question has been partially answered in another post!

 Uu> Well, I really used only 5 different remailers, total of 16 hops.  I
 Uu> Should haf made that clearer.
 Uu> This message will go through 24 hops, just for the heck of it.

Well, it made it, I suppose.  I'll try this one via the same remailers,
plus another one I know to be working.

*********************************************************************
* <m..stirner@f28.n125.z1.fidonet.org> - PGP Key D30909 via servers *
* > What country can preserve its liberties if its rulers are not  <*
* > warned from time to time that their people preserve the spirit <*
* > of resistance?  Let them take arms!" - Thomas Jefferson, 1787  <*
*********************************************************************

___ Blue Wave/QWK v2.12
--  
M. Stirner - via RBBS-NET node 8:914/201
INTERNET: M..Stirner@f28.n125.z1.RBBS-NET.ORG




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: zane@genesis.mcs.com (Sameer)
Date: Sat, 26 Jun 93 11:41:43 PDT
To: M..Stirner@f28.n125.z1.RBBS-NET.ORG (M. Stirner)
Subject: Re: Remailer origin lines
In-Reply-To: <47.2C2951B0@wyrm.rbbs-net.ORG>
Message-ID: <m0o9f1i-000MSTC@genesis.mcs.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


In message <47.2C2951B0@wyrm.rbbs-net.ORG>, M. Stirner writes:
> 
>  Uu> A "Dont-Mess-With-Trailers:" header line would help a bit.
> 
> The BlueWave blurb was added by the program & can be stripped by
> re-editing the message before upload.  Everything else is out of my
> control completely & added automagically by the host or the UUCP
> gateway.  The sucker stays, no matter what I do.  Some anonymity!
> 

	How about a header line such as:

X-Cut-End-Lines: 6
	Which would instruct the remailer to cut the last six lines off the
mail message as it receives it. Thus a user could figure out how many
lines at the end of his message is added on without his control and
instruct the remailer to cut out that amount of lines.


--
| Sameer Parekh-zane@genesis.MCS.COM-PFA related mail to pfa@genesis.MCS.COM |
| Apprentice Philosopher, Writer, Physicist, Healer, Programmer, Lover, more |
| "Symbiosis is Good" - Me_"Specialization is for Insects" - R. A. Heinlein_/
 \_______________________/ \______________________________________________/ 




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: gnu (John Gilmore)
Date: Sat, 26 Jun 93 13:40:32 PDT
To: cypherpunks, gnu
Subject: Int'l Conf on Signal Processing Apps & Tech, Santa Clara, 28Sep93
Message-ID: <9306262040.AA12510@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Folks interested in DSP's, including voice compression and encryption,
fast exponentiation, etc, may want to attend this conference.  Particular
sessions of interest:

Workshop, 27 Sep:  Low Cost Speech Compression Technology for Consumer
	Applications.  (costs extra $150)

Digital Encryption System for Speech Communication over the Public
Switching Telephone Network, Sofi'a Moreno Pe'rez, Rafael Sarmiento de
Sotomayor, Luis Di'ez del Ri'o, Jose' Parera Bermu'dez, Marcelino
Veiga Pe'rez, and Ramo'n Garcia Go'mez, E.T.S.I. de Telecomunicacio'n,
Spain.

Real-Time Implementation of Variable Rate QCELP Codec using TMS320C30
DSP, Kyongo Han, Byungsik Yoon, Insung Lee, and Sangwon Kang,
Electronics & Telecom. Research Institute, Korea

Improving the Cryptanalysis Algorithms Based Upon the Multiple
Residues, S.J. Tabatabaian and G.P. Singh, University of Newcastle upon
Tyne, U.K.

three more papers on Speech Coding Algorithms
15 more papers on Speech Coding Implementation

and about 100 other papers.

Price: $495 before 25Aug93; $595 after.
Students: $350 before, $425 after.

DSP Associates
18 Peregrine Road
Newton Centre, MA  02159
USA
+1 617 964 3817
+1 617 969 6689
DSPWorld@world.std.com




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: nobody@rosebud.ee.uh.edu
Date: Sat, 26 Jun 93 12:06:01 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: chained remails
Message-ID: <9306261905.AA09976@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


* Reply to msg originally in CYPHERPUNKS

 Uu> The problem may be the Fidonet addressing.  Many times I have tried to
 Uu> send mail to people with mailing addresses like M's, and not had the
 Uu> mail get through.  I don't know what the rules are but perhaps some
 Uu> systems can get it and some can't.

Note that _this_ message goes through an RBBS/UUCP gate.  The problem
remains, however.  On the other hand, I just noted a sheepish message
about the remailer@rebma.mn.org being ill for the past couple of weeks,
which would explain my failures with that system.

 Uu> I'd suggest to M. that he take one of the systems that does respond to
 Uu> his remailing requests, and have that be the LAST one in a chain of
 Uu> two.  So, he could send to, say, hh@cicada.berkeley.edu, and follow
 Uu> that with  elee7h5@rosebud.ee.uh.edu.  Perhaps this would get through:

An interesting experiment I shall try today, perhaps with this very
message.  Thank's, Hal, for the input.  I should like to see these
remailers popularized, along with encryption, as one of the best
political moves we cypherpunks can make.  De-glitching them for broader
use may be a thankless task, but would be worth it if it results in
their general use.

 Uu> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----

P.S.:  Have you heard anything of the alleged bug with version 2.3 being
unable to verify plaintext PGP signatures?

*********************************************************************
* <m..stirner@f28.n125.z1.fidonet.org> - PGP Key D30909 via servers *
* > What country can preserve its liberties if its rulers are not  <*
* > warned from time to time that their people preserve the spirit <*
* > of resistance?  Let them take arms!" - Thomas Jefferson, 1787  <*
*********************************************************************
___ Blue Wave/QWK v2.12
--  
M. Stirner - via RBBS-NET node 8:914/201
INTERNET: M..Stirner@f28.n125.z1.RBBS-NET.ORG




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: M..Stirner@f28.n125.z1.RBBS-NET.ORG (M. Stirner)
Date: Sun, 27 Jun 93 11:33:58 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: remailer origin lines
Message-ID: <70.2C2D7E4E@wyrm.rbbs-net.ORG>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



 * Reply to msg originally in CYPHERPUNKS
 Uu> How about a header line such as:

 Uu> X-Cut-End-Lines: 6
 Uu> Which would instruct the remailer to cut the last six lines
 Uu> off the mail message as it receives it. Thus a user could figure out
 Uu> how many lines at the end of his message is added on without his
 Uu> control and instruct the remailer to cut out that amount of lines.

The number of lines added seems to vary with the gating.  I'm sort of
leaning toward a

........8<....(cut here).....8<.......

kind of solution; I mean, I know for a fact where I stopped, so anything
beyond that ought to be eaten by the remailers, IMHO.  There is probably
a good argument against that solution, but I can't think of it offhand.

*********************************************************************
* <m..stirner@f28.n125.z1.fidonet.org> - PGP Key D30909 via servers *
* > What country can preserve its liberties if its rulers are not  <*
* > warned from time to time that their people preserve the spirit <*
* > of resistance?  Let them take arms!" - Thomas Jefferson, 1787  <*
*********************************************************************

___ Blue Wave/QWK v2.12
--  
M. Stirner - via RBBS-NET node 8:914/201
INTERNET: M..Stirner@f28.n125.z1.RBBS-NET.ORG




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Pat Farrell" <pfarrell@cs.gmu.edu>
Date: Sun, 27 Jun 93 10:37:01 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: RE: term for ibm
Message-ID: <49011.pfarrell@cs.gmu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


In Message Fri, 25 Jun 1993 16:07:03 -1000 (HST),
  Timothy Newsham <newsham@wiliki.eng.hawaii.edu> writes:

>The problem is that the package is (c) and shareware.  Furthermore
>none of the documents say anything about the status of the
>demo programs.  I estimate it would take 30 minutes to an
>hour to get encryption up and running with that term program.
>
>Does anyone know of a small terminal program that has
>a few essential features,  with good modularity?  One that
>is publically available or we could use with the authors
>blessings?

The Microsoft C/C++ compilers come with the source code for a simple windows
based terminal program. While it is copyrighted, it is all over the planet.

In Timmothy Mann's book: Windows Programmer's Guide to Serial
Communications, isbn 0-672-30030-3, are sample code for a mid-level terminal
program (complete with xmodem). The source is in the book and on
a diskette. There are _no_ copyright messages in the sources. The book
itself, is of course, copyrighted.

In Mark Nelson's book: Serial Communications: a C++ Developer's Guide
isbn 1-55851-281-0, are sample code (and diskette)in C++ for DOS, Windows,
FOSSIL, and pure UART drivers and a terminal program (complete with
ZModem).  The code _does not work_ for Windows, but works fine with DOS.
Again, no copyright messages in the source code.

Kermit (anon-ftp from watsun.cc.columbia.edu) is a free, source available
terminal program. Copyrighted Columbia, but enhancements encouraged.

Kermit's modularity is at best marginal. Nelson's code is very good. Mann's
is acceptable. The Windows TTY is acceptable, but being a Windows program,
hardly counts as "small"

The Microsoft Visual Control Pack for Visual Basic and Visual C++ includes
a "serial control" that should handle most of the hard work in building a
terminal program. I can't get it to work from MSVC, and can find no one else
on the planet that can either. But if you wanted to start in Visual Basic,
I expect that a simple terminal program is no more than a day's work.

Pat

p.s. I'm using a hacked version of MS TTY as the starting point for my
WinPOP mail client. If you think I've spend several hundred dollars looking
for working code to build upon, you're right.

Pat Farrell      Grad Student                 pfarrell@cs.gmu.edu
Department of Computer Science    George Mason University, Fairfax, VA
Public key availble via finger          #include <standard.disclaimer>




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: nobody@rosebud.ee.uh.edu
Date: Sun, 27 Jun 93 12:29:10 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Remailer ping test
Message-ID: <9306271929.AA17347@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I tried pinging all the remailers on the latest copy I have of
Karl's remailer list (except extropia, which I know only accepts
encrypted messages).  I sent to each:

::
Request-Remailing-To: hfinney@shell.portal.com

then a short test message.

I only heard back from 8 of them, to wit:

hfinney@shell.portal.com  Sun Jun 27 08:48:08 1993
hh@soda.berkeley.edu  Sun Jun 27 08:48:15 1993
remail@tamsun.tamu.edu  Sun Jun 27 08:48:38 1993
nowhere@bsu-cs.bsu.edu  Sun Jun 27 08:48:43 1993
phantom@u.washington.edu  Sun Jun 27 08:48:40 1993
elee7h5@rosebud.ee.uh.edu  Sun Jun 27 08:48:56 1993
hal@alumni.cco.caltech.edu  Sun Jun 27 08:48:59 1993
dis.org!remailer@merde.dis.org  Sun Jun 27 09:17:24 1993

I did not hear back from the following remailers.  Perhaps their operators
could check on them, or notify Karl if they are no longer operating.

 1: hh@pmantis.berkeley.edu 
 2: hh@cicada.berkeley.edu 
 6: remail@tamaix.tamu.edu
 7: ebrandt@jarthur.claremont.edu 
 9: remailer@rebma.mn.org 
14: 00x@uclink.berkeley.edu 

Hal
hfinney@shell.portal.com




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: M..Stirner@f28.n125.z1.FIDONET.ORG (M. Stirner)
Date: Mon, 28 Jun 93 01:00:13 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Remailer ping test
Message-ID: <705.2C2EA0A7@shelter.FIDONET.ORG>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain




 * Reply to msg originally in CYPHERPUNKS

 Uu> I tried pinging all the remailers on the latest copy I have of
 Uu> Karl's remailer list (except extropia, which I know only accepts
 Uu> encrypted messages).  I sent to each:

 Uu> ::
 Uu> Request-Remailing-To: hfinney@shell.portal.com

 Uu> then a short test message.

 Uu> I only heard back from 8 of them, to wit:

 Uu> hfinney@shell.portal.com  Sun Jun 27 08:48:08 1993
 Uu> hh@soda.berkeley.edu  Sun Jun 27 08:48:15 1993
 Uu> remail@tamsun.tamu.edu  Sun Jun 27 08:48:38 1993
 Uu> nowhere@bsu-cs.bsu.edu  Sun Jun 27 08:48:43 1993
 Uu> phantom@u.washington.edu  Sun Jun 27 08:48:40 1993
 Uu> elee7h5@rosebud.ee.uh.edu  Sun Jun 27 08:48:56 1993
 Uu> hal@alumni.cco.caltech.edu  Sun Jun 27 08:48:59 1993
 Uu> dis.org!remailer@merde.dis.org  Sun Jun 27 09:17:24 1993

I have had problems with getting the same test routed through hh@soda
and phantom@u.washington.  I have not tried dis.org! yet.

Uu> I did not hear back from the following remailers.  Perhaps their
Uu> operators could check on them, or notify Karl if they are no longer
Uu> operating.
Uu> 1: hh@pmantis.berkeley.edu
Uu> 2: hh@cicada.berkeley.edu
Uu> 6: remail@tamaix.tamu.edu
Uu> 7: ebrandt@jarthur.claremont.edu
Uu> 9: remailer@rebma.mn.org
Uu>14: 00x@uclink.berkeley.edu

#6 has worked for me.  The others have not, though the hh@_berkeley
remailers will sometimes work if the message is first bounced through
another reliable remailer.  Why this should be, I know not.

Sending the PGP-encrypted message & header to remail@extropia.wimsey.com
seems to work very well for losing those stupid footer IDs, & is usually
my first leg of multiple-bounce test transmissions.

BTW, I note that hal@alumni.caltech.edu has a different address in the
first batch of successful remailers.  The address hal@alumni.caltech.edu
has worked well.

 Uu> Hal
 Uu> hfinney@shell.portal.com

Thanks for your efforts!
*********************************************************************
* <m..stirner@f28.n125.z1.fidonet.org> - PGP Key D30909 via servers *
* > What country can preserve its liberties if its rulers are not  <*
* > warned from time to time that their people preserve the spirit <*
* > of resistance?  Let them take arms!" - Thomas Jefferson, 1787  <*
*********************************************************************

___ Blue Wave/QWK v2.12
--  
M. Stirner - via FidoNet node 1:125/1
UUCP: ...!uunet!kumr!shelter!28!M..Stirner
INTERNET: M..Stirner@f28.n125.z1.FIDONET.ORG




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Tom Knight <tk@reagan.ai.mit.edu>
Date: Sun, 27 Jun 93 19:25:47 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: SEARCH ME
In-Reply-To: <930625191757_76630.3577_EHK47-1@CompuServe.COM>
Message-ID: <19930628022527.3.TK@ROCKY.AI.MIT.EDU>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


    Date: Fri, 25 Jun 1993 15:17 EDT
    From: Duncan Frissell <76630.3577@compuserve.com>
    When amonium nitrate and diesel fuel in a 16 to 1 ratio are outlawed 
    only outlaws (and farmers) will have amonium nitrate and diesel fuel in 
    a 16 to 1 ratio.
If you're going to be cool and make ANFO, you gotta spell it rite:
Ammonium nitrate.  Don't leave your correct name and address on the
rental car, either.

Kids: Don't do this at home.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: bear@eagle.fsl.noaa.gov (Bear Giles)
Date: Sun, 27 Jun 93 16:49:27 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Landlords accepting search warrants....
Message-ID: <9306272345.AA18589@eagle.fsl.noaa.gov>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


An anonymous writer wrote:

>9) I still wonder if the officers would have been able to get a warrant
>under my circumstances. At the time I was convinced that they wouldn't
>have without additional evidence (of which there assurredly is none).
>I had in the back of my mind that I would rather have them search when
>I didn't expect it or through my landlord when I wasn't there.
		       ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^

This keeps popping up, probably due to old _Dragnet_ episodes...

As I understand contract law regarding leases, a landlord _cannot_
grant permission for a police search unless the lease is in default.
Or, more precisely, if they did you could sue them for "breach of
contract" and extract pretty hefty penalties.

Perhaps California leases have some standard clause which permits
this, but in general a "lease" transfers all "non-freeholder" property
rights, except for those explicitly -returned- within the contract.
That means the tenant is the property owner for all intents and
purposes except for "freeholder" rights (e.g., a tenant can't sell
the property).

Bear Giles




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: nobody@pmantis.berkeley.edu
Date: Mon, 28 Jun 93 05:30:19 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Remailer at rebma.mn.org
Message-ID: <9306281231.AA19866@pmantis.berkeley.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> * Reply to msg originally in CYPHERPUNKS
> 
>  Uu> My apologies to anyone who has tried to use the anonymous remailer at
>  Uu> rebma.mn.org in the past several weeks.
> 
>  Uu> I  imagine that people who weren't successful were
>  Uu> experimenters who chalked up the failure to something they'd done
>  Uu> wrong.
> 
> I did, indeed!
> 
>  Uu> It's working again, now.
> 
>  Uu> Here's the PGP key.
> 
> 
> Does this remailer _require_ an encrypted header, or will it take the
> |
> |       ::
> |       Request-Remailing-To:
> |
> plaintext command?

From dmandl@lehman.com:

It is indeed working OK now.  Encryption is not required.  Good to see this
remailer back up, especially because it introduces a long delay, making traffic
analysis more difficult.  FYI, sending a message to myself (in NYC) through
this remailer, it took about 15 hours for it to come back.  This is either very
good or very bad depending on your purposes.  Bad for urgent messages, good for
more...er...sensitive applications.

   --Dave.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: nobody@alumni.cco.caltech.edu
Date: Mon, 28 Jun 93 05:46:57 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Remailer ping test
Message-ID: <9306281245.AA14406@alumni.cco.caltech.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> I did not hear back from the following remailers.  Perhaps their operators
> could check on them, or notify Karl if they are no longer operating.
> 
>  1: hh@pmantis.berkeley.edu 
>  2: hh@cicada.berkeley.edu 
>  6: remail@tamaix.tamu.edu
>  7: ebrandt@jarthur.claremont.edu 
>  9: remailer@rebma.mn.org 
> 14: 00x@uclink.berkeley.edu 
> 
> Hal
> hfinney@shell.portal.com

From: dmandl@lehman.com

This is distressing.  I just used some of these (1, 2, and 9, which has
just been brought back up) with no problems.  Have any of these remailers
been going up and down?  I've found service to be a bit unpredictable in
the past.  It's a pain to have to test remailers first before each use, and
I can't ping from my site, which makes things even more inconvenient.  Has
anyone else experienced intermittent problems with these reamailers?  Is
there any reason why they should work from some sites and not others?

   --Dave.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Eli Brandt <ebrandt@jarthur.Claremont.EDU>
Date: Mon, 28 Jun 93 08:16:53 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Remailer ping test
In-Reply-To: <9306271929.AA17347@toad.com>
Message-ID: <9306281516.AA13805@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>  7: ebrandt@jarthur.claremont.edu 

Something came through here at "Sun Jun 27 08:44:41 PDT 1993",
which is close to the stamps on the other messages you sent.
Perhaps it didn't make it back to you?  If you want to try it
again with full logging, tell me and I can turn it on.

Incidentally, there have been a couple of messages to the list
with the stigmata of my remailer, but the address 
"eli-remailer@toad.com".  Is the list software doing anything
that could account for this?

> Hal

   Eli   ebrandt@jarthur.claremont.edu




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: pat@tstc.edu (Patrick E. Hykkonen)
Date: Mon, 28 Jun 93 06:39:17 PDT
To: hkhenson@cup.portal.com
Subject: Re: triggerfish
In-Reply-To: <9306251518.1.29858@cup.portal.com>
Message-ID: <9306281338.AA27091@tstc.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> >  It would be child's play for the NSA to accomplish this from
> >orbit.....hmmmmm I wonder what they call it?
> 
> On the other hand, with enough directionality . . . . nah, the
> antenna would be a monster.

Actually, no it wouldn't.  A yagi antenna at 800 Mhz is not very large
at all.  A 16 element at that frequency would probably be less than 5
feet long.  Beans for a satellite to carry into orbit today.  Of
course the problem then is the beam will provide a fairly wide "spot"
on the surface of the Earth that will still cover several cell sites.
Although come to think of it, narrowed to area to adjacent sites
you'll not have to contend with hearing two sites on the same
frequency due to coordination.

-- 
Pat Hykkonen, N5NPL                     Texas State Technical College at Waco
Internet: {pat,postmaster,root}@tstc.edu       Instructional Network Services
Packet: N5NPL@WD5KAL.#CENTX.TX.USA.NA        3801 Campus Dr.  Waco, Tx  76705
                                           V:(817) 867-4830  F:(817) 799-2843




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: gnu (John Gilmore)
Date: Mon, 28 Jun 93 09:10:48 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: 1st Amendment vs. ITAR:  bibliography
Message-ID: <9306281610.AA15456@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


We sent this off to the State Dept. today.

				law office of
				  Lee Tien
			     1452 Curtis Street
			  Berkeley, California  94702
				_______________
			       tien@well.sf.ca.us
			     voice:  (510) 525-0817
			       fax:  (510) 525-3015

June 28, 1993

Clyde Bryant
Foreign Affairs Officer
Compliance Division
Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs
Office of Defense Trade Controls
U.S. Department of State
PM/ODTC SA-6 Rm. 200
Washington, DC  20522


Dear Mr. Bryant:

Mr. Dan Cook told my client, Mr. John Gilmore, that you and
the Compliance Division of the Office of Defense Trade Controls
are presently reviewing aspects of the International Traffic in
Arms Regulations (ITAR) with respect to First Amendment
questions.  My client volunteered to send some law review
articles in order that all relevant materials be available to you in
this review.

I am pleased to provide you with some materials which you
may find useful in your review.  They address First Amendment
and other constitutional issues raised by the Arms Export Control
Act, the ITAR, and the Export Administration Act.

We believe that information about cryptography, including
research papers, discussion of cryptographic algorithms, and
implementations in source-code form, is protected speech within
the meaning of the First Amendment.  We also believe that the
export controls of the ITAR violate the First Amendment
because they infringe the rights of cryptographers to speak and
publish freely.  The licensing procedure amounts to prior
restraint.  The laws and regulations are vague and overbroad.

I have enclosed the following materials:

1.	Ferguson, Scientific Inquiry and the First Amendment,
64 CORNELL L.REV. 639 (1979)

2.	Note, National Security Controls on the Dissemination
of Privately Generated Scientific Information, 30
U.C.L.A. L. REV. 405 (1982)

3.	Cheh, Government Control of Private Ideas -- Striking a
Balance Between Scientific Freedom and National
Security, 23 JURIMETRICS J. 1 (1982)

4.	Greenstein, National Security Controls on Scientific
Information, 23 JURIMETRICS J. 50 (1982)

5.	Alexander, Preserving High-Tech Secrets:  National
Security Controls on University Research and Teaching,
15 LAW & POL'Y IN INT'L BUS. 173 (1983)

6.	Wilson, National Security Control of Technological
Information, 25 JURIMETRICS J. 109 (1985)

7.	John Harmon, Assistant Attorney General, Office of
Legal Counsel, Department of Justice, Memorandum to
Dr. Frank Press, Science Advisor to the President, Re:
Constitutionality Under the First Amendment of ITAR
Restrictions on Public Cryptography (May 11, 1978).

This memorandum was reprinted in The Government's
Classification of Private Ideas:  Hearings before a Subcomm. of
the House Comm. on Government Operations, 96th Cong., 2d
Sess., 268-84 (1980).  These hearing transcripts were
accompanied by a House Report.  House Comm. on Gov't
Operations, The Government's Classification of Private Ideas,
H.R. REP. NO. 1540, 96TH CONG., 2D SESS. (1980).  We strongly
recommend that you read both the hearing transcripts and the
summary report.

We hope that these materials will assist you in formulating a
constitutional export control policy for scientific research in
general and for cryptography in particular.  Please do not hesitate
to contact me if you wish to engage in further exchanges.

Sincerely,





Lee Tien
Attorney at Law
On behalf of Mr. John
Gilmore


cc:  Mr. Daniel Cook
     Mr. John Gilmore




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Karl Barrus <elee9sf@Menudo.UH.EDU>
Date: Mon, 28 Jun 93 08:08:24 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: REMAIL: problems
Message-ID: <199306281508.AA26337@Menudo.UH.EDU>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



There must be some correlation between my weekend trips and other
events.  Last time I went out of town was "Cliper weekend" :-)

I've tested the remailers with unencrypted requests, and have received
these replies (within seconds, I might add):

soda.berkeley.edu
cicada.berkeley.edu
pmantis.berkeley.edu
bsu-cs.bsu.edu
alumni.caltech.edu
rosebud.ee.uh.edu
mead.u.washington.edu
shell.portal.com
tamsun.tamu.edu
tamaix.tamu.edu       <-- note, 'Return-Path: remail@tamaix.tamu.edu'
                                'From: remail@tamsun.tamu.edu'
                          just in case you see the from line and think tamaix
                          isn't working

So I'll wait for the others (rebma, extropia, utter, uclink, jarthur)
and then try them all with encrypted requests.

A while ago I had a script test all the remailers once a week - I
wasn't able to have a cron entry, but I used the 'at' command to
schedule the mailing of prepared messages and itself every week.
Maybe I'll start that up again since it would help isolate problems if
a remailer doesn't respond, especially if twice in a row.

/-----------------------------------\
| Karl L. Barrus                    |
| elee9sf@menudo.uh.edu             | <- preferred address
| barrus@tree.egr.uh.edu (NeXTMail) |
\-----------------------------------/




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: peter honeyman <honey@citi.umich.edu>
Date: Mon, 28 Jun 93 09:06:06 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Geer Zolot White Paper: Clipper Initiative
Message-ID: <9306281606.AA15299@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



------- Forwarded Message

Geer Zolot White Paper: Clipper Initiative

On April 16, 1993, the U.S. Government issued a "Public Encryption Management" 
directive, requesting that communications vendors install into their products 
chips that implement a secret algorithm with controversial key-escrow 
facilities. These chips (called "Clipper" and "Capstone") stem from work by 
the NSA (National Security Agency) and its contractors; they implement the 
SKIPJACK algorithm, which is classified SECRET and is therefore not available 
for public review. For more information on the initiative, consult the 
National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) Computer Security BBS 
at 301.948.5717 or via Internet ftp to csrc.ncsl.nist.gov in the /pub/nistnews 
directory.

The Government states that one motivation for this initiative is to allow 
authorized wiretapping of encrypted communications by escrowing the keys 
corresponding to individual components. A pair of "entities" (choices not 
announced) will have responsibility for keeping keys secure and releasing 
them only to government officials who have received legal authorization to 
perform a wiretap.

The Government recommends use of the chips instead of already existing 
cryptographic algorithms, such as the secret-key DES algorithm (a Federal 
Information Processing Standard and the basis of Kerberos and other network 
security tools) and the public-key RSA algorithm. Since DES and RSA have been 
subject to public scrutiny, experts have tested and confirmed their strength, 
which has led to their adoption within internationally-agreed networking 
standards; since SKIPJACK is secret and can never receive this scrutiny, it 
is unlikely that it will ever have such acceptance. Further, DES and RSA can 
run in both hardware and software, which satisfies performance and system 
integration requirements; the Government has limited Clipper/Capstone to 
hardware, which restricts the range of systems that may use it.

For now, the Government is recommending that equipment vendors use the chips 
on a voluntary basis; however, some observers regard the initiative as an 
attempt to establish a precedent that could later lead to governmental 
restrictions on the availability and use of open cryptographic systems. This 
could limit innovation in cryptographic technology. Further, user 
organizations could lose control over protecting and managing the keys on 
which their security depends. This summer, the Government plans inter-agency 
discussions of future policies in this area; observers have noted that policy 
development should also reflect private sector interests. Concerns about 
personal privacy raise additional controversy. Significant debate on these 
topics is likely in upcoming months.

Geer Zolot Associates believes that availability of open and exportable 
cryptography serves our clients' interests. Because of this, we are concerned 
about the implications of the "Public Encryption Management" initiative, and 
of its possible chilling effect on development, availability, and use of 
cryptographic technology. 

The initiative raises many issues, including:

      o	If the Government mandates enclosing cryptography in hardware modules, 
	this will surely delay the vital process of enhancing the security of 
	today's distributed computing base--it could even prevent some systems 
	from being secured at all. We want to avoid the prospect of our 
	clients being forced to choose between systems that satisfy their 
	operational needs and other systems containing Government-provided 
	hardware encryption components.

      o	Introducing a requirement for procurement, integration, and use of 
	special-purpose components (which manufacturers must separately handle 
	and program on a per-unit basis) will increase the cost of security 
	integration.

      o	If flaws in the hardware-implemented Clipper/Capstone cryptographic 
	algorithms ever come to light, users of the chips will have been 
	subjected to a data compromise from which no clear recovery path 
	exists. 

      o	It appears that gaining access to a Clipper/Capstone chip's escrowed 
	keys, through whatever means (authorized or unauthorized), may reveal 
	the contents of all its encrypted traffic (past, present, and future). 
	Effectively, this is analogous to binding an unchangeable password 
	into hardware, an undesirable characteristic.

      o	It appears unlikely that international telecommunications users and 
	providers will reach uniform agreement on an encryption technology 
	whose algorithms are known only to the US Government. As a result, the 
	initiative may force companies engaging in international commerce to 
	use and support different encryption systems, depending on the parties 
	involved in the communication. Such a course of action will lead to 
	increased costs in hardware, software, user training, and systems 
	management. 

We invite and encourage you to consider the Government initiative, including 
its impact on your organizations and distributed system security plans, and 
that you submit comments to your representatives. If your business plans rely 
on open cryptographic systems, based on publicly documented algorithms and 
available in hardware or software form, we encourage you to make this clear 
to your representatives. 

If you wish to share any of your comments or observations with us, we would 
welcome them. Further, we are happy to serve as an organizer for assembling 
and coordinating such information. Please indicate whether we may identify 
your organization (specifically or generically) as the information's source.

John Linn & Dan Geer

------- End of Forwarded Message

this is forwarded to the cypherpunks mailing list with dan geer's permission.

		peter





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Marc Horowitz <marc@GZA.COM>
Date: Mon, 28 Jun 93 09:37:48 PDT
To: peter honeyman <honey@citi.umich.edu>
Subject: Re: Geer Zolot White Paper: Clipper Initiative
In-Reply-To: <9306281606.AA15299@toad.com>
Message-ID: <9306281637.AA05896@dun-dun-noodles.aktis.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


FYI, several long-time cypherpunks are employees of Geer Zolot, and
were involved in writing the White Paper.

I hope you all like it :-)

		Marc




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Derek Atkins <warlord@MIT.EDU>
Date: Mon, 28 Jun 93 16:03:06 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: My Thesis Presentation... CHARON...
Message-ID: <9306282257.AA06812@toxicwaste.MEDIA.MIT.EDU>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


You are invited to attend my Thesis Presentation, entitled "Charon:
Kerberos Extensions For Authentication Over Secondary Networks"

Date: 	Wednesday, June 30, 1993
Time: 	12:30 - 2pm
Place: 	MIT Room E40-382 
	(1 Amherst, Cambridge)

You can pick up a PostScript copy of my Thesis either on Athena:
	attach warlord; cd /mit/warlord/Thesis/Thesis; more thesis.ps

or via anonymous ftp to 
	toxicwaste.mit.edu:/pub/charon/thesis.ps.Z

Hope to see you there.  Please forward this as you see fit.

-derek

			Abstract

In this thesis, I describe extensions to the Kerberos Authentication
System to enable a secure method of Authentication over multiple
networks.  Kerberos was designed with a fully-connected IP network in
mind, however when you add dialup capabilities to the picture,
Kerberos doesn't expand to secure the whole connection.

Charon was created to tackle this problem.  It was developed to
provide a way to securely authenticate to a login server over a modem
connection, without allowing a passive attacker to gain enough
information to impersonate the user.  This means that a user can log
into a Kerberized host without typing his password in clear-text over
the phone.  In addition, no modifications to the login server's base
operating system need to be made in order to accomplish this.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: zane@genesis.mcs.com (Sameer)
Date: Mon, 28 Jun 93 18:04:25 PDT
To: Karl Barrus <elee9sf@Menudo.UH.EDU>
Subject: Re: REMAIL: problems
In-Reply-To: <199306281508.AA26337@Menudo.UH.EDU>
Message-ID: <m0oAU20-000MU8C@genesis.mcs.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


	I've been thinking a little bit about the problems with unreliable
remailers.

	Supposing that we can never rely on the reliability of all the
remailers in a given path (because of not just bugs in the software, but
political hassles) it would be good to figure out a mechanism by which
a problem can be noticed.

	For example: supposing that I made the following mail path

::
Request-Remailing-To: hh@soda.berkeley.edu

::
Request-Remailing-To: remail@tamsun.tamu.edu

::
Request-Remailing-To: hfinney@shell.portal.com

::
Request-Remailing-To: cypherpunks@toad.com

	Suppose that remail@tamsun.tamu.edu wasn't working. Maybe it would
be possible for the remailer to notice that the next address in the hop
is a remailer, and check to see whether the next remailer is working or
not. (Send a ping-message.. This would slow things down greatly, yes.)
	Then if the remailer isn't working, something can be done. (Maybe
figure out some way of telling the originator [through encrypted
return-paths] that a certain remailer isn't working)

	This idea (obviously) isn't fully thought out. There are some
glaring problems with the system in that it would end up destroying a
good deal of the anonymity in the system. It might be possible, however,
to modify this idea to make it workable.
	It is definitely likely, in my mind, that remailers will continue
to be unreliable as long as net-anonymity is a controversial topic.

--
| Sameer Parekh-zane@genesis.MCS.COM-PFA related mail to pfa@genesis.MCS.COM |
| Apprentice Philosopher, Writer, Physicist, Healer, Programmer, Lover, more |
| "Symbiosis is Good" - Me_"Specialization is for Insects" - R. A. Heinlein_/
 \_______________________/ \______________________________________________/ 




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Joe Thomas <jthomas@access.digex.net>
Date: Mon, 28 Jun 93 18:36:31 PDT
To: Sameer <zane@genesis.mcs.com>
Subject: Re: REMAIL: problems
In-Reply-To: <m0oAU20-000MU8C@genesis.mcs.com>
Message-ID: <Pine.3.07.9306282132.A8310-b100000@access.digex.net>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


On Mon, 28 Jun 1993, Sameer wrote:

> 	I've been thinking a little bit about the problems with unreliable
> remailers.
> 
> 	Supposing that we can never rely on the reliability of all the
> remailers in a given path (because of not just bugs in the software, but
> political hassles) it would be good to figure out a mechanism by which
> a problem can be noticed.

I've thought about this as well.  I don't think it's right to _ever_ keep
return path information in a cypherpunk remailer, even for error reporting.
Far better to just drop the message on the floor than provide a loophole
to the anonymity of the system.

That said, I think there are possible solutions to the problem of
vanishing remailers.  Let's say there is a method to quickly and easily
verify the continuing existance (or lack thereof) of a remailer.  When a
remailer receives a request to send a message to another remailer, it can
quickly check to see if that remailer is in operation.  The question is
what to do with the information if it turns out the remailer is really down.
If the message is unencrypted, a smart remailer could simply skip the
missing remailer or send the message on to a substitute remailer, which
would then pass the message down the chain.

But if the message is encrypted with each remailer's key, it is
undeliverable without that remailer to decrypt it.  My idea is for
remailers to share their private keys using a secret-sharing protocol. 
When a remailer goes down, all the other remailers that hold pieces of its
key would choose a replacement remailer and send it the key pieces.  From
then on, all mail for the missing remailer would be routed instead to its
replacement remailer, which would decrypt and process it as usual.

It would be quite a pain to implement, but would make large remailer nets
a lot more reliable if it's done right.

Joe






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: nobody@newsgate.cs.pdx.edu (/Dev/Null)
Date: Mon, 28 Jun 93 23:02:59 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: End to End encryption for PC AND UNIX
Message-ID: <9306290605.AA12126@newsgate.cs.pdx.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Does anyone out there know if there is a program that will encrypt everything going over the phone line between a IBM MSDOS computer and a unix system?




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Nickey MacDonald <i6t4@jupiter.sun.csd.unb.ca>
Date: Mon, 28 Jun 93 22:31:09 PDT
To: cypherpunks list <cypherpunks@toad.com>
Subject: Re: REMAIL: problems
In-Reply-To: <m0oAU20-000MU8C@genesis.mcs.com>
Message-ID: <Pine.3.05.9306290204.A16729-c100000@jupiter>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


On Mon, 28 Jun 1993, Sameer wrote:

> 	I've been thinking a little bit about the problems with unreliable
> remailers.

I had another suggestion that might be helpful for people that are
chaining through many remailers, but it would require an addition or two
to existing remailers.

I'm not sure how to make clear what I mean, but lets start with a proposed
sample message:

   ::
   Request-Remailing-To-Remailer: hh@soda.berkeley.edu

   ::
   Request-Remailing-To-Remailer: remail@tamsun.tamu.edu

   ::
   Request-Remailing-To-Remailer: hfinney@shell.portal.com

   ::
   Request-Remailing-To: cypherpunks@toad.com

   {Message body goes here}

I'm sure you caught the change... You identify for the remailer when the
next hop is supposed to be a remailer.  Just by itself, this is of no
extra help, but hopefully of little extra bother because the old style
would still work.  Now how do we make it more reliable?

If the remailer knows that the message is going to another remailer, it
can expect a 'reply' from that remailer once the message has been
processed (forwarded), say within 48 hours.  Give each message a serial
number and the remailer a memory...  If the message is not acknowledged
within the timeout period, it skips a hop and goes to the next remailer
(or the destination).

This could also be expanded to let each remailer tell other remailers
about itself... it could maintain a database of known remailers.

The problem with this approach is that the remailer must store messages
locally for up 48 hours (well more if all of the hops were down)...  I
can't see (as Sameer alluded to) a way to have reliability (which sort of
implies, especially with the above approach, storage) and secrecy (which
implies quick and dirty 'less safe' message handling).

I have source code for serializing things (file access is what it was
designed form but I have found lots of neat uses for it).  It really quite
simple code, and not completely portable (well it uses flock(), not all
versions of un*x support flock()...)  I wrote the serializer to make sure
that my mail alias did not allow more than one copy of my email processing
script to run at once (thus creating very nasty log file collisions!).

Comments?

--
Nick MacDonald               | NMD on IRC
i6t4@jupiter.sun.csd.unb.ca  | PGP 2.1 Public key available via finger
i6t4@unb.ca                  | (506) 457-1931    ^{1024/746EBB 1993/02/23}






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: jthomas@kolanut.mitre.org (Joe Thomas)
Date: Tue, 29 Jun 93 05:26:56 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: REMAIL: problems
Message-ID: <9306291227.AA00990@kolanut>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> > 	I've been thinking a little bit about the problems with unreliable
> > remailers.
> 

> I had another suggestion that might be helpful for people that are
> chaining through many remailers, but it would require an addition or two
> to existing remailers.
. . .
> If the remailer knows that the message is going to another remailer, it
> can expect a 'reply' from that remailer once the message has been
> processed (forwarded), say within 48 hours.  Give each message a serial
> number and the remailer a memory...  If the message is not acknowledged
> within the timeout period, it skips a hop and goes to the next remailer
> (or the destination).

This is a serious misfeature.  An essential goal of remailer design is that  
they be stateless.  A message is forwarded, then immediately forgotten.  Any  
historical information about messages that have gone through is a potential  
weakness.  Message serial numbers are a perfect audit trail.

> The problem with this approach is that the remailer must store messages
> locally for up 48 hours (well more if all of the hops were down)...  I
> can't see (as Sameer alluded to) a way to have reliability (which sort of
> implies, especially with the above approach, storage) and secrecy (which
> implies quick and dirty 'less safe' message handling).

Consider cryptographic secret-sharing protocols.  If we have 20 remailers,  
each remailer could split his key into 20 pieces, 15 of which would be  
necessary to reconstruct the key.  When a remailer goes down, the key could  
be reconstructed and given to a substitute remailer.  The system can survive  
the loss of 5 remailers, and would require a collaboration of 15, or 3/4 of  
the remailer operators to intentionally break the security.

Joe
(working on my .sig; I don't speak for MITRE)
--
Joe Thomas <jthomas@kolanut.mitre.org>          Say no to the Wiretap Chip!
PGP key available by request, finger, or pgp-public-keys@toxicwaste.mit.edu
PGP   key   fingerprint:   1E E1 B8 6E 49 67 C4 19  8B F1 E4 9D F0 6D 68 4B




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Timothy Newsham <newsham@wiliki.eng.hawaii.edu>
Date: Tue, 29 Jun 93 12:11:07 PDT
To: nobody@newsgate.cs.pdx.edu (/Dev/Null)
Subject: Re: End to End encryption for PC AND UNIX
In-Reply-To: <9306290605.AA12126@newsgate.cs.pdx.edu>
Message-ID: <9306291911.AA01818@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> 
> Does anyone out there know if there is a program that will encrypt everything going over the phone line between a IBM MSDOS computer and a unix system?
> 

I wrote such a program, but no MSDOS port exists.  I have a Unix end
that runs a shell while doing encrpytion and decryption, and an
Amiga end that is built on top of a P.D. term program.
Someone volunteered to do a DOS port at one point but I havent
heard anything from them.  I'm thinking of putting in a little
time and putting together something simple just so something exists
and people can see how it was done (if they care to make something
with more bells and whistles).
  The code is on soda in one of the cypherpunks directories under
the name of link1.0.tar.Z, Ami-link1.0-src.lha and Ami-link1.0.lha

                               ...




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Timothy Newsham <newsham@wiliki.eng.hawaii.edu>
Date: Tue, 29 Jun 93 13:07:07 PDT
To: pmetzger@lehman.com
Subject: Re: End to End encryption for PC AND UNIX
In-Reply-To: <9306291920.AA02902@snark.shearson.com>
Message-ID: <9306292007.AA03286@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> 
> > > 
> > 
> > I wrote such a program, but no MSDOS port exists.  I have a Unix end
> > that runs a shell while doing encrpytion and decryption, and an
> > Amiga end that is built on top of a P.D. term program.
> > Someone volunteered to do a DOS port at one point but I havent
> > heard anything from them.  I'm thinking of putting in a little
> > time and putting together something simple just so something exists
> > and people can see how it was done (if they care to make something
> > with more bells and whistles).
> >   The code is on soda in one of the cypherpunks directories under
> > the name of link1.0.tar.Z, Ami-link1.0-src.lha and Ami-link1.0.lha
> 
> I wnat to build a unix-unix version of this -- are the sources to both
> ends in the tar file? I don't have lha...
> 
> .pm
> 

Yes, the .tar.Z file should have everything you want.
Most of the work is already done for you.
The program comes as a server (link) but there is also
a test client (connect) that I wrote to test out the
protocol.  If you edit the makefile and include the
defines DEBUG and SOCKET link and connect will be
built to use a socket as I/O and will talk to
each other.  If you wish to use it over a serial
line you can take the connect client and modify
it to use a serial device instead of the socket.

                         ...





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Bernard.A.Galler@um.cc.umich.edu
Date: Tue, 29 Jun 93 08:36:11 -0600
To: interesting_people@um.cc.umich.edu
Subject: Digital Signature Scandal
Message-ID: <24039642@um.cc.umich.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


 

- ------- Forwarded message

Received: from eff.org by um.cc.umich.edu via MTS-Net; Mon, 28 Jun 93 19:01:51 EDT
Received: by eff.org id AA18269
  (5.65c/IDA-1.5/ident for interesting-people-exploder); Mon, 28 Jun
1993 19:01:33 -0400
Posted-Date: Mon, 28 Jun 1993 18:59:37 -0500
Message-Id: <9306282259.AA06949@linc.cis.upenn.edu>
X-Sender: farber@linc.cis.upenn.edu
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"
Date: Mon, 28 Jun 1993 18:59:37 -0500
From: farber@central.cis.upenn.edu (David Farber)
Subject: Digital Signature Scandal
To: interesting-people@eff.org (interesting-people mailing list)


[The following is an official announcement from the League for Programming
Freedom.  Please redistribute this as widely as possible.]


                   Digital Signature Scandal

Digital signature is a technique whereby one person (call her
J. R. Gensym) can produce a specially encrypted number which anyone
can verify could only have been produced by her.  (Typically a
particular signature number encodes additional information such as a
date and time or a legal document being signed.)  Anyone can decrypt
the number because that can be done with information that is
published; but producing such a number uses a "key" (a password) that
J. R. Gensym does not tell to anyone else.

Several years ago, Congress directed the NIST (National Institute of
Standards and Technology, formerly the National Bureau of Standards)
to choose a single digital signature algorithm as a standard for the
US.

In 1992, two algorithms were under consideration.  One had been
developed by NIST with advice from the NSA (National Security Agency),
which engages in electronic spying and decoding.  There was widespread
suspicion that this algorithm had been designed to facilitate some
sort of trickery.

The fact that NIST had applied for a patent on this algorithm
engendered additional suspicion; despite their assurances that this
would not be used to interfere with use of the technique, people could
imagine no harmless motive for patenting it.

The other algorithm was proposed by a company called PKP, Inc., which
not coincidentally has patents covering its use.  This alternative had
a disadvantage that was not just speculation: if this algorithm were
adopted as the standard, everyone using the standard would have to pay
PKP.

(The same patents cover the broader field of public key cryptography,
a technique whose use in the US has been mostly inhibited for a decade
by PKP's assiduous enforcement of these patents.  The patents were
licensed exclusively to PKP by the Massachusetts Institute of
Technology and Stanford University, and derive from taxpayer-funded
research.)

PKP, Inc. made much of the suspect nature of the NIST algorithm and
portrayed itself as warning the public about this.

On June 8, NIST published a new plan which combines the worst of both
worlds: to adopt the suspect NIST algorithm, and give PKP, Inc. an
*exclusive* license to the patent for it.  This plan places digital
signature use under the control of PKP through the year 2010.

By agreeing to this arrangement, PKP, Inc. shows that its concern to
protect the public from possible trickery was a sham.  Its real desire
was, as one might have guessed, to own an official national standard.
Meanwhile, NIST has justified past suspicion about its patent
application by proposing to give that patent (in effect) to a private
entity.

Instead of making a gift to PKP, Inc., of the work all of us have paid
for, NIST and Congress ought to protect our access to it--by pursuing
all possible means, judicial and legislative, to invalidate or annull
the PKP patents.  If that fails, even taking them by eminent domain is
better (and cheaper in the long run!) than the current plan.

You can write to NIST to object to this giveaway.  Write to:

Michael R. Rubin
Active Chief Counsel for Technology
Room A-1111, Administration Building,
National Institute of Standards and Technology
Gaithersburg, Maryland 20899
(301) 975-2803.

The deadline for arrival of letters is around August 4.

Please send a copy of your letter to:

League for Programming Freedom
1 Kendall Square #143
P.O.Box 9171
Cambridge, Massachusetts 02139

(The League for Programming Freedom is an organization which defends
the freedom to write software, and opposes monopolies such as patented
algorithms and copyrighted languages.  It advocates returning to the
former legal system under which if you write the program, you are free
to use it.  Please write to the League if you want more information.)

Sending copies to the League will enable us to show them to elected
officials if that is useful.



This text was transcribed from a fax and may have transcription
errors.  We believe the text to be correct but some of the numbers
may be incorrect or incomplete.

- ---------------------------------------------------------------------

 ** The following notice was published in the Federal Register, Vol.
           58, No. 108, dated June 8, 1993 under Notices **

National Institute of Standards and Technology

Notice of Proposal for Grant of Exclusive Patent License

This is to notify the public that the National Institute of
Standards and Technology (NIST) intends to grant an exclusive
world-wide license to Public Key Partners of Sunnyvale, California
to practice the Invention embodied in U.S. Patent Application No.
07/738.431 and entitled "Digital Signature Algorithm."  A PCT
application has been filed.  The rights in the invention have been
assigned to the United States of America. 

The prospective license is a cross-license which would resolve a
patent dispute with Public Key Partners and includes the right to
sublicense.  Notice of availability of this invention for licensing
was waived because it was determined that expeditious granting of
such license will best serve the interest of the Federal Government
and the public.  Public Key Partners has provided NIST with the
materials contained in Appendix A as part of their proposal to
NIST.

Inquiries, comments, and other materials relating to the prospec-
tive license shall be submitted to Michael R. Rubin, Active Chief
Counsel for Technology, Room A-1111, Administration Building,
National Institute of Standards and Technology, Gaithersburg,
Maryland 20899.  His telephone number is (301) 975-2803.  Applica-
tions for a license filed in response to this notice will be
treated as objections to the grant of the prospective license. 
Only written comments and/or applications for a license which are
received by NIST within sixty (60) days for the publication of this
notice will be considered.

The prospective license will be granted unless, within sixty (60)
days of this notice, NIST receives written evidence and argument
which established that the grant of the license would not be
consistent with the requirements of 35 U.S.C. 209 and 37 CFR 404.7.

  Dated:  June 2, 1993.

Raymond G. Kammer
Acting Director, National Institute Standards and Technology.

Appendix "A"

The National Institute for Standards and Technology ("NIST") has
announced its intention to grant Public Key Partners ("PKP")
sublicensing rights to NIST's pending patent application on the
Digital Signature Algorithm ("DSA").

Subject to NIST's grant of this license, PKP is pleased to declare
its support for the proposed Federal Information Processing
Standard for Digital Signatures (the "DSS") and the pending
availability of licenses to practice the DSA.  In addition to the
DSA, licenses to practice digital signatures will be offered by PKP
under the following patents:

          Cryptographic Apparatus and Method ("Diffie-Hellman")
                No. 4,200,770
          Public Key Cryptographic Apparatus and Method
                ("Hellman-Merkle")   No. 4,315,552
          Exponential Cryptographic Apparatus and Method
                ("Hellman-Pohlig")   No. 4,434,414
          Method For Identifying Subscribers And For Generating
                And Verifying Electronic Signatures In A Data Exchange
                System ("Schnorr")   No. 4,995,082

It is PKP's intent to make practice of the DSA royalty free for
personal, noncommercial and U.S. Federal, state and local
government use.  As explained below, only those parties who enjoy
commercial benefit from making or selling products, or certifying
digital signatures, will be required to pay royalties to practice
the DSA.

PKP will also grant a license to practice key management, at no
additional fee, for the integrated circuits which will implement
both the DSA and the anticipated Federal Information Processing
Standard for the "key escrow" system announced by President Clinton
on April 16, 1993.

Having stated these intentions, PKP now takes this opportunity to
publish its guidelines for granting uniform licenses to all parties
having a commercial interest in practicing this technology:

First, no party will be denied a license for any reason other that
the following:

          (i)    Failure to meet its payment obligations,
          (ii)   Outstanding claims of infringement, or
          (iii)  Previous termination due to material breach.

Second, licenses will be granted for any embodiment sold by the
licensee or made for its use, whether for final products software,
or components such as integrated circuits and boards, and regard-
less of the licensee's channel of distribution.  Provided the
requisite royalties have been paid by the seller on the enabling
component(s), no further royalties will be owned by the buyer for
making or selling the final product which incorporates such
components.

Third, the practice of digital signatures in accordance with the
DSS may be licensed separately from any other technical art covered
by PKP's patents.

Fourth, PKP's royalty rates for the right to make or sell products,
subject to uniform minimum fees, will be no more than 2 1/2% for
hardware products and 5% for software, with the royalty rate
further declining to 1% on any portion of the product price
exceeding $1,000.  These royalty rates apply only to noninfringing
parties and will be uniform without regard to whether the licensed
product creates digital signatures, verifies digital signatures or
performs both.

Fifth, for the next three (3) years, all commercial services which
certify a signature's authenticity for a fee may be operated
royalty free.  Thereafter, all providers of such commercial
certification services shall pay a royalty to PKP of $1.00 per
certificate for each year the certificate is valid.

Sixth, provided the foregoing royalties are paid on such products
or services, all other practice of the DSA shall be royalty free.

Seventh, PKP invites all of its existing licensees, at their
option, to exchange their current licenses for the standard license
offered for DSA.

Finally, PKP will mediate the concerns of any party regarding the
availability of PKP's licenses for the DSA with designated
representatives of NIST and PKP.  For copies of PKP's license
terms, contact Michael R. Rubin, Acting Chief Counsel for Technolo-
gy, NIST, or Public Key Partners.

  Dated:  June 2, 1993.

Robert B. Fougner, Esq.,
Director of Licensing, Public Key Partners,
310 North Mary Avenue, Sunnyvale, CA  94033

[FR Doc. 93-13473 Filed 8-7-93; 8:45 am]

- ---------------------------------------------------------------------
Forwarded by:
- -- 
        Jim Gillogly
        Trewesday, 21 Forelithe S.R. 1993, 20:56









------- End of Forwarded Message





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: morpheus@entropy.linet.org (morpheus)
Date: Tue, 29 Jun 93 22:13:42 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: REMAIL: problems
In-Reply-To: <Pine.3.07.9306282132.A8310-b100000@access.digex.net>
Message-ID: <m0oAiWu-0002SeC@entropy.linet.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


In article <Pine.3.07.9306282132.A8310-b100000@access.digex.net> Joe Thomas <src4src!imageek!access.digex.net!jthomas> writes:
> [...] Let's say there is a method to quickly and easily
>verify the continuing existance (or lack thereof) of a remailer.  When a
>remailer receives a request to send a message to another remailer, it can
>quickly check to see if that remailer is in operation.  [...]

But how would this be done?  The first way that comes to my mind is spooling
the message in a queue of some sort, sending a "ping" message to the next
remailer in the chain, and waiting x minutes for a response.  If a response
does arrive within x minutes, that remailer is considered alive.  But what is
the value of x?  It can't be too short - the remailer might be on a slow
link.  For example, I have a remailer running on my machine, which is
connected via uucp. The turnaround time of a "ping" message would vary from
about 35 minutes to upwards of 13 hours (I don't connect at all from 0855
to 2205 EDT).  But the longer the delay, the slower the whole chain runs.
If one popular remailer goes down, all messages routed to it would be
delayed at least x minutes, which is better than the bit bucket - but with
x being, say, 1440 (one day) the delay would not be trival.  There also might
be security issues with the spooling of the messages.

I just wrote a couple extra perl programs for the remailer that do part of
the above.  I'll try to put them on soda, called "morpheus-remailer-hack"
or something similiar.  They add another header (called
"Request-Safe-Remailing-To for now - please send better suggestions!) that
acts just like R-R-To: but spools the message and sends out a email ping,
then waits to send the actual message until it gets the "ok" message back.
It's slow and ugly, but it seems to work (it works with itself, anyway ;-)
There's probably lots of locally-dependant stuff in it (like the MESSAGE_ID
and VISIBLE_NAME enviroment variables, etc) that will need to be fixed.

The big problem with it at this point is that it's useless - there isn't any
code to deal with the "no response" condition.  A simple script ran from
the crontab could check timestamps in the spool area and do something if
they were more than x minutes old - but _WHAT_ should it do?


Maybe a better idea would be to add a Recipt-Requested header instead of
doing the email ping, which would have the receiving remailer send back 
an "ok", but continue with delivery..  Then the sending remailer could
delete the spooled message, otherwise if it didn't get an ok it would
try again at another site.  Better or worse?

-- 
morpheus@entropy.linet.org			Non serviam!
Support your local police for a more efficient police state.





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Gerald Dejong <gerald.dejong@canrem.com>
Date: Wed, 30 Jun 93 08:15:38 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: cryptomoney
Message-ID: <60.230400.104.0C17CC55@canrem.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



hello folks!

i brought up a question about cryptomoney, and i was sent this
from a fellow called John Nieder.

JN>"Digital money" is a favorite subject of the whiz kids on the usenet
JN>"Cypherpunks" request.  If you have access to a FIDO/UUCP gate, send a
JN>request for this mailing to cypherpunks@toad.com to receive it via
JN>netmail.

is there something you can send me?

                              )gdj(
---
 þ DeLuxeý 1.21 #11557 þ testosterone: my drug of choice




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: smb@research.att.com
Date: Tue, 29 Jun 93 12:33:09 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Clipper vs. Russia
Message-ID: <9306291933.AA02464@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


According to an AP wire story, Article 23 of the draft Russian
constitution says that ``Each person has the right to secret
correspondence, telephone conversations, mail, telegraph and other
communications.''

Shucks -- there goes another export market for Clipper...

Oh yeah -- the AP explains the clause by referring to the ways that
Soviet authorities used to spy on people.


		--Steve Bellovin




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: anonymous@extropia.wimsey.com (Anonymous)
Date: Tue, 29 Jun 93 15:33:09 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: REMAIL:  Howto Post Anon to (almost?) any Newsgroup
Message-ID: <199306292206.AA23446@xtropia>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


This subject came up here a few months ago.  I can report that
I was able to post to the rec.video.cable-tv newsgroup anonymously
through the wimsey remailer plus group-name@cs.utexas.edu.

Send the following to

   Remailer <remail@extropia.wimsey.com>

all PGP encrypted with key

   pub  1024/B5A32F 1992/12/13  Remailer <remail@extropia.wimsey.com>

To: group-name@cs.utexas.edu
Subject: <subject to appear in post>
<blank line>
Text to appear in anonymous post to newsgroup "group-name"

"Group-name" is the name of the newsgroup with dashes "-" substituted
for periods ".".  Where the name already contains a dash, just leave
it alone.  So, for example, rec.video.cable-tv becomes
rec-video-cable-tv.

Note that with the wimsey remailer, anything not encrypted is
discarded, so no need to worry about your automatic sig.

Here is how the anonymous post appears:

[Newsgroup rec.video.cable-tv]

Post: 614 of 619
From: anonymous@extropia.wimsey.com (Anonymous)
Newsgroups: rec.video.cable-tv
Subject: TCI San Jose Free(?) Extended Basic
Date: 26 Jun 1993 05:50:28 -0500
Organization: UTexas Mail-to-News Gateway
Lines: 34
NNTP-Posting-Host: cs.utexas.edu

Here in San Jose, CA, TCI recently cut the price of "basic" cable
in half, but made a corresponding increase in the fee for "extended"
...
So the conclusion is,  cancel extended basic immediately. At worst
you're losing a vastly overpriced service; at best, you're losing
nothing at all, and saving $15/month!!
[end of post - no trailer]

This apparently works to any newsgroup, which function Julf got in
trouble for providing.  Use and enjoy!  We'll see what happens to
UTexas or Wimsey.

There is also apparently a new Julf-like forwarder that just appeared.
To get more info, send a message to:

   anonymus+info@charcoal.com.






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Marc Horowitz <marc@GZA.COM>
Date: Tue, 29 Jun 93 13:02:38 PDT
To: smb@research.att.com
Subject: Re: Clipper vs. Russia
In-Reply-To: <9306291933.AA02464@toad.com>
Message-ID: <9306292002.AA06961@dun-dun-noodles.aktis.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>> According to an AP wire story, Article 23 of the draft Russian
>> constitution says that ``Each person has the right to secret
>> correspondence, telephone conversations, mail, telegraph and other
>> communications.''

That's not really too meaningful.  Our Constitution provides for
protection against unlawful search and seizure (comments on the
reality of this to alt.flame, please :-).  Does the draft Russian
constitution forbid *all* tapping of mail, phones, etc?  I doubt it.
So that basically gives them the same protection we (nominally) have,
and our government seems quite happy with Key Escrow.

		Marc




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: zane@genesis.mcs.com (Sameer)
Date: Tue, 29 Jun 93 17:52:19 PDT
To: jthomas@kolanut.mitre.org (Joe Thomas)
Subject: Re: REMAIL: problems
In-Reply-To: <9306291227.AA00990@kolanut>
Message-ID: <m0oAqLa-000MVxC@genesis.mcs.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


In message <9306291227.AA00990@kolanut>, Joe Thomas writes:
> 
> Consider cryptographic secret-sharing protocols.  If we have 20 remailers,  
> each remailer could split his key into 20 pieces, 15 of which would be  
> necessary to reconstruct the key.  When a remailer goes down, the key could  
> be reconstructed and given to a substitute remailer.  The system can survive  
> the loss of 5 remailers, and would require a collaboration of 15, or 3/4 of  
> the remailer operators to intentionally break the security.
> 
> Joe
	This secret sharing *does* look very appealling.
	How would the substitute remailer be chosen? Very difficult to
build, however, as it would require a great deal of similarity between
remailer software.
	How can a key be split into 20 pieces while only requiring [any?] 15
to work? Redundancy?

	It would be a good idea to have two sorts of keys for each
remailer, maybe. One key for normal usage and another key for
communication between remailers, key-part distribution, etc.

--
| Sameer Parekh-zane@genesis.MCS.COM-PFA related mail to pfa@genesis.MCS.COM |
| Apprentice Philosopher, Writer, Physicist, Healer, Programmer, Lover, more |
| "Symbiosis is Good" - Me_"Specialization is for Insects" - R. A. Heinlein_/
 \_______________________/ \______________________________________________/ 




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: M..Stirner@f28.n125.z1.FIDONET.ORG (M. Stirner)
Date: Tue, 29 Jun 93 21:01:10 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Charcoal remailer
Message-ID: <778.2C310523@shelter.FIDONET.ORG>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Has anyone here had any experience with the "charcoal remailer," a
Penet-ish looking system that I saw in another newgroup footer?

The footer says to contact "anonymus+info@charcoal.com" for information,
but this isn't a good address.  The misspelling of anonymous is
suggestive, but that's how it read...
___ Blue Wave/QWK v2.12
--  
M. Stirner - via FidoNet node 1:125/1
UUCP: ...!uunet!kumr!shelter!28!M..Stirner
INTERNET: M..Stirner@f28.n125.z1.FIDONET.ORG




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: khijol!erc@apple.com (Ed Carp)
Date: Tue, 29 Jun 93 20:37:07 PDT
To: fergp@sytex.com (Paul Ferguson)
Subject: Re: PC Week Clipper article
In-Reply-To: <c6PX6B1w165w@sytex.com>
Message-ID: <m0oAsls-0002DjC@warrior>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text


> On the other hand, Clipper chip supporters such as Dorothy
> Denning, chairman of the Computer Science Dept. at Georgetown
> University in Washington and a noted expert in the field of
> cryptography, say the key-escrow system is more than adequate to
> protect legitimate American interests.

Dorothy Denning is a fucking idiot.

Oh, 'scuse me ... is this a family-oriented list? ;)
-- 
Ed Carp			erc@apple.com, erc@saturn.upl.com	510/659-9560
   For anonymous mailers -->   anonymus+5300@charcoal.com
"I've met many thinkers and many cats, but the wisdom of cats is infinitely
 superior."      -- Hippolyte Taine  (1828-1893)



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: khijol!erc@apple.com (Ed Carp)
Date: Tue, 29 Jun 93 21:17:36 PDT
To: M..Stirner@f28.n125.z1.FIDONET.ORG (M. Stirner)
Subject: Re: Charcoal remailer
In-Reply-To: <778.2C310523@shelter.FIDONET.ORG>
Message-ID: <m0oAtYH-0002ETC@warrior>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text


> Has anyone here had any experience with the "charcoal remailer," a
> Penet-ish looking system that I saw in another newgroup footer?
> 
> The footer says to contact "anonymus+info@charcoal.com" for information,
> but this isn't a good address.  The misspelling of anonymous is
> suggestive, but that's how it read...

Yes.  It works.  Some mailers, it seems, don't like "+" in the address...:(
-- 
Ed Carp			erc@apple.com, erc@saturn.upl.com	510/659-9560
   For anonymous mailers -->   anonymus+5300@charcoal.com
"I've met many thinkers and many cats, but the wisdom of cats is infinitely
 superior."      -- Hippolyte Taine  (1828-1893)



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: fergp@sytex.com (Paul Ferguson)
Date: Tue, 29 Jun 93 19:43:14 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: PC Week Clipper article
Message-ID: <c6PX6B1w165w@sytex.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I just got back from the first day of PC Expo at Javits Center here
in New Yawk. (God, how I love these shows. Trinkets, trinkets and
more trinkets.) To make a long story short, I picked up a copy (and
renewed my subscription) of the latest PC Week. The following article
shows (at least) that the Clipper/Capstone debate has not subsided,
but rather, is just becoming public knowledge thanks to coverage in
trade publications and popular press.
 
This particular article is included amongst several others in a
"Special Report" section in the June 28 issue of PC Week relating
to Privacy in the Workplace, "Privacy issue comes of age in the
networked world." Other articles in this issue include "Encryption,
monitoring and E-mail spur the privacy debate," "Some companies
spell it right out: We will be watching you," "Privacy Act would
force firms to inform their employees about E-mail monitoring,
"Electronic monitoring raises legal and societal questions,
"Encryption technology is on the rise in the private sector," "UPS
toes the line with its package-tracking technologies" and two
side-bar articles entitled " Cellular phones: Some like'em and some
don't" and "From A too Z: Privacy policies run the gamut."
 
Cheers from Times Square, Manhattan.
 
8<------- Article follows ---------------
 
PC Week Special Report
"Workplace Privacy"
"News Analysis"
 
PC Week
June 28, 1993
pages 207, 211
 
Crypto policy and business privacy
 
The White House wants businesses to protect data but leave doors
open to law-enforcement agencies
 
by Winn Schwartau
 
Following the Clinton administration's April 16 endorsement of
the Clipper chip, law-enforcement and privacy advocates are
staking out positions that will likely test the bounds of the
Constitution.
 
The Clipper chip, manufactured by Mykotronx Inc., of Torrance,
Calif., and officially designated the MYK-78, contains a
sophisticated encryption algorithm that protects a company's
communications by scrambling the data.
 
Announced as a joint technical effort between the NSA (National
Security Agency) and NIST (National Institute for Standards and
Technology), the chip is supposed to balance the needs of law
enforcement with businesses' need for data privacy.
 
The Clinton administration is encouraging American businesses to
adopt Clipper to ensure their own privacy, yet still permit
"lawful government electronic surveillance," according to a
statement released by the White House. Third-party products that
contain the Clipper chip are expected to be announced by fall.
 
The keys to decrypting Clipper communications will be held by two
independent parties, such as the Federal Reserve Board and a
private company. Attorney General Janet Reno had expected to
announce the holders of the keys in early May, but has delayed
the announcement until midsummer, according to a spokesman at the
Attorney General's office.
 
The Clipper endeavor stems from Bush-era intelligence-agency
attempts at adding legislative riders to congressional bills that
would have forced telecommunications and networking companies to
build in back doors for encrypted transmissions. The EFF
(Electronic Frontier Foundation) and CPSR (Computer Professionals
for Social Responsibility), citizen groups based in Washington,
are generally credited with having such riders removed from
the bills.
 
Deep concern drives the anti-Clipper privacy advocates, many of
whom focus on the integrity of the encryption key-escrow agents
who will ultimately hold the keys to the U.S. digital kingdom if
the proposed program is successful. Said Kevin Murray, president
of Murray & Assoc., a security-consulting firm in Clinton, N.J.,
"I don't like Clipper at all. If you're going to offer privacy,
then offer it. I've seen too many cases where secrets easily
leaked out."
 
Few, if any, businesses appear willing to sign on with the
government's plan. Spearheaded by the EFF and the ACLU (American
Civil Liberties Union), 31 companies sent a letter last month to
the White House and Congress stating "... We believe that there
are fundamental privacy and other constitutional rights that must
be taken into account when any domestic surveillance is
proposed." Among the companies signing the letter were AT&T,
Apple Computer Inc., Digital Equipment Corp., IBM,
Hewlett-Packard Co., Lotus Development Corp., MCI Communications
Corp., Microsoft Corp., RSA Data Security Inc. and Sun
Microsystems Inc.
 
One area of concern among the companies is that the government
intends to keep all technical information about the Clipper
encryption algorithm secret. Conventional cryptological wisdom
says that only after wide-spread public analysis and comment can
an encryption technique be trusted.
 
CPSR last month filed a lawsuit against the National Security
Council seeking information about the Clipper chip.
 
"The Clipper plan was developed behind a veil of secrecy," said
Marc Rotenberg, director of CPSR's Washington office. "We need to
know why the standard was developed, what alternatives were
considered and what the impact will be on privacy.
 
"As the proposal currently stands, Clipper looks a lot like
desktop surveillance," Rotenberg said.
 
Said Mitch Kapor, founder of Lotus and chairman of the EFF, "An
[encryption] system based upon classified, secret technology will
not and should not gain the confidence of the American public."
 
On the other hand, Clipper chip supporters such as Dorothy
Denning, chairman of the Computer Science Dept. at Georgetown
University in Washington and a noted expert in the field of
cryptography, say the key-escrow system is more than adequate to
protect legitimate American interests.
 
Padgett Peterson, information-security specialist at defense
contractor Martin Marietta Corp., in Orlando, Fla., said, "I
believe Clipper's going to work. The government has more to lose
than we do." The Justice Department has already placed large
orders with AT&T for telephones fitted with Clipper encryption
chips. Said Peterson,"Soon enough, everyone will be using
Clipper: doctors, lawyers and CPAs."
 
However, the chip's use in other governmental agencies is not
assured. Neither the Federal Reserve Board nor the Department of
the Treasury has indicated that they will adopt Clipper.
 
Many business executives believe the government's encouragement
of voluntary adoption is only the first step in a plan drawn by
the intelligence community years ago that will eventually mandate
Clipper encryption for private businesses and outlaw all other
forms of encryption. The ACLU, EFF, CPSR and other watchdog
groups aim to ensure that the government never goes that far.
 
American businesses that adopt Clipper encryption in their
networks and communications systems will have to accept some
far-reaching assumptions, according to its skeptics:
 
- that the Clipper algorithm is robust enough to secure their
  corporate information assets domestically and internationally.
  The international security community already believes American
  data to be less secure than it should be and worries about
  leaving doors open to the United States;
- that the government does not have its own back door to read
  encrypted communications;
- that the key-escrow agents, once named, can be trusted;
- that the key-escrow repository, a vault that contains the
  Clipper chip serial numbers and encrypting and decrypting keys,
  will be secure enough to withstand a dedicated attack. The
  Attorney General's office also plans to announce this summer
  what form the repository will take -- electronic or otherwise
  -- and how it will be secured;
- that by its very use, the company is not unintentionally giving
  up its right to privacy or other constitutional rights; and
- that purchasing machines that include the hardware-based
  Clipper chip is better than using currently available and
  field-tested software encryption techniques such as DES and
  RSA.
 
The response to Clipper has been negative despite pleas from the
administration that "while [other forms of] encryption technology
can help Americans protect business secrets and the unauthorized
release of personal information, [they] also can be used by
terrorists, drug dealers and other criminals."
 
Martin Marietta's Peterson still believes Clipper is "good
enough" for business, but he is in the minority. The majority
opinion holds that Clipper may be what the government wants, but
it shouldn't even think about making any laws mandating its use.
 
------
Winn Schwartau is the executive director of INTERPACT, a
Seminole, Fla., consultancy, publisher of the Security Insider
Report and author of "Terminal Compromise" and "Information
Warfare: How To Wage It, How To Win It."
 

Paul Ferguson               |  "Confidence is the feeling you get
Network Integrator          |   just before you fully understand
Centreville, Virginia USA   |   the problem."
fergp@sytex.com             |      - Murphy's 7th Law of Computing
 
               Quis Custodiet Ipsos Custodes?




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: fergp@sytex.com (Paul Ferguson)
Date: Tue, 29 Jun 93 20:04:01 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: BYTE Clipper article (newsbite)
Message-ID: <saqX6B2w165w@sytex.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


 
Okay, here's another one. This time its Peter Wayner in the pages
of BYTE magazine (volume 18, number 8, July 1993).
 
8<------ Article follows -------------
 
BYTE Magazine
July 1993
page 36
News & Views; Data Security
 
Clipped Wings?
 
Encryption Chip Draws Fire
 
Part of the Clinton administration's vision for a digital America
is a fast encryption chip to help companies and individuals
protect their secrets from prying eyes as voice and data messages
are sent over communications wires. The catch is that this
encryption chip includes a backdoor that will let
law-enforcement agencies listen in. The White House believes that
the hardware will protect all Americans' right to privacy while
also protecting them from those who break the law.
 
The chip is named Clipper (because Intergraph in Huntsville,
Alabama, manufactures a processor with the same name, the Clipper
moniker will likely be changed). It is a 12 Mbps encryption
coprocessor designed by Mykotronx (Torrance, CA) and manufactured
by VLSI (San Jose, CA). The chip is built in a tamper-resistant
package to prevent reverse-engineering efforts to reveal the
classified algorithm used inside.
 
Along with privacy concerns that the government could abuse its
ability to tap digital wires, another impediment to widespread
acceptance of Clipper will be its cost. Ben Stolz, a member of
the technical staff at Sun Microsystems (Mountain View, CA),
says, "Our rule of thumb is that a part that costs n dollars adds
3n to 4n dollars to the final price [of a computer]." Raymond
Kammer, acting director of the National Institute of Standards
and Technology (Gaithersburg, MD), recently told a U.S.
congressional committee that he hopes the Mykotronx chips will
eventually cost $26 each if purchased in large quantities. That
means a potential $75 to $100 addition to the price of each
computer that uses the chip.
 
Critics of the Clipper chip note that less expensive chips that
provide DES encryption have not received widespread acceptance
because software encryption, although usually slower than
hardware, is less expensive. Jim Bidzos, president of RSA Data
Securities (Redwood City, CA), says, "This is just another arrow
aimed at preventing people from using RSA." RSA's cryptographic
routines will be included in new releases of system software
written by Apple and Novell and are already used in Lotus Notes.
 
The government will undoubtedly provide a large market for the
Clipper chip initially. President Clinton has already directed
the U.S. Attorney General Janet Reno to purchase several thousand
units for use in computers and secure phones. The impact of the
chip on the rest of the world, though, will be governed by
economics.
 

Paul Ferguson               |  "Confidence is the feeling you get
Network Integrator          |   just before you fully understand
Centreville, Virginia USA   |   the problem."
fergp@sytex.com             |      - Murphy's 7th Law of Computing
 
               Quis Custodiet Ipsos Custodes?




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: ""L. Detweiler"" <ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Date: Tue, 29 Jun 93 21:19:01 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: LPF statement on PKP-DSS patent
Message-ID: <9306300418.AA25017@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



I especially like the part where they concisely summarize it all as
`the worst of both worlds'...

------- Forwarded Message




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: nobody@mead.u.washington.edu
Date: Tue, 29 Jun 93 22:20:46 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Remailer Test
Message-ID: <9306300520.AA49995@mead.u.washington.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


This is a remailer test. Please forgive the waste of time/space.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: TO1SITTLER@APSICC.APS.EDU (Kragen Sittler)
Date: Tue, 29 Jun 93 22:26:55 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: mailers not liking + in the address
Message-ID: <930629231409.3244@APSICC.APS.EDU>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


There is, of course, a way around this if you have telnet... telnet to 
port 25 on charcoal.com, or to somewhere else if you can't reach there,
and enter your message as per RFC-821, SMTP.
Directions for the lazy:
once you get an acknowledgement from the remote computer, type
helo apsicc.aps.edu
(or whatever your computer is called)
It should greet you or hang up.
So if it didn't hang up, type
mail from: <your name here>
DON'T FORGET THE ANGLE BRACKETS!
Then, type
rcpt to: <anonymus+info@charcoal.com>
if you connected to charcoal directly, or 
rcpt to: <@somecomputer.com:anonymus+info@charcoal.com>
where somecomputer.com is where you are connected to.
(It is possible this is wrong and @somecomputer.com either: a) is not necessary
or b) should appear in the mail from: line.  Try it.)
Then, type
data
and type in the From:, To: Subject:, Date:, Message-ID:, and so on fields.
Send yourself a message to find out how it should look.  Make the Message-ID
something that will not be replicated by the computer you are on.
Follow this with a blank line, and type the body of your message.
Double any periods appearing alone on lines.
End your message with a period alone on a line.
Then type 
quit
to close the connection.
(BTW: this provides a certain amount of anonymity without need for a remailer,
but it is then possible to detect which computer you are mailing from.  I sent
the anonymous message about people not doing something if you make it hard
enough by this method, as a demo, but I kind of botched it.  The message
arrived, but it did not look right.)

Kragen, SMTP wizard
(NOT!)
hee hee




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: smb@research.att.com
Date: Tue, 29 Jun 93 20:20:52 PDT
To: zane@genesis.mcs.com (Sameer)
Subject: Re: REMAIL: problems
Message-ID: <9306300320.AA15034@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


	 How can a key be split into 20 pieces while only requiring [any ?] 15
	 to work? Redundancy?

There are a fair number of such schemes.  The best overview is in Gus
Simmons' own chapter in ``Contemporary Cryptology:  The Science of
Information Integrity'', edited by Simmons and published last year by
IEEE Press.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: ""L. Detweiler"" <ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Date: Wed, 30 Jun 93 00:14:52 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: remailer ideas & proposals
Message-ID: <9306300657.AA26896@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


The remailer details have always been one of the most persistent,
relevant, and interesting aspects of this group. I'm really pleased to
see e.g. Hal Finney's attempts to automate a testing process, and
others' interests in methods of increasing reliability and security. 
Unfortunately, it seems to me the same problems keep popping up unresolved.

Here are a few brief ideas.

1. `dropping' messages

Here is an idea: if a remailer drops a message or forwards it
successfully it could broadcast a message to a group such as misc.test.
 There are all kinds of problems with autoresponders replying to these
kinds of messages but I think anyone who has the audacity to run an
autoresponder despite no clear mandate to do so is asking for trouble
anyway. Regarding traffic analysis, see below.

Also, Miron Cuperman was running an anonymous pool mailing list, last I
heard email pool0-request@extropria.wimsey.com with `subscribe' in the
subject line to get on it. Is this still running? Is anybody playing
with this? What are people doing with this anyway?

Now, for some *really* radical ideas. If cypherpunk remailers were
truly impervious to traffic analysis then we wouldn't *care* if
detailed statistics on mail messages were broadcast to the world,
because correlations would be intractable to determine so it wouldn't matter.

So, I propose that remailers actually start posting to a list somewhere
*all* internal traffic. This will create an excellent incentive for
them to implement traffic-analysis-thwarting (TAT?) mechanisms. Of
course, the mechanisms should be implemented before they start
broadcasting this information!

The broadcasting of this information is like built-in accountability.
If people see trends they can notify operators of their weaknesses. It
actually *encourages* the development of traffic analysis and thereby
improved safeguards.  Also, it helps us paint an excellent *overall*
picture of remailer use and increase their exposure to the `unwashed masses'.

BTW, I would like to see a list that keeps track of the professed
`logging' practices and historical reliability of the various remailers. 

2. Embedded messages

I've been thinking about the whole idea of message transmission in
SMTP, and it strikes me as very sloppy. We have this system where
intermediate hosts can tack on junk at the beginning and ending of
messages (such as `Received' lines, overflow headers, etc.) without
violating any standards. I think this should change--an explicit
standard handling this modification should be in place and anyone that
doesn't adhere to it can be blamed for `violating the standard' and
maybe even cleaning up their act.

Here is one such proposed standard. I'd like to see what everyone
thinks. I proposed something similar a long time ago.

Here is the idea: when a message is submitted to a host, the host is
responsible for maintaining a very precise map of what the message
appeared as when it went `in', and what was added in the process,
`out'.  Here is one such way to make this explicit:

Have a `x-message-format' line. The way this header works is that it
represents the structure of the message in lines. Each new remailer,
when it adds *anything* *anywhere* in the message is also responsible
for correctly updating the x-message-format line, under the following standard.

The line contains text tags, followed by a colon, followed by a number
of lines representing that field in the message. Also, the use of
paranthesis makes the idea of `embedding' explicit. Each level of
paranthesis represents a `wrapper'. A mailer may add any number of new
fields anywhere in a message and then `wrap' the whole thing in
parenthesis.  Fields are separated by spaces.  The fields collectively
name all lines in the message in sequential order.

For example, the first mailer might create a root x-message-format-line like:

x-message-format: (headers:4 body:10 signature:3)

Then passing through one intermediate remailers, we might get a
`recieved' status line added, at the *beginning*:

x-message-format: (recd:1 (headers:4 body:10 signature:3))

And some goofy Fidonet gateway may find it necessary to stick something on the end:

x-message-format: ((headers:4 body:10 signature:3) fidofooter:4)

Of course, under the standard it would make sense to have categories of
the tag specifications, so for example any tag that represents a header
would have something in its text like `header' so it could be identified.

We might even have text fields inside the embedded message routing
structure that identify the names, errors-to emails address, etc. of
the intermediate hosts.

The point is that with all this the recipient has a transparently clear
picture of what constitutes the original message and what was added as
intermediate fluff, which currently SMTP is frighteningly and
embarrassingly lax in identifying. The idea of the *original message*
vs. *intermediate fluff* is absolutely critical and we deserve
sophisticated protocols that preserve the distinction.  (Gad, it's
amazing what remailers do to messages. They will mess with lines that
contain only hyphens or '>' quote any line that begins `From'. I find
all this highly atrocious.)

So, what does anyone think?

The problems I can see are in the proliferation of tags. Maybe a
central authority needed to regulate them to be sensible and unique (a
registry). Also, is it the case that some headers can get too large?
The solution I have for this is to break up the x-message-format line
into multiple lines:

x-message-format1:
x-message-format2:

where successive lines actually represent one level of nested parenthesis.

Note: I don't know if the inherent `sloppiness' in SMTP will ever be
successfully evaded given its widespread entrenchment. However, I
believe protocols superior to it in that regard are inevitable in their adoption.





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Sandy <72114.1712@CompuServe.COM>
Date: Tue, 29 Jun 93 22:11:03 PDT
To: <cypherpunks@toad.com>
Subject: SEARCH ME
Message-ID: <930630050650_72114.1712_FHF19-1@CompuServe.COM>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
  SANDY SANDFORT               Reply to:  ssandfort@attmail.com
 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Cypherpunks,

Duncan Frissell's experience with the "drain police" reminded me
of a similar experience I had some years ago.  I found out that
the "building police" in Kansas City would be inspecting homes in
my neighborhood looking for "code violations."  I had put in some
electrical plugs without benefit of an electrician.  Also, I was
still in law school, so naturally I felt like raising some
(legal) hell with the Powers That Be.

When the inspector showed up, I said "no thank you" when he asked
if he could inspect my house.  If I had poll-axed him, he
couldn't have looked more surprised.  Apparently, nobody had
*ever* said "no."

After he recovered, he asked me why not.  I mentioned the Fourth
Amendment and the -See- and -Camara- decisions in the Supreme
Court.  He never came back.

I won't go into the embarrassing story of the one time I did
cooperate with the police.  Suffice it to say, I regretted it.
Both events, however, have made it clear to me that it is almost
always stupid to cooperate with the cops.

To be truthful, I strongly considered leaving out the word
*almost* in the previous sentence.  I'm afraid some of you will
outsmart yourself by thinking you can control a law enforcement
situation with "clever" cooperation.  Dream on.  If you aren't a
lawyer, it is very likely you will fuck yourself.

But shouldn't you cooperate for the little things, especially
when you know you are clean?  No, no, no, for two reasons.
First, I are you sure you are clean in the officials eyes?  The
one time I cooperated, the fact that I had 3-4 $100 bills on my
dresser made it into the cops report (though he did add, "no
other signs of drug dealing").  Are you *sure* you're clean?

Second, it's great practice.  You have a right to require a valid
warrant.  These guys (nominally) work for you.  Enjoy yourself;
make them jump through some hoops for you.  Rights are like
muscles, if you don't exercise them, they atrophy.

Use it, or loose it!

 S a n d y

>>>>>>    Please send e-mail to:  ssandfort@attmail.com    <<<<<<
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: ""L. Detweiler"" <ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Date: Wed, 30 Jun 93 00:21:59 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Kleinpaste's Charcoal anonymous server
Message-ID: <9306300721.AA27192@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


One person asked about the Charcoal remailer.  I try to stay on top of
this area of anonymity servers and have corresponded with the owner
Karl Kleinpaste extensively in the past.  First, I would like to
encourage *everyone* who wants to create and run an anonymous server,
which is time-consuming, thankless, and even painful at times, and
don't want any of my comments to be construed otherwise.

I think something disparaging could probably be said about any remailer
operator. However, I also think that remailer policies vary and that we
should keep track of the practices and reputed integrity of operators
as much as possible. Under that vein I'll just make a few *candid*
comments to cypherpunks on Mr. Kleinpaste. Please *do not* forward
these notes anywhere.

Kleinpaste started his server early this year mostly in response to
alt.personals, with the death of another server, I believe.  In a
*very* scorching-hot incident, an estranged boyfriend posted nude
pictures of his old girlfriend to alt.binaries.pictures or some other
newsgroup. It is not clear to me that he used an anonymous server to do
so--I believe he did not based on some testimony of others. Anyway,
this caused a huge eruption as these things inevitably do, and legal
action was in motion against the person in his hometown.

The guy apparently *later* used Kleinpaste's anonymous server to send
mail to another anonymous person who he thought worked with the
girlfriend's mother.  I guess there was some extortion or `threats' in
the letters.  Anyway, Kleinpaste gave all the persons mail to the
`authorities' (despite marginal relevance to the original
picture-posting) and got very emotional and wrapped up in the whole
case. In fact, he acted, in my view, very paternalistic in the way a
father would protect his daughter. (At one point he made the comment
that the young girl had moved to a new town and `was making new
friends' -- something that sounds like something one's parent's would
say, eh?) BTW--the estranged boyfriend was never prosecuted apparently
due to gray legal areas and prosecution cost.

Kleinpaste also revealed how a person was suicidal and was posting
through his server. It's not clear to me what he did but I think he
said he tried to contact the person's home institution.  Here is where
the ethical quandaries of anonymous servers are rather intense! What
should an operator do if a person, who is using the system in *trust*
of their anonymity, is suicidal? Is about to commit a crime? Involved
in a conspiracy? Well, I'm not advocating anything, but the stance of
`unhindered carrier' is certainly the least problematic from the
operator point of view.

Anyway, through all this it seemed to be clear to me that Kleinpaste
may be regularly reading some of the mail that is going through his
server, and in any case probably keeping fairly thorough logs.  Look at
his policies!  Essentially they are: if you don't post anything
offensive, I'm behind you. If you do, I will restrict your access
temporarily, permantently, or even expose you.

Kleinpaste soured very seriously on the whole idea of the anonymous
server and killed it. Then in the big flame wars J. Palmer started up
his server and Kleinpaste appeared to want some attention that Julf &
others were getting.  I found it highly incongruous in the least and
hypocritical at worst given some of his statements on `bastards who
abuse the service' that he restarted his own -- he's one of the most
strong-mouthed people on that subject.

Anyway, charcoal.com seems to have been humming along for a few months
now and Kleinpaste does not appear to be ready to shut it down anytime
soon. It posts to a limited number of groups. He tells me that he has
refused requests to `out' a particular individual in alt.personals by
another prominent individual.

So, I'd say that if you have his endorsement for your use of anonymity,
it's a safe server. But if you're on morally gray areas in your use, by
*his* definitions, then Caveat Emptor.

p.s. one reference on all this is
rtfm.mit.edu:/pub/usenet/news.answers/net-anonymity.  I would document
further these really volatile incidents (esp. the `nude picture
posting') but don't have enough eye-witness accounts to do so (in
particular, not my own).





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: skyhawk@cpac.washington.edu
Date: Wed, 30 Jun 93 01:31:25 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: remailer ideas & proposals
Message-ID: <9306300830.AA18466@bailey.cpac.washington.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> From: ""L. Detweiler"" <ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu> <ld231782/daemon>
> Subject: remailer ideas & proposals
> 
> Now, for some *really* radical ideas. If cypherpunk remailers were
> truly impervious to traffic analysis then we wouldn't *care* if
> detailed statistics on mail messages were broadcast to the world,
> because correlations would be intractable to determine so it wouldn't matter.
> So, I propose that remailers actually start posting to a list somewhere
> *all* internal traffic. [...]

That's a big if.  I think the idea is interesting, but would *very* much like
to see this tested first on a set of "play" remailers, which are advertised as
being for research only, don't trust them to actually work, etc.

> 2. Embedded messages
> 
> I've been thinking about the whole idea of message transmission in
> SMTP, and it strikes me as very sloppy. [...]
> Here is the idea: when a message is submitted to a host, the host is
> responsible for maintaining a very precise map of what the message
> appeared as when it went `in', and what was added in the process,
> `out'.  [...]
> Note: I don't know if the inherent `sloppiness' in SMTP will ever be
> successfully evaded given its widespread entrenchment. However, I
> believe protocols superior to it in that regard are inevitable in their
> adoption.

MIME, in particular, solves this problem, along with many others.  Three cheers
for Metamail!  Specifically, you can have several seperate messages within your
RFC822 message, arranged hierarchially.  You could have your public key, your
cute .sig, your message, your signature for the message, contact information
for you, a JPEG image (of your cat, say), and a sound ("meow") all in the same
mail message.  There is even faint hope that it would be portable.

--
Scott Northrop          <skyhawk@cpac.washington.edu>            (206)784-2083
ObVirus:   The demand for obedience is inherently evil.
ObVirus2:  As a juror in a Trial by Jury, you have the right, power and duty
           to acquit the defendant if you judge the law itself to be unjust.





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: ""L. Detweiler"" <ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Date: Wed, 30 Jun 93 00:31:48 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: PGP speech coding on SoundBlaster
Message-ID: <9306300731.AA27352@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


This person is very serious about developing a scrambler based on PGP
and Soundblaster, topics that get banged around here alot (``...with
great sound and fury, told by an idiot, signifying nothing.'')  There
is room for suggestions on approaches or (more importantly) volunteers
in coding.  He does not subscribe to the list because of volume.

------- Forwarded Message

From: dorsey@lila.com (Bill Dorsey)
Subject: PGP Mailing List
Date: Tue, 29 Jun 1993 02:12:54 -0700 (PDT)

- --- BEGIN SUMMARY ---

Voice-PGP is a software package that will allow PC owners to have secure
communications over insecure phone lines.  It will require only that the
users possess a modem capable of 9600 baud or greater and own a SoundBlaster
compatible sound card.  Later versions may support other sound cards.

As the project stands now, I have developed a large number of speech coders
of varying complexity based on coders discussed in the literature from the
early 70's to the present.  Although the sound quality is generally poor
among the simple coders at these bit rates, they do allow computers not
blessed with fast CPUs to make use of the software.  The more complex
coders produce sound quality equal to or better than local two-way radio
communications and operate on contemporary (486 and fast 386-based) PCs.

In addition to the coders, I have developed a simple user-interface and
an expandable packet-based communications protocol.  What remains to be
done includes writing driver modules for the modem (I'll assume they are
Hayes compatible) and SoundBlaster card in addition to coding up a set of
functions to implement the communications protocol and hooks for encryption.
Finally, I'll need to integrate all of the above together and test it out.

Initial code development is being done on a Sun Sparcstation and a 486-based
PC running Linux.  As my DOS experience is severely limited, it is my hope
that someone will come forward and volunteer to port the software to DOS.
Since the code is being written with portability in mind, this should
require little more than re-writing the driver modules.

- --- END SUMMARY ---

I hope this isn't too long.  Feel free to edit/condense as you feel is
appropriate.

- --
Bill Dorsey      "Give me your tired, your poor, I'll piss on 'em
dorsey@lila.com   That's what the Statue of Bigotry says."
PGP 2.x public    	-- Lou Reed
key on request



------- End of Forwarded Message





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Timothy L. Nali" <tn0s+@andrew.cmu.edu>
Date: Tue, 29 Jun 93 23:29:19 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Wired tidbit about NSA
Message-ID: <QgAH9Qe00WCZE2mDAU@andrew.cmu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Here's a little something about the NSA from the latest issue of Wired:

pg 25, in the middle type 

Clipper Purposely Clipped?  Sources cloas to those in the know on
Captial Hill claim that NSA deliberately sabatoged the poorly considered
Clipper encryption chip (rolled out to the Net.public's dismay by the
White House early this spring).  The NSA, our sources say, would like
nothing more than to see the the Clipper chip fail, resulting in the
outlawing of encryption altogether ("Gee, we tried...").  The Electronic
Frontier Foundation's response to the Clipper plan, which has been in
the works for four years and was formulated by the NSA:  "We should not
rely on the government as the sole source for Clipper or any other chip.
 Rather, independent chip manufacturers should be able  to produce chip
sets based on open standards."

-----------------------------------------------------------------

While I wouldn't take this as absolute truth yet, it is certainly food
for thought.

--Phelix


/----- P h e l i x ' s    P s y c h o t i c    P h i l o s o p h i e s -----\
*****************************************************************************
                    Perfect Paranoia is Perfect Awareness
\---------------------------------------------------------------------------/


_____________________________________________________________________________
 
 Tim Nali            \  "We are the music makers, and we are the dreamers of
 tn0s@andrew.cmu.edu  \   the dreams" -Willy Wonka and the Chocolate Factory






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: James Still <still@kailua.colorado.edu>
Date: Wed, 30 Jun 93 07:02:23 PDT
To: 'Cypherpunks List' <cypherpunks@toad.com>
Subject: RE: PGP and offline-readers
Message-ID: <2C31A670@kailua.colorado.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



>> I am getting involved in networking some local BBS' and
>> message bases.

I'm beta testing a privacy-oriented BBS right now that I just finished
programming, called CryptoBBS and what better place to
introduce/ask questions on it than among the cypherpunks!

It is geared towards the hobbyist sysop with an old XT clone or
something lying around as it is a mere 80K (for the floppy-sysops!)
There is no logon prompt asking for name, birthdate, SSAN, and
who knows what else, it goes directly onto the board.  Callers
wishing to post messages, are asked for an alias name to
fill in the FROM: block, but real names or call-back verifiers
are not supported.  My hope is to offer sysop's a choice,
between *choosing* to preserve privacy, rather than the
current practice of obtaining personal information because
the questionnaire's are preprogrammed that way.

The unique feature about CryptoBBS is it's "Post Office."  The
P.O. allows callers to set up a p.o. box from which they can
up/download any file (pgp encrypted files for instance) to any
other user on the board without the sysop's approval/knowledge.
It encourages and nurtures an anonymous "mail drop" community
while protecting the caller's privacy.

The question is, should I throw away the virtues of a lean 'n mean
app at 80K by adding a dolphin or pgp to it that automatically
encrypts the message base, uploaded messages, etc?  Should
we give the BBS caller a little credit and assume he knows to
encrypt at his own machine before uploading the text?  Or is
the temptation to make everyone *lick and seal their message
envelopes* too invasive?

I know the issue of encouraging pgp use by making it as
painless as possible on the end-user is nothing new around
here, but as far as I know no one has ever discussed whether
or not BBS's should handle the job for the caller.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Kent Hastings" <kent_hastings@qmail2.aero.org>
Date: Wed, 30 Jun 93 09:24:29 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: WARLOCK 4.0 Info
Message-ID: <199306301621.AA23444@aerospace.aero.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: x-text


                      WARLOCK 4.0 Info
The enclosed file is the documentation for WARLOCK 4.0, 
"A New Matrix-based Paradigm for Public Key Cryptography."

The source code and executeable MS-DOS program are included
in the shareware version, but my internet gateway complains
"permission denied" if I try to send out the ZIP file.

Hmm. The text file is about 43k and the ZIP is only 78k.

Oh well. This is the first I've heard of WARLOCK. "NIST DSS
and RSA systems suffice for authentication but are too slow
for ordinary encryption/decryption functions forcing users to 
employ more complicated hybrid systems resulting in 'double
exposure'."

"WARNING: The WARLOCK cryptosystem provided herein is a copy-
righted system protected by patents (awarded and pending) and
is provided solely for private personal use and evaluation
only, etc ..." For more info, contact WARLOCK@ACM.org.

Kent - kent_hastings@qmail2.aero.org. 



<<<<<< Attached TEXT file follows >>>>>>
.OJ OFF

.UL ON



WARLOCK - A New Matrix-based Paradigm for Public Key Cryptography



       (C) 1993 by William J. Wilson and C. Larry Craig                  





1. INTRODUCTION



The following narrative briefly reviews the functionality of 

contemporary private key and public key (PK) cryptosystems in 

meeting current and future private sector security needs.  To 

assist in meeting these needs, the WARLOCK paradigm for achieving 

matrix-based PK cryptosystems is presented and explained.  Sys-

tems based on this paradigm are designed as alternatives to RSA 

and RSA-hybrid systems by making available single, high-speed, 

full bandwidth systems capable of the basic cryptographic func-

tions of encryption, decryption, and source authentication 

(digital signature). 



The WARLOCK paradigm is outlined in the following paragraphs  

with actual examples of system keys and step-by-step encryption, 

decryption, and authentications transformations effected by those 

keys.



User evaluations, comments and suggestions are solicited on the 

WARLOCK paradigm as well as the particular WARLOCK 4.0 PC imple-

mentation (available in C++ source code from file WARLOCK.CPP and 

in MS DOS executable code as WARLOCK.EXE).  Please direct such 

input to WARLOCK@ACM.org or Datasec Systems, PO Box 4152, Hunts-

ville AL 35815-4152, or by calling Wilson at (205) 881-8002.  

User suggestions and improvements will be incorporated, as appro-

priate, and improved versions (as well as other implementations 

of the WARLOCK paradigm) will made available to interested users 

in the future.

  

*****************************************************************



WARNING:  The WARLOCK cryptosystem provided herein is a copy-

righted system protected by patents (awarded and pending) and is 

provided solely for private personal use and evaluation only. 

Modifications to (or copies of) WARLOCK source or executable 

programs must retain the warning and proprietary legend displayed 

on the first user screen.



The use of WARLOCK cryptosystems for private-sector commercial or 

public-sector governmental purposes is strictly prohibited with-

out proper licensing arrangements.  Licensing information can be 

obtained from the above-noted sources.



*****************************************************************











2. BACKGROUND



Today's telecommunications and information system designers 

contemplating cryptographic technology are confronted with a 

relatively limited set of choices and capabilities (e.g. DES, 

RSA, proposed NIST DSS (Digital Signature Standard), etc.) which, 

even when combined in hybrid systems, are inadequate in our 

opinion to the complex security and authentication needs of the 

burgeoning information age and the even more daunting require-

ments of the emerging digital multimedia revolution.  For exam-

ple, the NIST DSS and RSA systems suffice for authentication but 

are too slow for ordinary encryption/decryption functions forcing 

users to employ more complicated hybrid systems resulting in 

"double exposure".  Hybrid systems typically use the DES standard 

which has been widely assailed for its all-too-short key length 

(56 bits).  Nor has the proposed NIST standard met with a warm 

reception either since it presently provides only a time-consum-

ing signature capability.  In terms of variety, flexibility, 

speed, and selectable and provable levels of security, we feel 

that contemporary cryptosystems fall short of efficiently meeting 

the wide range of known and predicted private sector application 

security needs, e.g. encrypted digital voice and video, digital 

satellite communication, ISDN, wireless LAN's, source authentica-

tion, IFF (Interrogate Friend or Foe) protocols, smart cards, and 

a host of other emerging applications.



To meet these needs, the authors over the past several years have 

developed and tested scores of high-speed matrix-based PK crypto-

systems beginning with a patented private-key version of the Hill 

cipher and culminating in the development of the WARLOCK family 

of PK cryptosystems.  Our goal throughout has been the attainment 

of a single, full-bandwidth PK cryptosystem paradigm (with digi-

tal signature) of sufficient simplicity, speed, and selectable 

levels of security for meeting current and expected cryptographic 

needs of the private sector. 



3. THE HILL PARADIGM                 



In 1929 Lester H. Hill proposed a unique, matrix-based, block 

ciphering system (1.) unlike any ever proposed before.  Although 

manifestly linear and later shown to be susceptible of chosen 

plaintext attack, Hill's system represented a quantum leap in the 

art of cryptography providing for the first time a true block 

ciphering capability with strengths substantially beyond those of 

the polyalphabetic systems of his day.  If fact, if computing 

(but not creating) the inverse of a matrix were as difficult as 

computing its permanent, Hill would have invented in a single 

stroke the first provably secure public key cryptosystem complete 

with digital signature.  Notwithstanding, Hill's method, employ-

ing standard matrix transformations, established a new direction 

whose full cryptographic potential in our opinion  is still 

unrealized and one capable of nullifying in large measure the 

standard tools of conventional cryptanalysis.  Apart from the 

issue of cryptographic strength, Hill succeeded in inventing the 

first two-key cryptosystem and it remained only for Hellman and 

Diffie to establish a rigorous mathematical paradigm (2.) for 

one-way, two-key public key cryptosystems and for Rivest et al. 

to provide the first viable example of such a system (3.).   



In a later development, McEliece developed a matrix-based public 

key system (4.) based on Goppa error correction codes.  Although 

inefficient in terms of bandwidth and initially lacking digital 

signature, his system demonstrated that workable matrix-based PK 

systems were indeed possible.  In spite of the fact that the 

McEliece system was recently cryptanalyzed (5.), it nevertheless 

represented a significant step in the evolution of matrix-based 

cryptosystems.



Still later, Rodney Cooper extended Hill's mod 26 systems to 

Galois Fields GF(p) and GF(q^n) to create a cryptosystem based on 

matrix theory and Galois Fields (6).  In essence, Cooper provided 

for a matrix of polynomials (subject to two moduli) to be used as 

an encryption key with the paramount advantage that  such ma-

trices can be made as large as needed to accommodate any required 

level of user security.  In fact, Patti (7.) has implemented such 

extensible multi-magabit cryptokeys in PC-based extended memory 

in which he also concatenates random bits with the plaintext 

vector prior to encryption to defeat linear attacks (cited in the 

above reference) as well as known-plaintext and chosen-plaintext 

attack.  



Rather than trying to impress a known NP-hard problem into the 

service of PK cryptography as others such as Merkle et al. (8.) 

have attempted, we have employed a two-step process instead.  In 

the first step, we developed weak but workable full-bandwidth PK 

systems with digital signature capability.  In the second step, 

we hardened the resulting system by incorporating artificial com-

plexities in the key generation, encryption, and decryption 

processes with the goal of attaining selectable and provable 

levels of security -- ideally NP-hard.             



Payne and McMillen's formula (9.) defines the number of nonsingu-

lar nxn binary matrices possible for each dimension of n and 

thereby the number of reversible linear mappings of n-bit strings 

possible with such matrices.  It is worth noting that such map-

pings are a tiny subset of the full range of (2**n)! possible 

mappings of unique n-bit values.  Unfortunately, as Chaitin has 

noted in another context (10.), all but a small fraction of these 

mappings are essentially noncomputable and can be effected only 

by table lookup -- as the small S-box mechanisms of DES exempli-

fy.  For the WARLOCK paradigm, one of the required private keys 

consists of a large, non-singular nxn matrix used to disguise the 

rectangular mxn public key.  In the implementation provided here, 

a smaller nonsingular nxn private key matrix is also required.  



In the paragraphs that follow, the term "matrix" always refers to 

a binary matrix and all forms of the term "addition"  indicated 

by the + symbol designate addition modulo-two (XOR operation).

Supporting figures for the WARLOCK paradigm and the particular 

implementation are all found at the end of the paper.  

4. THE WARLOCK PARADIGM



Overview



WARLOCK is a paradigm for a family of advanced, high-speed, full-

bandwidth, matrix-based PK cryptosystems with full digital signa-

ture. These systems can be operated in ordinary encryption/de-

cryption mode or in superencrypted mode, (achieving encryption 

and authentication simultaneously) as necessary with key and 

block sizes incrementally selectable according to security needs.             



All implementations of the WARLOCK paradigm share certain common-

alities:



     - use of a single public key K consisting of a rectangular

       mxn binary matrix where m>n and where n is the system

       block size of plaintext and ciphertext



     - achievement of nonlinear plaintext to ciphertext mappings 

       such that for plaintexts A and B under key K, the follow         

       ing is true: MAP(A,K) + MAP(B,K) <> MAP(A+B). 



     - incorporation of secret "row identifiers" in rows         

       of the public key (which are injected in disguised form        

       into the ciphertext by the encryption process) allowing        

       a private key holder to identify public key rows            

       selected by the encryption process.           



     - use of entropy increasing "noise bits" for selected

       bit positions of the public key not occupied by row 

       identifiers



     - use of a secret, nonsingular nxn matrix M to disguise the

       public key and to serve (in inverse form) as a private key

 

     - user-selectable key and system block sizes to accommodate 

       varying levels of security requirements



     - system key generation from user-supplied "key-seeds" or

       pass phrases of 1 to 85 bytes  

          

           

As the example below shows, the public key for the implementation 

provided here is initially constructed of two parts -- an A-part 

and a B-part.  The A-part consists of a key-seed generated and 

triplicated nxn nonsingular matrix whose n dimension is exactly 

1/3 the row dimension of the public key.



Construction of the B-part begins with a template matrix (T-

matrix) containing a diagonal of submatrices each comprised of 

"row identifiers" whose value and row positions uniquely identify 

each matrix row.  In the first hardening step, the area above the 

diagonal is filled with key-seed generated "noise bits" and the 

area below the diagonal is filled with "replacement bits" con-

sisting of key-seed generated but replicated row values.  The A-

part and the B-part are concatenated to form an mxn matrix where 

m<n.  This matrix is then disguised by being multiplied by a 

secret invertible nxn matrix_M  whose inverse later serves as a 

private key.  The result is then jumbled by row groups and 

(optionally) rows within row groups to create a single mxn public 

key K where m>n and where n is the block size of both the input 

plaintext and the resulting ciphertext.  The purpose of row group 

jumbling is to disguise the original A-part and B-part row group 

sequence.  



WARLOCK encryption is accomplished by expanding an n-bit plain-

text block in a nonlinear manner to form an m-bit vector which is 

multiplied by the public key to create an n-bit ciphertext.  This 

multiplication is greatly hastened (as are all binary matrix 

multiplications) by the simple expedient of associating each bit 

position of the expanded vector with a row of K allowing 1-bits 

in the expanded plaintext vector to select corresponding rows of 

K which are added modulo two to produce the plaintext. 



In the first step of the decryption process, the ciphertext is 

multiplied by private key M_inverse to create the same value as 

if the plaintext had been multiplied by the completed T-matrix. 

Rows selected by the encryption process (whose row identifiers 

are encoded in the ciphertext) are then retrieved by a deconvolu-

tion process which removes the effects of the noise bits identi-

fied in the private key T-matrix.   Accomplishing the inverse of 

the row selection process employed during encryption serves to 

identify the original plaintext.



Like most computer-based cryptosystems, WARLOCK consists of three 

basic modules: a key generation module, an encryption module, and 

a decryption module.  Digital signatures (as well as superencryp-

tion) are accomplished conventionally by concatenating decryption 

and encryption functions employing appropriate public and private 

keys.         



WARLOCK Key Generation

 

The WARLOCK T matrix is comprised of two major parts: an A-part 

and a B-part.  The A-part consists of a triplicated and expanded 

nonsingular A matrix as shown in Figures 1. through 3. and the B-

part consists of a set of rows each containing a unique 3-bit row 

identifiers as shown in Figure 5.  Note that the triplicated rows 

of the A part when selected always produce a "fat bit" consisting 

of 000 or 111.  These "fat bits" when combined with the row 

identifiers of the B-part in the encryption process either pre-

serve the row identifier value or complement it with the result 

that identifiers are recovered in original or complemented form.  

For example, a row identifier 100 in a given ciphertext row 

position will be recovered either as 100 or as its complement 011 

-- both identifying a particular B-part row selected in the 

encryption process.  Row identifier values for the B-Part are 

chosen as shown below such that their values and their comple-

ments form a unique set of unduplicated values allowing unambigu-

ous row identification. 

               4-let   Row         Identifier

               Row     Identifier  Complement



                1      100         011 

                2      010         101

                3      001         110      

                4      111         000



In the encryption process, an information containing fat bit from 

the A-part consisting of 000 or 111 is always added to each 3-bit 

identifier value selected in the B-part.  This technique not only 

preserves identification of the B-part row selected, but permits 

identification of the value of the information carrying fat bit 

as well.  In other words, if a row identifier is recovered un-

changed, its fat bit is known to be 000 otherwise its fat bit is 

known to be 111.  Since the selection of fat bits is also deter-

mined by plaintext values, fat bits are also information carry-

ing.



                         |----------|

                         |          |

                         |  B-part  |   

                         |          |

                         |__________|          

                         |  A-Part  |

                         |__________|





                        WARLOCK T-matrix

                                              



The A-part of the WARLOCK T-matrix is created as follows.  A key-

seed generated, nonsingular nxn matrix A (whose n dimension is 

exactly 1/3 the width of the T-matrix) and its inverse A_inverse 

is initially created as shown in Figures 1. and 2.  The A-matrix 

is then triplicated to create the matrix shown in Fig. 3.  As al-

ready noted, triplication of the columns of matrix A produces the 

fat bits required by the encryption process. In the next step, 

shown in Fig. 4., the matrix row dimension is increased by adding 

each row pair of the matrix in Fig. 3. to create a third row.  A 

fourth all-zero row is then created completing the row expansion.  

This last step is necessary to create A-part row groups (4-lets) 

that allow the row selection process (governed by plaintext 

values) to be identical for both the A-part and the B-part. 



Construction of the B-part of the T-matrix begins with an initial 

template containing row identifiers as shown in Figure 5.  In the 

first hardening step, key-seed generated noise bits are added 

above the submatrix diagonal to produce the intermediate version 

shown in Figure 6.  In the next step, the A-part and the B-part 

are joined to form a single T-matrix shown in Figure 7.  To 

eliminate the "sea of zeroes" under the diagonal of the B-part 

(and to further disguise the T-matrix), a special "replacement 

bit or R-bit" matrix shown in Figure 8. is created with row 

values identical for each row 4-let.  This matrix is added to the 

matrix in Figure 7. to produce the final T-matrix shown in Fig. 

9.  Not only does this step eliminate the "sea of zeroes" under 

the diagonal, but it also displaces and further disguises all 

other bits in the T-matrix.  If the set of unique replacement row 

values in the R-matrix has been initially selected to sum to 

zero, the replacement row values vanish in the encryption proc-

ess; otherwise their sum must be removed from the ciphertext as a 

special step in the decryption process.  



In the penultimate step of key generation, the T-matrix is multi-

plied by the M-matrix in Figure 10. to produce the public key K-

matrix shown in Figure 12.  In the final step, this key is then 

key-seed jumbled in two ways: in four row groups (4-lets) and 

(optionally) by rows within groups.  In the example below 4-lets 

are jumbled as follows: 



                       From       To

                       4-let      4-let



                       6          1

                       4          2

                       1          3

                       2          4

                       3          5

                       5          6



 WARLOCK Encryption Process



The first encryption step consists of expanding the input plain-

text block of n-bits (K-matrix column dimension) to a bit vector 

of m-bits (K-matrix row dimension) in accordance with the trans-

lation table below.  In the second and final step, this vector is 

then multiplied as a column vector by public key K to produce the 

ciphertext.  Alternatively, the plaintext bit values could simply 

select the applicable rows of K directly as mentioned above and 

add them together.



                                     Expanded

                      Plaintext      Plaintext

                      2-bit Seg-     Vector   

                      ment           Segment



                      00             0001    

                      01             1000

                      10             0100

                      11             0010



WARLOCK Decryption Process



Decryption is a multi-step process.  In the first step, the 

ciphertext is multiplied by private key M_inverse to produce an 

"unmasked version" having the same value as if the expanded 

plaintext had been multiplied by the T-matrix.  





In the second step, row identifiers of the B-part are recovered 

beginning with the leftmost row identifier which is always recov-

ered in undisguised or complementary form (since it has not been 

altered by noise bits).  The noise bits associated with this 

identifier row can now be identified using T-matrix private key 

information and removed from the ciphertext revealing the next 

leftmost row identifier in the same manner.  This process is 

repeated iteratively until all row identifiers have been identi-

fied -- in their original or complemented form.  Each identifier 

value, thus recovered, unequivocally identifies an applicable 4-

bit sector of the invoking expanded plaintext vector which, in 

turn, identifies a 2-bit sector of the plaintext.  In addition, 

each recovered row identifier identifies its associated fat bit 

value as 000 or 111.  



When all row identifiers have been recovered, 2/3 of the plain-

text has been decrypted.  The remaining 1/3 can now be decrypted 

by examining fat bit values derived from the recovered identifier 

values themselves, i.e. for unchanged row identifiers, the ap-

plicable fat bit = 000; otherwise the applicable fat bit = 111.  

When all fat bits have been identified, they are reduced from 3 

bits to 1 bit and concatenated to form a value which is multi-

plied by private key A_inverse (in Fig. 2.) to recover the re-

maining 1/3 of the plaintext.  



In the final step of decryption, the full set of 2-bit plaintext 

segments are unjumbled to reverse the effects of the row 4-let 

jumbling of the public key.              



7. WARLOCK 4.0 MANUAL EXAMPLE

 

As an example of WARLOCK 4.0 operation, the WARLOCK 4.0 crypto-

graphic keys shown in Figures 6., 11., and 12. may be used to 

manually encrypt and decrypt 12-bit inputs and to create and 

verify 12-bit digital signatures as desired.



For example, to encrypt plain_text P =  001110000110 using pub-

lic_key_K shown in Figure 12., accomplish the following steps:



  Expand plain_text P to expanded_text 000100100100000110000100. 



  Select and add rows of public_key_K under control of 1-bits in

  expanded_text to produce encrypted_text as follows:



           bit 4  selects row 4  of K = 101000100001

           bit 7  selects row 7  of K = 011110010011    

           bit 10 selects row 10 of K = 110011110001

           bit 16 selects row 16 of K = 011000001000     

           bit 17 selects row 17 of K = 000010100101

           bit 22 selects row 22 of K = 001001110001



                      encrypted_text  = 010110011111                      







To facilitate understanding of the more complex decryption proce-

dure detailed below, the following reference table is provided 

which relates row identifier values (as recovered) to the follow-

ing necessary information: (1) row position selected within each 

row 4-let (2) selecting 2-bit plaintext values and (3) applicable 

fat bit values.



                      Row                       

    Row Identi-       Selected    Selecting      Associated

    fier Value        within      Plaintext      Fat Bit           

    (as recovered     4-let       Value          Value



    100               1            01            000 

    011               1            01            111

    010               2            10            000

    101               2            10            111

    001               3            11            000

    110               3            11            111

    000               4            00            000

    111               4            00            111 





The following steps detail the decryption process:



A. Multiply encrypted_text 010110011111 by private key 

key_M_inverse shown in Figure 11. to create the initial value of 

reverted_text 100101101111. Note that the leftmost row identifier 

in bit positions 1, 5, and 9 is unaffected by noise bits and is 

seen to have the value 101 indicating that row 2 of the applica-

ble 4-let of the public key was chosen.  Accordingly, 



    1. Initialize the value of resultant_text with the first 2 

recovered plaintext bit values, e.g. resultant_text 10.



    2. Create the first iteration of intermediate_text by remov-

ing from reverted_text the noise bits associated with row 2 of 

private key key_T_with_noise by XORing subject row 2 with the 

reverted_text to produce the first intermediate_text value as 

follows: 



             100101101111 (reverted_text)

             011010010000 (row 2 template and noise bit values)

             111111111111 (intermediate_text)



This step also records the fat bits in positions 1, 5, and 9. of 

the intermediate_text and the reduced fat bit in position 1.

B. Note that the value of the row identifier in bits 2, 6, and 10 

"uncovered" by the previous step is seen to be 111 indicating 

that row position 4 of its respective 4-let was selected and 

further indicating an invoking plaintext value of 00 and an 

associated fat bit value of 000.  Accordingly, 



     1. Append recovered plaintext bits 00 to the current result-

ant_text value giving new resultant_text 1000.  



     2. Remove from the current intermediate_text value the noise 

bits associated with applicable row 4 of key_T_with_noise_bits by 

XORing subject row 4 with intermediate_text to produce a new 

intermediate_text value as follows: 



             111111111111 (current intermediate_text)

             010101110110 (row 4 template and noise bit values)

             101010001001 (new intermediate_text)



This step also records the reduced fat bits in positions 1 and 2 

of the new intermediate_text.



C.  The value of the third row identifier (bits 3, 7, and 11) 

uncovered by the previous step is seen to be 100 indicating that 

row 1 of its respective 4-let was invoked by a plaintext value of 

01 and that its associated fat bit value is 000.  Accordingly, 



    1.  Append the recovered plaintext bits 01 to the current re-

sultant_text value giving 10000.  



    2.  Remove from the intermediate_text the noise bits associ-

ated with row position 1 of private key key_T_with_noise_bits by 

XORing subject row 1 with the current intermediate_text to pro-

duce a new intermediate_text value as follows: 



             101010001001 (current intermediate_text)

             001000000000 (row 1 template and noise bit values)               

             100010001001 (new intermediate_text)



This step also records the reduced fat bits in positions 1, 2, 

and 3 of the new intermediate_text.



D.  The fourth and final row identifier (bit positions 4, 8, and 

12) uncovered by the previous step is seen to be 001 indicating 

that row 3 was selected by a plaintext value of 11 and that its 

associated fat bit value is 000.  Accordingly, 



    1. Append recovered plaintext bits 11 to current 

resultant_text value giving 10000111.  



    2. Remove from the current intermediate_text value the noise 

bits associated with row position 3 of the subject 4-let of 

key_T_with_noise_bits by XORing row 3 with the current intermedi-

ate_text to produce a new intermediate_text_value as follows: 



             100010001001 (current intermediate_text)

             000000000001 (row 3 template value)

             100010001000 (new intermediate_text)



This step also records the final reduced fat bit in position 4 of 

the new intermediate_text whose current value is now seen to be 

1000.  







D. This completed intermediate_text value 1000 will be multiplied 

by private key A_inverse to recover the final plaintext values 

(originally encoded by the A-part of the public key) as follows: 



            1000 x A_inverse = 1000  



The recovered plaintext value 1000 is then appended to the cur-

rent value of resultant_text to produce resultant_text = 

100001111000.



J.  The completed resultant_text value 100001111000 (now seen to 

be a 2-bit permutation of the original plaintext) must now be 

unjumbled in the final decryption step by reversing the row 

jumbling accomplished in the last step of the key generation  

process (described on page 7.) as follows:

            

             Source Bit        Desti-     Destination 

  Source     Pair Position     nation     Bit Pair Position

  Bit Pair   (resultant_       Bit Pair   (decrypted_

  Number     text)/(value)     Number     text)/(value)  



  6          11-12  (00)       1          1-2    (00)

  4          7-8    (11)       2          3-4    (11) 

  1          1-2    (10)       3          5-6    (10) 

  3          3-4    (00)       4          7-8    (00)

  2          5-6    (01)       5          9-10   (01)

  5          9-10   (10)       6          11-12  (10)



This final permutation step produces the sought plaintext value 

001110000110 completing the decryption process.             



Source Authentication and Superencryption



To create a source authentication value S (for source authentica-

tion purposes) represented by any selected 12-bit value, S must 

first be "decrypted" by the decryption module by the steps noted 

in the foregoing paragraphs to create signature value S*.  When 

submitted to the encryption module for validation, S* produces 

the sought value S thereby proving unequivocally that S emanated 

from the private key holder.



Because of the relatively high encryption and decryption speeds 

of WARLOCK 4.0, Alice and Bob may choose for purposes of enhanced 

security to exchange messages that are simultaneously encrypted 

and authenticated. To accomplish this, Alice and Bob first obtain 

each others public keys.  In encrypting messages for Bob, Alice 

accomplishes the following:



     1.  Alice first "decrypts" each plaintext block using her

         private key to create an "authenticated version" 

         of the plaintext.  She then encrypts this version 

         by Bob's public key to create a final ciphertext block

         which she transmits to Bob.





     2.  Bob first decrypts the ciphertext block by his private 

         key recovering the "authenticated version".  He then 

         transforms this version to Alice's original plaintext

         by "encrypting" it with Alice's public key thus proving

         Alice to be the originator of the plaintext since she

         is the only holder of the private key.

         

In encrypting messages for Alice, Bob follows the same procedure 

with the appropriate public and private keys. 

   

8. SEEDING THE WARLOCK KEY GENERATION FUNCTION         



A basic desideratum of classic private key cryptosystems was  

easily generated and memorized keys to avoid a possibly compro-

mising (or incriminating) recording of the key.  This desideratum 

has all but vanished with DES and the advent of PK systems.  Who, 

for example, can remember a thousand-bit RSA modulus or its 

constituent primes.  Nevertheless, there are many occasions where 

one would not wish to transport private keys to a new operating 

locations, but regenerate them at their new location, use them, 

and destroy them.  Such a capability is available through the 

unique WARLOCK key seeding feature which allows users to seed the 

key generation process with a user secret key-seed (or pass 

phrase) of 1 to 85 bytes (8 to 680 bits).  Such a feature is 

typically absent from number theoretic cryptosystems such as RSA 

and the NIST DSS.  With the WARLOCK key seeding feature, users 

can establish simple mnemonic seeding tokens or create elaborate-

ly structured key-seeds as needed.   



Key seeding also facilitates the use of WARLOCK as a stream 

cipher where Bob and Alice at different locations independently 

generate a common private key based on a secret shared key-seed.  

Such a procedure allows then to generate and synchronize a common 

pseudorandom bit stream beginning with an agreed-on starting 

value v which is "decrypted" by the private key and the result 

XORed with plaintext to encrypt and decrypt in the manner of one-

time pads or Vernam ciphers.  The starting value v would then be 

incremented by +1 each iteration yielding a nonrepeating cycle of 

2**n iterations where n is the system block size in bits.       



Key seeding also facilitates opportunistic encryption using 

devices such as PC's and workstations that are generally avail-

able but not portable.  For example, Bob could freely transport 

the encryption/decryption program on a 3 1/2" floppy in his shirt 

pocket without fear of compromising his secret key-seed.  Alice 

could encrypt from any available PC initialized with an installed 

WARLOCK program.  Both would enter their secret key-seed at the 

time of message exchange.  



As yet another example of the potential of key seeding, consider 

an environment where Bob and Alice are deployed as secret agents 

who must unequivocally authenticate each other's identity prior 

to commencing their mission.  Each has memorized a key-seed given 

them by their faceless directors and each carries an unknown 

ciphertext segment as well.  When they finally rendezvous in 

Vienna, Bob and Alice XOR the ASCII representation of their key-

seeds to produce a new key-seed value which they use to generate 

cryptographic keys.  Each then decrypts his ciphertext segment 

with the newly-generated keys.  Bob hands his decrypted message 

to Alice who reads, "Of course, you know my name isn't Bob at 

all, it's Travis and I am pleased to meet you at last, Tatiana 

AKA Alice."   



9. WARLOCK CRYPTOGRAPHIC STRENGTH



It would be presumptuous at this point to assert that WARLOCK is 

categorically unassailable -- particularly in light of the vast 

resources of linear algebraic techniques (most of which are 

unknown to the authors) that might be mustered for its cryptanal-

ysis.  The rise and fall of numerous PK cryptosystems proposed 

during the last decade certainly recommend caution as well.  

However, based on our experience to date in making and breaking 

scores of matrix-based PK cryptosystems, it is our feeling that 

the only potentially effective assault possible against WARLOCK 

is the derivation of private keys (or workable alternatives) from 

the public key (assuming that the keys are sufficiently large to 

preclude other attacks).  Clearly, the keys themselves cannot be 

exhaustively enumerated owing to their size.  Simmons generalized 

PK system attack (11.) can be precluded in several ways.  Users 

may choose to operate in superencrypted mode which accomplishes 

encryption and source authentication simultaneously or they may 

choose a suitably large system block size.  Various kinds of pre-

encryption scrambling (to increase input entropy) and post-de-

cryption unscrambling may also be employed.



Thus far we have been unable to cryptanalyze WARLOCK 4.0 with 

techniques successful against ancestors of WARLOCK.  Under all 

the attacks that we have been able to muster, the work factor 

required to cryptanalyze WARLOCK 4.0 is an exponential function 

of block size which can be made arbitrarily large.  What we are 

seeking from the user community is an assessment of the viability 

of the WARLOCK paradigm as well as a more precise quantification 

of the work factor required to cryptanalyze WARLOCK 4.0.



10. CONCLUSION 

  

Apart from the undecided issue of security, the WARLOCK paradigm 

meets our objective of providing users with single high-speed 

general purpose PK cryptosystems (exemplified by WARLOCK 4.0) as 

alternatives to number theoretic systems.  We feel that WARLOCK 

cryptosystems can serve the security needs of private users to 

whom we grant free use subject to the restrictions noted in the 

source code and in the introduction to this paper.  The WARLOCK 

paradigm also suggests a new direction for the development of PK 

systems free of the computational burden of number theoretic 

systems.  Finally, the WARLOCK paradigm suggests a potentially 

fruitful direction for achieving a viable cryptographic embodi-

ment of the NP-hard coding problem cited by Berlekamp et 

al.(12.).



11. WARLOCK 4.0 NUMBERED FIGURES                          

                                        Note: To facilitate de-

1000       1000         101010101010    cryption, Row 1. is row 2        

1010       0110         100010001000    of Matrix A triplica-

1110       1100         001000100010    ted.  Row 2 is row 1

0011       1101         000000000000    triplicated; row 3 is

                        001100110011    the XOR of rows 1 and 

Figure 1.  Figure 2.    111011101110    2 and row 4 is the 

A-Part     Private Key  110111011101    XOR of rows 1, 2, and 

Matrix A   Matrix A_    000000000000    3. The same process   

           inverse                      using remaining row

                        Figure 3.       pairs of Matrix A is re-

                        A-expanded      peated to create A_expan-

                                        ded.                        



100000000000  100010101101  101101000011                  

010000000000  010100100010  011010010000  

001000000000  001011001000  000001001110               

111000000000  111111001001  110011001111  

000100000000  000100101011  011000010011                 

000010000000  000010111111  001101110011  

000001000000  000001111100  001100100110                

000111000000  000111011110  010101110110  

000000100000  000000100000  001000000000                

000000010000  000000010001  000000100001  

000000001000  000000001001  000000000011               

000000111000  000000111000  001000100010  

000000000100  000000000100  000100000000                

000000000011  000000000010  000000010000  

000000000001  000000000001  000000000001               

000000000111  000000000111  000100010001  



Figure 4.     Figure 5.     Figure 6.               

B-Part        B-Part        B-Part           

Initial       key_T_temp-   Columnar re-                     

key_T_temp-   late with     arrangement

late          noise bits    = key_T_with_

                            noise_bits

                             

110000001000     101001010100

000110100011     100100111100

100000100001     010001110011

110101011011     000001101100

111010111100     001111001000

110101000010     110010110100

001000111100     110110001110

100100010001     111111110010

011000000100     101101101000

100001111010     110101000111

000000010010     111111110000

010111011110     010111011010

.OJ OFF



Figure 7.        Figure 8.

key_M            Private Key                

                 key_M_inverse

101101000011  110100100010   011001100001

011010010000  110100100010   101110110010                  

000001001110  110100100010   110101101100   

110011001111  110100100010   000111101101                

011000010011  001101010001   010101000010   

001101110011  001101010001   000000100010                  

001100100110  001101010001   000001110111   

010101110110  001101010001   011000100111                

001000000000  010011011011   011011011011    

000000100001  010011011011   010011111010                 

000000000011  010011011011   010011011000   

001000100010  010011011011   011011111001                  

000100000000  101100110010   101000110010  

000000010000  101100110010   101100100010                

000000000001  101100110010   101100110011          

000100010001  101100110010   101000100011                  

101010101010  011111101001   110101000011  

100010001000  011111101001   111101100001                          

001000100010  011111101001   010111001011 

000000000000  011111101001   011111101001

001100110011  011001110011   010101000000

111011101110  011001110011   100010011101

110111011101  011001110011   101110101110

000000000000  011001110011   011001110011



Figure 9.     Figure 10.     Figure 11.                      

key_T_with_   replacement_   key_T_replaced                    

noise (A      rows           (Figure 9.                                        
                                                                       

and B-Part                   XOR'd with Fi-    

joined)                      gure 10.)





11. BIOGRAPHICAL DATA



William J. Wilson is an early-retiree of the Sperry half of the 

current UNISYS corporation.  During his 23 years there, he spe-

cialized in database design, information storage and retrieval, 

and system security.  He is a member of ACM occasionally consult-

ing in his areas of expertise and is also identified in the 

current Directory of American Fiction Writers and Poets as both a 

writer (science fiction and horror) and a poet.  His light and 

satirical verse appeared frequently in DATAMATION (Churl's Garden 

of Verses, Solid-state Jabberwocky, Ode to the Indomitable GOTO, 

etc.) and other magazines.



C. Larry Craig (co-inventor of WARLOCK and author of the C++ 

WARLOCK program) currently works as a private consultant and 

software designer in the fields of digital communication, commu-

nication networks, and cellular and telephony applications.













12. REFERENCES 



    1. Hill, L. "Cryptography in an Algebraic Alphabet," Amer. 

Math. Monthly. 36: 306-312, 1929. 



    2. Diffie, W., and Hellman, M.E. "New Directions in Cryptog-

raphy," IEEE Trans. Inform. Theory IT-22, 644-654, Nov. 1976.



    3. Rivest, R. et al., A Method for Obtaining Digital Signa-

tures and Public-key Cryptosystems, Communications of the ACM 21, 

pp. 120-126, Feb 1978.



    4. McEleice, R.J. "A Public-key cryptosystem based on Alge-

braic Coding Theory," DSN Progress Rep. 42-44, Jet Propulsion 

Laboratory, pp. 114-116, 1978.



    5. Korzhik, V.L. and Turkin, A.I., "Cryptanalysis of McE-

liece's Public-key Cryptosystem," Advances in Cryptology - Euro-

crypt '91 Proceedings.



    6. Cooper, R. "Linear Transformations in Galois Fields and 

Their Application to Cryptography," Cryptologia, Vol 4., No. 3, 

pp. 184-188, 1992.



    7. Patti, T. "The SUMMIT Cryptosystem,"  Cryptosystems Jour-

na, Vol 2., No. 2, 1992.                                  



    8. Merkle, C. and Hellman, M.E. "Hiding Information and 

Signatures in Trapdoor Knapsacks," IEEE Trans. Inform. Theory.IT-

24: pp. 525-530, 1978. 



    9. Payne, W.H. and McMillan, K.L., Orderly Enumeration of 

Nonsingular Binary Matrices Applied to Text Encryption, Communi-

cations of the ACM, pp. 259-265, April 1978.                       



   10. Chaitin, G. J. ""Randomness and Mathematical Proof," 

Scientific American pp. 47-52, May 1975.



   11. Simmons, G.J., Forward Search as a Cryptanalytic Tool 

Against a Public Key Privacy Channel, Proceedings of the IEEE 

Symposium on Security and Privacy, April 1982.                       



   12. Berlecamp, E.R., McEleice, R.J., and van Tilborg, H.C.A.,  

On the Inherent Intractability of Certain Coding Problems, IEEE 

Trans. Inform. Theory, IT-24, pp. 384-386, May 1978.



#000#




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Peter Breton <pbreton@cs.umb.edu>
Date: Wed, 30 Jun 93 06:52:06 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Boston cpunx meeting?
Message-ID: <Pine.3.05.9306300912.A15841-9100000@ra.cs.umb.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Are Boston area folks interested in another get together? The last one I
went to (early April) was a blast...


-------------------------------------------------------------------------
Peter Breton  pbreton@cs.umb.edu          PGP key by finger
=========================================================================






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: remail@tamsun.tamu.edu
Date: Wed, 30 Jun 93 08:23:59 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Remailer ping test
Message-ID: <9306301523.AA20787@tamaix.tamu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


[list of defunct remailers (?)]

>  1: hh@pmantis.berkeley.edu 
>  2: hh@cicada.berkeley.edu 
>  6: remail@tamaix.tamu.edu
>  7: ebrandt@jarthur.claremont.edu 
>  9: remailer@rebma.mn.org 
> 14: 00x@uclink.berkeley.edu 
> 
> Hal
> hfinney@shell.portal.com

The remailer at remail@tamaix.tamu.edu and remail@tamsun.tamu.edu are working.
Must have been a temporary problem Hal.  Thanks for checking it out.

Carlos

-- 
[  Carlos Macedo Gomes		][   The Message is     ][:    .8.    :]------
[  gomes@tamu.edu		][	the Media	][   . ooo .   ]000000
[  cmghelp@tamsun.tamu.edu	][  :Marshall McLuhan   ][ : =o(Y)o= : ]000000
[  PGP 2.2 key by finger	][30 37 40 N, 96 20 03 W][oo .ooooo. oo]------




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: David Heck <O1DSH@VM1.CC.UAKRON.EDU>
Date: Wed, 30 Jun 93 08:38:50 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Speaking of get togethers....
Message-ID: <9306301538.AA06072@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


While we're on the subject, is there anyone on the list in the NE Ohio
area (Cleveland) interested in getting together?  I'd love to go to Boston
or the West Coast, but just can't swing it with my work schedule ;-)

David




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: eric@Synopsys.COM (Eric Messick)
Date: Wed, 30 Jun 93 13:32:26 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Remailer pings
Message-ID: <9306302032.AA23540@tiedye.synopsys.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



I've gotten responses from the following remailers:

hfinney@shell.portal.com
hh@soda.berkeley.edu
remail@tamsun.tamu.edu
nowhere@bsu-cs.bsu.edu
phantom@mead.u.washington.edu
elee7h5@rosebud.ee.uh.edu
hal@alumni.cco.caltech.edu
dis.org!remailer@merde.dis.org
hh@pmantis.berkeley.edu
hh@cicada.berkeley.edu
remail@tamaix.tamu.edu
ebrandt@jarthur.claremont.edu
remailer@rebma.mn.org

And have not recieved (in two days) a response from:

00x@uclink.berkeley.edu 

I used the perl script appended to this message.

-eric messick (eric@toad.com)

#!/usr/local/bin/perl

$me = "eric@synopsys.com" ; # put your email address here

sub begin_mail {
	local ($addr, $from, $subject) = (@_);

	if (!open(MAIL, "| /usr/lib/sendmail '" . $addr . "'")) {
		&log("error", "Error sending mail to $addr") ;
		return;
		}
	print MAIL "To: $addr\n" ;
	print MAIL "From: $from\n" ;
	print MAIL "Reply-To: $from\n" ;
	print MAIL "Subject:  $subject\n" ;
	print MAIL "\n" ;
}

$home = $ENV{'HOME'} ;

open(REMAILERS, "$home/remail/currentremailers") || die "Can't open $home/remail/currentremailers: $!\n" ;

while (<REMAILERS>) {
	chop;
	($addr) = split ;
	next if ($addr eq "#") ;

	print "$addr\n" ;

	&begin_mail($addr, $me, "ferd");
	print MAIL "::\n" ;
	print MAIL "Request-Remailing-To: $me\n" ;
	print MAIL "\n" ;
	print MAIL "mailed to $addr\n" ;
	close MAIL;

	}





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Peter shipley <shipley@merde.dis.org>
Date: Wed, 30 Jun 93 16:02:37 PDT
To: shipley@dis.org
Subject: Re: remailer ideas & proposals
In-Reply-To: <9306300830.AA18466@bailey.cpac.washington.edu>
Message-ID: <9306302300.AA14856@merde.dis.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/x-pgp


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----


>
>MIME, in particular, solves this problem, along with many others.  Three cheers
>for Metamail!  Specifically, you can have several seperate messages within your
>RFC822 message, arranged hierarchially.  You could have your public key, your
>cute .sig, your message, your signature for the message, contact information
>for you, a JPEG image (of your cat, say), and a sound ("meow") all in the same
>mail message.  There is even faint hope that it would be portable.
>


it would be nice it remailers accepted MIME multipart messages then procesed
each separately thus I can "queue" up outgoing email into a single letter
to a remailer.   Another side is it a remailer would queue up mail whose
desination was another remailer and sent it a digest/MIME multipart format
thus making traffic analysis more more difficult.


                        -Pete




-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.3

iQBVAgUBLDIbGXynuL1gkffFAQE+2AH6A9l3QJiYHNie7Ch8aURSDjI1tWBegLms
FEf7ah+VsgNos+FotsMOryZYd0oN7KVD/1Mpk9SkrlXkF0PF7OPrjQ==
=z5pc
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Peter shipley <shipley@merde.dis.org>
Date: Wed, 30 Jun 93 17:42:08 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: remailer ideas & proposals
In-Reply-To: <m0oBBRT-000MVpC@genesis.mcs.com>
Message-ID: <9307010019.AA15108@merde.dis.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/x-pgp


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----


>And some goofy Fidonet gateway may find it necessary to stick something o=
n tha
end:
>>
>> x-message-format: ((headers:4 body:10 signature:3) fidofooter:4)
>>

>I doubt that we will have much control of other net-elements.

Well we should then encourage Fidonet mailers to get on the bandwagon
for MIME formatted email.  then we can send encode arbitrary data with
whatever other info tacked on




-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.3

iQBVAgUBLDItl3ynuL1gkffFAQH5SQH+MMWHS7ZCtQeKk45lKHuQBUdB5QH68SVZ
Y7deATUA/t07L9MFvQNGWD3T+olyZjdZ2gcj2TUE0KXlC9aFbAo2Cg==
=zC5h
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: zane@genesis.mcs.com (Sameer)
Date: Wed, 30 Jun 93 16:29:10 PDT
To: ""L. Detweiler"" <ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Subject: Re: remailer ideas & proposals
In-Reply-To: <9306300657.AA26896@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Message-ID: <m0oBBRT-000MVpC@genesis.mcs.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


In message <9306300657.AA26896@longs.lance.colostate.edu>, ""L. Detweiler"" writes:
> 
> Here is an idea: if a remailer drops a message or forwards it
> successfully it could broadcast a message to a group such as misc.test.
	I like this idea.. How about alt.remail?
	And a header:

::
Request-Remailing-To: remail@extropia.wimsey.com
Error-ID: &DNANC*WHS

	If the message is dropped the remailer posts a note to
alt.remail saying, "Remail message &DNANC*WHS has been dropped." Maybe
some sort of ID-encryption similar to that used in Chaum's digital cash
algorithim could be used for security.

> 
> And some goofy Fidonet gateway may find it necessary to stick something on the end:
> 
> x-message-format: ((headers:4 body:10 signature:3) fidofooter:4)
> 
	This would require that the operator of the Fidonet gateway be
cypherpunk-friendly. I think it is best if all modifications/ideas be
made *only* to remailers, for I doubt that we will have much control of
other net-elements.

--
| Sameer Parekh-zane@genesis.MCS.COM-PFA related mail to pfa@genesis.MCS.COM |
| Apprentice Philosopher, Writer, Physicist, Healer, Programmer, Lover, more |
| "Symbiosis is Good" - Me_"Specialization is for Insects" - R. A. Heinlein_/
 \_______________________/ \______________________________________________/ 




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: jet@nas.nasa.gov (J. Eric Townsend)
Date: Wed, 30 Jun 93 18:01:15 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: id this chip?
Message-ID: <9307010101.AA26550@boxer.nas.nasa.gov>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Found this in my desk in my new cubicle.  I'm not a chip head, so I
have no clue as to the id of all sorts of obscure chip manus and
whatnot.  (I recognize hitachi, intel, motorola, that sort of thing,
duh. :-)

48pin

marked on top with the following text *only*.  No symbols, logos, etc:

CIPHER 1984
960430-004
8816 IP8073B


So, what do I win?  A free clipper phone?

-eric





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: ""L. Detweiler"" <ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Date: Wed, 30 Jun 93 17:18:07 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: rumors of Clipper hardware problems
Message-ID: <9307010017.AA14364@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


The following came from D. Farber who is closely associated with NSF
Internet commitees and has been following Clipper development, as
received from an anonymous informant. Items:

1. list of Clipper committee members
2. more NIST irregularities around DSS
3. Clipper: low yield, average failure in 40 hours, `substantial
redesign', delayed up to a year?

If anyone forwards this past cypherpunks (e.g. Usenet) take out my and
D. Farber names.

===cut=here==

From: farber@central.cis.upenn.edu (David Farber)
Subject: technical review of the Slipjack algorithm
Date: Tue, 29 Jun 1993 16:42:24 -0500

In case anyone hasn'y picked this up yet, this is the list of individuals
who are participating in the technical review of the Slipjack algorithm:

Dorothy Denning, Georgetown U.
Walt Tubman, IBM (retired)
Ernie Brickell, Sandia Labs
Steve Kent, BBN
Dave Mayer, AT&T

According to Lynn McNulty (NIST), the group met for a few days last week
with NIST and NSA representatives.  They are now in the process of
formulating more questions for a second meeting with the government team. 
No word yet on the form, content or schedule of the group's report.



From: farber@central.cis.upenn.edu (David Farber)
Subject: "Digital Signature Scandal" a bit more
Date: Tue, 29 Jun 1993 16:40:57 -0500

During a discussion in DC today the following arose.

The Federal register announcement was dated and signed on 2 June 1993 (and
published on 8 June). The NIST Advisory Board mandated by the congress was
meeting at NIST on 2-5 June. They were not told about the announcement even
though the matter was of direct interest and importance to their assigned
task. Why??? Did someone have something to hide? 

I hear tell also that the Clipper chip's first run of final silicon was not
a winner. Chips failed after 40 hours. I also heard a rumor that the redo
would [delay] things for up to a year (sounds like a long time). Any better
info out there?

Dave

"Informant" [forwarded by D. Farber]:

"My info is that there were three parallel tests; your number comes from
the first, though the others were little better.

Batch I         n=8     mtbf= 41.5 hrs.

Batch II        n=11 mtbf= 49.0 hrs.

Batch III
                n=20    mtbf= 32.0 hrs.

My NSA source said that he thought that the difficulty was related to
thermal issues and that if environmental issues were addressed or at least audit
ed to assure proper operating environment the numbers might have been better.

I have been unable to get any 'hard' info re what actually happened and what
kind of a post mortem is taking place."

2.  Re chip health.  I heard the same story plus yield was very low.
I also understand that there is substantial redesign going on because
the story about defaulting to an all-0 key if the LEB were corrupted
was apparently true.





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: friedman@gnu.ai.mit.edu (Noah Friedman)
Date: Mon, 28 Jun 93 17:25:32 edt
To: lpf-all-members@prep.ai.mit.edu
Subject: Digital Signature Scandal
Message-ID: <9306282125.AA13550@nutrimat.gnu.ai.mit.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


[The following is an official announcement from the League for Programming
Freedom.  Please redistribute this as widely as possible.]


                   Digital Signature Scandal

Digital signature is a technique whereby one person (call her
J. R. Gensym) can produce a specially encrypted number which anyone
can verify could only have been produced by her.  (Typically a
particular signature number encodes additional information such as a
date and time or a legal document being signed.)  Anyone can decrypt
the number because that can be done with information that is
published; but producing such a number uses a "key" (a password) that
J. R. Gensym does not tell to anyone else.

Several years ago, Congress directed the NIST (National Institute of
Standards and Technology, formerly the National Bureau of Standards)
to choose a single digital signature algorithm as a standard for the
US.

In 1992, two algorithms were under consideration.  One had been
developed by NIST with advice from the NSA (National Security Agency),
which engages in electronic spying and decoding.  There was widespread
suspicion that this algorithm had been designed to facilitate some
sort of trickery.

The fact that NIST had applied for a patent on this algorithm
engendered additional suspicion; despite their assurances that this
would not be used to interfere with use of the technique, people could
imagine no harmless motive for patenting it.

The other algorithm was proposed by a company called PKP, Inc., which
not coincidentally has patents covering its use.  This alternative had
a disadvantage that was not just speculation: if this algorithm were
adopted as the standard, everyone using the standard would have to pay
PKP.

(The same patents cover the broader field of public key cryptography,
a technique whose use in the US has been mostly inhibited for a decade
by PKP's assiduous enforcement of these patents.  The patents were
licensed exclusively to PKP by the Massachusetts Institute of
Technology and Stanford University, and derive from taxpayer-funded
research.)

PKP, Inc. made much of the suspect nature of the NIST algorithm and
portrayed itself as warning the public about this.

On June 8, NIST published a new plan which combines the worst of both
worlds: to adopt the suspect NIST algorithm, and give PKP, Inc. an
*exclusive* license to the patent for it.  This plan places digital
signature use under the control of PKP through the year 2010.

By agreeing to this arrangement, PKP, Inc. shows that its concern to
protect the public from possible trickery was a sham.  Its real desire
was, as one might have guessed, to own an official national standard.
Meanwhile, NIST has justified past suspicion about its patent
application by proposing to give that patent (in effect) to a private
entity.

Instead of making a gift to PKP, Inc., of the work all of us have paid
for, NIST and Congress ought to protect our access to it--by pursuing
all possible means, judicial and legislative, to invalidate or annull
the PKP patents.  If that fails, even taking them by eminent domain is
better (and cheaper in the long run!) than the current plan.

You can write to NIST to object to this giveaway.  Write to:

Michael R. Rubin
Active Chief Counsel for Technology
Room A-1111, Administration Building,
National Institute of Standards and Technology
Gaithersburg, Maryland 20899
(301) 975-2803.

The deadline for arrival of letters is around August 4.

Please send a copy of your letter to:

League for Programming Freedom
1 Kendall Square #143
P.O.Box 9171
Cambridge, Massachusetts 02139

(The League for Programming Freedom is an organization which defends
the freedom to write software, and opposes monopolies such as patented
algorithms and copyrighted languages.  It advocates returning to the
former legal system under which if you write the program, you are free
to use it.  Please write to the League if you want more information.)

Sending copies to the League will enable us to show them to elected
officials if that is useful.

=====================================================================

APPENDIX G: THE LETTERS I INTEND TO SEND
========================================

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Dr Ross N. Williams
Rocksoft Pty Ltd (ACN 008-280-153).
16 Lerwick Avenue
Hazelwood Park 5066
Australia
Net  : ross@guest.adelaide.edu.au.
Fax  : +61 8 373-4911 (C/-Internode Systems)
Work : +61 8 379-9217


Michael R. Rubin
Acting Chief Counsel for Technology
Room A-1111
Administration Building
National Institute of Standards and Technology
Gaithersburg, MD 20899

4 August 1993.

Dear Mr Rubin,

As a concerned member of the Australian public, and as a director of
an Australian software company, I am writing in response to the notice
"Notice of Proposal for Grant of Exclusive Patent License" published by
NIST in the U.S. Federal Register, Vol. 58, No. 108, dated June 8, 1993
under Notices and relating to U.S. Patent Application No. 07/738.431 and
entitled "Digital Signature Algorithm." This notice affects myself and my
company in its relationship to the US commercial environment and because
of the propagation of patent claims internationally. The notice states
that:

   >The prospective license will be granted unless, within sixty (60)
   >days of this notice, NIST receives written evidence and argument
   >which established that the grant of the license would not be
   >consistent with the requirements of 35 U.S.C. 209 and 37 CFR 404.7.

I am writing because I believe that the license is NOT consistent with
the requirements of 35 U.S.C. 209. Here's why.

In 35 U.S.C. 209. part (c)(1), the requirements specify a list of conditions
(A)..(D) all of which must be met before a U.S. Federal agency may grant an
exclusive or partially exclusive license. Part (A) says:

   >(A) the interests of the Federal Government and the public will
   >best be served by the proposed license, in view of the applicant's
   >intentions, plans, and ability to bring the invention to practical
   >application or otherwise promote the invention's utilization by
   >the public;

I do not wish to debate this clause as satisified or not satisifed except
to note that this clause defines NIST's primary goal as the public benefit,
not the private.


   >(B) the desired practical application has not been achieved, or is not
   >likely expeditiously to be achieved, under any non-exclusive license
   >which has been granted, or which may be granted, on the invention;

There is no reason why the DSA standard should not be widely
implemented without the benefit of any patents at all. I am aware of
the potential conflict that prospective implementers might have with
Public Key Partners (PKP) of Sunnyvale California. However, I believe
that this problem should be resolved by the free market and the patent
system rather than by NIST.


   >(C) exclusive or partially exclusive licensing is a reasonable and
   >necessary initiative to call forth the investment of risk capital and
   >expenditures to bring the invention to practical application or
   >otherwise promote the invention's utilization by the public; and

The history of innovation and technology diffusion in the computing
industry clearly indicates that, in the absence of PKP, there would be
no requirement to boost risk capital with the use of patents in order
to diffuse the technology. As soon as a technologically workable
standard is proclaimed, it will be adopted. In particular, the cost of
implementing the standard in software is likely to be less than
$30,000. As a result there will soon be many implementations.


   >(D) the proposed terms and scope of exclusivity are not greater than
   >reasonably necessary to provide the incentive for bringing the invention
   >to practical application or otherwise promote the invention's
   >utilization by the public.

It is clause (D) to which I mainly take exception. In (A) I asserted
that the goal of NIST should be the public good. In (B) and (C) I
asserted that for a much-awaited cheap-to-implement standard such as
the DSA, patents are not required in order to attract risk capital.
These two clauses in combination with (D) imply that NIST should be
doing its best to deliver the standard into the public domain, and if
this is not possible, licensing it in the least-restrictive manner
possible.

Under the current proposal, NIST will license the DSA patent to PKP
indefinitely; that is, until it runs out in the year 2010. However,
PKP's patents, (which in the light of (A),(B), and (C) should be the
sole motivation for the license proposal) expire in 1997 or soon
after. This flies in the face of clause (D) which permits NIST to
grant at most only the minimum reasonable license, in this case a
license lasting only until 1997, after which the DSA patent should be
placed in the public domain. This argument applies independent to any
arguments stating that PKP have committed to behave in a certain
"limited" way once granted the DSA patent licence; my argument applies
to the time period over which the patent license is granted not the
manner in which PKP conduct themselves during the period in which it
is granted. Ideally thought, NIST should not grant DSS to PKP at all.

I hope that the above provides a convincing argument that NIST would
not be complying with the requirements of 35 U.S.C. 209.(c)(1)(D)
if it executed the proposed license.

                            --O--

There are many alternatives to the proposed license that NIST could
pursue. For example, NIST could simply issue a general public license
to DSA. Or NIST could use it's patent powers to impose the following
condition on all implementors:

   Condition: All implementations of the DSA must be constructed in
   accordance with <<new standard that NIST suboffice can create>>
   so that DSA can be quickly and cheaply replaced with other algorithms
   at a later date.

If this move were adopted now, it would pave the way for RSA in 2000,
or perhaps for an even better, hitherto uncreate, algorithm.

Other, more aggressive strategies exist that could solve the problem
too, the extreme being the taking of PKPs patents by "eminant domain".
However, I realize that this would be extreme and am writing primarily
to submit the objections given above.

In addition to the above, I enclose three letters applying for:

   1) A license of DSA for myself to use DSA.
   2) A license of DSA for myself to implement and distribute DSA for free.
   3) An unlimited commercial license for my company Rocksoft Pty Ltd,
      or failing this a non-commercial license.


I would like to end this letter on a lighter note...

During times of drought a farmer noticed that his cow was looking a bit
thin so he sent his son out with the cow to find some nice green grass
to munch on so that the cow would grow fat and yield lots of milk. The
son walked the cow for miles and miles (making the cow even thinner in the
process), but couldn't find any grass (this is actually the Australian
outback). In the end he found a nice green paddock and set the cow grazing.

Later the son returned to the homestead:

Farmer : How'd it go son? Do we have a happy cow now?
Son    : Well sort of; I had trouble finding a grassy paddock.
Farmer : But you found one in the end didn't you?
Son    : Yes, and I put the cow in the paddock. But soon another farmer
         came running out. He said it was his paddock --- he had rented it
         for three years --- and that I couldn't graze my cow there without
         giving him some milk. It was the only green paddock there was.
Farmer : So what did you do?
Son    : I gave him the cow.


Thank you for your kind attention. Please do not hesitate to contact
me if you require any more information or clarification of the above.

Yours sincerely,



Ross Williams
-------------

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

Dr Ross N. Williams
Rocksoft Pty Ltd (ACN 008-280-153).
16 Lerwick Avenue
Hazelwood Park 5066
Australia
Net  : ross@guest.adelaide.edu.au.
Fax  : +61 8 373-4911 (C/-Internode Systems)
Work : +61 8 379-9217


Michael R. Rubin
Acting Chief Counsel for Technology
Room A-1111
Administration Building
National Institute of Standards and Technology
Gaithersburg, MD 20899

4 August 1993.

Dear Mr Rubin,

I am writing in response to the notice "Notice of Proposal for Grant of
Exclusive Patent License" published by NIST in the U.S. Federal Register,
Vol. 58, No. 108, dated June 8, 1993 under Notices and relating to
U.S. Patent Application No. 07/738.431 and entitled "Digital Signature
Algorithm." The notice states that:

   >Applications for a license filed in response to this notice will be
   >treated as objections to the grant of the prospective license.
   >Only written comments and/or applications for a license which are
   >received by NIST within sixty (60) days for the publication of this
   >notice will be considered.

As such, I would like to apply, on behalf of my company Rocksoft Pty Ltd
for a license of this patent. The following information is provided in
accordance with 37 CFR 404.8.

(a) Identification of the invention:
    Title: "Digital Signature Algorithm (DSA)."
    Patent Application Serial Number: 07/738.431.
    United States Patent Number: To be issued as 5,231,668, I believe.

(b) The type of license required is a commercial license requiring
no royalties, OR FAILING THAT A NON-COMMERCIAL (i.e. non-profit) LICENSE
requiring no royalty payments.

(c) The organization applying for the license is "Rocksoft Pty Ltd",
a company incorporated in Australia, whose formally registered address is
   c/- Nelson Wheeler
   200 East Terrace
   Adelaide 5000
   Australia
whose Australian Company Number is 008-280-153, and whose postal
address (please address correspondence to this address) is:
   16 Lerwick Avenue
   Hazelwood Park 5066
   Australia.

(d) The representative of Rocksoft is:
    Name : Dr Ross N. Williams.
    Address: 16 Lerwick Avenue, Hazelwood Park 5066 Australia.
    Phone: +61 8 379-5020.

(e) Rocksoft is a software consultancy employing only Ross Williams.
The company has not yet successfully commercialized any products.

(f) Source of information concerning availability of a license: various
sources, including your Federal Register notice.

(g) I am unable to determine whether Rocksoft Pty Ltd may be formally
classified as a small business firm under 404.3(c). However, I would
be very surprised if it is not, unless there is some requirement for
it to be incorporated in the US.

(h) Development plan. If a license is granted, Rocksoft will attempt
to create an implementation of the DSA and either sub license it as a
component or embed it in products requiring digital signatures. No plans
more specific than this can be provided at this time.

(1) Rocksoft expects that many hundreds of programmer hours could be
committed to the project. Very little capital is available.
However, if a license is secured, this may become available.

(2) NO further statement on a development plan can be made at present.

(3) Fields of use: Rocksoft wishes to use the technology in many
diverse fields.

(4) Geographic are of use: The whole world. Failing this, just Australia.

(i) No previous licenses have been granted to Rocksoft under Federally owned
inventions.

(j) Known uses of DSA by industry or government: I have heard that ISC
sells a product called dsaSIGN, and that Bellcore has implemented DSA.

(k) Any other information. I am aware that one of the goals of the
licensing of Federally owned inventions is to promote small business
in the US and Rocksoft is a small business in Australia. I am
hoping however that this application will be successful because it
is an application for a non-exclusive, non-transferrable license.

I understand that NIST may grant an exclusive  DSA license to PKP,
and that this license application will be treated as  an objection
to the PKP license. I would like this application to be treated as
such.


Thank you for your kind attention. Please do not hesitate to contact
me if you require any more information or clarification of the above.

Yours sincerely,



Ross Williams
-------------

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

Dr Ross N. Williams
16 Lerwick Avenue
Hazelwood Park 5066
Australia
Net  : ross@guest.adelaide.edu.au.
Fax  : +61 8 373-4911 (C/-Internode Systems)
Work : +61 8 379-9217


Michael R. Rubin
Acting Chief Counsel for Technology
Room A-1111
Administration Building
National Institute of Standards and Technology
Gaithersburg, MD 20899

4 August 1993.

Dear Mr. Rubin:

I hereby apply for a personal license to use the Digital Signature
Algorithm.

1. Title of invention: Digital Signature Algorithm (DSA).

2. Patent Application Serial Number: 07/738.431.

3. United States Patent Number: To be issued as 5,231,668, I believe.

4. Source of information concerning availability of a license: Various
sources, including your Federal Register notice.

5. Name and address of applicant:
   Dr Ross N. Williams
   16 Lerwick Avenue
   Hazelwood Park 5066
   Australia
   Net  : ross@guest.adelaide.edu.au.
   Fax  : +61 8 373-4911 (C/-Internode Systems)
   Work : +61 8 379-9217

6. Applicant's representative: not applicable.

7. I am an Australian citizen.

8. Approximate number of persons employed: not applicable.

9. I am not a small business firm.

10. Purpose: I would like a personal license allowing me to implement
and use DSA. See #12.

11. Business and commercialization: not applicable; see #10.

12. Plans: I plan to use DSA to attach digital signatures to a variety
of electronic documents, primarily for authentication. I plan to use DSA
implementations, initially in software but perhaps later in hardware,
from a variety of potential future sources. Investments: I may spend
many hours programming a DSA implementation.

13. Fields of commercialization: not applicable; see #10.

14. I am not willing to accept a license for less than all fields of use
of DSA.

15. I intend to implement and use DSA throughout the world. However,
failing this a license for Australia and the U.S.A. would be appreciated.
Failing this, a license for just Australia would still be useful.

16. Type of license: I would like a non-exclusive license which does not
require royalty payments.

17. I have never been granted a license to a federally owned invention.

18. Known uses of DSA by industry or government: I have heard that ISC
sells a product called dsaSIGN, and that Bellcore has implemented DSA.

19. Other information: I understand that NIST may grant an exclusive
DSA license to PKP, and that this license application will be treated as
an objection to the PKP license.

Please note that PKP has stated its intent to make DSA free for personal
use. Therefore, if NIST grants PKP a license and PKP acts according to
its stated intent, there is no harm to anyone if I am granted this
personal license. However, I do not trust PKP to act according to its
stated intent, and I do not want to have to apply for a license from PKP
even if it is royalty-free. So I ask that you grant me a license
directly.

Thank you for your kind attention. Please let me know if you need more
information.

Yours sincerely,



Ross Williams
-------------

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

Dr Ross N. Williams
16 Lerwick Avenue
Hazelwood Park 5066
Australia
Net  : ross@guest.adelaide.edu.au.
Fax  : +61 8 373-4911 (C/-Internode Systems)
Work : +61 8 379-9217


Michael R. Rubin
Acting Chief Counsel for Technology
Room A-1111
Administration Building
National Institute of Standards and Technology
Gaithersburg, MD 20899

4 August 1993.

Dear Mr. Rubin:

I hereby apply for an implementor's license permitting me to sublicense
the use of the Digital Signature Algorithm.

1. Title of invention: Digital Signature Algorithm (DSA).

2. Patent Application Serial Number: 07/738.431.

3. United States Patent Number: To be issued as 5,231,668, I believe.

4. Source of information concerning availability of a license: Various
sources, including your Federal Register notice.

5. Name and address of applicant:
   Dr Ross N. Williams
   16 Lerwick Avenue
   Hazelwood Park 5066
   Australia
   Net  : ross@guest.adelaide.edu.au.
   Fax  : +61 8 373-4911 (C/-Internode Systems)
   Work : +61 8 379-9217


6. Applicant's representative: not applicable.

7. I am an Australian citizen.

8. Approximate number of persons employed: not applicable.

9. I am not a small business firm.

10. Purpose: I would like a license allowing me to let others freely
use my implementation of DSA, i.e., allowing me to sublicense the use of
DSA at no cost. See #12.

11. Business and commercialization: not applicable; see #10.

12. Plans: I plan to create a source-code implementation of DSA in
software, using computer resources which are already available to me.
I plan to give this implementation to anyone who asks, and perhaps to
publish this implementation via electronic or non-electronic means, for
study and use by the academic and non-academic communities. I hope to
have people hear about this implementation by a variety of means,
including word of mouth.

13. Fields of commercialization: not applicable; see #10.

14. I am not willing to accept a license for less than all fields of use
of DSA.

15. I intend to implement DSA in Australia (but distribute my implementations
throughout the world).

16. Type of license: I would like a non-exclusive license which does not
require royalty payments.

17. I have never been granted a license to a federally owned invention.

18. Known uses of DSA by industry or government: I have heard that ISC
sells a product called dsaSIGN, and that Bellcore has implemented DSA.

19. Other information: I understand that NIST may grant an exclusive
DSA license to PKP, and that this license application will be treated as
an objection to the PKP license.

Let me emphasize that this is not a commercial license application. I do
not intend to collect any fees for the use of this implementation.

Thank you for your kind attention. Please let me know if you need more
information.

Yours sincerely,



Ross Williams
-------------

=====================================================================

---<End of Document>---

Paul Ferguson               |  "Government, even in its best state,
Network Integrator          |   is but a necessary evil; in its worst
Centreville, Virginia USA   |   state, an intolerable one."
fergp@sytex.com             |      - Thomas Paine, Common Sense
 
         I love my country, but I fear its government.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Allan Thompson <sparky12@earthlink.net>
Date: Wed, 21 May 1997 11:23:26 +0800
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: encryption laws
Message-ID: <2.2.32.19930716030439.0067dc10@earthlink.net>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


        Would it be possible for a court to subpeona a encrypted file or key,
and order you to tell them the key ?
If you didn't would you be held in 'contempt of court' ?



-----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----
Version: 2.6.2

mQCNAyw57X8AAAEEANs79QzyCIwCXMUnbiFTK5l8lJBXKdZqGAHxwgbDOuOGBSJB
HBxlfycbSqevTPmKRTL4yHD1yCmAbkTrZtZuP1DDWeStaujf3M8lh6RlU4lOLU4Z
IAu12Y9i4IgyBQkM03d/TZfAaXwUKQu2APBNz8D6ZT53xVzJVy80opqUWHzJAAUR
tB9BbGxhbiBUaG9tcHNvbiA8YXRjMTJAd2VsbC5jb20+iQCVAwUQLDsrvS80opqU
WHzJAQEvWgQAvx/DdLFB5Jk4BOiSD5QX8qDbAb40L1rgNAi3R/1kSYnBjli/ncDR
msyJKoviG0Ppl0JSxfX4SpgoKOsS1jpz5yFFmBAPCPJ5VC0cjwhgItdnyHnAcj99
FdrcVhF9G2oJkeoqgXkt3Hy6YWhGhxI4Wvcrv6eAC1yKZ8FA3xltuWA=
=o+Ud
-----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: karn@qualcomm.com (Phil Karn)
Date: Thu, 1 Jul 93 01:45:05 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re:  LEB corruption in Clipper phones--the backdoor?
Message-ID: <9307010844.AA24024@servo>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Why are we pointing out these flaws publicly? You should let them
pass, so that the flawed Clipper chips get widely deployed. THEN you
go in front of Malarkey's subcommittee and demonstrate to the whole
world how to intercept any Clipper-encrypted conversation without the
escrowed keys. Then just stand back and watch the fun begin.

1/2 :-)

Phil




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Clark Reynard <clark@metal.psu.edu>
Date: Thu, 1 Jul 93 01:29:14 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: LEB corruption in Clipper phones--the backdoor?
Message-ID: <9307010903.AA03572@metal.psu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


""L. Detweiler"" <ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu> quotes:

>farber@central.cis.upenn.edu (David Farber) writes:

>>2.  Re chip health.  I heard the same story plus yield was very low.
>>I also understand that there is substantial redesign going on because
>>the story about defaulting to an all-0 key if the LEB were corrupted
>>was apparently true.

I had heard this story, but discounted it as a 'cyberspace legend.'
If this is true, there's the damn backdoor, obvious as the ass on
a baboon.  

As others have noted, simply using the old crummy alligator clip
method of wiretapping, sending a spike down the line at the moment
of connection, and perhaps even a simple non-IC device like a 
cable descrambler could tap it, as easily as a normal phone.
At the very least, you could record for later decryption,
and it would require no more field work than currently necessary.

Even with the corruption of analog media such as audio tapes,
wouldn't an all-0 key make error-correction for line noise
trivial?

Corrupt the LEB, and any idiot could decrypt.  Even _I_ could do
that, with patience and at most a few thousand plaintext/ciphertext
pairs (available to any fool with a Clipper chip).  

Am I wrong here, or is this, in fact, an idiotically simple flaw,
so elementary that even the NSA could not have committed such a 
whopping, cretinous blunder in "good faith"?
----
Robert W. F. Clark              
rclark@nyx.cs.du.edu            
clark@metal.psu.edu       




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: nobody@eli-remailer
Date: Thu, 1 Jul 93 07:57:26 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: REMAIL: list of remailers 7/1/93
Message-ID: <9307011457.AA15378@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

Q1: What cypherpunk remailers exist?

A1:

 1: nowhere@bsu-cs.bsu.edu 
 2: hh@cicada.berkeley.edu 
 3: hh@pmantis.berkeley.edu 
 4: hh@soda.berkeley.edu 
 5: 00x@uclink.berkeley.edu 
 6: hal@alumni.caltech.edu 
 7: ebrandt@jarthur.claremont.edu 
 8: phantom@mead.u.washington.edu 
 9: remailer@rebma.mn.org 
10: elee7h5@rosebud.ee.uh.edu 
11: hfinney@shell.portal.com 
12: remail@tamsun.tamu.edu 
13: remail@tamaix.tamu.edu 
14: remailer@utter.dis.org 
15: remail@extropia.wimsey.com 

NOTES: 
#1-#5		no encryption of remailing requests
#6-#14		support encrypted remailing requests
#15		special - header and message must be encrypted together
#9,#14,#15	introduce larger than average delay (not direct connect)
#9,#14,#15      running on privately owned machines

======================================================================

Q2: What help is available?

A2:

Check out the pub/cypherpunks directory at soda.berkeley.edu
(128.32.149.19).  Instructions on how to use the remailers are in the
remailer directory, along with some unix scripts and dos batch files.

The public keys for the remailers which support encrypted remailing
requests is also available in the same directory.

Mail to me (elee9sf@menudo.uh.edu) for further help and/or questions.


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.3

iQCVAgUBLDLfl4OA7OpLWtYzAQHb8wQApHOt2pmOHoRJn7VZqUtZh3b+DLcSDI3i
ReClJ//VYO2p30e5ZGlP6zhdfB0N6lbR3nK1d1u6a8hfIKM67Y9KorAgYRrIZr/n
7z/yj8mhX4FG606naDVIy0eXbwX/R5+XiYA00WQNRfhfzYdSxBibmpbdX7mFH/V+
xlkiNkCs+0E=
=urKR
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: nobody@mead.u.washington.edu
Date: Thu, 1 Jul 93 07:49:06 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: REMAIL: list 7/1/93
Message-ID: <9307011448.AA57122@mead.u.washington.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

Q1: What cypherpunk remailers exist?

A1:

 1: nowhere@bsu-cs.bsu.edu 
 2: hh@cicada.berkeley.edu 
 3: hh@pmantis.berkeley.edu 
 4: hh@soda.berkeley.edu 
 5: 00x@uclink.berkeley.edu 
 6: hal@alumni.caltech.edu 
 7: ebrandt@jarthur.claremont.edu 
 8: phantom@mead.u.washington.edu 
 9: remailer@rebma.mn.org 
10: elee7h5@rosebud.ee.uh.edu 
11: hfinney@shell.portal.com 
12: remail@tamsun.tamu.edu 
13: remail@tamaix.tamu.edu 
14: remailer@utter.dis.org 
15: remail@extropia.wimsey.com 

NOTES: 
#1-#5		no encryption of remailing requests
#6-#14		support encrypted remailing requests
#15		special - header and message must be encrypted together
#9,#14,#15	introduce larger than average delay (not direct connect)
#9,#14,#15      running on privately owned machines

======================================================================

Q2: What help is available?

A2:

Check out the pub/cypherpunks directory at soda.berkeley.edu
(128.32.149.19).  Instructions on how to use the remailers are in the
remailer directory, along with some unix scripts and dos batch files.

The public keys for the remailers which support encrypted remailing
requests is also available in the same directory.

Mail to me (elee9sf@menudo.uh.edu) for further help and/or questions.


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Version: 2.3

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ReClJ//VYO2p30e5ZGlP6zhdfB0N6lbR3nK1d1u6a8hfIKM67Y9KorAgYRrIZr/n
7z/yj8mhX4FG606naDVIy0eXbwX/R5+XiYA00WQNRfhfzYdSxBibmpbdX7mFH/V+
xlkiNkCs+0E=
=urKR
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From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Anonymous <nowhere@bsu-cs.bsu.edu>
Date: Thu, 1 Jul 93 06:20:18 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: No Subject
Message-ID: <9307011323.AA25759@bsu-cs.bsu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

Just a few updates: Eric Hollander told me he is working on updating
the uclink remailer to only remail encrypted messages (like extropia)
so that explains why it seems to be down... for now I moved it to the
other remailers which don't support encrypted requests, and
alphabetized the list by host.


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Version: 2.3

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m+F6fOYdq5VP9j37AUr6LUXV4rg4SKcIVCip85eY6UBCLuwcio38wUSAbMbm8fP7
glUzWuSlmtI=
=G7/a
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Karl Barrus <elee9sf@Menudo.UH.EDU>
Date: Thu, 1 Jul 93 06:55:19 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: ANON: free speech
Message-ID: <199307011355.AA09915@Menudo.UH.EDU>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Wow,
Here's an unfortunate case of somebody who could have used anonymous 
methods to protect his speech and speak without fear:

Gregory Steshenko was fired from Microsoft because users on a elist
he was on complained.  Check out the USENET post (I saw it in
alt.comp.acad-freedom.talk) but it was crossposted to zillions of
groups.

/-----------------------------------\
| Karl L. Barrus                    |
| elee9sf@menudo.uh.edu             | <- preferred address
| barrus@tree.egr.uh.edu (NeXTMail) |
\-----------------------------------/





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: jet@nas.nasa.gov (J. Eric Townsend)
Date: Thu, 1 Jul 93 11:41:53 PDT
To: Karl Barrus <elee9sf@Menudo.UH.EDU>
Subject: ANON: free speech
In-Reply-To: <199307011355.AA09915@Menudo.UH.EDU>
Message-ID: <9307011841.AA01966@boxer.nas.nasa.gov>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



This is not an official NASA document, nor does it in any way reflect
any of NASA's opinions, actions or views.

Karl Barrus writes:
 > Gregory Steshenko was fired from Microsoft because users on a elist
 > he was on complained.  Check out the USENET post (I saw it in
 > alt.comp.acad-freedom.talk) but it was crossposted to zillions of
 > groups.


This sort of thing happens all the time, actually.  A close friend of
mine was put on an 'employee improvement plan' (the first step to
being fired, actually) because she read/posted to rec.pets.cats.  Upon
closer examination by her grandboss and subsequent review of her
actions before, during and after the plan, it was determined that the
action was taken for political reasons.  (ie: her boss was looking for
a reason to get rid of her because they had a personal conflict).

In other words, if they want to fire you, they'll look for a reason.
I could be fired for sending this message, if someone wanted to push
the issue and my bosses didn't like me.  As it is, they do like me,
and I do a very good job, so the worst that would happen (first
iteration) is an official direction to stop contributing to the
cypherpunks list from my work machine.  (non-work related use of my
government machine.)






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: fnerd@smds.com (FutureNerd Steve Witham)
Date: Thu, 1 Jul 93 13:29:19 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Boston cpunx mtg Jul 10?
Message-ID: <9307012015.AA22920@smds.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



A good time for the Next Boston area Cypherpunks meeting would be
the second saturday of July--july 10, at 6 PM EDT.

At least that would be good for me, and easy to remember since it's
the canonical time...

-fnerd
quote me




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: zane@genesis.mcs.com (Sameer)
Date: Thu, 1 Jul 93 22:36:40 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Junk email/encrypted return-path-blocks
Message-ID: <m0oBdbz-000MTeC@genesis.mcs.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


	I've been recently working at the direct-mail place putting rubber
bands around mass mailings of junk mail (ah, the wonders of being a poor
soon-to-be college student), which got me thinking about electronic junk
mail and how such a thing can be avoided.
	In rl, you can go to the store, buy a product with cash, and you're
not put on their mailing list. Buying via mail order, using
check/credit-card, etc., requires that they get your address so they can
put you on their mailing list, compile statistics about who you are,
etc., as we all know.
	Now, over the net, suppose I wanted to buy an email product. I'd
pay for it with digital cash, communicating with the vendor through the
anonymous remailers. Now I see a problem in how the vendor will deliver
the product. Obviously I can give the vendor my email address encrypted
with the remailer's public keys, so the vendor still doesn't know who I
am. But the vendor can still keep a database of address-blocks and which
address blocks go with which purchases. Then the vendor can compile her
mailing list of address blocks, and even *sell* this list to others,
with product purchase history. Even though the junk-mailers don't know
who I am, they can still flood my box with email.
	I thought of two possible solutions.

	The first solution I thought of requires a great deal of bandwidth.
The vendor could simply post publicly (to usenet or something) the
product I wanted, encrypted with my public key. (Rather, a public key I
created just for this venture with a psuedonym so that none could
see that it was I who was buying from the vendor.) The bandwidth for
this thing would be incredible.

	The second solution I thought of seems like it would work. When I
create the return-address block, it can be given some sort of ID-code
(again, like with my other idea posted, similar to the ID-code on peices
of Digicash in Chaum's scheme) so when the vendor delivers the product,
she sends to encrypted block to the remailer, and the remailer forwards
the product to me, and stores the ID-code in its database (doing the
proper one-way transformation for untraceability) so that further
attempts to use the exact same address-block will be noticed and not
delivered.

	I also thought of creating a digicash like entity, a currency to
pay for remailer transactions, so that sending junk mail through a
remailer would be prohibitively expensive. It will probably happen
anyway once we near the goal of full crypto-anarchy that most remailers
will not operate without a fee, while the scheme I present above seems
like it would work with both free remailers and those which charge for
usage. (And a charge on a remailer which agrees with the market probably
won't be high enough to stop a really rich junk mailer from spending the
cash on junk mailings.)

--
| Sameer Parekh-zane@genesis.MCS.COM-PFA related mail to pfa@genesis.MCS.COM |
| Apprentice Philosopher, Writer, Physicist, Healer, Programmer, Lover, more |
| "Symbiosis is Good" - Me_"Specialization is for Insects" - R. A. Heinlein_/
 \_______________________/ \______________________________________________/ 




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Dan Veeneman <ftgcorp!dan@uunet.UU.NET>
Date: Thu, 1 Jul 93 13:47:17 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Clipper article (and an OCR check)
Message-ID: <u7Z16B1w165w@ftgcorp.UUCP>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Cypherpunks,

  This may be old news to  most of you, but I just got my
HP ScanJet IIc working with Caere's OmniPage Pro 2.1, and
thought I'd scan this in to give it a try.

  Note to D.C. Cypherpunks (or anyone else, for that matter):
I'll be happy to scan any documents or newsclippings you
send my way.  I'm located in Columbia, Maryland.  I'm reachable
by UUCP e-mail at uunet!anagld!ftgcorp!dan.


From Network World, issue date May 31, 1993.


OPINIONS
SECURITY PERSPECTIVES
BY MICHEL KABAY

Vigilance is needed to keep Clipper Chip in check

  Last month, the federal government endorsed a new encryption
technology based on the Clipper Chip. The Clipper Chip will give
federal agencies a key to unlock users' encrypted voice and data
communications.  Network users can live with this situation, but
only if they're vigilant about preventing any attempt to make the
Clipper Chip the only legal encryption mechanism available in
the U.S.

  The Clipper Chip will serve some legitimate needs. As the
U.S. builds its National Information Infrastructure, increasing
amounts of data will flow electronically throughout the nation.
Users will need encryption to protect their sensitive data. In
a multivendor world, having a common encryption standard,
such as the Clipper Chip, will simplify protection so users
won't even notice their communications being encrypted.

  However, users have many questions and concerns about the Clipper
Chip, as well.

  Internet users are curious about how the chip was
developed: specifically, what companies and individuals were
consulted and how the initial manufacturer, Mykotronx, Inc.
of Torrance, Calif., was selected.  This information might cast
light on the quality of the chip and the price to be charged.

  Internet users also wonder why the algorithm is being kept
secret. Without free access to the algorithm, many argue, the
scientific community will not be sure that the algorithm actually
functions as claimed.

  Defenders of the plan point to a proposed examination by selected
experts, but any closed process leaves open the question of whether
there is a back door to decryption.

A major user concern involves key escrow, which is at the heart of the
administration's proposal. Government agencies would hold pairs of
incomplete decryption keys for every Clipper Chip installed in the U.S.
To decrypt private communications, a government agency would need to get
a warrant to obtain the two parts of the decryption key.
         
INSET:   Clipper Chip will give
         federal agencies a key
         to users' encrypted
         communications

  Anyone who discovers the key pairs for a specific Clipper
Chip could decode all encrypted communications initiated by
that device, even after the warrant expires. Therefore, the
trustworthiness of the key escrow agencies is crucial to avoid
abuses of the decryption keys.

   The partial keys might be stored in databases or generated
by black-box decryption devices.  Any party involved in creating
these databases or devices would be a vulnerable point in
the control over decryption.

  It would be valuable to know whether the federal government
has studied the risks and estimated the costs of providing
adequate protection. If so, many users would want to evaluate
such studies independently.

  Key escrow for foreign purchasers of the Clipper Chip and
for foreign manufacturers will also cause problems. If other
countries use the technology and have all the keys in escrow,
U.S. users may find their own security compromised by legal
systems beyond their control.

  But the biggest concern regarding this technology is that it
could lead to a ban on all unauthorized encryption technology
in the U.S. A few years from now, anyone using a non-Clipper
Chip encryption method could be assumed to be engaging in
crime. Political pressure to ban all non-Clipper Chip encryption
could become intense.

  Making non-Clipper Chip encryption illegal would lead to
enforcement problems. Applying the technology only to voice
transmissions would raise the popularity of data transmission
-- that is, digitally encoded voice file transfers. So it would
have to be applied to data, too.

  But failure to produce clear text using the Clipper Chip decryption
could be construed as evidence of illegal encryption,
even if the original data stream was not, in fact, interpretable.

  The prospect of astronomers being arrested because law enforcement
officials couldn't make sense of their data on elemental composition
of supernovas is pretty funny--if you like that kind of joke.

  I urge all users to fight any attempt to make the Clipper Chip
the only legal encryption mechanism in the U.S. For further
developments in the ongoing debate, users should follow the
dialogues on the Internet in the Risks forum, the Privacy forum
and the new alt.privacy.clipper news group.

END 

Kabay is director of education with the National Computer Security
Association in Carlisle, Pa. He can be reached at (717) 258-1816 or
on the Internet at 75300.3232@compuserve.com.


--
dan@ftgcorp.UUCP (Dan Veeneman)
Fountainhead Title Group




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Derek Atkins <warlord@MIT.EDU>
Date: Thu, 1 Jul 93 13:52:48 PDT
To: fnerd@smds.com (FutureNerd Steve Witham)
Subject: Re: Boston cpunx mtg Jul 10?
In-Reply-To: <9307012015.AA22920@smds.com>
Message-ID: <9307012052.AA09872@toxicwaste.MEDIA.MIT.EDU>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I'm probably going to be out of town that weekend, so I can't organize
things..  If someone else wants to organize, feel free.  Otherwise, I
can probably work on organizing the weekend after for this month,
assuming people have things they want to talk about and can generate a
meeting agenda.  I havent had an agenda, which is why I havent called
a meeting since the last one in April.  Also, I've been busy on my
Thesis.  ;-)

-derek





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Peter Breton <pbreton@cs.umb.edu>
Date: Thu, 1 Jul 93 14:19:28 PDT
To: Derek Atkins <warlord@MIT.EDU>
Subject: Re: Boston cpunx mtg Jul 10?
In-Reply-To: <9307012052.AA09872@toxicwaste.MEDIA.MIT.EDU>
Message-ID: <Pine.3.05.9307011730.A2680-9100000@ra.cs.umb.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



The weekend after the 10th (the 17th) would also be better for me. Has
Derek or anybody else still got the email addresses of the people who
attended last time?

-------------------------------------------------------------------------
Peter Breton  pbreton@cs.umb.edu          PGP key by finger
======================
==================================================






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: miron@extropia.wimsey.com (Miron Cuperman)
Date: Thu, 1 Jul 93 10:51:18 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: REMAIL: Error reporting implemented
Message-ID: <1993Jul1.172952.10775@extropia.wimsey.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

I've implemented error reporting on remail@extropia.

The errors are forwarded to errors@extropia.wimsey.com.  This is an anon
pool (=mailing list).  Errors are concise, explaining what went wrong.
The incoming Subject: line is used as the (sole) identifier.

To subscribe to the error list, send 'subscribe' on the subject line
to errors-request@extropia.wimsey.com.  For help, send 'help'.
- -- 
        Miron Cuperman <miron@extropia.wimsey.com> | NeXTmail/Mime ok
        Unix/C++/DSP,  consulting/contracting      | Public key avail
        AMIX: MCuperman                            |
Laissez faire, laissez passer. Le monde va de lui meme.



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Version: 2.2x

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HkWHzWr1et+3CP8mt+F/esDIQLmJZuHp+ulZsMowunVdNvfQQy/UU1jeMsepijkJ
2fqIJTjddAgdxs6cIPeZbEHjwFUbfGers5swH7aVe/NM2/W+38zGn3XzdOKHJMly
9llSzJ9K+CA=
=V+9b
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Marc Horowitz <marc@GZA.COM>
Date: Thu, 1 Jul 93 14:32:44 PDT
To: fnerd@smds.com (FutureNerd Steve Witham)
Subject: Re: Boston cpunx mtg Jul 10?
In-Reply-To: <9307012015.AA22920@smds.com>
Message-ID: <9307012132.AA09157@dun-dun-noodles.aktis.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>> A good time for the Next Boston area Cypherpunks meeting would be
>> the second saturday of July--july 10, at 6 PM EDT.
>> 
>> At least that would be good for me, and easy to remember since it's
>> the canonical time...

I'll be out of town for IETF.

Since I'll be attending a DigiCash technical presentation (by David
Chaum) and a new "Internet Mercantile Protocols" BOF session, I think
I'll have something to offer the group :-) I return on the 18th.  But
my mother's birthday is the next weekend.  Damn.  I hate scheduling.
Maybe we should just have an August meeting, too :-)

Is anybody else here going to IETF?  I'd like to meet up with anyone
who is.

		Marc




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Eric J Fogleman <ejf@world.std.com>
Date: Thu, 1 Jul 93 14:39:35 PDT
To: FutureNerd Steve Witham <fnerd@smds.com>
Subject: Re: Boston cpunx mtg Jul 10?
In-Reply-To: <9307012015.AA22920@smds.com>
Message-ID: <Pine.3.07.9307011708.A7214-a100000@world.std.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



On Thu, 1 Jul 1993, FutureNerd Steve Witham wrote:

> 
> A good time for the Next Boston area Cypherpunks meeting would be
> the second saturday of July--july 10, at 6 PM EDT.
> 
> At least that would be good for me, and easy to remember since it's
> the canonical time...
> 
> -fnerd
> quote me

Not a good time for me -- I'll be out of town...  Any Saturday from
7/24 on is ok w/ me.

Eric
=====================================================================
ejf@world.std.com <eric fogleman>  1 Concord Sq #4, Boston, MA  02118 
    







From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Sandy <72114.1712@CompuServe.COM>
Date: Thu, 1 Jul 93 18:06:47 PDT
To: <cypherpunks@toad.com>
Subject: CLIPPER IN SCIENCE NEWS
Message-ID: <930702010048_72114.1712_FHF46-1@CompuServe.COM>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
  SANDY SANDFORT               Reply to:  ssandfort@attmail.com
 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Punksters,

I have missed some messages because of a computer problem.
Perhaps someone has already mentioned or reprinted an article
by Ivars Peterson ("Encryption Controversy -- A Fierce Debate
Erupts over Cryptography and privacy") about the Clipper,
Capstone, et al. in June 19 issue of SCIENCE NEWS.  If not, I
would be willing to transcribe the article into ASCII and upload
it to the list if enough folks are interested.

 S a n d y

>>>>>>    Please send e-mail to:  ssandfort@attmail.com    <<<<<<
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: J. Michael Diehl <mdiehl@triton.unm.edu>
Date: Thu, 1 Jul 93 21:53:25 PDT
To: still@kailua.colorado.edu (James Still)
Subject: Re: PGP and offline-readers
In-Reply-To: <2C31A670@kailua.colorado.edu>
Message-ID: <9307020453.AA23579@triton.unm.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


According to James Still:
> 
> >> I am getting involved in networking some local BBS' and
> >> message bases.
> 
> The unique feature about CryptoBBS is it's "Post Office."  The
> P.O. allows callers to set up a p.o. box from which they can
> up/download any file (pgp encrypted files for instance) to any
> other user on the board without the sysop's approval/knowledge.
> It encourages and nurtures an anonymous "mail drop" community
> while protecting the caller's privacy.

Be carefull!  Remember that you may be held accountable for ANYTHING found on
your BBS.  If someone uses your board to trade credit card numbers..... See ya!

> The question is, should I throw away the virtues of a lean 'n mean
> app at 80K by adding a dolphin or pgp to it that automatically
> encrypts the message base, uploaded messages, etc?  Should
> we give the BBS caller a little credit and assume he knows to
> encrypt at his own machine before uploading the text?  Or is
> the temptation to make everyone *lick and seal their message
> envelopes* too invasive?

Typically, you want to assume that user knows NOTHING!  You design your user-
interface accordingly.....  I know it sounds insulting but if this attitude 
makes your stuff easier to use....what do you care?

+-----------------------+-----------------------------+---------+
| J. Michael Diehl ;-)  | I thought I was wrong once. | PGP KEY |
| mdiehl@triton.unm.edu |   But, I was mistaken.      |available|
| mike.diehl@fido.org   |                             | Ask Me! |
| (505) 299-2282        +-----------------------------+---------+
|                                                               |
+------"I'm just looking for the opportunity to be -------------+
|            Politically Incorrect!"   <Me>                     |
+-----If codes are outlawed, only criminals wil have codes.-----+
+----Is Big Brother in your phone?  If you don't know, ask me---+



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: fergp@sytex.com (Paul Ferguson)
Date: Fri, 2 Jul 93 00:13:18 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: The last word? (forwarded article)
Message-ID: <6XL26B1w165w@sytex.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I took a few minutes (quite a few) and commited this to bidgets. I hope 
you folks take this as seriously as I do.
 
Cheers.

BoardWatch Magazine
July 1993
pages 43 - 46
 
Steve Jackson Games v. US Secret Service
 
by Peter D. Kennedy
 
On March 12, 1993, a federal judge in Austin, Texas decided that
the US Secret Service broke the law when it searched Steve
Jackson Games Inc., and seized its bulletin board system and
other computer equipment. The decision in this case has been
long-awaited in the computer world, and most observers have
hailed it as a significant victory for computer user's freedom
and privacy.
 
I had the fortune to be one of the lawyers representing Steve
Jackson and his co-plaintiffs. During the course of the lawsuit, I
met many people passionately interested in the issues the case
raised. I watched and listened to the discussions and arguments
about the case. I've been impressed by the intelligence of the
on-line world, and the interest that computer enthusiasts show --
especially computer communications enthusiasts -- in the law.
I've also been impressed and distressed at how the Net can
spontaneously generate misinformation. Steve Jackson has spent
untold hours correcting errors about him, his company, and the
case on both the Net and more traditional news media.
 
The decision in the Steve Jackson Games case is clearly a
significant victory for computer users, especially BBS operators
and subscribers. I hope to give a simple and clear explanation
for the intelligent non-lawyer of the legal issues raised by the
case, and the significance and limitations of the court's
decision.
 
The facts.
 
By now, most people interested in the case are familiar with the
basic facts: On March 1, 1990, the Secret Service, in an
early-morning raid, searched the offices of Steve Jackson Games.
The agents kept the employees out of the offices until the
afternoon, and took the company's BBS -- called "Illuminati" --
along with an employee's work computer, other computer equipment,
and hundreds and hundreds of floppy disks. They took all the
recent versions of a soon-to-be-published game book, "GURPS
Cyberpunk," including big parts of the draft which were publicly
available on Illuminati.
 
On March 2, Steve Jackson tried to get copies of the seized files
back from the Secret Service. He was treated badly, and given
only a handful of files from one office computer. He was not
allowed to touch the Illuminati computer, or copy any of its
files.
 
Steve Jackson Games took a nosedive, and barely avoided going
out of business. According to Jackson, eight employees lost their
jobs on account of the Secret Service raid, and the company lost
many thousands of dollars in sales. It is again a busy
enterprise, no thanks to the Secret Service (although they tried
to take credit, pointing to the supposedly wonderful publicity
their raid produced.)
 
After months of pestering, including pressure by lawyers and
Senator Lloyd Bentson (now, as Treasury Secretary, the Secret
Service's boss) the Secret Service returned most of the
equipment taken, some of it much the worse for wear.
 
By then, Steve Jackson had restarted Illuminati on a different
computer. When the old Illuminati computer was finally given
back, Jackson turned it one -- and saw that all the electronic
mail which had been on the board on March 1 was gone! Wayne Bell,
WWIV developer and guru, was called in. He gave us invaluable
(and free) help evaluating the condition of the files. He
concluded, and testified firmly at trial, that during the week of
March 20, 1990, when the Secret Service still had Illuminati,
the BBS was run, and every piece of e-mail was individually
accessed and deleted. The Illuminati files the Secret Service had
returned to Steve Jackson left irrefutable electronic traces of
what had been done -- even I could understand how the condition
and dates of the e-mail files showed what had happened, and when.
 
The lawsuit.
 
Suing the federal government and its agents is never a simple
thing. The United States can only be sued when it consents.
Lawsuits against individual agents face big legal hurdles erected
to protect government officials from fear off a tidal wave of
lawsuits.
 
Amazing as it may sound, you cannot sue the United States (or any
federal agency) for money damages for violating your
constitutional rights. You can sue individual federal agents,
though. If you do, you have to get past a defense called
"qualified immunity" which basically means you have to show that
the officials violated "clearly established" constitutional law.
For reasons I can't explain briefly, "qualified immunity" often
creates a vicious circle in civil rights litigation, where the
substance of constitutional law is never established because the
court never has determine the Constitution's scope, only whether
the law was "clearly established" at the time of the violation.
 
The strongest remedies for federal over-stepping are often
statutes which allow direct suit against the United States or
federal agencies (although these are less dramatic than the
Constitution). Fortunately, these statutes were available to
Steve Jackson and the three Illuminati users who joined him in
his suit against the Secret Service.
 
The legal claims.
 
The Steve Jackson Games case was a lot of things to a lot of
people. I saw the case as having two basic goals: (1) to redress
the suppression of the public expression embodied in Steve
Jackson's publications (including his publication via BBS) and
thereby compensate the company for the damage unnecessarily done
by the raid, and (2) to redress the violation of the privacy of
the BBS users, and the less tangible harm they suffered.
 
The individual government agents involved in the raid were sued
for constitutional violations -- the First and Fourth Amendments.
The Secret Service was sued under two important laws which embody
the same principles as the First and Fourth Amendments -- the
Privacy Protection Act of 1980 and provisions of the Electronic
Communications Privacy Act of 1986. There were other claims, but
these were the core.
 
After the case was pending a year and a half and all discovery
completed, the government moved to have thee claims dismissed,
claiming qualified immunity. This motion (usually brought early
in a case) guaranteed that the trail would be delayed by over a
year, because even if the government lost its motion, the
individuals could immediately appeal. In December, 1992, the
tactical decision was made to drop those claims, rather than
suffer the delay, and proceed promptly to trail on the claims
against the Secret Service itself.
 
The Privacy Protection Act of 1980.
 
In the late 1970's the Stanford Daily was subjected to a fishing
expedition by police officers in the Stanford Daily's newsroom.
The police were looking for notes and photos of a demonstration
the newspaper had covered for a story, hoping the newspaper's
files would identify suspects. The Supreme Court held in 1979
that the newspaper had no separate First Amendment right
protecting it from searches and seizures of its reporters notes
and photographs if they were "evidence" of a crime the paper had
covered -- even when the newspaper was not under any suspicion
itself. Congress responded in 1980 with the Privacy Protection
Act, which, until Steve jackson came along, was distinguished
mostly by its lack of interpretation by courts.
 
The Act's wording is rather obtuse, but basically it enacts a
"subpoena only" rule for publishers -- law enforcement officials
are not allowed to search for evidence of crimes in publisher's
offices, or more accurately, they  may not "search for or seize"
publishers' "work product" or "documentary materials",
essentially draft of publications, writer's notes, and such.  To
get such material, the police must subpoena them, not with the
much more disruptive search warrant. Every BBS sysop should read
this act, located at 42 U.S.C. 2000aa in the law books, because I
can't fully explain it here.
 
The Act is quite broad, protecting from searches and seizures
the work product and commentary materials of anyone who has "a
purpose to disseminate to the public a newspaper, book,
broadcast, or other similar form of public communication..." It
also has a big exception -- if the publisher is the person
suspected in the criminal investigation.
 
The Electronic Communications Privacy Act.
 
Two provisions of the Electronic Communications Privacy Act (or
ECPA) were paramount in the suit. The plaintiffs claimed the
Secret Service violated two provisions -- one prohibiting
unjustified "disclosure and use" of e-mail (18 U.S.C. 2703; the
other prohibiting "interception" of e-mail (18 U.S.C. 22511(1)).
 
The parties' positions were fairly simple, and laid out well
before trail. As for the Privacy Protection Act, Steve Jackson
claimed that his company's publication, both in book form and on
Illuminati, were obviously "work product" protected by the Act,
and the government had no right to seize them, and therefore owed
him money for the damages the raid caused his business. The
government replied claiming that (1) Steve Jackson Games'
products are not the type of publications protected by the PPA;
and anyway, (2) the Secret Service didn't know that Steve Jackson
Games was a publisher when it raided its offices; and even then,
(3) the Secret Service didn't mean to take the books, the books
just came along when the computers and disks were taken.
 
As for the e-mail, Steve Jackson and the other BBS users claimed
that the seizure, disclosure, and deletion of the e-mail was both
an unlawful "disclosure and use," and an "interception" of
electronic communications in violation of the ECPA. The Secret
Service replied that (1) there was no "interception" because the
e-mail was just sitting there on the hard drive, not moving; and
(2) the Secret Service didn't read the mail, but if it did, it
was acting on good faith, because it had a search warrant
authorizing it so seize Steve Jackson Games' "computers" and read
their contents.
 
The trial.
 
When the individual defendants were dropped, the case quickly
went to trail. The plaintiffs opened their case on January 29,
1993. The trail took the better part of four days; the witnesses
included now-familiar names: Timothy Foley and Barbara Golden of
the Secret Service, William Cook, formerly of the U.S. Attorney's
office in Chicago, Henry Kluepfel of Bellcore, Steve Jackson and
the BBS users Elizabeth McCoy, Walter Milliken and Steffan
O'Sullivan, and WWIV master Wayne Bell.
 
At trail, Judge Sparks was introduced to the labyrinthine E911
investigation. We also set up and ran Illuminati as it looked on
March 1, 1990, and Steve Jackson walked Judge Sparks through his
BBS, lingering on discussion areas such as "GURPS Old West" to
give the Judge a taste of the scope and breadth of BBS
publication and communications which the Secret Service had shut
down. The judge had appeared upset by the callous and suspicious
manner in which the Secret Service had treated Steve Jackson, and
with the Service's apparent disregard for the effects the raid
might have on the company.
 
The decision.
 
Judge Sparks decided the case in February, 1993, in a long
written opinion. The full text of the opinion is available on
the Internet at ftp.eff.org, and on Illuminati itself
(512-447-7866). I recommend all sysops and BBS users to read it,
as it is one of the very few legal rulings specifically
addressing bulletin boards and electronic mail.
 
First, the bad news: Judge Sparks accepted the government's
argument that the seizure of the BBS was not an "interception" of
the e-mail, even mail that had not yet been read. Essentially, he
decided that the definition of "interception" implicitly means
"contemporaneously with the transmission"; that is, for there to
be an interception, the government must position itself in the
data stream. like a conventional wiretap. Since the e-mail was
temporarily stored on the BBS hard drive, he held there was no
contemporaneous interception.
 
Ruling that there was no interception means two things. First,
the plaintiffs did not receive the $10,000 minimum damages a
violation of the "interception" law provides, even though the
judge found the Secret Service had not acted in good faith. More
importantly, it lowers the standard for seizing BBS e-mail -- and
threatens to lower the standard for the seizure of all electronic
communications which reside long enough in computer memory to be
seized (which is most all computer communications, as far as I
understand it).  To "intercept" wire communications you need a
court order, not just a routine search warrant. This ruling
(which technically only applies in Western District of Texas)
means law enforcement is not limited in its seizure of BBSs by
the higher standards required of wire-tapping.
 
Now, the good news: the plaintiffs won the "disclosure and use"
argument under the ECPA, getting back most of what was lost in
the "interception" decision. First, Judge Sparks found the
obvious: that while the Secret Service had Illuminati they or
their agents read and deleted all the e-mail on Illuminati,
including the plaintiffs' mail -- persons the Secret Service
admittedly having no reason at all to suspect of any illegal
activity.
 
Next, he rejected the Secret Service's argument that its agents
were acting in "good faith." While he didn't list all the
reasons, quite a few are supported by the evidence: the Secret
Service's investigation was "sloppy", he said, and there was no
attempt to find out what Steve Jackson Games did as a business;
the Secret Service was told the day of the raid that the company
was a "publisher," and refused to make copies or return files for
months after they were done reviewing them; and the Secret
Service apparently allowed the private mail of dozens of entirely
innocent and unsuspecting people to be read and trashed.
 
The judge ruled that Steve Jackson, his company, and the three
Illuminati users who joined Jackson in the suit were each
entitled to an $1,000 award from the government, as provided by
the ECPA.
 
The Privacy Protection Act was pretty much a clean sweep. While
the judge and Steve Jackson still differ over how much money the
raid cost the company, the court's ruling was squarely in
Jackson's favor on the law. Although unconventional, the court
found that Steve Jackson Games' publications were clearly
covered by the Act, should not have been seized, and should have
been promptly returned. At trail, the Secret Service agents had
freely admitted they knew nothing about the Act. Former U.S.
Attorney William Cook claimed he knew about it before the raid,
but decided (without any investigation) that Steve Jackson Games
wasn't covered. The Privacy Protection Act (unlike the ECPA)
allows no "good faith" excuses, anyway, and since the Secret
Service was repeatedly told on March 1 and afterwards that the
company was a publishing business there was no defense for the
seizure of "GURPS Cyberpunk" or the other book drafts. Most of
the over $50,000 awarded in damages was due to the violation of
the Privacy Protection Act.
 
Steve Jackson Games publishes traditional books and magazines,
with printed paper pages. Is the BBS operator who publishes only
on-line articles protected, too? It's a question Judge Sparks did
not need to address directly, but his opinion can and should be
read to include the on-line publisher. The court's opinion
includes the BBS files as material improperly seized, and the Act
specifically includes work product in electronic form. Publishing
via BBSs has become just like publishing a "newspaper, book, or
other form of publication..." -- the only source of news many
people get.
 
If the Privacy Protection Act is broadly understood to encompass
electronic publishing (as it should) it should provide
meaningful protection to innocent sysops whose boards may be
used by some for illegal purposes. It should prevent the
"preventative detention" of BBSs -- where boards are seized in
investigations and held indefinitely -- which seems to be one
crude means used to attack suspected criminal activity without
bothering to actually prosecute a case. It should also force law
enforcement to consider who the actual suspect is -- for
instance, in the recent spate of seizures of BBSs for suspected
copyright violations. The Privacy Protection Act should prevent
law enforcement from seizing a sysop's board who is not suspect
in engaging or condoning illegal activity.
 
Those of you who have followed this case will note how little
significance I've given to the "Phrack" investigation and the
overvaluation of the E911 document. Of course the Secret Service
misunderstood or exaggerated the importance of the purloined E911
document, and were chasing imaginary goblins.
 
The real significance of the Steve Jackson Games case, however,
was not knocking holes in that one investigation (the Neidorf
trail effectively did that), but taking a solid step to set firm,
discernible limits for criminal investigations involving computer
communication. To focus on the specific foibles of the E911
investigation is to miss the importance of what the Secret
Service really did wrong. Out of ignorance or callousness, they
ignored the legal rights of people not even suspected of crimes;
people who simple shared common electronic space. There are and
will continue to be legitimate computer-crime investigations. The
closeness that people live in Cyberspace, though, means the
government must learn ways to conduct investigations without
violating the rights of all the innocent members of the on-line
community. In March 1990, the Privacy Protection Act said that
Steve Jackson could write and publish his books without having
them seized; the Secret Service didn't know that. In 1990, the
Illuminati users had the right not to have their e-mail seized
and read without at least being suspected of a crime; the Secret
Service apparently didn't know that, either. Now they do, and
hopefully the word will spread to other government agencies,
too.
 
(As of this writing, there is still no decision whether the
Secret Service (or Steve Jackson, for that matter) will appeal
Judge Spark's decision.)
 
[Peter D. Kennedy is an associate with the Austin, Texas law firm
of George, Donaldson & Ford, specializing in civil litigation.
George, Donaldson & Ford represents national media, technology
and other corporate and individual clients in a variety of civil
litigation, including libel and invasion of privacy defense,
constitutional law, intellectual property, commercial and
employment litigation. George, Donaldson & Ford, 114 W. 7th
Street, Suite 100, Austin, Texas 787001; (512) 495-1400 voice;
(512) 499-0094 fax; E-mail: gdf.well.sf.ca.us]
 

Paul Ferguson               |  "Confidence is the feeling you get
Network Integrator          |   just before you fully understand
Centreville, Virginia USA   |   the problem."
fergp@sytex.com             |      - Murphy's 7th Law of Computing
 
               Quis Custodiet Ipsos Custodes?




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Timothy Newsham <newsham@wiliki.eng.hawaii.edu>
Date: Fri, 2 Jul 93 11:24:10 PDT
To: mdiehl@triton.unm.edu (J. Michael Diehl)
Subject: Re: PGP and offline-readers
In-Reply-To: <9307020453.AA23579@triton.unm.edu>
Message-ID: <9307021824.AA00266@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain




  I think a good idea for offline readers would be to build ontop of
currently implemented protocols.  One protocol worth mentioning is
IMAP2.  Right now IMAP2 usually runs over TCP but there is no reason
why it couldn't run over a serial channel instead (SIMAP :)
It allows for remote access to mailboxes from a mail server, and also
remote access to builitin-board messages (ie. USENET).  There are
several packages in development or already in use that use IMAP.
PINE for unix's and soon to be available for DOS machines supports
IMAP access.  PINE also supports MIME and could be extended nicely
to handle automatic PGP encryption/decryption of mail (or en/de-
cryption with other crypto-systems).  Macintosh already has a mailer
supporting IMAP, the name eludes me at the moment.   The mailers
in existence are written for TCP and would have to be modified for
use over the serial line, perhaps with a pseudo-packet driver in
the dos case.  I think this type of solution would be much cheaper
and much more feature filled than starting from scratch.

                              Tim N.
                              



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: fergp@sytex.com (Paul Ferguson)
Date: Fri, 2 Jul 93 14:44:23 PDT
To: sandfort@attmail.com
Subject: Science News article request
Message-ID: <3Fg36B1w165w@sytex.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


On 01 Jul 93 21:00:49 EDT,
 Sandy Sandfort <uunet!CompuServe.COM!72114.1712> wrote -
 
> I have missed some messages because of a computer problem.
> Perhaps someone has already mentioned or reprinted an article
> by Ivars Peterson ("Encryption Controversy -- A Fierce Debate
> Erupts over Cryptography and privacy") about the Clipper,
> Capstone, et al. in June 19 issue of SCIENCE NEWS.  If not, I
> would be willing to transcribe the article into ASCII and upload
> it to the list if enough folks are interested.
 
 Please do. I'm interested in seeing any article relative to the
 subject at hand...
 
 Cheers.
 

Paul Ferguson               |  "Confidence is the feeling you get
Network Integrator          |   just before you fully understand
Centreville, Virginia USA   |   the problem."
fergp@sytex.com             |      - Murphy's 7th Law of Computing
 
               Quis Custodiet Ipsos Custodes?




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: crunch@netcom.com (John Draper)
Date: Fri, 2 Jul 93 12:29:21 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Cypherpunks brocures needed - Feedback welcome
Message-ID: <9307021929.AA27787@netcom4.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



  I am setting up some info tables at various upcoming events and
partys.    I want to make up a flier for those attending,  and would
like for someone in cypherpunks to please draft up what the flier should
say.

   It should basically say what the goals of the Cypherpunks are,
what they do,  and stress the issues at stake,  IE:  Clipper ship
proposal,  promoting private data encryption,  and the like.

   The flier will be an 8 1/2 by 11 paper,  and I plan on making
about 50 of them initially.    I would like someone here to help me
with the wording.    It should be brief,   and give just enough
information to help our cause.

   Last call for Laptops.  I have someone who has PC-DOS laptop,
and we need someone with a Mac laptop,  and we then have all bases
covered.

Thanx




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Sandy <72114.1712@CompuServe.COM>
Date: Fri, 2 Jul 93 12:15:00 PDT
To: <cypherpunks@toad.com>
Subject: CLIPPER IN SCIENCE NEWS
Message-ID: <930702190909_72114.1712_FHF95-1@CompuServe.COM>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
  SANDY SANDFORT               Reply to:  ssandfort@attmail.com
 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

As requested by some of you, here is the encryption article that
appeared in the 19 June issue of SCIENCE NEWS.  It's copied
without permission, for personal use of list members only, blah,
blah, blah.

 S a n d y

                          * * * * * * *

                     ENCRYPTION CONTROVERSY
                   A fierce debate erupts over
                    cryptography and privacy

                        by Ivers Peterson


With a little encryption to hide their words, Prince Charles and
Princess Diana might never have suffered the embarrassing
spectacle of having transcripts of their private telephone
conversations splashed across the front pages of newspapers
around the world.

The royal couple has not been alone in learning the painful
lesson that modern technology has made eavesdropping -- whether
officially sanctioned, inadvertent, or illegal -- remarkably
easy.  Today, cellular and cordless telephones transmit
conversations via radio waves that can be readily intercepted.
Electronic-mail messages pass openly from one computer to another
across a network accessible to innumerable people.

"We take for granted that by sealing the envelope or closing the
door, we can achieve privacy in our communications," says
Whitfield Diffie of Sun Microsystems in Mountain View, Calif.
"The challenge of modern security technology is to transplant
these familiar mechanisms from the traditional world of
face-to-face meetings and pen-and-ink communications to a world
in which digital electronic communications are the norm and the
luxury of personal encounters or handwritten messages [is] the
exception."

Modern technology has provided a solution in the form of
sophisticated schemes for encrypting digitized sounds and text.
Only a recipient with the proper key for unlocking the secret
code can hear or read the otherwise unintelligible, encrypted
string of digits.

Nonetheless, few telephones and computers used by the general
public come equipped with either software or micro-electronic
circuitry for encrypting speech or text.  Indeed, some critics
charge that the U.S. government has actively discouraged wide
dissemination of cryptographic technology.

"Conflicting signals from a succession of administrations have
led many to be very confused as to what U.S. citizens have a
right to expect from cryptographic technologies and what
capabilities the U.S. government would prefer its citizens have
available," says Stephen T. Walker, president of Trusted
Information Systems, Inc., in Glenwood, Md.

                              . . .

In April, the Clinton administration added a new ingredient that
set the cryptographic-policy pot boiling.  The White House
proposal called for the adoption of a novel encryption scheme as
a federal standard.  It would incorporate a "front door" through
which properly authorized government officials could readily
decrypt intercepted messages for reasons of law enforcement or
national security.

the proposal ignited a firestorm of protest from large segments
of the computer community.  Since then, angry debate over this
issue and the more general question of privacy in an electronic
age has dominated discourse on many electronic bulletin boards,
where individuals can post their queries and opinions on a
smorgasbord of concerns.

"Not everybody is saying this is terrible, terrible, terrible,
but nobody is happy about it," Walker says.  The list of
dissatisfied parties ranges from major computer manufacturers and
telephone companies to privacy activists belonging to
organizations such as the Electronic Frontier Foundation and
Computer Professionals for Social Responsibility.

The administration's scheme has also attracted congressional
scrutiny and focused attention on the need to formulate a
coherent national cryptographic policy.  Many see the resolution
of privacy issues as one of the key elements in developing a
national information infrastructure, which would allow anyone
using a networked computer unprecedented access to libraries,
data repositories, and other information sources throughout the
United States.

"Recent years have seen a succession of technological
developments that diminish the privacy available to the
individual," Diffie stated last month in testimony before the
House science subcommittee.  "Cryptography is perhaps alone in
its promise to give us more privacy rather than less.  But here
we are told that we should forgo this technical benefit and
accept a solution in which the government will retain the power
to intercept our ever more valuable and intimate communications."

                              . . .

For many decades, cryptography remained largely a government
matter -- an arcane discipline of interest to military
organizations and to the secretive National Security Agency
(NSA), which routinely monitors foreign communications.  But the
subject also captured the attention of a few enthusiasts outside
government.  In the 1970s, the development of electronic
communication via the first national computer networks spurred
these people to look for ways to protect information in this new,
wide-open environment.

In 1975, Diffie, working with computer scientist Martin E.
Hellman of Stanford University, invented a novel, revolutionary
cryptographic technique now know as public-key cryptography.
Developed entirely outside of government, it offered a high level
of security and privacy to any individual using the system.

In conventional cryptographic schemes, the user typically has a
"key" that changes all the digits of a message into an
unintelligible string.  The recipient then uses the same key to
unscramble the code and read the message.

In a public-key system, the user has one key -- kept secret --
encrypting the message and the recipient has a different but
mathematically related key to decrypt the message.  There's no
need to keep the second key secret because, in principle, there
should be no way to figure out the private key from knowledge of
the public key.  This, everyone has a private key and a public
key, which they can then use to encrypt or decrypt messages.

Almost simultaneously, the U.S. government offered an
alternative, single-key method known as the Data Encryption
Standard (DES), for coding information.  Although experts outside
of government initially harbored suspicions that the NSA had
deliberately weakened the scheme to make code-breaking easier, 15
years of concerted effort to find flaws have failed to turn up
any serious problems.  Many banks and other institutions now
routinely use this technique to maintain the confidentiality and
integrity of communications involving financial transactions and
other matters.

                              . . .

One of the first hints of something new in the works came early
this year.  Last fall, Walker heard about a new AT&T telephone
equipped with a lightweight electronic device, basd on DES, for
turning a telephone signal into a digital stream of encrypted
information.  He ordered five of these secure telephones for his
business.

In January, AT&T representatives told Walker they could only loan
him the telephones he wanted; something better would become
available in April, they said.  Walker noticed they no longer
mentioned DES as the encryption scheme.

"So I knew there was something coming," Walker says.  "But I
didn't know what the details were."  When the White House
announcement finally came, the details caught just about everyone
in the computer community by surprise.

In essence, the proposed "key-escrow" technology takes the form
of two specially fabricated, tamper-resistant integrated-circuit
chips -- one, known as Clipper, for encrypting digital telephone
signals and another, known as Capstone, for encrypting the output
of computers.  Information from any telephone or computer would
pass through the chip to be encrypted, and a corresponding chip
attached to the recipient's telephone or computer would decipher
the message.

However, the scheme is designed to include another key, divided
into two parts, that when reconstituted will also unlock the
message.  The administration's plan is to deposit these pieces
-- unique to each chip -- in two separate, secure databases.  The
two pieces of a particular key would be released only to
officials at such agencies as the Federal Bureau of Investigation
who are authorized to tap a particular telephone line.

This technology improves "the security and privacy of telephone
communications while meeting the legitimate needs of law
enforcement," the White House stated in announcing the Clipper
chip.

"The effect," says Diffie, "is very much like that of the little
keyhole in the back of the combination locks used on the lockers
of schoolchildren.  The children open the locks with the
combination, which is supposed to keep the other children out,
but the teachers can always look in the lockers by using the
key."

"Because the key-escrow chip enables lawful interceptions, the
government for the first time in history is in a position to
promote encryption without putting public safety at risk," says
Dorothy E. Denning, a cryptography expert at Georgetown
University in Washington, D.C.  "As a result of the government's
efforts, I expect to see greater use of encryption and,
consequently, greater protection of sensitive communications."

Administration officials insist the Clipper-Capstone scheme is
voluntary.  Initially, only certain departments and agencies of
the government will be required to use it.  But clearly, the
administration hopes that various companies will start
incorporating this technology into commercial products, at first
to supply the government market and then to meet the security
needs of businesses and private individuals.

This approach puzzles many observers.  "If you're not going to
force it on people, then it's going to be largely irrelevant for
the computer community," says Walker.  "DES and RSA [a public-key
cryptosystem] are already so widely used in software versions
that most users will not even consider converting to Clipper or
Capstone, simply because of the additional hardware expense."

"Anyone who is seriously seeking to protect sensitive information
will use alternative methods, either instead of or in addition to
the Clipper-Capstone chips," he adds.  That leaves the
possibility that the government may eventually ban the use of
certain types of cryptography, though officials presently deny
any such intent.

"Encryption is a technology that could be constrained legally in
the same way that other technologies are constrained," Denning
argues.  "Congress should consider legislation that would impose
such constraints."

                              . . .


Debating the technical merits of the administration's proposal
has proved tricky.  Many of the details of the scheme's
implementation remain fuzzy, and the government has insisted on
keeping secret the actual mathematical recipe, or algorithm, for
generating the required keys.

"It's very hard to assess something when you don't know what
you're assessing," notes Lance J. Hoffman, a computer scientist
at George Washington University in Washington, D.C.

In contrast, the government made public the DES algorithm, giving
cryptography experts a chance to examine and test the scheme
thoroughly t vouch for its security.  Developed secretly at the
NSA, the new algorithm use for the Clipper and Capstone chips
will receive no such scrutiny.

The government's reluctance to release the algorithm stems from
the possibility that some people might then use the algorithm
without its accompanying key-escrow provision to create a
formidable encryption scheme.  "Tis is a powerful algorithm,"
says NSA's Clint Brooks.  "You need some kind of control
mechanism . . . to ensure the law-enforcement capability is
preserved."

The Clipper and Capstone chips also represent only one possible
approach to achieving a reasonable balance between unconstrained
privacy and the needs of law enforcement and national security.
Silvio Micali of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology has
proposed an alternative scheme -- developed well before the
Clipper chip announcement -- that eschews complicated chips and
special hardware in favor of a considerably more flexible,
inexpensive software solution.

Like the administration, Micali favors an approach that includes
a cryptographic escape hatch in case of dire emergency.
"Scientists ought to be socially responsible," he argues.  "We
have to ask ourselves what would be the social impact of
widespread cryptography."

Micali has demonstrated that it's possible with his technique to
transform any public-key cryptosystem into one that includes a
provision for third-party access to encrypted information, if a
court deems such access essential for reasons of law enforcement
or national security.  He calls the transformed version a "fair"
public-key cryptosystem.

"The transformed systems preserve the security and efficiency of
the original ones," Micali says.  "Thus, one can still use
whatever system [he or she] believes to be more secure and enjoy
the additional property of fairness."

                              . . .

But to many others, the real debate is not about the technical
merits of the Clipper and Capstone proposals.  "The fundamental
issue that people are talking about is the question of whether
people have a right to have privacy in a conversation . . .
something that cryptography can provide," says Ronald L. Rivest,
a computer scientist at MIT.

Denning contends that it would be irresponsible for either
government or industry to promote the widespread use of strong
encryption.  "I do not believe our laws grant an `absolute right'
to a private conversation," she says.

But Rivest and others reject the notion that the pubic should
have access only to cryptography that the U.S. government can
decipher.  They feel shut out of the government decision-making
process that brought forth the Clipper chip.

"I don't know anyone inside the government who is fighting for
the average citizen's protection here," Walker says.  "It's the
national security and law enforcement guys that are running the
show, and the administration has bought in to their side."

"I don't think we have a fair situation at all," he adds.
"That's why I keep insisting we've got to have a national review
involving . . . private citizens and private organizations."

The administration already has an internal review of
cryptographic policy under way.  This task force is supposed to
have its final report ready by the end of the summer.  In
addition, earlier this month, the Computer System Security and
Privacy Advisory Board, which advises the administration on
matters of security and privacy, held a three-day meeting to hear
public comments on a variety of cryptographic issues.

Many people question the sudden rush to implement
Clipper-Capstone, given the major ethical and constitutional
questions at issue.  "There hasn't been a serious public
discussion," Hoffman says.  "Nobody has been given enough time."

Faced with such criticisms, the government now shows signs of
slowing implementation of its key-escrow plan until the scheme's
ramifications have been studied further.  At the same time,
computer users already have access to chips and software
incorporating DES or the RSA public-key cryptosystem.

"For the first time in history, we have a situation in which
individuals can use cryptography good enough that even
governments can't read [the encrypted messages]," Hoffman says.
"That is a big change.  The administration is ultimately going to
have to address the issue of whether people can use their own
cryptography and keep the keys secret themselves."

                          * * * * * * *


>>>>>>    Please send e-mail to:  ssandfort@attmail.com    <<<<<<
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Dave Banisar <banisar@washofc.cpsr.org>
Date: Fri, 2 Jul 93 14:33:14 PDT
To: CYPHERPUNKS <CYPHERPUNKS@toad.com>
Subject: CPSR Workplace Privacy Test
Message-ID: <00541.2824473766.4122@washofc.cpsr.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


  CPSR Workplace Privacy Testimony
  =====================================================

                 Prepared Testimony
                           and
                Statement for the Record
                            of
                     Marc Rotenberg, 
           Director, CPSR Washington office,
  Adjunct Professor, Georgetown University Law Center
                            on
                        H.R. 1900, 
       The Privacy for Consumers and Workers Act

                          Before
    The Subcommittee on Labor-Management Relations,
           Committee on Education and Labor,
             U.S. House of Representatives
                      June 30, 1993

	Mr. Chairman, members of the Subcommittee, thank 
for the opportunity to testify today on H.R. 1900, the 
Privacy for Consumers and Workers Act.  My name is Marc 
Rotenberg and I am the director of the CPSR Washington 
office and an adjunct professor at Georgetown University 
Law Center where I teach a course on information privacy 
law.
	Speaking on behalf of CPSR, we strongly endorse the 
Privacy for Consumers and Workers Act.  The measure will 
establish important safeguards for workers and consumers 
in the United States.  We believe that H.R. 1900 is 
particularly important as our country becomes more 
dependent on computerized information systems and the 
risk of privacy abuse increases.
	CPSR has a special interest in workplace privacy.  
For almost a decade we have advocated for the design of 
computer systems that better serve the needs of 
employees in the workplace.  We do not view this 
particular goal as a trade-off between labor and 
management.  It is our belief that computer systems and 
information policies that are designed so as to value 
employees will lead to a more productive work 
environment and ultimately more successful companies and 
organizations.  As Charles Hecksher of the Harvard 
Business School has said good managers have no use for 
secret monitoring.
	Equally important is the need to ensure that 
certain fundamental rights of employees are safeguarded.  
The protection of personal privacy in the information 
age may be as crucial for American workers as the 
protection of safety was in the age of machines.  
Organizations that fail to develop appropriate workplace 
privacy policies leave employees at risk of abuse, 
embarrassment, and harassment.
	The concern about workplace privacy is widely felt 
in the computer profession.  This month MacWorld 
magazine, a leading publication in the computer 
industry, released a special report on workplace 
privacy.  The report, based on a survey of 301 companies 
in the United States and authored by noted science 
writer Charles Piller, made clear the need for a strong 
federal policy.

	Among the key findings of the MacWorld survey:

>  More than 21 percent of those polled said that 
they had "engaged in searches of employee 
computer files, voice mail, electronic mail, or 
other networking communications."

>  "Monitoring work flow" is the most frequently 
cited reason for electronic searches.

>  In two out of three cases, employees are not 
warned about electronic searches.

>  Only one third of the companies surveyed have a 
written policy on privacy

	What is also interesting about the MacWorld survey 
is the high level of concern expressed by top corporate 
managers about electronic monitoring.  More than a half 
of those polled said that electronic monitoring was 
either "never acceptable" or "usually or always 
counterproductive."  Less than five percent believed 
that electronic monitoring was a good tool to routinely 
verify honesty.
	These numbers suggest that managers would support a 
sensible privacy law.  Indeed, they are consistent with 
other privacy polls conducted by Professor Alan Westin 
for the Lou Harris organization which show that managers 
are well aware of privacy concerns and may, with a 
little prodding, agree to sensible policies.
	What would such a policy look like?  The MacWorld 
report also includes a model privacy policy that is 
based on several U.S. and international privacy codes.  
Here are the key elements:

>  Employees should know what electronic 
surveillance tools are used, and how management 
will use the data gathered.

>  Management should minimize electronic monitoring 
as much as possible.  Continuous monitoring 
should not be permitted.

>  Data should only be used for clearly defined, 
work-related purposes.

>  Management should not engage in secret 
monitoring unless there is credible evidence of 
criminal activity or serious wrongdoing.

>  Data gathered through monitoring should not be 
the sole factor in employee evaluations.

>  Personal information gathered by employers 
should not be disclosed to any third parties, 
except to comply with legal requirements.

>  Employees or prospective employees should not be 
asked to waive privacy rights.

>  Managers who violate these privacy principles 
should be subject to discipline or termination.

	Many of these provisions are contained in H.R. 
1900, the Privacy for Consumers and Workers Act.  
Clearly, the policies and the bill itself are not 
intended to prohibit monitoring, nor to prevent 
employers from protecting their business interests.  
What the bill will do is help establish a clear 
framework that ensures employees are properly notified 
of monitoring practices, that personal information is 
not misused, and that monitoring capability is not 
abused.  It is a straightforward, sensible approach that 
does not so much balance rights as it clarifies 
interests and ensures that both employers and employees 
will respect appropriate limitations on monitoring 
capability. 
	The need to move quickly to establish a framework 
for workplace privacy protection is clear.  Privacy 
problems will become more acute in the years ahead as 
new monitoring schemes are developed and new forms of 
personal data are collected.  As Professor Gary Marx has 
made clear, there is little that can be imagined in the 
monitoring realm that can not be achieved.  Already, 
some members of the computer profession are wearing 
"active badges" that provide full-time geographical 
monitoring.  Properly used, these devices help employees 
use new tools in the hi-tech workplace.  Improperly 
used, such devices could track the physical movements of 
an employee throughout the day, almost like a blip on a 
radar screen.
	Computers are certainly powerful tools.  We believe 
that they can be used to improve productivity and 
increase job satisfaction.  But this requires that 
appropriate policies be developed to address employee 
concerns and that laws be passed, when necessary, to 
ensure that computer abuse does not occur.
	This concludes my testimony.  I would be pleased to 
answer your questions.

 =====================================================







From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Timothy Newsham <newsham@wiliki.eng.hawaii.edu>
Date: Fri, 2 Jul 93 20:06:43 PDT
To: mdiehl@triton.unm.edu (J. Michael Diehl)
Subject: Re: PGP and offline-readers
In-Reply-To: <9307030116.AA17473@triton.unm.edu>
Message-ID: <9307030306.AA14108@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> 
> According to Timothy Newsham:
> >   I think a good idea for offline readers would be to build ontop of
> > currently implemented protocols.  One protocol worth mentioning is
> 
> This is fine if you are using a *nix machine.  But if you are trying 
> to enforce
> your privacy over CI$ or genie or a bbs, well, you can't rely on one common
> protocol.  This is why I advocate communications program scripts.

We need to get people to use common protocols!  
CI$ will respond to what its users want.
If we got alot of BBS's to use IMAP then the users would
want CI$ to use the same.
If we made IMAP easy to use and helped BBS authors
get IMAP code running in their systems then BBS users would
use it

PINE is very easy to use.  It will be available soon for personal
computers to use.  That part of the solution is almost there.
How do we get BBS's to use IMAP?  they could support IMAP in
a similar way that they support Zmodem.  What needs to be done
is to write some code that does IMAPD functions that could easily
be incorporated into a BBS program, and figure out a way for
end users to run PINE from their favorite bbs program.
(and get PINE people to allow for a serial-line connection *or*
write a false-packet driver that just strips off TCP/IP headers
sends the data over the line and sends back ACK's to the TCP/IP
process).
                              Tim




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: J. Michael Diehl <mdiehl@triton.unm.edu>
Date: Fri, 2 Jul 93 18:16:43 PDT
To: newsham@wiliki.eng.hawaii.edu (Timothy Newsham)
Subject: Re: PGP and offline-readers
In-Reply-To: <9307021824.AA00266@toad.com>
Message-ID: <9307030116.AA17473@triton.unm.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


According to Timothy Newsham:
>   I think a good idea for offline readers would be to build ontop of
> currently implemented protocols.  One protocol worth mentioning is

This is fine if you are using a *nix machine.  But if you are trying to enforce
your privacy over CI$ or genie or a bbs, well, you can't rely on one common
protocol.  This is why I advocate communications program scripts.
+-----------------------+-----------------------------+---------+
| J. Michael Diehl ;-)  | I thought I was wrong once. | PGP KEY |
| mdiehl@triton.unm.edu |   But, I was mistaken.      |available|
| mike.diehl@fido.org   |                             | Ask Me! |
| (505) 299-2282        +-----------------------------+---------+
|                                                               |
+------"I'm just looking for the opportunity to be -------------+
|            Politically Incorrect!"   <Me>                     |
+-----If codes are outlawed, only criminals wil have codes.-----+
+----Is Big Brother in your phone?  If you don't know, ask me---+



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Timothy Newsham <newsham@wiliki.eng.hawaii.edu>
Date: Sat, 3 Jul 93 01:42:07 PDT
To: mccoy@ccwf.cc.utexas.edu (Jim McCoy)
Subject: Re: PGP and offline-readers
In-Reply-To: <199307030723.AA19543@tramp.cc.utexas.edu>
Message-ID: <9307030842.AA23089@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> 
> > PINE is very easy to use.  It will be available soon for personal
> > computers to use.  That part of the solution is almost there.
> 
> That part of the solution is already done.  There are already several very
> good POP/IMAP clients for Macs and PCs (Eudora, NuPOP, etc).  Why the
> fixation on a particular mail agent?  There is no way that you are going to
> get people to agree on a single MUA, therefore it seems that the comm
> channel is the beastie that one should focus on for encryption.

No fixation.  Just that IMAP is the best protocol for remote mail 
reading and pine is already available and supporting IMAP.  And
as a bonus it supports MIME.  This *is* something that BBS'ers dont
already have..  multi-media mail.

> 
> I hate to break it to you, but there already exists a protocol for off-line
> reading of mail and news over serial connections: QWK.  While a noble
> effort, I sincerely doubt that the BBSers and CI$ users are going to jump
> over to a completely new protocol for transport of information for off-line
> reading unless it offers them something that they do not already have, and
> IMAP/POP just doesn't do that.  If one were to be able to offer encrypted
> TCP/IP connectivity though, then you would be offering people the additional
> functionality of this comm channel (telnet, ftp, gopher/www, etc) to entice
> them to switch over.

You dont need encrypted TCP/IP!  A good mail reader supporting MIME
could handle encryption packages automatically!  MIME also supports
many other things that "they do not already have".

> 
> > (and get PINE people to allow for a serial-line connection *or*
> > write a false-packet driver that just strips off TCP/IP headers
> > sends the data over the line and sends back ACK's to the TCP/IP
> > process).
> 
> Why not just get them to support IP?  Probably easier...  All they need is
> a slip/ppp driver on the host, then you can do the encryption over comm
> channel and avoid wasting time encrypting something that doesn't need to be
> encrypted.  Many BBS systems are beginning to wade through the shallow
> water of the Internet, if we had the ability to offer them modifications to
> provide encryption to thier IP connectivity while they are still new to the
> game it would be much easier to get them accostomed to the idea that such
> traffic should offer encryption; not that I think this will happen, but in
> an ideal world...

I dont think its easier.  I think something like SLIMAP (serial line
imap) would be the easist thing to implement.  IMAP runs over a network
stream and there is no reason it couldnt run over a serial line stream.
The code written for imapd already runs on stdin/stdout...  It wouldnt
be hard to port to run on a serial line connection.

> jim

I dont think offering IP to the masses is the right solution right
now.  Its not appropriate for the BBS world.  Getting people to use
remote mail clients is something that the masses could take to
alot easier.  I think this would be the prefered way to read mail
since the user interface could be made more friendly,  sorta
the 'prodigy thang'.  I dont think it matters what protocol is used
in the end but I think its something that should happen, and something
that we as cypherpunks have an interest in seeing happen.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Jim McCoy <mccoy@ccwf.cc.utexas.edu>
Date: Sat, 3 Jul 93 00:23:27 PDT
To: newsham@wiliki.eng.hawaii.edu (Timothy Newsham)
Subject: Re: PGP and offline-readers
In-Reply-To: <9307030306.AA14108@toad.com>
Message-ID: <199307030723.AA19543@tramp.cc.utexas.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text


> PINE is very easy to use.  It will be available soon for personal
> computers to use.  That part of the solution is almost there.

That part of the solution is already done.  There are already several very
good POP/IMAP clients for Macs and PCs (Eudora, NuPOP, etc).  Why the
fixation on a particular mail agent?  There is no way that you are going to
get people to agree on a single MUA, therefore it seems that the comm
channel is the beastie that one should focus on for encryption.

> How do we get BBS's to use IMAP?  they could support IMAP in
> a similar way that they support Zmodem.  What needs to be done
> is to write some code that does IMAPD functions that could easily
> be incorporated into a BBS program, and figure out a way for
> end users to run PINE from their favorite bbs program.

I hate to break it to you, but there already exists a protocol for off-line
reading of mail and news over serial connections: QWK.  While a noble
effort, I sincerely doubt that the BBSers and CI$ users are going to jump
over to a completely new protocol for transport of information for off-line
reading unless it offers them something that they do not already have, and
IMAP/POP just doesn't do that.  If one were to be able to offer encrypted
TCP/IP connectivity though, then you would be offering people the additional
functionality of this comm channel (telnet, ftp, gopher/www, etc) to entice
them to switch over.

> (and get PINE people to allow for a serial-line connection *or*
> write a false-packet driver that just strips off TCP/IP headers
> sends the data over the line and sends back ACK's to the TCP/IP
> process).

Why not just get them to support IP?  Probably easier...  All they need is
a slip/ppp driver on the host, then you can do the encryption over comm
channel and avoid wasting time encrypting something that doesn't need to be
encrypted.  Many BBS systems are beginning to wade through the shallow
water of the Internet, if we had the ability to offer them modifications to
provide encryption to thier IP connectivity while they are still new to the
game it would be much easier to get them accostomed to the idea that such
traffic should offer encryption; not that I think this will happen, but in
an ideal world...

jim





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Date: Sat, 3 Jul 93 02:41:39 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: (fwd) GIFs--Now it can be told
Message-ID: <9307030942.AA03729@netcom3.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Cypherpatriots,

Here's a little experiment I've been conducting. A week ago I posted
an ecrypted GIF to a bizarre new newsgroup that showed up on NETCOM,
"alt.binaries.pictures.erotica.children." Quite a controversial group,
pushing several buttons.

My posting generated some real heat, though there was absolutely no
evidence it was anything more than just a file. Apparently the mere
fact of it existing was a kind of "thoughtcrime" in these politically
correct times.

Anyway, I let it brew for one week, then wrote this explanation and
posted it. Several Cypherpunk list readers were slightly involved,
some to criticize me, some to say "Not so fast." You know who you are.
:-}

All in all, a pleasant little experiment.

Here's the posting I sent out:


Newsgroups: alt.binaries.pictures.erotica.children,alt.config,netcom.netnews
From: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Subject: GIFs--Now it can be told
Message-ID: <tcmayC9L0zI.2C3@netcom.com>
Date: Sat, 3 Jul 1993 09:28:29 GMT


One week ago tonight a new group appeared at my site,
"alt.binaries.pictures.erotica.children," a group certain to provoke
controversy, to bring out the Net Cops, and to induce a certain kind
of "Stockholm Syndrome," wherein some folks scramble to initiate
censorship prior even to the Feds doing it. (Their battle cry is "Eeek! If
we don't nip this in the bud, _right now_, think of what might
happen!)

My experience has been that these Net.Censors are usually too quick to
claim something has clearly gone beyond the bounds of decency and
acceptability. Thankfully, they usually fail in their efforts.

Anyway, seeing this strange new group appear on my system, I decided
to conduct an experiment.

I posted an "encrypted GIF," not further identified, and waited for
the reaction. The file was as follows (only part of it shown):


-----BEGIN PGP MESSAGE-----
Version: 2.2

b2cCrVJKUYUZf7UBA/i1tSSz66dOx4+cJKzNkm1JBhGigMdRvxM8Slm3TyC7kgWW
L8J3w/On10thisi487rU/Gl7xOMajxCQedHrb6k0+wYDGjxmVcu9xwLWAWpkgq+5
fUiNKBnF/SUA/JisFrWvn63rt44n+DqROwx8CXuSvL1mUdqLRTS0t/timjHnhIwC
VmLN1FTnSD8BBACFa38SqiwByarfcVhFg/fuKWc4AgKtYqSt5oWW6sYLckC3nEen
ZcHV+DNFo36Exg7r0trapoBXpjoe9ENCsCbFJ7i/M7FwFYvK1QAcxQ6zGt+3HICM
9Hsxg1d5Goqp4+nmpW+9Y/UVY16+WVl9moY3c7Iv04Cp0ipu2B5qfIxPZoSMAlKv
.....

Not to my surprise, about 20 people have (so far) requested the key to
this file. (The whole encryption rationale is covered later.) I didn't
reply to them...some of them asked for the key a second time!

What surprised me is that nobody carefully looked at the file. Here it
is again, with some places marked:


-----BEGIN PGP MESSAGE-----
Version: 2.2

b2cCrVJKUYUZf7UBA/i1tSSz66dOx4+cJKzNkm1JBhGigMdRvxM8Slm3TyC7kgWW
L8J3w/On10thisi487rU/Gl7xOMajxCQedHrb6k0+wYDGjxmVcu9xwLWAWpkgq+5
          ^^^^
fUiNKBnF/SUA/JisFrWvn63rt44n+DqROwx8CXuSvL1mUdqLRTS0t/timjHnhIwC
              ^^
VmLN1FTnSD8BBACFa38SqiwByarfcVhFg/fuKWc4AgKtYqSt5oWW6sYLckC3nEen
                ^
ZcHV+DNFo36Exg7r0trapoBXpjoe9ENCsCbFJ7i/M7FwFYvK1QAcxQ6zGt+3HICM
                 ^^^^
9Hsxg1d5Goqp4+nmpW+9Y/UVY16+WVl9moY3c7Iv04Cp0ipu2B5qfIxPZoSMAlKv
.......

I put a couple of other "subliminal messages" in, which I suppose
could provoke the Religious Right into squawking that "Satanic
messages" are being hidden in computer files *that children could
possibly read*. Gasp!

Needless to say, such ASCII surgery performed on a PGP file (which, by
the way, was just some random message someone had sent me a while
back, utterly unreadable by anyone other than the two of us--and not
even that after I mutated various characters) makes it completely
unreadable. Even if someone had the other half of the PGP key
pair--which never existed--the file would not even checksum as a legal
PGP file!

(Putting plaintext into the file was both a message I hoped astute
readers would eventually notice--though it *is* pretty hard to
see--and an ironclad proof that the file could not be a real PGP
message, let alone a GIF, let alone kiddie porn.)

There are some quasi-legitimate issues surrounding the area of child
erotica. Was the child coerced? Was consent meaningful? Etc.

But the posting of mere bits qua bits causing such anger and flamage
indicates a serious overreaction.

Are mere thoughts the crime? Orwell covered this, didn't he?

* What if such images merely "look like" children (and just what is the
age of consent? 18? 16? "Children" of 15 can get married in most
countries of the world.)...are such "fakes" illegal?

* What if they are computer-generated images, of children that never
existed outside of a computer? Which children were exploited? We're
back to thoughtcrime again. (Don't laugh, a leading interpretation is
that even computer-generated child porn would be illegal, not because
of crimes committed against children, but because of the "atmosphere"
and "climate" it might produce. That is, thoughtcrime.)

* What if the images were morphs? Not wholly computer-generated, but the
morph of an adult image into that of a child?

* What if one 15-year old child took photos of a another 15-year old
child? What if one child "exploited" another? What if a child took
pictures of herself, self-portraits?

* What if the images, if they were ever to be posted, originated
someplace where they are legal? Perhaps Amsterdam, someone suggested.
If the U.S government tries to stop the Net (which is already a market
anarchy, thankfully) from distributing this material, mightn't all the
various countries that have different laws than ours do the same
thing? There goes alt.fan.salman.rushdie. And there goes soc.motss and
all the "normal" alt.binaries.pictures.* groups. Of course it won't
likely happen, nor will alt.binaries.pictures.erotica.children go
away,either. Get used to it. (Again, I don't care for it, but wailing
and moaning won't make it go away.)

* What if someone scanned-in images from the widely available books by
David Hamilton, or Robert Mapplethorpe? Certainly many of these photos
are of nude children...would the imminent death of Usenet finally
happen if someone went down to B. Dalton Books, bought a David
Hamilton collection, and posted some of the photos in a.b.p.e.c.?


So, I would encourage folks to lighten up. In a week on the Net, not a
single kiddie porn picture has been posted. And if it does happen, try
to just ignore it. The kid whose picture was taken is probably grown
up by now (I'm guessing that many such images are from old magazines,
etc.). In any case, the occasional picture is hardly going to create a
new slave trade in children.

The issue of how the media may react is a more serious one. Part of
the reason I'm explaining my little experiment now is to make sure my
posting, at least, is not used by some nitwit reporter as the basis of
a story. (If it's being used, then he'll soon have egg on his face.)

That's the story. I hope you enjoyed the ride.


P.S. I said I'd say something about why I used encryption. Aside from
not being a real PGP-readable file, the idea was to make it look like
one. This is the likeliest way for such material to get posted, along
with anonymous remailers. The "look for the key in the 'usual places'"
bit was to resonate with the "binary nerve gas" idea, where the
dangerous pieces are stored separately and only combined at the last
minute. I don't know if such techniques are already in use, but I
expect them soon.

The mutant condors that one reader (who claimed to be a Pope in the
Church of the Subgenius, but who humorlessly missed the joke--but I
forgive him, for he knew not what he saw) wanted to feed me to, can
now stop circling my house.

-Tim May


-- 
..........................................................................
Timothy C. May         | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,  
tcmay@netcom.com       | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
408-688-5409           | knowledge, reputations, information markets, 
W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA  | black markets, collapse of governments.
Higher Power: 2^756839 | Public Key: PGP and MailSafe available.
Note: I put time and money into writing this posting. I hope you enjoy it.

--




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Michael Ross <mross@antigone.com>
Date: Sat, 3 Jul 93 06:57:52 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: (fwd) GIFs--Now it can be told
Message-ID: <9307031355.AA00356@antigone.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Tim,

That was very manipulative, and did not achieve much. 


It has also very little to do with the subject of this mailing list.  
If anything, you discouraged at least one person I know who became  
genuinely interested in encryption and PGP as a result of your post.

If you had posted an actual David Hamilton photo, even encrypted, you  
would have put yourself forward, perhaps even bravely, as a test  
case. You then would really have had a point to argue, having taken a  
stand. 


As it turns out, you hid behind a pretty lame scheme, the only object  
of which seems to have been to make a fool out of as many people as  
possible. This is not how you accomplish constructive change, Tim.  
People resent being made to feel stupid, and they certainly will  
_not_ listen to what you have to say if you are belittling them. 


I happen to agree with those points you deigned to make in a  
straightforward manner. But you hid them so well behind trickery that  
they will go unnoticed. Learn to deal with people, and you'll see  
they are willing to listen to reasonable arguments.

If your parents didn't give you enough attention as a child, don't  
take it out on the world by trying to get some here... Learn to work  
_with_ people, not _against_ people, lest within ten years you'll be  
walking into office buildings with automatic weapons strapped to your  
body and shooting lawyers... ;)

Michael




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: s.summers1@genie.geis.com
Date: Sat, 3 Jul 93 00:15:22 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Junk mail/return encrypted-blo
Message-ID: <9307030715.AA22317@relay2.geis.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


 
From zane@genesis.mcs.com (Sameer)
 
>The second solution I thought of seems like it would work. When I
 >create the return-address block, it can be given some sort of ID-code
 >(again, like with my other idea posted, similar to the ID-code on peices
 >of Digicash in Chaum's scheme) so when the vendor delivers the product,
 >she sends to encrypted block to the remailer, and the remailer forwards
 >the product to me, and stores the ID-code in its database (doing the
 >proper one-way transformation for untraceability) so that further
 >attempts to use the exact same address-block will be noticed and not
 >delivered.
 
        Why not just include an Expire: header in the encrypted block, after
 which the remailer would just junk any mail sent with that return address?
 
 




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: wet!naga (Peter Davidson)
Date: Sat, 3 Jul 93 17:48:36 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Reply to Michael's criticism of Tim
Message-ID: <m0oCAW8-000APVC@wet.uucp>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


 
I think Michael's reaction to Tim's experiment re
alt.binaries.pictures.erotica.children deserves comment.
 
>Date: Sat, 3 Jul 93 06:55:56 -0700
>From: Michael Ross <mross@antigone.com>
>Subject: Re: (fwd) GIFs--Now it can be told
>
>Tim,
>
>That was very manipulative, and did not achieve much.
 
Who was manipulated?  Those who reacted did so freely.
As Tim said, it was an experiment, not an attempt to
achieve anything.  The point was to see what would happen.
 
>It has also very little to do with the subject of this mailing list.
 
This mailing list is about encryption and other matters.  The use
of PGP to distribute erotica is thus a relevant topic.
 
>If anything, you discouraged at least one person I know who became
>genuinely interested in encryption and PGP as a result of your post.
 
Tough.
 
>As it turns out, you hid behind a pretty lame scheme, the only object
>of which seems to have been to make a fool out of as many people as
>possible.
 
I think Michael has missed the point.
 
>This is not how you accomplish constructive change, Tim.
>People resent being made to feel stupid, and they certainly will
>_not_ listen to what you have to say if you are belittling them.
 
I don't recall Tim's belittling anyone - except perhaps the
Net.Censors - who certainy deserve it.  I don't think we need
be too concerned about hurting their feelings.  After all,
they plan on doing worse to us.
 
>I happen to agree with those points you deigned to make in a
>straightforward manner. But you hid them so well behind trickery that
>they will go unnoticed.
 
On the contrary, were it not for the trickery some folks wouldn't
bother reading Tim's comments on this subject.
 
>Learn to deal with people, and you'll see
>they are willing to listen to reasonable arguments.
 
Ha!  Chortle!  Where you been all your life, Michael?
People listen to reasonable arguments only when it suits them to.
 
>If your parents didn't give you enough attention as a child, don't
>take it out on the world by trying to get some here... Learn to work
>_with_ people, not _against_ people, lest within ten years ...
 
Garbage.  If we are to go into spurious psychoanalysis then I think
Michael's post reveals that he is still fixated on pleasing his parents
by being a good little boy and not giving anyone any trouble.
 
Fact is, there are people in the world who want to restrict our
freedom and make us behave in ways they think best.  Fuck 'em all!
 




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Pat Farrell" <pfarrell@cs.gmu.edu>
Date: Sat, 3 Jul 93 07:04:27 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Ad Hominum attacks (was Re: PC Week Clipper article
Message-ID: <36251.pfarrell@cs.gmu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I'm more than a little concerned about the vicious personal attacks that
this list makes on folks that have strongly held beliefs that disagree with
some (or all) of the beliefs of hot headed posters to cypherpunks.
I thought this was a technical mailing list, that dabbled in politics only
as necessary. I see no justification for the personal attacks, especially on
3rd parties that do not read this list. These uncalled for attacks will not
convince anyone on the list, and do not become the poster.

In Message Tue, 29 Jun 1993 , (someone who should know better) writes:
>Dorothy Denning is a fucking idiot.
I strongly object to this posting. D.E.Denning is neither an idiot nor a
"wicked witch of the East." She just happens to support a view that she
strongly believes in. The fact that I think her side is dead wrong does not
make her an idiot. Name calling accomplishes nothing but does hurt the
signal to noise ratio of this list.

Even more annoying are the attacks on Jim Bidzos. He is trying to make a
buck, which was legal last time I looked. And on many issues, he is far more
in our camp than against us. He at least likes strong cryptography, and his
disputable patents expire in a relatively short time. He has agreed to allow
a PGP-compatible program to use RSA without cost, providing the legal
version that many U.S. users would like to see.

I thought cypherpunks wrote code. I think that personal attacks on folks
that are not on the list is a waste of bandwidth. (If you want to attack me
here, fine, at least I get to respond firsthand)

Pat

Pat Farrell      Grad Student                 pfarrell@cs.gmu.edu
Department of Computer Science    George Mason University, Fairfax, VA
Public key availble via finger          #include <standard.disclaimer>




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Date: Sat, 3 Jul 93 12:48:06 PDT
To: Cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: "Wired" has more than one cover--why?
Message-ID: <9307031948.AA04165@netcom.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



I noticed that some copies of the latest "Wired" have Peter Gabriel on the
cover and others have Mitch Kapor on the cover. What gives?

Some sort of experiment? A novel way to gauge reader reaction to the
covers? A lawsuit that forced a change in the covers?

Esthetics? (My issue, with Peter Gabriel on the cover, is much artier,
though harder to figure out, than the relatively mundane image of Kapor.)

(Peter Gabriel, being a musician, may be said to be doing "a cover of a
piece by Mitch Kapor.")

Is Crunch on another set of covers? 

Did the issue with some of us Cypherpunks on the cover merely represent one
of _several_ versions of the cover? (I envision the "Crypto Rebels" covers
going to the Bay Area, the "Dish-Wallahs" covers going overseas, and the
"Brenda Laurel" covers going directly to "Mondo 2000" headquarters in
Berkeley.)

-Tim May

P.S. The issue of "Wired" is superb, as always.



--
Timothy C. May         | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,  
tcmay@netcom.com       | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
408-688-5409           | knowledge, reputations, information markets, 
W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA  | black markets, collapse of governments.
Higher Power: 2^756839 | Public Key: by arrangement
Note: I put time and money into writing this posting. I hope you enjoy it.      







From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Date: Sat, 3 Jul 93 13:39:04 PDT
To: "Pat Farrell" <pfarrell@cs.gmu.edu>
Subject: Re: Ad Hominum attacks (was Re: PC Week Clipper article
Message-ID: <9307032039.AA07619@netcom.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I largely agree with Pat Farrell's comments about the vicious attacks on
various crypto folks.

I was the one who jokingly used the term "wicked witch of the East" in
reference to D.D., though I am almost 100% certain it was only to this
mailing list, and not to sci.crypt in general. Perhaps I let my enthusiasm
for my wit take precedence over judgment. And in other places, such as
sci.crypt, I have in fact defended Denning against ignorant comments along
the lines of "Who is this Dorothy Denning person? I can't find her name
anywhere in "The Codebreakers." She must not know anything about crypto."
Whatever we may think of her position on Clipper, criticizing her
personally and imputing motives to her that cannot possibly be known to
outsiders, is foolish.

What really bothers me is the type of criticism, which I also tend to call
"ad hominem" (but which rhetoriticians may have a special name for), in
which people impute _motives_ to others. Thus, we see seemingly endless
comments about the motives of Denning, of Bidzos, of Sternlight, and of
others. (When I posted on the topic of possible cooperation with Bidzos and
RSA, I was hit with a barrage of highly critical rebuttals. The substantive
ones were fine, and expected, but the ones speculating on my motives and
imputing evilness to me were uncalled for. I wrote them off as typical Net
zeal, and am still on good terms even with those who foamed at the mouth
the most.)

"Demonizing" our opponents, or making them look like dunces (as with the
many "I've never heard of Dorothy Denning before" posts), does not help our
cause. In fact, it probably weakens our cause, for two reasons. First, it
cuts off dialog with those we disagree with. Second, we tend to
underestimate people we have written off as stooges or dunces.

While I think Dorothy Denning is, for various reasons, hopelessly in the
camp of the NSA and FBI, I see nothing to be gained by demonizing her. Or
imputing evil qua evil motives. Personally, I think being close to the FBI,
Justice Dept., NIST, NSA, etc., and socializing with them, having lunch
with them, doing contract work for them (nothing evil about that, per
se...it's how academic departments fund their research), and generally
being in "the Washington scene" has polarized her somewhat, just as we
Cypherpunks are polarized by the support we get from our peer group, from
the "cognitive dissonance" of seeing mostly the evidence that supports our
existing point of view.

When you spend your time in a milieu, work with people on their problems,
you begin to adopt their world view.

Understand, of course, that I am not addressing the underlying issues of
who is right and who is wrong...I've already made my beliefs on this clear.
I'm just agreeing with Pat Farrell that we all need to be careful not to
demonize folks like Denning, Bidzos, or even Sternlight. We don't have to
be solicitous (overly polite) toward them, and we can knock down their
arguments, but we ought not to use cheap shots and cheap rhetorical tricks
(one I hate especially is the "sound effect" jab, the "<snicker, snicker>"
sort of comment inserted into postings, sometimes even into the direct
quotes of those being attacked!).

Pat writes:

>Even more annoying are the attacks on Jim Bidzos. He is trying to make a
>buck, which was legal last time I looked. And on many issues, he is far more
>in our camp than against us. He at least likes strong cryptography, and his
>disputable patents expire in a relatively short time. He has agreed to allow
>a PGP-compatible program to use RSA without cost, providing the legal
>version that many U.S. users would like to see.

I agree, though of course he and RSADSI did not fight as hard as they might
have, in my opinion, on the subject of the cross-licensing with the DSS and
Clipper/Skipjack products. I don't pretend to understand all of the issues
involved, though I certainly can imagine he felt a lot more pressure
(legal, export, classification) from the Feds than he felt from a loose
organization of crypto privacy advocates. We're not where the money is, at
least not yet. (In fact, Cypherpunks are generally not even customers of
RSADSI, so why should Bidzos really care about our views? The industry
security group that has denounced Clipper is undoubtedly much more
influential.)

Meanwhile, I have no real interest, personally, in the whole RSA v. PGP
issue...let those directly involved work it all out. I will applaud loudly
if Phil Z. and the other PGP folks do in fact reach an agreement with
RSADSI, if only because it will remove one possible avenue of attack on
private encryption.

-Tim May

--
Timothy C. May         | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,  
tcmay@netcom.com       | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
408-688-5409           | knowledge, reputations, information markets, 
W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA  | black markets, collapse of governments.
Higher Power: 2^756839 | Public Key: by arrangement
Note: I put time and money into writing this posting. I hope you enjoy it.      







From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Date: Sat, 3 Jul 93 14:07:37 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: (fwd) GIFs--Now it can be told
Message-ID: <9307032107.AA09849@netcom.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


(I'll only make a few comments.)

Ed Carp writes:

>> There are some quasi-legitimate issues surrounding the area of child
>> erotica. Was the child coerced? Was consent meaningful? Etc.
>
>There are no quasi-legitimate issues surrounding child pornography in the
>United States.  It doesn't matter, legally whether consent was obtained or
>not, etc.  Child pornography is not legal.  To make, sell, possess, distribute,
>or conspire to do any of the above is a crime.

I meant "quasi-legitimate" in the sense of being at least a real criminal
issue. By contrast, merely discussing the issues cannot possibly be a
crime, nor can, IMHO, the creation of such a group absent actual evidence
of criminality. Sort of like shutting down "alt.drugs" on the grounds that
illegal drugs are often discussed. (We can all think of several dozen
newsgroups that touch on subjects illegal in many states of the U.S., in
many countries of the world, etc.)


>In the US, it doesn't matter what their actual ages are - if they are
>depicted as being under the age of consent, they are illegal.

Ah, but what if no mention is made of the age? If I happen to have a
collection of pictures of 19-year-olds-who-look-15, because of my own
esthetic standards, is this illegal? It sounds totally legal to me, and I
think a court opinion will ultimately be rendered that so long as the
models actually are over 18, no matter how young they look, no crime as
ocurred.

(Actually, the various "cheerleader porn" films cater to this fantasy and
are not classed as child porn, so long as the actresses are 18 or older.)

On purely computer-generated images:

>Not at all.  It's not an issue of exploitation in that case, nor is it an
>issue of "thoughtcrime", since the thought has produced an actual image
>that can be viewed by others.

I strongly disagree. A computer image that never involved an actual child,
cannot reasonably be viewed as child porn. Can a computer-generated "snuff"
film be viewed as murder? (I see acted-out murders every day on t.v.)


>Nothing in this email should be construed as a personal attack against you,
>Tim.  I'm just trying to relate the laws and the facts as they are.

I don't take it as a personal attack. Ed's comments were thoughtful, even
if I disagreed with some of them. 


By the way, I agree with some comments I've received that this subject is
somewhat far afield from the "Cypherpunks charter," such as it is, but I'm
finding the hundreds of highly repetitive and arcane postings about the
same old remailer issues, and the internals of obscure mail programs, not
all that close to the charter either. (I'm not saying they shouldn't be
posted, and some have been well-written summaries, but I am saying they're
highly-detailed nuts-and-bolts issues which probably are meaninful to only
a few readers.)

Part of the Cypherpunks approach is to "monkey wrench" the "Surveillance
State" by flooding the comm lines with encrypted junk, with
suspicious-looking files that will soak up surveillance time, and with
various other subversive things that will push the boundaries.

-Tim May



--
Timothy C. May         | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,  
tcmay@netcom.com       | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
408-688-5409           | knowledge, reputations, information markets, 
W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA  | black markets, collapse of governments.
Higher Power: 2^756839 | Public Key: by arrangement
Note: I put time and money into writing this posting. I hope you enjoy it.      







From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: khijol!erc@apple.com (Ed Carp)
Date: Sat, 3 Jul 93 18:34:58 PDT
To: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Subject: Re: Ad Hominum attacks (was Re: PC Week Clipper article
In-Reply-To: <9307032039.AA07619@netcom.netcom.com>
Message-ID: <m0oCG4g-00022SC@khijol>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text


> I was the one who jokingly used the term "wicked witch of the East" in
> reference to D.D., though I am almost 100% certain it was only to this
> mailing list, and not to sci.crypt in general. Perhaps I let my enthusiasm
> for my wit take precedence over judgment. And in other places, such as
> sci.crypt, I have in fact defended Denning against ignorant comments along
> the lines of "Who is this Dorothy Denning person? I can't find her name
> anywhere in "The Codebreakers." She must not know anything about crypto."
> Whatever we may think of her position on Clipper, criticizing her
> personally and imputing motives to her that cannot possibly be known to
> outsiders, is foolish.

I was the one who called Denning a "fucking idiot".  Perhaps I should have
said "fucking naive idiot" and been more specific, because while it might
make sense for her to be "in bed with" the intelligence community to *her*,
it makes no sense to anyone else I've talked to.  In my view, she's either
being criminally naive in being a mouthpiece for the NSA, being bought off
by them, being threatened by them, has a personal/financial interest in
the whole Clipper fiasco, or sees a political advantage in aligning herself
with them.  As has been discussed (to death, probably) in sci.crypt,
alt.security*, etc., Clipper has several apparent flaws, none of which I'll
go into here.  Why would someone who is supposed to be some sort of "expert"
be endorsing such a scheme is beyond me, unless she is being motivated by
one of the above.  In any case, the endorsement of such a scheme is naive
in the extreme and almost criminally irresponsible of her, given the nature
of Clipper/Capstone and the history of the intelligence community using
such technology to spy on its own citizens in illegal operations.

*That's* what I meant by my "fucking idiot" remark.

> comments about the motives of Denning, of Bidzos, of Sternlight, and of

Bidzos is just trying to make a buck.  Sternlight seems to be anally
retentive in the extreme, and believes his own bullshit.

> "Demonizing" our opponents, or making them look like dunces (as with the
> many "I've never heard of Dorothy Denning before" posts), does not help our
> cause. In fact, it probably weakens our cause, for two reasons. First, it
> cuts off dialog with those we disagree with. Second, we tend to
> underestimate people we have written off as stooges or dunces.

The first rule of most martial arts, as the first rule of combat, is "never
underestimate your opponent".  However irresponsible I may think Dorothy
Denning, Jim Bidzos, or David Sternlight are, I don't underestimate them.
If any one of those three (or anyone else, for that matter) has something to
say, I will listen and judge it on its own merits.
-- 
Ed Carp			erc@apple.com, erc@saturn.upl.com	510/659-9560
   For anonymous mailers -->   anonymus+5300@charcoal.com
"I've met many thinkers and many cats, but the wisdom of cats is infinitely
 superior."      -- Hippolyte Taine  (1828-1893)



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Stanton McCandlish <anton@hydra.unm.edu>
Date: Sat, 3 Jul 93 17:42:05 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: test
Message-ID: <9307040041.AA13428@hydra.unm.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Hmm no mail in weeks from this list...I ass-u-me the problem is on my end,
so here be a test message.  Blah blah blah.
-- 
Stanton  McCandlish   * Space Migration * Networking * ChaOrder * NO GOV'T. *
anton@hydra.unm.edu   * Intelligence Increase * Nano * Crypto * NO RELIGION *
FidoNet:    1:301/2   * Life Extension * Ethics * VR * Now! * NO MORE LIES! *
Noise in the Void BBS * +1-505-246-8515   (24hr, 1200-14400, v32bis, N-8-1) *



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: mkapor@kei.com (Mitchell Kapor)
Date: Sat, 3 Jul 93 18:41:34 PDT
To: Mike Godwin <mnemonic@eff.org>
Subject: Re: "Wired" has more than one cover--why? (fwd)
Message-ID: <199307040140.AA26801@kei.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


They decided that West Coast covers should feature Peter Gabriel and the
East Coast covers Mitch Kapor.  Something about rock and roll playing
better on newsstands than policy everywhere but the Northeasteast corridor.
 All subscribers got the Gabriel cover.

As the Wired editor told me this split cover was a last minute decision and
a first-time experiment.  The Cypherpunks were on the cover all of copies
of issue #2.


------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                Mitchell Kapor, Electronic Frontier Foundation
     Note permanent new email address for all correspondence as of 6/1/93
                              mkapor@kei.com






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: J. Michael Diehl <mdiehl@triton.unm.edu>
Date: Sat, 3 Jul 93 20:46:48 PDT
To: erc@apple.com
Subject: Re: Ad Hominum attacks (was Re: PC Week Clipper article
In-Reply-To: <m0oCG4g-00022SC@khijol>
Message-ID: <9307040345.AA27592@triton.unm.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


According to Ed Carp:
> 
> I was the one who called Denning a "fucking idiot".  Perhaps I should have
> said "fucking naive idiot" and been more specific, because while it might

Well, I read the post, too, and I thought it was funny!  Obviously not meant to
be informative.  I feel that people such as DD and LEA-mongers are @#$%ing 
idiots.  And in a free forum, I should be able to say so.  This is kinda what
Cypherpunks stand for, IMHO.

> The first rule of most martial arts, as the first rule of combat, is "never
> underestimate your opponent".  However irresponsible I may think Dorothy
> Denning, Jim Bidzos, or David Sternlight are, I don't underestimate them.
> If any one of those three (or anyone else, for that matter) has something to
> say, I will listen and judge it on its own merits.

And the second rule of most martial arts is, "Never get hit."  In light of all 
of the LEA's trying to "hit" us, this is something to think about.

Just my $.02.  Laters.

+-----------------------+-----------------------------+---------+
| J. Michael Diehl ;-)  | I thought I was wrong once. | PGP KEY |
| mdiehl@triton.unm.edu |   But, I was mistaken.      |available|
| mike.diehl@fido.org   |                             | Ask Me! |
| (505) 299-2282        +-----------------------------+---------+
|                                                               |
+------"I'm just looking for the opportunity to be -------------+
|            Politically Incorrect!"   <Me>                     |
+-----If codes are outlawed, only criminals wil have codes.-----+
+----Is Big Brother in your phone?  If you don't know, ask me---+

> -- 
> Ed Carp			erc@apple.com, erc@saturn.upl.com	510/659-9560
>    For anonymous mailers -->   anonymus+5300@charcoal.com
> "I've met many thinkers and many cats, but the wisdom of cats is infinitely
>  superior."      -- Hippolyte Taine  (1828-1893)
> 




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Al Billings <mimir@u.washington.edu>
Date: Sat, 3 Jul 93 23:28:33 PDT
To: "Timothy C. May" <tcmay@netcom.com>
Subject: Re: "Wired" has more than one cover--why?
In-Reply-To: <9307031948.AA04165@netcom.netcom.com>
Message-ID: <Pine.3.05z.9307032346.A5937-9100000@carson.u.washington.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



On Sat, 3 Jul 1993, Timothy C. May wrote:

> I noticed that some copies of the latest "Wired" have Peter Gabriel on the
> cover and others have Mitch Kapor on the cover. What gives?

 I don't know if this is related to it or not but I work in a magazine
store and when we received the latest issue, I noticed that our invoice
said something like "West Coast Edition" or something similar. Perhaps the
different editions have different covers?







From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Leslie Regan Shade <shade@Ice.CC.McGill.CA>
Date: Sun, 4 Jul 93 07:20:42 PDT
To: Al Billings <mimir@u.washington.edu>
Subject: Re: "Wired" has more than one cover--why?
In-Reply-To: <Pine.3.05z.9307032346.A5937-9100000@carson.u.washington.edu>
Message-ID: <Pine.3.05.9307041059.C6204-9100000@ice.cc.mcgill.ca>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain




> 
> On Sat, 3 Jul 1993, Timothy C. May wrote:
> 
> > I noticed that some copies of the latest "Wired" have Peter Gabriel on the
> > cover and others have Mitch Kapor on the cover. What gives?
> 
Well, here in Montreal we got Peter Gabriel and we're certainly not on the
west coast!

Leslie Shade







From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Chris Parrinello <parrinel@ux1.cso.uiuc.edu>
Date: Mon, 5 Jul 93 11:35:57 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Non-cypherpunk question.
Message-ID: <199307051835.AA21072@ux1.cso.uiuc.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Hi,

I just started reading this mailing list and I've run into a few problems
reading some of the messages because they include MIME information
which my copy of MH chokes on for some reason. It doesn't like the x-text
and text/x-pgp content-types. Would anybody on this list have a fix for
that so I can continue to read this list with MH? Any help would be appreciated.

Thanks in advance!

Chris





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: marc@Athena.MIT.EDU
Date: Mon, 5 Jul 93 13:33:37 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: [daemon@ATHENA.MIT.EDU : On-Line Congressional Hearing]
Message-ID: <9307052033.AA17212@steve-dallas.MIT.EDU>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain




------- Forwarded transaction

[6484]  daemon@ATHENA.MIT.EDU (hearing-info@trystero.malamud.com) Commercialization & Privatization of the Internet 07/05/93 14:27 (70 lines)
Subject: On-Line Congressional Hearing
Date: Mon, 5 Jul 93 14:28:25 -0400
To: com-priv@psi.com
From: hearing-info@trystero.malamud.com
Reply-To: hearing-info@trystero.malamud.com

Station: Internet Multicasting Service
Channel: Internet Town Hall
Program: On-Line Congressional Hearing
Release: July 5, 1993 
Content: First Announcement/On-Line Congressional Hearing

     On July 26 at 9:30AM EDT, the Subcommittee on Telecommunications
and Finance of the U.S. House of Representatives will hold the first
Congressional Hearing ever held over a computer network.  The oversight
hearing on "The Role of Government in Cyberspace" will take place in 
the Grand Ballroom of the National Press Club at 14th and F Streets, 
N.W., Washington, D.C.  The hearing is open to the public. An open 
house will be held from 3-5PM on the same day in the same location and 
is also open to the public.

     Chairman Markey has asked that this historic occasion demonstrate
the potential and diversity of the global Internet.  Thirty Sparcstations 
will be in the hearing room, allowing members of Congress, staff, and 
their guests to read e-mail, use Gopher menus, read testimony in WAIS 
databases, browse the World Wide Web, and otherwise use the resources 
of the global Internet as part of the hearing.  

     Some witnesses for the hearing will testify remotely, sending audio 
and video over the Internet.  Audio and video of the hearing will also 
be multicast over the Multicast Backbone (MBONE).  We are hoping that 
C-SPAN and other traditional media will also carry the event.  *MORE 
DETAILS ON MBONE AND OTHER WAYS TO WATCH THE HEARINGS REMOTELY WILL BE 
FORTHCOMING SHORTLY.*

     One of the primary points that we are hoping to demonstrate is
the diversity and size of the Internet.  We have therefore established
an electronic mail address by which people on the Internet can communicate 
with the Subcommittee before and during the hearing:

          congress@town.hall.org

     We encourage you to send your comments on what the role of government
should be in the information age to this address.  Your comments to this
address will be made part of the public record of the hearing.  Feel free
to carry on a dialogue with others on a mailing list, cc'ing the e-mail
address.  

     Your cards and letters to congress@town.hall.org will help
demonstrate that there are people who use the Internet as part of their
personal and professional lives.  We encourage you to send comments on
the role of government in cyberspace, on what role cyberspace should play
in government (e.g., whether government data be made available on the
Internet), on how the Internet should be built and financed, on how you 
use the Internet, and on any other topic you feel is appropriate.  This 
is your chance to show the U.S. Congress that there is a constituency 
that cares about this global infrastructure.

     If you would like to communicate with a human being about the
hearing, you may send your comments and questions to:

          hearing-info@town.hall.org

     Support for the Internet Town Hall is provided by Sun Microsystems
and O'Reilly & Associates.  Additional support for the July 26 on-line 
congressional hearing is being provided by ARPA, BBN Communications, 
the National Press Club, Xerox PARC, and many other organizations.
 
     Network connectivity for the Internet Town Hall is provided by 
UUNET Technologies.

--[6484]--

------- End forwarded transaction




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: miron@extropia.wimsey.com (Miron Cuperman)
Date: Mon, 5 Jul 93 18:05:36 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: More on remail error reporting
Message-ID: <1993Jul5.184526.7226@extropia.wimsey.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I've created a digest list for error reporting.  The digest list
is errors-d@extropia.wimsey.com.  Send a message to errors-d-request
to subscribe.  Following this is an example of a digest.  Notice
that the subjects (which include the ID of the messages in question)
are the the top for quick browsing.  Currently, the digest is
transmitted every 12 hours.

I'm also handling bounces now, not only remail errors.

--- cut here ---

Date: Mon, 5 Jul 1993 09:30:29 -0700
From: errors-d-request@extropia.wimsey.com
Reply-To: errors@extropia.wimsey.com
Subject: errors-d Digest V1993 #2
X-Loop: errors-d@extropia.wimsey.com
Precedence: list
To: errors-d@extropia.wimsey.com

errors-d Digest				Volume 1993 : Issue 2

Today's Topics:
	 Remailing error, ID = (No subject supplied)
	 Remailing bounce, ID = "Horror That Scares"

----------------------------------------------------------------------

Date: Sat, 3 Jul 1993 13:44:36 -0700
From: anonymous@extropia.wimsey.com
To: errors@extropia.wimsey.com
Subject: Remailing error, ID = (No subject supplied)
Message-Id: <199307032044.AA26014@xtropia>

No receipient could be ascertained.
Note: No encrypted contents was found (encryption is required).

No subject was included. Please supply a subject in the future for reporting.
It will be stripped-off before remailing.

------------------------------

Date: Mon, 5 Jul 1993 09:30:04 -0700
From: anonymous@extropia.wimsey.com
To: errors@extropia.wimsey.com
Subject: Remailing bounce, ID = "Horror That Scares"
Message-Id: <199307051630.AA05344@xtropia>

Bounced mail:
> From: Mail Delivery Subsystem <MAILER-DAEMON@extropia.wimsey.com>

Subject of 'Returned mail: User unknown'.

------------------------------

End of errors-d Digest V1993 Issue #2
*************************************





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: hfinney@shell.portal.com (Hal Finney)
Date: Mon, 5 Jul 93 20:17:13 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Encrypted cypherpunks list
Message-ID: <9307060222.AA18201@jobe.shell.portal.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


As Eric Hughes suggested, I put together a little perl script to remail
cypherpunks mail, PGP encrypted, to all names on a list.  If you'd like
to receive your cypherpunks messages encrypted, send me your address and
your PGP key and I'll add you to the list.  Then you can unsubscribe from
the regular list.

I'll upload the script once I test it a little more.  Initial subscribers
should consider themselves alpha testers and feel free to complain.

Hal Finney
hfinney@shell.portal.com




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: ""L. Detweiler"" <ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Date: Mon, 5 Jul 93 21:47:13 PDT
To: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Subject: Re: (fwd) GIFs--Now it can be told
In-Reply-To: <9307030942.AA03729@netcom3.netcom.com>
Message-ID: <9307060447.AA08750@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>Their battle cry is "Eeek! If
>we don't nip this in the bud, _right now_, think of what might
>happen!

or `if we don't police ourselves, then somebody else will do it for us,
and we don't want that'.

>The mutant condors that one reader (who claimed to be a Pope in the
>Church of the Subgenius, but who humorlessly missed the joke--but I
>forgive him, for he knew not what he saw) wanted to feed me to, can
>now stop circling my house.

boy, all I can say is that you sure have a lot of chutzpah doing
something like this, but it does definitely make a fascinating
Gedanken. I especially appreciate your cogent description & analysis of
the grey areas without which the whole thing would have been pointless,
but with it make superb social commentary.

ltr.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Mark <mark@coombs.anu.edu.au>
Date: Mon, 5 Jul 93 14:55:59 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Non-cypherpunk question.
Message-ID: <9307052155.AA00294@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>I just started reading this mailing list and I've run into a few problems
>reading some of the messages because they include MIME information
>which my copy of MH chokes on for some reason. It doesn't like the x-text
>and text/x-pgp content-types. Would anybody on this list have a fix for
>that so I can continue to read this list with MH? Any help would be appreciated.

I use elm to read the list and it barfs on metamail messages as metamail hasnt
been installed. What i did was to get cat.c and remove the arg checks so it
didnt try to interpret the metamail switches elm piped to it and to not report
missing files. Then it just catted it's arguements so /tmp/mail-aa0127 is catted
and piped through less so i am able to read metamail (which are just nomal messages
with a different Content-Type: line int he header anyway). Bit of a kludge but it
works.

Mark
mark@coombs.anu.edu.au



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: nobody@rosebud.ee.uh.edu
Date: Tue, 6 Jul 93 07:54:35 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: REMAIL: list 7/6/93
Message-ID: <9307061454.AA13165@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


NOTE: new remailer @entropy.linet.org!

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

Last update: 07/02/93

Q1: What cypherpunk remailers exist?

A1:

 1: nowhere@bsu-cs.bsu.edu 
 2: hh@cicada.berkeley.edu 
 3: hh@pmantis.berkeley.edu 
 4: hh@soda.berkeley.edu 
 5: 00x@uclink.berkeley.edu 
 6: hal@alumni.caltech.edu 
 7: ebrandt@jarthur.claremont.edu 
 8: phantom@mead.u.washington.edu 
 9: remailer@rebma.mn.org 
10: elee7h5@rosebud.ee.uh.edu 
11: hfinney@shell.portal.com 
12: remail@tamsun.tamu.edu 
13: remail@tamaix.tamu.edu 
14: remailer@utter.dis.org 
15: remailer@entropy.linet.org
16: remail@extropia.wimsey.com 

NOTES: 
#1-#5		no encryption of remailing requests
#6-#15		support encrypted remailing requests
#16		special - header and message must be encrypted together
#9,#14,#15,#16	introduce larger than average delay (not direct connect)
#9,#14,#15      running on privately owned machines

======================================================================

Q2: What help is available?

A2:

Check out the pub/cypherpunks directory at soda.berkeley.edu
(128.32.149.19).  Instructions on how to use the remailers are in the
remailer directory, along with some unix scripts and dos batch files.

The public keys for the remailers which support encrypted remailing
requests is also available in the same directory.

Mail to me (elee9sf@menudo.uh.edu) for further help and/or questions.


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.3

iQCVAgUBLDRKRYOA7OpLWtYzAQEoQgP+MS4qW2ITP5UCSACcG/ngSid3/o/I1fic
guGXQ5Ay6QWu9CVdc6YlbmkxxL6ekbLhtFSmMyXC356yixJ8Nvxcs7MYypHLlo3W
oG7C6HDPmAq6JgVUdD4YCUXOS7haBt3HJ3K/utXFe3G6ybbEfG0TSUvwqgIVADql
LSKB4yfpsk8=
=04Iy
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Perry E. Metzger" <pmetzger@lehman.com>
Date: Tue, 6 Jul 93 07:43:03 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: (fwd) GIFs--Now it can be told
In-Reply-To: <9307031355.AA00356@antigone.com>
Message-ID: <9307061442.AA10023@snark.shearson.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Michael Ross says:
> Tim,
> 
> That was very manipulative, and did not achieve much. 

I wholely disagree. Tim's post to alt.binaries.pictures.erotica.children 
was a valuable exercise even given its limitations.

Perry




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: dmandl@lehman.com (David Mandl)
Date: Tue, 6 Jul 93 08:34:07 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: PC Week hops on the bandwagon
Message-ID: <9307061533.AA11664@disvnm2.shearson.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Sorry if this has been mentioned already, but the new issue of PC
Week contains a big special report entitled "Privacy in the Workplace."
It's got about five or six separate pieces on electronic eavesdropping
in the workplace, encryption, Clipper, etc., etc.  I've only had a chance
to scan it quickly (I mean with my eyes), but it seems that there's no
mention of PGP at all, even in the piece on public-key encryption.
Shocking.  And the piece on Clipper, while it of course mentions all the
opposition to the proposal, seemed just a bit wimpy to me.  Anyway, it's
the June 28 issue.  Worth checking out, I guess.

   --Dave.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Date: Tue, 6 Jul 93 12:04:22 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: We are Becoming Politically Correct Sheep
Message-ID: <9307061904.AA12415@netcom.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Perry Metzger writes, about the reaction to the "junk bits" file I posted
in a controversial new group, "alt.binaries.pictures.erotica.children":

>Michael Ross says:
>> Tim,
>> 
>> That was very manipulative, and did not achieve much. 
>
>I wholely disagree. Tim's post to alt.binaries.pictures.erotica.children 
>was a valuable exercise even given its limitations.
>

Of course I agree with Perry, though I also respect the others who have
posted disagreements (sometimes strong!) here on this List or in the
various newsgroups...that's what free speech is all about.

Bear in mind that most of the "Cypherpunks agenda," to the extent we can
identify it, is likely to provoke ordinary citizens into _outrage_. Talk of
anonymous mail, digital money, money laundering, information markets, data
havens, undermining authority, transnationalism, and all the rest (insert
your favorite idea) is not exactly mainstream.

While I don't personally care for the "kiddie porn" I've seen (the David
Hamilton photos of young girls and the occasional Mapplethorpe photos in
news reports), the issues raised in this area are of great importance. (I
don't plan to argue for or against these images in this forum, though.)

If we back down every time a censor screams "Illegal!," then very few of
our agenda items will ever see the light of day.

So long as physical violence or coercion is not involved, I see no reason
to restrict the activities of others. I completely reject the concept of
"class-based crimes," such as:

- conventional erotica and pornography should be banned because it is
degrading to women, objectifies them, etc. (ironically, unless of course it
is "made by and for wimmin," a loophole added by Andrea Dworkin and her
supporters after they discovered their anti-porn crusade in Canada and
elsewhere would put an end to Lesbian porn mags like "Yellow Silk"!).

- I put "child porn" in this category because only the actual coercion of
children--if it is happening--should be stopped. (And even this is
confusing, as coercion of children happens all the time--we call it
"parenting.")

A mere image carries no proof that this coercion has happened, for the many
reasons I have cited and others have cited (e.g., the child may have
willingly participated, the "child" may be 18 and merely look 15, the
images may have come from other countries where the customs and laws are
different, the image may have been computer-generated or morphed, and so
on).

- "racist jokes" are being targeted for elimination in many of the Usenet
groups, by halting the carrying of "offensive" newsgroups. Legal purists
will of course note that this is not "censorship" in the legal/government
sense. IMHO, the English language needs a new term for something between
the one extreme of government censorship and the other extreme of personal
choice, perhaps something like "institutional censorship." Being a free
market sort of person, I have no problems with, say, Apple Computer
deciding not to carry "alt.binaries.pictures.erotica.children" or
"rec.humor.funny.cripples," but it still a _form_ of "institutional
censorship." [especially when they are acting so as to head off legal
action, as I describe below]

- read the "academic freedom" group (I forget the exact title...search for
"acad-free" in your newsreader) and you'll see that more and more
universities are using the "sexual harassment" laws/codes to stop certain
newsgroups, to halt the distribution of sexually oriented images, and to
take disciplinary action against students (mostly male) who have put GIFs
on their computers or workstations (apparently female students who walk
past an office in which female models are used as startup screens have
decided they are being "sexually assaulted" or "harassed").

[An important point to make here is that many of these institutions are
taking actions largely because they fear that if they don't, the plaintiffs
will take their case to the _government_ legal system, perhaps by suing the
university for "condoning an atmosphere hostile to womym and other people
of color." <insert smileys here, lest I be sued for insulting colored
people> If there was no threat of ultimate legal action, much of this
"institutional censorship" would vanish, and people could just concentrate
on doing their jobs, with or without calendars of "Miss Usenet" gracing
their walls.]

- discussion of ways to undermine the State, via crypto anarchy and strong
crypography, are likely to be targets of future crackdowns. Sedition laws,
conspiracy laws, RICO, etc. How long before speaking on these matters earns
a warning letter from your university or your company? [Again, I think it's
the "big stick" of ultimate government action that spurs these univeristy
and company policies. Apple fears being shut down for having "involvement"
with a terrorist plot, Emory University fears being sued for millions of
dollars for "conspiring" to degrade wimmin of color, etc.)

- how long before "rec.guns" is no longer carried at many sites, as they
fear having their universities or companies linked to discussions of
"assault weapons" and "cop-killer bullets"?

[Prediction: Many companies and universities, under pressure from the Feds,
will block groups in which encrypted files are posted. After all, if one
encrypts, one must have something to hide, and that could expose the
university to legal action from some group that feels aggrieved.]


So, free speech is under assault across the country. The tort system is
being abused to stifle dissentinting views (and lest you think I am only a
capitalist, only a free marketeer, the use of "SLAPP suits"--"Strategic
Lawsuits Against Public Participation"--by corporations or real estate
developers to threaten those who dare to publicly speak against their
projects is a travesty, a travesty that the courts have only recently begun
to correct).

We are becoming a nation of sheep, fearing the midnight raid, the knock on
the door. We fear that if we tell a joke, someone will glare at us and
threaten to sue us _and_ our company! And so companies are adopting "speech
codes" and other such baggage of the Orwell's totalitarian state. Political
correctness is extending its tendrils into nearly every aspect of life in
America.

Time to fight back. 

-Tim May
--
Timothy C. May         | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,  
tcmay@netcom.com       | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
408-688-5409           | knowledge, reputations, information markets, 
W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA  | black markets, collapse of governments.
Higher Power: 2^756839 | Public Key: by arrangement
Note: I put time and money into writing this posting. I hope you enjoy it.      







From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: gnu (John Gilmore)
Date: Tue, 6 Jul 93 13:19:19 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Looking for biblio re commercialization of encryption
Message-ID: <9307062019.AA15820@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


------- Start of forwarded message -------
From: Kibbee=Streetman%ACIS.1037%DSRD.K25@VINES.ORNL.GOV
To: eff@eff.org
Subject: References for Crypto Study
Date: Wed, 23 Jun 93 15:27:26 EDT

Dear Sir -- I am working on a project for NIST to develop an annotated 
bibliography on issues in the commercialization of encryption technology. Can 
you provide me with any references to EFF publications dealing with export, 
Clipper/Capstone, privacy, etc. ? I already have copies of the material 
presented at the CSS&PAB meeting at NIST but would like to have anything else 
that might be available. Thank you for your help!

Kibbee D. Streetman  (kds@ornl.gov)
1099 Commerce Park
Oak Ridge, TN 37830
(615)574-9952

------- End of Forwarded Message





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: mike@EGFABT.ORG (Mike Sherwood)
Date: Tue, 6 Jul 93 14:03:51 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: (fwd) GIFs--Now it can be told
In-Reply-To: <9307061442.AA10023@snark.shearson.com>
Message-ID: <om006B5w165w@EGFABT.ORG>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


"Perry E. Metzger" <pmetzger@lehman.com> writes:

> > That was very manipulative, and did not achieve much. 
> 
> I wholely disagree. Tim's post to alt.binaries.pictures.erotica.children 
> was a valuable exercise even given its limitations.

I agree.. what if he posted it as some silly program in one of the 
sources groups, encrypted and all, with a description as something almost 
no one would want? then the worst that would happen is people flaming him 
for encrypting it.. that would be a way to go for a real post to convey 
information.. we could always create an alt.too.many.secrets (obligatory 
documentary movie reference =]) to post things to where there is a large 
audience, but for an audience of people who care about such issues, as 
opposed to a normal post which joe random user could argue with everyone 
without knowing the difference between a pgp encrypted and uuencoded 
file.

the other issue is that people will think what they want to think if 
they're uninformed, such as all of the people who flamed Tim for posting 
what's basically a worthless message, just that those people who flamed 
him didn't like the name of the group he posted it in.. for all we know, 
he could've posted his local /etc/hosts.

--
Mike Sherwood
internet: mike@EGFABT.ORG     uucp: ...!sgiblab!egfabt!mike





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Duncan Frissell <76630.3577@CompuServe.COM>
Date: Tue, 6 Jul 93 11:15:43 PDT
To: <cypherpunks@toad.com>
Subject: Thoughtcrime
Message-ID: <930706181141_76630.3577_EHK32-2@CompuServe.COM>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


(Ed Carp?)

>There are no quasi-legitimate issues surrounding child pornography in the
>United States.  It doesn't matter, legally whether consent was obtained or
>not, etc.  Child pornography is not legal.  To make, sell, possess, distribute,
>or conspire to do any of the above is a crime.

Not quite.  The 9th Circuit Court of Appeals recently threw out the sell,
possess,
and distribute parts of the Child Pornography act on the traditional 1st
Amendment
grounds that retailers can't be punished for failure to examine (and get the 
model's age certificates) for every page or every film frame of every item in 
their inventory.  Such blanket coverage is vague and overbroad.  Who knows 
what the Supremes or other Circuits not located in San Francisco will do but 
the state of the law is still fluid.

The question of morphing or animated kiddie porn is an interesting one.  I 
haven't read the law so I don't know if they would be arguably covered.  Pure 
*text* kiddieporn is legal of course.  Remember all the battles over text 
pornography?  Isn't it great that the video/graphics revolution has 
eliminated most censorship issues concerning pure text.

********************************************************************
* DUNCAN FRISSELL             Attorney at Law, Writer, and Privacy *
* CIS 76630,3577              Consultant since the Nixon           *
* Internet:                   Administration                       *
* 76630.3577@compuserve.com                                        *
* or frissell@panix.com                                            *
* Easylink 62853962                                                *
* Attmail !dfrissell                                               *
* TLX:  402231 FRISSELL NYK                                        *
*                                                                  *
*    Privacy Checkup still only $29.95.  Buy today before price    *
*    controls force me to raise my prices.                         *
*                                                                  *
*     Would you like a debit VISA card from your secret offshore   *
*     bank account.  Let me show you how.                          *
*                                                                  *
********************************************************************





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: stub23 <eaeu362@orion.oac.uci.edu>
Date: Tue, 6 Jul 93 14:44:58 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Wired cover
Message-ID: <199307062144.AA01546@orion.oac.uci.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


well on mindvox the cover decision was announced a bit
before the magazine came out
and there was a huge guessing contest
over who was going to be on the cover
with some damn creative ideas

but anyhow...
although if i were to guess, i would say taht peter gabriel
is on the cover of my issue,
but on the inside it says 
cover: mitch kapor
so i got confused
dunno what mitch kapor looks like...

also to note la and sf have different covers
from what i ahve heard




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Tyler Yip - UnixWeenie(tm) <davros@ecst.csuchico.edu>
Date: Tue, 6 Jul 93 15:18:22 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: wired covers
Message-ID: <9307062217.AA09173@hairball.ecst.csuchico.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


In Chico, California, the two book stores large enough to have Wired have
Mitch Kapor (Tower Books) and Peter Gabriel (Readmore Books).  I might go
pick up the other cover. :)





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: jet@nas.nasa.gov (J. Eric Townsend)
Date: Tue, 6 Jul 93 15:23:55 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: apologies (was Re: Complete ignorance of any sort of reality on May's part (was We are
In-Reply-To: <9307062001.AA10698@snark.shearson.com>
Message-ID: <9307062223.AA09861@boxer.nas.nasa.gov>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



I'm sorry I got sidetracked with the bit about dworkin.  I'm not
really even a serious supporter of hers.  On the other hand, I'm
probably one of the few people 'here' who've read most of her work.
Before one goes about believing many of the outrageous things
attributed to her, one should read her writing and take many of the
statements in context.  (Who was it a couple of years ago posting
summaries of out of context quotes by usenetters in alt.flame?)

At any rate, I was dismayed by Tim May's lack of knowledge regarding
the people he was attacking.  Wildly thrashing about and attacking
anyone who isn't completely on one's side tends to get one nowhere.

Again, I apologize for sidetracking things. 

-eric





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Perry E. Metzger" <pmetzger@lehman.com>
Date: Tue, 6 Jul 93 13:01:37 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Complete ignorance of any sort of reality on May's part (was We are
In-Reply-To: <9307061947.AA17712@netcom.netcom.com>
Message-ID: <9307062001.AA10698@snark.shearson.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



J. Eric Townsend says:
> - Dworkin has never called for the banning of porn.  I've read most of
> her books, and she even goes out of her way to say she's not calling
> for any sort of censorship.  She *does* push for 'victim
> compenstation'-style legislation. 

This is silly. Its like saying "I'm not in favor of banning guns --
but I want victims to be able to sue the gun manufacturers for
negligence". Dworkin is a fascist in feminist clothing -- for all
intents and purposes she believes that any act of heterosexual sex is
on some level rape. She's nuts.

> Tired of white het male computer geeks talking nonsense about anyone
> who threatens their place in the power structure,

This white male het computer geek marches in the Gay Pride Parade
every year. (Well, not this year -- I was sick. Mea culpa.) He also
thinks that Andrea Dworkin is about as anti-censorship as Rev.
Wildmon. I don't give a shit about the power structure -- I just think
that anyone telling me what I can and cannot see, what I can and
cannot write, and what I can and cannot sell, is my enemy.

Perry




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Edward J OConnell <ejo@world.std.com>
Date: Tue, 6 Jul 93 13:19:44 PDT
To: "J. Eric Townsend" <jet@netcom.com>
Subject: Re: Complete ignorance of any sort of reality on May's part (was We are
In-Reply-To: <9307061947.AA17712@netcom.netcom.com>
Message-ID: <Pine.3.07.9307061600.A24452-b100000@world.std.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Yeah, I heard that she had to do some gymnastics to explain how gay male
porn degrades women, too. ;-)

Is this true, or am I also a homophobe? ;-)

I hate Dworkins arguments. There are plenty of pro porn
lesbians/feminists. At least, I've read stuff by several, (bright/Annie
sprinkle, etc) and I've read some stuff by various porn stars that call
themselves feminists... Identifying feminism with censorship annoys me...I
wish I had some data on how many women who call themselves feminists are
pro censorship... if its the majority, I guess I'd have to allow it... ;-)

The problem for intellectuals is how to protect 'erotica' and somehow
squash 'pornography.' The difference is amusing to me. One mans erotica is
another womans porn...

All right thinking people would agree that the only thing that could be
wrong in the sex trade is coercion, be it of women or children or horses
or hamsters... I have some problem with the idea of the coerciveness of
the 'free market' though, as does Dworkin, so I guess we do have some
things in common... I'd like to know that no one is in the trade to pay
for a drug habit...of course, I think that drugs, like food and shelter
and air, should be free...

But I'm a nut. ;-)

Jay






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Date: Tue, 6 Jul 93 16:07:36 PDT
To: Cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: "Let's kill all the lawyers..."
Message-ID: <9307062308.AA22680@netcom.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



"What do you call the killing of those lawyers in San Francisco last week?"


Answer (you knew this was coming): "A good start."


The discussion of free speech and political correctness is apparently not
welcome by some on this list. I guess the usual religious debates about
which mail reader is better are what we're supposed to talk about. Well,
I'm a member of this list, too, and issues of censorship and free speech
are more interesting to me--and to some others, I suspect--than the
intricacies of "MH."

To each their own. Learn to use your "delete" key.

(I agree that discussions of libertarianism vs. liberalism, etc., are the
bane of the Net, and that we have been fortunate in avoiding the usual
pitched battles between these camps on this List. My comments about
censorship of speech, photos, etc., were not intended to provoke such a
political battle.)


Ironically, even as I type this, I am watching CNN and a special report on
a "trial balloon" to ban anti-lawyer remarks! Seriously! Harvey Saferstein,
President of the California State Bar, is explaining how "hate speech" laws
can and should be used to limit the bashing of lawyers, the portrayal of
them as good targets (he cited the lawyer being the first to be eaten in
"Jurassic Park" as an example of the "atmosphere of hate" surrounding
lawyers), and "inciting to violence." He specifically cited the killings in
San Francisco last week as a reason to classify such speech as a "hate
crime."

No word on whether Shakespeare's "First, let's kill all the lawyers"
would've gotten him 10-20 in the Tower of London.

What is happening to free speech? What has happened to "Sir, I disagree
with what you say, but I defend to the death your right to say it."?

Now of course such a law is not likely to pass, or be upheld. (Saferstein
is actually not lobbying for a _new_ law, but for extension through the
judicial system of existing "hate crime" laws to included any
"class-related" jokes and insults. A move other groups are already trying.)

In a way, I am cheering this, as it can only end up trivializing and
undermining the whole concept of "hate crimes" and "hate speech." Real
crimes, including trespass to burn crosses on people's lawns, and the like,
can and _should_ be prosecuted, but not "hate" crimes. (If such laws were
applied uniformly, instead of just against so-called "white rights" groups,
then most "minority" organizations, which preach hatred of "honkeys" and
"hets," would be shut down.)

As John Gilmore pointed out a few years back, most of us are breaking laws
every day. If the government can attach penalties based on our political
views, then dissidents can be targeted selectively and given sentences
based on their alleged "hate crimes." (Imagine how the Black Panthers or
Malcolm X could have been harassed even more aggressively if their "hate"
could have been used to increase punishments for otherwise minor crimes?
That they were harassed, 20 and 30 years ago, is beside the point. Folks
who advocate "hate crime" laws should reflect carefully on how such laws
may someday be used against them.)


-Tim May
--
Timothy C. May         | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,  
tcmay@netcom.com       | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
408-688-5409           | knowledge, reputations, information markets, 
W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA  | black markets, collapse of governments.
Higher Power: 2^756839 | Public Key: by arrangement
Note: I put time and money into writing this posting. I hope you enjoy it.      







From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: khijol!erc@apple.com (Ed Carp)
Date: Tue, 6 Jul 93 16:22:00 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: On the medium being the message
Message-ID: <m0oDMCi-00022SC@khijol>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text


I was eating lunch today, staring at the cover of "Wired", when the phrase
"The medium..." caught my eye.  This set off a whole train of thought on
message concealibility, like hiding messages in, say, the order of headers
in a posting, or the "Reply-To:" header, or even the words in subsequent
postings to a newsgroup.  Who would ever think to look at, say, the third
word in every posting Tim makes to alt.whatever newsgroup?  Or in the "Date:"
field, or in the "Message-ID:" field, or ... or ... or ...

Hmmm.  Food for thought.
-- 
Ed Carp				erc@wetware.com			510/659-9560
   For anonymous mailers -->   anonymus+5300@charcoal.com
"I've met many thinkers and many cats, but the wisdom of cats is infinitely
 superior."      -- Hippolyte Taine  (1828-1893)



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: gnu (John Gilmore)
Date: Tue, 6 Jul 93 17:41:12 PDT
To: eff-staff@eff.org, gnu
Subject: Matchbook reminders for EFF / Cypherpunk members
Message-ID: <9307070041.AA17216@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


At a friend's house I found a matchbook printed up by NORML.  It
serves to advertise the organization, as well as providing information
useful during legal troubles.

It got me thinking about matchbooks or wallet cards as a good way to
make people aware of us.  (Matchbooks work better when your
organization is concerned with smokables...)  Someone mentioned a few
weeks ago that we need to have a wallet-sized card that reminds people
of their rights when they get into hassles.  Experience has shown that
we forget and bungle it, without a reminder.

The NORML front cover says:		Cypherpunk version (strawman):

	NORML				CYPHERPUNKS

	National Organization		Teaching, Learning,
	for the Reform of		and Deploying
	Marijuana Laws			Cryptographic Protection
	------------------
	1636 R. St., N.W.
	Washington, DC 20009

	spectron, cleveland, oh		<- whoever makes the matches

The spine:

	900-97-NORML			cypherpunks@toad.com

The back:

	Before you rat,			Big Brother's listenin'
	before you squeal,		Big Sister's watchin'.
	before you snitch,		Don't get cold feet,
	or cut a deal..			Use cryptographic stockin's.
	 Call NORML.

	900-97-NORML			...etc...
	(2.95 per minute
    You must be 18 or older to call)

The inside:

	* NEVER CONSENT TO A		Something very similar
	  SEARCH

	(even with nothing to hide)

	* NEVER ANSWER ANY
	  QUESTIONS

	(without an attorney)

	* CALL AN ATTORNEY IM-
	  MEDIATELY

	(or call NORML)

	900-97-NORML			EFF's phone number?

	(2.95 per minute
    You must be 18 or older to call)

	NOTE:  The live option is
	available only from 9 a.m. to 6
	p.m., EST, M-F.



A tract I cut out of a gay newspaper some years ago is in my
wallet now; its advice is:


	SILENCE = GOLDEN
ACT-UP/New York's clip-and-save guide to police intimidation

The following guidelines were formulated by legal advisors to ACT
UP/NY, but they apply to all gay men and lesbians and activists.

1. You do not have to talk to the police or FBI or any other
investigators.  You do not have to talk to them whether they come
to your house, on the street, if you've been arrested, or even if you
are in jail.  Only a court or a grand jury has legal authority to
compel testimony.

2.  You don't have to let the police or FBI into your home or office
unless they show you an arrest or search warrant which authorizes them
to enter that SPECIFIC place.

3.  If they do present a warrant, you do not have to tell them
anything other than your name and address.  You have a right to
observe what they do.

4.  Make written notes, including the agents' names, agency and badge
numbers.  Try to have other people present as witnesses and have them
make written notes, too.

5.  Anything you do say to any law enforcement officer may be used
against you and other people.

6.  If you do give the FBI or police information, it may mean that you
will have to testify to the same information at a trial or before a
grand jury.

7.  Lying to an FBI agent or other federal investigators is a crime.

8.  The best advice, if the FBI or police try to question you or to
enter your home or office without a warrant, is to JUST SAY NO!  Law
enforcement agents have a job to do and they are highly skilled at it.
Attempting to "outwit" them is very risky.  YOU CAN NEVER TELL HOW 
A SEEMINGLY HARMLESS BIT OF INFORMATION CAN HELP THEM HURT YOU OR
ANOTHER ACT UP MEMBER.

9.  The investigators may threaten you with a grand jury subpoena if
you don't give them information.  But you may get one anyway, and
anything you've already told them will be the basis for more detailed
questioning under oath.

10.  They may try to threaten or intimidate you by pretending to have
information about you ("We know what you've been doing, but if you
cooperate it will be all right.")  If you are concerned about this,
tell them you will consider talking to them with your lawyer present.

11.  If you are nervous about simply refusing to talk, you may find it
easier to tell them to contact your lawyer.  Once a lawyer is
involved, the agents usually pull back since they have lost their
power to intimidate.  If you are taken into police custory, once you
request an attorney, they MUST cease questioning until your lawyer is
present.  But remember, you don't have to answer their questions, even
if they keep asking.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: karn@qualcomm.com (Phil Karn)
Date: Tue, 6 Jul 93 18:03:18 PDT
To: tcmay@netcom.com
Subject: Re:  "Let's kill all the lawyers..."
Message-ID: <9307070103.AA23132@servo>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Amen! Well spoken, Tim.

Last night I saw the Saferstein remarks you mention. I think they hit
the local California TV stations before being picked up by CNN. I
fully agree that PC is *really* getting out of hand if lawyers are now
to be considered one of the downtrodden minority groups.

Saferstein doesn't seem to understand the serious role satire plays in
actually *preventing* violence in our society. Lawyers and politicians
(lawyers being the larval stage of the latter) hold a tremendous
amount of power over the rest of us. Satire (including jokes,
political cartoons and the like) might not actually do much to lessen
that power, but it does give the rest of us a chance to vent some of
the resentment that might otherwise build into violence in more
people.

And of course there is satire's unique selectivity. It's hard to
satirize somebody who doesn't deserve it. But a hypocritical lawyer or
a politician with a bloated ego... well, I don't think bullets ever
get any more magic than this.  *They* may still believe in their own
overriding self-importance, but thanks to satire, the rest of us don't
have to!

The real irony of trying to ban "lawyer bashing" is that some of the
best (most critical) lawyer jokes are told by the lawyers themselves!
So maybe we *should* pass a law against it. What better way to get
more lawyers off the street and where they belong? (Short of cloning
some more T. Rexes, of course...was there also applause in your
theater during that scene?)

Phil





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: dante@microsoft.com
Date: Tue, 6 Jul 93 18:08:35 PDT
To: gnu@toad.com
Subject: Re: Matchbook reminders for EFF / Cypherpunk members
Message-ID: <9307070107.AA00445@netmail.microsoft.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


John Gilmore said:
|
|At a friend's house I found a matchbook printed up by NORML.  It
|serves to advertise the organization, as well as providing information
|useful during legal troubles.
|
|It got me thinking about matchbooks or wallet cards as a good way to
|make people aware of us.  (Matchbooks work better when your
|organization is concerned with smokables...)  Someone mentioned a few
|weeks ago that we need to have a wallet-sized card that reminds people
|of their rights when they get into hassles.  Experience has shown that
|we forget and bungle it, without a reminder.

Good idea. FYI, the ACLU also provides these wallet-sized cards
to anyone who asks, and they are invaluable. Read them _before_
you get arrested.





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Fred Heutte <phred@well.sf.ca.us>
Date: Tue, 6 Jul 93 18:32:40 PDT
To: tcmay@netcom.com
Subject: Re:  "Let's kill all the lawyers..."
Message-ID: <93Jul6.183147pdt.14190-3@well.sf.ca.us>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Tim May and Phil Karn's comments remind me of my friend Mark the Lawyer
who lives in SF.  I visit him on occasion when I'm in the Bay Area and
notice that he has the proper perspective on things.  When I was there
a week ago he had a copy of the Nolo Press newspaper (including a hefty
selection of their vast catalogue of lawyer jokes).  And his refrigerator
magnet reads: "Lawyer: person retained to protect client from others of
profession."

We need lawyers, but do we need *so many*?!  I was born and grew up
in Washington, DC.  The DC Bar has over *50,000* lawyers!  Even in
our nation's capital that seems excessive.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Judith Milhon <stjude@well.sf.ca.us>
Date: Tue, 6 Jul 93 18:43:00 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: fwd of Chi.Trib article...
Message-ID: <93Jul6.184232pdt.14403-3@well.sf.ca.us>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


...for you maths hooligans and crypto thugs...
From:  SPOETZ
Subj:    The Chicago Tribune on Fermat's Last Theorem
To:       DELTORTO, SaintJude


------- Forwarded Message
Subject: The Chicago Tribune on Fermat's Last Theorem
>From: David Notkin <notkin@whistler.cs.washington.edu>


The following column appeared in the Chicago Tribune / DuPage County
edition
Tuesday June 29 1993 page 2-1.

MATH RIOTS PROVE FUN INCALCULABLE
/by/ Eric Zorn

/begin italics/
News Item (June 23) -- Mathematicians worldwide were excited and
pleased today by the announcement that Princeton University professor
Andrew Wiles had finally proved Fermat's Last Theorem, a 365-year-old
problem said to be the most famous in the field.
/end italics/

Yes, admittedly, there was rioting and vandalism last week during the
celebration. A few bookstores had windows smashed and shelves stripped,
and vacant lots glowed with burning piles of old dissertations. But
overall we can feel relief that it was nothing -- nothing -- compared
to the outbreak of exuberant thuggery that occurred in 1984 after
Louis DeBranges finally proved the Bieberbach Conjecture.

"Math hooligans are the worst," said a Chicago Police Department
spokesman. "But the city learned from the Bieberbach riots. We were
ready for them this time."

When word hit Wednesday that Fermat's Last Theorem had fallen, a
massive show of force from law enforcement at universities all around
the country headed off a repeat of the festive looting sprees that have
become the traditional accompaniment to triumphant breakthroughs in
higher mathematics.

Mounted police throughout Hyde Park kept crowds of delirious wizards at
the University of Chicago from tipping over cars on the midway as they
first did in 1976 when Wolfgang Haken and Kenneth Appel cracked the
long-vexing Four-Color Problem. Incidents of textbook-throwing and
citizens being pulled from their cars and humiliated with difficult
story problems last week were described by the university's math
department chairman Bob Zimmer as "isolated."

Zimmer said, "Most of the celebrations were orderly and peaceful. But
there will always be a few -- usually graduate students -- who use any
excuse to cause trouble and steal. These are not true fans of Andrew
Wiles."

Wiles himself pleaded for calm even as he offered up the proof that
there is no solution to the equation  x^n + y^n = z^n  when  n  is a
whole number greater than two, as Pierre de Fermat first proposed in
the 17th Century. "Party hard but party safe," he said, echoing the
phrase he had repeated often in interviews with scholarly journals as
he came closer and closer to completing his proof.

Some authorities tried to blame the disorder on the provocative
taunting of Japanese mathematician Yoichi Miyaoka. Miyaoka thought he
had proved Fermat's Last Theorem in 1988, but his claims did not bear
up under the scrutiny of professional referees, leading some to
suspect that the fix was in. And ever since, as Wiles chipped away
steadily at the Fermat problem, Miyaoka scoffed that there would be no
reason to board up windows near universities any time soon; that God
wanted Miyaoka to prove it.

In a peculiar sidelight, Miyaoka recently took the trouble to secure a
U.S. trademark on the equation "x^n + y^n = z^n " as well as the
now-ubiquitous expression "Take that, Fermat!" Ironically, in defeat,
he stands to make a good deal of money on cap and T-shirt sales.

This was no walk-in-the-park proof for Wiles. He was dogged, in the
early going, by sniping publicity that claimed he was seen puttering
late one night doing set theory in a New Jersey library when he either
should have been sleeping, critics said, or focusing on arithmetic
algebraic geometry for the proving work ahead.

"Set theory is my hobby, it helps me relax," was his angry explanation.
The next night, he channeled his fury and came up with five critical
steps in his proof. Not a record, but close.

There was talk that he thought he could do it all by himself,
especially when he candidly referred to University of California
mathematician Kenneth Ribet as part of his "supporting cast," when most
people in the field knew that without Ribet's 1986 proof definitively
linking the Taniyama Conjecture to Fermat's Last Theorem, Wiles would
be just another frustrated guy in a tweed jacket teaching calculus to
freshmen.

His travails made the ultimate victory that much more explosive for
math buffs. When the news arrived, many were already wired from
caffeine consumed at daily colloquial teas, and the took to the streets
en masse shouting, "Obvious! Yessss! It was obvious!"

The law cannot hope to stop such enthusiasm, only to control it.  Still,
one
has to wonder what the connection is between wanton pillaging and a
mathematical proof, no matter how long-awaited and subtle.

The Victory Over Fermat rally, held on a cloudless day in front of a
crowd of 30,000 (police estimate: 150,000) was pleasantly peaceful.
Signs unfurled in the audience proclaimed Wiles the greatest
mathematician of all time, though partisans of Euclid, Descartes,
Newton, and C.F. Gauss and others argued the point vehemently.

A warmup act, The Supertheorists, delighted the crowd with a ragged
song, "It Was Never Less Than Probable, My Friend," which included such
gloating, barbed verses as --- "I had a proof all ready / But then I
did a choke-a / Made liberal assumptions / Hi! I'm Yoichi Miyaoka."

In the speeches from the stage, there was talk of a dynasty,
specifically that next year Wiles will crack the great unproven Riemann
Hypothesis ("Rie-peat! Rie-peat!" the crowd cried), and that after the
Prime-Pair Problem, the Goldbach Conjecture ("Minimum Goldbach," said
one T-shirt) and so on.

They couldn't just let him enjoy his proof. Not even for one day. Math
people. Go figure 'em.

----------------------------------------------------------------------

St.Jude the Oblique




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Date: Tue, 6 Jul 93 18:55:34 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re:  "Let's kill all the lawyers..."
In-Reply-To: <93Jul6.183147pdt.14190-3@well.sf.ca.us>
Message-ID: <9307070156.AA16144@netcom3.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Fred Heutte comments:

> Tim May and Phil Karn's comments remind me of my friend Mark the Lawyer
> who lives in SF.  I visit him on occasion when I'm in the Bay Area and
> notice that he has the proper perspective on things.  When I was there
> a week ago he had a copy of the Nolo Press newspaper (including a hefty
> selection of their vast catalogue of lawyer jokes).  And his refrigerator
> magnet reads: "Lawyer: person retained to protect client from others of
> profession."
> 
> We need lawyers, but do we need *so many*?!  I was born and grew up
> in Washington, DC.  The DC Bar has over *50,000* lawyers!  Even in
> our nation's capital that seems excessive.

I don't really think of lawyers as the problem, per se, nor do I think
there are too many GIVEN WHAT THE LAW HAS BECOME.

Seems to me folks have gotten what they asked for. The asked for more
regulation, they got it. The asked to be protected from the contracts
they signed (that is, to find ways to get out of contracts they no
longer liked), they got it. They asked for easier divorce, they got
it. They asked to be able to sue for nearly anything bad that happens
to them, they got it.

All of these things increase the business of lawyers, as business is
no longer done on a handshake, property has to be divided up with the
easier divorces, and so on. If you think about it, the reason for the
surge in lawyers is clear.

What, if anything, can be done? Here are several suggestions:

1. Return the sanctity of the contract. If parties sign a contract,
then unless there is provable fraud, the contract is valid. No
wiggling out claiming "diminished capacity" (if you're diminished,
hire someone to handle your affairs), claims of "not understanding,"
or claims that the contract itself was coercion, racist, unfair,
whatever.

2. Eliminate public funding of court proceedings. Eliminate things
like the "Legal Aid Society" that subsidize court proceeding against
landlords and property owners (as but one example).

3. Loser pays all court costs, and perhaps damages for bringing the
suit, if the suit was clearly unfounded. (A murky area, I'll grant
you, but other countries have tried it and it cuts down on frivolous
"I'll sue!" types of suits.)

4. In divorce cases, adopt a system in advance of the wedding clearly
stating the terms and conditions under which property, kids, etc., are
to be doled out. Oh, and by Point #1, the sanctity of Pre-Nuptial
Agreements is ironclad...no wiggling out by hiring lawyers.

5. Ultimately, privatize the court system. Bruce Benson, in "The
Enterprise of Law," describes how this might work. (I won't debate it
here in this group.)

Obligatory Link to Cypherpunk Ideas: Many of these reforms are likely
in cyberspace, where contracts will be contracts....with money placed
in escrow with anonymous escrow services and only fairly simple
adjudication and arbitration of the "facts," not the "intents."

(Read Vinge's "True Names" for one vision of crypto anarchy and then
try to imagine how the lawyers will ply their trade in such an
environment.)


-Tim May



-- 
..........................................................................
Timothy C. May         | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,  
tcmay@netcom.com       | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
408-688-5409           | knowledge, reputations, information markets, 
W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA  | black markets, collapse of governments.
Higher Power: 2^756839 | Public Key: PGP and MailSafe available.
Note: I put time and money into writing this posting. I hope you enjoy it.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Fred Heutte <phred@well.sf.ca.us>
Date: Tue, 6 Jul 93 19:07:08 PDT
To: stjude@well.sf.ca.us
Subject: Re:  fwd of Chi.Trib article...
Message-ID: <93Jul6.190635pdt.14421-1@well.sf.ca.us>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Thanks, that was priceless!  Best thing I've read this year.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: khijol!erc@apple.com (Ed Carp)
Date: Tue, 6 Jul 93 19:32:17 PDT
To: mccoy@ccwf.cc.utexas.edu (Jim McCoy)
Subject: Re: On the medium being the message
In-Reply-To: <199307070119.AA23872@tigger.cc.utexas.edu>
Message-ID: <m0oDPFd-00022fC@khijol>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text


> > [...] This set off a whole train of thought on
> > message concealibility, like hiding messages in, say, the order of headers
> > in a posting, or the "Reply-To:" header, or even the words in subsequent
> > postings to a newsgroup.  Who would ever think to look at, say, the third
> > word in every posting Tim makes to alt.whatever newsgroup?  Or in the "Date:"
> > field, or in the "Message-ID:" field, or ... or ... or ...
> 
> Not much bandwidth in that medium there...
> 
> Things like gif/jpeg images and sound files have a ton of semi-random bits
> in them that you can fool around with without anyone noticing much, but
> plain text in news headers and postings just doesn;t leave one with much
> room for putting in a message.  At least not without being blanently
> obvious... 

True, but how much do you need if you have code dictionaries?  The Message-ID
field, for example, could contain a page.word reference, one that meant
"the cops are watching me, be careful", or "Nuclear detonator received".
Not much the NSA could do to figure that one out unless they had searched
your place, or knew a HELL of a lot about you and your co-conspirator.

My point was, there are a lot of covert channels that one can use without
making it obvious that there is any sort of covert data being passed.
-- 
Ed Carp				erc@wetware.com			510/659-9560
   For anonymous mailers -->   anonymus+5300@charcoal.com
"I've met many thinkers and many cats, but the wisdom of cats is infinitely
 superior."      -- Hippolyte Taine  (1828-1893)



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: jet@netcom.com (J. Eric Townsend)
Date: Tue, 6 Jul 93 12:46:36 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Complete ignorance of any sort of reality on May's part (was We are
Message-ID: <9307061947.AA17712@netcom.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Timothy C. May writes:
 > degrading to women, objectifies them, etc. (ironically, unless of course it
 > is "made by and for wimmin," a loophole added by Andrea Dworkin and her
 > supporters after they discovered their anti-porn crusade in Canada and
 > elsewhere would put an end to Lesbian porn mags like "Yellow Silk"!).

This is complete and utter nonsense.  Tim May has no clue as to what
he talks about. What's worse, it smells of homophobia.

In no particular order:

- Dworkin has never called for the banning of porn.  I've read most of
her books, and she even goes out of her way to say she's not calling
for any sort of censorship.  She *does* push for 'victim
compenstation'-style legislation.  (How this sort of legislation
interacts with constitutional rights is beyond my keen, save a few
decisions I've read about 19th century property rights in Louisiana. :-)

- I've heard Dworkin come down just has hard on lesbigay porn, if not
harder than, as she does on het porn.  Her old housemate John
Stoltenberg (sp?) is as noxious as she is on this point.

- "Yellow Silk" is not a lesbian porn mag.  It's a very lame het
softcore mag. If you'd like to see *real* lesbian porn (some of which
pisses off a fair portition of the feminist and lesbian communities)
find "On Our Backs" (started by Susie Bright), "Venus Infers" (started
by Pat Califia, women-only SM), or "Girljock" (sort of a
preppie/athelete/lesbian (not dyke :-) porn mag).

- Last I heard, there was no need to capitalize 'lesbian'. None of the
dykes/lesbians I know capitalize it, unless it starts a sentence.
Residents of Lesbos (the true 'Lesbians') might disagree, however.

Tired of white het male computer geeks talking nonsense about anyone
who threatens their place in the power structure,

--
jet@netcom.com -- J. Eric Townsend -- '92 R100R: "CLACKER"
"Either what you've said is so vague that it's meaningless or I disagreee
 with you completely." -- Tom Maddox




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Jim McCoy <mccoy@ccwf.cc.utexas.edu>
Date: Tue, 6 Jul 93 18:20:03 PDT
To: erc@wetware.com
Subject: Re: On the medium being the message
In-Reply-To: <m0oDMCi-00022SC@khijol>
Message-ID: <199307070119.AA23872@tigger.cc.utexas.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text


> [...] This set off a whole train of thought on
> message concealibility, like hiding messages in, say, the order of headers
> in a posting, or the "Reply-To:" header, or even the words in subsequent
> postings to a newsgroup.  Who would ever think to look at, say, the third
> word in every posting Tim makes to alt.whatever newsgroup?  Or in the "Date:"
> field, or in the "Message-ID:" field, or ... or ... or ...

Not much bandwidth in that medium there...

Things like gif/jpeg images and sound files have a ton of semi-random bits
in them that you can fool around with without anyone noticing much, but
plain text in news headers and postings just doesn;t leave one with much
room for putting in a message.  At least not without being blanently
obvious... 

jim



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: nobody@soda.berkeley.edu
Date: Tue, 6 Jul 93 21:07:14 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Encrypted list software
Message-ID: <9307070403.AA05223@soda.berkeley.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

I've had a couple of people ask to have their names added to the
encrypted list forwarder I put together.  I'm soliciting feedback on
how this service should work.

Right now, it only encrypts the "body" of the message.  The "headers",
which are the "From:" and "Subject:" lines, etc., are passed through
basically unchanged (except for "To:", which I change to be the person it
is going to.  Maybe that's unnecessary, as I notice that the cypherpunks
list puts its own address into "To:", for some reason.)  It also adds
"Encrypted: PGP" to the headers.

I wonder if it would be better for it to encrypt the whole message, headers
and body together, then to mail that with a fresh new header that would
show nothing about the original message.

The first approach hides the contents of the message, but not its subject
or who it is from; the second hides more.  Any suggestions as to which is
more useful?

Hal Finney
hfinney@shell.portal.com

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
iQCUAgUBLDoazagTA69YIUw3AQEVIQP4yImWVmyipsNbMUu8pX4QkyPx9T/95MVP
lTc+LAFwACUSbm2/DNTqLOLbDhb9rnMlHT/926mjoJFC4H3xQn61oXzM50GtRiaY
ORJOxJ8CVqmQE7RW51jEAM0wIH4L2CDhveudY6r2ZX7uLjmybkdHJy4G5BSb46cD
x5h93fOyXg==
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: sneal@muskwa.ucs.ualberta.ca (Sneal)
Date: Tue, 6 Jul 93 20:08:19 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: We are becoming politically correct sheep
Message-ID: <9307070308.AA02565@muskwa.ucs.ualberta.ca>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I am slightly dubious of the wisdom of Tim's switch-and-bate on
a.b.p.e.c. for a couple of reasons:
 
a) The possibility of some media nitwit hearing about the initial
post and missing Tim's "retraction" (or ignoring it in the interests
of a great big ol' byline).  Nightmarish possibilities abound,
particularly given the subtle nature of the "clue" in the PGP block.
 
b) In a more paranoid moment some months ago, I predicted that the
NSA would be waiting for a chance to work a PGP angle into some
sensational story that creates a lot of public outcry.  Linking PGP
to terrorism, drug dealing, or kiddie porn would be a great first
step towards getting some laws against "unlicensed cryptography" on
the books.  I'm less worried about Tim giving the TLAs any ideas (I'm
sure they have lots of bright "media relations" people already) than
I am about him inspiring real pornographers (or agent provocateurs).
 
c) Personally, I think that the fewer excuses one gives busybodies to
"make policy", the better.  However, what with Clipper, Markey, Gore,
Denning, Sternlight, et al, the cat's already out of the bag.  We can
only sigh and wish that these beknighted ones had viewed with alarm
the excess profits and price gouging of the haircutting industry, and
the need to balance unbridled free enterprise with the tonsorial
rights of the public.
 
  However - tickling a few neurons may very well have been worth the
risks noted above.
 
  In response to Tim's later post about freedom of speech, J. Eric
Townsend writes:
>[flameage censored]
 
  In arguing the fine points of Dworkinism, pornography, 
capitalization of proper nouns, etc., I think Eric misses Tim's point,
which is (I think) that the current movement of society is from
 
Forbidding actions that cause harm to others
 
             to
 
Forbidding actions and speech that might offend others, or make them
uncomfortable, or hurt their feelings.
 
  This is an obviously not a happy thing.  While not offending others
is an admirable goal, I am going to disagree with Tim May if he
claims that he can levitate given the right mix of ginseng, pig
knuckles, and spiritual harmony.  Tim may be emotionally crushed by
this, but that's life.  If things keep on the way they are, in a few
years, Tim will have the option of taking me to the Spiritual
Tribunal and having me busted for emotional assault, where I'll be
sentenced to three to five years at hard consciousness-raising.
 
  There's an excellent article on this issue by Jonathan Rauch in the
April 93 issue of 'Reason'; this is an excerpt from his book "Kindly
Inquisitors: The New Attack On Free Thought".  Rauch's thesis is that
the very humanitarian goal of making sure that nobody's feelings are
hurt is incompatible with the free inquiry and lively discourse that
are necessary parts of a free society.
 
  To those of you who think "it can't happen here", I would refer you
to Canada's "hate speech" laws, which make it a criminal offense to
"promote hatred against an identifiable group".  To date, the only
well-known charges under these laws have been against couple of
Holocaust revisionists; however, the definitions of "promoting
hatred" and "identifiable group" are vague enough to make this
country a somewhat dangerous place to have unpopular views, even
disregarding the tremendous leverage this law gives governments to
step on anyone who gets too far out of line.
 
  "It's the First Amendment, stupid."
 
  -- Steve
 
 
 
 




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Date: Tue, 6 Jul 93 21:25:10 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: We are becoming politically correct sheep
In-Reply-To: <9307070308.AA02565@muskwa.ucs.ualberta.ca>
Message-ID: <9307070425.AA15301@netcom3.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Steve Neal makes some very good points:

> a) The possibility of some media nitwit hearing about the initial
> post and missing Tim's "retraction" (or ignoring it in the interests
> of a great big ol' byline).  Nightmarish possibilities abound,
> particularly given the subtle nature of the "clue" in the PGP block.

I agree, which is why I ended the charade. (And I would've ended it
sooner had I gotten any strange phone calls, suggesting a reporter
sniffing around, or threats to report the posting to the cops. I did
get a few strange messages suggesting Netcom should yank my account.)

But the interesting thing is how paranoid people are about free speech
being exercised (the free speech being posting of non-provably illegal
material, not the posting of provably illegal material). I won't
repeat my point about a nation of politically correct sheep.

>   However - tickling a few neurons may very well have been worth the
> risks noted above.

Yes, perhaps thinking about some issues in advance is a good "drill."

(For some reason, I seem to gravitate toward these "early warning"
situations...it was me who posted the first message about Dorothy
Denning's key escrow system, last October ("A Trial Balloon to Ban
Encryption?"), and I also posted the fake "Stealth Secrets" article in
cypherpunks, anonymously. The intent was to test the commitment of the
list to the much-talked about "whistleblowers" group and to the likey
implications. (Sure enough, several people freaked out and called for
censorship--as if anonymous whistleblowing can be censored! I
'fessed-up after several days, pointing out the material came from a
published book and some Aviation Leak material.)

Steve then makes some really excellent points:

>   In arguing the fine points of Dworkinism, pornography, 
> capitalization of proper nouns, etc., I think Eric misses Tim's point,
> which is (I think) that the current movement of society is from
>  
> Forbidding actions that cause harm to others
>  
>              to
>  
> Forbidding actions and speech that might offend others, or make them
> uncomfortable, or hurt their feelings.

Yes, exactly! This is a profound shift from the principles on which
this country (apologies to Brits, etc.) was founded. 


>   To those of you who think "it can't happen here", I would refer you
> to Canada's "hate speech" laws, which make it a criminal offense to
> "promote hatred against an identifiable group".  To date, the only

And France and Germany have both used "hate crimes" as "hate groups"
as justification to ban certain groups from existing.

> well-known charges under these laws have been against couple of
> Holocaust revisionists; however, the definitions of "promoting
> hatred" and "identifiable group" are vague enough to make this
> country a somewhat dangerous place to have unpopular views, even
> disregarding the tremendous leverage this law gives governments to
> step on anyone who gets too far out of line.

Good points, but the so-called "Holocaust" never actually happened,
hence there cannot be any such thing as "Holocaust revisionism," just
the telling of the truth. While the Nazis were not perfect, this
nonsense about extermination camps was just Allied propaganda
(confirmed by documents declassified in 1967) designed to embarass the
Nazi "Huns" and to hide the mass exodus of Jews, who stole the wealth
of Germany and took it to New York to set up brokerage and banking
firms like S.G.  Warburg and the Rothschild Bank. Every true
researcher knows this.


(This little joke could be enough in Canada, as Steve points out, to
at least threaten me, and perhaps the machine this message originates
to the List from. Most likely not (the Canadians concentrated on
long-time activists), but the _threat_ is there. And this
threat is coming down to the U.S.)

Understand that the real threat to the Jews in Germany was not so much
hatred of the Jews (of which there was probably less in Germany than
in France and other European countried until Hitler began stirring up
hatred and staging events to trigger mass hatred) as it was the
unbridled power of the Nazi state. Civil rights were suspended, the
courts fell under the control of Hitler's people, and "law" became
whatever the government wanted. Ironically, with "hate crimes" as a
prosecutorial tool in the 1930s, Hitler could have used the laws to
prosecute Jews (especially Orthodox Jews, with different fashion
styles and a dislike ("hate"?) for many Gentiles. 

The real threat is the government, whatever its initial intent. They
have the guns, they have the courts, they have the power. 

We've sunk into a strange situation in which various special interest
groups jockey for special privilege, special powers granted to them
by the State.

"Live and let live" doesn't mean one has to _like_ all the various
individuals or groups that are out there, it just means you let them
do their thing as long as they don't interfere with your own life.

You can't pass laws to force others to like you, or your group, or to
make their thougths conform to yours. About all you can really do is make
sure they can't rob and kill, and even that's iffy.


--Tim May



-- 
..........................................................................
Timothy C. May         | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,  
tcmay@netcom.com       | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
408-688-5409           | knowledge, reputations, information markets, 
W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA  | black markets, collapse of governments.
Higher Power: 2^756839 | Public Key: PGP and MailSafe available.
Note: I put time and money into writing this posting. I hope you enjoy it.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Date: Tue, 6 Jul 93 21:40:37 PDT
To: fergp@sytex.com (Paul Ferguson)
Subject: Re: Live for today
In-Reply-To: <DFPa7B1w165w@sytex.com>
Message-ID: <9307070441.AA21415@netcom3.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Paul Ferguson writes:


>  I applaud your exploit in the bitwise/erotica/net-police experiment.
>  I personally think it was damned clever and proved a valuable point.
>  In fact, I'd like to get your permission to reprint your original
>  message in Legal Net News, por favor.

By all means! Just be sure to provide enough context and to included
the "explanation." Also, several other people made some excellent
comments, and you might want to somehow include their points.


>  Ask us. We will tell you -- its about stirring up the pot.

Yeah, I think a lot of us got involved in this whole thing (now called
Cypherpunks, but it started percolating years ago) precisely to stir
things up. And to the credit of you folks, I think some progress has
been made. The remailers, the awareness of Cypherpunks-type issues in
the media ("Wired," "Whole Earth Review," "New York Times,"
"Newsweek"), and our role in the Clipper/Capstone/Skipjack/whatever
matter, are all positive steps.

It is true we haven't deployed digital cash, nor have we set up data
havens in cyberspace, nor a bunch of other things, but these things
are instrinsically hard to pull off. Someday they'll come.

Finally:

>                Quis Custodiet Ipsos Custodes?

(I've been tempted recently to come up with a "crypto" version of
this famous "And who shall guard the guardians?" line. Something, in
Latin of course (for effect), about "And who shall eavesdrop on the
eavesdroppers?" or somesuch. Perhaps the original is best as it is.)

-Tim May


-- 
..........................................................................
Timothy C. May         | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,  
tcmay@netcom.com       | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
408-688-5409           | knowledge, reputations, information markets, 
W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA  | black markets, collapse of governments.
Higher Power: 2^756839 | Public Key: PGP and MailSafe available.
Note: I put time and money into writing this posting. I hope you enjoy it.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: fergp@sytex.com (Paul Ferguson)
Date: Tue, 6 Jul 93 21:13:49 PDT
To: tcmay@netcom.com
Subject: Live for today
Message-ID: <DFPa7B1w165w@sytex.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


On Tue, 6 Jul 93 16:08:00 -0700,
 Timothy C. May <uunet!netcom.com!tcmay> wrote -
 
> The discussion of free speech and political correctness is
> apparently not welcome by some on this list. I guess the usual
> religious debates about which mail reader is better are what
> we're supposed to talk about. Well, I'm a member of this list,
> too, and issues of censorship and free speech are more
> interesting to me--and to some others, I suspect--than the
> intricacies of "MH."
 
 Hear, hear.
 
 Settle down, old chum. I suppose it takes a volitile issue or two to
 get me off of my keister, but now that I'm up, I'm more than willing
 to toss my (good?) name into the fracas.
 
 Idealisms are much akin to links in a chain; each crafted
 individually, yet forming a bond that link each idealism together
 into a society. (Discussions on how healthy this society really
 should be left for future discusion.)
 
 I walk a fine line between an affectionado for free speech and a
 staunch supporter of individual rights and privacy. Each aspect has
 its proponents and contentions, yet each aspect needs protection
 under _human_ law.
 
 Now, where does one infringe upon the other? I have always been fond
 of the adage that "your right to swing your fist ends when it hits my
 nose," and I hope you understand my sentiment. I have even played the
 role of the "net police" in at least one instance. (But then again, I
 did not react to rumor, innuendo or happenstance. This is another
 topic entirely. Those who subscribe to RISKS may be the wiser.)
 
 I applaud your exploit in the bitwise/erotica/net-police experiment.
 I personally think it was damned clever and proved a valuable point.
 In fact, I'd like to get your permission to reprint your original
 message in Legal Net News, por favor.
 
> What is happening to free speech? What has happened to "Sir, I
> disagree with what you say, but I defend to the death your right
> to say it."?
 
 I was a military-man (once upon a time), and took that oath
 seriously.  I tired of the "spinning-your-wheels" metality, so I
 naturally migrated into the private telecommunications sector.
 I would still defend it today, to death. Make no mistake, this
 country may have developed some serious problems over the course
 of the past 200 years, but some of us hold the intrinsic values
 embelished in the Constitution dear.
 
 What Tim has done is above and beyond petty in-fighting in this
 group. We are about change, challenge and chaos. We are old, we are
 new. We change, yet we are the same. What does it take?
 
 Ask us. We will tell you -- its about stirring up the pot.
 

Paul Ferguson               |  "Confidence is the feeling you get
Network Integrator          |   just before you fully understand
Centreville, Virginia USA   |   the problem."
fergp@sytex.com             |      - Murphy's 7th Law of Computing
 
               Quis Custodiet Ipsos Custodes?




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: fergp@sytex.com (Paul Ferguson)
Date: Tue, 6 Jul 93 21:13:11 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Public record
Message-ID: <5HPa7B2w165w@sytex.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I received a letter from "The National Computer System Security and
Priivacy Advisory Board" this past week, acknowledging my letter to
them (and submission thereof) on the "key-escrow" initiative.
 
Without quoting the entirety of the letter, one particular passage
merits repeat:
 
"Copies of written statements/comments received on these issues will
be made part of the public record. All statements/comments are
available for inspection aand copying in the Central Reference and
Records Inspection Facility, Room 600, Herbert C. Hoover (Department
of Commerce) Building, 14th Street between Pennsylvania and
Constitution Avenues, NW, Washington, DC 20230."
 
The letter is signed by Lynn McNulty, Board Secretariat.
 
(Actually, his secretary called me here in New York to get my
 mailing address even though I made a point of including it in my
 original letter of opposition. Go figure.)
 
 Anyway, this is now public record and subject to an FOIA request, no?
 
 Cheers.
 

Paul Ferguson               |  "Confidence is the feeling you get
Network Integrator          |   just before you fully understand
Centreville, Virginia USA   |   the problem."
fergp@sytex.com             |      - Murphy's 7th Law of Computing
 
               Quis Custodiet Ipsos Custodes?




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Peter shipley <shipley@merde.dis.org>
Date: Wed, 7 Jul 93 01:22:04 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: a forward of a forward of a ....
Message-ID: <9307070608.AA06525@merde.dis.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


------- Forwarded Message

Return-Path: shipley@remarque.berkeley.edu
Message-Id: <m0oDQZo-00001yC@scintilla.santa-clara.ca.us>
From: sinster@scintilla.santa-clara.ca.us (Darren Senn)
Subject: Warning from the LPF...
To: fyi@xcf.berkeley.edu
Date: Tue, 6 Jul 1993 20:53:48 -0800 (PDT)
X-Mailer: ELM [version 2.4 PL21]
Content-Type: text
Content-Length: 11239     
Resent-To: shipley@dis.org
Resent-Date: Tue, 06 Jul 1993 21:02:51 -0700
Resent-From: Evil Pete  <shipley@remarque.berkeley.edu>


[ Indented just so I don't choke anyone's mailer  -- DS ]

  Date: Mon, 28 Jun 1993 07:48:33 GMT
  From: friedman@gnu.ai.mit.edu (Noah Friedman)
  Subject: Digital Signature Scandal
  Organization: Free Software Foundation, 675 Mass Ave. Cambridge, MA 02139

[The following is an official announcement from the League for Programming
Freedom.  Please redistribute this as widely as possible.  [NF]]

                   Digital Signature Scandal

Digital signature is a technique whereby one person (call her J. R. Gensym)
can produce a specially encrypted number which anyone can verify could only
have been produced by her.  (Typically a particular signature number encodes
additional information such as a date and time or a legal document being
signed.)  Anyone can decrypt the number because that can be done with
information that is published; but producing such a number uses a "key" (a
password) that J. R. Gensym does not tell to anyone else.

Several years ago, Congress directed the NIST (National Institute of Standards
and Technology, formerly the National Bureau of Standards) to choose a single
digital signature algorithm as a standard for the US.

In 1992, two algorithms were under consideration.  One had been
developed by NIST with advice from the NSA (National Security Agency),
which engages in electronic spying and decoding.  There was widespread
suspicion that this algorithm had been designed to facilitate some
sort of trickery.

The fact that NIST had applied for a patent on this algorithm engendered
additional suspicion; despite their assurances that this would not be used to
interfere with use of the technique, people could imagine no harmless motive
for patenting it.

The other algorithm was proposed by a company called PKP, Inc., which not
coincidentally has patents covering its use.  This alternative had a
disadvantage that was not just speculation: if this algorithm were adopted as
the standard, everyone using the standard would have to pay PKP.

(The same patents cover the broader field of public key cryptography,
a technique whose use in the US has been mostly inhibited for a decade
by PKP's assiduous enforcement of these patents.  The patents were
licensed exclusively to PKP by the Massachusetts Institute of
Technology and Stanford University, and derive from taxpayer-funded
research.)

PKP, Inc. made much of the suspect nature of the NIST algorithm and
portrayed itself as warning the public about this.

On June 8, NIST published a new plan which combines the worst of both
worlds: to adopt the suspect NIST algorithm, and give PKP, Inc. an
*exclusive* license to the patent for it.  This plan places digital
signature use under the control of PKP through the year 2010.

By agreeing to this arrangement, PKP, Inc. shows that its concern to protect
the public from possible trickery was a sham.  Its real desire was, as one
might have guessed, to own an official national standard.  Meanwhile, NIST has
justified past suspicion about its patent application by proposing to give
that patent (in effect) to a private entity.

Instead of making a gift to PKP, Inc., of the work all of us have paid for,
NIST and Congress ought to protect our access to it--by pursuing all possible
means, judicial and legislative, to invalidate or annul the PKP patents.  If
that fails, even taking them by eminent domain is better (and cheaper in the
long run!) than the current plan.

You can write to NIST to object to this giveaway.  Write to:

Michael R. Rubin
Active Chief Counsel for Technology
Room A-1111, Administration Building,
National Institute of Standards and Technology
Gaithersburg, Maryland 20899
(301) 975-2803.

The deadline for arrival of letters is around August 4.

Please send a copy of your letter to:

League for Programming Freedom
1 Kendall Square #143
P.O.Box 9171
Cambridge, Massachusetts 02139

(The League for Programming Freedom is an organization which defends
the freedom to write software, and opposes monopolies such as patented
algorithms and copyrighted languages.  It advocates returning to the
former legal system under which if you write the program, you are free
to use it.  Please write to the League if you want more information.)

Sending copies to the League will enable us to show them to elected
officials if that is useful.


This text was transcribed from a fax and may have transcription
errors.  We believe the text to be correct but some of the numbers
may be incorrect or incomplete.

  - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 

 ** The following notice was published in the Federal Register, Vol.
           58, No. 108, dated June 8, 1993 under Notices **

National Institute of Standards and Technology

Notice of Proposal for Grant of Exclusive Patent License

This is to notify the public that the National Institute of Standards and
Technology (NIST) intends to grant an exclusive world-wide license to Public
Key Partners of Sunnyvale, California to practice the Invention embodied in
U.S. Patent Application No.  07/738.431 and entitled "Digital Signature
Algorithm."  A PCT application has been filed.  The rights in the invention
have been assigned to the United States of America.

The prospective license is a cross-license which would resolve a patent
dispute with Public Key Partners and includes the right to sublicense.  Notice
of availability of this invention for licensing was waived because it was
determined that expeditious granting of such license will best serve the
interest of the Federal Government and the public.  Public Key Partners has
provided NIST with the materials contained in Appendix A as part of their
proposal to NIST.

Inquiries, comments, and other materials relating to the prospective license
shall be submitted to Michael R. Rubin, Active Chief Counsel for Technology,
Room A-1111, Administration Building, National Institute of Standards and
Technology, Gaithersburg, Maryland 20899.  His telephone number is (301)
975-2803.  Applications for a license filed in response to this notice will be
treated as objections to the grant of the prospective license.  Only written
comments and/or applications for a license which are received by NIST within
sixty (60) days for the publication of this notice will be considered.

The prospective license will be granted unless, within sixty (60) days of this
notice, NIST receives written evidence and argument which established that the
grant of the license would not be consistent with the requirements of 35
U.S.C. 209 and 37 CFR 404.7.

  Dated:  June 2, 1993.

Raymond G. Kammer
Acting Director, National Institute Standards and Technology.

Appendix "A"

The National Institute for Standards and Technology ("NIST") has announced its
intention to grant Public Key Partners ("PKP") sublicensing rights to NIST's
pending patent application on the Digital Signature Algorithm ("DSA").

Subject to NIST's grant of this license, PKP is pleased to declare its support
for the proposed Federal Information Processing Standard for Digital
Signatures (the "DSS") and the pending availability of licenses to practice
the DSA.  In addition to the DSA, licenses to practice digital signatures will
be offered by PKP under the following patents:

          Cryptographic Apparatus and Method ("Diffie-Hellman")
                No. 4,200,770
          Public Key Cryptographic Apparatus and Method
                ("Hellman-Merkle")   No. 4,315,552
          Exponential Cryptographic Apparatus and Method
                ("Hellman-Pohlig")   No. 4,434,414
          Method For Identifying Subscribers And For Generating
                And Verifying Electronic Signatures In A Data Exchange
                System ("Schnorr")   No. 4,995,082

It is PKP's intent to make practice of the DSA royalty free for personal,
noncommercial and U.S. Federal, state and local government use.  As explained
below, only those parties who enjoy commercial benefit from making or selling
products, or certifying digital signatures, will be required to pay royalties
to practice the DSA.

PKP will also grant a license to practice key management, at no additional
fee, for the integrated circuits which will implement both the DSA and the
anticipated Federal Information Processing Standard for the "key escrow"
system announced by President Clinton on April 16, 1993.

Having stated these intentions, PKP now takes this opportunity to publish its
guidelines for granting uniform licenses to all parties having a commercial
interest in practicing this technology:

First, no party will be denied a license for any reason other that the
following:
          (i)    Failure to meet its payment obligations,
          (ii)   Outstanding claims of infringement, or
          (iii)  Previous termination due to material breach.

Second, licenses will be granted for any embodiment sold by the licensee or
made for its use, whether for final products software, or components such as
integrated circuits and boards, and regardless of the licensee's channel of
distribution.  Provided the requisite royalties have been paid by the seller
on the enabling component(s), no further royalties will be owned by the buyer
for making or selling the final product which incorporates such components.

Third, the practice of digital signatures in accordance with the DSS may be
licensed separately from any other technical art covered by PKP's patents.

Fourth, PKP's royalty rates for the right to make or sell products, subject to
uniform minimum fees, will be no more than 2 1/2% for hardware products and 5%
for software, with the royalty rate further declining to 1% on any portion of
the product price exceeding $1,000.  These royalty rates apply only to
noninfringing parties and will be uniform without regard to whether the
licensed product creates digital signatures, verifies digital signatures or
performs both.

Fifth, for the next three (3) years, all commercial services which certify a
signature's authenticity for a fee may be operated royalty free.  Thereafter,
all providers of such commercial certification services shall pay a royalty to
PKP of $1.00 per certificate for each year the certificate is valid.

Sixth, provided the foregoing royalties are paid on such products or services,
all other practice of the DSA shall be royalty free.

Seventh, PKP invites all of its existing licensees, at their option, to
exchange their current licenses for the standard license offered for DSA.

Finally, PKP will mediate the concerns of any party regarding the availability
of PKP's licenses for the DSA with designated representatives of NIST and PKP.
For copies of PKP's license terms, contact Michael R. Rubin, Acting Chief
Counsel for Technology, NIST, or Public Key Partners.

  Dated:  June 2, 1993.

Robert B. Fougner, Esq.,
Director of Licensing, Public Key Partners,
310 North Mary Avenue, Sunnyvale, CA  94033

[FR Doc. 93-13473 Filed 8-7-93; 8:45 am]
                        ^^^^^^
                [Looks like a typo to me... -- DS ]
- -- 
Darren Senn          Phone: (408) 988-2640      Snail: 620 Park View Drive #206
sinster@scintilla.santa-clara.ca.us                       Santa Clara, CA 95054
Just another alpha male wire-head pyromaniac

------- End of Forwarded Message





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Chris Parrinello <parrinel@ux1.cso.uiuc.edu>
Date: Tue, 6 Jul 93 21:47:34 PDT
To: nobody@soda.berkeley.edu
Subject: Re: Encrypted list software
In-Reply-To: <9307070403.AA05223@soda.berkeley.edu>
Message-ID: <199307070446.AA27421@ux1.cso.uiuc.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Your message dated: Tue, 06 Jul 1993 21:03:30 PDT
>-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
>
>I've had a couple of people ask to have their names added to the
>encrypted list forwarder I put together.  I'm soliciting feedback on
>how this service should work.
>
>I wonder if it would be better for it to encrypt the whole message, headers
>and body together, then to mail that with a fresh new header that would
>show nothing about the original message.

I think encrypting who the message is from and the subject would be
best that way I can have a subject of "Plans to Kill Pauly Shore"
after I decrypt the message.

For how the service should work, I think you should look into MIME. You 
can include encrypted text that will decrypt when you read it with
your mail program.

Chris




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: khijol!erc@apple.com (Ed Carp)
Date: Wed, 7 Jul 93 00:07:56 PDT
To: i6t4@jupiter.sun.csd.unb.ca (Nickey MacDonald)
Subject: Re: What do you make of this?
In-Reply-To: <Pine.3.05.9307070205.C23187-b100000@jupiter>
Message-ID: <m0oDTRz-00022fC@khijol>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text


> Here's a list of phone numbers, what do you make of them?

> Nick MacDonald               | NMD on IRC
> i6t4@jupiter.sun.csd.unb.ca  | PGP 2.1 Public key available via finger
> i6t4@unb.ca                  | (506) 457-1931    ^{1024/746EBB 1993/02/23}

I don't know.  What are they?

Ed (busily building gcc-2.4.5 on a 486) Carp
-- 
Ed Carp				erc@wetware.com			510/659-9560
   For anonymous mailers -->   anonymus+5300@charcoal.com
"I've met many thinkers and many cats, but the wisdom of cats is infinitely
 superior."      -- Hippolyte Taine  (1828-1893)



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: mike@EGFABT.ORG (Mike Sherwood)
Date: Wed, 7 Jul 93 00:36:42 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: What do you make of this?
In-Reply-To: <Pine.3.05.9307070205.C23187-b100000@jupiter>
Message-ID: <Dm4a7B1w165w@EGFABT.ORG>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Nickey MacDonald <i6t4@jupiter.sun.csd.unb.ca> writes:

> Here's a list of phone numbers, what do you make of them?
> 
> (503) 241-9796  ext: 09
> (510) 244-8003  ext: 308

I dont know about all of them, but the second one is near me and I 
confirmed that there is no 244 prefix in the 510 area code, so either 
ther is an error in that data, or should I venture so far as to say that 
he's trying to make a point about hiding information in a seemingly 
harmless format.  I don't have the desire to actually try to find out 
what it is, but it wouldnt take much more research to find out if the 
list is primarily made of nonexistent numbers.  However, the only reason I
even looked that far is because of the nature of this group and the fact that
it was brought up as such, rather than "Local U.S. Department of Agriculture
offices" or some other title that would cause people to want to be as far
away from it as possible.

--
Mike Sherwood
internet: mike@EGFABT.ORG     uucp: ...!sgiblab!egfabt!mike






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: rwhelan@mason1.gmu.edu (Ryan A. Whelan)
Date: Tue, 6 Jul 93 23:00:41 PDT
To: parrinel@ux1.cso.uiuc.edu (Chris Parrinello)
Subject: Re: Encrypted list software
In-Reply-To: <199307070446.AA27421@ux1.cso.uiuc.edu>
Message-ID: <9307070600.AA23572@mason1.gmu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

> I think encrypting who the message is from and the subject would be
> best that way I can have a subject of "Plans to Kill Pauly Shore"
> after I decrypt the message.

> For how the service should work, I think you should look into MIME. You 
> can include encrypted text that will decrypt when you read it with
> your mail program.

Well actaully, since we just recently got perl installed on our system,
I have been playing around with the elm and nn scripts.  They seem to
work resonably well, but it looks like they need a little work.  The do
detect if the message is PGP encrypted or if it has a PGP signature in
it and when I mail things it asks if I want to sign it or encrypt it.
They need a little polishing but they do work.  Anyone else has any
experience using this? anyone got any suggestions?
Sometime when I am not so tired I am going to play with the emacs and
tin scripts.

- -- 
Ryan A. Whelan  "Only two good things came out of Berkeley, LSD and BSD,
rwhelan@mason1.gmu.edu    rwhelan@cosmos.gmu.edu    coincidence???"
rwhelan@gmuvax.gmu.edu   
PGP Public Key available via finger    "If its not UNIX, its crap"

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.3

iQCVAgUBLDpmSxGKBstqmlA7AQHHQwQAjSnhBqjU28HAjYN87g7iSSwfZxRYxrdY
ArpkU89N72CW1NgEQnLoZGYmyVuXNdmMn7qVJrEPXM5ivT/iGgiLmrUsiFSe1mtF
gt20XyQ/VYO74M3DI7wC3tUcn63lRaJO79rYjenQKL6g4HPdIZxYjJMj6TlEzPK3
ULahI5aALys=
=zUm7
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Nickey MacDonald <i6t4@jupiter.sun.csd.unb.ca>
Date: Tue, 6 Jul 93 22:31:44 PDT
To: cypherpunks list <cypherpunks@toad.com>
Subject: What do you make of this?
Message-ID: <Pine.3.05.9307070205.C23187-b100000@jupiter>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Here's a list of phone numbers, what do you make of them?

(503) 241-9796  ext: 09
(510) 244-8003  ext: 308
(614) 626-6421  ext: 19
(917) 806-0801  ext: 19
(208) 565-6220  ext: 23
(807) 961-6176
(608) 809-5822
(402) 815-5084
(716) 251-3201  ext: 214
(317) 837-9796  ext: 20
(514) 999-7352  ext: 38
(412) 221-7266  ext: 226
(619) 620-9556  ext: 18
(417) 582-2491  ext: 26
(210) 879-1228  ext: 017
(413) 708-9037  ext: 24
(203) 791-3828  ext: 15
(413) 366-5478  ext: 37
(414) 297-3632  ext: 301
(305) 469-5633
(200) 296-4919  ext: 104
(818) 708-4065  ext: 12
(402) 614-0058
(213) 918-2514  ext: 221
(201) 897-4434  ext: 01
(611) 200-0862  ext: 208
(213) 248-9232  ext: 0309
(507) 236-2585  ext: 27
(218) 271-1379  ext: 0329
(201) 267-6176  ext: 114
(504) 214-8612  ext: 22
(803) 823-1367
(207) 562-8716  ext: 27
(215) 239-5596  ext: 0421
(405) 332-6203
(912) 248-6594  ext: 225
(216) 440-2025  ext: 122
(313) 322-2667  ext: 33

--
Nick MacDonald               | NMD on IRC
i6t4@jupiter.sun.csd.unb.ca  | PGP 2.1 Public key available via finger
i6t4@unb.ca                  | (506) 457-1931    ^{1024/746EBB 1993/02/23}






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: jota@iguana.inesc.pt (Joao Pedro Martins)
Date: Tue, 6 Jul 93 17:41:10 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Subscribe
Message-ID: <9307070041.AA21672@iguana.inesc.pt>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text


subscribe


-- 
*  "Deitaram-se. Blimunda era virgem. Que idade tens, perguntou Baltasar, e
*Blimunda respondeu, Dezanove anos, mas ja' enta~o se tornara muito mais
*velha." - Jose' Saramago, "Memorial do Convento"
**************************************************** jota@mujave.inesc.pt *
*	...jotinha meu amor...				    INFOFREE
*			i got pgp, ask me	      NO MORE ! (U2,SBS-L)
* 9431006 <- noy my password                          dancing and laughing



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Mike Godwin <mnemonic@eff.org>
Date: Wed, 7 Jul 93 22:15:48 PDT
To: karn@qualcomm.com (Phil Karn)
Subject: Re: "Let's kill all the lawyers..."
In-Reply-To: <9307070103.AA23132@servo>
Message-ID: <199307071221.AA05193@eff.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


 
Phil writes:

> Last night I saw the Saferstein remarks you mention. I think they hit
> the local California TV stations before being picked up by CNN. I
> fully agree that PC is *really* getting out of hand if lawyers are now
> to be considered one of the downtrodden minority groups.
 
If I were to set out to deliberate make lawyers look even sillier than
they look already, I couldn't imagine a better place to start than to make
a remark like Saferstein's "hate crimes" comment.


--Mike







From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: pat@tstc.edu (Patrick E. Hykkonen)
Date: Wed, 7 Jul 93 22:15:15 PDT
To: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Subject: Re: Live for today
In-Reply-To: <9307070441.AA21415@netcom3.netcom.com>
Message-ID: <9307071325.AA04823@tstc.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> It is true we haven't deployed digital cash, nor have we set up data
> havens in cyberspace, nor a bunch of other things, but these things
> are instrinsically hard to pull off. Someday they'll come.

Could someone please define a 'data haven'?  I understand digitial 
cash, it is exactly what it sounds like.  However, in the context I've heard
data haven used in, then there is much more than simply keeping one's 
data encrypted on your local hard drive.

Still learning and trying to understand all of these things.

-- 
Pat Hykkonen, N5NPL                     Texas State Technical College at Waco
Internet: {pat,postmaster,root}@tstc.edu       Instructional Network Services
Packet: N5NPL@WD5KAL.#CENTX.TX.USA.NA        3801 Campus Dr.  Waco, Tx  76705
                                           V:(817) 867-4830  F:(817) 799-2843




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Mike Godwin <mnemonic@eff.org>
Date: Wed, 7 Jul 93 22:15:21 PDT
To: phred@well.sf.ca.us (Fred Heutte)
Subject: Re: "Let's kill all the lawyers..."
In-Reply-To: <93Jul6.183147pdt.14190-3@well.sf.ca.us>
Message-ID: <199307071228.AA05225@eff.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


 
Fred Heutte writes:

> We need lawyers, but do we need *so many*?!  I was born and grew up
> in Washington, DC.  The DC Bar has over *50,000* lawyers!  Even in
> our nation's capital that seems excessive.
 
They're not all in our nation's capital. The DC Bar allows lawyers
admitted to other jurisdictions to "waive into" DC if their MBE
score is sufficiently high--no separate bar exam. Many lawyers get
admitted to the DC Bar this way in anticipation of the possibility that
someday they may have to do some legal work in DC. 

Conversely, lots of lawyers simply come to DC without getting admitted
to the DC Bar. They just don't practice in the District.


--Mike






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Chris Claborne <claborne@ccgate.sandiegoca.NCR.COM>
Date: Wed, 7 Jul 93 22:06:38 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Encrypted postings.
Message-ID: <9307071256.ab02776@ncrcom.DaytonOH.NCR.COM>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


     >I've had a couple of people ask to have their names added to the 
     >encrypted list forwarder I put together.  I'm soliciting feedback on 
     >how this service should work.
     
     Could we send our postings to the mailer in encrypted format?  That 
     is... I would encrypt the message with the public key for the mailer, 
     the mailer would decrypt and re-post to the clear-text mailer and to 
     the PGP group.  
     
        Granted, because the mailer must be run in full auto mode, it won't 
     be the most secure.  It would mean that all inbound as well as 
     outbound cypherpunk traffic to my node would be in an electronic 
     envelope.
     
         2
     -- C  --




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Andrew S Hall <ashall@magnus.acs.ohio-state.edu>
Date: Wed, 7 Jul 93 22:14:55 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Tim's shenanigans
Message-ID: <9307071350.AA29739@photon.magnus.acs.ohio-state.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain




A brief comment. Anyone who was fooled was a dimwit. If I remember
correctly, Tim's "encrypted GIF" was about 80 lines long. This isn't
large enough for a stick drawing, let alone kiddie porn.

A.



Techno-Anarchy.Neophilia.Economic Freedom.Cryptography.Anti-Statism.Personal
Liberty.Laissez-Faire.Privacy Protection.Libertarianism.No Taxes.No Bullshit.
**********            Liberty BBS 1-614-798-9537                  **********
**********           Dedicated to Freedom. Yours.                 **********




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: jon barber <jonb@insignia.co.uk>
Date: Wed, 7 Jul 93 02:36:21 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Complete ignorance of any sort of reality on May's part (was We are
Message-ID: <756.9307070933@panacea.insignia.co.uk>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



> Tired of white het male computer geeks talking nonsense about  
anyone
> who threatens their place in the power structure,

Bollocks.  I'm sick of being labelled 'white het male'.  I am, but so  
what ?  Your response was the most power-oriented in this exchange,  
and your steroetypes are just as banal as me calling all lesbians fat  
& ugly.

What power structure ?  I don't see any power structure - in fact I'm  
just as powerless as anyone else is.

I'm sick and tired of having to be politically correct for fear of  
being called a bigot.  I'll be damned if I'll be turned into an  
emasculated new age man, as the ones I've come across repel me almost  
as much as child pornographers.

Jon Barber, donning asbestos suit.

P.S. I'm no homophobe.  My best friend is HIV+ after having a  
bisexual history, and his girlfriends twin sister is a lesbian, who I  
like very much.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: whitfield.diffie@Eng.Sun.COM
Date: Wed, 7 Jul 93 22:07:33 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Happens to `best' of them
Message-ID: <9307072015.AA25620@ushabti.Eng.Sun.COM>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



    The following delicious item appeared at the bottom of page 4 in
the National Edition of The New York Times on Saturday, 3 July 1993.

		The Iraq Raid: Snoop Gets Scoop
		 Special to The New York Times

   Washington, July 2 --- An electronic hacker was able to listen in
as top aides to Secretary of State Warren Christopher helped him to
alert world leaders about the missile strike against Baghdad last
Saturday.

   The conversations were intercepted beginning nearly an hour before
the raid was made public.  But the first calls were apparently not
overheard until after Tomahawk missiles from Navy ships struck the
headquarters of the Iraqi intelligence service.

   The calls, placed from a Government plane as Mr. Christopher
returned to Washington from Maine, provided a sense of the hurried
efforts made by officials in midair and in Washington to spread news
of the attack.  At one point, they indicate, a State Department
official awakened Chancellor Helmut Kohl of of Germany only to
discover that President Clinton had spoken with the German leader
earlier in the day.

   The eavesdropping was first reported in the current issue of
Business Week, which obtained a tape recording of the conversations
from an electronic hacker who specializes in monitoring unsecured
calls.  The magazine made available a transcript of the recording.

   The State Department refused to comment on what is said were
private conversations among Mr.  Christopher's aides, but a senior
official there said the transcript was essentially accurate.  None of
the calls made by Mr. Christopher himself was recorded, apparently
because they were placed through secure channels.

   Any uncoded call that travels through the airwaves rather than
along a wire can be intercepted, and electronic eavesdroppers have
become skilled at using scanners to monitor the communications.






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Nickey MacDonald <i6t4@jupiter.sun.csd.unb.ca>
Date: Wed, 7 Jul 93 22:12:09 PDT
To: Mike Sherwood <mike@EGFABT.ORG>
Subject: Re: What do you make of this?
In-Reply-To: <Dm4a7B1w165w@EGFABT.ORG>
Message-ID: <Pine.3.05.9307071320.C22807-b100000@jupiter>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


On Wed, 7 Jul 1993, Mike Sherwood wrote:

> I dont know about all of them, but the second one is near me and I 
> confirmed that there is no 244 prefix in the 510 area code, so either 
> ther is an error in that data, or should I venture so far as to say that 
> he's trying to make a point about hiding information in a seemingly 
> harmless format.

I hope no one actually trys to call any of those numbers...  I couldn't
think of a way to list them without giving away the truth...

You are correct, I was trying to make a point of hiding information in a
seemingly harmless format (although the longer the message, the less
harmless the format looks)...

> I don't have the desire to actually try to find out 
> what it is, but it wouldnt take much more research to find out if the 
> list is primarily made of nonexistent numbers.

Well... I'll increase your chances to figure it out, should you get the
desire...  The hidden text was Un*x compressed...

> However, the only reason I
> even looked that far is because of the nature of this group and the fact that
> it was brought up as such, rather than "Local U.S. Department of Agriculture
> offices" or some other title that would cause people to want to be as far
> away from it as possible.

I had hoped that someone would assume there was a message...  I'm still
hoping someone will find it...  I'll release the source either way...  :-)

--
Nick MacDonald               | NMD on IRC
i6t4@jupiter.sun.csd.unb.ca  | PGP 2.1 Public key available via finger
i6t4@unb.ca                  | (506) 457-1931    ^{1024/746EBB 1993/02/23}






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Chris Claborne <claborne@ccgate.sandiegoca.NCR.COM>
Date: Wed, 7 Jul 93 21:58:29 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: PC week
Message-ID: <9307071831.af02186@ncrcom.DaytonOH.NCR.COM>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


     >Sorry if this has been mentioned already, but the new issue of PC
     >Week contains a big special report entitled "Privacy in the 
     >Workplace." It's got about five or six separate pieces on electronic 
     >eavesdropping in the workplace, encryption, Clipper, etc., etc.  I've 
     >only had a chance to scan it quickly (I mean with my eyes), but it 
     >seems that there's no mention of PGP at all, even in the piece on 
     >public-key encryption. Shocking.  And the piece on Clipper, while it 
     >of course mentions all the opposition to the proposal, seemed just a 
     >bit wimpy to me.  Anyway, it's the June 28 issue.  Worth checking 
     >out, I guess.
     
     Wimpy yes, but a good start.  I am seeing more and more on clipper and 
     encryption.  I think I even saw on in the LA Times.  I would reccomend 
     that we encourage this behavior by writing letters to the editor.  
     Remember... Power of the press. (some day "power of the net")
     
         2
     -- C  --




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: smm@engr.uark.edu (MILLIGAN STEVEN M)
Date: Wed, 7 Jul 93 22:07:11 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: hello
Message-ID: <m0oDg8h-0007SfC@engr.engr.uark.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



 hey there.  I just joined the group about a week ago and have held off writting, until I sort of got a feel
 for what goes on.  I still don't think I have the feel for it , but what the hell I'm writting anyway.

 If it is possible is there anyone who could take a little time to give  me a few hints on how to send, receive, and 
forward encyrpted messages.  

any help at all would be appreciated. 
					Thanx,
	                                    			   Steve Milligan
					   smm@engr.uark.edu
				"George Washington fought for his country and 
				 ended up in the White House...
				 Sitting Bull fought for HIS country and ended
				 up in a tent show."




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: fergp@sytex.com (Paul Ferguson)
Date: Wed, 7 Jul 93 22:06:29 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Technophobia & Intelligence: Forwarded article from Information Week
Message-ID: <y85B7B1w165w@sytex.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


 
reprinted from:
 
Information Week
July 5, 1993
(cover story)
pages 31 through 38
 
The Intelligence Test
 
Do tight funds and technophobia impede the CIA's ability to
gather information?
 
by Francis Hamit
 
As the United States turns 217 years old this week, the officials
responsible for the computers and communications of the nation's
intelligence agencies are in no mood for a party. Many of their
systems are antiquated, inefficient, and sometimes dangerously
ineffective. Their resources are being taxed by the changing
demands of post-Cold War politics. They need money to update
their systems, yet a Democratic Congress appears intent on
cutting the overall intelligence budget by more than $1 billion.
To top it all off, IS officials in the intelligence community
face an internal cultural bias against computers; some CIA
employees see the machines as little more than electronic
security leaks. "They just don't get it," says industry analyst
Esther Dyson, who recently visited the CIA with an Electronic
Frontier Foundation delegation. "It's depressing."
 
Yet, the U.S. intelligence community, under the leadership of the
CIA, is undergoing a quiet revolution in culture and
methodology. The IT component of the effort is being led by
Michael L. Dillard, chairman of the information policy board in
the Office of the Director of Central Intelligence, essentially
the intelligence community's CIO.
 
Dillard has the authority to do the job. He reports directly to
the director of central intelligence, R. James Woolsey. Dillard
and Woolsey's charter includes the CIA -- which is in the process
of trying to fill a new CIO position of their own -- as well as
government departments such as the Bureau of Research and
Intelligence in the State Department, the intelligence elements
of the various Armed Forces, the Energy Department's intelligence
component, the National Security Agency, even units of the
Treasury Department. Factor in the ad hoc task forces and working
groups set up to handle specific areas of concern such as
terrorism, narcotics, and transnational criminal activities, and
it's a potentially cacophonous collection of sources to manage
in a real-time environment -- and with an extremely limited
margin for error.
 
The Agency That Knew Too Much?
 
The intelligence community's work is breathtaking in scope. Raw
data floods in daily from every conceivable source. Technical
collection efforts such as signals interception and high-
resolution imaging from spy satellites and other sources are
combined with the reports of agents and secret sources around the
world and "open sources," such as newspaper articles and radio
broadcasts. All this information flows like a river into a system
that must select, analyze, and evaluate significant data, and
then turn it into easy-to-understand digests for policymakers.
 
But the overall system is not working as well as it should, and
the need for reform has long been acknowledged by members of the
intelligence community. The CIA alone runs 10 data processing
systems; under the current classification and
compartmentalization, there is virtually no interoperability
between them (see related story below). This has led to some
public embarrassments. Recently, for example, the agency was
accused of covering up part of the BNL scandal, in which an
Italian bank used U.S. Agriculture Department guarantees to help
Saddam Hussein finance Iraq's arms buildup before the Gulf War.
This accusation came after the CIA first denied knowledge of the
affair, then later found the requested documents in a file box
under a staff member's desk.
 
The current reforms began last year under former director of
central intelligence Robert Gates and have continued under
Woolsey, who was a member of the committee that made the
original reform recommendations. Late last year, before the
annual convention of the Association of Former Intelligence
Officers, Gates identified the targets for intelligence community
reform as nothing less than "our mission, our structure, our
long-term size and budget, and our culture."
 
These changes come at a time when intelligence consumers are
demanding interactive, multimedia systems that better meet their
needs and time constraints. Given the current climate of budget
cutbacks and growing demands, the community may undergo a major
restructuring that will force wider use of distributed,
multimedia computer and communications systems.
 
CIO Dillard is unable to detail precise changes to the
intelligence community's IS effort because information such as
various agencies' IS budget and staff size is strictly
classified. But he shared his five goals for IS in the
intelligence community:
 
o Increase the volume of data, especially from "open sources."
  The first Open Source Coordinator has been appointed.
 
o Attain true connectivity and interoperability among the systems
  used in the intelligence community. While some are PC- and
  workstation-based and use commercially available software,
  traditional approaches to security had mandated that they not
  be linked.
 
o Reduce the growing cost of operating and maintaining legacy
  systems. Today, 82 cents of every dollar spent by IS groups in
  intelligence goes to maintain and operate existing systems.
  "This," says Dillard,"is using up our resources and driving out
  our ability to recapitalize and meet new requirements."
 
o Downsize systems.
 
o Create an equal infusion of technology throughout the
  community. While some computers in use are leading edge,
  others date back to the 1960s, Some software is 25 years old.
 
These initiatives would be difficult in any environment, But the
intelligence community also harbors a cultural bias against
electronic systems. It stems, in part, from the need to secure
information in such a way to protect sources and methods. "In the
proper-based world, this is not a problem," Dillard says. "In the
electronic one, the ability to connect and compare data can lead
to unintended compromises of security."
 
Indeed, the intelligence community has had an explosion of
literally thousands of databases. Open sources alone command
4,000 databases of all kinds; the most sensitive are kept
offline. Many paper files are never converted to digital form.
With the intelligence community creating an estimated 20,000
digital records a day, the job of digitizing and transferring
older paper files is relegated to the to-do pile.
 
The agencies are researching and developing software tools to
break through this logjam by helping analysts search very large
databases. This effort is being managed by the Intelligence
Community Management Staff, a separate entity charged with
implementing much of the reform.
 
Congress has had much to say about the intelligence community's
need to eliminate redundant computer systems. But unlike in
private businesses, redundant sources in intelligence may
actually help clarify information by providing additional checks
on incoming data.  Redundant information also helps guard against
deception schemes by adversary intelligence services.
 
In addition, while the community's rapidly growing stream of data
demands the use of the latest technology, the open systems
approach that works best in the business world is unfamiliar,
possibly even threatening, to those in the intelligence community.
 
Past attempts to cut one type of collection in favor of another
generally have been damaging. In the late '70s, director of
central intelligence Stansfield Turner emphasized technical means
over human intelligence sources -- he was uncomfortable with
spies and forced out many veteran covert operatives. Turner's
critics say the efforts may have led to an inability to respond
to anti-American terrorist operations in the Middle East,
such as the 1983 bombing of the U.S. Marines barracks in Beirut,
which was aggravated by the bombing and subsequent kidnapping and
murder of the CIA's local station chief.
 
Satellites Alone Don't Fly
 
Only 30% to 40% of all intelligence gathering is the result of
technical means such as satellite surveillance and signals
interception. Another 30% comes from open sources, while an
overwhelming 80% is derived from human sources (the total exceeds
100% to account for overlap between sources). Many in the
intelligence community believe there is no substitute for the
human analyst.
 
Funding for the intelligence community's new IT efforts may be
scarce. Despite Clinton administration efforts to expand the
overall intelligence budget to more than $28 billion in order to
cope with the changes caused by the collapse of the Soviet
Union, Congress seems intent upon cutting more than $1 billion
from current levels.
 
Not surprisingly, intelligence professionals are horrified by
this prospect in the midst of the agencies' most profound
cultural change and organizational restructuring since World War
II. They fear that vital programs may be damaged, eroding the
nation's ability to cope with new challenges.
 
At the same time, the intelligence community is trying to
downsize by attrition and has cut expenditures by 17.5%. Hiring
has been cut back both for career and contract agents, and many
veterans are being offered early retirement.
 
Some intelligence officers feel budget cuts could interfere with
the community's recruiting ability. "The lifeblood of the
intelligence community is bringing in new people and giving them
experience and training," says David Whipple, a CIA veteran and
now executive director of the association of Former Intelligence
Officers.
 
The demands upon the intelligence community since the end  of the
Cold War have grown more complex. Veterans of the Cold War era
sometimes even wax nostalgic. "The Cold War simplified things
into a bipolar world," says one CIA veteran analyst. "It froze a
lot of things, like the situation in the Balkans, which have now
erupted with a vengeance."
 
In the 1980s, nearly 60% of the overall intelligence budget was
focused upon the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact nations. At
first glance, it would seem that this amount could now be cut.
But with the fluid geopolitical situation and the emergence of
dozens of new players, the requirements in Eastern Europe are
increasing, the agencies argue.
 
Not surprisingly, so is the use of computing. "We've all had to
develop an understanding of computing and how to use it in out
day-today work," says a CIA public affairs officer. While
mainframes still dominate, PCs are appearing on intelligence
desktops, joining older systems rather than replacing them.
 
There's still a long way to go for real change. And the
intelligence community's wary attitude could mean necessary
changes are made later rather than sooner. "There's this sort of
intellectual understanding of change, but there's none of that
understanding, somewhere between emotional and intellectual,
where you 'get it,'" says analyst Dyson. "Some of them do, but to
me a good intelligence service is smarter than everybody else."
 
 
[ related story ]
 
Downsizing: Is It Safe?
 
An ongoing debate is raging within the U.S. intelligence
community about large-scale computer systems. Michael Dillard,
chairman of the information policy board in the Office of the
Director of Central Intelligence, talks about reviewing
standalone systems to see if they can be combined, or at least
made co-resident, with other systems on similar hardware. This
would cut operations and maintenance staffing, but it would also
make such systems more vulnerable to compromise. Such a melding
of data sets violates the well-established culture of keeping
secrets by separating them on a "need-to-know" basis.
 
Given the literally millions of people who have Confidential,
Secret, Top Secret, and higher clearances, the real surprise is
not that there is an occasional traitor such as Jonathan Pollard
or John Walker, but that there are not more such breaches of
security. Of course, for the intelligence community, one is too
many. Pollard, for instance, is said to have given 85,000
documents to his Israeli handlers. And the full extent of the
damage done by Walker during his 20 years of spying for the
Soviets may never be known, but certainly codes and other vital
intelligence sources and methods were compromised.
 
"Sources and methods" are, of course, the most closely held
secrets of any intelligence service. While former director of
central intelligence Robert Gates initiated a vigorous
declassification program, a National Archives official recently
complained that the review and declassification of documents from
the 1960s alone would take nearly 20 years to complete at the
present rate. In fact, the U.S. government still holds classified
documents that date back to World War I.
 
"Why shouldn't there be one national policy concerning the
protection of valuable national assets?" asks Maynard C.
Anderson, an assistant deputy undersecretary of defense, in a
recent letter to Security Management magazine. He notes that laws
such as the Atomic Energy Act, the Arms Control Act, and the
Privacy Act have added categories of information to be protected
but not a mechanism for the overall administration of information
security. "The lack of a single, coordinated, national
information policy has resulted in the fragmentation of
policy-making and prevented the allocation of resources where
they are needed most."
 
Such issues are consciously avoided by both civilian and military
intelligence officers who view themselves as the implementors
rather than the makers of policy. The highly compartmentalized
approach of sharing information only with those who "need to
know" is the ultimate protection of sources and methods.
 
Dire Consequences
 
More important, it saves lives. An agent-in-place can be run for
years with his or her true identity known only to a handful of
people within one agency. In such a circumstance, the data from
the source must be heavily filtered to avoid compromising the
source's identity, which could have fatal consequences for the
operation and the agent. The downside is that it allows ad hoc
operations to take place, such as Iran-Contra, which was mounted
from within the basement of the National Security Council offices
in the White House. (It also explains why Robert Gates was not
informed about the operation despite his position at the time as
deputy director of intelligence.)
 
Computer networks have not proven themselves to be absolutely
secure, so the  creation of an electronic system vulnerable to
compromise goes very much against the grain of senior officers.
But the need for quicker processing is apparent, as is the need
for absolute security. It is a big problem not easily resolved.
In fact, resolution may depend upon software yet to be
developed, possibly by a new generation of programmers who will
be offered well-paying jobs  by private enterprise at a time
when government research dollars are being absorbed by current
program needs.
             -F.H.
 
8<------- End  forwarded  article --------
 

Paul Ferguson               |  "Confidence is the feeling you get
Network Integrator          |   just before you fully understand
Centreville, Virginia USA   |   the problem."
fergp@sytex.com             |      - Murphy's 7th Law of Computing
 
               Quis Custodiet Ipsos Custodes?




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Nickey MacDonald <i6t4@jupiter.sun.csd.unb.ca>
Date: Wed, 7 Jul 93 22:04:34 PDT
To: cypherpunks list <cypherpunks@toad.com>
Subject: Motorola cordless phones with 'Secure Clear (tm) Audio'
Message-ID: <Pine.3.05.9307071911.A12475-b100000@jupiter>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Anyone know anything about Motorola's new phones (models VST 100, VST 350,
VST 550, locally priced at $179, $249 and $299 Canadian)?

This is what the ad says:

- Motorola's newest telephones add nothing to cellular, but do set a new
standard for Cordless Technology.

- The Secure Clear (tm) Technology is the only Cordless Telephone to
virtually eliminate any possibility of eaves dropping.

- Motorola Cordless Telephones project a scrambled signal making it
virtually impossible to monitor a conversation with other Cordless Phones,
scanners or baby monitors.

- The Motorola Secure Clear (tm) Cordless Phones are available in three
models:  VST 550, VST 350, VST 100.

- The New Secure Clear (tm) Cordless Telephones meet the same rigid
quality and durability standards demanded of all Motorola products.

There are pictures and feature lists... and then a phone number, which I
have been trying to get through fo 2 hours...  1-800-668-1117

{As if it was obvious... the bottom line says:
   Secure Clear (tm) and Motorola are Trademarks of Motorola Inc.}

--
Nick MacDonald               | NMD on IRC
i6t4@jupiter.sun.csd.unb.ca  | PGP 2.1 Public key available via finger
i6t4@unb.ca                  | (506) 457-1931    ^{1024/746EBB 1993/02/23}






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Nickey MacDonald <i6t4@jupiter.sun.csd.unb.ca>
Date: Wed, 7 Jul 93 22:04:10 PDT
To: cypherpunks list <cypherpunks@toad.com>
Subject: Some source code for phone number coding...
Message-ID: <Pine.3.05.9307071932.B12475-d100000@jupiter>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Here is a couple of message about my phone encoding format (giving
progressively more info to a person trying to guess the format) followed
by the complete source...  Use it well.  (TABsize was 3.)



Okay, well without giving you the source...  heres the biggest hint I can
think of...

>From /etc/magic:
0	string		\037\235	compressed data

Translating that to decimal and in 4 byte unsigned long we get
  (\037\235\0\0 == 31,157,0,0 == 0,530,382,848
                                 ^^^^^

>From the start of my posted list of phone numbers:
(503) 241-9796  ext: 09
 ^^^                 ^
 ??   ?

If you know the rules for forming (valid looking) phone numbers...

Anyway, to finially give the whole thing away...

The file that is hidden starts with these 4 bytes...

1f 9d 90 54 == 0,530,419,796

Well.. I like puzzles... (as long as the answer is eventually revealed) so
I'll let you think it over for a bit, before I send you the source... ;-)




Okay well... lets assume that all valid phone numbers must be in the form
   [2-9][0-1][0-9]  [2-9][0-9][0-9]  [0-9][0-9][0-9][0-9]

This is the form of my encoding... now if you take a sample number, like
  1,234,567,890
and try encode it into a phone number, you would get
  (123) 456-7890
   ^^
And you notice that the 1 and the two are out of range...
Well.. as it happens, for 32 bit unsigned numbers the range is 0 to
4,294,967,294...  The first digit will always be 0-4, half of which are
illegal in that position, so I decided to swap the first two digits...

That doesn't fix all of the range problems, thus whenever there is an
invalid digit in position 1,2 or 4 I move it to the extension and put a
special indicator value (the higest of the legal range) in its place.

Thats the whole secret...  Code will follow soon...  :-)




/*
	pe.c

	phone encode

	Written by:
		Nickey MacDonald
		July 7, 1993

	Encode a message as a list of phone numbers...  There are some tricks
	used to make the phone numbers appear more realistic, and there is a
	caveate...  If the input file has 4 null bytes aligned of a 4 byte
	boundry, then the program will think its the EOF and stop...  This
	could be fixed easily... I just didn't.
*/


#include <stdio.h>


unsigned long getbytes(FILE *fp);


int main(void)
{
	unsigned short i, ei;					/* i=work counter, ei=ext. counter */
	unsigned char pn[10], ext[4], v=0;	/* Digits of phone num, ext and a */
													/* pseudo random value */
	unsigned long b;							/* 4 bytes compress to a unsigned long */
	char tpnumbuf[11];						/* a sprinft buffer for b */

	/* Read until EOF or 4 properly aligned null bytes */
	while((b=getbytes(stdin)) != 0)
	{
		ei=0;

		/* Convert the unsigned long into a string */
		sprintf(tpnumbuf, "%010lu", b);

		/* Pick up the digits of the unsigned long */

		/* Because of the distribution, swap the first two digits... */
		pn[0]=tpnumbuf[1]-'0';
		pn[1]=tpnumbuf[0]-'0';
		for(i=2; i<10; i++)
		{
			pn[i]=tpnumbuf[i]-'0';
			v+=pn[i];
		}

		/* The first digit of the area code must be [2-9] */
		if (pn[0]<3)
		{
			ext[ei++]=pn[0];
			pn[0]=2;
		}

		/* Currently the middle digit of area code must be 0 or 1 */
		if (pn[1]>0)
		{
			ext[ei++]=pn[1];
			pn[1]=1;
		}

		/* The first digit of prefix must be [2-9] */
		if (pn[3]<3)
		{
			ext[ei++]=pn[3];
			pn[3]=2;
		}

		/* Generate the output phone number */
		fprintf(stdout, "(%d%d%d) %d%d%d-%d%d%d%d", pn[0], pn[1], pn[2],
                                                  pn[3], pn[4], pn[5],
                                                  pn[6], pn[7], pn[8], pn[9]);

		/* Generate the extension if needed */
		if (ei>0)
		{
			ext[ei++]=v%10;
			fprintf(stdout, "  ext: ");
			for (i=0; i<ei; i++)
				fprintf(stdout, "%d", ext[i]);
		}

		fprintf(stdout, "\n");
	}

	return(0);
}


/* Input 4 bytes, convert EOF to null and encode as an unsigned long */
unsigned long getbytes(FILE *fp)
{
	int b[4];
	unsigned short i;

	for(i=0; i<4; i++)
	{
		b[i]=fgetc(fp);
		if (b[i]==EOF)  b[i]=0;
	}

	return(((unsigned long)b[0])<<24 |
          ((unsigned long)b[1])<<16 |
          ((unsigned long)b[2])<< 8 |
          ((unsigned long)b[3]));
}




/*
	pd.c

	phone decode

	Written by:
		Nickey MacDonald
		July 7, 1993

	Decodes a message hidden in a list of phone numbers.
*/


#include <stdio.h>


void putbytes(FILE *fp, unsigned long val);


int main(void)
{
	unsigned short i, ei;	/* i=work counter, ei=extention work counter */
	unsigned char pn[10];	/* The digits of the phone number */
	unsigned long b;			/* The finally decoded value from the phone num */
	char pnline[30];			/* Input line buffer */
	int flg=0;					/* The error message is only output once */

	/* Read lines until end of file */
	while((fgets(pnline, 30, stdin)) != NULL)
	{
		/* error checking */
		if ((pnline[0] != '(')  ||
          (pnline[4] != ')')  ||
          (pnline[9] != '-'))
		{
			if (flg==0)
			{
				fprintf(stderr, "Input not in correct format, output will be garbage!\n");
				flg=1;
			}
		}

		/* Extract the digits of the phone number, and convert from ASCII */
		pn[0]=pnline[1]-'0';
		pn[1]=pnline[2]-'0';
		pn[2]=pnline[3]-'0';

		pn[3]=pnline[6]-'0';
		pn[4]=pnline[7]-'0';
		pn[5]=pnline[8]-'0';

		pn[6]=pnline[10]-'0';
		pn[7]=pnline[11]-'0';
		pn[8]=pnline[12]-'0';
		pn[9]=pnline[13]-'0';

		/* The first digit of the extension should be the 21st loc of input buf */
		ei=21;

		/* The first digit of an area code is always [2-9] */
		if (pn[0]==2)
		{
			pn[0]=pnline[ei++]-'0';
		}

		/* Currently, the middle digit of area code is always 0 or 1 */
		if (pn[1]==1)
		{
			pn[1]=pnline[ei++]-'0';
		}

		/* The first digit of a prefix is always [2-9] */
		if (pn[3]==2)
		{
			pn[3]=pnline[ei++]-'0';
		}

		/* Swap first two digits */
		i=pn[0];
		pn[0]=pn[1];
		pn[1]=i;

		/* Encode the individualt digits into a unsigned long */
		b=0;
		for(i=0; i<10; i++)
			b=b*10+pn[i];

		/* output the decoded bytes */
		putbytes(stdout, b);
	}

	return(0);
}


/* Simple encoding... 4 bytes to the longword...  seperate them here */
void putbytes(FILE *fp, unsigned long val)
{
	int b[4];

	b[0]=(int)(val>>24 & 255);
	b[1]=(int)(val>>16 & 255);
	b[2]=(int)(val>> 8 & 255);
	b[3]=(int)(val     & 255);

	fprintf(fp, "%c%c%c%c", b[0], b[1], b[2], b[3]);
}

--
Nick MacDonald               | NMD on IRC
i6t4@jupiter.sun.csd.unb.ca  | PGP 2.1 Public key available via finger
i6t4@unb.ca                  | (506) 457-1931    ^{1024/746EBB 1993/02/23}






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: The Phantom <phantom@u.washington.edu>
Date: Wed, 7 Jul 93 22:01:13 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: John Gilmores' matchbook cover idea
Message-ID: <Pine.3.05.9307072006.A4425-a100000@stein2.u.washington.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I have made a mockup of what it 'should' (note my quotations) look like.
I'd appreciate it if some of you would take the time to ftp the .eps and
dump it to the nearest postscript printer. Let me know what you think
about the text and the font sizes, also what you think about the layout.

Does anyone want to pursue this?

Let me know, I think they might be pretty nice looking (and a way to get
our name (& cause) known).

Matt


Matt Thomlinson                               Say no to the Wiretap Chip!
University of Washington, Seattle, Washington.
Internet: phantom@u.washington.edu      	    phone: (206) 528-5732
PGP 2.2  key available via email or finger phantom@hardy.u.washington.edu





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: The Phantom <phantom@u.washington.edu>
Date: Wed, 7 Jul 93 22:01:01 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: John Gilmores' matchbook idea
Message-ID: <Pine.3.05.9307072020.A4488-9100000@stein2.u.washington.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I forgot to tell you where to ftp to:

ftp.u.washington.edu
login: anonymous

/pub/user-supported/cypherpunks/cpmatch.eps

(CypherPunk MATCH.eps)

let me know --

Matt Thomlinson                               Say no to the Wiretap Chip!
University of Washington, Seattle, Washington.
Internet: phantom@u.washington.edu      	    phone: (206) 528-5732
PGP 2.2  key available via email or finger phantom@hardy.u.washington.edu





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Clifford A Adams <caadams@polaris.unm.edu>
Date: Wed, 7 Jul 93 21:59:59 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: USENET newsreaders and cryptography: features/suggestions/questions
Message-ID: <9307080348.AA10446@polaris.unm.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Hello out there!

	The current version of strn (see below) contains a signature
verification command (control-V).  It looks for either a RIPEM or PGP
signature line and passes the article to the appropriate command for
verification.  (Strn leaves it up to the user to interpret the output
of the command.)

	I have a few questions/requests that I hope the cypherpunks
list can help me with:

	1.  Does anyone know if including code like
system("pgp -m foobar") might cause legal problems?  Strn doesn't
implement any cryptographic techniques.

	2.  What's the status on a USA-legal PGP (using RSAREF)?
I would like to greatly expand strn's cryptographic features, but I'd
rather not implement features that many of strn's users can't use.
(That includes me--I won't use PGP until/unless the legal issues are
 cleared up.)

	3.  It would be greatly convenient if someone would implement
a "verify signature only" switch for PGP.  Most of the applications I
would like to use don't involve data hiding--just signature verification.
I'm also lobbying the RIPEM author to include a similar feature.

	Also, if anyone has any comments or suggestions about
newsreader cryptographic features feel free to send mail.  I hope to
do some work later with things like remote reconfiguration, trusted
ratings, suggested reading lists, and the like.

				--Cliff

P.S.  Strn is about 10K lines of C code added to trn.  It is
(probably) just a few weeks away from a public beta test.  If anyone
really wants to test strn, let me know and I'll consider it.  More
information is also available via finger or mail.

-- 
Clifford A. Adams  caadams@polaris.unm.edu | USENET Interface Project:
457 Ash St. NE      Albuquerque, NM  87106 | Tools for advanced newsreading
STRN (Scan TRN) now in testing: trn 3.0 plus flexible newsgroup menus, fast
article scoring with score ordered display, and merged/virtual newsgroups.



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: ccat@netcom.com (ccat)
Date: Wed, 7 Jul 93 22:33:34 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Release: July 5, 1993
Message-ID: <9307080534.AA29729@netcom2.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Content: First Announcement/On-Line Congressional Hearing

     On July 26 at 9:30AM EDT, the Subcommittee on Telecommunications
and Finance of the U.S. House of Representatives will hold the first
Congressional Hearing ever held over a computer network.  The oversight
hearing on "The Role of Government in Cyberspace" will take place in
the Grand Ballroom of the National Press Club at 14th and F Streets,
N.W., Washington, D.C.  The hearing is open to the public. An open
house will be held from 3-5PM on the same day in the same location and
is also open to the public.

     Chairman Markey has asked that this historic occasion demonstrate
the potential and diversity of the global Internet.  Thirty Sparcstations
will be in the hearing room, allowing members of Congress, staff, and
their guests to read e-mail, use Gopher menus, read testimony in WAIS
databases, browse the World Wide Web, and otherwise use the resources
of the global Internet as part of the hearing.

     Some witnesses for the hearing will testify remotely, sending audio
and video over the Internet.  Audio and video of the hearing will also
be multicast over the Multicast Backbone (MBONE).  We are hoping that
C-SPAN and other traditional media will also carry the event.  *MORE
DETAILS ON MBONE AND OTHER WAYS TO WATCH THE HEARINGS REMOTELY WILL BE
FORTHCOMING SHORTLY.*

     One of the primary points that we are hoping to demonstrate is
the diversity and size of the Internet.  We have therefore established
an electronic mail address by which people on the Internet can communicate
with the Subcommittee before and during the hearing:

          congress@town.hall.org

     We encourage you to send your comments on what the role of government
should be in the information age to this address.  Your comments to this
address will be made part of the public record of the hearing.  Feel free
to carry on a dialogue with others on a mailing list, cc'ing the e-mail
address.

     Your cards and letters to congress@town.hall.org will help
demonstrate that there are people who use the Internet as part of their
personal and professional lives.  We encourage you to send comments on
the role of government in cyberspace, on what role cyberspace should play
in government (e.g., whether government data be made available on the
Internet), on how the Internet should be built and financed, on how you
use the Internet, and on any other topic you feel is appropriate.  This
is your chance to show the U.S. Congress that there is a constituency
that cares about this global infrastructure.

     If you would like to communicate with a human being about the
hearing, you may send your comments and questions to:

          hearing-info@town.hall.org

     Support for the Internet Town Hall is provided by Sun Microsystems
and O'Reilly & Associates.  Additional support for the July 26 on-line
congressional hearing is being provided by ARPA, BBN Communications,
the National Press Club, Xerox PARC, and many other organizations.

     Network connectivity for the Internet Town Hall is provided by
UUNET Technologies.






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Steven Hodas <hhll@u.washington.edu>
Date: Thu, 8 Jul 93 00:21:15 PDT
To: ccat <ccat@netcom.com>
Subject: Re: Release: July 5, 1993
In-Reply-To: <9307080534.AA29729@netcom2.netcom.com>
Message-ID: <Pine.3.05.9307080018.D15595-c100000@stein.u.washington.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain




This hearing has been "indefinitely postponed" due tothe realization of
some bright young thing that in this country, at least, private
corporations do not sponsor government hearings. perhaps this is a way to
raise some much needed reveneu, but for now it's a no-go.

Steven

On Wed, 7 Jul 1993, ccat wrote:

> Content: First Announcement/On-Line Congressional Hearing
> 
>      On July 26 at 9:30AM EDT, the Subcommittee on Telecommunications
> and Finance of the U.S. House of Representatives will hold the first
> Congressional Hearing ever held over a computer network.  The oversight
> hearing on "The Role of Government in Cyberspace" will take place in
> the Grand Ballroom of the National Press Club at 14th and F Streets,
> N.W., Washington, D.C.  The hearing is open to the public. An open
> house will be held from 3-5PM on the same day in the same location and
> is also open to the public.
> 
>      Chairman Markey has asked that this historic occasion demonstrate
> the potential and diversity of the global Internet.  Thirty Sparcstations
> will be in the hearing room, allowing members of Congress, staff, and
> their guests to read e-mail, use Gopher menus, read testimony in WAIS
> databases, browse the World Wide Web, and otherwise use the resources
> of the global Internet as part of the hearing.
> 
>      Some witnesses for the hearing will testify remotely, sending audio
> and video over the Internet.  Audio and video of the hearing will also
> be multicast over the Multicast Backbone (MBONE).  We are hoping that
> C-SPAN and other traditional media will also carry the event.  *MORE
> DETAILS ON MBONE AND OTHER WAYS TO WATCH THE HEARINGS REMOTELY WILL BE
> FORTHCOMING SHORTLY.*
> 
>      One of the primary points that we are hoping to demonstrate is
> the diversity and size of the Internet.  We have therefore established
> an electronic mail address by which people on the Internet can communicate
> with the Subcommittee before and during the hearing:
> 
>           congress@town.hall.org
> 
>      We encourage you to send your comments on what the role of government
> should be in the information age to this address.  Your comments to this
> address will be made part of the public record of the hearing.  Feel free
> to carry on a dialogue with others on a mailing list, cc'ing the e-mail
> address.
> 
>      Your cards and letters to congress@town.hall.org will help
> demonstrate that there are people who use the Internet as part of their
> personal and professional lives.  We encourage you to send comments on
> the role of government in cyberspace, on what role cyberspace should play
> in government (e.g., whether government data be made available on the
> Internet), on how the Internet should be built and financed, on how you
> use the Internet, and on any other topic you feel is appropriate.  This
> is your chance to show the U.S. Congress that there is a constituency
> that cares about this global infrastructure.
> 
>      If you would like to communicate with a human being about the
> hearing, you may send your comments and questions to:
> 
>           hearing-info@town.hall.org
> 
>      Support for the Internet Town Hall is provided by Sun Microsystems
> and O'Reilly & Associates.  Additional support for the July 26 on-line
> congressional hearing is being provided by ARPA, BBN Communications,
> the National Press Club, Xerox PARC, and many other organizations.
> 
>      Network connectivity for the Internet Town Hall is provided by
> UUNET Technologies.
> 
> 






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: blankmklp@aol.com
Date: Wed, 7 Jul 93 23:28:41 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: stop the feed
Message-ID: <9307080228.tn04952@aol.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I was not prepared to receive newsgroup mail on a service like AOL. I just
can't deal with it because I can't read it offline and respond with my Point
like I do my newsgroups from UUCP.

Please turn off the flow; stop sending me this.

All I want to know is if this newsgroup can be req from the internet via
UUCP.

Michael Pearce




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: XXCLARK@indst.indstate.edu
Date: Thu, 8 Jul 93 00:44:32 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Motorola
Message-ID: <9307080744.AA04899@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



  >Anyone know anything about Motorola's new phones (models VST 100,
  >VST 350,VST 550, locally priced at $179, $249 and $299 Canadian)?

	Secure Clear (tm) Technology is the only...

	What's in a name?

	In this case, bullshit.

	I believe they do a simple frequency inversion, known in the
  `20's, easily defeated with a $15 kit added to one's scanner or for
  $5 in parts. Technology of the `20's packaged and named for the `90's.

	To quote a Canadian general, former commander of UN forces in
  Bosnia: "The UN doesn't have much in the way of communications. All
  we have is Motorola [radios]."

  ---------------------------------------------------------------------
     internet      : xxclark@indst.indstate.edu   RelayNet (488)
     Vanilla BITNET: XXCLARK@INDST                FidoNet (1:2230/114)
     Phone: 911                                   TechNet 11:800/0
                      We're all Bozos on this bus.
  ---------------------------------------------------------------------





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: nobody@entropy.linet.org
Date: Fri, 9 Jul 93 05:58:28 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: anonymous mail
Message-ID: <m0oDsdr-0002bCC@entropy.linet.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

Some people have e-mailed me saying that what happened to Mr.
Steshenko isn't uncommon at all.  This fact bothered me all weekend
long, that somebody can get fired for views expressed in a private
e-list, which probably extrapolates to USENET posting as well.
Apparently, Mr. Steshenko forgot to include the "disclaimer: my
opinions" with his email.  

Is this all that is required?  If he merely would have added the
disclaimer, would his former employer be facing possible legal action?
Would he still be employed?  Is there some "minimal" text that must be
included?  I mean, I've seen disclaimers that are nearly a paragraph
long to ones that try to be cute (#include <std.disclaimer> and so
forth).

(If you missed the post to alt.comp.acad-freedom.talk and various
other groups and don't get usenet let me know and I'll post it to the
list if there is enough interest.  I'm not sure if email copies I sent
out made it since some bounces occured.  Plus the good old "cannot
deliver for 3 days; message queued" sort of error.)

It bugged me because I really beleive that it is impossible to carry
on a rational discussion if one side is afraid to voice an opinion.
I'm not advocating libel or misuse (personal attacks, threats of
violence, etc.) but every once in a while a really hot topic comes up
which stirs the emotions.

So, we can all forge mail with smtp, use the cypherpunk remailers, use
"anonymous" servers like penet and charcoal, email-to-usenet gateways,
etc.  I've never seen instructions on how to forge a usenet post, so
here goes:

1) Telnet to an NNTP server (see Yanoff's internet services list)
2) Type 'post'.  After a bit, you'll get an OK message.
3) Type in what you want to appear.  Have in mind before you start
   what fields you want in the header, or check other posts to see what
   they have.
4) End with a period on a line all by itself.  After a bit, you'll get
   a "Post OK" message.
5) Type 'quit'

For example, I was experimenting and posted this to
alt.binaries.pictures.d:

======================================================================
Newsgroups: alt.binaries.pictures.d
From: anyone@here.and.there
Subject: A test
Content-Type: text
Nntp-Posting-Host: nowhere
Organization: none
Date: Wed, 7 Jul 1993 11:14:00 GMT

This is merely a test.
======================================================================

I just typed all that stuff in (including a lone period, but that
doesn't show in your message) and it showed up after a while.

If you examine the post closer, particularly the Path and Sender
fields, the fact the message originated at the nntp server in Germany
is revealed.  I guess I'll work on more sophisticated methods in my
spare time :-)

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.3

iQCVAgUBLDseRoOA7OpLWtYzAQF+HQP+NUd41Sw3QVzBcisaG7o5W2tld02A+e6u
6TDNnwioCsTq/n9arLJ7+dDOEI15c4TTQ2d4f/YoFi5JpMGdc8svC4DFGVY9kZRR
bZjnW3/EPaeqbh2dB5AJj3o5X4+UQc4KnB3RuEY62QOvVQ4mzWVMC/D55EH53o9y
AYs0scqMwJI=
=Dh7z
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: nobody@shell.portal.com
Date: Thu, 8 Jul 93 12:06:01 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: ANON: Steshenko, nntp
Message-ID: <9307081437.AA10106@jobe.shell.portal.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

The discussion on Mr. Steshenko's termination of employment has taken
off in misc.jobs.misc and news.admin.policy.  Some people have
e-mailed me saying that what happened to Mr. Steshenko isn't uncommon
at all.  This fact bothered me all weekend long, that somebody can get
fired for views expressed in a private e-list, which probably
extrapolates to USENET posting as well.  Apparently, Mr. Steshenko
forgot to include the "disclaimer: my opinions" with his email.

Is this all that is required?  If he merely would have added the
disclaimer, would his former employer be facing possible legal action?
Would he still be employed?  Is there some "minimal" text that must be
included?  I mean, I've seen disclaimers that are nearly a paragraph
long to ones that try to be cute (#include <std.disclaimer> and so
forth).

I'm not saying his employer is in the wrong (I haven't really thought
about this issue too much) since they are a private company and can
censor and control use of their machines and all that stuff; it just
goes to show sometimes you have to be really careful what you say and
to whom.

(If you missed the post to alt.comp.acad-freedom.talk and various
other groups and don't get usenet let me know and I'll post it to the
list if there is enough interest.  I'm not sure if email copies I sent
out made it since some bounces occured.  Plus the good old "cannot
deliver for 3 days; message queued" sort of error.)

It bugged me because I really beleive that it is impossible to carry
on a rational discussion if one side is afraid to voice an opinion.
I'm not advocating libel or misuse (personal attacks, threats of
violence, etc.) but every once in a while a really hot topic comes up
which stirs the emotions.

So, we can all forge mail with smtp, use the cypherpunk remailers, use
"anonymous" servers like penet and charcoal, email-to-usenet gateways,
etc.  I've never seen instructions on how to forge a usenet post, so
here goes:

1) Telnet to an NNTP server (see Yanoff's internet services list)
2) Type 'post'.  After a bit, you'll get an OK message.
3) Type in what you want to appear.  Have in mind before you start
   what fields you want in the header, or check other posts to see what
   they have.
4) End with a period on a line all by itself.  After a bit, you'll get
   a "Post OK" message.
5) Type 'quit'

For example, I was experimenting and telnetted to news.fu-berlin.de 119:

======================================================================
menudo> telnet news.fu-berlin.de 119
Trying 130.133.4.250...
Connected to gibb.math.fu-berlin.de.
Escape character is '^]'.
200 gibb NNTP server version 1.5.11 (10 February 1991) ready at Thu Jul  8 16:19:05 1993 (posting ok).
post
340 Ok
Newsgroups: alt.binaries.pictures.d
Path: one!two!three
From: mr.smiley@other
plane
Subject: A test II
Content-Type: text
Sender: the MailMan
Nntp-Posting-Host: castle
Organization: other plane hackers
Date: Thu, 8 Jul 1993 07:45:00 GMT
Lines: 1

This is another test.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: norm@netcom.com (Norman Hardy)
Date: Thu, 8 Jul 93 08:08:55 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: DigiCash
Message-ID: <9307081509.AA18537@netcom4.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


If someone is implementing Chaum's DigiCash I have some
input. Pleas send me e-mail.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Chris Claborne <claborne@ccgate.sandiegoca.NCR.COM>
Date: Thu, 8 Jul 93 11:59:28 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Motorola phones
Message-ID: <9307081220.ad11912@ncrcom.DaytonOH.NCR.COM>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


     >Anyone know anything about Motorola's new phones (models VST 100, VST 
     >350, VST 550, locally priced at $179, $249 and $299 Canadian)?
     
        I have the 550.  It has a demo mode on it so that you can hear what 
     it sounds like to other phones.  I is one of the few phones that will 
     work in my office (because of all of the EMI).  The range doesn't seem 
     to be as good as the AT&T phone.  People seem to be able to tell that 
     I am using it as opposed to when I used my AT&T cordless (it was 
     stolen).  The sound on my end is _very_ clear.  
     
        I tried out the demo mode and you can possible pick out a few words 
     on it.  I feel much safer using it as apposed to other cordless 
     phones.  The only company that I have seen sell the Motorola is Sears.
     
         2
     -- C  --




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: nobody@cicada.berkeley.edu
Date: Thu, 8 Jul 93 08:41:47 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Test.  Sorry.
Message-ID: <9307081541.AA12054@cicada.berkeley.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


This is a test.  Apologies for wasted bandwidth.

AA01851; Thu, 8 Jul 93 11:40:10 EDT
Received: by snark.shearson.com (4.1/SMI-4.1)
	id AA22568; Thu, 8 Jul 93 11:40:08 EDT
Message-Id: <9307081540.AA22568@snark.shearson.com>
To: Rachel Beth Goldstein <rbg@panix.com>
Cc: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: text p.d. cryptosystems for email 
In-Reply-To: Your message of "Thu, 08 Jul 1993 11:03:02 EDT."
             <199307081503.AA28828@panix.com> 
Reply-To: pmetzger@lehman.com
X-Reposting-Policy: redistribute only with permission
Date: Thu, 08 Jul 1993 11:40:08 -0400
From: "Perry E. Metzger" <pmetzger@lehman.com>


Rachel Beth Goldstein says:
> 
> this is probably a faq, but pardon me, since this is my first mail to
> the cypherpunks list.  the problem is this: i once worked for a
> (nameless) finance company that had pseudo-wizard-dorkos for sa's, and
> a gravitationally-challenged boss that routinely read employees' (ie.
> *my*) personal email.  i knew this because he asked me specific
> questions regading the email subjects.  both he and the dorkos
> relished this ability and probably got some power trip from it.

This is likely a violation of federal law, but never mind that.

> however, friends told me that (1) crypt is easily compromised, and 
> (2) not all unix sites have crypt available anyway.  are there 
> text-based alternates to crypt, such that i don't have to use 
> uuencode or btoa to mail encrypted text?   

What you want is PGP. Doubtless someone out there is likely to tell
you more about it...

Perry




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Timothy Newsham <newsham@wiliki.eng.hawaii.edu>
Date: Thu, 8 Jul 93 11:59:20 PDT
To: rtannen@borland.com (Bob Tannen)
Subject: Re: encrypted email software
In-Reply-To: <m0oE0oj-0004nPC@genghis.borland.com>
Message-ID: <9307081859.AA19346@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> 
> I've been looking for email software (smtp) that does encryption on the
> fly with something more secure than  DES.  I was told that you might be
> able to help me.

suddenly everyone thinks that someone is going to decrypt
their email that has been DES'ed.


> 
> Thanks in advance.
> -- 
> Bob Tannen
> Borland International
> 1800 Greenhills Rd.
> Scotts Valley, CA. 95066
> 
> rtannen@borland.com
> RTANNEN @ BORLAND (MHS)
> 




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Peter Wayner <pcw@access.digex.net>
Date: Thu, 8 Jul 93 06:50:16 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Crypto Phones...
Message-ID: <199307081350.AA11853@access.digex.net>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



I realize that it is quite possible to design a secure phone
with a Vocoder, a modem and some cpu power to do the encryption,
but I think that an easier solution may be on the horizon. 

I believe that Microsoft and many others are exploring hooking
phones to PCs so people can do things like ship pictures of their
weekend fun to friends. When PC's can easily access phone communications,
then developing encrypted conversations should be as easy as
programming for Windows :-). 

Another solution may be for the Digital Phone companies to make 
a phone that is reprogrammable so people can hook up their laptops
or run software on the phone itself. This is, I believe, a valid
marketting strategy because it could make the phone that more desirable
when third parties start offering Sharp Wizard/Newton/EO interfaces
so people can hook up their address books to the phones. 

What do you think, Phil? You said that you had plenty of cycles left
over to do DES with the last digital phone you designed. Do you
have enough left to bring up Windoze? 

-Peter




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Rachel Beth Goldstein <rbg@panix.com>
Date: Thu, 8 Jul 93 08:03:04 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: text p.d. cryptosystems for email
Message-ID: <199307081503.AA28828@panix.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



this is probably a faq, but pardon me, since this is my first mail to
the cypherpunks list.  the problem is this: i once worked for a
(nameless) finance company that had pseudo-wizard-dorkos for sa's, and
a gravitationally-challenged boss that routinely read employees' (ie.
*my*) personal email.  i knew this because he asked me specific
questions regading the email subjects.  both he and the dorkos
relished this ability and probably got some power trip from it.

to prevent further abuse, i resorted to using crypt and uuencode 
when sending personal email to friends.  i found mr. megaton and his 
pseudo-wizards complaining about this.  they were having a heck 
of a time trying to decrypt my mail, esp. since they could not
easily recognize uuencode output. (hence the pseudo-wizard label).

however, friends told me that (1) crypt is easily compromised, and 
(2) not all unix sites have crypt available anyway.  are there 
text-based alternates to crypt, such that i don't have to use 
uuencode or btoa to mail encrypted text?   

as an aside, i bought an account from panix.com in order to further
safeguard my privacy -- at least from those self-appointed netcops at
my previous employer (and my current employer, who i'm pretty sure
wont stoop to that level).  the former employer left me with a lot of
bad feelings towards those in charge of technology.  i now send
sensitive emails and netnews postings through this account (only).


thanks for any reply.

/Rache




# ======================================================================
# Disclaimer:  My bod, my mind, and yes, my opinions are my own.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: khijol!erc@apple.com (Ed Carp)
Date: Thu, 8 Jul 93 11:14:05 PDT
To: pmetzger@lehman.com
Subject: Re: text p.d. cryptosystems for email
In-Reply-To: <9307081540.AA22568@snark.shearson.com>
Message-ID: <m0oE0L4-00026eC@warrior>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text


> What you want is PGP. Doubtless someone out there is likely to tell
> you more about it...

I'd be careful with PGP - since the source code is freely available, it'd be
simplicity itself to insert one or two lines of C code to snarf away a copy
of your cleartext before encryption.  Somewhere where ye olde sysadmin could
peruse it at his/her leisure...

The only way to be sure is to get PGP off the net (from an ftp site out of
the control of your admin folks) and build it yourself.
-- 
Ed Carp				erc@wetware.com			510/659-9560
   For anonymous mailers -->   anonymus+5300@charcoal.com
"Disagreements are not meant to be challenges.  They are just a different
 reality."  -- Risa D'Angeles



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: mdavis@pro-sol.cts.com (Morgan Davis)
Date: Thu, 8 Jul 93 11:30:58 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: I need a way to...
Message-ID: <g840230@pro-sol.cts.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


nate@VIS.ColoState.EDU (CVL staff member Nate Sammons) writes:

>-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
>
       [useful content deleted]
>
>+--------------------------------------------------------------------
>| Nate Sammons   email: nate@VIS.ColoState.Edu
>|      Colorado State University Computer Visualization Laboratory
>|      Finger me at nate@monet.VIS.ColoState.Edu for my PGP key
>|  #include <std.disclaimer>
>|  "I have but one single desire - to tear down the sky" -A. Toomba
>+----------------------+
>
>-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
>Version: 2.3
>
>iQCVAgUBLDxY0tTgi1fmrpxlAQH8ZgP7BHGGnAP2MGLg0pbhJ8HpgU/1t6Ai+ln5
>xzpcsvbG4cJwhKBrX5luVLGmdHSZxdZ3kyv4+G6ypcIb5MZMpiPzbGH7z2kuRc4y
>XlHBwrjOlbZDcyupJJUzSi8LuoQmXVu+M1r7EAkiK7JOMgljyOQ//E5ctJbt3qHl
>8eA0uJGQFqs=
>=4oo0
>-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----


This is my first post here, so go easy if I'm way off base.  Why would
you want to include a PGP signature (in addition to your net .signature)
for a message that is NOT encoded?  I've included the pageful of useless
text from your message as an example of how wasteful this seems to me.
I'm all for personal privacy and message security, but this smacks of
either paranoia, showing off, or laziness.  Genuinely curious.

 /\/\  Morgan Davis Group (619/670-0563)
/ /__\  Internet: mdavis@pro-sol.cts.com




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: jet@nas.nasa.gov (J. Eric Townsend)
Date: Thu, 8 Jul 93 11:24:06 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: scanning (was Happens to `best' of them
In-Reply-To: <9307072015.AA25620@ushabti.Eng.Sun.COM>
Message-ID: <9307081824.AA28647@boxer.nas.nasa.gov>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


 >    Any uncoded call that travels through the airwaves rather than
 > along a wire can be intercepted, and electronic eavesdroppers have
 > become skilled at using scanners to monitor the communications.

one can 'become skilled' at scanning about as easily as one can
'become skilled' at using a non-Macintosh micro.

MacScanner, anyone?







From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: nate@VIS.ColoState.EDU (CVL staff member Nate Sammons)
Date: Thu, 8 Jul 93 10:27:12 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: I need a way to...
Message-ID: <9307081726.AA05797@vangogh.VIS.ColoState.EDU>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----


Guys,

(and, of course, all species that may be getting this)

I need a way to be able to have pgp envoked on a mail message that is
encrypted, or that has a pgp signature on it.  I would like it if it
just printed a banner about the fact that "this is a PGP encrypted
and signed meessage", then, if necessary, it asks me for my password,
etc.... and then says "message has been validated as coming from 
so-and-so" etc....


thanks,

- -nate sammons
+--------------------------------------------------------------------
| Nate Sammons   email: nate@VIS.ColoState.Edu
|      Colorado State University Computer Visualization Laboratory
|      Finger me at nate@monet.VIS.ColoState.Edu for my PGP key
|  #include <std.disclaimer>
|  "I have but one single desire - to tear down the sky" -A. Toomba
+----------------------+

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.3

iQCVAgUBLDxY0tTgi1fmrpxlAQH8ZgP7BHGGnAP2MGLg0pbhJ8HpgU/1t6Ai+ln5
xzpcsvbG4cJwhKBrX5luVLGmdHSZxdZ3kyv4+G6ypcIb5MZMpiPzbGH7z2kuRc4y
XlHBwrjOlbZDcyupJJUzSi8LuoQmXVu+M1r7EAkiK7JOMgljyOQ//E5ctJbt3qHl
8eA0uJGQFqs=
=4oo0
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: rtannen@borland.com (Bob Tannen)
Date: Thu, 8 Jul 93 11:32:54 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: encrypted email software
Message-ID: <m0oE0oj-0004nPC@genghis.borland.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I've been looking for email software (smtp) that does encryption on the
fly with something more secure than  DES.  I was told that you might be
able to help me.

Thanks in advance.
-- 
Bob Tannen
Borland International
1800 Greenhills Rd.
Scotts Valley, CA. 95066

rtannen@borland.com
RTANNEN @ BORLAND (MHS)




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Mike Rose <mrose@stsci.edu>
Date: Thu, 8 Jul 93 08:39:01 PDT
To: rbg@panix.com
Subject: Re: text p.d. cryptosystems for email
In-Reply-To: <199307081503.AA28828@panix.com>
Message-ID: <9307081538.AA22424@MARIAN.STSCI.EDU>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


On Thu, 8 Jul 1993 11:03:02 -0400, Rachel Beth Goldstein <rbg@panix.com> said:

>however, friends told me that (1) crypt is easily compromised, and 
>(2) not all unix sites have crypt available anyway.  are there 
>text-based alternates to crypt, such that i don't have to use 
>uuencode or btoa to mail encrypted text?   

If they control the machine, anything is easily compromised.  One way
is to replace the standard crypt with a special one that secretly
saves a copy of the plaintext.

The alternatives you suggest suffer from the same problem.  If you
want to encrypt securely, you'll have to encrypt the plaintext on a
system that you trust - a computer that only you have access to is
best.

Depending on your privacy needs, an account on a system where you
trust the administrators not to abuse their privilege may be
sufficient.  While providing less privacy than encryption, it can be
more convenient.  It will certainly make it harder for them to harrass
you.  

Mike




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: zane@genesis.mcs.com (Sameer)
Date: Thu, 8 Jul 93 23:40:38 PDT
To: ccat@netcom.com (ccat)
Subject: Re: Release: July 5, 1993
In-Reply-To: <9307080534.AA29729@netcom2.netcom.com>
Message-ID: <m0oE9bD-000ZCzC@genesis.mcs.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


In message <9307080534.AA29729@netcom2.netcom.com>, ccat writes:
>      If you would like to communicate with a human being about the
> hearing, you may send your comments and questions to:
> 
>           hearing-info@town.hall.org
	I guess it's official: Congresscritters aren't human.

--
| Sameer Parekh-zane@genesis.MCS.COM-PFA related mail to pfa@genesis.MCS.COM |
| Apprentice Philosopher, Writer, Physicist, Healer, Programmer, Lover, more |
| "Symbiosis is Good" - Me_"Specialization is for Insects" - R. A. Heinlein_/
 \_______________________/ \______________________________________________/ 




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: zane@genesis.mcs.com (Sameer)
Date: Thu, 8 Jul 93 23:40:40 PDT
To: ccat@netcom.com (ccat)
Subject: Re: Release: July 5, 1993
In-Reply-To: <9307080534.AA29729@netcom2.netcom.com>
Message-ID: <m0oE9c1-000ZDGC@genesis.mcs.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


In message <9307080534.AA29729@netcom2.netcom.com>, ccat writes:
>      If you would like to communicate with a human being about the
> hearing, you may send your comments and questions to:
> 
>           hearing-info@town.hall.org
	I guess it's official: Congresscritters aren't human.

--
| Sameer Parekh-zane@genesis.MCS.COM-PFA related mail to pfa@genesis.MCS.COM |
| Apprentice Philosopher, Writer, Physicist, Healer, Programmer, Lover, more |
| "Symbiosis is Good" - Me_"Specialization is for Insects" - R. A. Heinlein_/
 \_______________________/ \______________________________________________/ 




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Peter shipley <shipley@merde.dis.org>
Date: Thu, 8 Jul 93 12:27:56 PDT
To: nate@VIS.ColoState.Edu (CVL staff member Nate Sammons)
Subject: Re: I need a way to...
In-Reply-To: <9307081726.AA05797@vangogh.VIS.ColoState.EDU>
Message-ID: <9307081910.AA01788@merde.dis.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/x-pgp


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----


>
>Guys,
>
>(and, of course, all species that may be getting this)
>
>I need a way to be able to have pgp envoked on a mail message that is
>encrypted, or that has a pgp signature on it.  I would like it if it
>just printed a banner about the fact that "this is a PGP encrypted
>and signed meessage", then, if necessary, it asks me for my password,
>etc.... and then says "message has been validated as coming from 
>so-and-so" etc....
>
>
>thanks,
>


if the sender uses a MIME compliant mailer (eg used a recent version of mh,
elm, pine, etc...) and you use a MIME compliant reader. it will automatily
me processed. look in the source  tree for pgp in the directlroy pgp23/contrib.


		-Pete

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.3

iQBUAgUBLDxwmnynuL1gkffFAQFc0QH427erTFJ7ws1OzSLPyX8aiR8/UawRkCiG
rK21fl70oa4qLPf43Y/44dabKUdazmnoAhjabGG59z1sjavOpN4+
=9SzN
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: jet@nas.nasa.gov (J. Eric Townsend)
Date: Thu, 8 Jul 93 12:21:45 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: scanning (was Happens to `best' of them
Message-ID: <9307081921.AA28998@boxer.nas.nasa.gov>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Sameer Parekh writes:
 > 	Remember that some people think that becoming skilled at using
 > a non-Mac is tough.

Which is why I made the statement about MacScanner.

Access to this sort of technology should not be limited to ham freaks,
private eyes, and followers of the great Radio Shack.

I bought an ICOM R-1 because it does almost everything interesting to
the average person (FM & AM), scans a wide range of stuff, and is
relatively cheap and lightweight.  It's easy to use, modulo tiny
buttons.  It doesn't have all sorts of ham stuff (special SSB mode,
for example).

The R-1 is not 'MacScanner', but it's closer.  It's sort of like
having Windows on a PC.  Once I got it up and running, figured out a
few wierd things, and ignored the rest, I can use it quite easily. :-)

What would be way cool is a handheld scanner with buttons marked:
"Fire", "Emergency", "State Police", "Sheriff", "Police Jury",
"Municipal Police", "Cellular", "Cordless Phone", "FM Radio", "AM
Radio".  It would also be nice to have built in DTMF decoding, blah
blah blah.

And it would really crank up the desire to have crypto phones. :-)






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: jet@nas.nasa.gov (J. Eric Townsend)
Date: Thu, 8 Jul 93 12:28:44 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: ANON: Steshenko, nntp
In-Reply-To: <9307081437.AA10106@jobe.shell.portal.com>
Message-ID: <9307081928.AA29036@boxer.nas.nasa.gov>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


nobody@shell.portal.com writes:
 > This fact bothered me all weekend long, that somebody can get
 > fired for views expressed in a private e-list, which probably
 > extrapolates to USENET posting as well.  Apparently, Mr. Steshenko


If I spend an hour a day using the phone at work for non-work
purposes, and I get fired, nobody's going to care.

If I spend an hour a day using the computing resources at work for
non-work purposes, and I get fired, people go nonlinear.

-eric




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Tyler Yip - UnixWeenie(tm) <davros@ecst.csuchico.edu>
Date: Thu, 8 Jul 93 13:07:13 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: a simple elm script for RIPEM and PGP
Message-ID: <9307082006.AA03122@hairball.ecst.csuchico.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


#!/bin/ksh
# use the elm "pipe" feature to automatically detect which type of privacy
# enchanced mail the message is under, and then automatically send the message
# with the correct options to the cipher program.
# usage from elm
#			| elm2pem
# you can also put this as the default reader in elm, but sometimes it barfs
# if you get a pgp signed message and don't have the sender's key.
umask 077
clear
cat > $HOME/.tmp/mbox.enc
PGP="BEGIN PGP"
PEM="BEGIN PRIVACY"

if grep "$PGP" $HOME/.tmp/mbox.enc > /dev/null
then
	pgp -m $HOME/.tmp/mbox.enc
elif grep "$PEM" $HOME/.tmp/mbox.enc > /dev/null
then
	ripem -d -i $HOME/.tmp/mbox.enc | more -d
else
	more $HOME/.tmp/mbox.enc
fi

rm -f $HOME/.tmp/mbox.enc




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: khijol!erc@apple.com (Ed Carp)
Date: Thu, 8 Jul 93 13:36:42 PDT
To: jet@nas.nasa.gov (J. Eric Townsend)
Subject: Re: ANON: Steshenko, nntp
In-Reply-To: <9307081928.AA29036@boxer.nas.nasa.gov>
Message-ID: <m0oE2Qq-00028lC@warrior>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

> nobody@shell.portal.com writes:
>  > This fact bothered me all weekend long, that somebody can get
>  > fired for views expressed in a private e-list, which probably
>  > extrapolates to USENET posting as well.  Apparently, Mr. Steshenko
> 
> 
> If I spend an hour a day using the phone at work for non-work
> purposes, and I get fired, nobody's going to care.
> 
> If I spend an hour a day using the computing resources at work for
> non-work purposes, and I get fired, people go nonlinear.

Good point.  Err, I'm at work, and my lunch hour's up, so ... ;)
- -- 
Ed Carp				erc@wetware.com			510/659-9560
   For anonymous mailers -->   anonymus+5300@charcoal.com
"Disagreements are not meant to be challenges.  They are just a different
 reality."  -- Risa D'Angeles

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.3

iQCVAgUBLDyBHxFgrV+S2pJNAQHaEgP/alRvqS8clLzQIrnBjx/Iy3xuLgIJbxmF
uSjgDP/J+BfDKuLfEFpmh+b5GNiAJGMjwrVOCRtpjQUZgcUR+BpU3btx+c40p60u
DBD+J9CopBR690oR6HXLcDReqSRg/QIlLTgZfDnPvp8cKm03wS0rHAUkyiH7wqFN
cq7htdKAycA=
=Eb7Q
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: nobody@mead.u.washington.edu
Date: Thu, 8 Jul 93 13:30:54 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: ANON: nntp, apology
Message-ID: <9307082030.AA26026@mead.u.washington.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I feel silly.  It just occurred to me that the remailers operate by
piping to sendmail directly; thus a lone period is interpreted as "the
end".  So I have cunningly arranged for my message to be indented by
one space (emacs has lots of functions!).

I apologize for posting this essentially three times.  I'm sure by now
nobody cares how to forge a usenet post :-)

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

 So, we can all forge mail with smtp, use the cypherpunk remailers, use
 "anonymous" servers like penet and charcoal, email-to-usenet gateways,
 etc.  I've never seen instructions on how to forge a usenet post, so
 here goes:

 1) Telnet to an NNTP server (see Yanoff's internet services list)
 2) Type 'post'.  After a bit, you'll get an OK message.
 3) Type in what you want to appear.  Have in mind before you start
    what fields you want in the header, or check other posts to see what
    they have.
 4) End with a period on a line all by itself.  After a bit, you'll get
    a "Post OK" message.
 5) Type 'quit'

 For example, I was experimenting and telnetted to news.fu-berlin.de 119:

 ======================================================================
 menudo> telnet news.fu-berlin.de 119
 Trying 130.133.4.250...
 Connected to gibb.math.fu-berlin.de.
 Escape character is '^]'.
 200 gibb NNTP server version 1.5.11 (10 February 1991) ready at Thu Jul  8 16:19:05 1993 (posting ok).
 post
 340 Ok
 Newsgroups: alt.binaries.pictures.d
 Path: one!two!three
 From: mr.smiley@other.plane
 Subject: A test II
 Content-Type: text
 Sender: the MailMan
 Nntp-Posting-Host: castle
 Organization: other plane hackers
 Date: Thu, 8 Jul 1993 07:45:00 GMT
 Lines: 1

 This is another test.
 .
 340 Post successful
 quit
 ======================================================================

 and this is what appeared:

 ======================================================================
 Newsgroups: alt.binaries.pictures.d
 Path: menudo.uh.edu!swrinde!cs.utexas.edu!math.ohio-state.edu!howland.reston.ans.net!noc.near.net!uunet!math.fu-berlin.de!one!two!three
 From: mr.smiley@other.plane
 Subject: A test II
 Content-Type: text
 Message-ID: <706EBA2L@math.fu-berlin.de>
 Sender: the MailMan
 Nntp-Posting-Host: castle
 Organization: other plane hackers
 Date: Thu, 8 Jul 1993 07:45:00 GMT
 Lines: 1

 This is another test.
 ======================================================================

 Although Path: contains the one!two!three I typed at the end, it
 reveals math.fu-berlin.de as the origin of the post.  Also, the
 Message-ID field reveals math.fu-berlin.de.  More works needs to be
 done on how to suppress or further disguise these fields, if possible.

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.3

iQCVAgUBLDyDDoOA7OpLWtYzAQHwvAP/bb8B+tMtZomonKfYfVEyzy4qVsRDcsy6
jekqxWf2F5xi/aA4EVoXvg6sBbYuO/H0o63xNnDXeA1GzYpAdDp7Ouhztvj0bhn3
TdT5nQHFU/8E5WxhttF6NHs8GNFRDb2QXAxTd5idScMyAEU0RD10VmkwryQXuPez
GC93HrcCKyo=
=NJA2
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: zane@genesis.mcs.com (Sameer Parekh)
Date: Thu, 8 Jul 93 12:13:49 PDT
To: jet@nas.nasa.gov (J. Eric Townsend)
Subject: Re: scanning (was Happens to `best' of them
In-Reply-To: <9307081824.AA28647@boxer.nas.nasa.gov>
Message-ID: <m0oE1CH-000ZDIC@genesis.mcs.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text


In a recent message J. Eric Townsend wrote
>
> >    Any uncoded call that travels through the airwaves rather than
> > along a wire can be intercepted, and electronic eavesdroppers have
> > become skilled at using scanners to monitor the communications.
>
>one can 'become skilled' at scanning about as easily as one can
>'become skilled' at using a non-Macintosh micro.
>
	Remember that some people think that becoming skilled at using
a non-Mac is tough.


-- 
| Sameer Parekh-zane@genesis.MCS.COM-PFA related mail to pfa@genesis.MCS.COM |
| Apprentice Philosopher, Writer, Physicist, Healer, Programmer, Lover, more |
| "Be God" - Me __ "Specialization is for Insects" - Robert A. Heinlein ____/



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: eichin@cygnus.com (Mark Eichin)
Date: Thu, 8 Jul 93 14:05:59 PDT
To: mrose@stsci.edu
Subject: PGP in emacs rmail
In-Reply-To: <9307082044.AA22724@MARIAN.STSCI.EDU>
Message-ID: <9307082104.AA29758@cygnus.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


There's one mode (that I'm not going to post without asking the author
first) that uses terminal-mode... however, pgp-2.2 had a feature added
which should make it much easier to write one, namely it lets you
specify that a key gets stuffed in via a file descriptor -- so you run
pgp (using a pty, rather than a pipe), feed it the private key
password, then the file, and it spits back the text (and other info.)
I've been lazy, and haven't actually implemented it, but it's much
cleaner than terminal mode (since you're trusting emacs with your key
anyway, having it read the input isn't much of a problem, though I'd
suggest a "limit coredumpsize 0" first :-)
				_Mark_ <eichin@athena.mit.edu>
				MIT Student Information Processing Board
				Cygnus Support <eichin@cygnus.com>



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: murphy@s1.elec.uq.oz.au (Peter Murphy)
Date: Wed, 7 Jul 93 21:59:56 PDT
To: cypherpunks-request@toad.com (Timothy C. May)
Subject: Re: We are becoming politically correct sheep
In-Reply-To: <9307070425.AA15301@netcom3.netcom.com>
Message-ID: <9307080418.AA00492@s2.elec.uq.oz.au>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Summarizing the important bits from Timothy's Post ...


> 
> But the interesting thing is how paranoid people are about free speech
> being exercised (the free speech being posting of non-provably illegal
> material, not the posting of provably illegal material). I won't
> repeat my point about a nation of politically correct sheep.
> 
> >   However - tickling a few neurons may very well have been worth the
> > risks noted above.
> 
> Yes, perhaps thinking about some issues in advance is a good "drill."
> 

.... and ....

> 
> Steve then makes some really excellent points:
> 
> >   In arguing the fine points of Dworkinism, pornography, 
> > capitalization of proper nouns, etc., I think Eric misses Tim's point,
> > which is (I think) that the current movement of society is from
> >  
> > Forbidding actions that cause harm to others
> >  
> >              to
> >  
> > Forbidding actions and speech that might offend others, or make them
> > uncomfortable, or hurt their feelings.
> 
> Yes, exactly! This is a profound shift from the principles on which
> this country (apologies to Brits, etc.) was founded. 
>  

.... plus more ...

> 
> The real threat is the government, whatever its initial intent. They
> have the guns, they have the courts, they have the power. 
> 
> We've sunk into a strange situation in which various special interest
> groups jockey for special privilege, special powers granted to them
> by the State.
> 
> "Live and let live" doesn't mean one has to _like_ all the various
> individuals or groups that are out there, it just means you let them
> do their thing as long as they don't interfere with your own life.
> 
> You can't pass laws to force others to like you, or your group, or to
> make their thougths conform to yours. About all you can really do is make
> sure they can't rob and kill, and even that's iffy.
> 
> 
> --Tim May
> 
> 
> 
> -- 
> ..........................................................................
> Timothy C. May         | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,  
> tcmay@netcom.com       | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
> 408-688-5409           | knowledge, reputations, information markets, 
> W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA  | black markets, collapse of governments.
> Higher Power: 2^756839 | Public Key: PGP and MailSafe available.
> Note: I put time and money into writing this posting. I hope you enjoy it.
> 

Okay. I agree with most of the post above. I also thought that Tim's "child-
porn" exercise was both useful and amusing. These two stories below are
some more examples of political correctness gone wrong.

The first concerns David Irving, well-known right-wing revisionist "historian". 
Mr. Irving wanted to do a lecture tour in my country of residence, Australia. The
government banned his entry, on grounds of racial hatred and the like. This
decision has immediately criticized my a sizeable majority of the newspapers,
with the prevalent view being "He's got appaling viewpoint, but he should be
permitted to be heard." I am not certain whether the decision has been reversed
or not. I'll have to get back on the subject. Personally, I agreed with the
newspapers on that subject (but of course not on others....)

The second story is more amusing. I don't know how many people on the list have
seen the movie "Romper Stomper", or even if it has been released in America (from
which most of the list resides). For those who don't know, Romper Stomper
concerns a gang of Nazi skinheads who live in Melbourne. Most of them are unedu-
cated scum, although their leader, Hando, although twisted, is quite intellegent
and charismatic. The film concerns the decline of the group, both through the
action of some Vietnamese immigrants (who fight back for a change), and the
police. The film, like the skinheads, are quite violent.

The film (from what I could gather) portrayed the skinheads in an unflattering light.
None of the cast or crew advocated Nazi ideology, and especially not Russell
Crowe, who played Hando. This didn't stop the British Anti-Nazi League from
picketing the film when it was shown in England. They seemed to have gathered
that it was a very naughty film indeed, although how they got their selective
myopia I don't understand. Fortunately, the picket was a failure. Most of
the Australian expatriates told their friends to see it, and they told their 
friends, und so weiter.

Okay, political correctness is a dangerous thing. Note that I didn't say bad,
just dangerous. I do agree that racism, sexism and homophobia are bad things,
so I do sympathize with most p.c. objectives. But mostly I have not found any strong
evidence for legislative strategies to enforce these objectives (with one
exception ... see below). 

Fortunately their are ways to defuse this dilemma without legal wrangling. 
Firstly, a lot of terms (although not all) which started out as a symbol of
demonizing have turned out to be words of pride. Examples are Nigga (as Niggas
with Attitute) and Dyke (as in Dykes on Bikes, which are always prominent in the
Sydney Gay Pride Festival, among other places, and whoops, I forgot to mention
"Gay"). This is of course imperfect ... I don't think the word "Faggot" is used
very positively, and as for such words like "Slag" (slang for women), the less
said the better. Of course, as a white male heterosexual (or Breeder, whatever
you prefer), I don't encounter much discrimination, so I am not as knowledgeble (sic)
as some people. Still, when people can use _some_ of these words in a humerous
fashion (as opposed to offensive), things look brighter.

The second point is immediately related to the last point - humour. If you are
not going to ban the bastards from speaking you can at least make fun of them.
After all, it is part of YOUR right to speak. As an example, in Australia some
judges have been under fire for making stupid comments at rape trial. Some people
have called for their dismissal (which is a bit extreme). However, a lot of
comics have been satirizing their judgements, and the jokes have even occured
on two comedy shows: "The Late Show" and "Full Frontal". (After all, can you
say the phrase "No means Yes" with a straight face anymore ..?)

For the third point, I admit that it does fall into the category of legal wrangling. 
It is this - remove all legislation that limits the powers of a minority. Fortunately,
most of this work has already been done in most Western countries. Still,
examples do exist. Queensland (my state) decriminalized homosexual behavior
among consenting adults only three years ago, and legislation still exists
in Tasmania (although it is "not enforced"). Also, until recently, several cantons
in Switzerland didn't give women the right to vote in local elections. I leave
you to think of local example. (Note - maternity leave for women is NOT an example
of limiting the power of a minority.) 

(Aside, I think the talk of the change of focus
to "forbidding speech that hurts others" is exaggerated, or at least in
Australia. (Obviously most of you know more about America than I do). My impression
was that some of the local focus is on "giving more freedom to consenting
adult, as doing otherwise encourages police corruption. Our state is currently
going though a review of it's Marijuana legislation, and the stuff is already
decriminalized in South Australia. Also, we've got more liberal censorship
laws than America.) 

The final point. Obviously removing stupid discriminatary action (calling
people by rude names, etc.,) is a laudible aim. This can (of course) occur in
different ways. For example, some poor soul might fall foul of the p.c. brigade,
not though nastiness, but through naivete (like using the term "chairman"). I
was once called a hypocrite because I believed both in capitalism and small-l
liberalism (by a socialist, no less). What's the big weapon for change? Well, it's 
powerful, but sometimes quite undependable. It's called time. Believe me, you need 
a lot of it to affect social change; revolutionary change leads almost always to
tyranny. Still, a lot has happened in the last 30 years. It was only in 1966
that Australian Aborigines were given full citizenship, and currently we are
in the middle of the aftereffects from the Mabo land claim decision. In a lot
of ways, the world has got worst as well as better. Still, when the conservative
elders die, you can only hope that their children have kept the good things,
and rejected the bad things, of their parents. 

I'll have to end it there. I want to have lunch. Whoops, this is going to a 
list primarily concerning encryption! What will I say? Got it ... "Stop the
Clipper chip!" I hope it will keep em' happy ... Cheers for now.

Peter.

-- 
=============================================================================
Peter Murphy - Department of Electrical Engineering,|Phone: 61 - 7 - 300 3452.
University of Queensland: murphy@s2.elec.uq.oz.au  .|------------------------
"Contrary to popular belief, the wings of demons are|Please do not put any 
the same as the wings of angels, although they're   |Heinlein quotes in your 
often better groomed." - Terry Pratchett.           |.sig - they're old.
=============================================================================




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Peter shipley <shipley@merde.dis.org>
Date: Fri, 9 Jul 93 10:42:12 PDT
To: Mike Rose <mrose@stsci.edu>
Subject: No Subject
Message-ID: <9307082128.AA02549@merde.dis.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----




I suppose this should be added to the the ftp site on soda.


		-Pete

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.3

iQBVAgUBLDyRNHynuL1gkffFAQGWigH6A6/aLAoAtJElN++r0qyMyD+aWQTVr7FH
gGb8C+4wNozzPAmr+wIpN0oBW7Cti7U1+G4oOW+FMQKdOljAyLJxQA==
=cinp
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----



;;
;; 
;; From: mpf@theory.lcs.mit.edu (Michael P. Frank)
;; A quick summary:
;; 
;; Key	  Command name		Notes
;; -------	  ------------------	----------------
;; C-c p e   pgp-encrypt-region	Prompts for recipient's ID.
;; C-c p d pgp-decrypt-region	The first time, prompts for your pass phrase.
;; C-c p s	  pgp-sign-region	       Ditto. Uses CLEARSIG.
;; C-c p S	  pgp-sign-and-encrypt-region  Doesn't use CLEARSIG. Encrypts also.
;; C-c p v	  pgp-verify-region	       Checks signature (in a new window).
;; C-c p p	  pgp-set-passphrase	Sets or changes PGP pass phrase.
;; C-c p c	  pgp-clear-passphrase	Erases pass phrase.
;; 
;; Thanks are due to Bob Anderson <bs891@cleveland.Freenet.Edu> for
;; writing a very helpful explanation of how to do the guts of these
;; commands.  However, any bugs are my own.
;; 
;; Enjoy!
;; 
;; -Mike
;; 
;;;
;;; Emacs Support for PGP
;;;
;;; People can see your PGP passphrase if:
;;; * They watch over your shoulder as you type it. (It's not invisible.)
;;; * They do "ps auxww" (SunOS) on your machine while you're
;;;     decrypting/signing.
;;; * They type C-h v *pgp-passphrase* in your emacs after you've
;;;     entered your passphrase.
;;;
;;; Plus the system suffers from all the normal Unix and X-windows
;;; security holes.
;;; 

(defun pgp-set-passphrase (arg)
  "Prompts for PGP pass phrase."
  (interactive "sPGP pass phrase: ")
  (setq *pgp-passphrase* arg))

(defun pgp-clear-passphrase ()
  "Clears the PGP pass phrase."
  (interactive)
  (makunbound '*pgp-passphrase*))

(defun pgp-encrypt-region (start end pgp-user-id &optional flag)
  "Encrypt the region using PGP. Prompts for a PGP user ID.
With prefix arg, puts result in serparate window.
Noninteractive args are START, END, PGP-USER-ID, and optional FLAG."
  (interactive "r\nsUser ID to encrypt to: \nP")
  (shell-command-on-region start end (concat "pgp -fea " pgp-user-id)
			   (not flag)))

(defun pgp-decrypt-region (start end &optional flag)
  "Decrypt the region using PGP. Prompts for the user's pass phrase,
if not already known.  With prefix arg, puts result in separate window.
Noninteractive args are START and END and optional FLAG."
  (interactive "r\nP")
  (if (not (boundp '*pgp-passphrase*))
      (call-interactively 'pgp-set-passphrase))
  (shell-command-on-region start end
			   (concat "pgp -f -z \"" *pgp-passphrase*
				   "\"")
			   (not flag)))

(defun pgp-sign-and-encrypt-region (start end pgp-user-id &optional flag)
  "Sign and encrypt the region using PGP. Prompts for a user to
encrypt to and a pass phrase, if not already known.
With prefix arg puts result in separate window. 
Noninteractive args are START, END, and PGP-USER-ID, and optional FLAG."
  (interactive "r\nsUser ID to encrypt to: \nP")
  (if (not (boundp '*pgp-passphrase*))
      (call-interactively 'pgp-set-passphrase))
  (shell-command-on-region start end (concat "pgp -safe " pgp-user-id
					     " -z \"" *pgp-passphrase*
					     "\"") (not flag)))

(defun pgp-sign-region (start end &optional flag)
  "Sign the region using PGP. Prompts for a pass phrase, if not already
Known. With prefix arg puts result in separate window.
Noninteractive args are START and END and optional FLAG."
  (interactive "r\nP")
  (if (not (boundp '*pgp-passphrase*))
      (call-interactively 'pgp-set-passphrase))
  (shell-command-on-region start end (concat "pgp -saft +clearsig=on"
					     " -z \"" *pgp-passphrase* "\"")
			   (not flag)))

(defun pgp-verify-region (start end)
  "Verify the signature on the text in the given region using PGP."
  (interactive "r")
  (shell-command-on-region start end "pgp -f"))

(global-set-key "\C-cpp" 'pgp-set-passphrase)
(global-set-key "\C-cpc" 'pgp-clear-passphrase)
(global-set-key "\C-cpe" 'pgp-encrypt-region)
(global-set-key "\C-cpd" 'pgp-decrypt-region)
(global-set-key "\C-cps" 'pgp-sign-region)
(global-set-key "\C-cpS" 'pgp-sign-and-encrypt-region)
(global-set-key "\C-cpv" 'pgp-verify-region)



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: nobody@rosebud.ee.uh.edu
Date: Thu, 8 Jul 93 12:34:53 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: ANON: nntp
Message-ID: <9307081934.AA20234@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

Oops...looks like my message got trimmed somewhere by a sig catcher.
Here is the usenet forging part:

So, we can all forge mail with smtp, use the cypherpunk remailers, use
"anonymous" servers like penet and charcoal, email-to-usenet gateways,
etc.  I've never seen instructions on how to forge a usenet post, so
here goes:

1) Telnet to an NNTP server (see Yanoff's internet services list)
2) Type 'post'.  After a bit, you'll get an OK message.
3) Type in what you want to appear.  Have in mind before you start
   what fields you want in the header, or check other posts to see what
   they have.
4) End with a period on a line all by itself.  After a bit, you'll get
   a "Post OK" message.
5) Type 'quit'

For example, I was experimenting and telnetted to news.fu-berlin.de 119:

======================================================================
menudo> telnet news.fu-berlin.de 119
Trying 130.133.4.250...
Connected to gibb.math.fu-berlin.de.
Escape character is '^]'.
200 gibb NNTP server version 1.5.11 (10 February 1991) ready at Thu Jul  8 16:19:05 1993 (posting ok).
post
340 Ok
Newsgroups: alt.binaries.pictures.d
Path: one!two!three
From: mr.smiley@other.plane
Subject: A test II
Content-Type: text
Sender: the MailMan
Nntp-Posting-Host: castle
Organization: other plane hackers
Date: Thu, 8 Jul 1993 07:45:00 GMT
Lines: 1

This is another test.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: jet@nas.nasa.gov (J. Eric Townsend)
Date: Thu, 8 Jul 93 14:56:10 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: job listing, supercomputer systems administration
Message-ID: <9307082149.AA00409@boxer.nas.nasa.gov>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



-----cut here----
Computer Sciences Corporation (CSC) has an immediate opening
for two Parallel Systems Analysts to support the Numerical
Aerodynamic Simulation (NAS) Program at NASA Ames Research
Center, including a possible lead analyst position.

The position is for a Systems Analyst in the Parallel
Systems (PS) group of the Computational Services branch.
This group provides support for the NAS parallel systems,
which currently include a 128 node Thinking Machines CM-5, a
128 node Intel iPSC/860, and a 224 node Intel Paragon XP/S.
Other systems may added in late 1993.

While the group is part of a support organization, the
immaturity of parallel supercomputers provides
opportunitities for a significant amount of development
work.  Routine system administration and user assistance is
provided by a separate user services organization, leaving
only the more difficult problems and policy issues to be
resolved by the parallel systems analysts.  Network,
distributed software, and parallel scientific programming
(i.e. FORTRAN) support is also provided by separate groups,
and on-site vendor analysts provide additional assistance.
Current group members are involved in projects ranging from
the development and modification of UNIX tools to kernel
development work, as well as day to day system maintenance
and evaluation tasks.  The parallel systems group also has a
close relationship with the proprietor of the best Indian
restaurant in the known Universe.

The NAS parallel systems operate in a networked (UltraNet,
HiPPI, FDDI, Ethernet) heterogeneous environment that
consists of a Cray Y-MP 8/8256, a Cray C-90, a large mass
storage system, several general purpose support processors,
and over 200 high performance workstations.  UNIX and
UNIX-derivatives are used exclusively.

Located at NASA Ames Research Center in Mountain View,
California, the NAS Program is recognized internationally as
a leader in large-scale scientific computing.  Its mission
is to act as the pathfinder in advanced, large-scale
computer system capability through systematic incorporation
of state-of-the- art improvements in computer hardware and
software technologies; provide a national computational
capability, available to NASA, industry, DoD, other
Government agencies, and universities as a necessary element
in ensuring continuing leadership in computational fluid
dynamics and related computational aerospace disciplines.

NAS considers parallel supercomputers to be the future of
supercomputing, and opportunities for a motivated individual
are extensive.

Required Skills:

  o Bachelor's degree in computer science or related field,
    or unrelated bachelor's degree with equivalent
    experience.

  o Fluency with C and at least one UNIX shell, and
    excellent UNIX skills.

  o Experience as a system administrator in a UNIX network
    environment.
 
  o Good problem-solving and communications skills.

  o Willingness and ability to learn new skills.

  o U.S. Citizenship.

Desired Skills:

  o Experience with parallel computers.

  o Experience with OSF/1, Mach 3.0, or other
    multiprocessor-capable operating systems.

  o Experience in a large scale scientific programming
    environment.

Note:  Computer Sciences Corporation policy requires pre-employment drug
screening.  Any job candidate who receives an offer letter from CSC must
report for testing within 48 hours.  

Please forward your resume to:

  Eric Townsend
  Computer Sciences Corporation
  NASA Ames Research Center
  M/S 258-6
  Moffett Field, CA  94035-1000

or email

  jet@nas.nasa.gov





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: khijol!erc@apple.com (Ed Carp)
Date: Thu, 8 Jul 93 15:12:15 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: ANON: nntp, apology
In-Reply-To: <9307082030.AA26026@mead.u.washington.edu>
Message-ID: <m0oE40G-0002BFC@warrior>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text


> I apologize for posting this essentially three times.  I'm sure by now
> nobody cares how to forge a usenet post :-)

I thought it was pretty good.  After all, the implications of such a scheme
are widespread.  I can imagine someone posting a message to talk.politics.guns,
purporting to be from clinton@whitehouse.gov (or whatever the White House
email address is these days), saying that personally he thinks Sarah Brady
is an idiot, but that he has to go along with the Brady Bill for political
reasons, and hell, he's just an Arkansas boy who goes out behind the Oval
Office and target practices with the Secret Service staff on weekends...

Of course, along more sinister lines, someone anonymously posting death threats
to Clinton might not be caught, but the Secret Service would sure be all over
someone's system REAL FAST.  I suppose it's an interesting "denial of service"
attack against a site that you don't like...
-- 
Ed Carp				erc@wetware.com			510/659-9560
   For anonymous mailers -->   anonymus+5300@charcoal.com
"Disagreements are not meant to be challenges.  They are just a different
 reality."  -- Risa D'Angeles



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: dmandl@lehman.com (David Mandl)
Date: Thu, 8 Jul 93 12:15:14 PDT
To: mdavis@pro-sol.cts.com
Subject: Re: I need a way to...
Message-ID: <9307081914.AA22838@disvnm2.shearson.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> From: mdavis@pro-sol.cts.com (Morgan Davis)
> 
> This is my first post here, so go easy if I'm way off base.  Why would
> you want to include a PGP signature (in addition to your net .signature)
> for a message that is NOT encoded?  I've included the pageful of useless
> text from your message as an example of how wasteful this seems to me.
> I'm all for personal privacy and message security, but this smacks of
> either paranoia, showing off, or laziness.  Genuinely curious.
> 
>  /\/\  Morgan Davis Group (619/670-0563)
> / /__\  Internet: mdavis@pro-sol.cts.com
> 

Simply to confirm that the file is from who it's supposed to be from.
If I send a file to you with my signature on it (assuming no major security
breaches), you can be absolutely certain that the file came from me.  This
is of tremendous importance if we're dealing with electronic contracts or
the like, but there are plenty of other situations where you need to be sure.
The file itself may or may not be confidential, so it may or may not need to
be encrypted.  The signature is valid either way.

Yep, it's true that most routine e-mail and Usenet postings don't NEED to be
signed, but it's good practice and good propaganda: it helps to promote the
widespread use of crypto, helps spread the word, and gets people in the habit
of doing it.  Believe me, it's not laziness, since as of today it's not too
convenient to send and receive encrypted email without going through gyrations.
Several cypherpunks have come up with good workarounds for this on various
platforms, but we still have a ways to go.

   --Dave.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: mdavis@pro-sol.cts.com (Morgan Davis)
Date: Thu, 8 Jul 93 16:51:10 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Thanks for the enlightenment
Message-ID: <g856795@pro-sol.cts.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Let me thank all of those who set me straight on the PGP signature stuff.
I got about half a dozen messages that politely educated me on the use of
PGP secured messages.  (This also served as a test to make sure our news
program is properly interfacing with this mailing list -- and it is.)

 /\/\  Morgan Davis Group (619/670-0563)
/ /__\  Internet: mdavis@pro-sol.cts.com




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Mike Rose <mrose@stsci.edu>
Date: Thu, 8 Jul 93 13:44:18 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: PGP in emacs rmail
Message-ID: <9307082044.AA22724@MARIAN.STSCI.EDU>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Has anyone written elisp code for running pgp?  I found crypt++, but
in its default configuration it only does conventional crypto, nothing
like signing, verification, and pubkey encryption.  Has someone
already done this, or am I pioneering new ground?

Mike





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Ciamac Moallemi <ciamac@hplms2.hpl.hp.com>
Date: Thu, 8 Jul 93 17:07:58 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: PGP in emacs rmail
Message-ID: <9307090007.AA18726@cello.hpl.hp.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


eichin> There's one mode (that I'm not going to post without asking the author
eichin> first) that uses terminal-mode... however, pgp-2.2 had a feature added
eichin> which should make it much easier to write one, namely it lets you
eichin> specify that a key gets stuffed in via a file descriptor -- so you run
eichin> pgp (using a pty, rather than a pipe), feed it the private key
eichin> password, then the file, and it spits back the text (and other info.)
eichin> I've been lazy, and haven't actually implemented it, but it's much
eichin> cleaner than terminal mode (since you're trusting emacs with your key
eichin> anyway, having it read the input isn't much of a problem, though I'd
eichin> suggest a "limit coredumpsize 0" first :-)

I wrote elisp code for vm that does this if anyone is interested.

Ciamac.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Derek Atkins <warlord@MIT.EDU>
Date: Thu, 8 Jul 93 14:13:32 PDT
To: Mike Rose <mrose@stsci.edu>
Subject: Re: PGP in emacs rmail
In-Reply-To: <9307082044.AA22724@MARIAN.STSCI.EDU>
Message-ID: <9307082113.AA04633@toxicwaste.MEDIA.MIT.EDU>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


You can look in the contrib directory of PGP 2.{2,3}.. There are a
number of elisp implementations.. And there is also rat-pgp.el, or
something like that, which I know is available via anonymous ftp but I
don't know what machine its on...  It should be in 2.4, hopefully.

I have not tested any of these implementations.

-derek





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Andrew S Hall <ashall@magnus.acs.ohio-state.edu>
Date: Thu, 8 Jul 93 14:19:14 PDT
To: Extropians@gnuai.mit.edu)
Subject: META:Digital Signatures
Message-ID: <9307082119.AA05694@photon.magnus.acs.ohio-state.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Is there anyway for the list software to incorporate digital signatures
as  verifying the poster is a list member?

I know Tim posted a whistle-blowing trial balloon, and I have used my
anonymous acct to post here. It would be nice if the software used
digital signatures to verify list members regardless of their actual
origin of posting. Presumably the signature recognition base would be
seperate from the names base.

This is primarily directed to the Extropians mailing list, but overlaps
to cypherpunks. What I am considering is that a user could chose to
only accept digitally verified postings. That would eliminate noise
like subscription requests. It would also "verify" anonymous postings
as being from a "valid" (as in list member) source.

I know there are some problems such as maintaining anonymity, but I think
verifying would have some interesting and positive results. We could trade
HeX shares based on signatures, not names. That would eliminate the element
of personality (or some of it) contest. Some one who is considered persona
non gratia could redeem themselves with a series of high quality, but
anonymous posts.

A.


Techno-Anarchy.Neophilia.Economic Freedom.Cryptography.Anti-Statism.Personal
Liberty.Laissez-Faire.Privacy Protection.Libertarianism.No Taxes.No Bullshit.
**********            Liberty BBS 1-614-798-9537                  **********
**********           Dedicated to Freedom. Yours.                 **********




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Nickey MacDonald <i6t4@jupiter.sun.csd.unb.ca>
Date: Thu, 8 Jul 93 13:26:47 PDT
Subject: Re: ANON: Steshenko, nntp
In-Reply-To: <9307081437.AA10106@jobe.shell.portal.com>
Message-ID: <Pine.3.05.9307081725.H18565-a100000@jupiter>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


On Thu, 8 Jul 1993 nobody@shell.portal.com wrote:

> (If you missed the post to alt.comp.acad-freedom.talk and various
> other groups and don't get usenet let me know and I'll post it to the
> list if there is enough interest.  I'm not sure if email copies I sent
> out made it since some bounces occured.  Plus the good old "cannot
> deliver for 3 days; message queued" sort of error.)

I'd like to see this...

A couple of points...  It looks like you were trying to stress test
someones software.. I saw a --- BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE --- at the start
of your message, but no matching signature block...  And it is kind of
annoying to the rest of the group to request "let me know and I'll..." and
then use an anonymous remailer to prevent replies...  Oh well...

--
Nick MacDonald               | NMD on IRC
i6t4@jupiter.sun.csd.unb.ca  | PGP 2.1 Public key available via finger
i6t4@unb.ca                  | (506) 457-1931    ^{1024/746EBB 1993/02/23}






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: zane@genesis.mcs.com (Sameer)
Date: Thu, 8 Jul 93 23:40:43 PDT
To: Clifford A Adams <caadams@polaris.unm.edu>
Subject: Re: USENET newsreaders and cryptography: features/suggestions/questions
In-Reply-To: <9307080348.AA10446@polaris.unm.edu>
Message-ID: <m0oE9bF-000ZD1C@genesis.mcs.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


In message <9307080348.AA10446@polaris.unm.edu>, Clifford A Adams writes:
> 	1.  Does anyone know if including code like
> system("pgp -m foobar") might cause legal problems?  Strn doesn't
> implement any cryptographic techniques.
	I wouldn't know, but to stay completely safe, it *might* be a good
idea to use environment variables.

CRYPTOPROGRAM=pgp

system(strcat(getenv("CRYPTOPROGRAM"), " -m foobar"))

	(I'm not well-versed in strcat, so this could be wrong, but you
know what I mean.)
	Then you're not mentioning PGP at all in the code. (Env. variables
for the options would be a good idea as well.. that way you can't be
attacked under the premise, "It's OBVIOUSLY for PGP, because the options
are PGP-options.")
 

> 	3.  It would be greatly convenient if someone would implement
> a "verify signature only" switch for PGP.  Most of the applications I
> would like to use don't involve data hiding--just signature verification.
> I'm also lobbying the RIPEM author to include a similar feature.
	One feature I'd like would be easy to parse PGP output. That way PGP
can be more easily integrated with other programs. For example, doing
the following:

(-p for "easyparse"?)
pgp -p <signed.txt

	Would create output to stderr:

3434/344D
Sameer Parekh <zane@genesis.mcs.com>
01/01/93 12:34:56 GMT

	Then a program can parse it very easily. A successful sig would give
a return code of 0, and failed sig would have a nonzero return code. 

--
| Sameer Parekh-zane@genesis.MCS.COM-PFA related mail to pfa@genesis.MCS.COM |
| Apprentice Philosopher, Writer, Physicist, Healer, Programmer, Lover, more |
| "Symbiosis is Good" - Me_"Specialization is for Insects" - R. A. Heinlein_/
 \_______________________/ \______________________________________________/ 




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: zane@genesis.mcs.com (Sameer)
Date: Thu, 8 Jul 93 23:40:46 PDT
To: Clifford A Adams <caadams@polaris.unm.edu>
Subject: Re: USENET newsreaders and cryptography: features/suggestions/questions
In-Reply-To: <9307080348.AA10446@polaris.unm.edu>
Message-ID: <m0oE9c2-000ZDIC@genesis.mcs.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


In message <9307080348.AA10446@polaris.unm.edu>, Clifford A Adams writes:
> 	1.  Does anyone know if including code like
> system("pgp -m foobar") might cause legal problems?  Strn doesn't
> implement any cryptographic techniques.
	I wouldn't know, but to stay completely safe, it *might* be a good
idea to use environment variables.

CRYPTOPROGRAM=pgp

system(strcat(getenv("CRYPTOPROGRAM"), " -m foobar"))

	(I'm not well-versed in strcat, so this could be wrong, but you
know what I mean.)
	Then you're not mentioning PGP at all in the code. (Env. variables
for the options would be a good idea as well.. that way you can't be
attacked under the premise, "It's OBVIOUSLY for PGP, because the options
are PGP-options.")
 

> 	3.  It would be greatly convenient if someone would implement
> a "verify signature only" switch for PGP.  Most of the applications I
> would like to use don't involve data hiding--just signature verification.
> I'm also lobbying the RIPEM author to include a similar feature.
	One feature I'd like would be easy to parse PGP output. That way PGP
can be more easily integrated with other programs. For example, doing
the following:

(-p for "easyparse"?)
pgp -p <signed.txt

	Would create output to stderr:

3434/344D
Sameer Parekh <zane@genesis.mcs.com>
01/01/93 12:34:56 GMT

	Then a program can parse it very easily. A successful sig would give
a return code of 0, and failed sig would have a nonzero return code. 

--
| Sameer Parekh-zane@genesis.MCS.COM-PFA related mail to pfa@genesis.MCS.COM |
| Apprentice Philosopher, Writer, Physicist, Healer, Programmer, Lover, more |
| "Symbiosis is Good" - Me_"Specialization is for Insects" - R. A. Heinlein_/
 \_______________________/ \______________________________________________/ 




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: elee9sf@Menudo.UH.EDU
Date: Thu, 8 Jul 93 15:30:14 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: ANON: Steshenko usenet posting
In-Reply-To: <Pine.3.05.9307081725.H18565-a100000@jupiter>
Message-ID: <199307082230.AA06511@Menudo.UH.EDU>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



> I'd like to see this...
It's attached to this message.
  
> A couple of points...  It looks like you were trying to stress test
> someones software.. I saw a --- BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE --- at the start
> of your message, but no matching signature block...  And it is kind of
> annoying to the rest of the group to request "let me know and I'll..." and
> then use an anonymous remailer to prevent replies...  Oh well...

Sorry, but I had a period on a line all by itself.  This caused
sendmail to truncate the rest of the message and my signature.  The
post sent through the phantom remailer should clear this up.

Here is the post:
----------------------------------------------------------------------
Newsgroups: soc.rights.human,soc.human-rights,alt.comp.acad-freedom.talk,soc.culture.ukrainian,soc.culture.soviet,talk.politics.soviet
From: viznyuk@ohstpy.bitnet (Serge Viznyuk)
Subject: Politics, human rights, and Microsoft Corp.
Organization: J. Random Misconfigured Site
Date: Thu, 1 Jul 1993 02:17:26 GMT
X-Posted-From: avalon.mps.ohio-state.edu
NNTP-Posting-Host: sol.ctr.columbia.edu

  This letter has been sent to a number of UseNet
newsgroups, e-mail lists, newspapers and information
agencies. Carbon copy to administration of Microsoft Corp.

  It is a deplorable fact that in supposedly democratic
country USA considers itself there could be a cases
when someone not in government/public office is persecuted
and loses his/her job for expressing his/her political views.
It is even more deplorable given that it happened to a
person who has undergone persecution and imprisonment
for political motives in former USSR. Now one has to
admit that similar to that of former USSR atmosphere of
fear and oppression routinely exists in and is being
maintained by administration officials of some US companies,
in particular of Microsoft Corporation.

  Here is the case of Mr.Steshenko, Senior Software Engineer
who has been fired by administration of Microsoft Corp.
for participation in discussions on
RUSSIA@ARIZVM1.CCIT.ARIZONA.EDU    and
UKRAINE@ARIZVM1.CCIT.ARIZONA.EDU   e-mail lists.

Those are moderated e-mail lists devoted to discussions
on various political, social, economic, and cultural
topics concerning related countries. As everybody knows,
the disputes and even flames are necessary components
of discussions on these and similar e-mail lists, and
UseNet newsgroups. There are and will always be persons
whose views and opinions do not coincide, or are opposite
to each other. The tolerance to and respect for the
opinion of your opponent are the prerequisites any society
must satisfy to be considered civilized and democratic.
However these basics seem to be unknown to administration
of Microsoft Corp. whose reaction to complains filed by
some paranoiac and hysteric individuals on behalf of
Mr.Steshenko was unexpected and sweeping:

---
> From: gregory steshenko <72410.626@COMPUSERVE.COM>
> 
> Today Microsoft Corp. dismissed me on the base of complaints
> of certain Ukrainian users about my posting on this network.
> I was told ( and even given writing ), that since my
> posting were considered as offensive by these users and
> since they complained to Microsoft about it, continuation of
> my work for that company may hurt Microsoft business.
> 
>                                   Regards,
>                                           Gregory Steshenko.


---
> From: Gregory Steshenko <72410.626@COMPUSERVE.COM>
>
>   Dismissal note from administration of Microsoft Corp.
> 
> "On June 21st and June 24th we received several complaints
> from UseNet subscribers regarding your comments to various
> Net news groups. The subscribers found your comments
> offensive and degrading to various ethnic and cultural
> groups and have complained to the Postmaster. In Employee
> Handbook, it clearly states that electronic bulletin boards
> should not be used to broadcast offensive material and
> should bear a disclaimer which indicates that the views of
> author do not represent Microsoft views. None of your
> messages carried this disclaimer and your comments
> expressed on the bulletin board were offensive. Your
> comments disparaging ethnic groups demonstrate your lack of
> discretion, judgement and professionalism. Therefore, your
> employment has been terminated effective June 29, 1993. "
>
>    Signed:   Glenn Noyama.


Mr.Steshenko has not been given neither any options,
nor prior warnings. This action of Microsoft constitutes
the case of persecution for political motives typical for
a totalitarian society, where anonymous reports and notes
from informers serve as a basis for oppressive actions.

Hopefully this letter might help urge Microsoft officials
to reconsider their practices. All concerned persons are
welcome to send a protest letters (some follow below) to:

          Mr. Bill Gates
          Microsoft Corp.
          One Microsoft Way
          Redmond, WA 98052

( billg@microsoft.com, postmaster@microsoft.com ).


---
> From: ST403231@BROWNVM.BITNET
> Subject: My extreme disappointment
>
> Dear Mr Gates,
> 
> I am a subscriber to the newsgroup _Russia and her neighbors_,
> housed at arizvm1.  I was extremely disappointed to learn over
> that newsgroup yesterday that one of Microsoft's employees,
> Gregory Steshenko, was dismissed because of complaints to
> Microsoft's management that some of Mr Steshenko's posting
> in that newsgroup had been construed as insulting to Ukrainians.
> 
> I am a graduate student in Slavic Languages.  In the course of
> my training, I have spent a good deal of time in the former
> Soviet Union and in other formerly Communist countries of Eastern
> Europe.  One of the things about those societies that most
> disturbed me was the role political denunciation could play
> in ruining someone's career.  I have had friends who lost
> their jobs and the ability to work in the profession for which
> they had been trained because of a carefully made, politically
> motivated denunciation.  I always took comfort in the knowledge
> that in our country it was not so easy to eliminate someone
> with whom you disagree.  Or so I thought.
> 
> It disturbs me a great deal that this dismissal was carried
> out without making other options available to Mr Steshenko
> (such as instructions to post to the Eastern European-related
> newsgroups from another account, for example).  And it disturbs
> me most of all that he was dismissed on the basis of people who
> complained about him because they were unable to best him by
> using their own intellect.  We call this bullying in English.
> And I am extremely upset that as solid and successful an
> organization as Microsoft caved in to bullies on this occasion.
> 
> I have been an enthusiastic user of Microsoft Word for the
> Macintosh for as long as I have been in graduate school and
> have had access to computers.  Over the past seven years, I
> have done my best to convince my friends and family, as they
> have become computer-literate, to use Word for their writing.
> I am in the process of writing my dissertation in Word.  But
> just as I do not buy Chinese-made goods, because of my objection
> to the Chinese government's exploitation of prison labor, so I
> will be forced to examine whether I can in good conscience buy
> and use the goods of an organization that is willing to yield
> so quickly and completely to the demands of bullies who seek to
> censor speech that they are not clever enough to combat by using
> free speech on their own.
> 
>                                       Sincerely,
> 
>                                       Frank McLellan
>                                       (st403231@brownvm.brown.edu)
>


---
> From: Jan Labanowski <jkl@OSC.EDU>
> 
> After reading a note from  Gregory Steshenko that he will have to leave
> Microsoft Inc., as a result of denunciations from Russia & her neighbors
> list readers, I am really stunned.
> People who made this happen were well trained in the methods used in the
> Soviet Union. Congratulations to our Ukrainian friends! You have great
> future in the US !!! Now go after your neighbors, coworkers, etc.
> Beware only that while you can destroy people's lives this way, it will
> not bring you any personal gains. They hate informers here, and some day
> the favor will be returned.
> 
> The Microsoft Inc. had to do what they had to do. Companies in this
> litigation driven society cannot risk defamation suits and have to
> be most careful not to endanger public relations.
> 
> However, the fact that people resort to denunciations rather than
> discussion means only they do not need discussion. We all know that
> the most secure way to silence your opponent is to decapitate him/her.
> Some of us, however, do not think that this is an ethical solution.
> And whatever reasons are given (the "good name", "truth", "honor",
> "national pride"), if you want to hit somebody, it is always easy to
> find a reason. And the "national pride", "the absolute truth", "honor"
> were used by several charismatic leaders now and in the past to justify
> doing things which we still wonder how they could have happened.
> 
> So congratulations again... As a result, this list may become
> a Politically Correct Forum for exchanging polite hiperbolas which do not
> hurt anybody's feelings, as they are contents free. BRAVO...
> 
> Jan Labanowski
> Myself (but you can send your denunciations to my institution, if you
> so desire --- at some point in the game it becomes a second nature...).


---
> From: CATHYF@EARLHAM.BITNET
> 
> Has anybody who understands the disputed language written
> to Microsoft about all this? They are concerned about their
> image, but that image might be damaged more by responding in
> this way to that sort of pressure.
>          Peace, Cathy Flick  cathyf@yang.earlham.edu



This letter has been sent/posted to:

RUSSIA@ARIZVM1.CCIT.ARIZONA.EDU    and
UKRAINE@ARIZVM1.CCIT.ARIZONA.EDU   e-mail lists.

soc.rights.human,soc.human-rights,alt.comp.acad-freedom.talk,
soc.culture.ukrainian,soc.culture.soviet,talk.politics.soviet,
relcom.comp.os.windows.prog,relcom.comp.os.windows,relcom.msdos,
relcom.politics,relcom.talk,relcom.fido.su.general,alt.politics,
alt.politics.misc,alt.politics.correct,alt.politics.reform,
alt.politics.usa.misc,news.admin,news.admin.misc,news.admin.policy,
news.misc,news.sysadmin,comp.os.msdos.misc,comp.os.msdos.programmer,
comp.sys.ibm.pc.hardware,misc.jobs.misc.comp.os.ms-windows,
comp.os.ms-windows.advocacy,comp.os.ms-windows.misc.

Radio Liberty                       postmaster@RFERL.ORG
Moscow office of
US National Republican Radio        postmaster@nrrusa.msk.su
Voice of America Radio              postmaster@voa.msk.su
All-Russia TV and Radio
Broadcasting Corporation            postmaster@vgtrk.msk.su
InterFax News Agency                postmaster@interfax.msk.su
Postfaktum News Agency              postmaster@postf.msk.su
Reuter News Agency                  postmaster@reuter.msk.su
RUFA News Agency                    postmaster@rufa.msk.su
TASS News Agency                    postmaster@tass.msk.su
UPI News Agency                     postmaster@UPupi.msk.su
Baltic News Agency                  postmaster@bns.msk.su
Information Agency Ala-Press        postmaster@alapress.msk.su
Moscow office of
"Dallas Morning News"               postmaster@dmn.msk.su
Moscow office of
"Financial Times"                   postmaster@fntms.msk.su
Newspaper "Komsomolskaya Pravda"    postmaster@kompr.msk.su
Moscow office of newspaper
"Koelner Stadt Anzeiger"            postmaster@ksta.msk.su
Moscow office of newspaper
"Los Angeles Times"                 postmaster@latimes.msk.su
Newspaper "Moscow News"             postmaster@moscow-news.msk.su
Newspaper "Nesavisimaya Gaseta"     postmaster@nega.msk.su
Moscow office of newspaper
"Philadelphia Inquirer"             postmaster@phinq.msk.su
Newspaper "Poisk"                   postmaster@poisk.msk.su
Newspaper "Business World"          postmaster@busworld.msk.su
Moscow office of
"Christian Science Monitor TV"      postmaster@csmtv.msk.su
Agency of Economic News             postmaster@css.ena.msk.su

---
S.Viznyuk





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: gnu (John Gilmore)
Date: Thu, 8 Jul 93 18:47:32 PDT
To: cypherpunks-request, cypherpunks
Subject: Loop stopped, I hope.
Message-ID: <9307090147.AA02502@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


The loop appeared to be at pro-storm.cts.com or pro-sol.cts.com, so
I temporarily removed two people at those sites from the list.
Neither is on the Intenet, so I can't check from here what the exact
problem is.

	John




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: J. Michael Diehl <mdiehl@triton.unm.edu>
Date: Thu, 8 Jul 93 18:08:09 PDT
To: mdavis@pro-sol.cts.com (Morgan Davis)
Subject: Re: Thanks for the enlightenment
In-Reply-To: <1993Jul8.153647.94@pro-sol.cts.com>
Message-ID: <9307090108.AA16663@triton.unm.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


According to Morgan Davis:
> 
> Let me thank all of those who set me straight on the PGP signature stuff.
> I got about half a dozen messages that politely educated me on the use of
> PGP secured messages.  (This also served as a test to make sure our news
> program is properly interfacing with this mailing list -- and it is.)
> 

This has puzzled me for some time, too.  Would you please summarize?  Thanx.
+-----------------------+-----------------------------+---------+
| J. Michael Diehl ;-)  | I thought I was wrong once. | PGP KEY |
| mdiehl@triton.unm.edu |   But, I was mistaken.      |available|
| mike.diehl@fido.org   |                             | Ask Me! |
| (505) 299-2282        +-----------------------------+---------+
|                                                               |
+------"I'm just looking for the opportunity to be -------------+
|            Politically Incorrect!"   <Me>                     |
+-----If codes are outlawed, only criminals wil have codes.-----+
+----Is Big Brother in your phone?  If you don't know, ask me---+



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: nate@VIS.ColoState.EDU (CVL staff member Nate Sammons)
Date: Thu, 8 Jul 93 18:20:22 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: using pgp with vanilla berkeley mail
Message-ID: <9307090120.AA07026@vangogh.VIS.ColoState.EDU>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----


Hey guys,

I set PAGER to "pgp -m" (with the full path, of course) in my .mailrc,
and I use the PGPmail wrapper from Jason L. Steiner (way to go Jason!)
to sign and encrypt mail.

This seems to work fine, since it leaves the message encrypted and all
in the mbox (or wherever) unless I choose to save it (when pgp asks)

thanks for all the help.

- -nate
+--------------------------------------------------------------------
| Nate Sammons   email: nate@VIS.ColoState.Edu
|      Colorado State University Computer Visualization Laboratory
|      Finger me at nate@monet.VIS.ColoState.Edu for my PGP key
|  #include <std.disclaimer>
|  "I have but one single desire - to tear down the sky" -A. Toomba
+----------------------+

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.3

iQCVAgUBLDzHutTgi1fmrpxlAQG2FgP+IiMAUOhteLeLMfRw5oQ0Q4bv8MUpwsep
UVvTn839CFD4s1qHZ9mhmYGFKHy2UHi0VkBsnWLYKfQgedMXdFXOlRrdFIAFufpG
743XIaSvYrcOODjRHlyQRQXw0RN0b76VJwBw9CLNJsTuRdT4yrWaxtw45li2bat3
8t+x/O9oJH4=
=BTN9
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Nickey MacDonald <i6t4@jupiter.sun.csd.unb.ca>
Date: Thu, 8 Jul 93 15:40:38 PDT
Subject: Re: ANON: Steshenko, nntp
In-Reply-To: <Pine.3.05.9307081725.H18565-a100000@jupiter>
Message-ID: <Pine.3.05.9307081921.A15519-a100000@jupiter>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


On Thu, 8 Jul 1993, Nickey MacDonald wrote:

> A couple of points...  It looks like you were trying to stress test
> someones software.. I saw a --- BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE --- at the start
> of your message, but no matching signature block...  And it is kind of
> annoying to the rest of the group to request "let me know and I'll..." and
> then use an anonymous remailer to prevent replies...  Oh well...

Oh dear... I fear that someone somewhere has gotten into a loop... This is
about my 10th copy of the above message...  I hope I'm the only one
getting all of them!!

--
Nick MacDonald               | NMD on IRC
i6t4@jupiter.sun.csd.unb.ca  | PGP 2.1 Public key available via finger
i6t4@unb.ca                  | (506) 457-1931    ^{1024/746EBB 1993/02/23}






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: nate@VIS.ColoState.EDU (CVL staff member Nate Sammons)
Date: Thu, 8 Jul 93 19:05:50 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: copy of "From Crossbows to Cryptography" anyone?
Message-ID: <9307090205.AA07226@vangogh.VIS.ColoState.EDU>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----


Inned a copy, and I think that there is a problem with the one at
soda... when I decompress it, the last few pages are a bit skewed..

thanks,

- -nate sammons
+--------------------------------------------------------------------
| Nate Sammons   email: nate@VIS.ColoState.Edu
|      Colorado State University Computer Visualization Laboratory
|      Finger me at nate@monet.VIS.ColoState.Edu for my PGP key
|  #include <std.disclaimer>
|  "I have but one single desire - to tear down the sky" -A. Toomba
+----------------------+

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.3

iQCVAgUBLDzSZdTgi1fmrpxlAQHwIwP9GcQQD8vdcmFPA+EU7HSrvId6he5rQYQs
far/oI+a/UKgFNkcapLY2CoBMcecdFWjaOxmq5kbJggER8jKmbGyaiYFds85aAF6
h09yWieFYKXDuM1UyT6s9EXQWBEQks24iCxERen5d0o/DiL3xT44zNWN97XRDCcd
apYQdULSh9Q=
=Qnsp
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: hfinney@shell.portal.com
Date: Fri, 9 Jul 93 09:58:15 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Encrypted postings.
Message-ID: <9307090322.AA03678@jobe.shell.portal.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


From: Chris Claborne <claborne@ccgate.sandiegoca.NCR.COM>
     Could we send our postings to the mailer in encrypted format?  That 
     is... I would encrypt the message with the public key for the mailer, 
     the mailer would decrypt and re-post to the clear-text mailer and to 
     the PGP group.  

You can already do this, in a way.  Just post to the list using one of
the existing encrypted remailers like the one at extropia (or the one
at portal, for that matter).

You need to put:

::
Request-Remailing-To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: <your subject here>

And a blank line at the top of your message, encrypt the whole thing
with the public key of the remailer, and add:

::
Encrypted: PGP

and a blank line to the PGP file just before the "-----BEGIN PGP MESSAGE-----"
line.

There are some scripts on the cypherpunks ftp site (soda.berkeley.edu,
/pub/cypherpunks/remailer) to automate this process.

The one disadvantage with this approach is that the source of the message
(namely, you) gets stripped off.  We might want to think about changing our
remailers to have a non-anonymous remailing command as well as an anonymous
one.  This way you could have "local" privacy from any sysop who snoops on
your mail going out, while still making it easy for people to reply to you.

Hal 




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: mdavis@pro-sol.cts.com (Morgan Davis)
Date: Fri, 9 Jul 93 03:05:27 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: If the cypherpunks list gets this, the loop is at pro-sol.cts.com
Message-ID: <g873971@pro-sol.cts.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


gnu@toad.com writes:

>There's been a message loop running in cypherpunks today.  Did you guys
>add cypherpunks@toad.com to your local list or something?  Please remove
>it, if so!
>
>	John Gilmore
>	postmaster@toad.com

No.  Our local list alias is "cypherpunks-list" and the only recipient is an
incoming news processor that posts messages in a local newsgroup
(pro.cypherpunks).  The only transmissions to the cypherpunks@toad.com
address are when posts are made in our local newsgroup.

I will double-check everything though.

 /\/\  Morgan Davis Group (619/670-0563)
/ /__\  Internet: mdavis@pro-sol.cts.com




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: ""L. Detweiler"" <ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Date: Fri, 9 Jul 93 00:12:53 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: `ad hominem' ad nauseam
Message-ID: <9307090712.AA11718@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I'd like to respond to a few introspective cypherpunkesque notes by P.
Farrell and T.C. May.  I've considered the general attitudes toward
e.g. Denning and Sternlight seriously, particularly my own.  I freely
admit to banging out scathing verbiage on behalf of both here and
elsewhere and critical reactions both publicly and privately.

First, a general observation. It strikes me that many have not
recognized the true meaning of `ad hominem' in their casual and
careless use of it (perhaps even it is the only Latin term known to
some tossing it about because of its frequent appearance in
cyberspatial flame wars). I think it has taken a new meaning on the net
to be something like `making someone look like a fool'.  By my view, it
means *calling* someone a fool completely without justification (e.g.
attacking irrelevent aspects of their reputation).  However,
devastating their flimsy arguments and false beliefs to the point they
*look* like a fool is not an ad hominem attack.  Perhaps I will be
accused of splitting fibers but I think the distinction is transparent.

P.F.:
>I'm more than a little concerned about the vicious personal attacks that
>this list makes on folks that have strongly held beliefs that disagree with
>some (or all) of the beliefs of hot headed posters to cypherpunks.
>I thought this was a technical mailing list, that dabbled in politics only
>as necessary. I see no justification for the personal attacks, especially on
>3rd parties that do not read this list. These uncalled for attacks will not
>convince anyone on the list, and do not become the poster.

First, I will not argue that ad hominem or vicious attacks are
warranted. However, they are there because they are *motivated* by
tangible reasons that you fail to address. Let's look at each case:

[D. Denning]
>She just happens to support a view that she
>strongly believes in. The fact that I think her side is dead wrong does not
>make her an idiot. Name calling accomplishes nothing but does hurt the
>signal to noise ratio of this list.

First, it is not clear why Denning doggedly pursues the key escrow
scheme and advocation of Clipper, and she has never expressed any
conceivable reason. Your invention of `strong belief' is nothing but
pure speculation and in the glaring lack of any statements on the
subject by her, not any superior in plausibility than attributions of
black machinations by others.  Yet, on the other hand, virtually
everyone who is (admittedly) equally dogmatically opposed to Clipper
supplies a continuous torrent of personal motivations, anecdotes, and
background for their characteristic position and drive. D. Denning once
volunteered some weak statistics on wiretapping a long time ago but has
long since abandoned them.  Others suggested they showed to the
contrary that wiretapping did not have a socially significant effect
despite severe compromises and sacrifices to institute it.

>Even more annoying are the attacks on Jim Bidzos. He is trying to make a
>buck, which was legal last time I looked. And on many issues, he is far more
>in our camp than against us. He at least likes strong cryptography, and his
>disputable patents expire in a relatively short time. He has agreed to allow
>a PGP-compatible program to use RSA without cost, providing the legal
>version that many U.S. users would like to see.

Again, you are postulating hypothetical motivations. You supply no
direct evidence for your claims whatsoever, despite very disturbing
evidence to the contrary (PGP hassling, DSA scheming, patent-mongering,
laywer-breeding, etc.).  As for the PGP case you cite, why has it taken
years for him to reverse the companies well-known belligerence despite
overtures by PRZ? Probably because of strong public pressure and PR
opportunism, IMHO. I don't claim my opinion is correct, but I do claim
that it is most plausible in light of all the data.

[T.M.]
>What really bothers me is the type of criticism, which I also tend to call
>"ad hominem" (but which rhetoriticians may have a special name for), in
>which people impute _motives_ to others. Thus, we see seemingly endless
>comments about the motives of Denning, of Bidzos, of Sternlight, and of
>others.
>[...]
>While I think Dorothy Denning is, for various reasons, hopelessly in the
>camp of the NSA and FBI, I see nothing to be gained by demonizing her.

This was a bit confusing to me to hear Mr. May first criticize imputing
motives, and then to say that `Denning is for various reasons
hopelessly in the camp of the NSA and FBI'.  What are her various
reasons for her bizarre lone intransigence?  The whole *point* is that
these reasons are unclear, and most of the `endless comments about the
motives' by others are actually encouraging bait for those parties to
publicly `come clean' with their associations and affiliations.  These
people's actions are completely baffling from our own point of view and
troubling in light of other hazy but discernable ulterior
trend-patterns. What is their version of reality? Particularly with
Denning and Bidzos their public comments on their motivations, despite
the sheer strangeness of it all, are essentially nonexistent.

I must admit a bit of frustration and annoyance (to say the least) with
T.C. May's habitual tendency to don rosy glasses in viewing the actions
of Denning and Bidzos and others (speaking in spineless psychoanalytic
babble like `cognitive dissonance'), seemingly reflecting a continual
forebearance and willingness to grant them `the benefit of the doubt'
despite increasingly sinister evidence of motives to the contrary.

Denning, in particular, has explicitly claimed no knowledge of Clipper
despite her uncannily prescient proposals (she was the *first* to
propose the `split key' idea on sci.crypt in an infamous `Copper
Balloon' message).  Bidzos appears to me to be playing different
cyberpunks against each other and making lame statements such as that
the DSS arrangement is completely sensible and rational despite the
historical convolutions preceding it.  We are dealing with people who
are failing to level with us at best and tricking and deceiving us at
worst, and the `demonizing' represents our desperation.  To the
contrary, it is attribution of their motives to `socializing' and
`support' from their `peer group' that dangerously trivializes,
underestimates, misjudges them.

[`demonizing']
>... weakens our cause, for two reasons. First, it
>cuts off dialog with those we disagree with. Second, we tend to
>underestimate people we have written off as stooges or dunces.

As the sci.crypt melee you valiantly instigated dramatically proves,
dialogue has so far been completely useless. Despite the most critical
reception possible to the idea of key escrow about 6 months before the
release of Clipper, no modification of the plan was apparent.  D.
Denning may as well be a brick wall when it comes to rational
consideration of opposing viewpoints on the subject (which she
conveniently delegates to others to explore).  She simply will not
budge from her basic premise that key-escrow is wholly desirable and
necessary.  In short, at present we have an impasse, not `dialogue'. 
Furthermore, it is precisely in scathingly criticizing opponents that
we encourage others *not* to underestimate these people and their
dangerous ideas.  That is the point: all of Denning, Bidzos, and
Sternlight are too intelligent to write of as `stooges or dunces' and
something more `intentional' and `systematic' is more likely.  That is
what is so alarming.

>... we ought not to use cheap shots and cheap rhetorical tricks
>(one I hate especially is the "sound effect" jab, the "<snicker, snicker>"
>sort of comment inserted into postings ...

While I've never done this, it is futile for you to request otherwise. 
This is one of the most colorful aspects of Usenet. Nothing is sacred
in cyberspace. Professional academicians will get ruthlessly ridiculed
or humiliated like anyone else if they doggedly advocate feeble ideas
through deluded arguments.  They are just another email address and
bursting bit pattern in the ultimate egaltarianocracy.  Who can escape
or transcend the glare of multitudinous eyes glued on a computer screen?





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: ""L. Detweiler"" <ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Date: Fri, 9 Jul 93 00:24:42 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Clipper committee: open meetings required by law?
Message-ID: <9307090724.AA11795@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain




 Subject: Clipper review committee must hold open meetings, etc!
 Date: Tue, 06 Jul 93 15:48:18 -0700
 From: gnu@cygnus.com

According to the Federal Advisory Committee Act (5 USC app. 2), the
panel of cryptographers who are reviewing the Skipjack algorithm
qualify as an advisory committee, and must hold open meetings,
announce the location and duration of meetings, make transcripts
available under FOIA, etc.

        5 U.S.C app. 2 (sec. 3) (2) The term "advisory committee"
        means any committee, board, commission, council, conference,
        panel, task force, or other similar group, or any subcommittee
        or other subgroup thereof (hereafter in this paragraph
        referred to as "committee"), which is:

                (A) established by statute or reorganization plan, or
                (B) established or utilized by the President, or
                (C) established or utilized by one or more agencies,

        in the interest of obtaining advice or recommendations for
        the President or one or more agencies or officers of the
        Federal Government, except that such term excludes (i) the
        Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, (ii) the
        Commission on Government Procurement, and (iii) any committee
        which is composed wholly of full-time officers or employees of
        the Federal Government.

        (3)  The term "agency" has the same meaning as in section
        551(1) of Title 5.

...
        (sec 10) (a) (1) Each advisory committee meeting shall be open
            to the public.

            (2) Except when the President tdetermines otherwise for
            reasons of national security, timely notice of each such
            meeting shall be published in the Federal Registers, and the
            Administrator shall proescribe regulations to provide for
            other types of public notice to insure that all interested
            persons are notified of such meeting prior thereto.

[Administrator = Administrator of General Services]

            (3)  Interested persons shall be permitted to attend, appear
            before, or file statements with any advisory committee,
            subject to such reasonable rules or regulations as the
            Administrator may prescribe.

        (b)  Subject to section 552 of Title 5, United States Code
        [the FOIA], the records, reports, transcripts, minutes,
        appendixes, working papers, drafts, studies, agenda, or other
        documents which were made available to or prepared for or by
        each advisory committee shall be available for public
        inspection and copying at a single location in the offices of
        the advisory committee or the agency to which the advisory
        committee reports until the advisory committee ceases to
        exist.

        (c)  Detailed minutes of each meeting...shall be kept...

        (d)  Subsections (a)(1) and (a)(3) of this section shall not
        apply to any portion of an advisory committee meeting where
        the President, or the head of the agency to which the
        advisory committee reports, determines that such portion of
        such meeting may be closed to the public in accordance with
        subsection (c) of section 552b of Title 5, United States Code
        [the Government in the Sunshine Act].  Any such determination
        shall be in writing and shall contain the reasons for such
        determination... 

[This lets them close portions of the meeting that are classified.
But they must hold an open meeting anytime their discussion is not
classified.  And they must vote publicly about what portions of the
meeting to close.]

...
        (sec 11) (a)  Except where prohibited by contractural
        agreements entered into prior to the effective date of this
        Act, agencies and advisory committees shall make available to
        any person, at actual cost of duplication, copies of
        transcripts of agency proceedings or advisory committee
        meetings.

Read over the whole act (it's in the annual Justice Dept. "FOIA Case
List" publication) and then let's find out whether NIST is following the
rules here...

The Sept 91 case list has about 40 FACA cases listed.  The recent
controversy over Hilary's health care advisory task force is also an
FACA case.

Thanks to Whit Diffie for thinking of this.

        John






------- End of Forwarded Message





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: ""L. Detweiler"" <ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Date: Fri, 9 Jul 93 00:28:40 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Phiber Optik pleads guilty
Message-ID: <9307090728.AA11840@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain




From: farber@central.cis.upenn.edu (David Farber)
Subject: Two messages that may interest you re: "Phiber Optik,"
Date: Tue, 6 Jul 1993 17:31:39 -0500

The following appears on Newsbytes today. Newsbytes is a copyrighted
commercial service which appears on GEnie, Compuserve, America OnLine,
Newsnet, DIALOG, Clarinet and other networks. This story is posted here
with the permission of the authors.

==========================================================================
Phiber Optik Pleads Guilty 07/06/93 NEW YORK, NEW YORK, U.S.A., 1993 JUL 6
(NB) -- Mark Abene, better known throughout the computer world by the
hacker handle "Phiber Optik," plead guilty on July 2 in Federal Court to
felony charges of conspiracy and unauthorized access to computers. Abene
had been due to go to trial on these counts today. 

The plea by Abene, entered before Judge Louis Stanton in the Southern District
of New York, admitted intrusion into computers owned by NYNEX, BellSouth, and
Southwestern Bell. In his statement, Abene said that he had, in his actions,
"never tried to damage any computer systems and, to my knowledge, I never
have." 

In the course of the proceedings, Judge Stanton asked Abene a series of
questions including: whether he understood the charges; whether he
realized that, by pleading guilty to felony charges, he was exposing
himself to possible loss of civil liberties such as the right to vote, sit
on jury or hold public office; whether he realized that he could face a
maximum sentence of 10 years imprisonment and a maximum fine of $500,000;
whether he understood that he could be required to make restitution for
damages; and whether he was satisfied that he had received adequate legal
counsel. He replied yes to all the above, but no to the question of
whether he had been threatened or coerced by the United States Attorney's
office to change his plea. 

Following the questioning, the judge asked Abene to say what he did. Abene
responded by admitting that he had conspired with others to gain access to
various computer systems, including those belonging NYNEX, BellSouth and
Southwestern Bell; he had intercepted data on networks belonging to
British Telcom and Tymnet; and that he had misrepresented himself to
employees of phone companies to gain access to their systems. It was
during these admissions that Abene said that he had never, to his
knowledge, damaged any systems. 

At the end of Abene's statement, Assistant US Attorney Fishbein stated that
Abene had fraudulently used computer accounts at New York University to access
the remote computer systems. When asked by the judge to confirm Fishbein's
assertion, Abene did. 

Judge Stanton then stated, "Mr. Abene is fully competent to make an informed
plea in this case. He is knowledgeable of the charges against him and is aware
of the possible consequences. I accept his guilty pleas." 

Judge Stanton then set sentencing for 9:30AM Wednesday, November 3rd. He asked
Abene's attorney, Paul Ruskin, to insure that he do everything possible to
cooperate with the probation staff in its development of a background of Abene
for the sentencing procedure. Abene was then released on his own
recognizance. 

Abene, together with Elias Ladopoulpos, a/k/a "Acid Phreak;" Paul Stira,
"Scorpion;" John Lee, "Corrupt;" and Julio Fernandez, "Outlaw," were
indicted on July 8, 1992. Ladopulous, Stira, Lee, and Fernandez previously
plead guilty to charges relating to the indictment. Lee, the only one
sentenced to date, has received a year and a day. Stira and Ladopoulos are
scheduled for sentencing on July 23. 

In a prepared statement after court adjournment, United States Attorney
Mary Jo White said that the investigation leading to the indictment was
performed jointly by the United Secret Service and the Federal Bureau of
Investigation. She praised both the Secret Service and FBI and thanked the
Department of Justice Computer Crime Unit for "their important assistance
in the investigation."

Ruskin, Abene's attorney, told Newsbytes, "My personal opinion is that
Mark has outgrown the phase in his life in which he performed the
activities to which he confessed. He wants to use his considerable
computer talents in manners that will be productive to society."

Fishbein told Newsbytes, "The government is satisfied with the successful end
to an important case. We hope that other people involved in illegal computer
activities recognize that the Federal Government takes these cases very
seriously." 

(Barbara E. McMullen & John F. McMullen/19930706) 


John F. McMullen           mcmullen@mindvox.phantom.com    Consultant,
knxd@maristb.bitnet        mcmullen@well.sf.ca.us            Writer,
70210.172@compuserve.com   mcmullen@panix.com                 Student,
GEnie - nb.nyc             mcmullen@eff.org                     Teacher


Subject: Perhaps you could help
From: mcmullen (John F. McMullen)
Comments: 
Message-ID: <N3006B7w165w@mindvox.phantom.com>
Date: Tue, 06 Jul 93 16:43:10 EDT
Organization: [Phantom Access] / the MindVox system

I received this from Mark and, with his permission, am sending it to you
in the hope that you might write something.

John

==========================================================================
>From panix.com!mark Tue Jul  6 15:31:07 1993
Return-Path: <mark@panix.com>
Received: from panix.com by mindvox.phantom.com with smtp
        (Smail3.1.28.1 #5) id m0oDIjD-0009STC; Tue, 6 Jul 93 15:30 EDT
Received: by panix.com id AA14749
  (5.65c/IDA-1.4.4 for mcmullen); Tue, 6 Jul 1993 15:25:42 -0400
From: Phiber Optik <mark@panix.com>
Subject: Personal request...

Friends and fellow netters:
        I regret to inform you all that after much stress and anxiety, I
decided the risk of loss to be too great, and have accepted a guilty plea
in my case.  All things considered, it seemed the only thing to do in order
to avoid the possibility of a much harsher sentence in the event things did
not go well during trial.  I entered my plea on Friday, July 2nd, and am to
be sentenced this November.
        I'm sending this letter to those who were under consideration for
testifying in my favor as character/expert witnesses, and I would greatly
appreciate if you could put together letters of recommendation attesting
to my character.  These letters would be considered by the judge and the
probation department and would help me in my review for sentencing. 

If there are any questions, feel free to reply, or you can contact my lawyers,
Paul Ruskin and Carl Hartmann, at 212/223-3330.

Thank you,
- -Mark.




------- End of Forwarded Message





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: miron@extropia.wimsey.com (Miron Cuperman)
Date: Thu, 8 Jul 93 20:30:25 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: ANON: nntp, apology
In-Reply-To: <9307082030.AA26026@mead.u.washington.edu>
Message-ID: <1993Jul9.023606.12732@extropia.wimsey.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

nobody@mead.u.washington.edu writes:

>I feel silly.  It just occurred to me that the remailers operate by
>piping to sendmail directly; thus a lone period is interpreted as "the
>end".  So I have cunningly arranged for my message to be indented by
>one space (emacs has lots of functions!).

This is a bug.  I've added the '-oi' option to sendmail invocations
in my remail scripts.  I recommend that other remail operators do
the same.
- -- 
        Miron Cuperman <miron@extropia.wimsey.com> | NeXTmail/Mime ok
        Unix/C++/DSP,  consulting/contracting      | Public key avail
        AMIX: MCuperman                            |
Laissez faire, laissez passer. Le monde va de lui meme.



-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.3

iQCVAgUBLDzZQJNxvvA36ONDAQHYKQP+Mpok7m5fABZG/PTkQ5TAVFtPUHdSyzQT
MpZF6MhWSEdR3Tj+8tpUahS3J/ZXfXENeacL9r2Nd2ORXwCNDziGoCkdjV1sKmS9
NR+HKS8uq/WVt7rlpZMHmf/9nSlvx4l5KTVJ/5iy8FtppbbJrlFpf0HsDvDMF7if
/PEAoSZs11I=
=0U6k
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Nickey MacDonald <i6t4@jupiter.sun.csd.unb.ca>
Date: Fri, 9 Jul 93 01:02:12 PDT
To: cypherpunks list <cypherpunks@toad.com>
Subject: Re: USENET newsreaders and cryptography: features/suggestions/questions
In-Reply-To: <m0oE9c2-000ZDIC@genesis.mcs.com>
Message-ID: <Pine.3.05.9307090439.A21528-b100000@jupiter>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


On Thu, 8 Jul 1993, Sameer wrote:

> CRYPTOPROGRAM=pgp
> 
> system(strcat(getenv("CRYPTOPROGRAM"), " -m foobar"))
> 
> 	(I'm not well-versed in strcat, so this could be wrong, but you
> know what I mean.)

I know you put a disclaimer, but I'll warn you that the above code is very
dangerous...  strcat() concatenates to its first argument, and the value
returned by getenv is not a suitable argument in this case...  the fix:

char enccmd[100];
strcpy(enccmd, getenv("CRYPTOPROGRAM"));
strcat(enccmd, " -m foobar");
system(enccmd);

However, I still find this unsatisfying, as the'-m' is probably a PGP
sepcific option, and it seems to me that a more general solution would be
either some form of template in the environment variable:

CRYPTOPROGRAM="pgp encode=-e decode= sign=-s stdin=-f text=-t ascii=-a
conventional=-c userid=-u %u forcepager=-m pagemode=-m wipeorig=-w
recoverorigfilename=-p detatchsig=-b leavesigintact=-d adresseelist=%a
...and so on..."

or a set of environment variables, such as:

CRYPTOENCODE=
CRYPTODECODE=
CRYPTOSIGN=
CRYPTOVERIFYSIGNATURE=
...and so on...

Either way is a lot more work, but probably a lot more general as well...
This is a piece of code that only needs to be written once...  would take
more work to do the documentation that the code...  Any takers, or should I
put this on my TODO list as well?

--
Nick MacDonald               | NMD on IRC
i6t4@jupiter.sun.csd.unb.ca  | PGP 2.1 Public key available via finger
i6t4@unb.ca                  | (506) 457-1931    ^{1024/746EBB 1993/02/23}






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Timothy Newsham <newsham@wiliki.eng.hawaii.edu>
Date: Fri, 9 Jul 93 12:19:02 PDT
To: tedwards@wam.umd.edu (technopagan priest)
Subject: Re: Hmm...hardware secure phone?
In-Reply-To: <199307091816.AA09211@rac3.wam.umd.edu>
Message-ID: <9307091918.AA03899@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> 
> 
> I've been reading up on Codecs.  Motorola has the MC145505 PCM Codec
> which samples at 8khz and the PCM output is at 64kbps.  We can then
> use the MC145532 ADPCM Transcoder to reduce the data stream to
> 16kbps.  With the breaks in spoken languages, perhaps we could get
> this to compress just enough to go through a 14.4 kbps modem.
> 
> Anyway, who knows of a DES or RSA chip which will do 16kbps?
> Then all we need is a microcontroller to run the show, and 
> perform D-H or RSA key exchange.
> 
> -Thomas
> 

with a DSP chip you can compress voice down to the
4.8kbps to 9.6kbps range with CELP
the 400 bps to 4800 bps range with LPC

If you have enough cycles and memory left over afterwards
you can do DES on the same DSP (depending on which brand you
choose this may or may not be feasible).

If you are using a host computer the computer can do
DES and framing for you.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Timothy Newsham <newsham@wiliki.eng.hawaii.edu>
Date: Fri, 9 Jul 93 12:25:19 PDT
To: rtannen@borland.com (Bob Tannen)
Subject: Re: encrypted email software
In-Reply-To: <m0oEK3u-0004nPC@genghis.borland.com>
Message-ID: <9307091925.AA04151@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> 
> > DES isnt secure?  And where was it that you got this precious
> > little piece of information?
> > 
> You mean to tell me you believe what your government tells you about DES?
> Come on now!  It's been public knowledge for quite some time that the NSA
> has a backdoor to DES and the FBI and other agencys know it.

Its public knowledge?
were's the proof?
Not one academic researcher has found it (and lived to publish
about it).
On the other hand some very respectable cryptographers have
been able to show that the design critereon has made for
very well chosen parameters.

The FBI has shown that they dont know a backdoor in DES or at least
they wont use it against suspects.  There have been cases were
data was encrypted with DES and the suspect refused to turn over
the keys. 

> 
> I certainly hope you were kidding! 
> 
> -- 
> Bob Tannen
> Borland International
> 1800 Greenhills Rd.
> Scotts Valley, CA. 95066
> 
> rtannen@borland.com
> RTANNEN @ BORLAND (MHS)
> 




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: eichin@cygnus.com (Mark Eichin)
Date: Fri, 9 Jul 93 11:05:19 PDT
To: shipley@merde.dis.org
Subject: emacs stuff
In-Reply-To: <9307082128.AA02549@merde.dis.org>
Message-ID: <9307091804.AA03813@cygnus.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>> ;;; * They do "ps auxww" (SunOS) on your machine while you're
>> ;;;     decrypting/signing.
	It should be possible, with pgp 2.2, to eliminate this
vulnerability.

>> ;;; * They type C-h v *pgp-passphrase* in your emacs after you've
	That's easy to clear optionally. What's hard to clear is "m-x
view-lossage" which has the raw characters. (I think emacs should have
support for safe reading and clearing, but I don't know if rms would
go for it. You'd need an excuse *other* than passwords.)

>> ;;; * They watch over your shoulder as you type it. (It's not invisible.)
	Didn't read-password or read-no-echo ever make it into an
emacs release?  Here are some ancient bits that I use. 
				_Mark_ <eichin@athena.mit.edu>
				MIT Student Information Processing Board
				Cygnus Support <eichin@cygnus.com>


;; ucbvax!brahms!weemba	Matthew P Wiener/UCB Math Dept/Berkeley CA 94720
;;; GNU Emacs library to read in passwords from the minibuffer
;;; Standard GNU copying privileges apply

(setq minibuffer-local-no-echo-map (make-keymap))

(mapcar '(lambda (x) (aset minibuffer-local-no-echo-map (car x) (cdr x)))
	(cdr minibuffer-local-map))

(let ((i ?\040))
  (while (< i ?\177)
    (aset minibuffer-local-no-echo-map i 'read-char-no-echo)
    (setq i (1+ i))))

(aset minibuffer-local-no-echo-map ?\177 'delete-char-no-echo)

;; This function squirrels each typed-in character away.
(defun read-char-no-echo () (interactive)
  (setq no-echo-list (append no-echo-list (list (this-command-keys)))))

;; This function erases the last character from the input list.
(defun delete-char-no-echo () (interactive)
  (setq no-echo-list (nreverse (cdr (nreverse no-echo-list)))))

;; This is the function the user actually uses.
(defun read-string-no-echo (prompt)
  "Get a password from the minibuffer, prompting with PROMPT."
  (let (no-echo-list)
    (read-from-minibuffer prompt nil minibuffer-local-no-echo-map)
    (mapconcat 'identity no-echo-list nil)))


;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;This crudity is just for demo!;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;
(defun read-password ()
  "Prompts for a password, and doesn't echo it, stores it in 'secret'"
  (interactive)
  (setq secret (read-string-no-echo "Password: ")))


(defun shell-password ()
  "Prompts for password, no echo, and sends it to the shell"
  (interactive)
  (process-send-string (get-buffer-process (current-buffer)) 
		       (concat
			(read-string-no-echo "Password: ")
			"\n")))



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: eichin@cygnus.com (Mark Eichin)
Date: Fri, 9 Jul 93 12:20:15 PDT
To: tedwards@wam.umd.edu
Subject: Hmm...hardware secure phone?
In-Reply-To: <199307091816.AA09211@rac3.wam.umd.edu>
Message-ID: <9307091919.AA05781@cygnus.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>> Anyway, who knows of a DES or RSA chip which will do 16kbps?
>> Then all we need is a microcontroller to run the show, and 
	(kbits? kbytes?) Well, a quick check of some C code gets me
200Kbytes[*] (1.6Mbits) per second on a SparcStation ELC. I'll have
numbers for the i960 microcontroller[**] later this weekend -- you
might be able to have the microcontroller do the encryption too :-)
							_Mark_

[*] That's 50,000 calls to des_ecb_encrypt and 50,000 calls to
des_ecb_decrypt, so 100K ecbs, each ecb is 8 bytes, so that's 800K
bytes, and it took 3.98 user CPU seconds, so that's 200K bytes. Yep,
the math checks. Compiler: Solaris gcc -O (a few months old); DES
code: Ferguson's, as folded into Kerberos 4.

[**] Yeah, it's marketed as a microcontroller. If you put it in a
toaster, you wouldn't need a heating element. Still, it's part of the
background for my talk at the Embedded Systems conference in October
on "Security Issues in Embedded Networking". 



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Marc Horowitz <marc@GZA.COM>
Date: Fri, 9 Jul 93 09:21:50 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: IETF
Message-ID: <9307091621.AA12178@dun-dun-noodles.aktis.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Is anyone else on this list going to be there?

		Marc




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: jet@nas.nasa.gov (J. Eric Townsend)
Date: Fri, 9 Jul 93 12:57:52 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: anonymous mail
In-Reply-To: <m0oDsdr-0002bCC@entropy.linet.org>
Message-ID: <9307091957.AA07710@boxer.nas.nasa.gov>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


nobody@entropy.linet.org writes:
 >  that somebody can get fired for views expressed in a private
 > e-list, which probably extrapolates to USENET posting as well.
 > Apparently, Mr. Steshenko forgot to include the "disclaimer: my
 > opinions" with his email.  

Apparently, Mr. Steshenko thought it was appropriate to use company
resources for non-company activities.  On top of that, those
activities misrepresented the company.

Steshenko's firing is something all the libertarians on this list
should applaud.






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Duncan Frissell <76630.3577@CompuServe.COM>
Date: Fri, 9 Jul 93 12:39:33 PDT
To: <cypherpunks@toad.com>
Subject: Subject
Message-ID: <930709174934_76630.3577_EHK67-1@CompuServe.COM>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


(Tim May)
>>>more and more universities are using the "sexual harassment" 
laws/codes to stop certain newsgroups, to halt the distribution of sexually 
oriented images, and to take disciplinary action against students (mostly 
male) who have put GIFs on their computers or workstations (apparently 
female students who walk past an office in which female models are used 
as startup screens have decided they are being "sexually assaulted" or
"harassed").<<<

Here is a free sample of my legal drafting skills.  Post this notice and
you will be immune:

*****************************************************************************
NOTICE

All speeches, writings, representations, or actions constituting symbolic 
speech; made, produced, or performed by me which are believed by anyone to be;
or which are held by any person or organization to be; RACIAL, SEXUAL, OR ANY
OTHER FORM OF HARASSMENT were made, produced, or performed by me with the 
specific intent to return the legal status of the person to whom they were 
directed to that legal status which they would have enjoyed prior to the 
year 1900.

Such speech, writing, representation, or action constituting symbolic speech;
is thus POLITICAL SPEECH and is absolutely protected by the First  Amendment 
to the United States Constitution. Therefore, No government  agency or private
institution acting under the orders of any government agency can legally 
punish me for such speech, writing, representation, or action constituting 8
symbolic speech.   
******************************************************************************

Make it clear that any move against you will cause you to wheel on in to 
federal court and sue their rear ends.

Also if your attacker is "of the Left" say:  "Look thousands of American boys
died to save the world from commie scum like you.  If I have to put up with 
persons of *your* ilk, then you have to put up with *my* personal peculiarities 
as well."

They tend to leave you alone after that. <G>

"Kids don't try this until you've been to law school."

In any case, net censorship is ridiculous when I can open 25 accounts per day
with Email access to Internet.

Duncan Frissell

********************************************************************
* DUNCAN FRISSELL             Attorney at Law, Writer, and Privacy *
* CIS 76630,3577              Consultant since the Nixon           *
* Internet:                   Administration                       *
* 76630.3577@compuserve.com                                        *
* or frissell@panix.com                                            *
* Easylink 62853962                                                *
* Attmail !dfrissell                                               *
* TLX:  402231 FRISSELL NYK                                        *
*                                                                  *
*    Privacy Checkup still only $29.95.  Buy today before price    *
*    controls force me to raise my prices.                         *
*                                                                  *
*    In 1870, a German couple registered the birth of their        *
*    little girl with the town clerk. 70 years later, the          *
*    woman that that little girl had become was executed           *
*    because of her parent's actions.  Don't let this happen       *
*    to you or your children. Give a gift of privacy this year.    *
*                                                                  *
********************************************************************
-----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----
Version: 2.2

mQCNAirtsUkAAAEEAN4wvnp5CE1ZUyqq8HnBDk78WP9WpyIFbINw/qvDxRGHPK4e
JFR7XBaMnd3Ek0x8c20syHwPVNrDUpdgRmJzperbNTeaS1lof4npfR8kPnGJ3wvv
wJtIXSM+4ePDy+pfGQkyY+Y0qJEbBTxYNW01ciMrVS2Uac5C3YVO4r4sgSPhAAUR
tCtEdW5jYW4gRnJpc3NlbGwgPDc2NjMwLjM1NzdAY29tcHVzZXJ2ZS5jb20+
=I88k
-----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: peb@PROCASE.COM (Paul Baclace)
Date: Fri, 9 Jul 93 14:12:35 PDT
To: jet@nas.nasa.gov
Subject: Re: anonymous mail
Message-ID: <9307092112.AA07438@banff.procase.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



>Apparently, Mr. Steshenko thought it was appropriate to use company
>resources for non-company activities. 

Use of phone, desk, email, bathroom, grounds, chairs, kitchen, are all
company facilities that are necessary for working for a company, but it
is widely accepted that they can also be used personally as perks.  At
the extreme of a perk-that-is-necessary is "calling your doctor".  This
is not company business, but if you can't make such calls at the
office, you end up working less in order to get around such
restrictions.  The other extreme is something that takes up company
resources due to purely individual convenience: posting to usenet for
personal business.  This can be done via a private account and does not
have to be done from the office, but many companies allow this because
they also expect people to work overtime for free and this keeps them 
at work. 

Depending upon many factors at a company, the amount of perk usage
allowed varies.  Some companies have policies about this while
others do not.  I think the reason no policy exists in many places
is that defining it is a form of encouragement (like saying you
have exactly 5 sick days a year, and they don't carry over to the
next; this causes people to call in sick even when they are not.
One company I worked for took sick days out of your vacation days
(but you got more vacation days than was ordinary); this encouraged
honesty, but also led to sick people coming to work).  

> On top of that, those activities misrepresented the company.

This gets into the disclaimer bit.  I *never* assume a person
is speaking for the company unless they are making a product
announcement; for anything else, it is fairly easy to see that
postings are personal (even if they regard business related 
subjects like commendts about the quality of particular software).

It would be far easier for everyone to assume that no messages 
represent the company, board of directors, etc., unless explicitly
stated as such, simply because official messages are rare and 
personal/unofficial ones are frequent.

>Steshenko's firing is something all the libertarians on this list
>should applaud.

The cost of accounting/surveillance/policing/ill-will must be balanced with 
the benefits of having a trusting/open/honest/self-policed-perks
policy; this is a tradeoff all organizations must make and has nothing to do
with free markets.  Libertarian thought doesn't say anything about this
tradeoff, except that governments shouldn't coerce a company into 
a particular position.  


Paul E. Baclace
peb@procase.com





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: technopagan priest <tedwards@wam.umd.edu>
Date: Fri, 9 Jul 93 11:16:43 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Hmm...hardware secure phone?
Message-ID: <199307091816.AA09211@rac3.wam.umd.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



I've been reading up on Codecs.  Motorola has the MC145505 PCM Codec
which samples at 8khz and the PCM output is at 64kbps.  We can then
use the MC145532 ADPCM Transcoder to reduce the data stream to
16kbps.  With the breaks in spoken languages, perhaps we could get
this to compress just enough to go through a 14.4 kbps modem.

Anyway, who knows of a DES or RSA chip which will do 16kbps?
Then all we need is a microcontroller to run the show, and 
perform D-H or RSA key exchange.

-Thomas




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: ab357@freenet.carleton.ca (Helena Dang)
Date: Fri, 9 Jul 93 11:30:03 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: UNSUBSCRIBE !
Message-ID: <9307091828.AA25441@freenet.carleton.ca>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Please unsubscribe me.

Thanks.

--
 ---------------------------------------------------------------------
|	HELENA DANG  |	hdang@math.carleton.ca                        |      
|    	  =)8->      |  ab357@freenet.carleton.ca                     |      
 --------------------------------------------------------------------- 




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Duncan Frissell <76630.3577@CompuServe.COM>
Date: Fri, 9 Jul 93 12:13:32 PDT
To: <cypherpunks@toad.com>
Subject: Politically Incorrect Sheep
Message-ID: <930709190617_76630.3577_EHK5-1@CompuServe.COM>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


(Sneal)

>>>a chance to work a PGP angle into some sensational story that 
creates a lot of public outcry.  Linking PGP to terrorism, drug 
dealing, or kiddie porn would be a great first step towards 
getting some laws against "unlicensed cryptography" on the books.<<<

Too late.  Open systems are beyond the point of no return.  Worriers
forget the "tipping factor".  Once half of the mass of an object is
above its center of gravity, it starts to fall over fast.

The unsexy bits of the digital revolution - EDI, electronic trading,
the quants, the ISO reference model have already worked their wonders
and started the tipping process.  Perestroika (restructuring) is
here to stay.

Without PGP, without cypherpunks, without UUNET, without any of it
governments would still see their mechanisms of control crumble.  Cheap
computing and telecoms by themselves are enough to render the nation
state technologically obsolete.

Read from the bottom up:

Anarchists              Application
Communists or           Communication
Socialists              System
Trust                   Transport
Never                   Network
Departments             Datalink
Police                  Physical


Duncan Frissell

********************************************************************
* DUNCAN FRISSELL             Attorney at Law, Writer, and Privacy *
* CIS 76630,3577              Consultant since the Nixon           *
* Internet:                   Administration                       *
* 76630.3577@compuserve.com                                        *
* or frissell@panix.com                                            *
* Easylink 62853962                                                *
* Attmail !dfrissell                                               *
* TLX:  402231 FRISSELL NYK                                        *
*                                                                  *
*    Privacy Checkup still only $29.95.  Buy today before price    *
*    controls force me to raise my prices.                         *
*                                                                  *
*    Rebecca Schaefer was shot to death on her own doorstep        *
*    because she told the State of California where she lived.     *
*    Don't make her mistake.  Hire me to teach you to guard        *
*    your privacy.                                                 *
*                                                                  *
********************************************************************
-----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----
Version: 2.2

mQCNAirtsUkAAAEEAN4wvnp5CE1ZUyqq8HnBDk78WP9WpyIFbINw/qvDxRGHPK4e
JFR7XBaMnd3Ek0x8c20syHwPVNrDUpdgRmJzperbNTeaS1lof4npfR8kPnGJ3wvv
wJtIXSM+4ePDy+pfGQkyY+Y0qJEbBTxYNW01ciMrVS2Uac5C3YVO4r4sgSPhAAUR
tCtEdW5jYW4gRnJpc3NlbGwgPDc2NjMwLjM1NzdAY29tcHVzZXJ2ZS5jb20+
=I88k
-----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: mike@EGFABT.ORG (Mike Sherwood)
Date: Fri, 9 Jul 93 15:47:08 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: encrypted email software
In-Reply-To: <9307091941.AA00142@snark.shearson.com>
Message-ID: <k0XF7B1w165w@EGFABT.ORG>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


"Perry E. Metzger" <pmetzger@lehman.com> writes:

> 100% correct. Although DES is likely breakable by brute force, that
> can only be done at tremendous expense. The back door notion, although
> still possible, is now not believed to be true.

People first thought there was a back door because they wouldn't release 
enough info on the algorithm to give people a chance to see if they 
trusted it or not.  After it was all common knowledge, people examined 
it and came to the conclusion that it was secure, though questions are 
still around about why it was changed from 64 bit to 56 bit, which is 
also why it is believed that the NSA has computers that can break it by 
brute force in a reasonable amount of time, but nevertheless it is a 
brute force attack.

That's how I've heard (from various sources) the whole story with DES 
goes, and it seems like a reasonable one.

--
Mike Sherwood
internet: mike@EGFABT.ORG     uucp: ...!sgiblab!egfabt!mike





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Perry E. Metzger" <pmetzger@lehman.com>
Date: Fri, 9 Jul 93 12:43:35 PDT
To: Timothy Newsham <newsham@wiliki.eng.hawaii.edu>
Subject: Re: encrypted email software
In-Reply-To: <9307091925.AA04151@toad.com>
Message-ID: <9307091941.AA00142@snark.shearson.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Timothy Newsham says:
> > 
> > > DES isnt secure?  And where was it that you got this precious
> > > little piece of information?
> > > 
> > You mean to tell me you believe what your government tells you about DES?
> > Come on now!  It's been public knowledge for quite some time that the NSA
> > has a backdoor to DES and the FBI and other agencys know it.
> 
> Its public knowledge?
> were's the proof?
> Not one academic researcher has found it (and lived to publish
> about it).

100% correct. Although DES is likely breakable by brute force, that
can only be done at tremendous expense. The back door notion, although
still possible, is now not believed to be true.

Perry




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: thug@phantom.com (Murdering Thug)
Date: Fri, 9 Jul 93 12:47:23 PDT
To: tedwards@wam.umd.edu (technopagan priest)
Subject: Re: Hmm...hardware secure phone?
In-Reply-To: <199307091816.AA09211@rac3.wam.umd.edu>
Message-ID: <m0oEOUC-0009YyC@mindvox.phantom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text


> I've been reading up on Codecs.  Motorola has the MC145505 PCM Codec
> which samples at 8khz and the PCM output is at 64kbps.  We can then
> use the MC145532 ADPCM Transcoder to reduce the data stream to
> 16kbps.  With the breaks in spoken languages, perhaps we could get
> this to compress just enough to go through a 14.4 kbps modem.

How about just feeding the 16kbps stream to either a DES chip or a
microcontroller programmed for IDEA encryption/decryption?  And don't
even bother with 14.4.  Zyxel modems can do 16.8 & 19.2kbps full duplex.
But Zyxel's modulation is proprietary.  A new standard called v.32terbo
has emerged which standardizes 16.8 and 19.2 modulation - I believe some
of AT&T's new modems support v.32terbo.  Down the road a bit 21.6, 24.4 & 28.8
modulation (v.FAST) will be more common.  The way I see it, the hassle of
squeezing 16kbps into a 14.4kbps bandwidth pipe is not worth the agrivation
when you can pipe it straight into a Zyxel or v.32terbo modem right now.

> Anyway, who knows of a DES or RSA chip which will do 16kbps?

They all do, some chips even go as high as several megabits per second for
DES.  I don't know of any chips that do RSA though.

> Then all we need is a microcontroller to run the show, and 
> perform D-H or RSA key exchange.

Exactly.


---
thug@phantom.com



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: eichin@cygnus.com (Mark Eichin)
Date: Fri, 9 Jul 93 16:04:58 PDT
To: mike@EGFABT.ORG
Subject: encrypted email software
In-Reply-To: <k0XF7B1w165w@EGFABT.ORG>
Message-ID: <9307092304.AA14157@cygnus.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>> it and came to the conclusion that it was secure, though questions are 
>> still around about why it was changed from 64 bit to 56 bit, ...
	Didn't someone figure out a way that the 64 bit version would
be more vulnerable to differential cryptanalysis (which was known to
IBM as the "sliding attack" back when DES was being developed) than
the 56 bit one was? And I've heard indications that the predecessor
"Lucifer" at 128 bits had some trivial "meet-in-the-middle" attack
that left it at least as weak as 64 bits.
	The only "backdoor" concept I've heard which had a technical
basis behind it was a few years back, when some researcher figured out
a way to *produce* S-boxes with particular types of holes, and
concluded that it was impossible to identify if the holes where there
or not unless you knew the precise formulation... I think it even had
a two-of-three challenge, ie, published 3 sets of s-boxes, one or two
of which were "trapped" in this way, as a challenge for people to find
methods of locating them. (The technical basis stops there -- the
psychological or political question that follows is "did NSA/IBM know
about this technique? Assuming they did, did they choose the s-boxes
with or without holes?")

				_Mark_ <eichin@athena.mit.edu>
				MIT Student Information Processing Board
				Cygnus Support <eichin@cygnus.com>




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: remail@tamsun.tamu.edu
Date: Fri, 9 Jul 93 14:21:52 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: REMAILER: really anon?
Message-ID: <9307092121.AA24627@tamsun.tamu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


If you can trace the origin (sender) of this message please send me mail
personally rather than to the list.  I'm using my favorite remailer here
and I want to make sure it's working right.  

I have sent mail to the below sites as a test for anonymous remailing
returns and to see what headers I get back. It has been maybe 4 days now
since I began this experiment, some of the sites below have still not
remailed my test message.

My main curiosity in this quest is to determine what each header will look
like when the mail is recieved.  I think this is important in determining
which remailer to use.  

The below is the list of remailers with the "unique header to remailer" info
below each site number.  

If you wish to discuss this matter further, please send a follow up
message to the cypher list with your address included and "Re: Unique
header".  I'm really not too concerned about remaining anonymous (that is,
I will come out of hiding), I just want to see if this scheme is really
airtight! 

Thanks!
-z

 **Please take note of remailer 12 of this list.**

The typical header received looks similar to the below:
(I have removed the date, time, etc. to protect my privacy) 

From rebma!remailer@kksys.mn.org Thu Jul x 00:38:01 1993
Received: by ahost.some.school.edu (5.57/Ultrix3.0/cc-ix.mc-1.5)
	id AA02491; Thu, x Jul 93 19:00:54 -0500
Received: from kksys.mn.org by uum1.mn.org with bsmtp
	(Smail3.1.28.1 #3) id m0oE6Du-00007JC; Thu,x Jul 93 00:21 CDT
Received: from rebma by kksys.mn.org with uucp
	(Smail3.1.28.1 #13) id m0oE5jG-0007TsC; Thu,x Jul 93 00:50 CDT
Received: by rebma.rebma.mn.org (Smail3.1.28.1 #1)
	id m0oE6nS-0002CzC; Thu, 8 Jul 93 17:58 PDT
Message-Id: <m0oE6nS-0002CzC@rebma.rebma.mn.org>
Date: Thu, x Jul 93 17:58 PDT
To: me@myhost.some.school.edu
From: nobody@rebma.rebma.mn.org
Subject: 9
Remailed-By: Mr. Nobody <remailer@rebma.mn.org>
Status: O


=========This is where the list of remailers begins===========

*** Please keep in mind that in the below I included only the "unique to
*** remailer" parts of the header.***

 1: nowhere@bsu-cs.bsu.edu 

From: Anonymous <nowhere@bsu-cs.bsu.edu>
To: omitted
X-Remailed-By: Anonymous <nowhere@bsu-cs.bsu.edu>
X-Ttl: 0
X-Notice: This message was forwarded by a software-
	  automated anonymous remailing service.

 2: hh@cicada.berkeley.edu 

From: nobody@cicada.berkeley.edu

 3: hh@pmantis.berkeley.edu 

No response after 4 days

 4: hh@soda.berkeley.edu 

From: nobody@soda.berkeley.edu
Remailed-By: Eric Hollander <hh@soda.berkeley.edu>

 5: 00x@uclink.berkeley.edu 

From: nobody@uclink.berkeley.edu
Remailed-By: Tommy the Tourist <tommy@out>

 6: hal@alumni.caltech.edu 

From: nobody@alumni.cco.caltech.edu
Comments: This message is NOT from the person listed in the From
 line.  It is from an automated software remailing service operating at
 that address.  Please report problem mail to <hal@alumni.caltech.edu>.

 7: ebrandt@jarthur.claremont.edu 

From: nobody@eli-remailer
Remailed-By: Eli Brandt <ebrandt@jarthur.Claremont.EDU>
Source-Info:  From (or Sender) name not authenticated.

 8: phantom@mead.u.washington.edu 

No response after 4 days

 9: remailer@rebma.mn.org (this reply took almost 3+ days!)

From: nobody@rebma.rebma.mn.org
Remailed-By: Mr. Nobody <remailer@rebma.mn.org>

10: elee7h5@rosebud.ee.uh.edu 

From: nobody@rosebud.ee.uh.edu

11: hfinney@shell.portal.com 

From: nobody@shell.portal.com
Comments: This message is NOT from the person listed in the From
 line.  It is from an automated software remailing service operating at
 that address.  Please report problem mail to <hfinney@shell.portal.com>.

12: remail@tamsun.tamu.edu 

From: remail@tamsun.tamu.edu
Remailed-By: Anonymous <remail@tamsun.tamu.edu>

Received: by tamsun.tamu.edu id AA04104
  (5.65b/IDA-1.4.3 for you@yourhost); Tue, 6 Jul 93 04:15:57 -0500

you@yourhost = your address! ...really!

13: remail@tamaix.tamu.edu 

From: remail@tamsun.tamu.edu
Remailed-By: Anonymous <remail@tamsun.tamu.edu>

14: remailer@utter.dis.org 

Received: by soda.berkeley.edu (5.65/KAOS-1)
	id AA13859; Tue, 6 Jul 93 03:09:09 -0700
Received: by merde.dis.org (4.1/SMI-4.2)
	id AA04354; Tue, 6 Jul 93 03:11:48 PDT
From: nobody@dis.org
Remailed-By: remailer bogus account <remailer@utter.dis.org>

15: remail@extropia.wimsey.com 

No response after 4 days


NOTES: 
#1-#5		no encryption of remailing requests
#6-#14		support encrypted remailing requests
#15		special - header and message must be encrypted together
#9,#14,#15	introduce larger than average delay (not direct connect)
#9,#14,#15      running on privately owned machines




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Nick Papadakis" <nick@martigny.ai.mit.edu>
Date: Fri, 9 Jul 93 15:06:01 PDT
To: newsham@wiliki.eng.hawaii.edu
Subject: Can FBI/NSA break DES?
In-Reply-To: <9307091925.AA04151@toad.com>
Message-ID: <9307092205.AA08207@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



> The FBI has shown that they dont know a backdoor in DES or at least
> they wont use it against suspects. 

	For what it is worth, an FBI agent here in Boston once told me
a story (over lunch) about a drug case involving a seized PC with DES
encrypted files.  The FBI folks called up "some friends" at NSA, who
were able to decrypt the files.  They couldn't use the info in court
(since that would reveal what the NSA could do), but the information
was valuable to them nonetheless.

	Now, I don't know whether to believe this or not.  There was
at least one interesting detail/inconsistency in the story (he
mentioned that when they got the PC back from NSA they were somehow
able to tell by examining some file-modification times that the
decrypt had taken 12 minutes.  It's not immediately obvious to me why
this would be so.)  The guy who told me the story isn't particularly
technical; neither is he totally non-technical (at one point he told
another story about how difficult it is to explain hexadecimal to a
jury.)  I don't think he would be above a little desinformatsiya.  I
don't see what he would gain from it, other than appearing to be more
technical/powerful/in-the-know than he really is.

	That NSA can break DES is widely suspected, even if unproved.


		Cheers,


			- nick

P.s. 	The truly funny postscript to this story is that halfway
through the aforementioned lunch with this FBI fellow, I looked down
and realized I was wearing one of the hack LOD T-Shirts.  After I
finished choking on my biriyani, he wanted to know where *he* could
get one ...




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: peter honeyman <honey@citi.umich.edu>
Date: Fri, 9 Jul 93 18:44:20 PDT
To: mike@EGFABT.ORG (Mike Sherwood)
Subject: Re: encrypted email software
In-Reply-To: <k0XF7B1w165w@EGFABT.ORG>
Message-ID: <9307100144.AA14701@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> People first thought there was a back door because they wouldn't release 
> enough info on the algorithm to give people a chance to see if they 
> trusted it or not.

not the algorithm, which was public from the start, but the rationale behind
the selection of its parameters.

>                     After it was all common knowledge, people examined 
> it and came to the conclusion that it was secure, 

the rationale remains classified; some people question nsa's motivation
in keeping that aspect of des secret.  i believe nsa keeps it secret to
avoid teaching potential (or imaginary) adversaries advanced cryptographic
techniques.   (and also because keeping secrets is what nsa is all about.
they seem to be very, very good at it.)

>                                                   though questions are 
> still around about why it was changed from 64 bit to 56 bit,

you mean 112 -> 56.  this has been resolved -- it seems that longer keys
don't impose any additional complexity on des attacks.  although these
attacks were discovered by the open crypto community only a few years ago,
nsa had these techniques in hand long before.  the bottom line is that
additional key bits would not make des more secure.  double des or triple
des do.

>                                                              which is 
> also why it is believed that the NSA has computers that can break it by 
> brute force in a reasonable amount of time, but nevertheless it is a 
> brute force attack.

it has long been believed that a dedicated des-cracker is within the budget
of extremely well financed organizations.  

> That's how I've heard (from various sources) the whole story with DES 
> goes, and it seems like a reasonable one.

your story is pretty close to the spin i'm familiar with.

	peter




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: jpp@markv.com
Date: Fri, 9 Jul 93 23:15:55 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Secure comm program, Sockets + LINK
In-Reply-To: <9306090653.AA23961@triton.unm.edu>
Message-ID: <9307092314.aa24145@hermix.markv.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


  Supose you opened up a socket on the local machine.  And that you
ran your usual telnet to connect to it.  The program listening on the
local socket would be responsible for running one end of a 'LINK' like
secure protocol.  It would connect to either the remote telnet socket,
or a special purpose socket at the remote end.  There either you can
use a pipe to a pty (standard telnet -> login shell -> LINK -> pty),
or in a special socket through LINK out the telnet socket.  (There is
an obvious extention with multiple hops through LINK-socket programs
which should provide the same kind of anonymity that is provided by
the CP remailers.)

  In this way, the data passing over the (presumed unsecure) net
connection (which might well be slip) is encrypted.  I am presuming
that both the local and remote kernels are 'secure' enough that you
would want to use them.

  The upside is that you get to use 'comercial grade' telnet==comm
programs.

  Of course this stratagy is no use for folks who don't have sockets
on both ends of the channel.  It is also likely to be obsoleted as
soon as secure-ip gets out.  Some ambitious sole might want to try the
analogous stratagy where a local pseudo-serial-device is created in
software, thus again getting 'comercial grade' comm==telnet programs.

  I sugest this stratagy, because it is one I am concidereing under MS
Windows.  I have a telnet which is acceptable, I have slip, and I have
the source to LINK, so...

(local-telnet) --kernel--> (local-LINK-SOCKET) ----unsecure-network---+
                                                                      |
                  (remote-telnet) <--kernel-- (remote-LINK-SOCKET) <--+
                                                                      |
(remote-pty) <--kernel-- (remote-LINK) <--kernel-- (remote-telnet) <--+

  Infact it would be nice to see some socket (perhaps 32?) become the
standard for the secure telnet service.

  Meanwhile, I did peruse the LINK source and am a little unhappy with
the actual protocol used in setting up the secure channel.  It is only
authenticated in one direction, rather than both (as I understand
it).  I would like to see two way authentication, and (perhaps)
Diffe-Helman key exchange.

j'




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: geoffw@nexsys.net (Geoff White)
Date: Sat, 10 Jul 93 00:13:07 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: 738 ANS CO+RE Security to Use RSA Public Key Cryptography
Message-ID: <9307100703.AA27907@nexsys.nexsys.net>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



--X-
ANS CO+RE Security to Use RSA Public Key Cryptography
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
Contacts:

ANS CO+RE Systems Inc.          RSA Data Security Inc.
Carol Harvey, Public Affairs    Kurt Stammberger, Technology Marketing
703/758-7700                    415/595-8782
harvey@ans.net                  kurt@rsa.com

           ANS CO+RE's Security Services to Incorporate
                   RSA Public Key Cryptography

REDWOOD CITY, CA and ELMSFORD, NY -- ANS CO+RE Systems Inc. announced major
new extensions to its advanced InterLock family of security services. The new
features focus around the incorporation of RSA Data Security Inc.'s Public
Key Cryptosystem. RSA's techniques are widely acknowledged as being the most
secure means of data encryption and authentication available today.

InterLock is a suite of security services that control access among segments
of an enterprise's private IP network and/or among multiple enterprises that
communicate over a IP private network. InterLock also controls access between
private networks and the public Internet. In addition to RSA key exchange-
enabled end-to-end encryption, InterLock services include TELNET, FTP, SMTP,
X windows, and NNTP. Network access is controlled by a rule base that can be
configured for each user according to userid, network service,
inbound/outbound connection, time of day, day of week, public/private network
and/or host address, authentication method and enforced encryption.

ANS CO+RE developed the new product with RSA's BSAFE 2.0 toolkit, the world's
best-selling cryptography software developer's kit. BSAFE is the same toolkit
that served as the encryption "engine" for the developers of Novell NetWare
4.0, Lotus Notes, WordPerfect InForms and Fischer International
Workflow.2000. BSAFE provides an easy path towards integration of state-of-
the-art encryption and digital signature technology -- without requiring the
developer to have a background in cryptography or number theory. RSA security
technology is a standard on the Internet, the world's largest network, and on
the secure networks of businesses and financial institutions worldwide.

RSA president Jim Bidzos, commenting on the deal, said, "As the Internet
grows, more and more confidential and mission-critical data is flowing over
it -- unfortunately, the open nature of the Internet makes that information
relatively easy to steal, alter or forge. The RSA-based Internet PEM
(privacy-enhanced mail) standards have provided a good start by offering
secure messaging capabilities to Internet users -- but now any IP user can
get a complete network security implementation, with RSA built right in, with
ANS CO+RE InterLock."

Al Hoover, VP of Information and Applications for ANS CO+RE stated, "We've
been looking to incorporate a public-key based key management system that is
both as advanced as the other InterLock services and easy to integrate. RSA's
Public Key Cryptography fills that need perfectly, and we will be pleased to
offer it to our customers beginning in the fourth quarter of this year. It
represents our continuing efforts to build on our foundation of quality
security services."

RSA Data Security Inc. is a recognized world leader in cryptography. The
Company develops and markets software developer's kits, end-user products,
and provides comprehensive consulting services in the cryptographic sciences.
RSA technology has been embedded in the products of companies such as IBM,
Apple Computer, DEC, Microsoft, Sun Microsystems, Novell, Lotus, Motorola,
Northern Telecom, AT&T, WordPerfect, Fischer International, General Electric,
Hughes and many others. Founded in 1982 by the inventors of the patented RSA
Public Key Cryptosystem, the company is headquartered in Redwood City,
California.

ANS CO+RE Systems, Inc. is a wholly owned subsidiary of Advanced Network &
Services, Inc. of Elmsford, NY. In addition to offering network security
services, the company markets attachments to its nationwide T3 backbone
network, and provides other related support, such as network management
outsourcing, network design and engineering, and systems integration.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
InterLock and the InterLock logo are servicemarks of ANS CO+RE Systems Inc.
X Windows is a trademark of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
The RSA logo and BSAFE are trademarks of RSA Data Security, Inc.

Copyright 1993 HPCwire.




----- End Included Message -----





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: wcs@anchor.ho.att.com
Date: Fri, 9 Jul 93 22:39:16 PDT
To: nick@mit.edu
Subject: Re:  Can FBI/NSA break DES?
Message-ID: <9307100423.AA16160@anchor.ho.att.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text


Nick's story of the FBI agent telling him about having the NSA crack
DES files found on a PC in a drug case could of course be the agent 
pulling his leg, but it could perfectly well be true.
After all, brute-force may not work well for searching 2**56 randomly-
generated session keys, but it's just fine for searching a million or
so easy-to-remember short stupid keys from dictionaries and such.
It's even faster if you augment your dictionary with the filenames on
the machine, first names of stupid people and the victim's friends,
family, customers, etc.  If Crack can do a good job finding root passwords
for computer-literate sysadmins, it ought to be pretty good at finding
passwords for semi-literate folks as well.

				Bill
# Bill Stewart    wcs@anchor.ho.att.com  +1-908-949-0705 Fax-4876
# AT&T Bell Labs, Room 4M-312, Crawfords Corner Rd, Holmdel, NJ  07733-3030




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: J. Michael Diehl <mdiehl@triton.unm.edu>
Date: Sat, 10 Jul 93 00:35:40 PDT
To: eichin@cygnus.com (Mark Eichin)
Subject: Re: encrypted email software
In-Reply-To: <9307092304.AA14157@cygnus.com>
Message-ID: <9307100735.AA09015@triton.unm.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


According to Mark Eichin:
> 
> 	The only "backdoor" concept I've heard which had a technical
> basis behind it was a few years back, when some researcher figured out
> a way to *produce* S-boxes with particular types of holes, and
> concluded that it was impossible to identify if the holes where there
> or not unless you knew the precise formulation... I think it even had
> a two-of-three challenge, ie, published 3 sets of s-boxes, one or two
> of which were "trapped" in this way, as a challenge for people to find
> methods of locating them. (The technical basis stops there -- the
> psychological or political question that follows is "did NSA/IBM know
> about this technique? Assuming they did, did they choose the s-boxes
> with or without holes?")

Could someone tell me what an s-box is?  Thanx in advance.
+-----------------------+-----------------------------+---------+
| J. Michael Diehl ;-)  | I thought I was wrong once. | PGP KEY |
| mdiehl@triton.unm.edu |   But, I was mistaken.      |available|
| mike.diehl@fido.org   |                             | Ask Me! |
| (505) 299-2282        +-----------------------------+---------+
|                                                               |
+------"I'm just looking for the opportunity to be -------------+
|            Politically Incorrect!"   <Me>                     |
+-----If codes are outlawed, only criminals wil have codes.-----+
+----Is Big Brother in your phone?  If you don't know, ask me---+




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: miron@extropia.wimsey.com (Miron Cuperman)
Date: Fri, 9 Jul 93 19:50:39 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: REMAILER: really anon?
In-Reply-To: <9307092121.AA24627@tamsun.tamu.edu>
Message-ID: <1993Jul10.015524.18877@extropia.wimsey.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Somebody writes:

>15: remail@extropia.wimsey.com 

>No response after 4 days

Tell me the originating email address, and I'll check the logs.

BTW, if you want error reporting, subscribe to the error list as described
earlier this week.

	Miron




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Timothy Newsham <newsham@wiliki.eng.hawaii.edu>
Date: Sat, 10 Jul 93 12:26:47 PDT
To: mdiehl@triton.unm.edu (J. Michael Diehl)
Subject: Re: encrypted email software
In-Reply-To: <9307100735.AA09015@triton.unm.edu>
Message-ID: <9307101926.AA08581@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> 
> 
> Could someone tell me what an s-box is?  Thanx in advance.


The Data Encryption Standard (any many other crypto systems devised
since) use a process of substitutions (replacing one block of bits
with another) and permutations (re-arranging the bits).  This process
is iterated a number of times and the key is mixed in at different
points.


    This R                                               This L
      |                                                      |
      v                                                      |
  [E Expansion]                                              |
      |                                                      |
      \                                                      |
        XOR <------------- key for this round (subkey)       |
         |                                                   |
     -----------------------------------                     |
     |   |    |     |    |    |   |    |                     |
     v   v    v     v    v    v   v    v                     |
  =========================================                  |
  | S1 | S2 | S3 | S4 | S5 | S6 | S7 | S8 |                  |
  =========================================                  |
     |   |    |    |    |    |    |    |                     |
     -----------------------------------                    /
                   |                                       /  
               [P Permutation]                            /
                   |                                     /
                   \____________________________________/__ 
                                       |               /   \
                                       v              /     \
                                      XOR <-----------       |
                                       v                     v
                                     Next R                Next L

This is the basic structure of DES (if I didnt make a mistake, this
is from memory).  Anyway the basic idea is you take half the key
(called L and R for Left and Right, but hey, I'm lysdexic).  You
put it through an expansion, this just mixes up the order of the
bits and duplicates a few of them.  Then you XOR it with the sub-key
(the Key Generator is not shown).  Then you split it up into 8 6-bit
chunks and do a table lookup in the S-boxes, each Sbox has 6 inputs
and 4 outputs.  Then you re-arrange the bits in the P permutation.
Finally you XOR that value with the L to get next R, and put the
pre-XOR'ed value into the next L.

This is 1 iteration and is done 16 times in DES, and 16*25 times in
crypt(3).  Crypt(3) also has the salt values which cause the swapping
of two bits in the E expansion for every salt bit that is set.  Before
pulling apart the 64 bit input into 2 32 bit halfs (L and R) the data
is passed through an Initial Permutation (IP), and at the end of the
whole thing passed through (IP^-1) its inverse (this permutation isnt
cryptographically that significant).  The subkeys are generated
by taking the input 56 bits of key, mixing them up and then successively
rotating those bits, and passing them through a permutation.  It outputs
48 bits of key each iteration to match the 48 bits after the E expansion.

I hope I didnt make too many mistakes in the above discussion, but
you get the general idea.

> +-----------------------+-----------------------------+---------+
> | J. Michael Diehl ;-)  | I thought I was wrong once. | PGP KEY |
> | mdiehl@triton.unm.edu |   But, I was mistaken.      |available|
> | mike.diehl@fido.org   |                             | Ask Me! |
> | (505) 299-2282        +-----------------------------+---------+
> |                                                               |
> +------"I'm just looking for the opportunity to be -------------+
> |            Politically Incorrect!"   <Me>                     |
> +-----If codes are outlawed, only criminals wil have codes.-----+
> +----Is Big Brother in your phone?  If you don't know, ask me---+




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Timothy Newsham <newsham@wiliki.eng.hawaii.edu>
Date: Sat, 10 Jul 93 12:35:48 PDT
To: jpp@markv.com
Subject: Re: Secure comm program, Sockets + LINK
In-Reply-To: <9307092314.aa24145@hermix.markv.com>
Message-ID: <9307101935.AA08791@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>   Meanwhile, I did peruse the LINK source and am a little unhappy with
> the actual protocol used in setting up the secure channel.  It is only
> authenticated in one direction, rather than both (as I understand
> it).  I would like to see two way authentication, and (perhaps)
> Diffe-Helman key exchange.

I assume you're talking about the link program I wrote.
If so:   I never really considered the RSA exchange as authentication
although it can be thought of that way I guess.  The reason for
the RSA part was primarily to exchange a private session key.  Only
one side initiates the key exchange because of a flaw in the 
implementation right now (if both send key exchange messages at the
exact same time, both ends will end up using different keys).
Even though only one end sends a message, both ends must "match up"
in that they must both have 1/2 of the RSA key (the "encryption"
and "decryption" or "public" and "private" keys).  Hence if they
end up with the same session key you can consider it a match and
hence a sort of authentication I guess.
If (when) I implement DH key exchange I guess I should add some
sort of authentication.
I would like to put DH exchange in but I havent seen (or really 
looked that hard :) for good DH source.  Anyone know of a fast
implementation that is public domain (or that I have permission
to use) and preferably available outside of the USA already?
 

> 
> j'
> 




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: jim@tadpole.com
Date: Sat, 10 Jul 93 03:08:23 PDT
To: jpp@markv.com
Subject: Re: Secure comm program, Sockets + LINK
Message-ID: <9307101007.AA22836@ono-sendai>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>   Supose you opened up a socket on the local machine.  And that you
> ran your usual telnet to connect to it.  The program listening on the
> local socket would be responsible for running one end of a 'LINK' like
> secure protocol.  It would connect to either the remote telnet socket,
> or a special purpose socket at the remote end.  There either you can
> use a pipe to a pty (standard telnet -> login shell -> LINK -> pty),
> or in a special socket through LINK out the telnet socket.  (There is
> an obvious extention with multiple hops through LINK-socket programs
> which should provide the same kind of anonymity that is provided by
> the CP remailers.)

This is the kind of thing which is just perfect for a streams-based
tty/networking environment.  Create a streams module that implements
Link and DH key excng.  Push it on your tty stream at both ends.  Works
over modems, telnet/rlogin, what-have-you.  A similar module could be
created to sit below the IP module in SVRx-based Un*xes.

>  It is also likely to be obsoleted as soon as secure-ip gets out.

And once the vendors for both endpoints update to it.  Could be a while.

>   Infact it would be nice to see some socket (perhaps 32?) become the
> standard for the secure telnet service.

I think it would be much better to develop something that will work with
the current port numbers, else we stand a good chance of asking for a 'new'
secure port foreach well-known service.  (Secure SMTP, Secure ftp-cmd, secure
ftp-data,...)

Jim




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: fergp@sytex.com (Paul Ferguson)
Date: Sat, 10 Jul 93 08:43:10 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Racal Datacryptor
Message-ID: <0L0g7B1w165w@sytex.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


While looking through my weekly snail after getting home last night, I
opened up a advertising card deck put together by Info Security News.
One particular advertisement got my attention, which I am going to
send for more technical information and perhaps a catalogue. (I have
used Racal-Datacom routing, bridging and mux equipment extensively,
and all-in-all, they're pretty solid boxes. Caveat: This point, however,
has no reflection on the quality of their s-boxes.)
 
Here is the complete text on the postcard:
 
"Encryption You Can Depend On!
 
Racal-Datacom, a world leader in data encryption, offers a full range
of high-quality Datacryptor (Registered Trademark) encryptors for use
in Government, Banking and Finance, R&D, and any application that
needs secure data transmissions!
 
Datacryptor highlights include:
 
- Automatic/manual key changes
- Generates and stores up to 400 keys
- Easy to manage and program
- Centarlized of front-panel operation
- Protects Dial-up, Leased Line, or Shared Packet Transmissions
- Up to E-1 rates
- DES and proprietary algorithms
- ANSI X9.17
- FED-STD 1027
- RSA Public Key
- And More!
 
For more information on Racal-Datacom Datacryptors, return this card
or call 1-800-RACAL-55."
 
The address (should anyone be interested) is:
 
Racal-Datacom
ATTN: Pre-Sales Support
155 Swanson Road
Boxborough, MA 01719-9980
 
(The small, black and white picture on the postcard reveals a small
box, not unlike an external modem, with two key-locks on the front
panel.)
 

Paul Ferguson               |  "Confidence is the feeling you get
Network Integrator          |   just before you fully understand
Centreville, Virginia USA   |   the problem."
fergp@sytex.com             |      - Murphy's 7th Law of Computing
 
               Quis Custodiet Ipsos Custodes?




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: wmo@rebma.rebma.mn.org (Bill O'Hanlon)
Date: Sun, 11 Jul 93 17:12:22 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: REMAILER: really anon?
Message-ID: <m0oEjrN-0002CnC@rebma.rebma.mn.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

> 
>  9: remailer@rebma.mn.org (this reply took almost 3+ days!)
> 
> From: nobody@rebma.rebma.mn.org
> Remailed-By: Mr. Nobody <remailer@rebma.mn.org>

A little background on my remailer...  My machine is connected to the net
at large via UUCP...  And I only have one phone line at home, which me and
the family share with the computer.  So it only polls out for mail when
we're asleep (22:30 CDT - 7:30 CDT).  And, I'll admit, when the weather gets
ugly enough here in Minnesota, the machine gets powered down to keep the
place cooler.

That's the disadvantage of the remailer at rebma.  The advantage is that since
I own the machine, the remailer will stay in operation, period.  (I think
my service provider does have a clause in the agreement that mentions that
use that prevents other users from getting service will not be tolerated,
but that's it.)

So, if you're looking for fast turnaround time, remailer@rebma.mn.org is not
for you.  If a long delay can be used as an advantage, more power to you.

- -Bill

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Version: 2.2

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b1AfCEgh3VJfEUmPFg3Ulmg6LtDCQ5EkYEFcrhdKHqa9edvm3xVFexodKwOPDzhL
tbTkxzdyiIk=
=cPEm
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From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: tango@world.std.com (john l dowrick)
Date: Sat, 10 Jul 93 12:04:42 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: unsubscribe
Message-ID: <199307101904.AA27017@world.std.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


tango@world.std.com




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: jpp@markv.com
Date: Sat, 10 Jul 93 19:59:58 PDT
To: newsham@wiliki.eng.hawaii.edu
Subject: Re: Secure comm program, Sockets + LINK
In-Reply-To: <9307101235.aa02134@hermix.markv.com>
Message-ID: <9307101959.aa26573@hermix.markv.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


	  Andrew			  Betty

    KCA=Initial key K0 in s/w       KCB=Initial key K0 in s/w
    KCB=Initial key K0 in s/w       KCA=Initial key K0 in s/w
    KCi= KCA + KCB                  KCi= KCA + KCB
    KCo= KCA + KCB                  KCo= KCA + KCB

    Use KCi for reading, and	    Use KCi for reading, and
    KCo for writeing to the         KCo for writeing to the
    chanell for a while             chanell for a while

    Requset a new sesion key        Requset a new sesion key
    DES(KCo,RSA(BP,K1A))            KRB=DES(KCo,RSA(AP,K1B))
            \_____________   ______________/
      KCi=KCA+KCB         \ /         KCi=KCB+KCA
      KCo=K1A+KCB          X	      KCo=K1B+KCA
             _____________/ \______________
            /                              \
    Sevice new key request
    TA=DES(KCi,KRB)
    K1B=RSA(AS,TA)
    KCi=K1A+K1B





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: jpp@markv.com
Date: Sat, 10 Jul 93 20:01:28 PDT
To: newsham@wiliki.eng.hawaii.edu
Subject: Re: Secure comm program, Sockets + LINK
In-Reply-To: <9307101235.aa02134@hermix.markv.com>
Message-ID: <9307101959.aa26576@hermix.markv.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


  Oops, ignore that previous message.  It got away from me (*blush*).
j'




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: eichin@cygnus.com (Mark Eichin)
Date: Sat, 10 Jul 93 20:45:09 PDT
To: uri@watson.ibm.com
Subject: encrypted email software
In-Reply-To: <9307110204.AA13167@buoy.watson.ibm.com>
Message-ID: <9307110345.AA10983@cygnus.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>> Well, first - I believe DES was designed with 64 bit keys in mind,
	and then they apparently discovered it to be sensitive to the
"sliding attack", ie. differential cryptanalysis...

>> While longer key indeed offers little protection against attacks
>> like differential cryptanalysis - it's hard to argue that it can
>> blow brute-force attack out of the water...  
	But isn't the idea differential cryptanalysis *can* blow
brute-force out of the water if the algorithm is sensitive to it, and
the symmetries that could be introduced by 64-bit DES keying might
have made it thus sensitive. It isn't just that extra key "offers
little protection", it might actually *weaken* the algorithm. (No, I'm
not an expert on DES, but I've followed the net, read the FIPS, read
Biham-Shamir, and thought about it a bit for myself.)
								_Mark_




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: uri@watson.ibm.com
Date: Sat, 10 Jul 93 19:05:03 PDT
To: honey@citi.umich.edu (peter honeyman)
Subject: Re: encrypted email software
In-Reply-To: <9307100144.AA14701@toad.com>
Message-ID: <9307110204.AA13167@buoy.watson.ibm.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


peter honeyman says:
> > still around about why it was changed from 64 bit to 56 bit,
> you mean 112 -> 56.  this has been resolved -- it seems that longer keys
> don't impose any additional complexity on des attacks.  although these
> attacks were discovered by the open crypto community only a few years ago,
> nsa had these techniques in hand long before.  the bottom line is that
> additional key bits would not make des more secure.  double des or triple
> des do.

Well, first - I believe DES was designed with 64 bit keys in mind,
and then due to some technical (unspecified :-) reasons he key was
shortened to 56 bits (and 56-bit version was submitted to NBS).

While longer key indeed offers little protection against attacks
like differential cryptanalysis - it's hard to argue that it can
blow brute-force attack out of the water...  And I'd be somewhat
more concerned about an adversary cracking my DES-encrypted mail
via brute force, than tapping my channel and collecting  2^45 of
plaintext-ciphertext pairs to deduce my  DES [randomly selected]
key (:-).

N'est pas?

> it has long been believed that a dedicated des-cracker is within the budget
> of extremely well financed organizations.

Well, of course a government (any government :-) could build such a
thing... After all, don't they get all those tax money? (:-)
--
Regards,
Uri         uri@watson.ibm.com      scifi!angmar!uri 	N2RIU
-----------
<Disclamer>





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: jpp@markv.com
Date: Sat, 10 Jul 93 22:48:54 PDT
To: newsham@wiliki.eng.hawaii.edu
Subject: Re: Secure comm program, Sockets + LINK
In-Reply-To: <9307101235.aa02134@hermix.markv.com>
Message-ID: <9307102248.aa04285@hermix.markv.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


   From: Timothy Newsham <newsham@wiliki.eng.hawaii.edu>

   I assume you're talking about the link program I wrote.

Yes, I was talking about your program Link.  

   If so:   I never really considered the RSA exchange as authentication
   although it can be thought of that way I guess.

Right.  The only person who can participate (on one side) of the
exchange is the one with the private key which matches the other
side's public key.  This does provide a weak level of authentication.
(An opponent can record 'authentication' sequences, and replay them
later.  For this to be usefull, the opponent will have to have
discovered the session key which is/was being selected by the
sequence.)

   If (when) I implement DH key exchange I guess I should add some
   sort of authentication.

I was concidering a different authentication, and secret session key
selection protocol (the one that got away :>).  It would only use RSA
(or any other suitable public key system) to sign and check
signatures, as well as encrypt and decrypt data.  No new number
theory.  However, it would require both parties to know the public key
of the other.

This sort of protocol would be ideal for logins.  Both parties
authenticate the other, and no-one else can read the channel.  No
passwords are ever transmitted over the channel either.

You and I use a "sum" (xor perhaps?) of our two key halves as the
session key.  At any time one of us can simultaneously request
changeing the sesion key, and chalange the identity of the other.

To do this, I send you a new key half encrypted under your public
key.  You respond with a signature of the resulting session key
encrypted under my public key.  We then start using the new sesion
key.  At this point both directions are authenticated, and observers
can't determin the new sesion key.

Things are complicated a little by the fact that all comunication is
done under a secret session key.  Things also become a bit more
complex because there may be data you sent before recieving my key
change request.

j'




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: jpp@markv.com
Date: Sat, 10 Jul 93 22:52:31 PDT
To: jim@tadpole.com
Subject: Re: Secure comm program, Sockets + LINK
In-Reply-To: <9307101007.AA22836@ono-sendai>
Message-ID: <9307102251.aa04501@hermix.markv.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I agree it is a cleaner design to use streams.  But I don't have
streams under windows :( so I am not very interested in working on
it.  I do have sockets though...

j'




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Carlos Macedo Gomes <remail@tamsun.tamu.edu>
Date: Sat, 10 Jul 93 22:24:09 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: REMAILER: really anon?
Message-ID: <9307110524.AA25281@tamsun.tamu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> If you can trace the origin (sender) of this message please send me mail
> personally rather than to the list.  I'm using my favorite remailer here
> and I want to make sure it's working right.  
[stuff deleted]
> My main curiosity in this quest is to determine what each header will look
> like when the mail is recieved.  I think this is important in determining
> which remailer to use.  
[stuff deleted]
> Thanks!
> -z
>  **Please take note of remailer 12 of this list.**
 
12: remail@tamsun.tamu.edu
 
> From: remail@tamsun.tamu.edu
> Remailed-By: Anonymous <remail@tamsun.tamu.edu>
> 
> Received: by tamsun.tamu.edu id AA04104
>   (5.65b/IDA-1.4.3 for you@yourhost); Tue, 6 Jul 93 04:15:57 -0500
> 
> you@yourhost = your address! ...really!
> 
> 13: remail@tamaix.tamu.edu 
> 
> From: remail@tamsun.tamu.edu
> Remailed-By: Anonymous <remail@tamsun.tamu.edu>
 
The remailed email from tamsun and tamaix have the same format, but you have
interpreted the headers incorrectly.  Please note that you@yourhost mentioned
above is not the sender's address but rather the recipients address.  You might
have been confused by this if you were sending and reading from the same
account.  The mail from tamsun and tamaix IS anonymous.  Take a look at this
piece of the header for your message to the cypherpunks list:
 
Received: by tamsun.tamu.edu id AA24627
  (5.65b/IDA-1.4.3 for cypherpunks@toad.com); Fri, 9 Jul 93 16:21:06 -0500
 
As you can see you@yourhost as you demarked in your message actually refers to
the recepient's address and not the sender's.  If I have misunderstood your
message, please excuse.  I just felt compelled to clear any doubts about the
anonymity of these two remailers.
 
Please feel free to reply to me personally if you'd like to get a close look at
the remailers.
 
ciao,
Carlos
 
--
[  Carlos Macedo Gomes          ][   Quis Costodiet     ][:    .8.    :]------
[  gomes@tamu.edu               ][    Ipsos Custodes?   ][   . ooo .   ]000000
[  cmghelp@tamsun.tamu.edu      ][     -----------	][ : =o(Y)o= : ]000000
[  PGP 2.2 key by finger        ][30 37 40 N, 96 20 03 W][oo .ooooo. oo]------
 





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: akcs.brendan@vpnet.chi.il.us (Sex, Drugs, and Rock and Roll)
Date: Sun, 11 Jul 93 09:07:39 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: No Subject
Message-ID: <m0oF3W5-0000GSC@vpnet.chi.il.us>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Unsubscribe




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Timothy Newsham <newsham@wiliki.eng.hawaii.edu>
Date: Sun, 11 Jul 93 15:08:06 PDT
To: jpp@markv.com
Subject: Re: Secure comm program, Sockets + LINK
In-Reply-To: <9307102248.aa04285@hermix.markv.com>
Message-ID: <9307112208.AA20350@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> 
>    From: Timothy Newsham <newsham@wiliki.eng.hawaii.edu>
> 
>    I assume you're talking about the link program I wrote.
> 
> Yes, I was talking about your program Link.  
> 
>    If so:   I never really considered the RSA exchange as authentication
>    although it can be thought of that way I guess.
> 
> Right.  The only person who can participate (on one side) of the
> exchange is the one with the private key which matches the other
> side's public key.  This does provide a weak level of authentication.
> (An opponent can record 'authentication' sequences, and replay them
> later.  For this to be usefull, the opponent will have to have
> discovered the session key which is/was being selected by the
> sequence.)

This is a matter of perspective.  You are thinking of the matching
keys as being 'public' and 'private'.  You can also think of them
both being half of a key, both being unknown to any third parties.
In such a case the mere possession of a matching key is a type of
authentication.   This because you only gave out one half to a
specific person in a private way, and you kept the other half for
yourself.

This is half way true in the sense of my link program but not
totally true, because both halves were generated on one machine
and one half transmitted (probably over an insecure channel) to
the remote.  This second key is secure in that it only got transfered
once and then exists in only one place that may be secure.  It is
insecure in that it might have been observed in that window of
vulnerability.  

Why is it that you want both sides to authenticate, btw?
In the case of a human<->human connection?
I can definitely add authentication (two way).




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: nate@VIS.ColoState.EDU (CVL staff member Nate Sammons)
Date: Sun, 11 Jul 93 14:28:24 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: PGPcompose, a mail wrapper
Message-ID: <9307112128.AA15649@vangogh.VIS.ColoState.EDU>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

CypherPunks,

I have been looking for a good mailer lately, or at least
a mail wrapper to sign and encrypt my mail easily.  I was
not completely satisfied with the wrappers that I could 
find, and especially since they mostly need perl.  So,
in a fit of frustration, I did what any good CypherPunk
would do: I wrote one.  It is called "PGPcompose" and 
if you invoke it with a username, it will prompt for 
the subject, open vi for editing, then ask you if you want
to sign the message, and encrypt it (either, or both),
then it asks for the key to use for encryption (if you choose
to encrypt the message).  It will then ask if you want to 
send, edit, or abort the message.  it uses /usr/ucb/mail
instead of sendmail, since I could not figure out how to
parse the ~/.mailrc file, and since it took less than 
a few hours to hack out.  Anyway, here it is, it's free,
so do whatever you want with it.

- ---------------------BEGIN PGPcompose-------------------
/* "PGPcompose" (comp) -- a replacement for the mail composition  */
/* program.  It allows for PGP signatures and encryption          */
/* for mail.  It asks for the ID of who the file is to be         */
/* encrypted for...  I did this because I have lots of            */
/* public keys, and some of the other mailers became              */
/* confused on occation and did not find the right key to         */
/* use for the encryption.  It also asks if you want to continue, */
/* abort or edit the message...                                   */
/*                                                                */
/* This software is free for the taking... if you modify it, send */
/* me the modification, since I'll be curious.                    */
/*        -nate sammons, July 11, 1993, nate@vis.colostate.edu    */


#include <stdio.h>

main(int argc, char *argv[])
{
	int intPID;
	int signMess, cryptMess;
	char subject[130];
	char cryptWho[100];
	char charPID[10];
	char theChoice[5];
	char messageName[100];
	char messageHeaderName[100];
	char messageCypherName[100];
	char commandLine[300];
	char scriptName[100];

	FILE *tmp;
	FILE *script;
	FILE *message;

	intPID = getpid();
        tmp = fopen("/tmp/PID.tmp", "w");
	fclose(tmp);
	tmp = fopen("/tmp/PID.tmp", "a");
        fprintf(tmp, "%d", intPID);
	fclose(tmp);
	tmp = fopen("/tmp/PID.tmp", "r");
	fscanf(tmp, "%s", charPID);
        fclose(tmp);

	strcpy(messageName, "/tmp/message.tmp.");
	strcat(messageName, charPID);
	strcpy(messageCypherName, "/tmp/message.cypher.");
	strcat(messageCypherName, charPID);
	strcpy(scriptName, "/tmp/message.script.");
	strcat(scriptName, charPID);

	message = fopen(messageName, "w");

	switch(argc)
	{
	case 2: printf("PGPcompose, (c)1993 Nate Sammons\n");
		printf("Subject: ");
		gets(subject);

		editIt:
                strcpy(commandLine, "vi ");
                strcat(commandLine, messageName);
                system(commandLine);

                signIt:
                printf("Sign this message? [y,n] : ");
                gets(theChoice);
                switch(theChoice[0])
                {
                case 'y':
                case 'Y': signMess = 1;
                        break;
                case 'n':
                case 'N': signMess = 0;
                        break;
                default: goto signIt;
                        break;
                }

                cryptIt:
                printf("Encrypt this message? [y,n] : ");
                gets(theChoice);
                cypherWithWho:
                switch(theChoice[0])
                {
                case 'y':
                case 'Y': printf("  With whose key? : ");
                        gets(cryptWho);
                        if (cryptWho[1] == NULL)
			{
                                goto cypherWithWho;
			}
                        cryptMess = 1;
                        break;
                case 'n':
                case 'N': cryptMess = 0;
                        break;
                default: goto cryptIt;
                }

		Continue:
		printf("send, abort, edit? : ");
		gets(theChoice);
		switch(theChoice[0])
		{
		case 's':
		case 'S': goto sendIt;
		case 'a':
		case 'A': system("/bin/rm -rf /tmp/message*");
			system("/bin/rm -rf /tmp/PID.tmp");
			exit(0);
		case 'e':
		case 'E': goto editIt;
		default: goto Continue;
		}

		sendIt:
                if((signMess == 1) && (cryptMess == 1))
                {
		script = fopen(scriptName, "w");
                fprintf(script, "cat %s | pgp -feast +clearsig=on \"%s\" > %s\n", messageName, cryptWho, messageCypherName);
		fclose(script);
		strcpy(commandLine, "chmod +x ");
		strcat(commandLine, scriptName);
		system(commandLine);
		system(scriptName);
		script = fopen(scriptName, "w");
		fprintf(script, "cat %s | /usr/ucb/mail -s \"%s\" %s", messageCypherName, subject, argv[1]); 
		fclose(script);
		system(commandLine);
		system(scriptName);
                }

                if((signMess == 1) && (cryptMess == 0))
                {
		script = fopen(scriptName, "w");
		fprintf(script, "cat %s | pgp -fast +clearsig=on > %s\n", messageName, messageCypherName);
		fclose(script);
		strcpy(commandLine, "chmod +x ");
		strcat(commandLine, scriptName);
		system(commandLine);
		system(scriptName);
		script = fopen(scriptName, "w");
		fprintf(script, "cat %s | /usr/ucb/mail -s \"%s\" %s", messageCypherName, subject, argv[1]);
		fclose(script);
		system(commandLine);
		system(scriptName);
                }

                if((signMess == 0) && (cryptMess == 1))
                {
		script = fopen(scriptName, "w");
		fprintf(script, "cat %s | pgp -fea \"%s\" > %s\n", messageName, cryptWho, messageCypherName);
		fclose(script);
		strcpy(commandLine, "chmod +x ");
		strcat(commandLine, scriptName);
		system(commandLine);
		system(scriptName);
		script = fopen(scriptName, "w");
		fprintf(script, "cat %s | /usr/ucb/mail -s \"%s\" %s", messageCypherName, subject, argv[1]);
		fclose(script);
		system(commandLine);
		system(scriptName);
                }

                if((signMess == 0) && (cryptMess == 0))
                {
		script = fopen(scriptName, "w");
		fprintf(script, "cat %s | /usr/ucb/mail -s \"%s\" %s", messageName, subject, argv[1]);
		fclose(script);
		strcpy(commandLine, "chmod +x ");
		strcat(commandLine, scriptName);
		system(commandLine);
		system(scriptName);
                }
		system("/bin/rm -rf /tmp/message*");
		system("/bin/rm -rf /tmp/PID.tmp");
		break;
	default: printf("Useage: comp username\n");
		exit(0);
	}
}

- ---------------------END PGPcompose---------------------

- -nate sammons
+--------------------------------------------------------------------
| Nate Sammons   email: nate@VIS.ColoState.Edu
|      Colorado State University Computer Visualization Laboratory
|      Finger me at nate@monet.VIS.ColoState.Edu for my PGP key
|  #include <std.disclaimer>
|  "I have but one single desire - to tear down the sky" -A. Toomba
+----------------------+

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.3

iQCVAgUBLECF4NTgi1fmrpxlAQGhbgP6AiZCyU2+qf5O06r3mE1JB4XWDocuK175
CO/HJU/8+QekgBG7+6PewERnqLt0pVPuTVmdWkHJyQ+VJyrPRiDlWzI7G2yJqwvG
sTCI9CT6cHbp0jBRzQhj48SFcN+Gr+nZ06Nc8/93X7/+QGZVtz+0MMTFXz8oVcEe
TWYeBNkXhDg=
=P0IW
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: jet@nas.nasa.gov (J. Eric Townsend)
Date: Sun, 11 Jul 93 17:09:04 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: security vs. PINE
In-Reply-To: <Pine.3.05.9307111733.A26652-a100000@eris.cs.umb.edu>
Message-ID: <9307120008.AA20041@boxer.nas.nasa.gov>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


me writes:
 > to the SMTP server _directly_, bypassing sendmail (and its security checks).
[...]
 >  Coming down the pike though, I see SMTP, maybe even NNTP protocols being
 > secured (check out the magazine someone mentioned earlier: INFO-SECURITY.
 > You just have to fill out a bingo card to get it, Write:INFO-SECURITY NEWS
 > 498 Concord St, Framingham MA 01701-2357). If that happens, the days of EZ
 > phreaking are over.....

I think that avoiding security avoids the real problem.

Many gov't agencies are swinging away from wide open SMTP in an effort
to find something that has security and authentication.  Having some
boffo mailer that bypasses sendmail does no good in such a case.





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: me <root@Cloud.Cuckoo.Land>
Date: Sun, 11 Jul 93 14:26:18 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: PINE
Message-ID: <Pine.3.05.9307111733.A26652-a100000@eris.cs.umb.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain




  One of the many neat features of PINE is that it allows one to talk
to the SMTP server _directly_, bypassing sendmail (and its security checks).
What this means is that instead of doing a  "telnet xxxx smtp", you can
build and configure a PINE client to do it for you, and retain all the
nice features. PINE source code is freely available, and does not require
root privs to run (any more than it requires root privs to "telnet xxx smtp").
The pine executable does take up a Meg and a half though, which could be a
problem for folks without a lot of space to play with.
 Coming down the pike though, I see SMTP, maybe even NNTP protocols being
secured (check out the magazine someone mentioned earlier: INFO-SECURITY.
You just have to fill out a bingo card to get it, Write:INFO-SECURITY NEWS
498 Concord St, Framingham MA 01701-2357). If that happens, the days of EZ
phreaking are over.....



			





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: uri@watson.ibm.com
Date: Sun, 11 Jul 93 14:44:38 PDT
To: eichin@cygnus.com (Mark Eichin)
Subject: Re: encrypted email software
In-Reply-To: <9307110345.AA10983@cygnus.com>
Message-ID: <9307112144.AA13032@buoy.watson.ibm.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Mark Eichin says:
> >> While longer key indeed offers little protection against attacks
> >> like differential cryptanalysis - it's hard to argue that it can
> >> blow brute-force attack out of the water...
> 	But isn't the idea differential cryptanalysis *can* blow
> brute-force out of the water if the algorithm is sensitive to it, and
> the symmetries that could be introduced by 64-bit DES keying might
> have made it thus sensitive. It isn't just that extra key "offers
> little protection", it might actually *weaken* the algorithm. (No, I'm
> not an expert on DES, but I've followed the net, read the FIPS, read
> Biham-Shamir, and thought about it a bit for myself.)

Well, to the best of my knowledge, "sliding attack" does NOT
care about the length of a key - because it deduces the
subkeys DIRECTLY. This means - one doesn't WEAKEN an
algorithm by increasing the key length, it just
doesn't help against "sliding attack"...

And in order to pull out this "sliding attack" one HAS to
have either enough of PLAINTEXT-CIPHERTEXT pairs, or even
better - to be able to run CHOSEN-PLAINTEXT attack.   How
much are you afraid of such an attack against your e-mail?
[Assuming you use one-time RSA-encrypted DES key, of
course :-]
--
Regards,
Uri         uri@watson.ibm.com      scifi!angmar!uri 	N2RIU
-----------
<Disclamer>


From cypherpunks-request  Sun Jul 11 20:17:07 1993



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: J. Michael Diehl <mdiehl@triton.unm.edu>
Date: Sun, 11 Jul 93 20:11:59 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Radical Paranoia?
Message-ID: <9307120311.AA07241@triton.unm.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


     I'm having a philisophical problem reguarding when to sign someone
else's public key.  
 
     Obviously, if you watch someone generate a key, and they physicaly hand
you a copy of it, you should sign it.  Fortunately, life has been this good
to me about 5 times.  But what if life isn't so good?
 
     Lets say someone emails me a key and the return address matches that of
the address in the key.  Do I assume no one is spoofing me?  You have to
admit that this is possible albeit unlikely.  What good is key certification
if it only "probably valid?"  I've noticed that many of the keys on the
server are signed with the same person's key.  I doubt that these people
have had physical contact with each of the people who's key that they've
signed.  Am I just being paranoid, or is there a valid issue here?  I
welcome any of your comments.
 
+-----------------------+-----------------------------+---------+
| J. Michael Diehl ;-)  | I thought I was wrong once. | PGP KEY |
| mdiehl@triton.unm.edu |   But, I was mistaken.      |available|
| mike.diehl@fido.org   |                             | Ask Me! |
| (505) 299-2282        +-----------------------------+---------+
|                                                               |
+------"I'm just looking for the opportunity to be -------------+
|            Politically Incorrect!"   <Me>                     |
+-----If codes are outlawed, only criminals wil have codes.-----+
+----Is Big Brother in your phone?  If you don't know, ask me---+




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: greg@ideath.goldenbear.com (Greg Broiles)
Date: Mon, 12 Jul 93 00:27:08 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: SMTP, PINE, and security
Message-ID: <ZBBk7B1w164w@ideath.goldenbear.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

me <uunet!Cloud.Cuckoo.Land!root> writes:

>   One of the many neat features of PINE is that it allows one to talk
> to the SMTP server _directly_, bypassing sendmail (and its security checks).
> What this means is that instead of doing a  "telnet xxxx smtp", you can
> build and configure a PINE client to do it for you, and retain all the
> nice features. PINE source code is freely available, and does not require
> root privs to run (any more than it requires root privs to "telnet xxx smtp")
[stuff deleted]
> If that happens, the days of EZ phreaking are over.....

I dunno; if things change such that it's considered normal for users to
connect to local or outside SMTP and NNTP ports, that would seem to create
an convenient smokescreen/excuse for folks who use those ports for their
own (non-approved) ends. It'll be a lot harder to look through a log for
unknown connections.

See the discussion on comp.dcom.telecom about how difficult it is to
provide authentication of cellular phones and fraud prevention, while
allowing people to buy new phones easily, roam, and do all of that
other stuff that people do. I think the SMTP/NNTP/PINE/whatever stuff
is very similar - I think it may prove so difficult to truly authenticate
unknown and untraceable users that people will turn to other means for
identifying a few trusted machines/people/processes. Public-key crypto,
perhaps? :) Security and convenience are basically incompatible; I'm hoping
that we opt for convenience.


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.3

iQCVAgUBLEEIfn3YhjZY3fMNAQGVfwQAoestrAnd168C061KVqb+znRBFNoAIS1k
Ic7JtsVxzj9xaFc5v5nKDUgHD4g47ulTyc1jqEFKmUjfqfal5xZVhN+/4wHFaN0v
2gNbYByvd7/QL685+lkGGkFr1ff7qTdWqVk5LV6b4fRyhJcTHIH48x/55QO0Oo3y
DYdA6GDuChk=
=SOFw
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

--
Greg Broiles                            greg@goldenbear.com
Golden Bear Computer Consulting         +1 503 465 0325
Box 12005 Eugene OR 97440               BBS: +1 503 687 7764




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: edgar@spectrx.Saigon.COM (Edgar W. Swank)
Date: Mon, 12 Jul 93 02:54:22 PDT
To: Cypherpunks          <cypherpunks@toad.com>
Subject: "Data Haven" def
Message-ID: <7wBk7B6w165w@spectrx.saigon.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Patrick E. Hykkonen Inquired:

    Could someone please define a 'data haven'?  I understand digitial
    cash, it is exactly what it sounds like.  However, in the context
    I've heard data haven used in, then there is much more than simply
    keeping one's data encrypted on your local hard drive.

Webster's Seventh New Coll. Dict.:

    Haven: 1: HARBOR, PORT  2: A place of safety  :ASYLUM

My analysis:

A "data haven" is some entity where data can be placed and have some
assurance against either accidental or deliberate destruction.

Encrypted data on your hard disk is safe enough against -disclosure-,
but is very vulnerable to destruction, either accidental or
deliberate.

Certain individuals and governments have such strong views on certain
forms of data that they will destroy them if they even suspect
encryption is hiding such data.

A data haven would ensure such data could not be destroyed without
permission of its owner. The owner might or might not permit
distribution of the data either free or for a fee.

Examples of data at risk for deliberate destruction:

Pornography, especially child ponography.  According to recent news,
a BBS in Denmark (Holland?) may be a data haven for that.

Politically incorrect programs.  For example, the German government is
trying (and may have succeeded) to destroy all copies of a game
program called "Concentration Camp Commander".  This was on the news a
few months ago.

The USA would be a data haven for this program, generally speaking,
since as political speach it would be protected by the First
Amendment. (But I don't know if any copies have ever made it here; I
net-chat with a few people in Europe & none of them have ever heard of
it.)

--
edgar@spectrx.saigon.com (Edgar W. Swank)
SPECTROX SYSTEMS +1.408.252.1005  Cupertino, Ca





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Paul Goggin <chaos@aql.gatech.edu>
Date: Sun, 11 Jul 93 22:08:34 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com (Cryptoanarchists are Us)
Subject: RE: Radical Paranoia?
Message-ID: <9307120508.AA01947@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain




>Lets say someone emails me a key and the return address matches that of
>the address in the key.  Do I assume no one is spoofing me?  You have to
>admit that this is possible albeit unlikely.  What good is key certification
>if it only "probably valid?"  I've noticed that many of the keys on the
>server are signed with the same person's key.  I doubt that these people
>have had physical contact with each of the people who's key that they've
>signed.  Am I just being paranoid, or is there a valid issue here?  I
>welcome any of your comments.

I understand your precaution and problem very well. I have had similar fears.
Recently, I was in similar situation recently. I wanted to exchange keys
with someone I have met only once. The situation as it arose actually ended
up working okay. We exchanged keys after encrypting them with the normal
encryption option, with a password being someone at the place we meet.
Knowledge common to only a few select people. Then we started a talk session
at a prescribed time at the relevant addresses and tried to rely on information
specific dialogue to verify one's person as the one in question. Without
physically being there this seems like at least a little extra security.
As to the broader question you are really asking on verification I am unsure
on how it can be solved. Obviously my situation was unique that we had met
and could decide on an information basis, that would seemingly be hard to
duplicate, but this is not always available.

Paul
--
R  O    All Comments Copyright by  | Technofetisht
 A  N     Paul S. Goggin (1993)    | Cypher, Cyber, Chaos              
  V        Information Broker      | Ergoflux, Interzone
   E      chaos@aql.gatech.edu     | Carpe Diem: Stop the Clipper wiretap chip 
Finger account for latest _Phrack_ | Public Key: PGP and RIPEM available
      For anonymous communication:---> anonymus+4744@charcoal.com
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Title 18 USC 2511 and 18 USC 2703 Protected -- Monitoring Absolutely Forbidden




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: wcs@anchor.ho.att.com
Date: Sun, 11 Jul 93 23:24:44 PDT
To: mdiehl@triton.unm.edu
Subject: Re:  Radical Paranoia?
Message-ID: <9307120625.AA13929@anchor.ho.att.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text


Email is *not* enough.  Easily forged, easily intercepted, not secure.
This mail could be coming from me, it could be coming from the NSA,
it could be my cat jumping on my keyboard's function keys triggering
emacs form-letter-mode.  No way to tell.  Cat already dumped my password and
modem dialcodes into this mail message, and he's still pretty young :-)

Building and maintaining a web of trust means we're all responsible for
signing keys carefully, and making sure people know how careful our 
signatures are.  Read through the READMEs a couple more times until
you really understand the procedures!  

My view is that you should only sign a key if you really *know* that the
person whose key your signing is that person and you've verified with them
that you've got the right key.  If somebody *you recognize* hands you 
their key, fine - I recognize about 10 or so well-known cypherpunks that
I could do this with (plus other people who might be interested but
aren't verbose contributors here :-)  On the other hand, if Vesselin
Bontchev asked me to sign his key, I wouldn't do it, because I don't
know him by sight, unless somebody I know knows him personally introduced us.
If somebody you know by *voice* wants you to sign their key,
you'd better at least have a voice telephone call with them where you
read key fingerprints over the phone.  This is how I had Phil sign my key,
and there are 3-4 others here I could probably do this with if I wanted.

When you're adding people to your PGP keyring, pgp asks you how well
you trust people to sign keys.  You can trust me to do that much for
identifying people, but on the other hand I've got a diskless workstation
as the only thing I have that can do PGP until I get it on my wife's laptop,
so you can't trust that my keyring hasn't been hacked -- that's why
my pgp userid says "multiuser" in it. I really won't feel comfortable
signing keys until I've got a secure system and we've got an RSAREF
implementation that makes use of RSA kosher.

If you're likely to sign keys for people you don't really know well,
such as giving out starter PGP floppies at a trade show or rave or something,
I suppose you could generate a separate key/userid that says it's not 
very secure, signed by your regular key,
but do try to at least check easily-forged ID like driver's licenses
for people you don't know, and encourage them to generate real keys
and get them signed by people that *they* really know.  It's not ideal;
do people feel that's acceptable to get people initial connections?

				Bill 
# Bill Stewart    wcs@anchor.ho.att.com  +1-908-949-0705 Fax-4876
# AT&T Bell Labs, Room 4M-312, Crawfords Corner Rd, Holmdel, NJ  07733-3030




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: M..Stirner@f28.n125.z1.FIDONET.ORG (M. Stirner)
Date: Mon, 12 Jul 93 04:06:19 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Remailer test
Message-ID: <1032.2C414356@shelter.FIDONET.ORG>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Just a quick note to say that I sent out a packet of tests for the
remailers via the RBBSnet UUCP gate following the standard Cypherpunks
form:

To: remailer@some.place.edu

::
Request-Remailing-To: me@my.address.com

This is a test of the ... remailer...

I sent this message to each of the following:

hh@pmantis.berkeley.edu
hh@cicada.berkeley.edu
hh@soda.berkeley.edu
phantom@mead.u.washington.edu
00x@uclink.berkeley.edu
remailer@utter.dis.org

I received the test message via the remailer@utter.dis.org quickly &
without problems.  I have yet to get the other messages, nearly a week
later.  With the exception of remailer@utter.dis.org, all of these have
been habitually unresponsive to regular tests.  I have been able to get
the soda remaier to work once, & with the efforts of the remailer
operator, was able to get the phantom remailer to work once.

I have been unable to get the anonymus+info@charcoal.com remailer to
accept mail after some six attempts.  The Charcoal daemon bounces back
the messages as coming to an unknown addressee.

The Extropia PGPed remailer seems to work well, as does the
hal@alumni.caltech.edu remailer.  Nearly everything else seems very
iffy.

Which remailers claim to be able to mail directly to newsgroups?

*********************************************************************
* <m..stirner@f28.n125.z1.fidonet.org> - PGP Key D30909 via servers *
* > What country can preserve its liberties if its rulers are not  <*
* > warned from time to time that their people preserve the spirit <*
* > of resistance?  Let them take arms!" - Thomas Jefferson, 1787  <*
*********************************************************************


... Starve a feeding bureaucrat, vote Libertarian.
___ Blue Wave/QWK v2.12
--  
M. Stirner - via FidoNet node 1:125/1
UUCP: ...!uunet!kumr!shelter!28!M..Stirner
INTERNET: M..Stirner@f28.n125.z1.FIDONET.ORG




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: nate@VIS.ColoState.EDU (CVL staff member Nate Sammons)
Date: Mon, 12 Jul 93 06:55:49 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Help!  not getting any CypherPunk mail!
Message-ID: <9307121355.AA16591@vangogh.VIS.ColoState.EDU>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

Help!

I am not getting any mail from the CypherPunks mailing list, 
although my posts are apparently getting through OK.
Please help!

thanks,

- -nate sammons

+--------------------------------------------------------------------
| Nate Sammons   email: nate@VIS.ColoState.Edu
|      Colorado State University Computer Visualization Laboratory
|      Finger me at nate@monet.VIS.ColoState.Edu for my PGP key
|  #include <std.disclaimer>
|  "I have but one single desire - to tear down the sky" -A. Toomba
+----------------------+

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.3

iQCVAgUBLEFtRtTgi1fmrpxlAQFzyAP8C6V9nVURq13bPYPa+FPnCFiYc71wAKKI
o+t1HGdcylMuY24lKk+UhI2yEMO/JEyqDYJnpeOV6kn+izfx4OyrWLVmN7rYD4Nf
Yr8wb18+3Zd9cFPsn6QwSLzd/2XVY+tmzrIMwVShmgIAl2gobuScey+q7JBK3j8X
ImzeUJF20Hw=
=Y2eB
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: elee9sf@Menudo.UH.EDU
Date: Mon, 12 Jul 93 06:10:56 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Remailer test
In-Reply-To: <1032.2C414356@shelter.FIDONET.ORG>
Message-ID: <199307121310.AA20979@Menudo.UH.EDU>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



M..Stirner@f28.n125.z1.fidonet.org (M. Stirner) wrote

> I received the test message via the remailer@utter.dis.org quickly &
> without problems.  I have yet to get the other messages, nearly a week
> later.  With the exception of remailer@utter.dis.org, all of these have
> been habitually unresponsive to regular tests.  I have been able to get
> the soda remaier to work once, & with the efforts of the remailer
> operator, was able to get the phantom remailer to work once.

Hm...something funny is going on here.  I test the remailers about
once every other week and generally here from all of them!  Can I try
sending mail to you through each remailer?  Maybe this will help
figure out the ones which can't reach you. 

> Which remailers claim to be able to mail directly to newsgroups?

As far as I know, none of the remailers mail directly to newsgroups.
But, you can have them remail to an email-to-usenet gateway like
group-name@cs.utexas.edu.  There are others (pws.bull.com, decwrl's,
demon); I'll find my list and send it.

/-----------------------------------\
| Karl L. Barrus                    |
| elee9sf@menudo.uh.edu             | <- preferred address
| barrus@tree.egr.uh.edu (NeXTMail) |
\-----------------------------------/




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: dmandl@lehman.com (David Mandl)
Date: Mon, 12 Jul 93 06:02:30 PDT
To: jet@nas.nasa.gov
Subject: Re: anonymous mail
Message-ID: <9307121301.AA06341@disvnm2.shearson.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> From: jet@nas.nasa.gov (J. Eric Townsend)
> 
> nobody@entropy.linet.org writes:
>  >  that somebody can get fired for views expressed in a private
>  > e-list, which probably extrapolates to USENET posting as well.
>  > Apparently, Mr. Steshenko forgot to include the "disclaimer: my
>  > opinions" with his email.  
> 
> Apparently, Mr. Steshenko thought it was appropriate to use company
> resources for non-company activities.  On top of that, those
> activities misrepresented the company.
> 
> Steshenko's firing is something all the libertarians on this list
> should applaud.

This "libertarian" (note small "l"--if you mean "Libertarian," you should
be more careful in the future) doesn't "applaud" Mr. S's firing.  What a
stupid thing to say.  You should either be fried by your more humane
Libertarian colleagues, or (if there is general agreement with your message),
you should be declared the Missing Link that some of us have been searching
for for years.  This is so typical.  If the State had pulled something like
this, you'd be screaming your head off, but when a "private" corporation does
it, you not only don't protest, but actually cheer them on?  This is just the
kind of rigid, stupid, pro-authoritarian thinking that many people expect from
the more zomboid Libs, though we rarely get to see anyone display it so
candidly.

Looking at your email address, I notice that you're an employee of mine.  I
strongly disapprove of your using this ID for your own leisure activities.
However, I'm a nice guy, so I'll give you, oh, two more chances.  Then, you're
out of here.

Direct all flames anywhere but dmandl@panix.com or dmandl@lehman.com.

   --Dave.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: jet@nas.nasa.gov (J. Eric Townsend)
Date: Mon, 12 Jul 93 09:57:29 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: SMTP, PINE, and security
In-Reply-To: <ZBBk7B1w164w@ideath.goldenbear.com>
Message-ID: <9307121629.AA24751@boxer.nas.nasa.gov>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Greg Broiles writes:
 > I dunno; if things change such that it's considered normal for users to
 > connect to local or outside SMTP and NNTP ports, that would seem to create

This assumes that the gateways at one's sites will pass stuff on these
ports from non-authorized hosts.  True, one could go to different
ports on a relay box, but that's a bit more complicated than what the
'average user' is willing to put up with.





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: jet@nas.nasa.gov (J. Eric Townsend)
Date: Mon, 12 Jul 93 09:38:57 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: anonymous mail
In-Reply-To: <9307121301.AA06341@disvnm2.shearson.com>
Message-ID: <9307121638.AA24768@boxer.nas.nasa.gov>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



First off, I'm not a [l,L]ibertarian.  For the most part, I've found
them to be closeted Amway salesdroids who give lip service to civil
rights and who are only interested in their 'right' to make as much
money as possible at the expense of everyone else's rights.

Most of my exposure to [l,L]ibertarianism has been in Texas, however,
so maybe there's hope for the party as a whole.

David Mandl writes:
>If the State had pulled something like
>this, you'd be screaming your head off, but when a "private" corporation does
>it, you not only don't protest, but actually cheer them on?  This is just the

Saying that 'group <x> should be happy' is not cheering on anyone.
Get a clue.

 > Looking at your email address, I notice that you're an employee of mine.  I

Actually, I'm an employee of Computer Sciences Corporation.

 > strongly disapprove of your using this ID for your own leisure activities.

What makes you think this is 'leisure activity'?





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: dmandl@lehman.com (David Mandl)
Date: Mon, 12 Jul 93 06:50:48 PDT
To: mdiehl@triton.unm.edu
Subject: Re: Radical Paranoia?
Message-ID: <9307121350.AA06834@disvnm2.shearson.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> From: J. Michael Diehl <mdiehl@triton.unm.edu>
> 
>      Lets say someone emails me a key and the return address matches that of
> the address in the key.  Do I assume no one is spoofing me?  You have to
> admit that this is possible albeit unlikely.  What good is key certification
> if it only "probably valid?"  I've noticed that many of the keys on the
> server are signed with the same person's key.  I doubt that these people
> have had physical contact with each of the people who's key that they've
> signed.  Am I just being paranoid, or is there a valid issue here?  I
> welcome any of your comments.

Anything is possible.  It's best to play it VERY safe when it comes to
certifying or accepting keys.  The ideal thing is to accept only keys
that have been signed by a key you know to be good.  Start with a key
that's been handed to you personally (or that you are absolutely certain
is legit), and work from there.

Some folks (bless them) have signed oodles of keys and are very trustworthy;
if you can work through the web to them eventually (being careful along
the way about who you trust as a certifier), you'll eventually have a windfall.

No, most people on the public servers have probably not met face to face;
they've worked their way to each other using trusted signatures and certifiers.
Just be careful about who you trust.

   --Dave.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: nate@VIS.ColoState.EDU (CVL staff member Nate Sammons)
Date: Mon, 12 Jul 93 08:51:38 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: please send cypherpunk mail to me at
Message-ID: <9307121551.AA17109@vangogh.VIS.ColoState.EDU>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

Please send the CP mail to me at nate@vangogh.vis.colostate.edu

I am having problems getting the CP mail forwarded to me,
and this may very well help.

thanks,

- -nate

+--------------------------------------------------------------------
| Nate Sammons   email: nate@VIS.ColoState.Edu
|      Colorado State University Computer Visualization Laboratory
|      Finger me at nate@monet.VIS.ColoState.Edu for my PGP key
|  #include <std.disclaimer>
|  "I have but one single desire - to tear down the sky" -A. Toomba
+----------------------+

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.3

iQCVAgUBLEGIb9Tgi1fmrpxlAQFMOwP9Gq8DUzldiPDSfRRrlBCjRKBAyXU9fZ8z
6wOBelKJqVNHwgDBOMDkgKWe0iSwANT1/yJ0szcOZmERT9pod75HGzHtDogNGyfL
4ZjrqVCtAA95Y+HnyTfGQ7Ej86NEqRaN8F+hE7ZqwurtCYBf3Ag0jES4iI/YvjbN
bSPpjSPItPA=
=PkJT
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: M..Stirner@f28.n125.z1.FIDONET.ORG (M. Stirner)
Date: Mon, 12 Jul 93 14:28:50 PDT
To: Cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Mailer tests
Message-ID: <1040.2C41D6C6@shelter.FIDONET.ORG>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Just a quick note to say that I sent out a packet of tests for the remailers via the RBBSnet UUCP gate following the standard Cypherpunks form:

To: remailer@some.place.edu

::
Request-Remailing-To: me@my.address.com

This is a test of the ... remailer...

I sent this message to each of the following:

hh@pmantis.berkeley.edu
hh@cicada.berkeley.edu
hh@soda.berkeley.edu
phantom@mead.u.washington.edu
00x@uclink.berkeley.edu
remailer@utter.dis.org

I received the test message via the remailer@utter.dis.org quickly & without problems.  I have yet to get the other messages, nearly a week later.  With the exception of remailer@utter.dis.org, all of these have been habitually unresponsive to regular tests.  I have been able to get the soda remaier to work once, & with the efforts of the remailer operator, was able to get the phantom remailer to work once.

I have been unable to get the anonymus+info@charcoal.com remailer to accept mail after some six attempts.  The Charcoal daemon bounces back the messages as coming to an unknown addressee.

The Extropia PGPed remailer seems to work well, as does the hal@alumni.caltech.edu remailer.  Nearly everything else seems very iffy.

Which remailers claim to be able to mail directly to newsgroups?

********************************************************************* * <m..stirner@f28.n125.z1.fidonet.org> - PGP Key D30909 via servers *
* > What country can preserve its liberties if its rulers are not  <*
* > warned from time to time that their people preserve the spirit <*
* > of resistance?  Let them take arms!" - Thomas Jefferson, 1787  <* ********************************************************************* ___ Blue Wave/QWK v2.12
--  
M. Stirner - via FidoNet node 1:125/1
UUCP: ...!uunet!kumr!shelter!28!M..Stirner
INTERNET: M..Stirner@f28.n125.z1.FIDONET.ORG




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: J. Michael Diehl <mdiehl@triton.unm.edu>
Date: Mon, 12 Jul 93 19:29:28 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: pgp patent.
Message-ID: <9307130229.AA20226@triton.unm.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Hi all, just a quick question.  Exactly when does the patent expire which
will make pgp legal?  Enquiring minds want to know? ;^)
+-----------------------+-----------------------------+---------+
| J. Michael Diehl ;-)  | I thought I was wrong once. | PGP KEY |
| mdiehl@triton.unm.edu |   But, I was mistaken.      |available|
| mike.diehl@fido.org   |                             | Ask Me! |
| (505) 299-2282        +-----------------------------+---------+
|                                                               |
+------"I'm just looking for the opportunity to be -------------+
|            Politically Incorrect!"   <Me>                     |
+-----If codes are outlawed, only criminals wil have codes.-----+
+----Is Big Brother in your phone?  If you don't know, ask me---+




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: J. Michael Diehl <mdiehl@triton.unm.edu>
Date: Mon, 12 Jul 93 19:30:41 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: xor data hiding?
Message-ID: <9307130230.AA20305@triton.unm.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


     I heard something interesting which made me think. (gasp)  
 
     I heard that if you encrypt a file with the xor encryption alg.
multiple times with different keys, you get an encrypted file with a
coorisponding effective key which has some interesting properties.  The key
in such a system would have a length equal to the Least Common Multiple of
the lengths of the original key.  So, if you used keys of length
1,2,3,5,7,11,13, you would have an effective key-length of 30,030 bytes!  Of
course, you could use more than one 5-byte key if you wanted, and some of
the bytes should be greater than 127.
 
     Not knowing any better, it occurs to me that given a 30,030 byte key,
and the task of finding the original keys that make it up, (if any)  I'd be
out of luck.  It would seem that "factoring" this large key into smaller
keys would be a tough job...perhapse almost as hard as the factoring problem
in a finite group?  
 
     Brute-force and known plaintext attacks are possible, but lets forget
that for (just) a moment.  If someone DID find the required 30,030 bytes
required to read your massage, you could just as easily show them another
30,030 bytes which would  decode the message into the U.S. Bill of Rights if
you wanted to.  You could keep such One Time Pads laying around your hard
disk if you wanted to...in zip format, perhapse.  You would always be able
to get the true plaintext by simply knowing the 7 key-words.  But few others
would be so lucky.  The point being that there would be some degree of
plausible deniability with such a cypher.  
 
     For the sake of arguement, lets say that the plaintext was first
encrypted with some strong crypto.  Then we used the xor crypto with 7 keys. 
It would be pretty hard to see what had been done.
 
     Now we deal with the brute force attack to get the original keys.  Lets
say that someone does get 7 words which will decrypt your ciphertext into a
plot to distribute <your favorite scum> to <your favorite victim>?  If you
had to, I'm sure you could reverse engineer a completely different set of
keys which will form the same plaintext.  If you absolutely had to, you
might be able to come up with 7 words which will decrypt your ciphertext
back into the Bill of Rights, thus giving you absolute plausible
deniability.  
 
     As far as known plaintext attacks go...well, we hope that doesn't
happen. ;^)
 
     Well, I'm about to wrap this up.  Some time ago, I proposed hiding
messages on the end of other files such as executable.  Well, if we pgp
encrypted a file, then xor encrypted the result with 7 keys and stuck that
on the end of 4dos.com, which is over 64K BTW, I find it hard to believe
that you would be caught readily.  I haven't had time to investigate the
harmonic qualities of such a cypher, but it seems feasible.  You could
delete and wipe the encryption program from your harddisk. (after uploading
the source/executable to your local bbs)  There would be tough times for
anyone who had to pin a given message on you.  Well, what do you think?  I
hope to drum up as much discussion here as with the "radical paranoia"
thread, from which I learned a lot.  Well, I promised to wrap this up, so I
guess I'm done.
 
+-----------------------+-----------------------------+---------+
| J. Michael Diehl ;-)  | I thought I was wrong once. | PGP KEY |
| mdiehl@triton.unm.edu |   But, I was mistaken.      |available|
| mike.diehl@fido.org   |                             | Ask Me! |
| (505) 299-2282        +-----------------------------+---------+
|                                                               |
+------"I'm just looking for the opportunity to be -------------+
|            Politically Incorrect!"   <Me>                     |
+-----If codes are outlawed, only criminals wil have codes.-----+
+----Is Big Brother in your phone?  If you don't know, ask me---+




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: ""L. Detweiler"" <ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Date: Mon, 12 Jul 93 21:38:05 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: State Dept. shuts down DEC machine
Message-ID: <9307130437.AA19964@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


A very hot topic (and one of my favorites to track) on this list is the
shutting down of various sites due to various factors. I'd be
interested in hearing more of the BBS shutdown cases here, which are
oft-rumored on Internet but rarely discussed authoritatively. Anyway,
here's some strange actions by the State Dept. in shutting down a DEC
FTP site. I wonder if this was *after* that little DES FTP retrieval
demonstration before congress--did  that give some people ideas?

Anyway, this is disturbing, and the question always is `is this an
isolated action or a trend emerging'--if hostility reaches the people
who are responsible they are unlikely to do it again; even ivory tower
bureacrats have a large CYA instinct (that's how they get there and stay there).

Note that this was NOT the DECWRL machine but another at DEC.

===cut=here===

Subject: State Dept. shuts down open-access Internet DEC-Alpha via export ctl!
Date: Thu, 08 Jul 93 01:34:07 -0700
From: gnu@cygnus.com

DEC was the first company to put up one of their machines on the
Internet so that people could log in and port their (free or
commercial) software to it.  This is a great idea, which I'm
encouraging others to emulate.  But the government objects...

The machine was called axposf (AXP is the model, OSF is the operating
system) .pa.dec.com (in the Palo Alto office of the DEC computer
company).  Anyone could connect to it over the Internet, using a standard
protocol (telnet), and type to it, as if they were sitting at its console.

This was WONDERFUL for people who are working on software.  The AXP is
a new "64-bit" machine, and most software will need at least minor revisions
to accomodate it.  But most software authors and companies won't immediately
buy an AXP.  Making one available for casual use on the Internet means that
much more software would appear on the AXP sooner.

The State Dept. regulates "remote access to computers" as equivalent
to "export of computers".  I shudder to think what would happen if
they discovered that ordinary email can invoke processing remotely.

Unfortunately, the machine is at DEC, which is gunshy about export
problems, after getting a multimillion dollar fine (which I don't think
they ever challenged in court) because some customer trans-shipped a
Vax to Eastern Europe in the '70s.  A more modern company might simply
tell the State Dept. to shove it, and beat them in court over the
unconstitutionality of the export laws.  Are they seriously telling us
that we can't put a public access machine on the Internet?  Can we attach
phone lines to it instead?  If not, a few thousand BBS's running on 
fast machines are violating export laws...  If so, what is the specific
difference between the Internet and a phone line, that lets a company
distinguish a legal act of commerce or communication from an illegal act
of export?

John, can you make sure the Congressional committees hear about this?
As far as I know, they are still not on email.

        John Gilmore

------- Forwarded Message

Date: Wed, 7 Jul 93 02:12:04 -0700
From: paul@vix.com (Paul Vixie)
Message-Id: <9307070912.AA15402@gw.home.vix.com>
To: gdb@cygnus.com, mike@mbsun.mlb.org
Subject: fyi

...  I helped set up axposf.pa.dec.com before I left DECWRL, and I know that
the U. S. State Department demanded that it be shut down since there were no
access controls to prevent foreign nationals (even those we are not friendly
with right now, e.g., Iraq) from telnetting in and getting access.  Since the
DEC Alpha machines fit the legal description of "supercomputer", this access
amounts to "exporting munitions" even though the hardware doesn't move and the
crypt(3) sources aren't online.  Anyway the service is down right now and the
relevant folks at DECWRL and DECNSL are working hard to get it back up again
but meanwhile there are no guest DEC Alpha ("AXP") machines on the Internet
just now.

        [gw:i386] telnet axposf.pa.dec.com
        Trying 16.1.0.14...
        Connected to axposf.pa.dec.com.
        Escape character is '^]'.

        OSF/1 (axposf.pa.dec.com) (ttyp1)

        login: axpguest
        Password:
        Login incorrect
        login: Connection closed by foreign host.
        [gw:i386] date
        Wed Jul  7 02:00:08 PDT 1993

- --
Paul Vixie
                                     "Be neither a conformist or a rebel,
<paul@vix.com>                        for they are really the same thing.
decwrl!vixie!paul                     Find your own path, and stay on it." (me)

------- End of Forwarded Message

To: farber@pcpond.cis.upenn.edu
Subject: Re: When did the DECWRL machine get pulled off the net? 
Date: Thu, 08 Jul 93 12:13:41 PDT
From: Paul A Vixie <paul@vix.com>

it happened about two months ago, while i was still brian reid's employee.

note that DECWRL is still there, it's the corporate internet gateway.  what
got taken off the net was an AXP-OSF/1 guest machine.  the state department
said it was legally a supercomputer and since dec could not guarantee that
folks on the SD's DNP ("denied parties list") (Iraq, for example) would be
prevented from using it, they insisted that the machine be shut down.  we
got the notification from the lord-high-weenie of dec's legal department,
and since they more-or-less outranked us we had to pull the machine off the
net.

i don't work for dec any more so i'm free to discuss this.  brian reid, my
old boss, is not free to discuss this.  the whole thing makes me really really
angry.






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: J. Michael Diehl <mdiehl@triton.unm.edu>
Date: Mon, 12 Jul 93 21:42:01 PDT
To: pmetzger@lehman.com
Subject: Re: xor data hiding?
In-Reply-To: <9307130306.AA15377@snark.shearson.com>
Message-ID: <9307130441.AA24227@triton.unm.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


According to Perry E. Metzger:
> Sadly, the Friedmans already cracked the "multiple repeating xored
> keys" cypher a while back -- about fifty years ago.

I knew it was crackable.  That wasn't the point.  The point was data hiding.

> Don't be embarassed, by the way -- everyone comes up with cyphers that
> have been cracked before. However, I would suggest reading "The
> Codebreakers" and the current literature before proposing new systems.

I'm not embarassed; I didn't develope the crypto I was discussing.  I was simply
discussing a new application for it.  I will read Codebreakers.  

Thanx.

+-----------------------+-----------------------------+---------+
| J. Michael Diehl ;-)  | I thought I was wrong once. | PGP KEY |
| mdiehl@triton.unm.edu |   But, I was mistaken.      |available|
| mike.diehl@fido.org   |                             | Ask Me! |
| (505) 299-2282        +-----------------------------+---------+
|                                                               |
+------"I'm just looking for the opportunity to be -------------+
|            Politically Incorrect!"   <Me>                     |
+-----If codes are outlawed, only criminals wil have codes.-----+
+----Is Big Brother in your phone?  If you don't know, ask me---+



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Perry E. Metzger" <pmetzger@lehman.com>
Date: Mon, 12 Jul 93 20:06:58 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: xor data hiding?
In-Reply-To: <9307130230.AA20305@triton.unm.edu>
Message-ID: <9307130306.AA15377@snark.shearson.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



J. Michael Diehl <mdiehl@triton.unm.edu> says:
>      I heard something interesting which made me think. (gasp)  
>  
>      I heard that if you encrypt a file with the xor encryption alg.
> multiple times with different keys, you get an encrypted file with a
> coorisponding effective key which has some interesting properties.  The key
> in such a system would have a length equal to the Least Common Multiple of
> the lengths of the original key.

Sadly, the Friedmans already cracked the "multiple repeating xored
keys" cypher a while back -- about fifty years ago.

Don't be embarassed, by the way -- everyone comes up with cyphers that
have been cracked before. However, I would suggest reading "The
Codebreakers" and the current literature before proposing new systems.

Perry




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: J. Michael Diehl <mdiehl@triton.unm.edu>
Date: Tue, 13 Jul 93 00:11:18 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Thesis pointer.
Message-ID: <9307130604.AA26837@triton.unm.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


     About a month ago, one of the cypherpunks posted that he had just
finished his thesis and had put it up for ftp.  I have since lost my mailbox
and can't even remember who's thesis it was.  All I can remember is that I
wanted to read it.  Can you send me a pointer?  Thanx in advance.
+-----------------------+-----------------------------+---------+
| J. Michael Diehl ;-)  | I thought I was wrong once. | PGP KEY |
| mdiehl@triton.unm.edu |   But, I was mistaken.      |available|
| mike.diehl@fido.org   |                             | Ask Me! |
| (505) 299-2282        +-----------------------------+---------+
|                                                               |
+------"I'm just looking for the opportunity to be -------------+
|            Politically Incorrect!"   <Me>                     |
+-----If codes are outlawed, only criminals wil have codes.-----+
+----Is Big Brother in your phone?  If you don't know, ask me---+




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: In search of cognitive dissonance...  13-Jul-1993 1036 <yerazunis@aidev.enet.dec.com>
Date: Tue, 13 Jul 93 08:02:35 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: State Departnemt shuts down DEC machine
Message-ID: <9307131502.AA08846@enet-gw.pa.dec.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>This looks annoyingly like a variant of the "initiative" a few years
>back where the State Dept. wanted makers of high performance
>workstations to export them only in a locked-down configuration
>capable of executing only the applications they were originally
>purchased to run; compilers need not apply...  fortunately, that died
>a quick & quiet death.

And people wonder why DEC is setting up production lines in both 
Ireland and Israel to build Alpha chips, and contracting with 
Kyocera to make them in Singapore as well... It's not export if
it never started out in the USA now, is it?  :-)

[this is my opinion ONLY, and is not necessarily the opinion or
strategy of my employer]

	-Bill








From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Douglas Sinclair <dsinclai@acs.ucalgary.ca>
Date: Tue, 13 Jul 93 07:41:33 PDT
To: mdiehl@triton.unm.edu (J. Michael Diehl)
Subject: Re: xor data hiding?
In-Reply-To: <9307130230.AA20305@triton.unm.edu>
Message-ID: <9307131439.AA46888@acs1.acs.ucalgary.ca>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


What you are talking about sounds like the original Vernam cipher that Dave
Kahn talks about in _CodeBreakers_.  There, he was using a teletype with two 
XORing tapes.  One tape was 1000 characters long, the other was 999.  Thus,
999000 characters would have to go past before the system repeated.  HOWEVER,
once it does repeat, all security is compromized.  Even before that time,
I believe there are subtle attacks you can use based on the repetition of the 
keys.  So, this is not a secure cipher method.  I would personally 
suggest tacking an 128 bit IDEA key onto 4dos.com instead.  Or use
DES even.

BTW: Though you could come up with a 30Kb+ string which when XORed would
give you any plaintext, you could not come up with a few small strings
which when used over each other would give you that.  There just isn't enough
information to make that possible.
-- 
PGP 2.3 Key by finger




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: sommerfeld@orchard.medford.ma.us (Bill Sommerfeld)
Date: Tue, 13 Jul 93 07:20:22 PDT
To: ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu
Subject: Re: State Dept. shuts down DEC machine
In-Reply-To: <9307130437.AA19964@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Message-ID: <9307131310.AA00173@orchard.medford.ma.us>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Note that the machine wasn't (only) an FTP server; it let anyone who
wanted get at a shell with compilers, debuggers, tools, etc., so that
the alleged Bad Guys from third world countries in a country with IP
connectivity on a student visa could run their nuclear bomb
design/simulation programs there....  never mind that the simulation
for the Manhattan Project was done with a horde of clerks, decks of
punched cards, and a big bunch of IBM card tabulators (see Feinmann's
autobiographies for more details..).

This looks annoyingly like a variant of the "initiative" a few years
back where the State Dept. wanted makers of high performance
workstations to export them only in a locked-down configuration
capable of executing only the applications they were originally
purchased to run; compilers need not apply...  fortunately, that died
a quick & quiet death.

					- Bill





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: paul@poboy.b17c.ingr.com (Paul Robichaux)
Date: Tue, 13 Jul 93 07:46:03 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: PGP 2.3 now avail for Intergraph Clipper CPU
Message-ID: <199307131440.AA01891@poboy.b17c.ingr.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I recently finished porting and testing PGP 2.3 for the Intergraph Clipper
C400 CPU. Anyone interested in getting an executable or source diffs
should contact me; I've already sent in the makefile changes to Phil Z,
so you can wait until 2.4 if you'd rather.

I'm also working on a C400 assembler equivalent of the machine-specific
fast math functions.. that should help performance a bit.

Of course, this effort is not supported (officially or otherwise) by
Integraph, and it's certainly not a product :)

-Paul


-- 
Paul Robichaux, KD4JZG     | I knew Clinton was _really_ the President when I
Intergraph Federal Systems | heard Somalis yelling "Down with Clinton!" on CNN.
 ** Every day, Jim Meadlock is grateful that I don't speak for Intergraph. **




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Karl Barrus <elee9sf@Menudo.UH.EDU>
Date: Tue, 13 Jul 93 07:42:50 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: ANON: in the news
Message-ID: <199307131442.AA08331@Menudo.UH.EDU>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

Anonymous posting and mail have up three times in the past few days, in
non-cypherpunk readings of mine.

1) In the Young Scientists Network, one of the list moderators
mentioned that an anonymous post was received, and to please not do
that in the future.  However, the reason given was that it is
difficult to contact the author of the post.

Since the moderator mentioned he was unable to contact the author, I
am guessing a cypherpunk remailer was used.  Importantly though,
anonymous submissions were discouraged only because of the
inconvenience of contacting the author.

2) The latest Computer Underground Digest #5-51.  The issue it about
the "cleansing" of the AIS BBS run by Kim Clancy.  Read the issue; Jim
Thomas was upset at this form of witch-hunting, in which accusations
were made anonymously.  A cypherpunk remailer was used in this
situation.

Although Jim and others were understandable upset about the situation,
I felt they were more upset about what the anonymous poster(s) said;
not so much the fact he(they) posted anonymously.  Or rather, the fact
anonymity was used in the manner it was.

3) Phrack 43 - includes a list of cypherpunk remailers in one of the
articles!  Looks like the remailers are getting some publicity, as
well as the ftp site.

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.3

iQCVAgUBLELJgIOA7OpLWtYzAQF+dgP/U9Evz5lM91FJnMEGBfDHyLwRGlgAAGbq
gnitNN9LA7NKIb8yWdHSSB1iQ0WX4Ae8NRK5m4c7MW2Ps9JekXA6Eu3zQPYwQJ34
nWdkY4y82l1suyo0/D5mrKcXysjvVVGw18Ypt7ErYl1B0qWxCEPp+eTkL7471yUX
ODZ1X8hVecs=
=lBwU
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: mbl@mail.msen.com (Matthew B Landry)
Date: Tue, 13 Jul 93 07:30:33 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Whose opinion? (was Re: anonymous mail)
Message-ID: <m0oFlMh-000EadC@garnet.msen.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


	On the subject of whether personal postings should be considered
as representing the company, I should point out that:

1:	NSF and several regional nets have acceptable use policies which
	do not permit commercial use. 
2:	Messages posted by the company (or by someone who is assumed to
	represent the company) would be in violation of these policies if the
	messages crossed the applicable networks. 
3:	There is no way to prevent a specific message over usenet from crossing
	a specific network.
4:	The owner of a network site (the company) is assumed to be responsible
	for any "unacceptable use" traffic that comes from the site.
5:	This liability would leave the company open to having its net feed
	cut off for such unacceptable use.

	It is therefore in the best interests of any corporation with
Internet/Usenet access to _assume_ that messages posted by its employees
are not company business.

	So what's all the fuss about? :-)
-- 
Matthew B. Landry                        | mbl@mail.msen.com
President of Project SAVE		 | (313)971-5469 (H/W)
My opinions are my most prized posession. I don't share them.



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: smb@research.att.com
Date: Tue, 13 Jul 93 08:13:10 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: new crypto standard to be announced
Message-ID: <9307131513.AA12102@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Today's NY Times says that Novell and a bunch of other companies (including
AT&T, but I haven't been able to track down any details yet) *and*
the British Ministry of Defense are going to announce a new crypto
standard.  The article indicated that RSA and DES were going to be
used, and portrayed the announcement as a rebuff to Clipper.

		--Steve Bellovin




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Peter Wayner <pcw@access.digex.net>
Date: Tue, 13 Jul 93 08:32:45 PDT
To: perobich@ingr.com
Subject: Re:  PGP 2.3 now avail for Intergraph Clipper CPU
Message-ID: <199307131532.AA13611@access.digex.net>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


PGP is now available for the Clipper? Now Phil has sold out
just like Jim Bidzos! :-) 

-Peter




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: nowhere@bsu-cs.bsu.edu (Chael Hall)
Date: Tue, 13 Jul 93 11:14:15 PDT
To: elee9sf@menudo.uh.edu
Subject: Re: Remailer test
In-Reply-To: <199307121310.AA20979@Menudo.UH.EDU>
Message-ID: <9307131813.AA22955@bsu-cs.bsu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



>M..Stirner@f28.n125.z1.fidonet.org (M. Stirner) wrote
>
>> I received the test message via the remailer@utter.dis.org quickly &
>> without problems.  I have yet to get the other messages, nearly a week
>> later.  With the exception of remailer@utter.dis.org, all of these have
>> been habitually unresponsive to regular tests.  I have been able to get
>> the soda remaier to work once, & with the efforts of the remailer
>> operator, was able to get the phantom remailer to work once.
>
>Hm...something funny is going on here.  I test the remailers about
>once every other week and generally here from all of them!  Can I try
>sending mail to you through each remailer?  Maybe this will help
>figure out the ones which can't reach you. 
>
>> Which remailers claim to be able to mail directly to newsgroups?
>
>As far as I know, none of the remailers mail directly to newsgroups.
>But, you can have them remail to an email-to-usenet gateway like
>group-name@cs.utexas.edu.  There are others (pws.bull.com, decwrl's,
>demon); I'll find my list and send it.

     I have always had difficulty sending directly to Fidonet...  If
you send to username%f1.n2.z3.fidonet.org@gator.rn.com it will usually
go through, though.  So by sending it through the remailer, then gator,
then Fidonet, it should go.

Chael

--
Chael Hall
nowhere@bsu-cs.bsu.edu, 00CCHALL@BSUVC.BSU.EDU, chall@bsu.edu
(317) 776-4000 from 8 am - 5 pm CST




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Derek Atkins <warlord@MIT.EDU>
Date: Tue, 13 Jul 93 11:07:34 PDT
To: J. Michael Diehl <mdiehl@triton.unm.edu>
Subject: Re: Thesis pointer.
In-Reply-To: <9307130604.AA26837@triton.unm.edu>
Message-ID: <9307131807.AA08361@toxicwaste.MEDIA.MIT.EDU>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Hi.  It was I who posted about my Thesis being available for FTP.
You can obtain it from toxicwaste.mit.edu:/pub/charon/thesis.ps.Z

-derek




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: khijol!erc@apple.com (Ed Carp)
Date: Tue, 13 Jul 93 22:18:24 PDT
To: greg@ideath.goldenbear.com (Greg Broiles)
Subject: Re: Whose opinion? (was Re: anonymous mail)
In-Reply-To: <NcqN7B1w164w@ideath.goldenbear.com>
Message-ID: <m0oFrwt-0002CtC@warrior>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text


> >         It is therefore in the best interests of any corporation with
> > Internet/Usenet access to _assume_ that messages posted by its employees
> > are not company business.

Someone wrote this, sorry the attribution got cut off.

Anyone who thinks that ANYONE on usenet speaks for their company, unless
explicitly stated, should have their damned head examined.  It was a clear
ploy to attempt to get the poor guy fired by someone who disagreed with his
opinion and decided to get nasty about it.  What an asshole.  Unfortunately,
it worked.

I think Microsoft ought be boycotted for this outrageous crap.  IMO.
I also think the guy that complained to Microsoft ought to have his head
examined ... AFTER his mailbox grows a couple hundred megs or so from
outraged people sending him mail expressing THEIR opinion.
-- 
Ed Carp				erc@wetware.com			510/659-9560
   For anonymous mailers -->   anonymus+5300@charcoal.com
"Disagreements are not meant to be challenges.  They are just a different
 reality."  -- Risa D'Angeles



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: J. Michael Diehl <mdiehl@triton.unm.edu>
Date: Tue, 13 Jul 93 17:51:48 PDT
To: dsinclai@acs.ucalgary.ca (Douglas Sinclair)
Subject: Re: xor data hiding?
In-Reply-To: <9307131439.AA46888@acs1.acs.ucalgary.ca>
Message-ID: <9307140017.AA03238@triton.unm.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


According to Douglas Sinclair:
> 
> What you are talking about sounds like the original Vernam cipher that Dave
> Kahn talks about in _CodeBreakers_.  There, he was using a teletype with two 
> XORing tapes.  One tape was 1000 characters long, the other was 999.  Thus,
> 999000 characters would have to go past before the system repeated.  HOWEVER,
> once it does repeat, all security is compromized.  Even before that time,
> I believe there are subtle attacks you can use based on the repetition of the 
> keys.  So, this is not a secure cipher method.  I would personally 
> suggest tacking an 128 bit IDEA key onto 4dos.com instead.  Or use
> DES even.

The point wasn't to be unbreakably secure; it was to be UNFINDABLY secure.  We
convolute an allready encrypted message to the point of not being recognizable
as cyphertext, then we hide it on the end of a file.  We want it to look like
garbage.

> BTW: Though you could come up with a 30Kb+ string which when XORed would
> give you any plaintext, you could not come up with a few small strings
> which when used over each other would give you that.  There just isn't enough
> information to make that possible.

Agreed.  This leaves us with several OTP's laying around in zip format.  This 
isn't so bad as long as we don't forget the original 7 keys.  The main purpose
of all of this is plausible deniability.

Thanx for your comments.  Still listening.

+-----------------------+-----------------------------+---------+
| J. Michael Diehl ;-)  | I thought I was wrong once. | PGP KEY |
| mdiehl@triton.unm.edu |   But, I was mistaken.      |available|
| mike.diehl@fido.org   |                             | Ask Me! |
| (505) 299-2282        +-----------------------------+---------+
|                                                               |
+------"I'm just looking for the opportunity to be -------------+
|            Politically Incorrect!"   <Me>                     |
+-----If codes are outlawed, only criminals wil have codes.-----+
+----Is Big Brother in your phone?  If you don't know, ask me---+



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: jet@nas.nasa.gov (J. Eric Townsend)
Date: Tue, 13 Jul 93 19:11:17 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: collecting references on parallel implementations of crypto s/w
Message-ID: <9307140211.AA11496@boxer.nas.nasa.gov>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain




Any pointers?  I'm about to head off to Boston for two weeks to do
work at a vendor, need some 'light reading' for the hotel and plane...

--
J. Eric Townsend jet@nas.nasa.gov 415.604.4311| personal email goes to: 
CM-5 Administrator, Parallel Systems Support  |   jet@well.sf.ca.us
NASA Ames Numerical Aerodynamic Simulation    |---------------------------
PGP2.2 public key available upon request or finger jet@simeon.nas.nasa.gov





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: fnerd@smds.com (FutureNerd Steve Witham)
Date: Tue, 13 Jul 93 17:52:09 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: PGP 2.3 now avail for Intergraph Clipper CPU
Message-ID: <9307132318.AA16955@smds.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


paul@poboy.b17c.ingr.com (Paul Robichaux) says:
 
> I recently finished porting and testing PGP 2.3 for the Intergraph Clipper
> C400 CPU. ...

Bravo!  Cypherpunk makes moral statement and scores rhetorical point with code!
Except, I wish the targets of the joke could decode it.

-fnerd
quote me




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: greg@ideath.goldenbear.com (Greg Broiles)
Date: Tue, 13 Jul 93 20:08:14 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Whose opinion? (was Re: anonymous mail)
Message-ID: <NcqN7B1w164w@ideath.goldenbear.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

Matthew B Landry writes:

>         On the subject of whether personal postings should be considered
> as representing the company, I should point out that:
>
> 1:      NSF and several regional nets have acceptable use policies which
>         do not permit commercial use.
> 2:      Messages posted by the company (or by someone who is assumed to
>         represent the company) would be in violation of these policies if the
>         messages crossed the applicable networks.

I don't think a description of a policy is at all clearly "commercial use".
Advertising, and use of net resources in the course of doing business seem
to be commercial use - but a discussion with outside folks about policies
or conditions doesn't seem to be commercial use. To suggest that net traffic
originating at a site with a .com domain name is commercial seems to
over-reach.

> 3:      There is no way to prevent a specific message over usenet from crossing
>         a specific network.
> 4:      The owner of a network site (the company) is assumed to be responsible
>         for any "unacceptable use" traffic that comes from the site.

I don't think I buy this one, either. If I can't control traffic (see #3)
how is it reasonable to say that I am responsible for it (#4)?

> 5:      This liability would leave the company open to having its net feed
>         cut off for such unacceptable use.

This assumes that the net feed comes from a provider which restricts
commercial use. Some providers (like Alternet) welcome commercial use.

>         It is therefore in the best interests of any corporation with
> Internet/Usenet access to _assume_ that messages posted by its employees
> are not company business.

It is probably convenient for policymakers to make this assumption. It is,
however, perhaps naiive. If I see a posting from Jim Bizdos, I *do* assume
that he is speaking for RSADSI/PKP, unless he makes efforts to disclaim such
attribution. Ditto for other folks who I know or suspect hold positions of
power or influence with other institutions. I suspect other folks on the net
react similarly to posts (apparently) coming from people who may have some
impact on corporate/institutional policy/behavior. I think it's probably
best to assume that people *will* associate what people post from a site's
name with that site, especially absent disclaimers to the contrary.


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.3

iQCVAgUBLEN3H33YhjZY3fMNAQHMAQP/VJX86pXxyZqXaEHsWIeH1cLnjsPW/9cR
gfNdp/3KRwZBwLAR/BbqPlfZUnY6VHJKtbJUHVDSMAOcgRZ9E9+3L6ghBFX3J4lO
aKS9SnAsEDOSY5PMqAF7z9YShP1FqVuRRq7XKMF6KjIfH/+rIsjj5AR0kSa5BB6p
kbBW/jis1U0=
=iuOy
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

--
Greg Broiles                            greg@goldenbear.com
Golden Bear Computer Consulting         +1 503 465 0325
Box 12005 Eugene OR 97440               BBS: +1 503 687 7764




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: jpp@markv.com
Date: Tue, 13 Jul 93 20:43:52 PDT
To: newsham@wiliki.eng.hawaii.edu
Subject: Re: Secure comm program, Sockets + LINK
In-Reply-To: <9307111507.aa07868@hermix.markv.com>
Message-ID: <9307132043.aa10612@hermix.markv.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


  My concerns about two way authentication become clear when you
concider the LINK+sockets program a substitute for rsh, rexec, login
or similar programs.  You don't want to be spoofed, and you don't want
others using your account.

  When you are using LINK in the way it was originaly designed, you
more or less *have* authentication in both directions.  From you to it
since discovering a private key given a public key is concidered
hard.  From it to you since *presumably* the only user able to read
the key file on the shared machine is you.

  The bootstrap problem (how you get the public key to the machine
with only unsecure chanels at your disposal) is interesting though.  I
wonder if it can be solved without DH key exchange?

j'




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: J. Michael Diehl <mdiehl@triton.unm.edu>
Date: Tue, 13 Jul 93 20:02:25 PDT
To: smb@research.att.com
Subject: Re: new crypto standard to be announced
In-Reply-To: <9307131513.AA12102@toad.com>
Message-ID: <9307140302.AA09844@triton.unm.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


According to smb@research.att.com:
> 
> Today's NY Times says that Novell and a bunch of other companies (including
> AT&T, but I haven't been able to track down any details yet) *and*

It would seem that AT&T has taken waffing-lessons from Clinton.  They are now
on both sides of the game, if this report is true.

> the British Ministry of Defense are going to announce a new crypto
> standard.  The article indicated that RSA and DES were going to be
> used, and portrayed the announcement as a rebuff to Clipper.

Maybe Billary is too..... ;^)
+-----------------------+-----------------------------+---------+
| J. Michael Diehl ;-)  | I thought I was wrong once. | PGP KEY |
| mdiehl@triton.unm.edu |   But, I was mistaken.      |available|
| mike.diehl@fido.org   |                             | Ask Me! |
| (505) 299-2282        +-----------------------------+---------+
|                                                               |
+------"I'm just looking for the opportunity to be -------------+
|            Politically Incorrect!"   <Me>                     |
+-----If codes are outlawed, only criminals wil have codes.-----+
+----Is Big Brother in your phone?  If you don't know, ask me---+



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: RCLARKE@ac.dal.ca
Date: Tue, 13 Jul 93 17:58:15 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: subscribe Egon <RClarke@AC.DAL.CA>
Message-ID: <01H0ICA6XZZ600556T@AC.DAL.CA>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


subscribe Egon <Rclarke@AC.DAL.CA>




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: gnu (John Gilmore)
Date: Tue, 13 Jul 93 23:24:34 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Hoptoad disk screwup
Message-ID: <9307140624.AA10036@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


The partition that holds /var/spool has had two hiccups in the last few
days.  This has caused some downtime, and possibly caused some mail to
be lost.  As far as I know, the NSA didn't do it :-))), so y'all can keep
your paranoia at the usual level, whatever that is.

	John




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: wmo@rebma.rebma.mn.org (Bill O'Hanlon)
Date: Tue, 13 Jul 93 23:43:00 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Remailer comments
Message-ID: <m0oG0Pz-0002CnC@rebma.rebma.mn.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


While checking for problems in the rebma remailer's logs, I noticed the
following:

Some folks have sent PGP encrypted test messages without including the
::
Encrypted: PGP
text, or the Encrypted: header.

Also, some folks have tried some variations on the 
::
Request-Remailing-To: 
line, such as just To:, putting the :: and the Request- line together, etc.

Those things won't work, and you'll get nothing back.  Anyone who has tried
to use the remailer here and has failed, send me a note and I'll send
you the instructions.  Or, I think Karl (Karl Barrus <elee9sf@Menudo.UH.EDU>)
has a complete set of information and scripts to help out.

Karl, you might consider including a terse list of instructions with your 
regular remailer mailing.

(Oh, to avoid starting the remailer-operator-responsibilities-discussion,
I'll state my policy on logs on this machine.  I glance at 'em to make
sure that there aren't any errors in the scripts, and then I remove 'em.
If you're going to be an asshole via my remailer, I'd appreciate it if
you used PGP so that there's no clear text here, so that I don't have to
ever revise this simple policy.)

-Bill



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: TO1SITTLER@APSICC.APS.EDU (Kragen Sittler)
Date: Tue, 13 Jul 93 23:10:37 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: sorry if you already read this, but...
Message-ID: <930714000544.1441@APSICC.APS.EDU>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


From:	SMTP%"more@hpcwire.ans.net" 13-JUL-1993 23:35:43.74
To:	to1sittler@apsicc.aps.edu
CC:	
Subj:	738 ANS CO+RE Security to Use RSA Public Key Cryptography

Date: Tue, 13 Jul 1993 22:38:28 -0700
From: More Select News <more@hpcwire.ans.net>
Message-Id: <199307140538.AA23787@hpcwire.ans.net>
To: to1sittler@apsicc.aps.edu
Subject: 738 ANS CO+RE Security to Use RSA Public Key Cryptography

ANS CO+RE Security to Use RSA Public Key Cryptography
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
Contacts:

ANS CO+RE Systems Inc.          RSA Data Security Inc.
Carol Harvey, Public Affairs    Kurt Stammberger, Technology Marketing
703/758-7700                    415/595-8782
harvey@ans.net                  kurt@rsa.com

           ANS CO+RE's Security Services to Incorporate
                   RSA Public Key Cryptography

REDWOOD CITY, CA and ELMSFORD, NY -- ANS CO+RE Systems Inc. announced major
new extensions to its advanced InterLock family of security services. The new
features focus around the incorporation of RSA Data Security Inc.'s Public
Key Cryptosystem. RSA's techniques are widely acknowledged as being the most
secure means of data encryption and authentication available today.

InterLock is a suite of security services that control access among segments
of an enterprise's private IP network and/or among multiple enterprises that
communicate over a IP private network. InterLock also controls access between
private networks and the public Internet. In addition to RSA key exchange-
enabled end-to-end encryption, InterLock services include TELNET, FTP, SMTP,
X windows, and NNTP. Network access is controlled by a rule base that can be
configured for each user according to userid, network service,
inbound/outbound connection, time of day, day of week, public/private network
and/or host address, authentication method and enforced encryption.

ANS CO+RE developed the new product with RSA's BSAFE 2.0 toolkit, the world's
best-selling cryptography software developer's kit. BSAFE is the same toolkit
that served as the encryption "engine" for the developers of Novell NetWare
4.0, Lotus Notes, WordPerfect InForms and Fischer International
Workflow.2000. BSAFE provides an easy path towards integration of state-of-
the-art encryption and digital signature technology -- without requiring the
developer to have a background in cryptography or number theory. RSA security
technology is a standard on the Internet, the world's largest network, and on
the secure networks of businesses and financial institutions worldwide.

RSA president Jim Bidzos, commenting on the deal, said, "As the Internet
grows, more and more confidential and mission-critical data is flowing over
it -- unfortunately, the open nature of the Internet makes that information
relatively easy to steal, alter or forge. The RSA-based Internet PEM
(privacy-enhanced mail) standards have provided a good start by offering
secure messaging capabilities to Internet users -- but now any IP user can
get a complete network security implementation, with RSA built right in, with
ANS CO+RE InterLock."

Al Hoover, VP of Information and Applications for ANS CO+RE stated, "We've
been looking to incorporate a public-key based key management system that is
both as advanced as the other InterLock services and easy to integrate. RSA's
Public Key Cryptography fills that need perfectly, and we will be pleased to
offer it to our customers beginning in the fourth quarter of this year. It
represents our continuing efforts to build on our foundation of quality
security services."

RSA Data Security Inc. is a recognized world leader in cryptography. The
Company develops and markets software developer's kits, end-user products,
and provides comprehensive consulting services in the cryptographic sciences.
RSA technology has been embedded in the products of companies such as IBM,
Apple Computer, DEC, Microsoft, Sun Microsystems, Novell, Lotus, Motorola,
Northern Telecom, AT&T, WordPerfect, Fischer International, General Electric,
Hughes and many others. Founded in 1982 by the inventors of the patented RSA
Public Key Cryptosystem, the company is headquartered in Redwood City,
California.

ANS CO+RE Systems, Inc. is a wholly owned subsidiary of Advanced Network &
Services, Inc. of Elmsford, NY. In addition to offering network security
services, the company markets attachments to its nationwide T3 backbone
network, and provides other related support, such as network management
outsourcing, network design and engineering, and systems integration.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
InterLock and the InterLock logo are servicemarks of ANS CO+RE Systems Inc.
X Windows is a trademark of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
The RSA logo and BSAFE are trademarks of RSA Data Security, Inc.

Copyright 1993 HPCwire.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: remail@tamsun.tamu.edu
Date: Tue, 13 Jul 93 23:19:46 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: REMAILER HEADERS
Message-ID: <9307140619.AA11420@tamsun.tamu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Some of you know the sender of the below message, please don't blow my
cover, I'm testing the remailers and people's knowledge of message id's
(if that would even be an accurate way of tracing the message).  

Cypherpunks remailer addresses and headers from those sites appear below.

If you can trace the origin (sender) of this message please send me mail
personally rather than to the list.  I'm using my favorite remailer here
and I want to make sure it's working right.  

I have sent mail to the below sites as a test for anonymous remailing
returns and to see what headers I get back. It has been maybe 4 days now
since I began this experiment, some of the sites below have still not
remailed my test message.

My main curiosity in this quest is to determine what each header will look
like when the mail is recieved.  I think this is important in determining
which remailer to use.  

The below is the list of remailers with the "unique header to remailer" info
below each site number.  

If you wish to discuss this matter further, please send a follow up
message to the cypher list with your address included and "Re: Unique
header".  I'm really not too concerned about remaining anonymous, I just
want to see if this scheme is really airtight! 

Thanks!
-z

A typical mail header looks similar to the below:
(I have removed the date, time, etc. to protect my privacy) 

From rebma!remailer@kksys.mn.org Thu Jul x 00:38:01 1993
Received: by ahost.some.school.edu (5.57/Ultrix3.0/cc-ix.mc-1.5)
	id AA02491; Thu, x Jul 93 19:00:54 -0500
Received: from kksys.mn.org by uum1.mn.org with bsmtp
	(Smail3.1.28.1 #3) id m0oE6Du-00007JC; Thu,x Jul 93 00:21 CDT
Received: from rebma by kksys.mn.org with uucp
	(Smail3.1.28.1 #13) id m0oE5jG-0007TsC; Thu,x Jul 93 00:50 CDT
Received: by rebma.rebma.mn.org (Smail3.1.28.1 #1)
	id m0oE6nS-0002CzC; Thu, 8 Jul 93 17:58 PDT
Message-Id: <m0oE6nS-0002CzC@rebma.rebma.mn.org>
Date: Thu, x Jul 93 17:58 PDT
To: me@myhost.some.school.edu
From: nobody@rebma.rebma.mn.org
Subject: 9
Remailed-By: Mr. Nobody <remailer@rebma.mn.org>
Status: O

^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
Check out the pub/cypherpunks directory at soda.berkeley.edu
(128.32.149.19).  Instructions on how to use the remailers are in the
remailer directory, along with some unix scripts and dos batch files.
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^

=========This is where the list of remailers and headers begins===========

*** Please keep in mind that in the below I included only the "unique to
*** remailer" parts of the header.***

 1: nowhere@bsu-cs.bsu.edu 

From: Anonymous <nowhere@bsu-cs.bsu.edu>
To: omitted
X-Remailed-By: Anonymous <nowhere@bsu-cs.bsu.edu>
X-Ttl: 0
X-Notice: This message was forwarded by a software-
	  automated anonymous remailing service.

 2: hh@cicada.berkeley.edu 

From: nobody@cicada.berkeley.edu

 3: hh@pmantis.berkeley.edu 

No response after 4 days

 4: hh@soda.berkeley.edu 

From: nobody@soda.berkeley.edu
Remailed-By: Eric Hollander <hh@soda.berkeley.edu>

 5: 00x@uclink.berkeley.edu 

From: nobody@uclink.berkeley.edu
Remailed-By: Tommy the Tourist <tommy@out>

 6: hal@alumni.caltech.edu 

From: nobody@alumni.cco.caltech.edu
Comments: This message is NOT from the person listed in the From
 line.  It is from an automated software remailing service operating at
 that address.  Please report problem mail to <hal@alumni.caltech.edu>.

 7: ebrandt@jarthur.claremont.edu 

From: nobody@eli-remailer
Remailed-By: Eli Brandt <ebrandt@jarthur.Claremont.EDU>
Source-Info:  From (or Sender) name not authenticated.

 8: phantom@mead.u.washington.edu 

No response after 4 days

 9: remailer@rebma.mn.org 

From: nobody@rebma.rebma.mn.org
Remailed-By: Mr. Nobody <remailer@rebma.mn.org>

** The reamiler at rebma.mn.org took 3+ days to remail.  This could be an
advantage to some, disadvantage to others.  You decide.


10: elee7h5@rosebud.ee.uh.edu 

From: nobody@rosebud.ee.uh.edu

11: hfinney@shell.portal.com 

From: nobody@shell.portal.com
Comments: This message is NOT from the person listed in the From
 line.  It is from an automated software remailing service operating at
 that address.  Please report problem mail to <hfinney@shell.portal.com>.

12: remail@tamsun.tamu.edu 

From: remail@tamsun.tamu.edu
Remailed-By: Anonymous <remail@tamsun.tamu.edu>

13: remail@tamaix.tamu.edu 

From: remail@tamsun.tamu.edu
Remailed-By: Anonymous <remail@tamsun.tamu.edu>

14: remailer@utter.dis.org 

Received: by soda.berkeley.edu (5.65/KAOS-1)
	id AA13859; Tue, 6 Jul 93 03:09:09 -0700
Received: by merde.dis.org (4.1/SMI-4.2)
	id AA04354; Tue, 6 Jul 93 03:11:48 PDT
From: nobody@dis.org
Remailed-By: remailer bogus account <remailer@utter.dis.org>

15: remail@extropia.wimsey.com 

No response ever!  ...unless you use encryption.  Details will follow in
the near future.  


NOTES: 
#1-#5		no encryption of remailing requests
#6-#14		support encrypted remailing requests
#15		special - header and message must be encrypted together
#9,#14,#15	introduce larger than average delay (not direct connect)
#9,#14,#15      running on privately owned machines




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Clark Reynard <clark@metal.psu.edu>
Date: Wed, 14 Jul 93 00:43:04 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Relation between number theory and cryptography
Message-ID: <9307140815.AA03221@metal.psu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Hi.  Me again.  

I asked this one a while back and got no response.  sci.crypt
was equally unresponsive.  It concerns the possibly obscure
relation between cryptography, number theory and information
theory.  

Is there considered to be a one-to-one isomorphism between
the units in a plaintext-cyphertext pair?  By this, I mean,
are they considered to contain the same information?

If not, does encryption lessen or increase the amount of
information in the units of the plaintext-cyphertext pair,
and why?  

Is this affected by whether or not the key is known?  If the
key has been irretrievably lost, does this lessen the amount
of information, or does the 'potential' informational content
remain the same?

Is cryptography considered to be as simple as, say, Huffman
coding, for purposes of informational content?  That is, is
the relationship between the units of a plaintext-cyphertext
pair considered to be more or less 'transparent,' or entirely
isomorphic?

Does the Second Law of Thermodynamics enter into this?  Is there
a minimum amount of energy required to extract information from
cyphertext, or a minimum amount of waste of energy?

If these questions are too difficult to answer in a short article,
does anyone have citations to a source which could explain this to
me?  I'm not certain how much research has been done into this
rather esoteric topic, and my main interest is theoretical, though
I'd be interested in knowing any practical applications of 
information theory and number theory to cryptography.  
----
Robert W. Clark             Just Say No! to the
rclark@nyx.cs.du.edu        Big Brother Chip  




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Clark Reynard <clark@metal.psu.edu>
Date: Wed, 14 Jul 93 00:45:41 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: WARNING:  NON-CYPHERPUNK QUESTION
Message-ID: <9307140818.AA03244@metal.psu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


WARNING:  NON-CRYPTOPRIVACY-RELATED QUESTION FOLLOWS:

Are there any fast, quick, reliable
methods of forestalling phone disconnection due to failure to 
pay the bills, and the ugly reconnection fee which ensues
thereupon?

Being a professional deadbeat, and having given up phone phreaking
since my nasty bust--I did get off better than poor Phiber, though--,
I find phone rates extortionate.  This is not to say that I do
not intend to pay the phone bill; I have no choice, since there is,
as in most areas, only ONE phone company for local service.  
What might have been called a 'vertical monopoly' in the days
of the robber barons, who have been reincarnated as phone company
magnates.

In either case, does anyone know of any federal laws which one
can cite to delay a phone service shutdown?  I only need about
two or three weeks before I can pay in full (I'm waiting on some
blasted residuals on work I did months ago).

I've kind of stalled on this, and now have until Friday before
the axe-man cometh.  If you believe that your answer to THIS
question would be relevant to the list at large, please post.
If not, send it to me personally.  But please hurry; by Friday,
I may not be able to receive your mail.  

[Oh, and for a partial answer to the second question, for anyone
in the same circumstance:  try 'sickness in the family' and be
vague.  If you've had a cold, it's more or less an honest excuse.
When the representative of the phone company goes silent, after
asking for the minimum you can pay immediately, do not say anything.
They are instructed to remain silent (as are any salesmen, myself
included) and wait for an answer.  Just stay on the line and not
say anything.  I waited five minutes.  Eventually they start to
talk; THEN, you've won the silence-battle.  Get them to cough up
the absolute minimum, and send THAT to them.  Complain about
the disconnect notice, saying you just got it, and it was for
days ago.  Then ask how you can pay it before the time allotted,
since if you sent it out today, it might not be there for days.
Get an extension.  Send them less than you said you would, claiming
any full-bore lie you can imagine; I used "car repairs," which
was half-true.  With similar half-truths you can forestall disconnection
for months.  However, I have reached the point where the phone
company is rapidly losing patience, and I want to know of any
sure-fire methods of delaying them.]

Thank you for your kind consideration and indulgence.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: mbl@mail.msen.com (Matthew B Landry)
Date: Wed, 14 Jul 93 07:16:17 PDT
To: greg@goldenbear.com
Subject: Re: Whose opinion? (was Re: anonymous mail)
Message-ID: <m0oG7cC-000EZiC@garnet.msen.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> > 1:      NSF and several regional nets have acceptable use policies which
> >         do not permit commercial use.
> > 2:      Messages posted by the company (or by someone who is assumed to
> >         represent the company) would be in violation of these policies if the
> >         messages crossed the applicable networks.
> 
> I don't think a description of a policy is at all clearly "commercial use".
> Advertising, and use of net resources in the course of doing business seem
> to be commercial use - but a discussion with outside folks about policies
> or conditions doesn't seem to be commercial use. To suggest that net traffic
> originating at a site with a .com domain name is commercial seems to
> over-reach.
	If you don't think that talking to the public about what your
company is doing constitutes commercial activity, I have some friends in
the corporate media relations business who would be very interested to
know about that.

> 
> > 3:      There is no way to prevent a specific message over usenet from crossing
> >         a specific network.
> > 4:      The owner of a network site (the company) is assumed to be responsible
> >         for any "unacceptable use" traffic that comes from the site.
> 
> I don't think I buy this one, either. If I can't control traffic (see #3)
> how is it reasonable to say that I am responsible for it (#4)?
	I didn't say that it was reasonable, only that it was true.

> 
> > 5:      This liability would leave the company open to having its net feed
> >         cut off for such unacceptable use.
> 
> This assumes that the net feed comes from a provider which restricts
> commercial use. Some providers (like Alternet) welcome commercial use.
	But I don't know of any providers which encourage people to send
traffic over government nets which violates government policies. As long
as the traffic stays within the commercial net, they're happy, but I don't
know of any provider that doesn't have a policy staing that its users must
follow the policies for any other networks that their traffic crosses.
Usenet posts will almost by definition cross all of the IP nets, so they
should conform to all of the acceptable use policies. 
	(So far as I know, this has never been enforced, but it's still
the rule.

> 
> however, perhaps naiive. If I see a posting from Jim Bizdos, I *do* assume
> that he is speaking for RSADSI/PKP, unless he makes efforts to disclaim such
	We aren't talking about Jim Bizdos. I agree that it's fair to
assume he speaks for PKP. But mail originating from a company machine
doesn't necessarily come from someone who speaks for the company.

-- 
Matthew B. Landry                        | mbl@mail.msen.com
President of Project SAVE		 | (313)971-5469 (H/W)
My opinions are my most prized posession. I don't share them.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Perry E. Metzger" <pmetzger@lehman.com>
Date: Wed, 14 Jul 93 08:47:40 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: xor data hiding?
In-Reply-To: <9307140017.AA03238@triton.unm.edu>
Message-ID: <9307141547.AA28336@snark.shearson.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



J. Michael Diehl <mdiehl@triton.unm.edu> says:
> According to Douglas Sinclair:

> The point wasn't to be unbreakably secure; it was to be UNFINDABLY
> secure.  We convolute an allready encrypted message to the point of
> not being recognizable as cyphertext, then we hide it on the end of
> a file.  We want it to look like garbage.

Cyphertext from any decent system ALREADY looks random. Whats the
point of doing more to it?

Perry




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: fergp@sytex.com (Paul Ferguson)
Date: Wed, 14 Jul 93 14:56:09 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: The right to be secure (fwd Computerworld article)
Message-ID: <HTPo7B2w165w@sytex.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


ComputerWorld
Volume 27, Number 28
July 12, 1993
page 28
Advanced Technology
 
The right to be secure
 
Government-backed data security standard raises Big Brother issues
By James Daly
 
Two months ago, the Clinton administration dropped a bomb on the
world of computer security.
 
In an effort to assist law enforcement officers looking for a
legal back door into coded criminal communications, officials
from the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST)
and the National Security Agency (NSA) said they intend to
establish as a federal standard an approach to voice and data
encryption called "key escrow." This method would require the
technology needed to unlock a coded conversation to be kept by
government-approved agencies and retrieved in the event of
government-approved wiretaps.
 
Data encryption would be done in silicon via a device called the
"Clipper chip," which would be installed in machines needing its
coding and decoding capabilities.
 
To put it mildly, the Clipper chip proposal has generated a lot
of excitement among privacy advocates who fear abuses by a
technologically empowered Big Brother.
 
Computerworld recently tried to talk with officials from both the
NIST and the NSA to further explore the Clipper issue, but
neither allowed a face-to-face interview with a staff member.
Instead, we had to submit written questions.
 
Here are the answers provided by officials from the NIST and the
NSA.
 
Q. The proposed Clipper chip technology has generated an awful
   lot of acrimony since it was announced in April. Has the
   government lessened its level of commitment to the chip?
 
A. The administration remains committed too the initiative and is
   proceeding with the following actions: the acquisition of key
   escrow encryption devices by law enforcement agencies; the
   naming of key escrow agents to hold the keys for the key
   escrow microcircuits and the establishment of procedures by
   the attorney general for the access of the keys; the
   evaluation of the key escrow encryption algorithm by respected
   experts; the promulgation of a standard by the secretary of
   commerce to facilitate the procurement and use of key escrow
   encryption devices in federal communications systems; and the
   comprehensive review of encryption policy.
 
   In addition, discussions with industry and other concerned
   groups have proved very productive. The administration does
   not intend to arbitrarily end its study of the issue while
   helpful consultations are under way.
 
   It should also be understood that the use of products
   implementing the key escrow encryption microcircuit is
   voluntary. There has been no attempt to either mandate its use
   or to deny the entry of other encryption technologies into the
   marketplace.
 
Q. Privacy advocates say that if the keys needed to de-crypt
   data are placed in the hands of government authorities, there
   is the potential for abuse. What kinds of safeguards would be
   implemented to prevent this?
 
A. The government may conduct electronic surveillance only when
   lawfully authorized. Moreover, the key escrow procedures being
   developed provide that each key will be split into two parts,
   and different key escrow authorities will hold each part.
   Neither part alone can be used to decrypt messages.
 
   To obtain the key needed to unlock the encryption, law
   enforcement must present evidence of its authority for a key,
   typically a court order, to both key escrow authorities.
   Finally, the system will be designed to ensure that law
   enforcement destroys the keys it receives when its authority
   to conduct the electronic surveillance has expired.
 
Q. Vendors who have extensive business overseas say they would
   not be able to sell Clipper-equipped machines on foreign
   shores. How do you respond?
 
A. Key-escrowed products will be exportable to U.S. persons and
   companies operating overseas. One issue under consideration in
   the presidential review is whether a broader export policy is
   advisable. Should a broader export policy be adopted, we
   believe products implementing the key escrow technology will
   find favor among consumers who desire the superb encryption
   security offered.
 
Q. If Clipper would be the standard, would the use of non-Clipper
   encryption devices be outlawed? If so, how would you find out
   who was using these non-Clipper devices?
 
A. No. Use of key-escrowed products by the private sector would
   be entirely voluntary. Federal agencies will have the option
   of using this technology once it becomes a Federal Information
   Processing Standard. DES [Data Encryption Standard], the
   existing federal encryption standard, will still be available
   for use in federal systems.
 
Q. Regarding DES, some security experts say that with powerful
   chips such as Pentium already on the market and the 686 and
   786 in design stages, DES is getting near to being crackable.
   Is DES nearing the end of its useful life?
 
A. NIST will recommend that DES be renewed for another five years
   as a Federal Information Processing Standard. We do recognize,
   however, that as computer technology advances, the expected
   effort needed to break DES-encrypted messages decreases. In
   time, DES will become less valuable for securing sensitive
   information.
 
Q. What eventually made DES and other cryptosystems acceptable was
   their ease of use in software. Do you feel companies will be
   willing to go back to the hassle and additional expenses of
   hardware-based cryptography?
 
A. Again, we must emphasize that use of this technology is
   voluntary. Software containing other cryptosystems is still
   available to consumers. As for use of this technology in
   hardware, new products are already being developed to lessen
   the "hassle" of hardware-based cryptography. One example would
   be its use of PCMCIA [Personal Computer Memory Card
   International Association] cards. Moreover, encryption
   implemented in software generally provides less security than
   hardware encryption.
 
Q. What happens when the Clipper chip's technology cannot keep up
   with faster networks and becomes a bottleneck? Do we then have
   to have a multiyear review process wherein we select a
   Clipper-2 chip and retrofit all the devices across the
   country?
 
A. We expect the key escrow microcircuits will be enhanced to keep
   pace with future data requirements. As with the introduction
   of any next-generation technology, consumers will decide the
   extent to which they require, and are willing to pat for, the
   new technology. We do not envision an "across the country"
   retrofit of all devices.
 
Q. What should the role of the government, if any, in developing
   a nationwide computer security policy guideline?
 
A. The government has a strong interest in computer security
   policies in light of the federal agencies' need to protect
   their own information: for law enforcement agencies to
   conduct lawfully authorized electronic intercepts in order to
   combat crime and terrorism; to protect national security
   through export controls of cryptographic technologies; and the
   growing U.S. economic interest in protecting corporations and
   citizens' information that is stored and transmitted
   electronically.
 
   That does not mean, however, that a government-imposed
   security policy is appropriate. Government must be actively
   involved in setting computer security standards for its own
   use and making its technology, expertise and guidance
   available to the private sector when requested and
   appropriate. Private sector organizations can then make
   appropriate risk-based, cost-effective decisions as to
   protecting their information assets.
 

Paul Ferguson               |  "Confidence is the feeling you get
Network Integrator          |   just before you fully understand
Centreville, Virginia USA   |   the problem."
fergp@sytex.com             |      - Murphy's 7th Law of Computing
 
               Quis Custodiet Ipsos Custodes?




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Perry E. Metzger" <pmetzger@lehman.com>
Date: Wed, 14 Jul 93 09:01:14 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Secure comm program, Sockets + LINK
In-Reply-To: <9307132043.aa10612@hermix.markv.com>
Message-ID: <9307141600.AA28360@snark.shearson.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



jpp@markv.com says:
>   The bootstrap problem (how you get the public key to the machine
> with only unsecure chanels at your disposal) is interesting though.  I
> wonder if it can be solved without DH key exchange?

You can't even solve the problem with DH key exchange -- you are
subject to "man in the middle" attacks. You must share SOME
information via a secure channel in order to have both authentication
and privacy on a channel. However, the information exchanged could be
small and fairly one-time -- like the public key of a trusted entity
that signs other public keys.

Perry




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Perry E. Metzger" <pmetzger@lehman.com>
Date: Wed, 14 Jul 93 10:57:08 PDT
To: jim@tadpole.com
Subject: Re: Secure comm program, Sockets + LINK
In-Reply-To: <9307141752.AA00397@ono-sendai>
Message-ID: <9307141756.AA28722@snark.shearson.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



jim@tadpole.com says:
> 
> > You can't even solve the problem with DH key exchange -- you are
> > subject to "man in the middle" attacks. You must share SOME
> > information via a secure channel in order to have both authentication
> > and privacy on a channel. However, the information exchanged could be
> > small and fairly one-time -- like the public key of a trusted entity
> > that signs other public keys.
> 
> How do STU-III phones work then?  Do they have some key in rom?

I dunno enough about STU-III phones. Maybe they don't care about man
in the middle, or maybe they use fixed conventional of some sort for
authentication. I have a vague memory of someone telling me that some
of them have code keys.

However, just as an exercise, I suggest people convince themselves of
how easy it is to play "man in the middle" on a D-H connection. Its
valuable to go through it in your head.

.pm




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: peb@PROCASE.COM (Paul Baclace)
Date: Wed, 14 Jul 93 14:31:11 PDT
To: clark@metal.psu.edu
Subject: Re: Relation between number theory and cryptography
Message-ID: <9307142130.AA08720@banff.procase.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



These are very interesting questions.  I like the idea that the
physical work of encryption and decryption might be accounted for by
the increased entropy of the message.

>Is this affected by whether or not the key is known?

If the key is unknown, then the meaning or affect of the message on the
recipient is that of noise (or more accurately, "this message exists
but you can't read it"), but information theory has nothing to say about
this since it is concerned only with the communication itself.  Perhaps
the AI theory of Language As Action could be connected to information
theory (yeah, recast meaning as communication to a homunculous...)

Somewhere I have a paper on Maxwell's Daemon and Data Compression,
which seems related to this.  I can dig it up if you want a ref.  
(I haven't read it yet; it's ftp available.)


Paul E. Baclace
peb@procase.com





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: smb@research.att.com
Date: Wed, 14 Jul 93 11:36:49 PDT
To: jim@tadpole.com
Subject: Re: Secure comm program, Sockets + LINK
Message-ID: <9307141836.AA25170@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


	 
	 > You can't even solve the problem with DH key exchange -- you are
	 > subject to "man in the middle" attacks. You must share SOME
	 > information via a secure channel in order to have both authenticatio
	n
	 > and privacy on a channel. However, the information exchanged could b
	e
	 > small and fairly one-time -- like the public key of a trusted entity
	 > that signs other public keys.

	 How do STU-III phones work then?  Do they have some key in rom?

RAM, actually.  The phones are keyed for some set of individuals;
these keys are tied to ``crypto ignition keys'' possessed by these
individuals.  When you insert your key, the phone knows who you are,
and transmits a certificate containing your public key to the far
end.  Other information in the certificate includes your security
clearance, and (I think) your name.  On some models at least, the
key storage can be erased instantly by pressing a single button.
The uses for that feature are obvious...

I highly commend this paper to the cypherpunks readership:

@article{Diffie88,
   author = {Whitfield Diffie},
   journal = {Proceedings of the IEEE},
   month = {May},
   number = {5},
   pages = {560--577},
   title = {The First Ten Years of Public Key Cryptography},
   volume = {76},
   year = {1988}
}





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: M..Stirner@f28.n125.z1.FIDONET.ORG (M. Stirner)
Date: Wed, 14 Jul 93 18:16:37 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Mail failed, returning to
Message-ID: <1091.2C449C47@shelter.FIDONET.ORG>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



 Uu> * Reply to msg originally in u_privacy

 AS> Is the anonymous server in Finland (anon@anon.penet.fi) down for good?

 Uu> We shall see.  There may be monkey business afoot.  Charcoal is also
 Uu> down.  We'll see if this message goes through.

Mail to Penet did indeed bounce.

What's going on?  There has been no mail from cypherpunks@toad.com for
well over a week at this site.  Mail to cypherpunks bounces showing
insane routing.  Charcoal is down.  Penet is down.  Most cypherpunks
remailers are down.

What's going on?  Did the cypherpunks piece on The Hightower Report
finally get Deadly Attention?  Anyone?

*********************************************************************
* <m..stirner@f28.n125.z1.fidonet.org> - PGP Key D30909 via servers *
* > What country can preserve its liberties if its rulers are not  <*
* > warned from time to time that their people preserve the spirit <*
* > of resistance?  Let them take arms!" - Thomas Jefferson, 1787  <*
*********************************************************************


___ Blue Wave/QWK v2.12
--  
M. Stirner - via FidoNet node 1:125/1
UUCP: ...!uunet!kumr!shelter!28!M..Stirner
INTERNET: M..Stirner@f28.n125.z1.FIDONET.ORG




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: wcs@anchor.ho.att.com (Bill_Stewart(HOY002)1305)
Date: Wed, 14 Jul 93 14:06:02 PDT
To: pmetzger@lehman.com
Subject: Re: Secure comm program, Sockets + LINK
Message-ID: <9307142023.AA01586@anchor.ho.att.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text


> > How do STU-III phones work then?  Do they have some key in rom?

I don't remember the details (and if I did I'd have to kill you :-),
but they use a little plastic key-shaped dongle that's got some memory in it,
probably EEPROM, which contains keying information.  
Each key works in only a few phones, and each phone only supports a few keys.
The keying information tells it what level of classification the 
phone is authorized for when the key is in it, and phone calls
negotiate that when they set up.  If the phone decides it doesn't like something,
it's able to zero out the key's memory.

> I dunno enough about STU-III phones. Maybe they don't care about man
> in the middle, or maybe they use fixed conventional of some sort for
> authentication. I have a vague memory of someone telling me that some
> of them have code keys.

When you're making a TOP SECRET phone call, you *do* care about man 
in the middle, just as you care about being in a soundproofed room.
The session key exchange is done with Diffie-Hellman with authentication;
I'm not sure if the authentication uses public-key or secret-key technology,
but my guess is it's basic secret-key stuff.  The military version of the phone 
uses classified secret-key algorithms, so presumably the key handling does too.

				Bill



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: jim@tadpole.com
Date: Wed, 14 Jul 93 10:52:57 PDT
To: pmetzger@lehman.com
Subject: Re: Secure comm program, Sockets + LINK
Message-ID: <9307141752.AA00397@ono-sendai>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



> You can't even solve the problem with DH key exchange -- you are
> subject to "man in the middle" attacks. You must share SOME
> information via a secure channel in order to have both authentication
> and privacy on a channel. However, the information exchanged could be
> small and fairly one-time -- like the public key of a trusted entity
> that signs other public keys.

How do STU-III phones work then?  Do they have some key in rom?

Jim




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: TO1SITTLER@APSICC.APS.EDU (Kragen Sittler)
Date: Wed, 14 Jul 93 17:35:23 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: stu-iii phones
Message-ID: <930714183032.189c@APSICC.APS.EDU>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I believe that there is a centralized location keeping track of which phones
have which keys, etc.  Don't quote me, this is just a piece of information that
I ran across somewhere(dunno where) and may be inaccurate.
kragen




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Peter Shipley <shipley@tfs.COM>
Date: Wed, 14 Jul 93 19:20:30 PDT
To: wcs@anchor.ho.att.com (Bill_Stewart(HOY002)1305)
Subject: Re: The right to be secure (fwd Computerworld article)
In-Reply-To: <9307150109.AA04795@anchor.ho.att.com>
Message-ID: <9307150220.AA01203@edev0.tfs.com.TFS>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>   Finally, the system will be designed to ensure that law
>   enforcement destroys the keys it receives when its authority
>   to conduct the electronic surveillance has expired.
> 
>.  It also suggests that keys *can* be kept longer than court
>orders permit if the attorney general wants.
>

if also suggests there no safeguard in the system for keys to expire;
thus an underground can form for keys since there is no expiration date.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Michael Glazer <72440.2236@CompuServe.COM>
Date: Wed, 14 Jul 93 16:53:23 PDT
To: The list <cypherpunks@toad.com>
Subject: PGP
Message-ID: <930714235026_72440.2236_EHB28-1@CompuServe.COM>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Folks,

	I'm trying to learn more about practical cryptography in general 
and PGP and similar programs in particular.  Any advice?

	Thanks in advance.

		Michael




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: wet!naga (Peter Davidson)
Date: Wed, 14 Jul 93 20:27:24 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: PGP tutorial
Message-ID: <m0oGJst-0007IhC@wet.uucp>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


 
>Date: 14 Jul 93 19:50:26 EDT
>From: Michael Glazer <72440.2236@CompuServe.COM>
>Subject: PGP
>
>Folks,
>
>    I'm trying to learn more about practical cryptography in general
>    and PGP and similar programs in particular.  Any advice?
 
@article{Nathan92,
   author = {Paco Xander Nathan},
   journal = {Fringeware Review},
   month = {July},
   number = {1},
   pages = {17--18},
   title = {Tutorial: PGP},
   volume = {1},
   year = {1992}
 
Fringeware Review is available for $3.50 from
Fringeware Inc., P. O. Box 49921, Austin, TX 78765
(512-477-1366, fringeware@wixer.bga.com)
 
This issue also has articles on inter-experiential snorkeling,
cruzin' the internet, email lists, tom jennings, the abolition
of work, mind control, cyborganics, melt-o-media and even cypherpunx.





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: wcs@anchor.ho.att.com (Bill_Stewart(HOY002)1305)
Date: Wed, 14 Jul 93 18:51:31 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: The right to be secure (fwd Computerworld article)
Message-ID: <9307150109.AA04795@anchor.ho.att.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text


Paul Ferguson sent out a copy of a ComputerWorld article "The right to be secure"
(ComputerWorld, Volume 27, Number 28, July 12, 1993, page 28, James Daly),
which had NIST/NSA Q&A on Clipper.   A couple things were mildly interesting
(assertion that use of escrow products would be voluntary (if we can trust them)),
but one was complex and nasty:
   To obtain the key needed to unlock the encryption, law
   enforcement must present evidence of its authority for a key,
   typically a court order, to both key escrow authorities.
   ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
   Finally, the system will be designed to ensure that law
   enforcement destroys the keys it receives when its authority
   to conduct the electronic surveillance has expired.
 
"Typically", of course, means "not always", and it's coupled with the phrase
"establishment of procedures by the attorney general for the access of the keys"
in a previous answer, which means that anything the attorney general wants,
he can get.  It also suggests that keys *can* be kept longer than court
orders permit if the attorney general wants.

			Bill Stewart



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: hfinney@shell.portal.com
Date: Wed, 14 Jul 93 21:50:10 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Relation between number theory and cryptography
Message-ID: <9307150419.AA29734@jobe.shell.portal.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Clark Reynard, <clark@metal.psu.edu>, asks about information and cryptography.

As I see it, a cyphertext has at most the same information as the sum of
the original message, the key, and the encryption algorithm.  Without
knowing the key a cyphertext may appear random, but actually it is not.
If it is the encryption of a lower-information plaintext (such as English
text) then it still basically possesses that low level of information, it's
just not obvious how to compress it.

It's not unusual for different compression algorithms to achieve very different
levels of compression.  In a sense, these different algorithms disagree
about the amount of information in the original data.  We discussed digitized
speech here some time back.  Ordinary compression algorithms such as Lempel-
Ziv or Huffman encoding don't compress digitized speech much at all.  Special
algorithms such as linear predictive coding can achieve great compression.

In the same way, there is no contradiction between the fact that an encrypted
file looks random and incompressible, and the fact that knowing the key it
becomes clear that the file actually can be compressed.  Any calculation of
the information content of a file can only be considered an upper bound.
A more clever algorithm may always exist which will reveal the data to have
much less information than was originally thought.  This is basically the
situation you have when faced with an encrypted file for which you don't
have the key.

Hal Finney
hfinney@shell.portal.com




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: peter honeyman <honey@citi.umich.edu>
Date: Wed, 14 Jul 93 19:02:10 PDT
To: Michael Glazer <72440.2236@CompuServe.COM>
Subject: Re: PGP
Message-ID: <9307150202.AA02423@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


my advice is to obtain a copy of pgp, play with it, and read the docs.

the sci.crypt faq is also valuable.

	peter




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: J. Michael Diehl <mdiehl@triton.unm.edu>
Date: Wed, 14 Jul 93 22:24:12 PDT
To: hfinney@shell.portal.com
Subject: Re: Relation between number theory and cryptography
In-Reply-To: <9307150419.AA29734@jobe.shell.portal.com>
Message-ID: <9307150524.AA03608@triton.unm.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


According to hfinney@shell.portal.com:
> Clark Reynard, <clark@metal.psu.edu>, asks about information and cryptography.
> 
> As I see it, a cyphertext has at most the same information as the sum of
> the original message, the key, and the encryption algorithm.  Without
> knowing the key a cyphertext may appear random, but actually it is not.
> If it is the encryption of a lower-information plaintext (such as English
> text) then it still basically possesses that low level of information, it's
> just not obvious how to compress it.

Well, you may have placed an upper-limit on the amount of information in an
encrypted message.  I will try to place a lower limit.  Consider the case where
there is less information in the ciphertext than in the plaintext.  Clearly, in
this case, there is no way to retrieve the entire plaintext from the ciphertext
since we no longer have enough information.  So we have to have at least as much
information in the CT as we do in the PT.  If I bought your original arguement,
I'd have to say there is no net change in information content.  Unfortunately,
I don't buy your arguement.

What if we were to add some noise in the process of crypting the PT?  If we did
it algorithmicly, we have added some kind of information to your CP, totally 
unrelated to the actuall message.  But nontheless, it is information of SOME
type; it may simply be 0xFE if the message was writen in the daytime or 0xAC
if not.  This is information in a very "uncompressed" form.  Strictly speaking
this is only 1 bit of information encoded into a byte, but the net result is a 
gain in information content in our CT.

I don't know, is there a flaw in my reasoning?

Laters.

+-----------------------+-----------------------------+---------+
| J. Michael Diehl ;-)  | I thought I was wrong once. | PGP KEY |
| mdiehl@triton.unm.edu |   But, I was mistaken.      |available|
| mike.diehl@fido.org   |                             | Ask Me! |
| (505) 299-2282        +-----------------------------+---------+
|                                                               |
+------"I'm just looking for the opportunity to be -------------+
|            Politically Incorrect!"   <Me>                     |
+-----If codes are outlawed, only criminals wil have codes.-----+
+----Is Big Brother in your phone?  If you don't know, ask me---+



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: M..Stirner@f28.n125.z1.FIDONET.ORG (M. Stirner)
Date: Thu, 15 Jul 93 00:58:15 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: mail failed, returnin
Message-ID: <1107.2C450191@shelter.FIDONET.ORG>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain




 >What's going on?  There has been no mail from cypherpunks@toad.com for
 >well over a week at this site.  Mail to cypherpunks bounces showing

 Uu> There is substantial daily volume on cypherpunks.  Maybe some
 Uu> machine on the way...

Presumably, this is the case, though why mail is bouncing from so many
places all of a sudden when sent from all over the country, I can't say.
I was able to get pings back from penet today after having mail there
bounce.  I was writing in response to a complaint from another user in
the midwest who could no longer get mail to run through penet.
.   Charcoal's still not working.
.   Mail has stopped bouncing at cypherpunks@toad.com apparently, though
the site that receives cypherpunks for me has been getting nothing for
over two weeks.  Seems I can send, but that's it.
.   <sigh!>
*********************************************************************
* <m..stirner@f28.n125.z1.fidonet.org> - PGP Key D30909 via servers *
* > What country can preserve its liberties if its rulers are not  <*
* > warned from time to time that their people preserve the spirit <*
* > of resistance?  Let them take arms!" - Thomas Jefferson, 1787  <*
*********************************************************************


___ Blue Wave/QWK v2.12
--  
M. Stirner - via FidoNet node 1:125/1
UUCP: ...!uunet!kumr!shelter!28!M..Stirner
INTERNET: M..Stirner@f28.n125.z1.FIDONET.ORG




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: J. Michael Diehl <mdiehl@triton.unm.edu>
Date: Wed, 14 Jul 93 22:36:32 PDT
To: pmetzger@lehman.com
Subject: Re: xor data hiding?
In-Reply-To: <9307141547.AA28336@snark.shearson.com>
Message-ID: <9307150536.AA03891@triton.unm.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


According to Perry E. Metzger:
> J. Michael Diehl <mdiehl@triton.unm.edu> says:
> > According to Douglas Sinclair:
> > The point wasn't to be unbreakably secure; it was to be UNFINDABLY
> > secure.  We convolute an allready encrypted message to the point of
> > not being recognizable as cyphertext, then we hide it on the end of
> > a file.  We want it to look like garbage.
> 
> Cyphertext from any decent system ALREADY looks random. Whats the
> point of doing more to it?

Many encryption tools such as ripem, pgp, and dolphin can recognize their own
output...which indicates that there is a footprint to that particular
implimentation.

+-----------------------+-----------------------------+---------+
| J. Michael Diehl ;-)  | I thought I was wrong once. | PGP KEY |
| mdiehl@triton.unm.edu |   But, I was mistaken.      |available|
| mike.diehl@fido.org   |                             | Ask Me! |
| (505) 299-2282        +-----------------------------+---------+
|                                                               |
+------"I'm just looking for the opportunity to be -------------+
|            Politically Incorrect!"   <Me>                     |
+-----If codes are outlawed, only criminals wil have codes.-----+
+----Is Big Brother in your phone?  If you don't know, ask me---+



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: mike@EGFABT.ORG (Mike Sherwood)
Date: Thu, 15 Jul 93 00:43:47 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: xor data hiding?
In-Reply-To: <9307150536.AA03891@triton.unm.edu>
Message-ID: <0HwP7B2w165w@EGFABT.ORG>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


J. Michael Diehl <mdiehl@triton.unm.edu> writes:

> Many encryption tools such as ripem, pgp, and dolphin can recognize their own
> output...which indicates that there is a footprint to that particular
> implimentation.

in this case, you're just trying to garble what people see so why not 
just xor "hello, world." /bin/csh or \command.com on top of it to avhieve 
that result.  No need for anything significant, I mean, if you xor 'X' 
over the whole thing, you've achieved the same result - after all, if 
someone wants to xor 'X' to knock that level of encryption(if I may call 
simple substitution "encryption") then it's fair to assume that the 
person knows it's cyphertext and they want the information below it, so 
that's a good place to use some decent encryption.. "congratulations, you 
have found the secret message. send the answer to old pink care of the 
funny farm" (Pink Floyd, The Wall (backmasking)) is what readily comes to 
mind when i see what you're getting at.. after all, searching a disk for 
data that fits specific patterns is one thing, figuring out that one of 
the index files for a database program with literally hundreds of 
database files and indecies (I used to work on programming such a 
database, so I know they exist and that they are a perfect hiding place 
for just about everything) is actually an encrypted file isn't a walk in 
the park.  anyway, enough babbling - hope some of it makes sense. =)
the park


--
Mike Sherwood
internet: mike@EGFABT.ORG     uucp: ...!sgiblab!egfabt!mike





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: ""L. Detweiler"" <ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Date: Thu, 15 Jul 93 00:27:05 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: reaction to Infoworld NIST/NSA queries
Message-ID: <9307150726.AA12754@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


This is very interesting information, because it is extremely current
and represents the first direct reactions by the behind-the-scenes
authorities on some crucial aspects of Clipper and its scalding reception.

>   It should also be understood that the use of products
>   implementing the key escrow encryption microcircuit is
>   voluntary. There has been no attempt to either mandate its use
>   or to deny the entry of other encryption technologies into the
>   marketplace.

Note in the answer to `has acrimony lessened the government commitment'
the feeble whimpering ultimately falls back on the aspect that it is
voluntary. Ah, the last refuge of these scoundrels! If there are any
plans to restrict or limit domestic cryptography, the policy-makers
(and I use the term loosely) are painting themselves into a corner. If
the only redeeming feature of Clipper is that it is voluntary, then
anything less is wholly unredeeming! But again, the text conspicuously
does not rule out that option.

>   Finally, the system will be designed to ensure that law
>   enforcement destroys the keys it receives when its authority
>   to conduct the electronic surveillance has expired.

Correct me if I'm wrong, but this is the first time I've seen any
official indication of this requirement to `destroy keys after
surveillance' -- this *is* clearly an extremely serious weakness with
the scheme, and I don't use past tense there because this lip service
doesn't remedy it in the least. However, we can take consolation: it
appears there have been direct responses to the criticisms of the key
escrow aspects. In fact, they appear to have the key-escrow issues
thought out to the least (hence my very uneasy suspicions), were
surprised by the focused critical analysis, and have been consistently
attempting to strengthen the `baroque activities in a vault' (as one
esteemed cypherpunk put it). The attempts look a little bit like
desperate scramblings to me. They still don't have a clue on the escrow agencies!

>   Should a broader export policy be adopted, we
>   believe products implementing the key escrow technology will
>   find favor among consumers who desire the superb encryption
>   security offered.
 
`superb'? hee, hee. First claim of security outside of the `superior to
many other schemes on the market' weasel quote in the announcement.
This sounds like vintage Sternlight.

>Q. If Clipper would be the standard, would the use of non-Clipper
>   encryption devices be outlawed? If so, how would you find out
>   who was using these non-Clipper devices?
> 
>A. No. Use of key-escrowed products by the private sector would
>   be entirely voluntary.

here they appear to be directly suggesting that they will *not* attempt
domestic cryptographic restriction. (?)

>   Federal agencies will have the option
>   of using this technology once it becomes a Federal Information
>   Processing Standard.

This little FIPS thing (Federal Information Processing Standard) is
clearly very important to all the Clipper conspirators right now
(Bidzos is plugging it too, and it was in the PKP-NSA-DSA patent
agreement announcement). Is there some way to sabotage the FIPS
process? Cypherpunks, this is a critical window.

>A. NIST will recommend that DES be renewed for another five years
>   as a Federal Information Processing Standard.

wow, I don't recall seeing that before.

>A. Again, we must emphasize that use of this technology is
>   voluntary. Software containing other cryptosystems is still
>   available to consumers.

they plug the `voluntary' bit so much here you'd think they're talking
about Bush's Thousand Points of Light.

>A. We expect the key escrow microcircuits will be enhanced to keep
>   pace with future data requirements.

hee, hee. They can't even keep up with *current* requirements. The
chips last for an astonishingly durable 2 days. (Actually, with Clipper
this is a very attractive feature!)

>   That does not mean, however, that a government-imposed
>   security policy is appropriate. Government must be actively
>   involved in setting computer security standards for its own
>   use and making its technology, expertise and guidance
>   available to the private sector when requested and
>   appropriate.

wow. At first I thought this was a typo and the statement was supposed
to be `does not mean it is *in*appropriate'.  `when requested and
appropriate'? Good lord, is this the NSA talking or did they have the
day off? Maybe they actually understand they have no domestic legal
regulatory standing whatsoever.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: ""L. Detweiler"" <ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Date: Thu, 15 Jul 93 00:40:54 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Clip the Clipper Consortium
Message-ID: <9307150740.AA13067@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



This is an AP news release on the industry rumblings we've been hearing
about. Novell, AT&T, Citicorp, Hughes Aircraft, Motorola? European
Community? British Ministry of Defense? ye gads! (Does GCHQ know about
this? Maybe they're not into jumping off bridges like their friend NSA.)

[anonymous `White House' Clipper sympathizer]
>           ``I think this won't drive us crazy,'' the official said.
>``We'll look at this and evaluate it on its technical merits.''

hee, hee. Sounds like a hardware engineer in a competing cryptography
company. These people simultaneously reside in the U.S. government and
Fantasy Land. (Don't you just love that `we're giving this thorough
evaluation' phrase? with Clipper it was `hm, what can we actually get
away with?' here it's a euphemism for `what the hell are we going to do?')

The 64k question of course: what's the CCC algorithm?

p.s. if anyone could pass on the Markoff NYT article on the same please post it.

===cut=here===

Group To Set Rules For Computer Encoding<
           NEW YORK (AP) _ Novell Inc., the leader in network software for
corporate computer systems, is set to reveal plans for protecting
information stored in computers or transmitted over networks,
according to a published report.
           Novell, leading an international industry group, was to make the
announcement in New York on Wednesday, The New York Times reported
Tuesday.
           The announcement was seen as an indirect challenge to the
Clinton Administration's effort to impose a national encoding
standard for computer and telephone communications, the newspaper
said.
           The other companies involved are AT&T, Computer Associates,
Citicorp, Hughes Aircraft, Motorola and smaller firms specializing
in data security.
           Representatives from the European Community standard setting
committee and the British Ministry of Defense were also to
participate in the announcement.
           Computer and communications companies, as well as corporate
users of information technology, are worried about the government's
plan, which would enable it to use wiretaps with a court's
authorization, the newspaper said.
           But an unidentified White House official told the Times that the
administration could live with the move.
           ``I think this won't drive us crazy,'' the official said.
``We'll look at this and evaluate it on its technical merits.''
           The government can influence the use of communications encoding
standards by controlling what types of hardware and software that
companies can export, but it has no legal means of imposing its own
standard or of blocking the development of an industry standard.







From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Johan Helsingius <julf@penet.FI>
Date: Wed, 14 Jul 93 21:42:53 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Anon down - and up again
In-Reply-To: <1091.2C449C47@shelter.FIDONET.ORG>
Message-ID: <9307150635.aa05832@penet.penet.FI>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



<m..stirner@f28.n125.z1.fidonet.org> (with a broken return address)
writes:

> Mail to Penet did indeed bounce.

Yes. I had a major system failure due to the temperature in the machine
room getting close to 90F. The main disk and the CPU board failed. To
recover, I have now changed to a new, more powerful machine (again),
and while doing that I also changed the OS from Interactive's crap to
BSDI.

So anon.penet.fi is back again. There might be minor problems due to the
new OS.

	Julf






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Mike Johnson <exabyte!smtplink!mikej@uunet.UU.NET>
Date: Thu, 15 Jul 93 09:12:43 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Information theory and cryptography
Message-ID: <9307150941.A01243@smtplink.exabyte.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Robert W. Clark asks:
> I asked this one a while back and got no response.  sci.crypt
> was equally unresponsive.  It concerns the possibly obscure
> relation between cryptography, number theory and information
> theory.
> 
> Is there considered to be a one-to-one isomorphism between
> the units in a plaintext-cyphertext pair?  By this, I mean,
> are they considered to contain the same information?
>
> Is this affected by whether or not the key is known?  If the
> key has been irretrievably lost, does this lessen the amount
> of information, or does the 'potential' informational content
> remain the same?

If you have the proper algorithm and key, then the same information can be
derived from both.  There may be additional information added to the
cipher text that is not relevant to the plain text if _noise addition_ is
used in the encryption.  The noise is stripped out on decryption.  Likewise,
data compression may be involved, so the cipher text may be smaller or larger
in physical size, but will contain the same information.  Note that strictly
speaking, the information in the plain text is conveyed by the combination of
the ciphertext, the key, and the algorithm used.  Take any of these away, and
you lose information.  In most cases, loss of the algorithm is not an issue,
but if you forget, lose, or damage either the key or the ciphertext, you have
reduced the useful information content, possibly to zero.

> Is cryptography considered to be as simple as, say, Huffman
> coding, for purposes of informational content?  That is, is
> the relationship between the units of a plaintext-cyphertext
> pair considered to be more or less 'transparent,' or entirely
> isomorphic?

Sort of.  If I encrypt my communications with Alice, and you don't have the
key, then the information content of the message for Alice (who has the key)
is the same as the plain text, but for you the information content is zero
unless you crack the encryption scheme.

> Does the Second Law of Thermodynamics enter into this?  Is there
> a minimum amount of energy required to extract information from
> cyphertext, or a minimum amount of waste of energy?

Decryption _always_ consumes energy (electrical, mechanical, biological or
whatever).  Do you have a computer that uses no electricity, heat, light, or
sound, does not eat, and involves no mechanical work?  If so, patent it quick
and sell it!  Don't confuse thermodynamic and information theory entropy,
though.  They are mathmatically similar, but measure different things.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
Mike Johnson       | Opinions expressed herein are mine, and come with no
mikej@exabyte.com  | warranty, expressed or implied.  PGP key on request.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Perry E. Metzger" <pmetzger@lehman.com>
Date: Thu, 15 Jul 93 06:50:02 PDT
To: wet!naga@ai.mit.edu (Peter Davidson)
Subject: Re: PGP tutorial
In-Reply-To: <m0oGJst-0007IhC@wet.uucp>
Message-ID: <9307151349.AA05001@snark.shearson.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Rather than pointing people to strange publications we've never heard
of written by authors without credentials, might I suggest...

1) The PGP docs themselves are very good and far better as a tutorial
   on cryptography than any of the "PGP tutorials" that have appeared
   in the fringe literature. They are also free.

2) Read a real text on cryptography. It isn't a childrens game. Its a
   real branch of math and computer science, and really bright people
   devote their lives to it. If you wanted to learn about medicine,
   would you pick up a professional medical text, or something written
   in a 'zine by people you hadn't heard of?


Perry

Peter Davidson says:
>  
> >Date: 14 Jul 93 19:50:26 EDT
> >From: Michael Glazer <72440.2236@CompuServe.COM>
> >Subject: PGP
> >
> >Folks,
> >
> >    I'm trying to learn more about practical cryptography in general
> >    and PGP and similar programs in particular.  Any advice?
>  
> @article{Nathan92,
>    author = {Paco Xander Nathan},
>    journal = {Fringeware Review},
>    month = {July},
>    number = {1},
>    pages = {17--18},
>    title = {Tutorial: PGP},
>    volume = {1},
>    year = {1992}
>  
> Fringeware Review is available for $3.50 from
> Fringeware Inc., P. O. Box 49921, Austin, TX 78765
> (512-477-1366, fringeware@wixer.bga.com)
>  
> This issue also has articles on inter-experiential snorkeling,
> cruzin' the internet, email lists, tom jennings, the abolition
> of work, mind control, cyborganics, melt-o-media and even cypherpunx.
> 




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Perry E. Metzger" <pmetzger@lehman.com>
Date: Thu, 15 Jul 93 07:05:31 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: xor data hiding?
In-Reply-To: <9307150536.AA03891@triton.unm.edu>
Message-ID: <9307151405.AA05028@snark.shearson.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



J. Michael Diehl <mdiehl@triton.unm.edu> says:
> According to Perry E. Metzger:
> > J. Michael Diehl <mdiehl@triton.unm.edu> says:
> > > According to Douglas Sinclair:
> > > The point wasn't to be unbreakably secure; it was to be UNFINDABLY
> > > secure.  We convolute an allready encrypted message to the point of
> > > not being recognizable as cyphertext, then we hide it on the end of
> > > a file.  We want it to look like garbage.
> > 
> > Cyphertext from any decent system ALREADY looks random. Whats the
> > point of doing more to it?
> 
> Many encryption tools such as ripem, pgp, and dolphin can recognize their own
> output...which indicates that there is a footprint to that particular
> implimentation.

Intentionally. They INTENTIONALLY put magic numbers at the head of the
file. If you remove that, the file is random. You can hack PGP not to
use headers if you really want to. Proposing some useless cryptosystem
just to hide the headers is completely unneeded.

Perry





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Francis.Toy@f28.n125.z1.FIDONET.ORG (Francis Toy)
Date: Thu, 15 Jul 93 12:59:15 PDT
To: Cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Sci-fi needs your help!
Message-ID: <1124.2C45B2F0@shelter.FIDONET.ORG>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I know that this is probably not the appropriate time or place to post,
however, if you are a true lover of Science Fiction literature, please
access the FIDONET SCI-FI LIT conference on your local BBS(if available).
Things are more or less dead over there, and stand a chance of disappearing
altogether without your support(posting messages)!

F.
---
 * SLMR 2.1a * Press any key to continue or any other key to quit
--  
Francis Toy - via FidoNet node 1:125/1
UUCP: ...!uunet!kumr!shelter!28!Francis.Toy
INTERNET: Francis.Toy@f28.n125.z1.FIDONET.ORG




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: poc@im.lcs.mit.edu (Physics of Computation Seminar)
Date: Thu, 15 Jul 93 10:40:36 EDT
To: msgs@bourbaki.mit.edu
Subject: Physics of Computation Seminar, Monday July 19
Message-ID: <2fe020320280403b997bad55d2966fce@NO-ID-FOUND.mhonarc.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain




		MIT PHYSICS OF COMPUTATION SEMINAR

		Date: Monday, July 19
		Time: 11AM
		Room: 4-270


    Quantum versus Classical Information: a Fruitful Dichotomy

    Charles H. Bennett
    IBM Research, Yorktown Heights

    Abstract:

    Classical information (the kind in newspapers) and quantum
    information (carried by certain states of elementary particles
    such as photons) are very different.  Classical information can
    be read, copied, and transcribed into any medium, but it cannot
    be sent faster than the speed of light.  Quantum information
    cannot be read or copied without disturbing it, but in some
    instances can propagate instantaneously or even backward in time.
    Together the two kinds of information can perform several feats
    that neither could do alone.  These include quantum cryptographic
    systems, some of which have already been built, in which privacy
    of communications is guaranteed by the uncertainty principle; and
    a new technique, "quantum teleportation", by which an unknown
    quantum state (eg a photon of unknown polarization), can be dismembered
    into purely classical and purely nonclassical parts, transmitted
    through separate channels to a new location, and recombined there to
    produce a perfect reincarnation of the original state.


    Host:  Norm Margolus, MIT Lab for Computer Science


This talk is part of a new seminar series on adapting computers and
computations to the constraints of, and opportunities afforded by,
microphysics; and on the development and application of the physical theory
of computation and information.  Please forward this notice to anyone who
you think might be interested.  Anyone who wishes to be added to the
distribution list for these seminar announcements should send email to
"poc@im.lcs.mit.edu".

This series is being sponsored by the MIT Information Mechanics Group (Lab
for Computer Science), in conjunction with the MIT Physics and Media Group
(Media Lab), the MIT Porous Flow Project (Earth, Atmospheric and Planetary
Sciences), and the Mathematical Sciences Research Group at Thinking
Machines Corporation.



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: collins@newton.apple.com (Scott Collins)
Date: Fri, 16 Jul 93 15:48:22 PDT
To: J. Michael Diehl <mdiehl@triton.unm.edu>
Subject: Re: Relation between number theory and cryptography
Message-ID: <9307151822.AA03311@newton.apple.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


J. Michael Diehl <mdiehl@triton.unm.edu> writes:

  >if we were to add some noise [then] we have added [...] information

Perhaps in 'Information Relativity'.  With respect to the original system
(and by definition), noise is not information.  It is only data.


Scott Collins         | "Few people realize what tremendous power there
                      |  is in one of these things."     -- Willy Wonka
......................|................................................
BUSINESS.   voice:408.862.0540  fax:974.6094   collins@newton.apple.com
Apple Computer, Inc.   1 Infinite Loop, MS 301-2C   Cupertino, CA 95014
.......................................................................
PERSONAL.   voice/fax:408.257.1746                  catalyst@netcom.com
.......................................................................
QUOTING.    Full text of sources upon request.  You may quote if you do
the same *and* include this notice so your readers may quote similarly.





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: crunch@netcom.com (John Draper)
Date: Thu, 15 Jul 93 11:24:20 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Need info ASAP
Message-ID: <9307151824.AA16233@netcom4.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



  I am putting final touches on the Cypherpunks flyer,  and need the
following information.

The address,  phone number,  and Email adddess of:

  a) CPSR
  b) EFF
  c) Cypherpunks
  
Naturally I have the Email address of the Cypherpunks,  but I also need
a non-computer address,  or phone number where non-computer folks can
contact on how they can:

  a) Support the cypherpunks cause
  b) Obtain copies of PGP
  c) Or help out in other ways.

I need this info ASAP,  as I only have access to Lazerwriter today only.

I would appreciate a phone call if possible as well as Email.

Time is of the essence...

Crunch




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: peb@PROCASE.COM (Paul Baclace)
Date: Thu, 15 Jul 93 11:29:13 PDT
To: wcs@anchor.ho.att.com
Subject: Re: The right to be secure (fwd Computerworld article)
Message-ID: <9307151828.AA08970@banff.procase.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



>>   typically a court order, to both key escrow authorities.

>"Typically", of course, means "not always", and it's coupled with the phrase

I think they must be implicitly refering to the anti terrorist act
which allows surveillence without a court order if national security
is involved or if foreign nationals are involved, etc.





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: ggoebel@sun1.ruf.uni-freiburg.de (Garrett Goebel)
Date: Thu, 15 Jul 93 02:37:38 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: unsub (request-cypherpunks not working)
Message-ID: <9307150937.AA04241@sun1.ruf.uni-freiburg.de>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text


Please unsubscribe me.

I am leaving this node Saturday.  for one month, mail
from this list will be thrown to /dev/null, thereafter
if will bounce back to the list.

I have tried the request address... I have writen Eric
PLEASE UNSUBSCRIBE ME...

Garrett

-- 
C. Garrett Goebel
<ggoebel@sun1.ruf.uni-freiburg.de>



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: peb@PROCASE.COM (Paul Baclace)
Date: Thu, 15 Jul 93 11:41:06 PDT
To: nick@martigny.ai.mit.edu
Subject: Re: Relation between number theory and cryptography
Message-ID: <9307151840.AA08973@banff.procase.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain




>Maxwell's Daemon and Data Compression.

I'm still looking...sorry, my WAIS index to postscript files isn't working
yet...too bad most tech reports have names like tr93.21.ps and are not
grep-able due to kerning, and I always compress them with gzip -9.

For all the theoretical types out there, see quantum crypto abstract below.

Paul E. Baclace
peb@procase.com

----- Begin Included Message -----




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: wet!naga (Peter Davidson)
Date: Thu, 15 Jul 93 12:06:56 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Reply to Perry
Message-ID: <m0oGYY0-000Er3C@wet.uucp>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



 
In reply to:
 
> >Date: 14 Jul 93 19:50:26 EDT
> >From: Michael Glazer <72440.2236@CompuServe.COM>
> >Subject: PGP
> >
> >Folks,
> >
> >    I'm trying to learn more about practical cryptography in general
> >    and PGP and similar programs in particular.  Any advice?
>
> @article{Nathan92,
>    author = {Paco Xander Nathan},
>    journal = {Fringeware Review},
>    month = {July},
>    number = {1},
>    pages = {17--18},
>    title = {Tutorial: PGP},
>    volume = {1},
>    year = {1992}
 
BTW the year should be 1993.  This issue of Fringeware Review
has just been released.
 
>
> Fringeware Review is available for $3.50 from
> Fringeware Inc., P. O. Box 49921, Austin, TX 78765
> (512-477-1366, fringeware@wixer.bga.com)
>
> This issue also has articles on inter-experiential snorkeling,
> cruzin' the internet, email lists, tom jennings, the abolition
> of work, mind control, cyborganics, melt-o-media and even cypherpunx.
 
Perry Metzger writes:
 
>Rather than pointing people to strange publications we've never heard
>of written by authors without credentials, might I suggest...
>
>1) The PGP docs themselves are very good and far better as a tutorial
>   on cryptography than any of the "PGP tutorials" that have appeared
>   in the fringe literature. They are also free.
>
>2) Read a real text on cryptography. It isn't a childrens game. Its a
>   real branch of math and computer science, and really bright people
>   devote their lives to it. If you wanted to learn about medicine,
>   would you pick up a professional medical text, or something written
>   in a 'zine by people you hadn't heard of?
 
Over the last few months I have noticed that Perry loses no opportunity
to say something negative.  It looks like you have a personality
problem, Perry.  Have you talked with your therapist lately?
 
Since you saw fit to post this criticism in public, I'll reply here.
 
1.  Many cypherpunks, being cypherpunks, are interested in "strange
publications" - especially those containing reports on the emerging
alternative culture - which you are apparently contemptuous of
(as of much else).
 
2.  If you've never heard of Fringeware then why display your ignorance?
 
3.  If you've never seen the article mentioned, and know nothing of
the author, on what basis do you claim that the author is without
credentials?  Because he publishes in a magazine with "Fringe" in
the title?  You're obviously prejudiced, Perry.
 
4.  Does it require an advanced degree in mathematics to write a clear
and lucid tutorial for those interested in using PGP?
 
5.  Is reading "a real text on cryptography" necessary in order to
learn to use PGP?  Your remark suggests it is, which is likely to
discourage people from using PGP rather than encourage them.
 
6.  Is the exchange of encrypted messages a branch of computer
science?  Why suggest that one has to study math to use PGP?
 
7.  Why don't you try to make a positive contribution to cypherpunks
instead of being continuously obnoxious?  I'm probably not the only
one here who thinks you're an asshole.
 




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: wet!naga (Peter Davidson)
Date: Thu, 15 Jul 93 12:14:42 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Information-content of ciphertext
Message-ID: <m0oGYfO-0001kWC@wet.uucp>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



 
>From: Mike Johnson <exabyte!smtplink!mikej@uunet.uu.net>
>To: cypherpunks@toad.com
>Subject: Information theory and cryptography
>
>Robert W. Clark asks:
>> ...
>> Is this affected by whether or not the key is known?  If the
>> key has been irretrievably lost, does this lessen the amount
>> of information, or does the 'potential' informational content
>> remain the same?
>
>If you have the proper algorithm and key, then the same information can be
>derived from both.  ...
>the information in the plain text is conveyed by the combination of
>the ciphertext, the key, and the algorithm used.  Take any of these away, and
>you lose information.  In most cases, loss of the algorithm is not an issue,
>but if you forget, lose, or damage either the key or the ciphertext, you have
>reduced the useful information content, possibly to zero.
 
Yes.  Remember what information is (in the real world): it is what
reduces our uncertainty about things, it is what allows us to exclude
some things from the realm of what we take to be the case.  An object
contains information only in the context of some method to use that
object to reduce uncertainty.  Thus a piece of ciphertext may contain
information for Joe if he knows how to convert it to plaintext. If
Fred does not know this then for Fred the ciphertext contains no
information, since he is just as uncertain about the world after
receiving the ciphertext as he was before.
 
Information is information only if you can access it.  What was not
informative may become informative, and vice-versa.  It makes no sense
to think of information independently of a representational agent
(something which represents a state-of-affairs to itself) who is or
can be informed by it.
 
Mathematicians have a mathematical definition of information, but
mathematicians live in an ideal world, so their definition of
information is different from that of the rest of us.
 
 




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: crunch@netcom.com (John Draper)
Date: Thu, 15 Jul 93 12:23:04 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Final flyer
Message-ID: <9307151923.AA24672@netcom4.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Thanx to the wonderful fast action on the part of the Cypherpunks and SFRavers
I now have the final copy and flyer printed up to hand out at raves,  and other
social events.    The flyer has following information...


Keep "Big Brother" out of your face


If you have a computer and modem,   use Electronic mail,   or keep personal 
data on your computer,  it may soon be illegal for you to protect it by 
using personal encryption programs,  if our snoopy government has their way.

Last April,  the Clinton Administration proposed a new Encryption chip 
called the "Clipper chip" which permits authorities with a "Master key" 
which unlocks encrypted data.  Would you trust your authorities with a 
key to your house?   Of course not!!

Ravers should take note that our group of "Freedom fighters" called 
"Cypherpunks" are making important tools available you can use now 
to protect your sensitive mail and data that cannot be unlocked using 
this so called "Master key" scheme.

The Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF),  and Computer Professionals 
for Social Responsibility (CPSR),  are important lobby organizations 
dedicated to keeping our government in check and preserving our 
privacy. They need your support.   Please contact them at address below.

Our goals are to get the word out,  and get as many people as possible 
to use simple encryption tools like PGP (Pretty Good Privacy) so our 
government cannot make their use illegal.  This program PGP, is 
available on PC-DOS, Macintosh, and UNIX computer systems free of 
charge.  Look for PGP distribution booths at future raves,  and 
spread the word.

For more information,  contact:

CPSR
PO Box 717
Palo Alto, Ca. 94301
(415) 322-3778
cpsr@cpsr.org

EFF
1001 G. Street NW suite 950 E.
Washington DC, 20001
(202) 347-5400
eff@eff.org


Cypherpunks
cypherpunks-request@toad.com

--- end ---





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: cdodhner@indirect.com (Christian D. Odhner)
Date: Thu, 15 Jul 93 13:11:16 PDT
To: peb@PROCASE.COM (Paul Baclace)
Subject: Re: The right to be secure (fwd Computerworld article)
In-Reply-To: <9307151828.AA08970@banff.procase.com>
Message-ID: <9307152009.AA15744@indirect.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> I think they must be implicitly refering to the anti terrorist act
> which allows surveillence without a court order if national security
> is involved or if foreign nationals are involved, etc.

Of course, anything, such as a certain DEC machine, could be construed as
a threat to national security...

Wouldn't want any 'foreign nationals' getting their hands on a computer,
would we...<G>






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: edgar@spectrx.Saigon.COM (Edgar W. Swank)
Date: Fri, 16 Jul 93 09:32:42 PDT
To: Cypherpunks          <cypherpunks@toad.com>
Subject: OPIN: PGP: When to sign keys
Message-ID: <siwq7B4w165w@spectrx.saigon.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

J. Michael Diehl wrote:

    I'm having a philosophical problem regarding when to sign someone
    else's public key.

    Obviously, if you watch someone generate a key, and they physically
    hand you a copy of it, you should sign it.  Fortunately, life has
    been this good to me about 5 times.  But what if life isn't so
    good?

    Lets say someone emails me a key and the return address matches
    that of the address in the key.  Do I assume no one is spoofing
    me?

Bad idea! The danger is not especially that the person you're talking
to isn't who he says he is.  Chances are you've never met him and
never will.  The danger is that a third person is intercepting
messages and substituting his own keys.  This allows him to monitor
your encrypted traffic, which is what encryption is supposed to
prevent.

My own rule for signing keys is that there must be a key verification
independent of the net.  i.e. nothing received by e-mail can be
depended on to verify a key. If you live any distance from the other
person, the most economical method is by postal mail.  I will sign
keys when I receive a mailed photocopy of any "official" picture ID,
along with a signed statement containing the key "fingerprint" (-kvc),
which matches the fingerprint of a key received via e-mail. You can
mail a letter anywhere in the world for less than $1.00. Any "spoofer"
short of governments (at either end) or organized crime will have a
hard time intercepting much less altering letter mail.

Another possibility is a phone verification.  The person who will be
signing the key should call the owner of the key at a -listed- phone
number (use the out-of-town phone books at the library, or check with
information at (xxx)555-1212.)  Don't rely on a phone number in
e-mail; it could be the spoofer's.  Once again, though, a government
or OC could arrange to intercept/divert incoming phone calls.

I also carry business-card-size pieces of paper with my name, net
address, and key fingerprint, with me.  I give them out at parties, or
anytime I physically meet someone who is on the net.  Person's
receiving the paper can use it to verify that the key I send them via
e-mail has the same fingerprint as on the paper.  Ideally, anyone
giving you such a card should also show you a driver's license or
other picture ID, before expecting you to go home and sign his key.

Phil Zimmerman has endorsed the idea of mail and phone verification;
this is the main reason the key fingerprint feature was added to PGP.
Phil signed my key based on a phone call.  Based on mail verification
I just signed a key from Taiwan! I've also signed two keys from
Germany with mail verification.

There are those (e.g. Perry Metzker) who think this standard is too
loose.  Opinions differ.

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.3.2/EWS

iQCVAgUBLEThEt4nNf3ah8DHAQGJfgP/W85P6IEkGYkmKeFe/px0XPfMvDqTMWXA
5kJ2cTIDRdSbLqDh0VdMsUaAtDR2nkWJKCFRnXA+GEttXy31gPGq6bY/Q19U8dAq
VzNHY0o2ldzrDmp77BQo2kqTapENvIxKkXFiFAATleoLt6hMAgfejRlci/uTfG7Z
NoCwQVeac7c=
=wwV4
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

--
edgar@spectrx.saigon.com (Edgar W. Swank)
SPECTROX SYSTEMS +1.408.252.1005  Cupertino, Ca





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: edgar@spectrx.Saigon.COM (Edgar W. Swank)
Date: Fri, 16 Jul 93 09:32:46 PDT
To: Cypherpunks          <cypherpunks@toad.com>
Subject: DCASH: Two Digital Cash Reports Available
Message-ID: <XJwq7B7w165w@spectrx.saigon.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

I have two reports on new ideas for digital cash which I retrieved
from Amsterdam.  Both are in PostScript format.  I have a hardcopy of
the larger one kindly supplied by mail by the author, Stephen Brands.

If there is any interest, I will bring both soft and hard-copies
to the next Physical Meeting, which I presume will take place
on the 2nd Sat of August, 8/8, noon, at Cygnus in Mtn. View.
(I didn't see any announcement/agenda for the July meeting, but
I understand it occurred anyway).

Here are summaries of the reports:

[Newsgroup sci.crypt]

Post: 1070 of 1149
From: brands@cwi.nl (Stefan Brands)
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
Subject: * REPORT ON PRIVACY-PROTECTING OFF-LINE CASH AVAILABLE *
Date: 19 Apr 93 14:37:17 GMT
Organization: CWI, Amsterdam
Lines: 60

I recently published a new privacy-protecting off-line electronic cash
system as a technical report at CWI. Being a PhD-student at David
Chaum's cryptography-group, our group has a long history in research
in the field of privacy-protecting cash systems.

The report is called CS-R9323.ps.Z, contains 77 pages, and can be
retrieved from

ftp.cwi.nl   (192.16.184.180)

from the directory pub/CWIreports/AA.
The postscript-file is suitable for 300dpi laserprinters.

====================================================================
ABSTRACT (from coverpage): We present a new off-line electronic cash
system based on a problem, called the representation problem, of which
little use has been made in literature thus far. Our system is the
first to be based entirely on discrete logarithms.  Using the
representation problem as a basic concept, some techniques are
introduced that enable us to construct protocols for withdrawal and
payment that do not use the cut and choose methodology of earlier
systems. As a consequence, our cash system is much more efficient in
both computation and communication complexity than any such system
proposed previously.

Another important aspect of our system concerns its provability.
Contrary to previously proposed systems, its correctness can be
mathematically proven to a very great extent. Specifically, if we
make one plausible assumption concerning a single hash-function, the
ability to break the system seems to imply that one can break the
Diffie-Hellman problem.

Our system offers a number of extensions that are hard to achieve in
previously known systems. In our opinion the most interesting of these
is that the entire cash system (including all the extensions) can be
incorporated in a setting based on wallets with observers, which has
the important advantage that double-spending can be prevented in the
first place, rather than detecting the identity of a double-spender
after the fact. In particular, it can be incorporated even under the
most stringent requirements conceivable about the privacy of the user,
which seems to be impossible to do with previously proposed systems.
Another benefit of our system is that framing attempts by a bank have
negligible probability of success (independent of computing power) by
a simple mechanism from within the system, which is something that
previous solutions lack entirely. Furthermore, the basic cash system
can be extended to checks, multi-show cash and divisibility, while
retaining its computational efficiency.
====================================================================

Cryptographers are challenged to try to break this system!

I made a particular effort to keep the report as self-contained as
possible.  Nevertheless, if you have any questions, please e-mail to
me and I will try to reply as good as I can. Any comments are also
welcome!

Stefan Brands,
- --------------------------------------------------------
CWI, Kruislaan 413, 1098 SJ Amsterdam, The Netherlands
Tel: +31 20 5924103, e-mail: brands@cwi.nl


[Newsgroup alt.privacy]

Post: 452 of 458
From: Niels Ferguson <Niels.Ferguson@cwi.nl>
Newsgroups: alt.privacy,comp.society.privacy,alt.security,comp.security.announce,comp.security.misc,sci.crypt
Subject: new Electronic Cash scheme: technical report available
Date: 25 Jun 93 13:48:26 GMT
Organization: Computer Privacy Digest
Lines: 58
Approved: comp-privacy@pica.army.mil
X-Submissions-To: comp-privacy@pica.army.mil
X-Administrivia-To: comp-privacy-request@pica.army.mil
X-Computer-Privacy-Digest: Volume 2, Issue 054, Message 4 of 4


  New electronic cash system: report available by FTP.
  ---------------------------------------------------

Electronic cash is the equivalent of paper cash in an electronic form.
It has all the same basic properties as ordinary cash: It carries
value, can be used to pay other people without contacting any central
organization and is completely anonymous.

Recent work at the CWI has resulted in significantly improved
protocols for electronic cash. The following CWI technical report is
now available by FTP:

Title:    Single Term Off-Line Coins
Author:   Niels Ferguson
Report:   CS-R9318
Site:     ftp.cwi.nl
directory:/pub/CWIreports/AA
file:     CS-R9318.ps.Z (compressed PostScript file)


                             Abstract
                             --------
  We present a new construction for off-line electronic coins that is
  both far more efficient and much simpler than previous systems.
  Instead of using many terms, each for a single bit of the
  challenge, our system uses a single term for a large number of
  possible challenges. The withdrawal protocol does not use a
  cut-and-choose methodology as with earlier systems, but uses a
  direct construction.


This report is slightly more extensive than the version that appeared
in the pre-proceedings of EuroCrypt '93.

If you are interested in this report, you might also be interested in
a report by my colleague Stefan Brands entitled "An Efficient Off-line
Electronic Cash System based on the Representation Problem". It can be
found under the name "CS-R9323.ps.Z" in the same directory.

Note: Followup set to sci.crypt

Niels

 -------------------------------------------------#include<stddisclaimer>------
 ... of shoes and ships and sealing-wax, of    | Niels Ferguson
cabbages and kings, and why the sea is boiling | CWI, Amsterdam, Netherlands
hot, and whether pigs have wings ...           | e-mail: niels@cwi.nl

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.3.2/EWS

iQCVAgUBLEW2Wd4nNf3ah8DHAQFQIAP/eCwkHJzjINs+0GHpW/USH0mI/CZGbtlx
wSCPZOHBfgboEOrttam/vz5SApghRHwraVcXYnCR+6cZaCkmdISkcZ8ISj6V/77w
L5q992BR5SZ7vVV31lLjEgTTw8Va2n9y2ry6ubZCMF0j5nTZy44OOYIU5gLQDHhR
fT0u8iwQY2s=
=4CNQ
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

--
edgar@spectrx.saigon.com (Edgar W. Swank)
SPECTROX SYSTEMS +1.408.252.1005  Cupertino, Ca





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: mbriceno@aol.com
Date: Thu, 15 Jul 93 11:17:37 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Who has Cypherpunks in SF?
Message-ID: <9307151404.tn00223@aol.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Is  there a BBS in San Francisco that carries this list?

Thanks in advance,

--Marc

(Yes, I know that I can get it by mail)




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Peter Shipley <shipley@tfs.COM>
Date: Thu, 15 Jul 93 14:07:46 PDT
To: Francis.Toy@f28.n125.z1.FIDONET.ORG (Francis Toy)
Subject: Re: Sci-fi needs your help!
In-Reply-To: <1124.2C45B2F0@shelter.FIDONET.ORG>
Message-ID: <9307152107.AA00779@edev0.tfs.com.TFS>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


thank you for you email to the low volume list "Cypherpunks", you
text was found to be very imformitive on the Cypherpunks topic list.


>I know that this is probably not the appropriate time or place to post,
>however, if you are a true lover of Science Fiction literature, please
>access the FIDONET SCI-FI LIT conference on your local BBS(if available).
>Things are more or less dead over there, and stand a chance of disappearing
>altogether without your support(posting messages)!
>
>F.
>---
> * SLMR 2.1a * Press any key to continue or any other key to quit
>--  
>Francis Toy - via FidoNet node 1:125/1
>UUCP: ...!uunet!kumr!shelter!28!Francis.Toy
>INTERNET: Francis.Toy@f28.n125.z1.FIDONET.ORG




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: dmandl@lehman.com (David Mandl)
Date: Thu, 15 Jul 93 11:58:19 PDT
To: crunch@netcom.com
Subject: Re: Need info ASAP
Message-ID: <9307151857.AA12289@disvnm2.shearson.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> From: crunch@netcom.com (John Draper)
> 
>   I am putting final touches on the Cypherpunks flyer,  and need the
> following information.
> 
> The address,  phone number,  and Email adddess of:
> 
>   a) CPSR
>   b) EFF
>   c) Cypherpunks

[...]

Don't forget to make it clear that people should email to

cypherpunks-request@toad.com

for administrative business (like joining the list).  Lots
of people give the address sans "-request," and then everyone's
got to see dozens of "Subscribe me" messages posted to
the list itself.  Good luck.

   --Dave.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Derek Upham <upham@cs.ubc.ca>
Date: Thu, 15 Jul 93 15:13:28 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Looking for fastest Legendre/Jacobi algorithm
Message-ID: <199307152212.AA14909@grolsch.cs.ubc.ca>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


In 1991, Tygar and Yee published a paper describing an authentication
and security system for Mach.  At least two of the techniques
described in the paper can be used elsewhere; one is a zero-knowledge
proof of identity algorithm, and the other is a public-key algorithm
for exchanging arbitrary data (i.e., private encryption keys).

The security of the scheme is based on the intractability of
determining quadratic residuosity.  Variable $a$ is a quadratic
residue on $n$---it has the Jacobi value of 1---if and only if there
exists some $x$ such that $(x^2\mod n)=a$; otherwise it is not a
residue and has Jacobi value -1.  (If $n$ is prime, the Jacobi value
is also the Legendre value).  Rabin(???) has proven that working
backwards from $a$ and $n$ to find $x$ is equivalent to factoring
$n$, so only the person who generated $n$ will be able to check the
residuosity of $a$ (if factoring $n$ is difficult, of course).

In the private key exchange algorithm, for example, the Sender
generates a series of quadratic residues and non-residues $a$ over
$n$ and passes these values on to the Receiver.  The Receiver
calculates the (non-)residuosity for each and assigns it a bit value,
thus building up a string of bits that determine the key.  Any Tapper
will be unable to calculate the residuosities from the data stream,
and so will not intercept the key.

I've written a bunch of programs to generate keys and run an
encrypted bit exchange, but the performance is lacking.  Decoding
time seems to grow at $O(\el^2)$ with the length of $p,q$, which
makes using any sort of secure public-key $n$ quite infeasible---
especially if people want to use these algorithms on small home boxes
for dialup security.  On a 386/40, receiving 56 bits encoded with a
512 bit public key takes twenty-two minutes...

So: anyone know tricks to bum as much speed as possible out either
the Jacobi or Legendre algorithms?  For our purposes, they are
equivalent.  If the Tygar and Yee algorithms ever run efficiently,
they could be very nice alternatives to RSA.

Derek

Derek Lynn Upham                               University of British Columbia
upham@cs.ubc.ca                                   Computer Science Department
=============================================================================
"Ha!  Your Leaping Tiger Kung Fu is no match for my Frightened Piglet Style!"




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Barry Evans <evans@ingres.com>
Date: Thu, 15 Jul 93 15:14:45 PDT
To: postmaster@toad.com
Subject: <sigh>  Can *somebody* remove "bobs@ingres.com" from this list?
Message-ID: <9307152214.AA03134@piglet.ingres.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I've been trying all week to get someone to remove "bobs@ingres.com"
from this list.  Really, we are tired of seeing all the bounced emails
that this mailing list is trying to send here.

Who's *responsible* for this mailing list?  Any why haven't they responded
to my requests?

------- Forwarded Message

>From Mailer-Daemon@ingres.com Thu Jul 15 13:57:02 1993
Date: Thu, 15 Jul 93 13:56:33 PDT
From: Mailer-Daemon@ingres.com (Mail Delivery Subsystem)
Subject: Returned mail: User unknown
To: Postmaster@pony
Content-Length: 891
X-Lines: 22

   ----- Transcript of session follows -----
Connected to pony:
>>> RCPT To:<bobs@ingres.com>
<<< 550 <bobs@ingres.com>... User unknown
550 <bobs@ingres.com>... User unknown

  ----- Message header follows -----
Received: from relay2.UU.NET
	by ingres.com (4.1/SMI-4.1/INGRES/zool/06.06.93)
	id AA00149; Thu, 15 Jul 93 13:56:33 PDT
Received: from toad.com by relay2.UU.NET with SMTP 
	(5.61/UUNET-internet-primary) id AA10455; Thu, 15 Jul 93 16:47:29 -0400
Received: by toad.com id AA24885; Thu, 15 Jul 93 12:06:56 PDT
Return-Path: <wet!naga>
Received: from wet.UUCP by toad.com id AA24881; Thu, 15 Jul 93 12:06:54 PDT
Received: by wet.uucp (/\=-/\ Smail3.1.18.1 #18.2)
	id <m0oGYY0-000Er3C@wet.uucp>; Thu, 15 Jul 93 12:00 PDT
Message-Id: <m0oGYY0-000Er3C@wet.uucp>
Date: Thu, 15 Jul 93 12:00 PDT
From: wet!naga@uunet.UU.NET (Peter Davidson)
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Reply to Perry

------- End of Forwarded Message





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: dante@microsoft.com
Date: Thu, 15 Jul 93 15:52:10 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: RE: unsub (request-cypherpunks not working)
Message-ID: <9307152250.AA20178@netmail.microsoft.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Please unsubscribe me too. I mailed cypherpunks-request twice
to no avail.
dante@microsoft.com




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: pmetzger@lehman.com (Perry E. Metzger)
Date: Thu, 15 Jul 93 13:13:41 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: query
Message-ID: <9307152013.AA05768@snark.shearson.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



This is slightly off topic:

I know that several cypherpunks are using automated tools to download
their mail from Unix hosts to their PCs at home. Could anyone doing
this please send me some mail on what package you are using?

Perry




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: J. Michael Diehl <mdiehl@triton.unm.edu>
Date: Thu, 15 Jul 93 16:45:39 PDT
To: peb@procase.com (Paul Baclace)
Subject: Re: The right to be secure (fwd Computerworld article)
In-Reply-To: <9307151828.AA08970@banff.procase.com>
Message-ID: <9307152345.AA12039@triton.unm.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


According to Paul Baclace:
> >>   typically a court order, to both key escrow authorities.
> >"Typically", of course, means "not always", and it's coupled with the phrase
> I think they must be implicitly refering to the anti terrorist act
> which allows surveillence without a court order if national security
> is involved or if foreign nationals are involved, etc.

Now this is news to me.  You mean that they can listen to me if they can 
rationalize that there is a threat to national security?

Here's a scenerio.  John Q. Public HAS a copy of pgp and some LEA knows it.  It
must be that he's some kind of subversive. Therefore, he is a threat to national
security.  It is therefore legal to infringe on his rights?  Maybe this is a bit
of exageration...maybe it's not....


+-----------------------+-----------------------------+---------+
| J. Michael Diehl ;-)  | I thought I was wrong once. | PGP KEY |
| mdiehl@triton.unm.edu |   But, I was mistaken.      |available|
| mike.diehl@fido.org   |                             | Ask Me! |
| (505) 299-2282        +-----------------------------+---------+
|                                                               |
+------"I'm just looking for the opportunity to be -------------+
|            Politically Incorrect!"   <Me>                     |
+-----If codes are outlawed, only criminals wil have codes.-----+
+----Is Big Brother in your phone?  If you don't know, ask me---+



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Andrew S Hall <ashall@magnus.acs.ohio-state.edu>
Date: Thu, 15 Jul 93 14:51:04 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Crypto Credentials
Message-ID: <9307152150.AA24691@photon.magnus.acs.ohio-state.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



A query was made:

> >    I'm trying to learn more about practical cryptography in general
> >    and PGP and similar programs in particular.  Any advice?
A response:

> @article{Nathan92,
>    author = {Paco Xander Nathan},
>    journal = {Fringeware Review},
>    month = {July},

To which Perry Metzger wrote:

>Rather than pointing people to strange publications we've never heard
>of written by authors without credentials, might I suggest...
>
>1) The PGP docs themselves are very good and far better as a tutorial
>   on cryptography than any of the "PGP tutorials" that have appeared
>   in the fringe literature. They are also free.
>
>2) Read a real text on cryptography. It isn't a childrens game. Its a
>   real branch of math and computer science, and really bright people
>   devote their lives to it. If you wanted to learn about medicine,
>   would you pick up a professional medical text, or something written
>   in a 'zine by people you hadn't heard of?

And then Peter Davidson responded:

: 1,2 deleted
:  3.  If you've never seen the article mentioned, and know nothing of
:  the author, on what basis do you claim that the author is without
:  credentials?  Because he publishes in a magazine with "Fringe" in
:  the title?  You're obviously prejudiced, Perry.

:  4.  Does it require an advanced degree in mathematics to write a clear
:  and lucid tutorial for those interested in using PGP?

:  5.  Is reading "a real text on cryptography" necessary in order to
:  learn to use PGP?  Your remark suggests it is, which is likely to
:  discourage people from using PGP rather than encourage them.


I agree with Perry. The original query was not 'how can I be cool and
use PGP to write secret notes?' It was a serious enquiry about PGP and
*other* similar systems. Reading a fringe popularization about PGP
will not do much. (And I consider Paco to be a competent general writer.)

Using PGP is about as easy as using DOS. Understanding PGP, its capablities,
its strengths, how it relates to other crypto systems, and evaluating it
and other systems is not so easy. It doesn't require 'an advanced degree
in mathmetics,' but just high school algebra won't do it either. I have
seen FringeWare and, while the treatment is PGP is fine as a tutorial, it
is not an introduction to public key cryptography. It wasn't meant to be.

There is a big difference between having people just use PGP and having
them understand it. I know since I have worked several pieces to explain
public key crypto for a general audience. If someone really wants to
learn about the subject, the PGP docs are the best place to begin. From
there, the sci.crypt FAQ, and then, if you are serious, Denning's
_Cryptography and Data Security_. A deep and complex topic like cryptography
requires as deep and complex study as the scholar wish to apply. That can
mean a lifetime. A fluff, yet hip, article in a cool, yet sophisticated
fringe journal is *not* the place to begin.

Perry doesn't need my defense, but I will add that this mostly-lurking
cypherpunk doesn't think he is an asshole. He is brutally honest and
declares his opinion. I respect that. While he is often a bit wired,
I have yet to see any hostility to those who didn't deserve it. (
cf recent extropians/pagans love-in or alt.binaries.pictures.erotica.children)

I apologize for excessive re-quoting, and hope someone will forward a good
crypto reference list to the original inquirer. I would, but I can't find
it.

A.

Techno-Anarchy.Neophilia.Economic Freedom.Cryptography.Anti-Statism.Personal
Liberty.Laissez-Faire.Privacy Protection.Libertarianism.No Taxes.No Bullshit.
**********            Liberty BBS 1-614-798-9537                  **********
**********           Dedicated to Freedom. Yours.                 **********




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Date: Thu, 15 Jul 93 19:26:04 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Crypto Credentials
In-Reply-To: <9307152150.AA24691@photon.magnus.acs.ohio-state.edu>
Message-ID: <9307160226.AA14540@netcom3.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Cypherzens,

Andrew Hall writes:

> Perry doesn't need my defense, but I will add that this mostly-lurking
> cypherpunk doesn't think he is an asshole. He is brutally honest and
> declares his opinion. I respect that. While he is often a bit wired,
> I have yet to see any hostility to those who didn't deserve it. (
> cf recent extropians/pagans love-in or alt.binaries.pictures.erotica.children)

Well, Perry didn't give the same response *I* would have given, but
then I didn't give a response at all, so I can hardly complain.
(Reading lists have been sent out before, and some basic materials are
contained in the pub/cypherpunks archives at soda.berkeley.edu,
including a glossary of terms, the various PGP files (including the
nice docs that Perry mentioned), and various "rants" by several of us.
This is a good place for newcomers to browse to get a feel for what
Cypherpunks is all about.)

It turns out that I was smack in the middle of both events Andrew just
referred to, and I can tell you first-hand that folks on the Net are
getting too freaked out over the views of others.

I posted the fake PGP-GIF in a.b.p.e.c., which provoked huge outcries
of "Thoughtcrime!!" And on the "Extropians" mailing list I was
challenged by Eric Raymond, the fellow who volunteered to write the
Cypherpunks FAQ on his first day on this list, to study various
writings on Paganism, Druidism, Shamanism, and Witchcraft and then
judge it "rational" or not (I won't bore you with the details).  When
I judged it "not rational" and "inconsistent" with the technophilic
emphasis of the Extropians list, all hell broke loose (figuratively,
and perhaps literally if Eric's witchly connections are as he
advertises!).

In fact, that List (Extropians) is so contentious and polarized that I
have temporarily unsubscribed for the rest of the summer (and perhaps
longer, depending on how I feel in the fall). The advantage of smaller
groups like Cypherpunks and Extropians, as mailing lists, is that
people can come to know each other and thus better avoid flaming.

Even better are in-person meetings, even if this contradicts the
"jacked-in," "wired" image of cyberpunks and console cowboys! The
Cypherpunks physical meetings in Mountain View are friendly, helpful,
and not at all rancorous. Likewise, the Extropians events I've
attended in the Bay Area (Thursday lunches, a couple of lectures, and
some parties) have been friendly and free of divisiveness and flaming.
This aspect of the in-person contacts has not been adequately
duplicated on the Net. But small groups like ours, where reputations
matter and where flamers can and should be simply expelled, are one
major hope. I, for one, don't want David Sternlight on our List.
(However, this could happen, as we have no membership screening
process. Still, we can hope that the flame wars that rage unchecked on
the Net as a whole can be limited to just small brush fires on our List.)

I'd hate to see our List degenerate into the kind of flaming so common
throughout the Net world. We've had a few minor flame wars, but have
pulled back from the abyss each time.

We ought to try to keep it that way.

Cheers!

-Tim

-- 
..........................................................................
Timothy C. May         | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,  
tcmay@netcom.com       | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
408-688-5409           | knowledge, reputations, information markets, 
W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA  | black markets, collapse of governments.
Higher Power: 2^756839 | Public Key: PGP and MailSafe available.
Note: I put time and money into writing this posting. I hope you enjoy it.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: zane@genesis.mcs.com (Sameer)
Date: Thu, 15 Jul 93 18:39:29 PDT
To: pmetzger@lehman.com
Subject: Re: PGP tutorial
In-Reply-To: <9307151349.AA05001@snark.shearson.com>
Message-ID: <m0oGeZw-000ZDJC@genesis.mcs.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


In message <9307151349.AA05001@snark.shearson.com>, "Perry E. Metzger" writes:
>
> 
> Rather than pointing people to strange publications we've never heard
> of written by authors without credentials, might I suggest...
> 
	Excellent comments, Perry, yes, but *I* have heard of Fringeware,
so maybe I'll throw some of my comments about Paco, as an "author
without credentials." (Not that I'm a cypherpunk with credentials or
anything. =)
	(I agree that reading the PGP-docs is probably the best way to
learn to use PGP, yet some people prefer simple tutorials-- when
advocating encryption-for-the-masses I don't expect everyone to
understand how RSA works, etc.)
	Fringeware is a 'zine which Paco Xander Nathan publishes, and while
he's no cypherpunk, he's an intelligent guy, so I'm pretty sure his
article would be a good one.

--
| Sameer Parekh-zane@genesis.MCS.COM-PFA related mail to pfa@genesis.MCS.COM |
| Apprentice Philosopher, Writer, Physicist, Healer, Programmer, Lover, more |
| "Symbiosis is Good" - Me_"Specialization is for Insects" - R. A. Heinlein_/
 \_______________________/ \______________________________________________/ 




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: smb@research.att.com
Date: Thu, 15 Jul 93 17:30:10 PDT
To: mdiehl@triton.unm.edu
Subject: Re: The right to be secure (fwd Computerworld article)
Message-ID: <9307160030.AA03190@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


	 Now this is news to me.  You mean that they can listen to me
	 if they can rationalize that there is a threat to national
	 security?

	 Here's a scenerio.  John Q. Public HAS a copy of pgp and some
	 LEA knows it.  It must be that he's some kind of subversive.
	 Therefore, he is a threat to national security.  It is
	 therefore legal to infringe on his rights?  Maybe this is a
	 bit of exageration...maybe it's not....

There are safeguards in the law; whether they're adequate or not is
open to discussion.  But it's not nearly as easy as you portray.

Warrantless wiretaps are governed by the provisions of 50 USC 1801, the
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act.  Under that act, the Feds can
engage in electronic surveillance without a warrant if and only if all
parties are non-Americans.  If an American is picked up, they have to
destroy the tape.  Furthermore, under many circumstances (and I don't
remember the details, and I don't seem to have a copy of that law in my
folder for such things), the consent of a special court is needed.

As I said -- they (or should that be ``They'') *can* do anything.  But
that doesn't make it legal, which was your question, and if they do it
and are caught, the case will undoubtedly be thrown out of court.
Furthermore, if the tap didn't fall under the exceptions of the FISA,
it's barred by the ECPA, so you could sue for damages.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Timothy Newsham <newsham@wiliki.eng.hawaii.edu>
Date: Fri, 16 Jul 93 00:02:01 PDT
To: ashall@magnus.acs.ohio-state.edu (Andrew S Hall)
Subject: Re: PGP and Offline Mail/News
In-Reply-To: <9307160343.AA27507@photon.magnus.acs.ohio-state.edu>
Message-ID: <9307160701.AA14473@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> 
> 
> A while ago some one here (from England) mentioned a program he was
> involved with that was an offline mail reader that allowed one to add
> external protocols like PGP. He gave an FTP site (also in England).
> The program was called something like APPNEWS. I downloaded it,
> looked at it, and archived it until I could put time into installing
> it with my connection and work out the bugs of dynamic addressing.
> Now was the time, but I have lost the program. Please help me.
> 
> Perry queried earlier about what off-line readers people use. I use
> Pop-mail and Eudora, but neither are really friendly with adding
> externals. The problem I want to overcome is providing multiple users
> on a single machine with security. Pop-mail and Eudora are designed to
> be used by a single user and a personal (hopefully secure) machine.
> The solution currently implemented is to have users save mail only to
> floppy. Both mailers will create personal directories, but these can be
> accessed both within and from outside the program. I would like to add
> PGP (or another scheme) so that *all* saved messages (or ones so desired)
> are encrypted. This would use the user's password and would be automatic.

check out the newly released PCPINE.  It is a pine client for IBMpc's.
It will run either stand alone (with packet drivers, using WATTCP),
under FTP's PC/TCP package, or under Novell.  (There are three
different files, one for each configuration).  To use it you
need to get a mail server running the IMAP protocol daemon
'imapd'.  It is like POP but has more advanced features.

You can find both at
  ftp.cac.washington.edu
in pine or pub/pine.

  c-client.tar.Z     <- has impad for unix boxes
  pcpine_p.zip     packet driver version
  pcpine_n.zip     novell version
  pcpine_f.zip     ftp pctcp version

pcpine has mostly all the PINE features, and is easily configured
for external mail processing add ons (like gif viewers and crypto 
stuff).  (note: 'easy' is a relative term :)

> Techno-Anarchy.Neophilia.Economic Freedom.Cryptography.Anti-Statism.Personal
> Liberty.Laissez-Faire.Privacy Protection.Libertarianism.No Taxes.No Bullshit.
> **********            Liberty BBS 1-614-798-9537                  **********
> **********           Dedicated to Freedom. Yours.                 **********
> 




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: uri@watson.ibm.com
Date: Thu, 15 Jul 93 19:26:23 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com (cypherpunks)
Subject: Re: Crypto Credentials
In-Reply-To: <9307152150.AA24691@photon.magnus.acs.ohio-state.edu>
Message-ID: <9307160226.AA18903@buoy.watson.ibm.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Andrew S Hall says:
> .................From
> there, the sci.crypt FAQ, and then, if you are serious, Denning's
> _Cryptography and Data Security_.

Oh, come on. With all due respect (:-) I have to disagree. Why on Earth
have you to select this book?! Maybe you don't like
	A. Konheim "Cryptography: A Primer"

Or maybe you don't feel, that
	Meyer & Matyas "Cryptography. A New Dimension in Data Security"

covers enough of the field, at least for a beginner?

Or maybe there are no new goodies like
	G. Simmons "Contemporary Cryptology"

with lots and lots of annotated bibliography?

> A deep and complex topic like cryptography
> requires as deep and complex study as the scholar wish to apply. That can
> mean a lifetime.

Indeed. One more reason to start with a real stuff (:-).

[Oh, of course, all the proper apologies for exhaling the
smoke and fire, and for misquoting (slightly, I hope) the
exact names of the books. :-]
--
Regards,
Uri         uri@watson.ibm.com      scifi!angmar!uri 	N2RIU
-----------
<Disclamer>


From cypherpunks-request  Thu Jul 15 23:20:05 1993



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: hfinney@shell.portal.com
Date: Thu, 15 Jul 93 23:17:18 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Cypherpunks&Clipper in Scientific American
Message-ID: <9307160542.AA06438@jobe.shell.portal.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


In the Science and Business section, the August 1993 Scientific American
has a short, negative article on Clipper, which mentions cypherpunks:

Clipper Runs Aground

Everyone seems to be listening in these days: tabloids regale readers with
the cellular telephone intimacies of the British royal family, and more
sober articles on the business pages tell how companies - or governments -
devote resources to "signals intelligence" for commercial gain.  So the
Clinton Administration might have thought it was doing everyone a favor in
April when it proposed a new standard for encryption chips, developed with
the aid of none other than the National Security Agency (NSA).  

Instead the administration met with outrage.  Along with the message,
Clipper, as the chip is named, sends out a string of bits called a law
enforcement field.  Its purpose is to enable the police and the Federal
Bureau of Investigation to decode conversations that they wiretap pursuant
to court order.  In addition, the chip's encryption algorithm, known as
Skipjack, is classified.  Thus, only a small cadre of cryptographic experts
would be able to study it to determine whether or not it was indeed secure.

Early in June the administration abandoned its plan to rush Clipper into
the marketplace and extended its internal review of the policy issues
raised by the chip until the end of the summer.  This decision presumably
also delays consideration of outlawing other encoding methods.   

A peculiar coalition of civil libertarians and large software companies has
formed to plead the cause of unregulated cryptography.  Self-styled
"cypherpunks" argue that the government has no more right to insist on a
back door in secure telephones than it does to restrict the language or
vocabulary used in telephone conversations on the grounds that dialect
might hinder interpretation of wiretaps.  Companies such as Microsoft,
Lotus Development Corporation, Banker's Trust and Digital Equipment
Corporation are worried about the administration's proposal because they
believe it will hurt the U.S. in international competition.  

Ilene Rosenthal, general counsel at the Software Publishers Association,
which numbers 1,000 companies among its members, points out that telephones
containing the NSA chip would be subject to export controls because
cryptographic equipment is considered "munitions" under U.S. law.  This
bureaucratic restraint could force U.S. manufacturers of secure telephones
to develop entirely different product lines for the domestic and
international markets.  Indeed, she says, even if the State Department did
license Clipper for widespread export, it is doubtful whether any foreign
government or company would buy a system to which the U.S. literally had
the keys.   

Rosenthal contends that the U.S. has lost control of cryptography, citing
more than 100 different brands of strong encoding software sold by non-U.S.
companies.  Indeed, discussion groups on the Internet computer network have
been buzzing with plans for a do-it-yourself secure telephone that requires
little more than a personal computer, a $200 modem and a microphone.  

It is not clear whether the administration will abandon its attempt to
stuff the unregulated-cryptography genie back in the bottle.  There are
already 10,000 Clipper-equipped telephones on order for government use, and
Jan Kosko of the National Institute of Science and Technology says the plan
for the standard "is being advanced as fast as we can move it."  Nine (thus
far unidentified) cryptographers have been invited to review the algorithm,
and Kosko reports that decoding equipment is in the works for "law
enforcement and other government agencies that feel they need it."  The
Justice Department is busy evaluating proposals for the "key escrow agents"
that are supposed to prevent the police and the FBI from listening in on
conversations without a warrant.   

Some companies, however, are less concerned.  They hope for enormous sales
once privacy issues are resolved.  AT&T, for example, announced its
intention to sell Clipper-based telephone scramblers the same day that the
chip was made public.  "What the standard is," says spokesman David Arneke,
"is less important than having a standard that all manufacturers can build
to." 

- Paul Wallich




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Andrew S Hall <ashall@magnus.acs.ohio-state.edu>
Date: Thu, 15 Jul 93 20:05:07 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re:Crypto Credentials
Message-ID: <9307160305.AA27249@photon.magnus.acs.ohio-state.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Tim May writes:

>It turns out that I was smack in the middle of both events Andrew just
>referred to, and I can tell you first-hand that folks on the Net are
>getting too freaked out over the views of others.

Maybe it's just you, Tim...

>Even better are in-person meetings, even if this contradicts the
>"jacked-in," "wired" image of cyberpunks and console cowboys! The
>Cypherpunks physical meetings in Mountain View are friendly, helpful,
>and not at all rancorous. Likewise, the Extropians events I've
>attended in the Bay Area (Thursday lunches, a couple of lectures, and
>some parties) have been friendly and free of divisiveness and flaming.
>This aspect of the in-person contacts has not been adequately
>duplicated on the Net.

This touches on what bugs me the most about the Net and why I post very
little. People are too goddamn sensitive. Too many people sit around with
a massive chip on their shoulder. I really have no idea why. I can't
imagine that *all* of these people have never really experienced
the hothouse atmosphere of hard-core problem-solving or brain-storming
where one is often curt, harsh, hostile, obscene, etc during the exchange
of ideas with no ill-effects later. Maybe people need to play rugby or
soccer more. You know, kill one another for an hour and have a beer to
laugh about it after. Maybe that brewski after is what is missing on the
Net.

The reason I am rambling on this here is that I also see a relation to
cypherpunk technology. Is the relatively anonymous technology of the
Net (faceless at least) causing people to forget the "polite  society"
which greases the skids of human contact? Will it be worse with even
more anonymity? (To be fair to the anonymous posters here, I have seen
no decrease of politeness from their quarter. When I have posted under
my pseud, I have not been impolite either.)

It would seem that we are still ape-like enough to need to see real teeth
in that smile and not ASCII ones. I know we mostly like to talk tech
on this list, but most of us see cypher-tech as a road to specific social
goals. (see Tim's .sig) This tech does and will have social impact even if
we are not sucessful in this agenda Part of the cypherpunks "job" needs to
be to anticipate and help guide the social changes. Step one needs to be
adapting homo sapiens to this new means of communication.

A.

BTW- I will stand by D. Denning's book as a crypto primer. It is a little
outdated but, IMHO, is still the best starting point.


Techno-Anarchy.Neophilia.Economic Freedom.Cryptography.Anti-Statism.Personal
Liberty.Laissez-Faire.Privacy Protection.Libertarianism.No Taxes.No Bullshit.
**********            Liberty BBS 1-614-798-9537                  **********
**********           Dedicated to Freedom. Yours.                 **********




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Andrew S Hall <ashall@magnus.acs.ohio-state.edu>
Date: Thu, 15 Jul 93 20:43:18 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: PGP and Offline Mail/News
Message-ID: <9307160343.AA27507@photon.magnus.acs.ohio-state.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



A while ago some one here (from England) mentioned a program he was
involved with that was an offline mail reader that allowed one to add
external protocols like PGP. He gave an FTP site (also in England).
The program was called something like APPNEWS. I downloaded it,
looked at it, and archived it until I could put time into installing
it with my connection and work out the bugs of dynamic addressing.
Now was the time, but I have lost the program. Please help me.

Perry queried earlier about what off-line readers people use. I use
Pop-mail and Eudora, but neither are really friendly with adding
externals. The problem I want to overcome is providing multiple users
on a single machine with security. Pop-mail and Eudora are designed to
be used by a single user and a personal (hopefully secure) machine.
The solution currently implemented is to have users save mail only to
floppy. Both mailers will create personal directories, but these can be
accessed both within and from outside the program. I would like to add
PGP (or another scheme) so that *all* saved messages (or ones so desired)
are encrypted. This would use the user's password and would be automatic.

A.

Techno-Anarchy.Neophilia.Economic Freedom.Cryptography.Anti-Statism.Personal
Liberty.Laissez-Faire.Privacy Protection.Libertarianism.No Taxes.No Bullshit.
**********            Liberty BBS 1-614-798-9537                  **********
**********           Dedicated to Freedom. Yours.                 **********




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Dave Banisar <banisar@washofc.cpsr.org>
Date: Fri, 16 Jul 93 06:39:10 PDT
To: CYPHERPUNKS <CYPHERPUNKS@toad.com>
Subject: CPSR Secrecy Statement
Message-ID: <00541.2825657567.4296@washofc.cpsr.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


  CPSR Secrecy Statement
    Computer Professionals for Social Responsibility (CPSR) has 
called for a complete overhaul in the federal government's 
information classification system, including the removal of 
cryptography from the categories of information automatically 
deemed to be secret.  In a letter to a special Presidential task 
force examining the classification system, CPSR said that the 
current system -- embodied in an Executive Order issued by 
President Reagan in 1982 -- "has limited informed public debate on 
technological issues and has restricted scientific innovation and 
technological development."

       The CPSR statement, which was submitted in response to a 
task force request for public comments, strongly criticizes a 
provision in the Reagan secrecy directive that presumptively 
classifies any information that "concerns cryptology."  CPSR notes 
that "while cryptography -- the science of making and breaking 
secret security codes -- was once the sole province of the 
military and the intelligence agencies, the technology today plays 
an essential role in assuring the security and privacy of a wide 
range of communications affecting finance, education, research and 
personal correspondence."  With the end of the Cold War and the 
growth of widely available computer network services, the outdated 
view of cryptography reflected in the Reagan order must change, 
according to the statement.

       CPSR's call for revision of the classification system is 
based upon the organization's experience in attempting to obtain 
government information relating to cryptography and computer 
security issues.  CPSR is currently litigating Freedom of 
Information Act lawsuits against the National Security Agency 
(NSA) seeking the disclosure of technical data concerning the 
digital signature standard (DSS) and the administration's recent 
"Clipper Chip" proposal.  NSA has relied on the Reagan Executive 
Order as authority for withholding the information from the 
public.

       In its submission to the classification task force, CPSR 
also called for the following changes to the current secrecy 
directive:

     *  A return to the "balancing test," whereby the public 
     interest in the disclosure of information is weighed 
     against the claimed harm that might result from such 
     disclosure;

     *  A prohibition against the reclassification of 
     information that has been previously released;

     *  The requirement that the economic cost of classifying 
     scientific and technical be considered before such 
     information may be classified;

     *  The automatic declassification of information after 
     20 years, unless the head of the original classifying 
     agency, in the exercise of his or her non-delegable 
     authority, determines in writing that the material 
     requires continued classification for a specified 
     period of time; and

     *  The establishment of an independent oversight 
     commission to monitor the operation of the security 
     classification system.

       The task force is scheduled to submit a draft revision of 
the Executive Order to President Clinton on November 30.

       The full text of the CPSR statement can be obtained via 
ftp, wais and gopher from cpsr.org, under the filename 
cpsr\crypto\secrecy_statement.txt.

       CPSR is a national organization of professionals in the 
computing field.  Membership is open to the public.  For more 
information on CPSR, contact <cpsr@cpsr.org>. 



                                        July 14, 1993




Information Security Oversight Office
750 17th Street, N.W.
Suite 530
Washington, DC 20006
Attention: PRD Task Force

     Re: Proposed Changes to the Security Classification System

     This submission is made in response to the Notice published 
in the Federal Register on May 20, 1993 (58 FR 29480).  According 
to the Notice, the Task Force is soliciting submissions "by 
interested parties on proposals to change the system under which 
information is classified, safeguarded, and declassified in the 
interest of national security."  Computer Professionals for Social 
Responsibility (CPSR), a national organization of professionals in 
the computing field, has a long-standing interest in the problems 
surrounding the current information classification system -- a 
system that has limited informed public debate on technological 
issues and has restricted scientific innovation and technological 
development.  Based on our experience conducting litigation under 
the Freedom of Information Act and our efforts to assess certain 
government policies concerning cryptography and computer security, 
we have the following recommendations regarding changes to the 
security classification system.


General Recommendations  

     CPSR believes that the current Executive Order 12356 is far 
too broad in its definition of classifiable information and that 
post Cold War realities require the substantial revision of this 
outdated directive.  We share the views of many public interest, 
journalistic, academic, historical, and scientific organizations 
that have recommended a complete revision of the classification 
scheme.  We believe such a revision is both necessary and 
appropriate.  In particular, we support the following changes to 
the classification system:

     *  A return to the "balancing test," whereby the public 
     interest in the disclosure of information is weighed 
     against the claimed harm that might result from such 
     disclosure;

     *  A prohibition against the reclassification of 
     information that has been previously released;

     *  The requirement that the economic cost of classifying 
     scientific and technical be completed before such 
     information may be classified;

     *  The automatic declassification of information after 
     20 years, unless the head of the original classifying 
     agency, in the exercise of his or her non-delegable 
     authority, determines in writing that the material 
     requires continued classification for a specified 
     period of time; and

     *  The establishment of an independent oversight 
     commission to monitor the operation of the security 
     classification system.


"Cryptology" as a Classification Category

     In addition to endorsing these general recommendations, we 
wish to address in detail one particular provision of the current 
Executive Order that unnecessarily restricts the dissemination of 
technical data that should be routinely available to the public 
and the scientific community.  At the time EO 12356 was 
promulgated in 1982, a new classification category was 
established, simply defined as "cryptology."  EO 12356, Sec. 
1.3(a)(8).  When the House Government Operations Committee 
examined the Executive Order shortly after its issuance, the 
Committee concluded that "[t]he need for this new category is 
uncertain" and noted that "[t]he word 'cryptology,' as added by 
the Reagan order, is not qualified or defined."  H. Rep. No. 731, 
97th Cong., 2d Sess. 16 (1982).

     This concern carries even more weight today.  The designation 
of a routine privacy-enhancing technology as presumptively a 
national security matter is inconsistent with the end of the Cold 
War and the dramatic growth of commercial and civilian 
telecommunications networks.  While cryptography -- the science of 
making and breaking secret security codes -- was once the sole 
province of the military and the intelligence agencies, the 
technology today plays an essential role in assuring the security 
and privacy of a wide range of communications affecting finance, 
education, research, and personal correspondence.  

     Electronic communications are now widely used in the civilian 
sector and have become an integral component of the global 
economy.  Computers store and exchange an ever increasing amount 
of personal information, including medical and financial data.  In 
this electronic environment, the need for privacy-enhancing 
technologies is apparent.  Communications applications such as 
electronic mail and electronic funds transfers require secure 
means of encryption and authentication -- goals that can be 
achieved only through the development and dissemination of robust 
cryptographic technology within the civilian sector.


The Computer Security Act and Civilian Cryptography

     In recognition of the emerging significance of civilian 
cryptography, Congress enacted the Computer Security Act (P.L. 
100-235) in 1987.  When Congress enacted the legislation, it 
expressed particular concern that the National Security Agency 
("NSA"), a secretive military intelligence agency, would 
improperly limit public access to information concerning civilian 
computer security activities.  H. Rep. No. 153 (Part 2), 100th 
Cong., 1st Sess. 21 (1987).  The House Report on the Act notes 
that NSA's 

     natural tendency to restrict and even deny access to 
     information that it deems important would disqualify 
     that agency from being put in charge of the protection 
     of non-national security information in the view of many 
     officials in the civilian agencies and the private 
     sector.  
Id.  
     
     To alleviate these concerns, Congress granted sole authority 
to the National Institute of Standards and Technology ("NIST") -- 
a civilian agency within the Department of Commerce -- to 
establish technical cryptography standards for civilian computer 
security.  During Congress' consideration of the legislation, "NSA 
opposed its passage and asserted that NSA should be in control of 
this nation's computer standards program."  Id. at 7.  Congress 
forthrightly rejected NSA's position, noting that continued 
military control over all cryptographic development "would 
jeopardize the entire Federal standards program."  Id. at 26.

     Since the enactment of the Computer Security Act, CPSR has 
sought to monitor compliance with its provisions.  In keeping with 
those efforts, CPSR requested relevant information from NIST under 
the Freedom of Information Act ("FOIA") concerning the development 
of the "digital signature standard" -- the agency's first proposed 
cryptographic standard since passage of the legislation.  It is 
important to note that the proposed standard itself would be 
"applicable to all federal departments and agencies for the 
protection of unclassified information."  56 Fed. Reg. 42981 
(August 30, 1991) (emphasis added).  

     After CPSR filed a lawsuit to compel disclosure of the 
information, NIST acknowledged that the great bulk of responsive 
material was under the jurisdiction of NSA.  NSA, in turn, has 
sought to withhold a substantial amount of that information on the 
grounds that it "concerns cryptology" and is therefore classified.  
CPSR v. National Institute of Standards and Technology, et al., 
C.A. 92-0972-RCL (D.D.C.).  The current Executive Order is thus 
being used to classify information relating to a civilian agency's 
development of a security standard intended to protect 
unclassified information.  Such a result contravenes Congress' 
intent that non-military cryptographic standards would be 
developed openly and subject to public scrutiny.


The Public Interest in Cryptography

     More recent developments further illustrate how the 
application of cryptographic technology is moving out of the 
"national security" realm and is thus an inappropriate subject for 
presumptive classification.  On April 16, 1993, the President 
announced that "government engineers" had developed a new 
cryptographic device known as the "Clipper Chip" that is intended 
for widespread public use.  The President noted that 
"[s]ophisticated encryption technology has been used for years to 
protect electronic funds transfer ... [and] is now being used to 
protect electronic mail and computer files."  He also recognized 
that "encryption technology can help Americans protect business 
secrets and the unauthorized release of personal information."  

     Unfortunately, the administration subsequently acknowledged 
that the "Clipper" technology was developed by NSA and that the 
underlying technical data is classified.  As in the case of the 
digital signature standard, a new technology that may have a 
significant impact on the nation's telecommunications 
infrastructure was developed in secrecy behind a shield of NSA-
imposed classification.  There is a great deal of interest in the 
development of civilian cryptography, but public involvement in 
the process has been substantially hampered by the improper 
classification of relevant technical information.  See, e.g., 
Markoff, U.S. as Big Brother of Computer Age, New York Times, May 
6, 1993 at D1. 

     In the Cold War atmosphere that prevailed for 45 years, 
cryptography was often viewed as a national security matter and 
policy makers were at times willing to permit the National 
Security Agency and the military establishment to maintain a 
shroud of secrecy around the technology, even to the detriment of 
scientific research and public accountability.  With the end of 
the Cold War and the growth of widely available computer network 
services, this view of cryptography must change.  Indeed, Congress 
recognized the need for reform when it enacted the Computer 
Security Act in 1987, even before the demise of the Soviet Union.  
At the same time, cryptographic technology has become an 
increasingly vital component of the nation's civilian information 
infrastructure.  Under these circumstances, there is no rational 
basis for continuing the presumption that information that 
"concerns cryptology" should be classified.  The economic and 
scientific cost to the country of the continuation of this policy 
will be substantial and cannot be justified.

     We believe that cryptographic information should only be 
classified upon a specific showing that such disclosure will 
result in an identifiable harm to legitimate national security 
interests.  Such a showing could clearly be made, for instance, 
with respect to the actual "keys" to government cryptographic 
systems.  However, the wholesale classification of all information 
relating to this increasingly important field of computer science 
cannot be justified and may even slow the development of more 
secure systems.  We urge the Task Force to recommend to the 
President that "cryptology" be removed from any listing of 
classification categories that might be contained in a revised 
Executive Order on security classification.

     *  "Cryptology" should be removed from the designated 
     "Classification Categories."


Limitations on Quasi-Classification Authority

     In addition to our concern regarding classification for 
cryptology, we wish to raise several additional points about the 
operation of the Executive Order. One aspect of the Executive 
Order concerning classification authority with which we agree has 
not received proper notice by federal agencies.   That is 
paragraph (b) or Part 1 which states that "Except as otherwise 
provided by statute, no other terms shall be used to identify 
classified information."  It has been CPSR's experience that 
agencies continue to use the designation "sensitive but 
unclassified" to invoke a national security concern when in fact 
there is no basis for such a claim and when such a "quasi-
classification" is disfavored by the Executive Order and contrary 
to the intent of the Computer Security Act.  In one instance, the 
Federal Bureau of Investigation specifically restricted public 
access to information regarding the development of certain 
computer systems because it designated technical documents 
"sensitive but unclassified."  

     We believe that these activities improperly restrict public 
access to government information that should otherwise be made 
available.  For this reason, we believe that a revised Executive 
Order should make very clear that classification authority is 
narrowly restricted.

     *  Classification authority must be narrowly construed and 
     invoked only pursuant to designated classification levels, 
     recognized by statute or executive order.

     
Limitations on Classification to Conceal Misconduct

     We are further concerned that Section 1.6(a)-(b) and Section 
5.4(b)(2)(c) in the current Executive Order have not received 
adequate attention by the national security community.  Section 
1.6(a) states that:

     In no case shall administrative information be 
     classified in order to conceal violations of law, 
     inefficiencies, or administrative error; to prevent 
     embarrassment to a person, organization, or agency; to 
     restrain competition; or to prevent or delay the release 
     of information that does not require protection in the 
     interest of national security.

Section 1.6(b) further states that "[b]asic scientific information 
not clearly related to the national security may not be 
classified."

Section 5.4 (Sanctions) states, in pertinent part, that:

     (b) Officers and employees of the United States 
     government and its contractors, licensees, and grantees 
     shall be subject to appropriate sanctions if they: . . . 

     (2) knowingly and willfully classify or continue the 
     classification of information in violation of this Order 
     or any implementing directive;

     (c) sanctions may include reprimand, suspension without 
     pay, removal, termination of classification authority, 
     loss or denial of access to classified information, or 
     other sanctions in accordance with applicable law and 
     agency regulation.

     As indicated above, it has been CPSR's experience that the 
National Security Agency sought to conceal its activities under 
the Computer Security Act through improper assertion of the (b)(1) 
exemption to the Freedom of Information Act.  It is clearly an 
improper use of classification authority to conceal agency conduct 
in this manner.  Such activities frustrate public oversight and 
permit the abuse of powers.

     Based on this experience, we make the following 
recommendations:

     *  ISOO should conduct an investigation to determine whether 
     the NSA's classification of documents regarding 
     cryptography was improper and, if so, whether sanctions are 
     appropriate for the agency officials involved.

     *  Any agency or government official exercising 
     classification authority with the intent of concealing 
     misconduct, inefficiencies or improper conduct should be 
     subject to sanctions and the ISOO should make known on an 
     annual basis its efforts to ensure that such activities do 
     not occur.


Implementation and Review

     It is also our belief that it would be appropriate to 
establish an independent commission on classification authority 
that would meet periodically to review the activities of the 
Information Security Oversight Office and to solicit public input 
on issues regarding information classification and national 
security.  Such a commission could include a representative of the 
National Security Council and the Director of the ISOO.  It would 
also include distinguished archivists, historians, journalists, 
librarians, scientists and academics.  Such a commission could 
provide ongoing oversight of the classification program and help 
ensure that future policies reflect the widespread needs of our 
country in information policy and the changing nature of our 
national security interest.


     We appreciate this opportunity to present our views and would 
be pleased to provide you with any additional information you 
might require.


Marc Rotenberg                         David L. Sobel
CPSR Washington Director        CPSR Legal Counsel








From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: TO1SITTLER@APSICC.APS.EDU (Kragen Sittler)
Date: Fri, 16 Jul 93 08:08:19 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: steganography
Message-ID: <930716090336.7b8@APSICC.APS.EDU>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


In a previous message, which my VMS newsreader is too stupid to remember and
can just barely quote, an Evil Genius For A Better Tomorrow, mike@egfabt.org,

says he thinks that xor'ing 'x' over a message would help to hide the fact that
it is cyphertext.
Problem: If someone is looking for encrypted information, IDEALLY we would like
steganographically for it to be unconditionally impossible to determine that a
file is cyphertext w/o the key.  (It is of course only computationally
infeasible to guess the key, if we pick our cryptosystem right.)

The suggestions that the Evil Genius makes could easily be defeated with an hour
or two of programming using pieces of PGP's source, or ripem, or a little piece
of software designed to tell whether a file is Dolphin Encrypted or Mailsafed.
The resulting program could check hundreds of database files easily, probably
in almost exactly the time required for an open, a single disk access, and a
close on each file.

For a steganographically strong code, the cyphertext must not be recognizable
to its home program.  This means, among other things, no CRC's, no MD5's, etc,
intended to assure data integrity.  This means no delimiter-structured files.
(I think--I'm not absolutely sure on this one.)  Every field in the file must
be either fixed-length or have a number somewhere in it
(in a format indistinguishable from the rest of the cyphertext) which tells its
length.  And every field, individually, must not be recognizable as something
unusual. (For instance, no sending of large prime numbers in the clear, as they
are very unlikely to appear in a random file.)

The foregoing "field" stuff has to do with things like PGP, which have a
message cyphertext, encrypted with a session key, and a session key, encrypted
with a PKC, in the same message. (Possible several cyphertexts of the session
key.)

Oh, and it would be nice, though not essential, if a corruption in the file
made it completely, rather than partially, nonsense when decrypted.  This way
you can't have a file with no use to the recipient used as evidence against
them.

The important qualifications seem to rule out any crypto package in current
widespread use, don't they?

Kragen, an ignorant crypto-wannabe




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: fergp@sytex.com (Paul Ferguson)
Date: Fri, 16 Jul 93 14:45:29 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: DCypherpunks
Message-ID: <LJFs7B2w165w@sytex.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Washington, DC area Cypherpunks:
 
I have accepted a consulting position in the DC area which will not
require consistent travel (unlike my current job), which I will begin
the first of August. This position will be designing, implementing and
configuring routed Internet access data networks for one of the big
three carriers (no, not AT&T).
 
Anyway, I'd like to find out how many of the DCypherpuuks are willing
to plan a physical meeting for mid-August to discuss current
happenings, sign keys and the likes.
 
E-mail me if you are interested.
 
Cheers.

Paul Ferguson               |  "Confidence is the feeling you get
Network Integrator          |   just before you fully understand
Centreville, Virginia USA   |   the problem."
fergp@sytex.com             |      - Murphy's 7th Law of Computing
 
               Quis Custodiet Ipsos Custodes?

 being used for,
what I consider, unethical, immoral and possibly illegal activities.
 
             ---- begin forwarded message -------------
 
AIS BBS Capture log.
 
To:  all interested parties, especially Americans who may wish to
ask relevant questions of relevant people.
 
Capture log from a BBS that claims to be run by the US Treasury
Department, Bureau of the Public Debt. Notice - I have not verified
that the US government is actually running this BBS, only that the
BBS claims that it is.
 
The capture was made live. I have cut out parts where the same area
was visited twice, and the information is identical. Also cut out,
is any information that could lead to the caller being identified, as
the caller wishes to retain privacy. If indeed this is being run by
the US Government, the caller would not wish to be harassed by that
organisation.
 
Also omitted are the "More" prompts for paging the display. And,
after the first few displays of the main menu, some of those have
also been omitted for brevity.
 
The file 27-ASM.ZIP was downloaded, to check that there really were
source codes. In fact, there were mostly recompilable disassemblies,
some good, some bad. I've included, at the end of this file, the
beginning of 512.ASM, a disassembly of Number of the Beast. But
I've only included the header, the first couple of instructions
(discover Dos version) and the end (the '666'). All the meat of
the code, I've omitted for brevity, and because this capture
is likely to become publicly available.
 
 
[End of forwarded transcript]
 
Immediately following the above text, was contained a list of computer
viruses, virus construction tools and virus disassemblies.
 
In the subsequent storm of debate, there have been several scathing
articles written about the way the situation was  brought into public
knowledge, including a front-page article in the Washington Post and
several rather scathing articles in Computer Underground Digest (CuD
5.51) and a rebuttal (of sorts, CuD 5.52) in which I stated my own
position on the matter.
 
It is also been brought to my attention that certain underground
hackers have vowed to seek revenge in some fashion, which really
worries me the least.
 
My main concern is that this instance of valid utilization of
"whistleblowing" has been overshadowed by the ravings of virus
exchange enthusiasts and underground virus distribution and propagation
groups who are calling "Foul!" without closely examine the
implications of their own actions (a topic which I will not launch
into at this time).
 
In fact, I applaud Peter G. Neumann, moderator of RISKS Forum for
allowing the anonymous post to be posted to the list in the first
place. Another copy of the message was sent anonymously to VIRUS-L
Digest (comp.virus list) where Ken van Wyk, the moderator, decided not
to post it. (A raspberry to Ken for that one.)
 
Perhaps the remainder of the  net is not quite ready to acknowledge
anonymity? As I stated above, I'd really like to hear some of your
thoughts on the matter...
 
Cheers.

Paul Ferguson               |  "Confidence is the feeling you get
Network Integrator          |   just before you fully understand
Centreville, Virginia USA   |   the problem."
fergp@sytex.com             |      - Murphy's 7th Law of Computing
 
               Quis Custodiet Ipsos Custodes?




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: anonymous@extropia.wimsey.com
Date: Fri, 16 Jul 93 12:28:19 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: WARNING:  NON-CYPHERPUNK QUESTION
Message-ID: <199307161907.AA19293@xtropia>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Clark Reynard asked:

    Are there any fast, quick, reliable methods of forestalling phone
    disconnection due to failure to pay the bills, and the ugly
    reconnection fee which ensues thereupon?

I can't offer a method of *eliminating* your phone bill, but I have
been practicing a method of drastically *reducing* the charge for
local phone service.

Simply ask Pac Bell (In California) for "Lifeline" service.  The
monthly bill is $1.31, after "credits" for "inside wire repair" and
"Tel Equip" (for buying your own phone(s)).  Clark, do you think you
could afford that?

This gets you a local (outgoing) call allowance of 60 calls per month
(about 2 a day).  Unlike regular measured service, which measures (and
charges) by call *and length of call*, each of your 60 calls under
lifeline can be of unlimited length.  Back when I had a 2400 baud
modem, I frequently had single calls of 2-4 *hours* while uploading &
downloading files from various local BB's.  Calls beyond your 60-call
allowance are charged at $.08 per call.

Of course, there's a catch.  Lifeline service is only offered to
"poor" people.  You have to sign a statement every year certifying
that your combined family income doesn't exceed their guidlines. But
although they warn you that the Public Utilities Commission "may
investigate" your claim; they apparently never do! Unlike the PG&E
lifeline program, Pac Bell doesn't ask for *any* documentation of your
income like W-2 forms or copies of your tax returns.

I've been on lifeline service for *years*, I think almost since they
started offering it, back when the Bell system was broken up, and
local phone rates were raised sharply.  During most of that time, I
earned around $50,000/year.  Now I'm retired & my pension is about
$24,000, still well above the lifeline "guideline".

One caveat, I live in an area of San Jose where many of my neighbors
are working-class, a few on welfare, etc.  This scam might not work
from an address in Hillsboro, Los Gatos, or Saratoga; but who knows,
the PUC may be so incompetent and/or lazy that it might.

Considering the moral factors, if you *don't* claim lifeline
eligibility, then you are *charged* a few cents a month to pay for the
people who *do*!  You are also charged $1.75 for "access to a long
distance carrier", even if you don't call long distance. (but
lifeline customers get an offsetting credit and still have long
distance access).  So you have to choose to be a sheep or a wolf, a
victim or a victimizer, to either take unfair advantage of the system
or have it take unfair advantage of you; there is no middle ground.

Consider the pragmatic factors. Based on my experience, the chances of
getting "caught" seem remote.  If I'm ever investigated, I plan to
play dumb and claim I didn't understand the lifeline forms I signed.
Since I didn't provide any false documentation of a low income (they
didn't *ask* for any), be pretty hard to prove intent to commit fraud.
So I expect the worst that could happen is that I'd have to pay some
estimate of what my correct bill might have been less what I actually
paid.  I suspect there's a statute of limitations, which I've already
exceeded for most of the time I've been on lifeline. So this sounds
like a good bet.  If you win, you win big; if you lose, you break
even, with chances of losing being much less than 50/50.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: khijol!erc@apple.com (Ed Carp)
Date: Fri, 16 Jul 93 14:53:58 PDT
To: tedwards@src.umd.edu (Thomas Grant Edwards)
Subject: Re: your mail
In-Reply-To: <199307161943.AA00777@kolo.src.umd.edu>
Message-ID: <m0oGwoX-000272C@warrior>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text


> Does anyone know of C source code for low speed CELP or vocoder
> software available on the net?  
> 
> I feel if we can develop even a low-speed software based answer to
> the secure-phone, it will probably be used and distributed to many
> people.  I think it would have to be based around the soundblaster
> card though.
> 
> Perhaps we can also devise an internet secure-phone standard, and
> clients can be written for NeXTs, Suns, PCs, and etc.  
> 
> I've had no luck getting our SparcStations to decompress ADPCM encoded
> Internet Talk Radio in real time...either the software I have is truly
> sad (could be), or we need to look at other compression methods
> such as CELP, or at worst, vocoder.
> 
> - -Thomas

Have you looked at netphone?  That should be fairly easy to hack to include
encryption, although I haven't looked at the source..
-- 
Ed Carp				erc@wetware.com			510/659-9560
   For anonymous mailers -->   anonymus+5300@charcoal.com
"Disagreements are not meant to be challenges.  They are just a different
 reality."  -- Risa D'Angeles



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: paul@poboy.b17c.ingr.com (Paul Robichaux)
Date: Fri, 16 Jul 93 12:22:01 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Crypto Conference from Hell
Message-ID: <199307161916.AA14652@poboy.b17c.ingr.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


The attached message was originally posted in comp.dcom.telecom. I haven't
contacted these people, but some 'punk in the DC area might be able to
weasel in.

Consider the list of speakers:
	- well-known (notorious) - Denning, Bidzos, Clint Brooks from
	  NSA, Kammer from NIST
	- people we should be talking to - the mgr of AT&T's Secure
	  Comm Systems division, that same division's chief scientist
	- Big Wheels - Rosenthal (chief counsel for SPA), Willis Ware,
	  Jerry Berman.

Fun for the whole family!

-Paul



Path: infonode!uunet!spool.mu.edu!telecom-request
Date: Mon, 12 Jul 1993 16:26:13 -0500
From: Matthew Lucas <matt@telestrat.com>
Newsgroups: comp.dcom.telecom
Subject: Conference With Dorothy Denning: Encrypting Voice and Data
Message-ID: <telecom13.468.1@eecs.nwu.edu>
Organization: TELECOM Digest
Sender: telecom@eecs.nwu.edu
Approved: telecom@eecs.nwu.edu
X-Submissions-To: telecom@eecs.nwu.edu
X-Administrivia-To: telecom-request@eecs.nwu.edu
X-Telecom-Digest: Volume 13, Issue 468, Message 1 of 9
Lines: 151

Conference Announcement:

         A TeleStrategies Conference with Dr. Dorothy Denning
            
         Encrypting Voice and Data: Strategies for the Future
                      
                          Aug. 3-4, 1993
                          Washington, DC
                   
Tuesday, August 3, 1993

8:30-9:00 Registration

9:00-10:30 
CRYPTOGRAPHY OVERVIEW 

The basic concepts of cryptography and encryption, including
single-key and publickey, authentication, digital signatures, key
negotiation or distribution, and cryptanalysis (code breaking) will be
introduced along with the Data Encryption Standard (DES), the RSA
public-key system, and the Digital Signature Standard (DSS). The
speaker will also discuss the need for encryption and the role of
encryption in telephony and communications networks.

Dr. Dorothy E. Denning, Professor and Chair of Computer Science,
    Georgetown University

10:30-10:45 Coffee Break

10:45-11:45
SURVEY OF ENCRYPTION PRODUCTS 

The speaker will survey commercial hardware and software products that
contain encryption capabilities, including the types of products that
are available, their relative strengths and weaknesses, and the major
vendors.

Jim Bidzos, President, RSA Data Security, Inc.

11:45-12:30
CELLULAR ENCRYPTION

Cellular calls are especially vulnerable to eavesdropping. PrivaFone's
approach, which is interoperable on cellular and land lines, will be
described. Digital cellular standards that provide voice privacy and
authentication for TDMA or CDMA technologies also will be discussed.

Dr. Ming Lee, President, Synacomm Technology
Charles Wistar, President, PrivaFone Corp.

12:30-1:45 Hosted Lunch

1:45-2:30 
THE CLIPPER AND CAPSTONE CHIPS 

The Clipper and Capstone Chips are part of a new U.S. technology
initiative to provide secure communications and legitimate law
enforcement access through a key escrow system. The speakers will
describe the initiative, the security functions provided by the chips,
and the use of the Clipper Chip in the AT&T Telephone Security Device.

William M. Agee, Manager, Secure Communication Systems - Government, AT&T
Raymond G. Kammer, Acting Director, National Institute of Standards 
     and Technology

2:30-3:00
BUSINESS CONCERNS WITH ENCRYPTION 

The speaker will give a snapshot of one computer security program and
discuss business concerns with encryption, including practical needs
and requirements, organizational constraints, operational concerns,
security of the process, and balancing concerns and practical use.

Randolph N. Sanovic, Manager of Computer Security Planning, Mobil Corp.

3:00-3:15 Coffee Break

3:15-4:00
USING CRYPTOGRAPHY TO ARCHITECT DISTRIBUTED OPEN SYSTEMS
SECURITY: A CASE STUDY 

Securing networks and computers in a distributed environment presents
several new challenges. The speaker will describe Bell Atlantic's
enterprise-wide approach to architecting security in such an
environment, showing how encryption fits into the design.

Ravi Ganesan, Specialist, Security Research and Planning, Bell Atlantic

4:00-5:00
ENCRYPTION IN ELECTRONIC COMMERCE AND ELECTRONIC MAIL 

Encryption is becoming an integral tool for building secure
applications.  The speakers will discuss the use of encryption and
digital signatures in Electronic Data Interchange (EDI) and Internet
Privacy Enhanced Mail (PEM).

Michael S. Baum J.D., Principal, Independent Monitoring
Dr. Stephen D. Crocker, Vice President, Trusted Information Systems, Inc.

5:00-6:00 Reception


Wednesday, August 4, 1993

8:30-10:30
CRYPTOGRAPHY POLICY IN THE U.S. 

The speakers will discuss the Clipper and Capstone chips, law
enforcement needs and the Digital Telephony proposal, export and
import of encryption products, international markets, industry growth
and competitiveness, and individual privacy. They will also report on
the national policy review in progress.
 
Dr. Willis H. Ware, Chair, Computer Systems Security and Privacy 
     Advisory Board (Moderator)
Jerry Berman, Executive Director, Electronic Frontier Foundation    
Clinton C. Brooks, Special Assistant to Director, National Security Agency 
Alan R. McDonald, Special Assistant (Legal) to the Assistant Director, 
     Technical Services Division, Federal Bureau of Investigation
Ilene Rosenthal, General Counsel, Software Publishers Association

10:30-10:45 Coffee Break

10:45-11:30 CRYPTOGRAPHY IN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY 

In the European Community, government controls on cryptography differ
across countries and affect achievement of secure open systems and,
consequently, achievement of the Open Market and transborder
electronic trading. The speaker will summarize the current situation
in Europe, describe some of the initiatives to address the issues, and
comment on the recent initiatives in the US.

Christopher E. Sundt, Business Strategy Manager, ICL Secure Systems

11:30-12:15
THE FUTURE OF CRYPTOGRAPHY IN TELECOMMUNICATIONS 

Several fast-moving trends in telecommunications demand cryptographic
solutions, including wireless transmission, multi-media conferencing,
and electronic commerce.  As broadcast and multiple access
technologies are used increasingly for information transmission, and
everyday business is carried out in "cyberspace," structures that
ensure privacy, authenticity, and (often) anonymity must become part
of the natural landscape.

Dr. David P. Maher, Chief Scientist for AT&T Secure Communications 
     Systems, AT&T

For complete information call TeleStrategies Inc. at (703) 734-7050.






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Mike Johnson <exabyte!smtplink!mikej@uunet.UU.NET>
Date: Fri, 16 Jul 93 14:16:47 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: steganography and cryptography
Message-ID: <9307161455.A01259@smtplink.exabyte.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Kragen Sittler says:

> . . .
> For a steganographically strong code, the cyphertext must not be recognizable
> to its home program.  This means, among other things, no CRC's, no MD5's, etc,
> intended to assure data integrity.  This means no delimiter-structured files.
> (I think--I'm not absolutely sure on this one.)  Every field in the file must
> be either fixed-length or have a number somewhere in it
> (in a format indistinguishable from the rest of the cyphertext) which tells it
s
> length.  And every field, individually, must not be recognizable as something
> unusual. (For instance, no sending of large prime numbers in the clear, as the
y
> are very unlikely to appear in a random file.)
> 
> The foregoing "field" stuff has to do with things like PGP, which have a
> message cyphertext, encrypted with a session key, and a session key, encrypted
> with a PKC, in the same message. (Possible several cyphertexts of the session
> key.)
> 
> Oh, and it would be nice, though not essential, if a corruption in the file
> made it completely, rather than partially, nonsense when decrypted.  This way
> you can't have a file with no use to the recipient used as evidence against
> them.
> 
> The important qualifications seem to rule out any crypto package in current
> widespread use, don't they?
> . . .

For a steganographically strong code, it is not enough to make it
unrecognizable to its home program.  The ciphertext must look like something
"innocent" to either a human reader or a computer program designed to look
for ciphertext.  For example, the message could be hidden in the least
significant intensity bits of a bitmapped picture that the intended recipient
has an unmodified copy of.

If data that looks like random noise is innocent enough, then it is not hard
to hack PGP or write another encryption program that intentionally lacks any
signature information.  I wrote several programs with this property.  The two
best examples are CRYPTE and CRYPTMPJ, both of which are available on the
Rainbow Missions BBS at 303-938-9654.  This makes them a little harder to use
than PGP and similar programs, because the user has to know in advance when
encryption and decryption are appropriate, and which algorithm to use. 

Allowing a signature in the file format makes it obvious which program was
used to encrypt the data (thus slightly reducing security), but it makes it
easier to use the program.  This increase in ease of use makes it more likely
that it will be used, and that increases security.





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Thomas Grant Edwards <tedwards@src.umd.edu>
Date: Fri, 16 Jul 93 12:44:02 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: No Subject
Message-ID: <199307161943.AA00777@kolo.src.umd.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

Does anyone know of C source code for low speed CELP or vocoder
software available on the net?  

I feel if we can develop even a low-speed software based answer to
the secure-phone, it will probably be used and distributed to many
people.  I think it would have to be based around the soundblaster
card though.

Perhaps we can also devise an internet secure-phone standard, and
clients can be written for NeXTs, Suns, PCs, and etc.  

I've had no luck getting our SparcStations to decompress ADPCM encoded
Internet Talk Radio in real time...either the software I have is truly
sad (could be), or we need to look at other compression methods
such as CELP, or at worst, vocoder.

- -Thomas
 

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.2

iQBVAgUBLEcE4DAI9D7h8UTJAQHGSgIAgleqJLQnpwQck4b8FQi79uL6RPGv1j01
LlLX+ICFA/yFfVheh43tWt9vsHrG0d+Vgbo3SX4FHUniDBlqAHYnfw==
=QYED
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: hughes (Eric Hughes)
Date: Fri, 16 Jul 93 16:15:07 PDT
To: cypherpunks
Subject: ADMIN: cypherpunks mail configuration change
Message-ID: <9307162315.AA05737@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Effective immediately, all cypherpunks mail will appear to originate
from 'owner-cypherpunks'.  Previously the name was
'cypherpunks-request'.  This change only affects those of you using
mail filters which are filtering on the out-of-band "From " line.
This change was made so that I can more easily separate bounce
messages from list requests.

Eric




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: norm@netcom.com (Norman Hardy)
Date: Fri, 16 Jul 93 16:36:56 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Names and Reputations
Message-ID: <9307162337.AA28881@netcom3.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


J. Michael Diehl wrote:
 
    I'm having a philosophical problem regarding when to sign someone
    else's public key.
 
It strikes me that while a public key may be properly associated with
someone that you know by sight it may more generally be associated
with an abstract reputation. Connecting a face to a public key may
be less useful than connecting a public key with someone that
I recognize by reputation. I don't know Stephen Wolff by sight
but I do know him by reputation and have conversed with
him by e-mail. If during these conversations we had exchanged
public keys, even thru insecure channels, then that would be
more reliable than exchanging keys with someone that I met
in person who claimed to be Steve Wolff but with whom I did not
have time to converse. Steve's reputation with me arose thru a book
he wrote. If he had included his private key there it would be
better yet. (Public keys had not been invented then.)
Having been influenced by Steve's book I would be inclined to
accept Steve's opinions in related areas, if they were signed
by his private key. I need not know what Steve looks like!
 
In CyberSpace it ultimately seems that the public key supplants
ordinary names and all reputations are connected to public keys!




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: hughes (Eric Hughes)
Date: Fri, 16 Jul 93 17:05:41 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: TEST: Ignore me
Message-ID: <9307170001.AA07104@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


More mailing list testing.  Please ignore.

Eric




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Ciamac Moallemi <ciamac@hplms2.hpl.hp.com>
Date: Fri, 16 Jul 93 18:34:32 PDT
To: edgar@spectrx.Saigon.COM (Edgar W. Swank)
Subject: Bay area August cypherpunks mtg
In-Reply-To: <XJwq7B7w165w@spectrx.saigon.com>
Message-ID: <9307170134.AA18082@cello.hpl.hp.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>>>>> On Thu, 15 Jul 93 13:10:20 PDT, edgar@spectrx.Saigon.COM (Edgar W. Swank) said:
edgar> If there is any interest, I will bring both soft and hard-copies
edgar> to the next Physical Meeting, which I presume will take place
edgar> on the 2nd Sat of August, 8/8, noon, at Cygnus in Mtn. View.
edgar> (I didn't see any announcement/agenda for the July meeting, but
edgar> I understand it occurred anyway).

8/8 is a Sunday, what's the deal?  I'm a newbie on this the
cypherpunks list and would be very interested in attending.  Could
someone post details?  Thanks.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: J. Michael Diehl <mdiehl@polaris.unm.edu>
Date: Fri, 16 Jul 93 19:03:14 PDT
To: collins@newton.apple.com (Scott Collins)
Subject: Re: Relation between number theory and cryptography
In-Reply-To: <9307151822.AA03311@newton.apple.com>
Message-ID: <9307170159.AA16388@polaris.unm.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


According to Scott Collins:
> J. Michael Diehl <mdiehl@triton.unm.edu> writes:
> 
>   >if we were to add some noise [then] we have added [...] information
> Perhaps in 'Information Relativity'.  With respect to the original system
> (and by definition), noise is not information.  It is only data.

This is a good arguement, but I believe I specified "algorithmic" information to
be added to the message.  This, I believe, does convey information of some kind.


+-----------------------+-----------------------------+---------+
| J. Michael Diehl ;-)  | I thought I was wrong once. | PGP KEY |
| mdiehl@triton.unm.edu |   But, I was mistaken.      |available|
| mike.diehl@fido.org   |                             | Ask Me! |
| (505) 299-2282        +-----------------------------+---------+
|                                                               |
+------"I'm just looking for the opportunity to be -------------+
|            Politically Incorrect!"   <Me>                     |
+-----If codes are outlawed, only criminals wil have codes.-----+
+----Is Big Brother in your phone?  If you don't know, ask me---+



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: norm@netcom.com (Norman Hardy)
Date: Fri, 16 Jul 93 21:03:15 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Names and Reputations
Message-ID: <9307170401.AA24295@netcom3.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


J. Michael Diehl writes:
 
> This is a good point, but I believe that eventually, people will want to sign
> legal documents via pgp and such.  So being able to tie a pseudonym to a 
> reputation to a public key to a REAL LIVE PERSON is very important.  I think 
 
That is a good point too. Perhaps the laws and practices of Notary Publics
may serve for one degree of assurance. They commonly need to know who
is asking them to notarize something such as a will. I don't remember
how they do this.
I suppose that a Notary public should have a published public key that
she uses like her seal.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: J. Michael Diehl <mdiehl@triton.unm.edu>
Date: Fri, 16 Jul 93 20:13:15 PDT
To: norm@netcom.com (Norman Hardy)
Subject: Re: Names and Reputations
In-Reply-To: <9307162337.AA28881@netcom3.netcom.com>
Message-ID: <9307170311.AA15511@triton.unm.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


According to Norman Hardy:
> J. Michael Diehl wrote:
>     I'm having a philosophical problem regarding when to sign someone
>     else's public key.
>  
> It strikes me that while a public key may be properly associated with
> someone that you know by sight it may more generally be associated
> with an abstract reputation. Connecting a face to a public key may
> be less useful than connecting a public key with someone that
> I recognize by reputation. I don't know Stephen Wolff by sight
> but I do know him by reputation and have conversed with
> him by e-mail. If during these conversations we had exchanged
> public keys, even thru insecure channels, then that would be
> more reliable than exchanging keys with someone that I met
> in person who claimed to be Steve Wolff but with whom I did not
> have time to converse. Steve's reputation with me arose thru a book
> he wrote. If he had included his private key there it would be
> better yet. (Public keys had not been invented then.)
> Having been influenced by Steve's book I would be inclined to
> accept Steve's opinions in related areas, if they were signed
> by his private key. I need not know what Steve looks like!

This is a good point, but I believe that eventually, people will want to sign
legal documents via pgp and such.  So being able to tie a pseudonym to a 
reputation to a public key to a REAL LIVE PERSON is very important.  I think 
that for many people, your attitude is one they can live with.  This is what I
was debating when I posted the original question.  But for others, your policy
may not be secure enough.  I'm working on a key-signing policy for myself which
I will make available via finger or request.  Laters.

+-----------------------+-----------------------------+---------+
| J. Michael Diehl ;-)  | I thought I was wrong once. | PGP KEY |
| mdiehl@triton.unm.edu |   But, I was mistaken.      |available|
| mike.diehl@fido.org   |                             | Ask Me! |
| (505) 299-2282        +-----------------------------+---------+
|                                                               |
+------"I'm just looking for the opportunity to be -------------+
|            Politically Incorrect!"   <Me>                     |
+-----If codes are outlawed, only criminals wil have codes.-----+
+----Is Big Brother in your phone?  If you don't know, ask me---+




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: baumbach@atmel.com (Peter Baumbach)
Date: Fri, 16 Jul 93 21:43:16 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: subscribe
Message-ID: <9307170121.AA02296@bass.chp.atmel.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Sorry to send this to the list.  (Is it still here?)
I would like to resubscribe to cypherpunks, but cannot
get a response from cypherpunks-request@toad.com .

Any help is appreciated,

Peter Baumbach
baumbach@atmel.com

ps.  Could someone tell me if this reached the list?




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: ""L. Detweiler"" <ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Date: Fri, 16 Jul 93 21:38:15 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Crypto Conference from Hell
Message-ID: <9307170436.AA27599@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Dr. David P. Maher, Chief Scientist for AT&T Secure Communications 
     Systems, AT&T
>As broadcast and multiple access
>technologies are used increasingly for information transmission, and
>everyday business is carried out in "cyberspace," structures that
>ensure privacy, authenticity, and (often) anonymity must become part
>of the natural landscape.

wow, is this guy a cypherpunk? Gad, this is really mainstream. NYT,
Newsweek, SciAm, and now a cryptographic conference *with* the NSA! 
We've hit the big time.  (Oops, he's from AT&T.)

>Wednesday, August 4, 1993
>
>8:30-10:30
>CRYPTOGRAPHY POLICY IN THE U.S. 

YIKES, the fireworks are going to fly at this one. CSSPAB (NIST), EFF,
NSA, FBI, SPA all in the same room at the same time. I sure hope
there'll be transcripts of this one. It would sure beat all that
Congressional testimony by far for rancor per bit! Cryptography meeting of the year?




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: peter honeyman <honey@citi.umich.edu>
Date: Fri, 16 Jul 93 19:39:32 PDT
To: fergp@sytex.com (Paul Ferguson)
Subject: Re: Anonymity takes one on the chin
Message-ID: <9307170239.AA10958@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


paul, my thoughts in (extremely) brief:

i applaud your resolve to correct what you saw to be wrongdoing.

i totally disagree with you on the merits of the case; i think the
civil servant runing the bbs (i forget her name) provides a valuable
service, and serves the common good.

as usual, anonymity is a lightning rod here, although it is largely
peripheral to the real issues.

	peter




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: wcs@anchor.ho.att.com (Bill_Stewart(HOY002)1305)
Date: Fri, 16 Jul 93 19:59:33 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: steganography
Message-ID: <9307170258.AA00984@anchor.ho.att.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text


I think Kragen's definition of "Steganographically Strong" is a bit overstrong.
He suggests that the cyphertext should not be recognizeable by its own program,
with no checksums or program-specific delimiters, headers, etc.
If checksums become widely used in other data formats (e.g. MIME or whatever),
having them used in "innocent-looking-format" is ok.  
And having a checksum that only checks out if you have the correct key
for decrypting the file is relatively ok, assuming you use strong encryption;
it's really no more of a giveaway than having the correctly-decrypted
plaintext have other recognizeable format, such as all-ascii or MIME or GIF.

The request for a feature that corrupted files decrypt to total garbage and
not just partial garbage can be implemented using some variant on doubly
encrypting the file, e.g. descbc file | reverse-the-file | descbc.
Most encryption systems can be used in modes that only trash the corrupted 
block, modes that trash the corrupted block and all following blocks,
or modes that trash the corrupted block and some stuff after it,
but eventually resync.  The latter are useful for on-line continuous encryption
systems like ethernet or T1 encryptors, where you don't want to send out
guys with briefcases handcuffed to their arms any time there's a noise burst :-)

One wimpy steganography approach I've thought of recently is to use uuencode.
Each line starts with an indicator of how many characters are on the line,
normally "M" for 64, followed by the characters; you could use variable-length
lines with the length encoding your real (cyphertext) data at 6 bits/line.
It'd be ugly, and probably noticeable, but you could always demonstrate that it 
outputs normal genuinely-innocent stuff by running it through uudecode.
And it's only a factor of 10 less efficient than hiding it in a GIF!

		Bill Stewart



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: felix@hu.se (Felix Ungman)
Date: Sat, 17 Jul 93 01:28:15 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: PGP 2.3 for Mac
Message-ID: <199307170825.AA17151@mail.swip.net>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Is anyone working on the Mac port of PGP 2.3? I read about the bug fixes of
PGP 2.3 DOS. Do the same bugs exists in the Mac version?
----------------------------------------------------------------------
- RealName: Felix Ungman   InterNet: felix@hu.se   AppleLink: SW0358 -
-                     Felix gor det goda godare!                     -
----------------------------------------------------------------------




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: ral@netcom.com (Robert A. Luscombe)
Date: Sat, 17 Jul 93 11:33:31 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com (Cypherpunks)
Subject: PGP & ELM
Message-ID: <9307171833.AA15751@netcom3.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Would someone be able to send me the most recent verions of the utils to
use PGP with ELM?  Just got a new account and finally have ELM.  If you
can, mail 'em or anon ftp to netcom.com and put them in pub/ral/incoming.

While i'm at it, has anyone ever tried to integrate PGP into VMS MAIL?

Thanks, 
 bob

  Robert Luscombe               ---------
   Internet:                    ---   ---     Home: 
   ral@netcom.com               ---------     2201 Sarah Street Apt. 3 
   ral@drycas.club.cc.cmu.edu   ---------     Pittsburgh, PA 15203-2224
   ral@telerama.pgh.pa.us       ---------     412/488-0941
                                ---   ---
                    *Finger for PGP or RIPEM pub keys*




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Karl Barrus <klbarrus@milp.jsc.nasa.gov>
Date: Sat, 17 Jul 93 09:55:56 PDT
Subject: No Subject
Message-ID: <9307171655.AA04294@milp.jsc.nasa.gov >
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----


This is a touchy topic!  It's a tough call, since statements like:
 
> in the UK. I am dismayed that this type of activity is being condoned
> by an American Governmental Agency. I can only hope that this operation
> is shut down and the responsible parties are reprimanded.  I am
> extremely disturbed by the thought that my tax money is being used for,
> what I consider, unethical, immoral and possibly illegal activities.

may be applied to MANY goverment activities:
* foreign policy (Iraq, Vietnam, Contras, lots of others)
* funding & the NEA
* environmentalist concerns
* homosexuals
* gambling - lots of debate here in TX about the state lottery.  Some
  found it unethical and immoral.  Same goes for the greyhound
  racetrack near Houston.  In the end, $$$$$$ won.
* our favorite: cryptography
 
> My main concern is that this instance of valid utilization of
> "whistleblowing" has been overshadowed by the ravings of virus

I'll have to say, though I disagree with your virus position and am
saddened by the outcome, I don't see anything wrong with
"whistleblowing" in this manner.
 
> Perhaps the remainder of the  net is not quite ready to acknowledge
> anonymity? As I stated above, I'd really like to hear some of your

This seem true.  Just a few months ago there was an enormous flap over
Julf's anonymous server.  But then, like now, the issue was really
over statements made and actions taken anonymously.  However,
anonymity became the focal point.

/-----------------------------------\
| Karl L. Barrus                    |
| elee9sf@menudo.uh.edu             | <- preferred address
| barrus@tree.egr.uh.edu (NeXTMail) |
\-----------------------------------/

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.3

iQCVAgUBLEgueYOA7OpLWtYzAQHdaQP/QEnqtm02Hkln0Mse2YccNxqcgB8v+aox
0VlZJDunfQeukSRgpVqMuAIvXPp9LPQGCr/ubAT01gxANtlSUpiVzMkfqDkxJm/b
z/W1wKOogNrmWHqpR7GMkjPAVHDgRWG8iRtrpW186HKe+TcH8EH9lVmyYBtYGn78
UIjhYwqSLT4=
=FIHB
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: norm@netcom.com (Norman Hardy)
Date: Sat, 17 Jul 93 14:14:47 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Diffie Hellman
Message-ID: <9307172115.AA03790@netcom3.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


What is the best reference to the Diffie Hellman key
exchange algorithm? (Preferably on line)
Thanks




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: cdodhner@indirect.com (Christian D. Odhner)
Date: Sat, 17 Jul 93 16:44:50 PDT
To: felix@hu.se (Felix Ungman)
Subject: Re: PGP 2.3 for Mac
In-Reply-To: <199307170825.AA17151@mail.swip.net>
Message-ID: <9307172342.AA24576@indirect.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Felix Ungman <felix@hu.se> asks:

> Is anyone working on the Mac port of PGP 2.3? I read about the bug fixes of
> PGP 2.3 DOS. Do the same bugs exists in the Mac version?

I have not heard anything about it here on the list, but according to an
interview in MONDO 2000 our own John Draper (BTW John, thanks for doing
all that work on the flyer) is working on an improved macintosh version
with mouse-driven interface, dialog boxes, etc. Too bad I use a 486 under
Linux...<g> Anyway, quite a few people are working on it I think and it
should include all of the same bug fixes, if needed. Funny how you hear
things through such indirect sources, eh?

Happy Hunting, -Chris Odhner
<cdodhner@indirect.com>





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: ral@netcom.com (Robert A. Luscombe)
Date: Sat, 17 Jul 93 17:16:00 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com (Cypherpunks)
Subject: PGP Perl scripts for Elm
Message-ID: <9307180015.AA24759@netcom3.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I have been trying to use the pgp perl scripts for elm, and i must be
doing something very wrong.  Perhaps someone here can help.  I did edit
the scripts to include the location of perl on this machine, and have
specified the scripts as my pager and editor.  This is what happens when i
try them:

Command: Mail                           To: ral (Robert A. Luscombe)
Subject: test
Copies to:
Invoking editor.../u43/ral/.bin/pgpedit: =: not found
/u43/ral/.bin/pgpedit: =: not found
/u43/ral/.bin/pgpedit: =: not found
/u43/ral/.bin/pgpedit: =: not found
/u43/ral/.bin/pgpedit: =: not found
/u43/ral/.bin/pgpedit: =: not found


And when i try to view something:


/u43/ral/.bin/pgppager: $: not found
/u43/ral/.bin/pgppager: =1: not found
/u43/ral/.bin/pgppager: =0: not found
/u43/ral/.bin/pgppager: =: not found
/u43/ral/.bin/pgppager: =/usr/local/bin/less -i -n -s -S -c -M: not found
/u43/ral/.bin/pgppager: syntax error at line 12: `(' unexpected

So, what did i do wrong (or didn't do)?


  Robert Luscombe               ---------
   Internet:                    ---   ---     Home: 
   ral@netcom.com               ---------     2201 Sarah Street Apt. 3 
   ral@drycas.club.cc.cmu.edu   ---------     Pittsburgh, PA 15203-2224
   ral@telerama.pgh.pa.us       ---------     412/488-0941
                                ---   ---
                    *Finger for PGP or RIPEM pub keys*




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Tyler Yip - UnixWeenie(tm) <davros@ecst.csuchico.edu>
Date: Sat, 17 Jul 93 17:48:36 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: No-Brainer elm script
Message-ID: <9307180045.AA24848@hairball.ecst.csuchico.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


#!/bin/ksh
# use the elm "pipe" feature to automatically detect which type of privacy
# enchanced mail the message is under, and then automatically send the message
# with the correct options to the cipher program.
# usage from elm
#			| elm2pem
# you can also put this as the default reader in elm, but sometimes it barfs
# if you get a pgp signed message and don't have the sender's key.
umask 077
clear
cat > $HOME/.tmp/mbox.enc
PGP="BEGIN PGP"
PEM="BEGIN PRIVACY"

if grep "$PGP" $HOME/.tmp/mbox.enc > /dev/null
then
	pgp -m $HOME/.tmp/mbox.enc
elif grep "$PEM" $HOME/.tmp/mbox.enc > /dev/null
then
	ripem -d -i $HOME/.tmp/mbox.enc | more -d
else
	more $HOME/.tmp/mbox.enc
fi

rm -f $HOME/.tmp/mbox.enc




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: smb@research.att.com
Date: Sat, 17 Jul 93 15:39:49 PDT
To: norm@netcom.com (Norman Hardy)
Subject: Re: Diffie Hellman
Message-ID: <9307172239.AA02431@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


	 What is the best reference to the Diffie Hellman key
	 exchange algorithm? (Preferably on line)
	 Thanks

Any decent book on cryptography should explain it.  The idea was
originally proposed in

@article{Diffie76,
   author = {Whitfield Diffie and Martin E. Hellman},
   journal = {IEEE Transactions on Information Theory},
   month = {November},
   pages = {644--654},
   title = {New Directions in Cryptography},
   volume = {IT-11},
   year = {1976}
}

The basic idea is simple.  Pick a large number p (probably a prime),
and a base b that is a generator of the group of integers modulo p.
Now, it turns out that given a known p, b, and (b^x) mod p, it's
extremely hard to find out x.  That's known as the discrete log problem.

Here's how to use it.  Let two parties, X and Y, pick random numbers
x and y, 1 < x,y < p.  They each calculate

	(b^x) mod p

and

	(b^y) mod p

and transmit them to each other.  Now, X knows x and (b^y) mod p, so
s/he can calculate (b^y)^x mod p = (b^(xy)) mod p.  Y can do the
same calculation.  Now they both know (b^(xy)) mod p.  But eavesdroppers
know only (b^x) mod p and (b^y) mod p, and can't use those quantities
to recover the shared secret.  Typically, of course, X and Y will
use that shared secret as a key to a conventional cryptosystem.

The biggest problem with the algorithm, as outlined above, is that
there is no authentication.  An attacker can sit in the middle and
speak that protocol to each legitimate party.

One last point -- you can treat x as a secret key, and publish
(b^X) mod p as a public key.  Proof is left as an exercise for
the reader.

		--Steve Bellovin




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Stanton McCandlish <anton@hydra.unm.edu>
Date: Sat, 17 Jul 93 17:38:36 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: PGP 2.3 for Macintosh
In-Reply-To: <9307171833.AA15751@netcom3.netcom.com>
Message-ID: <9307180038.AA26287@hydra.unm.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Some axed about MacPGP2.3: it's already on the soda site, as are the 2.3a
versions for DOS and Unix.  I have no clue if this is in anyway related
to the "PGP 2.3a" OS/2 port; I tend to doubt it; I think the porter just
named it that.  Anyone seen new ports for other OSs?  Like Archimedes,
VMS, etc.?  Windows even? Amiga? 

-- 
Stanton  McCandlish   * Space Migration * Networking * ChaOrder * NO GOV'T. *
anton@hydra.unm.edu   * Intelligence Increase * Nano * Crypto * NO RELIGION *
FidoNet:    1:301/2   * Life Extension * Ethics * VR * Now! * NO MORE LIES! *
Noise in the Void BBS * +1-505-246-8515   (24hr, 1200-14400, v32bis, N-8-1) *



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: ccat@netcom.com (ccat)
Date: Sat, 17 Jul 93 23:39:53 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Show Sunday on Clipper in Bay Area
Message-ID: <9307180639.AA28000@netcom3.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I just saw a teaser for a Channel 4 treatment of the Whitehouse going
onto the Internet and
Clipper. Didn't see the name of the show,but caught the times,5 and 10 pm.
Channel 4.
-Chris.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: TO1SITTLER@APSICC.APS.EDU (Kragen Sittler)
Date: Sun, 18 Jul 93 00:03:37 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: stegano codes.
Message-ID: <930718005643.e25@APSICC.APS.EDU>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


In reference to a message by Mike Johnson:

I was thinking of steganography as being in two stages: first, you encrypt,
(possibly with the identity transformation) then, you embed your encrypted
message in your medium of transmission.  My previous message was describing
requirements for a strong encryption algorithm, quite apart from the actual
embedding.  I stand by my statements: the purpose of steganography is to make
it difficult or impossible for an interloper to determine that enciphered data
are being transferred.  Thus, embedding a magic number in the file defeats the
purpose completely.
(As opposed to "slightly reducing security.")

I accept your correction regarding availability of software.

I think that designing a program to embed this apparently random bitstream in
an innocent-looking file is a different and much harder problem.

It is probable that I have misunderstood some part of your message, and I
apologize if this is the case.

Kragen
(Bug my sysman for a newsreader that allows quoting with >'s-his username is jim.)




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: TO1SITTLER@APSICC.APS.EDU (Kragen Sittler)
Date: Sun, 18 Jul 93 00:13:37 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: bill stewart on steganography
Message-ID: <930718010610.e25@APSICC.APS.EDU>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


You are correct.  I had not thought of having crc's after decryption.  Your
idea about PCBC'ing twice is a good one.

Kragen




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: norm@netcom.com (Norman Hardy)
Date: Sun, 18 Jul 93 09:59:58 PDT
To: diffie@eng.sun.com
Subject: Diffie-Hellman Weakness Weakness
Message-ID: <9307181700.AA08369@netcom4.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


It has been mentioned several places that the Diffie-Hellman key exchange
algorithm is subject to the man-in-the-meddle attack. There is
a weakness in the attack that I understand. I suppose that
the attack goes as follows where I am the man in the middle:
 
I am able to install an active wire tap that allows me to substitute the
data traveling in either direction. I have a fast computer to help me.
I want to conceal my activity but learn what transpires.
 
Upon receiving signals to begin DH protocol I respond to each side separatly
"lets go". I establish a secret session key with each side. I am unable to
cause the two keys to be equal except by passing the b^x going one way and b^y
going the other. In this case I know neither x or y and can't read the traffic.
I must choose my own random numbers zx and zy and replace b^x with b^zx and
b^y with b^zy. X and Y now enter secure mode with the secret keys b^(x*zy)
between me and X and b^(zx*y) between me and Y. I can read the traffic.
If the connection is digitized voice and if X should happen to mention the
low ten bits of b^zy to Y then Y would notice the discrepency since Y knows
that he sent b^y. The jig is up. I don't know how to do voice recognition
so as to intercept the vocal quotation of b^zy and change it to a quotation
of b^y in a way that Y would not notice. I would have to simulate X's
voice.
 
Curiously there seems to be no analog of this precaution for digital DH
communicators. If there is a secret protocol for comparing b^y over the
nominally secured channel then there may as well have been a secret key
in the first place. If there is a public protocol for comparing b^y then
I can follow that protocol my self.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: al007@cleveland.freenet.edu (Nombrist Beor)
Date: Sun, 18 Jul 93 07:48:46 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: subscribe
Message-ID: <247@cleveland.freenet.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


subscribe




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: edgar@spectrx.Saigon.COM (Edgar W. Swank)
Date: Tue, 20 Jul 93 01:15:41 PDT
To: Cypherpunks          <cypherpunks@toad.com>
Subject: PGP: "Stealth" mode
Message-ID: <c8ew7B5w165w@spectrx.saigon.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

J. Michael Diehl wrote:

    Many encryption tools such as ripem, pgp, and dolphin can
    recognize their own output...which indicates that there is a
    footprint to that particular implimentation.

There has been discussion among us PGP developers (I guess I am one
now; see my recent posts to alt.security.pgp) of implementation of
a "stealth" option, which would remove all the identifying footprints
from encrypted output.

RSA-Encrypted files would start with the (random) IDEA key followed
by IDEA-encrypted data.

Conventionally encrypted files (-c) would contain only encrypted data.

Possibly the armor format wouldn't change, since PGP can be used
to convert any binary file to armored form (-a). But it would probably
be better to convert PGP binary output to e-mailable form using a
common external utility like UUENCODE to make it look even more
ordinary, especially if you change the UUENCODE BEGIN statement
to specify, say, xxx.ZIP instead of XXX.PGP.

Of course, the UUDECODED file wouldn't be recognized by PKUNZIP. "Oh,
what a shame, the file must have got corrupted somewhere on the net".

That's the easy part.

The hard part is designing decryption procedures. PGP would have
to prompt something like:

"unrecognized input file. May be stealth mode. Select procedure

   1. Assume RSA file with your default secret key
   2. "     "       " Prompt for userid of secret key to try.
   3. "     "       " try all your secret keys (may be impractical on
                      slower CPU's)
   4. Assume conventional file. prompt for pass phrase."

Also note that for each secret key tried, PGP must prompt for its
pass phrase. Of course, once decryption is successful, then the
usual footprints can be there for signatures and compression.

AFAIK, this idea is still just in the talking stage.

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.3a.1/EWS

iQCVAgUBLElab94nNf3ah8DHAQFIEwP/RR1+oUMpJL75smnHJCfP+8e8b4+P6uEm
uFpyN1LOpVbuKwNG73tu2c/wvdmABDH39xDDs5C29rOj/RFjpGWj40wTXJcvJ878
dSI/Dmj1pAZXCay9qSOldxxrtXes/wsCuQtHL/PX9y+tcXGIaduP4TYlxMSCqXvr
rwNTH1jeM5I=
=t5A8
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

--
edgar@spectrx.saigon.com (Edgar W. Swank)
SPECTROX SYSTEMS +1.408.252.1005  Cupertino, Ca





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: fergp@sytex.com (Paul Ferguson)
Date: Sun, 18 Jul 93 14:28:47 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: It could happen to anyone (fwd Washington Post commentary)
Message-ID: <ZL8V7B1w165w@sytex.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


reprinted from:
 
The Washington Post
Sunday, July 18, 1993
Editorials/Columnists
Page C7
 
 
It Could Happen to Anyone
 
Law enforcement out of control.
by David Z. Nevin
 
Randy Weaver was an insignificant little man, struggling to
survive with his family of five in a plywood cabin in the
mountains of north Idaho when he became a target of his
government. His story is important because it illustrates law
enforcement out of control -- and because it could happen to
anyone.
 
Weaver held beliefs about racial separation that are repugnant
to most Americans. But he had served honorably in the military,
had no criminal record and in 1989 had violated no laws. Then the
Bureau of Alcohol Tobacco and Firearms turned its gaze upon him
because it believed (incorrectly) that he was a member of a
neo-Nazi group. An ATF informer -- a spy -- persuaded Weaver to
saw off two shotguns and sell them. ATF then sprung its trap:
Weaver must infiltrate and spy on thee Nazi group himself or be
indicted for sale of the shotguns.
 
When Weaver refused to spy he was arrested, taken to court and
released pending trials. Alarmed by a series of suspiciously
inconsistent statements by court personnel about the date of his
trial, he became fearful that the government meant to destroy his
family and seize his property. He refused to leave his
mountaintop cabin and did not appear for trial.
 
Now a "fugitive," Weaver's apprehension fell to the U.S.
Marshal's Service, which came loaded for bear. The marshals
called in military aerial reconnaissance and had photos studied
by the Defense Mapping Agency. They prowled the woods around
Weaver's cabin with night vision equipment. They had
psychological profiles performed and installed $130,000 worth of
solar-powered long-range spy cameras. They intercepted the
Weaver's mail. They even knew the menstrual cycle of weaver's
teenage daughter, and planned an arrest scenario around it. They
actually bought a track of land next to Weaver's where an
undercover marshal was to pose as a neighbor and build a cabin in
hopes of befriending Weaver and luring him away from his cabin.
 
Although they knew his precise location throughout this elaborate
investigation, not a single marshal ever met face-to-face with
Weaver. Even so, Weaver offered to surrender if conditions were
met to guarantee his safety. The marshals drafted a letter of
acceptance, but the U.S. attorney for Idaho abruptly ordered that
negotiations cease.
 
On Aug. 21, 1992, Weaver, his son Sammy, 14, and their friend
Kevin Harris, 24, heard the family dog barking. In the woods a
team of six camouflaged marshals armed with fully automatic
assault weapons (one with a silencer) had attracted the dog's
attention. Harris and Sammy followed the dog's bark. The dog had
chased the marshals. At the fork of two abandoned logging roads,
the boys and the marshals met. One of the marshals shot the dog,
and Sammy, in the line of fire, shot back in self defense.
 
Thee woods erupted with gunsmoke and flying shell casings as the
marshals opened up on the boy, who had by now turned to run home.
One shot struck the rifle he carried, and another hit him
square in the back, killing him instantly. In the melee, Kevin
Harris fired in defense of himself and of Sammy, killing deputy
marshal William Degan.
 
Two of the remaining marshals made their way to a telephone and
called for help. Within hours the FBI Hostage Rescue Team was in
the air from Virginia and soon thronged the hills above the
Weaver cabin. On the spot the HRT promulgated new rules of
engagement, directing agents to shoot any armed adult male on
sight, whether he posed an immediate threat or not. These rules
violated Idaho law and had never been applied before. They were
not even used in the extraordinary attack on the Branch Davidian
compound at Waco, which took 72 lives.
 
Late the next day, Weaver, Harris and Weaver's teenage daughter
Sara left the cabin and went to an outbuilding where Sammy's body
lay, washed and prepared for home burial.
 
Sniper Lon Horiuchi, who testified he could hit a quarter-inch
target at 200 meters, took two shots. The first struck Weaver
under the right arm. The three then rushed back to the cabin,
where Weaver's wife, Vicki, stood holding open the door, with
10-month old Elisheba in her arms. As Harris ran into the open
door Horiuchi shot again, striking Vicki in the head and then
Harris as he passed behind her. Vicki fell dead. Horiuchi
reporting hearing a scream (it was from 10-year-old Rachel) that
lasted at least 30 seconds.
 
Weaver at last surrendered. He was charged with the sale of the
shotguns and failure to appear at trial, and he and Harris were
charged with Degan's murder, assault on the officers and a
nine-year conspiracy to provoke a confrontation with federal
officers.
 
At trial -- Weaver and Harris were tried together with separate
attorneys -- misconduct on the part of prosecutors led Judge
Edward J. Lodge to assess defense attorney's fees against the
government itself, a step almost unheard of in criminal cases.
Well into the case, the lead prosecutor, who enjoyed a reputation
of punctilious attention to professional responsibilities,
collapsed and was unable to complete the trial. After 40 days of
government testimony, Weaver and harris rested their cases
without calling a single witness. The jury acquitted an all the
substantive charges except for Weaver's failure to appear. With
three human lives and some $3 million down the drain, the U.S.
attorney declined to answer questions from the press.
 
The ATF, the Marshal's Service, the FBI, even the U.S. attorney,
each had the opportunity to stop this trail of horrors. Because
they saw nothing wrong in any of it, none did. As late in the day
as closing argument, the assistant prosecutor who took over the
sagging case called all this the "honorable" tactics of proper
police work.
 
Law enforcement has become a sacred cow in America, and it
happened quite naturally. It is comforting to believe that our
thorny problems -- violence, drug abuse, child exploitaton,
public corruption -- can be solved simply by getting tough. And
every year we build more prisons and put more people in them for
longer periods of time.
 
But consigning our social problems to the criminal justice system
is bad policy for two reasons. First, it won't work. Despite all
the mandatory prison terms, no one seriously argues that the
crime problem is diminishing.
 
Second, it has disturbing side effects. Overwhelming expense, the
degradation of constitutional protections and the country's
growing sense of frustration and helplessness are a few. The
sorry tale of federal law enforcement run amok in the Weaver case
-- as in the Branch Davidian affair -- is another.
 
We know that those with power will use it -- all of it. And
police officers in America have vast power. Not just statutory
power, although there is plenty of that, but also the power that
comes from being what America believes is its last best hope.
 
But beware: As officers perceive no genuine checks on their
authority, more will take their lead from the Dirty Harry movies
and do whatever it takes to get their man. And we will be left to
learn again the hard way, as George Washington taught, that
government, "like fire ... is a dangerous servant and a terrible
master."
 
--------------------------------------------
The writer is lead attorney for Kevin Harris.

Paul Ferguson               |  "Confidence is the feeling you get
Network Integrator          |   just before you fully understand
Centreville, Virginia USA   |   the problem."
fergp@sytex.com             |      - Murphy's 7th Law of Computing
 
               Quis Custodiet Ipsos Custodes?




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Date: Sun, 18 Jul 93 15:03:49 PDT
To: fergp@sytex.com (Paul Ferguson)
Subject: Re: It could happen to anyone (fwd Washington Post commentary)
In-Reply-To: <ZL8V7B1w165w@sytex.com>
Message-ID: <9307182202.AA13095@netcom3.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Many thanks to Paul Ferguson for posting that article from today's
Washington Post about the Randy Weaver trial.

The killing of that Fed in Idaho was fully justified, as the jury just
confirmed. I am hopeful the "defendants" in whatver Waco Shootout
trial occurs will likewise receive justice and be found innocent.

The BATF, DEA, Marshal's Service, and their kind have essentially
become a Gestapo-like band of secret police. They raid homes without
proper warrants (Phil Karn has told us of the San Diego case), they
entrap innocents, they use high tech satellite imagery to locate plots
of land they want for various purposes and then trump up charges (the
Oxnard-Santa Monica case where the County wanted a guy's land and then
drew up drug charges, raided him, and killed him...no drugs were
found), and they seize computers and modems of folks like Steve
Jackson without bothering to do their homework.

And perhaps their next target will be "crypto-terrorists" like us.
After all, many of us advocate overthrowing the fascist/socialist
government (I know I do, and many of you do, too), and many of us
believe strong crypto is the key ingredient for bypassing tax systems,
for trading weapons technology details with others (how long before
some of us are charged with aiding and abetting the enemy?), and for
creating a transnational cyberspace.

The Feds must surely come to see us as the enemy.

We need to be as prepared as Randy Weaver was!


-Tim

-- 
..........................................................................
Timothy C. May         | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,  
tcmay@netcom.com       | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
408-688-5409           | knowledge, reputations, information markets, 
W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA  | black markets, collapse of governments.
Higher Power: 2^756839 | Public Key: PGP and MailSafe available.
Note: I put time and money into writing this posting. I hope you enjoy it.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: jpp@markv.com
Date: Sun, 18 Jul 93 16:15:08 PDT
To: diffie@eng.sun.com
Subject: Re: Diffie-Hellman Weakness Weakness
In-Reply-To: <9307181700.AA08369@netcom4.netcom.com>
Message-ID: <9307181614.aa18663@hermix.markv.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


  If you compare the digital interceptor, to the voice interceptor,
fairly, you will see they are in equally strong positions.

  When I am phoneing a person I know, I am automatically checking the
`signature' of their voice.  The other party on the line might be able
to convince me they have a cold, but I hope I will have enough wisdom
to postpone discussing the March 15th assassination plot untill the
cold clears up.

  So we should compare a voice interceptor on a channel where the two
people don't know each other's voice to the unsigned digital
interceptor.  In this case, the interceptor can claim to one party to
be the other party, and remain undetected.  This is the Diffe-Helman
weakness.

  Alternatively we should compare the voice interceptor on a channel
where the two people do know each other's voice to the signed digital
interceptor.  In this case, the interceptor will either be detected
should some minimal authentication and verification be tried, or the
interceptor will be unable to even listen in.  The weakness remains
here, but it has been patched over with authentication, and signed
verification of the channel key.  This is the Diffe-Helman weakness
weakness.

  The (potential) interceptor is the reason why we must be so very
carefull when validating other people's public keys.  I know there is
no interceptor between me and the people who's keys I sign.  If I can
be sure of no interceptors between one of them, and the person I wish
to speak to, then I will be able to establish a secure channel.

  BTW props (respect, and thanks) to Diffe for his work creating this
fascinating field of mathematics and cryptography.

j'
--
                O I am Jay Prime Positive jpp@markv.com 
1250 bit key fingerprint =  B8 95 E0 AF 9A A2 CD A5  89 C9 F0 FE B4 3A 2C 3F
 524 bit key fingerprint =  8A 7C B9 F2 D5 46 4D ED  66 23 F1 71 DE FF 51 48
Public keys by `finger jpp @hermix.markv.com' or pgp-public-keys@pgp.mit.edu
Your feedback is welcome, directly or via symbol JPP on hex@sea.east.sun.com




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: nate@VIS.ColoState.EDU (CVL staff member Nate Sammons)
Date: Sun, 18 Jul 93 17:08:50 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: bsd mail question
Message-ID: <9307190007.AA10824@vangogh.VIS.ColoState.EDU>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



CPs,
 
I am working on a revision of my PGPcompose program,
and I would like to know if anyone knows a good way
to get bsd mail to call a program when it is going to
send mail (i.e. when you type 'mail user' or when
a message is replied to.)
 
So far, it (my app) can be called as follows:
comp -s <subject> -c <Cc list> -b <Bcc list> <recipient>
these arguments can be given in any order, as long
as the recipient is at the end.  It will prompt for the
information that is not provided at teh command line.
 
I just need to get mail to spit a subject and a recipient
out, so I can call this app.  it will do the rest.
 
Also, is there a fast and easy way to get mail to give me
the expanded version of a .mailrc alias from the command
line?  I read the man, and it does not look possible.
 
thanks,
 
-nate sammons
+--------------------------------------------------------------------
| Nate Sammons   email: nate@VIS.ColoState.Edu
|      Colorado State University Computer Visualization Laboratory
|      Finger nate@monet.VIS.ColoState.Edu for my PGP key
|      #include <std.disclaimer>
|  "I have but one single desire - to tear down the sky" -A. Toomba
|                 Quis Custodiet Ipsos Custodes?
+----------------------+




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: nate@VIS.ColoState.EDU (CVL staff member Nate Sammons)
Date: Sun, 18 Jul 93 17:10:09 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: recomendations for intro books
Message-ID: <9307190008.AA10831@vangogh.VIS.ColoState.EDU>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



CPs,

can any of you give me some recomendations on introductory books
on cryptography?

thanks,

-nate sammons
+--------------------------------------------------------------------
| Nate Sammons   email: nate@VIS.ColoState.Edu
|      Colorado State University Computer Visualization Laboratory
|      Finger nate@monet.VIS.ColoState.Edu for my PGP key
|      #include <std.disclaimer>
|  "I have but one single desire - to tear down the sky" -A. Toomba
|                 Quis Custodiet Ipsos Custodes?
+----------------------+




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: nate@VIS.ColoState.EDU (CVL staff member Nate Sammons)
Date: Sun, 18 Jul 93 17:49:53 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: PGPcompose 1.1 source
Message-ID: <9307190046.AA11214@vangogh.VIS.ColoState.EDU>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----


===============  BEGIN README =============
PGPcompose 1.0
(c) 1993 Nate Sammons

PGPcompose is a C program (that needs to be compiled, oddly enough)
that is designed to allow for easy incorporation of digital 
signatures and encryption with PGP (from Phil Zimmerman).

It may be necessary to change some of the calls within PGPcompose,
so that it will access the right mailer (it is set to /usr/lib/sendmail)
etc...  It should be placed somewhere in your path, or that you
modify your path (in ~/.cshrc) so that it is.

I plan to expand PGPcompose's abilities so that it will be a complete
mailer package ready for use...  hopefully!  I want to add support for
replys and for mail management.

BTW, this software carries no warranty, and if in the use of it you 
break something, it's not my fault (this for all you legaleese-speakers
out there...)

- -Nate Sammons, July 18, 1993
+--------------------------------------------------------------------
| Nate Sammons   email: nate@VIS.ColoState.Edu
|      Colorado State University Computer Visualization Laboratory
|      Finger nate@monet.VIS.ColoState.Edu for my PGP key
|      #include <std.disclaimer>
|  "I have but one single desire - to tear down the sky" -A. Toomba
|                 Quis Custodiet Ipsos Custodes?
+----------------------+

FIGHT THE CLIPPER!

=============== END README ================

=============== BEGIN COMP.C =================

#include <stdio.h>

char version[] = "1.1";
int includeFile;
char fileToInclude[100];
int PID;
int signMess, cryptMess;
char CCwho[130];
char BCCwho[130];
char subject[130];
char toWho[130];
char cryptWho[100];
char test[50];
char whoami[30];
char spoolName[100];
char tmpName[150];
char commandLine[300];
char scriptName[150];

main(int argc, char *argv[])

{


FILE *tmp;
FILE *message;
FILE *messageHeader;
char messageName[150];
char messageHeaderName[150];
char messageCypherName[150];

char theChoice[5];
int n, q;
int getSub, getCC, getBCC;
getSub = 1;
getCC = 1;
getBCC = 1;

if((argc ==2) && (strcmp(argv[1], "-h") ==0))
	{
	printf("Useage: comp -s <subject> -c <Cc list> -b <Bcc list> <recipients>\n");
	help();
	}

if(argc == 1)
{
	system("/usr/ucb/mail");
	exit(0);
}

PID = getpid();
sprintf(messageName, "/tmp/comp.mess.tmp.%d", PID);
sprintf(messageHeaderName, "/tmp/comp.head.tmp.%d", PID);
sprintf(tmpName, "tmp/comp.tmp.%d", PID);
sprintf(messageCypherName, "/tmp/comp.cypher.message.tmp.%d", PID);

if(argc > 2)
{
for(n=1;n<argc;n++)
{
if(strcmp(argv[n], "-s") == 0)
	{
	getSub = 0;
	strcpy(subject, argv[n+1]);
	}
if(strcmp(argv[n], "-c") == 0)
	{
	getCC = 0;
	strcpy(CCwho, argv[n+1]);
	}
if(strcmp(argv[n], "-b") ==0)
	{
	getBCC = 0;
	strcpy(BCCwho, argv[n+1]);
	}
}

strcpy(toWho, argv[argc-1]);
}

message = fopen(messageName, "w");

if((getBCC == 1) && (getCC == 1) && (getSub == 1))
strcpy(toWho, argv[1]);

printf("PGPcompose %s (c)1993 Nate Sammons\n", version);
if(getSub == 1)
{
	printf("Subject: ");
	gets(subject);
}
if(getCC == 1)
{
printf("Cc: ");
gets(CCwho);
}
if(getBCC == 1)
{
printf("Bcc: ");
gets(BCCwho);
}
 
fprintf(message, "To: %s\nSubject: %s\nCc: %s\nBcc: %s\n---EOH---\n\n", toWho, subject, CCwho, BCCwho);
fclose(message);

editIt:
sprintf(commandLine, "/usr/ucb/vi %s", messageName);
system(commandLine);
 
extractHeader();

signIt:
printf("Sign this message? [y,n] : ");
gets(theChoice);
switch(theChoice[0])
{
case 'y':
case 'Y': signMess = 1;
	break;
case 'n':
case 'N': signMess = 0;
	break;
default: goto signIt;
	break;
}
 
cryptIt:
printf("Encrypt this message? [y,n] : ");
gets(theChoice);
cypherWithWho:
switch(theChoice[0])
{
case 'y':
case 'Y': strcpy( cryptWho, toWho);
	cryptMess = 1;
	break;
case 'n':
case 'N': cryptMess = 0;
	break;
default: goto cryptIt;
}
 
Continue:
printf("send, abort, edit? : ");
gets(theChoice);
switch(theChoice[0])
{
case 's':
case 'S': sendmail();
case 'a':
case 'A': system("/bin/rm -rf /tmp/message*");
	system("/bin/rm -rf /tmp/tmp.*");
	exit(0);
case 'e':
case 'E': messageHeader = fopen(messageHeaderName, "a");
	fprintf(messageHeader, "---EOH---\n");
	fclose(messageHeader);
	sprintf(commandLine, "cat %s >> %s ; /bin/rm -rf %s ; mv %s %s", messageName, messageHeaderName, messageName, messageHeaderName, messageName);
	system(commandLine);
	goto editIt;
default: goto Continue;
}

}
#include <stdio.h>

extractHeader()
{

char tmpName[150];
char messageName[150];
char messageHeaderName[150];
int pid;

FILE *tmp;
FILE *message;
FILE *messageHeader;

char commandLine[200];
char theLine[90];
char initTheLine[90];
int rc;
int n=1;
int q=0;

pid = getpid();
sprintf(tmpName, "/tmp/comp.tmp.%d", pid);
sprintf(messageName, "/tmp/comp.mess.tmp.%d", pid);
sprintf(messageHeaderName, "/tmp/comp.head.tmp.%d", pid);

tmp = fopen(tmpName, "w");
fclose(tmp);
tmp = fopen(tmpName, "a");

message = fopen(messageName, "r");

messageHeader = fopen(messageHeaderName, "w");
fclose(messageHeader);
messageHeader = fopen(messageHeaderName, "a");

while(n!=q)
{
	fgets(theLine, 81, message);
	if((theLine[0] == '-') && (theLine[1] == '-') && (theLine[2] == '-') && (theLine[3] == 'E') && (theLine[4] == 'O') && (theLine[5] == 'H') && (theLine[6] == '-') && (theLine[7] == '-') && (theLine[8] == '-'))
		goto Continue;
	fprintf(messageHeader, "%s", theLine);
}

Continue:
while(n!=q)
{
	fgets(theLine, 81, message);
	if(feof(message))
                goto keepGoing;
	fprintf(tmp, "%s", theLine);
}

keepGoing:
fclose(message);
fclose(messageHeader);
fclose(tmp);

sprintf(commandLine, "/bin/rm -rf %s", messageName);
system(commandLine);
sprintf(commandLine, "mv %s %s", tmpName, messageName);
system(commandLine);

}
#include <stdio.h>

sendmail()
 
{
FILE *script;
 
int PID;
extern int signMess, cryptMess;
extern char CCwho[130];
extern char BCCwho[130];
extern char subject[130];
extern char toWho[130];
extern char cryptWho[100];
extern char test[50];
extern char whoami[30];
extern char tmpName[150];
char messageName[150];
char messageHeaderName[150];
char messageCypherName[150];
extern char commandLine[300];
char scriptName[150];
 
PID = getpid();
sprintf(messageName, "/tmp/comp.mess.tmp.%d", PID);
sprintf(messageHeaderName, "/tmp/comp.head.tmp.%d", PID);
sprintf(tmpName, "tmp/comp.tmp.%d", PID);
sprintf(messageCypherName, "/tmp/comp.cypher.message.tmp.%d", PID);
sprintf(scriptName, "/tmp/comp.script.%d", PID);

if((signMess == 1) && (cryptMess == 1))
{
script = fopen(scriptName, "w");
fprintf(script, "cat %s | pgp -feast \"%s\" > %s\n", messageName, cryptWho, messageCypherName);
fclose(script);
sprintf(commandLine, "chmod +x %s", scriptName);
system(commandLine);
system(scriptName);
sprintf(commandLine, "cat %s >> %s ; cat %s | /usr/lib/sendmail -t", messageCypherName, messageHeaderName, messageHeaderName);
system(commandLine);
}
 
if((signMess == 1) && (cryptMess == 0))
{
sprintf(commandLine, "cat %s | pgp -fast +clearsig=on > %s\n", messageName, messageCypherName);
system(commandLine);
sprintf(commandLine, "cat %s >> %s ; cat %s | /usr/lib/sendmail -t", messageCypherName, messageHeaderName, messageHeaderName);
system(commandLine);
}
 
if((signMess == 0) && (cryptMess == 1))
{
script = fopen(scriptName, "w");
fprintf(script, "cat %s | pgp -fea \"%s\" > %s\n", messageName, cryptWho, messageCypherName);
fclose(script);
sprintf(commandLine, "chmod +x %s", scriptName);
system(commandLine);
system(scriptName);
sprintf(script, "cat %s >> %s ; cat %s | /usr/lib/sendmail -t", messageCypherName, messageHeaderName, messageHeaderName);
system(commandLine);
}
 
if((signMess == 0) && (cryptMess == 0))
{
sprintf(commandLine, "cat %s >> %s ; cat %s | /usr/lib/sendmail -t", messageName, messageHeaderName, messageHeaderName);
system(commandLine);
}
 
sprintf(commandLine, "/bin/rm -rf /tmp/comp.*.%d", PID);
system(commandLine);
 
}

#include<stdio.h>

help()

{
printf("\n\n");
printf("PGPcompose 1.1, (c) 1993 Nate Sammons\n\n");
printf("This is a utility to let people who do not have perl to\n");
printf("use PGP from within standard bsd mail with ease.  This\n");
printf("application relies on general UNIX system calls for several\n");
printf("of it's functions.  It is meant to be fairly easy to use, and \n");
printf("as unintrusive as possible.  For reading mail, I recomend setting\n");
printf("the PAGER variable in your ~/.mailrc file to \"pgp -mf\".\n\n");
printf("If you like this program, send me mail.  If you don't like something,\n");
printf("tell me what you don't like.\n\n         -Nate Sammons, nate@vis.colostate.edu\n\n");
exit(0);
}
============================ END COMP.C ===================

I hope you like it.

- -nate sammons

+--------------------------------------------------------------------
| Nate Sammons   email: nate@VIS.ColoState.Edu
|      Colorado State University Computer Visualization Laboratory
|      Finger nate@monet.VIS.ColoState.Edu for my PGP key
|      #include <std.disclaimer>
|  "I have but one single desire - to tear down the sky" -A. Toomba
|                 Quis Custodiet Ipsos Custodes?
+----------------------+

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.3

iQCUAgUBLEnu7dTgi1fmrpxlAQE/JwP3XmktT5YFe5sQ/28YunJigm0CPGVKRgxS
3MqfbCGDEqmGz3tpXfaPsHvgNCl0H71Wb3sxbqLgQi30FYKrqA8f+VEF0XlyMNJC
hWCBL0PwZQbQGFKThz7/Tj/dtxUWOksbaV/2mRo66avlULpDAY2PsAyAIe1HksE3
TUmCUQOyWg==
=qR9G
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: gdale@apple.com (Geoff Dale)
Date: Sun, 18 Jul 93 18:48:51 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: steganography
Message-ID: <9307190147.AA07571@apple.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Bill Stewart <wcs@anchor.ho.att.com> said:
>I think Kragen's definition of "Steganographically Strong" is a bit overstrong.
>He suggests that the cyphertext should not be recognizeable by its own program,
>with no checksums or program-specific delimiters, headers, etc.
>If checksums become widely used in other data formats (e.g. MIME or whatever),
>having them used in "innocent-looking-format" is ok.  
>And having a checksum that only checks out if you have the correct key
>for decrypting the file is relatively ok, assuming you use strong encryption;
>it's really no more of a giveaway than having the correctly-decrypted
>plaintext have other recognizeable format, such as all-ascii or MIME or GIF.

What you want to avoid is giving any spooks/agents the ability to:

A> Quickly scan GIFs (or whatever) on your hard disk (or .binary.
newsgroups) for files that are "likely" to be hiding something.

B> Be able to prove that you have an encrypted file. If they get that proof
they can apply pressure to you to get the key.

Anything that allows either of the above is only providing moderate security.






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: smb@research.att.com
Date: Sun, 18 Jul 93 17:43:51 PDT
To: nate@VIS.ColoState.EDU (CVL staff member Nate Sammons)
Subject: Re: recomendations for intro books
Message-ID: <9307190042.AA12708@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


	 
	 CPs,

	 can any of you give me some recomendations on introductory books
	 on cryptography?

The best thing would be to look at the sci.crypt FAQ.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: technopagan priest <tedwards@wam.umd.edu>
Date: Sun, 18 Jul 93 17:48:50 PDT
To: norm@netcom.com
Subject: Re:  Diffie Hellman
Message-ID: <199307190048.AA02432@rac3.wam.umd.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


For a broad introduction to information theory, coding, and their
applications in cryptography, I reccommend _Codes_and_Cryptgraphy_
by Dominic Welsh (Oxford Science Publications, ISBN 0-19-853288-1
and ISBN 0-19-853287-3 Pbk).  Some topics: information theory,
noiseless coding theory, noisy channels, error-correcting codes,
source theory, natural language structure, one-time pads,
computational complexity, public key systems (RSA, Knapsacks,
Rabin, Elgamal), authentication and digital signatures
(Diffie-Lamport, Rabin), Diffie-Helman key exchange, and
random numbers and random cryptsstems.

-Thomas




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: smb@research.att.com
Date: Sun, 18 Jul 93 21:23:53 PDT
To: jpp@markv.com
Subject: Re: Diffie-Hellman Weakness Weakness
Message-ID: <9307190420.AA18807@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


	   If you compare the digital interceptor, to the voice interceptor,
	 fairly, you will see they are in equally strong positions.

	   When I am phoneing a person I know, I am automatically checking the
	 `signature' of their voice.  The other party on the line might be able
	 to convince me they have a cold, but I hope I will have enough wisdom
	 to postpone discussing the March 15th assassination plot untill the
	 cold clears up.

	   So we should compare a voice interceptor on a channel where the two
	 people don't know each other's voice to the unsigned digital
	 interceptor.  In this case, the interceptor can claim to one party to
	 be the other party, and remain undetected.  This is the Diffe-Helman
	 weakness.

	   Alternatively we should compare the voice interceptor on a channel
	 where the two people do know each other's voice to the signed digital
	 interceptor.  In this case, the interceptor will either be detected
	 should some minimal authentication and verification be tried, or the
	 interceptor will be unable to even listen in.  The weakness remains
	 here, but it has been patched over with authentication, and signed
	 verification of the channel key.  This is the Diffe-Helman weakness
	 weakness.

	   The (potential) interceptor is the reason why we must be so very
	 carefull when validating other people's public keys.  I know there is
	 no interceptor between me and the people who's keys I sign.  If I can
	 be sure of no interceptors between one of them, and the person I wish
	 to speak to, then I will be able to establish a secure channel.

The AT&T Telephone Security Device (you know, the beast with the Clipper
chip...) has a display that shows a few digits of a hash of the key.
Each party reads off some of it to the other; the idea is that an
intruder won't be able to spoof a voice in real-time.

For data connections, have a look at

@article{interlock,
   author = {Ronald L. Rivest and Adi Shamir},
   journal = {Communications of the ACM},
   number = {4},
   pages = {393--395},
   title = {How to Expose an Eavesdropper},
   volume = {27},
   year = {1984}
}

The idea is to send half of an encrypted block.  You then await a
half-block from the far side, at which point you send your other
half, and listen for the far side's other half.  The idea is that
since one can't decrypt a half-block, the intruder in the middle
can't send a fraudulent one.

Depending on how this scheme (known as the ``Interlock Protocol'')
is used, it may be vulnerable to attack.  Davies and Price, in their
(excellent) book ``Security for Computer Networks'', suggest sending
passwords that way.  But Mike Merritt and I showed how to attack
that scheme under certain circumstances.  (Details to appear in
IEEE Transactions on Information Theory.)


		--Steve Bellovin




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: peter honeyman <honey@citi.umich.edu>
Date: Sun, 18 Jul 93 21:45:11 PDT
To: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Subject: Re: It could happen to anyone (fwd Washington Post commentary)
Message-ID: <9307190444.AA19454@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> We need to be as prepared as Randy Weaver was!

tell that to his dead kin.  we need to be prepared, but
not as randy weaver was.

	peter




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Date: Mon, 19 Jul 93 02:08:55 PDT
To: nate@VIS.ColoState.EDU (CVL staff member Nate Sammons)
Subject: Re: recomendations for intro books
In-Reply-To: <9307190008.AA10831@vangogh.VIS.ColoState.EDU>
Message-ID: <9307190907.AA11552@netcom3.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Nate Sammons asks:

> can any of you give me some recomendations on introductory books
> on cryptography?
> 
> thanks,
> 

I like Gilles Brassard's "Modern Cryptology: A Tutorial," 1988,
Springer-Verlag, a small tutorial on _modern_ crypto, with discussions
of such applications as digital money, secret sharing, and the like.

The IEEE Press book, "Contemporary Cryptology," edited by Gus Simmons,
is also nice, with a lot of recent stuff. Good preparation for reading
the proceedings of the annual "Crypto" conferences.

(These proceedings are available in many technical bookstores--like
Computer Literacy, Staceys, and Stanford in the Bay Area--and in
well-equipped university libraries. The papers report on modern crypto
results and should be looked at by nearly all Cypherpunks.)

And then there are the standard textbooks: Denning, Meyer and Matyas,
Salomaa, Patterson, etc. These are all cited in nearly any one of the
books, are readily findable with a library card catalog, and are
frequently mentioned in sci.crypt.

My advice: spend a few hours at a good university library. The crypto
books (and journals--"Journal of Cryptology" and "Cryptologia") are in
the math section, usually with the call numbers around "QA76.9.A25."
Some crypto books, especially historical cryptography (like Kahn's
"The Codebreakers"), are found in Z103.

Spend time perusing these books and journals to get a feel for what's
happening. Crypto is a lot more than just PGP!

I hope this helps.

-Tim May

-- 
..........................................................................
Timothy C. May         | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,  
tcmay@netcom.com       | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
408-688-5409           | knowledge, reputations, information markets, 
W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA  | black markets, collapse of governments.
Higher Power: 2^756839 | Public Key: PGP and MailSafe available.
Note: I put time and money into writing this posting. I hope you enjoy it.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: XXCLARK@indst.indstate.edu
Date: Mon, 19 Jul 93 01:18:54 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: AIS BBS
Message-ID: <9307190818.AA25746@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Paul Ferguson wrote:

>I'd like to get some of your collective thoughts an a matter
>which has stirred quite a debate in the free-information/computer-
>virus-exchange arena.

	Okay...

	The stated charge against Kim Clancy is that she posted [or
  allowed to be posted], among other contraband, virus disassemblies
  [poor, by your reckoning].

	But, as the complaint emerged on VIRUS-L, I suspect the actual
  offense, far worse in the eyes of builders of empires and reputations
  was that she openly and knowingly consorted with known "hackers" and
  other underground types.

  	I suggest that what so belatedly brought the wrath of the
  self-righteous down on Kim Clancy is that she broke the rules of
  the inner circle of the VIRUS-L self-appointed elect.

	While Kim Clancy is not the only security type to knowingly
  and openly communicate with the unwashed, she is one of the few to
  demonstrate an excess of intelligence over ego. She would seem to
  know that no one person or group is the font of perfect knowledge.
  If the US military didn't learn from the VC, was it the VC's fault?

	There is, of course, little so conducive to the enhancement of
  undeserved reputation as that based upon knowledge alleged to be so
  dangerous and so sacrosanct that no one outside the inner circle
  can be trusted with possession.

	Sounds like a disease all too common inside and about the
  beltway, among TLA's and bureaucracies, both corporate and
  governmental.

	VIRUS-L Digest I find amusing, a suitable substitute for MAD
  Magazine. I've never seen it undigested, but if the signal-to-noise
  ratio is as poor as in the Digest, it must be gargantuan. Budding
  shrinks and social studies types looking for new ground to work just
  might find material for several dissertations there.

	VIRUS-L Digest seems the perfect place to look if one is bent
  on studying the cult of the self-appointed, self-important keepers
  of the myth of the mainframe priesthood.

	There is information there, but, as Eliot wrote in one of the
  Sweeney poems, "the trouble is, I gotta use words when I talk to you."
  Therefore, in VIRUS-L Digest, most of the information is between the
  lines. And some residing within the select inner circle don't have
  quite the depth of knowledge they think.

	For the record, Paul, I do not have knowledge of any virus
  exchange boards. I am sure they exist, I just don't know of any.
  And for yourself and Peterson, I've never inquired of anyone
  for any such information. I believe I can meet Peterson's criteria
  for admission to his tutelage, but have neither need nor desire...
  which may have been the point to his recent... challenge.

	I am curious how your foreign colleague discovered this
  threat to western civilization. As I understand it, the AIS BBS is
  a dial-up board. Was he running a demon dialer across the net?
  Was he working for MI-5?

	Your "exposure" of an open secret seems to me not unlike what
  happens on the playground during recess. Much ado about nothing.

	While the danger of viruses is real, I do believe those who
  would be our protectors have learned something from that branch of
  the Department of Corporate/High-Tech Welfare [aka Department of
  Defense], which, not content with probably unconstitutional military
  involvement in law enforcement, is now attempting to drum up new
  contracts to protect us from the comet/asteroid menace. Crikey.

	I dunno about secret cabals of "underground hackers" out to
  get you... I think the danger there is about as great as that to
  Bozo Reagan from "secret Lybian hit squads."

	Save me from legends in their own minds.

	No more fucking secrets...

	You asked...

  ---------------------------------------------------------------------
     internet      : xxclark@indst.indstate.edu   RelayNet (488)
     Vanilla BITNET: XXCLARK@INDST                FidoNet (1:2230/114)
     Phone: 911                                   TechNet 11:800/0
    One need not be a weatherman to know which way the wind is blowing.
  ---------------------------------------------------------------------




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Karl Barrus <elee9sf@Menudo.UH.EDU>
Date: Mon, 19 Jul 93 06:35:22 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: ANON: AP story
Message-ID: <199307191334.AA09153@Menudo.UH.EDU>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



In today's Houston Chronicle appeared a story ("Federal employee's
computer searched after whistleblowing") which ties together
cypherpunk concerns: whistleblowing, privacy, etc.  I'll just type in
a few paragraphs.


Washington - The Resolution Trust Corp.'s top lawyer authorized a
secret search of an employee's computer that turned up files detailing
whistleblowing activities, a document shows.
	An internal agency memo shows RTC officials conducted the
search after failing to persuade the agency's inspector general to do
it, and says that the IG assured the RTC officials they wouldn't be
investigated if questions were later raised.  The IG's office disputes
the claim.
	Officials at the savings and loan cleanup agency say RTC
acting general counsel Richard T. Aboussie gave the go-ahead for the
search because he suspected Bruce Pederson, a mid-level agency
attorney in Denver, was doing personal business on government equipment.
	[1 paragraph deleted]
	Pederson has never disputed that the agency found personal
matters in his files, arguing instead that the search was an invasion
of privacy.  Pederson said he believes agency officials were trying to
punish him for being a whisleblower.  "These evens are outrageous," he
said.
	The search of Pederson's computer, first reported in May,
occurred less that six months after he had criticized agency
management practives in testimony before a Seante panel.  He gained
assurances at the time that he would not be retaliated against for
airing his views.
	[2 paragraphs deleted]
	The federal wiretap law was expanded in 1986 to prohibit
employers, including the government, from accessing employee work
computer records.  Under the law, the government is allowed to conduct
clandestine searches if the employee is suspected of espionage or
theft.  Pederson was under no such suspicion.  [I guess this is the ECPA?]
	[4 paragraphs deleted]
	According to electronic time stamps on each document, many of
the letters and memos were generated on Pederson's government computer
after normal working hours, the memo revealed.  [Probably not
cryptographic timestamps :-)]
	[3 paragraphs deleted to end of article]

He should've used PGP!




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: edgar@spectrx.Saigon.COM (Edgar W. Swank)
Date: Tue, 20 Jul 93 01:15:32 PDT
To: Cypherpunks          <cypherpunks@toad.com>
Subject: OOPS!
Message-ID: <Fc8X7B2w165w@spectrx.saigon.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


On July 15, I posted here:

   If there is any interest, I will bring both soft and hard-copies
   to the next Physical Meeting, which I presume will take place
   on the 2nd Sat of August, 8/8, noon, at Cygnus in Mtn. View. ...

Of course that should have read

   on the 2nd Sat of August, 8/14, noon, at Cygnus in Mtn. View. ...
                            ^^^^^^
Sorry if this error caused any confusion.  It's not my fault; All the
blame falls on my computer calendar which just has "S" for both
Saturday and Sunday.  (:}

--
edgar@spectrx.saigon.com (Edgar W. Swank)
SPECTROX SYSTEMS +1.408.252.1005  Cupertino, Ca





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Perry E. Metzger" <pmetzger@lehman.com>
Date: Mon, 19 Jul 93 09:45:24 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Diffie-Hellman Weakness Weakness
In-Reply-To: <9307181614.aa18663@hermix.markv.com>
Message-ID: <9307191643.AA27736@snark.shearson.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



jpp@markv.com says:
>   If you compare the digital interceptor, to the voice interceptor,
> fairly, you will see they are in equally strong positions.
> 
>   When I am phoneing a person I know, I am automatically checking the
> `signature' of their voice.  The other party on the line might be able
> to convince me they have a cold, but I hope I will have enough wisdom
> to postpone discussing the March 15th assassination plot untill the
> cold clears up.

What if you are using a cheap vocoder because you don't have lots of
available CPU? With cheap vocoders, voices are not easily recognized.

What if you are using data and not voice?

DH key exchange is great -- if you are willing to do something to
actively authenticate the other end. Several protocols to do this have
been developed. Personally, I would not recommend doing without them
just on the basis that "I can recognise Fred's voice".

Perry




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: faust@cd.chalmers.se
Date: Mon, 19 Jul 93 04:36:14 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: No Subject
Message-ID: <199307191135.AA05425@castafiore.cd.chalmers.se>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Hi,

As I'm taking my first steps towards ethernal freedom, I just wanted to
try this channel with some questions:

1. Cypherpunk-remailers and multi-identities with preserved anonymity.

What if I use >1 identities and don't want them to be associated with neither
my username nor the other identities?

When my mail leaves the last remailer in direction towards me, 'everyone' has
the opportunity to read my mail. Ok, the mail may be encrypted with my
public-key, but there comes the problem, by beeing encrypted with my pub.key
it is also marked with one of my identities, so by monitoring my mail 
they can connect my 'real' name with pseudonyms I use!

Of course, I can tell the senders to encrypt my mail with a passphrase 
(like PGP -c) before sending it to me, but that don't work in situations like:

 'If you support these opinions, feel free to mail me , using this header and
  this key...'

I guess it's not that smart to tell them 'Oh, and please encrypt my mail with
PGP -c "secret" first!' ???

I may most certainly have overlooked some details about this, but if not,
I would like to have a command in those remailers like:

::
Conventional-encryption-password: 'password'

Which invokes PGP -c 'password' on the rest of the message before sending it
to next adress.

2. Server for Anonymous-headers.

My problem with anonymous-headers (that is reversed chains of PGP-encrypted
adresses for remailers) are that they:
	
	 1) Are too big and ugly,
	 2) Needs common updates as remailers goes down.

Therefor, wouldn't it be nice with servers like the public-keys servers where
you could request the latest header for a pseudonym?

Maybe even be able to mail directly to that server with pseudonym@server...
and get the mail redirected to 'pseudonym'?

3. Protection of remailers.

How are the cypherpunk remailers protected from sec.key-thieves and mail
monitoring?
I mean, their keys can't be protected by passphrases, and they often resides
in multiuser/timesharing systems?

I would certainly make the first attack towards the remailers before trying
brute-force on a 1024-bit RSA-key!


Regards, Henrik





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: khijol!erc (Ed Carp)
Date: Mon, 19 Jul 93 16:09:08 PDT
To: broitman@bucrf4.bu.edu (Jeff Broitman)
Subject: Re: AP Story
In-Reply-To: <9307192115.AA15865@bucrf4.bu.edu>
Message-ID: <m0oI3vw-0002FLC@warrior>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text


> since they had his computer, they had his PUBKEY and SECKEY files...
> and more than likely his pass phrase in simple encryption somewhere in
> his files...(fairly easy to break simple encryptions...like CRYPT
> command on unix...)
> 
> Don't you think?

He could've kept his secring.pgp on diskette... :)
-- 
Ed Carp				erc@apple.com			510/659-9560
   For anonymous mailers -->   anonymus+5300@charcoal.com
"Disagreements are not meant to be challenges.  They are just a different
 reality."  -- Risa D'Angeles



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: broitman@bucrf4.bu.edu (Jeff Broitman)
Date: Mon, 19 Jul 93 14:15:23 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: AP Story
Message-ID: <9307192115.AA15865@bucrf4.bu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



> He should've used PGP!

since they had his computer, they had his PUBKEY and SECKEY files...
and more than likely his pass phrase in simple encryption somewhere in
his files...(fairly easy to break simple encryptions...like CRYPT
command on unix...)

Don't you think?

-JzB

%#%#%#%#%#%#%#%#%#%#%#%#%#%#%#%#%#%#%#%#%#%#%#%#%#%#%#%#%#%#%#%#%#%#%#%#%#%#%#%
		               Internet:broitman@koala.bu.edu
J.Z.Broitman				broitman@radon.bu.edu
Dept. of Chemistry       		broitman@carbon.bu.edu
Boston University			broitman@xenon.bu.edu
			          Snail:42 Maynard St. W.Newton MA. 02165
%#%#%#%#%#%#%#%#%#%#%#%#%#%#%#%#%#%#%#%#%#%#%#%#%#%#%#%#%#%#%#%#%#%#%#%#%#%#%#%




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Mike Johnson <exabyte!smtplink!mikej@uunet.UU.NET>
Date: Mon, 19 Jul 93 17:15:30 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: steganograpy and cryptography
Message-ID: <9307191739.A01267@smtplink.exabyte.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Kragen writes:
> I was thinking of steganography as being in two stages: first, you encrypt,
> (possibly with the identity transformation) then, you embed your encrypted
> message in your medium of transmission.  My previous message was describing
> requirements for a strong encryption algorithm, quite apart from the actual
> embedding.  I stand by my statements: the purpose of steganography is to make
> it difficult or impossible for an interloper to determine that enciphered data
> are being transferred.  Thus, embedding a magic number in the file defeats the
> purpose completely.
> (As opposed to "slightly reducing security.")

True.  I was refering to cryptographic security instead of steganographic
security when I said "slightly reducing security."  Sorry about the
miscommunication.  For steganographic purposes, there should be no _constant_
magic numbers or CRCs taken _after_ the encryption (and visible in the
ciphertext).  All magic numbers and CRCs should be embedded _before_
encryption and checked _after_ decryption when you want the ciphertext to
look purely random.  This way you can have _both_ cryptographic convenience
and random looking ciphertext ready for steganographic hiding.

> I think that designing a program to embed this apparently random bitstream in
> an innocent-looking file is a different and much harder problem.

Definitely.  Such a program is also very likely to drastically inflate the
message, depending on the definition of "innocent-looking" and the
characteristics of the channel or storage medium used.  For example, a
message could be concealed in the number of blank characters after each line
of text from an recipe book, but someone might even get suspicious about a
sudden interest in cooking among cypherpunks.  :)

By the way, I heard a rumor from a telephone company employee who I met (face
to face) who is in a position to know that a U. S. company was using DES to
communicate proprietary information between one of its facilities in Japan and
an office in the USA.  They got a letter from the Japanese parliament asking
them why they were sending encrypted data.  Perhaps there is more to the
question of steganography than purely academic interest...

-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
Mike Johnson       | Opinions expressed herein are mine, and come with no
mikej@exabyte.com  | warranty, expressed or implied.  PGP key on request.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: allan@elvis.tamu.edu (Allan Bailey)
Date: Mon, 19 Jul 93 15:54:09 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: It could happen to anyone (fwd Washington Post commentary)
Message-ID: <9307192249.AA26576@elvis.tamu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text



  Is it just me?  Or does CNN just not cover things like the 
Randy Weaver trial when the gov't loses?

-- 
Allan Bailey, UNIX programmer, CSC          | "Freedom is not free."
Infinite Diversity in Infinite Combinations | or: allan.bailey@tamu.edu
616c6c616e206261696c6579                    | or: nefud-the-delirious@tamu.edu



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: smb@research.att.com
Date: Mon, 19 Jul 93 18:19:08 PDT
To: Karl Barrus <elee9sf@Menudo.UH.EDU>
Subject: Re: ANON: AP story
Message-ID: <9307200118.AA24979@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


	 The federal wiretap law was expanded in 1986 to prohibit
	 employers, including the government, from accessing employee
	 work computer records.  Under the law, the government is
	 allowed to conduct clandestine searches if the employee is
	 suspected of espionage or theft.  Pederson was under no such
	 suspicion.  [I guess this is the ECPA?]

I'd like someone to provide some statute citations or some case law to
back this up.  As I read the ECPA, nothing in it prevents an employer
from looking at employee files.  (Admittedly, the government may be
different.)  The following quote is from

@article{hernandez,
        title =         {{ECPA} and Online Computer Privacy},
        author =        {Ruel Torres Hernandez},
        journal =       {Federal Communications Law Journal},
        volume =        41,
        number =        1,
        month =         {November},
        year =          1988,
        pages =         {17--41}
}

	ECPA protection in the employer-employee situation may indeed be
	non-existent.  [Footnote:  This legislative intent to exclude
	corporate monitoring of employees from ECPA was confirmed by those
	who followed the drafting of the legislation.  According to Jerry
	Berman, counsel for the Americal Civil Liberties Union, a
	participant in the drafting of th elegislation, ``ECPA `goes right
	up to the water's edge [of employee privacy protection] but stops
	short' and to have included some employee privacy protection
	against employers in the corporate context `would have killed the
	bill.' ''  Electronic message from Brock Meeks (Mar. 31, 1988)]
	While the corporate exception acknolwedges an employer's property
	rights in all parts of his business, it leaves the employee's
	privacy interests completely unprotected.

I should note that the ECPA also explicitly permits monitoring ``as may
be necessarily incident to ...  the protection of the rights or
property of the provider of that service''.

Again, if anyone has hard citations to the contrary, I'd really like to
know.  In the case that has drawn the most attention, the Epson email
case, the claim was based on a state law that protects employee telephone
calls.  From what I've read, the judge rule against the plaintiff on
the grounds that only voice calls were protected.  That ruling was
apparently not appealed, probably because there was little chance that
that holding would be overturned.


		--Steve Bellovin




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Paco Xander Nathan <pacoid@wixer.bga.com>
Date: Mon, 19 Jul 93 23:14:11 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: PGP tutorial
In-Reply-To: <m0oGeZw-000ZDJC@genesis.mcs.com>
Message-ID: <9307200548.AA07956@wixer>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> In message <9307151349.AA05001@snark.shearson.com>, "Perry E. Metzger":
> > Rather than pointing people to strange publications we've never heard
> > of written by authors without credentials, might I suggest...
> > 
> 	Excellent comments, Perry, yes, but *I* have heard of Fringeware,
> so maybe I'll throw some of my comments about Paco, as an "author
> without credentials." (Not that I'm a cypherpunk with credentials or
> anything. =)
> ...
> 	Fringeware is a 'zine which Paco Xander Nathan publishes, and while
> he's no cypherpunk, he's an intelligent guy, so I'm pretty sure his
> article would be a good one.
> Sameer Parekh-zane@genesis.MCS.COM-PFA related mail to pfa@genesis.MCS.COM

Thank you kindly Sameer!!
 
I'm pleased to find a ref to FWR#1 here, in a bibliography no less :)  I'll
add a plug that our new magazine is in int'l distribution, ISSN 1069-5656.

The tutorial was written as a practical intro for people who would *not*
be comfortable reading this list, but who would probably read the PGP docs
anyway.  The premier issue includes an article about Cypherpunks from my
interview/stay/club-hopping with Eric Hughes back in Sep 92, along with a 
tutorial on how to join interesting email lists, such as this one.  LERI-L's 
cofounder Scotto adds philosophical insights about the Net, virtual 
communities and lists in general, plus Tom Jennings favored us with 
beautific wisdoms on a predominantly cypherpunk theme.

Whether I am a "cypherpunk" or not is as always debatable, but to assuage
your fears Perry, I've been on this list nearly a year, posting occasionally.
Creditials?  I have degrees in Math & CompSci from Stanford, +20 years
programming experience including a lot of Unix & comm work for Bell Labs, 
and my writing appears in Mondo 2000, WiReD, 2600, bOING-bOING, Pix-Elation,
WER, etc..  some of which, to relative extents, appear to hold value within
the context of this list. (tongue placed firmly in cheek)  Those of you who
actually read 'em may have noticed my bent for going mano-a-mano in court
and on the streets against distopian organizations such as the Secret 
Service, the DEA's droids and a particular multinational telecom giant 
which shall go unmentioned.

FWR is jointly published with my biz partner Jon Lebkowsky, who shares
a similar trail of magazine gigs, along with fame as illuminary/host/
gopher editor on the WELL and president of EFF-Austin..  We run a popular
Interent email list, fringeware@wixer.bga.com

Hopefully, knowing these tidbits, we can all rest easier at night, assured
that the hallowed trust of PGP has not been tainted by an unsocialized
and heathen publication.  NB: Perry, we're *TICKLED* silly that you refered
to us as "strange"; may we consider this as "letter to the editor" material? 
BTW, we'd been waiting eagerly..  FWR staff had decided to just shush and 
wait for SOME kind of mention/review to pop up here, eventually :)  

Thank you.
 
pxn.
----
PS: even our firm's *lawyer* participates in this list: 
strange.. credentials.. geez!  :)




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "J. J. Larrea" <jjl@panix.com>
Date: Mon, 19 Jul 93 21:59:10 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Crypto Patent Abstracts #1
Message-ID: <199307200456.AA27500@panix.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Cypherpunks,

I finally got to the library to do some patent searches.  Attached to
this mail is summary information on 6 significant crypto patents.  Note
that some of the patent numbers which have appeared in prior postings on
cypherpunks were incorrect, but I managed to track down the references
via other means; someone should make sure they're correct in any relavent
FAQs etc.

Of the 6, I have full-text for 4 of them:
	Schnorr: 4,995,082 
	Gaffney: 4,562,305 
	Hellman-Pohlig: 4,424,414
	Rivest-Shamir: 4,405,829 

and partial text for one more:
	Hellman-Merkle: 4,218,582 

I hope to be able to get a full version of Hellman-Merkle, as well as:
	Hellman-Diffie: 4,200,770 	
within a week.

So, is there an FTP site I should place these on?

Have fun,
J.J. Larrea


 O  /
  \/
  /\  ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ CUT HERE ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
 O  \

US PAT NO:      4,995,082 [IMAGE AVAILABLE]           L19: 1 of 5
DATE ISSUED:   Feb. 19, 1991
TITLE:         Method for identifying subscribers and for generating and
                 verifying electronic signatures in a data exchange system
INVENTOR:      Claus P. Schnorr, Frankfurterstr. 81, 6350 Bad Nauheim,
                 Federal Republic of Germany
APPL-NO:       07/484,127
DATE FILED:    Feb. 23, 1990
ART-UNIT:      222
PRIM-EXMR:     Thomas H. Tarcza
ASST-EXMR:     David Cain
LEGAL-REP:     Hill, Van Santen, Steadman & Simpson
 
ABSTRACT: 
In a data exchange system working with processor chip cards, a chip card
transmits coded identification data I, v and, proceeding from a random,
discrete logarithm r, an exponential value x=2.sup.r (mod p) to the
subscriber who, in turn, generates and transmits a random bit sequence e to
the chip card. By multiplication of a stored, private key s with the bit
sequence e and by addition of the random number r, the chip card calculates a
y value and transmits the y value to the subscriber who, in turn, calculates
an x value from the information y, v.sub.j and e and checks whether the
calculated x value coincides with the transmitted x value. For an electronic
signature, a hash value e is first calculated from an x value and from the
message m to be signed and a y value is subsequently calculated from the
information r, s.sub.j and e. The numbers x and y then yield the electronic
signature of the message m.
 
 
US PAT NO:      4,405,829 [IMAGE AVAILABLE]           L19: 3 of 5
DATE ISSUED:   Sep. 20, 1983
TITLE:         Cryptographic communications system and method
INVENTOR:      Ronald L. Rivest, Belmont, MA
               Adi Shamir, Cambridge, MA
               Leonard M. Adleman, Arlington, MA
ASSIGNEE:      Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, MA (U.S.
                 corp.) 
APPL-NO:       05/860,586
DATE FILED:    Dec. 14, 1977
ART-UNIT:      222
PRIM-EXMR:     Sal Cangialosi
LEGAL-REP:     Arthur A. Smith, Jr., Robert J. Horn, Jr.
 
ABSTRACT: 
A cryptographic communications system and method. The system includes a
communications channel coupled to at least one terminal having an encoding
device and to at least one terminal having a decoding device. A
message-to-be-transferred is enciphered to ciphertext at the encoding
terminal by first encoding the message as a number M in a predetermined set,
and then raising that number to a first predetermined power (associated with
the intended receiver) and finally computing the remainder, or residue, C,
when the exponentiated number is divided by the product of two predetermined
prime numbers (associated with the intended receiver). The residue C is the
ciphertext. The ciphertext is deciphered to the original message at the
decoding terminal in a similar manner by raising the ciphertext to a second
predetermined power (associated with the intended receiver), and then
computing the residue, M', when the exponentiated ciphertext is divided by
the product of the two predetermined prime numbers associated with the
intended receiver. The residue M' corresponds to the original encoded message
M.
 
 
US PAT NO:      4,200,770 [IMAGE AVAILABLE]           L19: 5 of 5
DATE ISSUED:   Apr. 29, 1980
TITLE:         Cryptographic apparatus and method
INVENTOR:      Martin E. Hellman, Stanford, CA
               Bailey W. Diffie, Berkeley, CA
               Ralph C. Merkle, Palo Alto, CA
ASSIGNEE:      Stanford University, Palo Alto, CA (U.S. corp.) 
DATE ISSUED:   Apr. 29, 1980
TITLE:         Cryptographic apparatus and method
APPL-NO:       05/830,754
DATE FILED:    Sep. 6, 1977
ART-UNIT:      222
PRIM-EXMR:     Howard A. Birmiel
LEGAL-REP:     Flehr, Hohbach, Test
 
ABSTRACT: 
A cryptographic system transmits a computationally secure cryptogram over an
insecure communication channel without prearrangement of a cipher key. A
secure cipher key is generated by the conversers from transformations of
exchanged transformed signals. The conversers each possess a secret signal
and exchange an initial transformation of the secret signal with the other
converser. The received transformation of the other converser's secret signal
is again transformed with the receiving converser's secret signal to generate
a secure cipher key. The transformations use non-secret operations that are
easily performed but extremely difficult to invert. It is infeasible for an
eavesdropper to invert the initial transformation to obtain either
conversers' secret signal, or duplicate the latter transformation to obtain
the secure cipher key.


US PAT NO:     4,562,305 [IMAGE AVAILABLE]             L22: 1 of 3
DATE ISSUED:   Dec. 31, 1985
TITLE:         Software cryptographic apparatus and method
INVENTOR:      John E. Gaffney, Jr., Bethesda, MD
ASSIGNEE:      International Business Machines Corporation, Armonk, NY (U.S.
                 corp.) 
APPL-NO:       06/452,248
DATE FILED:    Dec. 22, 1982
ART-UNIT:      222
DATE ISSUED:   Dec. 31, 1985
TITLE:         Software cryptographic apparatus and method
PRIM-EXMR:     Salvatore Cangialosi
ASST-EXMR:     Aaron J. Lewis
LEGAL-REP:     John E. Hoel
 
ABSTRACT: 
An improved software cryptographic apparatus and method are disclosed. The
apparatus and method enables the encryption of the object code of a program
so as to enable relocatable code operations. The apparatus and method will
adapt program execution for a mixture of encrypted and nonencrypted code. A
particular advantage of the apparatus and method is its accommodation of
interrupts and branches while carrying out the cryptographic function.
 
 
US PAT NO:     4,424,414 [IMAGE AVAILABLE]             L22: 2 of 3
DATE ISSUED:   Jan. 3, 1984
TITLE:         Exponentiation cryptographic apparatus and method
INVENTOR:      Martin E. Hellman, Stanford, CA
               Stephen C. Pohlig, Acton, MA
ASSIGNEE:      Board of Trustees of the Leland Stanford Junior University,
                 Stanford, CA (U.S. corp.) 
APPL-NO:       05/901,770
DATE FILED:    May 1, 1978
ART-UNIT:      222
PRIM-EXMR:     Sal Cangialosi
LEGAL-REP:     Flehr, Hohbach, Test, Albritton & Herbert
 
ABSTRACT: 
A cryptographic system transmits a computationally secure cryptogram that is
generated from a secret transformation of the message sent by the authorized
transmitter; the cryptogram is again transformed by the authorized receiver
using a secret reciprocal transformation to reproduce the message sent. The
secret transformations use secret cipher keys that are known only by the
authorized transmitter and receiver. The transformations are performed with
nonsecret operations, exponentiation, that are easily performed but extremely
difficult to invert. It is computationally infeasible for an eavesdropper
either to solve known plaintext-ciphertext pairs for the secret cipher keys,
or to invert the nonsecret operations that are used to generate the
cryptogram.
 
 
US PAT NO:     4,218,582 [IMAGE AVAILABLE]             L22: 3 of 3
DATE ISSUED:   Aug. 19, 1980
TITLE:         Public key cryptographic apparatus and method
INVENTOR:      Martin E. Hellman, Stanford, CA
               Ralph C. Merkle, Palo Alto, CA
DATE ISSUED:   Aug. 19, 1980
TITLE:         Public key cryptographic apparatus and method
ASSIGNEE:      The Board of Trustees of the Leland Stanford Junior University
                 , Stanford, CA (U.S. corp.) 
APPL-NO:       05/839,939
DATE FILED:    Oct. 6, 1977
ART-UNIT:      222
PRIM-EXMR:     Howard A. Birmiel
 
ABSTRACT: 
A cryptographic system transmits a computationally secure cryptogram that is
generated from a publicly known transformation of the message sent by the
transmitter; the cryptogram is again transformed by the authorized receiver
using a secret reciprocal transformation to reproduce the message sent. The
authorized receiver's transformation is known only by the authorized receiver
and is used to generate the transmitter's transformation that is made
publicly known. The publicly known transformation uses operations that are
easily performed but extremely difficult to invert. It is infeasible for an
unauthorized receiver to invert the publicly known transformation or
duplicate the authorized receiver's secret transformation to obtain the
message sent.

*** END ***




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Paul Goggin <chaos@aql.gatech.edu>
Date: Mon, 19 Jul 93 22:24:10 PDT
To: jjl@panix.com
Subject: Re: Crypto Patent Abstracts #1
In-Reply-To: <199307200456.AA27500@panix.com>
Message-ID: <9307200520.AA02122@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>From: "J. J. Larrea" <jjl@panix.com>

>Message-Id: <199307200456.AA27500@panix.com>
>Subject: Crypto Patent Abstracts #1
>To: cypherpunks@toad.com

>Of the 6, I have full-text for 4 of them:
>       Schnorr: 4,995,082 
>       Gaffney: 4,562,305 
>       Hellman-Pohlig: 4,424,414
>       Rivest-Shamir: 4,405,829 

>and partial text for one more:
>       Hellman-Merkle: 4,218,582 

>I hope to be able to get a full version of Hellman-Merkle, as well as:
>       Hellman-Diffie: 4,200,770       
>within a week.

>So, is there an FTP site I should place these on?

I don't know about soda, but I have been mirroring it here at aql.gatech.edu
and would love to put them up for ftp. I have /pub/cypherpunks/Incoming
set up for dropoffs. Put them in and I should have them up within a day for
anonymous ftp. Drop me a note also when you drop them off for quicker 
response. What did the [images available] besides the patent number mean?

Look forward to hearing from you.

Paul
--
R  O    All Comments Copyright by  | Technofetisht
 A  N     Paul S. Goggin (1993)    | Cypher, Cyber, Chaos              
  V        Information Broker      | Ergoflux, Interzone
   E      chaos@aql.gatech.edu     | Carpe Diem: Stop the Clipper wiretap chip 
Finger account for latest _Phrack_ | Public Key: PGP and RIPEM available
      For anonymous communication:---> anonymus+4744@charcoal.com
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Title 18 USC 2511 and 18 USC 2703 Protected -- Monitoring Absolutely Forbidden




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: whitaker@eternity.demon.co.uk (Russell Earl Whitaker)
Date: Tue, 20 Jul 93 09:35:37 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Forwarded article.
Message-ID: <9913@eternity.demon.co.uk>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



This article was forwarded to you by whitaker@eternity.demon.co.uk (Russell Earl Whitaker):

--------------------------------- cut here -----------------------------

Path: eternity.demon.co.uk!demon!news!uunet!usc!math.ohio-state.edu!
magnus.acs.ohio-state.edu!dbruedig
From: dbruedig@magnus.acs.ohio-state.edu (Dena L Bruedigam)
Newsgroups: alt.politics.libertarian
Subject: Claustrophobia
Date: 20 Jul 1993 00:56:45 GMT
Organization: The Ohio State University
Lines: 25
Message-ID: <22ffsd$adq@charm.magnus.acs.ohio-state.edu>
NNTP-Posting-Host: top.magnus.acs.ohio-state.edu


The August issue of _Claustrophobia_ is hot off the press and has some great
articles of interest to libertarians, such as:

   *  NSA: The Eyes of Big Brother, an expose of the prying secret government
      organization

   *  What You Should Know About Your Social Security Number

   *  Violence on TV

   *  The Right (?) to Health Care

   *  And more!

===========================================================================
For a free sample, just send your name and address and a 29-cent stamp to:

     Claustrophobia
     400 N. High St. #137
     Columbus, OH 43215
============================================================================

**  The Claustrophobia staff has agreed not to sell, rent, trade, or give **
**  away our mailing list -- ever.

--------------------------------- cut here -----------------------------





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Stanton McCandlish <anton@hydra.unm.edu>
Date: Tue, 20 Jul 93 02:59:14 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Crypto Patent Abstracts #1
In-Reply-To: <9307200930.AA12485@hydra.unm.edu>
Message-ID: <9307200956.AA13242@hydra.unm.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Well, I hereby relinquish my claim to having the most complete PGP site.  Aql
beats NitV hands down!  But not for long...  >;)  Truly impressive though!

PS someone requested that I UL my stuff (much of it hard-to-get Fido/PGP
utils, and the like) to their site.  Who was that? I've lost the msg.

-- 
Stanton  McCandlish   * Space Migration * Networking * ChaOrder * NO GOV'T. *
anton@hydra.unm.edu   * Intelligence Increase * Nano * Crypto * NO RELIGION *
FidoNet:    1:301/2   * Life Extension * Ethics * VR * Now! * NO MORE LIES! *
Noise in the Void BBS * +1-505-246-8515   (24hr, 1200-14400, v32bis, N-8-1) *



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: elee9sf@Menudo.UH.EDU
Date: Tue, 20 Jul 93 06:16:24 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: STEG: subliminal messages
In-Reply-To: <930718005643.e25@APSICC.APS.EDU>
Message-ID: <199307201315.AA21726@Menudo.UH.EDU>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



> I was thinking of steganography as being in two stages: first, you encrypt,
> (possibly with the identity transformation) then, you embed your encrypted
> message in your medium of transmission.  My previous message was describing

An interesting related topic is subliminal channels and messages.  A
subliminal channel is one in which communication takes place without
an external observer realizing it.

The classic example is communication between two prisoners (I guess
they played the prisoner's dilemma and both wound up in jail anyway).
Two prisoners are allowed to communicate, but the warden is suspicious
so he intercepts all traffic, reads it, and then passes it on.  The
prisoners demand that they be able to digitally sign messages to
prevent forgeries by the warden.  The warden demands he be able to
read the messages (no PGP).  All parties agree to these terms and the
communication begins.

Basically, the prisoners communicate in the open (the message readable
by the warden) but they also communicate with a "subliminal channel"
the warden isn't aware of: the digital signature.  The prisoners sign
their messages in such a way as to communicate a few bits of
information with each message passed along.  The digital signatures
can be verified, so the warden suspects nothing.  Eventually, the
prisoners work out their stories and are released.  :-)

As I remember, and I don't have the book here with me now, Seberry and
Peipryzk's book describes this, and gives several examples of
subliminal channel algorithms, of which I only recall El Gamal`s at
the moment.  Perhaps Arto Salaama's "Public Key Cryptography" contains
more information.

/-----------------------------------\
| Karl L. Barrus                    |
| elee9sf@menudo.uh.edu             | <- preferred address
| barrus@tree.egr.uh.edu (NeXTMail) |
\-----------------------------------/




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: elee9sf@Menudo.UH.EDU
Date: Tue, 20 Jul 93 06:39:15 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: AP Story
In-Reply-To: <9307192115.AA15865@bucrf4.bu.edu>
Message-ID: <199307201338.AA23202@Menudo.UH.EDU>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



> > He should've used PGP!
> 
> since they had his computer, they had his PUBKEY and SECKEY files...
> and more than likely his pass phrase in simple encryption somewhere in
> his files...(fairly easy to break simple encryptions...like CRYPT
> command on unix...)
> 
> Don't you think?

I apologize if this appears twice; I sent out a reply late last night
but it hasn't shown up yet.  And I can't remember if I sent it to the
list or to the author...

Okay, it would be incredible oversight on his part to "simple encrypt"
his passphrase and leave it on his computer!  It would be even worse
if he put his passphrase in config.txt.

But, he could have used "pgp -c" and IDEA encrypted his files, thus
rendering pubring.pgp and secring.pgp useless information.

So, he shouldn've used PGP!

/-----------------------------------\
| Karl L. Barrus                    |
| elee9sf@menudo.uh.edu             | <- preferred address
| barrus@tree.egr.uh.edu (NeXTMail) |
\-----------------------------------/




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Brad Huntting <Brad.Huntting@HK.Super.NET>
Date: Mon, 19 Jul 93 18:04:08 PDT
To: allan@elvis.tamu.edu (Allan Bailey)
Subject: Re: It could happen to anyone (fwd Washington Post commentary)
In-Reply-To: <9307192249.AA26576@elvis.tamu.edu>
Message-ID: <199307200102.AA13763@hk.super.net>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> Is it just me?  Or does CNN just not cover things like the 
> Randy Weaver trial when the gov't loses?

CNN (like every other real-time news service) is under pressure to keep
costs down.  So they tend to rely on tried and true sources such as the
government.

They're staff probably didn't hear about this case till long after it
became "yesterdays news".

On the other hand, perhaps they have been sucking up to "government
sources" for so long, they just blindly assume that what they say is
what's news worthy.


brad




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: fergp@sytex.com (Paul Ferguson)
Date: Tue, 20 Jul 93 16:05:34 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: An Ode to Sternlight (fwd)
Message-ID: <JZ7Z7B1w165w@sytex.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


From: warlock@PASCAL.ACM.ORG
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
Subject: Sternlight, Sternlight, burning bright...
Date: 20 Jul 1993 00:07:29 GMT
Organization: ACM Network Services, Waco, TX
Lines: 38
Reply-To: warlock@PASCAL.ACM.ORG
NNTP-Posting-Host: acm.org
 
} 
.OJ OFF
.op
           The Sternlight Tyger (Apologies to Wm. Blake)
 
 
              Sternlight, Sternlight, burning bright
              From the flamings left and right, 
              What group covert or front pontific
              Dare frame thy postings so prolific.
 
              From what cloistered chamber flows
              The torrents of your party prose?
              Who foots the bill? Who pays the piper?
              Are you saint or are you viper?
 
              Are you the likes of Walter Mitty
              Or just another gov-committee
              Whose Dole-ful charge, we must confess,
              Is simply to obstruct progress.*
 
              When the Evil Empire of the Left
              Gave up the ghost (of cash bereft),
              Did he smile his work to see
              Did he who made the spooks make thee?
 
              Sternlight, Sternlight, burning bright
              From the flamings left and right, 
              What group covert or front pontific
              Dare frame thy postings so prolific.
 
 
                            WARLOCK
 
 
 
              * progress = private sector cryptographic 
                innovation and use.

Paul Ferguson               |  "Government, even in its best state,
Network Integrator          |   is but a necessary evil; in its worst
Centreville, Virginia USA   |   state, an intolerable one."
fergp@sytex.com             |      - Thomas Paine, Common Sense
 
         I love my country, but I fear its government.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: fergp@sytex.com (Paul Ferguson)
Date: Tue, 20 Jul 93 16:04:25 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Sprint-bound
Message-ID: <TH8Z7B5w165w@sytex.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


On Mon, 19 Jul 93 22:24:38 -0700,
 John Gilmore <uunet!toad.com!gnu> wrote -
 
> So, will you be working for SprintNet?  We have been evaluating
> quotes for Internet service from them.  They seem to have pretty
> good policies -- better than most -- though from what I hear, their
> uptime (quality of service) is poorer than the other vendors.
 
Hi John.
 
Actually, they refer to themselves as "SprintLink." ;-)
 
In all reality, I'm leaving Computer Sciences Corporation for a
consulting position with Mindbank Consulting Group, based in the
Washington, DC area. While CSC has kept me travelling five days
a week (mostly in New Yawk City), I welcome the opportunity to
stay closer to home for a change. (My wife is certainly happier.)
 
If you turn to page 339 of "The Whole Internet User's Guide & Catalog
(by Ed Krol, copyright 1992, O'Reilly & Associates <nuts@ora.com>),
in the middle of the page you'll see the name of gentleman for whom
I'll be working.
 
I remain distanced from the controversy surrounding the
Sprint/Congressional-hearing debate, because I do not work there
yet. <g>
 
As far as their reliabilty, I certainly hope to contribute to the
future of Sprint's connectivity reputation; hopefully that will be a
good thing.
 
Wish me luck, chum.
 

Paul Ferguson               |  "Government, even in its best state,
Network Integrator          |   is but a necessary evil; in its worst
Centreville, Virginia USA   |   state, an intolerable one."
fergp@sytex.com             |      - Thomas Paine, Common Sense
 
         I love my country, but I fear its government.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: fergp@sytex.com (Paul Ferguson)
Date: Tue, 20 Jul 93 15:49:24 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Congressional contacts list
Message-ID: <1J9Z7B1w165w@sytex.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


On Tue, 20 Jul 1993 11:22:00 -0700,
 Peter shipley <uunet!merde.dis.org!shipley> wrote -
 
> can you resend me you list of Congressional FAX numbers, I lost
> what you sent before.
>
>                -Pete
 
Hi, Pete.
 
While your original message was sent to me directly, meObthinks
that my reply is important enough to be broadcast in the public
channels.
 
Please note that this list is dated and some entries may be outdated.
Fortunately, some FCs (Fat Cats) have been removed from office. I am
in the process of finding (creating?) a new and updated list.
 
Cheers from Washington, DC.
 
8<-------- Cut Here --------------------
 
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703-971-4491 (modem).  For further information on our lists and
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Franconia Rd., Suite 214, Alexandria, VA 22310.
 
ST DIST FIRST             LAST           PHONE         FAX
AK  1   Don               Young          (202)225-5765
AK  S   Frank H.          Murkowski      (202)224-6665 (202)224-5301
AK  S   Ted               Stevens        (202)224-3004 (202)224-1044
AL  1   Sonny             Callahan       (202)225-4931 (202)225-0562
AL  2   William L.        Dickinson      (202)225-2901
AL  3   Glen              Browder        (202)225-3261 (202)225-9020
AL  4   Tom               Bevill         (202)225-4876 (202)225-0842
AL  5   Bud               Cramer         (202)225-4801
AL  6   Ben               Erdreich       (202)225-4931
AL  7   Claude            Harris         (202)225-2665
AL  S   Howell            Heflin         (202)224-4124 (202)224-3149
AL  S   Richard           Shelby         (202)224-5744 (202)224-3416
AR  1   Bill              Alexander      (202)225-4076
AR  2   Ray               Thornton       (202)225-2506 (202)225-2506
AR  3   John Paul         Hammerschmidt  (202)225-4301 (202)225-7492
AR  4   Beryl             Anthony        (202)225-3772 (202)225-3646
AR  S   Dale L.           Bumpers        (202)224-4843 (202)224-6435
AR  S   David             Pryor          (202)224-2353 (202)224-8261
AZ  1   John J.           Rhodes         (202)225-2635 (202)225-0985
AZ  2                                    (202)225-4065
AZ  3   Bob               Stump          (202)225-4576 (202)225-6328
AZ  4   Jon L.            Kyl            (202)225-3361 (202)225-1143
AZ  5   Jim               Kolbe          (202)225-2542 (202)225-0378
AZ  S   Dennis            DeConcini      (202)224-4521 (202)224-8698
AZ  S   John              McCain         (202)224-2235 (202)224-8938
CA  1   Frank             Riggs          (202)225-3311 (202)225-5577
CA  2   Wally             Herger         (202)225-3076 (202)225-0996
CA  3   Robert T.         Matsui         (202)225-7163 (202)225-0566
CA  4   Vic               Fazio          (202)225-5716 (202)225-0354
CA  5   Nancy             Pelosi         (202)225-4965 (202)225-8259
CA  6   Barbara           Boxer          (202)225-5161 (202)225-1004
CA  7   George            Miller         (202)225-2095 (202)225-5609
CA  8   Ronald V.         Dellums        (202)225-2661
CA  9   Fortney (Pete)    Stark          (202)225-5065
CA  S   John              Seymour        (202)224-3841 (202)224-6031
CA  S   Alan              Cranston       (202)224-3553 (202)224-8128
CA 10   Don               Edwards        (202)225-3072
CA 11   Tom               Lantos         (202)225-3531
CA 12   Tom J.            Campbell       (202)225-5411 (202)225-5944
CA 13   Norman Y.         Mineta         (202)225-2631
CA 14   John T.           Doolittle      (202)225-2511 (202)225-5444
CA 15   Gary              Condit         (202)225-6131 (202)225-0819
CA 16   Leon E.           Panetta        (202)225-2861
CA 17   Calvin            Dooley         (202)225-3341 (202)225-9308
CA 18   Richard H.        Lehman         (202)225-4540
CA 19   Robert J.         Lagomarsino    (202)225-3601 (202)225-3096
CA 20   William M.        Thomas         (202)225-2915 (202)225-8798
CA 21   Elton             Gallegly       (202)225-5811
CA 22   Carlos J.         Moorhead       (202)225-4176 (202)225-1279
CA 23   Anthony           Beilenson      (202)225-5911
CA 24   Henry A.          Waxman         (202)225-3976 (202)225-4099
CA 25   Edward            Roybal         (202)225-6235 (202)225-1251
CA 26   Howard L.         Berman         (202)225-4695 (202)225-5279
CA 27   Mel               Levine         (202)225-6451 (202)225-6975
CA 28   Julian C.         Dixon          (202)225-7084 (202)225-4091
CA 29   Maxine            Waters         (202)225-2201 (202)225-7854
CA 30   Matthew G.        Martinez       (202)225-5464 (202)225-5467
CA 31   Mervyn M.         Dymally        (202)225-5425 (202)225-6847
CA 32   Glenn             Anderson       (202)225-6676
CA 33   David             Dreier         (202)225-2305 (202)225-4745
CA 34   Esteban Edward    Torres         (202)225-5256 (202)225-9711
CA 35   Jerry             Lewis          (202)225-5861 (202)225-6498
CA 36   George            Brown          (202)225-6161 (202)225-8671
CA 37   Al                McCandless     (202)225-5330
CA 38   Robert K.         Dornan         (202)225-2965
CA 39   William E.        Dannemeyer     (202)225-4111 (202)225-1755
CA 40   Christopher       Cox            (202)225-5611 (202)225-9177
CA 41   Bill              Lowery         (202)225-3201
CA 42   Dana              Rohrabacher    (202)225-2415 (202)225-0145
CA 43   Ronald C.         Packard        (202)225-3906 (202)225-0134
CA 44   Randy             Cunningham     (202)225-5452 (202)225-2558
CA 45   Duncan L.         Hunter         (202)225-5672 (202)225-0235
CO  1   Patricia          Schroeder      (202)225-4431 (202)225-5842
CO  2   David E.          Skaggs         (202)225-2161
CO  3   Ben Nighthorse    Campbell       (202)225-4761
CO  4   Wayne             Allard         (202)225-4676 (202)225-8630
CO  5   Joel              Hefley         (202)225-4422
CO  6   Dan               Schaefer       (202)225-7882
CO  S   Hank              Brown          (202)224-5941
CO  S   Timothy           Wirth          (202)224-5852 (202)224-1933
CT  1   Barbara           Kennelly       (202)225-2265 (202)225-1031
CT  2   Sam               Gejdenson      (202)225-2076 (202)225-4977
CT  3   Rosa   .          DeLauro        (202)225-3661
CT  4   Christopher       Shays          (202)225-5541 (202)225-9629
CT  5   Gary              Franks         (202)225-3822 (202)225-5085
CT  6   Nancy L.          Johnson        (202)225-4476 (202)225-4488
CT  S   Joe               Lieberman      (202)224-4041 (202)224-9750
CT  S   Christopher J.    Dodd           (202)224-2823 (202)224-
DE  1   Thomas            Carper         (202)225-4165 (202)225-1912
DE  S   Joseph            Biden          (202)224-5042 (202)224-0139
DE  S   William V.        Roth           (202)224-2441 (202)224-2805
FL  1   Earl D.           Hutto          (202)225-4136 (202)225-5785
FL  2   Pete              Peterson       (202)225-5235 (202)225-1586
FL  3   Charles E.        Bennett        (202)225-2501 (202)225-9635
FL  4   Craig             James          (202)225-4035 (202)225-1727
FL  5   Bill              McCollum       (202)225-2176 (202)225-0999
FL  6   Clifford B.       Stearns        (202)225-5744 (202)225-3973
FL  7   Sam               Gibbons        (202)225-3376
FL  8   C. W. Bill        Young          (202)225-5961 (202)225-9764
FL  9   Michael           Bilirakis      (202)225-5755 (202)225-4085
FL  S   Bob               Graham         (202)224-3041 (202)224-6843
FL  S   Connie            Mack           (202)224-5274 (202)224-9365
FL 10   Andy              Ireland        (202)225-5015 (202)225-6944
FL 11   Jim               Bacchus        (202)225-3671 (202)225-9039
FL 12   Tom               Lewis          (202)225-5792 (202)225-1860
FL 13   Porter J.         Goss           (202)225-2536 (202)225-6820
FL 14   Harry A.          Johnston       (202)225-3001 (202)225-8791
FL 15   Clay              Shaw           (202)225-3026 (202)225-8398
FL 16   Lawrence J.       Smith          (202)225-7931 (202)225-9816
FL 17   William           Lehman         (202)225-4211 (202)225-6208
FL 18   Ilena             Ros-Lehtinen   (202)225-3931 (202)225-5620
FL 19   Dante             Fascell        (202)225-4506 (202)225-0724
GA  1   Lindsay           Thomas         (202)225-5831 (202)225-6922
GA  2   Charles           Hatcher        (202)225-3631 (202)225-1117
GA  3   Richard           Ray            (202)225-5901
GA  4   Ben               Jones          (202)225-4272 (202)225-8675
GA  5   John              Lewis          (202)225-3801 (202)225-0351
GA  6   Newt              Gingrich       (202)225-4501 (202)225-4656
GA  7   George (Buddy)    Darden         (202)225-2931
GA  8   J. Roy            Rowland        (202)225-6531
GA  9   Ed                Jenkins        (202)225-5211 (202)225-0594
GA  S   Wyche             Fowler         (202)224-3643 (202)224-8227
GA  S   Sam               Nunn           (202)224-3521 (202)224-0072
GA 10   Doug              Barnard        (202)225-4101 (202)225-1873
HI  1   Neil              Abercrombie    (202)225-2726 (202)225-4580
HI  2   Patsy             Mink           (202)225-4906 (202)225-4987
HI  S   Spark M.          Akaka          (202)224-6361 (202)224-2126
HI  S   Daniel K.         Inouye         (202)224-3934 (202)224-6747
IA  1   Jim               Leach          (202)225-6576 (202)225-1278
IA  2   Jim               Nussle         (202)225-2911 (202)225-9129
IA  3   David R.          Nagle          (202)225-3301 (202)225-9104
IA  4   Neal              Smith          (202)225-4426
IA  5   Jim               Lightfoot      (202)225-3806 (202)225-6973
IA  6   Fred              Grandy         (202)225-5476
IA  S   Charles           Grassley       (202)224-3744 (202)224-0473
IA  S   Tom               Harkin         (202)224-3254 (202)224-7431
ID  1   Larry             LaRocco        (202)225-6611 (202)225-1213
ID  2   Richard H.        Stallings      (202)225-5531 (202)225-2393
ID  S   Steven D.         Symms          (202)224-6142 (202)224-5893
ID  S   Larry             Craig          (202)224-2752 (202)224-2573
IL  1   Charles A.        Hayes          (202)225-4372 (202)225-7571
IL  2   Gus               Savage         (202)225-0773 (202)225-8608
IL  3   Marty             Russo          (202)225-5736 (202)225-0295
IL  4   George            Sangmeister    (202)225-3635 (202)225-4447
IL  5   William O.        Lipinski       (202)225-5701 (202)225-1012
IL  6   Henry             Hyde           (202)225-4561 (202)225-1240
IL  7   Cardiss           Collins        (202)225-5006 (202)225-8396
IL  8   Dan               Rostenkowski   (202)225-4061
IL  9   Sidney            Yates          (202)225-2111 (202)225-3493
IL  S   Alan J.           Dixon          (202)224-2854 (202)224-5581
IL  S   Paul              Simon          (202)224-2152 (202)224-2223
IL 10   John Edward       Porter         (202)225-4835 (202)225-0157
IL 11   Frank             Annunzio       (202)225-6661
IL 12   Philip M.         Crane          (202)225-3711
IL 13   Harris W.         Fawell         (202)225-3515 (202)225-9420
IL 14   J. Dennis         Hastert        (202)225-2976 (202)225-0697
IL 15   Ewing             Thomas W.
IL 16   John W.           Cox            (202)225-5676
IL 17   Lane              Evans          (202)225-5905 (202)225-5396
IL 18   Robert            Michel         (202)225-6201 (202)225-9249
IL 19   Terry L.          Bruce          (202)225-5001
IL 20   Richard J.        Durbin         (202)225-5271 (202)225-0170
IL 21   Jerry F.          Costello       (202)225-5661 (202)225-0285
IL 22   Glenn             Poshard        (202)225-5201 (202)225-1541
IN  1   Peter J.          Visclosky      (202)225-2461
IN  2   Philip R.         Sharp          (202)225-3021 (202)225-8140
IN  3   Tim               Roemer         (202)225-3915 (202)225-6798
IN  4   Jill              Long           (202)225-4436
IN  5   James             Jontz          (202)225-5037 (202)225-5870
IN  6   Dan               Burton         (202)225-2276 (202)225-0016
IN  7   John T.           Myers          (202)225-5805 (202)225-1649
IN  8   Frank             McCloskey      (202)225-4636 (202)225-4688
IN  9   Lee               Hamilton       (202)225-5315
IN  S   Richard G.        Lugar          (202)224-4814
IN  S   Dan               Coats          (202)224-5623 (202)224-8964
IN 10   Andrew            Jacobs         (202)225-4011 (202)225-4093
KS  1   Pat               Roberts        (202)225-2715 (202)225-5375
KS  2   Jim               Slattery       (202)225-6601 (202)225-1445
KS  3   Jan               Meyers         (202)225-2865 (202)225-0554
KS  4   Dan               Glickman       (202)225-6216 (202)225-5398
KS  5   Dick              Nichols        (202)225-3911 (202)225-9415
KS  S   Robert J.         Dole           (202)224-6521 (202)224-8952
KS  S   Nancy L.          Kassebaum      (202)224-4774 (202)224-3514
KY  1   Carroll           Hubbard        (202)225-3115 (202)225-1622
KY  2   William           Natcher        (202)225-3501
KY  3   Romano            Mazzoli        (202)225-5401
KY  4   Jim               Bunning        (202)225-3465 (202)225-0003
KY  5   Harold            Rogers         (202)225-4601 (202)225-0940
KY  6   Larry J.          Hopkins        (202)225-4706 (202)225-1413
KY  7   Carl C.           Perkins        (202)225-4935 (202)225-1411
KY  S   Mitchell          McConnell      (202)224-2541 (202)224-2499
KY  S   Wendell H.        Ford           (202)224-4343 (202)224-1144
LA  1   Bob               Livingston     (202)225-3015 (202)225-0739
LA  2   William J.        Jefferson      (202)225-6636 (202)225-1988
LA  3   Billy             Tauzin         (202)225-4031 (202)225-0563
LA  4   Jim               McCrery        (202)225-2777 (202)225-8039
LA  5   Jerry             Huckaby        (202)225-2376 (202)225-2387
LA  6   Richard Hugh      Baker          (202)225-3901 (202)225-7313
LA  7   James A.          Hayes          (202)225-2031 (202)225-1175
LA  8   Clyde C.          Holloway       (202)225-4926 (202)225-6252
LA  S   J. Bennett        Johnston       (202)224-5824
LA  S   John              Breaux         (202)224-4623 (202)224-9753
MA  1   John              Oliver
MA  2   Richard E.        Neal           (202)225-5601 (202)225-8112
MA  3   Joseph D.         Early          (202)225-6101 (202)225-3181
MA  4   Barney            Frank          (202)225-5931
MA  5   Chester G.        Atkins         (202)225-3411
MA  6   Nicholas          Mavroules      (202)225-8020 (202)225-8023
MA  7   Edward J.         Markey         (202)225-2836 (202)225-8689
MA  8   Joseph P.         Kennedy        (202)225-5111 (202)225-9322
MA  9   Joe               Moakley        (202)225-8273 (202)225-7804
MA  S   John              Kerry          (202)224-2742 (202)224-8525
MA  S   Edward M.         Kennedy        (202)224-4543 (202)224-2417
MA 10   Gerry             Studds         (202)225-3111
MA 11   Brian             Donnelly       (202)225-3215
MD  1   Wayne T.          Gilchrest      (202)225-5311 (202)225-0254
MD  2   Helen Delich      Bentley        (202)225-3061 (202)225-4251
MD  3   Benjamin L.       Cardin         (202)225-4016 (202)225-9219
MD  4   C. Thomas         McMillen       (202)225-8090
MD  5   Steny H.          Hoyer          (202)225-4131 (202)225-4300
MD  6   Beverly B.        Byron          (202)225-2721 (202)225-6159
MD  7   Kweisi            Mfume          (202)225-4741 (202)225-3178
MD  8   Constance A.      Morella        (202)225-5341 (202)225-1389
MD  S   Paul S.           Sarbanes       (202)224-4524 (202)224-1651
MD  S   Barbara           Mikulski       (202)224-4654 (202)224-8858
ME  1   Thomas H.         Andrews        (202)225-6116 (202)225-9065
ME  2   Olympia J.        Snowe          (202)225-6306
ME  S   William S.        Cohen          (202)224-2523 (202)224-2693
ME  S   George            Mitchell       (202)224-5344
MI  1   John              Conyers        (202)225-5126 (202)225-0072
MI  2   Carl              Pursell        (202)225-4401
MI  3   Howard            Wolpe          (202)225-5011 (202)225-8602
MI  4   Frederick S.      Upton          (202)225-3761 (202)225-4986
MI  5   Paul B.           Henry          (202)225-3831
MI  6   Bob               Carr           (202)225-4872 (202)225-1260
MI  7   Dale E.           Kildee         (202)225-3611 (202)225-6393
MI  8   Bob               Traxler        (202)225-2806
MI  9   Guy               Vander Jagt    (202)225-3511
MI  S   Carl M.           Levin          (202)224-6221
MI  S   Donald W.         Riegle         (202)224-4822
MI 10   Dave              Camp           (202)225-3561 (202)225-9679
MI 11   Robert W.         Davis          (202)225-4735
MI 12   David E.          Bonior         (202)225-2106 (202)225-1169
MI 13   Barbara-Rose      Collins        (202)225-2261
MI 14   Dennis M.         Hertel         (202)225-6276
MI 15   William           Ford           (202)225-6261
MI 16   John D.           Dingell        (202)225-4071 (202)225-7426
MI 17   Sander M.         Levin          (202)225-4961 (202)225-1033
MI 18   William           Broomfield     (202)225-6135 (202)225-1807
MN  1   Timothy J.        Penny          (202)225-2472
MN  2   Vin               Weber          (202)225-2331 (202)225-0987
MN  3   Jim               Ramstad        (202)225-2871 (202)225-6351
MN  4   Bruce F.          Vento          (202)225-6631 (202)225-1968
MN  5   Martin Olav       Sabo           (202)225-4755
MN  6   Gerry             Sikorski       (202)225-2271 (202)225-4347
MN  7   Collin C.         Peterson       (202)225-2165 (202)225-1593
MN  8   James L.          Oberstar       (202)225-6211 (202)225-0699
MN  S   David             Durenberger    (202)224-3244 (202)224-9846
MN  S   Paul              Wellstone      (202)224-5641 (202)224-8438
MO  1   William           Clay           (202)225-2406 (202)225-1725
MO  2   John Kelly        Horn           (202)225-2561
MO  3   Richard           Gephardt       (202)225-2671 (202)225-7452
MO  4   Ike               Skelton        (202)225-2876
MO  5   Alan              Wheat          (202)225-4535 (202)225-5990
MO  6   E. Thomas         Coleman        (202)225-7041 (202)225-4799
MO  7   Mel               Hancock        (202)225-6536 (202)225-7700
MO  8   Bill              Emerson        (202)225-4404 (202)225-9621
MO  9   Harold L.         Volkmer        (202)225-2956 (202)225-7834
MO  S   John C.           Danforth       (202)224-6154
MO  S   Christopher       Bond           (202)224-5721 (202)224-7491
MS  1   Jamie             Whitten        (202)225-4306 (202)225-4328
MS  2   Mike              Espy           (202)225-5876
MS  3   G. V. (Sonny)     Montgomery     (202)225-5031 (202)225-3375
MS  4   Mike              Parker         (202)225-5865 (202)225-5886
MS  5   Gene              Taylor         (202)225-5772 (202)225-7074
MS  S   Trent             Lott           (202)224-6253 (202)224-2262
MS  S   Thad              Cochran        (202)224-5054 (202)224-9450
MT  1   Pat               Williams       (202)225-3211 (202)225-1257
MT  2   Ron               Marlenee       (202)225-1555 (202)225-1558
MT  S   Conrad            Burns          (202)224-2644 (202)224-8594
MT  S   Max S.            Baucus         (202)224-2651 (202)224-4379
NC  1   Walter B.         Jones          (202)225-3101 (202)225-3354
NC  2   Tim               Valentine      (202)225-4531 (202)225-1539
NC  3   H. Martin         Lancaster      (202)225-3415 (202)225-0666
NC  4   David E.          Price          (202)225-1784 (202)225-6314
NC  5   Stephen L.        Neal           (202)225-2071
NC  6   Howard            Coble          (202)225-3065 (202)225-8611
NC  7   Charles           Rose           (202)225-2731 (202)225-2470
NC  8   W. G.             Hefner         (202)225-3715 (202)225-4036
NC  9   J. Alex           McMillan       (202)225-1976 (202)225-8995
NC  S   Terry             Sanford        (202)224-3154 (202)224-7406
NC  S   Jesse A.          Helms          (202)224-6342 (202)224-1376
NC 10   Cass              Ballenger      (202)225-2576 (202)225-1316
NC 11   Charles           Taylor         (202)225-6401 (202)225-0519
ND  1   Byron L.          Dorgan         (202)225-2611 (202)225-9436
ND  S   Kent              Conrad         (202)224-2043 (202)224-7776
ND  S   Quentin           Burdick        (202)224-2551 (202)224-1193
NE  1   Douglas           Bereuter       (202)225-4806
NE  2   Peter             Hoagland       (202)225-4155 (202)225-4684
NE  3   Bill              Barrett        (202)225-6435 (202)225-0207
NE  S   Bob               Kerrey         (202)224-6551 (202)224-7645
NE  S   J. James          Exon           (202)224-4224 (202)225-5213
NH  -                     Smith          (202)224-2841 (202)224-1353
NH  1   Bill              Zeliff         (202)225-5456 (202)225-4370
NH  2   DIck              Swett          (202)225-5206 (202)225-0046
NH  S   Warren            Rudman         (202)224-3324
NJ  1   Robert T.         Andrews        (202)225-6501
NJ  2   William           Hughes         (202)225-6572 (202)225-8530
NJ  3   Frank             Pallone        (202)225-4671 (202)225-9665
NJ  4   Christopher       Smith          (202)225-3765 (202)225-7768
NJ  5   Marge             Roukema        (202)225-4465 (202)225-9048
NJ  6   Bernard J.        Dwyer          (202)225-6301 (202)225-1553
NJ  7   Matthew           Rinaldo        (202)225-5361
NJ  8   Robert            Roe            (202)225-5751 (202)225-3071
NJ  9   Robert            Torricelli     (202)225-5061 (202)225-0843
NJ  S   Frank             Lautenberg     (202)224-4744 (202)224-9707
NJ  S   Bill              Bradley        (202)224-3224 (202)224-8567
NJ 10   Donald            Payne          (202)225-3436 (202)225-4160
NJ 11   Dean A.           Gallo          (202)225-5034 (202)225-0658
NJ 12   Dick              Zimmer         (202)225-5801
NJ 13   Jim               Saxton         (202)225-4765 (202)225-0778
NJ 14   Frank J.          Guarini        (202)225-2765 (202)225-7023
NM  1   Steven H.         Schiff         (202)225-6316 (202)225-4975
NM  2   Joe               Skeen          (202)225-2365 (202)225-9599
NM  3   Bill              Richardson     (202)225-6190
NM  S   Pete V.           Domenici       (202)224-6621 (202)224-7371
NM  S   Jeff              Bingaman       (202)224-5521 (202)224-1810
NV  1   James H.          Bilbray        (202)225-5965 (202)225-8808
NV  2   Barbara F.        Vucanovich     (202)225-6155 (202)225-2319
NV  S   Richard           Bryan          (202)224-6244 (202)224-1867
NV  S   Harry             Reid           (202)224-3542 (202)224-7327
NY  1   George J.         Hochbrueckner  (202)225-3826 (202)225-0776
NY  2   Thomas J.         Downey         (202)225-3335 (202)225-1275
NY  3   Robert J.         Mrazek         (202)225-5956 (202)225-7215
NY  4   Norman            Lent           (202)225-7896 (202)225-0357
NY  5   Raymond           McGrath        (202)225-5516 (202)225-3626
NY  6   Floyd H.          Flake          (202)225-3461 (202)225-4169
NY  7   Gary              Ackerman       (202)225-2601
NY  8   James             Scheuer        (202)225-5471 (202)225-9695
NY  9   Thomas J.         Manton         (202)225-3965 (202)225-1452
NY  S   Daniel P.         Moynihan       (202)224-4451 (202)224-9293
NY  S   Alfonse           D'Amato        (202)224-6542 (202)224-5871
NY 10   Charles E.        Schumer        (202)225-6616 (202)225-4183
NY 11   Edolphus          Towns          (202)225-5936 (202)225-1018
NY 12   Major R.          Owens          (202)225-6231 (202)225-0112
NY 13   Stephen           Solarz         (202)225-2361 (202)225-9469
NY 14   Susan             Molinari       (202)225-3371 (202)225-1272
NY 15   Bill              Green          (202)225-2436 (202)225-0840
NY 16   Charles B.        Rangel         (202)225-4365 (202)225-0816
NY 17   Ted               Weiss          (202)225-5635 (202)225-6923
NY 18   Jose              Serrano        (202)225-4361
NY 19   Eliot L.          Engel          (202)225-2464
NY 20   Nita M.           Lowey          (202)225-6506 (202)225-0546
NY 21   Hamilton          Fish           (202)225-5441 (202)225-0962
NY 22   Benjamin          Gilman         (202)225-3776
NY 23   Micheal           McNulty        (202)225-5076 (202)225-5077
NY 24   Gerald B. H.      Solomon        (202)225-5614 (202)225-1168
NY 25   Sherwood L.       Boehlert       (202)225-3665 (202)225-1891
NY 26   David O'B.        Martin         (202)225-4611
NY 27   James T.          Walsh          (202)225-3701 (202)225-4042
NY 28   Matthew F.        McHugh         (202)225-6335
NY 29   Frank             Horton         (202)225-4916 (202)225-5909
NY 30   Louise M.         Slaughter      (202)225-3615 (202)225-7822
NY 31   Bill              Paxon          (202)225-5265 (202)225-5910
NY 32   John J.           LaFalce        (202)225-3231 (202)225-8693
NY 33   Henry J.          Nowak          (202)225-3306 (202)225-3523
NY 34   Amo               Houghton       (202)225-3161 (202)225-5574
OH  1   Thomas            Luken          (202)225-2216 (202)225-2293
OH  2   Willis            Gradison       (202)225-3164
OH  3   Tony              Hall           (202)225-6465 (202)225-6766
OH  4   Michael           Oxley          (202)225-2676
OH  5   Paul E.           Gillmor        (202)225-6405 (202)225-1985
OH  6   Bob               McEwen         (202)225-5705 (202)225-0224
OH  7   David             Hobson         (202)225-4324 (202)225-1984
OH  8   John A.           Boehner        (202)225-6205 (202)225-0704
OH  9   Marcy             Kaptur         (202)225-4146 (202)225-7711
OH  S   Howard M.         Metzenbaum     (202)224-2315 (202)224-8906
OH  S   John H.           Glenn          (202)224-3353 (202)224-7983
OH 10   Clarence E.       Miller         (202)225-5131 (202)225-5132
OH 11   Dennis E.         Eckart         (202)225-6331 (202)225-6331
OH 12   John R.           Kasich         (202)225-5355
OH 13   Donald J.         Pease          (202)225-3401 (202)225-0066
OH 14   Thomas C.         Sawyer         (202)225-5231 (202)225-5278
OH 15   Chalmers          Wylie          (202)225-2015
OH 16   Ralph             Regula         (202)225-3876 (202)225-3059
OH 17   James A.          Traficant      (202)225-5261 (202)225-3719
OH 18   Douglas           Applegate      (202)225-6265
OH 19   Edward F.         Feighan        (202)225-5731 (202)225-1230
OH 20   Mary Rose         Oakar          (202)225-5871 (202)225-0663
OH 21   Louis             Stokes         (202)225-7032
OK  1   James M.          Inhofe         (202)225-2211 (202)225-9187
OK  2   Michael L.        Synar          (202)225-2701 (202)225-2796
OK  3   Bill              Brewster       (202)225-4565 (202)225-9029
OK  4   Dave              McCurdy        (202)225-6165 (202)225-9746
OK  5   Mickey            Edwards        (202)225-2132 (202)225-1193
OK  6   Glenn             English        (202)225-5565 (202)225-8698
OK  S   David L.          Boren          (202)224-4721 (202)224-0154
OK  S   Donald L.         Nickles        (202)224-5754 (202)224-6008
OR  1   Les               AuCoin         (202)225-0855 (202)225-2707
OR  2   Robert F.         Smith          (202)225-6730 (202)225-3129
OR  3   Ron               Wyden          (202)225-4811
OR  4   Peter A.          DeFazio        (202)225-6416 (202)225-0694
OR  5   Mike              Kopetski       (202)225-5711 (202)225-9477
OR  S   Mark O.           Hatfield       (202)224-3753 (202)224-0276
OR  S   Bob               Packwood       (202)224-5244 (202)224-9065
PA  1   Thomas            Foglietta      (202)225-4731 (202)225-0088
PA  2   William H.        Gray           (202)225-4001
PA  3   Robert A.         Borski         (202)225-8251 (202)225-4628
PA  4   Joseph P.         Kolter         (202)225-2565 (202)225-0526
PA  5   Richard           Schulze        (202)225-5761 (202)225-8464
PA  6   Gus               Yatron         (202)225-5546 (202)225-5548
PA  7   Curt              Weldon         (202)225-2011 (202)225-8137
PA  8   Peter H.          Kostmayer      (202)225-4276 (202)225-5060
PA  9   Bud               Shuster        (202)225-2431
PA  S   Harris            Wofford        (202)224-6324 (202)225-8187
PA  S   Arlen             Specter        (202)224-4254 (202)224-9029
PA 10   Joseph            McDade         (202)225-3731 (202)225-9594
PA 11   Paul              Kanjorski      (202)225-6511
PA 12   John P.           Murtha         (202)225-2065 (202)225-5709
PA 13   Lawrence          Coughlin       (202)225-6111 (202)225-1238
PA 14   William J.        Coyne          (202)225-2301
PA 15   Donald L.         Ritter         (202)225-6411 (202)225-5248
PA 16   Robert S.         Walker         (202)225-2411 (202)225-2484
PA 17   George            Gekas          (202)225-4315 (202)225-8440
PA 18   Rick              Santorum       (202)225-2135 (202)225-7747
PA 19   William           Goodling       (202)225-5836 (202)225-1000
PA 20   Joseph M.         Gaydos         (202)225-4631
PA 21   Thomas            Ridge          (202)225-5406 (202)225-1081
PA 22   Austin J.         Murphy         (202)225-4665 (202)225-4772
PA 23   William F.        Clinger        (202)225-5121 (202)225-4681
RI  1   Ronald K.         Machtley       (202)225-4911 (202)225-4417
RI  2   John F.           Reed           (202)225-2735 (202)225-9580
RI  S   John H.           Chafee         (202)224-2921 (202)224-0166
RI  S   Claiborne         Pell           (202)224-4642 (202)224-4680
SC  1   Arthur            Ravenel        (202)225-3176 (202)225-4340
SC  2   Floyd             Spence         (202)225-2452 (202)225-2455
SC  3   Butler            Derrick        (202)225-5301
SC  4   Elizabeth J.      Patterson      (202)225-6030 (202)225-7664
SC  5   John M.           Spratt         (202)225-5501 (202)225-0464
SC  6   Robin M.          Tallon         (202)225-3315 (202)225-2857
SC  S   Ernest F.         Hollings       (202)224-6121 (202)224-3573
SC  S   Strom             Thurmond       (202)224-5972 (202)224-1300
SD  1   Tim               Johnson        (202)225-2801 (202)225-2427
SD  S   Thomas            Daschle        (202)224-2321 (202)224-2047
SD  S   Larry             Pressler       (202)224-5842 (202)224-1630
TN  1   James H.          Quillen        (202)225-6356 (202)225-7812
TN  2   John J.           Duncan         (202)225-5435 (202)225-6440
TN  3   Marilyn           Lloyd          (202)225-3271 (202)225-6974
TN  4   Jim               Cooper         (202)225-6831 (202)225-4520
TN  5   Bob               Clement        (202)225-4311 (202)225-1035
TN  6   Bart              Gordon         (202)225-4231 (202)225-6887
TN  7   Don               Sundquist      (202)225-2811 (202)225-2814
TN  8   John S.           Tanner         (202)225-4714 (202)225-1765
TN  9   Harold E.         Ford           (202)225-3265 (202)225-9215
TN  S   Albert            Gore           (202)224-4944 (202)224-
TN  S   Jim               Sasser         (202)224-3344 (202)224-9590
TX  1   Jim               Chapman        (202)225-3035 (202)225-7265
TX  2   Charles           Wilson         (202)225-2401 (202)225-1764
TX  3   Sam               Johnson        (202)225-4201
TX  4   Ralph M.          Hall           (202)225-6673 (202)225-3332
TX  5   John              Bryant         (202)225-2231
TX  6   Joe               Barton         (202)225-2002 (202)225-3052
TX  7   Bill              Archer         (202)225-2571 (202)225-4381
TX  8   Jack              Fields         (202)225-4901 (202)225-6899
TX  9   Jack              Brooks         (202)225-6565 (202)225-1584
TX  S   Lloyd             Bentsen        (202)224-5922
TX  S   Phil              Gramm          (202)224-2934
TX 10   J. J.             Pickle         (202)225-4865 (202)225-1103
TX 11   Chet              Edwards        (202)225-6105 (202)225-0350
TX 12   Pete              Geren          (202)225-5071 (202)225-2786
TX 13   Bill              Sarpalius      (202)225-3706 (202)225-6142
TX 14   Greg              Laughlin       (202)225-2831 (202)225-1108
TX 15   E. (Kika)         De la Garza    (202)225-2531 (202)225-2534
TX 16   Ronald D.         Coleman        (202)225-4831
TX 17   Charles W.        Stenholm       (202)225-6605 (202)225-2234
TX 18   Craig             Washington     (202)225-3816
TX 19   Larry             Combest        (202)225-4005 (202)225-9615
TX 20   Henry             Gonzalez       (202)225-3236 (202)225-1915
TX 21   Lamar S.          Smith          (202)225-4236
TX 22   Thomas D.         DeLay          (202)225-5951
TX 23   Albert G.         Bustamante     (202)225-4511 (202)225-3849
TX 24   Martin            Frost          (202)225-3605 (202)225-4951
TX 25   Michael           Andrews        (202)225-7508 (202)225-4210
TX 26   Richard K.        Armey          (202)225-7772 (202)225-7614
TX 27   Solomon           Ortiz          (202)225-7742 (202)225-1134
US  -   George            Bush           (202)456-2168
UT  1   James V.          Hansen         (202)225-0453 (202)225-5857
UT  2   Wayne             Owens          (202)225-3011 (202)225-3524
UT  3   Bill              Orton          (202)225-7751 (202)225-1223
UT  S   Edwin (Jake)      Garn           (202)224-5444
UT  S   Orrin G.          Hatch          (202)224-5251 (202)224-6331
VA  1   Herbert           Bateman        (202)225-4261 (202)225-4382
VA  2   Owen B.           Pickett        (202)225-4215 (202)225-4218
VA  3   Thomas J.         Bliley         (202)225-2815
VA  4   Norman D.         Sisisky        (202)225-6365 (202)225-1170
VA  5   Lewis F.          Payne          (202)225-4711 (202)225-1147
VA  6   Jim               Olin           (202)225-5431 (202)225-9623
VA  7   D. French         Slaughter      (202)225-6561
VA  8   Jim               Moran          (202)225-4376 (202)225-0017
VA  9   Rick              Boucher        (202)225-3861
VA  S   John W.           Warner         (202)224-2023 (202)224-6295
VA  S   Charles           Robb           (202)224-4024 (202)224-8689
VA 10   Frank R.          Wolf           (202)225-5136 (202)225-0437
VT  1   Bernie            Sanders        (202)225-4115 (202)225-6790
VT  S   Patrick           Leahy          (202)224-4242
VT  S   Jim               Jeffords       (202)224-5141 (202)224-1507
WA  1   John R.           Miller         (202)225-6311 (202)225-0636
WA  2   Al                Swift          (202)225-2605
WA  3   Jolene            Unsoeld        (202)225-3536 (202)225-9095
WA  4   Sid               Morrison       (202)225-5816 (202)225-9293
WA  5   Thomas S.         Foley          (202)225-2006
WA  6   Norman D.         Dicks          (202)225-5916 (202)225-1176
WA  7   Jim               McDermott      (202)225-3106 (202)225-9212
WA  S   Slade             Gorton         (202)224-3441 (202)224-9393
WA  S   Brock             Adams          (202)224-2621 (202)224-0238
WA 8    Rod               Chandler       (202)-225-776
WI  1   Les               Aspin          (202)225-3031
WI  2   Scott             Klug           1202)225-2906 (202)225-6942
WI  3   Steve             Gunderson      (202)225-5506
WI  7   David             Obey           (202)225-3365
WI  8   Toby              Roth           (202)225-5665 (202)225-0087
WI  9   F. James          Sensenbrenner  (202)225-5101 (202)225-3190
WI  S   Herbert           Kohl           (202)224-5653 (202)224-9787
WI  S   Robert            Kasten         (202)224-5323 (202)224-7700
WV  1   Alan B.           Mollohan       (202)225-4172 (202)225-7564
WV  2   Harley O.         Staggers       (202)225-4172
WV  3   Robert            Wise           (202)225-2711
WV  4   Nick Joe          Rahall         (202)225-3452 (202)225-9061
WV  S   John D.           Rockefeller    (202)224-6472 (202)224-1689
WV  S   Robert C.         Byrd           (202)224-3954 (202)224-4025
WY  1   Craig             Thomas         (202)225-2311 (202)225-0726
WY  S   Alan K.           Simpson        (202)224-3424 (202)224-1315
WY  S   Malcolm           Wallop         (202)224-6441 (202)224-3230
 
8<------ Cut Here -----
 
Cheers.


Paul Ferguson               |  "Government, even in its best state,
Network Integrator          |   is but a necessary evil; in its worst
Centreville, Virginia USA   |   state, an intolerable one."
fergp@sytex.com             |      - Thomas Paine, Common Sense
 
         I love my country, but I fear its government.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Robert Minnis"  <MINNIS@cobaf.unt.edu>
Date: Tue, 20 Jul 93 15:34:25 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: FTP
Message-ID: <MAILQUEUE-101.930720173048.416@cobaf.unt.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I have just found out about this group and am interested in becoming
involved.  What do I need to know to be able to use the FTP site?

Robert Minnis
MINNIS@COBAF.UNT.EDU




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Karl Barrus <elee9sf@Menudo.UH.EDU>
Date: Tue, 20 Jul 93 17:09:27 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: subliminal messages
Message-ID: <199307210008.AA21142@Menudo.UH.EDU>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

Eric Hughes just told me some extremely interesting information
concerning subliminal channels and the DSS.  Apparently, the DSS is
very hospitable towards subliminal channels.  (I won't summarize
further since Eric may have posted to the list).

Again: a subliminal channel is a channel in which an external observer
is unaware of communication.  For example, two prisoners want to
communicate.  The warden agrees if the messages are plaintext.  The
prisoners agree if they can authenticate (digitally sign) the messages
- - after all, the warden may try to spoof them.  The warden agrees to
this arrangement (for instance, after reading up on digital signatures
in Denning's book, which doesn't cover subliminal channels!), allowing
the prisoners to embed their true communication in the digital
signature of their plaintext messages.

Before showing an example El Gamal subliminal channel, I'll briefly
describe El Gamal's authentication scheme (since most people are
familiar with or have heard of the RSA method only).  In El Gamal's
scheme (from Seberry and Pieprzyk's "Cryptography: an Introduction to
Computer Security"):

1) Alice chooses p a prime, g a primitive element of GF(p), r a random
   integer.  Loosely, g (being primitive) can be used to generate the
   rest of the field GF(p) by exponentiation.
2) Alice calculates K = g^r mod p
   Alice publishes (K,g,p) as the public key
3) a message M is authenticated by first choosing a second random
   integer r' such that r' and p-1 are relatively prime
   Alice computes X = g^r' mod p
   Alice solves M = rX + r'Y mod p-1 for Y
   Alice sends (M,X,Y) to B and keeps (r,r') secret
4) Bob can verify the message M by calculating A = K^X X^Y mod p and
   only accepts the message as authentic if and only if A = g^M mod p

The example in the book is (I'm not sitting at a NeXT at the moment,
the only place it's convenient for me to use Mathematica, or I'd use
some larger numbers):

Alice chooses p = 11, g = 2, r = 8
Alice computes K = g^r mod p = 2^8 mod 11 = 3
Thus (K,g,p) = (3,2,11)
Say the message is M = 5
Alice chooses r' = 9.  GCD(r',p-1) = 1, so they are relatively prime
Alice computes X = g^r' mod p = 2^9 mod 11 = 6
Alice solves M = rX + r'Y mod p-1 for Y
             5 = 8*6 + 9*Y mod 10; yeilding Y = 3
Alice sends out the triple (M,X,Y) = (5,6,3) to Bob.

Note: M can be read.

Bob now has (M,X,Y) = (5,6,3) and the public key (K,g,p) = (3,2,11)
Bob calculates A = K^X X^Y mod p = 3^6 6^3 mod 11 = 10
Bob calculates g^M mod p = 2^5 mod 11 = 10

So, since A = 10 and g^M mod p = 10, the message is valid.

Again, when I have a chance I'll plug in much larger numbers so you
don't think it all works out by coincidence.

In the El Gamal subliminal channel, somehow the random integer r is
known by both parties.  So Alice and Bob agree on a random r before
they ever find themselves in the position of using a subliminal
channel.  

1) Alice chooses p, g as before.  She chooses the r that she and Bob
   share.  She calculates K as before.
2) Alice calculates the subliminal message m, using a plaintext
   message M, by calculating X = g^m and solving the following equation
   for Y: M = rX + mY mod (p-1)
3) Alice send (M,X,Y) to Bob.
4) Bob receives (M,X,Y) and knows (p,g) which are public and the
   secret r he shares with Alice.
5) Bob calculates A = (g^r)^X X^Y mod p and accepts the message M as
   authentic if A = g^M mod p (as before in El Gamal authentication).
6) Now Bob extracts the subliminal message by computing
   m = Y^-1 (M - rX) mod (p-1)

As before, (K,g,p) = (3,2,11) is public.  r = 8 is the shared secret.
Alice wants to send m = 9, using the plaintext message M = 5
Alice computes X = g^m mod p = 2^9 mod 11 = 6
Alice solves 5 = 8*6 9Y mod 10 for Y; Y = 3
Alice sends (M,X,Y) = (5,6,3) to Bob.

Bob computes A = (2^8)^6 6^3 mod 11 = 10
Bob computes g^M mod p = 2^5 mod 11 = 10
These are equal, so Bob accepts the message.
Now, he extracts the subliminal message: m = Y^-1 (M - rX) mod (p-1)
  = 3^-1 (5 - 8*6) mod 10 = 9.

So, it is possible to communicate information with subliminal
channels.  A real life example where this could occur is with ham
radio operators.  Encrypted messages are illegal, but checksum message
can be transmitted, so the checksum can be modified to include a
subliminal message.  I'm just pointing this out for theoretical
interest - I know it's illegal!

Now, back to subliminal messages and the DSS.  Suppose the government
decides to authenticate the information on your driver's license with
DSS.  All sorts of information can be included subliminally, such as
an arrest record, number of speeding tickets, if the person in
question is suspicious, etc...


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.3

iQCVAgUBLEyIroOA7OpLWtYzAQE95gQAmrCoIB0lWTbBUOcayev0HvKUoAyz2dT4
FSbqi65oytE+EA2RhY9BHOFeRuA8yF97Dm+tTunOUYlA3CTlGRvmfxdA98TuGD7X
otmr0qVPJlAFsW7xqm8sJq09mozM+NMONwQJTOObaEr9UzPsgGeyGs4RVz3h29Qp
nvxCopYQy6A=
=4kzu
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: smb@research.att.com
Date: Tue, 20 Jul 93 17:54:25 PDT
To: Karl Barrus <elee9sf@Menudo.UH.EDU>
Subject: Re: subliminal messages
Message-ID: <9307210052.AA29937@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


	 Now, back to subliminal messages and the DSS.  Suppose the government
	 decides to authenticate the information on your driver's license with
	 DSS.  All sorts of information can be included subliminally, such as
	 an arrest record, number of speeding tickets, if the person in
	 question is suspicious, etc...

Or your Capstone keys, during certificate exchange.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Perry E. Metzger" <pmetzger@lehman.com>
Date: Tue, 20 Jul 93 18:19:25 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: subliminal messages
In-Reply-To: <199307210008.AA21142@Menudo.UH.EDU>
Message-ID: <9307210117.AA05181@snark.shearson.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Karl Barrus says:
> Eric Hughes just told me some extremely interesting information
> concerning subliminal channels and the DSS.  Apparently, the DSS is
> very hospitable towards subliminal channels.  (I won't summarize
> further since Eric may have posted to the list).

A very good posting, Karl, but I will note in the literature these are
called "covert" channels, not "subliminal" channels. Otherwise, really
top quality posting.

Perry




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: nobody@rosebud.ee.uh.edu
Date: Tue, 20 Jul 93 20:54:27 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Server for Anonymous-headers
Message-ID: <9307210353.AA02731@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----


from Henrik:
>2. Server for Anonymous-headers.
>
>My problem with anonymous-headers (that is reversed chains of PGP-encrypted
>adresses for remailers) are that they:
>
>         1) Are too big and ugly,
>         2) Needs common updates as remailers goes down.
>
>Therefor, wouldn't it be nice with servers like the public-keys servers where
>you could request the latest header for a pseudonym?
>
>Maybe even be able to mail directly to that server with pseudonym@server...
>and get the mail redirected to 'pseudonym'?

Great idea!

In the meantime, I put my encrypted return address in my public key and put
them both on the existing servers. I put each line of the return address
into an 'id' of my key, so that with a little editing the return address
can be reassembled. Unfortunately, this will not work in the future,
because new revisions of PGP will not guarantee that the order of id's is
well defined.  Even then, I could number the id's. 

If PGP was totally bulletproof, it could handle carriage returns within a
single id, or at least an id long enough to contain a return address with
the carriage returns replaced with markers. PGP 2.2 bombs if you paste too
long a sting into an id field.

Eternal Optimist
7/20/93

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.3

iQCVAgUBLEx5B4jvfLxJbYYtAQFmqAP9ErPHDKg1qN99knL2OmTOG9F2hje2HW6O
7YAL0kcYFXqQWpYoahxV84uRPjoKRjIcR0rsNyqB7AauQR3RwaPidXcFtY0Q0scv
04y7Zli97R+Ww2XjaLOsjUWjWhROo8uBpgLDREndUNFekrDNNYSJRffELMvA09h/
eWOOaMhaNks=
=SFGh
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Stanton McCandlish <anton@hydra.unm.edu>
Date: Tue, 20 Jul 93 22:14:28 PDT
To: leide871@uidaho.edu
Subject: Re: Addresses of your site and Aql?
In-Reply-To: <Pine.3.02.9307202003.A18522-b100000@crow.csrv.uidaho.edu>
Message-ID: <9307210512.AA16808@hydra.unm.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


People keep asking me for site addresses for PGP, so I figured it would be
more sensible to post this so everyone gets it.  There are of course many
more; these are just my "site", sites I know that have a large archive of
crypto files, and sites that get new releases of PGP almost instantly.

NitV-BBS +1-505-246-8515 N-8-2 1200-14000bps v32[b] v42[b] 24hr
soda.berkeley.edu  /pub/cypherpunks  mucho crypto
aql.gatech.edu  /pub/cypherpunks  many different platform Unix PGP execs
scr.doc.ic.ac.uk     gets new stuff quick
ghost.dsi.unimi.it         ditto


Hope that helps.  :)

-- 
Stanton  McCandlish   * Space Migration * Networking * ChaOrder * NO GOV'T. *
anton@hydra.unm.edu   * Intelligence Increase * Nano * Crypto * NO RELIGION *
FidoNet:    1:301/2   * Life Extension * Ethics * VR * Now! * NO MORE LIES! *
Noise in the Void BBS * +1-505-246-8515   (24hr, 1200-14400, v32bis, N-8-1) *



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: ""L. Detweiler"" <ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Date: Tue, 20 Jul 93 22:24:28 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: FBI credit record inquiry proposal
Message-ID: <9307210523.AA15381@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Gosh, weren't we just talking about the suspension of requirement for
warrants in cases of `national security'? Below the FBI is posturing to
get access to credit records of `spies and terrorists' by writing only
a letter instead of the currently required warrant.

The FBI really scares me with the nonchalance and finesse with which
they keep introducing these unpleasant bills into Congress.

===cut=here===

From: kaplan@sol1.lrsm.upenn.edu (Peter Kaplan -Yodh)
Newsgroups: alt.privacy
Subject: ALERT.  New law on FBI and Credit Records
Keywords: Credit records, privacy, FBI, suspected "spies and terrorists."
Message-ID: <136431@netnews.upenn.edu>
Date: 17 Jul 93 16:42:33 GMT
Sender: news@netnews.upenn.edu
Followup-To: alt.privacy
Organization: /etc/organization
Lines: 14
Nntp-Posting-Host: sol1.lrsm.upenn.edu

On page 7 of today's New York Times (_Saturday_, July 17) there is
a short article about the nation's inflated intelligence budget.

Buried in the article are two paragraphs describing another section of
the intelligence funding bill.  Tacked onto the bill is a provision to
allow the FBI to access the credit records of suspected "spies and
terrorists" by writing a letter rather than getting a search warrant
or other court order.

Your credit card bills and mortgage payments are rapidly becoming
police information.


- - --Peter (kaplan@sol1.lrsm.upenn.edu)






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: J. Michael Diehl <mdiehl@vesta.unm.edu>
Date: Tue, 20 Jul 93 22:45:45 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: People's rights????
Message-ID: <9307210544.AA12040@vesta.unm.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


     This isn't actually, crypto-related, but it does relate to privacy. 
The other day, I was watching COPS on TV. (No flames, please)  They showed a
segment where the LEA had received complaints about the conditions in which
some children were living.  They were poor and living in a trailer.  So the
cop knocks on the door and the father answers.  THE COP STEPS INSIDE, SAYS,
"WE'VE HAD SOME COMPLAINTS.....AND I NEED TO TAKE A LOOK AROUND!"  The cop
then went through the people's living quarters!  Then the cop decided that
he was a child-care expert and that the conditions were not fit for the
children to live in.  SO THE COP TOOK THE CHILDREN AWAY.
 
     Now this scares the shit out of me.  Did this cop have the right to
just walk in and search the place based on a complaint?  Why didn't the man
know to ask for a warrent?  Was this cop trained as a social worker?  Is it
now possible to be so poor that the stat won't let you keep your children? 
Now don't get me wrong, I'm not a weep-for-the-poor-liberal; I'm very
conservative.  But don't these poor people have rights?  
 
     Does anyone know if there is a news-list devoted to people's rights? 
Thanx for letting me vent my rage!  Laters
 
+-----------------------+-----------------------------+---------+
| J. Michael Diehl ;-)  | I thought I was wrong once. | PGP KEY |
| mdiehl@triton.unm.edu |   But, I was mistaken.      |available|
| mike.diehl@fido.org   |                             | Ask Me! |
| (505) 299-2282        +-----------------------------+---------+
|                                                               |
+------"I'm just looking for the opportunity to be -------------+
|            Politically Incorrect!"   <Me>                     |
+-----If codes are outlawed, only criminals wil have codes.-----+
+----Is Big Brother in your phone?  If you don't know, ask me---+




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: cdodhner@indirect.com (Christian D. Odhner)
Date: Tue, 20 Jul 93 23:49:29 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Thoughts on remailers
Message-ID: <9307210647.AA13445@indirect.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I have recently encountered a situation (ongoing in the newsgroup
alt.zines) in which some person has been sending a woman harassment mail
and threats, etc in an anonymous manner. She has tried to put his name on
her kill list, but he uses a different ID each message. I assume that he
is telneting to the mail port, so analysis of the message headers will
show what system the message is from. I will be happy as soon as she can
kill all his messages and ignore him. But during conversation with her, I
mentioned that it was a good thing he wasn't useing a cypherpunk remailer,
else we would never be able to identify the source. She responded with the
comment that she could just kill all messages incoming from the remailers
and be done with it if that were the case, which gets me thinking...
The remailers are perfect for those who would harrass and abuse others.
Freedom of speech with 0 responsibility, etc. They are also good for many
other things, and the amount of junk mail going through them must be FAR
less than the usefull traffic, however we all have seen or heard about
what a few obnoxious people can do. The problem I forsee is that junk
mailers and porno-grams like the ones I've been dealing with this week
will start using our remailers as their method of choice, and once word
gets around of that, many, many people could put all the remailers in
thier kill lists, thinking "Why would anybody need to send ME anonymous
mail?", and the effectiveness of the remailers would be drasticly reduced.
Then again, maybe it won't be a problem. I'm realy not sure, but it's
worth a little thought.

Happy Hunting, -Chris Odhner





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: ""L. Detweiler"" <ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Date: Tue, 20 Jul 93 23:09:28 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Anonymous server encryption
In-Reply-To: <199307191135.AA05425@castafiore.cd.chalmers.se>
Message-ID: <9307210608.AA15937@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


faust@cd.chalmers.se brings up some interesting points about remailer
encryption, suggesting the capability to re-encrypt a message at the
remailer point instead of a-prior by the sender. This was proposed to
allow replies to a anonymous user to be encrypted using that user's
public key, avoiding the problem of the final message being transmitted
in cleartext.

The sophisticated server run by D. Clunie around December for a few
months allowed exactly this basic and valuable capability, and so far
has been unmatched. In his system the user sent messages to the server
encoded by the server's public key. Replies to the user through the
server were first encrypted with that user's public key before being
transmitted. This means that security at the remailer-to-`nym' is
protected even if respondents do not encode their messages first. 
Despite being fairly simple to implement (esp. with the availability of
PGP) this is not yet available on anon.penet.fi. J. Helsingius has
repeatedly reaffirmed his intent to put the feature in a New & Improved
Mark II server due sometime in the fall.

I've also suggested some improvements to anonymous servers. In
particular, I would like to see a sophisticated `nym-management' scheme
whereby the user can allocate, redirect, and deallocate addresses at
will. Such flexibility and versatility allows many other neat
unforeseen uses of the anonymous server. For example, many sysadmins
are in the habit of creating new email ID's for each new query posted
on Usenet to aid in organizing simultaneous queries. With
nym-management a user could do this as well. The user could also
receive mailing lists at different addresses. This would be useful
under a very radical new capability: local archives. In fact, the
transition from anonymous servers to personal rented file spaces may be
automatic and seamless in the future.

Unfortunately, while there's been a modest proliferation of cypherpunk
remailers, and quite a bit of general interest (the recent summer
Usenix anonymity conference was attended by a few hundred, see
comp.org.usenix), the only server allowing anonymous responses is still
Helsingius's anon.penet.fi. (I've not heard a lot about Kleinpaste's.)
It seems to me this is an extreme weakness in cyberspace at the moment.
When his server went down recently for a few days (from 90 degree
weather, damage to the system board) many people were `stranded'. In
fact, the only link between a lot of people and their correspondents is
that server and its nym-to-address database mapping file, and if
anything happened to either many would be disconsolate at minimum.

I suspect operators are reluctant to run a `full-fledged' anonymous
server because of all the cyberspatial politics & hassle involved for
virtually no personal benefit and serious drain on personal time,
finances, and cycles. When someone sets up an FTP site they at least
are creating a sort of personal library and BBS for perusal. But the
anonymous server operator actually is ethically restricted from
completely perusing the data spawned by his creation. Hopefully the
field will change when there are economic incentives to run an
anonymous server. For now we will have to rely on selfless heroes and
paternalistic voyeurs. I'll leave it to the reader to sort them out.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Date: Wed, 21 Jul 93 00:14:29 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: subliminal messages
Message-ID: <9307210712.AA11086@netcom.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Here's my minor correction of Perry Metzger's minor correction:

>Karl Barrus says:
>> Eric Hughes just told me some extremely interesting information
>> concerning subliminal channels and the DSS.  Apparently, the DSS is
>> very hospitable towards subliminal channels.  (I won't summarize
>> further since Eric may have posted to the list).
>
>A very good posting, Karl, but I will note in the literature these are
>called "covert" channels, not "subliminal" channels. Otherwise, really
>top quality posting.
>
>Perry

Yvo Desmedt gave a very nice paper at the Crypto '88 conference, which I
attented, entitled "Abuses in Cryptography and How to Fight Them."

He begins:

"[Sim83b] introduced the notion of subliminal channel. His example is
related to two prisoners who are communicating authenticated messages in
full view of a warden who is able to read the messages. The subliminal
consists in hiding a message _through_ the authentication scheme such that
the warden _cannot detect its use nor read the hidden part_."

Later he writes:

"Abuses (in particular subliminal channels) are not covert channels in the
strict way, as will briefly be discussed in Section 2.2."


Covert channels usually refer to using "out of band" techniques, such as
signal crosstalk, time-jitter, amplitude modulation, etc., to pass
information (e.g., to leak bits out of a classified computer facility),
whereas subliminal channels rely on the crypto protocols. (I suppose the
Clipper could use either or both, or could be rigged that way.)

I've heard people use the term "covert channel" in a broader sense,
encompasssing the subliminal channel term coined by Simmons as well as the
tradional covert channel, but certainly the term "subliminal channel" is
not incorrect as used by Karl. ("Covert" may be more descriptive than
"subliminal," though such is life.)

I'll leave the rest of the discussion for interested readers. "Advances in
Cryptology--CRYPTO '88," ed. S. Goldwasser, Springer-Verlag, 1990.

By the way, Desmedt's paper argues persuasively that "abuse-free
cryptography" overcomes the objections to public key crypto that terrorists
and others bad folks will be able to pass subliminal messages. If the
weaknesses mentioned by Eric Hughes and Karl Barrus are confirmed, this
could be another point of attack against Clipper.

Like Perry, I enjoyed Karl's summary.


-Tim May
--
Timothy C. May         | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,  
tcmay@netcom.com       | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
408-688-5409           | knowledge, reputations, information markets, 
W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA  | black markets, collapse of governments.
Higher Power: 2^756839 | Public Key: by arrangement
Note: I put time and money into writing this posting. I hope you enjoy it.      







From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: ""L. Detweiler"" <ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Date: Wed, 21 Jul 93 00:15:45 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Weaver/BATF trial
Message-ID: <9307210712.AA16784@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


The Washington Post portrayal posted courtesy of P. Ferguson is beyond
deeply disturbing, and borders on the horrifyingly shocking.
Particularly the sniper aim on Weaver's wife--around her children!--I
found brutally, heinously barbarian. One wonders if law enforcement is
composed of responsible servants or maurading mercenaries. I'm really
stunned not to see any reaction in the popular press so far to this
editorial, but I suspect it won't sow ripples but hurtle shearing
shockwaves through the media for years to come.

However, perhaps just a few weeks have passed since T.C. May admonished
and chastised various members for `demonizing' opponents, and then
posts a few statements as follows (the sheer bluntness reminds me of
the long-dead cries of Murderous Thug on this list, and I feel
compelled to respond by blunting the mad, chaotic, rambling, and
unfocused shooting):

>The killing of that Fed in Idaho was fully justified, as the jury just
>confirmed.
>The BATF, DEA, Marshal's Service, and their kind have essentially
>become a Gestapo-like band of secret police. They raid homes without
>proper warrants (Phil Karn has told us of the San Diego case), they
>entrap innocents, they use high tech satellite imagery to locate plots
>of land they want for various purposes and then trump up charges (the
>Oxnard-Santa Monica case where the County wanted a guy's land and then
>drew up drug charges, raided him, and killed him...no drugs were
>found), and they seize computers and modems of folks like Steve
>Jackson without bothering to do their homework.

Killing justified? Gestapo-like band of secret police? Yeeks. First of
all, please resist the temptation to tar a vast number of law
enforcement agents with the same brush under the polarizing heading
`they'. It is more dangerous to see enemies everywhere than only
somewhere (hm, I think the inspiration for that quote came from your
own words). Unless they all showed up at an annual Loot & Pillage
Conference and traded techniques and swapped success stories, my
suspicions wouldn't be aroused.  But as it stands your paragraph starts
out with the explosion of `Gestapo band of secret police' and ends with
a limp whine of `without bothering to do their homework'.

As it stands, there is actually a bit of hostility between different
law enforcement branches (best documented, I think, in Hacker Crackdown
by Sterling, as in FBI vs. local police forces). This animosity
prevents the various groups from wholeheartedly colluding, for which we
can be ecstatically thankful for. Yes, the individual agencies are
extremely dangerous in some of their recent actions, but this is more
adequately explained in terms of local stupidity and imperialism than
global malice and conspiracy.  Ah, but the most dangerous call comes next:

>And perhaps their next target will be "crypto-terrorists" like us.
>After all, many of us advocate overthrowing the fascist/socialist
>government (I know I do, and many of you do, too), and many of us
>believe strong crypto is the key ingredient for bypassing tax systems,
>for trading weapons technology details with others (how long before
>some of us are charged with aiding and abetting the enemy?), and for
>creating a transnational cyberspace.

Uhm, I think if law enforcement officials were at all alarmed by our
presence we would have encountered rather obvious signs by now. But
look how little interference has been erected in front of
cypherpunkesque adventurism. Cypherpunk remailers have only gone down
for extremely mundane reasons.  A rather feeble letter was sent to the
operator of soda.berkeley.edu suggesting in the most delicate terms
that something might be amiss (for which there was great ensuing
fireworks, our nervous-edgy heavy barrage of artillery and cannons
aimed at a wandering rabbit).  *Nothing* has come of the Mycotronx
postings like a Tianamen Square tank-rolling clampdown massacre
response by the Establishment. We don't even have the whimper of a
single misguided officer pursuing a lone local vigilante justice
revenge power trip. We got spectacular coverage in Wired and the New
York Times and not even a sneeze from a real red-blooded shifty-eyed Enemy in Black.

>The Feds must surely come to see us as the enemy.

The `Feds' are actually numerous and disparate agencies, have created
their own realities that they live in, and so far have almost,
apparently, *completely* ignored the Cacaphony of the Cypherpunks.

I believe the situation is that the pillars we are targeting most
directly (e.g. the NSA, FBI) are precisely those that are most limited
in meeting and engaging us on our terms of warfare of a
public-relations campaign. When they say anything in the media they
sound absolutely ridiculous -- the FBI with their `a lot of dead bodies
lying around' and `cryptography as nitroglycerin,' Denning's `I'm not
sure if people should be informed' come to mind.  Their clandestine
preference is our strongest asset. We can advance by being loud and
obnoxious and they cannot (a sort of Perotian-Clintonian relationship).
So far I think we have exercised it effectively, galliantly, and
perhaps even superbly. But as soon as we make statements that bespeak
fanatic paranoia and dangerous and polarizing rhetorical posturing we
will be swiftly discredited or hammered.

>We need to be as prepared as Randy Weaver was!

This is a rather irresponsible and dangerous sentiment and metaphor. I
urge you to reconsider. Which cypherpunks are volunteering to barricade
themselves from the police in their houses?  To defy some court
proceedings because of `distrust' of the prosecution? To arm their
children with rifles for `defense'? Mr. Weaver was apparently subject
to the most grave miscarriage of law enforcement in many years, perhaps
only second to the Waco massacre in recent history if reported elements
of the recent story hold up. But the fact remains that he refused to go
to court and completely defied *our* `system' that has been erected to
defend the innocent. He managed to delay going to court by a few months
with absolutely disastrous and horrible payment.

In fact, one could argue quite convincingly that Weaver was very
clearly a victim of his own paranoia. If he had trusted the courts to
minimize his plight the gruesome horror show might have been averted.
Perhaps not. But are we cypherpunks now going to take on the American
Judicial System? Dissolute focus means dissolute energy.

Finally, I would like to take up the question of the Weaver Debacle in
relation to the nation's media. First, anything this horrendous takes
*years* to penetrate and percolate through the American consciousness
and media, so we should be patient.  It is like the trickle of Chinese
water torture--one can go insane in the process. The fallout from the
Steve Jackson games case has taken that long. (This is not to
discourage public relations but to encourage it.)  Secondly, the
American public is actually firmly supportive of some of these bloody
miscarriages. For example, Reno's approval/popularity soared after her
public post-Waco culpability speeches. That is, we have met the enemy,
and he is us. We *must* change American attitudes if we are to thwart
future egregious law enforcement violations. And in this quest I think
there is nothing but grave pallor in elevating Weaver as an epitomizing
icon of our cause.





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: b44729@achilles.ctd.anl.gov (Samuel Pigg)
Date: Wed, 21 Jul 93 05:00:54 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Chicago area cypherpunks?
Message-ID: <9307211159.AA06461@achilles.ctd.anl.gov>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Is there a Chicago area cypherpunks group/meeting time/place?
(or have I just not been paying attention..?)
-Sam




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: peter honeyman <honey@citi.umich.edu>
Date: Wed, 21 Jul 93 05:41:08 PDT
To: cdodhner@indirect.com
Subject: Re:  Thoughts on remailers
Message-ID: <9307211241.AA08938@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


pay phones and postal mail are also "perfect for those who would harrass and abuse others."

	peter




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: <hughes@toad.com>
Date: Wed, 21 Jul 93 17:09:46 PDT
To: cypherpunks@indigo.mese.com
Subject: No Subject
In-Reply-To: <0096FD31.CFAACAE0.23924@INDIGO.MESE.COM>
Message-ID: <9307211608.AA14922@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


You have been added to the cypherpunks mailing list.

The cypherpunks list is a forum for discussing personal defenses for
privacy in the digital domain.  It is a high volume mailing list.  If
you want to be added or removed from the list, send mail to

	cypherpunks-request@toad.com

There is no automated list processing software; a human (me, Eric
Hughes) will read your message and take the appropriate action.  If
you get two of these welcome messages, it likely means you've double
subscribed and will have trouble getting off the list.  Send mail to
the above address and tell me if this happens.

Do not expect instant turnaround.  Remember, a human is looking at
your requests, not a program.  I try to do list maintenance every
other day or so, but sometimes the delays are longer.

Do not mail to the whole list asking to be removed.  You'll just get
the members of the list thinking you're a newbie and you'll get a note
from me telling you to send mail the the -request address.

If your mail bounces repeatedly, you will be removed from the list.
Nothing personal, but I have to look at all the bounce messages.

There is no digest version available.

There is an announcements list which is moderated and has low volume.
Announcements for physical cypherpunks meetings, new software and
important developments will be posted there.  Mail to

	cypherpunks-announce-request@toad.com

if you want to be added or removed to the announce list.  All
announcements also go out to the full cypherpunks list, so there is no
need to subscribe to both.

There is an ftp site for cypherpunks.  It is

	soda.berkeley.edu:pub/cypherpunks

This site contains code, information, rants, and other miscellany.
There is a glossary there that all new members should download and
read.  Also recommended for all users are Hal Finney's instructions on
how to use the anonymous remailer system; the remailer sources are
there for the perl-literate.

Enjoy and deploy.

Eric

-----------------------------------------------------------------------------

Cypherpunks assume privacy is a good thing and wish there were more
of it.  Cypherpunks acknowledge that those who want privacy must
create it for themselves and not expect governments, corporations, or
other large, faceless organizations to grant them privacy out of
beneficence.  Cypherpunks know that people have been creating their
own privacy for centuries with whispers, envelopes, closed doors, and
couriers.  Cypherpunks do not seek to prevent other people from
speaking about their experiences or their opinions.

The most important means to the defense of privacy is encryption. To
encrypt is to indicate the desire for privacy.  But to encrypt with
weak cryptography is to indicate not too much desire for privacy.
Cypherpunks hope that all people desiring privacy will learn how best
to defend it.

Cypherpunks are therefore devoted to cryptography.  Cypherpunks wish
to learn about it, to teach it, to implement it, and to make more of
it.  Cypherpunks know that cryptographic protocols make social
structures.  Cypherpunks know how to attack a system and how to
defend it.  Cypherpunks know just how hard it is to make good
cryptosystems.

Cypherpunks love to practice.  They love to play with public key
cryptography.  They love to play with anonymous and pseudonymous mail
forwarding and delivery.  They love to play with DC-nets.  They love
to play with secure communications of all kinds.

Cypherpunks write code.  They know that someone has to write code to
defend privacy, and since it's their privacy, they're going to write
it.  Cypherpunks publish their code so that their fellow cypherpunks
may practice and play with it.  Cypherpunks realize that security is
not built in a day and are patient with incremental progress.

Cypherpunks don't care if you don't like the software they write.
Cypherpunks know that software can't be destroyed.  Cypherpunks know
that a widely dispersed system can't be shut down.

Cypherpunks will make the networks safe for privacy.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Karl Barrus <elee9sf@Menudo.UH.EDU>
Date: Wed, 21 Jul 93 08:09:41 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: ANON: remail abuse
Message-ID: <199307211508.AA17766@Menudo.UH.EDU>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Earlier, Chris Odner brought up some concerns about abusing anonymous
remailers.  (I deleted the message before saving it, so I can't quote
from it).

He mentioned his friend is getting abusive mail, probably from telnet to
the smtp port, and then mentions the "remailers are perfect for those
who would harrass and abuse others."  Wait a second... here is an
example of harrassment right now, without anything to do with the
remailers!  I mean, if you want to really hassle somebody, you could
just wait patiently until someone leaves their machine for a few seconds
and type

sh (or ksh)
while true 
do
uuencode /vmunix irritate | mail somebody@somewhere
done

followed with a

clear

and then leave quickly.

I guess I'm one of those people who would get upset and blame the person
responsible for the action instead of software and/or technological
advancement for possible providing a means.

As Peter mentioned, payphones are already perfect for harrassment.  So
is junk mail... and the crucial thing here is these services cost money.
I'm sure future remailers will incorporate digital cash and be a
pay-for-each-remail service.

Chris also mentions concers about distributing porn and stuff like that
through remailers.  I guess this could be done, but why give up the
speed and convenience of ftp, fsp, irc (dcc), and usenet posting?  These
services distribute files faster and further than remailing.

/-----------------------------------\
| Karl L. Barrus                    |
| elee9sf@menudo.uh.edu             | <- preferred address
| barrus@tree.egr.uh.edu (NeXTMail) |
\-----------------------------------/




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Date: Wed, 21 Jul 93 11:34:42 PDT
To: Cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Subliminal Channels in the Digital Signature Algorithm (DSA)
Message-ID: <9307211832.AA01087@netcom.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



The recent discussion of possible subliminal channels (which some call
covert channels) in the DSA reminds me of a preprint of a paper I received
several months back with a rather mysterious note attached to it. There was
no return address on the envelope. Apparently a number of Cypherpunks and
folks active in the sci.crypt community also received it, as it came up on
sci.crypt and we talked about it at a physical Cypherpunks meeting.

The note read:

"This needs to be made very public. Simmons resigned from Sandia over
writing it."

Some caveats:

* this allegation that Gus Simmons left Sandia was denied by several folks
on sci.crypt who actually _know_ Simmons. I don't know him, so I haven't
checked directly.

* some say this paper is hardly earth-shaking, though the possibility of
subliminal channels should be taken seriously, especially in light of the
cross-licensing of DSA/DSS with Public Key Partners (RSA Data, etc.).

* I don't even know where this paper is being published--the preprint gave
no clues. The timing of my getting it, several months back, suggests this
year's Crypto Conference. The advance program ought to have it (I can't
find my copy).

I've OCRed the first page or so, including the Abstract. Too many OCR
errors and too many equations with Greek symbols for me to scan-in the
entire 20-page paper.

The implications for Clipper, Capstone, Skipjack, etc. I'll leave for now.


Here it is:



The Subliminal Channels in the U.S. Digital Signature Algorithm (DSA)

    Gustavus J. Simmons
Sandia Park. NM 87047. USA

Abstract

    Since the DSA is derivative from El Gamal's digital signature
scheme--which Simmons showed in 1985 permitted a subliminal channel--it
should come as no surprise that the DSA also permits a similar channel. The
subliminal channel in the El Gamal scheme, however, had several
shortcomings. In order for the subliminal receiver to be able to recover
the subliminal message, it was necessary for him to know the transmitter's
secret key.  This meant that the subliminal receiver had the capability to
utter undetectable forgeries of the transmitter's signature.  Also, only a
subset of the desired message set could be communicated subliminally (phi
(p-l) messages instead of p-1) and some of those that could be transmitted
were computationally infeasible for the subliminal receiver to recover.

    The subliminal channels in the DSA avoid all of these difficulties! In
fairness, it should be mentioned that not all are avoided at the same time.
The channel in the DSA analogous to the one Simmons demonstrated in the El
Gamal scheme can communicate messages conveying the full log-base-2  |X|
bits, where  X is the set of session keys; all of which are easily
recovered by the subliminal receiver.  However, this broadband channel
still requires the subliminal receiver to know the transmitter's secret
key. There are two other narrowband (<< 1og-base-2  |X|) subliminal
channels in the DSA that do not give the subliminal receiver any better
chance of forging the transmitter's signature than an outsider has. The
price one pays for this integrity for the transmitter's signature is a
reduced bandwidth for the subliminal channel and a difficult but feasible
(dependent on the bandwidth actually used) amount of computation needed to
use the channel. Two quite different such channels have been devised:  one
places the computational load almost entirely on the transmitter, the other
almost entirely on the subliminal receiver.  Since the total computation is
essentially the same in either case, the choice of a particular channel
would be based on which end is best equipped to do the necessary
computation.

    To make clear what a remarkable coincidence it is that the apparently
inherent shortcomings of subliminal channels using the El Gamal scheme can
all be overcome in the DSA, we will analyze each of the channels
implemented in both schemes. The inescapable conclusion, though, is that
the DSA provides-the most hospitable setting for subliminal communications
discovered to date.

Introduction

    In  1983  Simmons  introduced   the  notion  of  a  subliminal  channel
 existing  in an  encrypted  communication  channel  by  pointing  out  
that  if  for  each  plaintext there  existed  two  or  more  corresponding
 cipher  texts,  the  identity  of  the  cipher used   to  communicate  a 
plaintext  could  convey  information  additional  to   that revealed  by 
the  decryptlon  of   the  cipher  [5].   In  particular,  in  a 
public-key based  authentication  scheme  in  which  the  decryption  key  
must  be  public  information  in  order  for  public  receivers  to  be 
able  to  decrypt  cipher  texts  and  verify the   authenticity   of   the
  encrypted  plaintext,   this   raised   the   possibility   of there 
also  being  subliminal  receivers  who  could  recover  information 
hidden  from the public receivers: hence the name of a subliminal channel.
Clearly subliminal channel receivers must have private information not
known to public receivers--and as we will see, the nature of this private
information provides a natural classification for subliminal channels.



(rest of paper not OCRed...too many errors (blurred fonts), too many equations)







From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Brian D Williams <talon57@well.sf.ca.us>
Date: Wed, 21 Jul 93 11:51:14 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: chicago area cypherpunks
Message-ID: <93Jul21.115018pdt.14097-1@well.sf.ca.us>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain




Samuel Pigg posts:


>Is there a Chicago area cypherpunks group/meeting time/place?
>(or have I just not been paying attention..?)


 There is no current group/meeting that I know of, but we could start one (
don't let the well.sf.ca.us fool you, I work in Downtown Chicago) any other
Chicago area cypherpunks?



                                             Brian Williams




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Marc Horowitz <marc@GZA.COM>
Date: Wed, 21 Jul 93 08:59:40 PDT
To: peter honeyman <honey@citi.umich.edu>
Subject: Re: Thoughts on remailers
In-Reply-To: <9307211241.AA08938@toad.com>
Message-ID: <9307211558.AA14701@dun-dun-noodles.aktis.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>> pay phones and postal mail are also "perfect for those who would
>> harrass and abuse others."

Both of those cost money.  If anonymous remailers cost a dime of
anonymous digital cash to use, people wouldn't use them quite as
often.  There would still be abuse, but random chronic abuse would be
much less.  Of course, if it cost money, people might not use them
when it was really necessary.  Not much can be done about that.

		Marc




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: gdale@apple.com (Geoff Dale)
Date: Wed, 21 Jul 93 12:19:42 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Encrypted data across international lines
Message-ID: <9307211916.AA25115@apple.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Does anybody have pointers to the actual statutes prohibiting transmitting
encrypted data across international boundries.

I had an argument with somebody who didn't think this was illegal.

I'm pretty sure you need special permits (export licenses??) for this.
_________________________________________________________________________
Geoff Dale     -- insert standard disclaimers here --     gdale@apple.com
                       -- How am I posting? --
To comment on this Apple Employee's posting etiquette call 1-800-373-9821





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Peter Wayner <pcw@access.digex.net>
Date: Wed, 21 Jul 93 09:30:54 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Remailers/PayPhones and Today's NYT
Message-ID: <199307211630.AA03454@access.digex.net>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Today's NYT has an article on PayPhone salons that
offer phone booths to their customers. They buy the
long distance connection in bulk and resell them
to the customers so the customer doesn't have to
pay the high payphone charge. They're quite common
in poor sections of town.

The article mentions that the phones can be problematic
because drug dealers can use them to avoid phone taps,
but it seems to conclude that this is a small price to
pay for bringing the connection to the poor. Most customers
use the service to call their home country and speak to
relatives. 

I thought it was interesting that the danger of untraceable
drug dealers popped into the reporters mind when they were
researching the article. After all, they don't tend to 
mention illegal problems when they speak about used car dealers
or other services. 

-Peter




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Eli Brandt <ebrandt@jarthur.Claremont.EDU>
Date: Wed, 21 Jul 93 12:54:42 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: subliminal messages
In-Reply-To: <9307210117.AA05181@snark.shearson.com>
Message-ID: <9307211953.AA16773@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> A very good posting, Karl, but I will note in the literature these are
> called "covert" channels, not "subliminal" channels.

Covert channels are signaling techniques which bypass secrecy
classification, right?  e.g. twiddling with free disk and other
system parameters.  Passing messages in digital signatures, which
I've always seen called "subliminal channels", could of course be
used as a covert channel if the OS permits signatures on material
accessible to lower-classification folk.

> Perry

   Eli   ebrandt@jarthur.claremont.edu




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: mbl@mail.msen.com (Matthew B Landry)
Date: Wed, 21 Jul 93 10:34:42 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Congressional contacts list
Message-ID: <m0oIi14-000EbyC@garnet.msen.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


	Just thought I ought to let you know... Carl Pursell (R-MI) is
gone. I know because I worked on his opponent's campaign. You might want
to advise the source of the list about that. (There are most likely more,
but I don't know about them personally.)
-- 
Matthew B. Landry                        | mbl@mail.msen.com
President of Project SAVE		 | (313)971-5469 (H/W)
My opinions are my most prized posession. I don't share them.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: cdodhner@indirect.com (Christian D. Odhner)
Date: Wed, 21 Jul 93 13:39:44 PDT
To: elee9sf@Menudo.UH.EDU (Karl Barrus)
Subject: Re: ANON: remail abuse
In-Reply-To: <199307211508.AA17766@Menudo.UH.EDU>
Message-ID: <9307212036.AA17170@indirect.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> I guess I'm one of those people who would get upset and blame the person
> responsible for the action instead of software and/or technological
> advancement for possible providing a means.

I'm sorry, maybe I didn't make myself clear enough. I also am blameing the
person, not the technology, and I am merely worried about the response
people may use if this becomes more commonplace.

> As Peter mentioned, payphones are already perfect for harrassment.  So
> is junk mail... and the crucial thing here is these services cost money.
> I'm sure future remailers will incorporate digital cash and be a
> pay-for-each-remail service.

I'm sure that would be a big help, although I'm not literate enough yet in
the area of digital cash to understand how this would work.

> Chris also mentions concers about distributing porn and stuff like that
> through remailers.  I guess this could be done, but why give up the

I'm not concerned in particular with porn etc, that just happens to be the
problem in this instance.



> /-----------------------------------\
> | Karl L. Barrus                    |
> | elee9sf@menudo.uh.edu             | <- preferred address
> | barrus@tree.egr.uh.edu (NeXTMail) |
> \-----------------------------------/
> 

Happy Hunting, -Chris Odhner
<cdodhner@indirect.com>




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: boojum!esr@gvls1.VFL.Paramax.COM (Eric S. Raymond)
Date: Wed, 21 Jul 93 16:09:44 PDT
To: boojum!cypherpunks
Subject: FAQ, round 2
Message-ID: <m0oIiVK-000BQZC@boojum.uucp>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I've written some more material for it.  Criticisms and additions
welcome.

--- DRAFT VERSION ---- DRAFT VERSION ---- DRAFT VERSION ---- DRAFT VERSION ---
From: esr@snark.thyrsus.com (Eric S. Raymond)
Newsgroups: news.answers
Followup-To: poster

This is the Cypherpunks FAQ.  It explains the projects and purposes of the
Cypherpunks mailing list.  It is also intended to serve as a general
introduction to privacy and encryption issues.

For details on the technical and theoretical aspects of computer cryptography,
see the sci.crypt FAQ, available for FTP from rtfm.mit.edu (18.172.1.27) in the
directory pub/usenet-by-group/sci.crypt.

The cypherpunks archive is available for FTP at

	soda.berkeley.edu:pub/cypherpunks

This site contains code, information, rants, and other miscellany, including
the most up-to-date version of this FAQ.

This FAQ is maintained by Eric S. Raymond <esr@snark.thyrsus.com>; send
additions and corrections to that address.  Sections contributed by others are
credited to individual authors.  We gratefully acknowledge, in addition,
feedback and comments from David Mandl <dmandl@lehman.com> and Eric Hughes
<hughes@soda.berkeley.edu>.

Here is a table of contents for this FAQ:

1. Why cypherpunks?

2. What are the essentials of privacy software?
   a. Public-key cryptosystems for secure communication.
   b. Unforgeable electronic signatures for message authentication.
   c. DC-net or similar protocols to thwart spoofing.

3. What are the potential applications of good privacy software?
   a. Secure communications.
   b. Digital cash.
   c. Electronic voting.
   d. Electronic contracts.
   e. Secure anonymous remailers and posters.
   f. <more?>

4. What are the key algorithms, tools, and implementations for privacy
   software?
   a. RSA
   b. DES
   c. Clipper/Capstone/DSS
   d. PGP
   e. Possible non-RSA trapdoor functions.

5. What are the social and political implications of good privacy software?
   a. Drastically lower transaction costs for trade.
   b. Expansion of the counter-economy.
   c. Disempowerment of government.
   d. Anonymity for whistleblowers.

6. What are the legal, political, and technical obstacles?
   a. The Clipper/Capstone/DSS power grab.
   b. The RSA patent and the PGP/RSA fight.
   c. RSA's base problem may not be NP-complete.

7. What can I do to help?
   a. Work on cryptographic software.
   b. Agitate against the Clipper/Capstone/DES proposals.
   c. Promote the use of encrypted communication.

To join the cypherpunks mailing list, send a request to:

	cypherpunks-request@toad.com

Working with us could be your best shot at stopping Big Brother.  So if you
have skills to contribute, act now.  The freedom you save could be your own.

1. Why cypherpunks?

   Because privacy is essential to freedom.

   If the government (or any other oppressor that behaves like one) can
effectively monitor communications, it can control or suppress them.  And it
will do so, because the natural tendency of controllers is always to seek more
control.

   The government cannot be relied on to protect your privacy rights.  Nor
can anyone else --- certainly not your employer, or the corporations that
want to know all about you so they can sell you things.

   Given half the chance, governments and corporations will always push
for security standards that protect *them*, but not *you*.

   Computer technology can help protect you against would-be snoopers, but only
if somebody is sufficiently smart and dedicated to build the tools.

   The Cypherpunks list exists to build and propagate privacy software.  Our
aim is to give you the tools to keep your private information private, and to
communicate with other people and computers in ways snoopers cannot tap.

2. What are the essentials of privacy software?

a. Public-key cryptosystems for secure communication.

   A conventional cryptosystem consists of an encoding/decoding method and
a single key.  Two users who share a key can exchange private messages.

   A public-key cryptosystem uses a *pair* of keys; one private, one public.
Anyone with either key can decode messages encoded with the other.  For
privacy, it must be impossible (or at least impractical) to deduce the private
key from the public one.

   Public-key cryptosystems imply many exciting things --- unforgeable
electronic signatures, digital cash, and secure electronic contracts are among
them.  The basic idea behind all of these is that, as long as your private key
is secure, people can verify that an encoded message containg known text came
from you by decoding with your public key.

   In the remainder of this FAQ we use `PKC' as an abbreviation for `Public
Key Cryptosystem'.

   The best-known PKCs are the RSA system, the Federal Government's DES
standard, and the government's Clipper proposal.  We'll discuss these, and
others, in more detail below.

b. Unforgeable electronic signatures for message authentication.

   There are many circumstances in which you want to be able to check a public
clear-text message for tampering.  To do this, the message must contain a
`digital signature' or `message digest code' or `message hash' derived from its
clear text, which can be checked against the clear text by a receiver.  For
security, the message hash should have the property that no one knows how
to modify a message in a way that preserves its hash.

   PKCs give you unforgeable signatures as a side-effect.  Unfortunately, known
PKCs are too slow to use practically for message hashing.

   Thus, there is a separate category of `Digital Signature Systems'.
The three major DSS techniques are Snefru, MD5, and DSS.  Snefru, invented
by Ralph Merkle at Xerox PARC, is of historical interest only as it has been
broken.

   MD5 is described in Internet RFC 1321, which also gives a reference
implementation in C.  As of July 1993 it is believed to be secure, but
has not been *proved* to be secure.

   DSS is a Federal Government proposed standard associated with the Clipper
proposal.  <more needed here>

c. DC-net or similar protocols to thwart spoofing.

<more needed here>

3. What are the potential applications of good privacy software?

a. Secure communications.

   With a PKC, you can send a message that no one but the intended receiver
can decrypt by encoding it with the receiver's public key.  If you encode
it with *your* public key, the receiver can verify that it came from you.

   This means that it is possible to do secure communications even over public
channels.  Neither nosy neighbors, business competitors, nor the government or
any (other) criminal gang can interfere with it.

b. Digital cash.

   Unforgeable messages also imply digital cash.  You could use a PKC to send
to the receiver a code permitting them to draw a particular amount of money
from your bank account.  The bank, with access to both yours and the payee's
public keys, can verify that the order is genuine.

   This means that it is possible to do trade over electronic links, without
any part trusting any other party beyond the bounds of normal commercial
risk.

c. Electronic voting.

   Unforgeable messages also imply secure electronic voting.  If you encode
your voting form with a PKC, the vote-collecting authority can verify it
with your public key.

d. Electronic contracts.

   If two or more people encode known text with their private keys applied in
succession, all their public keys will be required to decode it.  This is
an unforgeable contract.  Furthermore, it is an unforgeable *private* contract.

e. Secure anonymous remailers and posters.

<more needed here>

4. What are the key algorithms, tools, and implementations for privacy
   software?

a. RSA

   RSA stands for `Rivest-Shamir-Adelson', the names of the three computer
scientists who developed the technique.  RSA has withstood determined attacks
for over a decade and is widely believed to be secure.  It has been proposed
as an Internet standard.

   The RSA technique is patented.  The patents are held by RSA, Inc. <contact
information should go here>.  An implemenation in C called RSAREF is
available for research and certain noncommercial uses.

b. DES

<more needed here>

c. Clipper/Capstone/DSS

<more needed here>

d. PGP

<more needed here>

e. Possible non-RSA trapdoor functions.

<more needed here>

5. What are the social and political implications of good privacy software?

a. Drastically lower transaction costs for trade.

<more needed here>

b. Expansion of the counter-economy.

<more needed here>

c. Disempowerment of government.

<more needed here>

d. Anonymity for whistleblowers.

<more needed here>

6. What are the legal, political, and technical obstacles?

<more needed here>

a. The Clipper/Capstone/DSS power grab.

<more needed here>

b. The RSA patent and the PGP/RSA fight.

<more needed here>

c. RSA's base problem may not be NP-complete.

<more needed here>

7. What can I do to help?

a. Work on cryptographic software.

<list of current projects should go here>

b. Agitate against the Clipper/Capstone/DES proposals.

<more needed here>

c. Promote the routine use of encrypted communication.

<more needed here>

   You can help spread PGP and other appropriate tools far and wide
(both to help get a better foothold to thwart the Clipper proposal and
its ilk, and to work towards making crypto as commonplace as
envelopes).

--- DRAFT VERSION ---- DRAFT VERSION ---- DRAFT VERSION ---- DRAFT VERSION ---
-- 
						>>eric>>




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: smb@research.att.com
Date: Wed, 21 Jul 93 12:25:55 PDT
To: Peter Wayner <pcw@access.digex.net>
Subject: Re: Remailers/PayPhones and Today's NYT
Message-ID: <9307211924.AA16600@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


	 I thought it was interesting that the danger of untraceable
	 drug dealers popped into the reporters mind when they were
	 researching the article. After all, they don't tend to 
	 mention illegal problems when they speak about used car dealers
	 or other services. 

Well, the article said that some of the phone store operators raised
the issue, often defensively.  Even if the reporter didn't know about
the issue beforehand, they sure knew after that.  Also note that part
of the market for such stores is that NY Telephone has cut off some
payphone service in certain areas, thereby sensitizing the reporter
to such questions.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Peter Wayner <pcw@access.digex.net>
Date: Wed, 21 Jul 93 12:40:50 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Simmons Subliminal channels and more...
Message-ID: <199307211936.AA08235@access.digex.net>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain




I too received a copy of Gus Simmons paper in the mail and I
called him on the phone to discuss it with him. He sent me 
a copy of his latest version of the paper. 

The significance of the paper is that it is possible to use
the DSS algorithm to send messages disguised as signatures. 
The specs for the DSS used by NIST required that it could not be used
to hold secrets. This would make it more exportable and this was
one of the reasons why RSA was not chosen as the DSS. 

On a more philosophical level, it shows that the DSS and 
the El Gamal system really aren't signature systems. They
convey extra information. That means that they really aren't
that different from RSA on a functional level.

The easiest way to understand how the message passing system 
works is notice that the DSS uses a random number to compute
the signature. If we could somehow recover this number, then
we could have the information. What's the simplest hidden
way to send a message? Let's say that you want to send a bit.
Just keep rerunning the algorithm with different random numbers
until the right parity appears. The real approach is more 
sophisticated than this. 

My personal feeling is that this shows how utterly impossible
it is to keep secret bits from hiding in the noise of the world.
If the NSA can't do it, then there is a good chance that no one
can. 

-Peter






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Peter Wayner <pcw@access.digex.net>
Date: Wed, 21 Jul 93 12:39:42 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Simmons...
Message-ID: <199307211938.AA09000@access.digex.net>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



I have no idea about the reason behind his departure from
Sandia, but I did note with curiosity that Sandia refuses
to forward mail to him. This may be Standard Operating Procedure
at secure sites, but the Journal of Cryptology reported this
in its latest issue. He is still an editor.

-Peter




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: faust@cd.chalmers.se
Date: Wed, 21 Jul 93 07:35:55 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Second-Hand-Remailers
Message-ID: <199307211434.AA12334@castafiore.cd.chalmers.se>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Second Hand Remailers (SHR).

As more users get a taste of the sweet flavor of freedom, more remailers 
must be connected.

Not only to stand the pressure of the mail, but also to assure the cypherpunks
that they aren't using remailerX.cypherpunks.GOV!

As Mr. Zimmmerman so nice states in the PGP.DOC , we need a grassrot-like
organisation.

But how do we get this? Keeping a remailer on a system you don't own, are not
THAT appealing for the usual 'heck-I-want-freedom-FREE' person.

The answer is Second Hand Remailers.

A Second Hand Remailer is just like a ordinary cypherpunk remailer, with 
one difference, it only forwards mail to 'approved' systems, i.e normally
other SHR's or LHR's (Last Hand Remailers, like those existing today.).

In this way, the owner of the account of a SHR will be able to check up ALL
forward-to-adresses before he starts, and thus keeps HIM from getting any 
flame for pumping GIGs of bad things into the net.

(Since there will only be few LHR's , operators who don't want to have 
 anonymously postings in their newsgroups/systems can easily keep track of 
 which to refuse mail from.)

Since the mail only passes thru the SHR's and will not be dropped into the net
by the SHR but rather thru a LHR,
(which, btw even can be a remailer.GOV if you don't care about the reciever and
 don't include any revealing signatures, like encrypting with your public-key.)  
the SHR's can't really be blamed for anything.

This fact that you can contribute to the great fight for freedom without 
risking anything, must certainly appeal to all you cypherpunks?

What we just need is to change the script for the ordinary remailers to first
match the remail-to adress with a aproved list of other remailers.
This should not be hard, should it?

Imagine, if we just can find an easy way for the ordinary user to set up a 
SHR, there will be no way to stop or track the remailing since there will be
thousands of remailers available and many will be 'friend-of-a-friend's and
maybe not even published.
(you trade SHR adresses with people you trust in the same way as you introduce
 new public keys of people you trust to other by signing them.)

And, when more remailers get's into the scene, there will be a possibility
to make adress-headers by chaining SEVERAL SHR's with one or more LHR's.
The SHR's can be chosen among people who you know and whose computers are
located near you.

But with increasing chains, there will be increasing header-sizes, and there
will most certainly go down some SHR's/day so you have to update your headers
often.
This two fact forces us to install some kind of header-site where you can 
pick up a fresh adress-header for a given pseudonym, preferly together with
that pseudonym's public key.
(and send your new header when a SHR's you used have bailed out.)

I've said it before, and I'll say it again, we need a service exactly like the
PGP-key server but who also supports adress-headers!

Regards, Faust 		- Ziffer macht frei -





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Derek Atkins <warlord@MIT.EDU>
Date: Wed, 21 Jul 93 13:50:55 PDT
To: gdale@apple.com (Geoff Dale)
Subject: Re: Encrypted data across international lines
In-Reply-To: <9307211916.AA25115@apple.com>
Message-ID: <9307212050.AA23272@toxicwaste.MEDIA.MIT.EDU>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Save a few exceptions (like France), I believe it is legal to transmit
encrypted data across country borders.  The question comes in as to
how to define "cryptographic material", as used in the ITAR (for the
US) or similar statutes for other places.

Basically, I doubt that anyone will do anything other than raise an
eyebrow if you send encrypted data out of the country.  

-derek




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Derek Atkins <warlord@MIT.EDU>
Date: Wed, 21 Jul 93 13:59:42 PDT
To: cypherpunks-east@MIT.EDU
Subject: MEET: Boston Area meeting
Message-ID: <9307212056.AA23296@toxicwaste.MEDIA.MIT.EDU>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I would like to hold a meeting on the second saturday in August, the
8th, to corespond with the California meeting.  I can get a room at
MIT unless someone else has a better place.  Also, can people give me
topics for the agenda?  I'm sure people have things they want to talk
about.

Send agenda items to me, directly.
Send problems/questions/place suggestions to the list.

-derek





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Ken McGlothlen <mcglk@cpac.washington.edu>
Date: Wed, 21 Jul 93 16:56:14 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: ANON: remail abuse
In-Reply-To: <199307211508.AA17766@Menudo.UH.EDU>
Message-ID: <9307212358.AA06651@yang.cpac.washington.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Just another lurker, speaking up for the first time. . . .

elee9sf@menudo.uh.edu (Karl Barrus) writes:

[...first, an example of how to harrass without a remailer, then:]

| I guess I'm one of those people who would get upset and blame the person
| responsible for the action instead of software and/or technological
| advancement for possible providing a means.

While I tend to agree with you on this point, the fact remains that most
people, by and large, are idiots.  And while I'm a closet libertarian at heart,
this one simple fact of life gives me pause on a number of issues where some
potentially useful and/or fun object can be put to extreme nastiness without
much (or any) knowledge or imagination:  firearms, poisons, neurotoxins,
gamma-ray sources, genetic-engineering kits . . . and anonymous remailers.

| As Peter mentioned, payphones are already perfect for harrassment.  So
| is junk mail... and the crucial thing here is these services cost money.
| I'm sure future remailers will incorporate digital cash and be a
| pay-for-each-remail service.

Oh, big deal.  Payphone = 25c.  Junk mail = 29c for *first-class* harrassment
mail.  :)  Anonymous E-mail remailers = something much less, or free at the
moment.

Money is *not* the issue.  Period.

The reason anonymous remailers are not the same as payphones or junk mail is
that the latter two leave tangible clues behind.  While I'm not entirely happy
with the US justice system, it seems to me that given society's current
limitations, a police force of some sort is generally a good thing (if strict
controls are kept on it).  (Sorry, I realize that this is a bit of a fringe
opinion in *this* group, but. . . .)  Both payphones and mail leave tangible
clues which can be investigated and traced by law enforcement authorities.
Anonymous mail doesn't---at least, not without actually running a process or a
logger on the machine itself.

So they're *not* equivalent.

| Chris also mentions concers about distributing porn and stuff like that
| through remailers.  I guess this could be done, but why give up the speed and
| convenience of ftp, fsp, irc (dcc), and usenet posting?  These services
| distribute files faster and further than remailing.

But not as anonymously, except in the case of Usenet postings.

				---Ken McGlothlen
				   mcglk@cpac.washington.edu
				   mcglk@cpac.bitnet




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: ""L. Detweiler"" <ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Date: Wed, 21 Jul 93 16:20:58 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: more on FBI credit search access
Message-ID: <9307212319.AA04464@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Hm, maybe someone could just check out the article (Sat Jul 17 NYT p.
7). This is a distinctly different interpretation.


===cut=here===

From: Shari Steele <ssteele@eff.org>
Date: Wed, 21 Jul 1993 09:17:28 -0400
Subject: New law on FBI and credit records

Hi Peter.
Your post in alt.privacy was forwarded to me.  I don't know of any
legislation that will permit the FBI to obtain your credit report without a
search warrant.  While it is possible that such legislation exists, what
you describe from the NY Times article sounds an awful lot like a proposed
amendment to the Electronic Communications Privacy Act (ECPA) introduced
this year that would allow the FBI access to *telephone calling data* with
a letter (rather than a search warrant) certifying that the person was
being investigated for engaging in terrorism or international espionage, or
cohorting with such folks.  The telephone calling data includes the names
and telephone numbers of all calls made from the phone number being
investigated, as well as the duration of the calls.  While this in itself
may be cause for alarm, it is not the same as FBI access to credit
reporting information.
Shari
******************************************************************************

Shari Steele
Director of Legal Services
Electronic Frontier Foundation
1001 G Street, NW
Suite 950 East
Washington, DC  20001
202/347-5400 (voice), 202/393-5509 (fax)
ssteele@eff.org



------- End of Forwarded Message





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: elee9sf@Menudo.UH.EDU
Date: Wed, 21 Jul 93 15:20:58 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: ANON: Re: remail abuse
In-Reply-To: <9307212036.AA17170@indirect.com>
Message-ID: <199307212220.AA24582@Menudo.UH.EDU>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



> I'm sure that would be a big help, although I'm not literate enough yet in
> the area of digital cash to understand how this would work.

Okay - actually, you don't need to be very familiar with digital cash
at all.  Just think of a cash accepting remailer as one in which you
are charged a fee for each use.  Similar to postage stamps and postal
mail.  When you want to use a digital cash accepting remailer, you
would first purchase some postage stamps, certificates, however you
want to think of it.  Then, you attach the cash/stamp/certificate to
the mail (maybe by a special header field), and send it to the
remailer.  Your mail would probably be encrypted as well to keep
others from spying on your cash, altering it (rendering it invalid)
and using it for themselves.  The remailer would validate your cash,
probably store it in a file to prevent multiple uses, and then forward
your mail to wherever.

The digital cash part just means electronic forms of payment which
have cash properties.  Say you purchase something with cash.  The
merchant can't link your identity to the cash, and later when the
merchant deposits cash in a bank, the bank cannot link the cash to
your transactions with the merchant.  But the merchant can verify the
cash is valid, and the bank can too.  Furthermore, you can't spend the
same piece of cash twice.

This is confusing to think about without being familiar with modern
crypto; one of these days I shall finish a digital cash application
I've been working on for people to play with.

/-----------------------------------\
| Karl L. Barrus                    |
| elee9sf@menudo.uh.edu             | <- preferred address
| barrus@tree.egr.uh.edu (NeXTMail) |
\-----------------------------------/




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: ""L. Detweiler"" <ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Date: Wed, 21 Jul 93 16:34:44 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Encrypted data across international lines
Message-ID: <9307212331.AA04712@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



 From: gdale@apple.com (Geoff Dale)
>Does anybody have pointers to the actual statutes prohibiting transmitting
>encrypted data across international boundries.
>
>I had an argument with somebody who didn't think this was illegal.

This is similar to the question `do any countries prohibit certain
kinds of cryptography' that arose after the Clipper announcement
suggested that some do.

The FCC prohibits the use of codes in amateur radio transmissions, and
violations are sufficient to revoke the license. This is enforced by
legislation. Also, various countries have rules against using
encryption in telegrams. I believe Australia has one, and also Britain.
Or maybe it was that Australia had an `official' code under which other
codes were illegal.  The question is, how are these enforced in practice?

I'd like to see a bit of information from the experts on this. What
constitutes `codes'? A friend operator told me that, unusual
statements, non sequiturs, qualified. Have any operators lost their
licenses this way? What is the enforcement like?

On a related subject, I recall the discussion here a few months ago
about `numbers stations' (or was it sci.crypt?). These are broadcast
frequencies where the announcer simply reads off long lists of numbers.
They are used for encrypted communication to clandestine operatives,
etc. Apparently most are Iron Curtain originating, from what I understand.

I saw on TV (nightly news) that there was a great deal of hullaballoo
about using the VOA (Voice of America) to send secret communications. A
director told a disk jockey to play a certain song and say that it was
for a request from `country [x]' where [x] was a very obscure locality
in Russia, and the song was unusual.  Apparently a disk jockey
complained about the practice, and a previous director was against it.
A new director was not unequivocally against the practice. There was
disagreement on whether the VOA charter allowed it (private analysts
saying emphatically no, shady slippery shifty-eyed gov't types saying
`well, ...'). If anyone else can expand on this one I'd appreciate it.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: peb@PROCASE.COM (Paul Baclace)
Date: Wed, 21 Jul 93 17:39:47 PDT
To: mdiehl@vesta.unm.edu
Subject: Re: People's rights????
Message-ID: <9307220037.AA10660@banff.procase.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Rant=on

Over the past few years many LEA pseudo-documentary-tabloid shows have
appeared on TV (I figure it all started with Raygun's WOD) with
re-creations of events using actors.  They usually are portrayed as if
they were real to the extent of bluring out faces, etc. (that is, no
disclaimers and everything appears to be done live with no indication
of due process).   I've seen this stuff whilst channel surfing in hotel
rooms (the only time I watch TV, really) and it seems very sick.  I
suppose the producers of such shows don't find legalities like warrants
to be interesting enough, so they leave it out.  So much for TV being
educational.  If the general public becomes so dulled to apparent
violations of rights as depicted in realistic settings, the cynicism
that Nixon had for the general public might one day become true (e.g.,
Nixon, as documented by transcripts declassified this year, said
that people don't care about wiretapping--they think it happens all
the time.  (I wonder why this statement by Nixon was protected for 
National Security for ~20 years...))

Rant=off


Paul E. Baclace
peb@procase.com





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Timothy Newsham <newsham@wiliki.eng.hawaii.edu>
Date: Wed, 21 Jul 93 21:24:55 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: carbon copy
Message-ID: <9307220424.AA25332@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Forwarded message:
> From owner-cypherpunks@toad.com Wed Jul 21 17:00 HST 1993
> Resent-Message-Id: <9307220127.AA16447@emory.mathcs.emory.edu>
> Resent-Date: Wed, 21 Jul 1993 21:21:11 EDT
> Resent-From: <cypherpunks@indigo.mese.com>
> Resent-To: <CYPHERPUNKS@toad.com>
> Date: Wed, 21 Jul 1993 15:36:55 -0400
> From: Peter Wayner <pcw@access.digex.net>
> Message-Id: <199307211936.AA08235@access.digex.net>
> To: cypherpunks@toad.com
> Subject: Simmons Subliminal channels and more...

Every single cypherpunk message I am receiving comes in duplicate.
The first from cypherpunks list, the second with added header lines
as above.

                         Tim N.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Eric Hughes <hughes@soda.berkeley.edu>
Date: Wed, 21 Jul 93 19:19:50 PDT
To: cypherpunks@indigo.mese.com
Subject: ADMIN: cypherpunks@indigo.mese.com has been removed
In-Reply-To: <9307211608.AA14922@toad.com>
Message-ID: <9307220131.AA08257@soda.berkeley.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


cypherpunks@indigo.mese.com has been removed from the mailing list
because it appears that mail being sent to this alias is ending up
back on the list.  This behavior is wrong.

If the list at large sees this, pardon me.

Eric




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: jpp@markv.com
Date: Wed, 21 Jul 93 19:01:02 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Thoughts on remailers
In-Reply-To: <9307210647.AA13445@indirect.com>
Message-ID: <9307211859.aa04589@hermix.markv.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


  We just discussed a related issue on another list I subscribe to.  I
feel that we want accountability along with anonymity in many
circumstances.  You can deny service to 'bad apples' with out
compromising the identities of anyone who uses your service.  Not even
the identiy of the 'bad apple' need ever be know to you.  Chaum
discusses how this can be achieved cryptographicaly.  Is anyone
working on an implementation?

j'
--
                O I am Jay Prime Positive jpp@markv.com 
1250 bit key fingerprint =  B8 95 E0 AF 9A A2 CD A5  89 C9 F0 FE B4 3A 2C 3F
 524 bit key fingerprint =  8A 7C B9 F2 D5 46 4D ED  66 23 F1 71 DE FF 51 48
Public keys by `finger jpp @hermix.markv.com' or pgp-public-keys@pgp.mit.edu
Your feedback is welcome, directly or via symbol JPP on hex@sea.east.sun.com




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: khijol!erc@apple.com (Ed Carp)
Date: Wed, 21 Jul 93 19:44:51 PDT
To: ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu (L. Detweiler)
Subject: Re: Encrypted data across international lines
In-Reply-To: <9307212331.AA04712@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Message-ID: <m0oIq5y-00029gC@warrior>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text


> The FCC prohibits the use of codes in amateur radio transmissions, and
> violations are sufficient to revoke the license. This is enforced by

Well, yes and no.  The FCC prohibits the use or codes, ciphers, or anything
else whose primary purpose is to obscure the meaning of the message.  On
the other hand, compression, since its primary purpose is not to obscure,
is OK.  But it sure makes it hard for the average Joe Blow ham to read my
packet traffic.  Not that I have anything to hide, but doubling my throughput
on a 1200 baud half-duplex session is sort of important to me. :)
-- 
Ed Carp				erc@apple.com			510/659-9560
"Disagreements are not meant to be challenges.  They are just a different
 reality."  -- Risa D'Angeles
DISCLAIMER:  I work for me ... what's it to you? :)



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: J. Michael Diehl <mdiehl@vesta.unm.edu>
Date: Wed, 21 Jul 93 18:56:18 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Key revoked.
Message-ID: <9307220155.AA26902@vesta.unm.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


     To whom it may concern: 
 
     I have completely destroyed my rsa encryption key, ID 700903.  This key
is no longer valid and any messages or files encrypted with it will be 
ABSOLUTELY UNREADABLE by me.  My new key will be available via finger or the
key servers.  Thank you. 
+-----------------------+-----------------------------+---------+ 
| J. Michael Diehl ;-)  | I thought I was wrong once. | PGP KEY | 
| mdiehl@triton.unm.edu |   But, I was mistaken.      |available| 
| mike.diehl@fido.org   |                             | Ask Me! | 
| (505) 299-2282        +-----------------------------+---------+ 
|                                                               | 
+------"I'm just looking for the opportunity to be -------------+ 
|            Politically Incorrect!"   <Me>                     | 
+-----If codes are outlawed, only criminals wil have codes.-----+ 
+----Is Big Brother in your phone?  If you don't know, ask me---+ 




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Sandy <72114.1712@CompuServe.COM>
Date: Wed, 21 Jul 93 17:14:46 PDT
To: <cypherpunks@toad.com>
Subject: INTERNATIONAL ENCRYPTION
Message-ID: <930722000756_72114.1712_FHF108-1@CompuServe.COM>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
  SANDY SANDFORT               Reply to:  ssandfort@attmail.com
 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Geoff Dale asks about statutes prohibiting the transmission of
encrypted data across international boundaries.  To the best of
my knowledge, there's no such animal.  If such exists, it is
widely violated, with impunity, by me and folks I know, on a
regular basis.

Where do these urban legends come from?  (Have I ever told you
about what happened when I put my poodle in the microwave, or
what my doberman was choking on?)

 S a n d y

>>>>>>    Please send e-mail to:  ssandfort@attmail.com    <<<<<<
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: smb@research.att.com
Date: Wed, 21 Jul 93 18:14:52 PDT
To: "" L. Detweiler "" <ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Subject: Re: more on FBI credit search access
Message-ID: <9307220112.AA20607@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


	 Hm, maybe someone could just check out the article (Sat Jul 17 NYT p.
	 7). This is a distinctly different interpretation.

I already looked at the article.  It didn't say much.  But I tend
to agree with Shari Steele's explanation, and in fact posted a
similar analysis to comp.org.eff.talk.  Here's what I said:

	Without more detail than appeared in the NY Times article (and
	yes, I did go and check it, too), it's impossible to say what
	that bill really means.  But I strongly suspect that it's less
	of a change than one might think

	The government already has the right to conduct wiretaps
	against non- Americans without benefit of a court order.  See
	the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (50 USC 1801, if
	memory serves).  Conversely, the prohibitions against
	eavesdropping on Americans under that act are quite strict, to
	the point of requiring destruction of any inadvertent
	recordings that would not be acceptable under the law.  My
	reading of the NY Times squib is that they are simply bringing
	another form of intelligence-gathering under the rubric of the
	FISA, rather than just using it for electronic surveillance.

	Note:  I'm not saying I approve of the new action -- but it
	doesn't seem to be as big a departure from current practice as
	one might think.


			--Steve Bellovin




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: morpheus@entropy.linet.org (morpheus)
Date: Wed, 21 Jul 93 19:39:51 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Weaver/BATF trial
In-Reply-To: <9307210712.AA16784@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Message-ID: <1993Jul21.213712.3713@entropy.linet.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


""L. Detweiler"" <src4src!imageek!longs.lance.colostate.edu!ld231782> writes:

[...]
> One wonders if law enforcement is composed of responsible servants or
> maurading mercenaries. 

I don't think a rational person needs to wonder about this for long.  It's
extremely obvious what the true colors of "Law Enforcement" are.

The world would be a better place if cypherpunks, after their crypto
activities, went out and torched a bacon wagon...

"there's more to cypherpunks than the cypher" ;-)
-- 
morpheus@entropy.linet.org			Non serviam!
Support your local police for a more efficient police state.





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: UCX_SMTP@crc.monroecc.edu
Date: Thu, 22 Jul 93 18:01:32 PDT
To: <cypherpunks@indigo.mese.com>
Subject: No Subject
Message-ID: <9307220326.AA23297@emory.mathcs.emory.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



---- Transcript of session follows ----

196608  %NONAME-W-NOMSG, Message number 00000000
-SYSTEM-S-NORMAL, normal successful completion

---- Unsent message follows ----

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From: <boojum!esr@gvls1.VFL.Paramax.COM>
Subject: FAQ, round 2
To: boojum!cypherpunks@uunet.uu.net
Date: Wed, 21 Jul 93 14:03:02 EDT
X-Mailer: ELM [version 2.3 PL11]

I've written some more material for it.  Criticisms and additions
welcome.

--- DRAFT VERSION ---- DRAFT VERSION ---- DRAFT VERSION ---- DRAFT VERSION ---
From: esr@snark.thyrsus.com (Eric S. Raymond)
Newsgroups: news.answers
Followup-To: poster

This is the Cypherpunks FAQ.  It explains the projects and purposes of the
Cypherpunks mailing list.  It is also intended to serve as a general
introduction to privacy and encryption issues.

For details on the technical and theoretical aspects of computer cryptography,
see the sci.crypt FAQ, available for FTP from rtfm.mit.edu (18.172.1.27) in the
directory pub/usenet-by-group/sci.crypt.

The cypherpunks archive is available for FTP at

	soda.berkeley.edu:pub/cypherpunks

This site contains code, information, rants, and other miscellany, including
the most up-to-date version of this FAQ.

This FAQ is maintained by Eric S. Raymond <esr@snark.thyrsus.com>; send
additions and corrections to that address.  Sections contributed by others are
credited to individual authors.  We gratefully acknowledge, in addition,
feedback and comments from David Mandl <dmandl@lehman.com> and Eric Hughes
<hughes@soda.berkeley.edu>.

Here is a table of contents for this FAQ:

1. Why cypherpunks?

2. What are the essentials of privacy software?
   a. Public-key cryptosystems for secure communication.
   b. Unforgeable electronic signatures for message authentication.
   c. DC-net or similar protocols to thwart spoofing.

3. What are the potential applications of good privacy software?
   a. Secure communications.
   b. Digital cash.
   c. Electronic voting.
   d. Electronic contracts.
   e. Secure anonymous remailers and posters.
   f. <more?>

4. What are the key algorithms, tools, and implementations for privacy
   software?
   a. RSA
   b. DES
   c. Clipper/Capstone/DSS
   d. PGP
   e. Possible non-RSA trapdoor functions.

5. What are the social and political implications of good privacy software?
   a. Drastically lower transaction costs for trade.
   b. Expansion of the counter-economy.
   c. Disempowerment of government.
   d. Anonymity for whistleblowers.

6. What are the legal, political, and technical obstacles?
   a. The Clipper/Capstone/DSS power grab.
   b. The RSA patent and the PGP/RSA fight.
   c. RSA's base problem may not be NP-complete.

7. What can I do to help?
   a. Work on cryptographic software.
   b. Agitate against the Clipper/Capstone/DES proposals.
   c. Promote the use of encrypted communication.

To join the cypherpunks mailing list, send a request to:

	cypherpunks-request@toad.com

Working with us could be your best shot at stopping Big Brother.  So if you
have skills to contribute, act now.  The freedom you save could be your own.

1. Why cypherpunks?

   Because privacy is essential to freedom.

   If the government (or any other oppressor that behaves like one) can
effectively monitor communications, it can control or suppress them.  And it
will do so, because the natural tendency of controllers is always to seek more
control.

   The government cannot be relied on to protect your privacy rights.  Nor
can anyone else --- certainly not your employer, or the corporations that
want to know all about you so they can sell you things.

   Given half the chance, governments and corporations will always push
for security standards that protect *them*, but not *you*.

   Computer technology can help protect you against would-be snoopers, but only
if somebody is sufficiently smart and dedicated to build the tools.

   The Cypherpunks list exists to build and propagate privacy software.  Our
aim is to give you the tools to keep your private information private, and to
communicate with other people and computers in ways snoopers cannot tap.

2. What are the essentials of privacy software?

a. Public-key cryptosystems for secure communication.

   A conventional cryptosystem consists of an encoding/decoding method and
a single key.  Two users who share a key can exchange private messages.

   A public-key cryptosystem uses a *pair* of keys; one private, one public.
Anyone with either key can decode messages encoded with the other.  For
privacy, it must be impossible (or at least impractical) to deduce the private
key from the public one.

   Public-key cryptosystems imply many exciting things --- unforgeable
electronic signatures, digital cash, and secure electronic contracts are among
them.  The basic idea behind all of these is that, as long as your private key
is secure, people can verify that an encoded message containg known text came
from you by decoding with your public key.

   In the remainder of this FAQ we use `PKC' as an abbreviation for `Public
Key Cryptosystem'.

   The best-known PKCs are the RSA system, the Federal Government's DES
standard, and the government's Clipper proposal.  We'll discuss these, and
others, in more detail below.

b. Unforgeable electronic signatures for message authentication.

   There are many circumstances in which you want to be able to check a public
clear-text message for tampering.  To do this, the message must contain a
`digital signature' or `message digest code' or `message hash' derived from its
clear text, which can be checked against the clear text by a receiver.  For
security, the message hash should have the property that no one knows how
to modify a message in a way that preserves its hash.

   PKCs give you unforgeable signatures as a side-effect.  Unfortunately, known
PKCs are too slow to use practically for message hashing.

   Thus, there is a separate category of `Digital Signature Systems'.
The three major DSS techniques are Snefru, MD5, and DSS.  Snefru, invented
by Ralph Merkle at Xerox PARC, is of historical interest only as it has been
broken.

   MD5 is described in Internet RFC 1321, which also gives a reference
implementation in C.  As of July 1993 it is believed to be secure, but
has not been *proved* to be secure.

   DSS is a Federal Government proposed standard associated with the Clipper
proposal.  <more needed here>

c. DC-net or similar protocols to thwart spoofing.

<more needed here>

3. What are the potential applications of good privacy software?

a. Secure communications.

   With a PKC, you can send a message that no one but the intended receiver
can decrypt by encoding it with the receiver's public key.  If you encode
it with *your* public key, the receiver can verify that it came from you.

   This means that it is possible to do secure communications even over public
channels.  Neither nosy neighbors, business competitors, nor the government or
any (other) criminal gang can interfere with it.

b. Digital cash.

   Unforgeable messages also imply digital cash.  You could use a PKC to send
to the receiver a code permitting them to draw a particular amount of money
from your bank account.  The bank, with access to both yours and the payee's
public keys, can verify that the order is genuine.

   This means that it is possible to do trade over electronic links, without
any part trusting any other party beyond the bounds of normal commercial
risk.

c. Electronic voting.

   Unforgeable messages also imply secure electronic voting.  If you encode
your voting form with a PKC, the vote-collecting authority can verify it
with your public key.

d. Electronic contracts.

   If two or more people encode known text with their private keys applied in
succession, all their public keys will be required to decode it.  This is
an unforgeable contract.  Furthermore, it is an unforgeable *private* contract.

e. Secure anonymous remailers and posters.

<more needed here>

4. What are the key algorithms, tools, and implementations for privacy
   software?

a. RSA

   RSA stands for `Rivest-Shamir-Adelson', the names of the three computer
scientists who developed the technique.  RSA has withstood determined attacks
for over a decade and is widely believed to be secure.  It has been proposed
as an Internet standard.

   The RSA technique is patented.  The patents are held by RSA, Inc. <contact
information should go here>.  An implemenation in C called RSAREF is
available for research and certain noncommercial uses.

b. DES

<more needed here>

c. Clipper/Capstone/DSS

<more needed here>

d. PGP

<more needed here>

e. Possible non-RSA trapdoor functions.

<more needed here>

5. What are the social and political implications of good privacy software?

a. Drastically lower transaction costs for trade.

<more needed here>

b. Expansion of the counter-economy.

<more needed here>

c. Disempowerment of government.

<more needed here>

d. Anonymity for whistleblowers.

<more needed here>

6. What are the legal, political, and technical obstacles?

<more needed here>

a. The Clipper/Capstone/DSS power grab.

<more needed here>

b. The RSA patent and the PGP/RSA fight.

<more needed here>

c. RSA's base problem may not be NP-complete.

<more needed here>

7. What can I do to help?

a. Work on cryptographic software.

<list of current projects should go here>

b. Agitate against the Clipper/Capstone/DES proposals.

<more needed here>

c. Promote the routine use of encrypted communication.

<more needed here>

   You can help spread PGP and other appropriate tools far and wide
(both to help get a better foothold to thwart the Clipper proposal and
its ilk, and to work towards making crypto as commonplace as
envelopes).

--- DRAFT VERSION ---- DRAFT VERSION ---- DRAFT VERSION ---- DRAFT VERSION ---
--
						>>eric>>




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: peter honeyman <honey@citi.umich.edu>
Date: Wed, 21 Jul 93 21:34:55 PDT
To: Ken McGlothlen <mcglk@cpac.washington.edu>
Subject: Re: ANON: remail abuse
Message-ID: <9307220432.AA25471@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> The reason anonymous remailers are not the same as payphones or junk mail is
> that the latter two leave tangible clues behind.  While I'm not entirely happy
> with the US justice system, it seems to me that given society's current
> limitations, a police force of some sort is generally a good thing (if strict
> controls are kept on it).  (Sorry, I realize that this is a bit of a fringe
> opinion in *this* group, but. . . .)  Both payphones and mail leave tangible
> clues which can be investigated and traced by law enforcement authorities.
> Anonymous mail doesn't---at least, not without actually running a process or a
> logger on the machine itself.

wow, much to disagree with in that paragraph.  tell you what, though.  since
you have such faith in the bloodhounds of the justice system, why don't you
post your home phone number here and invite a test of the efficacy of those
tangible clues etc.?

i haven't a clue, tangible or otherwise, how you would trace a carefully
plotted campaign of harrassment, whether by phone or postal mail.  perhaps
you could elaborate?

	peter




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: technopagan priest <tedwards@wam.umd.edu>
Date: Wed, 21 Jul 93 23:14:55 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: No Subject
Message-ID: <199307220613.AA11756@rac3.wam.umd.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Recently, there has been some talk on here concerning anonymous
remailers and harassment.  

I don't think we will ever exist in a society where anonymous information
sources will be eliminated.  Even 50 years ago, the "rumour mill" was
the equivalent of the modern anonymous remailer.  And yes, harassing
rumours got started and hurt people. 

But the fault, as I see it, lies not so much in those who started 
the rumour, but more in the people who believed the rumour without
trust in the source.

And that is where cryptographically secure models of trust comes in.
If we are going to continue to be coherent in our future virtual world,
we are going to have to "filter out" information which originates from
sources which we do not have a cryptographic web of trust to.

Does this make any sense?

-Thomas

(I'm not signing this message on purpose ;)






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Paul Goggin <chaos@aql.gatech.edu>
Date: Wed, 21 Jul 93 23:39:57 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: your mail
In-Reply-To: <199307220613.AA11756@rac3.wam.umd.edu>
Message-ID: <9307220636.AA26597@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Thomas thus said:

>And that is where cryptographically secure models of trust comes in.
>If we are going to continue to be coherent in our future virtual world,
>we are going to have to "filter out" information which originates from
>sources which we do not have a cryptographic web of trust to.

I understand the predictament and security that it entails. However, I am
not sure as I understand you, that this is a good solution. Let's say if
everyone jumps on the cryptographic bandwagon, how does the web of trust
help out the end user who's feelings have been hurt? Or if the user is not
in the web of trust does that eliminate their information from the field?

Sorry, its late and I probably should'nt post but what the hell.
Probably get flamed in the morning.

>Does this make any sense?

I decided for about 2 weeks to accept only PGP messages as authenticated, so
to speak -- and it sucked even friends that have PGP and such would not
go in for the idea of a total security blanket.

Just my .02, probably give another .02 in the next 12 hours.

Paul
--
R  O    All Comments Copyright by  | Technofetisht
 A  N     Paul S. Goggin (1993)    | Cypher, Cyber, Chaos              
  V        Information Broker      | Ergoflux, Interzone
   E      chaos@aql.gatech.edu     | Carpe Diem: Stop the Clipper wiretap chip 
Finger account for latest _Phrack_ | Public Key: PGP and RIPEM available
      For anonymous communication:---> anonymus+4744@charcoal.com
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Title 18 USC 2511 and 18 USC 2703 Protected -- Monitoring Absolutely Forbidden




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Paul Goggin <chaos@aql.gatech.edu>
Date: Wed, 21 Jul 93 23:54:58 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Webs
Message-ID: <9307220654.AA26888@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Thomas thus said:

>And that is where cryptographically secure models of trust comes in.
>If we are going to continue to be coherent in our future virtual world,
>we are going to have to "filter out" information which originates from
>sources which we do not have a cryptographic web of trust to.

I understand the predictament and security that it entails. However, I am
not sure as I understand you, that this is a good solution. Let's say if
everyone jumps on the cryptographic bandwagon, how does the web of trust
help out the end user who's feelings have been hurt? Or if the user is not
in the web of trust does that eliminate their information from the field?

Sorry, its late and I probably should'nt post but what the hell.
Probably get flamed in the morning.

>Does this make any sense?

I decided for about 2 weeks to accept only PGP messages as authenticated, so
to speak -- and it sucked even friends that have PGP and such would not
go in for the idea of a total security blanket.

Just my .02, probably give another .02 in the next 12 hours.

Paul
--
R  O    All Comments Copyright by  | Technofetisht
 A  N     Paul S. Goggin (1993)    | Cypher, Cyber, Chaos              
  V        Information Broker      | Ergoflux, Interzone
   E      chaos@aql.gatech.edu     | Carpe Diem: Stop the Clipper wiretap chip 
Finger account for latest _Phrack_ | Public Key: PGP and RIPEM available
      For anonymous communication:---> anonymus+4744@charcoal.com
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Title 18 USC 2511 and 18 USC 2703 Protected -- Monitoring Absolutely Forbidden




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Dwayne Campogan <vivisect@u.washington.edu>
Date: Thu, 22 Jul 93 10:30:39 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: setting up a mailing list?
Message-ID: <9307221726.AA07874@hardy.u.washington.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



I have been looking for information or a FAQ for setting up a mailing
list of my own..

I would like to compose a list that used PGP encryption by default
supported a key-server swap like enviorment with online extraction
of specific keys, as the server lists are huge and PGP's extract and 
sort routines often do not work on them and when they do take quit long..

information and direction needed, recommended, and thnaked for..

-Paris




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Paul Goggin <chaos@aql.gatech.edu>
Date: Thu, 22 Jul 93 11:11:24 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: setting up a mailing list?
In-Reply-To: <9307221726.AA07874@hardy.u.washington.edu>
Message-ID: <9307221811.AA08590@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Paris,

>I have been looking for information or a FAQ for setting up a mailing
>list of my own..

I don't know of a FAQ, does anybody else?

>information and direction needed, recommended, and thnaked for..

I know there exist many variants of mailers today, but the major packages I
have heard of are "Major Domo" and several varietiest of "Listserver." You
can archie for the various sites. As to public key usage, I have little
experience with these programs and some other people on the list could
answer far more adequately than I -- my initial feeling is are going to hack
on the programs a bit.

Paul
--
R  O    All Comments Copyright by  | Technofetisht
 A  N     Paul S. Goggin (1993)    | Cypher, Cyber, Chaos              
  V        Information Broker      | Ergoflux, Interzone
   E      chaos@aql.gatech.edu     | Carpe Diem: Stop the Clipper wiretap chip 
Finger account for latest _Phrack_ | Public Key: PGP and RIPEM available
      For anonymous communication:---> anonymus+4744@charcoal.com
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Title 18 USC 2511 and 18 USC 2703 Protected -- Monitoring Absolutely Forbidden




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: karn@qualcomm.com (Phil Karn)
Date: Thu, 22 Jul 93 16:21:32 PDT
To: warlord@MIT.EDU
Subject: Re: forged mail
Message-ID: <9307222320.AA00635@servo>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


You should also bear in mind a fatal mistake that most people make when
they forge email. They test it first by sending themselves a forged note!

I'm told that when the guilty parties are confronted with the sendmail logs,
they usually confess quickly...

Phil




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: baumbach@atmel.com (Peter Baumbach)
Date: Thu, 22 Jul 93 14:50:10 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: forged mail
Message-ID: <9307222111.AA04163@bass.chp.atmel.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I only have access to an email connection to the internet, so I cannot
test a method of forging mail that I learned.  

Is this a taboo topic?  It seems it would be useful for anonomous mailers.

Give me the go ahead, and I'll continue...tomorrow.
I'm done for the day.

Peter Baumbach
baumbach@atmel.com




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Derek Atkins <warlord@MIT.EDU>
Date: Thu, 22 Jul 93 15:15:11 PDT
To: baumbach@atmel.com
Subject: Re: forged mail
In-Reply-To: <9307222111.AA04163@bass.chp.atmel.com>
Message-ID: <9307222213.AA26650@toxicwaste.MEDIA.MIT.EDU>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


No, forging e-mail is not a taboo topic, but then again it doesn't buy
you anything if you're up against a smart person.  If you just forge
mail to me, most likely I can track you down to at LEAST the machine
you forged it from!

If you go through a remailer, then it strips the headers off, so its
not a problem.  But there is no reason to need to forge a message to a
remailer since it hides your identity in the first place.  That's its
job.

-derek




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: ""L. Detweiler"" <ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Date: Thu, 22 Jul 93 17:25:15 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: FAX on Internet
Message-ID: <9307230020.AA02146@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Here's some information on using the Internet to fax messages. This
gives me a lot of ideas. First, there was some talk here about
encrypting FAXes. Since somebody is already getting the data on the
internet, this would be trivial for someone to do here with PGP.
Secondly, I don't know if they are using mail or FTP to transmit, but
if they converted it to mail we could have `anonymous faxes' by
coupling with the cypherpunk remailers (then to a receiver site that
supports the FAX service via email reception). Finally, it seems to me
that this is the first glimmer of a very massive new market opening up.
Maybe the first entrepreneurs in cyberspace will be developing this
service.  Digital cash will be extremely useful here.

So far, no one has told them `no' (`is this legal?' he asks) but I'm
sure there's a lot of people that will be mighty upset by all this
stellar progress!  The problem with services like these is that once
they become wildly successful and popular the weasels whine and clamp
down.  Note the developers are also behind the Internet Radio.

Boy, when a universal network is built where commercial activity is not
considered some kind of shady taboo, our economy is going to just GO
CRAZY and EXPLODE. I'd like to set up a hypertext library with modest
transaction charges, and will do so once the opportunity is there (BTW,
also heard that Brewster Kahle, major mastermind between WAIS, has
formed his own company and is now marketing workstation `electronic
printing presses'.) All the elements are there. We're all dressed up
and ready to go, with no way to get there! Somebody go and kick your
legislator, and phone and cable company reps!


- ------- Forwarded message

Date: Thu, 22 Jul 1993 07:04:57 -0800
From: farber@central.cis.upenn.edu (David Farber)
Subject: actually it is really an experiment and should be viewed as one but ..

From: the terminal of Geoff Goodfellow <geoff@radiomail.net>


Today's SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS Business Section had the following
front page story (From the New York Times - by John Markoff):

        "USERS AVOID FAX COSTS WITH INTERNET MESSAGES"

   The dividing line between paper facsimile documents
and electronic mail is vanishing.
   Thanks to the volunteer efforts of a group of computer
network designers, the network of networks known as Internet now
permits users to send an e-mail message to be printed out on fax
machines at a growing number of sites around the world.
    Because transmission charges on the Internet are minimal
compared with those of the long-distance phone calls normally
used for faxes, the system is a cheap way to send faxes across
the country or around the world.
    To use the system, begun this month as an experiment in
remote printing, computer mail users include a fax telephone
number in the address portion of their message. The message,
which may include both text and graphics, will then be
automatically routed to a site that has agreed to serve a local
geographic ``cell'' for delivery of the fax message.
    So far, participating regions include all of Japan,
Australia, the Netherlands and Ireland, and in the United States,
metropolitan Washington, Silicon Valley and parts of the San
Francisco Bay area, as well as other pockets of the country.
    Leading the project is Marshall T. Rose, a computer
communications consultant at Dover Beach Consulting in Mountain
View, Calif. He has worked with another Internet researcher, Carl
Malamud, who has created Internet Talk Radio, a weekly commercial
audio program that is distributed internationally and can be
played on computer work stations.
    The fax cell sites are computers on the Internet that are
also connected to inexpensive computer-controlled fax modems that
can route the files to virtually any fax machine.
    Each site can designate the size of the area that it will
serve - whether an entire city or just the fax machines within a
particular company.
    So far, in keeping with the utopianism that still permeates
Internet culture, none of the fax middlemen and -women are
charging for their services. Rose noted that the blurring of fax
and electronic mail would raise thorny questions.
    ``Is this global and local bypass of the telephone companies
using the Internet?'' he asked rhetorically. ``Is this legal? We
need to think about this.''

(Information on Internet Fax Bypass can be obtained by sending a
message to   tpc-faq@town.hall.org).




------- End of Forwarded Message





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: ""L. Detweiler"" <ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Date: Thu, 22 Jul 93 17:45:15 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: PGP progress report
Message-ID: <9307230043.AA02655@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



A query was made about the Macintosh version of PGP and the bug fixes
in 2.3.  There was a bug in random number generation routines
apparently introduced in a recent version that caused some decrease in
security of the process but nothing seriously weakening. The Macintosh
version is developed mostly independently of the `official' PGP version
and the bug is not present in the 2.3 release. The 2.3a PGP release
fixes the bug. PRZ writes, `The security problem was mostly 
theoretical, not a practical one for most scenarios.' (more information
below).

Queries were made about the effort to streamline the Macintosh user
interface. In general, this has been underway for a long time in slow
but consistent progress (the improvement from say 2.1 to 2.2 was
significant). In MacPGP 2.3 a new online help system has been
added based on Norstadt's excellent Disinfectant code (a system
which exceeds the sophistication of many commercial software
packages). There is an announcement currently on sci.crypt
for the FTP site.

All GUI versions of the PGP code are somewhat limited in
sophistication by internal organization of PGP code toward the
`teletype output' mindset. A major effort is underway to remodularize
the code to internally encapsulate algorithms from the input & output
(user interface) to make future GUI versions more accessable to
programmers, and ultimately with new versions for users.
A Windows version is in the works.

PGP-RSAREF negotiations are plodding along with J. Berman of EFF as 
an intermediary. The developers are unsure of the reasons for the slow
pace.  J. Bidzos is supposed to make a major public announcement on 
this avenue very soon.

Finally, some concern has been raised about bugs in the PGP code. The
various developers are aware of the slightly disconcerting quality
control on recent versions. One of the most direct ways that PGP users
can help improve the quality of the software is to volunteer to
beta-test versions on their platform in a timely manner at the release
of new versions. Surprisingly few volunteers are available. If you
would like to contribute in this area, please send mail to
prz@acm.org.

Following is information from Z. Fiedorwicz, the MacPGP developer.

(Feel free to redistribute my message in its entirety.)

===cut=here===

Date: Wed, 21 Jul 1993 10:08:33 -0500
From: Zbigniew Fiedorowicz <fiedorow@math.ohio-state.edu>
Subject: MacPGP 2.3 randseed bug fix

There is a small bug in MacPGP 2.2 and MacPGP 2.3 in the
handling of the randseed.bin file used in the generation
of the random session IDEA keys used to encrypt outgoing
messages. (This bug is also present in the Unix and MS-DOS
versions.) Due to this bug only the first four bytes of the
24 byte randseed.bin file are ever read into memory.  Since
MacPGP also uses keyboard and mouse timings to generate
random bytes, this does not give rise to any predictability
which could easily be exploited for cracking MacPGP messages.

While a special bug fix version 2.3a was released for the
Unix and MS-DOS versions of PGP, this was necessitated by the
presence of several other bugs NOT present in MacPGP 2.3 (eg.
verification of clear-signed messages didn't work).  Hence NO
version 2.3a release of MacPGP is planned.

If you are concerned by this bug, you can fix it by hand with
ResEdit following the instructions below.  The usual precautions
when using ResEdit apply: FIRST MAKE A BACKUP COPY OF MACPGP 2.3

The patch: open the CODE 4 using the Hex Editor (under the Resource
menu).  Then using the Find menu, find the following offsets in
CODE 4 and apply the patches indicated:

Offset
0005E8   4878 0004 4878 0001
              ^^^^
              0018 <--- replace 0004 by 0018

0005F8   5980 4FEF 0010 640A
         ^^^^
         5180 <--- replace 5980 by 5180

Then choose "Save" under the File menu.

Exactly the same instructions apply to MacPGP 2.2 as well.


Technical Explanation:
The bug is caused by a single line in the 
  open_strong_pseudorandom(byte key[16], byte buf[24])
function in the crypto.c module:
  if (fread(buf,1,sizeof(buf),f) < sizeof(buf))	/* empty file? */
                  ^^^^^^^^^^^      ^^^^^^^^^^^
Since buf is an argument to the function, it gets reinterpreted by
the C compiler as simply 
  char *buf
and hence sizeof(buf) is taken to be 4 instead of 24 as intended.
This line of C gets compiled into the following machine/assembly
code:
0005E6: 2F0C          MOVE.L    A4,-(A7)
0005E8: 4878 0004     PEA       $0004
0005EC: 4878 0001     PEA       $0001
0005F0: 2F2E 000C     MOVE.L    $000C(A6),-(A7)
0005F4: 4EAD 067A     JSR       $067A(A5)
0005F8: 5980          SUBQ.L    #$4,D0
0005FA: 4FEF 0010     LEA       $0010(A7),A7
0005FE: 640A          BCC.S     *+$000C        ;

The patch converts this to

0005E6: 2F0C          MOVE.L    A4,-(A7)
0005E8: 4878 0018     PEA       $0018
0005EC: 4878 0001     PEA       $0001
0005F0: 2F2E 000C     MOVE.L    $000C(A6),-(A7)
0005F4: 4EAD 067A     JSR       $067A(A5)
0005F8: 5180          SUBQ.L    #$8,D0
0005FA: 4FEF 0010     LEA       $0010(A7),A7
0005FE: 640A          BCC.S     *+$000C        ;

which corresponds to
  if (fread(buf,1,24,f) < 8)
This is of course still not quite right, but unfortunately there
is no SUBQ.L #24,D0 instruction.  (SUB.L #24,D0 is a 4 byte
instruction which would mess up relative offset references all
over CODE 4.)  However the chances of this causing any problem are
extremely small.






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Timothy Newsham <newsham@wiliki.eng.hawaii.edu>
Date: Thu, 22 Jul 93 22:36:36 PDT
To: pcw@access.digex.net (Peter Wayner)
Subject: Re: Remailers/PayPhones and Today's NYT
In-Reply-To: <199307211630.AA03454@access.digex.net>
Message-ID: <9307230535.AA16240@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> 
> The article mentions that the phones can be problematic
> because drug dealers can use them to avoid phone taps,
> but it seems to conclude that this is a small price to
> pay for bringing the connection to the poor. Most customers
> use the service to call their home country and speak to
> relatives.

This is getting quite irritating.  Drug dealers have as much right
to use a pay fone as the next person until they are proved guilty
in a court of law.

> -Peter
> 




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: markh@wimsey.bc.ca (Mark C. Henderson)
Date: Thu, 22 Jul 93 19:30:15 PDT
To: ""L. Detweiler"" <ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Subject: Re: PGP progress report
Message-ID: <m0oJCoR-0000XJC@vanbc.wimsey.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> 
> PGP-RSAREF negotiations are plodding along with J. Berman of EFF as 
> an intermediary. The developers are unsure of the reasons for the slow
> pace.  J. Bidzos is supposed to make a major public announcement on 
> this avenue very soon.
This is good news.

I believe I've managed to overcome the legal obstacles to RSAREF+GNU
MP. This is of interest because PGP+RSAREF+GNU MP is actually
considerably faster than PGP on a number of platforms (at least Sun
Sparc, IBM RS6000, 80486 Linux).

Mark
(for those who are interested, overcoming the obstacles involved my
writing a public domain implementation of a subset of the
functionality of libgmp with the same interface. The subset is, in
fact, pretty much what you want to do RSA, LUC &c. My free code is
slower than GNU gmp, but it is functional. For more details, see the
last few weeks of gnu.misc.discuss).

-- 
Mark Henderson
markh@wimsey.bc.ca (personal account)
RIPEM key available by key server/finger/E-mail
  MD5OfPublicKey: F1F5F0C3984CBEAF3889ADAFA2437433




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Eric Hughes <hughes@soda.berkeley.edu>
Date: Thu, 22 Jul 93 19:40:16 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: REMAIL: replying to cp-remailed messages
In-Reply-To: <9307090322.AA03678@jobe.shell.portal.com>
Message-ID: <9307230235.AA26480@soda.berkeley.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>We might want to think about changing our
>remailers to have a non-anonymous remailing command as well as an anonymous
>one.  This way you could have "local" privacy from any sysop who snoops on
>your mail going out, while still making it easy for people to reply to you.

There should be a way to do this already.  Just as :: does header
pasting when a mailer receives a message, so should ## paste headers
when a mailer sends a message.  Then you just paste in a Reply-To:
header field when the message leaves the last remailer.

This technique is also useful for Usenet posting, for things like
Organization:, etc.

Eric




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Subject: No Subject
Message-ID: <9307230148.AA09179@emory.mathcs.emory.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



---- Transcript of session follows ----

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---- Transcript of session follows ----

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From: <boojum!esr@gvls1.VFL.Paramax.COM>
Subject: FAQ, round 2
To: boojum!cypherpunks@uunet.uu.net
Date: Wed, 21 Jul 93 14:03:02 EDT
X-Mailer: ELM [version 2.3 PL11]

I've written some more material for it.  Criticisms and additions
welcome.

--- DRAFT VERSION ---- DRAFT VERSION ---- DRAFT VERSION ---- DRAFT VERSION ---
From: esr@snark.thyrsus.com (Eric S. Raymond)
Newsgroups: news.answers
Followup-To: poster

This is the Cypherpunks FAQ.  It explains the projects and purposes of the
Cypherpunks mailing list.  It is also intended to serve as a general
introduction to privacy and encryption issues.

For details on the technical and theoretical aspects of computer cryptography,
see the sci.crypt FAQ, available for FTP from rtfm.mit.edu (18.172.1.27) in the
directory pub/usenet-by-group/sci.crypt.

The cypherpunks archive is available for FTP at

	soda.berkeley.edu:pub/cypherpunks

This site contains code, information, rants, and other miscellany, including
the most up-to-date version of this FAQ.

This FAQ is maintained by Eric S. Raymond <esr@snark.thyrsus.com>; send
additions and corrections to that address.  Sections contributed by others are
credited to individual authors.  We gratefully acknowledge, in addition,
feedback and comments from David Mandl <dmandl@lehman.com> and Eric Hughes
<hughes@soda.berkeley.edu>.

Here is a table of contents for this FAQ:

1. Why cypherpunks?

2. What are the essentials of privacy software?
   a. Public-key cryptosystems for secure communication.
   b. Unforgeable electronic signatures for message authentication.
   c. DC-net or similar protocols to thwart spoofing.

3. What are the potential applications of good privacy software?
   a. Secure communications.
   b. Digital cash.
   c. Electronic voting.
   d. Electronic contracts.
   e. Secure anonymous remailers and posters.
   f. <more?>

4. What are the key algorithms, tools, and implementations for privacy
   software?
   a. RSA
   b. DES
   c. Clipper/Capstone/DSS
   d. PGP
   e. Possible non-RSA trapdoor functions.

5. What are the social and political implications of good privacy software?
   a. Drastically lower transaction costs for trade.
   b. Expansion of the counter-economy.
   c. Disempowerment of government.
   d. Anonymity for whistleblowers.

6. What are the legal, political, and technical obstacles?
   a. The Clipper/Capstone/DSS power grab.
   b. The RSA patent and the PGP/RSA fight.
   c. RSA's base problem may not be NP-complete.

7. What can I do to help?
   a. Work on cryptographic software.
   b. Agitate against the Clipper/Capstone/DES proposals.
   c. Promote the use of encrypted communication.

To join the cypherpunks mailing list, send a request to:

	cypherpunks-request@toad.com

Working with us could be your best shot at stopping Big Brother.  So if you
have skills to contribute, act now.  The freedom you save could be your own.

1. Why cypherpunks?

   Because privacy is essential to freedom.

   If the government (or any other oppressor that behaves like one) can
effectively monitor communications, it can control or suppress them.  And it
will do so, because the natural tendency of controllers is always to seek more
control.

   The government cannot be relied on to protect your privacy rights.  Nor
can anyone else --- certainly not your employer, or the corporations that
want to know all about you so they can sell you things.

   Given half the chance, governments and corporations will always push
for security standards that protect *them*, but not *you*.

   Computer technology can help protect you against would-be snoopers, but only
if somebody is sufficiently smart and dedicated to build the tools.

   The Cypherpunks list exists to build and propagate privacy software.  Our
aim is to give you the tools to keep your private information private, and to
communicate with other people and computers in ways snoopers cannot tap.

2. What are the essentials of privacy software?

a. Public-key cryptosystems for secure communication.

   A conventional cryptosystem consists of an encoding/decoding method and
a single key.  Two users who share a key can exchange private messages.

   A public-key cryptosystem uses a *pair* of keys; one private, one public.
Anyone with either key can decode messages encoded with the other.  For
privacy, it must be impossible (or at least impractical) to deduce the private
key from the public one.

   Public-key cryptosystems imply many exciting things --- unforgeable
electronic signatures, digital cash, and secure electronic contracts are among
them.  The basic idea behind all of these is that, as long as your private key
is secure, people can verify that an encoded message containg known text came
from you by decoding with your public key.

   In the remainder of this FAQ we use `PKC' as an abbreviation for `Public
Key Cryptosystem'.

   The best-known PKCs are the RSA system, the Federal Government's DES
standard, and the government's Clipper proposal.  We'll discuss these, and
others, in more detail below.

b. Unforgeable electronic signatures for message authentication.

   There are many circumstances in which you want to be able to check a public
clear-text message for tampering.  To do this, the message must contain a
`digital signature' or `message digest code' or `message hash' derived from its
clear text, which can be checked against the clear text by a receiver.  For
security, the message hash should have the property that no one knows how
to modify a message in a way that preserves its hash.

   PKCs give you unforgeable signatures as a side-effect.  Unfortunately, known
PKCs are too slow to use practically for message hashing.

   Thus, there is a separate category of `Digital Signature Systems'.
The three major DSS techniques are Snefru, MD5, and DSS.  Snefru, invented
by Ralph Merkle at Xerox PARC, is of historical interest only as it has been
broken.

   MD5 is described in Internet RFC 1321, which also gives a reference
implementation in C.  As of July 1993 it is believed to be secure, but
has not been *proved* to be secure.

   DSS is a Federal Government proposed standard associated with the Clipper
proposal.  <more needed here>

c. DC-net or similar protocols to thwart spoofing.

<more needed here>

3. What are the potential applications of good privacy software?

a. Secure communications.

   With a PKC, you can send a message that no one but the intended receiver
can decrypt by encoding it with the receiver's public key.  If you encode
it with *your* public key, the receiver can verify that it came from you.

   This means that it is possible to do secure communications even over public
channels.  Neither nosy neighbors, business competitors, nor the government or
any (other) criminal gang can interfere with it.

b. Digital cash.

   Unforgeable messages also imply digital cash.  You could use a PKC to send
to the receiver a code permitting them to draw a particular amount of money
from your bank account.  The bank, with access to both yours and the payee's
public keys, can verify that the order is genuine.

   This means that it is possible to do trade over electronic links, without
any part trusting any other party beyond the bounds of normal commercial
risk.

c. Electronic voting.

   Unforgeable messages also imply secure electronic voting.  If you encode
your voting form with a PKC, the vote-collecting authority can verify it
with your public key.

d. Electronic contracts.

   If two or more people encode known text with their private keys applied in
succession, all their public keys will be required to decode it.  This is
an unforgeable contract.  Furthermore, it is an unforgeable *private* contract.

e. Secure anonymous remailers and posters.

<more needed here>

4. What are the key algorithms, tools, and implementations for privacy
   software?

a. RSA

   RSA stands for `Rivest-Shamir-Adelson', the names of the three computer
scientists who developed the technique.  RSA has withstood determined attacks
for over a decade and is widely believed to be secure.  It has been proposed
as an Internet standard.

   The RSA technique is patented.  The patents are held by RSA, Inc. <contact
information should go here>.  An implemenation in C called RSAREF is
available for research and certain noncommercial uses.

b. DES

<more needed here>

c. Clipper/Capstone/DSS

<more needed here>

d. PGP

<more needed here>

e. Possible non-RSA trapdoor functions.

<more needed here>

5. What are the social and political implications of good privacy software?

a. Drastically lower transaction costs for trade.

<more needed here>

b. Expansion of the counter-economy.

<more needed here>

c. Disempowerment of government.

<more needed here>

d. Anonymity for whistleblowers.

<more needed here>

6. What are the legal, political, and technical obstacles?

<more needed here>

a. The Clipper/Capstone/DSS power grab.

<more needed here>

b. The RSA patent and the PGP/RSA fight.

<more needed here>

c. RSA's base problem may not be NP-complete.

<more needed here>

7. What can I do to help?

a. Work on cryptographic software.

<list of current projects should go here>

b. Agitate against the Clipper/Capstone/DES proposals.

<more needed here>

c. Promote the routine use of encrypted communication.

<more needed here>

   You can help spread PGP and other appropriate tools far and wide
(both to help get a better foothold to thwart the Clipper proposal and
its ilk, and to work towards making crypto as commonplace as
envelopes).

--- DRAFT VERSION ---- DRAFT VERSION ---- DRAFT VERSION ---- DRAFT VERSION ---
--
						>>eric>>




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: deboni@diego.llnl.gov (Tom DeBoni)
Date: Thu, 22 Jul 93 22:05:17 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Macpgp 2.3
Message-ID: <9307230459.AA07078@diego.llnl.gov>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I just fetched macpgp 2.3 from soda, and wound up with a file ending in
the suffix "gz". This is a new one on me, and I don't know how to decode
it. Can anybody inform me? Inside whatever it is is a binhexed compactor
file, and I can deal with those formats, but the outside wrapper defies
every decompressing utility I've got.

Tom DeBoni
deboni@llnl.gov




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Date: Thu, 22 Jul 93 22:31:36 PDT
To: deboni@diego.llnl.gov (Tom DeBoni)
Subject: Re: Macpgp 2.3
In-Reply-To: <9307230459.AA07078@diego.llnl.gov>
Message-ID: <9307230531.AA12653@netcom5.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> 
> I just fetched macpgp 2.3 from soda, and wound up with a file ending in
> the suffix "gz". This is a new one on me, and I don't know how to decode
> it. Can anybody inform me? Inside whatever it is is a binhexed compactor
> file, and I can deal with those formats, but the outside wrapper defies
> every decompressing utility I've got.
> 
> Tom DeBoni

"gunzip" does the job. Fortunately for me, Netcom had it installed.
Gunzip the file, send it to your home machine (I use "sz"), unstuff it
and double-click the .sea file.

This compression stuff--pun intended--is getting out of hand. Files
are zipped, gzipped, binhexed, stuffed, and made into self-extracting
archives! Seriously, I've had several of these associated with just
one file. Mostly the compression is a waste, as the Internet already
compresses (so I have been told), and for sure when I "sz" the
gunzipped file to my home Mac for debinhexing, unstuffing, and
self-extracting, my Supra modem has already tried in vain to compress
the files for transmission! (I know, by the way, that binhexing is not
compression, and that the .sea archives are a way to ship multiple
files and folders, but, still....)

MacPGP 2.3 is very nice, by the way! A wonderfuly "help" facility, and
an even cleaner interface.

-Tim

-- 
..........................................................................
Timothy C. May         | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,  
tcmay@netcom.com       | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
408-688-5409           | knowledge, reputations, information markets, 
W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA  | black markets, collapse of governments.
Higher Power: 2^756839 | Public Key: PGP and MailSafe available.
Note: I put time and money into writing this posting. I hope you enjoy it.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Mandrake@f1.n8012.z86.toadnet.org (Mandrake)
Date: Sun, 25 Jul 93 09:38:11 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: question
Message-ID: <743619668.AA02220@cheswicks.toadnet.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


How does one get off the mailing list?




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Karl Barrus <elee9sf@Menudo.UH.EDU>
Date: Thu, 22 Jul 93 21:05:16 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: STEG: subliminal messages
Message-ID: <199307230404.AA00923@Menudo.UH.EDU>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



[I'm forwarding mail from Eric which was meant for the list as well]

From: Eric Hughes <hughes@soda.berkeley.edu>
To: elee9sf@Menudo.UH.EDU

>An interesting related topic is subliminal channels and messages.  A
>subliminal channel is one in which communication takes place without
>an external observer realizing it.

[summary deleted]

Gus Simmons has recently written a paper on subliminal channels in the
DSA (the one PKP is about to license).  The paper as of yet is not
officially published, but likely will be at Crypto '93 next month.
I've seen a copy of the paper, but don't have a copy.  

I do, however, remember this one line. "The DSA provides the most
hospitable environment for subliminal channels in any system yet
seen." (Almost verbatim, but not quite.)  

Assume this is true.  (I believe Simmons, myself.)  What might this
mean?  Suppose some agency of the government makes digital signatures
on some certificate for individuals.  To take a concrete example, take
driver's licenses.  The subliminal channel in the signature might be
used to encode, say, the following:

  1. number of drunk driving convictions
  2. number of drunk driving arrests
  3. insurance rating
  4. whether this person is suspected of habitually
    a. merchandising narcotics
    b. carrying large amounts of cash
    c. looking at child pornography
    d. wanting to kill police officers
    e. carrying concealed messages

Since the signature itself contains this information, and since the
channel is subliminal, the only way to know whether the channel
carries data is to see the software.

For this reason the DSA should not be used by government agencies to
make certificates for individuals.  It should be scrapped for this
purpose and some other algorithm designed which has a provable upper
bound on the subliminal channel of less than one bit.

Eric






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Dave Banisar <cpsr@access.digex.net>
Date: Thu, 22 Jul 93 20:15:15 PDT
To: "L. Detweiler" <ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Subject: Re: more on FBI credit search access
In-Reply-To: <9307212319.AA04464@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Message-ID: <Pine.3.07.9307222350.A22377-a100000@access.digex.net>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Sheri is unfortunally mistaken on this issue. There is a pending legislative
initiative to allow for easier access to credit records using a national
security letter, instead of a warrant. It was approved by the Senate
Intelligence Committee last week. This is different from HR175, the
initiative to allow for easier access to toll records that the house
approved a few months ago.

 The ACLU, CPSR, PIRG and the US Privacy Council wrote a letter to Sen.
Deconcini opposing the provision last week that I will send up tomorrow
along with the text of the bill, if I can find it in time.

Dave






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: J. Michael Diehl <mdiehl@vesta.unm.edu>
Date: Thu, 22 Jul 93 23:50:15 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Pgp help.
Message-ID: <9307230648.AA11771@vesta.unm.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


     Hi all!  I've got YAPP (Yet Another Pgp Problem!) I want to know how
people are signing their messages and keeping the message in plaintext.  I
see the message and the pgp sig on the end.  Could someone outline how this
is done so I can implement it in my mailing system.  BTW, I sure like being
able to compose email in WordPerfect.... ;^)
+-----------------------+-----------------------------+---------+
| J. Michael Diehl ;-)  | I thought I was wrong once. | PGP KEY |
| mdiehl@triton.unm.edu |   But, I was mistaken.      |available|
| mike.diehl@fido.org   |                             | Ask Me! |
| (505) 299-2282        +-----------------------------+---------+
|                                                               |
+------"I'm just looking for the opportunity to be -------------+
|            Politically Incorrect!"   <Me>                     |
+-----If codes are outlawed, only criminals wil have codes.-----+
+----Is Big Brother in your phone?  If you don't know, ask me---+




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Paul Goggin <chaos@aql.gatech.edu>
Date: Thu, 22 Jul 93 22:25:17 PDT
To: deboni@diego.llnl.gov
Subject: Re: Macpgp 2.2
In-Reply-To: <9307230459.AA07078@diego.llnl.gov>
Message-ID: <9307230524.AA16150@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Tom thus said,

>I just fetched macpgp 2.3 from soda, and wound up with a file ending in
>the suffix "gz". This is a new one on me, and I don't know how to decode
>it. Can anybody inform me? Inside whatever it is is a binhexed compactor
>file, and I can deal with those formats, but the outside wrapper defies
>every decompressing utility I've got.

This is GNU's zip compression utility. I am not sure if a port to the mac
has been made, but the source code is available. However, I have the prog
available here at aql.gatech.edu /pub/cypherpunks/pgp/binaries in cpt.hqx
format. The source code for gzip is also available in /pub.

Hope this helps.

Paul
--
R  O    All Comments Copyright by  | Technofetisht
 A  N     Paul S. Goggin (1993)    | Cypher, Cyber, Chaos              
  V        Information Broker      | Ergoflux, Interzone
   E      chaos@aql.gatech.edu     | Carpe Diem: Stop the Clipper wiretap chip 
Finger account for latest _Phrack_ | Public Key: PGP and RIPEM available
      For anonymous communication:---> anonymus+4744@charcoal.com
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Title 18 USC 2511 and 18 USC 2703 Protected -- Monitoring Absolutely Forbidden




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "George A. Gleason" <gg@well.sf.ca.us>
Date: Fri, 23 Jul 93 02:26:54 PDT
To: smb@research.att.com
Subject: Re: Remailers/PayPhones and Today's NYT
Message-ID: <93Jul23.022610pdt.14662-1@well.sf.ca.us>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Re "NY Tel cutting off payphone service in *some areas.*" 

You can bet those areas are black.  You can bet that high up in some
corporate office tower, the opinion was voiced, "what the hell do those
pickaninnies need phones for anyway?!"  Call it Information-Age Apartheid if
you wish, you won't be off the mark by much.  

-gg




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: khijol!erc@apple.com (Ed Carp)
Date: Fri, 23 Jul 93 08:35:37 PDT
To: gg@well.sf.ca.us (George A. Gleason)
Subject: Re: Remailers/PayPhones and Today's NYT
In-Reply-To: <93Jul23.022610pdt.14662-1@well.sf.ca.us>
Message-ID: <m0oJOuW-00026wC@warrior>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text


> Re "NY Tel cutting off payphone service in *some areas.*" 
> 
> You can bet those areas are black.  You can bet that high up in some
> corporate office tower, the opinion was voiced, "what the hell do those
> pickaninnies need phones for anyway?!"  Call it Information-Age Apartheid if
> you wish, you won't be off the mark by much.  

Oh, *bullshit*.  Decisions like that are almost always driven by monetary
concerns.  In this case, the vandalism rate for pay phones in certain areas
is too high, so they just pull the phones.  It's a statistical fact that
vandalism is higher in predominately black areas.
-- 
Ed Carp				erc@apple.com			510/659-9560
"Disagreements are not meant to be challenges.  They are just a different
 reality."  -- Risa D'Angeles
DISCLAIMER:  I work for me ... what's it to you? :)



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: mulivor@orion.crc.monroecc.edu
Date: Fri, 23 Jul 93 05:40:24 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Your Input Requested for Article
Message-ID: <9307231238.AA22099@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Hello Cypherpunks; I'm a newspaper journalist now writing a piece for the
American Journalism Review (formerly Washington Journalism Review). In case
you're not familiar with AJR, it's a mass-circulation monthly magazine
that's available at many large newsstands. Journalists in the U.S. consider
it a principal source of professional news.

My article is tentatively scheduled for publication in the Oct. 93 issue.

I am looking for:

              1. Examples of how and why anonymous e-mail has been used to
                 communicate with journalists.

              2. Your comments concerning anon-mail's role in the future of
                 newsgathering, particularly investigative reporting.

I need to receive your comments directly, not posted to this list. Kindly
include your telephone and fax numbers. Please do not send me responses
containing requests to remain partly or completely off-the-record. I won't
be able to use those.

The less technical your remarks, the more of them I might be able to use,
since the magazine has a non-technical readership. (However, in the
interest of interview etiquette and personal disclosure, I'll mention that
I have a technical degree and teach computer science part-time at a branch
of the State University of New York.)

I already have the alt.whistleblowers sizeable FAQ.

Please do not cross-post this to any other list.

Thank you in advance for your kind cooperation. I will acknowledge every
reply that I receive from Cypherpunks.

------------------------------
Philip Mulivor

mulivor@orion.crc.monroecc.edu
716 256-2222 voice
716 271-4052 fax




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: peter honeyman <honey@citi.umich.edu>
Date: Fri, 23 Jul 93 05:35:25 PDT
To: "J. Michael Diehl" <mdiehl@vesta.unm.edu>
Subject: Re: Pgp help.
Message-ID: <9307231232.AA21957@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


i use a script, which i call sign, as follows:

    #!/bin/sh
    exec pgp -sta +clearsig=on ${1+"$@"}

please excuse my unix idioms.

	peter




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: lefty@apple.com (Lefty)
Date: Fri, 23 Jul 93 09:05:37 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Macpgp 2.3
Message-ID: <9307231533.AA10180@internal.apple.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>I just fetched macpgp 2.3 from soda, and wound up with a file ending in
>the suffix "gz". This is a new one on me, and I don't know how to decode
>it. Can anybody inform me? Inside whatever it is is a binhexed compactor
>file, and I can deal with those formats, but the outside wrapper defies
>every decompressing utility I've got.

It's compressed with the gnu utility gzip, as Tim May and Paul Goggin have
pointed out.

However, as they failed to mention, soda at least will decompress .gz files
on the fly.  If you want to pull down the file "xxxx.yyyy.gz", issue the
command "get xxxx.yyyy" (i.e. leave off the .gz suffix) and soda will unzip
it for you as it ftp's it down.

--
Lefty (lefty@apple.com)
C:.M:.C:., D:.O:.D:.





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Peter shipley <shipley@merde.dis.org>
Date: Sun, 25 Jul 93 10:09:34 PDT
To: "George A. Gleason" <gg@well.sf.ca.us>
Subject: Re: Remailers/PayPhones and Today's NYT
In-Reply-To: <93Jul23.022610pdt.14662-1@well.sf.ca.us>
Message-ID: <9307231711.AA05990@merde.dis.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/x-pgp


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----


>Re "NY Tel cutting off payphone service in *some areas.*"
>
>You can bet those areas are black.  You can bet that high up in some
>corporate office tower, the opinion was voiced, "what the hell do those
>pickaninnies need phones for anyway?!"  Call it Information-Age Apartheid if
>you wish, you won't be off the mark by much.
>

Yea right!  have you ever noticed the about of physical abuse the phone take
in "*some areas.*".  I so not blame NY tel for cutting off payphone service
especialy when they have to repair/replace the phones every other week.
(note at we all know these phone are bulletproof, they are not broken/smashed
trivaly).  

the  NY tel Co. is loosing money in these "areas".   A valid debate would be 
if the NY tel Co. should maintain these phone at a loss.



	     -Pete



-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.3

iQBVAgUBLFAbu3ynuL1gkffFAQHoagH9HWQCmXlrMK29b3DW/XL0FSPvlRX5d/bv
gcgIk9dSKf971ZPCSvodazIpdkklIuyQvDhnhWfRwc3HyzKCLE/txw==
=owju
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: any@uu4.psi.com, old@uu4.psi.com, name@uu4.psi.com, I@uu4.psi.com,       like@atmel.com
Date: Fri, 23 Jul 93 11:06:58 PDT
Subject: local network only?
Message-ID: <9307231724.AA00600@hood.sjo.atmel.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Derek,

>mail to me, most likely I can track you down to at LEAST the machine
>you forged it from!

I don't have an account on this machine.  The machine doesn't seem to care.
Does the machine keep a record of this letter, I don't know?

I'm using the command mconnect on a sun system.  It asks me who I am,
and then trusts me when I tell it!  I have even told it I was ROOT, and
it filled in "Operator" from the local passwd file!  Is this security
so lax because I am on a local area network unconnected to the Internet?
Does anyone know?

mconnect even gives me help if I ask it!

I didn't mail this,
                    not me




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: lefty@apple.com (Lefty)
Date: Fri, 23 Jul 93 12:16:58 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: INTERNATIONAL ENCRYPTION
Message-ID: <9307231753.AA12197@internal.apple.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Sandy Sandfort writes:
>Geoff Dale asks about statutes prohibiting the transmission of
>encrypted data across international boundaries.  To the best of
>my knowledge, there's no such animal.  If such exists, it is
>widely violated, with impunity, by me and folks I know, on a
>regular basis.

Au contraire, I am certain that France has restrictions on the transmission
of encrypted data within its borders.  I believe Brazil does as well.

>Where do these urban legends come from?

Umm, many of them are based on fact?

--
Lefty (lefty@apple.com)
C:.M:.C:., D:.O:.D:.





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Mark W. Eichin" <eichin@paycheck.cygnus.com>
Date: Fri, 23 Jul 93 19:05:53 PDT
To: tcmay@netcom.com
Subject: Macpgp 2.3
In-Reply-To: <9307230531.AA12653@netcom5.netcom.com>
Message-ID: <9307231610.AA03543@paycheck.cygnus.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>> one file. Mostly the compression is a waste, as the Internet already
>> compresses (so I have been told), and for sure when I "sz" the
	You have been mislead; while Usenet News feeds are sometimes
compressed, Internet connections in general are not. I have a citation
of a paper somewhere (mentioned on the com-priv mailing list) which
(if I recall correctly) said that less than 1/3 of the traffic over
the NSFnet backbone used any kind of compression...

>> compresses (so I have been told), and for sure when I "sz" the
	The compression is only *partly* for the benefit of reduced
transmission time -- more often files at ftp sites are compressed to
save disk space at the ftp site, and possibly to reduce ftp transit
time to remote sites. (That said, there are some versions of ftpd,
namely the wuarchive one, that given a foo.Z if you request foo it
will automatically decompress it for you in case you don't have
compress; I think the same support for gzip exists (is trivial in any
case), though I don't know if many sites have it installed.
				_Mark_ <eichin@paycheck.cygnus.com>
				... just me at home ...





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Peter Shipley <shipley@tfs.COM>
Date: Fri, 23 Jul 93 12:30:39 PDT
To: Derek Atkins <warlord@MIT.EDU>
Subject: Re: local network only?
In-Reply-To: <9307231839.AA28473@toxicwaste.MEDIA.MIT.EDU>
Message-ID: <9307231927.AA08706@edev0.tfs.com.TFS>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>
>Yes, using the "mconnect" command will let you type anything you want.
>Like I said, forging e-mail is trivial, but it down't buy you
>anything.  There are always logs at some point!
>


btw:

    mconnect <host>

is the same as the command:

    telnet <host> smtp




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Derek Atkins <warlord@MIT.EDU>
Date: Fri, 23 Jul 93 11:40:39 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: local network only?
In-Reply-To: <9307231724.AA00600@hood.sjo.atmel.com>
Message-ID: <9307231839.AA28473@toxicwaste.MEDIA.MIT.EDU>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> I don't have an account on this machine.  The machine doesn't seem to care.
> Does the machine keep a record of this letter, I don't know?

You don't need an account on the machine, but I can still tell that
you came through amtel.com, and most likely originated from the
machine "bass", but I can't be sure about that.  Yes, machines do keep
logs of all mail transactions, so I could theoretically track down
that message.  It's not difficult.

Granted, it would probably take me some time to track this down
truely, although I know that you do get the cypherpunks list in some
fashion, so I can recursively track down everyone on the cypherpunks
list until I find you.  (I'm not going to do that, since its not worth
my time, but it's possible!)

Yes, using the "mconnect" command will let you type anything you want.
Like I said, forging e-mail is trivial, but it down't buy you
anything.  There are always logs at some point!

-derek




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: composer@Beyond.Dreams.ORG (Jeff Kellem)
Date: Fri, 23 Jul 93 12:00:39 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: local network only?
In-Reply-To: <9307231724.AA00600@hood.sjo.atmel.com>
Message-ID: <9307231902.AA00300@Beyond.Dreams.ORG>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


On the cypherpunks mailing list, Peter (it seems :) forged... ;-)
 > Derek Atkins wrote...
 > >mail to me, most likely I can track you down to at LEAST the machine
 > >you forged it from!
 >  
 > I don't have an account on this machine.  The machine doesn't seem to care.

So, you don't have an account on bass.sjo.atmel.com?  And, you wouldn't,
by chance, have a first name of Peter, would you?  :)  [Only the machine
name was gotten from your mail message.]

 > I didn't mail this,
 >                     not me

Of course not. ;-)  Just don't believe that simple forged mail is totally
untraceable, at least to the machine you forged it from.

FYI...

		-jeff

Jeff Kellem
Internet: composer@Beyond.Dreams.ORG




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: bobi@vswr.sps.mot.com (Bob Izenberg)
Date: Fri, 23 Jul 93 13:06:59 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Remailers/PayPhones and Today's NYT
In-Reply-To: <m0oJOuW-00026wC@warrior>
Message-ID: <9307232002.AA19450@vswr.sps.mot.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text


Ed Carp wrote:

# Decisions like that are almost always driven by monetary concerns.

Sounds like a perfect discussion to continue in email.  :-)

Bob
-- 
 ==============================================================================
   Bob Izenberg                                     voice phone: 512-891-8680
   Motorola RISC Software                               bobi@vswr.sps.mot.com
 ==============================================================================



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: nobody@merde.dis.org
Date: Sun, 25 Jul 93 10:09:53 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: GUI
Message-ID: <9307232229.AA07022@merde.dis.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>
>All GUI versions of the PGP code are somewhat limited in
>sophistication by internal organization of PGP code toward the
>`teletype output' mindset. A major effort is underway to remodularize
>the code to internally encapsulate algorithms from the input & output
>(user interface) to make future GUI versions more accessable to
>programmers, and ultimately with new versions for users.
>A Windows version is in the works.
>

How about a workbench of reusable components?

When will macPGP handle AppleEvents?





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Peter Breton <pbreton@cs.umb.edu>
Date: Fri, 23 Jul 93 13:15:40 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: forged mail
In-Reply-To: <9307222213.AA26650@toxicwaste.MEDIA.MIT.EDU>
Message-ID: <Pine.3.05.9307231654.B26575-b100000@ra.cs.umb.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain





> you anything if you're up against a smart person.  If you just forge
> mail to me, most likely I can track you down to at LEAST the machine
> you forged it from!

....but a smart person can ensure that you can't track him down FARTHER
than the machine he forged it from (without extraordinary aid, like
access to the site's sendmail logs).
 
> If you go through a remailer, then it strips the headers off, so its
> not a problem.  But there is no reason to need to forge a message to a
> remailer since it hides your identity in the first place.  That's its
> job.

  Actually, forging mail at the machine you're on en route to the remailer
protects you against:

1) Anyone who can snoop the message headers on the way to the remailer
("Tra la la. Let's keep a little list of everyone using those remailers...")

2) A corrupt remailer operator.

  I'm assuming you send from a fairly large organization. Then even though
they can find out which machine originated the message, one can't
determine which of the users (and there may be more than 100) originated the
message. Plausible deniability.


		Peter 

	(NOT the one who allegedly forged mail from bass.sco.atmel.com ;-)





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: fnerd@smds.com (FutureNerd Steve Witham)
Date: Fri, 23 Jul 93 16:20:47 PDT
To: Paul Goggin <chaos@aql.gatech.edu>
Subject: Re: Macpgp 2.2
Message-ID: <9307232314.AA09474@smds.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> However, I have the prog
> available here at aql.gatech.edu /pub/cypherpunks/pgp/binaries in cpt.hqx
> format. The source code for gzip is also available in /pub.
> 
> Hope this helps.
> 
>  A  N     Paul S. Goggin (1993)    | Cypher, Cyber, Chaos              
>    E      chaos@aql.gatech.edu     | Carpe Diem: Stop the Clipper wiretap chip 
Thanks, but
	a) BINARIES?
	b) who are these binaries PGP-signed by?
	c) what program do I use to verify the signature(s)?

I do mean the thanks.  Just wondering.
-fnerd
quote me




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Paul Goggin <chaos@aql.gatech.edu>
Date: Fri, 23 Jul 93 17:52:16 PDT
To: fnerd@smds.com
Subject: Re: Macpgp 2.2
In-Reply-To: <9307232314.AA09474@smds.com>
Message-ID: <9307240051.AA29998@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


fnerd formulates:

>> However, I have the prog
>> available here at aql.gatech.edu /pub/cypherpunks/pgp/binaries in cpt.hqx
>> format. The source code for gzip is also available in /pub.

>Thanks, but
>       a) BINARIES?
>       b) who are these binaries PGP-signed by?
>       c) what program do I use to verify the signature(s)?

If you look in this directory you will find pgp sigs for the files by the
uploading individuals. I do not have access to every type of computer, thus
I queried on cypherpunks approximately 5 weeks (I think) for binary submissions.
The unix versions have individual sigs as you can see, as to the dos, this is
the original shipping material, I have not looked inside since I rely on Unix
myself. The Mac version was picked up from soda.berkeley.edu, as I understand
it sigs are included within the compactor pro archive. The os2 version is
in the same boat as dos. As for the amiga version, I am at a loss I do not
have access to an amiga, but viewing the archive a signature is apparently not
attached. I will try to find out who I received the file from as I currently
do not remember. I would like everyones opinion though. I thought that offering
binaries from sources I considered secure was a good idea. I understand the
inherent danger in not compiling the source yourself, but.... not everyone
knows how to compile. What is the list's opinion. Is this a bad idea? Improper?


Paul
--
R  O    All Comments Copyright by  | Technofetisht
 A  N     Paul S. Goggin (1993)    | Cypher, Cyber, Chaos              
  V        Information Broker      | Ergoflux, Interzone
   E      chaos@aql.gatech.edu     | Carpe Diem: Stop the Clipper wiretap chip 
Finger account for latest _Phrack_ | Public Key: PGP and RIPEM available
      For anonymous communication:---> anonymus+4744@charcoal.com
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Title 18 USC 2511 and 18 USC 2703 Protected -- Monitoring Absolutely Forbidden




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: nowhere@bsu-cs.bsu.edu (Chael Hall)
Date: Fri, 23 Jul 93 20:45:53 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Encrypted communications with phone and PC
Message-ID: <9307240345.AA00738@bsu-cs.bsu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



     I am about 300 messages behind on the list because I'm dialing in long-
distance right now, but I just happened to think of something because it is
related directly to my work...  I install and debug voice mail systems all
the time that run on 286's, 386's or 486's and can run up to 24 telephone
lines on a single computer *at full speed*.  The analog signal gets
digitized by the voice board, compressed, and stored on disk whenever a
person leaves a message.

     What if an extra step were added where the information were encrypted
before being written to disk and it took the receiver entering his PGP
key on the PC before it would play the messages to him?  Then, if this
works, the user on each end could use a computer with a voice board in it
and dial into one port while an encrypted/scrambled session is being
transmitted on another port.  Who knows how real-time it would be and
I don't have the technical expertise to pull it off, but I see these
things go out of our office every day with little security other than that
of obscurity on them.

     One note, though, the voice boards that we use (high quality) cost
anywhere from $800 for a repaired one to $1000 for the one I like the best
to $1200 for a different brand that we also sell.  Neither voice mail
software vendor is willing to give us the super-secret security code that
unlocks full system access, so I seriously doubt if I could scare any
source out of them.

     Anyway, it is a thought and now that I have my own voice board to
play with I might just try to piece together some interesting software.

Chael

--
Chael Hall
nowhere@bsu-cs.bsu.edu, 00CCHALL@BSUVC.BSU.EDU, chall@bsu.edu
(317) 776-4000 from 8 am - 5 pm CST




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Dave Banisar <banisar@washofc.cpsr.org>
Date: Fri, 23 Jul 93 20:47:31 PDT
To: CYPHERPUNKS <CYPHERPUNKS@toad.com>
Subject: Credit Reports and NS
Message-ID: <00541.2826315450.4450@washofc.cpsr.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


  Credit Reports and NS
Here is the letter opposing the provision to allow for easier access to
credit reports. As you can guess,  the Senate Intelligence Committee (which
generally acts as the biggest supporter of the agencies on the Hill) did not
address our concerns at all and approved the provision.

 I was unable to easily find the actualy text but will get it after I come
back from vacation.

Dave




                           July 12, 1993


 The Honorable Dennis Deconcini
 Chairman
 Senate Select Committee on Intelligence
 United States Senate
 SH-211 Hart Senate Office Building
 Washington, DC  20510-6475

 Dear Chairman DeConcini;

      We are writing to voice our strong opposition to the
 Administration's legislative proposal to amend the Fair Credit
 Reporting Act (FCRA) to allow the Federal Bureau of  Investigation
 (FBI) to obtain consumer credit reports in foreign
 counterintelligence cases.

      The FBI seeks a national security letter exemption to the
 FCRA to obtain personal information from consumer  reporting
 agencies without a subpoena or court order. A  national  security
 letter gives the FBI the authority to obtain records without
 judicial approval and without providing notice to the  individual
 that his or her records have been obtained by the Bureau.
 Similar FBT proposals were rejected in previous years  after
 Congressional leaders expressed concern over  the  civil  liberties
 issues raised.

      Although the current draft proposal is more comprehensive
 than those circulated in previous years, the changes and
 additions do not alter significantly the central character of  the
 proposal. The Administration's 1993 proposal  includes  explicit
 limits to'dissemination of obtained information within the
 goverrment, penalties for violations including punitive  damages,
 and reporting requirements.  These provisions are positive
 changes from the legislation put forward in previous years,  but
 they do not save the proposal from its intrinsic flaws.

      Therefore, the reasons for our fundamental opposition to  the
 current proposal remain the same: 1) the FBI has not  demonstrated
 a compelling need for access to consumer credit reports; and  2)
 legislation that implicates civil liberties should be  addressed
 separately and not as part of the authorization process.

       There are only two instances in which Congress has
 authorized the FBI, in counterintelligence investigations, to
 obtain information about individuals pursuant to a  national
 security letter but without a subpoena, search warrant or  court
 order. First, the Electronic Communications Privacy  Act  (ECPA)
 of 1986 included a provision requiring common carriers to
 disclose subscriber information and long distance toll records  to
 the FBI in response to a national security  letter.  Second,
 congress included in the 1987 Intelligence Authorization Act  an
  amendment to the Right to Financial Privacy Act (RFPA) that
  requires banks to provide customer records to the FBI in  response
  to a similar letter. In that case, the FBI presented  to  Congress
  its case for obtaining financial records in foreign counter-
  intelligence cases and the difficulty of obtaining  those  records
  without a court order.

       in both instances when congress has previously  authorized
  the national security letter, Congress recognized that  the
  procedure departs dramatically from the procedure necessary  to
  obtain a court order.

        The FBI's current proposal seeks similar access to
  individuals' credit records held by consumer reporting  companies.
  The FBI has yet to adequately justify its need to add such  highly
  personal, sensitive information to the narrow category of  records
  subject to the national security letter exemption.
       The Bureau claims obtaining credit reports will allow  it  to
  more easily determine where a subject of an investigation  banks
  -- information the FBI claims will help them effectuate their
  ability to access bank records under the RFPA. We  opposed  the
  national security letter exemption in the RFPA and do not  endorse
  the FBI's slippery slope approach to ensuring that they  can  more
  easily obtain financial information in foreign
  counterintelligence cases. This information can be  and  is
  routinely gained without credit reports.  We do not believe
  convenience is a sufficient justification for this  significant
  exception to the law.
       The FBI further argues that obtaining banking  information
  through a credit report is preferred because it is  actually  leas
  intrusive than those investigative methods that would  otherwise
  be used.  While we too are frustrated that other information-
  gathering techniques are frequently too intrusive, our  objections
  to the other techniques do not lead us to endorse yet another
  technique that is also intrusive and that weakens  existing
  privacy law.
       Finally, we object to using the authorization process as  the
  vehicle for pursuing this change. The national  security  latter
  exemption, because it diminishes the due process and privacy
  protections for individuals, must be given the most careful
  consideration. The FBI's proposal should be  introduced  as
  separate legislation on which public hearings can  be  held.  only
  in this way can the Committee test thoroughly the FBI's  case  for
  the exemption and hear from witnesses who object to the change.


      We urge you to reject the FBI's proposal in its current
 form.  We are available to work with you on this issue.

                          Sincerely,



 Janiori Goldman                                   Michelle Meier
 Privacy and Technology Project          Consumers Union
 American civil Liberties Union


 Marc Rotenberg                                 Evan Hendricks
 Computer Professionals for              U.S. Privacy Council
 Social Responsibility






 cc:  Members, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence

      The Honorable George J. Mitchell
      Senate Majority Leader

      The Honorable Donald W. Riegle, Jr., Chairman
      Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs

      The Honorable Patrick J. Leahy, Chairman
      Subcommittee on Technology and the Law









From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: karn@qualcomm.com (Phil Karn)
Date: Sat, 24 Jul 93 00:17:13 PDT
To: banisar@washofc.cpsr.org
Subject: Credit Reports and NS
In-Reply-To: <00541.2826315450.4450@washofc.cpsr.org>
Message-ID: <9307240716.AA10145@servo>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


"national security" - the root password to the Constitution...sigh...

Phil




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: J. Michael Diehl <mdiehl@vesta.unm.edu>
Date: Sat, 24 Jul 93 00:25:55 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Key Signing Policy.
Message-ID: <9307240723.AA08656@vesta.unm.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
 
     Well, I got a lot of good discussion about when to sign someone's key. 
I have since come up with my own policy on when I will sign a key. 
Actually, I plagarized much of it from the many good responses I received. 
If anyone looks at my policy, recognizes their words and objects, please
tell me.  Otherwise, after about 10 days, I will make my statement a matter
of public domain.  Also, If you have any comments/questions/additions to my
statement, please tell me  I hope this will help clear up some of the
confusion reguarding when to sign someone's key.  Laters.
 
BTW, what do you think of my new sig?
========================+==========================================+
J. Michael Diehl   ;^)  | Have you hugged a Hetero........Lately?  |
mdiehl@triton.unm.edu   | "I'm just looking for the opportunity to |
mike.diehl@fido.org help|    be Politically Incorrect!"  +=========+
al945@cwns9.ins.cwru.edu| Is Big Brother in your phone?  | PGP KEY |
(505) 299-2282  (voice) |    If you don't know, ask me.  |Available|
========================+================================+=========+
PGP Key = 7C06F1 = A6 27 E1 1D 5F B2 F2 F1  12 E7 53 2D 85 A2 10 5D 
This message is protected by 18 USC 2511 and 18 USC 2703. Monitoring 
by anyone other than the recipient is absolutely forbidden by US Law
 
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.2
 
iQCVAgUBLFDMSlWjzUwifAbxAQG3ngP/QXhforNMRIcDp8/alFhz5jMfXYH5+UTd
xIs+hi6ocrSK2ZEtqfndto1agHaTdlNjAaJRgD8twmGrMUi+iEfRfsVtLwjBOTLV
Ly0sJbnLbxR9K+2DweC6YsqDNEMvCxS3QHR3q5/sq8jLcPMEdC0wHuZ8lhMp8yCC
VhFpls1Lv9Q=
=Lgii
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "George A. Gleason" <gg@well.sf.ca.us>
Date: Sat, 24 Jul 93 02:27:14 PDT
To: shipley@merde.dis.org
Subject: Re: Remailers/PayPhones and Today's NYT
Message-ID: <93Jul24.022600pdt.14455-1@well.sf.ca.us>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



How about a valid debate being over **how** to best provide universal
service in this day & age of red-lining?  Interesting to note that when the
private entrepreneurs open up U.S. versions of the traditional European
"Call Offices," (rows of payphones with a window clerk or other attendant to
help provide service & security), all of a sudden a chorus of voices go up, 
"OH NO, the Dope Dealers will use these things!"  Well, one excuse or
another, same old racist BS either way.  The right to anonymity has got to
be universal, and the right to access has got to be universal, or these
things become mere privileges which can be taken away on a whim.

-gg




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: geoffw@nexsys.net (Geoff White)
Date: Sat, 24 Jul 93 15:17:39 PDT
To: shipley@merde.dis.org
Subject: Re: Remailers/PayPhones and Today's NYT
Message-ID: <9307241600.AA00619@nexsys.nexsys.net>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> How about a valid debate being over **how** to best provide universal
> service in this day & age of red-lining?  Interesting to note that when the
> private entrepreneurs open up U.S. versions of the traditional European
> "Call Offices," (rows of payphones with a window clerk or other attendant to
> help provide service & security), all of a sudden a chorus of voices go up, 
> "OH NO, the Dope Dealers will use these things!"  Well, one excuse or
> another, same old racist BS either way.  The right to anonymity has got to
> be universal, and the right to access has got to be universal, or these
> things become mere privileges which can be taken away on a whim.
> 
> -gg
> 

So what if some small time drug dealers are using them.  One thing is for sure,
the Big Time drug dealers, (the ones with the ships, planes, and enough money
to finance the transport of tons of contraband) do not, and will not be using
them.  As far as dening payphone service in "high crime" (read black areas),
well the information kiosk would tend to solve the problem of vandalism, so
what's the big deal?  An for all you supposed libertarian types, I'm sure there
is some enterprising person or family who will be willing to take the
perceived risks with operating such an establishment to get the potential
financial reward.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: collins@newton.apple.com (Scott Collins)
Date: Sat, 24 Jul 93 13:00:08 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: RE: FAQ, round 2 (posting because of bounce)
Message-ID: <9307241954.AA26549@newton.apple.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I tried to mail these comments directly to Eric Raymond, who posted his in
progress FAQ.  My mail bounced, so I am posting it in hopes that he will
get it.  I missed a lot of the FAQ commentary, so I apologize if this is
all known.

Scott Collins         | "Few people realize what tremendous power there
                      |  is in one of these things."     -- Willy Wonka
......................|................................................
BUSINESS.   voice:408.862.0540  fax:974.6094   collins@newton.apple.com
Apple Computer, Inc.   1 Infinite Loop, MS 301-2C   Cupertino, CA 95014
.......................................................................
PERSONAL.   voice/fax:408.257.1746    1024/669687   catalyst@netcom.com


..........bounced comments follow..........
Hi,

Good work on the FAQ.  I'ts not a rewarding job, I'm sure; I just wanted to
personally express gratitude.

Sorry I took so long to get these comments to you.


  >   The best-known PKCs are [...] DES

DES is a symmetric cypher, i.e. *not* a public key crypto-system.


  >`digital signature' or `message digest code' or `message hash'

A message digest or hash is distinct from a digital signature.  In
particular, for a given input, everyone will derive the same digest or hash
but a different signature.


  >The three major DSS techniques are Snefru, MD5, and DSS.

Again, MD5 is not a signature algorigthm.  It is only a (supposedly)
cryptographically secure, i.e. one way, hash.  Everyone who runs MD5 on the
same input, will get the same output.  If you meant that MD5 is used as a
component of some signature algorithms (which is true), then I apologize,
it wasn't clear to me.


  >   DSS is [...] associated with the Clipper proposal.

They both come from the government.  They were both influenced by the NSA. 
They are not associated in any formal way.  More cousins than brothers.


  >c. DC-net or similar protocols to thwart spoofing.

DC-nets are anonymous voting mechanisms (at their heart).  I don't see the
direct relation to 'thwart spoofing'.


  >   If two or more people encode known text with their private keys applied in
  >succession, all their public keys will be required to decode it.  This is
  >an unforgeable contract.

Yes, although more often digital signatures are what people want and mean
when they discuss digital contracts.  With individual digital signatures,
i.e. a hash of the contract signed with your private key, each signature
can be individually verified.


  >   RSA stands for `Rivest-Shamir-Adelson',

Adleman


Keep up the good work,

Scott Collins         | "Few people realize what tremendous power there
                      |  is in one of these things."     -- Willy Wonka
......................|................................................
BUSINESS.   voice:408.862.0540  fax:974.6094   collins@newton.apple.com
Apple Computer, Inc.   1 Infinite Loop, MS 301-2C   Cupertino, CA 95014
.......................................................................
PERSONAL.   voice/fax:408.257.1746    1024/669687   catalyst@netcom.com





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Matt Schroth <Charles.M.Schroth@williams.edu>
Date: Sat, 24 Jul 93 10:08:46 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: FAQ corrections
Message-ID: <199307241707.AA29043@rowe.williams.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


[I tried mailing this directly to Eric Raymond, but I got
a bounce message a day later.]

Eric,

I have read some things I think are incorrect in the FAQ you're
working on.  I could be wrong, of course, but I wanted to point them
out to you anyway:

     In the introduction to PKC, you say that "the Federal
Government's DES standard" is a PKC.  Is there some way to
view DES as a public key system that I'm not aware of?  I
have only seen it used as a symmetric key system.

     In 3a, you state that "If you encode with *your* public key...".
I think you meant "with your private key...", as anyone can encode
something with a public key.

     In 4a, "RSA stands for 'Rivest-Shamir-Adelson'"...his name
is Adleman.

     I saw a few "more needed here's".  Are you soliciting help for these,
or are you just not finished with those sections yourself?

Good luck,

Matt




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: hfinney@shell.portal.com
Date: Sat, 24 Jul 93 17:03:51 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: forged mail
Message-ID: <9307242018.AA01350@jobe.shell.portal.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


From: Peter Breton <pbreton@cs.umb.edu>

>   Actually, forging mail at the machine you're on en route to the remailer
> protects you against:
> 
> 1) Anyone who can snoop the message headers on the way to the remailer
> ("Tra la la. Let's keep a little list of everyone using those remailers...")
> 
> 2) A corrupt remailer operator.

It's not so much a matter of "corrupt" remailer operators.  The remailer
scripts on the cypherpunks FTP site are distributed with automatic logging
of the text of ALL remailed messages by default.  This is intended for
debugging purposes, but some of the remailers still operate in this mode.

This could perhaps provide some protection against liability for operators
of remailers, because they can trace back the source of an abusive message
that was sent through their remailers.  However, it obviously seriously
impairs user privacy.

The only logs my remailers (on hfinney@shell.portal.com and
hal@alumni.caltech.edu) keep are the date and time when they did an operation.
No record is kept of any message header or content which would allow re-
construction of sender information.  The date/time stamps just give me a
general idea of how much my remailer is used.

However, Eric Hughes has pointed out that most Unix systems can be configured
to keep logs of all incoming and outgoing mail.  Such logs could be used to
reconstruct input/output pairs, by observing that a particular message sent
to me was followed by a particular outgoing message a few seconds later.  I
have not been able to determine whether such logs are kept on the machines
I use (the directories which would hold them are protected) but it's safest
to assume that they are.

I think a better solution to the problem than trying forged mail is to use
a chain of cypherpunks remailers, some of which are user-owned and -operated
and which (I think) have policies of not keeping content logs.  The monthly
postings of remailer lists include information on which machines are user-
owned, although no information is listed presently about logging.

Since the whole point of a remailer is to lose incoming-to-outgoing
correspondence, it seems to me that logging should be minimized, otherwise
there is little point to running a remailer.

Hal Finney 
hfinney@shell.portal.com




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: hfinney@shell.portal.com
Date: Sat, 24 Jul 93 17:02:44 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: REMAIL: replying to cp-remailed messages
Message-ID: <9307242019.AA01355@jobe.shell.portal.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I want to elaborate on Eric's comment about the "##" pasting token.
The cypherpunks remailers are activated by mail header fields.  They look
for a header entry of the form "Request-Remailing-To:" among the Subject,
From, To, etc. headers.  Although it is traditional for user-defined extension
header fields to start with "X-", Eric argued that since we hope to extend
remailer availability to the point that it is a widespread and standard
service, it was reasonable to choose a non-"X-" field name.

Since some mailers don't allow users to insert header fields, Eric created
the "::" incoming pasting token.  If no header field is found matching the
ones the remailer looks for, it then checks to see if the first non-blank
line of the message is "::".  If so, it copies all the following lines of
the message into the header, up to the next blank line, and then restarts
processing of the message.  The "::" line is intended to be followed by the
user-added header fields like "Request-Remailing-To".

When the remailer does a remailing step, it strips all of the header fields
except Subject.  Keeping the Subject header impairs security somewhat because
it would facilitate pairing up input and output messages, but it adds a
lot of convenience for users.

What is little known is that there is another step which can be done.  Just
before the remailer sends a message for which remailing has been requested,
it again checks the first non-blank line, this time to see if it is the
outgoing pasting token "##".  If so, it again copies the following lines
up to a blank line into the message header of the outgoing message.  The
message is then sent without further processing.

This means that any header line can be added to an outgoing message by
this means.  In particular, as Eric pointed out, a Reply-To header could be
added which would reveal the true sender of the message for those cases
where that was wanted.  Subject headers could also be added at this step
as well as after the :: incoming pasting token.  

Hal Finney
hfinney@shell.portal.com




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Rob Earhart <earhart+@CMU.EDU>
Date: Sat, 24 Jul 93 10:38:55 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Key Signing Policy.
In-Reply-To: <9307240723.AA08656@vesta.unm.edu>
Message-ID: <ggILCAa00WD5MF6Xx6@andrew.cmu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


J. Michael Diehl <mdiehl@vesta.unm.edu> writes:
> BTW, what do you think of my new sig?

  It's a bit long...

  )Rob




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: hugh@toad.com (Hugh Daniel)
Date: Sat, 24 Jul 93 16:04:23 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: POLITICS: Cutting off coin payphone services
In-Reply-To: <93Jul23.022610pdt.14662-1@well.sf.ca.us>
Message-ID: <9307242301.AA27582@ecotone.toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



  I ran into one that boiled by blood over a year ago.  I was on the
north side of Chicago having just gotten off the L, and walked about
a block to find a payphone to call the friends I was visiting to have
them pick me up.
  I had problems dialing, the phone seemed broken and would not dial
right, even when I used more then enough money.  I decided to report
the problem to the operator (and hopefully get my call thorough).  She
told me that the phone was not broken, but was in an area that was
not allowed to make coin calls from 7pm to something like 8am!  I was
welcome to make phone card or collect calls if I wished.  Right.
  You can be sure that I did not do any biz with that phone company
again if I could avoid it!  Hard though, as it was Illinois Bell.
  This is in no way the worst part of Chicago, the area around the
L is a bit grungy, but within blocks there are lots-o-YUPPIES.
  I wonder if this could be used against anonymity on the nets?
Maybe this is something that should be fought in the courts now so
as not to set bad presidents(sp?) for anonymity in general.

		||ugh Daniel
		<hugh@toad.com>






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: UCX_SMTP@crc.monroecc.edu
Date: Sat, 24 Jul 93 22:13:56 PDT
To: <cypherpunks@indigo.mese.com>
Subject: No Subject
Message-ID: <9307242219.AA18696@emory.mathcs.emory.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



---- Transcript of session follows ----

196608  %NONAME-W-NOMSG, Message number 00000000
-SYSTEM-S-NORMAL, normal successful completion

---- Unsent message follows ----

Received: from toad.com by relay2.UU.NET with SMTP
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Apparently-To: <cypherpunks@indigo.mese.com>
To: <cypherpunks@indigo.mese.com>


---- Transcript of session follows ----

196608  %NONAME-W-NOMSG, Message number 00000000
-SYSTEM-S-NORMAL, normal successful completion

---- Unsent message follows ----

Received: from toad.com by relay2.UU.NET with SMTP
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---- Transcript of session follows ----

196608  %NONAME-W-NOMSG, Message number 00000000
-SYSTEM-S-NORMAL, normal successful completion

---- Unsent message follows ----

Received: from toad.com by relay2.UU.NET with SMTP
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From: <boojum!esr@gvls1.VFL.Paramax.COM>
Subject: FAQ, round 2
To: boojum!cypherpunks@uunet.uu.net
Date: Wed, 21 Jul 93 14:03:02 EDT
X-Mailer: ELM [version 2.3 PL11]

I've written some more material for it.  Criticisms and additions
welcome.

--- DRAFT VERSION ---- DRAFT VERSION ---- DRAFT VERSION ---- DRAFT VERSION ---
From: esr@snark.thyrsus.com (Eric S. Raymond)
Newsgroups: news.answers
Followup-To: poster

This is the Cypherpunks FAQ.  It explains the projects and purposes of the
Cypherpunks mailing list.  It is also intended to serve as a general
introduction to privacy and encryption issues.

For details on the technical and theoretical aspects of computer cryptography,
see the sci.crypt FAQ, available for FTP from rtfm.mit.edu (18.172.1.27) in the
directory pub/usenet-by-group/sci.crypt.

The cypherpunks archive is available for FTP at

	soda.berkeley.edu:pub/cypherpunks

This site contains code, information, rants, and other miscellany, including
the most up-to-date version of this FAQ.

This FAQ is maintained by Eric S. Raymond <esr@snark.thyrsus.com>; send
additions and corrections to that address.  Sections contributed by others are
credited to individual authors.  We gratefully acknowledge, in addition,
feedback and comments from David Mandl <dmandl@lehman.com> and Eric Hughes
<hughes@soda.berkeley.edu>.

Here is a table of contents for this FAQ:

1. Why cypherpunks?

2. What are the essentials of privacy software?
   a. Public-key cryptosystems for secure communication.
   b. Unforgeable electronic signatures for message authentication.
   c. DC-net or similar protocols to thwart spoofing.

3. What are the potential applications of good privacy software?
   a. Secure communications.
   b. Digital cash.
   c. Electronic voting.
   d. Electronic contracts.
   e. Secure anonymous remailers and posters.
   f. <more?>

4. What are the key algorithms, tools, and implementations for privacy
   software?
   a. RSA
   b. DES
   c. Clipper/Capstone/DSS
   d. PGP
   e. Possible non-RSA trapdoor functions.

5. What are the social and political implications of good privacy software?
   a. Drastically lower transaction costs for trade.
   b. Expansion of the counter-economy.
   c. Disempowerment of government.
   d. Anonymity for whistleblowers.

6. What are the legal, political, and technical obstacles?
   a. The Clipper/Capstone/DSS power grab.
   b. The RSA patent and the PGP/RSA fight.
   c. RSA's base problem may not be NP-complete.

7. What can I do to help?
   a. Work on cryptographic software.
   b. Agitate against the Clipper/Capstone/DES proposals.
   c. Promote the use of encrypted communication.

To join the cypherpunks mailing list, send a request to:

	cypherpunks-request@toad.com

Working with us could be your best shot at stopping Big Brother.  So if you
have skills to contribute, act now.  The freedom you save could be your own.

1. Why cypherpunks?

   Because privacy is essential to freedom.

   If the government (or any other oppressor that behaves like one) can
effectively monitor communications, it can control or suppress them.  And it
will do so, because the natural tendency of controllers is always to seek more
control.

   The government cannot be relied on to protect your privacy rights.  Nor
can anyone else --- certainly not your employer, or the corporations that
want to know all about you so they can sell you things.

   Given half the chance, governments and corporations will always push
for security standards that protect *them*, but not *you*.

   Computer technology can help protect you against would-be snoopers, but only
if somebody is sufficiently smart and dedicated to build the tools.

   The Cypherpunks list exists to build and propagate privacy software.  Our
aim is to give you the tools to keep your private information private, and to
communicate with other people and computers in ways snoopers cannot tap.

2. What are the essentials of privacy software?

a. Public-key cryptosystems for secure communication.

   A conventional cryptosystem consists of an encoding/decoding method and
a single key.  Two users who share a key can exchange private messages.

   A public-key cryptosystem uses a *pair* of keys; one private, one public.
Anyone with either key can decode messages encoded with the other.  For
privacy, it must be impossible (or at least impractical) to deduce the private
key from the public one.

   Public-key cryptosystems imply many exciting things --- unforgeable
electronic signatures, digital cash, and secure electronic contracts are among
them.  The basic idea behind all of these is that, as long as your private key
is secure, people can verify that an encoded message containg known text came
from you by decoding with your public key.

   In the remainder of this FAQ we use `PKC' as an abbreviation for `Public
Key Cryptosystem'.

   The best-known PKCs are the RSA system, the Federal Government's DES
standard, and the government's Clipper proposal.  We'll discuss these, and
others, in more detail below.

b. Unforgeable electronic signatures for message authentication.

   There are many circumstances in which you want to be able to check a public
clear-text message for tampering.  To do this, the message must contain a
`digital signature' or `message digest code' or `message hash' derived from its
clear text, which can be checked against the clear text by a receiver.  For
security, the message hash should have the property that no one knows how
to modify a message in a way that preserves its hash.

   PKCs give you unforgeable signatures as a side-effect.  Unfortunately, known
PKCs are too slow to use practically for message hashing.

   Thus, there is a separate category of `Digital Signature Systems'.
The three major DSS techniques are Snefru, MD5, and DSS.  Snefru, invented
by Ralph Merkle at Xerox PARC, is of historical interest only as it has been
broken.

   MD5 is described in Internet RFC 1321, which also gives a reference
implementation in C.  As of July 1993 it is believed to be secure, but
has not been *proved* to be secure.

   DSS is a Federal Government proposed standard associated with the Clipper
proposal.  <more needed here>

c. DC-net or similar protocols to thwart spoofing.

<more needed here>

3. What are the potential applications of good privacy software?

a. Secure communications.

   With a PKC, you can send a message that no one but the intended receiver
can decrypt by encoding it with the receiver's public key.  If you encode
it with *your* public key, the receiver can verify that it came from you.

   This means that it is possible to do secure communications even over public
channels.  Neither nosy neighbors, business competitors, nor the government or
any (other) criminal gang can interfere with it.

b. Digital cash.

   Unforgeable messages also imply digital cash.  You could use a PKC to send
to the receiver a code permitting them to draw a particular amount of money
from your bank account.  The bank, with access to both yours and the payee's
public keys, can verify that the order is genuine.

   This means that it is possible to do trade over electronic links, without
any part trusting any other party beyond the bounds of normal commercial
risk.

c. Electronic voting.

   Unforgeable messages also imply secure electronic voting.  If you encode
your voting form with a PKC, the vote-collecting authority can verify it
with your public key.

d. Electronic contracts.

   If two or more people encode known text with their private keys applied in
succession, all their public keys will be required to decode it.  This is
an unforgeable contract.  Furthermore, it is an unforgeable *private* contract.

e. Secure anonymous remailers and posters.

<more needed here>

4. What are the key algorithms, tools, and implementations for privacy
   software?

a. RSA

   RSA stands for `Rivest-Shamir-Adelson', the names of the three computer
scientists who developed the technique.  RSA has withstood determined attacks
for over a decade and is widely believed to be secure.  It has been proposed
as an Internet standard.

   The RSA technique is patented.  The patents are held by RSA, Inc. <contact
information should go here>.  An implemenation in C called RSAREF is
available for research and certain noncommercial uses.

b. DES

<more needed here>

c. Clipper/Capstone/DSS

<more needed here>

d. PGP

<more needed here>

e. Possible non-RSA trapdoor functions.

<more needed here>

5. What are the social and political implications of good privacy software?

a. Drastically lower transaction costs for trade.

<more needed here>

b. Expansion of the counter-economy.

<more needed here>

c. Disempowerment of government.

<more needed here>

d. Anonymity for whistleblowers.

<more needed here>

6. What are the legal, political, and technical obstacles?

<more needed here>

a. The Clipper/Capstone/DSS power grab.

<more needed here>

b. The RSA patent and the PGP/RSA fight.

<more needed here>

c. RSA's base problem may not be NP-complete.

<more needed here>

7. What can I do to help?

a. Work on cryptographic software.

<list of current projects should go here>

b. Agitate against the Clipper/Capstone/DES proposals.

<more needed here>

c. Promote the routine use of encrypted communication.

<more needed here>

   You can help spread PGP and other appropriate tools far and wide
(both to help get a better foothold to thwart the Clipper proposal and
its ilk, and to work towards making crypto as commonplace as
envelopes).

--- DRAFT VERSION ---- DRAFT VERSION ---- DRAFT VERSION ---- DRAFT VERSION ---
--
						>>eric>>




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: smb@research.att.com
Date: Sat, 24 Jul 93 17:22:44 PDT
To: geoffw@nexsys.net (Geoff White)
Subject: Re: Remailers/PayPhones and Today's NYT
Message-ID: <9307250020.AA14394@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


A lot of the issue isn't drug dealers using payphones, it's credit card
fraud.  Ask yourself what hurts phone companies in their bottom lines.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "George A. Gleason" <gg@well.sf.ca.us>
Date: Sun, 25 Jul 93 00:07:58 PDT
To: smb@research.att.com
Subject: Re: Remailers/PayPhones and Today's NYT
Message-ID: <93Jul25.003746pdt.14039-1@well.sf.ca.us>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Credit card fraud happens almost everywhere.  Drawing a circle around a
neighborhood and zapping it is what's known as redlining, and when the
neighborhood is defined by its racial composition, it's bigotry and
discrimination.  And did you read Hugh's posting about the 7pm to 8am coin
curfew in Czechago?  They *allow* credit card calls after those hours, so
the credit card fraud issue is at best a red herring.

Wake up, how much evidence do you need that it's a simple matter of bigotry
and classism?  This stuff is real.  The bottom line is, in the information
age, access is power; hence the continuing little maneuvers to dis-access
the disenfranchised.  Too much access, like too much democracy, makes some
people very nervous.  Think about it, stop engaging in denial.  If what
we're fighting for makes any difference at the bottom level of the
grassroots, it's the right to drop a quarter in the slot and make a call
without having one's name in a consumer database.  That's basic privacy and
anonymity for you.  And it's all that a whole lot of people can afford.  

-gg




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: williacw@vuse.vanderbilt.edu (Charles Williams)
Date: Sat, 24 Jul 93 22:07:56 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: TEST
Message-ID: <9307250538.AA03918@necs.vuse>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Could someone E-Mail me a PGP encrypted message, so that I may test out my key.
I'll place my public key in this messaege.

-----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----

Version: 2.3a

 

mQCNAixv1gEAAAEEAJkpZFvYyCu23f5y7NuMQuEjIZzEbN2trPJJfGO5V8+8RX+V

j94S5cx3q5lkOEJz7/YjWx6c0EIU+gEbdQ4Fw/Ar5jOmVJNcCqUHJZlH/eLhVWb2

R5JqNF8FLfFBkBAWCccfPTbccdGFPz6Jjnzn87HJT3r4HKSgKKDQOWvqVsxdAAUR

tDJDaGFybGVzIFcuIFdpbGxpYW1zIDxXZXNsZXlAY3RydmF4LnZhbmRlcmJpbHQu

ZWR1PokAlQIFECxv2KWg0Dlr6lbMXQEBWgkD/268KxYNV0POptYQJRQKNNaAulCd

oaS5oG5EoQSg3mK9HkshWeq6mapk1xs0f2iZEedFqJq8m/oP1BMHM8XQ+uqn+HTp

/lsPg1aVqgkBzB3udF755WHf+IlbplnNTdJTqu4gLJKhwlYEEQUcop3KgJ4gh8g+

h/u+O8gpXqSdncS1

=GuoW

-----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: WESLEY@ctrvax.Vanderbilt.Edu
Date: Sat, 24 Jul 93 22:12:56 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: MESSAGE
Message-ID: <01H0XV5CT7O28X4EY2@ctrvax.Vanderbilt.Edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I don't think my last message worked too well. I am asking that someone reply
to this message with a PGP encrypted message, using the following KEY. Thanks

-----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----
Version: 2.3a
 
mQCNAixv1gEAAAEEAJkpZFvYyCu23f5y7NuMQuEjIZzEbN2trPJJfGO5V8+8RX+V
j94S5cx3q5lkOEJz7/YjWx6c0EIU+gEbdQ4Fw/Ar5jOmVJNcCqUHJZlH/eLhVWb2
R5JqNF8FLfFBkBAWCccfPTbccdGFPz6Jjnzn87HJT3r4HKSgKKDQOWvqVsxdAAUR
tDJDaGFybGVzIFcuIFdpbGxpYW1zIDxXZXNsZXlAY3RydmF4LnZhbmRlcmJpbHQu
ZWR1PokAlQIFECxv2KWg0Dlr6lbMXQEBWgkD/268KxYNV0POptYQJRQKNNaAulCd
oaS5oG5EoQSg3mK9HkshWeq6mapk1xs0f2iZEedFqJq8m/oP1BMHM8XQ+uqn+HTp
/lsPg1aVqgkBzB3udF755WHf+IlbplnNTdJTqu4gLJKhwlYEEQUcop3KgJ4gh8g+
h/u+O8gpXqSdncS1
=GuoW
-----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Chris Parrinello <parrinel@ux1.cso.uiuc.edu>
Date: Sat, 24 Jul 93 22:17:56 PDT
To: williacw@vuse.vanderbilt.edu (Charles Williams)
Subject: Re: TEST
In-Reply-To: <9307250538.AA03918@necs.vuse>
Message-ID: <199307250548.AA00239@ux1.cso.uiuc.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Your message dated: Sun, 25 Jul 1993 00:38:56 CDT
>Could someone E-Mail me a PGP encrypted message, so that I may test out my key
>.
>I'll place my public key in this messaege.

There are a bunch of extra newlines in your public key... I can't
add it to my keyring to use it...

Chris





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: UCX_SMTP@crc.monroecc.edu
Date: Sun, 25 Jul 93 09:53:11 PDT
To: <cypherpunks@indigo.mese.com>
Subject: No Subject
Message-ID: <9307250602.AA11977@emory.mathcs.emory.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



---- Transcript of session follows ----

196608  %NONAME-W-NOMSG, Message number 00000000
-SYSTEM-S-NORMAL, normal successful completion

---- Unsent message follows ----

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---- Transcript of session follows ----

196608  %NONAME-W-NOMSG, Message number 00000000
-SYSTEM-S-NORMAL, normal successful completion

---- Unsent message follows ----

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---- Transcript of session follows ----

196608  %NONAME-W-NOMSG, Message number 00000000
-SYSTEM-S-NORMAL, normal successful completion

---- Unsent message follows ----

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---- Transcript of session follows ----

196608  %NONAME-W-NOMSG, Message number 00000000
-SYSTEM-S-NORMAL, normal successful completion

---- Unsent message follows ----

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From: <boojum!esr@gvls1.VFL.Paramax.COM>
Subject: FAQ, round 2
To: boojum!cypherpunks@uunet.uu.net
Date: Wed, 21 Jul 93 14:03:02 EDT
X-Mailer: ELM [version 2.3 PL11]

I've written some more material for it.  Criticisms and additions
welcome.

--- DRAFT VERSION ---- DRAFT VERSION ---- DRAFT VERSION ---- DRAFT VERSION ---
From: esr@snark.thyrsus.com (Eric S. Raymond)
Newsgroups: news.answers
Followup-To: poster

This is the Cypherpunks FAQ.  It explains the projects and purposes of the
Cypherpunks mailing list.  It is also intended to serve as a general
introduction to privacy and encryption issues.

For details on the technical and theoretical aspects of computer cryptography,
see the sci.crypt FAQ, available for FTP from rtfm.mit.edu (18.172.1.27) in the
directory pub/usenet-by-group/sci.crypt.

The cypherpunks archive is available for FTP at

	soda.berkeley.edu:pub/cypherpunks

This site contains code, information, rants, and other miscellany, including
the most up-to-date version of this FAQ.

This FAQ is maintained by Eric S. Raymond <esr@snark.thyrsus.com>; send
additions and corrections to that address.  Sections contributed by others are
credited to individual authors.  We gratefully acknowledge, in addition,
feedback and comments from David Mandl <dmandl@lehman.com> and Eric Hughes
<hughes@soda.berkeley.edu>.

Here is a table of contents for this FAQ:

1. Why cypherpunks?

2. What are the essentials of privacy software?
   a. Public-key cryptosystems for secure communication.
   b. Unforgeable electronic signatures for message authentication.
   c. DC-net or similar protocols to thwart spoofing.

3. What are the potential applications of good privacy software?
   a. Secure communications.
   b. Digital cash.
   c. Electronic voting.
   d. Electronic contracts.
   e. Secure anonymous remailers and posters.
   f. <more?>

4. What are the key algorithms, tools, and implementations for privacy
   software?
   a. RSA
   b. DES
   c. Clipper/Capstone/DSS
   d. PGP
   e. Possible non-RSA trapdoor functions.

5. What are the social and political implications of good privacy software?
   a. Drastically lower transaction costs for trade.
   b. Expansion of the counter-economy.
   c. Disempowerment of government.
   d. Anonymity for whistleblowers.

6. What are the legal, political, and technical obstacles?
   a. The Clipper/Capstone/DSS power grab.
   b. The RSA patent and the PGP/RSA fight.
   c. RSA's base problem may not be NP-complete.

7. What can I do to help?
   a. Work on cryptographic software.
   b. Agitate against the Clipper/Capstone/DES proposals.
   c. Promote the use of encrypted communication.

To join the cypherpunks mailing list, send a request to:

	cypherpunks-request@toad.com

Working with us could be your best shot at stopping Big Brother.  So if you
have skills to contribute, act now.  The freedom you save could be your own.

1. Why cypherpunks?

   Because privacy is essential to freedom.

   If the government (or any other oppressor that behaves like one) can
effectively monitor communications, it can control or suppress them.  And it
will do so, because the natural tendency of controllers is always to seek more
control.

   The government cannot be relied on to protect your privacy rights.  Nor
can anyone else --- certainly not your employer, or the corporations that
want to know all about you so they can sell you things.

   Given half the chance, governments and corporations will always push
for security standards that protect *them*, but not *you*.

   Computer technology can help protect you against would-be snoopers, but only
if somebody is sufficiently smart and dedicated to build the tools.

   The Cypherpunks list exists to build and propagate privacy software.  Our
aim is to give you the tools to keep your private information private, and to
communicate with other people and computers in ways snoopers cannot tap.

2. What are the essentials of privacy software?

a. Public-key cryptosystems for secure communication.

   A conventional cryptosystem consists of an encoding/decoding method and
a single key.  Two users who share a key can exchange private messages.

   A public-key cryptosystem uses a *pair* of keys; one private, one public.
Anyone with either key can decode messages encoded with the other.  For
privacy, it must be impossible (or at least impractical) to deduce the private
key from the public one.

   Public-key cryptosystems imply many exciting things --- unforgeable
electronic signatures, digital cash, and secure electronic contracts are among
them.  The basic idea behind all of these is that, as long as your private key
is secure, people can verify that an encoded message containg known text came
from you by decoding with your public key.

   In the remainder of this FAQ we use `PKC' as an abbreviation for `Public
Key Cryptosystem'.

   The best-known PKCs are the RSA system, the Federal Government's DES
standard, and the government's Clipper proposal.  We'll discuss these, and
others, in more detail below.

b. Unforgeable electronic signatures for message authentication.

   There are many circumstances in which you want to be able to check a public
clear-text message for tampering.  To do this, the message must contain a
`digital signature' or `message digest code' or `message hash' derived from its
clear text, which can be checked against the clear text by a receiver.  For
security, the message hash should have the property that no one knows how
to modify a message in a way that preserves its hash.

   PKCs give you unforgeable signatures as a side-effect.  Unfortunately, known
PKCs are too slow to use practically for message hashing.

   Thus, there is a separate category of `Digital Signature Systems'.
The three major DSS techniques are Snefru, MD5, and DSS.  Snefru, invented
by Ralph Merkle at Xerox PARC, is of historical interest only as it has been
broken.

   MD5 is described in Internet RFC 1321, which also gives a reference
implementation in C.  As of July 1993 it is believed to be secure, but
has not been *proved* to be secure.

   DSS is a Federal Government proposed standard associated with the Clipper
proposal.  <more needed here>

c. DC-net or similar protocols to thwart spoofing.

<more needed here>

3. What are the potential applications of good privacy software?

a. Secure communications.

   With a PKC, you can send a message that no one but the intended receiver
can decrypt by encoding it with the receiver's public key.  If you encode
it with *your* public key, the receiver can verify that it came from you.

   This means that it is possible to do secure communications even over public
channels.  Neither nosy neighbors, business competitors, nor the government or
any (other) criminal gang can interfere with it.

b. Digital cash.

   Unforgeable messages also imply digital cash.  You could use a PKC to send
to the receiver a code permitting them to draw a particular amount of money
from your bank account.  The bank, with access to both yours and the payee's
public keys, can verify that the order is genuine.

   This means that it is possible to do trade over electronic links, without
any part trusting any other party beyond the bounds of normal commercial
risk.

c. Electronic voting.

   Unforgeable messages also imply secure electronic voting.  If you encode
your voting form with a PKC, the vote-collecting authority can verify it
with your public key.

d. Electronic contracts.

   If two or more people encode known text with their private keys applied in
succession, all their public keys will be required to decode it.  This is
an unforgeable contract.  Furthermore, it is an unforgeable *private* contract.

e. Secure anonymous remailers and posters.

<more needed here>

4. What are the key algorithms, tools, and implementations for privacy
   software?

a. RSA

   RSA stands for `Rivest-Shamir-Adelson', the names of the three computer
scientists who developed the technique.  RSA has withstood determined attacks
for over a decade and is widely believed to be secure.  It has been proposed
as an Internet standard.

   The RSA technique is patented.  The patents are held by RSA, Inc. <contact
information should go here>.  An implemenation in C called RSAREF is
available for research and certain noncommercial uses.

b. DES

<more needed here>

c. Clipper/Capstone/DSS

<more needed here>

d. PGP

<more needed here>

e. Possible non-RSA trapdoor functions.

<more needed here>

5. What are the social and political implications of good privacy software?

a. Drastically lower transaction costs for trade.

<more needed here>

b. Expansion of the counter-economy.

<more needed here>

c. Disempowerment of government.

<more needed here>

d. Anonymity for whistleblowers.

<more needed here>

6. What are the legal, political, and technical obstacles?

<more needed here>

a. The Clipper/Capstone/DSS power grab.

<more needed here>

b. The RSA patent and the PGP/RSA fight.

<more needed here>

c. RSA's base problem may not be NP-complete.

<more needed here>

7. What can I do to help?

a. Work on cryptographic software.

<list of current projects should go here>

b. Agitate against the Clipper/Capstone/DES proposals.

<more needed here>

c. Promote the routine use of encrypted communication.

<more needed here>

   You can help spread PGP and other appropriate tools far and wide
(both to help get a better foothold to thwart the Clipper proposal and
its ilk, and to work towards making crypto as commonplace as
envelopes).

--- DRAFT VERSION ---- DRAFT VERSION ---- DRAFT VERSION ---- DRAFT VERSION ---
--
						>>eric>>




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Peter shipley <shipley@merde.dis.org>
Date: Sun, 25 Jul 93 10:08:11 PDT
To: geoffw@nexsys.net (Geoff White)
Subject: Re: Remailers/PayPhones and Today's NYT
In-Reply-To: <9307241600.AA00619@nexsys.nexsys.net>
Message-ID: <9307250944.AA15322@merde.dis.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/x-pgp


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----


>.  As far as dening payphone service in "high crime" (read black areas),

Gee I guess all us asian &  white foke better stop driving into black
areas to destroy payphones and preform credit card fraud.

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.3

iQBVAgUBLFJV4HynuL1gkffFAQGC1wH+LV/hdfD93Y0lzwwSDj411cwC8ZU60/0s
VrIMM/iqRUXSMiVCn49315nHd0NIMLldGYNf0hYK8kJieC4/mC2a/w==
=TspG
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: covin@cs.uchicago.edu
Date: Sun, 25 Jul 93 09:58:13 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Remailers/PayPhones and Today's NYT
Message-ID: <9307251731.AA28061@tartarus.uchicago.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


"George A. Gleason" <gg@well.sf.ca.us> writes:

>And did you read Hugh's posting about the 7pm to 8am coin
>curfew in Czechago?
...
>Wake up, how much evidence do you need that it's a simple matter of bigotry
>and classism?

Hm.  Perhaps it is.  On the other hand, it could also be a combination
of a little bit of greed for power with a bit of genuine fear and despair.
You see, if the Chicago Tribune can be believed, there are actual citizens'
groups lobbying for the removal of pay phones from certain areas of the
city.  Groups of citizens who *live* in those same areas.

These folk claim that public pay phones attract drug dealers, presumably
because of the semi-anonymity they provide.  I don't know personally how
true this claim is, but I can understand the advantages that a pay phone
might offer to a drug dealer.  Sure, the "big time" dealers might not
use anything as plebian as a public pay phone, but drugs are a big booming
business, and clearly there are far more small-time dealers than big-time
ones.

They further claim that drug dealers attract violence.  I don't know myself
if this is true, but I do know from reading the paper that an absurdly large
number of people are killed in Chicago by stray bullets shot by drug dealers
in conflicts with each other.  And, of course, still more folks who *are*
drug dealers are killed directly, each year.

Finally, they claim that merchants in certain areas are pandering to the
drug-dealer market for pay phones by installing far more than one would
otherwise think necessary.  I haven't seen this myself, but the article I
read did mention what seemed like unusually large clusters (street corners
with 7-10 pay phones).

That's the fear and despair bit.  It could be bigotry, it could be classism--
but stray bullets are damn good motivators too, and here in Chicago we have
a lot of them.

As for greed: this could be a factor, it might not.  At least one alderman
has made it illegal to install new pay phones in his ward without his explicit
permission.  Clearly this adds to his power.  The same fellow has made much
of his public name in recent campaigning against these public pay phones,
and threatening to take an axe to them himself if some of them weren't
removed.  Make of this what you will.

How much more evidence do I need that it's a simple matter of bigotry
and classism?  Well, a bit more than I've seen so far.

Cypherpunk content?  This is a damn good illustration of the problems that
can crop up with an anonymous service.  Though services on the net have the
advantage of not being tied to a physical location, like pay phones are;
so they probably won't serve to attract a "bad element" to any particular
place.  On the other hand, any sort of public terminal service offering 
encrypted email, might very well.

                            -David




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: khijol!erc@apple.com (Ed Carp)
Date: Sun, 25 Jul 93 12:53:17 PDT
To: gg@well.sf.ca.us (George A. Gleason)
Subject: Re: Remailers/PayPhones and Today's NYT
In-Reply-To: <93Jul24.022600pdt.14455-1@well.sf.ca.us>
Message-ID: <m0oKCJz-0002EXC@warrior>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text


> help provide service & security), all of a sudden a chorus of voices go up, 
> "OH NO, the Dope Dealers will use these things!"  Well, one excuse or
> another, same old racist BS either way.  The right to anonymity has got to

Why is everything a "racist" issue?  I seriously doubt that everything can be
traced back to racism, overt or otherwise.  Most things, however, can be
traced back to simple economics, disguised as racism, fear of crime, or other
"causes".
-- 
Ed Carp				erc@apple.com			510/659-9560

If you want magic, let go of your armor.  Magic is so much stronger than
steel!        -- Richard Bach, "The Bridge Across Forever"



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: fergp@sytex.com (Paul Ferguson)
Date: Sun, 25 Jul 93 14:48:38 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: e-mail to USENET remailers (info)
Message-ID: <eDH07B1w165w@sytex.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Could someone re-post the information of the e-mail to USENET newsgroup 
system remailers? I remember someone mentioning it a few weeks back (some 
in Texas, the great state of), but seem to have not saved the message or 
missed it in my archives.
 
Thanks in advance.

Paul Ferguson               |  "Government, even in its best state,
Network Integrator          |   is but a necessary evil; in its worst
Centreville, Virginia USA   |   state, an intolerable one."
fergp@sytex.com             |      - Thomas Paine, Common Sense
 
         I love my country, but I fear its government.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
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To: <cypherpunks@indigo.mese.com>
Subject: No Subject
Message-ID: <9307252243.AA03179@emory.mathcs.emory.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



---- Transcript of session follows ----

196608  %NONAME-W-NOMSG, Message number 00000000
-SYSTEM-S-NORMAL, normal successful completion

---- Unsent message follows ----

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---- Transcript of session follows ----

196608  %NONAME-W-NOMSG, Message number 00000000
-SYSTEM-S-NORMAL, normal successful completion

---- Unsent message follows ----

Received: from toad.com by relay2.UU.NET with SMTP
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---- Transcript of session follows ----

196608  %NONAME-W-NOMSG, Message number 00000000
-SYSTEM-S-NORMAL, normal successful completion

---- Unsent message follows ----

Received: from toad.com by relay2.UU.NET with SMTP
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---- Transcript of session follows ----

196608  %NONAME-W-NOMSG, Message number 00000000
-SYSTEM-S-NORMAL, normal successful completion

---- Unsent message follows ----

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---- Transcript of session follows ----

196608  %NONAME-W-NOMSG, Message number 00000000
-SYSTEM-S-NORMAL, normal successful completion

---- Unsent message follows ----

Received: from toad.com by relay2.UU.NET with SMTP
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From: <boojum!esr@gvls1.VFL.Paramax.COM>
Subject: FAQ, round 2
To: boojum!cypherpunks@uunet.uu.net
Date: Wed, 21 Jul 93 14:03:02 EDT
X-Mailer: ELM [version 2.3 PL11]

I've written some more material for it.  Criticisms and additions
welcome.

--- DRAFT VERSION ---- DRAFT VERSION ---- DRAFT VERSION ---- DRAFT VERSION ---
From: esr@snark.thyrsus.com (Eric S. Raymond)
Newsgroups: news.answers
Followup-To: poster

This is the Cypherpunks FAQ.  It explains the projects and purposes of the
Cypherpunks mailing list.  It is also intended to serve as a general
introduction to privacy and encryption issues.

For details on the technical and theoretical aspects of computer cryptography,
see the sci.crypt FAQ, available for FTP from rtfm.mit.edu (18.172.1.27) in the
directory pub/usenet-by-group/sci.crypt.

The cypherpunks archive is available for FTP at

	soda.berkeley.edu:pub/cypherpunks

This site contains code, information, rants, and other miscellany, including
the most up-to-date version of this FAQ.

This FAQ is maintained by Eric S. Raymond <esr@snark.thyrsus.com>; send
additions and corrections to that address.  Sections contributed by others are
credited to individual authors.  We gratefully acknowledge, in addition,
feedback and comments from David Mandl <dmandl@lehman.com> and Eric Hughes
<hughes@soda.berkeley.edu>.

Here is a table of contents for this FAQ:

1. Why cypherpunks?

2. What are the essentials of privacy software?
   a. Public-key cryptosystems for secure communication.
   b. Unforgeable electronic signatures for message authentication.
   c. DC-net or similar protocols to thwart spoofing.

3. What are the potential applications of good privacy software?
   a. Secure communications.
   b. Digital cash.
   c. Electronic voting.
   d. Electronic contracts.
   e. Secure anonymous remailers and posters.
   f. <more?>

4. What are the key algorithms, tools, and implementations for privacy
   software?
   a. RSA
   b. DES
   c. Clipper/Capstone/DSS
   d. PGP
   e. Possible non-RSA trapdoor functions.

5. What are the social and political implications of good privacy software?
   a. Drastically lower transaction costs for trade.
   b. Expansion of the counter-economy.
   c. Disempowerment of government.
   d. Anonymity for whistleblowers.

6. What are the legal, political, and technical obstacles?
   a. The Clipper/Capstone/DSS power grab.
   b. The RSA patent and the PGP/RSA fight.
   c. RSA's base problem may not be NP-complete.

7. What can I do to help?
   a. Work on cryptographic software.
   b. Agitate against the Clipper/Capstone/DES proposals.
   c. Promote the use of encrypted communication.

To join the cypherpunks mailing list, send a request to:

	cypherpunks-request@toad.com

Working with us could be your best shot at stopping Big Brother.  So if you
have skills to contribute, act now.  The freedom you save could be your own.

1. Why cypherpunks?

   Because privacy is essential to freedom.

   If the government (or any other oppressor that behaves like one) can
effectively monitor communications, it can control or suppress them.  And it
will do so, because the natural tendency of controllers is always to seek more
control.

   The government cannot be relied on to protect your privacy rights.  Nor
can anyone else --- certainly not your employer, or the corporations that
want to know all about you so they can sell you things.

   Given half the chance, governments and corporations will always push
for security standards that protect *them*, but not *you*.

   Computer technology can help protect you against would-be snoopers, but only
if somebody is sufficiently smart and dedicated to build the tools.

   The Cypherpunks list exists to build and propagate privacy software.  Our
aim is to give you the tools to keep your private information private, and to
communicate with other people and computers in ways snoopers cannot tap.

2. What are the essentials of privacy software?

a. Public-key cryptosystems for secure communication.

   A conventional cryptosystem consists of an encoding/decoding method and
a single key.  Two users who share a key can exchange private messages.

   A public-key cryptosystem uses a *pair* of keys; one private, one public.
Anyone with either key can decode messages encoded with the other.  For
privacy, it must be impossible (or at least impractical) to deduce the private
key from the public one.

   Public-key cryptosystems imply many exciting things --- unforgeable
electronic signatures, digital cash, and secure electronic contracts are among
them.  The basic idea behind all of these is that, as long as your private key
is secure, people can verify that an encoded message containg known text came
from you by decoding with your public key.

   In the remainder of this FAQ we use `PKC' as an abbreviation for `Public
Key Cryptosystem'.

   The best-known PKCs are the RSA system, the Federal Government's DES
standard, and the government's Clipper proposal.  We'll discuss these, and
others, in more detail below.

b. Unforgeable electronic signatures for message authentication.

   There are many circumstances in which you want to be able to check a public
clear-text message for tampering.  To do this, the message must contain a
`digital signature' or `message digest code' or `message hash' derived from its
clear text, which can be checked against the clear text by a receiver.  For
security, the message hash should have the property that no one knows how
to modify a message in a way that preserves its hash.

   PKCs give you unforgeable signatures as a side-effect.  Unfortunately, known
PKCs are too slow to use practically for message hashing.

   Thus, there is a separate category of `Digital Signature Systems'.
The three major DSS techniques are Snefru, MD5, and DSS.  Snefru, invented
by Ralph Merkle at Xerox PARC, is of historical interest only as it has been
broken.

   MD5 is described in Internet RFC 1321, which also gives a reference
implementation in C.  As of July 1993 it is believed to be secure, but
has not been *proved* to be secure.

   DSS is a Federal Government proposed standard associated with the Clipper
proposal.  <more needed here>

c. DC-net or similar protocols to thwart spoofing.

<more needed here>

3. What are the potential applications of good privacy software?

a. Secure communications.

   With a PKC, you can send a message that no one but the intended receiver
can decrypt by encoding it with the receiver's public key.  If you encode
it with *your* public key, the receiver can verify that it came from you.

   This means that it is possible to do secure communications even over public
channels.  Neither nosy neighbors, business competitors, nor the government or
any (other) criminal gang can interfere with it.

b. Digital cash.

   Unforgeable messages also imply digital cash.  You could use a PKC to send
to the receiver a code permitting them to draw a particular amount of money
from your bank account.  The bank, with access to both yours and the payee's
public keys, can verify that the order is genuine.

   This means that it is possible to do trade over electronic links, without
any part trusting any other party beyond the bounds of normal commercial
risk.

c. Electronic voting.

   Unforgeable messages also imply secure electronic voting.  If you encode
your voting form with a PKC, the vote-collecting authority can verify it
with your public key.

d. Electronic contracts.

   If two or more people encode known text with their private keys applied in
succession, all their public keys will be required to decode it.  This is
an unforgeable contract.  Furthermore, it is an unforgeable *private* contract.

e. Secure anonymous remailers and posters.

<more needed here>

4. What are the key algorithms, tools, and implementations for privacy
   software?

a. RSA

   RSA stands for `Rivest-Shamir-Adelson', the names of the three computer
scientists who developed the technique.  RSA has withstood determined attacks
for over a decade and is widely believed to be secure.  It has been proposed
as an Internet standard.

   The RSA technique is patented.  The patents are held by RSA, Inc. <contact
information should go here>.  An implemenation in C called RSAREF is
available for research and certain noncommercial uses.

b. DES

<more needed here>

c. Clipper/Capstone/DSS

<more needed here>

d. PGP

<more needed here>

e. Possible non-RSA trapdoor functions.

<more needed here>

5. What are the social and political implications of good privacy software?

a. Drastically lower transaction costs for trade.

<more needed here>

b. Expansion of the counter-economy.

<more needed here>

c. Disempowerment of government.

<more needed here>

d. Anonymity for whistleblowers.

<more needed here>

6. What are the legal, political, and technical obstacles?

<more needed here>

a. The Clipper/Capstone/DSS power grab.

<more needed here>

b. The RSA patent and the PGP/RSA fight.

<more needed here>

c. RSA's base problem may not be NP-complete.

<more needed here>

7. What can I do to help?

a. Work on cryptographic software.

<list of current projects should go here>

b. Agitate against the Clipper/Capstone/DES proposals.

<more needed here>

c. Promote the routine use of encrypted communication.

<more needed here>

   You can help spread PGP and other appropriate tools far and wide
(both to help get a better foothold to thwart the Clipper proposal and
its ilk, and to work towards making crypto as commonplace as
envelopes).

--- DRAFT VERSION ---- DRAFT VERSION ---- DRAFT VERSION ---- DRAFT VERSION ---
--
						>>eric>>




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: mulivor@orion.crc.monroecc.edu
Date: Sun, 25 Jul 93 15:59:30 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: email-to-newsgroup gateway
Message-ID: <9307252259.AA10932@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Paul Ferguson wrote:

> Could someone re-post the information of the e-mail to USENET newsgroup 
> system remailers?

Send your post to <newsgroup-name>@cs.utexas.edu

i.e., to post to alt.privacy: alt-privacy@cs.utexas.edu

Note that dots in the newsgroup name get replaced by hyphens in the email 
address.

If anyone knows of additional email-to-newsgroup gateways, I'd appreciate 
receiving these by direct email. Thanks.

Phil Mulivor
mulivor@orion.crc.monroecc.edu




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Date: Sun, 25 Jul 93 19:23:47 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: HUMOR: Drug joke
In-Reply-To: <9307260049.AA19807@s2.elec.uq.oz.au>
Message-ID: <9307260222.AA02781@netcom5.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


(Not much Cypherpunks content, but I'll make it brief)

Peter Murphy writes:
...much stuff elided...

> 	I think that one of the biggest crutches that the NSA and others use
> to infringe YOUR privacy is "The War on Drugs". It should be stopped, and
> now! Not only is it unsuccessful, not only is it hypocritical (I wince when I
> see those "Winners don't use drugs!" messages on video games), but it has
> also blinded a lot of people into supporting attacks on YOUR privacy. If it is

Here in Oceania (Orwell's name), the War on (Some) Drugs has caused
kids to be sent through a mandatory 12-week anti-drug brainwashing program
called "D.A.R.E.," for "Drug Abuse Resistance Education." The schools
administer this (my sister's stepson went through it in Kalifornia and
spouted anti-drug slogans for a few weeks....then he realized the
stupidity of it and is probably now more inclinded to try drugs just
as a counterreaction to the dweebs who gave the class).

In theory, the little junior Pavel Morozovs learn how to spot signs of
drug use in their parents, how to "Just Say No" to such dangerous
drugs as aspirin (illegal to have aspirin or Tylenol in most public
schools, even with note from parent), and how to dial a toll-free
number to call in the narcs and drug warriors.

Anyway, I have long wanted to get a t-shirt or sweatshirt
silk-screened with "D.A.R.E." on it, as so many phony parents are now
parent (I think the kiddies get gold stars if they sell one of these
shirts to their parents). But *my* shirt would go something like this:

"D. rugs
   A. re
     R. eality 
       E. nhancers"


I figure this'd shake a few folks up! (I wonder which states such a
shirt is now illegal in?)

I'm not really into drugs, but I hate this kind of sanctimonious
preaching (the DARE propaganda), and I'd love to see the reaction of
these phonies at the gym I go to.

The War on (Some) Drugs is clearly being used for no-knock searches,
deadly raids, seizure of property grossly out of proportion to the
alleged crimes (and sometime the property is simply forfeited and a
trial is never held--I can't understand how this is done, or upheld by
courts), and other such travesties.

As Phil Karn put it, "national security" is the root password of the
Constitution--invoke it and the Constitution is bypassed. To this we
can add "drug war," "money laundering," and "banned weapons." Maybe
even "unauthorized crypto."

-Tim

P.S. Speaking of t-shirts...maybe we ought to think about some
Cypherpunks shirts?


-- 
..........................................................................
Timothy C. May         | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,  
tcmay@netcom.com       | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
408-688-5409           | knowledge, reputations, information markets, 
W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA  | black markets, collapse of governments.
Higher Power: 2^756839 | Public Key: PGP and MailSafe available.
Note: I put time and money into writing this posting. I hope you enjoy it.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: guy@theporch.raider.net (Jonathan Guy)
Date: Mon, 26 Jul 93 06:46:25 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Digital Money
Message-ID: <m0oKITm-0009URC@theporch.raider.net>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I'm new to the list and this may be a dumb question, but what is currently
being done in the area of digital money?  Anything?

-- 
Jonathan R. Guy                    |  The opinions expressed above are not  
E-Mail: guy@theporch.raider.net    |     those of my employer.  Nor are
Snail:  P.O. Box 158325            |  they my own.  Actually, I copied them  
        Nashville, TN 37215        |        from the encyclopedia.



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Paco Xander Nathan <pacoid@wixer.bga.com>
Date: Sun, 25 Jul 93 20:30:11 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: HUMOR: Drug joke
In-Reply-To: <9307260222.AA02781@netcom5.netcom.com>
Message-ID: <9307260309.AA09932@wixer>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


"Sent from the cyberdeck of: Timothy C. May"

> Anyway, I have long wanted to get a t-shirt or sweatshirt
> silk-screened with "D.A.R.E." on it, as so many phony parents are now
> parent (I think the kiddies get gold stars if they sell one of these
> shirts to their parents). But *my* shirt would go something like this:
> 
> "D. rugs
>    A. re
>      R. eality 
>        E. nhancers"
> 
> I figure this'd shake a few folks up! (I wonder which states such a
> shirt is now illegal in?)
> 
> P.S. Speaking of t-shirts...maybe we ought to think about some
> Cypherpunks shirts?

ONE UP: make the shirts and/or stickers to look EXACTLY like "real thing"
*except* for these subtle mods..  Are they gonna sue?  Sue who?




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: bwp@mindvox.phantom.com (Jane Doe)
Date: Sun, 25 Jul 93 19:13:46 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: MacPGP question
Message-ID: <k3V07B1w165w@mindvox.phantom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


CPs,

Sorry to intrude with something as un-political as a user question, but
perhaps someone could tell me how to remove additional user id's that have
been attached to a public key. I'm using MacPGP 2.3. The public key is my
own, btw.

Thanks,
-bwp




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: geoffw@nexsys.net (Geoff White)
Date: Sun, 25 Jul 93 22:35:14 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Digital Money again
Message-ID: <9307260556.AA00479@nexsys.nexsys.net>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



	A while back someone, (I hink it was John) made a post abot
	doing some prototyping of some digital money applications.
	Did anything happen with this?  If not, can someone please
	tell me how I can get in charge with the person who has the patents,
	of a company which can send me info on how I would go about
	using it.   Any whitepapers that you know off would help as well




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: kelly@netcom.com (Kelly Goen)
Date: Sun, 25 Jul 93 22:43:52 PDT
To: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Subject: Tshirts(was Drug Joke
In-Reply-To: <9307260222.AA02781@netcom5.netcom.com>
Message-ID: <9307260610.AA21715@netcom.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


As we are now engaged in a battle of wits with the opposition
who being non compos mentis, are effectively composed of legions
of armed illiterate thugs spoting the words national security
May I suggest shirts from H+H Enterpises which are a copy of the
bill of rights on back and the US Constition on front...
Maybe the "cypherpunks t-shirt us version could
be a listing of the U.S. Patent numbers on PKC's in the US
with a red slash circle overlaid(the somewhat universal
symbol of negation) on front
 with specific excerpts from the ECPA on the back
 possibly the 1st, 4, 5 and 9th amendments could also
be fitted in
What do you think...
(hmm mabe a pen vs sword motif?)

    cheers
    kelly
p.s. the effect of the above could be to remind the Agent Tim Foleys
of the world that we DO indeed have rights...
-- 




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: cdodhner@indirect.com (Christian D. Odhner)
Date: Sun, 25 Jul 93 23:03:53 PDT
To: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Subject: Cypherpunks T-Shirt
In-Reply-To: <9307260222.AA02781@netcom5.netcom.com>
Message-ID: <9307260626.AA02916@indirect.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Timothy C. May <tcmay@netcom.com> said:

> P.S. Speaking of t-shirts...maybe we ought to think about some
> Cypherpunks shirts?

I've been thinking for quite some time of getting a tee shirt made up with
nothing more than my pgp public key (in Radix-64 format) on the back.
However the cost for one (1) uniqe tee shirt is a little expensive. What
else could we put on them? I'd be happy to collect everybody's suggestions
and get a design drawn up, silkscreened, and printed, and then I could
take orders and ship 'em all off to anybody who wanted one. I might even
pay the postage <NOT!>  ;->

Happy Hunting, -Chris Odhner
<cdodhner@indirect.com>




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: UCX_SMTP@crc.monroecc.edu
Date: Mon, 26 Jul 93 01:26:53 PDT
To: <cypherpunks@indigo.mese.com>
Subject: No Subject
Message-ID: <9307260345.AA19538@emory.mathcs.emory.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



---- Transcript of session follows ----

196608  %NONAME-W-NOMSG, Message number 00000000
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---- Transcript of session follows ----

196608  %NONAME-W-NOMSG, Message number 00000000
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---- Transcript of session follows ----

196608  %NONAME-W-NOMSG, Message number 00000000
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---- Unsent message follows ----

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---- Transcript of session follows ----

196608  %NONAME-W-NOMSG, Message number 00000000
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---- Transcript of session follows ----

196608  %NONAME-W-NOMSG, Message number 00000000
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---- Transcript of session follows ----

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From: <boojum!esr@gvls1.VFL.Paramax.COM>
Subject: FAQ, round 2
To: boojum!cypherpunks@uunet.uu.net
Date: Wed, 21 Jul 93 14:03:02 EDT
X-Mailer: ELM [version 2.3 PL11]

I've written some more material for it.  Criticisms and additions
welcome.

--- DRAFT VERSION ---- DRAFT VERSION ---- DRAFT VERSION ---- DRAFT VERSION ---
From: esr@snark.thyrsus.com (Eric S. Raymond)
Newsgroups: news.answers
Followup-To: poster

This is the Cypherpunks FAQ.  It explains the projects and purposes of the
Cypherpunks mailing list.  It is also intended to serve as a general
introduction to privacy and encryption issues.

For details on the technical and theoretical aspects of computer cryptography,
see the sci.crypt FAQ, available for FTP from rtfm.mit.edu (18.172.1.27) in the
directory pub/usenet-by-group/sci.crypt.

The cypherpunks archive is available for FTP at

	soda.berkeley.edu:pub/cypherpunks

This site contains code, information, rants, and other miscellany, including
the most up-to-date version of this FAQ.

This FAQ is maintained by Eric S. Raymond <esr@snark.thyrsus.com>; send
additions and corrections to that address.  Sections contributed by others are
credited to individual authors.  We gratefully acknowledge, in addition,
feedback and comments from David Mandl <dmandl@lehman.com> and Eric Hughes
<hughes@soda.berkeley.edu>.

Here is a table of contents for this FAQ:

1. Why cypherpunks?

2. What are the essentials of privacy software?
   a. Public-key cryptosystems for secure communication.
   b. Unforgeable electronic signatures for message authentication.
   c. DC-net or similar protocols to thwart spoofing.

3. What are the potential applications of good privacy software?
   a. Secure communications.
   b. Digital cash.
   c. Electronic voting.
   d. Electronic contracts.
   e. Secure anonymous remailers and posters.
   f. <more?>

4. What are the key algorithms, tools, and implementations for privacy
   software?
   a. RSA
   b. DES
   c. Clipper/Capstone/DSS
   d. PGP
   e. Possible non-RSA trapdoor functions.

5. What are the social and political implications of good privacy software?
   a. Drastically lower transaction costs for trade.
   b. Expansion of the counter-economy.
   c. Disempowerment of government.
   d. Anonymity for whistleblowers.

6. What are the legal, political, and technical obstacles?
   a. The Clipper/Capstone/DSS power grab.
   b. The RSA patent and the PGP/RSA fight.
   c. RSA's base problem may not be NP-complete.

7. What can I do to help?
   a. Work on cryptographic software.
   b. Agitate against the Clipper/Capstone/DES proposals.
   c. Promote the use of encrypted communication.

To join the cypherpunks mailing list, send a request to:

	cypherpunks-request@toad.com

Working with us could be your best shot at stopping Big Brother.  So if you
have skills to contribute, act now.  The freedom you save could be your own.

1. Why cypherpunks?

   Because privacy is essential to freedom.

   If the government (or any other oppressor that behaves like one) can
effectively monitor communications, it can control or suppress them.  And it
will do so, because the natural tendency of controllers is always to seek more
control.

   The government cannot be relied on to protect your privacy rights.  Nor
can anyone else --- certainly not your employer, or the corporations that
want to know all about you so they can sell you things.

   Given half the chance, governments and corporations will always push
for security standards that protect *them*, but not *you*.

   Computer technology can help protect you against would-be snoopers, but only
if somebody is sufficiently smart and dedicated to build the tools.

   The Cypherpunks list exists to build and propagate privacy software.  Our
aim is to give you the tools to keep your private information private, and to
communicate with other people and computers in ways snoopers cannot tap.

2. What are the essentials of privacy software?

a. Public-key cryptosystems for secure communication.

   A conventional cryptosystem consists of an encoding/decoding method and
a single key.  Two users who share a key can exchange private messages.

   A public-key cryptosystem uses a *pair* of keys; one private, one public.
Anyone with either key can decode messages encoded with the other.  For
privacy, it must be impossible (or at least impractical) to deduce the private
key from the public one.

   Public-key cryptosystems imply many exciting things --- unforgeable
electronic signatures, digital cash, and secure electronic contracts are among
them.  The basic idea behind all of these is that, as long as your private key
is secure, people can verify that an encoded message containg known text came
from you by decoding with your public key.

   In the remainder of this FAQ we use `PKC' as an abbreviation for `Public
Key Cryptosystem'.

   The best-known PKCs are the RSA system, the Federal Government's DES
standard, and the government's Clipper proposal.  We'll discuss these, and
others, in more detail below.

b. Unforgeable electronic signatures for message authentication.

   There are many circumstances in which you want to be able to check a public
clear-text message for tampering.  To do this, the message must contain a
`digital signature' or `message digest code' or `message hash' derived from its
clear text, which can be checked against the clear text by a receiver.  For
security, the message hash should have the property that no one knows how
to modify a message in a way that preserves its hash.

   PKCs give you unforgeable signatures as a side-effect.  Unfortunately, known
PKCs are too slow to use practically for message hashing.

   Thus, there is a separate category of `Digital Signature Systems'.
The three major DSS techniques are Snefru, MD5, and DSS.  Snefru, invented
by Ralph Merkle at Xerox PARC, is of historical interest only as it has been
broken.

   MD5 is described in Internet RFC 1321, which also gives a reference
implementation in C.  As of July 1993 it is believed to be secure, but
has not been *proved* to be secure.

   DSS is a Federal Government proposed standard associated with the Clipper
proposal.  <more needed here>

c. DC-net or similar protocols to thwart spoofing.

<more needed here>

3. What are the potential applications of good privacy software?

a. Secure communications.

   With a PKC, you can send a message that no one but the intended receiver
can decrypt by encoding it with the receiver's public key.  If you encode
it with *your* public key, the receiver can verify that it came from you.

   This means that it is possible to do secure communications even over public
channels.  Neither nosy neighbors, business competitors, nor the government or
any (other) criminal gang can interfere with it.

b. Digital cash.

   Unforgeable messages also imply digital cash.  You could use a PKC to send
to the receiver a code permitting them to draw a particular amount of money
from your bank account.  The bank, with access to both yours and the payee's
public keys, can verify that the order is genuine.

   This means that it is possible to do trade over electronic links, without
any part trusting any other party beyond the bounds of normal commercial
risk.

c. Electronic voting.

   Unforgeable messages also imply secure electronic voting.  If you encode
your voting form with a PKC, the vote-collecting authority can verify it
with your public key.

d. Electronic contracts.

   If two or more people encode known text with their private keys applied in
succession, all their public keys will be required to decode it.  This is
an unforgeable contract.  Furthermore, it is an unforgeable *private* contract.

e. Secure anonymous remailers and posters.

<more needed here>

4. What are the key algorithms, tools, and implementations for privacy
   software?

a. RSA

   RSA stands for `Rivest-Shamir-Adelson', the names of the three computer
scientists who developed the technique.  RSA has withstood determined attacks
for over a decade and is widely believed to be secure.  It has been proposed
as an Internet standard.

   The RSA technique is patented.  The patents are held by RSA, Inc. <contact
information should go here>.  An implemenation in C called RSAREF is
available for research and certain noncommercial uses.

b. DES

<more needed here>

c. Clipper/Capstone/DSS

<more needed here>

d. PGP

<more needed here>

e. Possible non-RSA trapdoor functions.

<more needed here>

5. What are the social and political implications of good privacy software?

a. Drastically lower transaction costs for trade.

<more needed here>

b. Expansion of the counter-economy.

<more needed here>

c. Disempowerment of government.

<more needed here>

d. Anonymity for whistleblowers.

<more needed here>

6. What are the legal, political, and technical obstacles?

<more needed here>

a. The Clipper/Capstone/DSS power grab.

<more needed here>

b. The RSA patent and the PGP/RSA fight.

<more needed here>

c. RSA's base problem may not be NP-complete.

<more needed here>

7. What can I do to help?

a. Work on cryptographic software.

<list of current projects should go here>

b. Agitate against the Clipper/Capstone/DES proposals.

<more needed here>

c. Promote the routine use of encrypted communication.

<more needed here>

   You can help spread PGP and other appropriate tools far and wide
(both to help get a better foothold to thwart the Clipper proposal and
its ilk, and to work towards making crypto as commonplace as
envelopes).

--- DRAFT VERSION ---- DRAFT VERSION ---- DRAFT VERSION ---- DRAFT VERSION ---
--
						>>eric>>




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: williacw@vuse.vanderbilt.edu (Charles Williams)
Date: Sun, 25 Jul 93 21:29:36 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Off-Line Mail EDITORS/READERS
Message-ID: <9307260455.AA08589@necs.vuse>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Where can one find a good Off-Line MAIL READER/EDITOR for the messages posted 
here? I'm using an IBM PSC. I notice that some of your guys post little notes 
at the end of tyour meessages. I'd ,like a program that would do thois 
for me..

Thanks




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: mdavis@pro-sol.cts.com (Morgan Davis)
Date: Mon, 26 Jul 93 01:11:52 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Secured E-mail standard?
Message-ID: <gq03290@pro-sol.cts.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Has a proposal been made to officially adopt a header field in standard
Internet mail messages that would essentially include security signature
information?  Something like:

        X-Security-Type: PGP 1.0
        X-Security-Code: asdui&Dh1daOFajsFNOA...etc.

These generic field names would allow for various types of security methods.
Most important, would make it a lot easier for smart e-mail systems to
recognize secured e-mail, with the option of allowing the user to filter
out such fields when reading text.  The current scheme of having to
"frame" the content (plain text) and add the PGP signature is distracting.

 /\/\  Morgan Davis Group (619/670-0563)
/ /__\  Internet: mdavis@pro-sol.cts.com




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "George A. Gleason" <gg@well.sf.ca.us>
Date: Mon, 26 Jul 93 01:35:30 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Remailers/PayPhones and Today's NYT
Message-ID: <93Jul26.013300pdt.14243-1@well.sf.ca.us>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Citizens lobbying for removal of payphones in their neighborhoods sounds
like more of the same old "fix a cut toe by chopping off the foot" syndrome.
People have to be pretty desperate to go that far.  Next step: remove indoor
plumbing because some dope dealers flush their stuff when the cops come to
the door.  Gee, how about tatooed ID on the wrists, eh?  

Drug dealers and violence: now there's a decent issue.  And of course the
idea of removing the *guns* won't go anywhere, but since there isn't a
National Payphone Association, taking away the phones is easier politically.
On the other hand, a lot of parents have themselves to blame for letting
their little kiddies play with toy guns and watch violent BS on TV.
Training, as it were.

Alderman Payphone Permit: is probably also violating FCC rules there; a
decent Federal case could be made.  Too many phones?  Hey, what about the
number of places where one can purchase alcohol?  Here in the Bay Area,
they're starting to crack down on liquor stores, since these seem to attract
a lot of nastiness also.   That seems more reasonable, given that 50% of
homicides and suicides involve alcohol.  

Baddies in Cyberspace: oh, as soon as they get Cellular Modems, you can bet
they will.  

Back to race & class.  Take a look at what has happened to the urban
ghettoes over the last 10 years.  If you look at drug abuse as
self-medication (which has been well demonstrated), what we see is an
incredible number of people in intolerable pain in their daily lives.
Reduce the pain with jobs, decent places to live, and some sense of
opportunity, and drugs will have far less attraction.  I'll never forget the
woman who was interviewed locally on the radio; saying, essentially, "we
have nothing at all, no hope of anything better, and every day is a
desperate scramble to survive; when I do a hit of dope it's like I've eaten
a meal, had a bowel movement, made love, and taken a nap all at once."
Sounds like hyperbole until you see the numbers, that something like half of
black children don't get three meals a day, and over half of black families
can't afford rent *and* food every month.  When you're dying slowly anyway,
shaving off a few more years with a dope habit is a bargain if those
remaining years hurt a little bit less.  *We are developing a serious
underclass in this country,* have been for ten years now.  Take a look at
any 3d world city; look back at the slums here, it all looks the same.
Punishing these people even more by taking away one after another of the
amenities of civilisation can only make it worse over the long run.  People
are very obliging; if they're treated like animals, they respond
accordingly.

-gg




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Date: Mon, 26 Jul 93 01:50:31 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: There's an echo here! There's an echo, hear?
Message-ID: <9307260850.AA17184@netcom5.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



I know the site "cypherpunks@indigo.mese.com" was supposedly removed
from the Cypherpunks list, as per a message from Eric Hughes, but I am
getting several bounces per day. I assume you folks are, too.

What's apparent is that each of these long bounces (400-500 lines) is
*getting longer* each cycle through the process. I noticed this when I
was deleting them. I suppose the extra lines--roughly 20 extra lines
each cycle--are more error messages being added by
cypherpunks@indigo.mese.com and then sent back to the List.

This is *not* a complaint, though I hope it stops soon. Instead, it's
a comment that e-mail systems and lists may need (soon!) more
sophisticated positive reputation filters, to screen out such
pathological behaviors, mail bombs, and the like. 

I feel sorry for the List members who are on more restrictive mail
systems, including those who may have to (gulp!) pay for incoming mail
by the byte.

-Tim

-- 
..........................................................................
Timothy C. May         | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,  
tcmay@netcom.com       | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
408-688-5409           | knowledge, reputations, information markets, 
W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA  | black markets, collapse of governments.
Higher Power: 2^756839 | Public Key: PGP and MailSafe available.
Note: I put time and money into writing this posting. I hope you enjoy it.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Dan M. Shaw" <72407.1513@CompuServe.COM>
Date: Mon, 26 Jul 93 01:30:30 PDT
To: <cypherpunks@toad.com>
Subject: DARE T-shirts
Message-ID: <930726082605_72407.1513_FHG27-1@CompuServe.COM>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Timothy C. May writes:

>Anyway, I have long wanted to get a t-shirt or sweatshirt
>silk-screened with "D.A.R.E." on it, as so many phony 
>parents are nowwearing (I think the kiddies get gold
>stars if they sell one of these shirts to their parents).
>But *my* shirt would go something like this: 

>"D. rugs
>   A. re
>     R. eality 
>       E. nhancers"

A friend of mine is in the T-shirt business...  he can 
take a GIF or other graphics file, print it on a color
printer, and heat-transfer it to a T-shirt.  Not quite 
as nice as silk-screen, but the set-up cost is much 
lower, especially for onesies.

Consider taking a paint program and, um, "rolling your
own" custom T-shirt design.  Perhaps run an official DARE 
poster through a color scanner and make suitable 
modifications.  If you're interested, I will ask him 
for details. 





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: jet@netcom.com (J. Eric Townsend)
Date: Sun, 25 Jul 93 23:00:15 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Tshirts(was Drug Joke
In-Reply-To: <9307260610.AA21715@netcom.netcom.com>
Message-ID: <9307260626.AA20131@netcom3.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



I've got a recently good idea for a shirt I've been working on for
a bit, but my funding fell through.

Anyone want to bank an initial run?

fyI, on my recent return from Boston I sat across from a guy wearing a
Secret Service logo'd polo shirt with the acronym 'C.A.T.' on it.
Anyone know what it stands for?  He went to sleep before I could
bother him.

-eric




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: jet@netcom.com (J. Eric Townsend)
Date: Sun, 25 Jul 93 23:28:53 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: one-off t-shirts
Message-ID: <9307260655.AA23437@netcom3.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Christian D. Odhner writes:
 > However the cost for one (1) uniqe tee shirt is a little expensive. What

not if you find a printmaking major and get them to silkscreen it.
Just call up the local university fine arts program and ask about for
the person who teaches silkscreening/printmaking.  You'll probably be
able to find through them a student who'd gladly do one for $30-50,
even lower per-shirt if you want a few done.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: fergp@sytex.com (Paul Ferguson)
Date: Mon, 26 Jul 93 04:46:21 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: CP T's
Message-ID: <Poka8B1w165w@sytex.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


On Sun, 25 Jul 93 19:22:20 PDT,
 Timothy C. May <uunet!netcom.com!tcmay> wrote -
 
> P.S. Speaking of t-shirts...maybe we ought to think about some
> Cypherpunks shirts?
 
 Now that's an idea. Something along the lines of the "Pretty Good
 Revolution" and/or "Crypto Rebels" would be interesting...
 
 The more I think about it, the more I like the idea. I'd surely opt
 to get one. ;-)
 
 Cheers,

Paul Ferguson               |  "Government, even in its best state,
Network Integrator          |   is but a necessary evil; in its worst
Centreville, Virginia USA   |   state, an intolerable one."
fergp@sytex.com             |      - Thomas Paine, Common Sense
 
         I love my country, but I fear its government.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: smb@research.att.com
Date: Mon, 26 Jul 93 04:16:19 PDT
To: mdavis@pro-sol.cts.com (Morgan Davis)
Subject: Re: Secured E-mail standard?
Message-ID: <9307261116.AA08492@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


	 Has a proposal been made to officially adopt a header field in
	 standard Internet mail messages that would essentially include
	 security signature information?  Something like:

		 X-Security-Type: PGP 1.0 X-Security-Code:
		 asdui&Dh1daOFajsFNOA...etc.

	 These generic field names would allow for various types of
	 security methods.  Most important, would make it a lot easier
	 for smart e-mail systems to recognize secured e-mail, with the
	 option of allowing the user to filter out such fields when
	 reading text.  The current scheme of having to "frame" the
	 content (plain text) and add the PGP signature is
	 distracting.

This won't fly for several reasons. 

First, X- implies a non-standard header.  Second, in the Internet world
PEM is on the standards track, and it uses a PGP-like encapsulation.
(More precisely, many facets of the PGP appearance were taken from PEM.)
PEM does provide for various security mechanisms, I should note, not
just the current RSA+DES.  Finally, the scheme which you label ``distracting''
(and I agree) was adopted because there's simply too much information
to put into headers in any comprehensible fashion, and to really
do the job properly requires an encoded (and hence unreadable) plaintext
of the message, independent of the encryption or signature algorithms.
(These folks worried, and rightly so, about character sets, gateways
that would add or drop trailing blanks or tabs, etc.)




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Mike Godwin <mnemonic@eff.org>
Date: Mon, 26 Jul 93 04:20:39 PDT
To: jet@netcom.com (J. Eric Townsend)
Subject: Re: Tshirts(was Drug Joke
In-Reply-To: <9307260626.AA20131@netcom3.netcom.com>
Message-ID: <199307261119.AA02449@eff.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Eric writes:
 
> fyI, on my recent return from Boston I sat across from a guy wearing a
> Secret Service logo'd polo shirt with the acronym 'C.A.T.' on it.
> Anyone know what it stands for?  He went to sleep before I could
> bother him.

Odds are that the "A.T." stands for "Attack Team."


--Mike






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: deboni@diego.llnl.gov (Tom DeBoni)
Date: Mon, 26 Jul 93 09:26:26 PDT
To: tcmay@netcom.com
Subject: thanks for the help on MacPGP
Message-ID: <9307261621.AA07811@diego.llnl.gov>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


To all who emailed me with helpful info and advice, thanks! You're too 
numerous to mention. To all who sent me unencoded versions and the old version
of MacGZ, thanks, also! I've got it squared away, now.

Tom DeBoni
deboni@llnl.gov




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Steve Greenberg <steve@oc3s-emh1.army.mil>
Date: Mon, 26 Jul 93 00:55:31 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Secret service 'C.A.T.'
Message-ID: <9307260754.AA01793@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



>... I sat across from a guy wearing a
>Secret Service logo'd polo shirt with the acronym 'C.A.T.' on it.

 I can't say for the secret service, but in the Army C.A.T stands for
 "Crisis Action Team".

					Steve

+-----------------------------------------+---------------------------------+
|VOTE Steve Greenberg for President (2004)| steve@oc3s-emh1.army.mil        |
|     He's "Too Big To Fail!" (tm)        | CMR 420, Box 2569 APO, AE 09063 |
+-----------------------------------------+---------------------------------+




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: murphy@s1.elec.uq.oz.au (Peter Murphy)
Date: Sun, 25 Jul 93 17:55:09 PDT
To: owner-cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Remailers/PayPhones and Today's NYT
In-Reply-To: <9307251731.AA28061@tartarus.uchicago.edu>
Message-ID: <9307260049.AA19807@s2.elec.uq.oz.au>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> 
> "George A. Gleason" <gg@well.sf.ca.us> writes:
> 
> >And did you read Hugh's posting about the 7pm to 8am coin
> >curfew in Czechago?
> ...
> >Wake up, how much evidence do you need that it's a simple matter of bigotry
> >and classism?
> 
> Hm.  Perhaps it is.  On the other hand, it could also be a combination
> of a little bit of greed for power with a bit of genuine fear and despair.
> You see, if the Chicago Tribune can be believed, there are actual citizens'
> groups lobbying for the removal of pay phones from certain areas of the
> city.  Groups of citizens who *live* in those same areas.
> 
> These folk claim that public pay phones attract drug dealers, presumably
> because of the semi-anonymity they provide.  I don't know personally how
> true this claim is, but I can understand the advantages that a pay phone
> might offer to a drug dealer.  Sure, the "big time" dealers might not
> use anything as plebian as a public pay phone, but drugs are a big booming
> business, and clearly there are far more small-time dealers than big-time
> ones.
> 
> They further claim that drug dealers attract violence.  I don't know myself
> if this is true, but I do know from reading the paper that an absurdly large
> number of people are killed in Chicago by stray bullets shot by drug dealers
> in conflicts with each other.  And, of course, still more folks who *are*
> drug dealers are killed directly, each year.
> 
> Finally, they claim that merchants in certain areas are pandering to the
> drug-dealer market for pay phones by installing far more than one would
> otherwise think necessary.  I haven't seen this myself, but the article I
> read did mention what seemed like unusually large clusters (street corners
> with 7-10 pay phones).
> 
> That's the fear and despair bit.  It could be bigotry, it could be classism--
> but stray bullets are damn good motivators too, and here in Chicago we have
> a lot of them.
> 
> As for greed: this could be a factor, it might not.  At least one alderman
> has made it illegal to install new pay phones in his ward without his explicit
> permission.  Clearly this adds to his power.  The same fellow has made much
> of his public name in recent campaigning against these public pay phones,
> and threatening to take an axe to them himself if some of them weren't
> removed.  Make of this what you will.
> 
> How much more evidence do I need that it's a simple matter of bigotry
> and classism?  Well, a bit more than I've seen so far.
> 
> Cypherpunk content?  This is a damn good illustration of the problems that
> can crop up with an anonymous service.  Though services on the net have the
> advantage of not being tied to a physical location, like pay phones are;
> so they probably won't serve to attract a "bad element" to any particular
> place.  On the other hand, any sort of public terminal service offering 
> encrypted email, might very well.
> 
>                             -David
> 


I admit, I was shocked when I read this post. For two reasons. One - that that
abominable phantasm, "The War on Drugs", still seems to take a significant
place in the American political debate. Two - that a politician would campaign
on the promise of REMOVING (not ADDING) public phones. I'm probably coming
across as very naive, but as someone who's lived in Australia for the last
13 years, I can only guess at what's going on over THERE. Most of my information
comes, not only through periodicals and TV, but also through this post. I have
to thank David in part for his contribution. Talk about a bucket of cold water
over the extremities...:-<

	Now, being a regular reader of the list, I have come upon many a quote
from those government types (FBI, NSA, etc.) who are looking for ways to
weasel themselves into the home, business, and even the Internet. One obvious
example of this weaselling in the Clipper chip. Many of these quotes contain
oblique references to "The War on Drugs" (oh, no! not that phrase again! :-) )
and "Fighting Drug Dealers". Again, from David's post, I've noticed that the
three reasons for limiting Public Phones all involve drug dealers. Now, these
arguments seemed to have some evidence to support their assertions. Still, it
was worrying all the same.

	Us Australians have had a topsy-turvy attitude to the drug debate. On 
one hand, South Australia has decriminalized Marijuana. On the other hand, 
Queensland's Drug Misuse Act, which puts the onus of proof on the defendant 
(e.g., you have to prove that THAT spoon was not used for shooting up HEROIN). 
This, of course, is inimical to the Americal and Australian judicial system.
Of course, this act has been a failure (marijuana is still Queensland's 2nd
largest cash crop), and the National party government who introduced the bill
were kicked out in 1989 for widespread evidence of corruption, involving
prostitution, bookkeeping, and (surprise! surprise!) drugs. Now that there
has been a government enquiry into marijuana, hopefully the mood will change
in favour of legalization.  

	I think that one of the biggest crutches that the NSA and others use
to infringe YOUR privacy is "The War on Drugs". It should be stopped, and
now! Not only is it unsuccessful, not only is it hypocritical (I wince when I
see those "Winners don't use drugs!" messages on video games), but it has
also blinded a lot of people into supporting attacks on YOUR privacy. If it is
stopped, then perhaps the government agencies won't be as likely to do
silly proposals like the Clipper chip. Perhaps..., but only if the public
keeps a watchful eye on what they are doing. Of course, the libertarians in
the list would want many of the drugs decriminalized, and from what I've
read about in other countries, not only does the drug use stay the same, the
criminals are not as likely to get involve in drug dealing.

Sorry, I had to get this off my chest.

Peter.

P.S. Is there any truth in the rumour that Canada is going to lighten it's
encryption restrictions? I wouldn't mind getting my hands on RSAREF....

-- 
=============================================================================
Peter Murphy - Department of Electrical Engineering,|Phone: 61 - 7 - 300 3452.
University of Queensland: murphy@s2.elec.uq.oz.au  .|------------------------
"Contrary to popular belief, the wings of demons are|Please do not put any 
the same as the wings of angels, although they're   |Heinlein quotes in your 
often better groomed." - Terry Pratchett.           |.sig - they're old.
=============================================================================




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: elee9sf@Menudo.UH.EDU
Date: Mon, 26 Jul 93 09:20:48 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: ANON: remail abuse
In-Reply-To: <9307212358.AA06651@yang.cpac.washington.edu>
Message-ID: <199307261618.AA29254@Menudo.UH.EDU>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



> potentially useful and/or fun object can be put to extreme nastiness without
> much (or any) knowledge or imagination:  firearms, poisons

Perhaps the government should quit selling these items to third world
countries.

> Oh, big deal.  Payphone = 25c.  Junk mail = 29c for *first-class*
> harrassment mail.  :) Anonymous E-mail remailers = something much
> less, or free at the moment.
 
> Money is *not* the issue.  Period.

I think it is a large factor.  It boils down to control.  I could get
my own domain from UUNET and ship megs of junk mail, but I'm probably
not going to do that since I would PAY for it all.  You think your
email is "free" since the associated cost is hidden in your school
fees.

> The reason anonymous remailers are not the same as payphones or junk
> mail is that the latter two leave tangible clues behind.

Yeah, but the clues that a payphone call or junk mail leave are nearly
worthless.  I mean, I could do a "pot shot" attack on somebody, one
time only, and there is no way I could be tracked, unless I were
observed at the time.

Just curious, but what makes e-mail so different to you?  E-mail
reaches thousands of people all over the world, but so does postal
mail.  E-mail is usually quick, and so is a phone call.  Anonymous
mail is harder to trace to the sender; a phone call from a payphone is
harder to trace to the caller.

Is it the combination of these items?

These remailers are just experimental!

> opinion in *this* group, but. . . .)  Both payphones and mail leave tangible
> clues which can be investigated and traced by law enforcement authorities.

Sendmail activity is generally logged in the syslog file.  Anonymous
mailers make is more difficult to determine the true destination.

You would have to repeatedly use the same payphone or mailbox, to
leave tangible clues





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: nobody@alumni.cco.caltech.edu
Date: Mon, 26 Jul 93 13:20:51 PDT
To: slippery@netcom.com
Subject: Digital Money again
Message-ID: <9307262016.AA03957@alumni.cco.caltech.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


You want David Chaum's company, Digicash. They are in Holland. I have
tried and failed to find telephone, address, or e-mail info for them.
If you do find out, could you let me know? Thanks.
 
One of the seminal papers on DC-nets and some of the protocols behind
digital cash is available by anonymous ftp from pub/cypherpunks at
soda.berkeley.edu. It's a paper by Chaum. Also, Hal Finney wrote an
excellent article on the basics of digicash that appeared in Extropy
#10.

Eric Watt Forste <arkuat@joes.garage.com> PGP key ID 0x431347




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: deboni@diego.llnl.gov (Tom DeBoni)
Date: Mon, 26 Jul 93 14:37:14 PDT
To: 72114.1712@compuserve.com
Subject: Re:  T-SHIRTS
Message-ID: <9307262133.AA10481@diego.llnl.gov>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Gold on Black sounds very stylish, but if it costs no more, why not go for
some sort of symbolic coat or arms or logo, along with the words? I like the
sword-and-pen idea, myself, although a big-brotherish eye/telescreen with a
red slash through it grabs me, too.

I'm definitely interested in the idea of t-shirts, in general. There is no
unity without a t-shirt and/or a coffee mug, IMHO.

Tom DeBoni
deboni@llnl.gov




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: bwp@mindvox.phantom.com (Jane Doe)
Date: Mon, 26 Jul 93 12:02:13 PDT
To: deboni@diego.llnl.gov (Tom DeBoni)
Subject: Re: thanks for the help on MacPGP
In-Reply-To: <9307261621.AA07811@diego.llnl.gov>
Message-ID: <4q7a8B1w165w@mindvox.phantom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I'd also like to add my thanks. The weird, unintuitive manner MacPGP uses
for deleting additional id's on a key worked. (Are you reading this, Crunch?)

-bwp




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Peter shipley <shipley@merde.dis.org>
Date: Tue, 27 Jul 93 08:01:17 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: No Subject
Message-ID: <9307262215.AA20404@merde.dis.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/x-pgp


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----



>I could really go for a stylized,
>gold thread, "CYPHERPUNKS" on a black polo shirt.  Anyone else
>interested?

I am intrested but I would like to see a the design first, can you MIME mail me
the image of postscript 

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.3

iQBVAgUBLFRXXHynuL1gkffFAQGqsgH9EPxWkSaDK2sZXcvg/SLo3digsmOhFG/y
n3k7YgkvjPyCRzl6IrlZnTvX+Y8Wvw2a2ms+nrTUMdxhPoGYb0BSww==
=Ri8/
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: hugh%none@uunet.UU.NET (Hugh Daniel)
Date: Mon, 26 Jul 93 15:40:58 PDT
To: 72114.1712@CompuServe.COM
Subject: T-SHIRTS
In-Reply-To: <930726211245_72114.1712_FHF36-1@CompuServe.COM>
Message-ID: <9307262238.AA00810@ecotone.toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


  I could deal with a cool logo (hey, I could even do the logo) on a
black poloshirt.
		||ugh




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Ian! D. Allen [NRC/IIT]" <idallen@guest0.iit.nrc.ca>
Date: Mon, 26 Jul 93 12:55:51 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Is this mailing list gatewayed into any news group?
Message-ID: <9307261954.AA23505@guest0.iit.nrc.ca>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I'd rather not subscribe and fill my mailbox if I can read it via Usenet...




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: cdodhner@indirect.com (Christian D. Odhner)
Date: Mon, 26 Jul 93 16:05:58 PDT
To: pcw@access.digex.net (Peter Wayner)
Subject: Re: T-shirts are for wimps...
In-Reply-To: <199307262232.AA24895@access.digex.net>
Message-ID: <9307262302.AA26301@indirect.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> Seriously, it is possible to get fake tattoos printed up
> with your design. I suggest either the classic heart with
> the word "Freedom" or "Privacy" replacing "Mom". They should
> last several days and they could be cheap enough to give
> out for grins.
> 
> -Peter Wayner

That would be realy cool! Sombody else (Eric I think) suggested maybe
buttons as well, and I've seen advertisements out in the net in various
news groups and such about 'cheap stickers' that you can get custom made,
like 100 for 15$US. Let's do _ALL_ of these ideas, and realy spread the word!

Happy Hunting, -Chris Odhner
<cdodhner@indirect.com>




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Peter Shipley <shipley@tfs.COM>
Date: Mon, 26 Jul 93 16:45:59 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com (Cryptoanarchists are Us)
Subject: Re: T-Shirts
In-Reply-To: <9307262159.AA24713@toad.com>
Message-ID: <9307262344.AA14724@edev0.tfs.com.TFS>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>With the various T-Shirt proposals flying, I would not mind having more than
>1 design myself. The Oxford-variety, dressy, a more classic look, while a
>t-shirt with big brother or keys more for the street. You can count me in for
>both varieties if someone has the gumption to really put them together.
>

Gee how about our public key printed in Hex as a big block on the front :-)




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Sandy <72114.1712@CompuServe.COM>
Date: Mon, 26 Jul 93 14:17:14 PDT
To: <cypherpunks@toad.com>
Subject: T-SHIRTS
Message-ID: <930726211245_72114.1712_FHF36-1@CompuServe.COM>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
  SANDY SANDFORT               Reply to:  ssandfort@attmail.com
 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Punksters,

Talk about synchronicity!  I just got an ad in the mail that
offers a special deal on custom *embroidered* polo shirts.  I
thought about bringing it to the next physical meeting, but
thought folks might think it was dumb.  Now with Tim May and
others raising the subject, I feel empowered.

Here's the deal.  The Queensboro Shirt Company will reproduce any
logo or design on their two-ply yarn all-cotton polo shirts.  The
special deal is the price for first-time customers--$179 for 6
shirts, $499 for 20 shirts.  I could really go for a stylized,
gold thread, "CYPHERPUNKS" on a black polo shirt.  Anyone else
interested?  I'll bring info about Queensboro and other companies
to the next physical meeting if I can make it.

 S a n d y

>>>>>>    Please send e-mail to:  ssandfort@attmail.com    <<<<<<
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: baumbach@atmel.com (Peter Baumbach)
Date: Mon, 26 Jul 93 14:40:53 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Cypherpunks T-Shirt
Message-ID: <9307262118.AA02220@hammerhead.chp.atmel.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


A custom one color t-shirt can be had for $27.60. 2 @ $15.90 each. 
4 @ $10.10 each. 12 @ $6.20 each.  

This is not silkscreening, it is fabric dye based laser printer toner.
You can actually do all this on your own laser printer, but the cost
above is for a finished product.  The company sells supplies or will
do it all for you.  You might want to ask for a sample of their
product before ordering anything.

They also publish a magazine: Flash   The premier Journal of Desktop Printing

The ad as seen in their magazine follows:

Transfer Services

  We can reproduce photographs, drawings, artwork or computer graphics on
a variety of products using our Transfer Toner technology.  We will color
separate your photos or artwork to create full color transfers.  The 
prices below are for projects where you provide us with camera ready artwork.
Design sizes are shown in parenthesis after item names.  Larger designs can
often be accomodated with one or more Additional Designs.  Designs may be
placed on the back, front, sleeve, cuff, & pocket.
  To use the chart below, simply match the product you want to the 
quantity you are ordering for the base price of the first color.  Next,
add in the cost per item for each additional color.  For full color 
photos & artwork add three more colors for a total of four.
  To receive these low prices artwork must be camera ready.  Single color
items should be in black ink on bright white paper.  Multicolor items
should be in their respective colors on one composite page.  High
contrast images will give the best results.  We also accept images on
3.5" Mac & PC disks in the follwing formats: ReadySetGo, TIFF, MacDraw,
MacPaint, Illustrator, & PjotoShop.  Files should be print erady and clearly
labeled.  Include any special fonts as outlines.  Be sure to keep a backup
of all artwork.  We attempt to return all originals, but can not be
responsible for their loss or damage.
  Our artists can create or modify a design at the rate of $45/hr billed
by the quarter-hour.  Simple jobs like curved text might be 15 minutes.
  Full scale mockups are available at the Q1 pricing and are 75% 
deductible against orders placed within 30-days of Q12 for that same item.

Per Piece Costs:      Quantity 1    Qty2     Qty4     Qty12
T-Shirt (10.7"x8")       $27.60    $15.90   $10.10    $6.20
Sweat Shirt (10.7"x8")   $33.50    $21.90   $16.00    $12.20
Additional Colors         $2.00     $1.75    $1.50     $0.75

Other items and costs, but I'm getting tired of typing.

BlackLightning Inc.
Riddle Pond Rd.
West Topsham, VT 05086
1-800-252-2599
(802)439-6463 Fax

------------------------------------
The magazine seems to have separated from the toner company.
For what it's worth, the masthead has CIS:[73130,1734].  I think
that's a Compuserve address, and offhand I don't know how to
send mail to one, yet I know it's possible.  The 2 companies
probably have employees in common.

I have never actually done business with this company, but from reading
their magazine I have a good feeling about them.  I considered going
into the t-shirt printing business using this companies products, but
for now I am still a wage slave.

Peter Baumbach
baumbach@bass.sco.atmel.com ;-)




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: gnu (John Gilmore)
Date: Mon, 26 Jul 93 17:31:00 PDT
To: private-garden@cygnus.com
Subject: EFF T-Shirt design contest
Message-ID: <9307270028.AA27368@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


EFF T-SHIRT DESIGN CONTEST

We're Looking for a New Look!

Help Us Make a Fashion Statement!!

EFF T-SHIRT DESIGN CONTEST
1001 G STREET, NW
SUITE 950 EAST
WASHINGTON, DC  20001

Entries must be received no later than 5:00pm on July 31, 1993.  Designs
should be actual size, camera ready and can be b/w or color.  Winner(s)
will receive a free shirt and a one-year membersh to the Electronic
Frontier Foundation.
******************************
Sarah L. Simpson
Membership Coordinator
Electronic Frontier Foundation
1001 G Street, NW
Suite 950 East
Washington, DC  20001
202/347-5400 tel
202/393-5509 fax

	(my submission was "One network, Invisible, with Liberty
	 and Justice for All".  Surely you can do better!	-- John)




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: jim@tadpole.com
Date: Mon, 26 Jul 93 15:35:57 PDT
To: 72114.1712@CompuServe.COM
Subject: Re: T-SHIRTS
In-Reply-To: <930726211245_72114.1712_FHF36-1@CompuServe.COM>
Message-ID: <9307262234.AA00486@ono-sendai>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



yes, I'm interested.





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: jim@tadpole.com
Date: Mon, 26 Jul 93 15:50:59 PDT
To: chaos@aql.gatech.edu
Subject: Re: T-Shirts
In-Reply-To: <9307262159.AA24713@toad.com>
Message-ID: <9307262249.AA00493@ono-sendai>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



I'm sorry, I'm sorry, I'm sorry.  I'm not (usually) stupid enough
to send these things back to the *whole* list.  (I'm sorry, really!)

I just convered to 'rmail'. I got bit.

Jim




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Paul Goggin <chaos@aql.gatech.edu>
Date: Mon, 26 Jul 93 15:00:54 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com (Cryptoanarchists are Us)
Subject: Re: T-Shirts
Message-ID: <9307262159.AA24713@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


With the various T-Shirt proposals flying, I would not mind having more than
1 design myself. The Oxford-variety, dressy, a more classic look, while a
t-shirt with big brother or keys more for the street. You can count me in for
both varieties if someone has the gumption to really put them together.

Paul
--
R  O    All Comments Copyright by  | Technofetisht
 A  N     Paul S. Goggin (1993)    | Cypher, Cyber, Chaos              
  V        Information Broker      | Ergoflux, Interzone
   E      chaos@aql.gatech.edu     | Carpe Diem: Stop the Clipper wiretap chip 
Finger account for latest _Phrack_ | Public Key: PGP and RIPEM available
      For anonymous communication:---> anonymus+4744@charcoal.com
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Title 18 USC 2511 and 18 USC 2703 Protected -- Monitoring Absolutely Forbidden




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Peter Wayner <pcw@access.digex.net>
Date: Mon, 26 Jul 93 15:36:30 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: T-shirts are for wimps...
Message-ID: <199307262232.AA24895@access.digex.net>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



I say lets get tattoos. If you _really_ are committed than
you won't have any problems with this. 

Seriously, it is possible to get fake tattoos printed up
with your design. I suggest either the classic heart with
the word "Freedom" or "Privacy" replacing "Mom". They should
last several days and they could be cheap enough to give
out for grins.

-Peter Wayner




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Some butthead <leide871@uidaho.edu>
Date: Mon, 26 Jul 93 19:21:04 PDT
To: CYPHERPUNKS LIST <cypherpunks@toad.com>
Subject: Shirts
Message-ID: <Pine.3.02.9307261936.A19965-b100000@crow.csrv.uidaho.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Whoever is interested in making up those t-shirts, count me as a customer.
1 shirt for sure.  Couldn't you post the designs as a gif or the likes and
let people check it out on their screen b4 purchasing though?


[ *  [  ][  ][  ][  ][  [  ][  ][  ][  ][  ][  ][  ][  ][  ][  ][  ]  * ]
[  ]                                                                 [  ]
[ ]	 HUBA LEIDENFROST   /   LEIDEN871@SNAKE.CS.UIDAHO.EDU         [ ]
[ ]							              [ ]
[ ]	    ``Now Imagine two armies, two strategically assisted,     [ ]
[ ]	cyberspace-trained, post-industrial, panoptic ninja armies,   [ ]
[ ]	going head-to-head.  What on earth would that look like?      [ ]
[ ]	A "conventional" war, a "non-nuclear" war, but a true War     [ ]
[ ]	in the Age of Intelligent Machines, analyzed by nano-         [ ]
[ ]	seconds to the last square micron.  			      [ ]
[ ]								      [ ]
[ ]	  Who would survive?  And what would be left of them?''       [ ]
[ ]	 							      [ ]
[ ]	           -Bruce Sterling, WAR IS VIRTUAL HELL-              [ ]
[  ]     							     [  ]
[ * [  ][  ][  ][  ][  ][  ][  ][  ][  ][  ][  ][  ][  ][  ][  ][  ]  * ]






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: nate@VIS.ColoState.EDU (CVL staff member Nate Sammons)
Date: Mon, 26 Jul 93 19:22:21 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Tshirts, buttons, stickers, bumper stickers, tatoos, earrings,.....
Message-ID: <9307270220.AA02571@vangogh.VIS.ColoState.EDU>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Chris Odhner writes:
That would be realy cool! Sombody else (Eric I think) suggested maybe
buttons as well, and I've seen advertisements out in the net in various
news groups and such about 'cheap stickers' that you can get custom made,
like 100 for 15$US. Let's do _ALL_ of these ideas, and realy spread the word!


I agree, we talked about the matchbook a while ago, what happened to that?
We should do:
Stickers, "nice" shirts, T-shirts, matchbooks, a wallet-card, and the Tatoos
sound REALLY cool.

I'm in for the whold lot.

-nate
+--------------------------------------------------------------------
| Nate Sammons   email: nate@VIS.ColoState.Edu
|      Colorado State University Computer Visualization Laboratory
|      Finger nate@monet.VIS.ColoState.Edu for my PGP key
|      #include <std.disclaimer>
|  "I have but one single desire - to tear down the sky" -A. Toomba
+----------------------+




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: The Phantom <phantom@u.washington.edu>
Date: Mon, 26 Jul 93 21:16:34 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Matchbooks, T-shirts, the whole lot
Message-ID: <Pine.3.05.9307262118.A5973-b100000@stein2.u.washington.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Nate@vis.colostate.edu writes:
Subject: Tshirts, buttons, stickers, bumper stickers, tatoos, earrings,.....

Chris Odhner writes:
That would be realy cool! Sombody else (Eric I think) suggested maybe
buttons as well, and I've seen advertisements out in the net in various
...[deleted]

I agree, we talked about the matchbook a while ago, what happened to that?
We should do:
Stickers, "nice" shirts, T-shirts, matchbooks, a wallet-card, and the Tatoos
sound REALLY cool.

I'm in for the whold lot.

------
Well, we got working on it and kept getting less and less feedback. The
last thing done on it was trying to get some type of cypherpunks logo
made. 

The latest of my ideas are available via ftp to ftp.u.washington.edu:
/pub/user-supported/cypherpunks/cpmatch.ps.Z

Other ideas I got we can discuss in email or if I get enough response, to
the list.

Matt


Matt Thomlinson                               Say no to the Wiretap Chip!
University of Washington, Seattle, Washington.
Internet: phantom@u.washington.edu      	    phone: (206) 528-5732
PGP 2.2  key available via email or finger phantom@hardy.u.washington.edu





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Eric Hughes <hughes@soda.berkeley.edu>
Date: Mon, 26 Jul 93 21:16:05 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: FASHION: temporary tattoos
Message-ID: <9307270409.AA20046@soda.berkeley.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


As long as we're in our graphic design stage, I'm not much into
ideographic clothing, but I wouldn't mind as temporary tattoo for my
forehead that said

	CRYPTOGRAPHY USER

All due credit to Neal Stephenson for _Snow Crash_ fame.

Eric




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Karl Barrus <elee9sf@Menudo.UH.EDU>
Date: Mon, 26 Jul 93 19:12:22 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: MISC: email-usenet
Message-ID: <199307270211.AA13310@Menudo.UH.EDU>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

Here's a list of email-to-usenet gateways I have:

group-name@cs.utexas.edu
group-name@pws.bull.com
group.name@news.demon.co.uk
group.name.usenet@decwrl.dec.com
group.name@news.cs.indiana.edu

Since I don't post to usenet much, I can't guarentee these (except the
once at UT since I used it recently) so test them out.


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.3a

iQCVAgUBLFSOjoOA7OpLWtYzAQHGGwP/QAsewVvqe8vJo6NMICZ3vbPnAR7fDjb1
OyWdkNK7P4bTTt7+NCjVqekvNQhsMd+OvOv7DOLidzwISrzkOX1Q8QCzw4boY84I
A8ssjAUpeoXHc5TVmEvKxF7xEZA9rUmgNl53voAiCyLwK4tTy8ep5I3UmQYm4tYj
Z/au+0h8qM4=
=WckZ
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: wcs@anchor.ho.att.com (Bill Stewart +1-908-949-0705 wcs@anchor.ho.att.com)
Date: Mon, 26 Jul 93 20:16:03 PDT
To: hugh@toad.com
Subject: Re:  T-SHIRTS
Message-ID: <9307270234.AA29176@anchor.ho.att.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text


||ugh writes:
>   I could deal with a cool logo (hey, I could even do the logo) on a
> black poloshirt.

Obviously the logo should also be in black, with details in black for contrast
:-) 
Alternatively, a snow-crashy pattern of white noise would have more entropy.


Someone suggested buttons; they are pretty cheap to make, 
and it's easy to do individualized versions using a laser printer,
if you want them with your own keys or fingerprints on them....

				Bill
				
# Bill Stewart    wcs@anchor.ho.att.com  +1-908-949-0705 Fax-4876
# AT&T Bell Labs, Room 4M-312, Crawfords Corner Rd, Holmdel, NJ  07733-3030
# rot-13 public key available upon request



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Peter shipley <shipley@merde.dis.org>
Date: Tue, 27 Jul 93 08:02:38 PDT
To: "L. Detweiler" <ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Subject: Re: oodles of Cypherpunk T-shirt ideas
In-Reply-To: <9307270548.AA01615@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Message-ID: <9307270622.AA22453@merde.dis.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/x-pgp


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----


>Hello, I've been following the T-shirt & cypherpunk meanderings. Fun! A few id
}eas:
>
>- as for graphic designs, it is amazingly easy to get absolutely
>stunning graphics from raytracers & fractal image generators. I would
>suggest chrome or glass letterings on checkerboard planes stretching to
>infinity (does anyone know of sites for 3d letter geometries?)

sounds line on paper, but how will it look on cotton after 30 washings.

>
>- the merchandising could be potentially lucrative,

yea, yea, does anyone care to just do thing for free anymore?  if there
are any profits they should go to Philip R. Zimmermann since his pgp
started this whole thing.  A large volume of the text on this list
was hot the RSA was trying to profit on encryption and who "we" did not
want to pay for it and how nice it is it to have good *free* software.

I suggest we sell the T's at cost.  there are enough of with jobs
that we can front the originator the startup costs.  Another advantage of
this is that more people will get the shirts.


			-Pete

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.3

iQBVAgUBLFTJonynuL1gkffFAQG3GQH9GCoGKesc20z99UsEODrRL1H3KM+qZXkn
rOEbZcsN4dAYVoDccO1uiWSoSr1hJA1IcX37as1zsdlvjNpr1l2+0A==
=r7RA
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: jpp@markv.com
Date: Mon, 26 Jul 93 23:31:05 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Alpha testers wanted: GNU Emacs, RMAIL, and PGP
Message-ID: <9307262328.aa17686@hermix.markv.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

  I have just finished writing a fancy new package for GNU Emacs
(pgpmail).  It requires PGP, RMAIL, and sendmail.  You must be able to
run a program from within Emacs.  Pgpmail automaticaly checks message
signatures and decrypts messages, it helps automate signing outgoing
messages (and strips the signatures a bit too!).  Pgpmail also helps
fix a known security hole -- it doesn't send you passphrase on the
command line, but uses the environment instead.

  If you would like to be an early alpha tester for my software, *and*
feel you would provide lots of testing please reply to me directly.

j'  
- --
                O I am Jay Prime Positive jpp@markv.com 
1250 bit key fingerprint =  B8 95 E0 AF 9A A2 CD A5  89 C9 F0 FE B4 3A 2C 3F
 524 bit key fingerprint =  8A 7C B9 F2 D5 46 4D ED  66 23 F1 71 DE FF 51 48
Public keys by `finger jpp@markv.com' or mail to pgp-public-keys@pgp.mit.edu
Your feedback is welcome, directly or via symbol JPP on hex@sea.east.sun.com

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
iQBXAgUBLFTK8NC3U5sdKpFdAQG9bwIJAcsJgRnxpKRPcC9EM1qIsXNvFsK9AiRQ
g9IqbsWHi2OIyWvsGrf7YEkZkNojOszgkY3AFlddCZvDueapGMmJHuTx
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "L. Detweiler" <ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Date: Mon, 26 Jul 93 22:51:05 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: oodles of Cypherpunk T-shirt ideas
Message-ID: <9307270548.AA01615@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Hello, I've been following the T-shirt & cypherpunk meanderings. Fun! A few ideas:

- as for graphic designs, it is amazingly easy to get absolutely
stunning graphics from raytracers & fractal image generators. I would
suggest chrome or glass letterings on checkerboard planes stretching to
infinity (does anyone know of sites for 3d letter geometries?) 

- the merchandising could be potentially lucrative, esp. if the designs
are beautiful and inspiring and interesting to people that have no
connections to the group directly. I suggest that a cypherpunk fund be
set up for some modest percentage of profits for group projects, such
as meetings or mailings or whatever. sellers should indicate how much
they will donate. If you think the fund would be mismanaged (money has
a tendency to warp people), feel free to donate nothing!

- In some ways the shirts should be very broadly appealing, if they are
then many non-cyberpunks will buy them and our message will spread like a virus!

Here are a lot of brainstormed ideas for mottos. If anyone makes
fantastic profit from them I get a share :) A long time ago (in
cyberspatial terms), I suggested `Cypherpunks do it secretly!' for T
shirts, so I've had plenty of time to think!

- Cypherpunks: The Cyberspatial Colonialists
- We the Cypherpunks, In Order to Form a More Perfect Cyberspace
- Give Me Privacy or Give Me Stealth
- I Regret that I have but One Life to Live in Cyberspace
- I Regret that I have but One Tshirt for the Cypherpunks
- Ask *not* what the NSA can do for you; ask what you can do to the NSA!
- Clip the Clipper (picture of crushed/exploding chip under hammered, clenched fist)
- NSA with circle/red line through it
- Stop the Spooks! circle/red line through spy figure
- Cypherpunks: Guerrila Cryptologists. Picture of rambo-like figure
wielding a sword like a pen. Maybe PGP themes here.
- Cypherpunks vs. National Spooks Anonymous (jab at NSA). The idea here
would be to mimic/parody a t-shirt for a big sporting event.
- Cypherpunks with variation on Markoff's quote: no more
self-consciously ornery group in all of cyberspace!
- Picture of Jefferson with caption Grade A Cypherpunk (I kind of like this one)
- Key Escrow: Good Enough for Sternlight & Denning (a real inside joke)
- Key Escrow: as Safe as a (Government-Insured) Savings and Loan
- Key Escrow: As American as Violating the Constitution
- Key Escrow: Big Brother is Listening
- Clipper: U.S. Social Insecurity
- Key Escrow: Lock It Up and Throw Away the Key
- Key Escrow: Lock It Up and Give Away the Key
- Picture of a lock & key. Cypherpunks: the Key to the Codes.
- How about a variation on the $20 bill design with Jefferson on it but
other pictures elsewhere on the bill. Maybe text all in those
computer-type fonts. Digital Cash. In Cryptography We Trust (a bit
pagan, but oh well). Legal tender for all debts, public and private.
- Cypherpunks: Patriotic Cyberspatial Citizens. Picture of U.S. flag
flapping with digital variations. Maybe computer screens in the place of stars?
- Cypherpunks: The New World Order.
- Has anyone seen any endangered bureacrats? (another real inside joke)
- How about some quotes from the Steve Jackson trial where the judge
really hammered at T. Foley?
- Operation SunDevil: Exactly as Planned
- ``If it had gone off exactly as planned, everything would have been
perfect'' (FBI quote on the Waco raid, but works for Steve Jackson, Clipper, etc.)
- `I'm not sure if people should have been involved' (Paraphrase, Denning)
- `We haven't had problems with encryption yet but if we do there's
going to be a lot of dead bodies lying around' (Paraphrase, FBI)
- April 16th, 1993: a Day that will Live in Infamy
- National Security: the root password to the constitution (tx. Ferguson)
- Clipper: Only A Chip Away at Your Privacy
- Big Brother is watching YOU (picture of those pointing Uncle Sam
pictures, dressed like a spy?)
- Cryptography is like Nitroglycerin. Or the question, what's the
difference between cryptography and nitroglycerin? (No answer!) Picture
of exploding chip on rear?
- Cypherpunks: the Big Mother of Big Brother (could be misconstrued)
- Cypherpunks: { Someone, Anyone, Everyone } Other than Big Brother
- We have Nothing to Lose but our Freedom
- Caveat Encryptor (anti Clipper picture)
- Cypherpunks: The Bug Bashers, or The Debuggers (this would cover both
wiretapping and programming).
- { NSA, FBI, Wiretapping, Clipper }: as American as J. Edgar Hoover (hehe).
- Cypherpunks: The Patriots Without a Country but With a Computer
- Cypherpunks: Assaulting the Putrid Palace (picture of crumbling castle? beseiged?)
- Cypherpunks: Cryptographic { Revolutionaries, subversives }
- Save Cyberspace - Nuke the NSA (bad pun on other stickers)
- Cypherpunks: Largely EFFective
- ``We are taking a great step toward a society where privacy is the
realm only of the rich'' (paraphrase, W. Diffie).
- Nothing is Sacred in Cyberspace
- Privacy: Worth Protecting
- Cryptography: Digital Draperies
- Cryptography: The Fences of Cyberspace (Good Fences make Good Neighbors).
- Front: Attention! Recruiting Professional Voyeurs! Back: send resume
to [address of NSA] (picture of depraved lecher looking through keyhole?)
- Practice Safe Sends. Cypherpunks. (PGP theme)
- Cypherpunks: the Cyberspatial Entrepreneurs.
- I Pledge Allegiance to Cyberspace
- I Pledge Disobedience to the NSA
- NSA: Safe From the Democratic Process (jab at aloofness from accountability)
- Cryptography for the Unwashed Masses
- Public Key Cryptography: Recipe for Revolution
- Cypherpunks: Founding Fathers of Netocracy (Modemocracy)
- NSA: The Abuses Are Behind { Us, It }
- NSA: Behind Us All The Way
- NSA: Still Hot Stuff after the Cold War (back: why is that, anyway?)
- NSA: Keeping Up with the Joneses
- NSA: Alive as the Soviet Union
- NSA: Frozen in Time
- NSA: Making It and Breaking It
- The Cypherpunks say, `No Such Agency!'.
- NSA: worst of the TLAs (really inside: three letter acronyms)
- NSA: Thanks to Your Taxes, State of the Art in Privacy Deprivation
- Cypherpunks: rebels with a cause (from Wired article?)
- Front: Old Spooks Never Die. Back: has anyone seen Jack Kevorkian around?
- NSA: official gov't agency for exterminating boogeymen. Call [x]
- NSA: The Government's Closet. (Picture of closet with skeletons)
- NSA: In the Dark (picture of dracula in coffin, hiding from sun?)

shew, that will do it for *now* :)




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Stanton McCandlish <anton@hydra.unm.edu>
Date: Mon, 26 Jul 93 23:51:06 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: T-SHIRTS
In-Reply-To: <930726211245_72114.1712_FHF36-1@CompuServe.COM>
Message-ID: <9307270647.AA04043@hydra.unm.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Quoth Sandy, verily I say unto thee:

-=>Here's the deal.  The Queensboro Shirt Company will reproduce any
-=>logo or design on their two-ply yarn all-cotton polo shirts.  The
-=>special deal is the price for first-time customers--$179 for 6
-=>shirts, $499 for 20 shirts.  I could really go for a stylized,
-=>gold thread, "CYPHERPUNKS" on a black polo shirt.  Anyone else
-=>interested?  I'll bring info about Queensboro and other companies
-=>to the next physical meeting if I can make it.

My 2 bits worth, before the deal is done:  I'd much rather have a T-shirt.
In fact I would not buy a polo shirt.  I don't play polo, and see no
reason to dress like a yuppie/preppie.  Some may like them, so here's my idea:
Make a silkscreen and put in on poloshirts, caps, Ts, and tanktops (in the
middle, sort of like those german army tanktops.)  Maybe even on a jersey
or sweatshirt.  Then everyone is happy.  

My question would be, who gets the money, and who does the work?  Is this
something some individual is going to go do, or is some sort of CP fund
going to be set up (which could perhaps be used to help get a conference
or something going, or at least cover the cost of some duly elected
representative of the CPs to attend important conferences and report back
to us all.  Or something like that.

-- 
Stanton  McCandlish   * Space Migration * Networking * ChaOrder * NO GOV'T. *
anton@hydra.unm.edu   * Intelligence Increase * Nano * Crypto * NO RELIGION *
FidoNet:    1:301/2   * Life Extension * Ethics * VR * Now! * NO MORE LIES! *
Noise in the Void BBS * +1-505-246-8515   (24hr, 1200-14400, v32bis, N-8-1) *



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: skyhawk@cpac.washington.edu
Date: Tue, 27 Jul 93 00:56:07 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Alpha testers wanted: GNU Emacs, RMAIL, and PGP
Message-ID: <9307270752.AA27586@bailey.cpac.washington.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> From: jpp@markv.com <jpp/daemon>
> Subject: Alpha testers wanted: GNU Emacs, RMAIL, and PGP
> 
> [...]  Pgpmail also helps fix a known security hole -- it doesn't send you
> passphrase on the command line, but uses the environment instead.

The security-conscious way to send something to a subprocess is to use a pipe.
Looking at environment variables requires just a single extra flag to ps(1).
If PGP can't be set up to use a pipe to get the passphrase, it would be best to
modify PGP to clear its arguments when it's done getting a copy of them.

--
Scott Northrop          <skyhawk@cpac.washington.edu>            (206)784-2083
ObVirus:   The demand for obedience is inherently evil.
ObVirus2:  As a juror in a Trial by Jury, you have the right, power and duty
           to acquit the defendant if you judge the law itself to be unjust.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: jpp@markv.com
Date: Tue, 27 Jul 93 01:06:06 PDT
To: b44729@achilles.ctd.anl.gov
Subject: Re: Alpha testers wanted: GNU Emacs, RMAIL, and PGP
In-Reply-To: <9307270728.AA06762@achilles.ctd.anl.gov>
Message-ID: <9307270103.aa21910@hermix.markv.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

Learn something new every day.  On *my* (SCO unix) system it is easy
to read the command line via ps.  On *my* system ps -e reports on
every process, not the environment.  I can find no reference to
'environment' in the ps man page.  Finaly, after talking with a more
knowledgeable-than-I unix guru, I felt that the environment was a
safer place to put the passphrase.

But, since there is at least one place where this is not true (and
after reading some BSD man pages, it seems there a quite a few), I
will have to *improve* my code.  I will offer all three ways
(environment, command line, and file-descriptor) to input a
passphrase.  (And will try to figure out how to read the environment
of other processes under Sys V...)  I would apreciate input from unix
gurus out there about which systems make the environment hard to read,
and which easy; and similar stuff about the command line, and pipes.

Thanks for your help making pgpmail even better!

j'
- --
                O I am Jay Prime Positive jpp@markv.com 
1250 bit key fingerprint =  B8 95 E0 AF 9A A2 CD A5  89 C9 F0 FE B4 3A 2C 3F
 524 bit key fingerprint =  8A 7C B9 F2 D5 46 4D ED  66 23 F1 71 DE FF 51 48
Public keys by `finger jpp@markv.com' or mail to pgp-public-keys@pgp.mit.edu
Your feedback is welcome, directly or via symbol JPP on hex@sea.east.sun.com

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
iQBXAgUBLFThN9C3U5sdKpFdAQHwmQIMDENppnUL3Y+KeteuUstqklcFD37+zZed
p7RY/FExSg1Axi96plNWXTD3UhOV7P0z1LQsaqi6W63HS4O0lkMsO7sf
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: jpp@markv.com
Date: Tue, 27 Jul 93 02:26:06 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Alpha testers wanted: GNU Emacs, RMAIL, and PGP
In-Reply-To: <9307270822.AA08896@achilles.ctd.anl.gov>
Message-ID: <9307270221.aa25288@hermix.markv.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

   From: Samuel Pigg <b44729@achilles.ctd.anl.gov>
   It already does clear the passphrase argument when using -z, but it's
   trivial to use a file descriptor to send the passphrase to pgp, either
   using the PGPPASSFD environment variable to give it the descriptor, or
   if PGPPASSFD is 0, then pgp will look on the first line of piped input
   for the passphrase.  (check out pgp.c)

   -Sam

Yep, so trival that I hacked pgpmail to do it.  Now pgpmail will use
PGPPASSFD, or PGPPASS.  Thanks for your help.

 __alpha__ testers are still wanted (and perhaps a little wiser about
the decision to test my software :) )

j'
- --
                O I am Jay Prime Positive jpp@markv.com 
1250 bit key fingerprint =  B8 95 E0 AF 9A A2 CD A5  89 C9 F0 FE B4 3A 2C 3F
 524 bit key fingerprint =  8A 7C B9 F2 D5 46 4D ED  66 23 F1 71 DE FF 51 48
Public keys by `finger jpp@markv.com' or mail to pgp-public-keys@pgp.mit.edu
Your feedback is welcome, directly or via symbol JPP on hex@sea.east.sun.com


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
iQBXAgUBLFTze9C3U5sdKpFdAQErQgIMCe0P2PsTS/ELNfe0R/Q8C39+WsI4M9wS
pMfmRrrJCwyfBNGqN2SSATUbf/5iEQ6h6t/0E7GSKothFD+Q9q/XS/SI
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: b44729@achilles.ctd.anl.gov (Samuel Pigg)
Date: Tue, 27 Jul 93 00:31:05 PDT
To: jpp@markv.com
Subject: Alpha testers wanted: GNU Emacs, RMAIL, and PGP
In-Reply-To: <9307262328.aa17686@hermix.markv.com>
Message-ID: <9307270728.AA06762@achilles.ctd.anl.gov>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


   Date: Mon, 26 Jul 93 23:28:36 PDT
   From: jpp@markv.com
   Sender: jpp@markv.com

     I have just finished writing a fancy new package for GNU Emacs
   (pgpmail).  It requires PGP, RMAIL, and sendmail.  You must be able to
   run a program from within Emacs.  Pgpmail automaticaly checks message
   signatures and decrypts messages, it helps automate signing outgoing
   messages (and strips the signatures a bit too!).  Pgpmail also helps
   fix a known security hole -- it doesn't send you passphrase on the
   command line, but uses the environment instead.

I may be missing something, but isn't this less secure than using the
command line? Anyone on the system can do a "ps -e" whilst you are
encrypting to get the environment of the pgp process.

If you use the -z option to pass the passphrase to pgp, that argument
gets cleared by pgp immedaitely when it executes, so it is not
available for very long.

An even better way would be to use the file descriptor method of
giving the passphrase to pgp.

Not sure how you would do this in elisp, but that's how I did it in
NXPGP (pgp front end for NeXT). Well, the newest version anyway, which
is still being beta tested (anyone want to help?).


-Sam





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: b44729@achilles.ctd.anl.gov (Samuel Pigg)
Date: Tue, 27 Jul 93 01:26:07 PDT
To: skyhawk@cpac.washington.edu
Subject: Alpha testers wanted: GNU Emacs, RMAIL, and PGP
In-Reply-To: <9307270752.AA27586@bailey.cpac.washington.edu>
Message-ID: <9307270822.AA08896@achilles.ctd.anl.gov>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


   From: skyhawk@cpac.washington.edu
   Date: Tue, 27 Jul 93 0:52:36 PDT
   X-Mailer: ELM [version 2.3 PL0]

   > From: jpp@markv.com <jpp/daemon>
   > Subject: Alpha testers wanted: GNU Emacs, RMAIL, and PGP
   > 
   > [...]  Pgpmail also helps fix a known security hole -- it doesn't send you
   > passphrase on the command line, but uses the environment instead.

   The security-conscious way to send something to a subprocess is to use a pipe.
   Looking at environment variables requires just a single extra flag to ps(1).
   If PGP can't be set up to use a pipe to get the passphrase, it would be best to
   modify PGP to clear its arguments when it's done getting a copy of them.

It already does clear the passphrase argument when using -z, but it's
trivial to use a file descriptor to send the passphrase to pgp, either
using the PGPPASSFD environment variable to give it the descriptor, or
if PGPPASSFD is 0, then pgp will look on the first line of piped input
for the passphrase.  (check out pgp.c)

-Sam





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: b44729@achilles.ctd.anl.gov (Samuel Pigg)
Date: Tue, 27 Jul 93 03:31:08 PDT
To: jpp@markv.com
Subject: Alpha testers wanted: GNU Emacs, RMAIL, and PGP
In-Reply-To: <9307270221.aa25288@hermix.markv.com>
Message-ID: <9307271028.AA13950@achilles.ctd.anl.gov>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Your program, if you are using it to send these messages, may be sending
out two copies of each message.

Here is a diff of the last two messages you sent:

1c1
< From jpp@markv.com Tue Jul 27 05:22:35 1993
---
> From jpp@markv.com Tue Jul 27 05:22:41 1993

They are identical except for one being sent 6 seconds after the other.

and here is a diff of the previous pair:

1c1
< From jpp@markv.com Tue Jul 27 05:26:11 1993
---
> From jpp@markv.com Tue Jul 27 05:26:15 1993

Same here, but four seconds after the other.

-Sam




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: hughes (Eric Hughes)
Date: Tue, 27 Jul 93 06:36:43 PDT
To: cypherpunks
Subject: TEST: please ignore
Message-ID: <9307271336.AA21414@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Please ignore this message.

Eric




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: jthomas@kolanut.mitre.org (Joe Thomas)
Date: Tue, 27 Jul 93 05:26:12 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: T-shirts are for wimps...
Message-ID: <9307271222.AA07456@kolanut>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


cdodhner@indirect.com (Christian D. Odhner) wrote:
> 

> That would be realy cool! Sombody else (Eric I think) suggested maybe
> buttons as well, and I've seen advertisements out in the net in various
> news groups and such about 'cheap stickers' that you can get custom made,
> like 100 for 15$US. Let's do _ALL_ of these ideas, and realy spread the word!

Was it Tim May who suggested the "Big Brother Inside" stickers to put on Clipper  
based phones?  If anyone gets these made up, I'll head down to my local AT&T  
store and put them to good use...

Joe




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: pat@tstc.edu (Patrick E. Hykkonen)
Date: Tue, 27 Jul 93 06:41:12 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: More stuff...
Message-ID: <9307271337.AA11041@tstc.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Ok, How about maybe one of these.  Obscure, but kinda fun.

 - 1984 + 10
 - Orwell missed by 10.
 - Big Brother has arrived!
 - So what's 10 years between Orwell and a few friends?

-- 
"I'm not being irrational, I just know to much."  - Tim Allen
--
Pat Hykkonen, N5NPL                     Texas State Technical College at Waco
Internet: {pat,postmaster,root}@tstc.edu       Instructional Network Services
Packet: N5NPL@WD5KAL.#CENTX.TX.USA.NA        3801 Campus Dr.  Waco, Tx  76705
Public keys available! ** 1984 + 10 **     V:(817) 867-4830  F:(817) 799-2843




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: mdavis@pro-sol.cts.com (Morgan Davis)
Date: Tue, 27 Jul 93 10:52:40 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Tee-shirt
In-Reply-To: <habs@panix.com>
Message-ID: <gr35763@pro-sol.cts.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Harry Shapiro <habs@panix.com> writes:

>Orwell was wrong
>
>   1994

Orwell was probably right, but some editor went in and changed the title to
1984.  If only Orwell had PGP back then...  :-)

 /\/\  Morgan Davis Group (619/670-0563)
/ /__\  Internet: mdavis@pro-sol.cts.com




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: peter honeyman <honey@hone.citi.umich.edu>
Date: Tue, 27 Jul 93 06:46:43 PDT
To: baumbach@atmel.com
Subject: Re: Cypherpunks T-Shirt
In-Reply-To: <9307262118.AA02220@hammerhead.chp.atmel.com>
Message-ID: <9307271346.AA21696@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> For what it's worth, the masthead has CIS:[73130,1734].  I think
> that's a Compuserve address, and offhand I don't know how to
> send mail to one, yet I know it's possible.  

73130.1734@compuserve.com.

	peter




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: peter honeyman <honey@hone.citi.umich.edu>
Date: Tue, 27 Jul 93 06:47:36 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: T-Shirts
In-Reply-To: <9307262159.AA24713@toad.com>
Message-ID: <9307271346.AA21701@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


personally, i'd like to have a cypherpunks-embroidered pillbox hat.

	peter




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Harry Shapiro <habs@panix.com>
Date: Tue, 27 Jul 93 07:17:36 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Tee-shirt
Message-ID: <199307271416.AA23652@panix.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


How about:

Orwell was wrong

   1994

(1994 in big bold large san serif typeface)


-- 
Harry S. Hawk  				      habs@extropy.org
Electronic Communications Officer, Extropy Institute Inc.
List Administrator of the Extropy Institute Mailing List
Private Communication for the Extropian Community since 1991



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: paul@poboy.b17c.ingr.com (Paul Robichaux)
Date: Tue, 27 Jul 93 08:52:37 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Nose against the grindstone
Message-ID: <199307271546.AA26996@poboy.b17c.ingr.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I assume everyone saw the message from Philip Mulivor here asking for our
input on the issues related to anonymity and newsgathering. As of
Friday afternoon, I was the only one to respond.

I can't help but think that we are being dissolute in discussing
T-shirts, coffee mugs, et al when a *REAL* *LIVE* *JOURNALIST* came to
the list asking for information and got almost zero response.

If we're looking at shirts which will raise people's awareness and
provoke questions, that's great. Many of the slogans and designs,
though, will be indecipherable to anyone who's not _already_ a
cypherpunk. If these shirts are just a membership badge, like a DoD #
in *.motorcycles, then IMNSHO we're wasting our time.

-Paul

-- 
Paul Robichaux, KD4JZG     | "An interesting mistake... I wish I knew what 
perobich@ingr.com          |  led you to make it."
Intergraph Federal Systems | "I make a lot of them. It's how I learn."
(but not their opinion)    |      - A. Jablokov, _A Deeper Sea_




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: khijol!erc@apple.com (Ed Carp)
Date: Tue, 27 Jul 93 12:26:18 PDT
To: perobich@ingr.com
Subject: Re: Nose against the grindstone
In-Reply-To: <199307271546.AA26996@poboy.b17c.ingr.com>
Message-ID: <m0oKu4P-00022GC@khijol>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text


> I assume everyone saw the message from Philip Mulivor here asking for our
> input on the issues related to anonymity and newsgathering. As of
> Friday afternoon, I was the only one to respond.

Hmmm...I didn't see the message, but I *have* seen the other ones about
T-shirts and the like.  I agree with Paul - let's get back to business,
shall we?
-- 
Ed Carp				erc@apple.com			510/659-9560

If you want magic, let go of your armor.  Magic is so much stronger than
steel!        -- Richard Bach, "The Bridge Across Forever"



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Date: Tue, 27 Jul 93 12:41:18 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Nose against the grindstone
Message-ID: <9307271849.AA12453@netcom.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Paul Robichaux believes we are being "dissolute" in discussing t-shirts and
such when our noses should instead be against the grindstone (talking to
journalists? huh?):

>I assume everyone saw the message from Philip Mulivor here asking for our
>input on the issues related to anonymity and newsgathering. As of
>Friday afternoon, I was the only one to respond.
>
>I can't help but think that we are being dissolute in discussing
>T-shirts, coffee mugs, et al when a *REAL* *LIVE* *JOURNALIST* came to
>the list asking for information and got almost zero response.
>
>If we're looking at shirts which will raise people's awareness and
>provoke questions, that's great. Many of the slogans and designs,
>though, will be indecipherable to anyone who's not _already_ a
>cypherpunk. If these shirts are just a membership badge, like a DoD #
>in *.motorcycles, then IMNSHO we're wasting our time.

Not to sound snippy or flamish, but such calls for us to "get back to work"
smack of the argument that goes like this: "How can people be doing X when
there's still Y in the world?" 

- "How can people watch television when some people don't even have radios?"
- "How can people own pets when people in Bangladesh are starving?"
- "How can anyone own a computer workstation when some people lack even a PC?"
- "How can Cypherpunks discuss t-shirts be discussed when journalists want
answers?"

And so on.

Mostly these points boil down to the plaintive cry of "How can you have fun
when others aren't?" That is, how can Cypherpunks pursue frivolous issues,
at times, when we should be in our sled dog harnesses, pulling a heavy
load?

Well, man does not live by bread alone! All work and no play make
Cypherpunks have a dull day.

Ironically, many of us have already talked _a lot_ to journalists. For
example, I spent about 5 hours each, on average, with Kevin Kelly ("Wired"
editor, which helped with his "Crypto Rebels" cover story by Steven Levy,
and his outstanding article on the "Technologies of Disconnection" in
"Whole Earth Review"), with Steven Levy (for the aforementioned "Wired"
article), and with Julian Dibbell of the "Village Voice" (for a forthcoming
article--on the cover, I hear). Plus, phone conversations (a radio
interview with Dave Mandl) and chats with some of them at "Cypherpunks"
meetings.

The same is true of Eric Hughes ("Newsweek" coverage, Richard Hart's t.v.
program, the same articles as above, etc.), John Gilmore (contacts too
numerous to mention!!!), John Draper, and others. Further, we have several
journalists/article writers *here on this list*! Sandy Sandfort, Peter
Wayner, Jude Milhon, Dave Mandl, are just some of them. (And Kevin Kelly,
Julian Dibbell, Steven Levy, have been List subscribers at times in the
past, and maybe still are.)

Other List members are also making contacts (Paul Ferguson?), and Lance
Dettweiler has posted the call for discussion with journalist Philip
Mulivor on the alt.whistleblower list. (Lance speculates, correctly I
think, that Mulivor has no Net access. If true, I question that Mulivor is
such a high-priority journalistic target anyway. Maybe he is. But I'm sure
enough folks will talk to him. The talk of mail programs and t-shirts is
not likely to affect this.)

Anyway, the danger is perhaps of journalistic _overexposure_, not
underexposure. Perhaps people should blast me for wasting precious hours
talking to Kelly, Levy, Dibbell, and others, when I could've *more*
profitably spent the time studying "perl" and hence pulled the Cypherpunks
sled a few more miles toward our distant goals. (I'm being facetious, of
course, as I don't particularly _want_ to learn perl and become another
Unix jock.)

As the one who brought up the "Cypherpunks t-shirt" issue, I see nothing
wrong with spending some time tossing ideas around on this. Most
conferences (like "Hackers," "Crypto," etc.) produce some sort of t-shirt
or hat or whatnot, and nobody seems all that perturbed that they are
becoming "dissolute." (And some of these t-shirts were on display on the
"Wired" cover, ironically.)

Such things can produce an enthusiasm, an esprit d'corps, which keeps folks
active and keeps them feeling part of something. I'm not saying I'll learn
perl just because I have a Cypherpunks t-shirt, but I don't see the harm in
spending some time thinking about it and perhaps even getting them made.
Same with bumper stickers, fliers, and the like.

The wonderful thing about distributed, decentralized systems like ours is
that folks can work on what interests them. For some, it'll be
whistleblowing. For others, new mail programs. And some will learn perl,
some will try to crack PGP, and some will design logos for t-shirts. Some
will even talk to journalists. In fact, some of us already _have_.

I appreciated Paul's comments, even though I disagreed with them.

Cheers!


-Tim May

--
Timothy C. May         | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,  
tcmay@netcom.com       | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
408-688-5409           | knowledge, reputations, information markets, 
W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA  | black markets, collapse of governments.
Higher Power: 2^756839 | Public Key: by arrangement
Note: I put time and money into writing this posting. I hope you enjoy it.      







From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: nobody@pmantis.berkeley.edu
Date: Tue, 27 Jul 93 11:52:41 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Nose against the grindstone
Message-ID: <9307271851.AA19907@pmantis.berkeley.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


X-Really-From: Dave Mandl (dmandl@lehman.com)

> From: paul@poboy.b17c.ingr.com (Paul Robichaux)
> 
> I assume everyone saw the message from Philip Mulivor here asking for our
> input on the issues related to anonymity and newsgathering. As of
> Friday afternoon, I was the only one to respond.
> 
> I can't help but think that we are being dissolute in discussing
> T-shirts, coffee mugs, et al when a *REAL* *LIVE* *JOURNALIST* came to
> the list asking for information and got almost zero response.
> 
> If we're looking at shirts which will raise people's awareness and
> provoke questions, that's great. Many of the slogans and designs,
> though, will be indecipherable to anyone who's not _already_ a
> cypherpunk. If these shirts are just a membership badge, like a DoD #
> in *.motorcycles, then IMNSHO we're wasting our time.
> 
> -Paul

I considered (for a couple of seconds) responding to P.M.'s request, but
then decided against it.  I'm sure he's a nice guy, but I generally don't
trust mainstream journalists too much and don't go out of my way to talk
to them.  People may have actually made a decision not to talk to him, so
I wouldn't assume it's "apathy" or anything like that.  (I'm sensitive about
this because people are always accusing anti-voting anarchists of "apathy,"
and that gets us hopping mad.)

On the subject of the T-shirts: I agree that they should not be too, er,
cryptic.  They shouldn't be just a way for us to pat ourselves on the
back and be in-group-ish, but a way to spread the word.  I also think we
should try to accommodate the different political views in the group (which
are not all that different anyway) by avoiding use of the American flag,
references to Jefferson, etc.  We should stick to issues we all agree
on, which there are plenty of: Anti-Big Brother, Anti-NSA/CIA/FBI,
pro-privacy, libertarianism (capital or small "L"), freedom of information,
etc.

   --Dave.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: eric@Synopsys.COM
Date: Tue, 27 Jul 93 12:16:18 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: T-SHIRTS
In-Reply-To: <9307270234.AA29176@anchor.ho.att.com>
Message-ID: <199307271913.AA26273@gaea.synopsys.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>>>>> On Mon, 26 Jul 93 22:34:02 EDT, wcs@anchor.ho.att.com (Bill Stewart +1-908-949-0705 wcs@anchor.ho.att.com) said:

Bill> Alternatively, a snow-crashy pattern of white noise would have more entropy.

How about a random dot stereogram?  I wrote a program a while back for
generating them.  A cypherpunks logo floating over a snowy
background... 

But only if you stare at it real hard...


-eric messick (eric@toad.com)




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: khijol!erc@apple.com (Ed Carp)
Date: Tue, 27 Jul 93 12:32:35 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Nose against the grindstone
In-Reply-To: <9307271851.AA19907@pmantis.berkeley.edu>
Message-ID: <m0oKuhG-00022GC@khijol>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text


> I considered (for a couple of seconds) responding to P.M.'s request, but
> then decided against it.  I'm sure he's a nice guy, but I generally don't
> trust mainstream journalists too much and don't go out of my way to talk
> to them.  People may have actually made a decision not to talk to him, so

In this day and age, this may be politically naive.  The press is so pervasive
and so persuasive that, if you don't get them on your side early, you may be
shooting yourself in the foot.
-- 
Ed Carp				erc@apple.com			510/659-9560

If you want magic, let go of your armor.  Magic is so much stronger than
steel!        -- Richard Bach, "The Bridge Across Forever"



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: IE63@vaxb.acs.unt.edu
Date: Wed, 4 Aug 93 22:53:26 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: help with encryptor - please?!?!
Message-ID: <01H11DLJLG020009B3@vaxb.acs.unt.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


     I've been working on a program for MS-DOS machines that will
encrypt and/or password protect .COM and .EXE files.  The way it works
is this: It encrypts the entire file specified by the user, then it
uses a polymorphic encryptor to encrypt the decryption code for the file 
and put it in a decryption envelope filled with anti-debugging code.  IT
then attaches the entire module/decryption code to the file so that it 
is executed initially when the file is run - at which point it decrypts
the file and does whatever relocation is needed (for .EXE files).  In
the case of a password - it asks for the password, encrypts it and checks
it against the stored version, then if they match it decrypts restoration
code using the password as a key and continues on.  

    I've got it working really well at this point - but my encryption 
algorithms are rather simple.  I'm fairly new in the encryption biz, 
and I was wondering what would be good to use for the file encryption 
algorithm to make it as secure as possible?  Of course - the code to 
decrypt it MUST be present in the file, so if you can bypass the anti-
debugging code it's yours, but the polymorphism makes it difficult to 
do this on more than a case-by-case basis.  Still - I'd like to make
it to where one can't just run a "decrypt-em-all" analysis program on it
and be able to read the included text - but I need a good algorithm 
for it.  Any help/suggestions would REALLY be appreciated.  Oh -
if you are interested in the protection utilities, email me at the
address below - it's freeware.

Thanks a lot,
Michael Ellison
ie63@vaxb.acs.unt.edu

If you wish to encrypt any messages E-mailed to me, please use the 
following key.....
-----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----
Version: 2.3a

mQCNAixUuYYAAAEEAKNllAee26qGqxJck3Bftdkrz0MUQLABGMZqVem9UW9kjjS+
rMAafauqYTE5/Kdnx+4Asj0Wgfon0YBtRMT0crMcBYNqVp4//RUh7wrxQNvKFeeO
ZGuQp2hyHQqh1FDfWsHG4ldGqIV1YuOXq6oeIDkmbwgf8BRgPcZkwUqsF4b1AAUR
tCpNaWNoYWVsIEEuIEVsbGlzb24gPGllNjNAdmF4Yi5hY3MudW50LmVkdT4=
=0rss
-----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Date: Tue, 27 Jul 93 13:21:18 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: T-Shirts, Grindstones, and our "Mission Objective"
In-Reply-To: <9307271954.AA12053@elvis.tamu.edu>
Message-ID: <9307272019.AA29896@netcom5.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



> David Vincenzetti writes:
> >I'd say STOP to all this discussing about t-shirts.
> >Isn't this mailing list supposed to be related to privacy and crypto topics?
> >Regards,
> >David

Learn to either ignore posts you aren't interested in, or rig up a
kill file for any thread that contains things like "t-shirt" or
whatever.

I posted a long response to Paul R.'s call for us to put our noses
back to the grindstone (by talking to journalists, in _his_ opinion),
but it may not appear for a while.

Folks, there just isn't any agreed-upon set of priorities. For some,
it's PGP. For others, digital money. And talking to journalists,
writing rants, investigating offshore banking, for others.

Let a thousand flowers bloom.

-Tim


-- 
..........................................................................
Timothy C. May         | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,  
tcmay@netcom.com       | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
408-688-5409           | knowledge, reputations, information markets, 
W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA  | black markets, collapse of governments.
Higher Power: 2^756839 | Public Key: PGP and MailSafe available.
Note: I put time and money into writing this posting. I hope you enjoy it.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: peb@PROCASE.COM (Paul Baclace)
Date: Tue, 27 Jul 93 13:41:22 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Tee-shirt
Message-ID: <9307272040.AA11581@banff.procase.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Here is my vote for a tee shirt below.  People are always asking my what
"/nev/dull" means on one of my T shirts, so I'd like it to be
understandable to more people (and my C++ tee shirt with 
Bjarne Stroustrup on the front with a screw going through his head
is understood by almost *no one*...)


>From: "L. Detweiler" <ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu>

On the front:

>- Big Brother is watching YOU (picture of those pointing Uncle Sam
>pictures, dressed like a spy)


On the back:

Random dot stereogram with the combined image that says "Cypherpunk"
or "Crypto" and under it, a plain text message: 
	"Eternal Vigilance for your Privacy".


Paul E. Baclace
peb@procase.com





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: gnu (John Gilmore)
Date: Tue, 27 Jul 93 13:58:11 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: You want to use DSA? Apply for a personal license from NIST!
Message-ID: <9307272057.AA03696@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


From: djb@silverton.berkeley.edu (D. J. Bernstein)
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
Subject: You want to use DSA? Apply for a personal license from NIST!
Date: 27 Jul 93 06:22:03 GMT

NIST plans to give Public Key Partners exclusive rights to the Digital 
Signature Algorithm. Do you want to guarantee your own rights to this 
technology? You can! It's free, if you can spare a stamp.

Attached is a form letter you can send to NIST to apply for a personal 
license. Put in your own name, address, country, and the right date; 
print it out; read through to check it over; sign it; and drop it in the
mail. You don't have to get everything right the first time---NIST will 
contact you if they need more information to make a decision. And, as a 
bonus, your application will automatically count as an objection to the 
NIST-PKP deal!

I believe that NIST must receive your application by next Friday, the
6th of August, but the due date might be earlier. You might want to 
check immediately with Michael Rubin at 301-975-2803. If necessary you 
can fax your letter to him.

---Dan




                                [address]
                                [date]

Michael R. Rubin
Acting Chief Counsel for Technology
Room A-1111
Administration Building
National Institute of Standards and Technology
Gaithersburg, MD 20899

Dear Mr. Rubin:

I hereby apply for a personal license to use the Digital Signature
Algorithm.

1. Title of invention: Digital Signature Algorithm (DSA).

2. Patent Application Serial Number: 07/738.431.

3. United States Patent Number: To be issued as 5,231,668, I believe.

4. Source of information concerning availability of a license: Various 
sources, including your Federal Register notice.

5. Name and address of applicant: [name], [address, phone, etc.].

6. Applicant's representative: not applicable.

7. I am a [country] citizen.

8. Approximate number of persons employed: not applicable.

9. I am not a small business firm.

10. Purpose: I would like a personal license allowing me to implement 
and use DSA. See #12.

11. Business and commercialization: not applicable; see #10.

12. Plans: I plan to use DSA to attach digital signatures to a variety
of electronic documents, primarily for authentication. I plan to use DSA
implementations, initially in software but perhaps later in hardware,
from a variety of potential future sources. Investments: I may spend 
many hours programming a DSA implementation.


                                                                page 2

13. Fields of commercialization: not applicable; see #10.

14. I am not willing to accept a license for less than all fields of use 
of DSA.

15. I intend to implement and use DSA only in [country].

16. Type of license: I would like a non-exclusive license which does not 
require royalty payments.

17. I have never been granted a license to a federally owned invention.

18. Known uses of DSA by industry or government: I have heard that ISC 
sells a product called dsaSIGN, and that Bellcore has implemented DSA.

19. Other information: I understand that NIST may grant an exclusive 
DSA license to PKP, and that this license application will be treated as 
an objection to the PKP license.

Please note that PKP has stated its intent to make DSA free for personal
use. Therefore, if NIST grants PKP a license and PKP acts according to 
its stated intent, there is no harm to anyone if I am granted this
personal license. However, I do not trust PKP to act according to its
stated intent, and I do not want to have to apply for a license from PKP
even if it is royalty-free. So I ask that you grant me a license
directly.

Thank you for your kind attention. Please let me know if you need more 
information.

                                Sincerely,



                                [name]




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: gnu (John Gilmore)
Date: Tue, 27 Jul 93 14:16:20 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: A few more slogan ideas
Message-ID: <9307272113.AA04156@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I got carried away...

EFF:  Restoring the Bill of Rights, bit by bit.
Cypherpunks:  There's safety in numbers.  (back of shirt:  BIG numbers.)
Cryptography:  There's safety in numbers.  (back of shirt:  BIG numbers.)
Clipper:  A chip off the old Constitution
NSA:  ``What First Amendment?''
Negative Social Advancement
Necrophiliacs Screwing America
Nasty Scheming Authoritarians
Nocturnal Spook Authority
No Secret Authorities

NSA:  Last bastion of thought control
NSA:  Making the world safe for totalitarianism
NSA:  Making the world safe for censorship
Clipper:  Making the world safe for bureacrats
Clipper:  The Policeman is your *Friend*  (italics on Friend)
The NSA supports peace, justice, and freedom.  Right.
Clipper:  Automating no-knock searches.
National Subversion Agents
NSA:  Naddering Nabobs of Negativism		(remember Spiro?)
Nobody's Support Agency
No Sunshine Anymore
Irrational Insecurity Reagency
Negative Survival Approach
Negative Social Access
Negative Social Alteration
Negative Social Amendment
Negative Social Acculturation
National Societal Adulteration
National Social Ablation
National Suppurating Agency
Nogoodniks Smashing America
Nogoodniks Screwing America
No Social Advancement
Naughty Scandalous Amorality
Nasty, Scheming, and Artificial
National Sin Agency
Social Change through Technology:  Cypherpunks
Cypherpunks:  making the world safe for anarchy
Cypherpunks:  making the world safe for privacy
Cypherpunks:  making the world safe for civil rights

A picture of a Clipper chip, with headphones leading off from one of
the pins.

A few more words to combine in N, S, and A:  Sinful, Shameful, 
Stealth, Shiftiness, Scheme.

	John




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: paul@poboy.b17c.ingr.com (Paul Robichaux)
Date: Tue, 27 Jul 93 13:01:18 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Tim's nose (was Re: nose against the grindstone)
Message-ID: <199307271953.AA02410@poboy.b17c.ingr.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



> Paul Robichaux believes we are being "dissolute" in discussing t-shirts and
> such when our noses should instead be against the grindstone (talking to
> journalists? huh?):
> 

[ my original message deleted ]

Perhaps I didn't express myself clearly. In fact, it's evident :)

My opinion, which stands, is that we have spent an inordinate amount
of time in frivolous discussion about T-shirts. My personal opinion is
that you build esprit de corps by common effort and common
achievement, not by how you dress (although my primary experience with
that sort of team spirit comes from my time in the Marines, where
everyone wears the same kind of T-shirt :)

> Mostly these points boil down to the plaintive cry of "How can you have fun
> when others aren't?" That is, how can Cypherpunks pursue frivolous issues,
> at times, when we should be in our sled dog harnesses, pulling a heavy
> load?

I'm not saying that we shouldn't be having fun- but the ongoing
discussion about dress preferences (T-shirt vs. polo vs. cap and so
on) and styles doesn't seem to have an end in either sense (that of
termination or that of purpose.)

Many of our illustrious contributors have talked with high-powered
journalists in the past, and I applaud that effort. Considering the
target market of Phil's article- other professional journalists- I
think spending time to answer his questions is worthwhile.

To me, it's more important to educate reporters in (for example)
Huntsville and Peoria to our cause than to spread the word to trendy,
likely-to-be-sympathetic-to-our-cause folks who read _Wired_, _Village
Voice_, and _Whole Earth Review._

> Other List members are also making contacts (Paul Ferguson?), and Lance
> Dettweiler has posted the call for discussion with journalist Philip
> Mulivor on the alt.whistleblower list. (Lance speculates, correctly I
> think, that Mulivor has no Net access. If true, I question that Mulivor is
> such a high-priority journalistic target anyway. Maybe he is. But I'm sure
> enough folks will talk to him. The talk of mail programs and t-shirts is
> not likely to affect this.)

Well, Lance missed the boat here; I have had an ongoing exchange with
Phil via his e-mail account (mulivor@crc.monroecc.edu), which last I
heard counted as net access...

> Anyway, the danger is perhaps of journalistic _overexposure_, not
> underexposure. Perhaps people should blast me for wasting precious hours
> talking to Kelly, Levy, Dibbell, and others, when I could've *more*
> profitably spent the time studying "perl" and hence pulled the Cypherpunks
> sled a few more miles toward our distant goals. (I'm being facetious, of
> course, as I don't particularly _want_ to learn perl and become another
> Unix jock.)

I'm tempted to say something flip here about "when the average Joe
understands crypto issues like he understands the beer tax, then we
can quit." I don't think that's true, but overexposure _in the media
as a whole_ is not a problem we have right now. Not everyone reads the
_NYT_ and the other pubs mentioned above, and not everyone listens to
NPR. (Ask Crunch about the audience he's trying to reach at raves!)

> As the one who brought up the "Cypherpunks t-shirt" issue, I see nothing
> wrong with spending some time tossing ideas around on this. Most
                      ^^^^
Agreed. I humbly suggest that we've spent our allotted time and could
move on to something more productive.

> The wonderful thing about distributed, decentralized systems like ours is
> that folks can work on what interests them.

Right on, brother. 


-- 
Paul Robichaux, KD4JZG     | "An interesting mistake... I wish I knew what 
perobich@ingr.com          |  led you to make it."
Intergraph Federal Systems | "I make a lot of them. It's how I learn."
(but not their opinion)    |      - A. Jablokov, _A Deeper Sea_




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: allan@elvis.tamu.edu (Allan Bailey)
Date: Tue, 27 Jul 93 12:56:18 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: T-Shirts
In-Reply-To: <9307271938.AA18303@pluto.sm.dsi.unimi.it>
Message-ID: <9307271954.AA12053@elvis.tamu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


David Vincenzetti writes:
>I'd say STOP to all this discussing about t-shirts.
>Isn't this mailing list supposed to be related to privacy and crypto topics?
>Regards,
>David
>--- Forwarded mail from peter honeyman <honey@hone.citi.umich.edu>
>From: peter honeyman <honey@hone.citi.umich.edu>
>To: cypherpunks@toad.com
>Date: Tue, 27 Jul 93 09:45:53 EDT
>Subject: Re: T-Shirts 
>X-Location: Lake Michigan, Harbor Springs
>In-Reply-To: Paul Goggin's message of Mon, 26 Jul 93 17:57:54 -0400.
>             <9307262159.AA24713@toad.com> 
>
>personally, i'd like to have a cypherpunks-embroidered pillbox hat.
>	peter
>--- End of forwarded message from peter honeyman <honey@hone.citi.umich.edu>
>


  But what's a pillbox hat?

--
Allan Bailey, UNIX programmer, CSC          | "Freedom is not free."
Infinite Diversity in Infinite Combinations | or: allan.bailey@tamu.edu





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: peb@PROCASE.COM (Paul Baclace)
Date: Tue, 27 Jul 93 15:43:14 PDT
To: perobich@ingr.com
Subject: Re: Tim's nose (was Re: nose against the grindstone)
Message-ID: <9307272241.AA11605@banff.procase.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



>My opinion, which stands, is that we have spent an inordinate amount
>of time in frivolous discussion about T-shirts.

Consider that it is much easier to make quick comments about tee shirts
than strategic decisions regarding sound bites for the press.  Thus,
the opportunity cost of these comments is fairly low and that also
explains the volume.

That said, here's another addition to the melange:


How about a tee shirt that has the source code to RSA or DES on it.
Could I wear it while flying out of the U.S.?


Curious person:	What's that on your tee shirt?

Cypherpunk:	It's the source code to a program that cannot be exported
	outside the U.S.A.  Banned information.  

Curious person:	How can information be banned?  I thought the First
	Amendment protected that.

Cypherpunk:	Not for export...It's considered munitions even though
	this source code is available in books and on computers almost
	anywhere in the world.

Curious person:	Looks fairly innocuous to me.

Cypherpunk: 	The French consider it second only to nuclear weapons.

Curious person:	Now that's what I call a power tee shirt!


If the source is too big (how about one long bar code: information-wear
(Mondo2000 could feature it as a centerfold)), perhaps the core
algorithm could be depicted.

Okay, I'll stop having fun now...;^)

Paul E. Baclace
peb@procase.com





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: koontzd@lrcs.loral.com (David Koontz )
Date: Tue, 27 Jul 93 16:31:25 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: No Subject
Message-ID: <9307272327.AA04275@nebula.lrcs.loral.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



>fnerd@smds.com

>For a logo... how a bout a fist holding a key?

How about a mailed fist holding a key, with the caption

Privacy is our Profession

:)




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Date: Tue, 27 Jul 93 16:52:52 PDT
To: jthomas@kolanut.mitre.org (Joe Thomas)
Subject: "Big Brother Inside"
In-Reply-To: <9307271222.AA07456@kolanut>
Message-ID: <9307272352.AA24348@netcom5.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Joe Thomas writes:

> Was it Tim May who suggested the "Big Brother Inside" stickers to put on Clipper  
> based phones?  If anyone gets these made up, I'll head down to my local AT&T  
> store and put them to good use...

Yep, that was me. My idea was to use the "Intel Inside" logo, modified
appropriately and printed as "professionally" as possible. With a good
design, these might be seen as "official" stickers and might last for
months on the things we stick them on.

My model for these are some stickers Fen LaBalme and others pass out
at the Hackers Conference every year: "We are everywhere." 

Here's a very crude, ASCII-limited, diagram:
                
            ***
               ***
       ****       *
     **            *
    *   Big         *
   *     Brother     *
   *       Inside!   * 
    *               *
      **        **
         *****
           
       
(Well, I hope you get the idea!)

--Tim May





-- 
..........................................................................
Timothy C. May         | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,  
tcmay@netcom.com       | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
408-688-5409           | knowledge, reputations, information markets, 
W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA  | black markets, collapse of governments.
Higher Power: 2^756839 | Public Key: PGP and MailSafe available.
Note: I put time and money into writing this posting. I hope you enjoy it.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Mike Johnson <exabyte!smtplink!mikej@uunet.UU.NET>
Date: Tue, 27 Jul 93 16:12:52 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Programmer pushes pen to proliferate privacy programs.
Message-ID: <9307271656.A01357@smtplink.exabyte.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I'm writing a book on practical cryptography for programmers.  As
part of my research for this book, I'd like to know what you would
like to see (or not see) in such a book.  If you would like to help
me out by answering a few questions, I'd be grateful.  Only the
aggregate results will be published, but if you want to ensure
that your response is anonymous, please reply directly to me via
one or more cypherpunk remailers.

In your opinion, what are the three most important applications of
cryptography in the private sector (I'll leave military and diplomatic
stuff to the NSA)?

What programs do you currently use, if any, to encrypt data?

What encryption algorithms do you use?

Who are you most concerned about reading your private data without your
permission?

Do you use PGP?  If so, how do you think it could best be improved?

What computer platforms do you use?

What operating systems do you use?

What language(s) do you program in (ANSI C, K&R C, C++, Pascal, BASIC,
ASM, Ada, etc.)?

-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
Mike Johnson       | Opinions expressed herein are mine, and come with no
mikej@exabyte.com  | warranty, expressed or implied.  PGP key on request.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: fergp@sytex.com (Paul Ferguson)
Date: Tue, 27 Jul 93 14:46:45 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: PKP/DSS License request? (fwd)
Message-ID: <7w7c8B1w165w@sytex.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


From: djb@silverton.berkeley.edu (D. J. Bernstein)
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
Subject: You want to use DSA? Apply for a personal license from NIST!
Date: 27 Jul 93 06:22:03 GMT
Organization: IR
Lines: 103
 
NIST plans to give Public Key Partners exclusive rights to the Digital 
Signature Algorithm. Do you want to guarantee your own rights to this 
technology? You can! It's free, if you can spare a stamp.
 
Attached is a form letter you can send to NIST to apply for a personal 
license. Put in your own name, address, country, and the right date; 
print it out; read through to check it over; sign it; and drop it in the
mail. You don't have to get everything right the first time---NIST will 
contact you if they need more information to make a decision. And, as a 
bonus, your application will automatically count as an objection to the 
NIST-PKP deal!
 
I believe that NIST must receive your application by next Friday, the
6th of August, but the due date might be earlier. You might want to 
check immediately with Michael Rubin at 301-975-2803. If necessary you 
can fax your letter to him.
 
---Dan
^L
 
 
 
                                [address]
                                [date]
 
Michael R. Rubin
Acting Chief Counsel for Technology
Room A-1111
Administration Building
National Institute of Standards and Technology
Gaithersburg, MD 20899
 
Dear Mr. Rubin:
 
I hereby apply for a personal license to use the Digital Signature
Algorithm.
 
1. Title of invention: Digital Signature Algorithm (DSA).
 
2. Patent Application Serial Number: 07/738.431.
 
3. United States Patent Number: To be issued as 5,231,668, I believe.
 
4. Source of information concerning availability of a license: Various 
sources, including your Federal Register notice.
 
5. Name and address of applicant: [name], [address, phone, etc.].
 
6. Applicant's representative: not applicable.
 
7. I am a [country] citizen.
 
8. Approximate number of persons employed: not applicable.
 
9. I am not a small business firm.
 
10. Purpose: I would like a personal license allowing me to implement 
and use DSA. See #12.
 
11. Business and commercialization: not applicable; see #10.
 
12. Plans: I plan to use DSA to attach digital signatures to a variety
of electronic documents, primarily for authentication. I plan to use DSA
implementations, initially in software but perhaps later in hardware,
from a variety of potential future sources. Investments: I may spend 
many hours programming a DSA implementation.
^L
 
                                                                page 2
 
13. Fields of commercialization: not applicable; see #10.
 
14. I am not willing to accept a license for less than all fields of use 
of DSA.
 
15. I intend to implement and use DSA only in [country].
 
16. Type of license: I would like a non-exclusive license which does not 
require royalty payments.
 
17. I have never been granted a license to a federally owned invention.
 
18. Known uses of DSA by industry or government: I have heard that ISC 
sells a product called dsaSIGN, and that Bellcore has implemented DSA.
 
19. Other information: I understand that NIST may grant an exclusive 
DSA license to PKP, and that this license application will be treated as 
an objection to the PKP license.
 
Please note that PKP has stated its intent to make DSA free for personal
use. Therefore, if NIST grants PKP a license and PKP acts according to 
its stated intent, there is no harm to anyone if I am granted this
personal license. However, I do not trust PKP to act according to its
stated intent, and I do not want to have to apply for a license from PKP
even if it is royalty-free. So I ask that you grant me a license
directly.
 
Thank you for your kind attention. Please let me know if you need more 
information.
 
                                Sincerely,
 
 
 
                                [name]

Paul Ferguson               |  "Government, even in its best state,
Network Integrator          |   is but a necessary evil; in its worst
Centreville, Virginia USA   |   state, an intolerable one."
fergp@sytex.com             |      - Thomas Paine, Common Sense
 
         I love my country, but I fear its government.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: pat@tstc.edu (Patrick E. Hykkonen)
Date: Tue, 27 Jul 93 15:03:12 PDT
To: gnu@toad.com (John Gilmore)
Subject: Re: A few more slogan ideas
In-Reply-To: <9307272113.AA04156@toad.com>
Message-ID: <9307272202.AA15727@tstc.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Joh Gilmore writes... 

> NSA:  ``What First Amendment?''

... to which I propose we change to.

First Ammendment, NSA.  No Such Ammendment.

-- 
"I'm not being irrational, I just know to much."  - Tim Allen
--
Pat Hykkonen, N5NPL                     Texas State Technical College at Waco
Internet: {pat,postmaster,root}@tstc.edu       Instructional Network Services
Packet: N5NPL@WD5KAL.#CENTX.TX.USA.NA        3801 Campus Dr.  Waco, Tx  76705
Public keys available! ** 1984 + 10 **     V:(817) 867-4830  F:(817) 799-2843




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: mulivor@orion.crc.monroecc.edu
Date: Tue, 27 Jul 93 14:31:21 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: My Magazine Story
Message-ID: <9307272129.AA04606@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I'm still writing the story (about anonymous email), and I'm still taking phone 
calls. All Cypherpunks are welcome to call.

Phil Mulivor
716 256-2222 office (24 hrs)
716 271-4052 fax
mulivor@orion.crc.monroecc.edu




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: af391@freenet.carleton.ca (Peter Hum)
Date: Tue, 27 Jul 93 15:06:26 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: another journalist's queries
Message-ID: <9307272202.AA18531@freenet.carleton.ca>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



This is Peter Hum, a reporter with a major daily newspaper in Canada,
e-mailing all you cypherpunks. Since the talk is flowing about t-shirts and/or
journalists, I thought I would renew my request for help and information.

For now, I'm researching:

1. encryption issues in Canada
2. privacy in Canada
 
I'd appreciate any e-mail, phone calls or faxes with suggestions on
sources, how to proceed, and so on. Confidentiality is assured.

I should mention that I'm an English professor by training and not a
crypto-specialist. I'm also new to the Net (one month on), but I should
add it was the WIRED article, among others, that sparked my interest. 

Hope to hear from you,

Peter Hum
The Ottawa Citizen
af391@Freenet.carleton.ca
(613)596-3761 (voice)
(613)726-1198 (fax)





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: fnerd@smds.com (FutureNerd Steve Witham)
Date: Tue, 27 Jul 93 15:57:50 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: logo
Message-ID: <9307272254.AA27074@smds.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


For a logo...how about a fist holding a key?
just a thot
-fnerd
quote me




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: nate@VIS.ColoState.EDU (CVL staff member Nate Sammons)
Date: Tue, 27 Jul 93 18:36:29 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: dissention in the ranks
Message-ID: <9307280133.AA04791@vangogh.VIS.ColoState.EDU>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Tim May says:
> Folks, there just isn't any agreed-upon set of priorities. For some,
> it's PGP. For others, digital money. And talking to journalists,
> writing rants, investigating offshore banking, for others.
>  
> Let a thousand flowers bloom.


Amen. (meaning a lot coming from an agnostic!)

I think that what does not belong on this list is people bickering,
essentially, about what cypherpunks are supposed to be doing.
If you don't like a particular article, don't read it.  Look at the 
subject, and decide.  I often don't read all the mail thoroughly,
but I don't tell everyone to stop posting so much ;-)

I think that it is important to remember that one of the basic
ideals of the cypherpunk movement is the protection of FREEDOM.
Freedom to not worry about if a posting in CP-Politically correct
not.  It's almost (but not quite) censorship.

Let everyone do what they feel is important.  Publicity is important,
talking to journalists is important, and everything we do here and 
outside of the net is important.

-nate sammons
  
+--------------------------------------------------------------------
| Nate Sammons   email: nate@VIS.ColoState.Edu
|      Colorado State University Computer Visualization Laboratory
|      Finger nate@monet.VIS.ColoState.Edu for my PGP key
|      #include <std.disclaimer>
|  "I have but one single desire - to tear down the sky" -A. Toomba
|                 Quis Custodiet Ipsos Custodes?
+----------------------+




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: nate@VIS.ColoState.EDU (CVL staff member Nate Sammons)
Date: Tue, 27 Jul 93 18:38:20 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: RE: A few more slogan ideas
Message-ID: <9307280137.AA04800@vangogh.VIS.ColoState.EDU>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



I would like to add to John's idea:

Cypherpunks:  There's safety in numbers.  (back of shirt:  BIG numbers.)
Cryptography:  There's safety in numbers.  (back of shirt:  BIG numbers.)

replace "BIG numbers" with "BIG, BIG, PRIME NUMBERS"

-nate




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: morpheus@entropy.linet.org (morpheus)
Date: Wed, 28 Jul 93 02:08:01 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: T-SHIRTS
In-Reply-To: <9307270647.AA04043@hydra.unm.edu>
Message-ID: <1993Jul27.193916.13447@entropy.linet.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Stanton McCandlish <src4src!imageek!hydra.unm.edu!anton> writes:

>My 2 bits worth, before the deal is done:  I'd much rather have a T-shirt.
>In fact I would not buy a polo shirt.  I don't play polo, and see no
>reason to dress like a yuppie/preppie.

Yeah, no kidding.  How about heat-transfer logos to be ironed-on to 
combat boots?  ;-)

My small serious bit of fashion advice:  make the t-shirt black

(evil voice:  "As black as the NSA's soul!" <evil laughter>)
-- 
morpheus@entropy.linet.org			Non serviam!
Support your local police for a more efficient police state.





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Date: Tue, 27 Jul 93 21:01:29 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Talking to Reporters, and Which Ones?
Message-ID: <9307280401.AA20503@netcom5.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Cyphercitizens,

Paul Robichaux writes:

> My opinion, which stands, is that we have spent an inordinate amount
> of time in frivolous discussion about T-shirts. My personal opinion is
> that you build esprit de corps by common effort and common
> achievement, not by how you dress (although my primary experience with
> that sort of team spirit comes from my time in the Marines, where
> everyone wears the same kind of T-shirt :)

I respect Paul's wishes. No one will force him to wear the Cypherpunks
t-shirt, nor to wear the official Cypherpunks sidearm, nor to use the
secret Cypherpunks handshake. (In fact, I doubt anyone will actually
get around to making the t-shirts. If it happens, it'll probably just
be some entrepreneur on the List, and will not come from a collective
decision--which is impossible, anyway.)

But I still maintain that the reason only one person has talked to the
journalist mentioned has *nothing* to do with the List working on
t-shirts....I mean, come on! If we drop all speculations about
t-shirts--which a lot of folks seem to be having some fun at, and some
stimulating ideas for publicity (which, ironically, may be *very*
valuable in communicating our message to journalists and others--will
we all suddenly start working on the "real" Cypherpunks projects?
(What are they, by the way? No one seems to know. Probably just as well.)

> Many of our illustrious contributors have talked with high-powered
> journalists in the past, and I applaud that effort. Considering the
> target market of Phil's article- other professional journalists- I
> think spending time to answer his questions is worthwhile.

Sounds fine to me. Those who want to talk to him, should. Most serious
journalists, though (and here I admit to running a risk of sounding
judgmental or snotty...not my intent), do enough groundwork to _seek
out_ the opinions of those they have gotten interested in. The "cattle
call" approach has been seen increasingly, as with the woman
journalist who announced she was researching an article on "Pedophiles
on the Net" and she wanted comments sent to her! Contrast this with
Kelly, Levy, Markoff, Dibbell, etc., all of whom have familiarized
themselves with the communities they intended to cover and then have
contacted specific folks. I'm not knocking either Mr. Mulivor or Mr.
Hum (if I remember his name correctly), and they may indeed be fine
reporters. Certainly they should be treated politely and helped by
whomever wishes to.

[To pick a nit: asking readers to call long-distance to give their
tips is unusual, at least from my experience. Reporters typically take
great efforts to call their sources, not the other way around. But
I'll concede that perhaps the three journalists mentioned so
far--Mulivor, Hum, and the woman writing on pedophiles--are using the
"call me" approach to generate initial contacts. They should be aware
of course of possible skewing effects (not that the rest of us are not
also skewed, of course :-} ).]

> To me, it's more important to educate reporters in (for example)
> Huntsville and Peoria to our cause than to spread the word to trendy,
> likely-to-be-sympathetic-to-our-cause folks who read _Wired_, _Village
> Voice_, and _Whole Earth Review._

Well here I just have to disagree completely. It's just a plain and
simple fact that these sorts of magazines--"Wired" and its
cousins--are having an enormous impact on folks. This is how many of our
List members first learned of this List, this is how much of the
crypto debate is being framed, and this is where interested readers
will turn for information. (To the list I would add "Mondo 2000,"
"Boing Boing," "Communications of the ACM," and a few other mags and
journals.)

Also, the articles in "Wired" and "WER" were exceptionally long and
well-written, quite likely beyond what could be conveyed in a
small-town newspaper. A small-time paper could just not justify such
in-depth coverage. Sound bites would be more likely. Ironically, as I
said earlier, the planning for a t-shirt may actually generated some
really memorable sound bites! And the wearing of such t-shirts, should
anyone actually just go ahead and make them (hint! hint!) could
actually be the catalyst for a local paper doing a story on these
"Cypherpunks" and their provocative comments about privacy, Big
Brother, and the NSA. But I digress.

Reporters from Huntsville and Peoria are not to be disdained, but the
List cannot be expected to educate and spoon-feed them. (Anyone who
wants to, can, obviously. I've not heard of anyone refusing to talk to
them, if they have contacted members of this List.)

The journal Mulivor writes for is familiar to me through interviews on
the C-SPAN cable t.v. show with Brian Lamb, but I haven't seen it
myself. Those who want to talk to him should, by all means.

> > Mulivor on the alt.whistleblower list. (Lance speculates, correctly I
> > think, that Mulivor has no Net access. If true, I question that Mulivor is
> > such a high-priority journalistic target anyway. Maybe he is. But I'm sure
> > enough folks will talk to him. The talk of mail programs and t-shirts is
> > not likely to affect this.)
> 
> Well, Lance missed the boat here; I have had an ongoing exchange with
> Phil via his e-mail account (mulivor@crc.monroecc.edu), which last I
> heard counted as net access...

By "Net access" I meant Usenet, as in the "alt.whistleblowers" and
"sci.crypt" newsgroups. 

My comment derived from this remark by Lance Dettweiler when he posted
Mr. Mulivor's call:

"This posting went through a gateway so the author is probably not able
to read news; reply via email."
 
I certainly hope Mr. Mulivor is able to get Net access--not just
e-mail--so he can get a better picture of what's going on before his
article appears.      

If Mr. Mulivor lives in the D.C. area, perhaps the D.C. Cypherpunks in
Northern Virginia (mostly) can meet with him, perhaps they can even
invite him to attend their next meeting (I hear Boston/Cambridge is
planning their meeting to coincided with the California meeting,
Saturday, August 14th, so perhaps the D.C. folks will also be doing
so.)

Finally, I think this little debate has been useful and enjoyable (to
me, at least). It helps us to focus on the issues of what we are,
what's important, how to talk to journalists, and so on. 

Kind of like what planning to put on a t-shirt does.


-Tim May

-- 





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: skyhawk@cpac.washington.edu
Date: Tue, 27 Jul 93 21:32:57 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: t-shirts, imagery, and Cypherpunks PR
Message-ID: <9307280430.AA16913@bailey.cpac.washington.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> From: koontzd@lrcs.loral.com (David Koontz ) <koontzd/daemon>
> >fnerd@smds.com
> >For a logo... how a bout a fist holding a key?
> 
> How about a mailed fist holding a key, with the caption
> 
> Privacy is our Profession

I like it, but it doesn't emphasize the fact that we're fighting a war here, a
war against government oppression.  We're fighting a guerilla war, here folks,
on the future battlefield of cyberspace.  And like anyone fighting a dinosaur,
we've got a big jump on the enemy in that we know our way around in this new
world, and they're dumb, blind, and slow.  We can hit them where they're weak,
use disinformation techniques to confuse them, and then fade into the mist.  We
can introduce false data into their computers to make them run in circles, and
drop their systems completely in classic guerilla style.  The people will
follow us, because we've got truth and freedom on our side -- all we have to do
is explain this, and we've won!  The leviathan must fall, and we'll help it
along its way!  We must arm ourselves conventionally, also, for those dark days
that may be ahead.  When a monster this size falls, we have no idea how chaotic
things may become.  Automatic weapons, the Anarchist's Cookbook (suitably
corrected, of course), and other martial pastimes will balance our
technological wizardry.

Hm.  It's not a particularly good imitation of Tim May's classic parodies, but
it'll have to do for now.

Folks, we're fighting a war.  A public relations war.  We are not, NOT,
fighting a conventional war.  Violence is not something we can have associated
with us.  We cannot be seen as hardcore anarchists, intent on crushing the
state.  We cannot enter into an obvious, head-to-head conflict with our
country's government, particularly law enforcement.  For us to be perceived as
such in the eyes of Joe Sixpack is fatal.  We will be, indeed we will have
BEEN, marginalized and rendered impotent and irrelevant.  For us to become so
engaged in conflict in *fact* is to have lost, because we have nothing like the
power of our wonderful government.

If we give them an excuse, they'll crush us like bugs.

We can't be seen as crazed revolutionaries.  We have to be more like relatively
harmless specialists in the field of privacy in cyberspace, explaining that
technology has the potential to cause arbitrary badness, and we've got ideas
about how to do things a different, better way.  We can be out on the fringe of
normality, but if we're seen in the same light as [fill in your favorite
trivialized group of wackos here], we're fucked.  Martyrdom is sexy and
romantic, but rarely useful, and almost never ideal.

Do keep in mind that this entire message is my personal opinion about how to go
about making the world a better place.  I'm not completely psycho about it, I
don't think people with different ideas are stupid or even necessarily wrong.
I just think the "conflict" meme is in danger of being given too much emphasis.

--
Scott Northrop          <skyhawk@cpac.washington.edu>            (206)784-2083
ObVirus:   The demand for obedience is inherently evil.
ObVirus2:  As a juror in a Trial by Jury, you have the right, power and duty
           to acquit the defendant if you judge the law itself to be unjust.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: vince@dsi.unimi.it (David Vincenzetti)
Date: Tue, 27 Jul 93 12:37:41 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: T-Shirts
Message-ID: <9307271938.AA18303@pluto.sm.dsi.unimi.it>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I'd say STOP to all this discussing about t-shirts.
Isn't this mailing list supposed to be related to privacy and crypto topics?

Regards,
David

--- Forwarded mail from peter honeyman <honey@hone.citi.umich.edu>

>From owner-cypherpunks@toad.com Tue Jul 27 16:02 MET 1993
Received: from relay2.UU.NET by ghost.dsi.unimi.it with SMTP id AA23715
  (5.65+/IDA-1.3.5 for vince); Tue, 27 Jul 93 16:02:53 +0200
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From: peter honeyman <honey@hone.citi.umich.edu>
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Date: Tue, 27 Jul 93 09:45:53 EDT
Subject: Re: T-Shirts 
X-Location: Lake Michigan, Harbor Springs
In-Reply-To: Paul Goggin's message of Mon, 26 Jul 93 17:57:54 -0400.
             <9307262159.AA24713@toad.com> 

personally, i'd like to have a cypherpunks-embroidered pillbox hat.

	peter


--- End of forwarded message from peter honeyman <honey@hone.citi.umich.edu>


-- 
David Vincenzetti, system administrator && security consultant
DSI, Department of Computer Science, |  email: vince@ghost.dsi.unimi.it 
via Comelico 39, 20135 Milan, ITALY  |  phone: ++39 2 55006 391
 **Public Key Available by Finger**  |    fax: ++39 2 55006 392




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: J. Michael Diehl <mdiehl@vesta.unm.edu>
Date: Tue, 27 Jul 93 20:51:29 PDT
To: mdavis@pro-sol.cts.com (Morgan Davis)
Subject: Re: Tee-shirt
In-Reply-To: <1993Jul27.084533.306@pro-sol.cts.com>
Message-ID: <9307280348.AA02523@vesta.unm.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


According to Morgan Davis:
> Harry Shapiro <habs@panix.com> writes:
> >Orwell was wrong
> >
> >   1994
> 
> Orwell was probably right, but some editor went in and changed the title to
> 1984.  If only Orwell had PGP back then...  :-)

Orwell never said 1984.  He said 1994.  If your version says anything else, you
have an unofficial version which needs to be returned to The Ministry of Truth.
========================+==========================================+
J. Michael Diehl   ;^)  | Have you hugged a Hetero........Lately?  |
mdiehl@triton.unm.edu   | "I'm just looking for the opportunity to |
mike.diehl@fido.org help|    be Politically Incorrect!"  +=========+
al945@cwns9.ins.cwru.edu| Is Big Brother in your phone?  | PGP KEY |
(505) 299-2282  (voice) |    If you don't know, ask me.  |Available|
========================+================================+=========+
PGP Key = 7C06F1 = A6 27 E1 1D 5F B2 F2 F1  12 E7 53 2D 85 A2 10 5D 
This message is protected by 18 USC 2511 and 18 USC 2703. Monitoring 
by anyone other than the recipient is absolutely forbidden by US Law



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Date: Tue, 27 Jul 93 22:16:30 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: t-shirts, imagery, and Cypherpunks PR
In-Reply-To: <9307280430.AA16913@bailey.cpac.washington.edu>
Message-ID: <9307280513.AA27685@netcom5.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Scott Northrup writes a wonderful crypto rant:

> I like it, but it doesn't emphasize the fact that we're fighting a war here, a
> war against government oppression.  We're fighting a guerilla war, here folks,
> on the future battlefield of cyberspace.  And like anyone fighting a dinosaur,
> we've got a big jump on the enemy in that we know our way around in this new

...part of this elided to save space....

> things may become.  Automatic weapons, the Anarchist's Cookbook (suitably
> corrected, of course), and other martial pastimes will balance our
> technological wizardry.

Wonderful!

> Hm.  It's not a particularly good imitation of Tim May's classic parodies, but
> it'll have to do for now.

A puzzlement! Two questions:

1. You mean you weren't serious, that this was meant to be a parody?

2. You mean you think my posts (and my rants) are meant as parodies?

I don't know which is more disturbing. In any case, I completely agree
with what you wrote. 

(I'll plead guilty to occasionally writing satires and parodies, but
most of my posts are meant seriously, even the occasional "rants,"
like where I get angry at gun control and midnight raids and suggest
we need to prepare ourselves for a "Branch Cryptidians" type of
situation. Perhaps I get too worked-up in these posts, but they're
certainly not meant as parodies.)

By the way, the mention of "The Anarchist's Cookbook" is quite
apropos: sitting on my bookshelf near me is a loose-leaf binder
labelled "The Crypto Anarchist's Cookbook," a collection of ideas and
plans I began in 1988, when I coined the term and distributed my
"Crypto Anarchist Manifesto" (available in the soda.berkeley.edu
archive).

(What's in the "Crypto Anarchist's Cookbook": Stuff on digital money,
information markets, data havens, bootleg medical research networks,
whistle blowing, using religions and games as legal cover for
encryption, schemes for an "electronic Democracy Wall," and the
"Labyrinth," a network of remailers I devised before learning of
Chaum's 1981 work and his "DC-Net" of 1988...I eagerly told Chaum
about my ideas for untraceable mail when I met him at the 1988 Crypto
Conference and he looked at me in a funny way and then told me he'd
invented these in 1981 and called them "mixes"! I was both crestfallen
and pleased, for the obvious reasons. Eric Hughes has suggested I
contact Loompanics Press--publisher and mail-order source of various
weird books, and a source you should all know about--about publishing
something like this. Some of the crypto books they publish ("Beyond
Decoder Rings") are really lame...some crypto anarchy stuff could
really find a market, I think.)


> If we give them an excuse, they'll crush us like bugs.
> 
> We can't be seen as crazed revolutionaries.  We have to be more like relatively
> harmless specialists in the field of privacy in cyberspace, explaining that
> technology has the potential to cause arbitrary badness, and we've got ideas
> about how to do things a different, better way.  We can be out on the fringe of
> normality, but if we're seen in the same light as [fill in your favorite
> trivialized group of wackos here], we're fucked.  Martyrdom is sexy and
> romantic, but rarely useful, and almost never ideal.
> 
> Do keep in mind that this entire message is my personal opinion about how to go
> about making the world a better place.  I'm not completely psycho about it, I
> don't think people with different ideas are stupid or even necessarily wrong.
> I just think the "conflict" meme is in danger of being given too much emphasis.

Boy, the debate about our mission is really getting interesting! I
applaud this debate, even if I disagree with Scott on these points.

As with the debate several months back over the _name_ of our group
("Cypherpunks" is seen as too subversive, too outre, by some, who
would prefer some name that is less threatening, such as the "Crypto
Privacy Association"), there are positives and negatives to be found
for each side.

I've already written too much today, so I'll leave it for others to
debate.

-Tim May, CPA   ("Oh, an accountant?" "No, I'm a crypto privacy
advocate." "Oh.")


-- 
..........................................................................
Timothy C. May         | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,  
tcmay@netcom.com       | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
408-688-5409           | knowledge, reputations, information markets, 
W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA  | black markets, collapse of governments.
Higher Power: 2^756839 | Public Key: PGP and MailSafe available.
Note: I put time and money into writing this posting. I hope you enjoy it.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Jeremy R. Smith" <jersmit@eis.calstate.edu>
Date: Tue, 27 Jul 93 22:46:31 PDT
To: Cypherpunks <cypherpunks@toad.com>
Subject: PGP Shell for the Amiga
Message-ID: <Pine.3.07.9307272247.A11360-a100000@eis.calstate.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


   Hi, I'm new to this forum and I was wondering if there was a front end
for the Amiga version of PGP.  I am currently using ver2.2 of PGP for the
Amiga under OS2.04.  Please let me know as this would make life a little
bit easier.  Thank you.
 
                                                    Jeremy Smith          
                                         jersmit@eis.calstate.edu
 
-----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK----- Version: 2.2
 
mQCNAixVlqsAAAEEAMlqS9nz+2dADwxwOglWVJk7xugtC9SMQX6rkJiv/0wkOhSB
RSQcUL5bVfRKJGa4YrnHefmBZaTSvwtFmSUCSqm4yN9n258xda+niz6pJwPDaTIX
7Gr1V8Xr9/J7K3grm8H1VCXJjKTUVt+zPns5KS4K+tQZgdcPQJefZlD5h/jTAAUV
tCdKZXJlbXkgU21pdGggPGplcnNtaXRAZWlzLmNhbHN0YXRlLmVkdT4= 
=J0/4 
-----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK----- 






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "L. Detweiler" <ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Date: Tue, 27 Jul 93 22:11:30 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: tidbit on Clipper review, San Hose Mercury News
Message-ID: <9307280509.AA26676@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Don't believe this was posted here. Mostly a rehash, but included for
completeness of the soda.berkeley.edu archive, and does note that the
analyst review deadline is `the end of the month' (July). So, depending
on how long the bureacrats sit on the results, we should hear something
soon. Sorry about the poor format quality.

(I wonder who the 6 were who defined? Surely a Who's Who in
Cryptography, e.g. W. Diffie etc. I wonder if they'd have the nerve to ask Kahn?)

------- Forwarded Message

Date: Mon, 26 Jul 1993 21:01:33 -0500
From: farber@central.cis.upenn.edu (David Farber)
Subject: Critics Belittle Data Security Probe A bit late but  ... from sci.crypt


San Lose Mercury News - July 16, 1993

Critics Belittle Data Security Probe
By Lee Gomes

A federal effort to answer complaints about a controversial government data
security plan
apparently has fallen short of its goal, with critics saying the effort
isn't dealing with all of
their concerns.

On Thursday, the National Institute of Standards and Technology, or NIST,
an agency of
the Comerce Department, named five outside computer researchers to evaluate
software
being used in the "Clipper" program, a proposed federal standard to encode
computer
messages in order to keep them secret.

Clipper, which uses both software and a special chip, has been criticized
by some 
cryptography experts for being an inferior technology, and for potentially
having a hidden
"trap door" that might allow law enforcement agencies to surreptitiously
peek at computer
messages.

While the program would directly apply to only federal agencies, many
predict the standard
would also come to dominate the commercial market.

In an effort to convince people no such trap door exists, the five experts
working with NIST
will evaluate the classified software used in Clipper and then report
publicly on their findings.

But Jim Bidzos, of RSA Data Security in Redwood City, a company that sells
a private
encryption plan and which is one of the government's main critics in the
controversy, said the
work of the five outsiders will be of limited value, since they will only
be looking at a protion
of Clipper software.

"There are a million other places where you can do some funny business to
grab messages,"
he said, including by copying or tampering with Cliper hardware.

NIST has always maintained there is no trap door and that including one
would be superfluous
because law enforcement agencies would be able to get the "keys" to Clipper
with a court
order.

NIST spokeswoman Janice E. Kosko said the agency had invited 11 experts to
examine the
actual encryption software, called Skipjack, provided they would agree to
obtain a security
clearance and to speak publicly about their findings without revealing the
detailed workings
of the software. Six declined.

The five who accepted are Ernest Brickell of Sandia National Laboritories,
Dorothy Denning of
the computer science department of Georgetown University, Stephen T. Kent of BBN
Communications Corp., David P. Maher of AT&T, and Walter Tuchman of Amperif
Corp.

The five outsiders have been asked to submit individual findings by the end
of the month.
Because Clipper software is secret, the work of the five will take place at
a classified
government laboratory in Bowie, MD.

- ---




------- End of Forwarded Message





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: lazylion@netcom.com (Ben Weiss)
Date: Tue, 27 Jul 93 23:11:32 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: rfc822 headers include encrypt std
Message-ID: <9307280610.AA18889@netcom2.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I've only been on the list a few days now, and the net for only a few
weeks.  Plesae pardon the apology :) but could someone please explain
to me why we are not putting an "Encryption: PGP <my-public-key>" line
in the header of each of our messages as allowed by RFC 822 (which I
was just reading for the first time today)

---Begin quote of RFC822 on Internet Message Header formats:---

     4.7.3.  ENCRYPTED

             Sometimes,  data  encryption  is  used  to  increase  the
        privacy  of  message  contents.   If the body of a message has
        been encrypted, to keep its contents private, the  "Encrypted"
        field  can be used to note the fact and to indicate the nature
        of the encryption.  The first <word> parameter  indicates  the
        software  used  to  encrypt the body, and the second, optional
        <word> is intended to  aid  the  recipient  in  selecting  the
        proper  decryption  key.   This  code word may be viewed as an
        index to a table of keys held by the recipient.

---End quote of RFC822 on Internet Message Header formats---

This would certainly solve many obvious problems.  Of course, you all
have seen this stuff for years and are not doing it so there must be
some really interesting reason... ?

Feel free to respond to me by email instead of posting to the group
and if anyone else wants to know, I'll forward responses to them.  If
I've struck a chord, by all means let's discuss this as well as t-shirts.

BTW, I'm looking forward to subscribing to alt.cypherpunks.merchandising :)






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "L. Detweiler" <ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Date: Tue, 27 Jul 93 22:12:58 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: DSS: `Stamp Tax'?
Message-ID: <9307280511.AA26685@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Interesting comparison of NIST-PKP-DSS licensing arrangement as `stamp
tax' with proceeds to `private company'. Originally in RISKS.

- ------------------------------

Date: Tue, 20 Jul 93 17:05:57 -0700
From: Mark Seecof <marks@wimsey.latimes.com>
Subject: DSS as a stamp tax

Many people raised in the U.S. are unfamiliar with general stamp taxes.  We
know about excise taxes (e.g., liquor) with payment evidenced by stamps, and
tax stamps to validate specific documents (e.g., hunting licenses).  But (to
my perhaps inadequate knowledge) the U.S. hasn't had a general stamp tax since
the War of Independence.  England had one years ago... most signatures on
receipts for money or bills of sale were invalid unless scrawled across
postage stamps.  England still imposes stamp taxes on some business
transactions, e.g., transfer of real property.

NIST's proposal to "license" the DSS to PKP, forcing "the rest of us"
including all who wish to transact business with the U.S. government to pay
PKP every time we sign something digitally amounts to the imposition of a
general stamp tax.  Worse, it is a tax imposed by the government for the
benefit of private persons (those who are paid by PKP).

Attempts by George III's government to impose various stamp taxes on American
colonists 200-odd years ago fueled revolutionary sentiment among them...




------- End of Forwarded Message





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "L. Detweiler" <ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Date: Tue, 27 Jul 93 22:16:50 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: SIMTEL 2GB FTP site seeks new home
Message-ID: <9307280515.AA26729@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


OK, we're the first to jump on the throats of anyone closing down a
site, so here's our chance to rescue one. Maybe someone can refer this
person to the right place or do the legwork in hooking up a connection.
(wuarchive comes to mind) On the other hand, if it is poorly organized
or replicated elsewhere or whatever, maybe it should just die with a whimper. 

(I would be very interested in finding out why the archive is being shut down.)

------- Forwarded Message

Date: Tue, 27 Jul 1993 02:44:12 -0500
From: farber@central.cis.upenn.edu (David Farber)
Subject: WSMR-SIMTEL20.ARMY.MIL is passing away

The massive archive site WSMR-SIMTEL20.ARMY.MIL at White Sands Missile
Range, New Mexico, USA, which is home to more than 2 gigabytes of files
for many computer systems, including MSDOS, Unix, VMS and some mainframes,
will be shut down by its operators as of September 20, 1993.  Unless a new
home is found for the archives, this major archive site will vanish.

This is a major archive and if it is possible to save it, then it should
not be allowed to just disappear. If anyone knows of a site that can house
the master archives, please send a message to 

             Keith Petersen <w8sdz@TACOM-EMH1.Army.Mil>

Mr. Petersen is trying to find a new home for the master archives.  Note
that many of the older files are on CD-ROM, so it is not absolutely
necessary that a site dedicate two GB of disk space, as perhaps 3/4 of
this is on CDs, so the option would be to loan perhaps 4 CD slots in 
an optical jukebox, along with perhaps 500 meg of disk space.

Please pass this message to any list that might find it of interest. 
Thank you.

- ---
Paul Robinson -- TDARCOS@MCIMAIL.COM





------- End of Forwarded Message





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: norm@netcom.com (Norman Hardy)
Date: Tue, 27 Jul 93 23:36:32 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Digital Silk Road
Message-ID: <9307280634.AA13117@netcom3.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


This is the stuff that Dean Tribble and I talked about at
a couple of Saturday Cypherpunk meetings in Calif.
While it has nothing directly to do with crypto it is an
architecture that avoids central control and thus has
an anarchical flavor.
 
Let me know if you can't use either RTF or PostScript
or cant do FTP.
 
Abstract: of The Digital Silk Road

Existing and proposed mechanisms for digital money all require large overhead
to transfer money between parties. This overhead makes them unsuitable for
extremely low cost activities such as delivering and routing packets.
We propose a money system with extremely low transaction cost built into the
communication protocols. The money introduced by this system is much more
like coins than like bank accounts; it supports only small transactions,
requires limited trust among the participants, and requires no central bank.
With this as a foundation, we then describe elements of an open system that
fully supports network resource management, routing, interconnection with
the Internet, and so forth, across trust boundaries with competing providers
for all services. This supports a style of informal information commerce.

This paper is available thru anonymous ftp at
netcom.com:pub/joule/DSR1.ps.gz and DSR1.rtf.gz.
The file format, .rtf, (Rich Text Fotmat) can be read by many different
word processors including those from Microsoft, MacWrite II,
and some Unix systems. I will produce other formats with a bit of pressure.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "L. Detweiler" <ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Date: Tue, 27 Jul 93 22:41:31 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: inspired programmers needed ASAP
Message-ID: <9307280540.AA27073@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Okay cypherpunks. If we want to create a `new & improved' (tm)
government in cyberspace this is the most direct route: drag our
current one in kicking and screaming all the way. In California there
is pivotal battle underway to get government legislature data onto the
internet to citizens, but powerful companies have lucrative
monopolistic arrangements on this data, so the legislature has adopted
a self-serving `impress us' attitude. The manner in which this current
attack is carried out will help forge a plan for the federal level.
Taxpayer's Assets Project is doggedly pushing a bill to free up the
data at that level. If a positive demonstration and firm foothold is
established at the state level then maybe this valuable knowledge and
know-how could be translated to the Federal level.

I sent a message to Gilmore & Pozar complaining about the imperious
attitude of the legislature in getting free programming labor without
even any obligations to repay the favor, and the limited time frame.
Ah, but isn't that life, the citizen bears the burden twice? Pays
through taxes once and has to pay dearly again to get the due goods &
services? Maybe it will be different in cyberspace eh? I'm betting on it...

I imagine that GUI or X Window programmers (for a nice interface) and
database programmers are especially desireable here. If a cypherpunk
pulled this off and it was promoted, it would be HOT press coverage.
We're talking 6 o'clock soundbites.  A glimmer of the momentum of a revolution!

------- Forwarded Message

Date: Mon, 26 Jul 1993 18:51:10 -0500
From: farber@central.cis.upenn.edu (David Farber)
Subject: Cal AB1624: PROGRAMMERS! START YOUR ENGINES! (sample legis data)

Date: Thu, 22 Jul 93 13:42:13 -0700
From: gnu@cygnus.com

Jim Warren has been leading a charge to get the California Legislature
to provide public access to their internal law- and bill-tracking systems
via the Internet.  Rep. Debra Bowen has introduced Assembly Bill 1624
to accomplish this.  It's kicking its way through the Legislature now,
and faces its next hearing on August 18th.

Part of the opposition to the bill is that the legislators don't
believe that the Internet community will end up providing software for
easy public access to this information, which is all in crufty formats
from proprietary systems.  (This would mean either that the state
would have to spend money to make the data usefully accessible, or
that they'd have gone through all this for nothing because the public
couldn't really use the results.)  The Legislature currently sells
exclusive access to the data, on tape, to a company that charges big
bucks per hour for online access to it.  This is the kind of people
that the Legislature understands, so we have to make them also understand
the generous spirit of the Internet, with a demonstration.

We hope, with some volunteer programming as well as volunteer
politicking, to open up the process of state legislation so that
ordinary citizens can track it and participate in it.  Any takers?

        John Gilmore
        Electronic Frontier Foundation
        gnu@eff.org

- ------- Forwarded Message

From: Jim Warren <jwarren@well.sf.ca.us>
Subject: UPDATE#19-AB1624: PROGRAMMERS! START YOUR ENGINES! (sample legis data)
Date:   Thu, 22 Jul 1993 10:42:07 -0700

July 20, 1993

Okay, all you programmers who volunteered to create readers, indexers, 
print utilities, etc., for California's legislative data -- 
HERE'S YOUR FIRST CHANCE.

GAIN FAME AND GLORY (if not wealth :-) !  Be the FIRST to create 
legislative data-handling utilites and share the source-code with 
the world.  Do it fast, and you/it can amaze and impress legislators 
at the Aug. 18th Senate Rules Committee hearing on AB1624.

The Legislative Data Center (LDC) has provided bill-author Bowen's office 
with six diskettes full of sample legislative data in the various forms in 
which it exists internally, at the LDC and/or the Office of State Printing 
(OSP).

They also provided documentation-files in electronic form.

With some kindly Sacramento assistance, Tim Pozar now has all of these 
files available across the Internet in the anonymous ftp directory 
(file transfer protocol) on   kumr.lns.com.

To obtain copies of the files, use the command  "ftp kumr.lns.com".
Login as  "anonymous"  and use your mailing address as a password.

Be sure to use the command  "binary"  to tranfer the files intact.
Use the command  "cd pub/ldc"  to change to the proper directory.
Then the command  "mget *"  to get all of the files.
After all of the files are retrived, type the command  "quit"  to end 
the ftp session and log out of kumr.kns.com.

If you have ftp problems, contact Tim:
Internet: pozar@kumr.lns.com     FidoNet: Tim Pozar @ 1:125/555
Snail: Tim Pozar, KKSF, 77 Maiden Lane, San Francisco CA 94108
POTS: +1 415 788 2022      Radio: KC6GNJ / KAE6247


According to LCD notes that accompanied the diskettes, the files include:
cgml.sou - California Generic Markup Language (CGML) parser table
codes.fmt - documentation of CGML (the LDC formatting language, that does 
  *not* give the page- or line-numbers by which amendments are defined)
measures.fmt - documentation of Page II (the OSP typesetting input, which is
  the only source of the page- and line-numbers of printed bills)
*cg.ina - introduced bill, in the Assembly, coded in CGML
*cg.ams - amended bill, in the Senate, coded in CGML
*.cg - Constitution part, state code or uncodified statute, coded in CGML
ab????.ina - bill introduced in the Assembly, coded in Page II
ab????.ams - Assembly bill amended in the Senate, coded in Page II
*.pg2 - Page II tables for introduced, amended, enrolled and chaptered bills
*ca - committee analysis
*fa - floor analysis
*cf - committee vote
*fv - floor vote
*s - bill status
*h - bill history
*ve - Governor's veto message
063093.boo files apparently concern the Assembly and Senate Daily Files.
  If you have questions AFTER you have diligently diddled these files and 
become totally frustrated, send specific questions to me and I'll try to 
scrounge up some answers.  [No guarantees, though.  :-)  ]


Let me know if/when you think you have some code working, and we'll figure 
out how best to gloriously - and *timely* - flaunt it in Sacramento.  :-)
[Note:  I will be at the Telluride Tele-Community conference and mostly offline
7/22-7/26.]
- - --jim
Jim Warren, columnist for MicroTimes, Government Technology & BoardWatch
jwarren@well.sf.ca.us  -or-  jwarren@autodesk.com
345 Swett Rd., Woodside CA 94062; voice/415-851-7075; fax/415-851-2814
[organizer & Chair, First Conference on Computers, Freedom & Privacy (1991); 
InfoWorld founder (1978); Autodesk Board of Directors member; etc. blah blah]
< just a citizen/volunteer/advocate re AB1624; no business interest therein >

- ------- End of Forwarded Message






------- End of Forwarded Message





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: szabo@techbook.com (Nick Szabo)
Date: Wed, 28 Jul 93 06:11:42 PDT
To: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Subject: Re: "Big Brother Inside"
In-Reply-To: <9307272352.AA24348@netcom5.netcom.com>
Message-ID: <m0oL5YX-000hzUC@techbook.techbook.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



I don't have the skills to make stickers, but I'd like to see this
happen.  For whoever is the first to make professional-looking "Big 
Brother Inside" stickers, I hereby place an advance order for
$200 worth.

Nick Szabo				szabo@techbook.com



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Jeremy R. Smith" <jersmit@eis.calstate.edu>
Date: Wed, 28 Jul 93 00:16:32 PDT
To: Cypherpunks <cypherpunks@toad.com>
Subject: PGP 2.3 for Amiga
Message-ID: <Pine.3.07.9307280016.A1859-a100000@eis.calstate.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


	I've just finished a trial run of PGP 2.3 for the Amiga and have
some news to report.  It is a bit buggy.  Had trouble signing and
encrypting with my secret key.  Is 2.3 backward compatible with 2.2?  I'm
running an A3000T with an '040 accelerator @ 25mhz.  Please let me know if
any of you have experienced similar problems.  Thanx in advance!


						Jeremy Smith
						jersmit@eis.calstate.edu

-----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK----- Version: 2.2
 
mQCNAixVlqsAAAEEAMlqS9nz+2dADwxwOglWVJk7xugtC9SMQX6rkJiv/0wkOhSB
RSQcUL5bVfRKJGa4YrnHefmBZaTSvwtFmSUCSqm4yN9n258xda+niz6pJwPDaTIX
7Gr1V8Xr9/J7K3grm8H1VCXJjKTUVt+zPns5KS4K+tQZgdcPQJefZlD5h/jTAAUV
tCdKZXJlbXkgU21pdGggPGplcnNtaXRAZWlzLmNhbHN0YXRlLmVkdT4= 
=J0/4 
-----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK----- 






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: cdodhner@indirect.com (Christian D. Odhner)
Date: Wed, 28 Jul 93 02:03:01 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Tshirts
Message-ID: <9307280900.AA03905@indirect.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


 Quoting Stanton McCandlish:
 
 > My question would be, who gets the money, and who does the work?  Is this
 > something some individual is going to go do, or is some sort of CP fund
 > going to be set up (which could perhaps be used to help get a conference
 > or something going, or at least cover the cost of some duly elected
 > representative of the CPs to attend important conferences and report back
 > to us all.  Or something like that.
  
 I think the easiest way to do it would be for sombody (like myself in
 about three weeks, or hopefully somebody else sooner, or best of all
 several people independantly) to decide on one design they personaly like
 the best, and print up about 12-24 of them out of petty cash. Figure out
 cost per shirt, charge listmembers at cost plus postage and others at cost
 plus a buck or two plus postage. If there is a big demand then make a lot
 more and charge a bit more per shirt, maybe come out of it with a little
 cash to fund the next project... The point is I think we are all a little
 too individualy-minded to reach a group agreement ahead of time, but as
 soon as somebody has a finished tshirt to sell I think most people will
 want one, weather or not it is the one they had hoped for.
 
 Happy Hunting, -Chris Odhner
 <cdodhner@indirect.com>
 
 





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Nickey MacDonald <i6t4@jupiter.sun.csd.unb.ca>
Date: Wed, 28 Jul 93 00:06:32 PDT
To: John Gilmore <gnu@toad.com>
Subject: Re: A few more slogan ideas
In-Reply-To: <9307272113.AA04156@toad.com>
Message-ID: <Pine.3.05.9307280445.B18722-9100000@jupiter>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


On Tue, 27 Jul 1993, John Gilmore wrote:

> Cypherpunks:  There's safety in numbers.  (back of shirt:  BIG numbers.)
> Cryptography:  There's safety in numbers.  (back of shirt:  BIG numbers.)

I like these two...  they highlight Crypto, are humorous and don't put
anyone down.

--
Nick MacDonald               | NMD on IRC
i6t4@jupiter.sun.csd.unb.ca  | PGP 2.1 Public key available via finger
i6t4@unb.ca                  | (506) 457-1931    ^{1024/746EBB 1993/02/23}






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Nickey MacDonald <i6t4@jupiter.sun.csd.unb.ca>
Date: Wed, 28 Jul 93 00:23:00 PDT
To: "Timothy C. May" <tcmay@netcom.com>
Subject: Re: Talking to Reporters, and Which Ones?
In-Reply-To: <9307280401.AA20503@netcom5.netcom.com>
Message-ID: <Pine.3.05.9307280456.C18722-a100000@jupiter>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


On Tue, 27 Jul 1993, Timothy C. May wrote:

> Well here I just have to disagree completely. It's just a plain and
> simple fact that these sorts of magazines--"Wired" and its
> cousins--are having an enormous impact on folks. This is how many of our
> List members first learned of this List, this is how much of the
> crypto debate is being framed, and this is where interested readers
> will turn for information. (To the list I would add "Mondo 2000,"
> "Boing Boing," "Communications of the ACM," and a few other mags and
> journals.)

[A shameless plug for a favorite magazine...]

I actually learned about the list from an article in _Boardwatch_ magazine.
It has had pretty good coverage of PGP and the issues surrounding TLA "BBS
Arrests".

--
Nick MacDonald               | NMD on IRC
i6t4@jupiter.sun.csd.unb.ca  | PGP 2.1 Public key available via finger
i6t4@unb.ca                  | (506) 457-1931    ^{1024/746EBB 1993/02/23}






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Paul Goggin <chaos@aql.gatech.edu>
Date: Wed, 28 Jul 93 01:22:59 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com (Cryptoanarchists are Us)
Subject: Phrack 43
Message-ID: <9307280822.AA22988@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


For those who are interested.

I have added phrack-43 to my EFF archive (used to be a mirror, until ....)

aql.gatech.edu
/pub/eff/cud/phrack


Enjoy.

Paul
--
R  O    All Comments Copyright by  | Technofetisht
 A  N     Paul S. Goggin (1993)    | Cypher, Cyber, Chaos              
  V        Information Broker      | Ergoflux, Interzone
   E      chaos@aql.gatech.edu     | Carpe Diem: Stop the Clipper wiretap chip 
Finger account for latest _Phrack_ | Public Key: PGP and RIPEM available
      For anonymous communication:---> anonymus+4744@charcoal.com
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Title 18 USC 2511 and 18 USC 2703 Protected -- Monitoring Absolutely Forbidden




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: dmandl@lehman.com (David Mandl)
Date: Wed, 28 Jul 93 06:43:07 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Anarchist Gathering in Philadelphia
Message-ID: <9307281341.AA01869@disvnm2.shearson.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Any Cypherpunks planning on attending the Mid-Atlantic Anarchist
Gathering in Philadelphia this weekend?  It's running from Friday,
July 30, through Monday, August 2.  It's supposed to be a smallish
regional gathering (as opposed to a major Continental gathering, 
like Chicago '86, Minneapolis '87, Toronto '88, S.F. '89), but it's
looking like there may be way more attendees than our hosts in
Philadelphia originally anticipated.  Should be big fun.

I'm considering throwing together an ad-hoc workshop on crypto-anarchy
and related issues if there's sufficient interest at the gathering
(should have thought of this three months ago when things were being
planned, of course).

   --Dave.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: R.Tait@bnr.co.uk
Date: Wed, 28 Jul 93 02:58:02 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Help needed in the Cypherpunks cause!
Message-ID: <199307280955.25386@bnsgs200.bnr.co.uk>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Hi all,

I've been on  this list for  quite a while  now, mostly  listening and
learning, but with the occasional post now and then. What I've learned
is that it's important for us all (even outside the US) to "spread the
word" (as it   were) and let  people know  how important Privacy,  and
associated  areas are to us.  In fact, I saw a   program on UK TV only
yesterday in which Ann Winterton (an English Member of Parliament) was
advocating that  the UK Government  allow British Telecom to routinely
(ie,  without a permit/warrant etc)  tap and  intercept people's phone
calls. Without  a warrant!!! Her excuse  was that we needed to capture
child pornographers,  who were downloading them  using the PSTN. Yeah,
right!

Anyway,  my call for   help is this. I've  got  to write my Final Year
thesis  starting in September, and since  we've got free reign on what
we say and  do, I'd like to take  the subjects of Encryption, Privacy,
Digital Cash (etc, etc, etc), and write a *decent* and *truthful* (ie,
a Cypherpunks view, *NOT* the media's,  or the Government's) thesis on
what it's all about, what it's not, how it all affects us, and what we
can all do. My intention is that  when it's all finished, I'll release
it into the public domain, and produce a Postscript file to be used as
an "intro" to the Crypto-world.

And since I'm no expert, and I want to make this a document showing us
in  a good (and honest) light,  it would be nice  if I could have some
suggestions as to the content, layout and format of the document. I've
prepared a  few questions, and if you  all wouldn't mind sparing a few
moments of your time in answering them, I'd be very grateful...

1, Do you see the need for a document such as this?
2, If not, how come?
3, What would you like to see covered in such a document?
4, What, if anything, would you like *not* to be covered?
5, How would you like it to be worded (ie, technical/beginner etc)
6, How would you like it be laid out?
7, <insert your comments/questions/flames here>

Thanks in advance for your comments!

-Peace from London!
Rick M. Tait <ricktait@bnr.co.uk>
Network Management Systems, Bell Northern-Research (Europe) Ltd.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: fnerd@smds.com (FutureNerd Steve Witham)
Date: Wed, 28 Jul 93 09:01:45 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: RE: A few more slogan ideas
Message-ID: <9307281545.AA01482@smds.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> Cypherpunks:  There's safety in numbers.  (back of shirt:  BIG numbers.)
> Cryptography:  There's safety in numbers.  (back of shirt:  BIG numbers.)
> replace "BIG numbers" with "BIG, BIG, PRIME NUMBERS"
> -nate

Products of two big prime numbers.  Show the multiplication of two
300-digit numbers!
-fnerd
factor me




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Paul Goggin <chaos@aql.gatech.edu>
Date: Wed, 28 Jul 93 08:56:44 PDT
To: hugh@toad.com
Subject: Re: Phrack 43, Eff mirror loss?
In-Reply-To: <9307280858.AA02307@ecotone.toad.com>
Message-ID: <9307281553.AA05144@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>  Whats the "until ...." on your mirroring the EFF ftp site all about?
>               ||ugh Daniel

EFF as of July will no longer be keeping up with Phrack. Eventually, Phrack
will be removed from the archive (I beleive). I thought this was well 
publicized...maybe not. From what I have read, Phrack accounts for over 50% of
all their traffic. They have been exceeding their lease-line agreement and
have been paying nearly twice their budgeted line-cost, etc... You get the
picture.

Paul
--
R  O    All Comments Copyright by  | Technofetisht
 A  N     Paul S. Goggin (1993)    | Cypher, Cyber, Chaos              
  V        Information Broker      | Ergoflux, Interzone
   E      chaos@aql.gatech.edu     | Carpe Diem: Stop the Clipper wiretap chip 
Finger account for latest _Phrack_ | Public Key: PGP and RIPEM available
      For anonymous communication:---> anonymus+4744@charcoal.com
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Title 18 USC 2511 and 18 USC 2703 Protected -- Monitoring Absolutely Forbidden




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Peter Shipley <shipley@tfs.COM>
Date: Wed, 28 Jul 93 11:53:12 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Cypherpunks on Voice cover
In-Reply-To: <199307281715.AA05331@panix.com>
Message-ID: <9307281851.AA18777@edev0.tfs.com.TFS>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>Cypherpunk are on the cover of the "Village Voice." A local
>nyc rag.
>
>Inside TIM, AND ERIC are quoted. The story is written by
>Julian Dibbell.

Berkeley locals can get the "Village Voice" at newspaper shop "daves" 
in berkeley  (near where "the other change of hobbit" used to be)





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: murphy@s1.elec.uq.oz.au (Peter Murphy)
Date: Tue, 27 Jul 93 19:26:28 PDT
To: owner-cypherpunks@toad.com (Patrick E. Hykkonen)
Subject: Re: More stuff...
In-Reply-To: <9307271337.AA11041@tstc.edu>
Message-ID: <9307280219.AA13330@s2.elec.uq.oz.au>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> 
> Ok, How about maybe one of these.  Obscure, but kinda fun.
> 
>  - 1984 + 10
>  - Orwell missed by 10.
>  - Big Brother has arrived!
>  - So what's 10 years between Orwell and a few friends?
> 
> -- 
> "I'm not being irrational, I just know to much."  - Tim Allen
> --
> Pat Hykkonen, N5NPL                     Texas State Technical College at Waco
> Internet: {pat,postmaster,root}@tstc.edu       Instructional Network Services
> Packet: N5NPL@WD5KAL.#CENTX.TX.USA.NA        3801 Campus Dr.  Waco, Tx  76705
> Public keys available! ** 1984 + 10 **     V:(817) 867-4830  F:(817) 799-2843
> 

It's interesting that you've listed these slogans. Someone (I think it was
Hunter S. Thompson) once pointed out that 1984 was a typing error, and that the
original title was "1994". Orwell was behind schedule when he wrote "1984", and
only realized his mistake around the time he submitted the manuscript. He tried
to get it changed, but (because of his timing) failed. Interestingly enough, if
I am correct in assuming H.S.T. was the origin of that bit of imformation, then
I think (again, unsurely) that it originated from his articles about his arrest
by some Colorado D.A.s on drug charges. Fortunately, because of the incompetence
of the police and D.A.s involved (especially in illegal searching), it was thrown
out of course. But that's another thread entirely...;->

	Anyway back to the T-shirt ideas. One ideas came to me:

1994: 1984 was a typo.

Below this captions would show George Orwell typing away at his typewriter, while
behind him, some shadowy figures (representing Government Agencies or the 
Dictator of your choice) would hover threatening around his shoulders, or lurk
in the background....

Now if the Cryptography T-Shirt idea gets realized, I wouldn't mind getting hold 
of one. One problem I have: how do I get hold of it? Does anyone know what the
costs (and timing) of mailing small objects from the U.S. to Australia? Or would
it be a better idea to email the GIF/bitmap/etc., of the design over here, and
I'll send some cash in return? Eagerly awaiting .....

Thanks,

Peter.

-- 
=============================================================================
Peter Murphy - Department of Electrical Engineering,|Phone: 61 - 7 - 300 3452.
University of Queensland: murphy@s2.elec.uq.oz.au  .|------------------------
"Contrary to popular belief, the wings of demons are|Please do not put any 
the same as the wings of angels, although they're   |Heinlein quotes in your 
often better groomed." - Terry Pratchett.           |.sig - they're old.
=============================================================================




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Kent Hastings" <kent_hastings@qmail2.aero.org>
Date: Wed, 28 Jul 93 12:26:49 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Cpunx T-shirt design
Message-ID: <199307281924.AA03845@aerospace.aero.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


                      Cpunx T-shirt design
Oops - sent to extropians by mistake ...
Here is a .GIF file signed with the "test" userid public key
found at the end of this message. This should make it through
our restrictive e-mail gateway. Enclosed T-shirt design uses
a B&W version of that R. Cobb cartoon: "Well...at least we
don't have to worry about Anarchy anymore." Maybe we could 
get permission from the copyright "owners."
-----BEGIN PGP MESSAGE-----
Version: 2.3

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From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Harry Shapiro <habs@panix.com>
Date: Wed, 28 Jul 93 10:16:46 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Cypherpunks on Voice cover
Message-ID: <199307281715.AA05331@panix.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Cypherpunk are on the cover of the "Village Voice." A local
nyc rag.

Inside TIM, AND ERIC are quoted. The story is written by
Julian Dibbell.

/hawk

-- 
Harry S. Hawk  				      habs@extropy.org
Electronic Communications Officer, Extropy Institute Inc. 
    	    The Extropians Mailing List, Since 1991
EXTROPY -- A measure of intelligence, information, energy, vitality,
experience, diversity, opportunity, and growth.  EXTROPIANISM -- The
philosophy that seeks to increase extropy.          



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: fergp@sytex.com (Paul Ferguson)
Date: Wed, 28 Jul 93 14:48:43 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Batteries not included
Message-ID: <DLRe8B1w165w@sytex.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


On Tue, 27 Jul 1993 11:51:56 -0700,
 Dave Mandle <uunet!pmantis.berkeley.edu!nobody> wrote -
 
> I considered (for a couple of seconds) responding to P.M.'s
> request, but then decided against it.  I'm sure he's a nice
> guy, but I generally don't trust mainstream journalists too
> much and don't go out of my way to talk to them.  People may
> have actually made a decision not to talk to him, so I
> wouldn't assume it's "apathy" or anything like that.  (I'm
> sensitive about this because people are always accusing
> anti-voting anarchists of "apathy," and that gets us
> hopping mad.)
 
 While I'm not trying to offend anyone in particular, I think this
 attitude hurts cypherpunks more than it helps us. I called Phil
 Mulivor this morning and had a long chat with him. He seems very
 knowledgeable about the intrinsic value of digital communications
 mediums, especially the Internet.
 
 Speaking your mind in a public fashion can sometimes help progress,
 Dave.
 
 Get involved.
 
 Cheers,

Paul Ferguson               |  "Government, even in its best state,
Network Integrator          |   is but a necessary evil; in its worst
Centreville, Virginia USA   |   state, an intolerable one."
fergp@sytex.com             |      - Thomas Paine, Common Sense
 
         I love my country, but I fear its government.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Paco Xander Nathan <pacoid@wixer.bga.com>
Date: Wed, 28 Jul 93 14:38:16 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: one-off t-shirts
In-Reply-To: <9307260655.AA23437@netcom3.netcom.com>
Message-ID: <9307282119.AA00010@wixer>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


"Sent from the cyberdeck of: J. Eric Townsend"

> Christian D. Odhner writes:
>  > However the cost for one (1) uniqe tee shirt is a little expensive. What
> 
> not if you find a printmaking major and get them to silkscreen it.
> Just call up the local university fine arts program and ask about for
> the person who teaches silkscreening/printmaking.  You'll probably be
> able to find through them a student who'd gladly do one for $30-50,
> even lower per-shirt if you want a few done.

Here in Austin, we got a quote for a recent EFF-Austin event..
One side, black on white XL cotton T-shirt was about $4.75
each, with a minimum of 24 shirts - that's not too expensive
at all.  Place was called Planet Janet.. I've heard of even
better deals in rural/midwest areas..






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Date: Wed, 28 Jul 93 16:43:23 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: (fwd) VINYL STICKERS: NEW PRICES, BETTER QUALITY
Message-ID: <9307282342.AA03999@netcom5.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Here's mention of getting vinyl stickers made. Even smaller stickers,
for a "Big Brother Inside" negative campaign, could be even cheaper.
Paper labels could be cheaper still.

-Tim May


From: menchett@pyramid.unr.edu (Peter J Menchetti)
Newsgroups: alt.cyberpunk.tech
Subject: VINYL STICKERS: NEW PRICES, BETTER QUALITY
Date: 18 Jul 1993 00:11:00 GMT


I have new prices on my vinyl stickers. They are now SCREEN PRINTED
so that the vinyl will NOT scratch off. My prices are now lower and
the stickers are better.

Anyone interested in these VINYL WEATHERPROOF GLOSSY STICKERS should
email menchett@cs.unr.edu for details.

They are CHEAP. $15 buys 100 cassette sized 2-color vinyl stickers!

Pete Menchetti  ** Vinyl stickers for cheap, email me! **





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: thug@phantom.com (Murdering Thug)
Date: Wed, 28 Jul 93 15:36:56 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Info wanted on DVP & DVG
Message-ID: <m0oLK9Q-0009FCC@mindvox.phantom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text



Does anyone out there have any technical specs and/or prices and/or
purchasing restrictions on Motorola's "Digital Voice Privacy" (DVP) and
General Electric's "Digital Voice Guard" (DVG) radio systems?  From what I
know, these are supposed to be DES encrypted voice radio systems used by
federal agencies like the DEA, FBI, SS, ATF, and perhaps the CIA.

I'm assuming that there are purchasing restrictions on these systems.  Are
there similar systems that are made by companies outside of the U.S.,
which perhaps could be imported without restriction and/or registration
with the NSA or Customs?


Thug



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Al Billings <mimir@u.washington.edu>
Date: Wed, 28 Jul 93 21:41:59 PDT
To: Norman Hardy <norm@netcom.com>
Subject: Re: Digital Silk Road
In-Reply-To: <9307280634.AA13117@netcom3.netcom.com>
Message-ID: <Pine.3.05z.9307282120.A10209-9100000@carson.u.washington.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



On Tue, 27 Jul 1993, Norman Hardy wrote:

> This paper is available thru anonymous ftp at
> netcom.com:pub/joule/DSR1.ps.gz and DSR1.rtf.gz.
> The file format, .rtf, (Rich Text Fotmat) can be read by many different
> word processors including those from Microsoft, MacWrite II,
> and some Unix systems. I will produce other formats with a bit of pressure.

 Where is the program to uncompress it available?







From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Peter Shipley <shipley@tfs.COM>
Date: Wed, 28 Jul 93 22:07:00 PDT
To: Al Billings <mimir@u.washington.edu>
Subject: Re: Digital Silk Road
In-Reply-To: <Pine.3.05z.9307282120.A10209-9100000@carson.u.washington.edu>
Message-ID: <9307290501.AA19646@edev0.tfs.com.TFS>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>
>On Tue, 27 Jul 1993, Norman Hardy wrote:
>
>> This paper is available thru anonymous ftp at
>> netcom.com:pub/joule/DSR1.ps.gz and DSR1.rtf.gz.
>> The file format, .rtf, (Rich Text Fotmat) can be read by many different
>> word processors including those from Microsoft, MacWrite II,
>> and some Unix systems. I will produce other formats with a bit of pressure.
>
> Where is the program to uncompress it available?
>

prep.ai.mit.edu:pub/gnu/gzip.*




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: norm@netcom.com (Norman Hardy)
Date: Wed, 28 Jul 93 23:12:02 PDT
To: mimir@u.washington.edu
Subject: Re: Digital Silk Road
Message-ID: <9307290609.AA19255@netcom4.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


The "gunzip" command expands .gz files on some Unix systems.
I hear that some ftp systems magically do it for you but
I can't confirm that.

If none of that works let me know.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: gnu (John Gilmore)
Date: Thu, 29 Jul 93 01:17:02 PDT
To: tien@toad.com
Subject: NSA FOIA hearing in SF -- Monday 2 August, 10AM
Message-ID: <9307290816.AA02311@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


My Freedom of Information case against the NSA continues to grind on.
This is the case where I found two manuscripts by William Friedman in
public libraries and got them formally declassified (they were never
properly classified).  The one that got national press coverage.

At this point, the case has been resolved except for the issue of
whether NSA has to follow the Freedom of Information Act with regard
to time limits.  The Act states that requests will be answered within
ten days, with exceptionally hard requests getting another ten days.
NSA doesn't even send you a postcard back within ten days; they often
take several months.  I have a FOIA request that's been in there more
than a year now and hasn't been answered.

The last courtroom action involved NSA's lawyer and my lawyer
presenting oral arguments about whether the lawsuit could be amended
to invoke the First Amendment, and whether the case should be thrown
out of court (`summary judgement').  After the hearing, Judge
Henderson decided that we couldn't bring in the First Amendment, since
NSA had made the question `moot' by declassifying the documents I
wanted to publish.  But he also decided that our case had merit with
respect to time limits, so it would not be thrown out of court.  He
also decided that our requests for documents from NSA should be
honored.

Since then, NSA has filed a second motion asking that the case be
thrown out, and has also gotten a temporary stop in the clock for
giving us documents.  Their reasoning on throwing the case out is very
interesting.  They claim that since I have all the documents I'm going
to get from my original FOIA request, the question of whether they
responded in a timely fashion is `moot'.  My lawyer, Lee Tien
(tien@toad.com or tien@well.sf.ca.us), wrote an excellent response in
which he shows six ways from Sunday that they can't throw this out.
Since it takes much longer to push such a case through the courts than
it takes NSA to eventually respond, they would NEVER have to confront
the issue, if this was how the courts worked.  (Often NSA uses this as
yet another delaying tactic: they simply don't respond, or deny having
any records, and force you to take them to court to get ANYTHING --
which then takes forever.  This is part of what we want to help change
by making them follow the time limits in the law -- we'd like to see
them penalized for withholding documents that they later reveal when
forced to.)

The upcoming hearing should include oral arguments on these points.
The judge probably won't decide anything right there and then.

	Judge Henderson's courtroom
	19th floor
	Federal Building
	450 Golden Gate Avenue (a few blocks off Van Ness Avenue)
	San Francisco, CA
	Monday, 2 August, 1993, 10AM

I know 10AM on a Monday is early for many cypherpunks to be seen at
the Federal Building, but a show of solidarity would be heartening.
It helps to convince the judge -- and the government lawyers -- that
the public really cares about the outcome of the case.  Also, you get
to see and talk with a real live lawyer for the NSA!  (I'm not sure
who will show up -- last time it was Jack Martin, who actually works
for the Dept. of Justice, defending the NSA.)

	John Gilmore

PS: Some early NSA documents in the case are available on ftp.eff.org in
pub/crypto.  I'll add a draft version of Lee's recent filing under
pub/crypto/Plaintiff/930718-statement-opposing-dismissal.  It's
all in Legalbol, so it's sort of like reading a paper on cryptography
-- you have to read between the lines until you get used to the terms
and ideas.  I recommend reading Defendant/declaration-of-michael-smith
for some info on the internal workings of the NSA FOIA process.  We
haven't scanned in the NSA's recent documents yet, nor put up most of
our own (they're on Lee's Mac, and Macs are congenitally unable to
produce ASCII text, it seems).




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Date: Thu, 29 Jul 93 01:57:03 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Paranoia and the Outlawing of Cash
In-Reply-To: <Pine.3.05.9307290446.H23353-b100000@jupiter>
Message-ID: <9307290837.AA00242@netcom5.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Nick MacDonald writes:

....
> What are the odds that banking machines are actually tracking which bills
> they give you.  If the banks then later checked out where the money was
> coming from, they could do some very interesting demographics... and it
> would be a great way to help catch bank machine criminals...

This scheme would require cooperation/collusion by the stores that
accept the money, require that they scan the money right there at the
counter or at least segregate the cash for later scanning. I haven't
seen either capability.

More to the point, cash transactions almost never involve producing
ID, so how will the store know who you are, even if it (somehow) could
track the bills?

(Ah, the *video surveillance cameras* in so many stores! It suddenly
becomes clear! The ATM machines take your picture automatically--you
knew this, didn't you?--and send the images to Fort Meade for
correlation with the 7-11 camera pictures. This way they see who's
buying Twinkies and copies of "Illuminatus!" and can fnord trace their
movements.  Fnord.)

By the way, I *do* suspect electronic transactions will become much
more common, perhaps even mandatory, over the next decade. Social
security and welfare payments may be deposited electronically (to
prevent theft and fraud) and even "poor people" will then have credit
or debit cards. This eliminates the last practical argument for
allowing cash. There will be the usual objections, but the "War on
Drugs" and the war on the underground economy, money laundering, etc.,
will be cited as a more pressing concern than the "freedom" to use
cash. An insistence on using cash, when electronic transactions are
*so much more convenient* will be see at best as an eccentricity and
at worst as grounds for further investigation.

(Practically, cash probably cannot be simply outlawed. But stores may
be required to fill out additional forms for cash, including the ID of
the cash-paying customer. Merchants may charge a fee for cash
(reversing the current economics), and may even refuse cash
transactions above a certain value. If you doubt this can happen, look
at the trend of laws regarding cash transactions at banks, jewelry
stores, and car lots. The effect may be a phase trasition away from
cash in amounts greater than pocket change. I've already noticed
confusion on the faces of store clerks when I've paid for moderatelly
expensive items with folding money.)

We Cypherpunks need to ensure our plans for digital money are not
closed off by these sorts of moves. (I'm not sure what we need to do,
or can do, but it's worth thinking about.)

-Tim May

-- 
..........................................................................
Timothy C. May         | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,  
tcmay@netcom.com       | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
408-688-5409           | knowledge, reputations, information markets, 
W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA  | black markets, collapse of governments.
Higher Power: 2^756839 | Public Key: PGP and MailSafe available.
Note: I put time and money into writing this posting. I hope you enjoy it.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Jeremy R. Smith" <jersmit@eis.calstate.edu>
Date: Thu, 29 Jul 93 01:42:05 PDT
To: "Timothy C. May" <tcmay@netcom.com>
Subject: Re: (fwd) VINYL STICKERS: NEW PRICES, BETTER QUALITY
In-Reply-To: <9307282342.AA03999@netcom5.netcom.com>
Message-ID: <Pine.3.07.9307290133.A16730-b100000@eis.calstate.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain




On Wed, 28 Jul 1993, Timothy C. May wrote:

> Here's mention of getting vinyl stickers made. Even smaller stickers,
> for a "Big Brother Inside" negative campaign, could be even cheaper.
> Paper labels could be cheaper still.
> 
> -Tim May
> 
> 
> From: menchett@pyramid.unr.edu (Peter J Menchetti)
> Newsgroups: alt.cyberpunk.tech
> Subject: VINYL STICKERS: NEW PRICES, BETTER QUALITY
> Date: 18 Jul 1993 00:11:00 GMT
> 
> 
> I have new prices on my vinyl stickers. They are now SCREEN PRINTED
> so that the vinyl will NOT scratch off. My prices are now lower and
> the stickers are better.
> 
> Anyone interested in these VINYL WEATHERPROOF GLOSSY STICKERS should
> email menchett@cs.unr.edu for details.
> 
> They are CHEAP. $15 buys 100 cassette sized 2-color vinyl stickers!
> 
> Pete Menchetti  ** Vinyl stickers for cheap, email me! **
> 

	I would be interested in ordering some of those.  Where would I
inquire?

						Jeremy Smith
						jersmit@eis.calstate.edu

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7Gr1V8Xr9/J7K3grm8H1VCXJjKTUVt+zPns5KS4K+tQZgdcPQJefZlD5h/jTAAUV
tCdKZXJlbXkgU21pdGggPGplcnNtaXRAZWlzLmNhbHN0YXRlLmVkdT4= 
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From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Jeremy R. Smith" <jersmit@eis.calstate.edu>
Date: Thu, 29 Jul 93 02:37:03 PDT
To: "Timothy C. May" <tcmay@netcom.com>
Subject: Re: Paranoia and the Outlawing of Cash
In-Reply-To: <9307290837.AA00242@netcom5.netcom.com>
Message-ID: <Pine.3.07.9307290210.A19548-b100000@eis.calstate.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


	I too have noticed a growing trend in the use of electronic money
for a wide range of transactions.  For example. I have an ATM card that
was issued on my checking account.  With it, I can make purchases at any
place displaying the Interlink symbol.  This includes gas stations, fast
food places, and a lot of common stores such as the Good Guys, Circuit
City, etc.
	Personally, I find this way of doing business a lot more
conveinent than carrying cash money.  No large demoninations to worry
about, and if you are robbed, they have to crack your PIN to use the card.
If they use a portabel reader, you could be screwed.  But, in most cases
you would have time to call customer service and cancel the card.
	I love progress.

						Jeremy Smith
						jersmit@eis.calstate.edu


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7Gr1V8Xr9/J7K3grm8H1VCXJjKTUVt+zPns5KS4K+tQZgdcPQJefZlD5h/jTAAUV
tCdKZXJlbXkgU21pdGggPGplcnNtaXRAZWlzLmNhbHN0YXRlLmVkdT4= 
=J0/4 
-----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK----- 






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Nickey MacDonald <i6t4@jupiter.sun.csd.unb.ca>
Date: Thu, 29 Jul 93 00:58:56 PDT
To: cypherpunks list <cypherpunks@toad.com>
Subject: I'm not paranoid...  They *are* out to get me!
Message-ID: <Pine.3.05.9307290446.H23353-b100000@jupiter>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Today, in one of those profound moments, I had a thought...  I'm still in
pain, so my therapy is to share with all of you.

Canadian money is not only colorful, its bar coded...  I'm so poor that I
don't have two of the same bills handy to compare them, but I suspect that
the bar codes only help identify the denomination (for vending machines
and the like) and not the serial number on the bill.  The serial number
would, however, be very easy to read by OCR...  after akk the numbers were
printed by a machine and should all be the same font, size, etc.

What are the odds that banking machines are actually tracking which bills
they give you.  If the banks then later checked out where the money was
coming from, they could do some very interesting demographics... and it
would be a great way to help catch bank machine criminals...

Anyway, I know I'm just being paranoid...  aren't I?

--
Nick MacDonald               | NMD on IRC
i6t4@jupiter.sun.csd.unb.ca  | PGP 2.1 Public key available via finger
i6t4@unb.ca                  | (506) 457-1931    ^{1024/746EBB 1993/02/23}






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Brian D Williams <talon57@well.sf.ca.us>
Date: Thu, 29 Jul 93 09:28:41 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Jurrasic revisited
Message-ID: <93Jul29.092656pdt.13933-1@well.sf.ca.us>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain




   This is from this weeks Network World, I thought we'd all enjoy it.

The following text is Copyright (c) 1993 by Network World. All rights
reserved.

Permission is granted by the copyright holder and the author to
distribute this file electronically or otherwise as long as the entire
file is printed without modification (other than cosmetic or formatting
changes).

<<begin text>>

Velocihackers and Tyrannosaurus superior

by M. E. Kabay, Ph.D.

Director of Education
National Computer Security Association
10 South Courthouse Avenue
Carlisle, PA 17013
Tel 717-258-1816
Fax 717-243-8642


The current hit movie "Jurassic Park" stars several holdovers from 65
million years ago. It also shows errors in network security that seem
to be as old.

For those of you who have just returned from Neptune, "Jurassic Park"
is about a dinosaur theme park that displays live dinosaurs created
after scientists cracked extinct dinosaur DNA code recovered from
petrified mosquitoes. The film has terrific live-action dinosaur
replicas and some heart-stopping scenes. It also dramatizes awful
network management and security. Unfortunately, the policies are as
realistic as the dinosaurs.

Consider a network security risk analysis for Jurassic Park. The
entire complex depends on computer-controlled electric fences and
gates to keep a range of prehistoric critters from eating the tourists
and staff. So at a simple level, if the network fails, people turn into
dinosaur food.

Jurassic Park's security network is controlled by an ultramodern Unix
system, but its management structures date from the Stone Age. There is
only one person who maintains the programs which control the security
network. This breaks Kabay's Law of Redundancy, which states, "No
knowledge shall be the property of only one member of the team." After
all, if that solitary guru were to leave, go on vacation, or get eaten
by a dinosaur, you'd be left without a safety net.

Jurassic Park's security system is controlled by computer programs
consisting of two million lines of proprietary code. These critical
programs are not properly documented. An undocumented system is by
definition a time bomb. In the movie, this bomb is triggered by a
vindictive programmer who is angry because he feels overworked and
underpaid.

One of the key principles of security is that people are the most
important component of any security system. Disgruntled and dishonest
employees cause far more damage to networks and computer systems than
hackers. The authoritarian owner of the Park dismisses the programmer's
arguments and complaints as if owning a bunch of dinosaurs gives him
the privilege of treating his employees rudely. He pays no attention to
explicit indications of discontent, including aggressive language,
resentful retorts, and sullen expressions. If the owner had taken the
time to listen to his employee's grievances and take steps to address
them, he could have prevented several dinosaur meals.

Bad housekeeping is another sign of trouble. The console where the
disgruntled programmer works looks like a garbage dump; it's covered in
coffee-cup fungus gardens, historically significant chocolate bar
wrappers, and a treasure trove of recyclable soft drink cans. You'd
think that a reasonable manager would be alarmed simply by the number
of empty calories per hour being consumed by this critically important
programmer. The poor fellow is so overweight that his life expectancy
would be short even if he didn't become dinosaur fodder.

Ironically, the owner repeats, `No expense spared' at several points
during the movie. It doesn't seem to occur to him that with hundreds of
millions of dollars spent on hardware and software--not to mention the
buildings and grounds and an entire private island--modest raises for
the staff would be trivial in terms of operating expenses but
significant for morale. 

In the movie, the network programmer is bribed by competitors to steal
dinosaur embryos. He does so by setting off a logic bomb that disrupts
network operations completely. The network outage causes surveillance
and containment systems to fail, stranding visitors in, well,
uncomfortable situations. Even though the plot is not exactly
brilliant, I'd like to leave at least something to surprise those who
haven't seen the movie yet.

When the systems fail, for some reason all the electric locks in the
park's laboratory are instantly switched to the open position. Why
aren't they automatically locked instead? Normally, when a security
controller fails, the default should be to keep security high, not
eliminate it completely. Manual overrides such as crash bars (the
horizontal bars that open latches on emergency exits) can provide
emergency egress without compromising security.

As all of this is happening, a tropical storm is bearing down on the
island. The contingency plan appears to consist of sending almost
everyone away to the mainland, leaving a pitifully inadequate skeleton
crew. The film suggests that the skeleton crew is not in physical
danger from the storm, so why send essential personnel away?
Contingency plans are supposed to include redundancy at every level.
Reducing the staff when more are needed is incomprehensible.

At one point, the systems are rebooted by turning the power off to the
entire island on which the park is located. This is equivalent to
turning the power off in your city because you had an application
failure on your PC. Talk about overkill: why couldn't they just power
off the computers themselves?

Where were the DPMRP (Dinosaur Prevention, Mitigation and Recovery
Planning) consultants when the park was being designed? Surely
everybody should know by now that the only way to be ready for
dinosaurs, uh, disasters, is to think, plan, rehearse, refine and
update. Didn't anyone think about what would happen if the critters got
loose? Where are the failsafe systems? The uninterruptible power
supplies? The backup power generators? Sounds like Stupidosaurians were
in charge.

We may be far from cloning dinosaurs, but we are uncomfortably close to
managing security with all the grace of a Brontosaurus trying to type.

I hope you see the film. And bring your boss. 

<<end text>>


     Best wishes,

     Mich

     Michel E. Kabay, Ph.D.
     Director of Education
     National Computer Security Association

<<end file>> 


                                                          Brian Williams
                                                          Cypherpunk




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: allan@elvis.tamu.edu (Allan Bailey)
Date: Thu, 29 Jul 93 07:37:11 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Digital Money again
In-Reply-To: <9307262016.AA03957@alumni.cco.caltech.edu>
Message-ID: <9307291435.AA20104@elvis.tamu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>
>You want David Chaum's company, Digicash. They are in Holland. I have
>tried and failed to find telephone, address, or e-mail info for them.
>If you do find out, could you let me know? Thanks.

  There was some posting a while back on one of either sci.crypt
or alt.privacy I think by one of Chaum's graduate slaves about
a paper he'd written and put on anon. ftp.

  Does anyone have that ftp address?

>One of the seminal papers on DC-nets and some of the protocols behind
>digital cash is available by anonymous ftp from pub/cypherpunks at
>soda.berkeley.edu. It's a paper by Chaum. Also, Hal Finney wrote an
>excellent article on the basics of digicash that appeared in Extropy
>#10.

  There doesn't seem to be a paper about digicash at
soda.berkeley.edu's  cypherpunks directories.  Any idea where it could
be?

-- 
Allan Bailey, UNIX programmer, CSC          | "Freedom is not free."
Infinite Diversity in Infinite Combinations | or: allan.bailey@tamu.edu





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: nobody@pmantis.berkeley.edu
Date: Thu, 29 Jul 93 11:43:43 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Chaum's Dining Cryptographers [LONG] (was: Digital Money again)
Message-ID: <9307291843.AA18858@pmantis.berkeley.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Someone suggested that Allan Bailey seek this paper on soda.berkeley.edu. It is
not there, but it was posted to the list last December. Here it is again.
 
Date: 11 Dec 1992 14:58:38 -0800
From: nobody@pmantis.berkeley.edu
Subject: Chaum's "The Dining Cryptographers Problem" (VERY LONG)
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Message-id: <9212112258.AA09353@pmantis.berkeley.edu>
Content-transfer-encoding: 7BIT
Remailed-By: Tommy the Tourist <tommy@out>
 
The following article is brought to you by the Information Liberation
Front (ILF), a group dedicated to the timely distribution of important
information. 
 
The ILF encourages you to use this article for educational purposes
only and to seek out the original article. Minor spelling errors and
slight alterations of formulas may have gotten past the OCR process.
 
We apologize for the length, but feel this is one of the key articles
in this area. 
 
 
J. Cryptology (1988) 1:65-75
 
The Dining Cryptographers Problem:
 
Unconditional Sender and Recipient Untraceability
 
David Chaum
Centre for Mathematics and Computer Science, Kruislan 413, 1098 SJ 
Amsterdam, The Netherlands
 
Abstract.  Keeping confidential who sends which messages, in a 
world where any physical transmission can be traced to its 
origin, seems impossible. The solution presented here is 
unconditionally or cryptographically secure, depending on whether 
it is based on one-time-use keys or on public keys, respectively. 
It can be adapted to address efficiently a wide variety of 
practical considerations.
 
Key words.  Untraceability, Unconditional Security, Pseudonymity.
 
Introduction
 
Three cryptographers are sitting down to dinner at their favorite 
three-star restaurant. Their waiter informs them that arrangements 
have been made with the maitre d'hotel for the bill to be paid 
anonymously. One of the cryptographers might be paying for the dinner, 
or it might have been NSA (U.S. National Security Agency). The three 
cryptographers respect each other's right to make an anonymous 
payment, but they wonder if NSA is paying. They resolve their 
uncertainty fairly by carrying out the following protocol:
 
Each cryptographer flips an unbiased coin behind his menu, between 
him and the cryptographer on his right, so that only the two of them can 
see the outcome. Each cryptographer then states aloud whether the two 
coins he can see--the one he flipped and the one his left-hand neighbor 
flipped--fell on the same side or on different sides. If one of the 
cryptographers is the payer, he states the opposite of what he sees. An 
odd number of differences uttered at the table indicates that a 
cryptographer is paying; an even number indicates that NSA is paying 
(assuming that the dinner was paid for only once). Yet if a 
cryptographer is paying, neither of the other two learns anything from 
the utterances about which cryptographer it is.
 
To see why the protocol is unconditionally secure if carried out 
faithfully, consider the dilemma of a cryptographer who is not the 
payer and wishes to find out which cryptographer is. (If NSA pays, there 
is no anonymity problem.) There are two cases. In case (1) the two 
coins he sees are the same, one of the other cryptographers said 
"different," and the other one said "same." If the hidden outcome was 
the same as the two outcomes he sees, the cryptographer who said 
"different" is the payer; if the outcome was different, the one who said 
"same" is the payer. But since the hidden coin is fair, both possibilities 
are equally likely. In case (2) the coins he sees are different; if both 
other cryptographers said "different," then the payer is closest to the 
coin that is the same as the hidden coin; if both said "same," then the 
payer is closest to the coin that differs from the hidden coin. Thus, in 
each subcase, a nonpaying cryptographer learns nothing about which of 
the other two is paying.
 
The cryptographers become intrigued with the ability to make 
messages public untraceably. They devise a way to do this at the table 
for a statement of arbitrary length: the basic protocol is repeated over 
and over; when one cryptographer wishes to make a message public, he 
merely begins inverting his statements in those rounds corresponding 
to 1 's in a binary coded version of his message. If he notices that his 
message would collide with some other message, he may for example 
wait a number of rounds chosen at random from a suitable distribution 
before trying to transmit again.
 
1. Generalizing the Approach
 
During dinner, the cryptographers also consider how any number of 
participants greater than one can carry out a version of the protocol. 
(With two participants, only nonparticipant listeners are unable to 
distinguish between the two potential senders.) Each participant has a 
secret key bit in common with, say, every other participant. Each 
participant outputs the sum, modulo two, of all the key bits he shares, 
and if he wishes to transmit, he inverts his output. If no participant 
transmits, the modulo two sum of the outputs must be zero, since every 
key bit enters exactly twice; if one participant transmits, the sum 
must be one. (In fact, any even number of transmitting participants 
yields zero, and any odd number yields one.) For j rounds, each 
participant could have a j-bit key in common with every other 
participant, and the ith bit of each such key would be used only in the 
ith round. Detected collision of messages leads to attempted 
retransmission as described above; undetected collision results only 
from an odd number of synchronized identical message segments. 
(Generalization to fields other than GF(2) is possible, but seems to 
offer little practical advantage.)
 
Other generalizations are also considered during dinner. The 
underlying assumptions are first made explicit, including modeling 
key-sharing arrangements as graphs. Next, the model is illustrated 
with some simple examples. The potential for cooperations of 
participants to violate the security of others is then looked at. Finally, 
a proof of security based on systems of linear equations is given.
 
1.1. Model
 
Each participant is assumed to have two kinds of secret: (a) the keys 
shared with other participants for each round; and (b) the inversion 
used in each round (i.e., a 1 if the participant inverts in that round and a 
0 if not). Some or all of a participant's secrets may be given to other 
participants in various forms of collusion, discussion of which is 
postponed until Section 1.3. (For simplicity in exposition, the 
possibility of secrets being stolen is ignored throughout.)
 
The remaining information about the system may be described as: (a)
who shares keys with whom; and (b) what each participant outputs
during each round (the modulo two sum of that participant's keys and
inversion). This information need not be secret to ensure
untraceability. If it is publicly known and agreed, it allows various
extensions discussed in Sections 2.5 and 2.6. The sum of all the
outputs will, of course, usually become known to all participants.
 
In the terminology of graphs, each participant corresponds to a 
vertex and each key corresponds to an edge. An edge is incident on the 
vertices corresponding to the pair of participants that shares the 
corresponding key. From here on, the graph and dinner-table 
terminologies will be used interchangeably. Also, without loss of 
generality, it will be assumed that the graph is connected (i.e., that a 
path exists between every pair of vertices), since each connected 
component (i.e., each maximal connected subgraph) could be considered 
a separate untraceable-sender system.
 
An anonymity set seen by a set of keys is the set of vertices in a 
connected component of the graph formed from the original graph by 
removing the edges concerned. Thus a set of keys sees one anonymity 
set for each connected partition induced by removing the keys. The main 
theorem of Section 1.4 is essentially that those having only the public 
information and a set of keys seeing some anonymity set can learn 
nothing about the members of that anonymity set except the overall 
parity of their inversions. Thus, for example, any two participants 
connected by at least one chain of keys unknown to an observer are both 
in the same anonymity set seen by the observer's keys, and the observer 
gains nothing that would help distinguish between their messages.
 
1.2. Some Examples
 
A few simple consequences of the above model may be illustrative. The 
anonymity set seen by the empty set (i.e., by a nonparticipant observer) 
is the set of all vertices, since the graph is assumed connected and 
remains so after zero edges are removed. Also, the anonymity sets seen 
by the full set of edges are all singleton sets, since each vertex's 
inversion is just the sum of its output and the corresponding key bits.
 
If all other participants cooperate fully against one, of course no 
protocol can keep that singleton's messages untraceable, since 
untraceability exists only among a set of possible actors, and if the set 
has only one member, its messages are traceable. For similar reasons, 
if a participant believes that some subset of other participants will 
fully cooperate against him, there is no need for him to have keys in 
common with them.
 
A biconnected graph (i.e., a graph with at least two vertex-disjoint 
paths between every pair of vertices) has no cut-vertices (i.e., a single 
vertex whose removal partitions the graph into disjoint subgraphs). In 
such a graph, the set of edges incident on a vertex v sees (apart from v) 
one anonymity set containing all other vertices, since there is a path 
not containing v between every pair of vertices, and thus they form a 
connected subgraph excluding v; each participant acting alone learns 
nothing about the contribution of other participants.
 
1.3. Collusion of Participants
 
Some participants may cooperate by pooling their keys in efforts to 
trace the messages of others; such cooperation will be called collusion. 
For simplicity, the possibilities for multiple collusions or for pooling 
of information other than full edges will be ignored. Colluders who lie 
to each other are only touched on briefly, in Section 2.6.
 
Consider collusion in a complete graph. A vertex is only seen as a 
singleton anonymity set by the collection of all edges incident on it; all 
other participants must supply the key they share with a participant in 
order to determine that participant's inversions. But since a collusion 
of all but one participant can always trace that participant merely by 
pooling its members' inversions as already mentioned, it gains nothing 
more by pooling its keys. The nonsingleton anonymity set seen by all 
edges incident on a colluding set of vertices in a complete graph is the 
set of all other vertices; again, a collusion yields nothing more from 
pooling all its keys than from pooling all its inversions.
 
Now consider noncomplete graphs. A full collusion is a subset of 
participants pooling all of their keys. The pooled keys see each colluder 
as a singleton anonymity set; the colluders completely sacrifice the 
untraceability of their own messages. If a full collusion includes a cut-
set of vertices (i.e., one whose removal partitions the graph), the 
collusion becomes nontrivial because it can learn something about the 
origin of messages originating outside the collusion; the noncolluding 
vertices are partitioned into disjoint subgraphs, which are the 
anonymity sets seen by the pooled keys.
 
Members of a partial collusion pool some but not all of their keys. 
Unlike the members of a full collusion, each member of a partial 
collusion in general has a different set of keys. For it to be nontrivial, 
a partial collusion's pooled keys must include the bridges or separating 
edges of a segregation or splitting of the graph (i.e., those edges whose 
removal would partition the graph). Settings are easily constructed in 
which the pooled keys see anonymity sets that partition the graph and 
yet leave each colluder in a nonsingleton partition seen by any other 
participant. Thus, colluders can join a collusion without having to make 
themselves completely traceable to the collusion's other members.
 
1.4. Proof of Security
 
Consider, without loss of generality, a single round in which say some 
full collusion knows some set of keys. Remove the edges known to the 
collusion from the key-sharing graph and consider any particular 
connected component C of the remaining graph. The vertices of C thus 
form an anonymity set seen by the pooled keys.
 
Informally, what remains to be shown is that the only thing the 
collusion learns about the members of C is the parity sum of their 
inversions. This is intuitively apparent, since the inversions of the 
members of C are each in effect hidden from the collusion by one or 
more unknown key bits, and only the parity of the sum of these key bits 
is known (to be zero). Thus the inversions are hidden by a one-time pad, 
and only their parity is revealed, because only the parity of the pad is 
known.
 
The setting is formalized as follows: the connected component C is 
comprised of rn vertices and n edges. The incidence matrix M of C is 
defined as usual, with the vertices labeling the rows and the edges 
labeling the columns. Let K, I, and A be stochastic variables defined on 
GF(2)^n, GF(2)^m, and GF(2)^m, respectively, such that
K is uniformly distributed over GF(2)^n, K and I are mutually 
independent, and A = (MK) cross I. In terms of the protocol, K comprises 
the keys corresponding to the edges, I consists of the inversions 
corresponding to the vertices, and A is formed by the outputs of the 
vertices. Notice that the parity of A (i.e., the modulo two sum of its 
components) is always equal to the parity of I, since the columns of M 
each have zero parity. The desired result is essentially that A reveals 
no more information about I than the parity of 1. More formally:
 
Theorem.  Let a be in GF(2)^n. For each i in GF(2)^n, which is assumed by 
I with nonzero probability and which has the same parity as a, the 
conditional probability that A = a given that I = i is 2^(1 - m). Hence, 
the conditional probability that I = i given that A = a is the a priori 
probability that I = i.
 
Proof.  Let i be an element of GF(2)^n have the same parity as a. 
Consider the system of linear equations (MK) cross i = a, in k an 
element of GF(2)^n. Since the columns of M each have even parity, as 
mentioned above, its rows are linearly dependent over GF(2)^m. But as a 
consequence of the connectedness of the graph, every proper subset of 
rows of M is linearly independent. Thus, the rank of M is m - 1, and so 
each vector with zero parity can be written as a linear combination of 
the columns of M. This implies that the system is solvable because i 
cross a has even parity. Since the set of n column vectors of M has rank 
m - 1, the system has exactly 2^(n - m + 1) solutions.
 
Together with the fact that K and I are mutually independent and 
that K is uniformly distributed, the theorem follows easily.                           
 
2. Some Practical Considerations
 
After dinner, while discussing how they can continue to make 
untraceable statements from this respective homes, the cryptographers 
take up a variety of other topics. In particular, they consider different 
ways to establish the needed keys; debate adapting the approach to 
various kinds of communication networks; examine the traditional 
problems of secrecy and authentication in the context of a system that 
can provide essentially optimal untraceability; address denial of 
service caused by malicious and devious participants; and propose 
means to discourage socially undesirable messages from being sent.
 
2.1. Establishing Keys
 
One way to provide the keys needed for longer messages is for one 
member of each pair to toss many coins in advance. Two identical 
copies of the resulting bits are made, say each on a separate optical 
disk. Supplying one such disk (which today can hold on the order of 
10^10 bits) to a partner provides enough key bits to allow people to 
type messages at full speed for years. If participants are not 
transmitting all the time, the keys can be made to last even longer by 
using a substantially slower rate when no message is being sent; the 
full rate would be invoked automatically only when a 1 bit indicated 
the beginning of a message. (This can also reduce the bandwidth 
requirements discussed in Section 2.2.)
 
Another possibility is for a pair to establish a short key and use a 
cryptographic pseudorandom-sequence generator to expand it as needed. 
Of course this system might be broken if the generator were broken. 
Cryptanalysis may be made more difficult, however, by lack of access 
to the output of individual generators. Even when the cryptographers do 
not exchange keys at dinner, they can safely do so later using a public-
key distribution system (first proposed by [4] and [3]).
 
2.2 Underlying Communication Techniques
 
A variety of underlying communication networks can be used, and their 
topology need not be related to that of the key-sharing graph.
 
Communication systems based on simple cycles, called rings, are 
common in local area networks. In a typical ring, each node receives 
each bit and passes it round-robin to the next node. This technology is 
readily adapted to the present protocols. Consider a single-bit message 
like the "I paid" message originally sent at the dinner table. Each 
participant exclusive-or's the bit he receives with his own output 
before forwarding it to the next participant. When the bit has traveled 
full circle, it is the exclusive-or sum of all the participants' outputs, 
which is the desired result of the protocol. To provide these messages 
to all participants, each bit is sent around a second time by the 
participant at the end of the loop.
 
Such an adapted ring requires, on average, a fourfold increase in 
bandwidth over the obvious traceable protocols in which messages 
travel only halfway around on average before being taken off the ring by 
their recipients. Rings differ from the dinner table in that several bit-
transmission delays may be required before all the outputs of a 
particular round are known to all participants; collisions are detected 
only after such delays.
 
Efficient use of many other practical communication techniques 
requires participants to group output bits into blocks. For example, in 
high-capacity broadcast systems, such as those based on coaxial cable, 
surface radio, or satellites, more efficient use of channel capacity is 
obtained by grouping a participant's contribution into a block about the 
size of a single message (see, e.g., [5]). Use of such communication 
techniques could require an increase in bandwidth on the order of the 
number of participants.
 
In a network with one message per block, the well-known contention 
protocols can be used: time is divided evenly into frames; a participant 
transmits a block during one frame; if the block was garbled by 
collision (presumably with another transmitted block), the participant 
waits a number of frames chosen at random from some distribution 
before attempting to retransmit; the participants' waiting intervals 
may be adjusted on the basis of the collision rate and possibly of other 
heuristics [5].
 
In a network with many messages per block, a first block may be 
used by various anonymous senders to request a "slot reservation" in a 
second block. A simple scheme would be for each anonymous sender to 
invert one randomly selected bit in the first block for each slot they 
wish to reserve in the second block. After the result of the first block 
becomes known, the participant who caused the ith 1 bit in the first 
block sends in the ith slot of the second block.
 
2.3. Example Key-Sharing Graphs
 
In large systems it may be desirable to use fewer than the m(m - 1)/2 
keys required by a complete graph. If the graph is merely a cycle, then 
individuals acting alone learn nothing, but any two colluders can 
partition the graph, perhaps fully compromising a participant 
immediately between them. Such a topology might nevertheless be 
adequate in an application in which nearby participants are not likely 
to collude against one another.
 
A different topology assumes the existence of a subset of 
participants who each participant believes are sufficiently unlikely to 
collude, such as participants with conflicting interests. This subset 
constitutes a fully connected subgraph, and the other participants each 
share a key with every member of it. Every participant is then 
untraceable among all the others, unless all members of the completely 
connected subset cooperate. (Such a situation is mentioned again in 
Section 3.)
 
If many people wish to participate in an untraceable communication 
system, hierarchical arrangements may offer further economy of keys. 
Consider an example in which a representative from each local fully 
connected subgraph is also a member of the fully connected central 
subgraph. The nonrepresentative members of a local subgraph provide 
the sum of their outputs to their representative. Representatives would 
then add their own contributions before providing the sum to the 
central subgraph. Only a local subgraph's representative, or a collusion 
of representatives from all other local subgraphs, can recognize 
messages as coming from the local subgraph. A collusion comprising 
the representative and all but one nonrepresentative member of a local 
subgraph is needed for messages to be recognized as coming from the 
remaining member.
 
2.4. Secrecy and Authentication
 
What about the usual cryptologic problems of secrecy and 
authentication?
 
A cryptographer can ensure the secrecy of an anonymous message by 
encrypting the message with the intended recipient's public key. (The 
message should include a hundred or so random bits to foil attempts to 
confirm a guess at its content [1].) The sender can even keep the 
identity of the intended recipient secret by leaving it to each recipient 
to try to decrypt every message. Alternatively, a prearranged prefix 
could be attached to each message so that the recipient need only 
decrypt messages with recognized prefixes. To keep even the 
multiplicity of a prefix's use from being revealed, a different prefix 
might be used each time. New prefixes could be agreed in advance, 
generated cryptographically as needed, or supplied in earlier messages.
 
Authentication is also quite useful in systems without identification.
Even though the messages are untraceable, they might still bear
digital signatures corresponding to public-key "digital pseudonyms"
[1]; only the untraceable owner of such a pseudonym would be able to
sign subsequent messages with it. Secure payment protocols have
elsewhere been proposed in which the payer and/or the payee might be
untraceable [2]. Other protocols have been proposed that allow
individuals known only by pseudonyms to transfer securely information
about themselves between organizations [2]. All these systems require
solutions to the sender untraceability problem, such as the solution
presented here, if they are to protect the unlinkability of pseudonyms
used to conduct transactions from home.
 
2.5. Disruption
 
Another question is how to stop participants who, accidentally or even 
intentionally, disrupt the system by preventing others from sending 
messages. In a sense, this problem has no solution, since any 
participant can send messages continuously, thereby clogging the 
channel. But nondisupters can ultimately stop disruption in a system 
meeting the following requirements: (1) the key-sharing graph is 
publicly agreed on; (2) each participant's outputs are publicly agreed on 
in such a way that participants cannot change their output for a round 
on the basis of other participants' outputs for that round; and (3) some 
rounds contain inversions that would not compromise the 
untraceability of any nondisrupter.
 
The first requirement has already been mentioned in Section 1.1, 
where it was said that this information need not be secret; now it is 
required that this information actually be made known to all 
participants and that the participants agree on it.
 
The second requirement is in part that disrupters be unable (at least 
with some significant probability) to change their output after hearing 
other participants' outputs. Some actual channels would automatically 
ensure this, such as broadcast systems in which all broadcasts are 
made simultaneously on different frequencies. The remainder of the 
second requirement, that the outputs be publicly agreed on, might also 
be met by broadcasting. Having only channels that do not provide it 
automatically, an effective way to meet the full second requirement 
would be for participants to "commit" to their outputs before making 
them. One way to do this is for participants to make public and agree on 
some (possibly compressing and hierarchical, see Section 2.6) one-way 
function of their outputs, before the outputs are made public.
 
The third requirement is that at least some rounds can be contested 
(i.e., that all inversions can be made public) without compromising the 
untraceability of non-disrupting senders. The feasibility of this will be 
demonstrated here by a simple example protocol based on the slot 
reservation technique already described in Section 2.2.
 
Suppose that each participant is always to make a single reservation 
in each reserving block, whether or not he actually intends to send a 
message. (Notice that, because of the "birthday paradox," the number of 
bits per reserving block must be quadratic in the number of 
participants.) A disrupted reserving block would then with very high 
probability have Hamming weight unequal to the number of participants. 
All bits of such a disrupted reserving block could be contested without 
loss of untraceability for nondisrupters.
 
The reserved blocks can also be made to have such safely contestable
bits if participants send trap messages. To lay a trap, a participant
first chooses the index of a bit in some reserving block, a random
message, and a secret key. Then the trapper makes public an
encryption, using the secret key, of both the bit index and the random
message. Later, the trapper reserves by inverting in the round
corresponding to the bit index, and sends the random message in the
resulting reserved slot. If a disrupter is unlucky enough to have
damaged a trap message, then release of the secret key by the trapper
would cause at least one bit of the reserved slot to be contested.
 
With the three requirements satisfied, it remains to be shown how 
if enough disrupted rounds are contested, the disrupters will be 
excluded from the network.
 
Consider first the case of a single participant's mail computer 
disrupting the network. If it tells the truth about contested key bits it 
shares (or lies about an even number of bits), the disrupter implicates 
itself, because its contribution to the sum is unequal to the sum of 
these bits (apart from any allowed inversion). If, on the other hand, the 
single disrupter lies about some odd number of shared bits, the values 
it claims will differ from those claimed for the same shared bits by 
the other participants sharing them. The disrupter thereby casts 
suspicion on all participants, including itself, that share the disputed 
bits. (It may be difficult for a disrupter to cast substantial suspicion 
on a large set of participants, since all the disputed bits will be in 
common with the disrupter.) Notice, however, that participants who 
have been falsely accused will know that they have been--and by 
whom--and should at least refuse to share bits with the disrupter in 
the future.
 
Even with colluding multiple disrupters, at least one inversion must 
be revealed as illegitimate or at least one key bit disputed, since the 
parity of the outputs does not correspond to the number of legitimate 
inversions. The result of such a contested round will be the removal of 
at least one edge or at least one vertex from the agreed graph. Thus, if 
every disruptive action has a nonzero probability of being contested, 
only a bounded amount of disruption is possible before the disrupters 
share no keys with anyone in the network, or before they are revealed, 
and are in either case excluded from the network.
 
The extension presented next can demonstrate the true value of 
disputed bits, and hence allows direct incrimination of disrupters.
 
2.6. Tracing by Consent
 
Antisocial use of a network can be deterred if the cooperation of most 
participants makes it possible, albeit expensive, to trace any message. 
If, for example, a threatening message is sent, a court might order all 
participants to reveal their shared key bits for a round of the message. 
The sender of the offending message might try to spread the blame, 
however, by lying about some odd number of shared bits. Digital 
signatures can be used to stop such blame-spreading altogether. In 
principle, each party sharing a key could insist on a signature, made by 
the other party sharing, for the value. of each shared bit.
 
Such signatures would allow for contested rounds to be fully resolved,
for accused senders to exonerate themselves, and even for colluders to
convince each other that they are pooling true keys.  Unfortunately,
cooperating participants able to trace a message to its sender could
convince others of the message's origin by revealing the sender's own
signatures. A variation can prevent a participant's signatures from
being used against him in this way: instead of each member of a pair
of participants signing the same shared key bit, each signs a separate
bit, such that the sum of the signed bits is the actual shared key
bit. Signatures on such "split" key bits would still be useful in
resolving contested rounds, since if one contester of a bit shows a
signature made by the second contester, then the second would have to
reveal the corresponding signature made by the first or be thought to
be a disrupter.
 
In many applications it may be impractical to obtain a separate 
signature on every key bit or split key bit. The overhead involved could 
be greatly reduced, however, by digitally signing cryptographic 
compressions of large numbers of key bits. This might of course require 
that a whole block of key bits be exposed in showing a signature, but 
such blocks could be padded with cryptographically generated 
pseudorandom (or truly random) bits, to allow the exposure of fewer 
bits per signature. The number of bits and amount of time required to 
verify a signature for a single bit can be reduced further by using a 
rooted tree in which each node is the one-way compression function of 
all its direct descendants; only a digital signature of each participant's 
root need be agreed on before use of the keys comprising the leaves.
 
3. Relation to Previous Work
 
There is another multiparty-secure sender-untraceability protocol in 
the literature [1]. To facilitate comparison, it will be called a mix-net 
here, while the protocol of the present work is called a dc-net. The 
mix-net approach relies on the security of a true public-key system 
(and possibly also of a conventional cryptosystem), and is thus at best 
computationally secure; the dc-net approach can use unconditional 
secrecy channels to provide an unconditionally secure untraceable-
sender system, or can use public-key distribution to provide a 
computationally secure system (as described in Section 2.1).
 
Under some trust assumptions and channel limitations, however, 
mix-nets can operate where dc-nets cannot. Suppose that a subset of 
participants is trusted by every other participant not to collude and 
that the bandwidth of at least some participants' channels to the 
trusted subset is incapable of handling the total message traffic. Then 
mix-nets may operate quite satisfactorily, but dc-nets will be unable 
to protect fully each participant's untraceability. Mix-nets can also 
provide recipient untraceability in this communication environment, 
even though there is insufficient bandwidth for use of the broadcast 
approach (mentioned in Section 2.4).
 
If optimal protection against collusion is to be provided and the 
crypto-security of mix-nets is acceptable, a choice between mix-nets 
and dc-nets may depend on the nature of the traffic. With a mail-like 
system that requires only periodic deliveries, and where the average 
number of messages per interval is relatively large, mix-nets may be 
suitable. When messages must be delivered continually and there is no 
time for batching large numbers of them, dc-nets appear preferable.
 
4. Conclusion
 
This solution to the dining cryptographers problem demonstrates that
unconditional secrecy channels can be used to construct an
unconditional sender-untraceability channel. It also shows that a
public-key distribution system can be used to construct a
computationally secure sender-untraceability channel. The approach
appears able to satisfy a wide range of practical concerns.
 
Acknowledgments
 
I am pleased to thank Jurjen Bos, Gilles Brassard, Jan-Hendrik Evertse, 
and the untraceable referees for all their help in revising this article. 
It is also a pleasure to thank, as in the original version that was 
distributed at Crypto 84, Whitfield Diffie, Ron Rivest, and Gus Simmons 
for some stimulating dinner-table conversations.
 
References
 
[1]	Chaum, D., Untraceable Electronic Mail, Return Addresses, and 
Digital Pseudonyms, Communications of the  ACM, vol. 24, no. 2, 
February 1981, pp. 84-88.
[2]	Chaum, D., Security Without Identification: Transaction Systems 
to Make Big Brother Obsolete, Communications of the ACM, vol. 28, 
no. 10, October 1985, pp. 1030-1044.
[3]	Diffie, W., and Hellman, M.E., New Directions in Cryptography, IEEE 
Transactions on Information Theory, vol. 22, no. 6, November 1976, 
pp. 644-654.
[4]	Merkle, R.C., Secure Communication over Insecure Channels, 
Communications of the ACM, vol. 21, no. 4, 1978, pp. 294-299.
[5]	Tanenbaum, A.S., Computer Networks, Prentice Hall, Englewood 
Cliffs, New Jersey, 1981.
 
 
[End of Transmission]
 
 
 
-- 
 




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Eric Blossom <eb@srlr14.sr.hp.com>
Date: Thu, 29 Jul 93 11:57:13 PDT
To: jersmit@eis.calstate.edu
Subject: Paranoia and the Outlawing of Cash
In-Reply-To: <Pine.3.07.9307290210.A19548-b100000@eis.calstate.edu>
Message-ID: <9307291853.AA23348@srlr14.sr.hp.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Jeremy R. Smith writes:

>	I too have noticed a growing trend in the use of electronic money
> for a wide range of transactions.  For example. I have an ATM card that
> was issued on my checking account.  With it, I can make purchases at any
> place displaying the Interlink symbol.  This includes gas stations, fast
> food places, and a lot of common stores such as the Good Guys, Circuit
> City, etc.
> 	Personally, I find this way of doing business a lot more
> conveinent than carrying cash money.  No large demoninations to worry

Can you say "dossier society".  Hope you don't buy cigarettes or
booze, or you may find that you can't purchase health insurance.

The problem is that *you* are tied to the card.  Please note that
debit and credit cards were designed primarily from the point of view
of the vendors and merchants.  Not the consumers.

Eric Blossom




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: fergp@sytex.com (Paul Ferguson)
Date: Thu, 29 Jul 93 14:53:48 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Blatant commercial want-ad ...
Message-ID: <TBJg8B1w165w@sytex.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


WANTED: (2) Individuals with strong network background skills. Strong
         familiarity with routers, bridges, SMNP, TCP/IP and other
         aspects of wide area telecommunications.
 
E-mail inquiries and/or resume to <fergp@sytex.com> asap.
 

Paul Ferguson               |  "Government, even in its best state,
Network Integrator          |   is but a necessary evil; in its worst
Centreville, Virginia USA   |   state, an intolerable one."
fergp@sytex.com             |      - Thomas Paine, Common Sense
 
         I love my country, but I fear its government.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: fergp@sytex.com (Paul Ferguson)
Date: Thu, 29 Jul 93 14:52:23 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Blatant commercial want-ad (part 2)
Message-ID: <3cJg8B2w165w@sytex.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I forgot to include the fact that these positions are in the Washington, 
DC area. Oops.

Paul Ferguson               |  "Government, even in its best state,
Network Integrator          |   is but a necessary evil; in its worst
Centreville, Virginia USA   |   state, an intolerable one."
fergp@sytex.com             |      - Thomas Paine, Common Sense
 
         I love my country, but I fear its government.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: norm@netcom.com (Norman Hardy)
Date: Thu, 29 Jul 93 12:37:14 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Digital Silk Road
Message-ID: <9307291936.AA28424@netcom3.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


There is a flat ASCII version of the paper at anonymous ftp:
   netcom.com:pub/Silk/DSR1.txt
It will soon move to
   netcom.com:pub/joule/DSR1.txt




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Morten V. Christiansen" <mvc@ncrsecp.copenhagen.NCR.COM>
Date: Thu, 29 Jul 93 22:42:30 PDT
To: cypherpunks <cypherpunks@toad.com>
Subject: Re: Paranoia and the Outlawing of Cash
Message-ID: <2C57B1BD@wk06.Copenhagen.NCR.COM>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text



Jeremy Smith writes:
>        I too have noticed a growing trend in the use of electronic money
>for a wide range of transactions.  For example. I have an ATM card that
>was issued on my checking account.  With it, I can make purchases at any
>place displaying the Interlink symbol.  This includes gas stations, fast
>food places, and a lot of common stores such as the Good Guys, Circuit
>City, etc.
>        Personally, I find this way of doing business a lot more
>conveinent than carrying cash money.  No large demoninations to worry
>about, and if you are robbed, they have to crack your PIN to use the card.
>If they use a portabel reader, you could be screwed.  But, in most cases
>you would have time to call customer service and cancel the card.
>        I love progress.

In Denmark practically everybody has a 'DAN-card', a card with which all 
purchaces, no matter how small, can be charged directly to one's bank 
account. There is no charge for using or having the card, and it can be used 
practically everywhere. If for some reason you still want cash, there are 
plenty of ATMs around.

This means that the banks and the government know pretty much how much each 
of us spends on everything, but that's ok since we all trust the banks and 
the government  :-( .

When are we going to get real and untracable (!) electronic money ?

               Morten V. Christiansen
               Morten.V.Christiansen@Copenhagen.NCR.COM



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: baumbach@atmel.com (Peter Baumbach)
Date: Thu, 29 Jul 93 10:47:13 PDT
To: extropians@gnu.ai.mit.edu
Subject: TECH: encrypted computer?
Message-ID: <9307291717.AA06020@bass.chp.atmel.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Here's something I've been thinking about:
Is it possible to create a computer system based on encryption?  Could
you have a computer that does not just increase the program counter for
each instruction, but instead jumps around forward and back based on
a combination of an encrypted program and a public key?  Without the
public key, the computer would never know what the next instruction was.
If you try to watch the execution, to figure out the order, you can't
tell if the next address was chosen because it's just next or if it
was chosen as the result of a comparison.  A new encryption/decryption
algorithm would need to be invented so as to securely hide how the
next address was chosen.  Decryption hardware would have to be created
so things run fast enough.  There is lots of other things to be worked
out, but is it possible?

If it is possible, software piracy is given a major blow with such a system.
Have any particular program encrypted with a different private key for
each customer.  Compile the name of the purchaser into the program code,
and then tracing illegal copies to the leak is trivial.

In case it's not clear above, the whole system is based on encryption.
It is not just a matter of the executable being encrypted.  I don't
want the owner to be able to decrypt the executable and run that, he
has to run it encrypted.

Peter Baumbach
baumbach@atmel.com




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: dmandl@lehman.com (David Mandl)
Date: Thu, 29 Jul 93 10:27:17 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Anarchist Gathering in Philadelphia
Message-ID: <9307291723.AA25605@disvnm2.shearson.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


OK, I've gotten a whole bunch of requests for more information,
so I'll post it to the group.

The gathering runs from tomorrow (Friday, 7/30) through Monday
8/2.  I don't have details handy here at work, but
Giuseppe Cimmino <0005533039@mcimail.com> called Wooden Shoe
Books (Philly's major Anarchist center and the main organizer
of the gathering) and got the following info from them...

-----------------------------------------------------------------

Action is Friday and Monday at 1st Unitarian Church, 2125 Chestnut - Friday
2pm-7pm, Monday 9am-1:30pm.  Saturday and Sunday at Friends Select Church, 16th
and Arch - both days 10am-6pm.

Wooden Shoe's phone number is 215-569-2477

-----------------------------------------------------------------

   --Dave.





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: treason@gnu.ai.mit.edu
Date: Thu, 29 Jul 93 10:27:13 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: DSA liscence
Message-ID: <9307291724.AA12522@spiff.gnu.ai.mit.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Can someone mail me the NIST dsa liscence agreement?

John?  It was deleted out of my mail by a co-student...I really wanted that.

treason@gnu.ai.mit.edu




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: elee9sf@Menudo.UH.EDU
Date: Thu, 29 Jul 93 12:52:19 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: DIGICASH: reports at cwi
Message-ID: <199307291948.AA09485@Menudo.UH.EDU>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



>   Does anyone have that ftp address?

Yes.  Ftp to ftp.cwi.nl and go to the /pub/CWIreports/AA directory.
There you will find two reports on digital money:

CS-R9318.ps.Z	offline coins
CS-R9323.ps.Z	money based on representation problem

Also, there is

DSR1.ps		digital silk road

available at netcom.com in /pub/joule (rtf and ascii also)

/-----------------------------------\
| Karl L. Barrus                    |
| elee9sf@menudo.uh.edu             | <- preferred address
| barrus@tree.egr.uh.edu (NeXTMail) |
\-----------------------------------/




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Peter Breton <pbreton@cs.umb.edu>
Date: Thu, 29 Jul 93 12:43:43 PDT
To: Peter Baumbach <baumbach@atmel.com>
Subject: Re: TECH: encrypted computer?
In-Reply-To: <9307291717.AA06020@bass.chp.atmel.com>
Message-ID: <Pine.3.05.9307291525.A5504-b100000@ra.cs.umb.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



> 
> If it is possible, software piracy is given a major blow with such a system.
> Have any particular program encrypted with a different private key for
> each customer.  Compile the name of the purchaser into the program code,
> and then tracing illegal copies to the leak is trivial.
> 

  There seem to be some problems with the above scheme:

1) Suppose I buy a legal copy of some software and give it to a friend,
along with the information he needs to run it. To prove piracy, someone
would have to check the files on his/her hard disk. Surely this is an
invasion of privacy no cypherpunk would tolerate.

2) Suppose that somehow a pirated copy of the software was discovered,
and traced back to me. This still does not provide any kind of case
against me, since it is not clear whether or not I gave the information
away (it could have been stolen off my hard drive while at a repair shop,
or by a house guest, or...). To argue otherwise implies making the
software owners liable if the software sold to them is pirated.

  Of course, these are legal, not technical objections to your scheme.

			Peter

-------------------------------------------------------------------------
Peter Breton  pbreton@cs.umb.edu          PGP key by finger
=========================================================================





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: smithm@nicco.sscnet.ucla.edu (Marc Smith)
Date: Thu, 29 Jul 93 16:38:52 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: ascii, rtf DIGICASH reports
Message-ID: <9307292335.AA07939@nicco.sscnet.ucla.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



I would like to read the papers on DigiCash but do not have the facilities for
dealing with postscript files.  Are ascii or rtf files available or is there
some way to convert a .ps file to something more easily digested?

Thanks,

Marc 




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Giuseppe Cimmino <0005533039@mcimail.com>
Date: Thu, 29 Jul 93 10:48:42 PDT
To: John Gilmore <gnu@toad.com>
Subject: Re: You want to use DSA? Apply for a personal license from NIST!
Message-ID: <60930729173406/0005533039ND1EM@mcimail.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


cpunx:  Rubin's FAX is 301-926-2569





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: norm@netcom.com (Norman Hardy)
Date: Thu, 29 Jul 93 18:12:27 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Digital Silk Road (Yet once more)
Message-ID: <9307300111.AA10115@netcom3.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


 
Sorry for the bad permission bits.
There is a flat ASCII version of the paper by anonymous ftp:
   netcom.com:pub/Silk/DSR1.txt
It will soon move to
   netcom.com:pub/joule/DSR1.txt
 
It is also available by anonymous ftp at
 
netcom.com:/pub/joule/DSR1.ps.gz and netcom.com:/pub/joule/DSR1.rtf.gz




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "L. Detweiler" <ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Date: Thu, 29 Jul 93 18:23:53 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: S. Walker review of NIST-PKP-DSS options
Message-ID: <9307300121.AA13277@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


DIGITAL SIGNATURE STANDARDS

OK cypherpunks, if my rantings on this subject were too obscure and
made no sense (as one respondent told me), then read this excellent
review of the past and present NIST-DSS-PKP situation. I recommend it
go on the soda.berkeley archive. Most importantly, it gives a small
glimmer of the sheer future economic impact of the signature standard
decision (it is far more vast than he suggests). It is the very basis
of a vast future `EC' economy, Electronic Commerce.

- RSA vs. DSA, duality of encryption & authentication
- free use of DSS: a promise broken
- Schnorr Patent: a wrench in the works
- Content and expiration dates of various PKP patents
- burdensome economic/social cost of DSS under current NIST proposed scenario
- available alternatives: other algorithms & expirations

Quotes:

>Reflecting on this range of alternatives, it quickly becomes
>apparent that the June 8 approach advocated by the Government is
>just about the worst approach one could devise. 

>this analysis
>shows that everyone, including the Government, will be better off
>if NIST just dropped DSS, including the plan announced on June 8,
>1993, and did nothing else.

Interesting tidbits: refers to the CSSPAB DSA announcement snub,
`government scientists' at NIST (where are they?), three other
algorithms considered but under wraps by the NSA, `highly censored
minutes' by NSA on them.

Corrections: 

- he says that no public key algorithm has been proposed by NIST/NSA.
But that is precisely the point of Clipper and Capstone. Denning made
this clear once (RISKS). A public key system with the most important
black ingredient: wiretappability!

- he assumes near the end that as soon as RSA patent expires, industry
will leap to it irrespective of any current standards, even suggesting
that commercial implementations of other algorithms would dry up and
become unavailable (if I read him right). I'd like to see that, but
it's a bit of a leap of faith because it completely ignores the inertia
of entrenched standards. In fact, this seems to be one of the weakest,
least supported, and least explained paragraphs.

Holes:

- doesn't cover the hoopla about the supposed insecurity of DSA (and
associated key length changes) that characterized a lot of the early bickering.

- doesn't cover the angle that the government gets unlimited use of
patented public-key authentication schemes (RSA, Diffie-Hellman) for
use in Capstone-Clipper combination based on the PKP DSS agreement.
This is a *major* ulterior motive & motivation for the agreement on the NSA side.

- doesn't look at the NSA as defiant, conspirational or subversive esp.
in regard to the DSA scheme & DSS hearings--almost no mention at all.

- doesn't look much at PKP as a company attempting to maximize its
profit to the point of backroom collusion, patent mongering, and vast
monopolizing, although hints at it.

===cut=here===

Date: Wed, 28 Jul 1993 18:41:43 -0500
From: farber@central.cis.upenn.edu (David Farber)
Subject:  DIGITAL SIGNATURE STANDARD We can do better! by  Stephen T. Walker




                        DIGITAL SIGNATURE STANDARD

                             We can do better!


                            Stephen T. Walker
                                President
                    Trusted Information Systems, Inc.

                               July 28, 1993


The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST)
recently announced its intention to grant Public Key Partners
(PKP) an exclusive license to NIST's pending patent for the
Digital Signature Algorithm (DSA), stating that this action "will
best serve the interests of the Federal Government and the
public."  While this may be a "good" deal for the Government's
own use of the Digital Signature Standard (DSS)[1], it leaves the
public in much worse shape for a much longer time than if NIST
did nothing.  History is full of examples where, if what is
thought to be best for the Government is not also clearly best
for the public, the Government also loses.  This will be yet
another example if something is not done very soon.  But there
are alternatives that open a wide range of possibilities, some
not very far from where we wanted to be in the first place with
DSS.

- - ----------
FOOTNOTE [1]: The Digital Signature Algorithm is the algorithm
that NIST has chosen to be the Digital Signature Standard.  For clarity
throughout this document, the term DSS will be used to refer to both the
standard and the algorithm.
- - ----------

This paper explores the background of the present NIST proposal
and how we got here.  It then analyzes the public key patent
situation and provides a high level economic analysis of the
impact that the NIST decision will have, followed by a discussion
of several alternatives.  Finally, it recommends a course of
action which seems to serve the interests of the Federal
Government and the public much better than the present proposal.

These comments are my own personal opinions and should not be
construed as necessarily representing the views of any
organization with which I am affiliated.

Background

In August 1991, after years of urging by Congress and industry,
NIST, with the behind-the-scenes help of the National Security
Agency (NSA), announced the Digital Signature Standard, which
adopts the Digital Signature Algorithm as a proposed Federal
Information Processing Standard (FIPS).  Most advocates actually
wanted a Federal standard for public key encryption that would
include both signature and confidentiality capabilities.  The
Rivest/Shamir/Adleman (RSA) algorithm is the obvious choice and
is already widely used in the U.S. and around the world. 
Nonetheless, the Government chose an algorithm which is useful
only for signatures and appears to have no plans to choose a
public key algorithm for encryption.

DSS is based on a variant of the ElGamal signature algorithm. 
The Government filed a patent application for DSS in July 1991. 
Dr. Ray Kammer, then Deputy Director of NIST, testified on June
27, 1991, to the House Subcommittee on Technology and
Competitiveness that "the digital signature technique is expected
to be available on a royalty-free basis in the public interest
world-wide."  Several months prior to this, Prof. Dr. C. P.
Schnorr of Germany obtained a U.S. patent for his digital
signature algorithm.  In October 1991,  Dr. Schnorr notified NIST
of his belief that DSS infringed his patent rights.

The ability to digitally sign information in electronic form is a
fundamental capability of great importance to the future of all
forms of Electronic Commerce (EC).  Some means of verifying the
identity of the sender and integrity of the message is essential
for the widespread success of EC.  Since EC will soon encompass
all forms of communications devices including telephones,
personal computers, and televisions, a universal, freely
available means for digitally signing electronic messages is
essential for U.S. industry.

If DSS could provide a royalty free signing capability, many
people would view this as an advantage which might outweigh the
serious disadvantage of its being incompatible with the widely
available, proprietary RSA algorithm which is subject to royalty
payments for the next seven (7) years in the U.S.

After the August 1991 announcement, much debate over the
technical strengths and weaknesses of DSS ensued, and the
Government initiated efforts to resolve the potential patent
issues that had arisen over the relationship of DSS to the
Schnorr patent and others held by PKP (see The Patent Situation
section below).  Minor changes to the key length resulted from
the first comment period on the proposed standard, and then a
long period of silence set in.  During 1992, both the Government
and PKP pursued the rights to the Schnorr patent and eventually
PKP succeeded in licensing those rights.

Then in the June 8, 1993 Federal Register[2], NIST announced its
intention to grant an exclusive license to PKP for the NIST DSS
patent.  In an Appendix to this notice, PKP stated "It is PKP's
intent to make practice of the DSA royalty free for personal,
non-commercial, and U.S. Federal, state and local government
use."  Commercial use of DSS would be subject to royalty payments
to PKP throughout the life of the Government DSS patent, a period
of seventeen (17) years after the patent is awarded (as of this
writing, the DSS patent has yet to be awarded).

- - ----------
FOOTNOTE [2]:  The announcement was signed by the Acting Director of
NIST on June 2, 1993, the first of three days of public hearings
on the Government's policies on cryptography by the Computer
System Security and Privacy Advisory Board (CSSPAB), a
Congressionally chartered Board charged with advising the
Executive and Legislative Branches on technical matters relating
to computer security.  Had the Government thought to have this
major development in the long struggle to get a digital signature
FIPS revealed to the public for criticism or endorsement, they
would have had the perfect audience and opportunity. 
Unfortunately, those in charge decided to keep the announcement
under wraps until four days after the meeting, missing an
excellent opportunity to explain the circumstances behind their
decision.
- - ----------

The Government has not publicly stated all of the reasons why it
believes granting PKP this exclusive license is in its and the
public's best interests.  It is not a far-reaching speculation
that this action was viewed by the Government's lawyers as
necessary to prevent PKP from charging the Government a royalty
for use of DSS based on its infringement of the PKP-owned Schnorr
patent.  Despite the fact that the Government has royalty free
rights to the PKP patents, it does not have rights to the Schnorr
patent.

All of this seems most unfortunate for the commercial development
of EC.  Suddenly the only significant argument for many in the
private sector in favor of DSS, the fact that it was to be free
for all uses to all users, is gone.  Without that positive
benefit, there no longer appears to be any advantage to DSS, and
the negative factor, its incompatibility with RSA (now even more
widely used), looms all the more heavily.  Much of industry will
continue to use RSA irrespective of the Government's position on
DSS, so those who must interact with both industry and the
Government will be forced to use both algorithms, each with its
own royalty payment.  The difficulties of validating digital
signatures based on two incompatible algorithms have been
described in detail at the February 1993 NIST-sponsored Federal
Digital Signature Applications Symposium.

The Government has always maintained that DSS is not covered by
earlier patents.  However,  to avoid lengthy patent disputes and
to get its proposed algorithm approved quickly, the Government
has, unfortunately, lost sight of one of its original objectives. 
The Government has protected its own direct interests by getting
royalty free use of its own algorithm, but at an enormous price
to the American public.  Does the Government have the right to
propose a Federal standard that goes directly against a well
established industry trend (the use of RSA) and that will result
in U.S. commercial interests having to pay substantially greater
royalty fees?  Can a FIPS be promulgated without an analysis of
the impact it will have on the public?  The answers appear to be
yes, but there are alternatives that should be considered first.

The Patent Situation

To understand these alternatives, we must first understand some
basic facts about the public key patent situation.

In the early 1980s, four patents covering various forms of public
key cryptography were granted.  They are, in order of date of
patent award:


     (1)  Patent #: 4,200,770 Issued on:     April 29, 1980
                              Expires on:    April 29, 1997

          Diffie/Hellman - Cryptographic Apparatus and Method
          (the "Diffie-Hellman" key exchange, covering both the
          secure generation and the secure exchange of the key)


     (2)  Patent #: 4,218,582 Issued on:     August 19, 1980
                              Expires on:    August 19, 1997
 
          Hellman/Merkle - Public Key Cryptographic Apparatus 
          (general concepts of secure communications using public
          key cryptography and general concepts of digital
          signature; specific public key "knapsack" systems for
          secure communications)


     (3) Patent #: 4,405,829  Issued on:     September 20, 1983
                              Expires on:    September 20, 2000

          Rivest/Shamir/Adleman - Cryptographic Communications
          System and Method
          (cryptographic communications systems employing the
          "RSA" algorithm)


     (4)  Patent #: 4,424,414 Issued on:     January 3, 1984
                              Expires on:    January 3,  2001

          Hellman/Pohlig - Exponentiation Cryptographic Apparatus 
          and Method
          (variant of Diffie-Hellman for secure exchange of
          messages)

In the late 1980s, the owners/licensees of these patents banded
together to form Public Key Partners.

Because the research that developed these algorithms was
sponsored by the U.S. Government, the Government has royalty free
access to these technologies.
 
In 1985, ElGamal published a paper on a digital signature
technique but did not seek a patent.  In August 1989, Schnorr
published a paper on this subject and in 1991 received a U.S.
patent:

     Patent #: 4,995,082 Issued on:     February 19, 1991
                         Expires on:    February 19, 2008

     Schnorr - Method for Identifying Subscribers and for
     Generating and Verifying Electronic Signatures in Data
     Exchange Systems
     (data exchange system working with processor chip cards to
     perform identification and electronic signature
     generation/verification procedures)

The U.S. Government does not have royalty free access to the
Schnorr patent.

After NIST announced the proposed DSS in August 1991, Schnorr
informed NIST of his belief that DSS infringed on his patent. 
Sometime later, PKP obtained a license for the Schnorr patent,
giving them a virtual monopoly in public key technology patents
in the U.S.

Economic Impact of NIST's June 8 Announcement

I recently asked NIST if the Government had analyzed the economic
impact on the Government or the public of granting an exclusive
license to PKP for DSS.  I was told that no such analysis had
been done.

The following high level analysis offers some very approximate
estimates of what it might cost if DSS, licensed as proposed by
NIST, were fully accepted by industry and became widely used.  We
acknowledge that these estimates could be off by as much as a
factor of five (5) or more either way, nonetheless they tell a
compelling story.

In its July 26, 1993 issue, Business Week discussed home shopping
networks which will involve the use of televisions, telephones,
and personal computers.  The article describes recent
conglomerates that will reach "more than 60 million viewers, or
two thirds of all television households." 

If digital signature standards were routinely available today,
they would be highly useful in confirming the identity of the
purchaser and the authenticity of the purchase request.


The cost of a DSS royalty per the NIST announcement "will be no
more then 2 1/2% for hardware products and 5% for software, with
the royalty rate further reduced to 1% on any portion of the
product price exceeding $1000."

The analysis below focuses on the potential home shopping market
for the Digital Signature Standard involving televisions,
telephones, and personal computers.  It assumes conservative
numbers of devices, periods of use, and royalties to derive
potential royalty figures.

     Assuming: 60 million televisions used in home retail
                    that need to be replaced every five (5) years
                    and
                    a  royalty of $2.50 per television
                    (5% of the $50 price for the signature
                    software),

               during the seventeen (17) years that the public
               will have to pay royalties to PKP for DSS, the
               cost will be approximately $500 million.
                    (60 million * 17 years/5 years * $2.50)


     Assuming: 150 million telephones, only 20% involved in home
               retailing
                    that need to be replaced every five (5) years
                    and
                    a royalty of $2.50 per telephone,

               the royalty cost will be approximately $250
               million.
                    (150 million * 20% * 17 years/5 years *
                    $2.50)
               If one includes growth from new phone markets,
               this number could easily grow to $750 million.


     Assuming: 40 million personal computers and workstations
                    that need to be replaced every five (5) years
                    and
                    a royalty of $5.00 per computer,

               the royalty cost will be approximately $680
               million
                    (40 million * 17 years/5 years * $5.00)

     Approximate total royalty payment over seventeen (17) years
     is $2 billion.

These are rough estimates for one business segment.  They do not
take into account business use for banking, financial, or dozens
of other commercial uses.  If one chooses to scale these down by
five (5) to be even more conservative, the $2 billion royalty
bill drops just below $400 million.  Others may want to raise the
estimate by five (5) because of growth in a rapidly emerging
industry, raising it to over $10 billion.


These are of course hypothetical scenarios that assume DSS is
widely endorsed by industry and becomes a commercial standard.

No matter how one looks at this deal, it's a very good thing the
Government got use of the 
DSS for free, because the public certainly will pay a fortune for
it.

Alternatives?

The Government appears to have been operating under the premise
that DSS, as currently defined, is its only possible way to
proceed.  The close relationship of DSS to the Schnorr patent
makes it subject to infringement charges from PKP.  This
unfortunate relationship seems to have forced the Government to
their June 8 "give away" of DSS as "best serving the Federal
Government and the public."

However, we should recognize that within four (4) years, the
Hellman/Merkle patent, which is the principal broadly based
public key signature patent, expires.  At that time, one could
implement an ElGamal-based algorithm which did not use the
techniques of the Schnorr patent and is therefore royalty free
from then on.  The Schnorr techniques involve efficiency
enhancements for ElGamal, but even if this new approach were not
as efficient as the present DSS, the removal of patent issues and
royalty payments would make up for a lot of inefficiency.

The above alternative suggests doing nothing for four (4) years
except defining a new signature algorithm (which may take that
long anyway).  Of course, we could take this path immediately and
agree to pay PKP royalties for the new algorithm until the
Hellman/Merkle patent expires.  The Government would not be
subject to these royalties since it has a free license to the
technology anyway.  Commercial users and developers would be much
less  unhappy to pay royalties for a few years rather than for
seventeen (17).  NIST scientists could start immediately to
identify an ElGamal-based algorithm that is not subject to
Schnorr patent restrictions.  There are indications in the highly
censored minutes to the NIST-NSA Technical Working Group that
there were at least three (3) other algorithms being considered
before the present DSS candidate was chosen, so perhaps we
already have a head start on this process.

Realizing that this alternative algorithm approach could reduce
PKP's potential royalty period for DSS from seventeen (17) years
to four (4) years opens other alternatives that include paying
PKP a reasonable sum based on estimates of DSS royalties for this
limited period, to allow royalty free use of the present DSS for
all users forever.  Faced with the alternative of the extremely
high royalty payments discussed above, it is likely that a
Government/industry consortium could be formed to raise the funds
to eliminate the four (4) year wait and the need to switch to a
new algorithm.

Of course, such a Government/industry consortium could also
decide to apply pressure on PKP to grant, as IBM did with the
Data Encryption Standard algorithm, royalty free use for the
public for all time.  PKP could continue to collect royalties on
all its other algorithms but, in return for the Government's
(and, therefore, the public's) having paid for the research that
led to those patents in the first place, PKP should make DSS
available for all royalty free.

There are those who claim the whole DSS exercise has been forced
upon us because some in Government do not want to see RSA become
a widely used "standard."  Those individuals must recognize that
the present plan is working directly against their desires.  The
RSA patents expire in seven (7) years, while the NIST plan forces
a seventeen year (17) royalty period.  Industry will choose the
shorter period, and DSS will be relegated to Government special
purchase efforts.  Indeed, after the RSA patent expires, it will
be impossible for the Government to get DSS from any commercial
source.  Thus, by the very terms of the June 8 announcement, RSA
will become the de facto standard for digital signature that
these individuals want to prevent.

Reflecting on this range of alternatives, it quickly becomes
apparent that the June 8 approach advocated by the Government is
just about the worst approach one could devise.  (Please do not
try to find a worse one!)

A Suggested Plan of Action

We strongly suggest that the Government back up from its headlong
plunge toward indenturing the U.S. public for a much needed
Digital Signature Standard.  There are alternatives, if we are
willing to wait a few years, that will reduce a high royalty
payment bill to zero.  There are approaches to analyzing this
situation that allow continuing with DSS at a greatly reduced
cost to the American public, perhaps even reducing it to zero. 
Any of these approaches will yield a more economically viable and
more generally available solution which serves the interests of
the Federal Government and the public far better than the present
plan.

Even if none of these alternatives are pursued, this analysis
shows that everyone, including the Government, will be better off
if NIST just dropped DSS, including the plan announced on June 8,
1993, and did nothing else.

Please, NIST, reconsider your options before it's too late!







From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: kelly@netcom.com (Kelly Goen)
Date: Thu, 29 Jul 93 19:48:57 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: (fwd) Perfectly secure voice communication
Message-ID: <9307300247.AA21169@netcom.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Path: netcom.com!netcomsv!decwrl!elroy.jpl.nasa.gov!usc!cs.utexas.edu!tamsun.tamu.edu!zeus.tamu.edu!nmrjock
From: nmrjock@zeus.tamu.edu (SKLOSS, TIMOTHY WILLIAM)
Newsgroups: alt.privacy
Subject: Perfectly secure voice communication
Date: 20 Jul 1993 14:03 CDT
Organization: Texas A&M University, Academic Computing Services
Lines: 14
Distribution: usa
Message-ID: <20JUL199314035274@zeus.tamu.edu>
NNTP-Posting-Host: zeus.tamu.edu
News-Software: VAX/VMS VNEWS 1.41    

For anyone interested, i know of a company that sell (until it's illegal) a 
computer package that enables the user to communicate over normal phone lines
with complete (and i mean it) security.  it runs on a 386 or higher with a 
sounblaster card.  The encryption is up to triple DES encoding with user 
programmed keys (no record kept and no back doors for Big Brother or anyone
else to use).  It would take serious effort by the NSA and all of their 
supercomputers to decode a single transmission (assuming they could come up
with a 'hook', something this program is incapable of transmitting).

Inquire to:
SVC Inc.
P.O. Box 9512
College Station, TX 77842





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Jeremy R. Smith" <jersmit@eis.calstate.edu>
Date: Thu, 29 Jul 93 19:57:20 PDT
To: Cypherpunks <cypherpunks@toad.com>
Subject: Phrack-43
Message-ID: <Pine.3.07.9307291937.A16950-a100000@eis.calstate.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


	I eagerly FTP'ed to aql.gatech.edu to get the latest issue of
Phrack only to find that it is compressed in a form that I can not
uncompress.  My access to the Internet is through a subscription-service
and does not provide shell access.  I can manipulate .z, .Z, and .tar, but
not .gz.  Is there any way for me to get an issue of Phrack-43 that I can
read?

						Jeremy Smith
						jersmit@eis.calstate.edu


-----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK----- Version: 2.2
 
mQCNAixVlqsAAAEEAMlqS9nz+2dADwxwOglWVJk7xugtC9SMQX6rkJiv/0wkOhSB
RSQcUL5bVfRKJGa4YrnHefmBZaTSvwtFmSUCSqm4yN9n258xda+niz6pJwPDaTIX
7Gr1V8Xr9/J7K3grm8H1VCXJjKTUVt+zPns5KS4K+tQZgdcPQJefZlD5h/jTAAUV
tCdKZXJlbXkgU21pdGggPGplcnNtaXRAZWlzLmNhbHN0YXRlLmVkdT4= 
=J0/4 
-----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK----- 






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Jeremy R. Smith" <jersmit@eis.calstate.edu>
Date: Thu, 29 Jul 93 20:22:29 PDT
To: jim@tadpole.com
Subject: Re: Phrack-43
In-Reply-To: <9307300311.AA01941@ono-sendai>
Message-ID: <Pine.3.07.9307292031.A24804-9100000@eis.calstate.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain




On Thu, 29 Jul 1993 jim@tadpole.com wrote:

> Grab gnu zip.  
> 

Well, what I'm trying to say is that I, in no way, have access to a Unix
prompt line.  I am restricted to menus in which I must choose from the
listed choices.  Gnu zip is not supported by the service through which I
gain my Internet access.  Is Gnu zip available for the Amiga and/or IBM?


						Jeremy Smith
						jersmit@eis.calstate.edu







From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Peter shipley <shipley@merde.dis.org>
Date: Thu, 29 Jul 93 22:07:21 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Phrack-43
Message-ID: <9307300458.AA05125@merde.dis.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>       I eagerly FTP'ed to aql.gatech.edu to get the latest issue of
>Phrack only to find that it is compressed in a form that I can not
>uncompress.

was it gziped (*.z or *.gz ?)

>   I can manipulate .z, .Z, and .tar, but
>not .gz.

.z is .gz (rename it and it will work)

> Is there any way for me to get an issue of Phrack-43 that I can
> read?


if you still can read I will uncompress it and email it to you?

q: how much disk space does pgp take?





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: hnash@mason1.gmu.edu
Date: Thu, 29 Jul 93 20:07:19 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: TECH: encrypted computer?
Message-ID: <9307300306.AA20191@mason1.gmu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Peter Baumbach wrote:
>I don't
>want the owner to be able to decrypt the executable and run 
>that, he has to run it encrypted.

I've been thinking about this also.  I think your idea boils 
down to an encoding for software which allows execution but not 
modification.  This could be called a tamper-proof software 
encoding.  Such an encoding would have all sorts of 
applications.  For example:

- public key encryption (a public key is simply a tamper-proof 
encoding of a private encryption algorithm).  
- distribution of software with advertisements or credits 
permanently attached.  
- distribution of software that requires "fuel" consisting of 
certificates signed by the manufacturer.  
- computer viruses that utilize secret information.  

It's clear that the state variables internal to the algorithm 
must remain encrypted.  If any of the *original* state variables 
were revealed, the algorithm could be inferred from changes to 
these variables.  Therefore, tamper-proof software requires 
processing of encrypted data.  The problem would be solved by a 
computationally complete set of functions (ex: NAND) which could 
produce encrypted output from encrypted input without revealing 
decrypted input or output.  It's a simple problem, but as far as 
I know it hasn't been solved.  

I have tried to solve this problem in several different ways, 
without much success.  I found one paper entitled "Processing 
Encrypted Data" (comm. of ACM v.30 n.9 1987), which reported 
some very rudimentary results, but which commented intriguingly:

"The Department of Defense has invested considerable efforts in 
recent years in solving this problem ... but the results of this 
efforts have not been made public."


-------------- Yours Truly, ][adon Nash --------------------------------
 in founding a family or a state, or acquiring fame even, we are mortal;
 but in dealing with truth we are immortal, and need fear no change nor
 accident. --------------------------------- ][enry David Thoreau, 1850




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: wcs@anchor.ho.att.com (Bill_Stewart(HOY002)1305)
Date: Fri, 30 Jul 93 00:53:59 PDT
To: i6t4@jupiter.sun.csd.unb.ca
Subject: Re:  I'm not paranoid...  They *are* out to get me!
Message-ID: <9307300749.AA09159@anchor.ho.att.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text


Nick MacDonald's note on bar codes on Canadian money, and speculation
about banks tracking what bills they give you, is something they're probably
not doing now, but could if they wanted; USA Today had an article a while
back about proposals to do that with US money.  You really can't do a 
perfect tracking job, but a large amount of cash comes from banks,
gets spent at stores, and goes back to banks, and could easily enough
be tracked it it were bar-coded and banks were forced (or paid) to 
read it with bar-code scanners.  Maybe you'd only track 50%, or 80%,
but that could have a major impact on privacy, and a major "improvement"
in the government's ability to keep tabs on us.  It's really no tougher
to print bar coded serial numbers than human-readable ones.

Sounds like it's a good time to get digicash out into the market,
or stock up on rrolls of quarters :-)

		Bill
# Bill Stewart    wcs@anchor.ho.att.com  +1-908-949-0705 Fax-4876
# AT&T Bell Labs, Room 4M-312, Crawfords Corner Rd, Holmdel, NJ  07733-3030



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Eric Hughes <hughes@soda.berkeley.edu>
Date: Fri, 30 Jul 93 06:59:48 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Paranoia and the Outlawing of Cash
In-Reply-To: <2C57B1BD@wk06.Copenhagen.NCR.COM>
Message-ID: <9307301354.AA09909@soda.berkeley.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



>In Denmark practically everybody has a 'DAN-card', [...]

Universality.

>[...] all purchaces, no matter how small, can be charged [...]

Arbitrarily small transactions.

>There is no charge for using [...] the card

Subsidized.

The Dan-card system uses dial-up authentications for a large part (if
not all) of its transactions.  The telecom charges are causing the
system to run at a large loss; this wouldn't be a commercially viable
system.  The Danish government is looking at making 'DAN-coin', which
would be a smart card system that relies upon the physical security of
the device.  Since no on-line telecom charges incur, the coin system 
will be much easier to deploy.

Eric




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Dwayne Campogan <vivisect@u.washington.edu>
Date: Fri, 30 Jul 93 07:19:49 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: anonymous email article
Message-ID: <9307301418.AA12010@hardy.u.washington.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



I had received a forwarded post about you writing an article
about anonymous email and misc. other things dealing with Cyberpunk
subculture... May I ask for what publication you are writing this
and it distribution purposes...

I have been in the "Cyberpunk" atmospherical genere for many years now,
I also am a writer.  I am currently working on a book about the government
and their shitty recklessness dealing with such problems...

I am interested in coresponding with other writers, please do reply soon
and I might be able to contribute to your efforts.

-Paris




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: csvcjld@nomvst.lsumc.edu
Date: Fri, 30 Jul 93 05:57:29 PDT
To: klaus@mail.lds.loral.com
Subject: Re: best way to check for modification of self
In-Reply-To: <9307301223.AA15123@mail.lds.loral.com>
Message-ID: <19930730075157658@nomvst.lsumc.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


  >I am looking for C src or algorithms that would be useful for a
  >program to check its own integrity and make sure it hasnt been
  >modified.

     Try caware.zip, cvirport.zip, and stealth.zip in /pub/msdos/virus
on oak.oakland.edu.





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: klaus@mail.lds.loral.com (Christopher Klaus)
Date: Fri, 30 Jul 93 05:24:45 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: best way to check for modification of self
Message-ID: <9307301223.AA15123@mail.lds.loral.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain




I am looking for C src or algorithms that would be useful for a program
to check its own integrity and make sure it hasnt been modified.  

Looking at the filesize of the file would not help, since I want to make
sure no one has modified just some text, etc.  I would like the algorithm
or code to be rather quick in doing the check in the initialization of
the program.  Would finding the src to CRC or sum and adding that into the
program be the best solution?

Has anyone else dealt with this?



-- 
Christopher Klaus
klaus@mail.lds.loral.com cklaus@hotsun.nersc.gov





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Oliver Seiler <oseiler@unixg.ubc.ca>
Date: Fri, 30 Jul 93 09:42:54 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Digital Cash ftp site...
Message-ID: <Pine.3.05.9307300926.A15754-b100000@unixg.ubc.ca>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Somebody recently posted a message with an ftp site with some articles on
digital cash, but I deleted it before I had a chance to get the site name.
Could someone e-mail me or repost the site for these articles?

I am planning on doing an undergraduate thesis this next school year, and
one of my proposed topics may be in the area of digital cash. I'm looking
for more specific topics. Anybody know any problems or potential thesis
topics (I'm a fishin' for topics :) suitable for an undergraduate thesis?

Another area suggested to me has more to do with cryptography and
copyrights. Specifically, encrypting copyright information into some data
which does not need to be a direct copy (like a program or a text file),
but something like an image or sound (song) file (as on DAT or CD)...
The encrypted copyright information would have to be robust, so that
further modification of the data, in efforts to break copyright
information, would still allow for the extraction of the original
copyright info. What sort of work has been done in this area? If anybody
knows of any papers or references to this, could you please e-mail or post
here?

-Oliver

| Oliver Seiler          + Erisian Development Group +  Amiga Developer  +
| oseiler@unixg.ubc.ca   +-------------Reality by the Slice--------------+
| oseiler@nyx.cs.du.edu  |           	  (604) 683-5364                 |
| ollie@BIX.com          | POB 3547, MPO, Vancouver, BC, CANADA  V6B 3Y6 |






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Eric Blossom <eb@srlr14.sr.hp.com>
Date: Fri, 30 Jul 93 12:52:57 PDT
To: thug@phantom.com
Subject: Tracing Cash
In-Reply-To: <m0oLzjT-0009ExC@mindvox.phantom.com>
Message-ID: <9307301948.AA00433@srlr14.sr.hp.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



> BTW, cash can be traced even without bar codes, since serial numbers can
> be read by OCR.  

The few $50 and $100 bills I've looked at over the past year or so
have had a light colored vertical stripe on them that was slightly raised
above the surface of the paper and had *small* numbers on it.  

Seems like it was designed to make counterfeiting harder and money
easier to trace.





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Tyler Yip - UnixWeenie(tm) <davros@ecst.csuchico.edu>
Date: Fri, 30 Jul 93 13:04:52 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: money tracing
Message-ID: <9307302002.AA19091@hairball.ecst.csuchico.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


since 1990, the Treasury has placed a nylon strip inside the paper of most of
the printed money ($10's and above, I believe).  This strip has letters on it,
spelling out "USA TWENTY" (for the $20 bill) such that it can only be seen if
light is passed through the note.  This was officially meant to prevent the
high quality scanners and color printers from being able to forge money, since
the scanner would not be able to reproduce the reflectively-invisible letters
in the strip.

Wonder if they could include such a technique in money tracking.
Has anyone ever checked the green ink on money for magnetic resonance?




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: khijol!erc@apple.com (Ed Carp)
Date: Fri, 30 Jul 93 13:22:57 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: looking for FTP site for fingerprint
Message-ID: <m0oM0tf-00023NC@khijol>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text


Does anyone know which sites have fingerprint on them?  I poked around, but
couldn't find it.  Any help would be appreciated - thanks!
-- 
Ed Carp, N7EKG			erc@apple.com			510/659-9560

If you want magic, let go of your armor.  Magic is so much stronger than
steel!        -- Richard Bach, "The Bridge Across Forever"



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Karl Barrus <elee9sf@Menudo.UH.EDU>
Date: Fri, 30 Jul 93 11:54:18 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: CASH: sites & idea
Message-ID: <199307301852.AA07926@Menudo.UH.EDU>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Those addresses were

cwi.nl in /pub/CWIreports/AA	CS-R9318.ps.Z and CS-R9323.ps.Z
netcom.com in /pub/joule        DSR1.ps.Z

You know, what would be really cool (and unfortunately I can't
implement this since today is my last day at work since I'm heading to
Rice to be a full time grad student once more) is a cypherpunks gopher
site!  Having text files like the manifesto, back cypherpunks articles
(I have quite a few), information like the remailer list, etc.
available for browsing...

/-----------------------------------\
| Karl L. Barrus                    |
| elee9sf@menudo.uh.edu             | <- preferred address
| barrus@tree.egr.uh.edu (NeXTMail) |
\-----------------------------------/




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Jeremy R. Smith" <jersmit@eis.calstate.edu>
Date: Fri, 30 Jul 93 14:09:55 PDT
To: Cypherpunks <cypherpunks@toad.com>
Subject: Public Key Servers
Message-ID: <Pine.3.07.9307301400.A27332-8100000@eis.calstate.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


	Are the key servers listed in the PGP documentation still active? 
And if so, what is the general opinion of using them?

						Jeremy Smith
						jersmit@eis.calstate.edu







From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Eric Blossom <eb@srlr14.sr.hp.com>
Date: Fri, 30 Jul 93 14:49:22 PDT
Subject: Public Key Servers
In-Reply-To: <Pine.3.07.9307301400.A27332-8100000@eis.calstate.edu>
Message-ID: <9307302146.AA12410@srlr14.sr.hp.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



>	   Are the key servers listed in the PGP documentation still active? 
>   And if so, what is the general opinion of using them?

Key server == list of people to bust and who knows who.
  (compute the transitive closure of the signatures)








From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: thug@phantom.com (Murdering Thug)
Date: Fri, 30 Jul 93 12:02:56 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Tracing Cash
In-Reply-To: <9307300749.AA09159@anchor.ho.att.com>
Message-ID: <m0oLzjT-0009ExC@mindvox.phantom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text


Bill Stewart writes:

> Nick MacDonald's note on bar codes on Canadian money, and speculation
> about banks tracking what bills they give you, is something they're probably
> not doing now, but could if they wanted; USA Today had an article a while
> back about proposals to do that with US money.  You really can't do a 
> perfect tracking job, but a large amount of cash comes from banks,
> gets spent at stores, and goes back to banks, and could easily enough
> be tracked it it were bar-coded and banks were forced (or paid) to 
> read it with bar-code scanners.  Maybe you'd only track 50%, or 80%,
> but that could have a major impact on privacy, and a major "improvement"
> in the government's ability to keep tabs on us.  It's really no tougher
> to print bar coded serial numbers than human-readable ones.
> 
> Sounds like it's a good time to get digicash out into the market,
> or stock up on rrolls of quarters :-)

There's a quick cure for those who are paranoid about spending bar coded
money; make sure the bills you spend at stores were not given to you by a
bank teller or ATM.  Since "getting change" (ie: converting $20 bills to
$10 bills at stores) is theoretically traceable if the store in question
processes a "making change" transaction by barscanning the input bills and
output bills and submitting the record of that transaction to some agency
or clearinghouse operated by the government (U.S. Treasury Dept?) or banks
(Federal Reserve).  Don't tell me this is not possible, because it is, try
purchasing a postal money order over $1500 at a U.S. Post office, and
you'll see that they ask for valid ID before completing the transaction. 
We're getting closer to a Big Brother electronically monitored economy
with each day.  Bar coding money is just one more step in that direction,
and certainly far more palateble to the American public than outlawing
cash alltogether, which is why I think the Treasury Dept. might do it soon.

Getting back to bar coded money, and how to avoid traceable transactions,
I can see an underground business of "money changers", people who act sort
of like cash shuffling agents. Here's how it would work: A person obtains
some cash at an ATM from his acount.  He'd like to spend the cash to buy
liquor, but doesn't want his bank to see any of his bills coming back in
the form of a deposit from a liquor store (such juicy info could be
re-sold by the bank to a insurance company clearinghouse/database).  So,
instead the person goes to a money changer.  The money changer takes the
cash from the customer and gives him some new cash, charging a small
transaction fee (1-5%?).  The money changer works by deposits the
customers bills into his own account, and withdrawing fresh bills from his
own account via ATM, the fresh bills are to be given to other customers of
the money changer.  Thus, there will exist two types of cash in such an
arrangement, "traceable" cash (cash withdrawn from a regular person's
account), and "untraceable" cash (cash withdrawn from a money changer's
account). The job of the money changer is to sell untraceable cash in
exchangefor traceable cash.  Such money changing businesses (if not made
illegal by laws) could operate accross the street from major banks, and
provide a valuable service (giving cash the anonymity it enjoys now).

BTW, cash can be traced even without bar codes, since serial numbers can
be read by OCR.  I'm assuming banks *already* scan all incoming cash
for serial numbers looking for money from unsolved bank heists, and
alerting the FBI/SS when a customer deposits such bills, so that the
FBI/SS can then interogate a chain of people leading up to the original
spender of the bill, much in the way the SS catches counterfeiters.



Thug



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: thug@phantom.com (Murdering Thug)
Date: Fri, 30 Jul 93 13:05:52 PDT
To: eb@srlr14.sr.hp.com (Eric Blossom)
Subject: Re: Tracing Cash
In-Reply-To: <9307301948.AA00433@srlr14.sr.hp.com>
Message-ID: <m0oM0ij-0009ExC@mindvox.phantom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text


Eric Blossom writes:
> 
> Murdering Thug writes:
>
> > BTW, cash can be traced even without bar codes, since serial numbers can
> > be read by OCR.  
> 
> The few $50 and $100 bills I've looked at over the past year or so
> have had a light colored vertical stripe on them that was slightly raised
> above the surface of the paper and had *small* numbers on it.  
> 
> Seems like it was designed to make counterfeiting harder and money
> easier to trace.

It used to be that just $50 and $100 bills had that vertical stripe, but now
it has reached $10 and $20 bills as well.  Also, notice the small text
around the border of the portrait of the bill, this small text can't be
copied too well with color copiers.  However, what is printed on the
stripe is not a serial number, but "USA TEN USA TEN..." on $10 bills, and
similarly USA TWENTY for $20, USA FIFTY for $50...

There are big time rumors about the vertical stripe embedded in the paper
though.  The government says it's for making counterfeiting more
difficult, but how come they just didn't use a watermark like they do on
the new postal money orders? A watermark is far more difficult to forge
than an embedded stripe, although anyone who has knowledge of making his
own paper knows that both are quite easy to do.  A rumor however has it
that the vertical stripe is a tracer material, and emits a distinguishing
signal when exposed to radiation or certain RF signals.  The use of such a
stripe could be used to catch people who try to bring large amounts of
cash past U.S. Customs without declaring it.  Thus cash would show up on
these detectors as easily as an Colt .45 does in an X-ray of your baggage.


Thug



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Derek Atkins <warlord@MIT.EDU>
Date: Fri, 30 Jul 93 13:24:06 PDT
To: Eric Blossom <eb@srlr14.sr.hp.com>
Subject: Re: Tracing Cash
In-Reply-To: <9307301948.AA00433@srlr14.sr.hp.com>
Message-ID: <9307302021.AA02027@toxicwaste.MEDIA.MIT.EDU>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> The few $50 and $100 bills I've looked at over the past year or so
> have had a light colored vertical stripe on them that was slightly raised
> above the surface of the paper and had *small* numbers on it.  
> 
> Seems like it was designed to make counterfeiting harder and money
> easier to trace.

20 dollar bills have them, too.  Actually, all they say on them is "US
20 dollars", or something similar on the 50 and 100's.  They are to
prevent counterfeiting because you can just hold a bill up to the
light and see this bar on it.  It does not have any serial information
on it, so I doubt that it eases the tracing of money.

-derek





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: thug@phantom.com (Murdering Thug)
Date: Fri, 30 Jul 93 13:47:31 PDT
To: davros@ecst.csuchico.edu (Tyler Yip - UnixWeenie)
Subject: Re: money tracing
In-Reply-To: <9307302002.AA19091@hairball.ecst.csuchico.edu>
Message-ID: <m0oM1Ot-0009FYC@mindvox.phantom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text


Typer Yip writes:

> since 1990, the Treasury has placed a nylon strip inside the paper of most of
> the printed money ($10's and above, I believe).  This strip has letters on it,
> spelling out "USA TWENTY" (for the $20 bill) such that it can only be seen if
> light is passed through the note.  This was officially meant to prevent the
> high quality scanners and color printers from being able to forge money, since
> the scanner would not be able to reproduce the reflectively-invisible letters
> in the strip.
> 
> Wonder if they could include such a technique in money tracking.
> Has anyone ever checked the green ink on money for magnetic resonance?

The black ink that is used to print the front side of U.S. cash contains a
very finely ground black iron oxide powder.  The ink is magnetic.  This
magnetism is used mostly by vending & change machines to distinguish real
bills from forgeries/photocopies.

A vending machine that accepts paper money typically has three tests for
cash validity.

          1. A digital image scan and imagage signature comparison.
             This test also determines the denomination of the bill.
             (good photocopies of bills can get past this test)
     
          2. Ultraviolet light test.  Real bills (printed on non-chemically
             treated paper) do not glow.  Most other papers, especially
             chemically whitened papers do glow, and are flagged as fakes.

          3. Magnetic ink detection.  Real bills are printed with magnetic
             ink, forgeries/photocopies are not.


Thug




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Reply to: hahn@lds.loral.com" <HAHN@lds.loral.com>
Date: Fri, 30 Jul 93 14:07:31 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: money tracing
Message-ID: <930730170325.10c9@lds.loral.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Tyler Yip enquires about the magnetic properties of ink used in U.S.
currency.  I believe the ink can be magnetized and the bill passed over
a magnetic scanner that recognizes a magnetic signature.  U.S. Tres.
has machines that very quickly pick counterfeits out of a stack of
bills using this method.

Other things U.S. Tres. does (and you can do) to recognize counterfeits
are:  1) Put the bill under UV light.  Cheap paper tends to fluoresce.
The real thing won't.  2) Look at the treasury seal (the only part of
the bill that is multi-colored).  Make sure that the denomination
printed over the seal is all black and all there.  3) Rub any of the
printing against a piece of typing paper hard enough so that the ink
from the bill stains the paper.  Now look at the bill where you rubbed
it.  Offset print jobs will smudge -- the real thing won't.

Europeans are now going a step further.  They are composing the
portrait out of concentric circles centered on one of the eyes.
If someone attempts to copy the bill using a digital scanner,
the resulting aliasing of the circles in the portrait will be
very noticeable to even a casual observer.  The are also using
colors chosen especially to foil color copiers.

|         (V)              |  "Tiger gotta hunt.  Bird gotta fly.
|   (^    (`>              |   Man gotta sit and wonder why, why, why.
|  ((\\__/ )               |   Tiger gotta sleep.  Bird gotta land.
|  (\\<   )   der Nethahn  |   Man gotta tell himself he understand."
|    \<  )                 |  
|     ( /                  |                Kurt Vonnegut Jr.
|      |                   |  
|      ^                   |






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Derek Atkins <warlord@MIT.EDU>
Date: Fri, 30 Jul 93 14:29:55 PDT
To: "Jeremy R. Smith" <jersmit@eis.calstate.edu>
Subject: Re: Public Key Servers
In-Reply-To: <Pine.3.07.9307301400.A27332-8100000@eis.calstate.edu>
Message-ID: <9307302128.AA00604@toxicwaste.MEDIA.MIT.EDU>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> 	Are the key servers listed in the PGP documentation still active? 

Yes, they are active.

> And if so, what is the general opinion of using them?  

It depends what you are trying to get to here?  The keyservers were
created as a way to implement out-of-band key distribution.  They
provide an easy way for you to get someone's key before initiating
contact with this person.

The key-servers do not do any key authentication, leaving the
validity-checking up to the end user.  It does leave a few things
open, namely, anyone can see who has keys on the servers.  But once a
US-legal PGP does come out (RSN, I believe), it won't be as big a
deal.

I hope this helps.

-derek




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Timothy Newsham <newsham@wiliki.eng.hawaii.edu>
Date: Fri, 30 Jul 93 20:37:33 PDT
To: klaus@mail.lds.loral.com (Christopher Klaus)
Subject: Re: best way to check for modification of self
In-Reply-To: <9307301223.AA15123@mail.lds.loral.com>
Message-ID: <9307310335.AA16404@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> 
> 
> 
> I am looking for C src or algorithms that would be useful for a program
> to check its own integrity and make sure it hasnt been modified.  
> 
> Looking at the filesize of the file would not help, since I want to make
> sure no one has modified just some text, etc.  I would like the algorithm
> or code to be rather quick in doing the check in the initialization of
> the program.  Would finding the src to CRC or sum and adding that into the
> program be the best solution?
> 
> Has anyone else dealt with this?

this is what the tripwire package does. 
I think (perhaps maybe) I heard someone say it uses a hashing
function that is not cryptographically secure (ie. can be forged)
but also that the design is highly modular and the hashing function
can be replaced with something more secure

> Christopher Klaus
> klaus@mail.lds.loral.com cklaus@hotsun.nersc.gov




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Derek Atkins <warlord@MIT.EDU>
Date: Fri, 30 Jul 93 15:09:57 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Usenix Mobie IP Conference in Boston
Message-ID: <9307302208.AA00695@toxicwaste.MEDIA.MIT.EDU>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


There is a conference in Boston for the Usenix Symposium on Mobile and
Location-Independent Computing.  I know that a couple a cypherpunks
are at least involved in the conference, and I was wondering if people
would be interested in a quick gettogether or BOF of some kind.

Since I really don't know how to organize this, I can only collect
names of interested individuals.

So, is anyone interested????

-derek





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Douglas Sinclair <dsinclai@acs.ucalgary.ca>
Date: Fri, 30 Jul 93 17:30:03 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Bank notes
Message-ID: <9307310029.AA49095@acs1.acs.ucalgary.ca>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Canada now uses holograms on its $20, $50, $100 and $1000 bills.
They're a small patch on the top right hand corner that looks like gold foil.
Written on this foil is the denomination of the bill (20, 50, &c).  As the
viewing angle is changed, the color of this writing shifts.

Obviously, this will blow a photocopier out of the water.  I have minimal
experience in holography, but it would also seem to be difficult to print
one on a metal foil.
-- 
PGP 2.3 Key by finger




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: peter honeyman <honey@hone.citi.umich.edu>
Date: Fri, 30 Jul 93 17:53:08 PDT
To: Derek Atkins <warlord@MIT.EDU>
Subject: Re: Usenix Mobie IP Conference in Boston
In-Reply-To: <9307302208.AA00695@toxicwaste.MEDIA.MIT.EDU>
Message-ID: <9307310052.AA14654@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


i'm interested.  see you there.  bring your key ring.

	peter




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: fergp@sytex.com (Paul Ferguson)
Date: Fri, 30 Jul 93 21:19:33 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Village Voice article on Cypherpunks
Message-ID: <999i8B1w165w@sytex.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


 
reprinted without permission from the Village Voice:
 
The Village Voice
August 3, 1993
Vol. 38, No. 31
pages 33 through 37
 
 
Code Warriors
 
Battling for the Keys to Privacy in the Info Age
by Julian Dibbell
 
 
It's difficult enough to say what the Information Age is. let
alone when it began. But if forced to name a starting point, you
could probably do worse than pick the moment the United States
government decided to declare children's drawings contraband.
 
The time was World War II, and the rationale, as with many of the
U.S. government's more surreal policy decisions, was national
security. Military censors, charged with weeding secret
communications from the international mails, feared the tremulous
lines of toddler art might too easily hide the contours of a
spy-drawn map, and so, rather than examine every grandparent-bound
masterpiece that crossed their desks, they chose to forbid the
public from sending them at all. The censors raised similar
objections to the mailing of crossword puzzles -- who knew what
messages might lurk in their solutions? So crossword puzzles too
were placed on the interdiction list -- as were student
transcripts, postal chess games, song requests phoned into radio
stations, and any floral orders that specified the kind of
flowers to be delivered. Wherever information signified to
unpredictably, too quirkily, too privately, the censors shut down
the flow. And where they couldn't ban outright,, they meddled;
the stamps on letters were routinely rearranged so as to scramble
any coded order; affectionate X's and O's were excised at random;
knitting instructions were held up long enough to produce and
analyze the resulting sweater; and on at least one occasion the
dials were spun on an entire shipment of watches, obliterating
whatever hidden meaning might have resided in the placement of
the hands.
 
State paranoia has always thrived in wartime, of course, but the
fear of secret writing that gripped the government during World
War II was something novel. Like the war itself, this fear was
total, projecting sinister meaning onto the full spread of
communications -- all the random traces of love and commerce,
study and play, hobbies and enthusiasms, that register a
society's transactions. Taking arms against this entropic haze of
human details and differences, the state got a taste of life in a
world oversaturated with information, the kind of world whose
central challenge is to snatch elusive signals from the jaws of
ever-proliferating noise. Today, we who live increasingly in just
such a world might diagnose the censor's panic response as a
simple, if dramatic, case of information anxiety -- that sinking
sense that buried somewhere in the overwhelming chaos of mediated
data surrounding us lie messages of life-or-death importance. But
back then the panic was something more: it was the premonition of
a dizzying new cultural order on the brink of emergence. It was,
like so many paranoid visions before it, a prophecy.
 
And a self-fulfilling one at that. For the wartime struggle
against secret communications didn't just envision the
Information Age -- it invented it, in a literal and technological
sense. The world's first digital electronic computer, after all,
was created by Alan Turing and a team of British scientists in
the war's grim early days, for the express and ultimately
successful purpose of cracking the German's key Enigma cipher.
Likewise, Bell engineer Claude Shannon's momentous postwar
discovery of the foundations of information theory -- a
sophisticated mathematical abstraction of the dynamic between
chaos (noise) and intelligibility (signal) in communications
channels -- was directly related to his ground-breaking war work
in cryptology -- the wickedly complex theory and practice of
codes and ciphers. And between computers and the high-speed
networks made possible in part by Shannon's insights, the
necessary tools for the info-saturation of society were in place.
Half a century later, the business pages like to portray the
emergent digital universe as a gift from the Apples and AT&Ts and
Time Warners of the world, brought to you in the name of
efficiency, entertainment, and, above all, profit. But ride the
information superhighway back to its ultimate sources and you end
up in the heat and dust of World War II's secret-code battles.
 
It's hardly an accident, then, that as the future foreseen in the
censor's cryptophobic nightmares approaches fruition, the code
wars are heating up again. As digital networks have evolved, the
technology of secrecy has evolved along with them, and just like
the computers that populate those networks, it has gotten
radically personal. Thanks to advances in practical cryptography,
anyone who wants it now has the ability to scramble their
communications into a digital hash readable by no one but the
intended recipient -- and increasing numbers of commercial and
individual computer user do want it. No longer the exclusive
domain of soldiers and diplomats, automated encryption systems so
powerful no government can break them now fit snugly into
software easily installed on any home computer. If the spread of
civilian encryption continues unabated, the day may soon come
when wiretap-addicted law-enforcers and the deep-dished
eavesdroppers in the National Security Agency find themselves
stripped forever of their accustomed power to penetrate the noise
the rest of us make just to talk to each other.
 
Terrified once again of an information landscape pregnant with
unreadable messages, the government is moving to head off this
new bad dream before it becomes a reality. On April 16 of this
year, the Clinton administration announced the development (by
the National Institute of Standards and Technology, with
"guidance" from the NSA's tight-lipped code-breaking gurus) of an
encrypting microchip designed for use in telephones, powerful
enough to thwart most intruders but rigged so that cops and other
warranted government agents can tap in to the encrypted
communications at will.
 
The White House presented the new system (code-named Clipper -- a
chip for computer modems, called Capstone, is soon to follow) as
a Solomonic compromise between the growing demand for
communications privacy and "the legitimate needs of law
enforcement," but its effect so far has been anything but
pacifying. Clipper's announcement brought to boil a
long-simmering battle between the state security establishment
and an accidental confederacy of high-tech business interests,
civil libertarians, and guerrilla cryptographers. It's been
blazing openly ever since, in online discussion groups, in
congressional committee groups, in the pages of The New York
Times, The Washington Post, Newsweek, and a slew of computer
trade magazines, with the Clipper chip at its center but with
much more than the fate of a cleverly etched silicon wafer at
stake. "The future of privacy in America" might best sum up the
usual understanding of what the fight is about, but even that
phrase seems inadequate given how far the warp-speed evolution of
information technology is stretching the very meaning of privacy.
Better, then, to say simply that if secret codes tell us where
the Information Age began, they may also hold an answer to the
difficult question of what it is. Or even, perhaps, to the still
more challenging one of what it could be.
 
"You can get further away in cyberspace than you could in going
to Alpha Centauri," says Tim May, and he should know. Before he
retired seven years ago, a wealthy man at age 34, May was a
reasonably illustrious corporate physicist. Now he's a
Cypherpunk, part of a loose-knit band of scrappy,
libertarian-leaning computer jockeys who have dedicated
themselves to perfecting  and promoting the art of disappearing
into the virtual hinterlands. Concentrated in Silicon Valley but
spread out across the country and as far away as Finland, the
Cypherpunks maintain daily e-mail contact, collaboratively
creating and distributing practical software answers to modern
cryptography's central question: How to wrap a piece of digital
information in mathematical complexity so dense only literally
astronomical expenditures of computer time can breach it?
 
"Some of these things sound like just a bunch of fucking
numbers," May explains. "But what they really are is they're
things which in computability space take more energy to get to
than to drive a car to Andromeda. I'm not kidding. I mean, you
can work the math out yourself."
 
Well no, you probably can't, but even those unversed in rocket
science can appreciate the social value of such calculations. As
computer-driven technology comes more and more to mediate
people's connections to society -- and as computers grow in their
abilities to store and sift the information generated by those
connections -- it gets harder for individuals to escape the
prying attentions of state and corporate bureaucracies. Medical
records, credit histories, spending patterns, life stories --
these are being swept up by the millions into a massively
connected web of chatty, chip-laden consumer toys and
institutional data factories, all of them potential informers on
the individuals whose lives pass through them. With every new
info-tech plaything that shows up under society's Christmas tree,
the hydra-headed surveillance machine moves in a little closer,
snuggling up to our skin and our wallets and intensifying the
urge to flee, to find a far-off, secret place to hide in.
 
Cryptography's power to carve such places out of the very
structure of cyberspace is its obvious selling point -- and
further evidence of computers; textbook-dialectical tendency to
offer liberatory solutions for every oppressive situation they
create. Yet, while the privacy afforded by cryptography seems to
be the main reason the Cypherpunks gather in its name, not all of
them see privacy as an end in itself. The most farsighted see it
as a beginning, a first step toward reshaping society in the
image of computer networks themselves: decentralized, fluid,
fault-tolerant, a fuzzy, nonhierarchical unity of autonomous
nodes.
 
"Cryptography is a greater equalizer than the Colt .45, " says
Eric Hughes, the long-haired, cowboy-hatted, and not entirely
lapsed Mormon who, along with may, conceived the Cypherpunks just
seven months before the Clipper hit the fan. "These are
power-leveling techniques," he adds, pointing out that the
hermetically sealed voice-and-data channels that could arm every
citizen against state wire-surveillance are just the simplest of
the crypto toys the Cypherpunks are playing with. Anonymous
remailers are another -- labyrinths of forwarding computers
through which encoded e-mail messages bounce, confounding any
attempt to trace them back to their sources and thus providing an
impenetrable anonymity ideal for whistleblowers and other
transgressors of local codes of silence, from Mafia turncoats to
isolated members od stigmatized sexual minorities. Building on
encryption and remailers, experimental digital cash schemes test
the possibility of untraceable electronic transactions, the basic
ingredient for unregulated worldwide information markets, where a
brisk commerce in trade secrets could spell doom for the
corporation as we know it. Hopelessly untaxable, such
crypto-markets, if they grew large enough, could also critically
sap the economic strength of governments. All of these mechanism,
then, conjured into existence by myriad small desires for simple
privacy, would tend on a large scale to siphon power away from
the huge, impersonal concentrations it likes to gather in. Five
years ago Tim May came up with a name for this vision of a
networked society brought to the brink of ungovernability by the
ubiquity of secret codes. He calls it "crypto-anarchy."
 
The U.S. government, on the other hand, has not yet dared call
it treason, but its Clipper maneuver does appear to be a step in
that direction. Hughes' comparison of encryption to firearms is
one of the Cypherpunks; favorite rhetorical moves, but for the
feds, cryptography's status as weaponry is more than a metaphor
-- national export laws classify encryption hardware and software
as munitions, right alongside tanks and artillery -- and the
agenda of the Cypherpunks and other crypto-privacy advocates
looks like the info-political equivalent of passing out Uzis on
street corners. Small wonder, then, that the opening move in the
government's preemptive counterrevolution works so much like gun
control: Clipper is in essence a system for registering dangerous
info-weapons, requiring the logging of every chip's secret key
with the government at the time of manufacture. The key would
then be split in two and the halves turned over for safekeeping
to two separate and "trustworthy" non-law enforcement agencies
(yet to be designated) till such a time as the government gets
the urge to take a peek.
 
So far, however, the government has refrained from mandating use
of the Clipper chip by law -- the feds claim they're counting on
government-wide use of the chip to coax its adoption by the
market as an exclusive standard. But it's hard to imagine this
inherently compromised system beating out more secure competition
even among the most law-abiding consumers, and never mind the
terrorists, drug dealers, mafiosi, and child pornographers
Clipper is meant to protect us from. In the end, then, the only
way to make the Clipper system universal would be to pass a law
against all other forms of encryption, an option the
administration has coyly admitted it's weighing.
 
But the opposition has been weighing it too. On the Cypherpunk's
mailing list, on the high-volume Usenet newsgroups like
sci.crypt, and in briefs and testimony filed at Representative
Edward Markey's congressional hearings on computer security
policy in June, critics of the Clipper chip have amassed a
heaping list of problems with the move toward crypto
criminalization that the proposal represents.  Economic. political,
and legal arguments have all been hurled at the possibility of an
anti-encryption law, but the most basic difficulty with such a ban
seems to be an essential epistemological one: namely, that
there's almost no way of knowing what the law prohibits, since in
practice it's rarely easy to tell the difference between
encrypted information and random noise. Indeed, the gist of
Claude Shannon's formative contribution to crypto theory was that
the most effective encryption systems are those whose output most
closely resembles raw static, drained as much as possible of the
structure that makes their hidden messages intelligible. Any
serious ban on cryptography would therefore have to go to the
rather loopy extreme of prohibiting the transmission of garbage
data as well.
 
Yet even so sweeping a law couldn't overcome the laws of
information theory, which say that communication channels are
always infected with a certain amount of ineradicable fuzz.
Crypto-heads are already seeking out and finding ways to exploit
this omnipresence of noise -- for instance by removing the bits
representing barely detectable hiss in sound recordings and
replacing them with virtually indistinguishable cipherdata. As
Tim May likes to point out, a DAT cassette of a Michael Jackson
album could thus easily conceal the digitized blueprints of the
Stealth bomber, and in fact it's more than likely that among the
thousands of photographs currently flowing through computer
networks, at least a few go bearing the secret communications of
amateur and not-so-amateur cryptographers, stowed away as digital
blur. Who knows then? If the campaign against nonstandard
encryption proceeds to its logical conclusions, the government
might one day find itself again looking with suspicion on the
transport of children's drawings -- or children's records,
children's videos, or for that matter any of the dense and
digitized info-chunks that will fill the fiber-optic supply lines
of tomorrow's bit-peddling markets.
 
But the potential for absurdity is just one of the forces lined
up against crypto control (and probably the weakest, given the
government's historic taste for absurdity in its communications
policy). The Constitution may be another. Since Clipper's public
debut, cyber-rights groups like Computer Professionals for Social
Responsibility and the Electronic Frontier Foundation have raised
questions about the system's legality, drawing out the
privacy-protecting implications buried in the Fourth and Fifth
Amendment freedoms from unreasonable search and seizure and
self-incrimination. And ultimately, as EFF counsel Mike Godwin
has suggested, any government regulation of cryptography may even
fall to the First Amendment arguments -- though courts have
historically excluded certain categories of speech from the
amendment's protection, unintelligible statements have never been
among them, and the government would probably have a hard time
showing why statements made unintelligible by mathematical
scrambling should be treated any less generously.
 
These are airy, theoretical objections, though, compared to the
howls coming from the quarter most immediately threatened by the
Clipper scheme: American business, especially the sector of it
that's already making money meeting the growing demand for
digital security, which stands to pay dearly if the government's
plans go through. For one thing, products with Clipper tech built
in will be worthless for export purposes -- in the currently
warming climate of industrial espionage, no foreign company in
its right mind would buy security the U.S. owns a master key to.
More ominously, domestic firms saddled with Clipper in their own
offices will be more vulnerable to spying than they might
otherwise, since the back door built in to the chip presents an
obvious soft spot for hackers to attack. Thus, the computer and
communications industries' anti-Clipper campaign has argued, the
chip may in the end do more to subvert the post-Cold War era's
new economically defined national security than to safeguard it.
And while an appeal to the notion that what's good for business
is good for America may not seem as principled as citing the Bill
of Rights, it's probably the argument that weighed heaviest in
the decision two months ago by the NIST -- the federal organ
charged with implementing the Clipper plan -- to ease up on the
program pending broader public review.
 
Moving quickly into the resulting breach, an ad hoc industry
group led by Novell Inc. announced mid July that it was
introducing its own set of encoding standards -- back-doorless
and cryptographically ironclad. The government's so far
acquiescent response ("I think this won't drive us crazy," one
unnamed White House honcho told the Times) is an encouraging sign
for the anti-Clipper coalition. But it's not much more than that;
this battle is far from over and its outcome is far from clear.
If only because of the massive bureaucratic bulk behind the
proposed standard (its patron the NSA has, to the best of
anyone's knowledge, the largest budget by far of any federal
intelligence agency), the government isn't likely to drop it.
Clipper might survive through sheer inertia, and if it does its
effects on widespread use of cryptography could be much more
devastating than its patent impracticality suggests.
 
Why? Because the spread of unbreakable personal crypto depends
heavily on what's known as the FAX Effect -- i.e., the fact that
the value of a given communications system increases in direct
proportion to the number of people of use it. So even though the
government will never succeed in keeping top-grade encryption out
of the hands of criminals and anyone who believes passionately in
its use, the vast majority of digital citizens might never adopt
strong crypto systems if government pressures make it even
moderately inconvenient to use or market them. Merely perfunctory
enforcement of key-registration laws could do the trick, but
legal measures of any kind might not even be necessary. If the
government simply sticks with its current strategy of tempting
manufacturers with a huge, ready-made federal market for
Clipper-equipped technology, then genuinely secure cryptography
could end up playing Beta to Clipper's VHS. At which point the
digital-info industries, would no doubt drop their current
freedom-fighter stance and get with the government program.
 
There's nothing inevitable about this scenario, of course --
except perhaps its preview of rapidly shifting battle formations
among the factions involved. The crypto wars won't end when the
Clipper debate does, and as they rage across the culture their
shape will change with that of the underlying terrain. For
instance, as the personal data of consumers grows more and more
valuable to information-hungry businesses, corporate America will
become an increasingly unreliable friend to any technology that
hides data. Likewise, civil libertarians, pure of heart though
they may be, will remain an effective force only as long  as the
case for strong crypto can be translated into constitutional
terms -- an easy enough trick while the government has its heavy
hand in the matter, but harder to pull off once the contest moves
out into the open marketplace of competing standards.
 
In the long run, then, the core resistance in the hard fight for
crypto-privacy will likely come from people whose commitment
rests not purely on economic self-interest or on larger social
concerns but also on a fascination with the intricate
machinery of cryptography itself. In other words, people like
Phil Zimmerman -- the free-lance programmer and political
activist who grew up engrossed with secret codes and then went on
to dedicate his leisure time writing and updating PGP, a free
e-mail encoding program that is rapidly becoming the encryption
system of choice among the cryptosocially aware. Or people like
Tim May, and Eric Hughes, and all the other technojargon-slinging
Cypherpunks. People whose relationship to cryptography has grown
so personal they cannot bear the thought of not having direct
access to its full power right from their desktops.
 
This army of hobbyists may not seem like the most formidable
agents of revolution. Yet in a time that demands increasingly
subtle understanding of the relationship between technology and
social transformation, their passionate intimacy with
revolutionary gadgetry is helping shape crucial strategies for
change. The Cypherpunks and their ilk are elaborating the latest
variation on the digital counterculture's Hacker Ethic, a
technoactivist outlook that crosswires commonplace theories of
how technology and society interact, buying neither the
technological determinism of pocket-protected engineers and glib
sub-McLuhanites nor the humanist line that technology is mere
putty in the grip of contending social forces. Hackers, who know
firsthand both technology's enthralling power and its empowering
malleability, tend instead toward a creative juggling of the two
opposing outlooks.
 
And Cypherpunks are hackers to the bone. :Encryption always
wins," Tim May insists with the serene confidence of one
convinced he's a mere conduit for historical tendencies built
into information technology itself -- and yet by definition no
Cypherpunk takes the ultimate achievement of the group's goal for
granted. A pragmatic activism hardwires the group's collective
identity, their very motto ("Cypherpunks write code") signals a
commitment to making the proliferation of cryptographic tools
happen now rather than waiting on big business, big science, or
Big Brother to determine its fate. Nor is this commitment limited
to the creation of tools; indeed, an even better motto might be
"Cypherpunks use code," since the essence of the revolution the
'punks seek to effect lies in making encryption a cultural habit,
as common and acceptable as hiding letters inside envelopes. Thus
the Cypherpunks' almost religious use of PGP and of their use
their own primitive remailer systems isn't just a grown-ups' game
of cloak and dagger, as it sometimes seems, or a matter of
testing out the crypto hackers' experimental creations. It's an
attempt to nudge ciphertech toward that pivotal accumulation of
users that finally makes the forward rush of the technology's
far-reaching social implications irresistible.
 
At some stage of the game, in other words, encryption does not
always win. But whether we as a society choose to play the game
is another matter. The Cypherpunks have made their choice, but
should the rest of us necessarily follow them in it? The time to
decide is now, because if public use of crypto-ware ever reaches
that elusive critical mass, debate won't be an option:
crypto-anarchy will be upon us, woven into the technological
fabric of daily life and about as easy to give up as breathing.
The resulting flood of privacy into politic will no doubt do the
body good, but it's worth considering whether the side effects
will in the end outweigh the benefits. Anonymous networks flushed
with digital cash, for instance, may dilute the power of
corporations, but they will also nurture extortion schemes,
bribery, and even brazen markets in no-strings-attached contract
murder. Less luridly, but perhaps more significantly, the
untaxability od enciphered transactions in an economy
increasingly composed od such transactions might wither whatever
mechanisms for meaningful sharing of social responsibilities
remain in this country. This prospect tends not to bother
Cypherpunks, at least not the hippie-hacker millionaires among
them, but libertarians less enchanted with marketocracy may end
up wondering whether crypto-anarchy, for all its power-leveling
potential, is quite the freedom they're fighting for.
 
It's no use to try and answer these doubts with the cheerful
counterresponsibilities -- with visions of the small-town,
closeted queer boy who explores sex and identity without fear of
discovery in a worldwide, cipher-secured on-line community of his
peers, or of cryptographically armored reproductive-rights info
networks standing by to keep choice alive in the event of a
sudden and drastic rightward lurch in national abortion policy.
For every heartwarmer a corresponding bummer can doubtless be
found -- the digital dialectic swings both ways, after all. The
option for strong cryptography, therefore, ultimately requires a
leap of faith, an intuitive confidence that a society which
unflinchingly honors the right to make illegible noise on the
whole be more just, more free, and more exciting than one that
doesn't.
 
For what it's worth, that confidence comes easier all the time.
More and more, the Information Age is looking more or less like
the hype doctors want you to think it is: the most radical
extension of minds and bodies into representational space since
humans first learned to talk.  What it could become, however, is
not nearly as clear. Will it be a time of unimaginably refined
surveillance and control of those minds and bodies? Or a time of
freely and furiously propagating connections among them?  To
suggest that the answer  depends on the failure or success of
unbreakable personal cryptography flirts recklessly with the
romance of the technological fix. But given the deeply
technological nature of the challenge, it's hard to imagine what
kind of fix could be more appropriate. Then again, given the
complexities and multiple strategies involved in the current
struggle over access to absolute digital inscrutability, it's
hard to envision anything as simple as a fix emerging anytime
soon. Call strong cryptography a technical wager, then. It's a
smart bet that the state's long-running worst nightmare -- a
society whose entire informational texture is woven out of
unreadable secret codes -- turns out to be our own best dream of
the future.
 

Paul Ferguson               |  "Government, even in its best state,
Network Integrator          |   is but a necessary evil; in its worst
Centreville, Virginia USA   |   state, an intolerable one."
fergp@sytex.com             |      - Thomas Paine, Common Sense
 
         I love my country, but I fear its government.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: geoffw@nexsys.net (Geoff White)
Date: Sat, 31 Jul 93 07:23:40 PDT
To: elee9sf@Menudo.UH.EDU
Subject: Re: CASH: sites & idea
Message-ID: <9307311429.AA06345@nexsys.nexsys.net>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> Those addresses were
> 
> cwi.nl in /pub/CWIreports/AA	CS-R9318.ps.Z and CS-R9323.ps.Z

There isn't any cwi.nl.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: tien (Lee Tien)
Date: Sat, 31 Jul 93 14:28:43 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Skipjack proposed Thursday?
Message-ID: <9307312127.AA26124@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



I seem to have missed this.  Today's Chronicle (July 31) (SanFran)
had a blurb on E2 saying that NIST on Thursday proposed Skipjack
as a federal standard.  Does anyone have the announcement and 
related documentation?

Lee Tien




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: elee9sf@Menudo.UH.EDU
Date: Sat, 31 Jul 93 11:33:39 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: CASH: sites & idea
Message-ID: <199307311941.AA04619@Menudo.UH.EDU>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



> > Those addresses were
> > 
> > cwi.nl in /pub/CWIreports/AA	CS-R9318.ps.Z and CS-R9323.ps.Z
> 
> There isn't any cwi.nl.

Oops, that's ftp.cwi.nl




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Jeremy R. Smith" <jersmit@eis.calstate.edu>
Date: Sat, 31 Jul 93 15:05:02 PDT
To: Cypherpunks <cypherpunks@toad.com>
Subject: Encrypted BBS?
Message-ID: <Pine.3.07.9307311613.A27337-9100000@eis.calstate.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


	Would it be at all possible, given today's present state of
cryptography, to run a bbs in a totally encrypted form?  If so, are there
any software packages out there that accomplish this at some level?

						Jeremy Smith
						jersmit@eis.calstate.edu







From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: nobody@soda.berkeley.edu
Date: Sat, 31 Jul 93 17:13:51 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Perfect voice encryption
Message-ID: <9308010125.AA01282@soda.berkeley.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> For anyone interested, i know of a company that sell (until it's illegal) a
> computer package that enables the user to communicate over normal phone lines
> with complete (and i mean it) security.  it runs on a 386 or higher with a 
> sounblaster card.  The encryption is up to triple DES encoding with user 
> programmed keys (no record kept and no back doors for Big Brother or anyone
> else to use).  It would take serious effort by the NSA and all of their 
> supercomputers to decode a single transmission (assuming they could come up
> with a 'hook', something this program is incapable of transmitting).
> 
> Inquire to:
> SVC Inc.
> P.O. Box 9512
> College Station, TX 77842

Can you provide any better references to this company than a post office
box?  A phone number, perhaps, or an email address?  Are you affiliated
with them in any way?  I can't help feeling a bit paranoid about sending
my address to an unknown company when dealing with a sensitive topic like
this.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: collins@newton.apple.com (Scott Collins)
Date: Sat, 31 Jul 93 17:47:55 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Programs that prove themselves.
Message-ID: <9308010213.AA26390@newton.apple.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Intuitively, this is akin to Godels incompleteness theorem.

Or read "What is the name of this book?" by Raymond Smulliyan.  A multitude
of interesting problems are posed, around the interaction of Knights,
Knaves and Normals.  Knights always tell the truth.  Knaves always lie. 
Normals sometimes tell the truth and sometimes lie.

A Normal can 'pretend' to be a Knight, because he is not constrained in his
answers, therefore, he can always answer as a Knight would.

Your program might be a Knight (i.e., constrained to always tell the truth)
but a 'Normal' program could always simulate your program.  It would
perform all the functions of your program with stolen code, but inside it
wouln't prove itself to itself.

It is only in the presence of some unforgeable distinguishing
characteristic recognized by a trustworthy *outside* observer, that a
bystander can tell Normal from Knight.

Sign your software and have users check the signature with a trusted
outside signature verification mechanism (e.g. a 'good' copy of PGP, or a
secure operating system).

I know this is not the information you are looking for.  I also know this
is not a pipe.

Scott Collins         | "Few people realize what tremendous power there
                      |  is in one of these things."     -- Willy Wonka
......................|................................................
BUSINESS.   voice:408.862.0540  fax:974.6094   collins@newton.apple.com
Apple Computer, Inc.   1 Infinite Loop, MS 301-2C   Cupertino, CA 95014
.......................................................................
PERSONAL.   voice/fax:408.257.1746    1024/669687   catalyst@netcom.com





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Date: Sat, 31 Jul 93 20:30:57 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: "Village Voice" Article is Another Winner!
Message-ID: <9308010537.AA13092@netcom.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Many thanks to Paul Ferguson for posting the "Village Voice" article...we
out here in the boonies of Silicon Valley (well, relative to the V.V....a
refreshing change, eh?) have to wait for the "clipper ships" (and clipper
chips?) to arrive with the latest copies. (I hope everyone will get the
issue as soon as possible.)

I am pleasantly surprised at just how good the three main articles on
Cypherpunks have been--Levy's "Wired" piece, Kelly's long article in "Whole
Earth Review," and now Julian Dibbell's nice report in "The Village Voice."


(Yes, maybe I have some bias, given that I was quoted in each of
them....that's another reason I'm urging _others_ to do more of the talking
with the latest batch of journalists, Mssrs. Mulivor and Hum, so as to
spread the load a bit. But, as fair warning, if journalists contact _me_,
I'll continue to spout off. Maybe they like our more "crypto anarchist"
slant on things over possibly more mainstream topics like "data privacy.")

Some have sent e-mail to me saying that Dibbell was perhaps a bit
"leftist-biased" in his comments about "hippie-hacker millionaires," or
somesuch. I actually thought his points were very solid, capturing the
"hippie-hacker" feel of Cypherpunks (recall that one of our proposed names
was "Cryppies," a play on the nickname crypto boffins are given and an
obvious parallel to "Yippies" and "Hippies," even though many of us are
economic libertarians). And pointing out that perhaps not everyone will
embrace this new technology without qualms, that perhaps there is some
natural elitism involved (in at least some of us). I couldn't agree more.I
detected in his words of caution some of my own (and perhaps others, though
Eric Hughes can comment for himself) concerns...I tend to think in terms of
historical and technological "inevitability," which Julian characterized as
a kind of smugness, and I think he was perceptive here.

The "Voice" is not a technophilic mag like "Wired," so the social
implications are handled differently. I think their readers will be
well-served.

(Having not yet seen the published article, I don't know if there are
sidebars and pointers to other articles and sources. Are there?)

And his closing comment about strong crypto was powerful:

"Call strong cryptography a technical wager, then. It's a
smart bet that the state's long-running worst nightmare -- a
society whose entire informational texture is woven out of
unreadable secret codes -- turns out to be our own best dream of
the future."

An impressive article.


-Tim May

--
Timothy C. May         | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,  
tcmay@netcom.com       | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
408-688-5409           | knowledge, reputations, information markets, 
W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA  | black markets, collapse of governments.
Higher Power: 2^756839 | Public Key: by arrangement
Note: I put time and money into writing this posting. I hope you enjoy it.      







From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "L. Detweiler" <ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Date: Sat, 31 Jul 93 19:48:03 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: NCIC abuse, electronic leash ideas
Message-ID: <9308010444.AA12537@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


This is an `executive summary' from CRA Bulletin (Computing Research
Assoc., contact josuna@cs.umd.edu), followed by more explanation from
an article by L. Knutson for AP, apparently sent to the Telcom Digest
edited by the `Pat' editor who inserted interesting comments at the
end. The AP article is very disturbing.

Short summary: National Crime Information Center is the government
agency that tracks criminal records, used by FBI all the way down to
local law enforcement, and the data continually leaks in serious
abuses. (This is the same government that will find not one but TWO
completely incorruptable Key Escrow houses.) So another black eye for
Big Brother and more ammunition for the Cypherpunks:

>Laurie E. Ekstrand, the GAO's associate director for administration of
>justice issues, said ...
>"Furthermore, all the reported misuse incidents involve insiders,
>while none involved outside [computer] hackers," she said.

And YIKES look at the lead in to that AP article...

* * *

Maybe we need a new Bill of Rights for cyberspace that describes
precisely what data can be accessed, and by whom. Here are a few ideas
that have been rattling around in my brain for a long time:

- If you could put an electronic `leash' on your name or any other
electronic information about you, such that whenever it was relocated
you would feel a `tug' (an email message or whatever), you could track
exactly where your personal data is going, such as when your name
exchanges through copied mailing lists.

- Not only that, but we could set up a system where the leash is
interactive so that the individual can individual veto or allow such requests.

- One should be able to `yank' the leash on the name out of databases
where it should be permitted (e.g. anything involving private
companies, but of course not criminal records).

- In general, imagine that every person has their own personal database
that tracks *exactly* where *all* information in the world is stored about them.

- This could all be accomplished without new legislation (always the
preferrable method!), if a system was developed whereby every
commercial transaction was actually a contract between the two parties
to adhere to the `privacy protocol'. Of course, the presence of a
ubiquitous network that everyone has access to, sort of a new Minitel, is assumed.

- In general, we should begin to recognize that information itself can
be considered private property, and the method to enforce its
exclusivity is a contract between the owner and anyone who wishes to
`lease' it that enforces the owner's desired degrees of exclusivity.
This may involve monetary arrangements, i.e. I get paid to allow my
name to be circulated if I agree.

So, to accomplish all this electronic standards are required. If anyone
wants to start, it now would be great head start prior to the explosion
of commercial networking, and the standard could become available not a
moment too soon and entrenched as a result. It's definitely a first
class Cypherpunk project.

===cut=here===

GAO TELLS HOUSE OF NCIC COMPUTER ABUSE
=============================================================

The General Accounting Office made a statement before a House subcommittee 
July 28 about security holes in the National Crime Information Center computer 
system.

NCIC is the nation's largest computerized criminal justice information system, 
consisting of 24 million records accessible by 500,000 people.

Upon a request from Gary Condit (D-CA), GAO testified on NCIC security before 
a joint meeting between the House Judiciary Subcommittee on Civil and 
Constitutional Rights and the House Government Operations Subcommittee on 
Information Justice, Transportation and Agriculture.

NCIC is not easily penetratable from outside. However, because there is no 
password authentication, NCIC is easily abused by insiders, GAO said. 

Most users of the system simple identify themselves and their agencies using 
codes that are not kept secret.  The GAO reported instances where law 
enforcement agents entered the system using false codes, retrieved information 
and sold it to private investigators.



Subject: NCIC News
From: trader@cellar.org
Date: Fri, 30 Jul 93 21:04:53 EDT
Organization: The Cellar electronic community and public access system


I sent this to CuD, but thought that Telecom readers may also be
interested.
 
{Philadelphia Inquirer} - 07/29/93
 
CRIMINAL RECORDS ARE VULNERABLE TO ABUSE, CONGRESS IS WARNED
 
Sometimes the information is for sale, the GAO said.  It called for
greater security.
 
By Lawrence L. Knutson
ASSOCIATED PRESS
 
WASHINGTON -- In Arizona, a former police officer gained access to
print-outs from the FBI's National Crime Information Center, tracked
down his estranged girlfriend and murdered her.
 
In Pennsylvania, a computer operator used the system to conduct
background searches for her drug-dealer boyfriend, who wanted to learn
if new clients were undercover agents.
 
In Colorado, Connecticut, Florida, Maryland and other states, private
investigators bought data from insiders with authorized access to the
criminal-record system.
 
These examples were presented to the House Judiciary and Government
Operations Committeess yesterday by the General Accounting Office,
which concluded that the criminal-records system is vulnerable to
widespread misuse.
 
The GAO recommended that Congress enact legislation with "strong
criminal sanctions" barring the misuse of the criminal record files
and that the FBI encourage state users to enhance security.
 
Laurie E. Ekstrand, the GAO's associate director for administration of
justice issues, said that while the FBI and the states do not keep
adequate records, "we did obtain sufficient examples of misuse to
indicate that such misuse occurred throughout the system."
 
"Furthermore, all the reported misuse incidents involve insiders,
while none involved outside [computer] hackers," she said.
 
"It appears that there are employers, insurers, lawyers or
investigators who are willing to pay for illegal access to personal
information, and there are insiders who are willing to supply the
data," said Rep. Gary Condit (D., Calif.) summing up the GAO's
findings.
 
The National Crime Information Center, with 24 million records, is the
nation's largest computerized criminal justice information system.
Its 14 separate files contain an extensive range of data, including
information about fugitives, stolen vehicles and missing persons.
 
The largest single file, known as "the III file" gives users access to
17 million criminal-history information records maintained in separate
state systems.
 
The GAO said more than 19,000 federal, state and local law enforcement
agencies in the U.S. and Canada, using 97,000 terminals, have direct
access to the system.
 
The GAO called the Arizona case the most extreme example of misuse it
uncovered.
 
The agency said investigators learned that the former police officer
was able to locate his estranged girlfriend using data provided from
the national records system by three people working in different law
enforcement agencies.
 
"After an investigation, the printouts provided by the three
individuals were discovered and they were identified, prosecuted and
convicted," the GAO said.
 
Other examples provided by the GAO:
 
    - In Maine, a police officer used the system to conduct a background
      check on one of his wife's employees who was then fired for not
      disclosing his criminal record
 
    - In Iowa, a dozen cases of misuse were reported over the last two
      years.  All involved computer operators conducting background
      searches on friends or relatives.
 
    - In New York state, an employee of a law enforcement agency provided
      criminal history information to be used by a local politician against
      political opponents.
 
    - In Pennsylvania, a police officer "accessed and widely disseminated"
      a fellow officer's criminal history record.
 
    - In South Carolina, a law enforcement agency conducted background
      searches on members of the City Council.
 
                          -------------

[Moderator's Note: Be aware however that much information people don't
like having released is considered public record, and that includes
criminal histories. There are perhaps right ways and wrong ways to go
about getting the information, but criminal background information on
any person can be obtained quite legally, and you don't have to be a
law enforcement officer to get it. Here is why: In the United States,
our constitution calls for *open, public trials*. To wit, anyone can
walk into a courtroom, sit down and observe a trial in progress.
Records are kept of trials (we call them transcripts) and the same
rules which provide that trials are open to the public say that by
extension, transcripts can be read by anyone who wants to get it and
read it later. The court may charge a fee for its expense in making
the copy, but pay the fee and you get the record. 

Now no one is going to traipse around the country, state by state and
county by county looking to see if you are a criminal, a deadbeat or
whatever. What happens is that nearly every community has at least one
practioner of records research. Send them a note plus their fee and
*they* will walk over to the courthouse, pull the file and fax it to
you. Many researchers have cooperative arrangements with other
researchers. You pull files in your community that I need and I'll
pull files here for you. This then lead to computerized databases of
perfectly open, legally obtained information on criminal records
(among other things) in much the same credit bureaus work with each
other. 

So you don't have to get into confidential records illegally to get
what you want to find out, you just have to know where to go for
*legal, public* files which say the same thing or the essence thereof.
If your record in the Podunk Circuit Court says Judge Greene sent you
away for ten years for refusing to select a default one plus carrier,
I don't have to have an illicit contact in the NCIC or law enforcement
to tell me the same thing at some risk to my own freedom if I get
caught snooping!  Remember, you can have all the information you want
on anyone quite legally. Public records abound. Learn to use them. PAT]





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "L. Detweiler" <ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Date: Sat, 31 Jul 93 20:00:20 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Clipper is now Skipjack
Message-ID: <9308010459.AA12647@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I don't recall seeing articles saying that the government officially
decided to stop calling Clipper Clipper, and start calling it Skipjack,
because of the trademark infringement. I wonder when this actually
happened. Just another little humiliation...

>To avoid a trademark conflict, the government is renaming Clipper to Skipjack. 

p.s. Of course we should keep calling it Clipper out of perverse glee
(did anyone see the recent Simpsons where the infant Bart kept calling
his dad Homer? hee, hee).

===cut=here===

**********************************************
CRA ELECTRONIC BULLETIN--JULY 30, 1993 
**********************************************

        =-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=- 
        Distributed By

        Juan Antonio Osuna
        Computing Research Association
        1875 Connecticut Ave., NW, Suite 718
        Washington, DC 20009

        phone: (202) 234-2111
        E-mail: josuna@cs.umd.edu

        =-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-

[...]

PANEL TO REVIEW SKIPJACK (AKA CLIPPER)
=============================================================

The National Institute of Standards and Technology has selected five people to 
review the classified encryption algorithm Skipjack, also popularly known as 
Clipper. The government proposes Skipjack as a new standard for encrypting 
voice communications.

To avoid a trademark conflict, the government is renaming Clipper to Skipjack. 
The five reviewers will be Ernest Brickell of Sandia National Laboratories, 
Dorothy Denning of Georgetown University (also on the CRA board), Stephen Kent 
of BBN Communications, David Maher of AT&T, and Walter Tuchman of Amperif Corp.





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: williacw@vuse.vanderbilt.edu (Charles Williams)
Date: Sat, 31 Jul 93 19:14:00 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: UUENCODE/UUDECODE Specs
Message-ID: <9308010402.AA09172@necs.vuse>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Does anyone know where I might find the SPECS for the UUENCODE/DECODE utilities?

Ta[Dhanks.

Wesley

PGP 2.3A Key avaial[D[Dlable via finger. 





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: The Phantom <phantom@u.washington.edu>
Date: Sat, 31 Jul 93 21:08:05 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Big Brother Inside stickers
Message-ID: <Pine.3.05.9307312353.A15427-a100000@stein2.u.washington.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I've made up a decent-looking mockup of the sticker; the only problem was
getting the lettering to look right. I used a font called 'kids' instead
of recreating the entire thing by hand -- I think this lettering is
probably close enough to the original, though.

download the 9k .gif and take a look: ftp.u.washington.edu:
/pub/user-supported/cypherpunks/intellogo.gif

I haven't had any luck in contacting the person (re: vinyl stickers) that
was posted to this list, his account has been revoked. If anyone wants to
pick the ball up from here, I'm more than happy to turn over my
camera-ready copies of the logo.


mt


Matt Thomlinson                               Say no to the Wiretap Chip!
University of Washington, Seattle, Washington.
Internet: phantom@u.washington.edu      	    phone: (206) 528-5732
PGP 2.2  key available via email or finger phantom@hardy.u.washington.edu





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: mdavis@pro-sol.cts.com (Morgan Davis)
Date: Sat, 31 Jul 93 22:00:26 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Clipper is now Skipjack
In-Reply-To: <ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Message-ID: <gv84117@pro-sol.cts.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


This is crazy.  Is anyone (i.e. corporations) really going to use Skipjack?
Or will they be forced to use it in order to service government/military
contracts that require "Skipjack Security"?

If I had to trust my company's data to an encryption scheme, it would be
one where only I knew the key to decode it, not "five selected people"
(and the rest of government, and any agencies they wished to share my
data with).

 /\/\  Morgan Davis Group (619/670-0563)
/ /__\  Internet: mdavis@pro-sol.cts.com




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Duncan Frissell <frissell@panix.com>
Date: Sat, 31 Jul 93 18:38:54 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Outlawing Cash
Message-ID: <199308010320.AA17036@panix.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


To: cypherpunks@toad.com


>>>even "poor people" will then have credit
or debit cards. This eliminates the last practical argument for
allowing cash. <<<

However, there is another major argument in favor of cash - that it 
provides a concrete and absolutly enforcible accounting system for people 
who are totally unable to use any other system (illiterate, mentally 
defective, spendthrift, non-abstract thinkers, etc).  A fair chunk of the 
population can't handle an electronic payments system to save their lives.

>>>There will be the usual objections, but the "War on
Drugs" and the war on the underground economy, money laundering, etc.,
will be cited as a more pressing concern than the "freedom" to use
cash.<<<

Hopefully we will have radically restructured the system before them.


>>>An insistence on using cash, when electronic transactions are
*so much more convenient* will be see at best as an eccentricity and
at worst as grounds for further investigation.<<<

Do they have enough cops.  There is so much "wrongdoing" out there (and 
it is on the rise) that the cops will have their hands full just keeping a 
lid on things without being able to pursue such "thin" investigatory 
leads.

The other point usually ignored is that even an EPS can provide anonymity. 
 As electronic payments become more common and necessary, a market is 
created to help those with lousy access to the systems to complete these 
transactions.  Check cashing services are booming and they are starting to 
offer various sorts of EPS services (phone bills, etc).  The private 
payphone companies (and AT&T) are starting to sell 'debit' phonecards that 
are now making it easy to complete anonymous LD calls without a pile of 
quarters.  Secured credit cards are being issued by everyone from Western 
Union to Citibank.  These secured credit cards are designed for people 
with no credit history.  Non-existent people (created to serve one's 
own purposes) have truly non-existant credit histories.  Credit and debit 
cards acquired from banks in Haven jurisdictions overseas can also be used 
domestically.

The First Digital Bank of Cyberspace (SM) will issue debit Visa cards as 
one of its first marketing ploys.  You pick your own name.

>>>We Cypherpunks need to ensure our plans for digital money are not
closed off by these sorts of moves. (I'm not sure what we need to do,
or can do, but it's worth thinking about.)<<<

No doubt about it.

Duncan Frissell

Did you know that it is still possible -- in 1993 -- to open a bank 
account in the United States in a nome de guerre?

Like all rulers, William Jefferson Blythe Clinton is a libertarian for 
himself.  By the appropriate application of technology, we can force him, 
the Mrs., and all the other rulers to grant us the liberty that they 
arrogate to themselves.  

7 X</--- WinQwk 2.0b#07 X</                                                                                        




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "L. Detweiler" <ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Date: Sat, 31 Jul 93 21:14:07 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: D. Bernstein's Open Letter on NIST-PKP-DSA
Message-ID: <9308010625.AA13452@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Someone flamed once over including Usenet (esp. sci.crypt) postings
here, so I'll just give a summary of an excellent letter posted by D.
Bernstein (cowriter sci.crypt FAQ, dogged Sternlight flamer, ITAR
consultant, cryptographic agitator, etc.). I'm sure there'll be a lot
of flames over this one in sci.crypt, assuming nobody's brain dead.
There's some real pointy pricks at Bidzos and PKP (the truth hurts).

In short, Bernstein looks at the specific laws and conventions
surrounding granting a patent and exclusively so by the government to a
private company. The laws are fairly restrictive. The most devastating
claim is that NIST has failed to adhere to the law in granting a
license "only if, after public notice and opportunity for filing
written objections, it is determined that the interests of the Federal
Government and the public will best be served by the proposed license
... and the proposed terms and scope of exclusivity are not greater
than reasonably necessary.." 35 USC 209(c)(1)  Mostly he objects to the
*exclusive* arrangement (read: MONOPOLY), and points out that ``NIST
does not need to wait 60 days for public comments in order to grant a
nonexclusive license.'' 

- ``The public obviously has an interest in being able to use DSA
without royalty payments after PKP's patents expire. The grant of an
exclusive license would not serve this interest.'' Hence the `public
will be best served by the proposed license' clause of the law above is
not satisfied. Similar to the S. Walker letter I posted earlier.

- Law states that, for (partially or wholly) exclusive arrangements,
"the desired practical application has not been achieved,  or is not
likely expeditiously to be achieved, under any nonexclusive license
which has been granted, or which may be granted, on the invention."
That is, a monopoly is only acceptable if the products would be brought
to market in no other way. But Bernstein cites Info Security Corp.
selling implementations of DSA *now*.

- Similarly, law requires "exclusive or partially exclusive licensing
is a reasonable and necessary incentive to call forth the investment of
risk capital and expenditures to bring the invention to practical
application or otherwise promote the invention's utilization by the
public." 35 USC 209(c)(1)(C) But DSA is already in practical
application and promoted by ISC. Not only that, but digital signatures
would clearly be embraced by many companies *without* the incentive of
awarded monopoly (assuming the algorithm was robust, but we're going in
circles). He argues that a *nonexclusive* arrangement with PKP could
achieve the `same effects', and therefore the monopolistic arrangement
is not `reasonable or necessary' under this law.

-  NIST's 8 June 1993 notice states that "it was determined that
expeditious granting of such license will best serve the interest of
the Federal Government and the public." As Bernstein writes, ``under 35
USC 209(c)(1), NIST is required to make such determinations
_a_f_t_e_r the public comment period...''

- Points out that NIST has `already promised the public royalty-free
use of DSS'.  Items: The Deputy Directory of NIST testified on 27 June
1991 that DSA "is expected to be available on a royalty-free basis in
the public interest world-wide." In the 30 August 1991 Federal
Register, NIST stated again "NIST expects it to be available on a
royalty-free basis. Broader use of this technique resulting from public
availability should be an economic benefit to the government and the public."

- Attacks the PKP royalty rates as `obscene' and `exploitive'. In the
June 8 announcement there is the slippery phrase, `subject to uniform
minimum fees'. The fees are neither uniform nor minimal. $10K startup
plus $10K per year for businesses under $1M per year, and $25K up front
and $10K per year for businesses over $1M per year.  ``Obviously it
would have been more difficult for PKP to convince NIST to grant PKP a
license if PKP had disclosed its actual exploitative fees---otherwise,
why has NIST been planning to require PKP to charge uniform fees?''
Sorry, that all assumes that NIST (that is, the NSA puppetmaster
driving it) isn't in full knowledge of every aspect of the complete
proposal, a rather unlikely scenario.

- He goes back and looks at early DSS testimony, and shows that
everyone's opinions on the patent infringement are divided and unsure,
whereas of those claiming `PKP and Schnorr have a serious claim upon
DSA rights' many have `a financial interest in PKP which they did not
disclose' (Bidzos, Rivest, Hellman, Fischer) which `you may not be
aware of'. (I can't imagine that M.R. Rubin could be so naive, he seems
rather likely to be an accomplice, but all bureacrats are inscrutable).

>Together these people shout quite loudly. Each one cites accusations of 
>patent infringement from the others, while they all pretend to be
>independent scientists and businessmen. Sometimes they bamboozle 
>outsiders into thinking "all these people say there's a problem, so
>there must be a problem."
>
>
In fact all the accusations come primarily from financial partners of
>one man, Jim Bidzos. Please be aware that all is not as it seems. The 
>interests of Jim Bidzos, no matter how often repeated, are not the 
>interests of the public.

- The NIST June 8 announcement does not actually describe the exact
licensing arrangement, only generalities. He asks that NIST give the
*specific* license arrangement and restart the 60 day public hearing
period, which is already ticking.

- Objects that NIST give in to PKP patents when it has not been
demonstrated (e.g. by a court) that the DSA algorithm infringes on the
PKP patents. I think he's on thin ice here, esp. regarding the Schnorr situation.

In general Bernstein doesn't subscribe to any conspiracy theories, and
takes the view that the wool has been pulled over NIST's eyes by PKP in
withholding information (such as the `uniform minimum fees'), and is
overly optimistic about the influence of his comments and others during
the review period (``even a short letter can be devastatingly
effective'' he writes).

I think this is a bit naive. In particular, the public-key Capstone
licensing term of the arrangement (which he completely ignores)
suggests that both sides were shrewdly engaged in a mutually beneficial
arrangement (that is, between NSA and PKP, NIST dutifully cloaking the
machinations of the former). The 60 days comments period on the
licensing is probably just a smokescreen--it serves nothing other than
determining how much outrage such an action would cause, how much
collusion can be slithered through.  Writing to Rubin, he states:

>You told me that the Federal Government has certain national security
>interests in the PKP license. As the documents explaining these
>interests are supposedly classified I am unable to address this point.

I'd be glad to explain it.  `national security interests': euphemism
for widespread Clipper & Capstone penetration and a wiretapping
free-for-all. Remember, without PKP's consent, Capstone public key
exchange infringes on PKP patents.  This is an *immensely* valuable PKP
trump card and critical necessity for the NSA if they want to have a
widespread commercial standard. Stop wondering why the NIST-PKP-DSS
arrangement is so one-sided! It makes no sense unless one considers it
in the full lewd exposure of the Clipper-Capstone clampdown.

* * *

On the other hand, lots of Anti PKP-Bidzos Propaganda!

>PKP is not an engineering company trying to protect a risky 
>investment; it is a litigation company using its patent portfolio.
>
>PKP is a litigation company. Its sole contact with the public, to my 
>knowledge, has been a series of threatening letters. It does not bring
>inventions to practical application, or promote use of anything by the
>public, nor has it ever demonstrated any ability to do so.


>Bidzos has habitually squashed the use of cryptography.
>
>It is well known that Bidzos, via PKP, has attempted to squash several
>public-key cryptography implementations, such as RPEM and PGP. For
>several years personal computers have been fast enough to make
>public-key cryptography convenient for the masses. Do you make daily use 
>of encryption? I suggest that, if it were not for Bidzos, we would all 
>be using cryptography now.
>
>If Bidzos's goal were to make money he would offer personal licenses to
>let individuals use PGP for a reasonable fee. Instead he simply refuses
>to provide any licenses for PGP.
>
>Given his history, do we want Bidzos in control of DSA? Especially now, 
>when he is just a few years away from losing his monopolies, does it 
>make any sense to give him a fresh new 17-year monopoly over a U.S. 
>government standard technology?

* * *

Included: why it's not `no big deal', and another call for YOU to write
letters (ah, if only all the faceless bureacrats had email addresses).

===cut=here===

From: djb@silverton.berkeley.edu (D. J. Bernstein)
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
Subject: An open letter of opposition to the NIST-PKP giveaway
Date: 31 Jul 93 00:23:03 GMT

NIST plans to give PKP exclusive rights to NIST's DSA patent. Attached
is a copy of a letter I just sent NIST in opposition to this plan.

Some people have told me that they've read the NIST-PKP announcement and 
don't see any big problem. After all, they say, PKP asks for a mere 5%
royalty rate! Isn't it worth this much to settle the issue?

These people have missed a crucial phrase in the announcement. ``PKP's 
royalty rates for the right to make or sell products, _subject to
uniform minimum fees_, will be no more than 2 1/2% for hardware products 
and 5% for software...'' [italics added].

Those ``uniform fees,'' it turns out, are a minimum of $5 per program
per user, subject to a minimum of $10,000 per program per year, plus a
non-uniform startup fee of $10,000 for small companies and $25,000 for
large companies.

If you'd like to object to the NIST-PKP giveaway, you still have time. 
Your letter must be received by Michael R. Rubin, Acting Chief Counsel 
for Technology, Room A-1111, Administration Building, National Institute 
of Standards and Technology, Gaithersburg, MD 20899, 301-975-2803, by 
Friday, 6 August. (Rubin actually says that the next Monday is okay; but 
I wouldn't risk it.)

Even a short letter (``Dear Mr. Rubin: For NIST to grant an exclusive
DSA license to PKP would be illegal and against the public interest.
Please do not do this.'') can be devastatingly effective.

(You may also want to send a copy of your letter to the League for 
Programming Freedom, 1 Kendall Square #143, P.O. Box 9171, Cambridge, MA 
02139.)

---Dan





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: fergp@sytex.com (Paul Ferguson)
Date: Sat, 31 Jul 93 22:05:26 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Anon remailer to USENET gate bogus
Message-ID: <LF7k8B3w165w@sytex.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I have been experimenting the past few days with anon remailer to USENET 
gateway systems to see what the results would be -- nada. I used Chael's 
BSU system (nowhere@bsu-cs.bsu.edu) to attempt a usenet post which never 
(magically?) appeared in the desired group (alt.privacy, I believe). I 
waited for several days for the post, but nada, zilch, zero. I retried 
the bsu remailer with a test message to make sure it was still active, 
and yes, it seemed to work perfectly. My guess is that the usenet gateway 
at utexas refuses anon e-mail. Anyone got any other suggestions? I 
haven't tried any other gateways -- yet.

Cheers.

Paul Ferguson               |  "Government, even in its best state,
Network Integrator          |   is but a necessary evil; in its worst
Centreville, Virginia USA   |   state, an intolerable one."
fergp@sytex.com             |      - Thomas Paine, Common Sense
 
         I love my country, but I fear its government.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: khijol!erc@apple.com (Ed Carp)
Date: Sun, 1 Aug 93 01:02:06 PDT
To: fergp@sytex.com (Paul Ferguson)
Subject: Re: Anon remailer to USENET gate bogus
In-Reply-To: <LF7k8B3w165w@sytex.com>
Message-ID: <m0oMXv4-00023VC@khijol>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text


> I have been experimenting the past few days with anon remailer to USENET 
> gateway systems to see what the results would be -- nada. I used Chael's 
> BSU system (nowhere@bsu-cs.bsu.edu) to attempt a usenet post which never 
> (magically?) appeared in the desired group (alt.privacy, I believe). I 
> waited for several days for the post, but nada, zilch, zero. I retried 
> the bsu remailer with a test message to make sure it was still active, 
> and yes, it seemed to work perfectly. My guess is that the usenet gateway 
> at utexas refuses anon e-mail. Anyone got any other suggestions? I 
> haven't tried any other gateways -- yet.

You're right.  Fletcher Mattox disabled anonymous posts a while back. :(
-- 
Ed Carp, N7EKG			erc@apple.com			510/659-9560

If you want magic, let go of your armor.  Magic is so much stronger than
steel!        -- Richard Bach, "The Bridge Across Forever"



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: khijol!erc@apple.com (Ed Carp)
Date: Sun, 1 Aug 93 01:01:03 PDT
To: ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu (L. Detweiler)
Subject: Re: D. Bernstein's Open Letter on NIST-PKP-DSA
In-Reply-To: <9308010625.AA13452@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Message-ID: <m0oMXwq-00023VC@khijol>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text


> Someone flamed once over including Usenet (esp. sci.crypt) postings

What was their rationale?  I'd rather see relevent postings reposted here-
damnit, I don't have *time* to read 280MB a week of news!  What's the person's
problem who flamed you?
-- 
Ed Carp, N7EKG			erc@apple.com			510/659-9560

If you want magic, let go of your armor.  Magic is so much stronger than
steel!        -- Richard Bach, "The Bridge Across Forever"



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: fergp@sytex.com (Paul Ferguson)
Date: Sun, 1 Aug 93 03:18:27 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Computer Systems Laboratory Newsletter, Aug '93
Message-ID: <928k8B1w165w@sytex.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


FYI -
 
              A LETTER FROM THE COMPUTER SYSTEMS LABORATORY            
 
                            August 1993 
 
TRACKING DEVELOPMENTS IN TRUSTED SYSTEMS
The 16th National Computer Security Conference, to be held
September 20-23, 1993, at the Baltimore Convention Center, will
dedicate a full track to Information Technology (IT) Security
Criteria and Evaluation.  The track will expand on the
collaborative effort between the National Institute of Standards
and Technology (NIST) and the National Security Agency (NSA) to
develop a security criteria document suitable for use by both 
government and industry.  The objectives are to enhance the
development and evaluation of IT products with security features
and to develop an extensible and flexible framework for defining
new requirements for IT security products that will be used by
the international IT community.
 
The new track will focus on IT security criteria efforts over the
last year.  An introduction to the Federal Criteria will be
followed by tutorials on protection profile development and the
potential ways in which profiles may be reviewed and registered
for use by product developers, customers, and evaluators.  Other
panel discussions will include a comparison of the current
evaluation processes in North America and Europe and a report on
the status and plans for a commercial security evaluation process
in the U.S.
 
The track will also feature a panel discussion on a new
international project to develop common IT security criteria that
will align existing national criteria.  NIST and NSA officials
announced the project during the Federal Criteria Invitational
Workshop, held on June 2-3, 1993.  The project is a joint
activity of the governments of the U.S., Canada, and European
nations.  Six government IT security officials from these nations
have formed the Common Criteria Editorial Board (CCEB). 
Presenting their perspectives, CCEB panel members will describe
their work, the starting documents, and the timetable for planned
draft criteria, review, and trial use periods.
 
Ellen Flahavin, coordinator for the Criteria and Evaluation
track, expects IT professionals from around the world to attend
these sessions.  For specific information on the track, contact
Ellen at NIST, Computer Systems Laboratory, POLY A241,
Gaithersburg, MD 20899-0001, telephone (301) 975-3871.  For
general information on the computer security conference, see the
Upcoming Technical Conferences section of the newsletter.  We
welcome your participation in the 16th National Computer Security
Conference and look forward to seeing you at the Baltimore
Convention Center at the Inner Harbor in September.
 
FEDERAL INFORMATION PROCESSING STANDARDS (FIPS) ACTIVITIES
Secure Hash Standard Approved for Federal Agency Use
On May 11, 1993, the Secretary of Commerce approved FIPS 180,
Secure Hash Standard, for use by federal agencies in protecting
unclassified information that is not subject to section 2315 of
Title 10, United States Code, or section 3502(2) of Title 44,
United States Code.  To be effective October 15, 1993, FIPS 180
specifies a Secure Hash Algorithm (SHA) which can be used to
generate a condensed representation of a message called a message
digest.  The SHA is required for use with the planned Digital
Signature Algorithm (DSA) and whenever a secure hash algorithm is
required for federal applications.  Private and commercial
organizations are encouraged to adopt and use the standard.
 
The SHA is used by both the transmitter and intended receiver of
a message in computing and verifying a digital signature. 
Appropriate applications of the SHA include electronic mail,
electronic funds transfer, software distribution, data storage,
and other applications which require data integrity assurance and
data origin authentication.  The SHA may be implemented in
software, firmware, hardware, or any combination. Implementations
of the SHA will be validated by NIST. 
 
Secretary of Commerce Approves POSIX Revision
FIPS 151-1, POSIX:  Portable Operating System Interface for
Computer Environments, has been revised to adopt International
Standard ISO/IEC 9945-1:1990, Information Technology--Portable
Operating System Interface (POSIX)--Part 1:  System Application
Program Interface (API) [C Language] which defines a C
programming language source interface to an operating system
environment.  Effective October 15, 1993, the revised standard
will be published as FIPS 151-2 and supersedes FIPS 151-1 in its
entirety.  FIPS 151-2 will maximize the federal return on
investment in generating or purchasing computer programs by
enhancing operating system compatibility.
 
Computer Graphics Metafile (CGM) Standard Revised
The Secretary of Commerce approved a revision to FIPS 128, CGM,
which will be published as FIPS 128-1.  The revised standard
adopts the redesignated version of the CGM standard known as
ANSI/ISO 8632.1-4:1992; adds a requirement for the use of
profiles which define the options, elements, and parameters of
ANSI/ISO 8632 necessary to accomplish a particular function and
to maximize the probability of interchange between systems
implementing the profile; and adopts the first such profile, the
military specification MIL-D-28003A, November 15, 1991, known as
the CALS (Computer-aided Acquisition and Logistic Support) CGM
Application Profile.
 
FIPS 128-1 is a graphics data interface standard which specifies
a file format suitable for the description, storage, and
communication of graphical (pictorial) information in a device-
independent manner.  The standard facilitates the transfer of
graphical information between different graphical software
systems, different graphical devices, and different computer
graphics installations.
 
The revised standard becomes effective October 15, 1993.  The use
of the CGM Application Profile is mandatory October 15, 1994.  We
encourage agencies to use the application profile in acquisitions
initiated during this period.
 
Revision of FIPS for Database Language SQL
On May 12, 1993, the Secretary of Commerce approved a substantial
enhancement of FIPS 127-1, SQL.  Effective December 3, 1993, the
revised standard will be published as FIPS 127-2 and replaces
FIPS 127-1 in its entirety.  FIPS 127-2 is mandatory for all
federal procurements of relational model database management
systems.  The revised SQL standard adds significant new features
for schema definition, diagnostics management, integrity
constraints, and international character set support, as well as
new data types, new table operations, and enhanced data
manipulation expressions.  A new Information Schema makes all
schema data available to applications.
 
FIPS 127-2 is specified in four separate conformance levels: 
Entry SQL, Transitional SQL, Intermediate SQL, and Full SQL. 
Although only Entry SQL is required, initially, for conformance
to FIPS 127-2, a higher conformance level may be specified as
mandatory in individual agency procurements.  The NIST SQL Test
Suite, Version 4.0, provides conformance tests for the Entry SQL
level of FIPS 127-2.  Future versions of the test suite will
evaluate other FIPS SQL conformance levels.  We invite you to
call Joan Sullivan on (301) 975-3258 for order information on the
NIST SQL Test Suite.  
 
Input/Output Interface Standards Withdrawn
Effective May 11, 1993, eight FIPS have been withdrawn because
the technical specifications that they adopt are obsolete and are
no longer supported by industry.  The standards include:
 
--   FIPS 60-2, I/O Channel Interface, revised December 18, 1990.
     
--   FIPS 61-1, Channel Level Power Control Interface, revised
     December 18, 1990.
 
--   FIPS 62, Operational Specifications for Magnetic Tape
     Subsystems, revised December 18, 1990.
 
--   FIPS 63-1, Operational Specifications for Variable Block
     Rotating Mass Storage Subsystems, revised December 18, 1990;
     Supplement to FIPS 63-1, Additional Operational
     Specifications for Variable Block Rotating Mass Storage
     Subsystems, revised December 18, 1990.
 
--   FIPS 97, Operational Specifications for Fixed Block Rotating
     Mass Storage Subsystems, revised December 18, 1990.
 
--   FIPS 111, Storage Module Interfaces (with extensions for
     enhanced storage module interfaces), revised December 18,
     1990.
 
--   FIPS 130, Intelligent Peripheral Interface (IPI), revised
     December 18, 1990.
 
--   FIPS 131, Small Computer System Interface (SCSI), revised
     December 18, 1990.
 
UPDATE ON NEW PUBLICATIONS
CSL publishes the results of studies, investigations, and
research.  The reports listed below may be ordered from the
following sources as indicated for each:
 
*Superintendent of Documents
U.S. Government Printing Office
(GPO)
Washington, DC 20402
Telephone (202) 783-3238
 
*National Technical Information
Service (NTIS)
5285 Port Royal Road
Springfield, VA 22161
Telephone (703) 487-4650
 
The First Text REtrieval Conference (TREC-1)
D. K. Harman, Editor
NIST Spec. Pub. 500-207
March 1993
SN003-003-03207-7        $29.00
Order from GPO
 
This report constitutes the proceedings of the first Text
REtrieval Conference (TREC-1) held November 4-6, 1992. 
Cosponsored by NIST and the Defense Advanced Research Projects
Agency (DARPA), the conference was the first in an ongoing series
of workshops to evaluate new technologies in text retrieval.
 
Software Error Analysis
By Wendy W. Peng and Dolores R. Wallace
NIST Spec. Pub. 500-209
March 1993
SN003-003-03212-3        $7.00
Order from GPO
 
This document provides the software engineering community with
current information regarding error analysis for software.  It
assists users by describing how error analysis can improve the
software development process and provides guidelines for the
evaluation of high-integrity software.
 
The DARPA TIMIT Acoustic Phonetic Continuous Speech Corpus CD-ROM
[TIMIT]
By John S. Garofolo, Lori F. Lamel, William M. Fisher, Jonathan
G. Fiscus, David S. Pallett, and Nancy L. Dahlgren
NISTIR 4930
February 1993
PB93-173938              $19.50 paper
Order from NTIS          $ 9.00 microfiche
 
This document presents the documentation supporting the DARPA
TIMIT (Texas Instruments/Massachusetts Institute of Technology)
Acoustic-Phonetic Continuous Speech Corpus released on CD-ROM in
October 1990 (NIST Speech Disc 1-1.1).
 
An International Survey of Industrial Applications of Formal
Methods Volume 1:  Purpose, Approach, Analysis, and Conclusions;
Volume 2:  Case Studies
By Dan Craigen, Susan Gerhart, and Ted Ralston
NIST GCR 93/626
March 1993
PB93-178556(vol.1)       $27.00 paper
PB93-178564(vol.2)       $17.50 microfiche
Order from NTIS
 
This two-volume study evaluates international industrial
experience in using formal methods and presents cases
representative of industrial-grade projects which span a variety
of application domains.
 
Building Hadamard Matrices in Steps of 4 to Order 200
By Nathalie Drouin
NISTIR 5121
April 1993
PB93-189835              $17.50 paper
Order from NTIS          $ 9.00 microfiche
 
This report describes the construction of Hadamard matrices for
use in generating statistical plans of analysis for the synthetic
perturbation tuning technique of program sensitivity analysis.
 
Computer Systems Laboratory Annual Report--1992
By Elizabeth B. Lennon, Shirley Radack, and Ramona Roach
NISTIR 5127
December 1992
PB93-181873              $19.50 paper
Order from NTIS          $12.50 microfiche
 
This report describes the 1992 computer and related
telecommunications activities of NIST's Computer Systems
Laboratory.
 
Using Synthetic-Perturbation Techniques for Tuning Shared Memory
Programs
By Robert Snelick, Joseph Ja'Ja', Raghu Kacker, and Gordon Lyon
NISTIR 5139
March 1993
PB93-178572              $17.50 paper
Order from NTIS          $ 9.00 microfiche
 
This paper explains the synthetic-perturbation tuning (SPT)
methodology which is based on an empirical approach that
introduces artificial delays into the multiple-instruction,
multiple-data (MIMD) program.  It also addresses specific
features that are the main source of poor performance on the
shared memory programming model.
 
Detailed Design Specification for Conformance Testing of Computer
Graphics Metafile (CGM) Interpreter Products
Daniel R. Benigni, Editor
NISTIR 5146
March 1993
PB93-178580              $19.50 paper
Order from NTIS          $ 9.00 microfiche
 
This report presents a detailed design specification for
determining conformance of CGM Interpreter Products to the
requirements of Federal Information Processing Standard (FIPS)
128, CGM, and the Military Specification MIL-D-28003A.  The work
supports the Computer-aided Acquisition and Logistic Support
(CALS) initiative of the Department of Defense.
 
Statistical Analysis of Information Content for Training Pattern
Recognition Networks
By C.L. Wilson
NISTIR 5149
March 1993
PB93-178861              $17.50 paper
Order from NTIS          $ 9.00 microfiche
 
This report provides an analysis, based upon statistical models
of neural networks, of the data content for training pattern
recognition systems.
 
Minimum Security Requirements for Multi-User Operating Systems
By David Ferraiolo, Nickilyn Lynch, Patricia Toth, David
Chizmadia, Michael Ressler, Roberta Medlock, and Sarah Weinberg
NISTIR 5153
March 1993
PB93-185999              $17.50 paper
Order from NTIS          $ 9.00 microfiche
 
This document provides basic commercial computer system security
requirements applicable to both government and commercial
organizations.  These requirements form the basis for the
commercially oriented protection profiles in Volume II of the
draft Federal Criteria for Information Technology Security
document (known as the Federal Criteria).
 
Comparative Performance of Classification Methods for
Fingerprints
By G.T. Candela and R. Chellappa
NISTIR 5163
April 1993
PB93-184273              $17.50 paper
Order from NTIS          $ 9.00 microfiche
 
This study compares the results of several pattern classifiers as
tested on NIST Special Database 4, which consists of fingerprint
images produced from two rollings of each of 2000 different
fingers.  The classifiers tested are drawn from traditional
pattern recognition literature as well as neural network
literature.
 
NIST Scoring Package Certification Procedures in Conjunction with
NIST Special Databases 2 and 6
By Michael D. Garris
NISTIR 5173
April 1993
PB93-188126              $17.50 paper
Order from NTIS          $ 9.00 microfiche
 
This document presents procedures developed by CSL to promote
compliance with existing Scoring Package file formats.  CSL
strongly encourages Scoring Package certification to maximize the
successful scoring of recognition system data.
 
Optimization of Adaptive Resonance Theory Network With Boltzmann
Machine
By Omid M. Omidvar and Charles L. Wilson
NISTIR 5176
April 1993
PB93-188134              $17.50 paper
Order from NTIS          $ 9.00 microfiche
 
This report presents optical character recognition research which
combines Boltzmann methods and the Adaptive Resonance Theory
(ART) to generate small testing networks which achieve reduced
training error and improved network speed applicable to the
optimization of large neural networks.
 
Computer Graphics Metafile (CGM) Test Requirements Document
(Update)
By Lynne S. Rosenthal
NISTIR 5191
April 1993
PB93-198273              $19.50 paper
Order from NTIS          $ 9.00 microfiche
 
This document updates and supplements the Computer Graphics
Metafile (CGM) Test Requirements Document published in 1989 as
NISTIR 4329.  Revisions in FIPS 128, CGM, and MIL-D-28003A add
new functionality and additional requirements, necessitating the
update of the conformance test suite and tools.
 
UPCOMING TECHNICAL CONFERENCES
 
Digital Systems Reliability and Nuclear Safety Workshop
This workshop will provide state-of-the-art information to the
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) staff and to the nuclear
industry from outside experts regarding potential safety issues,
proposed regulatory positions, and research associated with the
application of digital systems in nuclear power plants.
Sponsor:  Nuclear Regulatory Commission, in cooperation with NIST
Dates:  September 13-14, 1993
Place:  Rockville Crowne Plaza Hotel, Rockville, MD
Contact:  Dolores Wallace
(301) 975-3340
 
Open System Environment (OSE) Implementors Workshop (OIW)
This workshop is part of a continuing series to develop
implementation specifications from international standard design
specifications for computer network protocols.
Sponsors:  NIST and the IEEE Computer Society
Dates:  September 13-17, 1993
        December 6-10, 1993
Place:  NIST, Gaithersburg, MD
Contact:  Brenda Gray
(301) 975-3664
 
16th National Computer Security Conference
The theme of this year's conference is "Information Systems
Security:  User Choices."  The major emphasis will be on meeting
the special needs of users and creating better security for user
information technology resources.
Sponsors:  NIST and NSA's National Computer Security Center
Date:  September 20-23, 1993
Place:  Baltimore Convention Center, Inner Harbor, Baltimore, MD
Contacts:  Irene Gilbert Perry (301) 975-3360
           Dennis Gilbert (301) 975-3872
 
Federal Wireless Users Forum (FWUF)
This new users group was established to address wireless digital
interface issues in the federal government.  Although focusing on
the requirements of federal wireless telecommunication users, the
forum encourages the participation of state and local government,
other interested users, product providers, and service providers. 
Sponsors:  NIST and the National Communications System (NCS)
Date:  September 27-29, 1993 at Marriott Washingtonian Center,
          Gaithersburg, MD
Date:  January 18-20, 1994, at NIST
Contact:  Mary Ruhl
(301) 975-2983
 
North American ISDN Users' Forum (NIUF)
The NIUF addresses many concerns over a broad range of Integrated
Services Digital Network (ISDN) issues and seeks to reach
consensus on ISDN Implementation Agreements.  Participants
include ISDN users, implementors, and service providers.
Dates:  October 18-22, 1993
Place:  NIST, Gaithersburg, MD
Contact:  Dawn Hoffman
(301) 975-2937
 
Applications Portability Profile (APP)/Open Systems Environment
(OSE) Workshop
This workshop is designed as a user's forum to discuss the latest
developments in the APP/OSE.
Dates:  November 16-17, 1993
Place:  NIST, Gaithersburg, MD
Contact:  Joe Hungate
(301) 975-3368
 
 

Paul Ferguson               |  "Government, even in its best state,
Network Integrator          |   is but a necessary evil; in its worst
Centreville, Virginia USA   |   state, an intolerable one."
fergp@sytex.com             |      - Thomas Paine, Common Sense
 
         I love my country, but I fear its government.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Duncan Frissell <frissell@panix.com>
Date: Sun, 1 Aug 93 04:57:09 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: "Village Voice" Article i
Message-ID: <199308011155.AA22970@panix.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


To: cypherpunks@toad.com
T >The "Voice" is not a technophilic mag like 
T >"Wired," so the social
T >implications are handled differently. I think 
T >their readers will be
T >well-served.

T >-Tim May

I didn't like being called a neo-luddite, however.  I don't see many 
paralells between extropianism and cypherpunks and Ned Lud.

Duncan Frissell

--
You don't have to be nice to nation states you meet on the way up if 
you're not coming back down.

--- WinQwk 2.0b#0
                                        




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: fergp@sytex.com (Paul Ferguson)
Date: Sun, 1 Aug 93 13:48:31 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Key Escrow and MYK-ky Mouse
Message-ID: <8kZL8B1w165w@sytex.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


On Sat, 31 Jul 93 22:59:12 -0600,
 L. Detweiler <uunet!longs.lance.colostate.edu!ld231782> wrote -
 
> I don't recall seeing articles saying that the government officially
> decided to stop calling Clipper Clipper, and start calling it Skipjack,
> because of the trademark infringement. I wonder when this actually
> happened. Just another little humiliation...
 
Probably because the government never officially annonced it. ,-)
 
The algoritm is _still_ called Skipjack, only the entire initiative,
and the chips themselves, have seemed to been discreetly renamed.
 
Actually, I noticed that the NIST stopped calling the plan "Clipper"
and started emphatically calling the entire farce the "key-escrow"
initiative when the open forum and hearing was announced in May for
the Computer Systems Security and Privacy Advisory Board review held
in June in Gaithersburg. A "contact" in the NIST explained that they
were embarrassed by the Intergraph correlation in the "Clipper"
moniker, so they just casually started calling it something else
completely.
 
As far as I'm concerned, it's still the MYK-78 and "Capstone" is still
MYK-80. It sounds more militaristic, which is in keeping with the image
of a Gestapo dictatorship.
 
Cheers.

Paul Ferguson               |  "Government, even in its best state,
Network Integrator          |   is but a necessary evil; in its worst
Centreville, Virginia USA   |   state, an intolerable one."
fergp@sytex.com             |      - Thomas Paine, Common Sense
 
         I love my country, but I fear its government.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: elee9sf@Menudo.UH.EDU
Date: Sun, 1 Aug 93 09:37:12 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Anon remailer to USENET gate bogus
Message-ID: <199308011634.AA13308@Menudo.UH.EDU>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



> and yes, it seemed to work perfectly. My guess is that the usenet gateway 
> at utexas refuses anon e-mail. Anyone got any other suggestions? I 

This could very well be.  An associate of mine :-) discovered that
anonymous posts made via remailers concerning the student suspension
at UH (traffic on comp.admin.policy and alt.comp.acad-freedom.talk a
few weeks ago) stopped showing quite suddenly.

On the other hand, be advised that the gateway at UTexas doesn't post
to all groups - I tried posting to alt.security once, only to have the
post returned to me with a note "group renamed to comp.security.misc".

So if anonymous posts are filtered - how is it being done?  If it is
something simple like refusing posts from a username of nobody then
that can be fixed easily enough.  But it may block posts by taking
addresses from the list of remailers.

/-----------------------------------\
| Karl L. Barrus                    |
| elee9sf@menudo.uh.edu             | <- preferred address
| barrus@tree.egr.uh.edu (NeXTMail) |
\-----------------------------------/




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: bart@netcom.com (Harry Bartholomew)
Date: Sun, 1 Aug 93 11:57:13 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Has the other shoe dropped ?
Message-ID: <9308011855.AA26646@netcom5.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


	Has nobody else heard on NPR's Weekend Edition that the FBI
	has requested the banning of non-Clipper encryption ?
	Or was I really not quite awake and recalling a bad dream ?

	Bart





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: nate@VIS.ColoState.EDU (CVL staff member Nate Sammons)
Date: Sun, 1 Aug 93 13:49:09 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: "Big Brother Inside" logo
Message-ID: <9308012048.AA19505@vangogh.VIS.ColoState.EDU>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



CPs,

I have just now finished my "Big Brother Inside" logo.  Here is a recap:

The logo was scanned in as 600dpi line-art on a Microtech scanner (logo
from an ad in Time mag.).  I then used Adobe Photoshop to change the size
to 8.667" wide and 8" tall, at 300 dpi.  At this size, I messed with the 
letters, and smoothed out all the aliasing bumbs that the scanner made.

Short story:  The logo is REALLY cool.  I have a 8.667" by 8" logo and 
a 2" by 1.8" version (for stickers) - I envision the larger one
being for T-shirts...  I am investigating having Tshirts made with
the logo on the front and a blurb about not using the Clipper (or is
it Skipjack?) chips.  Does anyone have any good ideas for what to 
put on the back?  so far I have this:

                     (BIG LETTERS HERE)
                     Fight the Clipper.
 
(Smaller letters)
   Arise, you have nothing to lose but your barbed wire fences! 
    (with Tim's permission, assuming he grants it)
               Quis Custodiet Ipsos Custodes?
 
         Consult the EFFto find out what you can do:
              Electronic Frontier Foundation
                   1001 G Street, NW
                     Suite 950 East
                  Washington, DC 20001
                  VOX  +1 202 347 5400
                  FAX  +1 202 393 5509
                  Internet: eff@eff.org

Anyway, I will send the files in Gif and PICT format to soda in the morning
(I have been having REAL problems with sending data over the phone lately)

BTW, has anyone had luck getting that guy's phone number - the one who said he
could make vinyl stickers?

I'll keep posting about the T-shirts...

-nate sammons
 nate@vis.colostate.edu




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: ckchiu@cs.cuhk.hk (Chiu Chong-kan)
Date: Sun, 1 Aug 93 01:51:03 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Any UNIX security references/mailing-lists ?
Message-ID: <9308010852.AA07244@cucs18.cs.cuhk.hk>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text


Hi,
    Can anyone suggest some good references/mailing-lists
about UNIX security ?  I've already read lots of popular
papers/books, such as "practical unix security",
"improving UNIX security",internet worm, race condition
to gain root permission, phrack(25), CERT, etc.  I heard
that there exists some references circulated among the 
SAs only, such as Neil Gorsuch mailings, right ?
I doubt if there any way to get some ? 
      
-- 
Chong-kan Chiu
The Chinese University of Hong Kong
Shatin, Hong Kong
E-mail address : ckchiu@cs.cuhk.hk



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Julian Dibbell <julian@panix.com>
Date: Sun, 1 Aug 93 14:53:32 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Village Voice sidebars
Message-ID: <199308012152.AA20354@panix.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Here are the two short sidebars that accompany the Village Voice article on
Cypherpunks et al. Posted by and with the permission of the author.

The first contains some of the more practical information that Tim May was
wondering about, though it does not point anyone towards ftp sites, mailing
lists, or anything as concrete as that. I didn't know whether you all would
appreciate an influx of "left-biased" :-) crypto-naifs flooding in here as a
result of my posting the list address, so I refrained. Also didn't think
advertising locations for PGP was a good idea, given the legal hassles that
might result to people doing the distribution. But if any of you think I was
being overscrupulous, I encourage you to write the Voice with further
information and I will do my best to see the letter gets published.

BUILDING A BETTER MONKEY WRENCH

Contrary to the conventional wisdom of an age gone cuckoo for ``smart''
technology, Luddism is neither dead nor beside the point -- it's just gotten
smarter. The Cypherpunks and other cryptography hackers are model
practitioners of a new, techno-savvy Luddism, implementing and popularizing
sophisticated gadgets that could short-circuit the awesome surveillance
capabilities built into cyberspace without harming its equally awesome power
to connect individuals. Long-term, these brave new tools will do more to
keep Big Brother out of your business than any legislation can, so you owe
yourself at least a cursory understanding of how they work. The following
primer should jump-start you. Read it and get smart.

PUBLIC-KEY CRYPTOGRAPHY: Most encryption schemes require sender and receiver
to agree on a secret encoding number, or key, before communication. This
increases vulnerability, since that first message establishing the key can't
itself be encrypted. Public-key systems, invented in 1975 by Ur-cypherpunk
Whitfield Diffie along with Martin Hellman, have no such requirement, making
them ideal for the highly snoopable channels of computer networks. In
public-key crypto, everybody creates two keys, one published for all the
world to read, and one kept absolutely secret. Whatever's encrypted with the
first can only be unlocked with the second. Thus, if you want to send
someone a secret message there's no need to make prior contact -- you just
look up that person's public key and use it to encrypt the text. Current
usage: The free public-key encryption program PGP is one of the most
popularly deployed crypto tools in the on-line world, with PGP public keys
rapidly becoming the electronic superhighway's equivalent of vanity plates.

ANONYMOUS REMAILERS: These systems aim to conceal not the contents of a
message but its source. A remailer is a network-connected computer that
takes in e-mail, then sends it on to a destination specified in attached,
encrypted instructions, thus placing a veil between sender and receiver. If
the message is sent through a chain of even a few remailers, the veil
quickly becomes rock solid, guaranteeing the sender's anonymity. Current
usage: The Cypherpunks maintain a working anonymous remailer chain, but the
most active are the one-hop systems used by participants in public on-line
discussions of bondage, foot worship, and assorted other predilections they
might not want their computer-literate boss/parents/neighbors to know
about.

DIGITAL SIGNATURES: In the fluid world of digital info, how do you verify
that a message is really from whom it claims it's from? Turn public-key
cryptography inside out, that's how. Have the sender encrypt the message
with her private key, then let the receiver try to decrypt it with the
sender's public key. If the decryption comes out clear, then the sender's
identity is confirmed -- without revealing her private key or even, if the
public key is attached to a pseudonymous but otherwise trustworthy on-line
persona, her physical identity. This is more or less how digital signatures
work. Current usage: mainly in corporate and bureaucratic settings, though
all good Cypherpunks try to make a habit of e-signing their e-mail.

ELECTRONIC CASH: Imagine the convenience of credit cards combined with the
anonymity of cash. Imagine a microchip-equipped debit card that instantly
deducts transactions from the user's bank account, yet does so without
revealing the payer's identity to the payee or linking payer and payee in
the bank's records. Imagine these mechanisms set loose in the world's
computer nets, converting great chunks of money supply into fast, loose,
digital e-cash. The wizardry of public-key crypto can make all this happen
and probably will. Current usage: experimental, mostly. Denmark, however, is
gearing up to implement an encrypted smart-card system, based on the ideas
of crypto-hacker David Chaum, who holds patents on most e-money
applications. 

--

TALE FROM THE CRYPTO WARS

The high weirdness of the military's code-busting censorship moves peaked in
World War II, but didn't end there. It was during the Gulf War, in fact,
that military censors made one of the strangest additions to their already
strange list of banned communications: the Navajo language. A small number
of Navajos, it seems, wanted to send broadcast greetings in their native
tongue to loved ones stationed overseas, but Armed Forces Radio refused to
pass the messages along. Once again, the mere possibility of enemy signals
lurking in the noise was too much for the censors to bear. ``We have a
responsibility to control what's on the radio,'' said the lieutenant colonel
in charge, ``and if I don't know what it says then I can't control it.'' 

    In the ripest of ironies, however, it turns out that the only nation
ever known to have used Navajo as a cover for secret communications was the
United States itself. Throughout World War II's Pacific campaign, the Marine
Corps made heavy and effective use of its Navajo codetalker units--teams of
Navajo radiomen who spoke a slangy, cryptic patois difficult even for
uninitiated Navajos to grasp, and ultimately impossible for the Japanese to
decode. Today the codetalkers remain legendary figures on the rez and beyond
-- legendary enough indeed that New Mexico congressman Bill Richardson,
wielding the memory of their exploits, finally shamed Armed Forces Radio
into lifting its ban and letting Navajo greetings reach the Gulf.

    It's a familiar story. Prized and feared for its impenetrable otherness,
Navajo has met the same uneasy fate reserved for all true difference in a
country that both prides itself on cultural diversity and insistently
suppresses it. But in its blurring of the lines between language and secret
code, Navajo's passage through the belly of the military beast hints at one
way out of America's terminal cultural ambivalence. As arch-Cypherpunk John
Gilmore has argued, committing to universally accessible encryption is one
way for our society to finally take the ideal of diversity seriously --
backing it up ``with physics and mathematics, not with laws,'' and certainly
not with the lip service it's traditionally honored with. Cryptography could
guarantee us each a language of our own, which no censor, military or
otherwise, could hope to silence. 



-- 
*********************************************************************
Julian Dibbell                                       julian@panix.com 
*********************************************************************



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: cme@ellisun.sw.stratus.com (Carl Ellison)
Date: Sun, 1 Aug 93 15:17:17 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Sterilized medflies of crypto
Message-ID: <9308012216.AA09933@ellisun.sw.stratus.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


It hit me yesterday that if the FBI succeeds in getting the Clipper chip as
the de facto hardware standard for encryption, it will be like the effort
to fight the Medfly infestation by releasing sterilized flies: a world full
of worthless encryption chips -- ones we'd never be able to use ourselves
or export, but with chips occupying the sites labeled "encryption chips go
here".


Meanwhile, notice how the FBI & Co. chose to milk the accusaiton that if
the algorithm is secret, it might have a back door?  ...ignoring the
obvious security weakness in the registration itself?  I have heard nothing
about the registration plan -- probably never will.  It's too easy for them
to fight over security of algorithms.

 - Carl




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: khijol!erc@apple.com (Ed Carp)
Date: Sun, 1 Aug 93 19:31:15 PDT
To: ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu (L. Detweiler)
Subject: Re: D. Bernstein's Open Letter on NIST-PKP-DSA
In-Reply-To: <9308020215.AA25380@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Message-ID: <m0oMpcu-00023LC@khijol>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text


> [flaming over sci.crypt posts]
> >What was their rationale?  I'd rather see relevent postings reposted here-
> >damnit, I don't have *time* to read 280MB a week of news!  What's the person's
> >problem who flamed you?
> 
> rationale was that most people on the list also read sci.crypt. And it
> is irritating for some to see the same message in multiple places, but
> personally I appreciate the redunancy.

I do, too!  I don't have time to read sci.crypt, which has upwards of 50
messages a day posted to it.  I'd much rather see relevent culls posted here.
Isn't that what this list is all about, getting information out to people
instead of censoring or controlling it?  I'd rather delete the ones I don't
wanna see, personally.  I think your flamer was way off base.
-- 
Ed Carp, N7EKG			erc@apple.com			510/659-9560

If you want magic, let go of your armor.  Magic is so much stronger than
steel!        -- Richard Bach, "The Bridge Across Forever"



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: wayner@cs.cornell.edu (Peter Wayner)
Date: Sun, 1 Aug 93 16:41:10 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Recent AP story...
Message-ID: <9308012340.AA18800@leo.cs.cornell.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Apparently, a recent Congressional investigation has revealed widespread
misuse of the National Crime Information Center. The most scandalous
case occured when an ex-officer found his ex-girlfriend using the system
and killed her. 

In other cases, the girlfriend of a drug dealer ran all the new recruits
through the system to see if they were undercover agents. In many cases,
private investigators accessed the data for a number of different 
purposes. 

It is interesting to note that all of the access was caused by
insiders (as a previous poster noted ). These are the people 
we're going to trust with the Clipper technology?

-Peter




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: fergp@sytex.com (Paul Ferguson)
Date: Sun, 1 Aug 93 18:47:25 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: NSA: The Eyes of Big Brother
Message-ID: <JLqm8B2w165w@sytex.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


reprinted without permission from Claustrophobia:
 
Claustrophobia
August 1993
Volume 2, Number 7
 
 
 
NSA: The Eyes of Big Brother
by Charles Dupree
 
-----------------------------------------------------------
 
The historical of the National Security Agency (NSA) presented
here includes and depends on information reported in three books.
The vast majority of data on the National Security Agency comes
from James Bamford's book The Puzzle Palace [1982]; all
quotations are taken from Bamford unless otherwise noted. As Tim
Weiner says, this book is "The best -- the only -- history of the
NSA." Material about NSA's secret funding comes entirely from
Weiner's Blank Check [1990], which also provided budget estimates
and supporting material for other sections. The CIA and the Cult
of Intelligence by Victor Marchetti and John D. Marks [1980
edition, originally published 1974], provided background
information and a glimpse of the NSA from within the intelligence
community but outside the agency itself.
--------------------------------------------------------------
 
The oppressive atmosphere of Orwell's 1984 arises from the
omnipresence of Big Brother, the symbol of the government's
concern for the individual. Big Brother controls the language,
outlawing words he dislikes and creating new words for his
favorite concepts. He can see and hear nearly everything, public
or private. Thus he enforces a rigid code of speech and action
that erodes the potential for resistance and reduces the need for
force. As Noam Chomsky says, propaganda is to democracy what
violence is to totalitarianism. Control thoughts, and you can
easily control behavior.
 
U.S. history affords a prime example in the era named after
Senator Joseph McCarthy, though he had many supporters in his
attack on freedom of thought and speech. Perhaps his most
powerful friend was J. edgar Hoover, who fed him material from
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) files (some of it true)
which  he used to attack individuals for their supposed political
leanings. By the time of Watergate, the Central Intelligence
Agency (CIA) had become at least as notorious as the FBI, due
largely to its assassinations of foreign leaders and support for
military coups around the world.
 
The Creation of the NSA
 
Budgetary authority for the National Security Agency (NSA)
apparently comes from the Central Intelligence Act of 1949. This
act provides the basis for the secret spending program known as
the black budget by allowing any arm of the government to
transfer money to the CIA "without regard to any provisions of
the law," and allowing the CIA to spend its funds as it sees fit,
with no need to account for them.
 
Congress passed the C.I.A. Act despite the fact that only the
ranking members of the Senate and House Armed Services Committees
knew anything about its contents; the remaining members of
Congress were told that open discussion, or even clear
explanation, of the bill would be counterproductive. There were
complaints about the secrecy; but in the end the bill passed the
House by a vote of 348-4, and the Senate by a majority voice
vote.
 
The NSA's estimated $10 billion annual allocation (as of 1990) is
funded entirely through the black budget. Thus Congress
appropriates funds for the NSA not only without information on
the agency's plans, but without even a clear idea of the amount
it appropriates; and it receives no accounting of the uses to
which the funds were put. This naturally precludes any debate
about the direction or management of such agencies, effectively
avoiding public oversight while spending public funds. (Weiner
notes the analogy to "Taxation without representation.")
 
Watching and Listening
 
"The NSA has also spent a great deal of time and money spying on
American citizens. For 21 years after its inception it tracked
every telegram and telex in and out of the United States, and
monitored the telephone conversations of the politically
suspect." (Weiner, Blank Check)
 
Due to its unique ability to monitor communications within the
U.S. without a warrant, which the FBI and CIA cannot legally do,
NSA becomes the center of attempts to spy on U.S. citizens.
Nominally this involves only communications in which at least one
terminal is outside the U.S., but in practice target lists have
often grown to include communications between U.S. citizens
within the country. And political considerations have sometimes
become important.
 
During the Nixon administration, for example, various agencies
(e.g., FBI, CIA, Secret Service) requested that the NSA provide
all information it encountered showing that foreign governments
were attempting to influence or controls activities of U.S.
anti-war groups, as well as information on civil rights, draft
resistance/evasion support groups, radical-related media
activities, and so on, "where such individuals have some foreign
connection," probably not that uncommon given the reception such
groups usually receive at home. Clearly it would have been
illegal for those agencies to gather such information themselves
without warrants, but they presumably believed that the NSA was
not similarly restricted when they included on their watch lists
such as Nixonian bugaboos as Eldridge Cleaver, Abbie Hoffman,
Jane Fonda, Joan Biaz, Dr. Benjamin Spock, and the Rev. ralph
Abernathy. Presumably the name of Dr, Martin Luther King, Jr.,
was removed from the list the year Nixon was elected; certainly
it was a targeted name before that time.
 
It is not feasible to determine in advance which telegrams and
telephone calls will be among those the NSA is tasked with
intercepting. Therefore, the NSA is normally reduced to recording
all traffic on lines it is monitoring, and screening this traffic
(by computer when possible) to catch targeted communications.
This is called the "vacuum-cleaner approach."
 
Also basic to this method is the "watch list" of groups and
individuals whose communications should be "targeted." When a
target is added to the watch list, NSA's computers are told to
extract communications to, from, or about the target; the agency
can then examine the selected communications and determine
whether they constitute intelligence data.
 
This list of targets usually expands to include all members of
targeted groups plus individuals and groups with whom they
communicate; thus it has a tendency to grow rapidly if not
checked. Some requests seems a bit astonishing: during the
presidency of Richard Nixon, a Quaker, J. Edgar Hoover requested
"complete surveillance of all Quakers in the United States"
because he thought they were shipping food and supplies to
Southeast Asia.
 
Project Shamrock
 
Project Shamrock was initiated in 1945 by the Signal Security
Agency (SSA), which eventually merged into the NSA. Until the
project was terminated in 1975 to prevent investigation, Shamrock
involved NSA (and its predecessors) in communications collection
activities that would be illegal for agencies such as the CIA or
FBI.
 
Under Shamrock, the international branches of RCA, ITT, and
Western Union provided access by SSA, and its successor NSA, to
certain telegrams sent by those companies. each company's counsel
recommended against involvement on legal grounds; each company
requested the written opinion of the Attorney General that it was
not making itself liable to legal action. However, none of them
received anything in writing from anyone in the government, and
they all cooperated without it. (They did get a verbal assurance
from the first Secretary of Defense, James Forrestal, who said he
was speaking for the President; thus they may have been concerned
at his resignation just over a year later, his hospitalization
within a week suffering from depression, anxiety, and paranoia,
and his suicide less than two months later.)
 
As Shamrock grew, and the NSA began to develop its own means of
intercepting communications, the watch list approach became the
accepted standard, since nothing less was effective or
worthwhile. the intelligence community became aware that it could
enter a name on the watch list more or less at will, and it would
soon receive the requested material, marked classified, and
gathered in within (or perhaps under cover of) the law.
 
The Huston Plan
 
The Huston Plan, formally known as "Domestic Intelligence
Gathering Plan: Analysis and Strategy," was submitted in July
1970 to President Nixon. The goal of the plan was to relax some
restrictions on intelligence gathering, apparently those of NSCID
No. 6. Some parts of the intelligence community felt that these
relaxations would assist their efforts. The proposals included:
 
o allowing the NSA to monitor "communications of U.S. citizens
using international facilities" (presumably facilities located in
the U.S., since the NSA already had authority to monitor such
communications if at least one terminal was outside U.S.
territory)
 
o intensifying "coverage of individuals and groups in the United
States who pose a major threat to the internal security"
 
o modifying restrictions "to permit selective use of
[surreptitious entry] against other urgent and high priority
internal security targets" as well as to procure "vitally needed
foreign cryptographic material," which would have required the
FBI to accept warrantless requests for such entries from other
agencies ("Use of this technique is clearly illegal: it amounts
to burglary. It is also highly risky and could result in great
embarrassment if exposed. However, it is also the most fruitful
tool and can produce the type of intelligence which cannot be
obtained in any other fashion.")
 
President Nixon approved this plan over the objection of J. Edgar
Hoover and without the knowledge of Attorney General Mitchell.
Hoover went to Mitchell, who had been left out of the entire
process, and was consequently angry; Mitchell convinced Nixon to
withdraw his approval 13 days after giving it.
 
Project Minaret
 
The size and complexity of the domestic watch list program became
a problem, since it bordered on illegality. Project Minaret was
established on July 1, 1969, to "privid[e] more restrictive
control" on the domestic products, and "to restrict the knowledge
that information is being collected and processed by the National
Security Agency." The agency knew it was close to legal
boundaries, and wanted to protect itself.
 
Minaret continued until the fall of 1973, when Attorney General
Richardson became aware of the domestic watch list program and
ordered such activities stopped. As the Watergate drama played
out, Congress began to hear about the NSA's projects, and within
two years formally inquiring about them
 
Uncontrolled Activities
 
Like most  intelligence agencies, the NSA uses words such as
"interrupt" and "target" in a technical sense with a precise but
often classified definition. This specialized language makes it
difficult to legislate or oversee the activities involved. For
instance, in NSA terms a conversation that is captured, decoded
if necessary, and distributed to the requesting agency is not
considered  to be the product of eavesdropping unless one of the
parties to the conversation is explicitly targeted. However, the
NSA does not depend on semantic defences; it can also produce
some legal arguments for exempting itself from normal
requirements.
 
On the rare occasions when NSA officials have to testify before
Congress, they have claimed a mandate broad enough to require a
special legal situation. In 1975, the NSA found its activities
under scrutiny by the Senate Intelligence Committee, chaired by
Frank Church; the House Select Committee on the Intelligence
Community, under Otis Pike; and the House Government Operations
Subcommittee on Government Information and Individual Rights, led
by Bella Abzug. The agency was notably consistent in responding
to those committees.
 
When Lt. Gen. Lew Allen appeared before the Pike committee, he
pointed out that it was the first time an NSA director had been
required to testify in open session. Two days earlier, CIA
director William Colby had testified that the NSA was not always
able to separate the calls of U.S. citizens from the traffic it
monitors. The general counsel of the NSA, Roy Banner, joined
Allen as witness. he was asked if, in his opinion, the NSA could
legally intercept overseas telephone calls from U.S. citizens
despite the legal prohibition on wiretapping. He replied, "That
is correct."
 
The top three officers of the NSA spoke with a single voice to
the Church committee. When the committee's chief counsel said to
Allen, "You believe you are consistent with the statutes, but
there is not any statute that prohibits your interception of
domestic communications." When deputy director Buffham was asked
about the legality of domestic aspects of the Huston plan, he
said, "Legality? That particular aspect didn't enter into the
discussions." Counsel Banner responded at least three times to
similar questions that the program had been legal at the time.
(Testimony took place on Oct. 29, 1975; Project Shamrock and its
watch lists were halted in mid-May of that year.)
 
The Abzug committee tried to get the story from the
communications corporations that had cooperated in Project
Shamrock. its hearings in late 1975 were unproductive because RCA
and ITT informed the committee, two days before hearings began,
that their executives would not appear without a subpoena; and a
former FBI agent who had been cooperating was forbidden by his
old employer from testifying. When the committee reconvened in
early 1976, it issued subpoenas to three FBI special agents, plus
one former agent; one NSA employee; and executives from
international arms of RCA, ITT, and Western Union. President Ford
prevented the five FBI/NSA people from testifying with a claim of
executive privilege, and the Attorney general requested that the
corporations refuse to comply with the subpoenas on the same
grounds. Their testimony in spite of that request brought Project
Shamrock to light less than a year after it was quickly
terminated.
 
There may have been some legal basis for the NSA claims of
extra-legal status. Despite having no statutory basis  or
charter, the NSA has considerable statutory protection: various
statutes, such as the COMINT statute, 18 U.S.C. 798; Public Law
86-36; and special provisions of the 1968 Omnibus Crime Control
and safe Streets Act, exempt it from normal scrutiny, even from
within the government. Thus the agency may be right in
interpreting the law to say that it can do anything not
specifically prohibited by the President of the National Security
Council.
 
NSCID No. 6, NSA's secret charter, includes this important
exemption (according to James Bamford's reconstruction):
 
  "The special nature of Communications Intelligence activities
  requires that they be treated in all respects as being outside
  the framework of other or general intelligence activities.
  Orders, directives, policies, or recommendations of any
  authority of the Executive branch relating to the collection
  ... of intelligence shall not be applicable to Communications
  Intelligence activities, unless specifically so stated and
  issued by competent departmental or agency authority
  represented on the [U.S. Communications Intelligence] Board.
  Other National Security Council Intelligence Directives to the
  Director of Central Intelligence and related implementing
  directives issued by the Director of Central Intelligence shall
  be construed as non-applicable to Communications Intelligence
  unless the National Security Council has made its directive
  specifically applicable to COMINT."
 
The unchecked ability to intercept and read communications,
including those of U.S. citizens within the country, would be
dangerous even if carefully regulated by elected officials held
to a public accounting.
 
When the method is available to officials whose names are often
unknown even to Congress who work for unaccountable agencies
like the NSA, it is very difficult for the intelligence
community, the defense community, and the Executive to refrain
form taking advantage of such easily obtained knowledge.
 
The lack of any effective oversight of the NSA makes it possible
for the agency to initiate or expand operations without
authorization from higher (or even other) authority. Periodic
meetings of members of the intelligence community do not
constitute true oversight or public control of government; and
the same is true of the provision of secret briefings to a small
number of senior members of the Congress, all chosen by the
intelligence community and sworn to secrecy.
 
Oversight of such extensive communications capability is
important enough; but NSA's capabilities are not necessarily
limited to intercepting and decrypting communications. The NSA
can also issue direct commands to military units involved in
Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) operations, bypassing even the
Joint Chiefs of Staff. Such orders are subject only to appeal to
the Secretary of Defense, and provide the NSA with capabilities
with which it could conceivably become involved in operations
beyond the collection of intelligence. At least, it does not seem
to be legally restrained from doing so.
 
It appears that the only effective restraint on the NSA is the
direct authority of the President, the National Security Council
(NSC), the Secretary of Defense, and the U.S. Intelligence Board.
Since the agency was created and chartered in secret by the
President and the NSC, it can presumably be modified in secret by
the same authorities.
 
Nor is the NSA bereft of means of influence other branches of
government, as Marchetti and Marks note:
 
   "A side effect of the NSA's programs to intercept diplomatic
   and commercial messages is that rather frequently certain
   information is acquired about American citizens, including
   members of Congress and other federal officials, which can be
   highly embarrassing to those individuals. This type of
   intercept message is handled with even greater care than the
   NSA's normal product, which itself is so highly classified a
   special security clearance is needed to see it."
 
 
Complete control over a secret agency with at least 60,000 direct
employees, a $10 billion budget, direct command of some military
units, and the ability to read all communications would be an
enormous weapon with which to maintain tyranny were it to arise.
A President with a Napoleonic or Stalinistic delusion would find
the perfect tool for the constant supervision of the individual
by the state in the NSA; not unlike scenarios depicted in novels
such as Orwell's 1984.
 
Senator Schweiker of the Church committee asked NSA director Allen
if it were possible to use NSA's capabilities "to monitor
domestic conversations within the United States if some person
with malintent desired to do it," and was probably not surprised
by Allen's "I suppose that such a thing is technically possible."
Certainly Senator Church feared the possibility:
 
   "That capability at any time could be turned around on the
   American people and no American would have any privacy left,
   such is the capability to monitor everything: telephone
   conversations, telegrams, it doesn't matter. There would be no
   place to hide. If this government ever became a tyranny, if a
   dictator ever took charge in this country, the technological
   capacity that the intelligence community has given the
   government could enable it to impose total tyranny, and there
   would be no way to fight back, because the most careful effort
   to combine together in resistance to the government, no matter
   how privately it was done, is within the reach of the
   government to know. Such is the capability of this technology
   ...
 
   I don't want to see this country ever go across the bridge. I
   know the capability that is there to make tyranny total in
   America, and we must see it that this agency and all agencies
   that possess this technology operate within the law and under
   proper supervision, so that we never cross over that abyss.
   That is the abyss from which there is no return..."
 
 
[This concludes part one of our two-part series on the National
Security Agency. Read part 2. "The NSA and the Clipper
Initiative," in next month's Claustrophobia.]
 
--------------------------------------------------------------
 
Charles Dupree writes user documentation for a Silicon Valley
software company. In recent years he has become concerned at the
intrusive power of the National Security Agency; but this is
probably just the effect of his antisocial habit of reading.
 
 
8<------ Snip, snip ---------
 
For more information on Claustrophobia, contact Dena Bruedigam at
dbruedig@magnus.acs.ohio-state.edu

Paul Ferguson               |  "Government, even in its best state,
Network Integrator          |   is but a necessary evil; in its worst
Centreville, Virginia USA   |   state, an intolerable one."
fergp@sytex.com             |      - Thomas Paine, Common Sense
 
         I love my country, but I fear its government.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: thug@phantom.com (Murdering Thug)
Date: Sun, 1 Aug 93 18:02:26 PDT
To: cme@ellisun.sw.stratus.com (Carl Ellison)
Subject: Re: Sterilized Medflies of Crypto
In-Reply-To: <9308012216.AA09933@ellisun.sw.stratus.com>
Message-ID: <m0oMoKL-0009F0C@mindvox.phantom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text


Carl Ellison writes:
> It hit me yesterday that if the FBI succeeds in getting the Clipper chip as
> the de facto hardware standard for encryption, it will be like the effort
> to fight the Medfly infestation by releasing sterilized flies: a world full
> of worthless encryption chips -- ones we'd never be able to use ourselves
> or export, but with chips occupying the sites labeled "encryption chips go
> here".
> 
> Meanwhile, notice how the FBI & Co. chose to milk the accusaiton that if
> the algorithm is secret, it might have a back door?  ...ignoring the
> obvious security weakness in the registration itself?  I have heard nothing
> about the registration plan -- probably never will.  It's too easy for them
> to fight over security of algorithms.

The whole argument over whether or not the algorithm is secure is a wild
goose chase designed by the NSA.  Yes, it's a fucking ploy in case anyone
hasn't realized it.  They can bring in D. Denning and a dozen other
"cryptographic experts" to analyze the algorithm and say "We find this
algorithm to be free of backdoors." *FIRST*, any hacker worth his weight
in mud knows that an algorithmic backdoor is several hundred orders of
magnitude harder to unearth than it is to create/bury in an algorithm.  If
Denning and the others say the algorithm is good, that doesn't mean that a
backdoor doesn't exist, only that they haven't found it. *SECONDLY*, let
us give the NSA and FBI the benefit of the doubt, and assume that there is
no back door in the _algorithm_. HOWEVER, there is no way for us to know
if a backdoor in the _chip_ will be designed onto the production IC mask,
one that can disable the algorithm by remote control (a secret 64-bit code
sent down the phone line to your phone telling it to turn your Skipjack
chip off).  Remote control of the chip is but one method of building a
backdoor into the chip that has nothing to do with the algorithm, and of
course there are hundreds of others.  Is Denning and the crew authorized
to inspect the chip fabrication IC masks that will be used for
manufacturing the _actual_ chips?  Assuming they are allowed to inspect
the hardware design (I'm sure this will be the second wild goose chase to
prove to the American public that the chip is secure), the NSA/FBI can
just as easily show the "experts" the IC mask of a chip without the
hardware backdoor, and then tell the manufacturers produce chips with the
hardware backdoor. 

I hope that the press is aware of the above and are not buying into the
government's bullshit and wild goose chases designed to prove something
secure which inherently cannot be proved secure simply because it is
manufactured in secret.  I have not seen this idea mentioned in the press
so I assume they are unaware of how many low down tricks the NSA is
willing to stoop to in order to get this chip to be trusted by the
American public.


Thug





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: jpp@markv.com
Date: Sun, 1 Aug 93 22:13:43 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Clipper counter-attack, technical
Message-ID: <9308012212.aa10519@hermix.markv.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

  The Law Enforcement Field is used by my clipper chip to make the
session key it is using available to the gov't.  Would it be possible
that my clipper chip could have a subtle flaw causing the LEF (sp?)
data to be corrupted?  Would my chip still function; would I be able
to use it to to communicate with other clipper chips?  Would anyone be
able to tell that my chip was broken without the help of the key
escrow agents?  Would the sesion key still be recoverable if the
clipper chip at the other end were working 'correctly'?

j'
- --
                O I am Jay Prime Positive jpp@markv.com 
1250 bit key fingerprint =  B8 95 E0 AF 9A A2 CD A5  89 C9 F0 FE B4 3A 2C 3F
 524 bit key fingerprint =  8A 7C B9 F2 D5 46 4D ED  66 23 F1 71 DE FF 51 48
Public keys by `finger jpp@markv.com' or mail to pgp-public-keys@pgp.mit.edu
Your feedback is welcome, directly or via symbol JPP on hex@sea.east.sun.com

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
iQBXAgUBLFyiN9C3U5sdKpFdAQGz3wILBs/DZRkKw8SwmnMuxqjH2GKwl+9FyLjh
i5GaBE6mjyT53SDYBhVsUuimHI2lYsOVO1H9p6etX4fVlLK8k+/+1xDy
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Derek Atkins <warlord@MIT.EDU>
Date: Sun, 1 Aug 93 20:41:15 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: [sci.crypt] SKIPJACK Review, Interim Report
Message-ID: <9308020340.AA25883@steve-dallas.MIT.EDU>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


------- Start of forwarded message -------
From: denning@guvax.acc.georgetown.edu
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
Subject: SKIPJACK Review, Interim Report
Date: 1 Aug 93 22:09:27 -0400
Distribution: world
Organization: Georgetown University

                            SKIPJACK Review
                                    
                             Interim Report
                                    
                        The SKIPJACK Algorithm


           Ernest F. Brickell, Sandia National Laboratories
               Dorothy E. Denning, Georgetown University
            Stephen T. Kent, BBN Communications Corporation
                          David P. Maher, AT&T
                  Walter Tuchman, Amperif Corporation
                                    
                              July 28, 1993

                            (copyright 1993)


Executive Summary

The objective of the SKIPJACK review was to provide a mechanism whereby
persons outside the government could evaluate the strength of the
classified encryption algorithm used in the escrowed encryption devices
and publicly report their findings.  Because SKIPJACK is but one
component of a large, complex system, and because the security of
communications encrypted with SKIPJACK depends on the security of the
system as a whole, the review was extended to encompass other
components of the system.  The purpose of this Interim Report is to
report on our evaluation of the SKIPJACK algorithm.  A later Final
Report will address the broader system issues.

The results of our evaluation of the SKIPJACK algorithm are as
follows:

  1. Under an assumption that the cost of processing power is halved
     every eighteen months, it will be 36 years before the cost of
     breaking SKIPJACK by exhaustive search will be equal to the cost
     of breaking DES today.  Thus, there is no significant risk that
     SKIPJACK will be broken by exhaustive search in the next 30-40
     years.

  2. There is no significant risk that SKIPJACK can be broken through a
     shortcut method of attack.

  3. While the internal structure of SKIPJACK must be classified in
     order to protect law enforcement and national security objectives,
     the strength of SKIPJACK against a cryptanalytic attack does not
     depend on the secrecy of the algorithm.



1.  Background

On April 16, the President announced a new technology initiative aimed
at providing a high level of security for sensitive, unclassified
communications, while enabling lawfully authorized intercepts of
telecommunications by law enforcement officials for criminal
investigations.  The initiative includes several components:

    A classified encryption/decryption algorithm called "SKIPJACK."

    Tamper-resistant cryptographic devices (e.g., electronic chips),
    each of which contains SKIPJACK, classified control software, a
    device identification number, a family key used by law enforcement,
    and a device unique key that unlocks the session key used to
    encrypt a particular communication.

    A secure facility for generating device unique keys and programming
    the devices with the classified algorithms, identifiers, and keys.

    Two escrow agents that each hold a component of every device unique
    key.  When combined, those two components form the device unique
    key.

    A law enforcement access field (LEAF), which enables an authorized
    law enforcement official to recover the session key.  The LEAF is
    created by a device at the start of an encrypted communication and
    contains the session key encrypted under the device unique key
    together with the device identifier, all encrypted under the family
    key.

    LEAF decoders that allow an authorized law enforcement official to
    extract the device identifier and encrypted session key from an
    intercepted LEAF.  The identifier is then sent to the escrow
    agents, who return the components of the corresponding device
    unique key.  Once obtained, the components are used to reconstruct
    the device unique key, which is then used to decrypt the session
    key.

This report reviews the security provided by the first component,
namely the SKIPJACK algorithm.  The review was performed pursuant to
the President's direction that "respected experts from outside the
government will be offered access to the confidential details of the
algorithm to assess its capabilities and publicly report their
finding."  The Acting Director of the National Institute of Standards
and Technology (NIST) sent letters of invitation to potential
reviewers.  The authors of this report accepted that invitation.

We attended an initial meeting at the Institute for Defense Analyses
Supercomputing Research Center (SRC) from June 21-23.  At that meeting,
the designer of SKIPJACK provided a complete, detailed description of
the algorithm, the rationale for each feature, and the history of the
design.  The head of the NSA evaluation team described the evaluation
process and its results.  Other NSA staff briefed us on the LEAF
structure and protocols for use, generation of device keys, protection
of the devices against reverse engineering, and NSA's history in the
design and evaluation of encryption methods contained in SKIPJACK.
Additional NSA and NIST staff were present at the meeting to answer our
questions and provide assistance.  All staff members were forthcoming
in providing us with requested information.

At the June meeting, we agreed to integrate our individual evaluations
into this joint report.  We also agreed to reconvene at SRC from July
19-21 for further discussions and to complete a draft of the report.
In the interim, we undertook independent tasks according to our
individual interests and availability.  Ernest Brickell specified a
suite of tests for evaluating SKIPJACK.  Dorothy Denning worked at NSA
on the refinement and execution of these and other tests that took into
account suggestions solicited from Professor Martin Hellman at Stanford
University.  NSA staff assisted with the programming and execution of
these tests.  Denning also analyzed the structure of SKIPJACK and its
susceptibility to differential cryptanalysis.  Stephen Kent visited NSA
to explore in more detail how SKIPJACK compared with NSA encryption
algorithms that he already knew and that were used to protect
classified data.  David Maher developed a risk assessment approach
while continuing his ongoing work on the use of the encryption chip in
the AT&T Telephone Security Device.  Walter Tuchman investigated the
anti-reverse engineering properties of the chips.

We investigated more than just SKIPJACK because the security of
communications encrypted with the escrowed encryption technology
depends on the security provided by all the components of the
initiative, including protection of the keys stored on the devices,
protection of the key components stored with the escrow agents, the
security provided by the LEAF and LEAF decoder, protection of keys
after they have been transmitted to law enforcement under court order,
and the resistance of the devices to reverse engineering.  In addition,
the success of the technology initiative depends on factors besides
security, for example, performance of the chips.  Because some
components of the escrowed encryption system, particularly the key
escrow system, are still under design, we decided to issue this Interim
Report on the security of the SKIPJACK algorithm and to defer our Final
Report until we could complete our evaluation of the system as a
whole.


2.  Overview of the SKIPJACK Algorithm

SKIPJACK is a 64-bit "electronic codebook" algorithm that transforms a
64-bit input block into a 64-bit output block.  The transformation is
parameterized by an 80-bit key, and involves performing 32 steps or
iterations of a complex, nonlinear function.  The algorithm can be used
in any one of the four operating modes defined in FIPS 81 for use with
the Data Encryption Standard (DES).

The SKIPJACK algorithm was developed by NSA and is classified SECRET.
It is representative of a family of encryption algorithms developed in
1980 as part of the NSA suite of "Type I" algorithms, suitable for
protecting all levels of classified data.  The specific algorithm,
SKIPJACK, is intended to be used with sensitive but unclassified
information.

The strength of any encryption algorithm depends on its ability to
withstand an attack aimed at determining either the key or the
unencrypted ("plaintext") communications.  There are basically two
types of attack, brute-force and shortcut.


3.  Susceptibility to Brute Force Attack by Exhaustive Search

In a brute-force attack (also called "exhaustive search"), the
adversary essentially tries all possible keys until one is found that
decrypts the intercepted communications into a known or meaningful
plaintext message.  The resources required to perform an exhaustive
search depend on the length of the keys, since the number of possible
keys is directly related to key length.  In particular, a key of length
N bits has 2^N possibilities.  SKIPJACK uses 80-bit keys, which means
there are 2^80 (approximately 10^24) or more than 1 trillion trillion
possible keys.

An implementation of  SKIPJACK optimized for a single processor on the
8-processor Cray YMP performs about 89,000 encryptions per second.  At
that rate, it would take more than 400 billion years to try all keys.
Assuming the use of all 8 processors and aggressive vectorization, the
time would be reduced to about a billion years.

A more speculative attack using a future, hypothetical, massively
parallel machine with 100,000 RISC processors, each of which was
capable of 100,000 encryptions per second, would still take about 4
million years.  The cost of such a machine might be on the order of $50
million.  In an even more speculative attack, a special purpose machine
might be built using 1.2 billion $1 chips with a 1 GHz clock.  If the
algorithm could be pipelined so that one encryption step were performed
per clock cycle, then the $1.2 billion machine could exhaust the key
space in 1 year.

Another way of looking at the problem is by comparing a brute force
attack on SKIPJACK with one on DES, which uses 56-bit keys.  Given that
no one has demonstrated a capability for breaking DES, DES offers a
reasonable benchmark.  Since SKIPJACK keys are 24 bits longer than DES
keys, there are 2^24 times more possibilities.  Assuming that the cost
of processing power is halved every eighteen months, then it will not
be for another 24 * 1.5 = 36 years before the cost of breaking
SKIPJACK is equal to the cost of breaking DES today.  Given the lack of
demonstrated capability for breaking DES, and the expectation that the
situation will continue for at least several more years, one can
reasonably expect that SKIPJACK will not be broken within the next
30-40 years.

Conclusion 1:   Under an assumption that the cost of processing power
is halved every eighteen months, it will be 36 years before the cost of
breaking SKIPJACK by exhaustive search will be equal to the cost of
breaking DES today.  Thus, there is no significant risk that SKIPJACK
will be broken by exhaustive search in the next 30-40 years.

4.  Susceptibility to Shortcut Attacks

In a shortcut attack, the adversary exploits some property of the
encryption algorithm that enables the key or plaintext to be determined
in much less time than by exhaustive search.  For example, the RSA
public-key encryption method is attacked by factoring a public value
that is the product of two secret primes into its primes.

Most shortcut attacks use probabilistic or statistical methods that
exploit a structural weakness, unintentional or intentional (i.e., a
"trapdoor"), in the encryption algorithm.  In order to determine
whether such attacks are possible, it is necessary to thoroughly
examine the structure of the algorithm and its statistical properties.
In the time available for this review, it was not feasible to conduct
an evaluation on the scale that NSA has conducted or that has been
conducted on the DES.  Such review would require many man-years of
effort over a considerable time interval.  Instead, we concentrated on
reviewing NSA's design and evaluation process.  In addition, we
conducted several of our own tests.

4.1  NSA's Design and Evaluation Process

SKIPJACK was designed using building blocks and techniques that date
back more than forty years.  Many of the techniques are related to work
that was evaluated by some of the world's most accomplished and famous
experts in combinatorics and abstract algebra.  SKIPJACK's more
immediate heritage dates to around 1980, and its initial design to
1987.

SKIPJACK was designed to be evaluatable, and the design and evaluation
approach was the same used with algorithms that protect the country's
most sensitive classified information.  The specific structures
included in SKIPJACK have a long evaluation history, and the
cryptographic properties of those structures had many prior years of
intense study before the formal process began in 1987.  Thus, an
arsenal of tools and data was available.  This arsenal was used by
dozens of adversarial evaluators whose job was to break SKIPJACK.  Many
spent at least a full year working on the algorithm.  Besides highly
experienced evaluators, SKIPJACK was subjected to cryptanalysis by less
experienced evaluators who were untainted by past approaches.  All
known methods of attacks were explored, including differential
cryptanalysis.  The goal was a design that did not allow a shortcut
attack.

The design underwent a sequence of iterations based on feedback from
the evaluation process.  These iterations eliminated properties which,
even though they might not allow successful attack, were related to
properties that could be indicative of vulnerabilities.  The head of
the NSA evaluation team confidently concluded "I believe that SKIPJACK
can only be broken by brute force   there is no better way."

In summary, SKIPJACK is based on some of NSA's best technology.
Considerable care went into its design and evaluation in accordance
with the care given to algorithms that protect classified data.

4.2  Independent Analysis and Testing

Our own analysis and testing increased our confidence in the strength
of SKIPJACK and its resistance to attack.

4.2.1  Randomness and Correlation Tests

A strong encryption algorithm will behave like a random function of the
key and plaintext so that it is impossible to determine any of the key
bits or plaintext bits from the ciphertext bits (except by exhaustive
search).  We ran two sets of tests aimed at determining whether
SKIPJACK is a good pseudo random number generator.  These tests were
run on a Cray YMP at NSA.  The results showed that SKIPJACK behaves
like a random function and that ciphertext bits are not correlated with
either key bits or plaintext bits.  Appendix A gives more details.

4.2.2  Differential Cryptanalysis

Differential cryptanalysis is a powerful method of attack that exploits
structural properties in an encryption algorithm.  The method involves
analyzing the structure of the algorithm in order to determine the
effect of particular differences in plaintext pairs on the differences
of their corresponding ciphertext pairs, where the differences are
represented by the exclusive-or of the pair.  If it is possible to
exploit these differential effects in order to determine a key in less
time than with exhaustive search, an encryption algorithm is said to be
susceptible to differential cryptanalysis.  However, an actual attack
using differential cryptanalysis may require substantially more chosen
plaintext than can be practically acquired.

We examined the internal structure of SKIPJACK to determine its
susceptibility to differential cryptanalysis.  We concluded it was not
possible to perform an attack based on differential cryptanalysis in
less time than with exhaustive search.

4.2.3  Weak Key Test

Some algorithms have "weak keys" that might permit a shortcut
solution.  DES has a few weak keys, which follow from a pattern of
symmetry in the algorithm.  We saw no pattern of symmetry in the
SKIPJACK algorithm which could lead to weak keys.  We also
experimentally tested the all "0" key (all 80 bits are "0") and the all
"1" key to see if they were weak and found they were not.

4.2.4  Symmetry Under Complementation Test

The DES satisfies the property that for a given plaintext-ciphertext
pair and associated key, encryption of the one's complement of the
plaintext with the one's complement of the key yields the one's
complement of the ciphertext.  This "complementation property" shortens
an attack by exhaustive search by a factor of two since half the keys
can be tested by computing complements in lieu of performing a more
costly encryption.  We tested SKIPJACK for this property and found that
it did not hold.

4.2.5  Comparison with Classified Algorithms

We compared the structure of SKIPJACK to that of NSA Type I algorithms
used in current and near-future devices designed to protect classified
data.  This analysis was conducted with the close assistance of the
cryptographer who developed SKIPJACK and included an in-depth
discussion of design rationale for all of the algorithms involved.
Based on this comparative, structural analysis of SKIPJACK against
these other algorithms, and a detailed discussion of the similarities
and differences between these algorithms, our confidence in the basic
soundness of SKIPJACK was further increased.

Conclusion 2:  There is no significant risk that SKIPJACK can be broken
through a shortcut method of attack.


5.   Secrecy of the Algorithm

The SKIPJACK algorithm is sensitive for several reasons.  Disclosure of
the algorithm would permit the construction of devices that fail to
properly implement the LEAF, while still interoperating with legitimate
SKIPJACK devices.  Such devices would provide high quality
cryptographic security without preserving the law enforcement access
capability that distinguishes this cryptographic initiative.
Additionally, the SKIPJACK algorithm is classified SECRET   NOT
RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS.  This classification reflects the high
quality of the algorithm, i.e., it incorporates design techniques that
are representative of algorithms used to protect classified
information.  Disclosure of the algorithm would permit analysis that
could result in discovery of these classified design techniques, and
this would be detrimental to national security.

However, while full exposure of the internal details of SKIPJACK would
jeopardize law enforcement and national security objectives, it would
not jeopardize the security of encrypted communications.  This is
because a shortcut attack is not feasible even with full knowledge of
the algorithm.  Indeed, our analysis of the susceptibility of SKIPJACK
to a brute force or shortcut attack was based on the assumption that
the algorithm was known.

Conclusion 3:  While the internal structure of SKIPJACK must be
classified in order to protect law enforcement and national security
objectives, the strength of SKIPJACK against a cryptanalytic attack
does not depend on the secrecy of the algorithm.
------- End of forwarded message -------




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Derek Atkins <warlord@MIT.EDU>
Date: Sun, 1 Aug 93 20:42:25 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: [sci.crypt] Appendix (in LaTex) to SKIPJACK Review, Interim Report
Message-ID: <9308020341.AA25890@steve-dallas.MIT.EDU>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


------- Start of forwarded message -------
Oops.. I didn't see this article when I sent the last one.  Sorry.

-derek

From: denning@guvax.acc.georgetown.edu
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
Subject: Appendix (in LaTex) to SKIPJACK Review, Interim Report
Date: 1 Aug 93 22:11:40 -0400
Distribution: world
Organization: Georgetown University

\documentstyle{article}
\textheight 8.25in
\topmargin -.25in
\textwidth 6.5in
\oddsidemargin 0in
\begin{document}
\parskip .25in
\large
\raggedright
\setcounter{page}{8}
\centerline{\bf Appendix A}

{\bf A.1 Cycle Structure Tests}

The first set of tests examined the cycle structure of SKIPJACK.  Fix
a set of keys, $\cal K$, a plaintext, $m$, and a function $h\; : \;
{\cal M} \longrightarrow {\cal K}$, where ${\cal M}$ is the set of all
64 bit messages.  Let $f \; : \; {\cal K} \longrightarrow {\cal K}$ be
defined as $f(k) = h ( SJ(k,m))$ (where $SJ(k,m)$ denotes the SKIPJACK
encryption of plaintext $m$ with key $k$).  Let $N = |\cal K|$.  The
expected cycle length of $f$ is $\sqrt{\pi N /8}$.  We chose sets of
$\cal K$ with $N \; = \; 2^{10}, 2^{16}, 2^{24}, 2^{32},
2^{40}, 2^{48}, 2^{56}$.  For all of these $N$, the mean of the cycle
lengths computed across all experiments was close to an expected
relative error of
$(1/\sqrt{j}$ for $j$ experiments) of the expected cycle length.  
We did not do this test with larger sets of keys because of the time
constraints.

\begin{center}
\begin{tabular}{lrrrrr}
$N$ & \# of exps & Mean cycle len & Expec cycle len &
Rel Err & Expec rel err \\
\hline
$2^{10}$ & 5000 & 20.4 & 20.1 & .019 & .014 \\
$2^{16}$ & 3000 & 164.7 & 160.4 & .027 & .018 \\
$2^{24}$ & 2000 & 2576.6 & 2566.8 & .004 & .022 \\
$2^{32}$ & 2000 & 40343.2 & 41068.6 & .018 & .022 \\
$2^{40}$ & 1000 & 646604.9 & 657097.6 & .016 & .032 \\
$2^{48}$ & 10 & 8,980,043 & 10,513,561 & .145 & .316 \\
$2^{56}$ & 1 & 28,767,197 & 168,216,976 & .829 & 1 \\
\end{tabular}
\end{center}

{\bf A.2 Statistical Randomness and Correlation Tests}

The second set of tests examined whether there were any correlations
between the input and output of SKIPJACK, or between a key and the
output.  We also looked for nonrandomness in functions of the form
$SJ(k,m) \oplus SJ(k,m \oplus h)$ and functions of the form $SJ(k,m) \oplus
SJ(k \oplus h , m)$ for all $h$ of Hamming weight 1 and 2 and for some
randomly chosen $h$.  All results were consistent with these functions
behaving like random functions.

Given a set of $N$ numbers of $k$-bits each, a chi-square test will
test the hypothesis that this set of numbers was drawn (with
replacement) from a uniform distribution on all of the $2^k$, $k$-bit
numbers.  We ran the tests using a 99\% confidence level.  A truly
random function would pass the test approximately 99\% of the time.
The test is not appropriate when $N/2^k$ is too small, say $\leq 5$.
Since it was infeasible to run the test for $k = 64$, we would pick 8
bit positions, and generate a set of $N= 10,000$ numbers, and run the
test on the $N$ numbers restricted to those 8 bit positions (thus
$k=8$).  In some of the tests, we selected the 8 bits from the output
of the function we were testing, and in others, we selected 4 bits
from the input and 4 from the output.

Some of the tests were run on both the encryption and decryption
functions of SKIPJACK.  The notation $SJ^{-1}(k,m)$ will be used to
denote the decryption function of SKIPJACK with key $k$ on message
$m$.

{\bf Test 1: Randomness test on output.  } In a single test: Fix $k$,
fix mask of 8 output bits, select 10,000 random messages, run
chi-square on the 10,000 outputs restricted to the mask of 8 output
bits.  Repeat this single test for 200 different values of $k$ and 50
different masks, for a total of 10,000 chi-square tests.  We found
that .87\% of the tests failed the 99\% confidence level chi-square
test.  This is within a reasonable experimental error of the expected
value of 1\%.  On the decryption function, there were only .64\% of
the tests that failed.  This was on a much smaller test set.

\begin{center}
\begin{tabular}{|c|c|c|c|c|}
\hline
\# $k$  & \# masks &  function, $f(m)$ & mask & \% failed \\
\hline
200 & 50 & $SJ(k,m)$ & 8 of $f(m)$ & .87 \\
\hline
25 & 50 & $SJ^{-1}(k,m)$ & 8 of $f(m)$ & .64 \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\end{center}

{\bf Test 2: Correlation test between messages and output.}
Single test:  Fix $k$, fix mask of 4 message bits and 4 output bits,
select 10,000 random messages, run chi-square.

\begin{center}
\begin{tabular}{|c|c|c|c|c|}
\hline
\# $k$  & \# masks &  function, $f(m)$ & mask & \% failed \\
\hline
200 & 1000  & $SJ(k,m)$ & 4 of $m$, 4 of $f(m)$ & 1.06 \\
\hline
25 & 1000 & $SJ^{-1}(k,m)$ & 4 of $m$, 4 of $f(m)$ & 1.01 \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\end{center}

{\bf Test 3: Randomness test on the xor of outputs, given a fixed xor of
inputs.  }
Single test: Fix $k$, fix mask of 8 output bits, select 10,000 random
messages. 
Let $\cal H$ be the union of all 64 bit words of Hamming
weight 1 (64 of these), all 64 bit words of Hamming weight 2 (2016 of
these), and some randomly chosen 64 bit words (920 of these).
Repeat this single test for all $h \in \cal H$, 50 different masks,
and  4 different values
of $k$.

\begin{center}
\begin{tabular}{|c|c|c|c|c|c|}
\hline
\# $k$  & \# masks  & \# $h$ &  function, $f(m)$ & mask & \% failed \\
\hline
4 & 50 & 3000 & $SJ(k,m) \oplus SJ(k,m \oplus h)$ & 8 of $f(m)$ & .99 \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\end{center}


{\bf Test 4: Correlation test between message xors and output xors.  }
Single test: Fix $k$, fix mask of 4 bits of $h$ and 4 bits of output,
select 10,000 random $(m,h)$ pairs.

\begin{center}
\begin{tabular}{|c|c|c|c|c|}
\hline
\# $k$  & \# masks &  function, $f(m,h)$ & mask & \% failed \\
\hline
200 & 1000 & $SJ(k,m) \oplus SJ(k,m \oplus h)$ & 4 of $h$, 4 of $f(m,h)$
& .99 \\
\hline
25 & 1000 & $SJ^{-1}(k,m)  \oplus SJ^{-1}(k,m \oplus h)$ & 4 of $h$, 4 of
$f(m,h)$ & 1.02 \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\end{center}

{\bf Test 5: Correlation test between messages and output xors.}
Single test: Fix $k$, fix mask of 4 bits of $m$ and 4 bits of output
xor, select 10,000 random messages.  Let $\cal H$ be the union of all
64 bit words of Hamming weight 1 (64 of these), some of the 64 bit
words of Hamming weight 2 (100 of these), and some randomly chosen 64
bit words (100 of these).

\begin{center}
\begin{tabular}{|c|c|c|c|c|c|}
\hline
\# $k$  & \# masks & \# $h$&  function, $f(m)$ & mask & \% failed \\
\hline
2 & 1000 & 264 & $SJ(k,m) \oplus SJ(k,m \oplus h)$ & 4 of $m$, 4 of $f(m)$
& .99 \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\end{center}

{\bf Test 6: Correlation test between keys and output.}
Single test:  Fix $m$, fix mask of 4 key bits and 4 output bits,
select 10,000 random keys.

\begin{center}
\begin{tabular}{|c|c|c|c|c|}
\hline
\# $m$ & \# masks &  function, $f(k)$ & mask & \% failed \\
\hline
200 & 1000  & $SJ(k,m)$ & 4 of $k$, 4 of $f(k)$ & 1.00 \\
\hline
25 & 1000 & $SJ^{-1}(k,m)$ & 4 of $k$, 4 of $f(k)$ & 1.02 \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\end{center}

{\bf Test 7: Randomness test on the xor of outputs, given a fixed xor of
keys.  }
Single test: Fix $m$, fix mask of 8 output bits, select 10,000 random
keys. 
Let $\cal H$ be the union of all 80 bit words of Hamming
weight 1 (80 of these), all 80 bit words of Hamming weight 2 (3160 of
these), and some randomly chosen 80 bit words (760 of these).
Repeat this single test for all $h \in \cal H$, 50 different masks,
and  2 different values
of $m$.

\begin{center}
\begin{tabular}{|c|c|c|c|c|c|}
\hline
\# $m$ & \# masks  & \# $h$ &  function, $f(k)$ & mask & \% failed \\
\hline
2 & 50 & 4000 & $SJ(k,m) \oplus SJ(k\oplus h,m )$ & 8 of $f(k)$ & .99 \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\end{center}


{\bf Test 8: Correlation test between key xors and output xors.  }
Single test: Fix $m$, fix mask of 4 bits of $h$ and 4 bits of output,
select 10,000 random $(k,h)$ pairs.

\begin{center}
\begin{tabular}{|c|c|c|c|c|}
\hline
\# $m$ & \# masks &  function, $f(k,h)$ & mask & \% failed \\
\hline
200 & 1000 & $SJ(k,m) \oplus SJ(k\oplus h,m )$ & 4 of $h$, 4 of $f(k,h)$
& 1.02 \\
\hline
25 & 1000 & $SJ^{-1}(k,m) \oplus SJ^{-1}(k\oplus h,m )$ & 4 of $h$, 4
of $f(k,h)$ & 1.1 \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\end{center}
\end{document}





------- End of forwarded message -------




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: J. Michael Diehl <mdiehl@vesta.unm.edu>
Date: Sun, 1 Aug 93 22:53:43 PDT
To: wayner@cs.cornell.edu (Peter Wayner)
Subject: Re: Recent AP story...
In-Reply-To: <9308012340.AA18800@leo.cs.cornell.edu>
Message-ID: <9308020552.AA06779@vesta.unm.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


According to Peter Wayner:
> Apparently, a recent Congressional investigation has revealed widespread
> misuse of the National Crime Information Center. The most scandalous
> case occured when an ex-officer found his ex-girlfriend using the system
> and killed her. 
> In other cases, the girlfriend of a drug dealer ran all the new recruits
> through the system to see if they were undercover agents. In many cases,
> private investigators accessed the data for a number of different 
> purposes. 

Can this be documented?  If so, this would be the most convincing arguement
against the Big Brother chip.  References anybody?  Thanx.

========================+==========================================+
J. Michael Diehl   ;^)  | Have you hugged a Hetero........Lately?  |
mdiehl@triton.unm.edu   | "I'm just looking for the opportunity to |
mike.diehl@fido.org help|    be Politically Incorrect!"  +=========+
al945@cwns9.ins.cwru.edu| Is Big Brother in your phone?  | PGP KEY |
(505) 299-2282  (voice) |    If you don't know, ask me.  |Available|
========================+================================+=========+
PGP Key = 7C06F1 = A6 27 E1 1D 5F B2 F2 F1  12 E7 53 2D 85 A2 10 5D 
This message is protected by 18 USC 2511 and 18 USC 2703. Monitoring 
by anyone other than the recipient is absolutely forbidden by US Law



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: nobody@alumni.cco.caltech.edu
Date: Mon, 2 Aug 93 05:58:48 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: No Subject
Message-ID: <9308021255.AA25406@alumni.cco.caltech.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Hi there,
I tried to post anonymously to netnews using the remailers with not
success.
The procedure was for example:

::
Request-Remailing-To: misc.test@cs.utexas.edu

and I addressed my mail to let's say nowhere-cs.bsu.edu. Using
cs.utexas.edu to post (not anonymously) works though. Any help is
highly 8-) appreciated.
Thanks in advance.





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: norm@netcom.com (Norman Hardy)
Date: Mon, 2 Aug 93 07:41:29 PDT
To: bridgers@nlm.nih.gov
Subject: ftp access to the Silk Road Paper
Message-ID: <9308021442.AA09524@netcom2.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


The Digital Silk road paper is now availnle in three forms at
netcom.com:pub/joule/DSR1.ps.gz, DSR1.rtf.gz and DSR1.txt
 
netcom.com may sometimes be too busy and then direct you to one of 
several other machines any of which can access the files.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: nate@VIS.ColoState.EDU (CVL staff member Nate Sammons)
Date: Mon, 2 Aug 93 06:48:49 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: lookin' for a slogan for Tshirts
Message-ID: <9308021347.AA20508@vangogh.VIS.ColoState.EDU>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



It looks like I'll be making a set of Big Brother inside T-shirts,
and I would like to ask for slogan ideas....

The ones that I like so far are:

"They can have my private key when they pry it from my cold, dead hands."

"When privacy is outlawed, only outlaws will have privacy."

thanks,

-nate




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: nobody@mead.u.washington.edu
Date: Mon, 2 Aug 93 07:57:34 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: No Subject
Message-ID: <9308021454.AA04893@mead.u.washington.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



> Duncan Frissell <frissell@panix.com> sez:

> I didn't like being called a neo-luddite, however.  I don't see many 
> paralells between extropianism and cypherpunks and Ned Lud.
> 
> Duncan Frissell

This is the cypherpunks list, not the extropians list. The article was about cypherpunks, not extropians, so it's irrelevent whether the extrops are luddites.

As for the c-punks, there's nothing inherently non-luddite about us. Not all of us accept all uses of computers and technology without question. There are certain machines that need to be trashed. I
liked the reference in the article. I don't think it was 100% accurate, but you should be aware that there ARE cypherpunks Luddites lurking out here...


 .snail




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: nate@VIS.ColoState.EDU (CVL staff member Nate Sammons)
Date: Mon, 2 Aug 93 07:12:34 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: someone wanted 12 shirts by Aug 16 -- who are you?
Message-ID: <9308021411.AA20631@vangogh.VIS.ColoState.EDU>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



I received some mail a few days ago saying that someone wanted 12
shirts by the 16th.... that mail has been vaporized.

who were you?

thanks,

-nate




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Peter Wayner <pcw@access.digex.net>
Date: Mon, 2 Aug 93 05:42:33 PDT
To: mdiehl@vesta.unm.edu
Subject: Re: Recent AP story...
Message-ID: <199308021241.AA28365@access.digex.net>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Yes, it can. My information about the abuses of the NCIC came
from an AP story by Lawrence Knutson. I didn't want to type
the whole thing because it would violate copyright. Apparently,
the Philadelphia Inquirer ran it on 7/29. 

-Peter




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Karl Barrus <elee9sf@Menudo.UH.EDU>
Date: Mon, 2 Aug 93 07:19:24 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: REMAIL: list 8/2/93
Message-ID: <199308021419.AA26546@Menudo.UH.EDU>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----


Q1: What cypherpunk remailers exist?

A1:

 1: nowhere@bsu-cs.bsu.edu 
 2: hh@cicada.berkeley.edu 
 3: hh@pmantis.berkeley.edu 
 4: hh@soda.berkeley.edu 
 5: 00x@uclink.berkeley.edu 
 6: hal@alumni.caltech.edu 
 7: ebrandt@jarthur.claremont.edu 
 8: phantom@mead.u.washington.edu 
 9: remailer@rebma.mn.org 
10: elee7h5@rosebud.ee.uh.edu 
11: hfinney@shell.portal.com 
12: remail@tamsun.tamu.edu 
13: remail@tamaix.tamu.edu 
14: remailer@utter.dis.org 
15: remailer@entropy.linet.org
16: remail@extropia.wimsey.com 

NOTES: 
#1-#5		no encryption of remailing requests
#6-#15		support encrypted remailing requests
#16		special - header and message must be encrypted together
#9,#14,#15,#16	introduce larger than average delay (not direct connect)
#9,#14,#16      running on privately owned machines

======================================================================

Q2: What help is available?

A2:

Check out the pub/cypherpunks directory at soda.berkeley.edu
(128.32.149.19).  Instructions on how to use the remailers are in the
remailer directory, along with some unix scripts and dos batch files.

The public keys for the remailers which support encrypted remailing
requests is also available in the same directory.

Mail to me (elee9sf@menudo.uh.edu) for further help and/or questions.


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.3a

iQCVAgUBLF0iL4OA7OpLWtYzAQHfUwP/RdoFAsUHn5N30Y4nUbskx4iXtrC36uai
LoktYeLaHEDPz0B46nmSt0Szzf4LWSVAAS6cdQQ+jMHKnL66avP/cmQ+aeY8xx5r
AJ69hLmkXLpdSc5566aKlSV1kCv5Yika7mp3WNlh+1OuW7uOFg5hcnVnXmx3aLye
hBIJtB3Yga4=
=AKHS
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: s.summers1@genie.geis.com
Date: Mon, 2 Aug 93 02:13:46 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: D. Bernstein's Open Letter
Message-ID: <9308020913.AA17916@relay2.geis.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


In-Reply-To: <9308010625.AA13452@longs.lance.colostate.edu> from "L.
Detweiler"
 
From Ed Carp:
 
> From L. Detweiler:
 >> Someone flamed once over including Usenet (esp. sci.crypt) postings
 
>What was their rationale?  I'd rather see relevent postings reposted here-
 >damnit, I don't have *time* to read 280MB a week of news!  What's the
>person's problem who flamed you?
 
        I second that.  I _don't_ have Usenet access (I actually would be
willing to read 280MB a week), or ftp access.  This mailing list is my only
source of information of this kind.
 
        If this person can back their rationale with a e-mail gateway to
usenet newsgroups (not just an e-mail POSTING server like utexas'), I might
see some justification...
 
Sean
 




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: dmandl@lehman.com (David Mandl)
Date: Mon, 2 Aug 93 06:47:34 PDT
To: eb@srlr14.sr.hp.com
Subject: Re: Public Key Servers
Message-ID: <9308021340.AA13894@disvnm2.shearson.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> >	   Are the key servers listed in the PGP documentation still active? 
> >   And if so, what is the general opinion of using them?
> 
> Key server == list of people to bust and who knows who.
>   (compute the transitive closure of the signatures)

Yeah, but there are >1501 keys on it (last time I checked, which
was about three weeks ago).  And the size seems to be growing pretty
fast.  Remember the "mandatory" draft registration imposed by Carter
in 1980?  I think about two kids were ever busted for not registering,
and they were VERY active and vocal.  The whole draft registration
program was basically ignored, and what was the government going to,
arrest every American male born after 1962?  I think it's important
to get as many keys on the servers as possible, for the same reasons
that encryption itself should be used as widely as possible.

   --Dave.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: cme@ellisun.sw.stratus.com (Carl Ellison)
Date: Mon, 2 Aug 93 07:01:29 PDT
To: jersmit@eis.calstate.edu
Subject: Re:  Encrypted BBS?
Message-ID: <9308021400.AA11508@ellisun.sw.stratus.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>Date: Sat, 31 Jul 1993 16:11:13 -0700 (PDT)
>From: "Jeremy R. Smith" <jersmit@eis.calstate.edu>
>Subject: Encrypted BBS?
>Message-Id: <Pine.3.07.9307311613.A27337-9100000@eis.calstate.edu>

>	Would it be at all possible, given today's present state of
>cryptography, to run a bbs in a totally encrypted form?  If so, are there
>any software packages out there that accomplish this at some level?

We did this about 8 years ago at E&S using DEC VMS NOTES.  We used a 
plain vanilla secret key algorithm and a key shared by all legitimate
members of the group.  We could do it today -- but why bother?  If you
have a key that widespread, it's effectively certain that a "wrong person"
(however you define him/her) will have a copy of the key.





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: csvcjld@nomvst.lsumc.edu
Date: Mon, 2 Aug 93 08:07:34 PDT
To: nate@VIS.ColoState.EDU
Subject: Re: lookin' for a slogan for Tshirts
In-Reply-To: <9308021347.AA20508@vangogh.VIS.ColoState.EDU>
Message-ID: <19930802100425065@nomvst.lsumc.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


  >"When privacy is outlawed, only outlaws will have privacy."

     How about,

"When privacy is outlawed, only governments will have privacy."





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: cme@ellisun.sw.stratus.com (Carl Ellison)
Date: Mon, 2 Aug 93 07:11:30 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re:  Has the other shoe dropped ?
Message-ID: <9308021409.AA11536@ellisun.sw.stratus.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>From: bart@netcom.com (Harry Bartholomew)
>Message-Id: <9308011855.AA26646@netcom5.netcom.com>
>Subject: Has the other shoe dropped ?
>Date: Sun, 1 Aug 93 11:55:32 PDT

>	Has nobody else heard on NPR's Weekend Edition that the FBI
>	has requested the banning of non-Clipper encryption ?
>	Or was I really not quite awake and recalling a bad dream ?

I taped it, listened twice -- heard the opposite: that the FBI has no
plans at present to ban other encryption.  I can listen again, if you're
dubious.





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: cme@ellisun.sw.stratus.com (Carl Ellison)
Date: Mon, 2 Aug 93 07:32:33 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Sterilized medflies of crypto
Message-ID: <9308021431.AA11569@ellisun.sw.stratus.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>Message-Id: <9308020407.AA26817@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
>To: cme@ellisun.sw.stratus.com (Carl Ellison)
>Subject: Re: Sterilized medflies of crypto 
>Date: Sun, 01 Aug 93 22:07:21 -0600
>From: "L. Detweiler" <ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu>


>>By "milking the algorithm talk", I'm talking about getting everybody to look
>>at the algorithm which might easily be secure and ignore the weakness:
>>the registration of keys.
>>
>>I don't care about the algorithm.  I care about registration.  That's what I
>>want to see people/press/citizens outraged about. 
>
>amen. Sorry you didn't elaborate on this on the list.

OK -- here's my replies for the list.

>The whole Key Escrow thing is totally ill conceived. It is clearly not
>the underlying point of the proposal. They don't name the entities.
>Denning comes up with some strange explanation of laptops in a vault
>shortly after the announcement. It is so transparent it is
>pathetic--but unfortunately the issue is largely framed as `who will be
>the agencies' in many places so far...

I believe key registration is the *whole point* of the Skipjack proposal.

This is the first time in the history of cryptography, as far as I can
tell, when a government has tried to interfere with the private citizenry's
ability to use strong cryptography -- and they're doing it strictly through
key registration.

However, being clever folks, they have added a strawman to the proposal.
They proposed an NSA-designed algorithm -- something people would fight in
such a way that the government could hopefully turn around and call the
opponents paranoid and get the public to believe the gov't, writing off the
opposition.

Look back at the original announcement.

The gov't said, in effect, 'if you don't like to use NSA's algorithm, you're
free to design algorithms of your own provided they permit key escrow.'

Then they left that as a note -- an aside -- and proceeded to take on all
comers w.r.t. the Skipjack algorithm.

I say:  don't fight their strength, even if it's flawed.  It's a tar
baby at best.

We should fight the only thing which matters:  key registration.


What's important about key registration, to me, isn't the details.  It's
the philosophy.  This is the first time in the history of the world that
the government has laid any claim at all to a citizen's cryptographic
keys.

The government has never had a right to private keys.

The private crypto users have always had strong crypto.

The government should never have the right to private keys.

Private crypto users should always have strong crypto in the future.

 - Carl




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Duncan Frissell <frissell@panix.com>
Date: Mon, 2 Aug 93 08:53:52 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: No Subject
Message-ID: <199308021552.AA19677@panix.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


To: cypherpunks@toad.com

nobody@mead.u.washington.edu said:

N.>This is the cypherpunks list, not the extropians list. The article was 
N.>about cypherpunks, not extropians, so it's irrelevent whether the 
N.>extrops are luddites.
N.>
N.>As for the c-punks, there's nothing inherently non-luddite about us. 
N.>Not all of us accept all uses of computers and technology without 
N.>question. There are certain machines that need to be trashed. I
N.>liked the reference in the article. I don't think it was 100% accurate, 
N.>but you should be aware that there ARE cypherpunks Luddites lurking out 
N.>here...

N.> .snail
N.>

However the list was founded and is dominated by extropians and (small e) 
expropianism is the dominent philosophy of the nets.

Ned Lud and the boys wished to keep themselves and everyone else poor, 
smash technology, and stop the world just so they would not have to 
transform their lives.  Just like the french farmers of today.  Since one 
must already have transformed one's life to get connected to the nets (at 
least at this stage of technology) there can't be too many genuine 
luddites here.  

If anyone qualifies as luddites in this contrroversy it is the 
*government*.  They are trying to slow the pace of technological 
transformation because it realizes that bureaucratic structures are 
hopless market competitors and will be destroyed by technological change.

I, for one, am not going to permint the neeo-luddites of the coercive 
state apparatus to stop change just so they can avoid honest work.

Duncan Frissell

*************************************************************************
EDI, Temporary Employment, Quants, Securitization, Equipment Leasing, 
Fullfillment Companies, Overnight Delivery Services, Facsimile Machines

- Not as sexy as Tim May's signature line but just as important.  


---
 ~ WinQwk 2.0b#0 ~ Unregistered Evaluation Copy
                   




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: cme@ellisun.sw.stratus.com (Carl Ellison)
Date: Mon, 2 Aug 93 09:17:34 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: lookin' for a slogan for Tshirts
Message-ID: <9308021614.AA11760@ellisun.sw.stratus.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>From: csvcjld@nomvst.lsumc.edu
>Message-Id: <19930802100425065@nomvst.lsumc.edu>
>Subject: Re: lookin' for a slogan for Tshirts
>Date: 02 Aug 93 10:04:25 -0700


>"When privacy is outlawed, only governments will have privacy."

How about,

	"celebrating 4000 years of strong cryptography in the
	 hands of private citizens"

??

 - Carl




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Sandy <72114.1712@CompuServe.COM>
Date: Mon, 2 Aug 93 09:58:52 PDT
To: <cypherpunks@toad.com>
Subject: SKIPJACK PANEL
Message-ID: <930802165408_72114.1712_FHF34-1@CompuServe.COM>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
  SANDY SANDFORT               Reply to:  ssandfort@attmail.com
 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Is it just me, or is anyone else dubious about Dorothy Dennings
and company running their various Skipjack tests ON AN *NSA*
CRAY COMPUTER?  Since many of the objections to the whole plan
arouse because of doubts about the intentions of the NSA, why
would D.D. et al. trust them to run these critical tests?  How
difficult would it be for the NSA to spoof its own computer?

Next big news items:  United Nations hires Serbian troops to
report on human rights violations in Bosnia.  Farmer Brown puts
fox in charge of henhouse.  Film at eleven.

 S a n d y

>>>>>>    Please send e-mail to:  ssandfort@attmail.com    <<<<<<
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: cme@ellisun.sw.stratus.com (Carl Ellison)
Date: Mon, 2 Aug 93 10:28:52 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: T-shirt detail
Message-ID: <9308021728.AA11831@ellisun.sw.stratus.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Sorry for distracting people with my T-shirt suggestion, but the more
I think about it, the more I like "celebrating 4000 years..." -- possibly
on the back.

On the front, I'd have 4 boxes (or regions set apart):

		LEB KAMAI


				y_i = x_i + k_{(i mod m)}


		y_i = x_i (+) k_i


				y = x^e mod N

--------------------------------------------------

1. LEB KAMAI, in Hebrew characters from the Bible -- cf., Kahn's "The
Codebreakers", pp. 77-78 -- atbash cipher, stronger than Caesar's and
predating him by more than a month :-)

2. polyalphabetic substitution -- stronger than nomenclators (based on when
attacks were known to exist) but ignored by gov't users for 100s of years

3. Vernam's tape -- theoretically unbreakable -- in the hands of citizens
from about 1920 {the (+) is a circled "+" -- meaning XOR}

4. RSA -- 1978

--------------------------------------------------

It might be interesting to date the four boxes.  Anyone have a date for
the LEB KAMAI?

 - Carl




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Jim McCoy <mccoy@ccwf.cc.utexas.edu>
Date: Mon, 2 Aug 93 11:29:26 PDT
To: cme@ellisun.sw.stratus.com (Carl Ellison)
Subject: Re: lookin' for a slogan for Tshirts
In-Reply-To: <9308021614.AA11760@ellisun.sw.stratus.com>
Message-ID: <199308021828.AA12198@flubber.cc.utexas.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text


> 
> 	"celebrating 4000 years of strong cryptography in the
> 	 hands of private citizens"

A nice thought, but it is not quite true now, is it?  Cryptography has been
a tool for specialists, scholars, and governments for those 4000 years, but
to claim that "the masses" have had access to it is clearly untrue.  In
fact, it seems that the current friction between groups such as this one
and the U.S. governement is caused mostly because private citizens are
beginning to get access to this strong cryptography and this is something
"those who watch" do not like...

jim



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: cme@ellisun.sw.stratus.com (Carl Ellison)
Date: Mon, 2 Aug 93 10:32:34 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: more T-shirt alternative
Message-ID: <9308021731.AA11837@ellisun.sw.stratus.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



	"celebrating 4000 years of personal privacy
	 through strong cryptography"





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: baumbach@atmel.com (Peter Baumbach)
Date: Mon, 2 Aug 93 11:01:28 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: money tracing
Message-ID: <9308021742.AA07002@bass.chp.atmel.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Thug writes:
> The black ink that is used to print the front side of U.S. cash contains a
> very finely ground black iron oxide powder.  The ink is magnetic.  This
> magnetism is used mostly by vending & change machines to distinguish real
> bills from forgeries/photocopies.
>[...]
>           3. Magnetic ink detection.  Real bills are printed with magnetic
>              ink, forgeries/photocopies are not.

Magnetic toner for laser printers does exist.  Its purpose is to allow people
to print their own checks.

Peter Baumbach
baumbach@atmel.com




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: technopagan priest <tedwards@wam.umd.edu>
Date: Mon, 2 Aug 93 10:47:34 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: LEEF->LEAF etc.
Message-ID: <199308021746.AA17259@rac2.wam.umd.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



I think it is interesting how the Law Enforcement Exploitation Field
has been renamed LEAF.  Good P.R. move NIST!

I'm personally not motivated to believe that Skipjack is a flawed
algorithm, but at the same time I do not consider it tested until
it has stood up to peer-reviewed public analysis.

I am very concerned about the key-exchange system.  As far as I can
see, we still don't know exactly what it is, and whether that is safe.
Public key systems are much more difficult to design securely than
private key systems.  The key exchange has to be secure from 
eavesdroppers and also proof against "man-in-the-middle" attacks.

Furthermore, there is the traffic-analysis problem.  Everything I have
read so far has indicated there will be a single system key which will
encrypt Clipper serial numbers.  A trivial phone tap with someone
armed with the system key could result in massive traffic-analysis, 
and the government could do this simply because they have the
system key, the Mafia will follow soon.

I think a good avenue of attack right now is to politically attack
the key-escrow parts of Clipper, and get Skipjack as a published 
private-key standard.  Write your congresscritters.

-Thomas




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: thug@phantom.com (Murdering Thug)
Date: Mon, 2 Aug 93 10:48:52 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: SKIPJACK PANEL
In-Reply-To: <930802165408_72114.1712_FHF34-1@CompuServe.COM>
Message-ID: <m0oN43f-0009G8C@mindvox.phantom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text


Sandy Sandford writes:
> 
> Is it just me, or is anyone else dubious about Dorothy Dennings
> and company running their various Skipjack tests ON AN *NSA*
> CRAY COMPUTER?  Since many of the objections to the whole plan
> arouse because of doubts about the intentions of the NSA, why
> would D.D. et al. trust them to run these critical tests?  How
> difficult would it be for the NSA to spoof its own computer?
> 
> Next big news items:  United Nations hires Serbian troops to
> report on human rights violations in Bosnia.  Farmer Brown puts
> fox in charge of henhouse.  Film at eleven.

This is but one of the obvious flaws in the whole Clipper scheme.
I think the whole Clipper debate can be boiled down to this one
important fact:
                  * It is not in the interest of the NSA for
                    Clipper/Skipjack to be secure, therefore
                    they will find a way to make sure that
                    either the algorithm or the chip itself
                    contains a NSA backdoor before the chip
                    is sold to the American public.

The whole escrow scheme is an obvious wild goose chase as well.  We all
know that the NSA operates by importing large amounts of information
(oceans of data) and uses it's computers to extract the goodies.  The
would not be able to do this if they had to obtain a warrant for each
conversation that constitutes a part of the ocean of data.  The whole
escrow aspect of the system is obviously bogus.

To review:  1) The key escrow aspect is a wild goose chase.
            2) The security of the algorithm is also a wild goose chase.
            3) The backdoor must be in the chip hardware itself.

Therefore even if Clinton and the NSA deside to make the two key escrow
agents the E.F.F. and the A.C.L.U, and Denning and her crew declare the
algorithm to be secure, I will still advocate a complete boycott of the
Clipper/Skipjack technology because the backdoor will be in those
tamper-proof chips. 


Thug



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Tom Knight <tk@reagan.ai.mit.edu>
Date: Mon, 2 Aug 93 11:27:34 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: SKIPJACK PANEL
In-Reply-To: <m0oN43f-0009G8C@mindvox.phantom.com>
Message-ID: <19930802182633.5.TK@ROCKY.AI.MIT.EDU>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


    Date: Mon, 2 Aug 1993 13:52 EDT
    From: thug@phantom.com (Murdering Thug)

    To review:  1) The key escrow aspect is a wild goose chase.
		2) The security of the algorithm is also a wild goose chase.
		3) The backdoor must be in the chip hardware itself.

Dr. Thug ignores the most obvious weakness, which is likely in the key
generation process.  By selecting the key from a relatively small
keyspace (say 40 bit equivalent, rather than the 80 bit nominal
keyspace) the cost of exhaustive search can be dramatically lowered to
those who know the basis of key selection, without any outward evidence
of tampering, weakness of the algorithm, weakness of the chip,
vulnerability to external attacks, special hardware to respond to
trapdoor codes, etc.

Examining the chip hardware for correctness will not discover this
attack.  Only providing users with the ability to program their own
keys, together with public disclosure of the Skipjack algorithm and
verification of its implementation can help.

If there are a significant number of weak keys in the Skipjack algorithm
(which is explicitly denied in the panel report) then even this approach
could be dangerous.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: wcs@anchor.ho.att.com (Bill_Stewart(HOY002)1305)
Date: Mon, 2 Aug 93 18:32:39 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Skipjack Panel
Message-ID: <9308021853.AA11158@anchor.ho.att.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text


I'll disagree with Mr. Thug.  It probably *is* in the interests of
the National Spook Agency to have the SkipJack algorithm secure;
they've taken too much heat in the past for DES, and if they can't
convince enough of us that we can trust them, we'll all use real
encryption products from independent vendors, or at least triple-DES.

The Key Escrow business strikes me as major sleight of hand,
but even if they don't steal the keys somewhere in that process,
they can change to rules so they can get them from the experts.
Obviously they could hide weaknesses anywhere in the system,
but the SkipJack part is pretty clean, and trapdoors in the chip itself
are a lot of trouble to use compared to the escrow process.

Right now they're trying to draw everybody's attention to the
foot-thick concrete walls and roof, and the final release of the report
will emphasize the heavy steel door with the big bulletproof
neon sign saying "COPS ONLY" and the elaborate ceremony for 
opening the two case-hardened real-estate-agent locks on the doors,
so you forget to notice that they've already made a spare copy of the key,
and maybe you can pop the unbreakable titanium pins out of the hinges as well.

			Bill
# Bill Stewart    wcs@anchor.ho.att.com  +1-908-949-0705 Fax-4876
# AT&T Bell Labs, Room 4M-312, Crawfords Corner Rd, Holmdel, NJ  07733-3030



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Peter Wayner <pcw@access.digex.net>
Date: Mon, 2 Aug 93 12:03:53 PDT
To: tk@reagan.ai.mit.edu
Subject: Re: SKIPJACK PANEL
Message-ID: <199308021903.AA21750@access.digex.net>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Tom Knight is correct that the key generation process is
a good place to hide a weakness. If I remember correctly,
the chip's key is generated directly from it's ID number
by padding it with 160 random bits and encrypting the whole
mess. 80 bits of the result becomes the key. Obviously, if
you can keep a copy of the 160 bits of padding, then you
can regenerate the chip's local key without calling
up the key-escrow fascility. Apparently, an early document
said that each collection of padding would be used for
a batch of 300 chips. So if you can keep a list of these
padding bits, then you're set...

(Disclosure: This data came from the hip, not from documents.)

-Peter




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: wcs@anchor.ho.att.com (Bill_Stewart(HOY002)1305)
Date: Mon, 2 Aug 93 18:21:33 PDT
To: cme@ellisun.sw.stratus.com
Subject: Re:  Encrypted BBS?
Message-ID: <9308021921.AA11320@anchor.ho.att.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text


> >	Would it be at all possible, given today's present state of
> >cryptography, to run a bbs in a totally encrypted form?  If so, are there
> >any software packages out there that accomplish this at some level?

You've got to think about what threats you're trying to protect against.

- Confiscated Machine - this can be done today with commercial products, a no-brainer.
	You keep the disk in encrypted form, either using software or 
	a hardware-assist DES board, and it's automatically handled by your
	disk drivers using a boot-time secret-key password.
	Neither your users nor your BBS sofware knows any difference.
	(Obviously you also want to decrypt your backup floppies.)

- Wiretapping - there are tons of possible solutions, at varying amounts of work.
	you can either do this with public or secret-key approaches,
	and you can use a shared secret key, separate secret keys,
	session keys set up using secret or public keys, etc.
	Most of these methods affect the BBS sofware itself,
	though you could use an encrypted telnet or other comm program instead,
	presumably in conjunction with the encrypted disk.

	A solution that requires a little more integration is to have the users 
	upload the files encrypted (using random keys), and upload the
	keys (encrypted) and have the host recrypt them with the readers
	public or private keys, either at upload or download time,
	or perhaps on a batch basis during idle time.
	You could probably adapt PGP to retain the initial key for each file,
	and only re-encrypt the key when a user wants to download it,
	instead of re-encrypting the whole file.

- Untrusted users - if there may be narcs on your box, you've got to give
	the users control over who can access what messages they create.
	If the users trust *you*, you can use some sort of password-based system;
	some existing BBSs presumably provide this, and you can even hack
	Usenet to do it (for non-NNTP use, anyway) using Unix groups;
	this allows groups of users who trust each other but not other users.

- Untrusted Sysadm - if *you* may be a narc :-), your users can include 
	PGP-encrypted messages in their postings, and there's not much
	you can do about it :-)  This somewhat solves the untrusted-user
	problem as well, though it makes the closed user group bit more annoying.

			Bill Stewart



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: cme@ellisun.sw.stratus.com (Carl Ellison)
Date: Mon, 2 Aug 93 13:01:30 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re:  LEEF->LEAF etc.
Message-ID: <9308021959.AA11988@ellisun.sw.stratus.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>Date: Mon, 2 Aug 1993 13:46:24 -0400
>From: technopagan priest <tedwards@wam.umd.edu>
>Message-Id: <199308021746.AA17259@rac2.wam.umd.edu>
>Subject: LEEF->LEAF etc.

>I am very concerned about the key-exchange system.  As far as I can
>see, we still don't know exactly what it is, and whether that is safe.


Safe?

You are joking, yes?

As long as *anyone* has skeleton keys, the system is worthless.

Even if *I* am the one holding the skeleton keys, you shouldn't trust it,
and I'm a great deal more trustworthy than the FBI and NSA and CIA, according
to our respective histories of abuses of privacy.

 - Carl
 - <<Disclaimer: All opinions expressed are my own, of course.>>
 - Carl Ellison                                        cme@sw.stratus.com
 - Stratus Computer Inc.       M3-2-BKW                TEL: (508)460-2783
 - 55 Fairbanks Boulevard ; Marlborough MA 01752-1298  FAX: (508)624-7488




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: cme@ellisun.sw.stratus.com (Carl Ellison)
Date: Mon, 2 Aug 93 13:11:31 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: lookin' for a slogan for Tshirts
Message-ID: <9308022009.AA12019@ellisun.sw.stratus.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>Message-Id: <199308021828.AA12198@flubber.cc.utexas.edu>
>Subject: Re: lookin' for a slogan for Tshirts
>Date: Mon, 2 Aug 1993 13:28:36 -0500 (CDT)
>From: Jim McCoy <mccoy@ccwf.cc.utexas.edu>


I wrote:

>> 	"celebrating 4000 years of strong cryptography in the
>> 	 hands of private citizens"

Jim replied:

>A nice thought, but it is not quite true now, is it?  Cryptography has been
>a tool for specialists, scholars, and governments for those 4000 years, but
>to claim that "the masses" have had access to it is clearly untrue.  In
>fact, it seems that the current friction between groups such as this one
>and the U.S. governement is caused mostly because private citizens are
>beginning to get access to this strong cryptography and this is something
>"those who watch" do not like...

Jim,

	I meant precisely this.  It is quite true.

	I didn't say "the masses".  In the old days, first you had to be
literate to use crypto.  That excluded the masses immediately.  However,
it was private citizens -- not military folks or diplomats -- who had
access to and who often invented the crypto.

	I am concerned that you would continue to state the popular
misconception.  This is, in fact, my one complaint with Julian's article
in the Village Voice.

	Check out the first several chapters of David Kahn's "The
Codebreakers".

	Cryptography originated with private individuals.  Private
individuals have *always* had access to and used cryptography at least as
strong as that used by the military of the time.  The few exceptions have
been very short-lived and rare.

	My 4 examples for the T-shirt show a steady progression of strong
cryptography in the hands of private citizens.  I stopped at 4 to keep from
making the T-shirt too busy.

	I *really* recommend reading Kahn about this.  The notion that
strong crypto in private hands is somehow new is totally bogus -- flattering
to those of us who like to think we're better off than our parents or
that we're exploring new ground -- but it's wrong and, even worse, it plays
into the hands of the NSA and FBI.  Once you start saying that citizens
have "first time ever" access to strong crypto, the FBI is free to turn
around and say "OK - now the gov't will have first time ever power to
take strong crypto away from the people".

	Read Kahn.

 - Carl




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: greg@ideath.goldenbear.com (Greg Broiles)
Date: Mon, 2 Aug 93 17:01:32 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: ...
Message-ID: <eyio8B1w164w@ideath.goldenbear.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



I think the T-shirt thing is a nice idea, and I think that the "Big Brother 
Inside" thing is also a nice idea, but I liked them better when they were 
separate. Wearing a shirt that suggests "big brother inside" seems like it 
might send the wrong message.

Dunno if there are enough of us in the world for it to be worth worrying 
about, but some of us Cypherpunks just laugh at L and XL T-shirt sizes; best 
fit for me is a XXXL-Tall. I might order an XL shirt to hang on my wall, but 
it's unlikely it'll ever hang on me. :)

The "celebrating 400 years .." thing sounds wonderful. Would make a neat 
poster/flyer, too.


--
Greg Broiles                            greg@goldenbear.com
Golden Bear Computer Consulting         +1 503 465 0325
Box 12005 Eugene OR 97440               BBS: +1 503 687 7764




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: cme@ellisun.sw.stratus.com (Carl Ellison)
Date: Mon, 2 Aug 93 14:31:31 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: cross-post
Message-ID: <9308022129.AA12752@ellisun.sw.stratus.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Path: transfer.stratus.com!ellisun.sw.stratus.com!cme
From: cme@ellisun.sw.stratus.com (Carl Ellison)
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
Subject: Skipjack review as a side-track
Date: 2 Aug 1993 21:25:11 GMT
Organization: Stratus Computer, Marlboro MA
Lines: 28
Message-ID: <23k0nn$8gk@transfer.stratus.com>
NNTP-Posting-Host: ellisun.sw.stratus.com


It amuses the gallows-humor bone in me to see people busily debating the
quality of Skipjack as an algorithm and the quality of the review of its
strength.

Someone proposes to dangle you over the Grand Canyon using

	sewing thread
tied to
	steel chain
tied to
	knitting yarn

and you're debating whether the steel chain has been X-rayed properly
to see if there are flaws in the metal.

Key generation, chip fabrication, court orders, distribution of keys once
acquired from escrow agencies and safety of keys within escrow agencies are
some of the real weaknesses.  Once those are as strong as my use of
1024-bit RSA and truly random session keys in keeping keys on the two sides
of a conversation with no one in the middle able to get the key, then we
need to look at the steel chain in the middle: Skipjack itself.

-- 
 - <<Disclaimer: All opinions expressed are my own, of course.>>
 - Carl Ellison                                        cme@sw.stratus.com
 - Stratus Computer Inc.       M3-2-BKW                TEL: (508)460-2783
 - 55 Fairbanks Boulevard ; Marlborough MA 01752-1298  FAX: (508)624-7488




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: nate@VIS.ColoState.EDU (CVL staff member Nate Sammons)
Date: Mon, 2 Aug 93 17:51:32 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: "Big Brother Inside" tshirts
Message-ID: <9308030049.AA21541@vangogh.VIS.ColoState.EDU>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



I regret to inform the group that I cannot make the T-shirts.  I have
no money to fund them, and even less time.  I do, however, encourage
anyone else who want to make the shirts to do so.  I uploaded the
logos to soda this morning, so they should be available soon (if
not already).  I printed on of the images out (the large one) and
it looked great......

I am sorry for this, but I am absolutely financially strapped now.

BTW, the images names started with "BigBro" -= and if you want,
you can strip off the "Image Edited by Nate Sammons" line I 
dropped in the lower right corner of the large images (it was in,
I think, 12-pixel high letters).

Well, for anyone whe makes the T-shirts, put something cool on the 
back, and sign me up for one, size XL.

-nate sammons
 nate@vis.colostate.edu




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: nobody@soda.berkeley.edu
Date: Mon, 2 Aug 93 22:09:03 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: REMAIL: Anonymous posts
Message-ID: <9308030504.AA01150@soda.berkeley.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

Several people have asked about anonymous posting given that the utexas
gateway is blocking (some?) cypherpunks remailers.

Another possibility is to use Julf's anonymous remailer in Finland.  I'm not
sure what groups it posts to but I'm pretty sure it includes sci.crypt and
most of the alt groups.

For more security, you can mail to it from my remailer at
hfinney@shell.portal.com, and probably other cypherpunks remailers as well.
I'm pretty sure my other remailer, hal@alumni.caltech.edu, will work too.

Send mail of the form:

========================= cut ====================
::
Request-Remailing-To: alt.privacy@anon.penet.fi

This is a post to alt.privacy.
========================= cut ====================

This should work.

You can also use PGP encryption; encrypt that message above with the PGP
public key of my remailer, add the header:

::
Encrypted: PGP

and a blank line before the -----BEGIN PGP MESSAGE----- line, and send
it to the remailer.  You can chain through a bunch of cpunks remailers
using Karl's scripts for higher security.

Hal Finney
hfinney@shell.portal.com

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
iQCVAgUBLF28O6gTA69YIUw3AQFj8QQAvaATrxKVYbKR4Jvj/Oj54DYJT7NdSs+z
lozanaG70YJRnJNI5EAzRK8mT9egjxHzd41aa/XqEeuC9qjLCA5qDYQEhsFFr6tw
LclgvXJ9I8xFvzHmIa7sVEytlWhDZJHXImHcyoFxAsmNFbLBJ5/h1szNgCx6NpzV
UnmXw3ftshQ=
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: cme@ellisun.sw.stratus.com (Carl Ellison)
Date: Mon, 2 Aug 93 20:27:40 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re:  ...
Message-ID: <9308030325.AA13237@ellisun.sw.stratus.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>Subject: ...
>From: greg@ideath.goldenbear.com (Greg Broiles)
>Message-Id: <eyio8B1w164w@ideath.goldenbear.com>
>Date: Mon, 02 Aug 93 16:55:01 PDT
>

>The "celebrating 400 years .." thing sounds wonderful. Would make a neat 
>poster/flyer, too.

Thanks.

It's 4000 years, BTW.  I assume your 400 was a typo.

 - Carl




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: anonymous@extropia.wimsey.com
Date: Tue, 3 Aug 93 00:29:05 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: REMAIL: Virtual remailers
Message-ID: <199308030627.AA12383@xtropia>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

I run two remailers; one is hal@alumni.caltech.edu and the other is
hfinney@shell.portal.com.  The first one is on a system to which I have
free access, while the second is on a system for which I am paying about
$40 a month.

I feel like the second one is "stronger" politically, since I am paying
hard-earned money for it.  Also, I remember the summaries that were posted
of last year's Hacker's conference, in which it was stated that the owner
of the Portal system was eager to support remailers.  I don't know if he
realizes that he is indirectly supporting them now since I am using my
Portal account to run one, but I feel that if they get some complaints and
come to me, I might be able to get the boss to step in on my behalf.

Given this situation, it has occured to me that it would be easy to have
the caltech remailer forward all mail to the portal remailer, to be
remailed from there.  This way nobody would receive objectionable mail
from the caltech account, and no one would ask for it to be shut down.

In the past, we have had suggestions that this would be a desirable mode
of operation for our cypherpunks remailers: to have the "front ends" be
a different set of machines than the actual remailers.  It was said that
this would represent a sort of "distributed computing" environment, a
"virtual remailer" that would span the network, thus making it harder to
shut down.

I did not really agree with these arguments, since I felt that the targets
would simply be the final-remailing machines, since these are the ones
from which people would receive anonymous mail.  If they were shut down,
then other machines would have to come on-line to replace them.  Given
that such replacements actually existed, I felt that it would be better
simply to use them from the beginning as stand-alone remailers, so that
there would be more remailers out there for people to use.

Now I am faced with a concrete test of this principle, and I'm soliciting
suggestions.  Would it be better to keep my two remailers operating, even
though I might eventually have to shut one down due if complaints arise?
Or should I make one just a front-end for the other, thereby creating a
"virtual remailer" (a term I don't really agree with) which spans the
two machines and which makes it unlikely that the front-end remailer at
caltech will be terminated.

Are there any advantages to having the caltech remailer if it just feeds
into the one at portal?  I'm not sure I see much point in keeping it
operating if it performs no useful task.

On the other hand, if people do see advantages, we could create a set of
"second-tier" remailers which would be politically safe.  They would
always feed into one of the "first-tier" remailers which would be the
ones which would actually send mail.  No anonymous mail or postings
would ever come from these second-tier remailers, hence their operators,
owners, and sysops would receive no complaints.  Perhaps more people
would be willing to run remailers on this basis, knowing they were
relatively immune from political pressure.

Hal Finney
hfinney@shell.portal.com

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
iQCVAgUBLF2/d6gTA69YIUw3AQEHOQP/dU996sl0yQk8FlbSVG3LjUzLOIg7ktGs
57IRPU9zWJXOTGbxxhcA/p+kApXzU4hwnLV4ch9+DFst/hPFDMoHuuetmUMSLscL
EjaCz5ySzS532i/6TdfNbHMiDMgpWNIorQCysC+Ilpi5J9VCBXURbd0ZSlMPj19a
0crq5P/scvA=
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: greg@ideath.goldenbear.com (Greg Broiles)
Date: Tue, 3 Aug 93 00:57:39 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Remailer configuration
Message-ID: <0w5o8B1w164w@ideath.goldenbear.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain




Hal Finney writes and asks what folks think about his remailers - if two are
better than one, etc.

My two cents' worth is that two is better; already we're starting to see 
applications (like the UT mail-to-news gateway) where people are filtering 
known remailers out. The bigger the list of remailers which might be sending 
mail, the harder it'll be to do that sort of thing. I wonder how big the 
list would need to get before sysadmins would consider it more economical to 
abandon filtering entirely?

Let a thousand flowers bloom.


--
Greg Broiles                            greg@goldenbear.com
Golden Bear Computer Consulting         +1 503 465 0325
Box 12005 Eugene OR 97440               BBS: +1 503 687 7764




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: gast@cs.ucla.edu
Date: Tue, 3 Aug 93 01:23:16 GMT
Subject: FBI wants to ban Crypto
Message-ID: <1993Aug3.012316.9036@cs.ucla.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I just heard a little of the report on NPR on Saturday, but it
seems that the FBI went public last week at a security conference
with its desires to ban cryptography, at least crypto that it cannot
break.  The FBI said that in four different wiretap cases, it got
encrypted messages instead of talk.

I know that the FBI has previously announced similar plans including
at CFP-2, but this seems to be a new salvo.

David

	




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: bart@netcom.com (Harry Bartholomew)
Date: Tue, 3 Aug 93 02:57:42 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Other shoe drop confirmation
Message-ID: <9308030956.AA27451@netcom5.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


	Well, somebody else heard the story as I did.		Bart





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: nate@VIS.ColoState.EDU (CVL staff member Nate Sammons)
Date: Tue, 3 Aug 93 07:54:13 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Sterilized medflies of crypto
Message-ID: <9308031453.AA22423@vangogh.VIS.ColoState.EDU>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Detweiler says:
We should fight the only thing which matters:  key registration.


I think that he has a point here.  The SkipJack *may* be secure,
it may not (my feeling is that it is not), but the whole bit about
key registration is absolutely absurd (at best).

-nate sammons
 nate@vis.colostate.edu




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: eric@Synopsys.COM
Date: Tue, 3 Aug 93 11:39:16 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: REMAIL: Virtual remailers
In-Reply-To: <199308030627.AA12383@xtropia>
Message-ID: <199308031838.AA12893@gaea.synopsys.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Hal:  you should definitely keep your caltech remailer up, and
forwarding it to portal will not destroy its usefulness.  Remember
that a primary function of the remailers is to obscure the sender of a
message.  A message that passed through both caltech and portal would
require collecting logs from both systems to trace back beyond that
point.  That can't be easier than collecting the logs from only one of
the systems.

-eric messick (eric@toad.com)




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: J. Michael Diehl <mdiehl@vesta.unm.edu>
Date: Tue, 3 Aug 93 11:07:52 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Sign my Key?
Message-ID: <9308031806.AA24971@vesta.unm.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


     Hi all!  Well, I'm getting married Aug. 7.  for our Honeymoon, we are
taking a driving trip through Pheonix, Az., Las Angeles, Ca., Sacramento,
Ca., and Denver Co.  I MIGHT be able get away from my wife in order to have
my pub key signed.  Are there any Cypherpunks in these cities who might be
willing to sign my key?  Thanx in advance.  Laters.
========================+==========================================+
J. Michael Diehl   ;^)  | Have you hugged a Hetero........Lately?  |
mdiehl@triton.unm.edu   | "I'm just looking for the opportunity to |
mike.diehl@fido.org help|    be Politically Incorrect!"  +=========+
al945@cwns9.ins.cwru.edu| Is Big Brother in your phone?  | PGP KEY |
(505) 299-2282  (voice) |    If you don't know, ask me.  |Available|
========================+================================+=========+
PGP Key = 7C06F1 = A6 27 E1 1D 5F B2 F2 F1  12 E7 53 2D 85 A2 10 5D 
This message is protected by 18 USC 2511 and 18 USC 2703. Monitoring 
by anyone other than the recipient is absolutely forbidden by US Law




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Karl Barrus <elee9sf@Menudo.UH.EDU>
Date: Tue, 3 Aug 93 10:14:13 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: BOOK: Differential Cryptanalysis
Message-ID: <199308031713.AA16913@Menudo.UH.EDU>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Just yesterday I saw _Differential Cryptanalysis of the Data
Encryption Standard_ by Biham and Shamir at a local bookstore and
immediately purchased it.  It is published by Springer-Verlag (who
also publish Salomaa's _Public Key Cryptography_); ISBN 0-387-97930-1
and 3-540-97930-1.

The book describes the differential cryptanalysis attack, which is
also applicable to "bounded-round versions" of certain other
cryptosystems [what is a "bounded-round version" anyway?].  Phil
Zimmerman is acknowledged in the Preface [could this be the same prz
of PGP?]

I haven't had a chance to read the book - I've just been flipping
around so far, but here are the chapters:

1	Introduction
2	Results
3	Introduction to Differential Cryptanalysis
4	Differential Cryptanalysis of DES Variants
		four rounds
		six rounds
		eight rounds
		arbitrary number of rounds
		modified variants of DES
		DES with independent keys
		generalized DES
5	Differential Cryptanalysis of the Full 16-Round DES
6	Differential Cryptanalysis of FEAL
		FEAL-8
		FEAL-N and FEAL-NX
		other properties
7	Differential Cryptanalysis of Other Cryptosystems
		Khafre
		REDOC-II
		LOKI
		Lucifer
8	Differential Cryptanalysis of Hash Functions
		Snefru
		N-Hash
9	Non-Differential Cryptanalysis of DES with a Small Number of Rounds
		Ciphertext Only
		Known Plaintext
		Statistical Known Plaintext

Appendix A:	Description of DES
Appendix B:	Difference Distribution Tables of DES

I doesn't look like IDEA, MD4, or MD5 are mentioned.

/-----------------------------------\
| Karl L. Barrus                    |
| elee9sf@menudo.uh.edu             | <- preferred address
| barrus@tree.egr.uh.edu (NeXTMail) |
\-----------------------------------/




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Brian D Williams <talon57@well.sf.ca.us>
Date: Tue, 3 Aug 93 14:24:47 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: another shirt idea...
Message-ID: <93Aug3.142353pdt.13986-1@well.sf.ca.us>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain






 How 'bout this one;



                               NSA
                      Mother to Big Brother
                             MYK-78




                                                       Brian Williams
                                                       Cypherpatriot





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: nobody@pmantis.berkeley.edu
Date: Tue, 3 Aug 93 15:11:41 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: PKZIP Encryption is worthless
Message-ID: <9308032211.AA21345@pmantis.berkeley.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


To the best of my knowledge, PKZip uses a simple Vigenere algorithm for its
encryption. There is a program called "zipcrack", widely available on BBSes,
that does cryptanalysis of encrypted PKZip files. The rumor is that the 
"zipcrack" program originated in Russia, but really, cryptanalysis of the stuff
that PK is using is relatively trivial.
 
There are many good implementations of DES, including Symantec's in the Norton
Utilities. You could also use PGP. But don't rely on PKZip to protect your 
privacy. That's not what it's designed for.
 
Note the reply-to address above if you wish to reply.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Jon_Axelrad@third.wsgr.com
Date: Tue, 3 Aug 93 16:39:24 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Cypherpunk Mailing List
Message-ID: <9308032329.AA25435@radiomail.net>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


          I've read about the cypherpunks and your mailing list in
          recent issues of _Wired_ and the _Whole Earth
          Review_.  I support your goals and would appreciate being
          added to the mailing list.  While I probably couldn't
          contribute to discussions from a technical standpoint,
          I am a lawyer and may have an occasional useful comment on
          policy/legal matters.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: bart@netcom.com (Harry Bartholomew)
Date: Tue, 3 Aug 93 16:11:41 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: mail failed, returning to sender (fwd)
Message-ID: <9308032311.AA28097@netcom5.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Forwarded message:



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: <MAILER-DAEMON@uunorth.north.net>
Date: Tue, 3 Aug 93 18:07 EDT
To: uunorth.uucp!uunorth.uucp!uunorth.uucp!uunorth.uucp!uunorth.uucp!uunorth.uucp!uunorth.uucp!uunorth.uucp!uunorth.uucp!uunorth.uucp!uunorth.uucp!uunorth.uucp!uunorth.uucp!uunorth.uucp!uunorth.uucp!uunorth.uucp!uunorth.uucp!uunorth.uucp!uunorth.uucp!uunorth.uucp!netcom.com!,       bart
Subject: mail failed, returning to sender
Message-ID: <m0oNUVk-0001dXC@uunorth.north.net>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


|------------------------- Failed addresses follow: ---------------------|
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From: bart@netcom.com (Harry Bartholomew)
Message-Id: <9308030956.AA27451@netcom5.netcom.com>
Subject: Other shoe drop confirmation
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Date: Tue, 3 Aug 93 2:56:10 PDT
X-Mailer: ELM [version 2.3 PL11]

	Well, somebody else heard the story as I did.		Bart


>From netcom.com!csus.edu!decwrl!decwrl!spool.mu.edu!agate!library.ucla.edu!ddsw1!uunet!news.claremont.edu!ucivax!ucla-cs!gast Tue Aug  3 02:52:20 1993
Newsgroups: alt.privacy.clipper
Path: netcom.com!csus.edu!decwrl!decwrl!spool.mu.edu!agate!library.ucla.edu!ddsw1!uunet!news.claremont.edu!ucivax!ucla-cs!gast
From: gast@cs.ucla.edu
Subject: FBI wants to ban Crypto
Message-ID: <1993Aug3.012316.9036@cs.ucla.edu>
Originator: gast@oahu.cs.ucla.edu
Sender: usenet@cs.ucla.edu (Mr Usenet)
Nntp-Posting-Host: oahu.cs.ucla.edu
Reply-To: gast@CS.UCLA.EDU (David Gast)
Organization: UCLA Computer Science Department
Distribution: alt
Date: Tue, 3 Aug 93 01:23:16 GMT
Lines: 10

I just heard a little of the report on NPR on Saturday, but it
seems that the FBI went public last week at a security conference
with its desires to ban cryptography, at least crypto that it cannot
break.  The FBI said that in four different wiretap cases, it got
encrypted messages instead of talk.

I know that the FBI has previously announced similar plans including
at CFP-2, but this seems to be a new salvo.

David

	


-- 




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Reply to: hahn@lds.loral.com" <HAHN@lds.loral.com>
Date: Tue, 3 Aug 93 13:17:52 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: PKZIP Encryption Been Compromised?
Message-ID: <930803161718.1285@lds.loral.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


A friend of mine tells me that the encryption feature of the PKZIP
compressor/archiver is vulnerable.  I have been using it for
private material that is not to be passed to anybody else.
To what extent is this material vulnerable to attack, given
that the attacker has no examples of a plaintext/ciphertext pair
using my key.  Also, to what extent is the vulnerability a function
of the key length?

Thanks in advance to anybody who can help me.

Karl

|         (V)              |  "Tiger gotta hunt.  Bird gotta fly.
|   (^    (`>              |   Man gotta sit and wonder why, why, why.
|  ((\\__/ )               |   Tiger gotta sleep.  Bird gotta land.
|  (\\<   )   der Nethahn  |   Man gotta tell himself he understand."
|    \<  )                 |  
|     ( /                  |                Kurt Vonnegut Jr.
|      |                   |  
|      ^                   |






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Brad Huntting <Brad.Huntting@HK.Super.NET>
Date: Tue, 3 Aug 93 02:39:38 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: crypto in HK
Message-ID: <199308030938.AA25459@hk.super.net>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Greetings from Hong Kong.

I've spent the last couple weeks helping setup Hong Kong SuperNet, the
first dialup Internet provider in China.

Sudenly last week, it dawned on me!  I'm not in Kansas anymore!  I dont
have to worry about ludicrous RSA patents, or antiquated export laws!
In fact there's not much respect for any intelectual property laws
here, but that's another matter....

So, I have two question's:

First, where (outside of the US) can I ftp (or mirror) the latest
version of PGP?

Second, does anyone know where I can find the RSA extensions for ISODE
(often called the osisec package).  There's an ftp site in the UK, but
the files are all des'ed, and the person with the key is ignoring my
e-mail messages.


brad




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Eric Hughes <hughes@soda.berkeley.edu>
Date: Tue, 3 Aug 93 17:59:24 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: ADMIN: misconfigured host north.net has been removed from the list
Message-ID: <9308040054.AA15387@soda.berkeley.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


The host north.net is misconfigured to send mail to itself forever,
that is, until it bounces.  I've removed it from the list, so any
further problems with this host may be ignored.

Eric




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: peb@PROCASE.COM (Paul Baclace)
Date: Tue, 3 Aug 93 18:11:42 PDT
To: thug@phantom.com
Subject: Re: Sterilized Medflies of Crypto
Message-ID: <9308040110.AA00834@banff.procase.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



>hardware backdoor

The NSA does mask inspection for it's own purposes.  They require
source code for products they buy under certain conditions too.

The CIA has been accused of stealing a company's source code and
reselling said software modified with a trojan horse to specific targets
outside the U.S.  I don't remember the name of the company, but read about 
the lawsuit pending against the government.  Anyone have more details?
This is nice evidence for people who think the spooks are fully accountable.


Paul E. Baclace
peb@procase.com





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: greg@ideath.goldenbear.com (Greg Broiles)
Date: Tue, 3 Aug 93 23:28:01 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Sterilized Medflies of Crypto
Message-ID: <oDsq8B1w164w@ideath.goldenbear.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


uunet!PROCASE.COM!peb (Paul Baclace) writes:

> The CIA has been accused of stealing a company's source code and
> reselling said software modified with a trojan horse to specific targets
> outside the U.S.  I don't remember the name of the company, but read about 
> the lawsuit pending against the government.  Anyone have more details?
> This is nice evidence for people who think the spooks are fully accountable.

This sounds like the Inslaw thing - a company called Inslaw sold some 
software for case management and person-tracking (intended for use by 
prosecuting attorneys for maintaining dossiers, etc.) to the Justice 
department. Then (the story goes) the Justice department deliberately failed 
to make agreed-upon payments and screwed around with Inslaw's cash flow to 
the point that they were forced into choosing between bankruptcy and selling 
out to another software company owned by cronies of Ed Meese. They chose 
bankruptcy and subsequently sued the Justice Department. The first judge who 
heard the case ruled in Inslaw's favor was not reappointed to his seat. I'm 
unable to remember the specifics of the following events - and the above 
summary probably leaves out important stuff. I've got a few text files on 
this - if folks are interested I can upload them to the soda archives.

This is also related to the "suicide" of writer Danny Casolaro about 2 years 
ago in Washington, D.C. - he was working on a book on this mess, supposedly 
discovered something pretty important, then allegedly killed himself.

Conspiracy stuff abounds with this. Supposedly the PROMIS software has also 
been given to Canadian intelligence/police forces, as well as the Israelis. 
It's a pretty sordid story and frankly I dunno how much of it to believe. I 
don't know if this is exactly relevant to Cypherpunk stuff (and it's long) 
so I'm not posting it to the list, but I can mail or ftp the stuff to 
interested folks.


--
Greg Broiles                            greg@goldenbear.com
Golden Bear Computer Consulting         +1 503 465 0325
Box 12005 Eugene OR 97440               BBS: +1 503 687 7764




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Date: Tue, 3 Aug 93 23:01:44 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Inslaw and PROMIS software
In-Reply-To: <9308040110.AA00834@banff.procase.com>
Message-ID: <9308040600.AA10364@netcom5.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



> The CIA has been accused of stealing a company's source code and
> reselling said software modified with a trojan horse to specific targets
> outside the U.S.  I don't remember the name of the company, but read about 
> the lawsuit pending against the government.  Anyone have more details?
> This is nice evidence for people who think the spooks are fully accountable.
> 
> 
> Paul E. Baclace

That sounds like the Inslaw case, in which their "PROMIS" (for
"Prosecution MIS") software was allegedly stolen/taken by government
agencies for various uses. 

There are many tangled threads to this story: the murder of Danny
Casolaro, back doors, Ed Meese, Cabazon Indian Reservation, Dr. Earl
Brian, Contra arms deals, Iraqgate, Israel, NSA SIGINT facilities,
Elliot Richardson, and on an on.

This story comes up frequently and was described here in Cypherpunks
some months back by Kelly Goen, if I remember correctly.

I won't recap the story tonight. Check out alt.conspiracy for some
discussion (though you may have to wait a while for this topic to come
back around).

My opinion: There's something to the stories.

-Tim May

-- 
..........................................................................
Timothy C. May         | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,  
tcmay@netcom.com       | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
408-688-5409           | knowledge, reputations, information markets, 
W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA  | black markets, collapse of governments.
Higher Power: 2^756839 | Public Key: PGP and MailSafe available.
Note: I put time and money into writing this posting. I hope you enjoy it.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "L. Detweiler" <ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Date: Tue, 3 Aug 93 23:29:14 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: CAKE--Citizens Against Key Escrow
Message-ID: <9308040625.AA21063@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Hey cypherfolks. It seems to me that the fundemental issue of the
acceptability of key escrow is not getting debated well enough in the
mainstream media. The Clipper debate keeps getting framed in terms of
`who will be the escrow agencies' or `how secure is the algorithm
really' or whatever. Also, I'm a bit disappointed in both EFF and CPSR
not coming out with firm positions *against* key escrow systems in
general (CPSR spokesman: `I don't want to sound too stridently
opposed...').  We have something of a void.  The problem is that the
stance is seen as anti-law enforcement by these organizations (or they
are afraid it will be perceived that way).

Anyway, as part of the propaganda effort, I am proposing starting a new
`group' called the Citizens Against Key Escrow. (Now, don't get too
excited.) To start out, what would be ideal is just a document
describing Clipper, a lot of anti-Clipper propaganda, and the appended
*signatures* of everyone who is a `member' of CAKE and affirms the
position `unlimited and unrestricted use of strong cryptography is an
inalienable right.'

Please do *not* mail me saying that you want to sign it. I'm not ready.
In particular, I'd like to propose that a patriotic cypherpunk set up a
mini-email server to handle signature additions, so that people can
send automated messages. Then, when this is posted to sci.crypt and
circulated to every dark corner of Cyberspace, the ability to handle
the traffic will be automatic, and hopefully we will collect *many*
signors. (Yes, there could be tricky authentication issues with names.
I would like to see the utmost attention given to the veracity of
signors if possible. If `David Sternlight' makes it to the list we know
its fake, and people could criticize it on that ground. Maybe some way
to `contest signatures' via email--if a signature is contested it is removed?) 

By the way, the supposed `comprehensive policy review' blared in the
Clipper announcement by the Clinton adminstration regarding
cryptographic policies (export, freedom of use, etc.) is rumored to be
over in mid-September. Surprise, they haven't contacted us yet! This
document would be something tangible to present and herald to them
*prior* to a big ugly hand-me-down announcement. If we got press
coverage of our view, saying that we're being excluded, that these are
the real issues at stake, and then the real announcement came out
shortly thereafter with all the inevitable bad news, it would be a great PR coup.

Anyway, here are some propaganda items that will be included in the
final document if this actually happens. I'd really appreciate if
anyone would contribute *specific* paragraphs. (I've never really
gotten great response from this kind of query, despite a lot of lip
service and excitement, and judging by the current Cypherpunk FAQ this
is not uncommon, but I'm the eternal optimist.)

- Description of Clipper
- Emphatic terms: we think Skipjack could be a strong algorithm, but
key escrow is inappropriate for a civilized cyberspatial society
- of course, we're not against law enforcement in general! we just
believe that just as the government currently has the capability to
wiretap insecured communications, the public has a right to thwart
wherever it wants with it secured
- Debate on security of key agencies, who will be `it' etc. are
smokescreen decoys by the NSA
- Indications that key escrow is not the actual fundamental motivation
of Clipper, from FOIA documents (the classification of the national
security reasons), the rather pathetic circumlocutions about vaults and
the agencies, etc.
- Maybe a little history of NSA and the abuses from Bamford
- Jefferson as cryptographic innovator, other revolutionaries requiring
anonymity and security in their writing
- Constitutional issues: freedom of speech and illegal search & seizure
- cryptographic device export restriction by the NSA
- Quotes from the FBI and NSA: cryptography is like nitroglycerin, we
might have a lot of dead bodies lying around, all the waffling quotes
about whether cryptography should be regulated, etc.

If you have anything on the above, please send it! In particular I need
`mini-essays'.  This is another project that everyone can contribute to
and prove we're not just a bunch of listless, noisy, inconsequential
nihilists. (Once again, my optimism overshadows my memory.)




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "L. Detweiler" <ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Date: Wed, 4 Aug 93 00:29:25 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: comments on Denning's American Scientist article on Clipper
Message-ID: <9308040728.AA22252@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Some notes on the D. Denning article on Clipper in Sigma Xi American
Scientist, July-August, vol 81 p. 319-323. Essentially almost nothing
new for people who have tracked the debate on the Internet. Some tiny
scraps at the end.

This is a sort of `Scientific American' article on the Clipper chip.
Apparently it was written before the switch to the Skipjack moniker,
although under the photo caption of the chip it states `The name
`Clipper Chip' should not be confused with Integraph Corperation's microprocessor.'

The article begins by noting that cryptography is as ancient as Julius
Caesar and the Gallic Wars. Clinton's Clipper and Capstone as a `new
government standard for encryption.'  Short blurb on public key
cryptosystems a la Diffie & Hellman and RSA in mid 1970s, `a turning
point in the development of modern cryptosystem.' (Madam, it is a
revolution.) DES in 1977 by IBM `with advice from the National Security
Agency.'  Mentions PEM as example of `growing interest in strong
cryptosystems that protect unclassified, private-sector
telecommunications and computer data.'

Next, the AT&T Model 3600 Telephone Security Device, which used the DES
chip that `illustrates the basic issues--some technical and some
societal--involved in securing voice communcations.' Denning says the
key exchange algorithm in the phone is `proprietary' but gives the
Diffie Hellman math as example.

Then we hear of Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 that
limits electronic surveillance, including wiretapping, to be `conducted
lawfully only by law-enforcement agencies that are authorized with a
court warrant, and then only for serious criminal activities in which
other means of gathering evidence have failed, are likely to fail or
are too dangerous.'

`This act prohibits surveillance in other cases such as political
discourse. The law provides a practical basis for safeguarding privacy
rights while allowing legitimate criminal investigations. In applies
only to federal investigations; two-thirds of the states have their own
laws that govern local surveillance activities.'

`Officials in the Dept. of Justice have become concerned that the
increasing use of digital encoding and the success of public
cryptography may make it impossible to intercept or understand criminal
communications. The AT&T telephone device added urgency to that
concern.' Hm, even the Clipper announcement didn't note any `concern'...

Then, Clipper was `proposed' by Clinton administration to (1) secure
telephone conversations, (2) preserve law-enforcement capability to
`legally intercept the telephone conversations of suspected criminals'
(wow, finally a word like `suspected' or `reputed' or `alleged' in
conjunction with Clipper, a real milestone), and (3) split key escrow
system that `balances' privacy.  `The president declared that it is
essential to establish these principles now, while the `national
information infrastructure' is still young, so that privacy and
effective law enforcement can guaranteed for everyone in years ahead.'
I don't recall that proclamation. What were his exact words again?

Next, description of Clipper and Capstone and the first user-friendly
diagrams suitable for public consumption showing the key generation,
communication session, and interception.  Fairly detailed esp. with the
key generation. Does not indicate at all how the key escrow agencies
are assured that the chip IDs presented to them are actually of the
people named in a warrant. `The details of the law-enforcement field
are classified so that no one will be able to construct compatible
chips that bypass this feature. Consequently, the structure of the law
enforcement decoder is classified.'

Then, Capstone as Clipper successor `will be relased this summer' with
all the same elements plus DSA, key negotiation, exponentiation, and
random number generator. `If the Capstone Chip become available on
workstations and personal computers, it could also be used for Privacy
Enhanced Mail.'  (Boy, clearly someone at NSA is really concerned about
this PEM thing.)

Yeeks, here's the news: `The Clinton administration intends to [promote
Clipper and] by developing and promulgating a standard for all
sensitive, unclassified federal communications by the end of 1993.'' 
The ominous statement is that this seems to suggest something more than
Clipper.  `The Clinton administration believes that industry will
follow the government's lead as it did in the 1970s with the DES
system.' (we'll see.) 

`The administration does not propose to enforce the use of the Clipper
Chip because it believes the technology will become widespread without coercion'.

This is the tantalizingly familar NSAspeak into which people can read
whatever they want, the same sounds-OK-except-to-here and
what-are-they-really-saying sentence structure that permeated the
Clipper announcment. Taken in the first half, it seems to be the most
bold and unequivocal indication so far in the popular press that
Clipper nor any other system will be `enforced'. On the other hand, it
also has the ulterior suggestion that if the technology does *not*
become widespread without coercion, some other attack will be
formulated, and the `administration' cannot be considered liable for
any seeming promises for unrestriction.

Now, for the kicker: the National Security Council will finish their
`comprehensive policy review' hinted in the Clipper announcement on
`privacy, secure business communications, ... electronic surveillance,
... manufacture and export of advanced [cryptographic] products, use of
advanced [cryptographic] technologies in digital networks and
telecommunications, ... expected to be completed in September'.

Can't wait for that one. `issues such as software encryption and
private-sector standards are likely to be raised by industry during the
process'. Don't you love that ubiquitous evasive passive voice? As the
Clipper announcement stated `public debate is expected to
intensify'...yelled at and echoing off the brick wall of the castle,
soon to disgorge the concealed schemers with their Royal Proclamation
for the Citizenry...

At the end:  `Note: the author obtained some of the information in this
article during private briefings with the National Security Agency and
the Federal Bureau of Investigation.' No kidding.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "L. Detweiler" <ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Date: Wed, 4 Aug 93 00:49:58 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Clipper Key generation
Message-ID: <9308040749.AA22749@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


The Clipper key generation is almost too bizarre to contemplate. In the
recent Denning article we still have the fantastically implausible (or
at least unimaginable) indication that it is all done on a `laptop
computer'. She left out the indication that it is destroyed. Only one
implausibility at a time.

Anyway, there are various aspects that don't entirely make sense, or
seem to indicate some kind of ulterior design constraints. I would like
to hear speculation on what the design constraints were.

In particular, they could just let the key generator site create random
keys. But then there would be accusations that they are encoding secret
information or something, and the appearance is too much like `we will
know all the keys' irrespective of key escrow agencies. 

So we have this picture of the two escrow agencies entering in
information into the initial system that determines the final unit key,
two 80 bit values.  This means the escrow agencies could theoretically
combine keys and reproduce the entire process to recompute the unit key
and prove that the key generation as described is actually taking
place. It also makes it look like the key originates completely from
outside sources. But wait! The generation site (read: NSA in capital
letters) supplies the `starting serial number'. That is, it is
completely at the discretion of the NSA to determine the serial number.
Now, given that this should be random and contain no extra information,
wouldn't we all feel a bit more comfortable if the key escrow agencies
also supplied it, or that it was based on their input? What could be
put in the serial number that is useful?  There are 64 bits to play
with here and the two keys are 160. Denning says that it is `padded' --
almost a Freudian slip.

The key generation process is rather interesting. It clearly is not
`cryptographically secure' in the sense that it relies on the security
of an algorithm for protection against abuse. This makes me think of
the following problem, which I wonder how has been explored in the literature:

consider it the Clean Key Generation problem. How can a chip be
programmed such that no one ever has the complete key all at once? I
would like to see the chip go through two stages: in the first stage
the first agency plugs in their half of the secret key, in the second
stage the second key agency does so, and the ability for either to read
the other is impossible. This would guarantee there is no illicit
archival. In fact, the centralized key generation in the scheme seems
so absolutely preposterous, because it is not `cryptographically
secure', it is only `NSA-assured-secure' (hey, a new category of
communications security!) What is the assurance that the facility is `safe'?

Alternatively, it would be very useful to devise some cryptographic or
technological scheme whereby a chip could be programmed at a
centralized location based on the input from multiple escrow agencies,
but the complete key is never available to the programmers. Seems like
a real catch-22, but then again so is public key cryptography (need to
ruminate on this one some more).

of course, these are all just theoretical ramblings and not to be taken
in any way of endorsement of key escrow...




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: nate@VIS.ColoState.EDU (CVL staff member Nate Sammons)
Date: Wed, 4 Aug 93 06:41:47 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: "Big Brother Inside" tshirts
Message-ID: <9308041340.AA24461@vangogh.VIS.ColoState.EDU>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



I regret to inform the group that I cannot make the T-shirts.  I have
no money to fund them, and even less time.  I do, however, encourage
anyone else who want to make the shirts to do so.  I uploaded the
logos to soda this morning, so they should be available soon (if
not already).  I printed on of the images out (the large one) and
it looked great......

I am sorry for this, but I am absolutely financially strapped now.

BTW, the images names started with "BigBro" -= and if you want,
you can strip off the "Image Edited by Nate Sammons" line I 
dropped in the lower right corner of the large images (it was in,
I think, 12-pixel high letters).

Well, for anyone whe makes the T-shirts, put something cool on the 
back, and sign me up for one, size XL.

-nate sammons
 nate@vis.colostate.edu




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Johan Helsingius <julf@penet.FI>
Date: Tue, 3 Aug 93 22:24:25 PDT
To: Peter Murphy <murphy@s1.elec.uq.oz.au>
Subject: Re: crypto in HK
In-Reply-To: <9308040106.AA28473@s2.elec.uq.oz.au>
Message-ID: <9308040723.aa12479@penet.penet.FI>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



> > First, where (outside of the US) can I ftp (or mirror) the latest
> > version of PGP?
> 
> Try nic.penet.fi .

Er... Nice to be famous, but... It's nic.funet.fi...

	Julf





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Peter Wayner <pcw@access.digex.net>
Date: Wed, 4 Aug 93 05:38:08 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Key Generation Scheme...
Message-ID: <199308041236.AA18293@access.digex.net>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



According to my latest communication with Dorothy Denning:

"The key generation process is not as described in my earlier
Clipper paper and is classifed. We did look at it and will come
back to it in our Final Report."

So don't even bother spending your time thinking about what
she wrote before. 

-Peter




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: pmulivor@eckert.acadcomp.monroecc.edu
Date: Wed, 4 Aug 93 07:08:09 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Mulivor's new address
Message-ID: <00970837.83594C00.13450@eckert.acadcomp.monroecc.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


To the sizeable group of cypherpunks who have been in contact with me during 
the last couple weeks concerning my current magazine article: I've just been 
given a new e-mail address -- pmulivor@eckert.acadcomp.monroecc.edu.  Please 
direct all e-mail there from now on. Thanks for the valuable assistance you've 
provided. I've enjoyed working with you all.

Phil Mulivor
716 256-2222
716 244-7212
716 271-4052 (fax)




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Date: Wed, 4 Aug 93 10:24:36 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Nice summary of NIST/PKP Deal in sci.crypt
Message-ID: <9308041724.AA20926@netcom5.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Ross Williams has distributed a nice summary of the current
NIST/PKP/DSA situation in sci.crypt, entitled "NIST/PKP scandal: All
you need to act."

It's 2000 lines, so I'm not sending it out to the entire List (and,
no, I was not the one Lance said chastised him, at least not so far as
I know). Anyone without Usenet access to sci.crypt can mail me and
I'll forward to you the Williams article. If enough folks are
sci-crypt-deprived, perhaps I'll post the whole thing.

Cheers, 

-Tim

-- 
..........................................................................
Timothy C. May         | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,  
tcmay@netcom.com       | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
408-688-5409           | knowledge, reputations, information markets, 
W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA  | black markets, collapse of governments.
Higher Power: 2^756839 | Public Key: PGP and MailSafe available.
Note: I put time and money into writing this posting. I hope you enjoy it.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: murphy@s1.elec.uq.oz.au (Peter Murphy)
Date: Tue, 3 Aug 93 18:09:24 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: crypto in HK
In-Reply-To: <199308030938.AA25459@hk.super.net>
Message-ID: <9308040106.AA28473@s2.elec.uq.oz.au>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> 
> 
> Greetings from Hong Kong.
> 
> I've spent the last couple weeks helping setup Hong Kong SuperNet, the
> first dialup Internet provider in China.
> 
> Sudenly last week, it dawned on me!  I'm not in Kansas anymore!  I dont
> have to worry about ludicrous RSA patents, or antiquated export laws!
> In fact there's not much respect for any intelectual property laws
> here, but that's another matter....
> 
> So, I have two question's:
> 
> First, where (outside of the US) can I ftp (or mirror) the latest
> version of PGP?

Try nic.penet.fi .

> 
> Second, does anyone know where I can find the RSA extensions for ISODE
> (often called the osisec package).  There's an ftp site in the UK, but
> the files are all des'ed, and the person with the key is ignoring my
> e-mail messages.
> 

No idea. I'm sorry.

> 
> brad
> 

Peter.

-- 
=============================================================================
Peter Murphy - Department of Electrical Engineering,|Phone: 61 - 7 - 300 3452.
University of Queensland: murphy@s2.elec.uq.oz.au  .|------------------------
"Contrary to popular belief, the wings of demons are|Please do not put any 
the same as the wings of angels, although they're   |Heinlein quotes in your 
often better groomed." - Terry Pratchett.           |.sig - they're old.
=============================================================================




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: bwp@mindvox.phantom.com (Jane Doe)
Date: Wed, 4 Aug 93 08:54:34 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: things that have been on my mind
Message-ID: <2FLR8B3w165w@mindvox.phantom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Reading Denning's latest remarks about the key generation process of
Clipper being classified, and reading the latest tired redundant flame war
with David Sternlight in Usenet, I have to wonder why so much energy is
being spent trying to discredit these people who are obviously
working towards Clipper and against pgp. Denning has her own agenda, Lord
knows where it all comes from, and she's apparently listened to in the
government. Sternlight, well, I can't get a handle on him, but it seems
like his motives are somewhat similar to Denning's except that he hides
his statements behind a veil of claiming to want what is "legal."

The thing is, why spend any energy on these two at all? CP's write code.
If CP's want to exert any political pressure at all, they should be
working with CPSR and EFF to mount a public information drive similar to
that which was put up against the FBI Wiretap-PBX deal. Making congressmen
uncomfortable with Clipper and facilitating the efforts of reporters like
those behind more the recent spate of news articles is where CP's can
excel. 

Just my thought for the day. Preserving privacy is a cause worth fighting
for, but keep your eyes on the prize. On the other hand, maybe there's
nothing here to get upset over; after all, this is the same government
that nominated Kimba Woods. ;-)

-bwp





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: edgar@spectrx.Saigon.COM (Edgar W. Swank)
Date: Wed, 4 Aug 93 14:15:08 PDT
To: Cypherpunks          <cypherpunks@toad.com>
Subject: Re: Anon remailer to USENET gate bogus
Message-ID: <PayR8B5w165w@spectrx.saigon.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Paul Ferguson wrote:

    I have been experimenting the past few days with anon remailer to
    USENET gateway systems to see what the results would be -- nada.
    ...  My guess is that the usenet gateway at utexas refuses anon
    e-mail.  Anyone got any other suggestions?  I haven't tried any
    other gateways -- yet.

I had a similar experience with utexas.  It worked the first time I
tried it, but failed on a subsequent attempt.  I suspect that after
some complaint utexas was modified to reject anonymous input. Here is
my list of E-mail/Usenet gateways:

   group-name@ucbvax.berkeley.edu *  (blocked from non-bky sites)
   group-name@cs.utexas.edu       *  (was working but now blocked???)
   group-name@pws.bull.com        *  (Bounced to remailer)
   group-name@demon.co.uk
   group.name.usenet@decwrl.dec.com
   group.name@news.cs.indiana.edu

Note that some of these require trans-literation of periods to dashes
in the newsgroup name; others do not.  Ucbvax is supposed to block
mail from non-Berkely sites; it might work from these Cypherpunks
remailers (I haven't tried it):

   1: hh@pmantis.berkeley.edu
   2: hh@cicada.berkeley.edu
   3: hh@soda.berkeley.edu

Utexas see above, bull bounced to the (wimsey) remailer;  I haven't
tried the others yet. But I'm afraid that the utexas story will be
repeated for any gateway that continues to allow anonymous posting to
newsgroups.

I see the obvious solution is for the Cypherpunks remailers to support
direct anonymous posting.  Certainly the programming should be
trivial. The "political" risk is something to consider, however. But
we are supposed to be the fearless leaders to crypto-anarchy.

"If not us, who? If not now, when?"

--
edgar@spectrx.saigon.com (Edgar W. Swank)
SPECTROX SYSTEMS +1.408.252.1005  Cupertino, Ca





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: edgar@spectrx.Saigon.COM (Edgar W. Swank)
Date: Wed, 4 Aug 93 14:14:37 PDT
To: Cypherpunks          <cypherpunks@toad.com>
Subject: Re: Anon Bank Accounts?
Message-ID: <2ayR8B6w165w@spectrx.saigon.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Duncan Frissell said:

    Did you know that it is still possible -- in 1993 -- to open a
    bank account in the United States in a nome de guerre?

No, I sure didn't know that.  My wife works in a bank, & she tells me
that she needs to see two forms of ID to open a new account.  So
please, Duncan, elucidate!

--
edgar@spectrx.saigon.com (Edgar W. Swank)
SPECTROX SYSTEMS +1.408.252.1005  Cupertino, Ca





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: wet!naga (Peter Davidson)
Date: Thu, 5 Aug 93 18:22:04 PDT
To: ie63@vaxb.acs.unt.edu
Subject: Re: help with encryptor
Message-ID: <m0oNrdM-0004uJC@wet.uucp>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



 
In reply to your:
 
>Subject: help with encryptor - please?!?!
>To: cypherpunks@toad.com
>
>     I've been working on a program for MS-DOS machines that will
>encrypt and/or password protect .COM and .EXE files.
 
>    I've got it working really well at this point - but my encryption
>algorithms are rather simple.  I'm fairly new in the encryption biz,
>and I was wondering what would be good to use for the file encryption
>algorithm to make it as secure as possible?
 
I dunno, but the Aug/Sept 1993 issue of PC Techniques magazine
contains a notice on page 100 of the publication of something that
might be useful. It's a C library of encryption routines (Microsoft
and Borland compatible). "The encryption method is a symmetric key
encryption process applicable both to blocks of data in RAM ... and
also to data residing in disk files. ...  Full source code is
included ..."   Unfortunately it's not free (though I don't suppose
there's any reason why it should be).  The notice says further details
are available from the publisher at 510-464-3009.
 
 




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Paul Goggin <chaos@aql.gatech.edu>
Date: Wed, 4 Aug 93 13:59:37 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com (Cryptoanarchists are Us)
Subject: InfoWorld Letter
Message-ID: <9308042058.AA22297@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Brought to without permission of anyone in authority.

InfoWorld August 2,1993
Section: To the Editor (pg.54)

_Big Brother's encryption_

   In his Peer to Peer essay on the Clipper data encryption chip (see "Clipper
chip won't clip your wings, it will just protect the unprotected," June 21,
page 55), A. Padgett Peterson contends that "the government has more to lose
by being exposed to world ridicule from a trapdoor or backdoor than it can 
hope to gain." My direct experience with the National Security Agency indicates
otherwise.
   At the 1981 fall Comdex, Epic computer Corp. unveiled Kryptyk, the only
commerical E-mail crypto package for CP/M computers. My software team and I had
implemented the first RSA public key cryptosystem for microprocessors. Our 
booth was swamped with managers from the Fortune 500 and many international
firms.
   Our ecstasy was still strong when a week later we were visited by the NSA.
I proudly explained that we could not inject a trapdoor function -- that
cracking the algorithm was computationally infeasible, even with the then-
recent advances of prime number theory in France.
   Within a month we received a letter from the Bureau of Tobacco and Firearms
the proclaimed our product was "strategic munition" and could not be sold
either to multinational companies nor outside the continental United States --
a heavy penalty for not allowing a trapdoor. And we should believe that NIST
and NSA did not boobytrap the Clipper chip?
   I agree with Mr. Peterson that "security by obscurity just does not work."
Remember Watergate? Teh Warren Commission's magic-bullet findings? But as long
as governments are the only people who can depend on having secrets, they
will always view their citizenry as fools to be manipulated. And when 
governments sanction data security, rest assured they can freely "E-avesdrop"

Steven Fisher, CDP
Controlled Information Environments
Compuserve: 71750,3203


All spelling mistakes my own.

Paul
--
R  O    All Comments Copyright by  | Technofetisht
 A  N     Paul S. Goggin (1993)    | Cypher, Cyber, Chaos              
  V        Information Broker      | Ergoflux, Interzone
   E      chaos@aql.gatech.edu     | Carpe Diem: Stop the Clipper wiretap chip 
Finger account for latest _Phrack_ | Public Key: PGP and RIPEM available
      For anonymous communication:---> anonymus+4744@charcoal.com
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Title 18 USC 2511 and 18 USC 2703 Protected -- Monitoring Absolutely Forbidden




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: DIC1241@cup.edu
Date: Wed, 4 Aug 93 14:08:16 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: INSLAW
Message-ID: <744498404.270000.DIC1241@cup.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


	Ahhh, I was looking around on ftp.eff.org and I found something(a 
paper) on the INSLAW thingie...  So if you want it, ftp ftp.eff.org and get
pub/cud/papers/inslw*...





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Eric Hughes <hughes@soda.berkeley.edu>
Date: Wed, 4 Aug 93 18:30:13 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: CAKE--Citizens Against Key Escrow
In-Reply-To: <9308040625.AA21063@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Message-ID: <9308050126.AA06825@soda.berkeley.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>In particular, I'd like to propose that a patriotic cypherpunk set up a
>mini-email server to handle signature additions, so that people can
>send automated messages.

The cypherpunks remailer was designed to be run out of a user account,
and can be modified to be just such an email server.  The remailer as
it is now is just such an email server, whose only function is to
remail.  Handling lists and votes as above is straightforward.

I do take it that you're a patriotic cypherpunk, no?

Eric




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: wcs@anchor.ho.att.com (Bill_Stewart(HOY002)1305)
Date: Wed, 4 Aug 93 19:58:22 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: InfoWorld Letter
Message-ID: <9308050109.AA01631@anchor.ho.att.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text


Paul Goggin sent the list a copy of Steven Fisher's letter to InfoWorld about
NSA harassment for offering commercial crypto back in 1981.
The NSA is supposedly a bit better behaved these days, at least in public :-),
but it's no surprise.  Sometime around then, they slapped patent secrecy
orders on a guy who had designed an analog scrambler for CB radio;
a real crypto-system must have been a much more significant threat to them.
A couple of comments were interesting:

One was the assertion in the letter he received from the BATF that their
product, as munition, could not only not be exported, but could also not
be sold to *multinational companies*.  Was that the law then?  Or was the
BATF just a bit over-enthusiastic about what they could get away with?
It's also interesting that it was the BATF.

Another was that the NSA asked them to put in a trapdoor.  These days,
escrow is the politically correct way of implementing a trapdoor, but -
I wonder if it would be possible to make a trapdoor/weak escrow system,
which escrows the keys for *some* kinds of keys, enough to make the
bureaucrats think it's ok, but which also has a class of keys for which the
escrow is non-effective, bogus, or otherwise doesn't let the cops in,
which could be revealed to users after the system has been approved and sold?
Perhaps a system which requires 2**N steps to retrieve most keys from
escrow, but has a small set that can be gotten quickly for demos?
Could you do a system like that and hide it from the NSA for a while?

Some alternative approaches would be a system that obscured the escrow
(easy to build from clipper if you've got a programmable phone;
you just encrypt the Wiretap Field with your session key),
or worked fine with a bogus Wiretap Field, or a system where the escrow
can be made ineffective administratively (either lost by the escrow agents,
or requiring the participation of the telephone owner, or tampered by the owner)

At the very minimum, having a system that doesn't let the NSA cheat during the
escrow process would be a good start - where each part of the escrow key
is really installed separately, and verifiable hardwarily-random numbers are
used to seed the key generation.

Since the NSA\b\b\bNIST hasn't announced their plans for how to select
escrow agents, much less who they are, or how they *really* plan to set the keys,
I suppose it's premature to ask them to announce what the rules will be
for approval of escrow procedures or agencies or guarantee that if you follow
them, you'll be allowed to export your products?  :-)

			Bill 
Bill Stewart wcs@anchor.ho.att.com +1-908-949-0705 fax-4876
ROT13 public key available upon request



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: jpp@markv.com
Date: Wed, 4 Aug 93 22:03:23 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: CAKE--Citizens Against Key Escrow
In-Reply-To: <9308040625.AA21063@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Message-ID: <9308042202.aa19224@hermix.markv.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


My mini-essay for the cake-paper:

  The most important right is that of free speech.  The area in which
free speech is most important is political speech, and the most
important kind of political speech is political dissent.
  If all speech is subject to government scrutiny the right to
dissenting political speech is greatly reduced or eliminated.  The
chill of big brother's gaze silences many dissenters.  Key escrow is a
way for the government to gain the ability to scrutinize all of your
speech; it is an attempt to take away your most important right.
Fight it.

j'
--
                O I am Jay Prime Positive jpp@markv.com 
1250 bit key fingerprint =  B8 95 E0 AF 9A A2 CD A5  89 C9 F0 FE B4 3A 2C 3F
 524 bit key fingerprint =  8A 7C B9 F2 D5 46 4D ED  66 23 F1 71 DE FF 51 48
Public keys by `finger jpp@markv.com' or mail to pgp-public-keys@pgp.mit.edu
Your feedback is welcome, directly or via symbol JPP on hex@sea.east.sun.com




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: nowhere@bsu-cs.bsu.edu (Chael Hall)
Date: Wed, 4 Aug 93 20:58:23 PDT
To: fergp@sytex.com (Paul Ferguson)
Subject: Re: Anon remailer to USENET gate bogus
In-Reply-To: <LF7k8B3w165w@sytex.com>
Message-ID: <9308050359.AA23838@bsu-cs.bsu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>
>I have been experimenting the past few days with anon remailer to USENET 
>gateway systems to see what the results would be -- nada. I used Chael's 
>BSU system (nowhere@bsu-cs.bsu.edu) to attempt a usenet post which never 
>(magically?) appeared in the desired group (alt.privacy, I believe). I 
>waited for several days for the post, but nada, zilch, zero. I retried 
>the bsu remailer with a test message to make sure it was still active, 
>and yes, it seemed to work perfectly. My guess is that the usenet gateway 
>at utexas refuses anon e-mail. Anyone got any other suggestions? I 
>haven't tried any other gateways -- yet.
>
>Cheers.
>
>Paul Ferguson               |  "Government, even in its best state,

Paul,

     I have seen several bounces from the utexas server because there
was no Subject for the posting, you need to put a subject line in the
pasted header like so:

::
Request-Remailing-To: alt-test@utexas.whatever...
Subject: this is a test
Organization: there

[body]

     Good luck, but that's what the error message said, there's nothing
about anonymity in the bounce, though.

Chael

--
Chael Hall
nowhere@bsu-cs.bsu.edu, 00CCHALL@BSUVC.BSU.EDU, chall@bsu.edu
(317) 776-4000 from 8 am - 5 pm CST




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: nowhere@bsu-cs.bsu.edu (Chael Hall)
Date: Wed, 4 Aug 93 21:10:15 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: mail-to-news error (fwd)
Message-ID: <9308050412.AA24270@bsu-cs.bsu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



     This is what was in my mailbox...  Just so you know, the anonymous
remailer here strips out your ENTIRE header.  It will process commands in
the header, but the original message's subject won't get passed on.  Anything
in the pasted "::" header block will get tacked onto the outgoing header
unless it is a command to the remailer.  So put a "Subject:" line in the
pasted header block and it will get through the news gateway barring any
other difficulties.

Chael Hall

Forwarded message:
>From daemon@cs.utexas.edu  Wed Jul 32 23:59:59 1993
>Delivery-Date: Wed, 32 Jul 93 23:59:39 -0600
>Date: Wed, 32 Jul 93 10:00:00 -0600
>From: daemon@cs.utexas.edu
>Message-Id: <9312345678.AA00001@cs.utexas.edu>
>To: nowhere@bsu-cs.bsu.edu
>Subject: mail-to-news error
>
>The post failed.
>Required "Subject" header is missing or empty.
>(Article not posted.)
>
>------- original message appended -------
>
>>From nowhere@bsu-cs.bsu.edu  Wed Jul 32 23:59:59
>Received: from bsu-cs.bsu.edu by deepthought.cs.utexas.edu (5.64/1.2/relay) with SMTP
>	id AA00001; Wed, 32 Jul 93 10:00:00 -0600
>Received: by bsu-cs.bsu.edu (5.57/Ultrix3.0-C)
>	id AA00001; Wed, 32 Jul 93 11:00:00 -0600
>Date: Wed, 32 Jul 93 10:00:00 -0600
>Message-Id: <9312345678.AA00001@bsu-cs.bsu.edu>
>From: Anonymous <nowhere@bsu-cs.bsu.edu>
>To: alt-test@cs.utexas.edu
>X-Remailed-By: Anonymous <nowhere@bsu-cs.bsu.edu>
>X-Ttl: 0
>X-Notice: This message was forwarded by a software-
>	  automated anonymous remailing service.
>
>[Remains of the bounced message]

--
Chael Hall
nowhere@bsu-cs.bsu.edu, 00CCHALL@BSUVC.BSU.EDU, chall@bsu.edu
(317) 776-4000 from 8 am - 5 pm CST




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: lazylion@netcom.com (Ben Weiss)
Date: Wed, 4 Aug 93 23:41:55 PDT
To: Eric Hughes <hughes@soda.berkeley.edu>
Subject: Re: CAKE--Citizens Against Key Escrow
Message-ID: <9308050642.AA03698@netcom.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>The cypherpunks remailer was designed to be run out of a user account,
>and can be modified to be just such an email server.  The remailer as
>it is now is just such an email server, whose only function is to
>remail.  Handling lists and votes as above is straightforward.
>
>I do take it that you're a patriotic cypherpunk, no?
>
>Eric

So Eric, how's bout we all send messages to cypherpunk-cake@toad.com
with a valid reply-to and it sends back a response such as "Please
confirm that this is a valid signiture by ... (doing something random?)

BTW, do you remember who it was that was talking about pgp mail headers who
has not yet responded to my groovy idea of using rfc822's "Encrypted:"
field?  So far, the only responses I've seen are from others saying "Yea,
when ya find out, let me know too..."  Any thoughts?
+---------------------------- Ben Weiss -------------------------------+
! Telephone: (510) 841-5709 voice     Internet: LazyLion@Netcom.com    !
!            (415) 325-9600 fax                 Ben_D._Weiss@bmug.org  !
+-------------- Packet Radio: WB5QAL@N6EEG.#NOCAL.CA.US ---------------+
! This message is protected by 18 USC 2511 and 18 USC 2703. Monitoring !
! by anyone other than the recipient is absolutely forbidden by US Law !
+---------------------------- Ben Weiss -------------------------------+





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Date: Wed, 4 Aug 93 23:58:27 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Offshore Data Havens and Services
Message-ID: <9308050656.AA12955@netcom5.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Crypto Anarchists,

I saw today a newspaper report that was initially surprising, then
utterly unsurprising (this is possible). Namely, that the "900" sex
service numbers, which have mostly been subjected to call blocking and
other forms of regulatory oblivion, have been moved _offshore_.
Surprised parents of teenaged children are discovering international
toll calls on their phone bills!

Short of barring international phone calls, the Feds can do nothing! I
love it!

I suppose if I followed the phone sex biz more closely, I'd've seen
this trend coming. (The "unsurprising" part of my realization is that
such moves offshore to avoid the regulations of one country are as old
as history. With the explosion in "degrees of freedom," which we
cypherpunks are riding, such movements become even easier.)

(Needless to say, the operators of such services can redirect the
calls back to the U.S., either via other phone lines, or via
high-speed networks. The Feds can do little.)

It really shows the "data transparency" of borders and the futility of
trying to legislate morality through technology. (For you worried
parents out there who worry about Junior calling these or any other
numbers, the "politically correct" (liberrtarian :-} ) solution is
also just about the only practical one: either control the phones
yourself, or have a persuasive talk with Junior, or just stop worrying
about who he calls--at least he won't get any diseases. The bad
solution, and the essentially unenforceable one, is to have the State
block certain calls, with or without the collusion of the phone
company.)

Things to Come:

* when will the first "personal data" agencies appear, which offer
dossier information for a fee? Information like rental records, skip
trace cases (deadbeats), alimony situation, arrests, etc. (I'm talking
about information which many of us need or want, but which "fair
credit reporting" laws forbid us to buy and sell. This is the "Mom and
Pop" data service I've talked about, where apartment owners,
landlords, employers, and ordinary people sell scraps of data--with
their actual or digital reputations on the line of course--to data
brokers who cross-correlate it in databases and then resell it.)

With these cypherspace tools (using remailers and some form of digital
money), we can have greater freedom in buying and selling data. This
may be criticized by some as "redlining," but I call it market
efficiency.

* preexisting medical conditions databases, similar to the above. (If
I'm thinking about insuring someone, it'd be nice to have some info
showing her lifestyle suggests a high risk.)

* data bases and information markets for medical research. Anyone
wanna buy some World War II medical experiment data? Banned in the
U.S. (really), but available on the digital black market...at least
some good will come of the deaths. (Cryonicists will be especially
interested in bootleg medical research networks, to handle the data
from voluntary suspension cases, the freezing of capital prisoners in
Third World countries, and similar cases where the market makes data
available that moralistic governments deem to be unethical or illegal.)

* to truly smash governments, we need to see the development of
information  markets for government secrets: Stealth bomber plans, CBW
formulas, Skipjack algorithms, locations of government facilities,
etc. (I don't envision this happening anytime soon, nor do I see it as
some kind of hackerish creation of the folks we usually deal with.
This'll take some money, some black market connections, and will not
just suddenly appear as a new newsgroup. It may already be forming in
certain circles...arms dealers, black marketeers, etc. What we can
offer with remailers, better encryption, digital money, and other
"cypherpunks" technology is a superior medium for exchange.)


Crypto anarchy is gonna change the world!


-Tim

-- 
..........................................................................
Timothy C. May         | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,  
tcmay@netcom.com       | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
408-688-5409           | knowledge, reputations, information markets, 
W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA  | black markets, collapse of governments.
Higher Power: 2^756839 | Public Key: PGP and MailSafe available.
Note: I put time and money into writing this posting. I hope you enjoy it.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: M..Stirner@f28.n125.z1.FIDONET.ORG (M. Stirner)
Date: Thu, 5 Aug 93 05:03:32 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Cypherpunks
Message-ID: <1584.2C60BE70@shelter.FIDONET.ORG>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Please netmail the address for requesting subscribe/unsubscribe for this
mailing.

Thanks.

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* <m..stirner@f28.n125.z1.fidonet.org> - PGP Key D30909 via servers *
* > What country can preserve its liberties if its rulers are not  <*
* > warned from time to time that their people preserve the spirit <*
* > of resistance?  Let them take arms!" - Thomas Jefferson, 1787  <*
*********************************************************************

___ Blue Wave/QWK v2.12
--  
M. Stirner - via FidoNet node 1:125/1
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INTERNET: M..Stirner@f28.n125.z1.FIDONET.ORG




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Douglas Sinclair <dsinclai@acs.ucalgary.ca>
Date: Thu, 5 Aug 93 03:28:30 PDT
To: IE63@vaxb.acs.unt.edu
Subject: Re: help with encryptor - please?!?!
In-Reply-To: <01H11DLJLG020009B3@vaxb.acs.unt.edu>
Message-ID: <9308051027.AA31381@acs1.acs.ucalgary.ca>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Hm.  We seem to have a duplication of effort here.  I am currently working
with s_duck@pinetree.org on the same sort of thing that you describe.
Right now we're having problems fooling DOS with the virtual EXE.  However,
the encryption algorithm used is IDEA -- the same one as PGP uses.

I suggest we pool our efforts and swap ideas/source code.
-- 
PGP 2.3 Key by finger




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Peter Wayner <pcw@access.digex.net>
Date: Thu, 5 Aug 93 06:39:51 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: No Subject
Message-ID: <199308051338.AA26748@access.digex.net>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain




The Rule of Law and the Clipper Escrow Project

Last Thursday, I attended the first day of the Computer System Ssecurity
and Privacy Advisory Board in Washington. This is a group of industry
experts who discuss topics in computer security that should affect the
public and industry. Some of the members are from users like banks and
others are from service providing companies like Trusted Information
Services. Lately, their discussion has centered on the NSA/NIST's
Clipper/Capstone/Skipjack project and the effects it will have on
society.

At the last meeting, the public was invited to make comments and they
were almost unanimously skeptical and critical. They ranged from
political objections to the purely practical impediments. Some argued
that this process of requiring the government to have the key to all
conversations was a violation of the fourth amendment of the
constitution prohibiting warrentless searches. Others noted that a
software solution was much simpler and cheaper even if the chips were
going to cost a moderate $25. There were many different objections,
but practically everyone felt that a standard security system was
preferable.

This meeting was largely devoted to the rebutals from the
government. The National Security Association, the Department of
Justice, the FBI, the national association of District Attorneys
and Sheriffs and several others were all testifying today. 

The board itself runs with a quasi-legal style they make a point of
making both video and audio tapes of the presentations. The entire
discussion is conducted with almost as much gravity as Congressional
hearings.  The entire meeting was suffused with an air of ernest
lawfullness that came these speakers. All of them came from the upper
ranks of the military or legal system and a person doesn't rise to
such a position without adopting the careful air of the very diligent
bureaucrat. People were fond of saying things like, "Oh, it's in the
Federal Register.  You can look it up." This is standard operating
procedure in Washington agencies and second nature to many of the
day's speakers.

Dorothy Denning was one of the first speakers and she reported on
the findings of the committee of five noted public cryptologists
who agreed to give the Clipper standard a once-over. Eleven people
were asked, but six declined for a variety of reasons. The review
was to be classified "Secret" and some balked at this condition
because they felt it would compromise their position in public. 

The talk made clear that the government intended to keep the 
standard secret for the sole purpose of preventing people from
making unauthorized implementations without the law enforcement
back door. Dr. Denning said that everyone at the NSA believes
that the algorithm could withstand public knowledge with no trouble.
The review by the panel revealed no reason why they shouldn't trust
this assessment. 

Although lack of time lead the panel to largely rubberstamp
the more extensive review by the NSA, they did conduct a few tests
of their own. They programmed the algorithm on a Cray YMP, which
incidentally could process 89,000 encryptions per second in single
processor mode. This implementation was used for a cycling test which
they found seemed to imply that there was good randomness. The test
is done by repeatedly encrypting one value of data until a cycle occurs.
The results agreed with what a random process should generate.

They also tested the system for strength against a differential 
cryptanalysis attack and found it worthy. There was really very
little other technical details in the talk. Saying more would
have divulged something about the algorithm.

My general impression is that the system is secure. Many people
have played paranoid and expressed concerns that the classified
algorithm might be hiding a trapdoor. It became clear to me that
these concerns were really silly. There is a built-in trapdoor
to be used by the government when it is "legal authorized" to
intercept messages. The NSA has rarely had trouble in the past
exercising either its explicitly granted legal authority  or
its implied authority. The phrase "national security" is a
powerful pass phrase around Washington and there is no reason
for me to believe that the NSA wouldn't get all of the access
to the escrow database that it needs to do its job. Building in
a backdoor would only leave a weakness for an opponent to exploit
and that is something that is almost as sacrilidgeous at the NSA
as just putting the classified secrets in a Fed Ex package to 
Saddam Hussein.

Next there was a report from Geoff Greiveldinger , the man from the
Department of Justice with the responsibility of implementing the the
Key Escrow plan. After the Clipper/Capstone/SkipJack chips are
manufactured, they will be programmed with an individual id number and
a secret, unique key. A list is made of the id, key pairs and this
list is split into two halves by taking each unique key, k, and
finding two numbers a and b such that a+b=k. (+ represents XOR). One
new list will go to one of the escrow agencies and one will go to the
other. It will be impossible to recover the secret key without getting
the list entry from both agencies.

At this point, they include an additional precaution. Each list
will be encrypted so even the escrow agency won't be able to 
know what is in its list. The key for decoding this list will 
be locked away in the evesdropping box. When a wiretap is authorized,
each escrow agency will lookup the halves of the key that correspond
to the phone being tapped and send these to evesdropping box
where they will be decrypted and combined. That means that 
two clerks from the escrow agencies could not combine their
knowledge. They would need access to a third key or an evesdropping
box. 

It became clear that the system was not fully designed. It wasn't
obvious how spontenaeous and fully automated the system would
be. Mr. Greiveldinger says that he is trying to balance the tradeoffs
between security and efficiency. Officers are bound to be annoyed and
hampered if they can't start a tap instanteneously. The kidnapping of
a child is the prototypical example of when this would be necessary.

The courts also grant authority for "roving" wiretaps that allow
the police to intercept calls from any number of phones. A tap like
this begs out for a highly automated system for delivering the 
keys. 

I imagine that the system as it's designed will consist of escrow
computers with a few clerks who have nothing to do all day. When
a tap is authorized, the evesdropping box will be programmed with
a private key and shipped to the agents via overnight express. When
they figure out the id number of the phone being tapped, the evesdropping
box will probably phone the two escrow computers, perform a bit of
zero-knowledge authorization and then receive the two halves of the
key. This would allow them to switch lines and conduct roving
taps effectively. The NSA would presumably have a box that would
allow them to decrypt messages from foreign suspects.

At this point, I had just listened to an entirely logical presentation
from a perfect gentleman. We had just run though a system that had many
nice technological checks and balances in it. Subverting it seemed 
very difficult. You would need access to the two escrow agencies and
an evesdropping box. Mr. Greiveldinger said that there would be many
different "auditting" records that would be kept of the taps. It was
very easy to feel rather secure about the whole system in a nice, 
air-conditioned auditorium where clean, nice legally precise people
were speaking in measured tones. It was very easy to believe in 
the Rule of Law.

To counteract this, I tried to figure out the easiest way for me
to subvert the system. The simplest way is to be a police officer
engaged in a stakeout of someone for whom you've already received
a warrant. You request the Clipper evesdropping box on the off chance
that the suspect will buy a Clipper phone and then you "lend" it
to a friend who needs it. I think that the automation will allow
the person who possesses the box to listen in to whatever lines
that they want. The escrow agency doesn't maintain a list of people
and id numbers-- they only know the list matching the id number to
the secret key. There is no way that they would know that a request
from the field was unreasonable. Yes, the audit trails could be
used later to reconstruct what the box was used for, but that would
only be necessary if someone got caught. 

The bribe value of this box would probably be hard to determine,
but it could be very valuable. We know that the government of France
is widely suspected of using its key escrow system to evesdrop on 
US manufacturers in France. Would they be willing to buy evesdropping
time here in America? It is not uncommon to see reports of industrial
espionage where the spies get millions of dollars. On the other hand,
cops on the beat in NYC have been influenced for much less. The 
supply and demand theory of economics virtually guarantees that 
some deals are going to be done.

It is not really clear what real effect the key escrow system is going
to have on security. Yes, theives would need to raid two different
buildings and steal two different copies of the tapes. This is
good. But it is still impossible to figure out if the requests from
the field are legitimate-- at least within the time constraints posed
by urgent cases involving terrorism and kidnapping. 

The net effect of implementing the system is that the phone system
would be substantially strengthened against nieve intruders, but the
police (and those that bribe them) would still be able to evesdrop
with impunity. Everyone needs to begin to do a bit of calculus between
the costs and benefits of this approach. On one hand, not letting the
police intercept signals will let the crooks run free but on the other
hand, the crooks are not about to use Clipper phones for their secrets
if they know that they can be tapped.

The most interesting speaker was the assistant director of the National
Security Agency, Dr. Clint Brooks. He immediately admitted that the
entire Clipper project was quite unusual because the Agency was not
used to dealing with the open world. Speaking before a wide audience
was strange for him and he admitted that producing a very low cost
commercial competitive chip was also a new challenge for them. 

Never-the-less, I found him to be the deepest thinker at the conference.
He readily admitted that the Clipper system isn't intended to catch
any crooks. They'll just avoid the phones. It is just going to deny
them access to the telecommunications system. They just won't be able
to go into Radio Shack and buy a secure phone that comes off the line.

It was apparent that he was somewhat skeptical of the Clipper's potential
for success. He said at one point the possibilities in the system
made it worth taking the chance that it would succeed. If it could capture
a large fraction of the market then it could help many efforts of the
law enforcement and intelligence community.

When I listened, though, I began to worry about what is going to happen
as we begin to see the eventual blurring of data and voice communications
systems. Right now, people go to Radio Shack to buy a phone. It's the
only way you can use the phone system. In the future, computers, networks
and telephones are going to be linked in much more sophisticated ways.
I think that Intel and Microsoft are already working on such a technology.

WHen this happens, programmable phones are going to emerge. People
will be able to pop a new ROM in their cellular digital phone or
install new software in their computer/video game/telephone. This
could easily be a proprietary encryption system that scrambles
everything. The traditional way of controlling technology by
controlling the capital intensive manufacturing sites will be gone. Sure,
the NSA and the police will go to Radio Shack and say "We want your
cooperation" and they'll get it. But it's the little, slippery ones
that will be trouble in the new, software world.

The end of the day was dominated by a panel of Law Enforcement specialists
from around the country. These were sheriffs, district attorneys,
FBI agents and other officers from different parts of the system. 
Their message was direct and they didn't hesitate to compare encryption
with assault rifles. One even said, "I don't want to see the officers
outgunned in a technical arena." 

They repeatedly stressed the incredible safe guards placed upon 
the wiretapping process and described the hurdles that the officers
must go through to use the system. One DA from New Jersey said that
in his office, they process about 10,000 cases a year, but they only
do one to two wiretaps on average. It just seems like a big hassle
and expense for them.

It is common for the judges to require that the officers have very
good circumstantial evidence from informers before giving them
the warrant. This constraint coupled with the crooks natural hesitation
to use the phone meant that wiretaps weren't the world's greatest
evidence producers. 

One moment of levity came when a board member asked what the criminals
favorite type of encryption was. The police refused to answer this one
and I'm not that sure if they've encountered enough cases to build a 
profile. 

At the end of all of the earnestness and "support-the-cop-on-the-beat",
I still began to wonder if there was much value to wiretaps at all. The
police tried to use the low numbers of wiretaps as evidence that they're not
out there abusing the system, but I kept thinking that this was mainly
caused by the high cost and relatively low utility of the technique. 

It turns out that there is an easy way to check the utility of these
devices. Only 37 states allow their state and local police to use
wiretaps in investigations. One member of the panel repeated the rumor
that this is supposedly because major politicians were caught with
wiretaps. The state legislatures in these states supposedly
realized that receipients of graft and influence peddlers were the main
target of wiretaps. Evesdropping just wasn't a tool against muggers.
So they decided to protect themselves. 

It would be possible to check the crime statistics from each of these
states and compare them against the evesdropping states to discover
which has a better record against crime. I would like to do this
if I can dig up the list of states that allow the technique.
I'm sure that this would prove little, but it could possibly clarify
something about this technique.

It is interesting to note that the House of Representative committee
on the Judiciary was holding hearings on abuses of the National Crime
Information Center. They came in the same week as the latest round 
of Clipper hearings before the CSAB. The NCIC is a large computer 
system run by the FBI to provide all the police departments with a 
way to track down the past records of people. The widespread access
to the system makes it quite vulnerable to abuse.

In the hearings, the Congress heard many examples of unauthorized
access. Some were as benign as people checking out employees. The
worst was an ex-police officer who used the system to track down his
ex-girlfriend and kill her. They also heard of a woman who looked
up clients for her drug-dealing boyfriend so he could avoid the 
undercover cops. 

These hearings made it obvious that there were going to be problems
determining the balance of grief. For every prototypical example of
a child kidnapped to make child pornography, there is a rengade 
police officer out to knock off his ex-girlfriend. On the whole, the
police may be much more trustworthy than the criminals, but we need
to ask how often a system like Clipper will aid the bad guys. 


In the end, I reduced the calculus of the decision about Clipper to be
a simple tradeoff. If we allow widespread, secure encryption, will the
criminals take great advantage of this system? The secure phones won't
be useful in rapes and random street crime, but they'll be a big aid
to organized endeavors. It would empower people to protect their own
information unconditionally, but at the cost of letting the criminals
do the same.

Built-in back doors for the law enforcement community, on the other
hand, will deny the power of off-the-shelf technology to crooks, 
but it would also leave everyone vulnerable to organized attacks
on people. 

I began to wonder if the choice between Clipper and totally secure
encryption was moot. In either case, there would be new opportunities
for both the law-abiding and the law-ignoring. The amount of crime
in the country would be limited only by the number of people who 
devote their life to the game-- not by any new fangled technology
that would shift the balance.




I did not attend the Friday meeting so someone else will need to summarize
the details. 








From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: peb@PROCASE.COM (Paul Baclace)
Date: Thu, 5 Aug 93 10:55:22 PDT
To: tcmay@netcom.com
Subject: Re: Offshore Data Havens and Services
Message-ID: <9308051754.AA01156@banff.procase.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



>(For you worried parents out there who worry about Junior calling these

I recently heard about a married adult who would call some sex line
uncontrollably...so apparently it is possible for some people to 
become addicted to a phone number--the blocking isn't just for concerned
parents!  What a surprise (to me).

>* when will the first "personal data" agencies appear, which offer

Yesterday on American Public Radio (used to be called NPR?) reported
that the IRS recently busted 300 or so of their employees for accessing 
tax returns of relatives, famous people, etc.  They noted that this 
information was also being sold to lawyers, private investigators, and
market researchers.  The IRS even stated that they cannot control the
problem since 56,000 employees have access to the data.  The black
market of tax information is doing quite fine...

>landlords

A database already exists for the purpose of identifying defaulting renters.  
I'd like to create a reverse one that tracks landlords who never make repairs 
or charge excessive cleaning fees.

>preexisting medical conditions databases

This kinda thing irks me since is a policy choice as to how preexisting
conditions are covered.  Since I've changed jobs often (startups, etc.),
it can be a real hassle every time they try to use this to weasle out of 
a claim.  (My wife just had a checkup, everything is fine, and they 
want all kinds of information released to them to determine whether there
was a preexisting condition even though she is being treated for nothing
at all!) The clause varies from company to company considerably and is 
archaic since insurance should be for the individual, not subsidized and 
controlled by group policies...

>Crypto anarchy is gonna change the world!

The race is on.

Paul E. Baclace
peb@procase.com





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Reply to: hahn@lds.loral.com" <HAHN@lds.loral.com>
Date: Thu, 5 Aug 93 08:43:33 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: FAX Numbers of Congress
Message-ID: <930805114136.1acd@lds.loral.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


For those folks who would like to FAX their congresspersons
their positions on SkipJack, here is a list of FAX numbers.

If you do intend to use this channel, please do so wisely.
Choose your words carefully, get to the point quickly, and
don't go on too long.  Remember that flames and usage of
profanity to Congress is counterproductive to your position.

//CONGRESS

US Senate, 103rd Congress phone and fax numbers
===============================================

 Information from US Congress Yellow Book, January 1993

p st name                       phone           fax
= == ========================   ==============  ==============
R AK Murkowski, Frank H.        1-202-224-6665  1-202-224-5301
R AK Stevens, Ted               1-202-224-3004  1-202-224-1044
D AL Heflin, Howell T.          1-202-224-4124  1-202-224-3149
D AL Shelby, Richard C.         1-202-224-5744  1-202-224-3416
D AR Bumpers, Dale              1-202-224-4843  1-202-224-6435
D AR Pryor, David               1-202-224-2353  na
D AZ DeConcini, Dennis          1-202-224-4521  1-202-224-2302
R AZ McCain, John               1-202-224-2235  na
D CA Boxer, Barbara             1-202-225-5161  na
D CA Feinstein, Diane           1-202-224-3841  na
D CO Campbell, Ben N.           1-202-225-4761  1-202-225-0228
R CO Brown, Henry               1-202-224-5941  na
D CT Dodd, Christopher J.       1-202-224-2823  na
D CT Lieberman, Joseph I.       1-202-224-4041  1-202-224-9750
D DE Biden Jr., Joseph R.       1-202-224-5042  na
R DE Roth Jr., William V.       1-202-224-2441  1-202-224-2805
D FL Graham, Robert             1-202-224-3041  na
R FL Mack, Connie               1-202-224-5274  1-202-224-8022
D GA Nunn, Samuel               1-202-224-3521  1-202-224-0072
R GA Coverdell, Paul            1-202-224-3643  na
D HI Akaka, Daniel K.           1-202-224-6361  1-202-224-2126
D HI Inouye, Daniel K.          1-202-224-3934  1-202-224-6747
D IA Harkin, Thomas             1-202-224-3254  1-202-224-7431
R IA Grassley, Charles E.       1-202-224-3744  na
R ID Craig, Larry E.            1-202-224-2752  1-202-224-2573
R ID Kempthorne, Dirk           1-202-224-6142  1-202-224-5893
D IL Moseley-Braun, Carol       1-202-224-2854  na
D IL Simon, Paul                1-202-224-2152  1-202-224-0868
R IN Coats, Daniel R.           1-202-224-5623  1-202-224-8964
R IN Lugar, Richard G.          1-202-224-4814  na
R KS Dole, Robert               1-202-224-6521  1-202-224-8952
R KS Kassebaum, Nancy L.        1-202-224-4774  1-202-224-3514
D KY Ford, Wendell H.           1-202-224-4343  na
R KY McConnell, Mitch           1-202-224-2541  1-202-224-2499
D LA Breaux, John B.            1-202-224-4623  na
D LA Johnston, J. Bennett       1-202-224-5824  na
D MA Kennedy, Edward M.         1-202-224-4543  1-202-224-2417
D MA Kerry, John F.             1-202-224-2742  na
D MD Mikulski, Barbara A.       1-202-224-4654  1-202-224-8858
D MD Sarbanes, Paul S.          1-202-224-4524  1-202-224-1651
D ME Mitchell, George J.        1-202-224-5344  na
R ME Cohen, William S.          1-202-224-2523  1-202-224-2693
D MI Levin, Carl                1-202-224-6221  na
D MI Riegle Jr., Donald         1-202-224-4822  1-202-224-8834
D MN Wellstone, Paul            1-202-224-5641  1-202-224-8438
R MN Durenberger, David         1-202-224-3244  na
R MO Bond, Christopher S.       1-202-224-5721  1-202-224-8149
R MO Danforth, John C.          1-202-224-6154  na
R MS Cochran, Thad              1-202-224-5054  na
R MS Lott, Trent                1-202-224-6253  1-202-224-2262
D MT Baucus, Max                1-202-224-2651  na
R MT Burns, Conrad R.           1-202-224-2644  1-202-224-8594
R NC Faircloth, D. M.           1-202-224-3154  1-202-224-7406
R NC Helms, Jesse               1-202-224-6342  na
D ND Conrad, Kent               1-202-224-2043  na
D ND Dorgan, Byron L.           1-202-225-2611  1-202-225-9436
D NE Exon, J. J.                1-202-224-4224  na
D NE Kerrey, Joseph R.          1-202-224-6551  1-202-224-7645
R NH Gregg, Judd                1-202-224-3324  na
R NH Smith, Robert              1-202-224-2841  1-202-224-1353
D NJ Bradley, William           1-202-224-3224  1-202-224-8567
D NJ Lautenberg, Frank R.       1-202-224-4744  1-202-224-9707
D NM Bingaman, Jeff             1-202-224-5521  na
R NM Domenici, Pete V.          1-202-224-6621  1-202-224-7371
D NV Bryan, Richard H.          1-202-224-6244  na
D NV Reid, Harry                1-202-224-3542  1-202-224-7327
D NY Moynihan, Daniel P.        1-202-224-4451  1-202-224-9293
R NY D'Amato, Alfonse M.        1-202-224-6542  1-202-224-5871
D OH Glenn, John                1-202-224-3353  na
D OH Metzenbaum, Howard         1-202-224-2315  1-202-224-6519
D OK Boren, David L.            1-202-224-4721  na
R OK Nickles, Donald            1-202-224-5754  1-202-224-6008
R OR Hatfield, Mark O.          1-202-224-3753  na
R OR Packwood, Robert           1-202-224-5244  na
D PA Wofford, Harris            1-202-224-6324  1-202-224-4161
R PA Specter, Arlen             1-202-224-4254  na
D RI Pell, Claiborne            1-202-224-4642  1-202-224-4680
R RI Chafee, John H.            1-202-224-2921  na
D SC Hollings, Ernest F.        1-202-224-6121  na
R SC Thurmond, Strom            1-202-224-5972  1-202-224-1300
D SD Daschle, Thomas A.         1-202-224-2321  1-202-224-2047
R SD Pressler, Larry            1-202-224-5842  1-202-224-1630
D TN Mathews, Harlan            1-202-224-1036  1-202-228-3679
D TN Sasser, James              1-202-224-3344  na
D TX Krueger, Robert            1-202-224-5922  na
R TX Gramm, Phil                1-202-224-2934  na
R UT Bennett, Robert            1-202-224-5444  na
R UT Hatch, Orrin G.            1-202-224-5251  1-202-224-6331
D VA Robb, Charles S.           1-202-224-4024  1-202-224-8689
R VA Warner, John W.            1-202-224-2023  1-202-224-6295
D VT Leahy, Patrick J.          1-202-224-4242  na
R VT Jeffords, James M.         1-202-224-5141  na
D WA Murray, Patty              1-202-224-2621  1-202-224-0238
R WA Gorton, Slade              1-202-224-3441  1-202-224-9393
D WI Feingold, Russell          1-202-224-5323  na
D WI Kohl, Herbert H.           1-202-224-5653  na
D WV Byrd, Robert C.            1-202-224-3954  1-202-224-4025
D WV Rockefeller, John D.       1-202-224-6472  1-202-224-1689
R WY Simpson, Alan K.           1-202-224-3424  1-202-224-1315
R WY Wallop, Malcolm            1-202-224-6441  1-202-224-3230

---
Joe Knapp   jmk@cbvox.att.com




103rd Congress phone and fax numbers
====================================

The following information is from the US Congress "Yellow Book," Jan. 1993.
Four seats were vacant at that time, in CA, MS, OH, and WI. The list
below of 436 people includes 5 non-voting members, from Guam (GU), Puerto
Rico (PR), Samoa (SA), Virgin Islands (VI), and DC. (some of those
abbreviations may be wrong)

Corrections welcome.

p st representative                 phone            fax
= == =============================  ==============   ==============
R AK Young, Donald                  1-202-225-5765   1-202-225-5765
D AL Bevill, Thomas                 1-202-225-4876   1-202-225-0842
D AL Browder, Glen                  1-202-225-3261   1-202-225-9020
D AL Cramer Jr, Robert E.           1-202-225-4801   na
D AL Hilliard, Earl F.              1-202-225-2665   na
R AL Bachus, Spencer                1-202-225-4921   na
R AL Callahan, H. L.                1-202-225-4931   1-202-225-0562
R AL Everett, Terry                 1-202-225-2901   na
D AR Lambert, Blanche               1-202-225-4076   na
D AR Thornton, Raymond              1-202-225-2506   1-202-225-9273
R AR Dickey, Jay                    1-202-225-3772   1-202-225-8646
R AR Hutchinson, Tim                1-202-225-4301   na
D AZ Coppersmith, Sam               1-202-225-2635   1-202-225-2607
D AZ English, Karan                 1-202-225-2190   1-202-225-8819
D AZ Pastor, Ed                     1-202-225-4065   1-202-225-1655
R AZ Kolbe, James T.                1-202-225-2542   1-202-225-0378
R AZ Kyl, Jon L.                    1-202-225-3361   na
R AZ Stump, Robert                  1-202-225-4576   1-202-225-6328
D CA Becerra, Xavier                1-202-225-6235   1-202-225-2202
D CA Beilenson, Anthony             1-202-225-5911   na
D CA Berman, Howard L.              1-202-225-4695   na
D CA Brown Jr., George E.           1-202-225-6161   1-202-225-8671
D CA Condit, Gary                   1-202-225-6131   1-202-225-0819
D CA Dellums, Ronald V.             1-202-225-2661   1-202-225-9817
D CA Dixon, Julian C.               1-202-225-7084   1-202-225-4091
D CA Dooley, Calvin M.              1-202-225-3341   1-202-225-9308
D CA Edwards, Donald                1-202-225-3072   1-202-225-9460
D CA Eshoo, Anna G.                 1-202-225-8104   na
D CA Fazio, Vic                     1-202-225-5716   1-202-225-0354
D CA Filner, Bob                    1-202-225-8045   na
D CA Hamburg, Dan                   1-202-225-3311   na
D CA Harman, Jane                   1-202-225-8220   na
D CA Lantos, Thomas                 1-202-225-3531   na
D CA Lehman, Richard H.             1-202-225-4540   na
D CA Martinez, Matthew G.           1-202-225-5464   1-202-225-4467
D CA Matsui, Robert T.              1-202-225-7163   1-202-225-0566
D CA McCandless, Alfred             1-202-225-5330   1-202-226-1040
D CA Miller, George                 1-202-225-2095   1-202-225-5609
D CA Mineta, Norman Y.              1-202-225-2631   na
D CA Pelosi, Nancy                  1-202-225-4965   1-202-225-8259
D CA Roybal-Allard, Lucille         1-202-225-1766   1-202-226-0350
D CA Schenk, Lynn                   1-202-225-2040   1-202-225-2042
D CA Stark, Fortney H.              1-202-225-5065   na
D CA Torres, Esteban E.             1-202-225-5256   na
D CA Tucker III, Walter R.          1-202-225-7924   1-202-225-7926
D CA Waters, Maxine                 1-202-225-2201   na
D CA Waxman, Henry A.               1-202-225-3976   1-202-225-4099
D CA Woolsey, Lynn                  1-202-225-5161   na
R CA Baker, Bill                    1-202-225-1880   1-202-225-2150
R CA Calvert, Ken                   1-202-225-1986   na
R CA Cox, Christopher               1-202-225-5611   1-202-225-9177
R CA Cunningham, Randy              1-202-225-5452   1-202-225-2558
R CA Doolittle, John T.             1-202-225-2511   1-202-225-5444
R CA Dornan, Robert K.              1-202-225-2965   1-202-225-3694
R CA Dreier, David                  1-202-225-2305   1-202-225-4745
R CA Gallegly, Elton                1-202-225-5811   na
R CA Herger, Walter W.              1-202-225-3076   1-202-225-1609
R CA Horn, Steve                    1-202-225-6676   na
R CA Huffington, Michael            1-202-225-3601   na
R CA Hunter, Duncan L.              1-202-225-5672   1-202-225-0235
R CA Kim, Jay C.                    1-202-225-3201   1-202-226-1485
R CA Lewis, Jerry                   1-202-225-5861   1-202-225-6498
R CA McKeon, Howard P.              1-202-225-1956   1-202-226-0683
R CA Moorhead, Carlos J.            1-202-225-4176   1-202-226-1279
R CA Packard, Ronald                1-202-225-3906   1-202-225-0134
R CA Pombo, Richard                 1-202-225-1947   1-202-226-0861
R CA Rohrabacher, Dana              1-202-225-2415   1-202-225-7067
R CA Royce, Ed                      1-202-225-4111   na
R CA Thomas, Bill                   1-202-225-2915   na
D CO Schroeder, Patricia            1-202-225-4431   1-202-225-5842
D CO Skaggs, David E.               1-202-225-2161   na
R CO Allard, Wayne                  1-202-225-4676   1-202-225-8630
R CO Hefley, Joel                   1-202-225-4422   1-202-225-1942
R CO McInnis, Scott                 1-202-225-4761   1-202-226-0622
R CO Schaefer, Daniel               1-202-225-7882   1-202-225-7885
D CT DeLauro, Rosa                  1-202-225-3661   1-202-225-4890
D CT Gejdenson, Samuel              1-202-225-2076   1-202-225-4977
D CT Kennelly, Barbara B.           1-202-225-2265   1-202-225-1031
R CT Franks, Gary                   1-202-225-3822   1-202-225-5085
R CT Johnson, Nancy L.              1-202-225-4476   1-202-225-4488
R CT Shays, Christopher             1-202-225-5541   1-202-225-9629
D DC Norton, Eleanor Holmes         1-202-225-8050   1-202-225-3002
R DE Castle, Michael N.             1-202-225-4165   1-202-225-2291
D FL Bacchus, James                 1-202-225-3671   1-202-225-9039
D FL Brown, Corrine                 1-202-225-0123   1-202-225-2256
D FL Deutsch, Peter                 1-202-225-7931   1-202-225-8456
D FL Gibbons, Samuel M.             1-202-225-3376   na
D FL Hastings, Alcee L.             1-202-225-1313   1-202-225-0690
D FL Hutto, Earl                    1-202-225-4136   1-202-225-5785
D FL Johnston II, Harry             1-202-225-3001   1-202-225-8791
D FL Meek, Carrie                   1-202-225-4506   1-202-226-0777
D FL Peterson, Peter                1-202-225-5235   1-202-225-1586
R FL Bilirakis, Michael             1-202-225-5755   1-202-225-4085
R FL Canady, Charles T.             1-202-225-1252   na
R FL Diaz-Balart, Lincoln           1-202-225-4211   1-202-225-8576
R FL Fowler, Tillie                 1-202-225-2501   na
R FL Goss, Porter J.                1-202-225-2536   1-202-225-6820
R FL Lewis, Thomas                  1-202-225-5792   1-202-225-1860
R FL McCollum, William              1-202-225-2176   na
R FL Mica, John L.                  1-202-225-4035   1-202-226-0821
R FL Miller, Dan                    1-202-225-5015   1-202-226-0828
R FL Ros-Lehtinen, Ileana           1-202-225-3931   1-202-225-5620
R FL Shaw Jr., E. C.                1-202-225-3026   1-202-225-8398
R FL Stearns, Clifford B.           1-202-225-5744   1-202-225-3973
R FL Thurman, Carol L.              1-202-225-1002   1-202-226-0329
R FL Young, C. W.                   1-202-225-5961   1-202-225-9764
D GA Bishop, Sanford                1-202-225-3631   1-202-225-2203
D GA Darden III, George             1-202-225-2931   na
D GA Deal, Nathan                   1-202-225-5211   1-202-225-8272
D GA Johnson, Don                   1-202-225-4101   1-202-226-1466
D GA Lewis, John                    1-202-225-3801   1-202-225-0351
D GA McKinney, Cynthia              1-202-225-1605   1-202-226-0691
D GA Rowland, J. R.                 1-202-225-6531   na
R GA Collins, Mac                   1-202-225-5901   1-202-225-2515
R GA Gingrich, Newt                 1-202-225-4501   1-202-225-4656
R GA Kingston, Jack                 1-202-225-5831   1-202-226-2269
R GA Linder, John                   1-202-225-4272   na
D GU Underwood, Robert A.           1-202-225-1188   1-202-226-0341
D HI Abercrombie, Neil              1-202-225-2726   na
D HI Mink, Patsy T.                 1-202-225-4906   1-202-225-4987
D IA Smith, Neal                    1-202-225-4426   na
R IA Grandy, Fred                   1-202-225-5476   na
R IA Leach, James                   1-202-225-6576   1-202-226-1278
R IA Lightfoot, James R.            1-202-225-3806   1-202-225-6973
R IA Nussle, James Allen            1-202-225-2911   1-202-225-9129
D ID LaRocco, Larry                 1-202-225-6611   na
R ID Crapo, Michael D.              1-202-225-5531   na
D IL Collins, Cardiss               1-202-225-5006   1-202-225-8396
D IL Costello, Jerry F.             1-202-225-5661   1-202-225-0285
D IL Durbin, Richard J.             1-202-225-5271   1-202-225-0170
D IL Evans, Lane                    1-202-225-5905   1-202-225-5396
D IL Lipinski, William O.           1-202-225-5701   1-202-225-1012
D IL Poshard, Glendal W.            1-202-225-5201   1-202-225-1541
D IL Reynolds, Mel                  1-202-225-0773   na
D IL Rostenkowski, Daniel           1-202-225-4061   na
D IL Rush, Bobby L.                 1-202-225-4372   1-202-226-0333
D IL Sangmeister, George            1-202-225-3635   1-202-225-4447
D IL Yates, Sidney R.               1-202-225-2111   1-202-225-3493
R IL Crane, Philip M.               1-202-225-3711   na
R IL Ewing, Thomas                  1-202-225-2371   1-202-225-8071
R IL Fawell, Harris W.              1-202-225-3515   1-202-225-9420
R IL Gutierrez, Luis V.             1-202-225-8203   1-202-225-7810
R IL Hastert, J. D.                 1-202-225-2976   1-202-225-0697
R IL Hyde, Henry J.                 1-202-225-4561   1-202-226-1240
R IL Manzullo, Donald               1-202-225-5676   1-202-225-5284
R IL Michel, Robert H.              1-202-225-6201   1-202-225-9461
R IL Porter, John E.                1-202-225-4835   1-202-225-0157
D IN Buyer, Steve                   1-202-225-5037   na
D IN Hamilton, Lee H.               1-202-225-5315   1-202-225-1101
D IN Jacobs Jr., Andrew             1-202-225-4011   na
D IN Long, Jill                     1-202-225-4436   na
D IN McCloskey, Frank               1-202-225-4636   1-202-225-4688
D IN Roemer, Timothy                1-202-225-3915   1-202-225-6798
D IN Sharp, Philip R.               1-202-225-3021   na
D IN Visclosky, Peter J.            1-202-225-2461   1-202-225-2493
R IN Burton, Daniel                 1-202-225-2276   1-202-225-0016
R IN Myers, John T.                 1-202-225-5805   na
D KS Glickman, Daniel               1-202-225-6216   na
D KS Slattery, James                1-202-225-6601   1-202-225-1445
R KS Meyers, Jan                    1-202-225-2865   1-202-225-0554
R KS Roberts, Pat                   1-202-225-2715   1-202-225-5375
D KY Baesler, Scotty                1-202-225-4706   na
D KY Barlow, Tom                    1-202-225-3115   1-202-225-2169
D KY Mazzoli, Romano L.             1-202-225-5401   na
D KY Natcher, William H.            1-202-225-3501   na
R KY Bunning, James                 1-202-225-3465   1-202-225-0003
R KY Rogers, Harold                 1-202-225-4601   1-202-225-0940
D LA Fields, Cleo                   1-202-225-8490   1-202-225-8959
D LA Hayes, James A.                1-202-225-2031   1-202-225-1175
D LA Jefferson, William             1-202-225-6636   1-202-225-1988
D LA Tauzin, W. J.                  1-202-225-4031   1-202-225-0563
R LA Baker, Richard H.              1-202-225-3901   1-202-225-7313
R LA Livingston, Robert             1-202-225-3015   1-202-225-0739
R LA McCrery, James                 1-202-225-2777   1-202-225-8039
D MA Frank, Barney                  1-202-225-5931   1-202-225-0182
D MA Kennedy II, Joseph P.          1-202-225-5111   1-202-225-9322
D MA Markey, Edward J.              1-202-225-2836   1-202-225-8689
D MA Meehan, Martin T.              1-202-225-3411   1-202-226-0771
D MA Moakley, John Joseph           1-202-225-8273   1-202-225-7304
D MA Neal, Richard E.               1-202-225-5601   1-202-225-8112
D MA Olver, John W.                 1-202-225-5335   1-202-226-1224
D MA Studds, Gerry E.               1-202-225-3111   1-202-225-2212
R MA Blute, Peter I.                1-202-225-6101   1-202-225-2217
R MA Torkildsen, Peter G.           1-202-225-8020   1-202-225-8037
D MD Cardin, Benjamin L.            1-202-225-4016   na
D MD Hoyer, Steny H.                1-202-225-4131   1-202-225-4300
D MD Mfume, Kweisi                  1-202-225-4741   1-202-225-3178
D MD Wynn, Albert R.                1-202-225-8699   1-202-225-8714
R MD Bartlett, Roscoe G.            1-202-225-2721   na
R MD Bentley, Helen D.              1-202-225-3061   1-202-225-4251
R MD Gilchrest, Wayne T.            1-202-225-5311   1-202-225-0254
R MD Morella, Constance             1-202-225-5341   1-202-225-1389
D ME Andrews, Thomas H.             1-202-225-6116   1-202-225-9065
R ME Snowe, Olympia J.              1-202-225-6306   na
D MI Barcia, James A.               1-202-225-8171   1-202-225-2168
D MI Bonior, David E.               1-202-225-2106   1-202-226-1169
D MI Carr, Robert                   1-202-225-4872   1-202-225-1260
D MI Collins Jr., Barbara           1-202-225-2261   1-202-225-6645
D MI Conyers Jr., John              1-202-225-5126   1-202-225-0072
D MI Dingell, John D.               1-202-225-4071   1-202-225-7426
D MI Ford, William D.               1-202-225-6261   na
D MI Kildee, Dale E.                1-202-225-3611   na
D MI Levin, Sander M.               1-202-225-4961   1-202-226-1033
D MI Stupak, Bart                   1-202-225-4735   1-202-225-4744
R MI Camp, David Lee                1-202-225-3561   1-202-225-9679
R MI Henry, Paul B.                 1-202-225-3831   na
R MI Hoekstra, Peter                1-202-225-4401   na
R MI Knollenberg, Joe               1-202-225-5802   1-202-226-2356
R MI Smith, Nick                    1-202-225-6276   na
R MI Upton, Frederick S.            1-202-225-3761   1-202-225-4986
D MN Minge, David                   1-202-225-2331   na
D MN Oberstar, James L.             1-202-225-6211   1-202-225-0699
D MN Penny, Timothy J.              1-202-225-2472   1-202-225-0051
D MN Peterson, Collin C.            1-202-225-2165   1-202-225-1593
D MN Sabo, Martin O.                1-202-225-4755   na
D MN Vento, Bruce F.                1-202-225-6631   na
R MN Grams, Rod                     1-202-225-2271   1-202-225-9802
R MN Ramstad, James M.              1-202-225-2871   1-202-225-6351
D MO Clay, William L.               1-202-225-2406   1-202-225-1725
D MO Danner, Pat                    1-202-225-7041   na
D MO Gephardt, Richard A.           1-202-225-2671   1-202-225-7452
D MO Skelton, Ike                   1-202-225-2876   1-202-225-2695
D MO Volkmer, Harold L.             1-202-225-2956   1-202-225-7834
D MO Wheat, Alan                    1-202-225-4535   1-202-225-5990
R MO Emerson, Bill                  1-202-225-4404   1-202-225-9621
R MO Hancock, Melton D.             1-202-225-6536   1-202-225-7700
R MO Talent, James M.               1-202-225-2561   1-202-225-2563
D MS Montgomery, G. V.              1-202-225-5031   1-202-225-3375
D MS Parker, Paul M.                1-202-225-5865   1-202-225-5886
D MS Taylor, Gene                   1-202-225-5772   1-202-225-7074
D MS Whitten, Jamie L.              1-202-225-4306   1-202-225-4328
D MT Williams, Pat                  1-202-225-3211   na
D NC Clayton, Eva                   1-202-225-3101   na
D NC Hefner, W. G.                  1-202-225-3715   1-202-225-4036
D NC Lancaster, H. M.               1-202-225-3415   1-202-225-0666
D NC Neal, Stephen L.               1-202-225-2071   1-202-225-4060
D NC Price, David E.                1-202-225-1784   1-202-225-6314
D NC Rose, Charles                  1-202-225-2731   1-202-225-2470
D NC Valentine, Tim                 1-202-225-4531   1-202-225-1539
D NC Watt, Melvin                   1-202-225-1510   1-202-225-1512
R NC Ballenger, Thomas C.           1-202-225-2576   1-202-225-0316
R NC Coble, Howard                  1-202-225-3065   1-202-225-8611
R NC McMillan, J. A.                1-202-225-1976   na
R NC Taylor, Charles Hart           1-202-225-6401   1-202-251-0794
D ND Pomeroy, Earl                  1-202-225-2611   1-202-226-0893
D NE Hoagland, Peter                1-202-225-4155   na
R NE Barrett, William E.            1-202-225-6435   na
R NE Bereuter, Douglas              1-202-225-4806   1-202-226-1148
D NH Swett, Richard N.              1-202-225-5206   na
R NH Zeliff Jr., William            1-202-225-5456   1-202-225-4370
D NJ Andrews, Robert E.             1-202-225-6501   na
D NJ Hughes, William J.             1-202-225-6572   1-202-226-1108
D NJ Klein, Herbert C.              1-202-225-5751   na
D NJ Menendez, Robert               1-202-225-7919   1-202-226-0792
D NJ Pallone Jr., Frank             1-202-225-4671   1-202-225-9665
D NJ Payne, Donald M.               1-202-225-3436   1-202-225-4160
D NJ Torricelli, Robert             1-202-224-5061   1-202-225-0843
R NJ Franks, Bob                    1-202-225-5361   1-202-225-9460
R NJ Gallo, Dean A.                 1-202-225-5034   1-202-225-0658
R NJ Roukema, Marge                 1-202-225-4465   1-202-225-9048
R NJ Saxton, H. J.                  1-202-225-4765   1-202-225-0778
R NJ Smith, Christopher             1-202-225-3765   1-202-225-7768
R NJ Zimmer, Richard A.             1-202-225-5801   1-202-225-9181
D NM Richardson, William            1-202-225-6190   na
R NM Schiff, Steven H.              1-202-225-6316   1-202-225-4975
R NM Skeen, Joseph                  1-202-225-2365   1-202-225-9599
D NV Bilbray, James H.              1-202-225-5965   1-202-225-8808
R NV Vucanovich, Barbara            1-202-225-6155   1-202-225-2319
D NY Ackerman, Gary L.              1-202-225-2601   na
D NY Engel, Eliot L.                1-202-225-2464   na
D NY Flake, Floyd H.                1-202-225-3461   1-202-226-4169
D NY Hinchey, Maurice D.            1-202-225-6335   na
D NY Hochbrueckner, G.              1-202-225-3826   1-202-225-0776
D NY LaFalce, John J.               1-202-225-3231   na
D NY Lowey, Nita M.                 1-202-225-6506   1-202-225-0546
D NY Maloney, Carolyn B.            1-202-225-7944   na
D NY Manton, Thomas J.              1-202-225-3965   na
D NY McNulty, Michael R.            1-202-225-5076   1-202-225-5077

D NY Nadler, Jerrold                1-202-225-5635   1-202-225-6923
Committee: 
	Public Works & Transportation
	Judiciary Committee
Subcommittees: 
	Economic Dev.
	Surface Transportation
	Water Resources & Environment
	Civil & Constitutional Rights
	International Law, Immigration & Refugees
Member, Cong. Arts Caucus
Member, Cong. Caucus for Women's Issues

D NY Owens, Major R.                1-202-225-6231   1-202-226-0112
D NY Rangel, Charles B.             1-202-225-4365   1-202-225-0816
D NY Schumer, Charles E.            1-202-225-6616   1-202-225-4183
D NY Serrano, Jose E.               1-202-225-4361   1-202-225-6001
D NY Slaughter, Louise M.           1-202-225-3615   1-202-225-7822
D NY Towns, Edolphus                1-202-225-5936   1-202-225-1018
D NY Velazquez, Nydia M.            1-202-225-2361   1-202-226-0327
R NY Boehlert, Sherwood             1-202-225-3665   1-202-225-1891
R NY Fish Jr., Hamilton             1-202-225-5441   1-202-225-0962
R NY Gilman, Benjamin A.            1-202-225-3776   na
R NY Houghton, Amory                1-202-225-3161   1-202-225-5574
R NY King, Peter T.                 1-202-225-7896   1-202-226-2279
R NY Lazio, Rick A.                 1-202-225-3335   na
R NY Levy, David A.                 1-202-225-5516   1-202-225-4672
R NY McHugh, John M.                1-202-225-4611   na
R NY Molinari, Susan                1-202-225-3371   1-202-226-1272
R NY Paxon, L. W.                   1-202-225-5265   1-202-225-5910
R NY Quinn, Jack                    1-202-225-3306   1-202-226-0347
R NY Solomon, Gerald B.             1-202-225-5614   1-202-225-1168
R NY Walsh, James T.                1-202-225-3701   1-202-225-4042
D OH Applegate, Douglas             1-202-225-6265   na
D OH Brown, Sherrod                 1-202-225-3401   na
D OH Fingerhut, Eric D.             1-202-225-5731   na
D OH Hall, Tony P.                  1-202-225-6465   na
D OH Kaptur, Marcy                  1-202-225-4146   1-202-225-7711
D OH Mann, Davis S.                 1-202-225-2216   na
D OH Sawyer, Thomas C.              1-202-225-5231   1-202-225-5278
D OH Stokes, Louis                  1-202-225-7032   1-202-225-1339
D OH Strickland, Ted                1-202-225-5705   1-202-226-0331
D OH Traficant Jr., James           1-202-225-5261   1-202-225-3719
R OH Boehner, John Andrew           1-202-225-6205   1-202-225-0704
R OH Gillmor, Paul E.               1-202-225-6405   na
R OH Hobson, David L.               1-202-225-4324   na
R OH Hoke, Martin R.                1-202-225-5871   1-202-226-0994
R OH Kasich, John R.                1-202-225-5355   na
R OH Oxley, Michael G.              1-202-225-2676   na
R OH Pryce, Deborah                 1-202-225-2015   1-202-226-0986
R OH Regula, Ralph                  1-202-225-3876   1-202-225-3059
D OK Brewster, Billy Kent           1-202-225-4565   na
D OK English, Glenn                 1-202-225-5565   1-202-225-8698
D OK McCurdy, David                 1-202-225-6165   1-202-225-9746
D OK Synar, Michael                 1-202-225-2701   1-202-225-2796
R OK Inhofe, James M.               1-202-225-2211   1-202-225-9187
R OK Istook, Ernest Jim             1-202-225-2132   na
D OR DeFazio, Peter A.              1-202-225-6416   na
D OR Furse, Elizabeth               1-202-225-0855   na
D OR Kopetski, Michael J.           1-202-225-5711   1-202-225-9477
D OR Wyden, Ronald                  1-202-225-4811   na
R OR Smith, Robert F.               1-202-225-6730   na
D PA Blackwell, Lucien E.           1-202-225-4001   1-202-225-7362
D PA Borski, Robert A.              1-202-225-8251   1-202-225-4628
D PA Coyne, William J.              1-202-225-2301   na
D PA Foglietta, Thomas M.           1-202-225-4731   1-202-225-0088
D PA Holden, Tim                    1-202-225-5546   1-202-226-0996
D PA Kanjorski, Paul E.             1-202-225-6511   1-202-225-9024
D PA Klink, Ron                     1-202-225-2565   na
D PA Margolies-Mezvinsky, Marjorie  1-202-225-6111   1-202-226-0798
D PA McHale, Paul                   1-202-225-6411   1-202-225-5320
D PA Murphy, Austin J.              1-202-225-4665   1-202-225-4772
D PA Murtha, John P.                1-202-225-2065   1-202-225-5709
R PA Clinger Jr., William           1-202-225-5121   1-202-225-4681
R PA Gekas, George W.               1-202-225-4315   1-202-225-8440
R PA Goodling, William F.           1-202-225-5836   1-202-226-1000
R PA Greenwood, Jim                 1-202-225-4276   1-202-225-9511
R PA McDade, Joseph M.              1-202-225-3731   1-202-225-9594
R PA Ridge, Thomas J.               1-202-225-5406   na
R PA Santorum, Richard J.           1-202-225-2135   1-202-225-7747
R PA Shuster, Bud                   1-202-225-2431   na
R PA Walker, Robert S.              1-202-225-2411   na
R PA Weldon, Curt                   1-202-225-2011   1-202-225-8137
D PR Romero-Barcelo, Carlos         1-202-225-2615   1-202-225-2154
D RI Reed, John F.                  1-202-225-2735   1-202-225-9580
R RI Machtley, Ronald K.            1-202-225-4911   1-202-225-4417
D SA Faleomavaega, Eni F.H.         1-202-225-8577   na
D SC Clyburn, James E.              1-202-225-3315   1-202-225-2302
D SC Derrick, Butler                1-202-225-5301   na
D SC Spratt Jr., John M.            1-202-225-5501   1-202-225-0464
R SC Inglis, Bob                    1-202-225-6030   na
R SC Ravenel Jr., Arthur            1-202-225-3176   na
R SC Spence, Floyd                  1-202-225-2452   1-202-225-2455
D SD Johnson, Timothy P.            1-202-225-2801   1-202-225-2427
D TN Clement, Robert                1-202-225-4311   1-202-226-1035
D TN Cooper, James                  1-202-225-6831   1-202-225-4520
D TN Ford, Harold E.                1-202-225-3265   na
D TN Lloyd, Marilyn                 1-202-225-3271   1-202-225-6974
D TN Tanner, John S.                1-202-225-4714   1-202-225-1765
R TN Duncan Jr., John J.            1-202-225-5435   1-202-225-6440
R TN Gordon, Bart                   1-202-225-4231   1-202-225-6887
R TN Quillen, James H.              1-202-225-6356   1-202-225-7812
R TN Sundquist, Donald              1-202-225-2811   1-202-225-2814
D TX Andrews, Michael A.            1-202-255-7508   na
D TX Brooks, Jack                   1-202-225-6565   1-202-225-1584
D TX Bryant, John                   1-202-225-2231   na
D TX Chapman, Jim                   1-202-225-3035   1-202-225-7265
D TX Coleman, Ronald D.             1-202-225-4831   na
D TX Edwards, Chet                  1-202-225-6105   1-202-225-0350
D TX Frost, Martin                  1-202-225-3605   1-202-225-4951
D TX Geren, Peter                   1-202-225-5071   1-202-225-2786
D TX Gonzalez, Henry B.             1-202-225-3236   1-202-225-1915
D TX Green, Gene                    1-202-225-1688   1-202-225-9903
D TX Hall, Ralph M.                 1-202-225-6673   1-202-225-3332
D TX Johnson, Eddie Bernice         1-202-225-8885   na
D TX Laughlin, Gregory H.           1-202-225-2831   1-202-225-1108
D TX Ortiz, Solomon P.              1-202-225-7742   1-202-226-1134
D TX Pickle, J. J.                  1-202-225-4865   na
D TX Sarpalius, Bill                1-202-225-3706   1-202-225-6142
D TX Stenholm, Charles W.           1-202-225-6605   1-202-225-2234
D TX Tejeda, Frank                  1-202-225-1640   na
D TX Washington, Craig A.           1-202-225-3816   na
D TX Wilson, Charles                1-202-225-2401   1-202-225-1764
D TX de la Garza, E                 1-202-225-2531   1-202-225-2534
R TX Archer, William                1-202-225-2571   1-202-225-4381
R TX Armey, Richard K.              1-202-225-7772   1-202-225-7614
R TX Barton, Joseph                 1-202-225-2002   1-202-225-3052
R TX Bonilla, Henry                 1-202-225-4511   na
R TX Combest, Larry                 1-202-225-4005   na
R TX DeLay, Thomas                  1-202-225-5951   na
R TX Fields, Jack                   1-202-225-4901   na
R TX Johnson, Sam                   1-202-225-4201   na
R TX Smith, Lamar S.                1-202-225-4236   1-202-225-8628
D UT Orton, William H.              1-202-225-7751   1-202-226-1223
D UT Shepherd, Karen                1-202-225-3011   1-202-226-0354
R UT Hansen, James V.               1-202-225-0453   1-202-225-5857
D VA Boucher, Rick                  1-202-225-3861   na
D VA Byrne, Leslie L.               1-202-225-1492   na
D VA Moran Jr., James P.            1-202-225-4376   1-202-225-0017
D VA Payne Jr., Lewis F.            1-202-225-4711   1-202-226-1147
D VA Pickett, Owen B.               1-202-225-4215   1-202-225-4218
D VA Scott, Robert C.               1-202-225-8351   1-202-225-3854
D VA Sisisky, Norman                1-202-225-6365   1-202-226-1170
R VA Bateman, Herbert H.            1-202-225-4261   1-202-225-4382
R VA Bliley Jr., Thomas J.          1-202-225-2815   na
R VA Goodlatte, Robert W.           1-202-225-5431   1-202-225-9681
R VA Wolf, Frank R.                 1-202-225-5136   na
D VI de Lugo, Ron                   1-202-225-1790   1-202-225-9392
I VT Sanders, Bernard               1-202-225-4115   1-202-225-6790
D WA Cantwell, Maria                1-202-225-6311   1-202-225-2286
D WA Dicks, Norman D.               1-202-225-5916   na
D WA Foley, Thomas S.               1-202-225-2006   na
D WA Inslee, Jay                    1-202-225-5816   1-202-226-1137
D WA Kreidler, Mike                 1-202-225-8901   1-202-226-2361
D WA McDermott, James A.            1-202-225-3106   1-202-225-9212
D WA Swift, Al                      1-202-225-2605   1-202-225-2608
D WA Unsoeld, Jolene                1-202-225-3536   1-202-225-9095
R WA Dunn, Jennifer                 1-202-225-7761   na
D WI Barrett, Thomas M.             1-202-225-3571   na
D WI Gunderson, Steve               1-202-225-5506   1-202-225-6195
D WI Kleczka, Gerald D.             1-202-225-4572   na
D WI Obey, David R.                 1-202-225-3365   na
R WI Klug, Scott                    1-202-225-2906   na
R WI Petri, Thomas E.               1-202-225-2476   1-202-225-2356
R WI Roth, Toby                     1-202-225-5665   1-202-225-0087
R WI Sensenbrenner, F. J.           1-202-225-5101   1-202-225-3190
D WV Mollohan, Alan B.              1-202-225-4172   1-202-225-7564
D WV Rahall II, Nick Joe            1-202-225-3452   1-202-225-9061
D WV Wise Jr., Robert E.            1-202-225-2711   1-202-225-7856
R WY Thomas, Craig                  1-202-225-2311   1-202-225-0726


//WHITE HOUSE

If you send a message to the White House, please include a US Post office 
address for replies.

        You can send e-mail to the following accounts:

Compuserve:             75300,3115
                        GO: WHITE HOUSE         finds White House forum

America OnLine:         clinton pz
                        KEYWORD: WHITEHOUSE     finds White House area

MCI                     TO: WHITE HOUSE
                        VIEW WHITE HOUSE        views bulletin boards

Internet:               clinton-hq@Campaign92.Org
                        75300.3115@compuserve.com
                        clintonpz@aol.com
			whouse@mcimail.com

__
|         (V)              |  "Tiger gotta hunt.  Bird gotta fly.
|   (^    (`>              |   Man gotta sit and wonder why, why, why.
|  ((\\__/ )               |   Tiger gotta sleep.  Bird gotta land.
|  (\\<   )   der Nethahn  |   Man gotta tell himself he understand."
|    \<  )                 |  
|     ( /                  |                Kurt Vonnegut Jr.
|      |                   |  
|      ^                   |





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Brian D Williams <talon57@well.sf.ca.us>
Date: Thu, 5 Aug 93 14:02:03 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: big brother
Message-ID: <93Aug5.140053pdt.14007-1@well.sf.ca.us>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain




  I just was remembering a little thing we had to do anytime we answered a
phone, when we were at squadron, it would make an interesting form of social
protest. We always had to answer "This is an unsecured line etc etc...."




                                                        Brian Williams
                                                        Cypherpatriot






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: technopagan priest <tedwards@wam.umd.edu>
Date: Thu, 5 Aug 93 11:08:35 PDT
To: pcw@access.digex.net
Subject: Our chances
Message-ID: <199308051805.AA26736@rac2.wam.umd.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



About NSA assistant director Dr. Clint Brooks:

>He readily admitted that the Clipper system isn't intended to catch
>any crooks. They'll just avoid the phones. It is just going to deny
>them access to the telecommunications system. They just won't be able
>to go into Radio Shack and buy a secure phone that comes off the line.

This is why it is _imperative_ that Cypherpunks develop secure
voice communication systems, to kill Clipper market share.

>Their message was direct and they didn't hesitate to compare encryption
>with assault rifles. 

Of course, the assault weapon issue is, for the most part, a bogus
attempt to grab rifles.  Semi-auto long weapons do not actually
show up in the crime stream with any regularity, there are millions
of legally owned rifles that are never used in crime, and anti-gun
groups are using people's inexperience with semi-auto weapons and
crime statistics to achieve their ends.

-Thomas




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: khijol!erc@apple.com (Ed Carp)
Date: Thu, 5 Aug 93 15:24:56 PDT
To: talon57@well.sf.ca.us (Brian D Williams)
Subject: Re: big brother
In-Reply-To: <93Aug5.140053pdt.14007-1@well.sf.ca.us>
Message-ID: <m0oOCvs-000244C@khijol>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text


>   I just was remembering a little thing we had to do anytime we answered a
> phone, when we were at squadron, it would make an interesting form of social
> protest. We always had to answer "This is an unsecured line etc etc...."

Something like "X-Comment: This is an unsecured email message, prone to
being tampered with, forged, or obliterated." :)
-- 
Ed Carp, N7EKG			erc@apple.com			510/659-9560
                            anon-2133@twwells.com
If you want magic, let go of your armor.  Magic is so much stronger than
steel!        -- Richard Bach, "The Bridge Across Forever"



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: deathmon@sunrayce.solar.umn.edu (Jared "Jake" Gage)
Date: Thu, 5 Aug 93 13:29:53 PDT
To: pmulivor@acadcomp.monroecc.edu
Subject: Re:  Mulivor's new address
Message-ID: <9308052034.AA14203@sunrayce.solar.umn.edu.>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


 Sorry about this, but how do I desubscribe to this mailing list.

                                        -Jake




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Johann Faust <faust@cd.chalmers.se>
Date: Thu, 5 Aug 93 08:13:32 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: ARAs
Message-ID: <199308051512.AA25436@castafiore.cd.chalmers.se>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----


Ben Weiss wrote:

> BTW, do you remember who it was that was talking about pgp mail headers who
> has not yet responded to my groovy idea of using rfc822's "Encrypted:"
> field?  So far, the only responses I've seen are from others saying "Yea,
> when ya find out, let me know too..."  Any thoughts?

Huh, I guess that was me... 

I thought that was a nice idea, the reason I "forgot" to reply was that I've
read it , thought about it, yes, that would be a nice idea, as long as you
don't have to see the ugly 64-radix-junk in your editor you don't care about
the bandwidth... 
Then it hit me ... Shit, I gotta go and study so I can get accepted to MIT
and work out a Ph.D under (hopefully) the almighty hero Ron Rivest.

That's the problem , soo much things to do, and soo little time...
(I happend to be one of those students who belives that 1 semester is AT LEAST
equal to 2 semesters :-)).

Anyhow, I'm learning perl now, and working on "improving" (eh, well "hack")
the cypherpunk remailing software, but for the moment my devilish Linux
kernel barfs core as soon as it sees the chain-program...

Anyhow, keep on working on those rfc822 fields, and please keep us informed,
I think it's a good idea, but still, remailers with capability to store
headers associated with a username and forward mail to them are better.

And remember: 		
		NSA says that all American citizens are criminals,

		NSA consists of American citizens...

	Stop the Clipper/Skipjack/Jackpot/Crackpot/Potshot chip!

Signed in Primes, Johann.


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.3

iQBVAgUBLGE97jxzhCdu2hFdAQEYIwH/cMBwxiLIECKQlKKgPOifvP0PE8yZHLHG
LULAH3eFjf/SxgWLv1vKkPsVp6FVP8rkbtmHdc93Y1khrHKsii325w==
=sXsi
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: UFLTAI@MSUVX1.MEMST.EDU
Date: Thu, 5 Aug 93 15:52:04 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Needed: Source for the air force's chicken gun
Message-ID: <01H1E8BSWMFM9ANI4G@MSUVX1.MEMST.EDU>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Hi,	
	I need to find out if the air force's chicken gun (frozen chicken is
shot at engines to test the engine's ability to meet little flying birdies)
is for real, and if it is, a source (paper, article, etc) that says that it
exists.  I've seen this a couple of times in news, but I've never seen a 
source quoted.  I know this is not the usual cypherpunkish themes, but I've
found that the people on this list are some of the best informed ones, and
I am hoping you all can help.
	Please reply to me and not the list.  Thanx very very much.  Ciao.

-Tai
ps: btw, I need the source quite urgently...  thanx again!




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: gnu (John Gilmore)
Date: Thu, 5 Aug 93 19:08:40 PDT
To: cypherpunks
Subject: `Web of trust model' matches common business situation too
Message-ID: <9308060205.AA11833@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Date:  Thu, 5 Aug 93 14:33 EDT
From: TCJones@DOCKMASTER.NCSC.MIL
...

Interestingly, I am coming to the conclusion that big business operates
on a web of trust very much like what is found in PGP.  There are
Dun&Bradstreet reports of course, but, bye-and-large, when a company
wants credit, they give a list of the other companies that they do
business with as evidence of their trustworthiness in receiving credit.

Peace ..Tom Jones




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: fergp@sytex.com (Paul Ferguson)
Date: Thu, 5 Aug 93 17:18:40 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: PKP and DSS -- Licensing and Summation (fwd)
Message-ID: <D43T8B1w165w@sytex.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


From: ross@wattle.itd.adelaide.edu.au (Ross Williams)
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
Subject: NIST/PKP scandal: All you need to act.
Followup-To: sci.crypt
Date: 4 Aug 1993 04:21:12 GMT
Organization: Rocksoft Pty Ltd.
Lines: 1885
Distribution: world
NNTP-Posting-Host: wattle.itd.adelaide.edu.au
Summary: NIST/PKP scandal: All you need to act.
Keywords: nist pkp dsa dss patent digital signature


Why It Is Important That You Read This Document and Address This Issue
----------------------------------------------------------------------
Right now there are some fairly significant political things happening
in the area of digital signatures that will determine how they are
managed for the next two decades. This matters because digital
signatures will be a key technology in the future. It is likely that,
in the future, most commercial transactions, and most digital
communications (including email) will be sealed with a digital
signature. In 1999 when J.Random Citizen goes the supermarket and
swipes his credit card to buy a chocolate bar, he will most likely be
issuing a digital signature. Digital signatures are going to be an
extremely important technology in future society, not just in the US,
but throughout the world. Because of the propagation of patents
through GATT and other agreements, what happens in the US affects
everyone.

Unfortunately, as far as I can tell, this is a technology that the
general public is not even aware of. As a result, the entire legal and
political foundation for the technology is being layed down right now
by the US Government and other organizations, without much interaction
with the outside world. Now this isn't necessarily a bad thing;
governments do a lot of good things. However, recent political
developments have alarmed many people.

A difficulty with the situation is that the issues are rather complex
and the approach one takes to them will depend on one's attitudes
towards Government, industry, intellectual property, patents and so
on. And even if you have firm convictions on any of these issues,
deciding what one's position on the issue is, and what one should do
can be difficult. It's easy to be a radical and shoot from the hip,
and it's easy to be a cynic and do nothing, but I don't like either of
these approaches. The only alternative is to think it through properly
and make a measured response (which may well happen to be radical!).

The document below is my attempt to enumerate the facts, identify the
key constraints and issues and identify a number of possible positions
and responses. Rather than attempting to "precompile" all this
information and advocate a particular course of action, I have
provided information so that you can make up your own mind. To this
end, I have added appendices containing reference material that you
might otherwise have to look up (as I had to).

The deadline for action (by fax) is midnight ending Monday 9 August
1993 Washington D.C. time, but it would be best to act well before
then to be on the safe side. I urge you, at the very least, to read
this document and make up your own mind about this important issue.

Ross Williams (ross@guest.adelaide.edu.au.)
4 August 1993.


AN ANALYSIS OF THE NIST/PKP DIGITAL SIGNATURE PATENT LICENSING PROPOSAL
=======================================================================
Version : 3.
Date    : 4 August 1993.
Author  : Ross N. Williams.
Net     : ross@guest.adelaide.edu.au.
Snail   : 16 Lerwick Avenue, Hazelwood Park 5066, Australia.
Fax     : +61 8 373-4911.
Phone   : +61 8 379-5020 (10am to 10pm Adelaide Australia time).
Thanks  : The following people have provided me with information:
             Noah Friedman    (friedman@gnu.ai.mit.edu.).
             Jack Larsen      (jl@epsilon.eecs.nwu.edu.).
             Richard Stallman (rms@gnu.ai.mit.edu.).
             Dan Bernstein    (djb@silverton.berkeley.edu.)
Cleared : Cleared for public release 1:18am 04-Aug-1993: RNW.
Status  : Copyright (C) Ross Williams 1993. However, permission is granted to
          make and distribute verbatim copies of this document provided
          that this copyright notice is included.
Disclaimer: Where this document expresses opinions on behalf of the
author, those opinions are the author's only and are not representative
of any organization associated with the author.

Note: A GLOSSARY appears at the end of this document. If you are
unsure of an acronym, look it up. Search for the word "glossary".


0. TABLE OF CONTENTS
====================
1. The Facts of the Case
   1.1 Public Key Cryptography
   1.2 The Digital Signature Standard
   1.3 The Choice
   1.4 The Gift
   1.5 Objecting and Appealing
2. What People Think (and Feel!)
3. Analysis.
   3.1 Enumerating The Objections
   3.2 The US Code
   3.3 Alternatives for NIST
   3.4 A Modern Aesops Fable
4. What You Can Do.
   4.1 Many Options
   4.2 To Whom To Write
   4.3 A Selection of Things To Say
--
A. Glossary.
B. NIST's Announcement
C. United States Code Title 35.
D: 37 CFR 404.7 (Checklist for License Application)
E: Dan Bernstein's Posting and Form Letter
F: The LPF Announcement
G. The letters I intend to send.


1. THE FACTS OF THE CASE
========================
As far as I can determine, these are the facts of the case. I have not
checked all these facts, and welcome corrections. I regret that I do
not have the time to substantiate the stuff in this section with
formal references.

1.1 Public Key Cryptography
----------------------------
* In late 1970's and early 1980's there was a revolution in
cryptography caused by the invention of public-key cryptography by
researchers at MIT and Stanford. Those researchers created patents
covering much of the new technology, and these patents were assigned
to their respective institutions.

* In order to exploit the new technology, MIT and Stanford created a
company called Public Key Partners (PKP) to whom they granted
exclusive sublicensing rights to the cryptography patents. As a result
PKP has controlled the use of public key cryptography for the last
decade or so.

* PKP claims that its patents are very broad and cover not just
specific public key cryptography techniques such as the RSA technique,
but also cover the IDEA of public-key cryptography too. Like most
issues involved in this whole situation, this issue is not clear and
can only be resolved in the courts. This document assumes that the PKP
patends are broad.

* The PKP patents expire between 1997 and 2008. The most important
ones expire between 1997 and 2000.

* Public key cryptography is a seminal enabling technology that solves
most information integrity problems, including the ability to create
unforgeable digital signatures. Digital signatures are just like real
handwritten signatures except that they can be applied to digital
documents.


1.2 The Digital Signature Standard
----------------------------------
* Digital signatures are extremely powerful, but also rather
technologically messy to implement. Keys have to be generated and
managed. In particular, the issuing of a digital signature is a social
and commercial event most likely requiring network events. In my
opinion digital signatures will not enter widespread use until they
are standardized.

* Several years ago, the US Congress, recognising the need for a
standard, instructed NIST (The US National Institute of Standards and
Technology) to perform a study and come up with a proposal for a
digital signature standard.

* NIST evaluated the options and, among other things, commissioned its
own signature scheme called DSA (Digital Signature Algorithm). The DSA
was prepared with assistance from the NSA (National Security Agency).

* When all the dust settled, there were two proposals to choose from:
a proposal by PKP based on RSA, and DSA. NIST patented DSA which meant
that both proposals were embodied in patents, one owned by PKP and the
other by NIST.

* There were many pros and cons for each proposal including:

   - PKP asserted that the NIST proposal was technically more
     arbitrary than the RSA and was created in a more politically
     impure environment (with help from the NSA) and so was more
     likely to have a backdoor in it somewhere. RSA is based on prime
     numbers and is simpler and more self-evidently backdoor-free.

   - The PKP proposal was privately owned and so, if it was chosen,
     everyone would have to pay PKP royalties.

* Because the use of digital signatures requires the interaction
between random pairs of individuals in society and other organizations
and agencies, it would appear that there is no room for two standards.
It might be possible for two standards to coexist, but once one
catches on, no one will want to know about the other, as "hardly
anybody uses it". Furthermore, whatever is chosen as the standard is
likely to become mandatory when interacting with various government
institutions. Thus, whatever happens, the standard that catches on is
likely to dominate and will be hard to supplant even by
technologically better rivals. This makes right-now a critical time.


1.3 The Choice
--------------
* The decision was up to NIST. In the end it chose its own proposal
which was subsequently named in its DSS (Digital Signature Standard)
as the standard algorithm.

* NIST's problem then was how to cope with PKP. It seems that earlier
on, NIST declared the DSA free of coverage from other patents:

   "[We] believe this technique is patentable and that no other patents
   would apply to the DSS."
   -- NIST --US Federal Register, 30 August 1991.

However, it seems that since that time, PKP applied pressure to NIST
claiming that the DSA was covered by PKP's broader patents. It is
still not clear what the practical scope of PKP's patents is and the
only way to tell is go to court. What is certain is that the PKP
patents THREATEN the DSA patent and can cause trouble for it at any
time.

Meanwhile, NIST has certainly behaved as if the PKP patents are a
problem as it stated in its DSA license proposal announcement (see
Appendix B of this document):

     >The prospective license is a cross-license which would resolve a
     >patent dispute with Public Key Partners and includes the right to

If PKP are right then patent law says that neither party can use the
technology without obtaining a license from the other party. However,
the coverage of PKP's patents is far from clear.


1.4 The Gift
------------
* In the end, NIST decided to simply GIVE its DSA patent to PKP.
Actually, it's not giving, it's an exclusive license, which is
effectively the same thing. We will use the word "give" in this
document.

* This decision has been, to say the least, controversial. At least is
has within the subculture that knows about these things. It hasn't hit
Donahue yet.

* The PKP patents run out between 1997 and 2000. The DSA patent runs
out in about 2010. Thus, if PKP's patents have teeth then NIST is
GIVING PKP a monopoly of a major national standard for 10 years. If
PKP's patents don't have coverage, then NIST is GIVING PKP the
monopoly for about 16 years. Either way, it's an unnecessarily
generous gift and one that will probably cost the public hundreds of
millions of dollars.

* Monopolistic control over DSA is a gold mine. I can't put a figure on
how much it would be worth, but certainly more than three flat rocks and a
piece of string. Just remember that most commercial transactions of the
future and probably most electronic communications will be executed using
digital signatures and you get an idea of the scope of the monopoly.
It's almost like simultaneously owning a patent on the pens with which
all people must sign contracts and on sealing wax with which people seal
envelopes (or did in more romantic eras).

* PKP has stated its INTENT to license DSA free for non-commercial use:

     >It is PKP's intent to make practice of the DSA royalty free for
     >personal, noncommercial and U.S. Federal, state and local
     >government use.  As explained below, only those parties who enjoy
     >commercial benefit from making or selling products, or certifying
     >digital signatures, will be required to pay royalties to practice
     >the DSA.

However, this apparently does not cover software distribution schemes
that operate at cost or which cross-subsidize distribution to yield a
non-profit. Note also that this statement of intent does not represent
a binding committment.

* PKP has issued a statement committing itself to charging a maximum
royalty rate of 5% if the deal goes through. However, there are also
"minimum fees" which are going to be $10000 per year, plus $10000 for
small companies and $25000 for big companies.

* An important aspect of the situation is that after PKP's patents run
out, there will be nothing stopping anyone from creating and using new
digital signature algorithms that are not DSA. The trouble is that by
that stage DSA will be so well established that no one will want to
use anything else. So, while PKP will eventually lose control over
public-key cryptography, they will still have control over the DSA,
and by then nobody will be able to supplant it with a free standard.

* If the deal does go through then we are likely to see an interesting
effect as the PKP patent expiry dates approach. At roughly that time,
PKP's RSA patents will expire and we will find that PKP is promoting
the DSA (over which it holds a patent) and downplaying (and possibly
denigrating) the RSA algorithms upon which the company was
founded!!!!!!!!!!!!!


1.5 Objecting and Appealing
---------------------------
* The DSA patent has not yet been licensed to PKP. By 37 CFR 404.7,
this cannot occur unless NIST first advertises the fact that the
licensing is to take place, and solicits objections from the public.
NIST made such an advertisement in the US Federal Register on 8 June
1993:

     >The prospective license will be granted unless, within sixty (60)
     >days of this notice, NIST receives written evidence and argument
     >which established that the grant of the license would not be
     >consistent with the requirements of 35 U.S.C. 209 and 37 CFR 404.7.
     >Dated:  June 2, 1993.

This noticed was published on about 8 June 1993 so the deadline for
responses is 8 August 1993 Washington D.C. time. However, this is a
Sunday and we have obtained a verbal commitment from NIST that Monday
is OK too.

* A lawyer I know who has knowledge of this case has indicated that he
thinks that there is no likelihood that NIST will back out of the deal
at this stage. However, he feels that this stance is a result of
leftovers from the Bush administration. Apparently appeals will be
heard by the new Clinton administration and so there is a chance of a
change of mind by NIST.

* An appeal can be made later to the new administration by anyone who
submitted written comments to NIST (as explained above) in opposition
to the proposal. Appealants can appeal "de novo" which means that they
are not limited to facts and arguments submitted now.

* The word "algorithm" appears in the DSA patent, despite the fact
that it is officially impossible to register a software patent (it has
to be framed in terms of hardware) so it may be that the DSA patent is
invalid.


2. WHAT VARIOUS PEOPLE THINK (AND FEEL!)
========================================
* Many people do not believe that algorithmic processes, and in
particular, software should be patentable at all. This is an extremely
complex issue, but if you do not believe that software patents should
exist, you will also believe that the PKP patents should not exist.

* Many people are worried that public key cryptography was patented,
given its origins. They point out that most of the research leading to
it was funded by public (i.e. taxpayer's) money granted by the US
Federal Government to Universities. They point out that if the result
of such research should be framed as property at all (e.g. patents)
then it should be public property. In fact, a database search of the
relevant patents reveals that many of them have the following note
attached which would seem to indicate that the government may have
some direct rights to the patents:

   >GOVERNMENT INTEREST       (GI)  The Government has rights in this
   >                          invention pursuant to Grant No. ENG-10173 of
   >                          the National Science Foundation and IPA No.
   >                          0005.

* One of the purposes of the patent system is to cause technology to
be exploited. Some people have suggested that PKP has not been
effective in allowing the diffusion public key cryptography. I am not
in a position to establish the truth or falsehood of this statement.
However, there is intuitive evidence in the fact that public key
cryptography was invented almost 20 years ago, and yet is not yet in
widespread use. A visit to the supermarket checkout counter reveals no
digital signatures. Why not?

* Some people have suggested that the reason for the lack of diffusion
of public key cryptography is that a cosy unspoken understanding
exists between PKP and various US Government agencies that are
none-too-happy about the prospect of a diffusion of this technology.
Evidence for the attitude of government agencies is: 1) the smoking
gun of the 56-bit DES key, 2) the fact that much cryptographic
technology is currently classified as "munitions" and cannot be
exported without a license. Evidence of the lack of diffusion is the
supermarket argument above. The rest is speculation.

* Many people were worried when NIST patented the DSA. They felt that
no good could come from embodying a public standard as a piece of
intellectual property. Their fears have been realized as NIST is about
to license that property exclusively to PKP.

* It is very easy to get hot under the collar at NIST. However, it is
also important to realize that their actions MAY be motivated by no
more than a desire for the public good - to disseminate digital
signature technology as quickly as possible. In this quest they ran up
against a problem - PKP - and solved it as quickly and as easily as
they could - by giving the DSA patent to PKP.

* I do not particularly hold any bad feelings towards PKP or its
employees. I have been developing a product recently that has required
me to interact with PKP and to license one of their algorithms. They
have been nothing but polite and helpful and have provided me with
useful information. My concern is not with PKP, but with the future of
digital signatures.


3. ANALYSIS
===========

3.1 Enumerating The Objections
------------------------------
I you are at all like me, by this stage your brain will be feeling as
if it is full of cotton wool so let's attempt to crystalize it all.
First, why should we care at all? The answer to this is that digital
signatures are going to be very important in the future. Second, what
bad things have happened, or are about to happen? This depends on your
stand on various issues in intellectual property. Combing through
previous sections, we can assemble at least the following list of
potential objections:

   * Object to software patents in general.
   * Object to publicly funded universities creating patents at all.
   * Object to such universities assigning such patents to commercial companies.
   * Object to PKP allegedly holding up the diffusion of public key technology.
   * Object to the involvement of the NSA in creating the DSA.
   * Object to NIST choosing DSA as standard instead of RSA.
   * Object to NIST embodying DSA in a patent.
   * Object to government agencies assigning patents to commercial companies.
   * Object to NIST assigning the patent to just ONE company.
   * Object to NIST effectively extending PKP's patent powers.
   * Object to NIST making it more difficult for companies that
     wish to fight PKP to do so.

So there is certainly a lot to grumble about! This is a problem with
this issue: there are too many ducks to shoot at and the more
idealistic you are the easier it becomes to get angry and confused.
However, right now we are right near the end of NIST's 60-day deadline
and coherent focussed action is required.

From the legal tactical point of view, there are many many angles of
attack. I won't go into them here; the situation touches on
constitutional law, administrative law, patent law and I don't
understand it all. Just be assured that "teams of lawyers are working
around the clock" :-) What we really need of course is a turbo-charged
Hillary, but this is not possible at this time.

What IS important is that the current situation seems to be largely a
result of the leftovers of the Bush administration. The new Clinton
administration may take different view on all this. I have heard that
soon the top few people in NIST will be replaced by Clinton people.
This means that if enough people object now with enough good reasons,
the issue might get held up long enough for it to be caught by the new
administration. And the "de novo" aspect of the appeals process means
that new arguments can be created and presented later, so you are not
limited later to what you say now. So say anything, but please say
something, now.

As we have seen, there are many legitimate objections that could be
made. In my mind the key ones are:

   * That NIST is placing a key international standard in the
   hands of a single company.

   * That by handing DSA to PKP, NIST is giving PKP power
   unnecessarily. It may be that some companies believe that they
   can beat PKP's broad patents in court. However, if the NIST/PKP
   deal goes through, such companies will have to break not only
   the broad PKP patents, but the more specific DSA one as well.
   If the PKP patents are so strong, why should NIST need to give
   PKP the DSA patent at all?

In addition to these general objections, we can also respond directly
and formally to NIST's requests for comments on the deal. The next
section discusses this.


3.2 The US Code
---------------
NIST has requested objections to its proposal before 8 August 1993.
Furthermore, it has specified exactly what its criterion is for
evaluating objections:

     >The prospective license will be granted unless, within sixty (60)
     >days of this notice, NIST receives written evidence and argument
     >which established that the grant of the license would not be
     >consistent with the requirements of 35 U.S.C. 209 and 37 CFR 404.7.
     >Dated:  June 2, 1993.

I have obtained copies of 35 U.S.C. 209 (see Appendix C) and 37 CFR 404.7
(see Appendix D). The latter is basically the former repeated over a few
times with some bits added.

Here are the juicy clauses of 35 U.S.C. 209 - the ones that specify the
criteria that NIST is supposed to be using to determine whether to license
DSA to PKP. NIST is most likely to respond favourably to objections lodged
to it that address these criteria and explain why they are not being met.
Here we go:

   >(A) the interests of the Federal Government and the public will
   >best be served by the proposed license, in view of the applicant's
   >intentions, plans, and ability to bring the invention to practical
   >application or otherwise promote the invention's utilization by
   >the public;

I think it's fairly clear from the history of the computer industry in
the last two decades that computer companies will need little
encouragement in adopting and implementing this standard without the
help of PKP!


   >(B) the desired practical application has not been achieved, or is not
   >likely expeditiously to be achieved, under any non-exclusive license
   >which has been granted, or which may be granted, on the invention;

DSS has only recently been declared a standard, so it's hard to judge.
It depends on how good PKP's is at preventing companies from
implementing DSA.


   >(C) exclusive or partially exclusive licensing is a reasonable and
   >necessary initiative to call forth the investment of risk capital and
   >expenditures to bring the invention to practical application or
   >otherwise promote the invention's utilization by the public; and

This condition absolutely is not met. The history of the computer
industry and the potential for the DSA clearly indicates that there
will be, if anything, a glut of risk capital for implementing DSA.
And it's probably not even likely to be "risk" capital!


   >(D) the proposed terms and scope of exclusivity are not greater than
   >reasonably necessary to provide the incentive for bringing the invention
   >to practical application or otherwise promote the invention's
   >utilization by the public.

Even if DSA is a subset of PKP's patents and NIST is assigning DSA to
PKP to simplify the situation, this condition is definitely not met as
NIST is licensing DSA to PKP for at least 10 years longer than it
needs to - more than half the life of the patent. PKP's patents expire
before 2000, but NIST is granting DSA until the year 2010. This is FAR
greater than is reasonably necessary. Because technology tends to
diffuse in accordance with an exponential curve (at least until it
saturates), it is likely that the royalties PKP will receive between
2000 and 2010 will be a hundred times greater than those it receives
beween 1993 and 2000. Thus, in practice, NIST may be being
overgenerous by a factor of one hundred or more.


SUMMARY: If we assume that NIST's goal is to get DSA in use as quickly
as possible, then their only obstacle is PKP. The clauses above
address the issues of technology diffusion and the attraction of risk
capital. These issues are not central in this case as it must be
blindingly obvious to anyone who knows the computer industry that the
DSA standard would go like curry through a senior citizen if all the
patents were lifted from it (remember, we are most likely talking
about most commercial outlets in the US and nearly all electronic mail
in the future). Thus, the only reason why NIST should consider handing
over the DSA patent under these clauses is because PKP has the
industry by the throat. But this is not certain, and even if it was,
under clause (D) above, NIST should attempt to minimize its commitment
to PKP. If it is to license DSA to PKP AT ALL, it should license it
only until PKP's patents run out, not until the year 2010. And even
licensing DSA to PKP until the patents run out is unnecessary because
if NIST offered a public license of DSA, companies could simply fight
PKP's patents in the courts directly without DSA being involved.


3.3 Alternatives for NIST
-------------------------
As we have seen above, NIST's actions are at least inconsistent with
the code with respect to section (D). So, we can write to them and
complain about that specifically.

By now, you should have a pretty good feel for the situation. My
personal opinion is that NIST are simply eager to diffuse the
technology, but because they feel "blocked" by PKP, have folded to
them. Unfortunately, they seem to giving up far more than they need
to. So let's help them get their confidence back :-) by coming up with
some alternatives:

A1: ISSUE A GENERAL PUBLIC LICENSE: This would knock NIST out of it,
allowing those wishing to implement DSA to deal with PKP directly,
either through the courts, or the banks. :-) At least PKP's power
would not be increased.

A2: FIND ANOTHER STANDARD OR ENCOURAGE INFRASTRUCTURE FOR ANOTHER
STANDARD: Do we want DSA at all? Given that the NSA had a finger in
it, it's not clear how secure it is. Is it really desirable for
certain U.S. government agencies, perhaps a little out of control, to
be able to digitally prove in court that any citizen it particularly
feels like targetting has taken out a $200,000 loan which has not been
repayed? Well, of course, it's not that simple. Even so, these
technologies have a habit of being used for increasingly serious
applications and this sort of abuse is not unimaginable. In the new
commercial world, a backdoor to the DSA would be a license to print
money, without all the hassles of running a printing press.

Perhaps it is better to take a completely different approach.
Independent of licensing issues, I don't think that NIST are going to
back down from their own standard. However, they could assist the free
market along by specifying that all implementations of DSA incorporate
a general digital signature framework into which a variety of digital
signature algorithms could be inserted, including DSA.

If all manufacturers implemented this, then, at a later date it would
be easy to switch to another standard or choose one or another
standard at the supermarket till. Even if NIST gave PKP DSA, by
enforcing this "slot" openness in the implementation of DSA, it could
pave the way for the standard to be replaced in the future by a better
one (perhaps RSA!) when the PKP patents expire.


3.4 A Modern Aesops Fable
-------------------------
During times of drought a farmer noticed that his cow was looking a bit
thin so he sent his son out with the cow to find some nice green grass
to munch on so that the cow would grow fat and yield lots of milk. The
son walked the cow for miles and miles (making the cow even thinner in the
process), but couldn't find any grass (it's the Australian outback).
In the end he found a nice green paddock and set the cow grazing.

Later the son returned to the homestead:

Farmer : How'd it go son? Do we have a happy cow now?
Son    : Well sort of; I had trouble finding a grassy paddock.
Farmer : But you found one in the end didn't you?
Son    : Yes, and I put the cow in the paddock. But soon another farmer
         came running out. He said it was his paddock --- he had rented it
         for three years --- and that I couldn't graze my cow there without
         giving him some milk. It was the only green paddock there was.
Farmer : So what did you do?
Son    : I gave him the cow.


4. WHAT YOU CAN DO
==================

4.1 Many Options
----------------
If you've read this far, the extra amount of work required to print
out a letter of objection and mail it to NIST will seem trivial by
comparison! Furthermore, if you act, you may be able to secure a DSA
license for yourself from NIST before DSA is handed over to PKP.

It is important to realize that NIST are actually SOLICITING
objections. So it's not as if you are writing in cold. Regardless of
what NIST's real attitude is, the fact is that they have to receive
and collate all the objections they receive and pay some sort of
attention to them.

As we've seen above, the issues are complicated, and the sort of
response you'll want to send NIST will depend on your point of view.
I'm not going to tell you what to send to NIST. However, I am going to
make it as easy as possible to send SOMETHING to NIST by providing
handy information such as the address of the person to send to :-)
along with various form letters.

One interesting aspect of objecting is stated by NIST in their
announcement:

     >Applications for a license filed in response to this notice will be
     >treated as objections to the grant of the prospective license.

Thus, if you do no more than simply file an application for a DSA
license (to NIST before it hands it over to PKP), you will be
objecting implicitly.


4.2 To Whom To Write
--------------------
NIST states in their announcement that "Inquiries, comments, and other
materials relating to the prospective license shall be submitted to:

   Michael R. Rubin
   Active Chief Counsel for Technology
   Room A-1111, Administration Building,
   National Institute of Standards and Technology
   Gaithersburg, Maryland 20899
   Phone: +1(301) 975-2803.
   Fax: +1(301) 926-2569.

The formal deadling is the end of 08-Aug-1993. However as that is a
Sunday, Michael Rubin has stated to others that correspondence
received on Monday 09-Aug-1993 will be accepted. Furthermore, in a
telephone conversation between Michael Rubin and myself between 1:22am
and 1:24am on 04-Aug-1993 Adelaide time, he informed me that faxed
correspondence would be accepted until midnight ending Mon 09-Aug-1993
[implicitly Washington DC time]. (Sorry, I forgot to ask him his email
address - fax is probably better anyway, as I understand that faxed
signatures are accepted in law (no digital signatures in email yet
:-)).

The LPF has requested that you send a copy of your letter to them at:

   League for Programming Freedom
   1 Kendall Square #143
   P.O.Box 9171
   Cambridge, Massachusetts 02139

The League for Programming Freedom is an organization which defends
the freedom to write software, and opposes monopolies such as patented
algorithms and copyrighted languages. It advocates returning to the
former legal system under which if you write the program, you are free
to use it. Please write to the League if you want more information.
Sending copies to the League will enable them to show them to elected
officials if that is useful.


4.3 A Selection of Things To Say
--------------------------------
Here is a list of actions to give you ideas.

* Write to NIST and ask for a personal or implementors license. The
personal license will allow you to use the DSA technology in
5,231,668. The implementors license will allow you to create
for-private-use or public domain DSA implementations. You can use the
Dan Bernstein form letters in Appendix E to do this. NIST may or may
not grant the license, but at least you can try.

* Write to NIST objecting to the DSA deal on one or more of the following
grounds:

   - Various idealistic reasons such as the creation of the technology
   using public money, the assignment of the technology to a private
   company, and the involvement of the NSA in formulating the standard.

   - Because the deal "is not consistent with requirements of
     35 U.S.C. 209 and 37 CFR 404.7." More specifically

   >(C) exclusive or partially exclusive licensing is a reasonable and
   >necessary initiative to call forth the investment of risk capital and
   >expenditures to bring the invention to practical application or
   >otherwise promote the invention's utilization by the public; and

   There will be no shortage of risk capital for DSA!

   >(D) the proposed terms and scope of exclusivity are not greater than
   >reasonably necessary to provide the incentive for bringing the invention
   >to practical application or otherwise promote the invention's
   >utilization by the public.

   PKP's patents run out by 2000, but NIST is granting them DSA to 2010.

* Write to NIST and suggest that they issue a general public license.

* Write to NIST objecting, explaining the importance of DSA in future
society and urging them to (as the LPF puts it) "pursue all possible
means, judicial and legislative, to invalidate or annull the PKP
patents", and failing that "take them by eminent domain". This would
be cheaper in the long run than the current plan. (Note: I can't help
you with the details here: I don't know what eminent domain is. I
presume it's what happens when congress finds out that someone has
patented the slush fund :-)

* Send a copy of the farmer fable :-)

That's it! Over to you now!

=====================================================================

APPENDIX A: GLOSSARY
====================
DES  = Data Encryption Standard.
DSA  = Digital Signature Algorithm.
DSS  = Digital Signature Standard.
LPF  = League for Programming Freedom
NIST = National Institute of Standards and Technology.
NSA  = National Security Agency.
PKP  = Public Key Partners.
RSA  = Rivest Shamir Adelman - an important public-key cypher.

=====================================================================

APPENDIX B: NIST'S ANNOUNCEMENT
===============================

 ** The following notice was published in the Federal Register, Vol.
           58, No. 108, dated June 8, 1993 under Notices **

National Institute of Standards and Technology

Notice of Proposal for Grant of Exclusive Patent License

This is to notify the public that the National Institute of
Standards and Technology (NIST) intends to grant an exclusive
world-wide license to Public Key Partners of Sunnyvale, California
to practice the Invention embodied in U.S. Patent Application No.
07/738.431 and entitled "Digital Signature Algorithm."  A PCT
application has been filed.  The rights in the invention have been
assigned to the United States of America.

The prospective license is a cross-license which would resolve a
patent dispute with Public Key Partners and includes the right to
sublicense.  Notice of availability of this invention for licensing
was waived because it was determined that expeditious granting of
such license will best serve the interest of the Federal Government
and the public.  Public Key Partners has provided NIST with the
materials contained in Appendix A as part of their proposal to
NIST.

Inquiries, comments, and other materials relating to the prospec-
tive license shall be submitted to Michael R. Rubin, Active Chief
Counsel for Technology, Room A-1111, Administration Building,
National Institute of Standards and Technology, Gaithersburg,
Maryland 20899.  His telephone number is (301) 975-2803.  Applica-
tions for a license filed in response to this notice will be
treated as objections to the grant of the prospective license.
Only written comments and/or applications for a license which are
received by NIST within sixty (60) days for the publication of this
notice will be considered.

The prospective license will be granted unless, within sixty (60)
days of this notice, NIST receives written evidence and argument
which established that the grant of the license would not be
consistent with the requirements of 35 U.S.C. 209 and 37 CFR 404.7.

  Dated:  June 2, 1993.

Raymond G. Kammer
Acting Director, National Institute Standards and Technology.

Appendix "A"

The National Institute for Standards and Technology ("NIST") has
announced its intention to grant Public Key Partners ("PKP")
sublicensing rights to NIST's pending patent application on the
Digital Signature Algorithm ("DSA").

Subject to NIST's grant of this license, PKP is pleased to declare
its support for the proposed Federal Information Processing
Standard for Digital Signatures (the "DSS") and the pending
availability of licenses to practice the DSA.  In addition to the
DSA, licenses to practice digital signatures will be offered by PKP
under the following patents:

          Cryptographic Apparatus and Method ("Diffie-Hellman")
                No. 4,200,770
          Public Key Cryptographic Apparatus and Method
                ("Hellman-Merkle")   No. 4,315,552
          Exponential Cryptographic Apparatus and Method
                ("Hellman-Pohlig")   No. 4,434,414
          Method For Identifying Subscribers And For Generating
                And Verifying Electronic Signatures In A Data Exchange
                System ("Schnorr")   No. 4,995,082

It is PKP's intent to make practice of the DSA royalty free for
personal, noncommercial and U.S. Federal, state and local
government use.  As explained below, only those parties who enjoy
commercial benefit from making or selling products, or certifying
digital signatures, will be required to pay royalties to practice
the DSA.

PKP will also grant a license to practice key management, at no
additional fee, for the integrated circuits which will implement
both the DSA and the anticipated Federal Information Processing
Standard for the "key escrow" system announced by President Clinton
on April 16, 1993.

Having stated these intentions, PKP now takes this opportunity to
publish its guidelines for granting uniform licenses to all parties
having a commercial interest in practicing this technology:

First, no party will be denied a license for any reason other that
the following:

          (i)    Failure to meet its payment obligations,
          (ii)   Outstanding claims of infringement, or
          (iii)  Previous termination due to material breach.

Second, licenses will be granted for any embodiment sold by the
licensee or made for its use, whether for final products software,
or components such as integrated circuits and boards, and regard-
less of the licensee's channel of distribution.  Provided the
requisite royalties have been paid by the seller on the enabling
component(s), no further royalties will be owned by the buyer for
making or selling the final product which incorporates such
components.

Third, the practice of digital signatures in accordance with the
DSA may be licensed separately from any other technical art covered
by PKP's patents.

Fourth, PKP's royalty rates for the right to make or sell products,
subject to uniform minimum fees, will be no more than 2 1/2% for
hardware products and 5% for software, with the royalty rate
further declining to 1% on any portion of the product price
exceeding $1,000.  These royalty rates apply only to noninfringing
parties and will be uniform without regard to whether the licensed
product creates digital signatures, verifies digital signatures or
performs both.

Fifth, for the next three (3) years, all commercial services which
certify a signature's authenticity for a fee may be operated
royalty free.  Thereafter, all providers of such commercial
certification services shall pay a royalty to PKP of $1.00 per
certificate for each year the certificate is valid.

Sixth, provided the foregoing royalties are paid on such products
or services, all other practice of the DSA shall be royalty free.

Seventh, PKP invites all of its existing licensees, at their
option, to exchange their current licenses for the standard license
offered for DSA.

Finally, PKP will mediate the concerns of any party regarding the
availability of PKP's licenses for the DSA with designated
representatives of NIST and PKP.  For copies of PKP's license
terms, contact Michael R. Rubin, Acting Chief Counsel for Technolo-
gy, NIST, or Public Key Partners.

  Dated:  June 2, 1993.

Robert B. Fougner, Esq.,
Director of Licensing, Public Key Partners,
310 North Mary Avenue, Sunnyvale, CA  94033

[FR Doc. 93-13473 Filed 8-7-93; 8:45 am]

=====================================================================

APPENDIX C: UNITED STATES CODE (U.S.C.) TITLE 35 - PATENTS SECTION 209
======================================================================

Note: 37 CFR 404.7. is basically the following repeated over a few
times with some irrelevant bits added.

S 209. Restrictions on licensing of federally owned inventions
--------------------------------------------------------------
(a) No Federal agency shall grant any license under a patent or patent
application on a federally owned invention unless the person requesting
the license has supplied the agency with a plan for development and/or
marketing of the invention, except that any such plan may be treated
by the Federal agency as a commercial and financial information obtained
from a person and privileded and confidential and not subject to disclosure
under section 552 of title 5 of the United States Code.

(b)  A Federal agency shall normally grant the right to use or sell any
federally owned invention in the United States only to a licensee that
agrees that any products embodying the invention and produced through
the use of the invention will be manufactured substantially in the United
States.

(c)

(1) Each Federal agency may grant exclusive or partially
exclusive licenses in any invention covered by a federally owned domestic
patent or patent application only if, after public notice and opportunity
for filing written objections, it is determined that ---

   (A) the interests of the Federal Government and the public will
   best be served by the proposed license, in view of the applicant's
   intentions, plans, and ability to bring the invention to practical
   application or otherwise promote the invention's utilization by
   the public;

   (B) the desired practical application has not been achieved, or is not
   likely expeditiously to be achieved, under any non-exclusive license
   which has been granted, or which may be granted, on the invention;

   (C) exclusive or partially exclusive licensing is a reasonable and
   necessary initiative to call forth the investment of risk capital and
   expenditures to bring the invention to practical application or
   otherwise promote the invention's utilization by the public; and

   (D) the proposed terms and scope of exclusivity are not greater than
   reasonably necessary to provide the incentive for bringing the invention
   to practical application or otherwise promote the invention's
   utilization by the public.

(2) A Federal agency shall not grant such exclusive or partially exclusive
license under paragraph (1) of this subsection if it determines that the grant
of such license will tend substantially to lessen competition or result in
undue concentration in any section of the country in any line of commerce
to which the technology to be licensed relates, or to create or maintain
other situations inconsistent with the antitrust laws.

(3) First preference in the exclusive or partially exclusive licensing of
federally owned inventions shall go to small business firms submitting
plans that are determined by the agency to be within the capabilities of
the firm and equally likely, if executed, to bring the invention to
practical application as any plans submitted by applicants that are not
small business firms.

<<<<Note: The rest of the clauses are mainly administrative dealing with
foreign patents and record keeping. There are clauses that enable the
government to terminate the license if the licensees misbehave. In particular,
the final clause (given below) is rather interesting.>>>>

(f)...(4) the right of the Federal agency to terminate the license
in whole or in part if the agency determines that such action is
necessary to meet requirements for public use specified by Federal
regulations issued after the date of the license and such requirements
are not reasonably satisfied by the licensee.

=====================================================================

APPENDIX D: 37 CFR 404.8 (Checklist for License Application)
============================================================

37 CFR 404.8 gives a checklist of the things you have to do to apply
for a license.

S 404.8 Application for a License
---------------------------------
An application for a license should be addressed to the Federal agency
having custody of the invention and should normally include:

(a) Identification of the invention for which the license is desired
including the patent application, serial number or patent number,
title, and date, if known;

(b) Identification of the type of license for which the application is
submitted.

(c) Name and address of the person, company, or organization applying
for the license and the citizenship or place of incorporation of the
applicant;

(d) Name, address, and telephone number of the representative of the
applicant to whom correspondence should be sent;

(e) Nature and type of the applicant's business, identifying products
and services which the applicant has successfully commercialized;
and approximate number of the applicant's employees;

(f) Source of information concerning the availability of a
license on the invention.

(g) A statement indicating whether the applicant is a small business
firm as defined in S404.3(c)

    [S404.3 (c) SMALL BUSINESS FIRM means a small business concern as
    defined in section 2 of Pub. L. 85-536 (U.S.C.632) and implementing
    regulations of the Administrator of the Small Business Administration.]

(h) A detailed description of applicant's plans for developing or
marketing the invention, or both, which should include:

   (1) A statement of the time, nature and amount of anticiapted investment
   capital and other resources which applicant believes will be required to
   bring the invention to practical application;

   (2) A statement as to the applicant's capability and intention to fulfill
   the plan, including information refarding manufacturing, marketing,
   financial and technical resources;

   (3) A statement of the fields of use for which applicant intends to
   practice the invention; and

   (4) A statement of the geographic areas in which applicant intents to
   manufacture any products embodying the invention and geographic areas
   where applicant intents to use or sell the invention, or both;

(i) Identification of licenses previously granted to applicant under
federally owned inventions;

(j) A statement containing applicant's best knowledge of the extent to
which the invention is being practiced by private industry or Government,
or both, or is otherwise available commercially; and

(k) Any other information which applicant believes will support a
determination to grant the license to the applicant.


=====================================================================

APPENDIX E: DAN BERNSTEIN'S POSTING AND FORM LETTER
===================================================

The following is a recent posting to sci.crypt by Dan Bernstein. It
provides two form letter that can be used to apply for a DSA license.
The first letter requests a personal license. The second requests an
implementer's license. Dan's letters seems to provide all the
information required by some sort of US code. I don't know which one
though. Certainly the information provided seems very similar to that
specified in 37 CFR 404.8 (see Appendix D).

Path: news.adelaide.edu.au!yoyo.aarnet.edu.au!fang.dsto.gov.au!foxhound.dsto.gov.au!
munnari.oz.au!news.Hawaii.Edu!ames!agate!ucbvax!silverton.berkeley.edu!djb
From: djb@silverton.berkeley.edu (D. J. Bernstein)
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
Subject: You want to use DSA? Apply for a personal license from NIST!
Message-ID: <13176.Jul2706.22.0393@silverton.berkeley.edu>
Date: 27 Jul 93 06:22:03 GMT
Organization: IR
Lines: 103

NIST plans to give Public Key Partners exclusive rights to the Digital
Signature Algorithm. Do you want to guarantee your own rights to this
technology? You can! It's free, if you can spare a stamp.

Attached is a form letter you can send to NIST to apply for a personal
license. Put in your own name, address, country, and the right date;
print it out; read through to check it over; sign it; and drop it in the
mail. You don't have to get everything right the first time---NIST will
contact you if they need more information to make a decision. And, as a
bonus, your application will automatically count as an objection to the
NIST-PKP deal!

I believe that NIST must receive your application by next Friday, the
6th of August, but the due date might be earlier. You might want to
check immediately with Michael Rubin at 301-975-2803. If necessary you
can fax your letter to him.

---Dan


                                [address]
                                [date]

Michael R. Rubin
Acting Chief Counsel for Technology
Room A-1111
Administration Building
National Institute of Standards and Technology
Gaithersburg, MD 20899

Dear Mr. Rubin:

I hereby apply for a personal license to use the Digital Signature
Algorithm.

1. Title of invention: Digital Signature Algorithm (DSA).

2. Patent Application Serial Number: 07/738.431.

3. United States Patent Number: To be issued as 5,231,668, I believe.

4. Source of information concerning availability of a license: Various
sources, including your Federal Register notice.

5. Name and address of applicant: [name], [address, phone, etc.].

6. Applicant's representative: not applicable.

7. I am a [country] citizen.

8. Approximate number of persons employed: not applicable.

9. I am not a small business firm.

10. Purpose: I would like a personal license allowing me to implement
and use DSA. See #12.

11. Business and commercialization: not applicable; see #10.

12. Plans: I plan to use DSA to attach digital signatures to a variety
of electronic documents, primarily for authentication. I plan to use DSA
implementations, initially in software but perhaps later in hardware,
from a variety of potential future sources. Investments: I may spend
many hours programming a DSA implementation.

13. Fields of commercialization: not applicable; see #10.

14. I am not willing to accept a license for less than all fields of use
of DSA.

15. I intend to implement and use DSA only in [country].

16. Type of license: I would like a non-exclusive license which does not
require royalty payments.

17. I have never been granted a license to a federally owned invention.

18. Known uses of DSA by industry or government: I have heard that ISC
sells a product called dsaSIGN, and that Bellcore has implemented DSA.

19. Other information: I understand that NIST may grant an exclusive
DSA license to PKP, and that this license application will be treated as
an objection to the PKP license.

Please note that PKP has stated its intent to make DSA free for personal
use. Therefore, if NIST grants PKP a license and PKP acts according to
its stated intent, there is no harm to anyone if I am granted this
personal license. However, I do not trust PKP to act according to its
stated intent, and I do not want to have to apply for a license from PKP
even if it is royalty-free. So I ask that you grant me a license
directly.

Thank you for your kind attention. Please let me know if you need more
information.

                                Sincerely,



                                [name]


Path: news.adelaide.edu.au!yoyo.aarnet.edu.au!fang.dsto.gov.au!foxhound.dsto.gov.au!
munnari.oz.au!news.Hawaii.Edu!ames!agate!ucbvax!silverton.berkeley.edu!djb
From: djb@silverton.berkeley.edu (D. J. Bernstein)
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
Subject: You want to publish your dsa.c? Apply for a license from NIST!
Message-ID: <13238.Jul2706.22.3993@silverton.berkeley.edu>
Date: 27 Jul 93 06:22:39 GMT
Organization: IR
Lines: 101

NIST plans to give Public Key Partners exclusive rights to the Digital
Signature Algorithm. Do you have a free DSA implementation, or have you
been thinking of writing one for the benefit of the net community? Do
you want to guarantee your users the rights to this technology? You can!
It's free, if you can spare a stamp.

This is another form letter---just like the personal license application
exhibited in my previous message. You should make sure to apply for a
personal license. Once you've done that, follow the same instructions
for the implementor's license. Once again, as a bonus, your application
will automatically count as an objection to the NIST-PKP deal!

I believe that NIST must receive your application by next Friday, the
6th of August, but the due date might be earlier. You might want to
check immediately with Michael Rubin at 301-975-2803. If necessary you
can fax your letter to him.

---Dan


                                [address]
                                [date]

Michael R. Rubin
Acting Chief Counsel for Technology
Room A-1111
Administration Building
National Institute of Standards and Technology
Gaithersburg, MD 20899

Dear Mr. Rubin:

I hereby apply for an implementor's license permitting me to sublicense
the use of the Digital Signature Algorithm.

1. Title of invention: Digital Signature Algorithm (DSA).

2. Patent Application Serial Number: 07/738.431.

3. United States Patent Number: To be issued as 5,231,668, I believe.

4. Source of information concerning availability of a license: Various
sources, including your Federal Register notice.

5. Name and address of applicant: [name], [address, phone, etc.].

6. Applicant's representative: not applicable.

7. I am a [country] citizen.

8. Approximate number of persons employed: not applicable.

9. I am not a small business firm.

10. Purpose: I would like a license allowing me to let others freely
use my implementation of DSA, i.e., allowing me to sublicense the use of
DSA at no cost. See #12.

11. Business and commercialization: not applicable; see #10.

12. Plans: I plan to create a source-code implementation of DSA in
software, using computer resources which are already available to me.
I plan to give this implementation to anyone who asks, and perhaps to
publish this implementation via electronic or non-electronic means, for
study and use by the academic and non-academic communities. I hope to
have people hear about this implementation by a variety of means,
including word of mouth.

13. Fields of commercialization: not applicable; see #10.

14. I am not willing to accept a license for less than all fields of use
of DSA.

15. I intend to implement DSA in [country].

16. Type of license: I would like a non-exclusive license which does not
require royalty payments.

17. I have never been granted a license to a federally owned invention.

18. Known uses of DSA by industry or government: I have heard that ISC
sells a product called dsaSIGN, and that Bellcore has implemented DSA.

19. Other information: I understand that NIST may grant an exclusive
DSA license to PKP, and that this license application will be treated as
an objection to the PKP license.

Let me emphasize that this is not a commercial license application. I do
not intend to collect any fees for the use of this implementation.

Thank you for your kind attention. Please let me know if you need more
information.

                                Sincerely,



                                [name]

=====================================================================

APPENDIX F: THE LPF ANNOUNCEMENT
================================




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Date: Thu, 5 Aug 93 20:48:39 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: (fwd) Re: Will SKIPJACK's algorithm get out? (Non-technical)
Message-ID: <9308060347.AA16297@netcom5.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Here's a posting I did on how Skipjack (which I deliberately called
"Clipjack") can be likely broken by groups like ours. The anonymous
remailers, and the alt.whistleblowing group, can be used to publish
details of the whole Skipjack/Capstone/Mykotronx/MYK-78/etc. ball of
wax as they become available.

Whether we can actually be the ones to analyze the chips or not is
immaterial: spreading reports that Clipjack is vulnerable will be
useful disinformation (reduced confidence, fewer commercial sales,
more acceptance of more provably strong software-based alternatives,
etc.)

-Tim


Newsgroups: sci.crypt,alt.privacy.clipper
From: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Subject: Re: Will SKIPJACK's algorithm get out? (Non-technical)
Message-ID: <tcmayCBBJCr.BsK@netcom.com>
Date: Fri, 6 Aug 1993 03:36:27 GMT


Larry Loen (lwloen@rchland.vnet.ibm.com) wrote:

: Myself, I confidently expect to see Skipjack published in some Eurocrypt
: proceedings or other in the next 4 or 5 years, especially if the darn thing
: is actually produced in any volumes.  There is a decidely
: different attitude in W. Europe towards this sort of thing.

: It's mostly a question of economics.  Will someone, somewhere put out the
: bucks to do a "tear down" of the chip and figure out how it works.  I could
: imagine some crypto company in Europe doing just that and being also motivated
: to publish what they find for competitive reasons. . . 

Some of us plan to do just this: once "Clipjack" phones are finalized
and on sale and/or Mykotronx is selling finalized chips, they'll be
looked at.

I once ran Intel's electron-beam testing lab, so I have some
familiarity with looking at chips, including ostensibly
tamper-resistant modules. VLSI Technology is fabbing the chips, using
a process said to be quite tamper-resistant. We'll see. (While
publishing the algorithm may or may not be illegal, there's no
reasonable law saying you can't look at something, unless perhaps it's
formally classified....will the Clipjack chips have "Top Secret"
stamped on them? Somehow I can't quite picture this in phones sold
across the country and outside!)

(I'm not saying it'll be easy to do this reverse-engineering, mind
you.  Between mechanical barriers to access (carbide-like particles in
the packaging compound to deter grinding), complex-chemistry epoxies
to deter plasma- and chemical-decapping, various chip-level
countermeasures (storing bits on floating gates, using multiple layers
of metal, etc.), the access to the die surface may be very difficult.
The "smartcard" chip makers have led the way in devising
tamper-resistant chip processes, though their task is quite a bit
easier (stopping access to an active chip on an active smartcard, to
modify the money amounts) than Clipjack faces (stopping any
examination of the chip topology and programming which would reveal
the algorithms used) 

But given enough samples, enough time, and some
commitment, the secrets of Clipjack will fall.)

As a "Cypherpunk" (cf. cover of "Wired" #2, "Whole Earth Review" Summer '93,
and the current (8-2-93) "Village Voice" cover story), I see no reason
not to publish the details. This'll let other folks build phones and other
comm systems which spoof or defeat the Clipjack system, especially the
disgusting and thoroughly un-American "key escrow" system.

Naturally, we'll use our "anonymous remailers" (multiple reroutings of
messages, with each node decrypting with its key and passing on what's
left to the next chosen node....diffusion and confusion, a la Chaum's
1981 "CACM" paper on "digital mixes") to protect ourselves. No sense
taking chances that the Feds will view our "liberation" efforts with
disfavor and hit us with charges they devise (violations of Munitions
Act, RICO, sedition, etc.). This is how some of our members were able
to "liberate" secret Mykotoxin documents from the dumpsters of
Mykotoxin (something the Supremes have said is OK for law enforcement
to do, by the way) and post them anonymously to our mailing list (I
believe these docs were then posted to alt.whistleblowers, but they were
only _mentioned_ on sci.crypt, not actually posted).

I expect at least _three_ separate groups are preparing to break the
Clipjack algorithm, at least as embodied in the Clipper/Skipjack chips
that come on the market.

Breaking the system also allows independent observers to see if it
does in fact contain deliberate weaknesses (though the focus on
"weaknesses" is secondary to the basic issue of "key escrow" as a
concept--it is key escrow, especially mandatory key escrow, that is
the real issue. (Mandatory key escrow is not yet part of law, to be
fair, but still "in the wind"...we won't really know for a few more
years whether the "voluntary" key escrow system will become mandatory)

It'll also be interesting to see how Clipjack phone customers react to
the revelations of the algorithms.

Crypto anarchy means never having to say you're sorry.


Yours in the struggle, 

-Tim May
-- 
..........................................................................
Timothy C. May         | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,  
tcmay@netcom.com       | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
408-688-5409           | knowledge, reputations, information markets, 
W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA  | black markets, collapse of governments.
Higher Power: 2^756839 | Public Key: PGP and MailSafe available.
Note: I put time and money into writing this posting. I hope you enjoy it.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: fergp@sytex.com (Paul Ferguson)
Date: Thu, 5 Aug 93 21:18:40 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: IRS flunkies browsing your tax records (Surprise!)
Message-ID: <9cau8B1w165w@sytex.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


excerpted from:
 
The Washington Post
5 August 1993
page A6
 
Accused of Failing to Protect Data, IRS Says It Will Buttress
Safeguards
 
by Stephen Barr
Washington Post Staff Writer
 
 
The Internal revenue Service, assailed by senators yesterday over
a breakdown in computer security that allowed IRS workers to
browse through tax records and monitor fraudulent tax refunds,
pledged to strengthen safeguards set up to ensure taxpayer
records are kept confidential.
 
"it's not easy. it's painful to admit mistakes you make,"
Internal revenue Commissioner Margaret Milner Richardson said
after listening to members of the Senate Governmental Affairs
Committee express outrage that IRS workers abused their public
trust.
 
Addressing committee Chairman John Glenn (D-Ohio), Richardson
said,"I feel very strongly about protecting the integrity of the
tax system, and I told you we will not tolerate anything that
will impinge on that integrity or the credibility of the American
people."
 
But Richardson rebuffed a suggestion by Sen. David Pryor (D-Ark.)
that the IRS notify the taxpayers whose files were improperly
reviewed. "I'm not sure there would be a serious value to that in
terms of tax administration or in the connection with what I see
as protecting the taxpayer's rights," she said.
 
Pryor said he would continue to press for taxpayer notification,
saying, "I'm going to really come down hard.... I think anyone
that we can identify whose files have been browsed for no
official reason, I think that taxpayer needs to know."
 
Richardson's testimony followed the release of a report this week
that showed almost 370 IRS employees in the agency's Southeast
Region have been investigated or disciplined for creating
fraudulent tax returns or browsing through tax returns of
friends, relatives, neighbors and celebrities.
 
In 154 cases, employees were disciplined. Deputy Commissioner
Michael P. Dolan said three employees were forced to resign,
three were fired, 38 received suspensions, 67 were given
reprimands, 24 were admonished, 17 underwent counseling and two
received "caution letters."
 
Sen. Byron L. Dorgan (D-N.D.), noting that few employees were
dismissed, questioned Richardson and Dolan on whether "we are
dealing appropriately enough" with violators. They said the IRS
would provide the committee with detailed information on how
disciplinary judgements were made.
 
Few details emerged at the hearing on how IRS regional employees
created bogus refunds. An IRS investigative report released by
the committee said that four employees are facing criminal
prosecution.
 
"In one case," the IRS report said, "an employee prepared over
200 fraudulent tax returns and monitored the refunds" on IRS
computers. The report suggested that the fake refunds cost the
government more than $300,000.
 
In another case, "the employee used her position to input
fraudulent adjustments and monitor the accounts of local
taxpayers. She also prepared fraudulent returns, including
returns for herself and her parents," the IRS report said.
 
Dolan noted that the violations ranged from the serious to the
benign, such as employees who were asked by neighbors for a
favor: determine the status of their income tax refund.
 
In answering questions, Richardson pointed out that IRS's
internal audit staff had uncovered the information with the
General Accounting Office. The IRS audit examined the Integrated
Data Retrieval System, a database of taxpayer accounts used by
56,000 IRS workers nationwide.
 
Richardson said the IRS is developing a "comprehensive review" of
computer security issues that will improve the agency's ability
to detect "inappropriate use."
 
The IRS also is reviewing its high-risk operations, such as
credit transfers amd taxpayer adjustments, in a renewed effort tp
avert employee misconduct. Dolan said a review of the agency's
most sensitive computer commands would be completed within the
next six weeks.
 
Richardson was a washington tax attorney before being selected
earlier this year by President Clinton to run the IRS. Dolan, a
career civil servant, was named deputy commissioner last year.
 
8<--------- End article -------------------
 
 
A old friend of mine sent me an e-mail this afternoon; it appears
we see eye-to-eye on this entire fiasco -- and the dangerous role
the government wants to play in the Information Age:
 
8<--------- forwarded message --------------
 
Subject: Clipper, escrows, and honesty. . .
To: "fergp" <sytex.com!fergp>
 
Saw your recent posting on SCI.CRYPT.  I generally shun public postings 
in such an arena. . . .
 
However, it occurred to me, with only a little bit of thought, that after
the recent articles in the Washington Post regarding the employee's of
the IRS browsing through friends, enemies, and famous folk's 1040's --
simply for kicks -- how would this be any different than an escrow key
arrangment.
 
Isn't it simply a given truth that if one man can view a personal secret
of another, that he will be tempted?  And let's face it, history proves
that, more often than not, the "apple is bitten," ---- or at least 
"nibbled."  No matter how you work it, there will always be a small 
group,
perhaps even one, that will have access to your key.  Just like that 
little
girl that sits behind the faceless terminal can pull up my 1040 and run
through the schedules to see what I won on and what I lost ---- and I'll
never know that it even happened.  Of course, until someone who shouldn't
know does know, and perhaps at a cocktail party makes mention. . . . . 
 
Small potatoes. . . .   but not if you're encrypting..
 
8<---------- end forwarded mail -----------
 
 
Once again -- "Be afraid; be very afraid."
 

Paul Ferguson               |  "Government, even in its best state,
Network Integrator          |   is but a necessary evil; in its worst
Centreville, Virginia USA   |   state, an intolerable one."
fergp@sytex.com             |      - Thomas Paine, Common Sense
 
         I love my country, but I fear its government.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: jet@netcom.com (J. Eric Townsend)
Date: Thu, 5 Aug 93 15:38:39 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Offshore Data Havens and Services
In-Reply-To: <9308050656.AA12955@netcom5.netcom.com>
Message-ID: <9308052236.AA17974@netcom5.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Timothy C. May writes:
 > Short of barring international phone calls, the Feds can do nothing! I
 > love it!

Actually, the Feds can do anything they want.  Theyve taking to
raiding off-short pirate radio statons in international waters, there
was that bit with Noriega, etc etc.   Reagan set a standard by
completely ignore the world court.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: gnu (John Gilmore)
Date: Thu, 5 Aug 93 23:28:40 PDT
To: interesting-people@eff.org
Subject: My personal objection to NIST's DSS exclusive licensing proposal
Message-ID: <9308060627.AA19182@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


[I encourage you to file objections too.  They don't have to be eight
 pages long!  One page will do.]

John Gilmore
PO Box 170608
San Francisco, California, USA  94117

August 5, 1993


Michael R. Rubin
Active Chief Counsel for Technology
Room A-1111, Administration Building,
National Institute of Standards and Technology
Gaithersburg, Maryland 20899
Phone: +1(301) 975-2803.
Fax: +1(301) 926-2569.


Dear Sir:

I am writing to provide written evidence and argument that the grant of
your prospective license for the Digital Signature Algorithm (DSA) to
Public Key Partners (PKP) would not be consistent with the requirements
of 35 U.S.C. 209 and 37 CFR 404.7.  I am also applying for a personal,
non-exclusive, sublicensable, and transferable license for the DSA.

I propose that instead of granting a license to PKP, the Government:

        Put its DSA technology into the public domain, and

        Standardize RSA as a digital signature algorithm.

In particular, the NIST proposal must meet the following criteria from
35 U.S.C. 209 (c)(1):

   (A) the interests of the Federal Government and the public will
   best be served by the proposed license, in view of the applicant's
   intentions, plans, and ability to bring the invention to practical
   application or otherwise promote the invention's utilization by
   the public;

I argue that interests of the Federal Government and the public
will best be served by my proposed approach to the problem.

The RSA cryptosystem was strongly considered as a digital signature
standard by NIST, and was reportedly rejected for two reasons:

	(1)  RSA is patented, while NIST wanted a royalty-free algorithm.

	(2)  The National Security Agency objected to the standardization
	     of RSA, for reasons it did not specify.

The first objection is interesting; both DSA and RSA are now controlled
by patents, and both would require royalty payments by users in the
United States.  However, the RSA patents only apply in the United
States, so that the public (which includes all people on the Earth)
will be better served by standardizing on the algorithm that is
available for royalty-free use in other countries.  Also, the RSA
patent is royalty-free to the government, because it was invented with
government grants.  The patents which control the DSA are in force
worldwide, and the government does not have free use of the algorithm.
This gives a clear edge to the RSA algorithm.

Also, the patents controlling RSA will expire at least ten years
earlier than the DSA patent (if issued) and more than seven years
before the Schnorr patent which controls use of DSA.  In particular,
the RSA patent will expire on September 20, 2000, and all other patents
which control the use of RSA expire in 1997.  The Schnorr patent
expires on February 19, 2008, and the DSA patent would expire seventeen
years after it is issued, which has not occurred yet.

The traditional model of market acceptance of technology begins with a
long slow climb, requiring years, and only peaks after this momentum has
built up the proper infrastructure to support the technology.  At the
peak, many millions of people use the technology (in some cases, almost
everyone in society).  Digital signature technology has followed this
model, and is widely expected to reach millions of people within the
next five to ten years.

This is important for two reasons:

	(a)  RSA's patent will expire before or near the point when
	     this technology enters the "mass market" of millions of
	     users.  This will benefit the public by reducing the cost
	     of deploying the technology to these users.  The size of
	     the market clearly provides an economic incentive
	     sufficient to cause its deployment even in the absence of
	     exclusive licensing.

	(b)  RSA digital signature technology has already been climbing
	     the curve for many years.  Standardizing on it will produce
	     quicker deployment of digital signature technology.

PKP is already licensing the RSA technology on terms similar to the
proposed DSA terms, and has promised non-discriminatory licensing if
RSA is standardized by NIST.

As for the second problem with standardizing on RSA, the objection
of the National Security Agency, there are two possible reasons:

	(a)  NSA does not want to see a digital signature technology
	     standardized if it would also allow data encryption, 
	     because that could make interception of intelligence
	     data harder.

This objection is completely specious.  NSA does not have a valid role
in setting domestic policy.  It is a secret agency, not accountable to
the public, and explicitly prohibited by statute from operating in the
United States or against United States citizens.  Its advice to NIST
under the Computer Security Act is restricted to be of a technical
nature, not straying onto questions of policy.  NIST is required to
give full weight to the interests of the public when deliberating on
standards.  Secret agencies whose policies oppose the public interest
have no weight in NIST's standardization process.

In fact, the standardization of identical technology for digital
signatures and for key exchange and other data encryption uses would be
a *good* decision.  This technology has already been implemented in
Lotus Notes and Privacy Enhanced Mail, and is well proven to be
acceptable to users, implementable by manufacturers, and without fault
as regards domestic encryption policy.  Tens of thousands of copies
of these products are in daily use without any impact on domestic
tranquility.

	(b)  NSA knows of a technical reason why RSA is not suitable.

In this scenario, NSA has learned how to "break" RSA, either by 
factoring large composites, or by some other method.  The proper
response of the Government, in that case, is to publicize this
fact, in order to protect domestic communications.  Because if
NSA knows it, it's likely that opposing intelligence agencies also
know how to break RSA.  The United States is the most computerized
society, the most networked, the most communicative.  We have the
most to lose by having unsecured communications that we believe are
secure.

In addition, it's likely that the revelation of the NSA method of
breaking RSA would result in substantial progress in mathematics
in other areas besides cryptography, providing further benefit to the
public.


Further reasons to standardize RSA rather than DSA:  The strengths and
weaknesses of the RSA algorithm are better understood by the technical
community.  More than ten years of research has gone into understanding
and implementing it.  The DSA has had much less research and thought
brought to bear on it.

A prominent cryptographer, Gustavus Simmons, alleges that the DSA
contains flaws which permit small amounts of secret information to be
conveyed in its digital signatures.  These flaws, which appear to have
been deliberately designed in, would permit the signing party to send
information to recipients of the signature, without the affected party
having any way to determine this.  For example, if a Government agency
provided a digital signature on a passport, it could secretly
communicate messages such as "this person should be searched at every
border crossing" or "this person is suspected of anti-American
leanings".  Such unproved `information' would not be tolerated by the
public if communicated on the face of the passport, but using the DSA,
an unscrupulous agency could use such suspicions to harass citizens
in the free exercise of their rights.

All of the above information should convince NIST that standardizing
the RSA technology and freeing the DSA technology would best serve the
interest of the Federal Government and the public, rather than granting
an exclusive license for the DSA technology to PKP.


The NIST proposal must also meet the following criterion from
35 U.S.C. 209 (c)(1):

   (B) the desired practical application has not been achieved, or is not
   likely expeditiously to be achieved, under any non-exclusive license
   which has been granted, or which may be granted, on the invention;

NIST's own experience with the Data Encryption Standard (DES) makes it
clear that releasing an encryption system for public use, without
assignment of exclusive rights to any organization, produces widespread
use within a short period of time.  The DES is clearly the premier
private-key encryption system in the country and in the world today.
It is used in every Automatic Teller Machine, in every bank, as well as
on the Fedwire interbank network.  A derivative algorithm is used in
the Unix password security system, which runs on more than a million
computers in daily use.  It is used in electronic mail privacy systems,
including Lotus Notes and the Privacy Enhanced Mail system for the
Internet.  It was used in secure telephones built by AT&T -- and in
fact the deployment there was too rapid for government comfort (the
FBI, NIST and NSA ended up rushing the Clipper/Skipjack program into
the public eye to prevent further deployment of telephones using this
algorithm.)  Whenever private-key encryption is used, DES is likely to
be there.  DES products are available worldwide from a large number of
chip, board, peripheral, system, and software vendors, providing data
rates ranging from very slow to a gigabit per second.

It is clear that the non-exclusive licensing of DES, as well as its
technical capability, was directly responsible for its widespread
adoption and use.  Had it been exclusively licensed, say to IBM, its
originator, it would not have enjoyed the wide use it has received.
IBM has built DES into products, but they did not sell well and capture
the market.  It was the innovative uses pioneered by others, who were
free to build on IBM's and NIST's standard without negotiations or
royalties, who produced the machines and software which has since
served large numbers of government users and the public.

The United States has a collection of programmers and cryptographers,
numbering in the hundreds, who have made significant contributions to
the development and deployment of cryptographic algorithms throughout
society.  I have seen at least ten different software implementations
of DES, freely available to everyone who wants them, including full
source code and commentary.  Each of these implementers was able to
study and build upon the work of the others, resulting in gradual
improvement of the speed and robustness of the implementations.  The
algorithm has been embedded into freely available software for
electronic mail (TIS-PEM and early PGP versions), computer network
security (Kerberos), clock synchronization (NTP), and networked voice
communications (VAT), just to name a few.  (Most of the work involved
in building these products was the software and infrastructure that was
built up AROUND the DES, by the way.)  If and when the DSA technology
is released for free use by the public, the same community will produce
widely available programs that employ it.

PKP may argue that the same development would occur, under its grant of
free noncommercial DSA licenses, but the point is that this
developement would occur WITHOUT granting an exclusive license to PKP.
And if this is true, then by statute, NIST cannot grant an exclusive
license.

PKP may also argue that its ownership of the Schnorr patent would
prevent the development of noncommercial DSA products, unless it was
granted an exclusive license in return for allowing noncommercial use
of the Schnorr and DSA patents.  However, the record clearly shows that
even when a technology is patented (RSA, or Lempel-Ziv compression) and
when the patent owner does not have a policy of permitting
noncommercial use, the free software community will still produce
widely used programs (PGP and Compress) which produce great benefit for
the public and for the government.  These programs can be used
immediately by those willing to challenge the patent, or to whom the patent
does not apply, and can be used by everyone after the patent expires,
or if the patent owner's policy changes.

Furthermore, Public Key Partners is in the position of having paid a
lot of money for the Schnorr patent.  If the government doesn't
standardize DSA, and doesn't give PKP an exclusive DSA patent, then PKP
will have to CONVINCE people to use their expensive patent.  The
traditional way to do so is by licensing it cheaply and widely.  If
people end up wanting to use DSA even though it has not been
standardized, it's likely that a license for the Schnorr patent that
controls it will be available at a similar price to what PKP proposed
under the exclusive licensing scheme.  PKP has already granted
no-cost noncommercial licenses to other patents that it holds,
including the RSA patent, so it is certainly conceivable that it
would come to grant similar licenses for the Schnorr patent, for
the same reasons.

35 USC 209 (c)(1)(C) requires that exclusive or partially exclusive
licensing is "reasonable and necessary" to call forth capital to deploy
the invention.  The above discussion, particularly the DES evidence,
has shown that this condition does not hold.

35 USC 209 (c)(1)(D) requires that the proposed terms and scope of
exclusivity are not greater than reasonably necessary to bring the
invention to practical application.  The scope proposed by NIST is
exclusive to a single company for seventeen years.  My proposal is
partially exclusive to the same company for seven years, then would
eliminate the exclusivity completely.  The company has promised similar
terms for the licensing of the RSA patent, for that seven year period,
so the terms of the NIST proposal and my proposal are similar, though
the scope of exclusivity in mine is shorter.  My proposal continues to
provide the incentive for bringing the invention to practical
application, so condition (D) does not hold either.

The conditions in 35 USC 209 (c)(1) are joined with "and" and prefaced
with "only if"; failure to meet any one of the conditions denies the
agency the ability to issue an exclusive or partially exclusive
license.  All four conditions have failed to be met in this case, so
for NIST to grant an exclusive license to PKP would be unlawful.  The
public interest in this technology is substantial, and it is unlikely
that NIST would escape without being sued if it attempted to grant the
exclusive license anyway.  I myself contract for the full time of a
lawyer, who is currently engaged in suing the Federal Government for
its unlawful acts.  I believe that two such suits are currently in
process, against NSA and the Department of Justice.  I would not be
averse to adding NIST to the list.

In the event that NIST fails to follow my recommendation that the
DSA technology be made freely available to the public, I hereby request
a personal, non-exclusive license to practice it.  The information
required under 37 CFR 404.8 for such an applicant is:

	Invention:  Digital Signature Algorithm
	Patent application number:  07/738.431

	Type of license:  Personal, non-exclusive, sublicensable, and
			  transferable.
 
	My name, address, email address, and phone number:
		John Gilmore
		PO Box 170608
		San Francisco, California, USA  94117
		gnu@toad.com
		+1 415 903 1418

	My citizenship:  USA

	My representative to correspond with:  myself.

	Nature and type of my business:  I am a privacy advocate,
	a programmer, an entrepreneur.  Personally, I have no employees at
	this time, though I am co-founder and part owner of a business
	which employs 40 people.  I am also co-founder and on the Board of
	Directors of a foundation which employs about ten people.  I
	contract with a lawyer for his full-time services, though he
	is not an employee.

	Products and services which I have successfully
	commercialized:  I was employee #5 at Sun Microsystems, and
	contributed significantly to the success of the company, which
	is now one of the world's largest computer companies.  I have
	co-founded several businesses.  I have written several
	substantial pieces of software which enjoy wide use, including
	PD Tar, a tape archive program, GNUUCP, which provides low-cost data
	communications, and GDB, which is a very widely used debugger.
	All of these programs were developed under an intellectual
	property technology that involves giving away the program
	itself, and selling services related to the program.  The
	40-person business mentioned above supports itself solely by
	this method, and provides commercial support for GDB among many
	other products.  I am also a co-founder of the Electronic
	Frontier Foundation, which, as a non-profit educational
	foundation, has commercialized the services of advocating
	privacy and the public interest in electronic media, and the
	service of defending the public against unconstitutional or
	unlawful searches, seizures, and restrictions on rights in
	electronic media.  I have successfully organized several
	volunteer teams of programmers and writers to produce products
	which were made available to the public, without requiring
	significant investment, by leveraging the goodwill of the
	people involved, and the availability of low cost computers and
	communications media.

	Source of information concerning the availability of the license:
	Internet electronic mail, including copies of the Federal Register.

	Statement indicating whether I am a small business:  As an
	individual, I am probably not considered a small business.
	I do not seek use of the patent for business purposes, but for
	my activities in advocating privacy and anonymity in electronic
	media.

	Detailed description of plans for developing or
	marketing the invention:

		If granted this license, I would immediately sublicense
		all persons who wished to use the patent, at no charge.
		I challenge any other proposed licensee to provide a greater
		benefit at a lower cost.

		I would market the invention via online and printed
		communications, making the public and the software
		development community aware of their ability to freely
		use the invention without restraint from me or from
		the Government.

		I would negotiate with Public Key Partners to come to an
		agreement on terms by which noncommercial use of the
		Schnorr patent could proceed.  Such availability would
		lead the way to commercial applications, as has happened
		with the RSA algorithm.

		I believe that minimal time and investment capital
		would be required in this endeavour:  less than a month
		of my personal time, spread across several months of
		elapsed time, and less than $20,000 in investment,
		which I have available from personal funds.

		My capability and intention to fulfill the plan is shown
		by my record of achievements listed above.

		I and my sublicensees intend to practice the invention
		in all fields of use.

		I and my sublicensees intend to practice the invention
		in all geographical areas, limited only by Government-
		imposed export restrictions.

	I have not applied for nor been granted previous licenses for
	federally owned inventions.

	I believe that the DSA is being practiced by a small number
	of companies in private industry, and is being practiced by
	the Government and its contractors in conjunction with the
	Capstone program of the NSA.

	Further information which I believe will support a determination
	to grant me the license:  If NIST truly wishes that the public
	be granted the maximum capability to use this invention, then
	granting me this license, or in the alternative, granting a
	royalty-free license to everyone, would best achieve that goal.


Sincerely,







John Gilmore




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: gnu (John Gilmore)
Date: Thu, 5 Aug 93 23:35:33 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com, gnu
Subject: Cliphack?
Message-ID: <9308060635.AA19414@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Tim was calling it Clipjack, but I think Cliphack is better.

	John

PS:  Would you trust your momma to escrow your private key?
The government is not your momma!




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Date: Fri, 6 Aug 93 00:13:39 PDT
To: gnu@toad.com (John Gilmore)
Subject: Re: Cliphack?
In-Reply-To: <9308060635.AA19414@toad.com>
Message-ID: <9308060713.AA12115@netcom5.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



John Gilmore writes:

> Tim was calling it Clipjack, but I think Cliphack is better.
> 
> 	John

Yes, there's a lot of resonance in the names "skipjack," "clipjack,"
"cliphack,". "hijack," etc.

If t-shirt slogans are still of interest (they will be someday...),
how about:

"Skipjack hijacks our privacy."

or

"Has your privacy been hijacked by Skipjack?"

Of course, just as the "Clipper" puns and jokes were gathering steam,
the Feds went and changed the name on us, so it may happen again.

By the way, I think I was about the 2nd or 3rd person in sci.crypt to
comment on the Clipper announcenment, and it was immediately obvious
to me that "Clipper" as a name was in serious trouble. I wrote: "By
the way, the "Clipper" name...isn't this already used for the
Clipper processor from Intergraph? I doubt they're the ones making the
chip, so a name conflict may be present."

If it took me approximately 19.2 seconds to realize a name problem
existed, how come the boys in Washington worked so long on this clever
little name and then said "Duh...we didn't know."?

Methinks they're as stupid as we make them out to be.


-Tim

-- 
..........................................................................
Timothy C. May         | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,  
tcmay@netcom.com       | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
408-688-5409           | knowledge, reputations, information markets, 
W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA  | black markets, collapse of governments.
Higher Power: 2^756839 | Public Key: PGP and MailSafe available.
Note: I put time and money into writing this posting. I hope you enjoy it.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Date: Fri, 6 Aug 93 00:30:04 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Cypherpunks, keep your powder dry....
Message-ID: <9308060729.AA14495@netcom5.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Here's a post that pretty much confirms that Dorothy Denning is
leaning toward schemes that outlaw competitors to Skipjack.

She continues to be the chief "Floater of Trial Balloons" (either
that, or she's awfully prescient) and I would suggest anything she
says about possible bans or restrictions on crypto that competes with
Skipjack be taken very seriously.

I'm trying not to be catty about Prof. Denning (even though I slipped
up a while back and called her "the wicked witch of the East"), but
I'm beginning to think we can automatically replace all occurrences of
her name with "According to a senior Administration official..."

Anyway, here it is:

Newsgroups: alt.privacy.clipper
Path: netcom.com!csus.edu!decwrl!decwrl!olivea!uunet!noc.near.net!chpc.chpc.org!rboudrie
From: rboudrie@chpc.org (Rob Boudrie)
Subject: Clipper article
Message-ID: <1993Aug5.043923.4353@chpc.org>
Organization: Center For High Perf. Computing of WPI; Marlboro Ma
Date: Thu, 5 Aug 1993 04:39:23 GMT
Lines: 16


The August 1993 issue of Security Management (American Society for
Industrial Security) has a one page article on Clipper entitled 
"The Clipper Chip Debate" by Lisa Arbetter.  The article goes over
a few of the issues discussed in this group, and includes the
following :

     She also conclused that getting criminals to use the system
     will be a problem.  As a solution, Denning suggests legislation
     tlat places some constraints on the use of other products.  This
     would force them to come up with their own solutions, costing them
     time and money that they might not be willing to sacrifice, she
     explains.m 




--




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: khijol!erc@apple.com (Ed Carp)
Date: Fri, 6 Aug 93 01:28:40 PDT
To: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Subject: Re: Cypherpunks, keep your powder dry....
In-Reply-To: <9308060729.AA14495@netcom5.netcom.com>
Message-ID: <m0oON0g-00023dC@khijol>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text


>      She also conclused that getting criminals to use the system
>      will be a problem.  As a solution, Denning suggests legislation
>      tlat places some constraints on the use of other products.  This
>      would force them to come up with their own solutions, costing them
>      time and money that they might not be willing to sacrifice, she
>      explains.m 

Nonsense.  I can already see a market, either black, gray, or otherwise,
for non-Clipper/Skipjack devices.  In fact, I'd REALLY be surprised if
people haven't already come up with them on their own.  How hard could it
be to throw together an 80386-based embedded system, put PGP in ROM, add
a couple of A/D converters, and *presto* - instant privacy.  Add table
lookup (programmable from the phone pad, of course, based on the number
dialed) and you've got a pretty decent PEP (privacy-enhanced phone) :)
-- 
Ed Carp, N7EKG			erc@apple.com			510/659-9560
                            anon-2133@twwells.com
If you want magic, let go of your armor.  Magic is so much stronger than
steel!        -- Richard Bach, "The Bridge Across Forever"



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "L. Detweiler" <ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Date: Fri, 6 Aug 93 00:23:39 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Brooks as quoted by Peter Wayner
In-Reply-To: <199308051338.AA26748@access.digex.net>
Message-ID: <9308060722.AA19039@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Peter Wayner <pcw@access.digex.net>
>The most interesting speaker was the assistant director of the National
>Security Agency, Dr. Clint Brooks. [...]
>He readily admitted that the Clipper system isn't intended to catch
>any crooks. [...]
>It was apparent that he was somewhat skeptical of the Clipper's potential
>for success. [...]

Assistant Director of the NSA.

this is something to celebrate! break out the bubbles!




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Date: Fri, 6 Aug 93 01:48:45 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Cypherpunks, keep your powder dry....
In-Reply-To: <m0oON0g-00023dC@khijol>
Message-ID: <9308060847.AA18069@netcom5.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Ed Carp writes:

> >      She also conclused that getting criminals to use the system
> >      will be a problem.  As a solution, Denning suggests legislation
> >      tlat places some constraints on the use of other products.  This
> >      would force them to come up with their own solutions, costing them
> >      time and money that they might not be willing to sacrifice, she
> >      explains.m 
> 
> Nonsense.  I can already see a market, either black, gray, or otherwise,
> for non-Clipper/Skipjack devices.  In fact, I'd REALLY be surprised if
> people haven't already come up with them on their own.  How hard could it
> be to throw together an 80386-based embedded system, put PGP in ROM, add
> a couple of A/D converters, and *presto* - instant privacy.  Add table
> lookup (programmable from the phone pad, of course, based on the number
> dialed) and you've got a pretty decent PEP (privacy-enhanced phone) :)

At the risk of stating the obvious, I think it is precisely schemes
like this that Denning was referring to. These are what she wants to
target.
      
Several groups have proposed crypto phones, most using CELP and
SoundBlaster-type cards for PCs. Recall that the Cypherpunks in
Silicon Valley, Washington, D.C., and Boston/Cambridge linked up with
encrypted audio links (albeit briefly). Such things are possible, for
sure.
      
But as "street corner drug dealers" start to use encryption (it could
happen...the "phase changes" to beepers and cellular phones happened
in a matter of months), there will be calls for restrictions to "keep
"unbreakable codes' out of the hands of criminals and terrorists.

As several others have noted, various nonlegislative measures can be
used....requirements for certification of all "devices" attached to
phone lines might be one such measure (never mind the futility of
enforcement). The ban on using crypto in ham radio transmissions is
illustrative. 

If Denning and her associates are already talking about the need to
make non-Clipper use more difficult (read: outlawed), then it is
likely the legislation is already being drawn up in some form.


-Tim


-- 
..........................................................................
Timothy C. May         | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,  
tcmay@netcom.com       | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
408-688-5409           | knowledge, reputations, information markets, 
W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA  | black markets, collapse of governments.
Higher Power: 2^756839 | Public Key: PGP and MailSafe available.
Note: I put time and money into writing this posting. I hope you enjoy it.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: demon@aql.gatech.edu (Network Demon)
Date: Thu, 5 Aug 93 23:55:03 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Our Rights are Dropping like Flies
Message-ID: <9308060654.AA20012@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


[
 I just saw this posted.  I think it might be of some interest.
 Though I hesitate to say "enjoy it".
 --demon
]

------------

           Feel free to copy this article far and wide, but please
           keep my name and this sentence on it.


                      The Bill of Rights, a Status Report
                              by Eric Postpischil

                                4 September 1990

                           6 Hamlett Drive, Apt. 17
                              Nashua, NH  03062

                           edp@jareth.enet.dec.com


           How many rights do you have?  You should check, because it
           might not be as many today as it was a few years ago, or
           even a few months ago.  Some people I talk to are not
           concerned that police will execute a search warrant without
           knocking or that they set up roadblocks and stop and
           interrogate innocent citizens.  They do not regard these as
           great infringements on their rights.  But when you put
           current events together, there is information that may be
           surprising to people who have not yet been concerned:  The
           amount of the Bill of Rights that is under attack is
           alarming.

           Let's take a look at the Bill of Rights and see which
           aspects are being pushed on or threatened.  The point here
           is not the degree of each attack or its rightness or
           wrongness, but the sheer number of rights that are under
           attack.


                                  Amendment I

                Congress shall make no law respecting an
                establishment of religion, or prohibiting the
                free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom
                of speech, or of the press; or the right of the
                people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the
                Government for a redress of grievances.

           ESTABLISHING RELIGION:  While campaigning for his first
           term, George Bush said "I don't know that atheists should
           be considered as citizens, nor should they be considered
           patriots."  Bush has not retracted, commented on, or
           clarified this statement, in spite of requests to do so. 
           According to Bush, this is one nation under God.  And
           apparently if you are not within Bush's religious beliefs,
           you are not a citizen.  Federal, state, and local
           governments also promote a particular religion (or,
           occasionally, religions) by spending public money on
           religious displays.

           FREE EXERCISE OF RELIGION:  Robert Newmeyer and Glenn
           Braunstein were jailed in 1988 for refusing to stand in
           respect for a judge.  Braunstein says the tradition of
           rising in court started decades ago when judges entered
           carrying Bibles.  Since judges no longer carry Bibles,
           Braunstein says there is no reason to stand -- and his
           Bible tells him to honor no other God.  For this religious
           practice, Newmeyer and Braunstein were jailed and are now
           suing.

           FREE SPEECH:  We find that technology has given the
           government an excuse to interfere with free speech. 
           Claiming that radio frequencies are a limited resource, the
           government tells broadcasters what to say (such as news and
           public and local service programming) and what not to say
           (obscenity, as defined by the Federal Communications
           Commission [FCC]).  The FCC is investigating Boston PBS
           station WGBH-TV for broadcasting photographs from the
           Mapplethorpe exhibit.

           FREE SPEECH:  There are also laws to limit political
           statements and contributions to political activities.  In
           1985, the Michigan Chamber of Commerce wanted to take out
           an advertisement supporting a candidate in the state house
           of representatives.  But a 1976 Michigan law prohibits a
           corporation from using its general treasury funds to make
           independent expenditures in a political campaign.  In
           March, the Supreme Court upheld that law.  According to
           dissenting Justice Kennedy, it is now a felony in Michigan
           for the Sierra Club, the American Civil Liberties Union, or
           the Chamber of Commerce to advise the public how a
           candidate voted on issues of urgent concern to their
           members.

           FREE PRESS:  As in speech, technology has provided another
           excuse for government intrusion in the press.  If you
           distribute a magazine electronically and do not print
           copies, the government doesn't consider you a press and
           does not give you the same protections courts have extended
           to printed news.  The equipment used to publish Phrack, a
           worldwide electronic magazine about phones and hacking, was
           confiscated after publishing a document copied from a Bell
           South computer entitled "A Bell South Standard Practice
           (BSP) 660-225-104SV Control Office Administration of
           Enhanced 911 Services for Special Services and Major
           Account Centers, March, 1988."  All of the information in
           this document was publicly available from Bell South in
           other documents.  The government has not alleged that the
           publisher of Phrack, Craig Neidorf, was involved with or
           participated in the copying of the document.  Also, the
           person who copied this document from telephone company
           computers placed a copy on a bulletin board run by Rich
           Andrews.  Andrews forwarded a copy to AT&T officials and
           cooperated with authorities fully.  In return, the Secret
           Service (SS) confiscated Andrews' computer along with all
           the mail and data that were on it.  Andrews was not charged
           with any crime.

           FREE PRESS:  In another incident that would be comical if
           it were not true, on March 1 the SS ransacked the offices
           of Steve Jackson Games (SJG); irreparably damaged property;
           and confiscated three computers, two laser printers,
           several hard disks, and many boxes of paper and floppy
           disks.  The target of the SS operation was to seize all
           copies of a game of fiction called GURPS Cyberpunk.  The
           Cyberpunk game contains fictitious break-ins in a
           futuristic world, with no technical information of actual
           use with real computers, nor is it played on computers. 
           The SS never filed any charges against SJG but still
           refused to return confiscated property.

           PEACEABLE ASSEMBLY:  The right to assemble peaceably is no
           longer free -- you have to get a permit.  Even that is not
           enough; some officials have to be sued before they realize
           their reasons for denying a permit are not Constitutional.

           PEACEABLE ASSEMBLY:  In Alexandria, Virginia, there is a
           law that prohibits people from loitering for more than
           seven minutes and exchanging small objects.  Punishment is
           two years in jail.  Consider the scene in jail:  "What'd
           you do?"  "I was waiting at a bus stop and gave a guy a
           cigarette."  This is not an impossible occurrence:  In
           Pittsburgh, Eugene Tyler, 15, has been ordered away from
           bus stops by police officers.  Sherman Jones, also 15, was
           accosted with a police officer's hands around his neck
           after putting the last bit of pizza crust into his mouth.
           The police suspected him of hiding drugs.

           PETITION FOR REDRESS OF GRIEVANCES:  Rounding out the
           attacks on the first amendment, there is a sword hanging
           over the right to petition for redress of grievances. 
           House Resolution 4079, the National Drug and Crime
           Emergency Act, tries to "modify" the right to habeas
           corpus.  It sets time limits on the right of people in
           custody to petition for redress and also limits the courts
           in which such an appeal may be heard.


                                  Amendment II

                A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the
                security of a free State, the right of the people
                to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.

           RIGHT TO BEAR ARMS:  This amendment is so commonly
           challenged that the movement has its own name:  gun
           control.  Legislation banning various types of weapons is
           supported with the claim that the weapons are not for
           "legitimate" sporting purposes.  This is a perversion of
           the right to bear arms for two reasons.  First, the basis
           of freedom is not that permission to do legitimate things
           is granted to the people, but rather that the government is
           empowered to do a limited number of legitimate things --
           everything else people are free to do; they do not need to
           justify their choices.  Second, should the need for defense
           arise, it will not be hordes of deer that the security of a
           free state needs to be defended from.  Defense would be
           needed against humans, whether external invaders or
           internal oppressors.  It is an unfortunate fact of life
           that the guns that would be needed to defend the security
           of a state are guns to attack people, not guns for sporting
           purposes.

           Firearms regulations also empower local officials, such as
           police chiefs, to grant or deny permits.  This results in
           towns where only friends of people in the right places are
           granted permits, or towns where women are generally denied
           the right to carry a weapon for self-defense.


                                 Amendment III

                No Soldier shall, in time of peace be quartered
                in any house, without the consent of the Owner,
                nor in time of war, but in a manner to be
                prescribed by law.

           QUARTERING SOLDIERS:  This amendment is fairly clean so
           far, but it is not entirely safe.  Recently, 200 troops in
           camouflage dress with M-16s and helicopters swept through
           Kings Ridge National Forest in Humboldt County, California. 
           In the process of searching for marijuana plants for four
           days, soldiers assaulted people on private land with M-16s
           and barred them from their own property.  This might not be
           a direct hit on the third amendment, but the disregard for
           private property is uncomfortably close.


                                  Amendment IV

                The right of the people to be secure in their
                persons, houses, papers and effects, against
                unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
                violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon
                probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation,
                and particularly describing the place to be
                searched, and the persons or things to be seized.

           RIGHT TO BE SECURE IN PERSONS, HOUSES, PAPERS AND EFFECTS
           AGAINST UNREASONABLE SEARCHES AND SEIZURES:  The RICO law
           is making a mockery of the right to be secure from seizure. 
           Entire stores of books or videotapes have been confiscated
           based upon the presence of some sexually explicit items. 
           Bars, restaurants, or houses are taken from the owners
           because employees or tenants sold drugs.  In Volusia
           County, Florida, Sheriff Robert Vogel and his officers stop
           automobiles for contrived violations.  If large amounts of
           cash are found, the police confiscate it on the PRESUMPTION
           that it is drug money -- even if there is no other evidence
           and no charges are filed against the car's occupants.  The
           victims can get their money back only if they prove the
           money was obtained legally.  One couple got their money
           back by proving it was an insurance settlement.  Two other
           men who tried to get their two thousand dollars back were
           denied by the Florida courts.
           
           RIGHT TO BE SECURE IN PERSONS, HOUSES, PAPERS AND EFFECTS
           AGAINST UNREASONABLE SEARCHES AND SEIZURES:  A new law goes
           into effect in Oklahoma on January 1, 1991. All property,
           real and personal, is taxable, and citizens are required to
           list all their personal property for tax assessors,
           including household furniture, gold and silver plate,
           musical instruments, watches, jewelry, and personal,
           private, or professional libraries.  If a citizen refuses
           to list their property or is suspected of not listing
           something, the law directs the assessor to visit and enter
           the premises, getting a search warrant if necessary.  Being
           required to tell the state everything you own is not being
           secure in one's home and effects.
           
           NO WARRANTS SHALL ISSUE, BUT UPON PROBABLE CAUSE, SUPPORTED
           BY OATH OR AFFIRMATION:  As a supporting oath or
           affirmation, reports of anonymous informants are accepted.
           This practice has been condoned by the Supreme Court.

           PARTICULARLY DESCRIBING THE PLACE TO BE SEARCHED AND
           PERSONS OR THINGS TO BE SEIZED:  Today's warrants do not
           particularly describe the things to be seized -- they list
           things that might be present.  For example, if police are
           making a drug raid, they will list weapons as things to be
           searched for and seized.  This is done not because the
           police know of any weapons and can particularly describe
           them, but because they allege people with drugs often have
           weapons.

           Both of the above apply to the warrant the Hudson, New
           Hampshire, police used when they broke down Bruce Lavoie's
           door at 5 a.m. with guns drawn and shot and killed him. 
           The warrant claimed information from an anonymous
           informant, and it said, among other things, that guns were
           to be seized.  The mention of guns in the warrant was used
           as reason to enter with guns drawn.  Bruce Lavoie had no
           guns.  Bruce Lavoie was not secure from unreasonable search
           and seizure -- nor is anybody else.

           Other infringements on the fourth amendment include
           roadblocks and the Boston Police detention of people based
           on colors they are wearing (supposedly indicating gang
           membership).  And in Pittsburgh again, Eugene Tyler was
           once searched because he was wearing sweat pants and a
           plaid shirt -- police told him they heard many drug dealers
           at that time were wearing sweat pants and plaid shirts.
           

                                  Amendment V

                No person shall be held to answer for a capital,
                or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a
                presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except
                in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or
                in the Militia, when in actual service in time of
                War or public danger; nor shall any person be
                subject to the same offence to be twice put in
                jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled
                in any criminal case to be a witness against
                himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or
                property, without due process of law; nor shall
                private property be taken for public use without
                just compensation.

           INDICTMENT OF A GRAND JURY:  Kevin Bjornson has been
           proprietor of Hydro-Tech for nearly a decade and is a
           leading authority on hydroponic technology and cultivation. 
           On October 26, 1989, both locations of Hydro-Tech were
           raided by the Drug Enforcement Administration.  National
           Drug Control Policy Director William Bennett has declared
           that some indoor lighting and hydroponic equipment is
           purchased by marijuana growers, so retailers and
           wholesalers of such equipment are drug profiteers and
           co-conspirators.  Bjornson was not charged with any crime,
           nor subpoenaed, issued a warrant, or arrested.  No illegal
           substances were found on his premises.  Federal officials
           were unable to convince grand juries to indict Bjornson. 
           By February, they had called scores of witnesses and
           recalled many two or three times, but none of the grand
           juries they convened decided there was reason to criminally
           prosecute Bjornson.  In spite of that, as of March, his
           bank accounts were still frozen and none of the inventories
           or records had been returned.  Grand juries refused to
           indict Bjornson, but the government is still penalizing
           him.

           TWICE PUT IN JEOPARDY OF LIFE OR LIMB:  Members of the
           McMartin family in California have been tried two or three
           times for child abuse.  Anthony Barnaby was tried for
           murder (without evidence linking him to the crime) three
           times before New Hampshire let him go.

           COMPELLED TO BE A WITNESS AGAINST HIMSELF:  Oliver North
           was forced to testify against himself.  Congress granted
           him immunity from having anything he said to them being
           used as evidence against him, and then they required him to
           talk.  After he did so, what he said was used to find other
           evidence which was used against him.  The courts also play
           games where you can be required to testify against yourself
           if you testify at all.

           COMPELLED TO BE A WITNESS AGAINST HIMSELF:  In the New York
           Central Park assault case, three people were found guilty
           of assault.  But there was no physical evidence linking
           them to the crime; semen did not match any of the
           defendants.  The only evidence the state had was
           confessions.  To obtain these confessions, the police
           questioned a 15-year old without a parent present -- which
           is illegal under New York state law.  Police also refused
           to let the subject's Big Brother, an attorney for the
           Federal government, see him during questioning.  Police
           screamed "You better tell us what we want to hear and
           cooperate or you are going to jail," at 14-year-old Antron
           McCray, according to Bobby McCray, his father.  Antron
           McCray "confessed" after his father told him to, so that
           police would release him.  These people were coerced into
           bearing witness against themselves, and those confessions
           were used to convict them.

           COMPELLED TO BE A WITNESS AGAINST HIMSELF:  Your answers to
           Census questions are required by law, with a $100 penalty
           for each question not answered.  But people have been
           evicted for giving honest Census answers.  According to the
           General Accounting Office, one of the most frequent ways
           city governments use census information is to detect
           illegal two-family dwellings.  This has happened in
           Montgomery County, Maryland; Pullman, Washington; and Long
           Island, New York.  The August 8, 1989, Wall Street Journal
           reports this and other ways Census answers have been used
           against the answerers.
           
           COMPELLED TO BE A WITNESS AGAINST HIMSELF:  Drug tests are
           being required from more and more people, even when there
           is no probable cause, no accident, and no suspicion of drug
           use.  Requiring people to take drug tests compels them to
           provide evidence against themselves.
                        
           DEPRIVED OF LIFE, LIBERTY, OR PROPERTY WITHOUT DUE PROCESS
           OF LAW:  This clause is violated on each of the items life,
           liberty, and property.  Incidents including such violations
           are described elsewhere in this article.  Here are two
           more:  On March 26, 1987, in Jeffersontown, Kentucky,
           Jeffrey Miles was killed by police officer John Rucker, who
           was looking for a suspected drug dealer.  Rucker had been
           sent to the wrong house; Miles was not wanted by police. 
           He received no due process.  In Detroit, $4,834 was seized
           from a grocery store after dogs detected traces of cocaine
           on three one-dollar bills in a cash register.
           
           PRIVATE PROPERTY TAKEN FOR PUBLIC USE WITHOUT JUST
           COMPENSATION:  RICO is shredding this aspect of the Bill of
           Rights.  The money confiscated by Sheriff Vogel goes
           directly into Vogel's budget; it is not regulated by the
           legislature.  Federal and local governments seize and
           auction boats, buildings, and other property.  Under RICO,
           the government is seizing property without due process. 
           The victims are required to prove not only that they are
           not guilty of a crime, but that they are entitled to their
           property.  Otherwise, the government auctions off the
           property and keeps the proceeds.


                                  Amendment VI

                In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall
                enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by
                an impartial jury of the State and district
                wherein the crime shall have been committed,
                which district shall have been previously
                ascertained by law, and to be informed of the
                nature and cause of the accusation; to be
                confronted with the witnesses against him; to
                have compulsory process for obtaining Witnesses
                in his favor, and to have the assistance of
                counsel for his defence.
           
           THE RIGHT TO A SPEEDY AND PUBLIC TRIAL:  Surprisingly, the
           right to a public trial is under attack.  When Marion Barry
           was being tried, the prosecution attempted to bar Louis
           Farrakhan and George Stallings from the gallery.  This
           request was based on an allegation that they would send
           silent and "impermissible messages" to the jurors.  The
           judge initially granted this request.  One might argue that
           the whole point of a public trial is to send a message to
           all the participants:  The message is that the public is
           watching; the trial had better be fair.
           
           BY AN IMPARTIAL JURY:  The government does not even honor
           the right to trial by an impartial jury.  US District Judge
           Edward Rafeedie is investigating improper influence on
           jurors by US marshals in the Enrique Camarena case.  US
           marshals apparently illegally communicated with jurors
           during deliberations.
           
           OF THE STATE AND DISTRICT WHEREIN THE CRIME SHALL HAVE BEEN
           COMMITTED:  This is incredible, but Manuel Noriega is being
           tried so far away from the place where he is alleged to
           have committed crimes that the United States had to invade
           another country and overturn a government to get him.  Nor
           is this a unique occurrence; in a matter separate from the
           Camarena case, Judge Rafeedie was asked to dismiss charges
           against Mexican gynecologist Dr. Humberto Alvarez Machain
           on the grounds that the doctor was illegally abducted from
           his Guadalajara office in April and turned over to US
           authorities.

           TO BE INFORMED OF THE NATURE AND CAUSE OF THE ACCUSATION: 
           Steve Jackson Games, nearly put out of business by the raid
           described previously, has been stonewalled by the SS.  "For
           the past month or so these guys have been insisting the
           book wasn't the target of the raid, but they don't say what
           the target was, or why they were critical of the book, or
           why they won't give it back," Steve Jackson says.  "They
           have repeatedly denied we're targets but don't explain why
           we've been made victims."  Attorneys for SJG tried to find
           out the basis for the search warrant that led to the raid
           on SJG.  But the application for that warrant was sealed by
           order of the court and remained sealed at last report, in
           July.  Not only has the SS taken property and nearly
           destroyed a publisher, it will not even explain the nature
           and cause of the accusations that led to the raid.

           TO BE CONFRONTED WITH THE WITNESSES AGAINST HIM:  The courts
           are beginning to play fast and loose with the right to
           confront witnesses.  Watch out for anonymous witnesses and
           videotaped testimony.

           TO HAVE COMPULSORY PROCESS FOR OBTAINING WITNESSES:  Ronald
           Reagan resisted submitting to subpoena and answering
           questions about Irangate, claiming matters of national
           security and executive privilege.  A judge had to dismiss
           some charges against Irangate participants because the
           government refused to provide information subpoenaed by the
           defendants.  And one wonders if the government would go
           to the same lengths to obtain witnesses for Manuel Noriega
           as it did to capture him.

           TO HAVE THE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL:  The right to assistance
           of counsel took a hit recently.  Connecticut Judge Joseph
           Sylvester is refusing to assign public defenders to people
           ACCUSED of drug-related crimes, including drunk driving.

           TO HAVE THE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL:  RICO is also affecting
           the right to have the assistance of counsel.  The
           government confiscates the money of an accused person,
           which leaves them unable to hire attorneys.  The IRS has
           served summonses nationwide to defense attorneys, demanding
           the names of clients who paid cash for fees exceeding
           $10,000.


                                 Amendment VII

                In Suits at common law, where the value in
                controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the
                right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no
                fact tried by a jury, shall be otherwise
                reexamined in any Court of the United States,
                than according to the rules of common law.

           RIGHT OF TRIAL BY JURY IN SUITS AT COMMON LAW:  This is a
           simple right; so far the government has not felt threatened
           by it and has not made attacks on it that I am aware of. 
           This is our only remaining safe haven in the Bill of Rights.


                                 Amendment VIII

                Excessive bail shall not be required, nor
                excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual
                punishments inflicted.

           EXCESSIVE BAIL AND FINES:  Tallahatchie County in
           Mississippi charges ten dollars a day to each person who
           spends time in the jail, regardless of the length of stay
           or the outcome of their trial.  This means innocent people
           are forced to pay.  Marvin Willis was stuck in jail for 90
           days trying to raise $2,500 bail on an assault charge.  But
           after he made that bail, he was kept imprisoned because he
           could not pay the $900 rent Tallahatchie demanded.  Nine
           former inmates are suing the county for this practice.

           CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENTS:  House Resolution 4079
           sticks its nose in here too:  "... a Federal court shall
           not hold prison or jail crowding unconstitutional under the
           eighth amendment except to the extent that an individual
           plaintiff inmate proves that the crowding causes the
           infliction of cruel and unusual punishment of that
           inmate."

           CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENTS:  A life sentence for selling
           a quarter of a gram of cocaine for $20 -- that is what
           Ricky Isom was sentenced to in February in Cobb County,
           Georgia.  It was Isom's second conviction in two years, and
           state law imposes a mandatory sentence.  Even the judge
           pronouncing the sentence thinks it is cruel; Judge Tom
           Cauthorn expressed grave reservations before sentencing
           Isom and Douglas Rucks (convicted of selling 3.5 grams of
           cocaine in a separate but similar case).  Judge Cauthorn
           called the sentences "Draconian."


                                  Amendment IX

                The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain
                rights, shall not be construed to deny or
                disparage others retained by the people.

           OTHER RIGHTS RETAINED BY THE PEOPLE:  This amendment is so
           weak today that I will ask not what infringements there are
           on it but rather what exercise of it exists at all?  What
           law can you appeal to a court to find you not guilty of
           violating because the law denies a right retained by you?


                                  Amendment X

                The powers not delegated to the United States by
                the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the
                States, are reserved to the States respectively,
                or to the people.

           POWERS RESERVED TO THE STATES OR THE PEOPLE:  This
           amendment is also weak, although it is not so nonexistent
           as the ninth amendment.  But few states set their own speed
           limits or drinking age limits.  Today, we mostly think of
           this country as the -- singular -- United States, rather
           than a collection of states.  This concentration of power
           detaches laws from the desires of people -- and even of
           states.  House Resolution 4079 crops up again here -- it
           uses financial incentives to get states to set specific
           penalties for certain crimes.  Making their own laws
           certainly must be considered a right of the states, and
           this right is being infringed upon.


           Out of ten amendments, nine are under attack, most of them
           under multiple attacks of different natures, and some of
           them under a barrage.  If this much of the Bill of Rights
           is threatened, how can you be sure your rights are safe?  A
           right has to be there when you need it.  Like insurance,
           you cannot afford to wait until you need it and then set
           about procuring it or ensuring it is available.  Assurance
           must be made in advance.

           The bottom line here is that your rights are not safe.  You
           do not know when one of your rights will be violated.  A
           number of rights protect accused persons, and you may think
           it is not important to protect the rights of criminals. 
           But if a right is not there for people accused of crimes,
           it will not be there when you need it.  With the Bill of
           Rights in the sad condition described above, nobody can be
           confident they will be able to exercise the rights to which
           they are justly entitled.  To preserve our rights for
           ourselves in the future, we must defend them for everybody
           today.





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: khijol!erc@apple.com (Ed Carp)
Date: Fri, 6 Aug 93 03:38:44 PDT
To: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Subject: Re: Cypherpunks, keep your powder dry....
In-Reply-To: <9308060847.AA18069@netcom5.netcom.com>
Message-ID: <m0oOP35-000246C@khijol>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text


> Ed Carp writes:
> 
> > >      She also conclused that getting criminals to use the system
> > >      will be a problem.  As a solution, Denning suggests legislation
> > >      tlat places some constraints on the use of other products.  This
> > >      would force them to come up with their own solutions, costing them
> > >      time and money that they might not be willing to sacrifice, she
> > >      explains.m 
> > 
> > Nonsense.  I can already see a market, either black, gray, or otherwise,
> > for non-Clipper/Skipjack devices.  In fact, I'd REALLY be surprised if
> > people haven't already come up with them on their own.  How hard could it
> > be to throw together an 80386-based embedded system, put PGP in ROM, add
> > a couple of A/D converters, and *presto* - instant privacy.  Add table
> > lookup (programmable from the phone pad, of course, based on the number
> > dialed) and you've got a pretty decent PEP (privacy-enhanced phone) :)
> 
> At the risk of stating the obvious, I think it is precisely schemes
> like this that Denning was referring to. These are what she wants to
> target.

My apologies - I guess I wasn't clear.  Waht I meant was, does she honestly
think that people *won't* do what I suggested, just because there are laws
forbidding it?  If she does, she is surely living in a dreamworld.

> Several groups have proposed crypto phones, most using CELP and
> SoundBlaster-type cards for PCs. Recall that the Cypherpunks in
> Silicon Valley, Washington, D.C., and Boston/Cambridge linked up with
> encrypted audio links (albeit briefly). Such things are possible, for
> sure.

Not to mention the infamous 'netphone' :)

> But as "street corner drug dealers" start to use encryption (it could
> happen...the "phase changes" to beepers and cellular phones happened
> in a matter of months), there will be calls for restrictions to "keep
> "unbreakable codes' out of the hands of criminals and terrorists.

At the risk of stating the obvious:

I think 'could' can very probably be changed to '*will*'.  So, how are
they going to keep '"unbreakable codes' out of the hands of criminals and
terrorists'?  Laws are obeyed by the 99% of society who are law-abiding
(generally speaking, that is), yet laws are made targeting the 1% of the
population who couldn't care less.

> As several others have noted, various nonlegislative measures can be
> used....requirements for certification of all "devices" attached to
> phone lines might be one such measure (never mind the futility of
> enforcement). The ban on using crypto in ham radio transmissions is
> illustrative. 

Yes, but remember, most hams are law-abiding, since a ham radio license
is not a right.

> If Denning and her associates are already talking about the need to
> make non-Clipper use more difficult (read: outlawed), then it is
> likely the legislation is already being drawn up in some form.

Of course it is!  But that won't stop anyone but the DAvid Sternlights of the
world from using crypto.  Can't the folks in DC plainly *see* that??

Time to go to bed - I've got an 11 AM interview.  Anyone know of any sysadmin
contracts out there?? :)
-- 
Ed Carp, N7EKG			erc@apple.com			510/659-9560
                            anon-2133@twwells.com
If you want magic, let go of your armor.  Magic is so much stronger than
steel!        -- Richard Bach, "The Bridge Across Forever"



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: an12070@anon.penet.fi
Date: Thu, 5 Aug 93 21:55:33 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Wayner's Wonderland
Message-ID: <9308060454.AA01127@anon.penet.fi>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Mr. Wayner posts thoughtful descriptions and reflections on the CSSPAB
proceedings. While I want to express my appreciation for this
interesting and revealing glimpse and encourage future postings in the
same vein, there are some deeply upsetting views and grating,
gratuitous benedictions expressed therein that would sound worse than
fingernails on a chalkboard for any hard core cypherpunk. Following is
mostly vitriolic and sarcastic flame; feel free to ignore it; you've been warned.

* * *

Peter Wayner <pcw@access.digex.net>
>The board itself runs with a quasi-legal style 

quasi-legal? and the NSA was there? how apropos!

>All of them came from the upper
>ranks of the military or legal system and a person doesn't rise to
>such a position without adopting the careful air of the very diligent
>bureaucrat.

This is precisely the fluffery and facade we are *not* impressed with.
The very Cream of the NSA, the brilliant minds who brought you Clipper and DSA.

>The NSA has rarely had trouble in the past
>exercising either its explicitly granted legal authority  or
>its implied authority. The phrase "national security" is a
>powerful pass phrase around Washington and there is no reason
>for me to believe that the NSA wouldn't get all of the access
>to the escrow database that it needs [...]

but you see, that is the problem. As P. Ferguson wrote, ` `National
security': the root password to the Constitution.'

>Building in
>a backdoor would only leave a weakness for an opponent to exploit
>and that is something that is almost as sacrilidgeous at the NSA
>as just putting the classified secrets in a Fed Ex package to 
>Saddam Hussein.

Hm, do you think they felt the same about DES? DSA? decreasing key size
makes me wonder at night...

>Next there was a report from Geoff Greiveldinger , the man from the
>Department of Justice with the responsibility of implementing the the
>Key Escrow plan.
>[...]
>It became clear that the system was not fully designed.

Reminds me of the trembling, pale kid at the front of the classroom
giving a book report, reading aloud from a blank page. He didn't do his
homework. Not only that, but it's the wrong assignment. No matter, he's
about to be expelled anyway.

This key escrow system is as solid as oozing phlegm. In the Official
Announcement we hear of a new Key Escrow System. Hm, what's it about?
Apparently not a Key Escrow System, from what I can figure out. Denning
scrambles out with some bizarre circumlocution soon after the
announcement that is supposedly now Null and Void, and we have this
grand new system with the Magic Eavesdropping Box. How are we to be
sure that this Box is secure? Why, it utilizes a Secure Chip inside.
What about the Chip? Why, there are Secure Atoms and Electrons,
assuredly in the Proper Places with Correct Clearance, as designated by
The Grand Holiness.

>At this point, I had just listened to an entirely logical presentation
>from a perfect gentleman. We had just run though a system that had many
>nice technological checks and balances in it. Subverting it seemed 
>very difficult. 

Gee, I missed something there somewhere. `Not fully designed' but
`difficult to subvert' because of all the `nice technological checks'.
Yes, I would bet my life on that.

>The most interesting speaker was the assistant director of the National
>Security Agency, Dr. Clint Brooks. He immediately admitted that the
>entire Clipper project was quite unusual because the Agency was not
>used to dealing with the open world. Speaking before a wide audience
>was strange for him and he admitted that producing a very low cost
>commercial competitive chip was also a new challenge for them. 

their amateurism is frightening and pathetic. The lesson is not that it
is `a new challenge' but a outrageous violation of their authority. I'm
quite nauseated that someone here would succumb  to their transparent
and shifty rhetoric.  They have no legal authority whatsoever in
proposing this. They still fail to grasp this simple fact, despite a
bludgeoning CPSR lawsuit slaps and FOIA jabs. It is a wonder they have
stopped hiding behind the legs of the President.

>He readily admitted that the Clipper system isn't intended to catch
>any crooks. 

Ah, but we have the Official Announcement from Mr. Clinton explaining
how it would be used to catch `criminals, drug dealers, and
terrorists'! How are we to reconcile this bizarre twist? This is all so
grotesque, so Orwellian, so wretched, so horribly nightmarish... we
have the Key Escrow Initiative with everything but the Key Escrow read,
to catch all the Criminals who aren't Criminals.

>When I listened, though, I began to worry about what is going to happen
>as we begin to see the eventual blurring of data and voice communications
>systems. 

what a fantastic revelation! when did you come to this epiphany?

>WHen this happens, programmable phones are going to emerge. 

what a ...

>This
>could easily be a proprietary encryption system that scrambles
>everything. 

what a ...

gosh, it would make sense for the NSA to propose Clipper for a scenario
like that! what a coincidence!

>The traditional way of controlling technology by
>controlling the capital intensive manufacturing sites will be gone. 

what a ...

`traditional way of controlling'? more like the `past method of manipulation'!

>Sure,
>the NSA and the police will go to Radio Shack and say "We want your
>cooperation" and they'll get it. But it's the little, slippery ones
>that will be trouble in the new, software world.

what a ...

It is the big, lumbering one called NSA that is already in *deep* trouble.

[ sheriffs, district attorneys, FBI agents]
>Their message was direct and they didn't hesitate to compare encryption
>with assault rifles. One even said, "I don't want to see the officers
>outgunned in a technical arena." 

sorry, they don't have a choice in the matter.

>One DA from New Jersey said that
>in his office, they process about 10,000 cases a year, but they only
>do one to two wiretaps on average. It just seems like a big hassle
>and expense for them.

oh, perhaps you are proposing it shouldn't be a `hassle' or a
`expensive'. Let me tell you, infringing on rights better DAMN WELL be
more than a `hassle'!

>The
>police tried to use the low numbers of wiretaps as evidence that they're not
>out there abusing the system, but I kept thinking that this was mainly
>caused by the high cost and relatively low utility of the technique. 

bless you. Now I only feel 95% like strangling you.

>In the end, I reduced the calculus of the decision about Clipper to be
>a simple tradeoff. If we allow widespread, secure encryption, will the
>criminals take great advantage of this system?

who is `we'? what do you mean by `allow'? this terminology presupposes
the fact that you, the NSA, or anyone else has the capability to control it.

>It would empower people to protect their own
>information unconditionally, but at the cost of letting the criminals
>do the same.

ultimately a net gain, IMHO.  There is far more to gain from protection
of businesses and private mail than any increased evasive power given
to criminals. The point is, we can catch criminals without illegitimate
crutches like wiretapping. In fact, I think wiretapping ultimately
encourages laziness and inefficiency in law enforcement and
investigative/detective work. We stand to gain a more efficient law
enforcement system when it is ultimately rendered impossible.

>I began to wonder if the choice between Clipper and totally secure
>encryption was moot.

for any true cypherpunk, it is not.
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
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From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: koontzd@lrcs.loral.com (David Koontz )
Date: Fri, 6 Aug 93 10:15:12 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: No Subject
Message-ID: <9308061714.AA06932@nebula.lrcs.loral.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Subject: AT&T DES vs. Clipper phone security products

Uncertainty on the availability of DES versus Clipper based products
from AT&T has sparked some interest.  Parties within AT&T were contacted to 
determine the state of their products.

DES is not available in AT&T TSD products and one person said "NSA doesn't
want DES in the TSD." #  Also, the clipper algorithm is currently unavailable
and expected in "September".   This person deferred to a second person who 
provided the following:

The 3600 is available with two proprietary AT&T encryption algorithms, 
one ITAR compliant, one for U.S. persons only.  Two Telephone Security Devices
(TSD) will attempt to hierarchially establish security, the higher security
being non-ITAR compliant.  This will be extended to the clipper algorithm
(highest) when available.  Neither proprietary algorithm is in the public
domain.  [Apparently NSA is perfectly happy with these. + ]

You can buy TSDs now, and pay an extra fee (reasonable) for the ungrade path
to clipper when available (September not absolutely guaranteed).  Paying the
fee will allow you to exchange the TSD for a new and improved one at a later
date.  The hold up on clipper is availability from Mykotronx and questions
were deferred to "the NSA".  AT&T has been performed product integration tests
with clipper and is ready to go as soon as chips are available.

Their willingness to sell clipper phones is predicated on marketplace 
acceptance and the prospect of having a national standard with the chance of 
interoperability between different manufacturers.  There is a perceived need 
for voice security products, and the balance with respect to "legitimate
law enforcement access" was discussed.  There was some confusion about
key management, which was inferred to be present in the clipper chip.

[The question arises as to which clipper chip they are waiting on, the
MYK-78 or the MYK-80 which has key management features.  The question also 
arises as to whether or not the MYK-78 is susceptible to a captured control 
programming attack to prevent transmission of the Law Enforcement Access 
Field, with an inferred assumption that the MKY-80 does not share this 
vulnerability. *]

AT&T will continue to market the present 3600 sans clipper with the two
proprietary encryption algorithms (ITAR/U.S. ONLY).  This was stressed
rather strongly.  The question of relative strenght of cryptographic
algorithms was brought up.  There were no conclusions, as no common
metric can be used, with one public algorithm, two proprietary and one
classified algorithm.  DES availability was discussed and was inferred
to be affected by international agreements limiting DES proliferation.

The TSD uses RCELP, a proprietary vocoder that is supposed to add
fidelity over CELP, and is supposed to encode female voices better,
with better treble.  AT&T feels RCELP is superior to anything else
at 4800 baud.  This raised the question of licensing for RCELP.  RCELP is
not in the public domain to date.  Executive resistance to CELP at 4800
baud is supposedly a good sell for RCELP.

The 4800 baud limitation is based on the least common denominator of
analog cellular communications paths, which won't support V.32 (9600 baud).
The greatest need for telephone security devices is seen for cellular
communications.

The 3600 optionally comes with 5 handset interface modules (as opposed to
one for the base product) that interface different phones to the TSD.
This is required based on different frequency response of handset microphones
as well as signal amplitudes.  The 5 interface modules are considered
universal - covering all types of phones.  Think of this as signal conditioning
to make the RCELP vocoder perform better.  The standard power supply takes
110 VAC, 60 Hz.  An optional universal power supply and international power
package are available.

------

# Is DES secure enough to cause heartburn for our 3 letter agencie cousins?

+ the inferrence being that DES is higher security than either proprietary
  algorithm.

* It has been reported that MYK-80 chips exist and have been tested by
  Mykotronx.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: geoffw@nexsys.net (Geoff White)
Date: Fri, 6 Aug 93 10:50:13 PDT
To: tcmay@netcom.com
Subject: Re: Cypherpunks, keep your powder dry....
Message-ID: <9308061733.AA02323@nexsys.nexsys.net>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>       
> But as "street corner drug dealers" start to use encryption (it could
> happen...the "phase changes" to beepers and cellular phones happened
> in a matter of months), there will be calls for restrictions to "keep
> "unbreakable codes' out of the hands of criminals and terrorists.

This is not a flame on you Tim, but look at the absurdity of this!
Containers full of tons of coke come into the US daily, I'm sure these deals
are not made on street corners, (their made in bank offices, and import
agencies :),  Isn't this like trying to keep our nation safe by passing
laws outlawing to carrying of a suit case sized container through a 
busy public area (like grand central station) because someone might have
a portable thermonuclear device hidden inside.  How much does it take
for the average person to totally see through this flimsy sharade?
For the capitalist among us, if the street corner crack dealer is making
fortunes, how much are the people who supply him getting?  Do they use/
need to use encrypted communications?  Most of those dealers who are using
any form of remote communication  (the smart one's at least, will still 
do their deals heavy on ghetto slang, nuonce and metaphor, More like;

"Hey what up, I'll meet you at the spot, it's 3 yards for dorothy."
This translates to " Hello, How are you, we'll rendezvous at the usual location
$3,000 for an ounce"




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: norm@netcom.com (Norman Hardy)
Date: Fri, 6 Aug 93 11:15:13 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: NSA and Trust Webs
Message-ID: <9308061814.AA27453@netcom2.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


While US military security models are thoroughly hierarchical
I imagine that when NSA deals with foreign countries regarding ciphers
used to communicate between governments and regarding mutual foes it too
uses a web of trust more Byzantine than most amateurs dream of.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: peb@PROCASE.COM (Paul Baclace)
Date: Fri, 6 Aug 93 11:50:13 PDT
To: nate@VIS.ColoState.EDU
Subject: Re: "Big Brother Inside" logo
Message-ID: <9308061849.AA01346@banff.procase.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



>I am investigating having Tshirts made with the logo on the front

How about the standard red circle with slash for NO Big Brother Inside.

Have you uploaded the gif to soda.berkeley.edu yet?  (What's the path?)


Paul E. Baclace
peb@procase.com




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: peb@PROCASE.COM (Paul Baclace)
Date: Fri, 6 Aug 93 12:00:13 PDT
To: geoffw@nexsys.net
Subject: Re: Cypherpunks, keep your powder dry....
Message-ID: <9308061859.AA01349@banff.procase.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



>> From: tcmay@netcom.com
>> there will be calls for restrictions to "keep
>> "unbreakable codes' out of the hands of criminals and terrorists.

>This is not a flame on you Tim, but look at the absurdity of this!
>[...] How much does it take
>for the average person to totally see through this flimsy sharade?

I think Tim correct about this as a possible scenario, although the
magnitude may be small.   Re: the Village Voice article's description 
of the WWII paranoia.  Example:  During the Gulf War paging people 
at the San Francisco airport was banned...

 
Paul E. Baclace
peb@procase.com





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Date: Fri, 6 Aug 93 12:18:50 PDT
To: geoffw@nexsys.net (Geoff White)
Subject: Re: Cypherpunks, keep your powder dry....
In-Reply-To: <9308061733.AA02323@nexsys.nexsys.net>
Message-ID: <9308061916.AA24291@netcom5.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Geoff White writes:

> > But as "street corner drug dealers" start to use encryption (it could
> > happen...the "phase changes" to beepers and cellular phones happened
> > in a matter of months), there will be calls for restrictions to "keep
> > "unbreakable codes' out of the hands of criminals and terrorists.
> 
> This is not a flame on you Tim, but look at the absurdity of this!
> Containers full of tons of coke come into the US daily, I'm sure these deals
> are not made on street corners, (their made in bank offices, and import

And this is not a flame back. I put "street corner drug dealers" in
quotes precisely to make an ironic point, that the Congresscritters
who make the laws will be citing these "street corner drug dealers" as
the justification of laws cracking down on crypto.

A code phrase, if you will.

Clearly there are many levels of drug distribution. Actually, I favor
complete and total drug legalization, and so I don't view drug
smuggling or sales as an kind of real crime. I just cited this is a
very likely rationale for crypto legislation--it certainly is not a
rationale many of us support.

-Tim May

-- 
..........................................................................
Timothy C. May         | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,  
tcmay@netcom.com       | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
408-688-5409           | knowledge, reputations, information markets, 
W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA  | black markets, collapse of governments.
Higher Power: 2^756839 | Public Key: PGP and MailSafe available.
Note: I put time and money into writing this posting. I hope you enjoy it.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: cme@ellisun.sw.stratus.com (Carl Ellison)
Date: Fri, 6 Aug 93 09:50:42 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: a question to ask NSA
Message-ID: <9308061650.AA01907@ellisun.sw.stratus.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Would they be happy using Skipjack phones for their own communication
if the key escrow agencies were in Bagdad and Tripoli, respectively,
and the key generation and chip programming were done in Tehran?

There are more details, but you get the drift.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: sneal@muskwa.ucs.ualberta.ca (Sneal)
Date: Fri, 6 Aug 93 12:30:13 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Cypherpunks, keep your humour dry
Message-ID: <9308061929.AA18519@muskwa.ucs.ualberta.ca>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Tim May writes:
 
>> At the risk of stating the obvious, I think it is precisely schemes
>> like this that Denning was referring to. These are what she wants to
>> target.
 
and Ed Carp replies:
 
>My apologies - I guess I wasn't clear.  Waht I meant was, does she
>honestly think that people *won't* do what I suggested, just because
>there are laws >forbidding it?  If she does, she is surely living in
>a dreamworld.
 
  An engineer was attending a convention, and after a hard day of
conventioneering, returned to his hotel room and feel asleep.  About
3 AM, he woke up and smelled smoke, and realized there was a fire in
his room!  He immediately leaped out of bed, grabbed the fire
extinguisher, and let loose at the base of the flames.  After 30
seconds of spraying, the fire went out.  The engineer went back to
sleep.
 
  A couple of months later, a physicist attended a physics convention
at the same hotel, and coincidentally was given the same room.  One
night during the convention, the physicist awoke and found the room
on fire!  The physicist grabbed a notepad and calculator from the bedside
table, and made some calculations.  He then picked up the fire
extinguisher, and made a quick squirt at a point a few feet from the
flames.  The fire immediately went out, and the physicist went back to
sleep.
 
  A couple of months after that, a mathematician attended a
mathematics convention at the same hotel, and sure enough, was given
the same hotel room.  After spending the day in seminars, the
mathematician returned to her hotel room and went promptly to sleep.
Some time later, she awoke to find the hotel room on fire!  She
quickly grabbed a notepad from the bedside table, made some
calculations, said, "There is a solution in principle", went back to
sleep and burned to death.
 
   -- Steve
      sneal@muskwa.ucs.ualberta.ca
 
----------------------------------------------------------------------
Anyone who believes in the intelligence, efficiency, and integrity
of any government anywhere really, REALLY needs to get out more often.
----------------------------------------------------------------------




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Duncan Frissell <frissell@panix.com>
Date: Fri, 6 Aug 93 10:50:42 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Offshore Data Havens and
Message-ID: <199308061749.AA10463@panix.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


To: cypherpunks@toad.com

J >From: jet@netcom.com (J. Eric Townsend)

J >Actually, the Feds can do anything they want.  Theyve taking to
J >raiding off-short pirate radio statons in international waters, there
J >was that bit with Noriega, etc etc.   Reagan set a standard by
J >completely ignore the world court.

Omniscience, omnipotence, and omnipresence eh?  We might as well give up 
and go home. <G>

The feds have many powers including the ability to nuke the hell out of 
everything.  The question becomes how usefull those powers are.  After 
all, Caeser or Louis XIV could "destroy the city, leave no stone standing 
upon stone and sow the ground with salt."  The difference today is that 
the "peasants" of the OECD countries are much more powerful than those of 
18th century France.

The Feds can apply point force but they can't apply it everywhere.  They 
can do some things in international waters, they can kidnap some "drug 
kingpins"  they can't go after every "criminal" *inside* the US much less 
overseas.  Their limited current powers will be further limited once 
secure untraceable communications nets are in place.

More than that, their power and prestige depend on how the people they 
rule view them.  If we turn aside from them, their power will evaporate 
overnight.  If the KGB couldn't block liberalization, the Fibbies, the 
Company, and Ft. Meade won't be able to either.  

Don't worry about it.  Social change is underway.  We'll achieve autonomy 
Just In Time.

Duncan Frissell

*************************************************************************
ATMs, Contracting Out,  Digital Switching, Downsizing, EDI, Fax, Fedex, 
Home Workers, Internet, Just In Time, Leasing, Quants, Securitization, 
Temps
      
- Not as sexy as Tim May's signature line but just as important.  


--- WinQwk 2.0b#0
                                                                                    




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Warren Keith Russell <keru@cpu.us.dynix.com>
Date: Fri, 6 Aug 93 13:08:50 PDT
To: Lee Tien <tien@toad.com>
Subject: Re: Skipjack proposed Thursday?
In-Reply-To: <9307312127.AA26124@toad.com>
Message-ID: <Pine.3.05.9308061419.C77985-a100000@cpu.us.dynix.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I apologize for the ignorance, but I'm new here!  I keep reading about
Skipjack; can someone tell me what it is?  Is there a question-and-answer
file or something of that sort for the list that can educate me and bring
me up to speed on what everyone is talking about?

-------------------------------------------------------------------------
Keith Russell                  Dynix Library Systems, Provo, Utah, U.S.A.
keru@cpu.us.dynix.com    or    keru@devg.us.dynix.com
-------------------------------------------------------------------------

On Sat, 31 Jul 1993, Lee Tien wrote:

> 
> I seem to have missed this.  Today's Chronicle (July 31) (SanFran)
> had a blurb on E2 saying that NIST on Thursday proposed Skipjack
> as a federal standard.  Does anyone have the announcement and 
> related documentation?
> 
> Lee Tien






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Derek Atkins <warlord@MIT.EDU>
Date: Fri, 6 Aug 93 14:02:09 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: MEET: Boston Area Cpunks meeting
Message-ID: <9308062056.AA18148@toxicwaste.MEDIA.MIT.EDU>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Announcing the August Boston Area Cypherpunks Meeting.

Where: MIT Room 1-115
When: Sat, Aug 14, 1993
Time: 3-8pm

Actually, I don't officially have the room until 4pm, but I figure
some people will come late, and the people who have it before might
decide to leave early.

Agenda:
	well, I don't have an agenda planned, but I'm sure we will
have some things to talk about.  Bring your PGP key, Magazine
articles, and anything else that might be of interest.

If you have any questions, either send me e-mail, or give me a call at
(617) 868-4469.

See you then!

-derek




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: nobody@cicada.berkeley.edu
Date: Fri, 6 Aug 93 19:28:55 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Offshore Data Havens and Services
Message-ID: <9308070225.AA05325@cicada.berkeley.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


At 11:56 PM 8/4/93 -0700, Timothy C. May wrote:
>the "900" sex
>service numbers, which have mostly been subjected to call blocking and
>other forms of regulatory oblivion, have been moved _offshore_.

Time for the long distance providers to extend the use of personal
identification numbers from calling cards to residences? One PIN per
authorized user. This would have saved me from getting the shaft from one
of my recent roomates!





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Date: Fri, 6 Aug 93 20:08:55 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Cypherpunks in Washington and Boston: Read this
Message-ID: <9308070306.AA15204@netcom5.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Cypherpunks in Washington, Boston, Atlanta, Dallas, Seattle, 

(and if someone wants to forward this to the Extropians list, which I
am temporarily taking a break from, I'm sure some of them would be interested)

The Internet service I use, NETCOM, is expanding into these cities,
offering flat-rate service for $17.50 a month (if paid by credit
card). I have no connection with them except for being a satisfied
user.

Many hacker friends of mine have NETCOM accounts, even if they have
ordinary corporate addresses as well (at a Bay Area Extropians lunch,
about 8 out of the dozen folks had NETCOM accounts). After all, NETCOM
can't lay you off, can't complain about what you say, and essentially
can't be leaned on by the Feds (not yet tested, but likely). A useful
service. Some people use it mostly for their mail, and then just
telnet to NETCOM to grab it.

(NETCOM provides 5 MB for your files, but charges beyond that.)

NETCOM also carries every newsgroup I've ever heard of, 4560 of them
at last count, and even carried the controversial group
"alt.binaries.pictures.erotica.children," about which I wrote a while
back (I mention this mainly to show how much of a hands-off policy
NETCOM takes). So far as I know, NETCOM has only kicked people out for
advertising competing Internet services blatantly, in the netcom.*
locall groups. Everything else seems to be fair game. (Some of the
most notorious Net bozos are NETCOM folks, indicating further the
freedom we have....I can't imagine any user on NETCOM being
"disciplined" for racist, sexist, homophobic, or speciesist remarks.)

And a full range of editors, newsreaders, mailreaders, ftp access,
telnet, etc...all the usual stuff, managed well. There are usually
enough modems to allow me to get on anytime I want to. And, to repeat,
there are no connect charges and no time limits. If you're within the
local call range of the nearest POP, you can stay logged-on as long as
you like with no charges.

It changed my life, no kidding.

Here's the announcement:

Xref: netcom.com netcom.announce:86 netcom.internet:1191 netcom.general:10006
Newsgroups: netcom.announce,netcom.internet,netcom.general
Path: netcom.com!info
From: info@netcom.com (Netcom Information Account)
Subject: NETCOM expands coverage
Message-ID: <infoCBBLt6.5BE@netcom.com>
Organization: NETCOM On-line Communication Services (408 241-9760 guest)
Distribution: netcom
Date: Fri, 6 Aug 1993 04:29:29 GMT
Approved: Info
Lines: 86

FYI:   

NETCOM On-line Communication Services, Incorporated is pleased to
announce  the expansion of the NETCOM  backbone into Seattle, WA,
Dallas, TX, Atlanta, GA, Washington, DC, and  Boston,  MA.   Each
of the new Points of Presence (POPs) will support a full range of
network services including:

      o  Internet Connections (T1 & 56kb dedicated and dialup)
      o  News/Mail feeds with Domain service
      o  Business Dial-up access (news/mail/ftp/telnet/shell)
      o  Host dial-up (stock reports, US News, news/mail/ftp/telnet/shell)
      o  Personal Network (SLIP/PPP) Connections (PNC)
      o  FrameConnect Internet Services

NETCOM can be your gateway  to  economical  communications  world
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--





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: kurtww@netcom.com (Kurt Wiedenhoeft)
Date: Fri, 6 Aug 93 21:05:22 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Oceania (libertarian country in the works)
Message-ID: <9308070400.AA26370@netcom3.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


hey all,

I just realized that I haven't seen any info on the Atlantis
Project come across the list (at least that I can remember).
That seems strange, since it seems to support directly or
indirectly all the Cypherpunk ideals.

Without going into too much detail (unless there is interest, I
suppose), The Atlantis Project is working on establishing a
floating city-state called Oceania in the Caribbean, based on a
very laissez-faire constitution and code of laws.  In my opinion,
Oceania is to become what Jefferson would have wanted the US to
be today.  

To receive periodic updates, mail your email (and snail mail)
address to oceania@world.std.com .  If anyone wants some more
info, I've got bunches of back mail I could send out to whoever wants
it.

BTW, I heartily second Tim May's endorsement of Netcom as an
internet provider.

Kurt
-- 
*/--kurtww@netcom.com--503/297.6555---Finger-for-Public-Key--\*
|.Kurt Wiedenhoeft....."What is an Epigram? a dwarfish whole,.|
|.RGB Imaging, Inc..... Its body brevity, and wit its soul."..|
*\--located-in-Portland-Oregon--------------S.T.-Coleridge---/*



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Derek Atkins <warlord@Athena.MIT.EDU>
Date: Fri, 6 Aug 93 20:45:22 PDT
To: Warren Keith Russell <keru@cpu.us.dynix.com>
Subject: Re: Skipjack proposed Thursday?
In-Reply-To: <Pine.3.05.9308061419.C77985-a100000@cpu.us.dynix.com>
Message-ID: <9308070344.AA07071@hodge>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Skipjack is a secret-key encryption algorithm designed by the NSA (and
NIST, supposedly) that is part of the Clipper/Capstone menagere.  It
is a classified algorithm, but it isof the same class of algorithms as
DES (namely a multi-round permutation/bit-swap algorithm).

Hope this helps.

-derek





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "George A. Gleason" <gg@well.sf.ca.us>
Date: Fri, 6 Aug 93 23:48:56 PDT
To: nobody@cicada.berkeley.edu
Subject: Re: Offshore Data Havens and Services
Message-ID: <93Aug6.234719pdt.14247-1@well.sf.ca.us>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Re your "Time for the long distance providers to extend the use of personal
identification numbers from calling cards to residences? One PIN per
authorized user. This would have saved me from getting the shaft from one
of my recent roomates!" item.   We're going to do this with Community
Dialtone service.  Toll calling is a separate accounting system than the
local part of the bill, and each person who uses the phone can get an
individual account; the person whose name it's in can require roommates to
get their own toll accounts.  This way no one gets stuck holding the bill.

-gg




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "L. Detweiler" <ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Date: Fri, 6 Aug 93 23:13:56 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: NSA SAYS: NO LIMIT ON ENCRYPTION
Message-ID: <9308070611.AA11855@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


From EFF Online V 5. No 14 8/5/93, official response on EFF Clipper
questions--a MINDBOGGLER!

>Because these measures may be
>sufficient to make key escrow encryption the easiest and most available
>privacy protection it would be imprudent to pursue the far more drastic
>step of regulating private encryption.  

`drastic'? `imprudent'? this from the NSA?

>The Administration has progressed
>far enough in its review to conclude it will not propose new legislation to
>limit use of encryption technology.

GOOD LORD! HALLELUJA! VICTORY!

(Is that a typo?! Did they mean `not far enough'? That's what I
*thought* they said at first!)
(uh, if this is right, can we get that in writing? with D. Denning's signature?)

BTW, This paragraph is almost incoherent and has another typo. Did NSA
have a hangover when they wrote this? Or were they drunk?

* * *

Other notes:

>Enhancing the government's ability to decrypt non-key escrow encryption
>used by the targets of authorized law enforcement wiretaps is another
>possible strategy for coping with the effects of encryption on law
>enforcement.  However, since encryption appears in a number of forms and
>applications, the costs are likely to be substantial and may not be either
>affordable or practical given the requirement for "real time" decryption in
>the course of wiretap operations.

This is the `give the NSA more money for research' argument, and is
infeasible not solely because of `a number of forms of encryption and
applications' but because of the underlying *security* of the emerging schemes.

Also in this they specifically address the question of whether Key
Escrow is legal within constitutional rights. Here they are so bold as
to suggest the 4th amendment is *strengthened* because only `legally
lawfully authorized' (their three most favorite words) taps can be
installed. Interesting, I wonder how our esteemed forefathers would
react to this unique interpretation of their masterpiece.

But as long as Skipjack is voluntary this begs the question. The
fundamental question: is *mandatory* or *restricted* use unconstitutional?

Also, we have the first official written admission that `criminals' may
turn to other schemes or `double encrypt' (i.e. encrypt the data into the system).

===cut=here===

Date: Fri, 6 Aug 1993 10:34:22 +0900
From: farber@central.cis.upenn.edu (David Farber)
Subject: EFFector Online 5.14

[...]

****************************
Answers to Clipper Questions
****************************
In a previous EFFector Online, we printed some of the 114 questions sent to
President Clinton by the Digital Privacy & Security Working Group on the
Clipper Chip.  On July 29, we received a response to these questions from
John D. Podesta, Assistant to the President and Staff Secretary.  Some
highlights of the response follow.  The complete text of the response will
be posted to EFF's ftp site.

Why is key escrow being proposed?

The development of key escrow encryption technology was born out of a
recognition on the part of the U.S. Government of the public's growing
desire for high quality encryption capability for commercial and private
use.  At the same time, the Government was concerned that the widespread
use of this technology could make lawfully authorized electronic
surveillance much more difficult.  Historically, law enforcement
encountered very little encryption, owing largely to the expense and
difficulty in using such technology.  With growing availability of lower
cost, commercial encryption technology for use by U.S. industry and private
citizens, it became clear that a strategy was needed that could accommodate
the needs of the private sector for top notch communications security; of
U.S. industry to remain competitive in the world's secure communications
market; and of U.S. law enforcement to conduct lawfully-authorized
electronic surveillance.

Enhancing the government's ability to decrypt non-key escrow encryption
used by the targets of authorized law enforcement wiretaps is another
possible strategy for coping with the effects of encryption on law
enforcement.  However, since encryption appears in a number of forms and
applications, the costs are likely to be substantial and may not be either
affordable or practical given the requirement for "real time" decryption in
the course of wiretap operations.

Why is the algorithm classified?

A classified algorithm is essential to the effectiveness of the key escrow
solution.  The use of a classified algorithm assures no one can use the
algorithm in non-escrowed systems.  Also, disclosure of the algorithm
would, in effect, provide the world with an extremely secure encryption
capability that could be implemented and used in systems by those whose
interests are adverse to U.S. national security interests.  Finally, NSA
classifies all of the algorithms used for defense systems as part of its
policy to take all reasonable steps to assure the security of systems it
develops.  The algorithm was classified in accordance with Executive Order
12356 and its implementing regulations.

For all these reasons the encryption algorithm could not be chosen from
those already available to the public, such as the Data Encryption Standard
(DES).  Similarly, the algorithm cannot be published for public review and
comment.  Nonetheless, in keeping with the Presidential Decision Directive
of April to allow independent experts to review the integrity of the
classified algorithm, five such experts have already begun a study of the
algorithm.  We expect their findings to be made public soon.

Is the key escrow initiative compatible with constitutional rights?

Questions have been raised whether the requirement of key disclosure
infringes upon one's right to free speech under the First Amendment, the
right against self incrimination contained in the Fifth Amendment, or the
right against improper search and seizure in the Fourth Amendment.  The key
escrow scheme does not require the owner or user of a device equipped with
the key escrow encryption chip to say or produce anything.  The key escrow
technique in no way addresses the issue of what people may choose to say,
and the individual user of key escrow products will not be required to
provide the government any information.  Indeed, the individual will not
know the keys.  Thus, this technology or technique in no way impacts the
rights available under the First or Fifth Amendments.

Law enforcement organizations will not be able to decrypt communications
without the device unique key and they can only obtain the key components
needed to determine a device unique key after making an appropriate
certification of their authority to conduct electronic surveillance to the
independent key escrow agents.  Thus, this technology actually strengthens
the Fourth Amendment protections afforded individuals, since law
enforcement cannot obtain the contents of communications without first
obtaining the key component.

Will use of the key escrow technology be required?

One point clearly stated in the Presidential Decision Directive and
emphasized several times since April is that use of key escrow encryption
technology is voluntary.  While the U.S. government encourages its use
because of the excellent security it provides, and will promulgate
standards permitting its use by government departments and agencies, there
is no requirement that the public use it.  No doubt some, particularly
those intent on thwarting authorized wiretaps, will buy other forms of
encryption or could "double encrypt" their communications suing a key
escrow device in combination with a non-escrowed device.  But we believe
the vast majority will buy this system because it is easy to use, provides
superb security, and likely will be readily available in commercial
products.

The Administration has chosen to encourage the widespread use of key escrow
devices rather than mandating or regulating its use.  Though we recognize
the risks to law enforcement activities posed by the widespread use of
sophisticated encryption products, we also recognize that encryption is an
effective means to secure communications and computer systems.  Thus far,
government purchases and standards have created secure products that sere
bought by private citizens "piggybacking" on the government's development
effort.  It makes little sense for the government to promulgate standards
or to develop products that will defeat law enforcement interests if and
when they spread to the private sector.  Because these measures may be
sufficient to make key escrow encryption the easiest and most available
privacy protection it would be imprudent to pursue the far more drastic
step of regulating private encryption.  The Administration has progressed
far enough in its review to conclude it will not propose new legislation to
limit use of encryption technology.





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: khijol!erc@apple.com (Ed Carp)
Date: Sat, 7 Aug 93 04:50:31 PDT
To: mnemonic@eff.org (Mike Godwin)
Subject: Re: Cypherpunks, keep your powder dry....
In-Reply-To: <199308070919.AA22366@eff.org>
Message-ID: <m0oOmfH-00023fC@khijol>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text


> Tim May writes:
> 
> > Here's a post that pretty much confirms that Dorothy Denning is
> > leaning toward schemes that outlaw competitors to Skipjack.
>  
> Dorothy said as much to me even before Clipper was announced. I think she
> would have no problem with my representing her here as being highly
> concerned that widespread powerful encryption (other than key-escrow encryption)
> poses a threat to the enforcement of the laws and the maintenance of
> public order. 

I think attitudes like Denning's pose a threat to the enforcement of the bill
of rights and the maintenance of public freedom.  People should be able to keep
their business private, without the government meddling.  I'll bet Jefferson
and Paine are both spinning in their graves.  Of course, Hamilton would
probably like Denning's ideas - he always was a bit of a busy-body...
-- 
Ed Carp, N7EKG			erc@apple.com			510/659-9560
                            anon-2133@twwells.com
If you want magic, let go of your armor.  Magic is so much stronger than
steel!        -- Richard Bach, "The Bridge Across Forever"



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: khijol!erc@apple.com (Ed Carp)
Date: Sat, 7 Aug 93 05:25:31 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: (fwd) Wolf's got a thing or two to say here...
Message-ID: <m0oOn47-00023fC@khijol>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text


Here's something I found on another newsgroup.  Any ideas what it is?  It was a
public posting...

I've tried uudecoding it and playing with it, running it through uncompress,
gunzip, and pgp (all with appropriate headers, of course - I'm not a total
idiot!), but I can't make heads or tails out of it.  Just curious if anyone
found this familiar-looking...

From: anon-2061@twwells.com (wolf)
Newsgroups: alt.sexual.abuse.recovery
Subject: Wolf's got a thing or two to say here...
Message-ID: <CBDKI8.9wy@twwells.com>
Date: 7 Aug 93 05:56:31 GMT
Sender: mail@twwells.com (mail system)
Organization: Anonymous Posting Service at twwells.com
Lines: 169

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-- 
Ed Carp, N7EKG			erc@apple.com			510/659-9560
                            anon-2133@twwells.com
If you want magic, let go of your armor.  Magic is so much stronger than
steel!        -- Richard Bach, "The Bridge Across Forever"



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Mike Godwin <mnemonic@eff.org>
Date: Sat, 7 Aug 93 02:18:59 PDT
To: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Subject: Re: Cypherpunks, keep your powder dry....
In-Reply-To: <9308060729.AA14495@netcom5.netcom.com>
Message-ID: <199308070919.AA22366@eff.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


 
Tim May writes:

> Here's a post that pretty much confirms that Dorothy Denning is
> leaning toward schemes that outlaw competitors to Skipjack.
 
Dorothy said as much to me even before Clipper was announced. I think she
would have no problem with my representing her here as being highly
concerned that widespread powerful encryption (other than key-escrow encryption)
poses a threat to the enforcement of the laws and the maintenance of
public order. 


--Mike







From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: anonymous@extropia.wimsey.com
Date: Sat, 7 Aug 93 05:49:02 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Anonymous Usenet Gateway
Message-ID: <199308071227.AA08709@xtropia>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I have found one Usenet Gateway that works with anonymous remailers,
at least for the present.

    group.name.usenet@decwrl.dec.com

For example, to use the Cuperman wimsey remailer to post to
rec.video.cable-tv send a PGP-Encrypted message to:

Remailer <remail@extropia.wimsey.com>
Subject: <code>

[Encrypted message body follows]
To: rec.video.cable-tv.usenet@decwrl.dec.com
Subject: A Pirate Replies

[message body of post]


Here is how the message appears in the newsgroup:

[Newsgroup rec.video.cable-tv]

Post: 148 of 161
From: anonymous@extropia.wimsey.com
Newsgroups: rec.video.cable-tv
Subject: A Pirate Replies
Date: Mon, 2 Aug 1993 18:06:21 -0700
Lines: 183
X-Received: by usenet.pa.dec.com; id AA00192; Mon, 2 Aug 93 19:10:01 -0700
X-Received: by inet-gw-2.pa.dec.com; id AA19438; Mon, 2 Aug 93 19:09:53 -0700
X-Received: by vanbc.wimsey.com (Smail3.1.28.1)
X-Received: by xtropia id AA10765
X-To: rec.video.cable-tv.usenet
X-Remailed-By: remail@extropia.wimsey.com
X-Comments: This message was anonymously remailed. Do not reply

[Message body]
=========================================================================
If you want to make any anonymous posts, I would jump on this quickly,
as I expect this remailer will sooner or later join utexas in blocking
anonymous posts.

I support Edgar Swank's call for the Cyherpunks remailers to support
anonymous posting directly.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: fergp@sytex.com (Paul Ferguson)
Date: Sat, 7 Aug 93 10:50:34 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: On-going experimentation....
Message-ID: <8q3w8B1w165w@sytex.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I'll try this later today to see if it makes a difference (after a
couple more cups of java), but for what its worth, I think that
this point Chael brought up should be mentioned again:
 
> From: uunet!bsu-cs.bsu.edu!nowhere (Chael Hall)
> Subject: Re: Anon remailer to USENET gate bogus
> To: sytex.com!fergp (Paul Ferguson)
> Date: Wed, 4 Aug 93 22:59:53 EST
> Cc: toad.com!cypherpunks
>
> Paul,
>
>     I have seen several bounces from the utexas server because there
> was no Subject for the posting, you need to put a subject line in the
> pasted header like so:
>
> ::
> Request-Remailing-To: alt-test@utexas.whatever...
> Subject: this is a test
> Organization: there
>
> [body]
>
>      Good luck, but that's what the error message said, there's nothing
> about anonymity in the bounce, though.
>
> Chael
>
> --
> Chael Hall
> nowhere@bsu-cs.bsu.edu, 00CCHALL@BSUVC.BSU.EDU, chall@bsu.edu
> (317) 776-4000 from 8 am - 5 pm CST

Paul Ferguson               |  "Government, even in its best state,
Network Integrator          |   is but a necessary evil; in its worst
Centreville, Virginia USA   |   state, an intolerable one."
fergp@sytex.com             |      - Thomas Paine, Common Sense
 
Type bits/keyID   Date       User ID
pub  1024/1CC04D 1993/03/15  Paul Ferguson <fergp@sytex.com>
  Key fingerprint =  EE D2 93 7D 04 6D C6 05  AC 36 AD 9D 8E 4F 41 58




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Date: Sat, 7 Aug 93 11:59:05 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Ayn Rand and Crypto-Anarchy
In-Reply-To: <9308071625.AA23852@mason1.gmu.edu>
Message-ID: <9308071856.AA20935@netcom5.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


hnash@mason1.gmu.edu writes:

> I recently read Atlas Shrugged by Ayne Rand.  I noticed two 
> crucial technologies that seem like good analogs for cypherpunk 
> technology.   

Yes, lots of parallels. I read Rand when I was 16, was mightily
influenced, but have been unable to read her since. Just the writing
style, I suppose. Other people tell me the same thing, that you
basically have to read her when you're young and impressionable. (put
a smiley here if you like)

> Did Ayn Rand anticipate crypto-anarchy?
> 

Rand later in her life denounced libertarians, let alone the even more
extreme anarcho-capitalists. And the crypto anarchists of today are
beyond even anarcho-capitalism.

But her ideas were of utmost importance. In fact, in 1988, I set out
to write a novel that would "update" "Atlas Shrugged." It's still
languishing, but many of the ideas I developed while attending Crypto
conferences, reading Vinge ("True Names") and Card ("Ender's Game"),
and exploring the implications of fully anonymous communication and
trade found their way into my "Crypto Anarchist Manifesto" that year.

So, I would agree that Rand was one of the prime motivators of crypto
anarchy. What she wanted to do with material technology (mirrors over
Galt's Gulch) is _much_ more easily done with mathematical technology.

Someday I'll repost my essay "Libertaria in Cyberspace" to this List.

-Tim May

-- 
..........................................................................
Timothy C. May         | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,  
tcmay@netcom.com       | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
408-688-5409           | knowledge, reputations, information markets, 
W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA  | black markets, collapse of governments.
Higher Power: 2^756839 | Public Key: PGP and MailSafe available.
Note: I put time and money into writing this posting. I hope you enjoy it.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: hnash@mason1.gmu.edu
Date: Sat, 7 Aug 93 09:25:59 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Ayn Rand and Crypto-Anarchy
Message-ID: <9308071625.AA23852@mason1.gmu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

I recently read Atlas Shrugged by Ayne Rand.  I noticed two 
crucial technologies that seem like good analogs for cypherpunk 
technology.   

In case your not familiar with the story, the most productive 
industrialists, engineers, etc. decide to remove themselves from 
society until the government stops interfering.  They create 
their own little community in a secluded valley where they can 
work without supporting the government.  

The first relevant technology is a mirror that hides the valley.  
The industrialists have built a small town, but from the air it 
looks like a barren desert.  The mirror conceals their 
transactions from everyone else.  This sounds like encrypted, 
untraceable communications and transactions.  Black markets 
flourish, but from outside they look like barren static.  

The second technology is a self-destructing laboratory.  This 
allows an engineer to experiment with secret technology without 
the need for physical security.  When the police break down the 
lab door, they find nothing but a fine powder, and they can't 
even guess what he's been up to.  This sounds like tamperproof 
hardware or software.  To the authorized user, it's useful 
equipment.  To everyone else, it's nothing more than random 
instructions.  

Did Ayn Rand anticipate crypto-anarchy?

          --- Yours Truly, ][adon Nash ---
in founding a family or a state, or acquiring fame even, we are mortal;
but in dealing with truth we are immortal, and need fear no change nor
accident. --- ][enry David Thoreau, 1850 ---



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Version: 2.3

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RFYGUqK1KEo=
=JvXB
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----


-------------- Yours Truly, ][adon Nash --------------------------------
 in founding a family or a state, or acquiring fame even, we are mortal;
 but in dealing with truth we are immortal, and need fear no change nor
 accident. --------------------------------- ][enry David Thoreau, 1850




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Anonymous <nowhere@bsu-cs.bsu.edu>
Date: Sat, 7 Aug 93 10:50:59 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Key-Escrow (black) Humor
Message-ID: <9308071752.AA09964@bsu-cs.bsu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Thanks to <ld231782@LANCE.ColoState.Edu> -
 
Q.  How many endangered bureacrats does it take to screw in a
    light bulb?
 
A1. We're not sure, they prefer to hide in the shadows.
A2. We don't know, we can't find any. Have you seen any?
A3. You only need one, but each only works once because they
    invariably manage to electrocute themselves in the process.
A4. You must fill out form KT-398930-0-3893-1z(321.31x*) in
    sextuplicate, "Requisition for Light Amplification and
    Enhancement Device Facilities and Staff Resources and Efficacy
    Data Measures Projections and Speculations." Invisible ink only.
    Reply will be shipped on punch cards by carrier pigeon after
    brief administrative period. Offer void where prohibited.
    Prohibited in this universe.
 
Q.  How many FBI agents does it take to wiretap?
 
A1. All of them. One to hold the alligator clips and the rest to
    convince the Congress and American public "he's just doing his
    job."
A2. FBI doesn't actually `wiretap,' a groundless popular myth. They
    only participate in wholesome law-enforcement activities at all
    times.
A3. Two. One to do the job and one to botch it. Public relations is
    automatically handled by a new AI program that endlessly constructs
    almost-coherent sentences from keywords like `dead bodies',
    `airplane explosion', `innocent children', `drug dealers',
    `terrorists', `criminals', `law-abiding public,' `American
    businesses'.
A4. B.C. (Before cryptography), several. After, none. (See also 
    `endangered bureacrats.')
 
 
Q.  How many NSA agents does it take to spy on U.S. citizens?
A.  Sorry, that's classified information.
 
 
Q.  Why does D. Sternlight favor Clipper technology?
 
A1. It's the kind of idea he could have come up with himself.
A2. Doesn't like to be bothered by details. That's what the NSA is for.
A3. No unsound idea has ever emanated from the U.S. Government.
A4. Having been to many subversive foreign countries, he recognizes the 
    necessity of spying on them.
 
 
Q.  Why is D. Denning promoting Clipper?
 
A1. Peer pressure (all her friends are doing it).
A2. Wanted to beat the rush.
A3. Looks good on her resume.
A4. Everyone needs a hobby.
A5. Coincidentally got an NSA employee after signing up for the
    Adopt an Endangered Bureacrat program.
 
 
Q.  Why is D. Denning's cryptography book so successful?
 
A1. It's cornered the lucrative NSA textbook market.
A2. The NSA bureacrats love to shred their reading material, and order
    new copies each time they need to look something up (which is
    frequent).
A3. People marvel at the writing by an expert endorsed by the NSA.
A4. NSA afraid someone will read it so they buy all the copies.
 
 
Q.  Why is the Clinton administration wholeheartedly promoting Clipper?
 
A1. The neato secret decoder rings handed out at the briefing won
    everyone over immediately.
A2. Opportunity for another authoritative and stunning nose-tweaking at 
    `the previous administration'.
A3. First installment of the fabulous new and comprehensive `Orwell 
Plan'.
A4. Anything to get those creepy NSA guys to go away.
 
 
Q.  Why did the NSA come up with the Clipper chip?
 
A1. Job security.
A2. Entertainment.
A3. Scared silly of `economic espionage' monsters hiding in the closet.
A4. Got bored that day.
A5. Great joke on those Mykotronx bozos.
 
- --
This is a carbon copy of a message that was sent to 4 different e-mail to 
USENET gatewys:
 
1. to alt.privacy.clipper via cs.utexas.edu via nowhere@bsu-cs.bsu.edu
2. to alt.privacy via demon.co.uk via ebrandt@jarthur.claremont.edu
3. to sci.crypt via decwrl.dec.com via elee7h5@rosebud.ee.uh.edu
4. to misc.legal.computing via news.cs.indiana.edu via 
phantom@mead.u.washington.edu
 
Let's see how they fare....

Ye olde Spooge Meister    spooge /spooj/ 1. Inexplicable or arcane code
<spooge@dev.null.net>            or random and probably incorrect output
                                 from a computer program.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: greg@ideath.goldenbear.com (Greg Broiles)
Date: Sat, 7 Aug 93 14:43:54 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Files re Inslaw
Message-ID: <FFkX8B1w164w@ideath.goldenbear.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain




I have uploaded three files to /pub/cypherpunks/incoming on
soda.berkeley.edu -

CASOLARO.Z      Boston Globe article re Danny Casolaro
INSLAW.Z        Barron's articles re Inslaw v U.S.
HAMILTON.Z      Transcript of radio interview with Inslaw founder

I will mail copies to folks who explicitly asked that they be mailed.
If you mailed me to say you're interested, but can't FTP, please
write again, and I'll mail them.


--
Greg Broiles                            greg@goldenbear.com
Golden Bear Computer Consulting         +1 503 342 7982
Box 12005 Eugene OR 97440               BBS: +1 503 687 7764




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: cme@ellisun.sw.stratus.com (Carl Ellison)
Date: Sat, 7 Aug 93 11:34:05 PDT
To: roeber@vxcern.cern.ch
Subject: Re: the real issue, re: Skipjack
Message-ID: <9308071833.AA04169@ellisun.sw.stratus.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Does one need to turn over keys in Switzerland just when encrypting
over the public phone wires -- or also for encrypting files on a
hard or floppy disk?

If one mails an encrypted file on a floppy disk, does the government
expect to have a copy of all keys?

 - Carl




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: fergp@sytex.com (Paul Ferguson)
Date: Sat, 7 Aug 93 14:49:06 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: NIST contact information
Message-ID: <9TJX8B1w165w@sytex.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


For anyone interested, this text was excerpted from the Computer
Systems Laboratory (CSL) Bulletin for July 1993, entitled, "Connecting
to the Internet: Security Considerations." Ironically, one paragraph
specifically states the admitted security concerns for unencrypted
traffic:
 
 "Ease of Spying and Spoofing:  The vast majority of Internet traffic
 is unencrypted and therefore easily readable.  As a result, e-mail,
 passwords, and file transfers can be monitored and captured using
 readily available software.  Intruders have been known to monitor
 connections to well-known Internet sites for the purpose of gaining
 information that would allow them to crack security or to steal
 valuable information.  This information sometimes permits intruders
 to spoof legitimate connections, i.e., trick system security into
 permitting normally disallowed network connections."
 
 
Surprisingly, the article also acknowledges the mind-boggling growth
of the Internet in a statement that says, "Consequently, the Internet
is now growing faster than any telecommunications system thus far,
including the telephone system." With that in mind, the "key-ecrow"
system is, in my opinion, just the beginning in a systemmatic
approach which I believe the NSA and the Justice Department will
attempt to entrench in their ever-elusive "War on Drugs" (WoD), etc.
This may become even more sinister in that the RICO statutes may
empower them with the ability to effectively eavesdrop at will,
monitoring voice and data communications in the shadows.
 
This file is on the NIST's publicly available system as
JUL93BLT.TXT. Other reports, announcements and bulletins are available
on their system which may be of interest to you. Information about how
to connect to the system is included below:
 
 "NIST maintains a computer security bulletin board system (BBS)
 and Internet-accessible site for computer security information open
 to the public at all times.  These resources provide information on
 computer security publications, CSL Bulletins, alert notices,
 information about viruses and anti-virus tools, a security events
 calendar, and sources for more information.
 
 To access the BBS, you need a computer with communications
 capability and a modem.  For modems at 2400 bits per second (BPS)
 or less, dial (301) 948-5717.  For 9600 BPS, dial (301) 948-5140.
 Modem settings for all speeds are 8 data bits, no parity, 1 stop
 bit.
 
 Internet users with telnet or ftp capability may telnet to the BBS
 at cs-bbs.nist.gov (129.6.54.30).  To download files, users need to
 use ftp as follows:  ftp to csrc.nist.gov (129.6.54.11), log into
 account anonymous, use your Internet address as the password, and
 locate files in directory pub; an index of all files is available
 for download.  For users with Internet-accessible e-mail
 capability, send e-mail to docserver@csrc.nist.gov with the
 following message:  send filename, where filename is the name of
 the file you wish to retrieve.  send index will return an index of
 available files."
 

Paul Ferguson               |  "Government, even in its best state,
Network Integrator          |   is but a necessary evil; in its worst
Centreville, Virginia USA   |   state, an intolerable one."
fergp@sytex.com             |      - Thomas Paine, Common Sense
 
Type bits/keyID   Date       User ID
pub  1024/1CC04D 1993/03/15  Paul Ferguson <fergp@sytex.com>
  Key fingerprint =  EE D2 93 7D 04 6D C6 05  AC 36 AD 9D 8E 4F 41 58




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Anonymous <nowhere@bsu-cs.bsu.edu>
Date: Sat, 7 Aug 93 18:49:07 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Status ongoingKey-Escrow (black) Humor
Message-ID: <9308080150.AA29201@bsu-cs.bsu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


That makes 3 of 4 ....
 

Ye olde Spooge Meister    spooge /spooj/ 1. Inexplicable or arcane code
<spooge@dev.null.net>            or random and probably incorrect output
                                 from a computer program.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Anonymous <nowhere@bsu-cs.bsu.edu>
Date: Sat, 7 Aug 93 17:49:07 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Anonymous remailer to USENET gateway testing continues
Message-ID: <9308080050.AA26972@bsu-cs.bsu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


This a summary of the anonymous e-mail to USENET gateway posts that I
sent earlier today (8/7/93) -
 
All messages included:
 
 ::
 Request-Remailing-To: <group.name or group-name>@<gateway>.<domain>
 Subject: Key-Escrow (black) Humor
 Organization: Shadows 'R Us
 
 
in the remail header (per suggestions of Chael Hall, thanks).
 
-----------------------------  ---------------------------------------
 
nowhere@bsu-cs.bsu.edu         alt-privacy-clipper@cs.utexas.edu
ebrandt@jarthur.claremont.edu  alt-privacy@demon.co.uk
elee7h5@rosebud.ee.uh.edu      sci.crypt.usenet@decwrl.dec.com
phantom@mead.u.washington.edu  misc.legal.computing@news.cs.indiana.edu
 
 
 
Based upon the following e-mail to USENET gateway templates:
 
   group-name@ucbvax.berkeley.edu
   group-name@cs.utexas.edu
   group-name@pws.bull.com
   group-name@demon.co.uk
   group.name.usenet@decwrl.dec.com
   group.name@news.cs.indiana.edu
 
 
And also based upon the following list of anonymous remailers:
 
  ebrandt@jarthur.claremont.edu
  elee7h5@rosebud.ee.uh.edu
  hal@alumni.caltech.edu
  hh@soda.berkeley.edu
  hh@cicada.berkeley.edu
  hh@pmantis.berkeley.edu
  nowhere@bsu-cs.bsu.edu 
  phantom@mead.u.washington.edu
 
 
The message sent consisted of the following message:
 
 ::
 Request-remailing-To: <host>@<gateway>.<domain>
 Subject: Key_Escrow (black) Humor
 Organization: Shadows 'R Us
 
 Thanks to <ld231782@LANCE.ColoState.Edu> -
 
 Q.  How many endangered bureacrats does it take to screw in a
     light bulb?
 
 A1. We're not sure, they prefer to hide in the shadows.
 A2. We don't know, we can't find any. Have you seen any?
 A3. You only need one, but each only works once because they
     invariably manage to electrocute themselves in the process.
 A4. You must fill out form KT-398930-0-3893-1z(321.31x*) in
     sextuplicate, "Requisition for Light Amplification and
     Enhancement Device Facilities and Staff Resources and Efficacy
     Data Measures Projections and Speculations." Invisible ink only.
     Reply will be shipped on punch cards by carrier pigeon after
     brief administrative period. Offer void where prohibited.
     Prohibited in this universe.
 
 Q.  How many FBI agents does it take to wiretap?
 
 A1. All of them. One to hold the alligator clips and the rest to
     convince the Congress and American public "he's just doing his
     job."
 A2. FBI doesn't actually `wiretap,' a groundless popular myth. They
     only participate in wholesome law-enforcement activities at all
     times.
 A3. Two. One to do the job and one to botch it. Public relations is
     automatically handled by a new AI program that endlessly constructs
     almost-coherent sentences from keywords like `dead bodies',
     `airplane explosion', `innocent children', `drug dealers',
     `terrorists', `criminals', `law-abiding public,' `American
     businesses'.
 A4. B.C. (Before cryptography), several. After, none. (See also
     `endangered bureacrats.')
 
 
 Q.  How many NSA agents does it take to spy on U.S. citizens?
 A.  Sorry, that's classified information.
 
 
 Q.  Why does D. Sternlight favor Clipper technology?
 
 A1. It's the kind of idea he could have come up with himself.
 A2. Doesn't like to be bothered by details. That's what the NSA is for.
 A3. No unsound idea has ever emanated from the U.S. Government.
 A4. Having been to many subversive foreign countries, he recognizes the
     necessity of spying on them.
 
 
 Q.  Why is D. Denning promoting Clipper?
 
 A1. Peer pressure (all her friends are doing it).
 A2. Wanted to beat the rush.
 A3. Looks good on her resume.
 A4. Everyone needs a hobby.
 A5. Coincidentally got an NSA employee after signing up for the
     Adopt an Endangered Bureacrat program.
 
 
 Q.  Why is D. Denning's cryptography book so successful?
 
 A1. It's cornered the lucrative NSA textbook market.
 A2. The NSA bureacrats love to shred their reading material, and order
     new copies each time they need to look something up (which is
     frequent).
 A3. People marvel at the writing by an expert endorsed by the NSA.
 A4. NSA afraid someone will read it so they buy all the copies.
 
 
 Q.  Why is the Clinton administration wholeheartedly promoting Clipper?
 
 A1. The neato secret decoder rings handed out at the briefing won
     everyone over immediately.
 A2. Opportunity for another authoritative and stunning nose-tweaking at
     `the previous administration'.
 A3. First installment of the fabulous new and comprehensive `Orwell 
Plan'.
 A4. Anything to get those creepy NSA guys to go away.
 
 
 Q.  Why did the NSA come up with the Clipper chip?
 
 A1. Job security.
 A2. Entertainment.
 A3. Scared silly of `economic espionage' monsters hiding in the closet.
 A4. Got bored that day.
 A5. Great joke on those Mykotronx bozos.
 
These resulting messages have been posted thus far:
 
Newsgroups: alt.privacy.clipper
Subject: Key-Escrow (black) Humor
Date: 7 Aug 1993 12:48:57 -0500
Organization: Shadows 'R Us
Lines: 91
NNTP-Posting-Host: cs.utexas.edu
 
Newsgroups: misc.legal.computing
Subject: Key-Escrow (black) Humor
X-Sender: phantom@mead.u.washington.edu
Organization: Computer Science, Indiana University
Date: Sat, 7 Aug 93 10:49:08 -0700
Remailed-By: Anon Remail  <phantom@mead.u.washington.edu>
Lines: 92
 
Further results will be posted as I receive them.

Ye olde Spooge Meister    spooge /spooj/ 1. Inexplicable or arcane code
<spooge@dev.null.net>            or random and probably incorrect output
                                 from a computer program.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: fergp@sytex.com (Paul Ferguson)
Date: Sat, 7 Aug 93 18:50:16 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: How does it really work, anyway?
Message-ID: <k5VX8B1w165w@sytex.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


As an aside, all this talk about anonymous remailers is intriguing.
 
Does anyone know with certainty what happens at the remailer site,
within the software process of stripping headers and the likes, where
the original sender of the message could be tracked? SENDMAIL logs,
etc.?
 
What would be preferrable, in ideal scenario, would be that all traces
of the incoming message was discarded altogether. In this fashion, the
operator of the remailer would be less likely to be "persuaded" to
divulge the originator(s) of messages, if found in such a precarious
position.
 

Paul Ferguson               |  "Government, even in its best state,
Network Integrator          |   is but a necessary evil; in its worst
Centreville, Virginia USA   |   state, an intolerable one."
fergp@sytex.com             |      - Thomas Paine, Common Sense
 
Type bits/keyID   Date       User ID
pub  1024/1CC04D 1993/03/15  Paul Ferguson <fergp@sytex.com>
  Key fingerprint =  EE D2 93 7D 04 6D C6 05  AC 36 AD 9D 8E 4F 41 58




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: fnerd@smds.com (FutureNerd Steve Witham)
Date: Sat, 7 Aug 93 18:29:07 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: voluntary compliance
Message-ID: <9308080120.AA16598@smds.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


An interesting statement from the Skipjack proponents is that
its use will be voluntary, and there's nothing that the citizen
using it will be required to divulge (he doesn't even know the
key and they do), and therefore no one's rights are being 
violated.  Assume for the moment that that will remain true.

They just want to encourage voluntary compliance.

This is an interesting point.  How much encouragement counts as
coercion?  Is it okay if they tax a dollar from a million people
and offer the million to you for your information?  Is it okay if 
they make it illegal to sell non-compromised phones (i.e., you
don't have to use Skipjack, you can go unencrypted or roll your
own)?

These people are purposely, avowedly, trying to "encourage" us
to do something they have no legal right to require.  Why is that
okay?  Other than asking us as "good citizens" to do something,
how is slanting the incentives okay?  Do we have the right not
to be nudged?

-fnerd
quote me




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: bart@netcom.com (Harry Bartholomew)
Date: Sun, 8 Aug 93 10:01:27 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: NIST contact information (further)
Message-ID: <9308080753.AA15221@netcom5.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Forwarded message:
> From: fergp@sytex.com (Paul Ferguson)
> Date: Sat, 07 Aug 93 16:52:31 EDT
	....
>  
> This file is on the NIST's publicly available system as
> JUL93BLT.TXT. Other reports, announcements and bulletins are available

	In a forest of other information. The full recursive directory
	of /pub is itself 78346 bytes! The file referenced above is
	found in /pub/nistbul, but I downloaded several megabytes of 
	interesting stuff.
	




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: nate@VIS.ColoState.EDU (CVL staff member Nate Sammons)
Date: Sun, 8 Aug 93 12:01:29 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: RE: (fwd) Wolf's got a thing or two to say here...
Message-ID: <9308081856.AA00254@vangogh.VIS.ColoState.EDU>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



That almost looks like a posting from "NewsGrazer" on the NeXT,
but I can't confirm it.  That app could post Ritch text,
and it often appeared as garbage unless you use
NewsGrazer to decode it, but it also had something in the header
about NewsGrazer...

who knows?

-nate




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: IE63@vaxb.acs.unt.edu
Date: Sun, 8 Aug 93 17:36:26 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: EXE/COM encryptions
Message-ID: <01H1IIPJ64TE001JWH@vaxb.acs.unt.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


This is a message I received for an excellent idea on the run-time encryptions.
Once I finish my current project(s), I may start on it, but in the mean time...
any of you out there want to try this one?  BTW - the program I mentioned
in the post at the beginning of this thread has been uploaded to 
soda.berkeley.edu - when (if) it gets posted, anyone who's interested can
FTP it... it contains full source code and is titled BWFPU21S.ZIP.  As
of yet, It has rather poor encryption techniques, but after all the suggestions
I've been receiving, I hope to change that ASAP.  Thanks Everyone!
				Michael Ellison  ie63@vaxb.acs.unt.edu

Forwarded Message:

From:	IN%"rarachel@ishara.poly.edu"  "A1 ray arachelian"  8-AUG-1993 13:18:00.86
To:	IN%"IE63@vaxb.acs.unt.edu"
CC:	
Subj:	RE: EXE/COM encryptions....

Return-path: <rarachel@ishara.poly.edu>
Received: from ishara.poly.edu by vaxb.acs.unt.edu (PMDF #3644 ) id
 <01H1I5P1HL3K001KB3@vaxb.acs.unt.edu>; Sun, 8 Aug 1993 13:17:49 CDT
Received: by ishara.poly.edu (5.59a/25-eef) id AA05059; Sun,
 8 Aug 93 10:16:57 EDT
Date: 08 Aug 1993 10:16:55 -0400 (EDT)
From: A1 ray arachelian <rarachel@ishara.poly.edu> (library)
Subject: RE: EXE/COM encryptions....
In-reply-to: <01H1H4U3WNYQ001JGI@vaxb.acs.unt.edu>; from
 "IE63@vaxb.acs.unt.edu" at Aug 7, 93 7:42 pm
To: IE63@vaxb.acs.unt.edu
Message-id: <9308081416.AA05059@ishara.poly.edu>
Content-transfer-encoding: 7BIT

>         That sounds like an excellent idea - I may start experiment with
> that soon if I get time, if not, you might want to send the idea to the
> cypherpunks list as a whole as it would be really cool to see implemented.  
> The program I've written attaches to already compiled .EXE and .COM files 
> after compiling, so it would be of little use in that application (and
> it is in .ASM), but writing another one at some point would be interesting...
> haveta find someone with some _really_ technical docs on a good commercial
> compiler.....
> 

I hope I'm right about this, but when you do a reply to a message coming
from the cypherpunks newsgroup (from my mailbox as I subscribed to it)
doesn't the reply go through toad.com rather than just as a reply to the
person to whom I'm responding? 

(If not, then I've been needlessly posting private messages!)


Anyhow, you could always go for a compiler whose sources are readily
available such as GCC.  Commercial grade compilers will generally not
provide a way to patch the back end.  >HOWEVER< you can get around this
by writing your own linker, and if the linker is smart enough to know
where a function call is made, you can add in your own code to do the
decryption to some free memory area off the disk, execute that area, 
and when the code returs back out, you free that memory area.  It would
be a somewhat disk intesive execution, but hey, it could be done from
RAM as well. :-)

There are several excellent third party linkers out there such as RTLINK
and Blinker in the DOS world that do all sorts of nifty things such as
overlays and dynamic memory management for compilers that don't give
these features.

Another possiblility is to write your own assembler as for instance Borland
C will produce assembly output if told to do so rather than obj code.
Then the assembler does the encryption handlink and I suppose a regular
linker would work too.

However, with most compilers, you should be able to write an engine
in C code which will open up a datbase or some other file which is encrypted
then grab portions of that file, decrypt them to memory, and do a
call to them as if they were functions.  Then when the call is done,
you free that memory block, and continue to do the same..  This
would deal with the ability to load up functions in overlays or
just execute functions via a pointer than a direct call to a function.

So the main code of your program is a decryption engine which loads up
modules from an encrypted overlay file (or from the end of the EXE file,)
decrypts them in RAM, calls them, and frees the memory they took up.
(This may fail with STATIC variable declarations within functions!)

It would work very nicely, but instead of doing direct function calls
your program's source would need to be modifyied to do a whole song
and dance before it can call a protected function.

With a linker or compiler that does this automatically it makes it
much easier to just recompile existing code, and much much easier
to write such code from the programmer's point of view.

Now an interesting situation is to be found on Macs which have
individual code resources which can be compressed.  There is no
built in decompression/compression scheme in the system software.
Rather it makes use of a special code resource labeled as DCMP for
decompress which of course you could replace with a decrypt
code resource, though the system would think the code resources
are compressed. :-)

This would not require any modifications to a compiler or linker.
Just encrypting resources and adding in a decryption code resource
which would pop up a dialog box asking for a key the first time it
runs.

(IF this winds up being private just to you, please post it as public
for me by forwarding it to the cypherpunks newsgroup.)





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "L. Detweiler" <ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Date: Sun, 8 Aug 93 21:16:26 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: CFP '94 announcement
Message-ID: <9308090415.AA17448@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


There was a huge amount of interest in this last time around, so I'm 
posting this to the list for anyone who hasn't seen it.

p.s. look who's running the `student paper competition'...

===cut=here===

From: faigin@aero.org (Daniel P. Faigin)
Newsgroups: comp.security.misc,comp.org.acm
Subject:  Computers Freedom and Privacy 1994
Date: 4 Aug 93 11:31:10
Message-ID: <FAIGIN.93Aug4113110@soldan.aero.org>


                    Conference Announcement 
              Computers, Freedom, and Privacy 1994 
                         23-26 March 1994

     The fourth annual conference, "Computers, Freedom, and
Privacy," (CFP'94) will be held in Chicago, Il., March 23-26, 1994. 
The conference is hosted by The John Marshall Law School; George B.
Trubow, professor of law and director of the Center for Informatics
Law at John Marshall, is general chair of the conference. (E-Mail:
7trubow@jmls.edu). The program is sponsored jointly by these
Association for Computing Machinery (ACM) Special Interest Groups:
Communications (SIGCOMM); Computers and Society (SIGCAS); Security,
Audit and Control (SIGSAC).

     The advance of computer and communications technologies holds
great promise for individuals and society.  From conveniences for
consumers and efficiencies in commerce to improved public health
and safety and increased participation in government and community,
these technologies  are fundamentally transforming our environment
and our lives.

     At the same time, these technologies present challenges to the
idea of a free and open society.  Personal privacy is at risk from
invasions by high-tech surveillance and monitoring; a myriad of
personal information data bases expose private life to constant
scrutiny; new forms of illegal activity may threaten the
traditional barriers between citizen and state and present new
tests of Constitutional protection; geographic boundaries of state
and nation may be recast by information exchange that knows no
boundaries in global data networks.

     CFP'94 will present an assemblage of experts, advocates and
interest groups from diverse perspectives and disciplines to
consider freedom and privacy in today's "information society." A
series of pre-conference tutorials will be offered on March 23,
1994, with the conference program beginning on Thursday, March 24,
and running through Saturday, March 26, 1994.

     The Palmer House, a Hilton hotel located in Chicago's "loop,"
and only about a block from The John Marshall Law School, is the
conference headquarters.  Room reservations should be made directly
with the hotel after September 1, 1993, mentioning John Marshall or
"CFP'94" to get the special conference rate of $99.00, plus tax.

                     The Palmer House Hilton
               17 E. Monroe., Chicago, Il., 60603
      Tel: 312-726-7500;  1-800-HILTONS;  Fax 312-263-2556  

Communications regarding the conference should be sent to:
                             CFP'94
                    The John Marshall Law School
                       315 S. Plymouth Ct.
                     Chicago, IL 60604-3907
(Voice: 312-987-1419; Fax: 312-427-8307; E-mail: CFP94@jmls.edu)

      CALL FOR CFP'94 PARTICIPATION AND PROGRAM SUGGESTIONS

     It is intended that CFP'94 programs will examine the potential
benefits and burdens of new information and communications
technologies and consider ways in which society can enjoy the
benefits while minimizing negative implications. 

     Proposals are requested from those who desire to present an
original paper in a relevant area of technology, policy analysis or
law, or to suggest a program presentation.  Any proposal (1) should
not exceed three typewritten double-spaced pages; (2) must state
the title of the paper or program; (3) briefly describe its theme
and content; and (4) set out the name, address, credentials and
experience of the author or suggested speakers. If a proposed paper
has already been completed a copy should be attached to the
proposal.

                    STUDENT PAPER COMPETITION

Full time college or graduate students are invited to enter the
student paper competition.  Papers must not exceed 2500 words and
should address the impact of computer and telecommunications
technologies on freedom and privacy in society.  Winners will
receive a scholarship to attend the conference and present their
papers. All papers should be submitted by November 1, 1993 (either
as straight text via e-mail or 6 printed copies) to:

                      Prof. Eugene Spafford
                 Department of Computer Science
                        Purdue University
                  West Lafeyette, IN 47907-2004
         E-Mail: spaf@cs.purdue.edu; Voice: 317-494-7825


                          REGISTRATION

Registration information and fee schedules will be announced by
September 1, 1993.  Inquiries regarding registration should be
directed to RoseMarie Knight, Registration Chair, at the JMLS
address above; her voice number is 312-987-1420.

--
[W]: The Aerospace Corp. M1/055 * POB 92957 * LA, CA 90009-2957 * 310/336-8228
[Email]:faigin@aero.org, faigin@acm.org         [Vmail]:310/336-5454 Box#68228
"I have a spelling checker/It came with my PC/It plainly marks four my revue/
Mistakes I cannot sea/I've run this poem threw it/I'm sure your pleased too no/
Its letter perfect in it's weigh/My checker tolled me sew."      Pennye Harper






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: gnu (John Gilmore)
Date: Mon, 9 Aug 93 00:26:29 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com, gnu
Subject: Re: Key-Escrow (black) Humor
In-Reply-To: <9308071752.AA09964@bsu-cs.bsu.edu>
Message-ID: <9308090723.AA25039@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> Q.  How many NSA agents does it take to spy on U.S. citizens?
> A.  Sorry, that's classified information.

Actually, the line is:

A.  We don't comment on our interception capabilities.

	John




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "George A. Gleason" <gg@well.sf.ca.us>
Date: Mon, 9 Aug 93 01:56:30 PDT
To: nowhere@bsu-cs.bsu.edu
Subject: Re:  Key-Escrow (black) Humor
Message-ID: <93Aug9.015133pdt.14000-2@well.sf.ca.us>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



How many government agents does it take to screw in a lightbulb?

a1: None, they don't screw.

a2: None, they only screw the general public.

a3: That question is forbidden under Don't Ask / Don't Tell.


-gg




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: James Still <still@kailua.colorado.edu>
Date: Mon, 9 Aug 93 07:51:49 PDT
To: 'Cypherpunks List' <cypherpunks@toad.com>
Subject: Re: Ayn Rand and Crypto-Anarchy
Message-ID: <2C667234@kailua.colorado.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



>So, I would agree that Rand was one of the prime motivators of crypto
>anarchy. What she wanted to do with material technology (mirrors over
>Galt's Gulch) is _much_ more easily done with mathematical technology.
>
>Someday I'll repost my essay "Libertaria in Cyberspace" to this List.

I've never seen it, how about humoring me and making "someday" today?

+----------------------------------+-----------------------------+
| Life is a PGP-encryted riddle,   | <still@kailua.colorado.edu> |
| and the secret key is hidden     | Hieroglyphic Voodoo Machine |
| on board a UFO with Elvis.       |    1.303.443.2457  N-8-1    |
+----------------------------------+-----------------------------+




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: paul@poboy.b17c.ingr.com (Paul Robichaux)
Date: Mon, 9 Aug 93 07:16:37 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Secure voice software issues
Message-ID: <199308091409.AA23126@poboy.b17c.ingr.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

As soon as I get the famous Intergraph Overtime Boot off my neck, I
plan to start writing some crypto-phone software for the Mac. Pursuant
to that, there are some issues and questions that I'd like to raise
here for your perusal.

There have been several calls here in the past for Sound-Blaster based
cryptophones, but none have yet appeared, so I'm going ahead with
this. Comments and questions, even flames, are welcome. Just don't ask
me to include support for Skipjack/Capstone hardware, or I'll sic
David Sternlight on you. (note: no smiley)

1. Why the Mac? Well, because I have one :) Also because all Macs for the
last three years or so have integrated sound I/O, and OS support for
same. This support includes choice of sampling rate, compression
(none, ~2:1, ~6:1), and even a choice of input device (the built-in
mike, or some more-exotic external device, like the Mac version of the
PAS-16 soundcard.)

2. Some fundamental principles:
	a) encryption routines will be provided as drop-in "plugins",
	much like Photoshop or BBEdit. Easy to customize, easy to
	roll-your-own. Easy for non-US residents to use. Easy to
	separate details of encryption from messy details of Mac
	Sound Manager and Toolbox.

	b) reuse. The initial version will leverage as much existing
	code (cf. Outerbridge's fast 68k DES, parts of PGP, and so on.)
	The eventual product will be released in complete source form
	to encourage adaptation to other platforms. (note that if I use
	AppMaker for my basic design, as I am wont to do, that I won't
	be able to distribute their source code.)

	c) STU-III metaphor. Basic mechanism: caller dials callee. The
	phones establish a connection and negotiate speed and security-
	for example, the crypto ignition key you put into a STU-III
	may be able to handle TOP SECRET or below, but your callee may
	only be able to handle SECRET.

	I expect the s/w version to also negotiate sampling fidelity
	(5.5, 11, or 22 kHz) based on DCE connect speed and compression
	based on DCE connect speed and CPU power. (neat idea: each side
	can compress and encrypt one of the standard system beeps to
	determine a relative "power index" for negotiation)

4. The initial version will probably support single and triple DES and
IDEA for encryption, with key exchange a la vat- none! Later versions
may include DH key exchange and other encryption algorithms.
Eventually (probably not until I get a PowerPC-based machine) I'd like
to be able to use PGP keyrings as phonebooks.

5. In a few months I'll need some beta testers. In the meantime I need
helpful suggestions for names, features, and designed-in expansion
capabilities.

- -Paul

- -- 
Paul Robichaux, KD4JZG     | "Crypto-anarchy means never having to say
perobich@ingr.com          |  you're sorry." - Tim May (tcmay@netcom.com)
Intergraph Federal Systems | Be a cryptography user- ask me how.


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Version: 2.3a

iQCVAgUBLGZaUiA78To+806NAQFzbwP/QcmDnDIqIxyzKyXdbWteVMDd6DUeHwQ0
is/C6yQgRNSNgf0fPTPBU8u3D8R8CWua7YM8oSwzPsR0MNYDbuMQqEKNLQNDHkGo
Sq1duWBKcjy1XmGXJ0QxlC3EqB85IQMnp2tI7JxmotsAv5YLFJ3+vvfRZZkmdpUS
c0Aea7baaec=
=kZWx
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: karn@qualcomm.com (Phil Karn)
Date: Mon, 9 Aug 93 09:51:49 PDT
To: elee9sf@Menudo.UH.EDU
Subject: ANON: Re: how does it work
In-Reply-To: <199308091614.AA19550@Menudo.UH.EDU>
Message-ID: <9308091646.AA21992@servo>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


On most UNIX systems, nothing prevents an ordinary user (one without the
root password) from writing his/her own program for sending mail to a remote
site with SMTP/TCP/IP; there's no requirement to go through the normal
sendmail queue. Incoming mail is a different story, but at least you can
keep the outgoing half of your traffic from being logged.

Phil




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: bart@netcom.com (Harry Bartholomew)
Date: Mon, 9 Aug 93 09:51:48 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: NIST System's Address
Message-ID: <9308091651.AA17492@netcom5.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> From: DIC1241@cup.edu
> Subject: NIST System's Address
> 
> 	I seemed to miss it the first time, so could someone please post NIST's
> system address again.  Thanks
> 
> 
	ftp to csrc.nist.gov:/pub






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: DIC1241@cup.edu
Date: Mon, 9 Aug 93 07:51:47 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: NIST System's Address
Message-ID: <744907861.240000.DIC1241@cup.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


	I seemed to miss it the first time, so could someone please post NIST's
system address again.  Thanks





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: karn@qualcomm.com (Phil Karn)
Date: Mon, 9 Aug 93 11:11:46 PDT
To: pbreton@cs.umb.edu
Subject: ANON: Re: how does it work
In-Reply-To: <Pine.3.05.9308091300.A5374-b100000@ra.cs.umb.edu>
Message-ID: <9308091810.AA23514@servo>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


You don't use the system telnet, you write your own socket application.
No UNIX systems I know log at this level, but it is certainly possible.
Or someone could record packets off the local Ethernet. There's not much
you can do about this.

You could hack up a copy of sendmail, but SMTP is so trivial that you
could do it yourself, especially since the functionality you need
is so limited.

Phil




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Karl Barrus <elee9sf@Menudo.UH.EDU>
Date: Mon, 9 Aug 93 09:16:38 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: ANON: Re: how does it work
Message-ID: <199308091614.AA19550@Menudo.UH.EDU>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----


> As an aside, all this talk about anonymous remailers is intriguing.
> Does anyone know with certainty what happens at the remailer site,
> within the software process of stripping headers and the likes, where
> the original sender of the message could be tracked? SENDMAIL logs,
> etc.?

Well, I recently checked the syslog file (found in /usr/spool/mqueue)
on rosebud, and it contains entries like this:

Aug  7 17:40:17 rosebud sendmail[24780]: AA24780: from=elee7h5,
size=6544, class=0
Aug  7 17:40:19 rosebud sendmail[24781]: AA24780: to=[deleted]
delay=00 :00:02, stat=Sent, mailer=tcp, host=[deleted]
Aug  8 10:19:41 rosebud sendmail[24816]: AA24816: message-id=<[deleted]>
Aug  8 10:19:41 rosebud sendmail[24816]: AA24816: from=<[deleted]>, 
size=618, class=0
Aug  8 10:19:41 rosebud sendmail[24817]: AA24816: 
to="|/users/emlab/elee7h5/remail/slocal.pl", delay=00:00:01, 
stat=Sent, mailer=prog, host= 

(I deleted out the addresses that were actually there.)
Unfortunately, I can't erase the syslog file or turn sendmail logging
off.

Some things that would help foil traffic analysis would be to file all
incoming mail in a directory, and then mail it out randomly in the
early hours of the morning.  Or, hop your mail around a bit more.

> What would be preferrable, in ideal scenario, would be that all traces
> of the incoming message was discarded altogether. In this fashion, the
> operator of the remailer would be less likely to be "persuaded" to
> divulge the originator(s) of messages, if found in such a precarious
> position.

Ah, I have some bad and good news about my remailer
elee7h5@rosebud.ee.uh.edu.  A friend has loaned me his account, and in
the course of setting up a remailer which uses RIPEM instead of PGP
(some folks have requested this - and it should be up RSN :-), I tried
to log into my account to fix the sendmail invocation option to -oi
and recompile perl to include flock() support.  I found my password
had been locked!

Actually, I've been expecting this to happen - you see, I'm through
with UH and am going to Rice from now on.  Rosebud is a workstation in
the grad group I used to be in, and since I'm no longer a student, I
figured this would happen sooner or later.  BUT, it is a precedent
that old student's directories are kept around, with logins disabled.
I've tested the remailer, and it still responds, so hopefully it will
run quietly for many more months/years :-)

That was the bad news: I can't log into it to fix things, or check
bounced mail, etc.  But this is good news as well: bounces and errors
are dropped, the remailer works automatically and I can't disable it
:-) In fact, I have a pretty good excuse if ever somebody "abuses" the
remailer... I can't do anything about it, heh :-)



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Xq1ehVSa7Q7UPeqfoNRVpDpWljyajKiJ5DZElhUPHiDJbTD9GZzoP0w9+SPQqB6D
Ar6nS1kt0BptEUoNC5aLDsFyOBx3f7pZg+7YfcBHs10hVybQUNIzGs+g9YWt+CtB
GXZV17GOzlY=
=BV0/
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "W. Kinney" <kinney@spot.Colorado.EDU>
Date: Mon, 9 Aug 93 10:21:45 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: PGP Bug?
Message-ID: <199308091717.AA19879@spot.Colorado.EDU>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain




Cypherpunks --

Looking at the code for doing conventional encryption in PGP, I've come across 
something that doesn't look right. It's with the 10-byte header block that PGP 
adds to the beginning of files -- 8 bytes of random data with the last two 
bytes repeated to use for key verification.

Indicating omissions by "[...]", the code in crypto.c looks like this:

int idea_encryptfile(char *infile, char *outfile, 
	boolean attempt_compression)
{
[...]
	byte ideakey[16];                <------- KEEP AN EYE ON THIS BUFFER
	struct hashedpw *hpw;

[... a call to GetHashedPassPhrase to set the key]


	/* Now compress the plaintext and encrypt it with IDEA... */
	squish_and_idea_file( ideakey, f, g, attempt_compression );

[...]
}


static int squish_and_idea_file(byte *ideakey, FILE *f, FILE *g, 
	boolean attempt_compression)
{

[...]

	idea_file( ideakey, ENCRYPT_IT, t, g, fsize(t) );

[...]
}


static
int idea_file(byte *ideakey, boolean decryp, FILE *f, FILE *g, word32 lenfile)
{	
[...]
#define RAND_PREFIX_LENGTH 8

[...]

	if (!decryp)	/* encrypt-- insert key check bytes */
	{	/* There is a random prefix followed by 2 key check bytes */

		memcpy(textbuf, ideakey+IDEAKEYSIZE, RAND_PREFIX_LENGTH);
                       ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^

But ideakey is only a sixteen byte buffer! Looks like we're copying junk from 
the stack here, instead of generating a strong random number to put in the 
prefix...



And now a question for the crypto gurus out there. The reason I came across the 
above is because I'm adding conventional encryption to some Mac code I had 
laying around, and I wanted to support PGP-format files. I had been thinking 
about the problem of verifying decryption keys, and the solution I had come up 
with to use in my code was to MD5 hash the plaintext when I encrypted it, then 
encrypt the hash with the same key and store it in a resource to use as a key 
verification block. When the file is decrypted, so is the verification block, 
and all you have to do to verify the key is MD5 the plaintext again and compare 
the new hash to the original hash. My question is, can anyone think of any 
weaknesses with doing it that way? (I can still support PGP data formats if I 
do...)


                                  -- Will



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: collins@newton.apple.com (Scott Collins)
Date: Mon, 9 Aug 93 22:26:56 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Wolf's got a thing or two to say
Message-ID: <9308091826.AA12189@newton.apple.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Hello,

The message in question was ascii armored with a missing checksum.  You can
trick PGP into ignoring the missing checksum by decrypting to the screen
(only).  It is an example of the fact that most messages are more work to
decrypt than they are worth upon reading (at least to me, since I do not
know or know of 'Wolf', 'Nancy', 'Rose', 'David' or 'Officer Cooper 171' or
any of their interactions).

Scott Collins         | "Few people realize what tremendous power there
                      |  is in one of these things."     -- Willy Wonka
......................|................................................
BUSINESS.   voice:408.862.0540  fax:974.6094   collins@newton.apple.com
Apple Computer, Inc.   1 Infinite Loop, MS 301-2C   Cupertino, CA 95014
.......................................................................
PERSONAL.   voice/fax:408.257.1746    1024/669687   catalyst@netcom.com


What follows is the de-armored text of the message "(fwd) Wolf's got a
thing or two to say":
----------cut here----------
Hello friends.
I hope you are all well.
I am doing better today than before.
I get a little more livelier every day.
I am not in the mood to talk about the situation right now, though.
I would like to first of all thank each an every one of you for
the SCADS of mail I have recieved in response to my post about what
happened last Monday night.
I am not very good at those name things...where everyone who writes someone
gets listed in a thank you note.
And I am not very good at promptly answering mail either.
And I am not very good at ever getting around to answering all of the mail
I recieve.  
I wish that I were better about this, but I am simply too busy.
I have tried to send a thankyou note to as many of you as I can personally.
I know for a fact that there are many replies that I recieved that went
unanswered, and for that I hope no one takes it personally.
I am not in any way trying to say that every bit of individual support is not

as important as any other.  I read every piece of mail I get!  And I respond 
to it if I can.
I want for all of asar to know...I thank you for being here for me and I know
who is out there on my side!


now...I have something else that is on my mind...
I will admit that I have neglected to read every post in the thread that got
ignited by Nancy's RE: David post.  I know that I have not been able to locate
the post by Rose that keeps getting reffered to.  Oh well, too bad...I still
have some things to add on my behalf and simply because seom
something about this thread is very disturbing to me.
I am going to place a spoiler here b/c I am fearful that what I am about to
say my be flame bait.  I think it might offend some of you and I do not want
to get into a situation like that again.  I have carefully considered what I
would like to express, but I get t
 he feeling that there are some people who are looking for a debate no matter
what.  So if you want to square off and hash this thread to pieces, then of
course you are certainly free to do so, but I will be much more comfortable
with this if my $.02 are inserted right here and now...

************************************SPOILER************************************
this 
will
discuss
my
feelings
concerning
some 
of 
"did
she 
do
the
right
thing"
and 
some
of
the
symantic

discussions

that
are
taking
place
as
a 
result
of
some
responses
to
my
post
that is most certainly enough lines...


I agree with whoever in response to this thread posted that this is emotionally
charged stuff.  I have been a little charged by it myself.
Since I have not read Rose's part in this I cannot relate to that area of the
discussion.  Obviously Rose is upset that someone said something negative to
her.  I will try not to be cynical about it, b/c I am feeling a little bit
upity and I do not want to be rude.
I am simply a bit disturbed by Nancy's original post about my having
"gotten David arrested".
On my behalf...call it symantic quibble if you will, but it is what I did to
protect myself and I am angered that it seems to have been questioned even
no especially when even David didn't question it once he had a period to calm
himself.
No I have read where everyone thinks that for one reason or another I did the
right thing to protect myself.  But let's face it, guys.
David got himself arrested.
As for police and police brutality and fairness and justice, well, look at
the perr
peers around you.
Many of us have very little faith in the justice system of this USA.
If we had more maybe more of us would have tried a long time ago to seek out
the justice we deserve for the violations we have suffered.
I am not quick to call the police either, let me tell you.
My first experience with trying to get police to help me with being harrassed
by Dez (where I was being forced to practice prostitution and being beaten and
ravaged regularly) led me to getting punished by Dez since he had so 
conveniently bought off parts of the police department in my home town.  I
got the shit beat out of me first by the cops then by Dez.
So I know how fucked up the police an be.
Luckily this is a different town and a different life (well almost).
As I sit here and think of the policeman, officer Cooper 171, beating David's
head against the roof of his squad car my stomach is turning.
David is badly bruised and one of his eyes got cut.
Now I am sorry that he has had to endure this.
I think it is wrong...and I am almost certain that the force used to restrain
him was a bit excessive.  I know David and he will not fight impossible odds.
Still, I am thankful that he got a little taste of hell that night with
respect to what he put me through.  He is a little bit sensitive to what he
did to me.
None of this is meant to excuse or justify his behavior, b/c I find it totally
unacceptable and abhoring at the very least.
I am sorry for the fucking injustices of the world.
There are in fact many.
Like the girl who tried to seek justice for being gang raped but had a bad
reputation so they told he to get out of their faces that they had no time
for her little case.
That was not just a case, that was her life.
Just like Nancy's friend who served 2 years for a crime he probably did not
commit.
It is an injustice.
I think we all agree that injustices do happen in every area of our society.
What are we here for?
ARe we here with hopes that we can pinpoint the exact place where society
went wrong and change it?
no I do not think that is it (stop me if I am wrong)
I think we are here to give care and support to one another b/c we have all
suffered some pretty haneous injustices and the care we get from one another
often helps to serve some purpose towards ending that cycle.
As for Rose...was she being manipulative?
well, I do not know.
I have felt that way at times, but I have also done that at times myself...
I firmly believe in the childhood come-back "takes one to know one"
and I know that when I see someone manipulating it is only because I have
done it myself that I am able to see it.
And yes it sometimes takes a bit of tough love to break behaviors like that.
I think we all love Rose...I know that we feel for her...she seems to be in
so much pain...
I do not think we are here to pass judgement on her...
and I do not think we are here to keep someone from being taken in by a situatio
n that we may percieve as harmful to them (within the infrastructure of the
group).  
We have all heard at one time or another someone on here tell us about boundarie
s andd it is still up to us as individuals to set them.
I hope that from asar more than any other place there is more tolerance of
people learning that and feeling out just how to go about that.
And at the same time I think that this is the place where I first learned how
to enforce them as well, so I hope that all of asar understands that many of
us are still trying on some  of these new clothes....
as for the RE: David thread, well, I guess I have had my say.
I am looking at this from this perspective right now, and my perspectives are
always subject to change.
So if I haven't hurt anyone's feelings or run anyone off, then good.
I do not step out and speak my mind like this often and it always feels good
when I do...
flame me if you must
just put a spoiler in it so that we will have some warning
I am up and down right now
so I am tyring to be careful about some of the stufff I read.

that is enough ranting for tonight I think.
wolf
----------cut here----------






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Date: Mon, 9 Aug 93 12:26:37 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Libertaria in Cyberspace
Message-ID: <9308091925.AA24594@netcom.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


"Libertaria in Cyberspace"


I wrote, and then James Still wrote:

>>So, I would agree that Rand was one of the prime motivators of crypto
>>anarchy. What she wanted to do with material technology (mirrors over
>>Galt's Gulch) is _much_ more easily done with mathematical technology.
>>
>>Someday I'll repost my essay "Libertaria in Cyberspace" to this List.
>
>I've never seen it, how about humoring me and making "someday" today?


Your wish is my command! Originally written for the "Extropians" mailing
list, nearly a year ago, there are undoubtedly things that could be changed
or improved. 

Reaching this state of "Libertaria," if it ever happens, will take a lot
more than the Cypherpunks remailers of today. Digital money, truly
anonymous transactions (a la Chaum's "Dining Cryptographers Net"), digital
escrow services, reputations, etc., are all needed.

Here it is:



To: Extropians@gnu.ai.mit.edu
From: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
X-Original-Message-Id: <9209011842.AA14649@netcom.netcom.com>
Subject: Libertaria in Cyberspace
Date: Tue, 1 Sep 92 11:42:12 PDT
X-Extropian-Date: Remailed on September 1, 372 P.N.O. [18:42:47 UTC]



LIBERTARIA IN CYBERSPACE

or

CYBERSPACE MORE HOSPITABLE TO IDEAS OF LIBERTY AND CRYPTO ANARCHY


Here are a few points about why "cyberspace," or a computer-mediated
network, is more hospitable than physical locations for the kind of
"crypto anarchy" libertarian system I've been describing.

Several folks have commented recently about ocean-going libertarian
havens, supertankers used as data havens, and so forth. In the 1970s,
especially, there were several unsuccessful attempts to acquire
islands in the Pacific for the site of what some called "Libertaria."
(Some keywords: Vanuatu, Minerva, Mike Oliver, Tonga)

Obtaining an entire island is problematic. Getting the consent of the
residents is one issue (familiar to those on the this list who
weathered the Hurrican Andrew diversion debate). Being _allowed_ to
operate by the leading world powers is another....the U.S. has
enforced trade embargoes and blockades against many nations in the
past several decades, including Cuba, North Korea, Libya, Iran, Iraq,
andothers. Further, the U.S. has invaded some countries---Panama- is a
good example---whose government it disliked. How long would a
supertanker "data haven" or libertarian regime last in such an
environment? (Stephenson's fascinating "SnowCrash" didn't address tthe
issue of why the "Raft" wasn't simply sunk by the remaining military
forces.)

I should note that the recent splintering of countries may provide
opportunities for libertarian (or PPL, if your prefer to think of it
in this way) regions. Some have speculated that Russia itself is a
candidate, given that it has little vested in the previous system and
may be willing to abandon statism. If several dozen new countries are
formed, some opportunities exist..

The basic problem is that _physical space_ is too small, too exposed
to the view of others. "Libertaria" in the form of, say, an island, is
too exposed to the retaliatation of world powers. (I won't go into the
"private nukes" strategy, which I need to think about further.)

A floating private nation (or whatever it's called) is too vulnerable
to a single well-placed torpedo. Even if it serves as a kind of Swiss
bank, and thus gets some of the same protection Switzerland got (to
wit, many leaders kept their loot there), it is too vulnerable to a
single attacker or invader. Piracy will be just one of the problems.

Finally, how many of us want to move to a South Pacific island? Or a
North Sea oil rig? Or even to Russia? 

Cyberspace looks more promising. There is more "space" in cyberspace,
thus allowing more security and more colonizable space. And this space
is coterminous with our physical space, accessible with proper
terminals from any place in the world (though there may be attempts in
physical space to block access, to restrict access to necessay
cryptographic methods, etc.).

I won't go into the various cryptographic methods here (see my earlier
posting on the "Dining Cryptographers" protocol and various other
postings on public key systems, digital mixes, electronic cash, etc.).
Interested readers have many sources. (I have just read a superb
survey of these new techniques, the 1992 Ph.D. thesis of Jurgen Bos,
"Practical Privacy," which deals with these various protocols in a
nice little book.)

Alice and Bob, our favorite cryptographic stand-ins, can communicate
and transact business without ever meeting or even knowing who the
other is. This can be extended to create virtual communities subject
only to rules they themselves reach agreement on, much like this very
Extropians list. Private law is the only law, as there is no appeal to
some higher authority like the Pope or police. (This is why I said in
several of my potings on the Hurricane Andrew debate that I am
sympathetic to the PPL view.)

And this is the most compelling advantage of "Crypto Libertaria": an
arbitrarily large number of separate "nations" can simultaneously
exist. This allows for rapid experimentation, self-selection, and
evolution. If folks get tired of some virtual community, they can
leave. The cryptographic aspects mean their membership in some
community is unknown to others (vis-a-vis the physical or outside
world, i.e., their "true names") and physical coercion is reduced.

Communalists are free to create a communal environment, Creative
Anachronists are free to create their own idea of a space, and so on.
I'm not even getting into the virtual reality-photorealistic
images-Jaron Lanier sort of thing, as even current text-based systems
are demonstrably enough to allow the kind of virtual communities I'm
describing here (and described in Vinge's "True Names," in Gibson's
"Neuromancer," in Sterling's "Islands in the Net," and in Stephenson's
"Snow Crash"...though all of them missed out on some of the most
exciting aspects...perhaps my novel will hit the mark?).

But will the government allow these sorts of things? Won't they just
torpedo it, just as they'd torpedo an offshore ooirig data haven?

The key is that distributed systems have no nexus which can be knocked
out. Neither Usenet norFidoNet can be disabled by any single
government, as they are worldwide. Shutting them down would mean
banning computer-to-computer communication. And despite the talk of
mandatory "trap doors" in encryption systems, encryption is
fundamentally easy to do and hard to detect. (For those who doubt
this, let me describe a simple system I posted to sci.crypt several
years ago. An ordinary digital audio tape (DAT) carries more than a
gigabyte of data. This means that thhe least significant bit (LSB) of
an audio DAT recordingng carries about 8megabytes of data! So Alice is
stopped by the Data Police. They ask if she's carrying illegal data.
She smiles inocently and say "No. I know you'll search me." They find
her Sony DATman and ask about her collection of tapes and live
recordings. Alice is carrying 80 MB of data---about 3 entire days
worth of Usenet feeds!---on each and every tape. The data are stored
in the LSBs, completely indistinguishable from microphone and
quantization noise...unless you know the key. Similar methods allow
data to be undetectably packed into LSBs of the PICT and GIF pictures
now flooding the Net, into sampled sounds, and even into messages like
this...the "whitespace" on the right margin of this message carries a
hidden message readable only to a few chosen Extropians.)

I've already described using religions and role-playing games as a
kind of legal cover for the development and deployment of these
techniques. If a church decides to offer "digital confessionals" for
its far-flung members, by what argument will the U.S. government
justify insisting that encryption not be used? (I should note that
psychiatrists and similar professionals have a responsibility to their
clients and to their licensing agencies to ensure the privacy of
patient records. Friends of mine are using encryption to protect
patient records. This is just one little example of how encryption is
getting woven into the fabric of our electronic society. There are
many other examples.)

In future discussions, I hope we can hit on some of the many
approaches to deploying these methods. I've spent several years
thinking about this, but I've surely missed some good ideas. The
"crypto anarchy game" being planned is an attempt to get some of the
best hackers in the Bay Area thinking along these lines and thinking
of new wrinkles. Several have already offered to help further.

Some have commented that this list is not an appropriate place to
discuss these ideas. I think it is. We are not discussing
anything that is actually illegal, even under the broad powers of RICO
(Racketeer-Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, used to go after
"conspiracies" of porn dealers and gun dealers, amongst others). What
we are discussing are long-range implications of these ideas.

In conclusion, it will be easier to form certain types of libertarian
societies in cyberspace than in the real world of nations and physical
locations. The electronic world is by no means complete, as we will
still live much of our lives in the physical world. But economic
activity is sharply increasing in the Net domain and these "crypto
anarchy" ideas will further erode the power of physical states to tax
and coerce residents.

Libertaria will thrive in cyberspace.



-Tim May



--
Timothy C. May         | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,  
tcmay@netcom.com       | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
408-688-5409           | knowledge, reputations, information markets, 
W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA  | black markets, collapse of governments.
Higher Power: 2^756839 | Public Key: by arrangement
Note: I put time and money into writing this posting. I hope you enjoy it.      







From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Marc Horowitz <marc@GZA.COM>
Date: Mon, 9 Aug 93 10:41:46 PDT
To: karn@qualcomm.com (Phil Karn)
Subject: Re: ANON: Re: how does it work
In-Reply-To: <9308091646.AA21992@servo>
Message-ID: <9308091740.AA20911@dun-dun-noodles.aktis.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Why write your own problem?  Get the sendmail sources from any number
of ftp sites, modify them a little, recompile, and use your own
sendmail instead of your OS's for delivery.  Then, you can keep
limited logs for debugging in a place you can delete them when you're
done.  The only catch is that running as you instead of root, you
can't listen on port 25.

		Marc




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Peter Breton <pbreton@cs.umb.edu>
Date: Mon, 9 Aug 93 11:01:46 PDT
To: Marc Horowitz <marc@gza.com>
Subject: Re: ANON: Re: how does it work
In-Reply-To: <9308091740.AA20911@dun-dun-noodles.aktis.com>
Message-ID: <Pine.3.05.9308091300.A5374-b100000@ra.cs.umb.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



> Why write your own problem?  Get the sendmail sources from any number
> of ftp sites, modify them a little, recompile, and use your own
> sendmail instead of your OS's for delivery.  Then, you can keep
> limited logs for debugging in a place you can delete them when you're
> done.  The only catch is that running as you instead of root, you
> can't listen on port 25.

Two problems:

1) Aren't telnets logged, at least at the site you telnet to? If I "telnet
xxxx smtp", doesn't the site I telnet to have it in a log? I can't control
that, and that could identify me.

2) Sendmail (at least on our system) drops mail into a queue owned by root,
and inaccessible to anyone else. So without root privs your sendmail may
not function. (I know because I've tried).

I'm no UNIX guru, just a hacker, so if someone knows more by all means
correct me.

-------------------------------------------------------------------------
Peter Breton  pbreton@cs.umb.edu          PGP key by finger
=========================================================================





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Perry E. Metzger" <pmetzger@lehman.com>
Date: Mon, 9 Aug 93 11:46:37 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: ANON: Re: how does it work
In-Reply-To: <9308091810.AA23514@servo>
Message-ID: <9308091837.AA11305@snark.shearson.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Phil Karn says:
> You don't use the system telnet, you write your own socket application.
> No UNIX systems I know log at this level, but it is certainly possible.
> Or someone could record packets off the local Ethernet. There's not much
> you can do about this.
> 
> You could hack up a copy of sendmail, but SMTP is so trivial that you
> could do it yourself, especially since the functionality you need
> is so limited.

Indeed, writing an SMTP agent in Perl is quite trivial -- I've done
it.

Perry




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: gnu (John Gilmore)
Date: Mon, 9 Aug 93 15:41:52 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com, gnu
Subject: Big Brother's New Eyes -- Economist, August 7th
Message-ID: <9308092241.AA21147@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


The Economist magazine has two articles on monitoring of citizens'
activities in its August 7th issue, and mentions the problem on the
cover.  In its editorial on p. 16, it comes out in favor of anonymity:

	"Even if the anonymous technologies are more expensive and less
	 convenient than the data-scooping alternative, the price will
	 be worth paying."

It also reports on road-toll charging systems starting on p. 71, with
a minor mention of anonymous toll payment.  The headline is "Big
Brother is Clocking You" with a subheading of "The technology that
promises fewer traffic jams may damage your civil liberties."

The Economist is one of the truly outstanding magazines of the decade,
by the way.  It sounds stogdy but it is anything but, and it tends to spot
trends long before the rest of the world has noticed them.

	John




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Warren Keith Russell <keru@cpu.us.dynix.com>
Date: Mon, 9 Aug 93 14:46:38 PDT
To: "Timothy C. May" <tcmay@netcom.com>
Subject: Re: "Village Voice" Article is Another Winner!
In-Reply-To: <9308010537.AA13092@netcom.netcom.com>
Message-ID: <Pine.3.05.9308091533.A29159-9100000@cpu.us.dynix.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Can anyone tell me how to get a copy of Levy's "Wired" article?  I have sent
several messages to the editors, with no response.  Kelly's Whole Earth
Review articles sounds like it might be of interest, too.

Thanks.

-------------------------------------------------------------------------
Keith Russell                  Dynix Library Systems, Provo, Utah, U.S.A.
keru@cpu.us.dynix.com    or    keru@devg.us.dynix.com
-------------------------------------------------------------------------





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: treason@gnu.ai.mit.edu
Date: Mon, 9 Aug 93 13:16:37 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Using a 'telserv' program to redirect mail
Message-ID: <9308092013.AA07670@spiff.gnu.ai.mit.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I know the subject is misleading but to get into the heart of the matter.

It is very simple to write a unix program to redirect a program driving
a port to another port without affecting it running on the first port.  The
program I have seen to do this is called 'telserv' and can redirect any
port daemon to operate on any other port available (above 1024 of course)
without any special system access.  With this program I have been able to
redirect telnetd, ftpd, and smtpd to other ports with no problem.  In most
cases, the new port is not logged, and works 100% accurately.  The only
current limitation is that only one port process can be taking place at a time.
This could easily be surpassed by a simple fork() statement addin.  I will
not post this code unless I am assured that it is not going to be a legal
problem.  As you can see from the above written statement, I am not a learned
unix programmer, as I have taught myself everything I know (the only accessible
machine our uni has is a prime 6250), so please be gentle with the flames, I 
have done my best to represent the code and system accurately.

treason@gnu 
 




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: wcs@anchor.ho.att.com (Bill_Stewart(HOY002)1305)
Date: Mon, 9 Aug 93 14:06:39 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: ANON: Re: how does it work
Message-ID: <9308092014.AA21402@anchor.ho.att.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text


> Phil Karn says:
> > You don't use the system telnet, you write your own socket application.
...
> > You could hack up a copy of sendmail, but SMTP is so trivial that you
> > could do it yourself, especially since the functionality you need
> > is so limited.
Perry says:
> Indeed, writing an SMTP agent in Perl is quite trivial -- I've done it.

While you're at it, another source for traffic analysis is DNS requests;
you may want to cache these for the sites you commonly connect to,
or at least put a DNS server on your machine to do some caching.
In a mature environment, most of your anonymous traffic will go to
other remailers anyway, but might as well cut down on the logging opportunities.
		Bill




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: peter honeyman <honey@citi.umich.edu>
Date: Mon, 9 Aug 93 15:46:40 PDT
To: wcs@anchor.ho.att.com (Bill_Stewart(HOY002)1305)
Subject: Re: ANON: Re: how does it work
Message-ID: <9308092243.AA21216@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> While you're at it, another source for traffic analysis is DNS requests;

dns requests are not generally logged, so i guess you're considering
a generalized net snooper in your threat model, in which case discovery
of dns requests is the least of your concerns.

	peter





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Steven Levy <steven@well.sf.ca.us>
Date: Mon, 9 Aug 93 18:46:40 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: getting wired #2
Message-ID: <93Aug9.184431pdt.13941-1@well.sf.ca.us>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



>Can anyone tell me how to get a copy of Levy's "Wired" article?

If it's any comfort I can't get any myself. The issue is
sold out and there are very few even in the WIRED office,
so few that they won't spare 'em.  What's worse, it's
very hard to Xerox the article since it is printed on a
weird background. If you can't get it anywhere, let me
know and I'll try to get one to you, but I would appreciate
it if you (and anyone else) wrote the editors at wired.com
and told 'em you would like to see reprints of the story.

Steven




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: karn@qualcomm.com (Phil Karn)
Date: Mon, 9 Aug 93 20:01:56 PDT
To: perobich@ingr.com
Subject: Secure voice software issues
In-Reply-To: <199308100132.AA26355@poboy.b17c.ingr.com>
Message-ID: <9308100259.AA24433@servo>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I recommend a signed Diffie Hellman key exchange for a secure phone.
That is, you generate a session key with Diffie Hellman, and you sign
your exchanges with RSA to guard against the meet-in-the-middle attack.

I agree that RSA public keys could be exchanged as needed during the
call, although this might require a few iterations before a party gets
a signature that it can trust. Finding a path through the PGP "web of
trust" back to a trusted public key that the other party already has
may be tricky. This is one thing that is much easier with a simple
tree a la PEM, as you simply give the path back up to a common, shared
root. 

I'm not sure how to do this with PGP. Perhaps the challenger could
list the public key(s) it trusts (perhaps just its own) and ask the
challenged party to find a (the) route through the web that connect
itself with the challenger's trusted key, and to return those keys and
signatures.  This might be easier than having the challenger remotely
"grope" through the paths in the challenged party's key database, one
signature/key at a time. Of course, keys and signatures ought to be
cached to speed the process the next time around. Or the users could
sign each others keys directly once they're satisified with their
identities.

If you first do Diffie Hellman and then immediately use the session
key it generates to conventionally encrypt the rest of the protocol,
including any RSA public key exchanges, this has the added benefit of
denying passive eavesdroppers any information that would identify the
parties to the call. The best an *active* eavesdropper (conducting a
man-in-the-middle attack against Diffie Hellman) could do is to trick
the parties into revealing their RSA public keys, and thus their
identities.  But the parties would quickly discover this at the
signature step, before the voice conversation actually starts.

Again, the *really* nice thing about this protocol is that once the DH
session key is destroyed, there's no way to recover it even if the RSA
secret keys are later compromised. And nothing (other than the
availability of CPU cycles) prevents you from rekeying periodically
during a single call.  The worst that could then happen if the phone
is captured and read out before it could be zeroized would be the
compromise of the conversation since the last rekey.

Phil




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: paul@poboy.b17c.ingr.com (Paul Robichaux)
Date: Mon, 9 Aug 93 18:41:52 PDT
To: thug@phantom.com (Murdering Thug)
Subject: re: Secure voice software issues
In-Reply-To: <m0oPiMJ-0009GJC@mindvox.phantom.com>
Message-ID: <199308100132.AA26355@poboy.b17c.ingr.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

The problem with this is that public-key encryption is slooooow. I
never thought of having a fixed key for each user; even the STU-III
ignition keys get reloaded every so often.

Until I implement DH key exchange, caller & callee must have some way
to agree on a key. This is far from ideal, but (based on PGP's RSA
implementation on my Mac) I don't think RSA would cut it.

One possibility is to use a PGP-style keyring; the caller can encrypt
the session key with the callee's pubkey and transmit it. I think that
this is less secure than DH, though.

More comments are way welcome! Thanks.

- -Paul

- -- 
Paul Robichaux, KD4JZG     | "Crypto-anarchy means never having to say
perobich@ingr.com          |  you're sorry." - Tim May (tcmay@netcom.com)
Intergraph Federal Systems | Be a cryptography user- ask me how.


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.3a

iQCVAgUBLGb6kCA78To+806NAQFsUgP/W2eKFBiKLzBg1Aip2VTzg6RJDAU4C/mt
pW0RMx4dLK7ZRp8r3frmLHDnS2dcEwtu9weNOnzkFyK/j2056kn52O0icTX9w4gl
xDLIm/ay3gNaDrqZDA81c9vYsdHAn3pQaK1dxx3VZoWA6Je62ULvNlrxGIEXrvX5
zEEsV/5dYkQ=
=YFQP
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: thug@phantom.com (Murdering Thug)
Date: Mon, 9 Aug 93 18:16:41 PDT
To: perobich@ingr.com
Subject: re: Secure voice software issues
Message-ID: <m0oPiMJ-0009GJC@mindvox.phantom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text


Paul,

I noticed you mentioned that you will be using key rings in your
cryptophones, so here's an idea I think would be great for cryptophones. 
This is a simple solution to the key-exchange problem.  Cryptophone users
would not need to exchange keys beforehand nor need to store other
people's public keys on their cryptophone. 

- Every cryptophone user has a public and private key pair (like in RSA or
  PGP)

- When a person calls another person, the phones automatically exchange their
  public keys before the voice conversation begins.  Obviously the private
  keys are never transmitted.

With this method, all one needs to initiate a secure telephone
conversation is the phone number of whoever you're calling, just like
using a regular telephone.  I am assuming this is how Clipper/Skipjack
phones would do this.  I hope your cryptophone software does this as well,
since I don't want to or need to keep keyrings full of public keys of
everyone I might ever have to call.


Thug




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: fergp@sytex.com (Paul Ferguson)
Date: Mon, 9 Aug 93 21:21:56 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Cypherpunks write code
Message-ID: <usN28B5w165w@sytex.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Can I entice someone to post the Cypherpunk charter statement again? I've 
been looking at the FAQ that Eric Raymond started, and need to to fill in 
some gaps.... This has taken way too long and I thought perhaps I might 
toss a few free moments into adding some text.
 
Cheers,

Paul Ferguson               |  "Government, even in its best state,
Network Integrator          |   is but a necessary evil; in its worst
Centreville, Virginia USA   |   state, an intolerable one."
fergp@sytex.com             |      - Thomas Paine, Common Sense
 
Type bits/keyID   Date       User ID
pub  1024/1CC04D 1993/03/15  Paul Ferguson <fergp@sytex.com>
  Key fingerprint =  EE D2 93 7D 04 6D C6 05  AC 36 AD 9D 8E 4F 41 58




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Ciamac Moallemi <ciamac@hplms2.hpl.hp.com>
Date: Mon, 9 Aug 93 22:26:43 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: directions to Cygnus
Message-ID: <9308100525.AA13623@cello.hpl.hp.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Could someone post directions to Cygnus for the meeting on Saturday?
Thanks.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: fergp@sytex.com (Paul Ferguson)
Date: Mon, 9 Aug 93 21:21:57 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Digitized for posterity
Message-ID: <kTo28B2w165w@sytex.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


They got me. At the DMV. Today. Yuck.
 
Bought a new (used) car and had to do all that fun stuff -- license, 
tags, etc, ad nauseam and decided to get my license updated to reflect my 
new mailing address while I'm there. Of course, I expected it, because my 
wife had it done to her earlier this year, but seeing the final product 
leaves a knot in your throat.
 
Digitized photographs, in the database of the state. (insert appropriate 
parable here)
 
Ptheewww!  At least they were quick about it. Too bad they don't have 
dial-in service. ,-)
 
Cheers,

Paul Ferguson               |  "Government, even in its best state,
Network Integrator          |   is but a necessary evil; in its worst
Centreville, Virginia USA   |   state, an intolerable one."
fergp@sytex.com             |      - Thomas Paine, Common Sense
 
Type bits/keyID   Date       User ID
pub  1024/1CC04D 1993/03/15  Paul Ferguson <fergp@sytex.com>
  Key fingerprint =  EE D2 93 7D 04 6D C6 05  AC 36 AD 9D 8E 4F 41 58




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: khijol!erc@apple.com (Ed Carp)
Date: Tue, 10 Aug 93 00:21:57 PDT
To: steven@well.sf.ca.us (Steven Levy)
Subject: Re: getting wired #2
In-Reply-To: <93Aug9.184431pdt.13941-1@well.sf.ca.us>
Message-ID: <m0oPnHS-00024DC@khijol>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text


> >Can anyone tell me how to get a copy of Levy's "Wired" article?
> 
> If it's any comfort I can't get any myself. The issue is
> sold out and there are very few even in the WIRED office,
> so few that they won't spare 'em.  What's worse, it's
> very hard to Xerox the article since it is printed on a
> weird background. If you can't get it anywhere, let me
> know and I'll try to get one to you, but I would appreciate
> it if you (and anyone else) wrote the editors at wired.com
> and told 'em you would like to see reprints of the story.

If someone can tell me the title of the article, I'll see what I can do to get
copies, or bring the article to the next Cypherpunks meeting.
-- 
Ed Carp, N7EKG			erc@apple.com			510/659-9560
                            anon-2133@twwells.com
If you want magic, let go of your armor.  Magic is so much stronger than
steel!        -- Richard Bach, "The Bridge Across Forever"



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: karn@qualcomm.com (Phil Karn)
Date: Wed, 11 Aug 93 15:42:05 PDT
To: fnerd@smds.com
Subject: voluntary compliance
In-Reply-To: <9308080120.AA16598@smds.com>
Message-ID: <9308100715.AA26199@servo>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>They just want to encourage voluntary compliance.

Hmm...I have this strong feeling of deja vu. Where else have I heard this
expression before? Oh, right, the IRS! They always like to talk about how
our tax system is based on "voluntary compliance"...

Phil




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: miron@extropia.wimsey.com (Miron Cuperman)
Date: Tue, 10 Aug 93 02:52:00 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: CRYPTO'93, anyone here going?
Message-ID: <199308100848.AA13015@xtropia>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I will be attending CRYPTO.  I was wondering if any cypherpunks will
attending this conference.

-- 
        Miron Cuperman <miron@extropia.wimsey.com> | NeXTmail/Mime ok
        Unix/C++/DSP,  consulting/contracting      | Public key avail
        AMIX: MCuperman                            |
Laissez faire, laissez passer. Le monde va de lui meme.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Duncan Frissell <frissell@panix.com>
Date: Tue, 10 Aug 93 03:02:00 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Digitized for posterity
Message-ID: <199308101000.AA25954@panix.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


To: cypherpunks@toad.com
F >Digitized photographs, in the database of 
F >the state. (insert appropriate 
F >parable here)

Naughty, naughty.  You should have a nice all paper UK license obtained 
without ID and a car owned by a New Hampshire-based corporation.  Is it 
rape if you say yes?

Duncan Frissell

"One is not required to own any car (even the one you're driving) a 
driver's license from any jurisdiction on earth is acceptable for 
(automobile) drivers in the US."  Privacy costs so little and means so 
much.  Frissell & Associates.



--- WinQwk 2.0b#0
                                                                        




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: fergp@sytex.com (Paul Ferguson)
Date: Tue, 10 Aug 93 04:52:04 PDT
To: uunet!eis.calstate.edu!jesmit@uunet.UU.NET
Subject: RE: Digitized for posterity
Message-ID: <0aD38B2w165w@sytex.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
 
On Tue, 10 Aug 1993 00:27:04 -0700 (PDT),
 "Jeremy R. Smith" <uunet!eis.calstate.edu!jersmit> wrote -
 
>   I know what you mean..out here in California, not only do they
> have digitizd photos, they've also got mag stripes on the back of
> the licenses.  Supposedly to hold your driving record, etc.  Make
> me nervous though.  Almost nervous enough to learn how to reprogram
> mag stripes.
 
The digitized photo doesn't really bother me that much, now that I
think about it (the picture really makes me look like my name should
be 'Festus" or something along those lines), but the mag stripe did.
 
Funny how all those little magnetized electrons can get scrambled so
easily. ,-)
 
Cheers.
 
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.2
 
iQCVAgUBLGeGhZRLcZSdHMBNAQGV1QQArhQxmEBzG1AmngaI5BaGj7qHZ54Y0ghO
Mzj7tH5Km88NFVy3F/N+vt6ckCBD6af7Hn5HSgBeU646NQTUuDdBjlmzhWK42sWp
qxOHrolJSUJThZHKnJyip9Bat9t8igat7xN2xguUnmhIrllO3GegRmoBGxicZGSm
9N3ajjNQgak=
=v8oM
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

Paul Ferguson               |  "Government, even in its best state,
Network Integrator          |   is but a necessary evil; in its worst
Centreville, Virginia USA   |   state, an intolerable one."
fergp@sytex.com             |      - Thomas Paine, Common Sense
 
Type bits/keyID   Date       User ID
pub  1024/1CC04D 1993/03/15  Paul Ferguson <fergp@sytex.com>
  Key fingerprint =  EE D2 93 7D 04 6D C6 05  AC 36 AD 9D 8E 4F 41 58




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Eric Hughes <hughes@soda.berkeley.edu>
Date: Tue, 10 Aug 93 08:42:07 PDT
To: cypherpunks-announce@toad.com
Subject: August Bay Area cypherpunks meeting
Message-ID: <9308101527.AA08230@soda.berkeley.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


ANNOUNCEMENT
============

August Bay Area cypherpunks meeting

Saturday, August 14, 1993
12:00 noon - 6:00 p.m.
Cygnus Support offices, Mt. View, California


  Topics this time include the usual assortment of mailer topics,
politics, protocols, and rant.  There will be a discussion of the
Twain privacy service and privacy.net, among others.

  Meetings are the second Saturday of every month, at the same
location and at the same time.  There is frequently an informal dinner
at a restaurant chosen by concensus at the meeting.


DIRECTIONS
==========
[Directions to Cygnus provided by John Gilmore. -- EH]

	Cygnus Support
	1937 Landings Drive
	Mt. View, CA  94043
	+1 415 903 1400   switchboard
	+1 415 903 1418   John Gilmore

Take US 101 toward Mt. View.  From San Francisco, it's about a
40-minute drive.  Get off at the Rengstorff Ave/Amphitheatre Parkway
exit.  If you were heading south on 101, you curve around to the
right, cross over the freeway, and get to a stoplight.  If you were
heading north on 101, you just come right off the exit to the
stoplight.  The light is the intersection of Amphitheatre and
Charleston Rd.  Take a right on Charleston; there's a right-turn-only
lane.

Follow Charleston for a short distance.  You'll pass the
Metaphor/Kaleida buildings on the right.  At a clump of palm trees and
a "Landmark Deli" sign, take a right into Landings Drive.  At the end
of the road, turn left into the complex with the big concrete
"Landmark" sign.  Follow the road past the deli til you are in front
of the clock tower that rises out of one of the buildings, facing you.
Enter through the doors immediately under the clock tower.  They'll be
open between noon and 1PM at least.  (See below if you're late.)

Once inside, take the stairs up, immediately to your right.  At the top
of the stairs, turn right past the treetops, and we'll be in 1937 on 
your left.  The door is marked "Cygnus".

If you are late and the door under the clock tower is locked, you can
walk to the deli (which will be around the building on your left, as
you face the door).  Go through the gate in the fence to the right of
the deli, and into the back lawns between the complex and the farm
behind it.  Walk forward and right around the buildings until you see
a satellite dish in the lawn.  Go up the stairs next to the dish,
which are the back stairs into the Cygnus office space.  We'll prop
the door (or you can bang on it if we forget).

Or, you can find the guard who's wandering around the complex, who
knows there's a meeting happening and will let you in.  They can be
beeped at 965 5250, though you'll have trouble finding a phone.

Don't forget to eat first, or bring food at noon!  I recommend hitting
the burrito place on Rengstorff (La Costen~a) at about 11:45.  To get
there, when you get off 101, take Rengstorff (toward the hills) rather
than Amphitheatre (toward the bay).  Follow it about ten blocks until
the major intersection at Middlefield Road.  La Costen~a is the store
on your left at the corner.  You can turn left into the narrow lane
behind the store, which leads to a parking lot, and enter by the front
door, which faces the intersection.  To get to the meeting from there,
just retrace your route on Rengstorff, go straight over the freeway,
and turn right at the stoplight onto Charleston; see above.

See you there!

	John Gilmore







From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Claborne, Chris" <claborne@ccsmtp.scrippsranchca.NCR.COM>
Date: Tue, 10 Aug 93 09:02:03 PDT
To: perobich@ingr.com
Subject: Re: re: Secure voice software issues
Message-ID: <9307107449.AA744997753@ccsmtp.ScrippsRanchCA.NCR.COM>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain




>The problem with this is that public-key encryption is slooooow. I 
>never thought of having a fixed key for each user; even the STU-III 
>ignition keys get reloaded every so often.

   The slow part is the RSA encryption.  The conversation doesn't 
need to be encrypted with RSA, mabe IDEA or something else.  All you 
really need to do is create a session key for each side once with RSA 
then you are done (similar to PGP).

    2
-- C  --




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Warren Keith Russell <keru@cpu.us.dynix.com>
Date: Tue, 10 Aug 93 08:32:02 PDT
To: Paul Ferguson <fergp@sytex.com>
Subject: Re: Cypherpunks write code
In-Reply-To: <usN28B5w165w@sytex.com>
Message-ID: <Pine.3.05.9308100926.A26326-b100000@cpu.us.dynix.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


On Mon, 9 Aug 1993, Paul Ferguson wrote:

> Can I entice someone to post the Cypherpunk charter statement again? I've 
> been looking at the FAQ that Eric Raymond started, and need to to fill in 
> some gaps.... This has taken way too long and I thought perhaps I might 
> toss a few free moments into adding some text.
>  
> Cheers,
> 
> Paul Ferguson               |  "Government, even in its best state,
> Network Integrator          |   is but a necessary evil; in its worst
> Centreville, Virginia USA   |   state, an intolerable one."
> fergp@sytex.com             |      - Thomas Paine, Common Sense
>  
> Type bits/keyID   Date       User ID
> pub  1024/1CC04D 1993/03/15  Paul Ferguson <fergp@sytex.com>
>   Key fingerprint =  EE D2 93 7D 04 6D C6 05  AC 36 AD 9D 8E 4F 41 58

Can someone tell me if there is an FAQ available, and if so, how I can get
it?  I'm having a hard time getting up to speed so I can follow the
discussion threads here.

Thanks.


Keith


-------------------------------------------------------------------------
Keith Russell                  Dynix Library Systems, Provo, Utah, U.S.A.
keru@cpu.us.dynix.com    or    keru@devg.us.dynix.com
-------------------------------------------------------------------------






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Warren Keith Russell <keru@cpu.us.dynix.com>
Date: Tue, 10 Aug 93 08:42:02 PDT
Subject: Re: getting wired #2
In-Reply-To: <m0oPnHS-00024DC@khijol>
Message-ID: <Pine.3.05.9308100904.C26326-a100000@cpu.us.dynix.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


On Mon, 9 Aug 1993, it was written:

> If someone can tell me the title of the article, I'll see what I can do to get
> copies, or bring the article to the next Cypherpunks meeting.
> -- 
> Ed Carp, N7EKG			erc@apple.com			510/659-9560
>                             anon-2133@twwells.com
> If you want magic, let go of your armor.  Magic is so much stronger than
> steel!        -- Richard Bach, "The Bridge Across Forever"

The title is "Crypto Rebels."  It was published in the May/June issue of
WIRED, page 54.  See my reply to L. Detweiler for information on the
response I got back from them.

Keith

-------------------------------------------------------------------------
Keith Russell                  Dynix Library Systems, Provo, Utah, U.S.A.
keru@cpu.us.dynix.com    or    keru@devg.us.dynix.com
-------------------------------------------------------------------------






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Date: Tue, 10 Aug 93 10:32:03 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: We Await Silent Tristero's Empire
In-Reply-To: <9308101639.AA02330@emoryu1.cc.emory.edu>
Message-ID: <9308101729.AA15266@netcom5.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Paul Moses writes:

> 
> the directions to Cygnus remind me of something from "The Crying of Lot 49"
> 

Instead of giving my entire sig, as I usually do, I will isolate just
a single line of it:


W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA  | black markets, collapse of governments.


We Await Silent Tristero's Empire!

For the Pynchon-deprived, "The Crying of Lot 49" is a novella about
the search by Oedipa Maas for the meaning of some strange occurrences,
It takes place in California. The _real_ Yoyodyne Corporation came
from "Lot 49," not from Buckaroo Banzai!

The crypto connections are many, even though "Lot 49" was written in
1966. A private mail delivery system, the direct descendant of
European mail systems, is in competition with the U.S. Postal System
(secretly, of course, as it is illegal to use other mail systems...a
lesson for Cypherpunks?). Mail is deposited in boxes marked
"W.A.S.T.E."

My W.A.S.T.E. address is Aptos, California, down the coast from Santa
Cruz. Now you know what that means. Now I've blown the secret.

For those who have found "Gravity's Rainbow" too cryptic, let me
recommend "Lot 49" as both a very quick read and an excellent
introduction to the world and style of Thomas Pynchon, ur-cypherpunk.

-Tim May





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: paul@poboy.b17c.ingr.com (Paul Robichaux)
Date: Tue, 10 Aug 93 09:12:03 PDT
To: karn@qualcomm.com (Phil Karn)
Subject: Re: Secure voice software issues
In-Reply-To: <9308100259.AA24433@servo>
Message-ID: <199308101603.AA28136@poboy.b17c.ingr.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

I may have a clouded view of the technology available here, because I
confess to not understanding all of your post- namely, why the "web of
trust" necessarily bears here.

It feels like DH would probably be the best mechanism for key
exchange.  When Alice calls Bob, their two Macs can conduct a DH
exchange of randomly generated, valid-for-only-one-call session keys
and use those to encrypt both ends of the link.

The reason behind my original proposal of a system that could use PGP
keyrings is thus: let's say that I want to call you. I tell my
cryptophone to call "Phil Karn", so it looks up your public key and
uses it to encrypt my side's session key, then signs the encrypted
version with my public key.

Your cryptophone answers, de-signatures the data block to see who's
calling, then decodes the encrypted session key using your secret key.
If you decide to accept the call, your cryptophone can send me a key
by encrypting it with my private key, then signing it with your pubkey.

This protocol is obviously not secure against spoofing attacks. It
does support anonymous use, though- if the caller doesn't sign the
encrypted session key block, you could still accept the call!

The big advantage to this scheme in my mind is that it leverages PGP's
infrastructure and key distribution. I'm not sure that the web model
would be terribly useful; I tend to think of most calls as being
either to "indirectly trusted" keys (i.e. I can call Phil Z to ask
about how the developers got permission to use IDEA in PGP) or to
directly trusted keys (i.e. I can call someone whose key I've
personally signed.)

The presence of a hardwired telephone number, of course, adds some
trustability. TCP/IP traffic can be falsified in ways that POTS
traffic can't, and it's very hard to subvert The Phone Company (tm).
Even if I don't completely trust your key, if I call Qualcomm's front
desk and ask for your work phone #, I can probably trust that.

OTOH, as I read someone post the other day, "Everyone you've ever met
is working for the CIA. There's absolutely no way to prove
differently." :)

- -Paul


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.3a

iQCVAgUBLGfGjSA78To+806NAQEunAP+PIddYdBa57YkVGwd9uXfxwDL59LABXfS
fTIC8xv7L6QC0r/9az4ToJCFqIF6c2+C5ZeVdCFlQ18mjQ8MApeJkN11gynRu3aX
5qCZOs5Nmyfg2JzS95eWe75UyCwO5GepSt1LNHAA4wi5cyFtBHTULXv2MKHRvWSj
YUePz50FDLg=
=IqKL
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Anonymous
Date: Tue, 10 Aug 1993 11:55:57 -0400 (EDT)
Subject: Software Patent Institute
Message-ID: <d97251e79cf190e261989f33233c88b7@NO-ID-FOUND.mhonarc.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



I saw this recently and thought it might be of interest to some people
on the list with strong feelings about IP. -S.?



Software Patent Institute
c/o Industrial Tech Inst.
2901 Hubbard St./ PO Box 1485
Ann Arbor, MI 48106-1485
(313) 769-4083
Fax: 313-769-4064
spi@iti.org

SPI "folklore" database

The SPI is now operating, and we are asking the software community to
help us build, our "folklore" database by sharing with everyone the
concepts and techniques which they find so familiar, but which the US
Patent and Trademark Office generally cannot identify as prior art,
since they lack any specific reference to the technique in question. We
must help the USPTO do its job better, so that patents are not granted
for techniques that have already been invented but were lost in the
"folklore" prior to the creation of our SPI folklore database.

[There's more to the letter, but I just wanted to give an idea. Contact
them for more information if you want. -S.]


------- End of Forwarded Message





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: plmoses@unix.cc.emory.edu (Paul L. Moses)
Date: Tue, 10 Aug 93 09:22:03 PDT
To: steven@well.sf.ca.us
Subject: Re:  getting wired #2
Message-ID: <9308101620.AA28576@emoryu1.cc.emory.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Isn't Wired magazine available on America Online?  I think AOL was promoting it
as a new set of text files it was offering.  Check there.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: plmoses@unix.cc.emory.edu (Paul L. Moses)
Date: Tue, 10 Aug 93 09:42:04 PDT
To: hughes@soda.berkeley.edu
Subject: Re:  August Bay Area cypherpunks meeting
Message-ID: <9308101639.AA02330@emoryu1.cc.emory.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


the directions to Cygnus remind me of something from "The Crying of Lot 49"




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: peb@PROCASE.COM (Paul Baclace)
Date: Tue, 10 Aug 93 13:06:53 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: patent on remote cash transactions?
Message-ID: <9308102004.AA01064@banff.procase.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



American Public Radio reported yesterday that some company was granted
a broad patent on remote cash transactions--they mentioned an article
in the NYTimes recently (NYT does patent reporting on Saturday typically, but
sometimes they do it in the business section on other days; I don't get
NYT anymore...); anyone here more about this?  Is this yet another 
example of bozo software patents?  If anyone finds out more, please post.


Paul E. Baclace
peb@procase.com





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Kent Hastings" <kent_hastings@qmail2.aero.org>
Date: Tue, 10 Aug 93 13:26:53 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: ADICO: Anarchist FDIC
Message-ID: <199308102022.AA10924@aerospace.aero.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


                      ADICO: Anarchist FDIC#000#
When someone objects to free banking (in gold, for example) on 
the grounds that unregulated banks will have fractional reserves 
and have no incentive to stay honest, perhaps describing an 
Anarchist Deposit Insurance COmpany (ADICO) will ease their fears.

A new or relatively obscure offshore bank would gain the trust of 
potential depositors by agreeing to cooperate with surprise 
inspections of their gold supply. Depositors would pay a small
premium to cover loss from bank failures due to theft or fraud.

Cryptographic protocols would need to be developed to allow the 
ADICO to see a verified total amount on deposit, without revealing
anything about any particular depositor. The total should match 
the physical amount of gold in storage, assuming 100% reserves.

Does anybody know of work on this, or think it is worth researching?

Kent - <jkhastings@aol.com>
#000#






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Date: Tue, 10 Aug 93 13:52:05 PDT
To: kent_hastings@qmail2.aero.org (Kent Hastings)
Subject: Re: ADICO: Anarchist FDIC
In-Reply-To: <199308102022.AA10924@aerospace.aero.org>
Message-ID: <9308102050.AA04016@netcom5.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Kent Hastings writes:

>                       ADICO: Anarchist FDIC#000#
> When someone objects to free banking (in gold, for example) on 
> the grounds that unregulated banks will have fractional reserves 
> and have no incentive to stay honest, perhaps describing an 
> Anarchist Deposit Insurance COmpany (ADICO) will ease their fears.
> 
> A new or relatively obscure offshore bank would gain the trust of 
> potential depositors by agreeing to cooperate with surprise 
> inspections of their gold supply. Depositors would pay a small
> premium to cover loss from bank failures due to theft or fraud.
> 
> Cryptographic protocols would need to be developed to allow the 
> ADICO to see a verified total amount on deposit, without revealing
> anything about any particular depositor. The total should match 
> the physical amount of gold in storage, assuming 100% reserves.

I suspect that verification that a physical quantity of gold is held
is much less important than that depositors can freely get back their
deposits. I suppose this means I don't see a real need for gold-backed
money. (At the national monetary system level, hard assets may be a
good idea, but at Joe's Bank I don't see any rationale for it having,
say, 132.74 kilos of gold in its vaults!)

The success of Swiss banks comes more from their reputation for scrupulous
honesty than from independent verification of their gold holdings. Their
"reputation capital" (a term Dean Tribble uses) is what matters.

Interestingly, a future crypto system will increase security by
allowing large deposits to be split into many smaller, anonymous
deposits. Some of these will be "pinging" tests from deposit-rating
services, some will be money being moved around, etc. A bank intent on
committing fraud will have a tough job ahead of it, and will be
quickly found out (thus, it is likely that people will split their
deposits into many smaller pieces, at many banks...and movve them
around based on the latest deposit ratings).

-Tim May


-- 
..........................................................................
Timothy C. May         | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,  
tcmay@netcom.com       | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
408-688-5409           | knowledge, reputations, information markets, 
W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA  | black markets, collapse of governments.
Higher Power: 2^756839 | Public Key: PGP and MailSafe available.
Note: I put time and money into writing this posting. I hope you enjoy it.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Warren Keith Russell <keru@cpu.us.dynix.com>
Date: Tue, 10 Aug 93 13:12:04 PDT
To: Norman Hardy <norm@netcom.com>
Subject: Re: ftp access to the Silk Road Paper
In-Reply-To: <9308021442.AA09524@netcom2.netcom.com>
Message-ID: <Pine.3.05.9308101447.A101920-a100000@cpu.us.dynix.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


On Mon, 2 Aug 1993, Norman Hardy wrote:

> The Digital Silk road paper is now availnle in three forms at
> netcom.com:pub/joule/DSR1.ps.gz, DSR1.rtf.gz and DSR1.txt
>  
> netcom.com may sometimes be too busy and then direct you to one of 
> several other machines any of which can access the files.

What is the Digital Silk Road paper?

Keith

-------------------------------------------------------------------------
Keith Russell                  Dynix Library Systems, Provo, Utah, U.S.A.
keru@cpu.us.dynix.com    or    keru@devg.us.dynix.com
-------------------------------------------------------------------------






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Kent Hastings" <kent_hastings@qmail2.aero.org>
Date: Tue, 10 Aug 93 16:16:54 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: So. Cal. Cypherpunks
Message-ID: <199308102313.AA15269@aerospace.aero.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


                      So. Cal. Cypherpunks
CYPHERPUNK-RELATED MEETINGS IN SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA:

J. Kent Hastings (Hey-that's ME!) will flame on about:
"CYBER CASH: FREE MARKET MONEY COMES OF AGE."
Wednesday, September 22, 1993: H.L. MENCKEN FORUM
At The Old Spaghetti Factory in Los Angeles 
6:30 pm Libations, 7:00 Supper, 7:55 Announcements, 
8:00 Speaker, 10:00 Adjournment
5939 Sunset Blvd. near the Hollywood Fwy at Gordon
Los Angeles, CA 90028 Restaurant: (213) 469-7149
RESERVATION/PRICES/INFO LINE: 1-310-289-3234

Just as Christ descended into Hell (mythically-don't 
want any of you to get upset about theism), an 
anti-Party speaker, J. Kent Hastings (hmm, that guy
sounds familiar), will address:
LIBERTARIAN PARTY REGION 62 - LOS ANGELES WESTSIDE
Thursday, September 23, 1993 at Chris's Italian
Restaurant, 10105 Venice Blvd. at Clarington Ave.
on the same old Digital Cash topic. Cocktails are at
6:30 pm, dinner at 7 pm, and talk is at 8:30 pm.
LP info: 1-310-477-6491

        The ALBERT J. NOCK FORUM and Southern California 
Supper Club is another club that may be of interest to you, 
run by the host of the H. L. Mencken Forum. Albert J. Nock 
wrote essays (An Anarchist's Progress) and books about 
government like Our Enemy, The State and Mr. Jefferson. 

        The Nock Forum has been in operation for over 10 
years, hosting speakers on engineering, scientific, financial, 
and political issues. Controversial figures, on and over the 
cutting edge of toleration and civil liberties, have also 
graced the forum, but nobody more outrageous than you'll see 
on a given day's Geraldo, Oprah, Donahue, or Montel Williams 
show. I DON'T remember a speaker having had a sex change from 
male to female, then discovering she was a lesbian, but I was 
in Northern California for a while and may have missed it.

Past speakers at Mencken and Nock include: Max More (Extropy), 
LiberTech's Chuck Hammill, Wendy McElroy (Freedom, Feminism, 
and the State), David Justin Ross (Calera), J. Neil Schulman 
(author of Alongside Night and Rainbow Cadenza), Vic Koman 
(Jehovah Contract), Robert Anton Wilson (Illuminatus!, Natural 
Law), L. Neil Smith (Confederacy SF novels), Dr. Sharon Presley
(Libertarian Psychology - Obedience to Authority), Samuel 
Edward Konkin III (New Libertarian, Agorist Institute), 
Brock Meeks (Computer Privacy), Burt Rutan (Voyager, FreeWing),
Paul Macready (Gossamer Condor and Albatross) and many others 
on topics like nanotechnology, public key crypto, artificial 
intelligence, immortality, informal markets and other topics 
that look like Tim May's tag line. BTW, Tim has a standing 
invitation from the host to speak about "Crypto Anarchy" and 
get a free dinner (He's gotta be in town and schedule ahead). 
        
        The latest speaker was Richard Grant, author 
(Incredible Bread Machine, Trashing Nuclear Power, Rent 
Control and the War against the Poor), on "Bring Us The Head 
of Michael Milken." 

Date/time/location of the next ALBERT J. NOCK Forum,
now in its 11th year:
STEVEN W. MOSHER "The Future of 1/4 of the Human Race."
ACAPULCO at Cerritos Plaza 1800 West Whittier Blvd.,
La Habra, California, East of Beach Blvd.
SAME INFO LINE AS MENCKEN: 1-310-289-3234







From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: edgar@spectrx.Saigon.COM (Edgar W. Swank)
Date: Tue, 10 Aug 93 17:16:53 PDT
To: Cypherpunks          <cypherpunks@toad.com>
Subject: Re: (fwd) Wolf's got a thing or two to say here...
Message-ID: <X0038B5w165w@spectrx.saigon.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I was able to decode the message from "wolf" posted to Newsgroup
alt.sexual.abuse.recovery and then posted here by Ed Carp, who said

    Here's something I found on another newsgroup.  Any ideas what it
    is?  It was a public posting...

    I've tried uudecoding it and playing with it, running it through
    uncompress, gunzip, and pgp (all with appropriate headers, of
    course - I'm not a total idiot!), but I can't make heads or tails
    out of it.  Just curious if anyone found this familiar-looking...

Procedure for decode is:

Extract message to file xxx.asc

Add -----BEGIN PGP MESSAGE----- and
    -----END PGP MESSAGE----- to start and end of file.

Change PGP's CONFIG.TXT file to de-comment

KeepBinary = on     # Decrypt will not delete intermediate .pgp file
verbose = on        # verbose diagnostic messages
[this is probably the step Ed missed]

Then just run PGP against the file
  PGP XXX.ASC

The result will be found in XXX.PGP which is now not deleted.  I won't
repeat the long message here.  It's apparently from a fag (Wolf) who
was beat up by his lover (David) whom he had arrested. Here are the
first few lines:

  Hello friends.
  I hope you are all well.
  I am doing better today than before.
  I get a little more livelier every day.
  I am not in the mood to talk about the situation right now, though.
  I would like to first of all thank each an every one of you for
  the SCADS of mail I have recieved in response to my post about what
  happened last Monday night.

I'm not sure how this message was produced. Maybe not by PGP.
I tried reversing the encoding with pgp -a xxx.pgp, but a different
encoded file is produced, which PGP decodes with no problems.

--
edgar@spectrx.saigon.com (Edgar W. Swank)
SPECTROX SYSTEMS +1.408.252.1005  Cupertino, Ca





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Perry E. Metzger" <pmetzger@lehman.com>
Date: Tue, 10 Aug 93 14:06:53 PDT
To: "Kent Hastings" <kent_hastings@qmail2.aero.org>
Subject: Re: ADICO: Anarchist FDIC
In-Reply-To: <199308102022.AA10924@aerospace.aero.org>
Message-ID: <9308102059.AA22885@snark.shearson.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



"Kent Hastings" says:
>                       ADICO: Anarchist FDIC#000#
> When someone objects to free banking (in gold, for example) on 
> the grounds that unregulated banks will have fractional reserves 
> and have no incentive to stay honest, perhaps describing an 
> Anarchist Deposit Insurance COmpany (ADICO) will ease their fears.
> 
> A new or relatively obscure offshore bank would gain the trust of 
> potential depositors by agreeing to cooperate with surprise 
> inspections of their gold supply. Depositors would pay a small
> premium to cover loss from bank failures due to theft or fraud.
> 
> Cryptographic protocols would need to be developed to allow the 
> ADICO to see a verified total amount on deposit, without revealing
> anything about any particular depositor. The total should match 
> the physical amount of gold in storage, assuming 100% reserves.
> 
> Does anybody know of work on this, or think it is worth researching?

Good job -- you have come up with a very interesting problem indeed.

A cryptographic protocol that permitted an outsider to determine the
amount of (pick your favorite) on deposit without requiring that the
bank reveal who owns what would be a neat trick. I suspect, based on
some of the voting protocols people are coming up with, that it might
in fact be possible, although it might end up involving an outside
auditing agency in many of the transactions. Whether a practical
protocol to permit this to be done would be possible is an extremely
interesting research topic -- many of the voting protocols I've heard
of are quite impractical if you have millions of voters. To my
knowledge, nothing to solve what I will now dub the "Anonymous
Auditing Problem" has yet been done, and this is the first time the
question has been posed.

Perry




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: nobody@pmantis.berkeley.edu
Date: Tue, 10 Aug 93 18:06:53 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Using a 'telserv' program to redirect mail
Message-ID: <9308110106.AA21036@pmantis.berkeley.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>I will
>not post this code unless I am assured that it is not going to be a legal
>problem.  As you can see from the above written statement
yada yada
>
>treason@gnu 
> 

Why not post it anoymously? Too late now. Cypherpunks not only write code,
they write code that people can use.





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Perry E. Metzger" <pmetzger@lehman.com>
Date: Tue, 10 Aug 93 15:36:53 PDT
To: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Subject: Re: ADICO: Anarchist FDIC
In-Reply-To: <9308102050.AA04016@netcom5.netcom.com>
Message-ID: <9308102234.AA23328@snark.shearson.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Timothy C. May says:
> I suspect that verification that a physical quantity of gold is held
> is much less important than that depositors can freely get back their
> deposits. I suppose this means I don't see a real need for gold-backed
> money. (At the national monetary system level, hard assets may be a
> good idea, but at Joe's Bank I don't see any rationale for it having,
> say, 132.74 kilos of gold in its vaults!)

Although this is not the right place for discussing this topic, I can
suggest a reading of "The Theory Of Free Banking" by George Selgin,
which is an excellent economic treatise on why a bank might want to
hold a particular physical commodity as backing for bank issued notes
instead of relying on a central banking system. The book is an
expansion of Selgin's PhD thesis at NYU -- its pretty good.

Even barring this, however, a protocol to determine if claimed
deposits correspond with what depositors think their deposits are,
i.e. an audit protocol, has many uses and would be valuable. Its a
genuinely good problem.

Perry




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: hfinney@shell.portal.com
Date: Wed, 11 Aug 93 12:47:23 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Secure voice software issues
Message-ID: <9308110421.AA29116@jobe.shell.portal.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


A couple of comments on the cryptophone idea.

First, there has seemed to be general agreement in our earlier discussions
of this concept that the hard part is compressing the voice to the point
where it can go over commonly-available modems.  The government-standard
CELP algorithm is too slow for general-purpose home computers.  You need
an algorithm that can operate in real time and compress intelligibly down
to about 13K bits per second.  It has to be either able to compress and
decompress simultaneously or else you need some switching logic to decide
which person is talking and which is listening at each moment, with both
sides reversing roles in synchrony.

Second, Diffie-Hellman key exchange will probably take about as long as
an RSA decryption with similar modulus sizes.  So speed would not seem to
be a reason to choose DH over RSA for key exchange.  If PGP is slow on
your machine, DH will be, too.

Hal Finney
hfinney@shell.portal.com




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: fergp@sytex.com (Paul Ferguson)
Date: Tue, 10 Aug 93 21:22:14 PDT
To: postmaster@tstc.edu
Subject: Legal Net Newsletter mail server -- now in service
Message-ID: <6mH48B4w165w@sytex.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


<warning: blatant plug follows>
 
      Legal Net News is now available via e-mail subscription.
 
 What it is -
 
   Legal Net Newsletter is dedicated to providing information on
   the legal issues of computing and networking in the 1990's and
   into the future. Legal Net News contains information which
   directly affects you and how you you compute.
 
 How to get it-
 
   To subscribe, send a message to <maiser@ins.tstc.edu>, with the
   following text in the body of the message:
 
           SUBSCRIBE LNN
 
   To unsubscribe send the message text:
 
           UNSUBSCRIBE LNN
 
   Or subsitute "UNSUB LNN" or "SIGNOFF LNN" instead of "UNSUBSCRIBE"
   if you like.
 
   The mail server has no facility for requesting help at this time,
   however, when you join the list you will be sent a "WELCOME"
   message describing Legal Net News in more detail, i.e. what Legal
   Net News is about, and how to handle unsubscribing from the list.
 
   Please send any admin mail (problems with the mailserver, etc.) to:
 
           postmaster@tstc.edu
 
   Back issues of Legal Net News can be obtained by anonymous FTP at:
 
           tstc.edu   (161.109.128.2)
           Directory: /pub/legal-net-news
 
 
     E-mail submissions, comments and editorials to: fergp@sytex.com

Paul Ferguson               |  "Government, even in its best state,
Network Integrator          |   is but a necessary evil; in its worst
Centreville, Virginia USA   |   state, an intolerable one."
fergp@sytex.com             |      - Thomas Paine, Common Sense
 
Type bits/keyID   Date       User ID
pub  1024/1CC04D 1993/03/15  Paul Ferguson <fergp@sytex.com>
  Key fingerprint =  EE D2 93 7D 04 6D C6 05  AC 36 AD 9D 8E 4F 41 58




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "L. Detweiler" <ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Date: Tue, 10 Aug 93 22:12:13 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: obtaining Wired article
Message-ID: <9308110508.AA07014@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>The title is "Crypto Rebels."  It was published in the May/June issue of
>WIRED, page 54.  See my reply to L. Detweiler for information on the
>response I got back from them.

Mr. W. K. Russel (a rather transparent neophyte =) posted this to the
list referencing private mail he sent to me, which perhaps he meant to
cc: to the list (it was both to: and cc: me, maybe a mistake). Anyway,
he said the following:

===cut=here===

I finally got a note back from Jane Metcalfe (jane@wired.com) saying that
the article text is available on America Online, or you can order that
issue of the mag for $10.

She told me WIRED is available on most newsstands, and at B Dalton,
Waldenbooks, Safeway, and Egghead Software.  I went right down to B Dalton
and bought the current issue.  It's very slick and looked interesting (not
cheap, though--$6.00 an issue).

You can subscribe at $29.95 for 12 issues to subscriptions@wired.com.

Keith





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "L. Detweiler" <ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Date: Tue, 10 Aug 93 22:16:53 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: birth of Software Patent Institute
Message-ID: <9308110513.AA07049@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Don't know anything about this, but it's a definite Cypherpunk cause...
the first question to ask would be whether they're in touch with LPF at all.


------- Forwarded Message




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "L. Detweiler" <ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Date: Tue, 10 Aug 93 22:22:13 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: AAAS-ABA `Ethics of Computers' conference announcement
Message-ID: <9308110517.AA07082@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



As the forwarder writes:

>I have forwarded this notice because I feel that the "cypherpunk" point of 
>view could profitably be presented at such a forum.  Is there anyone out there
>who feels up to putting the case forward in this academic setting?  I hope so.
>
>Yours in plaintext.
>
>cjl      "Keep on 'crypting."


===cut=here===

Date: Tue, 10 Aug 93 15:18:21 EDT
From: cjl@micro.med.cornell.edu (Chris Leonard)
Message-Id: <9308101918.AA12387@ micro.med.cornell.edu>
Subject: for your information



Reprinted from SCIENCE magazine July 30, 1993 vol.261 pg. 632

xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx

NETWORK ETHICS: A CALL FOR PAPERS

The AAAS-ABA National Conference of Lawyers and Scientists (NCLS) invites 
proposals for original papers for presentation at a two-and-a-half day 
invitational conference on "Legal, Ethical, and Technological Aspects of 
Computer and Network Use and Abuse."  Forty participants representing a 
diverse set of perspectives and areas of expertise will present papers at the 
conference which will be held in southern California in mid-December 1993.  Up
to three successful applicants will receive travel expenses and room and board
at teh conference.  Papers will be included in the conference proceedings and
may be published subsequently in a book or journal symposium.
	The conference will focus on the ways in which the law, ethics, and
technology can influence the bounds of the bounds of acceptable behavior and
foster the development of positive human values in a shared computer
environment.  Participants will address handling unwanted intrusions
into computer software or networks, including unauthorized entry and dissemination 
of viruses through networks or shared disks.  Also on the agenda: access to
information, privacy, security, and equity; the role of computer users, 
academic institutions, industry, profesional soceities, government, and the  
law in defining and maintaining legal and ethical standards for the use of
computer networks; and a policy agenda for implementing these standards.
	Although participants may address any aspect of the conference theme,
papers reporting empirical research, surveys of computer users, and case 
studies (other than those that are already well known) are especially 
encouraged.
	If you are interested in participating in the conference, please
forward a summary or outline of no more than 500 words, together with a 
one-page resume and a brief statement detailing how your expertise or 
perspective would contribute to the meeting.  These proposals will be 
reviewed by an advisory committee convened by NCLS and successful applicants 
will be asked to prepare papers for the meeting.  Participants must submit an 
original previously unpublished paper, between 5000 and 8000 words (25 to
30 double-spaced pages) in length.
	Proposals must be received by 5 pm EST 15 Sept. 1993.  Applicants
selected to prepare papers will be informed by 1 October, and draft papers will 
be due 3 December 1993.  Final versions of the papers, revised in light of 
conference discussions, will be due approximately two months after the
conference.
	NCLS is an organization sponsored jointly by the American Association 
for the Advancement of Science and the American Bar Association, dedicated to
improving communication between members of the legal and scientific/
technical professions and exploring issues at the intersection of law, science,
and technology.  Funding for this meeting has been providesd by the Program
on Ethics and Vales Studies of the National Science Foundation.  For further
information or to submit paper abstracts and accompanying materials, please
contact Deborah Runkle, Directorate for Science & Policy Programs, AAAS, 
1333 H Street, NW, Washington, DC 20005.  Phone: 202-326-660, Fax: 202-289-
4950.  E-mail: values@gwuvm.gwu.edu.


xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx


------- End of Forwarded Message





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: bart@netcom.com (Harry Bartholomew)
Date: Wed, 11 Aug 93 01:06:53 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: NIST call for comments on SKIPJACK
Message-ID: <9308110804.AA28714@netcom5.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


	From the Clarinet.Newsbytes.Govt:

Written comments (from anyone) on the proposed standard are due
by September 28, 1993, to Director, Computer Systems Laboratory,
Attn: Proposed FIPS for Escrowed Encryption Standard, B154
Technology Bldg., NIST, Gaithersburg, Md. 20899-0001.


	




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: guy@theporch.raider.net (Jonathan Guy)
Date: Wed, 11 Aug 93 01:56:52 PDT
To: karn@qualcomm.com (Phil Karn)
Subject: Re: Secure voice software issues
In-Reply-To: <9308100259.AA24433@servo>
Message-ID: <m0oQB7m-0009UVC@theporch.raider.net>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> I agree that RSA public keys could be exchanged as needed during the
> call, although this might require a few iterations before a party gets
> a signature that it can trust. Finding a path through the PGP "web of

To me at least this seems unimportant for the application.  If all you're
doing is exchanging session keys over the phone, it doesn't really matter if
you are sure that the public key actually belongs to who it claims it does,
only that the person you're talking to (who you presumably already know)
actually possesses the corresponding private key.  This can be verified with
a simple challenge-response system.  The identity problem is removed if you
use a different key pair for phone conversations than you do for signature
purposes... there doesn't need to be any information actually connecting the
key with you.

-- 
Jonathan R. Guy                    |  The opinions expressed above are not  
E-Mail: guy@theporch.raider.net    |     those of my employer.  Nor are
Snail:  P.O. Box 158325            |  they my own.  Actually, I copied them  
        Nashville, TN 37215        |        from the encyclopedia.



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: guy@theporch.raider.net (Jonathan Guy)
Date: Wed, 11 Aug 93 01:57:15 PDT
To: peb@PROCASE.COM (Paul Baclace)
Subject: Re: patent on remote cash transactions?
In-Reply-To: <9308102004.AA01064@banff.procase.com>
Message-ID: <m0oQBKY-0009UVC@theporch.raider.net>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> American Public Radio reported yesterday that some company was granted
> a broad patent on remote cash transactions--they mentioned an article
> in the NYTimes recently (NYT does patent reporting on Saturday typically, but
> sometimes they do it in the business section on other days; I don't get
> NYT anymore...); anyone here more about this?  Is this yet another 
> example of bozo software patents?  If anyone finds out more, please post.

I read the NYT article, which was on the second page of the business section
in Monday's edition.  Apparently the patent was granted to a Virginia
company (don't recall the name, and that may be the wrong state... <sigh>)
and covers virtually anything that provides ATM-like functionality from a
home computer.  The exact boundaries of the patent weren't discussed in the
article, but I seriously doubt it would affect a digital cash system.

-- 
Jonathan R. Guy                    |  The opinions expressed above are not  
E-Mail: guy@theporch.raider.net    |     those of my employer.  Nor are
Snail:  P.O. Box 158325            |  they my own.  Actually, I copied them  
        Nashville, TN 37215        |        from the encyclopedia.



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Jin S Choi <jsc@monolith.MIT.EDU>
Date: Wed, 11 Aug 93 04:56:55 PDT
To: R.Tait@bnr.co.uk
Subject: Re: Any PGP utils for Emacs?
In-Reply-To: <199308110901.25595@bnsgs200.bnr.co.uk>
Message-ID: <9308111154.AA09832@monolith.MIT.EDU>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----


   Tait> Does anyone have any elisp to integrate PGP into Emacs? I'm fed up of
   Tait> having to use VI to send/receive all my encrypted mail, and there's no
   Tait> point in me writing any code if someone already has.

I've released a few beta versions of my mailcrypt.el package to
alt.privacy.pgp, alt.privacy.ripem, and gnu.emacs.sources recently. It's
meant to provide an easy to use interface to PGP and RIPEM from within
emacs. It has support for RMAIL and VM.

I'm still making small changes to it, so I still consider it beta, but
everything does work. I will release it to the elisp archive when I stop
fiddling with it. I don't want to inundate this mailing list with
continual revisions of code only a few people might be interested in, so
if you'd like to play with it, you can pick up my last release to the
mentioned newsgroups, or email me for the latest version. If you have
afs, you can also pick up a copy at
/afs/athena.mit.edu/contrib/emacs-contrib/elisp/mailcrypt.el

I welcome any and all comments, suggestions, and additions.

- --
Jin Choi
jsc@mit.edu

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.3

iQCVAgUBLGjdqHAdLmoLYgSRAQEBNQP/e6T4j1jaEriecjXR/OSb0mjEJRCII6qm
UrODGvNpOhcx5/h4nWJ3aoUDuvdsBPePccVFMbQv77g2XhlaJsRp+taU9JzE4m0t
44TzYe03lLI9WmME+S2vsbtXbB6oI1jEC4CmOoiVInnKWCkA9LPSuwztcnyVfx6c
B/97XM63IDg=
=uQDK
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Mail Delivery Subsystem <MAILER-DAEMON>
Date: Wed, 11 Aug 1993 07:58:38 -0400
To: pcw
Subject: Returned mail: Host unknown
Message-ID: <199308111158.AA01899@access.digex.net>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


   ----- Transcript of session follows -----
550 toad.com (TCP)... 550 Host unknown
554 cypherpunks@toad.com... 550 Host unknown (Valid name but no data [address])

   ----- Unsent message follows -----
Received: by access.digex.net id AA01895
  (5.65c/IDA-1.4.4 for cypherpunks@toad.com); Wed, 11 Aug 1993 07:58:38 -0400
Date: Wed, 11 Aug 1993 07:58:38 -0400
From: Peter Wayner <pcw>


There is a bit of funny satire in the New Yorker this week. 
(This is the Aug 16th issue with the funny Bruce McCall painting
of a Zeppelin park and the stories about AIDS and the Muppets.)
It's aimed at the proposed "V" chip that would allow parents
to protect their children from televised violence by shutting
off the "violence" mode of the television. The central broadcasters
would be required to include a signal saying, "Hey, we're going
to be busting some heads in this show. Turn yourself off if the
owners don't want you showing violent things." Given that we're
talking alot about Big Bubba chips like this, I'll grab a few 
excerpts:

"Sorry. I have a brand-new daughter and I'm already aware of the
grim reality: technologically speaking it's us against them--
us the parents, against them, the kids. My kid, Gabrielle, is only
five weeks old, and somehow she has already learned how to 
manipulate the signal from her baby monitor so as to jam my microwave
and VCR when she's cranky."

"Her mother and I have just hired a pediatric counter-insurgency expert
from the Rand Corporation to assist us in eavesdropping on and,
if necessary, interdicting some of the electronic conversation that
our daughter is involved in."

The piece is uneven in spots and given to a few dull jokes, but I
thought I would send a blip across your radar screen.

-Peter





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Jin S Choi <jsc@monolith.MIT.EDU>
Date: Wed, 11 Aug 93 05:02:17 PDT
To: R.Tait@bnr.co.uk
Subject: Re: Any PGP utils for Emacs?
In-Reply-To: <199308110901.25595@bnsgs200.bnr.co.uk>
Message-ID: <9308111201.AA09855@monolith.MIT.EDU>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



I forgot to mention that mailcrypt uses a few emacs19 elisp features. It
shouldn't be too hard to hack it for emacs 18 compatibility, if you know
elisp. I only knowingly used two emacs 19 functions, `run-at-time' and
`kill-new'. The first is used to deactivate your passphrase
automatically after a time so it doesn't stayed stored in a
variable. The second is used in mc-temp-display, to transfer information
between buffers.





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Eric Hughes <hughes@soda.berkeley.edu>
Date: Wed, 11 Aug 93 09:22:19 PDT
To: ciamac@hplms2.hpl.hp.com
Subject: directions to Cygnus
In-Reply-To: <9308100525.AA13623@cello.hpl.hp.com>
Message-ID: <9308111614.AA21277@soda.berkeley.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


This file is on the archive site at 

	soda.berkeley.edu:pub/cypherpunks/misc/directions.to.cygnus

Eric
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
[Directions to Cygnus provided by John Gilmore. -- EH]

	Cygnus Support
	1937 Landings Drive
	Mt. View, CA  94043
	+1 415 903 1400   switchboard
	+1 415 903 1418   John Gilmore

Take US 101 toward Mt. View.  From San Francisco, it's about a
40-minute drive.  Get off at the Rengstorff Ave/Amphitheatre Parkway
exit.  If you were heading south on 101, you curve around to the
right, cross over the freeway, and get to a stoplight.  If you were
heading north on 101, you just come right off the exit to the
stoplight.  The light is the intersection of Amphitheatre and
Charleston Rd.  Take a right on Charleston; there's a right-turn-only
lane.

Follow Charleston for a short distance.  You'll pass the
Metaphor/Kaleida buildings on the right.  At a clump of palm trees and
a "Landmark Deli" sign, take a right into Landings Drive.  At the end
of the road, turn left into the complex with the big concrete
"Landmark" sign.  Follow the road past the deli til you are in front
of the clock tower that rises out of one of the buildings, facing you.
Enter through the doors immediately under the clock tower.  They'll be
open between noon and 1PM at least.  (See below if you're late.)

Once inside, take the stairs up, immediately to your right.  At the top
of the stairs, turn right past the treetops, and we'll be in 1937 on 
your left.  The door is marked "Cygnus".

If you are late and the door under the clock tower is locked, you can
walk to the deli (which will be around the building on your left, as
you face the door).  Go through the gate in the fence to the right of
the deli, and into the back lawns between the complex and the farm
behind it.  Walk forward and right around the buildings until you see
a satellite dish in the lawn.  Go up the stairs next to the dish,
which are the back stairs into the Cygnus office space.  We'll prop
the door (or you can bang on it if we forget).

Or, you can find the guard who's wandering around the complex, who
knows there's a meeting happening and will let you in.  They can be
beeped at 965 5250, though you'll have trouble finding a phone.

Don't forget to eat first, or bring food at noon!  I recommend hitting
the burrito place on Rengstorff (La Costen~a) at about 11:45.  To get
there, when you get off 101, take Rengstorff (toward the hills) rather
than Amphitheatre (toward the bay).  Follow it about ten blocks until
the major intersection at Middlefield Road.  La Costen~a is the store
on your left at the corner.  You can turn left into the narrow lane
behind the store, which leads to a parking lot, and enter by the front
door, which faces the intersection.  To get to the meeting from there,
just retrace your route on Rengstorff, go straight over the freeway,
and turn right at the stoplight onto Charleston; see above.

See you there!

	John Gilmore






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: williacw@vuse.vanderbilt.edu (Charles Williams)
Date: Wed, 11 Aug 93 07:26:57 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: How long would it take?
Message-ID: <9308111426.AA20884@necs.vuse>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


   Could the NSA reverse PGP encryption on a message that was iencrypted with
a 1264bit key? Do you think they could do this in a matter of hours? Why, or
why not? How long would it take? What do you know that corroborates this?

This is a genereic question, which I hope aeveryone who knows about  this
will attempt to answer. If this is not the right subject for the LIST, send
replies via EMAIL to

wesley@ctrvax.vanderbilt.edu

Thanks




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Peter Wayner <pcw@access.digex.net>
Date: Wed, 11 Aug 93 06:36:55 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: The New Yorker, Yes, the New Yorker
Message-ID: <199308111336.AA13427@access.digex.net>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Eric Hughes <hughes@soda.berkeley.edu>
Date: Wed, 11 Aug 93 09:46:59 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: How long would it take?
In-Reply-To: <9308111426.AA20884@necs.vuse>
Message-ID: <9308111639.AA22325@soda.berkeley.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


re: a question about the security of RSA

This question is better asked in sci.crypt, since it involves
technicalities of number theory that are not in the purview of this
list.

Eric




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: peter honeyman <honey@citi.umich.edu>
Date: Wed, 11 Aug 93 06:46:55 PDT
To: "L. Detweiler" <ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Subject: Re: birth of Software Patent Institute
Message-ID: <9308111344.AA00298@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> the first question to ask would be whether they're in touch with LPF at all.

the next question would be whether lpf is willing to work with them.
rms has never been known to put progress ahead of politics.

	peter




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: collins@newton.apple.com (Scott Collins)
Date: Wed, 11 Aug 93 09:56:59 PDT
To: williacw@vuse.vanderbilt.edu (Charles Williams)
Subject: Re: How long would it take?
Message-ID: <9308111649.AA17888@newton.apple.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Hello,

When you encrypt a message M with PGP, you are really doing several things:

        1. Generating a random IDEA key K
        2. Encrypting M with K yielding IDEA(K,M)
        3. Encrypting K with the public key of the recipient, Rpub
           yielding RSA(Rpub,K)
           (note that if YOUR key is 1256 bits, but THEIR key is only 512 bits,
           you only get 512 bits of 'security' because you are encrypting to
           them, not to yourself)
        4. Sending (essentially) the message {RSA(Rpub,K)+IDEA(K,M)}

Someone who wants to read the message (e.g., the recipient or some
interceptor) must either know Rpri (Rpub's corresponding private key) to
extract K, or must be able to break RSA, or must know K a priori, or must
be able to break IDEA.

This is a lot of ways to get in.  Most of them prohibitive, except for the
recipient who can be expected to know Rpri.

  > Could the NSA reverse PGP encryption on a message that was encrypted with a
  > 1264 bit key?

Yes.  Although, I think it would be more likely through cryptanalysis of
the IDEA cypher than of the RSA encrypted IDEA key.

  > Do you think they could do this in a matter of hours?

I don't think so.

  > Why or why not

Cracking RSA is presumed to be as hard as factoring one of the components
of the key.  Although this has not been proven, I think it likely that no
better attack is currently known.  I have no figures yet on the complexity
of the IDEA cypher.  I do not know if it is susceptible to differential
cryptanalysis.  To my knowledge, exhaustive search is the only attack. 
With a random 128 bit key, search is prohibitive.

Sorry I didn't include more numbers,

Scott Collins         | "Few people realize what tremendous power there
                      |  is in one of these things."     -- Willy Wonka
......................|................................................
BUSINESS.   voice:408.862.0540  fax:974.6094   collins@newton.apple.com
Apple Computer, Inc.   1 Infinite Loop, MS 301-2C   Cupertino, CA 95014
.......................................................................
PERSONAL.   voice/fax:408.257.1746    1024/669687   catalyst@netcom.com





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: R.Tait@bnr.co.uk
Date: Wed, 11 Aug 93 02:02:15 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Any PGP utils for Emacs?
Message-ID: <199308110901.25595@bnsgs200.bnr.co.uk>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Does anyone have any elisp to integrate PGP into Emacs? I'm fed up of
having to use VI to send/receive all my encrypted mail, and there's no
point in me writing any code if someone already has.

So, is there any out there?

-Rick




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: gnu (John Gilmore)
Date: Wed, 11 Aug 93 10:26:59 PDT
To: cypherpunks, gnu
Subject: Chaos harnessed for encryption / Fluctuations and Order research
Message-ID: <9308111723.AA07380@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


EE Times, Aug 9, 1993, p. 31 reports that "MIT's Research Lab of
Electronics is creating new signal processor designs, based on chaos
theory, that could open up a simple route to secure communications.

The new designs use a recent discovery called synchronized chaos to
transform a meaningful signal into what only seems to be random
noise., A similarly constructed receiver responds to the noisy signal,
sychronizing its own chaotic behaviour to extract the message.  The
MIT design requires only eight op-amps and is based on the Lorenz
attractor, which generates a simple three-dimensional chaotic system."

There's more, this is just a pointer.  Their current encryption system
is analog, not digital, and encrypts analog signals like audio; I
don't know if this is a fundamental design property or not.  They claim
it's not super-great encryption, just cheap and interesting.

Wired Sep/Oct 93 also reports (p.118) a Sep 9-12 conference on "Fluctuations
and Order" at Los Alamos National Labs' Center for Nonlinear Studies.
"The labs are gathering a couple dozen researchers who have realized
they can induce order into systems by using noise and randomness.  As
one abstract says, `The addition of noise to certain types of driven
systems can paradoxically cause a signal to become clearer.'"  These
seem related, to me.

	John




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: jthomas@kolanut.mitre.org (Joe Thomas)
Date: Wed, 11 Aug 93 08:06:58 PDT
To: peter honeyman <honey@citi.umich.edu>
Subject: Re: birth of Software Patent Institute
Message-ID: <9308111505.AA02818@kolanut>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> > the first question to ask would be whether they're in
> touch with LPF at all.
> 

> the next question would be whether lpf is willing to work
> with them. rms has never been known to put progress ahead
> of politics.

First, rms isn't the LPF.  He's practically the FSF, and supports the  
LPF, but the two organizations aren't synonymous.  


Second, I believe the LPF has made an official statement that they  
will _not_ work with SPI.  SPI is primarily funded by large holders  
of software patents, and LPF believes that this database will give  
patent holders an advantage in defending their patents in court (i.e.  
against suits by LPF to invalidate the patents).  I'm not even a  
member of the LPF; you should write to them for their actual  
arguments.

Third, I'm not sure this is appropriate to the list, unless someone  
expects to find "folklore" about public key cryptography that  
predates RSA, etc.

Joe




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: David Heck <O1DSH@VM1.CC.UAKRON.EDU>
Date: Wed, 11 Aug 93 08:27:00 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Numeric IP address for ftp.eff.org?
Message-ID: <9308111523.AA03682@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


would anyone happen to have the numeric ip address for eff.org or
ftp.eff.org handy?  I'd sure appreciate it....


Thanks,
David




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Kent Hastings" <kent_hastings@qmail2.aero.org>
Date: Wed, 11 Aug 93 11:22:21 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: New Chaos?
Message-ID: <199308111819.AA04314@aerospace.aero.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


                      New Chaos?
John Gilmore wrote:
  
>EE Times, Aug 9, 1993, p. 31 reports that "MIT's Research Lab of
>Electronics is creating new signal processor designs, based on chaos
>theory, that could open up a simple route to secure communications.
...
>The new designs use a recent discovery called synchronized chaos to
>transform a meaningful signal into what only seems to be random
>noise...

I saw something like this in the latest Scientific American, but is 
it new??

From my survey of spread-spectrum techniques, this 1950's approach
to signal hiding is called a "Transmitted Reference." Random thermal
noise in a resistor was transmitted in one band, and the same noise
mixed with a message was sent in another. The receiver would take the
the difference between the two noisy signals to get the message.

Although casual snoopers would be thwarted, the key is broadcast 
openly, therefore this should not be considered secure. Mix it with
modern Stored Reference techniques like frequency-hopping, direct-
sequence, and time-hopping and you might get a great hybrid system.

Are there any freeware spread-spectrum designs, analogous to PGP, to 
solve the physical data communications problem? Encryption is great,
but the phone company is enemy territory. bypass. Bypass. BYPASS!!!!

Kent <jkhastings@aol.com>






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Mark <mark@coombs.anu.edu.au>
Date: Tue, 10 Aug 93 18:42:10 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Using a 'telserv' program to redirect mail
Message-ID: <9308110139.AA09329@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>>I will
>>not post this code unless I am assured that it is not going to be a legal
>>problem.  As you can see from the above written statement
>yada yada
>>
>>treason@gnu 
>> 
>
>Why not post it anoymously? Too late now. Cypherpunks not only write code,
>they write code that people can use.

Um guys, it was already posted here over a year ago by myself and another
person. It's a simple port bouncer and not that hard to write. 

treason: just post it. it's no big secret.

If anyone is in a hurry it's been up for ftp as /pub/perl/telserv.c on
coombs.anu.edu.au [150.203.76.2] since Nov 92. It's still there.
(Note it's C code not perl, thats just the tree I maintain).

Mark.



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: peter honeyman <honey@citi.umich.edu>
Date: Wed, 11 Aug 93 08:47:00 PDT
To: jthomas@kolanut.mitre.org (Joe Thomas)
Subject: Re: birth of Software Patent Institute
Message-ID: <9308111544.AA04238@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


joe, thanks for setting me straight.

	peter




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: collins@newton.apple.com (Scott Collins)
Date: Wed, 11 Aug 93 12:02:22 PDT
To: uri@watson.ibm.com
Subject: Re: How long would it take?
Message-ID: <9308111856.AA22501@newton.apple.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


  >How does your "Yes" wash with the next paragraph of your note?

I'm sorry.  My answer was misleading (read 'wrong').  What I was trying to
say was:

  "Yes, but not in a reasonable amount of time."

My implication was that an attack against RSA with a 1264 bit key and an
attack against IDEA with a 128 bit key are both prohibitive, but that my
_guess_ is that cryptanalysis of the IDEA cypher would be the more fruitful
attack.

If the real question is:

  "Am I safe from the NSA when I use PGP and encrypt with a 1264 bit key?"

Then I must answer:

  "In my opinion, you are reasonably safe."

If the question is:

  > Could the NSA reverse PGP encryption on a message that was encrypted with a
  > 1264 bit key?

Then I must answer:

  "Yes, it is mathematically possible; although unlikely in the extreme."



I apologize.

  >Sorry I didn't include more numbers,

...really sorry.  They said what I meant.



  >And IDEA is not susceptible to diff.cryptan  -  that's the way
  >it was *designed* (actually the designer proved mathematically
  >the invinsibility of IDEA to this attack).

Thanks for this info.  I have been trying to get the IDEA papers:

  "Detailed Description and a Software Implementation of the IPES Cipher"
  "Markov Ciphers and Differential Cryptanalysis"

without success, as yet.  Perhaps you have them or know of an ftp site?

Thanks,

Scott Collins         | "Few people realize what tremendous power there
                      |  is in one of these things."     -- Willy Wonka
......................|................................................
BUSINESS.   voice:408.862.0540  fax:974.6094   collins@newton.apple.com
Apple Computer, Inc.   1 Infinite Loop, MS 301-2C   Cupertino, CA 95014
.......................................................................
PERSONAL.   voice/fax:408.257.1746    1024/669687   catalyst@netcom.com





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Round Waffle <eggo@student.umass.edu>
Date: Wed, 11 Aug 93 09:06:59 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com (Cypherpunks)
Subject: Re: Numeric IP address for ftp.eff.org?
In-Reply-To: <9308111523.AA03682@toad.com>
Message-ID: <9308111605.AA09461@titan.ucs.umass.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text


Possessed by The Unholy, David Heck scrawled the following in blood:
> 
> would anyone happen to have the numeric ip address for eff.org or
> ftp.eff.org handy?  I'd sure appreciate it....

     Both eff.org and ftp.eff.org resolve to 192.88.144.3, according to
nslookup.

> 
> Thanks,
> David
> 

+-   eggo@titan.ucs.umass.edu      --><--       Eat Some Paste   -+
+-          Yorn desh born, der ritt de gitt der gue,            -+
+-      Orn desh, dee born desh, de umn bork! bork! bork!        -+
+----------------- The Durex Blender Corporation -----------------+



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: karn@qualcomm.com (Phil Karn)
Date: Wed, 11 Aug 93 12:16:59 PDT
To: perobich@ingr.com
Subject: Secure voice software issues
In-Reply-To: <199308101603.AA28136@poboy.b17c.ingr.com>
Message-ID: <9308111916.AA03336@servo>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>The reason behind my original proposal of a system that could use PGP
>keyrings is thus: let's say that I want to call you. I tell my
>cryptophone to call "Phil Karn", so it looks up your public key and
>uses it to encrypt my side's session key, then signs the encrypted
>version with my public key.

You're creating an unnecessary vulnerability here. By using RSA to
encrypt the session key, all of your past conversations would be
compromised if your RSA secret key were ever revealed.

True, this is already the case for PGP-encrypted messages which are
usually sent over unidirectional mail channels. There you can't
really do much better.

Voice calls are different, as the availability of a two-way path lets
you do things much more securely. If you generate a session key with
DH and use PGP/RSA *only to sign the exchanges*, not to encrypt the
session key, then even if your RSA secret key is later compromised, it
would not compromise those session keys that had already been created,
used and destroyed.

This is a very powerful feature! Consider the profound effect it would
have on the whole topic of "rubber hose cryptanalysis", either in its
pure unadulterated form (blackmail, torture, death threats) or in its
"legal" form (being compelled to divulge an encryption key that could
be used against you, despite the 5th amendment). Session keys could be
created, authenticated, used and destroyed without the user ever
having to know them, or even having any way to recreate them after the
fact despite knowledge of the RSA secret key that was used to
authenticate them.

Phil





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: jthomas@kolanut.mitre.org (Joe Thomas)
Date: Wed, 11 Aug 93 09:32:19 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Numeric IP address for ftp.eff.org?
Message-ID: <9308111631.AA02889@kolanut>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Round Waffle wrote: 

> Possessed by The Unholy, David Heck scrawled the
> following in blood: 

> > would anyone happen to have the numeric ip address for eff.org or 

> > ftp.eff.org handy? 

> > I'd sure appreciate it....
> 

>      Both eff.org and ftp.eff.org resolve to 192.88.144.3,
> according to nslookup.
> 


But when you actually ftp to ftp.eff.org, the hostname reported is  
kragar.eff.org, and a traceroute there shows the endpoint's IP address as  
192.88.144.4.  Creative DNS administration...

mwunix> ftp ftp.eff.org
Connected to kragar.eff.org.
220 kragar.eff.org FTP server (Version 2.1WU(1) Thu May 20 15:21:04 EDT 1993)  
ready.

mwunix> traceroute ftp.eff.org
traceroute to kragar.eff.org (192.88.144.4), 30 hops max, 40 byte packets
 1  128.29.154.254 (128.29.154.254)  2 ms  2 ms  5 ms
 2  mwgw.mitre.org (128.29.18.251)  2 ms  2 ms  2 ms
 3  reston1gw.mitre.org (128.29.1.2)  4 ms  4 ms  4 ms
 4  reston2gw.mitre.org (128.29.100.253)  4 ms  4 ms  4 ms
 5  128.29.217.253 (128.29.217.253)  5 ms  5 ms  5 ms
 6  192.80.55.254 (192.80.55.254)  5 ms  5 ms  5 ms
 7  Falls-Church3.VA.ALTER.NET (137.39.61.1)  7 ms  13 ms  6 ms
 8  Washington.DC.ALTER.NET (137.39.128.1)  35 ms  16 ms  41 ms
 9  Boston1.MA.ALTER.NET (137.39.12.2)  22 ms  22 ms  24 ms
10  EFF-gw.ALTER.NET (137.39.25.2)  39 ms  22 ms  29 ms
11  kragar.eff.org (192.88.144.4)  26 ms  27 ms  29 ms
mwunix> 


Joe
a font of trivia today




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: smb@research.att.com
Date: Wed, 11 Aug 93 09:52:20 PDT
To: jthomas@kolanut.mitre.org (Joe Thomas)
Subject: Re: Numeric IP address for ftp.eff.org?
Message-ID: <9308111649.AA06257@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


	 Round Waffle wrote: 

	 But when you actually ftp to ftp.eff.org, the hostname reported is  
	 kragar.eff.org, and a traceroute there shows the endpoint's IP address
	 as  
	 192.88.144.4.  Creative DNS administration...

The dig output explains what's going on.

	$ dig ftp.eff.org

	; <<>> DiG 2.0 <<>> ftp.eff.org 
	;; ->>HEADER<<- opcode: QUERY , status: NOERROR, id: 6
	;; flags: qr aa rd ra ; Ques: 1, Ans: 2, Auth: 0, Addit: 0
	;; QUESTIONS: 
	;;      ftp.eff.org, type = A, class = IN

	;; ANSWERS:
	ftp.eff.org.    86400   CNAME   kragar.eff.org.
	kragar.eff.org. 86400   A       192.88.144.4

	;; Sent 1 pkts, answer found in time: 158 msec 
	;; FROM: inet to SERVER: default -- 0.0.0.0
	;; WHEN: Wed Aug 11 11:44:15 1993
	;; MSG SIZE  sent: 29  rcvd: 73

In other words, ftp.eff.org is an alias for the official name of
the host.  Quite properly, the inverse map lists the official name
for the host:

	$ dig -x 192.88.144.4

	; <<>> DiG 2.0 <<>> -x 
	;; ->>HEADER<<- opcode: QUERY , status: NOERROR, id: 6
	;; flags: qr aa rd ra ; Ques: 1, Ans: 1, Auth: 0, Addit: 0
	;; QUESTIONS: 
	;;      4.144.88.192.in-addr.arpa, type = ANY, class = IN

	;; ANSWERS:
	4.144.88.192.in-addr.arpa.      86400   PTR     kragar.eff.org.

	;; Sent 1 pkts, answer found in time: 329 msec 
	;; FROM: inet to SERVER: default -- 0.0.0.0
	;; WHEN: Wed Aug 11 12:45:52 1993
	;; MSG SIZE  sent: 43  rcvd: 71

But by advertising the name ``ftp.eff.org'', instead of ``kragar.eff.org'',
the administrator gains the flexibility to move the archive to some
other machine if necessary/desirable.  That's exactly the right way
to run such a service.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: norm@netcom.com (Norman Hardy)
Date: Wed, 11 Aug 93 13:07:22 PDT
To: spi@iti.org
Subject: Re: Software Patent Institute
Message-ID: <9308112006.AA10806@netcom2.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I am interested in the issue of patenting ideas that have
already been put into practice or that would be obvious
to any of many practitioners. I have a patent and my
patent attorney included in the ideas that were not
new. We were not motivated to spend the time and money
to revise the patent to avoid this. The patent examiner
had little experience in programming and missed the
old ideas.
 
I would be curious to know what software patents exist
and the outcome of any court fights to overturn patents
on ideas that were indeed not new.
 
I am not good a keeping track of publications where I
have learned of ideas but I often do know people who were
using various ideas going back to 1955 when I began
programming professionally.
 
I do not know very much about patent law but I understand that
IBM, for instance, regularly publishes "Technical Disclosures"
which is mostly comprised of the work products of IBM patent attorneys
when they have decided that it is not worth the expense of
patenting some particular idea.
 
It would be good to have a public repository of programming ideas
that are good but not worth patenting.
 
Let me know how I can help.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: paul@poboy.b17c.ingr.com (Paul Robichaux)
Date: Wed, 11 Aug 93 11:16:59 PDT
To: gnu@toad.com (John Gilmore)
Subject: Re: Chaos harnessed for encryption / Fluctuations and Order research
In-Reply-To: <9308111723.AA07380@toad.com>
Message-ID: <199308111810.AA02594@poboy.b17c.ingr.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

A recent _Scientific American_ had a brief piece on inducing order in
chaotic systems; I don't have it handy, but apparently it's fairly
simple to induce order in some nonlinear systems.

I'm no chaotician, but it seems that if you want to synchronize two
chaos generators at different sites, you must a) use the same initial
values and b) use the same mechanism to induce order. Granted that
small changes in a) or b) can change the system greatly, this doesn't
seem all that different from conventional synchronized encryption
systems.

(I'm happy to note that much of this work is being done at Georgia
Tech, my alma mater. It's great to be a fuzzy bee!)

- -Paul

- -- 
Paul Robichaux, KD4JZG     | "Crypto-anarchy means never having to say
perobich@ingr.com          |  you're sorry." - Tim May (tcmay@netcom.com)
Intergraph Federal Systems | Be a cryptography user- ask me how.


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.3a

iQCVAgUBLGk15SA78To+806NAQFLyQQAoZkg0VNeLCpfyqBtIDOsXcZQtBt0lo/Z
gOSS8p1Q2hSYAaO6NgGAgZ3dsVBSaGVpoGxMoIGlzbjNbJ72BEIRxiz2Itt3ul/s
DGbCIvqU8omph0msq8s2a3FBAnwE/yHfCbSHBPqmqRL29Bif7SpNh5qAc5JpEXBT
IjrsgcVa83I=
=4Mbz
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: henrik@stat.tamu.edu (Henrik Schmiediche)
Date: Wed, 11 Aug 93 11:37:21 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Cryptographics Journals
Message-ID: <9308111837.AA06985@picard.tamu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



    Hi,
could anyone mail me info on the Cryptology oriented journals like Cryptologia
and Journal of Cryptology? Specifically, how do I subscribe to them?

Thanks.

    - Henrik




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Peter Wayner <pcw@access.digex.net>
Date: Wed, 11 Aug 93 10:57:00 PDT
To: gnu@toad.com
Subject: Re:  Chaos harnessed for encryption / Fluctuations and Order research
Message-ID: <199308111755.AA03541@access.digex.net>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



There was a paper several years back in Cryptologia that came to 
the conclusion that many of the chaotic functions were unsuitable
for encryption. By this, they mean the "classic" chaotic functions
like the Lorentz attractor. DES is obviously a very nice chaotic 
generator. 

The problem with the systems has its basis in the philosophical
foundations of the field. Mathematicians have been basically
saying, "Like Wow. These very simple equations just generate
stuff that is totally out of whack." The equations are just
simple differential equations that go kablooie. In many cases,
though, the kablooie only means that a small pertubation in 
the system causes large changes in the outcome. While this
is a necessary effect for solid encryption, it is not sufficient
for a good system. What we really want to know is whether
you can recover x from f(x) where f is the encryption function. 
if f(x+small value) is wildly different from f(x), then this
is good, but not good enough. 

Now, think a minute about the "synchronization" of these two
chaotic generators. This means that both ends of the conversation
have set their scramblers to the same "key". But since this
is analog, things might not be _exactly_ the same on both 
ends. If this was a really chaotic system then the tiny differences
in the two systems should make things go kablooie. 

My guess is that they figured out some way to use a feedback
mechanism to fix small pertubations and keep things from going
kablooie in a small range. I would guess that this could lead
to a hole for attacking the system. Just a guess, though. 

This insight is similar to the holes that people found in 
linear feedback shift registers. These systems are pretty
good random number generators, but they're not secure if
the user can guess a few bits of your message. Why? Because
the equations are simple enough to be inverted. 

The only question is whether the chaotic equations can be inverted.
I think that the Cryptologia paper came to the conclusion that
it could be done. 

I'm sorry I don't have a complete reference to the Cryptologia
paper. Perhaps my memory is a bit flawed here as well. 

It would be interesting, though, to study the EE times article
in depth. I think John is right that there is a certain amount
of philosophical convergence between the work at MIT and the
work at Los Alamos.

-Peter




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: David Sobel <dsobel@washofc.cpsr.org>
Date: Wed, 11 Aug 93 14:32:06 PDT
To: Cypherpunks <cypherpunks@toad.com>
Subject: Clipper trapdoor?
Message-ID: <00541.2827923432.4658@washofc.cpsr.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


  Clipper trapdoor?

Peter Wayner <pcw@access.digex.net> writes:

>My general impression is that the system is secure. Many people
>have played paranoid and expressed concerns that the classified
>algorithm might be hiding a trapdoor. It became clear to me that
>these concerns were really silly. There is a built-in trapdoor
>to be used by the government when it is "legal authorized" to
>intercept messages. The NSA has rarely had trouble in the past
>exercising either its explicitly granted legal authority  or
>its implied authority. The phrase "national security" is a
>powerful pass phrase around Washington and there is no reason
>for me to believe that the NSA wouldn't get all of the access
>to the escrow database that it needs to do its job. Building in
>a backdoor would only leave a weakness for an opponent to exploit
>and that is something that is almost as sacrilidgeous at the NSA
>as just putting the classified secrets in a Fed Ex package to 
>Saddam Hussein.

This raises an interesting question and I draw a totally different
conclusion.  If, as we have been told, the only way for an agency to
obtain the escrow keys is to present a court order, than NSA needs
to obtain such an order to decrypt *any* communication it intercepts.

I don't really understand what Peter means when he says that "NSA has 
rarely had trouble in the past exercising either its explicitly granted 
legal authority  or its implied authority. The phrase 'national security'
is a powerful pass phrase around Washington and there is no reason
for me to believe that the NSA wouldn't get all of the access
to the escrow database that it needs to do its job."

Does this mean NSA would, in fact, obtain a warrant in order to "get all 
of the access to the escrow database that it needs to do its job"?  If so,
this would represent an unprecedented change in the way NSA does "its
job."  NSA has no domestic law enforcement authority, so it would
obviously never be in a position to obtain a law enforcement wiretap
warrant under Title III.  The only possible way for NSA to obtain a warrant
would be under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA).  But the
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, which issues warrants under FISA,
has ruled that FISA's provisions

   limit the authority to conduct electronic surveillances to the U.S.
   in a geographic sense as defined in sec. 101(i).  The drafters left
   to another day the matter of "broadening this legislation to apply
   overseas ... because the problems and circumstances of overseas
   surveillance demand separate treatment."

In the Matter of the Application of the United States for an Order
Authorizing
the Physical Search of Nonresidential Premises and Personal Property (1981),
footnote 1 (citations omitted).

Consider the following hypothetical: Iraqi agents smuggle Clipper phones
out of the U.S.  Saddam Hussein uses them to communicate with his military
commander in Basra.  NSA intercepts the communications.  Question:  How
does NSA decrypt the messages?

Note that neither Title III (law enforcement) nor FISA (U.S.-based) apply
to this situation, so we have to assume that NSA will not have a court order
to obtain the escrow keys.  I have to conclude that NSA would not be putting
this technology out into the world *unless* it did, in fact, have some way
to
decrypt messages *without* access to the escrow keys.

Am I missing something?


David Sobel
CPSR Legal Counsel







From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: karn@qualcomm.com (Phil Karn)
Date: Wed, 11 Aug 93 14:22:05 PDT
To: guy@theporch.raider.net
Subject: Secure voice software issues
In-Reply-To: <m0oQB7m-0009UVC@theporch.raider.net>
Message-ID: <9308112117.AA03868@servo>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>To me at least this seems unimportant for the application.  If all you're
>doing is exchanging session keys over the phone, it doesn't really matter if
>you are sure that the public key actually belongs to who it claims it does,

Well...yes. *If* you know the person you are talking to, then you can
read off your session key (or preferably its hash) to guard against the
man in the middle. But let's say you are being referred to someone who
you don't already know (or you know them only by email, and have no idea
what they sound like). You trust this person, but you can't depend on
an oral challenge-response. The existing PGP web should be handy here.

Phil




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: norm@netcom.com (Norman Hardy)
Date: Wed, 11 Aug 93 14:37:23 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Secure voice software issues
Message-ID: <9308112136.AA16886@netcom3.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Can someone tell me how fast CELP is when written in C?
(On some particular machine.)




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Tom Knight <tk@reagan.ai.mit.edu>
Date: Wed, 11 Aug 93 11:56:59 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Chaos harnessed for encryption / Fluctuations and Order research
In-Reply-To: <199308111810.AA02594@poboy.b17c.ingr.com>
Message-ID: <19930811185438.1.TK@ROCKY.AI.MIT.EDU>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


This is how I see the situation:

 Neural Nets : Computers  ::  Chaotic analog encryption : DES

The chaotic encryption work depends on a secret algorithm, no less.  If
you want a system which works, do it digitally.  If you want to play and
get papers accepted to the next hot-topic-of-the-day conference, go play
with some op amps.  If you want to play, there's an article in SciAm
this month on building a chaotic "encryption" machine.  It probably
provides acceptable security if you use triple DES on signals prior to
sending them.





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Derek Atkins <warlord@MIT.EDU>
Date: Wed, 11 Aug 93 11:57:22 PDT
To: williacw@vuse.vanderbilt.edu (Charles Williams)
Subject: Re: How long would it take?
In-Reply-To: <9308111426.AA20884@necs.vuse>
Message-ID: <9308111854.AA00246@toxicwaste.MEDIA.MIT.EDU>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


There are a number of ways to attack a PGP (or PEM) encrypted
document.  The first, and most likely easiest, is to try to get
someone's private key.  Other attacks include attacks on IDEA (128-bit
keys) or RSA.

Its unclear what any of these attacks require, at this point.
Breaking IDEA would take a brute force attack (2^128 keys) unless
something better comes up.  Breaking RSA requires factoring the
modulus, unless something easier comes up.

I would expect that the time to factor a 1200bit modulus would be on
the order of a million years or more, even given technology upgreades
of the near-future.

I've seen a number-of-addition-bits to amount-of-extra-time-to-factor
ratio, but I don't remember what it is.  (order of magnitude per 10
decimal digits, maybe????)

Comments, suggestions, corrections, all welcome.

-derek




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: JAW7254@ACFcluster.NYU.EDU
Date: Wed, 11 Aug 93 21:48:12 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: (fwd) Wolf's got a thing or two to say here...
Message-ID: <01H1MGBIEXFAVSZSU3@ACFcluster.NYU.EDU>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

>>It's apparently from a fag (Wolf) who was beat up by his lover (David)
                         ^^^
>>whom he had arrested
Watch it honey.  Intolerance ain't cool on or off net.  Just my 0.02.
				Jim Wise
				JAW7254@ACF.NYU.EDU
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.3

iQBVAgUBLGoOYwgFW+TtMfolAQHN2QH/Zlux4YbF4xBcZr/H7CC3v9TeuYfIE6HR
rU+WhDnQxLjpLZN2p2UeyE7ZlAKHEo7rsl4mCEO/WOnxP6MRy9I21A==
=zpNE
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: peb@PROCASE.COM (Paul Baclace)
Date: Wed, 11 Aug 93 15:17:24 PDT
To: dsobel@washofc.cpsr.org
Subject: Re: Clipper trapdoor?
Message-ID: <9308112213.AA01510@banff.procase.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



>Note that neither Title III (law enforcement) nor FISA (U.S.-based) apply
>to this situation, [...]
>I have to conclude that NSA would not be putting
>this technology out into the world *unless* it did, in fact, have some way
>to decrypt messages *without* access to the escrow keys.

Which is why they probably already have a draft for a bill to get escrowed 
keys without a warrant for national security reasons.  They would want 
the whole escrow process set up before they announce this, of course.
If they can't get this kind of bill passed, then they probably will not 
approve the technology for export.

Alternatively, the escrow process may be written with specific wording
that it applies only to US citizens leaving a convenient escrow process
trap-door.  This makes the Privacy Clipper difficult to sell overseas,
but specially made chips for export might be compromised anyway with 
weak random seeds.


Paul E. Baclace
peb@procase.com





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Perry E. Metzger" <pmetzger@lehman.com>
Date: Wed, 11 Aug 93 12:27:00 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: How long would it take?
In-Reply-To: <9308111854.AA00246@toxicwaste.MEDIA.MIT.EDU>
Message-ID: <9308111925.AA03024@snark.shearson.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Derek Atkins says:
> Breaking IDEA would take a brute force attack (2^128 keys) unless
> something better comes up.

Its generally unwise to make the assumption that the only possible
attack on your conventional scheme is a brute force attack. Certainly
the attacks used on many previous generations of cryptosystems were
never brute force -- and certainly every generation of naive
cryptographer has said "well, using brute force it would take N years
to break my cypher". A simple vingenere cypher with a 12 letter key
would seem to be very strong indeed (stronger than DES), and yet we
know you can break one in a few moments because there are better
attacks than brute force.

We have suprisingly little in the way of general theory on what would
or would not make a conventional cryptosystem strong.  Certainly
differential cryptanalysis will not be the last thing people come up
with. Until we know everything the NSA knows, I will be hesitant to
say "unless something better comes up" and more comfortable saying
"until something better comes up."

Perry




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: smb@research.att.com
Date: Wed, 11 Aug 93 12:52:22 PDT
To: pmetzger@lehman.com
Subject: Re: How long would it take?
Message-ID: <9308111952.AA11810@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


	 Its generally unwise to make the assumption that the only possible
	 attack on your conventional scheme is a brute force attack. Certainly
	 the attacks used on many previous generations of cryptosystems were
	 never brute force -- and certainly every generation of naive
	 cryptographer has said "well, using brute force it would take N years
	 to break my cypher". A simple vingenere cypher with a 12 letter key
	 would seem to be very strong indeed (stronger than DES), and yet we
	 know you can break one in a few moments because there are better
	 attacks than brute force.

	 We have suprisingly little in the way of general theory on what would
	 or would not make a conventional cryptosystem strong.  Certainly
	 differential cryptanalysis will not be the last thing people come up
	 with. Until we know everything the NSA knows, I will be hesitant to
	 say "unless something better comes up" and more comfortable saying
	 "until something better comes up."

Indeed.  The key length is a worst-case analysis for the cryptanalyst;
they can do no worse than that.  We can be confident that NSA has cracked
DES because an exhaustive search engine is within their means, but we
don't know how much better they can do.

A while back, Shamir gave a talk on differential cryptanalysis here at
Murray Hill.  He mentioned Coppersmith's letter, which said that IBM
knew about differential cryptanalysis back when they built DES, and they
designed it to resist the attack.  That's obviously the case -- so Shamir
said that he asked Coppersmith to state that in the intervening 18 years,
IBM had not come up with a stronger attack on DES.  Coppersmith was
silent, from which you can draw any conclusions you wish.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Kent Hastings" <kent_hastings@qmail2.aero.org>
Date: Wed, 11 Aug 93 16:12:06 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: CryptoStacker
Message-ID: <199308112308.AA11676@aerospace.aero.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


                      CryptoStacker#000#
Whatever happened to CryptoStacker(s) research?

Please voluntarily comply with my request for a status report,
or I'll padlock your business, throw you in jail, arrest all
your friends, and firebomb your compound.

It is your choice.

Kent - <jkhastings@aol.com>#000#






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Eric Blossom <eb@srlr14.sr.hp.com>
Date: Wed, 11 Aug 93 16:12:28 PDT
To: perobich@ingr.com
Subject: Secure voice software issues
In-Reply-To: <199308112153.AA04326@poboy.b17c.ingr.com>
Message-ID: <9308112309.AA07559@srlr14.sr.hp.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



> I do know that ZyXEL's modems are able to do real-time CELP using a
> 68000 processor. The low-end models can do CELP encoding at 9600 baud,
> and the faster ones do better-quality encoding (ACELP, I think they
> call it) at 19200 baud.

I believe that there is a DSP of some kind in there in addition to the 68000.
Also, only their high end modems do CELP.  The regular 14.4/16.8 one doesnt't.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: paul@poboy.b17c.ingr.com (Paul Robichaux)
Date: Wed, 11 Aug 93 15:02:06 PDT
To: norm@netcom.com (Norman Hardy)
Subject: Re: Secure voice software issues
In-Reply-To: <9308112136.AA16886@netcom3.netcom.com>
Message-ID: <199308112153.AA04326@poboy.b17c.ingr.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


This was discussed a while back in the context of secure voice
hardware, but I don't remember whether anyone had been able to get
real-time CELP performance with any particular implementation.

I do know that ZyXEL's modems are able to do real-time CELP using a
68000 processor. The low-end models can do CELP encoding at 9600 baud,
and the faster ones do better-quality encoding (ACELP, I think they
call it) at 19200 baud.

The Mac OS also includes Apple's sound compression routines, which
aren't CELP (i.e. they're not optimized for voice) but allegedly can
do real-time compression.

-Paul

-- 
Paul Robichaux, KD4JZG     | "Crypto-anarchy means never having to say
perobich@ingr.com          |  you're sorry." - Tim May (tcmay@netcom.com)
Intergraph Federal Systems | Be a cryptography user- ask me how.





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: menya zavoot cmpuk <strick@versant.com>
Date: Wed, 11 Aug 93 17:17:28 PDT
To: "Kent Hastings" <kent_hastings@qmail2.aero.org>
Subject: Re: CryptoStacker
In-Reply-To: <199308112308.AA11676@aerospace.aero.org>
Message-ID: <9308120015.AA07981@versant.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


THUS SPAKE "Kent Hastings" <kent_hastings@qmail2.aero.org>:
# Whatever happened to CryptoStacker(s) research?

Ryan "CryptoStacker" Porter <rap@coconut.cis.ufl.edu> has been 
travelling in (supposedly) Belgium & Sweden for the last month, 
and I haven't heard from him since the beginning of July.

He did *not* meet me in Budapest two weeks ago.

# Please voluntarily comply with my request for a status report,
# or I'll padlock your business, throw you in jail, arrest all
# your friends, and firebomb your compound.

Please!  Spare his friends!!!
 
# It is your choice.
 
If it were my choice, I'd choose the vacation.


						strick




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: wcs@anchor.ho.att.com (Bill_Stewart(HOY002)1305)
Date: Wed, 11 Aug 93 19:27:28 PDT
To: hfinney@shell.portal.com
Subject: Re: Secure voice software issues
Message-ID: <9308112126.AA25524@anchor.ho.att.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text


> First, there has seemed to be general agreement in our earlier discussions
> of this concept that the hard part is compressing the voice to the point
> where it can go over commonly-available modems.  The government-standard
> CELP algorithm is too slow for general-purpose home computers.  You need
> an algorithm that can operate in real time and compress intelligibly down
> to about 13K bits per second. 

I downloaded a copy of the GSM 06.10 software (gsm-1.0) from some machine
at Technische Universitat Berlin, tub.cs.tu-berlin.de, which does
a 13.3 kb/s voice coding, and has conversion for Sun, linear, mu-law, and A-law.
(Jutta Degener and Carsten Bormann, Copyright 1992.)
It runs in two different modes - a strictly-follow-the-standards mode
and a cheat-a-little-using-floating-point mode.
In standard mode, piping the compressor into the decompressor ran epsilon faster
than real time on a Sparcstation 2, and epsilon slower on a Sun ELC.
Cheating mode took about 2/3 as long as standard mode.

Looked like it was fairly portable.  I compiled it with GCC.
One of the readmes says that compression and decompression run faster than
realtime on Sparcs, but I assume that means doing just one at a time,
not both simultaneously.  As is typical, the decompression is about
twice as fast as the compression.  I assume it won't be quite fast enough
on a 486 box, but a "Version 1.0" of anything can often be made faster;
I haven't looked at the algorithm to see how much optimizing can be done,
but the code's cleanly written and has a bunch of medium-sized tables and
unrolled loops suggesting they've at least done some work on speed.


Both of these were on samples that were a little fancier than /dev/tty voice;
one was /usr/demo/SOUND/sounds/sample.au, and one was the 106.au
"It's 106 miles to Chicago, we've got a full tank of gas...." 
Blues Brothers sound-byte from the net.  Haven't tried it on other samples
yet, and I need to try running it across the net.
I also don't have two 14.4kbs external modems to play with on Sparcs,
so I haven't been able to verify which V.42/V.42bis/MNP options will let
you squeeze out the start/stop bits to let you fit 13.3 kbps of data over it,
but people tell me it should work ok.


			Bill Stewart



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: szabo@netcom.com (Nick Szabo)
Date: Wed, 11 Aug 93 17:37:28 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Privacy-friendly auditing
In-Reply-To: <9308112300.AA40559@frc060>
Message-ID: <9308120037.AA06256@netcom.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Tony Hamilton:
> It is nearly impossible to acquire statistics
> on the %ROI and %STDEV on individual investment strategies. This can be
> for a number of reasons. Some people, such as yourself, are not willing
> do publicly divulge specifics. More often, in all likelihood, those figures
> divulged are inaccurate or biased in some way.

Sounds like another use for the hypothetical Auditing Protocol recently 
mentioned on the cypherpunks list.  The problem is to figure out a way to 
audit the accounts of a bank, to determine if there are sufficient reserves,
without divulging information on the accounts
therein, or having to trust an outside auditing agency with the
accounts' privacy.  If such a protocol could be discovered it might 
also apply to this problem (or vice versa), how to audit the returns 
of an investment fund or strategy, without revealing information on 
the participants in such a fund, or revealing the specific strategy.  
One approach might be to express the strategy as a unique string which
hashes to a unique digital signature, which can then be published
along with the returns.   

Has anybody thought of a more formal way to express this
problem?  Ways to audit a bank without divulging customer
privacy were also discussed at that July Bay Area
cypherpunks meeting, and I'll bring up the question again this
Saturday.

>[figures from govn't & schools relatively unbiased]

Governments are quite biased by political concerns, eg the desire
to raise taxes and spending, to make themselves look good for
elections, etc.  Schools have to worry about their government
and corporate sponsors, and both worry about political 
popularity & correctness, which is hardly unbiased.  For
example the Luddite reaction against program trading after the '87 
crash, the reaction against corporate takeovers by "uppity Jews"
like Milken in the 80s, etc. along with the biased statistics
used to make cases for arguments against "junk" bonds, program
trading, etc.  Most importantly, these government and university
people have no incentive to get it right, while S&P et. al.
make their business on their reputation of getting it right.
If it was discovered somebody was bribing S&P to cook the
books you could be sure their competitors would make a Big Deal
about it.  In cases where there is no long-standing reputation
on the line (and no trustworthy auditors, whether agencies or
algorithms) I join you in being dubious about investment
claims.

Nick Szabo				szabo@netcom.com




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Warren Keith Russell <keru@cpu.us.dynix.com>
Date: Wed, 11 Aug 93 16:42:05 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: cypher punks (fwd)
Message-ID: <Pine.3.05.9308111713.C53685-a100000@cpu.us.dynix.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


---------- Forwarded message ----------
Date: Tue, 10 Aug 1993 17:16:21 -0700
From: Kevin Kelly <kk@well.sf.ca.us>
To: keru@cpu.us.dynix.com
Subject: cypher punks


I heard you were asking about online versions of Levy's WIRED article. I'm
the editor of WIRED. It's available in an e-text version in the WIRED
folder on American Online, but not elsewhere at the moment. In a few months
WIREDs' gopher site will be up.

My own article in WER is not yet ready for ftp world. I'm finishing a book
of which that is one chapter, and I need to focus on that before geting
stuff up on the net.

-- Kevin Kelly
kk@well.sf.ca.us





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Kragen Sittler <TO1SITTLER@APSICC.APS.EDU>
Date: Wed, 11 Aug 93 16:47:28 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: final post
Message-ID: <930811174124.1c47@APSICC.APS.EDU>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Looks like the sands of time are running out on my account.  If there is
someone here who can inform me of a service provider for internet access in
Albuquerque, NM, tell me about it.  It's been nice being here and listening to
the discussion, even contributing occasionally.  Hopefully I wasn't too shy or
too mouthy.  See y'all in my next account.
Kragen
Xentrac
finger me for other contact points.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: The Phantom <phantom@u.washington.edu>
Date: Wed, 11 Aug 93 17:47:34 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: under pressure from University Computing svcs,
Message-ID: <Pine.3.05.9308111734.A16929-a100000@stein2.u.washington.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I'm going to have to shut down the phantom remailer. 

Seems someone complained about a remailed message. I got a copy of the
message, and it didn't seem to bad to me, but I've gotta go with what UCS
says.

As of today, the phantom remailer (phantom@mead) is hereby out of service.

Matt

Matt Thomlinson                               Say no to the Wiretap Chip!
University of Washington, Seattle, Washington.
Internet: phantom@u.washington.edu      	    phone: (206) 528-5732
PGP 2.2  key available via email or finger phantom@hardy.u.washington.edu





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Tom Knight <tk@reagan.ai.mit.edu>
Date: Wed, 11 Aug 93 15:12:06 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Clipper trapdoor?
In-Reply-To: <00541.2827923432.4658@washofc.cpsr.org>
Message-ID: <19930811220825.2.TK@ROCKY.AI.MIT.EDU>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


You didn't read the original clipper announcement carefully.  It never
said that all access to the escrowed keys was to be handled through
warrants.  Clearly the other weasel word access techniques envisioned
included requests from the Agencies.

My paranoid fantasy, actually, is that we are really seeing phase I of a
longer term plan, which will result in outlawing non-escrowed keys.  The
way it works is this:

Skipjack is distributed.  A clever group of nameless individuals obtains
some components.  Through significant effort, they determine the
algorithm and family key, and they are published.  Phase II: mock
Agency uproar ensues, NSA claims it tried to be "reasonable" about
escrowed keys, but obviously the bad guys have demonstrated that they
can't be trusted.  The only way to solve the "problem" is to outlaw
non-escrowed key cryptography.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: szabo@netcom.com (Nick Szabo)
Date: Wed, 11 Aug 93 18:07:34 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Anonymous code name allocated. (fwd)
Message-ID: <9308120108.AA10357@netcom.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Looks like everybody who sent mail to cypherpunks
lately (T=?) got signed up by anon.penent.fi.

Forwarded message:
> From daemon@anon.penet.fi Wed Aug 11 17:54:43 1993
> [you've been signed up, blah blah]
 
> If you want to use a nickname, please send a message to
> nick@anon.penet.fi, with a Subject: field containing your nickname.

But "nick" is already my name!  (insert Marx Bros. routine here)

szabo@netcom.com 




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Perry E. Metzger" <pmetzger@lehman.com>
Date: Wed, 11 Aug 93 15:17:31 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Secure voice software issues
In-Reply-To: <9308112117.AA03868@servo>
Message-ID: <9308112213.AA03961@snark.shearson.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Phil Karn says:
> >To me at least this seems unimportant for the application.  If all you're
> >doing is exchanging session keys over the phone, it doesn't really matter if
> >you are sure that the public key actually belongs to who it claims it does,
> 
> Well...yes. *If* you know the person you are talking to, then you can
> read off your session key (or preferably its hash) to guard against the
> man in the middle. But let's say you are being referred to someone who
> you don't already know (or you know them only by email, and have no idea
> what they sound like). You trust this person, but you can't depend on
> an oral challenge-response. The existing PGP web should be handy here.

I think that we are too casual about this -- Rich Little or someone
similar could easily impersonate your voice over a vocoder well enough
that unless I decided to do a "so, tell me about what we had for lunch
last week" routine you couldn't tell the difference. I think that even
if you DO know the other person verification is valuable -- especially
given the distortionary effects of vocoders.

Perry






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Marc Horowitz <marc@GZA.COM>
Date: Wed, 11 Aug 93 15:22:05 PDT
To: David Sobel <dsobel@washofc.cpsr.org>
Subject: Re: Clipper trapdoor?
In-Reply-To: <00541.2827923432.4658@washofc.cpsr.org>
Message-ID: <9308112220.AA22120@dun-dun-noodles.aktis.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>> Note that neither Title III (law enforcement) nor FISA (U.S.-based)
>> apply to this situation, so we have to assume that NSA will not have a
>> court order to obtain the escrow keys.  I have to conclude that NSA
>> would not be putting this technology out into the world *unless* it
>> did, in fact, have some way to decrypt messages *without* access to
>> the escrow keys.
>> 
>> Am I missing something?

Yes.  Quoting the original Presidential release:

>> Access to these keys will be limited to government officials with
>> legal authorization to conduct a wiretap.

"legal authorization to conduct a wiretap" != "court order".  I've
seen lots of people slip into that habit.  Today, it requires a court
order to wiretap domestic conversations between US citizens.
Presumably, the same conditions apply to Skipjack.  However, that
could change.

As for the example of snooping on Hussein and his officers, you know
exactly how much legal authorization the NSA needs to conduct that
wiretap.  Exactly none.  Hence, it needs no paperwork to get the key
to Hussein's phone.

How the escrow agents make the NSA prove that the keyid in question
belongs to Hussen's phone is an exercise left to the legislature :-/

		Marc




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: fnerd@smds.com (FutureNerd Steve Witham)
Date: Wed, 11 Aug 93 15:47:27 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Secure voice software issues
Message-ID: <9308112238.AA05820@smds.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


karn@qualcomm.com (Phil Karn) sez-
 
> ...Finding a path through the PGP "web of
> trust" back to a trusted public key that the other party already has
> may be tricky. This is one thing that is much easier with a simple
> tree a la PEM, as you simply give the path back up to a common, shared
> root. 
> 
> I'm not sure how to do this with PGP. ...

Maybe this is a good service for a key server to perform.

Are there cases where you would want to endorse a key *privately*?
I.e., tell certain people only that you've met someone?

> If you first do Diffie Hellman and then immediately use the session
> key it generates to conventionally encrypt the rest of the protocol,
> including any RSA public key exchanges, this has the added benefit of
> denying passive eavesdroppers any information that would identify the
> parties to the call. The best an *active* eavesdropper (conducting a
> man-in-the-middle attack against Diffie Hellman) could do is to trick
> the parties into revealing their RSA public keys, and thus their
> identities.  But the parties would quickly discover this at the
> signature step, before the voice conversation actually starts.

What if you prepare RSA key pairs in advance in your computer's 
(phone's) spare time, then use one per conversation (at least for the 
initializing)?  You would encode your public key with the session 
private key, and a conventional key with your private key, in advance.
That would save time at the start of the conversation (although, to 
decode his keys would take two regular RSA steps.)

Am I wrong, or is Diffie-Helman only useful when you *don't* have
a way of verifying who each other are?

-fnerd@smds.com
quote me




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Warren Keith Russell <keru@cpu.us.dynix.com>
Date: Wed, 11 Aug 93 17:47:28 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: ANONYMOUS CONTACT SERVICE
Message-ID: <Pine.3.05.9308111858.H53685-a100000@cpu.us.dynix.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I received a message from System Daemon telling me that I had sent a
message using the anonymous contact service, allocating a code name, and
explaining how I can be reached anonymously.

What does this mean?  Sounds great, but I have no idea how I managed to
send such a message!


-------------------------------------------------------------------------
Keith Russell                  Dynix Library Systems, Provo, Utah, U.S.A.
keru@cpu.us.dynix.com    or    keru@devg.us.dynix.com
-------------------------------------------------------------------------





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Derek Atkins <warlord@MIT.EDU>
Date: Wed, 11 Aug 93 16:02:06 PDT
To: fnerd@smds.com (FutureNerd Steve Witham)
Subject: Re: Secure voice software issues
In-Reply-To: <9308112238.AA05820@smds.com>
Message-ID: <9308112259.AA01362@toxicwaste.MEDIA.MIT.EDU>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> Am I wrong, or is Diffie-Helman only useful when you *don't* have
> a way of verifying who each other are?

No, DH is useful whenever you want to generate a session key between
two entities, and its even more useful because it doesn't require any
prior knowledge.  This means that you don't *need* to verify the
identity of the other person.  

However, without some way of verifying the key of the other party,
there is no easy way to detect a monkey-in-the-middle attack.  As was
put forward, a combination of DH to key exchange and RSA to detect
monkey-in-the-middle will protect you, but you lose your anonymity at
that point.

So, to return to your question, DH is useful even when you have a
method of verification.  So the answer to your question is yes, you
are wrong.

-derek




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: karn@qualcomm.com (Phil Karn)
Date: Wed, 11 Aug 93 19:07:35 PDT
To: fnerd@smds.com
Subject: Secure voice software issues
In-Reply-To: <9308112238.AA05820@smds.com>
Message-ID: <9308120203.AA04871@servo>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>Maybe this is a good service for a key server to perform.

Yeah, but that kind of assumes connectivity to the net. It's rather inconvenient
for a pair of phones who only have dialup modems connected to each other
to do this on every call.

>What if you prepare RSA key pairs in advance in your computer's 
>(phone's) spare time, then use one per conversation (at least for the 
>initializing)?  You would encode your public key with the session 

You could probably use temporary RSA key-pairs for each call, but RSA
key generation is notoriously slow. A lot slower than a Diffie-Hellman
key exchange.

>Am I wrong, or is Diffie-Helman only useful when you *don't* have
>a way of verifying who each other are?

Eh? No, as I've been saying, you can produce a very strong hybrid in
which both Diffie-Hellman and RSA each play an important part.
Diffie-Hellman generates the session keys, while RSA signs them.

Phil




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: karn@qualcomm.com (Phil Karn)
Date: Wed, 11 Aug 93 19:52:05 PDT
To: wcs@anchor.ho.att.com1305)
Subject: Secure voice software issues
In-Reply-To: <9308112126.AA25524@anchor.ho.att.com>
Message-ID: <9308120249.AA05022@servo>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>so I haven't been able to verify which V.42/V.42bis/MNP options will let
>you squeeze out the start/stop bits to let you fit 13.3 kbps of data over it,

Whenever V.42 error correction (LAPM) is enabled, synchronous HDLC
frames are what actually pass over the link. So the start/stop bits are
already removed.  Unfortunately, the packetizing done by LAPM adds delay we
don't want for a real time voice application. And if you turn off LAPM,
you return to sending the start/stop bits over the wire.

Most V.32 and V.32bis modems provide for direct synchronous operation,
which would let us have our cake and eat it too, except that few PCs
can speak synchronously to a modem. This may require some extra
hardware (sigh).

Phil






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: smb@research.att.com
Date: Wed, 11 Aug 93 17:12:05 PDT
To: David Sobel <dsobel@washofc.cpsr.org>
Subject: Re: Clipper trapdoor?
Message-ID: <9308120007.AA19082@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


	 Consider the following hypothetical: Iraqi agents smuggle
	 Clipper phones out of the U.S.  Saddam Hussein uses them to
	 communicate with his military commander in Basra.  NSA
	 intercepts the communications.  Question:  How does NSA
	 decrypt the messages?

You raise a valid point.  I think there are several possible answers.

First, of course, since the key escrow mechanism has not yet been
established, an exception could be written into the procedures.  (And
whether they would be established by law or executive order remains to
be seen.)  There might be some clause saying, ``NSA may have access to
escrowed keys, provided that they certify that the targets of their
surveillance are foreign powers, as defined in the FISA.  If, upon
decryption, it is determined that a U.S.  citizen's conversations have
been intercepted, the procedures of the FISA for such eventualities
will apply.''  Yes, they could abuse such a clause -- but by that
logic, they could be listening in to cleartext domestic phone calls
today.  (And of course, there have been such abuses.)

A second possible answer is for export phones to come from a separate
production run, using a different family key.  These would be
export-only, and you'd never get a license to export a ``secure''
model.  For U.S. residents to make an encrypted phone call to such a
site, either they, too, would need such a phone, or they need some way
to interoperate with a phone with a different family key.  The obstacle
there is the verification procedures such phones have, to guard against
bogus narc headers being inserted.  I'm not certain whether or not such
a solution can be found.


		--Steve Bellovin




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: plmoses@unix.cc.emory.edu (Paul L. Moses)
Date: Wed, 11 Aug 93 18:47:28 PDT
To: perobich@ingr.com
Subject: Re:  Secure voice software issues
Message-ID: <9308120144.AA07430@emoryu1.cc.emory.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


what about the DSP in the new macs?  could this be used for encoding?




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: fergp@sytex.com (Paul Ferguson)
Date: Wed, 11 Aug 93 21:22:41 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: CuD mailserver barfed -- privacy enhancement?
Message-ID: <J0B68B1w165w@sytex.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Am I the only shmuck who noticed that when the CuD server hiccupped
yesterday  --
 
(Date: Mon, 9 Aug 1993 01:14:21 CDT)
(From: Cu-Digest <uunet!CMUVM.CSV.CMICH.EDU!tk0jut2%mvs.cso.niu.edu>)
(Subject: TEST MAIL FROM CuD RE CuD #5.59)
 
-- it "accidently" sent out to each subscriber the entire mail list?
 
Funny how things like that happen...


BTW, did I hear correctly? WIRED for Sept.Oct is out?

Paul Ferguson               |  "Government, even in its best state,
Network Integrator          |   is but a necessary evil; in its worst
Centreville, Virginia USA   |   state, an intolerable one."
fergp@sytex.com             |      - Thomas Paine, Common Sense
 
Type bits/keyID   Date       User ID
pub  1024/1CC04D 1993/03/15  Paul Ferguson <fergp@sytex.com>
  Key fingerprint =  EE D2 93 7D 04 6D C6 05  AC 36 AD 9D 8E 4F 41 58




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Date: Wed, 11 Aug 93 22:58:06 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: (fwd) Wolf's got a thing or two to say here...
In-Reply-To: <01H1MGBIEXFAVSZSU3@ACFcluster.NYU.EDU>
Message-ID: <9308120554.AA24745@netcom5.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Cypherdenizens, 

I have been trying to decode this message which found its way into our group:


> >>It's apparently from a fag (Wolf) who was beat up by his lover (David)
>                          ^^^
> >>whom he had arrested
> Watch it honey.  Intolerance ain't cool on or off net.  Just my 0.02.
> 				Jim Wise
> 				JAW7254@ACF.NYU.EDU

I've tried all the usual tricks: analyzing the whitespace, looking for
meaning in the names, etc. But it still doesn't turn into anything
meaningful.

Oh well, maybe the boys in the NSA just got their wires crossed (ac to
dc, so to speak) and piped GayNet into our list. If _we're_ confused,
imagine how Wolf and Jim and their pals must feel reading about
Clipper and CELP and chaotic compression!


-Tim May

-- 
..........................................................................
Timothy C. May         | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,  
tcmay@netcom.com       | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
408-688-5409           | knowledge, reputations, information markets, 
W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA  | black markets, collapse of governments.
Higher Power: 2^756839 | Public Key: PGP and MailSafe available.
Note: I put time and money into writing this posting. I hope you enjoy it.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "L. Detweiler" <ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Date: Wed, 11 Aug 93 22:22:42 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: more on Software Patent Institute by LPF
Message-ID: <9308120521.AA04411@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


(Someone wondered whether this was relevant to the list. The software
patent issue goes back a long ways with the cypherpunks and is
pre-eminent in `our' role of software development and the use of PGP
and other cryptographic and general algorithms.)

With that aside, here is some more info that should help cypherpunks
decide whether SPI is friend or foe, and I'd like to see reactions. 
They are either an obstacle or a useful tool in the eradication of past
and future software patents.

I used the subject `birth of the SPI' in the first message because
(ahem) I'd never heard of this organization or seen it mentioned here,
which is somewhat surprising given its goal. They may be fairly new but
Richard Stallman of FSF (Free Software Foundation) has forwarded a
paper by LPF (League of Programming Freedom) as early as April, so
they've been around at least that long, at least in theory.

The LPF paper is a bit speculative and clearly doesn't know what to
make of SPI except taking a rather pessimistic view--it probably came
out around the time of its inception.  The SPI acc. to the statement is
going to be a professional, searchable database in the style of Westlaw
and Lexus with a charge for access, `which suggests that in practice it
may be available primarily to larger companies'. This is probably the
most damaging claim:

>The SPI is supported by large companies such as IBM, Apple and DEC
>that can expect to have many software patents, and by patent law
>firms.  It is not likely these sponsors would support the SPI if they
>expected it to prevent most software patents.

Here are the other assertions:

- the database will tend to help companies strengthen their future
patents by eliminating the weak aspects by searching through the
database of `prior art'

- the SPI `cannot prevent all patents that harm the software field but
prevent a certain kind of Patent Office mistake: overlooking prior art
whose prior publication can be proved', `only a fraction of the patents
that cause trouble for programmers'.

But the LPF paper is very unsatisfying. It closes by simply suggesting
not to bother with SPI but

>Instead,
>spend it telling our lawmakers that software patents are harmful and
>should be abolished.

Definitely a valid approach, but seemingly a bit innocuous and
ineffectual. *If* SPI is a professional organization, well-backed, and
dedicated to the goal of abolishing software patents, it would be a
much more influential and dynamical force in the cause than a
letter-writing campaign.

I just wrote a message to R. Stallman pointing out the potential
advantages of this database in the cause of eradicating software
patents, and am listening for more info on SPI. I pointed out:

- Ultimately, the goal of constraining software patents *seems* to be
common to both the SPI and LPF, we just have the case that LPF is a
little more extreme in asking for complete abolution. To address this,
consider that SPI would be a useful stepping stone to a world with no
software patents.

- The database has the support of very major companies such as Apple,
IBM and DEC. This is the kind of thing that gets press coverage and
public attention and *pressure*.

- The database could actually be used as a tool to thwart new patents.
Potentially programmers could send all techniques not covered by past
patents to the list to prevent future patents regarding the art,
accompanied by notices `releasing the technique to the public domain'. 
I don't know the legal force of this, but the patent office has been
tiptoeing on tenuous law for software patents in the first place, and
perhaps might be encouraged to tiptoe in the opposite direction.

In other words, while the current patent situation is like a bunch of
landmines strewn by lawyers for programmers & developers, the archive
could hold a bunch of landmines strewn by programmers for the lawyers.

Anyway, I hope to hear more about this agency. If all that LPF
advocates is `writing letters to congressmen' and demeaning more
organized efforts (note I'm definitely reserving judgement on whether
SPI is a cypherpunk ally, current signs are not promising) then I'd say
they aren't going to meet with a lot of success.

Here's the complete paper from LPF, feel free to frame it or cover the
bit bucket with it.  While we may not know what to make of SPI
currently, it is likely to play a very prominent future role in this
arena if not disbanded. I would really like to hear from
representatives of Apple, DEC, IBM, et. al. on how their participation
& support of the project should be construed.

===cut=here===

	What Can The Software Patent Institute Accomplish?
	   by the League for Programming Freedom (14 April 1993)

Software patents are patents which can apply to (and thus prohibit)
writing a program.  Any software patent can cause trouble for people
who want to develop software.

Some software patents are Patent Office mistakes which cover things
that are already known.  In some cases (but not all), these mistakes
can be proved based on published prior art.

Other software patents do not result from errors of the system, but
are still disadvantageous to software development.  How much trouble a
software patent causes is independent of whether it violates the
patent system's own rules.  And the sheer number of software patents
causes trouble regardless of their details.

The Software Patent Institute is a new organization that aims to
produce a data base of "prior art"--published and known software
ideas--to make it easier for the Patent Office and others to find out
which software techniques and features are already known and thus
supposed to be unpatentable.

The SPI cannot prevent all patents which harm the software field.  It
can only prevent a certain kind of Patent Office mistake: overlooking
prior art whose prior publication can be proved.  Thus, the SPI can
address only a fraction of the software patents that cause trouble for
programmers.

Even perfect knowledge of prior art would not prevent all absurd
software patents.  Some software patents cover such trivial matters
that a description of the idea would be reject by any professional
technical journal.  For example, patent number 5,049,881, issued in
1991, covers modifying the way a data compression program uses a hash
table to look up the strings that have assigned encodings:
specifically, when it has found the hash bucket for a string being
looked up, it considers only the first string in the bucket as a
possible match, rather than all of them.  Patent number 5,140,321,
issued in 1992, covers checking just the first N strings in the hash
bucket as possible matches.  (Both of these modifications apply to a
particular data compression algorithm, and similar modifications could
probably be patented for any other algorithm.)

To ask whether those particular variations were published before, is
to miss the point---it is a mistake for patent system decisions to
depend on such questions.  But those questions are the only ones that
the SPI can help answer.

No matter how well the published prior art is known, it cannot include
all variations, and under current policy, many of these can be
patented.  What's more, you cannot effectively challenge decisions
about obviousness in court, because the courts presume that the Patent
Office has exercised good judgement when deciding what is obvious.

But suppose that the Patent Office learns how to judge obviousness
better; then how much good can the SPI do?  Even if this prevents a
sizable fraction of future software patents, that will not appreciably
reduce the problem that software patents cause for programmers.

Even cutting the number of software patents in half (which would be
great success for the SPI!) will not cut the problem in half.  This is
because a large software system is likely in the future to infringe a
large number of patents--easily dozens.  Even if half of them were
eliminated, the remaining half could still create prohibitive
problems.

There is no official figure for the number of software patents we have
today, but 5000 or 6000 is a likely estimate given past numbers and
trends.  (To find them all would be a mammoth task.)  At the beginning
of 1992 there were 9000 pending patent applications in a category
which contains many software patents, which suggests there will be
many more software patents in the future.  To make software
development a safe activity again, we must do more than cut the number
of patents in half.  Eliminating 90% of the software patents that
exist today would just reach the level where further reduction starts
to help matters.  (See the LPF's position paper, "Against Software
Patents," for more explanation of why software patents in general
cause mainly trouble, even those that are not trivial.)

While the SPI may prevent some software patents from being issued,
ironically it may also make some patents more dangerous by helping the
patent applicant design the patent to withstand legal challenges.
Even the holders of existing patents can use this information to
rewrite the patents and make them harder to overturn.  For more
information, see the companion paper, "What Should You Do With Prior
Art?"

The SPI is supported by large companies such as IBM, Apple and DEC
that can expect to have many software patents, and by patent law
firms.  It is not likely these sponsors would support the SPI if they
expected it to prevent most software patents.

The interface proposed for the SPI's database will resemble those of
Westlaw and Lexis; it seems to be aimed at use by lawyers, not
software developers.  The SPI plans to raise revenue by charging for
access to the data base, which suggests that in practice it may
available primarily to larger companies.

The operation of the SPI will not alter the overall software patent
problem.  So wish the SPI good luck in preventing a few absurd
software patents; but don't spend your time on the SPI.  Instead,
spend it telling our lawmakers that software patents are harmful and
should be abolished.





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: wce@hogbbs.scol.pa.us (Bill Eichman)
Date: Wed, 11 Aug 93 21:32:41 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Privacy and mail-lists
Message-ID: <BPg68B1w166w@hogbbs.scol.pa.us>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>From:   Duncan Frissell <frissell@panix.com>

>Naughty, naughty.  You should have a nice all paper UK license obtained
>without ID and a car owned by a New Hampshire-based corporation.  Is it
>rape if you say yes?
>
>Duncan Frissell
>
>"One is not required to own any car (even the one you're driving) a
>driver's license from any jurisdiction on earth is acceptable for
>(automobile) drivers in the US."  Privacy costs so little and means so
>much.  Frissell & Associates.

This might be a step away from 'cypher' topics, but, Duncan, I was
curious as to wether you publish any manuals on privacy, and/or can
suggest books or sources for privacy and financial privacy info. Ideally
of a hard-headed type, not the "If we could only start an offshore
digital Free Bank" genre.

Back to 'cypher' topics; I've not seen anything mentioned here about
anonymous and secure mail-lists-- probably I missed the discussion. Can
anyone suggest any files in soda.berkeley.edu or other archives that
tackle this topic?

Later, Bill




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: norm@netcom.com (Norman Hardy)
Date: Wed, 11 Aug 93 23:32:44 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Secure voice software issues
Message-ID: <9308120629.AA17113@netcom4.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Eric Blossom <eb@srlr14.sr.hp.com> says:
> I have seen estimates that a straight forward implementation requires
> about 13.5 million Mulitply+Accumulates / second.  Most of the time is
> burned up using a brute force search for the best excitation vector to
> use.  There is a fixed 512 entry code book, and a dynamic code book
> with 256 entries (it may be 128).  Each code book entry is an
> excitation vector that is 60 samples long.  Therefore, to evalute each one,
> you have to run a 60 element vector through a 10 pole filter to get
> the predicted output, then compute some measure of error.  This
> requires an additional difference operation that is implemented as
> some kind of "perception weighting filter" (I don't remember the
> details).
 
I have been reading the PowerPC 601 manual (MPC601, The Macs of early
1994). It is dangerous to
believe performance figures. They give you the world in one chapter 
and then take it back here and there in bits and pieces.
Here is what I see however. Simple single precision floating point
operations can issue one per cycle. The book mentions several
floating point ops that take more than one clock in a pipeline stage.
They don't mention floating multiply-add. I think one can issue each
clock. I-unit instructions can issue in the same clock as floating
point ops. If you do the block trick used to multiply matrices then
one load is required per multiply add. All this leads to the optimistic
estimate that the 50MHz machine can sustain nearly 50 fmadd's per
microsecond on a 50MHz chip. Inner products are much like matrix multiply
which is a benchmark where the RS/6000 (The MPC601's father) achieved
nearly one fmadd per clock, and that was double precision!
 
128 excitation vectors each of 60 single precision loats fit in the on
chip cache, but it is tight.
 
There may be enough margin here for it to work with no special DSP.
 
I'll be in Yosemite for a few days so I won't be able to respond
immediately to comments.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Date: Wed, 11 Aug 93 23:33:06 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: CA online legislative database access
In-Reply-To: <9308120543.AA04755@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Message-ID: <9308120630.AA29140@netcom5.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Lance Dettweiler writes:

> cypherfolks, do you have any idea what these efforts are the faint
> glimmers of? Imagine a future society where *anyone* can propose laws,
> not just the elite few called Legislators and identified in an

Actually, this is my worst nightmare of what this country could
become: a direct democracy of the most populist sort.

Prices too high at the grocery store? Quick, pass a law lowering them.
Too many bums downtown? I'm sure a majority can be quickly gotten
together to pass a new law. 

Much of what we are seeing in America today is the result not of venal
and corrupt government folks, but of them simply doing what they
perceive the people want. The people want drugs outlawed, so they are.
The people want jobs, so imports are restricted. And so on, just as de
Tocqueville warned 150 years ago (something like: "America's grand
experiment in democracy will last only until its citizens discover
they can use the democracy to pick the pockets of their
neighbors"...he said it more elegantly!).

I certainly am not implying that Lance is in favor of this. But there
are some mighty good reasons, outlined in "The Federalist Papers," why
a direct democracy is undesirable. In today's terms, we might speak of
it as having undesirable feedback relationships, with too much
tendency toward wild oscillations (mirroring the oscillations of
public opinion). The Founders wisely adopted a _representative_
democracy, with more dampers on the results a direct democracy often
gives.

(I would be less fearful if fewer things came up for voting, if a
Constitution truly protected basic property rights. This would
eliminate things like most drug laws, the motorcycle helmet laws, "No
smoking" laws (which, naturally, are wildly popular to the "majority,"
even if the rights of airlines and restaurants to set whatever
policies they wish are completely trampled), minimum wage laws, and so
on. I won't cite the usual libertarian points here.

> exceedingly time-consuming, tedious, and troublesome process. Imagine
> that everyone has complete access and full understanding of all the
> laws that affect one's life, and the ability to propose and *pass*
> superior modifications. It would be a sort of Legislative Free
> Enterprise, a competition in the marketplace of laws such that superior
> ones would prosper and inferior, archaic, and absurd laws would be
> rooted out and expunged by the citizenry itself, in a very dynamic,
> interactive, and responsive process! Far from this bureacratic
> nightmare we lumber in daily! Write that small letter to set in motion
> this grandiose cyberspatial karma!

I am not as hopeful as Lance is. "Electronic democracy" could easily
be the most totalitarian thing the planet has ever seen. Imagine this
on CNN: "This just in to CNN. Todays's popular vote on whether
citizens can use strong cryptography has gone 72% to 16% in favor of
the ban , with 12% either abstaining or generally clueless. To remind
our listeners, under this new law, effective tomorrow, unauthorized
use of a cryptographic system can result in forfeiture of all assets,
plus a 5-year jail sentance.  People we interviewed expressed the
opinion that only drug dealers and tax cheats would want to use these
hacker systems.  President Reno expressed satisfaction, saying "This
plebiscite will make America free.""

We certainly don't need more laws, more restrictions, however popular
they may be.

Besides, as Milton Friedman points out so cogently, in a free market
we are in fact free to choose. Anything that makes even more laws
possible is _not_ a good thing, in my opinion.

Having said this, the proposal Jim Warren is pushing sounds fair
enough. But not because it'll turn ordinary citizens into proposers of
new laws. Rather, it will allow groups to spot legislation early on
(this is one of the main motivations, the NRA tells me--yes, "I am the
NRA," to no one's surprise) and then marshal their forces to defeat
the legislation. Things like tax increases, new regulations, etc.

Just this Cypherpunk's opinion.

-Tim May


-- 
..........................................................................
Timothy C. May         | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,  
tcmay@netcom.com       | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
408-688-5409           | knowledge, reputations, information markets, 
W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA  | black markets, collapse of governments.
Higher Power: 2^756839 | Public Key: PGP and MailSafe available.
Note: I put time and money into writing this posting. I hope you enjoy it.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "L. Detweiler" <ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Date: Wed, 11 Aug 93 22:38:06 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: MCI PC Connect service
Message-ID: <9308120533.AA04698@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


BBS access & PC pursuit were a topic here. New PC connection service by
MCI. I wonder if they use the PC Pursuit `call back' technique to
ensure no voice communication.

------- Forwarded Message

Date: Tue, 10 Aug 1993 11:12:38 -0500
From: farber@central.cis.upenn.edu (David Farber)
Subject: Interesting service

Press Release    07/26/93   09:00 EDT

Systems Solutions, the owner and operator of The Virginia Connection
bulletin board system, the Washington, DC area's premier PCBoard BBS
system located in Reston, VA announced today that The Virginia
Connection is one of the first bulletin boards in the United States
selected by MCI Telecommunications, Inc. to participate as an official
startup BBS member of the MCI PC CONNECT computer telephone network.
MCI PC CONNECT is an exciting new program being offered by MCI which
provides computer modem users with low long distance rates for
telephone calls made to bulletin boards from both intrastate and
interstate calls.

        MCI PC Connect(sm) FEE/RATES:
        =============================
     -  $3.00 monthly fee (does not apply towards usage)
     -  Includes calling to continental U.S. in addition to Alaska,
        Hawaii,
        Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands.

        PC Connect Customer to NON-PC Connect Customer:
        -----------------------------------------------
        $0.22 during Day (Mon-Fri: 8am - 5pm)
        $0.10 during E/N/W (Mon-Fri: 5pm-8am: Sat/Sun: 24 hours)

        PC Connect Customer to PC Connect Customer:
        -------------------------------------------
        $.176 during Day
        $.08 during E/N/W
        Friends & Family discount does not apply to fee

For an additional $1.50 per month, MCI PC Connect customers can include
in-state calls at the same MCI PC Connect plan rates as above.

        Available in the following states:
        ==================================

Alabama, Arkansas, Arizona, California, Colorado, Florida, Georgia,
Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana,
Massachusetts, Maryland, Michigan, Missouri, Mississippi, Montana,
North Carolina, North Dakota, Nebraska, New York, Ohio, Oklahoma,
Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas,
Utah, Virginia, Washington, Wisconsin

        Not Available in the following states:
        ======================================

Alaska, Connecticut, Delaware, District of Columbia, Hawaii, Maine,
Minnesota, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, Rhode Island,
Vermont, West Virginia, Wyoming

It is important to remember that you must be a member of MCI PC
CONNECT in order to receive these rates!  The thousands of computer
bulletin board users should immediately contact MCI and become members
of this low cost calling service to take advantage of the low rate
structure and the ability to reach the best bulletin boards in the
country at the best long distance rates.

The Virginia Connection BBS has been in operation since 1985 and
serves thousands of users.  This BBS supports most computers with
features which include: 50,000 programs available for downloading,
National and International E-Mail via FidoNet, SmartNet, MetroLink,
and RelayNet International Message Exchange, 20 incoming telephone
lines connected to computer modems capable of operating from 1200 to
14400 baud, and on-line games for individual and team players.  This
BBS is a member of The Capital Area SysOps Association, a group of
over 200 metropolitan Washington, DC area bulletin board operators.

MCI PC CONNECT will allow computer users from most of the United
States to participate on these bulletin boards for very reasonable
long distance rates.  Now long distance callers will be able to
utilize the quality and depth of this exceptional BBS as local
computer bulletin board users have done for years.  Modem users can
reach The Virginia Connection BBS by dialing (703) 648-1841.

In order to receive all information regarding this MCI PC CONNECT
service, call 1-800-333-2511 and MCI operators will provide you with
more details.  Call now!  Do not delay!  Don't be satisfied with less!
Take advantage of the service -- save money!

The Virginia Connection BBS
c/o Systems Solutions
11088 Thrush Ridge Road
Reston, VA 22091-4722

Contact:        Tony McClenny
Voice:          (703) 758-7984
Modem:          (703) 648-1841




------- End of Forwarded Message





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Marc Horowitz <marc@Athena.MIT.EDU>
Date: Wed, 11 Aug 93 20:38:06 PDT
To: Warren Keith Russell <keru@cpu.us.dynix.com>
Subject: Re: ANONYMOUS CONTACT SERVICE
In-Reply-To: <Pine.3.05.9308111858.H53685-a100000@cpu.us.dynix.com>
Message-ID: <9308120336.AA00927@podge.MIT.EDU>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


This has happened before.  Last time, it was because a penet address
had found its way onto the cypherpunks list.

Again, I'd like to find out who it is, have them removed, and have my
new penet id cancelled.  After all, this person now has email from me,
with my penet id on it, with my name signed at the bottom.  If I
decide to use the penet remailer in the future, I don't want this
person to have a binding between my penet id and my real name.

		MArc




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "L. Detweiler" <ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Date: Wed, 11 Aug 93 22:48:12 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: CA online legislative database access
Message-ID: <9308120543.AA04755@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Letter writers needed ASAP! This is the bill that will open up
legislative databases to the masses and serve as a model for other
states and even the country!

cypherfolks, do you have any idea what these efforts are the faint
glimmers of? Imagine a future society where *anyone* can propose laws,
not just the elite few called Legislators and identified in an
exceedingly time-consuming, tedious, and troublesome process. Imagine
that everyone has complete access and full understanding of all the
laws that affect one's life, and the ability to propose and *pass*
superior modifications. It would be a sort of Legislative Free
Enterprise, a competition in the marketplace of laws such that superior
ones would prosper and inferior, archaic, and absurd laws would be
rooted out and expunged by the citizenry itself, in a very dynamic,
interactive, and responsive process! Far from this bureacratic
nightmare we lumber in daily! Write that small letter to set in motion
this grandiose cyberspatial karma!

------- Forwarded Message

>Date: Tue, 10 Aug 93 17:14:01 -0500
>Newsgroups: austin.eff
>From: jwarren@well.sf.ca.us (Jim Warren)
>Subject: UPDATE #21-AB1624: *ACTION ALERT*: END-GAME APPROACHING (& misc notes)
>
>[MODERATOR'S NOTE: This is a California bill, but its outcome could set
>a precedent which would help or hurt similar efforts in other states,
>including Texas.  If you've got friends in California, you might want
>to pass this along to them.  -- Prentiss Riddle, riddle@tic.com]
>
>August 9, 1993
>
>*** PLEASE WRITE, NOW!***      PLEASE, DON'T STOP NOW!
>
>  Assembly Bill 1624, mandating online public access to public legislative 
>information via the public networks (i.e., the Internet and all the nets 
>connected to it - including wherever you are receiving this msg), will either 
>pass the Legislature by Sept. 10th, or will die - and we have to re-fight the 
>whole battle, year after year.
>  LETTERS & FAXES ARE *NEEDED*!.  THEY *WILL* DETERMINE THE OUTCOME.
>
>REMAINING 1993 LEGISLATION SCHEDULE
>  Jul 16th, the Legislature went into remission - uh, recess.
>  Aug 16th, the Legislature reconvenes to diddle remaining 1993 business.
>  Sep 10th, the Legislature quits working in Sacramento for the year.
>  Oct 10th, the Governor must veto legislatively-approved bills he opposes.
>On AUGUST 18TH, the Senate Rules Committee run by Sen. Dave Roberti 
>(D-Van Nuys area) will hear AB1624.  If Roberti doesn't like it, he can and 
>will kill it.   If Roberti passes it, it will almost-certainly pass the 
>Senate. Then we need for the Assembly to "concur in amendments" and the 
>Governor to not veto it.
>
>
>  Address letters/faxes to "State Capitol, Sacremanto CA 95814."
>
>AS SOON AS POSSIBLE, send a one-page letter supporting AB1624 to the 
>Senate Rules Committee - who have seen essentially *no* support for it:
>Sen. David Roberti, Chair, Room 400; fax/916-323-7224; voice/916-445-8390.
> and to the other four members (tiny, *powerful* committee!):
>Sen. Ruben Ayala (D-Chino area), Room 5108; f/916-445-0128; v/916-445-6868.
>Sen. Robert Beverly (R-Long Bch), Room 5082; f/not avail.; v/916-445-6447.
>Sen. William Craven (R-Oceanside), Room 3070; f/not avail.; v/916-445-3731.
>Sen. Nick Petris (D-Alameda), Room 5080; fax/916-327-1997; v/916-445-6577.
>
>Important:  Please send COPIES of ALL letters to the AB1624 author:
>Hon. Debra Bowen, Room 3126; voice/916-445-8528; fax/916-327-2201.
>
>
>CAN EMAIL VIA ME, IF YA CAN'T FIND TIME FOR SNAIL-MAIL
>  If you don't have time to send snail-mail, you can email your message via 
>jwarren@well.sf.ca.us.
>  Write it exactly as you would snail-mail, but be SURE TO INCLUDE your name, 
>address and phone #s for legislators' independent verification.  Upon receipt 
>by email, I will print and/or fax the entire message to Bowen and to the 
>legislator(s) to whom you address it.  (Please allow for that delay.)
>
>
>LEGI-TECH'S OLDER BROTHER DONE GOOD!
>  The McClatchy organization is the owner of Legi-Tech, one of the two 
>largest online distributors of California legislative information.  They are 
>also owner of a number of newspapers - their flagship being the powerful 
>Sacramento Bee.
>  On Jul 26th, the Bee ran an editorial *strongly* supportive of AB1624 - 
>laudible, principled action by The Bee, McClatchy, and presumably by 
>Legi-Tech in the face of a difficult trade-off between the public's 
>interests versus their business interests.
>  Applause!  Applause!
>
>
>CALIFORNIA LEGISPEAK: "AUTHOR" VS. "SPONSOR" VS. "SUPPORTER"
>  In California legislative circles:
>A bill's AUTHOR is a legislator who introduced the bill.
>A bill's SPONSOR(S) is a person or organization, if any, that requested that 
>the bill be introduced by the bill's author.
>A bill's SUPPORTER(S) is a person or organization that is officially listed 
>as being in favor of the bill, usually including its sponsor(s), if any.
>  All bills have one or more authors.  Some bills do NOT have sponsors.
>  AB1624's author was Assembly Member Debra Bowen.  It had no sponsors, but 
>has a growing number of supporters.
>
>
>PROGRAMMERS:  SAMPLE LEGISLATIVE DATA-FILES ALSO AVAILABLE AT CPSR.ORG
>  AB1624 Update #19 detailed a set of sample data-files for review and 
>test-programming, available from Tim Pozar's KUMR.LNS.COM by anonymous ftp.
>  As of Jul 22nd, those Legislative Data Center sample files were/are also 
>online at cpsr.org in  /ftp/cpsr/states/california/ab1624/sample_data  
>for binary ftp access.  For questions about accessing them there, contact:
>Al Whaley        al@sunnyside.com       +1-415 322-5411(Tel), -6481 (Fax)
>Sunnyside Computing, Inc., PO Box 60, Palo Alto, CA 94302
>
>
>We have a voice.  Use it or loose it.
>--jim
>Jim Warren, columnist for MicroTimes, Government Technology & BoardWatch
>jwarren@well.sf.ca.us  -or-  jwarren@autodesk.com
>345 Swett Rd., Woodside CA 94062; voice/415-851-7075; fax/415-851-2814
>
>
>



------- End of Forwarded Message





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "L. Detweiler" <ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Date: Wed, 11 Aug 93 23:42:45 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Anonymity Warning! ID stored in TAR files
Message-ID: <9308120640.AA05507@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


From Risks 14.81 Aug 11 93

===cut=here===

From: olaf@bigred.ka.sub.org (Olaf Titz)
Subject: Surprise! contained in tar file

The RISK of trusting in software to save confidentiality has recently been
exposed in a German newsgroup. On a debate whether DES is illegal in Germany
(it is not, by the way) someone posted a tarred, compressed, uuencoded archive
of DES code via an anonymizing service.  (No discussion on the topic of
anonymization, please.) Not only that he forgot to delete the object code
before tarring (thus giving an indication which kind of hardware he uses). The
next day someone else posted an explanation why this action was stupid, giving
the anonymous poster's full real name and address. He found it out because the
tar he used leaves user names (not only UIDs, which would suffice to restore
file permission settings) in the tar file. Of course, this fact is not
mentioned explicitly in the man page rsp. info file (but the average user
wouldn't expect it in the first place...) where an explicit warning could be
considered appropriate.

Olaf Titz  -  olaf@bigred.ka.sub.org  -  s_titz@ira.uka.de




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: kelly@netcom.com (Kelly Goen)
Date: Thu, 12 Aug 93 02:28:07 PDT
To: ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu (L. Detweiler)
Subject: Re: On The Inherent Evil of Electronic Democracy
In-Reply-To: <9308120846.AA06905@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Message-ID: <9308120926.AA15971@netcom.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


 Actually I believe the answer is neither electronic democracy nor
representative government...I will settle for making government
so inefficient and bumbling to as have no 'real' effects on
its victims, ah, I meant to say "citizens". I believe that
my so called brother will always seek to pick my pocket so
I will settle for simply strait jacketing my govermental
opposition by increasing the rate of change in street tech available
till shock sets in...I ma far more practical I suspect then most in this 
discussion...

    cheers
    kelly
-- 




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "L. Detweiler" <ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Date: Thu, 12 Aug 93 01:48:08 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: On The Inherent Evil of Electronic Democracy
In-Reply-To: <9308120630.AA29140@netcom5.netcom.com>
Message-ID: <9308120846.AA06905@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May) on `electronic democracy':

>Actually, this is my worst nightmare of what this country could
>become: a direct democracy of the most populist sort.
[...]
>"Electronic democracy" could easily
>be the most totalitarian thing the planet has ever seen.

I'm delighted that Mr. May has come out against my vision for the
future based on all the tired cliches and entrenched blind spots of the
status quo of two milleniums. It is extremely dischordant and eerie to
hear someone who advocates `CryptoAnarchy', black markets, drug
legalization, digital pornography, digital cash (tax evasion?) and the
Collapse of Governments to suddenly decide that Representative
Democracy is a Good Thing (tm) because of a quotes by the snobbish
elitist De Tocqueville, Milton Friedman, and a 200 year old experiment
called the Federal System of America that is far from perfect and could
stand some serious adjustments and fine-tuning. His beautiful
statements nicely capture all the stereotypical knee-jerk reactions and
objections of a prosaic minds, dulled by centuries of history's
mediocre mundanities and brainless propaganda inflicted by their
rulers, all who wouldn't recognize salvation if it was nailed to a
cross, to the true potential of future Cyberspace!

We stand at the threshhold of a new era in human interaction and social
systems with the onslaught of cyberspace, but when I propose a new kind
of *government* Mr. May is too uncomfortable and beats a hasty retreat
to `representative democracy', an elaborate and complex system that
purports to protect people from their own stupidity by diluting their
demands through blundering elected officials.  Perhaps what I am
advocating is truly new, and deserves a new name: Responsive Democracy.
If anyone would care to look up `representative' in the dictionary, Mr.
May's comments will be rendered nonsensical. To paraphrase:

``Our government doesn't actually represent the people. That's why it
is stable. There are unresponsive elements and obstacles to social
change called `legislators' that dampen the tendency toward `wild
oscillations in public opinion'.  If our government truly represented
public opinion we would easily have the Most Totalitarian Thing the
World Has Ever Seen. People want drugs to be illegal, restricted
imports, and banned cryptography. Of course, I'm certainly not implying
that Lance is in favor of Apocalypse!''

(It sounds more like anarchy as Mr. May describes it, so I wonder why
he's coming out against this scenario.) Mr. May, are you saying you
*don't* want a responsive government? one that is an inspiration
instead of a degradation? do you *prefer* to complain about injustice
and wretchedness to the point you would rather wallow in it than be lifted from it?

I find it exceedingly difficult to rebut Mr. May on specific points
because his whole position, when I try to grasp it, comes out to be a
tangle of convoluted and ephemeral contradictions, speculations, and
emotional quasi-fictional references to e.g. the War on Drugs or Janet
Reno. Do you like our current `representative' government or don't you?
What, exactly, is the Representative Democratic Government's role in
`cryptoanarchy', and why are you in favor of it?

* * *

Anyway, I would like to elaborate on a few of the misconceptions that
are raised by his statements.

1) the world has not really ever seen a true `direct democracy' or had
the technology to support one -- until now. Not even the Greeks,
renowned as the inventors of democracy, had one.  It seems to be every
civilized person's worst nightmare, yet it has never been implemented.
How do we know it would be so terrible? Does anyone even know what it is?

2) consider that our current government represents the *imbalance* of
popular opinions. A vocal, powerful, or wealthy minority is able to
distract attention from issues or manipulate the process to the point
of influencing law. e.g., the NSA can derail cryptography exports
because no one has any influence on the other side, despite plenty of
supporters for loosened restrictions! e.g., some Widget Manufacturer
gets favorable tax breaks or import restrictions! What if everyone
could have an equal influence on *all* laws irrespective of their
wealth & illegitimate influence?

3) consider that dampening mechanisms can be built in to a `responsive
democracy' system. To paint a picture of `direct democracy' as people
voting instantly on CNN is an ignorant insult.  Conservative,
deliberative, stable structures, with the formality of court
proceedings and similar protocol, can be developed. What is a court but
an elaborate mechanism to uncover truth, resolve conflict, and pass
judgement, through presentations of evidence, opinion, and voting by a
nation's citizens? Held to the utmost ideal of impartiality and
fairness? Impacting every plane of human interaction?

4) I believe `representative democracy' is essentially a mask for the
idea of saying `some people should have more influence than others in
voting and influencing social conventions, because they are leaders,
they know more about the subject, they are more affected by it, they
are recognized experts, they have everyone's best interest in mind'
etc. Now, consider that this `influence' could be *formalized* into a
system such that people `own' it and trade it and grant it to others
like a *currency system*, and that voting systems automatically weight
votes in different areas based on it.

5) Mr. May says `we don't need more laws & restrictions however popular
they may be' and completely missed my specific point that the citizens
would have the capability to *retract* ineffective, useless, obsolete
laws just as easily as creating them. He completely ignores the aspect
of `competition of superior laws by selection' that is central to the
idea. If laws have disastrous, outrageous, or terrible effects, the
citizen-populace and collective social psyche will quickly learn and
*evolve* to *avoid* them.

6) Finally, the bizarre Urban Legend that Order would Collapse or Utter
Totalitarianism would Ensue if everyone could vote on issues directly
without the tedious formalities of legislators, or that a government
unresponsive to true citizen desires to `protect them from their
stupidity' is preferrable or even existent, I simply all dismiss as
utterly ridiculous. As Mr. May says, the population gets what it wants.

The whole idea is far too multifaceted to explore in one essay, of
course--it requires an entire Movement, a Revolution, to advance to the
point that even Joe Sixpack grasps its basics and will not insult and
ridicule it upon first sight.  Fortunately, this is all automatic,
inevitable, and underway. Cypherpunks, you will be soon seeing dynamic
& interactive voting systems, `reputation currency' and all these other
fantastic social mechanisms that will formalize all your vague longings
for order and sensibility in the universe! I certainly don't claim that
Paradise is at hand, but a new form of government, that combines
elements of all previous models but unequivocally surpasses and
transcends them all, *is*!





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: kelly@netcom.com (Kelly Goen)
Date: Thu, 12 Aug 93 03:48:08 PDT
To: gg@well.sf.ca.us (George A. Gleason)
Subject: Re:  Key-Escrow (black) Humor
In-Reply-To: <93Aug9.015133pdt.14000-2@well.sf.ca.us>
Message-ID: <9308121047.AA18838@netcom.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> 
> 
> How many government agents does it take to screw in a lightbulb?
          (intelligence)
a[deleted for reasons of National Security]: if [deleted for reasons of 
National Security] told [deleted for reasons of National Security],
[deleted for reasons of National Security] would have to 
[deleted for reasons of National Security] [deleted for reasons of
National Security] .

    cheers
     [deleted for reasons of National Security]




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Duncan Frissell <frissell@panix.com>
Date: Thu, 12 Aug 93 03:28:15 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Privacy and mail-lists
Message-ID: <199308121026.AA11898@panix.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


To: cypherpunks@toad.com

W >This might be a step away from 'cypher' 
W >topics, but, Duncan, I was
W >curious as to wether you publish any manuals 
W >on privacy, and/or can
W >suggest books or sources for privacy and 
W >financial privacy info.

Cypherpunks is dedicated to digital privacy.  One cannot practice digital 
privacy without an understanding of physical privacy techniques (and 
vice-versa these days).

Shameless marketing propoaganda will be sent by Email.

Duncan Frissell

"Privacy is a type of information that has its polarity reversed; I 
imagine it as anti-information.  In a world where everything is connected 
to everything -- where connection and information and knowledge are dirt 
cheap -- then disconnection and anti-information and no-knowledge become 
expensive."  -- Kevin Kelly

But not *too* expensive.  Frissell & Associates, custom crafted legal 
regimes since 1969. 

--- WinQwk 2.0b#0
                                                                                                     




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: miron@extropia.wimsey.com (Miron Cuperman)
Date: Thu, 12 Aug 93 01:12:49 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Secure voice software issues
In-Reply-To: <9308112136.AA16886@netcom3.netcom.com>
Message-ID: <1993Aug12.071243.4241@extropia.wimsey.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


norm@netcom.com (Norman Hardy) writes:

>Can someone tell me how fast CELP is when written in C?
>(On some particular machine.)

Our CELP codec should run real-time in C on the Pentium and PowerPC.

By the way, note that GSM will not run with v.32bis asynchronously,
because of the start and stop bits.

	Miron




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: miron@extropia.wimsey.com (Miron Cuperman)
Date: Thu, 12 Aug 93 01:32:48 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Secure voice software issues
In-Reply-To: <9308120629.AA17113@netcom4.netcom.com>
Message-ID: <1993Aug12.075614.4423@extropia.wimsey.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


norm@netcom.com (Norman Hardy) writes:

>128 excitation vectors each of 60 single precision loads fit in the on
>chip cache, but it is tight.

The codebooks are overlapped.  The whole thing (program + data)
should fit in 32K.

Reduced complexity CELP can be done in less than 10Meg operations per sec,
including everything.  Of course, multiply-accumulate is considered
one operation.

   Sincerely,
	Miron Cuperman, Software Consulting
		TCP/IP,UNIX,C++,DSP

Voice: (604) 987 1719
Fax  : (604) 986 8139
Email: miron@extropia.wimsey.com




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Duncan Frissell <frissell@panix.com>
Date: Thu, 12 Aug 93 05:33:18 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Physical Privacy
Message-ID: <199308121233.AA17229@panix.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


To: cypherpunks@toad.com

W >This might be a step away from 'cypher' 
W >topics, but, Duncan, I was
W >curious as to wether you publish any manuals 
W >on privacy, and/or can
W >suggest books or sources for privacy and 
W >financial privacy info.

Cypherpunks is dedicated to digital privacy.  One cannot practice digital 
privacy without an understanding of physical privacy techniques (and 
vice-versa these days).

Shameless marketing propoaganda will be sent by Email.

Duncan Frissell

"Privacy is a type of information that has its polarity reversed; I 
imagine it as anti-information.  In a world where everything is connected 
to everything -- where connection and information and knowledge are dirt 
cheap -- then disconnection and anti-information and no-knowledge become 
expensive."  -- Kevin Kelly

But not *too* expensive.  Frissell & Associates, custom crafted legal 
regimes since 1969. 


                                                                          
                           



---
 ~ WinQwk 2.0b#0 ~ Unregistered Evaluation Copy
                                                                                        




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: nobody@alumni.cco.caltech.edu
Date: Thu, 12 Aug 93 08:43:11 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: RE:patent on remote cash transactions?
Message-ID: <9308121538.AA14710@alumni.cco.caltech.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


THE MOUSE THAT ROARED. A small company has received a big patent
covering financial transactions from home computers. While
industry giants have bickered over who's on first in home
banking, shopping, entertainment, etc., Online Resources &
Communications Corporation of Fairfax, Va., has received what
appears to be an enormously broad patent covering financial
transactions made from home computers. "The patented payment
process potentially applies to a wide range of nonbanking
services, from pay-per-view television to stock trading done from
home terminals." (New York Times 8/9/93 C2)





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: nobody@shell.portal.com
Date: Thu, 12 Aug 93 09:18:27 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: No Subject
Message-ID: <9308121545.AA02901@jobe.shell.portal.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


At 12:25 PM 8/9/93 -0700, Timothy C. May wrote:
>despite the talk of
>mandatory "trap doors" in encryption systems, encryption is
>fundamentally easy to do and hard to detect. (For those who doubt
>this, let me describe a simple system I posted to sci.crypt several
>years ago. An ordinary digital audio tape (DAT) carries more than a
>gigabyte of data. This means that thhe least significant bit (LSB) of
>an audio DAT recordingng carries about 8megabytes of data! So Alice is
>stopped by the Data Police. They ask if she's carrying illegal data.
>She smiles inocently and say "No. I know you'll search me." They find
>her Sony DATman and ask about her collection of tapes and live
>recordings. Alice is carrying 80 MB of data---about 3 entire days
>worth of Usenet feeds!---on each and every tape. The data are stored
>in the LSBs, completely indistinguishable from microphone and
>quantization noise...unless you know the key. Similar methods allow
>data to be undetectably packed into LSBs of the PICT and GIF pictures
>now flooding the Net, into sampled sounds, and even into messages like
>this...

Alice better not be carrying any software that could retrieve that data. The cynic in me suggests that this scenario is just an excuse for the data police to seize any equipment or data it feels like. Besides, Alice won't be stopped by the data police, Alice will have her door kicked in by the data police and they'll take everything electronic she has, including harmless music and video. And anything electronic they find in her residence, whether it belongs to her or not.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: hfinney@shell.portal.com
Date: Thu, 12 Aug 93 09:18:12 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: ANONYMOUS CONTACT SERVICE
Message-ID: <9308121608.AA03468@jobe.shell.portal.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


From: Warren Keith Russell <keru@cpu.us.dynix.com>
> I received a message from System Daemon telling me that I had sent a
> message using the anonymous contact service, allocating a code name, and
> explaining how I can be reached anonymously.

A few months ago, someone subscribed to the list through the Penet service,
and it ended up revealing the Penet aliases of everyone who posted.  Each
post was delivered to that subscriber marked as being from the Penet alias
corresponding to the poster.  All it took was a parallel non-Penet subscription
to break the anonymity provided by Penet.

Has this now happened again?

At the time, there was some discussion about using "an..." versus "na..."
forms of the Penet aliases, one of which would avoid this revelation.  Has
that been taken care of?

Hal Finney
hfinney@shell.portal.com




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: hfinney@shell.portal.com
Date: Thu, 12 Aug 93 09:18:20 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: under pressure from University Computing svcs,
Message-ID: <9308121608.AA03472@jobe.shell.portal.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


From: The Phantom <phantom@u.washington.edu>
> I'm going to have to shut down the phantom remailer. 
> 
> Seems someone complained about a remailed message. I got a copy of the
> message, and it didn't seem to bad to me, but I've gotta go with what UCS
> says.
> 
> As of today, the phantom remailer (phantom@mead) is hereby out of service.
> 
> Matt

It's too bad that this remailer is being shut down.  I posted a few days
ago about this problem, and someone asked if there had been any specific
examples of shutdowns.  Here is one; I know Matt's is not the first.

If it would help, Matt, I could provide you with code to act as a "second-
tier" remailer, one which would only forward to one of the other Cypherpunks
remailers.  No person would receive messages from your remailer, hence there
would be no complaints to your administration.  Your remailer would just be
an extra "entry port" into the Cypherpunks remailer system.

I don't know whether the terms of the shutdown of your remailer would allow
you to experiment with what is arguably a different piece of code, one which
would not lead to complaints.

Hal Finney
hfinney@shell.portal.com




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: sneal@muskwa.ucs.ualberta.ca (Sneal)
Date: Thu, 12 Aug 93 08:38:11 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: ONE BBSCON
Message-ID: <9308121536.AA21970@muskwa.ucs.ualberta.ca>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Stanton McCandlish writes: 
 
>I'm off to ONE BBSCON, this month. Anyone else going?  If so, and
>you will be passing thru Albuquerque, I'm looking for a carpool
>situation, so I don't have to drive this crappy Hyundai up there... 
 
  Unfortunately, I'm coming from the north, so I can't offer you a 
lift.  However, while we're on the subject, I'm wondering if any
arrangements have been made to distribute anti-Clipper material at
the con.  I'd be happy to distribute flyers or what-have-you, but
they'd have to reach the show by other means; I'm not willing to
carry such seditious material across the US/Canada border.
 
  I hope that EFF will have a presence at the show* as they did last
year, and can sow some further seeds of discontent among the
non-Internet online world, many parts of which don't seem aware of
the Clipper debacle.  Any comments from the EFF folks hereabouts?
 
  -- Steve
     sneal@muskwa.ucs.ualberta.ca
 
* I had a great time arguing with Shari Steele and accusing her of
"dancing with the Devil" w/ reference to backing then-Senator Gore's
Data Superhighway proposal.  Very libertarially-incorrect position to
take, Shari. :-)




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: gnu (John Gilmore)
Date: Thu, 12 Aug 93 09:58:12 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Secure voice software issues
In-Reply-To: <9308120629.AA17113@netcom4.netcom.com>
Message-ID: <9308121657.AA20346@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


My proposal is that we get some software working that produces poor
quality speech in realtime on fast hardware that most people don't
have.  Then, improved search algorithms will bring higher quality.*
The natural evolution of faster hardware will make it available to all.

I think that we as cypherpunks have been thrown off a bit by the policy
issues and the publicity we've received.  It's time to get back into 
active development.  Remember, architecture *is* policy!

	John

* The way these algorithms work is that the sender goes through a
laborious process to find the best "encoding" (literally -- out of a
code book) that matches the sounds it is trying to communicate.
Typically the quality depends on how much time it has to do this;
spending more time looking at more possibilities, makes it more likely
that you find one with a very small difference between the real signal
and the encoded signal.  We can start off with stupid algorithms that
just give up and use the best-so-far when they run out of time, and
gradually improve them to be more intelligent about the *order* in which
they search.  This requires no change to receivers; it's backward
compatible.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: dmandl@lehman.com (David Mandl)
Date: Thu, 12 Aug 93 07:02:53 PDT
To: R.Tait@bnr.co.uk
Subject: Re: [uk.transport] Speed Camera with OCR
Message-ID: <9308121401.AA21989@disvnm2.shearson.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> From: R.Tait@bnr.co.uk

> I have just seen an item on the the BBC South East News about a new
> speed trap in Kent. Apparently the radar clocks your speed, a TV camera
> records your number plate & then a real time OCR system picks out the
> actual number & flashes it up on a digital display a short distance
> further up the road. The idea is to embarrass drivers by letting them
> & others see their speed & registration. I don't know what type of
> equipment they are using, but it sounds like a really neat trick.
> The ability to read a car's plate & decypher the number in real time
> without any human intervention must take a bit of work. Has anybody
> heard how reliable this system really is ?

Hmmm...most drivers I've known would be thrilled to get off with just
"embarrassment."  In fact, they'd probably be proud to have it broadcast
to everyone else on the road (except the lawmen, naturally) that they'd
just been clocked at 110 MPH or whatever.  But somehow, I doubt that this
data is used only for embarrassment, don't you?

   --Dave.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: gtoal@an-teallach.com (Graham Toal)
Date: Thu, 12 Aug 93 03:18:08 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Secure voice software issues
Message-ID: <4731@an-teallach.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


In article <9308110421.AA29116@jobe.shell.portal.com> hfinney@shell.portal.com writes:
 > A couple of comments on the cryptophone idea.
 > 
 > First, there has seemed to be general agreement in our earlier discussions
 > of this concept that the hard part is compressing the voice to the point
 > where it can go over commonly-available modems.  The government-standard
 > CELP algorithm is too slow for general-purpose home computers.  You need
 > an algorithm that can operate in real time and compress intelligibly down
 > to about 13K bits per second.  It has to be either able to compress and
 > decompress simultaneously or else you need some switching logic to decide
 > which person is talking and which is listening at each moment, with both
 > sides reversing roles in synchrony.

Tony Robinson (who some of you might know already) - the author of the
lossless 'shorten' sound compression program - is working on an ADPCM
version.  Currently compresses at 3 bits per (8 bit) sample.  This plus
a sampling rate of 4000hz instead of 8000hz (keeping it easy, on a sun)
just squeezes in under the bandwidth limitation of v32bis, with a little
left over for protocol overhead.

Graham
PS Has the 'netphone' list died or did I just drop off when I moved house
like I lost my cypherpunks subscription?  I remember there was talk of
letting it drop because the situation seemed to be in control, but I haven't
seen much progress since on vat et al, and the underground effort to do
something on soundblasters that everyone said 'shut up about' has had more
than enough time to come up with the goods...
===
Personal mail to gtoal@gtoal.com (I read it in the evenings)
Business mail to gtoal@an-teallach.com (Be careful with the spelling!)
Faxes to An Teallach Limited: 031 662 4678  Voice: 031 668 1550 x212





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: gtoal@an-teallach.com (Graham Toal)
Date: Thu, 12 Aug 93 03:22:50 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Secure voice software issues
Message-ID: <4732@an-teallach.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


In article <9308111916.AA03336@servo> karn@qualcomm.com writes:
 > Voice calls are different, as the availability of a two-way path lets
 > you do things much more securely. If you generate a session key with
 > DH and use PGP/RSA *only to sign the exchanges*, not to encrypt the
 > session key, then even if your RSA secret key is later compromised, it
 > would not compromise those session keys that had already been created,
 > used and destroyed.

Thanks for that explanation, that bit hadn't sunk in with me!

This makes me think... something similar would be a good extension to
SMTP wouldn't it?  DH exchange of keys before sending point to point
mail?  With the user's public keys being picked up via their .mailrc
or .pgpkey or something...

(It would only happen if both SMTP's supported it and both users had
made their public key available to the mail system)

I'm thinking of ways of automatically and easily encoding all traffic
by default, to avoid line snooping.  I'm not suggesting this as an
alternative to explicitly encrypting things you want to keep private.
You could still do that too.

G
===
Personal mail to gtoal@gtoal.com (I read it in the evenings)
Business mail to gtoal@an-teallach.com (Be careful with the spelling!)
Faxes to An Teallach Limited: 031 662 4678  Voice: 031 668 1550 x212





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: The Phantom <phantom@u.washington.edu>
Date: Thu, 12 Aug 93 10:22:51 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Real time OCR
Message-ID: <Pine.3.05.9308121000.A6081-b100000@stein2.u.washington.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



--------------- cypherpunks-list #4087		(54 lines) ---------------

Date: Thu Aug 12 08:40:56 1993
From: wcs@anchor.ho.att.com (Bill_Stewart(HOY002)1305) <wcs/daemon>
Subject: Re: [uk.transport] Speed Camera with OCR

> > The ability to read a car's plate & decypher the number in real time
> > without any human intervention must take a bit of work. 

> There's a lot of automated-highway research going on; most of it has
> been oriented towards radio+smartcards, which are easy to make accurate,
> and while they're not totally cheap, you can palm off much of the cost
> on the car-owner and use cheap equipment in the tollbooth.

>			Bill Stewart

If anyone can dig out the April issue of 'Advanced Imaging' (I seem to
have given mine away), there was an article about imaging license plates
for use at border crossings. The bugs looked like they were worked out and
the system was ready for action. I don't remember where it was going to be
put into effect, but..


mt


Matt Thomlinson                               Say no to the Wiretap Chip!
University of Washington, Seattle, Washington.
Internet: phantom@u.washington.edu      	    phone: (206) 548-9804
PGP 2.2  key available via email or finger phantom@hardy.u.washington.edu





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: gtoal@an-teallach.com (Graham Toal)
Date: Thu, 12 Aug 93 03:28:07 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Chaos harnessed for encryption / Fluctuations and Or
Message-ID: <4733@an-teallach.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


In article <19930811185438.1.TK@ROCKY.AI.MIT.EDU> tk@reagan.ai.mit.edu writes:
 > with some op amps.  If you want to play, there's an article in SciAm
 > this month on building a chaotic "encryption" machine.  It probably
 > provides acceptable security if you use triple DES on signals prior to
 > sending them.

That was smoke and mirrors by people who understand chaos better than
they understand encryption.  All it boils down to is a synchronised
pair of (not very good) PRNGs.  It's not a substitute for a one-time
pad by a long chalk, which is how they seem to be using it.  Basically
they've just reinvented every schoolboy's exor encryption program all
over again, this time with the latest 'chaos' buzzword thrown in to make
it sound hip.

Forget it.  It's a dead end.

G
===
Personal mail to gtoal@gtoal.com (I read it in the evenings)
Business mail to gtoal@an-teallach.com (Be careful with the spelling!)
Faxes to An Teallach Limited: 031 662 4678  Voice: 031 668 1550 x212





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Eric Hughes <hughes@soda.berkeley.edu>
Date: Thu, 12 Aug 93 10:28:12 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: No Subject
In-Reply-To: <9308121545.AA02901@jobe.shell.portal.com>
Message-ID: <9308121724.AA10093@soda.berkeley.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>Alice better not be carrying any software that could retrieve that
>data. 

Q: What do you call a store that sells 'cryptographic paraphernilia?'

A: A mind shop.

If crypto is outlawed, then random numbers will be probable cause for
search for illegal cryptographic devices, software or hardware.

Q: What is a random number?

A: Anything I don't understand.

Eric




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: collins@newton.apple.com (Scott Collins)
Date: Thu, 12 Aug 93 13:22:53 PDT
To: fnerd@smds.com (FutureNerd Steve Witham)
Subject: Re: Chaos harnessed for encryption / Fluctuations and Or
Message-ID: <9308121728.AA25115@newton.apple.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


  >[...] that can synchronize without publishing their states.
  >If this could be done with strong PRNGs, you'd have something.

Here is a related article

  Article = "Secret Key Agreement by Public Discussion from Common Information"
  Author  = Ueli M. Maurer
  Publication = IEEE Transactions on Information Theory, Vol 39, No. 3
  Date    = May 1993

--Abstract--
The problem of generating a shared secret key S by two parties knowing
dependent random variables X and Y, respectively, but not sharing a secret
key initially, is considered.  An enemy who knows the random variable Z,
jointly distributed with X and Y according to some probability distribution
Pxyz, can also receive all messages exchanged by the two parties over a
public channel.  The goal of a protocol is that the enemy obtains at most a
negligible amount of information about S.  Upper bounds on H(S) as a
function of Pxyz are presented.  Lower bounds on the rate H(S)/N (as
N-->infinity) are derived for the case where X = [X1, ..., Xn], Y = [Y1,
..., Yn], and Z = [Z1, ..., Zn] result from N independent executions of a
random experiment generating Xi, Yi and Zi for i=1, ..., N.  In particular,
it is shown that such secret key agreement is possible for a scenario where
all three parties receive the output of a binary symmetric source over
independent binary symmetric channels, even when the enemy's channel is
superior to the other two channels.  The results suggest how to build
cryptographic systems that are provably secure against enemies with
unlimited computing power under realistic assumptions about the partial
independence of the noise on the involved communications channels.
--end of Abstract--

Hope you like it,

Scott Collins         | "Few people realize what tremendous power there
                      |  is in one of these things."     -- Willy Wonka
......................|................................................
BUSINESS.   voice:408.862.0540  fax:974.6094   collins@newton.apple.com
Apple Computer, Inc.   1 Infinite Loop, MS 301-2C   Cupertino, CA 95014
.......................................................................
PERSONAL.   voice/fax:408.257.1746    1024/669687   catalyst@netcom.com





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: jim@tadpole.com (Jim Thompson)
Date: Thu, 12 Aug 93 08:42:51 PDT
To: jthomas@kolanut.mitre.org
Subject: Re: Secure voice software issues
Message-ID: <9308121534.AA11536@chiba.tadpole.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



V.42 adds about 200ms to my slip link.

I'd rather do without it, thanks.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: jthomas@kolanut.mitre.org (Joe Thomas)
Date: Thu, 12 Aug 93 08:08:12 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Secure voice software issues
Message-ID: <9308121503.AA00397@kolanut>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Phil Karn <karn@qualcomm.com> wrote:

[Re: squeezing 13.3 kbps data w/o start&stop bits over modem] 

> Whenever V.42 error correction (LAPM) is enabled,
> synchronous HDLC frames are what actually pass over the
> link. So the start/stop bits are already removed. 

> Unfortunately, the packetizing done by LAPM adds delay
> we don't want for a real time voice application. And if you
> turn off LAPM, you return to sending the start/stop bits
> over the wire.

Well...  How much latency does LAPM really add?  Little enough that  
full duplex keystrokes echo back nearly instantly on my connections.   
People talk over satellite links with more delay than that all the  
time.  Since we're not going to get toll quality voice out of the  
vocoders anyway, and the error correcting stuff is especially useful  
for encrypted data streams...  I think V.42 is probably a good idea  
for a cryptophone project. 


> Most V.32 and V.32bis modems provide for direct
> synchronous operation, which would let us have our cake
> and eat it too, except that few PCs can speak
> synchronously to a modem. This may require some extra
> hardware (sigh).

I'm in favor of getting a minimal version that will run on the lowest  
common denominator hardware first.   (Might have something to do with  
the fact that I just spent a couple hundred dollars on an internal  
V.32bis modem that doesn't do synchronous :^)

Joe




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: wcs@anchor.ho.att.com (Bill_Stewart(HOY002)1305)
Date: Thu, 12 Aug 93 08:28:20 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: [uk.transport] Speed Camera with OCR
Message-ID: <9308121516.AA05238@anchor.ho.att.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text


Rick Tait, R.Tait@bnr.co.uk, reports Marcus Reynold's note that there's a new
> > speed trap in Kent. Apparently the radar clocks your speed, a TV camera
> > records your number plate & then a real time OCR system picks out the
> > actual number & flashes it up on a digital display a short distance
> > further up the road. [...]
> > The ability to read a car's plate & decypher the number in real time
> > without any human intervention must take a bit of work. 

There's a lot of automated-highway research going on; most of it has
been oriented towards radio+smartcards, which are easy to make accurate,
and while they're not totally cheap, you can palm off much of the cost
on the car-owner and use cheap equipment in the tollbooth.

License-plate reading in real time is tough, if you're trying to get both
speed and accuracy from a video image of a moving car;
our neural-net folks were looking into it about three years ago, 
and it seemed like they'd be pretty good at it if they could
get a bit more funding:-) ; they've mainly been concentrating on
envelope-readers for Post Offices and railroad-car identifiers.

Embarrassing speeders is a special case, because the accuracy doesn't
really have to be 100% - you catch the cars on video, so if you
decide to prosecute anybody, you can have a human read the picture
and verify that you had the right license plate number.
Meanwhile, back on the road, if your computer misidentifies
the speeding driver half the time, he may assume the speed trap
was nicking the other fast car next to him, and you've
scared a lot of other drivers into slowing down because
it *looks* like you've could have nicked them;
so you've accomplished the safety objective.

It's scary stuff, because the technology is mostly there,
and a government that wanted to pay for development could get it done
by a number of research companies.  If it's too expensive for widespread
use now, computer horsepower keeps getting cheaper every year,
especially when what you need is DSP-crunchers and gate-arrays for
neural nets, rather than general-purpose systems.
Meanwhile, the smartcard people are mostly not using digicash,
they're using no-privacy systems and appealing to the convenience
for the commercial driver, whose company probably doesn't object.

Dave Mandl comments:
> Hmmm...most drivers I've known would be thrilled to get off with just
> "embarrassment."  In fact, they'd probably be proud to have it broadcast
> to everyone else on the road (except the lawmen, naturally) that they'd
> just been clocked at 110 MPH or whatever.  

A number of years ago, Ohio tried a system that displayed your speed
(but not your license plate) as you went by - they quickly discovered
that they had to cut off the display at something like 80 or 85 MPH
to prevent just that effect (though adding the license plate number
would cut down on the exhibitionism a bit.)

			Bill Stewart



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: lstanton@lehman.com (Linn Stanton)
Date: Thu, 12 Aug 93 08:28:12 PDT
To: dmandl@lehman.com
Subject: RE: [uk.transport] Speed Camera with OCR
In-Reply-To: <9308121401.AA21989@disvnm2.shearson.com>
Message-ID: <9308121524.AA15878@cfdev1.shearson.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


dmandl@lehman.com (David Mandl) says

>  Hmmm...most drivers I've known would be thrilled to get off with just
>  "embarrassment."  In fact, they'd probably be proud to have it broadcast
>  to everyone else on the road (except the lawmen, naturally) that they'd
>  just been clocked at 110 MPH or whatever.  But somehow, I doubt that this
>  data is used only for embarrassment, don't you?

In practice, it can be hard to use this system for more than embarrassment,
since it works by identifying the car, not the driver. Fortunately, we have
not quite reached the point yet where my license gets the points if I loan
you my car, and you speed.

Soon though...


Linn H. Stanton <stanton@acm.org>

The above opinions are exclusively my own. If anyone else wants them,
they can buy them from me. Easy terms can be arranged.
-----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----
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mQBNAitK8+EAAAECALzK83DH79m7DLKBmZA2h9U33fBE80EwT4xRY05K7WRfxpO3
BmhPVBmes9h97odVZ0RxAFvinOl4wZGOb8pDclMABRG0IUxpbm4gSC4gU3RhbnRv
biA8c3RhbnRvbkBhY20ub3JnPrQnTGlubiBILiBTdGFudG9uIDxsc3RhbnRvbkBz
aGVhcnNvbi5jb20+
=oCru
-----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: fnerd@smds.com (FutureNerd Steve Witham)
Date: Thu, 12 Aug 93 08:48:12 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Chaos harnessed for encryption / Fluctuations and Or
Message-ID: <9308121539.AA10228@smds.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


gtoal@gtoal.com sez-

> That was smoke and mirrors by people who understand chaos better than
> they understand encryption.  All it boils down to is a synchronised
> pair of (not very good) PRNGs.
> ...
> Forget it.  It's a dead end.

What it is is PRNGs that can synchronize without publishing their
states.  If this could be done with strong PRNGs, you'd have something.

-fnerd
quote me




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Date: Thu, 12 Aug 93 12:08:12 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Making the World Safe for Steganography
Message-ID: <9308121908.AA10732@netcom.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



How do we make steganography safer to use?

An anonymous comentator wrote about my point (in the essay "Libertaria in
Cyberspace"), and then Eric Hughes responded:

>>Alice better not be carrying any software that could retrieve that
>>data. 
>
>Q: What do you call a store that sells 'cryptographic paraphernilia?'
>
>A: A mind shop.
>
>If crypto is outlawed, then random numbers will be probable cause for
>search for illegal cryptographic devices, software or hardware.
>
>Q: What is a random number?
>
>A: Anything I don't understand.


With steganographic (data-hiding) schemes, how is the "unhiding" scheme to
be stored? If the user has a diskette labelled "Steganography" sitting
prominently near his computer, for example, and this diskette has just a
single algorithm on it--perhaps for stripping the LSBs out of GIFs--then it
is fairly obvious which algorithm is being used, and that steganography is
in fact being used in the first place. (However, what comes out of the
de-stegging, to coin a phrase, should still be meaningless without the
actual decryption, so I'm not sure what the authorities can or will try to
do. During wartime, or in many countries, I'm sure that possessing such
steganographic software would be a serious matter, but the U.S. has not
(yet) reached this point. And there's enough bits to play with on a DAT to
make the data bits look almost exactly like audio/microphone noise, with
the same statistics, spectrum, etc.)

One good way to further confuse the issue is to make certain steganographic
schemes *widely available* by wide distribution on CD-ROMs (to ensure that
nearly everyone can feign innocense when the Data Patrol asks them some
questions) or by easy access by ftp-type approaches (though this has limits
which are discussed later). 

In other words, there is no obvious "smoking gun" pointing to the use of
steganography. Or encryption, for that matter, as PGP-like crypto programs
could be similary distributed, someday, and only the secret key/passphrase
would be "incriminating" to the user. I'll leave it for another time to
discuss ways to hide the secret key/passphrase (perhaps in things like
Newton PDAs which implement "digital flash paper" in their flash memories,
or are carried with the person at all times, etc.).

A Cypherpunks CD-ROM?

Perhaps the Cypherpunks could someday even make such a CD-ROM widely
available, along with rants, source code, whatever. (*Very* speculatively,
someday "Wired" may even distribute a CD-ROM in one of their issues.)

Remember, the point about steganography schemes, like hiding message bits
in the LSBs of music tapes or images, is *not* to make the bits
"undetectable," but only to hide them sufficiently to make a case for
"plausible deniability." Thus, if the Data Patrol uses "Algorithm A6" (one
of many on the CD-ROM) on a DAT you are carrying, and the sequence "1 0 1 1
1 0 1 0 ...." emerges, you just shrug and claim ignorance. "Sounds like
noise to me." However, when the Patrol is not around, you apply, say,
"Algorithm Z1" to the DAT and then use your private key to decrypt the
bits. (How you secure your private key is another issue, of course, as
mentioned above.)

Some may quibble that this is a kind of low-level encryption...after all,
the CD-ROM may contain only a few dozen algorithms for stripping bits out
of DATs and images, so the NSA or FBI can simply apply them all, trivially.
This method would indeed be low-level (nonexistent, actually) security if
the resulting bits were a plaintext message. But the resulting bits are in
fact meaningless noise without the private key.

I suspect that such wide distribution of steganographic schemes will be
enough to ensure that users can safely retrieve "their" bits (using one of
the algorithms) without the authorities being able to prove anything.

If this analysis is correct, then getting various steganographic schemes
out in the public domain is important. Executable code--to allow users to
run the programs right off the CD-ROM and thus not have the code copied
(incriminatingly) to their hard disks--would be best. This code could be
tucked away in a small part of CD-ROMs.

What I envision is a CD-ROM (or whatever other distribution modes are
popular) containing this steganogrophic and cryptographic software  and
lots of other stuff, in other domains. That is, the crypto/stego part could
just be a tiny fraction of this "Hackers Disc." Speculatively, we could do
this ourselves, or work with "Wired," EFF, the Gnu folks, etc., to get
these programs tucked in someplace amongst their files. (There are issues
of platform compatitibility, which systems can read which CD-ROMs, etc.
Details.)

Making the algorithms available by ftp is of course already common
practice. The reason I don't emphasize this is that users must download the
programs to their systems, thus decreasing plausible deniability.

(However, if the programs are just part of a larger collection of files,
like a "News Magazine" of a bunch of files, then these algorithms will be
just some of the _many_ files downloaded, and the user can once again feign
ignorance. This would be a kind of "stego stego," where the stegonographic
algorithms are themselves hidden amongst a bunch of unrelated files.)

I realize all this may be too complicated, that the stego programs
themselves  are barely starting to appear (I know of a couple of efforts
going on), and that the problem of how to claim ignorance may not be
important for a few years yet, if ever.

On the other hand, there may be value in getting these stego schemes
distributed long in advance of their being needed.

Comments?

-Tim May
--
Timothy C. May         | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,  
tcmay@netcom.com       | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
408-688-5409           | knowledge, reputations, information markets, 
W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA  | black markets, collapse of governments.
Higher Power: 2^756839 | Public Key: by arrangement
Note: I put time and money into writing this posting. I hope you enjoy it.      







From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: karn@qualcomm.com (Phil Karn)
Date: Thu, 12 Aug 93 12:42:54 PDT
To: jthomas@kolanut.mitre.org
Subject: Secure voice software issues
In-Reply-To: <9308121503.AA00397@kolanut>
Message-ID: <9308121939.AA12734@servo>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I see 160ms round trip times on my SLIP link from home to work, and I
can't account for all of this time by just adding up transmission
times and store-and-forward delays for the data rates and packet sizes
I'm using. And I don't think it can be explained by the trellis
decoding in V.32 bis, as that should account for only a few bits of
delay.

I've since heard of very similar figures for other modems, so It's not
just my modem. I'm beginning to suspect the V.42bis packetizing
algorithms. Although they're not described in the spec, I suspect that
real V.42bis implementations use timers to determine when to send the
the currently queued data as a frame. Or maybe there's a Nagle-like
algorithm like the one in TCP: immediately send the first byte of data
on an idle link, but keep additional traffic pending until the first
byte is acknowledged in order to aggregate stream traffic into larger
frames.

This is all speculation so far, but it does explain the long RTTs I
see with packet traffic even though raw character-at-a-time traffic
seems to be fast.  Stream traffic would see the worst delays of all,
which is ordinarily okay for a file transfer, but death to a real time
stream like voice. That's why we may be forced to turn off V.42
entirely and speak synchronously to the modem.

Time to haul out a protocol analyzer and do some timing measurements.

Phil





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: This is _intense_!  12-Aug-1993 1536 <yerazunis@aidev.enet.dec.com>
Date: Thu, 12 Aug 93 12:58:13 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Subliminal channels in signature functions may be unavoidable.
Message-ID: <9308121955.AA20556@enet-gw.pa.dec.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I  was considering the subliminal-channel-in-the-digital-signature question
in the shower, and came to an interesting handwaving proof of the following
statement:

	All signature systems (public key and otherwise) that allow 
	timestamped messages contain subliminal channels of bandwidth 
	proportional to the timestamp resolution.

Fortunately, this mailing list is wide enough to contain the essence of 
the proof.

1) Hypothesize an arbitrary signature system that simply provides 
authentication via a randomish-looking bitstream that is a function
only of the input document and (possibly) a secret or public key
known to the sender and intended recipient, and that an 
"external monitor" exists who will verify that each message is
indeed signed appropriately; 

2) The job of the monitor is to censor communications between the 
sender and recipient; hie does this by examining the contents of
the messages and if 
	1) their visible contents are innoucuous
	2) their signatures do verify
he passes the message; otherwise he refuses the message back to the sender.

3) Assume the signature-generating algorithm is published, and is
a strongly random function of the input stream.

4) Assume any number of messages may be passed.

5) Assume that the sender and intended recipient have previously 
arranged for an unknown-to-the-censor second signature and bit 
count.

6) To send a subliminal-channel message, the sender generates an
innocuous message, time-stamps it, and signs it, then signs the 
signature with the "secret second signature".  If the [bit-count]
low-order bits of the second secret signature match the desired 
first N bits of the desired subliminal channel message, then
the message plus first (authenticating) signature is handed
off to the censor to examine and transport.  If the bits don't
match, the time-stamp of the original message is updated, and
the process repeated until the bits _do_ match.  The loop of
innoucuous-message/first-signature/second-signature/compare is
then repeated again until all the bits of the desired subliminal
channel message have been sent.

Since for any good signature scheme all bits in the output bitstream are
strongly random functions of all bits in the input stream, changing one
bit (in the timestamp) has a chance of 1 in 2^bitcount bits of giving
the desired secret-signature bitset.

Proof of the bandwidth of such a scheme is proportional to 1/2 the
resolution in bits of the time-stamp is left to the student.  (I just
_had_ to say that.  :-)  ).  

Extension: If the number of messages per unit time allowed by the censor 
is limited, then the bandwidth becomes MIN ( [1/2 timestamp resolution] , 
[bitcount * allowed-message-frequency] 

	-Bill




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Sandy <72114.1712@CompuServe.COM>
Date: Thu, 12 Aug 93 10:18:12 PDT
To: <cypherpunks@toad.com>
Subject: WIRED #4
Message-ID: <930812171006_72114.1712_FHF92-1@CompuServe.COM>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
  SANDY SANDFORT               Reply to:  ssandfort@attmail.com
 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Punksters,

Paul Ferguson asks if the new WIRED is out yet.  The answer is
"yes and no."  Complimentary copies were given away at a couple
of recent conferences.  Also, subscription copies are going out
now or in a few days.  Newsstand copies should be available in
three weeks or so.

I would appreciate any Cypherpunk thoughts, opinions, questions
or raves on my article, "Intelligent Island?" which appears in
this issue.  It and William Gibson's "Disneyland with the Death
Penalty" are the lead articles in WIRED #4.  Hope you like it.

 S a n d y

>>>>>>    Please send e-mail to:  ssandfort@attmail.com    <<<<<<
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: charles@loki.ksc.nasa.gov (Charles Edward Patisaul)
Date: Thu, 12 Aug 93 10:12:52 PDT
To: strick@versant.com (menya zavoot cmpuk)
Subject: Re: CryptoStacker
In-Reply-To: <9308120015.AA07981@versant.com>
Message-ID: <9308121711.AA01422@loki.ksc.nasa.gov>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


When last we heard, menya zavoot cmpuk wrote:
> THUS SPAKE "Kent Hastings" <kent_hastings@qmail2.aero.org>:
> # Whatever happened to CryptoStacker(s) research?
> 
> Ryan "CryptoStacker" Porter <rap@coconut.cis.ufl.edu> has been 
> travelling in (supposedly) Belgium & Sweden for the last month, 
> and I haven't heard from him since the beginning of July.

	Ryan has returned from his trip (also included some of
Germany and France) and has not gotten much net access since then.  
He's been busy on some other consulting projects, and has had some 
recovery to do.

	Almost immediately after returning to the United States
he was a passenger in a vehicle that was hit in a head on 
collision of about 50 MPH a piece.

	The vehicle was a Volvo station wagon and true 
to it's reputation the outside crumpled beyond recognition but
the passenger compartment was untouched. Ryan escaped with 
'only' internal bruising and general pain, while the passengers
in the other two vehicles were also treated for cuts, loss of
blood, massive smashedness and the like.

	Despite the realization that the superior armament of the
Volvo behemoth is what protected him from the other crazies on the
road (the oncoming vehicle was piloted by two guys who were watching
the aluminum in the back of their truck, instead of the which part
of US Highway 1 they were on), we are still going to West Palm beach this 
weekend to pick up the motorcycle he just bought. You'd think 
he'd learn from experience...

> He did *not* meet me in Budapest two weeks ago.

	One could say that *you* did not meet him...

> # Please voluntarily comply with my request for a status report,
> # or I'll padlock your business, throw you in jail, arrest all
> # your friends, and firebomb your compound.
> 
> Please!  Spare his friends!!!

	I guess that would include me! Yikes! If you are going to
firebomb our secret computing complex, at least let us be there
so we can be made into post toasties as the great ShorDurPerSav
from Waco has done.

>  
> # It is your choice.
>  
> If it were my choice, I'd choose the vacation.

	"Peace, 
	 or annihilation"

						-charles
-- 
Charles E. Patisaul  charles@loki.ksc.nasa.gov  Kennedy Space Center FL USA




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: klaus@mail.lds.loral.com (Christopher Klaus)
Date: Thu, 12 Aug 93 10:32:52 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: chaos harnessed for encryption
Message-ID: <9308121731.AA09087@mail.lds.loral.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain




There is an article in some paper magazine (Technology) about
some research at MIT for creating a signal-processing designs
that use chaos to encrypt information. Voice telephone
would be an excellent use of this technology. Anyone
have more info on it?


-- 
Christopher Klaus
klaus@mail.lds.loral.com cklaus@hotsun.nersc.gov





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: nobody@shell.portal.com
Date: Thu, 12 Aug 93 14:18:14 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Real time OCR
Message-ID: <9308122038.AA11660@jobe.shell.portal.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Neural network hardware is currently being trained to recognize the
serial numbers on US$.  This is being done by a company that has
successfully applied its nn hardware to read the numbers off of        
checks and distinguish between real/fake while obtaining the numbers too.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: David Sobel <dsobel@washofc.cpsr.org>
Date: Thu, 12 Aug 93 11:12:51 PDT
To: Cypherpunks <cypherpunks@toad.com>
Subject: Re: >Clipper trapdoor?
Message-ID: <00541.2828009147.4718@washofc.cpsr.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


  RE>>Clipper trapdoor?

Marc -

You wrote:

>As for the example of snooping on Hussein and his officers, you know
>exactly how much legal authorization the NSA needs to conduct that
>wiretap.  Exactly none.  Hence, it needs no paperwork to get the key
>to Hussein's phone.
>
>How the escrow agents make the NSA prove that the keyid in question
>belongs to Hussen's phone is an exercise left to the legislature :-/

As you (and others) noted in response to my posting, there is either a
trapdoor *or* a "national security exception" to the warrant/escrow
arrangement.  As your comment suggests, NSA has heretofore been
able to act unilaterally in exercising its "legal authorization" to
intercept communications overseas, but with the Clipper scheme must
obtain assistance from a third (and fourth?) party -- the escrow
agents.  I think the question you raise is a critical one -- under what
guidelines will the escrow agents determine the validity of an NSA
request for the key without a FISA warrant?

- David








From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Duncan Frissell <frissell@panix.com>
Date: Thu, 12 Aug 93 11:13:11 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: ANONYMOUS CONTACT SERVICE
Message-ID: <199308121808.AA23068@panix.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


To: cypherpunks@toad.com

H>A few months ago, someone subscribed to 
H>the list through the Penet service,
H>and it ended up revealing the Penet 
H>aliases of everyone who posted.  Each
H>post was delivered to that subscriber 
H>marked as being from the Penet alias
H>corresponding to the poster.  All it took 
H>was a parallel non-Penet subscription
H>to break the anonymity provided by Penet.
H>
H>Has this now happened again?

Funny you should mention this.  Maybe someone else just subscribed via 
penet since my morning post to cypherpunks was bounced back to *me* from 
penet (as well as being posted normally).  The bounce was caused because 
penet was reading the originating address as *my* address (not 
cypherpunks) and since I have been using a penet password and my message 
did not contain the password, it was not forwarded.

I have noticed that some postings show up here from cypherpunks and some 
from the address of the original poster.  I suppose different mailing 
situations cause different results.

Maybe all penet users on the list should activate passwords on penet.fi.  
Penet may search back along the chain of addresses for any familiar 
address to check against it's list of password-enabled addresses.

Duncan Frissell




H>
H>At the time, there was some discussion 
H>about using "an..." versus "na..."
H>forms of the Penet aliases, one of which 
H>would avoid this revelation.  Has
H>that been taken care of?
H>
H>Hal Finney
H>hfinney@shell.portal.com
H>
H>

---
 ~ WinQwk 2.0b#0 ~ Unregistered Evaluation Copy
                                                                                                                       




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: R.Tait@bnr.co.uk
Date: Thu, 12 Aug 93 06:38:10 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: [uk.transport] Speed Camera with OCR
Message-ID: <199308121337.5465@bnsgs200.bnr.co.uk>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I thought this might be of interest to fellow cypherpunks, especially
to those of us in the UK.

Has anything like this been done in the US or Canada?

-Rick

------- Start of forwarded message -------
Newsgroups: uk.transport
From: mreyno@sound.demon.co.uk (Marcus Reynolds)
Subject: Speed Camera with OCR
Reply-To: mreyno@sound.demon.co.uk
Distribution: world
X-Mailer: cppnews $Revision: 1.20 $
Organization: Sound & Vision BBS +44 (0)932 252323
Date: Wed, 11 Aug 1993 20:34:43 +0000

I have just seen an item on the the BBC South East News about a new
speed trap in Kent. Apparently the radar clocks your speed, a TV camera
records your number plate & then a real time OCR system picks out the
actual number & flashes it up on a digital display a short distance
further up the road. The idea is to embarrass drivers by letting them
& others see their speed & registration. I don't know what type of
equipment they are using, but it sounds like a really neat trick.
The ability to read a car's plate & decypher the number in real time
without any human intervention must take a bit of work. Has anybody
heard how reliable this system really is ?

I can see a few more uses for such a system than merely embarrassing
speeding motorists, if it can work reliably & cheaply. How's this for
starters:-

City centre entry control & road pricing without the fancy toll booths,
just an itemised bill at the end of the month.
Tracking stolen vehicles, check every plate against the DVLC wanted list.
Tracking any vehicle the State wants to track. Hello Big Brother.
    
--
Marcus Reynolds                 (Bandwidth saving sig)

------- End of forwarded message -------




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Peter Wayner <pcw@access.digex.net>
Date: Thu, 12 Aug 93 11:48:12 PDT
To: dsobel@washofc.cpsr.org
Subject: Re: >Clipper trapdoor?
Message-ID: <199308121845.AA12068@access.digex.net>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Dave Sobel has been wondering just how the Escrow Agency will
check up on the requests for keys that it gets from the NSA.
The procedures aren't decided yet, but from my understanding
of the presentation given at the last CSSAB meeting in Washington,
the Escrow agencies won't have a person/phone to escrow id number
mapping that would allow them to check if a request for a key
is valid. 

There are two reasons for this. 1) It would be pretty useless because
people could sell their phones at garage sales or give them as
Christmas gifts and screw up the list. 2) This is also a "feature".
If two of the escrow agents (from different agencies) decided to
go bad, then they wouldn't be able to look up their enemy Bob's 
escrow key by name. They would need some of the real-time hardware
and access to the family key. Presumably, this would be handled
by a third party. 

-Peter




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: ferguson@fiber.sprintlink.net (Paul Ferguson x2044)
Date: Thu, 12 Aug 93 11:58:12 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Cypherpunk FTP site -- where is it?
Message-ID: <9308121953.AA07413@fiber.sprintlink.net>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Could I entice someone to remind me of where the anon FTP site (and
directory) is located? I seem to recall that it was on soda.berkeley.edu
but beyond that, my memory fails me....
 




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Peter Shipley <shipley@tfs.COM>
Date: Thu, 12 Aug 93 14:58:13 PDT
To: smb@research.att.com
Subject: Re: Secure voice software issues
In-Reply-To: <9308122055.AA27140@toad.com>
Message-ID: <9308122154.AA18473@edev0.tfs.com.TFS>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>	 I see 160ms round trip times on my SLIP link from home to work, and I
>	 can't account for all of this time by just adding up transmission
>	 times and store-and-forward delays for the data rates and packet sizes
>	 I'm using. And I don't think it can be explained by the trellis
>	 decoding in V.32 bis, as that should account for only a few bits of
>	 delay.
>
>	 I've since heard of very similar figures for other modems, so It's not
>	 just my modem. I'm beginning to suspect the V.42bis packetizing
>	 algorithms. Although they're not described in the spec, I suspect that
>	 real V.42bis implementations use timers to determine when to send the
>	 the currently queued data as a frame. Or maybe there's a Nagle-like
>	 algorithm like the one in TCP: immediately send the first byte of data
>	 on an idle link, but keep additional traffic pending until the first
>	 byte is acknowledged in order to aggregate stream traffic into larger

do not use error correction or compression.  (they will slow you down)
and tcp does it's own error correction.  as for 160ms round trip times
that is acceptable for slip.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: mab@vax135.att.com
Date: Thu, 12 Aug 93 12:18:12 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Cryptographic File System paper available for ftp.
Message-ID: <9308121905.AA07550@vax135.UUCP>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Hi,

A PostScript pre-print of the final version of my paper "A Cryptographic File
System for Unix" is available for anonymous ftp from research.att.com
in the file dist/mab/cfs.ps .  The paper will be presented at the
1st ACM Conference on Communications and Computing Security, November
3-5, Fairfax, VA.

A number of people on this list have seen an early draft; this
is the final version.  Some of the techniques in the paper may be
of general interest to people contemplating file system-level encryption
in other systems (e.g., the cryptostacker project).

-matt




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: plmoses@unix.cc.emory.edu (Paul L. Moses)
Date: Thu, 12 Aug 93 12:08:28 PDT
To: ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu
Subject: Re:  On The Inherent Evil of Electronic Democracy
Message-ID: <9308121908.AA06721@emoryu1.cc.emory.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Regarding the Electronic Democracy idea, I vote with Tim May.  Look at the
way public opinion is molded today through CNN, Tom Brokaw, Connie Chung, 
Oprah Winfrey, etc.  One could even say that Clinton is the "Phil Donahue
president" (he 'cares') - just look at the second candidate debate last fall.
A talk show if ever there was one.  No, erasing procedural safeguards in the 
name of access by the masses is an *EXTREMELY* bad idea, because a lot of 
these archaic procedures still have use and serve a filtering function,
albeit one that may not be recognized fully until they are removed and 
drastic, undesirable, unwanted,and unintended consequences follow.
What we should be doing instead is focusing our analytic powers on 
the present bottlenecks and distortions in the system and resolving those
rather than opening ENTIRELY NEW "runoff channels".  For at the end of the
day, the only beneficiaries of innovation are the ones poised to exploit it.
And that certainly is not the "enlightened citizen" today.
What am I saying?  If we allow direct legislating power to go to everyone,
we will eliminate the concern with PLURALITY that the Constitution
protects.  If not sooner, then later.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: M..Stirner@f0.n0.z1.FIDONET.ORG (M. Stirner)
Date: Thu, 12 Aug 93 18:18:16 PDT
To: Cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Anonymous contact service
Message-ID: <1771.2C6AD490@shelter.FIDONET.ORG>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


 Uu> Maybe all penet users on the list should activate passwords on
 Uu> penet.fi.   Penet may search back along the chain of addresses for any
 Uu> familiar  address to check against it's list of password-enabled
 Uu> addresses.

Something is way screwy with Penet lately.  I have found that I have had
passwords required when I had no recollection of installing them.  On
top of this, I am unable to use the password provision due to header
grunging at the UUCP gate, in any case.
.   I have requested to admin@anon.penet.fi that the accounts by number
be deleted in order that I can start over with fresh accounts, & despite
three requests, this has not been done.  Bloody annoying, but I suppose
when we give Julf a big raise, _then_ I can start bitching, huh? 8-)
.   Speaking of related remailers, what is the status of Charcoal?

*********************************************************************
* <m..stirner@f28.n125.z1.fidonet.org> - PGP Key D30909 via servers *
* > What country can preserve its liberties if its rulers are not  <*
* > warned from time to time that their people preserve the spirit <*
* > of resistance?  Let them take arms!" - Thomas Jefferson, 1787  <*
*********************************************************************

___ Blue Wave/QWK v2.12
--  
M. Stirner - via FidoNet node 1:125/1
UUCP: ...!uunet!kumr!shelter!0!0!M..Stirner
INTERNET: M..Stirner@f0.n0.z1.FIDONET.ORG




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: M..Stirner@f0.n0.z1.FIDONET.ORG (M. Stirner)
Date: Thu, 12 Aug 93 18:18:26 PDT
To: Cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re:  on the inherent evil
Message-ID: <1772.2C6AD491@shelter.FIDONET.ORG>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


 Uu> From: plmoses@unix.cc.emory.edu (Paul L. Moses)

 Uu> Regarding the Electronic Democracy idea, I vote with Tim May.  Look at
 Uu> the way public opinion is molded today through CNN, Tom Brokaw, Connie
 Uu> Chung,  Oprah Winfrey, etc.  One could even say that Clinton is the
 Uu> "Phil Donahue president" (he 'cares') - just look at the second
 Uu> candidate debate last fall. A talk show if ever there was one.

As a Second Amendment activist, I am particularly aware of the dangers
of an instant-input viewer poll bearing the weight of law following a
particularly disgusting piece of BooHoo/Advocacy Broadcast Journalism.
.   Though I don't see how this is directly relevant to the cypherpunks
thang, I do know that I am horrified at the potential for abuse inherent
in the "electronic Town Hall" concept. I also find that most computer
folk have wild enthusiasm for this idea while bearing no inkling of the
ease with which the process could be subverted.

*********************************************************************
* <m..stirner@f28.n125.z1.fidonet.org> - PGP Key D30909 via servers *
* > What country can preserve its liberties if its rulers are not  <*
* > warned from time to time that their people preserve the spirit <*
* > of resistance?  Let them take arms!" - Thomas Jefferson, 1787  <*
*********************************************************************

___ Blue Wave/QWK v2.12
--  
M. Stirner - via FidoNet node 1:125/1
UUCP: ...!uunet!kumr!shelter!0!0!M..Stirner
INTERNET: M..Stirner@f0.n0.z1.FIDONET.ORG




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Date: Thu, 12 Aug 93 15:53:24 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Spooking of neural nets and image recognition...
In-Reply-To: <9308122227.AA22138@tamsun.tamu.edu>
Message-ID: <9308122254.AA18262@netcom5.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain




> 
> Speaking of neural nets and image recognition, my former employers
> landed a contract with "various law enforcement agencies" although
> the project manager I spoke to said primarily the FBI and CIA - to
> develop neural network hardware and software to do face recognition,
> to be used to identify criminals at the airports.
> 
> Indeed, I recall being photographed twice when I hired on - normal
> lighting for my regular id, and low lighting.  At the time, I
> wondered why but didn't think anything of it.  The project manager
> said they were amassing a database of pictures to use as training
> sets.

I think you mean "Spooking of neural nets and image recognition..."

This technology is supposedly being deployed at Customs offices and
especially at airports.

Long hair may come back, as I hear that the _ear_ is one of the main
identifying points...ears are fairly characteristic of individuals
(not as much as fingerprints, but enough for a rough sort) and
edge-tracing algorithms can be run quickly. So, keep those ears
covered!

Of course, only criminals fear such security monitoring. Remember, the
policement is your _friend_.


-Tim May

-- 




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: karn@qualcomm.com (Phil Karn)
Date: Thu, 12 Aug 93 16:12:57 PDT
To: shipley@tfs.COM
Subject: Secure voice software issues
In-Reply-To: <9308122154.AA18473@edev0.tfs.com.TFS>
Message-ID: <9308122309.AA13742@servo>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>do not use error correction or compression.  (they will slow you down)
>and tcp does it's own error correction.  as for 160ms round trip times
>that is acceptable for slip.

Well, in theory turning off V.42bis entirely should get rid of these
delays, but in my exerience with Motorola Codex 3260 modems, it doesn't.
Don't know why.

Also, if you turn off LAPM you are back to sending start/stop bits again.

Phil






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: karn@qualcomm.com (Phil Karn)
Date: Thu, 12 Aug 93 16:38:15 PDT
To: shipley@tfs.COM
Subject: Secure voice software issues
In-Reply-To: <9308122154.AA18473@edev0.tfs.com.TFS>
Message-ID: <9308122337.AA13799@servo>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>do not use error correction or compression.  (they will slow you down)
>and tcp does it's own error correction.  as for 160ms round trip times
>that is acceptable for slip.

I don't know about you, but 160ms *is* objectionable to me when typing
on a character-at-a-time telnet connection. And several people I've
tried to introduce to demand-dialed SLIP (instead of hogging annex
ports for hours with idle dumb terminals) have also complained about
the delay.

BTW, there's another problem with V.42bis compression that I haven't
mentioned yet. When you enable compression, most modems suck in
several seconds' worth of transmit data before they drop CTS to flow
control the host (this assumes the DTE speed is considerably faster
than the line speed, as it needs to be to get the most out of the
compression).

This is no problem if you're sending a large file with, say, ZMODEM;
presumably the modem buffers up all this data so it can figure out
whether to compress it or not. But this creates nasty delay problems
for SLIP/PPP when you try to mix bulk and interactive traffic streams.
Even if your router gives interactive (e.g., Telnet) packets priority
over bulk (e.g., FTP) traffic in its own interface send queues, it
can't do anything about the data that's already gone to the modem. So
if the modem buffers up 2 seconds of FTP data, then your telnet
packets will see 2 second delays even if it they have unconditional
priority in the router over your big background FTP transfer.

Worse still, some modems seem to buffer up all this data even when
you disable V.42bis compression. Sigh.

I point this out because many people would like to multiplex secure
voice with IP data over their SLIP links. This lets you use a single
phone line for voice and data simultaneously (especially if you have a
variable rate vocoder), and it lets you use the Internet for voice.
Not only does this let you bypass the long distance network, but it
would make a pen register on your modem line almost useless. It would
just show that you frequently call a local SLIP server to which you
presumably have legitimate access. :-)

But there are some problems yet to be solved. I'm rapidly coming to
the conclusion that the only way around the SLIP/PPP modem buffer/delay
problems is to speak raw synchronous data to the modems, even to the
point of implementing V.42bis and HDLC in the host computer instead of
using the modem's implementation.

Phil





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: James Still <still@kailua.colorado.edu>
Date: Thu, 12 Aug 93 15:42:55 PDT
To: 'Cypherpunks List' <cypherpunks@toad.com>
Subject: Re:  On The Inherent Evil of Electronic Democracy
Message-ID: <2C6AD4C4@kailua.colorado.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



>Regarding the Electronic Democracy idea, I vote with Tim May.  Look at the
>way public opinion is molded today through CNN, Tom Brokaw, Connie Chung,
>Oprah Winfrey, etc.  One could even say that Clinton is the "Phil Donahue
>president" (he 'cares') - just look at the second candidate debate last 
fall.

I don't think public opinion is 'molded' so much, just that it's fancies are
entertained too much.  (Info-tained?)  I dropped by a local bookstore last
night to hear Jim Lehrer (McNeil/Lehrer Newhour on PBS) speak about his new
book.  He brought up this topic, saying that "mainstream news," (never
mind the dribble of Donahue or Oprah) has been remiss in *reporting
the news* for years, instead sensationalizing news and entertaining the 
masses.

According to Lehrer, T.V. news (and newspapers who must now compete
with them) have stopped asking their reporters to "get the facts" instead
encouraging them to "get the dirt," or else.  Look what has happened:
the three major networks have lost over 30% market-share to other outlets
like NPR and PBS or from people that just plain turn it off.  Extreme
voter apathy.  Twentynothings from hell :-)

The good side to this according to Lehrer is that one day soon a bunch
of balding men will sit around the NBC board-room table and say, "We
need more viewers, what do we do?"  One particularly bright young man
will finally say, "I know, let's report the news!," and everyone will bust
out in applause.  Lehrer's been doing it for 18 years.  The info-tainment
stuff is a small blip on the Neilson charts and nothing more.  Maybe I'm a 
bit
too optimistic for my own good though  :^)   - Jim




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: smb@research.att.com
Date: Thu, 12 Aug 93 13:58:13 PDT
To: karn@qualcomm.com (Phil Karn)
Subject: Re: Secure voice software issues
Message-ID: <9308122055.AA27140@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


	 I see 160ms round trip times on my SLIP link from home to work, and I
	 can't account for all of this time by just adding up transmission
	 times and store-and-forward delays for the data rates and packet sizes
	 I'm using. And I don't think it can be explained by the trellis
	 decoding in V.32 bis, as that should account for only a few bits of
	 delay.

	 I've since heard of very similar figures for other modems, so It's not
	 just my modem. I'm beginning to suspect the V.42bis packetizing
	 algorithms. Although they're not described in the spec, I suspect that
	 real V.42bis implementations use timers to determine when to send the
	 the currently queued data as a frame. Or maybe there's a Nagle-like
	 algorithm like the one in TCP: immediately send the first byte of data
	 on an idle link, but keep additional traffic pending until the first
	 byte is acknowledged in order to aggregate stream traffic into larger
	 frames.

	 This is all speculation so far, but it does explain the long RTTs I
	 see with packet traffic even though raw character-at-a-time traffic
	 seems to be fast.  Stream traffic would see the worst delays of all,
	 which is ordinarily okay for a file transfer, but death to a real time
	 stream like voice. That's why we may be forced to turn off V.42
	 entirely and speak synchronously to the modem.

	 Time to haul out a protocol analyzer and do some timing measurements.

Real timing measurements would help, but it's not just the V.42bis
algorithms.  A year or two ago, I did some measurements on a number
of different modems.  I saw large -- and sometimes unacceptable -- delays
even without V.42 or MNP in use.  My methodology was to enable loopback
at various points -- hardware loopback plugs, local loopback on my
modem, remote loopback or a plug at the far end, etc.  I sent single
characters, and timed how long they took to show up.  The modems
seem to either buffer up several characters, or have to wait a while
before sending the first one, but the delays appeared to be for the
first character in a ``bunch'' (``packet'' is too strong a word).




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: remail@tamsun.tamu.edu
Date: Thu, 12 Aug 93 15:28:14 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: neural nets
Message-ID: <9308122227.AA22138@tamsun.tamu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Speaking of neural nets and image recognition, my former employers
landed a contract with "various law enforcement agencies" although
the project manager I spoke to said primarily the FBI and CIA - to
develop neural network hardware and software to do face recognition,
to be used to identify criminals at the airports.

Indeed, I recall being photographed twice when I hired on - normal
lighting for my regular id, and low lighting.  At the time, I
wondered why but didn't think anything of it.  The project manager
said they were amassing a database of pictures to use as training
sets.

Pretty interesting...




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: szabo@netcom.com (Nick Szabo)
Date: Thu, 12 Aug 93 18:02:55 PDT
To: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Subject: Re: Spooking of neural nets and image recognition...
In-Reply-To: <9308122254.AA18262@netcom5.netcom.com>
Message-ID: <9308130102.AA22344@netcom4.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Are the pictures taken by ATMs good enough for automated
recognition?



Nick Szabo				szabo@netcom.com




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: szabo@netcom.com (Nick Szabo)
Date: Thu, 12 Aug 93 19:08:26 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re:  On The Inherent Evil of Electronic Democracy
In-Reply-To: <9308121908.AA06721@emoryu1.cc.emory.edu>
Message-ID: <9308130207.AA27537@netcom4.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Some aspects of Electronic Democracy (like Communism, Catholicism,
etc. a religion, and thus the capital letters):

*  We have quite a lot of it now.  The mass media (CNN, newspapers,
call-in radio, etc.) is "the fourth branch of government".  We
can send billions of pieces of junk e-mail, faxes, or voice
messages to the White House and Congresscritters if we like,
and they can send junk mail back.

* As long as we have it, it's a good idea to at least try
to provide information to the voter, so I support this bill.
Cypherpunks might find some of this information useful.
However, I am under no illusions that a significant fraction 
of voters will bother to access or read the information to any 
significant degree.

* A basic problem with E.D. is that nobody has an
incentive to vote correctly.  People's political opinions
can be as stupid and wrong as can be and it won't have any
negative impact on their own lives, or at least none that 
is disproportionate or easily recognized to be a result decisions
based on that opinion.  Other people might have great opinions, which 
if implemented would solve world hunger, clean up the environment, 
grow the economy, etc. etc.  but there is no special benefit to these 
people for having done their altruistic homework and arrived at effective 
solutions to these problems.

This is not only reflected in the fact that less than half the people 
vote in many elections, but also in the fact that only a miniscule 
fraction of those who do vote know what the hell they are voting on.  
Including me, BTW: this isn't an elitist issue of "the masses are asses", 
but the fact that most of the important problems and decisions require 
in-depth knowledge based on years of experience, not the flipping
of levers based on a few minutes per week of video clips.  

Contrast to the much more effective tools we have to make 
social decisions in a free market: what to make, what to use, 
what to buy, what to sell, how to be of service to other people
what services to choose, etc.  Good decisionmaking processes have 
negative feedback loops so that good opinions or decisions tend to 
clearly and quickly reward the decisionaker, and vice versa, and 
tend to benefit or harm the decisionmaker disproportionately to
innocent bystanders (people making decisions about other aspects
of society).

The market's feedback is by no means perfect!  That is why I
am hyped about systems to make the feedback more effective,
like the recently discussed auditing protocol, and the
cypherpunks movement which I hope will free some people and
markets from abusive, coercive control by those who (a)
do not have our best interests at heart, and (b) have no
incentive to do the homework needed to make good decisions.

Regardless of how cypherpunks feel about this issue, E.D. is one
of the most powerful memes making its way thru current society, and 
we have to deal with it.

Nick Szabo					szabo@netcom.com




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Date: Thu, 12 Aug 93 20:12:55 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Spooking of neural nets and image recognition...
Message-ID: <9308130311.AA11786@netcom.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>On Thu, 12 Aug 93 18:02:06 PDT, szabo@netcom.com (Nick Szabo) said:
>
>>Are the pictures taken by ATMs good enough for automated
>>recognition?
>>Nick Szabo                             szabo@netcom.com
>
>Do atm's usually have real cameras?  I always figured most of them
>were fakes.
>
>Mike

I'll comment on both questions.

First, Nick's question. Yes, the resolution is sufficient, especially since
the faces are right in front of the camera. They're black-and-white (so
far, but this will change, and the costs of small surveillance cameras will
drop further), and of limited res (probably not full NTSC). But adequate
for image recognition (though I've not heard of this being done, just
archiving of videotapes for some time period....see the movie "Rising Sun"
for some insights). 

Second, Mike's question. I have no idea what fraction are real cameras, but
I suspect many if not most are real. Robberies and killings near ATMs are
often accompanied with video footage from the ATMs, shown on television.
Some of the cameras may now be dummies, but this will likely change as the
costs drop further and as local communities push for more surveillance.
(Speculatively, I would not be very surprised to see private
companies--banks, convenience stores, daycare centers--forced to install
surveillance cameras. Big Brother arrives throught the corporate liability
laws? Orwell missed this one, though he got so much of it right.)

Comment: The case of banks having cameras doesn't bother me much at all, as
the bank already knows exactly who its customers are. That is, the
surveillance is not used to gather any information the bank does not
already have immediate and complete access to.

A much more serious situation will arise when convenience stores, gas
stations, and the like adopt the same camera systems--maybe they already
are--and begin to compile customer dossiers, purchasing preferences, etc.
(Credit card and check purchases are already being used, according to a CNN
report I recently saw, to compile such dossiers, so that customers can be
sent "customized" advertisements reminding them or making special offers.
Cypherpunks can avoid using checks and credit cards, for the time being.)

Understand that I don't support bans on such surveillance cameras--it is
always my choice to patronize a store--but I do object to situations where
the State mandates that stores have cameras or outlaws masks and other
efforts to hide one's features.


-Tim 


--
Timothy C. May         | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,  
tcmay@netcom.com       | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
408-688-5409           | knowledge, reputations, information markets, 
W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA  | black markets, collapse of governments.
Higher Power: 2^756839 | Public Key: by arrangement
Note: I put time and money into writing this posting. I hope you enjoy it.      







From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Anonymous <nowhere@bsu-cs.bsu.edu>
Date: Thu, 12 Aug 93 19:22:55 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: No Subject
Message-ID: <9308130131.AA14438@bsu-cs.bsu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Is there any reason why a single mail address should have only one
pseudonym? Along with declaring a private password, why not declare any
number of public names? One password per name would be nice. Another plus -
then penet could be chained between cypherpunk remailers. Now this is not
possible because it identifies users with their 'From:' field.





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Johan Helsingius <julf@penet.FI>
Date: Thu, 12 Aug 93 12:52:53 PDT
To: hfinney@shell.portal.com
Subject: Re: ANONYMOUS CONTACT SERVICE
In-Reply-To: <9308121608.AA03468@jobe.shell.portal.com>
Message-ID: <9308122020.aa01932@penet.penet.FI>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



> A few months ago, someone subscribed to the list through the Penet service,
> and it ended up revealing the Penet aliases of everyone who posted.  Each
> post was delivered to that subscriber marked as being from the Penet alias
> corresponding to the poster.  All it took was a parallel non-Penet subscripti
 > on
> to break the anonymity provided by Penet.
> 
> Has this now happened again?

Yes. I was contacted by the user who was the cause of this. He didn't
reaalize what would happen. He has now send an unsubscribe request.

> At the time, there was some discussion about using "an..." versus "na..."
> forms of the Penet aliases, one of which would avoid this revelation.  Has
> that been taken care of?

Evidently not. :-(

	Julf





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: fnerd@smds.com (FutureNerd Steve Witham)
Date: Thu, 12 Aug 93 18:48:17 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Democracy
Message-ID: <9308130131.AA12501@smds.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


A procedural point about this democracy debate,
and then a substantive (hah! didn't think I knew that
word, did you?) one.

It's in line with the idea of this list to keep up with possibilities
and developments like electronic direct democracy ideas, and to
serve as a way for people who are into things like that to get in
touch with each other.  But at some point the purely political
aspect of the disagreement isn't especially a cypherpunk issue.
I hope everybody cools off or takes it elsewhere (I don't know 
where) before that point.  Robin Hanson's Alternative Institutions
list seems like a good place for that.

That said, I want to throw in my bic lighter...

Democracy is bad; smarter democracy would be worse.
The system we have is ravenous and stupid, but we're adapted to
it.  There's nothing "good" about representative democracy
except that it's relatively slow-changing and we know some ways
of dealing with it.  If we made democracy able to respond to events 
more quickly, it might be smarter and better at what it does best--
prey on us.  It might break past our defenses.  I feel the same way 
about calls for efficient government.  No-o-o-o-o thanks!

This has nothing to do with respect for the common man.  I think 
people are basically decent and reasonably smart.  But no one has a 
right to take part in the crime called government, including the 
parts people are playing right now, much less more active parts.

I think democracy evolved from standoffs in multi-way wars.  Wars
used to be won by body count, and at some point someone said,
"Okay, we'll compromise and make peace for now, but I'm still
keeping track of who's on my side, just so you don't get out of
line."  Voting is a way of predicting who would win a war.

Which is nicer than real war, and all respect and rights are
ultimately based on what other people can do, but there's nothing
inherently right about democracy, and it keeps people
in a sort of tense standoff, unable to trust each other.

Nothing in democracy itself lets the sides make agreements and 
structurally keeps them from changing their minds the next day.
Cumbersome, procedure-bound setups like we have actually allow
those sorts of things somewhat, but not in an up-front and
reliable way.  Democracy doesn't hold individual voters responsible 
for the effects and costs of their votes.  Even in our 
"unresponsive" democracy there's little reason for the statistical
will of the people not to be flighty and untrustworthy.

Technology can help somewhat in replacing the systems we have
with better systems.  Better would be anarchic.  To me, anarchy 
means shifting from overarching systems for regulating and taking 
care of people, to ways for people to take care of their own 
interests.  Democracy sounds like the latter, but instead of
taking care of your own life, you have a sort of metaphorical 
surrogate--a minute influence on what happens to everybody.

As usual, I would have stopped, but I thought some things I hadn't
before.

I'll post the body of this to AltInst and then shut up about it
on this list.

-fnerd
quote me




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: szabo@netcom.com (Nick Szabo)
Date: Thu, 12 Aug 93 21:58:18 PDT
To: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Subject: Re: Spooking of neural nets and image recognition...
In-Reply-To: <9308130311.AA11786@netcom.netcom.com>
Message-ID: <9308130458.AA13627@netcom4.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Here are some general ideas for "encrypting" one's image:

Ear muffs, long hair, etc. 
	(Tim May mentioned ears are good for recognition)
Makeup variety
Beard variety (mustache, full beard, beatnik, sideburns, etc.)
False scars, moles, etc.
Variety of hats & eyeglasses
Realistic looking masks 
	(available from film or theatre prop/makeup companies?)
Gloves (if they start looking at hands, unique jewelry, etc.)
Scarves

Anything too obvious (ski mask, sunglasses at night, the masks
used for the "Wired" cover, etc.) might trigger smart algorithms to 
red-flag the image.  As usual these techniques are popularly reputed 
to be the special province of criminals.  Only a criminal would want 
to avoid giving the world a dossier on where they shop, travel, withdraw 
money, etc. right?

Alas, that may be right: I suspect only smart criminals and
secret agents will go to the expense of doing this stuff; innocent 
trusting citizens will be the ones building their dossiers for
the Security of the State.

Nick Szabo				szabo@netcom.com




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Mike Rose <mrose@stsci.edu>
Date: Thu, 12 Aug 93 19:02:55 PDT
To: szabo@netcom.com
Subject: Re: Spooking of neural nets and image recognition...
In-Reply-To: <9308130102.AA22344@netcom4.netcom.com>
Message-ID: <9308130201.AA15462@MARIAN.STSCI.EDU>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


On Thu, 12 Aug 93 18:02:06 PDT, szabo@netcom.com (Nick Szabo) said:

>Are the pictures taken by ATMs good enough for automated
>recognition?
>Nick Szabo				szabo@netcom.com

Do atm's usually have real cameras?  I always figured most of them
were fakes.

Mike




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: smb@research.att.com
Date: Thu, 12 Aug 93 19:08:16 PDT
To: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Subject: Re: CA online legislative database access
Message-ID: <9308130205.AA04602@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


	 Lance Dettweiler writes:

	 > cypherfolks, do you have any idea what these efforts are the faint
	 > glimmers of? Imagine a future society where *anyone* can propose law
	s,
	 > not just the elite few called Legislators and identified in an

	 Actually, this is my worst nightmare of what this country could
	 become: a direct democracy of the most populist sort.

Agreed.  Let me put the issue in technical terms:  you want a government
with hysteresis.  Call hysteresis the antidote to hysteria.

The concept, if not the word, was well known to Jefferson et al.
In fact, that was the reason that Senators serve six-year terms, and
are elected at staggered intervals.  

Why?  Well, there was an Op-Ed column in the NY Times recently that
explained it quite well -- the instantaneous reaction of the public
to certain kinds of events (like shooting up Iraqi missle batteries,
or starting a war) is quite noticeable.  Was George Bush really doing
a much better job the day after Desert Storm started than the day before?
A substantial portion of the American people seemed to think so.

No, I'll pass.  Our current system of government is far from perfect.
But a switch to direct democracy (the technical term for what you Lance
Dettweiler proposes) is not the answer.  (Want more evidence -- look
at the effects of the referendum and initiative process, especially
in California.  While it can -- and has -- acted as a check on government,
a vast number of propositions have been passed that reflect either
well-financed advertising campaigns or a desire to decree magic.)


		--Steve Bellovin




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: hfinney@shell.portal.com
Date: Thu, 12 Aug 93 22:18:18 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Making the World Safe for Steganography
Message-ID: <9308130514.AA26082@jobe.shell.portal.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I agree with Tim's suggestion that it would be good if steganography
and cryptography tools were widely available, especially in light of
the government's obvious hostility towards cryptography.

But I can't agree that these tools will be sufficient to bring about
Tim's concept of "crypto anarchy", of "libertaria in cyberspace".  If
we really want to achieve these goals I think it will be necessary to
take political action.  Technology alone will not be enough.

After all, even today techniques exist which would in principle allow
a digital cash system to develop.  Yet no such system exists.  There
needs to be an infrastructure, a network of bankers, sellers, users, and
other participants.  All this will take time to develop even in the best
of cases.

But if the government is actively fighting such technology, I don't
see how Tim's proposed subterfuges with DAT's and CD's are going to be
enough to overcome this additional barrier.  Without the ability to
publically negotiate the tricky issues of standards and contracts, I
don't see how a financial infrastructure of the sophistication needed
for digital cash could arise.

As another example, suppose the government banned non-Clipper cryptography.
Despite the brave comments of some, I think it would be very hard
to overcome such a ban.  Look at the problems PGP has had, faced merely
with the relatively weak threat of patent suits (patents which have not,
to my knowledge, been tested in court).  PGP is constantly being taken off
FTP sites based just on letters from the patent holders.  Even Tim himself
suggested some time back that Cypherpunks should rethink support for PGP
given the patent situation.  Imagine how much worse it would be if the
government actually could put people in jail for using PGP.

My main point is that we cannot rely on the technology to save us.  A
concerted government effort could, in my opinion, stifle the growth of
individual liberties that cryptography may offer.  Clipper is just one
battle in this longer war.  We can't afford to fall victim to a smug
confidence that victory will inevitably be ours.  If we get to the point
that steganography is the only way to communicate privately, we will have
lost.

Hal Finney
hfinney@shell.portal.com




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Marc Horowitz <marc@Athena.MIT.EDU>
Date: Thu, 12 Aug 93 19:38:17 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: ANONYMOUS CONTACT SERVICE
In-Reply-To: <9308130016.AA15644@anon.penet.fi>
Message-ID: <9308130236.AA02668@hodge>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>> >Again, I'd like to find out who it is, have them removed, and have my
>> >new penet id cancelled.  After all, this person now has email from me,
>> >with my penet id on it, with my name signed at the bottom.  If I
>> >decide to use the penet remailer in the future, I don't want this
>> >person to have a binding between my penet id and my real name.
>> >
>> >               Marc
>> 
>> If you'd set a password you'd have no problem. If you got a bounce,
>> you're OK.

I *never* had a penet account.  I sent mail to cypherpunks, and I was
magically allocated an ID.  When was I supposed to set my password?

BTW, this has happened for both accounts I use regularly, immediately
after I sent mail to the lists from those accounts.  The two
occurrences were days apart.

I think the only solution for this problem is to make id allocation
*not* be automatic.  I should have to explicitly request an id to send
through the remailer.

		Marc




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Date: Thu, 12 Aug 93 22:38:40 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: ATM AND IMAGE RECONGITION
In-Reply-To: <930813041951_72114.1712_FHF23-1@CompuServe.COM>
Message-ID: <9308130539.AA26767@netcom5.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Sandy Sandfort writes:

> Not quite true.  One very good privacy technique is to use an ATM
> or credit card issued to someone else.  How can this be done?
> Well, a friend (preferably a visiting foreigner) could do it for
> you.  Or you could hire a bum (pardon; "hygienically challenged
> person") to do the honors.  At any rate, you wouldn't want to get
> busted by an image recognizing ATM, now would you?

OK, you got me here. I wasn't thinking of cases where you might want
to deceive your own bank!

By the way, the folks you referred to as bums no longer like to be
called the "hygienically challenged." Now in vogue is "differently
odored."

Only a few days ago in sci.astro I had to correct someone who was
using the unacceptable term "brown dwarf." My Politically Correct
Online Dictionary automatically corrected that to the more sensitive
term "differently-sized star of color."

(To non-U.S. residents to whom this joke may be puzzling, "cripples"
became "handicapped," then "disabled," then "physically challenged,"
and are now, last time I heard, to be called "differently abled.")

The only real Cypherpunks links are the general political aspects and
the very important issue that in cyherspace we'll be able to be as
politically incorrect and oafish as we wish. The anonyomous remailers
are just the start. Of course, the easily offended will also have the
easy option of tuning out speech they don't want to hear.

I'll take the "technology of disconnection" (Kevin Kelly, "Whole Earth
Review") over "electronic democracy" any day.

-Tim

-- 
..........................................................................
Timothy C. May         | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,  
tcmay@netcom.com       | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
408-688-5409           | knowledge, reputations, information markets, 
W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA  | black markets, collapse of governments.
Higher Power: 2^756839 | Public Key: PGP and MailSafe available.
Note: I put time and money into writing this posting. I hope you enjoy it.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: fergp@sytex.com (Paul Ferguson)
Date: Thu, 12 Aug 93 21:22:55 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Today's Quotable Notes
Message-ID: <6Da88B1w165w@sytex.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Today's "Notable quote" -
 
"... I have to say up front I don't speak for the CIA and this
is just me.  I can tell you I did my doctoral work studying
Soviet-East European personal computing.  I have seen export
controls and all that close at hand, and actually kicked the
tires and things and all that.  I can say I agreed nearly
100% with what Mr. Diffie said, up until he said something
that surprised me, in that this room didn't shout it down.
That was when he said information is less dangerous than
physical things.  Good God! If you believe that, I'll give
you a choice.  I can go to your school district and give out
one hit of PCP, or I can cover the area with instructions on
how to make it.  All I'd ask you to keep in mind is to have
some sympathy for the foreign policy-niks who know that, in a
sort of frustrated air, when it's hard to move information
around, it's unlikely that someone can even get an atomic
bomb plan, despite the fact that we've got tens of thousands
in both the former Soviet Union and in the United States.
But I would fear someone giving out the Princeton
dissertation and broadcasting it over the nets to all and
sundry in that form -- now, given plutonium, we can make a
bomb.  So, information is a dangerous thing, in the right
hands.  I think we're all selling ourselves short if we think
information is an unempowered commodity.
 
All that said, I have to agree with everything else.
Cryptography is not magic, it's math, and DES is not only
here, it's on a server in Helsinki, so we have to live with
the fact that information moves around.  We may want to be
sympathetic to the fact that there are people, in fact people
without the tools that we all have here, trying to enact the
current and past foreign policy.  Help educate them, help
tell them why these things are happening, but realize that
we're disrupting a lot of things real fast."
 
-- Ross Stapleton, Central Intelligence Agency
 
  "WHO HOLDS THE KEYS?"
     Friday, March 20, 1992
 
     Chair: Dorothy Denning, Georgetown University
 
     Panel: Jim Bidzos, RSA Data Security
            David Bellin, Pratt Institute
            John Gilmore, Cygnus Support
            Whitfield Diffie, SunSoft, Inc.
            John Perry Barlow, Electronic Frontier Foundation

Paul Ferguson               |  "Government, even in its best state,
Network Integrator          |   is but a necessary evil; in its worst
Centreville, Virginia USA   |   state, an intolerable one."
fergp@sytex.com             |      - Thomas Paine, Common Sense
 
Type bits/keyID   Date       User ID
pub  1024/1CC04D 1993/03/15  Paul Ferguson <fergp@sytex.com>
  Key fingerprint =  EE D2 93 7D 04 6D C6 05  AC 36 AD 9D 8E 4F 41 58




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: andrew m. boardman <amb@cs.columbia.edu>
Date: Thu, 12 Aug 93 20:38:17 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Spooking of neural nets and image recognition...
In-Reply-To: <9308130311.AA11786@netcom.netcom.com>
Message-ID: <199308130333.AA17414@ground.cs.columbia.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


   A much more serious situation will arise when convenience stores, gas
   stations, and the like adopt the same camera systems--maybe they already
   are--and begin to compile customer dossiers, purchasing preferences, etc.

Insofar as monitoring passage of people, I noted a few hours ago a new
installation of cameras at the tollbooths on the George Washington
Bridge, positioned to be under a meter from people's faces when they stop
to fork over their $4.00.  The police density at this toll plaza makes
additional surveillance of would-be toll booth robbers unnecessary; while
traffic analysis on the matching of facial patterns is probably out of
their scope right now, it *is* a precedent, and food for thought...

(Cameras in concenience stores, BTW, are entirely normal around here.
FYI, the George Washington Bridge carries much, probably most, of the
traffic into Manhattan and New York City...)

andrew m. boardman
amb@cs.columbia.edu




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Date: Thu, 12 Aug 93 23:58:19 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Cypherpunks, Politics, and Deployment
In-Reply-To: <9308130514.AA26082@jobe.shell.portal.com>
Message-ID: <9308130655.AA05100@netcom5.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Cypherpunks, Politics, and Deployment


I'll begin by addressing Hal's points about my latest comments on
steganography, move on to some comments about the niche that
Cypherpunks occupy contrasted with those occupied by such political
action groups as the EFF and CPSR, and close by mentioning some
exciting possible developments in using digital money and crypto
methods for developing actual, legal banks and for moving data packets
around in a new kind of network (called "Digital Silk Road" by its
inventors).

This to show my version of Eric's "Cypherpunks write code" (even if
some of us mostly just write words!).


Hal Finney writes:

> I agree with Tim's suggestion that it would be good if steganography
> and cryptography tools were widely available, especially in light of
> the government's obvious hostility towards cryptography.
> 
> But I can't agree that these tools will be sufficient to bring about
> Tim's concept of "crypto anarchy", of "libertaria in cyberspace".  If
> we really want to achieve these goals I think it will be necessary to
> take political action.  Technology alone will not be enough.

Oh, I agree with you! I've never believed it will be easy, or will
happen naturally, or will even happen as I, and others, think it may.
The real future will have a lot of surprises in store for us. But we
can speculate, help to flesh out visions, and look at possibilities.
Orwell did this with "1984," Vinge did it with "True Names," and
Stephenson did it recently with "Snow Crash," to name just a few of
the "futurology" novels that have influenced some of us a lot.

> After all, even today techniques exist which would in principle allow
> a digital cash system to develop.  Yet no such system exists.  There
> needs to be an infrastructure, a network of bankers, sellers, users, and
> other participants.  All this will take time to develop even in the best
> of cases.

Agreed, and how it develops may surprise us. Maybe movie rentals will
be the first use, because of the politically correct issue of rental
privacy. Maybe toll roads in Europe will use digital money, as Chaum
has been negotiating for.

Implementing digital money deep inside the world of software and data
may be even more promising. Smart objects, agoric payment for storage,
for security, and for transmission, may be some early areas of
application, as the last section of this posting will report. And this
area will not require much political action at all...in fact, it's
probably best that we simply avoid telling the bureaucrats what's
going on at all. Present them with a fait accompli, as we (the
"technological we") did with personal computers, Xerox machines, VCRs,
and even the Internet itself.

> But if the government is actively fighting such technology, I don't
> see how Tim's proposed subterfuges with DAT's and CD's are going to be
> enough to overcome this additional barrier.  Without the ability to

The steganography stuff is truly minor compared to other stuff. Please
don't let my one big post on this ("Making the World Safe..."), or the
quotes by Kelly about me holding up a DAT tape, lead you to believe I
think this is central. For the articles in "WER" and the "Village
Voice" it just made for a good, easily understandable image of the
point that bits are essentially uncontrollable, that if the Soviets
couldn't stop samizdats, then the governments of the West are surely
not going to be able to halt bits at the border, or control what bits
are on the screens of millions of computers.

> My main point is that we cannot rely on the technology to save us.  A
> concerted government effort could, in my opinion, stifle the growth of
> individual liberties that cryptography may offer.  Clipper is just one
> battle in this longer war.  We can't afford to fall victim to a smug
> confidence that victory will inevitably be ours.  If we get to the point
> that steganography is the only way to communicate privately, we will have
> lost.

Well said, Hal. Certainly political activism is important. But so is
demonstration of actual technological paths. The political side has
been fairly well-covered, with EFF, CPSR, the ACLU, and other groups
fighing various battles (and missing others, or even taking the
"wrong" side on some issues...but such is life). 

The niche I think our group fills (and many members of EFF, CPSR, the
ACLU, and such, are in our group, too) is that of being a group that
is actually playing around with these various technologies. There are
groups of amateur cryptanalysts, of which we do very little or none,
and there are groups of ham radio enthusiasts, and so on. These groups
are similar to us in some respects, except that none of them are
investigating the same set of things we are. Who else is attempting to
actually _implement_ the ideas we are, at least as an entire set? (I'm
not suggesting we Cypherpunks take the credit for PGP, which was
already out (in Version 2.0, no less) just as our first meeting was
happening, nor can we claim to have invented anonymous remailers, as
Julf, Kleinpaste, and others were already doing this--and Chaum wrote
his "mix" paper in 1981. But we were and are "involved" in various
ways, as Hal himself was/is so prominently.)

No other group, so far as I know, has the same self-chosen charter we
have, to build and deploy systems involving "modern" cryptology in all
its many forms and to develop workable approaches to using these
technologies--public key crypto, digital money, dining cryptographers
nets, anonymous remailers, reputation markets, digital escrow
services, data havens, etc.--in new ways.

My point is that Cypherpunks fill an important ecological niche, that
the lawyers and political activists cannot completely fill themselves.
Nor do their interests lie in this area.

We complement each other.

And let me give fair warning: I don't think digital money and "crypto
anarchy" will ever happen in this country via the political process.
Rather, it'll happen through surprising, sudden shifts in the way
people do business, such as the way the Internet developed without
real legislative sanction (I'll grant it was never completely ignored,
and was subject to some kinds of laws. But mostly it just grew. This
is certainly not to say digital money will grow in an analogous way.
But anonymous reputation markets might, for example. Or offshore data
havens. Unless and until international phone lines are cut, it's hard
to imagine any law stopping such things. An outright ban on
non-Clipjacked encryption would of course be a major obstacle. Hence
the need to fight that with every weapon at our disposal.)

In any case, I personally am lousy as a political organizer and have
no interest in this. Personally speaking, to repeat. For those who do
have the skills, great!

Let me also remind readers that one mostly "political" achievement was
the creation of the alt.whistleblowers group. Though time will tell
whether this really changes things or not, it has the potential to.
This is just one example.

Let me close by citing some interesting developments which have not
gotten much discussion here on the main list. While the
"CryptoStacker" debate was raging a while back on the List, other
developments were continuing.

At the last Cypherpunks meeting, there was an excellent discussion of
how to to use existing laws to set up a form of bank that would do
business with digital money and that could use various crypto
techniques to enhance its business. (I expect this is a cryptic enough
summary!) I won't comment further, as the originator and developers
can comment on what they feel can be said on a public list. (They
spoke at the meeting without getting Nondisclosure Agreements, and the
Cypherpunks meetings are explicitly public, but it's still best if I
let the developers themselves do the talking.)

At the same meeting, Dean Tribble and Norm Hardy described their work
on "Digital Silk Road," a system for paying for packet transmissions
using digital money. (Their documents are available in the ftp site
netcom/pub/joule in PostScript, RTF, and text formats.) 

This proposed system uses digital money and yet would require almost
no legislative approval (I can't see how _any_ legal approval would be
needed initially, though when real transactions get big enough, the
Tax Man and his FTC/FCC brothers may stick their noses in). This
system could revolutionize the way packets of data are moved around
and could be the fait accompli I cited earlier.  If this succeeds
(long odds of course against any specific idea hitting big), then this
could introduce digital money and "Cypherpunks-style" ideas
ubiquitously and uncontrollably.

These developments could shape the future of cyberspace significantly.

Cypherpunks, we are making progress slowly but surely.


-Tim May

-- 
..........................................................................
Timothy C. May         | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,  
tcmay@netcom.com       | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
408-688-5409           | knowledge, reputations, information markets, 
W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA  | black markets, collapse of governments.
Higher Power: 2^756839 | Public Key: PGP and MailSafe available.
Note: I put time and money into writing this posting. I hope you enjoy it.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: an26436@anon.penet.fi
Date: Thu, 12 Aug 93 17:18:16 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: ANONYMOUS CONTACT SERVICE
Message-ID: <9308130016.AA15644@anon.penet.fi>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



At  6:44 PM 8/11/93 -0700, Warren Keith Russell wrote:

>I received a message from System Daemon telling me that I had sent a
>message using the anonymous contact service, allocating a code name, and
>explaining how I can be reached anonymously.
>
>What does this mean?  Sounds great, but I have no idea how I managed to
>send such a message!

Probably means someone sent a message to cypherpunks@toad.com using that
service. The service then allocated an id to cypherpunks@toad.com and sent
it mail. 

At  9:08 AM 8/12/93 -0700, hfinney@shell.portal.com wrote:
>
>A few months ago, someone subscribed to the list through the Penet service,
>and it ended up revealing the Penet aliases of everyone who posted.  Each
>post was delivered to that subscriber marked as being from the Penet alias
>corresponding to the poster.  All it took was a parallel non-Penet subscription
>to break the anonymity provided by Penet.
>
>Has this now happened again?
>
>At the time, there was some discussion about using "an..." versus "na..."
>forms of the Penet aliases, one of which would avoid this revelation.  Has
>that been taken care of?

Now the service requires a password, so we're safe (I hope). Stuff sent by
an  unsuspecting user through the list to penet will cause a bounce at
penet saying something like 'are you new? set your password.' However, the
way Julf set up the password setting/using is not totally secure. There is
an option where you can set no password which an attacker would find
useful. It wouldn't work for a mass disclosure though. The attacker would
have to pick and impersonate each of his targets, and unless the attacker
can intercept his victims' mail they will get stuff from penet giving them
a clue that something's amiss.

I suppose this is a worthy topic for this list: How do you have anonymity
that allows replies and psuedonyms that can't be hacked by impersonation? 

One cheap way would be to not automatically include the poster's pseudonym
in the recipient's copy - have it be totally anonymous like the cypherpunks
remailers. Pseudonyms would be only for replies/return addresses. 

Actually, Julf's solution isn't too bad. Having your password in plain text
on its way to the remailer is insecure, but Julf's remailer doesn't allow
encryption, so you're vulnerable to a truly determined attack anyhow.

Maybe Julf needs to bite the bullet and start using PGP.

>
>Again, I'd like to find out who it is, have them removed, and have my
>new penet id cancelled.  After all, this person now has email from me,
>with my penet id on it, with my name signed at the bottom.  If I
>decide to use the penet remailer in the future, I don't want this
>person to have a binding between my penet id and my real name.
>
>               MArc

If you'd set a password you'd have no problem. If you got a bounce, you're OK.

-------------------------------------------------------------------------
To find out more about the anon service, send mail to help@anon.penet.fi.
Due to the double-blind, any mail replies to this message will be anonymized,
and an anonymous id will be allocated automatically. You have been warned.
Please report any problems, inappropriate use etc. to admin@anon.penet.fi.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Sandy <72114.1712@CompuServe.COM>
Date: Thu, 12 Aug 93 21:23:40 PDT
To: <cypherpunks@toad.com>
Subject: ATM AND IMAGE RECONGITION
Message-ID: <930813041951_72114.1712_FHF23-1@CompuServe.COM>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
  SANDY SANDFORT               Reply to:  ssandfort@attmail.com
 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Just a minor quibble to Tim May's otherwise excellent post on ATM
cameras and image recognition.  Tim said:

    Comment: The case of banks having cameras doesn't bother
    me much at all, as the bank already knows exactly who
    its customers are. That is, the surveillance is not used
    to gather any information the bank does not already have
    immediate and complete access to.

Not quite true.  One very good privacy technique is to use an ATM
or credit card issued to someone else.  How can this be done?
Well, a friend (preferably a visiting foreigner) could do it for
you.  Or you could hire a bum (pardon; "hygienically challenged
person") to do the honors.  At any rate, you wouldn't want to get
busted by an image recognizing ATM, now would you?

 S a n d y

         "Privacy Consultation and Services since 1978"
             (Sorry Duncan, got you beat by a mile)

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: szabo@netcom.com (Nick Szabo)
Date: Fri, 13 Aug 93 00:58:20 PDT
To: ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu (L. Detweiler)
Subject: Re: Electracy: Evil Revisited
In-Reply-To: <9308130703.AA01369@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Message-ID: <9308130756.AA00697@netcom4.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



While I'm dubious about the trend towards E.D. with our current
physically-bounded, coercive governments, I'm quite interested 
in this proposal which seems to (embedded within the hoopla :-) 
be for starting an E.D. system outside the boundaries of normal 
government, a virtual area of what Extropians call "Privately Practiced
Law" (PPL) within the anarchy of the Internet.  

The Extropian list (extropians-request@gnu.ai.mit.edu)
has been experimenting with a kind of mini-totalitarian 
justice system for a while, and we are now experimenting with
the Hawthorne Exchange reputation market.  Both experiments
have revealed much room for improvement, but they are
valuable as tentative first steps towards virtual
PPLs, an important part of the cypherpunks vision.

It would be quite interesting to set up an E.D.-based PPL,
with both public reputation-based and anonymous voting.
Especially interesting, but seemingly difficult, would be 
mechanisms for evauluating the consequences of specific laws 
being enacted, so those benefits or penalties could be fed back and 
added/deducted from accounts of those who voted for for/against
the law.  Quite interesting!  I look forward to more specifics, 
perhaps I'll think of some myself.

Nick Szabo				szabo@netcom.com




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "L. Detweiler" <ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Date: Fri, 13 Aug 93 00:08:19 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Electracy: Evil Revisited
Message-ID: <9308130703.AA01369@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Buried in my latest delirious rant were multiple *pragmatic*
descriptions of Electronic Democracy, and to my great chagrin all have
been virtually completely ignored, save one thoughtful soul responding
to me in email, who I've exhorted to post to the list. Where is the
picking apart of the pieces? I expected the highly suggestive details
to be pounced on like scrumptious food for further thought or (more
likely) carrion for vultures, but instead get the standard vague
marshmallow-philosophical Libertarian and Anarchic Promotional Literature.

I'm really quite amazed at all the deathly pessimism and antipathy
herein toward genuinely improving our governmental system. It seems
that many believe that the natural state of `their' government is
oppression, and that the goal is only to minimize it. The perverted
Majority is fundamentally and invariably Untrustworthy, Capricious, and
Painfully Stupid.  It is always stated in terms of Us and They. But
*we* *are* our government. How can it not be more obvious? What does it
say about our character if we are resigned to deprivation?

As I've already stated, the future will hold many developments that
will gradually shift opinion, and give working models that won't be
subject to immediate ridicule and vague philosophical ramblings about
Inherent Evil. It seems everyone here is interested in debating the
issue in terms of how they see government, how it has functioned in the
past, *irrespective* of any novel mechanisms presented (which I took
great pains to put on the table, to specifically address virtually all
objections, with the same dramatic effect of shouting at a chasm).

I've written about this in the past, and will write about it in the
future, but for now I'm going to focus on a comment by N. Szabo
<szabo@netcom.com>, to elaborate on an earlier item everyone conveniently ignores:

[electronic democracy (electrocracy? electracy?)]
>* A basic problem with E.D. is that nobody has an
>incentive to vote correctly.  People's political opinions
>can be as stupid and wrong as can be and it won't have any
>negative impact on their own lives, or at least none that 
>is disproportionate or easily recognized to be a result decisions
>based on that opinion.  Other people might have great opinions, which 
>if implemented would solve world hunger, clean up the environment, 
>grow the economy, etc. etc.  but there is no special benefit to these 
>people for having done their altruistic homework and arrived at effective 
>solutions to these problems.

Here are some ideas that my lone anonymous respondent picked up on, but
that I've been taking as obvious and given, perhaps because I've
thought about it for a long time, and overestimated the imagination of
the reader (quite unexpected in this crowd).  To make this more
specific and tangible, consider a system where people can choose to
vote non-anonymously (choosing to vote anonymously is of course always
permitted). Now suppose that a `vote' is not something static but
rather a pledge of support for a proposal that can vary over time. That
is, one can revoke or increase support of a proposal over its entire
lifetime, not at an instantaneous blip in a curtained booth. 

Further, imagine that people can propose different categories for bills
such as National, Local, Environmental, Law Enforcement, Infrastructure
Maintenance, National Information Infrastructure, Unemployed
Programmers, etc. ad infinitum ad nauseam. When a bill is created the
creator suggests the category. Categories are created and deleted by
anyone. Others can propose the same bill in a different category if
they think it merits it. People can refuse to vote on bills or against
them based on the classification.

Now imagine that everone has Status or Credit associated with their
votes in any category. Under certain circumstances, with a certain
amount of global support or combination of support based on tabulation
of votes and the status (weight) associated with each, a bill becomes
Law. The requirements for a bill to become National Law are themselves
subject to modification but of course eventually stabilize (a bill to
modify the current voting system itself can be introduced under the
system). However, a whole set of different characteristics can be
associated with bills that become Laws in each category (again subject
to modification), and many less `formal' laws can be passed with less
constriction in smaller spheres. When a new category is proposed under
the system itself, the presenter also indicates that `status formula'
associated with it.

The status or `credit' is such that it can be impacted in various ways.
If one consistently voted for bills in a category who declined in
support, one's status in that realm would be diminished by intrinsic
mechanisms (remember, a `vote' is dynamic and can change over time
based on the owner's `maintenance'). Note that this can be done even
with an anonymous voting record by an automated but concealed system. 
Also, there might be a way that people can trade their status to others
whom they admire or respect in that category, based on past experience
or their non-anonymous voting record. The status of people might become
closely associated with not just their proposals of bills but their
successful *real* implementation of them.  Under this system, the
status becomes very much like a currency system! The `status' itself of
people may be advertised or hidden for further effect. (``How much is
he worth, anyway?'')

In fact, it is not really the case that this system sounds like today's
currency, it is the case that our monetary system is actually a very
small microcosm of this future Electronic Democracy. Look at all the
synonyms associated with money: Power. Status. Influence. Money is the
economy's built-in `voting mechanism'. It is an abstraction that, when
implemented, causes a competition for improvement and superiority, an
*incentive* for *evolution* and *success*. Similarly, under the new
system sensible classifications, status formulas, and bills will
prosper and persist, while nonsensical, inferior, and obsolete ones will die out.

These ideas are all very cypherpunkesque in their allusions to digital
cash, reputations, social upheaval, `anarchy' in the sense of a
government so unobtrusive and natural it is virtually invisible yet
omnipresent (sort of like God, eh? ah, well, a good role model.)

I call on patriotic and guerilla cypherpunks to implement this system,
to be a model for the world! all the critical features of technology
are already in place -- methods of providing universal communication
called `email', guaranteeing accurate voting via authenication called
PGP, a widespead `proposal dissemination and discussion system' called
Usenet, a library for past proposals and bills and resolutions called
FTP.  I guarantee that by *far* this will be the most important of all
cypherpunk projects, if in the amazing odds it were actually adopted by
one (considering the recent formidably frosty reception, currently all
that is left of my attempt at a burgeoning snowball is a Dissolving Drip in Hell).

In fact, the sheer dischordant cacophony on this group might be
ameliorated through such a system. Imagine that we as a group (the most
disorderly and uncooperative group ever to be called one) could vote
and stabilize Cypherpunk Resolutions.

(Nah -- some things are just fundamentally impossible.)




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: karn@qualcomm.com (Phil Karn)
Date: Fri, 13 Aug 93 01:08:26 PDT
To: jonb@isltd.insignia.com
Subject: [uk.transport] Speed Camera with OCR
In-Reply-To: <3877.9308130728@panacea.insignia.co.uk>
Message-ID: <9308130806.AA17560@servo>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Speaking of dummy speed traps, there's a great one on the road to
Aspen, Colorado (don't remember offhand the town name or the route, but
it's east of Aspen on the only road there).

Driving toward Aspen on a two lane road, we suddenly saw the classic
small-town speed trap: a cruiser parked off the other side of the
road, facing us with a radar gun pointed out the window and a cop in
the front seat.

Only as we went by did it become obvious (to me at least) that it was
a fake!  I stopped and went back with my camera to get a closer look.
The car was just an empty shell that had been rescued from the
junkyard, and the dummy in the front seat wasn't exactly up to Disney
AudioAnimatronics standards, if you know what I mean. But seen from a
distance in a moving car, it had the desired effect...

Don't forget low-tech! Of course, for those towns more interested in
collecting money than in getting people to slow down, this particular
approach may not appeal to them.

Phil




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: szabo@netcom.com (Nick Szabo)
Date: Fri, 13 Aug 93 01:08:20 PDT
To: jonb@isltd.insignia.com (jon barber)
Subject: Re: [uk.transport] Speed Camera with OCR
In-Reply-To: <3877.9308130728@panacea.insignia.co.uk>
Message-ID: <9308130806.AA01571@netcom4.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



They tried robot-photo speeding tickets in Pasadena, California a 
few years ago, but I understand the judge threw out all the 
challenged tickets and they discontinued the practice.  We might
see automatic tickets reincarnated a few years hence when the highway 
starts reading bar codes on our cars.  Then you'll get a ticket
if you arrive at your destination sooner than is deemed
proper!  Bar code forgery might become popular (and necessary
for those of us who don't want government dossiers of every trip
we make).

Nick Szabo				szabo@netcom.com




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "L. Detweiler" <ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Date: Fri, 13 Aug 93 00:22:56 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: NSA Requests Delay in CPSR Clipper Lawsuit
Message-ID: <9308130722.AA01574@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Tidbits: NSA has classified an `entire Federal program in substantial
part' surrounding Clipper. Also, CPSR filed similar suit over NSA
secrecy & classification of DES.

Note: This is a standard NSA tactic, evasion by delay. They don't
respond to FOIA requests in the legislated time frame (1-2 weeks) using
the same delay technique. Maybe if we send nasty email to the laywers
all will be well =)

===cut=here===

From: Dave Banisar <banisar@washofc.cpsr.org>
Organization: CPSR, Washington Office
 Subject: NSA Asks For One Year Delay in Clipper Case
 
  NSA Seeks Delay in Clipper Case
 
 
     The National Security Agency (NSA) has asked a federal court
for a one-year delay in a lawsuit challenging the secrecy of the
government's "Clipper Chip" encryption proposal.  The suit was
filed by Computer Professionals for Social Responsibility (CPSR)
on May 28 and seeks the disclosure of all information concerning
the controversial plan.
 
     In an affidavit submitted to the United States District Court
for the District of Columbia on August 9, NSA Director of Policy
Michael A. Smith states that
 
     NSA's search for records responsive to [CPSR's] request
     is under way, but is not yet complete.  Because the
     Clipper Chip program is a significant one involving the
     participation of organizations in four of NSA's five
     Directorates and the Director's staff, the volume of
     responsive documents is likely to be quite large.
     Moreover, because the Clipper Chip program is highly
     complex and technical and is, in substantial part,
     classified for national security purposes, the review
     process cannot be accomplished quickly.
 
     CPSR called for the disclosure of all relevant information
and full public debate on the proposal on April 16, the day it was
announced.  While NSA has insisted from the outset that the
"Skipjack" encryption algorithm, which underlies the Clipper
proposal, must remain secret, the Smith affidavit contains the
first suggestion that the entire federal program is classified "in
substantial part."  In the interest of obtaining timely judicial
review of the agency's broad classification claim, CPSR intends to
oppose NSA's request for delay in the court proceedings.
 
     In another case involving government cryptography policy,
CPSR has challenged NSA's classification of information concerning
the development of the Digital Signature Standard (DSS).  The
court is currently considering the issue and a decision is
expected soon.
 
     CPSR is a national public-interest alliance of computer
industry professionals dedicated to examining the impact of
technology on society.  CPSR has 21 chapters in the U.S. and
maintains offices in Palo Alto, California, and Washington, DC.
For additional information on CPSR, call (415) 322-3778 or
e-mail <cpsr@cpsr.org>.





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: M..Stirner@f0.n0.z1.FIDONET.ORG (M. Stirner)
Date: Fri, 13 Aug 93 04:48:24 PDT
To: Cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: anonymous contact ser
Message-ID: <1791.2C6B7915@shelter.FIDONET.ORG>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


 -=> Quoting Uucp to All <=-

 Uu> Apologies for replying on the list....

That's OK with me.  This probably answers some questions for a few
others, too.

 Uu> Here's why. I can't reply directly to your message, as some gateway on
 Uu> the way barfs on the ".." in your name. This seems to come and go.
 Uu> This is probably also what screws up anon.penet.fi.

This is extremely interesting!  This "problem" was supposedly fixed some
time ago, but this is why I have alternate accounts elsewhere with more
common names.   In any event, I will pass this information along to the
proper persons.

 > repl: bad addresses:
 >       "M. Stirner" <M..Stirner@f0.n0.z1.fidonet.org> -- no mailbox in
 > local-part (.)

This is yet another problem that was supposedly repaired - it should
read m..stirner@f28.n125.z1.fidonet.org, but a curious glitch in the BBS
reply software that handles conversions of mailings to conferences &
automatic routing of replies periodically enters all zeroes in the "f" &
"n" fields.  I will pass this along, also.

 Uu> Another problem is that your address keeps changing. Thus you have
 Uu> several ID's on anon.penet.fi, some with passwords, some without. Your
 Uu> message was from m..stirner@f0.n0.z1.fidonet.org, but in your sinature
 Uu> you claim you are also m..stirner@f28.n125.z1.fidonet.org (or
 Uu> ...!uunet!kumr!shelter!0!0!M..Stirner).

Yes, the zeros are wrong & were inserted by software out of my control.
I also have different addresses, true enough, but there is no f0.n0.z1
in fido; that address is a software error.  I suspect it'll be on this
message, too.

STILL....the problem I have is not addressed:  I cannot make a
multi-line header (as in the required "X-Anon-Password: password" line)
work through this UUCP gate, as far as I can tell.  I have been
attempting to route my mail to the penet remailer via other cypherpunks
remailers with the syntax:

::
Request-Remailing-To: anon@anon.penet.fi
From: anXXXXXX@anon.penet.fi
X-Anon-Password: password
X-Anon-To: alt.foolishness

But I am not sure if the cypherpunk remailer's address conflicts with my
From: field or not - I _think_ it does.  If so, I cannot use password
header lines unless anon.penet.fi can handle having blank lines between
the header fields:

To: anon@anon.penet.fi

From: anXXXXX@anon.penet.fi

X-Anon-Password: password

X-Anon-To: alt.foolishness


The above header will pass the UUCP gate here.  Without the blank lines,
the header gets grunged after the To: anon@anon.penet.fi line.
.   Thank you for your personal attention to this vexing problem.
.   ~
.   M.

___ Blue Wave/QWK v2.12
--  
M. Stirner - via FidoNet node 1:125/1
UUCP: ...!uunet!kumr!shelter!0!0!M..Stirner
INTERNET: M..Stirner@f0.n0.z1.FIDONET.ORG




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Date: Fri, 13 Aug 93 01:32:56 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: T R A F F I C  C I T A T I O N
In-Reply-To: <9308130806.AA01571@netcom4.netcom.com>
Message-ID: <9308130831.AA12898@netcom5.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



> They tried robot-photo speeding tickets in Pasadena, California a 
> few years ago, but I understand the judge threw out all the 
> challenged tickets and they discontinued the practice.  We might
> see automatic tickets reincarnated a few years hence when the highway 
> starts reading bar codes on our cars.  Then you'll get a ticket
> if you arrive at your destination sooner than is deemed
> proper!  Bar code forgery might become popular (and necessary
> for those of us who don't want government dossiers of every trip
> we make).
> 
> Nick Szabo				szabo@netcom.com


T R A F F I C  C I T A T I O N

Distance travelled: 14.31 miles. 
Time elapsed: 13.86 minutes. 
Average speed: 61.95 MPH
Speed Limit: 55 MPH
Excess Speed: 6.95 MPH
Penalty: 6.95 x $50 = $347.50

This is your 8th speeding ticket in the past 23.17 months. Your
accumulated excess speed penalty is 81.03 MPH, resulting in an
additional $519 surcharge for abusing the National Health Care Plan
through dangerous driving. Your insurance rates have also been
automatically increased $125 per year for each ticket.

If you wish to contest this, pay the fee, pay a $425 court fee, and
bring your own evidence. We estimate your court date will be 7.23
years from now.

Have a nice day.








From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: kelly@netcom.com (Kelly Goen)
Date: Fri, 13 Aug 93 02:53:28 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Second Tier remailers ...
Message-ID: <9308130954.AA08659@netcom.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


 To All,
       The idea of second tier remailers may be MUCH more palatable to all to
run as they add more hops in the chain... as they dont introduce such a visible
liability to the operator they could possibly be a LOT easier to propagate
than first tier remailers. One additional facility neede is the ability
to recognize a signed and/or encrypted control message to update their
remailer maps from a periodic posting...maybe this last needs a lot of thought.
   cheers
   kelly
-- 




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Johan Helsingius <julf@penet.FI>
Date: Thu, 12 Aug 93 22:03:40 PDT
Subject: Re: Anonymous contact service
In-Reply-To: <1771.2C6AD490@shelter.FIDONET.ORG>
Message-ID: <9308130542.aa12829@penet.penet.FI>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Apologies for replying on the list....

> Something is way screwy with Penet lately.  I have found that I have had
> passwords required when I had no recollection of installing them.  On
> top of this, I am unable to use the password provision due to header
> grunging at the UUCP gate, in any case.
> .   I have requested to admin@anon.penet.fi that the accounts by number
> be deleted in order that I can start over with fresh accounts, & despite
> three requests, this has not been done.  Bloody annoying, but I suppose
> when we give Julf a big raise, _then_ I can start bitching, huh? 8-)

Here's why. I can't reply directly to your message, as some gateway on
the way barfs on the ".." in your name. This seems to come and go. This
is probably also what screws up anon.penet.fi.

> repl: bad addresses:
> 	"M. Stirner" <M..Stirner@f0.n0.z1.fidonet.org> -- no mailbox in
> local-part (.)

Another problem is that your address keeps changing. Thus you have
several ID's on anon.penet.fi, some with passwords, some without. Your
message was from m..stirner@f0.n0.z1.fidonet.org, but in your sinature
you claim you are also m..stirner@f28.n125.z1.fidonet.org (or
...!uunet!kumr!shelter!0!0!M..Stirner).

	Julf





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: A1 ray arachelian (library)  <rarachel@ishara.poly.edu>
Date: Fri, 13 Aug 93 07:52:58 PDT
To: szabo@netcom.com (Nick Szabo)
Subject: Beepers can also be used to track you down!
In-Reply-To: <9308130806.AA01571@netcom4.netcom.com>
Message-ID: <9308131050.AA28463@ishara.poly.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


While you're at it, don't forget to mention that beepers have a "ping" option
in them.  If you were a crook on the run, and you were stupid enough to not
have ditched your beeper you can easily be tracked down.

The beeper ping command can be used (supposedly) to track down stolen or lost
beepers.  The Ping itself also disables the beeper from that point on.

Basically, they'd send pings to your beeper throughout the city they expected
you in, then they'd find out which cell you were in.  After that, they can
use a small radar-like gun to actually find your beeper, also by pings.

There's probably a way to disable the transmitter in the beeper, but I
wouldn't want to mess with a device that tiny.

Right now, this is all fine and great, but what would happen when your company
pays for the beeper and decides to track you down and see if you actually did
have your beeper off when you said it was off so you wouldn't be bothered
at home???  I'd say that's a major privacy tresspass right there.

Of course there's always the "button" technology which basically tracks
down employees....





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: A1 ray arachelian (library)  <rarachel@ishara.poly.edu>
Date: Fri, 13 Aug 93 07:58:26 PDT
To: jonb@isltd.insignia.com (jon barber)
Subject: Re: [uk.transport] Speed Camera with OCR
In-Reply-To: <3877.9308130728@panacea.insignia.co.uk>
Message-ID: <9308131054.AA28483@ishara.poly.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> The Oxfordshire police force here in the UK have introduced speed  
> cameras.  The way they work is to use radar to check oncoming cars  
> speeds, and if its over the limit the camera takes a picture of the  
> cars number plate.  I guess a human back at police HQ has to do the  
> bit about reading the plate, and then a fixed fine is sent through  

There's a cure for this.  Get neon license plate lights instead.  This
will work at night at least.  Have you ever seen a car with them pass
you by?  It makes the license plate illuminated, but almost impossible
to see!  (Although, they might resort to IR cameras to take your
picture as well!)





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Jin S Choi <jsc@monolith.MIT.EDU>
Date: Fri, 13 Aug 93 04:22:57 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Home Banking Patent
Message-ID: <9308131120.AA06925@monolith.MIT.EDU>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



I'm surprised I haven't seen any discussion of this at all. Is anyone
else just a little surprised at this patent? I was using a home banking
system in the early 80s; when did this Online Resources & Communications
Corp. file for their patent?

Does anyone know where I can find more info on this patent? What it
covers, and so forth? Is anyone gearing up to fight this?






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: jon barber <jonb@isltd.insignia.com>
Date: Fri, 13 Aug 93 00:32:57 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: [uk.transport] Speed Camera with OCR
Message-ID: <3877.9308130728@panacea.insignia.co.uk>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


The Oxfordshire police force here in the UK have introduced speed  
cameras.  The way they work is to use radar to check oncoming cars  
speeds, and if its over the limit the camera takes a picture of the  
cars number plate.  I guess a human back at police HQ has to do the  
bit about reading the plate, and then a fixed fine is sent through  
the post.

They admit that there's a lot of dummy speed camera warning signs, as  
they only have 3 to cover the whole of the county.  What they do is  
move the cameras around every now and then.

Most regular motorists know where they are, as they're easy to see -  
big grey boxes in the middle of the road.  


Apparently ( I have no figures ) they've been a great success and  
police are amazed at how much speeding goes on ( I'm not ).

Jon.





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: peter honeyman <honey@citi.umich.edu>
Date: Fri, 13 Aug 93 05:58:25 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Secure voice software issues
Message-ID: <9308131255.AA23722@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> do not use error correction or compression.  (they will slow you down)

huh?!?  my file transfer times would *double* if i turned off v.42bis
(modem compression).  *that* would slow me down.  and you can't run
v.42bis without running the error handling protocol (v.42), for obvious
reasons.  what's more, v.42 gives an immediate 20% (or so) increase in
throughput, by eliminating start and stop bits.

arguably, i could (and should) be running compression in my slip or ppp
driver, but certainly it is false to say that v.42bis and v.42 slow me
down -- the opposite is true.

> and tcp does it's own error correction.  as for 160ms round trip times
> that is acceptable for slip.

i don't much care about round-trip times, as i use my slip line principally
for afs, which runs as a data stream.  round-trip delays are amortized over
file transfers.

phil karn's points about modem buffering interfering with type-of-service
queueing are the strongest condemnations of modern modems, in my view.
i wish someone would build a modem that recognized ip packet framing.

	peter




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: cme@ellisun.sw.stratus.com (Carl Ellison)
Date: Fri, 13 Aug 93 07:02:58 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: >Clipper trapdoor?
Message-ID: <9308131359.AA16791@ellisun.sw.stratus.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>Message-Id: <00541.2828009147.4718@washofc.cpsr.org>
>From: David Sobel <dsobel@washofc.cpsr.org>
>Date: Thu, 12 Aug 1993 14:01:54 EST    
>Subject: Re: >Clipper trapdoor? 


David,

You wrote:

>[...]  I think the question you raise is a critical one -- under what
>guidelines will the escrow agents determine the validity of an NSA
>request for the key without a FISA warrant?


If I were the NSA, I would *never* permit a key request to leave the
building at Ft. Meade.  The fact that it wanted a given key is, itself,
intelligence.

I am one person who believes that the gov't would never be able to
establish a key escrow agency secure enough even for my customers (Stratus
customers: already extra-careful purchasers of high priced fault tolerant
equipment: banks, large funds transfer people, stock brokers, hospitals,
...).  It's too cheap for organized crime to bribe or break in at the
escrow agencies.  Therefore, I'm on record as a commercial crypto
consultant recommending against any customer of ours using any escrowed-key
mechanism, no matter how strong the algorithm or how trustworthy the
key generation process.

If the agency is too flaky for me, they're bound to be too flaky to be
trusted with a paper trail of NSA's eavesdropping targets.  The traffic
analysis of that trail would be worth an absolute fortune.  I'd give it a
week before it was compromised.

So:  I wouldn't go to the escrow agencies in any way at all.

----------

Now, there was an interesting thing from DERD the other day -- that the
original key generation mechanism is out, replaced by one which is
classified (for nat'l security reasons, I assume).

----------

As I mentioned in alt.privacy.clipper the other day,  if I were the NSA
I would:

1.	pick a *very* secure block cryptosystem (secure enough for them to
	use to send top secret crypto keys around the world, where the enemy
	is sure to intercept the message)

2.	encrypt the chip's serial number in that algorithm, using a single
	key which only the agency knows

3.	use the output of that encryption as the chip's key [that output
	will look totally random to the outside observer, because the
	encryption algorithm is so good]

4.	make the two escrow copies, as before, and deliver them to
	the escrow agencies

5.	keep the key generation process secret, for fear of inciting
	rebellion among civil liberties groups


-----------

 - Carl

P.S.  One of my questions for CSSPAB was why the key generation procedure
didn't just use a hardware random number generator.  That's the accepted
practice and there's no reason to classify it.

P.P.S.  Is there any way to get NIST to answer my list of 22 questions?






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: smb@research.att.com
Date: Fri, 13 Aug 93 07:12:58 PDT
To: "andrew m. boardman" <amb@cs.columbia.edu>
Subject: Re: Spooking of neural nets and image recognition...
Message-ID: <9308131408.AA25592@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


	 Insofar as monitoring passage of people, I noted a few hours
	 ago a new installation of cameras at the tollbooths on the
	 George Washington Bridge, positioned to be under a meter from
	 people's faces when they stop to fork over their $4.00.  The
	 police density at this toll plaza makes additional
	 surveillance of would-be toll booth robbers unnecessary; while
	 traffic analysis on the matching of facial patterns is
	 probably out of their scope right now, it *is* a precedent,
	 and food for thought...

Well -- the cameras may have been prompted by the fact that the
toll booths at the GWB have been the targets of armed robberies
several times of late...

	 FYI, the George Washington Bridge carries much, probably most,
	 of the traffic into Manhattan and New York City...)

Most?  Hardly.  Don't forget the bridges and tunnels from Brooklyn and
Queens, and the two tunnels from New Jersey, and...




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: nfe@scf.nmsu.edu
Date: Fri, 13 Aug 93 09:18:31 PDT
To: tcmay@netcom.com
Subject: Re: Spooking of neural nets and image recognition...
Message-ID: <9308131618.AA16347@NMSU.Edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Nick Szabo writes:
>[...]some general ideas for "encrypting" (sic) one's image:

  Some idea's are good, other's are abit off base.
  Major points of recognition are: jaw, cranium, nose, eyes, ears, age,
and facial hair. Secondary points include: health, weight, optics, scars,
etc.

jaw: presence or lack of beards, highlighting skeletal lines, and hollows
  (aging) with makeup, or cigarette ash, plastic inserts in the cheeks,
  building up areas of the face with liquid latex, or morticians wax.
  (note that some of these techniques can be used on other areas of the
  face).

cranium: hats, sudden changes in hair length/style, wigs (possably with
  padding).

nose: highlighting/latex/wax - as with jaw, inserting a pair of small nuts/
  buttons in the nose (drill for adequate airflow) will give the nose an
  appearence of having a "squashed/flattened" tip. 1/4 inch sections of
  stiff plastic tubing may also work.

eyes: appear "sunken" w/ makup, altering eyebrows can misdirect eyesocket
  shape, pull back (oriental), or buldge out by pulling/gluing skin with
  spirit gum, or liquid latex. change color with tinted contacts.
  (note: sunken = old age, malnutrician, or sickness - pulling skin can
  also highlight cheekbones, etc.)

ears: glue to the side of the head w/ rubber cement, spirit gum, or latex.

age:
  1) younger: very close shave, hot towles, alum, and talcum powder will
    tighten the skin, giving a youthfull appearence.
  2) older: Max Factor hair whitener to grey temples, highlight lines and
    hollows of face (STUDY a stage makeup book, and prectice this before
    trying to fool anyone. Subtlety is the key with any realistic makeup,
    there is a tendency to over do it most of the time. As a rule of thumb
    cosmetic, and theatrical makeup is mostly worthless for disguise, and
    will not stand up to examination at close distances, unless well done,
    subtlely, and with extreme moderation.)

facial hair: presence/absence, drastic changes in length, style and color
  can significantly alter ones appearence. Remember that neural nets, or
  a trained observer is going to be looking for the underlying skeletal
  shape, and building on top of that.

health: depressed eye sockets, hollow cheeks, flush or jaundus (beta-kerotine)
  skin color. contra: exercise/good skin tone. Gaining or loosing weight,

  "sudden tan" type products...

optics: glasses can hide features, and in some cases slightly alter the
  shape of the face. If unusual, they can be used as misdirection for an
  untrained observer (just like buttons, "loud" clothing, etc - as people
  tend to remember the unusual aspects, and not concentrate on usual features.
  Tinted contact lenses can change eye color.

scars: hard to do right - use liquid latex, burns, cuts, etc. Probably best
  avoided, though very memoral to the observer, esp. if on the face.

Misc: teath can be altered w/ iodine(stained), or blocked out with black wax.
  Have different "classes" of clothes (clergy, blue collar, white collar,
"bum", etc - but stay in character. Remember that a construction worker isn't

going to have an accountants hands, or imaculate tools, a bum will probably

have dirt under their fingernails, etc.
  horizontal stripes make you look shorter/fatter, vertical ones taller/
  skinnier. loud clothing, or pollitical buttons, a "funky" hat, etc will
  act as misdirection. skin acn also be bleached. consider: weight,
  muscle tone, stance, gait, etc. hair gell, and a curling iron are your
  friends :-)




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: karn@qualcomm.com (Phil Karn)
Date: Fri, 13 Aug 93 10:22:57 PDT
To: honey@citi.umich.edu
Subject: Secure voice software issues
In-Reply-To: <9308131255.AA23722@toad.com>
Message-ID: <9308131721.AA21363@servo>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>> do not use error correction or compression.  (they will slow you down)

>huh?!?  my file transfer times would *double* if i turned off v.42bis
>(modem compression).  *that* would slow me down.  and you can't run
>v.42bis without running the error handling protocol (v.42), for obvious
>reasons.  what's more, v.42 gives an immediate 20% (or so) increase in
>throughput, by eliminating start and stop bits.

I think there's a confusion here between the conflicting goals of low
delay and high throughput. Depending on which is more important to
your application, V.42bis will either "slow you down" or "speed you
up". Unfortunately, most modems don't give the user any way to say
whether delay or throughput is more important to you at the moment;
the modems themselves try to infer this automatically from the data
streams you send them. And they bias the decision in favor of greater
throughput. This is right for most computer applications, but not so
for real time voice.

Phil




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: peb@PROCASE.COM (Paul Baclace)
Date: Fri, 13 Aug 93 10:32:57 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Spooking of neural nets and image recognition...
Message-ID: <9308131731.AA02173@banff.procase.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



>4) placing a magnet on the side of the camera (does this work?)

Not with CCD cameras.


All the other methods you mentioned require special physical access--
it won't work if one gets photographed while placing post-its on the
camera window...

The high error rates of image recognition make this whole scenario
a future issue.  One FAA funded experiment used mice to detect 
excessive adeneline (the mice go nuts or their heart rates increase
just by smelling the excitement); the idea was to catch hijackers
who would generally be a bit excited.  This sounds obvious boneheaded
because of all the people who fear flying...but the stated reason
for abandoning the research was that mice don't rate too well as
anonymous tipsters!  Anyway, the error rate was very high too.

However, the whole "profile" thing used by the WoD is essentially a
conscious application of generalization that neural networks do.  This
may expand if "suspicion detection" is socially acceptable--my guess
is that it would not be accepted given the speeding ticket automation
systems that have been widely rejected (they probably could have gotten
it accepted if the reduced a speeding ticket cost by a magnitude and 
considered it like a parking ticket--but these are legal changes, not
technological changes, so they are much more difficult to do).

The OCR of cash serial numbers would be highly probabilistic--that is,
too many transactions would not be tracked so the knowledge of the flow
would be partial.  More likely would be that all large cash deposits
would be scanned for general analysis just as large cash transactions 
require that a bank fill out a special form and send to the State.  


Paul E. Baclace
peb@procase.com





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: karn@qualcomm.com (Phil Karn)
Date: Fri, 13 Aug 93 10:48:27 PDT
To: rarachel@ishara.poly.edu
Subject: Beepers can also be used to track you down!
In-Reply-To: <9308131050.AA28463@ishara.poly.edu>
Message-ID: <9308131744.AA21446@servo>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Eh? Conventional pocket pagers are receive only. This is well known. Oh,
they probably do emit tiny amounts of RF from their local oscillators,
but I doubt much could be done with that.

Cell phones, on the other hand, *do* tell the system which cell you
are in, and they can do this even when you're not in a call. It's
called "registration".  The usual purpose is benign: directing pages
(land-to-mobile call requests) only to the cell you're in, instead of
having to "flood" them all over the system. But it *could* be used to
keep track of your location.

I carry both a pager and a cell phone.  Normally I keep the cell phone
turned off to save its batteries. When I get a page, I can turn the
phone on and return the call.  The pager/cellphone combination is very
nice, as I effectively get "caller ID" functionality.  Even better,
*I* get to choose when, how or even if to answer a particular page.
And since pagers are unidirectional (no acks) I can always lie about
not having gotten a page from somebody I don't want to talk to!  :-)

Phil




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: nfe@scf.nmsu.edu
Date: Fri, 13 Aug 93 09:48:27 PDT
To: smb@research.att.com
Subject: Re: Spooking of neural nets and image recognition...
Message-ID: <9308131644.AA16850@NMSU.Edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


  As to serveilence cameras, is anyone familiar with methods of not getting
photographed in the first place? Some methods I've heard of:

1) spray paint or vasoline on the lens (kinda obvious :)

2) putting a pin or finnishing nail in it's coaxial cable (umbilical if you
  will) - how good of a job of scrabbling the image will this do?

3) mounting a "test pattern" in front of the lens.

4) placing a magnet on the side of the camera (does this work?)

5) timing the pan, and taking advantage of "dead areas" (areas not covered
  for brief periods). Anyone familiar with the general range/resolution
  ratio, and how wide an area will get covered?

  Any other methods?




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: koontzd@lrcs.loral.com (David Koontz )
Date: Fri, 13 Aug 93 10:52:58 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Beepers can also be used to track you down!
Message-ID: <9308131749.AA12091@nebula.lrcs.loral.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>Basically, they'd send pings to your beeper throughout the city they expected
>you in, then they'd find out which cell you were in.  After that, they can
>use a small radar-like gun to actually find your beeper, also by pings.

>There's probably a way to disable the transmitter in the beeper, but I

All you need is a faraday cage, an all metal enclosure with metal to metal
contacts between all its surfaces.  A Copper brillo type scrub pad, expanded
out to make a pocket big enough for the pager.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Perry E. Metzger" <pmetzger@lehman.com>
Date: Fri, 13 Aug 93 07:53:26 PDT
To: "L. Detweiler" <ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Subject: Re: Electracy: Evil Revisited
In-Reply-To: <9308130703.AA01369@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Message-ID: <9308131451.AA13358@snark.lehman.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



"L. Detweiler" says:
> Buried in my latest delirious rant were multiple *pragmatic*
> descriptions of Electronic Democracy, and to my great chagrin all have
> been virtually completely ignored, save one thoughtful soul responding
> to me in email, who I've exhorted to post to the list. Where is the
> picking apart of the pieces? I expected the highly suggestive details
> to be pounced on like scrumptious food for further thought or (more
> likely) carrion for vultures, but instead get the standard vague
> marshmallow-philosophical Libertarian and Anarchic Promotional Literature.

Look, people on this list have many different political views.
Political views qua political views do not belong on this list.
However, you seem to insist. I will therefore indulge you.

> I'm really quite amazed at all the deathly pessimism and antipathy
> herein toward genuinely improving our governmental system. It seems
> that many believe that the natural state of `their' government is
> oppression, and that the goal is only to minimize it. The perverted
> Majority is fundamentally and invariably Untrustworthy, Capricious, and
> Painfully Stupid.  It is always stated in terms of Us and They. But
> *we* *are* our government. How can it not be more obvious? What does it
> say about our character if we are resigned to deprivation?

WE ARE NOT OUR GOVERNMENT.

I have an interesting fact for you, Mr. Detweiler. I did not choose
the government I live under. I chose none of its parts, agreed to none
of its actions, selected none of its members (not one person I've ever
voted for has been elected, and I only vote in self defense, not as an
endorsement of the system), and I agree with virtually none of its
actions. Sadly, this is the best country I know of to live in, so
leaving is not an option. However, don't for one minute claim that
this is *my* government. It is the government that rules me, to be
sure, but it is my master, not my servant. I would not choose to have
it operate as it does were I given the choice. It is not mine. 

Perhaps you are in control of the government, in which case I would
ask that you explain to your servants in Washington that I am not
undertaxed, am old enough to choose my own lifestyle and decide for
myself whether I should ingest any chemicals I happen to find, can
fend for myself in negotiating with employers and shopkeepers, and in
general have no desire for their protection or, as I view it,
opression.

So far as I can tell, government is run Of the Bureaucrats, By the
Bureaucrats, For the Bureaucrats. It is an oozing flatulent behemoth
that eats everything in sight and then blames the state of its victims
on the fact that it doesn't have enough to eat.

The very notion of voting on issues makes no sense. From whence does
the majority gain the right to rule me? If five people are sitting in
a room, and three of them vote to rape the other two, that does not
make it right. If one hundred people are sitting on a desert island,
and 70 of them vote to enslave the other 30, that does not make it
right. If a gang of 15 people comes upon a couple sitting in a park,
and they decide to hold an "election" to decide whether or not to beat
up the other two, that does not lend legitimacy to the actions of the
15. Why, then, should the whims of 100 million people sitting in their
living rooms with video game consoles decide the fate of those who
find themselves on the losing end of the vote?

In ancient Athens, they had a direct democracy. Allow me to describe
to you what they did with it. Among other fun practices, like
enslaving half the population because they felt like it, the Athenians
would periodically get together and decide they wanted to kick someone
out of town, so they would get together Ostracons, meaning pottery
shards, and write down the names of the folks they didn't like on
them. The guy who got the most Ostracons was Ostracized. Fun folks,
eh? Well, thats what you want to do, but on a national scale.

Athens would periodically get a charismatic leader, like Pericles, who
would manage by demagoguery to take control and impose nearly
dictatorial rule. (The word demagogue comes from the same greek roots
as the word democracy, by the way).

Imagine if every year only one company was allowed to make cars, and
we picked the company by vote. One year we would get Chryslers, and
one year Fords, and we could never compare them or choose a car of our
own desiring. We would just get this massive campaign every year for
the franchise. Well, everything government does is like that -- no
chance for comparison, no efficiency, choices made on the basis of
short and massive campaigns, and no sense.

I will be happiest when all that is forbidden is initiating force
against others or their property. I will be reasonably happy when the
government is crippled enough that it can make no decisions -- the
founding fathers tried that, and sadly it didn't work for long, but it
did last for a while. It is often said that no man's life, liberty or
property are safe when the legislature is in session. In an Electronic
Direct Democracy the legislature will never be out of session. It will
rule people's lives like the most iron-fisted dictatorship you can
imagine. 

People often confound liberty and democracy. The one means freedom --
the other is merely a form of government. Democracy does not
necessarily generate liberty, and more democracy does not mean more
liberty. 

Perry




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: David Sobel <dsobel@washofc.cpsr.org>
Date: Fri, 13 Aug 93 09:08:49 PDT
To: Cypherpunks <cypherpunks@toad.com>
Subject: NSA Seeks Delay in Clipper
Message-ID: <00541.2828087154.4728@washofc.cpsr.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


  NSA Seeks Delay in Clipper Case

     The National Security Agency (NSA) has asked a federal court
for a one-year delay in a lawsuit challenging the secrecy of the
government's "Clipper Chip" encryption proposal.  The suit was
filed by Computer Professionals for Social Responsibility (CPSR)
on May 28 and seeks the disclosure of all information concerning
the controversial plan.

     In an affidavit submitted to the United States District Court
for the District of Columbia on August 9, NSA Director of Policy
Michael A. Smith states that

     NSA's search for records responsive to [CPSR's] request
     is under way, but is not yet complete.  Because the
     Clipper Chip program is a significant one involving the
     participation of organizations in four of NSA's five
     Directorates and the Director's staff, the volume of
     responsive documents is likely to be quite large.
     Moreover, because the Clipper Chip program is highly
     complex and technical and is, in substantial part,
     classified for national security purposes, the review
     process cannot be accomplished quickly.

     CPSR called for the disclosure of all relevant information
and full public debate on the proposal on April 16, the day it was
announced.  While NSA has insisted from the outset that the
"Skipjack" encryption algorithm, which underlies the Clipper
proposal, must remain secret, the Smith affidavit contains the
first suggestion that the entire federal program is classified "in
substantial part."  In the interest of obtaining timely judicial
review of the agency's broad classification claim, CPSR intends to
oppose NSA's request for delay in the court proceedings.

     In another case involving government cryptography policy,
CPSR has challenged NSA's classification of information concerning
the development of the Digital Signature Standard (DSS).  The
court is currently considering the issue and a decision is
expected soon.

     CPSR is a national public-interest alliance of computer
industry professionals dedicated to examining the impact of
technology on society.  CPSR has 21 chapters in the U.S. and
maintains offices in Palo Alto, California, and Washington, DC.
For additional information on CPSR, call (415) 322-3778 or
e-mail <cpsr@cpsr.org>.

David L. Sobel
CPSR Legal Counsel
<sobel@washofc.cpsr.org>






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Hastings@courier8.aero.org
Date: Fri, 13 Aug 93 11:33:27 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Electric Fooling Machine
Message-ID: <0006ECF1.MAI*Hastings@courier8.aero.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Homer: "You couldn't fool your own mother on the foolingest day of the
year, even if you had an electric fooling machine."
 
> *pragmatic* descriptions of Electronic Democracy ...
 
You're walking down the street, and a gang of thugs jumps out
from behind some bushes. Their leader approaches you and says:
 
"Don't be alarmed, we're your very local community - we believe
in the noble principle of Democracy, majority rule, and you
have an equal vote with each of us."
 
You say, "Whew. I guess my marshmallow-philosophical Libertarianism
clouded my vision of the great ideal that is our American way of
life. What should we vote on first?"
 
The gang leader says, "Glad to hear someone with confidence in the
system. A concerned member of our community, upset at the unfair
distribution of wealth in our society, has proposed an equal
sharing of whatever cash we have on hand at the moment. Since
none of us have any cash, the implementation would require you to
give an equal share to each of us. Now, that seems reasonable,
doesn't it?"
 
You say, "Oh no, my worst nightmare come true, even while I am
awake! But, the essence of Democracy is my right to vote, and
if I'm unhappy that I'm completely ruined this election, why I
have a chance to get screwed every couple of years forever!
But, wait, if this process were AUTOMATED, ELECTRONICALLY, why,
I could be ripped off continuously every single nanosecond!"
 
> and to my great chagrin all have been virtually completely
> ignored...
 
Could anyone really BELIEVE that high school civics class garbage?
 
>I'm really quite amazed at all the deathly pessimism and antipathy
>herein toward genuinely improving our governmental system.
 
On this list, we've all probably experienced firsthand, the joys
of "our" government in the person of an IRS (or state tax) agent,
and after that enlightening encounter, have sworn uncompromising
revenge on THEM, THE ENEMY. Maybe someone had their kid taken
from them to die in some stinking jungle or desert. Or maybe
someone owns a gun for protection, or has an unapproved
hygienic practice (smoking, drugs, booze, midwife, health food)
and isn't thrilled with the zero-tolerance, no-conviction-needed
asset forfeiture revenue-enhancing scam, or the threats on privacy
because of "money-laundering" or "terrorism".
 
Can you stand to watch the "cleared by military censors" media
prattle on about how government needs to stick everyone in a
hamster cage for their own good without getting totally pissed?
If so, I'm jealous.
 
Now, what is the most effective tactic to achieve a universal
respect for rights? Oops. Nobody has any rights, that would
support Natural Law. We'd have to shovel heretics into the
fire according to religious revelation if we accept NL/NR.
 
Begging for our "rights" from the Secret Masters' puppets, or
buying "our own" politicians into office, may bring
temporary relief, but a lasting victory will come by
cutting the supply lines (taxes and inflation) and their
brainwashing stranglehold on the media (and "public" education).
 
Digital cash might "nuke" tax collection, as Tim May puts it.
Anything other than Federal Reserve Units as the unit of
account removes the enemy's benefit from any inflation that
occurs.
 
Unlicensed broadcasts (perhaps starting with wireless
spread-sprectrum internet extensions) muscles in on media
territory and can cause reader/viewers to question the absurd
establishment interpretations of current and historic events.
 
>It seems everyone here is interested in debating the issue in
>terms of how they see government, how it has functioned in the
>past, *irrespective* of any novel mechanisms presented...
 
Gee, if only the Nazis would have an e-mail address, everything
would be wonderful. Email: hitler@nazi.edu or stalin@commie.org.
 
>N. Szabo <szabo@netcom.com> [said:]
 
>>* A basic problem with E.D. is that nobody has an
>>incentive to vote correctly.
 
A Nobel Prize was awarded to the Public Choice school for just
this insight. The selfless, dedicated public servants have the
same motivations as the most ruthless wolves on Wall Street.
I think David Friedman covers this, and you could do worse than
to read The Machinery of Freedom. (This is NOT a direct quote):
A political victory is winner-take-all, completely shutting
out the desires of a minority. In a free market, if a good or
service is favored by the majority, guess what: The majority
rules! You'll see whatever they want just about everywhere.
But minority tastes will be catered to as well, perhaps not at
the supermarket, but in a little boutique somewhere.
 
>suppose that a `vote' is not something static but rather a
>pledge of support for a proposal that can vary over time...
 
If this is what you have in mind for political decisions, then
you've reinvented proprietary communities, described in Spencer
Heath McCallum's (sp?) The Art of Community (1970), which provides
agreeable structures to the signatories of their covenants.
 
But you would NOT be talking about the coercive, tax-and-draft,
master-and-subject relationships which define a "government."
 
Kent - <jkhastings@aol.com>
 




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: paul@poboy.b17c.ingr.com (Paul Robichaux)
Date: Fri, 13 Aug 93 09:42:57 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Software patents
Message-ID: <199308131637.AA11354@poboy.b17c.ingr.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I want to bring this up in the context of the PGP vs PKP thread from a
while back. I am personally interested, since my cryptophone software
could conceivable infringe on several varied patents simply by using
excerpted code from PGP.

Background: the Association for Computing Machinery is the computer
science equivalent of the ABA or the AMA.  They are in the process of
revising their code of ethics for ACM members.

Several lumiaries (Guy L. Steele, Jr., Danny Hillis, Richard Stallman,
Gerald J. Sussman, Marvin Minsky, John McCarthy, John Backus, and
Fernando J. Corbato) wrote a letter objecting to the new clause. I
have excerpted Turing Award winner, 1990

The original was posted to gnu.misc.discuss by jhawk@panix.com (John
Hawkinson); he had RMS' permission, but I am reposting here without
permission. Comments in {} are mine.

begin included text

The ACM recently adopted a "moral imperative" for its members to
"Honor property rights including copyrights and patents."  This is
clause 1.5 of a new ethics code for ACM members, adopted in October
1992.

...

ACM surveys suggest that most ACM members disapprove of having
patents in software at all; yet the ACM moral imperative calls on
members to honor what they may regard as a disaster for their field.

[... spirit vs. letter of law ...]

But the word "honor" has other implications.  The spirit and practical
effect of the ACM code is to endorse the current intellectual property
system and discourage independent judgement about it.  This directly
opposes the views of many, perhaps most, ACM members.

Not only that; it also distorts the patent system, by telling people
not to exercise their rights in the system.  After all, what does it
mean to "honor" a patent?

Whether a particular patent is valid and applicable is always an open
question until decided by a court case.  And it is never a crime to
infringe a patent.  If you think a patent is invalid, the legal system
encourages you to disregard it; if you are not sued, then your actions
are legitimate.  If you are sued, then you are welcome to fight the
case and see if you can overturn the patent.  (This is so expensive
that the possibility is purely theoretical for most of us, and it
cannot solve more than a tiny fraction of the software patent problem,
but some of the readers may work for companies that can afford to do
so occasionally.)

If you can do all that and still be "honoring" the patent, then
"honoring" is an empty requirement which there is no way to violate.
The reader is likely to dismiss this interpretation, based on the
heuristic that every clause in the ACM code must have some practical
import or it would have been deleted.

If "honoring" a patent does not permit challenging it in that way,
then the ACM is directing its members to treat all patents as valid
and not exercise their legal right to challenge patents!

[... remainder deleted ...]

Now, IANAL, but the preceding is new to me. By the argument presented
above PGP is legal w.r.t. patent infringment. Infringement is _not_ an
unlawful act, and the question of whether or not PGP is infringing can
only be settled by a court encounter between PKP and someone else.

Theoretically, then, we are all safe unless PKP decides to take us
individually to court. We are likewise safe should any of us-
collectively or individually- write, distribute, or aid/abet thereof
any code which might potentially infringe a patent.

Sounds like innocent until proven guilty. Sounds like Schnorr and
digital cash are fair game.

-Paul
 "quote me"
-- 
Paul Robichaux, KD4JZG     | "Change the world for a better tomorrow. But
perobich@ingr.com          |  watch your ass today." - aaron@halcyon.com
Intergraph Federal Systems | Be a cryptography user- ask me how.





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Hastings@courier8.aero.org
Date: Fri, 13 Aug 93 12:22:59 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Privacy-Friendly Auditing
Message-ID: <0006ED08.MAI*Hastings@courier8.aero.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I sent messages pertaining to the anonymous auditing problem to Neils
Ferguson, and like someone who hopes the property owner forgives the
trespass that occurs when someone walks up and rings the doorbell, I
hope he doesn't "have a cow" that I'm sharing some of his remarks.
 
>The anonymous auditing problem is, as far as I have understood, not
>well defined.
 
Duh!!! Ahem...
 
>The purpose is to allow an external auditor compute the sum of all
>the banks commitments without revealing the individual commitments
>to the auditor. The problem is: who is going to provide the data to
>the auditor?
 
>The simplest answer would be that the customers are going to provide
>the data. In this case the voting protocols described in literature
>are a good start. It should even be possible to have the bank provide
>signed account statements for a specific date to all clients which are
>then used in the protocol to prevent clients from cheating and thereby
>generating a false result in the audit. But any such scheme is not
>practical as ALL customers have to cooperate.
 
>If the bank is going to supply the information to the auditors, then
>there must be some way to stop the bank from creating an entire
>`shadow' bookkeeping. That is, the data must include some kind of
>customers signature on the balance of each bankaccount, and the public
>key of this customer must somehow be verified to belong to a real
>person (to ensure that it was not generated by the bank itself). The
>authentication of a public key and linking it to an actual person
>requires another institution (government?) which keeps track of people
>and authenticates that they are actual living persons.
 
>Note that all this information does not have to be revealed to the
>auditor, but it is necessary as input to the cryptographic protocol.
>In general a cryptographic protocol cannot achieve anything that a
>computer which is trusted by all parties cannot achieve. If someone
>could give a description of the required functionality of this virtual
>trusted computer, then the cryptographers can try to make it into a
>protocol (and then try to make it practical).
 
>Did I miss something when I quickly read your mail or is the notion of
>an anonymous auditing still vague?
 
>I havn't studied voting schemes but most of them have serious flaws.
>Many of them have difficulty handling a dishonest minority, or require
>too much resources to be practical. One requirement for voting schemes
>which I have not seen in literature is the unprovability. After voting
>a voter should not be able to prove what she voted to another party.
>If this were possible, then buying votes (or blackmailing people to
>vote a certain way) becomes possible. The old Italian voting system
>had so many possibilities to cast your vote that this was used by the
>Mafia in certain areas. They would approach a person and basically
>state: "You'd better make sure that there is a ballot with exactly
>these choices in the result or else....".
 
>I don't read the cypherpunk mailing list. If it were a newsgroup I
>would find it quite interesting, but as a mailing list it is much
>harder for me to selectively read the articles. Also, my mail handler
>doesn't support a kill file. When I tried a subscription I found the
>signal to noise ration to be too low to read it as a mailing list. The
>volume was also so high that it drowned out my other e-mail. With a
>newsgroup you can safely ignore it for a while. Maybe I should get a
>better mail handler, but when I mentioned this problem to Eric Hughes,
>he said that they could have created a newsgroup but decided not to. A
>clear mistake in my opinion. Anyways, maybe someone will create an
>alt.cypherpunk newsgroup and put up a gateway from the mailing list to
>the newsgroup.
 
Niels Ferguson can be reached at niels@cwi.nl, and I'm sure one of you
finks will rat on me and tell him I'm betraying confidentiality. Well,
go ahead, you'll see what I do to you.
 
Kent - <jkhastings@aol.com>
 
 




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Duncan Frissell <frissell@panix.com>
Date: Fri, 13 Aug 93 09:08:27 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re:  On The Inherent Evil
Message-ID: <199308131603.AA27010@panix.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


To: cypherpunks@toad.com

S >Regardless of how cypherpunks feel about this issue, E.D. is one
S >of the most powerful memes making its way thru current society, and 
S >we have to deal with it.
S >
S >Nick Szabo					szabo@netcom.com

By ignoring it like all other forms of "others" government (tyranny).  How 
anyone can think that more efficiently allowing others to rule them 
(whether one man or many) is a good idea is beyond me.  Tyrrany is tyrrany 
is tyranny.  Maybe with ED we'll be benefitted by the fact that the 
government itself which is carrying out the orders of the populace will be 
so busy with system volitility that it won't have time to do much real 
harm.  

Duncan Frissell
(Net Prime - 01000001st Fiberborne)

"A Machine Age army can no more defeat an Information Age army than a 
Muscle Age army can defeat a Machine Age army."  

Join in the fun as Slick Willie and the other spearcarriers of the New 
World Order charge the machine guns of the Info Army.  Cyberspace Wants 
You.  Join the 01000001st Fiberborne - recruiting depot open at this 
address.  Phase One guerilla operations have alredy begun... 


--- WinQwk 2.0b#0
                                                                                                                               




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Duncan Frissell <frissell@panix.com>
Date: Fri, 13 Aug 93 09:12:09 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Making the World Safe for
Message-ID: <199308131603.AA27038@panix.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


To: cypherpunks@toad.com

H>As another example, suppose the government banned non-Clipper 
H>cryptography.
H>Despite the brave comments of some, I think it would be very hard
H>to overcome such a ban.  

H>My main point is that we cannot rely on the technology to save us.  A
H>concerted government effort could, in my opinion, stifle the growth of
H>individual liberties that cryptography may offer.  Clipper is just one
H>battle in this longer war.  We can't afford to fall victim to a smug
H>confidence that victory will inevitably be ours.  If we get to the 
H>point
H>that steganography is the only way to communicate privately, we will 
H>have
H>lost.
H>
H>Hal Finney
H>hfinney@shell.portal.com
H>

Hal, the point is that the government actions you fear are politically 
unlikely and would be limited to one nation in any case.  Par example - 
humorous letter to the editor in today's NYT from someone I'll call 
"Clueless in New Jersey."  He promotes the idea of a 1% tax on the markets 
for currencies and derivatives (because they are volitile, unproductive 
and hurt governments).  Even before the passage of such a tax, the 
currency traders would have relocated themselves (physically or virtually) 
to an untaxed location.  

They nice thing about the modern communications environment is not strong 
crypto, steganography, or anonymous networks (though these are fun) it is 
the ability to randomie your physical location while still living as full 
and productive life as you used to live when tied down to one spot.  The 
multiplying power of the new technologies also llows you to "run a Fortune 
500 corporation" from your back pocket as informal work groups form and 
disband as needed.

Crackdowns by a single government will just speed up the process of people 
becoming Permanent Tourists (PTs).  The control problems experienced by 
modern States do not grow out strong crypto (which is not yet deployed) 
but out of the growing relative power of individuals.  
Power=Choice=Control.  If we have power (the ability to jet anywhere on 
earth at the speed of sound for 1 or 3 week's average salary) we can make 
choices and control ourselves.  If we control ourselves others lose 
control over us.  

The individual's natural organiational superiority over larger entities 
(my right hand rarely wheels on in to federal court to force me to file an 
environmental impact statement before defecation) when enhanced by modern 
technology weakens those less organied institutions.

Remember laws are *not* self-enforcing.  The success of their legal regime 
depends upon obedience by the populace.  Does anyone out there see 
obedience and deference *increasing*?  I don't.  If disobedience keeps 
increasing, at some point the rules will be meaningless.  

Duncan Frissell

November 10th 1989 - Berlin Wall - Death for unauthorized crossing
November 11th 1989 - No Berlin Wall  
Sic semper tyrannis - "What a Difference a Day Makes"




--- WinQwk 2.0b#0
                                                                                                  




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Duncan Frissell <frissell@panix.com>
Date: Fri, 13 Aug 93 09:08:31 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: ATM AND IMAGE RECONGI
Message-ID: <199308131603.AA27045@panix.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


To: cypherpunks@toad.com


T >OK, you got me here. I wasn't thinking of cases where you might want
T >to deceive your own bank!

T >Tim May

One tends to forget that an ATM card is a bearer instrument.  Ive always 
thought it ironic that the first manifestation of the Orwellian technology 
of electronic payments that was supposed to strip us of our liberties was 
a *bearer* instrument.

There are many circumstances where you might want to have someone other 
than the account holder use ATM or other Credit or Debit cards.  Spouses, 
children, and employees might be given the card.  If you want to make 
cheap instant overseas transfers you might give a trusted person an ATM 
card.  If you want to make regular anonymous payments to someone you might 
open an account for that purpose, give them the card, and then just 
deposit whatever you want to transmit to them.  If you've opened an 
account in a nome de guerre, it might be convenient not to have your image 
recorded.  There are many more circumstances.

For me the more significant concern is not getting my picture taken but 
the possibility that card use might be limited to the account holder only. 
 I like the bearer instrument aspect of ATMs.  Of course, as long as some 
banks on the net don't use pictures or other personal measurments as a 
replacement for pins, one can always use these institutions.

Duncan Frissell

As for the PC parts of Tim's post:

How to handle fanatic evironmentalists/animal rightists/commies:  "What's 
the matter; don't you believe in cultural diversity?  Look, these days *I* 
have to put up with <anal-intercoursing> <oral-genital copulators> whether 
I like them or not.  <Use Old English words instead of the Norman French 
above.>  If *I* have to put up with <anal-intercoursing> <oral-genital 
copulators> whether I want to or not, then you have to put up with 
perverts like me."


--- WinQwk 2.0b#0
          




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Eric Blossom <eb@srlr14.sr.hp.com>
Date: Fri, 13 Aug 93 12:18:32 PDT
To: diffie@eng.sun.com
Subject: Secure voice software issues
In-Reply-To: <9308120203.AA04871@servo>
Message-ID: <9308131914.AA15560@srlr14.sr.hp.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



> Eh? No, as I've been saying, you can produce a very strong hybrid in
> which both Diffie-Hellman and RSA each play an important part.
> Diffie-Hellman generates the session keys, while RSA signs them.

Does anybody *know* how existing secure phones do authentication?  I'm
familiar with the AT&T 3600, but I was wondering about a STU-III,
perhaps a Motorola SECTEL-1500, or equivalent Cylink. I assume that
they use Diffie-Hellman to exchange session keys, but what
public/private key info is stored in the phones (if any), and how do
you load it in?  Do you contact some kind of certifying authority to
download key info?  Is it stored in some kind of NVRAM, or EEPROM?
How many keys will the phone store?  I assume, given the presense of a
"zeroize" button that something useful is stored in the phone.  Also,
what is the "cryptographic ignition key"?  It is some kind of FLASH or
EEPROM?  What's on it? The key pair?

Thanks,
Eric Blossom




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: koontzd@lrcs.loral.com (David Koontz )
Date: Fri, 13 Aug 93 12:18:27 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: No Subject
Message-ID: <9308131915.AA12203@nebula.lrcs.loral.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Subject:Beepers can also be used to track you down!

I had heard that Motorola was talking about pagers based on the cellular
phone system, with hand off between cells, etc.   That would imply XMIT.

As far as local detection, I understand that in Britain vans go around
with sniffing gear looking for IF freqs to find unlicensed TVs.

When in the Air Force, we used to leave our pagers in Faraday cages when
going into some of the SCFs, which were built with the copper mesh in the
walls etc.  The idea being that you didn't want any being carried on
IF from the pager.

As far as the microwave oven, fine you can hide in there, but watch out
for them.. one of THEM may come by and turn it on...




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: plmoses@unix.cc.emory.edu (Paul L. Moses)
Date: Fri, 13 Aug 93 09:48:32 PDT
To: ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu
Subject: Re:  Electracy: Evil Revisited
Message-ID: <9308131644.AA21417@emoryu1.cc.emory.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Sorry, but today's currency system is anything but a democracy.  Thank God.
It works because it is entrusted to a COMPETENT elite.  The "global approval"
of bills that you suggest seems to be to inevitably lead to the worst sort
of populist rhetoric and pandering becoming law.
You don't seem to recognize that in an age of irrationalism, opening the 
doors to mass participation any further will simply de-legitimize the system
even more.  (I suppose if you liked Motor Voter, you dont understand why
I am saying this.)  But look at the Constitution.  Its paradigm is for a
federal government of limited powers to function as the "glue" to hold
together otherwise disparate political entities.  
The point is that majority rule is only *half* the story in American democracy;
the other half is checks and balances to ensure that those who do not
fit into the mainstream can pursue life, liberty,and happiness.
Since you think I am blathering on in vague generalities, let me put it 
another way:
	Colorado's Amendment 2 is EXACTLY the kind of bill one would expect out of "Elektracy".




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: andrew m. boardman <amb@cs.columbia.edu>
Date: Fri, 13 Aug 93 10:12:57 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Spooking of neural nets and image recognition...
In-Reply-To: <199308131408.AB13144@cs.columbia.edu>
Message-ID: <199308131710.AA07902@ground.cs.columbia.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


With regard to the scope of surveillance cameras, the elevators in the GM
building have cameras pointed down at an off angle; I thought they would
be mostly useless until I was shown the (probably computer-modeled)
contoured shell over the lens; on the far and, it produces a suprisingly
broad and non-"fisheyed" view of anyone facing the front of the car.
Image recognition is currently limited to a book of photos of people they
(security) don't want in the building, though...  When the real cost of
such recognition systems is low enough that such run-of-the-mill
rent-a-cops are looking to buy them, we've really got something to worry
about.  (How nice that Citibank credit card holders are all getting their
faces digitized, for their security of course.)

[cypherpunks content ends about here...]
	    FYI, the George Washington Bridge carries much, probably most,
	    of the traffic into Manhattan and New York City...)

   Most?  Hardly.  Don't forget the bridges and tunnels from Brooklyn and
   Queens, and the two tunnels from New Jersey, and...

Someone I knew in grad school (they, not I) was doing surveys of
Manhattan-NJ traffic, and measured some amazing throughput on the GWB,
compared with the tunnels.  I *was* being incredibly NJ-centric, though...

andrew




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: hkhenson@cup.portal.com
Date: Fri, 13 Aug 93 13:18:27 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Beepers can also be used to track you down!
Message-ID: <9308131316.13.6838@cup.portal.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I may be out of date on beepers, but the ones I know about are recievers
only, no transmitters.  Cell phones *can* be used to track, though.  Keith




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: koontzd@lrcs.loral.com (David Koontz )
Date: Fri, 13 Aug 93 13:28:27 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: pagers
Message-ID: <9308132026.AA12426@nebula.lrcs.loral.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>I wonder if they noticed that they never got any pages...

Geez, you would have thought they were bank tellers, too.  Seems silly 
they wouldn't trust us to just turn them off.  They would certify 
coffee pots going into the SCFs too, once in they can't come back out.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Eric Blossom <eb@srlr14.sr.hp.com>
Date: Fri, 13 Aug 93 13:28:33 PDT
To: honey@citi.umich.edu
Subject: Secure voice software issues
In-Reply-To: <9308131255.AA23722@toad.com>
Message-ID: <9308132028.AA17610@srlr14.sr.hp.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



> phil karn's points about modem buffering interfering with type-of-service
> queueing are the strongest condemnations of modern modems, in my view.
> i wish someone would build a modem that recognized ip packet framing.

This is why you'd really want to run your modems synchronously.  You'd
just send HDLC frames that encapsulated IP packets (fragmentation may
be required).  This is how most IP routers work over serial links.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: csvcjld@nomvst.lsumc.edu
Date: Fri, 13 Aug 93 11:53:27 PDT
Subject: Re: Beepers can also be used to track you down!
In-Reply-To: <9308131749.AA12091@nebula.lrcs.loral.com>
Message-ID: <19930813134754397@nomvst.lsumc.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



  >>There's probably a way to disable the transmitter in the beeper, but
  >
  >All you need is a faraday cage, an all metal enclosure with metal to
  >metal contacts between all its surfaces.  A Copper brillo type scrub
  >pad, expanded out to make a pocket big enough for the pager.

     How about a microwave oven?





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: karn@qualcomm.com (Phil Karn)
Date: Fri, 13 Aug 93 14:23:00 PDT
To: eb@srlr14.sr.hp.com
Subject: Secure voice software issues
In-Reply-To: <9308132028.AA17610@srlr14.sr.hp.com>
Message-ID: <9308132119.AA21953@servo>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>This is why you'd really want to run your modems synchronously.  You'd
>just send HDLC frames that encapsulated IP packets (fragmentation may
>be required).  This is how most IP routers work over serial links.

Indeed. And because LAPM uses HDLC framing over the modem, you could
be completely compatible with a regular (asynch DTE interface) V.42bis
modem on the other end of the call. But by implementing V.42bis
yourself, you would have complete control over when frames get sent,
and how large they are.

Phil





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Matt Blaze <mab@crypto.com>
Date: Fri, 13 Aug 93 11:52:56 PDT
To: koontzd@lrcs.loral.com (David Koontz )
Subject: Re: Beepers can also be used to track you down!
In-Reply-To: <9308131749.AA12091@nebula.lrcs.loral.com>
Message-ID: <9308131837.AA11141@crypto.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



>>Basically, they'd send pings to your beeper throughout the city they expected
>>you in, then they'd find out which cell you were in.  After that, they can
>>use a small radar-like gun to actually find your beeper, also by pings.
>
>>There's probably a way to disable the transmitter in the beeper, but I
>
>All you need is a faraday cage, an all metal enclosure with metal to metal
>contacts between all its surfaces.  A Copper brillo type scrub pad, expanded
>out to make a pocket big enough for the pager.

No, that won't work - the pager won't be able to receive the signals for
paging you.  You need a one-way faraday cage (OWFC).  You can get
these from a good electronic supply house, but they're rather expensive and
specialized so they don't usually list them in their catalogs.  You have to
call and ask.  Law enforcement and the military are the main users of OWFC's,
so they may refuse to sell you one without proper authorization, or they may
deny knowing about them at all.  Expect to pay at least $500 bucks for a pager-
sized one, much more for a room size model.  Use a fake name when buying, or
expect extra attention from the authorities.

If you have no luck finding someone willing to sell you one, you can make your
own, but it's a bit of a tedious process.  A brillo pad is a good starting
point, but you have to insert diodes at least every 1/64th wavelength to allow
the RF energy to flow into the cage but not out.  For a 450mhz pager, every
centimeter or so will do.  Surface-mount diodes are a good choice because of
their small size.  Basically, expand out the brillo pad as described in the
previous post, then mark 1cm size squares  around its entire outer surface.
At each intersection point, cut throw the mesh and solder in a diode, making
sure that the emitter side is pointing either in or out for all the diodes.
(I don't remember which side the diodes are supposed to point, but you
can easily turn the mesh inside out when you're done.  Whichever way lets
you receive pages is the right way.).    Be warned that buying a large number
of surface mount diodes is considered somewhat suspicious, so to play it safe
and order them with a fake name and in small quantities from several suppliers.

It's been over a year since I made an OWFC for my pager and the results have
been astounding - I am certain that the authorities are no longer using my
pager to track my location.

Be warned, though, that those so-called holographic images on Visa and
MasterCards can easily be used for much the same purpose, although I've been
unable to prove that they are actually using this technology to track people
on any kind of large scale.  Safest bet is to carry your credit cards along
with your pager in your OWFC.





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: JAW7254@ACFcluster.NYU.EDU
Date: Fri, 13 Aug 93 12:28:27 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: customer tracking, et al...
Message-ID: <01H1P8AGPYAQVSZQUE@ACFcluster.NYU.EDU>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

I don't know about the camera's/recognition in retail stores that were
mentioned, but at least here in NY, record stores are pushing something
called the I-Card.  The unit is a simple terminal in Tower Records(tho
I think they've dropped it now), some Sam Goody Records', J&R, etc.
When you 'apply' for a card, you fill out a customer survey, name/address/
etc.  They then take two copies of a bar code, and put one on the survey,
and one on a card they give you.  The terminal allows you to see music
and video previews and things of the sort, but to use it, you must slot
your bar code.  The result--a database somewhere with a profile on you
including all participating record stores you've been to , and what music
you've previewed.  Perhaps that should be the Eye-Card, eh?

				Jim Wise
				JAW7254@ACF.NYU.EDU

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From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Perry E. Metzger" <pmetzger@lehman.com>
Date: Fri, 13 Aug 93 11:58:32 PDT
To: Duncan Frissell <frissell@panix.com>
Subject: Re: Making the World Safe for
In-Reply-To: <199308131603.AA27038@panix.com>
Message-ID: <9308131853.AA13780@snark.lehman.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Duncan Frissell says:
> Hal, the point is that the government actions you fear are politically 
> unlikely and would be limited to one nation in any case.  Par example - 
> humorous letter to the editor in today's NYT from someone I'll call 
> "Clueless in New Jersey."  He promotes the idea of a 1% tax on the markets 
> for currencies and derivatives (because they are volitile, unproductive 
> and hurt governments).  Even before the passage of such a tax, the 
> currency traders would have relocated themselves (physically or virtually) 
> to an untaxed location.  

Indeed, virtually all Swedish stocks are now traded in London for much
the same reason.

Perry Metzger 





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: andrew m. boardman <amb@cs.columbia.edu>
Date: Fri, 13 Aug 93 12:02:57 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: one person's speculation is another's insurance hike
In-Reply-To: <9308130831.AA12898@netcom5.netcom.com>
Message-ID: <199308131900.AA11607@ground.cs.columbia.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


   Distance travelled: 14.31 miles. 
   Time elapsed: 13.86 minutes. 
   Average speed: 61.95 MPH
   Speed Limit: 55 MPH
   Excess Speed: 6.95 MPH
   Penalty: 6.95 x $50 = $347.50

Hmm, driving the KS turnpike again?  (Its fines are a bit cheaper, though.)




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: peter honeyman <honey@citi.umich.edu>
Date: Fri, 13 Aug 93 12:12:58 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Beepers can also be used to track you down!
Message-ID: <9308131911.AA02718@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> I carry both a pager and a cell phone.

phil, i've known you a long time, so i'm used to the fact
that you carry a slide rule and a calculator, a walkman and
a transistor radio, wear a belt and suspenders, a ski hat
and earmuffs, but with this, you've gone too far my friend.

	peter




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: peter honeyman <honey@citi.umich.edu>
Date: Fri, 13 Aug 93 12:13:27 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Beepers can also be used to track you down!
Message-ID: <9308131913.AA02733@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>There's probably a way to disable the transmitter in the beeper, ...

i should think that all the second amendment enthusiasts on this list
could come up with something ...

	peter




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: paul@poboy.b17c.ingr.com (Paul Robichaux)
Date: Fri, 13 Aug 93 13:22:59 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re:  Electracy: Evil Revisited
Message-ID: <199308132016.AA12660@poboy.b17c.ingr.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

 Fully participative electronic democracy is what you get when you
 cross cable TV with mob rule.

 I'm a little suprised no one has brought up Brunner's Oracle from _The
 Shockwave Rider_. For those of you who haven't read it, imagine a sort
 of Nintendo-meets-OTB system where you can vote- and *bet* - on the
 probability of certain events.

 Of course, the government has the means to effect the outcome of many
 such events (money supply, availability of crypto, who wins the Miss
 Teen USA pageant), but it's an interesting concept.

 The problem with Lance's positive reputation, et al system is that
 having power, money, status, influence, or a stout reputation doesn't
 automatically mean you're _right_. (cf. Armand Hammer, J. Edgar
 Hoover, Lani Guinier), and the lack thereof doesn't necessarily mean
 you're wrong or that your ideas shouldn't be heard (cf. Alger Hiss,
 the guy-who-invented-variable-delay-wipers, early Martin Luther King
 Jr.)

 -Paul


- -- 
Paul Robichaux, KD4JZG     | "Change the world for a better tomorrow. But
perobich@ingr.com          |  watch your ass today." - aaron@halcyon.com
Intergraph Federal Systems | Be a cryptography user- ask me how.


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From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: rarachel@photon.poly.edu (Aarsen Ray Arachelian)
Date: Fri, 13 Aug 93 12:52:59 PDT
To: jet@netcom.com (J. Eric Townsend)
Subject: Re: Beepers can also be used to track you down!
In-Reply-To: <9308131809.AA17666@netcom.netcom.com>
Message-ID: <9308131951.AA02119@photon.poly.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text


> >While you're at it, don't forget to mention that beepers have a "ping" option
> >in them.  If you were a crook on the run, and you were stupid enough to not
> 
> Documentation, please.  Or a reference.  Having opened up more than
> one of my pagers, I have yet to find evidence of a transmitter.

This came from a conversation I had with a friend of mine.  This guy is usually
on the ball when it comes to technology, so I'll ask him for a refrence.  He's
fairly reliable when it comes to discovering weaknesses in systems, and is
particularly knowledgeable in unix and OS/2, so this sort of thing is something
that is of concern to him as well.  He's worked with a lot of comm stuff as
well.

However, it could wind up as a rumor, so let me ask him and find out where
he found out.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Perry E. Metzger" <pmetzger@lehman.com>
Date: Fri, 13 Aug 93 13:08:27 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: No Subject
In-Reply-To: <9308131915.AA12203@nebula.lrcs.loral.com>
Message-ID: <9308132006.AA13908@snark.lehman.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



David Koontz says:
> When in the Air Force, we used to leave our pagers in Faraday cages when
> going into some of the SCFs, which were built with the copper mesh in the
> walls etc.  The idea being that you didn't want any being carried on
> IF from the pager.

I wonder if they noticed that they never got any pages...

Perry




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: wcs@anchor.ho.att.com (Bill_Stewart(HOY002)1305)
Date: Fri, 13 Aug 93 14:38:29 PDT
To: hkhenson@cup.portal.com
Subject: Re: Beepers can also be used to track you down!
Message-ID: <9308132123.AA26208@anchor.ho.att.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text


There is one way to track someone with a beeper - you call them,
leave your number, and trace the call if they call back.
It doesn't work for people who only accept calls from certain numbers
(mid-level drug dealers, for instance) or use other authentication
(voice pagers, or codes you dial along with the number),
and it's worth calling them from a pay phone in case they recognize
the usual pay-phone numbers (if you live in an area where you can
still call back to a pay-phone.)

It's not generally possible to locate specific beepers from the miniscule amount
of IF that they generate, especially since many of them work by listening to
a standard frequency and only beeping if there's a specific message sent
to alert that user; at most you could find someone using that beeper company.
As an extreme case, consider Skypage, which is satellite-based :-)

On the other hand, if you're trying to figure out which of the 
<politically targeted ethnic group members> hanging around on the street corner
is the drug dealer, and you know the popular local beeper companies'
frequencies and addressing, you _could_ set up a transmitter that
loops through the addresses and see who pulls out a beeper and heads
for the pay phone....  It may take a while if the beepers support
10,000 or 4 billion addresses, but you can limit your search a bit if the
beeper company or stool pigeons have provided you the numbers of the
usual suspects...  Sounds like a good reason to design a paging system
with a large sparse address space to prevent brute-force searches,
and not to key the address directly off your home phone number
or anything obvious like that.

		Bill, who doesn't carry a beeper and whose sales of
		dangerous addictive drugs are normally limited to caffeine...



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Edward Elhauge <ee@lever.com>
Date: Fri, 13 Aug 93 17:48:48 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: On The Inherent Evil of Electronic Democracy
In-Reply-To: <9308120846.AA06905@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Message-ID: <m0oR9Yy-0001ZcC@lever.lever.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


In message <9308120846.AA06905@longs.lance.colostate.edu>, "L. Detweiler" writes:
>3) consider that dampening mechanisms can be built in to a `responsive
>democracy' system. To paint a picture of `direct democracy' as people
>voting instantly on CNN is an ignorant insult.  Conservative,
>deliberative, stable structures, with the formality of court
>proceedings and similar protocol, can be developed. What is a court but
>an elaborate mechanism to uncover truth, resolve conflict, and pass
>judgement, through presentations of evidence, opinion, and voting by a
>nation's citizens? Held to the utmost ideal of impartiality and
>fairness? Impacting every plane of human interaction?

An alternative to courts would be the using the concept of free association so
that if a decision you couldn't agree with was made in a group you
participated in, you could withdraw from the group and join another whose
decisions were more to your liking. Certainly there would be some actions like
dumping toxic wastes that are of society wide concern, but many other
questions such as how much money to spend (taxes) on roads and infrastructure
could be handled on a group commitment basis. Computers could be used to
implement the voting and keep track of accounting procedures that would
otherwise be impractical. Such as, how many people voted (bought shares in) the
space shuttle project and the corresponding benefits; access to the
information, status reports, etc.

>4) I believe `representative democracy' is essentially a mask for the
>idea of saying `some people should have more influence than others in
>voting and influencing social conventions, because they are leaders,
>they know more about the subject, they are more affected by it, they
>are recognized experts, they have everyone's best interest in mind'
>etc. Now, consider that this `influence' could be *formalized* into a
>system such that people `own' it and trade it and grant it to others
>like a *currency system*, and that voting systems automatically weight
>votes in different areas based on it.

I agree totally about the elitist assumptions of representative democracy. I
would prefer a combination of direct voting and an issue by issue proxy
system. For instance I have no problem giving Barbara Boxer my proxy on
health care, but am totally unwilling to give her my proxy on gun control.
This proxy system would also eliminate the winner take all system that
disenfranchises minorities. For instance blacks who are 10% of the population
in a district often get no representation; then there are gerry mandered
districts where a black is guaranteed to win. But you might have a
conservative black businessman representing a district where 30% of the blacks
are more radical. The winner take all system is just a way of diluting and
ignoring non-mainstream ideas and groups.

PS. I wish the From: or Reply-To: header came from the cypherpunk list. I had
meant to reply to this post to the group but accidently sent it to L.
Detweiler instead, only.
--
       Edward Elhauge -- ee@lever.com -- Lever Industries, San Francisco
"The goal of the working class is liberation from exploitation. This goal is
not reached and cannot be reached by a new directing and governing class
substituting itself for the bourgeoisie. It is only realized by the workers
themselves being master over production." -- Anton Pannekoek




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Derek Atkins <warlord@MIT.EDU>
Date: Fri, 13 Aug 93 14:43:00 PDT
To: cypherpunks-east@MIT.EDU
Subject: MEET: Reminder: Boston Area Cypherpunks
Message-ID: <9308132140.AA06766@toxicwaste.MEDIA.MIT.EDU>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


This is a final reminder that there will be a Boston Area Cypherpunks
meeting this Saturday, August 14, 1993, from 4-8 pm in MIT room 1-115.

Directions:
Get to MIT.  
	By T: you can get off at Kendall Sq., off the red line.
	By BUS: route #1 stops right in front of MIT's main entrance
at 77 Mass. Ave.
	By Car: Have fun parking!!  ;-)

Room 1-115 is on the first floor of building 1.  Building one is just
a little south of the Main MIT entrance at 77 Mass. Ave, close to
Mass. Ave.  If you take the T, you will have to cross campus to get to
Mass Ave.  There will be signs (hopefully) to point the way once you
get close to the main entrance.

If you need more detailed directions, please call me at home:
868-4469, or send me email.

See you Saturday at 4!

-derek




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: gnu (John Gilmore)
Date: Fri, 13 Aug 93 17:49:11 PDT
To: cypherpunks, gnu
Subject: Requesting all records of the Clipper review panel
Message-ID: <9308140044.AA08293@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


This is a draft, which will be sent out within a day or two.

	John

Karl Bell
Deputy Director of Administration
Freedom of Information Act Officer
National Institute of Standards and Technology
Building 101, Room A-110
Gaithersburg, MD	20899

Dear Mr. Bell:

This is a request under the Freedom of Information Act 
("FOIA"), 5 U.S.C. $ 552, on behalf of Mr. John Gilmore for all 
agency records pertaining to and utilized by the Skipjack review 
panel ("Panel").  

This request also requests access to records which must be 
made available under the Federal Advisory Committee Act 
("FACA"), 5 U.S.C. App. II (1972).  Section 8(b)(2) of the FACA 
requires that the supervising agency for an advisory committee 
must assemble and maintain records for the committee; Section 
8(b)(3) of the FACA provides that such records are subject to the 
FOIA.

The Panel's review is being performed pursuant to the 
President's direction that "respected experts from outside the 
government [] be offered access to the confidential details of the 
algorithm to assess its capabilities and publicly report their 
finding."  The Acting Director of the National Institute of 
Standards and Technology sent letters of invitation to potential 
reviewers.  

This request for records includes, but is not limited to: 

all records relating to the selection of the Panel members;

all records of the Panel's activities and use of funds [FACA 
$ 12(a)]; 

the charter of the Panel [FACA $ 9(c)]; 

all notices of Panel meetings [FACA $ 10(a)(2)];

all written determinations to close any part of a Panel 
meeting [FACA $ 10(d)];

all records, reports, transcripts, minutes, appendices, 
working papers, drafts, studies, agenda or other documents which 
were made available to or prepared by the committee [FACA 
$$10(b) & (c)].  

For instance, the Panel's interim report states that:

We attended an initial meeting at the Institute for Defense Analyses
Supercomputing Research Center (SRC) from June 21-23.  At that
meeting, the designer of SKIPJACK provided a complete, detailed
description of the algorithm, the rationale for each feature, and the
history of the design.  The head of the NSA evaluation team described
the evaluation process and its results.  Other NSA staff briefed us on
the LEAF structure and protocols for use, generation of device keys,
protection of the devices against reverse engineering, and NSA's
history in the design and evaluation of encryption methods contained
in SKIPJACK.  Additional NSA and NIST staff were present at the
meeting to answer our questions and provide assistance.  All staff
members were forthcoming in providing us with requested information.

All records pertaining to this and other meetings of the 
Panel are included within the scope of this FOIA/FACA request.

If the requested records are not in the possession of your 
agency, I ask that you forward this request to any agency that you 
believe may have records that are responsive to this request.  In the 
alternative, I ask that you inform me of other agencies that might 
have such records.  

As you know, the FOIA provides that even if some 
requested material is properly exempted from mandatory 
disclosure, all segregable portions must be released.  [5 U.S.C. $ 
552(b)]  If any or all material covered by this request is withheld, 
please inform me of the specific exemptions that are being claimed.  
If any of the requested material is released with deletions, I ask that 
each deletion be marked to indicate the exemption(s) being claimed 
to authorize each particular withholding.  

In addition, I ask that your agency exercise its discretion to 
release information that may be technically exempt but where 
withholding would serve no important public interest.

As you know, the FOIA provides that agencies may reduce 
or waive fees if it would be "in the public interest because 
furnishing the information can be considered as primarily 
benefiting the public."  [5 U.S.C. $ 552(a)(4)(A)]  Release of this 
material would be of benefit to the public because of the 
importance of public discussion of technology which can enhance 
personal privacy.  

Moreover, in previous FOIA requests to NIST, Mr. Gilmore 
has amply demonstrated his ability and willingness to disseminate 
such information to the general public.  I therefore ask that you 
waive any fees relating to this request.  Mr. Gilmore promises to 
pay up to $1000 in processing costs should this fee waiver be 
denied, so that NIST can begin processing this request while you 
rule on the propriety of this fee waiver.  

If you have any questions regarding this request, please 
telephone me at the above number.  I would be happy to discuss 
ways in which this request could be clarified or somewhat 
redesigned to reflect the agency's filing system and speed the 
search for records.

As provided under the FOIA, I will expect a reply within 10 
working days.



Sincerely yours,



Lee Tien
On behalf of Mr. 
John Gilmore





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Warren Keith Russell <keru@cpu.us.dynix.com>
Date: Fri, 13 Aug 93 17:08:39 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Pine
Message-ID: <Pine.3.05.9308131707.E71026-b100000@cpu.us.dynix.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


R. Tait wrote the following:

>Does anyone have elisp to integrate PGP into Emacs?  I'm fed up of
>having to use VI to send/receive all my encrypted mail, and there's no
>point in me writing any code if someone already has.

Which prompts me to ask:

Is anyone out there using the Pine email software?  If so, do you know of
any way to integrate PGP into Pine?  If not, any other ideas?  I see a lot
of signed messages out there, but the only way for me to send one is to
shell out to AIX, use vi to create a message, run pgp to create the signed
message, then run Pine and read the message in, at which point I can
finally send it.

Notice that this message isn't signed.  It's just too much hassle!

Thanks for any advice anyone can give me.

Keith

-------------------------------------------------------------------------
Keith Russell                  Dynix Library Systems, Provo, Utah, U.S.A.
keru@cpu.us.dynix.com    or    keru@devg.us.dynix.com
-------------------------------------------------------------------------





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: jet@netcom.com (J. Eric Townsend)
Date: Fri, 13 Aug 93 11:12:57 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Beepers can also be used to track you down!
In-Reply-To: <9308131050.AA28463@ishara.poly.edu>
Message-ID: <9308131809.AA17666@netcom.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


A1 ray arachelian (library) writes:
>While you're at it, don't forget to mention that beepers have a "ping" option
>in them.  If you were a crook on the run, and you were stupid enough to not

Documentation, please.  Or a reference.  Having opened up more than
one of my pagers, I have yet to find evidence of a transmitter.





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: peb@PROCASE.COM (Paul Baclace)
Date: Fri, 13 Aug 93 18:13:06 PDT
To: tcmay@netcom.com
Subject: Re: CA online legislative database access
Message-ID: <9308140110.AA02254@banff.procase.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



I agree with sentiments against a direct democracy for all the reasons
given and some extra reasons:  laws should have expiration dates and
a better feedback process is needed to determine whether particular
laws are beneficial (hmm, sounds like PPL.)  

The real problem seems to be a general lack of education and wealth, but
there is always the bell curve--such things will always be unevenly
distributed.

However, tracking proposed laws via the net creates the possibility
of anyone being able to have a cheap lobbyist--the stuff can
be posted and filtered, etc.  This has nothing to do with people
proposing stupid laws whenever they feel like it (this would require
more significant legal changes).


Paul E. Baclace
peb@procase.com




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: gtoal@an-teallach.com (Graham Toal)
Date: Fri, 13 Aug 93 11:58:27 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: how does it work
Message-ID: <5028@an-teallach.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


In article <Pine.3.05.9308091300.A5374-b100000@ra.cs.umb.edu> pbreton@cs.umb.edu writes:
 > 1) Aren't telnets logged, at least at the site you telnet to? If I "telnet
 > xxxx smtp", doesn't the site I telnet to have it in a log? I can't control
 > that, and that could identify me.

*All* connections to any port can be logged.  And if your site isn't entirely
under your own control, your site can collude with the called site using
the ident protocol to tell the other site the name of the user that the
tcp/ip connection belongs to.  If the other end has a smart SMTP, it
can put this info in the received: headers.

I do stuff like this myself using the LOG_TCP wrappers.

G
===
Personal mail to gtoal@gtoal.com (I read it in the evenings)
Business mail to gtoal@an-teallach.com (Be careful with the spelling!)
Faxes to An Teallach Limited: +44 31 662 4678  Voice: +44 31 668 1550 x212





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: nobody@rosebud.ee.uh.edu
Date: Fri, 13 Aug 93 16:53:04 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: encrypting viruses
Message-ID: <9308132350.AA07169@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

Fellow cypherpunks,

Speaking of cryptostacker and beneficial viruses that encrypt files for you
in the background, I just got a copy of one in the mail!  I think this may
be of interest to the group, so I am posting.

Here's a section from the documentation:

- ---begin excerpt
Wouldn't it make sense to have a virus that encrypts your system for you?
It can work in the background, and just encrypt every floppy you make,
and put a copy of itself on that disk too, if there's room, so when you
take it somewhere, you can still decrypt.  And best of all, the encryption
is public domain and free.

Well, now you have just the virus you need.  The Potassium Hydroxide Virus
is a friendly virus, desinged specifically to solve the problems of the
average computer user who attaches some value to the privacy of what he
has on his computer - either because he doesn't agree with the strictest
interpretation of copyright law, or for any other reason.  I say it is
"friendly" because it doesn't just go in and infect your system without
your knowledge, and use some unknown key for encryption so you can't
recover.  Rather, the Potassium Hydroxide politely asks if you want to 
infect (yes, it even uses the word "please"), and it asks you for a 
password to use for encrypting.

As far as encryption goes, the Potassium Hydroxide uses two different
algorithms.  One is slow-but-good, the other fast-but-easy to break.
And it allows you to choose which one will be used on your hard disk.
That way you can choose the level of security and performance you like.
Floppy disks are always encrypted with the slow-but-good algorithm, 
since they are already slow.
 
The slow-but-good algorithm used is state-of-the-art.  It is the
International Data Encryption Algorithm (known as IDEA), which was
developed by someone besides the government , (for those of you who do
not trust the government to keep you data safe) and has been the subject
of intense public scrutiny for several years.  Although cryptographers
admit that IDEA is fairly new, and someone may find a way to crack it in
the future, no one has done so yet.

[skipping a few sentences]

Using the Potassium Hydroxide

Installing the Potassium Hydroxide on your computer is fairly easy.  
However, as with installing any cryptographic system, I'd highly recommend
you back up everything on your hard disk first.  After all, if the power
fails after your FAT has been encrypted, but nothing else, it's going
to be tought to recover without a backup

Step 1: Format a floppy and put the system files on it so it can boot
to the DOS prompt.  Pull the disk out and put it back in.  (You must do
this or the virus won't infect it)

Step 2: Execute the KOH.COM file included on the disk with this issue.
This will encrypt the diskette in the A: drive and install the Potassium
Hydroxide on it live.  Enter a password when it requests one.  This
password is only temporary.  Do a directory on this disk, and you will
see only gibberish.  That will prove to you it has been properly encrypted.

Step 3: Boot from the disk you just infected.  The virus will then request
permission to infect your hard disk.  Tell it yes.

Step 4: Reboot your computer from the hard disk.  Now the virus will ask you
if you want to encrypt your hard disk.  If you do, enter "Y".  If you don't,
all floppies will still be encrypted, and you must enter the floppy
encryption password at boot-up.  I recommend you attempt to boot at least
once without encrypting just to make sure the virus installed properly
on the hard disk.

Step 5: After booting once without encrypting, reboot and encrypt this time.
You will be asked if you want casual (fast) encryption or strong (slow)
encryption.  Make your choice.  Next you'll be asked for a password for
floppies and for the hard disk.  The floppy password is stored on your
hard disk in (strong) encrypted form, and the hard disk password must be
entered every time you boot.  Enter them both at this time.  The initial
encryption process then begins.  It is admittedly very slow.  Just allocate
and hour or so for strong encryption and be patient.  The virus does not use
a very large buffer for encrypting because it doesn't want to take up too
much memory.

Step 6: After the encryption is done, you should reboot your computer and
test it.  With any luck it will work just fine.  A good test to make sure
everything worked OK is to run CHKDSK, and test out some of your favorite
programs.  If you experience problems, you may have to use your backup
to restore everything.  That's no different than any encryption program,
though.

Compatibility

  [been tested with DOS 4,5,6 and Windows 3.1.  So far, the only problem
is with the 32-bit disk driver for Windows 3.1]

Incidentally, the Potassium Hydroxide has been donated to the PUBLIC DOMAIN.

- ---end excerpt

I can't seem to find mention of what the fast/casual encryption algorithm
is.  Instead of source code, a hex listing is provided.  According to
further notes, there is a hot-key for toggling floppy encrypt, and another
hot key to uninstall from the hard drive.

All the same, if I get a chance this weekend I'll probably try it
out!





-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.3a

iQCVAgUBLGwl24OA7OpLWtYzAQExMwQAv2d/CJA+qq/1CcRWR/IH2kDPlqqMMw2J
W5WWLz1ngaNSWYddY1c29mrRlgKKdLdt+ijLNo6iP2/YbFzS3x66Y7c14dvmtfZP
J1S0yvc70eWu/gZPNQLpyYwvYJjYL8jWMtdLWROlXk9UYQSolxTETRugRo02eApt
tO5ZPIs+iYw=
=beMR
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Johan Helsingius <julf@penet.FI>
Date: Fri, 13 Aug 93 10:18:27 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Re: anonymous contact ser
Message-ID: <9308131937.aa01023@penet.penet.FI>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


"M. Stirner" <M..Stirner@f0.n0.z1.fidonet.org>:

>  Uu> Here's why. I can't reply directly to your message, as some gateway on
>  Uu> the way barfs on the ".." in your name. This seems to come and go.
>  Uu> This is probably also what screws up anon.penet.fi.
> 
> This is extremely interesting!  This "problem" was supposedly fixed some
> time ago, but this is why I have alternate accounts elsewhere with more
> common names.   In any event, I will pass this information along to the
> proper persons.

Well, having ".." in your username is *not* a good idea for most mail
systems!

> Yes, the zeros are wrong & were inserted by software out of my control.
> I also have different addresses, true enough, but there is no f0.n0.z1
> in fido; that address is a software error.  I suspect it'll be on this
> message, too.

Yeah. This is one of my pet peeves. PEOPLE WHO SEND OUT STUFF ON THE NET
WITH NON-REPLYABLE FROM ADDRESSES SHOULD BE FORCED TO READ REC.HUMOR FOR
A MONTH!

So there!

> STILL....the problem I have is not addressed:  I cannot make a
> multi-line header (as in the required "X-Anon-Password: password" line)
> work through this UUCP gate, as far as I can tell.

> I cannot use password
> header lines unless anon.penet.fi can handle having blank lines between
> the header fields:

It can handle empty lines betwen the header proper and the X-Anon stuff,
but not in between the X-Anon lines.

> The above header will pass the UUCP gate here.  Without the blank lines,
> the header gets grunged after the To: anon@anon.penet.fi line.

What brain-damaged (excuse the expression) gateway software are you using?


	Julf






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: koontzd@lrcs.loral.com (David Koontz )
Date: Fri, 13 Aug 93 20:33:45 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: No Subject
Message-ID: <9308140332.AA13545@nebula.lrcs.loral.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain




I used to have a collection of COMSEC posters, which were at best inane.
Sort of in the same vein as a T shirt, how about:

   CRIPPLED PRIVACY:    



   [ Artwork of MYK-78A ]  / (or replace with Uncle SAM pointing finger)

  N ever
   S ay
    A nything you DON'T 
        want overheard.


or

  [ Artwork of MYK-78A ]
   (identifying legend)

    Cryptographically
    Secure from all but
    Government TYRANNY


or

    Does PRIVACY have  to
    be  a choice  between
    being eavesdropped on
    by  anybody   OR  the 
       U.S. GOVERNMENT?

    SECURE CRYPTO is  the 
    ultimate FREE SPEECH!

or

   [ Artwork of Robot Cop, from
     THX 1138 ]

  [ speech bubble "Are you now, or 
    have you ever been ... ? ]
  

    A country that can have
    the McCarthy Era has no
    business  allowing  its
    government  to  spy  on 
    its Citizens.

   BAN MANDATORY PHONE BUGS!

or

   [ Artwork of SPY with headphones ]

    PRIVACY is  not  having  to
    worry about being overheard
    by  the  government.   FREE
    SPEECH  doesn't  end at the
    your phone handset.

  
    
Unfortunately George Orwells 'Animal Farm' isn't widely enough read to 
us quotes for making the point.  Its probably only applicable after the
other shoe drops anyway.

Did you notice that the artwork in Dorthy Dennings 'American Scientist'
article showed a minority member with headsets listening to a decoded
clipper phone conversation?  One wonders if this was intended as a 
propoganda ploy to disarm as being Politically unCorrect (PUNC) critizism
of the action?

What we need is a national talk show host/comedian belittling the
governments plan.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: bbyer@BIX.com
Date: Fri, 13 Aug 93 17:48:42 PDT
To: nfe@freedom.NMSU.Edu
Subject: Re: Spooking of neural nets and image recognition...
In-Reply-To: <9308131644.AA16850@NMSU.Edu>
Message-ID: <9308132042.memo.45489@BIX.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


How about radio-frequency interference?   I've heard that this works
quite well for video camera and other electronic monitoring equipment.

Ben Byer <bbyer@bix.com>




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Date: Fri, 13 Aug 93 22:33:09 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Anyone have the Gus Simmons paper?
Message-ID: <9308140532.AA24598@netcom5.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



I recently scanned and OCRed the first part of the Gus Simmons
preprint on subliminal channels in the Digital Signature System, then
I posted this to the Cypherpunks list.

Eric Hughes has asked me to scan in the whole paper and upload it the
soda archives. (I cannot agree to OCR it all, however, as even my
excellent OCR package cannot handle the many equations, subscripts,
superscripts, etc. Eric proposes that I upload the raw TIFF file and
then Cypherpunk volunteers can, if they wish, open the images and work
on parts. Well, that's the theory.)

But I can't find my copy anywhere! Also, a couple of people said a
more recent revision is now circulating.

So, could anyone who has a version--any version will do in a pinch,
but the more recent the better--get in touch with me? Even better
would be to bring it to the Cypherpunks meeting tomorrow (the Mountain
View one).

Thanks,

-Tim May


-- 
..........................................................................
Timothy C. May         | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,  
tcmay@netcom.com       | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
408-688-5409           | knowledge, reputations, information markets, 
W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA  | black markets, collapse of governments.
Higher Power: 2^756839 | Public Key: PGP and MailSafe available.
Note: I put time and money into writing this posting. I hope you enjoy it.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Date: Fri, 13 Aug 93 23:33:09 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Solicitation of Tax Evasion--An Example
Message-ID: <9308140630.AA17518@netcom5.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



What could anonymous systems be used for? Besides allowing anonymity
in posting embarrassing or otherwise "questionable" messages, is there
any _commercial_ use? 

These are questions I hear a lot. Yes, there are commercial uses.

Here's a case that just came wafting across the Net: a woman who wants
to evade taxes--she states this explicitly--by bartering her labor for
some software. (I have no problem with this, being against taxes and
all, and knowing that various kinds of untaxable barter exchanges are
going on everywhere.)

Here's her post (no names have been changed, as she posted publicly):

Newsgroups: misc.forsale.computers.mac
From: vanous@mdd.comm.mot.com (Brendan K. Vanous)
Subject: BARTER: graphic design for s/w
Message-ID: <1993Aug14.040010.141@mdd.comm.mot.com>
Summary: would like to barter services for Mac software
Date: Sat, 14 Aug 1993 04:00:10 GMT


POSTING FROM MY HUSBAND'S ACCOUNT (mine's temporarily inaccessable):

Hi.  I'm a freelance forms/graphics designer who would like to expand her
software library in an inexpensive (& non-taxable :-) manner.  Therefore,
I would like to propose the following:

I will trade any of my design services (business forms, business cards,
illustrations, manual formatting, brochures, newsletters, any sort of
desktop publishing task that can be performed on a Mac ...) for an
equivalent amount of Mac software (got an extra copy of PageMaker 4.1
lying around that you don't need?)  All software must be original, with
documentation and letter of transferral.  NO PIRATED COPIES, PLEASE!

If interested, please reply to cyphrkt@eskimo.com and I'll reply to you
as soon as I possibly can (probably another 1 or 2 days before I get
my account back up and running), or contact me at (206) 778-3362 by voice.

Thanks!
		- Cindy Vanous

.................


Chances are no IRS types are watching the Net for such
solicitations--and the act of making such an offer is probably not
itself illegal. The IRS would have to investigate, call an audit,
prove taxes were evaded, etc. The existence of her solicitation might
or might not be considered.

But in an era in which every Usenet utterance is recorde in perpetuity
and is available on CD-ROMs for browsing and compilation of databases
and dossiers (you all *do* know this, don't you? Don't bother applying
for certain jobs if you posted too many times, or even once, to
"alt.sex.perversion.whatever").

Furthermore, anyone _reading_ this kind of post can, for example, call
an anonymous (semi-anonymous?) tip line run by the IRS. Last I heard,
tipsters can get 25% of any taxes collected as the result of their
good citizenship.

So, what can anonymity of the sort we discuss do here? After all, if
she's anonymous, how can a tranaction ever be consummated? (I'll leave
aside purely electronic transactions, which could in principle be done
fully anonymously, using a combination of "pools" (the "digital
democracy walls" I have cited before) and anonymous remailers.)

If Cindy were to use an anonymous remailer to post her offer, and then
offer a public key that could be used by anyone who wished to respond
to her offer, a response could then be posted in the same group.
Something like this:

"Alice" (really Cindy): "Want to trade consulting for a used
Macintosh. If you are interested, use this public key to respond:
3$1k8dRW4..."

Bob (really Jack) sees this, decides to offer a deal, encrypts it with
her public key (a one-time public key, used just for this deal), and
used anonymous remailers to post it in place she is sure to see it
(the same newsgroup, for example, or in one of Miron Cuperman's
"pools," or in "alt.w.a.s.t.e," etc.). Bob also includes a public key
she can use to communicate with him.

If they like the general deal, they can then agree (using only their
encrypted channel, readable only to themselves, even though they have
never met and have no idea who the other is or where they live) on the
next step. In a purely electronic transaction, this process can
continue digitally and fully securely.

If physical goods or money need to change hands, they can agree to
meet, to use phones, etc. The risk to Cindy is still there--Bob (Jack)
could of course be a government agent, etc.--but at least she is no
longer broadcasting her intentions for all Usenet readers, present and
future, to potentially see. And no future readers, such as government
computer programs set to scan all postings for evidence of such
illegalities, can retroactively detect and compromise her.

(If no actual physical contact is needed--such as for software sales
and consulting--then of course the contact can in principle remain
fully anonymous. Even the transfer of physical goods can be done with
moderately good security against tracing...smugglers, drug dealers,
and hijackers do it all the time. "Fences," they are called. And so
on.)

This is just one example of how "the little people" can benefit from
the schemes we are exploring. Understand that I have no illusions that
our friend Cindy will soon be using such methods...but maybe in 5
years.


-Tim May

--
..........................................................................
Timothy C. May         | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,  
tcmay@netcom.com       | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
408-688-5409           | knowledge, reputations, information markets, 
W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA  | black markets, collapse of governments.
Higher Power: 2^756839 | Public Key: PGP and MailSafe available.
Note: I put time and money into writing this posting. I hope you enjoy it.


-- 
..........................................................................
Timothy C. May         | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,  
tcmay@netcom.com       | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
408-688-5409           | knowledge, reputations, information markets, 
W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA  | black markets, collapse of governments.
Higher Power: 2^756839 | Public Key: PGP and MailSafe available.
Note: I put time and money into writing this posting. I hope you enjoy it.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Al Billings <mimir@u.washington.edu>
Date: Fri, 13 Aug 93 23:53:09 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Pine
In-Reply-To: <Pine.3.05.9308131707.E71026-b100000@cpu.us.dynix.com>
Message-ID: <Pine.3.05z.9308132327.A23524-a100000@carson.u.washington.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain




On Fri, 13 Aug 1993, Warren Keith Russell wrote:

> Which prompts me to ask:
> 
> Is anyone out there using the Pine email software?  If so, do you know of
> any way to integrate PGP into Pine?  If not, any other ideas?  I see a lot
> of signed messages out there, but the only way for me to send one is to
> shell out to AIX, use vi to create a message, run pgp to create the signed
> message, then run Pine and read the message in, at which point I can
> finally send it.

 Well, I can't help you directly but why are you using vi? The editor you
use inside of pine can also be used as a full screen editor. It is pico.







From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: khijol!erc@apple.com (Ed Carp)
Date: Sat, 14 Aug 93 00:38:47 PDT
To: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Subject: Re: Solicitation of Tax Evasion--An Example
In-Reply-To: <9308140630.AA17518@netcom5.netcom.com>
Message-ID: <m0oRG0E-00024eC@khijol>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text


> Bob (really Jack) sees this, decides to offer a deal, encrypts it with
> her public key (a one-time public key, used just for this deal), and
> used anonymous remailers to post it in place she is sure to see it
> (the same newsgroup, for example, or in one of Miron Cuperman's
> "pools," or in "alt.w.a.s.t.e," etc.). Bob also includes a public key
> she can use to communicate with him.

The problem is, unless you're very careful about distributions and such,
you can easily clog the net with zillions of public-key-encryptions to
alt.security.pgp.messages <grin>.  But then again, I suppose it's not
any more traffic than alt.sex.pictures.erotica.* generates. :)

It would be trivial to write a script to be put in your .login to
automatically skim that newsgroup for anything encrypted with your public
key.  Hmmm...
-- 
Ed Carp, N7EKG			erc@apple.com			510/659-9560
                            anon-2133@twwells.com
If you want magic, let go of your armor.  Magic is so much stronger than
steel!        -- Richard Bach, "The Bridge Across Forever"



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Date: Sat, 14 Aug 93 01:13:08 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Solicitation of Tax Evasion--An Example
In-Reply-To: <m0oRG0E-00024eC@khijol>
Message-ID: <9308140811.AA16134@netcom5.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Ed Carp writes:

...

> The problem is, unless you're very careful about distributions and such,
> you can easily clog the net with zillions of public-key-encryptions to
> alt.security.pgp.messages <grin>.  But then again, I suppose it's not
> any more traffic than alt.sex.pictures.erotica.* generates. :)
> 
> It would be trivial to write a script to be put in your .login to
> automatically skim that newsgroup for anything encrypted with your public
> key.  Hmmm...

Yes, Ed is right. Easy to spot messages intended for you. And the
volumes involved in this "crypto classfieds" are not unreasonable.

Several comments:

1. As Ed points out, not such a large volume compared to the GIFs and
JPEGs (and now even MPEGs) being posted. A "classifed ad" is small for
what it carries (in terms of commercial information). That is, all the
ads we could write as individuals in a year would be less than a
single large JPEG image. And of course the ads could be packed in the
bits of such images, but I digress. And as Hal Finney notes,
steganography is not the main issue.

Ironically, though, these "crypto classifieds" represent a kind of
steganography, in that the authorities may _suspect_ the meaningless
bits are related to tax evasion, or solicitation of murders
(untraceable!), or sales of Stealth bomber plans, but they can't prove
this. The cyphertext could just as easily be love letters, encrypted
notes to lawyers (attorney-client privilege), psychiatric records (the
law now requires due diligence in keeping them secure, so encryption
is increasing here), or the "digital confessionals" of networked
churches! (These "legal covers" for crypto will be _very_ hard to
stop, even if the Administration wants to ban strong crypto. Telling a
priest or a lawyer that his communications with his client must be
wire-tappable will not go over well, and may be ipso facto thrown out.)

2. By analogy with publishing real classified ads in real newspapers,
imagine a "pool" site, reachable by ftp, that could contain gigabytes
of such encrypted "junk." (Incrimination of those who use such a site
can be eliminated by having it used for all kinds of things, and
encouraging everyone who retrieves something that's actually of
interest to them to randomly take a bunch of other stuff. This could
be cumbersome, I'll grant you.)

(Probably easier to just use UseNet, unless and until the volumes get
really large. When we last discussed this in a major way, probably
around last November or so, Miron Cuperman proposed "pools" that
people would subscribe to, automatically getting _all_ messages sent
to the pool. Incrimination is avoided, as above. However, using idle
UseNet groups ("alt.fan.chaum"?) will work just about as well, modulo
some concerns that who reads what newsgroups is theoretically
observable.)

3. Satellite distribution, as with all kinds of feeds. (These various
alternative distribution systems--satellite, pool, newsgroup, ftp
site--are all just variations on the idea that nobody knows who's
reading what ads in a newspaper-type system, a batched transmission
system.)

4. How does the target of a message know where to look? Must he scan
through all messages?

Obviously not, as many indexing schemes can be used which do not
compromise the security. For example, he may know that messages he can
read will start with "BARTER FOR SOFTWARE." The sender's security is
still maintained (remailers) and so is the recipient's (he takes many
messages, or downloads a large chunk of them to his local machine,
where he can extract the message meant for him).

(And the messages may also be apparently meaningless junk, readable
only to the intended recipient. So that he won't have to decrypt each
and every message to see which ones he can open--and he may have
multiple transactions in the pipeline, all with their own unique keys
to use!--there can be simple headers which are very quickly decrypted
Or the two communicants, once a channel is established, can agree to
put keywords in their messages, outside the cypertext. Again, this is
exactly what those communicating with newspaper ads do: they use
codes.)

Enough for now.

-Tim May



-- 
..........................................................................
Timothy C. May         | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,  
tcmay@netcom.com       | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
408-688-5409           | knowledge, reputations, information markets, 
W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA  | black markets, collapse of governments.
Higher Power: 2^756839 | Public Key: PGP and MailSafe available.
Note: I put time and money into writing this posting. I hope you enjoy it.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: plmoses@unix.cc.emory.edu (Paul L. Moses)
Date: Fri, 13 Aug 93 22:48:46 PDT
To: koontzd@lrcs.loral.com
Subject: Get Rush Limbaugh to mock Clipper phonez
Message-ID: <9308140544.AA15784@emoryu1.cc.emory.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



David Koontz sez, get some national figure to belittle the government.
Well, Limbaugh does it for a living.....




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: khijol!erc@apple.com (Ed Carp)
Date: Sat, 14 Aug 93 01:53:09 PDT
To: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Subject: Re: Solicitation of Tax Evasion--An Example
In-Reply-To: <9308140811.AA16134@netcom5.netcom.com>
Message-ID: <m0oRHEZ-00024eC@khijol>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text


> > The problem is, unless you're very careful about distributions and such,
> > you can easily clog the net with zillions of public-key-encryptions to
> > alt.security.pgp.messages <grin>.  But then again, I suppose it's not
> > any more traffic than alt.sex.pictures.erotica.* generates. :)
> > 
> > It would be trivial to write a script to be put in your .login to
> > automatically skim that newsgroup for anything encrypted with your public
> > key.  Hmmm...
> 
> Yes, Ed is right. Easy to spot messages intended for you. And the
> volumes involved in this "crypto classfieds" are not unreasonable.
> 
> 4. How does the target of a message know where to look? Must he scan
> through all messages?

PGP will fail if signed with a key that it doesn't know about - that makes
it easy... So, one doesn't need to decrypt all the messages (or try to),
nor does one have to agree on a subject header or anything else.
-- 
Ed Carp, N7EKG			erc@apple.com			510/659-9560
                            anon-2133@twwells.com
If you want magic, let go of your armor.  Magic is so much stronger than
steel!        -- Richard Bach, "The Bridge Across Forever"



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: szabo@netcom.com (Nick Szabo)
Date: Sat, 14 Aug 93 01:58:47 PDT
To: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Subject: Preempting net.archive.blacklist
In-Reply-To: <9308140630.AA17518@netcom5.netcom.com>
Message-ID: <9308140858.AA26459@netcom5.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Tim May: 

> This is just one example of how "the little people" can benefit from 
> the schemes we are exploring. Understand that I have no illusions that 
> our friend Cindy will soon be using such methods...but maybe in 5  years.

Did you forward her a copy of your excellent ariticle?  That would
be a start.  More generally,  we can explain how Usenet can be
archived and used for these kinds of purposes, posting 
to newsgroups far & wide (esp. alt.drugs, *.activists, soc.motss,
support newsgroups, flame-prone political newsgroups, etc.) until 
net.users have been made aware of the consequences of their posting.

Alas, mere explanation and exhortation might indeed take five years.
Illustration could be far more effective.  Perhaps we should do some
dossier accumulation ourselves, blatantly.  Interesting replies 
could be sent via anon remailer to people who post on controversial 
political topics.   For example, a hit on '/black/ && /welfare queen/' 
might trigger the following:

----------------------
From: multicult@nowhere.com (Racism Tracking Project)
Organization: Multicultural Unity Activists
To: redneck_poster@deep.south.edu

Your recent post to soc.culture.usa, enclosed below, has been archived 
as part of an exciting new experiment to stamp out racism worldwide.  
Our first step is the Racism Tracking Project is to track
racist hate speech in order that society may never again be caught
unaware of those promoting hate.  Our database will be made 
available to selected scholars, journalists, and law enforcement 
officials upon request.

Your posting has been recorded as follows:

<carbon copy of redneck's post here>

Please let us know if this is in error.  Have a good day.
--------------------

A more sophisticated version would respond to intercepted private
e-mail in addition to grepping netnews.  Such "Tracking Projects" 
might, if net.users continue scrawling their private thoughts on
the public archives, accumulate detailed blacklists on homophobes, 
homosexuals, satan-worshipers, Aryan Nationalists, Communists, anarchists, 
Scientologists, atheists, pagans, promoters of illegal drug use and tax 
evasion, etc.  Preemptive, blatant Net.Blacklists may be the only way
to effectively raise awareness of the issue before the real blacklists
start up -- if they haven't already.

Nick Szabo				szabo@netcom.com




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: anonymous@extropia.wimsey.com
Date: Sat, 14 Aug 93 11:51:44 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: No Subject
Message-ID: <199308141827.AA26394@xtropia>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



 >   *pragmatic* descriptions of Electronic Democracy ...
 Uu> 
 Uu> You're walking down the street, and a gang of thugs jumps out
 Uu> from behind some bushes. Their leader approaches you and says:
 Uu> 
 Uu> "Don't be alarmed, we're your very local community - we believe
 Uu> in the noble principle of Democracy, majority rule, and you
 Uu> have an equal vote with each of us."

Et cetera, und so weiter...

More succinctly, "Democracy is four wolves and a sheep voting on lunch."

Up the republic!





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: danodom@matt.ksu.ksu.edu (Dan Odom)
Date: Sat, 14 Aug 93 09:31:42 PDT
To: ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu (L. Detweiler)
Subject: Re: birth of Software Patent Institute
In-Reply-To: <9308110513.AA07049@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Message-ID: <9308141628.AA12770@matt.ksu.ksu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


L. Detweiler Said:

> Don't know anything about this, but it's a definite Cypherpunk cause...
> the first question to ask would be whether they're in touch with LPF at all.

I don't know if this is what you were asking, but:

The LPF is very strongly against the SPI, and requests that people
refrain from providing it with ANY information that might assist it in
building a database containing software patent information.  This
database, whatever its intended use may be, can assist
leeches^H^H^H^H^H^H^Hlawyers in building bulletproof software patents
by making information on prior art available to them.  It will have a
user interface in the same style as LEXIS/NEXUS (sp?), and that
suggests that it is inteded for the lawyers rather than for us (no
offense intended to Mike).

-- 
Dan Odom
danodom@matt.ksu.ksu.edu -- Kansas State University, Manhattan, KS

Support the League for Programming Freedom.  Mail lpf@uunet.uu.net



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: bwp@mindvox.phantom.com (Jane Doe)
Date: Sat, 14 Aug 93 08:56:42 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: User suggestion on MacPGP
Message-ID: <HH508B1w165w@mindvox.phantom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


One of the best improvements implemented in MacPGP 2.3 was the ability for
the user to enable an option that let PGP keep the key passphrase in
memory so you don't have to re-type it each message. However, I have ran
up against two problems with its implementation. 

1). if you mis-type the passphrase, the incorrect phrase goes into memory
and MacPGP takes it instead of putting back up a dialog box for you to
re-try. The result of any mis-typed passphrase is therfore a bad
passphrase error that you cannot recover from except by quitting and
re-starting MacPGP.

2). if you try to generate another key pair after typing (or mis-typing) a
passphrase, MacPGP takes the passphrase from memory and automatically
applies it to the new secret key. This is inconvenient especially if the
mis-typed phrase is so badly munged that the user cannot remember what
she typed ;-).

-bwp




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: geoffw@nexsys.net (Geoff White)
Date: Sat, 14 Aug 93 13:21:43 PDT
To: koontzd@lrcs.loral.com
Subject: Media Wars
Message-ID: <9308141944.AA19533@nexsys.nexsys.net>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> 
> What we need is a national talk show host/comedian belittling the
> governments plan.
> 
Good Idea, someone like george carlin, maybe we can get frank zappa
to speak out on it, It would reach a section of the population that would
normally not be reached, he has challenged Big Government before on free
speack issues (in the music industry), he's not a comedian but he would
be effective.  A real good person to get would be Lilly Tomlin!!
She could definately get exposure with her Ernestine the Operator charecter.
I think her political orientation would support our cause.

Although, if you really want to be effective, you should win over
Bob Hope; a few wise cracks from him on some tv special and the Clipper would
be dead before morning :)




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "L. Detweiler" <ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Date: Sat, 14 Aug 93 15:36:46 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: few bits of info on Mycotronx
Message-ID: <9308142231.AA03733@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


here are a few bits of info on Mycotronx. IBM's `supplier of the year'
and heavy into `satellite encryption systems'.

p.s. rumor has it a reporter out there picked up on the Mycotronx
`dumpster' postings here and the pointer in alt.whistleblowing to it
for a mainstream news article to appear ~Sep.-Oct.

ltr.

------- Forwarded Message

[...]

I pulled this from the Business Wire, it's not copyrighted was 
was distributed on BW for inclusion in Business Editor's files... it's
the "approved" company profile of the folks making the Cliper Chip.


=-=-=-=-=-=-=

CORPORATE PROFILE FOR MYKOTRONX INC., DATED FRIDAY, AUG. 13
 
Published date:   Friday, Aug. 13
Company name:     Mykotronx Inc.
 
Address:          357 Van Ness Way, Suite 200
                  Torrance, Calif., 90501
Telephone No.:    310/533-8100
 
Chairman of the
 Board:           Leonard J. Baker
Secretary/
Treasurer:       Kikuo Ogawa
President:        Theodore S. Bettwy
Public Relations
 Contact:         Sheila R. Coon
 Business number: 310/533-8100 ext. 13
 Home number:     310/548-7061
 
 
Company description:
   Mykotronx Inc., a small Torrance, Calif. business (42 employees) is
fast becoming recognized as a leader in the Information Security
(INFOSEC) field.
   The company has received numerous commendations for its quality
program.  Mykotronx was named "supplier of the year" by IBM's Federal
Systems Co. of Boulder, Colo., for both 1992 and 1993.
   The Mykotronx staff is composed of experienced authorities in
cryptology, telecommunications and the digital design of electronic
equipment and microcircuits (chips).  It also has excellent facilities
for performing R & D engineering, prototype, production and testing.
The small company atmosphere provides for personalized service and
quick-react capability.
   Low overhead and operating expenses contribute to Mykotronx's price
competitive capability.
   Since 1987 Mykotronx has gained a steadily increasing market share
of the Space Communications Security (COMSEC) business through its
COMSEC equipment design and production.  Bookings through June 1993
have exceeded $7.5 million.
   Mykotronx is a major supplier of satellite-to-ground encryption
equipment and the developer of the U.S. Government's proposed new
standard ("Clipper") for encryption of electronic communications such
as voice and computer transmissions via telephone, fax machine, modem,
etc.  Whether for high-volume or one-of-a-kind custom units, Mykotronx
has the technology and capability to meet customer's INFOSEC needs.
 
 
 
   CONTACT:  Mykotronx Inc., Torrance
             Sheila R. Coon, 310/533-8100 (phone)
                             310/533-0527 (fax)






------- End of Forwarded Message





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: wcs@anchor.ho.att.com (Bill_Stewart(HOY002)1305)
Date: Sat, 14 Aug 93 13:46:43 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Electronic Democracy
Message-ID: <9308142042.AA21896@anchor.ho.att.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text


An anonymous personage writes
> More succinctly, "Democracy is four wolves and a sheep voting on lunch."
> Up the republic!

Yeah, though representative government is four wolves voting on _which_ sheep
to have for lunch.  Any time power is available, it can be abused;
it's nice to be working on systems that allow people to do transactions
without providing additional information which can be abused.



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: jet@netcom.com (J. Eric Townsend)
Date: Sat, 14 Aug 93 12:21:44 PDT
To: wcs@anchor.ho.att.com (Bill_Stewart(HOY002)1305)
Subject: Re: Beepers can also be used to track you down!
In-Reply-To: <9308132123.AA26208@anchor.ho.att.com>
Message-ID: <9308141917.AA00520@netcom2.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


HOY002 writes:
 > There is one way to track someone with a beeper - you call them,
 > leave your number, and trace the call if they call back.
 > It doesn't work for people who only accept calls from certain numbers

true.  I don't return pages from wierd or unknown numbers because of
the rash of pay-service fraud incidents.  (Get a 900-type number in an
area that doesn't use '900' or '976'.  Make your number a $20 or so
charge.  Page lots of people with the number.)

 > loops through the addresses and see who pulls out a beeper and heads

Or you can find out the user->id mapping by bribing/breaking into the
paging company, and look for certain numbers being sent as
page-strings to certain people.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: A1 ray arachelian (library)  <rarachel@ishara.poly.edu>
Date: Sat, 14 Aug 93 20:41:52 PDT
To: jet@netcom.com (J. Eric Townsend)
Subject: Re: Beepers can also be used to track you down!
In-Reply-To: <9308141917.AA00520@netcom2.netcom.com>
Message-ID: <9308142338.AA05358@ishara.poly.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Okay guys, I called up my friend and this is what he had to say about it:

1.  The company he works for is for one thing involved in selling beepers and
beeper service.

2.  Beepers respond to something called a "CAP" code.  Each individual beeper
has a unique CAP code.  This code is what is used to transmit a beep to that
particular beeper (as well as the ping.)

3.  The FCC supposedly has information on how to track down beepers (without
the obvious way of placing a beep and seeing if they return the call.)
Obviously, someone that is higher up in the tech dept. of a beeper co.
might provide confirmation of this if the FCC does not (and would they
if such a feature did exist?)

4.   This "ping" signal is used to disable the beeper incase it gets stolen.
What's not too clear to me is whether there is one type of ping that responds
or two, with the second one that also disables the beeper incase of
loss of theft.

5.    Supposedly, the ping is a broad band signal that has 1/4 mile acuracy
per cell, then after that a tracking gun of some sort can be used, which
looks pretty much like a radar speed gun, but has a shoulder strap or something.

Again, this description isn't mine, and I'm not familiar with any of these,
so any questions you have will take a few answers to clear up.  Also, this
could just be a case of bad info.  My friend is fairly trustworthy in his
info in general, however, it is also possible that he got faulty info
from someone else in the company.

I won't metion his name or his company for obvious reasons, but will
forward questions.

However, I did notice one message from an individual who mentioned that
in Britain, some sort of scanners were used to track down unlicensed TV's
and that his buddies used to keep their beepers in Faraday cages.  Since
I stored this message on a machine which seems to be down, I don't have
his name or quotes yet, however this was posted a few days ago 
(forgive me for not remembering your name.)  Also, (again this too
is unconfirmed) another friend of mine who is slightly familiar with
electronics and who wanted to become a piolot mentioned that AM receivers
can cause troubles in airplane sensors.  (Again, I'm not confusing this
with laptops or CD players, etc, but specifically AM receivers.  This too
is unconfirmed, so take it with or without several grains of salt.) :-)





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: IE63@vaxb.acs.unt.edu
Date: Sat, 14 Aug 93 17:56:47 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Encrypting Viruses.... good idea?
Message-ID: <01H1QX6LHQPE0029G2@vaxb.acs.unt.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

>Speaking of cryptostacker and beneficial viruses that encrypt files for you
>in the background, I just got a copy of one in the mail!  I think this may
>be of interest to the group, so I am posting.
                        .........
>I can't seem to find mention of what the fast/casual encryption algorithm
>is.  Instead of source code, a hex listing is provided.  According to
>further notes, there is a hot-key for toggling floppy encrypt, and another
>hot key to uninstall from the hard drive.
>
>All the same, if I get a chance this weekend I'll probably try it
>out!

        Well, good luck with it.  I'd personally like to see/do a disassembly
of the _entire_ virus before I would install it - security systems are great 
for back doors, and a virus would be GREAT for such.  There are a few things
anyone using this program might want to watch for (I have yet to see it,
though I'd be VERY interested in disassembling it....  anyone out there 
with a copy that wouldn't mind sending it _ENCRYPTED_ through E-mail? 
Full commented disassembly returned to sender ASAP!):

        1.)  Some anti-virus programs with heuristics are going to have a
             cow, most likely - CES, F-PROT, TBSCAN are a few that are likely
             (especially VIRSTOP from F-Prot - if I'm wrong, tell me...)
             and these are some of the best out there for personal protection
             (sorry SCAN & CPAV).

        2.)  I'd recommend NOT using it if you have a special master boot
             record, like Windows NT or some boot-based security systems
             or multiple boot choices.  There are 9 sectors free at the 
             beginning of most IBM hard drives, I assume this virus uses 
             the first sector and 1/more of the others.....  if another 
             program wants to use these as well - I'd bet the virus doesn't 
             notice until too late.
        
        3.)  Watch where the virus puts itself on floppies.  If it is larger
             than 512 bytes (almost have to be for its functionality) then
             there are only three ways I know of to put additional code in:

             a.) Mark sectors bad, and place code there.
                 Problem: DON'T "FIX" BAD SECTORS ON YOUR DISK WITH NORTON!

             b.) Use space after root directory entry and FAT to put virus
                 in, just like the Stoned virus.
                 Problem: Trashes data if there are more than 80 files in the
                          root directory.  Also sometimes causes other 
                          problems with High-Density disks....
                          And, if a new format of disk comes out - WATCH OUT!

             c.) Format extra tracks on the floppy - these tracks are rarely
                 very reliable - you might loose information if these
                 tracks give out, depending on the setup of the virus you
                 might loose the disk.

             d.) This method I haven't seen, but I guess it could happen -
                 create an actual file and allocate it from the FAT....
                 this might actually be safe, as long as the virus didn't
                 let anyone delete it or write over it.

        4.)  Watch where it locates itself in memory: most likely it will
             lower the memory in BIOS before DOS gets loaded (CHKDSK will
             inform you that you have <640k low memory rather than the 
             usual 65536 bytes....) which is generally relatively safe if
             the computer has a standard config.  It may cause problems
             depending on where/how/when it allocates memory, though.

        5.)  What happens when you bypass Int 13h (which is presumably what
             it hooks) and use absolute disk I/O by directly using the
             driver?  Careful with Norton and other diskfix programs 
             that _might_ do this at times.....

        6.)  Don't press 'DISINFECT' from your favorite AV program
             without decrypting your disks first...........

     My bottome line is this: the virus may be cool, but why a virus?
Viruses may work for attacking things, wiping stuff out, hacking stuff,
whatever (although they always tend to hit more than the intended target,
funny thing about that), but when the only user of a machine WANTS to do 
something with their machine, why a virus?  I mean, honestly......  although
I must admit, it solves the problem of distribution of software in
the most interesting way - I want to see what happens if a commercial
company writes one of these and COPYRIGHTS it......

"This program may only be used by the original purchaser.  Any unauthorized
 copying, lending, or any other method of distribution is STRICTLY 
 PROHIBITED!  Violators will be prosecuted to the full extent of the law!
 You want I should infect this here hard drive? huh? huh? (Y/n)?"
 
 "BTW - if you're reading this message and did not buy this software, then 
 we'll be sueing you in two weeks, your modem just dialed our mainframe."

I suppose I may be being a bit judgemental, as I am speaking simply from
the letter quoted above, but still......  it sounds very reminiscent of
Fred Cohen's compression virus.....

My Public Key:
- -----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----
Version: 2.3a

mQCNAixUuYYAAAEEAKNllAee26qGqxJck3Bftdkrz0MUQLABGMZqVem9UW9kjjS+
rMAafauqYTE5/Kdnx+4Asj0Wgfon0YBtRMT0crMcBYNqVp4//RUh7wrxQNvKFeeO
ZGuQp2hyHQqh1FDfWsHG4ldGqIV1YuOXq6oeIDkmbwgf8BRgPcZkwUqsF4b1AAUR
tCpNaWNoYWVsIEEuIEVsbGlzb24gPGllNjNAdmF4Yi5hY3MudW50LmVkdT4=
=0rss
- -----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----

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From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: nobody@alumni.cco.caltech.edu
Date: Sat, 14 Aug 93 21:31:52 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: No Subject
Message-ID: <9308150424.AA19004@alumni.cco.caltech.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>From: honey@citi.umich.edu (peter honeyman)
> To:   cypherpunks@toad.com
> Date: Fri, 13 Aug 1993 15:12:31 -0400
 
 >There's probably a way to disable the transmitter in the beeper, ...

   > i should think that all the second amendment enthusiasts on this list
   > could come up with something ...

   > peter

Well, the immediate solution is an application of 230-grain hardball,
but you probably had something more sophisticated in mind, huh?







From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: greg@ideath.goldenbear.com (Greg Broiles)
Date: Sun, 15 Aug 93 00:41:52 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Pagers
Message-ID: <m1aB9B1w164w@ideath.goldenbear.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



For what it's worth, my pager (a Motorola Bravo (Plus?) using a frequency of 
152.240 MHz) cheerfully receives pages while inside my microwave. (No, I 
didn't turn the microwave on. :) What that implies about the shielding 
capabilites of my microwave (and the safety of its continued use) is beyond 
my knowledge of RF and microwaves. I have some idea (please correct me if 
I'm wrong here) that shielding effective for energy at one frequency (like 
that of my pager) may be ineffective or less effective at another (like the 
frequency of microwaves).

I'm intrigued (and alarmed) at the idea that it's possible to disable pagers 
via remote control. While I'll admit that there's some wee utility in being 
able to make sure nobody can use my pager if it's lost/stolen, it's 
sounding, from the posts to the list, like it'd be possible to disable many 
folks' pagers, were some miscreant so inclined. I know of pagers being used 
by police, fire department, search & rescue, private/campus security, and 
medical folks; if someone put some time into the "kill all the pagers" 
thing, it could be pretty damaging.

Then again, knowing that, if I swiped somebody's pager, I'd probably just 
remove the battery for a few days, and hopefully miss the "stop working now" 
signal.

I'm curious, though, how long the battery would last - my pager has a single 
AA battery, which lasts about a month. On average, a pager in the "find this 
pager" mode would have a single half-discharged AA battery to power its 
transmitter; and that transmitter would be sending its signal without 
benefit of any sort of external antenna. My very limited knowledge of RF 
propagation makes me think it'd be hard to get much range or duration under 
those circumstances.

I'd be interested to see this thread move over to comp.dcom.telecom - there 
might be more folks who know about pagers who could comment. This is 
interesting, but frankly I'm still pretty skeptical. 


--
Greg Broiles                            greg@goldenbear.com
Golden Bear Computer Consulting         +1 503 342 7982
Box 12005 Eugene OR 97440               BBS: +1 503 687 7764




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Stanton McCandlish <anton@hydra.unm.edu>
Date: Sat, 14 Aug 93 23:46:53 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: ONE BBSCON
In-Reply-To: <9308121536.AA21970@muskwa.ucs.ualberta.ca>
Message-ID: <9308150646.AA18284@hydra.unm.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Quoth Sneal, verily I say unto thee:

-=>lift.  However, while we're on the subject, I'm wondering if any
-=>arrangements have been made to distribute anti-Clipper material at
[ONE BBSCON]
-=>I'd be happy to distribute flyers or what-have-you, but
-=>they'd have to reach the show by other means; I'm not willing to
-=>carry such seditious material across the US/Canada border.

Well, quick someone draft something that will fit onto one page.  I'll be
happy to xerox several hundred of them.
 
-=>  I hope that EFF will have a presence at the show* 

They will.  One of the strongest presences at the whole show.

Reminds me, I think we (meaning libertarianistically minded sysops and
users) should organize another con, to compete with ONE BBSCON.  ONE
BBSCON (Online Networking Exposition & BBS Convention) will apparently
be held in the same place every year, costs $325 just to get in the
door, and it 100% controlled by the corporate interests that are
screwing up the BBS scene.  We need a new con that is run by, and
caters to, the hobbyist and shareware BBS scene.  Still lots of room
for vendors, but for the non- and semi-commercial software authors, who
are left behind by ONE BBSCON's outrageous prices for display booth
space. 

[back to EFF]
-=>as they did last 
-=>year, and can sow some further seeds of discontent among the
-=>non-Internet online world, many parts of which don't seem aware of
-=>the Clipper debacle.  Any comments from the EFF folks hereabouts?

I certainly don't speak for them, but from what I've seen of the list of
conferences and seminars, they will be covering a very wide variety of
material.

-=>* I had a great time arguing with Shari Steele and accusing her of
-=>"dancing with the Devil" w/ reference to backing then-Senator Gore's
-=>Data Superhighway proposal.  Very libertarially-incorrect position to
-=>take, Shari. :-)

Back then it sounded cool.  I was all for it too, until he got to be VP
and then the view darkened considerably.  Hell, I never should've trusted
the husband of the Wicked Witch that came up with the PMRC!
Seriously, as originally announced, it didn't sound all that bad, and I
think many of us figured we could activize enough to get it to be what we
wanted.  This did not happen however.

-- 
Stanton  McCandlish   * Space Migration * Networking * ChaOrder * NO GOV'T. *
anton@hydra.unm.edu   * Intelligence Increase * Nano * Crypto * NO RELIGION *
FidoNet:    1:301/2   * Life Extension * Ethics * VR * Now! * NO MORE LIES! *
Noise in the Void BBS * +1-505-246-8515   (24hr, 1200-14400, v32bis, N-8-1) *



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: karn@qualcomm.com (Phil Karn)
Date: Sun, 15 Aug 93 01:31:52 PDT
To: greg@ideath.goldenbear.com
Subject: Pagers
In-Reply-To: <m1aB9B1w164w@ideath.goldenbear.com>
Message-ID: <9308150828.AA03881@servo>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Yes, the microwave oven is designed to be especially effective at one
particular frequency. Look at the gasket on the inside surface of the
door.  Underneath is what is called a "quarter-wave choke". It looks
like a short circuit at the surface of the door, but only at 2450 Mhz,
the operating frequency of a microwave oven.

You probably still got a lot of shielding, it just wasn't enough.
Remember that modern communication receivers (even pocket pagers) are
capable of working with incredibly small amounts of signal energy by
human standards.  And paging systems are designed to blanket their
coverage areas with a *lot* of RF from multiple synchronized
transmitters, each running several hundred watts. This seeming
overkill is necessary to handle the very wide dynamic range in
propagation losses that terrestrial communication links can encounter
due to fading, multipath, terrain blockage, changing distances, etc.

Even a properly operating microwave oven that is well within all
radiation safety limits is *easily* detectable with a communications
receiver or spectrum analyzer (the latter is preferable because the
frequency is so unstable). I think I saw about -8dbm an inch from the
door seal of the oven I had back in NJ when I checked it. As I said,
this is well within biological safety limits but it is, by radio
communication standards, an *extremely* strong signal.

Amusing anecdote: recently I took one of our CDMA cellular phones into
a supposedly NSA-certified RF screen room at work (though it's not
used for government work). The cell antennas are on the roof of the
same building. I closed the room door and latched it, and the phone
still worked! I then put the phone into a conventional metal cabinet
in the room and my call finally dropped. It's conceivable that the
room still met specs (something like 100 dB), but that just wasn't
enough until I added a few more dB with the metal cabinet. Like I
said, mobile radio systems have to deal with some *very* wide dynamic
ranges.

Phil




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: khijol!erc@apple.com (Ed Carp)
Date: Sun, 15 Aug 93 02:11:53 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Summary: Denning's report on SKIPJACK
Message-ID: <m0oRdZv-000227C@khijol>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text


I hadn't seen this posted anywhere else, so I took the liberty of posting
it here.  Sorry if this creates unnecessary bandwidth, but flames can be sent
to /dev/null. :)

From: risks@CSL.SRI.COM (RISKS Forum)
Newsgroups: comp.risks
Subject: RISKS DIGEST 14.80
Message-ID: <CMM.0.90.1.745042704.risks@chiron.csl.sri.com>
Date: 11 Aug 93 04:18:24 GMT
Sender: daemon@ucbvax.BERKELEY.EDU
Reply-To: risks@csl.sri.com
Distribution: world
Organization: The Internet
Lines: 689
Approved: risks@csl.sri.com

RISKS-LIST: RISKS-FORUM Digest  Wednesday 11 August 1993  Volume 14 : Issue 80

        FORUM ON RISKS TO THE PUBLIC IN COMPUTERS AND RELATED SYSTEMS 
   ACM Committee on Computers and Public Policy, Peter G. Neumann, moderator

----------------------------------------------------------------------

Date: Wed, 4 Aug 93 10:35:05 PDT
From: forags@nature.berkeley.edu (Al Stangenberger)
Subject: Article by Dorothy Denning on Clipper Chip

The July-August issue of American Scientist (Amer. Scientist 81:319-323) has a
column by Dorothy Denning describing the Clipper Encryption System.  It is
written from the Administration and law enforcement viewpoint and does not
discuss the serious privacy issues which have been raised in RISKS.  However,
it does present a clear discussion of the system and might be useful in
explaining the system to colleagues.

Al Stangenberger            Dept. of Env. Sci., Policy, & Mgt.
forags@nature.berkeley.edu  145 Mulford Hall, Univ. of Calif. Berkeley CA 94720

------------------------------

Date: Sun, 01 Aug 1993 21:16:56 -0400 (EDT)
From: Dorothy Denning <DENNING@guvax.acc.georgetown.edu>
Subject: SKIPJACK Review

                            SKIPJACK Review
                             Interim Report
                        The SKIPJACK Algorithm

           Ernest F. Brickell, Sandia National Laboratories
               Dorothy E. Denning, Georgetown University
            Stephen T. Kent, BBN Communications Corporation
                          David P. Maher, AT&T
                  Walter Tuchman, Amperif Corporation
                                    
                              July 28, 1993
                            (copyright 1993)

Executive Summary

The objective of the SKIPJACK review was to provide a mechanism whereby
persons outside the government could evaluate the strength of the
classified encryption algorithm used in the escrowed encryption devices
and publicly report their findings.  Because SKIPJACK is but one
component of a large, complex system, and because the security of
communications encrypted with SKIPJACK depends on the security of the
system as a whole, the review was extended to encompass other
components of the system.  The purpose of this Interim Report is to
report on our evaluation of the SKIPJACK algorithm.  A later Final
Report will address the broader system issues.

The results of our evaluation of the SKIPJACK algorithm are as
follows:

  1. Under an assumption that the cost of processing power is halved
     every eighteen months, it will be 36 years before the cost of
     breaking SKIPJACK by exhaustive search will be equal to the cost
     of breaking DES today.  Thus, there is no significant risk that
     SKIPJACK will be broken by exhaustive search in the next 30-40
     years.

  2. There is no significant risk that SKIPJACK can be broken through a
     shortcut method of attack.

  3. While the internal structure of SKIPJACK must be classified in
     order to protect law enforcement and national security objectives,
     the strength of SKIPJACK against a cryptanalytic attack does not
     depend on the secrecy of the algorithm.



1.  Background

On April 16, the President announced a new technology initiative aimed
at providing a high level of security for sensitive, unclassified
communications, while enabling lawfully authorized intercepts of
telecommunications by law enforcement officials for criminal
investigations.  The initiative includes several components:

    A classified encryption/decryption algorithm called "SKIPJACK."

    Tamper-resistant cryptographic devices (e.g., electronic chips),
    each of which contains SKIPJACK, classified control software, a
    device identification number, a family key used by law enforcement,
    and a device unique key that unlocks the session key used to
    encrypt a particular communication.

    A secure facility for generating device unique keys and programming
    the devices with the classified algorithms, identifiers, and keys.

    Two escrow agents that each hold a component of every device unique
    key.  When combined, those two components form the device unique
    key.

    A law enforcement access field (LEAF), which enables an authorized
    law enforcement official to recover the session key.  The LEAF is
    created by a device at the start of an encrypted communication and
    contains the session key encrypted under the device unique key
    together with the device identifier, all encrypted under the family
    key.

    LEAF decoders that allow an authorized law enforcement official to
    extract the device identifier and encrypted session key from an
    intercepted LEAF.  The identifier is then sent to the escrow
    agents, who return the components of the corresponding device
    unique key.  Once obtained, the components are used to reconstruct
    the device unique key, which is then used to decrypt the session key.

This report reviews the security provided by the first component, namely the
SKIPJACK algorithm.  The review was performed pursuant to the President's
direction that "respected experts from outside the government will be offered
access to the confidential details of the algorithm to assess its capabilities
and publicly report their finding."  The Acting Director of the National
Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) sent letters of invitation to
potential reviewers.  The authors of this report accepted that invitation.

We attended an initial meeting at the Institute for Defense Analyses
Supercomputing Research Center (SRC) from June 21-23.  At that meeting, the
designer of SKIPJACK provided a complete, detailed description of the
algorithm, the rationale for each feature, and the history of the design.  The
head of the NSA evaluation team described the evaluation process and its
results.  Other NSA staff briefed us on the LEAF structure and protocols for
use, generation of device keys, protection of the devices against reverse
engineering, and NSA's history in the design and evaluation of encryption
methods contained in SKIPJACK.  Additional NSA and NIST staff were present at
the meeting to answer our questions and provide assistance.  All staff members
were forthcoming in providing us with requested information.

At the June meeting, we agreed to integrate our individual evaluations into
this joint report.  We also agreed to reconvene at SRC from July 19-21 for
further discussions and to complete a draft of the report.  In the interim, we
undertook independent tasks according to our individual interests and
availability.  Ernest Brickell specified a suite of tests for evaluating
SKIPJACK.  Dorothy Denning worked at NSA on the refinement and execution of
these and other tests that took into account suggestions solicited from
Professor Martin Hellman at Stanford University.  NSA staff assisted with the
programming and execution of these tests.  Denning also analyzed the structure
of SKIPJACK and its susceptibility to differential cryptanalysis.  Stephen
Kent visited NSA to explore in more detail how SKIPJACK compared with NSA
encryption algorithms that he already knew and that were used to protect
classified data.  David Maher developed a risk assessment approach while
continuing his ongoing work on the use of the encryption chip in the AT&T
Telephone Security Device.  Walter Tuchman investigated the anti-reverse
engineering properties of the chips.

We investigated more than just SKIPJACK because the security of communications
encrypted with the escrowed encryption technology depends on the security
provided by all the components of the initiative, including protection of the
keys stored on the devices, protection of the key components stored with the
escrow agents, the security provided by the LEAF and LEAF decoder, protection
of keys after they have been transmitted to law enforcement under court order,
and the resistance of the devices to reverse engineering.  In addition, the
success of the technology initiative depends on factors besides security, for
example, performance of the chips.  Because some components of the escrowed
encryption system, particularly the key escrow system, are still under design,
we decided to issue this Interim Report on the security of the SKIPJACK
algorithm and to defer our Final Report until we could complete our evaluation
of the system as a whole.


2.  Overview of the SKIPJACK Algorithm

SKIPJACK is a 64-bit "electronic codebook" algorithm that transforms a 64-bit
input block into a 64-bit output block.  The transformation is parameterized
by an 80-bit key, and involves performing 32 steps or iterations of a complex,
nonlinear function.  The algorithm can be used in any one of the four
operating modes defined in FIPS 81 for use with the Data Encryption Standard
(DES).

The SKIPJACK algorithm was developed by NSA and is classified SECRET.  It is
representative of a family of encryption algorithms developed in 1980 as part
of the NSA suite of "Type I" algorithms, suitable for protecting all levels of
classified data.  The specific algorithm, SKIPJACK, is intended to be used
with sensitive but unclassified information.

The strength of any encryption algorithm depends on its ability to withstand
an attack aimed at determining either the key or the unencrypted ("plaintext")
communications.  There are basically two types of attack, brute-force and
shortcut.


3.  Susceptibility to Brute Force Attack by Exhaustive Search

In a brute-force attack (also called "exhaustive search"), the adversary
essentially tries all possible keys until one is found that decrypts the
intercepted communications into a known or meaningful plaintext message.  The
resources required to perform an exhaustive search depend on the length of the
keys, since the number of possible keys is directly related to key length.  In
particular, a key of length N bits has 2^N possibilities.  SKIPJACK uses
80-bit keys, which means there are 2^80 (approximately 10^24) or more than 1
trillion trillion possible keys.

An implementation of SKIPJACK optimized for a single processor on the
8-processor Cray YMP performs about 89,000 encryptions per second.  At that
rate, it would take more than 400 billion years to try all keys.  Assuming the
use of all 8 processors and aggressive vectorization, the time would be
reduced to about a billion years.

A more speculative attack using a future, hypothetical, massively parallel
machine with 100,000 RISC processors, each of which was capable of 100,000
encryptions per second, would still take about 4 million years.  The cost of
such a machine might be on the order of $50 million.  In an even more
speculative attack, a special purpose machine might be built using 1.2 billion
$1 chips with a 1 GHz clock.  If the algorithm could be pipelined so that one
encryption step were performed per clock cycle, then the $1.2 billion machine
could exhaust the key space in 1 year.

Another way of looking at the problem is by comparing a brute force attack on
SKIPJACK with one on DES, which uses 56-bit keys.  Given that no one has
demonstrated a capability for breaking DES, DES offers a reasonable benchmark.
Since SKIPJACK keys are 24 bits longer than DES keys, there are 2^24 times
more possibilities.  Assuming that the cost of processing power is halved
every eighteen months, then it will not be for another 24 * 1.5 = 36 years
before the cost of breaking SKIPJACK is equal to the cost of breaking DES
today.  Given the lack of demonstrated capability for breaking DES, and the
expectation that the situation will continue for at least several more years,
one can reasonably expect that SKIPJACK will not be broken within the next
30-40 years.

Conclusion 1: Under an assumption that the cost of processing power is halved
every eighteen months, it will be 36 years before the cost of breaking
SKIPJACK by exhaustive search will be equal to the cost of breaking DES today.
Thus, there is no significant risk that SKIPJACK will be broken by exhaustive
search in the next 30-40 years.

4.  Susceptibility to Shortcut Attacks

In a shortcut attack, the adversary exploits some property of the encryption
algorithm that enables the key or plaintext to be determined in much less time
than by exhaustive search.  For example, the RSA public-key encryption method
is attacked by factoring a public value that is the product of two secret
primes into its primes.

Most shortcut attacks use probabilistic or statistical methods that exploit a
structural weakness, unintentional or intentional (i.e., a "trapdoor"), in the
encryption algorithm.  In order to determine whether such attacks are
possible, it is necessary to thoroughly examine the structure of the algorithm
and its statistical properties.  In the time available for this review, it was
not feasible to conduct an evaluation on the scale that NSA has conducted or
that has been conducted on the DES.  Such review would require many man-years
of effort over a considerable time interval.  Instead, we concentrated on
reviewing NSA's design and evaluation process.  In addition, we conducted
several of our own tests.

4.1  NSA's Design and Evaluation Process

SKIPJACK was designed using building blocks and techniques that date back more
than forty years.  Many of the techniques are related to work that was
evaluated by some of the world's most accomplished and famous experts in
combinatorics and abstract algebra.  SKIPJACK's more immediate heritage dates
to around 1980, and its initial design to 1987.

SKIPJACK was designed to be evaluatable, and the design and evaluation
approach was the same used with algorithms that protect the country's most
sensitive classified information.  The specific structures included in
SKIPJACK have a long evaluation history, and the cryptographic properties of
those structures had many prior years of intense study before the formal
process began in 1987.  Thus, an arsenal of tools and data was available.
This arsenal was used by dozens of adversarial evaluators whose job was to
break SKIPJACK.  Many spent at least a full year working on the algorithm.
Besides highly experienced evaluators, SKIPJACK was subjected to cryptanalysis
by less experienced evaluators who were untainted by past approaches.  All
known methods of attacks were explored, including differential cryptanalysis.
The goal was a design that did not allow a shortcut attack.

The design underwent a sequence of iterations based on feedback from the
evaluation process.  These iterations eliminated properties which, even though
they might not allow successful attack, were related to properties that could
be indicative of vulnerabilities.  The head of the NSA evaluation team
confidently concluded "I believe that SKIPJACK can only be broken by brute
force; there is no better way."

In summary, SKIPJACK is based on some of NSA's best technology.  Considerable
care went into its design and evaluation in accordance with the care given to
algorithms that protect classified data.

4.2  Independent Analysis and Testing

Our own analysis and testing increased our confidence in the strength
of SKIPJACK and its resistance to attack.

4.2.1  Randomness and Correlation Tests

A strong encryption algorithm will behave like a random function of the key
and plaintext so that it is impossible to determine any of the key bits or
plaintext bits from the ciphertext bits (except by exhaustive search).  We ran
two sets of tests aimed at determining whether SKIPJACK is a good pseudo
random number generator.  These tests were run on a Cray YMP at NSA.  The
results showed that SKIPJACK behaves like a random function and that
ciphertext bits are not correlated with either key bits or plaintext bits.
Appendix A gives more details.

4.2.2  Differential Cryptanalysis

Differential cryptanalysis is a powerful method of attack that exploits
structural properties in an encryption algorithm.  The method involves
analyzing the structure of the algorithm in order to determine the effect of
particular differences in plaintext pairs on the differences of their
corresponding ciphertext pairs, where the differences are represented by the
exclusive-or of the pair.  If it is possible to exploit these differential
effects in order to determine a key in less time than with exhaustive search,
an encryption algorithm is said to be susceptible to differential
cryptanalysis.  However, an actual attack using differential cryptanalysis may
require substantially more chosen plaintext than can be practically acquired.

We examined the internal structure of SKIPJACK to determine its susceptibility
to differential cryptanalysis.  We concluded it was not possible to perform an
attack based on differential cryptanalysis in less time than with exhaustive
search.

4.2.3  Weak Key Test

Some algorithms have "weak keys" that might permit a shortcut solution.  DES
has a few weak keys, which follow from a pattern of symmetry in the algorithm.
We saw no pattern of symmetry in the SKIPJACK algorithm which could lead to
weak keys.  We also experimentally tested the all "0" key (all 80 bits are
"0") and the all "1" key to see if they were weak and found they were not.

4.2.4  Symmetry Under Complementation Test

The DES satisfies the property that for a given plaintext-ciphertext pair and
associated key, encryption of the one's complement of the plaintext with the
one's complement of the key yields the one's complement of the ciphertext.
This "complementation property" shortens an attack by exhaustive search by a
factor of two since half the keys can be tested by computing complements in
lieu of performing a more costly encryption.  We tested SKIPJACK for this
property and found that it did not hold.

4.2.5  Comparison with Classified Algorithms

We compared the structure of SKIPJACK to that of NSA Type I algorithms used in
current and near-future devices designed to protect classified data.  This
analysis was conducted with the close assistance of the cryptographer who
developed SKIPJACK and included an in-depth discussion of design rationale for
all of the algorithms involved.  Based on this comparative, structural
analysis of SKIPJACK against these other algorithms, and a detailed discussion
of the similarities and differences between these algorithms, our confidence
in the basic soundness of SKIPJACK was further increased.

Conclusion 2:  There is no significant risk that SKIPJACK can be broken
through a shortcut method of attack.


5.   Secrecy of the Algorithm

The SKIPJACK algorithm is sensitive for several reasons.  Disclosure of the
algorithm would permit the construction of devices that fail to properly
implement the LEAF, while still interoperating with legitimate SKIPJACK
devices.  Such devices would provide high quality cryptographic security
without preserving the law enforcement access capability that distinguishes
this cryptographic initiative.  Additionally, the SKIPJACK algorithm is
classified SECRET  NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS.  This classification
reflects the high quality of the algorithm, i.e., it incorporates design
techniques that are representative of algorithms used to protect classified
information.  Disclosure of the algorithm would permit analysis that could
result in discovery of these classified design techniques, and this would be
detrimental to national security.

However, while full exposure of the internal details of SKIPJACK would
jeopardize law enforcement and national security objectives, it would not
jeopardize the security of encrypted communications.  This is because a
shortcut attack is not feasible even with full knowledge of the algorithm.
Indeed, our analysis of the susceptibility of SKIPJACK to a brute force or
shortcut attack was based on the assumption that the algorithm was known.

Conclusion 3: While the internal structure of SKIPJACK must be classified in
order to protect law enforcement and national security objectives, the
strength of SKIPJACK against a cryptanalytic attack does not depend on the
secrecy of the algorithm.

  [The appendix in LaTeX form is available from Dorothy.  PGN]


-- 
Ed Carp, N7EKG			erc@apple.com			510/659-9560
                            anon-2133@twwells.com
If you want magic, let go of your armor.  Magic is so much stronger than
steel!        -- Richard Bach, "The Bridge Across Forever"



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: szabo@netcom.com (Nick Szabo)
Date: Sun, 15 Aug 93 01:56:49 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Cypherpunk trends & visions
Message-ID: <9308150855.AA24359@netcom4.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



At today's Silly Valley cypherpunks meeting (Tim May, John
Gilmore, Eric Hughes, Sandy Sandfort, Whit Diffie,
Romana "Cypherella" Machado, etc. etc.) there was a lot of 
hand-wringing about the cypherpunks movement "stalling".  Ever the 
pessimist, Tim May drew a chart showing cypherpunks starting out 
with a bang (publicizing PGP, starting up anon remailers, etc.) 
and seeming to stall out (even as we've gotten major publicity 
in Mondo, Wired, Village Voice, etc.).

Much of the rancor and pessimism may reflect the fact that
cypherpunks are more distributed now.  For example, the stuff
on this list is very disconnected from the Bay Area meetings.  Do any 
non-Californians know or care about Digital Silk Road, electronic 
credit unions, Twain, etc?  How hip are Bay Area cypherpunks to the 
various projects re: user-friendly PGP, CryptoStacker, 
securely private BBS's, secure phones, etc?  (The main motivation
for me typing in this message is to try to open up the lines
of communication more, let people know what Bay Area cypherpunks
are doing, and encourage replies from folks in other regions
who are holding meetings & doing projects).

Besides, we haven't stalled; we're just on a more mature part
of the learning curve.  Much of the "low hanging fruit" has 
been picked (as Tim May pointed out: PGP was already here,
remailers were ripe, etc. when cypherpunks crystallized).
We seem to have played a major role in delaying Clipper just with 
our big mouths (and fat fingers :-).  More concretely, just today Romana 
and Geoff Dale unveiled a slick steganography tool for the Mac that, 
if distributed widely and ported to the PC, would make it practically 
impossible to outlaw strong crypto.

We also have a variety of goals.  We all share
a commitment to spreading crypto beyond the elites, but for 
a wide variety of reasons.   Some of us (Tim May, myself, etc.)
are libertarians who want government out of our 
lives, others are liberals fighting the NSA, others
find it great fun to ding people in power with cool hacks,
and still others are in it for the variety of opportunities
crypto-anarchy opens up for making "filthy lucre".  

I don't think it's productive to do too much breastbeating over this, 
to try to define "cypherpunk correct" politics, or insist that everybody 
work towards the same goals.  The only stuff we really need to agree on is
the practical stuff: the general "web of trust" model of
cryptography, and the development of common tools and standards on that
basis.  Beyond that I hope there's room for a wide variety of
opinions and projects.

My own vision of cypherpunks evolution runs along the following
lines.  Some of these may be commercial opportunities, but
so far cypherpunks have been most effective with freeware like
anon remailers, PGP add-ons, etc.:

* Digital coupons: S&H greenstamps for online services 
(netcom/Well/Compuserve net connection services, AMIX, 
NEXIS/LEXIS, Dow Jones, commercial MUDs, metered e-mail, anon 
services, network and computing resources, reputation ratings, 
etc.)  Greenstamps are like frequent-flyer miles, you accumulate
them with heavy patronage of some service.  But greenstamps
can be used to purchase a wide variety of services, not just 
more of the same service.  Service providers and 
coupon vendor(s) work out arrangements for awarding and honoring
greenstamps.  Implemented with Chaum-style protocol to prevent
forgery and assure privacy.
* Digital cash: accumulating credits/debits for use of on-line
services (including travel services, concert tickets, etc. 
purchased on-line), eventually paid for by some "real" currency: 
FRNs, yen, etc.  Implemented with Chaum-style protocol to prevent
forgery and assure privacy.
* On-line markets: Internet video poker, election outcome
markets, satellite track betting, etc.  Investments[1] can be 
made & paid out by greenstamps, natch.  On-line advertising.
* Securely private BBS's
* etc.


[1] Hey, if Clinton can call government spending "investment"
I can do the same for wagers on his reelection!

Nick Szabo					szabo@netcom.com




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Leevi Marttila <leemartt@utu.fi>
Date: Sat, 14 Aug 93 16:26:47 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: lookin' for a slogan for Tshirts
Message-ID: <Pine.3.07.9308150203.D9092-b100000@polaris.cc.utu.fi>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

>Message-Id: <199308021828.AA12198@flubber.cc.utexas.edu>
>Subject: Re: lookin' for a slogan for Tshirts
>Date: Mon, 2 Aug 1993 13:28:36 -0500 (CDT)
>From: Jim McCoy <mccoy@ccwf.cc.utexas.edu>

>A nice thought, but it is not quite true now, is it?  Cryptography has been
>a tool for specialists, scholars, and governments for those 4000 years, but
>to claim that "the masses" have had access to it is clearly untrue.  In
>fact, it seems that the current friction between groups such as this one
>and the U.S. governement is caused mostly because private citizens are
>beginning to get access to this strong cryptography and this is something
>"those who watch" do not like...
>
>jim

*The masses* have easy access to cryptography *and*
the goverment has easy access to messages of *the masses*.

Leevi Marttila
leemartt@polaris.utu.fi
"leevi.marttila/o=elisa-turku/"@elisa.fi

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.2

iQCVAgUBLG097TUMRj48GHK9AQH8fQP/ZmHmwEYejsXvFGRHkeSymTB8kuRfjQRy
vPCaFs6NSqC4Sl65ezx4ujEztGBcNHy7h4XwErYXj+KBD4HB6pMJr/jYtLnwHUhi
L6rHDgF9JY4rawIRO7xVyCYl23Wa3aYNM1beFj7S8tw0QUYR4JOK8zslIQtv9vm5
7AOQurPKYXE=
=JTmd
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----







From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Stanton McCandlish <anton@hydra.unm.edu>
Date: Sun, 15 Aug 93 03:46:51 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: e-voting
Message-ID: <9308151045.AA23060@hydra.unm.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


You know, the first thing that comes to mind when I hear all these slams
against the idea of electronic democracy is that the tone and content of
the objections are all but identical to those opposing any new tech, most
notably the prospect of nanotechnology.  

I mean, give me a break.  Of course the idea is dangerous.  But movement
at least somewhat in that direction is totally inevitable.  Only by
recognizing that it, or something like it, will occur, and planning for
it, will head off the possible abuses.  I personally think it highly
unlikely that the whole govt would just roll over and die, but in time
people will outright DEMAND more control over the govt.  It IS coming
whether any of you like it or not.  If you doubt this, ask yourself why
FOIA appeared.  The govt certainly didn't come up with that idea.  Nor did
they come up with and promote the idea of govt. info available via
computer and networking tech to the general populace.  Nor FIJA. 

-- 
Stanton  McCandlish   * Space Migration * Networking * ChaOrder * NO GOV'T. *
anton@hydra.unm.edu   * Intelligence Increase * Nano * Crypto * NO RELIGION *
FidoNet:    1:301/2   * Life Extension * Ethics * VR * Now! * NO MORE LIES! *
Noise in the Void BBS * +1-505-246-8515   (24hr, 1200-14400, v32bis, N-8-1) *



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: hfinney@shell.portal.com (Hal Finney)
Date: Sun, 15 Aug 93 11:21:56 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re:  Electronic Democracy
Message-ID: <9308151736.AA29973@jobe.shell.portal.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


The one comment I'd make on the wolves vs sheep analogy is this.  In the
real world, there *are* wolves and sheep.  Violence and coercion are part
of life.  Democracy, in a sense, recognizes the power implicit in large
numbers of people.  If they can't vote, they may revolt.  No libertarian
government will survive without the acceptance of the masses.

A populace willing to countenance a Libertarian society would perhaps be
wise enough to be entrusted with democracy, anyway.

Hal Finney
hfinney@shell.portal.com




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: fergp@sytex.com (Paul Ferguson)
Date: Sun, 15 Aug 93 14:52:02 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Cellular tracing (Done all the time.)
Message-ID: <oyVB9B1w165w@sytex.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
 
A bit off-topic, but:
 
Authorities in Fayetteville, North Carolina arrested two juveniles
yesterday, in the death of James Jordan, father of basketball
superstar Michael Jordan. Charles Kuralt, on CBS's "Sunday Morning,"
reported that authorities believe that Jordan was a victim of random
violence.
 
Authorities were able to locate the suspects because they allegedly
used the cellular phone in Jordan's car before they dumped it.
 
 
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.2
 
iQCVAgUBLG5MEpRLcZSdHMBNAQGCWwP/SZOkRSDjmFopxngHzcREsqY68PTQHC4N
Y5oxmbK7V+MK88MjRdzTizq2298qndu50a170J8NT/KFrNbVUkiOTNhxtu6V3+SU
mH2nyTUWs4oapQyYjPGGYyRqQbkbR/Z+aDGc0zWwZ5cfHztbesEpgoUot19pLsxu
/TzNJL/PWVI=
=1etK
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

Paul Ferguson               |  "Government, even in its best state,
Network Integrator          |   is but a necessary evil; in its worst
Centreville, Virginia USA   |   state, an intolerable one."
fergp@sytex.com             |      - Thomas Paine, Common Sense
 
Type bits/keyID   Date       User ID
pub  1024/1CC04D 1993/03/15  Paul Ferguson <fergp@sytex.com>
  Key fingerprint =  EE D2 93 7D 04 6D C6 05  AC 36 AD 9D 8E 4F 41 58

ser's knowledge. In doing
this, it violates the integrity of the system and furthermore, it does
it surreptitiously. Personally, I like to be intamately aware of every
byte on each of my systems (I am) and know _exactly_ what every
executable which resides on my system does (again, I do). For users
who cannot know this, then a virus is a breech of their privacy, in a
matter of speaking.
 
Finally, distributed computing need not be accomplished by something
as brain-damaged as a virus. Anything a virus could beneficially do, a
legitimate, non-replicating program can do better. In fact, there have
been viruses designed and coded which were supposed to perform
beneficial activities (see historical notes about the Denzuko, Ohio,
etc. viruses). Also, every virus harbors the potential for damage. No
programmer (read: virus author) can possibly know each and every
environment where the code will be introduced. An example which I
frequently use to illustrate this point is the Stoned virus; it is
mostly an innocuous virus, however with several spoofing disk
partitioning schemes (such as Disk Mangler), it can devastating. And
with the advent of the Microsoft Doublspace shit, alot of other
potholes in the road are introduced into the possible scenarios.
 
A final note: There is a virus called "Cruncher" which compresses
executables in much the same way as PKLite or LZEXE. Is this a "good"
virus? This ia an exercise left to the reader...
 
Cheers from Washington, DC
 
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.2
 
iQCVAgUBLG57NZRLcZSdHMBNAQEHygQAhER6mpzGIctOx6sHpndNsv9EdoO++DBq
x32h5Q4b5ylGDJWEcbC3RMqpkbDrzzYJOaBtRiqW+XTfpTagAKI0CbBWknxJcF3T
W8hdDxu0kN2K0TVPbinkUUM+bvXLAdhYdv9GqixoWJx+Y/mkW2XtQLKbxRSFt/Uv
ZC/YC+YVb18=
=Mq8P
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

Paul Ferguson               |  "Government, even in its best state,
Network Integrator          |   is but a necessary evil; in its worst
Centreville, Virginia USA   |   state, an intolerable one."
fergp@sytex.com             |      - Thomas Paine, Common Sense
 
Type bits/keyID   Date       User ID
pub  1024/1CC04D 1993/03/15  Paul Ferguson <fergp@sytex.com>
  Key fingerprint =  EE D2 93 7D 04 6D C6 05  AC 36 AD 9D 8E 4F 41 58




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Anonymous
Date: Tue Sep 07 12:39:11 1999
Subject: No Subject
Message-ID: <778e3d9ab54852047b1495c426841802@NO-ID-FOUND.mhonarc.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Based on previous experience, a couple more will appear overnight.

Hal Finney
hfinney@shell.portal.com




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: hfinney@shell.portal.com (Hal Finney)
Date: Sun, 15 Aug 93 11:22:00 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re:  Which remailers are up & working?
Message-ID: <9308151752.AA00444@jobe.shell.portal.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I just updated the version of PGP on my remailers at Caltech and Portal
to use version 2.3a.  It turns out that, starting with version 2.3,
PGP by default creates messages that are not readable by versions
before 2.2.  2.2 can read the 2.3 messages, but 2.0 and 2.1 cannot.  I
was running 2.1 so I wasn't able to process messages created with 2.3.

If anyone else is running PGP versions before 2.2 on their remailers they
should upgrade them.

I just did a non-encrypted ping test to a list of remailers, and heard back
from the following remailers within 2 minutes:




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: hfinney@shell.portal.com (Hal Finney)
Date: Sun, 15 Aug 93 11:22:01 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re:  Cypherpunk trends & visions
Message-ID: <9308151808.AA00769@jobe.shell.portal.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I have a shorter-term focus than Nick's proposals for digital coupons
and cash.  Here's what would be on my cypherpunks wish list:

Improved remailers:  The ability to handle reply messages; the ability to
	register pseudonyms of the user's choice, which get mapped to
	a user-supplied encrypted remailing block (this is Eric Hughes'
	model); true Chaumian "mix" functionality, with message batching
	so that in-to-out mapping is lost, including message padding
	so all messages are the same size.

Remailer standards:  An ad hoc assertion of standard remailer commands
	which all our different implementations will support.  We could
	have a SIG just to discuss this.  I don't think it would take long.

Remailer proliferation:  Build remailer software into some widely used
	mail packages like elm, metamail (which provides MIME support),
	emacs, etc.

Digital cash:  We badly need some implementation to start playing with;
	some net-based game which uses the digital cash.  Digital postage
	stamps for the remailers.

DH:  I'd like to see more DH-based comm software so I can log in from
	home to my work or school computer and have an encrypted link.  I
	know we have a version for the Amiga; I'd like to see it for PC.
	I'd also like to see an email program which used DH so that
	there would be no danger of coerced key exposure.

Cryptophones:  PC/Soundblaster or Mac based encrypted comm software using
	14.4 Kbaud modems.

This is a fairly daunting list, of course, but perhaps we should re-orient
ourselves to be a working group more than a debating group.  Split off
sub-groups, get people to volunteer for each one, put one person in charge,
have him make weekly or monthly reports to the main group.

Hal Finney
hfinney@shell.portal.com




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: R.Tait@bnr.co.uk
Date: Sun, 15 Aug 93 05:56:53 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Which remailers are up & working?
Message-ID: <199308151253.23965@bnsgs200.bnr.co.uk>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Does anyone have an up to date of the anonymous remailers which are up
and running? I used the  Entropy and Hal's  the other day, and on both
cases I got bounced mail back.

What gives?
-Rick




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Jin S Choi <jsc@monolith.MIT.EDU>
Date: Sun, 15 Aug 93 14:06:58 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: elisp for PGP encryption and remailing
Message-ID: <9308152104.AA19194@monolith.MIT.EDU>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



I submitted my mailcrypt package to the elisp archive a few days ago,
but it doesn't seem to have been put up yet, and people have been asking
me for it, so I'll put it up here.

As a bonus, I've hacked up a little function which lets you easily set
up a mail message for encrypted, chained remailing through any number of
cypherpunk remailers.

I hope someone finds this useful. Comments and suggestions appreciated.

-----------------------cut here----------------------------------
#! /bin/sh
# This is a shell archive, meaning:
# 1. Remove everything above the #! /bin/sh line.
# 2. Save the resulting text in a file.
# 3. Execute the file with /bin/sh (not csh) to create the files:
#	mailcrypt.el
#	remail.el
# This archive created: Sun Aug 15 17:02:07 1993
export PATH; PATH=/bin:$PATH
if test -f 'mailcrypt.el'
then
	echo shar: will not over-write existing file "'mailcrypt.el'"
else
cat << \SHAR_EOF > 'mailcrypt.el'
;; mailcrypt.el v1.2, mail encryption with RIPEM and PGP
;; Copyright (C) 1993  Jin Choi <jsc@mit.edu>
;; Any comments or suggestions welcome.
;; Inspired by pgp.el, by Gray Watson <gray@antaire.com>.

;; LCD Archive Entry:
;; mailcrypt|Jin S Choi|jsc@mit.edu|
;; Encryption/decryption for mail using RIPEM or PGP. Supports RMAIL and VM.|
;; 15-Aug-93|Version 1.2| *archive path* |

;;{{{ Licensing
;; This file is intended to be used with GNU Emacs.

;; This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
;; it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
;; the Free Software Foundation; either version 2, or (at your option)
;; any later version.

;; This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
;; but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
;; MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
;; GNU General Public License for more details.

;; You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
;; along with GNU Emacs; see the file COPYING.  If not, write to
;; the Free Software Foundation, 675 Mass Ave, Cambridge, MA 02139, USA.
;;}}}

;;{{{ Change Log
;;{{{ Changes from 1.1:
;; * Added recipients field to mc-encrypt-message.
;;}}}
;;{{{ Changes from 1.0:
;; * Fixed batchmode bug in decryption, where unsigned messages would return
;;   with exit code of 1.
;;}}}
;;{{{ Changes from 0.3b:
;; * Only set PGPPASSFD when needed, so PGP won't break when used
;;   in shell mode.
;; * Use call-process-region instead of shell-command-on-region in order
;;   to detect exit codes.
;; * Changed mc-temp-display to not use the kill ring.
;; * Bug fixes.
;;}}}
;;{{{ Changes from 0.2b:
;; * Prompts for replacement in mc-rmail-decrypt-message.
;; * Bug fixes.
;;}}}
;;{{{ Changes from 0.1b:
;; * Several bug fixes.
;; Contributed by Jason Merrill <jason@cygnus.com>:
;; * VM mailreader support
;; * Support for addresses with spaces and <>'s in them
;; * Support for using an explicit path for the pgp executable
;; * Key management functions
;; * The ability to avoid some of the prompts when encrypting
;; * Assumes mc-default-scheme unless prefixed
;;}}}
;;}}}

;;{{{ Usage:
;;{{{ Installation:

;; To use, put the following elisp into your .emacs file.
;; You may want to set some of the user variables there as well,
;; particularly mc-default-scheme.

;;(autoload 'mc-encrypt-message "mailcrypt" nil t)
;;(autoload 'mc-sign-message "mailcrypt" nil t)
;;(autoload 'mc-insert-public-key "mailcrypt" nil t)
;;(add-hook 'mail-mode-hook
;;	  '(lambda ()
;;	     (require 'mailcrypt)
;;	     (define-key mail-mode-map "\C-ce" 'mc-encrypt-message)
;;	     (define-key mail-mode-map "\C-cs" 'mc-sign-message)
;;	     (define-key mail-mode-map "\C-ca" 'mc-insert-public-key)))

;;(autoload 'mc-rmail-decrypt-message "mailcrypt" nil t)
;;(autoload 'mc-rmail-verify-signature "mailcrypt" nil t)
;;(autoload 'mc-snarf-keys "mailcrypt" nil t)
;;(add-hook 'rmail-mode-hook
;;	  '(lambda ()
;;	     (require 'mailcrypt)
;;	     (define-key rmail-mode-map "\C-cd" 'mc-rmail-decrypt-message)
;;	     (define-key rmail-mode-map "\C-cv" 'mc-rmail-verify-signature)
;;	     (define-key rmail-mode-map "\C-cs" 'mc-snarf-keys)))

;;(autoload 'mc-vm-decrypt-message "mailcrypt" nil t)
;;(autoload 'mc-vm-verify-signature "mailcrypt" nil t)
;;(add-hook 'vm-mode-hooks
;;	  '(lambda ()
;;	     (require 'mailcrypt)
;;	     (define-key vm-mode-map "\C-cd" 'mc-vm-decrypt-message)
;;	     (define-key vm-mode-map "\C-cv" 'mc-vm-verify-signature)
;;	     (define-key vm-mode-map "\C-cs" 'mc-snarf-keys)))

;;}}}
;;{{{ Security Considerations

;; I've tried to write this with security in mind, especially in
;; regard to the passphrase used to encrypt the private key.

;; No passphrase is ever passed by command line or environment
;; variable. The passphrase may be temporarily stored into an elisp
;; variable to allow multiple encryptions/decryptions within a short
;; period of time without having to type it in each time. It will
;; deactivate automatically some time after its last use (default one
;; minute; see `mc-passwd-timeout') if you are running emacs 19. This
;; is to prevent someone from walking up to your computer while you're
;; gone and looking up your passphrase. If you are using an older
;; version of emacs, you can either set mc-passwd-timeout to nil,
;; which disables passphrase cacheing, or manually deactivate your
;; passphrase when you are done with it by typing `M-x mc-deactivate-passwd'.

;; The passphrase may still be visible shortly after entry as lossage
;; (the last 100 characters entered can be displayed by typing 
;; `C-h l'). I've taken no steps to deal with this, as I don't think
;; anything *can* be done. If you are the paranoid type, make sure you
;; type at least a hundred keys after entering your passphrase before
;; you leave your emacs unattended.

;; If you are truly security conscious, you should, of course, never
;; leave your computer unattended while you're logged in....

;;}}}
;;{{{ CAVEAT:

;; This code breaks if you have "Verbose=0" in your config.txt for PGP.
;; Thanks to Ciamac Moallemi (ciamac@hplms2.hpl.hp.com) for pointing this out.

;; This was written under emacs v19. Its behavior under older versions
;; of emacs is untested. If something breaks under emacs 18, please
;; feel free to fix it and send me patches.

;;}}}
;;{{{ Note:
;; The funny triple braces you see are used by `folding-mode', a minor
;; mode by Jamie Lokier, available from the elisp archive.
;;}}}
;;}}}

(require 'comint)
(require 'mail-utils)

;;{{{ User variables.

(defvar mc-default-scheme 'pgp "*Default encryption scheme to use.")
(defvar mc-passwd-timeout "1 min" 
  "*Time to deactivate password in after a use, or nil for immediately.")

(defvar mc-pgp-user-id (user-login-name) "*Your PGP user ID.")
(defvar mc-ripem-user-id (or (getenv "RIPEM_USER_NAME")
			     (user-full-name) "*Your RIPEM user ID."))

(defvar mc-pgp-always-sign nil "*Always sign encrypted PGP messages.")
(defvar mc-always-replace nil "*Decrypt messages in place without prompting.")
(defvar mc-use-default-recipients nil
  "*Assume that the message should be encoded for everyone listed in the To:
and Cc: fields.")
(defvar mc-encrypt-for-me nil
  "*Encrypt all outgoing messages with user's public key.")

;;}}}
;;{{{ Program variables and constants.

(defvar mc-timer nil "Timer object for password deactivation.")

(defvar mc-pgp-passwd nil "Your PGP passphrase.")
(defvar mc-ripem-passwd nil "Your RIPEM passphrase.")

(defvar mc-pgp-path "pgp" "*The PGP executable.")
(defvar mc-ripem-path "ripem" "*The RIPEM executable.")

(defvar mc-ripem-pubkeyfile (getenv "RIPEM_PUBLIC_KEY_FILE")
  "*Location of RIPEM public key file.")				

(defconst mc-pgp-msg-begin-line "-----BEGIN PGP MESSAGE-----"
  "Text for start of PGP message delimiter.")
(defconst mc-pgp-msg-end-line "-----END PGP MESSAGE-----"
  "Text for end of PGP message delimiter.")
(defconst mc-pgp-signed-begin-line "-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----"
  "Text for start of PGP signed messages.")
(defconst mc-pgp-signed-end-line "-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----"
  "Text for end of PGP signed messages.")
(defconst mc-pgp-key-begin-line "-----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----"
  "Text for start of PGP public key.")
(defconst mc-pgp-key-end-line "-----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----"
  "Text for end of PGP public key.")
(defconst mc-ripem-key-begin-line "-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----"
  "Text for start of RIPEM public key.")
(defconst mc-ripem-key-end-line "-----END PUBLIC KEY-----"
  "Text for end of RIPEM public key.")
(defconst mc-ripem-msg-begin-line "-----BEGIN PRIVACY-ENHANCED MESSAGE-----"
  "Text for start of RIPEM message delimiter.")
(defconst mc-ripem-msg-end-line "-----END PRIVACY-ENHANCED MESSAGE-----"
  "Text for end of RIPEM message delimiter.")

;;}}}
;;{{{ Utility functions.

(defun mc-split (regexp str)
  "Splits STR into a list of elements which were separated by REGEXP,
stripping initial and trailing whitespace."
  (let ((data (match-data))
	beg end	retval)
    (string-match "[ \t\n]*" str)	; Will always match at 0
    (setq beg (match-end 0))
    ;; This will break if there are newlines in str XXX
    (setq end (string-match "[ \t\n]*$" str))
    (while (string-match regexp str beg)
      (setq retval (append retval 
			   (list (substring str beg (match-beginning 0)))))
      (setq beg (match-end 0)))
    (if (not (= (length str) beg))	; Not end
	(setq retval (append retval (list (substring str beg end)))))
    (store-match-data data)
    retval))

(defun mc-temp-display (beg end &optional name)
  (let (tmp)
    (if (not name)
	(setq name "*Mailcrypt Temp*"))
    (setq tmp (buffer-substring beg end))
    (delete-region beg end)
    (save-excursion
      (set-buffer (generate-new-buffer name))
      (insert tmp)
      (goto-char (point-min))
      (save-window-excursion
	(shrink-window-if-larger-than-buffer 
	 (display-buffer (current-buffer)))
	(message "Press any key to remove the %s window." name)
	(read-char)
	(kill-buffer (current-buffer))))))
  

;;}}}
;;{{{ Passphrase management

(defun mc-activate-passwd (scheme)
  (if (fboundp 'run-at-time)
      (progn
	(if mc-timer (cancel-timer mc-timer))
	(setq mc-timer (if mc-passwd-timeout
			   (run-at-time mc-passwd-timeout 
					nil 'mc-deactivate-passwd)
			 nil))))
  (cond ((eq scheme 'pgp)
	 (if (not mc-pgp-passwd)
	     (setq mc-pgp-passwd (comint-read-noecho "PGP Password: "))))
	((eq scheme 'ripem)
	 (if (not mc-ripem-passwd)
	     (setq mc-ripem-passwd (comint-read-noecho "RIPEM Password: "))))
	(t
	 (error "Encryption scheme %s not recognized" scheme))))

(defun mc-deactivate-passwd ()
  "*Deactivates both PGP and RIPEM passwords."
  (interactive)
  (and mc-timer (fboundp 'cancel-timer) (cancel-timer mc-timer))
  (setq mc-pgp-passwd nil
	mc-ripem-passwd nil)
  (message "password deactivated"))

;;}}}
;;{{{ Encryption

(defun mc-encrypt-message (&optional recipients scheme)
  "*Encrypt the message to RECIPIENTS using the given encryption SCHEME.
If SCHEME is nil, use the value of `mc-default-scheme'."
  (interactive
   (if current-prefix-arg
       (list nil (read-from-minibuffer "Encryption Scheme: " nil nil t))))
  
  (let (args start signed-p retval)
    (or scheme (setq scheme mc-default-scheme))
    (setq recipients
	  (cond (recipients		; given as function argument
		 recipients)
		(mc-use-default-recipients
		 (concat (mail-fetch-field "to" nil t) ", "
			 (mail-fetch-field "cc" nil t)))
		(t			; prompt for it
		 (read-from-minibuffer
		  "Recipients: " (concat (mail-fetch-field "to" nil t) ", "
					 (mail-fetch-field "cc" nil t))))))
    
    (setq recipients (mc-split "\\([ \t\n]*,[ \t\n]*\\)+" recipients))
    (or recipients
	(error "No recipients!"))

    (cond ((eq scheme 'pgp)
	   (and mc-encrypt-for-me
		(setq recipients (cons mc-pgp-user-id recipients)))
	   (setq args (list "+batchmode" "-feat"))
	   (if (or mc-pgp-always-sign (y-or-n-p "Sign the message? "))
	       (setq signed-p t
		     args (append args (list "-su" mc-pgp-user-id))))
	   (setq args (append args recipients))
	   (goto-char (point-min))
	   (search-forward (concat "\n" mail-header-separator "\n"))
	   (setq start (point))
	   (let ((process-environment process-environment))
	     ;; Don't need to ask for the passphrase if not signing.
	     (if signed-p
		 (progn (mc-activate-passwd 'pgp)
			(insert mc-pgp-passwd "\n")
			(setq process-environment (cons "PGPPASSFD=0"
							process-environment))))
	     (message "Encrypting...")
	     ;; Use call-process-region rather than shell-command-on-region
	     ;; to get the exit code.
	     (setq retval (apply 'call-process-region
				 (append (list start (point-max) mc-pgp-path
					       t t nil)
					 args)))
	     (or mc-passwd-timeout (mc-deactivate-passwd))
	     (if (= retval 0)
		 (progn
		   (goto-char start)
		   (search-forward mc-pgp-msg-begin-line)
		   (search-backward mc-pgp-msg-begin-line)
		   (mc-temp-display start (point) "*Encryption*"))
	       (error "Error while encrypting. Hit C-x u to undo."))))
	  ((eq scheme 'ripem)
	   (and mc-encrypt-for-me
		(setq recipients (cons mc-ripem-user-id recipients)))
	   ;; Anyone know any better way to do the following?
	   (setq args (append (list "-e" "-m" "encrypted"
				    "-T" "a" "-k" "-")
			      (apply 'append
				     (mapcar (lambda (x) (list "-r" x)) 
					     recipients))))
	   (goto-char (point-min))
	   (search-forward (concat "\n" mail-header-separator "\n"))
	   (setq start (point))
	   (mc-activate-passwd 'ripem)
	   (insert mc-ripem-passwd "\n")
	   (message "Encrypting...")
	   (setq retval (apply 'call-process-region
			       (append (list start (point-max) mc-ripem-path
					     t t nil)
				       args)))
	   (or mc-passwd-timeout (mc-deactivate-passwd))
	   (if (/= retval 0)
	       (error "Error while encrypting. Hit C-x u to undo.")))
	  (t
	   (error "Encryption scheme %s not recognized" scheme)))))

;;}}}
;;{{{ Decryption

(defun mc-decrypt-message ()
  "*Decrypt whatever message is in the current buffer. Return t on success."
  (interactive)
  (let (start msg retval)
    (goto-char (point-min))
    (cond ((search-forward mc-pgp-msg-begin-line nil t)
	   (search-backward mc-pgp-msg-begin-line)
	   (setq start (point))
	   (mc-activate-passwd 'pgp)
	   (or buffer-read-only
	       (insert mc-pgp-passwd "\n"))
	   (re-search-forward (concat "^" mc-pgp-msg-end-line))
	   (cond (buffer-read-only
		  (setq msg (buffer-substring start (point)))
		  (pop-to-buffer (get-buffer-create "*Decrypted Message*"))
		  (erase-buffer)
		  (insert mc-pgp-passwd "\n" msg)
		  (setq start (point-min))))
	   (let ((process-environment 
		  (cons "PGPPASSFD=0" process-environment)))
	     (message "Decrypting...")
	     (setq retval (call-process-region start (point) mc-pgp-path t t
					       nil "-f"))
	     (or mc-passwd-timeout (mc-deactivate-passwd))
	     (if (= retval 0)
		 (prog1
		     t
		   (goto-char start)
		   (or (re-search-forward "^Signature made.*\n" nil t)
		       (search-forward "Just a moment......"))
		   (mc-temp-display start (point) "*Decryption*"))
	       (mc-temp-display start (point) "*ERROR*")
	       nil)))
	  ((search-forward mc-ripem-msg-begin-line nil t)
	   (search-backward mc-ripem-msg-begin-line)
	   (setq start (point))
	   (mc-activate-passwd 'ripem)
	   (insert mc-ripem-passwd "\n")
	   (re-search-forward (concat "^" mc-ripem-msg-end-line))
	   (message "Decrypting...")
	   (setq retval (call-process-region start (point) mc-ripem-path t t
					     nil "-d" "-k" "-"))
	   (or mc-passwd-timeout (mc-deactivate-passwd))
	   (if (= retval 0)
	       t
	     (mc-temp-display start (point) "*ERROR*")
	     nil))
	  (t
	   (message "Found no encrypted message in this buffer.")
	   nil))))

(defun mc-rmail-decrypt-message ()
  "*Decrypt the contents of this message"
  (interactive)
  (if (not (equal mode-name "RMAIL"))
      (error "mc-rmail-decrypt-message called in a non-RMAIL buffer"))
  (rmail-edit-current-message)
  (cond ((not (mc-decrypt-message))
	 (rmail-abort-edit))
	((or mc-always-replace
	     (y-or-n-p "Replace encrypted message with decrypted? "))
	 (rmail-cease-edit)
	 (rmail-kill-label "edited")
	 (rmail-add-label "decrypted"))
	(t
	 (rmail-abort-edit))))

(defun mc-vm-decrypt-message ()
  "*Decrypt the contents of the current VM message"
  (interactive)
  (if (interactive-p)
      (vm-follow-summary-cursor))
  (vm-select-folder-buffer)
  (vm-check-for-killed-summary)
  (vm-error-if-folder-read-only)
  (vm-error-if-folder-empty)
  (vm-edit-message)
  (cond ((not (mc-decrypt-message))
	 (progn (message "Decryption failed.")
		(vm-edit-message-abort)))
	((or mc-always-replace
	     (y-or-n-p "Replace encrypted message with decrypted? "))
	 (vm-edit-message-end))
	(t
	 (vm-edit-message-abort))))

;;}}}  
;;{{{ Signing

(defun mc-sign-message (&optional scheme)
  "*Clear sign the message using the given encryption SCHEME."
  (interactive
   (if current-prefix-arg
       (list (read-from-minibuffer "Encryption Scheme: " nil nil t))))
  (or scheme (setq scheme mc-default-scheme))
  (let (start retval)
    (cond ((eq scheme 'pgp)
	   (goto-char (point-min))
	   (search-forward (concat "\n" mail-header-separator "\n"))
	   (setq start (point))
	   (mc-activate-passwd 'pgp)
	   (insert mc-pgp-passwd "\n")
	   (let ((process-environment 
		  (cons "PGPPASSFD=0" process-environment)))
	     (setq retval (call-process-region start (point-max) mc-pgp-path
					       t t nil "-fast" "+clearsig=on"
					       "+batchmode" "-u"
					       mc-pgp-user-id)))
	   (or mc-passwd-timeout (mc-deactivate-passwd))
	   (cond ((= 0 retval)
		  (goto-char start)
		  (search-forward "\nJust a moment....")
		  (mc-temp-display start (point)))
		 (t
		  (error "PGP signing failed. Use C-x u to undo."))))
	  ((eq scheme 'ripem)
	   (setq command (concat mc-ripem-path " -e -m mic-clear -k -"))
	   (goto-char (point-min))
	   (search-forward (concat "\n" mail-header-separator "\n"))
	   (setq start (point))
	   (mc-activate-passwd 'ripem)
	   (insert mc-ripem-passwd "\n")
	   (setq retval (call-process-region start (point-max) mc-ripem-path
					     t t nil "-e" "-m" "mic-clear"
					     "-k" "-"))
	   (or mc-passwd-timeout (mc-deactivate-passwd))
	   (if (/= 0 retval)
	       (error "RIPEM signing failed. Use C-x u to undo.")))
	  (t
	   (error "Encryption scheme %s not recognized" scheme)))))
	   
;;}}}
;;{{{ Signature verification

;;{{{ mc-verify-signature

(defun mc-verify-signature ()
  "*Verify the signature of whatever signed message is in the current
buffer, and give the result as a message in the minibuffer. Returns t
if the signature is verified."
  (interactive)
  (let (start buf msg retval)
    (goto-char (point-min))
    (cond ((re-search-forward (concat "^" mc-pgp-signed-begin-line) nil t)
	   (beginning-of-line)
	   (setq start (point))
	   (search-forward mc-pgp-signed-end-line)
	   (setq msg (buffer-substring start (point)))
	   (save-excursion
	     (set-buffer (generate-new-buffer "*Verification*"))
	     (insert msg)
	     (setq retval (call-process-region
			   (point-min) (point-max) mc-pgp-path t 
			   t nil "+batchmode" "-f"))
	     (if (/= retval 0)
		 (progn (mc-temp-display (point-min) (point-max) "*ERROR*")
			(kill-buffer (current-buffer))
			nil)
	       (goto-char (point-min))
	       (search-forward "Good signature")
	       (beginning-of-line)
	       (setq start (point))
	       (end-of-line)
	       (message (buffer-substring start (point)))
	       (kill-buffer (current-buffer))
	       t)))
	  ((re-search-forward (concat "^" mc-ripem-msg-begin-line) nil t)
	   (beginning-of-line)
	   (setq start (point))
	   (search-forward mc-ripem-msg-end-line)
	   (setq msg (buffer-substring start (point)))
	   (save-excursion
	     (set-buffer (generate-new-buffer "*Verification*"))
	     (insert msg)
	     (setq retval (call-process-region (point-min) (point-max)
					       mc-ripem-path t t nil "-d"))

	     ;; Theoretically, at this point retval should hold a 0 if
	     ;; the signature was correct, and a 1 if it wasn't. In
	     ;; practice, it holds whatever it feels like holding. I
	     ;; believe this is a bug in call-process-region, but have
	     ;; not been able to figure out why it works everywhere
	     ;; else but not here. For now, I'm just going to display
	     ;; the output.

	     (mc-temp-display (point-min) (point-max))
	     (kill-buffer (current-buffer))))

;	     (if (/= 0 retval)
;		 (progn (goto-char (point-min))
;			(message (buffer-substring (point) (progn
;							     (end-of-line)
;							     (point))))
;			(kill-buffer (current-buffer))
;			nil)
;	       (message "RIPEM signature verified")
;	       (kill-buffer (current-buffer))
;	       t)))
	  (t
	   (error "No signed message found.")))))

;;}}}
;;{{{ mc-rmail-verify-signature

(defun mc-rmail-verify-signature ()
  "*Verify the signature in the current message."
  (interactive)
  (if (not (equal mode-name "RMAIL"))
      (error "mc-rmail-verify-signature called in a non-RMAIL buffer"))
  (if (mc-verify-signature)
      (rmail-add-label "verified")))

;;}}}
;;{{{ mc-vm-verify-signature

(defun mc-vm-verify-signature ()
  "*Verify the signature in the current VM message"
  (interactive)
  (if (interactive-p)
      (vm-follow-summary-cursor))
  (vm-select-folder-buffer)
  (vm-check-for-killed-summary)
  (vm-error-if-folder-empty)
  (mc-verify-signature))

;;}}}

;;}}}
;;{{{ Key management

;;{{{ mc-insert-public-key

(defun mc-insert-public-key (&optional scheme)
  "*Insert your public key at the end of the current buffer."
  (interactive
   (if current-prefix-arg
       (list (read-from-minibuffer "Encryption Scheme: " nil nil t))))
  (or scheme (setq scheme mc-default-scheme))
  (let (command start pubkey)
    (goto-char (point-max))
    (if (not (bolp))
	(insert "\n"))
    (cond ((eq scheme 'pgp)
	   (setq command (concat mc-pgp-path " +batchmode -kxaf '"
				 mc-pgp-user-id "'"))
	   (setq start (point))
	   (shell-command command t)
	   (goto-char start)
	   (search-forward mc-pgp-key-begin-line)
	   (beginning-of-line)
	   (mc-temp-display start (point)))
	  ((eq scheme 'ripem)
	   (if (file-readable-p mc-ripem-pubkeyfile)
	       (save-excursion
		 (set-buffer (find-file-noselect mc-ripem-pubkeyfile))
		 (goto-char (point-min))
		 (if (search-forward mc-ripem-user-id nil t)
		     (progn
		       (search-backward mc-ripem-key-begin-line)
		       (setq start (point))
		       (search-forward mc-ripem-key-end-line)
		       (setq pubkey (buffer-substring start (point))))
		   (message "Couldn't find key for `%s' in file %s"
			    mc-ripem-user-id mc-ripem-pubkeyfile))
		 (kill-buffer (current-buffer)))
	     (error "Cannot read file %s for public key" mc-ripem-pubkeyfile))
	   (if pubkey
	       (insert pubkey)))
	  (t
	   (error "Encryption scheme %s not recognized" scheme)))))

;;}}}
;;{{{ mc-snarf-keys

(defun mc-snarf-keys ()
  "*Add any public keys in the buffer to your keyring."
  (interactive)
  (let (start buf user exists)
    (goto-char (point-min))
    (cond ((search-forward mc-pgp-key-begin-line nil t)
	   (setq buf (generate-new-buffer " *Key Temp*"))
	   (goto-char (match-beginning 0))
	   (call-process-region (point) (point-max) mc-pgp-path nil
				buf nil "+batchmode" "-kaf")
	   (save-excursion
	     (set-buffer buf)
	     (mc-temp-display (point-min) (point-max) "*Key Management*"))
	   (kill-buffer buf))
	  ((search-forward mc-ripem-key-begin-line nil t)
	   (goto-char (match-beginning 0))
	   (setq start (point))
	   ;; Get the user ID of the key being added.
	   (re-search-forward "^User:\s-*.*$" nil t)
	   (setq user (buffer-substring (match-beginning 0) (match-end 0)))

	   (search-forward mc-ripem-key-end-line)
	   (if (file-writable-p mc-ripem-pubkeyfile)
	       (progn
		 (save-excursion
		   (set-buffer (find-file-noselect mc-ripem-pubkeyfile))
		   (goto-char (point-min))
		   (if (search-forward user nil t)
		       (setq exists t))
		   (kill-buffer (current-buffer)))
		 (if (not exists)
		     (append-to-file start (point) mc-ripem-pubkeyfile)
		   (message "RIPEM public key for this user already exists.")))
	     (error "Can't write to file %s" mc-ripem-pubkeyfile))))))

;;}}}

;;}}}

(provide 'mailcrypt)



;; Local Variables:
;; folded-file: t
;; End:
SHAR_EOF
fi # end of overwriting check
if test -f 'remail.el'
then
	echo shar: will not over-write existing file "'remail.el'"
else
cat << \SHAR_EOF > 'remail.el'
;; remail.el, by Jin S. Choi <jsc@mit.edu>
;; Quick hack to allow easy use of cypherpunk remailers.
;; Requires mailcrypt v1.2 or higher.

;; Always encrypts. If you don't want to use encryption, it's simple
;; enough to set up by hand....
;; Assumes that you have the public keys of the remailers you want to
;; use in your keyring already.

(require 'mailcrypt)

(defvar remailer-list
  (list "hfinney@shell.portal.com" "hal@alumni.caltech.edu")
  "*A list of remailers to mail through.")

(defun remail-message ()
  "*Munge the current message to go through the remailers listed in
remailer-list and end up at the address listed in the To: field."
  (interactive)
  (goto-char (point-min))
  (re-search-forward (concat "^" mail-header-separator))
  (beginning-of-line)
  (narrow-to-region (point-min) (point))
  (let ((recipients (mail-fetch-field "to" nil t))
	(remailer-list remailer-list)
	from to)
    (delete-region (point-min) (point-max))
    (goto-char (point-min))
    (insert "To: " (car remailer-list) "\n")
    (setq remailer-list (reverse remailer-list))
    (widen)
    (forward-line)
    (setq to recipients)
    (setq from (car remailer-list))
    (while remailer-list
      (if to 
	  (insert "::\nRequest-Remailing-To: " to "\n\n"))
      (mc-encrypt-message from 'pgp)
      (save-excursion 
	(insert "::\nEncrypted: PGP\n\n"))
      (setq remailer-list (cdr remailer-list))
      (setq to from)
      (setq from (car remailer-list)))))
SHAR_EOF
fi # end of overwriting check
#	End of shell archive
exit 0





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Karl Barrus <elee9sf@Menudo.UH.EDU>
Date: Sun, 15 Aug 93 15:42:00 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: encrypting virus (KOH)
Message-ID: <199308152240.AA11446@Menudo.UH.EDU>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----


Well, perhaps any discussion of viruses tends to cause feelings to run
high, so perhaps the author of potassium hydroxide shouldn't have
termed his program a virus.

I don't see any difference between Stacker 3.0 and its stacked disk
option that compresses files on a floppy and inserts a small
decompression routine there as well, and the encrypting "program" I
posted information on.  Well, besides the fact the Stacker compresses
and potassium hydroxide encrypts.

> Anything a virus could beneficially do, a legitimate,
> non-replicating program can do better.

Well, if I were more proficient in assembly I might code an encrypting
Stacker program.  Perhaps you will take the public domain code,
disassemble it and improve it, elevating it from "virus" status.

> Also, every virus harbors the potential for damage. No programmer
> (read: virus author) can possibly know each and every environment
> where the code will be introduced.

Yes, this may be true, and applied to every program ever written, not
just "viruses".  

Not to insult anybody, but if memory serves PGP had a bug which
destroyed files on hard drives.... why, even Microsoft's CHKDSK
program had a bug which could destroy a hard drive.

Modern software is complex and configurations uncountable.  Now I do
not advocate spreading viruses and damaging computer systems, but to
imply the only viruses harbor potential for damage is surely
ridiculous.

I posted this because the purpose of the "virus" is to automatically
encrypt files, a goal that I understand some people on this list are
working on.  If anybody is interested in a copy, I can send it.  A
disassembly would be instructive, and would allow people to fine tune
the program, improve it, incorporate it into other projects, etc.

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.3a

iQCVAgUBLG67HYOA7OpLWtYzAQF5IAP/VFEqemlG8ntyyqikQie1eFR+61D2JX8k
3k5oc5pU2LdYqFPKDFyNQ/Rn/Sw9LAB2+NFfc4X1J1+nWcGTPxZ1Njb5n9tYrC8D
WQUMD6O8NxgKQhfJMsBJQqmbrXKcCnLOfAYyzDlrEszmKzg3xp0uqRqvsh2rHyIb
YDK6HYk3B08=
=f6WE
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Seth Morris <Seth.Morris@lambada.oit.unc.edu>
Date: Sun, 15 Aug 93 15:57:00 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com (punks)
Subject: Back on track(s)...
Message-ID: <9308152256.AA01403@lambada.oit.unc.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text


 Hi... I haven't posted much here, but I've been lurking for quite
some time.
 
 On the issue of "lost focus" and a return to projects, I'd like to
ask about some of the projects that were/are underway from a while
ago. Some months back, there was a push to get kits together for
different non-technical persons needing access to privacy, anonymity,
digital signatures, crypto, etc... such as journalists, political
activists, religious groups, terro^H^H^H^H^Hetc. This is an idea I am
very interested in, and I'm wondering if it's still ongoing. It seems
to gel well with the proposed cd-rom collection (I think some shareware/PD
distributors might be talked into a multi-disk privacy distribution set,
perhaps with some basic utils like antiviruses/text-editors/defraggers
as a "must have" basic start-up kit). Could one of the major FTP sites
be persuaded to maintain a privacy/anonymity section that didn't put them
in a legally tenuous position? No PGP, perhaps but articles (with sample
code?), steganographic utils, etc. Maybe some front ends for popular
remailers/encryption utils.
 What about digital cash? I thought some ongoing experiments testing ease-
of-use/speed etc. started up (or were announced) about six months
ago? (I lost net access for about three months a while back, so I may
have missed preliminary results.) I think that this is a fertile area
for trial balloons based on games. Set up a server with several games being
managed (possibly as either lists or CC-groups or with human moderators)
and use secure digital cash protocals(sp?) both within a game and between
games... sounds like the FBI (Flying Buffalo, Inc) Illuminati PBM and other
PBM's with requirements to progress from one game to another would serve as a
useful model.... Gnomic or Elusius(sp? the research-based cardgame from
one of the Penrose books, I believe) would serve as an excellent test for
popular secure anonymous voting by non-programmers. All in all, gamers are
excellent sources of guinea pigs, and usually quite willing (hmmm... how
about handing out disk packs at SF/Gamer cons?... MANY gamers are computer
users and they can be counted on the use the programs in their PBEM games,
spreading them on to other BBSing Gamers while they're at it... maybe I can
test this here in Tucson).
 
 I think that just getting dialog generated will spark most of us to get 
work done. I feel, personally, that the cypherpunks remailers need some
spec-work done and the specs published more openly, and similar work done
with steganographic tools, etc. We need more active, reputation-building
anonymous Usenetters, people who want to create such identities need to
feel that THEY can control the tools they will be using.

 Are the pools still active?

 Can a set of games be developed that model crypto/anonymity/steg?
rec.games.abstract is a wonderful source of ideas and shows what can be
done with an abstract idea (play both gnomic and elesius sometime!).

 What we need is a list of projects that people are interested in/working
on, with some communication about how they're going. We have no dearth of
ideas, or people, or interest. It's the assumption that either, someone else
is already doing it (a bad attitude among the hacker-types that abound here,
reminds me of a SF story where a bunch of ship captians are put in a 
simulator to see who gets a big promotion. The simulator is wretched, has
too many little (useless) lights, the AC blows in your eyes, the sound is
WAY too loud, etc. Everyone fails, all making the same complaints and
telling them how to redesign the simulator. The promotion goes to the guy
who tapes up the redundant lights, puts cardboard over the AC and turns the
speakers to face outward... the wanted a commander who would actually FIX
things, not make orders)
 Cypherpunks aren't bery organised, nor should we be, but having some lists
of what some of us want to do, who's doing what, and what some of us are
thinking/worried about might be very helpful. Hmmm. maybe someone should see
if a regular digest of what's ACTUALLY being said/done on the list, for
reference, would go over well... 
   This week we discussed:
	a) pagers and ping... most think it's a myth
	b) T-Shirts
	  (list of popular ideas for shirts)
	c) Digital democracy debates
	d) meetings
	e) focus
	F) Someone is installing and will probably be reporting
  on an encryption virus in the PD... there's some talk of a commented
  dis-assembly being made.
	g) the Phantom mailer when down (am I remembering this right? This is
  off-the-cuff)
	h) California law being decided NOW about online access to current
  legislative agenda. Get your viewpoint in before the 18th.
	i) NSA asked for one year on the FOIA request about MYK78/80 (again,
  pardonany misinformation, take NONE of this as gospel... check the
  archives).
	j) <more> with any reports on ongoing games/projects/running gags,etc.

 Hmmm... some comments on this idea. a) We've done a lot more this week
than I'd noticed. b) it may be more bandwidth than many want (but a CC list
is easy to maintain for those that want it, or it could be dropped in to
archives and left to rot until someone cares enough to retieve it). c) it's
pretty easy to make. d) it will be, to some extent, subjective. e) I make
too many lists... probably a sign of something about my poddy training, I
suppose. f) I'm rambling.

 When the kits idea was first kicked around, I expressed support (I think...
the message may have been lost by my mailer before it reached the list... that
happens here at launchpad), but offered no other help or support, a I was just
starting a new job. Well, now I'm about to be fired, so I have a bit of free
time (oh well, never set out to write Nintendo games, anyway.... sigh).
 I suspect that we're not actually being stagnant at all. Maybe not even taking
a breather.

 Seth Morris (Seth.Morris@launchpad.unc.edu)

 PS. T-shirt ideas: "We watch the Watchmen" and "Wiretapping is Privacy;
Censorship is Freedom; Publicity is Anonymity: 1994 -- the eight was a
typo."

 "We do not believe any group of men adequate enough or wise enough to
operate without scrutiny or without criticism. We know that the only way to 
avoid error is to detect it, that the only way to detect it is to be free to
inquire. We know that in secrecy error undetected will flourish and subvert."
				-- J. Robert Oppenheimer




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: jet@netcom.com (J. Eric Townsend)
Date: Sun, 15 Aug 93 12:06:56 PDT
To: A1 ray arachelian (library) <rarachel@ishara.poly.edu>
Subject: Re: Beepers can also be used to track you down!
In-Reply-To: <9308142338.AA05358@ishara.poly.edu>
Message-ID: <9308151905.AA18939@netcom2.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


A1 ray arachelian (library) writes:
 > However, I did notice one message from an individual who mentioned that
 > in Britain, some sort of scanners were used to track down unlicensed TV's

That's merely a matter of passively picking up the frequencies put off
by a tv tube.  Drive down a street with a receiver/display and a list
of who paid their tv tax.  That simple.  (My dad used that sort of
gear when he was a spook in the bay area in the early 70s.)




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "L. Detweiler" <ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Date: Sun, 15 Aug 93 21:02:02 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: cyberspace & cybercycles donations!
Message-ID: <9308160358.AA20381@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


 From: an12070@anon.penet.fi
>* it is extremely difficult find sites willing to donate computer
>cycles, space, and management despite that it is rather abundant in the
>world. virtually every cypherpunk idea requires some cycles & space
>somewhere. 
[...]
> ideally a list of volunteering sites could be created and
>individual cypherpunks could contact the sites independently.

Hey, I think this is a great idea. The only problem is that the list
would probably be empty =)  I personally have many pet projects that
might see the light of day if they could find the inside of a computer
on the internet. I volunteer to maintain this list. If anyone would
like to donate cycles or space for pet cypherpunk projects such as
digital cash, anonymity servers, archives, etc. please send me your
name and availability and I'll stick it in the list. Unfortunately, the
people most likely to be in charge of these resources are
coincidentally the most paranoid about restricting them and least
likely to hear this--and once they hear the word `cypherpunk' their
mind will slam shut in a nanosecond.

We may be able to get more `outside support' if such a list was posted
into Usenet. In fact, if the list kept track of all the current
projects and the status, it might really encourage volunteers out there
in the world. Maybe the problem is that the list is just too high noise
for important people to pay attention, but that a summary like this
might get results.

ltr.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "L. Detweiler" <ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Date: Sun, 15 Aug 93 21:12:02 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: CPSR Oct. 16 Meeting Announcement
Message-ID: <9308160409.AA20506@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Items of interest to (some) cpunks:

- (ahem) COMPUTERS AND DEMOCRACY
- Nat'l Info Infrastructure policy
- Public access to Internet & major networks
- local municipal and community network development

- - -

************************************************************************

            COMPUTER PROFESSIONALS FOR SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY
                                 ANNUAL MEETING

                              October 16 - 17, 1993

                  University of Washington, South Campus Center
                             Seattle, Washington, USA


                             Envisioning the Future:
                             A National Forum on the
             National Information Infrastructure and Community Access

          Co-sponsored by the American Society for Information Science
                       Pacific Northwest Chapter (ASIS-PNC)

************************************************************************
Saturday, October 16th


8:00 - 9:00  Registration/Coffee & Tea

9:00 - 9:15   Welcome to the CPSR Annual Meeting  -  Aki Namioka

9:15 - 10:15  Keynote Address - Bruce McConnell,
                                Office of Management and Budget


           "Shaping National Information Infrastructure Policy"

    Bruce McConnell, Chief of Information Policy at the Office of
    Information and Regulatory Affairs in the Office of Management and
    Budget (OMB), will present his views on the major NII issues now
    facing the administration.  He has been with OMB since 1985 and
    became head of Information Policy in 1992.  He now chairs the
    inter-agency task force responsible for developing federal
    information policy for the Information Infrastructure Task Force.


10:15 - 10:45  Break


10:45 - 12:15  Panel Discussion - Moderated by Eric Roberts

                      "Public Access to Internetworks"

    Public access to the Internet (and other major networks) is a critical
    issue in any discussion about an "electronic highway".  Panelists
    representing a wide variety of perspectives, including representatives
    from the Pacific Northwest, will present their views.

  Panelists:
    Phil Bereano
    Craig Buthod, Deputy City Librarian and Chief Operating Officer,
                  Seattle Public Library
    Kenneth Kay, Computer Science Policy Program
    Laura Breeden, FARnet


12:15 - 1:45  Lunch break


1:45 - 3:00   Panel Discussion - Moderated by Andrew Gordon

                   "Municipal Information Infrastructure"

    City and other government agencies are exploring possibilities for
    developing municipal networks.  In this panel a city official as well as a
    representative from the state regulatory agency and a representative of
    commercial interests will offer their insights and interests.

  Panelists:
    Joe Hommel - Washington Utilities and Transportation Commission
    Jane Noland - Seattle City Council


3:00 - 4:30   Panel Discussion - Moderated by Douglas Schuler

                       "Networking in the Community"

    Community networks exist and are being developed all over the U.S.
    Panelists from various community networks will present their
    perspectives on the state of community networking now and in the future.

  Panelists:
    Tom Grundner, National Public Telecomputing Network
    Parker Lindner, New Media Matters
    Evelyn Pine, CPSR/Berkeley member and former Executive Director of the
        Community Memory Project
    Roy Sahali, CLAMDYP (Computing Literacy and Access Making a Difference for
        Youth Projects)


4:30 - 4:45    Break


4:45 - 6:15  Panel Discussion - Moderated by Marc Rotenberg

             "Computers and Democracy - What's the Connection?"

    What aspects of democracy might be improved with computers?  Which ones
    probably wouldn't.  This is a concept that is in the public eye, and an
    idea that will probably be tested soon.  What can be done to promote
    wise uses of computers in this critical area?

  Panelists:
    Jeff Chester, Center for Media Education
    Jamie Love, Taxpayers Assets Project
    Leah Lievrouw, Department of Telecommunication and Film,
    University of Alabama

6:15 - 6:30  Closing Remarks - Jeff Johnson


************************************************************************

7:00 - 7:30  No host bar at banquet site

7:30 CPSR Banquet - Fundraiser
    (Vegetarian food will be available)

  + Presentation of the 1993 Norbert Wiener Award to
    The Institute for Global Communications (IGC)
    Presenter: Eric Roberts

    The CPSR Board of Directors unamiously award the 1993 Wiener
    Award to IGC to recognize the work the organization has done to
    use network technology to empower previously disenfranchised
    individuals and groups working for progressive change.  Geoff Sears,
    IGC's Executive Director, will be present to accept the award.

  + Banquet Address and Interactive Event -  Kit Galloway, Electronic
    Cafe International

    Kit Galloway of Electronic Cafe International in Santa Monica,
    California will present his innovative approach to electronic
    communication using phone lines, slow-scan television, and other
    technology.  Using videotapes and a live demonstration with CPSR
    chapters in Los Angeles and other locations, Kit will discus how the
    Electronic Cafe concept has been used in a variety of settings.
    Electronic Cafe International has staged global events with poets,
    children, and communities in France, Nicaragua, Japan, as well as a
    variety of American cities.

    Be sure to attend the banquet and participate in this provocative
    encounter with multimedia community networks !!

************************************************************************

Sunday, October 17th (preliminary schedule)

8:30 - 9:30 Coffee & Tea

9:30 - 11:30 Workshop sessions I

11:30 - 1:00 Lunch break

1:00 - 3:00 Workshop sessions II

3:00 - 3:30 Break

3:30 - 5:00 CPSR NII vision document discussion - Moderated by Todd Newman

5:00 - 5:30 Closing Remarks - CPSR NII program future - Marc Rotenberg

************************************************************************

                                 ABOUT CPSR

Computer Professionals for Social Responsibility stands alone as the only
national, non-partisan, public-interest organization dedicated to
understanding and directing the impact of computers on society.  Decisions
regarding the use of this technology have far-reaching consequences that
necessarily reflect the basic values and priorities of the people who govern
their use.

Founded in 1981, CPSR has 2000 members from all over the world
and 22 chapters across the country.  Each of our members is an
important participant in the dialogue that is helping to shape the
future use of computers in the United States.  Our National Advisory
Board includes one Nobel laureate and three winners of the Turing
Award, the highest honor in computer science.

We believe that as the influence of computers continues to permeate every
aspect of our society, it is important that professionals become active
participants in formulating the policy that governs computer use and access.
CPSR welcomes any and all who share our convictions.


- -------------------------------------------------------------------------------

                             Registration Form

Please pre-register by September 24 to guarantee seating.  Registrations at
the door will be accepted pending space.

Name _________________________________________________________________

Address ______________________________________________________________

City _______________________________  State _____________ Zip _________

Telephone __________________________ E-mail_____________________________

CPSR member                             $55 _______

Non member                              $75 _______

1 year CPSR membership & registration  $100 _______

Low income/student                      $25 _______

Banquet ticket                  $40 X ___ = _______

Additional donation to further CPSR's work  _______

Total enclosed                              _______

For more information contact CPSR, 415-322-3778, draper@csli.stanford.edu,
or Aki Namioka, 206-865-3249, aki@cpsr.org.  Send completed registration
form with check to: CPSR, P.O. Box 717, Palo Alto, CA  94301


- -- 
David Friedlander
df@iochom.com

voice 212-942-1156
fax   212-569-8680





------- End of Forwarded Message





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "J. J. Larrea" <jjl@panix.com>
Date: Sun, 15 Aug 93 20:17:01 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: encrypting virus (KOH)
In-Reply-To: <199308152240.AA11446@Menudo.UH.EDU>
Message-ID: <199308160315.AA07140@panix.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Karl Barrus writes:
> I don't see any difference between Stacker 3.0 and its stacked disk
> option that compresses files on a floppy and inserts a small
> decompression routine there as well, and the encrypting "program" I
> posted information on.  Well, besides the fact the Stacker compresses
> and potassium hydroxide encrypts.

I did not save the original potassium hydroxide posting, so I am not sure
whether it truly constitutes a "virus", but I can't let any defense of
"benign" infection mechanisms go unchallenged.

If someone gives me a floppy, and, by running a program contained on it
or booting off of it, some algorithm contained therein is permanently 
incorporated into my system *without my explicit desire and command*,
to me that constitutes a viral ATTACK on my system, by compromising the
sanctity of my data, whether or not the author's intent was benign.

Even if a question like "Compress [Encrypt] drive C: ?" were presented,
I'd be rather perturbed (especially since I use a Mac :-), since the
question would probably be completely outside of the context of what I
was trying to do (eg. run a GIF viewer, checkbook balancer, compiler,
whatever), and would not provide sufficient notification of potential
ramifications from answering in either the negative or the affirmative.
Should that happen to *me*, I'd immediately go for the reboot switch and
never use that floppy again; but most non-hacker computer users I know
would be pretty lost, and feel rather violated if they chose the wrong
option and something bad happened.

Now, if a smart compressor/encryptor wrote itself along with the files
it was treating, and then wrote a nice README file which explained that
files on the floppy were compressed/encrypted, would be automatically
decompressed/decrypted, and that the treatment could, if you wished, be
performed on your hard drives and/or other floppies by making a backup
and then executing the following command, that would be perfectly fine.
Low-pressure sales techniques are far more humane than high-pressure:
one gets time to scratch one's head, think about alternative strategies,
reconsider one's intent.  And a decision to reformat possibly years of
data from a universally-accessible native format to a proprietary format
certainly should not be made in an ad hoc manner.

If a compressor/encryptor has a mode whereby it can automatically compress/
encrypt native-mode floppies when they are first mounted, that's quite a
useful feature.  But in this case I would have first had to have made a 
pro-active decision to install the software on my system, and thus been
apprised of the ramifications.  I would certainly still want and expect
at least a minimal query like the above before anything is changed, otherwise
it would be too easy to forget the mechanism is in place, get a floppy from
a friend, and without knowing it return to them an altered and possibly
unuseable disk.  Not good.

I thought Cypherpunks were all for self-determination?  If there's anything
in the computer world which strips us of that it's a virus or trojan horse,
no?

- JJ



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: wmo@rebma.rebma.mn.org (Bill O'Hanlon)
Date: Sun, 15 Aug 93 22:02:02 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Remailer bug...
Message-ID: <m0oRxsM-0001zuC@rebma.rebma.mn.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

I just noticed a potential problem with the current Cypherpunks remailers.

If someone uses the -m option when they encrypt for the remailer, the
pgp session will hang, waiting for input to the "For your eyes 
only.   Display now? (Y/n)?" message.

(Yeah, if you're wondering, someone did this to the remailer on Rebma.)

- -Bill

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.3

iQCVAgUBLG8mLRiQVHeOVJ+HAQEqaQP/YFFiNpR9qsZ39sTNccAsxeYegeuTEh1+
0Xf/B2XylQtyNnJ0PQnJ5FQdQa79DTNoI2pwbh4N1pVDYPAF5KkZiXf9m5MLhhbi
UqXrFGiaGRTLI1JcssgvqvvodM+9EtrDf5eBw/M3k/iEnYEjKiIPkSx4DCLCuGId
exjqwL6lgqM=
=aHty
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Karl Barrus <elee9sf@Menudo.UH.EDU>
Date: Sun, 15 Aug 93 21:37:02 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: encrypting virus (KOH)
Message-ID: <199308160433.AA01390@Menudo.UH.EDU>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

Since this doesn't have much to do with encryption or cypherpunks per
se, I am hesitant to respond.  Interested people may obtain the
software from me.

Perhaps I should have doctored the text included with the program I
received and termed it an automatic encryption program, which encrypts
your hard drive and floppies with your permission.  We would possibly
be spared some of the fears of viruses.

1) the program asks for permission before performing any action

> I'd be rather perturbed (especially since I use a Mac :-), since the
> question would probably be completely outside of the context of what I
> was trying to do (eg. run a GIF viewer, checkbook balancer, compiler,
> whatever), and would not provide sufficient notification of potential
> ramifications from answering in either the negative or the affirmative.

2) perhaps the program should include the standard disclaimer that ALL
SOFTWARE INCLUDING COMMERCIAL SOFTWARE includes, usually in the
beginning of the documentation, or on a separate card.  You know, the
one that says essentially that the the authors are not omniscient,
cannot predict all circumstances the software shall be used under, and
thus disclaim any damages.  This warning is included in all the
commercial software I own.  Actually, the disclaimers simply say that
you use the software at your own risk, damages are disclaimed.  I have
yet to see software which attempts to explain all potential
ramifications of its use.  I very much doubt I would be using software
at all if I were to wait for such packages to appear.

> Now, if a smart compressor/encryptor wrote itself along with the files
> it was treating, and then wrote a nice README file which explained that
> files on the floppy were compressed/encrypted, would be automatically
> decompressed/decrypted, and that the treatment could, if you wished, be
> performed on your hard drives and/or other floppies by making a backup
> and then executing the following command, that would be perfectly fine.

3) the program does not do this, much like Stacker does not create
README files which explain that your disks are now compressed.  This
is left to the documentation that comes with the program, some
appearing in a booklet, some as a text file (this practice occurs in
every single commercial package I own)

Now, I realize that since the author chose to call his program the
"potassium hydroxide virus" that alarm bells sound.  Maybe he should
have posted the source to this list, describing it as a CryptoStacker
program, which after installation encrypts floppy disks after
prompting.

Why, the whole thing would be so much better if MSDOS could run
background processes - he could have written it to work like a unix
daemon.

As I said before, I posted this since I know some people are working
on a similar program and may be interested in one which purports to do
all this.  Interested people may obtain the program, hex debug, and
read.me file from me.  I don't have the source code but maybe I can
contact the author and ask for it.  I don't have the tools or
expertise in assembly to do the disassembly myself.



-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
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iQCVAgUBLG8N8IOA7OpLWtYzAQFk5AP/TDib1SwkADkfk1D/WDwIk4gwpYLOIax/
sZ6WqrwDIl+Wpu9cO6sfIpxlO5iOqLVGhHeGxYfgaIKKr+IrS3x/t9HwWOV3vo7F
8zu5gPObI3J8yJ7C1xAgyKZ3kJ0ZfCX3fMYEK/zUt47W61qbfAp6QqGoo1jlE4D4
4HDp8uF3wzg=
=BDLa
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: plmoses@unix.cc.emory.edu (Paul L. Moses)
Date: Sun, 15 Aug 93 21:47:02 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re:  e-voting
Message-ID: <9308160442.AA26674@emoryu1.cc.emory.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


instead of promoting another "magic bullet" (ie electronic democracy),
why dont we just take a stand against the tide of ignorance and violence
that has engulfed us?
new technology handed down from on high will serve only to amplify the 
underlying instabilities unless these are addressed first.  or at least
simultaneously.
of course there are short term profit opportunities in innovation, fortunes
to be made.
but then again no one is safe from the growing instability. just ask Michael
Jordan
no matter how much money u have ur still in the same boat with everyone else




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: an12070@anon.penet.fi
Date: Sun, 15 Aug 93 19:42:02 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: `Stalled' Progress
Message-ID: <9308160236.AA02030@anon.penet.fi>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


we've accomplished a great deal as cypherpunks so far, but major
obstacles are in place of our ambitious goals. here are some critical factors:

* it is extremely difficult find sites willing to donate computer
cycles, space, and management despite that it is rather abundant in the
world. virtually every cypherpunk idea requires some cycles & space
somewhere. building up all these things on student accounts is
commendable but a foundation of quicksand in the long run. rumor has it
even soda.berkeley.edu ftp site (perhaps the most critical cypherpunk
element other than the mailing list) is being run off a student
account. ideally a list of volunteering sites could be created and
individual cypherpunks could contact the sites independently.

* the internet itself is very hostile in general to most cypherpunk
ideas, including digital cash, anonymous remailing, etc. because of
nonuniform policies and general resentment and taboos on anything
commercial. to some degree only prototypes can be created in this
atmosphere, but even prototypes of our most critical ideas are lacking.
great attention should be placed on identifying and cultivating
emerging networks where commercialism is officially sanctioned and encouraged.

* the `i thought you were doing that' factor. with no organization and
coordination, the effort and energy of the group is needlessly
dissipated and tragically wasted. in fact, many cypherpunks have
philosophies that are exceedingly antagonistic toward and distrustful
of any oversight or coordination, and frequently assume that others are
making progress in some area when in fact no one is.

* to a large degree, despite the commandment `cypherpunks write code',
the `cypherpunks' have always gained their cohesion more from political
ideology than implementing tangible systems. 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
To find out more about the anon service, send mail to help@anon.penet.fi.
Due to the double-blind, any mail replies to this message will be anonymized,
and an anonymous id will be allocated automatically. You have been warned.
Please report any problems, inappropriate use etc. to admin@anon.penet.fi.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: nobody@pmantis.berkeley.edu
Date: Mon, 16 Aug 93 05:27:06 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Electronic Democracy
Message-ID: <9308161227.AA19906@pmantis.berkeley.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> From: wcs@anchor.ho.att.com (Bill_Stewart(HOY002)1305)
> 
> An anonymous personage writes
> > More succinctly, "Democracy is four wolves and a sheep voting on lunch."
> > Up the republic!
> 
> Yeah, though representative government is four wolves voting on _which_ sheep
> to have for lunch.

Actually, elections are more like four sheep voting on which wolf they want
to be eaten by.

 .snail




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Cindy Vanous <cyphrkt@eskimo.com>
Date: Mon, 16 Aug 93 10:07:07 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: A Follow-up
Message-ID: <Pine.3.05.9308160926.I27224-c100000@eskimo.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



To the lady or chap who arbitrates this mailing list:

I am sending along a message which I would like to have forwarded to your
mailing list.  A colleague of mine found my name mentioned somewhat out of
context in a letter posted to your list, and I would like a chance to
address the issues mentioned therein.

Let me start out by saying that I do fully support the perpetuation of
encryption and anonymous posting; however, there are some circumstances in
which it is neither appropriate nor desirable.  My situation represents
one of these circumstances.  Let me explain:

There are certain transactions which the IRS has allowed to be
non-taxable.  For example, in Washington state, as in several other
states, non-luxury food items are tax-exempt.  Another tax-exempt
transaction is barter.  Barter is one of the mainstays of struggling
small-farm owners, a method of support between startup businesses, and an
excellent way to obtain needed goods and services without the exchange of
money, which might not always be available.

In my case, I am a startup business owner with limited funds and a need
for better software than I currently possess.  Therefore, I post to the
Internet that I am willing to trade my services for an equivalent value in
software.  Therefore, I get my copy of Word or PageMaker, and some other
cash-low company receives a professional business form or other graphic
design project.  All perfectly legal, all tax-exempt, according to the
IRS' own laws.  This is not tax evasion, merely good business sense.

This brings me to the following conclusion:  even if anonymous posting was
available to me (which it very well might be; I haven't pursued
information about it), I would have no need or desire to use it.  My
clients are not interested in playing some sort of spy game, they are
interested in making a business arrangement with me.  They would very
likely not be willing to trust me if I was merely a phantom name from a
nonexistant site.

Finally, I would like to point out that there is currently a movement on
the Internet, pushing for the greater utilization and availability of
barter.  The IRS left a loophole in their rules, it is up to us to take
advantage of it.  For more information on barter through the Internet,
subscribe to the Fringeware mailing list at the following address: 
fringeware-request@wixer.bga.com

Thank you for your time and bandwidth,
					- Cindy L Vanous

    --------------- * cyphrkt@eskimo.com * ---------------  
     Cindy Vanous, the Cypherkat, graphic artist at large
    ------------------------------------------------------ 
    Disclaimer: even though I work for myself, my opinions
      STILL don't seem to be the opinions of my employer. 








From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: szabo@netcom.com (Nick Szabo)
Date: Mon, 16 Aug 93 10:32:12 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Electronic Democracy
In-Reply-To: <9308161227.AA19906@pmantis.berkeley.edu>
Message-ID: <9308161732.AA10330@netcom4.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



This is a great example of a issue we don't need to agree on.
The underlying cryptographic tools needed for private voting 
and digital cash are practically the same.  Once the common tools 
are written, each side can go finish off their own user interfaces, 
one labelled "cash market" and the other "voting booth".

So let's quit bickering and write those tools!

Nick Szabo				szabo@netcom.com




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Eric Hughes <hughes@soda.berkeley.edu>
Date: Mon, 16 Aug 93 10:47:07 PDT
To: miron@extropia.wimsey.com
Subject: CRYPTO'93, anyone here going?
In-Reply-To: <199308100848.AA13015@xtropia>
Message-ID: <9308161745.AA22457@soda.berkeley.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I may show up for a day, for the Tuesday evening rump session, in
particular.  I won't be attending the whole conference.  There are a
few I do know are going: John Gilmore, Whit Diffie (who shows up for
every other monthly meeting, even though he doesn't participate much
on the list), Phil Zimmerman (who's not on the list, but ...).  Phil
called me yesterday to talk about what to do to promote PGP etc. at
the conference.  You might want to get in touch with him as well:
prz@acm.org.

As to your other question, about a cypherpunks meeting the weekend of
the 28, we won't be holding one.  As it is, our 2nd annual meeting
will be only two weeks later.  I'd not mind having an informal
cypherpunks party, but I don't know where we would hold such an event.

Eric




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: greg@ideath.goldenbear.com (Greg Broiles)
Date: Mon, 16 Aug 93 11:17:07 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Inslaw files
Message-ID: <H6ZD9B1w164w@ideath.goldenbear.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Eric Hughes says he's uninterested in making the Inslaw files available on 
soda, so I'll be happy to mail copies of them to interested parties.


--
Greg Broiles                            greg@goldenbear.com
Golden Bear Computer Consulting         +1 503 342 7982
Box 12005 Eugene OR 97440               BBS: +1 503 687 7764




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: gtoal@an-teallach.com (Graham Toal)
Date: Mon, 16 Aug 93 06:12:09 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Mail problems
Message-ID: <5145@an-teallach.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


In article <9308121657.AA20346@toad.com> gnu@toad.com writes:
 > My proposal is that we get some software working that produces poor
 > quality speech in realtime on fast hardware that most people don't
 > have.  Then, improved search algorithms will bring higher quality.*
 > The natural evolution of faster hardware will make it available to all.

It exists.  It's called 'nevot'.

The improved faster compression algorithm is also on the way very shortly
(the one by ajr that I mentioned the other day); with 4000byte/sec samples
and 8:3 compression, it fits in 14.4kb with enough to spare for packet
encapsulation.

G
===
Personal mail to gtoal@gtoal.com (I read it in the evenings)
Business mail to gtoal@an-teallach.com (Be careful with the spelling!)
Faxes to An Teallach Limited: +44 31 662 4678  Voice: +44 31 668 1550 x212





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Eric Hughes <hughes@soda.berkeley.edu>
Date: Mon, 16 Aug 93 14:02:16 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: PROTOCOL: Encrypted Open Books
In-Reply-To: <9308102059.AA22885@snark.shearson.com>
Message-ID: <9308162057.AA05059@soda.berkeley.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Kent Hastings wondered how an offshore bank could provide assurances
to depositors.  I wondered the same thing a few months ago, and
started working on what Perry calls the anonymous auditing problem.  I
have what I consider to be the core of a solution.

All the following protocols and ideas are in the public domain.

The following is long.

My notation here will also be much less formal than I am capable of; I
don't want to make the uninitiated read TeX.

The basic idea is that summation can be performed encrypted by using
exponentiation in a finite field.  That is, if I represent an amount x
by g^x and an amount y by g^y, then I can compute the sum of x and y
by multiplying g^x and g^y, getting g^(x+y).  Very basic.

So let us take a very simple version of this protocol, which leaves
out many desiderata.  If a shared funds account, say, has a bunch of
transactions made on it, then we can publish each of those amounts x_i
(for the non-TeX'd, underscore means subscript) encrypted as g^(x_i).
I know what my transaction number, i, is, and what the amount was, so
I can verify that my transaction appeared in the public list.  We also
publish the beginning and ending balances, givings use a total
difference X.  Now anyone can verify that g^X equals g^(Sum_i x_i).
That is, everyone can verify that the aggregate effect of the
transactions is what is claimed without revealing the amounts of any
of them.

What does this protocol reveal?  It reveals the number of transactions
on each account and thus the total number of transactions.  It is also
subject to known plaintext attack.  If I get an account on this system
and make one transaction in each amount, I can decrypt by table lookup
the whole transaction flow.  The total number of transaction accounts
is also revealed, or, for a bank, the number of customers.

We can easily solve the known plaintext attack by blinding each
transaction.  Instead of publishing pairs <i, g^(x_i)>, we have for
each transaction a blinding factor r_i and publish triples

	<i, g^(x_i + r_i), h^(r_i)>

The notation has grown.  g is a generator of a finite field G, and h
is a generator of a different finite field H.  

We also publish R = Sum_i r_i in addition to X = Sum_i x_i.

What is the public verification procedure?  Basically the same as the
first case, but in addition taking into account the blinding factors.

Step 1.  Calculate Product_i h^(r_i) and make sure that it equals h^R.
This validates the blinding factors.

Step 2.  Calculate Product_i g^(x_i + r_i) and make sure that it
equals g^(X+R).  This, given the validity of the blinding factors,
validates the actual transactions.

How does this resist known plaintext attack?  Since the blinding
factors r_i are flatly distributed over their range (caveat! you pick
the order of G smaller than of H to assure this), the x_i + r_i sum
acts exactly as a one-time pad to encrypt the amount.  In summary,
what is going on here is that both the messages (amounts) and the keys
(the blinding factors) are being sent out as images of one-way
functions (exponentiations) that preserve exactly the relationships
that we want.

There's more.  For a real business, we want to keep double entry books
and not just single entry accounts as above.  By extending the number
of terms in the transaction, we can do that too.  In double entry
bookkeeping, the total amounts for each transaction must sum to zero
over the various accounts being transacted upon; I say this knowing
that when you print out the information for an accountant you'll have
to do some sign twiddling for the asset and liability/equity halves of
the books.  Also, a single transaction may involve more than two
accounts, even if in practice most involve only two.

The basic idea here is that each transaction is a set of the above
transactions whose sum must be zero.  So for a transaction i, we publish
a set of triples, indexed by j, 

	< T_i,j, g^( m_i,j + r_i,j ), h^( r_i,j ) >

where the subscripts are doubly indexed and where T_i,j represents the
account that amount m_i,j is changing.  Now we can perform, on each
transaction, the following very similar verification procedure for
each fixed i.

Step 1.  Verify that Product_j h^( r_i,j ) = 1.  This verifies that
the blinding factors sum to zero.

Step 2.  Verify that Product_j g^( m_i,j + r_i,j ) = 1.  Since the
blinding factors sum to zero, this ensures that the transaction
amounts sum to zero.

Not that both of these sums are done over j, not i.  In other words,
we validate each transaction individually.

Now we also publish aggregate changes in the public accounts just as
before.  The holders of private accounts know what how their accounts
have changed.  Then we can use the the single account verification
method as above to verify that the totals match.  Everyone can verify
that the public accounts match, and the holders of private accounts
can verify that they match.

To summarize: The transactions are doubly indexed.  If you group by
transaction, then you verify that each transaction sums to zero.  If
you group by account, then you verify that the change in that account
is as expected, be it public or private.

In the scenario that Kent originally proposed, one of the public
accounts would be a gold account, which through independent public
auditing would be verified to be accurate.  I personally would not use
gold but rather denominate certain accounts in shares of mutual funds,
which are resistant to the currency inflations of mining and stockpile
sales.

What information is still being disclosed?  The most worrisome to me
is that the total number of transactions per account is revealed, that
is, aggregate activity, but not total money flux.  I have an insight
that may allow the _account_ to be blinded as well as the amounts, and
be revealed in aggregate just as the amounts are, but I have not
worked out the details because I am not fully up to speed on the
relevant math.  

BEGIN BIG MATH
I only expect a few people to follow the next paragraphs, so if you
don't understand it, skip it.

Here's the idea.  The modular exponentiation is performed in a finite
ring.  We choose a ring that has lots of distinct prime ideals of
sufficiently large order.  To each account we assign one ideal.  We
represent dollar amounts as elements of this ideal; since the ideal is
prime, this is straightforward.  The property of the ideal we use is
that the sum of any two elements of the ideal is also in the ideal.
Hence by partitioning the ring, we also partition the computation of
the accounts.  We are blinding the transcations by account because we
rely on the fact that blinding is not an intra-ideal operation, and
thus does not preserve that invariant, which would otherwise be
public.

We must be careful not to allow operations that would result in an
element which was in the intersection of two ideals.  This requires
upper bounds both on the transaction amount and on the number of
transactions per cycle.  There might be rings of order p^n+1 which
would be suitable for this operations, but I am not sure of the
security of the discrete log in such cases, except for p=2, in which
case it is bad.

END OF BIG MATH

The protocol as specified, though, is useful as it stands.  I have not
specified all the details.  For example the blinding factors should
likely be created in a cooperative protocol at the point of
transaction; blinding factors for intra-bank transactions should not
contain subliminal channels.  Certificates of deposit and withdrawal
should be tied to the published transaction information.  Etc.
Remember, this is the core of an idea.

One criticism I do wish to address now.  I don't think it matters if
the bank manufactures fake transactions.  The customer can reveal the
sum of all the blinding factors for transactions on that account, in
public, and can thus prove what should have been there.  Since the
blinding factors were committed to in public, there is a strong
assurance that these blinding factors are what they are claimed to be.
This in itself can be made into an actual proof of liability.  Note
that even this revelantion does not compromise individual
transactions.  It only reveals the aggregate value change, which is
exactly what is at issue with the bank.

On the other hand, all of the bank assets that are held external to
that organization can be externally audited in the same way.  The
other institutions that hold money might be persuaded to undertake a
legal obligation to honor what the encrypted open books say they
should have; this may not be difficult because they can verify that
their record of the transactions matches what has been published.

If we use the contents of the encrypted books at the organizational
boundary points to create suitable legal opbligations, we can mostly
ignore what goes on inside of the mess of random numbers.  That is,
even if double books were being kept, the legal obligations created
should suffice to ensure that everything can be unwound if needed.
This doesn't prevent networks of corrupt businesses from going down
all at once, but it does allow networks of honest businesses to
operate with more assurance of honesty.

Eric




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: eric@Synopsys.COM
Date: Mon, 16 Aug 93 15:17:08 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Solicitation of Tax Evasion--An Example
In-Reply-To: <9308140811.AA16134@netcom5.netcom.com>
Message-ID: <199308162216.AA07154@gaea.synopsys.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



The example given (someone soliciting an act of questionable legality)
is a perfect application for the SASE remailer that I've been
developing.  I presented it at a phys-meeting a few months back, and
have been working on coding it sporadically since then.

The idea is that you have an address block that encodes the
information on how to get a message to you.  This is like a self
addressed envelope.  The envelope can specify multiple hops through
remailers, but is encrypted in layers so only the next hop is revealed
at each remailer.

The difficulty comes in allowing the message to be re-encrypted at
each stage (to keep a remailer from recognizing a message it has
passed through itself on an earlier hop), but still allow it to be
reconstructed at the final destination.

The protocol also allows postage stamps to be securely delivered to
each hop along the way, and yet be provided by the sender (who doesn't
know the identity, or public key, of the remailers).

You could use this by paying someone to forward messages to you via
your SASE address.  This way, you can publish an address by which
messages can be sent to you, but without leaving yourself easily
trackable. 

-eric messick




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: fergp@sytex.com (Paul Ferguson)
Date: Mon, 16 Aug 93 16:52:20 PDT
To: greg@goldenbear.com
Subject: Inslaw info (bitte)
Message-ID: <NaDe9B1w165w@sytex.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
 
On Mon, 16 Aug 93 11:06:28 PDT,
 Greg Broiles <uunet!ideath.goldenbear.com!greg> wrote -
 
> Eric Hughes says he's uninterested in making the Inslaw files
> available on soda, so I'll be happy to mail copies of them to
> interested parties.
 
Send any info you have to me at either:
 
  <fergp@sytex.com>
       or
  <ferguson@fiber.sprintlink.net>
 
Danke.
 
 
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.2
 
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PlpGZpFuzuk=
=aMAi
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

Paul Ferguson               |  "Government, even in its best state,
Network Integrator          |   is but a necessary evil; in its worst
Centreville, Virginia USA   |   state, an intolerable one."
fergp@sytex.com             |      - Thomas Paine, Common Sense
 
Type bits/keyID   Date       User ID
pub  1024/1CC04D 1993/03/15  Paul Ferguson <fergp@sytex.com>
  Key fingerprint =  EE D2 93 7D 04 6D C6 05  AC 36 AD 9D 8E 4F 41 58




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: hfinney@shell.portal.com
Date: Mon, 16 Aug 93 23:20:09 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: CRYPTO'93, anyone here going?
In-Reply-To: <199308100848.AA13015@xtropia>
Message-ID: <9308170525.AA22560@jobe.shell.portal.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I happen to live in Santa Barbara, and although I am not signed up for
the conference (too busy at work) I am hoping to drop by and crash a
session or two.  Hopefully I'll be able to meet some other list members
while they are there.

Hal Finney
hfinney@shell.portal.com




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: hfinney@shell.portal.com
Date: Mon, 16 Aug 93 23:20:25 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: PROTOCOL: Encrypted Open Books
Message-ID: <9308170525.AA22568@jobe.shell.portal.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Eric had some good ideas in his protocol for verifying anonymous bank
deposits.  One thing wasn't clear to me: what if the bank creates
a fake account?

It would seem that the bank could explain away a sudden decrease in its
asset reserves (money that the bank officers actually spent on mistresses
and drugs) by creating a fake anonymous account which made a large with-
drawal.  The books would still balance.

It wasn't clear to me in Eric's protocol whether it would be expected that
the identity of accounts which made such withdrawals would be revealed.
Doing so would seem to go against the purpose of the digital bank.  But
without that ability it would seem that fake accounts could cover up any
amount of mismanagement.

Hal




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: fergp@sytex.com (Paul Ferguson)
Date: Mon, 16 Aug 93 21:20:22 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: PGP 2.3a
Message-ID: <m1Ne9B1w165w@sytex.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Uh, just a quick and dirty request:
 
I have a few net.friends who want a copy of this latest version. Where is 
a quick and reliable anon FTP site (no kidding)....

I don't care to upgrade, but I  certainly won'y stand in the way ...


Paul Ferguson               |  "Government, even in its best state,
Network Integrator          |   is but a necessary evil; in its worst
Centreville, Virginia USA   |   state, an intolerable one."
fergp@sytex.com             |      - Thomas Paine, Common Sense
 
Type bits/keyID   Date       User ID
pub  1024/1CC04D 1993/03/15  Paul Ferguson <fergp@sytex.com>
  Key fingerprint =  EE D2 93 7D 04 6D C6 05  AC 36 AD 9D 8E 4F 41 58




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "L. Detweiler" <ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Date: Mon, 16 Aug 93 22:30:08 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: FBI Credit Search bill update (CPSR)
Message-ID: <9308170509.AA18329@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


From the CPSR newsletter v.6 #6 Aug 12, 93

===cut=here===

[a 2] FBI Seeks Power for Credit Search Without Warrant

In early July, the Senate Intelligence Committee approved a provision
that allows for FBI access to credit reports using only a letter
instead of a judicial warrant in cases that they say involved national
security. There is concern that this will be subject to abuse and that
the necessity has not been proven.

A national security letter gives the FBI the authority to obtain
records without judicial approval and without providing notice to the
individual that his or her records have been obtained by the Bureau.
Similar FBI proposals were rejected in previous years after
Congressional leaders expressed concern over the civil liberties
issues raised.

Although the current draft proposal is more comprehensive than those
circulated in previous years, the changes and additions do not alter
significantly the central character of the proposal. The
Administration's 1993 proposal includes explicit limits to
dissemination of obtained information within the government, penalties
for violations including punitive damages, and reporting requirements.
These provisions are positive changes from the legislation put forward
in previous years, but they do not save the proposal from its
intrinsic flaws.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Paul Goggin <chaos@aql.gatech.edu>
Date: Mon, 16 Aug 93 22:05:08 PDT
To: fergp@sytex.com
Subject: Re: PGP 2.3a
In-Reply-To: <m1Ne9B1w165w@sytex.com>
Message-ID: <9308170501.AA06723@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

Paul Ferguson said:

>I have a few net.friends who want a copy of this latest version. Where is 
>a quick and reliable anon FTP site (no kidding)....

>I don't care to upgrade, but I  certainly won'y stand in the way ...

Why not soda.berkley.edu or aql.gatech.edu?

Paul
- --
R  O    All Comments Copyright by  | Technofetisht
 A  N     Paul S. Goggin (1993)    | Cypher, Cyber, Chaos              
  V        Information Broker      | Ergoflux, Interzone
   E      chaos@aql.gatech.edu     | Carpe Diem: Stop the Clipper wiretap chip 
Finger account for latest _Phrack_ | Public Key: PGP and RIPEM available
      For anonymous communication:---> anonymus+4744@charcoal.com
- ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Title 18 USC 2511 and 18 USC 2703 Protected -- Monitoring Absolutely Forbidden

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From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Graham Toal <gtoal@an-teallach.com>
Date: Mon, 16 Aug 93 17:12:19 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: nevot README (by popular request)
Message-ID: <9308170006.AA18694@an-teallach.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


NEVOT - A network voice terminal (BETA RELEASE 1.3 03/25/93)
(c) Henning Schulzrinne
=============================================================

NOTE: The .nevotinit files from versions prior to 1.3 are incompatible
with the current command language and should be deleted.

DESCRIPTION:
The network voice terminal (NEVOT) allows audio-capable workstations to
participate in audio conferences across local and wide area networks.

Features:
- real-time protocols:
  - NVP (network voice protocol), as used by 'vat' (LBL) and VT (isi)
  - 'vat' native packet format and session protocol
  - RTP draft 
- versions for:
  - Sun SPARCstation (SunOS 4.1.x and Solaris 5.x)
  - SGI Indigo (4D Series) and
  - Personal DECstations [as soon as we can get the DEC audio library to work]
- GUIs:
  - XView
  - Tk [in progress]
  - curses
  - dumb terminal
- fully controllable by Tcl-based command language
- can serve as gateway for protocol and encoding translation
- network transport protocols:
  - TCP
  - unicast/multicast UDP 
  - ST-II [currently inoperative]
- several independent concurrent conferences, each with different
  encoding and compression
- DES-based voice encryption (U.S. only)
- audio encodings:
  - 64 kb/s (mu-law PCM)
  - 32 kb/s G.721 ADPCM (Sun only)
  - 32 kb/s Intel DVI
  - 24 kb/s G.723 APDCM (Sun only)
  - 13 kb/s GSM
  - 4.8 kb/s LPC codec
- each site can use different audio encodings
- playback and recording of AIFC and .snd audio files
- extensive statistics and tracing facilities
- arbitrary voice packet length, which may differ for each site
- lost packet and silence substitution
- setable audio buffer occupancy
- configurable adjustment mechanisms for playout delay, VU meter,
  silence detector and automatic gain control
- redefinable session identifier string with variable substitution

DOCUMENTATION:
A compressed PostScript file describing Nevot is available for anonymous
ftp from gaia.cs.umass.edu, as file ~ftp/pub/nevot.ps.Z.

INSTALLATION:
The sources are available by anonymous ftp from gaia.cs.umass.edu, as
file ~ftp/pub/nevot/nevot.tar.Z (compressed tar file).  The platform-
specific external libraries are contained in the directory
pub/nevot/lib.$ARCH. These typically change rarely.  ARCH can be either
dec, sgi, or sun4.

Precompiled binaries are available as well:
  nevot/bin.$ARCH/nevot.tar.Z
For the precompiled binaries, you also need to retrieve the 
initialization file ~ftp/pub/nevot/nevotinit and rename it to .nevotinit
in the directory from which you plan to start Nevot.

Unpack the compressed tar files, then execute the shell script
  compile
You may have to adjust parameters within the shell script to your
local needs, e.g., the compiler name.  You also have to install the
tcl library (version 6.7 or later), either the binary version as
mentioned above, or from sources to be found in
sprite.berkeley.edu:tcl.  In order to use the UDP multicast and/or
ST-II facilities, you have to install the appropriate kernel
modifications.

Due to export restrictions, the DES encryption code is available only by
e-mail from the author. If you do have the DES code, change the value of
the symbol DES in the Makefiles to 1.

To enable on-line help for the OpenWindows version, the environment
variable HELPPATH should be set to include the source directory where
the .info files are located (here, assumed to be
/usr/local/nevot/xview):

   setenv HELPPATH ${HELPPATH}:/usr/local/nevot/xview

OPERATION WITH SD:
------------------
sd is a session directory written by Van Jacobson, LBL, available for
anonymous ftp at ftp.ee.lbl.gov.
The nevot/sd directory contains a replacement for the sd start_audio
procedure, which you can insert into your ~/.sd.tcl startup file. Make
sure that the directory containing the Nevot binary is in your path.
Use at your own risk (i.e., don't blame VJ if it doesn't work...).


DIFFICULTIES:
-------------
If you experience difficulties, check the problems.tex file in the
doc directory.

BUG REPORTS:
This is a beta release.  Please send all bug reports and suggestions
to the author at hgschulz@cs.umass.edu.  New releases will be
announced through the rem-conf mailing list (to join the list, send a
request to rem-conf-request@es.net).  I would appreciate if you could
let me know how you are using the software.

[A version for the Personal DECstation and DECstations with the DEC audio
hardware is currently under development.]

COPYRIGHT:
All sources and documentation (except those listed in the
acknowledgements or otherwise identified) are (c) Henning Schulzrinne
1992, University of Massachusetts and AT&T Bell Laboratories.  Do not
redistribute this software, or integrate with other software, without
preserving the copyright notice.  All changes have to be clearly
marked.  You may modify the code as long as you provide me with a
copy.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS:
The DES encryption module was developed by Steve Kent and John Linn of
BBN Communications Corporation, Cambridge, MA and provided by Karen Seo
of BBN. The audio library incorporating G.721 and G.723 audio
compression was provided by Daniel Steinberg of Sun Microsystems. It may
at some point be integrated into the regular Sun OS. The Intel/DVI ADPCM
codec was slightly modified from sources by Jack Kansen (CWI) and is
copyrighted 1992 by Stichting Mathematisch Centrum, Amsterdam, The
Netherlands (used by permission).

The ST-II API and kernel support was developed by Charlie Lynn at BBN.
The ST-II API (\C{st2_api.h}) is copyrighted (c) 1991 by BBN Systems and
Technologies, a division of Bolt Beranek and Newman, Inc. and used by
permission.  The UDP multicast kernel support was written by Steve
Deering, Xerox Parc.  Charlie Lynn (BBN) was helpful with some of the
fine points of the ST-II API. 

The Tcl interpreter was developed by John Osterhout, University of
California at Berkeley. The sources are copyright University of
California and used by permission.

Advice on porting \nevot\ to the Silicon Graphics platform and
numerous bug fixes were provided by Andrew Cherenson (SGI).  Michael
Halle (MIT) figured out how to get Xview applications to display fonts
at the design sizes.  The VU meter is based on discussions with Gints
Klimanis (SGI).

The audio mixing (mix.c) and checksum code (checksum.c) was taken from
the ISI voice terminal (VT), copyright June 1991 by the University of
Southern California, by permission. The silence detector and the ST-II
code are modified versions of the respective parts of VT.

The \vat\ session and audio protocol were implemented based on
descriptions provided by Van Jacobsen.

The I/O flags interpreter (flags.c) is a modified version of software
contributed to Berkeley by Chris Torek. Copyright (c) 1990 by the
Regents of the University of California; used by permission.





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: XXCLARK@indst.indstate.edu
Date: Mon, 16 Aug 93 23:25:09 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Smaller PGP source archives
Message-ID: <9308170623.AA09127@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain




        Anyone know of an ftp site with the latest PGP source in two
   smaller files, rather than one large one?

        No Unix account and insufficient disk space on this end at the
   moment.

        Any help appreciated.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: remailer@merde.dis.org (remailer bogus account)
Date: Tue, 17 Aug 93 20:30:28 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: No Subject
Message-ID: <9308171014.AA11136@merde.dis.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


   > From: pmetzger@lehman.com ("Perry E. Metzger")
   > To:   "L. Detweiler" <ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu>

 > *we* *are* our government. How can it not be more obvious? What does it
 > say about our character if we are resigned to deprivation?

> WE ARE NOT OUR GOVERNMENT.

> I have an interesting fact for you, Mr. Detweiler. I did not choose
> the government I live under. I chose none of its parts, agreed to none
> of its actions, selected none of its members (not one person I've ever
> voted for has been elected, and I only vote in self defense, not as an
> endorsement of the system), and I agree with virtually none of its
> actions. Sadly, this is the best country I know of to live in, so
> leaving is not an option. However, don't for one minute claim that
> this is *my* government. It is the government that rules me, to be
> sure, but it is my master, not my servant. I would not choose to have
> it operate as it does were I given the choice. It is not mine.

Yes, absolutely.  This discussion may be considered tangential, but the
issue here is at the core of the cypherpunks raison d'etre.  Detweiller
seems to be tremendously confused about the source of government and
unaware of the emergence of the American State.  I personally feel that
I have zero representation in what passes for our "democratic"
government for the reasons you mention, exactly.  I find myself amazed
to encounter the numbers of "mainstream Americans" who have gradually
come to the same conclusion, independent of outside prompting.

My only hope, personally, is to fight vigorously (perhaps literally, in
due course) for the maintenance of the Bill of Rights as protection
against the tyranny of _both_ the mob and the State.  I personally see
the prospect of an electronic so-called democracy to be terrifying, a
mechanism whose technical subversion would be trivial for the State's
assets, say the NSA.  Simple manipulation by propaganda would be even
easier.  Read Orwell.  Read Zamyatin.

Cypherpunks are providing the basis for long-range, (relatively) secure
communication between those activists and thinkers who may have the
power to bring down the State and restore the individual autonomy this
nation was originally devised to foster.  In the past year I have had
the privilege to see a de facto cadre of brilliant men and women
develop from formerly isolated individuals, all thanks to computer
networks and the emergence of secure communication.  I have found
answers to questions I have been asking for twenty-five years, and
provided information that answered similar questions for others.  I have
seen the product of these private communications develop into public
statements that have demonstrably influenced the political outlooks of
hundreds, perhaps thousands, of casual computer network users.

The ability of computer networks and secure communication has in itself
empowered and radicalized an otherwise disenfranchised body of valuable
and vital Americans.

Really, this is heady stuff.  It gives me reason to stick around and
watch this country for a few more years.





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: andrew m. boardman <amb@cs.columbia.edu>
Date: Tue, 17 Aug 93 01:00:25 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: [brown@psi.com: PSI, MORNING STAR TEAM UP TO PROVIDE SECURE INTERNET CONNECTIONS]
Message-ID: <199308170759.AA11814@shiva.cs.columbia.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Haven't seen news of this here.  Apologies if my mail is lagged.  FYI.

Return-Path: <brown@psi.com>
Date: Mon, 16 Aug 93 16:02:09 EDT
From: brown@psi.com (Kimberly Brown)
Subject: PSI, MORNING STAR TEAM UP TO PROVIDE SECURE INTERNET CONNECTIONS


			    FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

     PSI, MORNING STAR TEAM UP TO PROVIDE SECURE INTERNET CONNECTIONS

HERNDON, VA., August 16, 1993 -- Performance Systems International, Inc.
(PSI), the largest provider of corporate Internet access, today announced
a service using an encryption technique that promises unparalleled
security for data transmissions at an affordable cost.

Combining forces with Morning Star Technologies of Columbus, Ohio,
and its brand new Morning Star Express Router which includes MST's unique
DES encryption facility, PSI has developed a service called SecureStream. 
Utilizing an Express Router at both ends of a data link, the service will
encrypt data from transmission to receipt.  It can be de-encrypted only
by a special key possessed by the SecureStream user.

PSI will offer SecureStream as an option to users of its InterFrame
Standard internetwork service, the company's premier product for Frame
Relay access to the Internet.  The cost will be $400 per month, according
to Martin Schoffstall, PSI's vice president and chief technical officer.
"This price is a fraction of the cost of competing Internet service
providers," said Kimberly Brown, manager of marketing communications for PSI.

"By offering high-level encryption at reasonable cost, we feel SecureStream
will provide medium-sized companies security in their Internet transmissions
that was previously beyond their reach," Schoffstall said.  He added that
the product will be demonstrated at next week's INTEROP West in San Francisco.

"We are pleased to offer our Express Router in conjunction with PSI's
SecureStream service," said K. James Laskey, Morning Star's director of sales.
"The Express Router is a high-performance, cost-effective solution for the
most demanding TCP/IP networking applications.  Providing encryption in the
router meets the need of many Internet users to protect sensitive
transmissions from interception."

As a reseller, PSI offers the Express Router for $1,995, the company said.

Laskey and Schoffstall noted that the Express Router is based on
Morning Star's PPP (Point-to-Point Protocol) software, designed as a
replacement for the Serial Line IP (SLIP) protocol.  It has been adopted
as an Internet standard, correcting many of the deficiencies in SLIP,
including address negotiation, link level error correction and synchronous
support for high speed communications. In addition, it supports Frame Relay
and the Internet standard RFC-1294.

PSI offers a variety of services and products to provide corporate
and individual computer users with access to the Internet.  In addition to
leased-line services, it offers a number of dial-up services and a wireless
e-mail service over the RAM Mobile Data network.

                                     # # # #

All brands, products and service names mentioned are trademarks or
registered service marks of their respective owners.

__________________
For further information, contact Kimberly Brown at PSI at 703.904.7187  
(phone), 703.904.7195 (fax) or info@psi.com (e-mail); K. James Laskey
at Morning Star Technologies at 614.451.1883 (phone), 614.459.5054 (fax) or
sales@morningstar.com (e-mail); or Michael Vernetti at Kaufman Public
Relations at 202.333.0700 (phone), 202.337.0449 (fax) or vernetti@psilink.com
(e-mail).





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Stanton McCandlish <anton@hydra.unm.edu>
Date: Tue, 17 Aug 93 03:20:11 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: DigiCoupons & DigiCash
Message-ID: <9308171016.AA21841@hydra.unm.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


* Digital coupons: S&H greenstamps for online services 
(netcom/Well/Compuserve net connection services, AMIX, 
NEXIS/LEXIS, Dow Jones, commercial MUDs, metered e-mail, anon 
services, network and computing resources, reputation ratings, 
etc.)  Greenstamps are like frequent-flyer miles, you accumulate
them with heavy patronage of some service.  But greenstamps
can be used to purchase a wide variety of services, not just 
more of the same service.  Service providers and 
coupon vendor(s) work out arrangements for awarding and honoring
greenstamps.  Implemented with Chaum-style protocol to prevent
forgery and assure privacy.
* Digital cash: accumulating credits/debits for use of on-line
services (including travel services, concert tickets, etc. 
purchased on-line), eventually paid for by some "real" currency: 
FRNs, yen, etc.  Implemented with Chaum-style protocol to prevent
forgery and assure privacy.
* On-line markets: Internet video poker, election outcome
markets, satellite track betting, etc.  Investments[1] can be 
made & paid out by greenstamps, natch.  On-line advertising.

Count me in.  You code-grinders come up with some way to do this stuff,
and I'll be happy to implement what of it I can on NitV-BBS.  Coupons [the
term greenstamps is probably trademarked] could work: those of you that
wish to make use of the BBS could upload (as a file or directly into the
message base) these coupons and get time/download credit on the board for
them, provided I have some way to spend them for something useful to me. 
Eventually if I can get IndraNetters into the idea, this could expand into
a user-to-user thing too, perhaps even in online door games (for those not
hip to BBS jargon, doors are programs run from the BBS, such as games,
doors, credit-card ordering applications for commercial stuff, etc etc.)
I can picture a high-stakes version of Barren Realms Elite, where the
"credits" in the game are real DigiCoupons that can be spent on other
boards, or at various Internetted sites, etc etc.  

I don't actually see much use in separating DigiCash and DigiCoupons. 
They both would appear to me to be almost identical in form and funtion. 
Whoever works on this sort of thing will hopefully work with Chaum to
ensure that our DigiCash is "compatible" as it were.  No sense getting
such a system going only to have it eclipsed later, and all our DigiCash
become worthless.

* Securely private BBS's

I'll pass on that one for now, my board's multi-user, open, and networked;
going the crypto route would reduce my user base to about 3 people,
including me!


Anyway, those of you not aware of it, NitV-BBS is still stocking a certain
fave crypto program of ours, legal threats be damned.

I'd also encrouge any of you running BBSs or participating in them to
contact mine and get in on IndraNet.  Just due to a few Extropians and
Cypherpunks doing this, the net has grown quite a bit, and is taking on a
decidedly libertarian flavour, with many spirited debates.  Sadly the
CRYPTO conference is very slow, so we need more participants.  More info
on the net:

IndraNet was founded by me, and oddly enough, a staunch republican that
enjoyed arguing with me.  I guess we just wanted our own entire net to
argue in.  He dropped out of it due to some personal things to deal with,
leaving a net of one.  SO, I promoted it, and within just a few month it
was not only national but international, now with nodes in 4 countries and
about 6 or so states.  There are over 30 conferences [UseNetters will
chuckle, but for a BBS-based OtherNet this is not bad; most BBSs don't
have more than 30 conferences total, many much less; there's just not
enough traffic on most boards to support that much chatter.]  Possibly
uniquely among BBS networks, there are:

NO POLICY DOCS (rules)
NO MODERATORS or COORDINATORS (dictators)
NO CENSORSHIP

It's a working, growing anarchy.  There have been some problems, namely
nodes that are "family" BBSs getting upset at the occasional swearing, but
oh well, not much to be done for it.  But all in all it appears to be working.

Currently we support QWK and Fido-tech mail formats, though those who are
also using some other format, such as MegaMail, PostLink, or PCRelay are
encouraged to make IndraNet available via those formats as well.  Some
time in the not-too-distant-future, I hope to get NitV hooked up to
Internet/UseNet via UUCP, and make IndraNet conferences available as
Internet mailing lists and "virtual local newgroups" (i.e. set up just
like local groups, but actually available to any node intending to
participate, but certainly not as a public alt.whatever series of
newsgroups; you know what I mean.)

To get into this, and to get more info, contact me by any means suggested
in the .sig below.

PS NOTE: I am not currently receiving the list, just for the time being
until I reconfigure elm to sort it into a separate folder, so any replies
should go directly to me by some means or other.  I'll be back on the list
soon enough I guess.
 -- 
Stanton  McCandlish   * Space Migration * Networking * ChaOrder * NO GOV'T. *
anton@hydra.unm.edu   * Intelligence Increase * Nano * Crypto * NO RELIGION *
FidoNet:    1:301/2   * Life Extension * Ethics * VR * Now! * NO MORE LIES! *
Noise in the Void BBS * +1-505-246-8515   (24hr, 1200-14400, v32bis, N-8-1) *



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: s.summers1@genie.geis.com
Date: Tue, 17 Aug 93 01:00:09 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: encrypting virus (KOH)
Message-ID: <9308170755.AA19760@relay2.geis.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>> Now, if a smart compressor/encryptor wrote itself along with the files
 >> it was treating, and then wrote a nice README file which explained that
 >> files on the floppy were compressed/encrypted, would be automatically
 >> decompressed/decrypted, and that the treatment could, if you wished, be
 >> performed on your hard drives and/or other floppies by making a backup
 >> and then executing the following command, that would be perfectly fine.
 
>3) the program does not do this, much like Stacker does not create
 >README files which explain that your disks are now compressed.  This
 
        As a matter of fact, when you Stac a floppy, a README file *IS*
generated, and the stacker.com tsr kindly gives you the 1-800 number you can
call to order stacker if you received the disk from someone and do not have
stacker now, but would like to have such a nifty utility on your hard
drive...
 
Sean
 




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: elee9sf@Menudo.UH.EDU
Date: Tue, 17 Aug 93 07:00:18 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: encrypting virus (KOH)
In-Reply-To: <9308170755.AA19760@relay2.geis.com>
Message-ID: <199308171359.AA04711@Menudo.UH.EDU>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



>         As a matter of fact, when you Stac a floppy, a README file *IS*
> generated, and the stacker.com tsr kindly gives you the 1-800 number you can
> call to order stacker if you received the disk from someone and do not have
> stacker now, but would like to have such a nifty utility on your hard
> drive...
>  

Well maybe things were updated since I bought my copy of Stacker 2.0.
A stacker.log file is created, but it only logs errors during the
screate process.  No mention of compression is made.  If everything
went well, the log file contains no information, except headers and
empty lists.

But then I never stack floppies because I want to be able to use them
wherever I go, something Stacker 2.0 can't do, but Stacker 3.0 does.

I wonder if the author of KOH made this same decision: to insert
decrypting code on the floppy so you aren't tied to using one
computer, or to not "invade" a floppy so you are stuck using one
computer.

/-----------------------------------\
| Karl L. Barrus                    |
| elee9sf@menudo.uh.edu             | <- preferred address
| barrus@tree.egr.uh.edu (NeXTMail) |
\-----------------------------------/




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: pat@tstc.edu (Patrick E. Hykkonen)
Date: Tue, 17 Aug 93 07:30:18 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Tax Evasion and SASE.
Message-ID: <9308171425.AA05425@tstc.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> The example given (someone soliciting an act of questionable legality)
> is a perfect application for the SASE remailer that I've been
> developing.  I presented it at a phys-meeting a few months back, and
> have been working on coding it sporadically since then.

I was thinking about this just yesterday...

> The idea is that you have an address block that encodes the
> information on how to get a message to you.  This is like a self
> addressed envelope.  The envelope can specify multiple hops through
> remailers, but is encrypted in layers so only the next hop is revealed
> at each remailer.

However, rather than rewrite an entire mailer system from scratch, might 
I propose that we ad an extra command to the cypherpunks remailers that
would allow a person to tell the remailer NOT to throw away the the 
header information.

This would allow a person to create an encrypted block to put at 
the top of their message telling the remailer to pass all header
information through to the recipient.

Example:

::
Remailer-Command: Header-Intact

::
Request-Remailing-To: pat@tstc.edu

The user encrypts this whole block and tells the remote user to put this 
at the header of thier reply message.

Example:

== place at the top of your message text and remove this line ==

::
Encrypted: PGP

-----BEGIN PGP MESSAGE-----
Version: 2.2

hEwCKlkQ745WINUBAf0f5D1bOXX333w08UAU5jVP5WeDblGnlD7Cwx9Q0fxwZcG6
sm+8f1S4zU8AIn0j6Dfmt8i7+BOcdFfjXmscU+oXpgAAAFse+dms+6BMBntqJh56
q4DBpHq6aMTJH1AT0nolOOnAOTxtPmSpolkKFYyXVbwKk0W8q9PpmX0PDBeodoGY
hi2BtkXRMTW9bzbzRLE6Q0YoOsWVOxLKx8FM2M/T
=ciKz
-----END PGP MESSAGE-----

== place message text below this line and remove this line ==

In effect, a self-addressed envelope.  Half of the functionality
is available in the remailers currently.

-- 
"I'm not being irrational, I just know to much."  - Tim Allen
--
Pat Hykkonen, N5NPL                     Texas State Technical College at Waco
Internet: {pat,postmaster,root}@tstc.edu       Instructional Network Services
Packet: N5NPL@WD5KAL.#CENTX.TX.USA.NA        3801 Campus Dr.  Waco, Tx  76705
Public keys available! ** 1984 + 10 **     V:(817) 867-4830  F:(817) 799-2843




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: karn@qualcomm.com (Phil Karn)
Date: Tue, 17 Aug 93 09:30:20 PDT
To: julf@penet.FI
Subject: ANON: alt.sexual.abuse.recovery
In-Reply-To: <9308171047.ab22248@penet.penet.FI>
Message-ID: <9308171628.AA20551@servo>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


One question is how he will enforce his ban on encryption if he only
rarely reads the messages passing through. He could probably write a
shell script that looks for PGP headers, but these could be stripped off.
He could probably look for ascii-encoded files with a flat character
distribution, but these could be uuencoded or binhexed.

Perhaps it's time to integrate one of the steganographic techniques
into the remailers as a configuration option. By inflating the size of
the messages it hides, that will increase the load through the
machines that don't like encrypted messages, but that's life.

Phil




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: nobody@cicada.berkeley.edu
Date: Tue, 17 Aug 93 10:35:22 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: "Clinton Considering National ID Card"
Message-ID: <9308171729.AA16581@cicada.berkeley.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


A forward from libernet -

>From:  ddeming@geohub.gcn.uoknor.edu (David Deming)
>To:  libernet@dartmouth.edu
>
>Subject:  "Clinton Considering National ID Card"
>
>Following appeared in Saturday, August 14, front page
>of Oklahoma City newspaper.
>
>Clinton scares the shit out of me.  His administration
>is turning out to a nightmare -- the secular version of
>the AntiChrist.
>
>******************************************************
>
>LOS ANGELES (Reuter) -- President Clinton said in an interview
>published Friday that his administration is studying the
>feasibility of creating a tamper-proof national identity card
>aimed in part at preventing illegal immigrants from using
>government benefit programs.
>
>Though civil liberties groups have strongly opposed similar
>plans in the past, Clinton told the Los Angeles Times he now
>believes the idea "ought to be examined".
>
>Clinton said he disagreed with a proposal presented earlier
>this week by California Gov. Pete Wilson for constitutional
>changes that would deny citzenship to the U.S.-born children
>of illegal immigrants.  He said he was also against Wilson's
>recommendation that emergency medical treatment should be shut
>off to undocumented residents.
>
>"None of us would tolerate just letting people die on the
>streets if it came to that," Clinton was quoted as saying.
>
>In the midst of a growing anti-immigrant backlash nationwide,
>Wilson on Monday called for sweeping reforms in federal laws
>to help stem the flow of illegal immigrants into the United
>States.
>
>Wilson's package also included a proposed tamper-proof
>identity card.  
>
>Civil libertarians and some conservatives have joined forces
>over the years to block the development of such a card, argueing
>that it would give the government too much control over
>individuals.
>
>Clinton acknowledged that "a lot of immigration groups and
>advocates have said that any kind of identification card like
>that sort of smacks of Big Brotherism".
>
>But he said the idea should be studied and that it is under
>discussion as part of the health care reform effort headed
>by first lady Hillary Clinton.
>
>***************************************************************
>





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Johan Helsingius <julf@penet.FI>
Date: Tue, 17 Aug 93 01:20:09 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: ANON: alt.sexual.abuse.recovery
Message-ID: <9308171047.ab22248@penet.penet.FI>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Here is a snippet of conversation you might find interesting....

	Julf

Subject: passing through encryption
To: postmaster@charcoal.com, postmaster@penet.fi
Date: Thu, 5 Aug 93 5:27:23 EDT
>From: "T. William Wells" <bill@twwells.com>
X-Mailer: ELM [version 2.3 PL11]
Message-Id: <9308050527.AA12334@twwells.com>

I just posted the following article. You may wish to consider the
subject and post your own conclusions. If you post to asar, please
set followups to asard so that the discussion doesn't bother the
other folks on asar.

Newsgroups: alt.sexual.abuse.recovery
>From: anon-admin@twwells.com
Subject: encryption through twwells.com
Date: Thu, 5 Aug 1993 09:12:12 GMT
Message-ID: <CBA48F.9Au@twwells.com>
Sender: bill@twwells.com (T. William Wells)
Followup-To: alt.sexual.abuse.recovery.d
Organization: None, Mt. Laurel, NJ

I know this will make some people unhappy but I will not allow the
passing of encrypted data through the twwells anonymous server.
Responsible running of an APS requires the ability to audit what
passes through and encryption defeats that.

Some time in the future, I may consider how one may use
encryption with my server; such a system will retain the
possibility of decryption at the server.

Followups have been directed to asar.d.

 --------------------------------------------------

Subject: Re: passing through encryption
In-Reply-To: Your message of Thu, 5 Aug 93 5:27:23 EDT
To: "T. William Wells" <bill@twwells.com>
Date: Mon, 09 Aug 93 11:49:21 +0300
>From: Johan Helsingius <julf@penet.fi>

> I just posted the following article. You may wish to consider the
> subject and post your own conclusions. If you post to asar, please
> set followups to asard so that the discussion doesn't bother the
> other folks on asar.
> 
> Newsgroups: alt.sexual.abuse.recovery
> From: anon-admin@twwells.com
> Subject: encryption through twwells.com
> Organization: None, Mt. Laurel, NJ
> 
> I know this will make some people unhappy but I will not allow the
> passing of encrypted data through the twwells anonymous server.
> Responsible running of an APS requires the ability to audit what
> passes through and encryption defeats that.

I have to say I disagree strongly with your position. Responsible
running of an anonymous service requires that the administrator *DOES*
*NOT* audit what passes through.

I feel that any anonymous service operator has no business looking at
the contents of other people's messages, and any attempt at doing so is
a gross violation of the trust of his/her users.

Your statement seems to indicate that you find it morally acceptable to
monitor the messages your users send using your server. How would you
feel if US Mail would get into the habit of peeking at the letters you
send "to ensure responsible running of the US Mail System"?

Please respond by e-mail, as I don't read a.s.a.r.

	Julf (admin@anon.penet.fi)

 --------------------------------------------------

To: Johan Helsingius <julf@penet.fi>
Date: Mon, 9 Aug 93 16:27:08 EDT
>From: "T. William Wells" <bill@twwells.com>
In-Reply-To:  <9308091125.aa28990@penet.penet.FI>; from "Johan Helsingius" at Aug 9, 93 11:49 am
X-Mailer: ELM [version 2.3 PL11]
Message-Id: <9308091627.AA28573@twwells.com>

Johan Helsingius writes:
: I have to say I disagree strongly with your position. Responsible
: running of an anonymous service requires that the administrator *DOES*
: *NOT* audit what passes through.

I replied publicly (to reassure the people on asar); here's the
substance of my reply:

	I want to address a possible misconception here. I do not
	read what goes through the server on any regular basis. I
	do so only when and to the extent my responsibilities to
	the service and its users require it.

	I believe that I, being the main server for and being a
	member of the asar community, have an obligation to try to
	prevent the use of the server as an aid in perping.

	It is my opinion that the simple fact that I *can* read
	whatever goes through the service, even if I never do, is
	the strongest defense we have against someone using the
	cloak of anonymity to further their perping.

	One thing I want to avoid here is a discussion of whether
	these views of mine are correct or not. The first is a
	moral judgement and so is completely outside the bounds of
	discussion in this forum. The second is a subjective
	judgement and is based on my observation that abuse
	thrives on secrecy; it, too, isn't likely up for
	discussion since I doubt anyone can offer more than
	opinion.

:                                                         How would you
: feel if US Mail would get into the habit of peeking at the letters you
: send "to ensure responsible running of the US Mail System"?

Well, analogies are always slippery, but let me change the analogy
a little to illustrate. Let's speak of UPS (or whatever your
parcel post is called). How would if feel if UPS would open my
parcels? That depends. If they did it for gratuitous reasons, I'd
pick another postal service. If, on the other hand, I was worried
about terrorists posting bombs, I would thank them.

ASAR is a different place than most on the net and there are a lot
of people worried about bombs in their parcels. As far as I'm
concerned, it's a matter of choice. Some people will worry and so
be thankful that I have the policies I do; others will be upset
and use the other services.

 --------------------------------------------------

To: alt.sexual.abuse.recovery,alt.sexual.abuse.recovery.d
Subject: "T. William Wells": Re: passing through encryption 
Date: Tue, 10 Aug 93 20:37:30 +0300
>From: Johan Helsingius <julf@penet.fi>


"T. William Wells" <bill@twwells.com> writes:

> Johan Helsingius writes:
> : I have to say I disagree strongly with your position. Responsible
> : running of an anonymous service requires that the administrator *DOES*
> : *NOT* audit what passes through.
> 
> I replied publicly (to reassure the people on asar); here's the
> substance of my reply:
> 
> 	I want to address a possible misconception here. I do not
> 	read what goes through the server on any regular basis. I
> 	do so only when and to the extent my responsibilities to
> 	the service and its users require it.

And you decide when that is, right?

> 	I believe that I, being the main server for and being a
> 	member of the asar community, have an obligation to try to
> 	prevent the use of the server as an aid in perping.

And *you*, in your infinite wisdom, will know what is perping and what
is not? And who to watch and who not to?

> 	One thing I want to avoid here is a discussion of whether
> 	these views of mine are correct or not. The first is a
> 	moral judgement and so is completely outside the bounds of
> 	discussion in this forum.

Why? Why should such a discussion be avoided at all costs?
Why is moral judgement outside the bounds of discussion?

>       The second is a subjective
> 	judgement and is based on my observation that abuse
> 	thrives on secrecy; it, too, isn't likely up for
> 	discussion since I doubt anyone can offer more than
> 	opinion.

I would not use the word "secrecy". I would use the word "privacy". That's
why users use your service! But you are saying they *don't* have a right
to privacy!


> :                                                         How would you
> : feel if US Mail would get into the habit of peeking at the letters you
> : send "to ensure responsible running of the US Mail System"?
> 
> Well, analogies are always slippery, but let me change the analogy
> a little to illustrate. Let's speak of UPS (or whatever your
> parcel post is called). How would if feel if UPS would open my
> parcels? That depends. If they did it for gratuitous reasons, I'd
> pick another postal service. If, on the other hand, I was worried
> about terrorists posting bombs, I would thank them.

If I'm worried about bombs, I might ask UPS or somebody else to check my
parcels. But I don't want them to rummage through all my parcels on the
pretense of looking for bombs, especially without asking me first.

> ASAR is a different place than most on the net and there are a lot
> of people worried about bombs in their parcels. As far as I'm
> concerned, it's a matter of choice. Some people will worry and so
> be thankful that I have the policies I do; others will be upset
> and use the other services.

True. Some people might actually want you to pre-check their messages.
Others might want to use other servers.

Fair enough, as long as you *tell* your users that's what happening!

	Julf (admin@anon.penet.fi)





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: ssteele@eff.org
Date: Tue, 17 Aug 93 09:20:20 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: One BBScon presence question
Message-ID: <199308171618.AA12776@eff.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Hi 'punks!

Steve writes:

>lift.  However, while we're on the subject, I'm wondering if any
>arrangements have been made to distribute anti-Clipper material at
>the con.  I'd be happy to distribute flyers or what-have-you, but
>they'd have to reach the show by other means; I'm not willing to
>carry such seditious material across the US/Canada border.
>
>  I hope that EFF will have a presence at the show* as they did last
>year, and can sow some further seeds of discontent among the
>non-Internet online world, many parts of which don't seem aware of
>the Clipper debacle.  Any comments from the EFF folks hereabouts?

EFF will be well-represented at ONE BBSCon.  Mike Godwin, Cliff Figallo,
Sarah Simpson (our new membership coordinator) and I will be there speaking
and coordinating an EFF booth, which will boast all sorts of documentation,
floppies, and, yes, you asked for it, t-shirts (new design)!  We will
certainly have some Clipper stuff.

>* I had a great time arguing with Shari Steele and accusing her of
>"dancing with the Devil" w/ reference to backing then-Senator Gore's
>Data Superhighway proposal.  Very libertarially-incorrect position to
>take, Shari. :-)

Yeah, yeah, I know.  It was really strange for me to be looked at as
supporting the government over individuals!  Maybe we can continue the
debate this year.  See you in a week!  :)
Shari
******************************************************************************

Shari Steele
Director of Legal Services
Electronic Frontier Foundation
1001 G Street, NW
Suite 950 East
Washington, DC  20001
202/347-5400 (voice), 202/393-5509 (fax)
ssteele@eff.org





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Derek Atkins <warlord@MIT.EDU>
Date: Tue, 17 Aug 93 09:40:20 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: [ari@ISI.EDU: New paper on electronic currency]
Message-ID: <9308171636.AA13653@toxicwaste.MEDIA.MIT.EDU>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I thought people would be interested in this....  Hope not too many
copies get forwarded here.. ;-)

-derek

------- Forwarded Message

Date: Tue, 17 Aug 93 09:21:20 PDT
From: ari@ISI.EDU
Posted-Date: Tue, 17 Aug 93 09:21:20 PDT
To: ietf-aac@ISI.EDU, imp-interest@thumper.bellcore.com, kerberos@MIT.EDU
Subject: New paper on electronic currency


A new paper on electronic currency to appear in the 1st ACM Conference on
Computer and Communications Security, Nov. 93 is now available via anonymous
FTP from PROSPERO.ISI.EDU as /pub/papers/security/netcash-cccs93.ps.Z

NetCash: A design for practical electronic currency on the Internet  

Gennady Medvinsky and Clifford Neuman

NetCash is a framework that supports realtime electronic payments with
provision of anonymity over an unsecure network.  It is designed to enable new
types of services on the Internet which have not been practical to date
because of the absence of a secure, scalable, potentially anonymous payment
method.

NetCash strikes a balance between unconditionally anonymous electronic
currency, and signed instruments analogous to checks that are more scalable
but identify the principals in a transaction.  It does this by providing the
framework within which proposed electronic currency protocols can be
integrated with the scalable, but non-anonymous, electronic banking
infrastructure that has been proposed for routine transactions.


------- End of Forwarded Message





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Duncan Frissell <frissell@panix.com>
Date: Tue, 17 Aug 93 09:50:20 PDT
To: CYPHERPUNKS@toad.com
Subject: National ID Cards!?
Message-ID: <199308171649.AA26609@panix.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


The "Fear of Foreigners" and the "Health Care Crisis" have come together 
nicely to make a new (forge-resistant *not* forge-proof) national identity 
card much more likely.  This will, BTW, be the first major piece of ID 
introduced since the new individualist movements came into existence from 
1960 to the present.  It will be interesting to see what the reaction of 
those movements will be to this major attack.

I will be posting a lot on this subject over the next few months.  My 
first thought was to form a non-profit 501c3 corporation to raise funds to 
pay for the reverse engineering of the beast (if it turns out to be a 
smart card).  Since its design and algorithims will be a public document 
that we paid for, and no national security issues are involved, it can 
arguably be reverse engineered legally.  It could be legally done in other 
countries in any case. 

In fact, of course, it will be simple for any individual who cares to to 
resist the thing.

Some approaches (Health):

1)  "I'm an anarchist and I don't believe in such things.  Send me a 
bill."

2)  "I'm a foreign tourist.  Send me a bill."

3)  "I'm an illegal alien.  Send me a bill."  -- Not recommended for real 
illegal aliens.

4)  "Here is my Health Security Smart Card, I puddled it with a welding 
torch.  You're welcome to have it."

5)  When they send you a bill (above) don't pay it say this:  "You have 
established that the separation of the provision of medical services and 
the payment for those services is a moral imperative.  I am taking you at 
your word by maintaining a *rigid* separation between the provision of 
services and payment for them."

6) Or: "You have used deadly force to maintain an oligopoly on the 
provision of medical services through licensing and immigration 
restrictions.  You have prohibited me from purchasing such services on an 
open competitive market, therefore, I don't owe you a dime."

Some approaches (employment):

1) Open a contract services firm (temp agency) that places illegal aliens 
with other companies and acts as a cutout for the enhanced worker's ID 
requirements.

2) Open any kind of a business.  No ID requirements for self employment.

3) Convert your job to a virtual one and move overseas.  61% of US expats 
don't even file US tax returns though almost all are required to do so.

Much more to come.

Duncan Frissell - Have that Privacy Ckeckup in advance of need.  No ID 
required. <G>

*************************************************************************
ATMs, Contracting Out,  Digital Switching, Downsizing, EDI, Fax, Fedex,
Home Workers, Internet, Just In Time, Leasing, Quants, Securitization, 
Temps
      
- Not as sexy as Tim May's signature line but just as important.


--- WinQwk 2.0b#0
                                                   




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: gtoal@an-teallach.com (Graham Toal)
Date: Tue, 17 Aug 93 06:05:18 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Beepers can also be used to track you down!
Message-ID: <5558@an-teallach.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


In article <9308131915.AA12203@nebula.lrcs.loral.com> koontzd@lrcs.loral.com writes:
 > As far as local detection, I understand that in Britain vans go around
 > with sniffing gear looking for IF freqs to find unlicensed TVs.

Errr... yes, and they have about 4 vans for the whole country - the
rest are dummies, accompanied by high-profile advertising campaigns
to scare people into paying for a licence before they're caught.

G
(Not folklore; fact - and I saw one of the real vans at the BBC
Research Centre at Kingswood Warren when I worked there on a contract
once.  *Very* expensive equipment.)
===
Personal mail to gtoal@gtoal.com (I read it in the evenings)
Business mail to gtoal@an-teallach.com (Be careful with the spelling!)
Faxes to An Teallach Limited: +44 31 662 4678  Voice: +44 31 668 1550 x212





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Dave Banisar <banisar@washofc.cpsr.org>
Date: Tue, 17 Aug 93 12:30:22 PDT
To: CYPHERPUNKS <CYPHERPUNKS@toad.com>
Subject: Call for Clipper Comments
Message-ID: <00541.2828442468.4792@washofc.cpsr.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


  Call for Clipper Comments

The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) has 
issued a request for public comments on its proposal to establish 
the "Skipjack" key-escrow system as a Federal Information 
Processing Standard (FIPS).  The deadline for the submission of 
comments is September 28, 1993.  The full text of the NIST notice 
follows.

CPSR is urging all interested individuals and organizations to 
express their views on the proposal and to submit comments 
directly to NIST.  Comments need not be lengthy or very detailed; 
all thoughtful statements addressing a particular concern will 
likely contribute to NIST's evaluation of the key-escrow proposal.  

The following points could be raised about the NIST proposal
(additional materials on Clipper and the key escrow proposal may 
be found at the CPSR ftp site, cpsr.org):

* The potential risks of the proposal have not been assessed and 
many questions about the implementation remain unanswered.  The 
NIST notice states that the current proposal "does not include 
identification of key escrow agents who will hold the keys for the 
key escrow microcircuits or the procedures for access to the 
keys."  The key escrow configuration may also create a dangerous 
vulnerability in a communications network.  The risks of misuse of 
this feature should be weighed against any perceived benefit.

* The classification of the Skipjack algorithm as a "national 
security" matter is inappropriate for technology that will be used 
primarily in civilian and commercial applications.  Classification 
of technical information also limits the computing community's 
ability to evaluate fully the proposal and the general public's 
right to know about the activities of government.
 
* The proposal was not developed in response to a public concern 
or a business request.  It was put forward by the National 
Security Agency and the Federal Bureau of Investigation so that 
these two agencies could continue surveillance of electronic 
communications. It has not been established that is necessary for 
crime prevention.  The number of arrests resulting from wiretaps 
has remained essentially unchanged since the federal wiretap law 
was enacted in 1968.

* The NIST proposal states that the escrow agents will provide the 
key components to a government agency that "properly demonstrates 
legal authorization to conduct electronic surveillance of 
communications which are encrypted."  The crucial term "legal 
authorization" has not been defined.  The vagueness of the term 
"legal authorization" leaves open the possibility that court-
issued warrants may not be required in some circumstances.  This 
issue must be squarely addressed and clarified. 

* Adoption of the proposed key escrow standard may have an adverse 
impact upon the ability of U.S. manufacturers to market 
cryptographic products abroad.  It is unlikely that non-U.S. users 
would purchase communication security products to which the U.S. 
government holds keys.


Comments on the NIST proposal should be sent to:

Director, Computer Systems Laboratory
ATTN: Proposed FIPS for Escrowed Encryption Standard
Technology Building, Room B-154
National Institute of Standards and Technology
Gaithersburg, MD 20899

Submissions must be received by September 28, 1993.  CPSR has 
asked NIST that provisions be made to allow for electronic 
submission of comments.

Please also send copies of your comments on the key escrow 
proposal to CPSR for inclusion in the CPSR Internet Library, our 
ftp site.  Copies should be sent to <clipper@washofc.cpsr.org>.



================================================================= 

                         FEDERAL REGISTER
                         VOL. 58, No. 145
 
                     DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE (DOC)
        National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST)

                     Docket No. 930659-3159
                         RIN 0693-AB19

A Proposed Federal Information Processing Standard for an Escrowed 
Encryption Standard (EES)

                        58 FR 40791

                     Friday, July 30, 1993

Notice; request for comments.

SUMMARY: A Federal Information Processing Standard (FIPS) for an 
Escrowed Encryption Standard (EES) is being proposed. This 
proposed standard specifies use of a symmetric-key 
encryption/decryption algorithm and a key escrowing method which 
are to be implemented in electronic devices and used for 
protecting certain unclassified government communications when 
such protection is required. The algorithm and the key escrowing 
method are classified and are referenced, but not specified, in 
the standard.

   This proposed standard adopts encryption technology developed 
by the Federal government to provide strong protection for 
unclassified information and to enable the keys used in the 
encryption and decryption processes to be escrowed. This latter 
feature will assist law enforcement and other government agencies, 
under the proper legal authority, in the collection and decryption 
of electronically transmitted information. This proposed standard 
does not include identification of  key escrow  agents who will 
hold the keys for the  key escrow  microcircuits or the procedures 
for access to the keys. These issues will be addressed by the 
Department of Justice.

   The purpose of this notice is to solicit views from the public, 
manufacturers, and Federal, state, and local government users so 
that their needs can be considered prior to submission of this 
proposed standard to the Secretary of Commerce for review and 
approval.

   The proposed standard contains two sections: (1) An 
announcement section, which provides information concerning the 
applicability, implementation, and maintenance of the standard; 
and (2) a specifications section which deals with the technical 
aspects of the standard. Both sections are provided in this 
notice.


DATES: Comments on this proposed standard must be received on or 
before September 28, 1993.


ADDRESSES: Written comments concerning the proposed standard 
should be sent to: Director, Computer Systems Laboratory, ATTN: 
Proposed FIPS for Escrowed Encryption Standard, Technology 
Building, room B-154, National Institute of Standards and 
Technology, Gaithersburg, MD 20899.

   Written comments received in response to this notice will be 
made part of the public record and will be made available for 
inspection and copying in the Central Reference and Records 
Inspection Facility, room 6020, Herbert C. Hoover Building, 14th 
Street between Pennsylvania and Constitution Avenues, NW., 
Washington, DC 20230.


FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Dr. Dennis Branstad, National 
Institute of Standards and Technology, Gaithersburg, MD 20899, 
telephone (301) 975-2913.


   SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: This proposed FIPS implements the 
initiative announced by the White House Office of the Press 
Secretary on April 16, 1993. The President of the U.S. approved a 
Public Encryption Management directive, which among other actions, 
called for standards to facilitate the procurement and use of 
encryption devices fitted with  key-escrow  microcircuits in 
Federal communication systems that process sensitive, but 
unclassified information.

   Dated: July 26, 1993.

 Arati Prabhakar,
 Director.(NIST)


----------------------------------------------------
 Federal Information Processing Standards Publication XX
 1993 XX
 Announcing the Escrowed Encryption Standard (EES)

   Federal Information Processing Standards Publications (FIPS 
PUBS) are issued by the National Institute of Standards and 
Technology (NIST) after approval by the Secretary of Commerce 
pursuant to section 111(d) of the Federal Property and 
Administrative Services Act of 1949 as amended by the Computer 
Security Act of 1987, Public Law 100-235.
 
 Name of Standard: Escrowed Encryption Standard (EES).

 Category of Standard: Telecommunications Security.

 Explanation: This Standard specifies use of a symmetric-key 
encryption (and decryption) algorithm and a Law Enforcement Access 
Field (LEAF) creation method (one part of a  key escrow  system) 
which provide for decryption of encrypted telecommunications when 
interception of the telecommunications is lawfully authorized. 
Both the algorithm and the LEAF creation method are to be 
implemented in electronic devices (e.g., very large scale 
integration chips). The devices may be incorporated in security 
equipment used to encrypt (and decrypt) sensitive unclassified 
telecommunications data. Decryption of lawfully intercepted 
telecommunications may be achieved through the acquisition and use 
of the LEAF, the decryption algorithm and escrowed key components.

   To escrow something (e.g., a document, an encryption key) means 
that it is "delivered to a third person to be given to the grantee 
only upon the fulfillment of a condition" (Webster's Seventh New 
Collegiate Dictionary). A key escrow  system is one that entrusts 
components of a key used to encrypt telecommunications to third 
persons, called key component escrow agents. In accordance with 
the common definition of "escrow", the key component escrow agents 
provide the key components to a "grantee" (i.e., a government 
agency) only upon fulfillment of the condition that the grantee 
properly demonstrates legal authorization to conduct electronic 
surveillance of communications which are encrypted using the 
specific device whose key component is requested. The key 
components obtained through this process are then used by the 
grantee to reconstruct the device unique key and obtain the 
session key (contained in the LEAF) which is used to decrypt the 
telecommunications that are encrypted with that device. The term, 
"escrow", for purposes of this standard, is restricted to the 
dictionary definition.

   The encryption/decryption algorithm has been approved for 
government applications requiring encryption of sensitive 
unclassified telecommunications of data as defined herein. The 
specific operations of the algorithm and the LEAF creation method 
are classified and hence are referenced, but not specified, in 
this standard.

   Data, for purposes of this standard, includes voice, facsimile 
and computer information communicated in a telephone system. 
Telephone system, for purposes of this standard, is limited to 
systems circuit-switched up to no more than 14.4 kbs or which use 
basic-rate ISDN, or to a similar grade wireless service.

   Data that is considered sensitive by a responsible authority 
should be encrypted if it is vulnerable to unauthorized disclosure 
during telecommunications. A risk analysis should be performed 
under the direction of a responsible authority to determine 
potential threats and risks. The costs of providing encryption 
using this standard as well as alternative methods and their 
respective costs should be projected. A responsible authority 
should then make a decision, based on the risk and cost analyses, 
whether or not to use encryption and then whether or not to use 
this standard.

 Approving Authority: Secretary of Commerce.

 Maintenance Agency: Department of Commerce, National Institute of 
Standards and Technology.

 Applicability: This standard is applicable to all Federal 
departments and agencies and their contractors under the 
conditions specified below. This standard may be used in designing 
and implementing security products and systems which Federal 
departments and agencies use or operate or which are operated for 
them under contract. These products may be used when replacing 
Type II and Type III (DES) encryption devices and products owned 
by the government and government contractors.

   This standard may be used when the following conditions apply:

   1. An authorized official or manager responsible for data 
security or the security of a computer system decides that 
encryption is required and cost justified as per OMB Circular A-
130; and

   2. The data is not classified according to the National 
Security Act of 1947, as amended, or the Atomic Energy Act of 
1954, as amended.

   However, Federal departments or agencies which use encryption 
devices for protecting data that is classified according to either 
of these acts may use those devices also for protecting 
unclassified data in lieu of this standard.

   In addition, this standard may be adopted and used by non-
Federal Government organizations. Such use is encouraged when it 
provides the desired security.
 
Applications: Devices conforming to this standard may be used for 
protecting unclassified communications.

 Implementations: The encryption/decryption algorithm and the LEAF 
creation method shall be implemented in electronic devices (e.g., 
electronic chip packages) that can be physically protected against 
unauthorized entry, modification and reverse engineering. 
Implementations which are tested and validated by NIST will be 
considered as complying with this standard. An electronic device 
shall be incorporated into a cyptographic module in accordance 
with FIPS 140-1. NIST will test for conformance with FIPS 140-1. 
Cryptographic modules can then be integrated into security 
equipment for sale and use in an application. Information about 
devices that have been validated, procedures for testing equipment 
for conformance with NIST standards, and information about 
obtaining approval of security equipment are available from the 
Computer Systems Laboratory, NIST, Gaithersburg, MD 20899.

 Export Control: Implementations of this standard are subject to 
Federal Government export controls as specified in title 22, Code 
of Federal Regulations, parts 120 through 131 (International 
Traffic of Arms Regulations -ITAR). Exporters of encryption 
devices, equipment and technical data are advised to contact the 
U.S. Department of State, Office of Defense Trade Controls for 
more information.   Patents: Implementations of this standard may 
be covered by U.S. and foreign patents.

 Implementation Schedule: This standard becomes effective thirty 
days following publication of this FIPS PUB.

 Specifications: Federal Information Processing Standard (FIPS 
XXX)(affixed).

 Cross Index:

   a. FIPS PUB 46-2, Data Encryption Standard.

   b. FIPS PUB 81, Modes of Operation of the DES

   c. FIPS PUB 140-1, Security Requirements for Cryptographic 
Modules.


 Glossary:

   The following terms are used as defined below for purposes of 
this standard:

   Data-Voice, facsimile and computer information communicated in 
a telephone system.

   Decryption-Conversion of ciphertext to plaintext through the 
use of a cryptographic algorithm.

   Device (cryptographic)-An electronic implementation of the 
encryption/decryption algorithm and the LEAF creation method as 
specified in this standard.

   Digital data-Data that have been converted to a binary 
representation.

   Encryption-Conversion of plaintext to ciphertext through the 
use of a cryptographic algorithm.

   Key components-The values from which a key can be derived 
(e.g., KU sub 1 + KU sub 2).

   Key escrow -A process involving transferring one or more 
components of a cryptographic key to one or more trusted key 
component escrow agents for storage and later use by government 
agencies to decrypt ciphertext if access to the plaintext is 
lawfully authorized.

   LEAF Creation Method 1-A part of a  key escrow  system that is 
implemented in a cryptographic device and creates a Law 
Enforcement Access Field.

   Type I cryptography-A cryptographic algorithm or device 
approved by the National Security Agency for protecting classified 
information.

   Type II cryptography-A cryptographic algorithm or device 
approved by the National Security Agency for protecting sensitive 
unclassified information in systems as specified in section 2315 
of Title 10 United State Code, or section 3502(2) of Title 44, 
United States Code.

   Type III cryptography-A cryptographic algorithm or device 
approved as a Federal Information Processing Standard.

   Type III(E) cryptography-A Type III algorithm or device that is 
approved for export from the United States.

 Qualifications. The protection provided by a security product or 
system is dependent on several factors. The protection provided by 
this standard against key search attacks is greater than that 
provided by the DES (e.g., the cryptographic key is longer). 
However, provisions of this standard are intended to ensure that 
information encrypted through use of devices implementing this 
standard can be decrypted by a legally authorized entity.

 Where to Obtain Copies of the Standard: Copies of this 
publication are for sale by the National Technical Information 
Service, U.S. Department of Commerce, Springfield, VA 22161. When 
ordering, refer to Federal Information Processing Standards 
Publication XX (FIPS PUB XX), and identify the title. When 
microfiche is desired, this should be specified. Prices are 
published by NTIS in current catalogs and other issuances. Payment 
may be made by check, money order, deposit account or charged to a 
credit card accepted by NTIS.
 Specifications for the Escrowed Encryption Standard


 1. Introduction

   This publication specifies Escrowed Encryption Standard (EES) 
functions and parameters.


 2. General

   This standard specifies use of the SKIPJACK cryptographic 
algorithm and the LEAF Creation Method 1 (LCM-1) to be implemented 
in an approved electronic device (e.g., a very large scale 
integration electronic chip). The device is contained in a logical 
cryptographic module which is then integrated in a security 
product for encrypting and decrypting telecommunications.

   Approved implementations may be procured by authorized 
organizations for integration into security equipment. Devices 
must be tested and validated by NIST for conformance to this 
standard. Cryptographic modules must be tested and validated by 
NIST for conformance to FIPS 140-1.


 3. Algorithm Specifications

   The specifications of the encryption/decryption algorithm 
(SKIPJACK) and the LEAF Creation Method 1 (LCM-1) are classified. 
The National Security Agency maintains these classified 
specifications and approves the manufacture of devices which 
implement the specifications. NIST tests for conformance of the 
devices implementing this standard in cryptographic modules to 
FIPS 140-1 and FIPS 81.


 4. Functions and Parameters


 4.1 Functions

   The following functions, at a minimum, shall be implemented:

   1. Data Encryption: A session key (80 bits) shall be used to 
encrypt plaintext information in one or more of the following 
modes of operation as specified in FIPS 81: ECB, CBC, OFB (64) CFB 
(1, 8, 16, 32, 64).

   2. Data Decryption: The session key (80 bits) used to encrypt 
the data shall be used to decrypt resulting ciphertext to obtain 
the data.

   3.  Key Escrow:  The Family Key (KF) shall be used to create 
the Law Enforcement Access Field (LEAF) in accordance with the 
LEAF Creation Method 1 (LCM-1). The Session Key shall be encrypted 
with the Device Unique Key and transmitted as part of the LEAF. 
The security equipment shall ensure that the LEAF is transmitted 
in such a manner that the LEAF and ciphertext may be decrypted 
with legal authorization. No additional encryption or modification 
of the LEAF is permitted.


 4.2 Parameters

   The following parameters shall be used in performing the 
prescribed functions:

   1. Device Identifier (DID): The identifier unique to a 
particular device and used by the  Key Escrow  System.

   2. Device Unique Key (KU): The cryptographic key unique to a 
particular device and used by the  Key Escrow  System.

   3. Cryptographic Protocol Field (CPF): The field identifying 
the registered cryptographic protocol used by a particular 
application and used by the  Key Escrow  System (reserved for 
future specification and use).

   4. Escrow Authenticator (EA): A binary pattern that is inserted 
in the LEAF to ensure that the LEAF is transmitted and received 
properly and has not been modified, deleted or replaced in an 
unauthorized manner.

   5. Initialization Vector (IV): A mode and application dependent 
vector of bytes used to initialize, synchronize and verify the 
encryption, decryption and key escrow  functions.

   6. Family Key (KF): The cryptographic key stored in all devices 
designated as a family that is used to create the LEAF.

   7. Session Key (KS): The cryptographic key used by a device to 
encrypt and decrypt data during a session. 

   8. Law Enforcement Access Field (LEAF): The field containing 
the encrypted session key and the device identifier and the escrow 
authenticator.


 5. Implementation

   The Cryptographic Algorithm and the LEAF Creation Method shall 
be implemented in an electronic device (e.g., VLSI chip) which is 
highly resistant to reverse engineering (destructive or non-
destructive) to obtain or modify the cryptographic algorithms, the 
DID, the KF, the KU, the EA, the CPF, the operational KS, or any 
other security or  Key Escrow  System relevant information. The 
device shall be able to be programmed/personalized (i.e., made 
unique) after mass production in such a manner that the DID, KU 
(or its components), KF (or its components) and EA fixed pattern 
can be entered once (and only once) and maintained without 
external electrical power.

   The LEAF and the IV shall be transmitted with the ciphertext. 
The specifics of the protocols used to create and transmit the 
LEAF, IV, and encrypted data shall be registered and a CPF 
assigned. The CPF shall then be transmitted in accordance with the 
registered specifications.

   The specific electric, physical and logical interface will vary 
with the implementation. Each approved, registered implementation 
shall have an unclassified electrical, physical and logical 
interface specification sufficient for an equipment manufacturer 
to understand the general requirements for using the device. Some 
of the requirements may be classified and therefore would not be 
specified in the unclassified interface specification.








From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: ssteele@eff.org
Date: Tue, 17 Aug 93 11:35:22 PDT
To: cme@ellisun.sw.stratus.com (Carl Ellison)
Subject: Re: One BBScon presence question
Message-ID: <199308171834.AA13699@eff.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Hi Carl.

You ask:

>        what kind of T-shirts?  Can we non-attendees get a crack at them?

Absolutely.  They're kinda hard to describe, since they're graphical, but
I'll do my best.  They're white.  On the front, above where the pocket
would be (if they had pockets) is the EFF logo.  The back is divided into
four large squares with the header "Famous Frontiers in History."  In the
first square is the picture of a cowboy on a horse looking at a sunset on
the prairie with the label "The Western Frontier."  The second square has a
picture of John F. Kennedy at a podium with the label "The New Frontier." 
The third square has a picture of the U.S.S. Enterprise with the label "The
Final Frontier."  And finally, the fourth square has the EFF logo with the
label "The Electronic Frontier."  Shirts are $10 and are available in small
(for little people and children) and extra large (for everyone else). 
Should I get a stash to John Gilmore for cypherpunk distribution?
Shari





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: nobody@alumni.cco.caltech.edu
Date: Tue, 17 Aug 93 15:10:25 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Private, legal-tender billing & refunding for online services
Message-ID: <9308172203.AA29532@alumni.cco.caltech.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


In "Twain" and other Internet business concepts there is a big
problem with establishing methods of payments and refunds that is 
convenient for both the customer and the business, while insuring the 
privacy of the customer.  AMIX, netcom, et. al. ask for credit card 
number, keep names and addresses of customers online, probably keep 
dossiers of services customers have bought, etc.  (Even if not 
purposefully, they frequently do system backups).  Just about every 
business has to have a way of recieving payment and distributing refunds 
to customers, in legal tender.  I'm interested in how to set up a 
physical mail drop/ATM protocol to allow customers to exchange legal 
tender for digital postage (or coupons, or greenstamps, or cash, or 
whatever we want to call it.  Digicash is ideal, but the nomenclature 
might have to depend on what is legal in various jurisdictions).

Here's my first cut:

	Customer signs up by sending legal tender (physical cash or
	money order) in mail, with anon physical mail drop to which the 
	stamp vendor replies with a floppy containing:
		* N digital stamps
		* other tools to connect to vendor (eg software
		to handle digital stamps, e-mail utilities,
		client software, etc.)

	Vendor also sets up a "bearer" offshore bank account
	or credit union account with ATM card.  A 
	PIN and password are sent to customer, needed to
	activate the card and digital stamps respectively.

	Customer pays up front for N digital stamps and the
	sign-up fee.  Digistamps obtained from various vendors 
	(in the S&H greenstamp scenario) can be deposited at will.  	
	For refunds, these stamps can be removed from the account,
	digitally converting to legal tender in the bearer bank
	account, where customer can remove at a max rate of
	(typically) $300/day via ATM.

Some problems: mail drops and bearer bank accounts may 
be a major hassle for customers of most service businesses.
Also for "normal" businesses many customers will be turned
off by the "shady" nature of the billing scheme.  (Cf. Cindy's 
recent response to Tim May's post on her bartering scheme).  There 
are major legal issues here: is a formal "bearer bank account" 
legal?  Are digital S&H greenstamps legal?  In what jurisdictions?






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Karl Lui Barrus <klbarrus@owlnet.rice.edu>
Date: Tue, 17 Aug 93 13:45:23 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: ANON: remailer list
Message-ID: <9308172042.AA23682@arcadien.owlnet.rice.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Sorry about the delay getting this out but I was waiting for my new
account.  Script updates will be made soon...

The only change is the shut down of phantom, unless it became a secondary
remailer and I missed it.

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----


Q1: What cypherpunk remailers exist?

A1:

 1: nowhere@bsu-cs.bsu.edu 
 2: hh@cicada.berkeley.edu 
 3: hh@pmantis.berkeley.edu 
 4: hh@soda.berkeley.edu 
 5: 00x@uclink.berkeley.edu 
 6: hal@alumni.caltech.edu 
 7: ebrandt@jarthur.claremont.edu 
 8: remailer@rebma.mn.org 
 9: elee7h5@rosebud.ee.uh.edu 
10: hfinney@shell.portal.com 
11: remail@tamsun.tamu.edu 
12: remail@tamaix.tamu.edu 
13: remailer@utter.dis.org 
14: remailer@entropy.linet.org
15: remail@extropia.wimsey.com 

NOTES: 
#1-#5		no encryption of remailing requests
#6-#14		support encrypted remailing requests
#15		special - header and message must be encrypted together
#8,#13,#14,#15	introduce larger than average delay (not direct connect)
#8,#13,#15      running on privately owned machines

======================================================================

Q2: What help is available?

A2:

Check out the pub/cypherpunks directory at soda.berkeley.edu
(128.32.149.19).  Instructions on how to use the remailers are in the
remailer directory, along with some unix scripts and dos batch files.

The public keys for the remailers which support encrypted remailing
requests is also available in the same directory.

Mail to me (klbarrus@owlnet.rice.edu) for further help and/or questions.


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.3a

iQCVAgUBLHFCLYOA7OpLWtYzAQFjrAQAi7M8xbny9CCnsvVbBR8lVtjvARxbgBiJ
qIqCCzYoIal2N1qTHB6SpItknLGWphayxpTLAe4QVZhF7MUndzvAZLGwur2FhMV8
ChWAPauleWUXbItaPtKZvbvGsDi4DEaf5OT643YVUc0xHNCD4kEe6trld7J5A03K
otP4hRDmC0Y=
=w4us
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Dave Banisar <banisar@washofc.cpsr.org>
Date: Tue, 17 Aug 93 14:10:23 PDT
To: CYPHERPUNKS <CYPHERPUNKS@toad.com>
Subject: FWD>Clinton and National ID
Message-ID: <00541.2828451318.4840@washofc.cpsr.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


  FWD>Clinton and National ID


                   Copyright 1993 The Times Mirror Company  
                               Los Angeles Times 

                     August  15, 1993, Sunday, Home Edition

SECTION: Business; Part D; Page 1; Column 2; Financial Desk

LENGTH: 1025 words

HEADLINE: JAMES FLANIGAN:  BLAMING IMMIGRANTS WON'T SOLVE ECONOMIC WOES

BYLINE: By JAMES FLANIGAN

 BODY:
   Immigration is a burning issue once again, with answers to perceived
problems
coming thick and fast from public officials -- notably the governor of
California. But emotions outrun reason, and most people aren't even asking
the
right questions.

   Gov. Pete Wilson sent an open letter to President  Clinton  last week
demanding that the federal government control U.S. borders because
California is
suffering the burden of illegal immigration.

   Wilson also proposed tamper-proof identity  cards  for immigrants, denial
of
health care, education and even citizenship to children of illegal
immigrants,
and that Mexican soldiers join the U.S. Border Patrol in forcing people back
from the border at gunpoint.

   Much of what he said, unfortunately, was demagoguery -- changing laws on
citizenship requires a Constitutional amendment, so lawyer Wilson's call was
political rhetoric.

   But not everything Wilson said was grandstanding; on some matters, he had
a
point, although like almost everybody involved in the new debate on
immigration,
his complaints were misdirected.

   There are problems and social changes occurring in the U.S. economy, but
immigrants, legal and illegal, are not the cause of them. Yet illegal
immigration -- however great or small its actual numbers -- is a problem
simply
because it breaks the law.

   So we should solve our problems, not avoid them by making scapegoats of
immigrants.

   To begin with, estimates vary incredibly about how big a "problem"
illegal
immigration is. The U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service estimates
that
300,000 people enter the country illegally each year, but don't remain here.
Illegal aliens go back and forth between Mexico and the United States, says
the
INS.

   The  Clinton  White House recently estimated that 3 million people live
here
illegally, from many nations -- China, Mexico, Ireland, Nigeria, India --
and in
many parts of the country. That's less than half the widespread estimates,
used
by immigration critics, that more than 6 million illegals live in America.
h
   Legal immigration has risen in recent years thanks to a change in federal
law, but at 1.5 million immigrants a year, the rate is only half that of the
1900-1910 historic peak. In California, however, immigration is at peak
rates,
which helps account for this state's anxious reactions.

   The charge is that immigrants cost more in social services than they
contribute in economic benefit. But that's more an argument about taxation
than
immigration. A study by Los Angeles County found that immigrants pay
billions
annually to the federal and state governments but little to the county,
which
provides hospital care and social services.

   The county's point, and one reason for Wilson's outburst last week, is
that
the federal government should pay more. "The federal government gets a free
ride," says Georges Vernez, an immigration expert at Rand Corp. the research
firm. Which is true, but that's not the immigrants' fault.

   The fact is, immigration answers needs in American society. If you don't
believe that, ask yourself why immigrants keep coming to a slow U.S. economy
--
and particularly to recession-bound California.

   The answer is they come for work. Skilled people the world over have an
open
invitation. American hospitals are still recruiting nurses from the
Philippines,
England and Ireland; draftsmen are brought from Europe, software programmers
from India.

   Unskilled people too find work. Consider the growing number of elder care
facilities in the United States, particularly those for elderly people
disabled
by Alzheimer's and other afflictions. They are staffed heavily by recent
immigrants who owe their unglamorous jobs to social changes in American
life.

   "We do not live in extended families, three generations in one house, as
people in poorer countries do," explains Professor Leo Chavez of UC Irvine.
We
may be close as families but geographically separate, and so there is a
growing
need for elder care facilities and staff to work in them.

   Couldn't low-skilled people from America's inner cities do such jobs?
Sure
they could, so why doesn't U.S. society train and educate people in its
inner
cities and make sure they get such jobs? The answer is America's inner-city
problem is a complex one of social neglect. But making scapegoats of
immigrants
won't solve it.

   Make no mistake, "America should control its borders, because lawlessness
is
always a problem," says Julian Simon, of the University of Maryland, a
leading
authority on immigration.

   Trouble is, most suggestions for controlling the border are unacceptable.
Guns won't do it -- can you imagine the public outcry the first time U.S. or
Mexican troops shoot down defenseless migrants?

   We could try an identity  card,  but surely our laws would demand that
everyone carry such a  card.  And a country that has a hard time imposing
minimal gun control won't soon have a national ID  card. 

   One way to gain border control and economic benefit would be to set up a
system of flexible legal immigration that could bring people in when needed
for a 
variety of jobs. Immigration experts say this might be along the lines of
the bracero program that brought agricultural laborers from Mexico from
wartime
1942 to 1964. The bracero program had faults and was criticized as a
cheap-labor
scheme, but a new system would have the advantage of being legal and less
exploitative.

   Another solution, for our southern border, would be to work through the
North
American Free Trade Agreement to improve Mexico's economy and ease at least
the
economic pressures driving Mexico's people north.

   The ultimate point, though, is we'll get nowhere blaming our problems on
immigrants, who have always come to this country just because it offers more
opportunity for individual development than any other nation on earth.

   "Only in America," President  Clinton  said last week as he nominated
Army
Gen. John M. Shalikashvili, who came from Poland as a child, to be chairman
of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Shalikashvili will succeed Colin Powell, the son
of
immigrants from Jamaica. Only in America -- still true, and hopefully always
true.

                        Copyright 1993 Reuters, Limited

                       August  13, 1993, Friday, AM cycle

LENGTH: 329 words

HEADLINE:  CLINTON  REPORTED LOOKING AT NATIONAL ID  CARD 

DATELINE: LOS ANGELES

 BODY:
   President  Clinton  said in an interview published Friday that his
administration is studying the feasibility of creating a tamper-proof
national
identity  card  aimed in part at preventing illegal immigrants from using
government benefit programs.

   Though civil liberties groups have strongly opposed similar plans in the
past,  Clinton  told the  Los Angeles Times  he now believed the idea "ought
to
be examined."

   But  Clinton  said he disagreed with a proposal presented earlier this
week
by California Gov. Pete Wilson for constitutional changes that would deny
citizenship to the U.S.-born children of illegal immigrants.

   He said he was also against Wilson's recommendation that emergency
medical
treatment should be shut off to undocumented residents. Such a policy, he
suggested, would create more problems than it solves.

   "None of us would tolerate just letting people die on the streets if it
came
to that,"  Clinton  was quoted as saying.

   In the midst of a growing anti-immigrant backlash nationwide, Wilson
Monday
called for sweeping reforms in federal laws to help stem the flow of illegal
immigrants into the United States.

   But immigrant rights advocates accused him of trying to make Mexican
immigrants a scapegoat for his own failure to solve the state's crushing
economic problems.

   Wilson's package included a proposed tamper-proof identity  card, and 
 Clinton's  disclosure was the first indication that it was under
consideration.

   Civil libertarians and even some conservatives have joined forces over
the
years to block the development of such a  card,  arguing that it would give
the
government too much control over individuals.

    Clinton  acknowledged that "a lot of immigration groups and advocates
have
said that any kind of identification  card  like that sort of smacks of Big
Brotherism."

   But he said the idea should be studied and that it is under discussion as
part of the health care reform effort being headed by First Lady Hillary
Rodham
 Clinton. 

                   Copyright 1993 The Times Mirror Company  
                               Los Angeles Times 

                     August  13, 1993, Friday, Home Edition

SECTION: Part A; Page 1; Column 5; National Desk

LENGTH: 1013 words

HEADLINE:  CLINTON  DIFFERS WITH WILSON IDEAS ON IMMIGRATION;
POLICY: PRESIDENT SAYS HE 'SYMPATHIZES' WITH GOVERNOR BUT THAT HE FAVORS A
'DIFFERENT TACK.' HOWEVER, HE REVEALS THAT ADMINISTRATION IS LOOKING AT THE
USE
OF ID  CARDS. 

BYLINE: By DAVID LAUTER and JOHN BRODER, TIMES STAFF WRITERS

DATELINE: OAKLAND

 BODY:
   Making his first public comments on Gov. Pete Wilson's calls for
fundamental
changes in the nation's immigration policies, President  Clinton  said
Thursday
that he "sympathizes" with Wilson's concerns about the impact illegal
immigration is having on California "but I believe we ought to take a
different
tack."

   The federal government must toughen its enforcement of immigration laws,
 Clinton  said, adding that his Administration is examining the feasibility
of
creating a tamper-proof national identity  card  which would be aimed, in
part,
at preventing illegal immigrants from taking advantage of government benefit
programs, something Wilson also has advocated.

   Civil liberties groups have strongly opposed similar plans in the past.
 Clinton  said, however, that he now believes the idea "ought to be
examined."

   But, he said, "I don't think we should change the Constitution," as
Wilson
has suggested, to deny citizenship for children born here to parents who are
in
the country illegally.

   In addition,  Clinton  said, he disagrees with Wilson's suggestions to
shut
off emergency medical treatment for illegal immigrants. Such a policy, he
suggested, would create more problems than it solves. He noted, for example,
that "it is probably very much in everyone else's interest" to provide
medical
care to treat people who have communicable diseases.

   Moreover, he added, "none of us would tolerate just letting people die on
the
street if it came to that."

    Clinton's  statements, in an interview with The Times on Air Force One
as he
traveled here after meeting with Pope John Paul II in Denver, marked his
most
extensive public discussion so far of future policy options on immigration
-- an
issue that White House advisers say they believe could become one of the
most
politically difficult for his presidency.

   His mention of a tamper-proof identification  card  was the first
suggestion
of a potentially far-reaching policy change.

   Groups advocating greater control of illegal immigration long have argued
that the flourishing market in phony documents allows widespread fraudulent
access to welfare and other government benefit programs.

   But civil liberties groups, along with many conservatives, have joined
forces
over the years to block any action toward developing a tamper-proof
identification  card,  arguing that it potentially would give the government
far
too much control over individuals and likening such  cards  to the internal
passports once required in the former Soviet Union.

    Clinton  acknowledged those arguments. "I know that a lot of the
immigration
groups and advocates have said that any kind of identification  card  like
that
sort of smacks of Big Brotherism," he said.

   But, he continued, he believes that the idea should be examined and that
it
is under discussion as part of the health care reform effort being headed by
First Lady Hillary Rodham  Clinton. 

   Health care task force aides have discussed the likelihood that a reform
program would provide all Americans with "health security"  cards  that
would
guarantee health benefits to all. But so far, they have not widely discussed
the
possibility that such a concept would be linked with the more controversial
issue of a tamper-proof identification  card. 

   Both in the interview and in his past statements on immigration,  Clinton

has tried to toe a careful line -- advocating a tougher set of policies to
handle illegal immigration while assuring the Democratic Party's base of
voters
in minority communities that he remains committed to continuing legal
immigration and the cultural diversity it brings.

   Over the long term,  Clinton  said, he continues to hope that the
proposed
North American Free Trade Agreement with Mexico and Canada will reduce
immigration pressure by improving the standard of living in Mexico and by
improving development in that country so that fewer people feel compelled to
migrate to the maquiladora zone near the U.S. border, where American-owned
factories offer employment.

   In the shorter term, the only way to avoid having the immigration debate
damage the nation's social fabric,  Clinton  argued, is for the government
to
begin demonstrating to citizens that it is taking real action to enforce the
nation's immigration laws.

   If the government can achieve that, he said, politicians will find that
"the
rhetoric of calling for more extreme solutions may be of limited usefulness"
to
them.

   On the other hand, he warned, if the government is unable to "show some
more
discipline" in its control of illegal immigration, "I'm afraid the genie out
of
the bottle will be passion to shut off legal immigration.

   "This country has greatly benefited from its immigrants for 200 years,"
 Clinton  said, and should not allow "aversion to illegal immigration" to
create
an "aversion to legal immigration."

   California, in particular, will continue to benefit from its large
immigrant
population, he predicted.

   "There's no question that California will have a rebound," he said, once
the
state's huge defense and aerospace industries complete the economically
painful
shrinkage brought on by the end of the Cold War.

   Once that rebound begins, the President argued, the state will benefit by
"being able to interface with more societies" in Asia and Latin America by
virtue of its immigrant population.

   But while he has been careful to praise legal immigration,  Clinton  has
been
eager to portray his Administration as having "taken a much more aggressive
posture on (illegal immigration)" than his predecessors did.

    Clinton  noted, for example, that his budget included additional money
to
strengthen the Border Patrol and to help California cope with the impact of
large numbers of illegal immigrants.

   Although several border states are facing major immigration-related
problems,
California clearly "is getting the biggest hit," he said.

   The President also pointed to his announcement earlier this summer of
steps
to control smuggling of illegal immigrants into the country by boat and to
revamp the nation's troubled system for judging requests for asylum.







From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: remail@tamsun.tamu.edu
Date: Tue, 17 Aug 93 15:15:24 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: `Stalled' Progress
Message-ID: <9308172215.AA18632@tamsun.tamu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


At  2:36 AM 8/16/93 +0000, an12070@anon.penet.fi wrote:
>building up all these things on student accounts is
>commendable but a foundation of quicksand in the long run. 

Quicksand is fine if you use pontoons. We *are* a guerrilla operation,
aren't we? Let me pay homage to those who have endured the risk of offering
their student accounts for use as remailers, etc. We need more like you. I
could get some bootleg student accounts, but I think the annoyance factor
might outweigh the benefit of more resouces. And, as my anonymous posting
implies, I'm not entirely sure I want to be out of the closet as a
cypherpunk yet.

>rumor has it
>even soda.berkeley.edu ftp site (perhaps the most critical cypherpunk
>element other than the mailing list) is being run off a student
>account. 

This is indeed our great vulnerable point. We should attempt to
decentralize it (at least have more backup). UNIX gurus- if I put PGP in my
home directory, how do I make it available netwide? Does my sysadmin

Another possibility - spring some real cash and get cycles and ftp support
on netcom or something like it. How much would it cost?

Is it cycles, space and access we need, money, or just someone to take charge?

Once we got digital cash working, things have a better chance to become
self-supporting and less at the mercy of university system administrators.

How difficult would it be to get some resources (cycles, disk space, code)
from Chaum's company Digicash? We could do an academic research project
studying the feasibility of trade over internet, funded primarily by
in-kind donations. Can we piggy-back on the netcash effort? 

>* the `i thought you were doing that' factor. 

Is this really a problem? I'm always pleasantly surprised when something
gets done, even if I'm working on it.
>
>* to a large degree, despite the commandment `cypherpunks write code',
>the `cypherpunks' have always gained their cohesion more from political
>ideology than implementing tangible systems. 

I don't know about anyone else, but the tangibility did it for me. I used
to be fatalistic about privacy etc. The tangible achievements of the
cypherpunks have given me hope that there *is* a soft underbelly on that
beast. Not that ideology isn't fun!





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: M..Stirner@f28.n125.z1.FIDONET.ORG (M. Stirner)
Date: Wed, 18 Aug 93 20:20:44 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Anon: remailer list
Message-ID: <1930.2C718751@shelter.FIDONET.ORG>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



 * Reply to msg originally in CYPHERPUNKS

 Uu> Q1: What cypherpunk remailers exist?

 Uu> 1: nowhere@bsu-cs.bsu.edu
 Uu> 2: hh@cicada.berkeley.edu
 Uu> 3: hh@pmantis.berkeley.edu
 Uu> 4: hh@soda.berkeley.edu
 Uu> 5: 00x@uclink.berkeley.edu
 Uu> 6: hal@alumni.caltech.edu
 Uu> 7: ebrandt@jarthur.claremont.edu
 Uu> 8: remailer@rebma.mn.org
 Uu> 9: elee7h5@rosebud.ee.uh.edu
 Uu> 10: hfinney@shell.portal.com
 Uu> 11: remail@tamsun.tamu.edu
 Uu> 12: remail@tamaix.tamu.edu
 Uu> 13: remailer@utter.dis.org
 Uu> 14: remailer@entropy.linet.org
 Uu> 15: remail@extropia.wimsey.com

OK.  It seems that remail@extropia.wimsey.com (#15) is down.  This is a
shame, as it was the _only_ remailer that would function as an anonymous
remailer for me.  It worked beautifully while it was up.  Its apparent
demise has been reported by other users as well,
.   Several of the remailers listed (2,3,4,5) have _never_ worked using
standard cypherpunks syntax:

::
Request-Remailing-To:

.   All other cypherpunks remailers, reliable or not, retain the footer
addresses automagically inserted by the host box here & are therefore
not in any way anonymous for my purposes.  There was a discussion of a
"cut line" syntax before I temporarily lost access to cypherpunks, but
as far as I know there was never any agreement or implementation (I
shall be pleased to be corrected if this is not the case).
.   Penet.fi will no longer work for me since the forced-password
implementation due to an apparent header conflict with the
X-Anon-Password: line & local host/gate software.
.   Why am I depressed?
.   ~
.   M.

*********************************************************************
* <m..stirner@f28.n125.z1.fidonet.org> - PGP Key D30909 via servers *
* > What country can preserve its liberties if its rulers are not  <*
* > warned from time to time that their people preserve the spirit <*
* > of resistance?  Let them take arms!" - Thomas Jefferson, 1787  <*
*********************************************************************

... Organization: Concerned Norwegians Against Lutefisk, S.F., CA
___ Blue Wave/QWK v2.12
--  
M. Stirner - via FidoNet node 1:125/1
UUCP: ...!uunet!kumr!shelter!28!M..Stirner
INTERNET: M..Stirner@f28.n125.z1.FIDONET.ORG




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "L. Detweiler" <ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Date: Tue, 17 Aug 93 17:20:28 PDT
To: "T. William Wells" <bill@twwells.com>
Subject: encrypted anonymous traffic
Message-ID: <9308180018.AA08773@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Mr. Wells:

I strongly am against your policy of prohibiting encrypted traffic
through your server, and your apparent monitoring of existing plaintext
information. I believe you should make this severe & oppressive
restriction (the former) and breach of privacy, confidentiality, and
trust (the latter) clear in your introductory statements to your
server. While providing this service of anonymity is commendable, it is
worthless without minimum levels of functionality and assurance, and
IMHO outlawing encrypted traffic is bordering on that line.

You `defuse' J. Helsingius's suggestion of comparing your service with
the post office by comparing it with the exchange of bombs in parcels,
saying that `analogies are slippery'. Indeed, you have slipped out of
this one and away from the crucial point. No one can send any `bomb'
through mere text, and to compare harassing mail (which is definitely
not to be condoned) to it is to expose your naive and self-serving view
of the matter.

I have a theory that one major motivation toward running such a server
is a somewhat paternalistic desire to `monitor' traffic through one's
server to one's `family'. Far better to do this with your own family
than through a public service, where it is inappropriate, deplorable,
and voyeristic.  That you arbitrarily restrict traffic to that which
you can read is a rather embarrassing indictment of your intentions,
despite your lame protestations that just the `capability' is relevant.
Anonymity and encryption are as interlinked as two sides of a hand. Who
are you to shear one half away?

Sincerely,
L. Detweiler




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: cme@ellisun.sw.stratus.com (Carl Ellison)
Date: Tue, 17 Aug 93 15:30:25 PDT
To: Dave Banisar <banisar@washofc.cpsr.org>
Subject: Re: Call for Clipper Comments
In-Reply-To: <00541.2828442468.4792@washofc.cpsr.org>
Message-ID: <9308171826.ZM27196@ellisun.sw.stratus.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I would/will add to your list of things to cite:

1.	the gov't has never had a right to citizens' keys and citizens
	have always had strong cryptography -- so this sets a terrible
	precedent, even if it's voluntary;

2.	cyberspace should benefit from the same rights as physical space
	-- i.e., the right to assemble and converse in private;

3.	secrecy around the key generation procedure is totally unnecessary.
	Keys should be generated as totally random numbers.  The secrecy
	strongly suggests that the NSA intends to bypass the escrow mechanism,
	for example by having a secret function map from chip serial number to
	its secret key;

4.	the justification for this effort was citizens' need for security
	in cellular and wireless calls while retaining the FBI's ability to
	wiretap.  A superior engineering solution exists and doesn't carry
	the civil liberties infringements:  to encrypt normally (e.g., with
	double DES) the broadcast portion of a cellular or wireless call,
	but leave the call in the clear over phone lines.  Why did the
	government not encourage this solution?

 - Carl




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: lazylion@netcom.com (Ben Weiss)
Date: Tue, 17 Aug 93 18:35:28 PDT
To: "L. Detweiler" <ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Subject: Re: encrypted anonymous traffic
Message-ID: <9308180134.AA23404@netcom.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Hmm.  Very interesting.  I observe two not completely diametrically opposed
viewpoints here.  Consider:

On one hand, there has been a lot of (IMHO government generated) hype
lately about the very real possibility of justice department "legal"
reprisals against individuals running what I consider to be common carrier
messaging services (BBS's, remailers, hosts, etc.) based on the content of
messages passing through those services (porn GIF's, etc).

While it is clear to me that in this environment of obvious government
oppression of expression through terror tactics against common carriers, it
is certainly true that a responsible indvidual in this environment must do
what they think is appropriate to protect themselves from government
harassment.  We are not all in situations where we can be arrested and
thrown in jail (even for an appropriate cause) and simply ignore
responsibilities to loved ones and employees (or even customers) who may be
relying on us to provide for them.

Each of us must make an individual choice weather and how much to fight the
oppressive atmosphere by refusing to subscribe to the justice department's
hillarious misreading of the Bill of Rights.

It behooves us all to respect the positions of those who for whatever
reason do not wish to put themselves in further danger by taking the firm
stand that we all know is appropriate against these government hoodlums.

I support and respect the right of any concered operator of a BBS, host or
anonomous remailer to responsibly (and concentually!) refraim from entering
this battle.  While it is true that I believe that it does further slightly
damage our cause, it is a necessary evil to support the wishes of others.

It is, of course, necessary, to completely disclose policies like this to
all perspective users (within reason) and it would be most convinient for
those users if an actual policy were developped and published, but I can
see that since we are in a state of controversy about this very issue, any
attempt to define what is or is not appropriate will always be met with
great discontent (probably on both sides :))

Live & Let Live (but INFORM!)

"Just Say KNno!"

<Insert whitty remark here>
          --- Ben D. Weiss ---        
Packet Radio: WB5QAL@N6EEG.#NOCAL.CA.US
Internet: LazyLion@Netcom.com
Telephone: (510) 841-5709
---------------------------------------  





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: gnu (John Gilmore)
Date: Tue, 17 Aug 93 18:45:28 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: [DEC] U.S. Computer May Have Violated Export Regulations
Message-ID: <9308180142.AA11306@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


a0600
r abx
^U.S. Computer May Have Violated Export Regulations<
^By PAUL RAEBURN=
^AP Science Editor=
	NEW YORK (AP) _ The Digital Equipment Corp. abruptly pulled
two powerful new computers off a global computer network out of concerns
about possible export violations, even though the computers never left
the country.
	The result of Digital's action was to deny U.S. computer users
access to U.S. computers operating in the United States.
	Critics said the episode demonstrates how export laws intended
to regulate weapons technology are not only infringing on American
civil liberties but also stifling innovation and hurting American
businesses.
	Digital said its concern was that foreigners could connect to
the computers from abroad, generate data, and illegally export it over
the Internet computer network, which carries data and electronic mail
around the world.
	The computers were reconnected to the computer network on July 7,
but access is now limited to people who are screened by the company,
Mark Fredrickson, a Digital spokesman, said Friday.
	The computers are not what industry would call supercomputers, but
they do fit the government definition of a supercomputer.
	A former Commerce Department official who is now a trade consultant
in Washington said the connection of a supercomputer to a global network
could lead to violations of federal export regulations.
	``If it was available overseas and they allowed people overseas to
use it, then technically they were allowing access to a supercomputer to
people they didn't know,'' said Paul Freedenberg, who was the
Commerce Department's undersecretary for export administration at the end of
the Reagan administration.
	Freedenberg is an international trade consultant at Baker and Botts
in Washington, the law firm of former Secretary of State James Baker.
	He emphasized that he had no personal knowledge of the Digital
computer hookup and that he was speaking of the regulations generally. ``I
can't say Digital violated the law, because I don't know what Digital did,''
he said.
	Lee Mercer, Digital's corporate export manager, said making
the computer available was not a violation. A Commerce Department
official, speaking on condition his name not be used, agreed that making the
computer available was not a violation, but that export of data generated on
the computer would be a violation of regulations.
	The computer hookup was in place for five weeks in April and May,
said Fredrickson. It was intended to give potential customers the
opportunity to test-drive the computers. It was terminated by company
executives who wanted to avoid any appearance of violating export
regulations, he said.
	``None of this has been motivated by anyone from the
government suggesting that we do anything here,'' said Fredrickson. ``This
was simply our own internal people raising the possibility of concern.''
	In a separate incident last year, a Digital computer
``bulletin board,'' offered access to programs for encoding computer data.
	Exporting such software is a violation of federal
regulations, Freedenberg said. ``It's a technical data transfer'' that falls
under the State Department's control of munitions export, he said.
	Frederickson said the company shut the bulletin board down to
ensure that the software would not be exported illegally. ``Nothing was
found that was thought to be a concern even meriting informing the
government about it,'' he said.
	Digital, the nation's No. 2 computer maker after IBM, said that
65 percent of its $14 billion in annual sales are overseas. In December
1991, the Commerce Department charged the company with 62 violations of
export laws and fined it $2.4 million.
	It was the largest fine the department had imposed for
export violations. Digital agreed to pay it without admitting or denying
guilt.
	The Digital computers connected to the network were two of
Digital's new AXP 4000 computers, operating in a Digital laboratory in Palo
Alto, Calif. The computers, which cost from $77,000 to $100,000, are
considered midsized computers by industry standards.
	Freedenberg said that the government would probably soon revise
its outmoded standards that define those models as supercomputers and
bring them under export regulations.
	Robert Kaylor, a spokesman for the Commerce Department, said
the department was prohibited by law from discussing the details of a
specific case.
	Critics called for speedy revision of the export laws, which date
from the Cold War.
	``Export control policies are shutting us directly out of
certain markets,'' costing U.S. businesses at least $10 billion a year in
lost exports, said Howard Lewis, vice president of the National Association
of Manufacturers.
	``It's harmful to innovation, but we think it's also very harmful
to the privacy interests of American citizens,'' said Daniel Weitzner,
an attorney with the Electronic Frontier Foundation, a group concerned
with computers and civil-liberties issues.





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Perry E. Metzger" <pmetzger@lehman.com>
Date: Tue, 17 Aug 93 16:05:27 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: `Stalled' Progress
In-Reply-To: <9308172215.AA18632@tamsun.tamu.edu>
Message-ID: <9308172302.AA14826@snark.lehman.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



remail@tamsun.tamu.edu says:
> At  2:36 AM 8/16/93 +0000, an12070@anon.penet.fi wrote:
> >building up all these things on student accounts is
> >commendable but a foundation of quicksand in the long run. 
> 
> Quicksand is fine if you use pontoons. We *are* a guerrilla operation,
> aren't we?

I dunno about you, but I'm mainstream. Privacy is for everyone. The
more we treat ourselves as people doing things that are shady, the
more we will be treated as shady. Nothing we are doing is illegal --
why must we then slink in shadows?

This list includes some of the world's foremost experts in
cryptography, as well as lots of perfectly solid citizens. I say we
wait until we are driven underground to pretend that we are
underground.

If we act as though we are shady, we will only make it easier to
repress us.

Perry




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: T. William Wells <bill@twwells.com>
Date: Tue, 17 Aug 93 19:05:29 PDT
To: ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu (L. Detweiler)
Subject: Re: encrypted anonymous traffic
In-Reply-To: <9308180018.AA08773@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Message-ID: <9308172101.AA16930@twwells.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I have better things to do with my time than deal with abusive
messages. If you have something you would like me to consider,
you will, first, remove all personal remarks from your message,
and, second, you will refrain from rhetoric and give me reasons.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: fergp@sytex.com (Paul Ferguson)
Date: Tue, 17 Aug 93 18:55:28 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: NIST call for Comments on "Key-Escrow" (fwd)
Message-ID: <qeeg9B1w165w@sytex.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


From: Dave Banisar <uunet!washofc.cpsr.org!banisar>
Date: Tue, 17 Aug 1993 14:23:16 EST    
Subject: Call for Clipper Comments 
 
  Call for Clipper Comments
 
The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) has 
issued a request for public comments on its proposal to establish 
the "Skipjack" key-escrow system as a Federal Information 
Processing Standard (FIPS).  The deadline for the submission of 
comments is September 28, 1993.  The full text of the NIST notice 
follows.
 
CPSR is urging all interested individuals and organizations to 
express their views on the proposal and to submit comments 
directly to NIST.  Comments need not be lengthy or very detailed; 
all thoughtful statements addressing a particular concern will 
likely contribute to NIST's evaluation of the key-escrow proposal.  
 
The following points could be raised about the NIST proposal
(additional materials on Clipper and the key escrow proposal may 
be found at the CPSR ftp site, cpsr.org):
 
* The potential risks of the proposal have not been assessed and 
many questions about the implementation remain unanswered.  The 
NIST notice states that the current proposal "does not include 
identification of key escrow agents who will hold the keys for the 
key escrow microcircuits or the procedures for access to the 
keys."  The key escrow configuration may also create a dangerous 
vulnerability in a communications network.  The risks of misuse of 
this feature should be weighed against any perceived benefit.
 
* The classification of the Skipjack algorithm as a "national 
security" matter is inappropriate for technology that will be used 
primarily in civilian and commercial applications.  Classification 
of technical information also limits the computing community's 
ability to evaluate fully the proposal and the general public's 
right to know about the activities of government.
 
* The proposal was not developed in response to a public concern 
or a business request.  It was put forward by the National 
Security Agency and the Federal Bureau of Investigation so that 
these two agencies could continue surveillance of electronic 
communications. It has not been established that is necessary for 
crime prevention.  The number of arrests resulting from wiretaps 
has remained essentially unchanged since the federal wiretap law 
was enacted in 1968.
 
* The NIST proposal states that the escrow agents will provide the 
key components to a government agency that "properly demonstrates 
legal authorization to conduct electronic surveillance of 
communications which are encrypted."  The crucial term "legal 
authorization" has not been defined.  The vagueness of the term 
"legal authorization" leaves open the possibility that court-
issued warrants may not be required in some circumstances.  This 
issue must be squarely addressed and clarified. 
 
* Adoption of the proposed key escrow standard may have an adverse 
impact upon the ability of U.S. manufacturers to market 
cryptographic products abroad.  It is unlikely that non-U.S. users 
would purchase communication security products to which the U.S. 
government holds keys.
 
 
Comments on the NIST proposal should be sent to:
 
Director, Computer Systems Laboratory
ATTN: Proposed FIPS for Escrowed Encryption Standard
Technology Building, Room B-154
National Institute of Standards and Technology
Gaithersburg, MD 20899
 
Submissions must be received by September 28, 1993.  CPSR has 
asked NIST that provisions be made to allow for electronic 
submission of comments.
 
Please also send copies of your comments on the key escrow 
proposal to CPSR for inclusion in the CPSR Internet Library, our 
ftp site.  Copies should be sent to <clipper@washofc.cpsr.org>.
 
 
 
================================================================= 
 
                         FEDERAL REGISTER
                         VOL. 58, No. 145
 
                     DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE (DOC)
        National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST)
 
                     Docket No. 930659-3159
                         RIN 0693-AB19
 
A Proposed Federal Information Processing Standard for an Escrowed 
Encryption Standard (EES)
 
                        58 FR 40791
 
                     Friday, July 30, 1993
 
Notice; request for comments.
 
SUMMARY: A Federal Information Processing Standard (FIPS) for an 
Escrowed Encryption Standard (EES) is being proposed. This 
proposed standard specifies use of a symmetric-key 
encryption/decryption algorithm and a key escrowing method which 
are to be implemented in electronic devices and used for 
protecting certain unclassified government communications when 
such protection is required. The algorithm and the key escrowing 
method are classified and are referenced, but not specified, in 
the standard.
 
   This proposed standard adopts encryption technology developed 
by the Federal government to provide strong protection for 
unclassified information and to enable the keys used in the 
encryption and decryption processes to be escrowed. This latter 
feature will assist law enforcement and other government agencies, 
under the proper legal authority, in the collection and decryption 
of electronically transmitted information. This proposed standard 
does not include identification of  key escrow  agents who will 
hold the keys for the  key escrow  microcircuits or the procedures 
for access to the keys. These issues will be addressed by the 
Department of Justice.
 
   The purpose of this notice is to solicit views from the public, 
manufacturers, and Federal, state, and local government users so 
that their needs can be considered prior to submission of this 
proposed standard to the Secretary of Commerce for review and 
approval.
 
   The proposed standard contains two sections: (1) An 
announcement section, which provides information concerning the 
applicability, implementation, and maintenance of the standard; 
and (2) a specifications section which deals with the technical 
aspects of the standard. Both sections are provided in this 
notice.
 
 
DATES: Comments on this proposed standard must be received on or 
before September 28, 1993.
 
 
ADDRESSES: Written comments concerning the proposed standard 
should be sent to: Director, Computer Systems Laboratory, ATTN: 
Proposed FIPS for Escrowed Encryption Standard, Technology 
Building, room B-154, National Institute of Standards and 
Technology, Gaithersburg, MD 20899.
 
   Written comments received in response to this notice will be 
made part of the public record and will be made available for 
inspection and copying in the Central Reference and Records 
Inspection Facility, room 6020, Herbert C. Hoover Building, 14th 
Street between Pennsylvania and Constitution Avenues, NW., 
Washington, DC 20230.
 
 
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Dr. Dennis Branstad, National 
Institute of Standards and Technology, Gaithersburg, MD 20899, 
telephone (301) 975-2913.
 
 
   SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: This proposed FIPS implements the 
initiative announced by the White House Office of the Press 
Secretary on April 16, 1993. The President of the U.S. approved a 
Public Encryption Management directive, which among other actions, 
called for standards to facilitate the procurement and use of 
encryption devices fitted with  key-escrow  microcircuits in 
Federal communication systems that process sensitive, but 
unclassified information.
 
   Dated: July 26, 1993.
 
 Arati Prabhakar,
 Director.(NIST)
 
 
----------------------------------------------------
 Federal Information Processing Standards Publication XX
 1993 XX
 Announcing the Escrowed Encryption Standard (EES)
 
   Federal Information Processing Standards Publications (FIPS 
PUBS) are issued by the National Institute of Standards and 
Technology (NIST) after approval by the Secretary of Commerce 
pursuant to section 111(d) of the Federal Property and 
Administrative Services Act of 1949 as amended by the Computer 
Security Act of 1987, Public Law 100-235.
 
 Name of Standard: Escrowed Encryption Standard (EES).
 
 Category of Standard: Telecommunications Security.
 
 Explanation: This Standard specifies use of a symmetric-key 
encryption (and decryption) algorithm and a Law Enforcement Access 
Field (LEAF) creation method (one part of a  key escrow  system) 
which provide for decryption of encrypted telecommunications when 
interception of the telecommunications is lawfully authorized. 
Both the algorithm and the LEAF creation method are to be 
implemented in electronic devices (e.g., very large scale 
integration chips). The devices may be incorporated in security 
equipment used to encrypt (and decrypt) sensitive unclassified 
telecommunications data. Decryption of lawfully intercepted 
telecommunications may be achieved through the acquisition and use 
of the LEAF, the decryption algorithm and escrowed key components.
 
   To escrow something (e.g., a document, an encryption key) means 
that it is "delivered to a third person to be given to the grantee 
only upon the fulfillment of a condition" (Webster's Seventh New 
Collegiate Dictionary). A key escrow  system is one that entrusts 
components of a key used to encrypt telecommunications to third 
persons, called key component escrow agents. In accordance with 
the common definition of "escrow", the key component escrow agents 
provide the key components to a "grantee" (i.e., a government 
agency) only upon fulfillment of the condition that the grantee 
properly demonstrates legal authorization to conduct electronic 
surveillance of communications which are encrypted using the 
specific device whose key component is requested. The key 
components obtained through this process are then used by the 
grantee to reconstruct the device unique key and obtain the 
session key (contained in the LEAF) which is used to decrypt the 
telecommunications that are encrypted with that device. The term, 
"escrow", for purposes of this standard, is restricted to the 
dictionary definition.
 
   The encryption/decryption algorithm has been approved for 
government applications requiring encryption of sensitive 
unclassified telecommunications of data as defined herein. The 
specific operations of the algorithm and the LEAF creation method 
are classified and hence are referenced, but not specified, in 
this standard.
 
   Data, for purposes of this standard, includes voice, facsimile 
and computer information communicated in a telephone system. 
Telephone system, for purposes of this standard, is limited to 
systems circuit-switched up to no more than 14.4 kbs or which use 
basic-rate ISDN, or to a similar grade wireless service.
 
   Data that is considered sensitive by a responsible authority 
should be encrypted if it is vulnerable to unauthorized disclosure 
during telecommunications. A risk analysis should be performed 
under the direction of a responsible authority to determine 
potential threats and risks. The costs of providing encryption 
using this standard as well as alternative methods and their 
respective costs should be projected. A responsible authority 
should then make a decision, based on the risk and cost analyses, 
whether or not to use encryption and then whether or not to use 
this standard.
 
 Approving Authority: Secretary of Commerce.
 
 Maintenance Agency: Department of Commerce, National Institute of 
Standards and Technology.
 
 Applicability: This standard is applicable to all Federal 
departments and agencies and their contractors under the 
conditions specified below. This standard may be used in designing 
and implementing security products and systems which Federal 
departments and agencies use or operate or which are operated for 
them under contract. These products may be used when replacing 
Type II and Type III (DES) encryption devices and products owned 
by the government and government contractors.
 
   This standard may be used when the following conditions apply:
 
   1. An authorized official or manager responsible for data 
security or the security of a computer system decides that 
encryption is required and cost justified as per OMB Circular A-
130; and
 
   2. The data is not classified according to the National 
Security Act of 1947, as amended, or the Atomic Energy Act of 
1954, as amended.
 
   However, Federal departments or agencies which use encryption 
devices for protecting data that is classified according to either 
of these acts may use those devices also for protecting 
unclassified data in lieu of this standard.
 
   In addition, this standard may be adopted and used by non-
Federal Government organizations. Such use is encouraged when it 
provides the desired security.
 
Applications: Devices conforming to this standard may be used for 
protecting unclassified communications.
 
 Implementations: The encryption/decryption algorithm and the LEAF 
creation method shall be implemented in electronic devices (e.g., 
electronic chip packages) that can be physically protected against 
unauthorized entry, modification and reverse engineering. 
Implementations which are tested and validated by NIST will be 
considered as complying with this standard. An electronic device 
shall be incorporated into a cyptographic module in accordance 
with FIPS 140-1. NIST will test for conformance with FIPS 140-1. 
Cryptographic modules can then be integrated into security 
equipment for sale and use in an application. Information about 
devices that have been validated, procedures for testing equipment 
for conformance with NIST standards, and information about 
obtaining approval of security equipment are available from the 
Computer Systems Laboratory, NIST, Gaithersburg, MD 20899.
 
 Export Control: Implementations of this standard are subject to 
Federal Government export controls as specified in title 22, Code 
of Federal Regulations, parts 120 through 131 (International 
Traffic of Arms Regulations -ITAR). Exporters of encryption 
devices, equipment and technical data are advised to contact the 
U.S. Department of State, Office of Defense Trade Controls for 
more information.   Patents: Implementations of this standard may 
be covered by U.S. and foreign patents.
 
 Implementation Schedule: This standard becomes effective thirty 
days following publication of this FIPS PUB.
 
 Specifications: Federal Information Processing Standard (FIPS 
XXX)(affixed).
 
 Cross Index:
 
   a. FIPS PUB 46-2, Data Encryption Standard.
 
   b. FIPS PUB 81, Modes of Operation of the DES
 
   c. FIPS PUB 140-1, Security Requirements for Cryptographic 
Modules.
 
 
 Glossary:
 
   The following terms are used as defined below for purposes of 
this standard:
 
   Data-Voice, facsimile and computer information communicated in 
a telephone system.
 
   Decryption-Conversion of ciphertext to plaintext through the 
use of a cryptographic algorithm.
 
   Device (cryptographic)-An electronic implementation of the 
encryption/decryption algorithm and the LEAF creation method as 
specified in this standard.
 
   Digital data-Data that have been converted to a binary 
representation.
 
   Encryption-Conversion of plaintext to ciphertext through the 
use of a cryptographic algorithm.
 
   Key components-The values from which a key can be derived 
(e.g., KU sub 1 + KU sub 2).
 
   Key escrow -A process involving transferring one or more 
components of a cryptographic key to one or more trusted key 
component escrow agents for storage and later use by government 
agencies to decrypt ciphertext if access to the plaintext is 
lawfully authorized.
 
   LEAF Creation Method 1-A part of a  key escrow  system that is 
implemented in a cryptographic device and creates a Law 
Enforcement Access Field.
 
   Type I cryptography-A cryptographic algorithm or device 
approved by the National Security Agency for protecting classified 
information.
 
   Type II cryptography-A cryptographic algorithm or device 
approved by the National Security Agency for protecting sensitive 
unclassified information in systems as specified in section 2315 
of Title 10 United State Code, or section 3502(2) of Title 44, 
United States Code.
 
   Type III cryptography-A cryptographic algorithm or device 
approved as a Federal Information Processing Standard.
 
   Type III(E) cryptography-A Type III algorithm or device that is 
approved for export from the United States.
 
 Qualifications. The protection provided by a security product or 
system is dependent on several factors. The protection provided by 
this standard against key search attacks is greater than that 
provided by the DES (e.g., the cryptographic key is longer). 
However, provisions of this standard are intended to ensure that 
information encrypted through use of devices implementing this 
standard can be decrypted by a legally authorized entity.
 
 Where to Obtain Copies of the Standard: Copies of this 
publication are for sale by the National Technical Information 
Service, U.S. Department of Commerce, Springfield, VA 22161. When 
ordering, refer to Federal Information Processing Standards 
Publication XX (FIPS PUB XX), and identify the title. When 
microfiche is desired, this should be specified. Prices are 
published by NTIS in current catalogs and other issuances. Payment 
may be made by check, money order, deposit account or charged to a 
credit card accepted by NTIS.
 Specifications for the Escrowed Encryption Standard
 
 
 1. Introduction
 
   This publication specifies Escrowed Encryption Standard (EES) 
functions and parameters.
 
 
 2. General
 
   This standard specifies use of the SKIPJACK cryptographic 
algorithm and the LEAF Creation Method 1 (LCM-1) to be implemented 
in an approved electronic device (e.g., a very large scale 
integration electronic chip). The device is contained in a logical 
cryptographic module which is then integrated in a security 
product for encrypting and decrypting telecommunications.
 
   Approved implementations may be procured by authorized 
organizations for integration into security equipment. Devices 
must be tested and validated by NIST for conformance to this 
standard. Cryptographic modules must be tested and validated by 
NIST for conformance to FIPS 140-1.
 
 
 3. Algorithm Specifications
 
   The specifications of the encryption/decryption algorithm 
(SKIPJACK) and the LEAF Creation Method 1 (LCM-1) are classified. 
The National Security Agency maintains these classified 
specifications and approves the manufacture of devices which 
implement the specifications. NIST tests for conformance of the 
devices implementing this standard in cryptographic modules to 
FIPS 140-1 and FIPS 81.
 
 
 4. Functions and Parameters
 
 
 4.1 Functions
 
   The following functions, at a minimum, shall be implemented:
 
   1. Data Encryption: A session key (80 bits) shall be used to 
encrypt plaintext information in one or more of the following 
modes of operation as specified in FIPS 81: ECB, CBC, OFB (64) CFB 
(1, 8, 16, 32, 64).
 
   2. Data Decryption: The session key (80 bits) used to encrypt 
the data shall be used to decrypt resulting ciphertext to obtain 
the data.
 
   3.  Key Escrow:  The Family Key (KF) shall be used to create 
the Law Enforcement Access Field (LEAF) in accordance with the 
LEAF Creation Method 1 (LCM-1). The Session Key shall be encrypted 
with the Device Unique Key and transmitted as part of the LEAF. 
The security equipment shall ensure that the LEAF is transmitted 
in such a manner that the LEAF and ciphertext may be decrypted 
with legal authorization. No additional encryption or modification 
of the LEAF is permitted.
 
 
 4.2 Parameters
 
   The following parameters shall be used in performing the 
prescribed functions:
 
   1. Device Identifier (DID): The identifier unique to a 
particular device and used by the  Key Escrow  System.
 
   2. Device Unique Key (KU): The cryptographic key unique to a 
particular device and used by the  Key Escrow  System.
 
   3. Cryptographic Protocol Field (CPF): The field identifying 
the registered cryptographic protocol used by a particular 
application and used by the  Key Escrow  System (reserved for 
future specification and use).
 
   4. Escrow Authenticator (EA): A binary pattern that is inserted 
in the LEAF to ensure that the LEAF is transmitted and received 
properly and has not been modified, deleted or replaced in an 
unauthorized manner.
 
   5. Initialization Vector (IV): A mode and application dependent 
vector of bytes used to initialize, synchronize and verify the 
encryption, decryption and key escrow  functions.
 
   6. Family Key (KF): The cryptographic key stored in all devices 
designated as a family that is used to create the LEAF.
 
   7. Session Key (KS): The cryptographic key used by a device to 
encrypt and decrypt data during a session. 
 
   8. Law Enforcement Access Field (LEAF): The field containing 
the encrypted session key and the device identifier and the escrow 
authenticator.
 
 
 5. Implementation
 
   The Cryptographic Algorithm and the LEAF Creation Method shall 
be implemented in an electronic device (e.g., VLSI chip) which is 
highly resistant to reverse engineering (destructive or non-
destructive) to obtain or modify the cryptographic algorithms, the 
DID, the KF, the KU, the EA, the CPF, the operational KS, or any 
other security or  Key Escrow  System relevant information. The 
device shall be able to be programmed/personalized (i.e., made 
unique) after mass production in such a manner that the DID, KU 
(or its components), KF (or its components) and EA fixed pattern 
can be entered once (and only once) and maintained without 
external electrical power.
 
   The LEAF and the IV shall be transmitted with the ciphertext. 
The specifics of the protocols used to create and transmit the 
LEAF, IV, and encrypted data shall be registered and a CPF 
assigned. The CPF shall then be transmitted in accordance with the 
registered specifications.
 
   The specific electric, physical and logical interface will vary 
with the implementation. Each approved, registered implementation 
shall have an unclassified electrical, physical and logical 
interface specification sufficient for an equipment manufacturer 
to understand the general requirements for using the device. Some 
of the requirements may be classified and therefore would not be 
specified in the unclassified interface specification.
 

Paul Ferguson               |  "Government, even in its best state,
Network Integrator          |   is but a necessary evil; in its worst
Centreville, Virginia USA   |   state, an intolerable one."
fergp@sytex.com             |      - Thomas Paine, Common Sense
 
Type bits/keyID   Date       User ID
pub  1024/1CC04D 1993/03/15  Paul Ferguson <fergp@sytex.com>
  Key fingerprint =  EE D2 93 7D 04 6D C6 05  AC 36 AD 9D 8E 4F 41 58




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: hfinney@shell.portal.com
Date: Tue, 17 Aug 93 22:20:35 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: [ari@ISI.EDU: New paper on electronic currency]
Message-ID: <9308180434.AA05641@jobe.shell.portal.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I just ftp'd, printed, and read the paper which Derek mentioned:

  NetCash: A design for practical electronic currency on the Internet  
  by Gennady Medvinsky and Clifford Neuman

I didn't think it was any good.  They have an incredibly simplistic
model, and their "protocols" are of the order, A sends the bank some
paper money, and B sends A some electronic cash in return.

They don't even do blinding of the cash.  Each piece of cash has a
unique serial number which is known to the currency provider.  This would
of course allow matching of withdrawn and deposited coins.

"In particular, at the point that a client purchases coins from a
currency server by check, or cashes in coins, it is possible for the
currency server to record which coins have been issued to a particular
client.  It is expected that currency servers will not do so, and it
is likely that the agreement with clients will specifically preclude it."

Right.  It is expected that they will not do so.  I feel so much better now.

These guys seem to have read the work in the field (they reference it)
but they don't appear to have understood it.

Hal Finney
hfinney@shell.portal.com




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: hfinney@shell.portal.com
Date: Tue, 17 Aug 93 22:20:29 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Digital cash references
Message-ID: <9308180434.AA05658@jobe.shell.portal.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I got asked what would be good survey articles on digital cash.
Two good ones that are widely available are both by David Chaum:
Scientific American, August 1992, p. 96; and Communications of the ACM,
October 1985, p. 1030.

Unfortunately, neither of these really describes the mathematics,
instead discussing things in terms of analogies.  To get more details
you have to read the conference proceedings.  Many of the recent
Eurocrypt and Crypto conferences have discussed implementations of
digital cash.

Hal Finney
hfinney@shell.portal.com




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: nobody@eli-remailer
Date: Tue, 17 Aug 93 22:10:30 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Private legal tender
Message-ID: <9308180509.AA16775@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


A simpler variation on what was suggested would go like this:

Customer sends cash or money order to digital bank, along with a floppy
with an anonymous email address (via a remailer) and a public key.  The
bank emails the customer encrypted digital cash corresponding to the
amount he sent in (minus any service charges).  If Chaum blinding is
used, the needed data can be included on the floppy.  Alternatives to
sending a floppy would be for the customer to email the same information
when he mailed his money, including some secret information with both
which would tie them together.

Customers spend money using the appropriate protocols.

When a customer wants, he can send his digital cash to the bank to get
it exchanged for new digital cash; or he can include with the digital
cash instructions to tell the bank to mail a check or money order to
a specified address.  Here is where he could use a postal mail drop if
he doesn't want to reveal his own identity (assuming he is mailing to
himself); or he may request mailing to some other business which doesn't
accept digital cash but from which he wants to purchase something.

---------
Sugarplum
---------




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Marc Horowitz <marc@Athena.MIT.EDU>
Date: Tue, 17 Aug 93 19:15:28 PDT
To: "L. Detweiler" <ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Subject: Re: encrypted anonymous traffic
In-Reply-To: <9308180018.AA08773@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Message-ID: <9308180211.AA20152@snorkelwacker.MIT.EDU>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I have to disagree with Lance here.

>> No one can send any `bomb' through mere text, and to compare harassing
>> mail (which is definitely not to be condoned) to it is to expose your
>> naive and self-serving view of the matter.

I know people who would probably rather receive an explosive in the
mail than receive email from certain individuals, or about certain
subjects.  Physical damage can be easier to heal.  Your requirements
are not everyone's.

Although I believe myself that encryption and anonymity go
hand-in-hand, I can understand that some members of the community Mr.
Wells serves might not quite agree with me.  As long as he makes the
fact that he audits posts absolutely clear, beforehand, to his users,
I have no problem with what he does.  I am free to find a remailer
operator with less restrictive policies, and will do so.  

Cypherpunks have been talking about a free market where users choose
the anonymity services they like best.  I see no reason to berate Mr.
Wells about his policies.  Make sure he discloses his policies, and
let the users vote with their packets.  Enforcing a standard, any
standard, is a Very Bad Thing.

		Marc




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: nobody@indirect.com
Date: Tue, 17 Aug 93 23:10:30 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: NEW CP REMAILER
Message-ID: <9308180606.AA21851@indirect.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Well, after two days or so of missed mail and a lot of headache and missed
sleep, I think I've got this working ok. The remailer address is 
<cdodhner@indirect.com>, and so far it is a vanilla remailer, nothing 
special at all. I have not tested it with encrypted messages yet, the public
key, however, is below. Consider the remailer in 'test mode' for the next
few days, and if all goes well I'll turn off the logging etc. by the 25th.
Until then the remailer should be considered unsecured and all messages are 
subject to being inadvertantly read by myself in the process of debugging.
If it works as well as it looks like it works, at that point I will turn
off all logging, debugging, and archiveing, and generaly keep my nose out
of it.
Send any questions to me at cdodhner@indirect.com.

Happy Hunting, -Chris

-----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----
Version: 2.3a

mQCNAixwXwsAAAEEAMMN+Y9tRX5V/cYEroALiE/2pW1289kK9NCpPjaG+ExuNn0E
lJOX4l0Yy6wqNCW7J4ZJEeZ7OQPUaZ6Ig4KUm2O3D8stg+YEuGPvO3TCrEpQ4faf
lCZB6+qaalOyuyfGXIcgjQRl026KeYmMJkOGCcc4dFgKfp2tvJJSqYY5uHDxAAUR
tClpbmRpcmVjdCByZW1haWxlciA8Y2RvZGhuZXJAaW5kaXJlY3QuY29tPg==
=77gB
-----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: khijol!erc@apple.com (Ed Carp)
Date: Wed, 18 Aug 93 02:10:35 PDT
To: ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu (L. Detweiler)
Subject: Re: The Zen of Anonymity
In-Reply-To: <9308180735.AA14083@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Message-ID: <m0oSieK-00022JC@khijol>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text


> Given: Some graffiti is on the wall.
> 
> Question: who is `responsible' or `liable' for graffiti?
> 
> the `vandal' (or `artist')? the owner of the wall? society? What if no
> means exists whatsoever to identify the originator? or the owner of the
> wall actually *encourages* people to use it for whatever purpose? And
> socially beneficial uses ensue?

How about "A credit card number is on the wall..."?  Interesting discussion...
-- 
Ed Carp, N7EKG			erc@apple.com			510/659-9560
                            anon-2133@twwells.com
If you want magic, let go of your armor.  Magic is so much stronger than
steel!        -- Richard Bach, "The Bridge Across Forever"



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: jet@netcom.com (J. Eric Townsend)
Date: Tue, 17 Aug 93 18:30:28 PDT
To: CYPHERPUNKS <CYPHERPUNKS@toad.com>
Subject: Why cypherpunks are 'stalled', IMHO
Message-ID: <9308180128.AA22934@netcom.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



I just got a 15k mail message from one Dave Banisar that consisted of
wire news clippings, only one of which had anything even vaguely
related to cryptogrophy.

*This* is why pepole drop off the list so often.  (Or don't show up at
meetings, thinking they'll be as noisy?).  If it's just more of the
general computer geek/privacy/libertarian stuff all over again, the
same crud that flows in such volumes on the libertarian list, and a
couple of other lists I've had the misfortune to be on, people will go
away.  (In particular, evoting, pranks to prove points, general
ranting.)

Let's try a little self-restraint, perhaps?  Or take discussions
off-list, or to the appropriate list?  Maybe if the list were more
hard-core crypto (and less noisy), more people would be on the list,
and more research types might be willing to be on the list.
mp-render, the massively parallel rendering list, has high content,
low volume, and some of the top folks in the biz on the list available
for discussion.  I'm sure if myself and a few other starting going on
at length about how cool Pixar's juice-box commercial was, there'd be
a lot of people unsubscribing...

Luckly, I have a mailer that supports 'kill', so I can easily blast
through multiple rounds of whether evoting is the End of the World.
:-) But I've worked with plenty of researchers (and been in the
position myself) where getting more than a few email messages a day is
a big pain in the ass.  Lots of people *doing* things don't put the
effort into making 'the net' as much a part of their lives as some of
the people here.  Hell, my boss at NASA was still reading their mail
with /bin/mail until I pointed them at elm.  Can you imagine getting
30-40 messages a day, and having to wade through them with /bin/mail?
(I watch my gf do this, I think she's nutz and on about a dozen too
many mailing lists.)

Granted, I've only made on c-punk meeting (travel and illness have
interfered with my other attempts), and the code I'm working on will
only be able to run on a machine with limited numbers (only 50 or so
built), so maybe I'm in the 'not doing so much' part.  (I'm not
immune to Off-Topic disease, either. :-)
 
--
jet@netcom.com -- J. Eric Townsend -- '92 R100R: "CLACKER"
"Either what you've said is so vague that it's meaningless or I disagreee
 with you completely." -- Tom Maddox




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "L. Detweiler" <ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Date: Wed, 18 Aug 93 00:35:46 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: The Zen of Anonymity
Message-ID: <9308180735.AA14083@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Given: Some graffiti is on the wall.

Question: who is `responsible' or `liable' for graffiti?

the `vandal' (or `artist')? the owner of the wall? society? What if no
means exists whatsoever to identify the originator? or the owner of the
wall actually *encourages* people to use it for whatever purpose? And
socially beneficial uses ensue?

Given: something `illegal' in country A but not in B has been written
on a piece of paper. The paper now resides precisely between, exactly
on the border, of A and B.

Question: Who is the criminal? What is the crime?

the writer for treason? the paper transporter for violating export
laws? the border guards for not shooting? Again, what if the writer is
unidentifiable, the transportation automatic, guarding impossible? What
if there is actually a great deal of utility in the transportation of
paper-scrawl across borders, for everyone involved?

(Note that answers like `it behooves us all to ...prevent the spread of
graffiti' or  `...prevent the spread of illegal papers to borders'
would be worthy of the NSA but pathetically beg the questions.)

* * *

IMHO, anonymous postings and email have the same legal status of
graffiti or the paper on the border. No one is `responsible' or
`liable' for the content of graffiti, no laws apply to the paper. 
Precautions can be taken to limit `offensive' or `illegal' graffiti
(whatever that is!) and contrain the transport of writing on paper, but
nothing can be done to completely eradicate either, save erecting the
most totalitarian system the world has ever seen (a phrase coined by
T.C. May, my respect).  Perhaps we should have licensing laws for
graffiti `vandals' or paper carriers? registers next to all the walls
and streets so they can sign in? `Scrawling implement' or `communicable
media' bans? Or panning cameras mounted in every 10 foot square area of
space in the world? Human identification tags and tracking systems?

We have this thing called `cyberspace' that has nothing to do with the
laws of any country and comprises nothing but innocuous electrical or
light streams coursing through wires and fibers, and trying to impose
some system of `accountability' or `responsibility' or `liability' on
every last element is an archaic, horrifying, but thankfully obsolete
and conceptually impossible artifact from the `dark' ages. Yes, people
can choose to become agitated by the *perceived* contents, but people
can also choose to starve for a cause. There is no limit to the
persecutions invented by the imagination of humanity. Offense is in the
lie of the beholder.

Libel, slander, sedition, thought crimes: what do these words mean?
Whatever meaning they once had is completely dissolved upon the advent
of true anonymity.

Perhaps if others quiet their minds, they too will hear the sound of
one hand clapping.





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: nobody@rosebud.ee.uh.edu
Date: Wed, 18 Aug 93 00:00:53 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Physical to digital cash, and back again
Message-ID: <9308180700.AA20607@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> A simpler variation...
> Customer sends cash or money order to digital bank, along with a floppy
> with an anonymous email address (via a remailer) and a public key.  

For any real business, the customer comes from the 99.99% 
of the population that are not hacker/cypherpunks, not the one or two 
dozen people who are.  These protocols aren't at all simple for the 
customer, unless the vendor (the same or another vendor) provides some 
free software on the net or by mail to automate the process (eg PGP with 
a user-freindly shell for generating the key, and a script for creating 
an anon e-mail address).  But then we have several steps:
	(1) customer reads ad about cool net.service
		(a) they contact directly (but this ruins privacy)
		(b) they contact independent distributor of
		PGP key and anon-remail address generating software.
		(but how does customer trust _them_?)
	(2) vendor sends key & address generators (via e-mail or floppy),
	and physical-mail-security instructions
	(3) customer sends in money order (from mail drop or without
	return address!) along with chosen anon e-mail address and public 
	key.
	(4) vendor sets up account and e-mails the d-cash.
	(5) we still need a physical mail drop or bearer bank
		account for withdrawals, refunds, etc. of physical cash.

Pretty exhausting for the typical service industry.  Most customers
will pick the service that's easier to sign up for, even if some
ivory-tower critics criticize its security.  Security and privacy
are very easy to hype, but often difficult to prove to the layman,
who doesn't know or care about the math.  Digressing a bit,
we could use some sort of independent (not government-run please!)
certification company, which takes (perhaps in alliance with
liability insurance providers) responsibility for examining the 
service's computer programs and protocols and giving out "privacy ratings".
Secure vendors could then use "Whit Diffie certified, top privacy
rating" in their ads.

Also, the issue of which parts of these schemes are *legal*
is critical, but being completely overlooked.  Any lawyers
out there with comments on this?  The best protocols for legal and
illegal operations may be very different, legality of digital cash
will vary between jurisdictions, etc.  And what about
certifying agencies that call a protocol "insecure" 
simply because it supports activities illegal in their jurisdiction, 
not for any reasons of physical or software privacy?
The cases of illegality and physical/software security are
both important risk factors for the vendor, customers, and
liability insurers to consider, but ratings for each should
be quite distinct.

But this discussion is too abstract. We need a real, visceral example.
The enclosure below illustrates some of the some legal and privacy
issues of a Mom & Pop BBS operation in the pre-d-cash era.  This
service could use some privacy -- it's an on-line football game 
with a $35 sign-up fee and cash "prizes."  I don't know whether or not
it's legal for the vendor, but it's certainly illegal for a significant 
subset of potential net.customers.  There will be thousands of these 
little on-line services springing up in the near future, if there 
aren't already.  The BBS# is area code (802), but I've lost the rest 
of it, sorry.  You can call their voice# toll-free for more info.

      Sports Spectrum Ltd. (800) 639-3719 (voice)

                        -----------------------------
                        P R I V A C Y     N O T I C E
                        -----------------------------

   Pursuant to the Electronic and Communications Privacy Act of 1986,  18
   USC 2510 et. seq., Notice is Hereby Given that There are NO FACILITIES
        PROVIDED BY  THIS SYSTEM for SENDING or RECEIVING PRIVATE OR
   CONFIDENTIAL ELECTRONIC COMMUNICATIONS. ALL Messages Shall be Deemed to
                be Readily Accessible to the General Public.

   Do NOT Use this System for ANY Communication for Which the SENDER
   Intends ONLY the Sender and the Intended Recipient(s) to read.  Notice
   is Herby Given that ALL Messages Entered into this System CAN and MAY
       Be READ by the Operators of this System, WHETHER OR NOT they
                       are the Intended Recipient(s).

         By Your Use of this System, You Agree to HOLD HARMLESS the
   Operators Thereof  Against  ANY  and ALL CLAIMS Arising Out of Said Use
                        NO MATTER THE CAUSE OR FAULT.
                                                                         ]
....

Please remember that this password is protecting yourself against the
unauthorized use of YOUR credit card. Please take all necessary precautions
to guard it.  Since all communications between customers and Sports Spectrum
Ltd. occur via computer-to-computer, the password is the only way for Sports
Spectrum Ltd. to verify that it is actually you on the other end of the
phone connection.  Gaining access to Sports Spectrum Ltd.'s service by
invoking your password at logon time implicitly authorizes the use of your
credit card to pay for any subsequent purchases during that particular
session.                                            

-----------------------





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: anonymous@extropia.wimsey.com
Date: Wed, 18 Aug 93 02:50:36 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: No Subject
Message-ID: <199308180906.AA10085@xtropia>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


 Uu> Actually, Julf's solution isn't too bad.

It is if your gate won't process the password header line.

 Uu> Maybe Julf needs to bite the bullet and start using PGP.
 
That would be nice.  I particularly enjoy using the PGPed remailer at
remail@extropia.wimsey.com, which is not only private, but reliable and
damn near grunge-proof.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: anonymous@extropia.wimsey.com
Date: Wed, 18 Aug 93 02:55:36 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: No Subject
Message-ID: <199308180906.AA10093@xtropia>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



   > From: pmetzger@lehman.com ("Perry E. Metzger")
   > To:   "L. Detweiler" <ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu>

 > *we* *are* our government. How can it not be more obvious? What does it
 > say about our character if we are resigned to deprivation?

> WE ARE NOT OUR GOVERNMENT.

> I have an interesting fact for you, Mr. Detweiler. I did not choose
> the government I live under. I chose none of its parts, agreed to none
> of its actions, selected none of its members (not one person I've ever
> voted for has been elected, and I only vote in self defense, not as an
> endorsement of the system), and I agree with virtually none of its
> actions. Sadly, this is the best country I know of to live in, so
> leaving is not an option. However, don't for one minute claim that
> this is *my* government. It is the government that rules me, to be
> sure, but it is my master, not my servant. I would not choose to have
> it operate as it does were I given the choice. It is not mine.

Yes, absolutely.  This discussion may be considered tangential, but the
issue here is at the core of the cypherpunks raison d'etre.  Detweiller
seems to be tremendously confused about the source of government and
unaware of the emergence of the American State.  I personally feel that
I have zero representation in what passes for our "democratic"
government for the reasons you mention, exactly.  I find myself amazed
to encounter the numbers of "mainstream Americans" who have gradually
come to the same conclusion, independent of outside prompting.

My only hope, personally, is to fight vigorously (perhaps literally, in
due course) for the maintenance of the Bill of Rights as protection
against the tyranny of _both_ the mob and the State.  I personally see
the prospect of an electronic so-called democracy to be terrifying, a
mechanism whose technical subversion would be trivial for the State's
assets, say the NSA.  Simple manipulation by propaganda would be even
easier.  Read Orwell.  Read Zamyatin.

Cypherpunks are providing the basis for long-range, (relatively) secure
communication between those activists and thinkers who may have the
power to bring down the State and restore the individual autonomy this
nation was originally devised to foster.  In the past year I have had
the privilege to see a de facto cadre of brilliant men and women
develop from formerly isolated individuals, all thanks to computer
networks and the emergence of secure communication.  I have found
answers to questions I have been asking for twenty-five years, and
provided information that answered similar questions for others.  I have
seen the product of these private communications develop into public
statements that have demonstrably influenced the political outlooks of
hundreds, perhaps thousands, of casual computer network users.

The ability of computer networks and secure communication has in itself
empowered and radicalized an otherwise disenfranchised body of valuable
and vital Americans.

Really, this is heady stuff.  It gives me reason to stick around and
watch this country for a few more years.






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Eric Hughes <hughes@soda.berkeley.edu>
Date: Wed, 18 Aug 93 07:50:38 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: The Zen of Anonymity
In-Reply-To: <9308180735.AA14083@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Message-ID: <9308181448.AA22436@soda.berkeley.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>Given: Some graffiti is on the wall.
>Question: who is `responsible' or `liable' for graffiti?

This question already has a known answer.  The author of the words is
the one that is liable for them.  No other parties are liable unless
they had prior knowledge; this would make them conspirators.

In libel cases specifically, if you can prove who the author was, you
can sue.  If you can't, too bad.  Heh, heh, heh.

I asked Mike Godwin about this specifically a few months ago.  I
mention him here to give him to opportunity to correct or elaborate.

Eric




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: koontzd@lrcs.loral.com (David Koontz )
Date: Wed, 18 Aug 93 08:45:42 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: No Subject
Message-ID: <9308181544.AA17115@nebula.lrcs.loral.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>From: remailer@merde.dis.org (remailer bogus account)

>My only hope, personally, is to fight vigorously (perhaps literally, in
						   ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
>due course) for the maintenance of the Bill of Rights as protection
>against the tyranny of _both_ the mob and the State.  I personally see
>the prospect of an electronic so-called democracy to be terrifying, a
>mechanism whose technical subversion would be trivial for the State's
>assets, say the NSA.  Simple manipulation by propaganda would be even
>easier.  Read Orwell.  Read Zamyatin.

>Cypherpunks are providing the basis for long-range, (relatively) secure
>communication between those activists and thinkers who may have the
>power to bring down the State and restore the individual autonomy this
>nation was originally devised to foster.  

As I understand it the Libertarian Party qualifies membership to exclude
any endorsement of violent overthrow of government.  While some portion
of those affected by this policy may well have gone underground, I don't 
believe that cypherpunks as a committee of the whole are willing or ready 
to do so.

Then again as someone pointed out yesterday, cypherpunks aren't just 
libertarians and/or may be unwilling to accept this sentiment.  Some portion,
however large of those receiving this mailing list, may not agree with this
political leaning and may not consider it germaine to their participation.

Avoiding the appearance of endorsing the violent overthrow of government 
is prudent policy for any organization.






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Timothy Newsham <newsham@wiliki.eng.hawaii.edu>
Date: Wed, 18 Aug 93 11:50:42 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: mailing list <-> newsgroup ?
Message-ID: <9308181850.AA10702@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Hi,
  How many people are subscribed to this list right now?  How many
people have read it before and dropped off only due to bandwidth
problems?  This list easily generates more traffic than any of
the newsgroups I read.  If the number of people on this list is
big why dont we set it up as a newsgroup (gatewayed to a list so
that people without newsfeeds can still read it) ?
Probably alot more people would read and participate.  Newsgroups
have the advantage that you can read them when you have the time
and let them go when you dont, without hassles of joining and
unjoining.  The audience would probably be bigger as as well.
Any counter arguments?

                            Tim N.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: csvcjld@nomvst.lsumc.edu
Date: Wed, 18 Aug 93 08:10:55 PDT
Subject: Differential Cryptanalysis of the DES
In-Reply-To: <9308181448.AA22436@soda.berkeley.edu>
Message-ID: <19930818100931791@nomvst.lsumc.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


     An earlier posting described Differential Cryptanalysis of the
Data Encryption Standard by E. Biham et al.  (ISBN 0-387-97930-1)
It can be ordered from Springer-Verlag (1-800-777-4643) for $39.





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Hastings@courier8.aero.org
Date: Wed, 18 Aug 93 10:25:44 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: ADICO: Privacy-Friendly Anon Auditing
Message-ID: <000705A0.MAI*Hastings@courier8.aero.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Niels Ferguson sent some e-mail to me, which I managed to delete because I'm
using this new MS-Mail package. But I STILL prefer it to QuickMail, mainly
because it doesn't cause the system to freeze up with a stupid TSR
notifier. It also is designed for Windows. But anyway ...
 
To the question Hal Finney raised about Eric Hughes protocols, Niels also
continues to have the same worries. He gave an example of a bogus depositor
being compensated for interest for parking $1 million, and also thought the
amount of data needed by Eric's protocol was excessive.
 
It seems the fraud works if a depositor can be left out of the accounting. A
way to insure that anyone with a signed bank statement is included might be to
certify each statement by an auditor registered with the Department of
Anarchy (some private association).
 
A similar approach for digital cash might be that when you hand over an amount
of gold (or whatever) to a "Notary Private," you get a receipt you can verify
from an Association.
 
Kent - <jkhastings@aol.com>




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: koontzd@lrcs.loral.com (David Koontz )
Date: Wed, 18 Aug 93 10:50:42 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: No Subject
Message-ID: <9308181747.AA17279@nebula.lrcs.loral.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>From: "Perry E. Metzger" <pmetzger@lehman.com>
>>From: plmoses@emoryu1.cc.emory.edu

>Paul L. Moses says:
>> 
>> This may be a semantic point, but it should be made....  David
>> Koontz sez: "Avoiding the appearance of endorsing the violent
>> overthrow of government is prudent policy..."  Um...I think I know
>> what you mean, but isn't it better to just say outright that
>> violence really is not the way to reform government at all, save in
>> truly historical, exceptional cases (American Revolution, French
>> Revolution...)

>I'm not sure either of those cases truly succeeded, either.

>Myself, I feel that no good can be accomplished by initiating force
>against others, no matter what the cause. Violent revolutions go
>completely against my grain. Any sorts of reforms that will stick are
>going to have to arise peacefully. This is not to say, of course, that
>they will necessarily arise via the "democratic process". The
>government may simply find itself outflanked, for instance. (Imagine
>as an example if the government realized tomorrow that allowing
>citizens to know how to read would be dangerous -- its a little late
>to stop it, so they will never do anything about that.)

Two points of clarification:

1) I do not now, nor have I in the past advocated the violent overthrow
   of any domestic government.  I am also opposed to the overthrow of
   foreign governments on moral grounds.

2) The necessity to distance ones self or organization (as may have occured
   in the case of the Libertarian Party) from what should be in effect
   an expression of free speech, smacks of McCarthyistic opression.

(this was what was hidden beneath the cynicism and 'waffle')

Thanks for rising to the occasion.

----
A country that can have a McCarthy Era has no business giving more power
to its government.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: wcs@anchor.ho.att.com (Bill_Stewart_HOY002_1305)
Date: Wed, 18 Aug 93 08:05:44 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re:  Private legal tender
Message-ID: <9308181501.AA05875@anchor.ho.att.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text


Writing anonymously, Sugarplum suggests:
> Customer sends cash or money order to digital bank, along with a floppy
> with an anonymous email address (via a remailer) and a public key.
> The bank emails the customer encrypted digital cash corresponding to the
> amount he sent in (minus any service charges).  

The problem with this is that the bank or clerks aren't accountable -
they can pocket the snail-cash and not send the digicash 
	"Oh, darn, the floppy's blank" or "Oh, darn, the email bounced"
	"Guess there's nothing I can do, what a shame"
just as they could if you snailmailed cash to a conventional account.
If you're sending non-accountable-by-sender cash, you need some way to get
a receipt.  If you're mailing a check or digicash, you have a way to 
repudiate the transaction or at least make a claim against them,
or if you can go in to the bank in person for the transactions with cash.

			Bill
# Bill Stewart    wcs@anchor.ho.att.com  +1-908-949-0705 Fax-4876
# AT&T Bell Labs, Room 4M-312, Crawfords Corner Rd, Holmdel, NJ  07733-3030



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: khijol!erc@apple.com (Ed Carp)
Date: Wed, 18 Aug 93 11:45:45 PDT
To: koontzd@lrcs.loral.com (David Koontz)
Subject: Re: your mail
In-Reply-To: <9308181747.AA17279@nebula.lrcs.loral.com>
Message-ID: <m0oSs7I-00022JC@khijol>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text


> 1) I do not now, nor have I in the past advocated the violent overthrow
>    of any domestic government.  I am also opposed to the overthrow of
>    foreign governments on moral grounds.

I find it interesting that the United States was formed via the venue of
armed rebellion, but disqualifies anyone from public service who advocates
the same.  As a friend says, "the first thing the revolutionary government
does when they get in power is to ... ban all revolutions!"

It is also interesting to note that Jefferson, Paine, and others of the era
advocated, even supported, the right of the people to overthrow an oppressive
government, even their own.
-- 
Ed Carp, N7EKG			erc@apple.com			510/659-9560
                            anon-2133@twwells.com
If you want magic, let go of your armor.  Magic is so much stronger than
steel!        -- Richard Bach, "The Bridge Across Forever"



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: khijol!erc@apple.com (Ed Carp)
Date: Wed, 18 Aug 93 11:45:58 PDT
To: pmetzger@lehman.com
Subject: Re: Violent overthrow?
In-Reply-To: <9308181653.AA20990@snark.lehman.com>
Message-ID: <m0oSs9f-00022JC@khijol>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text


> Myself, I feel that no good can be accomplished by initiating force
> against others, no matter what the cause. Violent revolutions go
> completely against my grain. Any sorts of reforms that will stick are
> going to have to arise peacefully. This is not to say, of course, that
> they will necessarily arise via the "democratic process". The
> government may simply find itself outflanked, for instance. (Imagine
> as an example if the government realized tomorrow that allowing
> citizens to know how to read would be dangerous -- its a little late
> to stop it, so they will never do anything about that.)

I believe it was Jefferson who said, "The tree of liberty must from time to
time be refreshed by the blood of patriots."
-- 
Ed Carp, N7EKG			erc@apple.com			510/659-9560
                            anon-2133@twwells.com
If you want magic, let go of your armor.  Magic is so much stronger than
steel!        -- Richard Bach, "The Bridge Across Forever"



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: smb@research.att.com
Date: Wed, 18 Aug 93 08:35:42 PDT
To: Eric Hughes <hughes@soda.berkeley.edu>
Subject: Re: The Zen of Anonymity
Message-ID: <9308181531.AA04787@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


	 >Given: Some graffiti is on the wall.
	 >Question: who is `responsible' or `liable' for graffiti?

	 This question already has a known answer.  The author of the words is
	 the one that is liable for them.  No other parties are liable unless
	 they had prior knowledge; this would make them conspirators.

However, under certain circumstances the owner of a facility can be
held liable for not removing libelous graffiti.  I picked up a paper
from the net some time back (/telecom-archives/sysops.libel.liability
on ftp.lcs.mit.edu, ``Defamation Liability of Computerized BBS
Operators & Problems of Proof'', by John R. Kahn) which discusses that
point.  The judgement is context-dependent -- one court noted that
different standards apply to a New York subway car [sic] than to the
interior of a manufacturing plant -- but the general rule is that if
you know of some defamatory graffiti on your property, you're obligated
to remove it.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: khijol!erc@apple.com (Ed Carp)
Date: Wed, 18 Aug 93 11:55:45 PDT
To: plmoses@emoryu1.cc.emory.edu (Paul L. Moses)
Subject: Re: Violent overthrow?
In-Reply-To: <9308181629.AA16838@emoryu1.cc.emory.edu>
Message-ID: <m0oSsSu-00022JC@khijol>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text


> This may be a semantic point, but it should be made....
> David Koontz sez: "Avoiding the appearance of endorsing the violent 
> overthrow of government is prudent policy..."

Perhaps.  If the founding fathers were here today, they'd probably all be
in jail.

> Um...I think I know what you mean, but isn't it better to just say outright
> that violence really is not the way to reform government at all, save in
> truly historical, exceptional cases (American Revolution, French Revolution...)

I don't understand.  Are you saying that oppressive governments are in the
past, and that we have no need for the option to overthrow one's own government?
The Chinese at Tienimen Square might disagree.

Besides, no matter what the government say, "we, the people" have a right to
advocate the overthrow of our own government if we so choose - the Declaration
of Independence says so.  Not that I think it's necessary or desirable to do
so, but I have always maintained that the options *is* there...

> I am no code cruncher but it seems to me that the relevant "precedents"
> for a "Cypherpunk Revolution" would be the Russian democracy movement, where
> the power of ideas toppled the oppressive regime with a minimum of bloodshed,
> while the world watched....

If the United States government was ever "overthrown", this is probably how
it would be done - via computers and high-tech, rather than guns.  I don't think
that the "violent overthrow" of the United States government is possible, save
by an external force, and I'm not sure that another government's army would be
strong enough to do so.

> Point:  Violence is abhorrent to civilized conduct, undermines social cohesion,
> and is generally justifiable only as a defensive measure.  Arent we concerned
> with the state of affairs today precisely because individuals no longer
> have a sense of these kind of boundaries?  So it is important to emphasis
> that violence is part of the problem, and not to be sloppy and suggest
> (inferentially) that it could be part of the solution.

Again, I don't think it's realistic to believe that the overthrow of a
government such as the United States, the PRC, or even the CIS can be
accomplished by violence.  The American and French revolutions were
justified (and successful) in part because the central authoritarian
government was unresponsive to the needs and desires of the people, harsh
and heavy-handed in its enforcement of arbitrary laws, and ruthless in its
suppression of any sort of opposition.  On the other hand, the United States
allows (but no longer encourages) opposition - the very fact that we have
the freedom to discuss topics like this in a free and open arena says that
(at least) we still have the freedom to express the opinion that the
government is full of it, and not be dragged out into our respective
front yards and shot in front of our neighbors.  Other societies haven't
been as lucky.
-- 
Ed Carp, N7EKG			erc@apple.com			510/659-9560
                            anon-2133@twwells.com
If you want magic, let go of your armor.  Magic is so much stronger than
steel!        -- Richard Bach, "The Bridge Across Forever"



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Date: Wed, 18 Aug 93 11:45:58 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: OK to advocate overthrow of the government
In-Reply-To: <9308181544.AA17115@nebula.lrcs.loral.com>
Message-ID: <9308181843.AA04066@netcom5.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


David Koontz writes:

> As I understand it the Libertarian Party qualifies membership to exclude
> any endorsement of violent overthrow of government.  While some portion
> of those affected by this policy may well have gone underground, I don't 
> believe that cypherpunks as a committee of the whole are willing or ready 
> to do so.

The (contentious) Libertarian Party "pledge" has to do with the
"initiation of force" in general. Most of us interpret this liberally,
or as we wish, and certainly few feel it constrains our agenda.

> Avoiding the appearance of endorsing the violent overthrow of government 
> is prudent policy for any organization.

In any case, my understanding of U.S. law is that it's legal to
advocate the overthrow of the government, it's legal to advocate the
use of violence, it's just not legal to combine the two and advocate
the _violent overthrow_ of the government.

(I'm sure there are subtleties lost here. Certainly advocating
violence that then _leads_ to violence may expose one to conspiracy,
solicitation of a crime, etc., charges. But generally, neo-Nazis are
relatively free to say "Kill all the Jews," provided they don't
actually commit violence---things are changing with the new standards
for "hurtful" and "discriminatory" speech, though. And rap musicians
are free to chant about killing cops and so forth.)

Overthrowing the government by force has never been a mainstream
Cypherpunk position. Use of strong crypto to protect privacy has, and
this may have some longterm implications for the form of government,
however. (Things like enforceability of tax laws, of export laws, and
speech laws. These will all be affected radically.)

As others have noted, Cypherpunks have a range of political beliefs,
from libertarian to socialist to ravist.


-Tim May


-- 
..........................................................................
Timothy C. May         | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,  
tcmay@netcom.com       | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
408-688-5409           | knowledge, reputations, information markets, 
W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA  | black markets, collapse of governments.
Higher Power: 2^756839 | Public Key: PGP and MailSafe available.
Note: I put time and money into writing this posting. I hope you enjoy it.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: allan@elvis.tamu.edu (Allan Bailey)
Date: Wed, 18 Aug 93 09:50:39 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: encrypted anonymous traffic
In-Reply-To: <9308180211.AA20152@snorkelwacker.MIT.EDU>
Message-ID: <9308181650.AA03366@elvis.tamu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


"Perry E. Metzger" writes:
>
>To begin with, the ban on encrypted messages makes no sense because
>people who do not have the key to read the messages can obviously not
>receive them, and even people who do have the key must make an active
>effort to read the messages. I will ignore that for the moment,
>however, and address this pervasive notion that words can cause more
>harm than letter bombs.
>

  Stupidity is it's own virtue.

  If people, who are afraid of fat electrons crowding their email-box,
don't bother to _read_the_manual_ that's their fault.  There's a
wonderful tool called the "filter", that can protect these virtual
innocents from themselves.  Unfortunately, no such device exists
for _real_mail_.  If they don't want email from certain individuals,
then they can put those people into the filter and ignore them 
as blissfully as they ignore reality itself.

  Just my $0.02 worth.

-- 
Allan Bailey, UNIX programmer, CSC          | "Freedom is not free."
Infinite Diversity in Infinite Combinations | allan.bailey@tamu.edu
GCS -d+ p--- c++++ l+++ u++ e++ m++ s n+ h+ f g+ w+ t+ r y+





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Perry E. Metzger" <pmetzger@lehman.com>
Date: Wed, 18 Aug 93 09:25:42 PDT
To: Marc Horowitz <marc@athena.mit.edu>
Subject: Re: encrypted anonymous traffic
In-Reply-To: <9308180211.AA20152@snorkelwacker.MIT.EDU>
Message-ID: <9308181620.AA20911@snark.lehman.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Marc Horowitz says:
> I have to disagree with Lance here.
> 
> >> No one can send any `bomb' through mere text, and to compare harassing
> >> mail (which is definitely not to be condoned) to it is to expose your
> >> naive and self-serving view of the matter.
> 
> I know people who would probably rather receive an explosive in the
> mail than receive email from certain individuals, or about certain
> subjects.

To begin with, the ban on encrypted messages makes no sense because
people who do not have the key to read the messages can obviously not
receive them, and even people who do have the key must make an active
effort to read the messages. I will ignore that for the moment,
however, and address this pervasive notion that words can cause more
harm than letter bombs.

I'm sorry, but its completely irrational to prefer to be killed by an
explosive over getting email from someone you hate. This insane notion
that words are somehow worse than physical blows has to stop.

It leads to insane conclusions, among others, the conclusion that we
must all be restricted in our speech at all times lest we offend
other's feelings. This is the same argument that fundamentalist
christians who would like to ban certain books from our libraries
would use -- that harm can be caused by people accidently reading the
books. This is no speculative notion -- the argument was once actually
used regularly in our country.

The real world contains lots of harmful things. People who are so
incapable of handling a threatening letter or an insulting piece of
mail that they would prefer to die from a letter bomb are unlikely to
be able to deal with the sights and sounds they will see on an
ordinary street in a big city. They are too fragile for this world and
likely should be locked up for their own good until psychiatrists can
manage to heal them, as the preference of death to being offended is
suicidal and the incapacity to deal with the real world will obviously
cripple them. The rest of the world should not be constrained to
handle the needs of these obviously very mentally unbalanced
individuals.




Perry Metzger




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: plmoses@unix.cc.emory.edu (Paul L. Moses)
Date: Wed, 18 Aug 93 09:30:37 PDT
To: koontzd@lrcs.loral.com
Subject: Violent overthrow?
Message-ID: <9308181629.AA16838@emoryu1.cc.emory.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



This may be a semantic point, but it should be made....
David Koontz sez: "Avoiding the appearance of endorsing the violent 
overthrow of government is prudent policy..."
Um...I think I know what you mean, but isn't it better to just say outright
that violence really is not the way to reform government at all, save in
truly historical, exceptional cases (American Revolution, French Revolution...)
I am no code cruncher but it seems to me that the relevant "precedents"
for a "Cypherpunk Revolution" would be the Russian democracy movement, where
the power of ideas toppled the oppressive regime with a minimum of bloodshed,
while the world watched....

The way Mr Koontz puts it is awfully ambiguous and open to be read as a 
*very* cynical and disingenuous kind of "waffle".

Point:  Violence is abhorrent to civilized conduct, undermines social cohesion,
and is generally justifiable only as a defensive measure.  Arent we concerned
with the state of affairs today precisely because individuals no longer
have a sense of these kind of boundaries?  So it is important to emphasis
that violence is part of the problem, and not to be sloppy and suggest
(inferentially) that it could be part of the solution.

IMHO.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: strick -- henry strickland <strick@versant.com>
Date: Wed, 18 Aug 93 12:35:45 PDT
To: Timothy Newsham <newsham@wiliki.eng.hawaii.edu>
Subject: Re: mailing list <-> newsgroup ?
In-Reply-To: <9308181850.AA10702@toad.com>
Message-ID: <9308181936.AA19123@versant.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


THUS SPAKE Timothy Newsham <newsham@wiliki.eng.hawaii.edu>:
# The audience would probably be bigger as as well.

and quality would degrade.    News and mail may look the
same, but the social effects are quite different.

# Any counter arguments?

Yeah.  Gene Spafford often says that newsgroups are no way to get
things done.  However I think that mailing lists can be rather
effective.

I think you're saying that your problem is that your newsreader is a
lot better than your mailreader.  Perhaps you can fix the problem...

					strick




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Matt Blaze <mab@crypto.com>
Date: Wed, 18 Aug 93 09:55:42 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: The Zen of Anonymity
In-Reply-To: <9308181448.AA22436@soda.berkeley.edu>
Message-ID: <9308181645.AA01889@crypto.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



>
>In libel cases specifically, if you can prove who the author was, you
>can sue.  If you can't, too bad.  Heh, heh, heh.
>

Be careful here - this does not allow third parties a blanket escape
from liability simply by disclaiming authorship.

As I understand the law of defamation, who *wrote* the words is not all
important; the issue is who is publishing or otherwise causing them
to be published (which would ordinarily include, but not be limited to,
their author).  For example, in NY Times v. Sullivan (the case that
established a different standard of defamation for public figures),
the NY Times didn't write a story, they simply carried an ad that claimed
abuse of power by some officials (in Georgia, I think).  Although it is
often easier to show that the author of defamatory words knew or should
have known them to be false (part of what you need to prove to win a
libel case), liability does not end there.

Knowingly repeating words you should know to be defamatory is still
defamation.

>I asked Mike Godwin about this specifically a few months ago.  I
>mention him here to give him to opportunity to correct or elaborate.
>
>Eric


-matt




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: jet@nas.nasa.gov (J. Eric Townsend)
Date: Wed, 18 Aug 93 12:55:59 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: World record in password checking
Message-ID: <9308181953.AA05020@boxer.nas.nasa.gov>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



[forwarded for your enjoyment --eric]

A NEW WORLD RECORD IN PASSWORD CHECKING HAS BEEN SET:
-----------------------------------------------------

Roch Bourbonnais, a Thinking Machines Corporation engineer, has ported
and optimized the CM/2 port of the UFC-crypt to a CM/5 system.

The UFC-crypt (Ultra Fast Crypt) implementation on the CM/2 Connection
Machine (parallel computer) is a UNIX password checking routine (crypt())
ported by Michael Glad at UNI-C.

The port, that is written in CM-fortran, utilizes the CM/5 vector units
and is partly programmed in cdpeac (vector unit assembly language).

The package achieves 1560 encryptions/second/vector unit. This scales to

    6,4 million encryptions per second on a large  1024 node machine.
    800,000          -       -     -    - - small   128  -      -
 
With this impressive performance, all combinations of 6 letters can be
tried in less than an hour and all combinations of 6 lower-case letters
can be tried in less than one minute.



Congratulations,
Jorgen Bo Madsen

+-----------------------------------------------------------------------+
!   Jorgen Bo Madsen,  Security Consultant                              !
!   UNI-C Lyngby,  Danish Computing Centre for Research and Education   !
!   DTH,  Building 305,  DK - 2800 Lyngby,                              !
!   Phone  : +45-45-938355                                              !
!   Telefax: +45-45-930220                                              !
!   E-Mail : Jorgen.Bo.Madsen@uni-c.dk                                  !
+-----------------------------------------------------------------------+
------- End of forwarded message -------





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Perry E. Metzger" <pmetzger@lehman.com>
Date: Wed, 18 Aug 93 09:55:56 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Violent overthrow?
In-Reply-To: <9308181629.AA16838@emoryu1.cc.emory.edu>
Message-ID: <9308181653.AA20990@snark.lehman.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Paul L. Moses says:
> 
> This may be a semantic point, but it should be made....  David
> Koontz sez: "Avoiding the appearance of endorsing the violent
> overthrow of government is prudent policy..."  Um...I think I know
> what you mean, but isn't it better to just say outright that
> violence really is not the way to reform government at all, save in
> truly historical, exceptional cases (American Revolution, French
> Revolution...)

I'm not sure either of those cases truly succeeded, either.

Myself, I feel that no good can be accomplished by initiating force
against others, no matter what the cause. Violent revolutions go
completely against my grain. Any sorts of reforms that will stick are
going to have to arise peacefully. This is not to say, of course, that
they will necessarily arise via the "democratic process". The
government may simply find itself outflanked, for instance. (Imagine
as an example if the government realized tomorrow that allowing
citizens to know how to read would be dangerous -- its a little late
to stop it, so they will never do anything about that.)

Perry




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Duncan Frissell <frissell@panix.com>
Date: Wed, 18 Aug 93 10:00:40 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Physical to digital cash,
Message-ID: <199308181657.AA16974@panix.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


To: cypherpunks@toad.com

N>Pretty exhausting for the typical service industry.  Most customers
N>will pick the service that's easier to sign up for, 

They used to think this about PCs in general but we now have a hard core 
of fairly sophisticated PC users that support sophisticated 
software/hardware.  Crypto will be a niche market for a while but there 
are enough "motivated buyers" out there to support a large market.  These 
buyers would include the retail pharmacutical trade, deadbeat dads, 
wagering, the 10 million tax non-filers and the other 10 million filers 
who practice tax evasion, upscale illegal aliens, the politically 
motivated, a portion of the financial services industry.

Obviously, people won't buy until they see a "must have" application.  
What will be the "Visicalc" of digital anarchy?  Offshore debit VISA cards 
linked to anonymous accounts?  If I knew of an institution offering same, 
I could "sell" thousands of such accounts tomorrow even with an unfriendly
user interface.

N>Also, the issue of which parts of these schemes are *legal*
N>is critical, but being completely overlooked.  Any lawyers
N>out there with comments on this?  

As long as the phyical part of the institution is in a tax haven 
jurisdiction, digital cash should be legal.  Most haven jurisdictions 
allow bank accounts in the names of businesses owned by the holders of 
bearer shares.  Those haven jurisdictions that are in what is now the 
European Free Trade Area (or whatever they're calling it this month) such 
as Austria, Gibraltar, The Channel Islands, and Isle of Man may lose their 
ability to offer anonymous accounts as EEC rules tighten but there are 
many other jurisdictions.  Also, not enough work has been done in the area 
of non-anonymous anonymous accounts.  If an account is in the name of an 
institution (company, etc) beneficial ownership may be just as difficult 
to determine as with a genuine anonymous account.  A haven-based cutout 
which holds accounts in ordinary jurisdictions can do many usefull 
things.  The proliferation of non-bank banks like money market funds also 
provide other opportunities.  

"No Truce with Kings"

Duncan Frissell

Teaching individuals the technology of liberty since 1969 - Frissell & 
Associates Privacy Consulting.

--- WinQwk 2.0b#0
                                                                                                                     




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Mike Rose <mrose@stsci.edu>
Date: Wed, 18 Aug 93 10:10:41 PDT
To: pmetzger@lehman.com
Subject: Re: encrypted anonymous traffic
In-Reply-To: <9308181620.AA20911@snark.lehman.com>
Message-ID: <9308181709.AA25457@MARIAN.STSCI.EDU>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


On Wed, 18 Aug 1993 12:20:51 -0400, "Perry E. Metzger" <pmetzger@lehman.com> said:

>I'm sorry, but its completely irrational to prefer to be killed by an
>explosive over getting email from someone you hate. This insane notion
>that words are somehow worse than physical blows has to stop.

I'm sure glad you wrote this.  It's about time some common sense got
injected into this thread.  


>It leads to insane conclusions, among others, the conclusion that we
>must all be restricted in our speech at all times lest we offend
>other's feelings. 

And I'm glad you pointed this out.  I hadn't looked at it this way,
but I see now it's a clear extension from the "words are worse than
bombs" philosophy.

Mike




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Peter shipley <shipley@merde.dis.org>
Date: Wed, 18 Aug 93 13:25:46 PDT
To: toad.com!cypherpunks@soda.berkeley.edu
Subject: fyi: forward from cert-tools-request mailing list.
Message-ID: <9308182019.AA16210@merde.dis.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


------- Forwarded Message

>From cert-tools-request@cert.org Wed Aug 18 13:05:55 1993
To: cert-tools@cert.org
Originally-From: Jorgen Bo Madsen <Jorgen.Bo.Madsen@uni-c.dk>
Subject: World record in password checking

A NEW WORLD RECORD IN PASSWORD CHECKING HAS BEEN SET:
- - - - -----------------------------------------------------

Roch Bourbonnais, a Thinking Machines Corporation engineer, has ported
and optimized the CM/2 port of the UFC-crypt to a CM/5 system.

The UFC-crypt (Ultra Fast Crypt) implementation on the CM/2 Connection
Machine (parallel computer) is a UNIX password checking routine (crypt())
ported by Michael Glad at UNI-C.

The port, that is written in CM-fortran, utilizes the CM/5 vector units
and is partly programmed in cdpeac (vector unit assembly language).

The package achieves 1560 encryptions/second/vector unit. This scales to

    6,4 million encryptions per second on a large  1024 node machine.
    800,000          -       -     -    - - small   128  -      -
 
With this impressive performance, all combinations of 6 letters can be
tried in less than an hour and all combinations of 6 lower-case letters
can be tried in less than one minute.


Congratulations,
Jorgen Bo Madsen

+-----------------------------------------------------------------------+
!   Jorgen Bo Madsen,  Security Consultant                              !
!   UNI-C Lyngby,  Danish Computing Centre for Research and Education   !
!   DTH,  Building 305,  DK - 2800 Lyngby,                              !
!   Phone  : +45-45-938355                                              !
!   Telefax: +45-45-930220                                              !
!   E-Mail : Jorgen.Bo.Madsen@uni-c.dk                                  !
+-----------------------------------------------------------------------+

------- End of Forwarded Message





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Date: Wed, 18 Aug 93 13:40:43 PDT
To: Cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Crypto Protocols are Hard to Analyze
Message-ID: <9308182038.AA05720@netcom.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Fellow Cypherdroids,

Crypto protocols are _hard_ to analyze! Speaking for myself, keeping the
many combinations and permutations of crypto terms, channels, spoofing
scenarios, and whatnot, straight is very confusing.

This should be no great revelation to any of you who've tried to closely
follow the protocols for digital cash (coins, coupons, certificates of
deposit, blinded notes, and even "S&H Green Stamps"). Analyzing and finding
flaws (often subtle) in cryptographic and digital money protocols is
time-consuming.

I'm currently trying to analyze a digital cash "coupon" system proposed by
Nick Szabo, and Hal Finney last night posted his initial analysis of the
"NetCash" scheme proposed recently. And the physical Cypherpunks meetings
have recently been dominated by fairly gory details ("gory" means highly
detailed and potentially confusing) of such new proposed systems as "Twain
(tm)," an anonymous remailer (and its associated pieces, like "Clemens
(tm)"...don't ask me to explain, as I got lost in the process!), and
"Digital Silk Road (tm)" (and its own associated pieces, "Joule (tm),"
"INDRA (tm)," etc.).

(Sidenote: I get worried when so many new protocols are already being given
names and being, to various degrees, "productized." Could this be a case of
"premature productization"?)

And anyone who looks at the "Advances in Cryptology-CRYPTO 'xx" books, the
books where the main crypto results are published (along with "EuroCrypt,"
"AusCrypt," and "AsiaCrypt"...mostly all published by Springer-Verlag in
their silver-grey paperback series), will quickly see the explosion of
complex protocols.


What's the connection with Cypherpunks?

After all, we all know this stuff is complex, so what's the big deal?

I argue that a group such as ours, devoted to actually exploring and
perhaps deploying modern crypto ideas, should try to *do something* about
the combinatorial explosion of concepts, terms, and confusing protocols.

It has been said about AI that 90% of the work is currently just
reinvention of terms of yore, with new ideas mainly being rehashes of
things invented 10 or 20 years earlier. My fear is that "digital money," to
name just one example, is showing the same sort of thing, with lots of new
terms for basic ideas, lots of complicated protocols which are (admittedly)
hard to analyze (to try to break, to try to spoof, to "game against"). Many
of these complex protocols simply _won't_ get analyzed in enough detail, if
only because there aren't enough of us to do the analyses.

(The obvious danger of _not_ analyzing a digital money scheme in enough
detail, with enough paranoid motivation, is that it gets deployed and then
broken by someone who knows how to break it--someone who has studied a
similar problem and knows the points of weakness, someone who is just
lucky, whatever. This could wipe out the developers, sow mistrust amongst
the Cypherpunks/crypto community, etc.)

Evidence that "protocols are hard to analyze" lies in the fact that only
recently has basic public-key crypto begun to spread...and there are still
lots of folks looking for weaknesses in PGP, for example. Almost nothing
using more recent protocols has shown up....no "Pretty Good Digital Cash,"
not "Pretty Good Digital Timestamping," etc. (Though our own remailers,
while very far from even Chaum's 1981 system, are interesting. Let's just
not think of them as "cryptographic" in any sense...they rely almost
totally on simple trust, a major cryptographic no-no.)

More complicated protocols, like the "Dining Cryptographers Problem"
(Chaum's paper on this should still be in the "soda" archives), are just a
_piece_ of what's needed for our longterm Cypherpunks future (which I
choose to call "crypto anarchy"), and yet analysis of it consumes
_hundreds_ of pages (see, for example, the Jurgen Bos Ph.D. thesis I
distributed a year ago at the first Cypherpunks meeting.)

Am I proposing anything constructive here?

First, I am not proposing limiting the universe of discourse on this List
in any way. Folks will always be free to say whatever they like, to use
whatever terms they wish. Second, I'm not pushing a particular agenda...at
least I hope I am not.

Here are some suggestions, some things to mull over.

1. Our archive site of papers and books is not available to many of the
folks attempting to develop new protocols. To pick one example: digital
money in all its various forms. The several proposals for digital cash
(digital postage, NetCash, S&H green stamps, Cayman Islands deposits, etc.)
are sometimes repeats of work done years ago--and shown to be flawed in
major ways. 

Workers in this field should of course plan to acquire _all_ of the
relevant papers, and probably should be at this year's "Crypto" conference
(too late now). There just is no excuse for trying to "reinvent the wheel"
when folks who are working full-time on something have already tilled the
field (to mix some metaphors). It may be true that gifted amateurs can
sometimes discover something the experts have not (after all, our fellow
Cypherpunk Whit Diffie was in some sense a "gifted amateur" in the mid-70s,
when nearly all "serious" cryptologists worked for the NSA), but it happens
fairly rarely. 

We need to encourage serious workers to obtain and read all of the
previously published material (the "Information Liberation Front," from
which little has been heard lately, can only scan and OCR a tiny fraction
of the papers that are relevant, and even then can't reasonably handle
equations and mathematical arguments).

2. We should agree on some terms, somehow, so that we're using a *common
language* and not wasting huge amounts of time trying to deduce what Alice
means by "return receipt" versus what Bob means when he uses the same term.
(For example, Eric Messick calls his things "onions," suggesting multiple
layers of "return postage guaranteed" envelopes. This may be a great idea,
and even a great name (which we may all be using in 5 years), but it is
potentially confusing, I think you'll agree.)


(Formal crypto papers often use their own terminology, and those of us who
read the papers have to convert from, say, "blobs" (a Chaum/Brassard term),
to the terms favored by others. A few "Schelling points" for terms have
appeared, usually with some groundbreaking or widely read paper, but
cryptologists continue to reinvent their own terms, sometimes because they
haven't understood the work of others, sometimes because of "NIH.")

3. The lack of a FAQ is not really the issue, as the issues I'm talking
about here go somewhat deeper than nearly any FAQ will ever go. Possibly a
much-expanded "Glossary" (also in the "soda" archives) could be used to
ensure more of us are using the standard terms.

4. I recommend we _not_ spend a lot of time at Cypherpunks meetings on
detailed protocols, as these are notoriously hard for people to follow,
except in broad outlines. People "space out" on the details and teh devil's
in the details. 

Rather, more detailed written papers are the best way, I think, to convey
complicated ideas. Written papers force the writers to more carefully state
their assumptions, their reliance on previous works, and to then more
carefully work through their line of reasoning. Readers who are interested
can then work through the papers in as much detail as they wish. Sometimes
it takes many hours to work through a protocol. For example, I must've
spent 10 hours going through Chaum's DC-Net paper, drawing pictures, going
back to his 1981 paper on "mixes," and generally reading and rereading.
(Then I spent even more time explaining it in a series of essays to the
Extropians mailing list, before this list existed.)

5. Eric Hughes and I toyed with the idea of creating a "protocol analysis
language," or at least a toolkit for describing and diagramming protocols
(inspired by the Chaum-school "triangle" diagrams, which place the
"Customer," the "Shop," and the "Bank" in a triangle and then analyze who
knows what, where the bits flow, who can prove what, etc.).

Here's just the most basic and initial look at such a diagram:


                   Customer
                   /      \
                  /        \           (I won't add all the other stuff)
                 /          \
               Shop---------Bank


(The "nouns" then have channels, actions ("verbs"), etc. associated with
them. The digital money protocols are themselves complicated, involving
"bit commitment," "blinding," and the like. And then there are the
complications of any of these entities attempting to "break" the system, to
steal money, to spend a digital token more than is authorized, to trace the
flow of money, etc. Collusion, spoofing, etc. It gets confusing very fast.)


Nothing has so far come of this idea, but it seems to me to be a shame that
we're just drawing chicken marks on paper or on whiteboards (and losing
most of the audience along the way, at least in terms of the all-important
details). Complicated protocols--and the digital money constellation of
ideas is just one--demand more powerful tools. 

(Speculatively, what I would someday hope to see is a kind of "Protocol
Compiler," with functional specs (possibly written in a very higl-level
language) transformed/rewritten to the best set of protocols available. The
building blocks would be various forms of encryption, of reputations, of
blinding, and so on. Each of the building blocks could be analyzed
separately and improved upon....and probably bought from specialized
developers. I know of no work along these lines, though. But I would not be
at all surprised to find that some groups are doing something like
this--the combinatorial explosion of possibilities makes hand-analysis
problematic.)

Well, enough for now. Let me know what you think.

With lots of new ideas for digital cash, remailers, mixes, digital betting
schemes, coupons, postage, data havens, digital voting, and all the rest,
we'll soon be drowning in protocols none of us have the time--or specific
expertise--to analyze.

Right now the crypto enthusiasts and amateurs are still stuck at the
"Here's my idea for a new cipher...can you break it?" level, not even
having reached the level of proposing new public key systems. We are
beginning to see proposals on the Net for new digital money systems
(NetCash being the most recent example). Over the next several years, there
may be an explosion of these new proposals. Analyzing and quickly debunking
them (when they need debunking, as most do...I am not saying this in a
disdainful way, just noting reality....nothing is gained by the adoption of
weak schemes) will be a challenge.

Perhaps one Cypherpunks goal could be to maintain a publicly accessible
database (in hypertext, even, using the World Wide Web or similar) of
published techniques, of how to break or spoof them, of tips and tricks,
and so on. (Yes, I am interested in working on something like this.)

Best wishes,


-Tim May


--
Timothy C. May         | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,  
tcmay@netcom.com       | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
408-688-5409           | knowledge, reputations, information markets, 
W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA  | black markets, collapse of governments.
Higher Power: 2^756839 | Public Key: by arrangement
Note: I put time and money into writing this posting. I hope you enjoy it.      







From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Date: Wed, 18 Aug 93 14:25:48 PDT
To: bill@twwells.com (T. William Wells)
Subject: Re: my aps
In-Reply-To: <9308181539.AA28939@twwells.com>
Message-ID: <9308182123.AA18807@netcom5.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


T. William Wells has written us a polite and nice summary of his
position, and his points are very helpful to us in understanding the
issues of anonymity.

> There are several issues I want to address in this message. One
> is communication style, another is the nature of my anonymous
> service, and finally, what I think about the whole thing.
> 
> On communication style: some people have this delusion that they
> can write to others and expect or even demand a reply. Well, it
> isn't so. If someone writes to me, I'm under no a priori
> obligation to read, to try to understand, or to spend effort
> replying. This is irrespective of the style *or* the content of
> their message.

He is right that insulting remarks will seldom produce good debate.

> The first thing you need to understand is that my anonymous
> service is integral to a specific community of people who have
> suffered through childhood abuse and adult sexual abuse. (In
....
> On the newsgroup, there are usually several individuals who are
> "that close" to committing suicide. Some will be shortly, or have
> been recently, in psychiatric wards. Most have been in, or are

I can readily see why Bill would like to have some limits (imposed by
_him_...a pure marketplace decision!) on anonymity. After all, some
sickos might literally post "Jump!" messages to those on the verge of
suicide. (I am not being facetious or sarcastic here...I mean this
quite seriously.)

Other services should be free, of course, to have different policies.
Those who want anonymity in anything they may say, including "Jump!,"
are free to patronize such services.

> I provide a service to people who, at least in specific areas,
> are not rational, who are definitely irrational. I know of, for
> example, one person who went into convulsions simply because they
> received e-mail from a person who, many years ago, had abused a
> child.

An excellent example of why and how specialized cyberspace services
(like remailers) will develop various strategies. In a sense, Bill is
acting as a filter, or a paternal figure (not meant pejoratively), for
his clients.

This is completely and fully consistent with Cypherpunks goals. (To
avoid flames about me presuming to speak for Cypherpunks, I mean "in
my opinion.")
 
> In line with that, my service differs from the standard anonymous
> services. One is that it *is* integrated into the community. I am
> a survivor myself, I offer personal assistance (in computer
> matters) to people in the group, I forward the newsgroup via
...
> automatically. Shortly, people will be able to specify by id who
> they do or do not get e-mail from.

This is exciting! Specialized "agents," the wave of the future.

> As to my thoughts on the relevant principles. As I mentioned, I
> am an Objectivist. That may clue you as to where I'm coming from.
> But in case not, the primary fact is that I'm offering a
> *private* service. I run it out of my home, using my phone lines,
> and paid for with my money. While I offer it to all on the

Many of us were strongly influenced by Rand (and even those who hate
Rand, including some of my closest friends and Cypherpunks colleagues,
understand the importance of freedom in market dealings).

> No one, other than myself, has any right to specify what I do
> with this, beyond the minimum of respecting their rights. Their
> rights do not extend to arbitrary protection of their
> confidentiality or privacy. Those who use my anonymous service
> have an implicit right to protection of their anonymity *and that
...rest of good points elided to save space....

> As things are, they work well. No change is *necessary* though
> some may be *desirable*. Careful thought and respectful dialog
> may convince me of desirable changes. Logicless rhetoric and
> verbal abuse, however, will, at best, cause me to ignore both the
> speaker and his message.

Bill, I agree with all your points. And if I was running one of these
abuse-related remailers (something about "ASAR," I recall), I suspect
I'd have the same policy you have.

Anonymity should not be forbidden by law, but it can (and sometimes
should be) filtered by agents of the subscribers. If they don't like
the way the filtering is done, they can try another service.

I hope you continue to contribute your ideas to our list.

-Tim May



-- 
..........................................................................
Timothy C. May         | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,  
tcmay@netcom.com       | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
408-688-5409           | knowledge, reputations, information markets, 
W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA  | black markets, collapse of governments.
Higher Power: 2^756839 | Public Key: PGP and MailSafe available.
Note: I put time and money into writing this posting. I hope you enjoy it.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Timothy Newsham <newsham@wiliki.eng.hawaii.edu>
Date: Wed, 18 Aug 93 17:35:51 PDT
To: mccoy@ccwf.cc.utexas.edu (Jim McCoy)
Subject: Re: World record in password checking
In-Reply-To: <199308182228.AA22350@tramp.cc.utexas.edu>
Message-ID: <9308190031.AA20910@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> 
> Perhaps because internal communication between those 1024 machines will be
> significantly more difficult than running on a machine that is optimized
> for parallel operations, RPC just doesn't cut it.  You would probably lose
> a number of your hosts off the top just to coordinate the activity of the
> remaining machines. Besides, if you really want to do this spend your
> one or two million (approx cost of your 1000PC site) on seriously dedicated
> DES-cracking parallel hardware.  Do the cracking in hardware, not software.

If you have the pc's aranged nicely there are very few packets that need
be sent.  You can use broadcasts on each net, or multicasting (broadcasting
to a group).  You simply need to send out the password entry to crack.
You could break up the job space by networks, and on each network have
the machines negotiate for portions of the sub-job space.  Alternatively
you could have all machines attacking the key space randomly which
is not as efficient but still quite workable.  Finally if/when one
of the boxes gets a solution, it shouts 'i got it'.  It can broadcast
the solution, which will turn off all the other boxes and get
put onto some consol window somewhere, or some file.

> 
> Either way, I could think of more fun things to do with those 1024 PCs :)
> 
> jim
> 
bon fire?




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Peter shipley <shipley@merde.dis.org>
Date: Wed, 18 Aug 93 23:00:45 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: No Subject
Message-ID: <9308182140.AA16487@merde.dis.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/x-pgp


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----


># The audience would probably be bigger as as well.
>
>and quality would degrade.    News and mail may look the
>same, but the social effects are quite different.
>
># Any counter arguments?
>
>Yeah.  Gene Spafford often says that newsgroups are no way to get
>things done.  However I think that mailing lists can be rather
>effective.
>
>I think you're saying that your problem is that your newsreader is a
>lot better than your mailreader.  Perhaps you can fix the problem...
>


I agree completely

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From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Derek Atkins <warlord@MIT.EDU>
Date: Wed, 18 Aug 93 12:05:44 PDT
To: Timothy Newsham <newsham@wiliki.eng.hawaii.edu>
Subject: Re: mailing list <-> newsgroup ?
In-Reply-To: <9308181850.AA10702@toad.com>
Message-ID: <9308181904.AA17099@toxicwaste.MEDIA.MIT.EDU>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> Any counter arguments?

Newsgroups tend to have a lot smaller S/N ratio, in general, than
mailing lists.  Granted, the S/N ration of this list varies, but I
think its always been a lot better than many of the better newsgroups.
Making cypherpunks a newsgroup will just lower the S/N ratio without
helping increase anything else (other than readership).

If you think there is too much traffic, have the mail go to some other
account that you only log into when you have the time.  Hitting the
"d" key in mh-rmail isn't that much overhead! ;-)

Cypherpunks should stay in e-mail.

my $.02

-derek




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: T. William Wells <bill@twwells.com>
Date: Wed, 18 Aug 93 13:36:00 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: my aps
Message-ID: <9308181539.AA28939@twwells.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


There are several issues I want to address in this message. One
is communication style, another is the nature of my anonymous
service, and finally, what I think about the whole thing.

On communication style: some people have this delusion that they
can write to others and expect or even demand a reply. Well, it
isn't so. If someone writes to me, I'm under no a priori
obligation to read, to try to understand, or to spend effort
replying. This is irrespective of the style *or* the content of
their message.

In general, the only thing that obligates one to answer another is
the prior respect that one should have for others -- which has to
be lived up to in *their* actions. Mr. Detweiler simply blew it.
His original message was full of insults and insinuations and,
quite frankly, he should consider himself honored that I bothered
to tell him where he went wrong. _Of course_, any legitimate
issues he brought up in the same message weren't addressed. He
demanded of me that I address those issues -- and that I deal
with hus abusiveness.

As you may guess, I really have no interest in addressing Mr.
Detweiler directly; I figure he's got a few years of mental
development to go through before I'll consider him fit for
carrying out any sort of rational conversation with. However,
others have been more reasonable and I'll try to address some of
their concerns and to point out some of the relevant
circumstances surrounding my service.

The first thing you need to understand is that my anonymous
service is integral to a specific community of people who have
suffered through childhood abuse and adult sexual abuse. (In
fact, essentially everyone on the group who is dealing with adult
sexual abuse is also dealing with childhood abuse.) It is
intended only for the users of a specific set of newsgroups,
alt.sexual.abuse.recovery and its .d group.

On the newsgroup, there are usually several individuals who are
"that close" to committing suicide. Some will be shortly, or have
been recently, in psychiatric wards. Most have been in, or are
contemplating, psychological therapy of one sort or another.
Quite a few are taking medication for various psychiatric
conditions.

This is neither the time nor the place to discuss the wherefors
and whys of abuse recovery; you'll just have to take it as a
given that the rules used for understanding people in general
won't work so well when applied to this newsgroup, or to my
anonymous service.

I provide a service to people who, at least in specific areas,
are not rational, who are definitely irrational. I know of, for
example, one person who went into convulsions simply because they
received e-mail from a person who, many years ago, had abused a
child.

In line with that, my service differs from the standard anonymous
services. One is that it *is* integrated into the community. I am
a survivor myself, I offer personal assistance (in computer
matters) to people in the group, I forward the newsgroup via
e-mail to those who can't get it otherwise, and so on. These are
all part of what I do, not just running the anonymous service.
(In fact, I have to occasionally correct the erroneous belief
that I am responsible for the newsgroup; not surprising when you
realize that over half the newsgroup goes through my server.) My
service has things like being able to turn on and off e-mail
forwarding. People can remove themselves from the server
automatically. Shortly, people will be able to specify by id who
they do or do not get e-mail from.

The other area where my service differs is that the others
provide two distinct functions, confidentiality and privacy, but
there is no attempt, or reason, to protect their users from any
sort of e-mail. It's enough to deal with harassment claims when
they arise.

In mine, I've chosen a different direction. I've decided to make
the attempt to keep out specific types of e-mail, with the cost
that I cannot guarantee privacy from me. Also, I probably have a
higher standard of confidentiality than the other two services.
(This is not intending to suggest that there's anything wrong
with their standards, just that I suspect mine are a bit tighter.)

People on the newsgroup post their innermost secrets and fears and
many have a need to believe that those won't then be used against
them. (And, for that reason, the default for e-mail forwarding is
"off".) Public posting is one thing but it is quite easy for one
skilled in the art of abusing (and, yes, there are such people
and they do read the newsgroup, getting a kick out of the pain of
others) to manipulate people behind the scenes into abusive
situations and in such a way as to keep the victim from being
able to speak of what is going on. *That*, and similar things,
are what this is all about.

As to my thoughts on the relevant principles. As I mentioned, I
am an Objectivist. That may clue you as to where I'm coming from.
But in case not, the primary fact is that I'm offering a
*private* service. I run it out of my home, using my phone lines,
and paid for with my money. While I offer it to all on the
newsgroup, it *is* *not* intended for the general public. Only
survivors and their supporters are legitimate users. (Though I
tend to be lax on that. Just as I am with my encryption
proscription. There are users who send encrypted e-mail through
my service but they have recieved my prior permission to do so.)

No one, other than myself, has any right to specify what I do
with this, beyond the minimum of respecting their rights. Their
rights do not extend to arbitrary protection of their
confidentiality or privacy. Those who use my anonymous service
have an implicit right to protection of their anonymity *and that
is all*. (And even that is only up to a point.) Any other
protections I offer beyond that are mine to choose; they are not
implicit in an anonymous server. In addition to confidentiality,
I offer privacy in two ways: from others, because it is necessary
to protect confidentiality, and from myself, because no one likes
their innermost thoughts gratuitously pawed over by one who is
essentially a complete stranger. But that latter privacy is only
with respect to *gratuitous* invasion by myself. Beyond that, I
offer a watchful eye to keep abuses in hand.

The bottom line is this: I provide a useful service to over half
of the newsgroup. Most of its users are happy with it. Most
people who have communicated with me, who are or are potentially
legitimate users of my service, have been either neutral or
positive about my policies. (Yes, most people who have expressed
dislike for my policies are outsiders.)

As things are, they work well. No change is *necessary* though
some may be *desirable*. Careful thought and respectful dialog
may convince me of desirable changes. Logicless rhetoric and
verbal abuse, however, will, at best, cause me to ignore both the
speaker and his message.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Date: Wed, 18 Aug 93 15:46:09 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: World record in password checking
In-Reply-To: <9308182154.AA21533@snark.lehman.com>
Message-ID: <9308182243.AA27924@netcom5.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Perry Metzger, pmetzger@lehman.com, writes:

> You can do even better if you happen to have 2000 sparcstations which
> are idle for 16 hours a day. Myself, I wonder how many machines we
> would need for a net parallel DES crack.

I think this is Perry's way of telling us how Lehman Brothers (or
Shearson-Lehman, or American Can, or Primerica, or Kuhn-Loeb, etc.) is
_really_ making its money!

Put those unused CPU cycles to use!


-Tim May


-- 
..........................................................................
Timothy C. May         | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,  
tcmay@netcom.com       | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
408-688-5409           | knowledge, reputations, information markets, 
W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA  | black markets, collapse of governments.
Higher Power: 2^756839 | Public Key: PGP and MailSafe available.
Note: I put time and money into writing this posting. I hope you enjoy it.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: peter honeyman <honey@citi.umich.edu>
Date: Wed, 18 Aug 93 12:55:46 PDT
To: strick -- henry strickland <strick@versant.com>
Subject: Re: mailing list <-> newsgroup ?
Message-ID: <9308181951.AA12678@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> Yeah.  Gene Spafford often says ...

it is odd that you quote gene spafford in a group that is anathema
to his avowed goals.

	peter




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: cme@ellisun.sw.stratus.com (Carl Ellison)
Date: Wed, 18 Aug 93 13:00:42 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: `Stalled' Progress
In-Reply-To: <9308172302.AA14826@snark.lehman.com>
Message-ID: <9308181557.ZM29483@ellisun.sw.stratus.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


On Aug 17,  7:02pm, "Perry E. Metzger" wrote:
> Subject: Re: `Stalled' Progress
> 
> If we act as though we are shady, we will only make it easier to
> repress us.
> 


Amen!

I enjoy being shady at times - and certainly did in my
youth (something I cling to with my fingernails, now :-).

However, the giverment is trying to do something here which is an affront
to perfectly dull, ordinary people (like the Republicans for whom I work)
and Cypherpunks are doing something to fight against such reprehensible
behavior.

For this fight against Skipjack, Clipper and ITAR, I see no reason to
act like an underground organization.

In the above-ground fight, of course, it's interesting to speculate about
what the underground would do if Clinton's Cops were to try to clamp down.
That can be good information to bring to the public.  Then again, if it's
scary enough (like the V.Voice article, perhaps), maybe it could drive
the voting public into the loving arms of the FBI.

 - Carl





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: cme@ellisun.sw.stratus.com (Carl Ellison)
Date: Wed, 18 Aug 93 13:05:46 PDT
To: cme@ellisun.sw.stratus.com
Subject: Re: encrypted anonymous traffic
In-Reply-To: <9308181709.AA25457@MARIAN.STSCI.EDU>
Message-ID: <9308181603.ZM29489@ellisun.sw.stratus.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


On Aug 18,  1:09pm, Mike Rose wrote:
> 
> >It leads to insane conclusions, among others, the conclusion that we
> >must all be restricted in our speech at all times lest we offend
> >other's feelings. 
> 
> And I'm glad you pointed this out.  I hadn't looked at it this way,
> but I see now it's a clear extension from the "words are worse than
> bombs" philosophy.


It also leads to talk about strong crypto as if it were assault rifles.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: kurt@grogatch.seaslug.org (Kurt Cockrum)
Date: Wed, 18 Aug 93 14:45:47 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Call for Clipper Comments
In-Reply-To: <00541.2828442468.4792@washofc.cpsr.org>
Message-ID: <9308181622.AA00050@grogatch.seaslug.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


[...]
>* The potential risks of the proposal have not been assessed and 
>many questions about the implementation remain unanswered.  The 
>NIST notice states that the current proposal "does not include 
>identification of key escrow agents who will hold the keys for the 
>key escrow microcircuits or the procedures for access to the 
>keys."  The key escrow configuration may also create a dangerous 
>vulnerability in a communications network.  The risks of misuse of 
>this feature should be weighed against any perceived benefit.

o Escrow agents will certainly be subject to attacks, especially
  by other foreign powers with national-level budgets (for example,
  Britain, France, Israel, Japan, Russia, etc., or multi-nationals),
  *and/or* by talented crackers, or cracker-consortia, such as might
  found be on the cypher-punks mailing list :) :) .  At best, publishing
  the results of successful attacks (say, on alt.whistleblowers) might
  have the positive benefit of eventually dooming the system as a bad idea
  from the start, at the expense of those who chose to use the system
  (evolution in action, I guess), and the taxpayers (who pay for
  implentation & deployment).  That's doing it the hard way, though.
o Social/political-change organizations using the Clipper system for
  their internal communications would be especially vulnerable to
  COINTELPRO-style attacks.

[...]
>* The NIST proposal states that the escrow agents will provide the 
>key components to a government agency that "properly demonstrates 
>legal authorization to conduct electronic surveillance of 
>communications which are encrypted."  The crucial term "legal 
>authorization" has not been defined.  The vagueness of the term 
>"legal authorization" leaves open the possibility that court-
>issued warrants may not be required in some circumstances.  This 
>issue must be squarely addressed and clarified. 

o Typically, "legal authorizations" operate over a constrained period
  of time.  Once that time period is over, the authorization is supposed
  to go away.  However, there's no provision for the released key components
  to go away.  In effect, once key components are released, the corresponding
  user hardware is *permanently* compromised.  It's pretty likely that
  released key components would find their way to such private cop-agencies
  as Wackenhut, or LEIU (Law Enforcement Intelligence Unit), which has
  branches right in the police departments of most major cities.  [typically,
  when "red squads" are ordered to "destroy" their accumulated files,
  the files generally get transferred to LEIU].
o What guarantees the "duopoly" of the 2 escrow agencies?
  It's almost certain that somebody will attempt to "mirror" them,
  whether "legitimately" (CIA, say) or illegitimately, overtly or covertly.
  Again, look for LEIU here.

>* Adoption of the proposed key escrow standard may have an adverse 
>impact upon the ability of U.S. manufacturers to market 
>cryptographic products abroad.  It is unlikely that non-U.S. users 
>would purchase communication security products to which the U.S. 
>government holds keys.

Maybe they can get the UN in on the deal:
UNESCROW-A and UNESCROW-B!  hee, hee

--kurt@grogatch.seaslug.org (Kurt Cockrum)




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: strick -- henry strickland <strick@versant.com>
Date: Wed, 18 Aug 93 16:30:43 PDT
To: peter honeyman <honey@citi.umich.edu>
Subject: Re: mailing list <-> newsgroup ?
In-Reply-To: <9308181951.AA12678@toad.com>
Message-ID: <9308182331.AA20656@versant.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


THUS SPAKE peter honeyman <honey@citi.umich.edu>:
# it is odd that you quote gene spafford in a group that is anathema
# to his avowed goals.

Whether I speak to the 'punks, the spooks, or the 700 Club,
if I repeat something that you said first or said best,
I'll credit you, peter.

Spaf does have some experience with netnews, 
so I don't think it's that odd.                           
					strick




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: peter honeyman <honey@citi.umich.edu>
Date: Wed, 18 Aug 93 14:20:42 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: World record in password checking
Message-ID: <9308182116.AA14986@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


why doesn't this impress me?  i'll tell you why.  with

o   a stock version of des (dennis ferguson's), which is written in c,
    and not optimized for any particular chip or vector hardware

o   a no-name 50 Mhz 486, which you can buy for under $1,000 at fry's

o   netbsd, a freely available general purpose operating system

i have measured 29,000 des crypts per second. 

now give me a "1,024 node" machine made of of these -- admittedly
unwieldy, but no doubt a hell of a lot cheaper than a 1,024 node CM/5
(and a hell of a lot more useful, imho) -- and i can run at three times
the "world record" rate.

	peter, inveterate iconoclast




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Jim McCoy <mccoy@ccwf.cc.utexas.edu>
Date: Wed, 18 Aug 93 15:30:43 PDT
To: honey@citi.umich.edu (peter honeyman)
Subject: Re: World record in password checking
In-Reply-To: <9308182116.AA14986@toad.com>
Message-ID: <199308182228.AA22350@tramp.cc.utexas.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text


> why doesn't this impress me?  i'll tell you why.  with
[use a bunch of PCs running some freenix to do it]
>
> now give me a "1,024 node" machine made of of these -- admittedly
> unwieldy, but no doubt a hell of a lot cheaper than a 1,024 node CM/5
> (and a hell of a lot more useful, imho) -- and i can run at three times
> the "world record" rate.

Perhaps because internal communication between those 1024 machines will be
significantly more difficult than running on a machine that is optimized
for parallel operations, RPC just doesn't cut it.  You would probably lose
a number of your hosts off the top just to coordinate the activity of the
remaining machines. Besides, if you really want to do this spend your
one or two million (approx cost of your 1000PC site) on seriously dedicated
DES-cracking parallel hardware.  Do the cracking in hardware, not software.

Either way, I could think of more fun things to do with those 1024 PCs :)

jim



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Perry E. Metzger" <pmetzger@lehman.com>
Date: Wed, 18 Aug 93 14:55:47 PDT
To: peter honeyman <honey@citi.umich.edu>
Subject: Re: World record in password checking
In-Reply-To: <9308182116.AA14986@toad.com>
Message-ID: <9308182154.AA21533@snark.lehman.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



peter honeyman says:
> why doesn't this impress me?  i'll tell you why.  with
> 
> o   a stock version of des (dennis ferguson's), which is written in c,
>     and not optimized for any particular chip or vector hardware
> 
> o   a no-name 50 Mhz 486, which you can buy for under $1,000 at fry's
> 
> o   netbsd, a freely available general purpose operating system
> 
> i have measured 29,000 des crypts per second. 
> 
> now give me a "1,024 node" machine made of of these -- admittedly
> unwieldy, but no doubt a hell of a lot cheaper than a 1,024 node CM/5
> (and a hell of a lot more useful, imho) -- and i can run at three times
> the "world record" rate.

You can do even better if you happen to have 2000 sparcstations which
are idle for 16 hours a day. Myself, I wonder how many machines we
would need for a net parallel DES crack.

Perry




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Douglas Sinclair <dsinclai@acs.ucalgary.ca>
Date: Wed, 18 Aug 93 17:10:44 PDT
To: erc@apple.com
Subject: Re: your mail
In-Reply-To: <m0oSs7I-00022JC@khijol>
Message-ID: <9308190008.AA15077@acs1.acs.ucalgary.ca>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Having a revolution and then banning revolutions is nothing new. 
Read Machiaveli's (sp) _The Prince_.  After winning a revolution, his first
instruction is to kill the general that won it, because he has the power to win one again.
-- 
PGP 2.3 Key by finger




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Timothy Newsham <newsham@wiliki.eng.hawaii.edu>
Date: Wed, 18 Aug 93 21:35:53 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: no subject (file transmission)
Message-ID: <9308190432.AA28152@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>From nowhere@bsu-cs.bsu.edu Tue Aug 17 15:28:39 1993
Return-Path: <nowhere@bsu-cs.bsu.edu>
Received: from bsu-cs.bsu.edu ([147.226.112.101]) by hemp-imi.hep.anl.gov.noname (4.1/SMI-4.1)
	id AA01228; Tue, 17 Aug 93 15:28:35 CDT
Received: by bsu-cs.bsu.edu (5.57/Ultrix3.0-C)
	id AA07310; Tue, 17 Aug 93 15:32:24 -0500
Date: Tue, 17 Aug 93 15:32:24 -0500
Message-Id: <9308172032.AA07310@bsu-cs.bsu.edu>
From: Anonymous <nowhere@bsu-cs.bsu.edu>
To: EDITED
X-Remailed-By: Anonymous <nowhere@bsu-cs.bsu.edu>
X-Ttl: 0
X-Notice: This message was forwarded by a software-
	  automated anonymous remailing service.
Status: R


Introduction to BlackNet


Your name has come to our attention. We have reason to believe you may be
interested in the products and services our new organization, BlackNet, has
to offer.

BlackNet is in the business of buying, selling, trading, and otherwise
dealing with *information* in all its many forms. 

We buy and sell information using public key cryptosystems with essentially
perfect security for our customers. Unless you tell us who you are (please
don't!) or inadvertently reveal information which provides clues, we have
no way of identifying you, nor you us. 

Our location in physical space is unimportant. Our location in cyberspace
is all that matters. Our primary address is the PGP key location:
"BlackNet<nowhere@cyberspace.nil>" and we can be contacted (preferably
through a chain of anonymous remailers) by encrypting a message to our
public key (contained below) and depositing this message in one of the
several locations in cyberspace we monitor. Currently, we monitor the
following locations: alt.extropians, alt.fan.david-sternlight, and the
"Cypherpunks" mailing list.

BlackNet is nominally nondideological, but considers nation-states, export
laws, patent laws, national security considerations and the like to be
relics of the pre-cyberspace era. Export and patent laws are often used to
explicity project national power and imperialist, colonialist state
fascism. BlackNet believes it is solely the responsibility of a secret
holder to keep that secret--not the responsibilty of the State, or of us,
or of anyone else who may come into possession of that secret. If a
secret's worth having, it's worth protecting.

BlackNet is currently building its information inventory. We are interested
in information in the following areas, though any other juicy stuff is
always welcome. "If you think it's valuable, offer it to us first."

- trade secrets, processes, production methods (esp. in semiconductors)
- nanotechnology and related techniques (esp. the Merkle sleeve bearing)
- chemical manufacturing and rational drug design (esp. fullerines and
protein folding)
- new product plans, from children's toys to cruise missiles (anything on
"3DO"?)
- business intelligence, mergers, buyouts, rumors

BlackNet can make anonymous deposits to the bank account of your choice,
where local banking laws permit, can mail cash directly (you assume the
risk of theft or seizure), or can credit you in "CryptoCredits," the
internal currency of BlackNet (which you then might use to buy _other_
information and have it encrypted to your special public key and posted in
public place).

If you are interested, do NOT attempt to contact us directly (you'll be
wasting your time), and do NOT post anything that contains your name, your
e-mail address, etc. Rather, compose your message, encrypt it with the
public key of BlackNet (included below), and use an anonymous remailer
chain of one or more links to post this encrypted, anonymized message in
one of the locations listed (more will be added later). Be sure to describe
what you are selling, what value you think it has, your payment terms, and,
of course, a special public key (NOT the one you use in your ordinary
business, of course!) that we can use to get back in touch with you. Then
watch the same public spaces for a reply.

(With these remailers, local PGP encryption within the remailers, the use
of special public keys, and the public postings of the encrypted messages,
a secure, two-way, untraceable, and fully anonymous channel has been opened
between the customer and BlackNet. This is the key to BlackNet.)

A more complete tutorial on using BlackNet will soon appear, in plaintext
form, in certain locations in cyberspace.

Join us in this revolutionary--and profitable--venture. 


BlackNet<nowhere@cyberspace.nil>

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Version: 2.3

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DPnzkKPk2mlSDOqRanJZCkyBe2jjHXQMhasUngReGxNDMjW1IBzuUFqioZRpABEB
AAG0IEJsYWNrTmV0PG5vd2hlcmVAY3liZXJzcGFjZS5uaWw+
=Vmmy
-----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Eric Blossom <eb@srlr14.sr.hp.com>
Date: Wed, 18 Aug 93 18:30:43 PDT
To: pmetzger@lehman.com
Subject: World record in password checking
In-Reply-To: <9308182154.AA21533@snark.lehman.com>
Message-ID: <9308190129.AA26882@srlr14.sr.hp.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



> You can do even better if you happen to have 2000 sparcstations which
> are idle for 16 hours a day. Myself, I wonder how many machines we
> would need for a net parallel DES crack.

I've got ~1500 workstations...
Most are idle at night... 








From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: cme@ellisun.sw.stratus.com (Carl Ellison)
Date: Wed, 18 Aug 93 15:45:50 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Call for Clipper Comments
In-Reply-To: <9308181622.AA00050@grogatch.seaslug.org>
Message-ID: <9308181842.ZM29957@ellisun.sw.stratus.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


On Aug 18,  4:22pm, Kurt Cockrum wrote:
> Subject: Re: Call for Clipper Comments
> 
> Maybe they can get the UN in on the deal:
> UNESCROW-A and UNESCROW-B!  hee, hee
> 

Not bad...but I'm going to put in the bid for being one of the
escrow agencies.  I'm certainly more trustworthy than any federal
agency.  Besides, why should the government get all the bribe money?
I think private citizens should get to share in that revenue stream.

 - Carl







From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: T. William Wells <bill@twwells.com>
Date: Wed, 18 Aug 93 16:40:43 PDT
To: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Subject: Re: my aps
In-Reply-To: <9308182123.AA18807@netcom5.netcom.com>
Message-ID: <9308181846.AA01552@twwells.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Timothy C. May writes:
: I can readily see why Bill would like to have some limits (imposed by
: _him_...a pure marketplace decision!) on anonymity. After all, some
: sickos might literally post "Jump!" messages to those on the verge of
: suicide. (I am not being facetious or sarcastic here...I mean this
: quite seriously.)

They have. That, unfortunately, is outside of what I can do, since
that would require continuous monitoring and would simply be
impracticable. Yesterday's e-mail flow, for example, containe 161
messages and came to 433283 bytes. Even allowing for 1K for each
header, that's 272K of data. We're talking a small novel here!
And it would slow things down tremendously; I have to sleep some
time!

Some examples of what I do: One woman posted a message saying
that she was afraid that she might be killed by her step-father.
At that time, I grabbed her e-mail address from the database and
put it elsewhere so that if she disappeared without saying
farewell, I could initiate inquiries (thankfully, she didn't).

More recently, someone posted a very strange message that either
came from an abuser or from someone in a very scary and confused
place. I checked out the e-mail address and discovered that it
was the latter (that person also using a different id on my
service). Then, I added a trap into the service to see if anyone
would send e-mail to the new id because, almost certainly, anyone
responding to that message in e-mail would have to be an abuser.
(No one did.)

More ambiguously, I know of one person who is playing some
serious mind games with the group. That's the sort of thing
that's a real test because it's next to impossible to say what
the motive is behind the games. He might be an abuser or he might
be just making a play for sympathy. So far, the only action I've
taken has been to explain some of the facts to a couple of others
and ask them whether I should begin monitoring this person. (So
far, they've said no.)

: Other services should be free, of course, to have different policies.
: Those who want anonymity in anything they may say, including "Jump!,"
: are free to patronize such services.

Yup. I'm actually glad that there are other services. I can tell
people where the limits are and not feel like I'm excluding them
thereby.

: An excellent example of why and how specialized cyberspace services
: (like remailers) will develop various strategies. In a sense, Bill is
: acting as a filter, or a paternal figure (not meant pejoratively), for
: his clients.

Sorta. I can't guarantee safety but I can be a lot more
sympathetic to the needs of this specific community.

: > automatically. Shortly, people will be able to specify by id who
: > they do or do not get e-mail from.
:
: This is exciting! Specialized "agents," the wave of the future.

I guess so, though I don't think of it that way. What I do is
listen to the needs of the community and respond to them when I
can. What I described is something people have been wanting to do
for a long time.

: > As to my thoughts on the relevant principles. As I mentioned, I
: > am an Objectivist. That may clue you as to where I'm coming from.
: > But in case not, the primary fact is that I'm offering a
: > *private* service. I run it out of my home, using my phone lines,
: > and paid for with my money. While I offer it to all on the
:
: Many of us were strongly influenced by Rand (and even those who hate
: Rand, including some of my closest friends and Cypherpunks colleagues,
: understand the importance of freedom in market dealings).

Those who have been turned off by Rand and the Randroids may want
to check out the Bitnet Ayn Rand list. It's polite, arguments
from authority are not allowed, serious disagreement with
Objectivist dogma occurs, and there are a number of professional
philosophers, not to mention a new member, Dr. Branden (yes, that
one), to make life interesting.

:                                     And if I was running one of these
: abuse-related remailers (something about "ASAR," I recall), I suspect
: I'd have the same policy you have.

The group my server for is ASAR, for alt.sexual.abuse.recovery.

: Anonymity should not be forbidden by law, but it can (and sometimes
: should be) filtered by agents of the subscribers. If they don't like
: the way the filtering is done, they can try another service.

Exactly. And I have two competitors to keep me honest already,
not to mention any number of potential competitors.

: I hope you continue to contribute your ideas to our list.

Well, I didn't know the list existed until someone cc'd a message
to me into the list. What is this list and why would I want to
subscribe?




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: remail@tamsun.tamu.edu
Date: Wed, 18 Aug 93 17:50:43 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: ANON: remailer list
Message-ID: <9308190002.AA05127@tamsun.tamu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


At  3:42 PM 8/17/93 -0500, Karl Lui Barrus wrote:
>Q1: What cypherpunk remailers exist?
>
>A1:
>
> 1: nowhere@bsu-cs.bsu.edu 
> 2: hh@cicada.berkeley.edu 
> 3: hh@pmantis.berkeley.edu 
> 4: hh@soda.berkeley.edu 
> 5: 00x@uclink.berkeley.edu 

I've never gotten a response from this one. Has anyone?

> 6: hal@alumni.caltech.edu 
> 7: ebrandt@jarthur.claremont.edu 
> 8: remailer@rebma.mn.org 
> 9: elee7h5@rosebud.ee.uh.edu 
>10: hfinney@shell.portal.com 
>11: remail@tamsun.tamu.edu 
>12: remail@tamaix.tamu.edu 

These last two seem to remail from the same address. Are there really two,
with one automatically feeding into the other as a two-tier? What's the
deal?

I'll send this message to remail@tamaix.tamu.edu to illustrate. I tried to,
and this message bounced. This is the second try, to
remail@tamsun.tamu.edu.





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: szabo@netcom.com (Nick Szabo)
Date: Wed, 18 Aug 93 19:06:10 PDT
To: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Subject: Re: Crypto Protocols are Hard to Analyze
In-Reply-To: <9308182038.AA05720@netcom.netcom.com>
Message-ID: <9308190206.AA16644@netcom.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Tim May: 
> Crypto protocols are _hard_ to analyze! 

Agreed, alas.

> I'm currently trying to analyze a digital cash "coupon" system proposed by
> Nick Szabo,

Whoa nelly!  "S&H greenstamps" and another recent idea I've bounced
off Tim refer to a LEGAL "protocol".  S&H greenstamps are
"coupons" that can be used to "win" a wide variety of items from
several participating companies; they are not just coupons good for 
discount on a specific item or the products & services of a specific 
company ("Disney Dollars").  S&H greenstamps got into some legal hot 
water for being too close to a privately issued currency, but 
nevertheless they are still around.  S&H greenstamps make a good legal 
"edge case".

From an object-oriented point of view, "E-greenstamps" inherit
digital cash and add legal structure.  Here I am assuming that 
E-greenstamps or other business/legal manifestations of digital cash can 
be implemented with Chaum's protocol, providing "Pretty Good Digital 
Cash" in the cryptographic sense.   The "Chaum off the shelf" 
assumption.  If there are holes in Chaum's scheme, or major problems 
with implementing it in software, I'd like to hear more, but "S&H 
greenstamps" concept doesn't address software security issues.

> "premature productization"?)

I think it's good to discuss business and legal issues -- cf.
the excellent thread on methods of converting physical to/from digital
cash.  If we think the work ends with implementing a 
good cryptographic protocol, we are sadly mistaken.  Perhaps that's 
where the work of "cypherpunks" ends, but I have a broader vision of
crypto-anarchy that covers the legal, business, and in general
social issues as well.  Any group that wants to seriously
deploy cryptography in the real world has to discuss these as well.
And indeed we do -- does PGP infringe on patents, is it proper
for a remailer operater to read or record what goes through his system, 
etc.  

Crypto-anarchy will really take off when the (real, spendable) money
starts flowing.   Thus we should examine a wide variety of business
concepts.  The "speculative business plan" is a great way to do this.
Of course cypherpunks are mostly hackers, and we will 
concentrate on the hacking -- but before crypto-anarchy emerges,
the legal and business problems (eg not driving off customers with
complex or "shady" operations) also have to be solved.  

We do need to be more clear on when we are talking about cryptographic 
protocols ("digital cash"), legal structures ("S&H greenstamps"), and 
business concepts ("commercial remailer"). 

> 1. Our archive site of papers and books is not available to many of the
> folks attempting to develop new protocols. To pick one example: digital
> money in all its various forms. 

I'd love to see some digicash papers on soda.  I also agree on the
need for standardizing terminology in the field of cryptography
and related protocols for remailers, digital cash, etc.  Your
concept of a "Protocol Compiler" to enable testing of new
concepts for anon remailers, digicash, etc. is intriguing. 
We have already started a "tricks database" with the Word Perfect
crypto-cracker on soda; we need to expand that.

Alas, there may be strong incentive for businesses to put hype
before strong crypto substance.  In response, we need to pursue 
the following two activities -- eventually, perhaps creating a separate 
organization for each:

* A "cracker's guild" to break weak cryptography and publicize
the cryptanalysis algorithms (cf. the Word Perfect crypto cracker),
forcing the weak crypto off the market.  For example, if 
NetCash was deployed this organization would crack it.  This
organization might be funded anonymously by those selling strong 
crypto (who have an incentive to debunk their competitor's hype).

* A formal Crypto Auditing Agency that would verify the algorithms
and protocols were secure, without revealing trade secrets.
My next statement may cause hisses & boos, but I think the recent
Crypto-Auditing of Clipper by Denning and other eminent 
cryptologists will be a model widely applied in the commercial
computer security business.   The auditors should be 
able to examine the source and run the programs without revealing
trade secrets.

Nick Szabo				szabo@netcom.com




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: smb@research.att.com
Date: Wed, 18 Aug 93 16:55:50 PDT
To: Jim McCoy <mccoy@ccwf.cc.utexas.edu>
Subject: Re: World record in password checking
Message-ID: <9308182351.AA19699@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


	 Perhaps because internal communication between those 1024
	 machines will be significantly more difficult than running on
	 a machine that is optimized for parallel operations, RPC just
	 doesn't cut it.  You would probably lose a number of your
	 hosts off the top just to coordinate the activity of the
	 remaining machines.

But DES-cracking and password-cracking are almost completely decomposable;
no co-ordination is necessary after you've sent the ciphertext string and
the starting point for the search. 

	 Besides, if you really want to do this spend your one or two
	 million (approx cost of your 1000PC site) on seriously
	 dedicated DES-cracking parallel hardware.  Do the cracking in
	 hardware, not software.

Sure -- if you want a machine that does nothing but.

	 Either way, I could think of more fun things to do with those
	 1024 PCs:)

Well, there's been an interesting thread on rec.woodworking about hurling
strange things with medieval siege engines...




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: remail@tamsun.tamu.edu
Date: Wed, 18 Aug 93 18:10:47 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: ANON: remailer list
Message-ID: <9308190108.AA11116@tamsun.tamu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> >11: remail@tamsun.tamu.edu
> >12: remail@tamaix.tamu.edu 
> These last two seem to remail from the same address. Are there really two,
> with one automatically feeding into the other as a two-tier? What's the
> deal?

tamsun and tamaix are two different machines which share, NFS-ed, user
directories; hence, any mail sent to tamsun or tamaix goes through the same bit
of remailing script.  They both work independantly, however, and I decided to
keep both in case one of the machines goes down for some reason.

> I'll send this message to remail@tamaix.tamu.edu to illustrate. I tried to,
> and this message bounced. This is the second try, to
> remail@tamsun.tamu.edu.

Let me know via email to remail@tamsun.tamu.edu if you still can't get your
message through.  It should work though.

-- 
[  Carlos Macedo Gomes		][    Quis Custodiet    ][:    .8.    :]------
[  gomes@tamu.edu		][    Ipsos Custodes?   ][   . ooo .   ]000000
[  cmghelp@tamsun.tamu.edu	][			][ : =o(Y)o= : ]000000
[  My views- not TAMU's		][30 37 40 N, 96 20 03 W][oo .ooooo. oo]------




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Johan Helsingius <julf@penet.FI>
Date: Wed, 18 Aug 93 10:55:44 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: No Subject
Message-ID: <9308182003.aa19556@penet.penet.FI>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


anonymous@extropia.wimsey.com writes:

>  Uu> Actually, Julf's solution isn't too bad.
> 
> It is if your gate won't process the password header line.

How many times do I have to repeat that anon.penet.fi can pick up
the X-Anon lines from the message body, as long as they are the
first non-empty message lines?

>  Uu> Maybe Julf needs to bite the bullet and start using PGP.
>  
> That would be nice.  I particularly enjoy using the PGPed remailer at
> remail@extropia.wimsey.com, which is not only private, but reliable and
> damn near grunge-proof.

Unfortunately it has the disadvantage that I can't reply to your messages.

Yes, I need to bite the bullet. I want to support PGP. But I have to pay my
rent, too...

	Julf





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: nobody@alumni.cco.caltech.edu
Date: Wed, 18 Aug 93 21:20:45 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: network parallel decryption amateur style
Message-ID: <9308190414.AA00586@alumni.cco.caltech.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Recent postings have gotten me to thinking:  If we wrote a
easily portable UNIX program to decrypt DES in parallel across
our many machines, how fast could we go?

Perhaps we could make use of the anonymous remailers to hide
our cooperation.

How many computers do we have?  I have account on somewhere between
10 and 20 Sparcstation IIPX's which are very lightly loaded
at night...someone else said they have 1500...

PC gurus might want to also make versions for high-speed PC's on
the net.  It wouldn't even need to be very difficult, just maybe
having one complex server which assigns keyranges to every
person who mails in a request, and gets mailed back the range
to check.  It doesn't really have to be automatic, although that
would be nice.

What do y'all think?

-(signature removed, because, this is a dangerous idea.
  That's why I like it ;)




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Eric Hughes <hughes@soda.berkeley.edu>
Date: Wed, 18 Aug 93 21:50:46 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: META: on topics
Message-ID: <9308190447.AA14672@soda.berkeley.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


A message from your list maintainer.

I try not to interfere with topic selection too much.  I have only
once or twice specifically requested that some topic not be discussed.
Today, however, I want to offer a specific guideline about a group of
topics.

The guideline is as follows: Do not discuss topics on cypherpunks
which are already frequently discussed on sci.crypt or
alt.security.pgp and do not directly relate to cypherpunks concerns.

To illustrate this guideline, the recent thread on parallel DES
cracking has been well discussed on sci.crypt.  This initial
announcement was interesting, and maybe one round of short comments
were appropriate, but the discussion should be held on sci.crypt.
There is already a forum there, please use it.  

The list is large and getting larger.  There are, by my guess, maybe
four times as many people who were previously on the list than those
who are on the list; most of these dropped out for volume, from the
comments I get.

I echo the call for self-restraint made earlier.

Others have recently written on what cypherpunks, the list, is about.
I have some comments myself, which are long, and go back to original
purposes, and such.  I will not elaborate too far in this message.
_Pace_ Tim May, I do think that there should be some guidelines about
list content.

Cypherpunks is not all cryptography to all people, and parallel
DES-cracking particular cryptography is totally mainstream.
Cypherpunks is not totally mainstream.  Cypherpunks is about
implementations of cryptography, particularly disapproved-of
cryptography--not just the privacy of epistles but the privacy of the
structure of society.

There can be no hard separation of topics between the newsgroups and
this list; I don't intend to enforce one.  Nevertheless, some things
clearly belong better elsewhere.  The existence of gray areas does not
prevent the existence of clear ones.

I do understand the concerns that some members of the list are new to
cryptography as well as cypherpunks.  Cryptology is a large and
increasingly technical field; there is no substitute for some hours of
study.  I myself have logged hundreds of hours reading technical
cryptography, and while I don't expect that many of the members of the
list will ever do that, I do expect that those who want to learn will
do some proactive reading.  You can't be spoon fed a working knowledge
of anything; working knowledge is the result of working.

Since meta-discussion can easily bring down a group, I will appreciate
it if responses to this position are short, cogent, and thoughtful.

Eric




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: bbyer@BIX.com
Date: Wed, 18 Aug 93 19:20:43 PDT
To: Jim McCoy <mccoy@ccwf.cc.utexas.edu>
Subject: Re: World record in password checking
In-Reply-To: <199308182228.AA22350@tramp.cc.utexas.edu>
Message-ID: <9308182210.memo.53061@BIX.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>Perhaps because internal communication between those 1024 machines will be
>significantly more difficult than running on a machine that is optimized
>for parallel operations, RPC just doesn't cut it.  You would probably lose
>a number of your hosts off the top just to coordinate the activity of the
>remaining machines.

They do not necessarily have to be co-ordinated (or interconnected at
all).  You could easily give each one a range of combinations to try, and
wait until one succeeds.

Ben Byer <bbyer@bix.com>






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Al Billings <mimir@u.washington.edu>
Date: Wed, 18 Aug 93 22:50:46 PDT
To: Timothy Newsham <newsham@wiliki.eng.hawaii.edu>
Subject: BlackNet
In-Reply-To: <9308190432.AA28152@toad.com>
Message-ID: <Pine.3.05z.9308182213.A25037-7100000@carson.u.washington.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



 It had to happen. Even if it isn't real, it will happen soon enough. I'm
all for it.







From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: hfinney@shell.portal.com
Date: Wed, 18 Aug 93 23:20:46 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Physical to digital cash, and back again
Message-ID: <9308190605.AA05358@jobe.shell.portal.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Anonymous points out problems with managing and using digital cash:

>	(1) customer reads ad about cool net.service
>		(a) they contact directly (but this ruins privacy)
>		(b) they contact independent distributor of
>		PGP key and anon-remail address generating software.
>		(but how does customer trust _them_?)
>	(2) vendor sends key & address generators (via e-mail or floppy),
>	and physical-mail-security instructions
>	(3) customer sends in money order (from mail drop or without
>	return address!) along with chosen anon e-mail address and public 
>	key.
>	(4) vendor sets up account and e-mails the d-cash.
>	(5) we still need a physical mail drop or bearer bank
>		account for withdrawals, refunds, etc. of physical cash.

It's true that this is a lot of steps.  This is one reason why we should
push to make anonymous mail easy to use.  If you start with an infra-
structure where you can communicate securely and anonymously across the
net, with return messages that don't reveal your true identity, you have
a good start on steps 1 and 2 above.

Another simplification would be to split the users of the digital cash
into customers and vendors, along the lines of the triangle diagram Tim
suggested.  In my experience, I make many withdrawals from my bank, but
often only two deposits a month as my paycheck comes in.  Applying this
to the digital bank model, customers would mostly make digital cash with-
drawals to buy things on the net, with occasional physical cash deposits
to keep their balance up. Customers would thus primarily turn real cash
into digital cash which they send to vendors; the vendors then turn the
digital cash back into real cash.  Customers can remain anonymous even
without physical mail drops, while vendors have less anonymity.

In this model, a customer sees some new software being sold on the
net.  He normally keeps enough digital cash on hand for such spending,
so he sends the cash to the seller, including one of his standard anonymous
return addresses for the return software.  If this lowered his stock of
digicash below the amount he likes to keep around, he sends another check
to the bank and gets another batch of digicash.

(This would be analogous to carrying cash in your wallet, and when it
gets low you stop by the ATM and withdraw more.  How often do you find
yourself depositing cash back into the ATM?  I suspect customers of the
digital cash bank would similarly not need to turn their digicash back
into real dollars very often.)

With an infrastructure like this, using digital cash does not have to be
complicated.

> Also, the issue of which parts of these schemes are *legal*
> is critical, but being completely overlooked.

I once posted some excerpts from the Code of Federal Regulations involving
the tax requirements of barter agencies.  These are organizations in
which their members exchange their labor without the use of regular
cash.  Often they use some scrip as a substitute for cash, or they may
just keep records in an accounting system.  It appeared to me that
virtually any form of digital cash would fall under this definition.

Barter agencies are not illegal, but there are many rules about reporting
transactions and members.  It would definately not be possible under the
current tax code for a barter agency to have anonymous members.  Therefore
it looks like anonymous digital cash would not be legal in the U.S. at
this time.  I don't know about Duncan's suggestion to use an offshore bank.

Paul Robichaux wrote, regarding the NetCash proposal:

> Collusion between the service provider & the currency house can
> produce a record of exactly what I bought, but I don't know that
> blinding can do much better.

Actually, blinding can do better.  Collusion between the bank and the
vendor can not break customer anonymity in a cash system using Chaum's
blinding protocols.  This is one of the things I found so surprising
about the NetCash proposal.  I am surprised they dare to call their
idea an implementation of digital cash when it does not even provide
this bare minimum of customer anonymity.  This anonymity is why we call
it "cash", as distinguished from other forms of money.  The NetCash
proposal is more like cashier's checks.

Bill Stewart writes:

> If you're sending non-accountable-by-sender cash, you need some way to get
> a receipt.  If you're mailing a check or digicash, you have a way to 
> repudiate the transaction or at least make a claim against them,
> or if you can go in to the bank in person for the transactions with cash.

This is a good point, and is another reason why blinding is so important.
If you don't mind it being known in general terms that you are a customer
of the bank, you can send a check with instructions to turn it into digital
cash to be sent to your email address.  There will still be no way that
the bank can figure out when or where you spend that digital cash.  And
they are no more likely to just cash your check and pocket the money than
any other mail order business would be.

Hal Finney
hfinney@shell.portal.com




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: cdodhner@indirect.com (Christian D. Odhner)
Date: Wed, 18 Aug 93 23:30:45 PDT
To: mimir@u.washington.edu (Al Billings)
Subject: Re: BlackNet
In-Reply-To: <Pine.3.05z.9308182213.A25037-7100000@carson.u.washington.edu>
Message-ID: <9308190626.AA22276@indirect.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> 
>  It had to happen. Even if it isn't real, it will happen soon enough. I'm
> all for it.
> 
I think it's not real. Or at least wasn't intended to be. My best guess is
that it's all a joke, but that the author will soon start receiveing
genuine replys; it may yet turn into the real thing.

Happy Hunting, -Chris.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: khijol!erc@apple.com (Ed Carp)
Date: Wed, 18 Aug 93 23:46:13 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: APS-0.3 - anonymous posting software for the masses
Message-ID: <m0oT3YF-00022JC@khijol>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text


FYI - I have released the source code for APS-0.3 out to alt.sources.  If
anyone wants the sources but doesn't have access to alt.sources, they can email
me and I'll be glad to email them the software (it's fairly small).
-- 
Ed Carp, N7EKG			erc@apple.com			510/659-9560
                            anon-admin@khijol.uucp
If you want magic, let go of your armor.  Magic is so much stronger than
steel!        -- Richard Bach, "The Bridge Across Forever"



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: MIKEINGLE@delphi.com
Date: Wed, 18 Aug 93 20:45:52 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Cypherpunk Chip
Message-ID: <01H1WQ5739PU8ZGJD4@delphi.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I'd like to propose a Cypherpunk chip to take the place of the
Clipper chip. This could go a long way toward bringing the
Cypherpunk vision to life, and it could also make someone a
fortune. But first, I'm going to flame a bit.
 
Even without key escrow and secret algorithms, Clipper is no good.
The Clipper chip uses a conventional single-key algorithm, so if
you want to use it with public-key, you have to do the RSA
operations in software. This makes it vulnerable to tampering and
key stealing. Clipper is essentially a beefed-up DES with a built-
in spy hole and a classified "trust us" algorithm.
 
The NSA seems to believe that only their classified algorithms are
unbreakable. This is not true. We don't need to trust the NSA to
give us an unbreakable single-key cipher. What we need are two
good, respected ciphers and a simple reorganization operation.
 
Choose, for instance, IDEA and triple-DES. Both are good
algorithms. They have keys which are long enough to rule out any
possibility of a brute-force attack. They are resistant to known
methods of cryptanalysis, including differential cryptanalysis.
They have good dispersion and produce pseudo-random ciphertext.
Whether the NSA could break either of these, using a classified
method, is pure speculation.
 
IDEA and triple-DES are very different algorithms. DES is based on
bit manipulation and permutation tables, whereas IDEA uses 16-bit
arithmetic operations. This is good, because it means that if
either algorithm has a flaw, the other one is not likely to have
the same flaw.
 
Take a 64-byte section of plaintext. Encrypt it using triple-DES.
Now, reorganize the ciphertext: take the first byte of each 8-byte
DES block (bytes 0,8,16, and so on) and make the first 8 bytes of
the reorganized section. Repeat with the second, third, etc. until
the entire 64 bytes are reorganized. So:
 
0       0       0       0       0       0       0       0       
ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZabcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz0123456789!@
becomes:
AIQYgow4BJRZhpx5...and so on.
 
Then, re-encrypt the section with IDEA, producing double-encrypted
ciphertext.
 
Suppose you now change one bit in the ciphertext and decrypt it.
When you decrypt IDEA, you get one 8-byte block of garbage (which
is indistinguishable from the rest of the still-encrypted data).
When you undo the reorganization, you get one bad byte in each DES
block. So when you DES decrypt, you get 64 bytes of garbage.
 
This compound cipher is effectively a 64-byte block cipher, in that
every bit in the 64 bytes depends on every other bit. This means
that you would have to attack a 64-byte section i.e. you would need
64 bytes of plaintext to attempt a plaintext attack. And even if
you had the 64 bytes, you probably couldn't do anything with it. If
you found a weakness in either cipher that allowed you to attack
it, the same weakness would not exist in the other cipher (since
they are based on different methods). So you could not attack the
compound cipher. For this reason, a combination of two ciphers,
especially with the reorganization, should be much more secure than
one cipher. If I had to choose a cryptosystem to bet my life on,
I'd choose this above Skipjack any day.
 
Of course, it would be slower than a single cipher, but there are
ways to make it usable. For example, the reorganization would be
performed by straight-line assembly language, with no loops. And
the encryption program would use a large disk buffer. Or, better
yet, use hardware. See below.
 
The Cypherpunk Chip
 
Why couldn't we make a chip of our own, with some venture capital?
This would be a public-key encryption chip, with all the necessary
hardware self-contained, which would make secure phones, faxes,
computers, and everything very easy. RSA Data Security could make
a fortune if they received only a small royalty on each one sold.
The design of the chip would be extremely public and readily
available. Any company could produce them if it was willing to pay
for the use of the RSA algorithm.
 
The chip would contain a hardware true-random-number generator;
facilities for executing RSA; MD5 or another message digest; and an
extremely secure conventional cipher such as the compound cipher
mentioned above. It would also contain nonvolatile (flash ROM)
registers to store its public key and secret key.
 
Hardware random numbers can be generated by several methods. One is
to measure the jitter in an unstable oscillator. Another is to
reverse bias a diode, right on the edge of zener breakdown, causing
it to produce white noise. These methods can be proven by quantum
mechanics to be inherently random.
 
The chip would be sold blank - no serial number or anything. The
user would instruct it to initialize itself by generating a key
pair. It would do this internally, producing and remembering a
public key and secret key. This might take a while, but you only
have to do it once. When this is finished, you can easily extract
the public key, but there would be no way to extract the secret key
from the chip. The chip would be designed to make it very difficult
and expensive to extract the secret key by physical surgery, thus
making key stealing hard. The secret key would be stored internally
in encrypted form, using a pass phrase much like PGP does, and the
chip would decrypt it before each operation.
 
In addition to the initialization, there would be five basic
operations. The chip could output its public key, encrypt, generate
signatures, decrypt, and check signatures.
To encrypt, you would send the chip one or more public keys for
people you want to send to. It would generate a random session key,
and output the session key RSA-encrypted with each of the provided
public keys. It would never reveal the actual session key. Then the
chip would accept plaintext, 64 bytes at a time, and output
ciphertext. When the encryption of a particular message was
finished, the chip would forget the session key.
 
To sign, you would send the text to the chip, along with the pass
phrase, and it would run the MD5 algorithm on it. When finished, it
would output the signature, the MD5 encrypted with its secret key.
 
To check a signature, you would send the text, signature, and
public key, and the chip would output good or bad.
 
To decrypt, you would send the ciphertext and pass phrase, and the
chip would output the plaintext.
 
This chip would do basically what PGP does, except that it would be
self-contained, very difficult to steal keys from, and easy to use
in any device. The chip would not need to be hard-wired into a
device. It could be built into a card or other plug-in module,
perhaps PCMCIA compatible. You could use this as an electronic
identity, while retaining the option to remain anonymous by getting
a second card and generating a new identity. The card might also
contain a memory for other people's public keys.
 
You could, for example, insert the card into a pay phone and dial
your pass phrase. This would secure the call, allow you and the
recipient of the call to verify each others' identities, and pay
for the call with digital cash.
 
If this chip existed, "crypto-anarchy" would be easy. Everyone
would have a motive to use it. There would be no more credit card
fraud, no more phone-code fraud, no more bad checks, no more
hacking, no more surveillance, etc. The chip could make it happen.
We cipherpunks could actually win.
 
The chip would be introduced in a low-key way. We would let the
market see its advantages and jump on it, before the bad guys
recognized the threat. For example, it could be introduced as an
option for computers - plug it into a PCMCIA card slot and use it
to secure E-mail, your hard drive, etc. Don't advertise what it
could become; just let it happen. When we get it started, it will
happen by itself.
 
                                     < mikeingle@delphi.com >




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Date: Thu, 19 Aug 93 00:15:53 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Crypto Protocols are Hard to Analyze
In-Reply-To: <9308190206.AA16644@netcom.netcom.com>
Message-ID: <9308190715.AA23256@netcom5.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


In the interests of keeping the volume of postings down, I'll say only
a few words about Nick Szabo's many good points:

> > I'm currently trying to analyze a digital cash "coupon" system proposed by
> > Nick Szabo,
> 
> Whoa nelly!  "S&H greenstamps" and another recent idea I've bounced
> off Tim refer to a LEGAL "protocol".  S&H greenstamps are
> "coupons" that can be used to "win" a wide variety of items from
> several participating companies; they are not just coupons good for 
> discount on a specific item or the products & services of a specific 
> company ("Disney Dollars").  S&H greenstamps got into some legal hot 
> water for being too close to a privately issued currency, but 
> nevertheless they are still around.  S&H greenstamps make a good legal 
> "edge case".

I certainly consider "legal" issues to be part of the larger protocol,
inasmuch as banks, credit unions, etc., must obey all sorts of laws.
And there are IRS reporting "protocols," and so on. 

Part of my point was that calling things "Green Stamps" (not a slur on
Nick's idea) does not exempt them, nor does it even really mean they
are not money. Whether Green Stamps, coupons, digital bearer bonds,
"Get Out of Jail Free Cards," whatever, are "money" or not is a
complicated issue, which I can't go into here (1. No space, 2. I'm not
an expert, 3. The _names_ alone are not enough to tell.).

Eric Hughes investigated digital money from a legal point of view (for
example, the funny messages printed on your checks, like "Pay to
the order of," have actual, real meanings). I'm sure Eric, Duncan
Frisell, Sandy Sandfort, Perry Metzger, etc., can elaborate.

Part of the energy barrier we face, or soon will, is that crypto money
has had none (or very little) of the centuries of evolution--successes
and failures--that ordinary money has had. There may be clever ways to
make some forms of digital money essentially be isomorphic to actual
money--the stuff the world is used to, that is--and hence ride the
coat tails of the world's current system. But these will be
complicated, adding to the difficulty of analyzing new protocols for
crytographic, legal, fiduciary, and social acceptability.

> >From an object-oriented point of view, "E-greenstamps" inherit
> digital cash and add legal structure.  Here I am assuming that 
> E-greenstamps or other business/legal manifestations of digital cash can 
> be implemented with Chaum's protocol, providing "Pretty Good Digital 
> Cash" in the cryptographic sense.   The "Chaum off the shelf" 
> assumption.  If there are holes in Chaum's scheme, or major problems 
> with implementing it in software, I'd like to hear more, but "S&H 
> greenstamps" concept doesn't address software security issues.

Well, Chaum and his students have various specialized protocols, that
is, they reduce the complexity by mainly targeting one particular type
of system (toll roads, or digital cash for shops to redeem, whatever).
The "difficulty of analyzing protocols" issue.

Where Nick's idea fits it, how it might be spoofed by shopkeepers,
what prevents forgery, etc., are some of the many issues.

By the way, the latest (August) issue of "Mother Jones" has an article
on a small town in New England (I think) which has their own barter
dollars. We talked about barter dollars, and the Italian experiment
some time back, about a year or so ago, when the List was just getting
started.

Let me point out that the IRS takes a dim view of barter transactions
that are denominated in things other than dollars. 

> cash.  If we think the work ends with implementing a 
> good cryptographic protocol, we are sadly mistaken.  Perhaps that's 
> where the work of "cypherpunks" ends, but I have a broader vision of
> crypto-anarchy that covers the legal, business, and in general
> social issues as well.  Any group that wants to seriously
> deploy cryptography in the real world has to discuss these as well.

Agreed. Which is yet another reason to better formalize our reasoning
about complex protocols. The metaphors are too vague.

> We do need to be more clear on when we are talking about cryptographic 
> protocols ("digital cash"), legal structures ("S&H greenstamps"), and 
> business concepts ("commercial remailer"). 

The lines that separate them are tenuous. I agree it would be nice to
try to identify some truly basic "cryptographic primitives," and even
have them available in libraries (secret sharing, bit committment,
n-out-of-m voting, etc.). (But this is a tall order, as most of these
schemes have been written about, but are not available in software.)

> I'd love to see some digicash papers on soda.  I also agree on the

They're best left scattered amongst the "Crypto" Proceedings, for
reasons I've mentioned (briefly: 1. Hard to OCR them, 2. Anyone doing
work in this area _must_ have access to the Proceedings, if only to
track down the various referenced papers, 3. Too many papers on soda
could expose it to legal action (copyright), 4. The printed papers are
easier to read, anyway.).


> * A "cracker's guild" to break weak cryptography and publicize
...
> * A formal Crypto Auditing Agency that would verify the algorithms
> and protocols were secure, without revealing trade secrets.

Any Cypherpunks are of course free to do these things, but I won't
hold my breath waiting. These things take a lot of time. And the
Cypherpunks group just is in no position to "decide" on a strategy and
then somehow "assign" staff to these projects. So, it won't get done
this way.

(That's also why a "Cypherpunk chip" is farfetched....too much work.)

This is not because Cypherpunks are lazy or unfocussed, but because
Cypherpunks is a group of volunteers, all with their own goals and pet
projects. 

-Tim May


-- 
..........................................................................
Timothy C. May         | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,  
tcmay@netcom.com       | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
408-688-5409           | knowledge, reputations, information markets, 
W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA  | black markets, collapse of governments.
Higher Power: 2^756839 | Public Key: PGP and MailSafe available.
Note: I put time and money into writing this posting. I hope you enjoy it.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "L. Detweiler" <ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Date: Wed, 18 Aug 93 23:25:53 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: T. Wells & Anonymity
Message-ID: <9308190625.AA04961@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


My last response to Mr. Wells was in private and I hoped he would take
that course himself in future communication, but as it stands he now
has screamed insults at me twice in a row in this forum, and I must
address his latest unanswered letter; most of these following points
are from my private letter.

The fundamental issue at stake is: is Mr. Wells routinely and regularly
monitoring the content of the email he forwards via his so-called
`anonymous server'? The answer is: definitely. To do so is very
ethically borderline, IMHO, no matter who his `family'. This was enough
to alarm me seriously to the point of writing a very vehement letter
condemning this type of `surveillance'. Yes, he has provided this
service for a long time, he is doing so voluntarily, he has a select
group of participants with a particular sensitivity and need, `most' of
whom are satisfied with it, this I all acknowledge.

However, it's evident to me that all users of anonymous services have a
set of unconscious expectations, foremost among them that the operator
will not routinely be reading their mail. I pointed out to Mr. Wells
that breaking the violation of trust in privacy may lead the operator
to breach the trust in anonymity. Merely the knowledge of content can
lead the operator to serious quandaries that can be wholly avoided in
completely adhering to privacy. Furthermore, an operator who does not
strive to adhere conscientiously to the set of unconscious user
expectations, even if working on a voluntary basis, is actually doing
his users a disservice.

Mr. Wells' rambling letter, replete with references to his personal
philosophy of Objectivism, is a complicated set of rationalizations
that amount to `yes, I regularly monitor my server's email traffic, in
fact I consider it my duty.'  Given his unswerving obstinacy to this
practice, I asked that he make this policy clear in his introductory
statements to the server, but he has consistently failed to reassure me
that he actually has done so, making me wonder to what extent of the
readers in the newsgroup and of his server (a substantial overlap
according to him) are aware of this very serious matter of `systematic
observation'. Are any people using this server as a plain vanilla
server, or do they all realize that they are establishing a very strong
personal arrangement of trust with this operator, who considers their
relationship analogous to the protective Platonic intimacy between a
therapist and his patients? Who will personally censor messages he
thinks will unduly upset them?

Mr. Wells tells us that `this is neither the time nor the place to
discuss the wherefors and whys of abuse recovery; you'll just have to
take it as a given that the rules used for understanding people in
general won't work so well when applied to this newsgroup, or to my
anonymous service.'  Mr. Wells, I don't claim to be a specialist in the
area as you insinuate yourself, but I believe there are fundamental
laws of respect and candor that are appropriate -- *necessary* -- for
*all* people, and my concern is precisely that you may be not be
adhering to it in this case in presenting your policies. Your polarized
dance of defensiveness and offensiveness indicates to me clearly a
nerve has been struck.

Mr. Wells' letter is full of seemingly contradictory statements. He
seems to think that `confidentiality' and `privacy' are `two distinct
functions', and suggests that in his regular email monitoring he
actually achieves a `tighter, higher standard of confidentiality' than
Helsingius or Kleinpaste's servers.

Also, his attitudes on the limitations of his actual commitments to the
people who use his service are extremely disturbing.  He says `Their
rights do not extend to arbitary protection of their confidentiality or
privacy' and the actual protections granted are `mine to choose' and
`not implicit in an anonymous server'. I find these comments
simultaneously highly revealing and alarming. From my point of view the
sheer all-encompassing trust awarded a server operator by users
requires every conceivable commitment on the latter's part to
*transcend* the common denominator in user expectations of privacy.

Mr. Wells says he personally handles `half the traffic' of the sexual
abuse recovery newsgroup, and that `most' of its users and his
`potentially legitimate' correspondents are satisfied, and that most
people who have `expressed dislike for my policies' are coincidentally
`outsiders'. His service is `integral to a specific community'. Perhaps
so, but how would he react to another server operator specifically
serving that group? His statements seem to reflect a perverse pride in
his monopoly on the group's anonymity and secret knowledge of its
participants. IMHO, this is precisely the kind of extremely
compromising position encryption would effortlessly avert.

Finally, I'm extremely disappointed in Mr. Wells transparently
vitriolic rhetoric to deflect the primary issues of systematic
monitoring and truth in advertising to ugly subsidiary sideshows, such
as with his expert diagnosis of me as `mentally unbalanced'.  This
classicly ridiculous ad hominem insult is particularly ironically
insensitive coming from someone who professes to tiptoe around areas
requiring the utmost delicacy in human interaction in supporting people
with mental anguish! Yes, my mind is indeed teetering on the brink of a
breakdown -- from Mr. Wells blows, who says of me, `he should consider
himself honored that I bothered to tell him where he went wrong.' --
such words bespeak an attitude of shocking, sickening arrogance and
intolerance. Caveat emptor!

P.S. I will respond no further to Mr. Wells in this forum.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: technopagan priest <tedwards@wam.umd.edu>
Date: Wed, 18 Aug 93 21:45:53 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Cypherpunk Chip
Message-ID: <199308190441.AA26648@rac2.wam.umd.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



I suppose the biggest problem with a Cypherpunk chip is
actually getting it designed and built.  I think it is
difficult to imagine anyone with a real job having the time
and money to put it together.  

However, it is not out of the realm of possibility for a
graduate project, except one must run the question of whether
there is enough novelty in such a device to make it an appropriate
project.  I'm not sure if IDEA has been implemented in silicon
yet, but clearly it will be more difficult to implement in a
fast way than DES.  

Then there is the issue of patents...DES is the only freely
usable algorithm in the concept.  One would probably have to
contact the IDEA people to ensure there are no problems with
us using the technique.  RSA, well, we know the problem there.

Finally, even if implemented as a MOSIS device under NSF or
other grants in a university research situation, we'd have to
find a foundry to go into mass-production.  This would not
be possible without ironing out all legal problems.

Of course, I think PKP might be on our side about Clipper,
and might be very willing to license the Cypherpunk chip
at a reasonable rate.

I've done a couple of analog chips through MOSIS...and no,
my advisor wants me doing silicon models of auditory cortex,
not crypto, but I'll mention it to any incoming grad students
here who want to do some digital stuff.

-Thomas




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: rjc@gnu.ai.mit.edu (Ray)
Date: Thu, 19 Aug 93 02:10:45 PDT
To: ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu (L. Detweiler)
Subject: Re: T. Wells & Anonymity
In-Reply-To: <9308190625.AA04961@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Message-ID: <9308190906.AA08244@geech.gnu.ai.mit.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



  This seems to be a case where technology can easily be applied to bring
about a mutually satisfactory solution. If Mr. Wells wants to moderate his 
anonymous posting service, why not have it immediately remove all header
information from the message, and store the result for later verification
and posting. Thus, Mr. Wells can still "weed-out" the annoying childish-insult
messages that someone like BIFF might post anonymously while protecting the
privacy of those who have legitimate needs.

  On the other hand, I feel Mr. Detweiler has gone a little overboard
in his attack in what seems to be an attempt to protect the masses from
their own stupidity. The simple facts of the matter are, any time you use an
anonymous remailer without encryption you run the risk of having your email 
intercepted. One thing people need to learn is that the world is a risky place
and any action you take can have negative consequences. I certainly
wouldn't send threats to president@whitehouse.gov expecting Hal's
or Julf's remailers to protect me.

  Even using encryption, an anonymous remailer operator as well as many
other people can do traffic analysis. Unix keeps tons of logs which
are quite easy to parse. (I recently got finished writing syslog accounting
software which tracks all the path of all messages sent and
received on a system bills them based on bandwidth.)

 There are several things you can do such as remailer chaining, using
private machines (off the network), etc but none guarantee absolute
privacy.

  If you are concerned about protecting the masses, write up your own
"Remailer Safety FAQ" detailing the benefits and dangers.


 
-Ray

p.s. is there a proposal out there to increase the security of
moderated newsgroups? I was thinking that it might be a good idea
to incorporate digital signatures into the moderation protocol
such that newsreaders could filter out messages which didn't have
a proper moderator's signature.


-- Ray Cromwell        |    Engineering is the implementation of science;    --
-- EE/Math Student     |       politics is the implementation of faith.      --
-- rjc@gnu.ai.mit.edu  |                         - Zetetic Commentaries      --




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: nobody@shell.portal.com
Date: Thu, 19 Aug 93 14:01:05 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Physical to digital cash, and back again
Message-ID: <9308191211.AA12617@jobe.shell.portal.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


As usual, Hal Finney writes an excellent post on digital cash.
However, some assumptions need to be addressed.

> [triangle model divides the world into banks, shops, and customers]
> Customers would thus primarily turn real cash
> into digital cash which they send to vendors; the vendors then turn the
> digital cash back into real cash.

In its first few years of operation (at least), a digicash currency
will be of highly uncertain value and reputation:

Currency will:
* Be of questionable legality in some jurisdictions.  Once
they catch on, governments will actively suppress it.
* Lack a track record.
* Be able to purchase only a limited number of specialized
information services -- the customer won't be able to use it to 
buy groceries, make house or car payments, etc.

Thus, as a customer, the *first* thing I will be concerned about is
the ability to convert my digital cash into currency that can
be used to purchase physical goods & services in my local
jurisdiction.  Specific application #1 -- an information worker
or contractor being payed in digital cash will want to convert that 
digital cash into local currency, early and often.  Specific 
application #2: customer deposits money into an account to pay 
for online services.  In most cases the customer will be concerned about
refunds and return of unspent funds.  Specific application #3:
on-line casino, with digital cash chips.  Casino customers'
first priority will be the ability to "cash out" with as little
hassle as possible.  

Now we could stretch things and call the person who wants to
cash out the "shop" (especially for case #1), but then the
necessity of a user-freindly system would apply just as much
to shops as it would to customers.  Better to have a symmetric 
relationship between agents rather than dividing the world into 
customers and shops.  Any of these agents may wish to make 
payments in either direction.  In many cases the amount of payments 
will be quite assymetric, but in most cases the ability to make secure 
payments both ways should exist.

This gives us the following model:  (using FRNs as the local
legal cash currency):


					-------
					|     |
			              	v     |
FRN bearer acct <--> d-cash acct <-> agents   |
	^				^     |
	|				|     |
	v				-------
  physical cash


> [customer] sends another check
> to the bank and gets another batch of digicash.

Not a good idea, checks are not private!  Try cash or money
order.






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Matt Blaze <mab@crypto.com>
Date: Thu, 19 Aug 93 03:25:59 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: network parallel decryption amateur style
In-Reply-To: <9308190414.AA00586@alumni.cco.caltech.edu>
Message-ID: <9308191010.AA10142@crypto.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



>Recent postings have gotten me to thinking:  If we wrote a
>easily portable UNIX program to decrypt DES in parallel across
>our many machines, how fast could we go?
>

Using the fastest software DES implementation I know of, optimized for
fast single-bit key change, it would take about a million SparcStation-years
(at 100% utilization) to do an exhaustive DES search.

Even assuming a order of magnitude faster than that (from a better
implementation or faster common workstation hardware), that's still
an awful lot of Sparc-years you'd have to get "the net" to donate.

-matt




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Johan Helsingius <julf@penet.FI>
Date: Wed, 18 Aug 93 23:40:45 PDT
Subject: Re: Anon: remailer list
In-Reply-To: <1930.2C718751@shelter.FIDONET.ORG>
Message-ID: <9308190844.aa05356@penet.penet.FI>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



As usual:

repl: bad addresses:
	"M. Stirner" <M..Stirner@f28.n125.z1.fidonet.org> -- no mailbox in local-part (.)

> .   Penet.fi will no longer work for me since the forced-password
> implementation due to an apparent header conflict with the
> X-Anon-Password: line & local host/gate software.

No, no, no! Sigh! Once again: You *don't* have to put the X-Anon-Password
line in among the headers, it's OK as the first non-empty line *in the message
body*.

> .   Why am I depressed?

Because you use a screwed-up mail system/gateway? Because you give up too
easily?

> ... Organization: Concerned Norwegians Against Lutefisk, S.F., CA

Oh? *This* might be the real reason for your depression. I sympatize. Lutefisk
gets me, too!

	Julf





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: cme@ellisun.sw.stratus.com (Carl Ellison)
Date: Thu, 19 Aug 93 07:40:47 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Cypherpunk Chip
In-Reply-To: <01H1WQ5739PU8ZGJD4@delphi.com>
Message-ID: <9308191037.ZM1771@ellisun.sw.stratus.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


On Aug 18, 11:36pm, MIKEINGLE@delphi.com wrote:
> Subject: Cypherpunk Chip

[triple-DES | permute larger block | IDEA]
  
> Suppose you now change one bit in the ciphertext and decrypt it.
> When you decrypt IDEA, you get one 8-byte block of garbage (which
> is indistinguishable from the rest of the still-encrypted data).
> When you undo the reorganization, you get one bad byte in each DES
> block. So when you DES decrypt, you get 64 bytes of garbage.

Yes.

For some time, I've been advocating (over in sci.crypt)

	compress|des-cbc|tran|des-cbc|tran|des-cbc

instead of normal triple DES.  tran is not an encryption algorithm so it's
been posted worldwide several times and is available from me by mail or on
a few ftp sites.  It does a pseudo-random transposition of a variable
length block (up to 8KB) -- using the sum of bytes in the first block as
the key to the PRNG.  [That could be better and I'm planning to do an
improvement -- using the histogram of the bytes of the first block as a
much larger key to the PRNG.]  tran is a self-inverse.

This dosen't guarantee bit diffusion -- but does diffuse the probability of
change (of a single output bit, given a changed single input bit) evenly
over a big block.

For operation within a single chip, I'd advocate yours rather than this
tran.

Of course, one could also do (for S/W solutions):

	compress|des-cbc|tran|idea-cbc|tran|des-cbc

> Of course, it would be slower than a single cipher, but there are
> ways to make it usable. For example, the reorganization would be
> performed by straight-line assembly language, with no loops. And
> the encryption program would use a large disk buffer. Or, better
> yet, use hardware. See below.

There's no reason for pipelined operations like yours or mine to be slower
than a single cipher.  The pipelines need to be kept full.  That means
that you feed the chip data with one set of handshaking and take data from
it with another set.  You don't treat the chip like an RPC.  As long as
you think UNIX pipes, it will make sense.

 - Carl





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: hkhenson@cup.portal.com
Date: Thu, 19 Aug 93 14:00:46 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Digital money prototypes
Message-ID: <9308191058.1.17017@cup.portal.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I wonder if the various precidents set by traveler's checks might
be useful in developing digital money.  If American Express (or
some similar) got into the game, it would be rather interesting.
Keith




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: remailer@merde.dis.org (remailer bogus account)
Date: Fri, 20 Aug 93 07:51:03 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: No Subject
Message-ID: <9308191811.AA23324@merde.dis.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


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From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: peter honeyman <honey@citi.umich.edu>
Date: Thu, 19 Aug 93 09:20:46 PDT
To: cme@ellisun.sw.stratus.com (Carl Ellison)
Subject: Re: Cypherpunk Chip
Message-ID: <9308191619.AA18795@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


how important is the prng aspect of tran?  presumably des-cbc does
a good job of bit diffusion.  why is it better to tran than to 
"dd conv=swab" or rot13?  (or even to do nothing at all, simply
des-cbc|des-cbc|des-cbc?)

	peter




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: khijol!erc@apple.com (Ed Carp)
Date: Thu, 19 Aug 93 13:06:05 PDT
To: julf@penet.FI (Johan Helsingius)
Subject: Re: T. Wells & Anonymity
In-Reply-To: <9308191324.aa09804@penet.penet.FI>
Message-ID: <m0oTG7R-00021zC@khijol>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text


> >   On the other hand, I feel Mr. Detweiler has gone a little overboard
> > in his attack in what seems to be an attempt to protect the masses from
> > their own stupidity. The simple facts of the matter are, any time you use an
> > anonymous remailer without encryption you run the risk of having your email 
> > intercepted. One thing people need to learn is that the world is a risky place
> > and any action you take can have negative consequences. I certainly
> > wouldn't send threats to president@whitehouse.gov expecting Hal's
> > or Julf's remailers to protect me.
> 
> Yes. But in this case we are talking about somebody who definitely feels it is
> OK to check in on other people's messages - but he only admited to it after a
> very lengthy debate on a.s.a.r, that he did his best to shut down - without
> replying to accusations of him eavesdropping.

He has threatened more than one person with lawsuits regarding this whole
matter.  I feel it is really in his best interest for this whole discussion
to go away.  Why, I can only speculate...

> >   If you are concerned about protecting the masses, write up your own
> > "Remailer Safety FAQ" detailing the benefits and dangers.
> 
> I still feel a remailer operator should make his policies known up front.
> Just like Karl Kleinpaste's "if you do something I consider abuse, I will
> expose you" policy.

I've released APS-0.3 to the outside world, because I welcome criticism and
suggestions.  The Wells APS has never been released so far as I know - who
knows what the software does?

I don't monitor ANY of the messages going out through my APS - I'm too damned
busy trying to make a living in the sluggish California economy to worry
about who's posting/emailing what...
-- 
Ed Carp, N7EKG			erc@apple.com			510/659-9560
                            anon-0001@khijol.uucp
If you want magic, let go of your armor.  Magic is so much stronger than
steel!        -- Richard Bach, "The Bridge Across Forever"



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: gtoal@an-teallach.com (Graham Toal)
Date: Thu, 19 Aug 93 07:26:04 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: mailing list <-> newsgroup ?
Message-ID: <6013@an-teallach.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


In article <9308181850.AA10702@toad.com> newsham@wiliki.eng.hawaii.edu writes:
 >   How many people are subscribed to this list right now?  How many
 > people have read it before and dropped off only due to bandwidth
 > problems?  This list easily generates more traffic than any of
 > the newsgroups I read.  If the number of people on this list is

Then use better tools!  I easily cope with this list -- and another
one which averages 300 letters a day.  I set up separate accounts
for each list and gateway them into local 'mail.*' newsgroups.

Admittedly, if it comes in with your real mail it would be a pain.

But I'd rather keep it as email than news just to keep that cretin
Sternlight out :-)

G
===
Personal mail to gtoal@gtoal.com (I read it in the evenings)
Business mail to gtoal@an-teallach.com (Be careful with the spelling!)
Faxes to An Teallach Limited: +44 31 662 4678  Voice: +44 31 668 1550 x212





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: gtoal@an-teallach.com (Graham Toal)
Date: Thu, 19 Aug 93 07:31:04 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: World record in password checking
Message-ID: <6015@an-teallach.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


 > You can do even better if you happen to have 2000 sparcstations which
 > are idle for 16 hours a day. Myself, I wonder how many machines we
 > would need for a net parallel DES crack.
 > 
 > Perry

Hmmm.... shouldn't be hard to organise either - everyone adds a crackd
daemon to their inetd.conf...  hey - even better - we make it an extension
to 'sendmail' and put it in the default distribution bwahahaha ;-)

G
===
Personal mail to gtoal@gtoal.com (I read it in the evenings)
Business mail to gtoal@an-teallach.com (Be careful with the spelling!)
Faxes to An Teallach Limited: +44 31 662 4678  Voice: +44 31 668 1550 x212





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Johan Helsingius <julf@penet.FI>
Date: Thu, 19 Aug 93 04:16:19 PDT
To: Ray <rjc@gnu.ai.mit.edu>
Subject: Re: T. Wells & Anonymity
In-Reply-To: <9308190906.AA08244@geech.gnu.ai.mit.edu>
Message-ID: <9308191324.aa09804@penet.penet.FI>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



>   On the other hand, I feel Mr. Detweiler has gone a little overboard
> in his attack in what seems to be an attempt to protect the masses from
> their own stupidity. The simple facts of the matter are, any time you use an
> anonymous remailer without encryption you run the risk of having your email 
> intercepted. One thing people need to learn is that the world is a risky place
> and any action you take can have negative consequences. I certainly
> wouldn't send threats to president@whitehouse.gov expecting Hal's
> or Julf's remailers to protect me.

Yes. But in this case we are talking about somebody who definitely feels it is
OK to check in on other people's messages - but he only admited to it after a
very lengthy debate on a.s.a.r, that he did his best to shut down - without
replying to accusations of him eavesdropping.

>   If you are concerned about protecting the masses, write up your own
> "Remailer Safety FAQ" detailing the benefits and dangers.

I still feel a remailer operator should make his policies known up front.
Just like Karl Kleinpaste's "if you do something I consider abuse, I will
expose you" policy.

	Julf





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: nobody@alumni.cco.caltech.edu
Date: Thu, 19 Aug 93 15:20:48 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Cypherpunk DES distributed DES last post
Message-ID: <9308192217.AA14930@alumni.cco.caltech.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Since the list keeper has requested, let us let the DES parallel
breaking die, for the time being at least.

I mentioned a possible Cypherpunk project to set up a network
of parallel DES de-cryptors linked by cryptographically secure
anonymous remailers to avoid obvious detection (although one could
argue all those flops in the night might speak for themselves).

A quick test shows the Sparcstation IIPX doing about 100 decryptions
per second in a typical unloaded system from a user account (these
are relatively small decryptions...we assume here we are decrypting
a text which only a small portion needs to be decrypted to reveal
its appropriate entropy measure).

Or over eight unused hours at night, in the neighborhood of 3 million
decryptions.  Let's even assume we can marshall 5000 similar machines
through our combined talents, that's 15*10^9 decryptions.  Keeping in
mind the total 56-bit keyspace is 72*10^15, we're still talking 
around 5 million nights to solve the problem (~13,000 years).

If we want to solve one system per month, it looks like we can only
handle about 38 bits worth of keyspace.  Not very impressive.
So, until the next technological leap, we can probably forget about
this.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: cme@ellisun.sw.stratus.com (Carl Ellison)
Date: Thu, 19 Aug 93 12:30:46 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Cypherpunk Chip
In-Reply-To: <9308191619.AA26375@transfer.stratus.com>
Message-ID: <9308191528.ZM2217@ellisun.sw.stratus.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


On Aug 19, 12:18pm, peter honeyman wrote:
> Subject: Re: Cypherpunk Chip
> how important is the prng aspect of tran?  presumably des-cbc does
> a good job of bit diffusion.  why is it better to tran than to 
> "dd conv=swab" or rot13?  (or even to do nothing at all, simply
> des-cbc|des-cbc|des-cbc?)
> 
> 	peter
>-- End of excerpt from peter honeyman


I did a version of tran which did 4 rounds of an FFT-style butterfly.
This achieves maximal mixing.  However, it's predictable -- therefore
easier to cryptanalyze (not that I'd care to try it :-).

DES does a fine job of bit diffusion, within its block.  (for CBC, that
includes the rest of the stream -- if you hide the ciphertext from the
cryptanalyst, so he can't XOR it out again)

tran moves bytes of DES output around so that they can expect to have
new neighbors for the next round of encryption.  This produces diffusion.

The actual diffusion of tran is less than that of the FFT-butterfly.
However, for the cryptanalyst, there are more possibilities.  Any byte
can go anywhere within the 8KB block.  With the FFT, each byte goes to
a known location and gets diffused with 7 neighbors by the next round of
DES.

 - Carl




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: jim@tadpole.com (Jim Thompson)
Date: Thu, 19 Aug 93 14:40:47 PDT
To: pcw@access.digex.net
Subject: Re: Traveller's Checks...
Message-ID: <9308192136.AA18425@chiba.tadpole.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain




> 
> I think that American Express wouldn't be interested in 
> anonymous cash because the most important "feature" of
> a traveller's check is the lack of transferability. Once
> they're bought, only one person can spend them. 

I doubt that Amex is interested in traveller's checks for this
reason.  AMEX likes traveller's checks because they make a lot
of money on the 'float', the time value of the money you give them
before they have to redeem the checks when some bank presents them
for payment.

A digital bank could make a lot of money on 'float' too.  Given that
anonymous cash could be much harder to steal than paper checks, AMEX
could very well be interested in this 'new' type of monetary instrument.

Jim



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Peter Wayner <pcw@access.digex.net>
Date: Thu, 19 Aug 93 14:20:46 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Traveller's Checks...
Message-ID: <199308192117.AA27958@access.digex.net>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



I think that American Express wouldn't be interested in 
anonymous cash because the most important "feature" of
a traveller's check is the lack of transferability. Once
they're bought, only one person can spend them. 

Still, there might be people interested in anonymous
approaches. 

-Peter




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: wcs@anchor.ho.att.com (Bill_Stewart_HOY002_1305)
Date: Thu, 19 Aug 93 16:51:31 PDT
To: plmoses@emoryu1.cc.emory.edu
Subject: Fiat currency: Re:  Electracy: Evil Revisited
Message-ID: <9308192239.AA06169@anchor.ho.att.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text


(Most of this is diatribe, and I wasn't sure whether to Cc: cypherpunks,
but there's some relevance to creating digital currency near the end.)

Paul Moses writes:
> Sorry, but today's currency system is anything but a democracy.  Thank God.
> It works because it is entrusted to a COMPETENT elite. 

Gack, sputter, foo, bletch!

The currency system works so *badly* because it's trusted to an elite
who can abuse it for their own power and enrichment.
It works as well as it does because currency *is* a market,
so it's subject to the usual price (all the market will bear)
and power is subject to the usual limits (overabuse leads to revolution),
and the elite is competent enough to know how much it can get away with.
Yes, an incompetent elite is usually worse (e.g. the old Argentina or Israel),
and democratically controlled fiat currency is inherently incompetent
(the Golgafrinchians in HHGTTG declaring leaves to be money, etc.,
and their current US version, the Populist Party.)

But fiat currency, anywhere, any time, can always be abused, and eventually is.
Hard currency, such as gold, or silver, is subject to market fluctuations,
but there's some inherent value, and a fair amount of local stability.
Consumable commodity currencies, such as tobacco, alcohol, cows, and grain, 
have their obvious drawbacks, but they're very useful in pre-industrial 
societies (including the US up to the mid-1800s), and use reappears in
badly trashed economies (immediate post-WWII Germany, when the alternative
was fiat scrip deutschmarks, which were rapidly being printed and inflating.)

In all of the non-fiat systems, the value of the "currency" is variable,
but *you* decide what value *you* place on it, relative to the market.
In fiat systems, *somebody else* (maybe "everyone", maybe an oligarchy)
decides not only what value they place on it, but what value YOU must place on it.
It's backed, not by trust, but by theft and threat of violence or default;
witness the US confiscations of gold and legal tender laws, or the current 
Russian replacement of old rubles with limited quantities of new ones.

Non-fiat soft currencies, including Green Stamps, private banknotes, etc.
work ok because the issuers realize they are subject to the constraints
of the market, so they have to maintain the goodwill of their customers,
either through backing with harder currencies, goods or services, 
or through expectations of future backing with them.  That's easiest to
maintain if you're a provider of services, or if you're (for example)
providing a convenient storage/exchange of other currencies.

In addition to US and other government fiat currency, I also use
a variety of private currencies - checks and credit cards,
which are agreements to provide quantities of real silver money,
(or substitute Federal Reserve private banknotes instead); New York Subway Tokens
and New Jersey freeway toll tokens, which are agreements to provide services;
Joe's Coffee Pot money, which is an agreement to provide addictive drugs :-).
I know and trust Joe, and he'll either provide the coffee out of the
accumulated coffee profits, or his own pocket, and I'd only be out a buck
if he defaults anyway.  I somewhat know and distrust the New York and New Jersey
transportation bureaucracies, but they'd take too much political heat if
they defaulted, and the price for their services never decreases :-),
so I'm willing to risk 1-20 bucks, and tokens are a bit cheaper than cash in NJ.
I use credit cards mainly for convenience; merchants are willing to
give me stuff in return for my signature on a credit card bill
because they trust the credit card provider to generally pay up.
Merchants in the US generally accept US traveller's checks, because they
can get cash for them cheaply and quickly; merchants in Central or Eastern Europe
either didn't take them, or gave me less than face value for them.

If we're going to start using digicash, and want people to accept it in
return for goods and services, we either need to back it with services
(like email or remailing or software support or freeway tolls), or we need
to back it with other-currency transport/delivery/storage services the way
credit cards and travellers checks do, or find some other reason for
people to want the digicash and trust its value-stability.


> [Elitist stuff about mob rule under democracy, deleted]

I agree with most of what you say there.  I'd be happy to have a system
where the public could BLOCK new legislation, or get rid of old legislation,
but just not make new stuff; the catch is how to implement it in a way
that doesn't get the positives and negatives mixed up.

		Bill Stewart



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: cme@ellisun.sw.stratus.com (Carl Ellison)
Date: Thu, 19 Aug 93 16:20:49 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: new tran
Message-ID: <9308192316.AA03198@ellisun.sw.stratus.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I've just modified tran to operate off the histogram of inputs
and have posted the code to sci.crypt.

It's also available from me by e-mail.

 - Carl




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Peter Wayner <pcw@access.digex.net>
Date: Thu, 19 Aug 93 16:26:10 PDT
To: jim@tadpole.com
Subject: Re: Traveller's Checks...
Message-ID: <199308192321.AA13563@access.digex.net>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Many banks make money on float. Could digital cash
pay interest? I guess the bank could append a date
to the cash and mark up the value when it is "spent",
but that might compromise some of the anonymity. 

I'm sure the bank would volunteer to guard our
anonymity in the strictest sense by not paying
the interest.

-Peter




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: baumbach@atmel.com (Peter Baumbach)
Date: Thu, 19 Aug 93 18:00:50 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Traveller's Checks...
Message-ID: <9308192350.AA12661@bass.chp.atmel.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Peter Wayner says:
> I think that American Express wouldn't be interested in 
> anonymous cash because the most important "feature" of
> a traveller's check is the lack of transferability. Once
> they're bought, only one person can spend them. 
>[...]
I think American Express would be interested in collecting a
percentage of the cash-flow.  The underground economy is pretty
big.  Wouldn't it be nice to get a percentage of it?

Peter Baumbach
baumbach@atmel.com




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: nfe@scf.nmsu.edu
Date: Thu, 19 Aug 93 20:00:49 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: parallel DES thread
Message-ID: <9308200259.AA18201@NMSU.Edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



nobody@alumni... please write me.
nfe@freedom.nmsu.edu




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: mbriceno@aol.com
Date: Thu, 19 Aug 93 19:20:49 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: mailing list <-> newsgroup ?
Message-ID: <9308192144.tn196089@aol.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


gtoal@gtoal.com writes:

>Admittedly, if [Cypherpunks] comes in with your real mail it would be a
pain.
   It does come with my regular mail and yes: it is a pain.

>But I'd rather keep it as email than news just to keep that cretin
>Sternlight out :-)
   I stopped reading the PGP news group. This Sternlight guy is
monopolizing-and thereby destroying- the discussion. Better stay a mailing
list.

--Marc




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: hfinney@shell.portal.com
Date: Thu, 19 Aug 93 22:50:51 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Encrypted cypherpunks list
Message-ID: <9308200517.AA14986@jobe.shell.portal.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


A reminder to old subscribers, and a notice to new:  I have some software
running on this system (related to the remailer software) which can be
configured to send a PGP-encrypted version of the list to subscribers.
This way you can receive this "subversive" material without any local
system operators knowing what you are doing.

Send me your address and PGP public key if you'd like to be put on the
encrypted list.

Hal Finney
hfinney@shell.portal.com




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: hfinney@shell.portal.com
Date: Thu, 19 Aug 93 22:51:38 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Physical to digital cash, and back again
Message-ID: <9308200517.AA14990@jobe.shell.portal.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I agree with Anonymous that there are problems with the actual use of
digital cash in the near term.  But it depends to some extent on what
problem you are trying to solve.

One concern I have is that the move to electronic payments will decrease
personal privacy by making it easier to log and record transactions.
Dossiers could be built up which would track the spending patterns of
each of us.

Already, when I order something over the phone or electronically using
my Visa card, a record is kept of exactly how much I spent and where I
spent it.  As time goes on, more transactions may be done in this way,
and the net result could be a great loss of privacy.

Paying in cash is still possible through the mail, but it is insecure and
inconvenient.  I think that the convenience of credit and debit cards will
overcome most people's privacy concerns and that we will find ourselves
in a situation where great volumes of information exist about people's
private lives.

This is a place that I could see digital cash playing a role.  Imagine a
Visa-like system in which I am not anonymous to the bank.  In this model,
imagine that the bank is granting me credit similar to a credit card.
But instead of giving me just an account number which I read over the phone
or send in an email message, it gives me the right to request digital cash
on demand.

I keep some digital cash around and spend it for transactions as I described
in my previous posts.  When I get low I send some email to the bank and get
some more dcash.  Every month I send a check to the bank to cover my account
just as I do with my credit cards.  My relations with the bank are very
similar to my current relationships with the credit card companies: frequent
withdrawals and a single payment each month by check.

This has several advantages over the system which we are heading towards.
No records are kept of where I spend my money.  All the bank knows is how
much I have withdrawn each month; I may or may not have spent it at that
time.  For some transactions (e.g. software) I could be anonymous to the
vendor; for others the vendor might know my real address, but still no central
location is able to track everything I buy.

(There is also a security advantage over the ridiculous current system in
which knowing a 16 digit number and an expiration date allows anyone to
order anything in my name!)

Furthermore, I don't see why this system could not be as legal as
current credit cards.  All that really differs in this system is the
inability to track where users spend their money, and as far as I know
this ability was never an important legal aspect of credit cards.
Certainly nobody will admit today that the government has a vested interest
in moving towards an environment in which every financial transaction is
tracked.

Granted, this does not provide full anonymity.  It is still possible to see
roughly how much each person spends (although nothing stops a person from
withdrawing much more cash than he will spend in a given month, except per-
haps for interest expenses; but maybe he can lend the extra digicash itself
and gain interest on that to compensate).  And it is oriented around the same
customer/vendor model that Anonymous criticized.  But I maintain that this
model represents the majority of electronic transactions, today and in the
near future.

It's worth noting that it is not trivial to become a merchant who can
accept credit cards.  I went through this with a business I had a couple
of years ago.  We were selling software through mail order, and this makes
the credit card companies very nervous.  There is so much phone fraud in
which credit card numbers are accumulated over a few months, then large
amounts of charges made against them.  By the time the user receives his
monthly statement and complains, the vendor has disappeared.  In order to
get our credit card terminal we went to a company which "helps" startups
with this.  They seemed like a pretty shady outfit, themselves.  We had to
fudge our application to say that we'd be selling something like 50% of
the units at trade shows, which apparently counted as over-the-counter sales.
And we had to pay about $3,000 up front, as a bribe, it seemed.  Even
then we probably couldn't have done it if we hadn't had an office in the
business district.

Under the digital cash system, this might be less of a problem.  The main
problem with digital cash is double-spending, and if you are willing to go
with online verification (reasonable for any business which is going to take
anything over several hours to deliver the merchandise) this can be
completely prevented.  So there is no longer any possibility of merchants
collecting credit card numbers for later fraud.  (You still have problems
with non-delivery of merchandise, though, so not all risks are eliminated.)
This might eventually make the system more widely available than current
credit cards.

I don't know whether this system could be used to support illegal actions,
tax evasion, gambling, or whatever.  That is not the purpose of this
proposal.  It does offer the prospect of improving personal privacy and
security, in a framework that might even be legal, and that's not bad.

Hal Finney
hfinney@shell.portal.com




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: nobody@shell.portal.com
Date: Thu, 19 Aug 93 22:51:18 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Blinded RSA signatures
Message-ID: <9308200544.AA15625@jobe.shell.portal.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


An excellent description of blinding and digital
cash, forwarded from sci.crypt:

In article <24924cINNg4c@network.ucsd.edu>, 
loki@sdphu3.ucsd.edu (Lance M Cottrell) writes:
 -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
 Some time ago I read an article in Scientific American
 about using RSA and smart cards to achieve untraceable
 and unforgable electronic cash.  The system hinged on being
 able to "blind" a message which would be signed
 by the bank, and then the blinding would be removed
 without disturbing the signature.  The signed message
 would then decrypt to the original message, but the signer
 would not know what she had signed.  The article made no
 mention of how to do this "blinding".
 
 This morning I came up with a method which I would like
 comments upon.  First the notation
 
 ^ : exponentiation
 n : the bank's modulus (p*q in usual notation)
 e : the exponent used to encrypt the message sent
 	to the bank
 d : the exponent used to decrypt the bank's encryption.
 t : the text that you want signed.
 x : some random number with a multiplicative inverse mod n.
 y : the inverse of x mod n.
 c : the cipher text corresponding to t
 a : the blinded plain text
 b : the encrypted blinded text.
 
 Now the procedure.
 
 blind the plain text by
 	a = ((x^d) * t) mod n
 
 the bank encrypts a by
 	b = (a^e) mod n
 	  = ((((x^d)^e)mod n) * ((t^e)mod n)) mod n
 
 the blind is removed by multiplying through by y
 	since ((x^d)^e)mod n = (x^(d*e))mod n = x
 
 	c = y * b 
 	  = (y * x * ((t^e) mod n))mod n
 	  = (t^e) mod n
 
 
 The question is, can one find x and y such that
 (x*y) mod n = 1, and can the bank recover t when only given a.
 Also, please tell me if there is some fundamental error in
 my handeling of math mod n.
 
 Many thanks for any comments.  If anyone knows the method the
 original authors used, please post that as well.
 

Fine description of Chaum's blind signature protocol.  Your
math looks good.

It is easy to find y, given x and n, such that (x*y) mod n = 1,
(provided gcd(x,n)=1, as it is for most x ).
See Knuth Vol II section 4.5.2, or look up the extended
Euclid's algorithm in some good algorithms text.

The bank can not tell which t was signed via some a, since
for any t and a with t in the multiplicative group mod n,
there is some x such that a=x^d * t (mod n).

Thus (1)the procedure is tractable, (2)blind forgeries are 
only possible if RSA is weak, and (3)the "blind" is 
unconditionally secure.

Bryan Olson
olson@umbc.edu 





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: nobody@alumni.cco.caltech.edu
Date: Fri, 20 Aug 93 01:30:53 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Violent Revolution?
Message-ID: <9308200824.AA23769@alumni.cco.caltech.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


++> From: koontzd@lrcs.loral.com (David Koontz )

+ >Cypherpunks are providing the basis for long-range, (relatively) secure
+ >communication between those activists and thinkers who may have the
+ >power to bring down the State and restore the individual autonomy this
+ >nation was originally devised to foster.

++> As I understand it the Libertarian Party qualifies membership to
++> exclude any endorsement of violent overthrow of government.

1]  I didn't see that the writer said anything about Libertarians.
2]  I didn't get the impression that the writer was specifically calling
    for the violent overthrow of the government, only that he/she
    believed that actual violence _might_ eventually come.

++> While some
++> portion of those affected by this policy may well have gone
++> underground...

Of course, I cannot personally say with any accuracy, but I feel
strongly that a private ("underground," if you prefer) network of those
discussing radical options must exist as a direct result of more secure
communication.  I have no evidence of this, but it seems like such an
obvious and irresistable consequence that I can't picture it NOT
happening, especially considering the numbers of pissed-off people using
computer networks these days.

++> I don't  believe that cypherpunks as a committee of the
++> whole are willing or ready  to do so.

1]  I didn't get the impression that the writer was saying that
    Cypherpunks were part of any such conspiracy, if it even exists, but
    only that Cypherpunks tech aided their communications.
2]  I have also never been clear on how formal an organization
    Cypherpunks actually are - if they actually have a platform or a
    membership roster or secret handshakes or have turned the word
    "Cypherpunks" into a registered trademark with marketing licensed
    for logoed adjustable size baseball caps and childrens' lunchbox
    sets.  Is there sufficient officialness for the result of a nut with
    "CYPHERPUNKS!" on his chest in Magic Marker biting off Hillary
    Roddam's left thumb at a press conference to be the forfeiture of
    Tim May's personal fortune under RICO?  I wonder.

++> Then again as someone pointed out yesterday, cypherpunks aren't just
++> libertarians...

Whatever gave you the idea that they were?

++> Some
++> portion, however large of those receiving this mailing list, may not
++> agree with this political leaning and may not consider it germaine to
++> their participation.

Certainly true enough, but who claims to "speak" for cypherpunks anyway?

++> Avoiding the appearance of endorsing the violent overthrow of
++> government  is prudent policy for any organization.

Hell, yes.  If I were signing my name to stuff, I'd be as benightedly
pro-Statist in my posts as David Sternlight himself.





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: nobody@shell.portal.com
Date: Fri, 20 Aug 93 03:36:21 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Parallel DES Decrypt Experiment
Message-ID: <9308200830.AA19492@jobe.shell.portal.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> Recent postings have gotten me to thinking:  If we wrote a
> easily portable UNIX program to decrypt DES in parallel across
> our many machines, how fast could we go?

> What do y'all think?

I say do it as an experiment.  That's how I always justified doing crazy
stuff as a child.

Besides, as a non-programmer, I am exempt from actually doing any work
on the project.





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Panzer Boy <panzer@drown.slip.andrew.cmu.edu>
Date: Fri, 20 Aug 93 00:56:17 PDT
To: Cypherpunk Mailing List <cypherpunks@toad.com>
Subject: Anonymous IRC
Message-ID: <Pine.3.05.1.9308200357.A5576-b100000@drown.slip.andrew.cmu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Subject2: Lurker adds another Thread...

Many people, I assume, have used, or at least heard of IRC.  For those of
you who haven't, it is a real time chat system made up of many servers
that clients(users) connect to.  Once connected the user can talk to
pretty much anyone else on the system.  It is similar to CIS's CB and
other CB simulators/chat-lines.  For more info, ftp to CSA.BU.EDU and look
in the "/irc" directory, both servers and clients can be found.

The current "problem" with irc is that when you connect, anyone can figure
out who you are.  Or if you have "hacked" up the standard client, people
can figure out your hostname.  This doesn't allow private/anonymous
connections to happen.

The "fix" I decided was to modify the server code and make all connections
completely anonymous.  Anonyminity is to all, the Server keeps no
long-term records of the machines it is connected to, and the only
connection information it keeps is in socket information.  Owning the
Server does not give you access to Clients information.  Now, the only way
people are identified by, is their chosen Nickname or alias.  I have this
server up and running on my own machine with basically no one using it
currently.  I would like to see what people think, pros & cons, of
real-time anonymous chat.

If you would like more information, you can send me email.  Or you can
either compile your own client, or run an existing one.  Change your
server to "DROWN.SLIP.ANDREW.CMU.EDU", and you should connect.

Disclaimer: Since this is still an experimental server, no guarentee
will/can be made about your protection.

-Matt
(panzer@drown.slip.andrew.cmu.edu)






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: T. William Wells <bill@twwells.com>
Date: Fri, 20 Aug 93 05:16:33 PDT
To: rjc@gnu.ai.mit.edu (toad.com!cypherpunks,penet.fi!julf, gnu.ai.mit.edu!rjc)
Subject: Re: T. Wells & Anonymity
In-Reply-To: <m0oTG7R-00021zC@khijol>
Message-ID: <9308200739.AA01030@twwells.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I've written a long post in answer to Ed and Julf's message.
However, I've decided that it's best not to burden everyone with a
couple of hundred lines of stuff whose content can be summarized
as "there is little truth in their message and what little there
is is told in such a way as to be misleading". If anyone cares to
listen to my full rant (excepting Ed, whom I simply refuse to
deal with), drop me a line and I'll send it to you.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: hkhenson@cup.portal.com
Date: Fri, 20 Aug 93 15:16:47 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Traveller's Checks...
Message-ID: <9308200938.2.14364@cup.portal.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Not that this is really relevant . . . but I remember an article on
traveller's checks that a significant percentage of them are *never*
cashed.  Talk about float!  Keith




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: collins@newton.apple.com (Scott Collins)
Date: Fri, 20 Aug 93 10:16:56 PDT
To: bill@twwells.com (T. William Wells)
Subject: Re: cypher breaking and genetic algorithms
Message-ID: <9308201639.AA10388@newton.apple.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Hello,

  -- T. William Wells writes: --
  Well, since I'm here, I thought I'd satisfy a curiosity of mine.
  Has anyone done any research, formal or informal, on the use of
  genetic algorithms to break cyphers? If not, would anyone care to
  discuss how it might be done?

GA's (which I love, but you won't be able to tell from the following) are a
'robust' search mechanism better at finding _good_ answers than _the_
answer.  Because genetic search is driven by partial reward from a
partially correct solution, GA's are not adept at searching a space that is
very flat except for the single 'spike' of the correct answer.  Good
encryption systems are like this.  You are either right or wrong, no in
between.  Being one bit off in the key should give a totally fruitless
result.  GA's don't help much with such ciphers.

However, in simple substitution ciphers, frequencies and patterns in
partial decryptions can provide the reward GA's need to climb the hills.

In fact, Spillman, Janssen, Nelson and Kepner wrote an article in the
January 1993 Cryptologia titled "Use of a Genetic Algorithm in the
Cryptanalysis of Simple Substitution Ciphers" in which they found that, for
the particular class of problems they were solving, within (a short) 100
generations, the GAs could bring the cipher text to the point where a human
could 'just read it', whatever that means.


Scott Collins         | "Few people realize what tremendous power there
                      |  is in one of these things."     -- Willy Wonka
......................|................................................
BUSINESS.   voice:408.862.0540  fax:974.6094   collins@newton.apple.com
Apple Computer, Inc.   1 Infinite Loop, MS 301-2C   Cupertino, CA 95014
.......................................................................
PERSONAL.   voice/fax:408.257.1746    1024/669687   catalyst@netcom.com





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Perry E. Metzger" <pmetzger@lehman.com>
Date: Fri, 20 Aug 93 07:16:54 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Traveller's Checks...
In-Reply-To: <9308192136.AA18425@chiba.tadpole.com>
Message-ID: <9308201416.AA03878@snark.lehman.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Jim Thompson says:
> 
> 
> > 
> > I think that American Express wouldn't be interested in 
> > anonymous cash because the most important "feature" of
> > a traveller's check is the lack of transferability. Once
> > they're bought, only one person can spend them. 
> 
> I doubt that Amex is interested in traveller's checks for this
> reason.  AMEX likes traveller's checks because they make a lot
> of money on the 'float', the time value of the money you give them
> before they have to redeem the checks when some bank presents them
> for payment.

This is not where my masters make theirs most money. Remember, over
the course of a few weeks during which you hold the travelers checks,
the riskless rate of return will bring in an insanely small amount of
money. Currently, even long term rates are at best 6% per annum, and
you can't make that much in the money markets in practice. In fact,
real interest rates, that is rates taking inflation into account, are
near zero right now.

On the other hand, the percentage of face value that you are charged
when you buy the checks makes a couple percent instantly.

The float is just cream -- its not the bread and butter.

Perry

Who works for Lehman Brothers, a division of American Express
but who is not directly affiliated with Travel Related Services, who
issue Travelers Checks and "The Card".




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Perry E. Metzger" <pmetzger@lehman.com>
Date: Fri, 20 Aug 93 07:31:32 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Traveller's Checks...
In-Reply-To: <9308192350.AA12661@bass.chp.atmel.com>
Message-ID: <9308201431.AA03899@snark.lehman.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Peter Baumbach says:
> Peter Wayner says:
> > I think that American Express wouldn't be interested in 
> > anonymous cash because the most important "feature" of
> > a traveller's check is the lack of transferability. Once
> > they're bought, only one person can spend them. 
> >[...]
> I think American Express would be interested in collecting a
> percentage of the cash-flow.  The underground economy is pretty
> big.  Wouldn't it be nice to get a percentage of it?

No. They have a special relationship with many governments around the
world and in order to keep it are extremely careful not to involve
themselves in anything that even remotely smells, especially after the
Safra affair a few years ago.

Perry




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Eric Hughes <hughes@soda.berkeley.edu>
Date: Fri, 20 Aug 93 11:01:34 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: building a sound sampler for cryptophone application...
In-Reply-To: <9308201356.AA07181@an-teallach.com>
Message-ID: <9308201757.AA04239@soda.berkeley.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>Thanks for your time.  I hope this isn't considered too off-topic... (I
>mean, I *could* have posted an incredibly interesting piece about the
>Challenger disater instead, eh Eric? ;-))

Perfectly on-topic, Graham.

That said, I think that designing custom hardware for sound sampling
is a waste of time, given the abundance of multimedia cards that
already work.

The barrier to entry to solder up even the tiniest, simplest circuit
is enormous for most people.  Cypherpunks is not the Privacy League
for Hackers.  The solutions that we make should be to the greatest
extent available to all without special prerequisites.  That means
that hardware should be freely purchasable, since the resource of
money is more widely available that the resource of hardware skill.
It means that software should not require root for Unix machines, nor,
if possible, knowing how to operate a compiler.

While I applaud your enthusiasm, your effort toward getting usable
secure phones would be much betting spent writing device drivers for
various soundblaster-type cards.

Eric




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: HELGE RENE URHOLM <HELGEU@dhhalden.no>
Date: Fri, 20 Aug 93 02:30:53 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: "Clipper" in Norway (FYI)
Message-ID: <9308200929.AA14585@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


The Department of Defence in Norway have given permission to 
develop a new crypto-chip to use in all public and confidential data, 
which has been collected about persons and groups.

The algorithm is secret.

The chip has been compared with the American Clipper-project. 

The Department of Defense will be administering the keys, and the user 
will have no choice whether they want to use the chip or not.

They are even trying to enforced the health system to use this chip.

Last week  Hans Olav Oestgaard (head of the Norwegian secret 
service) said he wanted a law which enforce companies and single 
persons to encrypt all information such that the secret service can 
access the information in a simple way.





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Eric Hughes <hughes@soda.berkeley.edu>
Date: Fri, 20 Aug 93 11:31:34 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Blinded RSA signatures
In-Reply-To: <9308200544.AA15625@jobe.shell.portal.com>
Message-ID: <9308201831.AA06912@soda.berkeley.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> The article made no
> mention of how to do this "blinding".

> This morning I came up with a method which I would like
> comments upon.  

Apparently the first author (the one being quoted in the forwarded
message) had never been exposed to the relevant math before.  What is
therefore significant is that this person has exactly reconstructed
the basic Chaum blind signature, except for notation.

The basic blind signature does not work well in practice, since the
product of two such signatures is also a signature.  In practice one
signs a one-way hash function of the message text and exhibits the
actual text; this destroys the ability to multiply signatures, assuming
that finding multiplicative pairs for the hash function is hard.

This scheme of algebraic blinding is quite easy to apply, once you get
the hang of it.  For example, it is behind the core of the encrypted
open books protocol, where to blind g^x you create a pair g^(x+r),h^r.
Basically all of the atomic operations that recent cryptology uses--
e.g. exponentiation in finite rings, both in the discrete log systems
and in RSA, integer multiplication in elliptic curves--are amenable to
blinding.  The El Gamal signature scheme uses a random number to
create the signature pair.

Applications to existing protocols are left as an exercise by the
reader.

Eric




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: bill@twwells.com (T. William Wells)
Date: Fri, 20 Aug 93 05:06:29 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: cypher breaking and genetic algorithms
Message-ID: <CC22rC.q6@twwells.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Well, since I'm here, I thought I'd satisfy a curiosity of mine.
Has anyone done any research, formal or informal, on the use of
genetic algorithms to break cyphers? If not, would anyone care to
discuss how it might be done?





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Eric Hughes <hughes@soda.berkeley.edu>
Date: Fri, 20 Aug 93 11:51:06 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Crypto Protocols are Hard to Analyze
In-Reply-To: <9308190715.AA23256@netcom5.netcom.com>
Message-ID: <9308201847.AA08308@soda.berkeley.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>Eric Hughes investigated digital money from a legal point of view [...]

Indeed.  It's a mess.

No matter how you do it, it seems, real corporations will have to be
involved, which means business plans, etc.  Not a low entry barrier,
unfortunately.  If you hold money for someone else, you'd better be a
corporation in order to limit liability.  And if you hold money for
someone else, you're either entirely within the regulated bank
environment or so close to its edge that your territory could be
included at any time.

It appears the easiest way to get digital money going is to be the
bank--a fully legitimate, above board, fully qualified financial
institution.  Fortunately, one doesn't have to be exactly a bank, in
the legal sense.  Other institutions are available, such as credit
unions, mutual savings banks, and S&L's--these are the so-called
thrift institutions.  These tend to have reduced regulatory burden in
exchange for limited power to transact.  

Eric




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: collins@newton.apple.com (Scott Collins)
Date: Fri, 20 Aug 93 12:56:57 PDT
To: catalyst@netcom.com
Subject: Re: cypher breaking and genetic algorithms
Message-ID: <9308201852.AA16537@newton.apple.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Oops, forgot to CC:cypherpunks.  Sorry.

  -- Peter Baumbach writes: --
  What if the GA "knew" the plain-text, the cyphertext, and the
  encryption algorithm, and was searching for a decryption algorithm
  without the encryption key? Would that be for fruitful?

The attack I was describing assumed that the genetic strings _were_ keys
and the population was about finding the right key.

Peters response suggests that rather than a population comprising keys, a
population of 'programs' -- probably built from (constantly reordered)
modules that performed the same atomic operations used by the encryption
algorithm (and then some).  This is a very strong generalization, and one
that is getting more attention in the field.  'Genetic Programming'.  In
practice this can lead to more fluid populations.

In this instance, though, you can think of a key as a program to be
executed by an encryption or decryption machine and see that a population
of programs is similar in expressive power to a population of keys.

In the case of cryptanalysis of a _good_ cipher, it is the terrain (of the
problem space) itself that gives us the clues about the expected
performance of GA's.  For a population to improve, it has to be able to
measure the performance of an individual (how high has it climbed?) so that
it can give increased resources to the more successful (whose children are
likely to climb higher on a continuous surface).

In cryptanalysis, the goal (the mountain peak) is the correct plaintext. 
An individual, however it may be constructed, yields a trial decryption. 
Its performance must be measured against the only standard available in
this case, the known plaintext (or the expected statistics of plaintext if
known plaintext is not available).

If there were an accurate measure of how 'good' a trial decryption was then
your GA could climb.  However that would imply a continuous 'goodness'
function, whose surly bonds strong ciphers surely seek to slip.

It is this reliance on continuousness that make GAs great at climbing
hills, but rarely better than undirected random search at finding a needle
in a haystack.


Scott Collins         | "Few people realize what tremendous power there
                      |  is in one of these things."     -- Willy Wonka
......................|................................................
BUSINESS.   voice:408.862.0540  fax:974.6094   collins@newton.apple.com
Apple Computer, Inc.   1 Infinite Loop, MS 301-2C   Cupertino, CA 95014
.......................................................................
PERSONAL.   voice/fax:408.257.1746    1024/669687   catalyst@netcom.com





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Eric Hughes <hughes@soda.berkeley.edu>
Date: Fri, 20 Aug 93 12:01:56 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: ADMIN: Blacknet mailings on the cypherpunks list
Message-ID: <9308201901.AA09451@soda.berkeley.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


There was a recent PGP message encrypted for Blacknet that sailed by
on the list.  This message did not discuss any topic relevant to
cypherpunks from what I could read, since, _a fortiori_ it didn't say
anything I could read.

Encrypted traffic such as this is inappropriate for this list.  Take
it elsewhere.

Tim and I have already invented the proper forum for this.  It's a
usenet newgroup called

	alt.w.a.s.t.e

(Read Pynchon to get the joke) The charter for this group is that it
takes only encrypted messages.  No plaintext allowed.  Discussions
about alt.w.a.s.t.e must therefore occur in a separate discussion
group, named according to Usenet convention

	alt.w.a.s.t.e.d

If someone would kindly create these two groups, the BlackNet folks
can revise their announcement appropriately.

I was waiting for some reason to create the newsgroup, because I
didn't know what traffic would go across it.  Now there is some, and
it deserves its own home.

Eric




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Date: Fri, 20 Aug 93 12:11:06 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: (fwd) anonymus@charcoal.com is going away
Message-ID: <9308201907.AA26206@netcom5.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Submitted for your consideration....


Message-ID: <Aug201408031993@charcoal.com>
Date: 20 Aug 1993 18:08:05 GMT
From: Karl_Kleinpaste@charcoal.com
Organization: Charcoal Communicators, Pittsburgh, PA, USA
Newsgroups: alt.privacy.anon-server,alt.personals,alt.sex.movies,alt.sex.fetish.feet,alt.personals.ads,alt.sex.bondage,alt.personals.bondage,soc.bi
Followup-To: alt.privacy.anon-server
Subject: anonymus@charcoal.com is going away
Reply-To: anonymus+admin@charcoal.com


I got off the phone a while ago with someone who is responsible for
mail at a large southern university.  He called me because he is being
pressed for action regarding anonymous mail sent through charcoal.com.
It seems that there is a dweeb at this university who is sending
anonymous "secret admirer" mail.  Two of the five recipients of this
sort of mail have raised the issue through university channels as
harassment, and at least one of those is in the process of dealing
with the police because it correlates uncomfortably closely with
harassing phone calls and other incidents going down.

This mail admin, having looked through his system's mail logs for
sources of the trouble, observed that one individual has repeatedly
sent mail to anonymus+clear@charcoal.com, and sometime shortly
thereafter mail comes back for these recipients, on the same machine.
(Yes, really.  This person is sending questionable anonymous mail to
people on the same system as himself.  No joke, though I wish it was.
It's a Big Bluish Beastie.)

So while I was unwilling to identify the originator of the mail
myself, the admin identified him for me by login name, and he was (no
surprise) correct.  The individual in question is going to get at
least a stern talking-to by Those Who Matter.  It is hoped that the
police can be kept at bay, and that more of that university's channels
will not be exercised in this process.

This comes on the heels of my having had to chase down incidents in
the last week or two...
        ...someone sending half-Mbyte uuencoded core files via
           anonymus+clear
        ...having had to extinguish a couple of individuals due to,
           e.g., repetitious reposting, and personals posted outside
           alt.personals*
        ...another report of anonymous harassment whose details I
           do not feel I am at liberty to disclose at all.

anonymus@charcoal.com is going away.  My heart is no longer in it,
because I am unwilling to ride herd on this ridiculous minority of
totally cluefree individuals who seem to believe that they are somehow
superior to the rest of the universe and can do things that are
clearly against the requirements I stipulate in the info sheet.  The
potential for repercussions against myself as admin is far too high
when I am informed that police are already involved -- I was much too
close to such a situation 10 months ago.

This server will cease operation on 31 Aug.  It is my belief that
other anon servers operate in all of the groups currently supported
here.  Users have 10 days to make other arrangements.

More and more, I am convinced that life as a hermit is preferable to
life on the network.  It is amazing how far one's attitude will fall
following one phone call.

Please respect Followup-To:.  Feel free (feel encouraged) to
disseminate this notice wherever appropriate.  This note is being
posted to alt.privacy.anon-server and those groups which have received
50+ postings in the life of the current news transfer log, less
alt.sexual.abuse.recovery (which happens to be far and away in the #1
slot of such a list).

--




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Date: Fri, 20 Aug 93 12:56:37 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Thurn, Thurn, Thurn (und Taxis, too!)
Message-ID: <9308201953.AA23576@netcom.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


J. Eric Townsend writes:

>Eric Hughes writes:
> >      alt.w.a.s.t.e
>
>please make it alt.waste, or alt.w-a-s-t-e if you must have seps
>between letters.  The additional '.' characters will cause a
>hierarchy:
>
>alt.w
>alt.w.a
>alt.w.a.s
>alt.w.a.s.t
>alt.w.a.s.t.e

For the first 3/4 of "The Crying of Lot 49," Oedipa Maas thinks she is
seeing "WASTE" written on boxes and mail drops. It is only later, as she is
travelling through Berkeley by AC-DC ("standing for Alameda County Death
Cult"), that she notices the periods, writ very small (.).

So calling our cyberspace mail drop "alt.waste" would have resonances with
this Oedipal error, allowing the correcting of newbies.

Don't Ever Antagonize the Horn.

(I hear you crying "No maas!," so I'll stop with the puns.)


-Tim


--
Timothy C. May         | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,  
tcmay@netcom.com       | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
408-688-5409           | knowledge, reputations, information markets, 
W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA  | black markets, collapse of governments.
Higher Power: 2^756839 | Public Key: by arrangement
Note: I put time and money into writing this posting. I hope you enjoy it.      







From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: khijol!erc@colossus.apple.com (Ed Carp)
Date: Fri, 20 Aug 93 14:36:40 PDT
To: bill@twwells.com (T. William Wells)
Subject: Re: cypher breaking and genetic algorithms
In-Reply-To: <CC22rC.q6@twwells.com>
Message-ID: <m0oTcyq-00022HC@khijol>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text


> Well, since I'm here, I thought I'd satisfy a curiosity of mine.
> Has anyone done any research, formal or informal, on the use of
> genetic algorithms to break cyphers? If not, would anyone care to
> discuss how it might be done?

As I recall, GAs are rather inappropriate for crypto applications, as they
tend to give rather inexact answers.  In a message where one wrong bit
could mean the difference between "en clair" and garbage, they are useless.
But for simple substitution ciphers, they can enable one to get "best guess"
clear - enough to make the message readable.  Hopefully. :)
-- 
Ed Carp, N7EKG			erc@apple.com			510/659-9560
                            anon-0001@khijol.uucp
If you want magic, let go of your armor.  Magic is so much stronger than
steel!        -- Richard Bach, "The Bridge Across Forever"



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Date: Fri, 20 Aug 93 13:26:37 PDT
To: pmetzger@lehman.com
Subject: Re: Thurn, Thurn, Thurn (und Taxis, too!)
In-Reply-To: <9308202012.AA04597@snark.lehman.com>
Message-ID: <9308202023.AA04919@netcom5.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



> > So calling our cyberspace mail drop "alt.waste" would have resonances with
> > this Oedipal error, allowing the correcting of newbies.
> 
> Yes, Tim, but none the less creating newsgroups with .s used as
> puncutation instead of as heirarchy seperators is considered Very
> Rude. I think there is no reason for us to do something that is
> considered Very Rude even if it is a good joke. Dashes are likely a
> good compromise.
> 
> Perry

I'm confused, Perry. I was acknowledging that "alt.waste" (with no
periods, no punctuation, in the "waste" part) would be nearly as
acceptable as the more Pynchonesque form.

Is "alt.waste" a rude formation in some way?

-Tim


-- 
..........................................................................
Timothy C. May         | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,  
tcmay@netcom.com       | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
408-688-5409           | knowledge, reputations, information markets, 
W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA  | black markets, collapse of governments.
Higher Power: 2^756839 | Public Key: PGP and MailSafe available.
Note: I put time and money into writing this posting. I hope you enjoy it.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: poier@sfu.ca (Skye Merlin Poier)
Date: Fri, 20 Aug 93 13:36:37 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Anonymous IRC
In-Reply-To: <Pine.3.05.1.9308200357.A5576-b100000@drown.slip.andrew.cmu.edu>
Message-ID: <9308202031.AA02041@malibu.sfu.ca>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

And verily Panzer Boy doth spake unto thee:

> The "fix" I decided was to modify the server code and make all connections
> completely anonymous.  Anonyminity is to all, the Server keeps no
> long-term records of the machines it is connected to, and the only
> connection information it keeps is in socket information.  Owning the
> Server does not give you access to Clients information.  Now, the only way
> people are identified by, is their chosen Nickname or alias.  I have this
> server up and running on my own machine with basically no one using it
> currently.  I would like to see what people think, pros & cons, of
> real-time anonymous chat.

Obviously you have not used IRC much... I think this idea would be exceptionally
bad. On IRC, for those that have not used it, there are channel operators 
(chops) on each channel. They have the power to kick and ban people from the
channel, if they are being abusive or exremely irritating (eg flooding everyone)
. By removing the client information, you remove the efficiency of a ban (usu
it applys the the person's userid from any machine on the same domain)... This
would make it very easy for one person in a bad mood to ruin a channel for 
everyone. And believe me, there are usually serveral people of that kind on
the net.

Perhaps you could set up your own IRC net (similar to the undernet) and have it
anonymous, but I would highly recommend against trying this on the standard IRC
net.

                                                        -- S.

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From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: an31122@anon.penet.fi
Date: Fri, 20 Aug 93 06:36:33 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Genetic Algorithms and password cracking
Message-ID: <9308201332.AA27968@anon.penet.fi>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Hi,
	If my understanding of GAs is correct (not a given), they operate
by progressively narrowing the search space until they arrive at the
solution.  More clearly, each generation uses information gleaned from 
previous generations to guide the current search.  The operation depends
on being able to take two sets of input parameters and decide which
operates better than the other.  I'm not a cryptographer, so I don't
know whether there is a way to find out if an answer is "close" to the
actual.  If not, GAs will probably be of little use.

-------------------------------------------------------------------------
To find out more about the anon service, send mail to help@anon.penet.fi.
Due to the double-blind, any mail replies to this message will be anonymized,
and an anonymous id will be allocated automatically. You have been warned.
Please report any problems, inappropriate use etc. to admin@anon.penet.fi.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: baumbach@atmel.com (Peter Baumbach)
Date: Fri, 20 Aug 93 11:01:06 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: cypher breaking and genetic algorithms
Message-ID: <9308201738.AA12822@bass.chp.atmel.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Scott Collins writes:
>[...]
> between.  Being one bit off in the key should give a totally fruitless
> result.  GA's don't help much with such ciphers.
>[...]

What if the GA "knew" the plain-text, the cyphertext, and the
encryption algorithm, and was searching for a decryption algorithm
without the encryption key? Would that be for fruitful?

Peter Baumbach
baumbach@atmel.com




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Anonymous <nowhere@bsu-cs.bsu.edu>
Date: Fri, 20 Aug 93 12:36:36 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: No Subject
Message-ID: <9308201935.AA25288@bsu-cs.bsu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain




An open message to "lurker@cyberspace.nil"


As your list administrator, Erik Hughes, has requested, we will no longer
accept messages posted on this List. (For bandwidth reasons.)

Brief open answer to lurker@cyberspace.nil: No, Yes, Thanks, and
"unreliable stock tips" probably have no market value.

We understand that ventures like ours have a long way to go. But cyberspace
is infinitely extensible, and we will eventually colonize it.

In the meantime, this initial experiment proves the concept is basically
sound. Lots of work needed, though. More places to post, better anonymous
remailers, out-of-the-U.S. mail-to-UseNet services, etc.

Onward and Inward!


BlackNet<nowhere@cyberspace.nil>

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From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Graham Toal <gtoal@an-teallach.com>
Date: Fri, 20 Aug 93 08:01:03 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: building a sound sampler for cryptophone application...
Message-ID: <9308201356.AA07181@an-teallach.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


My old uncle - a retired electrical engineer - has gone back to
night classes to learn electronics.  His class has to do little
projects that they pick themselves; nothing too advanced yet -
his last one was a musical door-chime...

Anyway, he was asking me for ideas for projects to build, and believe
me I've got dozens :-)  The one that I think is of most value to most
people, if he designs a simple circuit for it that I can publish,
is a cheap sound sampling interface .... which we can happen to
steal for our various cryptophone projects...

Here's how I see the design:  it feeds data into a (probably IBM PC)
parallel port (has to be the bidirectional kind, a plain printer port
clearly won't work), and *it* supplies the timing, ie the PC reads from
the port when the flags say data is ready, and no more data will be
presented to that port until n uSecs later - I foresee it supplying
data at either 8000 bytes/sec or 4000 bytes/sec if the former is too
fast for a PC to handle.

Putting the timing in the sampler frees the PC from a horrendous overhead
in sampling at accurate times, and would make it trivial to feed the
4000Hz samples into code like 'shorten' which would then be shoved down
a v32bis modem quite comfortably.  At a cost *much* less than any
commercial sampler: this thing is built from: a battery; a box; a DAC;
a 7$ microphone; a parallel port driver; a crystal, and a counter.
And that's it.  Dead cheap and easy to build, I hope.

What I'm writing here to ask is where can I get info on what chip to
use to feed data into a PC down the bidirectional parallel port, and
how do you drive the chip and what are the pinouts etc.  I don't expect
anyone to mail me detailed schematics or anything like that, just a
pointer to where to look for them.  (Though if someone *did* have data
sheets, I wouldn't say no to a quick fax :-) )

(fwiw, I used to do electronics as a hobby *years* ago - I once
built a dual-processor micro with dynamic ram, so don't be shy of
mailing me anything grossly technical; I've forgotten most of what
I knew in detail, but I remember enough to steer my uncle in the right
direction, though I won't be doing the actual circuit design myself)

Thanks for your time.  I hope this isn't considered too off-topic... (I
mean, I *could* have posted an incredibly interesting piece about the
Challenger disater instead, eh Eric? ;-))

G
PS Pointers to suitable usenet groups equally appreciated...




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: peb@PROCASE.COM (Paul Baclace)
Date: Fri, 20 Aug 93 15:01:17 PDT
To: HAHN@lds.loral.com
Subject: Re: genetic algorithms for crypto analysis
Message-ID: <9308202159.AA04543@banff.procase.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Using a GA to drive a brute force key search would certainly not help:
the fitness surface has a needle in a haystack (spike).  This kind of
problem has been identified as "unlearnable" by theoreticians like 
Valiant at Harvard.

However, using a GA to drive a more intelligent cryptanalysis that has
partial results *would* help.  It seems that cryptanalysis benefits from 
human assistance due our excellent abilities at recognition of partial
solutions.  Because of this, a GA could help automate the cryptanalysis
process.

(My knowledge of cryptanalysis ends at the Enigma machine breaker cbw
(crypt breakers workbench in comp.sources.unix archives) which uses an
interative process where partial results are visible and are used to guide
new guesses.  The Enigma machine does state-machine substitution, but 
no diffusion/mixing/scrambling; lack of the latter makes visual 
recognition much simpler.  Since DES uses scrambling, I'm not sure whether
partial results are possible.)

>  I recall reading (I think in Sci. Am.) that a theory under investigation
>  now as to why nature has sexual reproduction as part of its repertoire
>  is that this gives a solution-seeking population a better opportunity to
>  located spikey solutions.

Crossover of the genome is the key part of "avoiding hill-climbing" and it the 
key ingredient to Holland's proof of a super-linear speedup (thus "violating"
Amdahl's Law of parallelization never attaining a linear speedup) otherwise 
known as implicit parallelism.  Holland's proof of this in the '70s opened 
up research in GAs because of this attractive feature.  [Note that it requires
certain assumptions about independence and stasis of the bits in the genome
to make the proof tractable, but the hope is that this will still be useful
for real problems.]

Paul E. Baclace
peb@procase.com




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: szabo@netcom.com (Nick Szabo)
Date: Fri, 20 Aug 93 15:11:17 PDT
To: hahn@lds.loral.com)
Subject: Re: genetic algorithms for crypto analysis
In-Reply-To: <930820165108.47c@lds.loral.com>
Message-ID: <9308202210.AA17612@netcom5.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



HAHN@lds.loral.com:
> [makes excellent point that given sexual reproduction, evolution
>  does not need continuous search space]
>   I don't know if such a strategy would help at all in crypto analysis,
>   or whether any genetic algorithm programs currently in use employ this
>   strategy.

Sexual reproduction (aka string crossover) is the fundamental attribute 
of GAs that distinguish them from hill-climbing algorithms; it has been in 
all GAs from their invention.  One of original works on the subject is 
now out in reprint: John Holland's _Adaptation in Natural and Artificial 
Systems_, MIT Press.  

Crossover doesn't allow magic teleportation directly to the
needle in the search space haystack.  GA leaps over gaps where the 
"crossover Hamming distance" is small, but the space need not be continuous.
Cryptanalysis where one can gain clues, partial solutions, etc. and
compose these into better solutions, might be amenable to GA.
If you can say "solution A is better than solution B" with an 
algorithm, it's a good candidate for solving with GA or GP (genetic 
programming, which works on trees instead of strings).

Nick Szabo				szabo@netcom.com




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Perry E. Metzger" <pmetzger@lehman.com>
Date: Fri, 20 Aug 93 13:06:37 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: ADMIN: Blacknet mailings on the cypherpunks list
In-Reply-To: <9308201919.AA18692@netcom.netcom.com>
Message-ID: <9308202002.AA04541@snark.lehman.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



J. Eric Townsend says:
> Eric Hughes writes:
>  > 	alt.w.a.s.t.e
> 
> please make it alt.waste, or alt.w-a-s-t-e if you must have seps
> between letters.  The additional '.' characters will cause a
> hierarchy:

I highly, highly agree.

Perry




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: collins@newton.apple.com (Scott Collins)
Date: Fri, 20 Aug 93 16:21:17 PDT
To: szabo@netcom.com (Nick Szabo)
Subject: Re: genetic algorithms for crypto analysis
Message-ID: <9308202305.AA26160@newton.apple.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


  >Sexual reproduction (aka string crossover)

Sexual reproduction is not string crossover.  Normal reproduction in a
typical GA picks two individuals from the population independently with
probability related to their fitness. In sexual reproduction, the pairs are
constrained such that selection is not independent e.g., 'males' mate with
'females'.

Sexual reproduction is one factor that dampens premature dominance of the
population by a few 'great' individuals, so that search can continue on
other hills, i.e. encourages diversity and thus IS good, as was previously
stated, in choppier solution spaces.

Also consider the dominance mechanism supported by the diploid chromosome. 
One reason why double-strand species like ourselves can more rapidly adapt
than haploid species.  Dominance protects solutions that were good once
(and might be again) from being sampled to death, by holding them in
abeyance (a 'recessive' trait) in a temporarily unfavorable environment. 
Again, this encourages diversity by dampening premature destruction of hard
won solutions.


Scott Collins         | "Few people realize what tremendous power there
                      |  is in one of these things."     -- Willy Wonka
......................|................................................
BUSINESS.   voice:408.862.0540  fax:974.6094   collins@newton.apple.com
Apple Computer, Inc.   1 Infinite Loop, MS 301-2C   Cupertino, CA 95014
.......................................................................
PERSONAL.   voice/fax:408.257.1746    1024/669687   catalyst@netcom.com





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Perry E. Metzger" <pmetzger@lehman.com>
Date: Fri, 20 Aug 93 13:16:37 PDT
To: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Subject: Re: Thurn, Thurn, Thurn (und Taxis, too!)
In-Reply-To: <9308201953.AA23576@netcom.netcom.com>
Message-ID: <9308202012.AA04597@snark.lehman.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Timothy C. May says:
> J. Eric Townsend writes:
> 
> >Eric Hughes writes:
> > >      alt.w.a.s.t.e
> >
> >please make it alt.waste, or alt.w-a-s-t-e if you must have seps
> >between letters.  The additional '.' characters will cause a
> >hierarchy:
> >
> >alt.w
> >alt.w.a
> >alt.w.a.s
> >alt.w.a.s.t
> >alt.w.a.s.t.e
> 
> For the first 3/4 of "The Crying of Lot 49," Oedipa Maas thinks she is
> seeing "WASTE" written on boxes and mail drops. It is only later, as she is
> travelling through Berkeley by AC-DC ("standing for Alameda County Death
> Cult"), that she notices the periods, writ very small (.).
> 
> So calling our cyberspace mail drop "alt.waste" would have resonances with
> this Oedipal error, allowing the correcting of newbies.

Yes, Tim, but none the less creating newsgroups with .s used as
puncutation instead of as heirarchy seperators is considered Very
Rude. I think there is no reason for us to do something that is
considered Very Rude even if it is a good joke. Dashes are likely a
good compromise.

Perry




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Perry E. Metzger" <pmetzger@lehman.com>
Date: Fri, 20 Aug 93 13:26:57 PDT
To: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Subject: Re: Thurn, Thurn, Thurn (und Taxis, too!)
In-Reply-To: <9308202023.AA04919@netcom5.netcom.com>
Message-ID: <9308202024.AA04640@snark.lehman.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Timothy C. May says:
> 
> > > So calling our cyberspace mail drop "alt.waste" would have resonances wit
h
> > > this Oedipal error, allowing the correcting of newbies.
> > 
> > Yes, Tim, but none the less creating newsgroups with .s used as
> > puncutation instead of as heirarchy seperators is considered Very
> > Rude. I think there is no reason for us to do something that is
> > considered Very Rude even if it is a good joke. Dashes are likely a
> > good compromise.
> > 
> > Perry
> 
> I'm confused, Perry. I was acknowledging that "alt.waste" (with no
> periods, no punctuation, in the "waste" part) would be nearly as
> acceptable as the more Pynchonesque form.
> 
> Is "alt.waste" a rude formation in some way?

Sorry -- I misunderstood. "alt.waste" would be perfectly fine.

Perry




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Reply to: hahn@lds.loral.com" <HAHN@lds.loral.com>
Date: Fri, 20 Aug 93 13:51:57 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: genetic algorithms for crypto analysis
Message-ID: <930820165108.47c@lds.loral.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


  
  It has been noted in this thread that a good crypto algorithm would
  require an attacker to locate a single spike in a problem space, rather
  than having to climb a hill (which is, of course, much easier).
  
  I recall reading (I think in Sci. Am.) that a theory under investigation
  now as to why nature has sexual reproduction as part of its repertoire
  is that this gives a solution-seeking population a better opportunity to
  located spikey solutions.
  
  From the point of view of genetic algorithms, sexual reproduction means
  that each offspring must be generated from two members of the existing
  population, each of which contributes half the information needed to
  generate the offspring.  In theory, this maintains a population that
  is spread over a wider terrain, and is thus more likely to find the
  spike.
  
  I don't know if such a strategy would help at all in crypto analysis,
  or whether any genetic algorithm programs currently in use employ this
  strategy.
  __
  |         (V)              |  "Tiger gotta hunt.  Bird gotta fly.
  |   (^    (`>              |   Man gotta sit and wonder why, why, why.
  |  ((\\__/ )               |   Tiger gotta sleep.  Bird gotta land.
  |  (\\<   )   der Nethahn  |   Man gotta tell himself he understand."
  |    \<  )                 |  
  |     ( /                  |                Kurt Vonnegut Jr.
  |      |                   |  
  |      ^                   |
  




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Karl Lui Barrus <klbarrus@owlnet.rice.edu>
Date: Fri, 20 Aug 93 15:17:04 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: KOH virus (long)
Message-ID: <9308202211.AA08607@flammulated.owlnet.rice.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

Fellow cypherpunks,

While I am woefully behind in cypherpunks mail, at this time I wish to pick
the discussion on the potassium hydroxide program.  I beleive this is 
relevant to the list, so I'm posting to the list.  So as to not try
everybody's patience, my own personal opinions and experiences are contained
in a section so delimited toward the end.  Also, some concerns brought up
previously are also contained in their own section, before my opinions.  So
you can stop reading at any time :-).

In summary, I am posting this because I intend to post KOH code when it 
becomes available.  The feelings expressed about this may very well affect 
the future of the list.  In fact, I may post to virus-l because it has come
to my attention the topic has surfaced there as well.  And I know that
anti-virus professionals are always interested in the facts of any matter.

A few people have requested copies of the program from me, and I know of
at least one person actively working on a disassembly.  I mention this
partly in an effort to mentally prepare some people on this list for
an event that is certain to happen in the future: the posting of KOH
source code.  I say this: when a disassembly of the program becomes
available, if I receive a copy, I fully intend to post it to this list.

I would like to point out the charter of this list includes the phrase
"Cypherpunks write code."  As we all know software development is a time
consuming process and thus not many programming projects are discussed,
due to complexity, time constraints, slow development, etc.  One such
project a few list readers expressed interest in was the so called
"CryptoStacker" project - a program which would funtion very much like
Stacker does (it automatically compresses and uncompresses disk drives)
except the CryptoStacker would automatically encrypt and decrypt.

Suddenly, a program which claims to do all this surfaces.  KOH claims to
install itself, encrypt and decrypt with IDEA and an unspecified quick
algorithm, and uninstall from the hard drive on request.  The author
explicity states he intends no maliciousness, and will even accept bug
reports and perform patches.  How then can we ignore such a program?

Now the author called his program a "virus", a word that is treated with
near hysteria by some.  I don't give a damn if the author calls his program
a virus, a program, an automatic encryption program, Pretty Automatic
Privacy, a universal Turing machine, or a duck-billed platypus.  The fact
is this program fill the need of many users, or may advance the state of
art in automatic encryption programs.  It most certainly will be helpful
to see IDEA implemented in assembly - perhaps this could be used to many
advantages, in PGP, other packages, etc.

A bit of the disassembly has been performed - and apparently the program
installs itself in memory, hooks various interrupts, and installs itself
on floppies, marking off sectors as bad.  I don't know how Stacker 3.0
stacks floppies to make them portably uncompressable (that is, you can
stack a floppy, and still use it on a system that doesn't run Stacker), but
it is clear it must reserve part of the disk as being used, at least to
contain the decompression routines.  It is also clear that Stacker installs
itself into memory, and hooks various interrupts to compress/decompress
on the fly, like KOH does.  

If this is too close to viral activity, then I ask the anti-virus 
professionals exactly how did you expect a program of this nature to work?
How can a program like stacker funtion if it doesn't hook interrupts,
install into memory, and place certain routines on floppies?  Answers to
these questions may direct efforts and work in another direction more
pleasing to some.

Now, I'm not going to waste my time looking for an official anti-virus
community sanctioned example of a program which does the above.  KOH
is here, and we may learn and benefit from it.

PREVIOUS CONCERNS

Some people wrote in objections to the list about the KOH "virus".  So as
to diffuse a potentially emotional situation, I am not crediting the
original authors, and am paraphasing their statements.

One person expressed concern that all viruses carry potential for damage,
and that a legitimate program would be better.

1) Yes, viruses carry potential for damage.  But the author of this one
   states he intends no malicious behavior.

   * perhaps somebody could enlighten us as to how a program like stacker
     or KOH is supposed to work in "legitimate program" form.  Both
     programs must obviously hook DOS systems calls, install into memory,
     and place "undoing" routines on floppies.

   * not to insult anyone, but to imply that only viruses carry potential
     for damage is a pretty outrageous selective use of facts.  PKZIP and
     PGP both had bugs which caused lost data, and even DOS itself has a
     buggy CHKDSK command.

{at this time I would like to apologize profusely to Phil Karn, Hal Finney,
Derek Atkins, Edgar Swanks, Phil Zimmerman, and anybody else involved in
PKZIP, PGP, or creating software in general.  The people devote hours of 
their time and expertise towards programs which help thousands of users; I 
am not poking fun of anybody or blaming them or anything like that.  I just
wish to point out that modern software is complex, configurations are 
uncountable, and that despite the best efforts, mistakes are made.  
Fortunately, most are caught quickly and corrected.  I don't think anybody 
can expect perfection.}

Another person expressed concern that the software comes with no explanation
of ramification.

2) Well, I have some interesting news: no software does.  In fact, after
   checking the manuals for every piece of commercial software I could find,
   I discovered that all software comes with two disclaimers:

   1) The manufacturer does not guarentee the software even works
   2) The manufacturer disclaims all damages

   So perhaps those who wish such promises from a public domain encryption
   program are expecting a lot given that there isn't even any commercial
   software which does this.

{interesting crypto relationship to reputation markets.  The software 
industry is a billion dollar industry that sells products not even
guarenteed to work, all damages disclaimed.  How then is the industry
so successful?  Answer: reputations.}

PERSONAL OPINIONS

Well, I'll keep it brief since if you've read this far, you are probably
getting tired :-)

* I do not condone or encourage speading malicious code, especially to
  novice users.  Perhaps the worst thing that viruses do is create a 
  sense of fear among people already intimidated by computers.  

* However, I don't see anything wrong with knowledgeable users who accept
  the risk sharing code.  Naturally, I expect they will take responsibility
  for their actions and not seek to destroy anybody elses property.  Keep
  it local, use your skill to everybody's advantage.

* I think viruses are severly over-hyped.  

  It is my deepest nightmare to one day open the paper and see the headline
  "Planet Earth Knocked Out of Orbit by Computer Virus!"

  Eventually with fancier security (operating system wise), cryptography 
  (message digests, authentication), and research on virus scanners the 
  problem will go to zero.

  Yes, I know it is impossible to have a program perfectly detect viruses.
  But in my own reading it seems that it is possible to have one program
  have no false positives (but some false negatives), and another have no 
  false negatives (but some false positives).  The combination of these two
  scanners would then be optimal.

  If this is incorrect reasoning, please let me know, with an explanation
  if possible.

* I've lost 10 minutes of work because of the nVIR virus on the copy of
  CricketGraph I once used.  I lost one whole week of work (2400 minutes)
  helping figure out why Windows, Novell, and Dr Dos wouldn't work
  together.  Files were lost, machines crashed, device drivers kept stomping
  one another.  The problems were fixed in bug patches from the 
  manufacturers.

  So maybe my experiences were atypical, but I just can't get excited about
  fearing a viral attack.  I am more likely to fear the commercial software
  I use.

* Some elements of the anti-viral community seem to act in a self-serving,
  high priesthood mode, gathering occasionally to congratulate and agree
  with one another.

  In fact, some seem to act like the NSA: answerable to no one but
  themselves, seeking to censor or otherwise restrict information they
  deem sensitive, preferring you trust them in various matters, etc.

  Now, I point no fingers, make no accusations, and in no way begrudge
  any of these people.  It's an honest living, and many people do benefit
  from their efforts.

  However, I am reminded of a favorite quote of mine:

  "The louder they spoke of their honor, the faster we counted the spoons."

  That is, the louder someone condemns viruses, the more hysteria they
  generate, the more vehement the accusations, the more I wonder how much
  $$$ this person stands to make.

* That's it.  Again, I say studying the KOH will benefit us.

Comments are welcome at klbarrus@owlnet.rice.edu.  However, I am a full time
student once again; classes being Monday so I will probably take a while to
respond.


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From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: szabo@netcom.com (Nick Szabo)
Date: Fri, 20 Aug 93 17:11:52 PDT
To: collins@newton.apple.com (Scott Collins)
Subject: Re: genetic algorithms for crypto analysis
In-Reply-To: <9308202305.AA26160@newton.apple.com>
Message-ID: <9308210012.AA04248@netcom5.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Scott Collins discusses the contraint of crossover with the male/
female partition and dominance.  This is theoretically 
interesting, especially to biology.  I know of no theoretical
proof that such constraints improve the search of choppy search spaces, 
and there is little empirical evidence -- this is a cutting-edge research 
topic. 

The poster who first brought up sexual reproduction was discussing it in
terms of its cutting and pasting of strings: crossover.  Crossover
itself provides a far more general solution than simple mutating, 
hill-climbing algorithms; specifically GAs are better in choppy, 
non-continuous spaces.  The empirical evidence for this is quite 
substantial (the literature on GAs) and there is theoretical 
substantiation (Holland, Goldberg, et. al.).  Perhaps constraining 
with male/female and dominance provides even further improvement 
for some kinds of choppiness, as might (more generally) demes,
but those are open research questions in the GA community, not 
immediately germane to the general question of whether GA might be 
useful for cryptanalysis.

I'd like to hear more about the male/female partition and dominance
-- on comp.ai.genetic, ga-distr, or genetic-programming
which I read regularly, and are much more appropriate for discussing
this issue.

Nick Szabo					szabo@netcom.com




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Panzer Boy <panzer@drown.slip.andrew.cmu.edu>
Date: Fri, 20 Aug 93 15:21:15 PDT
To: Cypherpunk Mailing List <cypherpunks@toad.com>
Subject: Re: Anonymous IRC
In-Reply-To: <9308202031.AA02041@malibu.sfu.ca>
Message-ID: <Pine.3.05.1.9308201819.A6207-b100000@drown.slip.andrew.cmu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


On Fri, 20 Aug 1993, Skye Merlin Poier wrote:
> Obviously you have not used IRC much... I think this idea would be exceptionally
> bad. On IRC, for those that have not used it, there are channel operators 
> (chops) on each channel. They have the power to kick and ban people from the
> channel, if they are being abusive or exremely irritating (eg flooding everyone)
> . By removing the client information, you remove the efficiency of a ban (usu
> it applys the the person's userid from any machine on the same domain)... This
> would make it very easy for one person in a bad mood to ruin a channel for 
> everyone. And believe me, there are usually serveral people of that kind on
> the net.
> 
> Perhaps you could set up your own IRC net (similar to the undernet) and have it
> anonymous, but I would highly recommend against trying this on the standard IRC
> net.

Actually I have used IRC for quite some time.  I have also noticed that
most of the time there is not much of a problem in "annoying" people. 
Also the power of the Operator is much in question when it comes to
banning people, as to how easy it is to overcome being "banned" from a
channel.  You make the example of how anyone in a "bad mood" can ruin the
channel for everyone.  This is something you have to deal with.  Ask
people running Anonymous Remailers, and Anonymous Posting Services.

I did not intend to connect this up with the "Normal IRC Network".  That
would be a little rude on my part.  Allowing people to become anonymous
only on my server.  Also I would suspect most other people who run servers
would not let mine conenct to theirs.

I am not trying to start up a server to be in competition with the "Normal
IRC Network".  I want an alternative for people who wish to talk, but
don't wish their identity known.

-Matt
(panzer@drown.slip.andrew.cmu.edu)








From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Hastings@courier8.aero.org
Date: Fri, 20 Aug 93 18:21:54 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Hardware Homebrew
Message-ID: <00071B4C.MAI*Hastings@courier8.aero.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


One of those "too many Erics" wrote:
 
> I think that designing custom hardware for sound sampling is
> a waste of time, given the abundance of multimedia cards...
 
I think we should build fluidic computers and communication
links to resist an EMP attack. How better could we meet
TEMPEST requirements than using water instead of electrons.
None of this namby-pamby off-the-shelf baby stuff. If users
can't build their own computers and write their own OS,
they deserve to be crushed under a jackboot forever. ;-)
 
> The solutions that we make should be to the greatest extent
> available to all without special prerequisites.  That means
> that hardware should be freely purchasable, since the
> resource of money is more widely available [THAN HOMEBREW].
And we're not talking beer, here.
"When you've said DUFF, you've said enough."
 
OK, buy when there is a variety of retail sources, but for
something as limited as RSA for example, it is wise to use
PGP. Is it unreasonable to prefer free software with source
code to commercial 'ware without source code? Even for
hardware that is freely purchaseable, shouldn't we review
the security of any privacy solution ourselves rather
than take some manufacturer's word that it's safe? I
grant you a sound board isn't the most critical item.
 
Writing device drivers for existing sound cards, as you
suggest we should do, assumes that the user already has a
general purpose computer system up and running. Isn't that
a "special prerequisite?"
 
The guy who started all this hoped his sampler would be
"dead cheap and easy to build" but admittedly was still
talking about an add-on to a PC. Computers and add-in
boards seem cheap compared to automobiles, but not
everyone has thousands of dollars to throw away on
this junk. I can't believe that when microcontrollers
are available for $1-$4 each, that we can't design a
simple non-Unix, non-DOS standalone gadget for use
by non-Nerds.
 
One project we should consider is a non-proprietary
hardware/software privacy product for mass consumption.
 
I'd like to have a cheap audio sampler as part of a DVR
module to record and play voice messages, spread-spectrum
radio to give unlicensed users access to the airwaves, a
self-configuring backbone of home radio voice/e-mail
mailboxes, perhaps combining omni and uni-directional
links for efficient message forwarding, and the ability
of any user to transmit a message from their portable
DVR transceiver to anyone's home mailbox and get a
response, without any record of the message paths.
 
Maybe this sounds really complicated, but a single CPU
can do compression, generate chip bits per the spreading
code (direct sequence software) to define a spread
spectrum channel, select the best address for efficient
message forwarding, and toast your bread in the morning.
It should be mostly software, no?
 
The 75% of the world's people who have no access to any
phone service have more time than money, so homebrew
hacking is one way for them to get privacy and freedom.
 
It is illegal to BUY a 10-meter amplifier for ham radio
because it may be abused by a CB operator (in the
11-meter band). But it is legal to BUILD a 10-meter
amplifier for ham use. If it were illegal, and if you
want it, but can't buy it, what other choice do you
have? What happens when one of these HR4079, Digital
Telephony, Clipper/Capstone/Skipjack proposals passes,
and Cyphernacht takes place? Storm troopers will throw
your nice little PC's on the ground to ruin the hard
drives, and only the new, improved hard drives, with
access for legitimate law enforcement needs will be sold.
 
Like Chuck Hammill says: "If you don't learn how to beat
your plowshares into swords before they outlaw swords,
you'd better learn before they outlaw plowshares."
 
Kent - jkhastings@aol.com
 
 




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: gtoal@an-teallach.com (Graham Toal)
Date: Fri, 20 Aug 93 11:51:35 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: building a sound sampler for cryptophone application...
Message-ID: <6263@an-teallach.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


In article <9308201757.AA04239@soda.berkeley.edu> hughes@soda.berkeley.edu writes:
 > That said, I think that designing custom hardware for sound sampling
 > is a waste of time, given the abundance of multimedia cards that
 > already work.
 
Yes, but have you ever tried to drive them from a C program?  From the
scanty docs I got with my Soundblaster, I wouldn't know where to start.
And I get the impression that there's a major cpu overhead with these
cards, like you can't actually do anything useful apart from grab the
data.  I want the data input to be free so there's CPU left over for
compression and encryption and network or modem driving, without having
to use a 66MHz 486 to do it...
 
Oh, and multimedia cards are pretty expensive.  This will cost maybe $25
at most.  It's the sort of thing that once designed, hardware-inclined
cypherpunks could hack up dozens of at home and pass them on at 
conventions like HoHoCon or the one we just had in the Netherlands...

 > While I applaud your enthusiasm, your effort toward getting usable
 > secure phones would be much betting spent writing device drivers for
 > various soundblaster-type cards.

*My* effort already is being better expended elsewhere.  As I said, my
old uncle has time on his hands and wanted suggestions; I thought it was
better not to squander such an opportune resource on junk like chiming
doorbells when he could be doing something for us just as easily.

Now, if anyone actually has an answer to the question, which was about
how to drive a PC parallel port for input, do let me know please.

regards

Graham
===
Personal mail to gtoal@gtoal.com (I read it in the evenings)
Business mail to gtoal@an-teallach.com (Be careful with the spelling!)
Faxes to An Teallach Limited: +44 31 662 4678  Voice: +44 31 668 1550 x212





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: jet@netcom.com (J. Eric Townsend)
Date: Fri, 20 Aug 93 12:21:06 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: ADMIN: Blacknet mailings on the cypherpunks list
In-Reply-To: <9308201901.AA09451@soda.berkeley.edu>
Message-ID: <9308201919.AA18692@netcom.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Eric Hughes writes:
 > 	alt.w.a.s.t.e

please make it alt.waste, or alt.w-a-s-t-e if you must have seps
between letters.  The additional '.' characters will cause a
hierarchy:

alt.w
alt.w.a
alt.w.a.s
alt.w.a.s.t
alt.w.a.s.t.e

And would suggest other possibilities such as 

alt.w.b
alt.w.a.s.b-k

etc, etc




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: greg@ideath.goldenbear.com (Greg Broiles)
Date: Sat, 21 Aug 93 00:31:25 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: building a sound sampler for cryptophone application...
Message-ID: <Vs2L9B1w164w@ideath.goldenbear.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


uunet!an-teallach.com!gtoal (Graham Toal) writes:

> In article <9308201757.AA04239@soda.berkeley.edu> hughes@soda.berkeley.edu wr
>  > That said, I think that designing custom hardware for sound sampling
>  > is a waste of time, given the abundance of multimedia cards that
>  > already work.
>  
> Yes, but have you ever tried to drive them from a C program?  From the
> scanty docs I got with my Soundblaster, I wouldn't know where to start.

Sorry I can't provide an exact pointer, but there's a whole newsgroup about 
it. It *might* be alt.sb.programmer, but I don't actually have a 
soundblaster, and hence didn't pay a lot of attention. A friend of mine has 
done quite a bit of soundblaster programming (more about music generation 
than accepting sound input, tho) and I'll track down the newsgroup name if 
anyone cares.

> Oh, and multimedia cards are pretty expensive.  This will cost maybe $25
> at most.  It's the sort of thing that once designed, hardware-inclined
> cypherpunks could hack up dozens of at home and pass them on at 
> conventions like HoHoCon or the one we just had in the Netherlands...

Soundblaster clones are (I'm certain) available for $50 retail and I think 
I've seen them for $35 wholesale. I can find a reference for the retail 
price, am less sure where I saw the reseller price.

None of my comments here are intended to dissuade Graham's uncle from 
building something useful - I do think it'd be nice to have a public domain 
(or shareware?) design for a hardware device useful in this context. It is 
reinventing the wheel, but if the reinvention is (a) fun to do, and/or (b) 
publicly distributable, it doesn't sound like wasted effort to me.


--
Greg Broiles                            greg@goldenbear.com
Golden Bear Computer Consulting         +1 503 342 7982
Box 12005 Eugene OR 97440               BBS: +1 503 687 7764




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: bill@twwells.com (T. William Wells)
Date: Fri, 20 Aug 93 13:16:58 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: cypher breaking and genetic algorithms
In-Reply-To: <9308201639.AA10388@newton.apple.com>
Message-ID: <CC2q00.654@twwells.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


In article <9308201639.AA10388@newton.apple.com>,
:   Well, since I'm here, I thought I'd satisfy a curiosity of mine.
:   Has anyone done any research, formal or informal, on the use of
:   genetic algorithms to break cyphers? If not, would anyone care to
:   discuss how it might be done?
:
: GA's (which I love, but you won't be able to tell from the following) are a
: 'robust' search mechanism better at finding _good_ answers than _the_
: answer.

Right. So the essential problem is to define "good" in the context
of deciphering. I'm sitting here trying to visualize a structure
(>3 dimensions always have eluded me :-) that would let one do
this but actually, I had something quite a bit more mundane in
mind.

What about the simple GA where each of half the bit string
represents a number and the fitness function is the bit count of
the complement of the XOR of the product of the two numbers and a
(presumably) composite number?

This seems like it would have the sorts of properties that makee
GAs work and, if it this resulted in a practicable factoring
system, would make hash out of several cryptosystems.

: However, in simple substitution ciphers, frequencies and patterns in
: partial decryptions can provide the reward GA's need to climb the hills.

Right. I'd assume you'd generate a key and then compute the
fitness frorm the decrypted text's statistics. That's an easy one.
:-)





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: hfinney@shell.portal.com
Date: Fri, 20 Aug 93 22:52:01 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: anonymus@charcoal.com is going away
Message-ID: <9308210316.AA16687@jobe.shell.portal.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


It does not really surprise me that Kleinpaste is shutting down his
server.  He always seemed to be a weak supporter of anonymity, IMO.
I remember how he was one of the loudest complainers when the contro-
versy arose over Julf's anonymous remailer.

This is how I would have handled the situation.  If the sysop of this
system sent mail to me (he couldn't get my phone number, I don't think),
asking whether so-and-so sent mail to such-and-such, I would only be
able to say, "I haven't the faintest idea."  I don't keep logs, and one
of the reasons I don't is so that I have no expectation of being able
to answer such questions.

What I would then do is to ask the sysop for the addresses which are
receiving the objectionable mail, and I would add them to my "blocked"
list, so that my remailer would no longer send mail to those individuals.
They would then have no more reason to complain to me.

All mail from my remailer includes a header message telling people that
they should complain to me if they get objectionable mail.  In the several
months that I have been running my remailer, only one person has asked to
have his name blocked.

Parenthetically, this incident shows the value of remailers which add some
delay to the message forwarding process.  This would then make it harder
to correlate the arrival of anonymous mail with the transmission of mail
from a particular user.

Hal Finney
hfinney@shell.portal.com




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: bill@twwells.com (T. William Wells)
Date: Fri, 20 Aug 93 14:11:10 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: building a sound sampler for cryptophone application...
In-Reply-To: <6263@an-teallach.com>
Message-ID: <CC2sut.7p7@twwells.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Somebody posted a Unix soundblaster driver on alt.sources, I
believe. Someone else will have to go digging though.

: Now, if anyone actually has an answer to the question, which was about
: how to drive a PC parallel port for input, do let me know please.

Well, I have an ancient AT manual that I could probably dig out.
But I don't think there's much trick to it.





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "gtoal@gtoal.com" <gtoal@pizzabox.demon.co.uk>
Date: Sat, 21 Aug 93 12:17:36 PDT
To: netphone@moink.nmsu.edu
Subject: Some idle comments on speech over data...
Message-ID: <9308202113.AA16085@pizzabox.demon.co.uk>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


A little bit of context first, since this message is going out to two
lists to save me explaining things twice:  I posted on the cypherpunks
list recently about a little hardware hack I had planned, asking for
technical help (which I received - thanks, to those of you who sent
schematics etc!)

I also received a few mails from people who didn't know the background
to what I was doing, who thought it was a fairly worthless exercise.

So rather than explain again to everyone individually, I'll make this
post to cypherpunks for everyone who is interested.

Now, there's a second list I'm on - netphone@moink.nmsu.edu - which was
set up some time ago as a discussion group for people working on various
independent projects to do with speech over data, mainly so that we
could get together and swap notes.  The group went rather quiet a few
months back after a post from Henning Schulzrinne telling us about
nevot - a speech over internet project, that seemed pretty well advanced -
so we all thought 'fine, this is being taken care of, there's less
urgency for us to hack something in a hurry'.

Also at the time there was a lot of talk about various people working
on secure speech over modems using either the Zyxel modem with built-in
codec, or using soundblaster cards.  Unfortunately none of the people
working in this area would stand up and be counted - all you'd hear
would be pgp mail saying 'don't worry, it's happening, be cool, shut up,
and don't rock the boat in public...' - for some reason the guys on
this project seemed more paranoid than most.  (The netphone group by
the way was about *voice* over *net* - if someone happened to add
encryption later, fine, but it wasn't in the groups stated goals,
so we were all pretty open about what we were doing ourselves...)
As far as i can see, nothing has actually happened on any of those
secret projects - i suspect the problems were too difficult, or the
kids doing them were just all talk.

Anyway, nevot looked like the way things were going to happen - except
that when you actually fetched the code, you discovered that unless you
had hardware support, none of the sound compression schemes gave
good enough performance for real-time speech over v32bis, especially
since you also had the overhead of slip or ppp.  And it was *very much*
a Unix program, it'll take a long time to port it to DOS I suspect, yet
DOS (unfortunately, but it's a fact of life) is what most of the
harware out there is running... - very few of us can afford high-powered
private sparcs, or 64K comms, which is what nevot et al need.  (by 'et al',
I actually mean Van Jacobson's 'vt', though I haven't actually seen that
program yet, if it exists; I'm not sure of any other compressed-speech
over net programs.  'netfone' isn't compressed and needs an ethernet)

So, the situation is that we have a nice bit of research done on protocols
and necessary housekeeping stuff like network lag recovery etc, and
silence detection, but no systems that run on cheap hardware or v32bis
modems, which many more of us have access to than networked unices.

Well, one big problem now seems to be solved: Tony Robinson (on the
netphone list; don't think he's a cypherpunk - pops up in comp.speech
now and then) has written a new piece of ADPCM code with some new
algorithms of his own, and he gets 8 bit sample -> 3 bits of compression
with it, which is pretty damn good, but even better than that it's
*fucking fast*... - orders of magnitude faster than real-time.  Anyone
who has played with the GSM 'toast' program or the CELP demo thats
around somewhere will appreciate what that means...

And of course the compression is sampling rate independent.  So I reckon
that taking something like /dev/audio's 8000s/sec and just averaging 
successive samples down to 4000s/sec will give us a baud rate that
fits very nicely into v32bis, thank you very much.  And I know that
4000s/sec is adequate for speech because I've run experiments and tried
it - trivial linear interpolation between samples to scale it back up
to 8000s/sec, and out to /dev/audio, is perfectly intelligible.  Not
*great*, but intelligible.

I've passed this info on to Henning for nevot, if he's willing to try
it, though I haven't received a reply.  It's quite possible one of us
is having mail problems.  If there are any other nevot hackers here,
and you want to have a go yourself, Tony's code is available from
svr-ftp.eng.cam.ac.uk:comp.speech/sources/shorten-2.alpha.2.tar.Z
I really urge anyone experimenting with sound compression to try it.

Now, the next news: I told cypherpunks that my old uncle, who was
an *electrical* engineer in the coal mines (ie high voltage stuff etc)
is now taking night classes in electronics, just for fun - and was
talking with me recently about suggestions for projects for his
class... they're a bit short of ideas, and I'm *never* short of ideas :-)
[so far they've been doing silly stuff like doorbell chimes, or a
detector for finding mains cables in walls]

So I suggested that he builds a cheap sound sampler that I can plug
into the netphone project...

Well, lots of people wrote to me saying that this was wasted effort
since a mass-market solution should be based on available kit like
a soundblaster.  To which I don't disagree - it should, and it will;
it's just that the old guy is going to build *something* and I'd
rather it was useful.  [Thanks to all the people who suggested
various ISDN codecs by the way, and gave info on driving PC ports -
any more info is still welcome.  Faxes of datasheets wouldn't go
amiss either! - it's hard for me to get that sort of stuff...]

*but*... the scheme I'm going to use this sampler in *is* amenable
to a mass-market solution.  The netphone people have heard this
already, but here it is again for the cypherpunks:

<<<< start of repost from netphone list from 3 or 4 months ago:

: OK, here's the philosophy... we should have separate bits of hardware for
: each identifiable task, and string them together like unix pipes. That way
: we minimise CPU overhead *and* allow any individual task to be replaced
: by any hardware/software combination we already have that does the job.
: 
: Specifically, I'm thinking of this:
: 
: A) A cheap digitiser as suggested earlier.  This has a mic socket for your
: average cheap microphone as with any cassette recorder, and a parallel port
: output that's compatible with bi-directional printer ports such as the one
: on the IBMPC.  In the middle is an a2d.  Maybe uLaw, maybe not.
: 
: B) We have a compression board that has a parallel input port (getting data
: from the above) and a serial output port.  In the middle is either a CPU
: or custom hardware.  Doesn't matter.
: 
: C) We have a crypto board which has a serial input port and a serial output
: port.  In the middle is a CPU.  Almost anything will do.
: 
: With these, we can build any system we like.  The three products are
: independent, thus letting us develop them in parallel, and (C) is probably
: just your own computer anyway.  If you've got a really beefy CPU, all three
: might be real unix software pipes...
: 
: The compression board can be either a micro running ADPCM (like shorten V2)
: or a DSP as discussed.  I'd say we try both - you now have *all* the spec
: you need to build it: centronix interface parallel in, taking bytes at
: 8000/sec, and rs232 out, writing data at 9600bps. (leaving bandwidth for
: network layer over v32bis slip or ppp...)  Again, if you have a spare
: machine, you could simply use a PC for this task as well.  Would have to be
: your best one, but fast 486's will cope with some of the good compression
: schemes mentioned.
: 
: The crypto board is an optional extra that doesn't affect the design of the
: rest of the system at all and needn't be discussed.  If you're a PC user and
: don't have the CPU for crypto as well as everything else you're doing, borrow
: another PC and have it run as a filter reading from COM1 and writing to
: COM2...  PCs are cheap and lying around all over the place.  Or *any* old
: computer you have with two serial ports.  An Amiga or whatever old junk
: you thought you'd never use again...
: 
: So, in summary: you could implement this with existing kit *now* using
: 1 average sparc for the 8000K samples, one good PC for the high-quality
: compression, and one average PC for a crypto filter.  Then feed the output
: into your internet machine (in my case, another PC talking SLIP down a
: v32bis modem)   ...   and then you replace the computers one by one as
: you build the custom devices.
: 
: Pipelined parallelism is the way to go folks.  I'm convinced this is
: the best way to get this project started.  And the modular approach will
: be really attractive to home hackers who get the design off the net or
: more likely a magazine... not too much to get working at once - keeps them
: interested.  Hey *there's* a thought!  Whatever happened to Steve 'Circuit
: Cellar' Ciarcia?  A three-part hardware series in Byte synchronised with
: articles on Clipper and 'how you can do it yourself' :) would be one hell
: of a coup...  Anyone got good contacts at Byte?
: 
: Graham
: 
: PS *Do* we have any electronics hackers here, or should I go recruiting...?
: PPS Speech *output* left as an exercise for the reader :)

>>>>> end of repost

Since then, I've thought about the detailed design of the sampler part, and
that's what I'm going to ask my uncle to build.  In fact, I just went out
and bought the $7 microphone today, and the kit box :-)

For the benefit of the netphone list who didn't see my cypherpunks post,
and to give a bit more detail to the c-p's who suggested there were fatal
flaws in what i was thinking about, here's the hardware plan:

There's a cheap microphone, and a d2a and a parallel port, and a timer.
The PC reads from the printer port and fetches a byte when the status
byte says 'ready'.  The PC does *not* have to do accurate timing, or
work under interrupt - all it has to do is make sure it's dealt with the
sample before it's time for another one.  The sampler hardware does
the 8000/sec (or more likely 4000/sec, switchable) timing, and doesn't
say 'data ready' after a read until that length of time has elapsed.

I chose interruptless parallel rather than interrupt-driven serial because
serial would either have to do expensive on-chip compression, or drive
the PC at very high speed - and I know from extensive comms experience
that PCs *really* can't stand up to much over 19.2K - low-end PCs
*certainly* can't.  With this scheme there's virtually no overhead at
all in getting the data to the cpu - it's almost an idle process.

Interrupt driven parallel wouldn't be too bad either, at 4000/sec, though
it does make the code harder to write.  I'm very wary of predicating a
project on tricky PC assembler - it can't be easy, otherwise there'd
already be code (for example) to do something like getting bytes in a
/dev/audio-like manner from say a SoundBlaster card.  And i haven't
found it yet if there is (though someone mailed me today to say he 
thought he had a copy of such code somewhere)

Anyway, the point is that this box can be replaced by a soundblaster or
by reading from /dev/audio - it's just another pipe in the series,
but having a design lets us push it in some electronics magazine and
get public awareness up another notch. But it's no big deal; it's not
critical to the project.

To the people who said it really should be serial and compressed - yes,
I agree - that's the *next* box - a little micro running Tony's code
that has parallel in and serial out.  Or that micro can be a PC as it
stands - no problem.  PC's are cheap and plentiful.

And the next box takes that serial stream and encrypts it.  That too can
be a PC, or if you have a powerful PC, make it a process on the one
that did the compression.  And finally the serial data can be shoved
down a modem directly, or you can use vt's protocols etc and send it
over the net, or the same protocols over slip and send *that* down
a modem.  The modular approach lets you do all sorts of things.

Anyway, I was fed up with people talking about this project but never
seeing anything working (except for Henning's laudable efforts - shame
about the low-end users) so I got off my butt and am doing something
about it myself.

If anyone else wants to join in, the tasks needing done are:

* add Tony Robinson's lossy compression to nevot

* get a nevot-compatible program running on DOS and Mac over SLIP
(major project here, but I know at least one guy who's starting
some work on a Mac project, and I want to twist his arm to make
it nevot compatible rather than Mac-proprietary, if he's listening :-) )

* help me (in the next couple of weeks, since the old guy's class
restarts soon) with details of chips that he can use in a sampler -
I've been told that there are several 'combo codecs' or maybe isdn
codecs that do almost all the work - if we can make something that's
100% data compatible (uLaw) with a Sun, so much the better! (makes for
easier development cycle and testing over the internet)

* make nevot baud-rate/lag adaptive so that it works when scaled down
to 14.4Kbaud and below (say when modems adapt to noise and run at
9600 - no problem, adjust the sample rate to 3000s/sec or whatever
as appropriate)

* experiment with crude zero-crossing algorithms (the kind they used
in kiddy micros 15 years ago with 1-bit speakers) to hack a *really*
low baud rate fallback algorithm to add to the protocols in nevot so
you can *guarantee* some speech getting through under even the worst
conditions.  (We're talking around 4800baud here folks... maybe even
2400 if in dire straights - there may be times when getting the info
over is more important than sounding like a dying dalek...) [btw, the
zero-cossing stuff is also sometimes known as 'time encoded speech']

* hack up a much cruder system than nevot, which works in half-duplex
mode, for low-powered systems that can't do incoming and outgoing 
speech compression/decompression at once - make it a sort of old-
fashioned ham-radio interface, where you do the equivalent of 'over'
at the end of an utterance, and the whole lot is sent, stored, and
played back at the right speed, even if transmission over the medium
isn't fast enough to keep up with speech.  Such a program would
*guarantee* that even the world's slowest modem would still allow
crypto speech, even though the interface would take some getting
used to for modern kids who never had the pleasure of half-duplex
comms :-)  This system needn't assume any specific underlying protocol -
udp, tcp/ip, appletalk, whatever - just treat the comms medium as
an error-corrected byte-stream and use what's available.  Ie it'll
work even if all you have is a 2400bd v42 modem...   Oh, and make
this code *portable* - the only device dependent bit it needs is
'put byte to comms port' and 'get byte from comms port' - you
shouldn't even need to poll the port to see if data is ready, if
you do it properly - remember, it's half-duplex: put stuff in the
protocol you invent to turn the line around...

Pretend it's very fast turnaround voice-mail if that makes you
feel any better about it ;-)

--

That's about it for now.  Actually I'm getting married in a couple
of days (to another cypherpunk as it happens) so I'll be mostly off
the net for two weeks, but please write if you've anything to say
and I'll answer all your mail as soon as I'm back on line.

thanks for reading all this!

Graham
PS If anyone has comments to make to everyone rather than to me,
the cypherpunks list is cypherpunks@toad.com and the netphone list
is netphone@moink.nmsu.edu - I recommend technical discussions to
the latter and general comments or politics or questions to the former.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: fergp@sytex.com (Paul Ferguson)
Date: Fri, 20 Aug 93 20:11:23 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: KOH software topic
Message-ID: <6F3L9B1w165w@sytex.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
 
On Fri, 20 Aug 93 17:11:51 CDT,
 Karl Lui Barrus <uunet!owlnet.rice.edu!klbarrus> wrote -
 
> In summary, I am posting this because I intend to post KOH code
> when it becomes available.  The feelings expressed about this
> may very well affect the future of the list.  In fact, I may
> post to virus-l because it has come to my attention the topic
> has surfaced there as well.  And I know that anti-virus
> professionals are always interested in the facts of any matter.
 
While I may have been one of the first to "sound the alarm," let's get
it straight -- up front -- that I do not condone any type of OS
subversive program that conducts it's "activities" without the user's
knowledge, or any code that has the potential to propogate without
user's knowledge.
 
That said, I think I qualify well enough as an "anti-virus
professional," even though I don't -officially- produce any antivirus
software for public consumption. In any case, I'm mano-en-mano with
most of the notables in the field.
 
> A few people have requested copies of the program from me, and I
> know of at least one person actively working on a disassembly.
 
I'd like to examine a copy myself.
 
> I mention this partly in an effort to mentally prepare some people on
> this list for an event that is certain to happen in the future: the
> posting of KOH source code.  I say this: when a disassembly of the
> program becomes available, if I receive a copy, I fully intend to post
> it to this list.
 
Words escape me at the moment -- perhaps its all those damned
Mooseheads...
 
> I would like to point out the charter of this list includes the phrase
> "Cypherpunks write code."
 
[Mooseheads-kicking-in mode]
 
"Cypherpunks write code" should be expanded (in fact, it -is-
expanded, to a certain extent) to include beneficial vs
non-beneificial software. But what delineates the two?
 
This is a -very- touchy subject.
 
"Subversive software," is a term which I use to demonstrate the
properties of software which spoofs someone, in one way or another.
Viruses do this, especially what we call "stealth" viruses, because of
their ability to spoof the operating system.
 
"Subversive software," in the terminolgy of KOH may be something else
entirely, but any software that marks sectors bad on my disks without
my permission automatically falls into the clssification of "unwanted"
or "bad" software.
 
Perhaps I don't understand or haven't familiarized myself enough with
this software, but it sounds ominously like some timebomb which
harbors the potential to hose the user at any given time.
 
IMHO, this sounds like badware, but I would have to examine it
further, under a debugger.
 
> As we all know software development is a time consuming process and
> thus not many programming projects are discussed, due to complexity,
> time constraints, slow development, etc.  One such project a few list
> readers expressed interest in was the so called "CryptoStacker"
> project - a program which would funtion very much like Stacker does
> (it automatically compresses and uncompresses disk drives)  except
> the CryptoStacker would automatically encrypt and decrypt.
 
> Suddenly, a program which claims to do all this surfaces.  KOH claims
> to install itself, encrypt and decrypt with IDEA and an unspecified
> quick algorithm, and uninstall from the hard drive on request.  The
> author explicity states he intends no maliciousness, and will even
> accept bug reports and perform patches.  How then can we ignore such
> a program?
 
Firstly, by not jumping the gun.
 
Secondly, by examining the software extensively.
 
Thirdly, by making an honest analysis of its merits, its pitfalls and
its contentions.
 
All in all, if all it does is actively encrypt and compress, then it
is certainly non-threatening to the general public. If it does
otherwise, or has some odd caveats, the it needs to be advertised "up
front."
 
Now, don't get ne wrong -- I don't condone someone posting a debug
script on the net and saying "This may hose your system," knowing full
well that it will do exactly that!
 
Comments?
 
 
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.2
 
iQCVAgUBLHWMTJRLcZSdHMBNAQF4EAQAmCtz1LYKZmh21UJcyZ5K3UuVv5rJ+4c/
L3K8oYjnqFevBQvjYBgiXIMqglxvu6R4XKXRAOXHLvUeUIHZk/3Da8UrfWbDyR14
ds72gn+5l/XldKw60DvJPuFJFvsjcYigNrvnVwMbzgUbpkN8zsi6Rfy85AfeclfG
AzfnMlO+cQc=
=QK5G
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

Paul Ferguson               |  "Government, even in its best state,
Network Integrator          |   is but a necessary evil; in its worst
Centreville, Virginia USA   |   state, an intolerable one."
fergp@sytex.com             |      - Thomas Paine, Common Sense
 
Type bits/keyID   Date       User ID
pub  1024/1CC04D 1993/03/15  Paul Ferguson <fergp@sytex.com>
  Key fingerprint =  EE D2 93 7D 04 6D C6 05  AC 36 AD 9D 8E 4F 41 58




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Anonymous <nowhere@bsu-cs.bsu.edu>
Date: Fri, 20 Aug 93 19:41:58 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: No Subject
Message-ID: <9308210357.AA19222@bsu-cs.bsu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Posted by a misguided, hysterical, raster-burned ranter:

What happens when one of these HR4079, Digital
Telephony, Clipper/Capstone/Skipjack proposals passes,
and Cyphernacht takes place? Storm troopers will throw
your nice little PC's on the ground to ruin the hard
drives, and only the new, improved hard drives, with
access for legitimate law enforcement needs will be sold.


Storm troopers?  You take this all a little too seriously.
What makes you think that you and your nasty little private
secrets warrent the time, money and effort of non-existant
storm-troopers?




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Stanton McCandlish <anton@hydra.unm.edu>
Date: Fri, 20 Aug 93 21:31:24 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: ONE BBSCON
Message-ID: <9308210542.AA19653@hydra.unm.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Well the time draws near.  My offer to distribute anti-clipper, and pro-CP
flyers, at my expense, still stands, but I don't have time to write up
the material.  If anyone has any good, one-page, flyer material for this
effort, please mail it to me directly, and soon.  Mon. will be the cut-
off, as I leave Tue morn (Aug. 24) 

Again, send this by pvt. mail please, I've got the list turned off
temporarily (to get elm's filtering working, but it refuses to cooperate,
so I may just give up on that.  Just doesn't seem to do ANYTHING, it just
sits there when the filter command is executed. <shrug>) 

-- 
Stanton  McCandlish   * Space Migration * Networking * ChaOrder * NO GOV'T. *
anton@hydra.unm.edu   * Intelligence Increase * Nano * Crypto * NO RELIGION *
FidoNet:    1:301/2   * Life Extension * Ethics * VR * Now! * NO MORE LIES! *
Noise in the Void BBS * +1-505-246-8515   (24hr, 1200-14400, v32bis, N-8-1) *



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: bart@netcom.com (Harry Bartholomew)
Date: Sat, 21 Aug 93 02:32:14 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: soundcard programming
Message-ID: <9308211050.AA19749@netcom5.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


	In addition to ALT.SB.PROGRAMMER another useful Usenet
	group is COMP.SYS.IBM.PC.SOUNDCARD. From the latter
	comes a FAQ listing various sources of software and
	documentation. It is found at rtfm.mit.edu in the
	/pub/usenet/news.answers/PCsoundcards directory called
	generic-faq.






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "George A. Gleason" <gg@well.sf.ca.us>
Date: Sat, 21 Aug 93 02:41:31 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re:  "Clipper" in Norway (FYI)
Message-ID: <93Aug21.035956pdt.14389-3@well.sf.ca.us>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Okay, here comes a test case.  Can enough copies of PGP and other decent
crypto get circulating in Norway, and posted on public-accessible terminals
(in bookstores and so on, perhaps with an attendant or coinbox to cover
telephone charges), and posted on every university machine and anywhere else
that seems useful, to prevent the Clipper-or-else law from being passed...?

If it passes, are there enough people willing to do civil disobedience to
get the law overturned in the courts...?  

Precedent is contagious.  Even internationally.  If the nasties get away
with it over there, it's just an incentive for their colleagues everywhere
else to try more of same.  

Does anyone here know the status of the crypto scene over there, in terms of
how many people involved, how many using good crypto, how many will hop on
the bandwagon if things get worse...?

-gg




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: bill@twwells.com (T. William Wells)
Date: Fri, 20 Aug 93 21:57:02 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: <none provided>
In-Reply-To: <9308210357.AA19222@bsu-cs.bsu.edu>
Message-ID: <CC3GoH.Du4@twwells.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


There's nothing technical here; it's a political rant, though
more or less related to the list topic.

In article <9308210357.AA19222@bsu-cs.bsu.edu>,
Anonymous <nowhere@bsu-cs.bsu.edu> wrote:
: Posted by a misguided, hysterical, raster-burned ranter:
:
: What happens when one of these HR4079, Digital
: Telephony, Clipper/Capstone/Skipjack proposals passes,
: and Cyphernacht takes place? Storm troopers will throw
: your nice little PC's on the ground to ruin the hard
: drives, and only the new, improved hard drives, with
: access for legitimate law enforcement needs will be sold.
:
:
: Storm troopers?  You take this all a little too seriously.
: What makes you think that you and your nasty little private
: secrets warrent the time, money and effort of non-existant
: storm-troopers?

Well, in the finest of Usenet tradition :-), let me ask: What
would have made a Jew think that innocent, innocuous little him
would warrant the time, money and effort of non-existant storm-
troopers? Other than, that is, that the storm-troopers were real
and they had already gone after lots of people just like him....

To answer the question, though: once the law enforcement folks
decide to make unapproved cryptography illegal, they *will* use
it, not only for the purpose it's intended, as bad as that is
(and, remember: *anyone* no matter how small, can serve as an
example to deter others), but as an excuse for various and sundry
invasions and seizures. I draw your attention to RICO, forfeiture
laws, the use of traffic tickets for police funding, Steve
Jackson Games, not to mention the rather dramatic destruction of
our civil liberties attendant (not at all coincidentally) on the
so-called Drug War.

One lesson of history is quite clear: governments have an
absolute tendency to misuse their power. Furthermore, the further
the misuse has progressed and been accepted as "normal", the
harder it is to stop, or reverse.

I could go on and on but the bottom line is that any attempt by
the government to exercise prior constraint on either the content
*or* methods of communication, as the latter entails the former,
must be absolutely rejected and without consideration for
utilitarian or other similar arguments. Ultimately, the free
flow of information is the only constraint on government.





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: gnu (John Gilmore)
Date: Sat, 21 Aug 93 08:57:30 PDT
To: szabo@netcom.com (Nick Szabo)
Subject: Re: Cracking & auditing crypto protocols
In-Reply-To: <9308190206.AA16644@netcom.netcom.com>
Message-ID: <9308211555.AA14075@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> * A "cracker's guild" to break weak cryptography and publicize
> the cryptanalysis algorithms (cf. the Word Perfect crypto cracker),
> forcing the weak crypto off the market.  For example, if 
> NetCash was deployed this organization would crack it.  This
> organization might be funded anonymously by those selling strong 
> crypto (who have an incentive to debunk their competitor's hype).

The person who built the standard "network license manager" for Unix
(flexlm) has offered us cypherpunks access to the protocol if we'll
try to crack it.

> * A formal Crypto Auditing Agency that would verify the algorithms
> and protocols were secure, without revealing trade secrets.
> My next statement may cause hisses & boos, but I think the recent
> Crypto-Auditing of Clipper by Denning and other eminent 
> cryptologists will be a model widely applied in the commercial
> computer security business.   The auditors should be 
> able to examine the source and run the programs without revealing
> trade secrets.

The auditing may indeed be duplicated.  By marketing departments, and for
the same reason as the Denning auditing -- marketing.  Solely.

There is no way that the selected group of people could crack a 
half-reasonable cryptosystem in a few weeks.  Real Cryptanalysts spend
months and years working on cracking cryptosystems, and none of the
panelists was a Real Cryptanalyst.  We had all the details of DES,
and it took 15 years to make a dent in it.

But they fooled you -- and maybe a lot of other people -- so there *is*
a function for such review panels.  Sponsoring one is a way to convince
innocent spectators who don't know better.  Marketing.

	John
	Marketing Dept, Cygnus Support




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: felix@hu.se (Felix Ungman)
Date: Sat, 21 Aug 93 00:11:25 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Key Mgmt GUI
Message-ID: <199308210824.AA01679@mail.swip.net>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I'm designing a (public) key managament utility. I have no experiense with
cryptography, but I have worked much with GUI design. Please let me know
your opinion on the following questions.

1 - Is the key/keyring methaphor the easiest one to understand (both
respect to encryption and signatures)? Is there another better methaphor,
such as users (instead of keys) having a public and a secret id. For
example, Apple OCE uses the notation of signer objects instead of keys.

2 - Each keyring is naturally stored as a file. The obvious way to view a
keyring is to show a list of all keys in it. How much information should be
visible in the list, and how should it be presented (so that the user can
navigate thru very large keyrings)? Should the list include certificates?
If not, how are they managed.

3 - How should key pairs be treated? Should a user's public key be
"associated" with his secret key (and maybe stored together)? Should it be
possible to mix public and secrets keys in a keyring? Is it neccesary to
have a secret key ring when there's only one secret key?
----------------------------------------------------------------------
- RealName: Felix Ungman   InterNet: felix@hu.se   AppleLink: SW0358 -
-                     Felix gor det goda godare!                     -
----------------------------------------------------------------------




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: cme@ellisun.sw.stratus.com (Carl Ellison)
Date: Sat, 21 Aug 93 07:02:24 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: genetic algorithms for crypto analysis
Message-ID: <9308211614.AA07811@ellisun.sw.stratus.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



The problem I see for finding spikes is that this is still a brute force
approach.  The advantage that biological populations have is in growing
new test processors exponentially, so that there is a chance to
attack something which is merely exponential.

An algorithm or breaking method which helps against modern cryptosystems
would have to turn the spikes into gentle hills by some sort of mapping of
the problem space.  Biological attack machines would still run up against
limits (e.g., the amoung of carbon in the solar system), so we have to spread
the spikes.  In fact, we have to spread them over the whole space since
enlargement of the key space can take a gentle but limited-width hill
and make it look/act like a spike.





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: karn@qualcomm.com (Phil Karn)
Date: Sat, 21 Aug 93 11:41:46 PDT
To: gnu@toad.com
Subject: Cracking & auditing crypto protocols
In-Reply-To: <9308211555.AA14075@toad.com>
Message-ID: <9308212112.AA24046@servo>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>There is no way that the selected group of people could crack a 
>half-reasonable cryptosystem in a few weeks.  Real Cryptanalysts spend
>months and years working on cracking cryptosystems, and none of the
>panelists was a Real Cryptanalyst.  We had all the details of DES,
>and it took 15 years to make a dent in it.

I knew one of the panelists, Ernie Brickell, when we were both at
Bellcore.  Of the five, he's probably the only one with claim to the
term Real Cryptanalyst, as we usually define the term (someone with a
proven track record in cracking real cryptosystems.)  He is generally
credited with putting the final nail into the coffin of the knapsack
public-key cryptosystem.  I was very disappointed when I heard that he
had agreed to let himself be used for such a crass political purpose
as the Clipper Committee.

Other than this minor point, your statement is absolutely correct.
The best known Real Cryptanalyst in civilian life, Adi Shamir, wasn't
involved, and even he took fifteen years to make the first dent in
DES.

Phil




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: khijol!erc@apple.com (Ed Carp)
Date: Sat, 21 Aug 93 11:47:34 PDT
To: gnu@toad.com (John Gilmore)
Subject: Re: Cracking & auditing crypto protocols
In-Reply-To: <9308211555.AA14075@toad.com>
Message-ID: <m0oU0Ky-00022PC@khijol>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text


> There is no way that the selected group of people could crack a 
> half-reasonable cryptosystem in a few weeks.  Real Cryptanalysts spend
> months and years working on cracking cryptosystems, and none of the
> panelists was a Real Cryptanalyst.  We had all the details of DES,
> and it took 15 years to make a dent in it.

That's one of the strongest points in favor of crypto in wartime, for example.
The usefulness of a cryptosystem is not just a function of its resistance to
attack, it is also a function of how long it *has* to resist attack.  For
example, if the Nazis had broken a message regarding D-Day, encrypted with
a cipher in such a way that if the message were compromised it wouldn't
compromise the system itself, it wouldn't matter when they broke it, as long
as it was after June 4, 1944.  After that time, it's useless, and many
messages during tactical operations have an effective lifetime of days, if
not hours.
-- 
Ed Carp, N7EKG			erc@apple.com			510/659-9560
                            anon-0001@khijol.uucp
If you want magic, let go of your armor.  Magic is so much stronger than
steel!        -- Richard Bach, "The Bridge Across Forever"



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: markh@wimsey.bc.ca (Mark C. Henderson)
Date: Sat, 21 Aug 93 12:13:02 PDT
To: szabo@netcom.com (Nick Szabo)
Subject: Re: Cracking & auditing crypto protocols
Message-ID: <m0oU0xG-0000qaC@vanbc.wimsey.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> 
> The person who built the standard "network license manager" for Unix
> (flexlm) has offered us cypherpunks access to the protocol if we'll
> try to crack it.

My experience with network licence managers suggests that most of
them are more or less a joke in terms of security, anyway. Whether
this is due to the underlying licence software and protocols used in
that or poor integration on the part of the vendor, I don't know.

I did some investigation of this, a while ago, from the point of view
of designing something more secure than the currently available schemes.

I don't need to say it in this forum, but there is a long history
of people coming up with schemes for various types of security where
the designers claim a certain level of security that they don't
actually achieve. Licence enforcement software is also prone to this
type of thing.

Mark

-- 
Mark Henderson      markh@wimsey.bc.ca (personal account)
RIPEM key available by key server/finger/E-mail
  MD5OfPublicKey: F1F5F0C3984CBEAF3889ADAFA2437433




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: khijol!erc@apple.com (Ed Carp)
Date: Sat, 21 Aug 93 12:12:43 PDT
To: bill@twwells.com (T. William Wells)
Subject: Re: mail header parser?
In-Reply-To: <CC4M0z.MC5@twwells.com>
Message-ID: <m0oU0yD-00022PC@khijol>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text


> I'm in the process of updating my anonymous server. Up till now, I've relied
> on a really brain-dead parsing of the mail headers. This is good enough
> essentially all of the time; it may even be good enough all of the time (on
> the theory that those addresses it rejects violate de facto standards even if
> they don't violate de jure ones).
> 
> Nonetheless, if there is a simple *and* correct mail header parser (Internet
> and uucp-style), I'd appreciate a pointer to it.
> 
> Ya know, I *hate* testing sometimes. Eventually I want to release this thing
> but I want a test suite to go with it -- and I think the damned suite will be
> bigger than the server!

Uh, I hate to say this, but why not use the one in sendmail or smail?  Of
course, you *could* write your own parser... ;)
-- 
Ed Carp, N7EKG			erc@apple.com			510/659-9560
                            anon-0001@khijol.uucp
If you want magic, let go of your armor.  Magic is so much stronger than
steel!        -- Richard Bach, "The Bridge Across Forever"



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: strick -- henry strickland <strick@versant.com>
Date: Sat, 21 Aug 93 13:17:53 PDT
To: bill@twwells.com (T. William Wells)
Subject: Re: mail header parser?
In-Reply-To: <CC4M0z.MC5@twwells.com>
Message-ID: <9308212341.AA19366@versant.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


THUS SPAKE bill@twwells.com (T. William Wells):
# Nonetheless, if there is a simple *and* correct mail header parser (Internet
# and uucp-style), I'd appreciate a pointer to it.

You might try to c-client code inside "imap" ... contact

	 Internet:      MRC@CAC.Washington.EDU
	 Postal mail:   Mark Crispin
			University of Washington
			Networks and Distributed Computing, HG-45
			Seattle, WA  98195
			USA
	 Phone:         +1 (206) 543-5762
	 FAX:           +1 (206) 543-3909


or prehaps ask archie for "imap".  		strick




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: jrk@sys.uea.ac.uk
Date: Sat, 21 Aug 93 07:21:39 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re:  anonymus@charcoal.com is going away
Message-ID: <7933.9308211638@zen.sys.uea.ac.uk>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Hal Finney writes:
>What I would then do is to ask the sysop for the addresses which are
>receiving the objectionable mail, and I would add them to my "blocked"
>list, so that my remailer would no longer send mail to those individuals.
>They would then have no more reason to complain to me.

It seems unsatisfactory for people to have to accept either all mail
from the remailer or none.  Can you not allow recipients to block mail
only from specific ids?  The sender of the mail can probably arrange
to send from a new id instead, but they're unlikely to if they're not
told that their mail was refused by the recipient.

--                                  ____
Richard Kennaway                  __\_ /    School of Information Systems
Internet:  jrk@sys.uea.ac.uk      \  X/     University of East Anglia
uucp:  ...mcsun!ukc!uea-sys!jrk    \/       Norwich NR4 7TJ, U.K.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "L. Detweiler" <ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Date: Sat, 21 Aug 93 15:17:49 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: anecdote about Prodigy
Message-ID: <9308220200.AA01974@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


ah, the perils of surveillance & censorship...

===cut=here===

Subject: Prodigy intrusiveness causes bogus security scare
Date: Fri, 20 Aug 93 19:52:17 -0700

Subject: 14-year-old's computer 'joke' sets off alarms nationwide
Date: 19 Aug 93 23:51:17 GMT

         SEATTLE (UPI) -- A seemingly innocuous joke sent by a 14-year-old girl
over a computer network didn't get any laughs at the New York City
Police Department, or with the Baltimore Orioles or Kingdome officials
in Seattle.
         In an attempt to get a rise out of her boyfriend in New Jersey, the
teenager typed out a phony death threat Monday against Baltimore Orioles
superstar Cal Ripkin, Jr.
         The young girl knew her boyfriend was an avid Orioles fan and that
Baltimore was playing the Seattle Mariners in the Kingdome.
         But Prodigy security personnel picked up on the message in their New
York headquarters and called police. They notified the Orioles and the
Kingdome, where security was immediately tightened.
         Police staked out the address from where the message had come for 16
hours before the girl, whose parents were on vacation, returned home
with her 28-year-old sister.
         The girl received a stern lecture, but no charges were filed. Police
said she was ``very embarrassed and apologetic'' and added, ``By the
time her sister got done chewing her out, that was enough.''





------- End of Forwarded Message





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: bill@twwells.com (T. William Wells)
Date: Sat, 21 Aug 93 11:37:36 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: mail header parser?
Message-ID: <CC4M0z.MC5@twwells.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I'm in the process of updating my anonymous server. Up till now, I've relied
on a really brain-dead parsing of the mail headers. This is good enough
essentially all of the time; it may even be good enough all of the time (on
the theory that those addresses it rejects violate de facto standards even if
they don't violate de jure ones).

Nonetheless, if there is a simple *and* correct mail header parser (Internet
and uucp-style), I'd appreciate a pointer to it.

Ya know, I *hate* testing sometimes. Eventually I want to release this thing
but I want a test suite to go with it -- and I think the damned suite will be
bigger than the server!





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: emv@mail.msen.com (Edward Vielmetti)
Date: Sat, 21 Aug 93 18:21:50 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: (fwd) [prodigy] Am-prodigy correction
Message-ID: <m0oU7bj-000EYeC@garnet.msen.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


This came over our Reuters wire - it looks like the Prodigy message
in question was not a private message, but rather a message
on a public forum (where Prodigy is known to monitor such things.)

I wonder whether this correction is going to get press in the print
media, most of which are not likely to be hip enough to be able to
convey the difference to their readers (who are not necessarily 
likely to know or care).

--Ed

From: reuters@msen.com (Msen Reuters News)
Newsgroups: msen.reuters.domestic
Subject: [prodigy] Am-prodigy correction
Date: 21 Aug 1993 20:54:46 -0400
Organization: Msen, Inc. -- Ann Arbor, MI (acct info +1 313 998-4562)
Keywords: AM-PRODIGY

AM-PRODIGY CORRECTION

    In MEDINA, Washington item headlined U.S. TEENAGER FINDS
DEATH 'THREAT' HAS ITS PRICE please read in 3rd graf ...The girl
told police she made the threat in a message on an electronic
bulletin board... instead of ...in an electronic message.
(Correcting form of transmission of message). A corrected story
follows immediately.
 REUTER




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: bart@netcom.com (Harry Bartholomew)
Date: Sun, 22 Aug 93 00:37:56 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: "Secure Voice"
Message-ID: <9308221120.AA11592@netcom3.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



    Just received a low budget brochure from SVC offering their
    "Secure Voice" TM software for $250. Used with a '386 minimum,
    a Sound Blaster board, and a 14.4K V.42 modem they claim to
    do compression and DES encryption (triple DES with a '486).
    "You talk into your computer, the computer digitizes your voice,
    encrypts it, transmits it through the high speed modem over the
    open phone lines to the other end, where it is decrypted, and
    can be heard."

    They indicate you need one "Secure Voice" for each end so I'd
    guess they have it copy protected.

    "No BS Updates:
    ... As a purchaser, you are entitled to free software updates
    for the life of this product. We keep no records of who purchases
    our products, so to receive your update, send us your original
    disk and a SASE."

    Their address: PO Box 9512
                   College Station, TX 77842

    Texas residents add 8.25%, VISA/MC add 5%




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: fergp@sytex.com (Paul Ferguson)
Date: Sun, 22 Aug 93 02:07:56 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Munged account feeding old mail?
Message-ID: <H0mo9B1w165w@sytex.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Am I the only one getting carbon copies of many of my own messages
from someone else's munged account?
 
8<------------------------
 



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: uunet!lebanon.cerf.fred.org!daemon  (FMF Mailer Version 2.03 fergp@sytex.com (Paul Ferguson)
Date: Sun, 22 Aug 93 06:11 EDT
To: sytex.com!fergp
Subject: returned mailNIST call for Comments on "Key-Escrow" (fwd)
Message-ID: <DHL85672@sdcoe.cerf.fred.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Paul Ferguson               |  "Government, even in its best state,
Network Integrator          |   is but a necessary evil; in its worst
Centreville, Virginia USA   |   state, an intolerable one."
fergp@sytex.com             |      - Thomas Paine, Common Sense
 
Type bits/keyID   Date       User ID
pub  1024/1CC04D 1993/03/15  Paul Ferguson <fergp@sytex.com>
  Key fingerprint =  EE D2 93 7D 04 6D C6 05  AC 36 AD 9D 8E 4F 41 58




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: geoffw@nexsys.net (Geoff White)
Date: Sun, 22 Aug 93 07:01:55 PDT
To: bart@netcom.com
Subject: Re: "Secure Voice"
Message-ID: <9308221736.AA00819@nexsys.nexsys.net>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain




	Anybody know about the voice capabilities of the ZyXel class modems?
	I own a ZyXel 1496E which can digitize voice and also transmit
	voice data that has been digitized.  It would be easy to
	first encript this stream before sending it out.

	The 1496E+ also support CELP (or is it (CLEP?) but that one
	cost about $400.  (The 1496E is around $300) It also is a 14.4 K
	baud modem and does FAX. 




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: XXCLARK@indst.indstate.edu
Date: Sun, 22 Aug 93 15:15:14 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: No Subject
Message-ID: <9308222211.AA24479@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain




 fergp@sytex.com asks:

>Am I the only one getting carbon copies of many of my own messages
>from someone else's munged account?

        Nope. But I received one only, and that a bounce back from
   cypherpunks... Seemed to take several days to come back.

>X-Delivery-Notice:  SMTP MAIL FROM does not correspond to sender.
>Received: from INDST (SMTP) by indst.INDSTATE.EDU (Mailer R2.08) with BSMTP id
> 4801; Sun, 22 Aug 93 04:04:07 EST
>Received: from nic.cerf.net by indst.indstate.edu (IBM VM SMTP R1.2.2MX) with
> TCP; Sun, 22 Aug 93 04:04:06 EST
>Received: by nic.cerf.net (4.1/CERFnet-1.0)  id AA11147; Sun, 22 Aug 93 02:06:2
> PDT
>X-Path: cerf!sdcoe!philly!lanleb!lebanon!daemon Sat, 21 Aug 93 23:45
>Received: by sdcoe  DHL85510: Sat, 21 Aug 93 23:45 Version 2.2.1 18Aug93
>Date: Fri, 20 Aug 93 11:02 edt
>From: daemon@lebanon.cerf.fred.org  (FMF Mailer Version 2.03 19apr93)
>To: xxclark@indst.indstate.edu
>Subject: returned mail
>Message-Id: <DHL85510@sdcoe.cerf.fred.org

>Error: User "dhaise" isn't on lebanon

>----------returned message----------
>From lanleb!philly!sdcoe!toad.com!owner-cypherpunks Wed, 18 Aug 93 02:36
>Received: by lanleb.cerf.fred.org Version 2.02 6apr93
>   id DHI00002; Wed, 18 Aug 93 02:36 edt
>Date: Tue, 17 Aug 93 01:24:07 EST
>Ppath: lebanon!dhaise
>From: XXCLARK@indst.indstate.edu
>To: cypherpunks@toad.com
>   ...
>----------end of returned message----------
>  daemon lebanon  8/22/93




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: M..Stirner@f28.n125.z1.FIDONET.ORG (M. Stirner)
Date: Mon, 23 Aug 93 04:46:54 PDT
To: Cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Munged account feeding ol
Message-ID: <2028.2C78568C@shelter.FIDONET.ORG>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


 -=> Quoting Uucp to All <=-

 Uu> From  kumr!toad.com!owner-cypherpunks
 Uu> From: fergp@sytex.com (Paul Ferguson)
 Uu> To:   cypherpunks@toad.com
 Uu> Date: Sun, 22 Aug 93 08:01:40 EDT

 Uu> Am I the only one getting carbon copies of many of my own messages
 Uu> from someone else's munged account?
 Uu>
 Uu> Error: User "dhaise" isn't on lebanon
 Uu>
 Uu> ----------returned message----------

I've received one of these too.


... Try to look unimportant because the bad guys may be low on ammo.
___ Blue Wave/QWK v2.12
--  
M. Stirner - via FidoNet node 1:125/1
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From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: bill@twwells.com (T. William Wells)
Date: Sun, 22 Aug 93 16:05:14 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Munged account feeding old mail?
In-Reply-To: <H0mo9B1w165w@sytex.com>
Message-ID: <CC6D8H.80w@twwells.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


In article <H0mo9B1w165w@sytex.com>,
Paul Ferguson <fergp@uunet.UU.NET@sytex.com> wrote:
: Am I the only one getting carbon copies of many of my own messages
: from someone else's munged account?

Nope. I got one too.





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Peter Wayner <pcw@access.digex.net>
Date: Sun, 22 Aug 93 18:06:21 PDT
To: karn@qualcomm.com
Subject: Re:  Cracking & auditing crypto protocols
Message-ID: <199308230106.AA11314@access.digex.net>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



I'm not sure whether it is fair to call Walter Tuchman
a Real Cryptanalyst, but there are many reasons to suspect 
that he is a talented one. When he headed the IBM team
developing DES, it is said (by Coppersmith) that they 
developed many attacks like what we now know as 
Differential Cryptanalysis. These contributed to their
design of DES and I think it would be fair to say that
the same principles could be used to assess the strength 
of the Clipper chip. A Mykotronix employee told me that
it "Contains s-boxes and all that stuff." 

I don't know whether he was the one responsible for these insights
back then, but he certainly was in the right place to learn
alot by osmosis.

-Peter




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Johan Helsingius <julf@penet.FI>
Date: Sun, 22 Aug 93 07:41:57 PDT
To: Geoff White <geoffw@nexsys.net>
Subject: Re: "Secure Voice"
In-Reply-To: <9308221736.AA00819@nexsys.nexsys.net>
Message-ID: <9308222122.aa04019@penet.penet.FI>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



> 	Anybody know about the voice capabilities of the ZyXel class modems?
> 	I own a ZyXel 1496E which can digitize voice and also transmit
> 	voice data that has been digitized.  It would be easy to
> 	first encript this stream before sending it out.

Well, we use one as a phone answering machine. Our system passes on the
recorded message as a MIME mail message...

	Julf





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: hfinney@shell.portal.com
Date: Mon, 23 Aug 93 10:35:19 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Chaum on the wrong foot?
Message-ID: <9308230602.AA25529@jobe.shell.portal.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


A lot of our discussion is influenced by the ideas of David Chaum.  He
pioneered technology which could protect individual privacy while allowing
very flexible sorts of credentials and guarantees.  He has also played
a big role in the various proposals for digital cash.

But I think that Chaum has gone off in the wrong direction in the last
few years.  More and more he is concentrating on protocols which rely
on a tamper-proof, hardware implementation of a cryptographic protocol
which he calls an "observer".  This observer chip would sit in your
computer (which could be a Newton-style PDA or a smart card) and would
play an important part in the exchanges of information, cash, or credentials
which you would make with others.  The observer basically makes sure you
are telling the truth in your transactions, that you are not double-spending
your digital cash, or not claiming a credential which you don't have.

Now, this approach has the obvious advantage that it allows solving
certain problems which can't be solved otherwise.  There appears to be
no way to provide for secure, off-line digital cash, for example, other
than with something like an observer.

But it has the equally obvious problem of relying on a tamper-proof
chip as a necessary part of the protocol.  Recently it seems that many
of the papers out of his group are designed to explore observer-based
protocols.  This means that these ideas are not useful for software-only
implementations.  One of the (relatively few) strengths that we and the
forces we represent have is that free software can be spread very far
and very fast, making it hard for those opposed to privacy to successfully
stop our efforts.  Any technology based on special chips is going to
lose these advantages.

Another problem with the observer is psychological.  Although Chaum goes
to great lengths to design his cryptographic protocols so that even a
cheating observer can learn effectively NOTHING about the computer user
that would compromise his privacy, people may still feel uncomfortable
about having a mechanical "conscience" in their pocket.  People want to
feel in control of their computers, and I think supporting this control
is a big part of the Cypherpunks philosophy.

A related point is that there have already been comparisons on sci.crypt
between Chaum's observers and the Clipper chip, in that both rely on
tamper-resistant technology to implement features which are not entirely
in their owner's best interests.  Assuming we do manage to successfully
defeat Clipper, the taint of this association may increase resistance to
observers.

I wish Chaum and his group would stop directing their efforts towards
protocols which require an observer chip to be effective.  Granted,
there are some things that don't work as nicely without observers.  But
I think that a realistic appraisal of the pros and cons suggests that
non-observer protocols are more likely to further our ultimate goal of
personal privacy.

Hal Finney
hfinney@shell.portal.com




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: hfinney@shell.portal.com
Date: Mon, 23 Aug 93 10:36:21 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Attacks on remailers
Message-ID: <9308230602.AA25533@jobe.shell.portal.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Chaum, in his first paper on "Mixes" (anonymous remailers) described
protocols which were designed to resist several attacks.  (See the
February, 1981, Communications of the ACM, p. 84.)  These can
be understood by considering a series of attacks of increasing sophis-
tication, with corresponding responses.

Our opponent has as his goal to track a message through a chain of
remailers.

Attack 1: Just intercept the message from the sender, and look at the
commands of the form:
::
Request-Remailing-To: first-remailer
::
Request-Remailing-To: second-remailer
::
Request-Remailing-To: final-destination

The final command shows where the message is finally going to go.

Response: Encrypt the messages.  Use "nesting", so that all that is
visible as each message leaves a remailer is the destination of the
next remailer.

Attack 2: Look at the mail logs on the system running the remailer to
see which message goes out from the remailer account shortly after each
message comes in.

Response: Run the remailer on a machine which does not keep mail logs,
or on a machine to which you can deny the attackers access.

Attack 3: Monitor the messages in real time as they flow into and out of
each remailer machine, again looking for the message which comes out
just after each incoming message.

Response: Batch up many messages which arrive over a period of time,
only sending them out at regular intervals or when a certain number have
accumulated.  Send them out in random order.  Alternatively, delay each
message by a random amount of time before the message goes out.  (This
response will also deal with the previous attack.)

Attack 4: Look at distinguishing features of the messages which are
preserved by the remailers, such as subject line or message size, to
match up incoming and outgoing messages within each batch.

Response: Do not retain any header fields through remailers, not even
subject.  Use an encryption mode in which messages are rounded up to
some standard size so that all messages appear to be the same size.

Attack 5: Record an incoming message to the remailer, and insert a copy
of it into the incoming message stream, so that the batch will have two
identical messages.  Look for two identical outgoing messages.  Remove
one.  This is the match to that incoming message.

Response: Check for duplicate incoming messages in the remailer, and
remove all but one copy of each duplicate.

Attack 6: Insert a duplicate message multiple times in separate batches.
Observe the outgoing batches and look for a pattern of destinations
which are correlated with those batches in which the incoming message
is inserted.

Response: Check for messages which have been duplicated from earlier
batches and remove them.  Include time/date stamps on incoming messages
with a time limit so that they are no good after a certain number of
days; this way the check for duplicates only has to go back that many
days.

Attack 7: Look at all messages coming out of the first remailer, and
follow them into their 2nd remailers; take all messages from those and
follow them on, and so on.  This will eventually lead to a number of
destinations, one of which must have been the destination of the original
message.  Over a period of time, look for correlations between destinations
and sources.

Response: Use large remailer chains of popular remailers.  With enough
mixing at each stage of the chain, the number of possible destinations
will become astronomically large, making correlations statistically
impossible.

Attack 8: Correlate messages being sent from person A with messages being
received a certain time later by person B.  Even without the ability to
track messages through the remailers this can show a communication pattern.

Response: Send dummy messages at regular intervals, which bounce through
the remailer network and then die.  When you have a real message to send,
replace one of the dummies with this.  The sender's traffic pattern is
then constant and no information can be gained from it.

Attack 9: Bribe or coerce one or more remailer operators into revealing
their keys, or into decrypting the desired messages.  Alternatively, run
many remailers, pretending to be dedicated to privacy, while secretly
gathering information on the messages.

Response: Use many remailers in a variety of geographical locations, so
that it is unlikely that all of them can be corrupted in this way.

These are all the attacks I can remember being implicitly considered in
Chaum's paper.  Other people who have ideas for attacks should mention
them so we can think of responses.

Chaum also discusses anonymous return addresses.  We have a simple form
of these enabled in our encrypting remailers.  The idea is to encrypt
a series of remailing requests for the path the message will follow,
with the last request directing the message to the user whose anonymous
address this is.

Some more attacks are possible in this case:

Attack 1A: Look at the message content as it passes through each remailer,
to correlate incoming and outgoing messages.

Response: Encrypt the message at each stage to prevent this matching.  This
raises the problem of how to determine the encryption key in such a way
that the final user can decrypt the message.  Chaum suggested including the
encryption key in the anonymous address (a different key at each stage
of the chain), so that the user can decrypt the message.  Eric Messick
has proposed letting the remailer choose the key, with a protocol for the
user to communicate again with the remailer to get the message decrypted.

Attack 1B: Send two different messages to the same return address with
different contents, and look for duplicate address blocks in the outgoing
batches.

Response: Apply some randomization to the address blocks at each stage so
that messages to the same address don't look identical.  (Chaum did not
give this solution, as he viewed the next attack as being essentially
unanswerable.)

Attack 1C: Send many addresses to the anonymous address, and look for a
destination which receives that many messages in a correlated fashion.

Response: Chaum's response is that the remailer must not accept more than
one message with a given anonymous return address, just as it must not
accept more than one copy of a message in the regular case.  This implies
that anonymous return addresses must be use-once to be truly secure.

This conclusion is uncomfortable, as the requirement that an address be
use-once will severely impair its usability.  But this attack appears
hard to avoid.

There is always the possibility of giving up on anonymous addresses in
the Chaumian sense, and instead using other ideas which have been
suggested here, such as posting to newsgroups, or message broadcast
pools.  All of these ideas have the problem that they expose everyone
in some group to all of the messages intended for every group member,
hence the number of messages will scale as the square of the number of
group members.  This will quickly become unmanageable for large groups,
therefore providing only a limited amount of anonymity.

It's also worth noting that our remailers are vulnerable to almost all
of these attacks; at best we are safe against two or three of them.

Hal Finney
hfinney@shell.portal.com




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: szabo@netcom.com (Nick Szabo)
Date: Sun, 22 Aug 93 23:05:17 PDT
To: plmoses@emoryu1.cc.emory.edu (Paul L. Moses)
Subject: Re: Digicash
In-Reply-To: <9308230349.AA16925@emoryu1.cc.emory.edu>
Message-ID: <9308230604.AA26451@netcom4.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Paul Moses:
>	3)  The [ATM] card then becomes a bearer instrument of sorts.  
>       No big deal; IT'S JUST LIKE MONEY.

It is a big deal.  Many people like carrying ID-based
cards (ATM w/PIN, credit cards, etc.) so they aren't easy targets for 
violent thieves.  Although this reaches equlilibrium -- as long as most 
people use credit cards instead of cash, a few of us can still carry 
around cash as long as we don't wave it around too much.  Targets of 
opportunity these days include late-night ATM customers.

Query: what will be the last businesses to install ATM terminals?
A couple that come to mind right away:

* rural businesses (poor net access)
* pawn shops (desire for privacy -- though I continue to be
amazed how many people create dossiers on themselves by 
calling 1-900 phone sex numbers, renting X-rated vids with
credit card, etc.)

Nick Szabo				szabo@netcom.com




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: plmoses@unix.cc.emory.edu (Paul L. Moses)
Date: Sun, 22 Aug 93 20:51:22 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Digicash
Message-ID: <9308230349.AA16925@emoryu1.cc.emory.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>From hughes@toad.com Sun Aug 22 20:06:38 1993
>To: plmoses@unix.cc.emory.edu (Paul L. Moses)
>Subject: [plmoses@unix.cc.emory.edu (Paul L. Moses): Digicash....I think]
>Date: Sun, 22 Aug 93 17:06:29 -0700
>From: hughes@toad.com
>
>Mail to owner-cypherpunks goes to the bounce box, where it gets looked
>at occasionally.  Mail to cypherpunks@toad.com to send to the whole list.
>
>Eric
>
>------- Forwarded Message
>
>Return-Path: plmoses@unix.cc.emory.edu
>Received: from emoryu1.cc.emory.edu ([128.140.1.1]) by toad.com id AA06687; Fri, 20 Aug 93 19:36:07 PDT
>Received: by
>	emoryu1.cc.emory.edu (5.65/Emory_cc.3.4.6) via MAILPROG
>	id AA19400 ; Fri, 20 Aug 93 23:49:26 -0400
>Return-Path: plmoses@unix.cc.emory.edu
>Date: Fri, 20 Aug 93 23:49:26 -0400
>From: plmoses@unix.cc.emory.edu (Paul L. Moses)
>Message-Id: <9308210349.AA19400@emoryu1.cc.emory.edu>
>To: owner-cypherpunks@toad.com
>Subject: Digicash....I think
>
>
>I hesitate to mention this, since I have *NO* idea of any of the mathematics
>behind the digicash articles you all have mention....BUT...
>
>I was out running errands today and used my ATM card for a cash purchase.
>This led me to think, aha, I could simply get this card "charged" every
>so often with another denomination ($20, $50, $200, $2000, whatever) and
>go around spending my money without the Store having to phone in the transaction.  This raises a couple of thought in my mind, namely
>	1)  Reverse the function of current ATM units, ie use them to 
>"charge" (as in, activate, add money to) the BANK CARD, rather than the 
>opposite that we do now...
>	2)  Find some way to ensure that the card itself does not contain
>an identifier, so that the user is not recorded during the transaction.
>	3)  The card then becomes a bearer instrument of sorts.  No big deal;
>IT'S JUST LIKE MONEY.  People have to be careful with money, so they ought
>to be careful with these things too.  You could still probably use PIN #s
>(personal code), since they're pretty generic and can be selected and
>changed by the end user himself....whoops no, on second thought, not unless
>the user can encode the PIN himself.  Hmm.  I dunno.  PIN could be OK as long
>as it was never recorded in the transaction, but there's the danger of the
>transaction program taking a look surreptitiously...
>
>	4) Digicash exists already.  I buy a copy card at the library and
>put money onto it, then use it at will in the copy machines.  If I lose the
>card, I'm outta luck, cos anyone who finds it can use it.  Primitive, single
>function, but basically what this is about, I think?
>
>So, what I'm trying to say is that it is possible now to do this, without
>any huge breakthrough or legal innovations.  If I have missed something obvious,
>please enlighten me (gently!).
>
>- -Paul
>
>------- End of Forwarded Message
>
>




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: plmoses@unix.cc.emory.edu (Paul L. Moses)
Date: Sun, 22 Aug 93 20:51:45 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Better late than never, eh Stanton?
Message-ID: <9308230350.AA17349@emoryu1.cc.emory.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>From hughes@toad.com Sun Aug 22 20:07:28 1993
>To: plmoses@unix.cc.emory.edu (Paul L. Moses)
>Subject: [plmoses@unix.cc.emory.edu (Paul L. Moses): forwarding]
>Date: Sun, 22 Aug 93 17:07:20 -0700
>From: hughes@toad.com
>
>
>------- Forwarded Message
>
>Return-Path: plmoses@unix.cc.emory.edu
>Received: from emoryu1.cc.emory.edu ([128.140.1.1]) by toad.com id AA25788; Tue, 17 Aug 93 09:19:15 PDT
>Received: by
>	emoryu1.cc.emory.edu (5.65/Emory_cc.3.4.6) via MAILPROG
>	id AA17454 ; Tue, 17 Aug 93 12:19:07 -0400
>Return-Path: plmoses@unix.cc.emory.edu
>Date: Tue, 17 Aug 93 12:19:07 -0400
>From: plmoses@unix.cc.emory.edu (Paul L. Moses)
>Message-Id: <9308171619.AA17454@emoryu1.cc.emory.edu>
>To: owner-cypherpunks@toad.com
>Subject: forwarding
>
>>From anton@hydra.unm.edu Sun Aug 15 03:21:35 1993
>From: Stanton McCandlish <anton@hydra.unm.edu>
>Subject: Re: On The Inherent Evil of Electronic Democracy
>To: plmoses@unix.cc.emory.edu (Paul L. Moses)
>Date: Sun, 15 Aug 1993 01:21:25 -0600 (MDT)
>In-Reply-To: <9308121908.AA06721@emoryu1.cc.emory.edu> from "Paul L. Moses" at Aug 12, 93 03:08:00 pm
>X-Mailer: ELM [version 2.4 PL21]
>Mime-Version: 1.0
>Content-Type: text/plain; charset=US-ASCII
>Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
>Content-Length: 3327      
>
>Quoth Paul L. Moses, verily I say unto thee:
>- -=>
>- -=>Regarding the Electronic Democracy idea, I vote with Tim May.  Look at the
>
>Just the opposite here.
>
>One factor has been missing from this discussion.  
>
>Representative "democracy" is a statist imposition.
>
>One other factor:
>
>The number of issues to be voted on is quite large.  Even with easy access
>via cable-tv data networks, public voting kiosks, etc, no one will be able
>to keep up.  This will immediately result in demand for LESS legislation,
>which is a good thing no matter how you look at it.  
>
>Simple requirements for quorums before a proposition comes up for voting
>would head off most goofy bills right from the start.  If you have to have
>at least, say, 10% of the population to vote to ALLOW AN ISSUE TO EVEN BE
>VOTED ON, most idiot bills will be nipped in the bud.  One other thing
>you'll see disappear is "private laws".  Our congress wastes an incredible
>amount of time and money working on laws that affect only one corporation,
>or one small area.  For one thing, most of this stuff is irrelevant as far
>as the Law of the Land goes.  It's not something our legislature should be
>involved in.  Let companies work out their own damn problems.  For
>another, local-area laws should be handled by local areas.  Period.
>In my opinion.
>
>The main objection I keep seeing is that all them loonies will vote for
>stupid laws.  I'd like to ask you how many of these people vote NOW?  Not
>very many.  The idiotic, the lazy, and the careless do not vote, by and
>large.  The people that vote are the people that think about issues, and
>decide that they want to do something about them.
>
>Anyway, when some of this comes about, and it is quite inevitable, I would
>hope that a very least e-voting gives the people veto power, to directly
>overturn anything passed by congress and the prez, and even the power to
>kill bills before they even get past the discussion stage.  Add to that
>the right to directly propose legislation, provided there is a quorum, and
>I think that would be a good starting point.
>
>If all Tim and others with the same views are upset about is that a sudden
>change could result in utter chaos, I have no argument with that.  The
>changes must be gradual, so as to not cause a governmental backlash.  I
>can see just installing the system and cutting congress out of the picture
>entirely.  The resulting mess would be allowed to go on for about a month,
>before the pres declared martial law due to national emergency, and then
>it'd be all over.  One thing that irritates the hell out of me about many
>anarch[o-capital]ists and libertarians, is an all or nothing stance.  Some
>of you folks don't seem to clue to the ideas of compromise, gradual
>change, long-term planning, and strategic retreat to throw an enemy off
>balance.  You aren't going to take the world by storm, and Tim's dire
>predictions of a hell hole that would result if such occured are right on
>the mark. Play our cards right, and we'll take the world by whispering breeze.
>
>- -- 
>Stanton  McCandlish   * Space Migration * Networking * ChaOrder * NO GOV'T. *
>anton@hydra.unm.edu   * Intelligence Increase * Nano * Crypto * NO RELIGION *
>FidoNet:    1:301/2   * Life Extension * Ethics * VR * Now! * NO MORE LIES! *
>Noise in the Void BBS * +1-505-246-8515   (24hr, 1200-14400, v32bis, N-8-1) *
>
> 
>
>------- End of Forwarded Message
>
>




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: cdodhner@indirect.com (Christian D. Odhner)
Date: Mon, 23 Aug 93 00:55:17 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: indirect remailer
Message-ID: <9308230752.AA24287@indirect.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


The indirect remailer <cdodhner@indirect.com> still has some bugs to work
out with the pgp portion of the scripts etc. Therefore the logs and
archive files and debug stuff will remain active until I have time to fix
it, probably in a day or two. I'll be sure to let you all know when it's
as secure as it can be (as secure as anything can be when I don't have
root and somebody else does...)

Happy Hunting, -Chris.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: plmoses@unix.cc.emory.edu (Paul L. Moses)
Date: Sun, 22 Aug 93 23:11:24 PDT
To: szabo@netcom.com
Subject: Re: Digicash
Message-ID: <9308230610.AA02065@emoryu1.cc.emory.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I dont see that a "reverse" ATM card (ie, one that was "charged" with
money to spend) poses any greater risk to the bearer, IF some kind of
authorization code/check is built into the card.  
What I am hazy on is how such an authorization could exist while avoiding
the problem of creating a dossier.  If the individual user could encode
his own PIN on the card without telling the bank, that would do it.
Or, the bank could know the PIN but if the Retailer's transaction software
never *records* the PIN, then there will be no privacy problem...since
there will be nothing to cross check against the bank's records.
The retailer is happy cos he has HIS data (item sold, amount, date, etc);
the consumer is protected, and the bank is not involved at all.
Eh?




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: b44729@achilles.ctd.anl.gov (Samuel Pigg)
Date: Mon, 23 Aug 93 02:11:28 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Remailers, pgp and SMTP.
Message-ID: <9308230909.AA23408@achilles.ctd.anl.gov>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Perhaps this has been discussed before (I am often guilty of
Not Paying Attention(tm)), but would security not be improved
for the remailers if people used some simple software to
connect to the remailer via socket 25 and send the message that way,
rather than leaving log files on their host?

For remailers run from student account security could be increased by
doing the same; preventing log files by using direct SMTP connections?

Ex:

	(1)	User composes message.

	(2)	User encrypts to recipient.

	(3)	User encrypts to remailer.

	(4)	User then mails to remailer using a small program
		to handle the SMTP connection directly.

	(5)	Remailer (perhaps running on a student account)
		decrypts message with its secret key.

	(6)	Remailer manually (whenever it gets around to it
		(to guard against traffic analysis)) SMTP's the message
		to the recipients host.

	(7)	Recipient decrypts message.

Of course these security gains could be circumvented by root (on the
remailer) in several different ways, but it would take much more work
I would think.

Hell, it could be that the remailers already do this (I don't have the
code) but I doubt if many people send mail to the remailers by connecting
to port 25 of the host.
-Sam




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Timothy Newsham <newsham@wiliki.eng.hawaii.edu>
Date: Mon, 23 Aug 93 13:01:36 PDT
To: wcs@anchor.ho.att.com
Subject: Re: "Secure Voice"
In-Reply-To: <9308231713.AA01938@anchor.ho.att.com>
Message-ID: <9308231957.AA02205@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> 
> What I'd like to see is a SoundBlaster followon with a DSP chip.
> It IS possible to get DSP boards for PCs and I think for Macs,
> so you could build a system easily enough with a DSP board and a SoundBlaster,
> but the last time I checked, the DSP boards tended to be expensive
> and packaged with lots of fancy waveform analysis tools.
> 
> 		Bill Stewart
> 

the soundblaster board already has a dsp on board.  It is supposed
to be programmable, but most books dont mention anything about
how to do this.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: strick -- henry strickland <strick@versant.com>
Date: Mon, 23 Aug 93 11:31:35 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: (CuD) (CuNews) Smart Kard Forum
Message-ID: <9308231833.AA00937@versant.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Does anyone know if these Smart Kards could be available via anonymous
cash transactions, like european telephone cards? 

Would any of these companies be open to ideas?

They don't list any address or references....          strick


------ Source: Computer underground Digest    Sun  Aug 22 1993   Volume 5 : Issue 64 ------

Date: Wed, 18 Aug 93 12:19:00 BST
From: grmeyer@GENIE.GEIS.COM
Subject: File 4--CuNews  ("Smart Kards," Comp Snooping at IRS/FBI, & more)

Smart Kards Are Coming
======================
A group of corporations, including MasterCard, Visa, Citicorp, Amex,
IBM, AT&T, Microsoft, and Apple, have formed the Smart Card Forum.
The cross-industry group will promote the use of smart-card technology
for payment, transit, health care, identification, and security
applications.
(Information Week August 9, 1993 pg 10)





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Brian J Harvey <bjh@world.std.com>
Date: Mon, 23 Aug 93 09:11:34 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Secure Voice
Message-ID: <Pine.3.07.9308231159.A16731-a100000@world.std.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


On 8/22/93 Harry Bartholomew mentioned a new "secure voice" product from
SVC in College Station, TX. Does anyone have more info on this product, ie
a phone number?

Question: He states that they offer "lifetime upgrades" but also that they
do not mantain cust. records (for privacy), so how does one find out about
new releases. Wouldn't one need to "poll the company" to learn of a new
release and wouldn't that turn into a headache for the company? (Assuming
they've sold significant numbers)

Brian






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Duncan Frissell <frissell@panix.com>
Date: Mon, 23 Aug 93 09:11:56 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Digicash
In-Reply-To: <9308230604.AA26451@netcom4.netcom.com>
Message-ID: <199308231607.AA08789@panix.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


In <9308230604.AA26451@netcom4.netcom.com> szabo@netcom.com (Nick Szabo) writes:

>It is a big deal.  Many people like carrying ID-based
>cards (ATM w/PIN, credit cards, etc.) so they aren't easy targets for 
>violent thieves.  Although this reaches equlilibrium -- as long as most 
>people use credit cards instead of cash, a few of us can still carry 
>around cash as long as we don't wave it around too much.  Targets of 
>opportunity these days include late-night ATM customers.

ATM cards w/pin are *already* bearer instruments.  Likewise credit cards for
ATM transactions and for those credit transactions (small stuff) where other
ID is not checked.

Most people use cash instead of credit cards.  Something like 60-75% of in 
person transactions are still in cash.  Many of the balance are via checks.
40% of the population still has no plastic and 20% don't even have checking
accounts.

Duncan Frissell

Sorry for any problems.  Learning to use Helldiver packets.  Anyone know a
Windows reader for Helldiver packets (they are called something else too)?





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: wcs@anchor.ho.att.com
Date: Mon, 23 Aug 93 10:21:34 PDT
To: geoffw@nexsys.net
Subject: Re: "Secure Voice"
Message-ID: <9308231713.AA01938@anchor.ho.att.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text


geoffw@nexsys.net (Geoff White) writes: 
> 	Anybody know about the voice capabilities of the ZyXel class modems?
> 	I own a ZyXel 1496E which can digitize voice and also transmit
> 	voice data that has been digitized.  It would be easy to
> 	first encript this stream before sending it out.
> 	The 1496E+ also support CELP (or is it (CLEP?) but that one
> 	cost about $400.  (The 1496E is around $300) It also is a 14.4 K
> 	baud modem and does FAX. 

The ZyXel has a 68xxx and a DSP chip.  It's able to digitize and compress voice,
and also to play back digitized voice, and also to do 9600/14400 modeming,
but it can't do all three at once.  To build a secure voice phone with Zyxels,
you'd need either 2 or 3 modems - one to handle the modem functions,
one to compress the voice, and either the same or a separate one to play voice.
But it's a good start.

What I'd like to see is a SoundBlaster followon with a DSP chip.
It IS possible to get DSP boards for PCs and I think for Macs,
so you could build a system easily enough with a DSP board and a SoundBlaster,
but the last time I checked, the DSP boards tended to be expensive
and packaged with lots of fancy waveform analysis tools.

		Bill Stewart




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Kent Hastings" <kent_hastings@qmail2.aero.org>
Date: Mon, 23 Aug 93 13:51:38 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Chaum criticism
Message-ID: <199308232050.AA12556@aerospace.aero.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


                      Chaum criticism#000#
Hal Finney writes:

> ... I think that Chaum has gone off in the wrong direction 
> in the last few years [by] concentrating on protocols which rely
> on a tamper-proof, hardware ... "observer"... chip ... etc. 
Amen.

> ... it seems that many of the papers out of his group are designed 
> to explore observer-based protocols.  

I am trying to read and understand the Niels Ferguson "Off-line Coins"
article, the "Efficient Off-line Digital Cash" paper also from CWI and 
the Netcash paper. Were you the one critical of the Netcash paper 
because it didn't offer unconditional untraceability? Do the papers I
just listed require observer chips, or are they OK for software-only?

> This means that these ideas are not useful for software-only
> implementations.  One of the (relatively few) strengths that we 
> and the forces we represent have is that free software can be 
> spread very far and very fast, making it hard for those opposed 
> to privacy to successfully stop our efforts.  Any technology based 
> on special chips is going to lose these advantages.

We have PageMaker, CAD ware, someday we may have "ChipMaker"
to create "chipscript" robotic control files to make our own
monolithic IC's. In the short term, perhaps we can distribute
shareware hardware designs using low-cost components to 
avoid back doors in manufactured comm gear.

> ... people may still feel uncomfortable about having a 
> mechanical "conscience" in their pocket ... there have already 
> been comparisons on sci.crypt between Chaum's observers and 
> the Clipper chip ...

In other words, if we can't see the "source code" for the 
hardware design, or "compile" it ourselves, maybe we shouldn't
really trust it. 

> I think that a realistic appraisal of the pros and cons 
> suggests that non-observer protocols are more likely to 
> further our ultimate goal of personal privacy.

What particular design would you like to see widely 
implemented now given these objections to observer chips?
Is there software we can use NOW for ATM's and banks?

Kent - jkhastings@aol.com








From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Date: Mon, 23 Aug 93 15:45:21 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: No digital coins (was: Chaum on the wrong foot?)
In-Reply-To: <9308230602.AA25529@jobe.shell.portal.com>
Message-ID: <9308232244.AA16620@netcom5.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


There is no silver bullet!

Here are some comments about why there are no easy to use "digital
coins," and why the digital money protocols are so complicated and
involve banks, tamper-resistant modules, and other things that may not
be make difficult some of our Cypherpunks goals.

I agree with Hal Finney's basic point about David Chaum's current
direction: it is not precisely the direction I'd like to see.

However, in Chaum's defense, his is only one group and can only do so
much. I don't see other groups pursuing digital cash with the same
vigor and depth, save for the occasional paper about "electronic
wallets" and so forth, and so Chaum is doing what he is doing.

It is possible that someone here in Cypherpunks will develop some form
of competing system. (Bear in mind, though, that these protocols are
notoriously complicated, and involve issues of forgery, spoofing,
denial (that a transaction occurred), tax laws, and so on.)

One of Hal's points deserves special comment:

(speaking of the observer protocol)

> Now, this approach has the obvious advantage that it allows solving
> certain problems which can't be solved otherwise.  There appears to be
> no way to provide for secure, off-line digital cash, for example, other
> than with something like an observer.

There are no digital coins.

A physical piece of gold, the canonical piece of money, is essentially
imposssible to counterfeit/forge, so coins can be passed from person
to person, person to shop, to banks, to tax collectors, etc. It is the
ultimate "bearer instrument." Importantly, the flow of such money is
"conservative" in that the total amount of such money is constant...no
amount of trickery or protocol complexity can increase the amount
present, and only loss of the physical coins can reduce the amount.

Paper currency is ostensibly a parallel to physical money (at least in
countries on a gold or silver standard, which the U.S. is not any
longer). Strong currencies (DM, yen, dollar, SF...though this is all
debatable) still have some of the "conservative" nature, because the
bills/notes are very difficult to counterfeit and are exchanged as
physical items or tokens.

I won't get into things like VISA transactions, promissory notes,
etc., except to say they are quite a bit less "tangible" (anyone who
has gotten unexpected VISA transactions, triggered by someone out
there, understands that the transactions are much less straightforward
and tangible). 

A problem with digital money has always been that there apparently is
no close equivalent to a digital coin, a token which can be passed
around freely, as a quarter or a dollar bill can be.

The reasons are obvious: a cryptographic number can be trivially
duplicated (counterfeited/forged) and presented to a second or third
person. Thus, the receiver of such a piece of digital money must
confirm that it has not already been spent, that some bank will redeem
it for "real" money, etc.

Digital coupons have this same problem. (Real coupons are made fairly
counterfeit-resistant, as are such things as lottery tickets. Lottery
tickets also use a clever scheme whereby the winning number, the thing
that gets announced, is hashed/transformed into another number with a
secret key, and this second number is also printed on the ticket, but
would-be spoofers are unable to generate the second number.)

The complicated Chaum protocols, which now are going in the direction
of the tamper-resistant "observer" chips (in smartcards, PDAs, etc.),
address these issues of spoofing, denial, counterfeiting, etc., in
various ways.

Later, Hal makes another good point:

> A related point is that there have already been comparisons on sci.crypt
> between Chaum's observers and the Clipper chip, in that both rely on
> tamper-resistant technology to implement features which are not entirely
> in their owner's best interests.  Assuming we do manage to successfully
> defeat Clipper, the taint of this association may increase resistance to
> observers.
> 
> I wish Chaum and his group would stop directing their efforts towards
> protocols which require an observer chip to be effective.  Granted,
> there are some things that don't work as nicely without observers.  But
> I think that a realistic appraisal of the pros and cons suggests that
> non-observer protocols are more likely to further our ultimate goal of
> personal privacy.

It seems likely to me that even now a group within the bowels of the
NSA and NIST is developing a "digital money clipper" (a euphonious
pun?), that is, a standard for digital money with similar sorts of
backdoors, emergency doors, etc., that Clipper has.

NSA/NIST surely knows of the pressures for digital money, and could
plan to introduce their own standard. Instead of "LEAFs" for the FBI
and other law enforcement, this one could have "IRS observers" and
"money-laundering observers" (this is wild speculation, I'll grant
you) which tie-in to currency exchange reporting, sales tax, and
income tax law enforcement systems.

It may be that Chaum, who is eager to actually get some sales to
groups within Europe and elsewhere, is already responding to some
pressures for "accountability" (the digital money version of
"wire-tappability") by various European governments and the observer
protocols are an effort to satisfy some of these concerns.

(I am not accusing Chaum of anything, just speculating that some
groups developing digital money--and Chaum is the clear leader
here--may have market or legal constraints which are shaping their
focus away from the digital money = untraceable cash = crypto anarchy
direction many of us favor.)

A "Cypherpunks digital money" system may be more urgent than ever.

-Tim May


-- 
..........................................................................
Timothy C. May         | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,  
tcmay@netcom.com       | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
408-688-5409           | knowledge, reputations, information markets, 
W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA  | black markets, collapse of governments.
Higher Power: 2^756839 | Public Key: PGP and MailSafe available.
Note: I put time and money into writing this posting. I hope you enjoy it.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: anonymous@extropia.wimsey.com
Date: Mon, 23 Aug 93 16:56:39 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Wimsey Remailer Alive!
Message-ID: <199308232328.AA07642@xtropia>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


M. Stirner said here:

"OK.  It seems that remail@extropia.wimsey.com (#15) is down.  This is a
shame, as it was the _only_ remailer that would function as an anonymous
remailer for me.  It worked beautifully while it was up.  Its apparent
demise has been reported by other users as well,"

Reports of the wimsey remailer's demise are premature.  I just used
it to post this message!

One possible cause of problems might be use of PGP version 2.3 or
2.3a WITHOUT the following set in CONFIG.TXT:

pkcs_compat = 0     # Use backwards-compatible formats

The PGP in use by the remailer may be version 2.0 or 2.1, which will
not read PKCS-compatible PGP Messages.

The wimsey remailer has an ingenious method of returning error messages
anonymously.  Specify a subject in the message sent to wimsey that
will be meaningful to you, but won't identify you (like a set of
random letters). This subject does not appear in the remailed
message. Then subscribe to the mailing list

   errors-request@extropia.wimsey.com

by sending a message with Subject: subscribe.  You will receive a msg
for ALL errors detected in incoming messages and ALL bounced messages.
Errors in incoming messages are identified by the subject field.
Errors from bounced messages are identified by the subject in the
bounced message, which is specified following the To: line in the
encrypted message sent to wimsey.

Wimsey also has an anonymous reply mechanism using a message pool.
For more info, send "help" to

        pool0-request@extropia.wimsey.com

I think wimsey is also the only Cypherpunks remailer which resides
outside the USA (It's in Canada).  This obviously makes it much more
inconvenient for USA Law Enforcement to broach the physical security
of the remailer.

Stirner also says:

". All other cypherpunks remailers, reliable or not, retain the footer
addresses automagically inserted by the host box here & are therefore
not in any way anonymous for my purposes.  There was a discussion of a
"cut line" syntax before I temporarily lost access to cypherpunks, but
as far as I know there was never any agreement or implementation (I
shall be pleased to be corrected if this is not the case)."

I think the Hall Remailer at <nowhere@bsu-cs.bsu.edu> recognizes a
"cut line" of

--ignore--

I tried this and it failed the first time, but worked the second.
You should try a message to yourself before relying on it.
Unfortunately this remailer doesn't support encrypted remailing
requests.

You also may be able to alter or eliminate the automatic signature
or footer produced by your BBS. Check your local documentation or
ask your SYSOP.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: anonymous@extropia.wimsey.com
Date: Mon, 23 Aug 93 17:31:40 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Private Message to BlackNet
Message-ID: <199308232328.AA07653@xtropia>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


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From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: cme@ellisun.sw.stratus.com (Carl Ellison)
Date: Mon, 23 Aug 93 14:51:39 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Attacks on remailers
In-Reply-To: <9308230602.AA25533@jobe.shell.portal.com>
Message-ID: <9308231749.ZM12733@ellisun.sw.stratus.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


On Aug 22, 11:02pm, hfinney@shell.portal.com wrote:
> Subject: Attacks on remailers
> Chaum, in his first paper on "Mixes" (anonymous remailers) described
> protocols which were designed to resist several attacks.  (See the
> February, 1981, Communications of the ACM, p. 84.)  These can
> be understood by considering a series of attacks of increasing sophis-
> tication, with corresponding responses.
> 
> Our opponent has as his goal to track a message through a chain of
> remailers.
> 
> Attack 1: Just intercept the message from the sender, and look at the
> commands of the form:
> ::
> Request-Remailing-To: first-remailer
> ::
> Request-Remailing-To: second-remailer
> ::
> Request-Remailing-To: final-destination
> 
> The final command shows where the message is finally going to go.
> 
> Response: Encrypt the messages.  Use "nesting", so that all that is
> visible as each message leaves a remailer is the destination of the
> next remailer.
> 
> Attack 2: Look at the mail logs on the system running the remailer to
> see which message goes out from the remailer account shortly after each
> message comes in.
> 
> Response: Run the remailer on a machine which does not keep mail logs,
> or on a machine to which you can deny the attackers access.
> 
> Attack 3: Monitor the messages in real time as they flow into and out of
> each remailer machine, again looking for the message which comes out
> just after each incoming message.
> 
> Response: Batch up many messages which arrive over a period of time,
> only sending them out at regular intervals or when a certain number have
> accumulated.  Send them out in random order.  Alternatively, delay each
> message by a random amount of time before the message goes out.  (This
> response will also deal with the previous attack.)
> 
> Attack 4: Look at distinguishing features of the messages which are
> preserved by the remailers, such as subject line or message size, to
> match up incoming and outgoing messages within each batch.
> 
> Response: Do not retain any header fields through remailers, not even
> subject.  Use an encryption mode in which messages are rounded up to
> some standard size so that all messages appear to be the same size.
> 
> Attack 5: Record an incoming message to the remailer, and insert a copy
> of it into the incoming message stream, so that the batch will have two
> identical messages.  Look for two identical outgoing messages.  Remove
> one.  This is the match to that incoming message.
> 
> Response: Check for duplicate incoming messages in the remailer, and
> remove all but one copy of each duplicate.
> 
> Attack 6: Insert a duplicate message multiple times in separate batches.
> Observe the outgoing batches and look for a pattern of destinations
> which are correlated with those batches in which the incoming message
> is inserted.
> 
> Response: Check for messages which have been duplicated from earlier
> batches and remove them.  Include time/date stamps on incoming messages
> with a time limit so that they are no good after a certain number of
> days; this way the check for duplicates only has to go back that many
> days.
> 
> Attack 7: Look at all messages coming out of the first remailer, and
> follow them into their 2nd remailers; take all messages from those and
> follow them on, and so on.  This will eventually lead to a number of
> destinations, one of which must have been the destination of the original
> message.  Over a period of time, look for correlations between destinations
> and sources.
> 
> Response: Use large remailer chains of popular remailers.  With enough
> mixing at each stage of the chain, the number of possible destinations
> will become astronomically large, making correlations statistically
> impossible.
> 
> Attack 8: Correlate messages being sent from person A with messages being
> received a certain time later by person B.  Even without the ability to
> track messages through the remailers this can show a communication pattern.
> 
> Response: Send dummy messages at regular intervals, which bounce through
> the remailer network and then die.  When you have a real message to send,
> replace one of the dummies with this.  The sender's traffic pattern is
> then constant and no information can be gained from it.
> 
> Attack 9: Bribe or coerce one or more remailer operators into revealing
> their keys, or into decrypting the desired messages.  Alternatively, run
> many remailers, pretending to be dedicated to privacy, while secretly
> gathering information on the messages.
> 
> Response: Use many remailers in a variety of geographical locations, so
> that it is unlikely that all of them can be corrupted in this way.
> 
> These are all the attacks I can remember being implicitly considered in
> Chaum's paper.  Other people who have ideas for attacks should mention
> them so we can think of responses.
> 
> Chaum also discusses anonymous return addresses.  We have a simple form
> of these enabled in our encrypting remailers.  The idea is to encrypt
> a series of remailing requests for the path the message will follow,
> with the last request directing the message to the user whose anonymous
> address this is.
> 
> Some more attacks are possible in this case:
> 
> Attack 1A: Look at the message content as it passes through each remailer,
> to correlate incoming and outgoing messages.
> 
> Response: Encrypt the message at each stage to prevent this matching.  This
> raises the problem of how to determine the encryption key in such a way
> that the final user can decrypt the message.  Chaum suggested including the
> encryption key in the anonymous address (a different key at each stage
> of the chain), so that the user can decrypt the message.  Eric Messick
> has proposed letting the remailer choose the key, with a protocol for the
> user to communicate again with the remailer to get the message decrypted.
> 
> Attack 1B: Send two different messages to the same return address with
> different contents, and look for duplicate address blocks in the outgoing
> batches.
> 
> Response: Apply some randomization to the address blocks at each stage so
> that messages to the same address don't look identical.  (Chaum did not
> give this solution, as he viewed the next attack as being essentially
> unanswerable.)
> 
> Attack 1C: Send many addresses to the anonymous address, and look for a
> destination which receives that many messages in a correlated fashion.
> 
> Response: Chaum's response is that the remailer must not accept more than
> one message with a given anonymous return address, just as it must not
> accept more than one copy of a message in the regular case.  This implies
> that anonymous return addresses must be use-once to be truly secure.
> 
> This conclusion is uncomfortable, as the requirement that an address be
> use-once will severely impair its usability.  But this attack appears
> hard to avoid.
> 
> There is always the possibility of giving up on anonymous addresses in
> the Chaumian sense, and instead using other ideas which have been
> suggested here, such as posting to newsgroups, or message broadcast
> pools.  All of these ideas have the problem that they expose everyone
> in some group to all of the messages intended for every group member,
> hence the number of messages will scale as the square of the number of
> group members.  This will quickly become unmanageable for large groups,
> therefore providing only a limited amount of anonymity.
> 
> It's also worth noting that our remailers are vulnerable to almost all
> of these attacks; at best we are safe against two or three of them.
> 
> Hal Finney
> hfinney@shell.portal.com
>-- End of excerpt from hfinney@shell.portal.com






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: cme@ellisun.sw.stratus.com (Carl Ellison)
Date: Mon, 23 Aug 93 15:01:39 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Attacks on remailers
In-Reply-To: <9308230602.AA25533@jobe.shell.portal.com>
Message-ID: <9308231757.ZM12740@ellisun.sw.stratus.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


On Aug 22, 11:02pm, hfinney@shell.portal.com wrote:
> Subject: Attacks on remailers

Please pardon the previous mail.  My new mailer's "send" button jumped into
the path of my mouse and got run down.

--------------------------------------------------

The best protection against traffic analysis I've seen is to make sure that
there is no information available from the traffic content, timing or
volume.

The first can be done by encrypting all header information, as well as
message contents.  Thanks to public-key, we have a chance to do that.

The others can be handled by making sure that the traffic timing and volume
are constant.  The luxurious way to do this is by keeping a continuous
traffic stream going.  We could do this more economically by sending daily
messages (same time(s) each day) of constant length -- both between each of
us and each remailer and between the remailers.  This limits the maximum
bandwidth per person but clobbers traffic analysis.

- Carl






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: hughes@ah.com (Eric Hughes)
Date: Mon, 23 Aug 93 18:41:41 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Chaum on the wrong foot?
In-Reply-To: <9308230602.AA25529@jobe.shell.portal.com>
Message-ID: <9308240131.AA05517@ah.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I applaud Hal's insight into Chaum.  I was in Amsterdam last year for
a few weeks working for/with him, and I can substantiate what Hal
says.  I was only there for six weeks, which was supposed to have been
the start of a longer relationship, but I got out.

>But I think that Chaum has gone off in the wrong direction in the last
>few years.  More and more he is concentrating on protocols which rely
>on a tamper-proof, hardware implementation of a cryptographic protocol
>which he calls an "observer".  

The observer, owned by the user, opens a communications channel to a
chip and to a central computer, both controlled by some company.  The
observer then mediates the communication between the chip and the
central computer to make sure that no privacy information leaks out.

>There appears to be
>no way to provide for secure, off-line digital cash, for example, other
>than with something like an observer.

This statement, while certainly true in Chaum's mindset, I no longer
believe to be true.  The question hinges on what 'security' means.  To
Chaum, it means that fraud losses are a mathematically perfect zero.
To a real business, however, the losses must be bounded.  The smaller
the bound, the better, of course, but real financial service companies
can and do tolerate some loss due to (technological) fraud.

If the cost of the perfect system is more than the losses from fraud,
there's no point in deploying it.  Make no mistake, the observer
system is expensive.  The reasons smart cards are not more widely
deployed is that they're too expensive per card.  The observer
protocols requires both a smart card and a small hand-held computer!

>This means that these [observer] ideas are not useful for software-only
>implementations.  

Not only not useful, but totally inapplicable.  The observer model
relies upon the fact that the computations inside the chip are unknown
to the user.  This just can't be the case with a software-only system.

>I wish Chaum and his group would stop directing their efforts towards
>protocols which require an observer chip to be effective.  

This just won't happen.  The observer protocols are *patented*, you
see.  Anyone can design and build observers, because the spec is
public, but you've got to pay up.  

Chaum seems to be basing his whole strategy for the future on
observers.  I think it's a gross strategic mistake.

>I think that a realistic appraisal of the pros and cons suggests that
>non-observer protocols are more likely to further our ultimate goal of
>personal privacy.

Amen.

Eric




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: hughes@ah.com (Eric Hughes)
Date: Mon, 23 Aug 93 18:51:41 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: (CuD) (CuNews) Smart Kard Forum
In-Reply-To: <9308231833.AA00937@versant.com>
Message-ID: <9308240139.AA05520@ah.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Strick:
>Does anyone know if these Smart Kards could be available via anonymous
>cash transactions, like european telephone cards? 

Well, let's look at the applications.

>The cross-industry group will promote the use of smart-card technology
>for 

Not necessarily     identifying
  identifying       ===========
===============     health care
payment             identification
transit             security

My guess is that anonymity isn't even in their heads.

Eric




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: hughes@ah.com (Eric Hughes)
Date: Mon, 23 Aug 93 19:02:05 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Chaum criticism
In-Reply-To: <199308232050.AA12556@aerospace.aero.org>
Message-ID: <9308240153.AA05544@ah.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>I am trying to read and understand the Niels Ferguson "Off-line Coins"
>article, the "Efficient Off-line Digital Cash" paper also from CWI 

Both articles, as I recall from the abstracts, exist square within the
observer framework.

>Do the papers I
>just listed require observer chips, or are they OK for software-only?

The two CWI papers do require observers and are useless for
software-only implementations.

>Is there software we can use NOW for ATM's and banks?

The original blind signature still works.  It can still be money.
That hasn't changed.  Recall, though, that the blind signature is
patented by Chaum in addition to also requiring the underlying RSA
patent.

Eric






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: hughes@ah.com (Eric Hughes)
Date: Mon, 23 Aug 93 19:27:04 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: No digital coins (was: Chaum on the wrong foot?)
In-Reply-To: <9308232244.AA16620@netcom5.netcom.com>
Message-ID: <9308240218.AA05576@ah.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Tim:
>There are no digital coins.

Gold obeys a mass conservation law.  Information as such does not.
Everything unique about digital money stems from this basic
observation.

Here is a thought problem to illustrate.  If money were required to be
able to be xeroxed, would you be able to make a monetary system?  The
answer is yes, but it doesn't act the same way as a coinage system.

>A problem with digital money has always been that there apparently is
>no close equivalent to a digital coin, a token which can be passed
>around freely, as a quarter or a dollar bill can be.

It is a problem only if you want to design a digital coin.  Once you
rid your mind of the need for that, it's not a problem but a design
constraint.

>It may be that Chaum, who is eager to actually get some sales to
>groups within Europe and elsewhere, is already responding to some
>pressures for "accountability" (the digital money version of
>"wire-tappability") by various European governments and the observer
>protocols are an effort to satisfy some of these concerns.

No.  This is way off the mark.  Chaum's complete and overriding goal
is privacy, sometimes to the exclusion of other desiderata.  The
observer protocols sacrifice nothing in the way of privacy, but
perpetuate and reinforce the subservient economic relationships
between individuals and large financial institutions.  The system is
assymetrical; the central computer talks to its chip through the
observer.  There is no room here for person to person interactions.
The barrier to entry to deploy chips is high, as well.

In other words, the observer protocols preserve chasm of relative size
of Big Business over and above the individual.  This is a benign
oversight, to be sure; all the individuals look alike.  (You thought
you were a number before?  Now you're a _random_ number!)
Nevertheless, the observers are not egalitarian; they are the model of
cable TV as opposed to the telephone network, of newspapers as opposed
to electronic mail.

Chaums got privacy down, but I don't want the rest of his world.  

No way.

Eric




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Steven Hodas <hhll@u.washington.edu>
Date: Mon, 23 Aug 93 19:51:41 PDT
To: Eric Hughes <hughes@ah.com>
Subject: Re: (CuD) (CuNews) Smart Kard Forum
In-Reply-To: <9308240139.AA05520@ah.com>
Message-ID: <Pine.3.05.9308231918.D23466-b100000@stein.u.washington.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain




On Mon, 23 Aug 1993, Eric Hughes wrote:

> Strick:
> >Does anyone know if these Smart Kards could be available via anonymous
> >cash transactions, like european telephone cards? 
> 
> Well, let's look at the applications.
> 
> >The cross-industry group will promote the use of smart-card technology
> >for 
> 
> Not necessarily     identifying
>   identifying       ===========
> ===============     health care
> payment             identification
> transit             security
> 
> My guess is that anonymity isn't even in their heads.
> 
> Eric

"Overpopulation has led to ever-increasing governmental control over the
private citizen, not on the old-style police-state models of oppression
and terror, but in terms of work, credit, housing, retirement benefits,
and medical care: things which can be withheld. These services are
computerized. No number, no service. However, this has not produced the
brainwashed standardized human units postulated by such linear prophets as
George Orwell. Instead, a large percentage of the population has been
forced underground. How large, no one knows. These people are NUMBERLESS."

From _Blade Runner (a movie)_, William S. Burroughs, 1979, Blue Wind Press


 	 _______________________________________________________________
	|								|
	|        HORSE HORSE LION LION, A Consulting Cooperative        | 
	|	            "Information into Culture"			| 
	|								| 
	| 	    Steven Hodas/Catherine Holland, Principals 		| 
	|								| 
	|         hhll@u.washington.edu   VOICE/FAX 206.285.5975	| 
	|_______________________________________________________________|






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: explorer@iastate.edu
Date: Mon, 23 Aug 93 18:22:11 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Large factoring attempt on RSA-129
Message-ID: <9308240121.AA18851@iastate.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


CALL FOR PARTICIPANTS
---------------------

In 1977, a 129-digit integer appeared in the pages of Scientific
American.  This number, the RSA challenge modulus or RSA-129, has not
yet been successfully factored.  Factoring it, a 425-bit number, would
be a major milestone in cryptography, as it would show that current
technology is able to break commonly-used RSA-cryptosystem keys within
a reasonable time.

Excerpted from the RSA Factoring Challenge news:

The "RSA challenge" published in the August 1977 issue of Scientific
American (in Martin Gardner's column) is still open, and the $100
prize offer still stands.  This prize can be won by factoring the RSA
modulus published there, which is:

RSA-129 = 11438162575788886766923577997614661201021829672124236256256184
          29357069352457338978305971235639587050589890751475992900268795
          43541 (129 digits, checksum = 105443)

--- End of RSA Factoring Challenge news ---

As with several other recent large scale factoring projects, we propose to
attack this number with a very large number of workstations independently
operating at dozens of research and corporate networks around the world.  We
are soliciting volunteers to provide compute cycles to help us towards our
goal.

With the permission of the authors, we will use the publicly available code of
the Lenstra/Manasse Factoring by Email project, with modifications by Paul
Leyland for RSA-129.  The sieving will be distributed around the Internet,
with relations transferred to a central site by email or ftp as convenient.
Combining the relations and matrix elimination will be performed at ISU, using
a combination of structured Gauss and a MasPar dense matrix eliminator.

Each participant will be provided with complete source code for the siever.
You can easily verify that the program takes no input from your machines and
does not pose a security risk.  It requires only an email connection to
transmit partial results -- the software does not require communication with
other machines except for this purpose.  It is easy to install, and is
designed so that it will take up no CPU cycles on your machine when
interactive users or other important processes are active.  If preferred,
participants can accumulate the results locally and ftp them to the central
site manually.

The project currently has around 500 workstations which are ready to begin
sieving.  However, to finish in a reasonable amount of time, this count needs
to increase greatly.  We are attempting to enroll around 10,000 workstations
in this project.

This is a call for participants, who have workstations or MasPars at their
disposal and would like to participate in this project.  All contributions
help a great deal.

There is a $100 prize associated with factoring this number.  The prize, if we
win it, will be donated to the GNU project of the Free Software Foundation to
help generate more of the excellent software they currently provide.

For more information, please mail rsa129-request@iastate.edu.  We will respond
to all questions quickly.

--Michael Graff  [project coordinator/programmer]
--Derek Atkins   [coordinator/programmer]
--Paul Leyland   [advisor/programmer]
--Daniel Ashlock [faculty advisor ISU]




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Christian D. Odhner" <cdodhner@indirect.com>
Date: Mon, 23 Aug 93 20:35:23 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: sticker guy (fwd)
Message-ID: <199308240331.AA00521@indirect.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I found the sticker guy! I'm sending him a letter tonight, I'll keep you
all posted. Who has the "Big Brother Inside(tm)" logo? I can't do .ps
stuff, if anyone wants to send me hardcopy, it goes to
Chris Odhner
14079 North 34th Place
Phoenix, Arizona
85032

Or you could send it directly to the sticker guy...

> Hello,
> 
> Now that school is started again, I have a new account. My new address
> is mench@cs.unr.edu. HOWEVER, I conduct no business over the Internet.
> 
> If you are still interested in custom
> vinyl stickers, send a loose stamp to:
> 
> 	STICKER GUY!
> 	c/o Pete Menchetti
> 	2190 Belcrest Circle
> 	Reno, NV 89512
> 
> I will then send you a sample and a brochure with all the info you
> need to order stickers.
> 
> Thanks,
> Pete
> 
> mench@cs.unr.edu
> 





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: s.summers1@genie.geis.com
Date: Mon, 23 Aug 93 12:45:20 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Munged account feeding old mai
Message-ID: <9308231942.AA00765@relay2.geis.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Subject: Munged account feeding old mail?
 
From Paul Ferguson:
 >Am I the only one getting carbon copies of many of my own messages
 >from someone else's munged account?
 
        Nope.  Even got it here (twice)...
 
Sean
 




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: cdodhner@indirect.com
Date: Mon, 23 Aug 93 22:21:41 PDT
To: MIKEINGLE@delphi.com (Mike Ingle)
Subject: Re: Mail --> News gateways
In-Reply-To: <01H23SCR87FM99F8ZN@delphi.com>
Message-ID: <199308240513.AA06016@indirect.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> Are there any alive and functional mail-to-news gateways other than
> anon.penet.fi? What format do they use? In particular, is there one 
> which can be put at the end of a chain of Cypherpunks remailers? 
> I tried the two mentioned in the "Hal's Instructions" file, posting 
> to alt.test, and they didn't work. How does one post to a group with 
> a - in the name, such as alt.fan.david-sternlight?

Ok, so far as I know, both of those remailers are still active, but at
least one of them blocks posts from all the anonymous remailers that the
operators know of. (I don't think they know of mine yet.) To post a
message to alt.fan.david-sternlight use the address of
alt-fan-david-sternlight
when posting to the remailer. Or so I've heard, someplace on this list a
while back I think. BTW, My remailer is still haveing trouble decrypting
messages sent to it, but unencrypted remailing requests still work fine.

> To BlackNet: until alt.w.a.s.t.e or a similar group is created,
> why not use alt.test for anonymous communication? Nobody really 
> cares what's posted there, since nobody reads it except to find 
> their own test posts. The poster could put a recognizable string, 
> such as your hex key id, in the subject, allowing you to find it
> quickly with the newsreader's search command.
>  
>                                   < MikeIngle@delphi.com >

I second the motion. Good Idea Mike.

Happy Hunting, -Chris.





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Perry E. Metzger" <pmetzger@lehman.com>
Date: Mon, 23 Aug 93 19:21:41 PDT
To: hughes@ah.com (Eric Hughes)
Subject: Re: Chaum criticism
In-Reply-To: <9308240153.AA05544@ah.com>
Message-ID: <9308240219.AA26476@snark.lehman.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Eric Hughes says:
> >I am trying to read and understand the Niels Ferguson "Off-line Coins"
> >article, the "Efficient Off-line Digital Cash" paper also from CWI 
> 
> Both articles, as I recall from the abstracts, exist square within the
> observer framework.

I think I have a scheme for real off-line payments, that is, payments
that do not require an observer at the time of transaction (although
they would require a couple of on line transactions in advance). They
would require that people conduct transactions in a style that they
are not used to, but would require no trust and would allow full
anonymity of parties.  

Unfortunately, I don't know enough about the mathematics of Chaum's
blinding schemes to know if the scheme I have in mind (which depends
on his scheme) would work. Could someone point me at a reference or
two on Chaum's original work? The mathematics associated with blinding
is, sadly, something that I haven't spent sufficient time on.

Perry




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: umhc@sunyit.edu (Michael Cummings)
Date: Mon, 23 Aug 93 19:45:23 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: SUBSCRIBE
Message-ID: <9308240243.AA26403@sunyit.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


SUBSCRIBE

-- 




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: sameer@netcom.com (Sameer Parekh)
Date: Tue, 24 Aug 93 00:11:43 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Testing
Message-ID: <9308240708.AA18317@netcom.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


	This is a test.
-- 
Sameer
sameer@netcom.com




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Mike Ingle <MIKEINGLE@delphi.com>
Date: Mon, 23 Aug 93 21:55:24 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Mail --> News gateways
Message-ID: <01H23SCR87FM99F8ZN@delphi.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Are there any alive and functional mail-to-news gateways other than
anon.penet.fi? What format do they use? In particular, is there one 
which can be put at the end of a chain of Cypherpunks remailers? 
I tried the two mentioned in the "Hal's Instructions" file, posting 
to alt.test, and they didn't work. How does one post to a group with 
a - in the name, such as alt.fan.david-sternlight?
 
To whoever sent that huge message for BlackNet: please read the
responses to this question and use news gateways to post messages
for BlackNet to alt.extropians.forbidden.topics or 
alt.fan.david-sternlight. Neither group has much traffic anyway,
and it's kind of annoying to receive large messages you can't
read, especially when you're paying for the download time.
 
To BlackNet: until alt.w.a.s.t.e or a similar group is created,
why not use alt.test for anonymous communication? Nobody really 
cares what's posted there, since nobody reads it except to find 
their own test posts. The poster could put a recognizable string, 
such as your hex key id, in the subject, allowing you to find it
quickly with the newsreader's search command.
 
                                  < MikeIngle@delphi.com >




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: fergp@sytex.com (Paul Ferguson)
Date: Thu, 26 Aug 93 04:42:26 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Data battles amongst the "Big Three"
Message-ID: <ek9R9B1w165w@sytex.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
 
On Wed, 25 Aug 93 22:36:33 -0600,
 "L. Detweiler" <uunet!longs.lance.colostate.edu!ld231782> wrote -
 
> Two announcements on products that will bring internet to large
> audiences. One by Continental Cablevision Inc. The cable line one
> apparently uses special coaxial cable modems, and apparently is
> full-duplex (?). On front page of today's Wall St. Journal.
 
> Following that, AT&T announces the Interspan `Frame Relay Services and
> Information Access Services' to the internet. In the former, one gets
> `cost-effective' internet capabilities, in the later
 
Forgive me for furthering this slightly off-topic thread, but Sprint
has been offerring Frame Relay data sevices for quite some time, both
for private wide-area networks and for interconnectivity to the global
internet via SprintLink. Now, Sprint will beat everyone else to the
punch offerring up ATM -
 
excerpted from:
 
Communications Week
August 23, 1993
pages 1, 144
 
 
Sprint Takes Lead in ATM Service Race
by Robin Gareiss
 
 
San Francisco -- Four months ahead of schedule, Sprint will announce
this week that its asynchronous transfer mode transmission service is
available immediately, according to industry analysts.
 
The service, to be introduced at the INTEROP 93 August show here, will
be the first ATM service from a major long distance carrier.
 
[....]
 
Sprint plans to announce flexible, user-specific pricing, according to
Jeffrey Held, partner with Ernst & Young's Network Strategies
practice, Vienna, Va. Sprint briefed Held on its announcement last
week.
 
Sprint originally had planned to make its ATM service available in
first-quarter 1994. According to sources, the carrier has been able to
step up its plans because trials have gone more smoothly than
anticipated.
 
[....]
 
Sprint will let users access its ATM-based service via local switched
multimegabit data service or dedicated -T-3 lines, sources said. As
specifications evolve, Sprint also will develop interfaces between its
ATM and frame-relay and SprintLink TCP/IP services, Held said.
 
[....]
 
8<-------- End excerpt ------
 
ferguson@icp.net                    ,-)
 
 
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Version: 2.2
 
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sxqxGw++lSsRWeA+T+fAU5at9oPaiE7zVgAgNBGoQjGy4Bz+paiyIjK+Mi9YHqa4
ufTKq2bV3ZutruznR1Nk9j3zYi/zGIkdrNg05y4pvEUcLeEgRTfnzo2EhXIu6M5l
t6cUjP1XhlY=
=exLc
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

Paul Ferguson               |  "Government, even in its best state,
Network Integrator          |   is but a necessary evil; in its worst
Centreville, Virginia USA   |   state, an intolerable one."
fergp@sytex.com             |      - Thomas Paine, Common Sense
 
Type bits/keyID   Date       User ID
pub  1024/1CC04D 1993/03/15  Paul Ferguson <fergp@sytex.com>
  Key fingerprint =  EE D2 93 7D 04 6D C6 05  AC 36 AD 9D 8E 4F 41 58




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: fergp@sytex.com (Paul Ferguson)
Date: Tue, 24 Aug 93 04:51:48 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: E-mail ---> Usenet gateways
Message-ID: <ca0R9B2w165w@sytex.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
 
On Tue, 24 Aug 1993 00:53:30 -0400 (EDT),
 Mike Ingle <uunet!delphi.com!MIKEINGLE> wrote -
 
> Are there any alive and functional mail-to-news gateways other than
> anon.penet.fi? What format do they use? In particular, is there one
> which can be put at the end of a chain of Cypherpunks remailers?
 
 
   group-name@ucbvax.berkeley.edu *  (blocked from non-bky sites)
   group-name@cs.utexas.edu
   group-name@pws.bull.com
   group-name@demon.co.uk
   group.name.usenet@decwrl.dec.com
   group.name@news.cs.indiana.edu
 
For the utexas server in particular, you need to put a subject line in
the pasted header like so:
 
::
Request-Remailing-To: alt-test@cs.utexas.edu
Subject: this is a test
Organization: Organization name you desire
 
[body]
 
 
* Note that some of these require trans-literation of periods to dashes
in the newsgroup name; others do not.  Ucbvax is supposed to block
mail from non-Berkely sites; it _might_ work from these Cypherpunks
remailers:
 
   1: hh@pmantis.berkeley.edu
   2: hh@cicada.berkeley.edu
   3: hh@soda.berkeley.edu
 
 
 
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Paul Ferguson               |  "Government, even in its best state,
Network Integrator          |   is but a necessary evil; in its worst
Centreville, Virginia USA   |   state, an intolerable one."
fergp@sytex.com             |      - Thomas Paine, Common Sense
 
Type bits/keyID   Date       User ID
pub  1024/1CC04D 1993/03/15  Paul Ferguson <fergp@sytex.com>
  Key fingerprint =  EE D2 93 7D 04 6D C6 05  AC 36 AD 9D 8E 4F 41 58




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: fergp@sytex.com (Paul Ferguson)
Date: Tue, 24 Aug 93 04:52:13 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: "Big Brother Inside" (tm) Logo
Message-ID: <Dc0R9B3w165w@sytex.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
 
On Mon, 23 Aug 93 20:30:47 MST,
 Christian D. Odhner <uunet!indirect.com!cdodhner> wrote -
 
> I found the sticker guy! I'm sending him a letter tonight, I'll keep
> you all posted. Who has the "Big Brother Inside(tm)" logo? I can't
> do .ps stuff, if anyone wants to send me hardcopy, it goes to
 
[...]
 
section 1 of uuencode 5.15 of file bigbro.zip    by R.E.M.
 
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MYD2R3J;NE#%/K/8,L<^Q_D0P4+<&O:]0O0ZM+M'(%DVRT<T>G2S2TB:-JU+?
M+CTIT^(VY:?3Z3[U)E3W1H6E5`Q/A3'5'5?=L-4^`YHSUEKAXM+67!U@4B/7
M7BL0TM=@/<`25&&-;>W&"6@YEEGHO!"CGV:E7;#!:8,I```[4$L!`A0`"@``
M````"KT!&]$)8BY*&0``2AD```P````````````@`````````$E.5$5,3$]'
:+D=)1E!+!08``````0`!`#H```!T&0``````
`
end
sum -r/size 6924/9117 section (from "begin" to "end")
sum -r/size 15003/6596 entire input file
 
 
 
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Paul Ferguson               |  "Government, even in its best state,
Network Integrator          |   is but a necessary evil; in its worst
Centreville, Virginia USA   |   state, an intolerable one."
fergp@sytex.com             |      - Thomas Paine, Common Sense
 
Type bits/keyID   Date       User ID
pub  1024/1CC04D 1993/03/15  Paul Ferguson <fergp@sytex.com>
  Key fingerprint =  EE D2 93 7D 04 6D C6 05  AC 36 AD 9D 8E 4F 41 58




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Anonymous <nowhere@bsu-cs.bsu.edu>
Date: Tue, 24 Aug 93 05:01:48 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: No Subject
Message-ID: <9308241203.AA13543@bsu-cs.bsu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



 > I think the Hall Remailer at <nowhere@bsu-cs.bsu.edu> recognizes a
 > "cut line" of

 > --ignore--

 > I tried this and it failed the first time, but worked the second.
 > You should try a message to yourself before relying on it.

Let us try it here and see how it works; the following line contains the
kiss-off "ignore" and everything that shows beyond it was added without
my intention:





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: anonymous@extropia.wimsey.com
Date: Tue, 24 Aug 93 10:11:51 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: No Subject
Message-ID: <199308241646.AA12564@xtropia>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


 Uu> Reports of the wimsey remailer's demise are premature.  I just used
 Uu> it to post this message!

If this goes through, it's back up.  I have used it recently and it
worked again.  Apparently, it was just temporarily ailing.

 Uu> pkcs_compat = 0     # Use backwards-compatible formats

 Uu> The PGP in use by the remailer may be version 2.0 or 2.1, which will
 Uu> not read PKCS-compatible PGP Messages.

I don't think that this was the problem, but is there any drawback to
installing this line in CONFIG just in case?

 Uu> Wimsey also has an anonymous reply mechanism using a message pool.
 Uu> For more info, send "help" to

 Uu> pool0-request@extropia.wimsey.com

Will check this out.

 Uu> I think wimsey is also the only Cypherpunks remailer which resides
 Uu> outside the USA (It's in Canada).  This obviously makes it much more
 Uu> inconvenient for USA Law Enforcement to broach the physical security
 Uu> of the remailer.

On the other hand, it makes it fair game for legal interception by the
NSA.

 Uu> I think the Hall Remailer at <nowhere@bsu-cs.bsu.edu> recognizes a
 Uu> "cut line" of

 Uu> --ignore--

I shall try this one also.  Thank you very much for your assistance.





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Perry E. Metzger" <pmetzger@lehman.com>
Date: Tue, 24 Aug 93 07:16:50 PDT
To: hughes@ah.com (Eric Hughes)
Subject: Re: No digital coins (was: Chaum on the wrong foot?)
In-Reply-To: <9308240218.AA05576@ah.com>
Message-ID: <9308241414.AA01681@snark.lehman.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Eric Hughes says:
> No.  This is way off the mark.  Chaum's complete and overriding goal
> is privacy, sometimes to the exclusion of other desiderata.  The
> observer protocols sacrifice nothing in the way of privacy, but
> perpetuate and reinforce the subservient economic relationships
> between individuals and large financial institutions.

In what sense are you "subservient", Mr. Hughes? The institution and
you have a contractual relationship in which they hold your money for
you and in exchange handle all sorts of inconvenient tasks, in
exchange for your having to pay them for performing these tasks by
letting them lend out your money. You can usually touch your money at
any time, though.

Doesn't seem to be terribly abusive. What do they do to you that's so
bad? Charge you for performing services? Shudder -- how horrible!
Capitalism! Ohmygod!

In any case I see no reason that small groups couldn't start digital
cash issuing organizations, just as very small groups can also form
banks -- you'd be suprised how small some credit unions are. Although
the cost of the infrastructure is high to DESIGN, it will presumably
be commercially available to any entity that wants to deploy it.

> In other words, the observer protocols preserve chasm of relative size
> of Big Business over and above the individual.

What is wrong with large organizations per se?

Perry




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: hughes@ah.com (Eric Hughes)
Date: Tue, 24 Aug 93 11:15:28 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: No digital coins (was: Chaum on the wrong foot?)
In-Reply-To: <9308241414.AA01681@snark.lehman.com>
Message-ID: <9308241805.AA06449@ah.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>Charge you for performing services? Shudder -- how horrible!
>Capitalism! Ohmygod!

I count this comment as an intentional misreading of my position.

I am not a libertarian, nor is it likely that I ever will be.  I've
also read E. F. Schumacher's _Small is Beautiful_ and thought much of
it was just plain wrong, or, at best, unprovable.  

I read your words as an attempt to enforce a sort of libertarian
political correctness, as insulting as that phrase will no doubt be to
you.

The agenda of privacy is orthogonal to most partisan political
positions.  As strong as the libertarian presence is on this list, it
is by no means the only view.  It is precisely because cypherpunk
issues cut clean across the political spectrum that they are so
powerful.

I expect no one here to wear seamless garments of any cut or cloth.

There are many on this list whose personal agendas call for making the
world safe for greater accumulations of capital.  This is not at all
my agenda, yet I have put aside my repugnance at this in pursuit of a
common goal.  While I expect no one to hold to any particular view,
I do expect that everyone here treat opposing views with respect, or
better yet, with silence.

The cypherpunks list is about creating privacy.  We assume that
everyone here wants the availability of more privacy than they
currently have.  We need not debate the particulars of these reasons,
nor need we suppress the statements of these reasons.  I am perfectly
happy with individuals stating their own reasons for desiring privacy;
these statements are powerful and useful, yet they should not engender
debate on this list as to their propriety.  Should anyone insist on
debating belief, private e-mail is always available.

I know that when the goals of personal privacy are achieved that the
people and opinions that currently cohere on this list will fragment
and splinter.  I do not want this dispersal to happen, however, before
our goals are acheived.  Disrespect for each other, or, in other
words, bone-headed stupidity, will certainly accomplish a premature
dissolution.

Let us work together while we need to, and no longer.

Eric




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: wcs@anchor.ho.att.com
Date: Tue, 24 Aug 93 13:41:56 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: syntax for cut lines
Message-ID: <9308241508.AA28992@anchor.ho.att.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text


Mr. Anonymous sent the following to cypherpunks, through one remailer:
>  > I think the Hall Remailer at <nowhere@bsu-cs.bsu.edu> recognizes a
>  > "cut line" of
>  > --ignore--
>  > I tried this and it failed the first time, but worked the second.
>  > You should try a message to yourself before relying on it.

> Let us try it here and see how it works; the following line contains the
> kiss-off "ignore" and everything that shows beyond it was added without
> my intention:

And it worked... 
I would recommend one change to the handling of cut lines like --ignore-- :
- leave the cut line in the message, just cut the stuff after it
This lets you use one --ignore-- line to chop of any trailers from multiple
remailers, so you don't risk building up a trail.  Getting rid of the 
first one is obviously the most critical, but the rest can also be a risk.

Also, someone has commented that most people who use anonymous remailers
test them by sending a message to themselves before sending it to their
real destination.  If your intended recipient is on the same system
or group of systems that you are, this is a traffic analysis risk...

		Bill Stewart




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Duncan Frissell <frissell@panix.com>
Date: Tue, 24 Aug 93 08:55:27 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: (CuD) (CuNews) Smart Kard Forum
In-Reply-To: <Pine.3.05.9308231918.D23466-b100000@stein.u.washington.edu>
Message-ID: <199308241553.AA19959@panix.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


In <Pine.3.05.9308231918.D23466-b100000@stein.u.washington.edu> Steven Hodas <hhll@u.washington.edu> writes:

Actually Burroughs...

>"Overpopulation has led to ever-increasing governmental control over the
>private citizen, not on the old-style police-state models of oppression
>and terror, but in terms of work, credit, housing, retirement benefits,
>and medical care: things which can be withheld. These services are
>computerized. No number, no service. However, this has not produced the

>>From _Blade Runner (a movie)_, William S. Burroughs, 1979, Blue Wind Press

Actually I have work, credit, housing, retirement benefits, and medical care
and they don't have my (right) numbers.  Mostly they don't have any numbers.

It is all still possible.

Duncan Frissell

Practicing & Preaching Privacy since at least 1969.






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Marc Horowitz <marc@GZA.COM>
Date: Tue, 24 Aug 93 11:45:29 PDT
To: pmetzger@lehman.com
Subject: Re: No digital coins (was: Chaum on the wrong foot?)
In-Reply-To: <9308241414.AA01681@snark.lehman.com>
Message-ID: <9308241842.AA00526@dun-dun-noodles.aktis.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>> What is wrong with large organizations per se?

This is way off-topic, but....

Large organizations have too much power.  Take a look at the sorts of
things Andrew Carnegie was able to do.  Like running at a loss in
order to squash small competitors.  That's where the Sherman antitrust
legislature comes from.  Before you call me a government-lover, I have
to say that I'm not sure which I find more abhorrent: "capitalist"
companies engaging in unfair business practices, or government
regulation.  If someone wants to explain how we can get away without
both (in personal email :-) I'd love to hear it.

I think the "right thing" is somewhere in between purely individual
transactions, with some sort of distributed trust model (the world is
too big for that to be tractable, I think), and the current model of
Huge Banks essentially controlling all money flow.  Fact is,
infrastructure costs money, and big organizations can amortize
one-time costs over more customers.

		Marc




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Karl Lui Barrus <klbarrus@owlnet.rice.edu>
Date: Tue, 24 Aug 93 12:46:53 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Blinding messages
Message-ID: <9308241945.AA20679@flammulated.owlnet.rice.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

Earlier Perry asked for references to blinding methods.  I can provide
one, but the mathematics is fairly simple and straightforward, so I'll
just talk about it here.  Any good intro text on number theory, or even
some crypto books (Denning, Seberry & Peiprzyk) will have all the math
you need to know.

Conceptually, when you blind a message, nobody else can read it.  A
property about blinding is that under the right circumstances if another 
party digitally signs a blinded message, the unblinded message will 
contain a valid digital signature.

So if Alice blinds the message "I owe Alice $1000" so that it reads (say)
"a;dfafq)(*&" or whatever, and Bob agrees to sign this message, later
Alice can unblind the message Bob signed to retrieve the original.  And
Bob's digital signature will appear on the original, although he didn't
sign the original directly.

Mathematically, blinding a message means multiplying it by a number (think
of the message as being a number).  Unblinding is simply dividing the
original blinding factor out.

One thing protocols that involve signing blinded messages have to watch
for are messages that you don't really want to sign.  If someone asks
you to digitally sign a random stream of symbols, remember that what you
sign may be unblinded to reveal a contract, etc.  Techniques of getting
around this seem to be cut-and-choose protocols, which I won't get into
here.

Judy Moore's paper "Protocol Failures in Cryptosystems" - appeared in
IEEE Proceedings, May 1988, Vol. 76, No.5, and also appears in the big 
IEEE Crypto book Simmons edited - discusses this as the "Notory Protocol."
I'll excerpt from her paper:

1) To setup the notary protocol, Alice chooses RSA parameters p, q, e, d
   She publishes her public key e, and n = pq

Bob now wants to trick Alice into signing a message which says she owes
him some money.

2) Bob now chooses an arbitrary number x.  He computes y = x^e mod n.
   e is Alice's public key and everyone knows it.

Bob can now use y (bliding factor) to obtain forgeries on another 
document.

3) Bob forms the messages he wants, and muliplies in the blinding factor 
   y.  He calulates m' = ym
4) Alice agrees to sign a message m' which is total gibberish.  She
   computes s = m'^d mod n and returns the result s to Bob.

5) Bob then calculates s' = s x^-1.

   A valid signature on m' is m'^d mod n = (ym)^d mod n
                                         = y^d m^d mod n
                                         = x m^d mod n

   so all Bob has to do is remove x from what Alice signed and he has
   m^d mod n, Alice's digital signature on message m.

An example with numbers (I'm currently learning Scheme so I will give
the Scheme code I used):

Alice chooses p = 43, q = 47, thus n = 2021
              d = 5, gcd(d,phi(n)) = 1, so e = 773 (* see note below)

Bob chooses x = 314, y = x^e mod n
                       = 314^773 mod 2021
                       = (expt-mod 314 773 2021)
                       = 1271

Bob creates the message m = 99, which means Alice owes him money.
Bob blinds the message by calculating m' = ym
                                         = 1271 99
                                         = (modulo (* 1271 99) 2021)
                                         = 527

Alice agrees to sign 527, a message which is possible unintelligible.
She calculates s = m'^d mod n
                 = 527^5 mod 2021
                 = (expt-mod 527 5 2021)
                 = 360

Bob takes Alice's signed message s = 360 and unblinds it.
He calculates s' = s x^-1
First he calculates x^-1 = 354 (*see note below)
Then, s' = 360 364
         = (modulo (* 360 354) 2021)
         = 117

As a check, say Alice decides to sign the original message m=99.
Then, the signed message would be m^d mod n
                                = 99^5 mod 2021
                                = 117

So Bob does indeed have a message which is his original message with
Alice's digital signature on it.  Be more careful next time, Alice.

* Note:

There are two ways I know of to calculate the inverse of a number.

First, x = a^((phi(n)-1) mod n will yeild x, the inverse of a mod n.

But, sharp eyed people will note you need phi(n) to calculate this way
- - and only Alice knows the factorization of n.  So she can calculate
e, the inverse of d mod phi(n) as:

e = d^((phi(phi(n))-1) mod phi(n)
  = 5^(phi(1932)-1) mod 1932
  = 5^(264-1) mod 1932
  = 5^263 mod 1932
  = (expt-mod 5 263 1932)
  = 773

Now how does Bob calculate the inverse of x mod n?  He does not know
the factorization of n.

Well, for the purposes of this problem I did now how n factors so I
used it :-)

BUT, there is a way you can calculate the inverse of a number mod n
without knowing how n factors.  The algorithm is related to Euclid's,
the one that you can use to tell if two numberse a relatively prime.
Essentially, you run through Euclid's forwards, and then in the reverse
direction, grouping and substituting, and the inverse will pop out.

Once you do it by hand it will be clear, and you won't ever want to do
it by hand again :-)

If you use Mathematica, it will let you do PowerMod[x, -1, n] to
calculate the inverse of x mod n.  But Scheme won't since the three
integers for expt-mod must be positive.




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From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: dmandl@lehman.com (David Mandl)
Date: Tue, 24 Aug 93 12:07:18 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: No digital coins (was: Chaum on the wrong foot?)
Message-ID: <9308241905.AA27779@disvnm2.lehman.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Well said, Eric.

There's no reason for people to assume that "We're all [fill
in name of your political faction] here."  We've got a common
goal/program and happily we agree on many of the most crucial
political issues.  Everything seems to work fine without subtle
swipes at other people's views or egocentric assumptions about
what we all believe.  Some people on this list, for example,
are staunch anti-capitalists, but we're polite enough to hold
off on the capitalist- and spectacle-bashing rhetoric because
we generally respect other people's views and realize that
there's no good in it.

Recently, one bonehead posted a message stating, in effect, that
this is an Extropian list.  That is, of course, nonsense, but
even more, it's obnoxious, egomaniacal, and pointless.  This
is a very diverse list, but I think we know what assumptions
are NOT shared by everyone.  Your remark did seem like a blatant
taunt, Perry.

   --Dave.

> From: hughes@ah.com (Eric Hughes)
> 
> >Charge you for performing services? Shudder -- how horrible!
> >Capitalism! Ohmygod!
> 
> I count this comment as an intentional misreading of my position.
> 
> I am not a libertarian, nor is it likely that I ever will be.  I've
> also read E. F. Schumacher's _Small is Beautiful_ and thought much of
> it was just plain wrong, or, at best, unprovable.  
> 
> I read your words as an attempt to enforce a sort of libertarian
> political correctness, as insulting as that phrase will no doubt be to
> you.
> 
> The agenda of privacy is orthogonal to most partisan political
> positions.  As strong as the libertarian presence is on this list, it
> is by no means the only view.  It is precisely because cypherpunk
> issues cut clean across the political spectrum that they are so
> powerful.
> 
> I expect no one here to wear seamless garments of any cut or cloth.
> 
> There are many on this list whose personal agendas call for making the
> world safe for greater accumulations of capital.  This is not at all
> my agenda, yet I have put aside my repugnance at this in pursuit of a
> common goal.  While I expect no one to hold to any particular view,
> I do expect that everyone here treat opposing views with respect, or
> better yet, with silence.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: explorer@iastate.edu
Date: Tue, 24 Aug 93 14:15:31 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: rsa129 project: Mail problems, some mail lost
Message-ID: <9308242112.AA05776@iastate.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



If you replied to the rsa129 factoring project using rsa129-request@iastate.edu,
please mail that address once again.  We had a local mail problem and some
mail was lost.

If you have gotten a reply from me however, I will mail out source and such
asap.

Thank you                              
--Michael




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Perry E. Metzger" <pmetzger@lehman.com>
Date: Tue, 24 Aug 93 13:15:30 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: No digital coins (was: Chaum on the wrong foot?)
In-Reply-To: <9308241805.AA06449@ah.com>
Message-ID: <9308242012.AA02593@snark.lehman.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Eric Hughes says:
> >Charge you for performing services? Shudder -- how horrible!
> >Capitalism! Ohmygod!
> 
[...]
> I read your words as an attempt to enforce a sort of libertarian
> political correctness, as insulting as that phrase will no doubt be to
> you.

There is no enforcement involved. If you truly feel that there is some
sort of horrific "power relationship" between large banks and their
customers, I would suggest that since the worst that they do to you is
charge you for performing services that you are upset with the notion
of banks charging for services.

> The agenda of privacy is orthogonal to most partisan political
> positions.

I strongly disagree. The liberal and conservative agendas depend on
control of the people in order to work. Privacy, cryptocash, etc. will
all result in a strong shift towards a libertarian society -- without
any need for people to try to produce such a society. When you can no
longer trace money transfers, for example, taxation becomes difficult
-- and any social programs you desire based on taxation become
difficult. If you are truly a liberal, strong privacy rights are
counter to what you truly want, and I would suggest that you reexamine
whether or not you hold a consistant position, as your position in
favor of privacy might be counterproductive to your position in favor
of what now goes by the term "liberalism". I would be happy to see you
favor strong privacy rights anyway -- but I am constrained by honesty
to point out that I don't think strong privacy and a state based on
coercive taxation are compatible.

I do not feel that this list should be involved in discussions of
libertarianism vs. any other political theory -- but I will point out
that it was you, not me, that brought up the question of whether big
banks are a good or bad thing, which is very much a political
question. I'll happily steer clear of this entire topic if you will.

Perry




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: hnash@mason1.gmu.edu
Date: Tue, 24 Aug 93 13:25:30 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Digital Gold
Message-ID: <9308242023.AA12227@mason1.gmu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----


I tried to imagine a digital currency which is not backed by 
any bank, but just exists by mathematics and convention, like 
gold.  The result is the following currency system which 
could be called digital gold.  It involves three conventions, 
(1) a convention for valuing coins, (2) a convention for 
claiming coins, (3) a convention for transfering coins.  

I believe the resulting currency is unforgeable, 
uninflatable, and untraceable.  Let me know where I've gone 
wrong (gently).


Digital Gold
 -----------

Let's associate one digital gold coin with each positive 
integer.  Let's agree that the coin for each integer N is 
worth half as much as the coin for integer N/2.  

integers:   are each worth:
 --------   ----------- 
1 - 1       1    ounce  
2 - 3       1/2  ounce 
4 - 7       1/4  ounce 
8 - 15      1/8  ounce 
16 - 31     1/16 ounce  

The total amount of digital gold is infinite.  However, the 
amount in circulation will always be finite because the 
lowest denomination coins aren't worth claiming or to 
spending.  (Claiming and spending of coins will be described 
shortly.  For the time being, let's just assume that each 
requires a certain amount of computation.)  

For example, if it costs 1/10 ounce of digital gold to spend 
a digital coin, then 1/16 ounce coins will not circulate.  
The total amount of digital gold in circulation will then be 
4 ounces.  

The supply of digital gold is similar to the supply of real 
gold.  As the value of real gold increases (relative to the 
cost of mining), more real gold can be mined profitably.  

If the demand for digital gold doubles, its value will 
roughly double, and a lower denomination can then circulate.  
Similarly, if the cost of computation halves, a lower 
denomination of coins can circulate.  In either case, the 
number of coins doubles, but the supply of digital gold 
increases only slightly.  

Each denomination represents an equal fraction of the digital 
gold in circulation.  Therefore, as new denominations come 
into circulation, the supply of digital gold remains 
relatively stable.  However, the number of coins increases in 
proportion to the demand for digital gold, and to the supply 
of computation.  This seems appropriate.  

Also, only a small fraction of the digital gold is in the 
smallest denominations.  This is important since the smallest 
denominations are always inefficient to spend.  


Claiming Digital Gold
 --------------------

Let's agree, by convention, that the first person to sign a 
particular integer, owns the digital gold corresponding to 
that integer.  This is the law of initial acquisition of 
digital gold.  

In order to claim a digital gold coin, the claimer must 
publicize a "claim certificate", containing the signed 
integer and the public key required to recognize the 
signature.  The first person to publicize a claim certificate 
will be recognized as the owner.  

A claimer can use a new alias for each new claim.  In this 
way, he can claim coins without revealing his identity.  


Spending Digital Gold
 --------------------

In order to spend a coin, the payor signs a claim certificate 
from the payee.  This voids the payor's ownership of the 
coin, and validates the payee's ownership.  The payor uses 
his old alias to sign the payee's claim, so that he does not 
identify himself.  The payee can generate a new alias for 
each new claim certificate, so he can accept coins without 
identifying himself.  

The law of property transfer for digital gold is the same as 
the law of property acquisition.  The first person to 
publicize a new claim certificate signed by the previous 
rightful owner, rightfully owns the coin.  

The payee should have the claim confirmed (signed) by some of 
the agencies where he might like to spend the coin.  A 
confirmation indicates that the agency is willing to accept 
the coin from the new alias.  Before confirming a claim, an 
agency should establish that the payer owned the coin at one 
time, and that he has not yet granted it to anyone but the 
payee.  If the claim is good, the agencies should take note 
of the new owner.  If the claim is bad, the payee can 
confront the payer.  

Agencies can do enough research to avoid confirming most bad 
claims.  For each coin, there exists a chain of claim 
certificates extending all the way back the the original 
owner of the coin.  The backward chain proves that each alias 
has owned the coin at one time.  The forward chain proves 
that each alias no longer owns the coin.  Agencies can also 
sign claims with timestamps, in order to settle disputes over 
coins claimed by multiple owners.  

The result is ownership by consensus.  If the agencies I wish 
to do business with agree that my alias owns a particular 
coin, then I own a certain amount of digital gold.  


 ------- Yours Truly, ][adon Nash ---------------------
in founding a family or a state, or acquiring fame even, 
we are mortal; but in dealing with truth we are immortal, 
and need fear no change nor accident. 
 --------------------------- ][enry David Thoreau -----


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.3

iQCVAgUBLHo/dTIwr9YMSTuBAQE2yAQAqOXczfGi0SffaNoPj294bQQSoSTMkiTU
Ko62ELCoshD729+2Qin5NqS+eFcW5zL+o/KZU4c1OZYa5Bt5PqlZIq29kjuNiNSr
Z/E6++HyaLO0S4ivjUhWRqOorT5b8WwL+a37zk2cNEdXG8sfsyS6Hn+xhHHhUmgD
2E4dGeMeftY=
=HWaS
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----







From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Perry E. Metzger" <pmetzger@lehman.com>
Date: Tue, 24 Aug 93 13:26:54 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: "Trusts" vs. Trust. (was: Re: No digital coins)
In-Reply-To: <9308241842.AA00526@dun-dun-noodles.aktis.com>
Message-ID: <9308242024.AA02658@snark.lehman.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Marc Horowitz says:
> >> What is wrong with large organizations per se?
> 
> This is way off-topic, but....
> 
> Large organizations have too much power.  Take a look at the sorts of
> things Andrew Carnegie was able to do.  Like running at a loss in
> order to squash small competitors.

Never happened. Its a myth, plain and simple. "Predatory pricing"
doesn't work -- any real business man can tell you that.
Unfortunately, decades of propaganda tell us all sorts of garbage.
Right now, some folks in Arkansas are suing Walmart for this very
offense -- Wallmart's real crime, of course, is providing too much
choice to the consumer at too low a price for the taste of their
competitors.

As for Andrew Carnegie's empire, U.S. Steel, which was formed by
merging Carnegie's operations and all the other big steel producing
operations in the U.S., controlled well over 95% of steel production
in the U.S. when it was started -- and within a few years, was down to
under 50%. Oh, and Standard Oil was dropping in market share as fast
as a stone when it was broken up.

Anyone REALLY believe Microsoft is a monopoly, please raise their
hands. I hate MS-DOS, but no one is FORCED to use it -- its just,
unfortunately, a standard.

> That's where the Sherman antitrust legislature comes from.

Nah. The Sherman Antitrust Act and all its friends are based partially
on myths, and partially on the desire of businessmen to get government
ENFORCEMENT of cartels. The ICC, for instance, was created entirely to
enforce cartel pricing on the railroads. Airlines scream loudly for
regulation -- because they don't like the low prices competition has
forced over the last decade. Most monopolies are things created by the
government -- phone companies or utility companies being given
exclusive franchises even though there is no real reason two or more
sets of lines couldn't be run. I can name exactly one significant real
monopoly -- that is, a monopoly that was not formed with the collusion
of the government and that wasn't a trivial case like "only pizza
parlor in the village" -- in U.S. history. The case in question was
Alcoa, and the only reason they maintained an aluminum monopoly as
long as they did was that they did everything they could to lower
aluminum prices and maintained minimal profits -- had they tried
jacking up profits, other companies would have appeared instantly.

> Before you call me a government-lover, I have to say that I'm not
> sure which I find more abhorrent: "capitalist" companies engaging in
> unfair business practices, or government regulation.  If someone
> wants to explain how we can get away without both (in personal email
> :-) I'd love to hear it.

Monopolies, cartels, etc, are all a myth. The longest any of J.P.
Morgan's railroad cartels lasted was a matter of months (until he got
the Interstate Commerce Commission created to get government to
enforce his cartels for him -- but thats another story). Cartesls and
monopolies are naturally unstable entities. OPEC was able to control
prices for only a couple of years before things crashed -- oil now is
near the same price it was in 1973 measured in real dollars (and OPEC
has NO regulation of its activities at all.)

Perry




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Perry E. Metzger" <pmetzger@lehman.com>
Date: Tue, 24 Aug 93 13:31:54 PDT
To: dmandl@lehman.com (David Mandl)
Subject: Re: No digital coins (was: Chaum on the wrong foot?)
In-Reply-To: <9308241905.AA27779@disvnm2.lehman.com>
Message-ID: <9308242030.AA02690@snark.lehman.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



David Mandl says:
> Well said, Eric.
> 
> There's no reason for people to assume that "We're all [fill
> in name of your political faction] here."  We've got a common
> goal/program and happily we agree on many of the most crucial
> political issues.

I agree with this -- however, I think the notion that people aren't
going to comment on other people's political comments is unrealistic.
If someone makes a political comment, its going to be answered.  My
suggestion is that people try to keep politics off the list and just
assume that people are interested in privacy for whatever reason.

Perry




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: nobody@soda.berkeley.edu
Date: Tue, 24 Aug 93 18:55:32 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Digital Gold
Message-ID: <9308250154.AA01671@soda.berkeley.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


At  4:23 PM 8/24/93 -0400, hnash@mason1.gmu.edu wrote:
>
>I tried to imagine a digital currency which is not backed by 
>any bank, but just exists by mathematics and convention, like 
>gold.  The result is the following currency system which 
>could be called digital gold.  It involves three conventions, 
>(1) a convention for valuing coins, (2) a convention for 
>claiming coins, (3) a convention for transfering coins.  
>
>I believe the resulting currency is unforgeable, 
>uninflatable, and untraceable.  Let me know where I've gone 
>wrong (gently).

I love this scheme, but I have two questions about it.

1) How will disputes be settled?
>In order to claim a digital gold coin, the claimer must 
>publicize a "claim certificate", containing the signed 
>integer and the public key required to recognize the 
>signature.  The first person to publicize a claim certificate 
>will be recognized as the owner.  
Some variant of the keyserver could be the public registry of gold. Can
this be done in a reasonable way, where a large part of the transaction
cost is not involved in verifying that the buyer really owns her cash? Is
there some way to make this more like a web of trust? Can it be blinded in
a way that maintains the trust but allows anonymous transactions?

2) Why should anyone value a digital gold coin in the first place? Money
has value because of people's expectation (based on experience) that if
they take it to a store they can buy stuff with it. Where will digital gold
obtain its bootstrap value? Somebody has to start using it.

My own feeling about how digicash will develop is that it will be added
into an initially non-anonymous digital based debt clearinghouse. With PGP
(etc.) we already have the means to create verifiable IOU's, contracts,
loans, etc. (Is anyone using them?) If such IOU's were used widely but
non-anonymously, it would require only a small innovation to move to
anonymity (either through blinding, or use of agents with reputations, or
?). The problem is getting any kind of online action to begin with. 
(AMiX?)





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Gomes, Bill              M'bio" <BillG@Microbio.LifeSci.ucla.edu>
Date: Tue, 24 Aug 93 19:16:58 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: No Subject
Message-ID: <2C7AC9C2@smtpgate.lifesci.ucla.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Please subscribe me to the cypherpunks mailing list.

Thanks.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: fergp@sytex.com (Paul Ferguson)
Date: Thu, 26 Aug 93 21:12:40 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Adding an "AKA"
Message-ID: <smeT9B1w165w@sytex.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
 
I just finished upgrading from PGP v2.2 to v2.3a (and without a
hitch, I might add). This may sound like a silly question, but
how do you add an AKA to your key? I skimmed through the
manual, as usual, to ensure that I didn't absent-mindedly overlook
something, but didn't see this mentioned. I have, however, seen it
done and have a couple on my keyring in fact.
 
 
Something along the <pgp -kva ferg> lines of:
 
Type bits/keyID   Date       User ID
pub  1024/1CC04D 1993/03/15  Paul Ferguson <fergp@sytex.com>
                     ----->  Paul Ferguson <ferguson@icp.net>
 
 
1 key(s) examined.
 
 
Danke.
 
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.3a
 
iQCVAgUBLH1mVJRLcZSdHMBNAQHchAP/URXN0T/7aW/kFC1flZgi4Rnjf4QEr2Nu
Dx/FidcB2JgV9Kz0M145VCvNa1w4f9+jBFltRMLRRB/xHLFFB6kCj18a6EO31rp0
VAhjqd3GG+WAgZJ4VyQ4vY+iuByum++gHSzbh+eiD1Gpha/Fw96Pv4xskl5QbtS2
Y55QKIQB1Io=
=tg73
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

Paul Ferguson               |  "Government, even in its best state,
Network Integrator          |   is but a necessary evil; in its worst
Centreville, Virginia USA   |   state, an intolerable one."
fergp@sytex.com             |      - Thomas Paine, Common Sense
 
Type bits/keyID   Date       User ID
pub  1024/1CC04D 1993/03/15  Paul Ferguson <fergp@sytex.com>
  Key fingerprint =  EE D2 93 7D 04 6D C6 05  AC 36 AD 9D 8E 4F 41 58




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: snark!esr@gvls1.VFL.Paramax.COM (Eric S. Raymond)
Date: Wed, 25 Aug 93 00:37:02 PDT
To: pmetzger@lehman.com
Subject: Re: "Trusts" vs. Trust. (was: Re: No digital coins)
In-Reply-To: <9308242024.AA02658@snark.lehman.com>
Message-ID: <m0oVBee-000BfPC@snark.uucp>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Perry Metzger writes:
> Never happened. Its a myth, plain and simple.
>       Oh, and Standard Oil was dropping in market share as fast
> as a stone when it was broken up.
> Nah. The Sherman Antitrust Act and all its friends are based partially
> on myths, and partially on the desire of businessmen to get government
> ENFORCEMENT of cartels.
> Monopolies, cartels, etc, are all a myth.

You are objectively correct about all this.

You're also being obnoxious and shouldn't have started this argument.

Please stop.
-- 
					Eric S. Raymond <esr@snark.thyrsus.com>



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: greg@ideath.goldenbear.com (Greg Broiles)
Date: Wed, 25 Aug 93 01:47:29 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Bank misbehavior (was: Re: No digital coins?)
In-Reply-To: <9308242012.AA02593@snark.lehman.com>
Message-ID: <VgsT9B1w164w@ideath.goldenbear.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Perry Metzger writes:

> If you truly feel that there is some
> sort of horrific "power relationship" between large banks and their
> customers, I would suggest that since the worst that they do to you is
> charge you for performing services that you are upset with the notion
> of banks charging for services.

I wish it were so; banks may provide information on me that I don't want
dispersed to the government, to other folks who know enough to use the
Touch-Tone account info hotline, and to marketing folks.

The Wall Street Journal had an article sometime in August 1991
(give or take a month; I don't have DJNR access or I'd give a real
cite) about how banks make available payee and amount information from
checks customers write, without customer notification or permission.

Banks in general seem to have poorly considered or actively harmful
(anti)privacy practices.

How easy IS it to start a credit union? Perhaps what we need is the
People's Sekrit Privacy Credit Union! 1/2 :)

--
Greg Broiles                            greg@goldenbear.com
Golden Bear Computer Consulting         +1 503 342 7982
Box 12005 Eugene OR 97440               BBS: +1 503 687 7764





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "L. Detweiler" <ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Date: Tue, 24 Aug 93 23:12:01 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: 16th NCSC meeting Sep 20-23 1993 announcement
Message-ID: <9308250610.AA20571@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



From Risks 14.86 Aug 24 1993

This is a Spook Central meeting, so the topics given are interesting
`signal intelligence' on what's on the NSA^D^D^DNIST's mind at the moment. 
Also, it suggests what companies have active consulting & production 
arrangements with NSA (MITRE, Motorola, etc.).

What's on their mind: hierarchical security systems (antithetical to the
subversive PGP `web of trust'), distributed/network security, CLIPPER, 
`publishing work', (read: restrictions on cryptographic topics in journals?), 
`security requirements for cryptographic modules' (read: restrictions
on cryptographic device export?) `International harmonization' by a 
Frenchman (hehe, sounds a lot like `Ministry of Truth'), a probable codeword
for International Cryptographic Restriction.

Acronyms: TPEP, TTAP -- sound big, what are they? Some kind of U.S. 
government `evaluation paradigms'. Again, probably for crypto-device export.

Interesting presentations by spook outsiders & wannabes: virus attacks, 
`Security & Auditability of Electronic Voting Systems', `Privacy Impact 
of technology in 90's', `Electronic Crime Prevention & Investigation'

Hopefully, some patriotic cypherpunk can sneak in and smuggle out a report!

------------------------------

Date:  Thu, 19 Aug 93 12:32 EDT
From: Reiner@DOCKMASTER.NCSC.MIL
Subject:  NCSC 16 Announcement for RISKS

16TH NATIONAL COMPUTER SECURITY CONFERENCE
Dates:  20-23 September 1993
Location:  Baltimore Convention Center Baltimore, Maryland
Registration fee:  $275

The National Computer Security Center and the National Institute of Standards
and Technology will present the 16th National Computer Security Conference
from 20-23 September at the Baltimore Convention Center.

This year's three and one-half day program features tracks in : Research &
Development; System Implementation; Management & Administration; Criteria &
Evaluation; Tutorials & Other Presentations.

aA summary of the technical program follows.  To obtain more information about
the technical program send a message to

          NCS_Conference at DOCKMASTER.NCSC.MIL   or
          call the NCSC on 410-859-4371.

To obtain a registration form, call the Conference Registrar at
301-975-2775 or send a message to NCS_Conference at DOCKMASTER.NCSC.MIL

TECHNICAL PROGRAM SUMMARY:

    R&D TRACK

       PANELS - Strategies for Integrating Evaluated Products
                    Chair: J. Williams, MITRE
              - Multilevel Information System Security Initiative
                    Chair: G. Secrest, NSA
              - Trusted Applications
                    Chair: J. Cugini, NIST
              - Best of the New Security Paradigms Workshop II
                    Chair: H. Hosmer, Data Security Inc.
              - Enterprise Security Solutions
                    Chair: P. Lambert, Motorola

       PAPER SESSIONS - Honesty Mechanisms
                              Chair: E. Boebert, SCTC
                      - Database Research
                              Chair: M. Schaefer, CTA
                      - Access Control
                              Chair: P. Neumann, SRI

    SYSTEM IMPLEMENTATION TRACK

        Panels: - Perspectives on MLS System Solution Acquisition
                    Chair: J. Sachs, ARCA
                - Network Management -- The Harder Problem
                    Chair: R. Henning, Harris Corp.
                -  Application of INFOSEC Products on WANs
                    Chair: J. Capell, Lockheed
                - Security for the Securities Industry
                    Chair: S. Meglathery, NYSE

       Paper Sessions:  - Access Control Topics
                              Chair: D. Balenson, TIS
                        - Network Risks & Responses
                              Chair: B. Burnham, NSA
                        - Software Engineering
                              Chair: V. Gibson, Grumman
                        - System Engineering with OTS Products
                              Chair: M. Tinto, NSA
                        - Network Implementation
                              Chair: F. Mayer, Aerospace Corp

    MANAGEMENT & ADMINISTRATION TRACK

       PANELS - Virus Attacks & Counterattacks: Real World Experiences
                    Chair: J. Litchko, TIS
              - Terror at the World Trade Center
                    Chair: S. Meglathery, NYSE
              - Contingency Planning in the 90s
                    Chair: I. Gilbert-Perry, NIST
              - On a Better Understanding of Risk Management Techniques
                    Chair: S. Katzke, NIST
              - Security Awareness, Training & Professionalization
                    Chair: D. Gilbert, NIST
              - Accreditor's Perspective - How Much is Enough?
                    Chair: J. Litchko, TIS
              - Security & Auditability of Electronic Voting Systems
                    Chair: R. Mercuri, U. of Penn.
              - Protection of Intellectual Property
                    Chair: G. Lang, Harrison Ave. Corp.
              - The Privacy Impact pof technology in the 90s
                    Chair: W. Madsen, CSC
              - Electronic Crime Prevention & Investigation
                    Chair: R. Lau, NSA

       PAPER SESSION - Managing & Promoting INFOSEC Programs
                              Chair: D. Parker, SRI

    TUTORIALS & PRESENTATIONS TRACK

       Tutorials: - Threats & Security Overview
                              A. Liddle, IRMC
                  - Trusted Systems Concepts
                              C. Abzug, IRMC
                  - Trusted Networks
                              R. Bauer, E. Schultz,  ARCA
                  - Trusted Databases
                              G. Smith, W. Wilson,  ARCA
                  - Trusted Integration & System Certification
                              J. Sachs, ARCA

      Panel Presentations: - CLIPPER Chip
                                        Chair: L. McNulty, NIST
                           - Getting Your Work Published
                                        Chair: J. Holleran, NSA
                           - INFOSEC Standards: The DISA Process
                                        Chair: W. Smith, DISA
                           - Security Requirements for Cryptographic
                               Modules; Chair: L. Carnahan, NIST

   CRITERIA & EVALUATION TRACK

      Presentations: - Introduction to the Federal Criteria
                              G. Troy, NIST; D. Campbell, NSA
                     - Federal Criteria: Protection Profile Development
                              J. Cugini, NIST; M. DelVilbiss, NSA
                     - Federal Criteria: Registration of Protection Profiles
                              D. Ferraiool, NIST; L. Ambuel, NSA

      Panels - Federal Criteria: Protection Profiles for the 90s
                    Chair: R. Dobry, NSA
             - Federal Criteria: Vetting & Registration of Protection Profiles
                    Chair: L Ambuel, NSA
             - Evaluation Paradigms: Update on TPEP and TTAP
                    Chair: S Nardone, NSA
             - European National Evaluation Schemes
                    Chair: E. Flahavin, NIST
             - The European Evaluation Process
                    Chair: P. Toth, NIST
             - International Harmonization I
                    Chair: Y. Klein, SCSSI, France
             - Goals & Progress Toward the Common Criteria
                    Chair: G. Troy, NIST
             - Federal Criteria User Forum
                    Chair: C. Wichers NSA

   Plenary: "Information System Security Strategies for the Future"
                    Chair: Stephen Walker
                    Panel: James P. Anderson
                           Dr. Willis Ware
                           Dr. Roger Schell

------------------------------

End of RISKS-FORUM Digest 14.86
************************





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: nobody@shell.portal.com
Date: Wed, 25 Aug 93 03:35:36 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: No digital coins (was: Chaum on the wrong foot?)
Message-ID: <9308250838.AA20693@jobe.shell.portal.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


  If your goal is only privacy of personal information not economic privacy
you would do better to support Clipper-like systems (such as DigiCash
with an IRS-Tax Backdoor). Supporting untracable perfectly secure
cash will make taxation and state economic planning hard if not impossible.
It is contradictory for a liberal to support DigiCash, Strong Cryptography,
etc because effective collective coercion requires personal information.
All you have to do is take perfect anonymity to its natural conclusion
and you see where it leads. (and it ain't socialism)







From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: nobody@shell.portal.com
Date: Wed, 25 Aug 93 03:36:33 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Blinding messages (newbie questions)
Message-ID: <9308250839.AA20717@jobe.shell.portal.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>[Karl Barrus describes blinding]

Excellent post!  Can you tolerate a few newbie questions?

> Conceptually, when you blind a message, nobody else can read it. 

So "blinding" is a synonym for encryption with your own public
key, aka multiplication by a very-hard-to-factor number?

> under the right circumstances if another 
> party digitally signs a blinded message, the unblinded message will 
> contain a valid digital signature.

In other words if Alice encrypts and Bob signs, Da(Db(Ea(M))) = Db(M)?  
Under what conditions?  Does RSA (in PGP) satisfy those conditions?

> If someone asks
> you to digitally sign a random stream of symbols, remember that what you
> sign may be unblinded to reveal a contract, etc. 

For what applications would Bob want to sign an encrypted contract
instead of a plaintext?






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Philip Zimmermann <prz@columbine.cgd.ucar.EDU>
Date: Wed, 25 Aug 93 01:55:35 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com (Cypherpunks)
Subject: Coming Soon:  Commercial version of PGP!
Message-ID: <9308250853.AA06179@columbine.cgd.ucar.EDU>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Coming Soon:  Commercial Version of PGP!


Philip Zimmermann has signed an agreement with ViaCrypt, a division
of Lemcom Systems, Inc, to sell a commercial version of PGP.  ViaCrypt
is a company in Phoenix Arizona that already has an RSA license from 
Public Key Partners to sell products that use the RSA algorithm.

The freeware version of PGP will still be available, and will be
maintained as well as the commercial version.  Most corporations
were not willing to use PGP because it was not licensed by PKP
or RSA Data Security.  With this commercial version of PGP, it will be
possible for PGP to enter commercial environments for the first time,
and compete with other products such as PEM.  This is expected to 
enhance PGP's viability as a de facto standard in the long run.

ViaCrypt PGP will be available in the USA and Canada, for an introductory
price of $100 for a single user, with quantity discounts available.
For details, call ViaCrypt at (602) 944-0773, or contact Philip Zimmermann
at prz@acm.org.






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: remail@tamsun.tamu.edu
Date: Wed, 25 Aug 93 05:32:06 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Attacks on remailers
Message-ID: <9308251148.AA25085@tamsun.tamu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Hal Finney writes a nice "To Do" list for the cypherpunks
remailers by enumerating and describing possible attacks.
Let's priortize these items.  First we should do those
items that are easy to implement, and those items needed
to prevent any remaining cheap 'n easy attacks.  We can
leave expensive attacks for future projects.

> Response: Encrypt the messages.  Use "nesting", so that all that is
> visible as each message leaves a remailer is the destination of the
> next remailer.

This should be made smoother.  The learning curve needed to
get to this stage : install PGP & get it working, learn
how to use remailers, install remailer nesting script, debug
all of the above, because something in there is bound to
break at this stage : quite a lot of work!  Just
improving things up to here with clearer documentation,
and better scripts and GUIs, would greatly increase the number
of remailer users and traffic.

> Response: Run the remailer on a machine which does not keep mail logs,
> or on a machine to which you can deny the attackers access.

The former is much to be preferred!  The first link in the
remailer chain, especially, needs to be trusted not to
maintain logs.  The trustworthy remailer operator goes to 
great lengths to minimize the temptation to look at messages.

>[Attack 3: timing & ordering of messages in & out]
>[Attack 4: look at subject line, message size, etc.]
>[other attacks involving intercepting mail stream]

Batching and random delays only work well if there is large
message traffic through the remailer.  What in specific
detail is needed to gain access to the mail stream to
make these attacks?  If no mail logs are kept, and the remailer
denies access to a spool file, by hiding it or putting
random garbage in it or denying access to its host computer,
an attack looks to me like it requires a sophisticated wiretap.
Avoiding expensive attacks is low priority at this 
point.

>[Message pools] have the problem that they expose everyone
> in some group to all of the messages intended for every group member,
> hence the number of messages will scale as the square of the number of
> group members. 

First let's make the problem happen.  Then we can solve it!

Here's another item: faster links!  The delay between
when I post this and when it arrives on "cypherpunks" can
be half a day. 

What about that idea of using direct sockets instead of
SMTP between remailers?  That could kill two birds with one stone:
delivery speed and cheap attacks against the intermediate
links via logging or spool files.






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: b44729@achilles.ctd.anl.gov (Samuel Pigg)
Date: Wed, 25 Aug 93 06:35:37 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Attacks on remailers
In-Reply-To: <9308251148.AA25085@tamsun.tamu.edu>
Message-ID: <9308251334.AA22042@achilles.ctd.anl.gov>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



   > Response: Encrypt the messages.  Use "nesting", so that all that is
   > visible as each message leaves a remailer is the destination of the
   > next remailer.

   This should be made smoother.  The learning curve needed to
   get to this stage : install PGP & get it working, learn
   how to use remailers, install remailer nesting script, debug
   all of the above, because something in there is bound to
   break at this stage : quite a lot of work!  Just
   improving things up to here with clearer documentation,
   and better scripts and GUIs, would greatly increase the number
   of remailer users and traffic.

Working on it. (NeXT version at least.)

	[..]

   Here's another item: faster links!  The delay between
   when I post this and when it arrives on "cypherpunks" can
   be half a day. 

   What about that idea of using direct sockets instead of
   SMTP between remailers?  That could kill two birds with one stone:
   delivery speed and cheap attacks against the intermediate
   links via logging or spool files.



Actually what I was proposing was the direct usage of SMTP itself rather
than going through the host machine's mail system. As anyone can do it,
it would help with the usage of student accounts as remailers.
And with direct SMTP (socket connections to port 25 of the receiving machine)
you have some control over the header information that is generated.

The protocol is outlined in RFC821 if anyone wants to look at it.

So that's 4 birds with one stone:

	(1) Speed.

	(2) No logging on remailer host.

	(3) Control over header information (hell you could even make 
	    something up for the header fields that looks 'legitimate')

	(4) Tighter control of possible batching by not going though
	    the host machine's mail system.

Earlier it was noted that traffic analysis worked for the a.s.a.r. remailer
to find the sender of messages by checking the logs on the machine
that the messages were originally from. With a simple utility someone could
submit mail directly to the remailer host using sockets, and so leave little
trace on their host of having done so.

I'm working on the tiny utility to send mail via socket 25
(I'm sure it has been done many times before, and is probably already
available somewhere. Is no big deal.)

School is of course stealing my time.
-Sam
(is the remailer source code available on soda?)




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: strick -- henry strickland <strick@versant.com>
Date: Wed, 25 Aug 93 08:42:08 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Visa, HNC Inc. develop neural network as a weapon to fight fraud
Message-ID: <9308251540.AA19232@versant.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Extracted from "FC NEWSBYTES 1.3", David Geddes <dgeddes@NETCOM.COM> Editor,
	where FC = FutureCulture mailing list <FUTUREC-request@UAFSYSB.UARK.EDU>.    strick
____________________________________________ _ _..........
B Y T E 4:

Visa, HNC Inc. develop neural network as a weapon to fight fraud
SAN FRANCISCO (AUG. 10) PR NEWSWIRE - Visa International and HNC Inc. have
announced a strategic agreement to develop a comprehensive merchant risk
detection system.  The new system will be designed to better control fraud at
the merchant level by determining the risk associated with individual card
transactions.

This agreement continues to support Visa International's active role in
developing effective solutions to the problem of fraud occurring at the point
of sale.  The merchant risk detection system will be available in 1994.

"Visa has combined its core systems capabilities and the premier technology
available -- neural networks -- for fighting credit card fraud," explained
Roger Peirce, Visa International's executive vice president, Delivery Systems.
"HNC, an industry leader in neural network applications and credit card
control services, is a logical partner for Visa," he added.

Michael A. Thiemann, HNC's executive vice president, called the agreement
"another example of our commitment to solving tough business problems through
the application of cutting-edge technologies."

Neural network technology enables a system to predict the probability of fraud
by learning from a large number of past transactions, both legitimate and
fraudulent.  By using neural networks to its full extent, Visa will be able to
provide superior risk analysis for its members.

In combating credit and debit card fraud, Visa already has developed several
programs utilizing information gained from neural network research.  Worldwide
implementation of the International Points-of- Compromise (IPOC) program has
proved highly effective for identifying merchant locations that may be selling
or giving account information to counterfeiters.  Another successful program,
called the Central Deposit Monitoring (CDM) program, matches merchant activity
with sales draft laundering characteristics and identifies unusual merchant
deposits. In addition, close cooperation with law enforcement agencies and
legislatures enhances the value of the programs which, in turn, allow Visa
members to pass on the protection to its cardholders and merchants.

The planned Visa-HNC merchant risk detection system is designed to further
reduce fraud losses by assigning a risk score to each authorization
transaction processed through the VisaNet systems.  "With this new system,
members will be better able to assess risk at the point- of-transaction and,
therefore, make more informed authorization decisions," confirmed Peirce.
According to The Nilson Report, merchant fraud worldwide cost the financial
industry an estimated US $689 million in 1992.

HNC will integrate the risk score into Falcon(TM), their existing, real-time
credit card fraud-detection system that runs at card issuer sites to identify
and prevent a wide range of fraud at the cardholder level. It determines the
probability of fraud on each credit card authorization by comparing it to the
cardholder's purchase patterns and the latest trends in credit card fraud.
Introduced in September 1992, Falcon has already achieved success in reducing
fraud losses of major credit card issuers.

HNC Inc., the world's leader in the application of neural networks, develops,
sells, integrates and supports advanced decision solutions based on neural
network and statistical technology. HNC provides practical products and
services to the financial, credit card, debit card, merchant services,
insurance, mortgage underwriting, retail and direct marketing industries.

Visa is the leading consumer payment system in the world with more than 10.4
million acceptance locations, the largest global ATM network and 309 million
cards issued worldwide.

-0-                          8/10/93 /CONTACT:  Gail Murayama of Visa
International, 415-570-3645; or Ken Jones of HNC Inc., 619-546-8877

____________________________________________ _ _..........





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: khijol!erc@colossus.apple.com (Ed Carp)
Date: Wed, 25 Aug 93 10:32:09 PDT
To: snark!esr@gvls1.VFL.Paramax.COM (Eric S. Raymond)
Subject: Re: "Trusts" vs. Trust. (was: Re: No digital coins)
In-Reply-To: <m0oVBee-000BfPC@snark.uucp>
Message-ID: <m0oVNxZ-00021zC@khijol>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text


> 
> Perry Metzger writes:
> > Never happened. Its a myth, plain and simple.
> >       Oh, and Standard Oil was dropping in market share as fast
> > as a stone when it was broken up.
> > Nah. The Sherman Antitrust Act and all its friends are based partially
> > on myths, and partially on the desire of businessmen to get government
> > ENFORCEMENT of cartels.
> > Monopolies, cartels, etc, are all a myth.
> 
> You are objectively correct about all this.
> 
> You're also being obnoxious and shouldn't have started this argument.
> 
> Please stop.

I don't think so.  Perry's arguments were well-reasoned and not obnoxious
at all.  Perhaps some don't like to be proven they are wrong?
-- 
Ed Carp, N7EKG			erc@apple.com			510/659-9560
                            anon-0001@khijol.uucp
If you want magic, let go of your armor.  Magic is so much stronger than
steel!        -- Richard Bach, "The Bridge Across Forever"



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Christian D. Odhner" <cdodhner@indirect.com>
Date: Wed, 25 Aug 93 10:25:38 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Coming Soon:  Commercial version of PGP!
In-Reply-To: <9308250853.AA06179@columbine.cgd.ucar.EDU>
Message-ID: <199308251723.AA21838@indirect.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> ViaCrypt PGP will be available in the USA and Canada, for an introductory
> price of $100 for a single user, with quantity discounts available.
> For details, call ViaCrypt at (602) 944-0773, or contact Philip Zimmermann
> at prz@acm.org.

Ok, I just spoke with Dave somebody at viacrypt, and he told me that the
ViaCrypt PGP would be based on PGP 2.3a, and the only code changed would
be the lines implementing rsa itself. He told me it would be backwards
compatable with all past versions of PGP and that as improvements were
made to ViaCrypt PGP, the same improvements would be made to the freeware
version. I was thinking that if a bunch of us cypherpunks wanted copys we
could order them as a group and get a volume discount. I've asked to have
the price scheduals sent to me. If anybody has any questions for ViaCrypt,
you could refer them through me if you like, as thier offices are just 16
miles or so from my house.

Happy Hunting, -Chris




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Eric Hughes <hughes@soda.berkeley.edu>
Date: Wed, 25 Aug 93 10:42:09 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: SEA Opposes Privatization of Digital Signature Standard (fwd)
Message-ID: <9308251738.AA10272@soda.berkeley.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Simona Nass of SEA sent this over to me for y'all.

Eric

-----------------------------------------------------------------------------

From: Simona Nass <simona@panix.com>
Subject: SEA Opposes Privatization of Digital Signature Standard (fwd)

> August 19, 1993                                   FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE
>
> CONTACT:    Simona Nass
>             (212) 982-4320 or simona@sea.org
>
>             Society for Electronic Access (SEA) Opposes
>             Privatization of Digital Signature Standard
>
> In June, the National Institute for Standards and Technology (NIST)
> published in the Federal Register its intention to grant an exclusive
> license for nongovernmental use of the Digital Signature Algorithm
> (DSA), a technique developed for NIST by federally-funded researchers.
> DSA can help people authenticate the origin of electronic mail and
> other computerized messages. NIST has proposed making DSA the basis of
> a standard for digital signatures for transactions within federal
> agencies and by anyone doing electronic business with the government
> (and thus, de facto, by anyone else interested in a widely-accepted
> digital-signature standard). Interested parties were given 60 days to
> comment. The SEA has now gone on record opposing this license on three
> grounds:
>
>   1) The law requires an open discussion of whether such an exclusive 
> license serves the interests of both the government and the public
> _before_ the license and its terms are proposed.
> 
>   2) The proposed license directly contravenes NIST's stated purpose
> in developing DSA in the first place, which was to make a
> digital-signature standard free of encumbrance from privately held
> patent licenses, one that would be available royalty-free worldwide.
> 
>   3) The proposed license violates federal law governing the granting
> of exclusive licenses. The law states that an exclusive license can
> only be granted for a patent if it can be shown that the technology
> embodied in the patent would not otherwise be developed, brought to
> market and widely used. Considering that NIST's proposed licensee,
> Public Key Partners, is currently engaged in legal action to prevent
> anyone else from developing or marketing digital-signature technology
> in the U.S., they appear to be an unlikely choice to ensure the widest
> possible use of DSA. Indeed, granting an exclusive license to PKP
> would extend their potential legal monopoly on digital signatures
> until 2010.
>
> Opposition to the NIST/PKP deal has been widespread throughout the
> electronic community. NIST has yet to respond to the SEA's August 9
> filing, or to comments filed by other organizations (a full text of
> the SEA's statement, written by SEA board member Clay Shirky, is
> available via Internet gopher -- reach gopher.panix.com and look under
> Society for Electronic Access (SEA), Telecom Law Information, SEA
> Comment on NIST-PKP Agreement -- or via e-mail by sending a request
> asking for the "SEA Comment on NIST-PKP Agreement" to sea@sea.org).
>
> The Society for Electronic Access is a New York-based organization
> focusing on electronic civil liberties and access issues; for more
> information, e-mail sea-info@sea.org; write to The Society for
> Electronic Access, Post Office Box 3131, Church Street Station,
> New York, NY 10008-3131; or call (212) 982-4320.





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Kevin Reynolds <kevinr@csn.org>
Date: Wed, 25 Aug 93 09:55:38 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: link
Message-ID: <199308251653.AA11302@teal.csn.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Is anyone currently porting link to msdos?  I have the ability, but it may
take me a while to do so, so if anyone is already doing it, I'd rather not
overdo it.  The file is available from soda.berkeley.edu in
/pub/cypherpunks.  Check it out.

kev



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Brian D Williams <talon57@well.sf.ca.us>
Date: Wed, 25 Aug 93 11:15:39 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: recommended reading
Message-ID: <93Aug25.111323pdt.13912-2@well.sf.ca.us>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain




                          Friendly Spies

                  How America's allies are using
                       economic espionage
                      to steal our secrets

                       By Peter Schweizer
                        ISBN 0-87113-497-7
                        'bout twenty bucks

 I would have to rate this as a must read for anyone concerned with
Privacy. Schweizer has written a very informative, and well written
text describing in great detail the involvement of so called
"friendly" inteligence services in corporate espionage.




                                                     Brian Williams 
                                                     Cypherpatriot






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Date: Wed, 25 Aug 93 11:25:39 PDT
To: Cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: "Inspired by the Cypherpunks"
Message-ID: <9308251825.AA20473@netcom.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



It's nice to know we're having some influence.

The latest "Wired" has the following letter, which credits the Cypherpunks
as the inspiration for a privacy seeker:

"A few days ago, in a chain record store, I bumped into this big screen on
a box marked with an "i." I looked at it, thinking it would be a good idea
to know what I'm buying, when this guy came up and told me that to be able
to use this neato piece of high tech, I'd have to fill out a piece of
paper, which not only asked about my taste, but about my credit, my name,
my address, etc. Inspired by the cypherpunks of your last issue (_Wired_
1.2, page 54), I decided there was no good reason for these people to know
this about me. I took the reply form and walked off, throwing it away when
I got home. The next day, I went searching bookstores and found the new
_Wired_. What did I see, but a glowing recommendation for this
privacy-basher on page 23 (_Wired_ 1.3). I'm sorry, 30 seconds of a pop
tune is too little for the price of my privacy."

"Dave Jacoby
Please don't print my user ID"


So, we are playing our part in raising consciousness. (I'll avoid getting
into a political debate about whether these corporations asking questions
havd too much power, whether the market works or not, etc.)

-Tim May

--
Timothy C. May         | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,  
tcmay@netcom.com       | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
408-688-5409           | knowledge, reputations, information markets, 
W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA  | black markets, collapse of governments.
Higher Power: 2^756839 | Public Key: by arrangement
Note: I put time and money into writing this posting. I hope you enjoy it.      







From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: J_G_Thomas%CAASD1@mwmgate1.mitre.org
Date: Wed, 25 Aug 93 08:45:38 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Attacks on remailers
Message-ID: <199308251542.AA23719@mwunix.mitre.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Samuel Pigg <b44729@achilles.ctd.anl.gov> wrote:

> Actually what I was proposing was the direct usage of SMTP itself rather
> than going through the host machine's mail system. As anyone can do it,
> it would help with the usage of student accounts as remailers.
> And with direct SMTP (socket connections to port 25 of the receiving machine)
> you have some control over the header information that is generated.

> The protocol is outlined in RFC821 if anyone wants to look at it.

The trouble is, one side (the receiver) is still keeping logs, since only 
sendmail (or some other root process doing the same job) can bind to port 25.  
On most machines, that means logs.  There are plenty of ports over 1000 that 
user processes can bind to, and that cypherpunk remailers can support, if we 
want to go that way.  I think it's worth thinking about.  (This is in addition 
to receiving mail delivered normally to their e-mail adresses, probably either 
by port-25/sendmail or uucp).

We could start by having cypherpunk remailers talk to _each_other_ on an agreed-
upon, unlogged port, using RFC 821 protocol.  Final hops to non-remailer 
addresses will have to be handled on port 25, of course, but within the 
remailer web we can avoid sendmail logs entirely.  After that's implemented, we 
could talk about using a different protocol.  

A new protocol is probably the cleanest way to solve the problem of traffic 
analysis of messages addressed with encrypted address blocks.  The best way to 
get security in a remailer chain is to nest your encryption, so only one layer 
gets peeled off in each remailer hop.  That isn't possible with encrypted 
address blocks, since the sender will only know the address (and public key) of 
the first remailer in the chain.  All hops after the first one must send the 
same message out as they got in, with just a layer off the encrypted address 
block.  But if remailers talked to each other by first doing RSA-signed Diffie-
Hellman key exchange, then encrypting the traffic, a packet snooper wouldn't be 
able to correlate incoming and outgoing messages.

The latter is one of the "expensive" attacks, I think, and should be thought 
about after we make sure the logs aren't being kept.

Thoughts?

Joe
(they're trying to pry me away from my NeXT, so don't reply directly to the 
From: line; use jthomas@mitre.org)





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Date: Wed, 25 Aug 93 11:45:39 PDT
To: Cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: How "Wired" did the "Crypto Rebels" article
Message-ID: <9308251842.AA23059@netcom.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



A free newspaper devoted to graphics arts, "OnLine Design," has a nice
piece in the August issue: "Designing _Wired_," by Ken Coupland. (I've seen
this issue at a mall software store, so those of you in California may want
to look for it before it vanishes.)

The focus is on the launching of "Wired," its layout policies, the feel of
the paper, the design team, and so on. "Wired" is turning into a major
publishing success story, hence the interest in its creative/artistic side.

The Steven Levy article on "Crypto Rebels" got a major part of the
coverage, especially the cover (some Cypherpunks in masks, holding the
American flag, in case some of you newcomers to this list missed this
issue) and the opening 2-page spread used in that article.

The caption for the 2-page spread is: "This layout for the "Crypto Rebels"
piece supports the story's argument that the "Cypherpunks" are patriotic
revolutionaries."

Nice to see that the "meme" is being accepted that folks like us are on the
right side.

Interestingly, one of the photos of the design editors shows one of them
holding a "Cypherpunks mask" up in front of her face. (Needless to say,
they are the ones who thought up the mask idea in the first place.)

Just thought you'd like to hear about this article.
--
Timothy C. May         | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,  
tcmay@netcom.com       | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
408-688-5409           | knowledge, reputations, information markets, 
W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA  | black markets, collapse of governments.
Higher Power: 2^756839 | Public Key: by arrangement
Note: I put time and money into writing this posting. I hope you enjoy it.      







From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: plmoses@unix.cc.emory.edu (Paul L. Moses)
Date: Wed, 25 Aug 93 08:52:08 PDT
To: greg@ideath.goldenbear.com
Subject: Re:  Bank misbehavior (was: Re: No digital coins?)
Message-ID: <9308251549.AA12684@emoryu1.cc.emory.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Maybe someone has said this, but another key way to foster privacy is to START A 
BANK that values this.  I recal some references to Swiss banking, anonymous accounts,
etc, before.  So wouldnt it be a good idea to find some bankers out there who wanted
to create a niche market for themselves, and sell them on the crypto-protocols?
First suggestion:  try Miami....
- paul




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: hnash@mason1.gmu.edu
Date: Wed, 25 Aug 93 09:56:41 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Digital Coin Claim
Message-ID: <9308251652.AA01541@mason1.gmu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


The first certificate attached to this message is a claim to ownership
of the first digital gold coin.  Some anonymous person is claiming
ownership of this coin simply because no one else has claimed it.  This
original owner has signed a deed granting ownership of the coin to
himself.  

The second attached certificate is a transfer of ownership of the same
digital coin.  The first owner has granted ownership of the coin to some
other anonymous person (who could be the original owner himself).  

If someone tries to offer you coin #1 in exchange for some good or
service, make sure his signature matches the public key in the latest
deed of ownership of coin #1.  (The first public key is now worthless,
by convention.) 


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

<>-<>-<> Deed of Ownership <>-<>-<>

The following digital coin is hereby granted to the owner of the 
following alias by the signer of this deed.

coin #1

- -----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----
Version: 2.3

mQA/Aix7OzAAAAEBgNeA+IZOQOmczjSUMiWaMTnkZLDYCA1XGzxjnXTiYA1/LVpN
SkUywA+kGfe9cCuaQQARAQABtAlhbm9ueW1vdXM=
=YrPq
- -----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.3

iQBFAgUBLHtQdYuK85NmoAdhAQHevwF+OOZEZHUjDADYBaM5EQvDbfCTTEskX2kr
aA46cE2GaZBPV5JdyjR+dnNwRXHfug0M
=z9OC
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

<>-<>-<> Deed of Ownership <>-<>-<>

The following digital coin is hereby granted to the owner of the 
following alias by the signer of this deed.

coin #1

- -----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----
Version: 2.3

mQA/Aix7SWsAAAEBgLanVXE9dTkrDCAWOt1Dw3bhLSIGMVweD1zifEpiDIWRZzXO
Sl22i4YVPmeLvfdL3QARAQABtAVhbm9uMg==
=5fkK
- -----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.3

iQBFAgUBLHtQo4uK85NmoAdhAQEF9QF/aB6iX/bwXn6HEerJrOzES0VTpxsybC9L
L++CIvjbDLBXmgPzXClGuGKg5t+urJ8J
=Jabu
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Kent Hastings" <kent_hastings@qmail2.aero.org>
Date: Wed, 25 Aug 93 14:32:41 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Julieboard DDS
Message-ID: <199308252128.AA16005@aerospace.aero.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


                      Julieboard DDS
Remember my constant whining about the lack of suitable hardware for
spread-spectrum radio? No more!

The August 1993 issue of 73 Amateur Radio Today
contains an article and schematic for: JULIEBOARD. Woo hoo!
 
Ahem. The Julieboard is a Direct Digital Synthesis (DDS) circuit built
around the 28-pin DIP Harris HSP45102 DDS chip. A software controller
program is shown using GWBASIC. Here is a summary of features:
 
"0 to 16 MHz coverage (*Note: can be used to modulate UHF/Microwave*)
 0.007 Hz frequency resolution
 Virtually instantaneous switching time
 No drift/no calibration
 Excellent spectral quality
 Simple interface via PC printer port"
 
The following is music to my eyes (Wha?...Dhoh!):
"...there is no reason why an appropriately programmed single chip
 microcomputer (such as a Motorola '68705 or Intel '8051) couldn't
 replace the PC for those who object to having to drag around a
 large, bulky *Homer-mungous* PC just to drive a tiny little board.
 With a single chip microcomputer, an entire HF rig could be made
 to fit into a shirt-pocket-sized package!"

A circuit board can be obtained for $25 U.S. from:

Bruce Hodgkinson, VE3JIL
Box 232
Pakenham, Ontario, CANADA K0A 2X0
Phone: (613) 624-5247

A wired and tested 33-MHz chip system can be obtained from stock or 
within a week for $120+$5.00 S&H. A wired and tested 40-MHz chip 
system waits up to 8 weeks for availability of chips, and costs
$135+$5.00 S&H. Bruce told me that the 33-MHz chips he tested
worked fine at 40-MHz. It seems Harris is very conservative in 
their chip ratings.

Of course, nobody would use these DDS boards for direct-sequence, 
frequency-hopping, time-hopping, plus chaos-transmitted-reference
hybrid spread-spectrum transmitters to achieve signal hiding and
interference rejection. Nope. Last thing on MY mind.
 
Haa ha ha ha... eat flaming death statist scum! You are all doomed!
 
Kent aka WA6ZFY - <jkhastings@aol.com>







From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Brian D Williams <talon57@well.sf.ca.us>
Date: Wed, 25 Aug 93 14:32:12 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: INFO: smoking gun?
Message-ID: <93Aug25.142818pdt.13935-2@well.sf.ca.us>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain




 "According to sources at the National Security Agency, on the
morning of July 13, 1982, the NSA had intercepted commercial
communications from the Washington office of Mitsubishi to the
Japanese Foreign Ministry in Tokyo. The NSA monitors fifty-three
thousand communication signals in the United States every day. They
usually aren't reviewed by analysts, however, unless the signal
carries a message with a signature-a key word or phrase that
triggers a computer to transcribe the communication. Any word that
might signal confidential or classified government information
triggers the transcribing system."

  from Friendly spies, page 90.


  looks like a smoking gun to me......



                                                 Brian Williams
                                                 Cypherpatriot







From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: M..Stirner@f28.n125.z1.FIDONET.ORG (M. Stirner)
Date: Wed, 25 Aug 93 16:32:14 PDT
To: Cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: "more money than brains?"
Message-ID: <2091.2C7BE7E4@shelter.FIDONET.ORG>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


 Uu> From: cdodhner@indirect.com ("Christian D. Odhner")

 > ViaCrypt PGP will be available in the USA and Canada, for an introductory
 > price of $100...for a single user
                         ^^^^^^
 Uu> Ok, I just spoke with Dave somebody at viacrypt, and he told me that
 Uu> the ViaCrypt PGP would be based on PGP 2.3a, and the only code changed
 Uu> would be the lines implementing rsa itself.
 ...
 Uu> improvements were made to ViaCrypt PGP, the same improvements would be
 Uu> made to the freeware version. I was thinking that if a bunch of us
 Uu> cypherpunks wanted copys we could order them...

Only one question:  WHY?  If PGP is freeware for noncommercial single
users, why on earth would anyone wish to drop $100 +/- for single-user
rights to a virtually identical program?

The mind boggles.  I know that the principal Cypherpunks are rich, but
I'm sure they could find more worthy charities than ViaCrypt...like
getting me a new modem, for example...

*********************************************************************
* <m..stirner@f28.n125.z1.fidonet.org> - PGP Key D30909 via servers *
* > What country can preserve its liberties if its rulers are not  <*
* > warned from time to time that their people preserve the spirit <*
* > of resistance?  Let them take arms!" - Thomas Jefferson, 1787  <*
*********************************************************************


___ Blue Wave/QWK v2.12
--  
M. Stirner - via FidoNet node 1:125/1
UUCP: ...!uunet!kumr!shelter!28!M..Stirner
INTERNET: M..Stirner@f28.n125.z1.FIDONET.ORG




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Mike Rose <mrose@stsci.edu>
Date: Wed, 25 Aug 93 12:57:39 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: reading mail with gnus
Message-ID: <9308251956.AA13519@MARIAN.STSCI.EDU>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I'd like to start reading cypherpunks mail with gnus, and continue
reading my other mail with rmail.  Is this possible?  I'm running
emacs 19.19; I know there were patches for an earlier gnus that
supported this, but I don't know if they work with the emacs 19 gnus.

Thanks,

Mike




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Andy Wilson <ajw@Think.COM>
Date: Wed, 25 Aug 93 13:05:40 PDT
To: strick@versant.com
Subject: Visa, HNC Inc. develop neural network as a weapon to fight fraud
In-Reply-To: <9308251540.AA19232@versant.com>
Message-ID: <9308252001.AA14017@custard.think.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


   Date: Wed, 25 Aug 93 08:37:07 -0700
   From: strick -- henry strickland <strick@versant.com>

   Extracted from "FC NEWSBYTES 1.3", David Geddes <dgeddes@NETCOM.COM> Editor,
	   where FC = FutureCulture mailing list <FUTUREC-request@UAFSYSB.UARK.EDU>.    strick
   ____________________________________________ _ _..........
   B Y T E 4:

   Visa, HNC Inc. develop neural network as a weapon to fight fraud
   SAN FRANCISCO (AUG. 10) PR NEWSWIRE - Visa International and HNC Inc. have
   announced a strategic agreement to develop a comprehensive merchant risk
   detection system.  The new system will be designed to better control fraud at
   the merchant level by determining the risk associated with individual card
   transactions.

For those who are not familiar with the details of neural networks,  I
thought I would point out that this represents a departure from the 
current notion of a credit rating in two ways:

1) There is no clear way to fix your "neural credit rating" if there
   is a problem.

The neural network program which predicts the probability of fraud will
give its guess as to the probability of fraud.  If you are a cardholder
and it predicts that a transaction is likely to be fraudulent,  then
your purchase won't be accepted.  But,  unlike conventional credit reporting
firms which use a credit report,  the neural network cannot explain
anything about how it came to its decision.  With existing credit reporting
schemes,  you at least have the option of acquiring your credit report and
taking the necessary steps to repair your credit rating if there is a
problem.  With the use of neural networks,  this is no longer possible.

Given the current state of neural network research,  a percentage of the 
rejections will be false.  This means that a number of card users will be 
denied service for no other reason than the fact that neural networks make 
mistakes.

2) You are no longer judged on your own actions,  but on the similarity
   of your purchasing patterns with those who have committed fraudulent acts.

Instead of being judged on your trustworthiness based on your past actions,
you will be judged based on whether people whose purchasing profiles are
similar to yours are trustworthy.  An example of this being problematic
is say you purchase a particular CD and the neural network decides that,
partly based on this and partly on other information,  that you won't
pay your bill because most of the people in the database who bought that
CD didn't pay their bills.

Andy





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Paul Goggin <chaos@aql.gatech.edu>
Date: Wed, 25 Aug 93 13:12:11 PDT
To: cdodhner@indirect.com
Subject: Commerical PGP
Message-ID: <9308252010.AA17861@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Chris,

I would be interested in going in on a group purchase of this product. However,
there is one main question on my mind: Unless they provide the source code, how
do we know these are the only lines changed within PGP 2.3A?

Paul
--
R  O    All Comments Copyright by  | Technofetisht
 A  N     Paul S. Goggin (1993)    | Cypher, Cyber, Chaos              
  V        Information Broker      | Ergoflux, Interzone
   E      chaos@aql.gatech.edu     | Carpe Diem: Stop the Clipper wiretap chip 
Finger account for latest _Phrack_ | Public Key: PGP and RIPEM available
      For anonymous communication:---> anonymus+4744@charcoal.com
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Title 18 USC 2511 and 18 USC 2703 Protected -- Monitoring Absolutely Forbidden




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Peter Wayner <pcw@access.digex.net>
Date: Wed, 25 Aug 93 13:17:11 PDT
To: ajw@Think.COM
Subject: Re:  Visa, HNC Inc. develop neural network as a weapon to fight fraud
Message-ID: <199308252015.AA24986@access.digex.net>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



My impression is that the companies will use the Neural Network
to detect strange spending habits. For instance, a friend with
an American Express card had a strange occurance when he was on
a business trip. His spending was way up and when he tried to make
a purchase, the card reader said, "Dial Amex." The clerk did and
the friend found himself talking to an Amex representative. They
said, "We've noticed that you've had more purchases than usual lately
and we just wanted to check in to see if you're who you say you are."
I think they asked him his mother's maiden name or something like that.

In the end, he felt that this intruision was a feature and touted it
to me as a great reason to get an Amex card. All these guys are out
there protecting you. 

Privacy advocates might have a different opinion. 

-Peter




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Timothy Newsham <newsham@wiliki.eng.hawaii.edu>
Date: Wed, 25 Aug 93 20:12:18 PDT
To: cdodhner@indirect.com (Christian D. Odhner)
Subject: Re: Source Code NOT available for ViaCrypt PGP
In-Reply-To: <199308260150.AA01716@indirect.com>
Message-ID: <9308260309.AA19952@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> 
> I talked once again with Dave Barnheart at ViaCrypt, and he told me:
> 	A) No source code will be available, due to the nature of the
> agreement between PKP and ViaCrypt.
> 
> But look on the bright side... 
> 
> 	This will blow David Sternlight out of the water!

will it?
the NSA seems to be pretty happy with the way PKP handles things.
PKP has an arangement with viacrypt not to release source.
It might be safe, but I wouldnt trust it given the way that
the NSA pushes commerce to install backdoors in strong encryption.

> Happy Hunting, -Simon Trask
> <cdodhner@indirect.com>
> PGP public key available upon request.


btw,  how did they get around PKP's rule about using the 
interface provided which uses DES ?




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: b44729@achilles.ctd.anl.gov (Samuel Pigg)
Date: Wed, 25 Aug 93 15:42:14 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: INFO: smoking gun?
In-Reply-To: <93Aug25.142818pdt.13935-2@well.sf.ca.us>
Message-ID: <9308252241.AA00104@achilles.ctd.anl.gov>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


   From: Brian D Williams <talon57@well.sf.ca.us>
   Date: 	Wed, 25 Aug 1993 14:28:12 -0700



    "According to sources at the National Security Agency, on the
   morning of July 13, 1982, the NSA had intercepted commercial
   communications from the Washington office of Mitsubishi to the
   Japanese Foreign Ministry in Tokyo. The NSA monitors fifty-three
   thousand communication signals in the United States every day. They


I haven't had a chance to read the book, but is this referring to the
*supposed* "project harvest"? (a supposed NSA project to automate the
wiretapping and flagging of phone conversations by voice-recognition
software (ie key words trigger conversations being bumped to human
listeners.))

   usually aren't reviewed by analysts, however, unless the signal
   carries a message with a signature-a key word or phrase that
   triggers a computer to transcribe the communication. Any word that
   might signal confidential or classified government information
   triggers the transcribing system."

     from Friendly spies, page 90.


     looks like a smoking gun to me......


(for all I know this is mere paranoia (the "project harvest") so no flames
about the obvious "fringe factor" involved here. Just wanting to know if the
book "Friendly Spies" (unavailable in my university library as of yet) 
mentions this.)
-Sam




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: szabo@netcom.com (Nick Szabo)
Date: Wed, 25 Aug 93 17:52:15 PDT
To: M..Stirner@f28.n125.z1.FIDONET.ORG (M. Stirner)
Subject: Re: "more money than brains?"
In-Reply-To: <2091.2C7BE7E4@shelter.FIDONET.ORG>
Message-ID: <9308260048.AA12637@netcom4.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



M. Stirner: 
> Only one question:  WHY?  If PGP is freeware for noncommercial single
> users, why on earth would anyone wish to drop $100 +/- for single-user
> rights to a virtually identical program?

There are several business proposals floating around the cypherpunks
community that would require commercial licenses.  I encourage the
various crypto-entrepreneurs elaborate if they wish.  

Some of the proposals are quite interesting and illuminating.
There's a strong habit of keeping business ideas "trade secret", 
which can be a bad idea, since (a) many of the ideas
are obvious; trade secrets only work for subtle but important
technological bottlenecks known to a small group of mutually
trustworthy people, and (b) many of the ideas need to
debugged by a wide variety of crackers and experts before they will
provid good privacy.  Trade secrets also inhibit the progress
of the cypherpunks agenda, but that's a judgement call; I myself
dont' feel morally bound to Reveal All for the sake of the 
Movement.  But, "I'll post mine if you post yours".

Nick Szabo					szabo@netcom.com




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Christian D. Odhner" <cdodhner@indirect.com>
Date: Wed, 25 Aug 93 18:52:45 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Source Code NOT available for ViaCrypt PGP
Message-ID: <199308260150.AA01716@indirect.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I talked once again with Dave Barnheart at ViaCrypt, and he told me:

	A) No source code will be available, due to the nature of the
agreement between PKP and ViaCrypt.
	B) He is under 'a lot' of pressure to have a product 'on the
shelves in under two months', and therefore the first release will be a
MS-DOS version, then Macintosh, SVR4, SUN OS, and all of those unix
versions, and that they will eventualy put out a windows product and start
makeing improvements to the actual product.
	
So in answer to (Paul Goggin's?) questions about verification of changes,
"We'll Just Have To Trust Them(tm)" <g> 

But look on the bright side... 

	This will blow David Sternlight out of the water!

Happy Hunting, -Simon Trask
<cdodhner@indirect.com>
PGP public key available upon request.





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Andy Wilson <ajw@Think.COM>
Date: Wed, 25 Aug 93 15:52:13 PDT
To: bill@twwells.com
Subject: Visa, HNC Inc. develop neural network as a weapon to fight fraud
In-Reply-To: <CCC2Iu.7ny@twwells.com>
Message-ID: <9308252250.AA17771@custard.think.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


   From: bill@twwells.com (T. William Wells)
   Date: Wed, 25 Aug 1993 21:04:05 GMT

   In article <9308252001.AA14017@custard.think.com>,
   Andy Wilson <ajw@Think.COM> wrote:
   : [mostly bogus stuff]

   That is irrelevant to cypherpunks, as I understand the list.

The prospect of the impossibility of anonymity and the uses
to which personal information is made in a cashless economy is 
not relevant?  I beg to differ.  This is exactly what digital
cash is meant to prevent.

   There is no technology, including that of privacy, that cannot be
   used for ill. We don't know how they're going to be using the
   neural network. They could, as was suggested, abandon their minds
   and and rely on the neural net. I don't think they will because
   doing so would be a really bad business decision. Furthermore, on
   the evidence, the neural network output will only be used as one
   datum in a process involving many inputs and a human making the
   final decision. Finally, in the examples I'm familiar with (from
   reading AI Expert), when a neural net is used as a decision
   element, precisely because of its error rate, the decision isn't
   "go/no go" but "go/refer the problem to a human".

The problem with referring a neural network's decision to a human
is that the neural network gives no information other than the 
probability of fraud.  It does not tell the human why it determined
the transaction was likely to be flawed,  like a system based on 
rules or case-based reasoning would be able to do.  There is not any 
good way to combine the judgement of the neural net with that of a
human for that reason.

With respect,  I have found AI Expert to consist more of marketing
hype than correct and useful information on artificial intelligence 
technology.

Andy








From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: bill@twwells.com (T. William Wells)
Date: Wed, 25 Aug 93 14:27:41 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Visa, HNC Inc. develop neural network as a weapon to fight fraud
In-Reply-To: <9308252001.AA14017@custard.think.com>
Message-ID: <CCC2Iu.7ny@twwells.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


In article <9308252001.AA14017@custard.think.com>,
Andy Wilson <ajw@Think.COM> wrote:
: [mostly bogus stuff]

That is irrelevant to cypherpunks, as I understand the list.

There is no technology, including that of privacy, that cannot be
used for ill. We don't know how they're going to be using the
neural network. They could, as was suggested, abandon their minds
and and rely on the neural net. I don't think they will because
doing so would be a really bad business decision. Furthermore, on
the evidence, the neural network output will only be used as one
datum in a process involving many inputs and a human making the
final decision. Finally, in the examples I'm familiar with (from
reading AI Expert), when a neural net is used as a decision
element, precisely because of its error rate, the decision isn't
"go/no go" but "go/refer the problem to a human".





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: fergp@sytex.com (Paul Ferguson)
Date: Fri, 27 Aug 93 18:42:58 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Cisco vulnerabilities?
Message-ID: <Jk8u9B3w165w@sytex.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


On Thu, 26 Aug 93 21:17:16 -0600,
 L. Detweiler <uunet!longs.lance.colostate.edu!ld231782> wrote -
 
> ===cut=here===
>
> Date: Wed, 25 Aug 1993 12:56:54 -0700 (PDT)
> From: Al Whaley <Al.Whaley@sunnyside.com>
> Subject: Cisco routers
>
> Rumors abound that Cisco routers have a back door; that is when
> a TCP port is disabled, it can still be accessed from Cisco's
> IP number.
>
> I have personally verified this with the sendmail port.
>
> Al Whaley        al@sunnyside.com       +1-415 322-5411(Tel), -6481 
(Fax)
> Sunnyside Computing, Inc., PO Box 60, Palo Alto, CA 94302
>
 
 Sure, they have a backdoor -- it's called unsecured ports and
 lackidaisical security.
 
 Cisco routers don't really have "TCP" ports, per se. They have
 ethernet ports, or token ring ports, v.35 serial ports, and
 dial-up rs-232 for fail-safe configuration when some idiot drops
 your feed at the local rboc and you need to "look into" your net.
 
 If the "entrance" passwords are enabled properly, then I feel quite
 sure that this threat is minimal. However, I have learned recently
 that some facets of SNMP encapsulation can exploit _management_ but
 can not, however exploit the configuration of the router. It can add
 to the traffic overhead.
 
 Also, there is an additional "enable" password for configuration
 modification, such as changing IP addresses of the ethernet or serial
 interfaces (ports) and saving the configuration to NVRAM.
 
 I had a guy adamantly try to convince me the other day that the
 (Cisco) routers were in jeopardy because of the ability to TFTP
 a new (albeit, damaging) operating system directly into NVRAM
 (a sleight of hand), rendering the box useless. It can be done,
 in fact, Cisco would have to ship me a whole new box overnight
 if it happened, but if I mind my P's and Q's (read: adhere to
 proper security), he's pissin' in the wind.
 
 ;-)
 
 Cheers,

Paul Ferguson               |  "Government, even in its best state,
Network Integrator          |   is but a necessary evil; in its worst
Centreville, Virginia USA   |   state, an intolerable one."
fergp@sytex.com             |      - Thomas Paine, Common Sense
 
Type bits/keyID   Date       User ID
pub  1024/1CC04D 1993/03/15  Paul Ferguson <fergp@sytex.com>
  Key fingerprint =  EE D2 93 7D 04 6D C6 05  AC 36 AD 9D 8E 4F 41 58




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: fergp@sytex.com (Paul Ferguson)
Date: Fri, 27 Aug 93 18:43:27 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Physical security lapses will getcha every time.
Message-ID: <ym8u9B4w165w@sytex.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
 
On Fri, 27 Aug 1993 01:46:57 -0400 (EDT),
 Mike Ingle <uunet!delphi.com!MIKEINGLE> wrote -
 
> The most likely place for a bug would be in the randomness.
> I suppose it is possible that a one-line bug somewhere could
> leave out most of the randomness, making the keys still look
> random but actually be predictable. Random number generation
> is hard to verify. How has that in PGP been checked? The PGP
> source is so big and spread out, it's hard to check. I don't
> think there is a bug, but it would be nice if PGP were
> carefully examined and attacked. Where are these rumors
> coming from? They are bad for the cause.
 
Let's be realistic, Mike.
 
The biggest threat to any security, on any basis, is the threat of
human nature. The chances of someone factoring your PGP encoded
message is somewhere in the range of slim-to-none, but the chances
of someone (you) -physically- compromising their key is much, much
higher.
 
In fact, I'd venture to say that it's much higher than even you or I
imagine, given the fact that some folks ignore what most of us would
deem common sense and use PGP on a multi-user system (such as a SUN
server, any other UNIX-flavored workstation, or even a Netware
server).
 
Fact Two: That's why you won't see messages from me either (a.)
signed with PGP, or (b.) encrypted with PGP from any of my other
e-mail accounts. All are UNIX (open) environments and I don't like
the implications of the possibilities of my secret key being exposed,
even if I do trust the folks I work with. Call me a schizoid.
 
Cheers,
 
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.3a
 
iQCVAgUBLH6FrJRLcZSdHMBNAQEs1AP8D3ve8oRYIT4/Lne3LYY9xZWkghZFQyhH
CcCdFhHfAyXeAnz6puIpSN+9zior4/W9pcgxK/EdcCt72hMOzTYQvWtFZVIE0nQA
Fn+a5FkUwCLhvfiIqCSPvBjG8UvBt2RTuv7GN0IiIfMwzCeAkB9MTkoNQut48DGU
thDLDXfnRxs=
=0v11
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

Paul Ferguson               |  "Government, even in its best state,
Network Integrator          |   is but a necessary evil; in its worst
Centreville, Virginia USA   |   state, an intolerable one."
fergp@sytex.com             |      - Thomas Paine, Common Sense
 
Type bits/keyID   Date       User ID
pub  1024/1CC04D 1993/03/15  Paul Ferguson <fergp@sytex.com>
  Key fingerprint =  EE D2 93 7D 04 6D C6 05  AC 36 AD 9D 8E 4F 41 58




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: plmoses@unix.cc.emory.edu (Paul L. Moses)
Date: Wed, 25 Aug 93 19:25:41 PDT
To: hnash@mason1.gmu.edu
Subject: Re:  Digital Coin Claim
Message-ID: <9308260224.AA10068@emoryu1.cc.emory.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


The idea of Digital Gold, here, now seems to include a Chain of Title dimension.
The idea that successive owners need to "record" the transfer from the previous
owner just completely *baffles* me.  A bearer instrument is payable to WHOEVER IS
HOLDING IT.  There are no title searches done on coins used in everyday commerce.
What "hnash" proposes is probably do-able, but currency does not operate this way.
On the other  hand, this is exactly what you do with Real Property.  

I think that creating a chain of title for digicoins would defeat the whole purpose
of the exercise.  Creating a history of ownership is done in order to increase
accountability, not privacy.  And such a history is necessary only to clarify 
disputes over ownership, liens, defects....things which are simply not problems 
with currency and bearer instruments.

The question is, what is the end to which this chain of title is being put?  To 
verify that the holder is a "valid" holder?  THIS IS IRRELEVANT.  He who holds,
owns.  A safeguard MAY be introduced (such as a PIN) for public policy and 
convenience (ie people will not be scared of armed robbery), but it is a secondary
measure.  

The digicoin is by definition (and purpose) SELF-AUTHENTICATING.  Any computer magic
here will only be the electronic equivalent of the red and blue fibers in the dollar
bill paper, the seals, the complex designs and colors of other currencies, etc.
Otherwise you don't have money.

- Paul




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "L. Detweiler" <ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Date: Wed, 25 Aug 93 21:37:47 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: AT&T & cable co. `internet for the masses' product announcements
Message-ID: <9308260436.AA17507@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Two announcements on products that will bring internet to large
audiences. One by Continental Cablevision Inc. The cable line one
apparently uses special coaxial cable modems, and apparently is
full-duplex (?). On front page of today's Wall St. Journal.

Following that, AT&T announces the Interspan `Frame Relay Services and
Information Access Services' to the internet. In the former, one gets
`cost-effective' internet capabilities, in the later 

``current Interspan customers and all global Internet users will be
able to subscribe to the full range of messaging services from AT&T
EasyLink Services including electronic mail, text-to-fax delivery and
telex, and will be able to communicate with subscribers of non-Internet
commercial network services worldwide.''

Access through current connections with new `virtual circuit' or by
anyone at 300-14.4 bps in nationwide, toll free, seven digit number
950-1ATT, also an 800 number.

Also, customers can register in an AT&T database for the DNS system
with company names. Also, access to InterNic directory (hm, I wonder if
that was built in preparation & anticipation of this).

then stuff on the current EasyLink: 160 countries, electronic messages
with data interchange, gateways from LANs, email, enhanced fax, etc.

The critical question underlying all these services -- when will it be
the case that a completely cyberspatial company is erected, free of
harassment by archaic `internet acceptable use policies'?

===cut=here===


From: cook@path.net (Gordon Cook)
Date: Tue, 24 Aug 1993 17:41:51 GMT

>From today's Wall St. Journal

"Cable Company is Set to Plug into Internet

Cable Television will connect to the Internet, information pathway to millions
of personal computer users world-wide, early next year through direct link up
via Continental Cablevision Inc., one of the nation's largest cable operators.

The service, which could greatly alter delivery of electronic information,
would allow Continental's customers to plug PCs and a special modem directly
into Continental's cable lines, said William Schrader, President of
Performance Systems, a Herndon, VA. network services company that is
Continental's partner in the project.

The cable link would by pass local phone and other special hookups to access
the internet directly.  More significantly it would allow customers . . . to
fetch whole kinds of information. . . at information superhighway speeds - as
fast as 10 million bits per second. . . . Mr Schrader said. . . . . "This
isn't some fluffy pie-in-the-sky vision," said David Fellows, a senior vice
president at Continental.  Added Mr. Schrader:  "Other companies such as Time
Warner inc in Orlando are talking about elaborate multimedia service tests.
But our plan is small simple and easy.  This will work."

But while the new service holds much promise, no one is sure what the customer
demand will be, especially at an estimated cost of $70 to $100 a month. . . .
[Comment by G COOK  Here the Journal gets confused.  It seems to assume that
the audience for this service is the same as for prodigy or for CATV home
entertainment.  NOT TRUE!  The audience will be telecommuters, individual
entrepreneurs, and small businessmen with their own LANs, and K-12 school
districts, and local governments for whom $100 a month would be about 20% of
what they would have to pay for equivalent service over regular internet RBOC
phone access channnels.]

Performance Systems, which provides a means for customers to hook up to the
internet system , plans to install computer routers in the continental
network. . . . The routers will be installed in the main hubs or "head end"
facilities in continental's vast network, allowing easy extension of the new
internet service to homes and businesses tethered to the cable company.  For
the customer's home or business computer Performance Systems will provide a
special computer modem to reach the service.

The two companies plan to announce the service today at an industry trade show
in San Francisco.  The first hookups are scheduled to take place in Cambridge
Mass where Continental has many subscribers connected to Harvard University
and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology."

The rest of the article is plain vanilla what is the internet all about.  This
seems to me to be an extremely significant announcement that
does not bode well for the RBOCs.  I'd expect to see the rest of IP commercial
service providers running hard to jump on the band wagon.

_______________________________________________________________
Gordon Cook, Editor Publisher:  COOK Report on Internet -> NREN
431 Greenway Ave, Ewing, NJ 08618
cook@path.net                                   (609) 882-2572
Ask about my 15,000 word, $250, CATV vs. Telco's Internet & NII Study
_______________________________________________________________

===cut=here===

Date: Tue, 24 Aug 1993 18:04:27 -0500
From: farber@central.cis.upenn.edu (David Farber)
Subject: rather PRey but still -- AT&T Announces New Internet Connectivity Options 


FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE:  Tuesday, August 24, 1993 


            AT&T Announces New Internet Connectivity Options 

        BASKING RIDGE, N.J -- AT&T today announced new options that will
provide a single-vendor solution for accessing both the global Internet
and enhanced messaging services.  These new options will be available in
the first quarter of 1994 to customers of AT&T InterSpan (R) Services,
AT&T EasyLink Services and the millions of people worldwide who use the
Internet.
        There will be new connections to the Internet from AT&T InterSpan
Frame Relay Services and Information Access Services.  There also will
be new connections from AT&T EasyLink Services to the Internet through
AT&T InterSpan Services.
        Customers of InterSpan Services will gain a variety of convenient,
cost-effective options to access the global Internet.  At the same time,
InterSpan customers and all global Internet users will be able to
subscribe to the full range of messaging services from AT&T EasyLink
Services including electronic mail, text-to-fax delivery and telex, and
will be able to communicate with subscribers of non-Internet commercial
network services worldwide.
          AT&T InterSpan Frame Relay Service customers will have access
to the Internet by simply adding a single permanent virtual circuit to
their existing connections.
        Similarly, InterSpan Information Access Service customers will
be able to access the Internet at speeds ranging from 300 - 14400 bps
with a nationwide toll-free, seven-digit number (950-1ATT).
        "Increasingly, organizations need to reach beyond their own
boundaries to access the information and computing resources they need,"
said Jayne Fitzgerald, product line director, InterSpan Data
Communications Services.  "With these new options, our customers will
have the opportunity to simplify their premises equipment needs and
vendor interface requirements, as well as streamline their network
management issues."
        For customers of AT&T EasyLink Services, who already have
access to the global Internet, the new connections will mean improved
reliability and performance for their Internet communications.
        "More and more people, including AT&T customers, want to have
the option to communicate on the global Internet," said Sal Noto,
product management vice president, AT&T EasyLink Services.  "In
providing that option, we're increasing the ease with which millions
of people can access each other as well as the information they want
and need."
         The new AT&T options will include a naming service based
on the Domain Name System (DNS), a widely used method for naming and
translating addresses on the Internet.  With this service, AT&T customers
will be able to register an Internet name of their choice--one that
reflects their corporate identity, for example--and use that name for
their communication on the Internet.  AT&T also will offer to assist
customers with selection, registration and maintenance of their names
on the Internet.
        All of the new AT&T Internet connectivity options will support
TCP/IP (Transmission Control Protocol/ Internet Protocol), the primary
method for transferring information across various networks on the
Internet.
        Customers of the new Internet connectivity options will be able
to tap into the InterNic directory and database services.  Provided by
AT&T since April under a cooperative agreement with the National Science
Foundation, these services make it easier for all Internet users to find
available Internet resources. 
       AT&T InterSpan Frame Relay Service and InterSpan Information
Access Service are members of a comprehensive new family of high-quality,
innovative data connectivity solutions designed to make it easier
to link people, locations and information.  The InterSpan Services
facilitate faster, more efficient distributed computing for business
through customized data services flexible enough to change and grow
as a company evolves.
        AT&T EasyLink Services serves more than 160 countries and has
sales and support offices in three dozen countries.  AT&T EasyLink
Services offers one of the broadest arrays of electronic messaging
services in the market, including electronic data interchange, gateways
from LAN-based e-mail systems and telex, in addition to electronic mail,
enhanced fax and information services. 

                            # # # 

Editors' notes: 

The global Internet is a system of approximately 14,000 interconnected
data networks, reaching more than 100 countries and serving commercial 
organizations, research organizations, governments and universities.
By the end of 1993, more than 2 million computers, terminals and other
devices will be accessible on the Internet. 

950 access is currently available in 90% of the U.S. market.  Where 950
access is not available and as back-up, an 800 number is provided. 


                            # # # 





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: plmoses@unix.cc.emory.edu (Paul L. Moses)
Date: Wed, 25 Aug 93 20:02:17 PDT
To: plmoses@unix.cc.emory.edu
Subject: Re:  Digital Coin Claim
Message-ID: <9308260256.AA14390@emoryu1.cc.emory.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Clarification 1) unix munched out on some text.  Para 2:  "such a history is necessary
only to clarify with currency and bearer instruments disputes over
ownership....arg try again now
"to clarify disputes over ownership, liens, and defects - things which are
simply not problems with bearer instruments"

Clarification 2)  Digicoins may differ from ordinary currency in being revocable,
but this is not necessary.  That is, X loses his digicoin.  Y finds it and uses it.
Just like money.  OR:  X loses his digicoin.  Y finds it but cannot use it b/c Y
does not know the PIN.  OR:  X loses his digicoin.  Y could use the digicoin, but
X calls the issuing bank and they cancel the digicoin number.  
	In the last scenario, the one most compatible with the 'chain of title'
or verification-type approach, there is clearly a major privacy problem.

At least this is the way I see it...




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: cjl@micro.med.cornell.edu (Chris Leonard)
Date: Wed, 25 Aug 93 20:17:17 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Viacrypt PGP source code unavailable
Message-ID: <9308260315.AA07283@ micro.med.cornell.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>I talked once again with Dave Barnheart at ViaCrypt, and he told me:
>
>	A) No source code will be available, due to the nature of the
>agreement between PKP and ViaCrypt.
>
>So in answer to (Paul Goggin's?) questions about verification of changes,
>"We'll Just Have To Trust Them(tm)" <g> 

PUBLIC NOTICE:  The question below reflects the curiosity of a cryptologically,
and mathematically, fairly naive user of PGP.

Isn't there some way to black box it the way engineers do with circuits?

If you control the inputs, randseed, message, keys etc. that goes into each
copy of the program aren't you going to be able to compare the outputs
directly.  Or are they going to be different everytime because of some 
randomization I am unaware of?  remember the naive part :-)  

You may not be able to break PGP with a plaintext attack, but all you really
need to know is that the output of the unsourced VIACrypt gives the same result
as the freeware, don't you?

Awaiting enlightenment, 
please be gentle it's my first time :-}


C. J. Leonard  <cjl@micro.med.cornell.edu




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "L. Detweiler" <ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Date: Wed, 25 Aug 93 22:17:48 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Thoughts on Posting to the List
Message-ID: <9308260516.AA17960@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


The topic of secrecy in development of various cypherpunk pet projects
has been raised peripherally before by G. Toal and szabo@netcom.com
(Nick Szabo) brings it up explicitly:

>There are several business proposals floating around the cypherpunks
>community that would require commercial licenses.  I encourage the
>various crypto-entrepreneurs elaborate if they wish.  
>Some of the proposals are quite interesting and illuminating.
>There's a strong habit of keeping business ideas "trade secret", 
>which can be a bad idea, [...]

I'd like to motivate anyone developing various projects to be candid in
describing their development. After all, there is enough room in areas
such as Digital Cash for the entire population. In publicizing your
efforts, you can unite with others who are developing similar ideas and
can point out weaknesses in approaches that may cost you dearly to
discover otherwise.

In fact, to be secretive about the development of critical projects is
extremely counterproductive from the point of view of the overall
movement. Only the NSA believes that it can (1) keep important
technology under wraps, (2) gain the upper hand in doing so.

To a large degree, this petty secrecy is probably inherent to the
Cypherpunk personality, one of those nagging glitches in the group
psyche that is continually tripping up true progress and prompting the
recent introspective meanderings about Cypherpunks Stalled.

However, in volunteering information about projects, I also recommend
that the author develop a thick skin and not be dissuaded by any
negative comments that attack the whole foundation of the proposal as
misguided. It is better to have written a program and toss it aside
than to have never written one at all.

===

Now, along totally opposite lines of *discouraging* postings to anyone
proposing digital cash ideas (or cryptographic ones in general) --
please, read at least *one* article on the subject in a magazine before
coming up with your own Digital Cash Scheme Supreme, which may look
rather naive and simpleminded in retrospect of further focused, serious
consideration. Minor criticisms aside, over almost a decade Chaum has
done an *excellent* job of putting together very solid and ingenious
systems, and in both articulating and accomplishing the critical goals
at stake. In fact, in reading his descriptions, one often has that
inescapable satisfaction that goes along with all great research and
discoveries, the vague feeling along the lines of `I wouldn't have
thought of that, but now that you point it out, it's obviously critical
and important'.

In particular, the two survey articles mentioned by H. Finney bear
repeating: Scientific American, Aug 1992 p. 96, and Communications of
the ACM, October 1985, p.1030.  The first is a rather `user friendly'
introduction that goes some detail on the `representative-observer'
relationship and the basics of blinding. The latter describes in much
more detail his three-tiered system for what might be called `social
privacy' (hinting at but still lacking most of the mathematics): dining
cryptographers protocol creating totally secure anonymity in
communication, the digital cash transaction that guarantees total
anonymity, and the idea of institutions granting `credentials' to allow
a person to develop and maintain reputations completely pseudonymously.
This is all very epochal work, perhaps only exceeded in importance by
public key cryptography in influencing vast new social and
technological infrastructures.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: hnash@mason1.gmu.edu
Date: Wed, 25 Aug 93 21:12:18 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Digital Gold or Digital Dirt?
Message-ID: <9308260407.AA08658@mason1.gmu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Dave Burns writes:
>2) Why should anyone value a digital gold coin in the first 
>place? Money has value because of people's expectation 
>(based on experience) that if they take it to a store they 
>can buy stuff with it. Where will digital gold obtain its 
>bootstrap value? Somebody has to start using it.

Good question.  At this point, we might call it "digital dirt" 
because no one values it at all.  The important thing is that a 
limited quantity of an informational substance exists.  
Therefore, if some community wants to begin using information as 
a medium of exchange, a suitable "virtual substance" exists.  

Furthermore, the fact that these tokens are not backed by any 
particular organization may be essential.  As I understand it, 
the US government prohibits its citizens from making private 
currencies that compete with the US dollar.  But it doesn't 
prohibit them from trading any currencies they like.  Therefore, 
as long as no-one guarantees digital gold (as long as its value 
is due only to convention), it should be legal.  

     Yours Truly, ][adon Nash






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: hnash@mason1.gmu.edu
Date: Wed, 25 Aug 93 21:12:47 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Digital Gold, a bearer instrument?
Message-ID: <9308260411.AA08724@mason1.gmu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Paul Moses writes:
>A bearer instrument is payable to WHOEVER IS HOLDING IT.  
>There are no title searches done on coins used in everyday 
>commerce. ...
>
>The question is, what is the end to which this chain of title 
>is being put?  To verify that the holder is a "valid" holder?  
>THIS IS IRRELEVANT.  He who holds, owns.  

These are fine questions.  Thanks for asking them.

The purpose I have in mind for the chain of titles is as a way 
of establishing ownership of something which consists *wholey of 
information*.  It is the closest approximation I can imagine to 
a bearer instrument for bearers who can have no physical 
contact.  

Please notice that the chain of titles is between *aliases* 
which do not reveal the identities of the people trading the 
coins.  Only the people engaged in particular transactions can 
associate particular people with particular digital coins.  Who 
owns digital coin #1?  (It might be me, but it has already been 
transfered to a new alias once.)

The chain of titles I have proposed does not increase 
accountability.  The public cannot determine where the money is 
being spent, they can only determine the aliases which 
anonymously identify the latest owners.  This is the bear 
minimum information that could make a peice of information 
valuable to the members of a community.  

    Yours Truly, ][adon Nash






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: M..Stirner@f28.n125.z1.FIDONET.ORG (M. Stirner)
Date: Thu, 26 Aug 93 04:32:55 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: "more money than brai
Message-ID: <2112.2C7C984F@shelter.FIDONET.ORG>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



 Uu> From: bei@dogface.austin.tx.us (Bob Izenberg)

 # Only one question:  WHY?  If PGP is freeware for noncommercial
 single # users, why on earth would anyone wish to drop $100 +/- for
 single-user # rights to a virtually identical program?

 Uu> Dumb as it may sound, at work the people from Finance want to see that
 Uu> we've paid for all the software on our machines.

Yes, I've received several replies like yours, but note that company use
was not the question - I understand the "why" there, complete with all
the corporate shareware/freeware phobia - but the question was why a
_private single user_ would pay $100 for the honor of a licensed private
single-user release of a freeware program.  THAT doesn't make sense,
thus my question.
.   Conceivably, someone with assets (certainly not me, but I suppose
such people exist somewhere) might be worried about the sound & fury
emanating from PKP concerning lawsuits against all freeware PGP users,
but $100 is mighty high insurance against an event with that low of a
probability.

*********************************************************************
* <m..stirner@f28.n125.z1.fidonet.org> - PGP Key D30909 via servers *
* > What country can preserve its liberties if its rulers are not  <*
* > warned from time to time that their people preserve the spirit <*
* > of resistance?  Let them take arms!" - Thomas Jefferson, 1787  <*
*********************************************************************

___ Blue Wave/QWK v2.12
--  
M. Stirner - via FidoNet node 1:125/1
UUCP: ...!uunet!kumr!shelter!28!M..Stirner
INTERNET: M..Stirner@f28.n125.z1.FIDONET.ORG




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Marc Horowitz <marc@Athena.MIT.EDU>
Date: Wed, 25 Aug 93 21:32:18 PDT
To: Peter Wayner <pcw@access.digex.net>
Subject: Re: Visa, HNC Inc. develop neural network as a weapon to fight fraud
In-Reply-To: <199308252015.AA24986@access.digex.net>
Message-ID: <9308260427.AA01502@steve-dallas.MIT.EDU>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>> In the end, he felt that this intruision was a feature and touted it
>> to me as a great reason to get an Amex card. All these guys are out
>> there protecting you. 
>> 
>> Privacy advocates might have a different opinion. 

This topic came up in a side conversation at the Internet Mercantile
Protocols BOF at the last IETF.

We asked ourselves why credit card companies, banks, supermarkets,
etc. were so keen on selling information about us.  Not surprisingly,
it came down to money.  The AmEx example is a great one.  By noticing
patterns in my purchasing, they can try to notice a stolen card via a
change in purchasing patterns.  In the long run, this reduces my costs
as an AmEx cardholder (or increases their profits).  If I told them
not to keep my spending patterns, they might not notice if my card was
stolen and used.  The law says my personal liability is limited, but
AmEx has to cover its costs somehow, through their commission or
yearly fee or whatever.  Same goes for the supermarket reselling my
buying patterns.  If they can sell information about me, my groceries
are cheaper (or they make money).  Selling personal information is a
competitive advantage.  For most people, this is more important than
privacy.

People here have advocated setting up a Privacy Credit Union.  I think
this would be a great idea, but I think that its costs would be higher
than its competitors.  When it comes right down to it, privacy costs
money.  And, as antithetical as this may seem to us, many people will
opt for more money in their pocket than more privacy.  Cypherpunks
will bank at Privacy Trust, use their Privacy Visa card, and make
transactions via anonymous digital cash whenever they can.  But other
people, maybe even most people, will choose the higher interest rate
or the cheaper credit card.

We can create technologies, and maybe even infrastructure.  But we
can't make people use it.

My rant for the day :-)

		Marc




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: M..Stirner@f28.n125.z1.FIDONET.ORG (M. Stirner)
Date: Thu, 26 Aug 93 04:32:57 PDT
To: Cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: "more money than brai
Message-ID: <2111.2C7C984E@shelter.FIDONET.ORG>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



 Uu> From: szabo@netcom.com (Nick Szabo)

 > M. Stirner:
 > Only one question:  WHY?  If PGP is freeware for noncommercial single
 > users, why on earth would anyone wish to drop $100 +/- for single-user
 > rights to a virtually identical program?

 Uu> There are several business proposals floating around the cypherpunks
 Uu> community that would require commercial licenses.

Note that I was not speaking of commercial, but single-user licenses.

 Uu> I encourage the
 Uu> various crypto-entrepreneurs elaborate if they wish.
 Uu> Some of the proposals are quite interesting and illuminating.
 Uu> There's a strong habit of keeping business ideas "trade secret",
 Uu> which can be a bad idea, since (a) many of the ideas
 Uu> are obvious; trade secrets only work for subtle but important
 Uu> technological bottlenecks known to a small group of mutually
 Uu> trustworthy people, and (b) many of the ideas need to
 Uu> debugged by a wide variety of crackers and experts before they will
 Uu> provid good privacy.  Trade secrets also inhibit the progress
 Uu> of the cypherpunks agenda, but that's a judgement call; I myself
 Uu> dont' feel morally bound to Reveal All for the sake of the
 Uu> Movement.  But, "I'll post mine if you post yours".

I feel rather in the dark.  If you are going to say something, please
say it.  I had my circumlocution buffer filled by noon today by others
who beat you to the punch.  However, the mere mention of money makes my
cute little ears stand right up, assuming it's not in non-negotiable
digital gold coins, which niether my landlady nor the Arab bodega where
I buy my menudo will accept...
.   ~
.   M.

... "The good & the possible never seemed to coincide."Orwell
___ Blue Wave/QWK v2.12
--  
M. Stirner - via FidoNet node 1:125/1
UUCP: ...!uunet!kumr!shelter!28!M..Stirner
INTERNET: M..Stirner@f28.n125.z1.FIDONET.ORG




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: khijol!erc@apple.com (Ed Carp)
Date: Thu, 26 Aug 93 02:12:23 PDT
To: mbriceno@aol.com
Subject: Re: Source Code NOT available for ViaCrypt PGP
In-Reply-To: <9308260321.tn19240@aol.com>
Message-ID: <m0oVcTz-00023kC@khijol>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text


> >  B) He is under 'a lot' of pressure to have a product 'on the shelves
> > in under two months', and therefore the first release will be a
> > MS-DOS version, then Macintosh, SVR4, SUN OS, and all of those unix
> > versions, and that they will eventualy put out a windows product and
> > start makeing improvements to the actual product.
> 
> I can't help but wonder if the guy is feeling other pressures besides time
> pressures. Just thinking. I don't think that ViaCrypt will make much money of
> the people on this list.

I think he's trying to run ahead of Clipper and the resulting encryption ban.
Make a lot of $$$ from people by selling them soon-to-be-"useless" software.

What a scam...
-- 
Ed Carp, N7EKG			erc@apple.com			510/659-9560
                            anon-0001@khijol.uucp
If you want magic, let go of your armor.  Magic is so much stronger than
steel!        -- Richard Bach, "The Bridge Across Forever"



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: bill@twwells.com (T. William Wells)
Date: Wed, 25 Aug 93 19:12:17 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Visa, HNC Inc. develop neural network as a weapon to fight fraud
In-Reply-To: <9308252250.AA17771@custard.think.com>
Message-ID: <CCCEF6.9rz@twwells.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


In article <9308252250.AA17771@custard.think.com>,
Andy Wilson <ajw@Think.COM> wrote:
:    Andy Wilson <ajw@Think.COM> wrote:
:    : [mostly bogus stuff]
:
:    That is irrelevant to cypherpunks, as I understand the list.
:
: The prospect of the impossibility of anonymity and the uses
: to which personal information is made in a cashless economy is
: not relevant?

But that wasn't what you were writing about. You were writing
about bad business decisions, not violations of privacy.

For that matter, your notions on neural networks seem
contradictory. On the one hand, you complain about a violation of
privacy and on the other you complain that a neural network won't
tell you how it reached its conclusions!

:                I beg to differ.  This is exactly what digital
: cash is meant to prevent.

Digital cash and the use of neural networks to authenticate
transactions are essentially orthogonal issues.

: The problem with referring a neural network's decision to a human
: is that the neural network gives no information other than the
: probability of fraud.

1) This statement is false. It is true of some neural networks
   but not all. We have no way of knowing whether their neural
   network is among those.

2) A problem with *any* decision system is that people may place
   an unsupportable weight on some particular piece of evidence.
   Your "problem" is not that (some) neural networks give answers
   that can't be interpreted but that some people will use their
   answers in an inappropriate way.

Blaming neural networks for bad *human* decision making is just
plain silly.

:                                                     There is not any
: good way to combine the judgement of the neural net with that of a
: human for that reason.

Nonsense. As the existence of rule based systems that incorporate
neural networks shows.

: With respect,  I have found AI Expert to consist more of marketing
: hype than correct and useful information on artificial intelligence
: technology.

Oh, goodie, an ad hominem argument.

But, as it happens, it is because AI Expert is so commercially
oriented that it is an appropriate reference. It speaks to how,
and why, AI gets deployed in business and that makes it just the
right place to go.





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: uri@watson.ibm.com
Date: Wed, 25 Aug 93 22:32:19 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com (cypherpunks)
Subject: Re: Viacrypt PGP source code unavailable
In-Reply-To: <9308260315.AA07283@ micro.med.cornell.edu>
Message-ID: <9308260527.AA19219@buoy.watson.ibm.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Chris Leonard says:
> >I talked once again with Dave Barnheart at ViaCrypt, and he told me:
> >	A) No source code will be available, due to the nature of the
> >agreement between PKP and ViaCrypt.

> Isn't there some way to black box it the way engineers do with circuits?
> If you control the inputs, randseed, message, keys etc. that goes into each
> copy of the program aren't you going to be able to compare the outputs
> directly.  Or are they going to be different everytime because of some
> randomization I am unaware of?  remember the naive part :-)

Frankly, I see no real problems so far. But several good things:

1) PKP is going to get some royalties, so they're happy.
   Does it mean they're going to leave freeware PGP alone?

2) Business users, who didn't dare to use PGP fearing lawsuits,
   can now buy it officially and use legally. A big step forward.

3) As long as ViaCrypt will release patches, so that freeware PGP can
   stay in sync with their product, compatibility isn't an issue...

4) It's not too hard to build a test-suite for PGP to ensure it's
   implementation of IDEA is correct, and it's possible to check
   it's key generation/session key generation things. Of course
   key management isn't too big a deal either... Thus I don't
   think it requires too great an effort to trust ViaCrypt.
   And if not - buy their copy to stay legal and use the
   Source to be safe (:-).

The only thing unclear to me yet is - what exactly is PKP going
to do (if anything) about freeware PGP in USA?
--
Regards,
Uri         uri@watson.ibm.com      scifi!angmar!uri 	N2RIU
-----------
<Disclamer>





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "George A. Gleason" <gg@well.sf.ca.us>
Date: Thu, 26 Aug 93 01:42:22 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Coming Soon:  Commercial version of PGP!
Message-ID: <93Aug26.013902pdt.14441-4@well.sf.ca.us>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


How soon before a Mac compatible version is available?  Or will the current
version run under Soft PC on the Mac, which is essentially a PC-emulator...?
If yes to either, sign me up...!

-gg@well.sf.ca.us




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "George A. Gleason" <gg@well.sf.ca.us>
Date: Thu, 26 Aug 93 02:02:22 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re:  Source Code NOT available for ViaCrypt PGP
Message-ID: <93Aug26.015906pdt.14440-4@well.sf.ca.us>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



What about the idea of having someone who is known trustworthy examine the
source code under nondisclosure?  A passing grade from a couple of the
respected members of the community here would be great for ViaCrypt's
promotional efforts, if nothing else...!

-gg




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: b44729@achilles.ctd.anl.gov (Samuel Pigg)
Date: Thu, 26 Aug 93 00:35:43 PDT
To: jthomas@mitre.org
Subject: Attacks on remailers
In-Reply-To: <199308251542.AA23719@mwunix.mitre.org>
Message-ID: <9308260733.AA26970@achilles.ctd.anl.gov>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>>>>> On Wed, 25 Aug 93 11:39:11 EDT, J_G_Thomas%CAASD1@mwmgate1.mitre.org said:

	Joe> Samuel Pigg <b44729@achilles.ctd.anl.gov> wrote:

> Actually what I was proposing was the direct usage of SMTP itself rather
> than going through the host machine's mail system. As anyone can do it,
> it would help with the usage of student accounts as remailers.
> And with direct SMTP (socket connections to port 25 of the receiving machine)
> you have some control over the header information that is generated.

> The protocol is outlined in RFC821 if anyone wants to look at it.

	Joe> The trouble is, one side (the receiver) is still keeping
	Joe> logs, since only sendmail (or some other root process
	Joe> doing the same job) can bind to port 25.  On most
	Joe> machines, that means logs.  There are plenty of ports
	Joe> over 1000 that user processes can bind to, and that
	Joe> cypherpunk remailers can support, if we want to go that
	Joe> way.  I think it's worth thinking about.  (This is in
	Joe> addition to receiving mail delivered normally to their
	Joe> e-mail adresses, probably either by port-25/sendmail or
	Joe> uucp).

	Joe> We could start by having cypherpunk remailers talk to
	Joe> _each_other_ on an agreed- upon, unlogged port, using RFC
	Joe> 821 protocol.  Final hops to non-remailer addresses will
	Joe> have to be handled on port 25, of course, but within the
	Joe> remailer web we can avoid sendmail logs entirely.  After
	Joe> that's implemented, we could talk about using a different
	Joe> protocol.

	Joe> A new protocol is probably the cleanest way to solve the
	Joe> problem of traffic analysis of messages addressed with
	Joe> encrypted address blocks.  The best way to get security
	Joe> in a remailer chain is to nest your encryption, so only
	Joe> one layer gets peeled off in each remailer hop.  That
	Joe> isn't possible with encrypted address blocks, since the
	Joe> sender will only know the address (and public key) of the
	Joe> first remailer in the chain.  All hops after the first
	Joe> one must send the same message out as they got in, with
	Joe> just a layer off the encrypted address block.  But if
	Joe> remailers talked to each other by first doing RSA-signed
	Joe> Diffie- Hellman key exchange, then encrypting the
	Joe> traffic, a packet snooper wouldn't be able to correlate
	Joe> incoming and outgoing messages.

	Joe> Thoughts?

I think this is probably the best solution proposed to date.

Does the RSA-signed DH key exchange mentioned above provide security
against possible spoofing on the remailer machine (someone else using the
agreed-upon port)? How exactly would such a thing be implemented?

	Joe> Joe (they're trying to pry me away from my NeXT, so don't
	Joe> reply directly to the From: line; use jthomas@mitre.org)

On the user side, I think a good tool to augment this would be a
mailer program which kept a list of the functioning remailers with
keys, and randomly selected a route through them using a random
(reasonable) number of hops, and performing the necessary nested
encryptions.  Then it could start the remailer hopping process via
special socket connection to the first remailer in the chain.

Perhaps a protocol could be worked out for the mailer program to
request from any one of the remailers a current list of the
functioning remailers? (in an effort to transparentize the process
some more, as manually maintaining a list of current remailers would
be tedious.)


We would need to work out the protocol details beforehand, such as how
to handle busy ports etc.
(Who wants to work on this project with me?)


Can someone supply a reference for DH key exchange? (for me, as I don't
know the details and so can't implement it. (is it patented?))

-Sam




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: mbriceno@aol.com
Date: Thu, 26 Aug 93 00:27:21 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Bank misbehavior (was: Re: No digital coins?)
Message-ID: <9308260321.tn19239@aol.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Greg Broiles writes:

> How easy IS it to start a credit union? Perhaps what we need is the
> People's Sekrit Privacy Credit Union! 1/2 :)

I would be ideal to start our own credit union. We  could make it a haven of
privacy and it would give us a base from which to implement digital cash.

So all you law wizards out there: How much starting capital do we legaly
need? What are the requirements?

--Marc




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: mbriceno@aol.com
Date: Thu, 26 Aug 93 00:27:50 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Source Code NOT available for ViaCrypt PGP
Message-ID: <9308260321.tn19240@aol.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Simon Trask writes:

>  A) No source code will be available, due to the nature of the
> agreement between PKP and ViaCrypt.

So we are supposed to trust it sight unseen?
Why in the world would anyone buy an encryption program of questionable
security --which any program for we can not get the source is-- when we can
get a supposedy virtually identical program that we know is secure for free? 

>  B) He is under 'a lot' of pressure to have a product 'on the shelves
> in under two months', and therefore the first release will be a
> MS-DOS version, then Macintosh, SVR4, SUN OS, and all of those unix
> versions, and that they will eventualy put out a windows product and
> start makeing improvements to the actual product.

I can't help but wonder if the guy is feeling other pressures besides time
pressures. Just thinking. I don't think that ViaCrypt will make much money of
the people on this list.

--Marc




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: remail@tamsun.tamu.edu
Date: Thu, 26 Aug 93 03:05:44 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: E-trade opinions (fwd)
Message-ID: <9308261003.AA12504@tamsun.tamu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Forwarded from misc.invest:

In article <476@complex.complex.is> frisk@complex.is (Fridrik Skulason) writes:

>Do you ever thing we will see something like E-trade on the Internet ?

They tell me that the Internet is not secure, so you would risk having
your password compromised.  But, yes, I assume that this will come
eventually.

>I would really like to see a service I could connect to using Telnet...as the
>services that are currently available are impractical for me - AOL is totally
>out of the question, as connecting to them would involve an international
>phone call, and CompuServe would require going through the X.25 network,
>which is not cheap either....I already pay around $7000/year for decent
>Internet access, and don't want to double that by using X.25 

I have been told that one can telnet to compuserve.com, but when
I tried it I got Unknown host.

....





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Brian D Williams <talon57@well.sf.ca.us>
Date: Thu, 26 Aug 93 07:22:28 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: info; ATM
Message-ID: <93Aug26.071800pdt.13947-1@well.sf.ca.us>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain




 Paul Ferguson wrote;
 
>Forgive me for furthering this slightly off-topic thread, but
>Sprint has been offerring Frame Relay data sevices for quite some
>time, both for private wide-area networks and for
>interconnectivity to the global internet via SprintLink. Now,
>Sprint will beat everyone else to the punch offerring up ATM -
 
  Too late;

  MFS plugs in leading-edge network for high-speed data transfers
MFS Communications Corp. claimed the technological lead among data
communications service providers last week with the launch of its
end-to-end asynchronous transfer mode network.  MFS, an upstart
better known for its successful challenges to local telephone
company monopolies, claims to have set up the first ATM network in
the country.  But analysts say that distinction could be fleeting,
as at least one other service provider -- Sprint Corp. -- is      
expected to offer a similar service by year-end.  Although these
systems can carry regular telephone conversations, they are most
apt to be used to transmit huge volumes of computer data and to
make it possible for computers in widely separate locations to work
together.  Ultimately, Royce Holland, president of MFS, sees ATM
networks providing the backbone for a telecommunications
infrastructure that supplies movies to home television sets at the
touch of a button.

Investor's Business Daily -- August 24 -- Page 4  


  Sprint was also before congress last week asking that MFJ
restrictions against the RBOC's entry into long distance be
codified into law, and that they (the RBOC's) be restricted from
entry into long distance for 10 years!


   can you say competition?



                                           Brian Williams
                                           Ameritech data center  
                                           Cypherpatriot






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: jet@netcom.com (J. Eric Townsend)
Date: Thu, 26 Aug 93 00:22:21 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: "more money than brains?"
In-Reply-To: <9308260048.AA12637@netcom4.netcom.com>
Message-ID: <9308260720.AA26178@netcom4.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


M. Stirner: 
> Only one question:  WHY?  If PGP is freeware for noncommercial single
> users, why on earth would anyone wish to drop $100 +/- for single-user
> rights to a virtually identical program?

Well, I've had dealings with a couple of business clients who refuse
to use freeware PGP it because of 'the shaky legal ground'.  We
explained that as a government agency, we can use PGP legally, and
because (in each case) the business already had rights to use RSA for
their own purposes, there was no problem.  They said if they could buy
it, that'd make it a lot easier to use.  (These same businesses refuse
to distribute FSF/GNU code for similarly vague legal reasons.)




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: jon barber <Jon.Barber@isltd.insignia.com>
Date: Thu, 26 Aug 93 01:02:21 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Visa, HNC Inc. develop neural network as a weapon to fight fraud
Message-ID: <1337.9308260756@panacea>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> Visa, HNC Inc. develop neural network as a weapon to fight fraud

About time too.  I recently had a run in with a local bike mechanic  
and had to stop a cheque for 650 pounds.  However, my cheque  
guarantee card is also a Visa card, and so the scumbag filled out a  
Visa slip using the details on my cheque - without my permission of  
course.  This was successfully paid to him by Visa.

However, I told my bank what had happened and they freaked.  It seems  
I'm definitely going to get the money back after about 3 months (!!).   
The bank were very embarrassed and want me to tell the police as it's  
a criminal offence.

It's always struck me how people could easily fill out Visa slips  
from discarded receipts, get the money and split.

Jon.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Duncan Frissell <frissell@panix.com>
Date: Thu, 26 Aug 93 07:25:46 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Visa, HNC Inc. develo
Message-ID: <199308261423.AA00547@panix.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


To: cypherpunks@toad.com

M >Same goes for the supermarket reselling my
M >buying patterns.  If they can sell information about me, my groceries
M >are cheaper (or they make money).  Selling personal information is a
M >competitive advantage.  For most people, this is more important than
M >privacy.
M >

M >		Marc

But it's trivial in the case of supermarket "Price Plus" card programs to 
use a nome de guerre and a mail drop (which you should be using in any 
case).  Thus you get the discount and the supermarket gets purchasing info 
which may or may not match your actual demographics depending on whether 
or not you lied about those as well as your name on the initial ap.

Secured credit cards allow you similar anonymous use of payment facilities 
(if obtained in a nome de guerre) without surrendering privacy.  

That said, I realize that it is difficult even to convince civilians of 
the benfits of receiving all their mail via an agent.  They consider it 
weird.  Perhaps "celebrity stalkers" and the general breakdown in civility 
will ecourage the use of communications screening devices like mail 
receiving services, voice mail, and the coming network-based 
communications servers.

Duncan Frissell

What this metaverse needs is a cheap anonymous communications server for 
all who want one.  This software entity located "somewhere on the nets" 
would receive all email, voice, fax, video, and VR communications directed 
to an individual, record and filter them, and forward (anonymously) those 
communications that meet certain pre-established criteria to its principal 
located "somewhere on the nets."

--- WinQwk 2.0b#0
                 




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: cme@ellisun.sw.stratus.com (Carl Ellison)
Date: Thu, 26 Aug 93 07:35:47 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Source Code NOT available for ViaCrypt PGP
In-Reply-To: <9308260309.AA19952@toad.com>
Message-ID: <9308261032.ZM2500@ellisun.sw.stratus.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


-----BEGIN PRIVACY-ENHANCED MESSAGE-----
Proc-Type: 2001,MIC-CLEAR
Originator-Name: cme@ellisun.sw.stratus.com
Originator-Key-Asymmetric:
 MIGbMAoGBFUIAQECAgP+A4GMADCBiAKBgCl79/jl0DEVl1GQzOHlzjDmChDDxnWO
 Acd7jShj2x1vclFh6vbHx9IJqkQdwNhNAWf8XnTrqBDN+VSBc1qdT6nSEAbNPxHD
 XcvY2DudhuRaRBVLgUQ4scTK657m90Q+bTL5yIh2MaFipUw9BgbIXPTDlksSskWP
 9oHjo+pCJC+lAgMBAAE=
MIC-Info: RSA-MD5,RSA,
 DT+ZyepTl4TuHEa3jiojjmLnH8GYnfP2owhSC0rQO7sq6vsmgUifrl/usgJ4VckB
 kxc7p7GK1kMeqPRG/1LLHcZDpOYvWEhbLSmV/xKpZ+nmj/wd0oBARuxd7nmRnxbS
 DE4WJzaT3I3rhREjtY0fjB/WFZCglu5IpOgsHuGlY/0=

On Aug 25,  5:05pm, Timothy Newsham wrote:
> > But look on the bright side... 
> > 
> > 	This will blow David Sternlight out of the water!
> 
> will it?
> the NSA seems to be pretty happy with the way PKP handles things.
> PKP has an arangement with viacrypt not to release source.
> It might be safe, but I wouldnt trust it given the way that
> the NSA pushes commerce to install backdoors in strong encryption.

As long as there is an approved version (ie., non-commercial, made by
the PGP cabal) -- interoperability will prevent any sneaking of back doors
into the message stream.  The only place to worry is with key generation,
both IDEA and RSA.

I wouldn't be surprised if they're using the BSAFE object code or something
equivalent.  In that case, key generation (random number routines, actually)
might be outside the package.  Does anyone here know?

> 
> btw,  how did they get around PKP's rule about using the 
> interface provided which uses DES ?

If they're using a general purpose, purchased library from RSA (not RSAREF)
then there's no built-in DES limitation.

Meanwhile, I'm looking forward to the commercial version, for my machine
here at work.  Until then, I'm limited to RIPEM -- which few others on this
list speak.

 - <<Disclaimer: All opinions expressed are my own, of course.>>
 - Carl Ellison                                        cme@sw.stratus.com
 - Stratus Computer Inc.       M3-2-BKW                TEL: (508)460-2783
 - 55 Fairbanks Boulevard ; Marlborough MA 01752-1298  FAX: (508)624-7488

 -----BEGIN RIPEM PUBLIC KEY-----
User: cme@ellisun.sw.stratus.com
PublicKeyInfo:
 MIGbMAoGBFUIAQECAgP+A4GMADCBiAKBgCl79/jl0DEVl1GQzOHlzjDmChDDxnWO
 Acd7jShj2x1vclFh6vbHx9IJqkQdwNhNAWf8XnTrqBDN+VSBc1qdT6nSEAbNPxHD
 XcvY2DudhuRaRBVLgUQ4scTK657m90Q+bTL5yIh2MaFipUw9BgbIXPTDlksSskWP
 9oHjo+pCJC+lAgMBAAE=
MD5OfPublicKey: 39D9860686A9F075A9A83D49589C677A
 -----END RIPEM PUBLIC KEY-----

>-- End of excerpt from Timothy Newsham


-----END PRIVACY-ENHANCED MESSAGE-----




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: James Still <still@kailua.colorado.edu>
Date: Thu, 26 Aug 93 09:42:29 PDT
To: 'Cypherpunks List' <cypherpunks@toad.com>
Subject: Re: Source Code NOT available for ViaCrypt PGP
Message-ID: <2C7CF52E@kailua.colorado.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Carl wrote:

>> I think he's trying to run ahead of Clipper and the resulting encryption
>ban.
>> Make a lot of $$$ from people by selling them soon-to-be-"useless" 
software.
>> What a scam...
>
>Is anyone taking bets on encryption bans?
[...]
>If each user of RIPEM or PGP would get one newcomer to start using it
>every month, for example, it would take less than 18 months to get the
>whole US covered.

Are there any volunteers among the Windows guru/programmer's here to
kick out a shell that supports PGP?  2.3a is *much* more stable than
2.2 (and runs great from within PGPShell .PIF'd from Windows.)

IMHO only a fraction of Carl's newcomers will even take a second look
at PGP unless there's an interface for it.  Our privacy shtick falls
short on the masses that don't understand our zealotry or the need to
protect their own privacy.  They want it to be *fun* and could care
less about the conspiracies involved.

First you get the teeming millions to enjoy what they're doing (see?
encryption is fun kids!) and more importantly, feel very comfortable
using encryption tools.  That way if the fateful day of encryption bans
does come, these tools will be as hard to take away from them as from a
Texan who first learns to shoot his father's gun.

 ---- still@kailua.colorado.edu -------------------------------------





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: cme@ellisun.sw.stratus.com (Carl Ellison)
Date: Thu, 26 Aug 93 08:27:29 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Source Code NOT available for ViaCrypt PGP
In-Reply-To: <m0oVcTz-00023kC@khijol>
Message-ID: <9308261125.ZM2808@ellisun.sw.stratus.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


On Aug 26,  1:14am, Ed Carp wrote:
> 
> I think he's trying to run ahead of Clipper and the resulting encryption ban.
> Make a lot of $$$ from people by selling them soon-to-be-"useless" software.
> 
> What a scam...

Is anyone taking bets on encryption bans?

I can't believe that the public would allow the gov't to get away with
one.  Of course, that's no reason to get complacent.  We still need to
continue flooding the country with decent S/W (non-escrowed)
encryption.

If each user of RIPEM or PGP would get one newcomer to start using it
every month, for example, it would take less than 18 months to get the
whole US covered.

 - Carl




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: an31144@anon.penet.fi
Date: Thu, 26 Aug 93 12:53:01 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Further PGP Security Doubts
Message-ID: <199308261827.AA25477@xtropia>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> 4) It's not too hard to build a test-suite for PGP to ensure it's
> implementation of IDEA is correct, and it's possible to check
> it's key generation/session key generation things. Of course
> key management isn't too big a deal either... Thus I don't
> think it requires too great an effort to trust ViaCrypt.
> And if not - buy their copy to stay legal and use the
> Source to be safe (:-).

I would be pleased to see some truly exhaustive efforts made to test
PGP's actual security.

I have been seeing yet more criticisms of PGP, this time from some
character calling himself "Raymond Paquin."  He claims to be a
professor of mathematics who has been working at an unnamed university
exclusively on cryptographics for the past twelve years.  He implies
that he is working for some government in a classified capacity and is
thus unable to either publish or discuss the matter openly.

He claims that PGP is fatally flawed, though the flaw is in niether
RSA or IDEA, but rather somewhere within the PGP part of the program.

Copping the "I can say no more!  I have said too much already!"
melodrama, no more detailed information is forthcoming.

Now, this tease seems to reek of a hoax, but Zimmermann himself claimed
no high degree of security for the program.  To my knowledge, no serious
or well-funded unclassified attempts have been made to crack PGP.  I
fear that we are putting our faith in snake oil, as Zimmermann puts it.

I am not a mathematician, but merely a former spear-carrier in the Cold
War with some fairly well-developed residual instincts about this sort
of thing, including a conviction that all security measures - physical,
electronic or cryptographic - can be compromised by a determined
opponent with extensive resources.  Once compromised, attacks thereafter
may often be trivially accomplished.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Eric Hughes <hughes@soda.berkeley.edu>
Date: Thu, 26 Aug 93 11:32:31 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: PROTOCOL: Encrypted open books
Message-ID: <9308261828.AA12936@soda.berkeley.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Note: I started this reply last week; I've decided to post what I
know, since I don't have a solution and I've run out of simple ideas
for now.

Hal' criticism that (real) money could leak out of the system is
correct.  The problem is that while the books would still balance,
i.e. sum to zero, some fake depositor would have a negative balance,
the net result of taking out more money than you put in.  Negative
numbers just aren't allowed in double-entry bookkeeping, but they were
allowed in the first protocol set.

The first part of the solution is to allow no private accounts on the
left hand (asset) side of the ledger, in other words, no anonymous
loans.  A protocol for doing anonymous loans could be invented, but
since the first problem is merely to run a money exchange and not more
complicated financial services, this is acceptable.  Most of the money
that left the S&L's was by corrupt loan practices, so I don't consider
this omission a particularly glaring one right now.

Therefore all the private accounts must be on the right hand side,
that is, they are all liabilities.  In layman's terms, the bank owes
you; should you ask for your money, they have to give it to you.  If
we can verify that each of these accounts never goes negative, then we
can be certain that if the books balance, that the amounts of money in
each account are accurate.

Consider this.  If money was transferred from your account to another
one, that transaction shows up in the public encrypted transaction
record.  If you have due diligence over this record, you can assertain
that no transaction was performed against your will.  This case
corresponds to a debit and credit against two customer accounts,
decreasing one and increasing the other.

Another way that money might end up in a fake account if it were
credited with assets.  A debit to an asset increase its value and the
credit to the account increases that value.  This is the case of a
deposit; the bank gets cash (+asset) and credits someone's account
(+account).  Now if they want to give someone money this way, they
have to do so by increasing the assets somehow; in other words, they
money has to come from somewhere.  It didn't come from any of the
customers because they've already verified that.  It didn't magically
appear from one of the other asset accounts because these are all
publically audited.

In summary, we need to ensure that all accounts have positive balance.
Public accounts can be revealed and seen to be positive.  Private
accounts need a cryptographic assurance.

A private account starts off at zero.  This can be publically
revealed.  Then to the encrypted transaction log and the public cyclic
balances we add publication of the private balances in encrypted form
that allows us to verify to the blinded balance is positive.  This
balance is verifiably linked to previous cyclic balances via the
transaction log.  It is therefore linked all the way back to the
beginning balance which was zero.  

Consider all the transaction triples for which the first element is
equal to the private account in question, since the account was
opened.  Take a product of all of the second elements and a product of
all the third elements.  It is clear that these products can be
calculated inductively from the previous cyclic products and the
activity in this cycle.

The products on second and third elements are equal to

	g^( Sum x_i,j,t + Sum r_i,j,t ), h^( Sum r_i,j,t )

where I've added a time index by cycle which was implicit before.  The
notation for the inductive calculation is different, of course, and
also obscures the underlying invariant.

What we want is a certificate that Sum x_i,j,t is positive.  Here it
gets a bit hairy.  There are likely other solutions to this technical
requirement; here is the one I thought up yesterday and today.

I thought I had an idea with promise on how to create such
certificates using quadratic residuosity, but it doesn't work.  I'm
still thinking about it; this certificate doesn't seem impossible to
create, but the standard ideas that I know about in algebraic protocol
design don't seem to work.

If anybody wants to work on this technical point off-line with me,
send me mail.  The math involved is advanced enough that I'd prefer to
post summaries of work rather than all the detailed discussion.

Another non-technical attack on the problem is to require periodic
bank holidays, where all private balances will be revealed to be zero
(preferably), or whatever is actually in the account.  This doesn't
prevent owner fraud, but does put an upper bound on the time in which
to perpetrate it.

Eric










From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Read me doctor memory!  26-Aug-1993 1434 <yerazunis@aidev.enet.dec.com>
Date: Thu, 26 Aug 93 11:47:31 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: ViaCrypt's PGP
Message-ID: <9308261844.AA08587@enet-gw.pa.dec.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Thug@phantom.com says:

>I'm assuming the NSA will pressure ViaCrypt to put in a backdoor.  One
>possible backdoor that can be placed inside the commercial PGP and still
>allow it to pass the above test is if commericial PGP secretly writes all
>keys and pass phrases to a block on your hard disk, and marks that
>block as used to the file system.  In order to prevent you from scanning
>your hard disk and finding that block, the information stored there could
>be encrypted by a key which the NSA has in it's possession.
 
There's actually a much easier way for a backdoor to be inserted that
will allow monitoring even without the spooks knocking on your door to
get your disk...

PGP uses RSA only to encode and transmit a "random" DES/IDEA-type session key,
and the rest of the message is encoded only with the session key.  The
recipient PGP uses RSA to recover the session key, and then decodes the
rest of the message with the recovered session key.

Say that the "backdoored" PGP is redesigned to only choose session keys from
a large-but-reasonably-brute-forceable set.... [example: only from consecutive 
8-byte sequences in the executable image; I'm sure some other more obscure
method can be easily devised].  

The result is that there might only be a few hundred thousand possible 
session keys- few enough that a brute-force attack with a small array 
of workstations might succeed in recovering the session key in a few
minutes to hours.  

-----

The only way ViaCrypt can prove that this isn't the case is to distribute
the source code of _their_ product.  [Note: they do NOT have to include the
RSA module source- if it's possible to examine the non-RSA code, and 
instrument it (to prove that the session key is honestly generated 
_AND_ transmitted/recovered correctly) then Thug's tests will be adequate
to verify a lack of backdoors (as far as I can see- but I'm perhaps not
as devious as a professional).

	-Bill




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: norm@netcom.com (Norman Hardy)
Date: Thu, 26 Aug 93 12:07:32 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Source Code NOT available for ViaCrypt PGP
Message-ID: <9308261906.AA17663@netcom3.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


The proper paranoid must worry whether the licenced PGP
does what it is supposed to do. One can
compare the output of the ViaCrypt PGP with that of
the current version. Discrepencies would merit great
suspicion and perhaps disassembly. Improper paranoids
might be comforted in the knowledge that many proper
paranoids were comparing the two versions.
 
I have not studied the format of the PGP output.
Is it possible for the ViaCrypt PGP to interoperate
with the current version unless it comforms completely?
We must clearly worry about undocumented new formats.
 
Incedently why do the code owners trust the customer
to not illegitamitely copy the binary program,
but not trust the customer
to not illegitamitely copy the source program?




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Karl Lui Barrus <klbarrus@owlnet.rice.edu>
Date: Thu, 26 Aug 93 10:22:30 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: blinding message & newbie questions
Message-ID: <9308261719.AA16210@elf.owlnet.rice.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

[I think I messed up when I responded originally ... KLB]

Sure, I'll take questions :-)  I may be a little slow in responding at
the moment.

>> Conceptually, when you blind a message, nobody else can read it. 
>So "blinding" is a synonym for encryption with your own public
>key, aka multiplication by a very-hard-to-factor number?

Not exactly.  Blinding/Unblinding is multiplication;
Encryption/Decryption is exponentiation.

While I can unblind a document without knowing phi(n), I cannot
decrypt a message without knowing phi(n).  Knowing phi(n) is
equivalent to knowing how n factors, so this is intractable.

phi(n) = Euler totient function.  

>> under the right circumstances if another 
>> party digitally signs a blinded message, the unblinded message will 
>> contain a valid digital signature.
>In other words if Alice encrypts and Bob signs, Da(Db(Ea(M))) = Db(M)?  
>Under what conditions?  Does RSA (in PGP) satisfy those conditions?

The conditions are usually satisfied.  Offhand, the only one I can
think of is that x and n must be relatively prime, otherwise there is
no inverse of x mod n.

With really huge numbers, the chances of guessing x such that 
gcd(x,n) != 1 are very small.  If this does happen, then you've
guessed x such that x is a multiple of one of the factors of n!  Time
for somebody to pick a new p,q, and n :-)

As far as PGP, I think the only messages PGP produces are exponentiated.
I mean, PGP doesn't produces messages obscured only by a muliplication
factor; the ascii snow messages PGP generates are encrypted, signed,
compressed, or all of the above.

So this doesn't arise.

>> If someone asks
>> you to digitally sign a random stream of symbols, remember that what you
>> sign may be unblinded to reveal a contract, etc. 
>For what applications would Bob want to sign an encrypted contract
>instead of a plaintext?

Let me get back on this.  I beleive the general name these sorts of
protocols go under is "embassy protocols".

They are useful in things such a digital cash: blind a message, and
get the bank to sign it.  Then unblind and you have a valid, digitally
signed piece of cash.  The bank is unable to track it since it
couldn't read it (message was blinded when the bank signed), but the
bank can verify that the cash is digitally signed by them.

It also arises in automatic protocols: say in computer security.  If
the computer sends a challenge string which you decrypt and send back,
the computer can encrypt with your public key to verify you.  If the
challenge string is random, you may have unwittingly digitally signed
a blinded document that is not in your favor...

The cut-and-choose protocol allows a person to sign a blinded document
and be sure they aren't signing something else.  I'll get back on this
as well.

/--------------------------------------------------\
| Karl L. Barrus                                   |
| klbarrus@owlnet.rice.edu                         |
| D1 59 9D 48 72 E9 19 D5  3D F3 93 7E 81 B5 CC 32 |
\--------------------------------------------------/






-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.3a

iQCVAgUBLHzwP4OA7OpLWtYzAQEyuQP/Vrc5tB5TfbDc0/FRWN9uALdSZk/JZNwX
UYmFfKHQzhYdqJkoOrDE+MMHbJaGuZkuSnYUbIEAFvos6SRPI9doRAvyWnKjQKfp
9h04BMGrB3IoHPBqK59CbH+jNtNc3hYgWw4zSpaFo3+1aEPM+WUHQ2plO2KjJSJg
2M272Y2Y3IE=
=tHuX
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: bryan@fegmania.wustl.edu (bryan o'connor)
Date: Thu, 26 Aug 93 10:52:30 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: No Subject
Message-ID: <9308261751.AA00635@fegmania.wustl.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text



subscribe bryan@fegmania



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Brad Huntting <huntting@glarp.com>
Date: Thu, 26 Aug 93 12:12:32 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: ViaCrypt's PGP
In-Reply-To: <9308261844.AA08587@enet-gw.pa.dec.com>
Message-ID: <199308261910.AA05802@misc.glarp.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



> The only way ViaCrypt can prove that this isn't the case is to distribute
> the source code of _their_ product.  [Note: they do NOT have to include the
> RSA module source- if it's possible to examine the non-RSA code, and 
> instrument it (to prove that the session key is honestly generated 
> _AND_ transmitted/recovered correctly) then Thug's tests will be adequate
> to verify a lack of backdoors (as far as I can see- but I'm perhaps not
> as devious as a professional).

One could apply the same sabotage to the generation of RSA public
keys making any keys generated with ViaCrypt easily crackable.

Of course you could use PGP to generate keys.  And now what is
ViaCrypt useful for?  It's original purpose:  Establishing plausable
deniability.

"Yes your honor, all these encrypted messages presented by the FBI
as Exibit A were generated by ViaCrypt which incidentally we have
a site licence for...  No sir, We've never used PGP."


brad




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: smb@research.att.com
Date: Thu, 26 Aug 93 13:05:48 PDT
To: Timothy Newsham <newsham@wiliki.eng.hawaii.edu>
Subject: Re: Source Code NOT available for ViaCrypt PGP
Message-ID: <9308262005.AA25758@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


	 btw,  how did they get around PKP's rule about using the 
	 interface provided which uses DES ?

That rule applies to RSAREF, and not necessarily to anything else.





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Karl Lui Barrus <klbarrus@owlnet.rice.edu>
Date: Thu, 26 Aug 93 12:05:48 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: blinding & PGP
Message-ID: <9308261903.AA19617@arcadien.owlnet.rice.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


It occured to me over lunch that PGP IDEA encrypts files; what is RSA
encrypted are session keys, hashes, etc.  

So you never really digitally sign the file itself, you instead
digitally sign the portion that contains the session key used, hashes
and so forth.

Again, I'm sure PGP doesn't blind the RSA portion, so I would
say you can't bamboozle someone into signing a blinded document with
PGP.  

Now, as for verifying a commercial version of PGP by comparing
encrypts... it all depends on how exactly randseed.bin figures into
the session key creation.  Two files encrypted with the same public
key could compare very differently if the random session keys are
different, since the IDEA encryptions would differ and the so would
the MD5 hashes, and so forth.

I'm not sure if additional info besides the randseed.bin file goes
into session key creation.


-- 
/--------------------------------------------------\
| Karl L. Barrus                                   |
| klbarrus@owlnet.rice.edu                         |
| D1 59 9D 48 72 E9 19 D5  3D F3 93 7E 81 B5 CC 32 |
\--------------------------------------------------/




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: thug@phantom.com (Murdering Thug)
Date: Thu, 26 Aug 93 11:05:47 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Commercial PGP: Verifying Trustworthiness
Message-ID: <m0oVliI-0009G0C@mindvox.phantom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text



Here's a real simple way to verify the trustworthiness of the commercial
version of PGP.  It's a bidirectional comparison of outputs.

1) Have freeware PGP generate a set of keys.

2) Using keys from (1) encrypt several files using both conventional and
   public key encryption using freeware PGP _and_ commercial PGP, then
   compare the output byte-for-byte of both to see if they match up.

3) Have commercial PGP generate a set of keys.

4) Using keys from (3) encrypt several files using both conventional and
   public key encryption using freeware PGP _and_ commercial PGP, then
   compare the output byte-for-byte of both to see if they match up.

Basically, if both commercial PGP and freeware PGP produce exactly the
same encrypted files as output based on the same keys, and if you have
the source code and can trust freeware PGP, then it can be stated that
commercial PGP is secure.  I'm no expert on mathematical proofs, but the
above seems very logical to me.

I'm assuming the NSA will pressure ViaCrypt to put in a backdoor.  One
possible backdoor that can be placed inside the commercial PGP and still
allow it to pass the above test is if commericial PGP secretly writes all
keys and pass phrases to a block on your hard disk, and marks that
block as used to the file system.  In order to prevent you from scanning
your hard disk and finding that block, the information stored there could
be encrypted by a key which the NSA has in it's possession.

I would never use commercial PGP because I do not place inherent trust in
programs which come with no source code, and commercial PGP doesn't come
with source code.


Thug



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: peter honeyman <honey@citi.umich.edu>
Date: Thu, 26 Aug 93 11:25:47 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Commercial PGP: Verifying Trustworthiness
Message-ID: <9308261825.AA25232@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> Basically, if both commercial PGP and freeware PGP produce exactly the
> same encrypted files as output based on the same keys, and if you have
> the source code and can trust freeware PGP, then it can be stated that
> commercial PGP is secure.  

pgp and viacrypt will always generate differnt outputs: pgp
adds some pseudo-random stuff to the start of the file it is
encrypting to ensure that a file encrypts differently each time. 

	peter




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: norm@netcom.com (Norman Hardy)
Date: Thu, 26 Aug 93 14:42:34 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Source Code NOT available for ViaCrypt PGP
Message-ID: <9308262139.AA05382@netcom3.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Regarding Secret key generation.
cme@ellisun.sw.stratus.com (Carl Ellison) says:
> The only place to worry is with key generation,
> both IDEA and RSA.
I presume this is true.
 
I include a Scheme program that finds the first
prime in an arithmetic sequence. It uses a function published in Knuth.
You can either study my program or compare its output with some program
written by someone else to the same spec. If people are interested
I will annotate the code and its output better. As it is now
the prime that it finds is the last number that it outputs before it stops.
Curiously it has a probability of error which is large for small numbers
but exceedingly small for large numbers, just the opposite of human testers.
I claim that this is a good specification for choosing your secret primes.
It has a slight advantage over merely finding the first prime beyond some
specified number because that tends to find primes that follow long runs of
composites. It just now (as I edited this) found the prime 1000000000000000
00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000913
as the first prime in the sequence 10^80+11*n. I typed (scan (expt 10 80) 11)
to the interpreter to get this. It took several minutes.
I used MacGambit on a 68030.
The output theoretically depends on the hokey random number generator here
but if two implementations yield different answers due to different random
number generators Knuth and others would be very interested!
For use in real RSA application we should include a function that hashes
typed in text into a bignum. A good hash of long text is a very good
random number! It need not be a crypto hash!
 
(define (ex x)(write x)x)
(define (rand31 seed) (lambda()(let* ((hi (quotient seed 127773))
(lo (- seed (* 127773 hi)))(test (- (* 16807 lo) (* 2836 hi))))
(set! seed (if (> test 0) test (+ test 2147483647))) seed)))
(define (gbrand max seed)(let* ((rq (rand31 seed))
  (nq (let v ((c max)(n 0))(if (< c (expt 2 31))
   (cons (let w ((cx c)(nx 1))(if (< cx 2) nx (w (quotient cx 2)(+ nx 1))))n)
  (v (quotient c (expt 2 31))(+ n 1)))))
  (z (car nq))(n (cdr nq))(k (+ (* 31 n) z)))
(write(list max k z n))
; max, k, n, z, L and m are non-negative integers.
; 2^(k-1)<=max<2^k. k=31*n+z. 0<z<=31. 
; I claim this code is efficient if 
; (quotient .. (expt 2 ..)) and (modulo .. (expt 2 ..)) are efficient.
  (if (= n 0)(lambda () (let r ()(let ((q (modulo (rq) (expt 2 z))))
     (if (< q max) q (r)))))
  (let ((L (quotient max (expt 2 (- k 31)))))(write L)
; max = L*2^(k-31) + m; 0<=m<2^(k-31). L is the high 31 bits of max.
    (lambda()(+ (* (expt 2 z)(let g ((nx n))(if (= nx 1)
    (let r ()(let ((q (rq)))(if (< q L) q (r))))
   (+ (* (expt 2 31)(g (- nx 1)))(rq)))))(modulo (rq)(expt 2 z))))))))
 
(load "Random.scm")
(define ww (lambda(n x)(display (list n x)) x))
; The following definition is to ensure that modulo never
; produces negative numbers.
(define modulo (let ((modulo modulo))(lambda (a m)
   (if (negative? a) (- (- m 1) (modulo (-(- m 1) a) m))
   (if (positive? a) (modulo a m) 0)))))
; The following is the "Jacobi Symbol". (a|P)
(define (j a P) (if (< a 2) (if (= a 1) 1
      (if (= a 0) 0 (j (modulo a P) P)))
   (if (>= a P) (j (modulo a P) P)
   (if (even? a) (let((q (j (/ a 2) P))
   (m (modulo P 8))) (if (or (= m 3)(= m 5))(- q) q))
   (let((q (j (modulo P a) a)))
   (if(or (= (modulo P 4) 1) (= (modulo a 4) 1)) q (- q)))))))
(define (mod-exp b p m)(cond ((= p 0) 1)
   ((even? p)(let ((x (mod-exp b (/ p 2) m)))(modulo (* x x)m)))
   (#t (modulo (* b (mod-exp b (- p 1) m)) m))))
; The following is by Solovay & Strassen as presented in Knuth page 396.
(define (p-test a P)(if(zero? a)(cdr 2))(and (odd? P) (= (gcd a P) 1)
   (zero? (modulo (- (j a P)(mod-exp a (/(- P 1) 2) P)) P))))
(quote "The function scan below returns the first prime in the")
(quote "arithmetic sequence a + n*b")
(define (scan a b)(let* ((g (gcd a b))(n (modulo b 210))
  (random (gbrand (+ a (if (positive? b) 0 (* 2000 b))) 228765))
  (probe (+ 1 (random))))
   (if (> g 1) (list "Always divisible by" g)
     (let more ((a1 a)(m (modulo a 210))(cn 0))
    (if (and (let all ((l (list 2 3 5 7)))(or (null? l)
      (and (positive? (remainder m (car l))) (all (cdr l)))))
        (let all ((l 20)(p probe)) (or (zero? l)
          (and (ww cn (pt p a1))
      (all (- l 1)(+ 1 (random)))))))
      a1
      (begin (display ",")(more (+ a1 b)(modulo (+ m n) 210)(+ cn 1))))))))
(define (pc wx) (let zz ((q (- wx 1))(s 0))(if (zero? q) s
   (zz (- q 1)(+ (if (p-test q wx) 1 0) s)))))
; The following prmality test is from second edition of
; volume 2 of Knuth's "The Art of Computer Programming",
; page 379.
(define (pt x n) (or (= n 2)
   (let* ((pr (let z ((q (- n 1))(k 0))(if (odd? q)(cons q k)
               (z (quotient q 2)(+ k 1)))))
          (q (car pr))(k (cdr pr))(nm1 (- n 1)))
   (let lp ((j 0)(y (mod-exp x q n)))
       (or (and (= j 0)(= y 1)) (= y nm1)
       (and (< (+ j 1) k)(lp (+ j 1)(modulo (* y y) n))))))))
 ; 10^100-797, 10^200-189, 10^299-171, 10^300-69 are prime.
 ~.
 ~.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: vince@dsi.unimi.it (David Vincenzetti)
Date: Thu, 26 Aug 93 05:47:26 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Source Code NOT available for ViaCrypt PGP
Message-ID: <9308261246.AA22555@pluto.sm.dsi.unimi.it>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> Just thinking. I don't think that ViaCrypt will make much money of
> the people on this list.

Very true.

Too bad that PGP is going commercial. Even worse the fact that sources
won't be available. If PGP will become a commercial product and the
public domain version will be unsupported or ``left behind'' in respect
of the commectial version, then I believe that some hackers will
start hacking the public domain version (probably infringing PGP's
copyright as well), a new version, newly-featured version of PGP
(let's call it NPGP) will start being used and then the commercial
version of PGP will become suspect, poorly trusted and unpopular in the
Internet community.

-- 
David Vincenzetti, system adminitrator  | <vince@ghost.dsi.unimi.it>
DSI, Universita` degli Studi di Milano, |  phone: ++39 2 55006 391
via Comelico 39, 20135 Milan, ITALY     |    fax: ++39 2 55006 373




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: norm@netcom.com (Norman Hardy)
Date: Thu, 26 Aug 93 14:57:34 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Commercial PGP: Verifying Trustworthiness
Message-ID: <9308262157.AA25459@netcom5.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


thug@phantom.com (Murdering Thug) writes:
> I'm assuming the NSA will pressure ViaCrypt to put in a backdoor.  One
> possible backdoor that can be placed inside the commercial PGP and still
> allow it to pass the above test is if commericial PGP secretly writes all
> keys and pass phrases to a block on your hard disk, and marks that
> block as used to the file system.  In order to prevent you from scanning
> your hard disk and finding that block, the information stored there could
> be encrypted by a key which the NSA has in it's possession.
 
At least the Commercial PGP is not tamper proof and examination can,
in principle, discover the backdoor. After discovery it would
impossible to deny.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: norm@netcom.com (Norman Hardy)
Date: Thu, 26 Aug 93 15:15:49 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Commercial PGP: Verifying Trustworthiness
Message-ID: <9308262215.AA29262@netcom4.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


peter honeyman <honey@citi.umich.edu> says:
> pgp and viacrypt will always generate differnt outputs: pgp
> adds some pseudo-random stuff to the start of the file it is
> encrypting to ensure that a file encrypts differently each time. 
This means that I am trusting the "pseudo-random" stuff not to be
some secrets that PGP has read from my disk. The only benefit
that I see to the pseudo-random stuff is to send the same message
to several people without revealing the fact that the messages are
the same except to those that can decode the messages.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Andy Wilson <ajw@Think.COM>
Date: Thu, 26 Aug 93 12:22:32 PDT
To: bill@twwells.com
Subject: Visa, HNC Inc. develop neural network as a weapon to fight fraud
In-Reply-To: <CCCEF6.9rz@twwells.com>
Message-ID: <9308261917.AA16210@custard.think.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


   From: bill@twwells.com (T. William Wells)
   Date: Thu, 26 Aug 1993 01:21:03 GMT

   [...]

   But that wasn't what you were writing about. You were writing
   about bad business decisions, not violations of privacy.

No, you were writing about bad business decisions.  I was providing
a few details on how credit/charge-card information is used in this
process and a few potential problems resulting from it.

   For that matter, your notions on neural networks seem
   contradictory. On the one hand, you complain about a violation of
   privacy and on the other you complain that a neural network won't
   tell you how it reached its conclusions!

You are deliberately confusing two different points: 1) the fact that
neural networks do not provide useful explanations of how they arrived
at a particular decision,  and 2) some potential problems that arise
from this fact that concern privacy issues.

   :                I beg to differ.  This is exactly what digital
   : cash is meant to prevent.

   Digital cash and the use of neural networks to authenticate
   transactions are essentially orthogonal issues.

I will reiterate that the whole point of digital cash is to provide
anonymity,  which will prevent these kinds of uses made of personal
information which are not done with the explicit approval of the
person involved.

   : The problem with referring a neural network's decision to a human
   : is that the neural network gives no information other than the
   : probability of fraud.

   1) This statement is false. It is true of some neural networks
      but not all. We have no way of knowing whether their neural
      network is among those.

It is true of all commercial applications of neural networks to my
knowledge,  and certainly true of the neural networks developed
by Hecht-Nielsen.

   :                                                     There is not any
   : good way to combine the judgement of the neural net with that of a
   : human for that reason.

   Nonsense. As the existence of rule based systems that incorporate
   neural networks shows.

That shows no such thing.  The only way to combine the judgement of
a neural network with that of a rule-based system,  or anything else,
is to see if both arrive at the same conclusion.  You cannot see the
reasoning process of the neural network to help the human understand
why it made the judgement that it did,  the marketing hype of neural
network vendors notwithstanding.

This is my last post on this thread.

Andy









From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Andy Wilson <ajw@Think.COM>
Date: Thu, 26 Aug 93 12:52:32 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Visa, HNC Inc. develop neural network as a weapon to fight fraud
Message-ID: <9308261948.AA16559@custard.think.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


   Date: Wed, 25 Aug 93 22:02:04 -0600
   From: "L. Detweiler" <ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu>

   [...]

   Furthermore, a `warning flag' system is potentially superior to the
   current system, contrary to your statement of it being a `problem' in
   that potentially no other information other than `suspicious activity
   alert' is provided. as P. Wayner indicated, the potential for simple PR
   is increased to the point that at least some customers are pleased.

I did not intend to imply that Visa's policy in particular was not to
use the neural network as a "warning flag".  I was merely pointing out
potential problems in the trend of using neural networks to make decisions
based on personal information,  including details of neural network 
technology that limit their usefulness as "warning flags".  I was not
commenting on the policies of Visa, Inc.,  of which I have no personal 
knowledge.

The use of AI technology by both businesses and the government to track 
personal and corporate transactions is a major trend.  A former colleague
who is doing classified work along this line referred to what he was 
doing as "building big brother."

Andy





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: danodom@matt.ksu.ksu.edu (Dan Odom)
Date: Thu, 26 Aug 93 15:42:35 PDT
To: gg@well.sf.ca.us (George A. Gleason)
Subject: Re: Source Code NOT available for ViaCrypt PGP
In-Reply-To: <93Aug26.015906pdt.14440-4@well.sf.ca.us>
Message-ID: <9308262239.AA26848@matt.ksu.ksu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


George A. Gleason Said:

> What about the idea of having someone who is known trustworthy examine the
> source code under nondisclosure?  A passing grade from a couple of the
> respected members of the community here would be great for ViaCrypt's
> promotional efforts, if nothing else...!

That is not a bad idea, and I would trust certain people to tell the
truth about ViaCrypt PGP's security....  the problem is convincing
ViaCrypt to let someone that Cypherpunks consider trustworthy to look
at it.  I mean, I wouldn't listen to Sternlight or Denning, but I
might listen to May or Gilmore.  But would ViaCrypt allow May or
Gilmore to see their source?

-- 
Dan Odom
danodom@matt.ksu.ksu.edu -- Kansas State University, Manhattan, KS

PGP key by finger or request.



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: norm@netcom.com (Norman Hardy)
Date: Thu, 26 Aug 93 19:15:51 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Commercial PGP: Verifying Trustworthiness
Message-ID: <9308270215.AA19598@netcom3.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Forwarding for cdodhner@indirect.com (Christian D. Odhner)
 
> 
> peter honeyman <honey@citi.umich.edu> says:
> > pgp and viacrypt will always generate differnt outputs: pgp
> > adds some pseudo-random stuff to the start of the file it is
> > encrypting to ensure that a file encrypts differently each time. 
> This means that I am trusting the "pseudo-random" stuff not to be
> some secrets that PGP has read from my disk. The only benefit
> that I see to the pseudo-random stuff is to send the same message
> to several people without revealing the fact that the messages are
> the same except to those that can decode the messages.
> 
I could very well be wrong about this one, but since pgp uses a random
idea session key each time you encrypt, wouldn't that in fact ensure that
no two encryptions of the same file with the same public key are ever the
same? Why then would random stuff be needed? 
 
Happy Hunting, -Chris
<cdodhner@indirect.com>
PGP public key available upon request.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: norm@netcom.com (Norman Hardy)
Date: Thu, 26 Aug 93 19:22:37 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Commercial PGP: Verifying Trustworthiness
Message-ID: <9308270218.AA19958@netcom3.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


cdodhner@indirect.com (Christian D. Odhner) says:
> I could very well be wrong about this one, but since pgp uses a random
> idea session key each time you encrypt, wouldn't that in fact ensure that
> no two encryptions of the same file with the same public key are ever the
> same? Why then would random stuff be needed? 
 
I knew that! I forgot that! Thanks for reminding me. Back to the drawing board!
A protocol where the user controlled the session key would be more awkward
but would solve that problem. On the otherhand that isn't the PGP protocol.
 




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: gnu (John Gilmore)
Date: Thu, 26 Aug 93 19:32:37 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Crypto Consulting / Employment Opportunities at Microsoft
Message-ID: <9308270228.AA27682@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Posted at CRYPTO '93 in Santa Barbara this week were these two job offers,
FYI:

CRYPTOGRAPHER -- Advanced Technology and Business Development, Advanced
Consumer Technology Group, reporting to Group Manager, Research Group

Primary responsibilities include the research, analysis, verification,
and recommendation of cryptographic methods; designing and proving new
methods; and working with a development team to implement such
methods.  Candidate should be familiar with authentication techniques,
blind signatures, digital signature and time-stamping techniques,
public key encryption systems, hashing methods, and encryption
standards.  Familiarity with RSA, LUC, DES, minimum knowledge systems,
and Digital Cash/Smart Card technology a plus.  A MS/Phd degree in
Mathematics, with a focus on cryptography, desired.

Do you need a research challenge which results in tangable (sic)
product?  Then Microsoft is the place for you!  Microsoft looking
(sic) to challenge the brightest mathematical minds with the latest
advances in cryptography.  The ideal candidate will be responsible for
the reserach, analysis, verification, and recommendation of
cryptographic standards as well as the design of new standards.
Candidate should be familiar with ...  [repeats itself here]


COMPUTER SECURITY EXPERT -- Advanced Technology and Business Development,
Advanced Consumer Technology Group, reporting to Group Manager.

Primary responsibilities include the reserach, analysis, verification,
and recommendation of computer and communication security techniques;
designing new methods; and working with a development team to
implement such methods.  Some programming responsibilities also will
be assumed.  Qualifications should include a minimum of 5 years
experience with secure transaction systems, data security,
authentication techniques, basic encryption technology, and knowledge
of security standards.  Famililarity with electronics funds transfer
systems (SWIFT, ...), Smart Card technology, C/C++ language, and RSA
encryption a plus.  A BS/MS/Phd degree in Computer Science or related
field preferred.

Contact:

Lester Waters, +1 206 936 4288, lesterw@microsoft.com
Gideon Yuval, gideony@microsoft.com




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: mbriceno@aol.com
Date: Thu, 26 Aug 93 17:42:37 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Coming Soon:  Commercial version of PGP!
Message-ID: <9308262031.tn30727@aol.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


gg@well.sf.ca.us writes:

> How soon before a Mac compatible version is available? Or will the
> current version run under Soft PC on the Mac, which is essentially a
> PC-emulator...? If yes to either, sign me up...! 

Have you tried the freeware version of MacPGP yet? It is very easy to use.
The next release (now in beta) will even support AppleEvents. I think it will
be quite a while before you can buy something similar.
[And why would you want to pay if you can get for free?]

--Marc




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "L. Detweiler" <ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Date: Thu, 26 Aug 93 20:22:39 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Cisco routers backdoor
Message-ID: <9308270317.AA16085@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



===cut=here===

Date: Wed, 25 Aug 1993 12:56:54 -0700 (PDT)
From: Al Whaley <Al.Whaley@sunnyside.com>
Subject: Cisco routers

Rumors abound that Cisco routers have a back door; that is when a TCP port is
disabled, it can still be accessed from Cisco's IP number.

I have personally verified this with the sendmail port.

Al Whaley        al@sunnyside.com       +1-415 322-5411(Tel), -6481 (Fax)
Sunnyside Computing, Inc., PO Box 60, Palo Alto, CA 94302

   [Private trapdoors for developers and maintenance folks are remarkably
   common, and in many other cases represent more serious risks than this 
   one.  WarGames was not pulling your leg.  PGN]




------- End of Forwarded Message





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: cjl@micro.med.cornell.edu (Chris Leonard)
Date: Thu, 26 Aug 93 18:32:37 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: .Comparing ViaCrypt and freeware.
Message-ID: <9308270131.AA13145@ micro.med.cornell.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



{Refering to my earlier post about the possibility of black-boxing the
  commercial ViaCrypt and comparing it to freeware PGP} 


I've been most gratified by the response (private and posted) to my question.
Thanks for the enlightenment.  The first few responses were diametrically
opposite in their conclusions, but after that what I have taken away as the 
message is that the session key is generated on-the-fly and would be different 
every time, although I guess I still don't understand enough to figure out 
why no matter what the program uses as randomness input some really bright 
boy capable of working real down close to the silicon couldn't fake up some 
sort of a test bed to spoon-feed the "randomness" to the program.  It's not 
like this thing runs on quantum randomness.  Is it?

As for why bother when the freeware is available, plausible deniability was
mentioned and I think that is probably the most convincing argument.  The
Jackson Games seizure, and other computer confiscations by law enforcement
are enough to keep any company from allowing a copy of PGP on the premises, it
also has a fairly chilling effect on those less brave souls who don't have
the power of their convictions and are willing to trust the government not 
to snoop on their E-mail or phone conversations.  The right to privacy can 
be eroded away because most people don't care to learn how the box on the 
desk works, let alone worry about exercising their civil liberties.  Hell,
most people don't even bother to vote.

I found out about PGP from the WIRED article on the cypherpunks, and I have been
doing as someone else suggested, turning other people on to privacy.  I have 
converted several friends already and they in turn are spreading the encrypted
word.

eep-Kay o-nay rypting-'Cay,

cjl




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: hfinney@shell.portal.com
Date: Thu, 26 Aug 93 22:23:12 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Digital Gold, a bearer instrument?
Message-ID: <9308270511.AA25625@jobe.shell.portal.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


][adon Nash's digital gold concept is interesting, however I think it is
harder to use than existing cash systems in the literature.

In order to know whether to accept a given piece of digital gold in payment
for a product or service, a vendor must check a central database which
records all transactions anywhere in the world.  It must trace through
the chain of possession for that piece of digital gold in order to verify
that the ownership is legitimate.

In particular, if the person passing the gold is a cheater he may be spending
it twice, perhaps very close together in time.  This means that the database
must be updated and checked in real time.

This is the same communications requirement for the simplest form of
digital cash based on Chaum blinded signatures.  We have discussed this
cash several times on this list.  It is basically just an RSA-signed
certificate from a trusted bank, but one which has had the "blinding"
technique (which Karl has been describing) applied so that the bank won't
recognize the cash when it is returned.  For a vendor to know whether
to accept a digital coin, he has to check with the bank to make sure the
coin hasn't been spent before.  This is analogous to ][adon's check of
the gold-claim database.  The bank's job seems somewhat easier, as it
just has to look up whether the coin's number is present in a list.

Also, Chaum provides "offline" variants on his system in which the vendor
just trusts the person passing the cash, because he knows that if the
customer cheats, his anonymity will be automatically broken and he can be
sued.  It's not clear how the digital gold approach could provide any
such generalization.

As for the notion of transferring assets from person to person, using
aliases to provide for privacy, this has been discussed by Barry Hayes
in Anonymous One-Time Signatures and Flexible Untraceable Electronic
Cash, in the AusCrypt proceedings.  He describes a system, in some ways
an elaboration of Chaum's ideas, which works like checks which get
endorsed from person to person.  Just the other day I got a check which
was made out to person A but endorsed over to me.  I could endorse it
over to someone else if I want.  This chain can continue until someone
cashes it.  Hayes's system, like Chaum's, retains anonymity as long as
no one cheats.  If someone tries to pass the same check twice, their
identity will be revealed.

It's too bad that these papers aren't more widely available.  The math is
not that complicated.  If you can understand RSA, you can understand
digital cash, at least the simpler systems.  But the papers are mostly
only in the crypto proceedings, and not all libraries have them.

I have to say, though, that although I don't really think the digital
gold proposal is technically feasible, the proposal to own numbers shows
tremendous chutzpah and is quite creative.

Hal Finney
hfinney@shell.portal.com




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: hfinney@shell.portal.com
Date: Thu, 26 Aug 93 22:25:53 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Attacks on remailers
Message-ID: <9308270511.AA25630@jobe.shell.portal.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>>>>> On Wed, 25 Aug 93 11:39:11 EDT, J_G_Thomas%CAASD1@mwmgate1.mitre.org said:

	Joe> A new protocol is probably the cleanest way to solve the
	Joe> problem of traffic analysis of messages addressed with
	Joe> encrypted address blocks.  The best way to get security
	Joe> in a remailer chain is to nest your encryption, so only
	Joe> one layer gets peeled off in each remailer hop.  That
	Joe> isn't possible with encrypted address blocks, since the
	Joe> sender will only know the address (and public key) of the
	Joe> first remailer in the chain.  All hops after the first
	Joe> one must send the same message out as they got in, with
	Joe> just a layer off the encrypted address block.

As I indicated in my long posting, it is not necessary to send out the
same message that was received.  Chaum proposed encrypting the message
(the non-address-block portion) with a secret key at each stage, a key
which would be revealed to the remailer (along with the address of the
next address in the chain) when it peeled off its own layer of encryption.

		But if
	Joe> remailers talked to each other by first doing RSA-signed
	Joe> Diffie- Hellman key exchange, then encrypting the
	Joe> traffic, a packet snooper wouldn't be able to correlate
	Joe> incoming and outgoing messages.

If no encryption is done on the message body, there is another attack for
this case that I didn't mention.  It is:

Run a remailer.  For every anonymous address floating around on the net,
try sending a message to it.  Look at the messages which pass through
your own remailer and look for matches to the message you sent.  Any
anonymous address which includes your remailer as one of the elements
will pass through you.  You have then defeated all of the stages of the
chain before yourself.  In particular, if you happen to be the last remailer
of the chain, you have broken the anonymity of the anonymous address.

This attack, while not the most powerful on the list, defeats many of the
principles of remailer chains, such as that the chain is as strong as
its strongest link.  It requires you to strongly trust at least one
remailer in the chain (the last one), whereas without this attack you
would not have to especially trust any single remailer.  So it is sig-
nificant.

Diffie-Hellman encrypting messages between remailers would not help against
this attack.

Also, rather than DH it would be just as effective to use the public key
of the next remailer in the chain, and more convenient: some remailers are
not able to participate in TCP exchanges, being connected to the net
by occasional uucp connections.

This lack-of-TCP problem also impacts the proposal to use a public telnet
port for message communication.  Another problem with that proposal is
that it would need the remailers to run as background processes.  With the
current software they can run as mail filters, which makes them much
less conspicuous to system managers.

The suggestion for remailers to send messages by telnet connection to
port 25 of some other machine (rather than by piping to sendmail as they
currently do) is perhaps reasonable (for those systems with TCP access),
although it makes the remailer somewhat harder to set up since you have to
find some other machine which will let you connect to their port.  Also,
I think some machines may log incoming or outgoing telnet connections to
this port, since it is a common technique for mail forgeries.  I have heard
that most systems will actually not allow public telnet connections to
this port.

I don't know that much about how widely available telnet and other TCP/IP
services are on the net, so if these techniques are more usable than I
am suggesting I'd like to hear about it.

Hal Finney
hfinney@shell.portal.com




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: hfinney@shell.portal.com
Date: Thu, 26 Aug 93 22:22:41 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Attacks on remailers
Message-ID: <9308270511.AA25634@jobe.shell.portal.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


From: b44729@achilles.ctd.anl.gov (Samuel Pigg)

> On the user side, I think a good tool to augment this would be a
> mailer program which kept a list of the functioning remailers with
> keys, and randomly selected a route through them using a random
> (reasonable) number of hops, and performing the necessary nested
> encryptions.  Then it could start the remailer hopping process via
> special socket connection to the first remailer in the chain.

This seems like a good idea.  Note that on the ftp site there are scripts
and a program which will set up a chained remailing if you are willing
to type in the names or numbers of the remailers to use.  Extending
these to use a random route or set of hops would not be a major job.

> Perhaps a protocol could be worked out for the mailer program to
> request from any one of the remailers a current list of the
> functioning remailers? (in an effort to transparentize the process
> some more, as manually maintaining a list of current remailers would
> be tedious.)

More and more I think this would be a good idea.  People are always
complaining about temporary "down time" among the remailers.  Perhaps
someone could run a service which would run every night, ping all the
remailers, and keep a file with a list of those remailers which have
responded in the last 24 hours.  This file could be made available by
finger, ftp, or some other method.  Perhaps someone could volunteer to
write such a beast?  This is another project that seems doable in a
moderate amount of time.

Putting these two together, as Sam suggests, would produce a more robust
and convenient way of using the remailers.

Nice ideas, Sam.

Hal Finney
hfinney@shell.portal.com




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: hfinney@shell.portal.com
Date: Thu, 26 Aug 93 22:23:09 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Viacrypt PGP source code unavailable
Message-ID: <9308270511.AA25638@jobe.shell.portal.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I spoke briefly with Phil Zimmermann about the ViaCrypt deal this
afternoon.  He explained, as I understood it, that the company was
contractually obligated to use their own version of the RSA library.
This code is apparently proprietary and so the source is not currently
planned to be released.  Phil indicated, though, that he will discuss
this issue with ViaCrypt, and hopefully some solution can be found which
will satisfy users.

It was not clear to me whether the random-number code from PGP would be
retained.  I suspect that it will be, though, which would mean that if
you started with identical randseed.bin files, and RSA-encrypted identical
files, that the two programs should produce identical output.  PGP uses
the contents of this file to initialize its random number generator.

(PGP does put some random data at the beginning of the plaintext before
encryption, as was described; this is to make cryptanalysis harder, since
the first few bytes of the plaintext will not be known.  Again, this
random data is based on the contents of the randseed.bin file.)

To address a few other points that were made:  Phil reiterated his strong
committment to keep the freeware version of PGP at least as up-to-date as
the commercial version.  This is not a case where the freeware version will
be left to languish.  In fact, Phil expects the commercial version to be
based on the freeware version, with advances occuring first in the freeware
code.

As to whether individuals will pay $100 or more for a legal version, that
remains to be seen.  In some ways the same question can be asked about many
commercial packages, for which pirated versions are available for free
from friends or user groups.  Yet still some people pay for software because
they feel better using a legal version.  People who feel this way would
perhaps also prefer a legal version of PGP.

Hal Finney
hfinney@shell.portal.com




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Derek Atkins <warlord@Athena.MIT.EDU>
Date: Thu, 26 Aug 93 20:32:38 PDT
To: danodom@matt.ksu.ksu.edu (Dan Odom)
Subject: Re: Source Code NOT available for ViaCrypt PGP
In-Reply-To: <9308262239.AA26848@matt.ksu.ksu.edu>
Message-ID: <9308270328.AA20123@w20-575-50.MIT.EDU>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> That is not a bad idea, and I would trust certain people to tell the
> truth about ViaCrypt PGP's security....  the problem is convincing
> ViaCrypt to let someone that Cypherpunks consider trustworthy to look
> at it.  I mean, I wouldn't listen to Sternlight or Denning, but I
> might listen to May or Gilmore.  But would ViaCrypt allow May or
> Gilmore to see their source?

You realize that this is not ViaCrypt taking PGP and making it into a
product, but an agreement between Phil Z. and ViaCrypt to turn the
Public version into a legal-for-commercial-use product???  First and
foremost, the public, shareware (freeware?  I forget what the status
is) version of PGP will always remain ahead of the commercial version,
but the commercial version will use the code from the free version.

Secondly, regarding "whom do you trust": Do you trust Phil Z?  As far
as I know (and granted, its not much, yet), Phil Z is going to oversee
the commercial product, to make sure that nothing is put into it.
Granted, he probably wont get to see the RSA sources, but there are
sources of those (pun intended).

Listen, this is a Good Thing (TM).  It means that there will be a
version of PGP, for a nominal fee, that is legal for commercial use in
the US.  When the free(share)ware version of PGP also becomes legal,
then there won't be any problems with RSA/PKP!!!  This is a step in
the right direction.  Let's calm down some and see where it goes!

-derek





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: an31185@anon.penet.fi (Anon of Ibid)
Date: Thu, 26 Aug 93 17:05:50 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Coming Soon: Commercial version of PGP!
Message-ID: <9308270001.AA11449@anon.penet.fi>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



>How soon before a Mac compatible version is available?  Or will the current
>version run under Soft PC on the Mac, which is essentially a PC-emulator...?
>If yes to either, sign me up...!
> 
>-gg@well.sf.ca.us

Well, it works on SoftPC on my workstation, so I guess it would work on
the Mac as well. I don't think I'd trust the key generation though, as
if I remember correctly the PC version sets the PC timer to a high rate
which SoftPC probably doesn't support.



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From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: cjl@micro.med.cornell.edu (Chris Leonard)
Date: Thu, 26 Aug 93 21:02:39 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: viacrypt and freeware
Message-ID: <9308270401.AA13257@ micro.med.cornell.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain




>> As for why bother when the freeware is available, plausible deniability was
>> mentioned and I think that is probably the most convincing argument.  The
>> Jackson Games seizure, and other computer confiscations by law enforcement

>Note that the seizure had *nothing* to do with copyright or other IP 
>infringement; no incriminating material was ever found, and we were 
>completely cleared. Also, the name of the company is "Steve Jackson Games"

>That aside, I agree with your basic analysis.

It was not my intent to speak to the *specifics* of the Steve Jackson Games
case, although your point is well taken.  My reference was more to the point
that as a reasonably well publicized event, particularly among the computer
cognescenti, that people (i.e. sysops and owners) have every reason to fear
completely outrageous and unconstitutional behavior from government agencies.
The law enforcement agencies are well aware of the value of making a high
profile example of how much they are able to get away with and be completely
free from any redress of grievances.

cjl




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: cjl@micro.med.cornell.edu (Chris Leonard)
Date: Thu, 26 Aug 93 21:05:52 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Apology
Message-ID: <9308270403.AA13260@ micro.med.cornell.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Sorry for the last post.  It was sent to the board in error.

cjl




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: an31185@anon.penet.fi (Anon of Ibid)
Date: Thu, 26 Aug 93 17:12:36 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Further PGP Security Doubts
Message-ID: <9308270006.AA11920@anon.penet.fi>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



an31144@anon.penet.fi writes:

["Raymond Paquin"]
>.. claims that PGP is fatally flawed, though the flaw is in niether
>RSA or IDEA, but rather somewhere within the PGP part of the program.
> 
>Copping the "I can say no more!  I have said too much already!"
>melodrama, no more detailed information is forthcoming.

Yes, this seems to be a persistent rumour, though I've no idea how true
it might be. I uploaded PGP to a bulletin board a few months back and
received a message from another user claiming the same thing. (And taking
the same copout...)

I've been meaning to take a good look at the source for a while, I think
it's about time to investigate the key generation code.....


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From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "George A. Gleason" <gg@well.sf.ca.us>
Date: Fri, 27 Aug 93 01:53:11 PDT
To: owner-cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re:  ViaCrypt's PGP
Message-ID: <93Aug27.014641pdt.14451-2@well.sf.ca.us>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Source code for ViaCrypt: 

I believe I raised a point about having some trusted members of the crypto
community (i.e. cypherpunks) examine the source under non-disclosure.
Well...?  This is an entirely reasonable demand.  There are people in this
list who are highly placed professionally, who own companies that are worth
a reasonable sum, or who own houses at least, and therefore who can be
trusted by ViaCrypt to not blow the gig because the resulting lawsuit would
cost them mightily.  So we trust those folks because they're part of this
community, and ViaCrypt would trust them to not blow their NDA because they
could be sued all to hell.  Also from ViaCrypt's perspective, think of the
marketing value of having the product independently certified or validated.
That would certainly be worth something.

NOw if Viacrypt refuses to go with this, that fact in and of itself would be
harmful to their position: it would be a virtual admission that their system
was dirty.  

The question is, who here wants to take this on...?   To me the point is
very straightforward: we have an interest in privacy, and the legal issues
around privacy... the fight to preserve "underground" crypto fits into this
picture, but I can't see any justification for boycotting or trying to tear
down ViaCrypt simply because they're charging a fee for it and are making a
profit on it and all that.  Free markets, right?  A successful ViaCrypt
product would probably spread around to many users who would never have
gotten onboard with PGP, for instance businesses who want to be totally
squeaky clean about the copyright issues.  We need everyone onboard who we
can get, and we *don't* need some kind of PC litmus test of "are you willing
to use underground software?"  

-gg




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Mike Ingle <MIKEINGLE@delphi.com>
Date: Thu, 26 Aug 93 23:05:52 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Commercial PGP; trapdoor rumors
Message-ID: <01H2813M8J6090MZGB@delphi.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


It would be very easy to put a trapdoor into a version of PGP, and the
only way to detect it would be to reverse-engineer the object code. For
example: take the date, recipient's key id, and a 16 bit random number,
MD5 it, and that's your session key. They all look random, but to crack
it you only have to try 65536 combinations (trivial - IDEA is fast).
You could also set a trapdoor value which would always be accepted as
a valid signature.

However, it would be very unlikely that a company which deals in
cryptography would actually do this. There are quite a few hackers
around who can reverse-engineer code. If one of them found the
tampering, ViaCrypt would be commercially ruined (magazine headlines,
nobody buys crypto from them again) and likely open to lawsuits from 
anyone who ever used their product. If they really want to reassure
us: let Phil Zimmerman and a couple of others examine *all* of the
source code, let Zimmerman run the compiler himself, then Zimmerman
and the others sign the object code and a statement that they certify
the program has no trapdoors. Include this as a detached signature
certificate with the program, much like PGPSIG.ASC. Also, offer a 
sizable reward ($1000 or better) for anyone who breaks either commercial 
or freeware PGP and tells how it's done.

PGP uses randseed.bin and the time to generate random session keys.
If you used the same randseed and wrote a tsr which freezes the
clock (i.e. always gives the same value) wouldn't you get the same
session key? You'd have to recopy randseed from a backup after each
run, because it's re-scrambled. If you get free PGP to give the
same key twice, commercial PGP should give the same key under
the same conditions.

There should be no way to tell, by looking at keys or ciphertext,
whether they were created by commercial or free PGP. This would
head off any persecution of free PGP users, provided of course
that anyone who makes a cent from PGP had better *own* the commercial
version. He could, of course, *use* the free version!

Will PKP agree to condone the use of the free version for personal
non-profit communication? They will if they know what's good for their
bottom line. PGP could become a standard, and they stand to make
a lot of money off its success. 

I hope that future U.S. PGP's are not hobbled with slow PKP-approved
RSA code. If they are, I and many people will ftp the foreign versions
from sites outside the U.S.

> From:   IN%"an31144@anon.penet.fi" 26-AUG-1993 19:17:39.96
> I would be pleased to see some truly exhaustive efforts made to test
> PGP's actual security.

> I have been seeing yet more criticisms of PGP, this time from some
> character calling himself "Raymond Paquin."  He claims to be a
> professor of mathematics who has been working at an unnamed university
> exclusively on cryptographics for the past twelve years.  He implies
> that he is working for some government in a classified capacity and is
> thus unable to either publish or discuss the matter openly.

> He claims that PGP is fatally flawed, though the flaw is in niether
> RSA or IDEA, but rather somewhere within the PGP part of the program.

> Copping the "I can say no more!  I have said too much already!"
> melodrama, no more detailed information is forthcoming.

> Now, this tease seems to reek of a hoax, but Zimmermann himself claimed
> no high degree of security for the program.  To my knowledge, no serious
> or well-funded unclassified attempts have been made to crack PGP.  I
> fear that we are putting our faith in snake oil, as Zimmermann puts it.

> I am not a mathematician, but merely a former spear-carrier in the Cold
> War with some fairly well-developed residual instincts about this sort
> of thing, including a conviction that all security measures - physical,
> electronic or cryptographic - can be compromised by a determined
> opponent with extensive resources.  Once compromised, attacks thereafter
> may often be trivially accomplished.

> From:   IN%"an31185@anon.penet.fi" 26-AUG-1993 20:40:09.66
> an31144@anon.penet.fi writes:

> ["Raymond Paquin"]
> >.. claims that PGP is fatally flawed, though the flaw is in niether
> >RSA or IDEA, but rather somewhere within the PGP part of the program.
> >
> >Copping the "I can say no more!  I have said too much already!"
> >melodrama, no more detailed information is forthcoming.

> Yes, this seems to be a persistent rumour, though I've no idea how true
> it might be. I uploaded PGP to a bulletin board a few months back and
> received a message from another user claiming the same thing. (And taking
> the same copout...)

> I've been meaning to take a good look at the source for a while, I think
> it's about time to investigate the key generation code.....

Where did these rumors come from?

1: PKP
2: NSA
3: David Sternlight

I remember a thread on alt.security.pgp about version 2.3 having a
trapdoor in it. And I think they said the same about 2.2 before that.
Whoever "Raymond Paquin" is, he's no spook. Spooks just don't do
things like that - tell a little bit, then clam up. They are 
trained by instinct never to leak. Most rumors wilt under bright 
lights; where were these originally posted? Ask this person to
post anonymously: where is the trapdoor?

If there is any flaw in PGP, there are only a few places where it
could be. The basic mechanics of the program (RSA, IDEA, etc) obviously
work. The file format can easily be checked to make sure it is correct.
A subtle flaw would have to be somewhere like: prime number generation,
random RSA key generation, or random session key generation. If the primes
weren't actually prime, that would make the RSA keys breakable. But
you could take the primes (pgp -kg -l and you will see them in hex)
and feed them into a primality tester to verify that.

The most likely place for a bug would be in the randomness. I suppose
it is possible that a one-line bug somewhere could leave out most of 
the randomness, making the keys still look random but actually be
predictable. Random number generation is hard to verify. How has
that in PGP been checked? The PGP source is so big and spread out,
it's hard to check. I don't think there is a bug, but it would
be nice if PGP were carefully examined and attacked. Where are these
rumors coming from? They are bad for the cause. 

                                     < mikeingle@delphi.com >
                                     PGP key on servers.
                                     Clipper - Big Brother Inside!





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "George A. Gleason" <gg@well.sf.ca.us>
Date: Fri, 27 Aug 93 01:52:42 PDT
To: huntting@glarp.com
Subject: Re: ViaCrypt's PGP
Message-ID: <93Aug27.014902pdt.14451-3@well.sf.ca.us>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


"No sir, we never used PGP" can probably be proven false if ViaCrypt has
some kind of tweak built in.  So then you get nailed both ways.  No thanks;
let's have someone check out the source code under NDA and then report back,
and if ViaCrypt is clean, great, that can only help the overall cause.

-gg




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "George A. Gleason" <gg@well.sf.ca.us>
Date: Fri, 27 Aug 93 02:02:42 PDT
To: gg@well.sf.ca.us
Subject: Re: Source Code NOT available for ViaCrypt PGP
Message-ID: <93Aug27.015856pdt.14453-4@well.sf.ca.us>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


"(the problem is) convincing ViaCrypt to trust (some Cypherpunk)."  There   
are cypherpunks who have sufficient assets that they would reasonably be    
considered to want to protect themselves from losing same in a lawsuit over 
violating the terms of the non-disclosure agreement.  Hey, if you have      
equity in a house, you begin to qualify for this one.  Better if you own a  
company or have other significant assets.

If someone here stands up and says, "Hey ViaCrypt, I'll put my
(house/company/stock portfolio/etc.) on the block to back up my NDA, now
let's play ball," ViaCrypt will have a very very hard time saying no.  And
if they do say no, they come out looking very bad indeed.  If ViaCrypt are
reasonable people, let's give them the reassurance that any reasonable
person needs against the possibility of getting burned.  Then the ball's in
their court, and they've got to respond.  

-gg




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: bill@twwells.com (T. William Wells)
Date: Thu, 26 Aug 93 22:05:52 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: .Comparing ViaCrypt and freeware.
In-Reply-To: <9308270131.AA13145@_micro.med.cornell.edu>
Message-ID: <CCEDo7.EDA@twwells.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


If you're worried about backdoors, reverse engineer it and verify
that it works as advertised. Given that the program has to largely
duplicate an existing set of source, this should be trivial.





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: b44729@achilles.ctd.anl.gov (Samuel Pigg)
Date: Fri, 27 Aug 93 03:55:54 PDT
To: hfinney@shell.portal.com
Subject: Re: Attacks on remailers (LONG)
In-Reply-To: <9308270511.AA25630@jobe.shell.portal.com>
Message-ID: <9308271052.AA07922@achilles.ctd.anl.gov>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



>>>>> On Thu, 26 Aug 93 22:11:20 PDT, hfinney@shell.portal.com said:

>>>>> On Wed, 25 Aug 93 11:39:11 EDT, J_G_Thomas%CAASD1@mwmgate1.mitre.org said:
	[...]

	hfinney> As I indicated in my long posting, it is not
	hfinney> necessary to send out the same message that was
	hfinney> received.  Chaum proposed encrypting the message (the
	hfinney> non-address-block portion) with a secret key at each
	hfinney> stage, a key which would be revealed to the remailer
	hfinney> (along with the address of the next address in the
	hfinney> chain) when it peeled off its own layer of
	hfinney> encryption.

	[...]

	hfinney> If no encryption is done on the message body, there
	hfinney> is another attack for this case that I didn't
	hfinney> mention.  It is:

	hfinney> Run a remailer.  For every anonymous address floating
	hfinney> around on the net, try sending a message to it.  Look
	hfinney> at the messages which pass through your own remailer
	hfinney> and look for matches to the message you sent.  Any
	hfinney> anonymous address which includes your remailer as one
	hfinney> of the elements will pass through you.  You have then
	hfinney> defeated all of the stages of the chain before
	hfinney> yourself.  In particular, if you happen to be the
	hfinney> last remailer of the chain, you have broken the
	hfinney> anonymity of the anonymous address.

	hfinney> This attack, while not the most powerful on the list,
	hfinney> defeats many of the principles of remailer chains,
	hfinney> such as that the chain is as strong as its strongest
	hfinney> link.  It requires you to strongly trust at least one
	hfinney> remailer in the chain (the last one), whereas without
	hfinney> this attack you would not have to especially trust
	hfinney> any single remailer.  So it is significant.

Correct me if I'm wrong, but as I see it, there are two goals
for the remailers:

(1) 	Anonymous addresses to which mail can be sent, but the recipient
	is unknown and cannot be determined (receiving anonymous mail).

(2)	The ability to send mail to someone without anyone (including
	the recipient) determing that you did so (sending anonymous mail).


Number 2 can be mostly taken care of with nested encryption of mail headers.

Using the method you mentioned above of including a key to encrypt the
body of the message nested inside each level of nested encryption
would take care of the above problem (having to completely trust the
last remailer) and restore the "chain is as strong as its strongest
link" principle.

This would complicate slightly complicate the final decryption for the
anonymous recipient (having to decrypt the body of the message with each
key in turn.) New software tools could need to be written for
the recipients as well as the sender to handle this easier.

A "anonymous address block" similar to the pgp signature blocks
would be helpful for automating the sending of mail to anonymous
addresses.

To construct an anonymous address block might be something like:

	Anonymous Anne wants an anonymous address.
	First she generates a set of N keys (IDEA, DES or RSA, doesn't
	matter except RSA would disallow a remailer to decrypt what it 
	encrypted using it.) She would then choose a path through
	the remailers and encrypt her address (and perhaps one of 
	the random keys) with the last remailer's key.

	The result of this she would pair with the address of the 
	next remailer closer to her (in the remailing path) and
	one of the random keys, and encrypt this with the 
	next-to-the-last remailer's key
		.
		. (for all hops)
		.
		|
		v
	She would then encrypt the result of the previous operation
	with the key of the intended first remailer in the chain.

	Then she would add the address of the first remailer
	(in cleartext).

	This (largish nested encrypted address chain + cleartext
	first remailer address) she would encrypt (or sign) with the
	secret key of her anonymous persona.

The appropriate software tools would allow someone to reply
to an anonymous address using this "anonymous address block".

	[...]
	hfinney> This lack-of-TCP problem also impacts the proposal to
	hfinney> use a public telnet port for message communication.
	hfinney> Another problem with that proposal is that it would
	hfinney> need the remailers to run as background processes.
	hfinney> With the current software they can run as mail
	hfinney> filters, which makes them much less conspicuous to
	hfinney> system managers.

True, but it would also protect against attack 2 in your "Attacks on
remailers" post -- the mail log problem.

I think it would be fairly simple to include in the next-remailer-address
whether or not to use normal mail channels (for uucp remailers)
or to use socket nnnn connection to the remailer (for the ones
that are capable.)

	hfinney> The suggestion for remailers to send messages by
	hfinney> telnet connection to port 25 of some other machine
	hfinney> (rather than by piping to sendmail as they currently
	hfinney> do) is perhaps reasonable (for those systems with TCP
	hfinney> access), although it makes the remailer somewhat
	hfinney> harder to set up since you have to find some other
	hfinney> machine which will let you connect to their port.
	hfinney> Also, I think some machines may log incoming or
	hfinney> outgoing telnet connections to this port, since it is
	hfinney> a common technique for mail forgeries.  I have heard
	hfinney> that most systems will actually not allow public
	hfinney> telnet connections to this port.

The socket connections to other remailers would use a special port
number. For the last connection (to the recipient) could be either
by socket 25 connection or normal mail, whichever works (preferrably
socket 25.)

	hfinney> I don't know that much about how widely available
	hfinney> telnet and other TCP/IP services are on the net, so
	hfinney> if these techniques are more usable than I am
	hfinney> suggesting I'd like to hear about it.

I haven't seen a machine that doesn't allow just anyone to
connect to port 25. (is there some new authentication protocol
for this that I missed?)


So the attacks and defenses as outlined by hal (with some additions):

(1) Reading the "request-remailing-to" lines in the message to determine
where it is going.

Defeats remailer goal #2.

Defense: can be defeated by nesting the remailer encryption.

(2) Reading mail logs to plot the path of a message.

Defeats remailer goals 1 and 2.

Defense: bypass mail systems on remailer hosts, using special
port socket connection communication wherever possible; run remailers
only on systems that do not keep mail logs.

(3) Monitor messages in real time flowing in and out of remailers,
	correlating the input messages with output.

This is a variation of attack 2, and can defeat both remailer goals.

Defense: Batch remailing messages in a manner which frustrates analysis;
	send fake messages to other remailers in such a manner as
	to maintain a constant flow, removing flow rate cues.

(4) Read header info and check message size for remailer input/output
	correlation cues.

Variation of attack 2, and can defeat both remailer goals.

Defense: Do not preserve any header information; pad messages to remove size
	cues.

(5) Inject a clone of a message into the remailer stream, and look for
	two identical messages to come out of a remailer to track the
	message.

Another variation of attack 2.

Defense: Check for duplicate messages in the remailer and remove all
	but one copy of each duplicate.

(6) Insert duplicate messages in the input stream in seperate batches,
	checking the outgoing batches for copies to track the message.

Same problem as (5) really.

Defense: Timestamp the messages so they are only good for a number of days,
	thus reducing the number of messages to check against for duplicates.

I don't like this defense.
Who would make the timestamp?
Where would you put the timestamp?
How would you prevent spoofing?

	If you added an element of randomness to the procedure that
padded/altered the message before sending on to the next remailer, it
would defend against this line of attack -- so two identical messages
going into a remailer would come out differently. This is where DH key
exchange could be fruitful (with random session keys for each
message.)  (Assuming that the remailers don't know each other's RSA
keys. If they did, then they could simply encrypt a random session key
with the other's key and encrypt the message with the key also, and
ship them both over to the next remailer.)


(7): Look at all messages coming out of the first remailer, and
follow them into their 2nd remailers; take all messages from those and
follow them on, and so on.  This will eventually lead to a number of
destinations, one of which must have been the destination of the original
message.  Over a period of time, look for correlations between destinations
and sources.

Defense: Use large remailer chains of popular remailers.  With enough
mixing at each stage of the chain, the number of possible destinations
will become astronomically large, making correlations statistically
impossible; use of dummy messages to pad flow rate to constant
would increase the difficulty of such an attack (would hide the signal
deeper in the noise.); such an attack (PROLONGED monitoring of all
remailers) would be very difficult to perform, esp. with use of
remailer-remailer socket connections.

(8): Correlate messages being sent from person A with messages being
received a certain time later by person B.  Even without the ability to
track messages through the remailers this can show a communication pattern.

Defense: Send dummy messages at regular intervals, which bounce through
the remailer network and then die.  When you have a real message to send,
replace one of the dummies with this.  The sender's traffic pattern is
then constant and no information can be gained from it.

(9): Bribe or coerce one or more remailer operators into revealing
their keys, or into decrypting the desired messages.  Alternatively, run
many remailers, pretending to be dedicated to privacy, while secretly
gathering information on the messages.

Defense: Use many remailers in a variety of geographical locations, so
that it is unlikely that all of them can be corrupted in this way.


There is another attack scenario, a variation of (9) that
has not really been discussed.

(10)The problem begins with the fact that anonymous addresses are
essentially timeless. While you are safe as long as one remailer is
not compromised ("chain being as strong as its strongest link"), your
anonymous address block is "eternal" in that it lasts as long as the
remailers themselves. 
	Suppose some "determined power" wanted to know who was at the
other end of an anonymous address.  This "determined power" could
coerce each remailer to in turn strip its encryption from the
anonymous address block, and TAKE AS LONG AS IT NEEDED with each
remailer to do this.
	To defend against this, I think remailer secret keys should
expire and BE DESTROYED after a set period of time. When it's time to
expire the old key pair, a remailer could generate a new key pair, and
sign the new public key with the old secret key (assuring it came from
the remailer) and then destroy the old secret key completely. All
remailers would have to do this fairly synchronized, in order for anon
addresses to be useable. (Can't have one key in the chain expiring
unexpectedly).
	Anonymous addresses would then have to be re-generated with the
new remailer keys (and hopefully a new remailer path as well!).

	Hopefully if such a situation ever arose, the keys would
expire and be deleted before the "determined power" could manage to coerce
ALL the remailers in the anonymous address block's remailer chain to
strip off their respective encryption layers.  (coercion/key
theft/whatever..)
(ie "Sorry.. can't decrypt this for you.. the key was automatically
destroyed 6 days ago...")

	This would also help defend against attack #7 by forcing 
the re-generation of anonymous address blocks, with (hopefully)
new remailer chains attached to them.


Other possibilities for increasing the security and the difficulty of
attacks:

(1)	Allow for encrypted header blocks (either in the anonymous
address block or in the sender's encrypted header block) to contain
commands to remailers to split the message into pieces (either just
cutting it up, or ripping it into 2 or more pieces connected by XOR's
or whatever) and send out via different paths (path "forking") to be
reassembled at the end.
	This would make attacks 3,4, and 7 more difficult, and would
not be too bad to reassemble for the anonymous address blocks, but
would be hard to deal with for the sender-anonymity version (at the
receiver end.)


(2) 	Implement a remailer web that is constantly connected via
sockets, with a near-constant-volume encrypted byte stream, with rapidly
changing keys and mixing of fake data and real data.
	This would eliminate the need to pad or batch messages and
would defeat attacks 2,3,4,5,6, and would make attack 7 harder.

	This would also be pretty tough to do, and could put a serious
drain on the computational and bandwidth resources of the remailer
hosts. (student accts would be out.)

Ideas/Comments/Criticisms?

Sorry, this was longer than I thought it would be (trying to be as complete
as I can.)
-Sam





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: dmandl@lehman.com (David Mandl)
Date: Fri, 27 Aug 93 05:12:47 PDT
To: mbriceno@aol.com
Subject: Re: Coming Soon:  Commercial version of PGP!
Message-ID: <9308271210.AA09599@disvnm2.lehman.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> gg@well.sf.ca.us writes:
> 
> > How soon before a Mac compatible version is available? Or will the
> > current version run under Soft PC on the Mac, which is essentially a
> > PC-emulator...? If yes to either, sign me up...! 
> 
> Have you tried the freeware version of MacPGP yet? It is very easy to use.
> The next release (now in beta) will even support AppleEvents. I think it will
> be quite a while before you can buy something similar.
> [And why would you want to pay if you can get for free?]
> 
> --Marc

I was a beta tester of the latest version of MacPGP, and it looks *very* nice.
Some annoying minor bugs have been fixed and a few new features added, including
a hook for BBEdit (a godsend).  I assume it'll be released any week now, if not
sooner.

If it's true that the freeware version of PGP will be allowed to exist alongside
the new (sourceless) commercial version, I don't think the cypherpunk in the know
will have much trouble choosing...

   --Dave.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: nobody@alumni.cco.caltech.edu
Date: Fri, 27 Aug 93 09:02:51 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Commercial PGP; trapdoor rumors
Message-ID: <9308271554.AA08533@alumni.cco.caltech.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> In April, I talked to Jim Bidzos @ PKP, and he agreed to allow his
> licensed RSA code to be built into a PGP compatible freeware program.

have you considered the possibility that bidzos is a FUCKING LIAR?

shaen bernhardt put it well many months ago:

    Don't sell out cypherpunks, RSA Inc. will stab you in the back as
    quickly as anyone else.

here's another quote i like to review when i'm feeling too calm.  it
comes from a tcmay description of a cpunx mtg in sf:

    I think I mentioned somewhere that I put Bidzos on the spot
    with what I called "The 64-bit Question": Are you going to cut
    a deal and sell us out? [regarding clipper/capstone]
    
    Bidzos was very sober when he answered this, and said, roughly:
    "If you mean will I conspire with the government to deny strong
    crypto to users, no. But if Clipper and Capstone are destined
    for deployment and they come to us and offer royalties, what
    choice will we have? We have a duty to our shareholders." And
    as he was leaving for the day, he leaned in the door to our
    meeting and said, as if to reiterate the point, "Tim, I won't
    sell you out."
    
let me translate bidzos' reply:  I WILL SELL YOU OUT.  

so go ahead, rely on bidzos' word.  but take my advice: count your
fingers after shaking hands.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: hughes@ah.com (Eric Hughes)
Date: Fri, 27 Aug 93 10:22:51 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: REMAIL: Attacks on remailers
In-Reply-To: <9308271052.AA07922@achilles.ctd.anl.gov>
Message-ID: <9308271714.AA11676@ah.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Attack (7) is made by an opponent who monitors all network traffic,
but has no access to the insides of the remailer nodes.

The defense is more subtle, however, than proposed.

>(7): Look at all messages coming out of the first remailer, and
>follow them into their 2nd remailers; take all messages from those and
>follow them on, and so on.  This will eventually lead to a number of
>destinations, one of which must have been the destination of the original
>message.  Over a period of time, look for correlations between destinations
>and sources.

Let us assume that these remailers have the basic characteristics of
mixes: encryption rewriting, size quantization, and message
reordering.  Furthermore, let us assume that the defense of using
'large' chains of 'popular' remailers is being used.

>With enough
>mixing at each stage of the chain, the number of possible destinations
>will become astronomically large, 

The possible number of destinations should increase exponentially with
each hop.  If gather-and-rearrange mixing is done, then the number is
the product of the rearrangement thresholds for each remailer.  If a
radioactive decay model for reordering is used, then it is the
expected value of the number of destinations which grows
exponentially, that is, the possible number of destinations (those
with non-zero probability) grows faster that the expected value of the
number of destinations.  They are both exponential, but one has a
larger base than the other.

What is more important than the reordering algorithm is that the
expected number of destinations grows exponentially with the number of
hops.  There will be correlations, but with linear increase in cost we
can get rid of them, we hope.  

>making correlations statistically impossible

What is the nature of the remailer path, however, for which we have an
assurance that the correlations are too difficult to carry out?  Or to
ask a simpler question for a simpler environment where we assume all
remailers are equal, just how long does the path have to be?

We know that by making the paths "long enough" that we can prevent
correlations from becoming significant.  The question is how do we
find out what is long enough?

>such an attack (PROLONGED monitoring of all
>remailers) would be very difficult to perform, esp. with use of
>remailer-remailer socket connections.

The fact that it would be difficult is not the issue for the theory,
but for the practice.  The extremely high cost, however, could be
justified for 'national security' reasons against a few targets, or
to break the system completely open looking for 'tax evaders.'

If our theory is good against an arbitrarily strong opponent, then the
system can withstand sustained attack.  If the existence of the system
is seen as sufficiently threatening, for any number of different
threats, we should plan for a sustained attack.  We need to know what
the limits of the capability are and not just guess.

I've been thinking about an invariant for communications systems proof
against traffic analysis which I call 'privacy diffusion'.  The
privacy diffusion is a probability distribution over possible
recipients.  One characteristic of the privacy diffusion is the
expected value of the number of different recipients.  This is a good
first measure, but I suspect it won't be enough.

The expected number of recipients is multiplicative in the diffusion
per node, as described above.  If different downstream nodes have
different mixing thresholds, they'll need to be weighted.  Since the
system is multiplicative, the weighting should be by geometric mean,
i.e. a downstream node with probability 1/10 should multiply by the
10th root of its own threshold.  One can see that if all the
downstream nodes have equal likelihood and identical thresholds, that
this formula degenerates into the simple one above.

In fact, there is a simple closed form expression for this value,
namely, e^-E(ln p), the inverse exponential of the expected log
probability.  This is exactly e^H, where H is the entropy of the
probability distribution.  e^H is also the expected size of the search
space, were we looking for encryption keys.

On the other hand, this situation is unlike a key search space in that
every value is not equally likely and that the priors are not
independent.  In a phrase, not everybody talks to everyone else, but
everyone who talks talks to someone else.  We can make a baseline
model of a communications graph with probabilities on it.  (This
doesn't take into account state, e.g. conversations tend to happen
alternately.)  Most edges on this graph will have p=0, i.e. these two
people have never communicated.  Let us remove these null edges.  What
we are left with is a sparse graph with lots of clustering (friends of
friends).  In this situation, if our message could have gone to ten
million people (say, 7 hops each with threshold 10), it is more likely
that it went to one of twenty or fifty.

Even if you don't know what the graph looks like, you'll know that it
is sparse, and you'll have some idea of what the characteristic
distributions are.  This is exactly the equivalent of studying letter,
digram, and higher order statistics for English and other natural
languages.  The statistics gathered as to the prior distribution will
appear in the observed output unless one has some good idea of how to
'confuse and diffuse' them.

I am pushing an analogy here between cracking codes and cracking
traffic patterns.  I am pretty sure that there are more parallels than
meet the eye.  The appearance of the entropy in the expected number of
recipients may be only the tip of a much larger correlation.

traffic			cipher
=======			======
statistics of		letter frequencies
interconnection		of the plaintext

observed messages	ciphertext

path through		key
remailers

mixing algorithms	encryption

null messages		padding

This whole mix system needs a lot more thought before we'll have an
assurance that it will be secure against sustained attack.

-------------------------------------------------------

On the lighter side, I couldn't resist this next one.

>(8): Correlate messages being sent from person A with messages being
>received a certain time later by person B.  

>Defense: [...] The sender's traffic pattern is
>then constant and no information can be gained from it.

And for the receiver, just subscribe to cypherpunks under several
different aliases.

Eric




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: hughes@ah.com (Eric Hughes)
Date: Fri, 27 Aug 93 10:32:52 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Mailer hooks for PGP
In-Reply-To: <m0oW5Bn-000BfRC@snark.uucp>
Message-ID: <9308271722.AA11690@ah.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>check your public ring and automatically sign/encode outgoing mail to
>eligible users

As a general rule, mere presence of a key on a keyring should not
indicate that this person wishes to receive encrypted mail.  There
should be a separate installation for that, either by an enhanced
alias file or similar.  There are many for whom reading encrypted mail
is not always desirable, because the effort required to download it
and decrypt it is more time than the content is worth.  I myself fall
into this category, unfortunately.

I mean, if you encrypted if there was a key for someone, and sent mail
to David Sternlight, he wouldn't be able to read what you wrote!  :-)

Eric




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: snark!esr@gvls1.VFL.Paramax.COM (Eric S. Raymond)
Date: Fri, 27 Aug 93 08:02:50 PDT
To: snark!cypherpunks
Subject: Cypherpunks FAQ status
Message-ID: <m0oW4nZ-000BfRC@snark.uucp>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I have received valuable and detailed feedback on the second-draft cypherpunk
FAQ from a couple of posters.  Accordingly, I expect to post a third cut
either later today or around 8th September, on my return for California.

(I'm flying out tomorrow for the World Science Fiction Convention.  I'll meet
some of you FTF at the 5th anniversary Extropians party.)
-- 
						>>eric>>



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Karl Lui Barrus <klbarrus@owlnet.rice.edu>
Date: Fri, 27 Aug 93 08:35:56 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Adding an "AKA"
In-Reply-To: <smeT9B1w165w@sytex.com>
Message-ID: <9308271532.AA10380@arcadien.owlnet.rice.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Paul,

I think all you do is

pgp -ke ferguson

and it will ask if you want to add more info to your public key.

I did this so now my public key looks like this: 'pgp -kvv barrus'

Key ring: '/home/klbarrus/Crypto/pgp/pubring.pgp', looking for user ID "barrus".
Type bits/keyID   Date       User ID
pub  1024/5AD633 1993/01/08  Karl L. Barrus <klbarrus@owlnet.rice.edu>
                             Karl L. Barrus <elee9sf@menudo.uh.edu>
1 key(s) examined.

-- 
/--------------------------------------------------\
| Karl L. Barrus                                   |
| klbarrus@owlnet.rice.edu                         |
| D1 59 9D 48 72 E9 19 D5  3D F3 93 7E 81 B5 CC 32 |
\--------------------------------------------------/




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Pat Farrell" <pfarrell@cs.gmu.edu>
Date: Fri, 27 Aug 93 07:38:18 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: RE: Commercial PGP; trapdoor rumors
Message-ID: <38183.pfarrell@cs.gmu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


In message Fri, 27 Aug 1993 01:46:57 -0400 (EDT),
  Mike Ingle <MIKEINGLE@delphi.com>  writes:

>
> Will PKP agree to condone the use of the free version for personal
> non-profit communication? They will if they know what's good for their
> bottom line. PGP could become a standard, and they stand to make
> a lot of money off its success.

In April, I talked to Jim Bidzos @ PKP, and he agreed to allow his
licensed RSA code to be built into a PGP compatible freeware program.
I believe some folks at MIT were planning to start work on it...
After all, cypherpunks write code...

Pat

Pat Farrell      Grad Student                 pfarrell@cs.gmu.edu
Department of Computer Science    George Mason University, Fairfax, VA
Public key availble via finger          #include <standard.disclaimer>




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: edgar@spectrx.Saigon.COM (Edgar W. Swank)
Date: Fri, 27 Aug 93 11:32:52 PDT
To: Cypherpunks          <cypherpunks@toad.com>
Subject: Phil Zimmerman Press Briefing?
Message-ID: <FRcy9B9w165w@spectrx.saigon.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


To:  Bay Area Extropians  <exi-bay@gnu.ai.mit.edu>
     Cypherpunks          <cypherpunks@toad.com>

I just spoke to Phil Zimmerman on the phone (8/27 about 10am).
He told me he plans to attend the Extropganza tomorrow, and
to use the occasion to hold some kind of press briefing of his just-
announce product "ViaCrypt", a commercial version of PGP.

He asked me to send out this E-mail request for all of you who
know any press people to invite them to attend.

Unfortunately, Phil was unable to tell me exactly when he expects
to arrive.

--
edgar@spectrx.saigon.com (Edgar W. Swank)
SPECTROX SYSTEMS +1.408.252.1005  Cupertino, Ca





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: snark!esr@gvls1.VFL.Paramax.COM (Eric S. Raymond)
Date: Fri, 27 Aug 93 08:03:19 PDT
To: snark!cypherpunks
Subject: Mailer hooks for PGP
Message-ID: <m0oW5Bn-000BfRC@snark.uucp>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I've now uploaded and made PGP.  It looks mondo cool, but also kind of a
pain to use because the existing interface requires one to perform encryption
and decryption manually.

I'm considering writing patches for Elm 2.4 that would allow it to (a)
check your public ring and automatically sign/encode outgoing mail to
eligible users, and (b) automatically decode incoming mail.

Elm is a very popular mailer.  If I could get these patches into the
distribution, the hassle barrier to widespread use of PGP would drop
significantly.  And the prospects for that are good; I'm friendly with
the Elm development group moderator.  Also, there's precedent for Elm
to delegate message decoding --- it has MIME hooks that shell out to
metamail.

(That brings up another point.  Has anyone worked on getting armored
PGP registered as an official MIME encoding type?  Getting pgp support
into metamail would be a massive win --- probably better than hooks in
Elm itself.  If no one else is working this angle, I'd be willing to
get in touch with Nathaniel Borenstein and use whatever zorch I have
with him to make it happen.)

Now, before I begin hacking.  Has anything like this been done before?
Are there any known design problems or pitfalls in integration with a
mailer such as Elm?  And, finally, if prz is listening, would you be
willing to accept minor hacks for this purpose such as the addition of
a new pgp interface mode tailored for use from mailers?
-- 
						>>eric>>



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Timothy Newsham <newsham@wiliki.eng.hawaii.edu>
Date: Fri, 27 Aug 93 14:07:54 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Matrix extensions of the rsa algorithm.
Message-ID: <9308272106.AA17441@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



I have posted this before and never saw any reply.
The following sounded appealing to me because it gives
public key features with private key cryptosystem speeds.

Matrix Extensions of the RSA Algorithm
Chih-Chwen Chuang and James George Dunham
CRYPTO '90

Abstract

A new matrix extension of the RSA algorithm is proposed which is based
on the Cayley-Hamilton theorem and a one-way function.  The security
of this algorithm rests on that of the RSA algorithm and the one-way
function.  The computational efficiency of the new algorithm depends
on the dimension of the marix.  The most efficient implementation is
the 2x2 case in which both the encryption and decryption use a single
modulo arithmetic multiplication and single evaluation of the one-way
function.


later in the paper..

'Under a chosen plaintext attack on the key, the security of the new
algorithm is equivalent to that of the RSA algorithm.  Under a known
plaintext attack on the message, the security of the system rests
upon that of the one-way function.'

'..theyse public key cryptosystems hvae the potential of a fast
implementation.'


Has anyone looked into this paper?  Has anyone implemented the
cryptosystem explained in it?





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: peb@PROCASE.COM (Paul Baclace)
Date: Fri, 27 Aug 93 11:13:21 PDT
To: frissell@panix.com
Subject: Re: What, Me Worry?
Message-ID: <9308271811.AA06477@banff.procase.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



The WSJ article about GPS has a familiar cypherpunk ring to it...the
commercial GPS signal is weakened (millitary 10ft accuracy signal is
encrypted), the "enemies" are using it for missile guidance anyway
(better than gyroscopes), and the hegemony of the US is wanning as
perfectly predicted in The Great Reckoning (James Davidson and
Rees-Mogg):  defensive technology is improving over destructive
technology and information technology eventually leaks out.

Paul E. Baclace
peb@procase.com




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: rjc@gnu.ai.mit.edu (Ray)
Date: Fri, 27 Aug 93 08:47:50 PDT
To: snark!esr@gvls1.vfl.paramax.com (Eric S. Raymond)
Subject: Re: Mailer hooks for PGP
In-Reply-To: <m0oW5Bn-000BfRC@snark.uucp>
Message-ID: <9308271545.AA29692@geech.gnu.ai.mit.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



  Isn't there already a version of elm with pgp patches?

-- Ray Cromwell        |    Engineering is the implementation of science;    --
-- EE/Math Student     |       politics is the implementation of faith.      --
-- rjc@gnu.ai.mit.edu  |                         - Zetetic Commentaries      --




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: collins@newton.apple.com (Scott Collins)
Date: Fri, 27 Aug 93 12:06:00 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Who is David Sternlight?
Message-ID: <9308271859.AA22219@newton.apple.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


  >[...] WHO IS DAVID STERNLIGHT? [...]

David Sternlight is a particulary active, if not universally admired,
poster to sci.crypt et al (including a special fan club news group).

The volume of his posts and their position (often antithetical to positions
taken by cypherpunks) has led some to speculate that he is not an
individual at all, but a group with an agenda.

Some people delight in reading his posts, either because they approve, or
for the same reason I like to read 'Ask Marilyn' in Parade: because they
like to get riled up.  Some people just add him to their 'kill' files. 
There has been debate over adding software moderation to sci.crypt that
automatically redirects David Sternlight posts to a side group.  In any
case, DS (as he is sometimes referred to) is a prominent political feature
of the privacy/cryptography related news groups.

If you really want to know who he is: join sci.crypt; read some of his
posts; and then ask him in e-mail.

If you do send him e-mail -- make sure that if you use an anonymous
remailer of the variety that allows him to respond to you, unlike the one
you used to post this request.

Hope this helps,

Scott Collins         | "Few people realize what tremendous power there
                      |  is in one of these things."     -- Willy Wonka
......................|................................................
BUSINESS.   voice:408.862.0540  fax:974.6094   collins@newton.apple.com
Apple Computer, Inc.   1 Infinite Loop, MS 301-2C   Cupertino, CA 95014
.......................................................................
PERSONAL.   voice/fax:408.257.1746    1024/669687   catalyst@netcom.com





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Date: Fri, 27 Aug 93 12:47:54 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Who is David Sternlight?
In-Reply-To: <9308271825.AA04321@bsu-cs.bsu.edu>
Message-ID: <9308271947.AA24274@netcom3.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Anonymous asks:

> Hi,
> 
> Being new to this list, I've got a ways to go before I understand
> everything I'm reading.  But one thing I'd like to know today, is
> JUST WHO IS DAVID STERNLIGHT?  I've seen his name mentioned here
> for the first time, and many times since.
> 
> Tanks

"David Sternlight" is actually an experimental neural net program
which is linked to the Net through Netcom. It has a long way to go
before being mistaken for a real person, though it seems to have
perfected the "rancor-mode" behavior seen in Net flame wars. 

This near-AI is especially active in sci.crypt, alt.privacy.clipper,
alt.security.pgp, and has its own special test area,
alt.fan.david-sternlight. Questions about the source code for the
"David Sternlight" program should be addressed there.

Like most computer programs, it is tenacious and has seemingly
inexhaustible patience in repeating arguments over and over again.
When challenged, it always responds. When challenged further, it
invokes subroutines which cite its knowledge base, its credentials,
and its general superiority to carbon-based intelligences.

Some say the program, which is nominally based in the Los Angeles
area, is actually one of the "Blue Ice" programs developed by the NSA,
similar to the Serdar Argic program deployed by the State Department
and the Ludwig Plutonium program being tested now by the National
Science Foundation.

I hope this helped.

-Tim May

-- 
..........................................................................
Timothy C. May         | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,  
tcmay@netcom.com       | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
408-688-5409           | knowledge, reputations, information markets, 
W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA  | black markets, collapse of governments.
Higher Power: 2^756839 | Public Key: PGP and MailSafe available.
Note: I put time and money into writing this posting. I hope you enjoy it.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: karn@qualcomm.com (Phil Karn)
Date: Fri, 27 Aug 93 13:13:24 PDT
To: peb@PROCASE.COM
Subject: What, Me Worry?
In-Reply-To: <9308271811.AA06477@banff.procase.com>
Message-ID: <9308272011.AA06979@servo>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I follow the GPS universe fairly closely.  The term for the
intentional degrading of accuracy for "unauthorized" (civilian) users
is "Selective Availability" (SA).

The story gets even better. Although the DoD hasn't described how SA
works, it's now apparent that they add cryptographically generated
"phase noise" to the timebase on each satellite, probably with a
direct digital synthesizer. In other words, the satellite looks like
it has a noiser atomic clock than it really does. "Authorized" users
with the right keys can regenerate the same dither stream and subtract
it out of their observations.

During the Gulf War, the DoD quietly turned SA *off* because they
could only meet their immediate need for vast quantities of receivers
by tapping the commercial ("unauthorized") market.  Of course, this
did not go unnoted by the civilan GPS market; there were probably some
red faces in the Pentagon.  I do know there were a lot of broad grins
in the civilian world. It's almost as if they had decided to use PGP
on PC clones due to a lack of NSA-approved military crypto gear.

Unfortunately, after the war, DoD turned SA back on again. However,
the civies had a neat trick up their sleeves: "differential GPS". This
involves placing a GPS receiver in a fixed spot and having it
broadcast the difference between its known location and its current
position as determined by GPS. Because most of the errors in GPS are
strongly correlated between nearby receivers, this subtracts out
almost all the errors in the mobile user's position. Not just SA, but
ionospheric dispersion, orbital element inaccuracies, etc.  The result
is an accuracy of 1-3 meters, with or without SA.

The really fun part is this. Guess who's leading the effort to deploy
differential GPS beacons? The US Coast Guard! That's right, while one
side of the military intentionally sabotages the signal, another
military service (albeit under the Department of Transportation rather
than the DoD) works to un-sabotage it! Your tax dollars at work.

Actually, the Coast Guard says it would be doing differential GPS even
if SA were turned off.  With SA on, accuracy is typically on the order
of 100m; without it, accuracy improves only to about 25m, and this is
insufficient for many harbor approaches.

And here's yet another delightful irony in the GPS saga. The DoD
maintains a network of ground tracking stations that determine the
orbit of each GPS satellite. Every few hours they uplink these orbital
elements to the satellites so they can be broadcast to the users.
There was talk for a time of encrypting the low order bits of the
orbital elements as part of SA, but this apparently hasn't happened.
Nevertheless, GPS is so useful to the international scientific
community that they've set up their own network of tracking stations
to produce and disseminate their own GPS orbital elements. And while
the DoD-generated elements are good only to about 10-15m, the
civilians, having many more stations and better techniques, generate
sets good to less than 1m!

Phil








From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Anonymous <nowhere@bsu-cs.bsu.edu>
Date: Fri, 27 Aug 93 11:25:59 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: No Subject
Message-ID: <9308271825.AA04321@bsu-cs.bsu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Hi,

Being new to this list, I've got a ways to go before I understand
everything I'm reading.  But one thing I'd like to know today, is
JUST WHO IS DAVID STERNLIGHT?  I've seen his name mentioned here
for the first time, and many times since.

Tanks




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Duncan Frissell <frissell@panix.com>
Date: Fri, 27 Aug 93 10:35:59 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: What, Me Worry?
Message-ID: <199308271732.AA13237@panix.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


To: cypherpunks@toad.com

From Thursday's WSJ news that suggests that the competition may be a tad 
busy to worry about suppressing strong crypto:

Poor Man's Cruise
Airliners Can Exploit
U.S. Guidance System
But So Can Enemies
  ---------
Global Positioning Satellites
Could Be Used to Direct
Cheap, Accurate Missiles
  ----------
Defense Aide:It's a Quandry

Washington--At the Pentagon, they
call it "the poor man's cruise missile."

It is a low-flying guided missile or
robot aircraft that is relatively
cheap to produce, but capable of hitting
targets with a precision the U.S. once
monopolized...


(you can fill in the rest of the story)


Reminded me of the late 60's early 70's with VonuLife and the gypsies 
and the troglodytes arguing that high-tech weapons would render large 
cities (aka target-rich environments) uninhabitable and people would have 
to spread out into communities too small to waste hardware on.

Also, Vinge's "The Ungoverned" in which tornado-killer missiles are 
retargeted at the government baddies.

This is an example of what I call the 
Sack-Full-Of-Cats-Thrown-In-The-River effect.  As things get dicey for 
large "target-rich" institutions like governments, and their revenues 
drain away to the nets, internal and external struggles for fading 
influence begin.  It ends up like a sack full of cats thrown into a river. 
Noisy, but fun if you don't like the cats.

Duncan Frissell

Who likes cats himself and could almost feel sorry for the rulers of 
others if they hadn't quite killed so many people.

"In his first three months in the White House, President Clinton killed 
more people in the United States than during the 12 years of Reagan-Bush."


--- WinQwk 2.0b#0
                                                                               




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: an31144@anon.penet.fi
Date: Fri, 27 Aug 93 14:15:59 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Plausible Spookiness
Message-ID: <199308272046.AA04048@xtropia>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> Whoever "Raymond Paquin" is, he's no spook. Spooks just don't do
> things like that - tell a little bit, then clam up. They are
> trained by instinct never to leak.

I got a sad little chuckle out of that one.  Leaving aside the
paradoxical "trained by instinct" line, I can assure you that your claim
here is simply naive.  Perhaps you watch too much TV.

For every Ivy League CIA careerist station chief with a vested interest
and thorough indoctrination, there are several thousand nobodies who
more or less blundered into the racket in minor capacities.  These are
underpaid, ignored, fucked-with, jacked around, abused, denied,
manipulated, lied to, insulted, cut loose, yanked back and otherwise
generally driven nuts until they quit, at which time they discover they
are too burned out to do anything in the real world - say, hold down
some shitty job ("There seems to be a rather large hole in your resume,
Mr. Smith...") or maintain personal relationships.

What these people will or won't do is beyond reliable conjecture.

Did you guess I speak from personal experience and observation?

What Paquin is or isn't, I can't say.  I haven't believed or trusted
anyone since late 1970 or so anyway, but I would not be surprised if
Paquin actually was doing pretty much what he said, namely working at
some university doing crypto math on some government grant with big
strings.  This is completely plausible.

> If there is any flaw in PGP, there are only a few places where it
> could be. The basic mechanics of the program (RSA, IDEA, etc)
> obviously work...

If you mean that they are NSA-proof, or that only brute force attacks
would affect decryption, I would suggest that we know no such thing, and
it is extremely unlikely that we ever will.  The NSA has _astounding_
resources, unequalled by anything in the private sector, dedicated to no
other purpose than compromising world-class cyphers.  Their successes
are not public knowledge, to say the least.  No one here should blithely
dismiss claims of PGP weaknesses when the opposition has literally
billions of dollars earmarked to find such flaws.

It bears noting that the concealment of major successes in decryption
are every bit as important as the decryption itself, a fact often
overlooked.

I would like to see "Paquin's" case against PGP as well as a competent
analysis of his claims.  Unfortunately, I cannot produce either.

 > A subtle flaw would have to be somewhere like: prime number
 > generation, random RSA key generation, or random session key
 > generation. If the primes weren't actually prime, that would make the
 > RSA keys breakable. But you could take the primes (pgp -kg -l and you
 > will see them in hex) and feed them into a primality tester to verify
 > that.

I have seen numerous conjectures about PGP primes, but am not competent
to judge them.

 > The most likely place for a bug would be in the randomness.
 
This has been another subject of discussion, though I know of no firm
conclusions being reached.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: wayner@cs.cornell.edu (Peter Wayner)
Date: Fri, 27 Aug 93 10:57:52 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Key Escrow Anecdote...
Message-ID: <9308271756.AA12706@sindri.cs.cornell.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



I was speaking with an international crypto consultant
who told me this story about a business with an office
in a South American country. They decided to start encrypting
their link. Within a week, a team of soldiers burst through
the door and smashed the encryption hardware to bits. On
the way out, they asked, "What are you trying to hide from us?"

-Peter




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: technopagan priest <tedwards@wam.umd.edu>
Date: Fri, 27 Aug 93 11:12:52 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: ViaCrypt PGP and source code
Message-ID: <199308271810.AA08679@rac1.wam.umd.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



I am sure that businesses will buy ViaCrypt PGP, even for $100.
PGP has proven itself to be a useful and safe encryption
package, and also can do digital signature, a feature not seen
in similarly priced PC security packages.

I think to not release the source code with ViaCrypt PGP is
a serious mistake.  First, I cannot see how releasing the 
RSA source can be harmful to ViaCrypt.  People can freely
examine PD PGP, I can't see how any trade secrets are going to
be revealed by showing the RSA source.  Perhaps it is slightly
faster, but information theoretic limits show that RSA quickly
becomes lengthy to encrypt, and I doubt PKP nor ViaCrypt have
made any significant progress towards making it faster compared
with PD PGP.

I had to laugh when people suggested the "Clipper-Like" review.
Why is it good for ViaCrypt, but not good for the government?

Let's face it...if ViaCrypt is serious about security, they will
release all source code for examination, and will digitally
sign all programs and have those signatures tracable to a
key on a ViaCrypt owned dial-up BBS.

I understand that there is a contractual problem with releasing
the RSA source.  Perhaps the contract should be re-negotiated.
I will bet ViaCrypt PGP will rapidly become a best-seller if
implemented properly.  There is plenty of money to be made if
everything is kept on the cryptographic "up and up."

-Thomas




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: nobody@pmantis.berkeley.edu
Date: Fri, 27 Aug 93 14:27:55 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re:  Digital Coin Claim
Message-ID: <9308272126.AA13256@pmantis.berkeley.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


At 10:24 PM 8/25/93 -0400, Paul L. Moses wrote:
>I think that creating a chain of title for digicoins would defeat the whole
>purpose of the exercise.  Creating a history of ownership is done in order to
>increase accountability, not privacy.  And such a history is necessary only to
>clarify disputes over ownership, liens, defects....things which are simply not
>problems with currency and bearer instruments.
>
>The question is, what is the end to which this chain of title is being put? 
>To verify that the holder is a "valid" holder?  THIS IS IRRELEVANT.  He who
>holds, owns.

Yes, but holds what?

I think you missed the point. You're thinking that people use their
identity-revealing keys to sign these public documents. I think Hnash
intended that people use anonymous or even one-time-only keys. The bearer
instrument is not the thing that gets publicized, it is the private key
corresponding to the public key in the public document. When you generate
that key, you put no identifying info in it. You use it only once, to
transfer ownership. Hence, your true identity is not tied in to the history
of ownership.

This leads back to the question about settling disputes - if the keys
associated with the owner of the coin do not identify him, he could attempt
to use the same coin more than once. This could perhaps be circumvented by
having a single registry. The merchant would wait until the registry showed
her (her key) to be the owner before handing over the goods. 





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Marc Horowitz <marc@GZA.COM>
Date: Fri, 27 Aug 93 11:42:52 PDT
To: technopagan priest <tedwards@wam.umd.edu>
Subject: Re: ViaCrypt PGP and source code
In-Reply-To: <199308271810.AA08679@rac1.wam.umd.edu>
Message-ID: <9308271841.AA01487@dun-dun-noodles.aktis.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>> I understand that there is a contractual problem with releasing
>> the RSA source.  Perhaps the contract should be re-negotiated.

You don't seem to understand that RSA has a monopoly.  You think they
are going to bend over backwards for ViaCrypt PGP when they are
pulling in millions in royalties from companies like Lotus?

>> I will bet ViaCrypt PGP will rapidly become a best-seller if
>> implemented properly.  There is plenty of money to be made if
>> everything is kept on the cryptographic "up and up."

"Nobody ever went broke underestimating the intelligence of the
American public."  Consider how unaware most people are today.
They're not going to care if they can audit the code; most people
don't have the skills anyway.  If AT&T or the government says
something is secure, they will be believed by most people.  Certain
large organizations (like banks) may have the clout (financial clout,
since that's what counts) to do their own code audit.  But Cypherpunks
just aren't big enough fish.  There's plenty of money to be made if
you aren't 'on the cryptographic "up and up"'.

If you don't want to buy ViaCrypt PGP because you can't get sources,
RSA isn't going to cry over those lost profits.  Their monopoly
insures that they can get their money from more compliant customers.

		Cynically yours,
		Marc




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: ferguson@icm1.icp.net (Paul Ferguson x2044)
Date: Fri, 27 Aug 93 12:45:58 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Another "fan"
Message-ID: <9308272009.AA03678@icm1.icp.net>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


On Fri, 27 Aug 93 13:25:39 -0500,
 Anonymous <nowhere@bsu-cs.bsu.edu> wrote -

> Being new to this list, I've got a ways to go before I understand
> everything I'm reading.  But one thing I'd like to know today, is
> JUST WHO IS DAVID STERNLIGHT?  I've seen his name mentioned here
> for the first time, and many times since.

<chuckle>

You must not follow the Usenet nesgoups sci.crypt, alt.privacy, 
alt.privacy.clipper, comp.eff.org.talk (etc, etc, ad nauseam)
which Sternlight frequents. 
 
He even has a news.group named for him (by his detractors), 
alt.fan.david.sternlight.  ,-)
 
Paul 




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: snark!esr@gvls1.VFL.Paramax.COM (Eric S. Raymond)
Date: Fri, 27 Aug 93 14:32:56 PDT
To: frissell@panix.com (Duncan Frissell)
Subject: Re: What, Me Worry?
In-Reply-To: <199308271732.AA13237@panix.com>
Message-ID: <m0oW9Nc-000BfRC@snark.uucp>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> "In his first three months in the White House, President Clinton killed 
> more people in the United States than during the 12 years of Reagan-Bush."

I'm no fan of Clinton and his crypto-socialist allies, but this strikes
me as extreme, unwarranted, and unsupported.  Can you back it up?
-- 
					Eric S. Raymond <esr@snark.thyrsus.com>



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: ferguson@fiber.sprintlink.net (Paul Ferguson x2044)
Date: Fri, 27 Aug 93 12:42:53 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Whois Sternlight?
Message-ID: <9308272038.AA19628@fiber.sprintlink.net>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



On Fri, 27 Aug 93 13:25:39 -0500,
 Anonymous <nowhere@bsu-cs.bsu.edu> wrote -

> Being new to this list, I've got a ways to go before I understand
> everything I'm reading.  But one thing I'd like to know today, is
> JUST WHO IS DAVID STERNLIGHT?  I've seen his name mentioned here
> for the first time, and many times since.

<chuckle>

You must not follow the Usenet nesgoups sci.crypt, alt.privacy, 
alt.privacy.clipper, comp.eff.org.talk (etc, etc, ad nauseam)
which Sternlight frequents. 
 
He even has a news.group named for him (by his detractors), 
alt.fan.david.sternlight.  ,-)
 

----------------------------                     -----------------------------
Paul Ferguson                                                               
Minbank Consulting Group                         ferguson@fiber.sprintlink.net  
Fairfax, Virginia  USA                           ferguson@icm1.icp.net 




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: J. Michael Diehl <mdiehl@triton.unm.edu>
Date: Fri, 27 Aug 93 14:52:59 PDT
To: wayner@cs.cornell.edu (Peter Wayner)
Subject: Re: Key Escrow Anecdote...
In-Reply-To: <9308271756.AA12706@sindri.cs.cornell.edu>
Message-ID: <9308272147.AA07656@triton.unm.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


According to Peter Wayner:
> I was speaking with an international crypto consultant
> who told me this story about a business with an office
> in a South American country. They decided to start encrypting
> their link. Within a week, a team of soldiers burst through
> the door and smashed the encryption hardware to bits. On
> the way out, they asked, "What are you trying to hide from us?"

...Which brings up the questoin of "who's soldiers were they?"




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: peter honeyman <honey@citi.umich.edu>
Date: Fri, 27 Aug 93 13:27:53 PDT
To: norm@netcom.com (Norman Hardy)
Subject: Re: Commercial PGP: Verifying Trustworthiness
Message-ID: <9308272026.AA17010@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> This means that I am trusting the "pseudo-random" stuff not to be
> some secrets that PGP has read from my disk.

trust?  you could read the code, starting at about line 550 of crypto.c.
of course, you have to trust your eyes, your editor (if you use one),
and your operating system not to deceive you.  (i think i've carried
this too far.)

>                                              The only benefit
> that I see to the pseudo-random stuff is to send the same message
> to several people without revealing the fact that the messages are
> the same except to those that can decode the messages.

that is a big win, in my view, but the random prefix also also helps
defeat chosen plaintext attacks, does it not?

	peter




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: peter honeyman <honey@citi.umich.edu>
Date: Fri, 27 Aug 93 13:32:54 PDT
To: danodom@matt.ksu.ksu.edu (Dan Odom)
Subject: Re: Source Code NOT available for ViaCrypt PGP
Message-ID: <9308272032.AA17050@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> > What about the idea of having someone who is known trustworthy examine the
> > source code under nondisclosure?
> > ...
> 
> That is not a bad idea, ...

i disagree.  who will guarantee that viacrypt ships binaries based on
the validated code?

	peter




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: peter honeyman <honey@citi.umich.edu>
Date: Fri, 27 Aug 93 14:02:56 PDT
To: bill@twwells.com (T. William Wells)
Subject: Re: .Comparing ViaCrypt and freeware.
Message-ID: <9308272102.AA17377@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> If you're worried about backdoors, reverse engineer it and verify
> that it works as advertised. Given that the program has to largely
> duplicate an existing set of source, this should be trivial.

do you mean decompile it, or reverse engineer it based on the
outputs?  that former is tractable, but i suspect the latter is
comparable to "busting" the idea algorithm.

neither is "trivial" in my mind.

	peter





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: peter honeyman <honey@citi.umich.edu>
Date: Fri, 27 Aug 93 14:12:55 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Viacrypt PGP source code unavailable
Message-ID: <9308272112.AA17537@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>                               Yet still some people pay for software because
> they feel better using a legal version.  People who feel this way would
> perhaps also prefer a legal version of PGP.

i remind you (all) that the courts have long recognized an exemption
from patent infringement liability for research and experimental use.

this exemption makes my use of pgp legal, maybe yours, too

	peter




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Timothy Newsham <newsham@wiliki.eng.hawaii.edu>
Date: Fri, 27 Aug 93 22:02:59 PDT
To: rjc@gnu.ai.mit.edu (Ray)
Subject: Re: Who is David Sternlight?
In-Reply-To: <9308280413.AA05634@geech.gnu.ai.mit.edu>
Message-ID: <9308280501.AA26285@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> 
> Timothy C. May () writes:
> > Some say the program, which is nominally based in the Los Angeles
> > area, is actually one of the "Blue Ice" programs developed by the NSA,
> > similar to the Serdar Argic program deployed by the State Department
> > and the Ludwig Plutonium program being tested now by the National
> > Science Foundation.
> 
>    No No No! Ludwig Plutonium was developed by the Atomic Energy Commission.
[... much deleted....]

I cant believe you didnt even *mention* the secret USL and BSD 
contract!  It is central to understanding the situation!





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: szabo@netcom.com (Nick Szabo)
Date: Fri, 27 Aug 93 20:42:58 PDT
To: fergp@sytex.com (Paul Ferguson)
Subject: Practical security, Internet commercialization, etc.
In-Reply-To: <ym8u9B4w165w@sytex.com>
Message-ID: <9308280338.AA06727@netcom4.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Paul Ferguson:
> The biggest threat to any security, on any basis, is the threat of
> human nature. The chances of someone factoring your PGP encoded
> message is somewhere in the range of slim-to-none, but the chances
> of someone (you) -physically- compromising their key is much, much
> higher.

I'd like to strongly second this, and add my own twist.
The problems of making & breaking ciphers are being hashed out, both 
in open literature and closed quarters (eg NSA), by many highly 
specialized minds far more focused on these problems 
than almost all of us on this list. The most important
cypherpunks issues are being almost completely ignored by these academics: 
practical implementation of remailers, most issues dealing with software-
based digital cash, reliable key handling, trustworhy key distribution,
construction of "webs of trust", implementation of these schemes with 
all of their pitfalls (legal, social, etc.), commercialization, etc.

In most of these cases, the protocols (ciphers, remailing mixes, 
digital cash, etc.) can theoretically be "broken" by a powerful
agent, but the real question is what practical, cheap steps can we take 
to make things more expensive for those with little respect for our
privacy or liberty.  Our design criterion should not be max(their expense) 
but min(our expense/their expense), where "our expense" includes the 
time needed to hack, test, deploy, and integrate these systems into the 
social net.fabric.  Furthermore, the antagonistic agent in almost all cases 
will have far less than the full computing power or crypto expertise
of the NSA at their disposal, and it's merely speculative fun to try to 
cover every possible attack at this time.  Romana Machado's "Stego" is 
a great example of useful steganography that address the simple practical 
issue of hiding data in Mac PICT files without worrying about the many
theoretical, statistical ways to detect encryption hidden in pattern-
containing pictures.  

Even if PGP could be broken by the NSA that's no reason not to use it, 
unless something significantly better comes along.  Real crypto-anarchy 
is quite imperfect, but vastly superior to no privacy at all,
the panoptic world to which the Internet sans cypherpunks 
seems to be heading.

Internet commercialization in itself is a _huge_ issue full of 
pitfall and  opportunity: Mom & Pop BBS's, commercial MUDs, 
data banks, for-profit pirate and porn boards, etc. are springing 
up everywhere like weeds, opening a vast array of both needs
of privacy and ways to abuse privacy.  Remailers, digital cash, etc. 
won't become part of this Internet commerce way of life unless they are
deployed soon, theoretical flaws and all, instead of waiting until 
The Perfect System comes along.  Crypto-anarchy in the real world
will be messy, "nature red in tooth and claw", not all nice
and clean like it says in the math books.  Most of the
debugging will be done not in any ivory tower, but by the 
bankruptcy of businesses who violate their customer's privacy, the 
confiscation of BBS operators who stray outside the laws of some 
jurisdication and screw up their privacy arrangements, etc.
Anybody who thinks they can flesh out a protocol in
secret and then deploy it, full-blown and working, is in for
a world of hurt.  For those who get their Pretty Good systems
out there and used, there is vast potential for business
growth -- think of the $trillions confiscated every year by 
governments around the world, for example.

At the last Bay Area meeting Tim May asked "what is the low-hanging 
fruit"?  A few pieces I see involve implementing _some_ of the discussed 
remailer function.  The non-SMTP socket solution looks attractive, even
if limited to TCP (which most if not all current remailers run
over anyway).  Non-SMTP sockets cut through the Gordion Knot of the
many attacks Hal Finney listed, making them far more expensive,
but not attempting to make them "theoretically impossible".  A
sockets solution seems much easier to implement, thus much
more likely to be implemented, than the huge piece of software needed 
to address address each of the 15-odd attacks in a theoretically 
strong way.

Nick Szabo				szabo@netcom.com




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Duncan Frissell <frissell@panix.com>
Date: Fri, 27 Aug 93 17:42:58 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: What, Me Worry?
Message-ID: <199308280040.AA00841@panix.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


To: cypherpunks@toad.com

Since I received 3 or 4 requests to explain my earlier signature line...

C.>>"In his first three months in the White House, President Clinton 
C.>killed 
C.>>more people in the United States than during the 12 years of 
C.>Reagan-Bush."
C.>
C.>Could you expand on this?  I'm curious.
C.>

Sorry, I was rushed.  The "improved" version:

During the first three months of the Clinton Administration, federal 
enforcement agencies killed more Americans than they killed during the 
entire 12 years of the Reagan and Bush Administrations.

Waco!

This is true because usually the Feds kill few Americans directly (fewer 
than 1 a month).

DCF



---
 ~ WinQwk 2.0b#0 ~ Unregistered Evaluation Copy
                                                




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: danodom@matt.ksu.ksu.edu (Dan Odom)
Date: Fri, 27 Aug 93 18:56:02 PDT
To: warlord@athena.mit.edu (Derek Atkins)
Subject: Re: Source Code NOT available for ViaCrypt PGP
In-Reply-To: <9308270328.AA20123@w20-575-50.MIT.EDU>
Message-ID: <9308280153.AA06594@matt.ksu.ksu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Derek Atkins Said:

> Secondly, regarding "whom do you trust": Do you trust Phil Z?  As far
> as I know (and granted, its not much, yet), Phil Z is going to oversee
> the commercial product, to make sure that nothing is put into it.
> Granted, he probably wont get to see the RSA sources, but there are
> sources of those (pun intended).

If Phil says that the commercial PGP is OK, I will believe him.

-- 
Dan Odom
danodom@matt.ksu.ksu.edu -- Kansas State University, Manhattan, KS

PGP key by finger or request.



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: eric@Synopsys.COM
Date: Fri, 27 Aug 93 20:56:02 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Attacks on remailers (LONG)
In-Reply-To: <9308271052.AA07922@achilles.ctd.anl.gov>
Message-ID: <199308280353.AA02675@gaea.synopsys.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>>>>> On Fri, 27 Aug 93 05:52:43 CDT, b44729@achilles.ctd.anl.gov (Samuel Pigg) said:

Samuel> Correct me if I'm wrong, but as I see it, there are two goals
Samuel> for the remailers:

Samuel> (1) 	Anonymous addresses to which mail can be sent, but the recipient
Samuel> 	is unknown and cannot be determined (receiving anonymous mail).

Samuel> (2)	The ability to send mail to someone without anyone (including
Samuel> 	the recipient) determing that you did so (sending anonymous mail).

Samuel> Number 2 can be mostly taken care of with nested encryption of mail headers.


This is an excellent observation which many people seem to ignore when
thinking about anonymous remailers.  It's understandable why, because
achieving both of these goals at the same time is really quite
difficult.  I've been working on a system to accomplish this for
several months now, and it's quite complicated.  I call it SASE for
Self Addressed Stampable Envelopes.  Actually a new name that doesn't
imply prepaid postage would be nice if anyone can think of a catchy
one...

Samuel> To construct an anonymous address block might be something like:

Samuel> 	Anonymous Anne wants an anonymous address.
Samuel> 	First she generates a set of N keys (IDEA, DES or .......

That's basically the way SASE works.  It's important that some of the
keys be public key pairs, however; as you need to be able to publish
one half of a key, and seal the other half for an unpublished remailer
to decrypt with.

One thing is certain, these protocols are not simple.  We definitely
need people thinking about them...

-eric messick




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: markh@wimsey.bc.ca (Mark C. Henderson)
Date: Fri, 27 Aug 93 21:43:30 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Physical security lapses will getcha every time.
Message-ID: <m0oWI3U-0000poC@vanbc.wimsey.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>  
> Fact Two: That's why you won't see messages from me either (a.)
> signed with PGP, or (b.) encrypted with PGP from any of my other
> e-mail accounts. All are UNIX (open) environments and I don't like
> the implications of the possibilities of my secret key being exposed,
> even if I do trust the folks I work with. Call me a schizoid.
Of course, this doesn't make the UNIX versions of PGP useless. There
is absolutely no reason why you can't run your own personal Unix
box. Really all you need is a 386 machine with Linux or 386BSD.

The nice thing about the UNIX/Linux setup, is that you can still use
all the UNIX tools to send/receive encrypted mail (your favourite
mail user agent+pgp/ripem+UUCP+sendmail/smail) in a convenient way
without messing with MSDOS. 

Mark

-- 
Mark Henderson      markh@wimsey.bc.ca (personal account)
RIPEM key available by key server/finger/E-mail
  MD5OfPublicKey: F1F5F0C3984CBEAF3889ADAFA2437433




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: bill@twwells.com (T. William Wells)
Date: Fri, 27 Aug 93 20:08:29 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: .Comparing ViaCrypt and freeware.
In-Reply-To: <9308272102.AA17377@toad.com>
Message-ID: <CCFvDw.4pL@twwells.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


: > If you're worried about backdoors, reverse engineer it and verify
: > that it works as advertised. Given that the program has to largely
: > duplicate an existing set of source, this should be trivial.
:
: do you mean decompile it, or reverse engineer it based on the

Decompile.

: neither is "trivial" in my mind.

I have a program that (mostly) automatically turns 386 code into
ugly C code. It's not maintainable but, for the purpose of
determining that the commercial product is essentially the same
as the version that you have source to, that's not necessary. You
compile the two versions, decompile them, diff the results,
pattern match to eliminate the artifactual differences, re-diff
and then examine the diff with the proverbial fine-tooth comb.
This would make it quite easy to determine what the commercial
code is actually doing, with a minimum of work. And remember: it
only has to be done once per version.

(No, before anyone asks, the decompiler isn't available. It's not
documented. It's hackery. And the code is gross. You'd be much
better off writing your own; it isn't hard.)





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: nobody@shell.portal.com
Date: Sat, 28 Aug 93 02:38:03 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: "The Internet Letter"--Internet's First Commercial Digest
Message-ID: <9308280620.AA10127@jobe.shell.portal.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


--------------------------------------------------------------
I hear the first issue of TIL is free.  If somebody obtains
an e-copy can they post pointers to its availability to
cypherpunks, send it via e-mail upon request, or put it up on an 
ftp site? thanks.
---------------------------------------------------------------

The Internet Letter (ISSN 1070-9851), the first commercial newsletter
on the Internet, will premiere at INET 93 and INTEROP(r)93, and a hard
copy version will be available at Booth #1334 (InterCon Systems Corp.)
in the South Hall of the Moscone Center.

The first issue of TIL provides provides the following information
about the editor:

     The editor is Jayne Levin (netweek@access.digex.net). Levin
     was former deputy bureau chief of Institutional Investor in
     Washington, D.C., and has written on the Internet for The
     Washington Post and Infoworld. Tony Rutkowski
     (amr@CNRI.Reston.VA.US) is special adviser. Rutkowski is
     founder and vice president of the Internet Society and
     director of technology assessment at Sprint Corp. He was
     former editor-in-chief and publisher of Telecommunications
     magazine. Levin will be available for interviews at INTEROP.
     Contact INTEROP press relations.

The table of contents for the first issue covered a wide range
of topics. The articles were professionally written and incisive:

001) INTERNET EXPERIENCING AN INFORMATION EXPLOSION
002) COMPANIES TAP INTERNET'S POWER
003) THE TOP 150 COMMERCIAL USERS ON INTERNET -- CHART
004) CIA, US GOVERNMENT INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES DEVELOP INTERNET LINK
005) REALTY FIRM IMPROVES PRODUCTIVITY, INTERNET SPEEDS REALTY TRANSACTIONS
006) MULTIMEDIA MAGAZINE TO DEBUT ON INTERNET
007) TASK FORCE PROPOSES STANDARD TO SECURE CONTENTS OF E-MAIL
008) INTERNET MERCANTILE STANDARDS EXPLORED
009) GOPHER LICENSING FEE SPARKS DISPUTE
010) FINDING GOPHER & GN
011) FROM SOFTWARE TO MAGAZINES, BUYING ELECTRONICALLY
012) CIX LAUNCHES COMMERCIAL "INFORMATION" EXCHANGE
013) SOME COMPANIES PREFER WAIS FOR BUILDING IN-HOUSE DATABASES
014) MORE ON WAIS
015) INTERNET TO ASSIST BETHANY IN ADOPTION SERVICES
016) FAQ
017) PROVIDERS' CIRCUIT
018) CIX CONTACTS -- CHART
019) TIPS & TECHNIQUES
020) POINTERS
021) TALK OF THE NET
022) WASHINGTON
023) READ ALL ABOUT IT
024) DATEBOOK

The first issue of TIL provides the following price information:

     30-DAY INTEROP SPECIAL (good until September 30)

     40% Discount off the regular rate of $249/year

     Charter subscriptions: $149/year -- a 40% discount.
     Universities and nonprofits $95/year.

     If you not completely satified, your money will be refunded.

     You can receive The Internet Letter electronically or on paper.






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: peter honeyman <honey@citi.umich.edu>
Date: Fri, 27 Aug 93 20:32:58 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: .Comparing ViaCrypt and freeware.
Message-ID: <9308280330.AA24324@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> I have a program that (mostly) automatically turns 386 code into
> ugly C code.

i'm impressed.  (honest.)  but the task here isn't to compare viacrypt
to pgp -- they use different rsa engines -- it's validating that viacrypt
doesn't have a backdoor.  the diff scheme you describe presupposes that
this step has been done, but it has not, and i think it would be very,
very hard to do.

	peter




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "L. Detweiler" <ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Date: Fri, 27 Aug 93 22:37:58 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Internet: commercial or not?
Message-ID: <9308280535.AA14562@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


This is just a little blip on the screen of the increasing strains in
the commercialization of the internet, a message enclosed below for
your perusal. There is a huge amount of seismic fault-slipping on this
subject. What is `allowed' on the internet? For example, are people
allowed to send credit card numbers to businesses for purchase? this is
happening with e.g. Wired subscriptions and other situations, but most
places who advertise directly get flamed by someone in the NSF ranks,
and afterwards at least do it more discreetly.

The situation is that the `internet' is now such a patchwork of
different nets, all with different policies and oversight, is very
close to anarchy, but still with distinct `taboos' against commercial
activity, to put it lightly. But the day that everyone will be dialing
up the Online Shopping Program over their PCs is inevitable and rapidly
approaching. The only question is, what will become of the current
`internet'? Will future networks just be laid on top of it, or will it
whither up after all traffic moves to completely `unrestricted'
commercial networks? I was just telling someone in email: to the extent
that you like the Internet, it is unrepresentative of the typical
government program. To the extent that you dislike it, it is
representative. It has only flourished to the degree it has because of
relative *unregulation* and *unrestriction*.

A major problem is that there is no way to guarantee that a given
message traverses exclusively commercial networks in going from one
source to another. I propose that new mail protocols be developed that
enforce the distinction, such that the message can `request' it be
transmitted in a completely commercial `unrestricted' path or not at
all. In this way a new group of networks governed by agencies
explicitly commited to unrestricted commercial traffic (hehe, sounds
sort of ominous like Unrestricted Submaring Warfare).

In the current situation, all the government bureacrats fire off
messages that `even though your message can travel on commercial nets
only, there is no way of guaranteeing that it does not cross public
networks, therefore it must abide by NSF Internet Use Policies.'  In a
system where transmission paths are prescribed for email, a completely
commercial network can be achieved, an absolutely critical foundation
for all future electronic economics, and all our favorite ideas
(digital banks, services, etc.), with no whiney complaints from the
Backward Bureacrats.

If anyone is familar with the proliferation of online services over
commercial internet subnetworks, such as the `biz' distribution of
Usenet, please post more information on the progress of this.

Read my words! as beautiful and promising as the Internet is today, it
is just a small glimmer in the eye of future cyberspace, in which all
traffic is unrestricted except in volume and cost per bit (the former
prodigious and the latter piddly), so that commercial enterprise can
flourish. We have already waited long enough. The current taboos on the
internet will look quaintly archaic.

Look at the way this guy below is whining because the NIC service had a
`nice booth at InterOp' with enough cost to have funded `3-4 full time
employees typing whois entries' and asks for an `audit' because of the
possibility of (horrors) `advertising'. Yes, in the current dark ages I
concede he has a valid point (they are funded in part by NSF grants),
but this shows in crystalline clarity the absolutely chilling effect
that government funding has on a project (e.g., the internet) in
constraining its full commercial development. The greatest supporters
are the greatest detractors!  Where else would a company be criticized
& investigated for having a classy booth at a trade convention (uh,
Microsoft excepted)?  When the whole cyberspace in unrestricted,
though,  I suppose he'll pop up complaining about the big companies
with glossy booths that could have funded 20 children on Welfare.

BTW, Network Information Center, database & catalogue of all internet
services, while a thinly veiled approach likely to evolve into a
full-fledged charging & advertising Cyberspatial Yellow Pages, is
clearly a cornerstone of AT&T's new drive into the internet for the
masses. (What is this guy referring to in the `attempt to reduce
expected services as with Whois'?)

===cut=here===

Posted-Date: Fri, 27 Aug 93 12:09:31 EDT
Date: Fri, 27 Aug 93 12:09:31 EDT
Sender: ietf-request@IETF.CNRI.Reston.VA.US
From: William Allen Simpson <bill.simpson@um.cc.umich.edu>
To: ietf@CNRI.Reston.VA.US
Cc: Stephen Wolff <steve@cise.cise.nsf.gov>
Reply-To: bsimpson@morningstar.com
Subject: over funding of [InterNIC]

It has become apparent with the recent spate of disregard for internet
etiquette (posting job positions, posting "advertisements"), and the
simultaneous attempt to reduce expected services (whois), the providers
of the InterNIC are not suitable.

Did everyone see that they can afford a nice booth at InterOp?  When did
any previous NSF grantee get such a thing?

The cost could have funded 3-4 full-time employees typing whois entries.

Obviously, the grant was too large, since they have all of this extra
money for advertising.

And why would they need to advertise, except that they want to leverage
a monopoly grant position into some commercial market?

I call for an NSF audit to endure that NSF money was not spent for
advertising and lobbying.

Bill.Simpson@um.cc.umich.edu





------- End of Forwarded Message





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Date: Fri, 27 Aug 93 23:48:00 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Another BBS Seizure in Hartford
In-Reply-To: <9308280543.AA22652@tamsun.tamu.edu>
Message-ID: <9308280645.AA01459@netcom5.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Someone has forwarded this info:

> The Hartford Courant on August 5, 1993 (page b-4) stated that a 21 year
> old computer BBS operator was arrested for maintaining a computer
> bulletin board that had a bomb making recipe.
> 
> Michael Elansky was charged by the West Hartford police with inciting
> injury to persons or property - a felony charge - and risk of injury
> to a minor.
> 
> He was held in lieu of $500,000 bond (in CT the bond for a person accused
> of murder is normally $100,000)
> 
> Det. Capt. James Gustafson said the case was "sealed" and no information
> could be released.
> 
> Michal Elansky's father said information from the Anarchists Cook Book
> (Available from Paladin Press, P.O. Box 1307, Boulder, CO 80306,

I find this hard to believe...not saying it isn't true, but it's hard
for me to believe that the cause was just material from the
long-available, long-discredited "Anarchists Cookbook"...I bought my
copy in 1972-3 and it's still widely available (Loompanics, Paladin,
the "Anubus Warpus" store in Santa Cruz, etc.).

I hope the EFF gets involved in this one, as there shouldn't be a
double standard, with printed material (books, magazines) held to a
different legal standard than bulletin boards and networks are. (The
copyright violation issues are another--and much lesser--matter.)

If something is legal in written form--and nearly everything should
be, of course--then the electronic form should be treated identically.


-Tim May


-- 
..........................................................................
Timothy C. May         | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,  
tcmay@netcom.com       | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
408-688-5409           | knowledge, reputations, information markets, 
W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA  | black markets, collapse of governments.
Higher Power: 2^756839 | Public Key: PGP and MailSafe available.
Note: I put time and money into writing this posting. I hope you enjoy it.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: b44729@achilles.ctd.anl.gov (Samuel Pigg)
Date: Fri, 27 Aug 93 21:48:30 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Attacks on remailers (LONG)
In-Reply-To: <199308280353.AA02675@gaea.synopsys.com>
Message-ID: <9308280446.AA01688@achilles.ctd.anl.gov>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



>>>>> On Fri, 27 Aug 93 20:53:51 -0700, eric@Synopsys.COM said:

>>>>> On Fri, 27 Aug 93 05:52:43 CDT, b44729@achilles.ctd.anl.gov (Samuel Pigg) said:

Samuel> Correct me if I'm wrong, but as I see it, there are two goals
Samuel> for the remailers:

Samuel> (1) 	Anonymous addresses to which mail can be sent, but the recipient
Samuel> 	is unknown and cannot be determined (receiving anonymous mail).

Samuel> (2)	The ability to send mail to someone without anyone
Samuel> (including 	the recipient) determing that you did so
Samuel> (sending anonymous mail).

Samuel> Number 2 can be mostly taken care of with nested encryption of
Samuel> mail headers.

	[...]

Samuel> To construct an anonymous address block might be something like:

Samuel> 	Anonymous Anne wants an anonymous address.
Samuel> 	First she generates a set of N keys (IDEA, DES or .......

	eric> That's basically the way SASE works.  It's important
	eric> that some of the keys be public key pairs, however; as
	eric> you need to be able to publish one half of a key, and
	eric> seal the other half for an unpublished remailer to
	eric> decrypt with.

I don't see why some of the keys need to be public key pairs.
The intermediate encryptions done by the remailers are only to be
undone by the anonymous recipient correct?

So why would one part of the keys need to be published?
(the anonymous address block would have these keys sealed in the various
nested encryption levels, as you said.)

	eric> One thing is certain, these protocols are not simple.
	eric> We definitely need people thinking about them...

..and discussing them! (as we are doing now.)

-Sam





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: rjc@gnu.ai.mit.edu (Ray)
Date: Fri, 27 Aug 93 21:16:02 PDT
To: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Subject: Re: Who is David Sternlight?
In-Reply-To: <9308271947.AA24274@netcom3.netcom.com>
Message-ID: <9308280413.AA05634@geech.gnu.ai.mit.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Timothy C. May () writes:
> Some say the program, which is nominally based in the Los Angeles
> area, is actually one of the "Blue Ice" programs developed by the NSA,
> similar to the Serdar Argic program deployed by the State Department
> and the Ludwig Plutonium program being tested now by the National
> Science Foundation.

   No No No! Ludwig Plutonium was developed by the Atomic Energy Commission.
Alexander Abian (of "TIME HAS INERTIA", "CORRECT EARTH'S TILT BY DROPPING
MOON INTO OCEAN", and "GIVE VENUS An EARTh ORBIT AND CURE AIDS AND CANCER"
fame) was developed by the NSF.  Robert McElwaine was deployed by the CIA
to test the limits of what the populace will believe before they see
through propaganda. (JUMBO COSMOSPHERES, BIOLOGICAL TRANSMUTATION, THE
RECIPROCAL SYSTEM)

   The Department of Commerce is now testing an automated program which
posts long diatribes on Japan and the need for "industrial
policy" (American version of MITI). This program has the unique approach
in that it posts messages to _every newsgroup_

  Why is the government developing all these propaganda robots? Well, in
1976 a secret panel of government officials called Majestic-14 met with
the head of the Trilateral Commission and the Bilderburgers to fight the
Martian Invasion and the Communists. The Communists and the Martians
had contracted with Folger's to secretly replace our government officials
with idiots. (And you thought they only did that with coffee, wrong!
The coffee commercials were a carefully constructed coverup)
  Anyway, the Folger replacements didn't work (the Communists thought they
would because the average person was an idiot too) So the Martians and
the Communists moved to and now control the University of California at
Berkeley.
  The Centurians then arrived and became very jealous that the Martians
and Communists had their own college. They created a super-android
code-named Ronald Reagan to fight the Communists-Martians and cut Federal
Spending for colleges. Professor Robert T. Birch-Sternlight, a member of
SEVSO (Super Elite Very Secretive Organization) decided that enough was
enough. He single-handedly pioneered AI (Artificial Insanity), a carefully
calculated technology to rid this planet of Martians and Centurians once
and for all.

  The AEC, SEC, RTC, FDIC, CIA, NSF, NSA, DEA, DoD, DoC, were all directed
to deploy this software on the internet for testing before installing it
at the New York Times, Newsweek, and Time Magazine.

  Some say NYT and Time are already beta-testing AI.


-Ray, member of HEMSATWOSEVSO(Hyper Elite Mega Secretive Agency That
Watches over SEVSO)

p.s. Hillary Clinton is actually a Star-Baby from the 24th century
who came back in time to prevent the Centurians and Earthmen from
teaming up to up the Galatic Matriarchy.

followups-to: alt.alien.visitors,talk.politics.misc,comp.ai,sci.space,
              alt.conspiracy

(alt.alien.visitors is a coverup! The so-called UFO enthusiasts in there
are really government agents attempting to locate the Plutonian base!)



THE MARS FACE IS REALLY ELVIS!





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: J. Michael Diehl <mdiehl@triton.unm.edu>
Date: Fri, 27 Aug 93 23:22:59 PDT
To: rjc@gnu.ai.mit.edu (Ray)
Subject: Re: Another BBS Seizure in Hartford
In-Reply-To: <9308280555.AA06139@geech.gnu.ai.mit.edu>
Message-ID: <9308280615.AA23307@triton.unm.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


According to Ray:
>   Does this mean I can be arrested for mentioning the fact that dry ice
> and water put into an empty 2-liter bottle of Coke makes a nice explosion?

Or how about saying, "You can kill someone by running them over with a car."

This is pathetic.
========================+==========================================+
J. Michael Diehl   ;^)  | Have you hugged a Hetero........Lately?  |
mdiehl@triton.unm.edu   | "I'm just looking for the opportunity to |
mike.diehl@fido.org help|    be Politically Incorrect!"  +=========+
al945@cwns9.ins.cwru.edu| Is Big Brother in your phone?  | PGP KEY |
(505) 299-2282  (voice) |    If you don't know, ask me.  |Available|
========================+================================+=========+
PGP Key = 7C06F1 = A6 27 E1 1D 5F B2 F2 F1  12 E7 53 2D 85 A2 10 5D 
This message is protected by 18 USC 2511 and 18 USC 2703. Monitoring 
by anyone other than the recipient is absolutely forbidden by US Law




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: remail@tamsun.tamu.edu
Date: Fri, 27 Aug 93 22:46:03 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Another BBS Seizure in Hartford
Message-ID: <9308280543.AA22652@tamsun.tamu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Date: 08-03-93 (22:35)             Number: 1089
From: KENNETH PAVLAK               Refer#: NONE
To: ALL                           Recvd: NO
Subj: Sysop held on $500,000 Bail    Conf: (24) F-Law&Dis
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Hartford Courant on August 5, 1993 (page b-4) stated that a 21 year
old computer BBS operator was arrested for maintaining a computer
bulletin board that had a bomb making recipe.

Michael Elansky was charged by the West Hartford police with inciting
injury to persons or property - a felony charge - and risk of injury
to a minor.

He was held in lieu of $500,000 bond (in CT the bond for a person accused
of murder is normally $100,000)

Det. Capt. James Gustafson said the case was "sealed" and no information
could be released.

Michal Elansky's father said information from the Anarchists Cook Book
(Available from Paladin Press, P.O. Box 1307, Boulder, CO 80306,
phone 303-443-7250) was on the bbs placed there by person or persons
unknown; it was impossible for his son to keep track of due to the
number of calls to his bbs.

And so, Big Brother now says that passing along information will get
a person 21 years old locked up on a half a million dollars bail, while
accused murderers get out on  100,000 dollars.  The newspaper did not
say if the computer or the files from it were taken.

Can the people who were on that bbs look forward to a "Visit" from
the servants of Big Brother?

Will they be arrested if they downloaded VERBOTEN information?  Will
there be MASS ARRESTS of people who have knowledge that is no longer
permitted?

Time will tell

=== GEcho 1.00

* SPEED 1.30 >01< * Remember, god works in meaningless ways.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: khijol!erc@apple.com (Ed Carp)
Date: Sat, 28 Aug 93 01:28:01 PDT
To: an31144@anon.penet.fi
Subject: Re: Plausible Spookiness
In-Reply-To: <199308272046.AA04048@xtropia>
Message-ID: <m0oWLKn-00021zC@khijol>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text


> If you mean that they are NSA-proof, or that only brute force attacks
> would affect decryption, I would suggest that we know no such thing, and
> it is extremely unlikely that we ever will.  The NSA has _astounding_
> resources, unequalled by anything in the private sector, dedicated to no
> other purpose than compromising world-class cyphers.  Their successes
> are not public knowledge, to say the least.  No one here should blithely
> dismiss claims of PGP weaknesses when the opposition has literally
> billions of dollars earmarked to find such flaws.
> 
> It bears noting that the concealment of major successes in decryption
> are every bit as important as the decryption itself, a fact often
> overlooked.
> 
> I would like to see "Paquin's" case against PGP as well as a competent
> analysis of his claims.  Unfortunately, I cannot produce either.

I'm rather surprised that the most significant piece of evidence in favor of
the "NSA has cracked PGP" theory is that no one's put a bullet through Phil
Zimmerman's head.  Not to be macabre or anything, but if PGP was a real
threat, don't you think that the NSA would act rather quickly to suppress
it if they couldn't read stuff encrypted with it?  And if you think that
they don't monitor stuff coming in and going out via ftp to various parts
of the world, I think you're being naive.  If you think that they wouldn't
act quickly, with violence if need be, to protect "national security", you're
being even more naive.  The umbrella of "national security" can (and has)
encompass a wide variety of sins, excesses, oversights, etc.  Hell, the
NSA probably enjoys every time someone writes about how "stupid" the NSA
really is - after all, it might convince someone to let down their guard.

I think that, personally, the public-key stuff's gotta have some sort of a
hole in it that nobody's thought of yet outside of spook central.
-- 
Ed Carp, N7EKG			erc@apple.com			510/659-9560
                            anon-0001@khijol.uucp
If you want magic, let go of your armor.  Magic is so much stronger than
steel!        -- Richard Bach, "The Bridge Across Forever"



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "L. Detweiler" <ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Date: Sat, 28 Aug 93 00:17:59 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Cisco response
Message-ID: <9308280715.AA15502@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


RISKS 14.89 27 Aug 93

===cut=here===

Date: Fri, 27 Aug 1993 11:15:23 -0700
From: Paul Traina <pst@cisco.com>
Subject: Re: Cisco backdoor?

There are no known bugs in any software providing access-control-list
functionality in any current cisco software.  There has only been one very
obscure bug that could cause a security problem in the history of our product,
and we immediately fixed this problem, published an immediate workaround, and
informed CERT of this problem.  We have never, and will never implement any
sort of trapdoor or backdoor functionality which would allow bypassing of
ordinary security systems.

Paul Traina, cisco Systems





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Mandrake@f1.n8012.z86.toadnet.org (Mandrake)
Date: Mon, 30 Aug 93 13:53:51 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: unsubscribe
Message-ID: <746729907.AA00601@cheswicks.toadnet.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


unsubscribe




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: rjc@gnu.ai.mit.edu (Ray)
Date: Fri, 27 Aug 93 22:57:58 PDT
To: remail@tamsun.tamu.edu
Subject: Re: Another BBS Seizure in Hartford
In-Reply-To: <9308280543.AA22652@tamsun.tamu.edu>
Message-ID: <9308280555.AA06139@geech.gnu.ai.mit.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



  Does this mean I can be arrested for mentioning the fact that dry ice
and water put into an empty 2-liter bottle of Coke makes a nice explosion?

-- Ray Cromwell        |    Engineering is the implementation of science;    --
-- EE/Math Student     |       politics is the implementation of faith.      --
-- rjc@gnu.ai.mit.edu  |                         - Zetetic Commentaries      --




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: remail@tamsun.tamu.edu
Date: Fri, 27 Aug 93 23:58:33 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Call for Papers IFIP SEC'94 Caribbean
Message-ID: <9308280655.AA26572@tamsun.tamu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


=================================================================
  Call for Papers IFIP SEC'94 - updated information August 1993
=================================================================

***************************************************************

                C A L L   F O R   P A P E R S

***************************************************************


Technical Committee 11 - Security and Protection in Information
Processing Systems - of the UNESCO affiliated INTERNATIONAL
FEDERATION FOR INFORMATION PROCESSING - IFIP, 

                      announces:

Its TENTH INTERNATIONAL INFORMATION SECURITY CONFERENCE, IFIP SEC'94
TO BE HELD IN THE NETHERLANDS ANTILLES (CARIBBEAN), FROM MAY 23
THROUGH MAY 27, 1994.

Organized by Technical Committee 11 of IFIP, in close cooperation with
the Special Interest Group on Information Security of the Dutch
Computer Society and hosted by the Caribbean Computer Society, the
TENTH International Information Security Conference IFIP SEC'94 will be 
devoted to advances in data, computer and communications security
management, planning and control. The conference will encompass
developments in both theory and practise, envisioning a broad perspective of 
the future of information security.
The event will be lead by its main theme "Dynamic Views on
Information Security in Progress".


Papers are invited and may be practical, conceptual, theoretical, tutorial
or descriptive in nature, addressing any issue, aspect or topic of
information security. Submitted papers will be refereed, and those presented
at the conference, will be included in the formal conference proceedings.
Submissions must not have been previously published and must be the
original work of the author(s). Both the conference and the five
tutorial expert workshops are open for refereed presentations.

The purpose of IFIP SEC'94 is to provide the most comprehensive international
forum and platform, sharing experiences and interchanging ideas, research
results, development activities and applications amongst academics,
practitioners, manufacturers and other professionals, directly or indirectly
involved with information security. The conference is intended for computer
security researchers, security managers, advisors, consultants, accountants,
lawyers, edp auditors, IT, adminiatration and system managers from
government, industry and the academia, as well as individuals interested and/or
involved in information security and protection.

IFIP SEC'94 will consist of a FIVE DAY - FIVE PARALLEL STREAM - enhanced
conference, including a cluster of SIX FULL DAY expert tutorial workshops.

In total over 120 presentations will be held. During the event the second 
Kristian Beckman award will be presented. The conference will address
virtually all aspects of computer and communications security, ranging
from viruses to cryptology, legislation to military trusted systems,
safety critical systems to network security, etc.

The six expert tutorial workshops, each a full day, will cover the
following issues:

Tutorial A: Medical Information Security
Tutorial B: Information Security in Developing Nations
Tutorial C: Modern Cryptology
Tutorial D: IT Security Evaluation Criteria
Tutorial E: Information Security in the Banking and Financial Industry
Tutorial F: Security of Open/Distributed Systems

Each of the tutorials will be chaired by a most senior and internationally
respected expert.

The formal proceedings will be published by Elsevier North Holland
Publishers, including all presentations, accepted papers, key-note talks,
and invited speeches.

The Venue for IFIP SEC'94 is the ITC World Trade Center Convention
Facility at Piscadera Bay, Willemstad, Curacao, Netherlands Antilles.

A unique social program, including formal banquet, giant 'all you can eat'
beach BBQ, island Carnival night, and much more will take care of leisure
and relax time.

A vast partners program is available, ranging from island hopping, boating,
snorkeling and diving to trips to Bonaire, St. Maarten, and Caracas.
A special explorers trip up the Venezuela jungle and the Orinoco River
is also available.
For families a full service kindergarten can take care of youngsters.

The conference will be held in the English language. Spanish translation
for Latin American delegates will be available.

Special arrangements with a wide range of hotels and appartments complexes
in all rate categories have been made to accommodate the delegates and
accompanying guests. (*)
The host organizer has made special exclusive arrangements with KLM Royal
Dutch Airlines and ALM Antillean Airlines for worldwide promotional fares
in both business and tourist class. (**)

(*)(**) Our own IFIP TC11 inhouse TRAVEL DESK will serve from any city on
the globe.

All authors of papers submitted for the referee process will enjoy special
benefits.

Authors of papers accepted by the International Referee Committee will enjoy
extra benefits.

If sufficient proof (written) is provided, students of colleges, universities
and science institutes within the academic community, may opt for
student enrollment. These include special airfares, appartment accommodations,
discounted participation, all in a one packet prepaid price.
(Authors' benefits will not be affected)

**************************

INSTRUCTIONS FOR AUTHORS

**************************

Five copies of the EXTENDED ABSTRACT, consisting of no more than 25 double
spaced typewritten pages, including diagrams and illustrations, of
approximately 5000 words, must be received by the Program Committee no
later than November 15th, 1993.

We regret that electronically transmitted papers, papers on diskettes,
papers transmitted by fax and handwritten papers are not accepted.

Each paper must have a title page, which includes the title of the paper,
full names of all author(s) and their title(s), complete address(es),
including affiliation(s), employer(s), telephone/fax number(s) and
email address(es).
To facilitate the blind refereeing process the author(s)' particulars
should only appear on the separate title page. The language of the 
conference papers is English.
The first page of the manuscript should include the title, a keyword list
and a 50 word introduction. The last page of the manuscript should include
the reference work (if any).

Authors are invited to express their interest in participating in the
contest, providing the Program Committee with the subject or issue that 
the authors intend to address (e.g. crypto, viruses, legal, privacy, design,
access control, etc.) This should be done preferably by email to 
< TC11@CIPHER.NL >, or alternately sending a faxmessage to
+31 43 619449 (Program Committee IFIP SEC'94)

The extended abstracts must be received by the Program Committee on or
before November 15th, 1993.

Notification of acceptance will be mailed to contestants on or before
December 31, 1993. This notification will hold particular detailed
instructions for the presentation and the preparation of camera ready 
manuscripts of the full paper.

Camera ready manuscripts must be ready and received by the Program Committee
on or before February 28, 1994.

If you want to submit a paper, or you want particular information on
the event, including participation, please write to:

IFIP SEC'94 Secretariat
Postoffice Box 1555
6201 BN   MAASTRICHT
THE NETHERLANDS  -  EUROPE

or fax to:

IFIP SEC'94 Secretariat: +31 43 619449 (Netherlands)

or email to:

< TC11@CIPHER.NL >

***************************************************************

Special request to all electronic mail readers:

Please forward this Call for Papers to all networks and listservices
that you have access to, or otherwise know of.

****************************************************************

Sincerely

IFIP TC 11 Secretariat


Call for Papers - updated information August 1993
=================================================================







From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "George A. Gleason" <gg@well.sf.ca.us>
Date: Sat, 28 Aug 93 02:53:03 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: AT&T Home Security Plus
Message-ID: <93Aug28.024813pdt.14474-3@well.sf.ca.us>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Today I got a most interesting call from a phone solicitor, who said that he
was with AT&T and they were going to be hosting a demo of an AT&T home
security system on my block and was I interested in attending.  

I told him about Clipper and asked if the AT&T home burglar alarms came
along with backdoors allowing various govt agents and burglars to sneak in.
Somehow the discussion shifts to PGP vs. Clipper, and the caller asks if
I've got a handle (I told him my email address, which was Really Dumb) and
then he asks if I'm into pirating or anything... of course I'm not, and said
so.... 

Somewhere along the line I entirely forgot to ask how the hell he got any
idea what block I lived on, since my residence address information is
something I take great pains to protect.  

And then it occurred to me... perhaps Something Else is also going on...?
Like, "are you into pirating...?"  Hmmm...  I never even thought about that
at the time, but if anyone else out there gets a call like this, it might be
worth some follow-up research...

-gg




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "George A. Gleason" <gg@well.sf.ca.us>
Date: Sat, 28 Aug 93 03:36:03 PDT
To: rjc@gnu.ai.mit.edu
Subject: Re: Another BBS Seizure in Hartford
Message-ID: <93Aug28.033217pdt.14474-2@well.sf.ca.us>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Bombs & bulletin boards: the news media regularly mention the name of the
chemical used to stinkbomb abortion clinics, and the composition of the
world trade center bomb.  So it seems to me a decent defense could be made
on the grounds of "selective prosecution" since after all, juveniles can
always tune in the news and learn how to make bad things.  Well...?

-gg




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: remail@tamsun.tamu.edu
Date: Sat, 28 Aug 93 02:36:04 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: NSA & the Crypto-Zionist Myth of "Public Key"!
Message-ID: <9308280932.AA03052@tamsun.tamu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>I'm rather surprised that the most significant piece of evidence in favor of
>the "NSA has cracked PGP" theory is that no one's put a bullet through Phil
>Zimmerman's head.  

Excuse me, but I'm getting tired of this silly paranoia.  NSA
is not Evil Incarnate Central, and we are not fighting a Valiant War 
We Are Fated to Lose.  The NSA are a  bunch of Americans who went
to school & college with the rest of us, and share our communities
with us.  Most of them joined NSA to fight totalitarian Communism, and 
most of them are sympathetic with values most Americans share when they 
bother to think about them, like freedom, privacy, etc.  Sure, NSA has
been caught up in the Cold War habits of secrecy, bureaucracy, and
an ingrained habit to control information.  It's also almost surely
caught up in the same kind of bureaucratic incompetence we see
in the rest of the U.S. Federal government (most of the DoD, the space 
programs, the BATF, the FBI, etc.)  Does a $40+ crypto-voice-chip with 
an obvious trap door look like Malicious Plot to Destroy All Strong
Crypto and Take Over The World, or does it look like an
a half-competent, half-hearted attempt to retain Cold War era 
capabilities they had gotten used to?

NSA is going through the same crisis of goals as the rest of
the Cold War establishment.  Their mission, if they have any left at
all, has changed radically, and they know it.  While it
may be "in the best interest of NSA" to maintain control over
strong crypto, that's only a superficial analysis at one level.
NSA employees are also Americans, community members, family
members, etc.  They don't typically go around murdering hackers
they don't like.  Nor would that accomplish anything for them --
RSA was published internationally long ago, and PGP is now
scattered at sites all over the world, with new versions being
hacked on in nearly a dozen countries.   

The biggest problem I've encountered talking to various
people about implementing encryption is that they think
cypherpunks are a bunch of paranoid nuts, so only paranoids
would want to do things like use digital cash for their
semi-legal barter schemes.  Your expression of surprise that 
the NSA hasn't offed Phil Zimmerman just confirms their suspicions.
How can I convince them that cryptography is not just for paranoids?
The rest of us are concerned about things like protecting and
enhancing our privacy and freedom, and there's nothing silly
or paranoid about that.

But now that you mention it -- Shamir does operate out of Tel 
Aviv.  Obviously he built RSA with a hole in it, and NSA is the
main arm of the Crypto-Zionist conspiracy of Jewish Planetary Hegemony!  
And he didn't publish "Differential Cryptanalysis of the DES" until
non-Zionist bankers got ahold of DES.  It's all clear now!

> I think that, personally, the public-key stuff's gotta have some sort 
> of a hole in it that nobody's thought of yet outside of spook central.

I think your head has to have some sort of a hole in it.  Perhaps the
NSA's work?






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: b44729@achilles.ctd.anl.gov (Samuel Pigg)
Date: Sat, 28 Aug 93 03:03:02 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: REMAIL: Attacks on remailers (LONG (again))
In-Reply-To: <9308271714.AA11676@ah.com>
Message-ID: <9308280959.AA15615@achilles.ctd.anl.gov>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>>>>> On Fri, 27 Aug 93 10:14:19 -0700, hughes@ah.com (Eric Hughes) said:

	Eric> Attack (7) is made by an opponent who monitors all
	Eric> network traffic, but has no access to the insides of the
	Eric> remailer nodes.

	Eric> The defense is more subtle, however, than proposed.

>(7): Look at all messages coming out of the first remailer, and
>follow them into their 2nd remailers; take all messages from those and
>follow them on, and so on.  This will eventually lead to a number of
>destinations, one of which must have been the destination of the original
>message.  Over a period of time, look for correlations between destinations
>and sources.

	[...]

>making correlations statistically impossible

	Eric> What is the nature of the remailer path, however, for
	Eric> which we have an assurance that the correlations are too
	Eric> difficult to carry out?  Or to ask a simpler question
	Eric> for a simpler environment where we assume all remailers
	Eric> are equal, just how long does the path have to be?

	Eric> We know that by making the paths "long enough" that we
	Eric> can prevent correlations from becoming significant.  The
	Eric> question is how do we find out what is long enough?

>such an attack (PROLONGED monitoring of all
>remailers) would be very difficult to perform, esp. with use of
>remailer-remailer socket connections.

	Eric> The fact that it would be difficult is not the issue for
	Eric> the theory, but for the practice.  The extremely high
	Eric> cost, however, could be justified for 'national
	Eric> security' reasons against a few targets, or to break the
	Eric> system completely open looking for 'tax evaders.'

	Eric> If our theory is good against an arbitrarily strong
	Eric> opponent, then the system can withstand sustained
	Eric> attack.  If the existence of the system is seen as
	Eric> sufficiently threatening, for any number of different
	Eric> threats, we should plan for a sustained attack.  We need
	Eric> to know what the limits of the capability are and not
	Eric> just guess.

	[.. lots of good stuff about privacy diffusion deleted..]

	You are right of course, we can't just hope that it's "good
enough", but I want to ask if this problem of defending against attack
(7) should be considered a problem for the remailer web to handle at
all. I think this should be a problem for the authors of anonymous address
blocks and sender-anonymous headers blocks, and the software used to
do such.
	NOT that this should not be addressed, but it should not be an
impediment to implementing a remailer web. If we delegate resolution
of that problem (as complex a defense as you want) to software to
create encrypted headers, then people can have as good a defense to
this attack as they deem reasonable. (ie protection against this is
responsibility of remail users rather than the remail net.)

	To delegate this responsibility to the remail users, one could
implement the remailers with the ability to process simple commands
that are revealed when the remailer strips off its layer of encryption
of the encrypted header (or anonymous address block).

	The most important command (for anonymous address blocks)
would be instructions to encrypt the message body with with a supplied
key.  This is to defeat the previously discussed problem of trusting
the remailers themselves (run your own remailer and send mail to anon
address, and look for a copy of your message to pass through.)

	A delay function would be useful also. (ie delay(15000) to
tell the remailer to hold the message 15 minutes before sending on.)

	A command that would make analysis more difficult would be a
random function that could be used to randomize aspects of the
message's path, layered encryption, or time delay.

Ex1:

	After removing its layer of encryption from the message header,
	the remailer gets something like (pseudo header with comment
	lines begin with a #):

	random(3,7463)
#     3 choices^    ^seed
	{
	header-block 1
	header-block 2
	header-block 3
	}
#the header blocks would contain the next remailer to use, the
#encrypted header to send along with the message, and the key to encrypt
#the message with (if this is an anonymous address block we are talking about)

Ex2:

	delay(random(20000,9842))

#this would tell the remailer to wait between some minimum and
#20000 seconds to send the message along (along with the seed of 9842 for 
#the random function.



The randomness should be seeded by both the message and the remailer,
and if using randomly selectly keys to encrypt with (from a list),
some indication of which one was used (1, 2, or 3 etc) should be
included with the message, perhaps tacked onto the end of the message
after encryption (in a remailer->recipient data block ?), possibly
encrypted to the anonymous recipient using their key (included in this
layer.)

Commands could of course be nested, to create as complex a routing
specification as desired.

While this may seem overly complicated, most of it could be
handled fairly transparently by the user software.

	This approach ("smart messages") would have the possible
drawback of very large anonymous address blocks (containing multiply
encrypted, command driven headers, path branches etc.)

	A response to this could consist of "anonymous address
servers" which which the user software could, when mailing to an anon
address (ie "anon7462849") query to get the associated anonymous
address block (which being signed by the anonymous recipient would
assure its authenticity) and connect to the first remailer in the
chain as specified by the anon address block, all handled
transparently, possibly including handling sender-anonymity header
work as well.
	This would have several added advantages. The first would be
the simplification of handling anonymous address block- all the user
would need to know is the name and public key of the anonymous persona.
	It would also assist in the remailer key-expiration defense I
proposed previously. The anonymous address server could be synched
with the remailers to erase all the anonymous addresses when the
remailer keys are replaced.

	Anonymous address creation software could be written to grab
the new public keys to all the remailers from somewhere (maybe even
the anon address server itself ?) which were signed with the old
secret keys to assure their authenticity, and construct a new
anonymous address block, which would then be encrypted with the
anonymous address server's key, and submitted to the server via
sender-anonymous mail.
	Anonymous recipients could then also alter their anon address
header as often as they wanted (although being forced to when the
remailer keys expire), changing the path specification to frustrate
statistical path analysis.

	As ideas progress regarding how to defend against statistical
analysis of the message traffic, software to create anonymous address
blocks and construct sender-anonymous headers could be correspondingly
improved, without having to rewrite the remailer software.



I know this appears to be quite a bit of software work, but if and when
we get the protocols agreed upon, *I* will work on it as much as I can,
and I hope others would work on it also (whatever system is accepted/agreed
upon -- be it this or something else.)

The software system I've proposed includes (so far):

Remailers:
	Socket connections for talking to other remailers;
	Encrypt using other remailers keys to insure that
		two identical messages going into a remailer come out
		differently (random session key).
	Ability to handle simple command language and perform operations
		on the message and header. (picking one of several paths etc.)
	Ability to handle all the necessary decryptions- header encryption
		using its pubkey and random session key based encryption
		from previous remailer.
	Message batching (to be combined with "delay" function somehow?)
	Message padding (to be handled inside of encryption-to-next-remailer?)


Mailer:
	Ability to handle construction of sender-anonymous
		nested encrypted headers possibly using command language.
	Ability to communicate with and verify output of anonymous
		address block servers.

Anonymous Address Creation Software:

	Ability to obtain current remailer keys.
	Generate set of random keys for remailers to use.
	Intelligent creation of "smart header" and random anonymous
		mail path(s).

Anonymous Mail Reader:

	Ability to parse message and determine which keys were used
		by the remailers and decrypt layers to get message.


	Such a system would not have to be implemented all at once.  I
think the first steps would be remailer socket communication, and
simple anonymous address and sender-anonymity header construction
software.


Comments/Suggestions/Improvements/Criticisms necessary and welcome.

(yeah I know.. it's easy to "propose" something -- but I'm willing to
actually invest significant effort and time in it also, for what it's worth.)

Sam Pigg                                  "UnAmused" by the USGovCo.
b44729@achilles.ctd.anl.gov     <or>     dt1acaca@cfraix.cfr.usf.edu
PGP Key Fingerprint: ED A7 49 33 65 90 9A BD A4 E4 C5 92 5A 00 BC 6C





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: bill@twwells.com (T. William Wells)
Date: Sat, 28 Aug 93 00:12:59 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: .Comparing ViaCrypt and freeware.
In-Reply-To: <9308280330.AA24324@toad.com>
Message-ID: <CCGF53.1xI@twwells.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


In article <9308280330.AA24324@toad.com>,
peter honeyman <honey@citi.umich.edu> wrote:
: i'm impressed.  (honest.)  but the task here isn't to compare viacrypt
: to pgp -- they use different rsa engines -- it's validating that viacrypt
: doesn't have a backdoor.  the diff scheme you describe presupposes that
: this step has been done, but it has not, and i think it would be very,
: very hard to do.

My understanding is that the two pieces of software are very
similar. A full decompile and analysis would be a pain (but
doable and worthwhile, if one is paranoid enough) but I don't
think it's necessary.

My thought is that once one has isolated the differences, those
alone would get scrutinized. One would isolate the rsa engines by
difference, pretty up the code, and then verify that it doesn't
have any backdoors. So long as the two versions are closely
related, the code that has to be understood apart from pgp should
be relatively small and that would make the verification process
much easier.





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: doug@netcom.com (Doug Merritt)
Date: Sat, 28 Aug 93 08:18:08 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: AT&T Home Security Plus
In-Reply-To: <gg@well.sf.ca.us>
Message-ID: <9308281517.AA02895@netcom.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


"George A. Gleason" <gg@well.sf.ca.us> said:
>Somehow the discussion shifts to PGP vs. Clipper, and the caller asks if
>I've got a handle (I told him my email address, which was Really Dumb) and
>then he asks if I'm into pirating or anything... of course I'm not, and said
>so.... 
>Somewhere along the line I entirely forgot to ask how the hell he got any
>idea what block I lived on, since my residence address information is
>something I take great pains to protect.  
>And then it occurred to me... perhaps Something Else is also going on...?

The term "handle", as well as the fact that this person could say anything
even slightly knowledgeable about any computer related subject, points to
him being a hobbyist who frequents BBS's. ("Handle" is pretty much not
used in newsgroups, nor have I run into it on muds, but it is very widely
used in BBS circles.)

Telephone soliciting is generally a minimum wage job, although in high
price sales "professional" salespeople are used who get a commission. Even
if you assume a conspiracy of some sort, there isn't any reason for the
company to make a particular effort to use someone more knowledgeable for
cold calling.

The question about pirating probably arose because it has always been a
very frequent topic of conversation on BBS's. The caller himself might
be a pirate; that would be my first guess.

As for knowing your address, phone companies sell phone books that are
reverse-indexed by address. Companies use these for cold-calling because
they can pick out more affluent neighborhoods and skip e.g. ghetto areas
where a call might be a waste of time or even worse. Generally "taking
great pains" to protect information about your address doesn't guarantee
that you are successful; I've heard that some of these sales-tool phone
books have more information in them than is released to the public in
the usual phone books. Perhaps they cross-reference with mailing lists.

I could believe that there's a backdoor built into home security systems,
if I could figure out how they would make use of it. Sell the info to
organized crime for the purpose of burglary, perhaps? A little paranoid
considering you're talking about AT&T. How would they be able to implement
such a thing and still keep it secret? Or in cahoots with the FBI/CIA/NSA?
Doesn't make sense; if spooks want to get into someone's house, they can
do so in any number of ways, they needn't risk a large scale conspiracy,
which would only pay off on the very small percentage of homes that used
AT&T's system in particular.

And regardless of that, again, even if there's a conspiracy, there's
just no reason to let the phone solicitors in on it. All they need to
do is build a backdoor into the security system and then do everything
else aboveboard. Calling people up and hoping to catch someone in the
admission of being a pirate during a sales pitch is just ludicrous.
	Doug




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Timothy Newsham <newsham@wiliki.eng.hawaii.edu>
Date: Sat, 28 Aug 93 13:03:10 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: differential cryptanalysis
Message-ID: <9308282000.AA07110@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Hi,
  Does anyone have code that implements differential cryptanalysis
of DES like systems?  I'd be most interested in seeing something
that will find the key of a DES system with less than 16 rounds.

                             Tim




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Duncan Frissell <frissell@panix.com>
Date: Sat, 28 Aug 93 08:23:40 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Internet: commercial or n
Message-ID: <199308281519.AA23074@panix.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


To: cypherpunks@toad.com

L.>In the current situation, all the government bureacrats fire off
L.>messages that `even though your message can travel on commercial nets
L.>only, there is no way of guaranteeing that it does not cross public
L.>networks, therefore it must abide by NSF Internet Use Policies.'

To which I fire back:

"Since you consider it OK for Internet to carry pictures of naked men, 
women, children, and animals as well as text (tiny) sex and such kink as 
alt.fan.bill.gates, you have to put up with *our* ideas of the sorts of 
activities that consenting adults can engage in online.  I'm sick and 
tired of this discrimination against commercial intercourse."

Duncan Frissell

Who practices commercial activities every day on the Internet and is not 
ashamed to admit it.

---
 ~ WinQwk 2.0b#0 ~ Unregistered Evaluation Copy
                                                




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Duncan Frissell <frissell@panix.com>
Date: Sat, 28 Aug 93 08:23:07 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Another BBS Seizure i
Message-ID: <199308281519.AA23081@panix.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


To: cypherpunks@toad.com

R >  Does this mean I can be arrested for mentioning the fact that dry 
R >ice and water put into an empty 2-liter bottle of Coke makes a nice 
R >explosion?

No but it *does* mean that you can be busted for saying that if you mix 
ammonium nitrate and diesel fuel in a 19 to 1 ratio, you can blow up the 
World Trade Center.  It's a good thing that I never said that.

Duncan Frissell

Who knows things much more dangerous to the government than explosives and 
will reveal all for a small fee.

--- WinQwk 2.0b#0
                                                                                                   




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: an31144@anon.penet.fi
Date: Sat, 28 Aug 93 12:13:09 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Only Pretty Good
Message-ID: <199308281845.AA10153@xtropia>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


 >> Derek Atkins Said:
 
 > Secondly, regarding "whom do you trust": Do you trust Phil Z?  As far
 > as I know (and granted, its not much, yet), Phil Z is going to oversee
 > the commercial product, to make sure that nothing is put into it.

 >>>> If Phil says that the commercial PGP is OK, I will believe him.
 >>>> Dan Odom

It's worth re-reading the PGP docs again to re-establish the fact that
_Phil_ only rated PGP as Pretty Good Privacy.

I trust that appraisal and believe it to be accurate.  I do not expect
that the commercial product will be appreciably better or worse.






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: bruce@phantom.com (Bruce Fancher)
Date: Sat, 28 Aug 93 09:26:06 PDT
To: gg@well.sf.ca.us (George A. Gleason)
Subject: Re: AT&T Home Security Plus
In-Reply-To: <93Aug28.024813pdt.14474-3@well.sf.ca.us>
Message-ID: <m0oWT8K-0009GSC@mindvox.phantom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text


> Today I got a most interesting call from a phone solicitor, who said that he
> was with AT&T and they were going to be hosting a demo of an AT&T home
> security system on my block and was I interested in attending.  
> 
> I told him about Clipper and asked if the AT&T home burglar alarms came
> along with backdoors allowing various govt agents and burglars to sneak in.
> Somehow the discussion shifts to PGP vs. Clipper, and the caller asks if
> I've got a handle (I told him my email address, which was Really Dumb) and
> then he asks if I'm into pirating or anything... of course I'm not, and said
> so.... 
> 
> Somewhere along the line I entirely forgot to ask how the hell he got any
> idea what block I lived on, since my residence address information is
> something I take great pains to protect.  
> 
> And then it occurred to me... perhaps Something Else is also going on...?
> Like, "are you into pirating...?"  Hmmm...  I never even thought about that
> at the time, but if anyone else out there gets a call like this, it might be
> worth some follow-up research...
> 
> -gg

	I used cold call for a home improvement company while I was in high
school.  Generally "Our salesman is going to be in your neighboorhood" is
just a way to get people to feel like they'd better look at the product now
rather than later.  It doesn't mean they know where you live.  However,
unless your number is unlisted it will probably be in the Coles directory
(along with such information as how long you've lived at that residence). 
It sounds like an ordinary cold call.






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Johan Helsingius <julf@penet.FI>
Date: Sat, 28 Aug 93 03:43:03 PDT
To: "Mark C. Henderson" <markh@wimsey.bc.ca>
Subject: Re: Physical security lapses will getcha every time.
In-Reply-To: <m0oWI3U-0000poC@vanbc.wimsey.com>
Message-ID: <9308281339.aa06956@penet.penet.FI>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



> Of course, this doesn't make the UNIX versions of PGP useless. There
> is absolutely no reason why you can't run your own personal Unix
> box. Really all you need is a 386 machine with Linux or 386BSD.

Yeah. Or even run BSDI on your 386SX notebook. That's what I'm doing.
I don't want to use DOS, with all it's cruft. Much prefer a system I have full
source code to...

> The nice thing about the UNIX/Linux setup, is that you can still use
> all the UNIX tools to send/receive encrypted mail (your favourite
> mail user agent+pgp/ripem+UUCP+sendmail/smail) in a convenient way
> without messing with MSDOS. 

Yeah. And... Well... I don't want to get into any religious battles, but I
still prefer BSDI (the support is great and the networking code is much more
stable) over Linux - and yes, I do know Linux was develped out here in
Finland...

	Julf





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Timothy Newsham <newsham@wiliki.eng.hawaii.edu>
Date: Sat, 28 Aug 93 16:53:14 PDT
To: huntting@misc.glarp.com (Brad Huntting)
Subject: Re: PGP-MIME
In-Reply-To: <199308292250.AA00175@mini.glarp.com>
Message-ID: <9308282352.AA09137@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> 
> As I see it, the main problems PGP-MIME would be (1) The lack of
> MIME capable readers available for PC's and MAC's (the preferred
> platforms for anyone concerned about PGP security).  But more
> importantly, (2) it's not obvious how to make a painless transition
> from PGP-2 to PGP-MIME.

check out the PCPINE package,  it does mime.  It can read mail
out of an mbox, or a remote mailbox using IMAP or POP (assuming
you have a network connection).

> brad
> 




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Duncan Frissell <frissell@panix.com>
Date: Sat, 28 Aug 93 11:13:44 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Free Electronic Cash
Message-ID: <199308281808.AA13416@panix.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


To: cypherpunks@toad.com

Be the first on your block to spend some electronic "near" cash.

If you are the first to read this post, you may be able to use up to $5 of 
electronic pseudo-cash.  I wanted to be the first to post some so it was 
worth $5 to me.

Yesterday I bought a Western Union Phone Card (tm) from my nearest Western 
Union money transfer agent.  It is good for about 8 minutes of phone calls 
anywhere in the continental US (fewer minutes of international calls).

To use the "cash:"

Call 1 (800) 374-8686

Wait for the tone

Dial the code 428 22 601

When you get a dial tone, dial the (area code) + phone-number of the 
number you wish to reach.  

The system will tell you how many minutes you have available for the call.

Western Union Phone Cards (tm) are available from any agent in $5, $10, 
$20, and $50 denominations.  They can be (must be) purchased for cash.  I 
have no idea whether Western Union saves the ANI info of incoming calls 
and cross indexes it with the outgoing number and the "account" number.

All that I ask is that the user(s) of this card send me email (anonymously 
if you like) so I can send back privacy consulting solicitations.

Duncan Frissell

Michael Elansky Defense Fund
25 Maiden Lane
West Hartford, CT 06117



---
 ~ WinQwk 2.0b#0 ~ Unregistered Evaluation Copy
                                                                                     




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Duncan Frissell <frissell@panix.com>
Date: Sat, 28 Aug 93 11:13:08 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Another BBS Seizure in Ha
Message-ID: <199308281808.AA13419@panix.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


To: cypherpunks@toad.com

Please crosspost 

---
 ~ WinQwk 2.0b#0 ~ Unregistered Evaluation Copy
                               




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Duncan Frissell <frissell@panix.com>
Date: Sat, 28 Aug 93 11:13:42 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Another BBS Seizure in Ha
Message-ID: <199308281808.AA13422@panix.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


To: cypherpunks@toad.com

                     PLEASE CROSS POST AT WILL

R >The Hartford Courant on August 5, 1993 (page b-4) stated that a 21 
R >year old computer BBS operator was arrested for maintaining a computer
R >bulletin board that had a bomb making recipe.
R >
R >Michael Elansky was charged by the West Hartford police with inciting
R >injury to persons or property - a felony charge - and risk of injury
R >to a minor.
R >
R >He was held in lieu of $500,000 bond (in CT the bond for a person 
R >accused of murder is normally $100,000)

I just spoke to his mother Elaine and Michael himself from jail via the 
miracle of call waiting.  She is establsihing a defense fund.  Please send 
money:


Michael Elansky Defense Fund
P. O. Box 
West Hartford, Connecticut  06117


Duncan Frissell 



---
 ~ WinQwk 2.0b#0 ~ Unregistered Evaluation Copy
                                        




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Jim McCoy <mccoy@ccwf.cc.utexas.edu>
Date: Sat, 28 Aug 93 13:36:07 PDT
To: gg@well.sf.ca.us (George A. Gleason)
Subject: Re: Another BBS Seizure in Hartford
In-Reply-To: <93Aug28.033217pdt.14474-2@well.sf.ca.us>
Message-ID: <199308282034.AA02091@tigger.cc.utexas.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text


> Bombs & bulletin boards: the news media regularly mention the name of the
> chemical used to stinkbomb abortion clinics, and the composition of the
> world trade center bomb.  So it seems to me a decent defense could be made
> on the grounds of "selective prosecution" since after all, juveniles can
> always tune in the news and learn how to make bad things.  Well...?

It is even easier than that.  They can go down to the local library and
check out a book that will tell them how to make something better than an
ammonium nitrate fuel oil composition (it is hard to ignite such beasts,
but as someone who was always intrigued with pyrotechnics as a youth I know
there is a lot of info out there...)  Besides, they could just order a book
from loompanics that tells them how do make a whole lot more.

A good lawyer should be able to tear this one to bits...

jim



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Clifford A Adams <caadams@polaris.unm.edu>
Date: Sat, 28 Aug 93 15:16:08 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: USENET and US-legal PGP (signing only?)
Message-ID: <9308282211.AA00889@polaris.unm.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Hello again!

	Has there been any progress on a USA-legal PGP?  Are
negotiations still in progress or are they stalled?

	I am willing to write code (up to a few thousand lines of C)
to help integrate PGP with USENET newsreaders.  (I have a little
PGP/RIPEM signature verification fuction now, and a section called
"Digital signatures, cryptograpy, and USENET" in the online documentation.)
I am waiting for a US-legal version of PGP before coding further.

	I think that USENET provides a wonderful environment for
public key crypto applications.  My particular interest is in digital
signatures for forgery protection.  One use of this is in collaborative
message filters where people can rate or add keywords to other
messages.  I would like for all of this to be updated semi-automagically,
using usual (insecure!) USENET postings.

	Greater numbers of strong-crypto users should also help in the
political arena.  Many people don't see why the current cryptograpy
battles are important, because they don't care very much about strong
privacy.  An easy-to-use cryptosystem integrated into their ordinary
tools like newsreaders and mailers will get some of these people involved.

For instance, imagine these interactions:
----- start examples -----
[While reading news, the user types 'r' to reply to a message]

The poster included a PGP encryption key, and will accept encrypted replies.
Encrypt your reply? [nyh]

===

[User posts a message]

PGP key found.
Sign this posting? [yn]
[User types 'y']
Signing posting using PGP key.
Enter your passphrase:
[...]
===

[User posts a message]

Digital signature not found.
Would you like to generate a digital signature? (type 'h' for help) [nyh]

[user types 'h']

A digital signature allows other people to have some confidence that
your postings are really from you, and not a forgery.
...[more explanation of digital signatures, about 10-15 lines]...
Generating a digital signature usually takes between 5-15 minutes.
You will only have to do this once.

Would you like to generate a digital signature? (type 'h' for help) [nyh]
[user types y]

PGP found.
RIPEM not found.
Generating digital signature using PGP...
[Nice, friendly key generation process.]
----- end examples -----

	Finally, would it be possible to release a US-legal/RSAREF
*subset* of PGP which allows only signatures and signature
verification?  To my knowledge this wouldn't require violating the
RSAREF interface.  (My understanding is that the interface problem
is that PGP uses IDEA rather than DES for message encryption.
The signature is simply an RSA-encrypted hash of the message--this
could be handled by the RSAREF package.  Correct?)

				--Cliff

-- 
Clifford A. Adams  caadams@polaris.unm.edu | USENET Interface Project:
457 Ash St. NE      Albuquerque, NM  87106 | Tools for advanced newsreading
STRN (Scan TRN) now in testing: trn 3.3 plus flexible newsgroup menus, fast
article scoring with score ordered display, and merged/virtual newsgroups.



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: collins@newton.apple.com (Scott Collins)
Date: Sat, 28 Aug 93 21:18:49 PDT
To: Network Demon <demon@aql.gatech.edu>
Subject: Re: Total RSA in PGP
Message-ID: <9308290413.AA21961@newton.apple.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


  >Am I mistaken in believing RSA is more secure than the present hybrid?

.....SHORT ANSWER.....

You are mistaken.


.....MEDIUM ANSWER.....

You are mistaken not because the statement 'RSA is more secure than the
present hybrid' is false, but because it is a mistake to put your belief in
this statement, which has not been proved true.  RSA alone would represent
a great increase in computational effort, without risk of a decrease in
security, after which you couldn't prove you were any better off (though,
in practice, against currently known attacks, and with a large key, you
might be).


.....LONG ANSWER.....

RSA alone is no _less_ secure than the PGP's combination of RSA and IDEA:
if you can break RSA, you can extract the IDEA key and decipher the
message; if you can break IDEA, you don't need the key.

I am guessing that you share a widely echoed predjudice that public-key
ciphers are better than secret-key ciphers (I apologize if I have
mis-labeled you :).  Public-key ciphers have gained a reputation for being
more secure, as a class, than secret-key ciphers.  Perhaps because
public-key ciphers afford 'better' key management, the world at large has
gotten the impression that they provide 'better' security.  Public-key
ciphers as a class are _not_ more secure than secret-key ciphers.  One
counter example, which periodically rears its ugly head here, is the (truly
random) one-time-pad.  This secret-key cipher offers perfect security in
the Shannon sense.  No public-key cipher can make that claim.

To prove RSA _more_ secure than the hybrid, RSA must be proved more secure
than IDEA.  Unfortunately, we don't really know how secure the RSA
algorithm is (or IDEA, for that matter).  It is known that RSA is no _more_
secure than factoring a component of the public key (readily available to
an attacker).  To my knowledge, it has not been proved that either a) RSA
is at least this secure; or b) factoring is hard.

Despite a paucity of formal proof, I know of know better attack on a
message enciphered with well chosen keys than factoring, which both man and
machine currently find taxing.  RSA with well chosen keys is 'empirically'
computationally secure.

While IDEA has been designed specifically to resist differential
cryptanalysis (thanks to those who pointed me to the IDEA papers explaining
this), more formal proof of its security awaits further understanding of
the information theory aspects of its foundation: mixing operations from
incompatible groups.  In the end, IDEA is also 'empirically'
computationally secure.

I know of no comparisons of the security offered by RSA and IDEA against
practical attacks.


.....FINAL ANSWER.....

In theory: theory is as good as practice; but in practice... it isn't.


Hope this helps,

Scott Collins         | "Few people realize what tremendous power there
                      |  is in one of these things."     -- Willy Wonka
......................|................................................
BUSINESS.   voice:408.862.0540  fax:974.6094   collins@newton.apple.com
Apple Computer, Inc.   1 Infinite Loop, MS 301-2C   Cupertino, CA 95014
.......................................................................
PERSONAL.   voice/fax:408.257.1746    1024/669687   catalyst@netcom.com





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Network Demon <demon@aql.gatech.edu>
Date: Sat, 28 Aug 93 19:23:17 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Total RSA in PGP
Message-ID: <9308290221.AA10833@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Is it possible to use RSA all the way through a PGP encrypted message
(do not use IDEA)?

If so, how?  I know it would take a LONG time, but it would make for
a nice option.

If not, why?  Although, it might take "forever", why not make it an
option for those willing to wait?

Am I mistaken in believing RSA is more secure than the present hybrid?


Thanx,
	--demon





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: an31185@anon.penet.fi (Anon of Ibid)
Date: Sat, 28 Aug 93 15:48:13 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Commercial PGP; trapdoor rumors
Message-ID: <9308282243.AA26548@anon.penet.fi>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



In message <01H2813M8J6090MZGB@delphi.com> Mike Ingle said:
>If there is any flaw in PGP, there are only a few places where it
>could be. The basic mechanics of the program (RSA, IDEA, etc) obviously
>work. 

I'll agree with you there, or at the least, if they don't work I'm not
likely to be able to prove it. I also very much doubt that there's
really a 'trapdoor' to deliberately make decryption easy, but there's
plenty of scope for a bug or unwarranted assumption to do so by
accident. (Look at WordPerfect 5.1 encryption, for a good example).

>The file format can easily be checked to make sure it is correct.
>A subtle flaw would have to be somewhere like: prime number generation,
>random RSA key generation, or random session key generation. If the primes
>weren't actually prime, that would make the RSA keys breakable. But
>you could take the primes (pgp -kg -l and you will see them in hex)
>and feed them into a primality tester to verify that.

With regard to the file format, I've just been looking at that, I hacked
a test copy of PGP 2.3a to dump out the plaintext that it would normally 
idea-encrypt to a file, and encrypted a selection of files with a
selection of keys to look for known plaintext, then went back into
the source code to track down where it came from.

The first twelve bytes of the data that gets idea-encrypted contain
two bytes of known plaintext, and two repeated bytes. The actual
contents are:

	bytes 1-8:	Randomly generated prefix
	bytes 9-10:	Repeat of bytes 7 and 8 (key check bytes)
	bytes 11-12:	ALWAYS 0xA3 and 0x01 !!!!

The repeated bytes come from idea_file() in crypto.c, and are used to
verify that you got the correct key to decrypt the file. The known
bytes come from squish_and_idea_file() in the same file, and verify that
the input contains compressed data and that it's zipped.

Now, I don't know enough about idea encryption to know how much this would
help to break the code, but it still seems to me that much of this does
not need to be here. Anyone got any suggestions ? (I'd guess you could 
at least move the repeated bytes to the end of the file ?). It's definitely a
weak point, as a brute-force attack would only need to decrypt 12 bytes
to verify (or almost verify ?) a correct idea key, though whether that
*greatly* reduces the security, I don't know.

I realise that the random bytes are supposed in part to protect you from
this, however, I don't see any point in reducing the security of the
data if you don't have to. 

>The most likely place for a bug would be in the randomness. I suppose
>it is possible that a one-line bug somewhere could leave out most of
>the randomness, making the keys still look random but actually be
>predictable. Random number generation is hard to verify. How has
>that in PGP been checked? The PGP source is so big and spread out,
>it's hard to check. I don't think there is a bug, but it would
>be nice if PGP were carefully examined and attacked. Where are these
>rumors coming from? They are bad for the cause.

Randomness is the next thing I'm going to look at. From the output I've
produced, I can't say I'm greatly impressed by the randomness of the random 
prefix bytes, though that's probably a result of looking at such a small 
sample.

Tomorrow, hopefully, I'll set a program running to generate a few hundred
thousand PGP random numbers and look at what comes out. Obviously, I
can look at the frequency of different byte values, both overall and in
each of the bytes it produces, but does anyone know of any other simple
'randomness' tests for 16-byte random numbers ?



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From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Derek Atkins <warlord@Athena.MIT.EDU>
Date: Sat, 28 Aug 93 20:23:18 PDT
To: Brad Huntting <huntting@misc.glarp.com>
Subject: Re: PGP-MIME
In-Reply-To: <199308292250.AA00175@mini.glarp.com>
Message-ID: <9308290317.AA07547@podge.MIT.EDU>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> For PGP to really make use of MIME, it could use "multipart" types
> to separate the objects being encrypted and/or signed from the
> signatures and encrypted session keys associated with them.

No, this is WRONG.  Take a look at the PEM-MIME Internet Draft.  You
*do not* want to separate the signature from the body of text being
signed, since then you lose the delimiters of the signed message, and
MIME can do anything with the data (like transfer tabs to spaces,
etc.)  This is BAD.

If you keep the message and signature together, it will work better.
MIME still does funky things, however, some times.

Currently, you can easily use MIME as a transport mechanism for PGP
messages.  However currently there is no way to use PGP security for a
MIME message.  Hopefully we can take what the PEM-MIME effort has
learned and apply that to PGP..

-derek





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Derek Atkins <warlord@Athena.MIT.EDU>
Date: Sat, 28 Aug 93 20:36:10 PDT
To: Network Demon <demon@aql.gatech.edu>
Subject: Re: Total RSA in PGP
In-Reply-To: <9308290221.AA10833@toad.com>
Message-ID: <9308290333.AA07580@podge.MIT.EDU>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


This was discussed about a year ago!  It is a bad idea to do this for
a couple reasons.  First of all, RSA can only encrypt a block of data
the same size as the key.  So, for example, if you encrypt a message
to me using my key, it RSA-encrypts in blocks of 709 bits!  Second,
there is no cypher-chaining, so the encryption from one block doesn't
affect the encryption of the next.  It is possible to do something
like this, but I sure wouldn't want to do it.

As for the time, lets say you have a 10K message (not unreasonable,
although thats a fairly long email message ;-), and you are encrypting
it in a 512-bit key.  Well, 512 bits is 64 bytes, so you are
encrypting 10K bytes 64 bytes at a time (or 160 blocks).  Each 64-byte
block takes a few seconds, lets just say one second (its a little
faster on some system, and a lot slower on others!)  This means you
are spending 160 seconds, or almost THREE MINUTES, to encrypt this 10K
file!

Personally, I don't think that the extra security that you may (or may
not: you now have a massive plain-text attack, although I don't know
how you can really use it) get is worth the 2 extra orders of
magnitude of time it takes to encrypt the data!

As for adding this as a feature to PGP.  It's *not* going to happen.

-derek




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "George A. Gleason" <gg@well.sf.ca.us>
Date: Sun, 29 Aug 93 00:26:11 PDT
To: doug@netcom.com
Subject: Re: AT&T Home Security Plus
Message-ID: <93Aug29.002236pdt.14096-3@well.sf.ca.us>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Re Doug's response to my item on this topic: please don't get the idea that
I thought AT&T were going after *me* for any reason, or trying to trap
hackers deliberately, or anything like that.  I may be dumb but I'm not one
of those raving paranoids who assumes that everything that happens means
someone is out to get me....!

Nor did I mean to suggest that AT&T would actually have a backdoor in their
home security systems.  I was using that point as a cynical joke with the
dude who called me.  It was *not* intended to be serious.  It *was* intended
to make a sarcastic poke at Clipper.   

Cross-list directories: having served as a key witness against a very deadly
local stalker here, I have taken great pains to let PacBell know that my
service address is not to be released in any form for any reason; I've gone
over this with service reps every single year at directory-compiling season.
 What I would really like to do is force the issue legally, i.e. serve them
with some kind of court order or something, which would bar them from
releasing that information.  Anyway, enough for now...

-gg




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: thug@phantom.com (Murdering Thug)
Date: Sat, 28 Aug 93 22:16:11 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Free Electronic Cash
In-Reply-To: <199308281808.AA13416@panix.com>
Message-ID: <m0oWf80-0009GSC@mindvox.phantom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text


> Western Union Phone Cards (tm) are available from any agent in $5, $10, 
> $20, and $50 denominations.  They can be (must be) purchased for cash.  I 
> have no idea whether Western Union saves the ANI info of incoming calls 
> and cross indexes it with the outgoing number and the "account" number.

If you don't want your number being passed via ANI to the 800 number owner
and don't want it to appear on their monthly 800 bill statement, simply
use your local "0" operator to place the 1-800 call for you, it's free.
Simply state "Operator, I'm having problems dailing this call..etc.."
Readers of comp.dcom.telecom and 2600 magazine already know about this
neat little trick.  You can prove it to yourself by calling Full
Disclosure's 800 ANI Demo line (800-235-1414) first without using an
operator, and then with an operator and compare the results.

If you call Dial-A-Mattress (1-800-MATTRESS) with your ANI blocked they
will get crazy on you and hang up.  They are so used to seeing your number
on their screen, that when they can't, they go berzerk.  The reason they
have live ANI is because apparently they are a big target for pranksters
(pranksters ordering mattresses to other peoples houses instead of pizzas,
like the pranksters of years past).

> Michael Elansky Defense Fund
> 25 Maiden Lane
> West Hartford, CT 06117

I just sent $10 cash to them.  Better them than the corrupt EFF which
has been accepting kickbacks/bribes from AT&T and Pac Bell. Speaking of
which, has anyone bothered to contact the EFF/CPSR/ACLU about this case? 
It seems like a perfect 1st Ammendment issue, and I would personally love
to see the pigs who raided Mr. Elansky lose their jobs because of these
outrageous civil rights violations. 


Thug




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: mbriceno@aol.com
Date: Sun, 29 Aug 93 02:08:23 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Examination of ViaCrypt's PGP by members of this group
Message-ID: <9308290503.tn71687@aol.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


A number of posts have proposed that perhaps some of the more astute members
of this list should be allowed by ViaCryp to examine the source of the
commercial PGP. The idea is that if some of the people we are likely to trust
give their O.K. to the code then we can all go out and buy the program
without fear of hidden back doors.
Unfortunately this proposal has the same fundamental flaws that the recent
review of the Clipper chip by Denning et al had.

A group of even the most competent reviewers can overlook some problems in
the code. It may take a long time before a flaw is discovered. The stamp of
approval by some members of this list to a commercial PGP with a secret
source code would therefore be little more than a marketing scheme. It would
be no different from the expert review marketing scheme used to sell us
Clipper, as --I think it was John Gillmore-- has recently explained.

---Marc




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: doug@netcom.com (Doug Merritt)
Date: Sun, 29 Aug 93 07:33:27 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: AT&T Home Security Plus
In-Reply-To: <gg@well.sf.ca.us>
Message-ID: <9308291431.AA02561@netcom4.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


"George A. Gleason" <gg@well.sf.ca.us> said:
>Cross-list directories: having served as a key witness against a very deadly
>local stalker here, I have taken great pains to let PacBell know that my
>service address is not to be released in any form for any reason; I've gone
>over this with service reps every single year at directory-compiling season.

Yes, unfortunately there are institutions that are obnoxious about this.
Here's an innocent anecdote that shows how bad things can be.

Last year I got to know a woman via her nome de plume on a mud. She was
highly privacy-conscious, to the point where she told no one there anything
about her real life (this is common on many muds, but not on that particular
one). We'd had a bunch of heart-to-heart's, and since I'm a smart ass, at
one point I called her up. Since she hadn't told me her real name nor what
city she was in, let alone given me her phone number, she naturally wanted
to know how I'd managed this.

(I underscore that this was innocent; we talked for 6 hours that time and
she recently visited me while passing through the area where I live, which
is to say that she wasn't bent out of shape by my doing the above.)

Anyway the scary part is that her university lists both *residence*
phone and address for all students in their phone directory services.
She said that she had tried to get unlisted but that university policy
*forbade* that, so she was stuck with being listed. (Yes, this is a U.S.
university.)

That's the sort of policy that ought to be prevented by law. Even non-deadly
stalkers can be a serious nuisance.
	Doug




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Christian D. Odhner" <cdodhner@indirect.com>
Date: Sun, 29 Aug 93 08:23:28 PDT
To: thug@phantom.com (Murdering Thug)
Subject: Re: Free Electronic Cash
In-Reply-To: <m0oWf80-0009GSC@mindvox.phantom.com>
Message-ID: <199308291518.AA13632@indirect.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> If you don't want your number being passed via ANI to the 800 number owner
> and don't want it to appear on their monthly 800 bill statement, simply
> use your local "0" operator to place the 1-800 call for you, it's free.
> Simply state "Operator, I'm having problems dailing this call..etc.."
> Readers of comp.dcom.telecom and 2600 magazine already know about this
> neat little trick.  You can prove it to yourself by calling Full
> Disclosure's 800 ANI Demo line (800-235-1414) first without using an
> operator, and then with an operator and compare the results.

I just tried this, both ways, and got my own home phone number repeated to
me, both times. Maybe they fixed this "bug"?

Happy Hunting, -Chris
<cdodhner@indirect.com>
PGP public key available upon request.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: smb@research.att.com
Date: Sun, 29 Aug 93 05:43:57 PDT
To: mbriceno@aol.com
Subject: Re: Examination of ViaCrypt's PGP by members of this group
Message-ID: <9308291242.AA16121@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


	 A group of even the most competent reviewers can overlook some
	 problems in the code. It may take a long time before a flaw is
	 discovered. The stamp of approval by some members of this list
	 to a commercial PGP with a secret source code would therefore
	 be little more than a marketing scheme. It would be no
	 different from the expert review marketing scheme used to sell
	 us Clipper, as --I think it was John Gillmore-- has recently
	 explained.

No, there is an important difference:  you'd be starting from known-
good source.  That might make the task feasible.

That doesn't mean it's easy, of course.  A fair number of years ago, I
participated in a review of some code which had been developed, in
part, by someone who was later convicted of assorted {h,cr,chr}acking-
related offenses.  There was far too much source code to check it all;
however, we knew when this person had first had access, so we could use
diff on many modules.  That tremendously reduced the scope of the
effort.  We did find one curious construct -- a combination of two bugs
that together constituted a security hole.  Either alone was harmless.
And to this day, I don't know if they were inserted deliberately.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Liam David Gray <lg2g+@andrew.cmu.edu>
Date: Sun, 29 Aug 93 05:43:26 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: no ftpd on soda.berkeley.edu ?
Message-ID: <8gU_DXW00Uh_I1fURT@andrew.cmu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Has anyone else tried to ftp soda in the past 2 days or so?  I've been
unable to establish a connection.  I assume whoever maintains the
Cypherpunks archive on this machine (is it Eric H.?) might be able to
find out:  Is there any ftpd running on it at the moment, and what's the
expected downtime?

Thanks.
- Liam Gray
lg2g+@andrew.cmu.edu




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Derek Atkins <warlord@Athena.MIT.EDU>
Date: Sun, 29 Aug 93 06:03:26 PDT
To: smb@research.att.com
Subject: Re: Examination of ViaCrypt's PGP by members of this group
In-Reply-To: <9308291242.AA16121@toad.com>
Message-ID: <9308291259.AA10290@c-m-kornbluth.MIT.EDU>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> No, there is an important difference:  you'd be starting from known-
> good source.  That might make the task feasible.

I can almost guarantee that you will not get to see the RSA sources.
And I can almost guarantee that the REST of the code for the product
will be straight PGP, similar to the freeware...  I can't guarantee
that ViaCrypt won't decide to do something stupid.

-derek





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Brad Huntting <huntting@glarp.com>
Date: Sun, 29 Aug 93 09:26:15 PDT
To: Derek Atkins <warlord@athena.mit.edu>
Subject: Re: PGP-MIME
In-Reply-To: <9308290317.AA07547@podge.MIT.EDU>
Message-ID: <199308291623.AA03115@misc.glarp.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



>> For PGP to really make use of MIME, it could use "multipart" types
>> to separate the objects being encrypted and/or signed from the
>> signatures and encrypted session keys associated with them.

> No, this is WRONG.  Take a look at the PEM-MIME Internet Draft.  You
> *do not* want to separate the signature from the body of text being
> signed, since then you lose the delimiters of the signed message, and
> MIME can do anything with the data (like transfer tabs to spaces,
> etc.)  This is BAD.

If the signed object where of type text/*, then yes it might be
altered with impunity.  But MIME would not alter a body part type
such as application/pgp-object or message/external-body would it?

There's a definite advantage in using multipart/* to separate
signatures from the plain-text they apply to because then you can
easily encode the signatures with base64 while encoding the text
in "7bit" or "8bit".

> If you keep the message and signature together, it will work
better.  > MIME still does funky things, however, some times.

Then we need to get the MIME do's and dont's nailed down in the
next RFC (if they arn't already) specifying exactly which type can
be altered, and to what extent.

> Currently, you can easily use MIME as a transport mechanism for
PGP > messages.  However currently there is no way to use PGP
security for a > MIME message.  Hopefully we can take what the
PEM-MIME effort has > learned and apply that to PGP..

But I can put a MIME message headers in a PGP message.  And (though
I haven't tried it), I should be able to specify that application/pgp
messages will be piped through a command like "pgp -m|metamail" or
"pgp -m|mhn -file /dev/stdin".  Unfortunately, I've had problems
redirecting pgp's stdin and stdout.  I'm not sure that it opens
/dev/tty every time it wants to talk to the user.

Also, since you bring up PEM-MIME, what could be done to bring PGP
and PEM closer together?  I'm not suggesting changing the web of
trust model or using DES instead of IDEA.  Just make the formats
similar enough so that an application implementing one could be
painlessly modified to implement the other.

A common format wouldn't seem to be all that difficult to implement.
Since some folks want to use triple DES and others IDEA, add this
info to the RSA encrypted portion of the message.  This has the
advantage of hiding not only the key used to encrypt the body of
the message, but the algorithm as well.

As for the trust models, there not so different in theory, just in
practice.  PEM is planing on using X.509 type certificates, and
they are having problems figuring out how to map X.500 Distinguished
Names (DN's) onto e-mail addresses (I think they're making the
problem allot harder than it is).

Perhaps the model for future PEM/PGP systems is to keep both private
key rings, and public key rings with the latter being found in the
(Internet) X.500 directory.  This would nessesitate being able to
sign a private key with a public key, and vice versa.


brad




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: gnu (John Gilmore)
Date: Sun, 29 Aug 93 10:36:15 PDT
To: interesting-people@eff.org
Subject: Whit Diffie on Sept 27th Sunergy Satellite TV Broadcast
Message-ID: <9308291735.AA18888@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


----------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                        The Florida SunFlash

                 Sept 27th Sunergy Satellite Broadcast

SunFLASH Vol 56 #26                                              August 1993
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
56.26   Sept 27th Sunergy Satellite Broadcast
        7th Sunergy Broadcast will be on September 28, 1993 from
        9:00 - 10:45 am PDT. Title: "Cyberjockying in the 21st Century".
        How will supernetworks and the Internet affect you ?
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
If you have satellite receive capabilities and wish to downlink this
program please send email to david.howard@Sun.COM.  We will add your
name to our alias and send the appropriate satellite and transponder
information when it becomes available.


                           Sunergy #7
                        September 28, 1993
                        9:00 - 10:45 am PDT
                   Cyberjockying in the 21st Century

How will supernetworks transport you to the far reaches of the data
galaxy?  What is the current status of the internet and other
"information highways"? What can these "highways" do for you today?

This next Sunergy live broadcast will focus on the issues and
technologies surrounding the worldwide movement of information.  It
will take a look at the internet, information suppliers, information
retrievers and the other related resources.  Discussions will also
include regulation and security on the internet. Some current
technologies will be demonstrated.

Guests include:

John Gage        - Director of the Science Office, SMCC
Whitfield Diffie - Distinguished Engineer, Security - SMCC
Carl Malamud     - President, Internet Multicasting Service
Brewster Kahle   - President, WAIS Inc

If you wish to downlink this broadcast, please send email to
david.howard@Sun.COM or phone the Sunergy office at +1 415/336-5847

Program is available on satellites over Europe (west, central and east),
Canada, Latin America and the US.

+++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
Biographies:


John Gage
Director, Science Office
Sun Microsystems Computer Corporation


John Gage works for Bill Joy, the Chief Technical Officer of
Sun, and is responsible for Sun's relationships with the world
scientific and public policy communities, international scientific
institutions and groups developing new forms of scientific research
involving computing.

He is on scientific and advisory panels of the United States
National Science Foundation, the US Congress Office of Technology
Assessment, the European institute of Technology and the United
States National Academy of Sciences. He has recently been appointed
to the US National Research Council Mathematical Sciences Education
Board.

He is a member of ACM, IEEE, SIAM, AMS, AAAS, and SMPTE.

He attended the Harvard Business School and the Harvard Graduate
School of Public Policy.  He did doctoral work in economics and
mathematics at the university of Berkeley at the same time as
Bill Joy.  Gage subsequently left Berkeley with Joy to start
Sun in 1982.

Gage is on the Board of Directors of Unicode, an industry consortium
of IBM, Microsoft, Apple, Novell, Sun, GO Corporation, and others to
provide multilingual capability in all world scripts for all
documents and applications.

+++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++

Carl Malamud
President
Internet Multicasting Service

Carl Malamud is the author of seven professional reference books including
STACKS (Prentice Hall), Analyzing Sun Networks (Van Nostrand Reinhold), and
Exploring the Internet: A Technical Travelogue (Prentice Hall).

Currently, Carl is producing the Internet Town Hall and Internet Talk Radio
series for the Internet Multicasting Service and conducts research on
integration of telephone systems into the Internet.

++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++

Whitfield Diffie
Distinguished Engineer
Sun Microsystems

Whitfield Diffie is best known for his 1975 discovery of
the concept of public key cryptography, for which he was recently
awarded a Doctorate in Technical Sciences (Honoris Causa) by the
Swiss Federal Institute of Technology.

For a dozen years prior to assuming his present position in 1991,
Diffie was Manager of Secure Systems Research for Northern Telecom,
functioning as the center of expertise in advanced security
technologies throughout the corporation.  Among his achievements in
this position was the design of the key management architecture for
NT's recently released PDSO security system for X.25 packet networks.

Diffie received a Bachelor of Science degree in mathematics
from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology in 1965.  Prior to
becoming interested in cryptography, he worked on the development of
the Mathlab symbolic manipulation system --- sponsored jointly at
Mitre and the MIT Artificial Intelligence Laboratory --- and later on
proof of correctness of computer programs at Stanford University.  He
is the recipient of the IEEE Information Theory Society Best Paper
Award for 1979 and the IEEE Donald E. Fink award for 1981.


+++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++

Brewster Kahle
President
Wide Area Information Servers, Inc.

Inventor and architect of the WAIS electronic publishing system, Brewster
Kahle has lead the multi-company effort to build a practical system for
end-users to find and retrieve information from servers worldwide.  Before
this work, he helped design and build parallel supercomputers at Thinking
Machines Corporation.

Brewster was schooled at MIT in Computer Science and Artificial
Intelligence.
**********************************************************************
For information about SunFlash send mail to info-sunflash@Sun.COM.
Subscription requests should be sent to sunflash-request@Sun.COM.
Archives are on draco.nova.edu, ftp.uu.net, sunsite.unc.edu,
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All prices, availability, and other statements relating to Sun or third
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Send brief articles (e.g. third party announcements) and include contact
information (non-800#, fax #, email, etc) to:
John McLaughlin, SunFlash editor, flash@Sun.COM. +1 305 351 4909




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Duncan Frissell <frissell@panix.com>
Date: Sun, 29 Aug 93 08:38:29 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Free Electronic Cash
Message-ID: <199308291536.AA23488@panix.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


To: cypherpunks@toad.com

T >> Michael Elansky Defense Fund
T >> 25 Maiden Lane
T >> West Hartford, CT 06117
T >
T >I just sent $10 cash to them.  Better them than the corrupt EFF which
T >has been accepting kickbacks/bribes from AT&T and Pac Bell. Speaking 
T >of which, has anyone bothered to contact the EFF/CPSR/ACLU about this 
T >case? It seems like a perfect 1st Ammendment issue, and I would 
T >personally love to see the pigs who raided Mr. Elansky lose their jobs
T > because of these outrageous civil rights violations. 

They have been in contact with the EFF and received some moral support but 
they mostly have to depend on their own resources.

I did determine that the BBS was not siezed, BTW.  It was missing when the 
Geheime Staats Polizei arrived.

Duncan Frissell
(Net Prime - 01000001st Fiberborne)

"A Machine Age army can no more defeat an Information Age army than a 
Muscle Age army can defeat a Machine Age army."  

Join in the fun as Slick Willie and the other spearcarriers of the New 
World Order charge the machine guns of the Info Army.  Cyberspace Wants 
You.  Join the 01000001st Fiberborne - recruiting depot open at this 
address.  Phase One guerilla operations have already begun... 






---
 ~ WinQwk 2.0b#0 ~ Unregistered Evaluation Copy
                                                                                                                              




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Date: Sun, 29 Aug 93 12:08:30 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Talked to Phil Zimmermann....
Message-ID: <9308291906.AA23360@netcom5.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Cypherians,

Phil Zimmermann was at our "Extropians Fifth Anniversary Party" in the
Santa Cruz mountains yesterday and last night; Extropians are another
mailing list/group, of course, but there is a substantial overlap
between the groups.

Several items of potential interest:

1. RSA did not know of the ViaCrypt deal until after it was signed
last Sunday. ViaCrypt's license allows it to put whatever it wants
around the RSA core....it has picked PGP as the wrapper. RSA can't
really object to this, provided the RSA core is as the contract with
ViaCrypt specifies.

2. Phil will carefully inspect the code, including the RSA part, and
is confident no funny business is planned by ViaCrypt or anyone else.

(I have to trust Phil on this matter more than any "panel" or the
like....after all, he wanted to put trapdoors in, he could in the
existing PGP--though of course this is highly unlikely to have been
put in in the first place and to have remained undiscovered all this
time.)

3. There's a bunch of confusing--to me--stuff about U.S. versions,
European/foreign versions, what can and can't be exported and
imported, the ITAR (International Traffic in Arms Regulations), and so
on. Basically, there may be separate European versions, possibly using
different code. Triple DES may be used in some versions (don't ask me
for details....I'm not sure of the tradeoffs between DES and
IDEA...perhaps the deal to use IDEA doesn't fit with a commercial
version of PGP).

4. I showed Phil the MacPGP 2.3 program on my PowerBook 170. The
"help" system especially impressed him (it does me, too). He is not
closely connected with Zig F.'s Macintosh development.

5. Integrating PGP with mailers--the "elm" and MIME ideas that keep
surfacing--is still being debated. Running PGP on a machine outside
one's own control is always dangerous, but, let's face it, is how
_many_ people are already using PGP and how many of the future
corporate customers will be likely to use it.

(The PGP secret key will then be found scattered around in backups, on
other disks, etc. Even the manually-entered passphrase is *not
sufficient*, as many systems have "scrypt" and similar
keystroke-capture programs automatically recording all keystrokes.
Even my Macintoshes capture all keystrokes ("Last Resort," "Thunder 7,
etc., have such utilities).

This is an unresolved issue! (Talk of using smartcards, RSA cards,
Newton-like PDAs, etc., is one approach, but this moves away from ease
of use by requiring specialized hardware.)

6. Ease of use remains a problem. Phil mentioned again that he sends a
routine form letter out to all those who send him encrypted e-mail
explaining that it may take him several days to get around to reading
their messages...he has to do the same multi-step procedure of
downloading to his local PC, quitting, saving the file, starting PGP,
and so on. (Phil has never run PGP on a machine outside his control.)

7. Phil also wanted to talk about the political issues of RSA vs. PGP,
about my concerns some months back that the battle for strong crypto
would not be won with explicitly illegal programs, etc. I told him I
thought the ViaCrypt deal was a nearly perfect solution to these
concerns: individuals and corporations can now safely use PGP without
the fear of asset forfeiture or criminal prosecution should a zealous
prosecutor decide to "make an example" of them.

A legal version of PGP is the goal many of us were seeking. A major
win. I congratulate Phil for pulling this off.

8. Perhaps most ironically, David Sternlight (the neural net AI
automatic posting program I mentioned a few days ago) has asked to be
a beta site for the ViaCrypt program! Sternlight blesses
ViaCrypt...the mind boggles. (To be fair to Sternlight--something many
people may flame me for :-} --he never argued for a ban on crypto, or
for restrictions, only that a "legal" or "unencumbered" version be
used. Hence his involvement with RIPEM.)

That's what I remember. The party started at 2 p.m. at the
mountain-top home of Mark Desilets and lasted 'til well after 3
a.m....and may still be going. I didn't count, but there were probably
at least a hundred people, including a dozen or more Cypherpunks.

A real blast.

-Tim May

-- 
..........................................................................
Timothy C. May         | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,  
tcmay@netcom.com       | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
408-688-5409           | knowledge, reputations, information markets, 
W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA  | black markets, collapse of governments.
Higher Power: 2^756839 | Public Key: PGP and MailSafe available.
Note: I put time and money into writing this posting. I hope you enjoy it.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: collins@newton.apple.com (Scott Collins)
Date: Sun, 29 Aug 93 12:13:30 PDT
To: Liam David Gray <lg2g+@andrew.cmu.edu>
Subject: Re: no ftpd on soda.berkeley.edu ?
Message-ID: <9308291907.AA01298@newton.apple.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


  >Has anyone else tried to ftp soda in the past 2 days or so? I've been
  >unable to establish a connection.

Ditto.





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: fergp@sytex.com (Paul Ferguson)
Date: Sun, 29 Aug 93 13:43:31 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: The Hunt for Red Miata (humor)
Message-ID: <HoZ29B1w165w@sytex.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


excerpted from the notorious, left-wing publication:
 
The Washington Post
Sunday, 29 August 1993
Page C5; Outlook
Commentary and Opinion
 
 
The Hunt for Red Miata
 
A Glimpse at the New Indutrial-Espionage CIA,
by David Corn
 
  "Economic intelligence is the hottest current topic in intelligence
   poilcy." - CIA Director R. James Woolsey
 
 
 
  The President slammed the files down on the desk and glared
across the Oval Office to his national security advisors.
"Intelligence reports from the NSA," he huffed, "tell us that
Volkswagen is about to introduce a sports coupe with room for
passengers in the back, air bags in front and rear, zero to 60 in
6.8, over 50 mpg, retailing for less than $12,000, due to a new
employee profit-sharing arrangement. This is intolerable. Detroit
could be driven to its knees. And what's worse is those damn ...
uh, competitors ... are stealing secrets from our companies.
Thank God, one of their design specialists used an unsecured
cellular phone. What are we going to do?"
   Woolsey finished cleaning his glasses with his tie. "Well, Mr.
President," he said, "our sources tell us that all they really
got was GM's plans to market luxury sedans in Japan -- a lot of
good that will do them. But we realize this threat is serious. We
are putting our best officer on the case ..."
   James Ryan was waiting in the hallway outside the Oval Office. He
was still nursing a bad case of eye strain and a touch of R.S.I
from the last operation -- the Toshiba HDTV case. It had ended
badly. Two hackers dead. A Cray was down. And the disks were at
the bottom of the Sea of Japan. As he entered the president's
office, Ryan silently cursed Woolsey for making him attend this
damn dog-and-pony show.
   The president stared at Ryan, a 25-year veteran of the service.
Was this the agency's best man? He wore thick glasses; a plastic
pocket-protector protruded from his shirt pocket. The end of his
belt dangled. "Mr. President," Woolsey explained," he's
undercover."
   The president clasped his hands together. "Very convincing,
Director," he said. "Just wanted to meet the man upon whom our
economic future as a nation rests. Now that I have, I feel very
comfortable. Make us proud, Mr. Ryan. Get us their secret plans.
By the way, if anyone ever asks, I will disavow any knowledge of
your actions."
   Ryan nodded. "I will erase it."
   First stop was Dusseldorf, an auto trade show. Ryan was following
a marketing exec out of a beerhall -- her gray suit flattered her
long legs -- when the personal fax in his briefcase rang. He
ducked into an alley and read the noncurling document: Go to the
HiTek Cafe in Berlin -- damnit, he hated that smoke-free,
non-alcohol pub -- and await your contact, who will carry a copy
of HyperText Life magazine.
   Ryan was playing with his slide rule when she walked in the
HiTek. Nice, he thought. She sat down next to him and gave the
code signal: "Don't you hate to run out of memory?"
   "With some data," he replied, "you just have to learn to let go."
   Victoria Goodlog, she introduced herself. An American grad
student in design engineering who had received a fellowship to
work in the new, restricted Fahrvergnugen Research Facility. "But
we're on the same team," she added. "You worked with Daddy on the
Greece business, didn't you?"
   "Dirty business, that was," he said. "But we won the Cold War."
   "It killed Daddy."
   "Yes, but he died knowing that the U.S. gold supply was safe and
that he had thwarted another communist plot to rule the world."
   "But now we know Moscow was not even capable of ruling its own
country."
   "Well, sure, hindsight is 20/20 .... So tell me, what's a girl
like you doing in a job like this?"
   Ryan put his hand on her thigh and rubbed the corduroy.
   "Make that 'woman'," she said. "And you don't have to seduce me.
I'm on your side. Let's go back to my hotel. I have condoms."
   Nothing is the same anymore, Ryan thought.
 
   After a lengthy discussion of their sexual pasts and then
moderately passionate lovemaking, the two ordered Evian from room
service and plotted. "I'll create a power surge to knock out the
computer security system. You'll have a few minutes to copy the
encrypted data file," Goolog said. Ryan like the plan. "What's
your favorite algorithm?" he asked. "Later," she said with a
smile.
   The next morning, everything fell into place. Ryan, posing as
a workplace facilitator, gained entry into the lab and cracked the
computer locks. He downloaded the file into his laptop and copied
the plans onto super-high-density diskettes designed by Langley's
techies to look like cough drops. On the way out, he dumped the
computer in a garbage can. It would be untraceable. He
rendezvoused with Goodlog at a virtual-reality arcade.
   As they walked down the Kurfurstendamm, Ryan stopped to fix the
penny in his loafer. "Look at this," Goodlog said as she walked
on. "Somebody must have dropped an experimental Hexium-25050
advance microprocessor chip." She bent doen to pick it up.
   "Don't!" bellowed Ryan. The chip exploded. It was too late.
   He held her in his arms, stroked her short hair, removed her
black-frame glasses. But when he heard the sirens, he dropped her
body to the cold pavement and ran. He didn't look back. His
satellite-signal beeper souded. He ignored it.
   He walked past the Brandenburg Gate. It all used to be much
easier. Back then, he was fighting the Evil Empire to save the
Free World. That was worth taking a bullet for. But why should he
have to face the diabolical security chief of BMW or the goons of
Honda to benefit the dinosaurs of Detroit? He hated the Ford he
owned. No pick-up, lousy handling.
   He thought of Goodlog. Who in Grosse Point would mourn her?
Rather than use the plans to build a better, cheaper car, GM
would probably find a way to sabotage the new VW model. That
might even be his next assignment.
   Ryan tossed the diskettes into a sewer. What would he tell
Woolsey? He looked at the spot where Checkpoint Charlie once
stood. It began to rain. "I know," Ryan muttered to himself.
"I'll say that I ran out of fax paper."
 
--------------------------
David Corn is Washington editor of the Nation magazine.

Paul Ferguson               |   privacy \'pri-va-see\ n, pl, -cies;
Mindbank Consulting Group   |   1: the quality or state of being apart
Fairfax, Virginia USA       |   from others  2: secrecy
fergp@sytex.com             |
ferguson@icp.net            |   Privacy -- Use it or lose it.
 
Type bits/keyID   Date       User ID
pub  1024/1CC04D 1993/03/15  Paul Ferguson <fergp@sytex.com>
    Key fingerprint =  EE D2 93 7D 04 6D C6 05  AC 36 AD 9D 8E 4F 41 58




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Date: Sun, 29 Aug 93 13:03:30 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Apple planning to use Clipper chip?
Message-ID: <9308292002.AA01284@netcom5.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


A disturbing rumor/tidbit from the party I just finished discussing:

Someone from Apple Computer said that Apple has been making "input" on
the Clipper/Skipjack/Capstone/whatever thing and _endorsed_ the idea
(or at least someone representing Apple did). Apple even discussed the
pricing and said that if the Clipper/Skipjack chip could be sold to
them for less than $30, they could "design it into every Mac."

Phil Zimmermann was listening when this was said, and he was as
shocked as I was.

Can anyone on this list confirm or refute this report? (I don't want
to name the Apple guy--several were at the party--unless he wants me
to. But since he's not on the Cypherpunks list...)

The fact that Apple is reviewing the "key escrow" proposals probably
implies other hardware makers are as well. This suggests a whole
behind-the-scenes movement to get Clipper/Skipjack/Capstone key escrow
chips designed into PCs, probably in the communications/modem/network
subsections.

Speculatively, this could be a worse "fait accompli" than the Clipper
proposal for phones, since not many people are planning to buy new
secure phones, but a huge number of new Macs and PCs will be bought.

(I assume folks can "wire around" the Skipjack/Capstone subroutines in some
way, probably more easily than mods to the Clipper phones can be made.
After all, it's software. So I don't claim the Feds will automatically
be successful.)

Many of us believe the "other shoe will drop" when a new Crime Bill
(like the Biden Bill of a while back) is proposed, and key escrow is
made mandatory for data systems.


--Tim May

-- 
..........................................................................
Timothy C. May         | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,  
tcmay@netcom.com       | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
408-688-5409           | knowledge, reputations, information markets, 
W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA  | black markets, collapse of governments.
Higher Power: 2^756839 | Public Key: PGP and MailSafe available.
Note: I put time and money into writing this posting. I hope you enjoy it.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Date: Sun, 29 Aug 93 13:13:31 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Talked to Phil Zimmermann....
Message-ID: <9308292008.AA01693@netcom5.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I rarely waste your time with minor spelling or grammar corrections,
or even missing words, but this omission needs a correction:


> 2. Phil will carefully inspect the code, including the RSA part, and
> is confident no funny business is planned by ViaCrypt or anyone else.
> 
> (I have to trust Phil on this matter more than any "panel" or the
> like....after all, he wanted to put trapdoors in, he could in the
> existing PGP--though of course this is highly unlikely to have been
> put in in the first place and to have remained undiscovered all this
> time.)

"...after all, if he wanted to put trapdoors in...."

The "if" is the all-important subjunctive qualifier.

-Tim





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: collins@newton.apple.com (Scott Collins)
Date: Sun, 29 Aug 93 15:23:33 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: ftp from soda
Message-ID: <9308292118.AA02494@newton.apple.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


available again





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Brad Huntting <huntting@misc.glarp.com>
Date: Sat, 28 Aug 93 15:58:12 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: PGP-MIME
In-Reply-To: <m0oW5Bn-000BfRC@snark.uucp>
Message-ID: <199308292250.AA00175@mini.glarp.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



> (That brings up another point.  Has anyone worked on getting armored
> PGP registered as an official MIME encoding type?  Getting pgp support
> into metamail would be a massive win --- probably better than hooks in
> Elm itself.  If no one else is working this angle, I'd be willing to
> get in touch with Nathaniel Borenstein and use whatever zorch I have
> with him to make it happen.)

I agree.  MIME is taking the Internet by storm and for PGP or PEM
to reach wide audiences, it will need to be integrated with MIME,
and be able to draw on MIME's features.

For PGP to really make use of MIME, it could use "multipart" types
to separate the objects being encrypted and/or signed from the
signatures and encrypted session keys associated with them.

This could facilitate using MIME's features for external body parts
where part of the message is stored on an anonymous ftp site or
retrievable from a mail responder.

One could encrypt a document or other file on an ftp server, then
send out PGP-MIME messages with the RSA encrypted session key to
decypt the file.  MIME handles retreving the file and PGP deals
with how to decrypt it.

MIME of course deals with ascii armor on any body part leaving PGP
free to use binary data wherever needed.

As I see it, the main problems PGP-MIME would be (1) The lack of
MIME capable readers available for PC's and MAC's (the preferred
platforms for anyone concerned about PGP security).  But more
importantly, (2) it's not obvious how to make a painless transition
from PGP-2 to PGP-MIME.

Any thoughts?


brad




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Peter Wayner <pcw@access.digex.net>
Date: Sun, 29 Aug 93 15:56:18 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Crypto and Jurassic Park
Message-ID: <199308292253.AA11905@access.digex.net>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain




Here is an anecdote about the use of cryptography taken
from "The Beauty in the Beasts" an article by Jody Duncan on
page 95 of the magazine "Cinefex". 

 Principal (sic) photography on Jurassic Park wrapped just after 
 the Thanksgiving weekend. In the six months that followed,
 the film was editted, scored, mixed for sound and provided
 with finalized computer graphics dinosaurs. Already on to his
 next project-- Schindler's List-- Speilberg was shooting in 
 Europe throughout most of the postproduction phase, but continued
 to keep his hand in Jurassic Park through an encrypted satellite
 feed from ILM (Industrial Lights and Magic).





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: stig@netcom.com (Stig)
Date: Sun, 29 Aug 93 19:08:36 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Apple planning to use Clipper chip?
In-Reply-To: <9308292002.AA01284@netcom5.netcom.com>
Message-ID: <9308300206.AA20871@netcom3.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> 
> The fact that Apple is reviewing the "key escrow" proposals probably
> implies other hardware makers are as well. This suggests a whole
> behind-the-scenes movement to get Clipper/Skipjack/Capstone key escrow
> chips designed into PCs, probably in the communications/modem/network
> subsections.
> 

It's quite fortunate, then, that the PC market is not monopolized as the
Macintosh market is.

    Stig


;; __________________________________________________________________________
;; Stig@netcom.com                            netcom.com:/pub/stig/00-PGP-KEY
;; It's hard to be cutting-edge at your own pace...   32 DF B9 19 AE 28 D1 7A
;; Bullet-proof code cannot stand up to teflon bugs.  A3 9D 0B 1A 33 13 4D 7F




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Sandy <72114.1712@CompuServe.COM>
Date: Sun, 29 Aug 93 16:54:05 PDT
To: <cypherpunks@toad.com>
Subject: JURASSIC CRYPTO
Message-ID: <930829234818_72114.1712_FHF50-1@CompuServe.COM>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
  SANDY SANDFORT               Reply to:  ssandfort@attmail.com
 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Peter Wayner quoted from an article by Jody Duncan on page 95 of
the magazine "Cinefex":

    . . . Speilberg was shooting in Europe throughout most
    of the postproduction phase, but continued to keep his
    hand in Jurassic Park through an encrypted satellite
    feed from ILM (Industrial Lights and Magic).

Maybe these folks need some stronger crypto.  I got a call from a
Cypherpunk on assignment in France.  He said that he had been
involved in an unauthorized capture and decryption some of those
very same digital dinosaurs.  He said they were "pretty cool."  I
got the impression the cracking wasn't very difficult.  Maybe
Speilberg and ILM need some expert help.  Another Cypherpunk
business opportunity?

 S a n d y

 "When crypto becomes extinct, only dinosaurs will have crypto"

>>>>>>    Please send e-mail to:  ssandfort@attmail.com    <<<<<<
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: hkhenson@cup.portal.com
Date: Sun, 29 Aug 93 21:19:08 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Another BBS Seizure in Ha
Message-ID: <9308292046.1.26977@cup.portal.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Re this thread, I know someone on this list is also very active with EFF.
Could John tell us if EFF is on this case?  I would really be interested
in such details as did the cops get warrants for all the email on the
system?  If they did not, it is Alcor or Steve Jackson all over again.
(and several other cases which did not go very far because the cops 
found out how much trouble they were in.  :)  )  Keith Henson
PS, EFF would seem like a good place to administer a defense fund.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Duncan Frissell <frissell@panix.com>
Date: Sun, 29 Aug 93 18:13:34 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: AT&T Home Security Pl
Message-ID: <199308300109.AA09976@panix.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


To: cypherpunks@toad.com

D >Anyway the scary part is that her university lists both *residence*
D >phone and address for all students in their phone directory services.
D >She said that she had tried to get unlisted but that university 
D >policy *forbade* that, so she was stuck with being listed. (Yes, this
D >is a U.S. university.)
D >
D >That's the sort of policy that ought to be prevented by law. Even 
D >non-deadly stalkers can be a serious nuisance.

D >	Doug

Haven't you people ever heard of mail receiving services and voice mail?  
When people want to violate your privacy by asking questions, give them 
what they want but make sure it's meaningless.  When people ask *me* 
address and phone number as they seem to do every week or so, I just give 
them my voice mail and mail drop.  ($20/month combined cost NYC.)

No laws required.

Duncan Frissell

*************************************************************************
ATMs, Contracting Out,  Digital Switching, Downsizing, EDI, Fax, Fedex,
Home Workers, Internet, Just In Time, Leasing, Mail Receiving, Quants, 
Securitization, Temps, Voice Mail.
      
- Not as sexy as Tim May's signature line but just as important.


---
 ~ WinQwk 2.0b#0 ~ Unregistered Evaluation Copy
                                 




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: nate@VIS.ColoState.EDU
Date: Sun, 29 Aug 93 20:49:08 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: RE: Apple planning to use Clipper chip?
Message-ID: <9308300346.AA04541@monet.VIS.ColoState.EDU>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



>
> The fact that Apple is reviewing the "key escrow" proposals probably
> implies other hardware makers are as well. This suggests a whole
> behind-the-scenes movement to get Clipper/Skipjack/Capstone key escrow
> chips designed into PCs, probably in the communications/modem/network
> subsections.
>

I think it signals a time to look into other platforms... The new 
Silicon Graphics Indy looks quite good right about now.

Just imagine the stickers we could put on those babies!

"Big Brother built-in!"  "Big Brother Inside!" come to mind,
among others.

-nate

+--------------------------------------------------------------------
| Nate Sammons   email: nate@VIS.ColoState.Edu
|      Colorado State University Computer Visualization Laboratory
|      Finger nate@monet.VIS.ColoState.Edu for my PGP key
|      #include <std.disclaimer>
|                                    Always remember "Brazil"
+----------------------+





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: edgar@spectrx.Saigon.COM (Edgar W. Swank)
Date: Mon, 30 Aug 93 01:23:39 PDT
To: Cypherpunks          <cypherpunks@toad.com>
Subject: Re: Phil Zimmerman Press Briefing?
Message-ID: <0s539B2w165w@spectrx.saigon.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


To:  Bay Area Extropians  <exi-bay@gnu.ai.mit.edu>
     Cypherpunks          <cypherpunks@toad.com>

Phil Zimmerman is sitting here beside me now (8/29 10:50am).
He was surprised to learn people thought he wanted to do a "press
conference" at Extropaganza.  I guess that was my misunderstanding of
what I heard on the phone. He asked me to find some Bay Area
trade press reporters to talk to about his commercialization of PGP,
at anytime during his CA visit, not necessarily during the party. And
certainly nothing as presumptious as a  "press conference."

--
edgar@spectrx.saigon.com (Edgar W. Swank)
SPECTROX SYSTEMS +1.408.252.1005  Cupertino, Ca





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: gnu (John Gilmore)
Date: Mon, 30 Aug 93 00:58:39 PDT
To: hkhenson@cup.portal.com
Subject: Re: Another BBS Seizure in Hartford
In-Reply-To: <9308292046.1.26977@cup.portal.com>
Message-ID: <9308300757.AA28049@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> Re this thread, I know someone on this list is also very active with EFF.
> Could John tell us if EFF is on this case?  I would really be interested

I have no idea.  I'm a few days back in my personal email, and just now
skipped ahead to read all the "BBS" messages.  As far as I can tell,
nobody actually forwarded any information about this problem *TO EFF*!

I have gathered all the useful msgs sent to cypherpunks and forwarded
them to Mike Godwin and Shari Steele at EFF.  But in future, guys,
when you want action our of EFF, howabout letting them know?
(eff@eff.org is probably the best place to send such info).

	John Gilmore






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: gnu (John Gilmore)
Date: Mon, 30 Aug 93 02:43:40 PDT
To: cypherpunks
Subject: CLIPPING CLIPPER by Lance Hoffman, by permission from CACM
Message-ID: <9308300939.AA29097@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Date: Sun, 29 Aug 1993 08:13:32 -0500
From: farber@central.cis.upenn.edu (David Farber)
Subject: CLIPPING CLIPPER by permission from CACM
To: interesting-people@eff.org (interesting-people mailing list)

From: hoffman@seas.gwu.edu (Lance J. Hoffman)
 
Several people have asked me to post this for
those who do not get Communications
of the Association for Computing Machinery. 
So here it is, reprinted with
permission from Communications of the ACM,
September 1993, volume 36, number 9.
 
(This is a version which differs in minor
detail from the one which finally
appeared, and which does not have the
footnotes included in the CACM article. 
But, otherwise it is substantially the same.)
 
Viewpoint:
 
CLIPPING CLIPPER
 
Professor Lance J. Hoffman
Department of Electrical Engineering and
Computer Science
The George Washington University
Washington, D. C.
hoffman@seas.gwu.edu
 
     The FBI is becoming increasingly worried
about the fact that the United
States is technologically close to having
effectively unbreakable encryption
available to individuals.  This will eliminate
its capability to listen in on
specific telephone conversations, even with a
court-authorized warrant under
existing wiretap legislation.  In 1991, it
pushed legislation to to require
significant changes in computer hardware,
software, and communications equipment
so that agents could maintain these
capabilities in the increasingly digital
telephone network [1].  But opposition by
computer and communications companies,
professional societies, and civil libertarians
convinced the Senate to remove the
provision from its crime bill.  Last year, not
one member of Congress was willing
to introduce legislation requiring
telecommunications providers to turn back the
clock and redesign the emerging digital
telecommunications system so that the FBI
could, at some considerable economic cost to
all users, continue to tap, under
court order, certain digital communications
[2].
     Now the FBI and its allies in the
intelligence community have persuaded the
President to pursue a course which, if not
reversed, may achieve the same goal by
effectively building "Big Brother"
capabilities into the computer/telephone
network of the future with the "Clipper" chip,
an encryption device with
applications in telephones and other computer
network peripherals [3, 4, 5].
     The Clipper encryption method [6] (see
sidebar) requires escrowing of user
encryption keys with two trusted authorities,
not announced as of this writing. 
One might anticipate the government will
compound its surprising move with Clipper
by selecting two in-government
executive-branch entities as the escrow
agents. 
If it does so, there will be further erosion
of the power of Congress to establish
public policy.
     One could, of course, ask whether escrow
technology will be accepted by
computer users who can get the real thing
elsewhere.  Encryption is available
around the world without the burden of key
escrowing -- preliminary survey results
from the Software Publishers Association
revealed 143 non-U.S. and 133 U. S.-based
cryptographic products, many providing DES [7]
and/or RSA [8] capabilities. 
Moreover, encryption software (including DES
and RSA algorithms and the user-ready
and popular Pretty Good Privacy (PGP) [9]
secure message system) is freely
downloadable from public networks around the
world [10].
     Encryption is becoming increasingly
important.  Persons who wish unescrowed
confidentiality -- both law-abiding persons
and criminals -- will find and use
other encryption schemes to protect
information they wish to keep secure.  After
all, it is not hard to superencrypt messages
with one's own software or hardware
encryption first, not registering any key with
any authority, and very possibly
using an imported device (or software) from
another country.  Increasingly,
travelers use telephones to communicate
information back and forth between
workstations they have never seen before and
their home or office computers; the
threats of eavesdropping and falsification are
much greater than in years past
[11].  These persons can't be expected to
trust a U. S.-developed standard whose
algorithm is secret if they can instead turn
to cryptosystems available elsewhere
with an algorithm that has faced public
scrutiny and whose keys are completely
under control of the user.  
     The only way a government can prevent
this is by outlawing the use of
encryption methods which are not readable by
the government.  The Administration
admits that this is a fundamental policy
question which "will be considered during
the broad policy review" [12] it has underway. 
If the government adopts (or, as
it appears now, decrees) such a "Digital
Volstead Act", there will be some
benefits to law enforcement.  In the long term
however, it will have a negative
effect on individual freedom and liberty.  It
might even encourage contempt for
law enforcement on the digital network since
strong cryptographic algorithms are
already available in software, freely
reproducible by all who desire, regardless
of where they live or work. 
 
     The Clinton administration should
postpone the introduction of Clipper.  And
Congress should mandate a serious, open,
public review of the issues and options
facing society.  The implications are too
profound to allow the promulgation of
the first partially classified Federal
Information Processing Standard (FIPS)
without appropriate discussion.
 
     Congress should also move to strengthen
the independence of NIST, which has
apparently not only used the National Security
Agency's skills in cryptography (as
required by the Computer Security Act of 1987)
but also appears to be all too
eager to adopt its policy interests as well. 
This has resulted in the discussion
of critical issues being framed by the
cryptographic policy specialists at NSA,
who have so far sidestepped Congress and are
protecting their traditional ways of
doing things, while the world is changing all
around them.  They are apparently
reluctant to admit that cryptography and the
policy issues that go with it are now
important enough to merit a full public
debate, or that the genie may be out of
the bottle, or that we now have "a regulatory
structure that goes back to the cold
war and does not recognize the realities of
the present situation" [11].  So they
are using the Clipper initiative to pull off a
"turf coup d'etat".  
     
     The issue here is U.S. cryptographic
policy and who controls it, not the
technical merit of the Clipper initiative.
This has far-reaching policy
implications [13, 14] and is not an issue for
the technical community only.
 
     The Clinton administration has, to its
credit, identified the important
questions and realizes that there are serious
constitutional issues here. 
Unfortunately, it has picked the wrong player
-- the National Security Council --
to examine them in the wrong forum, a
classified one.  There is no valid reason
for the broad policy debate to be classified
and many reasons for it not to be;
one of the most important is the government's
credibility.  There is no need to
rush to judgement here.
     The administration has not reached out
beyond the government to computer
hardware or software manufacturers or to the
telecommunications industry or to
business in general or to academe during the
planning of the Clipper initiative. 
This is one reason that almost all the major
players in the industry have raised
serious objections [11, 10, 15].  No adequate
and public analysis of the economic
and social costs and benefits of the Clipper
proposal has yet been done.
     Unfortunately, the administration is
conducting a hasty ill-defined
investigation, going hell-bent for leather to
conclude by about the time you read
this [19].  Instead, what is needed is a
serious, comprehensive, dispassionate
study, with real data, cool heads, unbiased
scientists, legal experts, and
adequate time for examining many intricate
issues which threaten long lasting,
even permanent, consequences for the basic
structure of constitutional government
in the United States.
     A number of issues must be considered in
the encryption policy discussion:
 
        -  Very serious Constitutional
questions.  In the opinion of some, the
government's key-escrow initiative would
violate the First, Fourth, and Fifth
Amendments of the U. S. Bill of Rights [15,
20, 21], and possibly others such as
the Ninth and Tenth.
        -  Serious questions regarding the
proposed Clipper key escrow scheme,
including non-government escrow agencies and
software solutions [22]
        -  114 questions asked by the Digital
Privacy and Security Working Group
[15].  As of this writing, NIST had not
responded to these.
        -  How U. S. firms can compete with
foreign firms who don't have to "dumb
down" [23] the technology (the "level playing
field" issue)
        -  Tensions between law enforcement,
national security, and the citizen's
personal freedoms and rights, such as privacy.
        -  The future world of a National (and
International) Information
Infrastructure, and why export controls [10,
24] have to be reformulated 
        -  A rough cost/benefit analysis of
any controls over cryptography,
including retraining and conversion costs for
cryptographic experts with much less
to do if an increasing amount of traffic will
be encrypted well enough to defy
effective decryption by them.
                              
Better answers will emerge if respected
organizations such as the National Academy
of Sciences and the Office of Technology
Assessment are given the opportunity to
analyze the issues carefully. 
     There are meritorious alternatives to
Clipper.  For example, Professor Silvio
Micali of MIT has proposed a multi-key escrow
capability in which multiple trusted
parties authenticate a message and/or allow
eavesdropping [25].  The parties can
be selected by the message sender or jointly
by the sender and the other party (as
with current escrow agents).  Without a choice
of alternatives, many persons who
are eager to develop and use the emerging
information infrastructure -- "digital
superhighways" and other forward-looking
projects of Vice President Gore -- will
turn away from those projects.  The full
potential of the network and the Vice
President's vision will never be realized.
     The Computer System Security and Privacy
Advisory Board, created by the
Computer Security Act of 1987, called for such
a full, public national review of
cryptographic policy in March 1992.  It, too,
is queasy with the Clipper
initiative.  On June 4, 1993, it passed a
resolution which stated that
 
     "Key escrowing encryption technology
represents a dramatic change in the
nation's information infrastructure.  The full
implications ... are not fully
understood at this time. 
     Therefore, the Board recommends that key
escrowing encryption technology not
be deployed beyond current implementations
planned within the Executive Branch,
until the significant public policy and
technical issues ... are fully
understood".
 
NIST has not (ever) taken any significant
action on the cryptographic policy
suggestions of this national statutory board
whose basic mission is to be alert
for latent public policy issues related to
computer and communications technology.
     By the time you read this, the government
policy "review" may be close to
completion.  Computer professionals have a
special obligation to let their
senators and member of Congress (as well as
other key legislators) know of the
profound negative impacts of such a rush to
judgment, and to urge them to defer
this initiative.  Copies of those
communications should also be sent to the
President (whose electronic mail address is
president@whitehouse.gov), the vice
president (whose electronic mail address is
vice.president@whitehouse.gov), and
to NIST which is the official government
spokesman on the issue through its deputy
director, Raymond G. Kammer,
(kammer@micf.nist.gov).
 
                                              
REFERENCES
 
1. Sessions, W.S., "Keeping an Ear on Crime",
New York Times, March 27, 1992, page
A35. 
 
2. Denning, D., To Tap or Not to Tap. CACM
36:25-44, 1993. 
 
3. Statement by the Press Secretary on a
Cryptography Initiative. White House
Press Office, April 16, 1993. 
 
4. Markoff, John,  "U. S. as Big Brother of
Computer Age", New York Times, May 6,
1993, page D1. 
 
5. Mintz, John and Schwartz, John, " Chipping
Away at Privacy?" Washington Post,
May 30, 1993, pages H1-H4. 
   
6. Denning, D., "Cryptography, Clipper, and
Capstone", Proc. 3rd CPSR Cryptography
& Privacy Conf., Washington, D.C., June 7,
1993. 
 
7. National Bureau of Standards, Data
Encryption Standard, Washington, D.C.:1977. 
 
  
8. Rivest, R., Shamir, A. and Adelman, L., A
method for obtaining digital
signatures and public-key cryptosystems. CACM
21:120-126, 1978. 
 
9. Zimmerman, P., "PGP, Public Key Encryption
for the Masses", Proc. 3rd CPSR
Cryptography & Privacy Conf., Washington,
D.C., June 7, 1993. 
 
10. Rosenthal, I., Software Publishers
Association Statement to the Computer
System Security and Privacy Advisory Board on
cryptography, June 3, 1993. 
 
11. Diffie, W., Testimony before the House
Subcommittee on Telecommunications and
Finance. Congressional Record June 9, 1993.
 
12. Statement by the White House Press
Secretary,  Questions and Answers about the
Clinton Administration Telecommunications
Initiative, April 16, 1993.
 
13. Who Holds the Keys? In: Proc. 2nd Conf. on
Computers, Freedom, and Privacy,
edited by Hoffman, Lance J. New York, N.Y.:
Association for Computing Machinery,
1993, p. 133-147. 
 
14. Murray, W.H., Who holds the keys? CACM
35:13-15, 1992. 
 
15. Digital Privacy and Security Working
Group,  Issues and Questions Regarding
the Administration's Clipper Chip Proposal, in
[18], 36-47, 1993. 
 
16. Denning, D., Position Statement Supporting
the Key-Escrow Chip, in [18],
64-67, 1993. 
 
17. Postings to sci.crypt, comp.risks, and
alt.privacy.clipper Internet newsgroups
after the announcement of the key escrow
initiative. 
 
18. Cryptographic issue Statements Submitted
to the Computer System Security and
Privacy Advisory Board, May 27. 1993,
Gaithersburg, Md.:NIST, 1993.  
 
19. Schwartz, J., "U. S. Data Decoding Plan
Delayed", Washington Post, June 8,
1993, p. A-12. 
 
20. Computer and Business Equipment
Manufacturers Association,  Statement before
the Computer Systems Security and Privacy
Advisory Board, May 27, 1993, in [18],
138-161, 1993. 
 
21. American Civil Liberties Union,  Comment
for Cryptographic Issue Statements,
in [18], 195-199, 1993. 
 
22. NIST Computer System Security and Privacy
Advisory Board,  Resolution #1 and
#2 of June 4, 1993.
 
23. Goldman, J., Why Cater to Luddites? New
York Times, March 27, 1992, p. A35. 
 
24. Turner, G.W., Commercial Cryptography at
the Crossroads. Information Systems
Security 1:34-42, 1992. 
 
25. Micali, S., Fair Public-Key Cryptosystems
(Preliminary Draft 3/25/93), MIT
Laboratory for Computer Science, Cambridge,
Mass.

-- 
Professor Lance J. Hoffman
Department of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science
The George Washington University    (202) 994-4955    Fax: (202) 994-0227
Washington, D. C. 20052             hoffman@seas.gwu.edu




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Christian D. Odhner" <cdodhner@indirect.com>
Date: Mon, 30 Aug 93 02:44:13 PDT
To: mgream@acacia.itd.uts.edu.au (Matthew Gream)
Subject: Re: Source Code NOT available for ViaCrypt PGP
In-Reply-To: <9308300745.AA22452@acacia.itd.uts.EDU.AU>
Message-ID: <199308300940.AA17049@indirect.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> In a previous life, peter honeyman said ...
> 
> | i disagree.  who will guarantee that viacrypt ships binaries based on
> | the validated code?
> 
> Have your appropriately trusted person watch the code compiled in
> front of him, and take a signature of the completed binary. Although,
> this becomes somewhat of a nightmare, as 'Mr Trusted' will need to 
> oversee all 'release' compilations, and spend time beforehand going
> over code to verify everything. This signature could be signed by
> 'Mr Trusted' and included with the distribution, including s/ware
> to allow the 'pleb' user ensure they match.
> 
> Matthew.
> -- 
> Matthew Gream,, M.Gream@uts.edu.au -- Consent Technologies, 02-821-2043.

Why not just arrange for 'Mr Trusted' to receive a copy of the source code
to examine on a secure system. Then when he/she is sure that it's ok,
compile it on the same trusted system and compare with the release binaries.

Happy Hunting, -Chris.
<cdodhner@indirect.com>
PGP public key available upon request




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: strat@abc.ksu.ksu.edu (Steve Davis)
Date: Mon, 30 Aug 93 04:03:41 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com (cypherpunks)
Subject: The need for FREE cryptography ...
Message-ID: <9308301100.AA13519@abc.ksu.ksu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


There is still a void in the arena of free public encryption systems for
regular human beings.  It would be wonderful if somebody would put a
reasonably secure package (much like PGP) and copyleft the source.  PGP has
never been a very useful tool to me as a programmer because of its internal
structure.  What I'd need, if I wanted to integrate this technology into
new platforms such as voice communication or an encrypted file system, is a
library of tools for shuffling this data around and piping it through the
"magic" algorithms.

I wonder if somebody on this list could outline what efforts are being made
in this area.

Stratocaster
-- 
                                               Steve Davis (strat@cis.ksu.edu)
                                                       Kansas State University
"[Nuclear Weapons] can't help but have an effect on the population as a whole."
    -- Ronald Reagan



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Mike Rose <mrose@stsci.edu>
Date: Mon, 30 Aug 93 05:43:42 PDT
To: stig@netcom.com
Subject: Re: Apple planning to use Clipper chip?
In-Reply-To: <9308300206.AA20871@netcom3.netcom.com>
Message-ID: <9308301237.AA17573@MARIAN.STSCI.EDU>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


On Sun, 29 Aug 1993 19:06:54 PDT, stig@netcom.com (Stig) said:

>> 
>> The fact that Apple is reviewing the "key escrow" proposals probably
>> implies other hardware makers are as well. This suggests a whole
>> behind-the-scenes movement to get Clipper/Skipjack/Capstone key escrow
>> chips designed into PCs, probably in the communications/modem/network
>> subsections.
>> 

>It's quite fortunate, then, that the PC market is not monopolized as the
>Macintosh market is.

>    Stig

Darn, and just as I was thinking about a powerbook 180.
If Apple buys into key escrow, I'm not buying into Apple.

Mike




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Karl Lui Barrus <klbarrus@owlnet.rice.edu>
Date: Mon, 30 Aug 93 07:23:44 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: REMAIL: Attacks on remailers
In-Reply-To: <9308280959.AA15615@achilles.ctd.anl.gov>
Message-ID: <9308301420.AA03878@elf.owlnet.rice.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Samuel Pigg wrote:

>	A delay function would be useful also. (ie delay(15000) to
>tell the remailer to hold the message 15 minutes before sending on.)

Well, I tried to implement this on a test remailer as follows:

1) file incoming mail in a spool directory
2) at midnight, pick a random file in the spool directory, operate on
   it, mail it out, and delete
3) keep on going until the directory is empty

Naturally, you could make the interval larger: say a week.

With no root privs on the machine, I tried using the at command to
perform the above function and then reschedule itself for tomorrow.
Problem: if the machine reboots then the mailing out portion is killed.

I'll fiddle with it some more.

>	Socket connections for talking to other remailers;

Yes!  This might help avoid some log files.

>	Encrypt using other remailers keys to insure that
>		two identical messages going into a remailer come out
>		differently (random session key).

If you add random stuff to the end of an encrypted message and encrypt
again, when you decrypt will PGP throw away the ending junk?  If so,
maybe the routing software could include random bits between each
nested encryption instead.

If the remailers encrypt then the operators will have to keep adding
to the remailer's pubring.

-- 
/--------------------------------------------------\
| Karl L. Barrus: klbarrus@owlnet.rice.edu         |
| D1 59 9D 48 72 E9 19 D5  3D F3 93 7E 81 B5 CC 32 |
\--------------------------------------------------/




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: lefty@apple.com (Lefty)
Date: Mon, 30 Aug 93 09:36:22 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Apple planning to use Clipper chip?
Message-ID: <9308301628.AA01701@internal.apple.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Tim May writes:
>> 
>> The fact that Apple is reviewing the "key escrow" proposals probably
>> implies other hardware makers are as well. This suggests a whole
>> behind-the-scenes movement to get Clipper/Skipjack/Capstone key escrow
>> chips designed into PCs, probably in the communications/modem/network
>> subsections.
>> 

To which Stig responds
>It's quite fortunate, then, that the PC market is not monopolized as the
>Macintosh market is.

and Nate Sammons rejoins:
>I think it signals a time to look into other platforms... The new 
>Silicon Graphics Indy looks quite good right about now.
>
>Just imagine the stickers we could put on those babies!
>
>"Big Brother built-in!"  "Big Brother Inside!" come to mind,
>among others.

Now, first off, I'm not the one who originally propogated this rumor.  And,
as near as I can tell, rumor is exactly what it is.

I would hope that people would make a minimal effort to obtain some facts
before coming to conclusions.

Just a suggestion, mind you.

--
Lefty (lefty@apple.com)
C:.M:.C:., D:.O:.D:.






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: strat@sam.ksu.ksu.edu (Steve Davis)
Date: Mon, 30 Aug 93 07:58:46 PDT
To: mrose@stsci.edu (Mike Rose)
Subject: Re: Apple planning to use Clipper chip?
In-Reply-To: <9308301237.AA17573@MARIAN.STSCI.EDU>
Message-ID: <9308301454.AA15682@sam.ksu.ksu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


From the keyboard of Mike Rose:

> Darn, and just as I was thinking about a powerbook 180.
> If Apple buys into key escrow, I'm not buying into Apple.

There are many other reasons not to buy or use Apple equipment.  I have
never purchased an Apple computer due to a profound distaste for their
policies.  The Free Software Foundation is boycotting Apple due to some
litigation concerning user interface design.

Companies like Apple don't like the idea of free software.  Consequently,
many people don't like Apple.

Stratocaster
-- 
                                               Steve Davis (strat@cis.ksu.edu)
                                                       Kansas State University
It is a far, far better thing to have a firm anchor in nonsense than
to put out on the troubled seas of thought.  -- John Kenneth Galbraith



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: strat@sam.ksu.ksu.edu (Steve Davis)
Date: Mon, 30 Aug 93 08:23:45 PDT
To: mrose@stsci.edu (Mike Rose)
Subject: Re: Apple planning to use Clipper chip?
In-Reply-To: <9308301500.AA17856@MARIAN.STSCI.EDU>
Message-ID: <9308301519.AA15857@sam.ksu.ksu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


From the keyboard of Mike Rose:

> >> Darn, and just as I was thinking about a powerbook 180.
> >> If Apple buys into key escrow, I'm not buying into Apple.

> >Consequently,
> >many people don't like Apple.

> I'm aware of this, but don't see its relevance to cypherpunks.

Most discussion here is a technical examination of privacy and freedom with
specific regards to the use of technology as either a tool or a weapon.
When something as broad and necessary as "freedom" is at stake, it is
important to know who your friends are.  

Stratocaster
-- 
                                               Steve Davis (strat@cis.ksu.edu)
                                                       Kansas State University

Anarchy means having to put up with things that really piss you off.



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: hughes@ah.com (Eric Hughes)
Date: Mon, 30 Aug 93 10:43:46 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: no ftpd on soda.berkeley.edu ?
In-Reply-To: <8gU_DXW00Uh_I1fURT@andrew.cmu.edu>
Message-ID: <9308301732.AA16372@ah.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>Has anyone else tried to ftp soda in the past 2 days or so?  I've been
>unable to establish a connection.  

soda.berkeley.edu was down Friday to have a disk reformatted.  It was
the disk that the cypherpunks archive was one, BTW; if anybody notices
anything missing, please tell me.

Eric




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Jamie Jamison <jamie@apl.washington.edu>
Date: Mon, 30 Aug 93 11:23:47 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Privacy issues and how to sell them
Message-ID: <Pine.3.07.9308301001.A4768-b100000@hopper>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



From reading the group it seems to me that there is a need for two styles
of data encryption. One style would be something similar to DES, it would
be a standard cypher and would be used for encrypting items such as the
files on your hard disk. The other would be a public key cypher and would
be used for communicating between individuals. 
	Now, as far as selling these two concepts goes one thing that
might help is to point out the fact that not only is the government
untrustworthy, in the sense that they abuse their power, but that they're
also incompetent. Americans have an unfortunate tendency, at least in my
eyes to, buy into catch-phrases such as "law and order" or "national
security" in a completely uncritical fashion. However Americans also
mistrust, and rightfully so, the competence of the government, so perhaps
we should point out that since the government can't keep its own secrets
very well that it obviously can't keep the secrets of 250 million citizens
very well either, which is what the government would be attempting to do
if SkipJack/Clipper/Capstone were made the national standard for encryption.


Jamie Jamison

WITH STANDARD DISCLAIMER







From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: markh@wimsey.bc.ca (Mark C. Henderson)
Date: Mon, 30 Aug 93 10:49:22 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com (cypherpunks)
Subject: Re: The need for FREE cryptography ...
Message-ID: <m0oXDF6-0000nqC@vanbc.wimsey.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> It would be wonderful if somebody would put a
> reasonably secure package (much like PGP) and copyleft the source.
> ... What I'd need, if I wanted to integrate this technology into
> new platforms such as voice communication or an encrypted file system, is a
> library of tools for shuffling this data around and piping it through the
> "magic" algorithms.
> 
> I wonder if somebody on this list could outline what efforts are being made
> in this area.
Well the GNU MP library would be a good place to start (it implements
the raw RSA operations quite efficiently). It wouldn't be much work
to package it up with free code for Triple DES, IDEA, MD5, SHS and
some good "random" number generation algorithms.

What you are looking for is something like RSAREF with different
licensing terms.

If this sort of work were to be distributed it should be done by
someone outside of the U.S. and Canada.

At one point I wrote some code to do part of this based on GMP (using
LUC). I've seen old versions of it on anonymous ftp sites. Obviously
one would want to add DH key exchange and some other features, but it
did come with a very simple sample application called L3 which
implemented PGP/RIPEM-like public key encryption and signing. Certainly
if you can find an one of these old versions lying around on a ftp site,
you are free to do with it as you like (anything I wrote is in the public
domain)  

At this point, I do NOT plan to distribute any newer versions of
this, because of anticipated patent infringement claims and because
of the overly restrictive licence of GMP. It has essentially become a
project for my own personal research and amusement.

Mark

-- 
Mark Henderson      markh@wimsey.bc.ca (personal account)
RIPEM key available by key server/finger/E-mail
  MD5OfPublicKey: F1F5F0C3984CBEAF3889ADAFA2437433




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: nobody@soda.berkeley.edu
Date: Mon, 30 Aug 93 10:46:22 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Apple vs. Free Software Foundation
Message-ID: <9308301743.AA05693@soda.berkeley.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Steve Davis writes:

  >When something as broad and necessary as "freedom" is at stake, it is
  >important to know who your friends are.

When my son asks me "What does 'fair' mean?", I had to answer: "It depends
on who says it."  When someone says "That's not fair!" or "I think that's
fair", most often they are not weighing abstract values; they are deciding
whether the situation is favorable to them, and describing it with charged
vocabulary to sway all other parties to their point of view.

Patents on machines are fair; but patents on really useful algorithms --
that I could actually use in my code (if it weren't for that damn patent)
-- aren't.  Why?  Because I don't like it (and I really, really don't like
it :( ).

Companies act like people in many ways: they grow; they have goals; they
protect their interests; and they ignore that which they don't believe will
effect them.  But like animals and machines, it is important not to
anthropomorphize companies.  No company is anyones 'friend'.

I speak for neither Apple, nor FSF, but it is easy to see why they have
taken the courses that they have.  Neither path has led to its promised
goal.

FSF is not punishing Apple.  It _is_ punishing programmers, individuals,
human beings who have a job to do.  In fact, the FSF is punishing me, since
I have spent no small amount time programming Apple computers (and no small
amount of time porting GNU tools to them).  Has Apple's strategy of closely
guarded secrets proved the correct one?  Let's call up Bill Gates and ask
him.

In summary, I find your statements to be an undisguised attempt to hang
your unrelated personal agenda from a charged political situation.  Do I
think that's fair?  People have been doing it for centuries.

I may not approve of Apple's technological strategy, but (even though it is
not a human being) I will defend its right to _its_ privacy.






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: nobody@rosebud.ee.uh.edu
Date: Mon, 30 Aug 93 08:43:45 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Practical security, Internet commercialization, etc.
Message-ID: <9308301541.AA02264@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


At  8:38 PM 8/27/93 -0700, Nick Szabo wrote:
>Paul Ferguson:
>> The biggest threat to any security, on any basis, is the threat of
>> human nature. The chances of someone factoring your PGP encoded
>> message is somewhere in the range of slim-to-none, but the chances
>> of someone (you) -physically- compromising their key is much, much
>> higher.
>
>I'd like to strongly second this
>The most important
>cypherpunks issues are being almost completely ignored by these academics: 
>practical implementation of remailers, most issues dealing with software-
>based digital cash, reliable key handling, trustworhy key distribution,
>construction of "webs of trust", implementation of these schemes with 
>all of their pitfalls (legal, social, etc.), commercialization, etc.
>
>In most of these cases, the protocols (ciphers, remailing mixes, 
>digital cash, etc.) can theoretically be "broken" by a powerful
>agent, but the real question is what practical, cheap steps can we take 
>to make things more expensive for those with little respect for our
>privacy or liberty. 

Yeah, its an arms race, and we don't have time to wait for the ultimate
weapon. Similarly, it doesn't matter how ultimate the weapon is in the
hands of someone who doesn't know how to use it. I wish that the generic
security advice was separate from the IBM-flavored instructions in the PGP
manual. It's very tedious for a Mac user.





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: hughes@ah.com (Eric Hughes)
Date: Mon, 30 Aug 93 10:53:46 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Talked to Phil Zimmermann....
In-Reply-To: <9308291906.AA23360@netcom5.netcom.com>
Message-ID: <9308301745.AA16383@ah.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>Triple DES may be used in some versions (don't ask me
>for details....I'm not sure of the tradeoffs between DES and
>IDEA...perhaps the deal to use IDEA doesn't fit with a commercial
>version of PGP).

As Phil told me, the owner of the IDEA patent has recently been asking
for lots more money.  These actions don't affect the agreement with
Phil with respect to PGP.  Phil doesn't want to encourage the
patentholder's behavior.

I've cc: Phil should he wish to elaborate.

Eric




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Mike Rose <mrose@stsci.edu>
Date: Mon, 30 Aug 93 08:03:45 PDT
To: strat@sam.ksu.ksu.edu
Subject: Re: Apple planning to use Clipper chip?
In-Reply-To: <9308301454.AA15682@sam.ksu.ksu.edu>
Message-ID: <9308301500.AA17856@MARIAN.STSCI.EDU>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


On Mon, 30 Aug 1993 09:54:15 -0500 (CDT), strat@sam.ksu.ksu.edu (Steve Davis) said:

>>From the keyboard of Mike Rose:

>> Darn, and just as I was thinking about a powerbook 180.
>> If Apple buys into key escrow, I'm not buying into Apple.

>Consequently,
>many people don't like Apple.

>Stratocaster

I'm aware of this, but don't see its relevance to cypherpunks.

Mike




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: collins@newton.apple.com (Scott Collins)
Date: Mon, 30 Aug 93 12:28:48 PDT
To: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Subject: Re: Apple planning to use Clipper chip?
Message-ID: <9308301921.AA14675@newton.apple.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I do not, in any capacity, speak for Apple.  But...

  >Apple even discussed the
  >pricing and said that if the Clipper/Skipjack chip could be sold to
  >them for less than $30, they could "design it into every Mac."

Based on long experience with Macs and Mac software (system and otherwise),
I think this is highly unlikely.

1. Apple has a history of following the 'software only' approach in general.

2. Apple loudly and often touts compatability across its entire line.

3. 3rd party Mac developers have little incentive to write software with mass
   appeal (e.g., communications software) but limited applicability (because of
   hardware requirements).

4. If the software isn't pre-installed in your system, then unless it comes from
   Microsoft, such a 'questionable' standard is probably avoidable.

5. Therefore, for a standard to emerge on the Mac... 1) Apple would have to
   begin producing machines that contained this chip; 2) Apple would have to
   produce special system software, explicitly for this class of machines,
   that used this chip; 3) Apple would have to produce compelling end-user
   communications software that used clipper services on this class of machines
   and either didn't run at all on earlier hardware, or didn't use clipper
   technology.

   It is unlikely that a 3rd party would do it, or have any impact if it did.

   But Apples history is scalable software that runs on every machine (ala
   QuickTime).  If Apple wanted to introduce privacy enhancement technology in
   its system, it seems economically and historically more probable that it
   would simply license RSA/DES/etc technology and roll in a software only
   service.

This is my opinion, based solely on my nine years of experience as
Macintosh developer.

To paraphrase Columbo: "It's my experience, sir, that people rarely do
things they don't *usually* do."  ...which may sound obvious, but then you
*saw* the killer do it in the first 10 minutes...


Scott Collins         | "Few people realize what tremendous power there
                      |  is in one of these things."     -- Willy Wonka
......................|................................................
BUSINESS.   voice:408.862.0540  fax:974.6094   collins@newton.apple.com
Apple Computer, Inc.   1 Infinite Loop, MS 301-2C   Cupertino, CA 95014
.......................................................................
PERSONAL.   voice/fax:408.257.1746    1024:669687   catalyst@netcom.com





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Date: Mon, 30 Aug 93 12:24:23 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Stego for Stegosaurs
Message-ID: <9308301922.AA01393@netcom5.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



> Some of you have asked for more details about the interception of
> encrypted digital dinosaurs.  Alas, I don't know much more than I
..
>  S a n d y

Frankly, I'm surprised no one has pointed out the obvious solution, so
I guess I'll have to.

Spielberg and Company clearly needed to protect their transmissions
using the "Stego" program of Romana Machado. By packing the real
content of the "Jurassic Park" communications into MPEG transmissions
of "Barney," the circle would be completed.

Just my least significant bit.


-Tim


-- 
..........................................................................
Timothy C. May         | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,  
tcmay@netcom.com       | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
408-688-5409           | knowledge, reputations, information markets, 
W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA  | black markets, collapse of governments.
Higher Power: 2^756839 | Public Key: PGP and MailSafe available.
Note: I put time and money into writing this posting. I hope you enjoy it.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Timothy Newsham <newsham@wiliki.eng.hawaii.edu>
Date: Mon, 30 Aug 93 15:44:27 PDT
To: markh@wimsey.bc.ca (Mark C. Henderson)
Subject: Re: The need for FREE cryptography ...
In-Reply-To: <m0oXDF6-0000nqC@vanbc.wimsey.com>
Message-ID: <9308302242.AA06434@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> 
> > It would be wonderful if somebody would put a
> > reasonably secure package (much like PGP) and copyleft the source.
> > ... What I'd need, if I wanted to integrate this technology into
> > new platforms such as voice communication or an encrypted file system, is a
> > library of tools for shuffling this data around and piping it through the
> > "magic" algorithms.
> > 
> > I wonder if somebody on this list could outline what efforts are being made
> > in this area.
> Well the GNU MP library would be a good place to start (it implements
> the raw RSA operations quite efficiently). It wouldn't be much work
> to package it up with free code for Triple DES, IDEA, MD5, SHS and
> some good "random" number generation algorithms.
> 
> What you are looking for is something like RSAREF with different
> licensing terms.

What I would like to see is libraries from PGP, along with some
additions.  Why PGP?  It would be nice to be able to use the
optimized IDEA and RSA algorithms from PGP.  More importantly it would
be nice to write programs that use the well established key ring
files.  This would solve problems of key ring distribution.  It would
also mean that crypto programmers need not worry about their own 
random number generation,  with all random number generation handled
by the PGP libs.  The advantage of this is that there would be 1
random number generator that did things right rather than a bunch
of implementations that had subtle flaws.  If everything shares the
same implementation, that implementation can be strengthened much
faster.

The PGP library itself is not enough though,  it is missing some
things that should accompany it:  DES/triple-DES and DH key exchange
for example.

                                Tim N.





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Timothy Newsham <newsham@wiliki.eng.hawaii.edu>
Date: Mon, 30 Aug 93 15:46:24 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Matrix extensions of the rsa algorithm. (fwd)
Message-ID: <9308302245.AA06486@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Forwarded message:
> You've probably gotten some other responses about this...
> 
> I think that the paper you describe has been implemented as the Warlock
> cyphersystem. Someone else posted a C++ Warlock implementation, and
> some related material, to cypherpunks about two months ago. I can't
> find my filed copy, but if you ask I'm sure someone has it stashed
> away.
> 
> Paul Robichaux, KD4JZG     | "Change the world for a better tomorrow. But
> perobich@ingr.com          |  watch your ass today." - aaron@halcyon.com
> Intergraph Federal Systems | Be a cryptography user- ask me how.

Does anyone have a copy of Warlock?  I'd appreciate getting a copy
from someone.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: nobody@shell.portal.com
Date: Tue, 31 Aug 93 03:49:02 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Internet commerce...for your cracking pleasure
Message-ID: <9308301940.AA22212@jobe.shell.portal.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


=================================================
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For more information, or to place an order send an e-mail to
subscrib@americast.com  Include the e-mail the address to which you
want the services delivered.  In that e-mail please designate the paper
and sections you would like to receive, give your full name, address,
phone number, and the credit card (Visa or MasterCard) you will be
using for the purchase, and the credit card expiration date.






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Date: Mon, 30 Aug 93 12:49:24 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Apple planning to use Clipper chip?
In-Reply-To: <9308301921.AA14675@newton.apple.com>
Message-ID: <9308301945.AA04070@netcom5.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Scott Collins has commented at length on my first post on this, which
is good. Let me note again that I was communicating pretty much
exactly what I heard, and labelled my own speculations as just that.
In particular, I was not claiming the decision has been made, or that
it could reasonably be implemented.

Anyway, some comments on Scott's points:

> Based on long experience with Macs and Mac software (system and otherwise),
> I think this is highly unlikely.
> 
> 1. Apple has a history of following the 'software only' approach in general.
> 
> 2. Apple loudly and often touts compatability across its entire line.

The new "audio-visual" Macs (660av and 840av) have DSP hardware inside
and software for speech recognition (part of PlainTalk, I understand)
which is specific to these machines. The speech synthesis software
will run on all (or most?) machines, as the DSP is not used, but the
speech recognition only runs on the av machines (or properly
DSP-equipped machines, presumably).

This suggests the "software only" and "compatibility across its entire
line" are things of the past. (BTW, as we Mac users all know, minor
incompatibilities have often existed, as with virtual memory not
running on all platforms--how could it have?--and the differences in
FPUs, screens, etc.)

> 3. 3rd party Mac developers have little incentive to write software with mass
>    appeal (e.g., communications software) but limited applicability (because of
>    hardware requirements).

My speculation would be that the Clipper/Skipjack/Capstone deal, if it
is happening at all, is some time off. Perhaps for a phone version of
the av Macs (there had been speculation that Apple was planning to use
the on-board DSP hardware for a modem tool, similar to what NeXT has
done with its hardware).

> 5. Therefore, for a standard to emerge on the Mac... 1) Apple would have to
>    begin producing machines that contained this chip; 2) Apple would have to
>    produce special system software, explicitly for this class of machines,
>    that used this chip; 3) Apple would have to produce compelling end-user
>    communications software that used clipper services on this class of machines
>    and either didn't run at all on earlier hardware, or didn't use clipper
>    technology.

#1 and #2 are already satisfied with the new generation of av Macs, as
noted above. #3 may or may not occur. My speculation is that Apple
will not go it alone, but may be in the early negotiation phases of
such a deal (perhaps an encrypted phone conferencing system, or other
phone use of the av Macs, which the Feds would have some interest in,
a la the whole Clipper thing).

I would never urge anyone to boycott Apple products on such a flimsy
basis as this story I heard from an Apple guy. I just wanted to let
the Cypherpunks know what I heard; it might make later developments
more understandable.

Anyone who wants a Mac but instead buys Windows because of this rumor
deserves what he gets.

-Tim


-- 
..........................................................................
Timothy C. May         | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,  
tcmay@netcom.com       | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
408-688-5409           | knowledge, reputations, information markets, 
W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA  | black markets, collapse of governments.
Higher Power: 2^756839 | Public Key: PGP and MailSafe available.
Note: I put time and money into writing this posting. I hope you enjoy it.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Mike Godwin <mnemonic@eff.org>
Date: Mon, 30 Aug 93 09:49:21 PDT
To: hkhenson@cup.portal.com
Subject: Re: Another BBS Seizure in Ha
In-Reply-To: <9308292046.1.26977@cup.portal.com>
Message-ID: <199308301646.AA07362@eff.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


 
I'm working on the Hartford, Conn., BBS-seizure case.


--Mike


> Re this thread, I know someone on this list is also very active with EFF.
> Could John tell us if EFF is on this case?  I would really be interested
> in such details as did the cops get warrants for all the email on the
> system?  If they did not, it is Alcor or Steve Jackson all over again.
> (and several other cases which did not go very far because the cops 
> found out how much trouble they were in.  :)  )  Keith Henson
> PS, EFF would seem like a good place to administer a defense fund.
> 




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: ferguson@fiber.sprintlink.net (Paul Ferguson x2044)
Date: Mon, 30 Aug 93 10:23:46 PDT
To: hoffman@seas.gwu.edu
Subject: Re: CACM article "Clipping Clipper"
Message-ID: <9308301819.AA23007@fiber.sprintlink.net>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



On Sun, 29 Aug 1993 13:14:01 GMT,
 Lance J. Hoffman <hoffman@seas.gwu.edu> wrote -
 
> Several people have asked me to post this for
> those who do not get Communications
> of the Association for Computing Machinery. 
> So here it is, reprinted with
> permission from Communications of the ACM,
> September 1993, volume 36, number 9.


 I would like to (firstly) extend my personal thanks to you for posting
 the article in sci.crypt, and (secondly) for expressing your opposition
 to the "key-escrow" initiative. I, and I am sure many others, appreciate
 your viewpoints on the entire fiasco and stand alongside you in 
 opposition of this threat to personal freedom and privacy in the dawning
 new age of information.

 Your paper is well-written and presents the facts in a succint and
 indisputable fashion. I look forward to the seeing the issue in print,
 and any counter-point articles which may also appear in this issue.
 
 Cheers,

_____________________________________________________________________________
Paul Ferguson                                                               
Mindbank Consulting Group                        ferguson@fiber.sprintlink.net  
Fairfax, Virginia  USA                           ferguson@icm1.icp.net




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Douglas Sinclair <dsinclai@acs.ucalgary.ca>
Date: Mon, 30 Aug 93 12:48:49 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: EXE Encryptor
Message-ID: <9308301945.AA42541@acs1.acs.ucalgary.ca>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Development of the EXE encrypting package that s_duck@pinetree.org
and I were working on has effectivly stalled.  We were unable to wedge
DOS at the right level to virtualize an .exe file.  Sorry for getting
your hopes up.  If anyone wishes to continue the project, please
ask s_duck for the existing code.
-- 
PGP 2.3a Key by finger




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: collins@newton.apple.com (Scott Collins)
Date: Mon, 30 Aug 93 13:58:50 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Apple+Clipper
Message-ID: <9308302050.AA17798@newton.apple.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Tim and Paul present accurate evidence mitigating some of my specific
points.  I agree that the AV Macs and AOCE are steps (or even leaps)
towards a platform favorable for clipper infestation.

.....BEGIN HAIR SPLITTING MESSAGE.....
I would like to fine tune one of Tim's comments:

  >#1 and #2 are already satisfied with the new generation of av Macs, as

These machines most certainly do not contain the clipper chip (which I'm
sure Tim did not mean to imply), though they do show that Apple can make
machines with special purpose hardware and capabilities not present, or
emulatable, on earlier machines (this, I think, was Tim's point: a counter
example to my speculation).

It is illuminating to note, however, that the 880av is not based on the
same hardware as the 800.  It is an earlier generation that took longer to
come to market.  In this sense it recalls the late IIfx i.e., faster for a
while and then a dead end.  In many ways, the 800 is a superior machine,
and the 880 has some catching up to do (like adding interleaved RAM access,
for one).  By my count, the 880 has taken over three years to come to
market.

Summary: the AV Macs may indicate a new trend, but they do not represent an
immediate foothold for clipper.
.....END HAIR SPLITTING MESSAGE.....

Other than that, and although they come to slightly different conclusions,
I agree with Tim and Paul, who examined the root motives rather than
'diagnosing for symptoms'.  My final take on this is:

Apples history and our guesses about its likely motives lead me to (still)
predict that Apple can't immediately jump on the Clipper bandwagon; though
the further out we speculate (beyond 2 years?), the less faith in this
prediction we can justify.

I like to be wrong almost as much as I like to be right.  More, if the pay
is better.


Scott Collins         | "Few people realize what tremendous power there
                      |  is in one of these things."     -- Willy Wonka
......................|................................................
BUSINESS.   voice:408.862.0540  fax:974.6094   collins@newton.apple.com
Apple Computer, Inc.   1 Infinite Loop, MS 301-2C   Cupertino, CA 95014
.......................................................................
PERSONAL.   voice/fax:408.257.1746    1024:669687   catalyst@netcom.com





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Sandy <72114.1712@CompuServe.COM>
Date: Mon, 30 Aug 93 11:33:47 PDT
To: <cypherpunks@toad.com>
Subject: JURASSIC CRYPTO
Message-ID: <930830182642_72114.1712_FHF80-5@CompuServe.COM>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
  SANDY SANDFORT               Reply to:  ssandfort@attmail.com
 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Punksters,

Some of you have asked for more details about the interception of
encrypted digital dinosaurs.  Alas, I don't know much more than I
posted.  The Cypherpunk in question is still out of the country,
to the best of my knowledge.  I have no contact information for
him.  When he gets in touch with me again, I'll suggest he post
something about how the satellite feed was compromised.  To me,
the most important facts are that it could be done and that it
was done, not how it was done.  (Flame away, technoids.)

 S a n d y

>>>>>>    Please send e-mail to:  ssandfort@attmail.com    <<<<<<
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: hughes@ah.com (Eric Hughes)
Date: Mon, 30 Aug 93 14:38:50 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: The need for FREE cryptography ...
In-Reply-To: <m0oXDF6-0000nqC@vanbc.wimsey.com>
Message-ID: <9308302129.AA16834@ah.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>> It would be wonderful if somebody would put a
>> reasonably secure package (much like PGP) and copyleft the source.

>Well the GNU MP library would be a good place to start [...]
>It wouldn't be much work
>to package it up with free code for Triple DES, IDEA, MD5, SHS and
>some good "random" number generation algorithms.

My own thoughts on packaging this kind of thing for general use is to
make a cryptographically enchanced PERL.

In particular, I'd add the following data types:

    - arbitrary precision integers
    - arbitrary precision modular integers (i.e. a value, modulus pair)
    - bit/byte/word vectors of specifiable lengths

I'd add the following operators

    - '*%' (ternary) modular multiplication
    - '**%' (ternary) modular exponentiation
    - '~' (binary) bit permutation
    - '~~' (binary) byte permutation

I'd add some functions

    - des()
    - armor(), disarmor()
    - gcd()
    - xgcd() which also returns the coefficients s.t. x*a + y*b = gcd(x,y)

I'd add some miscellaneous stuff like being able to read in a PGP
keyring as an associative array.  Some strong pseudorandom number
generators might be useful.  It might also be convenient to have a
fast parser for RFC822 email.

(Does everybody see where this is leading??)

And just because you _can_ easily write, say,

    $plaintext = &idea( decrypt, $ciphertext, 
	$cipherkey ** $public_exponent{ $user} % $public_modulus{ $user } )

or maybe something else, say,

    $p = & first_prime( & long_random( 510, 514 ) ) ;
    $q = & first_prime( & long_random( 510, 514 ) ) ;
    $N = $p * $q ;
    [...]

doesn't mean that the cryptographic PERL violates anybody's patent
rights in any way.

These are just my thoughts.  I'm not going to work on this, but I do
hope to inspire someone who might.

Eric




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Jim McCoy <mccoy@ccwf.cc.utexas.edu>
Date: Mon, 30 Aug 93 12:46:24 PDT
To: strat@abc.ksu.ksu.edu (Steve Davis)
Subject: Re: The need for FREE cryptography ...
In-Reply-To: <9308301100.AA13519@abc.ksu.ksu.edu>
Message-ID: <199308301943.AA29011@tramp.cc.utexas.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text


> What I'd need, if I wanted to integrate this technology into
> new platforms such as voice communication or an encrypted file system, is a
> library of tools for shuffling this data around and piping it through the
> "magic" algorithms.

Such an interface would be a useful addition to PGP, maybe a libpgp.a
approach with such magic routines.  This would definitely be useful for a
great many things.

> It would be wonderful if somebody would put a
> reasonably secure package (much like PGP) and copyleft the source.

You should try reading the source sometime.  Like the file pgp.c....

jim



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: scott@Cadence.COM (Scott Gustafson)
Date: Mon, 30 Aug 93 14:56:24 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Apple planning to use Clipper chip?
Message-ID: <9308302148.AA12099@racecar>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


At 12:45 PM 8/30/93 -0700, Timothy C. May wrote:
>My speculation would be that the Clipper/Skipjack/Capstone deal, if it
>is happening at all, is some time off. Perhaps for a phone version of
>the av Macs (there had been speculation that Apple was planning to use
>the on-board DSP hardware for a modem tool, similar to what NeXT has
>done with its hardware).

The Centris 660av and Quadra 840av are both equiped with the Phone software
to allow them to do modem emulation, phone calls (speaker phone), and faxes in
software only.

If you want more info on this, send me an email and we'll keep it off this list.

scott
---
Scott Gustafson          '93 ZX-11D Pilot          (408) 894-3432
Cadence Design Systems, 555 River Oaks Pkwy., San Jose, CA  95134
Internet: scott@cadence.com

WARNING: This vechile capable of evading high speed pursuit.





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: paul@poboy.b17c.ingr.com (Paul Robichaux)
Date: Mon, 30 Aug 93 13:03:49 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Apple planning to use Clipper chip?
In-Reply-To: <9308301921.AA14675@newton.apple.com>
Message-ID: <199308301955.AA20308@poboy.b17c.ingr.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I agree 100% with what Scott had to say about Apple's past history. My
own experience as a Mac owner and developer bears him out.

However, Apple *does* have a set of software to allow digital
signatures for documents and mail- AOCE. 

1. Apple has a history of releasing software which *can* take
advantage of special hardware available on newer machines (i.e. Color
QuickDraw, the Sound Manager, which allows recording sounds directly
on machines with built-in mikes), but which is still
backwards-compatible.

2. AOCE already includes RSA for digital signatures; using the
Component Manager, it could conceivably take advantage of a
Capstone/Clipper ASIC on the motherboard or on an expansion card (or a
PCMCIA slot, or whatever.)

3. Third-party developers have little reward in developing an API for
something like digital signatures, but there are great rewards in
writing software which supports Apple's API. Look at the ongoing
competition between video codecs for an example.

Theorem A: just because Apple _can_ do something is no reason to think
they _will_, especially when the benefits are questionable (as they
certainly are here!)

Theorem B: Even *if* (and I stress that one little word) Apple put a Capstone
into every Macintosh, that doesn't mean *you* have to use it. Since
AOCE supports plug-in encryption & signature technology, you can roll
your own (and I see a good market in doing so.)

While the proof of both of the above must be left to future readers,
I'm not too concerned. A meta-note: let's keep all the FSF wrangling
someplace else. It's really not appropriate here.

-Paul

-- 
Paul Robichaux, KD4JZG     | "Change the world for a better tomorrow. But
perobich@ingr.com          |  watch your ass today." - aaron@halcyon.com
Intergraph Federal Systems | Be a cryptography user- ask me how.





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Jamie Jamison <jamie@apl.washington.edu>
Date: Mon, 30 Aug 93 15:43:50 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: AV Macs and Apple Paranoia
Message-ID: <Pine.3.07.9308301518.A9769-8100000@hopper>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Actually I was going to ask in here if the DSP in the new Macs would lend
itself to real-time PGP use for voice communications.

WITH STANDARD DISCLAIMER







From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: nate@rodin.VIS.ColoState.EDU
Date: Mon, 30 Aug 93 15:26:24 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Apple planning to use Clipper chip?
Message-ID: <9308302222.AA11542@rodin.VIS.ColoState.EDU>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



>5. Therefore, for a standard to emerge on the Mac... 1) Apple would have to
>begin producing machines that contained this chip; 2) Apple would have to
>produce special system software, explicitly for this class of machines,
>that used this chip; 3) Apple would have to produce compelling end-user
>communications software that used clipper services on this class of machines
>and either didn't run at all on earlier hardware, or didn't use clipper
>technology.


kind of like they put the DSPs in the new macs, and make a new,
individualized version o fhte MacOS for EVERY new machine
(individualized by the "System Enablers").. and how they make
everyone want the new macs because of the speech and video software,
that is dependant on the new hardware...

Nope, it'll never happen...

-nate






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Reply to: hahn@lds.loral.com" <HAHN@lds.loral.com>
Date: Mon, 30 Aug 93 13:56:25 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Another BBS Seizure in Hartford
Message-ID: <930830165241.28e3@lds.loral.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


So this fellow was arrested because one of his BBS clients posted the
bomb recipes on his BBS?  This makes for a viable means of destroying
somebody else's means of info distribution.

Say XYZ-BBS attracts clients who are interested in some political
viewpoint that I oppose.  I would subscribe, pretending to share their
interests, then post bomb recipes.  I could facilitate my treachery
even further by making a call to the appropriate authorities, warning
them of a political terrorism conspiracy.  XYZ-BBS is destroyed.  If
I then inform the press, I can also publicly impeach the entire group.

BTW, you don't need _The Anarchist's Cookbook_ to make a bomb.  I have
a US Gubment (DOD special forces) book that provides enough recipes
to produce mountains of mayhem.  And you can find most of the materials
you need in stores that would be present in any small town.  What law
would it violate to post what the gubment has already published?
__
|         (V)              |  "Tiger gotta hunt.  Bird gotta fly.
|   (^    (`>              |   Man gotta sit and wonder why, why, why.
|  ((\\__/ )               |   Tiger gotta sleep.  Bird gotta land.
|  (\\<   )   der Nethahn  |   Man gotta tell himself he understand."
|    \<  )                 |  
|     ( /                  |                Kurt Vonnegut Jr.
|      |                   |  
|      ^                   |





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Peter Wayner <pcw@access.digex.net>
Date: Mon, 30 Aug 93 14:18:50 PDT
To: HAHN@lds.loral.com
Subject: Re: Another BBS Seizure in Hartford
Message-ID: <199308302116.AA00126@access.digex.net>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



BTW, there is a story in today's NYT about a poor, French kid
who watched McGiver make a bomb in the TV show and then decided
to "try this at home." He was killed. Now his family has filed
a nice, big law suit. 

The guy on the show made the bomb with sugar and some kind of
fertilizer or other stuff.

-Peter




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: danodom@matt.ksu.ksu.edu (Dan Odom)
Date: Mon, 30 Aug 93 15:33:50 PDT
To: strat@abc.ksu.ksu.edu (Steve Davis)
Subject: Re: The need for FREE cryptography ...
In-Reply-To: <9308301100.AA13519@abc.ksu.ksu.edu>
Message-ID: <9308302227.AA18470@matt.ksu.ksu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Steve Davis Said:

> There is still a void in the arena of free public encryption systems for
> regular human beings.  It would be wonderful if somebody would put a
> reasonably secure package (much like PGP) and copyleft the source.  PGP has
> never been a very useful tool to me as a programmer because of its internal
> structure.  What I'd need, if I wanted to integrate this technology into
> new platforms such as voice communication or an encrypted file system, is a
> library of tools for shuffling this data around and piping it through the
> "magic" algorithms.

RSAREF is available, but you can't use it in commercial products.
Also, it doesn't have many 'toys', although I can't really figure out
what 'toys' are needed...

If you don't need public-key algorithms (doesn't PKP claim patent
rights on _all_ public key systems?), IDEA may be used for
non-commercial purposes; IDEA is also fairly fast.


---> Dob

-- 
Dan Odom
danodom@matt.ksu.ksu.edu -- Kansas State University, Manhattan, KS

PGP key by finger or request.



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: danodom@matt.ksu.ksu.edu (Dan Odom)
Date: Mon, 30 Aug 93 15:44:26 PDT
Subject: Re: Apple vs. Free Software Foundation
In-Reply-To: <9308301743.AA05693@soda.berkeley.edu>
Message-ID: <9308302241.AA19165@matt.ksu.ksu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



[Much deleted from the below quotes]

> Steve Davis writes:
> 
>   >When something as broad and necessary as "freedom" is at stake, it is
>   >important to know who your friends are.
> 
> FSF is not punishing Apple.  It _is_ punishing programmers, individuals,
> human beings who have a job to do.  In fact, the FSF is punishing me, since
> I have spent no small amount time programming Apple computers (and no small
> amount of time porting GNU tools to them).  Has Apple's strategy of closely
> guarded secrets proved the correct one?  Let's call up Bill Gates and ask
> him.
> 
> In summary, I find your statements to be an undisguised attempt to hang
> your unrelated personal agenda from a charged political situation.  Do I
> think that's fair?  People have been doing it for centuries.

I would love to write pages about how Apple used to supply ROM code
for free with its machines and now sends the FBI after people who
simply get portions of their code, or about how they 'went corporate'
and betrayed all of the people who were loyal throughout the Steve^2 era,
but instead I'll say:

Please don't argue about this here.  It may have some relevance to
Cypherpunks, but it is an emotionally charged issue and neither side
will ever convert the other; this will just degenerate in to a
mindless flame war, getting nowhere fast.  Don't flood the list.

If you do decide to continue this, keep using anonymous remailers;
Strat is vicious when he's pissed, just ask Dave.

<ducks and runs for cover, hoping that Strat doesn't know where he
lives <grin>>

-- 
Dan Odom
danodom@matt.ksu.ksu.edu -- Kansas State University, Manhattan, KS

PGP key by finger or request.



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: mgream@acacia.itd.uts.edu.au (Matthew Gream)
Date: Mon, 30 Aug 93 00:46:20 PDT
To: honey@citi.umich.edu (peter honeyman)
Subject: Re: Source Code NOT available for ViaCrypt PGP
In-Reply-To: <9308272032.AA17050@toad.com>
Message-ID: <9308300745.AA22452@acacia.itd.uts.EDU.AU>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


In a previous life, peter honeyman said ...

| i disagree.  who will guarantee that viacrypt ships binaries based on
| the validated code?

Have your appropriately trusted person watch the code compiled in
front of him, and take a signature of the completed binary. Although,
this becomes somewhat of a nightmare, as 'Mr Trusted' will need to 
oversee all 'release' compilations, and spend time beforehand going
over code to verify everything. This signature could be signed by
'Mr Trusted' and included with the distribution, including s/ware
to allow the 'pleb' user ensure they match.

Matthew.
-- 
Matthew Gream,, M.Gream@uts.edu.au -- Consent Technologies, 02-821-2043.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: greg@ideath.goldenbear.com (Greg Broiles)
Date: Mon, 30 Aug 93 22:14:30 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Apple, privacy, and AOCE
Message-ID: <w1J59B1w164w@ideath.goldenbear.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Recent discussion about Apple's commitment (or lack thereof) to
providing anything like real privacy calls to mind some stuff
from MacWeek of several weeks ago; the 7/12/93 issue of MacWeek
includes a "special report" on AOCE (Apple Open Collaborative
Environment, a "groupware" (anyone have any better explanation?)
setup which facilitates sharing data between colleagues.
The "special report" includes two sidebars about encryption and security
in the AOCE environment, which I reproduce below.

I called and asked about permission to reprint the entire article
to the list but was unable to get past marketroids who wanted me
to pay $50 + copying costs (payable to them) for my 4-color
glossy reprints showcasing my product. (don't have one, dammit.)
Some folks still don't "get" the net. Sigh.
                                           
I found the idea that RSADSI will be generating folks' key pairs
particularly chilling. The article accompanying these sidebars
suggests that folks' private keys will be stored on the server; the
article made the security of the thing sound *so* poorly designed that
I figure it must be the result of miscommunication between the
Apple folks and the article's author (Mitch Radcliffe). If anyone
really cares I can see about posting some more of the article.

---

"Apple could have the toughest code on the block"

The Cold War mind-set in Washington, D.C., thawed a bit when Apple
gained permission from the U.S. government to ship AOCE outside the
United States while retaining the software's advanced encryption
features.

Encryption technology is considered munitions by the national defense
apparatus. For many years, the Department of Commerce, in collaboration
with the National Security Agency, has limited encryption technology
exports. But the strict limits on cryptography seem to be eroding after
the fall of the Soviet Union.

According to sources, the RC-4 encryption in AOCE was approved under a
special agreement between Apple and the NSA that will allow slightly
more-powerful scrambling capabilities than are typically given export
clearance. The NSA recently signed an agreement with the Software
Publishers Association that will provide expedited approval of RC-4
encryption based on 40-bit keys. AOCE uses 64-bit keys, and larger keys
mean better security.

"Protection can be at many levels," Gursharan Sidhu, Apple technical
director of collaboration systems development, told attendees at the
Apple Worldwide Developers Conference in May. He said it's very easy to
protect against casual intrusion and even determined hackers. But a
resource-rich intruder with access to supercomputers can defeat many
encryption technologies. "You've got to look at these various dimensions
of how far you want to go in providing security," Sidhu said.

Apple's security is among the best available, he said. The company
fought for several years to win approval for AOCE's privacy and security
technologies.

"In the world of commercial security, it's a matter of saying it is
secure within the parameters of commercial reality," Sidhu said.

Sources said it would take a supercomputer-equipped intruder from two
hours to six days to crack a 64-bit RC-4 key using a brute-force attack
that analyzed the encrypted data for hints about the key. Even if such
an intruder cracked the key for one network session, each successive
session would have to be recracked because it would have a different
key.

Apple will be constrained from selling AOCE in countries on the State
Department's list of terrorist nations. And the company will sell a
version of AOCE without encryption functions in France, because the
French government requires access to all imported encryption
technology.

In the United States, the barriers against encryption export seem to be
falling. In May, the Computer System Security and Privacy Advisory Board
of the National Institute of Standards and Technology, the Department of
Commerce agency that monitors civilian encryption technologies, issued
resolutions that recommend the United States revise its export laws to
facilitate the spread of encryption technologies.

"I think the NIST resolutions are a good indication that the Department
of Commerce is trying to make it clear to the White House that these
policies are backward," said Marc Rotenberg, director of the Washington,
D.C., office of Computer Professionals for Social Responsibility. "If
they don't change, they'll still be making policy for the 1950's."

- by Mitch Ratcliffe

---------

"Behind it all, digital signatures"

If the messaging engine is the workhorse of AOCE, the digital signature
capability is the electronic Paul Revere that carries the important
information.

A digital signature is an electronic analogy to the written signature,
and no two are alike. The result of complex cryptographic processes, a
digital signature can prove that a particular user "signed" a particular
document. Users sign a document by clicking a check box in the AOCE
mailer.

The legal force of such signatures has not been determined, but Apple
believes they are sufficiently reliable for building audit trails
through a company or even between companies.

Users will have to apply for and recieve their digital signatures from
RSA Data Security Inc. of Redwood City, Calif., which developed the
technology. The signature arrives in two parts, a private key that the
user must keep secure and a public key that can be distributed freely.
Any document signed using the private key can be compared with the
user's public key to see if the document is authentic and unchanged.

Public keys can be handed out by a user or stored in a key database,
where users can go to get keys that have been verified by a third party.
For example, a bank might keep the list of public keys that can be used
by a customer's company for signing purchase orders.

Developers, such as Snow Development Corp. of Clearwater, Fla., and
Shana Corp. of Edmonton, Alberta, plan to use AOCE digital signatures in
report-routing and forms software. The applications will let a user
create a flowchart of colleagues who need to sign off on a document,
send the document to that list serially or in parallel, and collect all
the digital signatures for auditing purposes in the final document.

-- by Mitch Ratcliffe




--
Greg Broiles                            greg@goldenbear.com
Golden Bear Computer Consulting         +1 503 342 7982
Box 12005 Eugene OR 97440               BBS: +1 503 687 7764




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Date: Mon, 30 Aug 93 19:23:51 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Apple+Clipper
In-Reply-To: <9308302050.AA17798@newton.apple.com>
Message-ID: <9308310218.AA19812@netcom5.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


It is very satisfying to me to see a post turn into a mini-debate (not
a flame...entirely too many debates are wrongly labelled as flames)
and then get resolved into a consens.

I agree with Scott that Apple is not likely to implement Clipper/etc.
anytime soon.

> Tim and Paul present accurate evidence mitigating some of my specific
> points.  I agree that the AV Macs and AOCE are steps (or even leaps)
> towards a platform favorable for clipper infestation.

This is all I meant, that _someone_ at Apple (and probably other
companies) is at least _talking_ to the Clipperpunks. Maybe it's just
"distant future" stuff, maybe it's industry panels, perhaps it's the
AOCE stuff Paul mentioned, and perhaps its the long-rumored telephone
product for the AV Macs (the true paranoid might see the failure of
Apple to unveil the modem and phone apps, using the DSP chip, as
evidence that Fort Meade has asked them to delay these products...as I
am not a true Xandor Korzybski-class paranoid, I will refrain from
such speculations!).


> These machines most certainly do not contain the clipper chip (which I'm
> sure Tim did not mean to imply), though they do show that Apple can make
> machines with special purpose hardware and capabilities not present, or
> emulatable, on earlier machines (this, I think, was Tim's point: a counter
> example to my speculation).

Yep, I was just making this point, that Apple is _already_ releasing
hardware with OS incompatibilities. (By the way, many/all? of the
newer Macs need a "system enabler" patch to run System 7.1, that is,
the standard System (OS) no longer runs on all machines. I could
easily see such patches for the AV Macs and the (debated) ClipperMacs.

> Other than that, and although they come to slightly different conclusions,
> I agree with Tim and Paul, who examined the root motives rather than
> 'diagnosing for symptoms'.  My final take on this is:

> Apples history and our guesses about its likely motives lead me to (still)
> predict that Apple can't immediately jump on the Clipper bandwagon; though
> the further out we speculate (beyond 2 years?), the less faith in this
> prediction we can justify.

On this we agree also. Moreover, when the "Clipper asteroid" is
possibly heading in your direction, but is still very far off, a
relatively small nudge can have great effect.

I'm not suggesting we rise up in righteous anger and march in front of
Spindler's offices, but we should keep in the back of our mind the
_possibility_ that makers of computer-based phones or conferencing
systems: Apple, IBM, NeXT _cubes_, SGI "Indy," and perhaps
Soundblaster folks...though I am even more skeptical that independent
DSP board makers could be brought into the Clipper fold.

If the NIST/NSA group wants Clipper/Capstone/etc. deployed widely,
then it would make sense for them to be working with computer and
multimedia companies. Else, in several years these DSP-based schemes
will have proliferated beyond any hope of control.

An outcome devoutly to be wished.

-Tim May


-- 
..........................................................................
Timothy C. May         | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,  
tcmay@netcom.com       | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
408-688-5409           | knowledge, reputations, information markets, 
W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA  | black markets, collapse of governments.
Higher Power: 2^756839 | Public Key: PGP and MailSafe available.
Note: I put time and money into writing this posting. I hope you enjoy it.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Date: Mon, 30 Aug 93 19:33:51 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: AV Macs and Apple Paranoia
In-Reply-To: <Pine.3.07.9308301518.A9769-8100000@hopper>
Message-ID: <9308310229.AA20932@netcom5.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Jamie Jamieson asks:
> 
> Actually I was going to ask in here if the DSP in the new Macs would lend
> itself to real-time PGP use for voice communications.

Phil Zimmermann says a non-CELP scheme he is investigating is fast
enough on a run-of-the-mill 486 for "Pretty Good Phone Privacy," or
whatever he ends up calling his project.

The 66 MHz AT&T DSP (a true paranoid would note the "AT&T") in the new
AV Macs is enormously faster, for many DSP and array manipulations,
and should be even easier to develop a voice-encryption scheme for.

Also, software-based schemes can easily be reconfigured to
emulate/talk to other encryption systems or phones. This may be part
of why the Skipjack algorithms are being held secret for as long as
possible, to delay this emulation.

-Tim May

-- 
..........................................................................
Timothy C. May         | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,  
tcmay@netcom.com       | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
408-688-5409           | knowledge, reputations, information markets, 
W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA  | black markets, collapse of governments.
Higher Power: 2^756839 | Public Key: PGP and MailSafe available.
Note: I put time and money into writing this posting. I hope you enjoy it.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Date: Mon, 30 Aug 93 20:03:53 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Apple+Clipper
In-Reply-To: <9308302050.AA17798@newton.apple.com>
Message-ID: <9308310300.AA23821@netcom5.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> I would like to fine tune one of Tim's comments:
> 
>   >#1 and #2 are already satisfied with the new generation of av Macs, as
> 
> These machines most certainly do not contain the clipper chip (which I'm
> sure Tim did not mean to imply), though they do show that Apple can make

In rereading my post earlier today on this issue, I can see I took
Scott to be referring to "a new standard" as any new specialized
hardware, such as the either the AV DSP stuff or the Clipper, etc. But
Scott was apparently using the _specific_ case of a Clipper inside as
the case he was citing.

Sorry for any confusion. I certainly agree that Clipper is far off, if
it happens, but specialized hardware is already a reality with the new
generation of AV Macs. 

And I don't dismiss the possibility, thought I consider it remote,
that the phone/modem tools have been delayed for reasons relating to
Clipper and key escrow. More likely, delayed because something just
didn't work in time for the announcement.

-Tim

-- 
..........................................................................
Timothy C. May         | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,  
tcmay@netcom.com       | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
408-688-5409           | knowledge, reputations, information markets, 
W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA  | black markets, collapse of governments.
Higher Power: 2^756839 | Public Key: PGP and MailSafe available.
Note: I put time and money into writing this posting. I hope you enjoy it.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Timothy Newsham <newsham@wiliki.eng.hawaii.edu>
Date: Mon, 30 Aug 93 23:08:55 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Diffie Hellman
Message-ID: <9308310606.AA14262@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Hi,
  Does anyone know of DH code that is freely available and distributable?
Preferably available outside the USA.  Preferably speed optimized.
although I'll put up w/ whatever i can get my hands on.

                                Tim N.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: thug@phantom.com (Murdering Thug)
Date: Mon, 30 Aug 93 19:09:26 PDT
To: gnu@toad.com
Subject: Re: Free Electronic Cash
In-Reply-To: <9308300825.AA28414@toad.com>
Message-ID: <m0oXLBT-0009GgC@mindvox.phantom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text


> Exactly which corrupt EFF did you have in mind?  Howabout some serious
> facts rather than random accusations?  Or did you just want to libel us?
> 
> 	John Gilmore
> 	Board of Directors, Electronic Frontier Foundation

True or False, the EFF accepted money from AT&T in return for the EFF's
support on various issues/bills before congress wherein AT&T came out on
top in it's effort to commercialize parts of the Internet for it's own
monetary gain?  I've that's not bribery and corruption of what otherwise
is supposed to be a non-profit organization, then I don't know what is.
'nuf said.

Thug



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Forrest Aldrich <visgraph!forrie>
Date: Mon, 30 Aug 93 19:53:52 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Help/Advice requested
Message-ID: <199308310248.AA03151@visgraph.uucp>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I'm working on the development of a resonably secure software registration
scheme, and thought that someone from the Cypherpunk list would be ideal
for helping out.  Sample code is even better, but general advice to do with
the methodology and coding would be most appreciated.

There is a program out there called PROTECT! EXE/COM, which does something
on the lines of EXE encryption which has been brought up here.  I've
corresponded with the author and he won't release the code (understandably,
he's worked very hard on it).  Apparently what it does is (after you
have run something like PKLITE on your executable) encapsulates the
EXE file, encrypted, with CRC checks and debugger traps.  He claims
this is quite effective and has not had anyone come through with
cracking it yet.  Just thought I would mention this ....

Unfortunately, that program is only for DOS/Windows.  It would be NICE
to have something like this working under UNIX, and I can't imagine
that it would be that difficult, although it would most certainly
be platform (assembly language) specific.  Anyone have some ideas about
how to implement such a beast?

Thanks alot...



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: bbyer@BIX.com
Date: Mon, 30 Aug 93 23:13:56 PDT
To: honey@citi.umich.edu
Subject: Re: Commercial PGP: Verifying Trustworthiness
Message-ID: <9308310014.memo.72462@BIX.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


In-Reply-To: <9308272026.AA17010@toad.com>
> From: peter honeyman <honey@citi.umich.edu>
> trust?  you could read the code, starting at about line 550 of crypto.c.
> of course, you have to trust your eyes, your editor (if you use one),
> and your operating system not to deceive you.  (i think i've carried
> this too far.)

I dunno.  The early versions of UNIX had a back door in the login
program put in by the designer.  The compiler also watched for the
login source code to be recompiled and added the back door.  The
compiler also watched for the compiler source code to be recompiled
and inserted the login code modification code _and the compiler
modification code.  You can never be to careful.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: bill@twwells.com (T. William Wells)
Date: Mon, 30 Aug 93 19:03:51 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: article in Science News
Message-ID: <CCLoEA.4AM@twwells.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


For those into such things, it might be worthwhile to check out
the articles on the last page of Science News, Vol. 144, No. 9,
August 28, 1993. Interesting tidbits are "...computer scientist
Dorothy E. Denning..." and mention of the panel that evaluated
SKIPJACK.

(Isn't Denning a lawyer turned ersatz cryptography expert? Or do
I have her confused with some other "expert"?)





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Marc Horowitz <marc@Athena.MIT.EDU>
Date: Mon, 30 Aug 93 23:33:56 PDT
To: bbyer@BIX.com
Subject: Re: Commercial PGP: Verifying Trustworthiness
In-Reply-To: <9308310014.memo.72462@BIX.com>
Message-ID: <9308310628.AA14903@oliver.MIT.EDU>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>> I dunno.  The early versions of UNIX had a back door in the login
>> program put in by the designer.  The compiler also watched for the
>> login source code to be recompiled and added the back door.  The
>> compiler also watched for the compiler source code to be recompiled
>> and inserted the login code modification code _and the compiler
>> modification code.  You can never be to careful.

I've let a lot of stupid comments go by, but I have to respond to this
one.

It is true that Dennis Ritchie (I believe, if not him, one of the
other original UNIX authors) proposed such a login/compiler virus.
But it wasn't in any early version of UNIX.

		Marc




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: collins@newton.apple.com (Scott Collins)
Date: Tue, 31 Aug 93 06:46:31 PDT
To: greg@ideath.goldenbear.com (Greg Broiles)
Subject: Re: Apple, privacy, and AOCE
Message-ID: <9308311334.AA07407@newton.apple.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


  >I found the idea that RSADSI will be generating folks' key pairs
  >particularly chilling.

What I gathered from actually using this software is that you personally
generate a key pair, on your own machine, and then transparently send your
public key to RSADSI.  Some time later, you receive a certificate (with an
expiration date) that allows your 'signer' to function.  RSADSI does not
make, or even see, your private key.


  >The article accompanying these sidebars suggests that folks' private keys
  >will be stored on the server;

My understanding is that address books on the [optional] servers may have
copies of certificates, for people who have certificates and want them
published.


  >the article [...] must be the result of miscommunication

yes


  >The NSA recently signed an agreement with the Software Publishers
  >Association that will provide expedited approval of RC-4 encryption based
  >on 40-bit keys.

Not surprising, since a pre-computation attack allowing a direct key lookup
against RC-4 with 40 bit keys is economically feasible for anyone who can
afford a CD-ROM jukebox (128 mips-years of computation + 8 terabytes of
storage).


  >NSA [...] will allow slightly more-powerful scrambling capabilities
  >[in AOCE] AOCE uses 64-bit keys, and larger keys mean better security.

This could mean anything.  They might actually be using 64 bit keys (which
would be good, although 80 bits is recommended), or they might be using 40
bit keys with 24 bits of salt (or worse: 32 and 32).  Salted keys (key+salt
of sufficient size), stop the precomputed attack, but if the actual key
size, without salt, is still only 40 bits, then exhaustive search of the
keyspace, after the salt has been seen, will only take 64 mips-years.


Scott Collins         | "Few people realize what tremendous power there
                      |  is in one of these things."     -- Willy Wonka
......................|................................................
BUSINESS.   voice:408.862.0540  fax:974.6094   collins@newton.apple.com
Apple Computer, Inc.   1 Infinite Loop, MS 301-2C   Cupertino, CA 95014
.......................................................................
PERSONAL.   voice/fax:408.257.1746    1024:669687   catalyst@netcom.com





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: doug@netcom5.netcom.com (Doug Merritt)
Date: Tue, 31 Aug 93 07:39:03 PDT
To: Marc Horowitz <bbyer@BIX.com
Subject: Re: Commercial PGP: Verifying Trustworthiness
In-Reply-To: <marc@Athena.MIT.EDU>
Message-ID: <9308311433.AA11758@netcom5.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


--- Forwarded mail from Marc Horowitz <marc@Athena.MIT.EDU>

>From owner-cypherpunks@toad.com Mon Aug 30 23:40:01 1993
Received: from relay2.UU.NET by mail.netcom.com (5.65/SMI-4.1/Netcom)
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To: bbyer@BIX.com
Cc: honey@citi.umich.edu, cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Commercial PGP: Verifying Trustworthiness 
In-Reply-To: Your message of Tue, 31 Aug 93 00:14:18 -0400.
             <9308310014.memo.72462@BIX.com> 
Date: Tue, 31 Aug 93 02:28:52 EDT
From: Marc Horowitz <marc@Athena.MIT.EDU>


Marc Horowitz <marc@Athena.MIT.EDU> said:
>> I dunno.  The early versions of UNIX had a back door in the login [...]
>I've let a lot of stupid comments go by, but I have to respond to this one.
>
>It is true that Dennis Ritchie (I believe, if not him, one of the
>other original UNIX authors) proposed such a login/compiler virus.
>But it wasn't in any early version of UNIX.

Stupid? Watch the flame bait...he merely overstated a touch. The back doors
weren't part of any of the full distributions, it's true, but they
were quite a bit more than proposals. Ken Thompson actually distributed
those back doors via a compiler update, warning of a security problem
and urging all sites to recompile. Most did, which inserted the back doors
into the programs. That's close enough to the original claim.

See the Ken Thompson & Dennis Ritchie Turing Award Lecture, which goes
into detail about this. The level of sneakiness involved was amazing.
Compilers are the ultimate security breach.
	Doug




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: collins@newton.apple.com (Scott Collins)
Date: Tue, 31 Aug 93 08:16:30 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: What's wrong with PEM?
Message-ID: <9308311508.AA08669@newton.apple.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


After reading the RFCs for PEM (1421-1424), I am curious what other people
think about PEM.  For cypherpunks agenda, in what ways is PEM lacking?  My
take is:

  1. PEM is a protocol, only applicable to mail (perhaps only to internet
mail) while PGP is program that provides similar services for mail, but is
also applicable to non-mail related encryption tasks.

  2. PEM and PGP don't aggree on the symmetric algorithms (DES, IDEA).

  3. PEM certificates are bulky, and transmission is encouraged.

  4. PEM certificates are issued by Certificate Authorities, which would
seem to preclude PGP's 'web of trust' model.


These all seem to have answers:

  1. PEM is protocal, PGP is a program that implements much of what PEM
is... why not make PGP PEM compliant.

  2. Propose IDEA as a symmetric algorithm for PEM.

  3. Ha! PGP already has key servers.

  4. Propose a revion to the certification scheme where USER certificates
would be created by the owner and signed by non-certificate-authority
acquaintances ala PGP.


Yes, this would take time and effort.  No, this should not be taken as an
affront to our current and previous efforts.  I think that we should persue
_every_ avenue.  If the only real problem with PEM is the trust model, and
we can change that, then this would be a strongly legitimizing action.


Scott Collins         | "Few people realize what tremendous power there
                      |  is in one of these things."     -- Willy Wonka
......................|................................................
BUSINESS.   voice:408.862.0540  fax:974.6094   collins@newton.apple.com
Apple Computer, Inc.   1 Infinite Loop, MS 301-2C   Cupertino, CA 95014
.......................................................................
PERSONAL.   voice/fax:408.257.1746    1024:669687   catalyst@netcom.com





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: gnu (John Gilmore)
Date: Tue, 31 Aug 93 08:34:02 PDT
To: thug@phantom.com (Murdering Thug)
Subject: Re: EFF bribery and corruption, not!
In-Reply-To: <m0oXLBT-0009GgC@mindvox.phantom.com>
Message-ID: <9308311533.AA21900@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> True or False, the EFF accepted money from AT&T in return for the EFF's
> support on various issues/bills before congress wherein AT&T came out on
> top in it's effort to commercialize parts of the Internet for it's own
> monetary gain?

False.

> I've that's not bribery and corruption of what otherwise
> is supposed to be a non-profit organization, then I don't know what is.
> 'nuf said.

You don't know what is.

You have managed to produce a mishmash of several false rumors,
National-Enquirer style.

	*  AT&T is a minor contributor to EFF, and has no effect on its
	   policy positions, which are set by its Board (including me).
	   CPSR and a few other organizations assumed that EFF wasn't
	   taking the same position as they were on various issues because
	   EFF had been corrupted by corporate funding.  In reality,
	   we were more interested in enforcing rights than in forced
	   equity (e.g. school choice rather than busing; no licensing
	   of broadcasters rather than requiring "equal time" to rebut).
	   We disagree because we're more libertarian than liberal,
	   not because we sold out.

	*  AT&T isn't crushing the net by commercialization.  A bill
	   introduced by Cong. Markey (which I spoke with him about
	   personally, when I happened to be in DC) would've required
	   that Internet access be provided solely by commercial
	   carriers, not by the NSF.  It already is -- ANS is a
	   commercial carrier.  The idea was to make *sure* the
	   government stops owning networks (which it would then
	   control the users of, with Acceptable Use Policies,
	   censorship, exclusion of political opponents, etc).
	   Instead, it would subsidize educational and research
	   organizations so they can buy network access from the
	   commercial carrier of their choice, the same way they buy
	   telephone service.  Whether by malice or mistake, a "modem
	   tax"-like rumor spread through the net that the bill would
	   kill academic use of Internet.  You fell for it.

I've enclosed a relevant article from Computer Underground Digest.

	John Gilmore

Date: Sun, 22 Aug 1993 20:23:18 CDT
From: Jim Thomas <cudigest@mindvox.phantom.com>
Subject: File 1--Has the EFF SOLD OUT?!?

The Electronic Frontier Foundation has been co-opted by the
telecommunications conglomerates and has, as a consequence, lost it's
integrity and credibility. Or so some critics would have us believe.
Especially since the re-organization of The EFF, allegations that they
have "sold out" by accepting contributions from telephone
companies--or worse, that EFF now is implicitly in the employ of
telephone companies--persist.  This allegation seems not only
unfounded, but does a disservice to the cybercommunity by falsely
maligning the integrity of one of the two (CPSR being the other) most
active and effective organizations working to establish and preserve
the rights of the electronic realm.

Because I am a dues-paying member of EFF and have recently sent my
subscription fee to CPSR, I am not a dispassionate observer. Both
groups are effective, and--even when in disagreement, I respect the
goals and strategies chosen by each group. Therefore, as a member of
EFF, I'm troubled by some of the public commentary I've read on
Usenet, BBSes, and public access systems that continue to
irresponsibly tarnish the integrity of EFF with false allegations.

Some of the basis for criticism rests on rumors. Perhaps some derives
from malice. But, the bulk may simply be a lack of information about
EFF's funding sources and an imperfect understanding about the
relationship between funders and recipients and the obligations that
relationship entails. I see nothing *inherently* improper about EFF
(or any organization) accepting funds from organizations whose goals,
ideology or practices may not overlay perfectly with those of the
recipients.  Let's look at a few issues.

1. HOW MUCH DOES EFF RECEIVE FROM TELECOS?  According to EFF sources,
roughly eight percent of their $1.6 million operation budget comes
from telecom sources, with no more than five percent coming from a
single source.  Fiscal ratios change, and whether the exact sum is
seven or 11 percent matters nil.  This is a useful chunk of resources,
but hardly substantial. It is certainly not a sufficient amount to
cause a crisis if it were withdrawn. The remainder of EFF's resources
are reported to derive from private donors, membership fees, and
revenue-generating activities (such as sales of t-shirts).  Both in the
Usenet discussion group (comp.org.eff.talk) and in its newsletters,
EFF has been open about its funding sources and has never concealed or
minimized contributions by corporate donors, including telecos.
Therefore, EFF's alleged ethical malfeasance does not lie in failure
to conceal its funding resources.  Nor does it lie in a dependency
relationship with the donors.

2. WHAT OBLIGATIONS DOES EFF OWE THE TELECOS? The broader question
here centers on what obligations a donor might expect from the
recipient. It is hardly unusual for organizations to accept funds from
contributors whose interests overlap. Examples include contributions
by R.J. Reynolds tobacco and The Playboy Foundation to the ACLU to--as
a personal example--my own former funding by the National Institute of
Justice.  Does the ACLU support freedom of speech because it is funded
in part by those with a commercial interest in protecting it?  Should
the ACLU abstain from taking a position on smokers'/non-smokers'
rights because of funding sources?  Should I have refused federal
funding lest I be accused (as I once was) of being little more than a
paid lackey of federal police and social control interests? Criticism
of EFF for its funding sources and suspicion of the strings that might
be attached extend into the lives of many of us.  However, it is rare
that general donations require any substantive changes in the behavior
or principles of recipients. It is also common for well-endowed donors
to spread their largess to a variety of groups with ends often
(seemingly) antithetical to each other and even to the donor.

There is no evidence whatsoever that EFF has changed its direction to
satisfy donors. In fact, the recent re-organization at EFF, however
much some of us might be disappointed by the emphasis, is fully
consistent with their original policy statement. In fact, a careful
reading of the founding EFF statement and its recent public policy
formulations indicate that the re-organization was primarily
structural rather than the reflection of a new philosophy. As the
CPSR/EFF/ACLU coalition in the 2600 Magazine Washington Mall incident
of 1992 suggest, the EFF continues to involve itself with those types
of issues that led to its founding. And, as Mike Godwin's continued
involvement with EFF and his willingness to help those in need of
legal advice attest, EFF remains the first resource most of us think of
when we seek computer-related legal assistance.  Those who know Mike
and EFF founders John Barlow and Mitch Kapor cannot, in their wildest
fantasies, imagine even the most generous donor influencing their
behavior or principles.

3. WHAT ARE THE ETHICAL/LEGAL OBLIGATIONS OF RECIPIENTS?  Federal and
state statutes, as well as various professional codes of ethics,
specify obligations that might lead to a conflict of interest. The
attorneys amongst us can elaborate on these.  However, there is
absolutely no evidence that the EFF approaches even the strictest
conflict of interest threshold. Its coincidental interests with
telecos involve policy and legislation affecting primarily the
development of an "information highway" and the attendant technology.
The EFF is not litigating on behalf of any telecos, it is not
(according to EFF sources and their documents) serving in a client
relationship with them, and it is engaged in no activity that--at
least by any apparent logic--could be construed to place the EFF in a
conflict of interest situation.  EFF's initiative and perseverance in
the Steve Jackson Games litigation would seem prima facie evidence
that the EFF is committed to principle and not to funding expedience.

There is room for considerable intellectual disagreement over the
focus, goals, and organization of EFF, CPSR, and, I suppose, even CuD.
But the one issue that is indisputable is the integrity, commitment,
and credibility the EFF possesses.  Because there is nary a soupcon of
evidence to to suggest cooptation, it's time to end this unnecessary
and destructive bickering about EFF's funding sources.

Those who have taken the trouble to follow the public policy
statements and read the EFF electronic and hardcopy newsletters, will
find nothing new in my comments. Those who do not receive the
newsletter and do not follow CuD's periodic summaries of the
activities of groups such as the EFF and CPSR might have been
influenced by rumors and misinformation. Those of us who are concerned
about the future of "cyberspace" should remember our debt to these
groups. Part of that debt means that we squelch false rumors that risk
irreparably tarnishing the reputations and subverting the effectiveness
of groups from whose actions we all benefit.





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: khijol!erc@colossus.apple.com (Ed Carp)
Date: Tue, 31 Aug 93 09:49:36 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: encryption program posted to comp.sources.misc
Message-ID: <m0oXYnl-00022PC@khijol>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text


Anyone else seen "syf" posted to comp.sources.misc?  Someone oughta talk
to Paul Vixie about posting XOR encryption programs... <sigh>
-- 
Ed Carp, N7EKG			erc@apple.com			510/659-9560
                            anon-0001@khijol.uucp
If you want magic, let go of your armor.  Magic is so much stronger than
steel!        -- Richard Bach, "The Bridge Across Forever"



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: hughes@ah.com (Eric Hughes)
Date: Tue, 31 Aug 93 10:54:04 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: REMAIL: Attacks on remailers
In-Reply-To: <9308301420.AA03878@elf.owlnet.rice.edu>
Message-ID: <9308311745.AA17964@ah.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>With no root privs on the machine, I tried using the at command to
>perform the above function and then reschedule itself for tomorrow.
>Problem: if the machine reboots then the mailing out portion is killed.

A user's crontab is not deleted at reboot, to my knowledge.  You could
simply run a cron job to schedule mail delivery.  (If you deliver on
cron, you don't get an even distribution of delivery times, unless you
use a much more frequent cron.)

Eric




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: lefty@apple.com (Lefty)
Date: Tue, 31 Aug 93 11:14:04 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Apple+Clipper
Message-ID: <9308311806.AA23317@internal.apple.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Tim May says:
>Yep, I was just making this point, that Apple is _already_ releasing
>hardware with OS incompatibilities. (By the way, many/all? of the
>newer Macs need a "system enabler" patch to run System 7.1, that is,
>the standard System (OS) no longer runs on all machines.

Actually, this has always been true.  It's just that it was done in the
form of patch resources internal to the System file prior to the release of
System 7.1.  It used to be that, in order to save disk space, one could go
into the System file with ResEdit and remove the various 'PTCH' resources
that didn't apply to the particular machine you happened to be using.

The System Enabler scheme is simply a somewhat cleaner method of
accomplishing the same thing: you now have a "generic" System file, with
the various hacks segregated in the Enabler.

--
Lefty (lefty@apple.com)
C:.M:.C:., D:.O:.D:.






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Superuser <visgraph!root>
Date: Tue, 31 Aug 93 08:39:02 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Help/Advice requested (fwd)
Message-ID: <199308311534.AA04994@visgraph.uucp>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Through e-mail, gnu@toad.com writes:
| 
| > Anyone have some ideas about how to implement such a beast?
| 
| First you have to tell us what it's supposed to do.
[ ... ]

	Sorry, I had assumed that people would know about registration schemes
	here.

	By the use of a (perhaps complex) algorithm, generate serial numbers
	that would be entered by the registering user which would effectively
	'register' the program.  There would be a routine in the executable
	that could detect a valid serial number and act accordingly.

	The algorithm to do this should be well-hidden into the code, as
	to discourage simple hacking and alteration...

	There are a wealth of schemes out there.  For example, SCO UNIX uses
	a (albeit weird) scheme that involves a serial number and activation
	key which actually decrypts the executable (not what I want to do,
	really).  INFORMIX uses a scheme that brands the executable with a
	serial number (very interesting).

	I thought of having an external program that would brand the executable
	with a serial number and perhaps some other hidden information in
	reserved spaces.

	Something like the program mentioned below would be effective in hiding
	the code.

	What else do you need to know?

| > have run something like PKLITE on your executable) encapsulates the
| > EXE file, encrypted, with CRC checks and debugger traps.
| 
| Fine, it uses encryption and CRC and debug traps.  Now, to what purpose?
| What's the objective?  What's the goal?  Why?
[ ... ]

	Here's a README from the distribution...

Protect! EXE/COM 3.1 encrypt and still run .EXE's       Registration $ 25.00
SDN_UTIL AUG93 PROTECT EXE COM CRC SECURE ENCRYPT SCRAMBLE
FILES: PrExCm31.SDN

Author: Jeremy Lilley

        Protect! EXE/COM  is a  powerful  EXE/COM  protection utility which
        thoroughly encrypts  any EXE or  COM file  but still  allows  it to
        be run. And, files protected by  it make a full CRC INTEGRITY CHECK
        every time they are run.

        This NEW version fixes many bugs found in previous versions of this
        program such as an infamous screen bug in v.3.0. Additions are made
        to make this program to prevent  CRACKING, REVERSE ENGINEERING, and
        MODIFICATION even more.

        This program is one of the most powerful and cost-effecive solutions
        to problems with your programs' being modified by malicious hackers.
        With every other form of file security being nullified, Protect! has
        been renewed and can  now secure your  programs more than ever. What
        would you do  if somebody  were to  add a  TROJAN or 'MODIFY'  a few
        screens to a program of yours ?  Protect! can make this circumstance
        extremely unlikely for only $25. If a problem is detected, a message
        of your choice can be outputted to the user to tell the user exactly
        what to do.  Instead of burying your head in the sand,  get Protect!
        to protect your programming and software investment.


Requirements: DOS 2.0 or higher, IBM or compatible PC, 256k RAM, & any
              executable file  compression  utility  such  as   LZEXE,
              PKLite, Compack, Diet, or another program for compressing
              EXE files before they are scrambled and protected.



          [ .SDA Format is (c)Copyright 1993 The SDN Project ]
          [  SDN Authors-Only Info Line is 203-634-0370 USA  ]

--------

If you need more information, I can give you the author's email address...



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: rjc@gnu.ai.mit.edu (Ray)
Date: Tue, 31 Aug 93 08:56:30 PDT
To: gnu@toad.com (John Gilmore)
Subject: Re: EFF bribery and corruption, not!
In-Reply-To: <9308311533.AA21900@toad.com>
Message-ID: <9308311553.AA02449@geech.gnu.ai.mit.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


John Gilmore () writes:
> 
> > True or False, the EFF accepted money from AT&T in return for the EFF's
> > support on various issues/bills before congress wherein AT&T came out on
> > top in it's effort to commercialize parts of the Internet for it's own
> > monetary gain?

 Oh, the horrors! Just think about it. A corporation doing something for
profit!

  I'll be cheering the day when AT&T, MCI, Sprint, the Baby Bells, and
the Cable Companies start offering internet service to the home at
affordale rates. 

(In fact, I've already read news on Clarinet of some cable company's
plan to sell a cable-modem pc card giving high speed internet access
at not much more than going phone rates)


-- Ray Cromwell        |    Engineering is the implementation of science;    --
-- EE/Math Student     |       politics is the implementation of faith.      --
-- rjc@gnu.ai.mit.edu  |                         - Zetetic Commentaries      --




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Karl Lui Barrus <klbarrus@owlnet.rice.edu>
Date: Tue, 31 Aug 93 10:54:37 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: PGP: question
Message-ID: <9308311748.AA25345@flammulated.owlnet.rice.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Cypherpunks,

Are there any heavy implications, security and otherwise, to the
truncation of the environment variable PGPPATH that occurs in
buildfilename()?

Background: I've been trying all sorts of stuff getting pgp to read
config.txt when I'm anywhere else in my directory structure.  My home
directory is /home/klbarrus which as it turns out is a symbolic link
another directory (it may even change from time to time).  Since I
never could get PGPPATH to work on my old NeXT account, and my home
directory there was also a link to something else, I thought: AHA!
PGP uses stat() and/or some other functions which don't follow
symbolic links!!

Nope, it does, so that wasn't it.

So, I poked around the code more and found out that buildfilename()
returns null if the length of getenv(PGPPATH) is greater than 50.
This probably explains why it didn't work on the NeXT; PGPPATH was set
to some huge path like /private/Net/tree/Users/barrus/Cryptography/pgp
or something close, so buildfilename() returned null.  But the
pathname on my new account is definitely shorter than 50 characters,
but I decided to try increasing 50 just to see what it would do.

Right before remaking pgp I realized the mistake I had made, one that
is (export) almost too embarrasing to admit :-)

Anyway, any "deep" reason to return null if the length of the
environment variable is > 50?  Or is it just to keep the path
relatively short, maybe to keep from breaking a system call on some
machine out there?

-- 
Karl L. Barrus: klbarrus@owlnet.rice.edu         
keyID: 5AD633 hash: D1 59 9D 48 72 E9 19 D5  3D F3 93 7E 81 B5 CC 32 

"One man's mnemonic is another man's cryptography" 
  - my compilers prof discussing file naming in public directories



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: markh@wimsey.bc.ca (Mark C. Henderson)
Date: Tue, 31 Aug 93 13:06:32 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: anonymous mail
Message-ID: <m0oXbnz-0000FfC@vanbc.wimsey.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> PEM, on the other hand, reveals in the clear who signed the message, outside
> of the encrypted portion. Also note that to be PEM compliant, you *must*
> always sign your messages. So much for anonymous encrypted messages...
There are also performance concerns here. There is no reason to take
the substantial amount of time it takes to sign, if you don't want to
sign a message.

On the other hand, in terms of anonymity, you can always generate a
self-signed key with TIS/PEM (I forget the exact term they use in the
TIS/PEM docs, but you can just make yourself a certificate which
doesn't really say anything about your identity).


-- 
Mark Henderson      markh@wimsey.bc.ca (personal account)
RIPEM key available by key server/finger/E-mail
  MD5OfPublicKey: F1F5F0C3984CBEAF3889ADAFA2437433




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: felix@hu.se (Felix Ungman)
Date: Thu, 2 Sep 93 08:26:56 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: ViaCrypt export?
Message-ID: <199309021523.AA24790@mail.swip.net>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Will ViaCrypt consider exporting pgp? (well, I think I can guess the answer
;-) However, pgp is already widely used outside USA (at least as many as
the US users, I suspect). It would be interesting to know what they're
going to do about it. There exists no country boundaries in cyberspace, you
know!
----------------------------------------------------------------------
- RealName: Felix Ungman   InterNet: felix@hu.se   AppleLink: SW0358 -
-                     Felix gor det goda godare!                     -
----------------------------------------------------------------------




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: remail@tamsun.tamu.edu
Date: Tue, 31 Aug 93 12:26:32 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: anonymous mail
Message-ID: <9308311923.AA17945@tamsun.tamu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


PEM also reveals who signs messages, even when the message is encrypted.
In other words, if I send you a PGP encrypted message which I also signed,
the signature is hidden under the encryption. You do not know who sent you
the PGP message (assuming a cypherpunks remailer or equivalent was used)
until after you decrypt the first "packet" and gaze inside.

PEM, on the other hand, reveals in the clear who signed the message, outside
of the encrypted portion. Also note that to be PEM compliant, you *must*
always sign your messages. So much for anonymous encrypted messages...

There is something to be said for the PGP encapsulated approach...




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Brad Huntting <huntting@glarp.com>
Date: Tue, 31 Aug 93 13:56:33 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: anonymous mail
In-Reply-To: <9308311923.AA17945@tamsun.tamu.edu>
Message-ID: <199308312052.AA01186@misc.glarp.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



> PEM, [...] reveals in the clear who signed the message, outside of
> the encrypted portion. Also [...] to be PEM compliant, you *must*
> always sign your messages.

Perhaps it's time we polished the edges, added a few of the features
that are lacking, and wrote up up an RFC for the PGP message format.

Some features I'd like to see in PGP are:

	The ability to send an encrypted message to multiple
	recipients without duplicating the entire message.  The
	most logical way to do this would probably be to encrypt
	the random IDEA key once for each recipient.

	There needs to be a facility for having multiple signatures
	on a single document without making the signers sign each
	others signatures.  Besides the obvious application of
	removing a signature from a document, this would also
	facilitate things like petitions where many people could
	asynchronously sign a single document, and latter assemble
	all the signatures together.

	It should be possible (though certainly not mandatory) to
	hide the recipient's identity entirely.

	The message format needs to allow for alternate forms of
	encryption (besides IDEA).  Furthermore, the (shared key)
	algorithm used to encrypt a message should be hidden in
	the RSA encrypted part of the message along with the shared
	key.  Ideally, a list of algorithms could be given which
	would allow the message to be optionally compressed before
	being encrypted, or encrypted two or more times with
	different algorithms.

If I'm confused and the PGP message format already supports some
of these features, please correct me.


brad




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Karl Lui Barrus <klbarrus@owlnet.rice.edu>
Date: Tue, 31 Aug 93 13:14:38 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: REMAIL: list
Message-ID: <9308312011.AA13862@flammulated.owlnet.rice.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----


Q1: What cypherpunk remailers exist?

A1:

 1: nowhere@bsu-cs.bsu.edu 
 2: hh@cicada.berkeley.edu 
 3: hh@pmantis.berkeley.edu 
 4: hh@soda.berkeley.edu 
 5: 00x@uclink.berkeley.edu 
 6: cdodhner@indirect.com
 7: hal@alumni.caltech.edu 
 8: ebrandt@jarthur.claremont.edu 
 9: remailer@rebma.mn.org 
10: elee7h5@rosebud.ee.uh.edu 
11: hfinney@shell.portal.com 
12: remail@tamsun.tamu.edu 
13: remail@tamaix.tamu.edu 
14: remailer@utter.dis.org 
15: remailer@entropy.linet.org
16: remail@extropia.wimsey.com 

NOTES: 
#1-#6		no encryption of remailing requests
#7-#15		support encrypted remailing requests
#16		special - header and message must be encrypted together
#9,#14,#15,#16	introduce larger than average delay (not direct connect)
#9,#14,#15      running on privately owned machines

======================================================================

Q2: What help is available?

A2:

Check out the pub/cypherpunks directory at soda.berkeley.edu
(128.32.149.19).  Instructions on how to use the remailers are in the
remailer directory, along with some unix scripts and dos batch files.

The public keys for the remailers which support encrypted remailing
requests is also available in the same directory.

Mail to me (klbarrus@owlnet.rice.edu) for further help and/or questions.


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.3a

iQCVAgUBLIOvDYOA7OpLWtYzAQGbDQQAvnyZ9XpGUntp483/trZQwyIb74jJEGgR
ZpWwPWAlp2j3Vp1WW2JcnvHXIfVtU9r8g22JErwDalgq00NdXIrqIpf5ZllbXfQA
XwNoq6hqeECeKtRG/nwc1NeLejFfi1QhA+tjL8yLbyvcZ+bawLbd58NmE7AODUK2
2vuRnYtz+WM=
=xnSQ
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: greg@ideath.goldenbear.com (Greg Broiles)
Date: Tue, 31 Aug 93 17:19:10 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Mitch Ratcliffe's article re AOCE
Message-ID: <7w969B2w164w@ideath.goldenbear.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



I received a nice message today from Mitch Ratcliffe (I misspelled his name 
in my earlier post to C-punks) re my posting of the sidebars from his AOCE 
article. I'm not forwarding his E-mail as I was raised to consider that 
impolite :), but feel safe in summarizing thus:

1. There are a number of weaknesses in AOCE, but it is also a step forward 
in some senses. Discussion/elaboration of these weaknesses is precluded by 
space limitations of MacWeek, as well as other trade or mainstream 
magazines.

2. Editing for space accounts for some lack of detail in the sidebars; they 
are also intended for a general audience. Mitch suggests Apple as a source 
of further technical information re AOCE, and mentions a talk given by 
Gursharan Sidhu at the Apple Worldwide Developers' Conference in May, in 
which Sidhu suggests the government should be able to crack a system's security
in some cases. Sidhu is the technical director of collaboration systems 
development at Apple.

Mitch's e-mail address is godsdog@netcom.com; I've written back asking for 
clarification about other points raised in the article. 


--
Greg Broiles                            greg@goldenbear.com
Golden Bear Computer Consulting         +1 503 342 7982
Box 12005 Eugene OR 97440               BBS: +1 503 687 7764




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: karn@qualcomm.com (Phil Karn)
Date: Tue, 31 Aug 93 18:04:11 PDT
To: cme@ellisun.sw.stratus.com
Subject: (fwd'd) more Clipper inside?
In-Reply-To: <9308312224.AA01506@ellisun.sw.stratus.com>
Message-ID: <9309010058.AA27169@servo>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Yeah, the NIST folks have been on the road trying to sell Clipper to
those industry groups who don't yet (or should) know better. A month
or two ago, it was the TIA digital cellular folks.

Phil




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: cme@ellisun.sw.stratus.com (Carl Ellison)
Date: Tue, 31 Aug 93 15:29:09 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: (fwd'd) more Clipper inside?
Message-ID: <9308312224.AA01506@ellisun.sw.stratus.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Check this out.

Clipper inside the Apple get you bothered?

How about Clipper inside all UNICES ?  (all POSICES)

Sorry if this is a repeat for folks..

 - Carl

Date:         Mon, 30 Aug 1993 10:03:00 EDT
Reply-To: TC11-I  IFIP TC11 Global information <TC11-I@HEARN.nic.SURFnet.nl>
Sender: TC11-I  IFIP TC11 Global information <TC11-I@HEARN.nic.SURFnet.nl>
From: Ambuel@DOCKMASTER.NCSC.MIL
Subject:      Call for Participation - POSIX Security Group
X-To:         tc11-i@HEARN.NIC.SURFNET.NL
X-Cc:         smaha@DOCKMASTER.NCSC.MIL, snapp@DOCKMASTER.NCSC.MIL,
              emery@D74SUN.MITRE.ORG, tsig@WDL1.WDL.LORAL.COM, wbr@MITRE.ORG,
              chang@ST1.NCSL.NIST.GIV, p1003.6@PERCH.NOSC.MIL,
              p1003.22@PERCH.NOSC.MIL, tc11@CIPHER.NL
To: Multiple recipients of list TC11-I <TC11-I@HEARN.nic.SURFnet.nl>
Status: RO

_____________________________________________

Call for Participation

The POSIX security working group will be concentrating on several
new areas of security functionality at the October 18 meeting in
Bethesda, Maryland.  The group believes that these areas must be completed
in order for the defined interfaces in P1003.6.1 and P1003.6.2 to be
fully useful.  These new areas include:
          Identification and Authentication Services
          Portable Data Formats
          Cryptographic Services
          Administrative Services

                    Identification and Authentication Services

POSIX 1003.1 and 1003.2 provide little functionality in the areas of
identification and authentication.  The security working group believes
that services for identifying users and authenticating those identities is
essential for protecting resources within a system. One proposal, from
ICL, has been received to date on this subject.  It will be distributed
in the POSIX mailing and will be discussed at the October meeting.  In
addition, distributed issues of identification and authentication will
be discussed so that a resulting standard will accommodate distributed
identification and authentication technology. Any additional proposals
for identification and authentication services will also be entertained.

                    Portable Data Formats

POSIX 1003.6.1 has defined several interfaces to create and manipulate
security-related data items - access control lists, labels, capabilities,
and audit records. However, the data items are not described to the level
of detail necessary to use them in a portable way.  For true application
portability the format of these data items must be known.  One proposal
has been received, from Haystack Laboratories, for a common audit trail
interchange format. This proposal will be included in the POSIX mailing
and will be discussed at the October meeting. Any additional proposals
for portable data formats will also be entertained.

                    Cryptographic Services

One proposal has been received, form NIST, which outlines interfaces for
several areas of cryptographic services: user cryptographic database
management, secret key cryptography services,  and public key cryptography
services.  The secret key services include encryption and data integrity,
as well as key management. The public key services include encryption
and digital signatures, as well as key management. The proposal will
be included in the POSIX mailing and will be discussed at the October meeting.
Another proposal may be submitted by the October meeting and will also
be discussed.  Any additional proposals for crytpographic services will
also be entertained.

                    Administrative Services

The security working group met with the administrative services working
group (P1003.7) to discuss what interfaces and utilities need to be defined
to provide portable application writers with a standard method for
administering security-related data items. The original scope of P1003.6
excluded this functionality because P1003.1 and P1003.2 excluded this
functionality.  However, these utilites and functions are essential for
application writers to provide truly portable applications. Any proposals
in this areas are encouraged and will be discussed at the October meeting.

Proposals in these, or other, security-related areas are welcome and can be
mailed to the chair for enclosure in the POSIX mailing and the agenda for
the meeting.  This will allow members of the working group to review the
proposal and be prepared for discussion at the meeting.  Proposals will
also be accepted at the meeting, but only in written form.  This makes it
more likely that a proposal has been thought out and keeps discussion
focused on a tangible document.

In order to plan for the agenda for the working group meeting, please
forward your name, email address, area of interest, and expected duration that you will be at the Bethesda meeting. Addresses for the chair are listed
below.  The hope is that a large group will be available for discussion all
week, but sometimes that is not quite reality. If you can only attend a few days, or would like to present something on a
specific day, please provide that inforamtion and the agenda will be created accordingly.

Questions and written proposals can be sent to the chair in any of the
following ways:
U.S. Mail:
          Lynne Ambuel
          Attn: I94
          Department of Defense
          Fort G.G. Meade, MD 20755-6000
Internet:
          Ambuel @ dockmaster.ncsc.mil
FAX:
          (410) 850-7166





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: remail@tamsun.tamu.edu
Date: Tue, 31 Aug 93 16:44:10 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Encryption policies of Fidnet, etc.
Message-ID: <9308312337.AA17814@tamsun.tamu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Forwarded from alt.cyberspace:
------------------------------

->> Joseph T Dickinson was mumbling something about Encryption <<-

 JTD> It is illegal to encrypt messages period.
 JTD> E-mail encryption is illegal

Depends on your network and where you live.

It is illegal to use PGP in the United States due to its use of a
copyrighted algoritm.  It is *NOT* illegal to use it anywhere else in 
the world.  Other encryption methods are legal.

In Fidonet (the largest *amatuer* mail network), it is against policy to
encrypt 'echomail' (Fido version of newsgroups), but perfectly 
acceptable to encrypt *direct* netmail (Fido email delivered directly to
the recieving system without regard to its location).  Routed netmail 
(email passed from system to system before eventually arriving at its 
destination) may be encrypted provided each sysop whose node the message
passes through agrees that the message may be encrypted, otherwise, it 
has to be sent en claire.

On RIME (Relaynet International Mail Exchange, the *2nd* largest amatuer
run network), email is regularly encrypted as part of the networking and
routing software in use by the network.  Sending routed, reciever-only 
mail is not only common, but *encouraged*, since it cuts down on the 
overhead of the other systems in the net.  You'd have to look at the 
network's topology to see why; it's basically a 'tree' formation in 
which nodes at the bottom feed their newsgroups up to the topstars and 
recieve them from the topstars. 

Keven


... Get the facts first - you can distort them later!
___ Blue Wave/QWK v2.12




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: bill@twwells.com (T. William Wells)
Date: Tue, 31 Aug 93 13:04:05 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: article in Science News
In-Reply-To: <CCLoEA.4AM@twwells.com>
Message-ID: <CCn0rL.FEM@twwells.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


In article <CCLoEA.4AM@twwells.com>, T. William Wells <bill@twwells.com> wrote:
: (Isn't Denning a lawyer turned ersatz cryptography expert? Or do
: I have her confused with some other "expert"?)

Apparently, the latter. Sorry.





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: remail@tamsun.tamu.edu
Date: Tue, 31 Aug 93 17:04:10 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Adv Pgm: 1st ACM Conf. on Computer and Communications Security
Message-ID: <9309010001.AA22758@tamsun.tamu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


  ***** 1st ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security ******
                      Nov 3-5 1993, Fairfax, Virginia


                            Sponsor: ACM SIGSAC
                 Hosts:  Bell Atlantic and George Mason U

                  In cooperation and participation from:
             International Association of Cryptologic Research
    IEEE Communications Society TC on Network Operations and Management
             IEEE Computer Society TC on Security and Privacy
                         Washington DC Chapter ACM


CONFERENCE HIGHLIGHTS: We invite your participation in this exciting new
conference whose purpose is to bring together researchers and practitioners
of computer and communications security. Our program offers a unique blend
of cryptography and security theory and practice, with emphasis on the
practical. The conference will be held in the Holiday Inn, Fair Oaks, in
Fairfax, Virginia; minutes from the Nation's Capital. We welcome you to
enjoy an informative and invigorating program, and Washington's pleasant
mid-fall sight-seeing weather.

Registration form and hotel information:
---------------------------------------
Is given at the end, or can be obtained from George Mason University at:
              Ph\#: +1 703-993-2090, Fax\#: +1 703-993-2112,
                       email: acmccs93\@isse.gmu.edu


                ADVANCE TECHNICAL PROGRAM (subject to change)
              ===============================================

November 3rd
------------

Welcome (Dorothy Denning & Ray Pyle)

Session: Applications-1 (Ravi Sandhu)

        - Does Licensing require new Access Control Techniques?
         (Ralf Hauser)

        - A Cryptographic File System for UNIX
         (Matt Blaze)

        - A Particular Solution to Provide Secure Communication in an
          Ethernet environment
         (Jordi Forne, Miguel Soriano, Jose Melus and Francisco Recacha)

Session: Cryptographic Protocols - 1 (Michael Weiner)

        - Lower Bounds on Messages and Rounds for Network Authentication
          Protocols
          (Li Gong)

        - Optimality of Multi-Domain Protocols
          (Raphael Yahalom)

        - On Simple and Secure Key Distribution
          (Gene Tsudik and Els Van Herreweghen)

Session: Digital Signatures (Ravi Ganesan)

        - The History of RSA -- Invited Talk (Ronald Rivest)

        - A New Signature Scheme Based on the DSA Giving Message Recovery
          (Kaisa Nyberg and Rainer Rueppel)

        - Random Oracles are Practical: A Paradigm for Designing Efficient
          Protocols
          (Mihir Bellare and Phillip Rogaway)

        - Sorting Out Signature Schemes
          (Birgit Pfitzmann)

Session: Legal and Policy Issues (Richard Graveman)

        - Avoiding Cryptographic Information Anarchy in Enterprises:
          Invited Talk
          (Donn Parker)

        - Digital Signatures: Can They Be Accepted As Legal Signatures in
          EDI?
          (Patrick Brown)

Session: Short Talks (Virgil Gligor)

        - Design of the Commercial Data Masking Facility (CDMF) Data
          Privacy Algorithm (Don Johnson, Stephen Matyas, An Le and John
          Wilkins)

        - Adding Time to a Logic of Authentication
          (Paul Syverson)

        - NetCash: A design for practical electronic currency on the
          Internet
          (Gennady Medvinsky and Clifford Neuman)


        - Considerations for Security in Personal Communications Systems
          (PCS) (Dan Brown)

        - A Framework for Distributed Authorization (Thomas Woo and Simon
          Lam)

November 4th
------------

Session: Multilevel and Database (Carl Landwehr)

        - A Pump for Rapid, Reliable, Secure Communication
          (Myong Kang and Ira Moskowitz)

        - Authorizations in Relational Data Base Mgmt. Systems
          (Elisa Bertino, Pierangela Samarati and Sushil Jajodia)

        - High Assurance Discretionary Access Control for Object Bases
          (Elisa Bertino, Pierangela Samarati and Sushil Jajodia)

Session: Applications - 2 (Victoria Ashby)

        - Denial of Service - Invited Talk
         (Roger Needham)

        - Analysis of an Algorithm for Distributed Recognition and
          Accountability
          (Terrance Goan, Deborah Frincke, Calvin Ko, Todd heberlein,
           Karl Levitt, Biswanath Mukherjee and Chris Wee)

        - Integration of DCE and Local Registries
          (Ping Lin)

Session: Cryptology  (Rainer Rueppel)

        - Multiple Encryption and the Economics of DES - Invited Talk
          (Whitfield Diffie)

        - Systematic Generation of Cryptographically Robust S-boxes
          (Jennifer Seberry, Xian-Mo Zhang and Yuliang Zheng)

        - Differential Cryptanalysis of Hash Functions Based on a Block
          Cipher (Bart Preneel)

        - Verifiable Secret Sharing for Monotone Access Structures
          (Marcus Otten, Han-Joachim Knobloch and Thomas Beth)

Session: Telecommunications Security (Ravi Ganesan)

        - Securing a Global Village and its Resources: Baseline Security
          for Interconnected Signaling System 7 Telecommunications Networks

        - Invited Talk
          (Hank Kluepfel)

        - Panel: How Secure is the Public Switched Network?

November 5th
------------

Session: Reliability of Security Systems (Ravi Sandhu)

        - Cryptanalysis and Protocol Failure - Invited Talk
          (Gustavus Simmons)

        - Why Cryptosystems Fail (Ross Anderson)

        - Panel: How to Engineer Reliable Security


Session: Cryptgraphic Protocols  - 2 (Yacov Yacobi)

        - Towards Practical `Proven Secure' Authenticated Key Distribution
          (Yvo Desmedt and Mike Burmester)

        - Applying Formal Analysis Techniques to Authenticated
          Diffie-Hellman Protocols
          (Paul Van Oorschot)

        - Augmented Encrypted Key Exchange: A Password-Based Protocol
          Secure Against Dictionary Attacks and Password File Compromise
          (Steve Bellovin and Michael Merritt)


                        ******************************

General Chairs                     Program Committee
--------------                     -----------------

Dorothy Denning                    Victoria Ashby (MITRE)
(Georgetown University)            Steve Bellovin (Bell Labs)
                                   Whitfield Diffie (Sun)
Raymond Pyle                       Taher El Gamal (Oki Data)
(Bell Atlantic)                    Deborah Estrin (USC)
                                   Joan Feigenbaum (Bell Labs)
Program Chairs                     Virgil Gligor (U. Maryland)
--------------                     Li Gong (SRI)
                                   Richard Graveman (Bellcore)
Ravi Ganesan                       Sushil Jajodia (GMU)
(Bell Atlantic)                    Paul Karger (GTE)
                                   Carl Landwehr (NRL)
Ravi Sandhu                        E. Stewart Lee (U. Toronto)
(George Mason University)          Giancarlo Martella (U. Milan)
                                   Michael Merritt (Bell Labs)
Invited Speakers                   Jonathan Millen (MITRE)
----------------                   Clifford Neuman (USC ISI)
Whitfield Diffie (Sun)             Steven Rudich (CMU)
Hank Kluepfel (Bellcore)           Rainer Rueppel (R3 Sec. Eng.)
Roger Needham (Cambridge U)        Eugene Spafford (Purdue U)
Donn Parker (SRI)                  Jacques Stern (DMI-GRECC)
Ronald Rivest (MIT)                Michael Wiener (BNR)
Gustavus Simmons                   Yacov Yacobi (Bellcore)


 ****** 1st ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security *******
                      Nov 3-5 1993, Fairfax, Virginia
                             REGISTRATION FORM

Mail or fax (+1 703-993-2112) this form to:
    ACMCCS '93 Registration
    Center for Professional Development-Business Office
    George Mason University
    Fairfax, VA 22030-4444

REGISTRATION CONTACT:
    Diane Waters, GMU (Phone: +1 703-993-2090, fax: +1 703-993-2112)

NAME:

AFFILIATION:

ADDRESS:

Phone:                            Fax:

ACM/IEEE Member Number:

Special Meal Requirements:  Kosher    Vegetarian

REGISTRATION FEE: (Circle one)
    ACM/IEEE Member        $300 (before 10/1/93)      $325 (after 10/1/93)
    Non-Members            $360 (before 10/1/93)      $400 (after 10/1/93)
    Students               $100                       $100

Fees include continental breakfast (11/3-5), lunch (11/3-4) and banquet
(11/4).  Student fee is restricted to full-time students, or part-time
students who are unemployed.  In either case an advisor's endorsement is
required.

Advisor Name and Signature:

Make checks or money orders payable, in US currency, to GMU/ACMCCS'93
Payment can also be made by purchase order (US organizations only) or
credit card (Visa or Mastercard only).

Cirle one of: VISA    Mastercard

Card No:                             Expiration:

Name on Card:                        Signature:

HOTEL: Holiday Inn at Fair Oaks, Phone: +1 703 352 2525, Fax: +1 703 352 4771
Rate: $69 (single/double) available until Oct 12
Mention 'ACM Security Conference' to get this rate




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: cme@ellisun.sw.stratus.com (Carl Ellison)
Date: Tue, 31 Aug 93 16:09:41 PDT
To: collins@newton.apple.com
Subject: Re:  What's wrong with PEM?
Message-ID: <9308312306.AA01658@ellisun.sw.stratus.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


-----BEGIN PRIVACY-ENHANCED MESSAGE-----
Proc-Type: 2001,MIC-CLEAR
Originator-Name: cme@ellisun.sw.stratus.com
Originator-Key-Asymmetric:
 MIGbMAoGBFUIAQECAgP+A4GMADCBiAKBgCl79/jl0DEVl1GQzOHlzjDmChDDxnWO
 Acd7jShj2x1vclFh6vbHx9IJqkQdwNhNAWf8XnTrqBDN+VSBc1qdT6nSEAbNPxHD
 XcvY2DudhuRaRBVLgUQ4scTK657m90Q+bTL5yIh2MaFipUw9BgbIXPTDlksSskWP
 9oHjo+pCJC+lAgMBAAE=
MIC-Info: RSA-MD5,RSA,
 D6p2f/wP8D4TOg3vWp7JGoGdKw4iL3bQeSFiany6kDNAdS8Tt65pSqb99zUpBN7v
 13Cu+LQhS0OA0jpyv+/DpkdjiW3GgECX05YkfIzd4iOF0CI/76pPoV65hIgdi5ze
 tcnBn6hr/fcBUByM+nWp0BIi/tApWp1xl/iEUOBiuwU=

>Message-Id: <9308311508.AA08669@newton.apple.com>
>Date: Tue, 31 Aug 1993 08:08:33 -0800
>From: collins@newton.apple.com (Scott Collins)

Hi Scott.

I think you have PEM right -- except that there's RIPEM which does
file encryption/decryption just like PGP.  I've built a shell script
for my mailer (Mail) which invokes either RIPEM or my own secret key
algorithm so it's a bit more convenient.  Once I get purchased PGP,
I'll add PGP to that list.

I hope to use the same key for PGP and RIPEM.  (1024 bit RSA).


 - <<Disclaimer: All opinions expressed are my own, of course.>>
 - Carl Ellison                                        cme@sw.stratus.com
 - Stratus Computer Inc.       M3-2-BKW                TEL: (508)460-2783
 - 55 Fairbanks Boulevard ; Marlborough MA 01752-1298  FAX: (508)624-7488

- -----BEGIN RIPEM PUBLIC KEY-----
User: cme@ellisun.sw.stratus.com
PublicKeyInfo:
 MIGbMAoGBFUIAQECAgP+A4GMADCBiAKBgCl79/jl0DEVl1GQzOHlzjDmChDDxnWO
 Acd7jShj2x1vclFh6vbHx9IJqkQdwNhNAWf8XnTrqBDN+VSBc1qdT6nSEAbNPxHD
 XcvY2DudhuRaRBVLgUQ4scTK657m90Q+bTL5yIh2MaFipUw9BgbIXPTDlksSskWP
 9oHjo+pCJC+lAgMBAAE=
MD5OfPublicKey: 39D9860686A9F075A9A83D49589C677A
- -----END RIPEM PUBLIC KEY-----
-----END PRIVACY-ENHANCED MESSAGE-----




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Date: Tue, 31 Aug 93 19:54:10 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Ratcliffe's palindrome
In-Reply-To: <7w969B2w164w@ideath.goldenbear.com>
Message-ID: <9309010251.AA03303@netcom5.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Greg Broiles wrote:

> Mitch's e-mail address is godsdog@netcom.com; I've written back asking for 


"godsdog" spelled backward is....

I wonder if anyone has ever gotten a good palindrome with their full
domain address? (Best to ignore the "." delimiters, for now.)

"limit@ti.mil" is a crude start, except that T.I. is not a military
site.

Our own "Abraham-Hughes" Cypherpunks team could have a user "mocha,"
as in the coffee, so that the address would be "mocha@ah.com".

I'll stop at that one.

-Tim May


-- 
..........................................................................
Timothy C. May         | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,  
tcmay@netcom.com       | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
408-688-5409           | knowledge, reputations, information markets, 
W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA  | black markets, collapse of governments.
Higher Power: 2^756839 | Public Key: PGP and MailSafe available.
Note: I put time and money into writing this posting. I hope you enjoy it.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: nobody@alumni.cco.caltech.edu
Date: Tue, 31 Aug 93 21:14:12 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Able was I ere I saw Elba
Message-ID: <9309010404.AA05328@alumni.cco.caltech.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Have recently heard from an official of the Advanced Logistical Planning board
of the city of Plano TX. (near Dallas)

vogon@alp.plano.gov

Something about a proposed hyperspace bypass ......

Napoleon

--ignore--




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: peter honeyman <honey@citi.umich.edu>
Date: Tue, 31 Aug 93 18:46:35 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: PGP: question
Message-ID: <9309010146.AA29652@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


if you ask me, limiting $PGPPATH to length 50 is a bug (albeit
most likely benign).

	peter




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "L. Detweiler" <ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Date: Tue, 31 Aug 93 22:29:14 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: NY TAXES CYBERSPACE, CRAM REACTS
Message-ID: <9309010524.AA11600@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Attention c'punks! A massive artillery fire on our Cyberspatial Reality
Advancement Movement (CRAM) has been volleyed on the NY front! 
Retrenchments and counterattack requested ASAP! Reports that this is
the first major enemy offensive on free Cyberspatial territory, to be
followed by supporting attacks in nearby theatres soon! The enemy must
be subjugated at this early critical period before basic footholds are
established to supply a larger offensive! Critical aspects of our evolving plan:

1) match offensives with more powerful counterattacks
2) infiltrate the enemy with spies and saboteurs, leverage strategic insights
3) propaganda and disinformation campaign on the public and enemy

We've been caught completely off guard by this attack! Let's banish our
passivity and complacency and surge into action! Onward, troops!

===cut=here===

Date: 31 Aug 93 06:01:03 EDT
From: Marty Winter <76407.3521@compuserve.com>
Subject: Sales tax on information services to increase

 OK, so what does all this gobbledegook mean? It means simply that New York
State has decided to trash the information superhighway that has been touted
as the solution to unemployment and the means by which New York could have
rebuilt itself. New York, former home of leading edge high-technology is
working overtime to relegate its citizenry to the welfare rolls.

 It means that BBS's which are already liable for collection of sales tax
must now go back and collect an additional 5% for a total of 13%. This tax
is RETROACTIVE ... Any BBS which has already collected a membership fee or
other charges up front for a year of service must go back and collect more
money from their subscribers unless their fiscal year begins on September 1.

 It means that a connection to the Internet, a subscription to GEnie,
Prodigy, or CompuServe just got A LOT more expensive. It means that
directory assistance calls to look up a phone number will cost more. Calls
for technical support or 800 or 900 services just got a lot more expensive.
Relatives of mine who are still employed by IBM downstate got told by their
superiors that as a potential result of this change IBM and numerous other
information service providers have decided or will decide to leave New York
as quickly as possible.

 Newspapers and other entities that would have poured millions of dollars 
into New York's economy have found the cost to potential users and 
subscribers  of new information services has now moved beyond practicality.
The bottom line is that New York has literally killed its own future. New
York's politicians from the Governor to the majority in both aisles of the
legislature have shown a degree of stupidity unparalleled since Nero was
emperor in Rome in killing the golden goose that could have made New York a
mecca for high tech communications. Modern communications in New York by
political fiat will have to consist of semaphor flags and smoke signals
while the remainder of the world outside our third-world state go digital.

 This particular episode proves that New York's political system is so
corrupt and so incredibly inept that citizens of New York really have to
give serious consideration to drastic measures against our state government
including voting out every single politician in statewide office. I am
particularly dismayed that this tax law was kept SO secret while being
nursed through the legislative process that no one knew about it at all,
including the Senate. Not a single one of my contacts was able to find out 
about any of this in advance. Even the notification from Tax and Finance a 
mere three days before its enactment was incredible and unprecedented.

 This latest folly will have no effect on free bulletin boards such as
Friends & Lovers, but it will be murder on those services run by those who
thought New York might have permitted them to eek out a living with a
computer and a modem. Thirteen percent sales tax? Think about that number a
little bit. The morons we elected have gone and done it. Do we really think
they're done yet? Are you REALLY going to vote for the same guy again in the
Assembly, the Senate, or the State house? Or are you going to make use of
your digital communications while there is still a dialtone? Is Bill Clinton
watching New York's government and is Bill Clinton REALLY going to sit idly
by and let our bozos in Albany get away with it?

 Information superhighway ... ptooey!

[...] The biggest threats to the use of cyberspace 
are NOT going to come out those committees and state organizations that 
deal directly with coputes, the Internet or other on-line services, but 
from places like the Finance committeess, etc, who see the use of the 
Internet and other services as a way of helping to fill the state's 
coffers. If we are going to educate anybody within the government, it MUST 
be those who seem to have the least sake in cyberspace. As Kevin so 
rightely pointed out, the boays in Finance and over at T&F have 
effectively put the Internet, CompuServe, GEnie and other commercial 
on-line services out of the reach of those who might benefit MOST from the 
use of such services. In some areas of the state the extra 5% that they 
just tacked onto the bill could bring the total coast closer to 20% rather 
than the 13% it does in ALbany. Worst part is, that the legislation that 
authorizes such things is often buried in the middle of bills that take 
weeks to read owing to their sheer size. Our information highway is going 
to become a dead end dirt road if things like this continue in NY.




STATE OF NEW YORK SLAPS 13 PERCENT SALES TAX ON INFORMATION SUPERHIGHWAY
------------------------------------------------------------------------
 The following is a complete electronic transcript of a bulletin issued by
the New York State Department of Taxation and Finance and was received by
Friends & Lovers BBS on Saturday, August 28, 1993.


(begin T&F document)

New York State Department of Taxation and Finance          N-93-20
                                                            (8/93)
                        IMPORTANT NOTICE

                Increase in Tax Rate Applicable to
              Entertainment and information Services
            Provided by Means of Telephony or Telegraphy

 Effective September 1, 1993, there will be an additional state sales tax at
the rate of 5% added to the existing 4% state sales tax imposed on receipts
from the services of furnishing or providing an entertainment or information
service which is furnished, provided or delivered by means of telephony or
telegraphy or telephone or telegraph service of whatever nature (see section 
1105(c)(9) of the Tax Law). The treatment of these services for sales tax 
purposes remains identical to the existing treatment except as to rate. 
Thus, the only change is that the state sales tax rate on such services has 
been increased from 4% to 9%. The Municipal Assistance Corporation sales 
taxes (section 1107 of the Tax Law), the Metropolitan Commuter 
Transportation District sales taxes (section 1109 of the Tax Law) and local 
sales taxes imposed pursuant to the authority of Article 29 of the Tax Law 
are to be added to the aforementioned 9% state sales tax rate.

 Example: A person residing in New York State subscribes to an entertainment 
service that is provided by telephony. The entertainment service recipient 
receives the service on a monthly basis and is charged for the service 
directly on the bill for telephone service. Prior to September 1, 1993, both 
the telephone service and the entertainment service were subject to an 8% 
sales tax (4% state, 4% local). However, any entertainment service provided 
after September 1, 1993 will be subject to a 13% sales tax (9% state, 4% 
local). There is no change in the rate of tax imposed on the telephone 
service which remains at 8%.

 The affected services contracted for or paid for prior to September 1, 1993 
will be subject to the additional state sales tax if they are rendered after
September 1, 1993.

 A new line and reporting code has been added to the sales and use tax 
return in order to report the additional state sales tax imposed on such 
services.

 Entertainment and information services provided or delivered by means of 
telephony or telegraphy or telephone or telegraph service include ALL such 
services delivered by such means. These services are taxable, and subject to 
tax at the higher rate and the applicable local tax rate, whether provided 
through 500, 700, 800 or 900 telephone numbers, as well as those delivered 
by local exchange, private telephone line, cable, or channel. It should be 
kept in mind that the services subject to tax at the increased rate are 
distinct from telephone or telegraph services subject to tax under section 
1105(b) of the Tax Law.

 Collecting, compiling or analyzing information of any kind and reporting 
such information to other persons by means of telephony or telegraphy or 
telephone or telegraph service constitutes the rendering of an information 
service subject to tax at the increased state tax rate as well as the 
applicable local sales tax, unless otherwise exempt.

 Information services that are currently subject to tax when furnished in 
written form by printed, mimeographed or multigraphed matter or duplicating 
written or printed matter, such as tapes, disc, electronic readouts or 
displays, continue to be subject to tax at the 4% state tax rate and the 
applicable local tax (see section 1105(c)(1) of the Tax Law). The higher 
sales tax rate applies to all charges for the service by the vendor to the 
customer which are subject to tax pursuant to section 1105(c)(9) of the Tax 
Law.

 A fee for subscribing to a taxable entertainment or information service 
(taxable under section 1105(c)(9) of the Tax Law) that is billed on a 
monthly, annual or other basis is taxable at the new rate. Membership or 
other fees entitling the subscriber to receive by means of telephony, 
telegraphy, a certain number of free reports or services, or reduced charges 
on reports or services, are also taxable at the new state tax rate. No tax 
is due if the vendor makes no charge for the services.

 Tax is to be separately stated on the recipient's telephone bill, credit 
card charge receipt or any other bill issued for such services.

 The increased state tax rate does not apply to any receipts from the sale 
of information services that are not subject to tax under section 1105(c)(1) 
of the Tax Law. These include an information service which is personal or 
individual in nature and is not or may not be substantially incorporated 
into reports furnished to other persons by the person who collected, 
compiled or analyzed the information. Examples of such services include a 
personalized management report delivered orally over the telephone, or an 
insurance damage appraisal conveyed over the telephone. Also, purchases of
information services by newspapers or radio and television broadcasters that
are used in the collection and dissemination of news are exempt from sales
tax.

 In addition, the increased state sales tax rate does not apply to charges
made to organizations and entities (such as government agencies, exempt
organizations, etc.) that are exempt from the general sales and use tax in
accordance with section 1116(a) of the Tax Law. Documentation which
substantiates exemption from the state and local sales tax for such
organizations will likewise serve to exempt such organizations from the
additional 5% state sales tax.

 When exempt entertainment services or exempt information services are being
billed by a person other than the actual exempt provider of the services,
the actual provider must give an exempt certification document, form ST-930, 
Certification of Nontaxable Services Provided Via Telephony or Telegraphy or 
Telephone or Telegraph Services, to the person who will be doing the billing 
in order that sales tax (including the increased state sales tax) will not 
be charged on the exempt services.

 This sales tax exempt certification document may not be issued unless the 
person issuing the document is registered to collect sales tax or is 
specifically exempt under section 1116(a) of the New York State Tax Law 
(and, if required issued a Form ST-119, Exempt Organization Certificate).

 When any person, affiliate or agent other than the actual provider of 
entertainment or information services bills the recipient of the services on 
behalf of the provider, that person will be deemed a vendor of the service 
for sales tax purposes and will be liable for all the obligations of a
vendor. Such obligations include collecting, reporting, and remitting the 
sales tax (including the additional 5% state tax) due on entertainment and 
information services which are furnished, provided or delivered by means of 
telephony or telegraphy or telephone or telegraph services.

 A person deemed a vendor of these services is entitled to and possesses all 
the rights afforded a vendor, including the right to an exclusion or a
credit or refund of tax as provided in section 1132(c) of the New York State
Tax Law with respect to such services.

 The person providing the billing service, whetyher doing the actual billing 
or or having the billing done by an affiliate or agent, will be deemed to be 
a vendor of entertainment or information services when the charges for the 
services are wither listed as part of, or as a schedule to the statement of 
such person to its customers, or are billed separately.

 The term affiliate means an entity which:

 - directly, indirectly or constructively controls a person deemed a vendor 
   of entertainment or information services.

 - is controlled by a person deemed a vendor of entertainment or information
   services

 - is controlled by a common parent who also controls a person deemed a 
   vendor of entertainment or information services.

 The designation of a person as a vendor, by virtue of such person 
performing the billing of charges on behalf of the actual provider of 
entertainment or information services, in no way limits the obligations or 
removes the liabilities of the actual provider of such services or any other 
person with respect to the sales tax imposed on these services.

                          (end of T&F bulletin N-93-20 [8/93])
--------------------------------------------------------------------------

==========================================================================




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Dave Banisar <banisar@epic.org>
Date: Tue, 9 Aug 94 10:21:20 PDT
To: Cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: EPIC Seeks Release of FBI Wiretap Data
Message-ID: <9308091315.AA11509@Hacker2.cpsr.digex.net>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain




             Electronic Privacy Information Center

                          PRESS RELEASE
  _____________________________________________________________

For Release:
August 9, 1994
2:00 pm

            Group Seeks Release of FBI Wiretap Data, 
      Calls Proposed Surveillance Legislation Unnecessary

     Washington, DC:  A leading privacy rights group today sued 
the Federal Bureau of Investigation to force the release of 
documents the FBI claims support its campaign for new wiretap 
legislation.  The documents were cited by FBI Director Louis Freeh 
during testimony before Congress and in a speech to an influential 
legal organization but have never been released to the public.

     The lawsuit was filed as proposed legislation which would 
mandate technological changes long sought by the FBI was scheduled 
to be introduced in Congress.  

     The case was brought in federal district court by the 
Electronic Privacy Information Center (EPIC), a public interest 
research organization that has closely monitored the Bureau's 
efforts to mandate the design of the nation's telecommunications 
infrastructure to facilitate wiretapping.  An earlier EPIC lawsuit 
revealed that FBI field offices had reported no difficulties 
conducting wiretaps as a result of new digital communications 
technology, in apparent contradiction of frequent Bureau claims.

     At issue are two internal FBI surveys that the FBI Director 
has cited as evidence that new telephone systems interfere with 
law enforcement investigations.  During Congressional testimony on 
March 18, Director Freeh described "a 1993 informal survey which 
the FBI did with respect to state and local law enforcement 
authorities."   According to Freeh, the survey describes the 
problems such agencies had encountered in executing court orders 
for electronic surveillance.  On May 19 the FBI Director delivered 
a speech before the American Law Institute in Washington, DC.  In 
his prepared remarks, Freeh stated that "[w]ithin the last month, 
the FBI conducted an informal survey of federal and local law 
enforcement regarding recent technological problems which revealed 
over 180 instances where law enforcement was precluded from 
implementing or fully implementing court [wiretap] orders."

     According to David L. Sobel, EPIC's Legal Counsel, the FBI 
has not yet demonstrated a need for the sweeping new legislation 
that it seeks.  "The Bureau has never presented a convincing case 
that its wiretapping capabilities are threatened.  Yet it seeks to 
redesign the information infrastructure at an astronomical cost to 
the taxpayers."  The nation's telephone companies have 
consistently stated that there have been no cases in which the 
needs of law enforcement have not been met.

     EPIC is a project of the Fund for Constitutional Government 
and Computer Professionals for Social Responsibility.


================================================================


           FBI Director Freeh's Recent Conflicting 
   Statements on the Need for Digital Telephony Legislation
_______________________________________________________________


Speech before the Executives' Club of Chicago, February 17:

   Development of technology is moving so rapidly that several
   hundred court-authorized surveillances already have been
   prevented by new technological impediments with advanced
   communications equipment.

               *               *               *

Testimony before Congress on March 18:

   SEN. LEAHY: Have you had any -- for example, digital telephony,
   have you had any instances where you've had a court order for a
   wiretap  that couldn't be executed because of digital
   telephony?

   MR. FREEH: We've had problems just short of that.  And I was
   going to continue with my statement, but I won't now because
   I'd actually rather answer questions than read. We have
   instances of 91 cases -- this was based on a 1993 informal
   survey which the FBI did with respect to state and local law
   enforcement authorities.  I can break that down for you.

               *               *               *

Newsday interview on May 16:

   We've determined about 81 different instances around the
   country where we were not able to execute a court-authorized
   electronic surveillance order because of lack of access to that
   particular system - a digital switch, a digital loop or some
   blocking technology which we didn't have to deal with four or
   five years ago.

               *               *               *

Speech before the American Law Institute on May 19:

   Within the last month, the FBI conducted an informal survey of
   federal and local law enforcement regarding recent techno-
   logical problems which revealed over 180 instances where law
   enforcement was precluded from implementing or fully
   implementing court orders [for electronic surveillance].


   ============================================================








From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Dave Banisar <banisar@epic.org>
Date: Mon, 22 Aug 94 13:55:22 PDT
To: Cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: EPIC Statement on FBI Wiretap Bill
Message-ID: <9308221648.AA48822@Hacker2.cpsr.digex.net>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain




                       *DISTRIBUTE WIDELY*

           EPIC Statement on Digital Telephony Wiretap Bill 

     The digital telephony bill recently introduced in Congress is the
culmination of a process that began more than two years ago, when the
Federal Bureau of Investigation first sought legislation to ensure its
ability to conduct electronic surveillance through mandated design
changes in the nation's information infrastructure.  We have monitored
that process closely and have scrutinized the FBI's claims that
remedial legislation is necessary.  We have sponsored conferences at
which the need for legislation was debated with the participation of
the law enforcement community, the telecommunications industry and
privacy advocates.  We have sought the disclosure of all relevant
information through a series of requests under the Freedom of
Information Act.  Having thus examined the issue, EPIC remains
unconvinced of the necessity or advisability of the pending bill.

     As a threshold matter, we do not believe that a compelling case
has been made that new communications technologies hamper the ability
of law enforcement agencies to execute court orders for electronic
surveillance. For more than two years, we have sought the public
disclosure of any FBI records that might document such a problem.  To
date, no such documentation has been released.  Without public scrutiny
of factual information on the nature and extent of the alleged
technological impediments to surveillance, the FBI's claims remain
anecdotal and speculative.  Indeed, the telecommunications industry
has consistently maintained that it is unaware of any instances in
which a communications carrier has been unable to comply with law
enforcement's requirements.  Under these circumstances, the nation
should not embark upon a costly and potentially dangerous re-design of
its telecommunications network solely to protect the viability of fewer
than 1000 annual surveillances against wholly speculative impediments.

     We also believe that the proposed legislation would establish a
dangerous precedent for the future.  While the FBI claims that the
legislation would not enhance its surveillance powers beyond those
contained in existing law, the pending bill represents a fundamental
change in the law's approach to electronic surveillance and police
powers generally.  The legislation would, for the first time, mandate
that our means of communications must be designed to facilitate
government interception.  While we as a society have always recognized
law enforcement's need to obtain investigative information upon
presentation of a judicial warrant, we have never accepted the notion
that the success of such a search must be guaranteed.  By mandating the
success of police searches through the re-design of the telephone
network, the proposed legislation breaks troubling new ground.  The
principle underlying the bill could easily be applied to all emerging
information technologies and be incorporated into the design of the
National Information Infrastructure.  It could also lead to the
prohibition of encryption techniques other than government-designed
"key escrow" or "Clipper" type systems.

     In short, EPIC believes that the proposed digital telephony bill
raises substantial civil liberties and privacy concerns.  The present
need for the legislation has not been established and its future
implications are frightening.  We therefore call upon all concerned
individuals and organizations to express their views on the legislation
to their Congressional representatives.  We also urge you to contact
Rep. Jack Brooks, Chairman of the House Judiciary Committee, to share
your opinions:

     Rep. Jack Brooks
     Chair, House Judiciary Committee
     2138 Rayburn House Office Bldg.
     Washington, DC 20515
     (202) 225-3951 (voice)
     (202) 225-1958 (fax)

The bill number is H.R. 4922 in the House and S. 2375 in the Senate.  It can 
be referred to as the "FBI Wiretap Bill" in correspondence.


Electronic Privacy Information Center 
666 Pennsylvania Avenue, S.E. 
Suite 301 Washington, DC 20003 
(202) 544-9240 (voice) 
(202) 547-5482 (fax) 
<info@epic.org>

EPIC is a project of the Fund for Constitutional Government and Computer 
Professionals for Social Responsibility.

=======================================================================








From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Brad Huntting <huntting@glarp.com>
Date: Wed, 1 Sep 93 07:54:22 PDT
To: peter honeyman <honey@citi.umich.edu>
Subject: Re: PGP: question
In-Reply-To: <9309010146.AA29652@toad.com>
Message-ID: <199309011449.AA00330@misc.glarp.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



> if you ask me, limiting $PGPPATH to length 50 is a bug (albeit
> most likely benign).

Hardly!  Many folks with home directories on AFS will have a hard
time with this.  I would suggest changing this to something like
_POSIX_PATH_MAX (which is 255 on BSD386 systems).


brad




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: khijol!erc@apple.com (Ed Carp)
Date: Wed, 1 Sep 93 10:14:23 PDT
To: jazz@hal.com (Jason Zions)
Subject: Re: Encryption policies of Fidnet, etc.
In-Reply-To: <9309011520.AA19223@jazz.hal.com>
Message-ID: <m0oXvA1-00028TC@warrior>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text


> 
>  JTD> It is illegal to encrypt messages period.
>  JTD> E-mail encryption is illegal
> 
> >Depends on your network and where you live.
> 
> >It is illegal to use PGP in the United States due to its use of a
> >copyrighted algoritm.  It is *NOT* illegal to use it anywhere else in 
> >the world.  Other encryption methods are legal.
> 
> Jeez, talk about misinformation.
> 
> If it were copyright, then a US copyright is indeed restrictive world-wide;
> that's the point of the Berne Convention.
> 
> However, it's not copyright; it's pretty tought to copyright an algorithm,
> all one can do is copyright the exact expression of one implementation of
> that algorithm. What's involved here is a patent, which is (as you note) not
> binding outside the US.
> 
> Finally, is it certain that PGP indeed infringes on a valid patent?
> 
> >... Get the facts first - you can distort them later!
> 
> Ah. This explains much.

I hate to jump into the fray, but according to Public Key Partners, if you
use RSA for educational, (etc.) purposes, you are not infringing on their
patent.

It has long been held that there is an exemption to 'patent infringment'
for educational or other "non-commercial" uses.
-- 
Ed Carp				erc@apple.com			510/659-9560

If you want magic, let go of your armor.  Magic is so much stronger than
steel!        -- Richard Bach, "The Bridge Across Forever"



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Jason Zions <jazz@hal.com>
Date: Wed, 1 Sep 93 08:19:54 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: NY TAXES CYBERSPACE, CRAM REACTS
In-Reply-To: <261clo$q1@hal.com>
Message-ID: <9309011516.AA19211@jazz.hal.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Y'know, a two-paragraph summary in calm tones, followed by the text of the
tax notice, would have been more effecitve; breathless hyperbole turns some
people off.

In any event, I see no reference to retroactivity. At worst, if someone paid
an annual fee, tax is owed only on the prorated portion of services to be
rendered after September 1. That is, if someone paid $30 on January 1 for
one year's service, tax is owed only on the "unused" $10 covering Sept 1
through December 31. This is relatively clear from the wording regarding
"service to be rendered after...".

Yes, it's monumentally stupid. You think you got it bad? I can't believe the
brokerage houses on Wall Street let this one go; NYSE ticker feeds are
covered by this, as are all generic reuseable information feeds, which means
transmission of credit reports and the like. This is gonna jack up most
things related to the US finance industry, especially NYSE and large
arbitrage.

I left New York State years ago; seems the state's IQ really *did* get
stupider after I left. :-)

Jason




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Jason Zions <jazz@hal.com>
Date: Wed, 1 Sep 93 08:24:22 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Encryption policies of Fidnet, etc.
In-Reply-To: <260ohk$l2e@hal.com>
Message-ID: <9309011520.AA19223@jazz.hal.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


 JTD> It is illegal to encrypt messages period.
 JTD> E-mail encryption is illegal

>Depends on your network and where you live.

>It is illegal to use PGP in the United States due to its use of a
>copyrighted algoritm.  It is *NOT* illegal to use it anywhere else in 
>the world.  Other encryption methods are legal.

Jeez, talk about misinformation.

If it were copyright, then a US copyright is indeed restrictive world-wide;
that's the point of the Berne Convention.

However, it's not copyright; it's pretty tought to copyright an algorithm,
all one can do is copyright the exact expression of one implementation of
that algorithm. What's involved here is a patent, which is (as you note) not
binding outside the US.

Finally, is it certain that PGP indeed infringes on a valid patent?

>... Get the facts first - you can distort them later!

Ah. This explains much.

Jason




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: doug@netcom4.netcom.com (Doug Merritt)
Date: Wed, 1 Sep 93 10:39:23 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Encryption policies of Fidnet, etc.
Message-ID: <9309011736.AA22359@netcom4.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


khijol!erc@apple.com (Ed Carp) said:
>I hate to jump into the fray, but according to Public Key Partners, if you
>use RSA for educational, (etc.) purposes, you are not infringing on their
>patent.
>
It has long been held that there is an exemption to 'patent infringment'
>for educational or other "non-commercial" uses.

Hmm. I would love to interpret this as meaning that I can freely use
their technology in freeware software that I write for and release to
the net. However there would seem to be reason to doubt this. ;-)

Any opinions on how much/how little one could get away with on such things?
Would it make a difference if the piece of software were intended for
a focused education/research area (say groupware research) rather than
being highly general (as a mailer is)?

I'm less familiar with patent exemptions than copyright exemptions, so
this is all somewhat opaque to me.

And there's always the old issue of whether someone will be motivated to
sue you, and whether you want to spend time & money on defense, quite aside
from the hypothetical legality or illegality that might eventually be
established. Urk.
	Doug




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Jason Zions <jazz@hal.com>
Date: Wed, 1 Sep 93 08:49:22 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: (fwd'd) more Clipper inside?
In-Reply-To: <260kjq$irr@hal.com>
Message-ID: <9309011545.AA19233@jazz.hal.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Warning: rampant paranoia inside.

>Check this out.
>Clipper inside the Apple get you bothered?
>How about Clipper inside all UNICES ?  (all POSICES)

Not bloody likely, for several dozen reasons.

Most importantly, POSIX does not, indeed cannot, specify implementation. All
it does is specify interfaces. That is, POSIX could define a standard API
which accepts a clear-text message and some form of secure identification
for a user and produces an authentication string which can be used by a
recipient of that message to verify that it was sent by that user. The
standard cannot state "You must use MD5" or "You must use Clipper".

POSIX also produces "Profiles", which are standards that point at other
standards. A profile might say "When the message-auth function is provided,
it shall use MD5 as its mechanism." Another profile might say "When the
message-auth function is provided, it shall use PGP."

A customer would tell a vendor "I want to buy a system that conforms to the
profile that says use Clipper for authentication." Other customers would
tell that same vendor "I want to buy a system that conforms to the profile
that says use PGP for authentication."

The base POSIX standard is neutral on the issue. Competing profiles take
stands on the issue. Customers buy systems that conform to profiles that
match their own stand on the issue.

The only way Clipper will appear in all POSIX-conforming systems is if one
of the following events occur:

  1) Only one profile is ever written, one that specified Clipper for
  message authentication and encryption.

  2) Customers tell their vendors they want the Clipper profile and don't
  tell their vendors they want any other profile.

Event (1) is pretty bloody unlikely. POSIX standards groups have substantial
international involvement; there are enough people from enough countries
where Clipper is recognized as stupid that other profiles will appear.
Besides, given a profile that requires Clipper, I can generate a profile
that requires PGP in about a day's work that will fly through ballot.

Event (2) is the one you have to watch out for. Here, though, it's a case of
the sheep going meekly to slaughter, which is what cypherpunks aim to stop
anyway.

Upshot: POSIX is a weak tool in the hands of the Clipper camp; don't sweat
it.

]                    Cryptographic Services
]
]One proposal has been received, form NIST, which outlines interfaces for
]several areas of cryptographic services: user cryptographic database
]management, secret key cryptography services,  and public key cryptography
]services.  The secret key services include encryption and data integrity,
]as well as key management. The public key services include encryption
]and digital signatures, as well as key management. The proposal will
]be included in the POSIX mailing and will be discussed at the October meeting.
]Another proposal may be submitted by the October meeting and will also
]be discussed.  Any additional proposals for crytpographic services will
]also be entertained.

Looks like APIs to me. I suspect there will be substantial opposition to
*all* cryptographic API standards from vendors, simply because they know
that the f-ing US Government, in the person of the Commerce Department, will
then tell them they cannot export those APIs and the mechanisms under them.
There's no point in standardizing something when you can't sell it to more
than half of your customers.

All you have to do is figure out how to use a more positive cryptographic
engine (like PGP) with each of the APIs that get defined; we push a profile,
and we're done.

Jason Zions
Chair, IEEE P1003.8 POSIX Transparent File Access
Note: I am speaking solely for myself. This is not an official statement of
IEEE or any entity thereof.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: khijol!erc@apple.com (Ed Carp)
Date: Wed, 1 Sep 93 15:24:28 PDT
To: danodom@matt.ksu.ksu.edu (Dan Odom)
Subject: Re: Encryption policies of Fidnet, etc.
In-Reply-To: <9309011744.AA12892@matt.ksu.ksu.edu>
Message-ID: <m0oXxvR-00028SC@warrior>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text


> Ed Carp Said:
> 
> > It has long been held that there is an exemption to 'patent infringment'
> > for educational or other "non-commercial" uses.
> 
> Is this just for RSA, or for all patents?  If PKP wanted to forbid
> academic use of RSA (or require a license for it), could they legally
> do so?  Assume for now that the patent is valid, which it may not
> be...

I'm under the impression that it's for any patent, but I'm not a lawyer (I
just play one on the net [grin]).

> I ask all this because I often hear researchers looking for a cure for
> (insert your favorite aliment here) complain that they have to pay
> patent royalties on the gentically-modified animals they use in their
> work, and if, say, two patented rabbits produce offspring, they
> have to pay royalties on each of the offspring as well.  This is
> academic use (to me anyway; I don't know about legally), but requires
> royalties.

I think it's because they are using them to make $$$.  I think.  :)

Here's the README from the RSA folks that I got with RSAREF.  Hope it answers
one or two of your questions. :)
--------------------------------- cut here -----------------------------------
                              RSAREF(TM):
          A Cryptographic Toolkit for Privacy-Enhanced Mail

                           RSA Laboratories
               (A division of RSA Data Security, Inc.)
                            April 20, 1992


This document copyright (C) 1992 RSA Laboratories, a division of RSA
Data Security, Inc. License is granted to reproduce, copy, post, or
distribute in any manner, provided this document is kept intact and
no modifications, deletions, or additions are made.


WHAT IS IT?

RSAREF is a cryptographic toolkit designed to facilitate rapid
deployment of Internet Privacy-Enhanced Mail (PEM) implementations.
RSAREF represents the fruits of RSA Data Security's commitment to the
U.S. Department of Defense's Advanced Research Projects Agency
(DARPA) to provide free cryptographic source code in support of a PEM
standard. RSA Laboratories offers RSAREF in expectation of PEM's
forthcoming publication as an Internet standard.

Part of RSA's commitment to DARPA was to authorize Trusted Information
Systems of Glenwood, MD, to distribute a full PEM implementation. That
implementation will be available this spring.

RSAREF supports the following PEM-specified algorithms:

     o    RSA encryption and key generation, as defined by RSA
            Laboratories' Public-Key Cryptography Standards (PKCS)

     o    MD2 and MD5 message digests

     o    DES (Data Encryption Standard) in cipher-block chaining mode

RSAREF is written in the C programming language as a library that can
be called from an application program. A simple PEM implementation
can be built directly on top of RSAREF, together with message parsing
and formatting routines and certificate-management routines. RSAREF
is distributed with a demonstration program that shows how one might
build such an implementation.

The name "RSAREF" means "RSA reference." RSA Laboratories intends
RSAREF to serve as a portable, educational, reference implementation
of cryptography.


WHAT YOU CAN (AND CANNOT) DO WITH RSAREF

The license at the end of this note gives legal terms and conditions.
Here's the layman's interpretation, for information only and with no
legal weight:

     1.   You can use RSAREF in personal, non-commercial applications,
          as long as you follow the interface described in the RSAREF
          documentation. You can't use RSAREF in any commercial
          (moneymaking) manner of any type, nor can you use it to
          provide services of any kind to any other party. For
          information on commercial licenses of RSAREF-compatible
          products, please contact RSA Data Security. (Special
          arrangements are available for educational institutions and
          non-profit organizations.)

     2.   You can give others RSAREF and programs that interface to
          RSAREF, under the same terms and conditions as your RSAREF
          license.

     3.   You can modify RSAREF as required to port it to other
          operating systems and compilers, as long as you give a copy
          of the results to RSA Laboratories. Other changes require
          written consent.

     4.   You can't send RSAREF outside the United States or Canada, or
          give it to anyone who is not a U.S. or Canadian citizen and
          doesn't have a U.S. "green card." (These are U.S. State and
          Commerce Department requirements, because RSA and DES are
          export-controlled technologies. Without the export-control
          restrictions, RSAREF would be available by anonymous FTP.)


HOW TO GET IT

To obtain RSAREF, read the license at the end of the note and return a
copy of the following paragraph by electronic mail to
<rsaref-administrator@rsa.com>:

     I acknowledge that I have read the RSAREF Program License
     Agreement and understand and agree to be bound by its terms and
     conditions, including without limitation its restrictions on
     foreign reshipment of the Program and information related to the
     Program. The electronic mail address to which I am requesting
     that the program be transmitted is located in the United States
     of America or Canada and I am a United States citizen, a Canadian
     citizen, or a permanent resident of the United States. The RSAREF
     Program License Agreement is the complete and exclusive agreement
     between RSA Laboratories and me relating to the Program, and
     supersedes any proposal or prior agreement, oral or written, and
     any other communications between RSA Laboratories and me relating
     to the Program.

RSAREF is distributed by electronic mail in UNIX(TM) "uuencoded" TAR
format. When you receive it, store the contents of the message in a
file, and run your operating system's "uudecode" and TAR programs.
For example, suppose you store the contents of your message in the
file 'contents'. You would run the commands:

     uudecode contents             # produces rsaref.tar
     tar xvf rsaref.tar

RSAREF includes about 60 files organized into the following
subdirectories:

     doc       documentation on RSAREF and RDEMO
     install   makefiles for various operating systems
     rdemo     RDEMO demonstration program
     source    RSAREF source code and include files
     test      test scripts for RDEMO


USERS' GROUP

RSA Laboratories maintains the electronic-mail users' group
<rsaref-users@rsa.com> for discussion of RSAREF applications, bug
fixes, etc. To join the users' group, send electronic mail to
<rsaref-users-request@rsa.com>.


REGISTRATION

RSAREF users who register with RSA Laboratories are entitled to free
RSAREF upgrades and bug fixes as soon as they become available and a
50% discount on selected RSA Data Security products. To register,
send your name, address, and telephone number to
<rsaref-registration@rsa.com>.


INNOVATION PRIZES

RSA Laboratories will award cash prizes for the best applications
built on RSAREF. If you'd like to submit an application, want to be
on the review panel, or would like more details, please send
electronic mail to <rsaref-prizes@rsa.com>. Applications are due
December 31, 1992, and awards will be announced March 31, 1993. First
prize is $5000, second prize is $2000, and there are five prizes of
$1000.


PUBLIC-KEY CERTIFICATION

RSA Data Security offers public-key certification services conforming
to forthcoming PEM standards. For more information, please send
electronic mail to <pem-info@rsa.com>.


PKCS: PUBLIC-KEY CRYPTOGRAPHY STANDARDS

To obtain copies of RSA Laboratories' Public-Key Cryptography
Standards (PKCS), send electronic mail to <pkcs-info@rsa.com>.


OTHER QUESTIONS

If you have questions on RSAREF software, licenses, export
restrictions, or other RSA Laboratories offerings, send electronic
mail to <rsaref-administrator@rsa.com>.


AUTHORS

RSAREF was written by the staff of RSA Laboratories with assistance
from RSA Data Security's software engineers. The DES code is based on
an implementation that Justin Reyneri did at Stanford University. Jim
Hwang of Stanford wrote parts of the arithmetic code under contract
to RSA Laboratories.


ABOUT RSA LABORATORIES

RSA Laboratories is the research and development division of RSA Data
Security, Inc., the company founded by the inventors of the RSA
public-key cryptosystem. RSA Laboratories reviews, designs and
implements secure and efficient cryptosystems of all kinds. Its
clients include government agencies, telecommunications companies,
computer manufacturers, software developers, cable TV broadcasters,
interactive video manufacturers, and satellite broadcast companies,
among others.

RSA Laboratories draws upon the talents of the following people:

Len Adleman, distinguished associate - Ph.D., University of
  California, Berkeley; Henry Salvatori professor of computer
  science at University of Southern California; co-inventor of
  RSA public-key cryptosystem; co-founder of RSA Data Security, Inc.

Taher Elgamal, senior associate - Ph.D., Stanford University;
  director of engineering at RSA Data Security, Inc.; inventor of
  Elgamal public-key cryptosystem based on discrete logarithms

Martin Hellman, distinguished associate - Ph.D., Stanford University;
  professor of electrical engineering at Stanford University;
  co-inventor of public-key cryptography, exponential key exchange;
  IEEE fellow; IEEE Centennial Medal recipient

Burt Kaliski, chief scientist - Ph.D., MIT; former visiting assistant
  professor at Rochester Institute of Technology; author of Public-Key
  Cryptography Standards; general chair of CRYPTO '91

Cetin Koc, associate - Ph.D., University of California, Santa
  Barbara; assistant professor at University of Houston
 
Ron Rivest, distinguished associate - Ph.D., Stanford University;
  professor of computer science, MIT; co-inventor of RSA public-key
  cryptosystem; co-founder of RSA Data Security, Inc.; member of
  National Academy of Engineering; director of International
  Association for Cryptologic Research; program co-chair of ASIACRYPT
  '91

RSA Laboratories seeks the talents of other people as well. If you're
interested, please write or call.

ADDRESSES

RSA Laboratories                   RSA Data Security, Inc.
10 Twin Dolphin Drive              100 Marine Parkway
Redwood City, CA  94065            Redwood City, CA  94065

(415) 595-7703                     (415) 595-8782
(415) 595-4126 (fax)               (415) 595-1873 (fax)

PKCS, RSAREF and RSA Laboratories are trademarks of RSA Data
Security, Inc. All other company names and trademarks are not.

----------------------------------------------------------------------
                           RSA LABORATORIES
                      PROGRAM LICENSE AGREEMENT

RSA LABORATORIES, A DIVISION OF RSA DATA SECURITY, INC. ("RSA"), IS
WILLING TO LICENSE THE "RSAREF" PROGRAM ON THE TERMS AND CONDITIONS
SET FORTH BELOW. YOUR ACKNOWLEDGEMENT AND ACCEPTANCE OF THESE TERMS
AND CONDITIONS IS REQUIRED PRIOR TO DELIVERY TO YOU OF THE RSAREF
PROGRAM.

1.   LICENSE. RSA is willing to grant you a non-exclusive,
     non-transferable license for the "RSAREF" program (the
     "Program") and its associated documentation, subject to all of
     the following terms and conditions:

     a.   to use the Program on any computer in your possession;

     b.   to make copies of the Program for back-up purposes;

     c.   to incorporate the Program into other computer programs only
          through interfaces described in the RSAREF Library
          Reference (the file "rsaref.txt" which accompanies the
          Program) (any such incorporated portion of the Program to
          continue to be subject to the terms and conditions of this
          license) only for your own personal or internal use or to
          create Application Programs;

     d.   to modify the Program for the purpose of porting the Program
          to any other operating systems and compilers, but only on
          the conditions that: (i) you do not alter any Program
          interface, except with the prior written consent of RSA;
          and (ii) you provide RSA with a copy of the ported version
          of the Program by electronic mail; and

     e.   to distribute the Program without charge to non-commercial
          users, but only in accordance with the limitations set forth
          in Section 2.

"Application Programs" are programs which either (i) incorporate all
or any portion of the Program in any form, or (ii) interface with the
Program but do not incorporate all or any portion of the Program in
any form.

2. LIMITATIONS ON LICENSE.

     a.   RSA owns the Program and its associated documentation and
          all copyrights therein. YOU MAY NOT USE, COPY, MODIFY OR
          TRANSFER THE PROGRAM, IN EITHER SOURCE CODE OR OBJECT CODE
          FORM, ITS ASSOCIATED DOCUMENTATION, OR ANY COPY,
          MODIFICATION OR MERGED PORTION THEREOF, IN WHOLE OR IN
          PART, EXCEPT AS EXPRESSLY PROVIDED IN THIS AGREEMENT OR
          WITH THE PRIOR WRITTEN CONSENT OF RSA. YOU MUST REPRODUCE
          AND INCLUDE RSA'S COPYRIGHT NOTICES ON ANY COPY OR
          MODIFICATION, OR ANY PORTION THEREOF, OF THE PROGRAM AND
          ITS ASSOCIATED DOCUMENTATION.

     b.   You may not distribute copies of the Program or its
          associated documentation or any Application Program except
          as expressly provided in this Agreement. IF YOU TRANSFER
          POSSESSION OF ANY COPY, MODIFICATION OR MERGED PORTION OF
          THE PROGRAM, WHETHER IN SOURCE CODE OR OBJECT CODE FORM, OR
          ITS ASSOCIATED DOCUMENTATION OR ANY APPLICATION PROGRAM, IN
          SOURCE CODE OR OBJECT CODE FORM, TO ANOTHER PARTY, EXCEPT
          AS EXPRESSLY PROVIDED FOR IN THIS LICENSE, YOUR LICENSE
          SHALL BE AUTOMATICALLY TERMINATED.

     c.   The Program and all Application Programs are to be used only
          for non-commercial purposes. This means that you may not use
          the Program or any Application Programs in any manner or for
          any purpose directly related to a product or service that is
          provided for sale to third parties (either by you or by any
          person or entity for whom you provide services) or that is
          provided (with or without compensation) for general use
          within a business organization or subdivision thereof. In
          addition, you may not distribute the Program or any
          Application Program in any manner that will generate any
          income to you, including without limitation any income on
          account of license fees, royalties, maintenance fees and
          upgrade fees.

     d.   You may not translate the Program into any other computer
          language, except with the prior written consent of RSA.

     e.   You may not incorporate the Program into other programs
          through interfaces other than the interfaces described in
          the RSAREF Library Reference, except with the prior written
          consent of RSA.

     f.  You may distribute the Program only in the following forms:
         (i) the unmodified Program, in source code or object code
         form; (ii) the Program as modified only for the purpose of
         porting it to another operating system or compiler in
         accordance with Section 1.d., in source code or object code
         form; and (iii) as part of an Application Program in
         executable code form.

     g.  You may distribute the Program only pursuant to a Program
         License Agreement exactly in the form of this Program License
         Agreement. You may not vary the terms of this Program License
         Agreement. You may distribute the Program only in compliance
         with all laws, regulations, orders and other restrictions on
         the export from the United States of America of the Program
         or of any information about the Program which are imposed by
         the government of the United States of America.

3.   NO RSA OBLIGATION. You are solely responsible for all of your
     costs and expenses incurred in connection with the distribution
     of the Program hereunder, and RSA shall have no liability,
     obligation or responsibility therefor. RSA shall have no
     obligation to provide maintenance, support, upgrades or new
     releases to you or to any distributee of the Program.

4.   NO WARRANTY OF PERFORMANCE. THE PROGRAM AND ITS ASSOCIATED
     DOCUMENTATION ARE LICENSED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY AS TO THEIR
     PERFORMANCE, MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR ANY PARTICULAR
     PURPOSE. THE ENTIRE RISK AS TO THE RESULTS AND PERFORMANCE OF
     THE PROGRAM IS ASSUMED BY YOU AND YOUR DISTRIBUTEES. SHOULD THE
     PROGRAM PROVE DEFECTIVE, YOU AND YOUR DISTRIBUTEES (AND NOT RSA)
     ASSUME THE ENTIRE COST OF ALL NECESSARY SERVICING, REPAIR OR
     CORRECTION.

5.   LIMITATION OF LIABILITY. EXCEPT AS EXPRESSLY PROVIDED FOR IN
     SECTION 6 HEREINUNDER, NEITHER RSA NOR ANY OTHER PERSON WHO HAS
     BEEN INVOLVED IN THE CREATION, PRODUCTION, OR DELIVERY OF THE
     PROGRAM SHALL BE LIABLE TO YOU OR TO ANY OTHER PERSON FOR ANY
     DIRECT, INCIDENTAL OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES, INCLUDING BUT NOT
     LIMITED TO ANY DAMAGES FOR LOST DATA, RE-RUN TIME, INACCURATE
     INPUT, WORK DELAYS OR LOST PROFITS, RESULTING FROM THE USE OF
     THE PROGRAM OR ITS ASSOCIATED DOCUMENTATION, EVEN IF RSA HAS
     BEEN ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGES.

6.   PATENT INFRINGEMENT OBLIGATION. Subject to the limitations set
     forth below, RSA, at its own expense, shall: (i) defend, or at
     its option settle, any claim, suit or proceeding against you on
     the basis of infringement of any United States patent in the
     field of cryptography by the unmodified Program; and (ii) pay any
     final judgment or settlement entered against you on such issue in
     any such suit or proceeding defended by RSA; provided, however,
     that RSA's indemnity obligations hereunder shall not exceed
     $5000, including the cost to RSA of defending or settling such
     suit or proceeding. The obligations of RSA under this Section 6
     are subject to: (i) RSA's having sole control of the defense of
     any such claim, suit or proceeding; (ii) your notifying RSA
     promptly in writing of each such claim, suit or proceeding and
     giving RSA authority to proceed as stated in this Section 6; and
     (iii) your giving RSA all information known to you relating to
     such claim, suit or proceeding and cooperating with RSA to defend
     any such claim, suit or proceeding. RSA shall have no obligation
     under this Section 6 with respect to any claim to the extent it
     is based upon use of the Program in a manner other than that
     permitted by this Agreement. THIS SECTION 6 SETS FORTH RSA'S
     ENTIRE OBLIGATION AND YOUR EXCLUSIVE REMEDIES CONCERNING CLAIMS
     FOR PROPRIETARY RIGHTS INFRINGEMENT.

     NOTE: Portions of the Program practice methods described in and
     subject to U.S. Patents Nos. 4,218,582 and 4,405,829, issued to
     Leland Stanford Jr. University and Massachusetts Institute of
     Technology, respectively. Such patents are licensed to RSA by
     Public Key Partners of Sunnyvale, California, the holder of
     exclusive licensing rights. This Agreement does not grant or
     convey any interest whatsoever in such patents.

7.   RESTRICTIONS ON FOREIGN RESHIPMENT. THIS LICENSE IS EXPRESSLY
     MADE SUBJECT TO ANY LAWS, REGULATIONS, ORDERS, OR OTHER
     RESTRICTIONS ON THE EXPORT FROM THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA OF
     THE PROGRAM OR OF ANY INFORMATION ABOUT THE PROGRAM WHICH MAY BE
     IMPOSED FROM TIME TO TIME BY THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES
     OF AMERICA. YOU MAY NOT EXPORT OR REEXPORT, DIRECTLY OR
     INDIRECTLY, THE PROGRAM OR INFORMATION PERTAINING THERETO, EXCEPT
     TO CANADA PURSUANT TO SECTION 126.5 OF THE U.S. INTERNATIONAL
     TRAFFIC IN ARMS REGULATIONS.

8.   TERM. The license granted hereunder is effective until
     terminated. You may terminate it at any time by destroying the
     Program and its associated documentation together with all
     copies, modifications and merged portions thereof in any form
     known to be in your possession. It will also terminate upon the
     conditions set forth elsewhere in this Agreement or if you fail
     to comply with any term or condition of this Agreement. You agree
     upon such termination to cease making copies of, using or
     distributing the Program and to destroy the Program and its
     associated documentation, together with all copies, modifications
     and merged portions thereof in any form known to be in your
     possession.

8.   GENERAL

     a.   This Agreement shall be governed by the laws of the State of
          California.

     b.   Address all correspondence regarding this license to RSA's
          electronic mail address <rsaref-administrator@rsa.com>, or
          to

               RSA Laboratories
               ATTN: RSAREF Administrator
               10 Twin Dolphin Drive
               Redwood City, CA  94065
-- 
Ed Carp				erc@apple.com			510/659-9560

If you want magic, let go of your armor.  Magic is so much stronger than
steel!        -- Richard Bach, "The Bridge Across Forever"



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: danodom@matt.ksu.ksu.edu (Dan Odom)
Date: Wed, 1 Sep 93 10:49:23 PDT
To: erc@apple.com
Subject: Re: Encryption policies of Fidnet, etc.
In-Reply-To: <m0oXvA1-00028TC@warrior>
Message-ID: <9309011744.AA12892@matt.ksu.ksu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Ed Carp Said:

> It has long been held that there is an exemption to 'patent infringment'
> for educational or other "non-commercial" uses.

Is this just for RSA, or for all patents?  If PKP wanted to forbid
academic use of RSA (or require a license for it), could they legally
do so?  Assume for now that the patent is valid, which it may not
be...

I ask all this because I often hear researchers looking for a cure for
(insert your favorite aliment here) complain that they have to pay
patent royalties on the gentically-modified animals they use in their
work, and if, say, two patented rabbits produce offspring, they
have to pay royalties on each of the offspring as well.  This is
academic use (to me anyway; I don't know about legally), but requires
royalties.

-- 
Dan Odom
danodom@matt.ksu.ksu.edu -- Kansas State University, Manhattan, KS

PGP key by finger or request.



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: paul@poboy.b17c.ingr.com (Paul Robichaux)
Date: Wed, 1 Sep 93 11:29:23 PDT
To: danodom@matt.ksu.ksu.edu (Dan Odom)
Subject: Re: Encryption policies of Fidnet, etc.
In-Reply-To: <9309011744.AA12892@matt.ksu.ksu.edu>
Message-ID: <199309011818.AA14080@poboy.b17c.ingr.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

The exemption is a part of the sections of the US code pertaining to
patents. As I understand it, the exemption allows you to build _one_
instance of a patented item for your _own_ _personal_ research.

If you as an individual want to keep a patented bunny as a pet, you're
probably OK. If you want to use PGP, as an ividual, you're probably
OK. If you want to use those patented items for anything else, you're
probably not OK, thus the recent interest in a
commercial-and-infringement-proof PGP.

Witness the just-decided Litton-Honeywell patent infringement case.
Litton obtained a $1.2G judgement against Honeywell, which used a
method patented by Litton to manufacture its very successful ring
laser gyros.

Since damages in patent infringement cases are based on actual damages
(with a 3x increase possible if the jury decides that the infringement
was deliberate), the Litton-Honeywell case might give a manufacturer
pause.

I bet that PKP would be unable to show that my use of PGP has caused
them _any_ actual (or even potential) damages.  However, Apple (or
Lotus, or any of the other RSA licensees) have obviously decided that
they'd rather play {safe,fair} and license the patents directly.

- -Paul

- -- 
Paul Robichaux, KD4JZG     | "Change the world for a better tomorrow. But
perobich@ingr.com          |  watch your ass today." - aaron@halcyon.com
Intergraph Federal Systems | Be a cryptography user- ask me how.


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.3a

iQCVAgUBLITm4iA78To+806NAQHUogP6AkrIf7+uyMehKosHi+qdeWz0POs7XHth
PejJe3qflnxEUlFaUnJWKemj9iF6gwP6N90LBsY68gWaO5aUNqLM00UE996GutpV
o5+AyzKST+cjJkC0p8P3N8K8tGe+llGJW9gSjRLmx61B+cdNQ/STjIMCSUevs8SZ
n54glbaC56Y=
=hkpg
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: thug@phantom.com (Murdering Thug)
Date: Wed, 1 Sep 93 10:19:23 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: NY TAXES CYBERSPACE, CRAM REACTS
In-Reply-To: <9309010524.AA11600@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Message-ID: <m0oXvqW-0009GrC@mindvox.phantom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text



So, what this means is that companies which produce information products
printed on paper (Newspapers, Magazines, etc..), and who contribute to
pollution (both as paper waste and as emissions into the environment in
the manufacturing, printing and transport of paper) and deforrestation pay
only a 4% sales tax to the state, while companies which sell information
electronically and produce no pollution or deforrestation pay a 9% tax to
the state.  Now there's a real insentive not to pollute the environment, NOT!

Cuomo is a FUCKING IDIOT! There, I've said it...

Il Duce must be pulled from his comfy office, hung upside down in a public
square in Albany, and repeatedly shot with high caliber weapons, and then
beaten to a pulp with baseball bats.


Thug

p.s. Mario, if you're reading this, repeal the tax now, you fucking bastard!





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: plmoses@unix.cc.emory.edu (Paul L. Moses)
Date: Wed, 1 Sep 93 10:29:23 PDT
To: jazz@hal.com
Subject: Re: NY TAXES CYBERSPACE, CRAM REACTS
Message-ID: <9309011724.AA03212@emoryu1.cc.emory.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Arguably the NY tax is a violation of the Commerce Clause of the Constitution.
Is the state's local interest more compelling than the burden this
law places on interstate commerce?  Doubtful.

Paul




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Tom Knight <tk@reagan.ai.mit.edu>
Date: Wed, 1 Sep 93 12:59:58 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Fair Use
In-Reply-To: <9309011744.AA12892@matt.ksu.ksu.edu>
Message-ID: <19930901195515.2.TK@ROCKY.AI.MIT.EDU>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


    Date: Wed, 1 Sep 1993 13:44 EDT
    From: danodom@matt.ksu.ksu.edu (Dan Odom)

    Is this just for RSA, or for all patents?  If PKP wanted to forbid
    academic use of RSA (or require a license for it), could they legally
    do so?  Assume for now that the patent is valid, which it may not
    be...

    I ask all this because I often hear researchers looking for a cure for
    (insert your favorite aliment here) complain that they have to pay
    patent royalties on the gentically-modified animals they use in their
    work, and if, say, two patented rabbits produce offspring, they
    have to pay royalties on each of the offspring as well.  This is
    academic use (to me anyway; I don't know about legally), but requires
    royalties.

The exemption from patent protection applies only to research which
attempts to improve or extend the patented idea.  Thus, if you were
breeding patented insulin-dependant rabbits with the intent to produce
better ones, this would be acceptable.  If, however, you wanted to test
your new diabetic drug on the rabbits, then you owe the patent holder a
royalty.

Using PGP (as opposed to writing a new one, or improving it, or
attempting to use it in new ways), even by academics, is probably
questionable in the US under patent law.  Developing new versions of RSA
code or algorithms clearly is legal, even for private commercial firms.
Patenting the improvements is legal and encouraged.  Selling or using
a patented invention, even internally, is prohibited.

So it all depends.  Are you a user or an improver?  Can you make a
legitimate claim to be testing new ideas, implementations, or
applications, or are you just using someone else's implementation.

A paper trail showing that you are thinking about ways to improve or
further develop the ideas might be a powerful defense.  Like, for
example, messages to this forum.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: collins@newton.apple.com (Scott Collins)
Date: Wed, 1 Sep 93 16:14:28 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Non-Cash Schemes -- precedent?
Message-ID: <9309012308.AA28734@newton.apple.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


This mornings (1 Sep 93) Wall Street Journal, page B2, Enterprise column:
"'Scrip' ATMs Appeal to Growing Number of Retailers".

The artical describes retailers who are installing ATM machines that hand
out 'scrip', deducted from a clients account, for use in the stores.  Less
attractive to thieves, cheaper to build and maintain.

A physical precedent for digital schemes ?


Scott Collins         | "Few people realize what tremendous power there
                      |  is in one of these things."     -- Willy Wonka
......................|................................................
BUSINESS.   voice:408.862.0540  fax:974.6094   collins@newton.apple.com
Apple Computer, Inc.   1 Infinite Loop, MS 301-2C   Cupertino, CA 95014
.......................................................................
PERSONAL.   voice/fax:408.257.1746    1024:669687   catalyst@netcom.com





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Derek Atkins <warlord@MIT.EDU>
Date: Wed, 1 Sep 93 14:14:27 PDT
To: Brad Huntting <huntting@glarp.com>
Subject: PGP suggestions (was Re: anonymous mail)
In-Reply-To: <199308312052.AA01186@misc.glarp.com>
Message-ID: <9309012108.AA03677@toxicwaste.MEDIA.MIT.EDU>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> Perhaps it's time we polished the edges, added a few of the features
> that are lacking, and wrote up up an RFC for the PGP message format.

This is being worked on....

> Some features I'd like to see in PGP are:
> 
> 	The ability to send an encrypted message to multiple
> 	recipients without duplicating the entire message.  The
> 	most logical way to do this would probably be to encrypt
> 	the random IDEA key once for each recipient.

This has been in PGP since version 2.2!  Read the docs!  To use this
feature, you just execute:

	pgp -e filename user1 user2 user3...

And it will encrypt the file to all users, using the same IDEA key and
RSA-encrypting it to the different recipients.

> 	There needs to be a facility for having multiple signatures
> 	on a single document without making the signers sign each
> 	others signatures.  Besides the obvious application of
> 	removing a signature from a document, this would also
> 	facilitate things like petitions where many people could
> 	asynchronously sign a single document, and latter assemble
> 	all the signatures together.

This has been discussed.  It is possible to do this in the PGP
protocol, but it has not been implemented.  What this means is that
you could write the code to generate the proper packets to do this,
since those packets are legal, but this code has not yet been written.
It is in the works, but I wouldn't expect to see it in the 2.4
version.

> 	It should be possible (though certainly not mandatory) to
> 	hide the recipient's identity entirely.

This, too, is in the works, albeit a little more difficult to
accomplish.

> 	The message format needs to allow for alternate forms of
> 	encryption (besides IDEA).  Furthermore, the (shared key)
> 	algorithm used to encrypt a message should be hidden in
> 	the RSA encrypted part of the message along with the shared
> 	key.  Ideally, a list of algorithms could be given which
> 	would allow the message to be optionally compressed before
> 	being encrypted, or encrypted two or more times with
> 	different algorithms.

This is already supported.  There is a byte that represents the
secret-key algorithm (and there is a byte that represents the
message-digest algorithm as well).  It would be simple to add, say,
triple-DES to PGP as an alternative encryption algorithm.  As for
hiding the encryption algorithm, this is a possibility but I don't see
it happening.  The data structures, I don't believe, allow for this
currently.  (I'd have to go back and double check this one).

> If I'm confused and the PGP message format already supports some
> of these features, please correct me.

Thats why this message was composed.  Enjoy!

-derek




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: bill@twwells.com (T. William Wells)
Date: Wed, 1 Sep 93 13:06:45 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: NY TAXES CYBERSPACE, CRAM REACTS
In-Reply-To: <9309011516.AA19211@jazz.hal.com>
Message-ID: <CCowIx.899@twwells.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


In article <9309011516.AA19211@jazz.hal.com>, Jason Zions <jazz@hal.com> wrote:
: Y'know, a two-paragraph summary in calm tones, followed by the text of the
: tax notice, would have been more effecitve; breathless hyperbole turns some
: people off.

Like me. I stopped reading just as soon as I realized that the
primary bit of information I would obtain from the message was
that its author needs to adjust his dose of antipsychotics.





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Anonymous <nowhere@bsu-cs.bsu.edu>
Date: Wed, 1 Sep 93 18:44:30 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Info Security News article on Clipper (fwd)
Message-ID: <9309020143.AA06952@bsu-cs.bsu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Info Security News
Volume 4, Number 5
September/October 1993
page 14
 
---
D.C. Dateline
---
 
 
New Crypto Standards in Contention
by Charlotte Adams
 
 
   Experts are hotly debating the Clipper initiative, a plan to
standardize on a voice-encryption device with built-in
law-enforcement access.  Although de facto or mandatory
acceptance of Clipper or similar hardware now seems remote, the
potential cost of such action makes it worth considering.
   The rationale for Clipper was to maintain the government's
information-eavesdropping capability as the use of encryption
spreads.  The hope was that the market would follow the
government's lead, making Clipper the de facto standard.
   The National Institute of Standards and Technology sees
benefits in making Clipper the accepted standard.  "If we deny
[criminals] the use of the national communications net, [that's
a] nontrivial accomplishment," says Ray Kammer, NIST's acting
director.  If the network standard is Clipper, he reasons,
criminals would "have to set up their own [communications]
system, an interesting and formidible task."
   NIST is pushing ahead with a proposed Escrowed Encryption
Standard.  If all goes well, this Federal Information Processing
Standard could be in place by October, an important step toward
widespread use by the federal government.  The key-escrow
mechanism should be in place by autumn, government sources say.
   A related issue is NIST's Digital Signature Standard, which
was developed in secret by the National Security Agency.  NIST
added a new issue to the DSS debate last summer when the agency
announced a proposed settlement with Public Key Partners giving
PKP control over commercial use of the standard.
 
Clipper pros and cons.
 
   The key-escrow concept, allowing access to law-enforcment
agencies, will have to become mandatory because it makes no sense
on a voluntary basis, critics say.  "It clearly has implications
for data transmission, as well," says Phil Karn of Qualcomm, a
San Diego maker of cellular telephones.
   Government contractors, in fact, are already fine-tuning
another chip, called Capstone, which will be much more convenient
for data-security applications.  Capstone will add the NIST's
secure hash, digital signature and key-exchange algorithms to
Clipper's Skipjack encryption algorithm and escrow support.
   "Clipper is good for voice, for telephony, but not as a
coprocessor inside a PC, selectively encrypting fields," says
Richard Ankney, a technical consultant with Fischer International
Systems Corp.  "Capstone is better in that regard."
   The trouble with Capstone is that it is big and expensive, a
full custom, very-large scale-integration ciruit design, says
John Droge, vice president of program development for chip
designer, Mykotronx Inc., of Torrance, Calif.  VLSI Technology
Inc., in San Jose, is actually fabricating the chip.
   Mykotronx expects the chips initially to sell at $100 apiece
in quantities of 10,000.  PCMCIA (Personal Computer Memory Card
International Association) cards initially will sell in the $300
range, he predicts.  That's a far cry from the government's $100
target price for the PCMCIA module.
   If the hardware becomes mandatory, space would have to be
found for the chips inside notebooks and palmtops, as well as in
laptop and desktop computers.  Estimates on the markup to
customers vary from 25 to 200 percent.
   The cost of retrofitting Clipper or Capstone into existing
machines would be tremendous, says Fred Gluck, director of
marketing for control products with Datamedia Corp., a Nashua,
N.H. security software and token vendor.  Simply multiply the $25
to $30 per half-hour you pay for technical people times the 100
million or so PCs out there, he says.
   But much of the cost may be hidden from the end user, Ankney
counters.  "You could take the hit and not raise the price at
all."
 
The Digital Signature Standard.
 
   Although eclipsed by the Clipper controversy, DSS nevertheless
remains an issue.  Even though its algorithm is not secret, NSA
"played a very dominant role" in creating it, says David Sobel,
legal counsel for the Computer Professionals for Social
Responsibilty.  The secrecy surrounding NSA's role in DSS goes
beyond the will of Congress in the Computer Security Act of 1987
for the "[standards] development process to be open and
accountable," Sobel says.
   The PKP angle is also a problem, CPSR says.  The arrangement
by which  NIST allows PKP to control commercial use of the
Digital Signature Standard "really comes down to ... almost
paying them off," says Marc Rotenberg, director of CPSR's
Washington office.
   People shouldn't read too much into the proposal, NIST says.
"It means ... the government wants to move on and get this out of
the way ... without any acknowledgement of [the validity of the
PKP] infringement action," explains F. Lynn McNulty, NIST's
associate director for computer security.
   The "big payoff" of the proposed agreement is that individual
citizens communicating with the government won't have to pay
royalties, he says.
 
More information needed.
 
   Almost everyone agrees that more information is necessary
before a policy decision can be made.  "Are we talking about
completely revamping the communications infrastructure to
facilitate 800 wiretaps?" asks Daniel Weitzner, senior counsel
for the Electronic Frontier Foundation.  EFF coordinates the
activities of the Digital Privacy and Security Working Group, a
coalition of information security technology companies and
non-profit groups that has raised many questions about Clipper.
   "We want a real, solid understanding of the problems from [the
administration's] perspective and a fact-based risk assessment,"
Weitzner says.
   NIST's own security and privacy advisory panel refused to
rubberstamp the Clipper initiative at first sight and various
interest groups have demanded a more thoughtful and open review.
   The Digital Privacy and Security Working Group has been asked
to contribute substantively to the ongoing interagency crypto
policy review, EFF's Weitzner says.
   CPSR, however, is forming its own policy review group.  The
administration's approach of taking outside imput is still
essentially a closed process, CPSR says.  "The point we're trying
to make [is that] the public has an interest in its privacy and
consumers have an interest in what they ultimately might end up
paying, " Rotenberg says.
 
----------------------------------------
 
Charlotte Adams is a free-lance journalist covering technology
issues in the Washington D.C. area for a variety of magazines.
 
 
Copyright (c) 1993 by MIS Training Institute Press, Inc.

Ye olde Spooge Meister    spooge /spooj/ 1. Inexplicable or arcane code
<spooge@dev.null.net>            or random and probably incorrect output
                                 from a computer program.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "L. Detweiler" <ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Date: Wed, 1 Sep 93 22:25:07 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: NSA response to EFF Clipper Q's
Message-ID: <9309020522.AA09539@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



An EFF Online newsletter previously reported highlights from a list of
questions submitted to the NIST/NSA regarding Clipper. That entire
document is now available on ftp.eff.org in
pub/EFF/legislation/clipper-answers. It makes reference to attachments
on chip specifications that are not present in the text file.  Overall,
the document has rather numerous typographical errors for a government
document, and it's unclear whether this is the result of the EFF
scanning or whether they are in the original document. Also, at this
point in the swift-moving arena, the responses are fairly dated, coming
out long before the close of the expert review of the algorithm and a
CSSPAB meeting at the end of July.

Items in this review of the Clipper comments:

- encryption regulation
- constitutionality
- Mycotronx, VLSI rationale, history of Clipper
- Presidential directive & review procedure
- key escrow in software
- history of Skipjack
- identification information in key escrow databases
- notes on wiretap protocol
- NSA cryptographic control wish list
- Capstone capabilities
- policy review
- Clipper: a status report

Encryption Regulation
---

The major revelation in this document as reported here previously is
the statement that the Administration has progressed far enough in the
`policy review' to determine that `regulating private encryption' would
be `imprudent' and `drastic' and that no new legilsation will be
proposed to `limituse of encryption technology'. Unfortunately, in the
characteristically maddening bureacratic doublespeak of the NSA, the
previous statements suggest that this is the case only `because these
measures may be sufficient to make key escrow encryption [widespread]'.
Nevertheless the statement is extremely significant given various
ominous sound bites in the media that suggested very clearly that
cryptographic regulation was definitely `on the table' for consideration.

Constitutionality
---

The other major revelations as reported in the EFF document are the
explicit attention to constitutional issues. However, the response is
not very meaningful except to deny that any are relevant. In
particular, it does not indicate the constitutionality of any
enforcement or regulation in the area.

>The key escrow technology only ensures that government agencies, will be
>able to decrypt intercepted communications when lawfully authorized. It
>neither expands nor contracts federal, state or local law enforcement
>authority to access and decrypt communications. The key escrow technology
>simply assures the continued feasibility of lawful electronic surveillance
>under statutes that have long since been determined to be constitutional.

Mostly the document is just a reformulation of the following idea in various ways:

>it became clear
>that a strategy was needed that could accommodate the needs of the private
>sector for top notch communications security; of U.S. industry to remain
>competitive in the world's secure communications market; and of U.S. law
>enforcement to conduct lawfully-authorized electronic surveillance.

Clearly, the writers' favorite words are `authorized' and `lawful' and
here we are doubly reassured.

Mycotronx, VLSI
---

Here are a few other significant details in the response. For the first
time there is official confirmation that the proposal goes back far
previous to the Clinton administration:

>The logic design contract for the microcircuit was awarded to MYKOTRONIX,
>Inc.  of Torrance, California, in late 1991

Mykotronx was chosen because:

>This company provided a
>unique combination of (i) expertise to quickly design custom cryptographic
>chips, (ii) secure facilities, and (iii) the cleared personnel (At the TOP
>SECRET level) necessary for the successful execution of the contract
>requirements.

Which makes me wonder. Has anyone with any serious sway in the NSA
noticed the stolen Mycotronx documents yet? I would love to see the
response to an FOIA inquiry on this one. Do they care? Did any heads
roll at Mycotronx?

>VLSI Technology of San Jose, California, was chosen as the chip foundry
>based primarily on its technological capabilities to fabricate
>microcircuits resistant to reverse engineering Selection of the vendors was
>in accordance with U.S.  government rules for sole source procurement.
>other manufacturers that wish to enter the market and can satisfy the
>technology and security requirements will be approved to manufacture these
>microcircuits.

Here we have the highly implausible suggestion that other companies
will be considered to manufacture the microcircuits. Fat chance.

Presidential Directive
---

The document gives more detail about the Presidential Review Directive
and Presidential Decision Directive behind Clipper.

>The PRD called for interagency studies examining a number
>of issues including, for example, the impact of the key escrow strategy and
>the feasibility of implementing the key escrow technique in software.
>Another issue to be addressed in the course of the review is the impact of
>advanced telecommunications on law enforcement. While analogous in the
>sense that both encryption and advanced telecommunications technology can
>impede the effectiveness of authorized law enforcement electronic
>surveillance, the two technologies present different issues and are being
>treated separately. The results of the reviews are expected early this
>fall.

Hence, the `feasibility of implementing the key escrow technique in
software' is `under review.' Later in the document, we have the point:

>Because software is easy to change, secure software implementations of the
>key escrow technique have been difficult to devise. We would welcome the
>participation of the software industry in a cooperative effort to meet this
>technical challenge.  of course, users may continue to use existing
>software encryption products.

I don't recommend cooperating with the NSA in trying to devise `secure
software' -- first of all, the suggestion that they will even have
`security' in chip hardware is a fantasy and illusion; secondly,
software is inherently free and unchained and nothing the NSA invents
can ever change that; thirdly, cooperating with the NSA can be
hazardous to one's economic health; and finally, probably no one in the
NSA seriously believes that secure software implementations are
possible, and are just throwing this out for cynical effect.

Skipjack
---

Information on SKIPJACK, confirming suggestions by some (e.g. A. Walker
on sci.crypt) that the algorithm is based on earlier defense-oriented
schemes in a long line of development:

>Was the encryption algorithm specifically designed for the key escrow
>initiative?
>
>No. The algorithm chosen for the key escrow microcircuit was originally
>developed by NSA for use in U.S. government communications systems, albeit
>not in the management of our nuclear arsenal as some have speculated.
>Essentially the same cryptographic technology was under government
>development and analysis for more than ten years.  Although NSA does not
>comment on the details of its design and analysis, the algorithm has
>undergone intense expert scrutiny comparable to that used in the analysis
>of cryptography intended for classified government systems. While the
>algorithm was originally developed for unclassified defense systems, it
>will be considered for certain classified applications in the future.

Key Escrow Databases
---

What about identification associated with keys in the databases? The
NSA is in a catch-22 here. If there is nothing but serial numbers in a
database, how do the key escrow agencies ensure that key IDs requested
for wiretapping are associated with the given entities named in
warrants? If they are present, how could such a scheme be maintained in
anything other than an Orwellian Totalitarian Dystopia? The following
is the first explicit commitment to total lack of identification
information in the databases:

>Some have expressed concerns that personal information could be contained
>in the key escrow databases.  The only information held by a key escrow
>agent will be the chip serial numbers and the key component associated with
>that number.  Since the information in the key escrow databases will not be
>associated with any particular individual, the database would be of no use
>in identifying individuals or otherwise obtaining personal information
>about them. Therefore, a key escrow agent will have no information about
>the person owning or using equipment containing a microcircuit for which it
>holds keys. Requests for a key component will be for a particular chip
>identification number. No information regarding the identity of the target
>of the authorized electronic surveillance will be provided to the key
>escrow agents.

Wiretap Protocol
---

Interestingly, they say that when a wiretapped device is moved to a new
phone number, they don't have the authority to tap it any longer:

>If the subject of A surveillance were to move the device to another
>location (and another telephone number), law enforcement authorities could
>not legally monitor communications at other locations. This is because, as
>noted above, electronic surveillance of wire or electronic communications
>must be directed at some identifiable telephone, cellular telephone, or
>computer facility.  Therefore, before law enforcement authorities can
>legally monitor any other telephone number in an effort to locate the
>subject's encryption device, they must first satisfy a court that there is
>probable cause to believe that illegal communications will occur over that
>line.

Major criticism is based on the fact that once a given key has been
released, a phone is forever in the future insecure. For the first time
we have the assurance

>As added protection, law enforcement will have access to a key only so long
>as it has authority to conduct a surveillance.  Systems are being designed
>to ensure that keys are destroyed when the authority to conduct a
>particular electronic surveillance has expired.

NSA wish list
---

We get a wish list of realms in which the NSA would like to control
domestic cryptography:

>Concerns have been expressed about use of this key escrow technology and
>these chips, in particular, across the panoply of new emerging
>technologies, such as ISDN, TDMA, Cellular, CDMA Cellular, ATM, SONET,
>SMDS, etc.

Don't forget PEM -- D.D. gets really excited about that one.

>It impossible to design key escrow encryption techniques that
>are almost totally transparent to the system, given the transmission media
>together with its propagation characteristics.  Optimally, the system
>should be designed with the encryption, if possible. The government intends
>to work cooperatively with industry toward this end.

Yes, just what every cryptography company wants, their personal NSA
consultant breathing down their circuits.

Capstone Capabilities
---

Here's some notes on Capstone. Most capabilities also indicated by D.D.
in her writings:

>In addition to the key escrow technology contained in the
>encryption-only chip, the enhanced chip also includes a Digital Signature
>Algorithm proposed by NIST as a FIPS; a Secure Hashing Algorithm (SHA)
>recently approved as FIPS 180; a Key Exchange Algorithm based on a public
>key exchange, a general purpose exponentiation algorithm; and a general
>purpose, random number generator which uses a pure noise source. This chip
>is now being considered for installation in PCMCIA electronic cards and for
>use in the Defense Messaging System.

Personally, I wonder if the NSA intends to phase out Clipper from the
beginning. The implementation could encrypt the law enforcement field
under that more low-level chip. The Capstone chip will be the NSA's
little `black box' miracle in every machine.

Policy Review
---

Finally, there are the indications that the `policy review' done in the
Fall will cover the exportability of key escrow and the future
cryptographic export control policy in the country concerning
`marketability and foreign competition'. While everyone is desperate
for a breakthrough here, the likely announcement will be that `no
export restrictions will be placed on Clipper' and since the technology
is completely suitable for all cryptographic applications (smirk) no
other cryptographic devices will be approved for export. That's my guess, anyway.

Clipper: a status report
---

Current progress report on Clipper: the most serious hurdles for the
NSA right now are imposing the Clipper FIPS standard and the DSA patent
arrangement with PKP. The NSA has long demonstrated its complete
obliviousness and imperviousness to public opinion no matter how loud
or negative (consider early DSS endorsement). However, for the previous
two standards, it has reached unprecedentedly screeching levels. The
government will find it *extremely* difficult to go ahead with either
in the face of almost uniformly hostile reception to both. Doing so is
likely to raise a much larger outcry and warrant more desperate
approaches on the side of the opposition (ala Zimmermann's `guerilla cryptography').

The future revelations in the DSS, Clipper, and `policy review' topics
will be critical in indicating whether the NSA will take a more low-key
and unobtrusive stance in regulation of domestic cryptography, with the
original Clipper announcment its boldest step ever, or whether it will
become even more paranoid and volatile in attempting to control and
strangle natural, evolving domestic cryptographic developments. If you
value your freedom, pray for the former.





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: sameer@netcom.com (Sameer Parekh)
Date: Thu, 2 Sep 93 00:46:51 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: REMAIL: Alpha testers for installation script
Message-ID: <9309020744.AA03586@netcom.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

	At the urging (urging, bah!-- I *wanted* a task-- He could've
probably seen it in my eyes) of Eric Hughes, I have been working on a
script so that the installation of an anonymous remailer (with PGP) is
as easy as typing install_remail. At this point it works *flawlessly*
on *my* system, so I'd like to see how it works on other systems.
	This is still an interim version, however, for it is not idiot
proof. A small typo (such as mistyping the pathname of your pgp
executable) will mean that you have to start over. That will change,
but probably in another version. I want to get this out as quickly as
possible so that more remailers can pop up like wildfire, and *then*
I'll work on idiot-proofing it, so that *everyone* with a UNIX account
and crypto-anarchist leanings (no matter their tech-expertise) can be
running a remailer.
	This script in the non-idiot-proof version needs that
~/.forward and ~/remail both don't exist.

	If you'd like to help me test this thing, and see if it works
on your system, please mail me, with some info about your system and
your tech expertise. (So I know what to expect.)
	(I'm setting Reply-To: to both this account and
cs60a-qu@cory.eecs.berkeley.edu, because cs60a-qu is where the
install_remail-installed remailer is running there. [It may go down at
any moment, so it would be appreciated if people could use it and test it,
but at this point it wouldn't be wise to rely on it for anything
important.])

Peace,
- -- 
Sameer
sameer@netcom.com

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.3a

iQCVAgUBLIWkQwvya0ihLgutAQENqgP+LR6cdm5Wy4jD6Ohl1g5iCR2JweTQRxPP
1AQ5KzW7MbRFhbO9l6wizSkYZE9emDR3YmpWTCZx2tpw+JucBk2C3GwtC4nMkY72
r7hgYwmwb41Fqe1MmfEzwAkvViYyRKSBhTxB869+54DYviHJ87jdxGG1gxxY5gmT
uYNwHag7m7o=
=IaYF
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: jet@netcom.com (J. Eric Townsend)
Date: Wed, 1 Sep 93 18:39:29 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: [EVENTS]: security related
Message-ID: <9309020135.AA23537@netcom.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



[marginal interest to this list. -eric]


Last update: 08/31/93
 
                  
                  COMPUTER SECURITY EVENTS CALENDAR
 
    This file contains a list of upcoming computer security events.
    The absence or inclusion of any particular event does not imply
    criticism or endorsement by the National Institute of Standards
    and Technology or the sysop.  Because of the nature of this
    material and how it is obtained, it is impossible to include
    every event.  If you know of computer security events that are
    not listed, please send the conference/course literature to the
    following:
 
                Lawrence B. Keys
                National Institute of Standards and Technology
                Room A-216, Bldg. 225
                Gaithersburg, MD 20899
 
 
 
DATE:      09/09/93
TITLE:     3rd International Virus Bulletin Conference
LOCATION:  Amsterdam
SPONSOR:   
CONTACT:   Editor, Virus Bulletin
ADDRESS:   21 The Quadrant, Abingdon Science Park
CITY_ST:   Abingdon, OX14 3YS, UK
PHONE:     +44 (0)235 559935


DATE:      09/15/93
TITLE:     Information Warfare Conference
LOCATION:  Montreal, CANADA
SPONSOR:   National Computer Security Association
CONTACT:   Michael E. Kabay, Ph.D.
ADDRESS:   P.O. Box 509
CITY_ST:   Westmount, QC/H3Z2T6 CANADA
PHONE:     514-931-6187


DATE:      09/20/93
TITLE:     16th National Computer Security Conference
LOCATION:  Baltimore, MD
SPONSOR:   NCSC and NIST
CONTACT:   NCSC, Attn: NCS Conference Secretary, AS11
ADDRESS:   National Computer Security Center
CITY_ST:   Fort George G. Meade, MD 20755-6000
PHONE:     (410) 850-0272


DATE:      10/04/93
TITLE:     4th USENIX UNIX Security Symposium
LOCATION:  Santa Clara, CA
SPONSOR:   USENIX Association
CONTACT:   USENIX Conference Office
ADDRESS:   22672 Lambert Street, Suite 613
CITY_ST:   El Toro, CA 92630
PHONE:     (714) 588-8649


DATE:      10/04/93
TITLE:     13th Conference on Control, Audit & Security of Information Sys.
LOCATION:  Boston, MA
SPONSOR:   MIS Training Institute
CONTACT:   MIS Registration
ADDRESS:   498 Concord St.
CITY_ST:   Framingham, MA 01701-2357
PHONE:     (508) 879-7999


DATE:      10/04/93
TITLE:     2nd Annual Pacific Conference on Information Systems Auditing
LOCATION:  Seattle, WA
SPONSOR:   EDP Auditors Association & CANAUDIT Inc.
CONTACT:   CANAUDIT Inc.
ADDRESS:   P.O. Box 4150
CITY_ST:   Simi Valley, CA 93093
PHONE:     (805) 583-3723


DATE:      10/04/93
TITLE:     Information Security Principles and Practices
LOCATION:  Fairfax, VA
SPONSOR:   Center for Professional Development (Gerorge Mason University)
CONTACT:   Catherine M. Hoover
ADDRESS:   Center for Professional Development (George Mason University)
CITY_ST:   Fairfax, VA 22030-4444
PHONE:     (703) 993-2090


DATE:      10/04/93
TITLE:     Recent Developments in Information Security
LOCATION:  Fairfax, VA
SPONSOR:   Center for Professional Development (George Mason University)
CONTACT:   Catherine M. Hoover
ADDRESS:   Center for Professional Development (George Mason University)
CITY_ST:   Fairfax, VA 22030-4444
PHONE:     (703) 993-2090


DATE:      10/12/93
TITLE:     UNIX Security
LOCATION:  Fairfax, VA
SPONSOR:   Center for Professional Development (George Mason University)
CONTACT:   Catherine M. Hoover
ADDRESS:   Center for Professional Development (George Mason University)
CITY_ST:   Fairfax, VA 22030-4444
PHONE:     (703) 993-2090


DATE:      10/20/93
TITLE:     10th World Conference on Computer Security, Audit & Control
LOCATION:  Westminster, London, UK
SPONSOR:   Compsec International
CONTACT:   Karen Giles
ADDRESS:   Elsevier Advanced Technology, Mayfield House, 256 Banbury Road
CITY_ST:   Oxford OX2 7BR, United Kingdom
PHONE:     +44 (0) 865 512242


DATE:      10/25/93
TITLE:     Protecting Networks and Small Systems
LOCATION:  Gaithersburg, MD
SPONSOR:   CSI, Hosted by NIST             (gov. employees/contractors only)
CONTACT:   CSI Conference Registration
ADDRESS:   600 Harrison St.
CITY_ST:   San Francisco, CA 94107
PHONE:     (415) 905-2626


DATE:      10/28/93
TITLE:     Building Information Security Awareness
LOCATION:  Gaithersburg, MD
SPONSOR:   CSI, Hosted by NIST            (gov. employees/contractors only)
CONTACT:   CSI Confrence Registration
ADDRESS:   600 Harrison St.
CITY_ST:   San Francisco, CA 94107
PHONE:     (415) 905-2626


DATE:      11/01/93
TITLE:     7th USENIX Systems Administration Conference (LISA VII)
LOCATION:  Monterey, CA
SPONSOR:   USENIX
CONTACT:   USENIX Conference Office
ADDRESS:   22672 Lambert St., Suite 613
CITY_ST:   Lake Forest, CA 92630
PHONE:     (714) 588-8649


DATE:      11/03/93
TITLE:     1st ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security
LOCATION:  Fairfax, VA
SPONSOR:   Bell Atlantic & George Mason University
CONTACT:   Ravi Ganesan
ADDRESS:   Bell Atlantic, 7th floor, 11720 Beltsville Dr.
CITY_ST:   Beltsville, MD 20705
PHONE:     (301) 595-8439


DATE:      11/08/93
TITLE:     20th Annual Computer Security Conference & Exhibition
LOCATION:  Anaheim, CA
SPONSOR:   Computer Security Institute
CONTACT:   CSI Conference Registration
ADDRESS:   600 Harrison St.
CITY_ST:   San Francisco, CA 94107
PHONE:     (415) 905-2626


DATE:      12/01/93
TITLE:     4th Annual EICAR Conference
LOCATION:  St. Alabans, Hertfordshire, ENGLAND
SPONSOR:   Eicar
CONTACT:   Ms. Allison Sweeney
ADDRESS:   S&S International Ltd., Berkley Ct. Mill St.
CITY_ST:   Berkhamsted, Herts, HP2 4HW, England
PHONE:     +44 442 877877


DATE:      12/06/93
TITLE:     9th Annual Computer Security Applications Conference
LOCATION:  Orlando, FL
SPONSOR:   Aerospace Computer Security Association
CONTACT:   Dr. Ronald Gove
ADDRESS:   Booz-Allen & Hamilton, 8283 Greenboro Drive
CITY_ST:   McLean, VA 22102
PHONE:     (703) 902-5280


DATE:      01/04/94
TITLE:     4th IFIP Working Conference on Dependable Computing for Critical
LOCATION:  San Diego, CA                                        Applications
SPONSOR:   IFIP Working Group
CONTACT:   Dr. Gerard Le Lann, INRIA -Project REFLECS
ADDRESS:   BP 105
CITY_ST:   78153 Le Chesnay Cedex, FRANCE
PHONE:     + (33) 1 39 63 53 64


DATE:      02/04/94
TITLE:     Internet Society Symposium on Network and Distributed Sys. Sec.
LOCATION:  San Diego, CA
SPONSOR:   Internet Society
CONTACT:   Robert W. Shirey, MS Z202
ADDRESS:   Mitre Corp.
CITY_ST:   McLean, VA 22102-3481
PHONE:     (703) 883-5397


DATE:      05/17/94
TITLE:     6th Annual Canadian Computer Security Symposium
LOCATION:  The Ottawa Congress Centre
SPONSOR:   The Canadian System Security Centre (Government of Canada)
CONTACT:   Karen Lowther
ADDRESS:   Canaian System Security Center, P.O. Box 9703, Terminal
CITY_ST:   Ottawa, Ontario K1G 3Z4
PHONE:     (613) 991-7513


DATE:      06/14/94
TITLE:     IEEE Computer Security Foundations Workshop VII
LOCATION:  Franconia, NH
SPONSOR:   IEEE Computer Society
CONTACT:   Ravi S. Sandhu
ADDRESS:   ISSE Department, George Mason University
CITY_ST:   Fairfax, VA 22030-4444
PHONE:     (703) 993-1659


DATE:      10/04/94
TITLE:     1st European Dependable Computing Conference
LOCATION:  Berlin, GERMANY
SPONSOR:   Joint Technical Interest Group
CONTACT:   Erik Maehle, University of Paderborn/FB14
ADDRESS:   Warburgerstr. 100
CITY_ST:   D-W-4790 Paderborn GERMANY
PHONE:     ++49 (5251) 602209






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "George A. Gleason" <gg@well.sf.ca.us>
Date: Thu, 2 Sep 93 02:20:09 PDT
To: thug@phantom.com
Subject: Re: NY TAXES CYBERSPACE, CRAM REACTS
Message-ID: <93Sep2.021540pdt.14287-4@well.sf.ca.us>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Yeah, I agree the tax is stupid, and I would certainly hope that some of the
affected parties get together and start some kind of lawsuit on the basis of
the discriminatory preference for paper media... 

...but for God's sake, let's not sink to the level of calling for the
assassination of elected officials... aside from the obvious legal issues,
that puts us on *their* level.  

-gg




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Mark <mark@coombs.anu.edu.au>
Date: Wed, 1 Sep 93 20:36:49 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: general purpose telnet bouncer.
Message-ID: <mark.746940062@coombs.anu.edu.au>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Several people have expressed interest in a utility such as this. It's
existed for several years but Ive recently decided to fix it up into a
releasable condition.

Share and enjoy.
flames to /dev/null

Mark
mark@cairo.anu.edu.au
---------------------- cut here ----------------------------
/* Name: ts2.c */
/* Author: Hal-9000, Richard Stevens, Xanadude, Avalon, Mark */
/* Distribution: Public */
/* Copyright: Held by the respective contributors */
/* Posted to USENET 1st September '93 by Mark mark@cairo.anu.edu.au */

/* This file was telserv.c, part of the Telnet Server package v. 1.0,
     written by "Hal-9000". Much of that package was developed by Richard
     Stephens and his thanks go to "Xanadude" for providing him with that
     section. Performance fix by Darren Reed. */

/* Reworked to add concurrency, password checking and destination selection
   on the fly. - Mark 31st Aug 93

   Compiled and tested on:
       HPUX 9.01 9000/700 series        NeXTStep 3.1 NeXT 68040
	   OSx Pyramid 90x BSD universe     SunOS 5.2 sun4c
	   Ultrix 4.3 DEC RISC

   To compile, type "cc -O -s ts2.c -o ts2".

   MY_PASSWORD and SERV_TCP_PORT are all that is required to be altered. */

#define    MY_PASSWORD    "pass"
#define    SERV_TCP_PORT  12345    /* port I'll listen for connections on */

#include <stdio.h>
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/socket.h>
#include <sys/time.h>
#include <sys/resource.h>
#include <sys/wait.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include <netinet/in.h>
#include <netdb.h>
#include <arpa/inet.h>
#include <sys/ioctl.h>

#define    QLEN           5

char sbuf[2048], cbuf[2048];
extern int errno;
extern char *sys_errlist[];
void reaper();
int main();
void telcli();

int main(argc, argv)
int argc;
char *argv[];
{
    int srv_fd, rem_fd, rem_len, opt = 1;
    struct sockaddr_in rem_addr, srv_addr;

    bzero((char *) &rem_addr, sizeof(rem_addr));
    bzero((char *) &srv_addr, sizeof(srv_addr));
    srv_addr.sin_family = AF_INET;
    srv_addr.sin_addr.s_addr = htonl(INADDR_ANY);
    srv_addr.sin_port = htons(SERV_TCP_PORT);
    srv_fd = socket(PF_INET, SOCK_STREAM, 0);
    if (bind(srv_fd, (struct sockaddr *) &srv_addr, sizeof(srv_addr)) == -1) {
        perror("bind");
        exit(-1);
    }
    listen(srv_fd, QLEN);
    close(0); close(1); close(2);
#ifdef TIOCNOTTY
    if ((rem_fd = open("/dev/tty", O_RDWR)) >= 0) {
        ioctl(rem_fd, TIOCNOTTY, (char *)0);
        close(rem_fd);
    }
#endif
    if (fork()) exit(0);
    while (1) {
    rem_len = sizeof(rem_addr);
        rem_fd=accept(srv_fd, (struct sockaddr *) &rem_addr, &rem_len);
        if (rem_fd < 0) {
            if (errno == EINTR) continue;
            exit(-1);
        }
        switch(fork()) {
        case 0:                             /* child process */
            close(srv_fd);                  /* close original socket */
            telcli(rem_fd);                 /* process the request */
            close(rem_fd);
            exit(0);
            break;
        default: 
            close(rem_fd);                  /* parent process */
            if (fork()) exit(0);            /* let init worry about children */
            break;
        case -1:
            fprintf(stderr, "\n\rfork: %s\n\r", sys_errlist[errno]);
            break;
        }
    }
}

void telcli(source)
int source;
{
    int dest;
    int found;
    struct sockaddr_in sa;
    struct hostent *hp;
    struct servent *sp;
    char gethost[100];
    char getport[100];
    char string[100];

    bzero(gethost, 100);
    sprintf(string, "Password: ");
    write(source, string, strlen(string));
    read(source, gethost, 100);
    gethost[(strlen(gethost)-2)] = '\0'; /* kludge alert - kill the \r\n */
    if (strcmp(gethost, MY_PASSWORD) != 0) {
        sprintf(string, "Wrong password, got %s.\n", gethost);
        write(source, string, strlen(string));
        close(source);
        exit(0);
    }
    do {
		found = 0;
		bzero(gethost,100);
        sprintf(string, "Host: ");
        write(source, string, strlen(string));
        read(source, gethost, 100);
        gethost[(strlen(gethost)-2)] = '\0';
        hp = gethostbyname(gethost);
        if (hp) {
            found++;
#if !defined(h_addr)        /* In 4.3, this is a #define */
#if defined(hpux) || defined(NeXT) || defined(ultrix) || defined(POSIX)
            memcpy((caddr_t)&sa.sin_addr, hp->h_addr_list[0], hp->h_length);
#else
            bcopy(hp->h_addr_list[0], &sa.sin_addr, hp->h_length);
#endif
#else /* defined(h_addr) */
#if defined(hpux) || defined(NeXT) || defined(ultrix) || defined(POSIX)
            memcpy((caddr_t)&sa.sin_addr, hp->h_addr, hp->h_length);
#else
            bcopy(hp->h_addr, &sa.sin_addr, hp->h_length);
#endif
#endif /* defined(h_addr) */
            sprintf(string, "Found address for %s\n", hp->h_name);
            write(source, string, strlen(string));
        } else {
            if (inet_addr(gethost) == -1) {
                found = 0;
                sprintf(string, "Didnt find address for %s\n", gethost);
                write(source, string, strlen(string));
            } else {
                found++;
                sa.sin_addr.s_addr = inet_addr(gethost);
            }
        }
    } while (!found);
    sa.sin_family = AF_INET;
    sprintf(string, "Port: ");
    write(source, string, strlen(string));
    read(source, getport, 100);
    gethost[(strlen(getport)-2)] = '\0';
    sa.sin_port = htons((unsigned) atoi(getport));
    if (sa.sin_port == 0) {
        sp = getservbyname(getport, "tcp");
        if (sp)
            sa.sin_port = sp->s_port;
        else {
            sprintf(string, "%s: bad port number\n", getport);
            write(source, string, strlen(string));
            return;
        }
    }
    sprintf(string, "Trying %s...\n", (char *) inet_ntoa(sa.sin_addr));
    write(source, string, strlen(string));
    if ((dest = socket(AF_INET, SOCK_STREAM, 0)) < 0) {
        perror("telcli: socket");
        exit(1);
    }
    connect(dest, (struct sockaddr *) &sa, sizeof(sa));
    sprintf(string, "Connected to %s port %d...\n", inet_ntoa(sa.sin_addr),
                                                          ntohs(sa.sin_port));
    write(source, string, strlen(string));
#ifdef FNDELAY
    fcntl(source,F_SETFL,fcntl(source,F_GETFL,0)|FNDELAY);
    fcntl(dest,F_SETFL,fcntl(dest,F_GETFL,0)|FNDELAY);
#else
    fcntl(source,F_SETFL,O_NDELAY);
    fcntl(dest,F_SETFL,O_NDELAY);
#endif
    communicate(dest,source);
    close(dest);
    exit(0);
}

communicate(sfd,cfd)    {
    char *chead, *ctail, *shead, *stail;
    int num, nfd, spos, cpos;
    extern int errno;
    fd_set rd, wr;

    chead = ctail = cbuf;
    cpos = 0;
    shead = stail = sbuf;
    spos = 0;
    while (1) {
        FD_ZERO(&rd);
        FD_ZERO(&wr);
        if (spos < sizeof(sbuf)-1) FD_SET(sfd, &rd);
        if (ctail > chead) FD_SET(sfd, &wr);
        if (cpos < sizeof(cbuf)-1) FD_SET(cfd, &rd);
        if (stail > shead) FD_SET(cfd, &wr);
        nfd = select(256, &rd, &wr, 0, 0);
        if (nfd <= 0) continue;
        if (FD_ISSET(sfd, &rd)) {
            num=read(sfd,stail,sizeof(sbuf)-spos);
            if ((num==-1) && (errno != EWOULDBLOCK)) return;
            if (num==0) return;
            if (num>0) {
                spos += num;
                stail += num;
                if (!--nfd) continue;
            }
        }
        if (FD_ISSET(cfd, &rd)) {
            num=read(cfd,ctail,sizeof(cbuf)-cpos);
            if ((num==-1) && (errno != EWOULDBLOCK)) return;
            if (num==0) return;
            if (num>0) {
                cpos += num;
                ctail += num;
                if (!--nfd) continue;
            }
        }
        if (FD_ISSET(sfd, &wr)) {
            num=write(sfd,chead,ctail-chead);
            if ((num==-1) && (errno != EWOULDBLOCK)) return;
            if (num>0) {
                chead += num;
                if (chead == ctail) {
                    chead = ctail = cbuf;
                    cpos = 0;
                }
                if (!--nfd) continue;
            }
        }
        if (FD_ISSET(cfd, &wr)) {
            num=write(cfd,shead,stail-shead);
            if ((num==-1) && (errno != EWOULDBLOCK)) return;
            if (num>0) {
                shead += num;
                if (shead == stail) {
                    shead = stail = sbuf;
                    spos = 0;
                }
                if (!--nfd) continue;
            }
        }
    }
}
----------- end of file ------ cut here -------




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: remailer@netcom.com
Date: Thu, 2 Sep 93 05:46:54 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: new remailer
Message-ID: <9309021239.AA15429@mail.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Well not _that_ new.  I've been operating it since Sunday.

I am operating this remailer out of my personal account.

It's interface is identical to the standard cypherpunks remailer as defined
by the code I ftp'd from soda.berkeley.edu.  I've modified the code to fit
it to my particular administrative situation, so you should consider this
remailer EXPERIMENTAL.

Remailer Address: catalyst@netcom.com
Remailer PGP Key:

-----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----
Version: 2.3a

mQCNAiyBTjoAAAEEAMIKpRnqXb82TOQpx/vEDwGPXndXaxtfiZeSLZqullWCEbd4
YkCHG/F1i3Wzq4Pgz6nSbb58vMS5RonY7+ZC6IHI8zBpp9oMW3u+lqbk8Z61x49d
xwAKlE7Zsk/pOeGrqbsidm83WUqlSGgyOpvq0A8LzT4+WPra8ZvHue9jwOpJAAUR
tChBbm9ueW1vdXMgUmVtYWlsZXIgPGNhdGFseXN0QG5ldGNvbS5jb20+
=MgMa
-----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----

Any message that has a header line of the form

        Request-Remailing-To: somebody@somewhere

-- either in the header or with the header pasting operator (::) -- will
get remailer handling.  If a message does _not_ include any remailer
commands, then it must actually be a message to catalyst@netcom.com (me). 
The message will subsequently be delivered to me.

Note: badly-formed remailer commands may be equivalent to _no_ commands at
all, and thus your message will be delivered to me, instead of getting
remailed!  I WARNED YOU.

Comments, problems, questions > catalyst@netcom.com.


Scott Collins         | "Few people realize what tremendous power there
                      |  is in one of these things."     -- Willy Wonka
......................|................................................
BUSINESS.   voice:408.862.0540  fax:974.6094   collins@newton.apple.com
Apple Computer, Inc.   1 Infinite Loop, MS 301-2C   Cupertino, CA 95014
.......................................................................
PERSONAL.   voice/fax:408.257.1746    1024:669687   catalyst@netcom.com





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Karl Lui Barrus <klbarrus@owlnet.rice.edu>
Date: Thu, 2 Sep 93 05:54:40 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: MISC: cut & choose
Message-ID: <9309021251.AA11969@flammulated.owlnet.rice.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

Earlier I mentioned cut-and-choose protocols as a way of protecting from
signing a message that you really don't want to (ways of forging signatures
on documents).

The protocols are simple and rest on a probabalistic argument (similar in
some ways to the "proof" in a zero-knowledge proof) - you can be certain
to any degree you wish that you are not about to sign a harmful document.

Essentially, Bob makes multiple copies of the document and appends random 
bits on the end of each.  Then, he blinds each document with a different 
blinding factor, and presents all the copies of the blinded documents to
Alice.  But before she signs anything, she demands that all documents
are unblinded, except one.  Bob complies and produces the unblinding factor
for all the documents except one, and unblinds them.  Alice looks over the
documents to verify their content, and if she is satisfied, she goes ahead
and digitally signs the remaining document, which is still blinded.

For example, say Alice is a digital bank.  Bob wants to get $10 of digital
cash, so he prepares a message, blinds it, and goes to the bank. However, 
Alice, who has read about the notary protocol, is leery of signing random
strings, so Bob goes home again and prepares 100 messages, 100 blinding 
factors, and blinds each message with its own blinding factor.  He shows up
at the bank and gives Alice all the messages.  Alice picks one message and 
hands back the other 99, demanding that Bob unblind them.  So he complies, 
and Alice verifies that they all are in fact messages for $10.  Satisfied,
she digitally signs the last message, knowing that there still is a 1%
chance that Bob cheated the bank by slipping in a $100 message with the
$10 messages.

So Alice can feel as comfortable as she likes by just asking for more
messages.

Say that cash messages look like this (with random bits at the end):

This is $10 of digicash legal tender from First Digital. ADF!#$%@^%&gsu$

When Bob blinds this, it becomes unreadable so Alice can't verify that it
is in fact a legitimate message (Bob may be trying to get Alice's signature
on another document).  But Bob does need to blind the message or the bank
(Alice) can note the random bits, serial number, or whatever, and thus
correlate the cash with him.  

The solution is the above protocol, which leaves an 1/n chance of fooling
the bank, where n is the number of messages.  Alice can ask for n messages
where n is large, but there will still be a 1/n chance that Alice picks
the special message and is tricked into signing it.  (Say Bob slips in a
message for $1000 into a bunch of $10 messages; he may get really lucky
and have Alice pick the $1000 message, demanding he unblind all the rest
to reveal $10 messages).

However, this can get pretty expensive to implement for high confidence 
levels.  Again, I'm sure a document forgery can't occur with PGP or even
RIPEM (in the notary protocol manner) since neither program blinds messages:
they calculate hashes, compress, encrypt, digitally sign hashes, but don't 
obscure messages by a multiplication factor.



-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.3a

iQCVAgUBLIVz4YOA7OpLWtYzAQH0lgQAl3QZ6GFbWntDzuk+CKrkGyealZvHXlu5
stiq3OY+svoQCNRa2TjwJKS6htWsgqeYT4YUFwFV8YtfofavKqUGpuhveC3T5kjH
DyKK9Ha1IVjrl5mX4uyz089nU45lQqKJKXCiplDLezRLiB1avVZmIyhdqOyB158W
WTjwedeXUVo=
=nzAD
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Karl Lui Barrus <klbarrus@owlnet.rice.edu>
Date: Thu, 2 Sep 93 05:58:16 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: MISC: DH key xchange
Message-ID: <9309021252.AA12006@flammulated.owlnet.rice.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

Earlier somebody (Samuel Pigg?) asked for a D-H key exchange reference.
It should be in any modern crypto textbook, and is easy to follow.

Alice and Bob want to exchange keys over a hostile channel.  They pick
a prime p, a random number a, and exchange this information.  

Alice picks Ra, a random number less than p, and keeps it secret.  Bob picks
Rb, also a random number less than p.  Alice calculates Ya = a^Ra mod p, and 
sends the result to Bob.  Bob calculates Yb = a^Rb mod p, and sends the 
result to Alice.  To recover the common key Alice and Bob will now use with
each other, they raise the result the other person sent them to their secret
random number, and take the result modulo p.  That is, Alice calculates
Yb^Ra mod p, and Bob calculates Ya^Rb mod p.

Even if an eavesdropper gets a, p, and the intermediate Ya and Yb, the final
key cannot be determined (due the difficulty of the discrete logarithm).

Example:

1) Alice and Bob pick a = 11, p = 347

2) Alice picks Ra = 240
   Bob picks Rb = 39

   Alice and Bob keep Ra and Rb secret

3) Alice calculates Ya = a^Ra mod p
                       = 11^240 mod 347 = 49

   Bob calculates   Yb = a^Rb mod p
                       = 11^39 mod 347 = 285

4) Alice sends Bob Ya = 49
   Bob sends Alice Yb = 285


5) Alice calculates Yb^Ra mod p = 285^240 mod 347
                                = 268

   Bob calculates   Ya^Rb mod p = 49^39 mod 347
                                = 268

   Now Alice and Bob can communicate using their common key.  Even if an
   enemy intercepts a = 11, p = 347, Ya = 49, and Yb = 285, the common
   key cannot be calcuated.  (Well, they can here since I'm using small
   numbers, but with large numbers the discrete log problem is intractable).





-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.3a

iQCVAgUBLIVzxYOA7OpLWtYzAQGzvQQAltkJR3xd/5YJt1pBt2/fWmCrRGqy0RFW
ZZEL5ZHUNO9glaYOA39vUlRbZX8IDwHwKSDXJt98NsHH3WT5JJ0i52hy37mcWLOx
7FbsCo8MMjg2xOye3YLLzXa6a99ad5nV7/rk2pL+9mP0lNZdFcWGnfDvz/F5gqCF
qMRAYby1KI8=
=6ZSd
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
Karl L. Barrus: klbarrus@owlnet.rice.edu         
keyID: 5AD633 hash: D1 59 9D 48 72 E9 19 D5  3D F3 93 7E 81 B5 CC 32 

"One man's mnemonic is another man's cryptography" 
  - my compilers prof discussing file naming in public directories




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Karl Lui Barrus <klbarrus@owlnet.rice.edu>
Date: Thu, 2 Sep 93 05:56:54 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: KOH: disassembly
Message-ID: <9309021253.AA12012@flammulated.owlnet.rice.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

About the KOH virus/program:

I've receive two disassemblies of the program (but not the original source
code yet; I haven't had a chance to try to contact the author).

I'm not sure that either person who mailed me the disassembly wants to take
credit for it, publically at least :-) so I'll just thank them here for 
their work, and answer questions in email (although one of the disassemblies
includes an email address).  One person indicated that KOH really isn't a
virus at all, so maybe this can be answered by folks who know more about
such matters than I do!

Apparently the fast encryption method is indeed an XOR; other than that I
haven't had a chance to look over the code.  I am interested in the IDEA
implementation that KOH includes.

So, if you are interested in copies of the disassembly, let me know.  I had
one report that KOH locked up an 8088 PC from a tester (thanks!).

I'd try to post something intelligent about the code but I just haven't
looked at it enough to comment.

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.3a

iQCVAgUBLIV0DYOA7OpLWtYzAQFP0wP+KrWx2hlne9XRdwOi/3uL//6sy7Bus69U
ZvBD7OVUTa9NQEjwlSRlUHEQq/WKnPVZwGhqXLMyIXz6A+DaMTt1NgsQ/RnbHNT0
I9tDUYnSOMA84LRYPP14ZFW+1tWdPtLFI3mOumVr/RyEhz7PJnkKdFVPoCZYWZd9
a9n3yF6YKV0=
=X0M4
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
Karl L. Barrus: klbarrus@owlnet.rice.edu         
keyID: 5AD633 hash: D1 59 9D 48 72 E9 19 D5  3D F3 93 7E 81 B5 CC 32 

"One man's mnemonic is another man's cryptography" 
  - my compilers prof discussing file naming in public directories




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: astrashe@nyx.cs.du.edu (Alex Strasheim)
Date: Thu, 2 Sep 93 07:50:12 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: CRM, a new remailer's utility
Message-ID: <9309021447.AA16276@nyx.cs.du.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I've just written an msdos utility called CRM that I'd like to offer to
the public for testing.  CRM is supposed to make use of the encrypted
cypherpunk remailers as simple as possible.

This is how it works:  you tell crm the name of the input (plaintext
file), and the address of the person you want to send it to, and crm will
affix the "Request-Remailing-To:" and "Encrypted: PGP" headers to the
document and perform nested encryptions with PGP.  It wraps the result in
a /bin/sh script that will mail the cypher text to the first remailer on
the chain when it's executed.

If you did one of these on your msdos computer:

	crm tfile astrashe@nyx.cs.du.edu

You'd end up with a file called tfile.crm that would contain the shell
script.  Then if you uploaded that to your unix account, and typed:

	sh < tfile.crm

The message would be sent to me through a chain of encrypted remailers.

A random list of of of crm's features:

You can specifiy the subject line in the original text file, or crm will
prompt you for it.  You can put the destination address in the command
line, or you'll be prompted for that as well.

Output (.crm) files can be concatenated to make a single long script that
will send more than one letter.

The subject-line is embedded in the ciphertext.

The number of links in the chains and the list of possible remailers is
contained in a text file that can be located anywhere on the path.

Crm is writen in turbo pascal 5.5 and the source comes with it.  I wrote
it all yesterday (except for some recycled code fragments), so it's kind
of quick and dirty.

If anyone would be willing to take a look at this, I'd be grateful.  Once
I'm convinced it's reliable (it *seems* reliable now) I'll upload it to soda.

If you're interested, email me at astrashe@nyx.cs.du.edu and I'll send you
a uuencoded version through the mail.  Please put CRM in the subject of
your letter so that it doesn't get lost in the shuffle.

Thanks.

	Alex
	astrashe@nyx.cs.du.edu





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: plmoses@unix.cc.emory.edu (Paul L. Moses)
Date: Thu, 2 Sep 93 09:46:58 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: NY tax on info services (whatever that means)
Message-ID: <9309021642.AA22892@emoryu1.cc.emory.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



I was sloppy in stating the test for a Commerce Clause problem with this
law.  Hopefully this is a bit more accurate:
	-  First ask, Does this law affect interstate commerce?  How and
		to what extent?
	-  Then ask, Does the law burden interstate commerce in any way?
	-  Next, Does the law have a discrete benefit to State (ie NY State)
		interests?
	-  Finally, does the benefit to NY interest outweigh the burden on
		interstate commerce?  Is the state interest more significant?

Two caveats:
- This is not offered for any purpose other than mere speculation and intellectual
analysis.
-  Free legal advice is worth exacty what you pay for it.

Paul




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Chael Hall <nowhere@chaos.bsu.edu>
Date: Thu, 2 Sep 93 10:49:42 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Chaos up and running
Message-ID: <9309020948.AA00514@chaos.bsu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text



I know, long time, no post...  Well, I have been very busy this summer.
The end result is that my machine (chaos) is finally online.  I will be
running an anonymous remailer (maybe more than one) from this site and
intend to run a pseudonymous system like anon.penet.fi here.  I have
implemented it and need a little help incorporating PGP encryption.
The machine is in a secure area and is under the exclusive control of
me.

At the moment, I am prepared to provide accounts to those who are willing
to help improve the system in some way.  If you feel that you can contribute,
there are several avenues by which you can do so.  For example (this is
not an exhaustive list):

     1.  Upload cypherpunks-related files to the anonymous FTP area.
     2.  Telnet or rlogin to chaos.bsu.edu (147.226.53.28) and login
         as guest.  Follow the instructions to request an account.
     3.  Write me (nowhere@chaos.bsu.edu or root@chaos.bsu.edu or
         nowhere@bsu-cs.bsu.edu or chall@bsu.edu or 00CCHALL@bsuvc.bsu.edu)
         with a request for an account.

If you choose either option two or three above, please tell me what you
intend to accomplish through having this account and in what positive ways
your having an account will impact my system.  Odds are, you will be accepted.

There is great potential in having this system on the Internet.  I am creating
a mail server to aid in discussion about the direction that chaos is going to
head.  Anyone who would like input on this please send a request to be put
on the mail server and I will set it up when we get a few brains together.

This is just a quick note (it's lunchtime in Indiana) so if I glossed over
anything or neglected to mention something, let me know.  The following
addresses might be of interest to you:

     remailer@chaos.bsu.edu
     anon.ping@chaos.bsu.edu and anon.help@chaos.bsu.edu

For a list of anon.* addresses for specific functions, finger anon@chaos.bsu.edu

We were having some lookup problems since chaos has only been online for two
days...  Please mail my nowhere@bsu-cs.bsu.edu account if you cannot access the
system for any reason.

Thanks,

Chael Hall

-- 
Chael Hall				nowhere@chaos.bsu.edu
Chaos Unlimited				nowhere@bsu-cs.bsu.edu



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Sameer Parekh <cs60a-qu@monoceros.EECS.Berkeley.EDU>
Date: Thu, 2 Sep 93 14:04:45 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Two new remailers
Message-ID: <Pine.3.05.9309021331.A26889-a100000@monoceros.EECS.Berkeley.EDU>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



	Here are the keys for the two new remailers I have set up,
sameer@netcom.com, and cs60a-qu@cory.eecs.berkeley.edu. Because I'm still
working on the installation script, they will probably disappear for short
periods of time, but they're semi-permanent now.
	(I haven't tested the netcom.com one yet, I just ran my script.
I'm hoping that it works!) Here are the keys:

-----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----
Version: 2.2

mQCNAiyGXXoAAAEEAMDtjyzGpLKugc49+Na4GZcUZ1Q1jyZYeofTdNwlTIbs4bGY
OaeFCXaQluD4ANsLn9muMVae+q+3gZsIq14klQLO6Xe55pZ0Efx5shfFU24S9+xA
RUrDfMMqD5TtaoBXH9aQBV9mVo0h5Pxu6ng9B0A+GPJg/ygdVqW95EIJnjMRAAUT
sAEAtCVTYW1lZXIncyBSZW1haWxlciA8c2FtZWVyQG5ldGNvbS5jb20+sAEAmQCN
AiyE6CgAAAEEALqDVb9/znhvoG0jMgFv1ezJWNKyC5XbXnO6DvbucHvqFsLHSYuQ
txtrKVsuk2yGturMVWFAmnH8xCmpf0wUWIVzydNQbg4IB6/FzJ/ZdwXWmvvUJi2R
6IKJB0PGDhiWpRwfHrLthcuzXwxK0buWGW6BAFAcLV0ipEwhnnhSVnRJAAURtDNT
YW1lZXIncyBSZW1haWxlciA8Y3M2MGEtcXVAY29yeS5FRUNTLkJlcmtlbGV5LkVE
VT4=
=eqRW
-----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: greg@ideath.goldenbear.com (Greg Broiles)
Date: Thu, 2 Sep 93 16:34:46 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Who generates AOCE keys?
Message-ID: <5qP09B1w164w@ideath.goldenbear.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Scott Collins (collins@newton.apple.com) writes:
(re AOCE, and who generates users' key pairs)

>What I gathered from actually using this software is that you personally
>generate a key pair, on your own machine, and then transparently send your
>public key to RSADSI.  Some time later, you receive a certificate (with an
>expiration date) that allows your 'signer' to function.  RSADSI does not
>make, or even see, your private key.

and Mitch Ratcliffe (godsdog@netcom.com) writes, in E-mail:
(posted with permission)

>While Apple will not cop to this, it is my understanding that users will
>get certified keys from RSA. I have Very Good Sources on this. They can
>generate a key for use on their network, but as part of the vision of the
>paperless, collaborative economy, Apple believes you'll want publically-
>certified keys.

Well, Apple has failed to guess what I'll want. :) Perhaps the similarity
of these two ideas (RSA generates keys & certificates, versus RSA gets
public key & generates certificate) has generated confusion internally
at Apple; I dunno.



--
Greg Broiles                            greg@goldenbear.com
Golden Bear Computer Consulting         +1 503 342 7982
Box 12005 Eugene OR 97440               BBS: +1 503 687 7764




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Duncan Frissell <frissell@panix.com>
Date: Thu, 2 Sep 93 12:25:17 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Digital Cash Experiment
Message-ID: <199309021920.AA03777@panix.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


To: cypherpunks@toad.com

Boy, you give people free money and they don't even use it.  Last 
Saturday, I posted the codes from a $5 Western Union phone card.  That is 
good for 8.3333 minutes of domestic long distance service.  Some people 
told me that they made calls on the card (and one generous soul even sent
me the codes from another $5 card in encrypted E-mail).  The 8 minutes in 
calls weren't, however, used up until today when I killed the last minute 
myself.  You can't even give money away.

Have all of you been to your local Western Union money transfer agent and 
bought your phone cards for convenient anonymous (when made from 
payphones) LD calls.

Today's NYT also featured a story about the similar Sprint phone cards 
(everyone and their uncle is issuing them these days).  Sprint cut a deal 
with Hallmark whereby you will be able to buy $6 greeting cards with a 10 
minute Sprint phone card inside so your recipient can call you back.  
This makes the calls 60 cents/minute which is the going rate for domestic 
LD calls on these cards.

And, yes this is a cypherpunks topic because it represents an anonymous 
telecommunications account (of sorts).

Duncan Frissell

The Economist has been tracking the price of a market basket of 
commodities since it was founded in the 1840s.  In the summer of 1991, the 
(inflation adjusted) price of those commodities fell to the lowest level 
ever observed.  I guess we aren't running out of things.  

--- WinQwk 2.0b#0
                                                 




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Duncan Frissell <frissell@panix.com>
Date: Thu, 2 Sep 93 12:24:42 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Anonymous Credentials
Message-ID: <199309021920.AA03784@panix.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


To: cypherpunks@toad.com

Another good argument in favor of anonymous credentials...

A person of my acquaintance who was long ago "seduced by the dark side of 
the Force" tells me that there is a lucrative market in ID copies supplied 
by people working in the personnel departments of companies.  When new 
employees come with their birth certificates, SSN cards, driver's 
licenses, etc and their completed I-9 forms as required by the '86 
Immigration Act, the clerk will take them to the copy machine, hit the 
button twice, pocket the extra set of copies, sell the ID package to a 
credit borrower or ID craftsman.  All sorts of juicy info is there in one 
place.  It's great.

Duncan Frissell

Who will fool them all one day (and make the former Prince jealous) by 
changing his name to ASCII 7 so that bells will ring whenever a database 
accesses it.



--- WinQwk 2.0b#0
               




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Panzer Boy <panzer@drown.slip.andrew.cmu.edu>
Date: Thu, 2 Sep 93 13:26:58 PDT
To: Cypherpunk Mailing List <cypherpunks@toad.com>
Subject: Anon IRC (Anonymous vs. Private)
Message-ID: <Pine.3.05.1.9309021630.A3479-c100000@drown.slip.andrew.cmu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



I have been running an Anonymous IRC server for a short time now.  This
allows a real time conversation, as opposed to the monologue provided via
netnews or mail.

Currently, when a user logs in, the internal (and external) representation
of the user is:

NICKNAME!user@anon.host

Users have the ability to change their Nickname, and all other people have
to identify people is by their Nickname.  People who have used IRC for
awhile have told me that this would promote anarchy on the channels,
because it makes it impossible to ban/ignore certain people from
conversations.

So my fix is going to be running users Hostname through a one-way hash
function.  So references to users will be:

NICKNAME!user@HASH(Real-Hostname)

The question is, what kind of hash do it use?

My first idea was to use a hash function that has many collisions, a
simple "summing" of the ascii characters.  This would make sure that
people would have certain ID's, and ban/ignore would work.  This would
also make it harder to be sure you had the correct host if you were going
to try to brute force out a users hostname.

A couple other people have suggested using a hash function that is much
more complex.  So that no collisions will occur, and all users will have
unique "ID's" associated with their Nickname.

If collisions occur, it is ok.  Just the possibility for banning/ignoring
people you don't intend goes up.  Any suggestions on this one?

I was also thinking of allowing users to come on the system as
NICK!user@anon.host and then switch between that, and their
NICK!user@HASH(Real-Host).  This would allow people to be both completely
anonymous or, if they wanted, have and identity attached to themselves. 
This way people could ban/ignore anyone at "anon.host" if they didn't want
to deal with "anonymous" people.

To connect to my server, load up an IRC client, and change your server to
"drown.slip.andrew.cmu.edu".
In standard clients, "/server drown.slip.andrew.cmu.edu", is how to do this.

For more information about irc, ftp to CSA.BU.EDU.

-Matt
panzer@drown.slip.andrew.cmu.edu







From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Eli Brandt <ebrandt@jarthur.Claremont.EDU>
Date: Thu, 2 Sep 93 18:54:47 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: REMAIL: list
In-Reply-To: <9308312011.AA13862@flammulated.owlnet.rice.edu>
Message-ID: <9309030152.AA04188@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


After being largely off-line for most of the summer, I came back to
find that my remailer had been bit-bucketing most encrypted messages,
apparently due to PGP 2.3's lack of backward compatibility.
(There'd better be a good reason for that, PGP team.) I'll get
around to building 2.3 RSN.  There will also be a momentary
interruption of encryption service when this old Sequent machine
gets swapped out from under the Sequent binary...

	 PGP 2 key by finger or e-mail
   Eli   ebrandt@jarthur.claremont.edu




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Date: Thu, 2 Sep 93 20:27:00 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Remailer Reliability
In-Reply-To: <9309030152.AA04188@toad.com>
Message-ID: <9309030322.AA20056@netcom5.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Eli Brandt writes:

> After being largely off-line for most of the summer, I came back to
> find that my remailer had been bit-bucketing most encrypted messages,
> apparently due to PGP 2.3's lack of backward compatibility.
> (There'd better be a good reason for that, PGP team.) I'll get
> around to building 2.3 RSN.  There will also be a momentary
> interruption of encryption service when this old Sequent machine
> gets swapped out from under the Sequent binary...

Glad to have Eli back! (and we missed you at the Extropaganza last
weekend)

This underscores one of the persistent problems with remailers: the
generally flaky nature!

(No insult or criticism intended...the folks who run remailers are to
be commended, but the fact is that "multiple hop" remailing routes are
are a real gamble these days, what with so many remailers temporarily
or permanently disabled or (somehow) not passing messages through.)

Karl Barrus's list of functional remailers is a great first step, but
we need to somehow establish a better "market system" of remailers
(digital postage woud be a boon here) so that the upness or downness
of remailers would be more predictable.

Like others, I suspect, I have to "ping" the remailers before sending
anything, and then hope and pray they aren't taken offline for
maintenance (or whatever) between the time I ping them and the time I
use them for something important.

If Sameer Parekh's "instant remailer" code multiplies the number of
remailers by some factor, we will even more urgently need to deal with
this issue of remailer reliability.

-Tim May


-- 
..........................................................................
Timothy C. May         | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,  
tcmay@netcom.com       | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
408-688-5409           | knowledge, reputations, information markets, 
W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA  | black markets, collapse of governments.
Higher Power: 2^756839 | Public Key: PGP and MailSafe available.
Note: I put time and money into writing this posting. I hope you enjoy it.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Johan Helsingius <julf@penet.FI>
Date: Thu, 2 Sep 93 12:06:58 PDT
To: Felix Ungman <felix@hu.se>
Subject: Re: ViaCrypt export?
In-Reply-To: <199309021523.AA24790@mail.swip.net>
Message-ID: <9309022035.aa15531@penet.penet.FI>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



> Will ViaCrypt consider exporting pgp?
O
Precisely what I was asking myself.

> There exists no country boundaries in cyberspace, you know!

Boy, do we know!

	Julf





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: John Perry Barlow <barlow@eff.org>
Date: Thu, 2 Sep 93 20:44:49 PDT
To: gnu@toad.com
Subject: Crypto Greetings from Russia
Message-ID: <199309030337.AA04757@eff.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Jerry,

I don't know if you saw this on its way through the office, but unless you
have some objection, I'm going to invite this organization to join the
Digital Privacy Working Group. There might be a lot of leverage gained from
working the standards processes in the two countries against/with each
other.

I'm also interested in hearing if anyone in cypherpunks has heard of these
folks or their product.


FAX TRANSMISSION

Date: 23 August, 1993

To: 
John P. Barlow
Electronic Frontier Foundation
Washington, DC,  USA

From:
Anatoly N. Lebedev
President
LAN Cypto
Moscow, Russia

Phone/Fax: 095-936-7256

Subject: Digittal privacy working group

Dear Mr. Barlow,

I enjoyed your brilliant paper "Decrypting the Puzzle Palace" (Comm. ACM,
vol.35, No.7, July 1992) very much. The situation with "the Russian NSA" or
Federal Agency of the Government Communications and Information (FAGHI) is
mostly the same as you describe there. So that I am in accord with the most
parts of the paper.

The company "LAN Crypto" is interested in becoming part of the digital
privacy working group.

"LAN Crypto" is the first Russian independent private company, which
specializes in the development of information security systems and
electronic documents transfer (electronic funds transfer, electronic
checks, contracts, etc.) by means of cryptology.

We have installed our software and the cryptological technology in more
than 100 state and commercial banks in Russia, Belorussia and Kazakhstan.

Our digital signature (we call it NOTARY) was recognized in April 1992 by
the Suprime Arbitre Court of Russia. The first solution on electronic
contract with our digital signature and conflict between the sides was made
by the Moscow Arbitre Court 28 July 1993.

NOTARY is a package of programs for electronic (digital) signing of PC
files, revealing the identity of the author and assuring the integrity of
such files.

NOTARY employs advanced method of digital signing. The method is based upon
the complex Discrete Logarithm Problem.

NOTARY takes 0.2 sec for signing and 0.8 sec for checking the signature by
AT-286/16MHz (secret key 512 bits).

Now the works on national standard of digital signature in Russia also
began. We work in this way actively with the other private companies and
state organisations.

We proposed to make the common standard for Russia and USA. This
proposition was supported by the Information Technologies Department of the
Russia State Committee of Standards. We've sent this proposal to the
presidential team of the US President Mr. W. Clinton in Jan 1993.

So I would be very glad to get from you any fresh information on DSS,
because the last version we have gotten from our american partners was of
Nov. 1992.

We as a private company also propose some other packages of programs:
VESTA (for encryption), which provides processing speed of 10 KBytes/sec on
AT-286 (16MHz), ATHENA (for public-key generation), which takes less than 3
seconds for two users to generate a common secret key of 512 bits (using an
AT-286 operating at 16MHz) (6.5 seconds for common key of 1024 bits),

DIANA for strong and flexible access regulaton to files of databases. DIANA
prevents an unauthorized access to information, contained in server or
working station of LAN. It is based on encrypting of files and dynamic
decrypting of them while working. All information between the server and
the working station goes in an encrypted form. User of the working station
uses a compact TSR-program.

The key distribution system of DIANA does not have analoges in the world.

To get more information on our programs you may connect with "LAN Crypto":

117630, Academician Chelomey St. 10-43,
Moscow, Russia,
phone/fax 095-936-7254
E-mail: lan@crypto.msk.su

or with our representatives in the USA:

Severtson and Associates
1901 Prytania, Suite 17
New Orleans, LA   70130
Phone 504/524-2256

or

Dmitry Orlov
San Francisco, CA
408/988-3832
E-mail: dimon@mcafee.com

Regards,

Anatoly N. Lebedev
President
LAN Crypto






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "L. Detweiler" <ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Date: Thu, 2 Sep 93 22:44:51 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Remailer Reliability
In-Reply-To: <9309030322.AA20056@netcom5.netcom.com>
Message-ID: <9309030539.AA16419@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
>Like others, I suspect, I have to "ping" the remailers before sending
>anything, and then hope and pray they aren't taken offline for
>maintenance (or whatever) between the time I ping them and the time I
>use them for something important.

C'punks, it seems to me that the anonymous pool idea is underutilized
by the remailers. I suggest that a remailer variation be developed that
posts to an anonymous pool (some appropriate obscure newsgroup)
indicating that a message actually was sent from the final hop. The
sender can be sure the message made it if they see this posting. If
anyone wants to get even more fancy, the final remailer might also post
to the pool when the message bounced to the final address back to the remailer.

Obviously, without reliability the anonymity is worthless.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "L. Detweiler" <ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Date: Thu, 2 Sep 93 23:44:52 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: New Online Organization
Message-ID: <9309030641.AA17507@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



===cut=here===

From: elrose@path.net (Lance Rose)
Date: Thu, 2 Sep 1993 22:37:24 PDT
Subject:  New BBS Trade Group Formed

                              NOMA 
                National Online Media Association 
 
                                   Contacts: Phill Liggett 
                                             LIGGETT@delphi.com 
                                             (203)233-3163 
 
                                             Lance Rose 
                                             elrose@echonyc.com 
                                             (201)509-1700 
 
FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE 
 
A new trade association, the National Online Media Association
(NOMA), was formed at ONE BBSCON '93 in Colorado Springs on August
27th, 1993.  NOMA comprises BBS operators, Internet service
providers, and other online media and services. 
 
NOMA's mission is to act for the BBS and online service industry
on matters of national importance by creating an industry presence
in Washington, D.C. and other means; assist its members at the
state and local levels; educate the public on the unique social,
business and legal roles of BBS's and other online services;
establish appropriate industry standards and guidelines; 
promote business development in the industry; and maintain and 
provide access to resources and industry information for use by the
public and the industry. 
 
An 11 person Organizing Committee was elected to develop a proposal
for NOMA's charter, bylaws, membership requirements, structure, and
form of leadership.  The proposal is to be completed and
distributed within the BBS and online services industry by November
30th, 1993. 
 
Discussion areas are being set up immediately for those interested 
in participating in NOMA's early development.  An Internet mailing 
list is available to all those interested at natbbs@echonyc.com 
(subscribe to natbbs-request@echonyc.com).  A conference area is 
also being made available on the Delphi national information 
service. 
 
The members of NOMA's Organizing Committee are: 
 
Phill Liggett - Chairperson 
LIGGETT@delphi.com 
 
Joe Balshone 
BALSHONE@delphi.com 
 
Celeste Clark 
BBS #: (805)520-2300 
 
Pat Clawson 
76357.3572@compuserve.com 
 
P. Victor Grambsch - Secretary 
PVICTOR@delphi.com 
 
Tony McClenny 
BBS#: (703)648-1841 
 
Robert Pataki 
PUGDOG@delphi.com 
 
W. Mark Richmond 
BBS#: (209)685-8487 
 
Steve Sprague 
steve.sprague@uboa.org 
 
Jim Taylor 
jim.taylor@F5.N310.Z1.FIDONET.ORG 
 
Bill Wilt 
wilt@aol.com 
 
In addition, three advisors agreed to assist NOMA's Organizing 
Committee: 
 
Mike Godwin, Esq. 
mnemonic@eff.org 
 
David Johnson, Esq. 
djohns06@reach.com 
 
Lance Rose, Esq. 
elrose@echonyc.com 
 
For further information, please contact Phill Liggett, (203)233- 
3163 or Lance Rose, Esq., (201)509-1700 
 
Mailing Address:    NOMA 
                    c/o Phill Liggett 
                    Solutions, Inc. 
                    89 Seymour Avenue, 
                    West Hartford, CT  06119


------- End of Forwarded Message





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: mbriceno@aol.com
Date: Thu, 2 Sep 93 21:54:52 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Crypto Greetings from Russia
Message-ID: <9309030042.tn45384@aol.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> We proposed to make the common standard for Russia and USA. This
> proposition was supported by the Information Technologies Department
> of the Russia State Committee of Standards. We've sent this proposal
> to the presidential team of the US President Mr. W. Clinton in Jan
> 1993.

What an opportunity! We Cypherpunks should establish a link with LAN Crypto
asap.

---Marc




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "George A. Gleason" <gg@well.sf.ca.us>
Date: Fri, 3 Sep 93 03:37:03 PDT
To: frissell@panix.com
Subject: Re:  Digital Cash Experiment
Message-ID: <93Sep3.033212pdt.14379-2@well.sf.ca.us>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


60-cents per minute...?   Is that the going rate on debit phone cards?  Do
you know any place I can call to find out more about these...?  
-gg




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Reply to: hahn@lds.loral.com" <HAHN@lds.loral.com>
Date: Fri, 3 Sep 93 04:55:28 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Gubment Bombmaker's Cookbook
Message-ID: <930903075125.42fd@lds.loral.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Several days ago I made a post in response to the gentleman
in Hartford's difficulty with the law.  His problems stem
from someone's posting to his BBS recipe(s) for bomb making.
I mentioned, offhand, that a federal government publication
exists containing such recipes.  Mike Godwin responded asking
for a citation, that it might be useful to the defense.  OK,
here it is:

   TM 31-210 Dept. of the Army Technical Manual
   Improvised Munitions Handbook
   published 1969

It contains chemical recipes for about a dozen explosive
materials (both primary and secondary explosives) from
easily obtainable ingredients, along with designs for 
fusing devices and explosive booby-traps.

I have never tried any of these (to paraphrase Shel Silverstein,
my eyes still see, my hair's unburned, and my fingers are still
on my hands -- and I'd like to keep it that way), but my knowlege
of chemistry and engineering convinces me that they all work.

The book contains the disclaimer "For official use only" on
nearly every page.  It is, however, widely available at gun
shows, which is where I got mine.

I'll not reproduce any recipes here, but if the defence
attornies for the gentleman in Hartford contact me and can
prove who they are, I will be happy to share any info with
them.
__
|         (V)              |  "Tiger gotta hunt.  Bird gotta fly.
|   (^    (`>              |   Man gotta sit and wonder why, why, why.
|  ((\\__/ )               |   Tiger gotta sleep.  Bird gotta land.
|  (\\<   )   der Nethahn  |   Man gotta tell himself he understand."
|    \<  )                 |  
|     ( /                  |                Kurt Vonnegut Jr.
|      |                   |  
|      ^                   |





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: khijol!erc@apple.com (Ed Carp)
Date: Sat, 4 Sep 93 03:30:40 PDT
To: hahn@lds.loral.com)
Subject: Re: Gubment Bombmaker's Cookbook
In-Reply-To: <930903075125.42fd@lds.loral.com>
Message-ID: <m0oYcYf-00028jC@warrior>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text


>    TM 31-210 Dept. of the Army Technical Manual
>    Improvised Munitions Handbook
>    published 1969
> 
> It contains chemical recipes for about a dozen explosive
> materials (both primary and secondary explosives) from
> easily obtainable ingredients, along with designs for 
> fusing devices and explosive booby-traps.

I also have a copy of this.

> I have never tried any of these (to paraphrase Shel Silverstein,
> my eyes still see, my hair's unburned, and my fingers are still
> on my hands -- and I'd like to keep it that way), but my knowlege
> of chemistry and engineering convinces me that they all work.

I have.  Pretty effective stuff, although I don't think it mentions
the old "ammonium nitrate + motor oil" standby.  ;)

> The book contains the disclaimer "For official use only" on
> nearly every page.  It is, however, widely available at gun
> shows, which is where I got mine.

I got mine at the Dallas Gun Show several years ago, along with "Survival,
Evasion, and Escape".

> I'll not reproduce any recipes here, but if the defence
> attornies for the gentleman in Hartford contact me and can
> prove who they are, I will be happy to share any info with
> them.

I don't see why not - after all, alt.pyrotechnics has a lot of discussion
of this sort of thing...
-- 
Ed Carp				erc@apple.com			510/659-9560

If you want magic, let go of your armor.  Magic is so much stronger than
steel!        -- Richard Bach, "The Bridge Across Forever"



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: karn@qualcomm.com (Phil Karn)
Date: Fri, 3 Sep 93 08:20:31 PDT
To: HAHN@lds.loral.com
Subject: Gubment Bombmaker's Cookbook
In-Reply-To: <930903075125.42fd@lds.loral.com>
Message-ID: <9309031517.AA17002@servo>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


This is ridiculous. Have they never heard of The Anarchist's Cookbook?
I've seen it on the shelf of the local large bookstore, though now I'm
not sure whether I want to admit to buying a copy.

Have they not yet discovered rec.pyrotechnics?

Phil





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Jason Zions <jazz@hal.com>
Date: Fri, 3 Sep 93 08:17:02 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: NY tax on info services (whatever that means)
In-Reply-To: <2658ge$s93@hal.com>
Message-ID: <9309031513.AA07974@jazz.hal.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>I was sloppy in stating the test for a Commerce Clause problem with this
>law.  Hopefully this is a bit more accurate:
>	-  First ask, Does this law affect interstate commerce?  How and
>		to what extent?
>	-  Then ask, Does the law burden interstate commerce in any way?
>	-  Next, Does the law have a discrete benefit to State (ie NY State)
>		interests?
>	-  Finally, does the benefit to NY interest outweigh the burden on
>		interstate commerce?  Is the state interest more significant?

If you read the text of the tax change, you'll find that it subjects no new
services to taxation, it merely changes the tax rate they pay. This
particular law does not increase the burden on any businesses other than how
much tax they must collect; they already had to collect some, now they have
to collect more. The specific tasks they had to perform stay the same, just
some numbers get larger.

You'd have to find and attack the original tax code changes that imposed
taxes of any sort on comm-based info services. Good luck; probably NY just
imposed a tax on all commerce where at least one party had nexus in NY,
which swallowed up comm-based info services along with everyone else.

Jason




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Johan Helsingius <julf@penet.FI>
Date: Fri, 3 Sep 93 00:24:53 PDT
To: mbriceno@aol.com
Subject: Re: Crypto Greetings from Russia
In-Reply-To: <9309030042.tn45384@aol.com>
Message-ID: <9309031018.aa18209@penet.penet.FI>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



> > We proposed to make the common standard for Russia and USA. This
> > proposition was supported by the Information Technologies Department
> > of the Russia State Committee of Standards. We've sent this proposal
> > to the presidential team of the US President Mr. W. Clinton in Jan
> > 1993.
> 
> What an opportunity! We Cypherpunks should establish a link with LAN Crypto
> asap.

Whooaa! Slow....

Please remember that the former SU is full of "companies" that claim to be
*the* whatever national initiative of Russia. Mostly they are just a couple
of former research scientists with a Grand Plan, and usually they have no clue
as to how to make it fly. They just think that with the new market echonomy,
simply forming a company and having some Big Words will make them filty rich
automatically...

I know there are exceptions. But.. Beware.

	Julf





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: edgar@spectrx.Saigon.COM (Edgar W. Swank)
Date: Fri, 3 Sep 93 13:15:36 PDT
To: Cypherpunks          <cypherpunks@toad.com>
Subject: PGP features
Message-ID: <FZDB0B8w165w@spectrx.saigon.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Brad Huntting recently posted:

    Perhaps it's time we polished the edges, added a few of the features
    that are lacking, and wrote up up an RFC for the PGP message format.

    Some features I'd like to see in PGP are:

I've added my comments [with these full margins] as appropriate.

            The ability to send an encrypted message to multiple
            recipients without duplicating the entire message.  The
            most logical way to do this would probably be to encrypt
            the random IDEA key once for each recipient.

??? This has been implemented in PGP since at least release 2.2.
(Maybe 2.1, memory fails).  Just specify multiple UserID fragments in
the command line when encrypting. Note that if you don't specify a
UserID in the command line, you -cannot- enter multiple ID's in the
resulting prompt. This is in the -h help text:

To encrypt a message for any number of multiple recipients:
     pgp -e textfile userid1 userid2 userid3

            There needs to be a facility for having multiple signatures
            on a single document without making the signers sign each
            others signatures.  Besides the obvious application of
            removing a signature from a document, this would also
            facilitate things like petitions where many people could
            asynchronously sign a single document, and latter assemble
            all the signatures together.

This can be done via detached signature certificates, which can be
gathered together and presented with the original document.

To create a signature certificate that is detached from the document:
     pgp -sb textfile [-u your_userid]

            It should be possible (though certainly not mandatory) to
            hide the recipient's identity entirely.

Not currently implemented, but being discussed. You can acheive much
the same effect by using a another key-pair with a pseudonym in the
UserID, to be distributed only through remailers or otherwise
anonymously.

            The message format needs to allow for alternate forms of
            encryption (besides IDEA).  Furthermore, the (shared key)
            algorithm used to encrypt a message should be hidden in
            the RSA encrypted part of the message along with the shared
            key.  Ideally, a list of algorithms could be given which
            would allow the message to be optionally compressed before
            being encrypted, or encrypted two or more times with
            different algorithms.

Not implemented, but has been mentioned.  Triple-DES is one possible
alternative.  You can achieve multiple IDEA encryption by just using
current PGP to encrypt twice (or more).  Even if you encrypt to the
same public key, the IDEA key used will be different.

Compression can currently be turned off, if desired, via a CONFIG.TXT
option, which can also be specified in the command line. Compression
is also automatically turned off if the plaintext is recognized as the
output of PKZIP or other popular compressors.

    If I'm confused and the PGP message format already supports some
    of these features, please correct me.

Consider yourself corrected (:}

--
edgar@spectrx.saigon.com (Edgar W. Swank)
SPECTROX SYSTEMS +1.408.252.1005  Cupertino, Ca





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: baumbach@atmel.com (Peter Baumbach)
Date: Fri, 3 Sep 93 09:25:02 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: NY tax on info services (whatever that means)
Message-ID: <9309031604.AA10266@octopus.chp.atmel.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I have been studying the US constitution lately, and an excerpt from
Article 1 Section 10 seems appropriate:

  No State shall, without the Consent of the Congress, lay any Imposts or
Duties on Imports or Exports, except what may be absolutely necessary
for executing its inspection Laws; and the net Produce of all Duties and
Imposts, laid by any State on Imports or Exports, shall be for the Use
of the Treasury of the Unites States; and all such Laws shall be subject
to the Revision and Control of the Congress.

In liberty,

Peter Baumbach




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: mbriceno@aol.com
Date: Fri, 3 Sep 93 09:35:02 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Crypto Greetings from Russia
Message-ID: <9309031218.tn53668@aol.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> Whooaa! Slow.... 
> 
> Please remember that the former SU is full of "companies" that claim
> to be *the* whatever national initiative of Russia. Mostly they are
> just a couple of former research scientists with a Grand Plan, and
> usually they have no clue as to how to make it fly. They just think
> that with the new market echonomy, simply forming a company and
> having some Big Words will make them filty rich automatically... 
> 
> I know there are exceptions. But.. Beware.

Thanks for telling me. I was not aware of that. However, they claim to have
equipped quite a number of sites. I haved asked them for more info on their
products. Let's see what they got.

--Marc




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: nobody@eli-remailer
Date: Fri, 3 Sep 93 13:25:37 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: WANTED:  List of very reliable remailers
Message-ID: <9309032021.AA17759@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----


I've been experimenting with the remailers lately, and I've been
trying to put together all the tools I'll need to start sending
most of my email through them.  Towards this end, I wrote a
simple program called CRM that adds forwarding tags, and calls
PGP to do multiple encryptions, and then wraps the result in a
/bin/sh script that will extract the cyphertext and do the
mailing.

In what is starting to look to me like a design flaw, I set the
program up to pick a random chain of a specified length out of a
set of remailers.  All of this talk about remailer reliability
has got me a little bit spooked, because I don't have any way of
knowing if my mail is going through or not.

I'd like to configure my remailer's utility so that it only uses
a small list of *very* reliable remailers, preferably with each
entry on the list being run by a distinct person.

Are there any remailers which:

o    Support PGP encryption?

o    Have been in reliable operation for a significant period of
     time (at least a couple of months)?

o    Are maintained by someone who knows enough about the
     software to prevent it from crashing?

o    Don't introduce significant delays in the remailing? 
     (Unless, of course, they are using some sort of scheme to
     frustrate traffic analysis.)

                               and

o    Are set up on systems over which the remailer's
     administrator has enough clout to prevent a summary shutdown
     without at least giving a couple of days' notice?


I'm assuming (for no very good reason) that Hal Finney's sites
fit these criterium.  If that's true, then strictly speaking, I'd
only need one other similar site run by another person, although
I'd feel better if I was using a chain through three remailers. 
Obviously, the more remailers I have on the list, the better off
I am.  But I'd rather have a small list of highly reliable
remailers than a larger list than contains even a single marginal
one.

The list of remailers that I'm using now came from a list that
was posted to this mail-list a few days ago, and I haven't had
any problems with it (at least none that I know of -- I'm
assuming that all of my mail went through).  I just got a little
worried about the post reporting dropped mail from the jarthur
remailer administrator, which had been mentioned on the list I
had been using as a reliable remailer.

If anyone can help me out, I'd be grateful.

Please post replies to the list, or mail me directly at:

     astrashe@nyx.cs.du.edu

Thanks,

     Alex



-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.3a

iQCVAgUBLIejerGKvmrRrQghAQHvMQQA1Ez5Lxo1glHaJhvquvuti1WseFl4Nw5r
g0qRfeWQFwSbZZtsFUiGs6f4iibj9lVpBwtmL8k7oTYRfCNLe+noi6TC0PChEeHt
BKQmCAGTx5oPu2UtqXUvfFtb2MwqDXxNpX4BOd+klO6qPjBq6H8eG7GCNzSmeLp5
yr3ALw+qANg=
=FSf4
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: M..Stirner@f28.n125.z1.FIDONET.ORG (M. Stirner)
Date: Fri, 3 Sep 93 17:05:17 PDT
To: Cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: remailer reliability
Message-ID: <2298.2C87C75D@shelter.FIDONET.ORG>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


 Uu> C'punks, it seems to me that the anonymous pool idea is underutilized
 Uu> by the remailers. I suggest that a remailer variation be developed
 Uu> that posts to an anonymous pool (some appropriate obscure newsgroup)
 Uu> indicating that a message actually was sent from the final hop.

I'm not absolutely clear on what you are suggesting, but I suspect that
alt.test can probably be made to serve your purposes.  Before the
password mess on penet (which kills automagic replies, unfortunately, as
they haven't passwords), I used the autoreplies that come form various
US & foreign sites in response to alt.test postings as a good shakedown
of penet remailer reliability.  I haven't messed with alt.test in a
while so have pretty much forgotten the drill, but it was definitely
useful at the time.

*********************************************************************
* <m..stirner@f28.n125.z1.fidonet.org> - PGP Key D30909 via servers *
* > What country can preserve its liberties if its rulers are not  <*
* > warned from time to time that their people preserve the spirit <*
* > of resistance?  Let them take arms!" - Thomas Jefferson, 1787  <*
*********************************************************************

___ Blue Wave/QWK v2.12
--  
M. Stirner - via FidoNet node 1:125/1
UUCP: ...!uunet!kumr!shelter!28!M..Stirner
INTERNET: M..Stirner@f28.n125.z1.FIDONET.ORG




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: cme@ellisun.sw.stratus.com (Carl Ellison)
Date: Fri, 3 Sep 93 11:30:34 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Remailer Reliability
Message-ID: <9309031826.AA09137@ellisun.sw.stratus.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


If you want reliability, you can take a page from the fault tolerance
business.  Replicate the remailers.  (There are many papers on this topic.
See, for example, ISIS from Cornell and Manetho from Rice.)

Example:

I send to r1 and r2.

Each of r1 and r2 sends to r3 and r4.

r3 and r4 each take the first message to arrive and drop the second.

at the end of the chain, you have rm and rn.

rm and rn each get the message (drop the second) and then decide between
them who gets to post it.  The one who gets to, does and tells the other
that it's all done -- at which time the other drops its copy.

Death detection is by time-out (but only rn and rm need to delay operation
until the time-out -- to prevent multiple postings from a split-brain
network.)

Expensive (4x the message traffic) -- but fault tolerant.

 - Carl




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: sameer@netcom.com (Sameer Parekh)
Date: Fri, 3 Sep 93 14:35:07 PDT
To: ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu (L. Detweiler)
Subject: Re: Remailer Reliability
In-Reply-To: <9309030539.AA16419@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Message-ID: <9309032129.AA02437@netcom.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


L. Detweiler said:
> C'punks, it seems to me that the anonymous pool idea is underutilized
> by the remailers. I suggest that a remailer variation be developed that
> posts to an anonymous pool (some appropriate obscure newsgroup)
> indicating that a message actually was sent from the final hop. The
> sender can be sure the message made it if they see this posting. If
> anyone wants to get even more fancy, the final remailer might also post
> to the pool when the message bounced to the final address back to the remailer.
	That definitely looks like a wise idea.
	Maybe if I can figure it out, among the writing of the
install-script I can add this little feature. Which newsgroup? Should
someone create an alt.remail? How exactly would it be implemented? I'm
thinking that simply the user would do:


::
Request-Remailing-To: sameer@netcom.com
Remail-ID: 572374237

	And the remailer would post to alt.remail:

Message with Remail-ID: 572374237 was remailed.
	Does that look good?


-- 
Sameer
sameer@netcom.com




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: jim@tadpole.com (Jim Thompson)
Date: Fri, 3 Sep 93 13:25:05 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re:  where can I get the source for BSD mail?
Message-ID: <9309032014.AA05116@tadpole.Tadpole.COM>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Oh, several places.  Look for the source to metamail (ask archie,
or fish around on bellcore.com), and there is typically a 'tahoe.tar.Z'
file around.

Jim




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Mark W. Eichin" <eichin@paycheck.cygnus.com>
Date: Fri, 3 Sep 93 15:05:14 PDT
To: HAHN@lds.loral.com
Subject: Gubment Bombmaker's Cookbook
In-Reply-To: <930903075125.42fd@lds.loral.com>
Message-ID: <9309032004.AA02837@paycheck.cygnus.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


My copy says:

	For further information or additional inserts, contact:
	Commanding Officer
	Frankford Arsenal
	ATTN: SMUF A-U3100, Special Products Division
	      Small Caliber Engineering Directorate
	Philadelphia, PA 19137

A friend got it for me at an Air Force PX, which was apparently open
to the public. It's about 250 pages of newsprint in about 4"x5"
format. 
	I don't have convenient access to a scanner or I'd scan in a
page or two -- there are sketches (improvised handguns, shaped
charges, and such) as well as text.
	Some of the "easily obtainable ingredients" aren't any more,
which shows the age of the book (one or two things use silver coins,
which haven't been circulated since the early sixties.) Overall,
though, the recipes use things that you can find.
							_Mark_




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Dave Banisar <banisar@washofc.cpsr.org>
Date: Fri, 3 Sep 93 14:20:06 PDT
To: CYPHERPUNKS <CYPHERPUNKS@toad.com>
Subject: UK Privacy International Co
Message-ID: <00541.2829920226.5141@washofc.cpsr.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


  UK Privacy International Conference
                        ANNOUNCEMENT 

                  ONE DAY PUBLIC CONFERENCE

            INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENTS IN PRIVACY 
                      AND DATA PROTECTION

             30th SEPTEMBER, 1993, MANCHESTER, UK

       A roundtable hosted jointly by Privacy International
        and the Law School of the University of Manchester


Topics include :

               Privacy concerns with Caller ID and digital phone 
                services

               Privacy implications of Electronic Health Care Patient 
                Record Systems and medical smart cards

               Cryptography, and communications surveillance

               Implications of the European Commission data 
                protection directive                                        
                                                                            
                                                                            
                                                                            
                                                                            
                                                                            
                                                                            
                                                                            
                                                                            
                                                                            
                                                                            
                                                                           

               The establishment of guidelines for handling police files 
                in emerging democracies in Central and Eastern Europe

               Weaknesses in the UK Data Protection Act


This programme will include a small number of papers and formal 
presentations, but will primarily be a forum for general discussion 
of the issues. A number of key international experts will be present 
at the meeting.

The conference is free for all Privacy International members, 
independent experts, and privacy and consumer advocates.

A fee of 50 (US$75) will apply to  representatives of government 
organisations or companies.


8.30 AM - 2.00 PM, Thursday 30th September  1993
Room 2.22,  The Law School,  University of Manchester, 
Oxford Road, Manchester,  M13 9PL

For more information, please contact :

Simon Davies at Privacy International in London on 
(44) 81 402 0737  or fax (44) 81 313 3726 
(email : Davies @privint.demon.co.uk ) 

                                or 

Dave Banisar at Privacy International in Washington on 
(1) 202 544 9240, fax (1) 202 547 5482  
(email : Banisar@washofc.cpsr.org )






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Andy Wilson <ajw@Think.COM>
Date: Fri, 3 Sep 93 14:35:41 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: programmer's lot
Message-ID: <9309032131.AA10572@custard.think.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



[forwards deleted]

>>From New Scientist, 28 august 93, Feedback column:
>>
>>"The National Westminster Bank admitted last month that it keeps
>> personal information about its customers-such as their political
>> affiliation-on computer. But now Computer Weekly reveals that a
>> financial institution, sadly unnamed, has gone one better and moved
>> into the realm of personal abuse.
>>  The institution decided to mailshot 2000 of its richest customers,
>> inviting them to buy extra services. One of its computer programmers
>> wrote a program to search through its databases and select its
>> customers automatically. He tested the program with an imaginary
>> customer called Rich Bastard.
>> Unfortunately, an error resulted in all 2000 letters being addressed
>> "Dear Rich Bastard". The luckless programmer was subsequently sacked."




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: remail@tamsun.tamu.edu
Date: Fri, 3 Sep 93 15:45:16 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: PEM vs. PGP formats
Message-ID: <9309032237.AA18712@tamsun.tamu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> On the other hand, in terms of anonymity, you can always generate a
> self-signed key with TIS/PEM (I forget the exact term they use in the
> TIS/PEM docs, but you can just make yourself a certificate which
> doesn't really say anything about your identity).

Yes, but this doesn't provide the service I desire. I *want* to be able
to sign a message, but I *only* want the intended recipient to know who
I am. PEM discloses the originator's ID *in the clear* when I send a
signed message. PGP hides the signature and all other information that
identifies me within the encrypted portion of the message!




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: nfe@scf.nmsu.edu
Date: Fri, 3 Sep 93 16:55:17 PDT
To: eichin@paycheck.cygnus.com
Subject: Re:  Gubment Bombmaker's Cookbook
Message-ID: <9309032349.AA13638@NMSU.Edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


  Most of the IMH has been typed in and posted on various BBS's - don't
know of a FTP site for it though... IMH was originally a gvmt publication,
and it's been reprinted by several of the R-wing paramilitary publisers
(paladine press, desert publications, etc.) it has a ISBN number, can be
found, and ordered via Books in print, however will be confiscated by
customs at the canadian border as that sort of thing is contraban in
canada - I don't know about england...
  For the address of some of the paramilitary publishers, and reviews of
some of these books get a copy of the rec.pyrotechnics FAQ sheet. This
includes pointers to FTP sites that have some online "bomb books"...
  btw: IMH is considered one of the more acurate, and safer books of this
kind. The anarchist cookbook is generaly considered the most dangerous
book to the prostective "kitchen chemist" in print...

  hope that helps

ps: rec.pyrotechnics has posts of this type of formula all the time, and 
ANY decent library will have books on explosives. Older High School chem
texts have recipies, and a good encyclopedia wil at least tell you how
to make black powder. police bomb disposal, and pyrotechnics books are
also good sources, as are theatrical special effect books.
  This type of info is widely available to anyone, anywhere! this court
case is obviously pure harrasment.






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: bill@twwells.com (T. William Wells)
Date: Fri, 3 Sep 93 13:15:05 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Remailer Reliability
In-Reply-To: <9309031826.AA09137@ellisun.sw.stratus.com>
Message-ID: <CCsM6D.Cx8@twwells.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


In article <9309031826.AA09137@ellisun.sw.stratus.com>,
Carl Ellison <cme@ellisun.sw.stratus.com> wrote:
: If you want reliability, you can take a page from the fault tolerance
: business.  Replicate the remailers.

If you're going to do that, why not go for extra security at the
same time? Instead of transmitting the same message to all of the
remailers, transmit different pieces to each and then reconstruct
the original from whatever pieces you get. Done right, this could
also be used to make traffic analysis harder.





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Johan Helsingius <julf@penet.FI>
Date: Fri, 3 Sep 93 09:50:03 PDT
To: mbriceno@aol.com
Subject: Re: Crypto Greetings from Russia
In-Reply-To: <9309031218.tn53668@aol.com>
Message-ID: <9309031947.aa00502@penet.penet.FI>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



> Thanks for telling me. I was not aware of that. However, they claim to have
> equipped quite a number of sites. I haved asked them for more info on their
> products. Let's see what they got.

Also, when talking about "quite a number" with regard to X-SU, remember the
scale of things. Relcom/EUnet, the commercial IP network provider out there,
has something like 120 POPs and 20,000 registered domains... And they consider
themselves still in the start-up phase...

	Julf





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: an23135@anon.penet.fi (aragorn)
Date: Fri, 3 Sep 93 12:57:05 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: where can I get the source for BSD mail?
Message-ID: <9309031952.AA21881@anon.penet.fi>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain




I am looking for a copy of the source for BSD mail.
Can anyone help me?


-------------------------------------------------------------------------
To find out more about the anon service, send mail to help@anon.penet.fi.
Due to the double-blind, any mail replies to this message will be anonymized,
and an anonymous id will be allocated automatically. You have been warned.
Please report any problems, inappropriate use etc. to admin@anon.penet.fi.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: b44729@achilles.ctd.anl.gov (Samuel Pigg)
Date: Fri, 3 Sep 93 18:30:31 PDT
To: bill@twwells.com
Subject: Remailer Reliability
In-Reply-To: <CCsM6D.Cx8@twwells.com>
Message-ID: <9309040125.AA27752@achilles.ctd.anl.gov>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>>>>> On Fri, 3 Sep 1993 19:30:10 GMT, bill@twwells.com (T. William Wells) said:

	bill> If you're going to do that, why not go for extra security at the
	bill> same time? Instead of transmitting the same message to all of the
	bill> remailers, transmit different pieces to each and then reconstruct
	bill> the original from whatever pieces you get. Done right, this could
	bill> also be used to make traffic analysis harder.


By breaking a message into pieces and sending them via different paths
to the same destination ("path forking"), this can only make traffic
analysis easier, because all the pieces lead to the same destination,
and you can follow any of them to get to the anonymous recipient.

But there *is* a way this could be useful: implementing a "kill message"
remailer command for pieces that have been forked off from the
original message. This way, a message could split itself into pieces
(or duplicate itself with a different header) and the attacker would
have to determine which one to try to follow to the recipient (or
follow them all), as only one will arrive there and the rest would die
after a number of remailer hops.

I really think that non-deterministic "smart messages" are the way to
go here. A simple command language for the remailers would allow
the header construction software already being worked on by
ebrandt@jarthur.Claremont.EDU (CRM) and others to use tricks
like this to defend against attacks. 
	The defense complexity would be a function of the users'
header construction software and needs. People who need "minimal"
anonymity would have simpler anonymous address blocks, as compared to
those who require "serious" anonymity, and the remailers themselves
would have a lighter load (not having to implement very serious
security for *all* messages-- just those that need it).
	"Smart messaging" would also have the added benefit of
not requiring the remailers to be constantly rewritten as new schemes
are conceived for foiling remailer attack (well, for the most part.)

Sam Pigg                                  dt1acaa@cfraix.cfr.usf.edu
samp@renoir.cftnet.com        <or>       b44729@achilles.ctd.anl.gov
PGP Key Fingerprint: ED A7 49 33 65 90 9A BD A4 E4 C5 92 5A 00 BC 6C






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: miron@extropia.wimsey.com (Miron Cuperman)
Date: Fri, 3 Sep 93 15:05:46 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Remailer Reliability
In-Reply-To: <9309030322.AA20056@netcom5.netcom.com>
Message-ID: <1993Sep3.203107.13987@extropia.wimsey.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu (L. Detweiler) writes:

>C'punks, it seems to me that the anonymous pool idea is underutilized
>by the remailers. I suggest that a remailer variation be developed that
>posts to an anonymous pool (some appropriate obscure newsgroup)

No need to change anything.  Just add a pool address to the
"Request-remailing-to:" line.

-- 
        Miron Cuperman <miron@extropia.wimsey.com> | NeXTmail/Mime ok
        Unix/C++/DSP,  consulting/contracting      | Public key avail
        AMIX: MCuperman                            |




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: doug@netcom5.netcom.com (Doug Merritt)
Date: Fri, 3 Sep 93 20:37:15 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: net.history (flashback)
In-Reply-To: <nowhere@bsu-cs.bsu.edu>
Message-ID: <9309040334.AA19172@netcom5.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> Today, he owns a firm that sells off-shore banking
>services.

Sounds like he might be interested in cypherpunk topics; there's a connection
to off-shore banking that goes further than the obvious.

Anyone know anything about Schneider's firm or other such firms? I've
always wondered how that works, what's legal and what's not, etc.
	Doug
--
Doug Merritt				doug@netcom.com
Professional Wild-eyed Visionary	Member, Crusaders for a Better Tomorrow




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Anonymous <nowhere@bsu-cs.bsu.edu>
Date: Fri, 3 Sep 93 18:45:32 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: net.history (flashback)
Message-ID: <9309040143.AA26741@bsu-cs.bsu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


On Fri, 3 Sep 1993 02:20:00 GMT,
 Bill Murray <WHMurray@DOCKMASTER.NCSC.MIL> writes -
 
> I am reminded of a story, perhaps apocryphal.  In the middle
> seventies Fortune magazine was working a feature on computer
> crime.  Most of the experts that they interviewed told them
> that the security on most of the nation's commercial time
> sharing systems was pretty good.  However, they admitted that
> one convicted felon and hacker, Jerry Schnieder, would tell
> them otherwise.  Of course Fortune had to interview him.
 
 I remember this story, Bill, and I find this correlation
 interesting. It's funny how Schneider's name hasn't really
 surfaced in such a long time. In fact, once I think about the
 real parallels to Herren Doktor's lip service, I find it even
 frightening, given the anticipated impact with which her opinions
 seem to affect governmentalism.
 
 For what its worth, there was another interesting item concerning
 Schneider which appeared in Info Security News this issue, in their
 "Top Ten Events" article of the top ten info-security events since
 the inception of computers.
 
 I relay the pertinent portion of this article below:
 
 "Jerry Schneider was not the first computer crook, which he
 became at 18; nor was he the first computer security consultant,
 which he became at age 21. Still, his antics on both sides of
 the law helped bring computer crime to the awareness of the
 public in general and business managers in particular.
 
 Although still in high school in 1968, Schneider started a
 company called Creative Systems Enterprises and began selling
 electronic telecommunications gadgets he invented. Each day as
 he passed the Pacific Telephone and Telegraph Company office, he
 scavenged the firm's dumpster for discarded equipment that could
 be used to build his gadgets. He also collected a wide variety
 of documents, ranging from invoices to training manuals. Within
 just a few years, he became an expert on telephone company
 technology and business, and reportedly knew more about Pacific
 Telephone's telephone equipment supply procedures than any of
 its employees.
 
 In June, 1971, Schneider set into motion an elaborate plan to
 steal new telephone equipment from Pacific Telephone and resell
 it as refurbished equipment through Creative Systems. Eventually
 the scam would net him hundred of thousands of dollars worth of
 Pacific Telephone equipment. Scneider accessed Pacific
 Telephone's computerized ordering system and by using a telephone
 card dialer succeeded in placing orders for equipment. To
 complete the scam, he needed to learn the telephone equipment
 budgets for individual telephone company's sites, equipment
 inventory levels and other key pieces of information. He
 gathered  the required information by getting access codes to a
 commercial time-sharing service used by the telephone company
 for inventory control and parts distribution.
 
 In January 1972, acting on information provided to them by one
 of Schneider's former employees, law enforcers raided
 Schneider's offices and a warehouse where they found equipment
 the district attorney said was worth $8,000. They also learned
 at that time that Schneider had stolen a total of $125,000 worth
 of equipment. Later, Schneider would admit that he had taken
 close to $900,000  worth of goods.
 
 The day after his arrest on February 8, 1972, newspapers across
 the country called it one of the most famous computer crimes
 ever. "How he Folded, Spindled, and Mutilated," one headline
 said.
 
 In a plea bargain, Schneider agreed to plead guilty to one
 count of grand theft of $5,000 worth of equipment. In July, he
 was sentenced to two monyhs in a minimum security corrections
 institution. In all, however, served 40 days and paid a $500
 fine.
 
 Later that year, Schneider, then only 21 years old, formed a
 computer consulting firm catering to companies that did not want
 to get ripped off by cyber-crooks. He stayed in the business
 until 1977. Today, he owns a firm that sells off-shore banking
 services.
 
 
8<------ Gut Here ---------------
 
Gee, imagine that.

Ye olde Spooge Meister    spooge /spooj/ 1. Inexplicable or arcane code
<spooge@dev.null.net>            or random and probably incorrect output
                                 from a computer program.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: doug@netcom5.netcom.com (Doug Merritt)
Date: Fri, 3 Sep 93 21:17:15 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Remailer Reliability
Message-ID: <9309040413.AA23647@netcom5.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


sameer@netcom.com (Sameer Parekh)
>install-script I can add this little feature. Which newsgroup? Should
>someone create an alt.remail? How exactly would it be implemented? I'm
>thinking that simply the user would do:
> [...]
>	And the remailer would post to alt.remail:

There are two problems here. One is that the remailer exposes itself
and defeats traffic analysis avoidance.

The other is a standard transaction processing sort of problem; the
posting to alt.remail might fail even though all else worked.

Although I've dealt with transaction processing problems, it's a tricky
area, and I don't have a good text on the subject. Any recommendations?

b44729@achilles.ctd.anl.gov (Samuel Pigg) said:
>By breaking a message into pieces and sending them via different paths
>to the same destination ("path forking"), this can only make traffic
>analysis easier, because all the pieces lead to the same destination,
>and you can follow any of them to get to the anonymous recipient.

Depends on how it's done. As stated this analysis implies that traffic
analysis is *always* possible, since after all, the message must somehow
make it to its destination. In other words, I disagree.

Traffic analysers will have access to only some limited subset of
information. If a certain kind of blind remailing with multiple pathways
is practiced, then traffic analysis can be statistically defeated. The
bad guys might sometimes know that X sent a message somewhere.
Other times they might know Y received a message. Only improbably
(under ideal implementation circumstances) would powerful bad guys own
so many machines & networks that they would be able to deduce both
sender and recipient, and even then, if traffic were heavy (as it will
be in some years), it would be a statistical rather than certain deduction.

(This of course raises the (no doubt old-hat) problem that no single
remailer can be trusted, since it might be in the hands of the NSA or
KGB or something. In fact, since the NSA is famous for doing their job
well, this list must have NSA watchers, no question, even without paranoia,
and if I were them I'd be experimenting with remailers even now, to keep
up with trends. We'll never know how many remailers are trustworthy,
so we'll have to use statistical schemes to make compromise unlikely.)

This is all standard parallel remailing stuff. Add to this the possibility
that the different remailing paths may contain message fragments rather
than full messages, and it doesn't really change the security relative to
full message parallel remailing...unless it's done badly.

Badly would mean that some remailer is the one that finally recombines
fragments prior to final delivery. Better is if the recipient's host does the
recombination (and I worry about *that*, too).

This needs to be done in conjunction with other standard cypherpunk fare,
of course. The major design problem I've had is not with security, it's
with fault tolerance. Statistical fault tolerance is available, but I
prefer leaving that kind to the underlying base systems and networks,
and trying to find a top level algorithm that is 100% guaranteed to either
work or report failure, so long as the host systems/networks don't fail
undetectably. A handshake ACK of receipt would help, except that it might
not get back even if the original reached its destination.

Which is why I'm starting to think I need to research transaction
processing more thoroughly; some years back I'd heard that a centralized
server was still state of the art for 100% fail-safe/soft operation. Is this
still the case? If so, then we'll have to fall back on probabilistic
fault-tolerance, to avoid issues of central authority compromise.

>follow them all), as only one will arrive there and the rest would die
>after a number of remailer hops.

This is actually less safe than an approach which requires multiple
pieces to arrive via multiple paths. Bad luck might leave your one
path completely in the hands of bad guys (posing as cypherpunks, let's
say).

>I really think that non-deterministic "smart messages" are the way to
>go here.

This I agree with; but the way that is done is critical.

>A simple command language for the remailers would allow
>the header construction software already being worked on by
>ebrandt@jarthur.Claremont.EDU (CRM) and others to use tricks
>like this to defend against attacks. 

Cool. More info?

>	The defense complexity would be a function of the users'
>header construction software and needs. People who need "minimal"
>anonymity would have simpler anonymous address blocks, as compared to
>those who require "serious" anonymity, and the remailers themselves
>would have a lighter load (not having to implement very serious
>security for *all* messages-- just those that need it).

Strongly agree.

BTW I consider this emphasis on batch mail to be short sighted. I'm
designing for interactive cyberspace. I have a complete algorithm in
mind, except I think it still needs some more OLTP wisdom added in.

People have been telling me for a long while that I should hook up
with cypherpunks; seeing traffic over the last week since I joined
shows me why I heard that from so many sources. Tip of the hat to y'all;
this is a much juicier forum than I had guessed.

I only hope I can continue weathering the storm of heavy traffic, on
top of other email lists. :-)
	Doug




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: albertson@attmail.com (Todd  Albertson )
Date: Fri, 3 Sep 93 21:07:17 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: RE: PGP features
Message-ID: <9309040406.AA23747@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text


My feature list for PGP are simplier.   I just want an integration of
 PGP into a commercial email package (such as Microsoft Mail or Lotus'
 CC Mail).  It can't be that hard to do - can it?
----------
From: Edgar W. Swank
To: Cypherpunks
Subject: PGP features
Date: Fri, Sep 3, 1993 11:46AM

Brad Huntting recently posted:

    Perhaps it's time we polished the edges, added a few of the features
    that are lacking, and wrote up up an RFC for the PGP message format.

    Some features I'd like to see in PGP are:

I've added my comments [with these full margins] as appropriate.

            The ability to send an encrypted message to multiple
            recipients without duplicating the entire message.  The
            most logical way to do this would probably be to encrypt
            the random IDEA key once for each recipient.

??? This has been implemented in PGP since at least release 2.2.
(Maybe 2.1, memory fails).  Just specify multiple UserID fragments in
the command line when encrypting. Note that if you don't specify a
UserID in the command line, you -cannot- enter multiple ID's in the
resulting prompt. This is in the -h help text:

To encrypt a message for any number of multiple recipients:
     pgp -e textfile userid1 userid2 userid3

            There needs to be a facility for having multiple signatures
            on a single document without making the signers sign each
            others signatures.  Besides the obvious application of
            removing a signature from a document, this would also
            facilitate things like petitions where many people could
            asynchronously sign a single document, and latter assemble
            all the signatures together.

This can be done via detached signature certificates, which can be
gathered together and presented with the original document.

To create a signature certificate that is detached from the document:
     pgp -sb textfile [-u your_userid]

            It should be possible (though certainly not mandatory) to
            hide the recipient's identity entirely.

Not currently implemented, but being discussed. You can acheive much
the same effect by using a another key-pair with a pseudonym in the
UserID, to be distributed only through remailers or otherwise
anonymously.

            The message format needs to allow for alternate forms of
            encryption (besides IDEA).  Furthermore, the (shared key)
            algorithm used to encrypt a message should be hidden in
            the RSA encrypted part of the message along with the shared
            key.  Ideally, a list of algorithms could be given which
            would allow the message to be optionally compressed before
            being encrypted, or encrypted two or more times with
            different algorithms.

Not implemented, but has been mentioned.  Triple-DES is one possible
alternative.  You can achieve multiple IDEA encryption by just using
current PGP to encrypt twice (or more).  Even if you encrypt to the
same public key, the IDEA key used will be different.

Compression can currently be turned off, if desired, via a CONFIG.TXT
option, which can also be specified in the command line. Compression
is also automatically turned off if the plaintext is recognized as the
output of PKZIP or other popular compressors.

    If I'm confused and the PGP message format already supports some
    of these features, please correct me.

Consider yourself corrected (:}

--
edgar@spectrx.saigon.com (Edgar W. Swank)
SPECTROX SYSTEMS +1.408.252.1005  Cupertino, Ca





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: anonymous@extropia.wimsey.com
Date: Fri, 3 Sep 93 23:15:36 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: No Subject
Message-ID: <199309040559.AA18179@xtropia>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



 > ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu (L. Detweiler) writes:
 
 >C'punks, it seems to me that the anonymous pool idea is underutilized
 >by the remailers. I suggest that a remailer variation be developed that
 >posts to an anonymous pool (some appropriate obscure newsgroup)

 MC> No need to change anything.  Just add a pool address to the
 MC> "Request-remailing-to:" line.

 MC> Miron Cuperman <miron@extropia.wimsey.com>

Excuse me if I am misunderstanding the "obscure newsgroup" concept, but
is not the "Request-Remailing-To:" feature of cypherpunks remailers
unable to post to newsgroups, but only to individual or mailing list
addresses?  I have been told that only Penet's remailer could remail
directly to newsgroups, obscure or otherwise.

Thanks for any clarification.





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: b44729@achilles.ctd.anl.gov (Samuel Pigg)
Date: Fri, 3 Sep 93 22:15:35 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Remailer Reliability
In-Reply-To: <9309040413.AA23647@netcom5.netcom.com>
Message-ID: <9309040511.AA07959@achilles.ctd.anl.gov>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>>>>> On Fri, 3 Sep 1993 21:13:47 PDT, doug@netcom5.netcom.com (Doug Merritt) said:

	Doug> sameer@netcom.com (Sameer Parekh)
>install-script I can add this little feature. Which newsgroup? Should
>someone create an alt.remail? How exactly would it be implemented? I'm
>thinking that simply the user would do:
> [...]
>	And the remailer would post to alt.remail:

	Doug> There are two problems here. One is that the remailer
	Doug> exposes itself and defeats traffic analysis avoidance.

Not necessarily. If the "post this message to alt.remailer" command
for a smart message were executed via splitting off another message
with its own encrypted header and path through the remailers to an
anonymous posting service. (as suggested by miron@extropia.wimsey.com)

	Doug> The other is a standard transaction processing sort of
	Doug> problem; the posting to alt.remail might fail even
	Doug> though all else worked.

I agree this could certainly be a problem (esp. executed as above.)

	[..]

	Doug> b44729@achilles.ctd.anl.gov (Samuel Pigg) said:
>By breaking a message into pieces and sending them via different paths
>to the same destination ("path forking"), this can only make traffic
>analysis easier, because all the pieces lead to the same destination,
>and you can follow any of them to get to the anonymous recipient.

	Doug> Depends on how it's done. As stated this analysis
	Doug> implies that traffic analysis is *always* possible,
	Doug> since after all, the message must somehow make it to its
	Doug> destination. In other words, I disagree.

No I'm not implying that. But there really isn't any way doing that
could make such an analysis *harder*, as by splitting pieces of the
message off, you have multiple parts all going to the same
destination.  This gives the attacker redundant paths to follow,
and if the attacker can trace *any* message, he can discover
the identity of the recipient. There would be no "dead-ends" for
the attacker. (when I say "follow" I don't necessarily mean follow
in a literal sense, but any traffic based statistical analysis.)

	Doug> This needs to be done in conjunction with other standard
	Doug> cypherpunk fare, of course. The major design problem
	Doug> I've had is not with security, it's with fault
	Doug> tolerance. Statistical fault tolerance is available, but
	Doug> I prefer leaving that kind to the underlying base
	Doug> systems and networks, and trying to find a top level
	Doug> algorithm that is 100% guaranteed to either work or
	Doug> report failure, so long as the host systems/networks
	Doug> don't fail undetectably. A handshake ACK of receipt
	Doug> would help, except that it might not get back even if
	Doug> the original reached its destination.

I agree this is the major problem, with the current state of the
remailers, but it may not be a problem with a stable remailer web and
an "anonymous address server" (see my long laborious boring posts
regarding this from about a week ago.)

>follow them all), as only one will arrive there and the rest would die
>after a number of remailer hops.

	Doug> This is actually less safe than an approach which
	Doug> requires multiple pieces to arrive via multiple paths.
	Doug> Bad luck might leave your one path completely in the
	Doug> hands of bad guys (posing as cypherpunks, let's say).

I don't think so. This way there is only one (or a few) paths that
actually would lead to the recipient, and many "blind alleys" for an
attacker to follow. With the multiple-pieces-same-destination scheme
*any* one path would be enough to determine the recipient.

>I really think that non-deterministic "smart messages" are the way to
>go here.

	Doug> This I agree with; but the way that is done is critical.

>A simple command language for the remailers would allow
>the header construction software already being worked on by
>ebrandt@jarthur.Claremont.EDU (CRM) and others to use tricks
>like this to defend against attacks. 

	Doug> Cool. More info?

I'm not saying that CRM actually uses a command language (it can't--
nothing has been agreed upon/worked out yet!) but tools like CRM
would be able to use a remailer command language to tailor the
message's (or anonymous address block's) anonymity protection.
See that same long, boring post I made about a few suggestions
for what such a language could contain/be useful with.

>	The defense complexity would be a function of the users'
>header construction software and needs. People who need "minimal"
>anonymity would have simpler anonymous address blocks, as compared to
>those who require "serious" anonymity, and the remailers themselves
>would have a lighter load (not having to implement very serious
>security for *all* messages-- just those that need it).

	Doug> Strongly agree.

	Doug> BTW I consider this emphasis on batch mail to be short
	Doug> sighted. I'm designing for interactive cyberspace. I
	Doug> have a complete algorithm in mind, except I think it
	Doug> still needs some more OLTP wisdom added in.

A remailer command language could include instructions to
specify how long to hold this message (possibly to be combined
with some remailer batching functions.)

	[..]

Sam Pigg                                  dt1acaa@cfraix.cfr.usf.edu
samp@renoir.cftnet.com        <or>       b44729@achilles.ctd.anl.gov
PGP Key Fingerprint: ED A7 49 33 65 90 9A BD A4 E4 C5 92 5A 00 BC 6C




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: b44729@achilles.ctd.anl.gov (Samuel Pigg)
Date: Fri, 3 Sep 93 22:55:35 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Mistake (CRM's author == Alex Strasheim)!
In-Reply-To: <9309040511.AA07959@achilles.ctd.anl.gov>
Message-ID: <9309040548.AA09614@achilles.ctd.anl.gov>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain




Oops! 

>A simple command language for the remailers would allow
>the header construction software already being worked on by
>ebrandt@jarthur.Claremont.EDU (CRM) and others to use tricks
>like this to defend against attacks.

ebrandt@jarthur.Claremont.EDU is the return address of the remailer
that sent the message from astrashe@nyx.cs.du.edu (Alex Strasheim),
who is the author of CRM.

My mistake.
(thankfully pointed out by Liam David Gray <lg2g+@andrew.cmu.edu>)

Sam Pigg                                  dt1acaa@cfraix.cfr.usf.edu
samp@renoir.cftnet.com        <or>       b44729@achilles.ctd.anl.gov
PGP Key Fingerprint: ED A7 49 33 65 90 9A BD A4 E4 C5 92 5A 00 BC 6C




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Sandy <72114.1712@CompuServe.COM>
Date: Fri, 3 Sep 93 22:25:35 PDT
To: <cypherpunks@toad.com>
Subject: JEROME SCHNEIDER
Message-ID: <930904051400_72114.1712_FHF52-1@CompuServe.COM>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
  SANDY SANDFORT               Reply to:  ssandfort@attmail.com
 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Punksters,

Just a few comments about Jerome Schneider.  In addition to the
piece in /Fortune/ magazine, there was also a segment done on him
by "60 Minutes."  During that show he did an impromptu telephone
hack for the "60 Minutes" interviewer.  At the end of the segment
when Schneider asked if he had gone straight, he answered "yes."
But when he was asked how we could be sure of that, he replied,
"you can't."  Such a kidder.

Contrary to the mythologized version of his computer crime
career, Schneider was not that technically competent.  What he
was good at was bribing telco employees to get equipment ordering
access codes and other inside information.

Because he was a juvenile when he committed his computer crimes,
he was able to have his record expunged.  He gets mad when anyone
brings up his criminal record, because, by law, he no longer has
a criminal "record."

I met Schneider a few years back when he was in the business of
selling offshore brass-plate banks.  He was in the process of
burning his bridges with government after government from the
Caribbean to the American Trust Territories.

I gave him a call a few months ago to see if he was still selling
banks through his company WFI.  He said that he was out of that
business.  He has a new company called American National
Securities which is a brokerage firm.  If you buy an offshore
bank, he will be more than happy to clear your trades through his
company.

If Doug Merritt, or anyone else is interested in offshore banking
with a Cypherpunk twist, contact me.  I'm working with several
other Cypherpunks on some projects in that area.

 S a n d y

>>>>>>    Please send e-mail to:  ssandfort@attmail.com    <<<<<<
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: b44729@achilles.ctd.anl.gov (Samuel Pigg)
Date: Fri, 3 Sep 93 23:35:35 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: No Subject
In-Reply-To: <199309040559.AA18179@xtropia>
Message-ID: <9309040631.AA11668@achilles.ctd.anl.gov>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>>>>> On Fri, 3 Sep 1993 22:59:48 -0700, anonymous@extropia.wimsey.com said:

 > ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu (L. Detweiler) writes:
 
 >C'punks, it seems to me that the anonymous pool idea is underutilized
 >by the remailers. I suggest that a remailer variation be developed that
 >posts to an anonymous pool (some appropriate obscure newsgroup)

 MC> No need to change anything.  Just add a pool address to the
 MC> "Request-remailing-to:" line.

 MC> Miron Cuperman <miron@extropia.wimsey.com>

	anonymous> Excuse me if I am misunderstanding the "obscure
	anonymous> newsgroup" concept, but is not the
	anonymous> "Request-Remailing-To:" feature of cypherpunks
	anonymous> remailers unable to post to newsgroups, but only to
	anonymous> individual or mailing list addresses?  I have been
	anonymous> told that only Penet's remailer could remail
	anonymous> directly to newsgroups, obscure or otherwise.

	anonymous> Thanks for any clarification.



No, I think that julf's remailer is the only *anonymous* posting
facility (heck there might be more *now*.) But there are several (last
I checked) non-anonymous mail->news gateways on the net, and if used
from a remailer, the only address the mail->news gateway would have is
the remailer's.
	Of course, the remailers could be rewritten to allow posting
capability also. (probably not a good idea, as I doubt many of the
remailer admins would want to suffer throught the controversy that
Julf has had to) but it's up to them.

Sam Pigg                                  dt1acaa@cfraix.cfr.usf.edu
samp@renoir.cftnet.com        <or>       b44729@achilles.ctd.anl.gov
PGP Key Fingerprint: ED A7 49 33 65 90 9A BD A4 E4 C5 92 5A 00 BC 6C




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: nobody@shell.portal.com
Date: Sat, 4 Sep 93 07:36:19 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Denning and the cost of attack against SKIPJACK (fwd)
Message-ID: <9309041300.AA27965@jobe.shell.portal.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


(forwarded from sci.crypt)
On page 14 of the August 30, 1993 issue of Government Computer News
Kevin Power reports that Dorothy Denning told the Computer System
Security and Privacy Advisory Board that SKIPJACK would not be
compromised by exhaustive attack methods in the next 30 to 40 years.

I am reminded of a story, perhaps apocryphal.  In the middle seventies
Fortune magazine was working a feature on computer crime.  Most of the
experts that they interviewed told them that the security on most of the
nation's commercial time sharing systems was pretty good.  However, they
admitted that one convicted felon and hacker, Jerry Schnieder, would 
tell them otherwise.  Of course Fortune had to interview him.  According
to the story, the interview went something like this:

Fortune:  Mr. Schnieder we understand that you are very critical of the
security on the nation's commercial time sharing systems.

Jerry:  Yes, that is right.  Their security is very poor.

Fortune:  Could you break into one of those systems?

Jerry: Yes, certainly.

Fortune:  Well, could you demonstrate for us?

Jerry:  Certainly, I'd be happy to.

At this point Jerry took the reporters into the room where his "Silent
700" terminal was.  He connected to the system that he normally used but
deliberately failed the logon.  When he deliberately failed again at the
retry prompt, the system disconnected.  Jerry dialed in again, failed a
third time, and this time he broke the connection.  He dialed a third 
time but this time he dialed the number of the operator.  

Jerry:  This is Mr. Schnieder.  I seem to have forgotten my password.
Can you help me?

Operator:  Sorry Mr. Schnieder, there is nothing that I can do.  You
will have to call back during normal business hours and talk to the
security people.  

Jerry:  I am sorry too, but you do not seem to understand.  I am working
on something very important and it is due out at 8am.  I have to get on
right now.  

Operator:  I am sorry.  There is nothing that I can do.

Jerry:  You still do not understand.  Let me see if can clarify it for
you.  I want you to go look at your billing records.  You will see that
you bill me about $800- a month.  This thing that I am working on; it is
why you get your $800-.  Now, if you do not get off your a-- and get me
my password so that I have this work out at 8am, by 9am there is going to 
be a process server standing on your front steps waiting to hang paper
on the first officer through the door.  Do I make myself clear?

Apparently he did.

Operator:  Mr. Schnieder, I will call you right back.

At this point he appears to have one or two things right.  He changed
the password, called Jerry back at the number where his records said
that he should be, and gave him the new password.  Jerry dumped two
files and then turned to the reporters.  With a triumphant smile he said
"You see!" 

Fortune (obviously disappointed):  No, No, Mr. Schneider!  That is not
what we wanted to see.  What we wanted to see was a sophisticated
penetration of the software controls.

Jerry:  Why would anybody do THAT?

__________________________



The cost of an exhaustive attack is an interesting number.  It gives us
an upper bound for the cost of efficient attacks.  However, it is never,
itself, an efficient attack.  It is almost always orders of magnitude
higher than the cost of alternative attacks.  The very fact that its
cost can be easily calculated ensures that no one will ever encrypt data
under it whose value approaches the cost of a brute force attack.

History is very clear.  "Black Bag" attacks are to be preferred; they
are almost always cheaper than the alternatives.  After those are
attacks aimed against poor key management.  These attacks will be very
efficient when the keepers of  the keys already work for you 
and where their continued cooperation and silence are assured.

William Hugh Murray, Executive Consultant, Information System Security
49 Locust Avenue, Suite 104; New Canaan, Connecticut 06840                
1-0-ATT-0-700-WMURRAY; WHMurray at DOCKMASTER.NCSC.MIL




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: miron@extropia.wimsey.com (Miron Cuperman)
Date: Sat, 4 Sep 93 03:40:40 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Remailer Reliability
In-Reply-To: <9309030322.AA20056@netcom5.netcom.com>
Message-ID: <1993Sep4.070059.18924@extropia.wimsey.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


miron@extropia.wimsey.com (Miron Cuperman) writes:

>ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu (L. Detweiler) writes:

>>C'punks, it seems to me that the anonymous pool idea is underutilized
>>by the remailers. I suggest that a remailer variation be developed that
>>posts to an anonymous pool (some appropriate obscure newsgroup)

>No need to change anything.  Just add a pool address to the
>"Request-remailing-to:" line.

Actually, an even better idea is to add the header

	Return-receipt-to: <pool address>

at the final hop.  This will send a note to the pool only if the
recipient system accepts the messaFrom owner-cypherpunks  Sat Sep  4 06:45:41 1993
Received: by toad.com id AA01922; Sat, 4 Sep 93 06:40:44 PDT
Received: by toad.com id AA01877; Sat, 4 Sep 93 06:37:26 PDT
Return-Path: <frissell@panix.com>
Received: from panix.com ([198.7.0.2]) by toad.com id AA01872; Sat, 4 Sep 93 06:37:22 PDT
Received: by panix.com id AA15005
  (5.65c/IDA-1.4.4 for cypherpunks@toad.com); Sat, 4 Sep 1993 09:34:21 -0400
Date: Sat, 4 Sep 1993 09:34:21 -0400
From: Duncan Frissell <frissell@panix.com>
Message-Id: <199309041334.AA15005@panix.com>
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re:  Gubment Bombmaker`s 

To: cypherpunks@toad.com

N >it has a ISBN number, can be found, and ordered via Books in print,
N >however will be confiscated by customs at the canadian border as that
N >sort of thing is contraband in canada - I don't know about england...

From the Loompanics Catalog:

"Special Notification Regarding Books Seized by the Authorities

Loompanics Unlimited cannot be responsible for any shipment of books 
seized by any government body.  This applies in particular to Canada, 
where many books are banned, and to prisoners, whose keepers often 
confiscate books.  If you are a prisoner or a Canadian, you are advised to 
check with your authorities before ordering books.  We cannot be 
responsible for books siezed by ANY government, since neither UPS nor Post 
Office insurance covers such a situation.  Be warned!"

Elaine Elansky has set up an account to receive contributions to her son's 
defense fund (he remains in jail in Hartford, CT for his BBS-related 
'crimes'.

They need money.  Send it to:

Michael Elansky Fund
25 Maiden Lane 
West Hartford, Connecticut  06117

or

Michael Elansky Fund
Account # 02060573652
Society for Savings
342 North Main Street
West Hartford, Connecticut 06117

Thank you,

Duncan Frissell

--- WinQwk 2.0b#0
                            




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Johan Helsingius <julf@penet.FI>
Date: Sat, 4 Sep 93 01:37:17 PDT
To: Cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: remailer reliability
In-Reply-To: <2298.2C87C75D@shelter.FIDONET.ORG>
Message-ID: <9309041137.aa03413@penet.penet.FI>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



I still can't reply to M. Stirner because he still uses a illegal user name.

Double periods in a user name is a _bad_ idea. But perhaps he doesn't want
to receive any mail.

> repl: bad addresses:
> 	M..Stirner@f28.n125.z1.fidonet.org (M. Stirner) -- no mailbox in local-part (.)

> Before the
> password mess on penet (which kills automagic replies, unfortunately, as
> they haven't passwords), I used the autoreplies that come form various
> US & foreign sites in response to alt.test postings as a good shakedown
> of penet remailer reliability.

Find out the facts first. You don't need passwords to send to anXXXX users.
Autoreplies work perfectly well. It's just that *your* real return address
doesn't work!

Sorry about sounding irritated, but we have discussed your dysfunctional return
address several times, and you haven't fixed it, instead blaiming the problems
on everything else...

	Julf





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: nobody@shell.portal.com
Date: Sat, 4 Sep 93 14:20:45 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: CRM (again)
Message-ID: <9309042020.AA08831@jobe.shell.portal.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

(Note:  this was sent through a remailer, and the return address is
inaccurate.  My address is astrashe@nyx.cs.du.edu.)

| I'm not saying that CRM actually uses a command language (it can't--
| nothing has been agreed upon/worked out yet!) but tools like CRM
| would be able to use a remailer command language to tailor the
| message's (or anonymous address block's) anonymity protection.
| See that same long, boring post I made about a few suggestions
| for what such a language could contain/be useful with.


CRM doesn't do anything grandiose.  All it does is pick a random path of a
specified length from a list of remailers, and wrap up an input file with
remailing requests, encrypted PGP tags, and nested PGP encryptions.

For example, if you start out with a file like:

- -+---snip-----
Subject:  Just a test...

I'm going to wrap up this file with CRM and make a /bin/sh script that
will mail it to myself through a chain of remailers.

- -+---snip-----

and do one of these:

c:\>crm infile astrashe@nyx.cs.du.edu

you'll end up (with no further intervention on your part) with the /bin/sh
script that's at the end of this post.

If you run that script, it will mail the above short note to me through a
chain of three remailers.  Each of the remailers gets PGP encrypted input. 
The subject line will show up as the subject on my mailer.  (Please don't run
the script;  my mailbox is full enough already.)

The reason I had CRM wrap the final output in a script is that because the
chain of remailers is random, the first remailer in the chain varies each time
CRM is invoked.  This way you don't have to worry about keeping track which
one to mail the cyphertext to.

This is obviously more of a hassle than using elm to send your mail;  but if
you're already writing letters offline and uploading them (which you ought to
be doing anyway, to take full advantage of PGP's protection), it's only
marginally more difficult than mailing stuff without the remailers.  And it
could be argued that it's *easier* to use CRM and the remailers than standard
mailing, because the shell script keeps track of the subject lines and the
destination for you.  You could write ten letters, wrap them with CRM, keep
concatenating the new scripts onto a outgoing mail file, then upload the whole
thing at once and mail it in one fell swoop.

If you want a copy of CRM, let me know.  (Write to astrashe@nyx.cs.du.edu, not
the return address on this post).  It's an msdos program, written in turbo
pascal.

- -+---snip-----
#!/bin/sh
#
# This is a shell script produced by CRM.
#
sed -e '/^BEGINCRM/d' -e '/^ENDCRM/d' << \End_of_File > crm.tmp
BEGINCRM
::
Encrypted: PGP

- -----BEGIN PGP MESSAGE-----
Version: 2.3a

hIwCPhjICRQCw4kBBACpc6PDQEH8FR03Y1nO1IgMiG/ypCqe9c4oFcZzmx8jQaJ+
hDLpM5VcCHCGEQJUcmd0i3FCOFw1qKsWY612BdYMETPGpfDvK7SOqTmzBESF/NHE
VhYgUuk06AYlhpcH5hNZ85DDXJLVLL7EJ/sLWy2mmV0p3CrIHK0aljddQmPbbKYA
AAL0GwZ1Z+1XUvIhKpyk2W4l2fbrGdfflox5TQy8MuBkgSAxelm5DNNdYz7IDD5w
G1X0G/YETmOs//7u7xL8gPAx2dYUi2raLSCXJ941Y4FtRc2W2Eci4M0uiDIYbTNT
45YBFW+emw6jawLvwKj5jlF2QAqn/6wuT1Px+azZSS39z8jyzcClhEEaEQSGBGcg
o1NpSR6Bk9myQG5hEezB7j92s+D6D6APkTtc/LgyX/UG3jkCt86dbrhljoGQcIku
NDS2lWHEJEXUJ4I/QwL8gwZLKcVkyxW1h8GB1Y8/LjfhnrjQXjig1jumPqbzOmBu
1u4exeV/kFADW2iDq8trjzkcBI7k/xGljtkaR1I9lVhIimyMz8bUr1WYuUte5u4P
4SxK9lSdS8TnK4pDwaubDL41aZ4eERNxuquerXbH1x3L7eDbUuerSI+vCM4uinWS
c/ZDsIGYc0xgNzg4bq9ji04KK/FA6Y5HsnKAkdNV2V65GaNxk8IwAlkSQBygvf0R
kdwOkJ+Y1L+k05lkI7N5AXOF+5cZQMw2oZElsF9pvbflzRIkJJBn+//Zx9cDJE6I
SaISCg/c/DFeuH21zyv06Xrs8kRvX7183dD6I40RuGx5pg5eOalbBZFTqda5PV6w
C6jtv2GxjfNYmOFLo/7uRpscrfAr2APvdR6/cTfb869tR22DcfYUOI5COxU0VH++
Lwq5Z6wVykrYWSZbUePO0MjzzRWCnAYOdlbJN0qFJXceNSKKIjYwZR/M4HlUTwYn
14jIfgvekaKWXL2ydk11S2eCPl9GrbNyptJUSjVteMFO333xjeoPMKST/yybvVsH
JTlKy0XfmV3jUzjiOxy2yCLxeTJRjXFK8gKtIPpgfD1TEYdBELDTbQSbqm0f4aWE
uHFEMI59IHPS0Dunu+Yn2QNyCw0NJbvclBUyYqrRFMyPT8R4V8qECYwZtcHbtP2z
eJxRlQNx43GHfS5GxgQdJGB4Urb0y3AhsuEm+gWYoX6xuJSQ+GRX
=42WF
- -----END PGP MESSAGE-----
ENDCRM
End_of_File
mail remail@tamsun.tamu.edu < crm.tmp
rm crm.tmp

- -+---snip-----

- -+
Alex Strasheim | astrashe@nyx.cs.du.edu | PGP public key available via finger


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.3a

iQCVAgUBLIj1fLGKvmrRrQghAQEniQP7BSeTbv9NtzMFAryrXAH0l6HdQ6dFTgxK
AdWGts1zxGhJxoBO+ULwnaApuVgJoFz9iKEJ5GWWjpvs6f4tlG69MiTrb6vTW+0+
H8ceNIC15uyUWQR0fyy28SqgQhQLB2Ys3Y54fPDU5kvZKxa6hi38ZY6hTIg4b8BY
6zWwiGnJI2w=
=kQ9/
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: sameer@netcom.com (Sameer Parekh)
Date: Sat, 4 Sep 93 18:15:47 PDT
To: doug@netcom.com (Doug Merritt)
Subject: Re: Remailer Reliability
In-Reply-To: <9309040413.AA23647@netcom5.netcom.com>
Message-ID: <9309050109.AA13068@netcom5.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



> I only hope I can continue weathering the storm of heavy traffic, on
> top of other email lists. :-)
> 	Doug
	Good luck.. 

	Didn't someone mention a while back a scheme by which a
message can be split up into a bunch of parts and only requires about
50% of them or so to be completely rebuilt? Something like that would
be very useful I think to deal with remailer reliability problems.
That would require a good deal more user work though.

-- 
Sameer
sameer@netcom.com




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: edgar@spectrx.Saigon.COM (Edgar W. Swank)
Date: Sat, 4 Sep 93 19:40:49 PDT
To: Cypherpunks          <cypherpunks@toad.com>
Subject: Phil Z Comments on ViaCrypt
Message-ID: <6gsD0B3w165w@spectrx.saigon.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I received the following comments on ViaCrypt from Phil Z. Reposting
here with permission.  I'll try to forward a summary of your comments.
====================================================================
Subject: Re: Your visit
To: spectrx!edgar (Edgar W. Swank)   *Edgar*
Date: Wed, 1 Sep 93 20:40:08 MDT
From: Philip Zimmermann <szebra!columbine.cgd.ucar.EDU!prz>

Hello Edgar.  Thanks for your hospitality.  I enjoyed our conversations
during my visit.

The PKP/Viacrypt contract requires that ViaCrypt use THEIR OWN RSA
cryptographic engine, not PKP's or RSADSI's.  I will be working closely
with them to ensure that they do a good job on that.  Actually, RSA
calculations are fairly straightforward, and it's hard to screw them up.
I will probably try to get them to stick with my own keygen routines,
if they are allowed to use them in the PKP contract.  The keygen stuff
would be the most important place to look for any security holes.
My discussions with ViaCrypt's president, Lenny Mikus, and his programming
staff, suggest to me that they are genuinely interested in making a very
secure product.

It's possible, I suppose, that maybe I could talk to ViaCrypt about
maybe publishing the source code for the rest of ViaCrypt PGP, minus the
RSA engines that the PKP contract won't let them publish.  We'll see.
The current plans are for them to use the straight PGP source code with
no changes except for using their own RSA engines.  So publishing the
source code would not yield many new insights anyway, since it's the
same.  Other than as a confidence builder, which is nice to have.

You may repost this to cypherpunks if you wish.

Phil

--
edgar@spectrx.saigon.com (Edgar W. Swank)
SPECTROX SYSTEMS +1.408.252.1005  Cupertino, Ca





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "L. Detweiler" <ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Date: Sat, 4 Sep 93 20:46:30 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Denning in Govt Comp News
Message-ID: <9309050342.AA07626@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


FYI, on sci.crypt W.H. Murray passes along quotes of D. Denning in an
article in Government Computer News, p14, Aug. 30, 1993 by Kevin Power.
If anyone could scan this for the cypherpunk collection it would be appreciated.

===cut=here===

From: WHMurray@DOCKMASTER.NCSC.MIL
Subject: Denning on Skipjack
Date: Fri, 3 Sep 1993 00:25:00 GMT

In Government Computer News, p14, August 30, 1993, Kevin Power quotes
Dorothy Denning as saying "I am 100 percent certain that there are no
weak keys."  

William Hugh Murray, Executive Consultant, Information System Security
49 Locust Avenue, Suite 104; New Canaan, Connecticut 06840                
1-0-ATT-0-700-WMURRAY; WHMurray at DOCKMASTER.NCSC.MIL


From: WHMurray@DOCKMASTER.NCSC.MIL
Subject: And again, Denning on SKIPJACK
Date: Fri, 3 Sep 1993 02:30:00 GMT


In the same article kevin Power quotes Denning as having said "The
people at NSA have done more to evaluate than the public algorithm in
DES.  They're way ahead of the game."

I hope Dr. Denning never said anything like that for the record.  Even
if it were true, it would not be knowable.  It would be unprofessional
to make such an unscientific assertion.

William Hugh Murray, Executive Consultant, Information System Security
49 Locust Avenue, Suite 104; New Canaan, Connecticut 06840                
1-0-ATT-0-700-WMURRAY; WHMurray at DOCKMASTER.NCSC.MIL


From: WHMurray@DOCKMASTER.NCSC.MIL
Subject: Denning and the cost of attack against SKIPJACK
Date: Fri, 3 Sep 1993 02:20:00 GMT


On page 14 of the August 30, 1993 issue of Government Computer News
Kevin Power reports that Dorothy Denning told the Computer System
Security and Privacy Advisory Board that SKIPJACK would not be
compromised by exhaustive attack methods in the next 30 to 40 years.

[...]




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Karl Lui Barrus <klbarrus@owlnet.rice.edu>
Date: Sat, 4 Sep 93 21:05:51 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: REMAIL: RIPEM and PGP remailer
Message-ID: <9309050400.AA13534@flammulated.owlnet.rice.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

Cypherpunks,

I have turned my old account (elee9sf@menudo.uh.edu) into a
cypherpunks remailer that supports BOTH pgp and ripem.  In addition to
the pgp pasting token

::
Encrypted: PGP

there is also a ripem pasting token

::
Encrypted: RIPEM

I've just tested the remailer with pgp, ripem, pgp nested inside
ripem, and ripem nested inside pgp, and all the messages have come
back successfully.

The installation went fairly quickly with Sameer's scripts; I
essentially added the necessary lines to the maildelivery file, copied
the pgpmail.pl file to ripemmail.pl (that's what I indicated in the
maildelivery file), altered ripemmail.pl to recognize RIPEM
message delimiters, and changed around the string that is built with
the $system call.

I apologize to those who have asked for a RIPEM remailer for taking so
long; I was bogged down trying to get RIPEM compiled on rosebud, an
HP/UX (cc, c89, -Aa flags: nothing worked; no gcc or disk space to
install gcc, unproto didn't help - I now think the compiler is way
broken).

The only drawback is that account is due to expire sometime.  Plus, if
many people decide to support ripem in addition to pgp the scripts are
going to need some reworking :-)  In order to update the dos batch
files I'll need an MSDOS ripem executable - has anyone seen any?
(Apparently I don't have a command line compiler to build it myself; I
have Turbo C++ for Windows)

Here are the public keys:

For the pgp half

- -----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----
Version: 2.3a

mQCNAiyIBzwAAAEEALgRUlovklKVnasbE6qyNB82RL8emHh6+BwRwt49Yqt/YJaP
Yl7V6k83/pnTE4w73S6rcWBo9jrSH1u1/Fcz7uUbRmGhteuMBEnB64wPqbxKEIrt
vKJAx4xuNkTPGeNBCGOq5RtiEHbEt99hKF2H6lk9iLb8UwQCnV45xNlD3J7pAAUT
tCByZW1haWxlciA8ZWxlZTlzZkBtZW51ZG8udWguZWR1PokAlQIFECyICuyDgOzq
S1rWMwEBE44D/3Wwl0SLFvcN6BHe3BJhh6m1KBs3pRXsy2SBGN/y3+/NVRHbYhgy
Q0MLEAPJ0PZnsJjH1pIyEDnoybcIvFyd5B3e9txawQJvaq238dyuzj5nzaTxe43H
KUlh52fJzLCvXNa035p5ApvkaD1PpdAo6Vk3BGuYGOtEtGQLzLFntaqv
=kIeo
- -----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----

and for the ripem half

- -----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
User: elee9sf@menudo.uh.edu
PublicKeyInfo:
 MFowCgYEVQgBAQICAgkDTAAwSQJCAXLNDW+7UU+XsgEfhDVdhgH0gq68Ss056URr
 3VDg7lSUu61anW2wABEeVEzCgQwYR4/hYdV3rojbADx9UOAp+cOzAgMBAAE=
MD5OfPublicKey: B6DB0C696304C9092F8A4493326461D3
- -----END PUBLIC KEY-----

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.3a

iQCVAgUBLIlj+YOA7OpLWtYzAQEx8gP/YejO5r9+dCAQa2jdypuQTQmZOeLvXZLu
UKK9sfn6Q2HJu0cp+ll0JVKh4qujLCmCFgFAeXwMbdBibJLByIowKzul6W0dNUEq
haLRnhrI/iGiDO9VgD8463TpA7BHxM13t7iJp5TaaYI3KfwIxj7J6H43bjr9Ea6u
aniKxu5WrDI=
=imPY
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

Karl L. Barrus: klbarrus@owlnet.rice.edu         
keyID: 5AD633 hash: D1 59 9D 48 72 E9 19 D5  3D F3 93 7E 81 B5 CC 32 

"One man's mnemonic is another man's cryptography" 
  - my compilers prof discussing file naming in public directories




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Karl Barrus <elee9sf@Menudo.UH.EDU>
Date: Sat, 4 Sep 93 22:25:50 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: REMAIL: sendmail invocation
Message-ID: <199309050521.AA13295@Menudo.UH.EDU>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



I just adjusted the sendmail invocation in the remailer scripts on
menudo to include the -oi option ("/usr/lib/sendmail -oi ").  This
option tells sendmail to not treat a period on a line by itself as the
end of input.

(I remember having fun posting a message where I showed forging a
usenet post - my post had such a line, and the rest of the message
kept on getting truncated.  Miron brought the -oi option to our
attention!)

However, it just occured to me that this is a simple, if unplanned,
way for people who have signatures automatically appended to messages
to use a remailer and have trailing lines cut!  No fancy "cut here"
marks for the scripts to recognize, let sendmail do the work!

On the other hand, I plan to not use sendmail in the long run.  I plan
to upgrade to an smtp package (hopefully to avoid logging like syslog)
sent to me by Peter Honeyman, so I'm going to leave the sendmail
invocation with -oi.

--
Karl L. Barrus - klbarrus@owlnet.rice.edu




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: nobody@eli-remailer
Date: Sun, 5 Sep 93 00:27:29 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: A question about pasting
Message-ID: <9309050727.AA15916@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

This probably a naive question, but:

Is there any way, using a remailer, to paste something into the
header that will provide a return address (different from the
reamiler's) that can be recognized by a garden variety unix mail
program?

Because it seems to me that if it is, then it would be possible
to set up a mail forwarding site that would work in the following
way:

1.   A user would send in and register, possibly (preferably) via
     a remailer chain, a public-key and a remailer return
     address.  A remailer return address would be a PGP encrypted
     command bundled with a remailer address;  the PGP command
     would cause the remailer to forward the mail to the user
     through a chain of remailers.

2.   These would be stored under an alias, either user-defined or
     automatically allocated (like anon.penet.fi).

3.   Once registered, the server would send encrypted mail back
     to the user via the chain, and request that the user take
     some specific action (ie., send mail with the a random ten
     character string in the subject line, or whatever) to verify
     the address.  This would prevent people from creating
     anonymous identities that forwarded mail to someone else.

4.   Once the identity was registered and confirmed, then
     whenever mail is sent to that address, the forwarder will
     encrypt it with the public key and use the remailer chain to
     forward the mail.  The identity of the person sending mail
     to the alias and the subject line would be buried in the
     cyhpertext.

5.   The server will also make the public key of all identities
     available via a mail request, so that signatures can be
     verified by people who want to do that.

The whole point of this is that it would then be possible to have
mail that's very secure (except for traffic analysis).  You could
use PGP encrypted outgoing mail to everyone, even people who
don't know or care about remailers.  Your sysadmin wouldn't know
what your outgoing mail contained or who it was to.  None of the
people operating remailers would know that either, because you're
using a chain.

If you could paste a line into a header that would allow others
to mail to your alias by just pressing 'r' on their mailer, then
you wouldn't be asking your correspondents to sacrifice any
convenience on their end.

The people running the alias server wouldn't know who you really
were, and niether would any of the people running the remailers
on on the encrypted return chain.

The result of all this would be that all of your incoming and
outgoing mail would be encrypted, and the identities of your
correspondents would be hidden, as would the contents of your
letters;  and you wouldn't be depending upon any single person to
hold your secrets for you, because none of the individual
remailers would be able to piece anything together, and the alias
server wouldn't know anything about you at all.  And all of this
would be 100% compatible with the existing email system (you
could communicate with non-participants).

It's almost an axiom that any simple idea like this can't work,
or else it would already be implemented.  That suggests to me
that you *can't* paste something in the header that will
automatically route replies to an alias rather than back to where
the letter came from.

Is that the case?

     Alex
     astrashe@nyx.cs.du.edu


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.3a

iQCVAgUBLImSLbGKvmrRrQghAQGs8QQAsVR4TKqKEda04dYarEuwWgwN5eejQbKP
SCdRwEYhl7UhzcVuTCoRezHeqLYWa56a00hBu3qGY+HE/0VPWns7bmNodt4Ykdxl
sbpPfwTwS+dPDrQBUAIhYSxT1A1dxhjkI5uKK7zj4PqbUjcp0e9BBuiClQk6Yz3K
WXmsJ3byvEw=
=xMN5
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "George A. Gleason" <gg@well.sf.ca.us>
Date: Sun, 5 Sep 93 01:27:30 PDT
To: karn@qualcomm.com
Subject: Re:  Gubment Bombmaker's Cookbook
Message-ID: <93Sep5.012213pdt.14278-1@well.sf.ca.us>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


This case brings up the same larger issue as does privacy in all its forms:
the question of whether and to what degree the protection of the Bill of
Rights extends into the realm of electronic media.  

I strongly suggest it's time to start a grassroots campaign for a new
constitutional amendment which extends all constitutional protections to
include and encompass "any electronic or optical or other means of
information storage, processing, and communication."  With a relatively
liberal, pro-technology administration in the White House, this stands a
better chance of passing now than it did a few years ago.   

A constitutional amendment would put BBSs etc. on the same footing as the
spoken word and the printed page.  Without this, we're doomed to a future of
petty tyrrany and censorship.  

-gg




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: nobody@shell.portal.com
Date: Sun, 5 Sep 93 06:21:38 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Two digital cash technical papers
Message-ID: <9309051250.AA09123@jobe.shell.portal.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


There are two papers at ftp.cwi.nl descibing some of the mathemathics,
/pub/CWIreports/CS/CS-R9318.ps.Z and /pub/CWIreports/CS/CS-R9323.ps.Z

CS-R9318
N. Ferguson
"Single Term Off-Line Coins"

CS-R9323
Stefan Brands
"An Efficient Off-line Electronic Cash System Based On The
        Representation Problem"                  




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: norm@netcom.com (Norman Hardy)
Date: Sun, 5 Sep 93 08:46:00 PDT
To: sameer@netcom.com
Subject: Remailer Reliability
Message-ID: <9309051539.AA01918@netcom4.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


sameer@netcom.com (Sameer Parekh) says:
 
> 	Didn't someone mention a while back a scheme by which a
> message can be split up into a bunch of parts and only requires about
> 50% of them or so to be completely rebuilt? Something like that would
> be very useful I think to deal with remailer reliability problems.
> That would require a good deal more user work though.
 
There was a paper sometime back (10 years I would guess) called
"Sharing Secrets". For any j and k such that 0<j<k you could arrange
that the secret was divided into k parts, any j of which sufficed
to reconstruct the secret. Each part was the size of the secret.
Any collection of less than k parts yielded absolutly no information
even with exhaustive search.
 
If I have a third degree real polynomial y=f(x) and have computed y for
six different values of x then the polynomial can be resonstituted
from knowing any four of those <x, y> pairs. The secret was the
value of f(x) for yet another public value of x. The paper described
how to do this in finite fields.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Karl Lui Barrus <klbarrus@owlnet.rice.edu>
Date: Sun, 5 Sep 93 09:21:01 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Remailer Reliability
In-Reply-To: <9309040125.AA27752@achilles.ctd.anl.gov>
Message-ID: <9309051614.AA27793@flammulated.owlnet.rice.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Samuel Pigg wrote:
>go here. A simple command language for the remailers would allow
>the header construction software already being worked on by
>ebrandt@jarthur.Claremont.EDU (CRM) and others to use tricks
>like this to defend against attacks. 

??

Header construction software for unix and pc's has existed for months
and is available at soda.berkeley.edu

Granted, I'm waiting to validate three of the remailers so the scripts
are a bit out of date, especially the dos batch files...

--
Karl L. Barrus: klbarrus@owlnet.rice.edu         
keyID: 5AD633 hash: D1 59 9D 48 72 E9 19 D5  3D F3 93 7E 81 B5 CC 32 

"One man's mnemonic is another man's cryptography" 
  - my compilers prof discussing file naming in public directories



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Karl Lui Barrus <klbarrus@owlnet.rice.edu>
Date: Sun, 5 Sep 93 09:46:01 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: REMAIL: 9/6/93
Message-ID: <9309051640.AA28953@flammulated.owlnet.rice.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



With all the new remailers, and more to come soon, I thought I'd post an
updated list.

Updated public keys and unix scripts should be available soon; hopefully I'll
update the dos batch files this weekend as well.

NOTE: my new remailer (elee9sf@menudo.uh.edu) is not on this list, partly
because I don't expect it to run for any great length of time.  It is more
of an experiment to support PGP and RIPEM at the same remailer.  If you
missed the public keys, mail to me and I'll send them.

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

Cypherpunk anonymous remailers, 9/6/93

Q1: What are the anonymous remailers?

A1:

 1: nowhere@bsu-cs.bsu.edu
 2: hh@cicada.berkeley.edu
 3: hh@pmantis.berkeley.edu
 4: hh@soda.berkeley.edu
 5: 00x@uclink.berkeley.edu
 6: cdodhner@indirect.com
 7: hal@alumni.caltech.edu
 8: cs60a-qu@cory.eecs.berkeley.edu
 9: ebrandt@jarthur.claremont.edu
10: catalyst@netcom.com
11: sameer@netcom.com
12: remailer@rebma.mn.org
13: elee7h5@rosebud.ee.uh.edu
14: hfinney@shell.portal.com
15: remail@tamsun.tamu.edu
16: remail@tamaix.tamu.edu
17: remailer@utter.dis.org
18: remailer@entropy.linet.org
19: remail@extropia.wimsey.com

NOTES: 

1-6		no encryption of remailing requests
7-19		support encrypted remailing requests
19		special - header and message must be encrypted together
12,17,18,19	introduce larger than average delay (not direct connect)
12,17,19	running on privately owned machines

======================================================================

Q2: What help is available?

A2:

Check out the pub/cypherpunks/remailer directory at soda.berkeley.edu
(128.32.149.19).  

chain.zip             - program that helps with using remailers
dosbat.zip            - MSDOS batch files that help with using remailers
hal's.instructions.gz - in depth instruction on how to use
hal's.remailer.gz     - remailer code
pubkeys.tar.gz        - public keys of remailers which support encryption
pubkeys.zip           - MSDOS zip file of public keys
scripts.tar.gz        - scripts that help with using remailers

Mail to me (klbarrus@owlnet.rice.edu) for further help and/or questions.

======================================================================

Q3.  Email-to-Usenet gateways?

A3.

 1: group-name@cs.utexas.edu
 2: group.name.usenet@decwrl.dec.com
 3: group.name@news.demon.co.uk
 4: group.name@news.cs.indiana.edu
 5: group-name@pws.bull.com
 6: group-name@ucbvax.berkeley.edu

NOTES:

*  This does not include ones that work for single groups, like twwells.com.
#1 apparently blocks anonymous remailer posts
#6 blocks from non-berkeley sites (so use the berkeley remailers :-)

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.3a

iQCVAgUBLIoT9IOA7OpLWtYzAQEyNQP/YeinL8uNCiOLDLVr0U+keX2LOkdyftHb
FYOc56yGa+GcvqZ0KwqQk3cIAhZjdpNoRv6HcFHUcbD25lh77vyP/F/8OCXtRrG1
6708o0gGPcj2CSuzYygSFlfey4bv9FAsIgwe71oHpe5W0u/XxHUlaBFebi+u0310
lRTAiuBNRhI=
=CcA+
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: bill@twwells.com (T. William Wells)
Date: Sun, 5 Sep 93 14:06:59 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: anonymous routing
Message-ID: <CCwDIJ.Cp9@twwells.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I've been thinking about the problem of sending anonymous e-mail
without using explicit routing. Here's one solution.

Each message is comprised of two parts, an encrypted address and
the data to be transmitted. The encrypted address has N parts,
each encrypted so that it can be decrypted by one remailer. These
N parts each contain information such that M of them can be used
to reconstitute the destination address. Note that no indication
is given of which remailer decrypts which; a remailer is expected
to attempt decryption of all of them and to check for success.
When a remailer is able to decrypt a piece, it replaces it with
its decrypted value. It then remails the results, either to a
randomly chosen remailer or to the destination, if it has the M
parts.

Sounds like the mail will never get delivered? Possibly.

	N pieces in the message
	M pieces needed to recover the addresses
	R remailers

If I haven't screwed the math,

H = R * (1/N + 1/(N-1) + 1/(N-2)....1/(N-M+1))

That is, the average number of hops to deliver a message will be
the product of the size of the remailer pool and a factor that is
purely a function of the address information. This number amounts
to an appreciable fraction of the remailer pool unless the number
of pieces is very large. For example, with just two pieces needed
and 20 pieces provided, you'll hit about 10% of the remailers.

Combine this with two things: make all messages the same size and
create a "background" set of noise messages and I think that just
about covers connecting sender to receiver. The only exception I
can think of is that, since a message going into the system has
the same data going out, if the bad guys see it in both places
you're screwed. There's an obvious solution to that that I've
overlooked, right?





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Date: Sun, 5 Sep 93 23:17:07 PDT
To: MIKEINGLE@delphi.com (Mike Ingle)
Subject: Re: Trusted timestamps
In-Reply-To: <01H2LZYT94GA935IO5@delphi.com>
Message-ID: <9309060613.AA18943@netcom5.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Mike Ingle writes:

> There are a lot of additions being talked about for the remailers, and
> timestamping is another which could be put in. With commercial PGP coming
> out, people may soon be doing "real business" using PGP. In this case,
> timestamps can be a problem. A simple example: you sign an electronic

New ideas for "Mom and Pop Timestapping Services" are useful to
discuss, but be aware that several papers on exactly this kind of
digital timestamping have been presented at conferences, mostly by Stu
Haber and Scott Stornetta of Bellcore.

Their system involves a hash of some document which is then published
in an effectively unchangeable place: the pages of the "New York
Times," Sunday edition, form a pretty good "widely witnessed event,"
to use their terminology.

A digital contract timestamped (to the "granularity" of the publishing
schedule, clearly) could not easily be disavowed.

There are some other details. To reduce storage/publishing
requirements, a binary tree of other documents can all be hashed
together, so that only a single number need be published.

Anyone trying to alter a contract, or to claim the given contract was
not in fact timestamped when it was, would have to produce the same
hash value with a different input...this can be made intractable with
a good hash function.

The hash function hides the content of course, so privacy is
maintained.

Bellcore is offering a commercial service to do this. An Internet
service might be exciting (the distribution of NetNews to many
thousands of sites, for archiving on CD-ROMs, tapes, etc., is a lot
like the "widely witnessed event" of publishing in the "New York
Times").

Alternatives to Bellcore may run afoul of patents, though.

-Tim May


-- 
..........................................................................
Timothy C. May         | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,  
tcmay@netcom.com       | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
408-688-5409           | knowledge, reputations, information markets, 
W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA  | black markets, collapse of governments.
Higher Power: 2^756839 | Public Key: PGP and MailSafe available.
Note: I put time and money into writing this posting. I hope you enjoy it.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Mike Ingle <MIKEINGLE@delphi.com>
Date: Sun, 5 Sep 93 22:51:09 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Trusted timestamps
Message-ID: <01H2LZYT94GA935IO5@delphi.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


There are a lot of additions being talked about for the remailers, and
timestamping is another which could be put in. With commercial PGP coming
out, people may soon be doing "real business" using PGP. In this case,
timestamps can be a problem. A simple example: you sign an electronic
contract with someone. Before signing, you set your date a month ahead.
The other person doesn't stop to notice it - many people have trouble
translating numeric dates to month names anyway - and accepts the contract.
Two weeks later, you revoke your key. He can't enforce the contract because
it was made two weeks after your key was revoked. There are plenty of
problems which can be caused by modified timestamps.

One means of protection would be to have future PGP's detect and warn of
postdated timestamps when a signed message is checked. Another would be to
use remailers to create trusted timestamps. The remailer would have a key
labeled < Remailer xx timestamp >. Timestamped messages would not
necessarily be anonymized.

There are several ways this could work. You could send a message to a
remailer and get back a detached signature certificate. Or the remailer
could sign the message and send it on its way. Ideally the remailer would
detect a PGP message, de-armor it, sign the .PGP file, re-armor it, and pass
it on. This way, PGP would automatically check all the signatures on the
received message. You could bounce a message through several remailers and
onto its destination, acquiring several timestamps along the way. Or bounce
it back to yourself to create a poor-man's copyright.

                           -- MikeIngle@delphi.com
  




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: remail@tamsun.tamu.edu
Date: Mon, 6 Sep 93 02:46:15 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Anonymous Forwarding
Message-ID: <9309060941.AA18958@tamsun.tamu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


  Do you have spare email accounts laying around?

  Would you like to have them forward mail to your main account anonymously?

  These are the questions which led me to hack up an anonymous .forward
technique. I figured that I'd use a spare account to receive mail which I 
normally wouldn't want connected to my main address. Furthermore, mail
forwarded to my main email address would be automatically encrypted to
prevent the prying eyes of the sysadmin from snooping.

Anonymous Forwarding
--------------------

  My software works like this. The destination address is prepared
as a standard remailer header and pgp encrypted for one or more remailers, 
e.g.

====================================
::
Request-Remailing-To: my_real_address

====================================

  becomes

===================================
::
Encrypted: PGP

-----BEGIN PGP MESSAGE-----
Version: 2.3a

hIwCPhjICRQCw4kBBACnRARz+qDK21BXcSUba3WjT4NEjoMtq+PZoJujGN2A/Ati
O31UHYpULTP7j8OKBC+4Zuuan2e8CLTG9f3/XgYSuv8YRU5DtKr6bEuDDuojjgfr
/ZudUWTej646ZJTqhrXRQldg/x/Wuu3kx8tby0zf+PcqqOssw7S2rgT6yrrdG6YA
AABFct7lohDMViS01vOxzWr3RYernaqB9bkQmWlGd32TFrbe9bGf6BFBMvlDT8v+
C6xf1qI24mDslNiGoabjd/nCsE6d4EFT
=7jt6
-----END PGP MESSAGE-----
===================================

  These "anonymous return addresses" are stored in the home directory
(e.g. lib/shell.addr, lib/rosebud.addr, etc) on the spare account.

  When an incoming message is processed through .forward, the body
of the message is stored and optionally encrypted with the public key
of the main email account. The software then picks a remailer return address
at random (e.g. lib/rosebud.addr), and appends it on the front of the
encrypted body. This file is then re-encrypted with the public key of the
destination anonymous remailer (optional). I did this so no one sees the
obvious two-part message (pgp encrypted return address and pgp encrypted
body). It probably doesn't add security, but it's optional.

  There is a configuration variable called "chain". If it is higher than
1, then up to "chain" number of remailers are chosen at random and
chained together. Optionally, each new envelope in the chain will use
the public key of the next remailer for encryption.

  So what happens is an incoming message is encrypted, the forwarding
address (which is already encrypted for specific remailers) is
added to an encrypted body and bounced randomly off a certain number
of remailers to the final destination which is the main email account.
Now you're all set to subscribe to alt.bomb.building with your other
email account without fear of it being connected to your "real" account. ;-)


Anonymous Mailing Lists
-----------------------

  Using my anonymous-forwarding script I have thrown together a kludgy
anonymous mailing list program. Not only are the users on this list totally
anonymous but the list address itself is secret! (Don't ya just love
double-blind mechanisms?)

  To subscribe, users simply pgp encrypt a "Request-Remailing-To:"
block as I detailed above and send it to the list request address. The
list software sends out messages using the exact same script as
anonymous-forward. At no time does the mailing list software see the
real e-mail address. Only by collaborating with the operators of 
anonymous remailers can the list operator find out the real
address of a user.

  The list address itself is also secret. Ihe true address is embedded
in an encrypted "Request-Remailing-To:" block and chained through several
remailers. Users post to the mailing list by adding their response to the
encrypted return block and sending it to the first anonymous remailer in the 
chain. (the list software automatically puts the list's return block
at the start of every message for easy response. [no cut/pasting needed])

Hopes, Dreams, and Bugs
-----------------------

  Obviously, with the small number of remailers on the net, and most of
them running from multiuser machines and student accounts, security is
not high. As the number of remailers increase, the probability of a bunch
of remailer operators all collaborating is small. If remailers ever
reach the level of popularity of gopher/fsp sites, it would be near 
impossible to shut down an anonymous mailing list. (there's no postmaster
to complain to because you don't know the true address!)

  Alas, there is currently no way of returning error messages so if something
bad happens, you aren't notified. Shutting down a single remailer in the
chain would be very harmful. A fault-tolerant mechanism is needed and
a robust way of returning error messages.

-rjc

p.s. If I have reinvented the wheel, ignore this message. I didn't see
any anonymous forwarding/anonymous list software on soda so I figured no one
had written any.


  





 




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: rjc@gnu.ai.mit.edu (Ray)
Date: Mon, 6 Sep 93 03:26:14 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Anonymous Forwarding
Message-ID: <9309061019.AA29877@geech.gnu.ai.mit.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



  Do you have spare email accounts laying around? 

  Would you like to have them forward mail to your main account anonymously?

  These are the questions which led me to hack up an anonymous .forward
technique. I figured that I'd use a spare account to receive mail which I 
normally wouldn't want connected to my main address. Furthermore, mail
forwarded to my main email address would be automatically encrypted to
prevent the prying eyes of the sysadmin from snooping.

Anonymous Forwarding
--------------------

  My software works like this. The destination address is prepared
as a standard remailer header and pgp encrypted for one or more remailers, 
e.g.

====================================
::
Request-Remailing-To: my_real_address

====================================

  becomes

===================================
::
Encrypted: PGP

-----BEGIN PGP MESSAGE-----
Version: 2.3a

hIwCPhjICRQCw4kBBACnRARz+qDK21BXcSUba3WjT4NEjoMtq+PZoJujGN2A/Ati
O31UHYpULTP7j8OKBC+4Zuuan2e8CLTG9f3/XgYSuv8YRU5DtKr6bEuDDuojjgfr
/ZudUWTej646ZJTqhrXRQldg/x/Wuu3kx8tby0zf+PcqqOssw7S2rgT6yrrdG6YA
AABFct7lohDMViS01vOxzWr3RYernaqB9bkQmWlGd32TFrbe9bGf6BFBMvlDT8v+
C6xf1qI24mDslNiGoabjd/nCsE6d4EFT
=7jt6
-----END PGP MESSAGE-----
===================================

  These "anonymous return addresses" are stored in the home directory
(e.g. lib/shell.addr, lib/rosebud.addr, etc) on the spare account.

  When an incoming message is processed through .forward, the body
of the message is stored and optionally encrypted with the public key
of the main email account. The software then picks a remailer return address
at random (e.g. lib/rosebud.addr), and appends it on the front of the
encrypted body. This file is then re-encrypted with the public key of the
destination anonymous remailer (optional). I did this so no one sees the
obvious two-part message (pgp encrypted return address and pgp encrypted
body). It probably doesn't add security, but it's optional.

  There is a configuration variable called "chain". If it is higher than
1, then up to "chain" number of remailers are chosen at random and
chained together. Optionally, each new envelope in the chain will use
the public key of the next remailer for encryption.

  So what happens is an incoming message is encrypted, the forwarding
address (which is already encrypted for specific remailers) is
added to an encrypted body and bounced randomly off a certain number
of remailers to the final destination which is the main email account.
Now you're all set to subscribe to alt.bomb.building with your other
email account without fear of it being connected to your "real" account. ;-)


Anonymous Mailing Lists
-----------------------

  Using my anonymous-forwarding script I have thrown together a kludgy
anonymous mailing list program. Not only are the users on this list totally
anonymous but the list address itself is secret! (Don't ya just love
double-blind mechanisms?)

  To subscribe, users simply pgp encrypt a "Request-Remailing-To:"
block as I detailed above and send it to the list request address. The
list software sends out messages using the exact same script as
anonymous-forward. At no time does the mailing list software see the
real e-mail address. Only by collaborating with the operators of 
anonymous remailers can the list operator find out the real
address of a user.

  The list address itself is also secret. Ihe true address is embedded
in an encrypted "Request-Remailing-To:" block and chained through several
remailers. Users post to the mailing list by adding their response to the
encrypted return block and sending it to the first anonymous remailer in the 
chain. (the list software automatically puts the list's return block
at the start of every message for easy response. [no cut/pasting needed])

Hopes, Dreams, and Bugs
-----------------------

  Obviously, with the small number of remailers on the net, and most of
them running from multiuser machines and student accounts, security is
not high. As the number of remailers increase, the probability of a bunch
of remailer operators all collaborating is small. If remailers ever
reach the level of popularity of gopher/fsp sites, it would be near 
impossible to shut down an anonymous mailing list. (there's no postmaster
to complain to because you don't know the true address!)

  Alas, there is currently no way of returning error messages so if something
bad happens, you aren't notified. Shutting down a single remailer in the
chain would be very harmful. A fault-tolerant mechanism is needed and
a robust way of returning error messages.

-rjc

p.s. If I have reinvented the wheel, ignore this message. I didn't see
any anonymous forward/list software on soda so I figured no one had
written any.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Christian D. Odhner" <cdodhner@indirect.com>
Date: Mon, 6 Sep 93 07:16:19 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Key signing, authentication
Message-ID: <199309061407.AA13849@indirect.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Recently there was some discussion about when to sign somebody's public
key and when not to. Does anybody have a short, to the point set of
guidelines on when it is ok to sign? I think minimum requirements to sign
would most likely be receiveing that key from the owner both on and off
the net. That way somebody on the net who is doing man-in-the-middle type
attacks is thwarted, as is somebody who gives you the key off the net with
a false net-id. Anyway, I'm sure there's more to it than that, like are
phone calls ok? I mean, how did you get the # anyway? And what about
meeting the person in the flesh? How do you know they are the same person
you talk to on the net? Thinking too much about this could make a person
.realy. paranoid!
______________________________________________________________________________
Christian Douglas Odhner     | "The NSA can have my secret key when they pry
cdodhner@indirect.com	     | it from my cold, dead, hands... But they shall
pgp 2.3 public key by finger | NEVER have the password it's encrypted with!"
My opinions are shareware. To register your copy, send me 15$ in DigiCash.
  Key fingerprint =  58 62 A2 84 FD 4F 56 38  82 69 6F 08 E4 F1 79 11 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: nate@VIS.ColoState.EDU
Date: Mon, 6 Sep 93 08:01:19 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: please send me info on the Randy Weaver case..
Message-ID: <9309061455.AA05349@nagel.VIS.ColoState.EDU>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



A while back there was a bit about a guy named Randy Weaver, I think in the
mountains of California.  Please send me all the information you may have
on that case... what transpired, what was done about it, anything.

thanks,

-nate 
 nate@vis.colostate.edu





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Matthew J Miszewski <MJMISKI@macc.wisc.edu>
Date: Mon, 6 Sep 93 09:46:21 PDT
To: CYPHERPUNKS@toad.com
Subject: Law Review Articles
Message-ID: <23090611381265@vms2.macc.wisc.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


 
To answer many of your questions, I am alive.  Ive been doing considerable
research and thus been unable to reply to much of my mail.  I am preparing to
write one or several articles for publication on the legal effects of the
internet and of course more specifically cryptography.  Unfortunately, in the
midst of my research i have come along a great deal more i could write about
then first thought.  So, I come to the list asking for input.
 
For those who do not know, Law Review articles help litigators to support
arguments that they need to make.  They are not primary authority but often
times one article will feed on another and develop into a school of thought.
It is important to break into this cycle in order to further legitimize our
(several) causes.
 
Among topics already considered:
      International Data Havens
      Digitial Cash
      Algorithmic Patents
      Electronic Signiture reliability
      Cryptographic Export Laws
      First Amendment and the Net
      Computers, Freedom and Privacy (I wonder if thats a copyright infraction)
      Fair Use Laws and general Copyright
      Telecommunication Laws Effects on Competitiveness
      And a General Overview of the Cryptography Controversy
 
I appeal to the list for further suggestions for topics as well as votes on
which topic is most important to establish now.  I am not locked in to any
particular topic right now but will need to get going soon.  Please forward any
sources (good technical papers and legal sources), and any ideas or thoughts
you may have.
 
To those who care, Im back.  To those who dont know me, Im back.  To those who
have offered help, I have not forgotten or abondoned ship, I will contact you.
BTW, glad to see so much activity on the list.  Keep up the good work.
 
Matthew J. Miszewski
mjmiski@macc.wisc.edu
 




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: doug@netcom.com (Doug Merritt)
Date: Mon, 6 Sep 93 11:51:22 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Law Review Articles
In-Reply-To: <MJMISKI@macc.wisc.edu>
Message-ID: <9309061846.AA08938@netcom.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Here's some more:
        authenticated signatures in regard to digital banking,
                direct democracy (both net and actual government),
		contract law, protection of sources in reporting,
		power of attorney, treaty signatures, anonymity of
		crime tips to police
	international bill of rights (some of these mechanisms potentially
		confer rights that certain governments do not)
	international law enforcement
	enforceability of information import/export restrictions
	evolution of international cooperative inter-government 
		institutions (UN, world courts, world banks, interpol, etc)
		to match evolution of international net activities
	jurisdictional issues of international net activities (what does
		location mean in the net? Can I send an information agent
		to do things that are legal in the target country but
		not locally? What if the target country is indeterminate?)
	future changes in interpretation of sovereignty
	impact of a hypothetical declaration of a new nation in cyberspace
		(considering technical ability to vote, trade, "print"
		currency, tax, implement and enforce contracts, negotiate
		treaties, etc)
	U.S. bill of rights and its transferability to net activities
	U.S. federal versus state jurisdiction over net activities
	ability of existing legal theory to adequately cover such topics,
		including strength of current theories of philosophy of law

Conceivably it's too early in the state of things to address some of these
topics, but they'll all arise at some point, will he nill he.
	Doug
--
Doug Merritt				doug@netcom.com
Professional Wild-eyed Visionary	Member, Crusaders for a Better Tomorrow

Unicode Novis Cypherpunks Gutenberg Wavelets Conlang Logli Alife HC_III
Computational linguistics Fundamental physics Cogsci SF GA VR CASE TLAs




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Eli Brandt <ebrandt@jarthur.Claremont.EDU>
Date: Mon, 6 Sep 93 14:41:25 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Remailer Reliability
In-Reply-To: <9309040125.AA27752@achilles.ctd.anl.gov>
Message-ID: <9309062138.AA15910@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> the header construction software already being worked on by
> ebrandt@jarthur.Claremont.EDU (CRM) and others to use tricks

Urk?

   Eli




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: J. Michael Diehl <mdiehl@triton.unm.edu>
Date: Mon, 6 Sep 93 13:51:26 PDT
To: cdodhner@indirect.com (Christian D. Odhner)
Subject: Re: Key signing, authentication
In-Reply-To: <199309061407.AA13849@indirect.com>
Message-ID: <9309062046.AA04749@triton.unm.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


According to Christian D. Odhner:
> 
> Recently there was some discussion about when to sign somebody's public
> key and when not to. Does anybody have a short, to the point set of
> guidelines on when it is ok to sign? I think minimum requirements to sign
> would most likely be receiveing that key from the owner both on and off
> the net. That way somebody on the net who is doing man-in-the-middle type
> attacks is thwarted, as is somebody who gives you the key off the net with
> a false net-id. Anyway, I'm sure there's more to it than that, like are
> phone calls ok? I mean, how did you get the # anyway? And what about
> meeting the person in the flesh? How do you know they are the same person
> you talk to on the net? Thinking too much about this could make a person
> .realy. paranoid!

Well, I think I started that thread with a query.  I got lots of discussion and 
summarized the (most conservative) concensus in my .plan file.  You can read my
policy by typing finger mdiehl@triton.unm.edu.  Hope this helps.

>"The NSA can have my secret key when they pry
>it from my cold, dead, hands... But they shall
>NEVER have the password it's encrypted with!"

I love it! ;^)

> 
J. Michael Diehl   ;^)  |*The 2nd Amendment is there in case the 
mdiehl@triton.unm.edu   | Government forgets about the 1st!  <RL>
Mike.Diehl@f29.n301.z1  |*God is a good Physicist, and an even 
    .fidonet.org        | better Mathematician.  <Me>
al945@cwns9.ins.cwru.edu|*I'm just looking for the opportunity to 
 (505) 299-2282 (voice) | be Politicly Incorrect! <Me>
Can we impeach him yet? |*Protected by 18 USC 2511 and 18 USC 2703. 
PGP Key = 7C06F1 = A6 27 E1 1D 5F B2 F2 F1  12 E7 53 2D 85 A2 10 5D




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: an23135@anon.penet.fi (aragorn)
Date: Mon, 6 Sep 93 15:12:19 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: generic source for mail available
Message-ID: <9309062207.AA21880@anon.penet.fi>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



sorry about this, it's a bit off the subject, but it will
be very much on the subject if I ever find what I am looking for
and do what I plan to do to it. 

Wanted: generic source code for mail.

I just want to find some source that is not dependant on 
bsd or on SVR4 UNIX.  It's for a "patch" I am planning for mail
and sendmail.

thanks in advance,



-------------------------------------------------------------------------
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Due to the double-blind, any mail replies to this message will be anonymized,
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From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "L. Detweiler" <ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Date: Mon, 6 Sep 93 21:46:31 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: the Warehouse-Elansky-Ionizer case (fwd from CuD)
Message-ID: <9309070441.AA20047@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


This is perhaps the first mostly factual & objective account coming out
so far on this subject at this very preliminary period, but still
plenty of appended bitter ire. Gives more background on Elansky but has
a definite speculative undertone. More info in comp.org.eff.talk. It
doesn't talk about the rather emotional relation of the bail to other
bail rates (e.g., is it true that murder is $100K standard?) There's
some mushy academic rationalization on Elansky as a
product-of-society-and-environment `rebellious youth':

>There is sufficient academic literature on the rebellious subcultures
>of youth to support the claim of excessive posturing, attachment to
>symbols perceived to be anti-social and shocking, and social rituals
>establishing unity and identity among participants in youthful
>"deviant" (a sociological, not a moral label) subcultures. 

oh brother. sounds like something Mr. T.C. May would write :-P

>It appears that Mike Elansky may be less than a saintly naif.
>It also appears that he is hardly a hardcore villain. 

Jim Thomas writes on comp.org.eff.talk 8/6/93 that he talked to the
defense attorney of Elansky, and `it sounded as if the defense is in
disarray' (last Tuesday & Thursday). Attorney D. Brown (203-522-3343)
`just returned from vacation', and was unfamiliar with the case
initially, the cyberspatial angle, and EFF. Nevertheless `His first
concern was to get Elansky released.'

Hence, amazingly, it appears that mobilization and publicity of the
defendant's corner has engaged far faster in cyberspace than in his
local `real world' proximity. Perhaps this signals a turning point for
cases of this type.

Preliminary signs, such as in the document below, suggest the `raid'
was fundamentally ill-considered, and given the sheer nonexistence and
paranoia of the prosecution's case so far revealed, and despite what J.
Thomas expects, I think this will probably be a major victory for
Elansky & BBS operator rights. Of course, in cases like this, for a
clear-cut PR victory, the more innocent and upstanding the victim the
more powerful the propaganda. Steve Jackson was absolutely classic in
both respects, and it is unlikely that any case on computer seizure &
constitutionality so momentous will ever return. However, this one
could rate high up there. (As J. Thomas writes below, however, the
so-far invisible media attention is very frustrating. It is possible
there are simply no major sources or reporters aware of it.)

Following came to the newsgroup comp.org.eff.talk via C.M. Kadie,
himself a modern cyberspatial hero.

(Warehouse is the BBS, Ionizer is Elansky's pseudonym.)

===cut=here===

[From Computer underground Digest Sun Sep 5 1993 Volume 5 : Issue 69,
 ISSN  1004-042X. For a free on-line subscription, send email to
 tk0jut2@mvs.cso.niu.edu. -cmk]

Date: Sun, 5 Sep 1993 14:43:51 CDT
From: Jim thomas <tk0jut2@mvs.cso.niu.edu>
Subject:  File 1--The Ware House BBS Case Reconsidered

Until August 2, Mike Elansky was just another 21 year old student at
the University of Hartford majoring in electronics.  He also ran a BBS
affiliated with the IIRG (International Information Retrieval Guild)
called The Ware House, using "Ionizer" as his handle.

Today (Sept 5), he remains in jail unable to post his $500,000 bond.
His crime?  Judging from newspaper accounts, his family, and his
attorney, it appears to be for exercising his First Amendment rights.
According to the prosecutor's indictment, Elansky's sin involves
creating risk of injury to a minor and advocating violence against law
enforcement agents.  If convicted, he faces up to 10 years in prison.

                              BACKGROUND

The following file elaborates on the details, and there seems little
substantive disagreement over the essential facts of the case.
Elansky was considered by those who knew him as a typically normal
youth with a passion for computers and electronics.  Some have also
noted that he did have an interest in explosives, neither illegal nor
odd, and that he had previous run-ins with the law for relatively
minor, non-violent offenses. This is not unusual in a society in which
up to 25 percent of male colleges students between the ages of 17-22
could say the same thing.  However, nothing officially noted in
Elansky's past seems to provide any reasonable justification for the
current reaction to him.

According to media, the indictment, defense attorney Dick Brown, and
others close to the case, two "anarchy files" led to the indictment.
The files, similar to but not identical with, those found in countless
other similar ASCII files or books (especially The Anarchists Cookbook)
described pyrotechnics. The vocabulary used in the files might be
considered by some to be childish posturing or offensive bad taste.
The prosecutor considered them a direct threat to law enforcement
officers by claiming that they actively advocated violence against
police.  Apparently using a minor to aid them, Hartford police
allegedly downloaded files from The Ware House's file section, and one
in particular drew their attention. According to those who have read
the file and seen the BBS logs, either the file's author or the
uploader, but *not* Elansky, introduced instructions for making an
explosive device with:

      ! Note to
      Law-enforcement type people: !  !  This file is
      intended to promote    !  ! general havoc and
      *ANARCHY*, and     !  ! since your going to be the
      first     !  ! assholes up against the wall.. there
      !  ! isnt a damn thing you can do about   !  ! it,
      pigs!                            !

Silly? Sure. Immature? You bet. Offensive? Depends on your point of
view. In bad taste? Undoubtedly. But, ILLEGAL? Doubtful. Of sufficient
import, even when coupled with pyrotechnic instructions, to warrant
arrest, indictment, and an insurmountable bond?  No way. "Way," says
the prosecutor. According to Elaine Elansky, Mike's mother, the bond
was initially set at $25,000 by the judge, but the prosecutor
intervened and succeeded in raising it.  According to some inside
sources, Elansky was also denied legal representation at critical
points in the initial proceedings.

There appears to be no evidence that Elansky himself advocated or
himself was involved in any activities that advocated violence.  His
apparent interest in explosives, which, according to one informant,
included a legal demonstration of a harmless pyrotechnic display as
part of a licit highschool project, added to the suspicions and
"evidence" against him. However, judging from the indictment, the only
concrete charges and substantive evidence were the "anarchy files."

                       WHAT ARE ANARCHY FILES?

"Anarchy" files have been a common feature of many BBSes since the
emergence of the "computer underground" culture. Their common theme
emphasizes destructive "trashing" often perceived as a primitive form
of social rebellion.  The files range from silly pranks (such as "How
to fuck-up a MacDonalds," which describes "barfing techniques") to
potentially dangerous instructions for making pyrotechnical and
similar devices. Many of the files, especially those that describe
how to manufacture home-made hallucinogens or how to make "weapons"
out of strange combinations of ingredients (make explosives with soap,
vinegar, and talcum powder??), are totally ineffective. Other
instructions are not. However, even the most destructive instructions
that we have seen are simply plagiarized or slightly edited accounts
taken from licit over-the-counter literature or from other sources,
such as U.S. military manuals or highschool/college chemistry classes.
The difference is that creators of anarchy files alter the vocabulary
and rhetoric for a young audience. The new discourse tends to reflect
the social rebellion of youth rather than any serious prescription for
action. And, one is likely to learn more from watching a MacGyver
episode than from most anarchy files.

There is sufficient academic literature on the rebellious subcultures
of youth to support the claim of excessive posturing, attachment to
symbols perceived to be anti-social and shocking, and social rituals
establishing unity and identity among participants in youthful
"deviant" (a sociological, not a moral label) subcultures.  This is a
common part of the maturation process as youths pass from adolescence
to adulthood.  Whether in the form of the counter-culture of the
1960s, "punk-rock"/heavy-metal/thrash-metal" of the last 15 years,
"rap" lyrics that extol violence and misogyny, or even Satanism and
other esoteric and, for some, grossly offensive expressions of
rejection of mainstream society, youth find increasingly creative ways
to shock their elders in a cyclical game of generational freak-outs.

There are, of course, misguided youths unable to distinguish fantasy
posturing from reality.  The most appropriate responses to troubled
youth include non-punitive intervention or, in extreme cases, law
enforcement intervention *after* they violate laws. Perhaps Mike
Elansky is one for whom intervention is appropriate. Or, perhaps not.
Based on the information released to the public so far, there appears
to exist no substantial evidence supporting the indictment other than
the availability of licit, Constitutionally-protected, youth culture
documents symbolizing "wreaking havoc" on the standards of propriety
of adults and "straights," rather than a literal advocacy of physical
assault on persons or property.

                      ISSUES IN THE ELANSKY CASE

Perhaps the prosecutor will find sufficient evidence to try Mike
Elansky for something. Perhaps, even if the facts are as they seem and
evidence of wrong-doing weak, he will be found guilty. After all, the
experiences of Len Rose, Craig Neidorf, Steve Jackson Games, Sun Devil
victims, Rich Andrews, and many others remind us that "justice" is not
always served by the justice system in computer-related cases.
However, the Elansky cases raises broader issues.  Just a few include:

1. THE FIRST AMENDMENT: If, as the prosecutor contends, the files in
question are illegal and subject to felony prosecution with potential
imprisonment, and if, as the next file indicates, the information in
these files is readily accessible to the public through licit
channels, then what is the basis for targeting a BBS sysop for
prosecution while ignoring public libraries and bookstores? Does this
mean that the prosecutor rejects First Amendment protections for
BBSes? If so, the implications for electronic publishing are
staggeringly frightening: It subjects sysops and users to an arbitrary
standard of acceptability that apparently may be determined at the
discretion of individual prosecutors.  Whatever suspicions the
prosecutor may have about Elansky's activities, making the anarchy
files available is the crux of the indictment, and if successful in
his prosecution for making it available, the chilling effect on
electronic publishing will be substantial.

2. ELECTRONIC PUBLISHING: The following IIRG file notes the
availability of numerous anarchy texts and discussions on the nets and
elsewhere. If prosecution of the Elansky case is successful, a
precedent could be established that would stifle both publishing and
public discussion.  If Elansky is found guilty as charged in the
indictment, should administrators at the University of Hartford also
be held liable for making such information available to minors through
its computer facilities? Could other BBS sysops be punished? Would a
user who calls a BBS in New York and downloads the file be at risk for
a federal crime by transporting "illegal files" across state lines?

MEDIA: It appears that Mike Elansky may be less than a saintly naif.
It also appears that he is hardly a hardcore villain.  Perhaps this is
why the media doesn't find his situation worthy of front page news.
But, Mike Elansky, depressing as his situation is, and unjust as his
situation may seem given the current available facts, IS NOT THE
ISSUE.  When The Department of Treasury BBS was criticized for having
virus source code and "underground files" (that included Cu Digest)
available, the story made the front page of the Washington Post, CNN,
the AP Wires, and other media (see CuD 5.51, 5.57, 5.58). When a
poster on The Well, a public access system in California, was using
ASCII to hustle four women, some simultaneously, it made the front
page of the Washington Post, and was given prominent play in Time
Magazine, The Chicago Tribune, The San Francisco Chronicle, and
numerous other papers. On a slow news day, mundane sex and fabricated
scandal sells. Substantive stories that are slow, lack a sexy angle,
or may require thought rather than momentary titillation, are boring.
Yet, the implications of of a kid languishing in jail because he can't
post $500,000 bond for running a BBS with "anarchist" files has
implications of far more import than cyber-sex. Perhaps Mike Elansky
is the next terrorist-from-hell, using his board to plot mayhem, as
his prosecutor suggests. Or, perhaps he is just some young kid who is
being persecuted for exercising First Amendment rights in a form of
persecution that illustrates prosecutorial abuse and trampling of the
Constitution.  Either way, it is curious that those who cover
cyberspace for the major media find "cyber-Lotharios" more worthy of
investigation than a story with substance.  Something is not right in
Hartford, and therein lies the story.

                           A FINAL COMMENT

The battle over symbolic boundaries between "good" and "evil" often
reflects conflicts of clashing values and cultures. When laws are used
creatively as weapons to suppress distasteful, but licit, language and
behavior rather than to enforce the law and ensure Constitutionally
protected rights, then the government abuses the law. To recast former
U.S. Supreme Court Justice Louis Brandeis's 1928 comment, if
government abuses law, it breeds contempt for law and invites people
to become a law unto themselves--it invites anarchy.  Whatever Mike
Elansky may or may not have done, the implications of the ostensible
indictment for publishing "anarchy files" seem to overstep both the
spirit and the letter of the Constitution.  Judging from the facts
currently available, it appears that the handling of the Elansky case
may be another instance of law enforcement excess in attempting to
police cyberspace.  If so, continued attempts by law enforcement to
impose moral standards by excessive use of law cannot be ignored.

Dissemination of information, especially information that puts others
at risk, also entails responsibilities. It strikes me as far more
appropriate to discuss the implications of information made
increasingly accessible by expanding information technology rather
than attempt to establish moral boundaries by fear of prosecution.
-- 
Carl Kadie -- I do not represent any organization; this is just me.
 = kadie@cs.uiuc.edu =





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: gnu (John Gilmore)
Date: Tue, 7 Sep 93 00:16:34 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Four new alt-groups on government agencies we love to hate
Message-ID: <9309070713.AA23639@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


------- Forwarded Messages

From: jkp@cs.HUT.FI (Jyrki Kuoppala)
Newsgroups: alt.politics.org.batf
Subject: cmsg newgroup alt.politics.org.batf
Control: newgroup alt.politics.org.batf
Date: 6 Sep 1993 20:23:46 GMT
Organization: Helsinki University of Technology, Finland
Message-ID: <26g68i$bgh@nntp.hut.fi>
Reply-To: jkp@cs.HUT.FI (Jyrki Kuoppala)

The topic of the group is the discussions and information on the
politics and activities of the U.S. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and
Firearms.

For your newsgroups file:
alt.politics.org.batf	Politics of the U.S. firearms (etc.) regulation agency

------- Message 2

From: jkp@cs.HUT.FI (Jyrki Kuoppala)
Newsgroups: alt.politics.org.cia
Subject: cmsg newgroup alt.politics.org.cia
Control: newgroup alt.politics.org.cia
Date: 6 Sep 1993 20:46:58 GMT
Organization: Helsinki University of Technology, Finland
Message-ID: <26g7k2$c9u@nntp.hut.fi>
Reply-To: jkp@cs.HUT.FI (Jyrki Kuoppala)

The topic of the group is the discussions and information on the
politics and activities of the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency.

For your newsgroups file:
alt.politics.org.cia	Politics of the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency

------- Message 3

From: jkp@cs.HUT.FI (Jyrki Kuoppala)
Newsgroups: alt.politics.org.nsa
Subject: cmsg newgroup alt.politics.org.nsa
Control: newgroup alt.politics.org.nsa
Date: 6 Sep 1993 20:52:36 GMT
Organization: Helsinki University of Technology, Finland
Message-ID: <26g7uk$cmo@nntp.hut.fi>
Reply-To: jkp@cs.HUT.FI (Jyrki Kuoppala)

The topic of the group is the discussions and information on the
politics and activities of the U.S. National Security Agency.

For your newsgroups file:
alt.politics.org.nsa	Politics of the U.S. National Security Agency

------- Message 4

From: jkp@cs.HUT.FI (Jyrki Kuoppala)
Newsgroups: alt.politics.org.covert
Subject: cmsg newgroup alt.politics.org.covert
Control: newgroup alt.politics.org.covert
Date: 5 Sep 1993 21:46:23 GMT
Organization: Helsinki University of Technology, Finland
Message-ID: <26dmnf$ksb@nntp.hut.fi>
Reply-To: jkp@cs.HUT.FI (Jyrki Kuoppala)

As proposed in alt.config 2 Sep 1993.

The topic of the group is various organizations around the world
engaging in paramilitary action, intelligence, spying, covert
operations, ie. the "dark side" of governmental action or action
supported by governments but secret to nearly all citizens.  What kind
of political power do these organizations hold?  How do they use it?
Are they a threat to governments by the people or a threat to freedom
and democracy?  Are they "a necessary evil" in an unperfect world?

For your newsgroups file:
alt.politics.org.covert		Covert ("spook") organizations around the world

------- End of Forwarded Messages





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "L. Detweiler" <ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Date: Mon, 6 Sep 93 23:57:24 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: correction
Message-ID: <9309070653.AA21588@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>Jim Thomas writes on comp.org.eff.talk 8/6/93 that he talked to the

9/6/93 -- Sept. 6.

mea culpa.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: b44729@achilles.ctd.anl.gov (Samuel Pigg)
Date: Tue, 7 Sep 93 05:02:29 PDT
To: klbarrus@owlnet.rice.edu
Subject: Remailer Reliability
In-Reply-To: <9309051614.AA27793@flammulated.owlnet.rice.edu>
Message-ID: <9309071157.AA05471@achilles.ctd.anl.gov>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>>>>> On Sun, 5 Sep 1993 11:14:48 -0500 (CDT), Karl Lui Barrus <klbarrus@owlnet.rice.edu> said:

	Karl> Samuel Pigg wrote:
>go here. A simple command language for the remailers would allow
>the header construction software already being worked on by
>ebrandt@jarthur.Claremont.EDU (CRM) and others to use tricks
>like this to defend against attacks. 

	Karl> ??

	Karl> Header construction software for unix and pc's has
	Karl> existed for months and is available at soda.berkeley.edu

	Karl> Granted, I'm waiting to validate three of the remailers
	Karl> so the scripts are a bit out of date, especially the dos
	Karl> batch files...

Ok.. I'll rewrite it:

>go here. A simple command language for the remailers would allow
>the header construction software already around to use tricks
>like this to defend against attacks. 

The point is that header contruction software would be able to use the
remailer command language in the header contruction to custom tailer
some of the defense against statistical and traffic based remailer
attacks.

Sam Pigg                                  dt1acaa@cfraix.cfr.usf.edu
samp@renoir.cftnet.com        <or>       b44729@achilles.ctd.anl.gov
PGP Key Fingerprint: ED A7 49 33 65 90 9A BD A4 E4 C5 92 5A 00 BC 6C




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: remail@tamsun.tamu.edu
Date: Tue, 7 Sep 93 05:16:37 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: New BBS Trade Group
Message-ID: <9309071209.AA15958@tamsun.tamu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


                              NOMA
                National Online Media Association

                                   Contacts: Phill Liggett
                                             LIGGETT@delphi.com
                                             (203)233-3163

                                             Lance Rose
                                             elrose@echonyc.com
                                             (201)509-1700

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

A new trade association, the National Online Media Association
(NOMA), was formed at ONE BBSCON '93 in Colorado Springs on August
27th, 1993.  NOMA comprises BBS operators, Internet service
providers, and other online media and services.

NOMA's mission is to act for the BBS and online service industry
on matters of national importance by creating an industry presence
in Washington, D.C. and other means; assist its members at the
state and local levels; educate the public on the unique social,
business and legal roles of BBS's and other online services;
establish appropriate industry standards and guidelines;
promote business development in the industry; and maintain and
provide access to resources and industry information for use by the
public and the industry.

An 11 person Organizing Committee was elected to develop a proposal
for NOMA's charter, bylaws, membership requirements, structure, and
form of leadership.  The proposal is to be completed and
distributed within the BBS and online services industry by November
30th, 1993.

Discussion areas are being set up immediately for those interested
in participating in NOMA's early development.  An Internet mailing
list is available to all those interested at natbbs@echonyc.com
(subscribe to natbbs-request@echonyc.com).  A conference area is
also being made available on the Delphi national information
service.

The members of NOMA's Organizing Committee are:

Phill Liggett - Chairperson
LIGGETT@delphi.com

Joe Balshone
BALSHONE@delphi.com

Celeste Clark
BBS #: (805)520-2300

Pat Clawson
76357.3572@compuserve.com

P. Victor Grambsch - Secretary
PVICTOR@delphi.com

Tony McClenny
BBS#: (703)648-1841

Robert Pataki
PUGDOG@delphi.com

W. Mark Richmond
BBS#: (209)685-8487

Steve Sprague
steve.sprague@uboa.org

Jim Taylor
jim.taylor@F5.N310.Z1.FIDONET.ORG

Bill Wilt
wilt@aol.com

In addition, three advisors agreed to assist NOMA's Organizing
Committee:

Mike Godwin, Esq.
mnemonic@eff.org

David Johnson, Esq.
djohns06@reach.com

Lance Rose, Esq.
elrose@echonyc.com

For further information, please contact Phill Liggett, (203)233-
3163 or Lance Rose, Esq., (201)509-1700

Mailing Address:    NOMA
                    c/o Phill Liggett
                    Solutions, Inc.
                    89 Seymour Avenue,
                    West Hartford, CT  06119.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: sameer@netcom.com (Sameer Parekh)
Date: Tue, 7 Sep 93 09:31:38 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: news.cs.indiana.edu
Message-ID: <9309071626.AA13650@netcom.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


	news.cs.indiana.edu oes not appear to be working as an
anonymous news posting gateway. A recent post through my remailer to
alt-security didn't work.

-- 
Sameer
sameer@netcom.com




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: cme@ellisun.sw.stratus.com (Carl Ellison)
Date: Tue, 7 Sep 93 08:06:39 PDT
To: MJMISKI@macc.wisc.edu
Subject: Re:  Law Review Articles
Message-ID: <9309071500.AA17823@ellisun.sw.stratus.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I have two pet issues:

1.	Who Owns Cryptography?

	David Kahn's "The Codebreakers" shows that strong cryptography (as
	strong as that used by the military of the time) has almost always
	been invented by and used by private individuals, throughout
	history.

	The US Gov't (especially the NSA) has been trying to give the
	impression that it owns cryptography.

	The case needs to be made that cryptography inventions occur
	spontaneously in the minds of individuals and that cryptography is
	used to guard privacy (of both files and conversations) in a way
	the government:

	a.	could not control if it tried, short of "1984" style room
		bugging, informants, ...

	b.	should not control because of the 4000 year history of
		private ownership of cryptography.

2.	Export Laws for Cryptography --

	There are three classes of cryptography, logically:

	i.	Munitions
	ii.	Commercial
	iii.	Public Domain

	Munitions cryptography would include systems using government
	classified algorithms or incorporated in physical hardware which
	has been hardened for battlefield use.

	Commercial would include systems which are proprietary to some
	company and sold by that company.

	Public domain would include systems which have been fully published
	(DES, RSA, DH, IDEA, <many older systems>, ...), have been
	implemented from those publications and which are effectively
	already in the hands of any interested high school kid.  These are
	often available on public BBSs, worldwide.  (PGP, for example)

	It makes sense to control munitions via ITAR and commercial systems
	via the commerce department, while leaving public domain systems
	uncontrolled c/o freedom of speech.


What can be done to make these points?

If these are not law review issues, what can I do as a private citizen
to put these forth?

 - Carl





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Forrest Aldrich <visgraph!forrie>
Date: Tue, 7 Sep 93 09:11:41 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Munitions class encryption
Message-ID: <199309071532.AA01937@visgraph.uucp>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I am curious about what constitutes "Munitions" class cryptography; is there
really anything out there available to "us" that is of this "quality" (being
unsure of where pgp stands with this).  If there were, would it be feasible
to have something like this that is software-only-based?  If so, and it
originated outside of the USA, I wonder what the officials would think of
its use.  On that line, I wonder if traffic-analysis isn't being performed
right now to determine where the heaviest use of PGP exists.

Perhaps to some, the idea of traffic-analysis (on the internet, that is) might
sound a bit silly; however, I have been assured that this type of activity
is none-the-less a regular one, and is used for many purposes.  Anyone have
more details?

I had a friend who worked in the COMM center at a former air force base.  He
had a top secret clearance, and said that one of his duties was to separate
(and deliver?) classified printouts.  He said that the stuff he read in
there would 'blow your mind'.  He said that (this was only a few years ago)
the government used encryption cards (computer cards) which were changed
on a daily basis.  Which makes me wonder if "Munitions" class cryptography
would indeed require hardware support.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: collins@newton.apple.com (Scott Collins)
Date: Tue, 7 Sep 93 12:26:42 PDT
To: greg@ideath.goldenbear.com (Greg Broiles)
Subject: Re: Who generates AOCE keys?
Message-ID: <9309071843.AA27927@newton.apple.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


In the software I used (as recently as last Thursday) the keys are
_absolutely_, _positively_ generated locally.  Subsequently the public key
can be mailed automagically to RSADSI to be incorporated into a certificate
which is returned to you.  The latest version of RIPEM Mac uses the same
procedure for the same functionality.

  >>[...] users will get certified keys from RSA [...]

Yes!  _After_ sending RSADSI an uncertified key.


  >>[the user] can generate a key for use on their network

This is the uncertified key.


  >>Apple believes you'll want publically certified keys

Thus, they provide a mechanism to get RSADSI to certify your (self
generated) key.


Scott Collins         | "Few people realize what tremendous power there
                      |  is in one of these things."     -- Willy Wonka
......................|................................................
BUSINESS.   voice:408.862.0540  fax:974.6094   collins@newton.apple.com
Apple Computer, Inc.   1 Infinite Loop, MS 301-2C   Cupertino, CA 95014
.......................................................................
PERSONAL.   voice/fax:408.257.1746    1024:669687   catalyst@netcom.com





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Andrew Corradini/SBDC <Andrew.Corradini@m.cc.utah.edu>
Date: Tue, 7 Sep 93 10:56:40 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Just the faq, jack
Message-ID: <Pine.3.05.9309071153.A9282-8100000@u.cc.utah.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Hiya, and ad-apologies-vance if this is patently obvious...

Just subscribed, and was hoping to find an ftp site associated with the
maillist, any faq-like information, whatever...

Thanks,
Andrew Corradini
asc7556@u.cc.utah.edu






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: nobody@Menudo.UH.EDU
Date: Tue, 7 Sep 93 10:12:34 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: REMAIL: pasting
Message-ID: <199309071705.AA02648@Menudo.UH.EDU>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

Earlier, a question about pasting arose.

The cypherpunks remailers to support an outgoing pasting token: the
double hash (##).  It will paste text into the outgoing mail header.

For example, this message was sent through the remailer
elee9sf@menudo.uh.edu:

- --------------------
::
Request-Remailing-To: cypherpunks@toad.com

##
X-Pasted-By: Karl Barrus

<text of this message>
- --------------------

So there should be an "X-Pasted-By:" in the header somewhere!

I'm not sure about pasting in reply fields to override behavrior.
That dependes on precedence between "From:" and "Reply-To:", etc.
Basically, I'm not real familiar with the appropriate RFC :-)

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9D5xakEYhiM=
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From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: nobody@Menudo.UH.EDU
Date: Tue, 7 Sep 93 10:32:41 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: REMAIL: timestamp
Message-ID: <199309071728.AA04198@Menudo.UH.EDU>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

With all the talk of timestamps, I decided to implement a simple
timestamp on the remailer at elee9sf@menudo.uh.edu.  It is by no means
a cryptographically secure timestamp.

The remailer adds a timestamp header field to outgoing messages.  It
looks like this:

X-Timestamp: hour:min:sec on day:month:year

For instance, this message should have one.

This nice thing about this is that in the process of stripping mail
headers, the remailers will automatically filter the X-Timestamp as
well.  Thus, if a message is chained through several remailers, only
the last remailer's timestamp (if any) will appear in the final
message.

klbarrus@owlnet.rice.edu

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TuhZQHAVR5U=
=U47Z
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: nowhere@bsu-cs.bsu.edu (Chael Hall)
Date: Tue, 7 Sep 93 11:41:41 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: REMAIL: pasting
Message-ID: <9309071839.AA26292@bsu-cs.bsu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


In-Reply-To: <199309071705.AA02648@Menudo.UH.EDU>; from "nobody@Menudo.UH.EDU" at Sep 7, 93 12:05 pm

>
>The cypherpunks remailers to support an outgoing pasting token: the
>double hash (##).  It will paste text into the outgoing mail header.
>
>I'm not sure about pasting in reply fields to override behavrior.
>That dependes on precedence between "From:" and "Reply-To:", etc.
>Basically, I'm not real familiar with the appropriate RFC :-)
>

     My remailer certainly does not support a double hash!  If you want
to paste something into the header with my remailer, put it in the "::"
header block.  For example:

::
Request-Remailing-To: nowhere@bsu-cs.bsu.edu
Subject: blah
Reply-To: an1234@anon.penet.fi
X-Pasted-By: nowhere

<body>

     It will ignore the "##" header block and send it as part of the body.

     By the way, chaos.bsu.edu is currently down...  I screwed up my boot
sector.  I was going to install NetBSD 0.9 anyway, so that's what I'll
do this afternoon or Thursday.

Chael

--
Chael Hall
nowhere@bsu-cs.bsu.edu  00CCHALL@BSUVC.BSU.EDU
nowhere@chaos.bsu.edu   chall@bsu.edu




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Christian D. Odhner" <cdodhner@indirect.com>
Date: Tue, 7 Sep 93 14:01:44 PDT
To: collins@newton.apple.com (Scott Collins)
Subject: Re: Who generates AOCE keys?
In-Reply-To: <9309071843.AA27927@newton.apple.com>
Message-ID: <199309072054.AA27320@indirect.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Scott Colins writes:

> In the software I used (as recently as last Thursday) the keys are
> _absolutely_, _positively_ generated locally.  Subsequently the public key
> can be mailed automagically to RSADSI to be incorporated into a certificate
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
> which is returned to you.  The latest version of RIPEM Mac uses the same
> procedure for the same functionality.

Well, what keeps people from makeing keys with somebody else's name/user
id on them and sending them in to be certified? Where is the
authentication from the key certifier's point of view?

Just wondering.
Happy Hunting, -Chris.

______________________________________________________________________________
Christian Douglas Odhner     | "The NSA can have my secret key when they pry
cdodhner@indirect.com	     | it from my cold, dead, hands... But they shall
pgp 2.3 public key by finger | NEVER have the password it's encrypted with!"
  "If guns are outlawed, only the government will have guns." -E. Abbey
My opinions are shareware. For a registered copy, send me 15$ in DigiCash.
  Key fingerprint =  58 62 A2 84 FD 4F 56 38  82 69 6F 08 E4 F1 79 11 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------









From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: J. Michael Diehl <mdiehl@triton.unm.edu>
Date: Tue, 7 Sep 93 13:16:42 PDT
To: nobody@Menudo.UH.EDU
Subject: Re: REMAIL: timestamp
In-Reply-To: <199309071728.AA04198@Menudo.UH.EDU>
Message-ID: <9309072012.AA27465@triton.unm.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


According to nobody@Menudo.UH.EDU:
> 
> The remailer adds a timestamp header field to outgoing messages.  It
> looks like this:
> 
> X-Timestamp: hour:min:sec on day:month:year

Ya fergot to mention which TIMEZONE you are in!




J. Michael Diehl   ;^)  |*The 2nd Amendment is there in case the 
mdiehl@triton.unm.edu   | Government forgets about the 1st!  <RL>
Mike.Diehl@f29.n301.z1  |*God is a good Physicist, and an even 
    .fidonet.org        | better Mathematician.  <Me>
al945@cwns9.ins.cwru.edu|*I'm just looking for the opportunity to 
 (505) 299-2282 (voice) | be Politicly Incorrect! <Me>
Can we impeach him yet? |*Protected by 18 USC 2511 and 18 USC 2703. 
PGP Key = 7C06F1 = A6 27 E1 1D 5F B2 F2 F1  12 E7 53 2D 85 A2 10 5D



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: collins@newton.apple.com (Scott Collins)
Date: Tue, 7 Sep 93 15:47:40 PDT
To: "Christian D. Odhner" <cdodhner@indirect.com>
Subject: Re: Who generates AOCE keys?
Message-ID: <9309072205.AA05327@newton.apple.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Christian D. Odhner writes:

  >what keeps people from [getting certified] keys with somebody else's name

The The relation between the preferred signature authority for the
installation, and that installation.  From the documentation:

  >Some companies authorized to issue approval files to their employees may
  >require that you sign a printed request form and have it notarized by a
  >notary public. (To create a printed request form, choose Print from the File
  >menu.)  Note:  If you are going to use your Signer as an individual or in a
  >small business, look for the insert that came with this package for
  >instructions on using an outside approval authority. 

  >Print your request and send it, with a copy of the Request file on disk if
  >necessary, to your approval authority.  See the insert that came with your
  >package for details.  Assuming that your request form has been completed
  >properly, the approval authority will send back your Signer Approval file.


...which would seem to put the lie to (the general application of) my
ealier statement:

  >[the key] can be mailed automagically to RSADSI


Which turns out to be true only for the 'low assurance' RSA Persona
Certificate Authority (currently handing out certificates for free) which
does no verification of the user<-->id link.  CAs with more stringent
policies have stronger prerequisites for the issuance of a certificate.

Hope this helps,


Scott Collins         | "Few people realize what tremendous power there
                      |  is in one of these things."     -- Willy Wonka
......................|................................................
BUSINESS.   voice:408.862.0540  fax:974.6094   collins@newton.apple.com
Apple Computer, Inc.   1 Infinite Loop, MS 301-2C   Cupertino, CA 95014
.......................................................................
PERSONAL.   voice/fax:408.257.1746    1024:669687   catalyst@netcom.com





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: nobody@Menudo.UH.EDU
Date: Tue, 7 Sep 93 13:36:44 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: REMAIL: timestamp
Message-ID: <199309072028.AA23070@Menudo.UH.EDU>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Well, I decided to comment out the timestamping (what a short lived
feature! :-)  I'm starting to work on a caching remailer, and the
timestamping info could be used to map input and output mailing pairs 
- especially since I was going to change the stamps to read
"X-Time-In:" and "X-Time-Out:".  That would defeat the entire purpose
of caching...

<klbarrus@owlnet.rice.edu>




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: lefty@apple.com (Lefty)
Date: Tue, 7 Sep 93 15:51:44 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Who generates AOCE keys?
Message-ID: <9309072243.AA09027@internal.apple.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Christian Odhner wonders:
>
>Well, what keeps people from makeing keys with somebody else's name/user
>id on them and sending them in to be certified? Where is the
>authentication from the key certifier's point of view?

The pass phrase.


--
Lefty (lefty@apple.com)
C:.M:.C:., D:.O:.D:.






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: sameer@netcom.com (Sameer Parekh)
Date: Tue, 7 Sep 93 16:51:46 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: news.cs.indiana.edu *does* work
Message-ID: <9309072346.AA22332@netcom.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


	The person using my remailer to send news through the posting
server incorrectrly used hyphens instead of periods to post news.
Sorry about not verifying a simple error like that before posting
about it.

-- 
Sameer
sameer@netcom.com




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: baumbach@atmel.com (Peter Baumbach)
Date: Tue, 7 Sep 93 16:31:45 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: double-blind vs single-blind
Message-ID: <9309072304.AA10914@octopus.chp.atmel.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> -------------------------------------------------------------------------
> To find out more about the anon service, send mail to help@anon.penet.fi.
> Due to the double-blind, any mail replies to this message will be anonymized,
> and an anonymous id will be allocated automatically. You have been warned.
> Please report any problems, inappropriate use etc. to admin@anon.penet.fi.

I have a remailer question.

I see a letter posting an offer on the net.
The person making the offer is not anonymous.
I wish to be anonymous, so I decide to use a remailer to reply.
My reply includes a anNNN reply address.
If the original poster replies back, an anonymous id will be allocated to him.

  This isn't any good.  When the reply arrives, I will see the new 
anonymous id of a user whos real username and address I know!  My
pen-pal would compromise his ability to post anonymously in the future.
How can I send an anonymous message that allows a reply that is not
anonymous?

Keep in mind my pen-pal may not know anything about remailers yet.
(I have yet to use them myself :-)

Peter Baumbach
baumbach@atmel.com




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: frc%bwnmr4@harvard.harvard.edu (Fred Cooper)
Date: Tue, 7 Sep 93 16:16:45 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com (Cypherpunks)
Subject: Remailing
Message-ID: <9309072309.AA08374@bwnmr4.harvard.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

Would it be possible to incorporate a ping into the remailer?  Say give it
a list of known remailers for the chain and have it pick one at random,
then ping it. If the remailer responds then send out the mail, otherwise
pick a new remailer, and repeat....


Or this there a flaw in this that I'm just too ignorant to see?


FRC


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From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: M..Stirner@f28.n125.z1.FIDONET.ORG (M. Stirner)
Date: Tue, 7 Sep 93 21:11:47 PDT
To: Cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: News.cs.indiana.edu
Message-ID: <2424.2C8D46EF@shelter.FIDONET.ORG>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


 Uu> news.cs.indiana.edu oes not appear to be working as an
 Uu> anonymous news posting gateway. A recent post through my remailer to
 Uu> alt-security didn't work.

I had a similar experience during testing this week.  On the other hand,
you should have mailed it to alt.security@ rather than alt-security@,
according to the latest FAQ.

I did successfully test group-name@pws.bull.com however.
.   ~
.   M.
--  
M. Stirner - via FidoNet node 1:125/1
UUCP: ...!uunet!kumr!shelter!28!M..Stirner
INTERNET: M..Stirner@f28.n125.z1.FIDONET.ORG




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Marc Horowitz <marc@Athena.MIT.EDU>
Date: Tue, 7 Sep 93 16:52:41 PDT
To: frc%bwnmr4@harvard.harvard.edu (Fred Cooper)
Subject: Re: Remailing
In-Reply-To: <9309072309.AA08374@bwnmr4.harvard.edu>
Message-ID: <9309072346.AA23274@hodge.MIT.EDU>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>> Or this there a flaw in this that I'm just too ignorant to see?

It's fine, if you don't mind making traffic analysis completely
trivial.

		Marc




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: frc%bwnmr4@harvard.harvard.edu (Fred Cooper)
Date: Tue, 7 Sep 93 17:11:46 PDT
To: marc@Athena.MIT.EDU (Marc Horowitz)
Subject: Re: Remailing
In-Reply-To: <9309072346.AA23274@hodge.MIT.EDU>
Message-ID: <9309080005.AA08479@bwnmr4.harvard.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

How does this make TA trivial?
I am assuming that batch mailings or staggered mailings are occuring.

The remailers are known locations so any traffic between mailers is
assumed to be observed.  The key is making it impossible to correlate
arrival and departure time of any particular message.  Am I missing
something?



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From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "L. Detweiler" <ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Date: Tue, 7 Sep 93 20:31:47 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: the Pitfalls and the Pendulum of Anonymity
In-Reply-To: <9309072304.AA10914@octopus.chp.atmel.com>
Message-ID: <9309080324.AA21869@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


baumbach@atmel.com (Peter Baumbach) raise the problem with the
anon.penet.fi remailer: he sends email to someone who does not have an
ID on the server. They reply, causing the server to automatically
allocate them an ID. He now knows their anonymous ID. This can also
happen if somebody `accidentally' responds to a message directed to
their `cleartext identity' (not sent through the server) anonymously
through the server.

Since no one else has posted on this yet I will.  The short answer is
that you can tell them to use your address `na[x]' and their anonymous
identity won't be revealed, and if they are using the server they might
know that (is it stated in the introduction material? it sure should be).

The collective list psyche realized this was a problem in an epiphany
about 6 months ago (due credit, I recall it was Deadbeat who brought it
to everyone's attention). It was a very lively exchange because J.
Helsingius was also involved simultaneously. (In fact, I'd call it one
of the few great testaments to cypherpunk prowess.) The problem is
rooted in two circumstances:

(1) the server was mainly intended for posting to newsgroups at its
origination, where the automated anonymizing (J. Helsingius' term:
`automated double blinding') makes sense. If someone posts to a
newsgroup anonymously, it is harmless and perhaps beneficial for
replies to that posting to be automatically anonymized.

(2) however, a major use of the server is email-to-email mail, so to
speak. in this case the scenario raised by Deadbeat in the past &
Baumbach recently reveals the pitfalls in the `feature'.

the automated anonymizing feature, implemented with the best of
intentions, has come back to haunt J. Helsingius rather rudely--it is
perhaps the greatest weakness of the server, other than the corrected
`forge-without-passwords' aspect (where someone can forge an email
message from: address and possibly determine anonymous-to-identity
mappings through trial and error if no passwords are used).

J. Helsingius has announced grand visions for the amazing, spectacular,
and impending Mark II server that will incorporate full encryption
(user keys mappings and a server key), along with a new default in
which replies to anonymous email will not be automatically anonymized.
Arriving `sometime in the fall'. If anyone wants it sooner, donate a
hard drive or something to this great living cypherpatriot, who has
personally monitored contributed to the list for suggestions and
maintenance over many months span.

There are multitudes of treacherous pitfalls to anonymity, far more
complex than the mere simplicity of keeping a password secret, and it
requires almost superhuman attention, precision, and cleverness to
avoid them all. It is like juggling multiple identities. In fact, the
studies on multiple personality disorder are very fascinating in this
light. Under an anonymous identity, one must respond as if certain
knowledge is known and other aspects are *not* known. This reminds me
of cases of MPD in which one personality can drive a car, and the other
cannot, for example. Analogously, if I revealed in some anonymous
message that I knew some secret or private aspect of one of my other
identities, `the jig is up'.

In fact, it would be very useful to try to enumerate all the various
pitfalls of maintaining an anonymous identity. One trick might go like
this: carry on a conversation with a person anonymously. Then, suppose
one has a pretty good guess of the person's identity. Send the next
snippet in the dialogue to the cleartext identity of your suspect. If
s/he responds as if nothing was different in the conversation, carrying
it on further, using the anonymous ID or even the regular one, you have
it nailed. If you get the response `what are you talking about?' the
test was inconclusive. This shows the absolute importance of looking to
*whom* a message you received was addressed to! was it to *you* or to
*you* or to ...

Ah--anonymity is such a delicate facade, and it is an apt symbolism on
multiple levels when the only difference between silent secrecy and
horrifying exposure teeters precariously [as if] on the order of the
two typed keystrokes `na'!

p.s. I would like to know if there is a way to (1) automatically get
traffic statuses from anon.penet.fi, and (2) get a list of supported newsgroups.





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: karn@qualcomm.com (Phil Karn)
Date: Tue, 7 Sep 93 23:42:47 PDT
To: clark@metal.psu.edu
Subject: Super Phones?
In-Reply-To: <9309080603.AA04729@metal.psu.edu>
Message-ID: <9309080637.AA12050@servo>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


"Spread spectrum" does *not* imply "encrypted". The spreading
sequences are quite often just simple linear feedback shift registers,
which anyone with basic knowledge of cryptanalysis knows how to crack.

Anyone with knowledge of the signal format and the right hardware
could easily intercept such a signal. This *definitely* includes the
government.

The fact that spread spectrum usually thwarts the average scanner
enthusiast is actually rather unfortunate in my opinion, because that
lessens the demand for truely secure cryptography.

Phil





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Marc Horowitz <marc@Athena.MIT.EDU>
Date: Tue, 7 Sep 93 20:56:47 PDT
To: frc%bwnmr4@harvard.harvard.edu (Fred Cooper)
Subject: Re: Remailing
In-Reply-To: <9309080005.AA08479@bwnmr4.harvard.edu>
Message-ID: <9309080351.AA11068@binkley.MIT.EDU>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>> How does this make TA trivial?
>> I am assuming that batch mailings or staggered mailings are occuring.

That is not currently the case.

And even if it were, sending messages to yourself is going to add a
significant "known quantity" to the remailer traffic.  The more an
attacker knows, the less he needs to figure out.

		Marc




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Clark Reynard <clark@metal.psu.edu>
Date: Tue, 7 Sep 93 22:51:51 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Super Phones?
Message-ID: <9309080603.AA04729@metal.psu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Excerpted from "Wired," August 1993 Playboy (Not THAT Wired)
Reprinted without Permission

Spread Spectrum technology was developed for the military to allow
for high-security communications with crystal-clear reception.  Now 
Cincinatti Microwave has introduced the Escort 9000 ($400), a cordless
digital phone with Spread Spectrum that operates on the recently
approved 900 MHz radio frequency (that's 20 times higher than the 
frequency conventional cordless phones use).  This marriage of 
technologies gives the Escort 9000 a remarkable range
of about a half maile, superior reception and complete privacy.
"Previous attempts to bring Spread Spectrum to the consumer market
have been too costly and too bulky for personal use," said
Cincinatti Microwave president Jacques Robinson, who sells the
phones directly to the public.  (Call 800-433-3487 for more
information or to order one.)  Another company, Cobra, incorporates
CM's Spread Spectrum technology into its latest 900 MHz model, and 
AT & T will introduce a 900 MHz Spread Spectrum phone in the fall.
Tropez and Panasonic also offer 900 MHz phones (without Spread
Spectrum).  It is rumored that the range for some 900 MHz phones
could be increased in the future to up to seven miles, which means 
that one could serve as an around-town alternative to a cellular
phone.

---END EXCERPT

Now, here's my problem with this nice-sounding product.  I called
the 800 number to ask for an explanation of this product, which
immediately aroused my suspicion.

From my conversation with the receptionist on the other end
of the phone, which was somewhat less than informative, the
idea of Spread Spectrum technology is that the signal is
spread out into individual packets on different wavelengths,
then reconstituted at the other end, using some sort of session
key generated at the beginning of each transaction.

Considering the rather lax security of high-ranking government
and military officials with phone technology, recent eavesdropping
on Air Force One and the White House most glaringly, I find
it difficult to accept as kosher any security scheme created
by the government and then offered to private industry.

More chillingly, the receptionist told me that no one would be
able to perform surveillance on me "except the government."

Alerted to this possibility, I immediately asked whether it 
had the Clipper Chip or the Capstone, or whether there was some
sort of key escrow involved.

This got me put on hold for a couple minutes.

Then the receptionist returned, and told me that the person from
the engineering department who took care of the phones had indicated
that not even the government had the technology to monitor these
phones.

Upon asking how and why the government might do this, I received
a rather chilly notification that the engineering department,
was, of course, unwilling to reveal these secrets.  Well, it was
worth a try.

I gave them my address so that they could send me further information.

More reports forthcoming.

You can contact Cincinatti Microwave by telephone at:
(800) 433-3487

or by snailmail at:

Cincinatti Microwave
1 Microwave Plaza             
Cincinatti, OH 45249
----
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7jdAGfohRthw/q1+x/z5nJ7gP2C7AZSlsa+XCYYRZbTR2fpaLXzs8jiGc9glAAUT
tClSb2JlcnQgVy4gRi4gQ2xhcmsgPHJjbGFya0BueXguY3MuZHUuZWR1Pg==
=vJ53
-----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: nobody@rebma.rebma.mn.org
Date: Wed, 8 Sep 93 01:41:51 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Remailing
Message-ID: <m0oaKhR-0001zxC@rebma.rebma.mn.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----


> Would it be possible to incorporate a ping into the remailer?  Say
> give it a list of known remailers for the chain and have it pick one
> at random, then ping it. If the remailer responds then send out the
> mail, otherwise pick a new remailer, and repeat....

One possible problem is that the final destination must then be
available to every remailer.

Say I construct an appropriate header consisting of nested
encryptions, and I use it to send a letter from

me -> A -> B -> C -> destination

where A, B, C are the remailers I chose.  Say that there are a total
of 10 remailers in the universe that are known.

Here, A knows me and B, B knows A and C, and C knows B and
destination.

However, if A chooses a random remailer from [A-J], then it must
somehow make available the final destination to all of the remailers,
since there is a chance that the next hop will be destination.  Now
instead of C knowing the final destination, [A-J] do.

Even if I made C the "final" hop (and it will then forward to
destination), then I have to make C known to all the remailers, where
before only B knew C.

Besides, some people may have set up anonymous remailers that aren't
public or haven't been announced.  

<klbarrus@owlnet.rice.edu>

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XvWER2TtDid8FN1fyj8Pf8sx6OeJ59aTkgGCJ3SjHTIVaU5y/Z1Z4mqGm49tIFBi
6OMh2r+lA7g=
=C7BC
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "You cannot conquer a free man, a man whose mind is free. The most you can do is kill him.  08-Sep-1993 1013" <yerazunis@aidev.enet.dec.com>
Date: Wed, 8 Sep 93 07:16:57 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Spread Spectrum- how it works
Message-ID: <9309081410.AA00883@enet-gw.pa.dec.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


From:	US3RMC::"clark@metal.psu.edu" "Clark Reynard"  8-SEP-1993 01:59:18.22

>Then the receptionist returned, and told me that the person from
>the engineering department who took care of the phones had indicated
>that not even the government had the technology to monitor these
>phones.
>
>Upon asking how and why the government might do this, I received
>a rather chilly notification that the engineering department,
>was, of course, unwilling to reveal these secrets.  Well, it was
>worth a try.

Actually, they aren't telling you, but SS techniques are published widely
in the technical literature.  For a relatively accessible and understandable
introduction, try the ARRL's book "Spread Spectrum Sourcebook", which 
describes not only the theory but also the results of the ARRL's 
experimentation with spread-spectrum technology for radio communications.
It's about $30 from any reputable ham radio supply house, and you 
can mail-order it.

[very succintly, SS works by adding a pseudorandom modulation to the
transmitter carrier that modulates the signal far far MORE than the
actual informational modulation.  For example, a 16-bit CRC register
feeding back on itself can be used.  The output of the CRC register 
(or any other pseudo-random-number-generator (PRNG) can be used as a 
modulator in two ways:

	1) Frequency hopping: the bits in the CRC or PRNG determine (via 
	   a lookup table ("hop set") the new center frequency that the 
	   transmitter will send on.  This freqency may hop a hundred 
	   times or more per second.

		a) ease of detection: easy- you hear a "click" whenever the
		   transmitter hops onto the freqency you're monitoring
		b) ease of interception: very hard- if there are a 
		   few thousand such signals around, you have to splice
		   together 10 millisecond slices from a thousand different
		   sources- and that's a combinatorially prohibitive 
		   problem.  You need to know the "hop set" and the 
		   particular polynomial or psuedorandom sequence to 
		   easily recover the signal.

	2) Direct Sequence: the single low-order bit in the CRC or PRNG
	   determines whether the output signal from the transmitter's
	   primary oscillator (already modulated with the user's voice)
	   is inverted or not.  This translates to massive phase modulation.  
	   If the CRC is clocked at a reasonable rate (say, 1 MHz) then 
	   the output signal ends up with a bandwidth of about twice 
	   the clocking freqency.  
	
		a) ease of detection: difficult- the SS signal shows
		   up in a conventional reciever as broadband noise- easy
		   to not notice.
           	b) ease of interception: very difficult- I haven't the 
		   foggiest about how to go about it.

In either case, to demodulate the signal, one recieves the entire bandwidth,
then either hops their first-stage local oscillator (for frequency hopping) 
or phase-inverts (for direct sequence) the incoming signal.  The result is
a second-stage signal that can be demodulated by conventional means.  The 
only big trick is to synchronize the PRNG on the reciever to the PRNG on
the transmitter.

Another advantage to SS is that it tends to "ignore" strong signals in the
band- any signal that does not correllate against the PRNG modulation is
"spread out" over the entire band by the demodulation operation, while the
correct signal energy is concentrated into a small channel.  This gives
what's called "process gain" and allows a weak spread-spectrum signal to
work even in channels that may be dominated by strong conventionally-modulated
signals.

The ARRL did find that if they knew the bandwidth of the signal they were
looking for they _could_ direction-find on it, using wideband recievers
and notch filters to remove known conventionally-modulated signals from
the signal; once they were close enough to be in the "near field" of the
transmitter standard direction-finding techniques were adequate to DF,
even if they couldn't understand what was being transmitted, they could
find the source. (this was the basis for the FCC's OKing of the use of
SS modulation by hams on the 440 and higher bands- that some form of
accountability was being preserved).

-----

Note that if the PRNG in a direct-sequence SS is replaced by a true 
random number source, we have the equivalent of a one-time pad and 
(I believe) complete security.  However, since the typical demands 
of a direct-sequence system for phase information are in the megabits 
per second, the logistics of "key management" may be utterly impractical.

-----

So, if CM was using either modulation method, and used some reasonable
PRNG (i.e. one with remappings and hopsets determined by user-genned random
numbers) then it is quite possible that the government does not have the
technology _deployed_ in the field to intercept them.  But if they 
need it, I'm sure they will figure out how to do it.  

	-Bill




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: ccat@netcom.com (Chris Beaumont)
Date: Wed, 8 Sep 93 08:11:58 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: The origin of spread spectrum (a true story)
Message-ID: <9309081504.AA05033@netcom5.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I have an interesting perspective on spread spectrum encryption,
because one of the inventors of this interesting technology was my father.
My father,George Antheil,was an avant garde composer living in Hollywood
in the late 30's and early 40's. One of his best friends was Hedy Lamarr,
the movie actress.One of the facts about Ms. Lamarr that many people were
unaware of,was that she was also very intelligent.(She had also just been
married and divorced from a Czeck arms magnate,and had spent much time
listening to her ex-husbands and friends 'shop talk'.) Anyway, she and
my father were very concerned about the Nazi's rise to power,and their
U-boat harassment of international shipping.My father, a composer who was
fascinated by machines (his composition,"Ballet Mechanique" was one of the
very first uses of machines in music.) was working on a composition for
several
player pianos at the time...This led them to the idea of using two rolls of
randomly
punched tape to synchronize a receiver and transmitter in a radio controlled
torpedo.Using this technology (frequency hopping) their torpedo would be
able to be remotely controlled,with virtually no risk of enemy jamming
or detection.And there you have it.I have the patent drawings..which
were done by both of them.. Theyre simply marvelous..
Several years ago, a guy who was writing a book on the history of encryption
called my half-brother to ask him about this story..Correct me if I'm
wrong,but I think this was the absolutely first use of spread spectrum
encryption... The patent was issued in 1940, and expired in 1957. In 1960
Sylvania, (I think) started manufacturing a radio controlled torpedo ...
Hedy Lamarr is still alive and living in Florida, my father died in
early 1959. Neither of them ever saw a penny from their pioneering patent.
Chris Beaumont
(Nutrient Cafe wholesale)
-
Chris Beaumont
ccat@netcom.com
ccat@casa.stanford.edu           public key available via finger





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Christian D. Odhner" <cdodhner@indirect.com>
Date: Wed, 8 Sep 93 08:16:58 PDT
To: lefty@apple.com (Lefty)
Subject: Re: Who generates AOCE keys?
In-Reply-To: <9309072243.AA09027@internal.apple.com>
Message-ID: <199309081511.AA09223@indirect.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> Christian Odhner wonders:
> >
> >Well, what keeps people from makeing keys with somebody else's name/user
> >id on them and sending them in to be certified? Where is the
> >authentication from the key certifier's point of view?
> 
> The pass phrase.
> 
> 
> --
> Lefty (lefty@apple.com)
> C:.M:.C:., D:.O:.D:.

And who chooses the pass phrase, and how is it transmited between parties,
and how is it linked to the keypair/user (is the key encrypted with it
like pgp?) ?
Just thinking some more... <Damn, gotta stop doin that...>  ;)

Happy Hunting, -Chris

______________________________________________________________________________
Christian Douglas Odhner     | "The NSA can have my secret key when they pry
cdodhner@indirect.com	     | it from my cold, dead, hands... But they shall
pgp 2.3 public key by finger | NEVER have the password it's encrypted with!"
  "If guns are outlawed, only the government will have guns." -E. Abbey
My opinions are shareware. For a registered copy, send me 15$ in DigiCash.
  Key fingerprint =  58 62 A2 84 FD 4F 56 38  82 69 6F 08 E4 F1 79 11 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------



Ps, Why is the sky blue?





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Christian D. Odhner" <cdodhner@indirect.com>
Date: Wed, 8 Sep 93 08:22:54 PDT
To: collins@newton.apple.com (Scott Collins)
Subject: Re: Who generates AOCE keys?
In-Reply-To: <9309072205.AA05327@newton.apple.com>
Message-ID: <199309081517.AA09544@indirect.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> Christian D. Odhner writes:
> 
>   >what keeps people from [getting certified] keys with somebody else's name
> 
> The The relation between the preferred signature authority for the
> installation, and that installation.  From the documentation:
> 
[good stuff from docs deleted]
> 
> Hope this helps,
> 
> 
> Scott Collins         

Oh, ok :> I realy get it now! Thanks. Sorry about the previous post,
everybody...

______________________________________________________________________________
Christian Douglas Odhner     | "The NSA can have my secret key when they pry
cdodhner@indirect.com	     | it from my cold, dead, hands... But they shall
pgp 2.3 public key by finger | NEVER have the password it's encrypted with!"
  "If guns are outlawed, only the government will have guns." -E. Abbey
My opinions are shareware. For a registered copy, send me 15$ in DigiCash.
  Key fingerprint =  58 62 A2 84 FD 4F 56 38  82 69 6F 08 E4 F1 79 11 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------









From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: pat@tstc.edu (Patrick E. Hykkonen)
Date: Wed, 8 Sep 93 06:51:57 PDT
To: clark@metal.psu.edu (Clark Reynard)
Subject: Re: Super Phones?
In-Reply-To: <9309080603.AA04729@metal.psu.edu>
Message-ID: <9309081345.AA09213@tstc.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> Now, here's my problem with this nice-sounding product.  I called
> the 800 number to ask for an explanation of this product, which
> immediately aroused my suspicion.
> 
> >From my conversation with the receptionist on the other end
> of the phone, which was somewhat less than informative, the
> idea of Spread Spectrum technology is that the signal is
> spread out into individual packets on different wavelengths,
> then reconstituted at the other end, using some sort of session
> key generated at the beginning of each transaction.

Essentially this is correct, but as Phil Karn already pointed out... spread
spectrum is easy to de-spread.

However, Motorola has a cordless phone called the Secure Clear phone that
operates at 46 to 50 MHz (standard cordless phone freqs.) that has 
"encryption" between the handset and the base.

After calling motorola I am not impressed... they use frequency inversion.
Their support person stated that the goal is to "stop casual eavesdroppers 
that might use baby-monitors or police scanners."  Which is fine and good.
I know, from personal experience, the problems that can arise from cordless
telephones being monitored and the information used against a person.

The Motorola and Cincinatti Microwave phones can help with the casual listeners
that are out there (and there are quite a few of them!), but neither will
stop an interested party with resources to spare.  :)

-- 
"I'm not being irrational, I just know to much."  - Tim Allen
--
Pat Hykkonen, N5NPL                     Texas State Technical College at Waco
Internet: {pat,postmaster,root}@tstc.edu       Instructional Network Services
Packet: N5NPL@WD5KAL.#CENTX.TX.USA.NA        3801 Campus Dr.  Waco, Tx  76705
Public keys available! ** 1984 + 10 **     V:(817) 867-4830  F:(817) 799-2843




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: hughes@ah.com (Eric Hughes)
Date: Wed, 8 Sep 93 11:17:57 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: REMAIL: pasting
In-Reply-To: <199309071705.AA02648@Menudo.UH.EDU>
Message-ID: <9309081810.AA00635@ah.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>I'm not sure about pasting in reply fields to override behavrior.
>That dependes on precedence between "From:" and "Reply-To:", etc.
>Basically, I'm not real familiar with the appropriate RFC :-)

In short, if there's a Reply-To: field present, the mailer is supposed
to reply to that address.  Some mailers don't, unfortunately.  Some
reply to the From: line in the mail, and some reply to the out of band
sender information, usually seen in the "From " line at the top of the
mail.

Let's face it, header pasting is a hack.  A very nice hack, in certain
ways, but still a hack.  As currently implemented, header pasting, be
it incoming (::) or outgoing (##), is a syntactic operator, not a
semantic one.

The relevant RFC is 822, "STANDARD FOR THE FORMAT OF ARPA INTERNET
TEXT MESSAGES".  This RFC has several holes in it, however.

The syntactic structure of the header fields indicates that the only
fields which may appear multiple times are receiver fields (To, cc,
bcc, and the Resent-* version of these), Received, and the optional
fields.  (I avoid a too-long discussion of the Resent-* fields, whose
description seems to contradict this definition.)  Therefore, it is
possible to make syntactically counter-spec mail using header pasting.
It is also possible to make such counter-spec mail in emacs mail mode,
for example, but it doesn't seem to bother anybody much.

Yet RFC-822 is followed as much in the breach as in the observance.
In particular, 822 seems to specify that the recipient of the mail be
contained in one of the destination fields.  Yet sendmail takes
parameters on the command line for the destination and ignores the To:
field inside the message.  Now there is a flag for sendmail to parse
the mail and determine addresses, but this is not the default, much
less required.  I think this behavior of sendmail is good, but it does
appear to be counter to the semantic interpretation of the destination
fields as specified in 822.

My own philosophy on this is that one should never flagrantly violate
822 syntactically, and to take it semantically with a grain of salt.

What are the implications for header pasting?  I think it ought to
remain only syntactic, since the semantics that would need to be
defined do not have a solid base in specification, much less in
implementation.

Yet this pasting does not allow 'overriding' of an existing header
field.  One could write an operator that removes header fields in the
context of header pasting.  In the current remailer situation, this
operator would allow one to remove the "From:" field and substitute
another--instant in-band forgery.

Whether the operators of remailers want to do this is left for
discussion.

Eric




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: hughes@ah.com (Eric Hughes)
Date: Wed, 8 Sep 93 12:37:02 PDT
To: cypherpunks-announce@toad.com
Subject: Second Annual Cypherpunks Conference
Message-ID: <9309081916.AA00730@ah.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


ANNOUNCEMENT
============

Second Annual Cypherpunks Conference
Saturday, September 11, 1993
12:00 noon
Cygnus Support, Mt. View, California, USA

One hear ago this month, the first cypherpunks meeting was held in
Oakland, CA.  Therefore, the September Bay Area meeting is
megalomaniacally named

	The Second Annual Cypherpunks Conference and Banquet

(but really, we'll just go out to dinner afterwards like normal.)
The theme this year is

			Where are my turnips?

		    Visions of cypherpunk futures
		     and Paths to implementation

Agenda
------

In no particular order

-- Tim May, "We are in a cryptographic arms race."

-- Other visionary statements from other attendees

-- Inspirational reading from _Temporary Autonomous Zone_ written by
	Hakim Bey.  

-- An as-yet unverified presentation on patent law.


I encourage people to prepare short position statements to be read
aloud at the meeting.  Topics should center around what you want out
of a cypherpunk future and how you'd go about getting there.  Tim has
already explicitly scheduled his time; others may do so as well by
sending me mail (hughes@ah.com).

Eric Hughes


DIRECTIONS
==========
[Directions to Cygnus provided by John Gilmore. -- EH]

	Cygnus Support
	1937 Landings Drive
	Mt. View, CA  94043
	+1 415 903 1400   switchboard
	+1 415 903 1418   John Gilmore

Take US 101 toward Mt. View.  From San Francisco, it's about a
40-minute drive.  Get off at the Rengstorff Ave/Amphitheatre Parkway
exit.  If you were heading south on 101, you curve around to the
right, cross over the freeway, and get to a stoplight.  If you were
heading north on 101, you just come right off the exit to the
stoplight.  The light is the intersection of Amphitheatre and
Charleston Rd.  Take a right on Charleston; there's a right-turn-only
lane.

Follow Charleston for a short distance.  You'll pass the
Metaphor/Kaleida buildings on the right.  At a clump of palm trees and
a "Landmark Deli" sign, take a right into Landings Drive.  At the end
of the road, turn left into the complex with the big concrete
"Landmark" sign.  Follow the road past the deli til you are in front
of the clock tower that rises out of one of the buildings, facing you.
Enter through the doors immediately under the clock tower.  They'll be
open between noon and 1PM at least.  (See below if you're late.)

Once inside, take the stairs up, immediately to your right.  At the top
of the stairs, turn right past the treetops, and we'll be in 1937 on 
your left.  The door is marked "Cygnus".

If you are late and the door under the clock tower is locked, you can
walk to the deli (which will be around the building on your left, as
you face the door).  Go through the gate in the fence to the right of
the deli, and into the back lawns between the complex and the farm
behind it.  Walk forward and right around the buildings until you see
a satellite dish in the lawn.  Go up the stairs next to the dish,
which are the back stairs into the Cygnus office space.  We'll prop
the door (or you can bang on it if we forget).

Or, you can find the guard who's wandering around the complex, who
knows there's a meeting happening and will let you in.  They can be
beeped at 965 5250, though you'll have trouble finding a phone.

Don't forget to eat first, or bring food at noon!  I recommend hitting
the burrito place on Rengstorff (La Costen~a) at about 11:45.  To get
there, when you get off 101, take Rengstorff (toward the hills) rather
than Amphitheatre (toward the bay).  Follow it about ten blocks until
the major intersection at Middlefield Road.  La Costen~a is the store
on your left at the corner.  You can turn left into the narrow lane
behind the store, which leads to a parking lot, and enter by the front
door, which faces the intersection.  To get to the meeting from there,
just retrace your route on Rengstorff, go straight over the freeway,
and turn right at the stoplight onto Charleston; see above.

See you there!

	John Gilmore








From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: gnu (John Gilmore)
Date: Wed, 8 Sep 93 12:47:59 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Privacy Advocate Position, Madison, Wisconsin
Message-ID: <9309081947.AA23392@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Job postings for cypherpunks, yet!

	John

From: oravec@cs.wisc.edu (Jo Ann Oravec)
Subject: Privacy Advocate Position, Madison, Wisconsin
Date: Mon, 6 Sep 93 09:48:43 -0500

To the Electronic Frontier Association:

    The following job opening announcement will
appear as an ad in September 12 Wisconsin 
newspapers and in various other vehicles.  It
may be of interest to many people who have ties to the
EFF.  (Wisconsin residency is NOT a requirement for
the position!) 

    Please disseminate the announcement as broadly 
as possible: 


Privacy Advocate... Madison, Wisconsin 

The State of Wisconsin is seeking a person responsible
for support and advocacy in development and implementation
of state and local government policies that protect personal privacy.
This position reports to the Privacy Council.  Background
in business and government application of information
technology.  Salary $33,000 per year plus excellent
benefits.  Applicants should submit a detailed resume
and a statement outlining their perspectives and approaches
to privacy concerns to Mary Becker (608-266-0058,
FAX 608-264-9500), Department of Administration, 9th Floor,
101 E. Wilson, P.O. Box 7869, Madison, WI  53707-7869. 
Materials must be received before 4:30 PM on September 27,
1993.

					       thanks--

					       Jo Ann Oravec
					       Chair, 
					       State of Wisconsin
					         Privacy Council




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Andrew Corradini/SBDC <Andrew.Corradini@m.cc.utah.edu>
Date: Wed, 8 Sep 93 14:52:04 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Interested in setting up (or joining!) local group in Utah.
Message-ID: <Pine.3.05.9309081525.A10564-b100000-b100000@u.cc.utah.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Having been recently acquainted with cypherpunkography, I have been rolling
around the idea of setting up a local group rather like the original in Cal.

Lest ye laugh, Utah happens to be a heckuva place to worry about privacy,
intrusion, et al...although it comes from both having a fairly silly state
government (they're finally trying to strike down a law which automatically
invalidates any marriage in which one of the partners has AIDS..., fer example),
and the fact that many here feel that the aura of the Mormon church is somewhat
weighty -- no comment either way, just pointing it out...

ANYWAY, if there are any other cypherUtahns on the list interested in getting
together monthly or so for an evening of pizza, beer, Jolt, milk, potentially
subversive activity, and cookies (wonder if the NSA monolith dropped a flag on
that one ;-) ... drop me a line. I know of at least 4 very talented and
potentially committable persons who'd also be highly interested. My girlfriend,
OTOH, will most likely roll her eyes, call me a geek, and head for the shoe
department at Nordstrom.

Also of potential interest, my BBS has a couple of areas on cryptography, other
"Sneakers"-type issues, as well as VR, cyberspace, and programming. Drop by
sometime: SENSE/NET (801) 364-6227  2400-9600

Andrew
asc7556@u.cc.utah.edu

NOTE: my opinions are too silly to be shared by my employer.







From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Sandy <72114.1712@CompuServe.COM>
Date: Wed, 8 Sep 93 14:02:04 PDT
To: <cypherpunks@toad.com>
Subject: CHAUM CHIMES IN
Message-ID: <930908203054_72114.1712_FHF95-2@CompuServe.COM>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
  SANDY SANDFORT               Reply to:  ssandfort@attmail.com
 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Punksters,

For those of you who live in darkness (i.e., don't read THE
ECONOMIST), here is a letter to the editor from David Chaum, in
the most recent issue:

    SIR--Your leader, "No hiding place", and article, "Big
    brother is clocking you" (August 7th), are to be
    commended for focusing attention on the exploding threat
    to privacy being created by piece-meal adoption of
    intrusive systems, such as automated road tolling.
    Proposing systems designed around pre-paid smart cards
    as the solution is, however, somewhat misleading.
         In French pay phones, Danish vending machines, and
    in fact all large-scale uses today, such cards must
    identify themselves during each transaction.  Even
    though your name is not on the card, it represents an
    erosion of privacy over the coins it replaces.  If you
    are once identified by even a single transaction, such
    as when you reload the card from your bank account, all
    your transaction details are linked to your identity.
         A rare few systems, however, truly do protect
    privacy.  They need not cost more, weaken security, or
    be harder to use.  The technology is described in my
    article in /Scientific American/, "Achieving Electronic
    Privacy" (August 1992).  A smart card version has
    already been demonstrated for road tolls by the Dutch
    government.  And CAFE, a project sponsored by the EC, is
    designing an electronic wallet that literally will, as
    you recommend, "leave as much control as possible in the
    hands of individuals."
    /Amsterdam/                                  DAVID CHAUM

Of course, the next letter to the editor calls for the adoption
of systems to track every vehicle at all times.  The genius who
wrote the letter, thinks it would be a good way to prevent
nuclear, biological or chemical terrorism.  Geeeeez.

 S a n d y

>>>>>>    Please send e-mail to:  ssandfort@attmail.com    <<<<<<
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Johan Helsingius <julf@penet.fi>
Date: Wed, 8 Sep 93 06:41:56 PDT
To: "L. Detweiler" <ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Subject: Re: the Pitfalls and the Pendulum of Anonymity
In-Reply-To: <9309080324.AA21869@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Message-ID: <199309081331.AA18760@mail.eunet.fi>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



> Since no one else has posted on this yet I will.  The short answer is
> that you can tell them to use your address `na[x]' and their anonymous
> identity won't be revealed, and if they are using the server they might
> know that (is it stated in the introduction material? it sure should be).

It shure should be in the help file. But the whole help file needs
to be rewritten. I'm running as fast as I can!

> (1) the server was mainly intended for posting to newsgroups at its
> origination, where the automated anonymizing (J. Helsingius' term:
> `automated double blinding') makes sense.

I hate the automatic anonymizing myself, but for historical reasons that
had to be done. Can be fixed in the next reincarnation of the server
if documented clearly enough.

> (2) however, a major use of the server is email-to-email mail, so to
> speak. in this case the scenario raised by Deadbeat in the past &
> Baumbach recently reveals the pitfalls in the `feature'.

Right. There is a solution, but it has to wait for MK II.

> the automated anonymizing feature, implemented with the best of
> intentions, has come back to haunt J. Helsingius rather rudely--it is
> perhaps the greatest weakness of the server, other than the corrected
> `forge-without-passwords' aspect (where someone can forge an email
> message from: address and possibly determine anonymous-to-identity
> mappings through trial and error if no passwords are used).

Right.

> J. Helsingius has announced grand visions for the amazing, spectacular,
> and impending Mark II server that will incorporate full encryption
> (user keys mappings and a server key), along with a new default in
> which replies to anonymous email will not be automatically anonymized.

Right. Amazing, spectacular - maybe, but impending... Sigh...

> p.s. I would like to know if there is a way to (1) automatically get
> traffic statuses from anon.penet.fi,

stats@anon.penet.fi.

> and (2) get a list of supported newsgroups.

No. Simply to reduce bandwith - the list is something like 4000 groups
(200K).

	Julf





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Date: Wed, 8 Sep 93 19:27:10 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Opportunities in Cyberspace
Message-ID: <9309090219.AA13375@netcom5.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Crypto Rebels,

Here's a piece I wrote for another mailing list, the Extropians list,
which about 20 of you are already on (a guess).

I make some points about the importance of strong crypto for the
"colonization of cyberspace."

I start out by commenting on a thread about the Libertarian Party,
which I know many of you have no interest in (not that I have much
interest, either).

Forwarded message:
To: Extropians@extropy.org
From: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Message-Id: <9309090128.AA05763@netcom5.netcom.com>
Subject: Opportunities in Cyberspace
Date: Wed, 8 Sep 93 18:28:16 PDT


I agree with everything Nick Szabo says here. A few comments:

> These kinds of groups, also ISIL, even LP in its saner moments,
> serve an important role in "spreading the meme" -- giving us
> the political knowledge that the media and high school Civics classes 

I don't discount the value of these groups in spreading the memes,
providing the support for unpopular beliefs ("You mean others think
this way, too?"), and maybe even in providing some alternatives in
local elections.

The focus of the LP on electoral politics these past 20 years, with
little or nothing to show for it, has been misguided, in my opinion.
Especially when alternatives exist.

> they hate the War on Drugs, etc.  Even for the libertarians influential
> writers like Rand, Heinlein, etc. may have played a larger role 
> than activist groups.  Also, implementing crypto-anarchy requires the 
> activists have speific real-world skills (computer programming, 
> mathemetics, legal, banking, etc.), so many libertarians might 
> not be able to contribute without a very large amount of effort.

I hate to say it, but I will anyway! Many libertarians I have met over
the years are ill-suited to making money in conventional jobs. Many
are underemployed, with vague dreams about starting companies or
otherwise making it big. Nothing wrong with high hopes and great
plans, of course. 

As Nick says, there are huge opportunities in cyberspace and crypto
anarchy. I mean these terms in the loose sense that covers networking,
software generation, offshore movements of data and capital, and even
things like games. (Sidenote on games: anybody with a lot of time on
their hands might want to catch the wave that "3DO" will be. If you
don't know what I'm talking about, never mind.)

> Many libertarians have limited resources to devote to the idealistic,
> altruistic efforts of political activism.  These legions should
> note that that crypto-anarchy if successful opens up
> not only political freedoms but also huge business opportunities.
> Governments worldwide confiscate over $3 trillion 
> every year, and most of those property owners would, given sufficient
> marketing, pay a significant fraction of that to avoid said
> confiscation.  This dwarfs the potential markets from, for
> example, ocean colonization by several orders of magnitude. 

And with "persistent institutions" (investment funds/accounts that
can be moved around the world, in pieces that are secure against
seizure, crytographically protected), we may see the development of
private fortunes that are enormous. If a wealthy person believes he
can hide his assets and have them grow even after his death, with some
of the proceeds funding things he now has interest in (and thinks may
help him to be reanimated....nanotech, cryonics, more crypto, etc.),
then some very large fortunes may flow into such channels. 

Such large pools/accounts can take "the long view," funding very
risky, high-payoff projects. Sort of like the "rich old men" so common
in Heinlein's world.

As Nick noted--and as Duncan Frisell and others have noted--the stakes
in avoiding taxes are enormous...trillions of dollars a year.

The colonization of cyberspace--the real next frontier--is well
underway. Within 10 years, graphics computers and Net bandwidths will
be high enough to support a much better illusion of a "real space"
(virtual reality, "True Names"-type spatial methaphors, more abstract
spatial metaphors, etc.). 

And the Nets will be the cutting edge for debate about the nature of
"government"....many of us believe governing such nets by governments
will be impossible. But the groundwork is being laid...and the whole
Libertarian Party debate is increasingly irrelevant.

One real world intrusion could be the outright banning of strong
crypto, with government-approved ciphers mandated. At the Worldcon I
mentioned recently, Whit Diffie, the principal inventor of public key
cryptography, outlined his scenario for a government ban on strong
crypto: the government offers the Clipper/Skipjack key escrow system,
they they argue that criminals and terrorists are using crypto, and
they then make it a crime to use unapproved crypto. The principle
enforcement mechanism is the fear of losing one's home, car, and
business through the civil forfeiture process, as with the drug laws.
Anyone with assets, and any business or corporation, will be scared
shitless to use unapproved crypto, and so alternatives will dry up
(they'll never go away completely, but will be confined to purely
criminal use).

Such a ban will have a chilling, devastating effect on our privacy, on
our ability to set up the cyberspace worlds I have described, and on
computer-mediated markets in general.

Our immediate goal must be to make sure the "genie is out of the
bottle," that enough crypto tools and knowledge are widely
disseminated so that such a government ban is futile. Education and
lobbying, to kill off the Clipper/Skipjack, is also important.

> Yet the startup costs for crypto-anarchy are much smaller, mostly 
> mastering obscure mathematics, programming skills, computer security,
> and legal/business protocols.  What skills can you learn now that
> will look good on your "BlackNet" resume?

Did the BlackNet piece get posted (anonymously, one would hope) to the
Extropians list? It's a good demonstration, I think, of the immanency
of this crypto anarchy world. In a sense, it reveals that fully
anonymous 2-way markets (as in selling Stealth bomber secrets, or
arranging hits, or trading financial data...all kinds of strange
stuff, of varying degrees of respectability) are already a reality.

> I should also take this opportunity to plug the cypherpunks mailing
> list (cypherpunks-request@toad.com) and the cypherpunks meeting
> computing up at Cygnus Support on Saturday, September 11th, 12 noon.
> Crypto-anarchy is an area where libertarian hackers, lawyers, businessmen, 
> etc. can make a vast difference in the future of our political landscape.

Yes, try to make this meeting if you live in the High Beyond (aka Bay
Area). I'll be speaking on this "crypto arms race" that I see coming.
Others will speak on goals, plans, new software, etc.

> prohibitive, and (3) we are a small minority so we almost always lose.  
> Many people can have a vastly larger effect on politics by
> starting businesses (where is a libertarian-freindly news service
> or cable TV channel?), volunteering to help implement crypto-anarchy,
> writing the next _Atlas Shrugged_, operating mailing lists, and
> posting good libertarian essays to the net.  Don't discount the latter --
> talk.politics.misc will likely have over 50,000 readers this
> fall, a larger readership than the number of subscribers to _Liberty_
> and _Reason_ combined.

Well, I'm doing my best on at least a couple of these points. Crypto
anarchy is of course my special interest, and the novel I am still
working on (sigh!) is/was ostensibly a "better 'Atlas Shrugged'", or
so I am hoping (but please don't ask me for progress reports...I get
very grumpy indeed when the first thing people ask is "How's the novel
going?"). And, like most of you, I write essays to various lists and
groups.

One thing I haven't done is to fund a start-up company, or invest in
one, but I am getting the itch to do something along these lines. A
lot of billionaires will come out of the developments of the next
decade or two; in many ways, there are more opportunities with the
globabilization of information flows than there were with personal
computers.

Several Extropians/Cypherpunks I know of have some potentially
exciting business ideas brewing.  

Don't change the channel, you might miss something exciting.


-Tim May


-- 
..........................................................................
Timothy C. May         | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,  
tcmay@netcom.com       | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
408-688-5409           | knowledge, reputations, information markets, 
W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA  | black markets, collapse of governments.
Higher Power: 2^756839 | Public Key: PGP and MailSafe available.
Note: I put time and money into writing this posting. I hope you enjoy it.





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: astrashe@nyx.cs.du.edu (Alex Strasheim)
Date: Wed, 8 Sep 93 18:37:08 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Viacrypt export?
Message-ID: <9309090132.AA12404@nyx.cs.du.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Why would people in Europe want to buy an exported Viacrypt when it's
completely legal for them to use PGP, which is free and which is built
from published source code?





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: wcs@anchor.ho.att.com (Bill_Stewart_HOY002_1305)
Date: Wed, 8 Sep 93 18:12:08 PDT
To: felix@hu.se
Subject: Re: ViaCrypt export?
Message-ID: <9309090055.AA17129@anchor.ho.att.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text


Felix Ungman felix@hu.se asks?
> Will ViaCrypt consider exporting pgp? (well, I think I can guess the answer ;-)
> However, pgp is already widely used outside USA (at least as many as
> the US users, I suspect). It would be interesting to know what they're going
> to do about it. There exists no country boundaries in cyberspace, you know!

I would guess that they're not willing to put up with the export law nonsense
required to export the product.  (If they do, more power to them!)
If the offensive export-prevention laws weren't there, and if other governments
didn't have offensive import-harassment and crypto-harassment laws,
then they'd probably decide whether they could make enough money by providing a 
supported product and pretty manuals to people who can get the net-version free,
just as companies like Cygnus are providing commercial support for free GNUware.
However, governments have not yet realized that they're obsolete, 
so you folks won't have that option. :-(

			Bill Stewart, wcs@anchor.att.com

Physical-Address: North America, right hand coast, near the middle.



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Sameer Parekh <cs60a-qu@po.EECS.Berkeley.EDU>
Date: Wed, 8 Sep 93 21:07:12 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: REMAIL: Perl/problems
Message-ID: <Pine.3.05.9309082112.E23070-9100000@po.EECS.Berkeley.EDU>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



	I'm not good at perl, so I can't solve this problem on my own. (I
hardly know anything about perl, actually.)

	Upon repeated tests of my remailers, I noticed that if there's
more than one blank line between the header and the header-pasting, then
the pasting doesn't take place. Does this happen with other people's
remailers? How is your script different from mine? How can this be fixed?





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: wcs@anchor.ho.att.com (Bill_Stewart_HOY002_1305)
Date: Wed, 8 Sep 93 18:22:08 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Gubment Bombmaker's Cookbook
Message-ID: <9309090109.AA17198@anchor.ho.att.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text


> This is ridiculous. Have they never heard of The Anarchist's Cookbook?
> I've seen it on the shelf of the local large bookstore, though now I'm
> not sure whether I want to admit to buying a copy.

A friend of a friend has it on the kitchen shelf along with her other cookbooks
:-)

Unfortunately, cops don't seem to have figured out that Anarchy isn't
against the law, it's just opposed to it.

> Have they not yet discovered rec.pyrotechnics?
(Shhhh!  They've only discovered child-porn and rec.humor so far;
next they'll figure out the pyros and pagans are there,
and then they'll decide some nonsense about talk.religion violating
separation of church and state and go after Phil Karn for creating it :-) 





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: b44729@achilles.ctd.anl.gov (Samuel Pigg)
Date: Wed, 8 Sep 93 19:22:09 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Viacrypt export?
In-Reply-To: <9309090132.AA12404@nyx.cs.du.edu>
Message-ID: <9309090216.AA29489@achilles.ctd.anl.gov>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



>>>>> On Wed, 8 Sep 93 19:32:42 MDT, astrashe@nyx.cs.du.edu (Alex Strasheim) said:

	Alex> Why would people in Europe want to buy an exported
	Alex> Viacrypt when it's completely legal for them to use PGP,
	Alex> which is free and which is built from published source
	Alex> code?

I wouldn't, but most corporations don't like purchasing software without
the safety blanket of commercial support. (At least in the states. I assume
it's the same in europe.)

Sam Pigg                                  dt1acaa@cfraix.cfr.usf.edu
samp@renoir.cftnet.com        <or>       b44729@achilles.ctd.anl.gov
PGP Key Fingerprint: ED A7 49 33 65 90 9A BD A4 E4 C5 92 5A 00 BC 6C





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: doug@netcom5.netcom.com (Doug Merritt)
Date: Wed, 8 Sep 93 22:02:11 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: REMAIL: pasting
Message-ID: <9309090454.AA02474@netcom5.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


hughes@ah.com (Eric Hughes) said:
>Yet RFC-822 is followed as much in the breach as in the observance.

Not only that, but it is woefully shortsighted. For instance, when
I reply to messages from email lists, sometimes I want to reply to
the list, and sometimes to the originator. The variations in
RFC-822 *compliant* email list headers are staggering; I have yet
to see any mail software that understands the variety of syntactically-
parseable signals that show that something is from a list, and allows
me to easily reply to either the list or the sender.

This is a technically trivial wish. It could be done, at least to the
95% mark, even as things stand. But NOOOOOoooo. :-)

Similar comments apply to saving things interactively. I'm about to
try procmail for non-interactive uses, but I still haven't seen a mailer
that lets me say e.g. "(save (from cypherpunks | to cypherpunks |
cc cypherpunks | Bcc cypherpunks | "From " cypherpunks) > savefile) & delete

Maybe I'm just email-challenged. Suggestions?
	Doug




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: frc%bwnmr4@harvard.harvard.edu (Fred Cooper)
Date: Wed, 8 Sep 93 19:08:04 PDT
To: marc@Athena.MIT.EDU (Marc Horowitz)
Subject: Re: Remailing
In-Reply-To: <9309080351.AA11068@binkley.MIT.EDU>
Message-ID: <9309090203.AA12499@bwnmr4.harvard.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----


> And even if it were, sending messages to yourself is going to add a
> significant "known quantity" to the remailer traffic.  The more an
> attacker knows, the less he needs to figure out.

	How is pinging a known address considered sending messages to
yourself? 

FRC


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.3a

iQCVAgUBLI6O3bbAlE4AqlTZAQE2qAP7ByAj4hf0IMYBqBhTQDuLY0mSIDGrYSdn
ahpDILrnvdPDcz6Lh72lAdT5QIXa8e+2hi/4PLXXPtQpmuW52uSSZjhN4w2FaLUl
/Y6ZccEWbbau4Okyw+RUUjJYZbWT4EUjv2vLiN06NjJaPztJJXwFKKWeLnJNixci
2xjZOa3iMKw=
=oUif
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: frc%bwnmr4@harvard.harvard.edu (Fred Cooper)
Date: Wed, 8 Sep 93 19:23:07 PDT
To: klbarrus@owlnet.rice.edu
Subject: Re: Remailing
In-Reply-To: <m0oaKhR-0001zxC@rebma.rebma.mn.org>
Message-ID: <9309090215.AA12523@bwnmr4.harvard.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

> One possible problem is that the final destination must then be
> available to every remailer.

[explanation removed]

ok, this one I can understand to be a problem.  Can anyone beat this?

> Besides, some people may have set up anonymous remailers that aren't 
> public or haven't been announced.

Well, if the mailer hasn't been announced or made public, then it
obviously won't be on the list of mailers that Remailer is choosing it's
ping targets from.




-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.3a

iQCVAgUBLI6RirbAlE4AqlTZAQGmzQP8CdOdShWx9SWcjeID/rdaBeStPmmfs4sW
o44Mccp1zKcHRicrr7ELWyEQ28zu7mBGjAuVFKjMDrta8i17sRYvsDchissH+mgw
w0qKMge9kYaHvfgrP2K8XMoE79tu3EATBPp32HTF3bBNtrUVV2OPpRSocbtcX4Vc
4VULcmUI4hk=
=1YCi
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: smb@research.att.com
Date: Wed, 8 Sep 93 19:42:10 PDT
To: b44729@achilles.ctd.anl.gov (Samuel Pigg)
Subject: Re: Viacrypt export?
Message-ID: <9309090240.AA29022@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


	 	Alex> Why would people in Europe want to buy an exported
	 	Alex> Viacrypt when it's completely legal for them to use PGP,
	 	Alex> which is free and which is built from published source
	 	Alex> code?

	 I wouldn't, but most corporations don't like purchasing software
	 without the safety blanket of commercial support. (At least in the
	 states. I assume it's the same in europe.)

It's not a matter of a safety blanket, it's where you choose to spend
your time and effort.  A well-supported application can easily pay
for itself in decreased staff time.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: jim@tadpole.com (Jim Thompson)
Date: Wed, 8 Sep 93 23:08:06 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: DES is dead
Message-ID: <9309090603.AA00304@tadpole.Tadpole.COM>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Forwarded, 'cause I've not seen it on cypherpunks as yet.
Note that the NIST has approved DES for another couple years.

Jim

Date: Wed, 8 Sep 1993 14:13:13 -0400 (EDT)
From: Matt Lawrence <matt@access.digex.net>
Subject: Re: [prz@columbine.cgd.ucar.EDU: Re: DES Key Search Paper (fwd)] (fwd)
To: eff-austin-directors@tic.com
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: TEXT/PLAIN; charset=US-ASCII

With the crypto conference coming up, I figured y'all ought to see this.

-- Matt

---------- Forwarded message ----------
Date: Wed, 8 Sep 93 09:57:27 EDT
From: Stainless Steel Rat <ratinox@ccs.neu.edu>
To: The Elboid Nation <elbows@mc.lcs.mit.edu>
Subject: Re: [prz@columbine.cgd.ucar.EDU: Re: DES Key Search Paper (fwd)]

This came to me via one of the crypto lists I'm on. I'm certain some
of you crypto-weenies out there will be interested:

From: Philip Zimmermann <prz@columbine.cgd.ucar.EDU>
To: ratinox@ccs.neu.edu
Subject: Re: DES Key Search Paper (fwd)

Michael Weiner presented a paper at Crypto93 that describes a fast DES
key search engine that uses a special inside-out DES chip that he designed.
This chip takes a single plaintext/ciphertext pair and quickly tries 
DES keys until it finds one that produces the given ciphertext from the
given plaintext.  Weiner can get these chips made for $10.50 each in quantity,
and can build a special machine with 57000 of these chips for $1 million.
This machine can exhaust the DES key space in 7 hours, finding a key
in 3.5 hours on the average.  He works for Bell Northern Research in 
Ottawa, and says they have not actually built this machine, but he has
the chip fully designed and ready for fabrication.  

This is a stunning breakthrough in the realization of practical DES
cracking.  BTW-- note that PEM uses straight 56-bit DES.

-prz

Forwarded message:
>From prz Wed Sep  1 14:11:48 1993
>Message-Id: <9309012010.AA10083@columbine.cgd.ucar.EDU>
>Subject: Re: DES Key Search Paper
>To: wiener@bnr.ca (Michael)
>Date: Wed, 1 Sep 93 14:10:18 MDT
>From: Philip Zimmermann <prz@columbine.cgd.ucar.EDU>
>Cc: prz (Philip Zimmermann)
>In-Reply-To: <"15836 Wed Sep  1 12:14:00 1993"@bnr.ca>; from "Michael" at Aug 31, 93 11:32 am
>X-Mailer: ELM [version 2.3 PL0]
>
>Thanks, Michael.  Your paper was the most important paper presented 
>at Crypto93, in my opinion.  It drove a wooden stake thru DES's heart.
>
>$1 million     - 3.5 hours
>$10 miliion    - 20 minutes
>$100 million   - 2 minutes
>
>It is not plausible to me that NSA's budget for examining DES-encrypted
>traffic is less than $100 million.   Two minutes.  Damn.  Two fucking
>minutes.  DES is dead, dead, dead.
>
>Regards,
>Philip
>
>

Rat <ratinox@ccs.neu.edu>                    Northeastern's Stainless Steel Rat
PGP Public Key Block available upon request          Ask about rat-pgp.el v1.61
||||| | | | |  |  |  |   |   |    |    |    |   |   |  |  |  |  | | | | | |||||
       An it harm none, Do what thou wilt shall be the whole of the Law.








From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "L. Detweiler" <ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Date: Thu, 9 Sep 93 00:42:12 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: BBS operator rights -- a paper
Message-ID: <9309090736.AA00686@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


From Current Underground Digest Volume 5 : Issue 70. CuD FTP sites
appended below. A paper by jmbell@DARMOK.WIN.NET(Jonathan Bell) on BBS
operator & user rights. Somewhat speculative: points out existing legal
framework is woefully inadequate to deal with this `fundamentally new
category' combining `the mass communications functions of publisher,
distributor, broadcaster, advertiser and utility rolled into one'.
(imagine the revolutions of the telephone, television, printing press
combined -- that's one of my analogies)

>It may seem shocking for [BBS] users today to learn that more than ever they
>are responsible for what they write and what they distribute.

he has it backwards -- now, *less* than ever (with things like
cyberspatial anonymity). I guess he's got a point though.

>The media lessons of copyright, privacy and
>defamation still are being taught on the networks today. They will
>continue as more people log on to the networks at hand, spreading
>their personage electronically.

actually, I think societal attitudes on `libel' `slander' and
`defamation' and `sedition' (wink wink) are going to be radically
transformed over the next few decades.

1) a mere posting alone is meaningless, and people will begin to
understand that offense is in the eye of the beholder. if there is no
tracable author there can be no `responsibility' and no one should
overreact as if there is.

2) overreaction will decrease. in fact I see networks as sort of a
automatic PC (policitically correct) countering device. People that are
incredibly sensitive about sexist language or whatever the current
fashionable academic term is will tend to get flamed into oblivion.
Likewise people that overreact to anonymous spew. Likewise, however,
people that are prejudiced get nailed into a more moderate consensus
too. Rough humans will get to be increasingly polished by the
torrential downpour of cyberspace.

also, concepts of `copyright' will be radically transformed. the
situation will be such that the `netiquette' will evolve where authors
are required to include hypertext *pointers* to actual works, rather
than copying the work itself. In this way many diverse problems (such
as automatic updating, handling fee charging, etc.) are localized to
the correct location (the author himself).

However, I also foresee a great deal of future turmoil and turbulence
on all these topics. We will probably reach a crescendo of outcry about
the time the first unrestricted commercial networks appear, say, mid-to-late 90s.

===cut=here==

Date: Sat, 28 Aug 1993 18:28:32
From: jmbell@DARMOK.WIN.NET(Jonathan Bell)
Subject: File 3--Re: A Class Like None Other [revised]

((MODERATORS' NOTE: For parsimony, we reproduce here only the first
and last two paragraphs of Johnathan Bell's paper, which summarize
his central themes. His points are well-argued, and the copious
footnotes should be of value to scholars. The entire paper can be
obtained from the CuD ftp archives. We recommend it)).

 A CLASS LIKE NONE OTHER:  HOW THE TRADITIONAL MEDIA CLASSIFICATIONS
              FAIL TO PROTECT IN THE ELECTRONIC FRONTIER

                           by Jonathan Bell


August 4, 1993
Mass Communications Law and Ethics
Dwight Teeter - Summer 1993

Imagine the mass communications functions of publisher, distributor,
broadcaster, advertiser and utility rolled into one and you might find
that the beast before you is being operated out of your own home -- or
at least that of a friend or neighbor.  The computer bulletin board
(BBS) offers a variety of services to its users: shopping, electronic
mail, public discussion of hot topics, free software, free advice,
news. All that may sound idealistic but it is here. The only thing
endangering BBS' and their system operators' (sysops') ability to run
them is a legal system unclear and uneducated about the First
Amendment held dearly by those who keep them going, whether they are
the users or the operators.

Exactly where BBS' stand in the legal structure has not been
definitively decided by anyone. Getting sysops to agree has yet to be
accomplished, users see things differently and lawyers and government
often have views widely divergent from the thoughts of the other two.
The simple fact that the proper status of bulletin boards has yet to
be answered reasonably opens up the dire need for a new media
classification system. No one sees eye to eye, and assurances that the
right thing will always be done do not work.

                      *************************

It may seem shocking for users today to learn that more than ever they
are responsible for what they write and what they distribute. The
ability to have your voice heard is unprecedented but so is the
capability to harm. The media lessons of copyright, privacy and
defamation still are being taught on the networks today. They will
continue as more people log on to the networks at hand, spreading
their personage electronically.

Education can answer many of the problems facing the electronic world
today. But no puzzles are solvable until computer information systems
and bulletin boards are granted the highest degree of First Amendment
rights and freedom from liability necessary to keep the waves of
public exchange coming throughout the future.

------------------------------

ANONYMOUS FTP SITES:
  UNITED STATES:  ftp.eff.org (192.88.144.4) in /pub/cud
                  etext.archive.umich.edu (141.211.164.18)  in /pub/CuD/cud
                  halcyon.com( 202.135.191.2) in /pub/mirror/cud
                  aql.gatech.edu (128.61.10.53) in /pub/eff/cud
  AUSTRALIA:      ftp.ee.mu.oz.au (128.250.77.2) in /pub/text/CuD.
  EUROPE:         nic.funet.fi in pub/doc/cud. (Finland)
                  ftp.warwick.ac.uk in pub/cud (United Kingdom)




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "L. Detweiler" <ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Date: Thu, 9 Sep 93 01:02:12 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Government access: satire (from CuD)
Message-ID: <9309090756.AA00900@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Also from CuD  Wed  Sep 8 1993   Volume 5 : Issue 70, a brilliant and
scalding satirization by john@ZYGOT.ATI.COM(John Higdon) of points that
J. Warren raises in favor of the `government online database access
bill' in California, AB1624. J. Warren provided a boilerplate letter,
very persuasive in many ways from a *citizen* point of view, for anyone
to fax to a specific obstinate legislator on the matter (copies
included in many forums).

I've been tracking this controversy with great interest, and have
forwarded various developments to the cypherpunk list. This last
conquest is a fantastic, dazzling example of cyberspatial democracy in
action. In this case, J. Warren has done, and continues to do, a
totally inspired job of coordinating resources, targeting critical
legislators and aspects of the law-making process, building consensus,
coordination, and tightly focused organization. More than ever, this
effort suggests that Legislators are very high up on the list of
Endangered Bureacrats and Future Obsolescence. J. Warren gets my vote
as Cypherpunk of the Month.

From: Jim Warren <jwarren@WELL.SF.CA.US>
>Today, AB1624 passed the Assembly 78-to-0 on the consent agenda, thus
>concurring with the amendments that had been made in the Senate after
>the Assembly passed it the first time.
>
>Unless Gov. Pete Wilson vetos it within 12 days, it will become law,
>taking effect Jan. 1, 1993.

78-to-0? my *gosh*. Warren appears to have greater diplomatic and
lobbying tenacity, and of course, fundamental splendor in his
proposals, than our esteemed President and Vice President (the latter
just appearing on David Letterman to plug the latest `streamlining
government' plan with all the juicy catchwords like `empowering
workers' and `corporation reformation').

This California Database Access bill will help pave the way for future
success in Federal ones. Note that there is a lot of bickering going on
at that level between groups Taxpayer Assets Project (rep. Jamie Love)
and EFF (rep. Shari Steele) in support of two different congressional
bills, one the Owens bill. We have to get our houses in order to
succeed at the national level so spectacularly, but we have a *major*
victory under the belt that will aid the Cyberspatial Reality
Advancement Movement tremendously.

===cut=here===

Date: Mon, 6 Sep 93 03:04 PDT
From: john@ZYGOT.ATI.COM(John Higdon)
Subject: File 4--Imaginary Government Reply to Jim Warren's Model Letter

((MODERATORS' NOTE: While we often share John's cynicism, which he
expresses satirically below, it appears that Jim Warren's idealism and
belief in collective action were *not* misplaced.  A few minutes ago,
CuD learned that Jim Warren's (and others') efforts to pass the
California electronic access bill that would increase availability of
public documents to the public were rewarded. Warren's model letters
and other strategies were instrumental in today's final passage of the
legislation. See File #11, below)).

+++++++

Jim Warren presented a substantial argument in his "Model Letter" to
John Burton. But it is entirely based upon the premise that anyone in
the California state government gives two hoots or a holler about the
citizenry. Therefore I appoint myself official (tongue-in-cheek)
spokesperson for our state legislature and answer each of Mr. Warren's
arguments against the charging of fees for on-line access to state
documents. (My apologies for anything that seems true enough to be
mistaken for seriousness.)

Mr. Warren writes:

> I ask that you reconsider your demand for fees, for at least ten reasons:
>
> 1.  BAD PRECEDENT -- FREE FOR OLD-FASHIONED PAPER VS. FEES FOR MODERN ACCESS

Mr. Warren, you obviously think that any of us here in Sacramento give
a damn about how much anything in government costs. The money comes out
of your pocket, not ours. We collect it from you in taxes. We even will
track you down after you retire in another state to make sure we get
our pound of flesh. I hope that answers your concern regarding costs.

> 2.  CREATES TWO CLASSES OF PUBLIC ACCESS BASED ON WEALTH AND POSITION

Mr. Warren, where on earth have you been all of your life. Of course
people with money and position have the power. We have campaign
contributions to work off here. Actually, there are several issues at work.
Newspapers are our friends. They give us mindless, unquestioning access
to the public with our press hand-outs and print what we make
convenient. On the other hand, people who are too poor to pay fees for
on-line document access are probably radical trouble makers. We don't
need that kind of riff-raff examining what we do here in Sacramento.

> 3.  YOU WOULD EXCLUDE SCHOOLS, COLLEGES, STUDENTS, LIBRARIES, HOMELESS, ETC.

Naturally. Students have always been a pain in our rear. Thankfully, as
a group, their voting record stinks. The last thing we want to do is
incite these children into recklessly exercising their rights. And for
heaven's sake, why on earth would we want a bunch of homeless bums to
know what is going on in Sacrmento? And the beard and glasses types
that frequent libraries--well, need I say more?

> 4.  BUREAUCRACY AND FEES WOULD DETER MOST LOW-COST PUBLIC ACCESS

No shit Sherlock! Did someone lead you to think that we had some desire
to make our silly shenanigans public?

> 5.  IMPOSSIBLE TO ENFORCE; WOULD INCITE WIDESPREAD VIOLATION OF YOUR LAW

Did you ever consider that maybe money is not the issue here, but
rather denial of access? Give us some credit. But a nice bonus in
having fees built into the system is the fact that we know perfectly
well that people will ignore the law. This gives us carte blanche to
"round up all the usual suspects" should we decide that someone has
spoken the wrong thing at the wrong time. When we want to "put someone
away", it is most useful to have some trumped up charge. Not paying
fees is made to order.

> 6.  A TECHNICAL NIGHTMARE -- WHO PAYS?  HOW MUCH SURVEILLANCE OF USERS?

Mr. Warren, we KNOW that. In addition to the above, we are provided
with a great excuse to monitor and search and seize to our hearts'
content.

> 7.  SUPPORT -- DON'T SUPPRESS -- DEVELOPMENT OF HIGH-TECH SMALL BUSINESS

Don't get us wrong--we support high-tech. But only in big corporations.
These garage operations, "loose cannons" if you will, scare the bloody
crap out of us. The idea that ordinary people can, unsupervised and in
private, create, develop, and manipulate data seen and read by other
ordinary people--using high-tech means, no less--strikes at the very
core of our benevolent purpose. That purpose is to protect you and
other citizens from unnecessary contact with data and devices that you
need not know anything about. We, and our corporate contributors--er, I
mean the corporations who are under our thumb--oops, rather the high
tech industry will handle everything and take care of you.

> 8.  FREE LAND-FILL PAPER VS. FEES FOR RECYCLABLE ELECTRONS

Green stuff is only for serving our agenda. Do not try to use that
"green" nonsense on us. We invented the hype so we could raise your
taxes. We are pleased that it has been effective. But do not attempt to
con your government. We invented the practice.

> 9.  PRECEDENTS FOR ELECTRONIC SPEECH, ELECTRONIC ASSEMBLY, ELECTRONIC PRESS
>   I understand you plan to exclude subscription newspapers from your fee-for-
> fee mandate.

Mr. Warren, as I explained earlier, the mindless newspapers are our
friends. Your rabble-rousing "electronic publishers" say things we
don't like, and have a "readership" that we would just as soon not see the
material. Remember the key word "access". Access is something that all
of us in government would just as soon you and all the other bozo
constituents NOT have.

> 10.  YOUR PRECEDENT FOR THE PEOPLE'S RIGHT TO PETITION THEIR GOVERNMENT

Hey, if we had our druthers, we would turn that off in a minute. All we
have between us and you clowns is a mountain of paperwork and
procedures. Are you seriously asking us to strip that away? You think
we WANT to hear from you between elections? Get real, son.

(End of comments as tongue-in-cheek government spokesperson.)

While the above may be pulling at the corners just a little, it is my
personal opinion that there is contained more truth than fiction. There
are two things to always remember about government bureaucrats: cost is
never an issue; and none wants you to know what really goes on in
government. After all, you pay the bill and what you don't know won't
hurt you.

------------------------------




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "L. Detweiler" <ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Date: Thu, 9 Sep 93 01:17:12 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: PRZ: ``is DES dead? ''
Message-ID: <9309090812.AA01090@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


seen on info.pem-dev, headers deleted

===cut=here===

From: Philip Zimmermann <prz@columbine.cgd.ucar.EDU>
To: ratinox@ccs.neu.edu
Subject: Re: DES Key Search Paper (fwd)

Michael Weiner presented a paper at Crypto93 that describes a fast DES
key search engine that uses a special inside-out DES chip that he designed.
This chip takes a single plaintext/ciphertext pair and quickly tries 
DES keys until it finds one that produces the given ciphertext from the
given plaintext.  Weiner can get these chips made for $10.50 each in quantity,
and can build a special machine with 57000 of these chips for $1 million.
This machine can exhaust the DES key space in 7 hours, finding a key
in 3.5 hours on the average.  He works for Bell Northern Research in 
Ottawa, and says they have not actually built this machine, but he has
the chip fully designed and ready for fabrication.  

This is a stunning breakthrough in the realization of practical DES
cracking.  BTW-- note that PEM uses straight 56-bit DES.

-prz

Forwarded message:
>From prz Wed Sep  1 14:11:48 1993
>Message-Id: <9309012010.AA10083@columbine.cgd.ucar.EDU>
>Subject: Re: DES Key Search Paper
>To: wiener@bnr.ca (Michael)
>Date: Wed, 1 Sep 93 14:10:18 MDT
>From: Philip Zimmermann <prz@columbine.cgd.ucar.EDU>
>Cc: prz (Philip Zimmermann)
>In-Reply-To: <"15836 Wed Sep  1 12:14:00 1993"@bnr.ca>; from "Michael"
at Aug 31, 93 11:32 am
>X-Mailer: ELM [version 2.3 PL0]
>
>Thanks, Michael.  Your paper was the most important paper presented 
>at Crypto93, in my opinion.  It drove a wooden stake thru DES's heart.
>
>$1 million     - 3.5 hours
>$10 miliion    - 20 minutes
>$100 million   - 2 minutes
>
>It is not plausible to me that NSA's budget for examining DES-encrypted
>traffic is less than $100 million.   Two minutes.  Damn.  Two fucking
>minutes.  DES is dead, dead, dead.
>
>Regards,
>Philip
>




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "L. Detweiler" <ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Date: Thu, 9 Sep 93 01:32:12 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: priorities for cyberspatial infrastructure from Roundtable
Message-ID: <9309090824.AA01206@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Communications Roundtable (CPSR, EFF, TAP, etc.) has established these
items as priorities in the Information Infrastructure.

Cypherpunks: it occured to me that we could gain a lot of valuable
knowledge with how to commence with this `infrastructure building' by
looking at historical analogues. While the advent of cyberspace is
clearly straight out of the 21st century, we have many parallels to
large government building programs throughout the whole American
history. What policies were beneficial in colonizing the frontier?
which ones were detrimental? Railroads? Highway system? What should we
have done differently? In some cases the government provided subsidies
to private companies to develop segments and to promote widespread
public access. How can we prevent abuse of these funds? Was this
generally a successful approach? Is this the best way to go about it?

There's a *tremendous* need for informed, thorough, impartial papers on
this subject, and not just policy statements from groups that say `this
is how it should be' with the words `because it would benefit *us* the
most' in between the lines... (Not suggesting that the below is
anything of this type, though. In fact, the roundtable represents an
excellent diversity of views in computer rights areas, IMHO--dunno
about commercial interests though.)

This document identifies as priorities:

1.  UNIVERSAL ACCESS
2.  FREEDOM TO COMMUNICATE
3.  VITAL CIVIC SECTOR
4.  DIVERSE AND COMPETITIVE MARKETPLACE
5.  EQUITABLE WORKPLACE
6.  PRIVACY
7.  DEMOCRATIC POLICYMAKING

Roundtable contacts appended.

==============================================================
          RENEWING THE COMMITMENT TO A PUBLIC INTEREST
                  TELECOMMUNICATIONS POLICY
            Telecommunications Policy Roundtable
                      September 1, 1993


A communications revolution is underway as profound as the
introduction of the printing press.  A new "National Information
Infrastructure" is rapidly moving into place -- which will carry
video, audio, and data information into homes and offices across
the country.  Its emergence will produce fundamental shifts in
American life, transforming everything from work to education to
government to culture.   Because the health of our democracy is
inextricably linked to the nature of our communications system,
this new information infrastructure raises far-reaching
questions about our country and its transition into the next
century:  Who will own these networks?  Who will have access to
them?  What steps will be taken to preserve public institutions?

Policy decisions made during the next few years will shape the
communications system for decades to come.  Enlightened policies
could harness the power of these new technologies to ameliorate
many of our nation's most critical problems by revitalizing
civic institutions, expanding educational opportunities,
enhancing access to health care services, and improving job
training.  However, without a clear commitment to public goals,
this promise will never be fulfilled.Instead, many of the
shortcomings of our present telecommunications system will be
intensified and a host of more serious problems created.   There
is already a growing disparity between the technologically
affluent and the technologically disenfranchised that endangers
our social fabric.

Policy makers must ensure that the development of the
information infrastructure reflects the public interest spirit
that has long guided our country's communications policies:  our
commitment to a national telephone system available to all gave
rise to the concept of "universal service," enabling those in
the most remote parts of the nation to have access to the means
of communication; our commitment to making noncommercial
educational, arts, and public affairs programming available to
all Americans led to the creation of a public broadcasting
system.

Our government has the responsibility as public trustee to
ensure that new communications technologies serve the democratic
and social needs of our country.  The rise of new technologies
and new businesses has increased the importance of this
responsibility.  The convergence of once separate industries
requires a new policy framework for the information
infrastructure, rooted in the shared values of our country
and dedicated to the common good.

We call on the President and the Congress to pursue a broad and
public interest vision for the National Information
Infrastructure.  We must move beyond narrow and short-term
interests and embrace a view that reflects the great diversity
and richness of our country.  Our policies should reflect the
values of a democratic government -- openness, participation,
and discussion.  They must be inclusive and generous in spirit,
ensuring that all segments of our pluralistic society have
meaningful access to the telecommunications system. These are
the principles on which a great nation has been built.

As representatives of many nonprofit and public interest
organizations, we believe that the following principles must
guide policy making in order to ensure that future generations
inherit an information infrastructure which enhances the quality
of life for everyone.


                PUBLIC INTEREST PRINCIPLES

1.  UNIVERSAL ACCESS

All people should have affordable access to the information
infrastructure.

Fundamental to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness in
the Information Age is access to video, audio, and data networks
that provide a broad range of news, public affairs, education,
health, and government information and services.  Such services
should be provided in a user-friendly format, widely available
to everyone, including persons with disabilities.  Information
that is essential in order to fully participate in a democratic
society should be provided free.

2.  FREEDOM TO COMMUNICATE

The information infrastructure should enable all people to
effectively exercise their fundamental right to communicate.

Freedom of speech should be protected and fostered by the new
information infrastructure, guaranteeing the right of every
person to communicate easily, affordably, and effectively.  The
design of the infrastructure should facilitate two-way, audio
and video communication from anyone to any individual, group, or
network.  The rights of creators must be protected, while
accommodating the needs of users and libraries.
Telecommunication carriers should not be permitted to constrain
the free flow of information protected by the First Amendment.

3.  VITAL CIVIC SECTOR

The information infrastructure must have a vital civic sector at
its core.

For our democracy to flourish in the 21st Century, there must be
a vital civic sector which enables the meaningful participation
of all segments of our pluralistic society.   Just as we have
established public libraries and public highways, we must create
public arenas or "electronic commons" in the media landscape.
This will require the active involvement of a broad range of
civic institutions --  schools, universities, and libraries,
not-for-profit groups, and governmental organizations.  It will
also require vibrant public telecommunications networks at the
national, regional, and state level.

4.  DIVERSE AND COMPETITIVE MARKETPLACE

The information infrastructure should ensure competition among
ideas and information providers.

The information infrastructure must be designed to foster a
healthy marketplace of ideas, where a full range of viewpoints
is expressed and robust debate is stimulated.  Individuals,
nonprofits, and for-profit information providers need ready
access to this marketplace if it is to thrive.  To ensure
competition among information providers, policies should be
developed to lower barriers to entry (particularly for small
and independent services); telecommunications carriers should
not be permitted to control programming; and antitrust policies
should be vigorously enforced to prevent market dominance by
vertically-integrated media monopolies.


5.  EQUITABLE WORKPLACE

New technologies should be used to enhance the quality of work
and to promote equity in  the workplace.

Because the information infrastructure will transform the
content and conduct of work, policies should be developed to
ensure that electronic technologies are utilized to improve the
work environment rather than dehumanize it.   Workers should
share the benefits of the increased productivity that those
technologies make possible.  The rights and protections that
workers now enjoy should be preserved and enhanced.  To
encourage nondiscriminatory practices throughout the information
marketplace, public policy should promote greater representation
of women, people of color, and persons with disabilities at all
levels of management.

6.  PRIVACY

Privacy should be carefully protected and extended.
A comprehensive set of policies should be developed to ensure
that the privacy of all people is adequately protected.  The
collection of personal data should be strictly limited to the
minimum necessary to provide specific services.  Sharing data
collected from individuals should only be permitted with their
informed consent, freely given without coercion.  Individuals
should have the right to inspect and correct data files about
them.  Innovative billing practices should be developed that
increase individual privacy.

7.  DEMOCRATIC POLICYMAKING

The public should be fully involved in policy making for the
information infrastructure.

The public must be fully involved in all stages of the
development and ongoing regulation of the information
infrastructure.  The issues are not narrow technical matters
which will only affect us as consumers; they are fundamental
questions that will have profound effects on us as citizens
and could reshape our democracy.  Extensive efforts should be
made to fully inform the public about what is at stake, and to
encourage broad discussion and debate.  The policy process
should be conducted in an open manner with full press scrutiny.
Effective mechanisms should be established to ensure continued
public participation in telecommunications policymaking.


    Persons wanting more information about the Roundtable are
urged to contact:

     Jeff Chester, Center for Media Education, 202/628-2620;
     cme@access.digex.net

     Marc Rotenberg, CPSR, 202/544-9240;
     rotenberg@washofc.cpsr.org

     Prue Adler, Association of Research Libraries,
     202/296-8656, prue@cni.org





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Christian D. Odhner" <cdodhner@indirect.com>
Date: Thu, 9 Sep 93 05:28:09 PDT
To: cs60a-qu@po.EECS.Berkeley.EDU (Sameer Parekh)
Subject: Re: REMAIL: Perl/problems
In-Reply-To: <Pine.3.05.9309082112.E23070-9100000@po.EECS.Berkeley.EDU>
Message-ID: <199309091221.AA03869@indirect.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> 
> 	I'm not good at perl, so I can't solve this problem on my own. (I
> hardly know anything about perl, actually.)
> 
> 	Upon repeated tests of my remailers, I noticed that if there's
> more than one blank line between the header and the header-pasting, then
> the pasting doesn't take place. Does this happen with other people's
> remailers? How is your script different from mine? How can this be fixed?
> 
Now that you mention it...
	I never had that problem before, I've sent messages with up to
three blank lines before the :: with no prob, I don't know about more than
three. But a few days ago somebody tried to remail through mine and the
message ended up in my mailbox, I looked at the message content and did
everything I could to figure out what happened, but the only thing I could
come up with was that maybe the :: was not on the first line like it
should be and that screwed it up. (clarification: The :: was on the second
or third line for sure, if that was the cause of the problem or not I
don't know.)

Happy Hunting, -Chris 

______________________________________________________________________________
Christian Douglas Odhner     | "The NSA can have my secret key when they pry
cdodhner@indirect.com	     | it from my cold, dead, hands... But they shall
pgp 2.3 public key by finger | NEVER have the password it's encrypted with!"
  "If guns are outlawed, only the government will have guns." -E. Abbey
My opinions are shareware. For a registered copy, send me 15$ in DigiCash.
  Key fingerprint =  58 62 A2 84 FD 4F 56 38  82 69 6F 08 E4 F1 79 11 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------









From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: szabo@netcom.com (Nick Szabo)
Date: Thu, 9 Sep 93 07:12:18 PDT
To: extropians@gnu.ai.mit.edu
Subject: Crypto Visions
Message-ID: <9309091404.AA19359@netcom4.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



In the spirit of the Second Annual Cypherpunks Conference in the
Bay Area this Saturday, here are a variety of visions for future 
crypto-anarchy:

* GUIs for X, Mac, & Windows that make PGP mail encryption & key handling,
anon remailer envelope-stuffing, etc. seamless
* mobile.com: pirate crypto ham and shortwave on the Internet
* How much computing power and radio gear can be crammed into a
van?  An RV?  A yacht?
* Fiber or hi-bandwidth satellite hookup for RV parks and yacht berths
* Itinerant hackers, indigent anarchists, and perpetual
tourists.  Physical crypto-raves for cyberspace biz & social partners
* Discovering, debugging, and implementing true software digicash
(upon which the following visions depend!)
* Distributed digicash banking, offshore, virtually & physically mobile
* International digicash telecommuter contracting: programming,
publishing, typing pools, etc.  Crypto-anarchy for the middle
class; pirate CD-ROM libraries for the 3rd World masses.
* Internet Casino: why travel to Las Vegas or Monte Carlo when 
you can play the finest games in the privacy of your own home?
* Integration of BBS businesses (already >$1 billion per
year) into the digicash economy
* Effective law enforcement approaches terrorism: random hits
against fixed, centralized physical targets to generate intimidating 
publicity
* Millions of jobs for college grads and military-industrial complex 
workers: future digicash-related markets in the $trillions per year

Nick Szabo					szabo@netcom.com




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Brad Huntting <huntting@glarp.com>
Date: Thu, 9 Sep 93 08:43:17 PDT
To: wcs@anchor.ho.att.com (Bill_Stewart_HOY002_1305)
Subject: Re: Gubment Bombmaker's Cookbook
In-Reply-To: <9309090109.AA17198@anchor.ho.att.com>
Message-ID: <199309091534.AA05189@misc.glarp.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



> Unfortunately, cops don't seem to have figured out that Anarchy isn't
> against the law, it's just opposed to it.

A few years back a freind of mine was busted for putting up
anarchistic grafiti on some public buildings.  He told the judge
he was voicing his political opionions which was protected by the
1st amendment.

Rather than retort with "then keep it to newspapers and kiosks",
the judge actually told him that he was free to advocate any
government system he wanted, but advocating no government was not
protected.

Granted, boulder county's is not nessesarily the most authoritive
court in the country, but it is interesting that a judge would
actually say this.


brad




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Brad Huntting <huntting@glarp.com>
Date: Thu, 9 Sep 93 08:42:19 PDT
To: astrashe@nyx.cs.du.edu (Alex Strasheim)
Subject: Re: Viacrypt export?
In-Reply-To: <9309090132.AA12404@nyx.cs.du.edu>
Message-ID: <199309091534.AA05201@misc.glarp.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



> Why would people in Europe want to buy an exported Viacrypt when it's
> completely legal for them to use PGP, which is free and which is built
> from published source code?

If the're like companies in the states, they may be concerned about
proper support.


brad




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Johan Helsingius <julf@penet.fi>
Date: Wed, 8 Sep 93 23:47:12 PDT
To: doug@netcom5.netcom.com (Doug Merritt)
Subject: Re: REMAIL: pasting
In-Reply-To: <9309090454.AA02474@netcom5.netcom.com>
Message-ID: <199309090641.AA24013@mail.eunet.fi>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



> Not only that, but it is woefully shortsighted. For instance, when
> I reply to messages from email lists, sometimes I want to reply to
> the list, and sometimes to the originator. The variations in
> RFC-822 *compliant* email list headers are staggering; I have yet
> to see any mail software that understands the variety of syntactically-
> parseable signals that show that something is from a list, and allows
> me to easily reply to either the list or the sender.

Yeah. I am amazed that people don't get it right. My server sends out
messages looking like this:

	From: anXXXXX@anon.penet.fi
	Reply-To: anXXXXX@anon.penet.fi
	Sender: anon@anon.penet.fi

And there are _lots_ of systems out there that send te reply to
"anon@anon.penet.fi"! Elm and VMSMail are the most obvious ones.

> Similar comments apply to saving things interactively. I'm about to
> try procmail for non-interactive uses, but I still haven't seen a mailer
> that lets me say e.g. "(save (from cypherpunks | to cypherpunks |
> cc cypherpunks | Bcc cypherpunks | "From " cypherpunks) > savefile) & delete
> 
> Maybe I'm just email-challenged. Suggestions?

Try mh. It does all that.

	Julf





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Mark Batik <96mbatik@ultrix.uor.edu>
Date: Thu, 9 Sep 93 10:27:21 PDT
To: cypherpunks <cypherpunks@toad.com>
Subject: No Subject
Message-ID: <Pine.3.07.9309091046.A22121-9100000@ultrix.uor.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


subscribe me again please

Mark Batik                          |  AT&T: Phones with big brother  |
University of Redlands              |        built in.                |
96mbatik@ultrix.uor.edu 
"The man who does not value himself, cannot value anything or anyone"    
  				 -Ayn Rand                     
the opinions expressed are obviously too intelligent and thoughtful to be
those of the University of Redlands






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: desilets@sj.ate.slb.com  (Mark Desilets)
Date: Thu, 9 Sep 93 10:28:18 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Subscribe
Message-ID: <9309091723.AA10557@eris.sj.ATE.SLB.COM>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Please subscribe desilets@sj.ate.slb.com (Mark DeSilets)


									Thanks
									    Mark




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: hughes@ah.com (Eric Hughes)
Date: Thu, 9 Sep 93 11:18:12 PDT
To: desilets@sj.ate.slb.com
Subject: Subscribe
In-Reply-To: <9309091723.AA10557@eris.sj.ATE.SLB.COM>
Message-ID: <9309091807.AA02516@ah.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


[Thanks for your hospitality last weekend.  The following is a form
letter--EH]

The cypherpunks list is for discussions on implementing cryptography.
To mail to the whole list, send mail to

	cypherpunks@toad.com

Every mail message sent to this address will be forwarded to everyone
on the list.  Make sure that the message you wish to send is
appropriate for such a broad delivery.


If you want to be added or removed from the cypherpunks list, or have
any other questions which pertain to list management, send mail to

	cypherpunks-request@toad.com

I don't manage the list from my regular account, so such mail which
ends up in my ah.com account will just get you another copy of this
file.

Eric Hughes 
   maintainer of the lists cypherpunks@toad.com and
   cypherpunks-announce@toad.com







From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: hughes@ah.com (Eric Hughes)
Date: Thu, 9 Sep 93 11:37:22 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: REMAIL: pasting
In-Reply-To: <199309090641.AA24013@mail.eunet.fi>
Message-ID: <9309091827.AA02544@ah.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>Yeah. I am amazed that people don't get it right. My server sends out
>messages looking like this:

>	   From: anXXXXX@anon.penet.fi
>	   Reply-To: anXXXXX@anon.penet.fi
>	   Sender: anon@anon.penet.fi

>And there are _lots_ of systems out there that send te reply to
>"anon@anon.penet.fi"! Elm and VMSMail are the most obvious ones.

Even worse, there are mailers that respond to the out-of-band sender
information that appears in the first line (not in the header!) as the
"From " information.

Bounce message (almost) always go back to the out-of-band sender, so
we changed the cypherpunks list alias on toad.com to generate that as
the out-of-band sender.  Now bounce message return to a different
mailbox and my inbox at toad.com is clear for regular list
maintenance.

Nonetheless, I still get a number of attempted posts to the mailing
list at large _and_ requests for list maintenance (?!) to the
owner-cypherpunks alias.

If only mail software were consistent, ...

Eric




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: cme@ellisun.sw.stratus.com (Carl Ellison)
Date: Thu, 9 Sep 93 08:57:19 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re:  CHAUM CHIMES IN
Message-ID: <9309091550.AA23383@ellisun.sw.stratus.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>Date: 08 Sep 93 16:30:55 EDT
>From: Sandy <72114.1712@CompuServe.COM>
>Subject: CHAUM CHIMES IN
>Message-Id: <930908203054_72114.1712_FHF95-2@CompuServe.COM>

..From:
>  SANDY SANDFORT               Reply to:  ssandfort@attmail.com
 [ . . . ]
>Of course, the next letter to the editor calls for the adoption
>of systems to track every vehicle at all times.  The genius who
>wrote the letter, thinks it would be a good way to prevent
>nuclear, biological or chemical terrorism.  Geeeeez.

It was signed by Dorothy Denning, right?

Actually, they should take that to its full conclusion.

We need implants in every individual, broadcasting to the local
surveillance agency, giving not only location but also every word spoken in
the vicinity.  It could also do a chemical analysis of the air in the
neighborhood.  It should also have a radiation counter.  It should also
monitor the host body, looking for signs of anger or sexual arousal?

How else will we be guaranteed safe from mad bombers, rapists and child
molesters?  How else will our big budget LE agencies be able to protect us?

I know.  When it's finally adopted, worldwide, they'll call it
the Ellison Plan. :-(

 - Carl




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Philip Zimmermann <prz@columbine.cgd.ucar.EDU>
Date: Thu, 9 Sep 93 11:48:12 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com (Cypherpunks)
Subject: DES is Dead
Message-ID: <9309091843.AA18068@columbine.cgd.ucar.EDU>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Forwarded message:
>Date: Thu, 09 Sep 1993 10:23:00 +0000
>From: "Michael (M.J.) Wiener" <wiener@bnr.ca>
>Subject: re:fw:DES is Dead
>To: prz@acm.org
>
>Philip,
>
>I'm pleased that my paper is getting some attention.  However, there
>were a few things in your note below that concerned me.
>
>The first is minor.  My last name is spelt "Wiener" - I've always been
>a little touchy about that.
>
>The second is that not only have we not built this machine, but we
>have no intention of doing so.  To say that the chip is ready for
>fabrication may mislead people about our intentions.  This is
>strictly a detailed paper design.
>
>Finally, I don't think that DES is dead.  After about 15 years of
>public scrutiny, we can conclude that DES is a well designed cipher
>with a well understood limitation (56-bit keys).  A natural
>replacement for it is triple-DES.  Proclaiming the death of DES
>may lead to its being replaced with an entirely new cryptosystem
>(e.g. Skipjack).
>
>I'd appreciate it if you would send a clarification (particularly on
>the second point) to the audience that received the message below.
>
>Thanks,
>
>Mike Wiener
>
>
>>From: Philip Zimmermann <prz@columbine.cgd.ucar.EDU>
>>Subject: Re: DES Key Search Paper (fwd)
>>
>>Michael Weiner presented a paper at Crypto93 that describes a fast DES
>>key search engine that uses a special inside-out DES chip that he designed.
>>This chip takes a single plaintext/ciphertext pair and quickly tries 
>>DES keys until it finds one that produces the given ciphertext from the
>>given plaintext.  Weiner can get these chips made for $10.50 each in quantity,
>>and can build a special machine with 57000 of these chips for $1 million.
>>This machine can exhaust the DES key space in 7 hours, finding a key
>>in 3.5 hours on the average.  He works for Bell Northern Research in 
>>Ottawa, and says they have not actually built this machine, but he has
>>the chip fully designed and ready for fabrication.  
>>
>>This is a stunning breakthrough in the realization of practical DES
>>cracking.  BTW-- note that PEM uses straight 56-bit DES.
>>
>>$1 million     - 3.5 hours
>>$10 miliion    - 21 minutes
>>$100 million   - 2 minutes
>>
>>It is not plausible to me that NSA's budget for examining DES-encrypted
>>traffic is less than $100 million.  Two minutes.  DES is dead, dead, dead.
>>
>> -prz
>>





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: collins@newton.apple.com (Scott Collins)
Date: Thu, 9 Sep 93 13:52:26 PDT
To: klbarrus@owlnet.rice.edu
Subject: blank lines v. the remailer
Message-ID: <9309092017.AA13959@newton.apple.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


  >        Upon repeated tests of my remailers, I noticed that if there's
  >more than one blank line between the header and the header-pasting, then
  >the pasting doesn't take place. Does this happen with other people's
  >remailers? How is your script different from mine? How can this be fixed?

What follows is some of the text of the recurse.pl script, a component of
the remailer system.  I imagine that there are different versions of this
script floating around, but this is the version I got from
soda.berkeley.com when I set up my remailer.  I have commented it (and
noted my comments with 'SC:') to explain the relevent behavior, and deleted
non-relevent sections:

----------cut here----------

  # SC:read the header, looking for relevent lines

while (<>) {                # SC:get the next line (from where ever) into $_
        s/[ \t\r]*$// ;     # SC:remove trailing white space from $_
        last if /^$/ ;      # SC:get out if this line ($_) is otherwise blank
       ...code deleted here...
}


# SC:at this point $_ contains the blank line that followed the header
#  unless there was no blank line or message following the header (bad message)


  # We have just read the last line in the header.
  # Now we check to see if there is a pasting operator.

if ( ( $_ = <> ) && /^::[ \t\r]*$/ ) {

  # SC:get the next line (from where ever) into $_ ('if' can't use 'while'
  #  magic form), and if that next line is the pasting token then...

           # SC:append all the folling lines (up to, but not including,
           #  the next blank one) to the header
        while (<>) {
           ...code deleted here...
        }
} 

...code deleted here...
----------cut here----------

You can see (from the condition of the 'if') that this code only finds the
pasting token if it is separated from the header by exactly one blank line.

This is easy enough to fix, if it is not the desired behavior, by inserting

while (<>) {
  last unless /^[ \t\r]*$/ ;
}

before the 'if' and removing the '($_=<>) &&' from the if condition.

Hope this helps,


Scott Collins         | "Few people realize what tremendous power there
                      |  is in one of these things."     -- Willy Wonka
......................|................................................
BUSINESS.   voice:408.862.0540  fax:974.6094   collins@newton.apple.com
Apple Computer, Inc.   1 Infinite Loop, MS 301-2C   Cupertino, CA 95014
.......................................................................
PERSONAL.   voice/fax:408.257.1746    1024:669687   catalyst@netcom.com





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Karl Lui Barrus <klbarrus@owlnet.rice.edu>
Date: Thu, 9 Sep 93 12:12:23 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: REMAIL: Perl/problems
In-Reply-To: <Pine.3.05.9309082112.E23070-9100000@po.EECS.Berkeley.EDU>
Message-ID: <9309091905.AA02437@flammulated.owlnet.rice.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Sameer Parekh wrote:

>	Upon repeated tests of my remailers, I noticed that if there's
>more than one blank line between the header and the header-pasting, then
>the pasting doesn't take place. Does this happen with other people's
>remailers? How is your script different from mine? How can this be fixed?

Could you give an example?  I tried a message like the following
(between the cut marks) which I sent to elee7h5@rosebud.ee.uh.edu:

------------8<--cut-->8------------



::
Anon-To: klbarrus@owlnet.rice.edu




testing
------------8<--cut-->8------------

and it came back OK, with the blanks squeezed out.  So I'm probably
misunderstanding what you said.

-- 
Karl L. Barrus: klbarrus@owlnet.rice.edu         
keyID: 5AD633 hash: D1 59 9D 48 72 E9 19 D5  3D F3 93 7E 81 B5 CC 32 

"One man's mnemonic is another man's cryptography" 
  - my compilers prof discussing file naming in public directories



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: gnu (John Gilmore)
Date: Thu, 9 Sep 93 16:17:27 PDT
To: pem-dev@tis.com
Subject: Crack DES in 3.5 hours for only $1,500,000!
Message-ID: <9309092314.AA15000@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Be the first on your block!

Michael Wiener <weiner@bnr.ca> produced a complete design for a DES
key search machine, which he presented in the "rump session" at Crypto '93
last month.  He designed a single custom chip which can do 50 million
test encryptions per second, and the boards and racks and frames into
which it fits.  The full design has about 60,000 copies of the chip,
solves DES in 3.5 hours, and is fully described in the paper.  Here is
an excerpt from his conclusions:	

    It is possible to build a $1 million machine that can attack DES and
    recover a key in an average time of 3.5 hours.  The machine uses a
    known plaintext to exhaustively search through the DES key space and
    could be developed for $500000 in about 10 months.  Because a great
    deal of detail has gone into the design of the key search machine, we
    can have high confidence in the assessment of its cost and speed.
    The key search design presented here is one to two orders of magnitude
    faster than other recently proposed designs.

    Even cryptosystems with 64-bit keys may be vulnerable.  If DES were
    modified to use 64-bit keys, there would be 2**8 times as many keys to
    search through, and a $10 million machine would take an average of 3.7
    days to find a key.

    It is possible to build a key search machine that can support a range
    of modes of DES with little penalty in run-time.  A $1 million machine
    would take 8 hours on average to find a key used in 1-bit CFB mode
    and 4 hours on average for any of ECB, CBC, 64-bit OFB, 64-bit CFB, or
    8-bit CFB mode.

    This work shows that exhaustive DES key search is alarmingly
    economical.  If it ever was true that attacking DES was only within
    the reach of large governments, it is clearly no longer true.  A
    fairly painless way to improve security dramatically is to switch to
    triple-DES.

The paper was written as a warning to DES users (bankers) and their
customers (depositors).  DES is used to protect electronic money
transfers among banks all over the world.  Several billion dollars per
day are moved in this way.  Within a day of finishing the machine, a
criminal could easily pay back the $1.5M in capital.  In the second
day, they'd have the capital required to build a second machine, and
in the third day a positive cash flow would begin.  Banks can do 
nothing to stop this -- if they shut down their comm links, they go
out of business; if they keep moving money over them, intruders suck
money out at will.  I recommend not keeping your money in banks...

Most organizations who would build such a machine (national
governments and other forms of organized crime) have probably already
constructed many similar machines.  This paper will not help them.  It
is intended to help people who thought that DES was secure.

The full paper is available in PostScript via ftp from:

	ftp.eff.org:/pub/crypto/des_key_search.ps
	cpsr.org:/cpsr/crypto/des/des_key_search.ps

cpsr.org also makes it available via their Gopher service.

CPSR.org is on a slow link; use the ftp.eff.org archive if possible.
(The file will appear there shortly; apologies for any delay.)

	John Gilmore
	Electronic Frontier Foundation


Feel free to hack this up and send me back revised copy...

	John




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: nobody@pmantis.berkeley.edu
Date: Thu, 9 Sep 93 16:27:27 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re:Crypto Visions
Message-ID: <9309092321.AA16275@pmantis.berkeley.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Hey Nick, visionary stuff in general, but . . .


szabo>* Internet Casino: why travel to Las Vegas or Monte Carlo when 
szabo>you can play the finest games in the privacy of your own home?


Maybe it's time you stopped working on the CRT tan, and checked out

the showgirls :-).   There is *virtually* nothing like it.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Cdt Pvt Dan Doughty <DOUGHTYD@Citadel.edu>
Date: Thu, 9 Sep 93 14:02:26 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: encryption
Message-ID: <01H2R2NU55LE8Y5X35@Citadel.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


sub cypherpunks Daniel J. doughty





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Date: Thu, 9 Sep 93 18:02:29 PDT
To: extropians@extropy.org
Subject: "Code Warriors" Article in "Metro" Newspaper
Message-ID: <9309100058.AA18920@netcom5.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Bay Area Cypherpunks and Extropians,

Julian Dibbell's excellent article that appeared in the "Village
Voice" (August 3rd, cover story) is the *cover story* as well in the
latest "Metro" newspaper, the free San Jose area paper (but we get it
down here in Santa Cruz as well).

I have picked up a handful of these free papers, which I'll take to
the Cypherpunks meeting this Saturday. But you all ought to do the
same.

And those not in the Bay Area may want to be on the lookout for
versions of this appearing in your own community newspapers. If it was
sold to "Metro," it'll probably be in other major markets as well.

Plastered across the cover is this:

"CODE WARRIORS   New encryption software cripples the government's
power to monitor our activities, eavesdrop on our conversations or
read our e-mail. Soon the state may be unable to regulate business,
collect taxes, spy on foreign enemies, or police criminal activity. It
will be the end of government as we know it."

And in the table of contents is this description of the article:

"COVER STORY   How will the Feds be able to control us when they won't
know what the hell's going on? Simple encryption software now gives
ordinary citizens the ability to keep their secrets secret--and
conduct underground transactions safe from the prying eyes of
government spooks and IRS agents."

And the "Metro" version also differs from the "VV" version by having
such paragraphs like this in 24-point type:

"Untraceable digital cash transactions and a brisk commerce in trade
secrets could spell doom for the corporation as we know it. Hopelessly
untaxable, such crypto-markets could also sap the strength of
governments."

Wow! And "Gulp." I may have to get my European Community passport
sooner than I had planned. Does Martinique have a Net connection?



-- 
..........................................................................
Timothy C. May         | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,  
tcmay@netcom.com       | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
408-688-5409           | knowledge, reputations, information markets, 
W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA  | black markets, collapse of governments.
Higher Power: 2^756839 | Public Key: PGP and MailSafe available.
Note: I put time and money into writing this posting. I hope you enjoy it.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: nobody@Menudo.UH.EDU
Date: Thu, 9 Sep 93 16:07:27 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: REMAIL: cache
Message-ID: <199309092301.AA29183@Menudo.UH.EDU>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

Cypherpunks,

This is a test message of the caching implementation I've added to the
remailer elee9sf@menudo.uh.edu.  If you are reading this, it should be
working :-)

I implemented caching with three extra scripts: filer.pl, mailout.at,
and mailout.pl.

filer.pl accepts incoming messages and files them into a queue
directory, appending the time in seconds, minutes, hours, and the
process id number to the file.  Hopefully, this will store the file in
a random order with respect to the actual order they arrived in.

Instead of piping incoming mail to slocal.pl, which is what the
typical cypherpunks remailer does, it is piped to filer.pl which just
files the messages.

mailout.at is a script for the at command.  It invokes the mailout.pl
command, which mails out the queued messages, and reschedules itself
for midnight the next day.  Today, I scheduled for 18:00 CDT, so this
message should leave for cypherpunks@toad.com then.

I forgot to check to see if I'm in cron.allow; if so I'll change from
the at command to a crontab.

For the time being the remailer "flushes" its queue every night at
midnight.  After a while I'll make it less often, perhaps every other
day or every three days.  A week is probably too long :-)

mailout.pl is a script which opens the queue directory and gets a list
of files.  Every file in the directory is opened, piped to slocal.pl,
and unlinked.

Well, that's it in a nutshell.

Next up: padding messages, and an smtp package instead of sendmail.

<klbarrus@owlnet.rice.edu>

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.3a

iQCVAgUBLI+wM4OA7OpLWtYzAQGM2wQAulXlIz50z6fVPdWeHstdyFA5GgeCPUaO
XRWooj0PNPPRrAcfUQqFhhgTZibBDHP6qmOXGU4GWfYL6dqPJhCHTi6iBUOGWQ+2
K1+YHinz7h6vNTf1R9fCRElvH0tn5iwq3uR4ZWLqJhhxtD6Mv01qidOsUQIUfQ9G
oN2lT+JrkeU=
=RdzB
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: khijol!erc@apple.com (Ed Carp)
Date: Thu, 9 Sep 93 19:12:30 PDT
To: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Subject: Re: "Code Warriors" Article in "Metro" Newspaper
In-Reply-To: <9309100058.AA18920@netcom5.netcom.com>
Message-ID: <m0oaxjq-000297C@warrior>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text


> "Untraceable digital cash transactions and a brisk commerce in trade
> secrets could spell doom for the corporation as we know it. Hopelessly
> untaxable, such crypto-markets could also sap the strength of
> governments."

I can see it now - electronic governments based on reputation.  With global
communications possible, how would it be possible for *any* government to lie
to its citizens?  Of course, you always run the risk of drowning in
information - but that's what filter programs are for, I suppose...
-- 
Ed Carp				erc@apple.com			510/659-9560

If you want magic, let go of your armor.  Magic is so much stronger than
steel!        -- Richard Bach, "The Bridge Across Forever"



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "L. Detweiler" <ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Date: Thu, 9 Sep 93 22:47:33 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: IETF + PEM = Internet Commerce
Message-ID: <9309100539.AA02295@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Report: the IETF (Internet Engineering Task Force) is very pro-commerce
and recently met in Amsterdam for a session to discuss Internet
Mercantile Protocols (IMP). It would allow consumers & companies on the
Internet to combine PEM and MIME to complete and automate commercial transactions.

J. C. Davin, previously of Bellcore helped initiate the IMP project. He
envisions a standard that would allow companies to sell data such as
image files or software. Another approach being considered would allow
a sort of `home shopping network' approach.

Meeting m Amsterdam minutes can be found at thumper.bellcore.com. 
Directory path: pub/devetzis/imp. Get: imp-archive.

Mail me for more information.

- - -

On a related note, Bob Metcalf of IETF and columnist for InfoWorld was
on NPR recently and talked about the `pampered elite' of people with
Unix machines that are currently using the internet. The comment was
clarified to mean that a vast audience of people with PCs and Macs and
other low-end computers are mostly unconnected. IETF membership info appended.

He shows a strong commitment to:

1) increasing address space for participants of the next century -
`upgrading in one of the biggest cutovers since Great Britain decided
to drive on the right side of the road'

2) exploiting ATM with ``cell-based protocols, operating systems, and
applications.  Otherwise, the Internet stays stuck in its current
20-year-old ASCII-bound applications -- TELNET, FTP, and E-mail.''

3) strong support for *individual* subscribers vs. the current
institutional monopoly, with ISDN playing a central role

4) he's in favor of usage billing as a critical aspect of commercial
development. ``Internet carriers must be able, as are telephone
companies, to settle with one another for traffic carried on behalf of
each other's customers.''

 From: "Bob Metcalfe" <Bob_Metcalfe@ccgate.infoworld.com>
>if you want to join the Internet Society, as I just did, 
>to keep in touch with how the third generation is coming along, it costs $70 
>per year and gets you the quarterly /Internet Society News/.  Call >703-620-8990.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "L. Detweiler" <ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Date: Thu, 9 Sep 93 23:58:16 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: ViaCrypt PGP Announcement clarifications
Message-ID: <9309100652.AA03509@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



- using their own cryptographic routines DigiSig+ (by necessity)
- first release scheduled early Nov. 1993
- Windows & Mac versions in 1994
- source code *not* released
- no indication of `reviews' or QA by PRZ etc.

------- Forwarded Message

Date: Thu, 09 Sep 93 13:59:41 -0700
From: "Tom Jones" <wk01965@worldlink.com>
Subject: ViaCrypt PGP Announcement

     Internet messages pertaining to ViaCrypt(tm) PGP(tm) have
been very positive but somewhat overwhelming.  With dozens of
messages received by Phil and passed on to ViaCrypt, this general
response will have to suffice until we can get back with more
personalized messages.

     First, ViaCrypt (a division of 17-year-old Lemcom Systems,
Inc.) presently has a PKP patent sublicense for its line of
DigiSig+(tm) software and hardware cryptographic engines.  By
using ViaCrypt's licensed DigiSig+ software cryptographic engine
for the RSA technology, and marrying it to most of the PGP code,
we will produce a totally compatible and legal commercial product
which is called ViaCrypt PGP.

     Second, there is a little work required before we can start
shipping.  Most significantly, PGP is being modified to
substitute the DigiSig+ cryptographic engine in the ViaCrypt PGP
product.  With the more generalized interface of the DigiSig+
cryptographic engine, ViaCrypt PGP may run slightly slower than
PGP but otherwise you won't notice any difference.  ViaCrypt will
attempt to minimize any performance differences in future
releases.

     ViaCrypt's patent sublicense from PKP only permits object
code to be distributed.  That may create uneasiness for some
people, but is necessary to market ViaCrypt PGP.

     Following are excerpts from the press release for ViaCrypt
PGP dated 3 September 1993:

     "ViaCrypt PGP will be available in object code for the DOS 
environment in early November, 1993.  ViaCrypt intends to make
the program available on a wide range of additional platforms. 
UNIX versions will soon follow.  To provide a high degree of
interoperability, the company expects to announce a Windows
version, Macintosh version, and ports to several other platforms
in 1994.

     ViaCrypt PGP for DOS prices are $199.95 for a single user
license, $599.95 for a five user license, and $1,649.95 for a 20
user license.  Shipping and handling are extra.  As an
introductory promotional offer, these prices are discounted 50%
for orders received through the end of 1993.  Multiple-user
licenses for 50 or more are also available from ViaCrypt.  Prices
for ViaCrypt PGP on other platforms may vary and will be          
established at announcement time."



------- End of Forwarded Message





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "L. Detweiler" <ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Date: Fri, 10 Sep 93 00:03:31 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Waco Raid: Justice Dept. requests FOIA IMMUNITY!
Message-ID: <9309100658.AA03565@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Just what we need -- a whole new field day for the disconsolate Kennedy
conspiracy theorist industry! Maybe they'll let us see *these*
documents in 2050 or so!

(Disclaimer: of course, this has only tangential relevance to the list,
but it has formed one of the hottest, most recurring, and emotional
topics on the list, and hopefully everyone who would flame me for
posting it here has already deleted the message based on the subject
line! so NYAAHH!)


------- Forwarded Message

From: Richard Ginn <rlg1@cornell.edu>
Subject: Waco, Texas [Branch Davidians] Raid and the Freedom of
Information Act Exemption Request by Justice Dept. of the US.
Date: Thu, 9 Sep 1993 18:21:21 -0400

By Richard Ginn <rlg1@cornell.edu>, Ithaca, New York, USA - 9 Sept. 1993 - 

The United States Justice Department has requested that all files relating
to the Waco, Texas [Branch Davidian - David Koresh and friends] raid by
U.S. Government forces and the resulting deaths be exempted from all
Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) inquiries and that the files be sealed
so that no one may make any further inquiries into the Waco incident.

The full text of the request can be found in the United States Federal
Register, Volume 58, Number 156, on Monday August 16, 1993, page 43312. 
The period for comment on this action expires on September 15, 1993 (six
days from the date of this message), after which the files will be sealed
if there is no opposing comment by the public.

- - 30 -
<end of message>





------- End of Forwarded Message





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Zeek <zeek@bongo.cc.utexas.edu>
Date: Thu, 9 Sep 93 23:57:34 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Cryptography Conference (Austin, Tx)
Message-ID: <199309100652.AA26841@bongo.cc.utexas.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text


-----------------------------------------------------------
Please forward this announcement to appropriate mailing
lists, newsgroups, bbs, and individuals.
Sincere apologies to those who have seen this announcement too many times. 
-----------------------------------------------------------


		EFF / EFF-Austin Cryptography Conference
		Wednesday, September 22, 1993 
		Ramada Inn North, Austin
		9220 N. IH-35 at Rundberg

     Admission is free.  Please arrive at 12:3o p.m. to find seating. 

1:oo - 1:3o p.m. *INTRODUCTORY REMARKS*

          Steve Jackson - WELCOME [5 minutes]
          Bruce Sterling - KEYNOTE [20 minutes]

PANEL #1 [1:45 - 3:oo] *POLICY*

          Mitch Kapor
          Jerry Berman
          Dave Farber

PANEL #2 [3:15 - 4:3o] *LAW ENFORCEMENT*

          Esther Dyson
          Mike Godwin

PANEL #3 [4:45 to 6:oo]  *CYPHERPUNKS*

     	  John Perry Barlow
     	  Eric Hughes
     	  John Gilmore
     
DINNER [6:oo to 8:oo]

No dinner arrangements have been made.  However, a buffet dinner
will be offered by the Ramada or you may order from their menu.  

Good dining is also available within the area.  
 
RECEPTION [8:oo to 10:oo] 

A cash bar will be available and everyone is invited.  Hopefully
those of you unable to make the daytime events can attend the
reception.

------------------------------------------------------------------

For more information please contact zeek@bongo.cc.utexas.edu,
jonl@wixer.bga.com, or call (512) 453-4483 [leave a message for zeek].



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "L. Detweiler" <ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Date: Fri, 10 Sep 93 01:08:16 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: WACO: commentary, addresses to write
Message-ID: <9309100803.AA04444@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



wow, I guess this has been known in cyberspace since last friday. just goes
to show you I don't read all the conspiracy newsgroups, eh? :)


===cut=here===

Newsgroups: talk.politics.guns,talk.politics.misc,alt.individualism,alt.activism,misc.legal
From: lvc@cbnews.cb.att.com (Larry Cipriani)
Subject: BATF GOES FOR COVER-UP OF WACO FIASCO,
Organization: Ideology Busters, Inc.
Date: Fri, 3 Sep 1993 17:35:28 GMT

           BATF GOES FOR COVER-UP OF WACO FIASCO,
            WRITE TO TREASURY NOW TO PROTEST!!!
 
	The people who launched the disastrous raid on the Branch Dividian
compound in Waco, Texas, have now mounted an attack on the American
people's right to know facts behind the tragedy. The Tresury Department
is seeking to deny public access to invesitgative reports probing the
government's actions leading to the Waco conflagration
 
     You have until September 15 to protest against this cover-up.
 
Comments (preferably in triplicate) should be sent to the Dept. of the
Tresaury, Office of Enforcemnet, Room 4312, 1500 Pennslyvania Ave.,
N.W., Washington, D.C. 20220.
 
                           WRITE NOW!
 
	It has been reported that the Treasury wants to lockup many of the
findings of the Waco investigation to "protect investigative techniques
and procedures."  What they are really doing is hiding the truth from
the American people and preventing the people from making an accurate
judgment on the BATF actions in Waco.  This action is being taken at teh
same time critizism of the raid is mounting.
 
	The affidavit used to justify the search warrant used in Waco has
come under intense criticism, with stories in a number of major papers,
the Washington Times the latest (Sept. 2).  Experts who have researched
the warrant have stated that it never should have been granted because
the affidavit did not meet legal requirements.
 
	Specifically cited were: a quote attributed to Koresh regarding
the LA riots, said to have been spoken three weeks before the riots
happened; no probable cause based on information included in the
warrant; inaccurate description of the firearms in possession of Koresh;
and only technical, if any, violations of firearms laws.  As a result of
this intense pressure, there has been speculation in the press that
Stephen Higgins, BATF Director and other top BATF officials may be
forced out.  However, to counter the growing outcry, the Treasury is now
taking steps to seal away information from the investigation of the
tragedy.  That is, they are trying to cover it all up.
 
	Below is the text of a proposed rule change that would lock up the
files of the "Waco Administrative Review Group Investigation", the panel
assigned to investigate the assault on the Branch Davidian Compound.
This means that Freedom of Information Act requests for information will
be denied, and the public will not have access to this information.
This is a blatant effort to cover-up the blunders in Waco.  It can only
be stopped if people cry-out in protest.
 
 
DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY
Departmental Offices (DEPO) 31 CFR Part 1
Proposed rule: Privacy Act of 1974, as Amended; Exemption of System of
Records From Certain Provisions
Contact: Nichole L. Jenkins, 202-622-0450
Comment Date: 09/15/93
(FEDREGISTER 58 FR 43312 08/16/93; 538 lines.)
*Proposed Rules*
--- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- ---
 
DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY
 
Departmental Offices
 
31 CFR Part 1
 
Privacy Act of 1974, as Amended; Exemption of System of Records From
Certain Provisions
 
AGENCY: Departmental Offices, Department of the Treasury.
 
ACTION: Proposed rule.
 
SUMMARY: In accordance with the requirements of the Privacy Act of 1974,
as amended, Departmental Offices, Office of Enforcement is proposing to
exempt a system of records, the Waco Administrative Review Group
Investigation (DO/.207) from certain provisions of the Privacy Act. The
exemptions are intended to increase the value of the system of records
for law enforcement and investigative purposes, to comply with legal
prohibitions against the disclosure of certain kinds of information, and
to protect the privacy of individuals identified in the system of
records. The exemptions are intended to increase the value of the system
of records for the factfinding investigation and administrative review
performed by the Waco Administrative Review Group so as not to reveal
local, state or Federal law enforcement techniques, sources and methods
or affect the ability of law enforcement agencies to prosecute people
for criminal wrongdoing.
 
DATES: Comments must be received no later than September 15, 1993.
 
ADDRESSES: Comments (preferably in triplicate) must be submitted to the
Department of the Treasury, Office of Enforcement, room 4312, 1500
Pennsylvania Ave., NW., Washington, DC 20220.
 
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Nichole L. Jenkins, Attorney, Office of
the Assistant General Counsel (Administrative & General Law), (202) 622-
0450, room 1410, 1500 Pennsylvania Ave., NW., Washington, DC 20220.
 
                Downloaded from GUN-TALK (703-719-6406)
                A service of the
                National Rifle Association
                Institute for Legislative Action
                Washington, DC 20036
-- 
Larry Cipriani -- l.v.cipriani@att.com or attmail!lcipriani





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: gnu (John Gilmore)
Date: Fri, 10 Sep 93 02:13:41 PDT
To: gnu@cygnus.com
Subject: Re: Crack DES in 3.5 hours for only $1,500,000!
In-Reply-To: <9309092314.AA15000@toad.com>
Message-ID: <9309100913.AA23487@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I will have printed copies of the paper at the Cypherpunks meeting
this weekend.  Folks in other locations, please print the PostScript
version from ftp.eff.org:/pub/crypto/des_key_search.ps, rather than
asking me to mail printed copies.

Kudos to Michael Wiener for doing the work, and for making the paper
freely available online!

By the way, with 60,000 chips, it takes 3.5 hours to brute-force a 56
bit key.  If you lop 16 bits off, you lose a factor of ~60,000: it
takes ONE chip a few hours to brute-force it -- or a third of a second
if you use the whole machine.  I wondered where those ``40-bit keys''
came from...

Oho!  I now suspect why RC2 and RC4 must remain trade-secret...NSA
doesn't want people to know what particular internal algorithm
features their brute-force chips are capable of handling!  I recall
the discussion of how RC2/4 were invented; NSA told the designer
(since identified as Ron Rivest): "No, this is too big; weaken this
over here; do fewer rounds here; etc..."  What resulted was suitable
for NSA brute-force using chips they had readily available.  It's
possible that simple changes to the algorithm would render it much
less penetrable by NSA's current hardware.  Ron even knows *which*
changes, and I encourage him to tell us.

	John




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: remail@tamsun.tamu.edu
Date: Fri, 10 Sep 93 01:37:35 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: WACO: commentary, addresses to write
Message-ID: <9309100832.AA16682@tamsun.tamu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Is there any ethical person inside Treasury with a digitizer
and net access (or a freind with net access)?  A great
opportunity for use of alt.whistleblowers.





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: doug@netcom5.netcom.com (Doug Merritt)
Date: Fri, 10 Sep 93 08:22:46 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: "Code Warriors" Article in "Metro" Newspaper
Message-ID: <9309101515.AA29004@netcom5.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May) said:
>Julian Dibbell's excellent article that appeared in the "Village
>Voice" (August 3rd, cover story) is the *cover story* as well in the
>latest "Metro" newspaper, the free San Jose area paper (but we get it
>down here in Santa Cruz as well).

Over lunch yesterday I was telling a friend (who had previously exhorted me
to find folks on the net more appropriate than sci.crypt to discuss
crypto schemes with) about discovering cypherpunks, and on our way out he
noticed this Metro issue, commenting "Zeitgeist." Quite. :-)

It quotes Tim, btw:
	You can get further away in cyberspace than you could in going
	to Alpha Centauri", says Tim May, and he should know. Before he
	retired seven years agao, a wealthy man at age 34, May was a
	reasonably illustrious corporate physicist. Now he's a Cypherpunk,
	part of a loose-knit band of scrappy, libertarian-leaning computer
	jockeys who have dedicated themselves to perfecting and promoting
	the art of disappearing into the virtual hinterlands. Concentrated
	in Silicon Valley but spread out across the country and as far
	away as Finland, the Cypherpunks maintain daily e-mail contact,
	collaboratively creating and distributing practical software answers
	to modern cryptography's central question: How to wrap a piece
	of digital information in mathematical complexity so dense that
	only literally astronomical expenditures of computer time can breach
	it?

	"Some of these things sound like just a bunch of fucking numbers,"
	May explains. "But what they really are is they're things which in
	computability space take more energy to get to than to drive a car
	to Andromeda. I'm not kidding. I mean, you can work the math out
	yourself."

	Well, no, you probably can't, but even those unversed in rocket
	science can appreciate the social value of such calculations...

And Eric:

	"Cryptography is a greater equalizer than the Colt .45," says Eric
	Hughes, the long-haired, cowboy-hatted and not entirely lapsed
	Mormon who, along with May, conceived the Cypherpunks just seven
	months before the Clipper hit the fan. "These are power-leveling
	techniques," he adds, pointing out that the hermetically sealed
	voice-and-data channels that could arm every citizen against state
	wire-surveillance are just the simplest of the crypto toys the
	Cypherpunks are playing with.

Nicely provocative article.
	Doug
--
Doug Merritt				doug@netcom.com
Professional Wild-eyed Visionary	Member, Crusaders for a Better Tomorrow

Unicode Novis Cypherpunks Gutenberg Wavelets Conlang Logli Alife HC_III
Computational linguistics Fundamental physics Cogsci SF GA VR CASE TLAs




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: koontzd@lrcs.loral.com (David Koontz )
Date: Fri, 10 Sep 93 09:03:48 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: No Subject
Message-ID: <9309101558.AA19871@nebula.lrcs.loral.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>From: "David LANDGREN, PUB         " <David.D.L.LANDGREN@pub.oecd.fr>
>To: cypherpunks@toad.com
>Subject: ... long live DES (sic)
>Importance: Normal
>Status: R
>
>>>>This chip takes a single plaintext/ciphertext pair and quickly tries
>>>>DES keys until it finds one that produces the given ciphertext from the
>>>>given plaintext.
>
>It's all very well to be able to crack DES in 3.5 hours, but I don't know
>of too many people who obligingly send out the plaintext and cyphertext of
>a message together, or in some other way combinable.  If U can get the
>plaintext of a DES-encrypted msg then U don't need to dick around with DES
>anyway.  No-one ever said it was bulletproof; a direct consequence is that
DES users change their keys awful frequently.

The way to get plaintext is through what is known as revealed-plaintext,
where you can with a high degree of accuracy 'guess' part of the plaintext
of a message, such as "From: Col. Dimwitt" in a message format, or the
title of a paper or document, which is usally unclassified and knowable
from another source.

Fearing such, our illustrious 3 letter governmental organization implemented
with the advent of electronic crypto gear (set your way back machine, sherman)
something called traffic flow security, where on a radio net or dedicated
line a cryptographic stream continously runs.  The idea is to make it
hard to distinguish boundaries of messages, and thus revealed-plaintext.

This also allows the use of the caveat - EFTO (Encrypted For Transmission Only)
seen on unclassified messages, hey the line was otherwise idle, waiting for
classified traffic, right?

Modern communications are swinging toward the use of packets, which beside
allowing traffic analysis unless the transmission medium is denied (Such
as using link encryption as a super encryption, or dedicated lines, etc.).

The way to offset to offset the vulnerability to revealed-plaintext attacks
is to use filling where some random data followed by a sync or start of
message symbol preceeds the the actual message.  All message traffic should
be encrypted in general, making it hard to separate the wheat from the
chaff.  Ideally the only unencrypted data should be that required for
operating the communications protocol, including denial of packet ordering
if possible.

There's a paper found on the NIST anonymous ftp site entitled 'Security in
ISDN' by William E. Burr that can be informative.  Its available in PostScript
and is around 70 pages long.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: smb@research.att.com
Date: Fri, 10 Sep 93 06:42:43 PDT
To: gnu@toad.com (John Gilmore)
Subject: Re: Crack DES in 3.5 hours for only $1,500,000!
Message-ID: <9309101339.AA26739@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


	 Oho!  I now suspect why RC2 and RC4 must remain trade-secret...NSA
	 doesn't want people to know what particular internal algorithm
	 features their brute-force chips are capable of handling!  I recall
	 the discussion of how RC2/4 were invented; NSA told the designer
	 (since identified as Ron Rivest): "No, this is too big; weaken this
	 over here; do fewer rounds here; etc..."  What resulted was suitable
	 for NSA brute-force using chips they had readily available.  It's
	 possible that simple changes to the algorithm would render it much
	 less penetrable by NSA's current hardware.  Ron even knows *which*
	 changes, and I encourage him to tell us.

I'll let Rivest speak for himself about NSA's influence -- but I've
spoken to cryptographers who've seen the algorithm (under
non-disclosure agreements), and they say that RC2 and RC4 are quite
strong *if* you use a long enough key.  They're algorithms with
variable-length keys, and their strength -- and not just their
resistance to exhaustive search -- is related to the key size used.
The gotcha is that only the 40-bit version is exportable.  But we don't
need stories about weakened algorithms to know that NSA can crack
40-bit RC2/4; they'd never have granted a license otherwise.  (And what
does that tell us about 512-bit RSA?)

One more point -- it's been claimed that RC2 and RC4 have an
inherently- slow key setup mechanism.  That can slow down brute-force
attacks tremendously, since it then takes a long time to try each
case.  But it's fine for point-to-point encryptions, where you can
amortize that overhead over many messages.


		--Steve Bellovin




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Timothy Newsham <newsham@wiliki.eng.hawaii.edu>
Date: Fri, 10 Sep 93 13:12:50 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: DES, key scheduler
Message-ID: <9309102010.AA01292@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Does anyone here have a list of the scheduled bits for each subkey
in each round of DES?  (ie. if input key is {0,1,...64} (or 56) then
k1 = { 15, 2, 35, ... } etc.)
Alternatively (next best thing) does anyone have a list of which
key bits arent used in each round?

                            Tim N.





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "David LANDGREN, PUB           " <David.D.L.LANDGREN@PUB.oecd.fr>
Date: Fri, 10 Sep 93 03:37:38 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: ... long live DES (sic)
Message-ID: <"21031101903991/16267 OECDX400*"@MHS>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>>>This chip takes a single plaintext/ciphertext pair and quickly tries
>>>DES keys until it finds one that produces the given ciphertext from the
>>>given plaintext.

It's all very well to be able to crack DES in 3.5 hours, but I don't know
of too many people who obligingly send out the plaintext and cyphertext of
a message together, or in some other way combinable.  If U can get the
plaintext of a DES-encrypted msg then U don't need to dick around with DES
anyway.  No-one ever said it was bulletproof; a direct consequence is that
DES users change their keys awful frequently.

 David Landgren
 <david.landgren@oecd.fr>  <dlandgren@bix.com>
 [standard disclaimer: this is my personal point of view]

     A B O L I S H   F E A R   --   E S T A B L I S H   T R U S T







From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: ferguson@fiber.sprintlink.net (Paul Ferguson x2044)
Date: Fri, 10 Sep 93 08:23:47 PDT
To: gnu@toad.com
Subject: Cracking DES - A practical implimentation?
Message-ID: <9309101617.AA09158@fiber.sprintlink.net>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



On Thu, 09 Sep 93 16:14:56 -0700,
 <gnu@toad.com> John Gilmore wrote -

> Be the first on your block!
 
No kidding. I just ftp'd the des_key_search.ps file from ftp.eff.org
and browsed through the first few pages (hats off to Michael for a 
fine piece of work). This is indeed an important milestone and will
have an impact on the cryptographic implementations used by banks, etc.
in the very near future. It should be interesting to see what the future
holds ....


> The paper was written as a warning to DES users (bankers) and their
> customers (depositors).  DES is used to protect electronic money
> transfers among banks all over the world.  Several billion dollars per
> day are moved in this way.  Within a day of finishing the machine, a
> criminal could easily pay back the $1.5M in capital.  In the second
> day, they'd have the capital required to build a second machine, and
> in the third day a positive cash flow would begin.  Banks can do 
> nothing to stop this -- if they shut down their comm links, they go
> out of business; if they keep moving money over them, intruders suck
> money out at will.  I recommend not keeping your money in banks...

...and in another communique -

> Oho!  I now suspect why RC2 and RC4 must remain trade-secret...NSA
> doesn't want people to know what particular internal algorithm
> features their brute-force chips are capable of handling!  I recall
> the discussion of how RC2/4 were invented; NSA told the designer
> (since identified as Ron Rivest): "No, this is too big; weaken this
> over here; do fewer rounds here; etc..."  What resulted was suitable
> for NSA brute-force using chips they had readily available.  It's
> possible that simple changes to the algorithm would render it much
> less penetrable by NSA's current hardware.  Ron even knows *which*
> changes, and I encourage him to tell us.

That would be an interesting revelation, wouldn't it? ,-)


_____________________________________________________________________________
Paul Ferguson                                                               
Mindbank Consulting Group                        fergp@sytex.com   
Fairfax, Virginia  USA                           ferguson@icp.net




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: smb@research.att.com
Date: Fri, 10 Sep 93 08:27:45 PDT
To: "David LANDGREN, PUB " <David.D.L.LANDGREN@PUB.oecd.fr>
Subject: Re: ... long live DES (sic)
Message-ID: <9309101526.AA28428@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


	 It's all very well to be able to crack DES in 3.5 hours, but I
	 don't know of too many people who obligingly send out the
	 plaintext and cyphertext of a message together, or in some
	 other way combinable.  If U can get the plaintext of a
	 DES-encrypted msg then U don't need to dick around with DES
	 anyway.  No-one ever said it was bulletproof; a direct
	 consequence is that DES users change their keys awful
	 frequently.

It's not that simple; Wiener's design is indeed a major breakthrough
(for the open literature, of course).

First of all, one can often guess probable plaintext for some of the
message.  Here's the first line of your note as it (apparently) left
your machine:

	Date: 10 Sep 93 10:30:12 GMT

If I've ever received mail from you, and hence know that format, I know
at least the first 6 bytes, and the format of the next two.  If I know
the date of the intercept, I have even more.  Poof -- a crib.

I can do even better.  Look at the $10,000,000 machine -- the one with
a 21-minute solution.  I can afford to try several guesses for where
the string `Date: ' occurs.  It doesn't take that much more complex a
chip to look for obvious variants, such as that string occuring shifted
over one or two bytes in either direction.  You may get some false
positives, but a second-order search machine can then apply more complex
heuristics to possible keys returned by Wiener's design.

And historically, enemies have been able to get probable plaintext --
or even some chosen plaintext -- for at least a few messages.  Read
``The Codebreakers'' or ``Seizing the Enigma'' for many such examples.

There's one more step here, described in detail in Garon and Outerbridge's
``DES Watch'' paper.  If the DES session key is transmitted encrypted
by DES using a 56-bit master key, you're dead meat.  I can crunch for
weeks to recover one session key, using many possibilities for the plaintext
and its location in the ciphertext.  But once I recover that long-gone
session key, I can use it as the known plaintext to recover your master
key.  And after that, the jig is up.

No, there should be no mistake about it.  Single DES is *dead*, for any
application where recovery of a single session key is bad.  If you want
to stick with single DES, you need to change session keys very often
(every few seconds against an enemy who can build a $10M machine), and
you need to distribute session keys by some other mechanism (i.e., RSA,
Diffie-Hellman, triple DES).


		--Steve Bellovin




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Matthew J Miszewski <MJMISKI@macc.wisc.edu>
Date: Fri, 10 Sep 93 13:27:50 PDT
To: CYPHERPUNKS@toad.com
Subject: Object Code Release
Message-ID: <23091013192867@vms2.macc.wisc.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


 
Just a qwik note on the release of ViaCrypt only in object code.  Ill dig up the
cite later but recent appelate decisions show two circuits leaning toward
allowing fair use decompiling for academic purposes.  Actually, they have gone
as far to say that deprogramming an EEPROM and printing out the resultant Source
(after decompiled) *might* be considered a fair use of sorts.  So, release VC in
object and have the folks that decompiled the KOH decompile this too and
whallah!  A more robust encryption scheme (not security thru obscurity).
 
Matt  (not --Matt)
mjmiski@macc.wisc.edu (I hate .sig space)
 




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Date: Fri, 10 Sep 93 14:42:52 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Armed gangs stealing chips from warehouses
Message-ID: <9309102135.AA25794@netcom5.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I saw on "Clarinet," the news service, a couple of A.P. reports on
armed attacks on chip warehouses.

The latest was yesterday when a van pulled up to the loading dock at
Wyle, a distributor in Santa Clara (across from Intel). Two armed men
forced everyone in the area to the floor, while they went straight for
the Intel microprocessors and filled a large bag. 

An investigator called this type of crime the wave of the future, and
said something to the effect that "chips will be the coke of the 90s."
Also talk of black markets and how computer networks are being used to
coordinate things.

So, if you see folks using BlackNet for advertising Intel chips....

(I regret that I cannot post the Clarinet article, as Clarinet has
fairly draconian policies about reposting its articles--even though I
never signed a contract. Still, Cypherunks should be aware of
this....I've seen at least one Clarinet article reposted here on this
list, and this could expose the list to actions.)

--Tim

-- 
..........................................................................
Timothy C. May         | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,  
tcmay@netcom.com       | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
408-688-5409           | knowledge, reputations, information markets, 
W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA  | black markets, collapse of governments.
Higher Power: 2^756839 | Public Key: PGP and MailSafe available.
Note: I put time and money into writing this posting. I hope you enjoy it.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: J. Michael Diehl <mdiehl@triton.unm.edu>
Date: Fri, 10 Sep 93 14:12:51 PDT
To: erc@apple.com
Subject: Re: "Code Warriors" Article in "Metro" Newspaper
In-Reply-To: <m0oaxjq-000297C@warrior>
Message-ID: <9309102106.AA26303@triton.unm.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


According to Ed Carp:
> I can see it now - electronic governments based on reputation.  With global

Well, we already have a government based on reputation.  The very currency with
which we pay our rent is "backed by the full faith and promise of the American
Government."  Pfffft!  Ya right.  Just think what would happen if the Banks
started refusing to loan Big Brother any more money to play with.  Our country
would fall within 1 year.

> communications possible, how would it be possible for *any* government to lie

It's becomming more difficult every day for our Big Brother to lie to us.  This
is happening, for the most part, due to the availability of electronic 
communications.

> to its citizens?  Of course, you always run the risk of drowning in
> information - but that's what filter programs are for, I suppose...

Have you ever played with gopher for 4 hours.....  Nuff said.. ;^)

Good post, Ed.  My only point is that the things you speak of are already
happening.  Take care.  Lagers,


J. Michael Diehl   ;^)  |*The 2nd Amendment is there in case the 
mdiehl@triton.unm.edu   | Government forgets about the 1st!  <RL>
Mike.Diehl@f29.n301.z1  |*God is a good Physicist, and an even 
    .fidonet.org        | better Mathematician.  <Me>
al945@cwns9.ins.cwru.edu|*I'm just looking for the opportunity to 
 (505) 299-2282 (voice) | be Politicly Incorrect! <Me>
Can we impeach him yet? |*Protected by 18 USC 2511 and 18 USC 2703. 
PGP Key = 7C06F1 = A6 27 E1 1D 5F B2 F2 F1  12 E7 53 2D 85 A2 10 5D



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: cme@ellisun.sw.stratus.com (Carl Ellison)
Date: Fri, 10 Sep 93 14:02:51 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Crack DES in 3.5 hours for only $1,500,000!
Message-ID: <9309102054.AA26212@ellisun.sw.stratus.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>From: gnu@toad.com (John Gilmore)
>Message-Id: <9309100913.AA23487@toad.com>
>Subject: Re: Crack DES in 3.5 hours for only $1,500,000! 
>Date: Fri, 10 Sep 93 02:13:32 -0700

It feels like you're jumping to conclusions, John.  At 40 bits of key, I
don't care how strong an algorithm is.  I can have my network of
SPARCstations try all keys.  NSA chip technology doesn't enter into that
analysis.

Meanwhile, on the death of DES -- what we know is that there's a known
plaintext attack, given the right hardware.

What I've recently heard called a pre-whitening (XOR with PRNG before the
DES) wipes out the known plaintext.  The PRNG doesn't need to be that
strong.  It's protected by DES and vice versa -- Chinese-puzzle style.

Of course, my personal favorite DES variant remains:

	compress|des|tran|des|tran|des

but if you're really paranoid, you could change it to:

	compress|xor|tran|des|tran|des|tran|des

since xor and tran are so cheap.  [des in any mode you prefer -- eg.,
cbc or cfb -- IVs kept secret, of course.]

[For those not reading sci.crypt, tran is an (up to) 8KB transposition
with PRNG keyed from the histogram of the first block of bytes -- code
posted to sci.crypt, mailed by me or avbl by ftp from scss3.cl.msu.edu.]

 - Carl




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Graham Toal <gtoal@an-teallach.com>
Date: Fri, 10 Sep 93 12:47:49 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Mailer hooks for PGP
Message-ID: <8778@an-teallach.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


In article <9308271722.AA11690@ah.com> hughes@ah.com writes:
 > >check your public ring and automatically sign/encode outgoing mail to
 > >eligible users
 > 
 > As a general rule, mere presence of a key on a keyring should not
 > indicate that this person wishes to receive encrypted mail.  There
 > should be a separate installation for that, either by an enhanced
 > alias file or similar.  There are many for whom reading encrypted mail
 > is not always desirable, because the effort required to download it
 > and decrypt it is more time than the content is worth.  I myself fall
 > into this category, unfortunately.

This is very true.  I hacked my mailer to encrypt when possible, and it
drove Phil Zimmerman batty every time I mailed him and forgot to
override it.

G
-- 
Personal mail to gtoal@gtoal.com (I read it in the evenings)
Business mail to gtoal@an-teallach.com (Be careful with the spelling!)
Faxes to An Teallach Limited: +44 31 662 4678  Voice: +44 31 668 1550 x212





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Graham Toal <gtoal@an-teallach.com>
Date: Fri, 10 Sep 93 12:48:42 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Further PGP Security Doubts
Message-ID: <8782@an-teallach.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


In article <199308261827.AA25477@xtropia> an31144@anon.penet.fi writes:
 > I have been seeing yet more criticisms of PGP, this time from some
 > character calling himself "Raymond Paquin."  He claims to be a
 > professor of mathematics who has been working at an unnamed university
 > exclusively on cryptographics for the past twelve years.  He implies
 > that he is working for some government in a classified capacity and is
 > thus unable to either publish or discuss the matter openly.

I missed that one (had <pressing> matters to attend to ;-) ) - could
someone repost it please?  I'd quite like to see if my text style
analysis skills are still working :)

G
-- 
Personal mail to gtoal@gtoal.com (I read it in the evenings)
Business mail to gtoal@an-teallach.com (Be careful with the spelling!)
Faxes to An Teallach Limited: +44 31 662 4678  Voice: +44 31 668 1550 x212





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: ferguson@fiber.sprintlink.net (Paul Ferguson x2044)
Date: Fri, 10 Sep 93 16:47:53 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Digital warfare
Message-ID: <9309110040.AA09675@fiber.sprintlink.net>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


On Fri, 10 Sep 93 14:35:02 PDT,
 <uunet!netcom.com!tcmay> Timothy C. May wrote -
 
> An investigator called this type of crime the wave of the
> future, and said something to the effect that "chips will
> be the coke of the 90s." Also talk of black markets and
> how computer networks are being used to coordinate things.
 
> So, if you see folks using BlackNet for advertising Intel
> chips....
 
 That's an interesting point (images of "Wild Palms" conjured).
 This _is_ the wave of the future, as Tim implies, and it's
 unfortunate that instances such as this (segway) tarnishes what
 it is that I think many of us are trying to espouse in the
 cypherpunk movement.

Paul Ferguson               |   privacy \'pri-va-see\ n, pl, -cies;
Mindbank Consulting Group   |   1: the quality or state of being apart
Fairfax, Virginia USA       |   from others  2: secrecy
fergp@sytex.com             |
ferguson@icp.net            |   Privacy -- Use it or lose it.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: cme@ellisun.sw.stratus.com (Carl Ellison)
Date: Fri, 10 Sep 93 18:02:55 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re:  Digital warfare
Message-ID: <9309110057.AA26559@ellisun.sw.stratus.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>Date: Fri, 10 Sep 93 19:40:37 -0500
>From: ferguson@fiber.sprintlink.net (Paul Ferguson x2044)
>Message-Id: <9309110040.AA09675@fiber.sprintlink.net>
>Subject: Digital warfare


>> So, if you see folks using BlackNet for advertising Intel
>> chips....
> 
> That's an interesting point (images of "Wild Palms" conjured).
> This _is_ the wave of the future, as Tim implies, and it's
> unfortunate that instances such as this (segway) tarnishes what
> it is that I think many of us are trying to espouse in the
> cypherpunk movement.
>

>ferguson@icp.net            |   Privacy -- Use it or lose it.

I have heard cypherpunks described as two groups under one label:

1.	those of us who advocate privacy in private hands

2.	those who advocate anarchy

I'm in the privacy camp and worry that enough talk from the anarchists
will cause the privacy to be attacked.  I fully expect total retaliation
by the governments of the world against any effective anarchy.  The wilder
the threats (even if they're not real), the stronger the retaliation.
We could lose all privacy as a result.

It's important not to give the government any excuse which would make the
populace side with them against us.  This is a political battle and we need
the people on our side.

For example, crypto-anarchic banks -- cute idea -- but if you ever want a
cop to make your banker give you the money, the banker can't be anonymous
and neither can you account be.  ..so you have to *really* trust this
banker.  Maybe some people will trust such a banker enough.  But,
meanwhile, talk of total tax evasion by the more excited of our
crypto-anarchy brethren might give the government the political ammunition
it needs.

In fact, if the FBI has planted agents on this list, I wouldn't be
surprised to discover someday that they were among the vocal anarchists.

 - Carl





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: karn@qualcomm.com (Phil Karn)
Date: Fri, 10 Sep 93 21:17:58 PDT
To: cme@ellisun.sw.stratus.com
Subject: Digital warfare
In-Reply-To: <9309110057.AA26559@ellisun.sw.stratus.com>
Message-ID: <9309110410.AA06849@servo>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I want to echo Carl's sentiments. I do find talk about cryptographically
enforced underground economies to be interesting, but scary as well
precisely because I'm afraid of what the backlash might do to the
cryptographically enforced personal privacy that I'm primarily
interested in.

Phil




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Perry E. Metzger" <pmetzger@lehman.com>
Date: Fri, 10 Sep 93 18:32:55 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Digital warfare
In-Reply-To: <9309110057.AA26559@ellisun.sw.stratus.com>
Message-ID: <9309110127.AA10043@snark.lehman.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Carl Ellison says:
> For example, crypto-anarchic banks -- cute idea -- but if you ever want a
> cop to make your banker give you the money, the banker can't be anonymous
> and neither can you account be.

Perhaps the banker can't be anonymous, but the account certainly can
be. Many countries have centuries of experience with this. Hell, the
Austrians have 100% anonymous accounts to this day. Works just fine,
and no trust is involved.

> In fact, if the FBI has planted agents on this list, I wouldn't be
> surprised to discover someday that they were among the vocal anarchists.

Feel free to check my credentials. I assure you I earn more than
enough money at my job that it wouldn't be worth the FBI's money to
make the bribe big enough -- it would also have to cover the risk to
me that being an anarchist presents vis a vis my job -- someday I
might lose it for having strange political ideas, and salaries like
mine are hard to come by in other professions.

Its entirely possible that there are FBI agents on this list -- I
proceed on that assumption every day. Its also possible that there are
agents provocateur. However, I fully assure you that many of us are
legitimate anarchists of long standing, most of us being of the
capitalist anarchist persuasion.

I'll fully agree that arguing for anarchy with the general public
won't work at the current time -- and I agree that our image is
important. However, at this point the battle is being fought by folks
like EFF and CPSR. I for one don't see any reason to hide my politics,
although I try not to make an issue of it.

Perry




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: ferguson@fiber.sprintlink.net (Paul Ferguson x2044)
Date: Fri, 10 Sep 93 19:33:47 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: RE: Digital warfare
Message-ID: <9309110326.AA09763@fiber.sprintlink.net>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


On Fri, 10 Sep 93 20:57:16 EDT,
 <cme@ellisun.sw.stratus.com> Carl Ellison wrote -
 
>> That's an interesting point (images of "Wild Palms" conjured).
>> This _is_ the wave of the future, as Tim implies, and it's
>> unfortunate that instances such as this (segway) tarnishes what
>> it is that I think many of us are trying to espouse in the
>> cypherpunk movement.
>>
>
>> ferguson@icp.net            |   Privacy -- Use it or lose it.
>
> I have heard cypherpunks described as two groups under one label:
>
> 1.      those of us who advocate privacy in private hands
>
> 2.      those who advocate anarchy
 
 I find myself straddling the line most of the time, but I have to
 come down solidly on the side of privacy-advocate, if push came to
 shove. However, push isn't shoving, so we (cypher-punk-advocates)
 should all be able to heterogeneously work our goals -- soild, secure
 and unmolested crypto for the masses. Let's be realistic -- and
 effective.
 
> It's important not to give the government any excuse which would
> make the populace side with them against us.  This is a political
> battle and we need the people on our side.
 
Anyone who thinks that this battle can be won purely on the grounds of
technology is dead wrong. Political leverage is a factor which we
must, absolutely be striving for.
 
We're getting there, slowly (very slowly) through education, but
digital realization is something that is not going to happen
overnight. The impact has yet to hit home in the public sector.
 
- --
 
On Fri, 10 Sep 1993 21:27:37 -0400,
 Perry E. Metzger <pmetzger@lehman.com> wrote -
 
> Feel free to check my credentials. I assure you I earn more than
> enough money at my job that it wouldn't be worth the FBI's money to
> make the bribe big enough -- it would also have to cover the risk to
> me that being an anarchist presents vis a vis my job -- someday I
> might lose it for having strange political ideas, and salaries like
> mine are hard to come by in other professions.
 
Oh, come now, Perry. Let's be practical. I (on just one side of
this multi-faceted topic), on the other hand, maintain more
conventional idealisms; much more geared towards maintaining
privacy (at all costs) and fighting the big brother machinations
of a government out of control. In my own hairy opinion, anarchy
is a losing strategy, but that is merely a matter of semantics,
not something we should hash out on this list.
 
I believe in the growth of the world-wide matrix; the growth of the
internet -- access for the masses. In fact, that's just what I do to
earn my pay. Filter this, Filter that, BGP this, EGP that, OSPF (oh,
no!). I believe in strong cryptography. I believe in your power (and
mine) to actually endorse and shape the world of digital
communications.
 
Let's just agree that we hold the same views on the matter of
cryptography: it's a powerful tool. In the hands of the masses, it
allows privacy unhindered. Compromised or crippled by the oppressive
forces of a government, it is a weapon against privacy.
 
> I'll fully agree that arguing for anarchy with the general public
> won't work at the current time -- and I agree that our image is
> important. However, at this point the battle is being fought by folks
> like EFF and CPSR. I for one don't see any reason to hide my politics,
> although I try not to make an issue of it.
 
A wise summation. I would like to think that others are as aware of
the political battlefields that must be crossed. I despise the
political machine, but I understand the importance in influencing it
in order to achieve the ideal "space."
 
Government has no damned business in networking.  We do.
 
Paul Ferguson               |   privacy \'pri-va-see\ n, pl, -cies;
Mindbank Consulting Group   |   1: the quality or state of being apart
Fairfax, Virginia USA       |   from others  2: secrecy
fergp@sytex.com             |
ferguson@icp.net            |   Privacy -- Use it or lose it.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "L. Detweiler" <ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Date: Fri, 10 Sep 93 21:48:28 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Usenet on CDs - info
Message-ID: <9309110442.AA05350@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Hello cypherpunks. I've been trying to track down the Internet legend
of `Usenet on CD' haphazardly for some time, and finally got lucky by
accident.  The first service was apparently started by Kent Landfield,
a FAQ editor and entrepreneur who worked with 3 others and `quickly
became overwhelmed' by the response and demand. This was under the
company Sterling Software. They handed it off to CD Publishing
Corporation, Vancouver, British Columbia, CA who is at this moment
distributing Usenet on CDs!

Each disk has about 600 megabytes of news. Shipped within 30 days after
the last date on the disk. Uses standard ISO 9660 CD format, Rock Ridge
extension planned.  They have Mac and Unix software on the disk, DOS
software planned, with other software acceptable if it is ISO 9660
compliant. Prices range from $40 + 5 s/h per disk down to $24 per disk for 24 disks.

The legal aspects of this are interesting. K. Landfield
<Kent_Landfield@sterling.com>is probably one of the best experts on
dealing with laywers on internet topics, and on copyright law &
redistribution rights as they apply to Usenet. Interestingly, notably
the highest traffic Usenet groups are purposely *omitted* from the
disks based on copyright quagmires:

>The following newsgroups are not supported due to legal reasons:
>
>    alt.binaries.*, alt.sex.*, alt.toon-pics, alt.tasteless,
>    de.alt.binaries.*, fj.binaries.*, rec.arts.erotica

BTW, the fact that semi- and wholly-pornographic material comprises a
very large portion of Usenet traffic (see news.lists) makes the whole
Usenet medium somewhat vulnerable to future legislative and public
assaults. Remember that new NY Tax increase on telecommunications
services I posted? The `conventional wisdom' is that it isn't very
threatening, just a `sin tax' on the `phone sex' numbers. Now, look at
how much of Usenet traffic is in lewd digitized pictures, and decide if
smugness and complacency are maintainable!

===cut=here===

For orders, inquiries, and technical support, please contact :

        NetNews on CD's
        CD Publishing Corporation
        4824 Fraser Street
        Vancouver, British Columbia
        Canada  V5V 4H4

        604-874-1430
        800-333-7565 (USA)
        604-874-1431 (FAX)

        <info@CDPublishing.COM>

Note: E-mail orders currently cannot be accepted.







From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "L. Detweiler" <ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Date: Fri, 10 Sep 93 22:07:59 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: offshore data havens, from RISKs
Message-ID: <9309110500.AA05482@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


OK, here's an *excellent* opportunity to get some cypherpunk exposure
on RISKS. Amazingly, we haven't really been seen there before. I move
that T.C. May or some other prominent cypherpunk write a letter
representative of group interest and ideas on the subject. But anyone
who feels they have something to say on the subject should pass on a
letter to increase our chances of `getting published'. I would, but
offshore data havens are not my niche. 

Everyone, *don't* argue about the specifics of the letter on the list
-- we will never get it sent that way -- but suggestions are OK). then,
in a segue (that's the *correct* spelling, Mr. P. `segway' Ferguson :) 

In the letter, consider talking about the Cypherpunks media exposure in
NYT, Village Voice, Whole Earth, etc.  However, if the c'punk mailing
list is advertised, be *sure* to point out that its up to ~30 messages
a day -- I think this helps alleviate spurious newcomers.

I would recommend that the more anarchic aspects of the issue of Data
Havens be glossed over, such as tax evasion, and just emphasize the
non-threatening aspects such as digital cash, etc. so as not to startle
all the fuddy duddies. I'm sure they will figure out the implications
without any help from us. We do *not* want to come off as a
cyberspatial terrorist organization (however close we may actually be
:)  Definitely, include a pointer to Chaum.

Strike while the iron is hot! this is a mainstream opportunity for
increased press exposure and attention to the cypherpunk cause. You'll
notice the person inquiring is a reporter. chances are the articles he
is referring to were cypherpunk-based. I wonder. Also, he *may* be
writing an article and purposely not mentioning to avoid competition.

===cut=here==

Date: Sun,  5 Sep 93 16:00:59 PDT
From: John_R_Bruni@cup.portal.com
Subject: Offshore Data Havens

As a reader of RISKS who combines his vocation, journalism, with his
avocation, computers, I'm writing in with a request.  In the course of working
on an assignment for one of the TV networks, I came across references to
"offshore data havens."  These are data networks, alleged to be in the
formative process, which will glean data by means fair and foul from the
world's legitimate data bases.  The implication is that formerly confidential
information, be it about individuals, corporations or governments, would seep
across networks.  The information would then be available, at a price, to
anyone who wanted it.
 
My questions are:

* Are "offshore data havens" actually being formed, and if so, where?
* What are the inherent problems that come to mind?  Don't be afraid to state
  the obvious; television audiences aren't experts in this area.
 
I'd love to see this become a topic for discussion on RISKS, but would also
appreciate (with thanks in advance) any responses sent to me directly.
 
john_bruni@cup.portal.com




------- End of Forwarded Message





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "L. Detweiler" <ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Date: Fri, 10 Sep 93 22:53:50 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Digital warfare
In-Reply-To: <199309110508.AA18091@tramp.cc.utexas.edu>
Message-ID: <9309110548.AA06074@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Mr. McCoy <mccoy@ccwf.cc.utexas.edu> of `strong cryptography' and `anarchy':

>The two are really inseperable and it seems to be of little value to
>pretend that they are not.

that is, 

>If you have the ability to send message that is private there is nothing to
>prevent that message from being a digital cheque for payment of services.
>The "underground economy" is probably a lot larger than you would imagine,
>and given the current political climate you might be able to get a lot
>farther with the masses by telling them that digital money will give them
>the ability to tell the IRS where to stick thier noses than pretending it
>would never happen in the "crypto-enlightened age" and have an opponent
>bring it up as a point against strong crypto.

I think this is absolutely baseless. Cash is just as untraceable as a
cryptographically encoded message. Have governments collapsed on the
existence of cash? (well, there's this thing called inflation, but
that's something else...)  Do we really think that criminals will
flourish if only they could get their hands on digital cash? don't
criminals make a pretty ingenious use of all the rudimentary tools in
use today? is lack of strong cryptography or digital cash preventing
all kinds of sordid mischief, criminality, and terrorism? is the fate
of the world teetering on the use of the RSA algorithm for [x] size
keys or the ability to generate primes and factor numbers?

Definitely, these new technologies will give rise to new *forms* of
criminality, but the delicate ratio between `lawful citizens' and `evil
violators' will assuredly always stay the same. Actually, truly
powerful new technology, despite all the rampant and paranoid fears of
the populace, has always inherently favored virtue and order in the long run.

While I also find the anarchic talk on the list someone disconcerting
and misguided, I find it ridiculous to claim that cryptography is a
technology that is inherently conducive to anarchy or the deterioration
of social order. It *is* conducive, however, to a new kind of
government and order unlike any we've ever seen before, and
unfortunately it will be so unlike anything in historical experience --
so unlike any `order' we've ever imagined -- that perhaps the crude
term `anarchy' is the most apropos of all in our vocabulary. Bush was
right on only one count in his characterization of `The New World
Order' -- in supposing it exists. Otherwise, the cypherpunks take over
the true vision.

I *do* believe that we will see entirely new `taxation' systems with
the advent of digital cash. It will just be exercised (or `excised') in
different ways. We are likely to see mechanisms at the digital bank
point for collecting a `transaction tax' (what a sales tax is today).

We may also see the creation of `virtual governments' in which the
geographical location of an individual is irrelevant to his choice of
government, and perhaps for the first time in history the individual
can choose freely among all those that exist, to that which best suits
his preferences, and the so-called `social contract' between the
citizen and his government is actually made *explicit* for the first
time. This will all happen on some levels.

But only the silly, pale bureacrats in the NSA attribute the Collapse
of the World and the Plague of the BoogieMen to the advent and
proliferation of strong cryptography.  Cryptography is not synonymous
with tax evasion, terrorism, or utter chaos. It is simply as neutral,
powerful, and liberating as communication itself. In fact, for the
first time we are beginning to realize what `communication' truly entails.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Jim McCoy <mccoy@ccwf.cc.utexas.edu>
Date: Fri, 10 Sep 93 22:13:50 PDT
To: karn@qualcomm.com (Phil Karn)
Subject: Re: Digital warfare
In-Reply-To: <9309110410.AA06849@servo>
Message-ID: <199309110508.AA18091@tramp.cc.utexas.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text


Phile Karn <karn@qualcomm.com> writes:
> I want to echo Carl's sentiments. I do find talk about cryptographically
> enforced underground economies to be interesting, but scary as well
> precisely because I'm afraid of what the backlash might do to the
> cryptographically enforced personal privacy that I'm primarily
> interested in.

Unfortunately (or fortunately, depending on your position) the two are
really inseperable; it is this fact above all others that I really think
gives the people inside the beltway the willies when it comes to
cryptography.  Information has no morality and is subject to no rules save
its own.  It is kinda like money in that way... >:)  

If you have the ability to send message that is private there is nothing to
prevent that message from being a digital cheque for payment of services.
The "underground economy" is probably a lot larger than you would imagine,
and given the current political climate you might be able to get a lot
farther with the masses by telling them that digital money will give them
the ability to tell the IRS where to stick thier noses than pretending it
would never happen in the "crypto-enlightened age" and have an opponent
bring it up as a point against strong crypto.

The two are really inseperable and it seems to be of little value to
pretend that they are not.

jim




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: smb@research.att.com
Date: Fri, 10 Sep 93 21:27:58 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: misc.legal.computing #4107 - Korea now accepts secret US patent applications
Message-ID: <9309110426.AA07913@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


This was posted to misc.legal.computing and misc.int-property.  It's
forwarded to this list with permission.

		--Steve Bellovin

In article <CD3H47.3Kz@world.std.com>, srctran@world.std.com (Gregory Aharonian) writes:
>     On July 29, 1993, the republic of South Korea became the 17th country
> to sign an agreement with the United States to protect patent rights of
> patent applications fild in the United States for which the government
> has classified secret and indefinitely delay the prosecution of the patent.
> Existing countries, mostly COCOM members, are: Australia, Belgium, Canada,
> Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands,
> Norway, Portugal, Sweden, Turkey and United Kingdom.
> 
>     For more information on secrecy aspects of US patents, contact Robert
> Garrett at the Patent Office, 703-308-0753.
> -- 
> **************************************************************************
>  Greg Aharonian                                      srctran@world.std.com
>  Source Translation & Optimization                            617-489-3727
>  P.O. Box 404, Belmont, MA 02178




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: cme@ellisun.sw.stratus.com (Carl Ellison)
Date: Sat, 11 Sep 93 00:18:51 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Digital warfare
Message-ID: <9309110713.AA27885@ellisun.sw.stratus.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>Message-Id: <199309110508.AA18091@tramp.cc.utexas.edu>
>Subject: Re: Digital warfare
>To: karn@qualcomm.com (Phil Karn)
>Date: Sat, 11 Sep 1993 00:08:37 -0500 (CDT)
>From: Jim McCoy <mccoy@ccwf.cc.utexas.edu>

>The two are really inseperable and it seems to be of little value to
>pretend that they are not.

IMNSHO, whether they're inseperable or not, harping on anarchy is like
advocating strong crypto so that terrorists can use it, ignoring all
legitimate uses.  It's the talk which plays into FBI hands, not the
reality.  The reality is here and can not be avoided but reality can't be
cited in PR campaigns the way talk can.

I know that drug dealers, terrorists and child molestors will use strong
crypto.  That doesn't mean that I cite such uses when I write letters to
Congress or to magazine editors.  I cite legitimate uses which the general
public will applaud -- not the abberant uses which can not be avoided, no
matter how draconian the legislation against crypto.

It might be satisfying to point out to the government that they can't stop
anarchists and criminals from using crypto but IMHO that would merely
(1) anger them and (2) give them ammo for denying ligitimate users
access to crypto.  It might even be that that's what they want all along
-- let the criminals have it and deny it to you and me.  That way criminals
identify themselves by passing random-looking bits between them.

Have a nice day.

 - Carl





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Da Mystic Homeboy <praveen@carina.unm.edu>
Date: Sat, 11 Sep 93 08:24:07 PDT
To: ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu (L. Detweiler)
Subject: Re: Digital warfare
In-Reply-To: <9309110548.AA06074@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Message-ID: <9309111519.AA04072@carina.unm.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


According to L. Detweiler:
>
>Mr. McCoy <mccoy@ccwf.cc.utexas.edu> of `strong cryptography' and `anarchy':
>
>>the ability to tell the IRS where to stick thier noses than pretending it
>>would never happen in the "crypto-enlightened age" and have an opponent
>>bring it up as a point against strong crypto.
>
>I think this is absolutely baseless. Cash is just as untraceable as a
>cryptographically encoded message. Have governments collapsed on the
>existence of cash? (well, there's this thing called inflation, but
>that's something else...)
	Actually, yes.  Like it or not, most major transactions ever since
probably the fifties, are not at all done in "real money".  Its all existed
as checks, credits, assets, etc. on some bank note somewhere, and now as
ones and zeroes in the international info markets.  Cash has become a *big*
worry for governments nowadays because of the "shadow economy" thats developed
with cash.  Its completely untraceable, mostly unrecorded, and so the IRS (or
any other government agency for that matter) has NO way to know whats
Happening.  The U.S. gova'ment is losing billions of dollars because of these
transactions, and many people have seriously considered outlawing cash.  
	What would happen if all our transactions become untraceable?  
How is the government supposed to prove anything, except by becoming fascist
corporate fanatics (which is what is trying to happen right now).  Better
yet, if all our communications are in private, how are the information
companies going to get their money?  Whos going to have established credit-
the very basis of our modern kapitalism?  

>Do we really think that criminals will
>flourish if only they could get their hands on digital cash? don't
>criminals make a pretty ingenious use of all the rudimentary tools in
>use today? is lack of strong cryptography or digital cash preventing
	Up until about the 70s it was damn near impossible to enforce
what the modern day fascists call the "drug war".  This was because
the world had not become superbly networked as it is, and so, any strange
transactions or series of transactions could go virtually unnoticed.
It was only in the eighties, with the microcomputer and increased
interconnectivity, was it possible to catch, for example, money laundering.
Yet, at the same time, for "criminals" it was pretty damn hard to
communicate.  So, what happens when you have all the freedom of privacy,
and all the power of communication?  The crash of the drug war and the
governments spellbinding and gestapo-like control of the public.

>powerful new technology, despite all the rampant and paranoid fears of
>the populace, has always inherently favored virtue and order in the long run.
	Bzzzzt.  Wrong again.  All major technologies have only *increased*
freedom, not the opposite.  Technology has always caused more opportunity
to think and to do, something that holders of power have never wanted you
to do.  Of course, it also depends on what you consider being virtue.
Being a discordian/anarchist, I consider the chaos and freedom the virtue.
	
>unfortunately it will be so unlike anything in historical experience --
>so unlike any `order' we've ever imagined -- that perhaps the crude
>term `anarchy' is the most apropos of all in our vocabulary. Bush was
	Agreed, but cryptography IMNSHO, is a very strong step toward
the natural progression towards true anarchy.

>proliferation of strong cryptography.  Cryptography is not synonymous
>with tax evasion, terrorism, or utter chaos. It is simply as neutral,
>powerful, and liberating as communication itself. In fact, for the
>first time we are beginning to realize what `communication' truly entails.
>
	Again, agreed.  But, as you pointed out, the effects of communication
is more often liberating than not.  Such the same with crypto.  The reason
crypto is getting so much hype is because its the safety protection for 
communication- the true weapon against the powermongrels.



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: greg@ideath.goldenbear.com (Greg Broiles)
Date: Sat, 11 Sep 93 10:39:02 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: offshore data havens, from RISKs
In-Reply-To: <9309110500.AA05482@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Message-ID: <Hi4P0B1w164w@ideath.goldenbear.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


"L. Detweiler" <uunet!longs.lance.colostate.edu!ld231782> writes:

> OK, here's an *excellent* opportunity to get some cypherpunk exposure
> on RISKS. Amazingly, we haven't really been seen there before. I move
> that T.C. May or some other prominent cypherpunk write a letter
> representative of group interest and ideas on the subject. But anyone

If someone does write this letter, please don't represent the Cypherpunks 
list as being entirely composed of libertarians or (in Perry's words)
"capitalist anarchists", whatever those might be. It seems counterproductive 
to me to enter into extended political debates here on the list, so I don't 
- but it's a mistake to assume that silence, in this case, constitutes 
agreement or consensus about deeper political issues. I think it'd be more 
accurate to represent the C-punks list as a group of folks with divergent 
political viewpoints who agree on the importance of personal privacy and see 
technology as a potential vehicle for acheiving or maintaining it.


--
Greg Broiles                            greg@goldenbear.com
Golden Bear Computer Consulting         +1 503 342 7982
Box 12005 Eugene OR 97440               BBS: +1 503 687 7764




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Perry E. Metzger" <pmetzger@lehman.com>
Date: Sat, 11 Sep 93 08:28:07 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Digital warfare
In-Reply-To: <9309110410.AA06849@servo>
Message-ID: <9309111519.AA15630@snark.lehman.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Phil Karn says:
> I want to echo Carl's sentiments. I do find talk about cryptographically
> enforced underground economies to be interesting, but scary as well
> precisely because I'm afraid of what the backlash might do to the
> cryptographically enforced personal privacy that I'm primarily
> interested in.

You have to accept that the tools for the one are the same as the
tools for the other. Its reasonable to not want to emphasize both, but
its unreasonable to assume that the enemy doesn't already know that
both are done with the same algorithms. If this worries you, come up
with your arguments now -- you will need them later.

Perry





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Perry E. Metzger" <pmetzger@lehman.com>
Date: Sat, 11 Sep 93 08:38:06 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Digital warfare
In-Reply-To: <199309110508.AA18091@tramp.cc.utexas.edu>
Message-ID: <9309111532.AA15648@snark.lehman.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Jim McCoy says:
> If you have the ability to send message that is private there is nothing to
> prevent that message from being a digital cheque for payment of services.
> The "underground economy" is probably a lot larger than you would imagine,

It is currently estimated that at least 10 MILLION people a year fail
to file income tax returns, and that another 10 MILLION file returns
that are partially or wholely fraudulent. The government would like
you to believe that this is rare, so they don't make much of it, but
the fact remains that your odds of being prosecuted for tax fraud or
failing to file are miniscule. They pick famous people every year to
go after like Leona Helmsley to get publicity, but they really don't
have the resources to go after more than a couple thousand people a
year. A large fraction of the economy in our country is completely
underground already.

> and given the current political climate you might be able to get a lot
> farther with the masses by telling them that digital money will give them
> the ability to tell the IRS where to stick thier noses than pretending it
> would never happen in the "crypto-enlightened age" and have an opponent
> bring it up as a point against strong crypto.

This I disagree with. Even people who commit tax fraud every day are
horrified by the notion of other people committing it. Its strange,
but its a product of our "sanction of the victim" culture. The result
of this is that even people who would in the back of their mind love
to be able to commit tax fraud with no chance of being caught will not
support infrastructure that makes it possible.

This is not to say, though, that their support is needed. Countries
around the world have turned tax evasion and secret banking into
national industries. Look at the Swiss, for example. Computer networks
will make private electronic funds transfer systems, and the capacity
to take advantage of offshore banks, ubiquitous. The only way to stop
it, even if it were to become illegal, would be massive tapping of all
data transactions on a scale that could literally not be sustained
without bankrupting the government. Imagine trying to hire a staff to
monitor all binary data crossing international lines even at todays data
rates -- then imagine if those rates went up by three orders of
magnitude.

Quite simply, whether governments like it or not, income taxation is
pretty much doomed. Either they have to move to operating entirely on
the level of tangible property and tangible consumption taxation, or
they will starve.

Perry




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Sandy <72114.1712@CompuServe.COM>
Date: Sat, 11 Sep 93 09:13:07 PDT
To: <cypherpunks@toad.com>
Subject: DIGITAL WARFARE
Message-ID: <930911160347_72114.1712_FHF27-1@CompuServe.COM>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
  SANDY SANDFORT               Reply to:  ssandfort@attmail.com
 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Cypherpunks,

Yes, strong crypto can be used for "good or evil."  That's true
of any tool.  And yes, dwelling on the darker applications may be
politically counter-productive.  But do any of you think that
curtailing such discussions will slow up the enemies of privacy
for one second?

Strong crypto is a threat to the powers that be.  Period.  We
know that, and so do they.  The will find reasons to try and stop
it.  If necessary, they will *manufacture* reasons.  They don't
care about kiddie porn or terrorism; they care about their power
base.  And their power base depends on their ability to extract
tribute.  Strong crypto and international diversification
undermine their ability to collect taxes.  They are going to
fight it no matter how innocuously we present ourselves.

I do think we should emphasize *attributes*, not particular
*applications*.  People who need strong crypto will understand
its potential.  We don't have to draw pictures.  As for the
"negative" uses, don't worry, our enemies will gladly describe
them.

 S a n d y

>>>>>>    Please send e-mail to:  ssandfort@attmail.com    <<<<<<
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: nobody@soda.berkeley.edu
Date: Sat, 11 Sep 93 14:23:12 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Spooks reading the list
Message-ID: <9309112115.AA04714@soda.berkeley.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


pmetzger@lehman.com writes:

>Its entirely possible that there are FBI agents on this list -- I
>proceed on that assumption every day. Its also possible that there are
>agents provocateur. However, I fully assure you that many of us are
>legitimate anarchists of long standing, most of us being of the
>capitalist anarchist persuasion.
>
>I'll fully agree that arguing for anarchy with the general public
>won't work at the current time -- and I agree that our image is
>like EFF and CPSR. I for one don't see any reason to hide my politics,
>although I try not to make an issue of it.
>
>Perry

In fact, there is at least one NSA agent on this list. Whether 
he/she is on our side or not, who knows? This message, a defense of 
the NSA, was posted here not long ago. I don't know if anyone else 
noticed this at the time, but take a look:

*From:   IN%"remail@tamsun.tamu.edu" 28-AUG-1993 06:02:47.29
*To:     IN%"cypherpunks@toad.com"
*CC:     
*Subj:   NSA & the Crypto-Zionist Myth of "Public Key"!

*>I'm rather surprised that the most significant piece of evidence in favor of
*>the "NSA has cracked PGP" theory is that no one's put a bullet through Phil
*>Zimmerman's head.  
*
*Excuse me, but I'm getting tired of this silly paranoia.  NSA
*is not Evil Incarnate Central, and we are not fighting a Valiant War 
                                    ==

We? WE! Do you suppose that was a Freudian slip, or did he mean to 
say it like that? Whoever he is, he works for the NSA. Did anyone else
notice this at the time?

So, tell us. Have they cracked PGP?

*We Are Fated to Lose.  The NSA are a  bunch of Americans who went
*to school & college with the rest of us, and share our communities
*with us.  Most of them joined NSA to fight totalitarian Communism, and 
*most of them are sympathetic with values most Americans share when they 
*bother to think about them, like freedom, privacy, etc.  Sure, NSA has
*been caught up in the Cold War habits of secrecy, bureaucracy, and
*an ingrained habit to control information.  It's also almost surely
*caught up in the same kind of bureaucratic incompetence we see
*in the rest of the U.S. Federal government (most of the DoD, the space 
*programs, the BATF, the FBI, etc.)  Does a $40+ crypto-voice-chip with 
*an obvious trap door look like Malicious Plot to Destroy All Strong
*Crypto and Take Over The World, or does it look like an
*a half-competent, half-hearted attempt to retain Cold War era 
*capabilities they had gotten used to?
*
*NSA is going through the same crisis of goals as the rest of
*the Cold War establishment.  Their mission, if they have any left at
*all, has changed radically, and they know it.  While it
*may be "in the best interest of NSA" to maintain control over
*NSA employees are also Americans, community members, family
*members, etc.  They don't typically go around murdering hackers
*they don't like.  Nor would that accomplish anything for them --
*RSA was published internationally long ago, and PGP is now
*scattered at sites all over the world, with new versions being
*hacked on in nearly a dozen countries.   
*
*The biggest problem I've encountered talking to various
*people about implementing encryption is that they think
*cypherpunks are a bunch of paranoid nuts, so only paranoids
*would want to do things like use digital cash for their
*semi-legal barter schemes.  Your expression of surprise that 
*the NSA hasn't offed Phil Zimmerman just confirms their suspicions.
*How can I convince them that cryptography is not just for paranoids?
*The rest of us are concerned about things like protecting and
*enhancing our privacy and freedom, and there's nothing silly
*or paranoid about that.
*
*But now that you mention it -- Shamir does operate out of Tel 
*Aviv.  Obviously he built RSA with a hole in it, and NSA is the
*main arm of the Crypto-Zionist conspiracy of Jewish Planetary Hegemony!  
*And he didn't publish "Differential Cryptanalysis of the DES" until
*non-Zionist bankers got ahold of DES.  It's all clear now!
*
*> I think that, personally, the public-key stuff's gotta have some sort 
*> of a hole in it that nobody's thought of yet outside of spook central.
*
*I think your head has to have some sort of a hole in it.  Perhaps the
*NSA's work?

From the sound of this, the NSA is just a little bit testy!

What's the matter, spook biz gone to hell in the post-cold-war era?

We must be winning...   :-)





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: bill@twwells.com (T. William Wells)
Date: Sat, 11 Sep 93 10:13:07 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Digital warfare
In-Reply-To: <9309111519.AA04072@carina.unm.edu>
Message-ID: <CD789B.FHu@twwells.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I'm really glad I gateway this mailing list into a newsgroup.
That way, I can killfile discussions such as this one. However,
for those not so blessed....





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: bill@twwells.com (T. William Wells)
Date: Sat, 11 Sep 93 12:08:09 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Digital warfare
In-Reply-To: <9309111519.AA04072@carina.unm.edu>
Message-ID: <CD7CMu.G6B@twwells.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


In article <CD789B.FHu@twwells.com>, T. William Wells <bill@twwells.com> wrote:
: I'm really glad I gateway this mailing list into a newsgroup.
: That way, I can killfile discussions such as this one. However,
: for those not so blessed....

Whoops. At least one person is imagining that I gateway this into
some global newsgroup somewhere...

What I'm using is a set of home-grown scripts to gateway the list
into a local newsgroup. There's a mail to news gateway package out
there that is probably a better solution. If you can't find it or
would prefer my home grown scripts, let me know. I can send you
that other software (though I haven't looked at it) or I can send
you my scripts. There are also things like procmail and deliver
that can be used to do this sort of thing.





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: doug@netcom5.netcom.com (Doug Merritt)
Date: Sat, 11 Sep 93 18:53:13 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Spooks reading the list
In-Reply-To: <lg2g+@andrew.cmu.edu>
Message-ID: <9309120147.AA02481@netcom5.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Liam David Gray <lg2g+@andrew.cmu.edu> said:
>Nobody, when I read the original post I assumed the "we" you're talking
>about was 'we, the Cypherpunks.'  I.e., if NSA were truly Evil Incarnate
>Central, the Cypherpunks would be fighting "a Valiant War ["We Are Fated
>to Lose"]".

Righto. If you're going to be paranoid, you may as well read more carefully.
The message in question was unambiguous; there were no Freudian slips
in it.

Like I said recently, the NSA wouldn't be doing their job if they weren't
following an obvious list like this. But you can trust them not to be
completely moronic. Information gatherers are likely to be complete
lurkers, and if they go for agent provocateurs, they'll likely be selected
and trained well enough to avoid IQ 80 slipups.

I've known NSA employees and contractors in the past and present. Nothing
regarding ultra secret work, else I'm sure I'd never have known about it,
nor gotten involved, etc. But still, it's just another government agency,
with a big budget, fingers in many pies, and with perhaps a higher than
average individual and collective intelligence (no pun intended) from what
I've seen. The NSA even goes to some open technical conferences; sometimes they
even host one (on more mundane computer matters, of course).

There's every reason to think that they're merely watching the situation
to see what happens. I doubt if they've even seen reason to put other
agencies like the FBI on alert. But if anything, if you want to be paranoid,
be paranoid about folks like the FBI and SS and Justice Department. They'd be
the ones to move in for the kill, you know, if anyone thought there was reason
to do so.

If you *must* be paranoid, just assume *I'm* from the NSA. I'll even
claim to speak for them. (I'm fairly sure I won't be contradicted. ;-)

Ok, here goes: "play nice, kids."  There, a pronouncement from the heart
of Evil Incarnate Central. :-)
	Doug




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Liam David Gray <lg2g+@andrew.cmu.edu>
Date: Sat, 11 Sep 93 18:18:13 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Spooks reading the list
In-Reply-To: <9309112115.AA04714@soda.berkeley.edu>
Message-ID: <kgYbRma00iV3A6HGZT@andrew.cmu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


[Here I quote nobody@soda who quotes remail@tamsun:]

> *Excuse me, but I'm getting tired of this silly paranoia.  NSA
> *is not Evil Incarnate Central, and we are not fighting a Valiant War 
>                                     ==
>  
> We? WE! Do you suppose that was a Freudian slip, or did he mean to 
> say it like that? Whoever he is, he works for the NSA. Did anyone else
> notice this at the time?

Nobody, when I read the original post I assumed the "we" you're talking
about was 'we, the Cypherpunks.'  I.e., if NSA were truly Evil Incarnate
Central, the Cypherpunks would be fighting "a Valiant War ["We Are Fated
to Lose"]".  For a moment there, nobody, you nearly had me believing
you.  But read the rest of the post, and the above 'slip' becomes much
less interesting:

[Me quoting nobody@soda quoting remail@tamsun, again:]

>*We Are Fated to Lose.  The NSA are a  bunch of Americans who went
>*to school & college with the rest of us, and share our communities
>*with us.  Most of them joined NSA to fight totalitarian Communism, and 
>*most of them are sympathetic with values most Americans share when they 
>*bother to think about them, like freedom, privacy, etc.  Sure, NSA has
>*been caught up in the Cold War habits of secrecy, bureaucracy, and
>*an ingrained habit to control information.  It's also almost surely
>*caught up in the same kind of bureaucratic incompetence we see
  ^^^^^^^^^^^^                               ^^^^^^^^^^^^
The NSA is caught up in bureaucracy, so the Cypherpunks need not lose.

>*in the rest of the U.S. Federal government (most of the DoD, the space 
>*programs, the BATF, the FBI, etc.)  Does a $40+ crypto-voice-chip with 
>*an obvious trap door look like Malicious Plot to Destroy All Strong
>*Crypto and Take Over The World, or does it look like an
>*a half-competent, half-hearted attempt to retain Cold War era 
    ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
Cypherpunks are not fated to lose, because the NSA's attempts are fated
to fail.

>*capabilities they had gotten used to?

[rest deleted]

If you give me some time, I can contact the author of the original post
-- remail@tamsun.tamu.edu -- and have him post a confirmation of my
interpretation of his original post.
/* for (i=0 ; i<2**64 ; i++) printf(":>"); */

Liam Gray - lg2g+@andrew.cmu.edu




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: ferguson@fiber.sprintlink.net (Paul Ferguson x2044)
Date: Sat, 11 Sep 93 18:38:13 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Proper context?
Message-ID: <9309120229.AA10732@fiber.sprintlink.net>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


On Sat, 11 Sep 93 14:15:46 -0700,
 <uunet!soda.berkeley.edu!nobody> wrote -
 
> In fact, there is at least one NSA agent on this list. Whether
> he/she is on our side or not, who knows? This message, a defense of
> the NSA, was posted here not long ago. I don't know if anyone else
> noticed this at the time, but take a look:
>
> *From:   IN%"remail@tamsun.tamu.edu" 28-AUG-1993 06:02:47.29
> *To:     IN%"cypherpunks@toad.com"
> *CC:
> *Subj:   NSA & the Crypto-Zionist Myth of "Public Key"!
 
> *>I'm rather surprised that the most significant piece of evidence
> *>in favor of the "NSA has cracked PGP" theory is that no one's put
> *>a bullet through Phil Zimmerman's head.
> *
> *Excuse me, but I'm getting tired of this silly paranoia.  NSA
> *is not Evil Incarnate Central, and we are not fighting a Valiant War
>                                     ==
>
> We? WE! Do you suppose that was a Freudian slip, or did he mean to
> say it like that? Whoever he is, he works for the NSA. Did anyone else
> notice this at the time?
 
 I went back through my archives and read this message; actually the
 context in which it was written could be construed that "we"
 is either party (NSA or Cypherpunks).
 
 After re- reading the remainder of his (or her) post, I think he's
 right for the most part. Messages containing hype (like yours, that
 I told myself I wasn't going to respond to) consist of much more
 paranoia than substance. 
 
Paul Ferguson               |   privacy \'pri-va-see\ n, pl, -cies;
Mindbank Consulting Group   |   1: the quality or state of being apart
Fairfax, Virginia USA       |   from others  2: secrecy
fergp@sytex.com             |
ferguson@icp.net            |   Privacy -- Use it or lose it.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Timothy Newsham <newsham@wiliki.eng.hawaii.edu>
Date: Sun, 12 Sep 93 01:39:14 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: warez
Message-ID: <9309120838.AA28789@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> 
> Some recent "warez" posts from alt.security....

Why was this posted to the cypherpunks list?
What is the point?

[..post deleted..]



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: gnu (John Gilmore)
Date: Sat, 11 Sep 93 22:53:16 PDT
To: diffie@eng.sun.com
Subject: RC2/RC4 were uninfluenced by NSA, says Ron Rivest
Message-ID: <9309120550.AA26406@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I claimed that RC2 and RC4 were derived in a process that involved
NSA asking that it be weakened in various ways.  This was a deduction
based on some apparently false information of mine.  Ron has set
me straight.

Please forget what I told you about RC2 and RC4...mea culpa.

	John

------- Forwarded Message

From: rivest@theory.lcs.mit.edu (Ron Rivest)
Date: Fri, 10 Sep 93 16:52:35 EDT
Message-Id: <199309102052.AA02268@swan.lcs.mit.edu>
To: gnu@toad.com
Subject: Crack DES in 3.5 hours for only $1,500,000! 

Hi John --

Glad to see you're high-lighting Wiener's work; I think it is very
important that people see it...

Re RC2 and RC4: NSA had absolutely no influence on the design of
either algorithm; they are entirely of my own creation.  I'll take the
credit for their strengths, or the blame for their faults.  Please
take the trouble to correct any misimpressions you may have given
people. (I don't know who you sent your mail to...)  I have no
information on what sort of brute-force attack machines NSA has in its
basement, but it is certainly the case that, as I said before, nothing
in either design was affected by NSA or its capabilities.  These
algorithms are designed to be very good algorithms, but with a
variable key-size, so that you could try to get out of NSA the biggest
key size you could for export.  

I really don't like your spreading false information about
my work, and wish you would take the simple step of talking to me
first; I'll be happy to talk to you.  

(Feel free to repost this, in its entirety...)

	Cheers,
	Ron Rivest

------- End of Forwarded Message





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "L. Detweiler" <ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Date: Sat, 11 Sep 93 23:04:11 PDT
To: Cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: EC proposes PRIVACY LICENSES
In-Reply-To: <9309120522.AA22336@tamsun.tamu.edu>
Message-ID: <9309120558.AA09019@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


[anonymously quoted EC policy proposal]
>A particular business might qualify for a CONFIDENTIALITY LICENSE
>depending on its internal procedures and activities. A general
>(minimum) level of confidentiality could be provided to all users.

THE HORROR!

*this* is Orwellian. *this* is how to outlaw cryptography. 

we need some ECypherpunk infiltrators ASAP!

Whoever posted this -- can you post more information on where it was
contained to sci.crypt or alt.privacy.clipper, so that we can get a
wider audience? there are probably plenty of Europeans who don't know
about this but should! We need a contact to report to the list!

I speculated on the list some time ago the efforts by NSA to get
Clipper to be an *international* standard. I suggested that the Britain
GCHQ would be the first to endorse it publicly. Sounds like the EC may
beat them to the punch. Was NSA lobbying involved here, or did they
just pick up on this great idea <smirk>?

Also, where was it [Norway?] that lady posted from saying that their
national secret service was pushing a proposal for cryptographic use
similar to Clipper?

In one word, 

YIKES




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: remail@tamsun.tamu.edu
Date: Sat, 11 Sep 93 22:28:16 PDT
To: Cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: EC isn't great for privacy either...
Message-ID: <9309120522.AA22336@tamsun.tamu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> Wow! And "Gulp." I may have to get my European Community passport
> sooner than I had planned. Does Martinique have a Net connection?

Don't rush out to get your EC passport yet. Below I have included some
exerpts from the EC Information Technology Security Document (ITSEC, aka
Green Book). The referenced sections are from the "Confidentiality" section.
I have put "..."'s where I have skipped over material and all upper case
words are emphasis that I have added.

For those who don't want to read it all, the gist of it is that the EC
folks are also interested in maintaining the government's ability to
intercept private communications. There is also talk about licensing
businesses to use good confidentiality services. Btw. There is also
a mention of PGP which I have left. Its the paragraph right before the
one that mentions Clipper!

--Begin Enclosure
\subsection{Privacy enhancement issues}

\subsubsection{Perception of requirements for privacy enhancement}

\SeiLa{Issue}

Confidentiality is, at times, essential for the good functioning of
administrations, business and human relations.
...
Most business and private users of communication systems are aware of
the conflict between their confidentiality requirements and national
security issues which require the possibility to intercept the
communication in a way regulated by national laws. They accept the
national authorities ability for this interception provided there are
adequate safeguards to prevent unauthorised interception even by
government employees.
...
{\bf Service provision}

The extent to which confidentiality services are provided for a
specific business or citizen could depend on a system of LICENSES or
certificates.

A particular business might qualify for a CONFIDENTIALITY LICENSE
depending on its internal procedures and activities. A general
(minimum) level of confidentiality could be provided to all users.

It should be possible for certain user groups or businesses to use
other confidential services (egproprietary) than the standard ones
provided.

There are strong indications of emerging ``bottom up'' solutions for
these needs (eg the Pretty Good Privacy offering on Internet,
beginning 1993).

Other initiatives (eg the announcement of the ``Clipper Chip'', 16 April
1993) illustrate the growing awareness of governments of the needs of
their citizens for confidentiality services.
...
If a public confidentiality scheme is offered, organised crime could
also subscribe to such a scheme, but as it would include provisions
for legal intercept, it would hardly be attractive. One would expect
that such users would continue to find their own solutions as will the
classified domain.

An open and public service offering a credible level of
confidentiality would therefore provide for the honest user, while not
worsening the situation with respect to public order or national
security.

The combination of international communication and national security
regulations require a common framework for confidentiality services,
which on the one hand interoperate within all Community Member States
as well as with countries outside the Community which themselves may
establish their confidentiality services. This requires either an
overlay approach or gateways which link the different national or
regional services. These gateways are only required where
multinational agreements for co-operation on national security
concerns is not yet established. In this case these gateways may
provide at least an interim solution.

--End Enclosure





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: gnu (John Gilmore)
Date: Sun, 12 Sep 93 00:28:37 PDT
To: "L. Detweiler" <ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Subject: Re: `supercomputer' export control
In-Reply-To: <9309120637.AA09563@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Message-ID: <9309120728.AA28062@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> >From Washington Post newswire   08/27

Note the date; this is old news.

>     U.S. Acts to Ease Export Controls On Computers; Industry Officials 
>     Say Proposed Standard Falls Far Short of Need 

They're right.

> 				    The new Commerce Decision rules allow
> export of microprocessors rated at 67 Mops (million operations per second),
> a big boost from the previous limit of 12 Mops.  However, multiprocessor
> units are still on the forbidden list.

67 NOPS [-) is a single SuperSPARC chip or a fast Pentium.  Nothing
faster than that can be exported without being considered a
"supercomputer", requiring armed guards around it in the foreign
country, etc.  Like, a SPARCstation-10 containing TWO SuperSPARC
chips...

The amusing thing is that the chips themselves are not export-controlled.
Foreign clone-makers buy the chips and sell to the rest of the world,
while U.S. companies are fried by endless red tape.  If you can get 
delivery next week or in six months, which supplier do you pick?

The whole concept of export controls on computers and communications gear
(including cryptography) has got to be demolished.  Smashed to the ground
like the Berlin Wall, a mere memory of decades of totalitarian bureacracy
that ruined real lives and real products.

	John




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "L. Detweiler" <ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Date: Sat, 11 Sep 93 23:43:17 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: fwds from RISKs
Message-ID: <9309120637.AA09563@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain




- Clinton administration eases Cold war era controls on export of
supercomputers to Soviet bloc countries
- mainstream article on digital signatures in The Sciences
- European secure phone & network advertisement

there's a pointer to Islands in the Net by B. Sterling for `offshore
data havens' and some other notes there, not included.

points:

- remember that DEC machine that was taken off the net because of
problems with the state department restricting computer access to
`foreign nationals'? will anything like this ever happen again?

- public comprehension of digital signatures is definitely a necessary
stepping stone to digital cash in the collective psyche. A positive sign.

- secure phones: was the EC policy recently quoted here affected by
this? anyone in Europe threatened by that proposal should look into this.


===cut=here===

RISKS-FORUM Digest 15.03

Date: 27 Aug 93 15:05:53 EDT
From: "Mich Kabay / JINBU Corp." <75300.3232@compuserve.com>
Subject: Technology export curbs

From Washington Post newswire   08/27

    U.S. Acts to Ease Export Controls On Computers; Industry Officials 
    Say Proposed Standard Falls Far Short of Need 
    By Peter Behr,  Washington Post Staff Writer 
  
    "The Clinton administration moved yesterday to ease Cold War-era
controls on exports of high-powered U.S. computers to the former Soviet
Bloc and other countries, fulfilling a campaign promise President Clinton
made to the Silicon Valley executives who supported him last year."

The article continues with comments on the lost sales caused by Cold War
restrictions on computer exports.  The new Commerce Decision rules allow
export of microprocessors rated at 67 Mops (million operations per second),
a big boost from the previous limit of 12 Mops.  However, multiprocessor
units are still on the forbidden list.

Sales to the former Soviet Union are still subject to approval by COCOM,
the Coordinating Committe for Multilateral Export Controls.  Apparently
some members of COCOM--Germany, in particular--are trying to link
relaxation of computer export restrictions with relaxation of
telecommunications gear.

***

It will be interesting to see if the long-standing assumption that export
restrictions prevent the distribution of technology to the interdicted
nations.  My reading of the DES-restriction debacle is that export controls
on high tech are a farce.  The U.S. restrictions hurt U.S. manufacturers
and are a boon for everyone else.

Michel E. Kabay, Ph.D., Director of Education, National Computer Security Assn


RISKS-FORUM Digest 15.02

Date: 03 Sep 93 07:52:52 EDT
From: "Mich Kabay / JINBU Corp." <75300.3232@compuserve.com>
Subject: Electronic documents

A recent article deals with several RISKS of depending on electronic
documents:

  Hayes, B. (1993). The electronic palimpsest; Digital documents for all
  occasions: erasable, correctable, reproducible, forgeable.  _The Sciences_
  (NY Academy of Sciences) 33(5):10.(Sept/Oct 1993)

I enjoyed reading Brian Hayes article in the new issue of this fine magazine.
It is not only informative and up to date, but also elegant, amusing and
beautifully illustrated with various paintings.  Summary follows:

"As a writing instrument, the computer is not su much a better pencil as a
better eraser."  You can eliminate all traces of your early versions at the
stroke of a key.

This easy erasability leads to difficulties of authentication.  How can one
prove who wrote an electronic document?  Digitized signatures make the problem
worse, since anyone can scan a real signature and then print in on any
document.  However, digital signatures are a good method of authentication.
The public key cryptosystem allows you to encrypt a document with your private
(secret) key; only the corresponding public key decrypts the message.  The
encrypted version is as big as the original, though: a nuisance.  A
refinement, the digital signature, encrypts a digest of only 160 bits and
provides the same confidence of authentication.

Another problem is forgery.  If we pay the rent with an electronic cheque,
what stops a crook from using copy after copy of the same cheque?  We will
need unique serial numbers on electronic cheques.

What about proving _when_ a document was created?  Here we have to rely on
a time-stamping service.  Scientists at BELLCORE have invented the
time-stamp equivalent of the digital signature.  You submit a digest of the
document that needs to be time-stamped to a trusted time-stamping computer;
it generates a cryptographically-sound certificate which includes the time
of receipt.

To prevent fraud at the time-stamping computer (where someone might change the
system clock long enough to produce fake time-stamps for a specific crime),
every certificate is merged mathematically with all the others issued during
the same weekly period.  The summary time-stamp is then published in _The New
York Times_.

The legal system will have to adapt to the increasing use of electronic
documents.  Historians will also have more trouble piecing together the
creative process if only the final version is published or physically
available.  And what about the rapid changes in computing technology and
storage devices?  Who will be able to read today's diskettes a hundred years
from now?  Or even ten?  Archivists must think about these issues.

<<end of summary>>

Michel E. Kabay, Ph.D., Director of Education, National Computer Security Assn

RISKS-FORUM Digest 15.04

Date: Thu, 9 Sep 1993 18:10:41 +0100
From: Brian.Randell@newcastle.ac.uk
Subject: EuroDigital

The attached article about a new digital phone service, about to be launched
in the UK, is from the Monday, Sept 6, 1993, issue of The Independent. Also in
this issue was a two page advertisement for the new service - the text of this
is also attached.  My understanding is that the new equipment produces
emissions that have characteristics that were not considered when the
regulations and guidelines (under which existing devices such as hearing aids
were designed) were laid down. If this is right, then the statement by the
providers of the new service that the problems are the responsibility of the
manufacturers of such devices would seem to be highly questionable. I await
with interest RISKs readers' reactions to the article (and the advertisement).

Brian Randell, Dept. of Computing Science, University of Newcastle, Newcastle
upon Tyne, NE1 7RU, UK Brian.Randell@newcastle.ac.uk PHONE = +44 91 222 7923

[...]

(Advt.)
LIBERTE'

The Freedom to make a call in total security

We have given you freedom. We have created a secure tomorrow for businessmen
and travellers both here and in Europe. New frontiers beckon.  Vodafone
proudly announces EuroDigital. The most advanced and most secure mobile phone
network. So sophisticated that it can even be used to make and receive calls
in Europe in total security. EuroDigital represents a revolution in mobile
phone technology. A superior digital system that provides a top quality
service. A quality that doesn't falter, that doesn't break up. Line rental is
21.50 per month. UK call charges 25p per minute peak, 10p off peak. Only
Vodafone can offer this. Liberate yourself. Enjoy freedom of speech and
security. Rise above the rest.  Call free, 0500 123 123 and ask for more
information. All prices are recommended and are exclusive of V.A.T.

VODAFONE
EuroDigital





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: nobody@alumni.cco.caltech.edu
Date: Sun, 12 Sep 93 01:03:17 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: nada
Message-ID: <9309120754.AA18108@alumni.cco.caltech.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Some comments on the relationship between anarchy and
privacy: 

1.  There have been some recent posts suggesting that 
    privacy is not fundamentally subversive of 
    government, and that cypherpunks should emphasize  
    the privacy and keep quite about the anarchy.  I 
    find these arguments disingenuous in the extreme, 
    and strategically unsound as well. 

2.  Cypherpunks believe that privacy is fundamentally 
    subversive.  Come on, folks, whom do you want 
    privacy FROM, if not your own government?  
    Otherwise there's no logical objection to the 
    key-escrow, trust-big-brother schemes. 

3.  The government has shown by its behavior that it 
    believes that privacy is fundamentally subversive.

4.  I personally find privacy, in itself, only mildly 
    interesting.  As a tool to undermine the government, 
    I find it VERY EXCITING INDEED.

5.  Cypherpunks' mission is to evangelize the use of 
    privacy.  Sell the sizzle, not the steak!  Privacy
    is the steak.  The sizzle is the possibility of 
    GETTING AWAY WITH SOMETHING.





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: remail@tamsun.tamu.edu
Date: Sat, 11 Sep 93 23:08:16 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: warez
Message-ID: <9309120601.AA24357@tamsun.tamu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Some recent "warez" posts from alt.security....

Newsgroups: alt.security
Path: netcom.com!netcomsv!decwrl!olivea!sgigate!sgi!wdl1!mail!klaus
From: klaus@lds.loral.com (Christopher Klaus)
Subject: software piracy lists (correction)
Message-ID: <1993Aug16.201509.24808@lds.loral.com>
Organization: Loral Data Systems
Date: Mon, 16 Aug 1993 20:15:09 GMT
Lines: 41

Okay, I got some email flaming me for making accusations about these 'warez'
lists.  Apparently, not all the sites in the lists contained actual warez
due to the list being outdated and as the list said it contained some sites
that were beneficial to software pirates but didnt contain any warez.  I
guess if someone wants to stress that because some of the sites werent infact
a warez site, that the lists I published werent actual warez lists. Thats fine.

So next time, Ill say this list MAY contain sites that support warez, but these
are not actual warez lists.   I hope that helps someone.  If you are the one
complaining about not going through the list and emailing each of the sites
about the possibility of a warez site, write a script for me. :)  I am not
going to work overtime to track down the evils of the net.  I dont have time
to check 400 sites if they are valid for warez.  Apparently quite a few sites
must have had actual warez, otherwise  Anti-track and other
pirates would not have been irate about such lists if it didn't contain
any 'warez sites'. 
   I find it ironic that many of the admins complained the lists were outdated
and useless (maybe they have access to better lists than me) while the pirates
complained it was one of the best lists ever produced.  In publishing
those lists, my point was that there is an organized crime on Internet
that maybe some admins should be aware of. I do not believe by publishing
those lists that much piracy has been crushed on Internet.

As far as the guys saying how insecure fsp and ftp is because it is so
easy for an admin to look at network statistics and notice the large amounts
of traffic for software piracy, I find it funny those so much pirating
is done without admins ever noticing. And it usually gets noticed
because of lack of hard drive space, not amount of network traffic.
And when 200 users are using some LAN, I really doubt you would notice
an enmormous jump in network traffic anyways, due to people ftp'ing
all the time as it is.  Not to mention it would be rather hard to
find out what kind of network traffic is going through
all the ports, without violating the privacy of the users.

-- 
Christopher Klaus
klaus@mail.lds.loral.com cklaus@hotsun.nersc.gov



Newsgroups: alt.security
Path: netcom.com!csus.edu!decwrl!decwrl!olivea!charnel!rat!usc!sdd.hp.com!nigel.msen.com!yale.edu!yale!mintaka.lcs.mit.edu!coup
From: coup@gnu.ai.mit.edu (Christopher Klaus)
Subject: warez list2
Message-ID: <1993Aug11.200800.20903@mintaka.lcs.mit.edu>
Sender: news@mintaka.lcs.mit.edu
Organization: Free Software Foundation
Date: Wed, 11 Aug 1993 20:08:00 GMT
Lines: 247


Here's another list found in some /tmp of warez dood sites..



	Please Inform me if U have sites/info not on this list
	And Any Updates To: an874@anon.penet.fi (irc: semi)
	(Please use same format in msg as I use on list so it s
	easy to update.)

	So If there is not you anonymous mail address on this list
	get one and tell it to me.. 
	Also I allways love to receive sites info and also I like
	to get info about realiable users as well as "antipirates".

	Soon I start working with WarBot and #site in irc but
	I tell 'bout that later
							-semi
FSP:**Address***********Port****Extra******************************************
FSP: 128.113.75.10      6611
FSP: 128.153.16.175     7777   
FSP: 128.174.240.63     21     Vampyr Central magnus.cs.uiuc.edu 
FSP: 128.174.80.13      900
FSP: 128.178.79.121     6969   Corvin
FSP: 128.183.8.31	21
FSP: 128.192.7.51       21     ada.stat.uga.edu
FSP: 128.2.206.138      30     seismo.soar.cs.cmu.edu 
FSP: 128.252.135.4      21     wuarchive.wustl.edu
FSP: 128.3.252.177      9030   Lankhmar Extension
FSP: 128.32.155.3       9999
FSP: 128.55.128.90      11111
FSP: 128.95.48.32       2468   byron.u.washington.edu
FSP: 128.96.32.20       21     flash.bellcore.com
FSP: 129.10.50.137      2121   vlsi37.coe.northeastern.edu
FSP: 129.125.6.206      6669   shapley.astro.rug.nl cray/amiga
FSP: 129.186.10.20      5200   naf1.zool.iastate.edu Was on 42 
FSP: 129.186.123.140    1992   pv7b8c.vincent.iastate.edu
FSP: 129.186.141.241    1992   marge.ecss.iastate.edu
FSP: 129.186.141.242    1992   marge.ecss.iastate.edu
FSP: 129.186.4.31       2992   pv041f.vincent.iastate.edu
FSP: 129.186.8.27       6969   The Ninth Level
FSP: 129.215.64.60      7000
FSP: 129.240.21.38      8080
FSP: 129.79.1.15        3000 
FSP: 130.179.25.31      6611   newton.amath.umanitoba.ca Slow IBM
FSP: 130.225.51.19      11111
FSP: 130.49.4.17        21     Good IBM
FSP: 130.84.144.190	7373
FSP: 131.151.1.57       4321   cetus.cc.umr.edu
FSP: 131.155.2.49       6669   and on 1200
FSP: 131.170.24.42      6669   yallara.cs.rmit.oz.au
FSP: 131.174.224.37     6669
FSP: 131.215.131.148	21
FSP: 131.215.131.148    21     mosaic.cs.caltech.edu
FSP: 131.215.131.97     21     ipsc2.caltech.edu and on 5200 \?
FSP: 131.229.64.1       2112   Shifty
FSP: 132.205.9.100      2711
FSP: 132.235.1.242      21     brandx.cs.ohiou.edu
FSP: 132.254.90.4       4444   IBM part closed
FSP: 134.148.96.105     21     pleiades.newcastle.edu.au
FSP: 134.154.1.10       1756   Aladdin
FSP: 134.225.11.1       5190
FSP: 134.225.11.1       5431
FSP: 134.225.11.1       5432
FSP: 134.225.11.1       7351
FSP: 134.225.11.1       8814
FSP: 134.225.4.2        4389   swsscsc2.rdg.ac.uk
FSP: 134.225.5.1        4321   scsscsc1.rdg.ac.uk
FSP: 134.29.41.1        1121   hobbes.ESCI.StCloud.MSUS.EDU
FSP: 134.48.17.13       666    Jims Site
FSP: 134.68.6.2         2911   Ethome
FSP: 134.68.6.2         3911
FSP: 134.68.7.60        911
FSP: 134.68.7.90        911
FSP: 137.122.6.17       2001   The Bat Cave
FSP: 138.23.106.203     6666   
FSP: 140.114.26.90      199    Good IBM
FSP: 140.114.78.214     21     sunc14.cs.nthu.edu.tw Good IBM
FSP: 141.215.69.5       21
FSP: 143.53.240.1       6996	muser.brad.ac.uk
FSP: 146.232.108.2      4999	Amiga
FSP: 146.232.128.2      6969	cs.sun.ac.za
FSP: 150.203.43.50      3333	mehta.anu.edu.au
FSP: 150.203.5.31       4455	caesar.anu.edu.au
FSP: 152.17.30.2	2766	Slow one
FSP: 158.38.60.202      3000
FSP: 158.39.30.24       21     hannibal.hsn.no
FSP: 18.172.1.2         21     tsx-11.mit.edu
FSP: 192.131.107.5	8564   bart.meiko.com
FSP: 192.48.98.1        6669   poly.polytechnique.fr
FSP: 192.70.34.205      6678   eurecom5.cica.fr
FSP: 192.76.134.1       11111  mcshh.Hanse.de
FSP: 192.76.144.75      2001   ftp.germany.EU.net
FSP: 192.87.1.150       9999   The Adventure Pit
FSP: 193.78.33.42	7549

FTP:**Address*******************Type****Directory**************************
FTP: 128.193.124.2		Warez	/pub/submit/"..."
FTP: 128.36.13.1		DEAD	/pub/haskell/library/incoming/" "
FTP: 129.43.1.11		Warez	/pub/incoming/. unreadable
FTP: 129.6.32.54		Warez	/upload/"..  "
FTP: 141.138.2.2                DEAD	/pub/uploads/for.gross/"..  "
FTP: 141.212.32.53		DEAD	/pub/../". unreadable"/.bi.n
FTP: 147.26.103.14		DEAD	/pub/incoming
FTP: 179.259.37.10		DEAD	/warez/".  ,"/pc
FTP: 36.10.0.4			Warez	/pub/...			(e)
FTP: Sun.soe.clarkson.edu	DEAD	/pub/incoming/"..."/.f
FTP: W20-575-67.mit.edu		Warez	/pub/"..  "	(Dos6.0, Os2 Site)
FTP: a.cs.uiuc.edu              DEAD    /tmp/reddy/papers/"..  "/.bin
FTP: apollo.di.unipi.ti		DEAD	/pub/"..  "/.bin
FTP: athena.erc.msstate.edu	DEAD	/pub/seger/"..  "
FTP: athena.erc.msstate.edu	DEAD	/pup/off-theses-ps/"..  "/.bin
FTP: aun.uninett.no		DEAD	/gopherfiles/tmp/gftpC+/"..."
FTP: cs.ep.utexas.edu           DEAD    /pub/reports/xfer/incoming
FTP: cs.tut.fi                  DEAD    /pub/tut/testing/confocal/.bin/.zip
FTP: delphi.cs.ucla.edu			/incoming/" "/". bin"
FTP: dix.gps.caltech.edu		/pub/...
FTP: doppler.ncsc.org			/pub/siggraph/uploads/...
FTP: elof.iit.edu			/.NeXT/...
FTP: elof.iit.edu		DEAD	/pub/drum/incoming/"..  "/b.i.n
FTP: emil.ma.utexas.edu			/gif/.../
FTP: emil.ma.utexas.edu			/incoming/.../
FTP: faui80.informatik.uni-erlangen.de	/pub/asl/"..  "
FTP: faui80.informatik.uni-erlangen.de	/pub/asl/..
FTP: faui80.informatik.uni-erlangen.de	/pub/scheme/yorku/new/...
FTP: fcs280s.ncifcrf.gov	Warez	/pub/incoming/". unreadable"
FTP: fourcroy.chem.wayne.edu 	SCOUnix /pub/unix/sco
FTP: fourcroy.chem.wayne.edu 	Warez   /pub/incoming/".message "/.bin
FTP: ftp.brad.ac.uk             WAREZ	/incoming/msdos/"..  "
FTP: ftp.cayman.com             DEAD    /pub/users/john/ibmpc
FTP: ftp.cs.umn.edu             GIF     /users/grante/incoming/...
FTP: ftp.psi.com                DEAD    /tmp/"..  "/". unreadable"/..f
FTP: ftp.uu.net				/library
FTP: ftp.uu.net				/published/usenix/faces
FTP: gatekeeper.dec.com			/.2/micro/sysv-386/uportlaCk
FTP: geom.umn.edu		Warez	/incoming/". unreadable"/ (visual c++)
FTP: guardian.cs.psu.edu		/pub/mosis/ugrain/...
FTP: gumby.cc.wmich.edu         DEAD    /pub/incoming/". unreadable"/". "/
FTP: hub.cs.jmu.edu             DEAD	/incoming/"..  "/". unreadable"
FTP: huron.scd.ucar.edu		Warez	/weather/CO_ski.obs/...
FTP: hydra.helsinki.fi		Warez	/incoming/". unreadable"
FTP: j.cc.purdue.edu			/pub/deTex/.../
FTP: kanaha.idbsu.edu			/incoming/...
FTP: kanaha.idbsu.edu			/pub/NOBS/flip/...
FTP: lamont.ldgo.columbia.edu		/nceer/data/"..  "
FTP: lamont.ldgo.columbia.edu		/nceer/data/...
FTP: louie.udel.edu			/incoming/.../
FTP: mango.rsmas.miami.edu      DEAD    /incoming/.../.../ibm/.zip
FTP: math.princeton.edu		Warez	/pub/deTex/"..  "
FTP: math.utexas.edu			/incoming/djgpp/...
FTP: math.utexas.edu			/pub/mp_arc/...
FTP: math.utexas.edu			/pub/mp_arc/abstracts/...
FTP: math.utexas.edu			/pub/mp_arc/doc/...
FTP: math.utexas.edu			/pub/mp_arc/papers/...
FTP: math.utexas.edu		Warez	/incoming/"..  "
FTP: math.utexas.edu		Warez	/incoming/klaus/haken3/...
FTP: mcnc.mcnc.org			/pub/4kk/...
FTP: ncar.ucar.edu			/pc/virus/"..  "
FTP: nexus.yorku.ca			/pub/scheme/new/...
FTP: nic.stolaf.edu			/pub/sci/...
FTP: nic.stolaf.edu			/pub/tmp/...
FTP: omnigate.clarkson.edu	DEAD	/pub/gw/dump/.../.f
FTP: osceola.cs.ucf.edu         DEAD    /amar/.../I/f
FTP: park.bu.edu 		DEAD	/pub/incoming/"   "/.b.in
FTP: park.bu.edu 		DEAD	/pub/incoming/dt.bak/.b.in
FTP: phoenix.oulu.fi			/pub/incoming/"misc.zip "/"... "
FTP: phoenix.oulu.fi            DEAD    /pub/incoming/"misc.zip "
FTP: picard.uakron.edu			/NetInfo/NeXT/" "/"..  "/
FTP: potemkin.cs.pdx.edu	Warez	/pub/ileaf/incoming/".. "
FTP: psuvax1.cs.psu.edu			/pub/mosis/ugrain/...
FTP: quayle.mu.wvnet.edu        DEAD	/pub/pc/uploads/.../.zip (no anon.)
FTP: rascal.ics.utexas.edu		/misc/...
FTP: rascal.ics.utexas.edu		/misc/av/safety-folder/...
FTP: rascal.ics.utexas.edu		/misc/mac/...
FTP: raven.alaska.edu		Warez	/pub/".. "
FTP: sachiko.acc.stolaf.edu		/pub/tmp/...
FTP: sesqui.net				/pub/incomming/"..  "
FTP: sifon.cc.mcgill.ca         DEAD	/pub/in.coming/_..___/__________
FTP: solar.stanford.edu		DEAD	/pub/"..."/.f
FTP: solbourne.solbourne.com		/pub/uploads/for.gross/incoming/...
FTP: sonata.cc.purdue.edu		/pub/next/submissions/multi-media
FTP: sonate.cc.purdue.edu	Warez	/pub/next/multi-media^A
FTP: sperm.ocean.washington.edu		/pub/matter/"   "/" "
FTP: sperm.ocean.washington.edu DEAD	/pub/matter/"   "
FTP: sun.soe.clarkson.edu		/pub/incoming/...
FTP: sun.soe.clarkson.edu		/pub/src/flex/.."     "
FTP: sunbcd.weizmann.ac.il      DEAD    /pub/incoming/"..  "
FTP: suntan.tandem.com			/pub/...
FTP: thor.cs.wayne.edu          DEAD    /pub/.warez
FTP: transit.ai.mit.edu			/incoming/...
FTP: uhunix2.uhcc.hawaii.edu		/mirrors/gnu
FTP: unmvax.cs.unm.edu			/pub/jensen/.bin/.zip
FTP: uvaarpa.virginia.edu		/public_access/aa/.find/".  "
FTP: venera.isi.edu			/pub/wuu/tmp/"..  "
FTP: wlv.iipo.gtegsc.com		/pub/...
FTP: zaphod.lanl.gov			/pub/clim/incoming/

USER:**Irc Nick*********Email**********************************************
USER:+ (not in irc)	an31@anon.penet.fi
USER:+ Amp		(No Email)
USER:+ Ap0ll0		an19159@anon.penet.fi
USER:+ Bin		ap.9416@cupid.sai.com
USER:+ BloodSlop	csc226117@husky1.stmarys.ca
USER:+ BosStone		an19426@anon.penet.fi
USER:+ DDay		(Not Yet)
USER:+ Darion		an18877@anon.penet.fi
USER:+ Dekion		an18796@anon.penet.fi
USER:+ Eddie		(Not Yet)
USER:+ Fidelio		an19045@anon.penet.fi
USER:+ Flognat		an14231@anon.penet.fi
USER:+ GreenDay		an18894@anon.penet.fi
USER:+ Ignotus		an17295@anon.penet.fi
USER:+ JizMak		(Not Yet)
USER:+ MasNinja		(Not Yet)
USER:+ PurpCon		(Not Yet)
USER:+ Q_Silver		an19169@anon.penet.fi
USER:+ RalfiBoy		an19218@anon.penet.fi
USER:+ RedOne		(Not Yet)
USER:+ Robinn		(Not Yet)
USER:+ S-Lord		an19288@anon.penet.fi
USER:+ Slick		(Not Yet)
USER:+ Snarf		snarf@oulubox.tolsun.oulu.fi
USER:+ Sp0t		(Not Yet)
USER:+ TBoard		an19155@anon.penet.fi
USER:+ TI_Master	an15612@anon.penet.fi
USER:+ TWC		an19455@anon.penet.fi
USER:+ TWicked		an19576@anon.penet.fi
USER:+ Zip		(Not Yet)
USER:+ semi		an874@anon.penet.fi

XTRA:*Id**User*Description****************************************************
XTRA: + - User is Real (Pirate)
XTRA: - - User Is Antipirate *BEWARE*
XTRA: ? - Unknow user

	ps. If U have idea how to make this list look better
	    or any idea at all about this "thing" just send
	    me mail.. I just love to receive mail ;)

	Pss. If Someone wants his name on this list and also
	     want to receive this my list regualy every time
	     it get chanced, PLEASE don't tell me that in irc,
	     just send me e-mail with: irc nick, anonymous
	     mail address and real mail address. (and if U
	     would tell in same message that where U get this
	     list, you will be in my list very soon).


Newsgroups: alt.security
Path: netcom.com!csus.edu!decwrl!decwrl!olivea!charnel!rat!usc!sdd.hp.com!nigel.msen.com!yale.edu!yale!mintaka.lcs.mit.edu!coup
From: coup@gnu.ai.mit.edu (Christopher Klaus)
Subject: warez list
Message-ID: <1993Aug11.200142.20536@mintaka.lcs.mit.edu>
Sender: news@mintaka.lcs.mit.edu
Organization: Free Software Foundation
Date: Wed, 11 Aug 1993 20:01:42 GMT
Lines: 259



Hello.   I happened to look at /tmp in some major ftp site and found
some interesting files.   Anyways, I know CERT has sent out a advisory
already on FTP abuse.  But they didnt really address the FSP sites either.

I dont know much about the IBM scene nor care, but I figure maybe some 
of the admins would like to investigate this list and maybe clean up
their sites if they are on it and it hasnt been cleaned up.  

Maybe the SPA can get involved if someone so desires.
Here's the list.



                __/__/__/__/__/
                     __/   __/   __/
                    __/         __/         __/__/    __/__/
                   __/   __/   __/ __/   __/   __/  __/
                  __/   __/   __/__/    __/__/__/  __/__/
                 __/   __/   __/ __/   __/             __/
                __/   __/   __/  __/   __/__/    __/__/

              The Little Tikes Software Co proudly presents
the most comprehensive and complete Warez Information available on the Internet

Last revision: 930721

				===========
				WARNING!!!!
				===========

THIS LIST SHOULD BE KEPT AMONG SITE OPERATORS ONLY!!!
If you wish to make a more public version of this file, be sure to remove all
information about site operators, IRC bots & servers.

Please direct any update information or comments to Tikes and send
flames to 127.0.0.1

				----
				NOTE
				----

From now on, you'll have to request me the list, I won't automatically dcc it
to U when it is updated...

Information
===========

This file contains many sections:
	FTP Sites	List of all sites that has been or are warez active
	FSP Sites	List of all sites that has been or are warez active
	Legal Sites	List of usefull sites... other than warez
	IRC		Alternate servers used primarly for Warez "hiding"
	IRC Robots	IRC robots
	Operators	List of all has been or actually involved in warez

FTP Sites
=========

Notes:  C)losed, P)password changed, D)irectory changed ?) Status unknown
	anonymous/@	 indicates "normal", lamer, dumb anonymous login
	user/pass@	 indicates a normal user login account...
	anonymous/[ip]	 indicates only specific ip's can connnect
	anonymous/[nick] indicates only nick@ip can connect
		    (developed by Tikes for is modified/enhanced FTP server)

C anonymouys/@thyme.lcs.mit.edu		18.26.0.115
	930717				/pub/jrd/". "/binary
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
C anonymous/@				36.10.0.4
	930715 Empty
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
C anonymous/[nick]@henry		128.95.42.28	Lawn
	930609
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
C daniel/herschel@rayleigh.ee.washington.edu 128.95.31.245 Ano/Pengo
	930712 Gateway 2000		"/rayleigh/home/daniel/..  / /.w"
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
C anonymous/@geom.umn.edu		128.101.25.35
	930715 				incoming/"..  "/.b.in
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
C alien/delete1@salmon.micro.umn.edu	128.101.193.121
	930715 SunOS 4.1		Warez
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
C anonymous/@math.princeton.edu		128.112.128.157
	930715				/pub/fycfung/baezpapers/". . ."/.bin
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
C anonymous/@bruno.cs.colorado.edu	128.138.243.151
	930715 				/pub/cs/doc/.NextTrash/"^L"/progs
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
P dhb/stratton@leach.cs.rit.edu		129.21.41.7
	930715
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
C anonymous/[nick]@			129.22.64.1	Rocks
	921330
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
C anonymous/[nick]@			129.22.64.6	Rocks
	930609 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
  anonymous/@ub.es (arrima)		130.206.15.53	an16480@ub.es
	930721			/incoming/".bin. "
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
P m90-scj/lingonris@trisse		130.241.220.2	Leinad
	930330
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
P m92-axb/ljulklapp@trisse 		130.241.220.2	Leinad
	930318 NetWare v3.11		/tcs/swap
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
  softsite/quandry@vtan			131.104.136.26
	930720 IBM OS/2 TCP/IP FTP	../[IBM|AMIGA|DOCS|NEW]
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
C anonymous/[ip]@mirage.unipv.it	131.175.45.34	Clint
	930420 Private			/incoming/"   "/is
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
  anonymous/[ip]@roxette.mty.itesm.mx	131.178.15.100	NetShadow
	930721 Empty... setting things up, don't ask for access
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
C anonymous/[nick]@tdsb-s.mais.hydro.qc.ca 131.195.163.5	TheCamel
	930715 				./private
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
  anonymous/[nick]@tdsb-s.mais.hydro.qc.ca 131.195.163.5	Tikes
	930718 On invitation only, don't ask	./private
	Site operators only, validate nick@host, so don't bother trying to log
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
C anonymous/@hobiecat.pcmp.caltech.edu	131.215.131.167
	930715				pub/dropoff/tar.Z/"..  "/.bin
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
  ftp/warez@gena			132.68.64.49	Gena/Freezer
	930721 This site will close soon	./[incoming,warez]
	Replaced by 132.74.3.50
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
  proba/epson@				132.74.3.50	Gena/Freezer
	930721				./warez
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
C anonymous/@plains.nodak.edu		134.129.111.64
	930721 No space!		/pub/tandy/incoming/"..  "/.b.in
	Permission denied in dir /pub/tandy/incoming
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
  anonymous/@fsa.cpsc.ucalgary.ca	136.159.2.1
	930721				pub/sschurch/[.b...in,.r...eq]
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
C slucas/richmond@powhatan.cc.cnc.edu   137.155.10.10
	930712				".   "
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
P c880148/kurilin@asterix.fi.upm.es	138.100.8.6
	930330 Slow link...
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
C wizard/hhhew@				140.113.215.192
	930330
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
C ftp/ylin@				140.114.26.90	marfada9
	930330				/pub
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
C ftp/maolong4@cobra			140.114.76.203	babuu
	930609
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
P Ether/amadeus@			140.117.73.1
	930719
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
P abc/trantor@cca.pue.udlap.mx		140.148.3.18
	930712
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
P adela/avatar!@goren.u.washington.edu	140.142.63.1	Ano/Pengo
	930709				/".   "/".  "
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
  georgias/fuk!it@honeydew.cc.wwu.edu	140.160.240.29	A-Flat/blazer
	930721				".^t./^t^l.^l^t"/.real
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
? anonymous/@				141.201.1.16
	930720 Always connection time-out...	pub/local/peter/upload/.bin
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
C ftp/@apache.telebit.com		143.191.3.1
	930712				/tmp/"..  "/.bin
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
  Scum/sux2bu@				152.94.21.8[15] Croc
	930720 Running on a PC, often down... Biggest site!
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
C stress/waterloo@unix1.mrih.no		158.38.66.44	berol
	930527 Closed while Berol is in the army...
		Heard some1 else is supposed to take the flame...
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
C zip/merlin@uropax			192.109.39.2
	930718 Empty			tmp/[unknown dir]
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
  anonymous/@netcom4.netcom.com		192.100.81.107
	930721 Still empty... asking 4 uploads!	/pub/tal/.warez
	       Loggin message says everything is logged... be carefull...
		README message says it's run by sysadmin... Would sure like
		to know who run this site!
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------

FSP SITES
=========

? Mirage 132.68.48.173 3000		Outrun
	930712
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
? NetShadow 131.178.15.100 5555		NetShadow
	930712 Registration required
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Legal Sites
===========

? vendor/microsoft@			137.39.1.9
	930712 Host unreachable
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------

IRC Servers
===========

C mecca.epri.com			144.58.65.48 7777
	930712
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
C picard.cc.umanitoba.ca		130.179.25.28 7777
	930712
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
? roxette.mty.itesm.mx			131.178.15.100 7777	NetShadow
	930720
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------

IRC Robots
==========

  WarezCat				TommydCat
	930718 [de]op/ban/kick/invite/dcc...
	       mirror fsp site titan.ucc.umass.edu 2112
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
C Shadow				Elminster
	930720 Initializing... not ready for use
	Due to the way Elminster is actying in #warez... he won't be "trusted"
	anymore (mass deop/mass kick/lame acting etc...)
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Operators
=========
A-Flat
Ano
Babuu
Blazer
Clint
Croc
Freezer
Gena
Lawn
Leinad
marfada9
NetShadow
Outrun
Pengo
Rocks
TheCamel
Tikes
TommydCat


---- thats it.


Newsgroups: alt.security
Path: netcom.com!netcomsv!decwrl!concert!news-feed-1.peachnet.edu!umn.edu!gold1.tc.umn.edu!werm0004
From: werm0004@gold1.tc.umn.edu (Angela M Wermager-1)
Subject: Pirate FSP Sites
Message-ID: <CBu2Mu.32s@news.cis.umn.edu>
Sender: news@news.cis.umn.edu (Usenet News Administration)
Nntp-Posting-Host: gold1.tc.umn.edu
Organization: University of Minnesota
Date: Mon, 16 Aug 1993 03:47:58 GMT
Lines: 58


The following is a list of pirate FSP sites that I found in a user's
account.  I'm tired of having good bandwidth wasted by these software
pirates.  Would the appropriate agencies please take action against these
scumbags?

180.212.61.199 31960
222.140.22.199 29351
112.251.164.94 30509
178.46.139.97 29452
122.94.93.72 11147
115.70.211.71 25732
135.85.44.229 16748
208.53.116.129 6858
163.189.180.38 3968
220.38.200.43 18558
208.7.218.73 23081
215.56.205.245 16858
186.252.0.138 7897
150.87.225.114 25469
116.82.74.146 19782
163.156.183.73 9784
202.28.148.90 12403
163.75.35.150 2098
103.110.27.119 30571
159.126.64.33 14246
169.163.3.17 8828
108.160.185.177 25120
248.175.119.118 8108
155.166.204.122 30757
191.24.223.240 31054
158.249.125.72 3576
180.85.59.93 31163
227.182.122.244 24240
135.41.109.38 5353
130.38.161.96 26739
200.32.35.177 27379
154.115.43.187 4720
250.155.87.134 20768
129.6.188.140 31107
152.52.224.120 11424
109.117.244.14 2852
181.72.235.229 22946
238.200.217.234 17017
135.27.77.38 6735
214.48.7.180 28877
211.119.138.107 30907
237.226.117.171 1081
194.185.133.12 10177
237.146.147.156 1673
223.28.192.163 15270
132.5.71.19 22793
203.154.231.9 5531
174.48.89.148 6950
119.0.50.44 5948
162.224.220.95 22302
185.243.66.69 15931
104.173.5.70 30427





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "George A. Gleason" <gg@well.sf.ca.us>
Date: Sun, 12 Sep 93 01:28:17 PDT
To: remail@tamsun.tamu.edu
Subject: Re:  EC isn't great for privacy either...
Message-ID: <93Sep12.011829pdt.14002-1@well.sf.ca.us>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Right, "most people accept" the need for Big Brother to snoop..... 

In the UK, during the 1970s, the govt routinely tapped the phones of labor
union organisers and members of opposing political parties. This got out in
a series of articles in _New Statesman_.  Presumably it was easy for
dissident telephone engineers to detect evidence of the taps, because the
exchanges were electromechanical in those days & taps were hard-wired.
Nowadays, it's all System X or other digital, no evidence to detect, no
dissident engineers popping out of the woodwork....  

There are plenty of other examples of politically-motivated tapping;
opposition political parties ought to be making much hay over this right
now.

During Nazi occupation, Dutch telephone engineers were particularly adept at
creating non-tappable direct-dial long distance routes for special use by
the resistance.  After the war was over, they unveiled it for public use as
direct distance dialing.  Anyway, if any of these veterans are around, they
would probably have interesting things to say about the current issues...

-gg




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: nate@VIS.ColoState.EDU (CVL staff member Nate Sammons)
Date: Sun, 12 Sep 93 02:39:14 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: PGPcompose (pgpc) 2.0 *just* finished.
Message-ID: <9309120933.AA13977@vangogh.VIS.ColoState.EDU>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

PGPcompose 2.0 is available for ftp from 129.82.156.104 (the macintosh
in my dorm room... ;-) in /pub/pgpc it's all of 11K, so don't sweat
the bandwidth!

PGPcompose 2.0 has the following features:

  -can send mail through anon.penet.fi
  -keeps your anon.penet.fi password in a PGP'd file in your home directory
  -mails through 15 of the cypherpunks remailers (unlimited remailings,
   actually, but there's only 15 servers in it now (tell me of more!))
  -can encrypt and sign mail
  -pumps output directly to sendmail (once you find out where sendmail is...
   read the README for more info)
  -will keep you fron doing stupid things, like mailing though anon.penet.fi
   and then through the remailers, or signing a message and then sending it
   through the remailers or through anon.penet.fi, etc...

If you use it, send me some email.  I would like to expand it's abilities,
but I'm lazy... and tired.

- -nate
 nate@vis.colostate.edu

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.3

iQCVAgUBLJLs4NTgi1fmrpxlAQEm+wP5AXyo6iBre/iffpMoDrwGLHbLgqwqeCUa
Dn1bI3AeYqj6kwyI7BdkZ4JFTgU6o6mPldDHHwtO1VNi+P/Hnkku+H+xa9YhmxDN
b5MouM7By7mEEpgWJS9Bu2+aYXdKa9ZxB6YuI4khBxSJID07mPUer2g35swiRayw
y+A2KB537/o=
=HhPi
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: ccat@netcom.com (Chris Beaumont)
Date: Sun, 12 Sep 93 09:14:18 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: encryption key switching,would it work?
Message-ID: <9309121608.AA08172@netcom5.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I'm wondering if there is any particular reason why an encrypted message
might not be encrypted with several different keys,within the same message,
divided by time.Perhaps synchronized clocks or time stamping might be used
to toggle the encryption parameters.This technology might be able to defeat
the brute force decryption technologies described in the paper mentioned
yesterday.
The only way that one might decrypt the message is to know the _exact_ time
at wich the algorhythm was switched.In other words, what to prevent people
from using _numerous_ keys during _one_ session,with the _times_ of
switching remaining secret?
Combined with a robust "one time pad" method,like triple DES,this
technology might be particularly resistant to casual decryption attempts
based on knowledge of the algorhythm? I know little about different
encryption methods.. is there
any reason this wouldnt work,besides the necessary complexity of the
information contained in the key?
-Chris
-
Chris Beaumont                    nutrient cafe wholesale
ccat@netcom.com                  MIME mail graciously accepted
ccat@casa.stanford.edu           public key available via finger





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Timothy Newsham <newsham@wiliki.eng.hawaii.edu>
Date: Sun, 12 Sep 93 13:19:35 PDT
To: ccat@netcom.com (Chris Beaumont)
Subject: Re: encryption key switching,would it work?
In-Reply-To: <9309121608.AA08172@netcom5.netcom.com>
Message-ID: <9309122019.AA06312@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> 
> I'm wondering if there is any particular reason why an encrypted message
> might not be encrypted with several different keys,within the same message,
> divided by time.Perhaps synchronized clocks or time stamping might be used
> to toggle the encryption parameters.This technology might be able to defeat
> the brute force decryption technologies described in the paper mentioned
> yesterday.

If you have a system with key exchange you can change the keys on demand
in the middle of a stream (provided the protocol you use allows this).
This may be done as many times and as often as you please up to the
limitations of the (usually) slower key exchange protocol.

> Chris Beaumont                    nutrient cafe wholesale
> ccat@netcom.com                  MIME mail graciously accepted
> ccat@casa.stanford.edu           public key available via finger




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: doug@netcom4.netcom.com (Doug Merritt)
Date: Sun, 12 Sep 93 10:28:23 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: nada against the gubbamess...
Message-ID: <9309121720.AA17362@netcom4.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


loki@convex1.TCS.Tulane.EDU (the mischeivious god) said:
>nobody@alumni.cco.caltech.edu (I think) said:
>> 1.  There have been some recent posts suggesting that 
>>     privacy is not fundamentally subversive of 
>>     government, and that cypherpunks should emphasize  
>>     the privacy and keep quite about the anarchy.  I 
>>     find these arguments disingenuous in the extreme, 
>>     and strategically unsound as well. 
>
>no doubt....I have a question for everyone though. How does anarchy
>deal with justice and who would be the ones to provide this service. 

That's one of the problems with absolute anarchy; it's unstable. Most
"anarchists" believe in relative anarchy rather than absolute; some would
call that simply "libertarian", but others dislike that label because
a lot of libertarians are less extreme in their views.

Regardless of fine distinctions in labelling, it is possible to come up
with schemes for things like justice that do not involve centralized
monolithic government, anyway. As I recall, Ursula LeGuin had justice
provided by ad hoc peer review committees, for instance. Snow Crash
had it provided by franchised companies that were called "governments",
but that sure didn't resemble today's governments in most details.

One scheme for future cyberspace would involve digital voting by established
reputable personas (anonymous or not) and enforcement via stakes involving
digital cash and/or digital reputation. Although building and establishing
reputation would require some kind of investment of time and energy, it's
difficult to maintain a "one physical body one vote" scheme. Randomized
selection of juries might assist in that in a statistical sense.

(I arrived late at the cypherpunk meeting Saturday, but from the printed
agenda it looks like some aspects of that had been discussed?)

As for the original point about whether cypherpunks should be quiet
about anarchy or not, this is a question of PR and of politics (of course).
If you're talking to a person with libertarian or anarchist leanings,
then that would be a selling point. If you're talking to the press, who
will in turn be talking to everyone including Peoria, the game is to be
more moderate while still offering the sizzle.

For instance, even mainstream Republicans and Democrats from the bible
belt may distrust the IRS and the CIA enough to want some protection from
*them*. But they may not sympathize with people who say that we need
protection from the government overall.

It's a selling game.

It's also worth keeping in mind that there are a variety of political
views among cypherpunks, and it would be dishonest to paint all cypherpunks
as being in absolute agreement about all aspects of politics.

>Also is society outside of our Ivory tower cases with twin cooling fans ready
>for an anarchical harmony???

Not a chance. But the sizzle might sell anyway, if it's packaged right.
	Doug
--
Doug Merritt				doug@netcom.com
Professional Wild-eyed Visionary	Member, Crusaders for a Better Tomorrow

Unicode Novis Cypherpunks Gutenberg Wavelets Conlang Logli Alife HC_III
Computational linguistics Fundamental physics Cogsci SF GA VR CASE TLAs




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: doug@netcom4.netcom.com (Doug Merritt)
Date: Sun, 12 Sep 93 11:04:21 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: nada against the gubbamess...
Message-ID: <9309121759.AA21048@netcom4.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


loki@convex1.TCS.Tulane.EDU (the mischeivious god) said:
>Any way question to that point about about elections...
>
>Who would be ble to be candidates...just anybody ???that would be 
>almost as bad as our present system...which has people with no relevant
>experience except in bullshit and fait de con. 

Sorry to say that you're a bit confused. The question was how to provide
justice under anarchy. I said something about voting. You jumped to the
assumption that I was talking about voting for government elections. This
is not the case. I was talking about voting on issues of justice, as
in a jury. You may want to reread my post with this in mind.

As for voting for government in cyberspace, it all depends on the other
assumptions. Should there be a virtual government? Should voting for
physical-world governments take place on the net? Etc, etc. There is
currently no active discussion going on about any of this, so there is no
framework for commenting on voting for such things.
	Doug




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: jdblair@nextsrv.cas.muohio.edu (John Blair)
Date: Sun, 12 Sep 93 08:28:22 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: is the list still going?
Message-ID: <9309121540.AA13298@ nextsrv.cas.muohio.EDU >
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I haven't gotten a mailing for quite a few days.  Is something wrong?
-john




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: loki@convex1.TCS.Tulane.EDU (the mischeivious god)
Date: Sun, 12 Sep 93 09:53:22 PDT
To: nobody@alumni.cco.caltech.edu
Subject: Re: nada against the gubbamess...
In-Reply-To: <9309120754.AA18108@alumni.cco.caltech.edu>
Message-ID: <9309121646.AA04893@convex1.tcs.tulane.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> 1.  There have been some recent posts suggesting that 
>     privacy is not fundamentally subversive of 
>     government, and that cypherpunks should emphasize  
>     the privacy and keep quite about the anarchy.  I 
>     find these arguments disingenuous in the extreme, 
>     and strategically unsound as well. 
no doubt....I have a question for everyone though. How does anarchy
deal with justice and who would be the ones to provide this service. 
Because lets face it we all have days some more that others where we need
recourse..be it a dispute on your VISA b/c some @#T$#@$ warezhouse mailed you some crappy stuff and still won't give you back your money...

For me the decline of West. Civ. started when Blanche was raped by Stanley in 
_Streetcar_named_DESIRE_ by Tn. Williams...but to get back to my point
...hmmm what was it...oh!!!

The last vestiges of our gubbamess will be the judicial system
...beacuse we all have those days...

Also is society outside of our Ivory tower cases with twin cooling fans ready
for an anarchical harmony???
> 
> 2.  Cypherpunks believe that privacy is fundamentally 
>     subversive.  Come on, folks, whom do you want 
>     privacy FROM, if not your own government?  
>     Otherwise there's no logical objection to the 
>     key-escrow, trust-big-brother schemes. 
Bzzztt.. the internet is becoming a great place for commerce and trade concerns
to get up wit' each other...Trade Secrets and financial records need to be
protected from reverse-engineers who cannot think up a creative idea for them-
selves so they will steal it. Granted the IRS will soon be peeing in its empty
pants pockets to keep them full...but trade is another reason for crypts.
And not this reconstituted clipper shit the E.C. is toying with right now.
> 
> 3.  The government has shown by its behavior that it 
>     believes that privacy is fundamentally subversive.

It is isn't it? see #1
    
     ...vi sucks...kk > 
> 4.  I personally find privacy, in itself, only mildly 
>     interesting.  As a tool to undermine the government, 
>     I find it VERY EXCITING INDEED.
> 
> 5.  Cypherpunks' mission is to evangelize the use of 
>     privacy.  Sell the sizzle, not the steak!  Privacy
>     is the steak.  The sizzle is the possibility of 
>     GETTING AWAY WITH SOMETHING.
> 
> 
kudos...


Loki on a mosquito ridden convex mired in a swamp never to be salvaged...except by da cajuns....





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Andrew Corradini/SBDC <Andrew.Corradini@m.cc.utah.edu>
Date: Sun, 12 Sep 93 11:58:23 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Let's stick to the topic, folks...
Message-ID: <Pine.3.05.9309121207.A16804-b100000@u.cc.utah.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


For purely practical reasons, could we all please try to limit stuff that'd
end up on soda.berkeley.edu in the "rants" directory? ;-)

This is a MAILING LIST, not a newsgroup, and some of us have pretty limited
space available. Debating constitutional issues, splitting hairs over the
difference between libertarianism and anarchism (let ALONE "strong" vs. "weak"
anarchy!) is best done in an alt.politics-type setting, no? I didn't subscribe
to the list to see 7-level-deep nested quotes arguing over whether anarchy is
fundamentally unstable; I suspect most others on the list didn't either. 

As I understood, and understand, the thrust of the group deals with the
TECHNOLOGY and TECHNIQUES involved in the application of cryptography to
privacy-related issues and the free distribution of "information", whether dirty
pictures, money, or a poem you just wrote to your loved one.

NOT the philosophy.

Please, for bandwidth's sake, would people please take their back-n-forth's.... 
*private*?! ;-)  (pun fully intended)

(deep breath, relax shoulder tension, stepping down from soapbox)

Thanks, y'all. I feel much better now.
Andrew






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Anonymous <nowhere@bsu-cs.bsu.edu>
Date: Sun, 12 Sep 93 10:53:23 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: The "Cypherpunk Melting Pot"
Message-ID: <9309121749.AA00279@bsu-cs.bsu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


On Sun, 12 Sep 93 00:54:18 PDT,
 <uunet!alumni.cco.caltech.edu!nobody> wrote -
 
> Some comments on the relationship between anarchy and
> privacy:
>
> 1.  There have been some recent posts suggesting that
>     privacy is not fundamentally subversive of
>     government, and that cypherpunks should emphasize
>     the privacy and keep quite about the anarchy.  I
>     find these arguments disingenuous in the extreme,
>     and strategically unsound as well.
 
 
Bullshit. Privacy is not inherently subversive at all. If you
take the time to browse back through the Bill of Rights, you might
recognize this paragraph -
 
                     ARTICLE IV
 
    The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but
upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or
things to be seized.
 
 
 
> 3.  The government has shown by its behavior that it
>     believes that privacy is fundamentally subversive.
 
This is not necessarily true. I agree that Big Brother has gone
to the extreme to violate individual privacy in the modern day, but
just how does this tie into anarchy? To solely entwine these two
idealisms is, in my opinion, a bankrupt strategy. I believe in strong
crypto, I believe in privacy. Pinch-hitting for anarchy will damage
work for privacy causes.
 
> 4.  I personally find privacy, in itself, only mildly
>     interesting.  As a tool to undermine the government,
>     I find it VERY EXCITING INDEED.
 
Excitement does not define the deed or the end result. Get your cheap
thrills at someone else's expense.
 
> 5.  Cypherpunks' mission is to evangelize the use of
>     privacy.  Sell the sizzle, not the steak!  Privacy
>     is the steak.  The sizzle is the possibility of
>     GETTING AWAY WITH SOMETHING.
 
"Getting away" with privacy is an oxymoron in itself. Privacy should
be something that we all have and enjoy as individuals, not simply as
guaranteed under the Constitution, but as a human right that is owed
each of us globally. I'll stand by you in a fight for privacy, but I
won't be party to anarchic idealisms that I believe will do more
damage to the privacy cause in the long run.





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: lefty@apple.com (Lefty)
Date: Sun, 12 Sep 93 13:08:41 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Spooks reading the list
Message-ID: <9309122000.AA00806@internal.apple.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


An anonymous "contributor" writes
>
>In fact, there is at least one NSA agent on this list. Whether 
>he/she is on our side or not, who knows? This message, a defense of 
>the NSA, was posted here not long ago. I don't know if anyone else 
>noticed this at the time, but take a look:
>
>*From:   IN%"remail@tamsun.tamu.edu" 28-AUG-1993 06:02:47.29
>*To:     IN%"cypherpunks@toad.com"
>*CC:     
>*Subj:   NSA & the Crypto-Zionist Myth of "Public Key"!
>
>* {Deletia}
>*
>*Excuse me, but I'm getting tired of this silly paranoia.  NSA
>*is not Evil Incarnate Central, and we are not fighting a Valiant War 
>                                    ==
>
>We? WE! Do you suppose that was a Freudian slip, or did he mean to 
>say it like that? Whoever he is, he works for the NSA. Did anyone else
>notice this at the time?

In this context, "we" clearly refers to the Cypherpunks, fighting a
"Valiant War" _against_ the NSA.

I think you sound like a paranoid loon.


--
Lefty [gYon-Pa] (lefty@apple.com)
C:.M:.C:., D:.O:.D:.






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Perry E. Metzger" <pmetzger@lehman.com>
Date: Sun, 12 Sep 93 10:33:23 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: nada against the gubbamess...
In-Reply-To: <9309121646.AA04893@convex1.tcs.tulane.edu>
Message-ID: <9309121725.AA23425@snark.lehman.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



loki@convex1.tcs.tulane.edu asks:
> no doubt....I have a question for everyone though. How does anarchy
> deal with justice and who would be the ones to provide this service. 

This is completely beyond the scope of Cypherpunks -- this isn't a
list about anarchism, its a list about cryptographic privacy. I'll
gladly suggest a few books for you, though...

"The Machinery of Freedom" by David Friedman (yes, THAT Friedman's son).
"The Enterprise of Law: Justice without the State" by Bruce Benson

Both are likely available from Laissez Faire books, at 800-326-0996.
They have a free catalog. 

Benson's book is a thick, detailed and scholarly work that
concentrates solely on legal and judicial systems. Friedman's work is
a light survey of all sorts of libertarian and anarchist topics, from
monetary systems to a discussion of private judicial practice in
medieval Iceland.

Having presented some references, I suggest we now abandon the topic
of anarchism -- it isn't the purpose of this list. I think its
appropriate that people like me not hide our positions, but thats very
different from discussing them in an inappropriate place. There are
lots of discussion groups on the net for propertarian anarchists to
chat in -- and this is a list for cryptography.

Perry






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Jonathan Axelrad <jaxelrad@crl.com>
Date: Sun, 12 Sep 93 15:24:24 PDT
To: Da Mystic Homeboy <praveen@carina.unm.edu>
Subject: Re: Digital warfare
In-Reply-To: <9309111519.AA04072@carina.unm.edu>
Message-ID: <Pine.3.05.9309121424.A8908-c100000@crl.crl.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain




On Sat, 11 Sep 1993, Da Mystic Homeboy wrote:

> 	What would happen if all our transactions become untraceable?  
> How is the government supposed to prove anything, except by becoming fascist
> corporate fanatics (which is what is trying to happen right now).  Better
> yet, if all our communications are in private, how are the information
> companies going to get their money?  Whos going to have established credit-
> the very basis of our modern kapitalism?  


While I'm very much in favor of digital cash & strong encryption and
excited by their potential uses, it seems to me that you're leaving out an
awful lot when you paint your vision of the "private" future.  Neither is
likely to dramatically reduce the amount of general-purpose information
available on people and businesses.  With the ATM always around the
corner, there's almost no reason for me to use a credit card, yet I do
(frequent flyer mile credits aside) because it's convenient.  The same for
giving my unlisted telephone number to the plumber (who, in the years to
come, undoubtedly will maintain it in a database and may even sell it)
because I want him to call if he's going to be three hours late to fix the
leaky pipe.  As far as who's going to have established credit, the answer
is darn near everyone who can get it.  Credit is a powerful tool in a
market economy -- to get an idea of how important it is even to average
people, just look at the number of articles published by feminists on the
plight of recently divorced women who had previously relied on their
husband's credit rating.  Rather than using the new tools for anonymity,
I'll bet that most people, most of the time, want to use them to more
securely establish *identity*  (i.e., I don't want that jerk down the
street with a Radio Shack scanner using my credit for his own purposes).

	In the end, I would suggest that a digital cash/strong encryption
future will include a delicate balance in which each of us is constantly
broadcasting personal information in the clear for purposes of convenience
(even though we will quickly lose control over how that information is
used) while simultaneously using privacy tools to permit more secure
transactions and communications.  This is not to suggest that there won't
be a continued underground economy, but I don't see it taking over the
world.  






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: P.V.McMahon@rea0803.wins.icl.co.uk
Date: Sun, 12 Sep 93 07:08:21 PDT
To: "L. Detweiler" <ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Subject: RE: EC proposes PRIVACY LICENSES
In-Reply-To: <9309120558.AA09019@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Message-ID: <"7088*/I=PV/S=McMahon/OU=rea0803/O=icl/PRMD=icl/ADMD=gold 400/C=GB/"@MHS>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain








> [anonymously quoted EC policy proposal]
> >A particular business might qualify for a CONFIDENTIALITY LICENSE
> >depending on its internal procedures and activities. A general
> >(minimum) level of confidentiality could be provided to all users.
> 
> THE HORROR!
> 
> *this* is Orwellian. *this* is how to outlaw cryptography. 
> 
> we need some ECypherpunk infiltrators ASAP!

I would be interested in knowing which EC document is being referred
to. You may perhaps be interested to know that the 14JUL93 Draft 3.6 of
the "Green Book on the Security of Information Systems" (from CEC DGXIIIB)
addresses the issue that "strong information privacy may also be used to
escape investigation by law enforcement". It identifies some related
requirements: "an effective, internationally agreed, economic, ethical,
and usable solution to meet business, administration, and personal needs
including mechanisms for authorised interception and reporting the
incidents and crimes adjusted to the conditions of the Internal Market,
and to include the necessary equipment and software, but also an 
infrastructure of Trusted Third Parties. This will discourage "home made"
or other solutions."

As its name suggests, the Green Book isn't an agreed policy, but is an
intermediate step in the process of constructing and Action Plan for
EC information security. As such, the current text might be interpreted
as a recommendation for EC adoption of a Clipper-style solution, but
this is by no means the only (or even the best) way to meet these
requirements. Personally I would favour a framework which encouraged
strong cryptography, and assumed that criminals will tend to ignore the
law, so therefore didn't burden the law-abiding 99% with pointless
constraints. This would require an adjustment to the current Green Book
requirements, which I, at least, will be suggesting.





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: composer@Beyond.Dreams.ORG (Jeff Kellem)
Date: Sun, 12 Sep 93 12:39:21 PDT
To: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Subject: Re: Armed gangs stealing chips from warehouses
In-Reply-To: <9309102135.AA25794@netcom5.netcom.com>
Message-ID: <9309121937.AA24265@Beyond.Dreams.ORG>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


On the cypherpunks mailing list, Tim May wrote...
 > (I regret that I cannot post the Clarinet article, as Clarinet has
 > fairly draconian policies about reposting its articles--even though I
 > never signed a contract. Still, Cypherunks should be aware of
 > this....I've seen at least one Clarinet article reposted here on this
 > list, and this could expose the list to actions.)

Send a note to Brad [Templeton] at Clarinet.  He has, in the past, allowed
_occasional_ repostings to mailing lists, as long as it is understood that
those postings should not be reposted.

FYI...

		-jeff

Jeff Kellem
Internet: composer@Beyond.Dreams.ORG




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Anonymous <nowhere@bsu-cs.bsu.edu>
Date: Sun, 12 Sep 93 13:48:24 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: The "Cypherpunk Melting Pot"
Message-ID: <9309122044.AA07882@bsu-cs.bsu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


On Sun, 12 Sep 93 00:54:18 PDT,
 <uunet!alumni.cco.caltech.edu!nobody> wrote -
 
> Some comments on the relationship between anarchy and
> privacy:
>
> 1.  There have been some recent posts suggesting that
>     privacy is not fundamentally subversive of
>     government, and that cypherpunks should emphasize
>     the privacy and keep quite about the anarchy.  I
>     find these arguments disingenuous in the extreme,
>     and strategically unsound as well.
 
 
Bullshit. Privacy is not inherently subversive at all. If you
take the time to browse back through the Bill of Rights, you might
recognize this paragraph -
 
                     ARTICLE IV
 
    The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but
upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or
things to be seized.
 
 
 
> 3.  The government has shown by its behavior that it
>     believes that privacy is fundamentally subversive.
 
This is not necessarily true. I agree that Big Brother has gone
to the extreme to violate individual privacy in the modern day, but
just how does this tie into anarchy? To solely entwine these two
idealisms is, in my opinion, a bankrupt strategy. I believe in strong
crypto, I believe in privacy. Pinch-hitting for anarchy will damage
work for privacy causes.
 
> 4.  I personally find privacy, in itself, only mildly
>     interesting.  As a tool to undermine the government,
>     I find it VERY EXCITING INDEED.
 
Excitement does not define the deed or the end result. Get your cheap
thrills at someone else's expense.
 
> 5.  Cypherpunks' mission is to evangelize the use of
>     privacy.  Sell the sizzle, not the steak!  Privacy
>     is the steak.  The sizzle is the possibility of
>     GETTING AWAY WITH SOMETHING.
 
"Getting away" with privacy is an oxymoron in itself. Privacy should
be something that we all have and enjoy as individuals, not simply as
guaranteed under the Constitution, but as a human right that is owed
each of us globally. I'll stand by you in a fight for privacy, but I
won't be party to anarchic idealisms that I believe will do more
damage to the privacy cause in the long run.

-




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Chael Hall <nowhere@chaos.bsu.edu>
Date: Sun, 12 Sep 93 14:54:23 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: chaos.bsu.edu online (again)
Message-ID: <199309122346.QAA17487@chaos.bsu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text



     Sorry about that...  I will remember not to disklabel my swap partition
again like that.  Unfortunately, a lot of data was lost last week when I
killed my 386BSD partition.  One thing that I lost was the pseudonymous
contact service that I had written.  The remailer, however, has been enhanced
a little bit (nothing noticeable) and is now running on chaos.  The remailer
address is <remailer@chaos.bsu.edu>.  This is *not* a user account, so if you
mess up a message to the remailer, your message will bounce with an
appropriate error code.

     Please try it out and let me know if you have any problems with it.
Accounts are available, the same restrictions apply as in my previous message.
Telnet to chaos.bsu.edu and login as "guest" to apply for an account.  There
is a mail server named "plans" on here too.  I created it with the intention
of getting others' input on the direction that chaos should go.  So, if you
would like to help give some constructive criticizm, please send a
subscription request to "plans-admin@chaos.bsu.edu" now!

Chael Hall
{nowhere|root}@chaos.bsu.edu	nowhere@bsu-cs.bsu.edu
00CCHALL@bsuvc.bsu.edu		chall@bsu.edu




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Chael Hall <nowhere@chaos.bsu.edu>
Date: Sun, 12 Sep 93 14:53:24 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Correction
Message-ID: <199309122347.QAA17514@chaos.bsu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text



Correction, that's plans-request@chaos.bsu.edu

Chael




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Anonymous <nowhere@bsu-cs.bsu.edu>
Date: Sun, 12 Sep 93 17:33:27 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: The "Cypherpunk Melting Pot"
Message-ID: <9309130027.AA24351@bsu-cs.bsu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Okay.
 
I've gotten my collective thought processes back on track, how
'bout the rest of you?
 
Can we move forward -together- on the front for strong crypto?
 
Seeing as how Mr. P. (segway) Ferguson and Mr. Spooge(y) like
to use dictionary entries, I suggest this one as an "end-all"
for our current purposes -
 
team - \teem\  2 : a number of persons associated in work or
       activity; esp: a group on one side in a match.
 
 
We should be working as a team and not vetting petty on issues outside
of strong crypto.





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: pmetzger@lehman.com (Perry E. Metzger)
Date: Sun, 12 Sep 93 17:28:28 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: The "Cypherpunk Melting Pot"
Message-ID: <9309130022.AA21166@kublai.lehman.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Anonymous says:
> Bullshit. Privacy is not inherently subversive at all. If you
> take the time to browse back through the Bill of Rights, you might
> recognize this paragraph -
>  
>                      ARTICLE IV
>  
>     The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
> houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and
> seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but
> upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and
> particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or
> things to be seized.

I'll point out something about the history of that line most people
forget.

Our fine nation was founded by drug smugglers. The drug in question
was Rum, admittedly, but none the less, the point remains -- the
revolutionary war was financed by big time criminals like John Hancock
who made their money in smuggling contraband and other similar acts.
They made sure that the constitution they got was supportive of their
particular business interests. History teachers don't like pointing
this sort of thing out, but its none the less true. 

Our founders wanted a government that is very close in size to what
minarchist libertarians think of as being the "right size" -- there
was a scandal early on when the white house staff was expanded to four
people -- so it shouldn't be suprising that a correct reading of the
constitution leads to certain unpleasant conclusions for statists.

Perry

PS Thomas Jefferson once fretted heavily over whether a constitutional
amendment was needed to make the Louisiana Purchase. Think of that
image in your mind the next time you hear a congressman propose some
new program that is plainly not authorized in the enumerated powers
section of the constitution.

(By the way, if your history teacher fed you the bull that the "escape
clause" means congress can pass any law it likes, I suggest looking up
the legal doctrine that the "exception proves the rule", and check out
the history of FDRs administration, paying special attention to
the early constutional battles like the so called Scheckter "Sick
Chicken" case and to the phrase "Court Packing".)




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu
Date: Sun, 12 Sep 93 19:43:29 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: NY cyberspace tax analyses
Message-ID: <9309130236.AA25457@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


These msgs were taken from miscellaneous mailing lists. Most importantly, this
tax does *not* simply affect `phone sex' 900 lines, as a sort of `sin tax' as 
supposed by some. To the contrary, BBSes, online services, even *shareware* 
is affected by the tax.

Authors below report

- BBSes *are* subject if computer & users are in NY
- CompuServe, Prodigy, America Online *subject* to tax (Newsday 9/6)
- SHAREWARE is *taxed* under the rate if downloaded from NY board
- relevant court cases that struck down similar taxes based on 1st amendment
- one person complains of `poor wording' in law -- no kidding.

I propose that a mailing list dedicated to the topics of cyberspatial 
regulation and taxation be created ASAP.

===cut=here===

Date: Sat, 11 Sep 1993 23:01:40 -0400 (EDT)
From: Jean Armour Polly <jpolly@nysernet.ORG>
Subject: Re: NY tax on information services


[...] I called the NYS Tax and Finance folks on Friday and they
faxed me info on this bill.
Briefly (though I am not a lawyer, pun intended), based on a phone
conversation with them:
 There is a tax if
-- the "bbs operator" charges a membership fee AND
-- the host computer is in NYS AND
-- the operator sells to NYS residents.

If the host computer is out of state it does not apply at all.
If the host is in NY but the customer is out of state it does not apply.
If the service is run by a non-profit it does also not apply.

Also, SHAREWARE is affected. If you download shareware and subsequently
send in the registration fee, the software producer has to charge you NYS
tax-- if he's in NY and the customer is in NY. This particular part is
written very poorly IMHO.

Hope this helps. I have the text of the memo and some examples I can send
to you monday if you want.

Best,
JP


Date: Sat, 11 Sep 1993 19:50:35 -0500
From: farber@central.cis.upenn.edu (David Farber)
Subject: NY tax on information services


Russell Nelson writes:
 
>> September 1, 1993  New York Newsday
>> By Joshua Quittner
>>
>>   Starting today, metropolitan New York residents will pay a hefty
>> 13.25% sales tax on information services they get over phones and
>> computers - the highest tax on information services in the country,
>> experts say.
>
> IMHO, this is not true (but it sure makes good press). 
> Reading over the text of the law, it appears to be 
> targetting the 900/800 oral information providers.  It 
> specifically excludes anything customized for the particular 
> user, and it specifically excludes written materials. 
 
Yes, but apparently the New York authorities disagree with you. 
See _Newsday_, 9/6:
 
"    The  Budget  Division  and the Department of Taxation and 
Finance agree that  the  5-percent surcharge also applies to such 
wildly popular computer services  as  CompuServe,  Prodigy  and 
America on Line. So, in addition to taxing  the  poor  souls who 
use those sex-phone services, the new law goes after  a  more 
sophisticated  and  altogether  more resourceful crowd, the 
computer literate."
 
Steve Haynes
 
* Stephen L. Haynes            Internet:  shaynes@research.westlaw.com
* Manager, WESTLAW Research    MCI Mail:  221-3969
*   & Development              Compuserve:  76236,3547
* West Publishing Company      Phone:  612/687-5770
* 610 Opperman Drive           Fax:  612/687-7907
* Eagan, MN  55123


Date: Sat, 11 Sep 93 23:45:14 -0700
From: djb@silverton.berkeley.edu (D. J. Bernstein)
Subject: Taxing the First Amendment

The First Amendment _does_ prohibit taxes aimed at the press.

See, for example, Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233 (1936).
A law whose effect was to impose fees on several large newspapers was
declared void on its face.

This protection is not limited to the press; it is a common theme in 
many First Amendment cases. See, for example, the important case of
Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, footnote 3 (1965): ``Appellant also
challenges the constitutionality of Sec. 6, establishing standards, as
invalid for vagueness under the Due Process Clause; Sec. 11, imposing
fees for the licensing and inspection of a film, as constituting an
invalid tax upon the exercise of freedom of speech; and Sec. 23, 
allowing exemptions to various classes of exhibitors, as denying him
the equal protection of the laws.''

The Supreme Court didn't rule on these issues---it didn't have to,
because it struck down the entire Maryland film censorship statute as an
invalid prior restraint. But Freedman's appeal would probably be a good
model for an attack on the New York cyberspace tax. The latter tax is,
after all, aimed directly at the exercise of freedom of speech, and its
exemptions deny equal protection to certain information providers. (Note
that the aim of a law is judged by its operation and effect, not by the
motives of the legislators, at least for First Amendment purposes.)

---Dan





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Duncan Frissell <frissell@panix.com>
Date: Sun, 12 Sep 93 19:23:29 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: DIGITAL WARFARE
Message-ID: <199309130215.AA07503@panix.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


To: cypherpunks@toad.com

 *************  Original From: FRISSELL
 * FORWARDED *             To: CYPHERPUNKS@TOAD.COM
 *  MESSAGE  *    Date/Number: 09/12/93 - Not Yet Posted
 *************             On: PANIX - 0000 - Email
-----------------------------------------------------------------------

To: cme@ellisun.sw.stratus.com

Here I innocently go away for the weekend and miss a hot thread on my 
favorite topic. Appropriate for the list because it's about what this 
list is about and what the results of its activities might be. Better 
late than never...

CC> I have heard cypherpunks described as two groups under one label:
CC> 1. those of us who advocate privacy in private hands  
CC>
CC> 2. those who advocate anarchy  
CC>
CC> I'm in the privacy camp and worry that
CC> enough talk from the anarchists will cause the privacy to be
CC> attacked.  I fully expect total retaliation by the governments of
CC> the world against any effective anarchy.  The wilder the threats
CC> (even if they're not real), the stronger the retaliation. We could
CC> lose all privacy as a result. 

I try not to advocate anarchy but rather to observe it. It is difficult 
for large institutions to exercise control over ever more powerful 
individuals. Even though I like crypto, it is neither necessary nor 
sufficient for what I'll call "governmental downsizing" to avoid 
controversy. IBM didn't "rightsize" because sweet reason convinced it 
to. It righsized (and is still rightsizing) because markets convinced 
it to. We already see signs of governments becoming mere market actors 
particularly in the currency markets.

The nets themselves are the most powerful technology which will reduce 
the role nation states have to play on the world stage. Crackdowns 
against strong crypto are not relevant. Since the nation state is bound 
to the nation and individuals are not, telecoms tends to liberate 
individuals from states. If I can live anywhere and work anywhere else, 
I am hard to find much less control.

People need not have to even be aware of what they are doing to 
participate in this process. If they are hired as contingent workers 
over the nets because that's where the work is, they will be outside of 
the control mechanism and have to choose to bring themselves back in. 
Some will do so many will not. For years, those who became expats or 
invested money overseas have had to make an affirmative choice to file 
US tax returns or report their overseas income on their returns. Some 
did so. Many did not. 61% of US expats don't file US returns even 
though most have income. Everyone on the nets is effectively an expat. 

According to IRS studies, only *48%* of the income of small businesses 
is reported. Those are businesses physically located in the US. Since 
computers will be converting most of us into small business operators 
(selling ourselves as permanent temps at least) and since the nets 
encourage locational ambiguity, we will have to choose to cooperate with 
our rulers. What do we call a "voluntary government"? A church, a social 
club, a corporation, or a family but not (according to *my* poli sci 
profs) a government. "An institution that claims a monopoly on the 
legitimate use of physical force in a given geographic area."

Note that by the end of this year, some Continental Cable subscribers 
will have 100 mbs connections to Internet. Once more people do and they 
find that they can buy/obtain almost anything digitizable (including 
"free" international telephone calls) over this link, they will do so. 
They will have expanded their area of freedom by downloading porno from 
Zimbabwae (or whatever from wherever). A few more expansions of liberty 
and the state is reduced to just another club.

CC> For example, crypto-anarchic banks -- cute idea -- but if
CC> you ever want a cop to make your banker give you the money, the
CC> banker can't be anonymous and neither can you account be.

Bankers don't give you your money because of fear of cops but because of 
the desire for future business.

Duncan Frissell

What is the world's most toxic hazardous waste dump? -- Watch this 
signature line for the surprising answer.
 * RM 1.2  * Eval Day 1 * X
              




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Peter Wayner <pcw@access.digex.net>
Date: Sun, 12 Sep 93 19:29:27 PDT
To: pmetzger@lehman.com
Subject: Re: Digital warfare
Message-ID: <199309130223.AA24415@access.digex.net>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



People who are skeptical about Perry Metzeger's claim about
tax avoidance might want to look at the files of Dave Dinkins,
the mayor of New York. I believe that he failed to file for 
something like 12 years. Yet, the machine runs on in that city....

-Peter




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Sandy <72114.1712@CompuServe.COM>
Date: Sun, 12 Sep 93 20:04:28 PDT
To: <cypherpunks@toad.com>
Subject: A CYPHERPUNK VISION
Message-ID: <930913025413_72114.1712_FHF93-1@CompuServe.COM>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
  SANDY SANDFORT               Reply to:  ssandfort@attmail.com
 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Cypherpunks,

At the Bay Area physical meeting on Saturday, I gave a slightly
longer version of the following presentation.  Please make sure
you read the "call to arms" at the end.  Uncle Sandy wants you.

 S a n d y

>>>>>>    Please send e-mail to:  ssandfort@attmail.com    <<<<<<


                            *   *   *

                       A CYPHERPUNK VISION


We are fond of saying, "Cypherpunks write code," but what does
that really mean?  "Writing code" isn't just programming.  To me,
it is a metaphor for direct, personal action.  That's what Phil
Zimmermann did when he wrote the code for PGP.  But, it is also
what John Gilmore did when he sued the NSA.

Cypherpunks don't wait for other people to grant them freedom or
privacy; they do it themselves.  They use their wits and talents
to create innovative defenses and bold counter-attacks.  Cypher-
punks are the ultimate practitioners of "self-help."

So what should YOU do, to be a "real" Cypherpunk?  The answer is:
Whatever interests you.

Are you good with electronics?  How about breadboarding a voice
compressor/encrypter.

Can you write code?  Maybe you can make a Windows shell for PGP.

Mathematically inclined?  Tweak the algorithms.  Find the weak-
nesses; find the improvements.

Do you have a flare for writing?  Write articles or stories that
popularize the Cypherpunk world-view.

Is business or law your cup of tea?  Start a privacy consultation
business and make a buck while fighting the good fight.

Whatever you WANT to do, is what you SHOULD do.  There is more
work to be done than Cypherpunks to do it.  Any area of the
struggle that is important to you, is also important to others.
The battle for freedom and privacy is a target-rich environment.
As Marine general "Chesty" Puller said when he was told that the
North Koreans had surrounded his position, "Great, we've got them
right where we want them.  We can fire in any direction!"

So where have I decided to fire?

As many of you know, I have a background in the law and offshore
business.  Naturally, I want apply that training and experience
to fighting the technological threats to freedom and privacy that
gave rise to the Cypherpunks.  To that end, I give you my vision:
A Bank in Cyberspace.


A BANK IN CYBERSPACE

Protecting one's privacy is nothing new.  For hundreds of years,
people have protected their wealth and financial privacy by
transnationalizing themselves.  In today's world, this means
"offshore" banks and other international techniques.  In simple
terms, by diversifying internationally, you can "forum shop" for
the best deals offered by each country's laws.  Since all nations
are in competition for foreign capital, one can be played off
against another.

Low taxes and banking secrecy are two services even the poorest
of countries can offer.  As a result, tax, banking and privacy
havens are quite numerous and affordable.  Take your pick.

The trouble is, tax haven banks are often located in the world's
backwaters.  Using them just isn't convenient for most people.
The obvious answer is technology, but bankers, being conserva-
tive, have failed to plumb its enormous potential.  It's time for
a change--a Cypherpunk change.

To that end, I am introducing The Internet Digital Security Bank
and Escrow, the first bank founded in cyberspace.  The Bank would
offer interest bearing checking accounts to the 10-15 million
Internet users, plus anyone else with access to e-mail.  Unlike
traditional banks, there would be no paper checks.  All checks
would be written as encrypted and digitally signed e-mail
messages.  In the future, digital cash would also be made
available to Bank customers.

The escrow services of the Bank would be used to protect both
parties to electronic business exchanges.  The escrow services
would facilitate a wide variety of anonymous transactions.

A team of entrepreneurs, computer programers, lawyers and
financiers is currently being assembled.  If you would like to
participate in this project, please contact: Sandy Sandfort,
ssandfort@attmail.com.  Please include your resume or other info
about your education, skills and interests.

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: frc%bwnmr4@harvard.harvard.edu (Fred Cooper)
Date: Sun, 12 Sep 93 21:23:30 PDT
To: 72114.1712@CompuServe.COM (Sandy)
Subject: Re: A CYPHERPUNK VISION
In-Reply-To: <930913025413_72114.1712_FHF93-1@CompuServe.COM>
Message-ID: <9309130416.AA23342@bwnmr4.harvard.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

Sandy wrote:

> Can you write code?  Maybe you can make a Windows shell for PGP.

	I said this once before, in private email so I'll repeat it here for
the everybody: I'm working on a windows shell for PGP, as well as a
pgp.dll for filemanager extensions and supporting drag and drop
encryption.  I say, give me about 1 month or so (I've got a app to deliver
for my real job too) and I'll have stuff that's ready to be tested.  I'll
start accpeting beta test volunteers now if anybody wants to speak up.





-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.3a

iQCVAgUBLJP0G7bAlE4AqlTZAQFvtgQAjiBanwpGrRxHst4dINjfzmr1Jsa0IkTS
YK2QuOE1ichjoLkVbHM/zCbVIaK6UXw0P9dGdD19n5zL3m2WbUYHXhSax875uwmg
TAuMNxpvK17oM6i/WFonshGDQJAwjLjtcMM9lnj3J1cPr7MfGiP68TkODeyKORyz
gIjM2K5U+aA=
=8b9Z
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Andrew Corradini/SBDC <Andrew.Corradini@m.cc.utah.edu>
Date: Mon, 13 Sep 93 00:28:34 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: WACO: FBI & BATF used *flamethrower*?!
In-Reply-To: <9309130301.AA07960@anon.penet.fi>
Message-ID: <Pine.3.05.9309130107.C22738-b100000@u.cc.utah.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


On Mon, 13 Sep 1993 an12070@anon.penet.fi wrote:
> 
> edited, from alt.activism
> 
> ===
> 
> This editorial was in the Arizona of 8/22. It was written by
> William P. Cheshire, Senior Editorial Columnist.

Oddly enough, this distribution, then, violates Mr. Cheshire's copyright.
'Spose that's one reason the author used the anonymous service.
Unfortunately, not too many people think that protecting the rights of
someone who created original written work is unreasonable government
intrusion. I think even the FF's believed in intellectual property rights.

> LOOKING BEYOND THE WACO SMOKE
>    An anonymous tipster sent me a videotape the other day
> describing in startling detail the government's shootout, siege
> and ultimate destruction - possibly deliberate - of the Branch
> Davidian compound outside Waco, Texas.

etc. etc., lots of "our gubment was doing something Wrong".

Can someone tell me, please, what the HELL this has to do with
cryptography, privacy, digital signatures, digital cash, or ANYTHING
except a particular political discussion? BLOODY NOTHING, that's what. If
I wanted to receive messages about police and military ethics (or idiocy),
I'd subscribe to a bazillion newsgroups like alt.talk.politics,
alt.conspiracy, etc. NOT THIS ONE!

Suppose that's another reason the poster used the anonymous server.

Like I said, folks, topics exist for a reason. This post was so far off
the mark as to be obvious even to the most dyslexic Prozac-addict in
southern California. PLEASE don't clutter up newsgroups with stuff that
don't belong. Note that it was grabbed from alt.activism -- where it DOES
belong ... and should have stayed.

(NOTE: can anyone else think of a GOOD reason for it to have been anon'd? ;-)

Makes you wish for an anon service that detects bull-headedness and blind
idealism -- and nukes it.

Andrew






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: an12070@anon.penet.fi
Date: Sun, 12 Sep 93 20:08:30 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: WACO: FBI & BATF used *flamethrower*?!
Message-ID: <9309130301.AA07960@anon.penet.fi>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



edited, from alt.activism

===

This editorial was in the Arizona of 8/22. It was written by
William P. Cheshire, Senior Editorial Columnist.

LOOKING BEYOND THE WACO SMOKE

   An anonymous tipster sent me a videotape the other day
describing in startling detail the government's shootout, siege
and ultimate destruction - possibly deliberate - of the Branch
Davidian compound outside Waco, Texas.
   The tape is the production of Linda D. Thompson, an
Indianapolis lawyer who traveled to Waco to protest the
government's initial assault on the compound, which left four
agents dead, and now devotes most of her time to investigating
how 80 or so people died 50 days later when the place was
torched.
   According to agents of the FBI and the Bureau of Alcohol,
Tobacco, and Firearms, the followers of guru David Koresh set
fire to their own building when it was stormed by tanks and a
small army of heavily armed governments agents.  But the
videotape, assembled from the government's own film, clearly
shows one of the tanks crashing into the building, then backing
out again, fire belching from its turret.

EYEWITNESSES LACKING

   This received virtually no publicity because the media were
kept under wraps.  On a story of this magnitude, reporters and
cameramen normally would have been on the scene providing first-
hand coverage.  But in this instance the press acquiesced in
extraordinary restraints.
   Search and arrest warrants were sealed, and when government
agents settled down for what was to be a seven-week siege, the
press was allowed to get no closer than two miles from the Branch
Davidian compound.
   As the tanks rolled and the feds broke out their grenades and
submachine guns for the final assault on April 19, reporters and
cameramen gathered behind distant roadblocks, waiting for
government handouts.  Miles away the compound was being burned to the ground.
   A school board can't meet in secret without the media going
ballistic, Thompson says, but here the government conducted a
massive armored assault on civilians, unencumbered by witnesses.
  "I'm very discouraged that reporters weren't being more
aggressive in Waco," Phil Record, ombudsman for the Fort Worth
Star-Telegram, told Mark Holmberg of the Rutherford Institute in
Charlottesville, VA.  "If there had been a few neutral eyes up
there, I would feel much better about it".
   Thompson is more blunt. "Reporters sucked up everything the
ATF and FBI told them," she says.  "They're a bunch of weenies
and sheep.  None of them had the guts to ask challenging
questions or the intelligence to ask constitutional questions."

FLAME THROWER IDENTIFIED

   I reached Thompson by phone at the American Justice
Federation, a civil liberties group she operates.  She now has
identified the tank seen backing out of the Branch Davidian
building, she told me.
   "It was an M67A1 tank manufactured by Chrysler," she said.
This tank, equipped with a flamethrower, is no longer in service
and, according to Thompson, had to be taken from "the graveyard"
for the Waco assignment.  The clear implication is that the
government deliberately set fire to the Branch Davidian compound,
killing some 17 children and 69 adults.
   I asked how she found out about the M67A1, a little-know
weapon to which even Jane's Armour and Artillery gives only brief
mention. "The driver who drove it from Fort Hood called me," she said.
   At the end of the Waco madness, President Clinton said the
Branch Davidians had "burned themselves up" - and allegation
that, in the light of Linda Thompson's allegations, Congress
needs to investigate.
   Already, The Washington Post reports, the Waco embarrassment
has prompted a major reshuffle at the ATF.  Some officials may be
forced to retire, the Post says, and the chief of the
intelligence division could be denied "future promotions."
   Such punishments seem hardly proportionate.
   As a consequence of the Rodney King beating in Los Angeles,
two police officers were tried for the assault and acquitted,
then tried again for civil rights violations and sentenced to two
and a half years in the federal penitentiary.
   How is it that federal agents responsible for the death of
more than 80 men, women and children may be permitted to retire
or even to keep their present jobs?

-------------------------------------------------------------------------
To find out more about the anon service, send mail to help@anon.penet.fi.
Due to the double-blind, any mail replies to this message will be anonymized,
and an anonymous id will be allocated automatically. You have been warned.
Please report any problems, inappropriate use etc. to admin@anon.penet.fi.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: jet@netcom.com (J. Eric Townsend)
Date: Sun, 12 Sep 93 22:53:32 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: alt.politics.org.[cia,nsa] and anon posting
Message-ID: <9309130545.AA24211@netcom3.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain




would one of the anon posting/remailer gurus post a faq to one of
these groups?  They could probably use it.

-eric




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Michael Kelly Larsen <mlarsen@cisco.com>
Date: Mon, 13 Sep 93 08:23:39 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: unsubscribe
Message-ID: <199309131516.AA27525@lager.cisco.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


unscubscribe




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Patrick M. Fitzgerald" <pmfitzge@fitz.b30.ingr.com>
Date: Mon, 13 Sep 93 07:43:39 PDT
To: frc%bwnmr4@harvard.harvard.edu (Fred Cooper)
Subject: PGP front-ends
In-Reply-To: <9309130416.AA23342@bwnmr4.harvard.edu>
Message-ID: <199309131435.AA10756@fitz.b30.ingr.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


frc%bwnmr4@harvard.harvard.edu (Fred Cooper) writes:
> 
> > Can you write code?  Maybe you can make a Windows shell for PGP.
> 
> I said this once before, in private email so I'll repeat it here for
> the everybody: I'm working on a windows shell for PGP [...]

Fred:

How about sending me a snapshot of your gui...
I might be up for making one on the Amiga.
Any Amiga users on the list?

Is there a front-end for X?
--
Patrick M. Fitzgerald, pmfitzge@ingr.com             ______
                                                    / ___  )
  On two occasions I have been asked [by members   / __)/ /__
  of Parliament!], 'Pray, Mr. Babbage, if you     (_/it(_____)
  put into the machine wrong figures, will the
  right answers come out?'  I am not able rightly to apprehend
  the kind of confusion of ideas that could provoke such a
  question.  - Charles Babbage




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Peter Wayner <pcw@access.digex.net>
Date: Mon, 13 Sep 93 07:19:52 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Stegno and DAT and digital music...
Message-ID: <199309131414.AA07464@access.digex.net>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



In this week's Sunday NYT, Hans Fantel, their music guy, writes
at length about the new "dithered" CD's and how the guys have
improved the sound. He says that the original CD format was
limited to 16 bits of sound because of costs. But many audiophiles
reacted very negatively to the tinny, metalic quality to the music.
For this reason, the companies have developed 20 bit DAT recording
tape and then come up with ways to "dither" this into 16 bits. 

I am curious if anyone knows the details of these algorithms. 

Also, his point suggests that flipping the least significant 
bit of 16 bit music may not be imperceptable to some ears. If
the classical music starts to sound tinny then there might be
something subversive in the least significant bits. 

-Peter Wayner







From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: geoffw@nexsys.net (Geoff White)
Date: Mon, 13 Sep 93 12:49:41 PDT
To: pmetzger@lehman.com
Subject: Re: The "Cypherpunk Melting Pot"
Message-ID: <9309131740.AA04418@nexsys.nexsys.net>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> 
> Anonymous says:
> > Bullshit. Privacy is not inherently subversive at all. If you
> > take the time to browse back through the Bill of Rights, you might
> > recognize this paragraph -
> >  
> >                      ARTICLE IV
> >  
> >     The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
> > houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and
> > seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but
> > upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and
> > particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or
> > things to be seized.
> 
> I'll point out something about the history of that line most people
> forget.
> 
> Our fine nation was founded by drug smugglers. The drug in question
> was Rum, admittedly, but none the less, the point remains -- the
> revolutionary war was financed by big time criminals like John Hancock
> who made their money in smuggling contraband and other similar acts.
> They made sure that the constitution they got was supportive of their
> particular business interests. History teachers don't like pointing
> this sort of thing out, but its none the less true. 

My "social studies" teacher from 7 - 9th grade, Mr. Codianni made sure we knew
this! (This was around 1968/69 so the System was being stress on all ends)
We had a textbook for american history that was made up completely of primary
and secondary sources.  It was obvious to me early on that the main reasons
for the american revolution were economic as opposed to some overwhelming
altruism. All of the founding fathers had a lot at stake but would also
make a bundle if they could just get rid of that middleman (King George III)




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Date: Mon, 13 Sep 93 11:33:42 PDT
To: Cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Cypherpunks--Where Do We Go From 	Here?
Message-ID: <9309131826.AA18811@netcom.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



This long posting summarizes the recent meeting and includes my own
presentation to the meeting.

Our physical meeting on Saturday in Mountain View, CA was very successful,
with 35 people in attendance, most of them in the same room at the same
time for the whole 6 hours (this is not always the case!). The best
attendance we've ever had, or at least equalling the crowd we had for the
special emergency meeting following the Clipper announcement. I think we
all knew the importance of the one-year anniversary and the need to think
carefully about our future direction (modulo the fact, pun intended, that
we are an organizational anarchy, with little structure, diverse
viewpoints, and no compelling reason to get more organized).

Eric Hughes began the meeting shortly after noon. Speakers included myself,
Sandy Sandfort, Nick Szabo, Dean Tribble, Whit Diffie, Russell Brand, John
Gilmore, and others (I apologize to anyone I left out, as I was taking
minutes of the meeting and so am relying just on my recollection).

Rather than attempt to recap all that was said--and a lot gets said in six
hours!--it's best that folks give their own summaries of what they said, or
what others said, whatever. And they can post their handouts if they have
them available in the right format...Sandy has already done this, for
example.

Just for quick orientation, here were some of the main themes:

* GOALS. Where we have been, where we are, and where we are going. Has
progress stalled, after the early results with Phil Zimmermann's PGP and
with our Cypherpunks remailers? (We concluded we are mostly in a useful
consolidation phase, digesting the early gains as we contemplate future
directions in better remailers, digital postage and money, steganography,
etc.)

* POLITICS. We touched on the political aspects, especially since the
"privacy, not anarchy" thread had just the List the few days before the
meeting. The consensus was s friendly realization that we would not be
resolving anything politically, that the socialists and Hayekians may
interpret the world differently, but still agree on the need for strong
cryptography. (Folks should appreciate that the physical meetings are very
friendly affairs, generally much less contentious than the List can be at
times...I wonder what this says about our ideas for anonymous networks?
Just something to think about.)

* "TAZ." Eric Hughes read a long selection from Hakim Bey's ("not his real
name") "TAZ," published in 1990, and excerpted in "Mondo 2000" a while
back. "TAZ" was published/helped by Dave Mandl, one of our New York City
list members ("New York City?...get a rope!"). TAZ stands for "temporary
autonomous zones," a kind of crypto anarchy, albeit with more of
postmodernist, literary slant than what we have been pitching. (Our
developments were independent, as I had seen only the Mondo excerpt, and
that only a couple of years ago, while my "Crypto Anarchist Manifesto" was
distributed in 1988.)

* BANKS. Digital banks, offshore banking, and possible projects that are
starting up. Sandy Sandfort presented material on this. There is real
interest in this. We may have "Caymans Cypherpunks" or "Bahamas
Cypherpunks" meetings before long.

* SPECULATIVE PROJECTS. Nick Szabo presented a list of possible projects,
which he recently posted to the list. Things like "the Internet Casino"
(betting markets), data havens, and so on.

* PRIVACY. Judi Clark, active in the Computers, Freedom and Privacy
Conference and other Bay Area computer privacy groups, asked us for inputs
to some lectures being arranged. She asked what a "secure network" should
be, in terms of privacy. Ideas would fill a post by themselves, but were,
as I remember them: voluntary disclosure of data (you tell only what you
want made available), self-enforcement as much as possible, limited root
access to systems, encryption of links whenever possible, etc. (I'm doing a
poor job of summarizing this brainstorming session, though.)

* PATENTS. Russell Brand, a computer scientist now attending law school,
gave a 90-minute lecture on intellectual property law, with special
attention to the cloud of RSA patents (set to expire 1998-2002).  

* LAWSUITS. John Gilmore spoke briefly about his FOIA lawsuits against the
NSA and NIST (especially over the failure to produce Clipper decision
documents in a timely fashion, as spelled out in the FOIA procedures) and
advised us that some important hearings are coming up in San Francisco in
the next month or so. He'll tell the List when the exact dates are.

* NEW LANGUAGES. Dean Tribble updated us on "Joule," the secure
language/operating system he and others are working on. (One of his
associates, Norm Hardy, once worked for IBM on the "Harvest" computer
installed at NSA in the early 60s, and detailed in Bamford's "The Puzzle
Palace." Norm will give a presentation on Harvest at the next Cypherpunks
meeting.)

* MISC. Mark Miller strongly praised the "Metro" cover story on "Code
Warriors" (the Julian Dibbell piece), noting that two major stories on
Cypherunks ("Wired" cover as well) had used the American flag as a motif
and had implied that strong crypto and privacy are fundamental American
values and that we are cypherpatriots.

Several newcomers (Sameer Parekh, Harry Bartholomew, Doug Merritt, others I
apologize to for not mentioning). There was a general feeling that the
importance of crypto is becoming more and more apparent every day.

We've come a long way this past year.


After the meeting, we adjourned to the Applewood Inn in Menlo Park for
pizza, a break from the usual Chinese or Thai food. After this, several
Cypherpunks were seen across the street in the huge Kepler's Books, some
even buying the latest issue of "Wired" despite the fact that cryptography
inexplicably went from the being #1 on the "Hot" list to not even being
listed in this issue! (I guess crypto is being retired from contention, out
of fairness to things like virtual reality and body piercings!)

........

Included below is the presentation I gave at the meeting. I also presented
a detailed PERT chart graph of important milestones on the way to long
range goals. I regret that this ASCII format is too limited to contain it,
to paraphrase a French mathematician in the news lately. (Don't ask for
PostScript versions...the effort of getting everything right in
transmission is unwarranted by the chart.)

I apologize for the occassional word wrap seen here, as I used an outliner
to generate the material and the line lengths sometimes are too long.


Cypherpunks--Where Do We Go From 
Here?


        I.  Difficult to Set Directions

                A.  an anarchy...no centralized control

                B.  everyone has some axe to grind, some 
                temporary set of priorities

                C.  little economic motivation (and most 
                have other jobs)


        II.  Past, Present, Future

                A.  Where We've Been

                        1.  successful mailing list and monthly 
                        meetings

                        2.  spread of crypto: Cypherpunks have 
                        helped (PGP)...publicity, an alternative 
                        forum to sci.crypt

                        3.  remailers, encrypted remailers

                        4.  ideas for perl scripts, mail handlers

                        5.  general discussion, with folks of 
                        several political persuasions

                        6.  concepts: pools, ILF, BlackNet

                B.  Where We Are Now

                        1.  Stalled?

                                a)  crypto protocols are hard to build, 
                                analyze, deploy

                                b)  little incentive for people to put 
                                incredible efforts in (unless they're 
                                researchers in the field)....look at 
                                effort just for PGP

                                c)  Has the "low-hanging fruit" already 
                                been picked?

                        2.  Need to Decide on Nature of 
                        Cypherpunks

                C.  Where We Could Go in the Future

                        1.  Privacy Emphasis

                        2.  Tools and Techniques Emphasis

                        3.  Education and Lobbying Emphasis

                        4.  Possible Directions

                                a)  Crypto Tools...make them ubiquitous 
                                "enough" so that the genie can't be 
                                put back in the bottle

                                        (1)  can worry about the politics later 
                                        (socialists vs. anarchocapitalists,
etc.)

                                        (2)  develop and deploy a variety
of tools

                                        (3)  attempt to implement as many 
                                        "research" tools as possible

                                        (4)  Commercial Opportunities!

                                b)  Education

                                        (1)  educating the masses about crypto, 
                                        public forums

                                        (2)  this was picked by the 
                                        Cambridge/MIT group as their special 
                                        interest

                                c)  Politics and Lobbying

                                        (1)  talking to Congressional aides and 
                                        committee staffers, attending 
                                        hearings, submitting briefs on 
                                        proposed legislation

                                        (2)  coordinating with EFF, CPSR, ACLU, 
                                        etc.

                                        (3)  this was picked by the Washington 
                                        group as their special interest, which 
                                        is compellingly appropriate (Calif. 
                                        group is simply too far away)

                                d)  Legal Challenges

                                        (1)  lawsuits against Skipjack, FOIA 
                                        requests, etc.


        III.  The Heart and Soul of Cypherpunks?

                A.  Competing Goals:

                        1.  Personal Privacy

                                a)  PGP, integration with mailers

                                b)  education

                        2.  Reducing the Power of Institutions

                                a)  whistleblowers group

                                b)  Chaum-style credentials (vs. national 
                                ID cards, etc.)

                        3.  Crypto Anarchy

                B.  Common Purposes (beyond ideology)

                        1.  Spreading strong crypto tools and 
                        knowledge

                                a)  PGP

                        2.  Fighting government restrictions and 
                        regulations

                                a)  Clipper/Skipjack fight was a unifying 
                                experience

                        3.  Exploring new directions in cryptology

                                a)  digital mixes, digital cash, voting

                                b)  no other groups are trying all that 
                                we're trying


        IV.  Thesis: Strong crypto is a good thing

                A.  Tool against governments of all 
                flavors, left and right

                B.  Religious freedom

                C.  Free speech

                D.  Personal choice


        V.  Thesis: Crypto can become 
        unstoppable if critical mass is reached

                A.  analogy: the Net...too scattered, too 
                many countries, too many degrees of 
                freedom

                B.  so scattered that attempts to outlaw 
                strong crypto will be futile...no 
                bottlenecks, no "mountain passes" (in 
                a race to the pass, beyond which the 
                expansion cannot be halted except by 
                extremely repressive means)


        VI.  The Path to Crypto Anarchy-A 
        Personal View

                A.  Uses:

                        1.  remailers, anonymity

                        2.  digital cash, for privacy and for tax 
                        evasion

                        3.  data havens, bootleg medical 
                        treatments, information markets

                        4.  bookies, betting, numbers games, 
                        smuggling, tax evasion

                        5.  religious networks (digital 
                        confessionals)

                        6.  crimes, digital hits

                B.  Increasing Personal Privacy (under 
                attack, of course)

                C.  Increasing Connectivity--networks, 
                links, speeds

                D.  Privacy + Connectivity = Beyond 
                Control of Governments or Institutions 
                = Crypto Anarchy



PERT chart was included at this point.

--
Timothy C. May         | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,  
tcmay@netcom.com       | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
408-688-5409           | knowledge, reputations, information markets, 
W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA  | black markets, collapse of governments.
Higher Power: 2^756839 | Public Key: by arrangement
Note: I put time and money into writing this posting. I hope you enjoy it.      







From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Alan Hunter <ah@dunaad.co.uk>
Date: Mon, 13 Sep 93 04:13:36 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: SUBSCRIBE
Message-ID: <Pine.3.07.9309131128.A598-6100000@coilabus>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain




Please
SUBSCRIBE A.Hunter@dunaad.co.uk

Thanks





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: norm@netcom.com (Norman Hardy)
Date: Mon, 13 Sep 93 13:13:43 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Stegno and DAT and digital music...
Message-ID: <9309132007.AA13469@netcom3.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


The DAT coding is 16 bit fixed point. The lowest bit always has
the same value which is nearly 90 db below the loudest sound.
This is perceptible when it is the only signal as is demonstrated 
in CD demonstrator disks. A steganographer might merely not put
data in quiet passages. Alternatively he could plausibly claim that
it was caused by a gentle breeze outside the recording studio. In the
later case he should add some noise to the next to bottom bit,
or generate and add some -85 db white noise and then replace the
bottom bit.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: remailer@netcom.com
Date: Mon, 13 Sep 93 13:24:41 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: PGPcompose (pgpc) 2.0 *just* finished.
Message-ID: <9309132014.AA13699@mail.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

At  3:33 AM 9/12/93 -0600, CVL staff member Nate Sammons wrote:
>PGPcompose 2.0 is available for ftp from 129.82.156.104 (the macintosh
>in my dorm room... ;-) in /pub/pgpc it's all of 11K, so don't sweat
>the bandwidth!

What does it run on? Should I assume UNIX is the default here?

>  -will keep you fron doing stupid things, like . . .
>   signing a message and then sending it
>   through the remailers or through anon.penet.fi, etc...

This ain't so stupid if you're using a digital pseudonym and encrypt at least the first remailer hop.

Eternal Optimist
Eternal!Optimist@anon.penet.fi
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.3

iQCVAgUBLJSPwojvfLxJbYYtAQGP8wP8CFhd2hNdP3aUlFYzL56LbilfKn8X2uQj
BZEkg3oIXmvwdxC2yWQaujkP0A5AvVCnWdbGyjB4/u7wo48B4cnw3j6zXykHCj8n
D6OfmpLrqMpGvfkfgGtuZBC7MItM7GqgZpHq1Cv0RzjG7X59n+pHORfVLTGLTxWJ
070ugKm5PvY=
=YS2x
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Bill Garland <bill@kean.ucs.mun.ca>
Date: Mon, 13 Sep 93 09:33:39 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: subscribe
Message-ID: <009727C5.3ECD6DC0.10692@Leif.ucs.mun.ca>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Please add me to your mailing list.
Thanks.

Bill Garland

bill@kean.ucs.mun.ca




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: nate@VIS.ColoState.EDU
Date: Mon, 13 Sep 93 12:58:43 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: pgpc 2.1 available
Message-ID: <9309131950.AA05516@nagel.VIS.ColoState.EDU>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

pcpc (was PGPcompose) 2.1 is available for anonymous
ftp from 129.82.156.104 in /pub/pgpc

it's in your choice of regular UNIX compress or the
new gnuzip format...

Adds the ability to mail through anon.penet.fi
and then send the mail on through remailers galore.

Special thnaks to stig@netcom.com for pointing out
lots of problems, and for even re-writing some of
the code (specifically the remailer selection piece).

Uh, that's it.  Have fun, and mail me if you like it.

                 -nate sammons
                  nate@vis.colostate.edu


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.3a

iQCVAgUBLJTO9dTgi1fmrpxlAQFTUwP8DIcrJNOYE1JwmgJi8giQfBEg/fBGZ7m7
NI30N8iKBWonTU1OT0OehAKQOj++mHQ2faSjabGq6K8F8UjDKfMxykABrr6LQIaK
LRnZER9H/RA0CBpgpL6kN7l4J3gn7RDCS449lBfV1pGucgzN9aSUM0B7UQry+mXN
kRtAbTDHzTE=
=g2an
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: gtoal@an-teallach.com (Graham Toal)
Date: Mon, 13 Sep 93 12:29:40 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: ... long live DES (sic)
Message-ID: <9118@an-teallach.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


In article <"21031101903991/16267 David.D.L.LANDGREN@pub.oecd.fr writes:
 > It's all very well to be able to crack DES in 3.5 hours, but I don't know
 > of too many people who obligingly send out the plaintext and cyphertext of
 > a message together, or in some other way combinable.  If U can get the

It may ostensibly be a known-plaintext crack, but with a tiny addition
of chips to recognise cleartext, fixed markers like the run in to a 
compressed file or mail file, or generally less than random output,
it ceases to be so.  Such chips already exist.

G
-- 
Personal mail to gtoal@gtoal.com (I read it in the evenings)
Business mail to gtoal@an-teallach.com (Be careful with the spelling!)
Faxes to An Teallach Limited: +44 31 662 4678  Voice: +44 31 668 1550 x212





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: sameer@netcom.com (Sameer Parekh)
Date: Mon, 13 Sep 93 20:49:47 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: testing remailers, the keys for my remailers
Message-ID: <9309140343.AA15529@netcom.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


	Has anyone written or is someone writing a script which will
take a list of remailers, and ping each of them to see if they are
working, both encrypted and unencrypted? If no one has taken on that
task, I'd be willing to do it.. I'll list here the remailers for whom
I have the keys for... if another remailer exists which I don't know
about please send me the key.
	(Also-- here's the keys for my remailers...)


Type bits/keyID   Date       User ID
pub  1024/69464F 1993/09/11  Sameer's Remailer <sameer@soda.berkeley.edu>
pub  1024/9E3311 1993/09/02  Sameer's Remailer <sameer@netcom.com>
pub  1024/567449 1993/09/01  Sameer's Remailer <cs60a-qu@cory.EECS.Berkeley.EDU>
pub   512/64E8A7 1993/03/05  Remailing Service <remailer@dis.org>
                              Anonymous Remailer <remailer@utter.dis.org>
pub  1024/02C389 1993/06/07  Anonymous <remail@tamsun.tamu.edu>
                             Anonymous <remail@tamaix.tamu.edu>
pub  1024/DB04AB 1993/05/05  Mr. Remailer <elee6ue@rosebud.ee.uh.edu>
pub  1024/BA80A9 1992/11/26  Remailer (remailer@rebma.mn.org)
pub  1024/7B47C3 1993/01/20  Anonymous Remailer <phantom@mead.u.washington.edu>
pub  1024/EBCC89 1993/04/27  Cypherpunk Remailer at <remailer@entropy.linet.org>
pub  1024/B5A32F 1992/12/13  Remailer <remail@extropia.wimsey.com>
pub   510/0BB437 1992/11/12  Remailing Service <hal@alumni.caltech.edu>
pub   510/5620D5 1992/11/15  Remailing Service <hfinney@shell.portal.com>
pub   512/7D154B 1993/04/04  jarthur remailer  c/o <ebrandt@jarthur.claremont.edu>
13 key(s) examined.

-----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----
Version: 2.3a
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=BdhD
-----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----

-- 
Sameer
sameer@netcom.com




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "L. Detweiler" <ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Date: Mon, 13 Sep 93 19:54:46 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: NSA harassing crypto software writer over export (fwd, sci.crypt)
Message-ID: <9309140249.AA25621@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


- NSA harassment alive and well
- is this company a `small fish'? doesn't NSA have something better to do?
- his request is overbroad, but still needs some kind of help
- maybe the laywers on the list can help out too

===cut=here===

From: grady@netcom.com (Grady Ward)
Subject: help me fight NSA
Organization: Moby lexicons
Date: Mon, 13 Sep 1993 23:54:54 GMT


An individual at the NSA has recently been warning
my publisher of Moby Crypto that they will be breaking
the law if they export the product.

Since I do not include any executables, only source
and other documentation that routinely appears in
textbooks that are exported, I think this hasseling 
is unwarranted and unconstitutional.

Since knocking heads with the NSA may result in
some kind of process, I need some assistance to
bolster my case.

What you can do: please send me a reference on every
book or magazine article you are aware of that
contains any 'source code'.  The code can be a fragment
or in any computer language as long as it implements
encryption or other material that would be
export controlled if incoporated in an executable.

I think collecting a large number of these citations
will help my attornies in pointing out the absurdity
of the situation to government attornies if necessary.

Please e-mail any citations that you have.  Thanks
ahead of time.

Grady Ward   grady@netcom.com




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Marc Horowitz <marc@MIT.EDU>
Date: Mon, 13 Sep 93 19:08:48 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: physical security is the weak link
Message-ID: <9309140201.AA10559@milquetoast.MIT.EDU>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


These articles are reposted with permission from the ClariNet
newsgroup clari.tw.computers.  Copyright 1993 by UPI.  For more info,
send mail to info@clarinet.com.

--begin repost

From: clarinews@clarinet.com (UPI)
Subject: Gang hits computer supply firm
Keywords: legal investigations, legal, violent crime, computers,
	manufacturing, corporate products & services, corporate finance
Message-ID: <chiptheftUR419_3S9@clarinet.com>
Date: Thu, 9 Sep 93 20:06:54 EDT

	SANTA CLARA, Calif. (UPI) -- Authorities said a gang of armed men
stormed into a Silicon Valley electronic supply company Thursday,
stealing a large number of valuable computer microprocessors before
fleeing in a van.
	Sgt. Mark Kirby, of the Santa Clara Police Department, said the
business takeover was the second of its kind in a week and took just
five minutes.
	``It's was well planned, they knew exactly what they were looking
for,'' he said. ``Unfortunately, this has become a trend in the Silicon
Valley. We have about one a month.''
	Kirby said the six men rolled up to a loading dock at Wyle Laboratory
Inc. about 9:07 a.m. PDT as if they were going to make a legitimate
pickup. Two armed men then jumped out of the van and ordered the
employees to the floor while four others made their way to a storage
room.
	The police spokesman said a 4-foot-long athletic bag was stuffed with
Intel Corp.'s microprocessors -- the ``brains'' that power most personal
computers -- and then the robbers fled. No shots were fired and no one
was injured. The value of the stolen items was not released.
	The van was recovered empty a short time later. Kirby said it has
since been traced to a Lynwood, Calif., U-Haul dealer and was signed out
on Sept. 4. However, the thieves used a fraudulent driver's license to
rent the vehicle.
	Kirby said the thieves likely were filling an order for the lucrative
black market in computer components.


From: clarinews@clarinet.com (WILLIAM D. MURRAY)
Subject: Violent computer chip takeovers worry officials
Keywords: lawyers, court proceedings, computers, manufacturing,
	corporate products & services, corporate finance
Message-ID: <chipcrimeURa71_3SB@clarinet.com>
Date: Fri, 10 Sep 93 19:33:57 PDT

	SAN JOSE, California (UPI) -- The lucrative trade in computer chips
has captured the attention of the state's street gangs, luring them to
California's Silicon Valley where the armed takeover of supply
warehouses has become a common occurrence, authorities said Friday.
	Julius Finkelstein, deputy district attorney in charge of the Santa
Clara, California, High Tech Crime unit, called the takeovers and the
trade in stolen computer parts ``the gang crime of the 1990s.
	``We see a trend developing here that concerns us,'' he said. ``These
are very violent attacks. Generally, the gang is well armed. It's just a
matter of time before someone get hurt. We consider ourselves lucky that
it hasn't already happened.''
	Finkelstein said gangs were turning their attention to dealing in the
impossible to trace stolen chips.
	``We are seeing a movement away from drugs and into computer chips by
some gangs,'' Finkelstein said. ``This is the coke of the 90's. The
chips have become as valuable pound for pound as cocaine and if you get
caught, the punishment is much less severe.''
	Once the chips are stolen, the district attorney said, they can
change hands as many as 3 or 4 times in 24 hours. Finally, the computer
parts make their way to what is called ``the gray market.
	``It's not really a black market, it's a gray market,'' Finkelstein
said. ``That's because it's really not illegal. It made up of suppliers
who legitimately buy their chips and those that get them from the gangs.
''
	The whole system is powered by the marketplace itself. Computer chip
manufacturers like Intel Corp. cannot keep pace with the demand for
their microprocessors -- the ``brains'' that power most personal
computers.
	So they place companies on an allotment system, forcing those
computer manufacturers to turn to the gray market to fill their orders.
	The chips are also almost impossible to trace. There is no encoding
on them to identify them individually. There is a system that shows who
manufactured the chips and what day they were manufactured.
	``The only way we can generally catch these thieves is to be tipped
off,'' Finkelstein said. ``We do prosecute some of these cases, but they
are extremely difficult. There is really no way to trace these products.
''
	The latest takeover robbery occurred Thursday when six masked gunmen
stormed into Wyle Laboratory Inc. in Santa Clara and in a matter of five
minutes had stolen thousands of dollars worth of Intel CPU
microprocessors.
	Sgt. Mark Kirby, of the Santa Clara Police Department, said the
robbery was the second of its kind in a week. He added that the area is
averaging at least one of these armed takeovers a month.
	``It was well planned, they knew exactly what they were looking for,''
he said. ``Unfortunately, this has become a trend in the Silicon Valley.
''
	However, Kirby said this one was different -- it was the first pulled
off a gang of black gunmen. The robbers abandoned van was discovered
later in the day Thursday and traced to Lynwood, California, a location
frequented by the Los Angeles gangs.

--end repost

If people are willing to go to these measures to steal Intel
microprocessors, which are generally available, imagine what people
will do in order to steal unprogrammed Skipjack chips.  In the volume
the Government would like to see them made, the physical security
which one might want to give to a classified production facility will
be difficult or impossible.

		Marc




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Timothy Newsham <newsham@wiliki.eng.hawaii.edu>
Date: Tue, 14 Sep 93 01:45:08 PDT
To: thug@phantom.com (Murdering Thug)
Subject: Re: warez garbage cluttering  the  screen
In-Reply-To: <m0ocVHw-0009HYC@mindvox.phantom.com>
Message-ID: <9309140844.AA04655@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> 
> 1) The fl0w of wArEz keeps the universe in perfect harmony.  Without wArEz
> there would be no life as we know it.  And just because you are a rich fat
> fuck who can afford to plunk down $795 for a copy of Pagemaker, you
> shouldn't take a moral stance against those who cannot afford such
> extortion yet need these software tools to keep up technologically with
> rich fat fucks like yourself. 

If you think prices are outrageous, let the software manufacturers know.
Let your friends know,  let everyone know.  The reason they charge such
prices is because they can.  The reason they can is because people let
them.  Even better, support free software alternatives, and get your
friends to do the same.  

> 2) wArEz have A LOT to do with Cypherpunks.  Software, pirated or
> otherwise has value, and as such it must be considered as a form of
> digital money.  One may trade encrypted wArEz anonymously over anonymous
> mailing lists, FSP/FTP sites, newsgroups like the proposed alt.waste, and
> BlackNet.  wArEz _are_ digital gold coins, they have inherent value,
> unlike useless encrypted random number certificates advocated by others. 

warez has little to do with cypherpunks other than the fact that
warez dewds can use crypto technology to help protect themselves
against overly strict and mostly industry driven laws against
piracy.  Warez is used more as an electronic ego booster than
a currency.

> 3) I don't give a flying fuck if you pay for your DL time.  If you're
> stupid enough to be using AOL as your Internet port of entry, then you
> deserve to be ripped off by Compuserve's evil bastard cousin.  Why don't
> you point and click yourself a new brain, and join a flat-rate system like
> Netcom or any of the hundred other public access internet sites. Support the
> small entrepreneurs instead of those lazy fat bastard nazi censors at AOL.

support the cause you believe in.  By the same token dont support evil
software companies *even by stealing their software!*  Use alternatives.
Stealing their software doesnt hurt them (contrary to what you would have
them believe).  Supporting free software and any competitors they have
who have plolicies you approve does hurt them.

> Thug




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Timothy Newsham <newsham@wiliki.eng.hawaii.edu>
Date: Tue, 14 Sep 93 01:48:51 PDT
To: loki@convex1.TCS.Tulane.EDU (the mischeivious god)
Subject: Re: warez garbage cluttering  the  screen
In-Reply-To: <9309140737.AA25877@convex1.tcs.tulane.edu>
Message-ID: <9309140848.AA04683@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> 
> > 
> > What have these endless  bandwidth wasting   lists   of                      
> >                supposed   warez   sites  to  do  with  Cypherpunks? Please  
> > take  your  personnal  vendettas  elsewhere.  I  pay  for DL  time.
> > 
> > ---Marc
> > 
> GRRRRRRRRRRRR......	I dont have to pay and I rather found it useful.
> 
> loki

Then maybe a list for warez topics should be formed.  I find alot
of things on the cypherpunks list that is off-topic to be interesting.
The list is however for the discussion of cryptography and privacy.
The only thing that all people on this list have in common is their
interest in crypto and privacy, and the list should stick to those
points.  Other topics that are interesting should be taken to
private email or put on the appropriate lists (barring of course
the occasional slip or wandering of the topic).




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Marc Horowitz <marc@MIT.EDU>
Date: Mon, 13 Sep 93 20:33:47 PDT
To: "L. Detweiler" <ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Subject: Re: NSA harassing crypto software writer over export (fwd, sci.crypt)
In-Reply-To: <9309140249.AA25621@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Message-ID: <9309140324.AA10611@milquetoast.MIT.EDU>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


What exactly is "Moby Crypto"?  Is it a book?  A disk?

The current law can be interpreted to mean that a piece of code on
paper is legal, but on a disk is not.  Clearly, this is what the NSA
is doing.  Stupid?  Yes, IMHO.  But the government has refused to see
it this way.  This person does not need lawyers.  He needs
congresscritters, preferably a majority of them :-/

		Marc




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Marc Horowitz <marc@MIT.EDU>
Date: Mon, 13 Sep 93 20:34:47 PDT
To: "L. Detweiler" <ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Subject: Re: NSA harassing crypto software writer over export (fwd, sci.crypt)
In-Reply-To: <9309140249.AA25621@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Message-ID: <9309140325.AA10617@milquetoast.MIT.EDU>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


What exactly is "Moby Crypto"?  Is it a book?  A disk?

The current law can be interpreted to mean that a piece of code on
paper is legal, but on a disk is not.  Clearly, this is what the NSA
is doing.  Stupid?  Yes, IMHO.  But the government has refused to see
it this way.  This person does not need lawyers.  He needs
congresscritters, preferably a majority of them :-/

>> I think collecting a large number of these citations
>> will help my attornies in pointing out the absurdity
>> of the situation to government attornies if necessary.

He is naive if he things proving that a law is absurd is sufficient to
nullify it.

		Marc




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: rjc@gnu.ai.mit.edu (Ray)
Date: Mon, 13 Sep 93 21:48:49 PDT
To: sameer@netcom.com (Sameer Parekh)
Subject: Re: testing remailers, the keys for my remailers
In-Reply-To: <9309140343.AA15529@netcom.netcom.com>
Message-ID: <9309140441.AA22003@geech.gnu.ai.mit.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Sameer Parekh () writes:
> 
> 	Has anyone written or is someone writing a script which will
> take a list of remailers, and ping each of them to see if they are
> working, both encrypted and unencrypted? If no one has taken on that
> task, I'd be willing to do it.. I'll list here the remailers for whom
> I have the keys for... if another remailer exists which I don't know
> about please send me the key.

  Yes,  I started writing such a system about 3 weeks ago but quit when
school started. Basically, it was a mail server to be operated at gnu.
Remailer operators would "register" their remailer along with 
some stats (PGP or RIPEM capability? Public Key? Private Machine? Delay time?
Mix capability? Owner? Comment field.)

  The software would then "ping" each remailer every 6 hours and update
its database. If you wanted a list of current working remailers, you would
ask the mail server (I was even thinking of adding socket capability
for fast query)

  I might eventually take some time to finish it (it wasn't even 50%
done) but I've got too much work to do now.

-Ray

-- Ray Cromwell        |    Engineering is the implementation of science;    --
-- EE/Math Student     |       politics is the implementation of faith.      --
-- rjc@gnu.ai.mit.edu  |                         - Zetetic Commentaries      --




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: msattler@netcom.com
Date: Tue, 14 Sep 93 00:43:51 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: The "Cypherpunk Melting Pot"
Message-ID: <9309140743.AA14959@netcom.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Anonymous <nowhere@bsu-cs.bsu.edu> said:
> 5.  Cypherpunks' mission is to evangelize the use of
>     privacy.  Sell the sizzle, not the steak!  Privacy
>     is the steak.  The sizzle is the possibility of
>     GETTING AWAY WITH SOMETHING.

I have a real problem with the attempted marriage of anarchy and the
Bill of Rights.  I'm interested in the issue of privacy not because I want
to screw our government out of my taxes, but because I want to have
the ability to communicate with any of you in private.  At different times
in our history certain opinions have been suspect for what we now consider
no good reason.  If I'm a homosexual, I want to be able to communicate with
others without worrying that my employer will monitor my email and fire
me for being homosexual.  If I'm Jewish, and I work in the deep south...

Privacy is the ability to keep and communicate thoughts without worrying
about someone using them against you.  I'm offended to be clumped in with
anyone who advocates selling privacy to get away with something.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
Michael S. Sattler         msattler@netcom.com        +1 (415) 358-3058
Digital Jungle Software    Encrypt now; ask me how.   (finger to get PGP
key)






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: khijol!erc@apple.com (Ed Carp)
Date: Tue, 14 Sep 93 01:49:53 PDT
To: thug@phantom.com (Murdering Thug)
Subject: Re: warez garbage cluttering  the  screen
In-Reply-To: <m0ocVHw-0009HYC@mindvox.phantom.com>
Message-ID: <m0ocVee-000297C@warrior>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text


> > What have these endless  bandwidth wasting   lists   of                      
> >                supposed   warez   sites  to  do  with  Cypherpunks? Please  
> > take  your  personnal  vendettas  elsewhere.  I  pay  for DL  time.
> > 
> > ---Marc
> 
> 1) The fl0w of wArEz keeps the universe in perfect harmony.  Without wArEz

Ommmmm....."If you can explain it, it isn't the Tao..."

> there would be no life as we know it.  And just because you are a rich fat
> fuck who can afford to plunk down $795 for a copy of Pagemaker, you
> shouldn't take a moral stance against those who cannot afford such
> extortion yet need these software tools to keep up technologically with
> rich fat fucks like yourself. 

If he's complaining about d/l time, I guess he can't be too rich.  Or maybe
that's how he got that way?

> 2) wArEz have A LOT to do with Cypherpunks.  Software, pirated or
> otherwise has value, and as such it must be considered as a form of
> digital money.  One may trade encrypted wArEz anonymously over anonymous
> mailing lists, FSP/FTP sites, newsgroups like the proposed alt.waste, and
> BlackNet.  wArEz _are_ digital gold coins, they have inherent value,
> unlike useless encrypted random number certificates advocated by others. 

Unfortunately, that sort of value is the sort that can get people thrown in
the clink unless one is very careful...

> 3) I don't give a flying fuck if you pay for your DL time.  If you're
> stupid enough to be using AOL as your Internet port of entry, then you
> deserve to be ripped off by Compuserve's evil bastard cousin.  Why don't
> you point and click yourself a new brain, and join a flat-rate system like
> Netcom or any of the hundred other public access internet sites. Support the
> small entrepreneurs instead of those lazy fat bastard nazi censors at AOL.

Too much coffee, or not enough Thorazine?  ;)

All in all, a very entertaining post - I think I woke up my roommate with
my chuckles!
-- 
Ed Carp				erc@apple.com			510/659-9560

If you want magic, let go of your armor.  Magic is so much stronger than
steel!        -- Richard Bach, "The Bridge Across Forever"



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: sameer@netcom.com (Sameer Parekh)
Date: Tue, 14 Sep 93 01:28:52 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Really simple script for pgp
Message-ID: <9309140826.AA19612@netcom.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

	I wrote a really simple script for PGP which I am particularly
proud of. (I'm not very experienced at sed/awk/etc. hacking, so that's
why I'm so happy with it.)
	All this does is extract all keys from your pgp keyring with
the partial string specified in the cmdline and saves it to either the
keyring given as the second argument or a file with the name of the
partial string.

- -- 
Sameer
sameer@netcom.com

#!/bin/sh
if [ $2 ]
then
 FILE=$2
else
 FILE=$1
fi

pgp -kv $1 | tail +3 | cut -c30-150 | sed -n -e '/./p' | sed -e 's/^.*$/pgp -kxf \"&\"/' | /bin/sh | pgp -kaf $FILE 







-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.3a

iQCVAgUBLJWAHgvya0ihLgutAQF+qAP6AnuLuCyLKAdysbWbcM5CVYozSQK8ESCf
j+njlB9PkfBGA/ap15WWcWQZybeXvglfzl2gjDYftslbb0UNqUyGEw4dPrthGq93
7WiVceatZmGf9zzwvrEOV8xMJfG7SovxY/KDsrXJOxXPTXpdJTB5cG42gQe/MSUX
Y3S3RWcD0Lo=
=9iQ7
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: mbriceno@aol.com
Date: Mon, 13 Sep 93 23:43:51 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re:  warez garbage cluttering  the  screen
Message-ID: <9309140231.tn02846@aol.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


What have these endless  bandwidth wasting   lists   of                      
               supposed   warez   sites  to  do  with  Cypherpunks? Please  
take  your  personnal  vendettas  elsewhere.  I  pay  for DL  time.

---Marc




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: loki@convex1.TCS.Tulane.EDU (the mischeivious god)
Date: Tue, 14 Sep 93 00:38:51 PDT
To: mbriceno@aol.com
Subject: Re:  warez garbage cluttering  the  screen
In-Reply-To: <9309140231.tn02846@aol.com>
Message-ID: <9309140737.AA25877@convex1.tcs.tulane.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> 
> What have these endless  bandwidth wasting   lists   of                      
>                supposed   warez   sites  to  do  with  Cypherpunks? Please  
> take  your  personnal  vendettas  elsewhere.  I  pay  for DL  time.
> 
> ---Marc
> 
GRRRRRRRRRRRR......	I dont have to pay and I rather found it useful.

loki





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: thug@phantom.com (Murdering Thug)
Date: Tue, 14 Sep 93 00:58:51 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: warez garbage cluttering  the  screen
In-Reply-To: <9309140231.tn02846@aol.com>
Message-ID: <m0ocVHw-0009HYC@mindvox.phantom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text


> What have these endless  bandwidth wasting   lists   of                      
>                supposed   warez   sites  to  do  with  Cypherpunks? Please  
> take  your  personnal  vendettas  elsewhere.  I  pay  for DL  time.
> 
> ---Marc

1) The fl0w of wArEz keeps the universe in perfect harmony.  Without wArEz
there would be no life as we know it.  And just because you are a rich fat
fuck who can afford to plunk down $795 for a copy of Pagemaker, you
shouldn't take a moral stance against those who cannot afford such
extortion yet need these software tools to keep up technologically with
rich fat fucks like yourself. 

2) wArEz have A LOT to do with Cypherpunks.  Software, pirated or
otherwise has value, and as such it must be considered as a form of
digital money.  One may trade encrypted wArEz anonymously over anonymous
mailing lists, FSP/FTP sites, newsgroups like the proposed alt.waste, and
BlackNet.  wArEz _are_ digital gold coins, they have inherent value,
unlike useless encrypted random number certificates advocated by others. 

3) I don't give a flying fuck if you pay for your DL time.  If you're
stupid enough to be using AOL as your Internet port of entry, then you
deserve to be ripped off by Compuserve's evil bastard cousin.  Why don't
you point and click yourself a new brain, and join a flat-rate system like
Netcom or any of the hundred other public access internet sites. Support the
small entrepreneurs instead of those lazy fat bastard nazi censors at AOL.


Thug



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: rjc@gnu.ai.mit.edu (Ray)
Date: Tue, 14 Sep 93 01:48:56 PDT
To: thug@phantom.com (Murdering Thug)
Subject: Re: warez garbage cluttering  the  screen
In-Reply-To: <m0ocVHw-0009HYC@mindvox.phantom.com>
Message-ID: <9309140848.AA23759@geech.gnu.ai.mit.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Murdering Thug () writes:
> 
> > What have these endless  bandwidth wasting   lists   of                      
> >                supposed   warez   sites  to  do  with  Cypherpunks? Please  
> > take  your  personnal  vendettas  elsewhere.  I  pay  for DL  time.
> > 
> > ---Marc
> 
> 1) The fl0w of wArEz keeps the universe in perfect harmony.  Without wArEz
> there would be no life as we know it.  And just because you are a rich fat
> fuck who can afford to plunk down $795 for a copy of Pagemaker, you
> shouldn't take a moral stance against those who cannot afford such
> extortion yet need these software tools to keep up technologically with
> rich fat fucks like yourself. 
   
  And later...

> 3) I don't give a flying fuck if you pay for your DL time.  If you're
> stupid enough to be using AOL as your Internet port of entry, then you
> deserve to be ripped off by Compuserve's evil bastard cousin.  Why don't
> you point and click yourself a new brain, and join a flat-rate system like
  ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
> Netcom or any of the hundred other public access internet sites. Support the
> small entrepreneurs instead of those lazy fat bastard nazi censors at AOL.

  Obviously, if you had a brain, you'd be using FreeWare TeX instead of
PageMaker, or you'd realize that there are competing packages out that
with similar features but at a lower cost. Ya, software is extortion alright.
Produce wealth in today's world but refuse to release it to looters without
charging them a fee and you're in the protection reacket. Ha.
The part about warez being digital coins is nonsense. If there was
a free fL0w 0f wAr3z, your currency would be devalued to nothing. There'd
be no point of "trading" warez cause anything you had, I could get
myself. It is only because wArEz]<1dZ like yourself run pseudo-elitist
cliques where having 0-dayz old wAReZ is king that you see any value at
all in trading Mortal Kombat or beta copies of Windoze.


(these "warez" sites on the net are hilarious. 99% of them are run out
of the /tmp directory (under ftp or fsp) and others under student accounts.
Unknowingly, many of them show up under archie! So much for secrets.
Save yourself, and the net, the trouble of trading warez via anonymous
remailers and call up your local pirate bbs instead)



 




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Mike Ingle <MIKEINGLE@delphi.com>
Date: Tue, 14 Sep 93 02:08:51 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Denning@ISSS Expo '93
Message-ID: <01H2XDC6XPT491XDZQ@delphi.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I was looking through the brochure for ISSS Expo '93, the Third Annual
International Security Systems Symposium and Exhibition, to be held in
Washington, DC Nov. 15-17. Convention topics: 

safeguarding proprietary info
opsec/intel/counterintel
computer/info systems security
competitive intelligence (translation: corporate espionage)
special topics 

Exhibits:
surveillance systems
counter-surveillance
detection systems
anti-terrorist/penetration
information security
transmission methodologies
computer and communications security
miscellaneous

One presentation in particular sounds rather ominous:

Encryption - The Law
(U.S. & International Implications)
Speaker: Dorothy "Skipjack" Denning

What do you suppose Denning will talk about? Perhaps she will point out
that, due to the government's overriding need to perform large-scale, cheap
monitoring, only very weak crypto can be exported. And that 40-bit keys can
be cracked not only by the government, but also by anyone with idle
workstations at night. Naturally, this is a problem for any multinational
which doesn't want to be a victim of "competitive intelligence".
 
She might even propose a solution: we can all standardize on Clipper, thereby
making the world safe from privacy, and restoring espionage to its proper
place as a government monopoly. She will probably forget to mention another
solution, however - one which is completely legal and which will be
available long before Clipper. A U.S. company can buy ViaCrypt PGP; the
foreign branch can use free PGP, and since no cryptographic software crosses
the border, no laws are broken.

Conference/exhibit info: (301) 986-7800

Exhibit attendance $20 or free with registration form.
Conference $595 business, $495 government/military.
Maybe some DC-area cypherpunks could show up for the exhibits and crash the
party with some highly subversive and seditious materials.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: geoffw@nexsys.net (Geoff White)
Date: Tue, 14 Sep 93 08:13:58 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: warez garbage cluttering  the  screen
Message-ID: <9309141508.AA05531@nexsys.nexsys.net>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



> From toad.com!owner-cypherpunks@cdp.igc.org Tue Sep 14 06:16:19 1993
> Return-Path: <newsham@wiliki.eng.hawaii.edu>
> From: Timothy Newsham <newsham@wiliki.eng.hawaii.edu>
> Subject: Re: warez garbage cluttering  the  screen
> To: loki@convex1.TCS.Tulane.EDU (the mischeivious god)
> Date: Mon, 13 Sep 1993 22:43:49 -1000 (HST)
> Cc: cypherpunks@toad.com
> X-Mailer: ELM [version 2.4 PL21]
> Mime-Version: 1.0
> Content-Type> : > text/plain> ; > charset=US-ASCII> 
> Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
> Content-Length: 863
> X-Lines: 21
> Status: RO
> 
> > 
> > > 
> > > What have these endless  bandwidth wasting   lists   of                      
> > >                supposed   warez   sites  to  do  with  Cypherpunks? Please  
> > > take  your  personnal  vendettas  elsewhere.  I  pay  for DL  time.
> > > 
> > > ---Marc
> > > 
> > GRRRRRRRRRRRR......	I dont have to pay and I rather found it useful.
> > 
> > loki
> 
> Then maybe a list for warez topics should be formed.  I find alot
> of things on the cypherpunks list that is off-topic to be interesting.
> The list is however for the discussion of cryptography and privacy.
> The only thing that all people on this list have in common is their
> interest in crypto and privacy, and the list should stick to those
> points.  Other topics that are interesting should be taken to
> private email or put on the appropriate lists (barring of course
> the occasional slip or wandering of the topic).
> 
> 
Shit, Well I'm interested in the list and I missed it as it went by so
will whoever posted it PLEASE send me a copy?

			geoffw@nexsys.net

			Thanks and keep up the good work.

	I personally think people should use their DISCRETION when
	posting, not hard and fast rules. If I wanted hard and fast
	rules I'd sign up for Prodigy. An occasional post related to
	the subject that is obviously of interest to a large sub-
	population of cypherpunks is appropriate, perhapse in the future
	put a warning in the subject line so the whinners can hit the
	"d" key in advance and save that .25 cents or whatever it cost them.

	And for the person who complained about bandwidth, how do you feel
	about the fact that we now have to waste more flaming about wasting
	bandwidth. (Please don't reply to the list, reply to me if you must)




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: karn@qualcomm.com (Phil Karn)
Date: Tue, 14 Sep 93 08:39:59 PDT
To: MIKEINGLE@delphi.com
Subject: Denning@ISSS Expo '93
In-Reply-To: <01H2XDC6XPT491XDZQ@delphi.com>
Message-ID: <9309141539.AA17745@servo>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I've seen Denning's name on other security conferences, most recently several
weeks ago in DC. As usual, one can always make money by toading for the
government.

Phil




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Hastings@courier8.aero.org
Date: Tue, 14 Sep 93 09:09:59 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Spread spectrum radio
Message-ID: <0007BCA6.MAI*Hastings@courier8.aero.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


It was encouraging to see messages about spread spectrum recently. Bypassing
the telcos could be important in a crypto-hostile legal environment. And who
wants to pay for message forwarding when we can do it ourselves
efficiently, almost for free?
 
A bit off topic, but I didn't start it:
Someone posted a message that the Waco tank driver ID'd the tank in the
Waco: The Big Lie video. But the Chrysler model equipped with a flame
thrower claimed to be the tank didn't match Neil Schulman's military expert's
opinion, that the model in question did not come equipped with a flame
thrower, but could easily support one. Linda Thompson (W:TBL producer)
then claimed it was the Chrysler flame thrower tank cleverly disguised to look
like the others. As Neil told me, "First she says some animal on the tape is a
squirrel. I say the zoologist says it's a chipmunk. Then she says it's a
chipmunk disguised as a squirrel." For the complete detailed exchange from the
Waco echo conference, e-mail me at jkhastings@aol.com or Neil at
softserv@genie.geis.com. Sorry for being off topic, but government atrocities
DO undermine the argument that law enforcement needs to take away your right
to privacy for your own safety. And we're talking about DECIPHERING what's on
the video. Yeah, that's it.
 
"Beat the system before the system beats you."
Kent - <jkhastings@aol.com>
 




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: doug@netcom4.netcom.com (Doug Merritt)
Date: Tue, 14 Sep 93 10:18:59 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: warez garbage cluttering  the  screen
Message-ID: <9309141718.AA20046@netcom4.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


thug@phantom.com (Murdering Thug) said:
> 1) The fl0w of wArEz keeps the universe in perfect harmony.  [...]
> 3) I don't give a flying fuck if you pay for your DL time.  [...]

These two comments are *highly* inappropriate for this list, so it pains
me to have to admit that he's got a point in #2:

>  wArEz _are_ digital gold coins, they have inherent value,

I don't happen to be interested in software piracy, but discussions of
software as digital gold coins, stolen or otherwise, are appropriate...
but *only* discussions of how they are coins and how that relates
to crypto schemes.

I wish thug would make a sharper distinction...and keep his flames and
generic non-cypherpunk "warez" crap to private email.
	Doug




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Perry E. Metzger" <pmetzger@lehman.com>
Date: Tue, 14 Sep 93 07:34:58 PDT
To: thug@phantom.com (Murdering Thug)
Subject: Re: warez garbage cluttering the screen
In-Reply-To: <m0ocVHw-0009HYC@mindvox.phantom.com>
Message-ID: <9309141429.AA04493@snark.lehman.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



1) I don't favor piracy. I especially don't favor piracy by people who
   can't capitalize or spell, and who think that saying "rich fat fucks"
   is a suave conversational gambit.

2) I agree that piracy is not the proper subject of this list.

3) If Mr. Thug wants to discuss piracy, there are thousands of places
   for him to do so.

Perry

Murdering Thug says:
> > What have these endless  bandwidth wasting   lists   of                    
  
> >                supposed   warez   sites  to  do  with  Cypherpunks? Please 
> > take  your  personnal  vendettas  elsewhere.  I  pay  for DL  time.
> 
> 1) The fl0w of wArEz keeps the universe in perfect harmony.  Without wArEz
> there would be no life as we know it.  And just because you are a rich fat
> fuck who can afford to plunk down $795 for a copy of Pagemaker, you
> shouldn't take a moral stance against those who cannot afford such
> extortion yet need these software tools to keep up technologically with
> rich fat fucks like yourself. 
> 
> 2) wArEz have A LOT to do with Cypherpunks.  Software, pirated or
> otherwise has value, and as such it must be considered as a form of
> digital money.  One may trade encrypted wArEz anonymously over anonymous
> mailing lists, FSP/FTP sites, newsgroups like the proposed alt.waste, and
> BlackNet.  wArEz _are_ digital gold coins, they have inherent value,
> unlike useless encrypted random number certificates advocated by others. 
> 
> 3) I don't give a flying fuck if you pay for your DL time.  If you're
> stupid enough to be using AOL as your Internet port of entry, then you
> deserve to be ripped off by Compuserve's evil bastard cousin.  Why don't
> you point and click yourself a new brain, and join a flat-rate system like
> Netcom or any of the hundred other public access internet sites. Support the
> small entrepreneurs instead of those lazy fat bastard nazi censors at AOL.
> 
> 
> Thug




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: drzaphod@brewmeister.xstablu.com
Date: Tue, 14 Sep 93 10:44:00 PDT
To: xstablu!mtdiablo.uucp!netcomsv.netcom.com!netcom!msattler@netcom.com
Subject: Re: The "Cypherpunk Melting Pot"
In-Reply-To: <9309140743.AA14959@netcom.netcom.com>
Message-ID: <m0oceKQ-0003E4C@brewmeister.xstablu.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> no good reason.  If I'm a homosexual, I want to be able to communicate with
> others without worrying that my employer will monitor my email and fire
> me for being homosexual.  If I'm Jewish, and I work in the deep south...
> 
> Privacy is the ability to keep and communicate thoughts without worrying
> about someone using them against you.

> Michael S. Sattler         msattler@netcom.com        +1 (415) 358-3058

	Soundz like you have opinions on what type of anarchy you'll
advocate.  "getting away with something" also means breaking the law
when the law is severely screwed up.  Privacy is needed to maintain
our human rights, which brings in the Bill of Rights.  
	You want to be able to communicate freely about your opinions.
Me too.. but maybe my opinions are about the overthrowing of the government

-- 
-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-
- DrZaphod                #Don't Come Any Closer Or I'll Encrypt!   -
- [AC/DC] / [DnA][HP]     #Xcitement thru Technology and Creativity -
- [drzaphod@brewmeister.xstablu.com] [MindPolice Censored This Bit] -
-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: sameer@netcom.com (Sameer Parekh)
Date: Tue, 14 Sep 93 10:45:19 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Anarchy v. Privacy
Message-ID: <9309141745.AA13662@netcom.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

	At the recent cypherpunks meeting, Tim, as he posted to the
list, mentioned during his presentation conflicting political views,
and how we don't plan on making that a big issue-- we will set aside
the politics until *later*, when we have full privacy & high bandwidth
people can decide what to do, splinter into their own groups, etc.,
but until then, as we have a common goal of personal privacy, we
should work together to reach that goal.
	It makes a great deal of sense.

	It strikes me, however, that Tim only took into account the
differences between the anarcho-capitalists and the
anarcho-syndicalists (A new term-- I've always used
anarcho-communist.. are they similar?) while not taking into account
the people who don't seem to want an anarchic future.

	Remember, though, that the cypherpunks is *not* a group with a
"party-line". Whether your vision of the future with crypto, I think
that having an internal squabble is pointless and futile. Let's work
for full privacy. Maybe for those who feel like debating the finer
points of anarchy with crypto (on an "intellectual" level) can use a
separate list?

Peace,
- -- 
Sameer
sameer@netcom.com

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.3a

iQCVAgUBLJYDGgvya0ihLgutAQEzJgQA4E+qOPnCwVSkdZM+0BwySxiRXkYqrA87
fd3Dp3meShFto3L9f47p4jHLMR2aUDG0RIxK/BTeSdTZfVwxbgPDt6oSM/lLKwy8
gkmbzlwoL3cHRa7P+P/A7ylClOtjfTCMZ+bRTSFJa4zLFGsnCxdVbpiZUP8cWTFr
8G0EydS+r7Q=
=gAA+
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Duncan Frissell <frissell@panix.com>
Date: Tue, 14 Sep 93 08:39:00 PDT
To: CYPHERPUNKS@toad.com
Subject: Re: The "Cypherpunk Melti
Message-ID: <199309141538.AA15764@panix.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


M >I have a real problem with the attempted marriage of anarchy and the
M >Bill of Rights.  I'm interested in the issue of privacy not because I 
M >want to screw our government out of my taxes, but because I want to
M >have the ability to communicate with any of you in private. 

You should be aware of the possible results of your actions, however.  A 
market is a place where traders meet and trade.  It involves 
communications and transfer.  When governments intervene in markets, they 
do so by preventing these communications and transfers.  

When it becomes technically possible to exclude anyone you like (including 
the government) from your communications and transfers of non-physical 
goods and services, you have a free market.  Once these traders start 
trading a higher and higher proportion of the world's goods and 
services in this free market, government monopoly market controls are 
broken.  The world's governments become mere market actors like everyone 
else.  They lose sovereignty.  They can no longer govern (an 
ever-expanding 
portion of human activity).  They are no longer governments.

All from the simple ability to reliably communicate with total privacy.  

Duncan Frissell

What is the world's most hazardous toxic waste dump?

Highgate Cemetery in North London.  Why?  See next Post for the answer.






--- WinQwk 2.0b#0
                                             




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: nate@VIS.ColoState.EDU
Date: Tue, 14 Sep 93 10:40:00 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: PGPC 2.2 available
Message-ID: <9309141739.AA08520@nagel.VIS.ColoState.EDU>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

PGPC 2.2 is available for anonymous ftp from 129.82.156.104
in /pub/pgpc/pgpc22.tar.[Z,gz]

It is available in either gnuzip or regular compress.

Read the README.  It comes with a makefile that will add the 
public keys to your public keyring... you may need to edit that
if you don't need it (or want it) to add the keys.

I added support for the encrypted remailers... it's quite slick now, 
IMHO.  It can nest as many rounds of encrypted remailing you want,
and it will also mail through anon.penet.fi into the remailers.

I also signed the archives, and put the signature certificates
in near the archives, you can get my public key from fingering
nate@monet.vis.colostate.edu

have fun,

- -nate
+--------------------------------------------------------------------
| Nate Sammons   email: nate@VIS.ColoState.Edu
|      Colorado State University Computer Visualization Laboratory
|      Finger nate@monet.VIS.ColoState.Edu for my PGP key
|      #include <std.disclaimer>
|                                    Always remember "Brazil"
+----------------------+

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.3a

iQCVAgUBLJYBudTgi1fmrpxlAQEG4wP9HTn4xqBP/1rvPUwsuUoDpnoN/uzvVl73
fY/j9jnFjA+cAJ0/fnvUtl7Iq1OcowLauZAlIPg8ts7aR3sCT4eQnZZg2fon4xj3
dMeVjy/K3nTXPCoz+67KzIurZxHgyS5BQMzYs8YWi6lE/t7cWfFxE/6IyYMr7bYL
B4OG6tKJOL4=
=OIsL
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: cme@ellisun.sw.stratus.com (Carl Ellison)
Date: Tue, 14 Sep 93 08:48:59 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: UK Privacy Council
Message-ID: <9309141545.AA05201@ellisun.sw.stratus.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



UK readers might want to check out comp.society.privacy for the
announcement of the forming of the UK Privacy Council.





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Dave Banisar <banisar@washofc.cpsr.org>
Date: Tue, 14 Sep 93 10:05:18 PDT
To: CYPHERPUNKS <CYPHERPUNKS@toad.com>
Subject: CSSPAB Questions Clipper
Message-ID: <00541.2830855938.5353@washofc.cpsr.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


  CSSPAB Questions Clipper
Govt. Panel Questions Clipper Chip Proposal

By David Banisar, The Privacy Times


	After two days of sometimes tumultuous hearings, a government advisory
board chartered to advise the administration and Congress on computer
security and privacy issued two resolutions questioning many of the aspects
of the Clinton Administration's controversial new encryption scheme, the
Clipper Chip. The National Institute for Standards and Technology's Computer
System Security and Privacy Advisory Board (CSSPAB) expressed continued
concern over many aspects of the proposal including the lack of a convincing
statement expressing the problems that the Clipper is supposed to solve, the
need to look for possible alternatives to the proposal,  the legal,
economic, export controls issues, and software implementation of the
proposal. In addition, the board also expressed concern  that the Clipper
proposal could negatively impact the availability of cost-effective security
products to the US government and industry and that it may not be marketable
or usable worldwide.

	In a second resolution, the board unanimously called for a public debate of
the proposal and recommended that Congress take an active role in
determining US cryptography policy. It also recommended that  any new policy
must address the interests of law enforcement and intelligence, US industry
and citizens' privacy and security in the US and worldwide.

	At the hearings, Geoff Greiveldinger from the Department of Justice
reported that the key escrow agents will be announced within a few weeks
after briefing members of  Congress. Sources inside the administration
indicate that the administration may have decided to eliminate from
consideration outside organizations holding the keys and are leaning towards
the Department of the Treasury as one of the key holders.

	Doug Miller of the Software Publishers Association (SPA) also presented the
latest survey of foreign software with cryptography finding that over 200
products from over 20 countries were available from overseas companies
including many that use DES. He expressed concern that the Clipper chip
would harm the US software industry while not providing any benefits to the
intelligence community, since cryptography was available worldwide. He
indicated that they were seeking a legislative solution to the issue. Last
year, a renewal of the Export Administration Act t, which removed
restrictions on off-the-shelf software with encryption,  was vetoed by
President Bush.

	NIST Deputy Director Ray Kammer announced that the Data Encryption Standard
(DES) will be recertified for government, non-classified use for another
five years. The paperwork has been sent to Secretary of Commerce Ron Brown,
who is expected to sign it within two weeks.

	The Clipper proposal was introduced April 16, 1993 and has been strongly
opposed by both civil liberties groups and industry. The proposal calls for
use of a secret encryption chip designed by the National Security Agency for
non-classified voice and data transmission. The keys for the chip would be
split and held in escrow by two government agencies. NIST has submitted the
Clipper proposal for public comment. The FIPS was published in the Federal
Register at Volume 58, page 40791 (July 30, 1993) and is also available in
electronic form from the CPSR Internet Library FTP/WAIS/Gopher cpsr.org
/cpsr/crypto/clipper/call-for-comments.  Comments are due to NIST by
September 28, 1993 to the  Director, Computer Systems Laboratory, ATTN:
Proposed FIPS for Escrowed Encryption Standard, Technology Building, room
B-154, National Institute of Standards and Technology, Gaithersburg, MD
20899. 

	CPSR has created an archive of comments on the proposal and has asked
people to electronically submit a copy of their comments to
clipper@washofc.cpsr.org.


--------------------------------

NON-CERTIFIED TEXT


        COMPUTER SYSTEM SECURITY AND PRIVACY ADVISORY BOARD

                           		RESOLUTION 93-5

				SEPTEMBER 1-2, 1993

Subsequent to the June 2-4, 1993 meeting of the CSSPAB, the Board has held
an addition 4 days of public hearings and has collected additional public
input.

The clear message is that the preliminary concerns stated in Resolution 1 of
that date have been confirmed as serious concerns which need to be resolved.

Public input has heightened the concerns of the Board to the following
issues:

	- A convincing statement of the problem that Clipper attempts to solve has
not been provided.

	- Export and import controls over cryptographic products must be reviewed.
Based upon data compiled from US and international vendors, current controls
are negatively impacting US competitiveness in the world market and are not
inhibiting the foreign production and use of cryptography (DES and RSA).

	- The Clipper/Capstone proposal does not address the needs of the software
industry, which is critical and significant component of the National
Information Infrastructure and the US economy.

	- Additional DES encryption alternatives and key management alternatives
should be considered since there is a significant installed base.

	- The individuals reviewing the Skipjack algorithm and key management
system must be given an appropriate time period and environment in which to
perform a thorough review. This review must address the escrow protocol and
chip implementation as well as the algorithm itself.

	- Sufficient information must be provided on the proposed key escrow scheme
to allow it to be fully understood by the general public.

	- Further development and consideration of alternatives to the key escrow
scheme need to be considered, e.g., three "escrow" entities, one of which is
a non-government agency, and a software based solution.

	- The economic implications for the Clipper/Capstone proposal have not been
examined. These costs go beyond the vendor cost of the chip and include such
factors as customer installation, maintenance, administration, chip
replacement, integration and interfacing, government escrow system costs,
etc.

	- Legal issues raised by the proposal must be reviewed.

	- Congress, as well as the administration, should play a role in the
conduct and approval of the results of the review.

Moreover, the following are additional concerns of the Board.

	- Implementation of the Clipper initiative may negatively impact the
availability of cost-effective security products to the US government and
the private sector;

	and

	- Clipper products may not be marketable or usable worldwide.



FOR: Castro, Gangemi, Lambert, Lipner, Kuyers, Philcox, Rand, Walker,
Whitehurst, and Zeitler.

AGAINST: none

ABSTAIN Gallagher [NSA]

ABSENT: Colvin


-----------------------------------------------------------------


NON-CERTIFIED TEXT


	COMPUTER SYSTEM SECURITY AND PRIVACY ADVISORY BOARD

				RESOLUTION 93-6

				SEPTEMBER 1-2, 1993

The Board believes that in deciding cryptographic policies and standards in
the US, there is a compelling need to consider and evaluate the concerns
listed below. We, therefore, endorse the process being pursued by the
administration in the form of an interagency review but believe the scope of
that review needs to include adequate industry input. We reaffirm our
recommendations (of March 1992) that the issues surrounding this policy be
debated in a public forum. In view of the worldwide significance of these
issues the Board believes that the Congress of the U.S. must be involved in
the establishment of cryptographic policy.

The board, furthermore, believes that there are a number of issues that must
be resolved before any new or additional cryptographic solution is approved
as a US government standard:

	1. The protection of law enforcement and national security interests.

	2. The protection of U.S. computer and telecommunications interests in the
international marketplace.

	3. The protection of U.S. person's interests both domestically and
internationally.




FOR: Castro, Gallagher, Gangemi, Lambert, Lipner, Kuyers, Philcox, Rand,
Walker, Whitehurst, and Zeitler.

AGAINST: none

ABSTAIN: none

ABSENT: Colvin






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: doug@netcom5.netcom.com (Doug Merritt)
Date: Tue, 14 Sep 93 12:45:01 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: authoritative definition of cryptography?
Message-ID: <9309141944.AA23921@netcom5.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Can anyone point me to (1) a reasonably authoritative legal definition
of what "cryptography" means, that can be used to help decide precisely
what does and does not fall under e.g. the export restrictions, and (2) a
similar definition from the technical literature, to use in conjunction
with #1?

Hopefully I won't have to fall back on "I know it when I see it" standards. :-)
        Thanks,
                Doug




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: futor@llnl.gov
Date: Tue, 14 Sep 93 13:35:02 PDT
To: ferguson@fiber.sprintlink.net (Paul Ferguson x2044)
Subject: Re: A definitive definition of "crypto"
Message-ID: <9309142034.AA26943@>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> [ The FAQ ]'s posted occasiuonally to sci.crypt,
> but I can't think of a site (offhand) where you can FTP it.
Try rtfm.mit.edu -- they tend to have most of the FAQs there.
__
\/  -+-  randy  -+-  all generalizations are flawed  -+-  futor@llnl.gov





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "David LANDGREN, PUB           " <David.D.L.LANDGREN@PUB.oecd.fr>
Date: Tue, 14 Sep 93 06:48:57 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: warez garbage cluttering  the  screen
Message-ID: <"14744141903991/17745 OECDX400*"@MHS>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


rm -f thug







From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: remailer@netcom.com
Date: Tue, 14 Sep 93 14:59:05 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: REMAIL: list
Message-ID: <9309142152.AA28550@mail.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Here is an interim release of the list, which includes the elee9sf@menudo
and elee6ue@rosebud remailer.  (And you thought I was joking when I said
that some people run remailers that aren't announced :-)

I cleaned up the scripts at elee6ue@rosebud, and in the process of creating
the proper directories for caching (which is NOT implemented just yet) I
zapped the pgp directory and the keyrings... so now there is a new key
for elee6ue@rosebud.ee.uh.edu, keyid = BBC00D.  Sorry about that!

Also, my key klbarrus@owlnet.rice.edu, keyid = 5AD633 has an A.K.A. on
it for elee9sf@menudo.uh.edu.  This is NOT the public key to the remailer,
whose keyid is DC9EE9.

I sign the public keys of remailers I have verified as working, so if you
get the latest pubkeys.tar.gz file from soda or the keys from me, you
will find a signature from 5AD633 on them.

Lastly, thanks to folks who are contributing programs to help other use
the remailers!  I decided to keep my offerings as shell scripts or batch
files, but there is only so much these languages can do, so I welcome
"high" level help programs (source included :-).  Nate's program is
mentioned, but not Alex's (yet) since it isn't available via ftp (yet).
I'll try to keep on top of this stuff.

Cypherpunk anonymous remailers, 9/15/93

Q1: What are the anonymous remailers?

A1:

 1: nowhere@bsu-cs.bsu.edu
 2: hh@cicada.berkeley.edu
 3: hh@pmantis.berkeley.edu
 4: hh@soda.berkeley.edu
 5: 00x@uclink.berkeley.edu
 6: cdodhner@indirect.com
 7: hal@alumni.caltech.edu
 8: cs60a-qu@cory.eecs.berkeley.edu
 9: ebrandt@jarthur.claremont.edu
10: catalyst@netcom.com
11: sameer@netcom.com
12: remailer@rebma.mn.org
13: elee6ue@rosebud.ee.uh.edu
14: elee7h5@rosebud.ee.uh.edu
15: hfinney@shell.portal.com
16: remail@tamsun.tamu.edu
17: remail@tamaix.tamu.edu
18: remailer@utter.dis.org
19: remailer@entropy.linet.org
20: elee9sf@menudo.uh.edu
21: remail@extropia.wimsey.com

NOTES: 

1-6		no encryption of remailing requests
7-20		support encrypted remailing requests
21		special - header and message must be encrypted together
12,18,19,21	introduce larger than average delay (not direct connect)
12,18,21	running on privately owned machines
20              supports RIPEM encryption, caches all requests

======================================================================

Q2: What help is available?

A2:

Check out the pub/cypherpunks/remailer directory at soda.berkeley.edu
(128.32.149.19).  

chain.zip             - program that helps with using remailers
dosbat.zip            - MSDOS batch files that help with using remailers
hal's.instructions.gz - in depth instruction on how to use
hal's.remailer.gz     - remailer code
pubkeys.tar.gz        - public keys of remailers which support encryption
pubkeys.zip           - MSDOS zip file of public keys
scripts.tar.gz        - scripts that help with using remailers

Also, at 129.82.156.104 in /pub/pgpc/ are two files: pgp22.tar.gz,
pgp22.tar.Z which assist in using the anonymous remailers, including
anon.penet.fi.

Mail to me (klbarrus@owlnet.rice.edu) for further help and/or questions.

======================================================================

Q3.  Email-to-Usenet gateways?

A3.

 1: group-name@cs.utexas.edu
 2: group.name.usenet@decwrl.dec.com
 3: group.name@news.demon.co.uk
 4: group.name@news.cs.indiana.edu
 5: group-name@pws.bull.com
 6: group-name@ucbvax.berkeley.edu

NOTES:

*  This does not include ones that work for single groups, like twwells.com.
#1 apparently blocks anonymous remailer posts
#6 blocks from non-berkeley sites (so use the berkeley remailers :-)




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: nobody@indirect.com
Date: Tue, 14 Sep 93 14:59:03 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: REMAIL: list
Message-ID: <199309142156.AA26314@indirect.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Here is an interim release of the list, which includes the elee9sf@menudo
and elee6ue@rosebud remailer.  (And you thought I was joking when I said
that some people run remailers that aren't announced :-)

I cleaned up the scripts at elee6ue@rosebud, and in the process of creating
the proper directories for caching (which is NOT implemented just yet) I
zapped the pgp directory and the keyrings... so now there is a new key
for elee6ue@rosebud.ee.uh.edu, keyid = BBC00D.  Sorry about that!

Also, my key klbarrus@owlnet.rice.edu, keyid = 5AD633 has an A.K.A. on
it for elee9sf@menudo.uh.edu.  This is NOT the public key to the remailer,
whose keyid is DC9EE9.

I sign the public keys of remailers I have verified as working, so if you
get the latest pubkeys.tar.gz file from soda or the keys from me, you
will find a signature from 5AD633 on them.

Lastly, thanks to folks who are contributing programs to help other use
the remailers!  I decided to keep my offerings as shell scripts or batch
files, but there is only so much these languages can do, so I welcome
"high" level help programs (source included :-).  Nate's program is
mentioned, but not Alex's (yet) since it isn't available via ftp (yet).
I'll try to keep on top of this stuff.

Cypherpunk anonymous remailers, 9/15/93

Q1: What are the anonymous remailers?

A1:

 1: nowhere@bsu-cs.bsu.edu
 2: hh@cicada.berkeley.edu
 3: hh@pmantis.berkeley.edu
 4: hh@soda.berkeley.edu
 5: 00x@uclink.berkeley.edu
 6: cdodhner@indirect.com
 7: hal@alumni.caltech.edu
 8: cs60a-qu@cory.eecs.berkeley.edu
 9: ebrandt@jarthur.claremont.edu
10: catalyst@netcom.com
11: sameer@netcom.com
12: remailer@rebma.mn.org
13: elee6ue@rosebud.ee.uh.edu
14: elee7h5@rosebud.ee.uh.edu
15: hfinney@shell.portal.com
16: remail@tamsun.tamu.edu
17: remail@tamaix.tamu.edu
18: remailer@utter.dis.org
19: remailer@entropy.linet.org
20: elee9sf@menudo.uh.edu
21: remail@extropia.wimsey.com

NOTES: 

1-6		no encryption of remailing requests
7-20		support encrypted remailing requests
21		special - header and message must be encrypted together
12,18,19,21	introduce larger than average delay (not direct connect)
12,18,21	running on privately owned machines
20              supports RIPEM encryption, caches all requests

======================================================================

Q2: What help is available?

A2:

Check out the pub/cypherpunks/remailer directory at soda.berkeley.edu
(128.32.149.19).  

chain.zip             - program that helps with using remailers
dosbat.zip            - MSDOS batch files that help with using remailers
hal's.instructions.gz - in depth instruction on how to use
hal's.remailer.gz     - remailer code
pubkeys.tar.gz        - public keys of remailers which support encryption
pubkeys.zip           - MSDOS zip file of public keys
scripts.tar.gz        - scripts that help with using remailers

Also, at 129.82.156.104 in /pub/pgpc/ are two files: pgp22.tar.gz,
pgp22.tar.Z which assist in using the anonymous remailers, including
anon.penet.fi.

Mail to me (klbarrus@owlnet.rice.edu) for further help and/or questions.

======================================================================

Q3.  Email-to-Usenet gateways?

A3.

 1: group-name@cs.utexas.edu
 2: group.name.usenet@decwrl.dec.com
 3: group.name@news.demon.co.uk
 4: group.name@news.cs.indiana.edu
 5: group-name@pws.bull.com
 6: group-name@ucbvax.berkeley.edu

NOTES:

*  This does not include ones that work for single groups, like twwells.com.
#1 apparently blocks anonymous remailer posts
#6 blocks from non-berkeley sites (so use the berkeley remailers :-)




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: ferguson@fiber.sprintlink.net (Paul Ferguson x2044)
Date: Tue, 14 Sep 93 13:19:03 PDT
To: doug@netcom5.netcom.com
Subject: A definitive definition of "crypto"
Message-ID: <9309142018.AA15838@fiber.sprintlink.net>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



On Tue, 14 Sep 1993 12:44:45 PDT,
 <doug@netcom5.netcom.com> Doug Merritt writes -


> Can anyone point me to (1) a reasonably authoritative legal definition
> of what "cryptography" means, that can be used to help decide precisely
> what does and does not fall under e.g. the export restrictions, and (2) a
> similar definition from the technical literature, to use in conjunction
> with #1?

Doug,
 
I'm not sure how much it will help you in distinguishing your objective,
but one of the best general purpose references that I have seen is the 
sci.crypt Usenet newsgroup FAQ. It's posted occasiuonally to sci.crypt,
but I can't think of a site (offhand) where you can FTP it. If you have
access to a gopher or WAIS, give that a try.
 
Cheers,

_____________________________________________________________________________
Paul Ferguson                                                               
Mindbank Consulting Group                                    fergp@sytex.com   
Fairfax, Virginia  USA                                       ferguson@icp.net




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Karl Lui Barrus <klbarrus@owlnet.rice.edu>
Date: Tue, 14 Sep 93 13:35:22 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: REMAIL: testing remailer & keys
In-Reply-To: <9309140343.AA15529@netcom.netcom.com>
Message-ID: <9309142034.AA00504@flammulated.owlnet.rice.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I think there are two more remailers:

elee7h5@rosebud.ee.uh.edu, and
catalyst@netcom.com

(keys below)

Incidentally, I see you have the Mr. Remailer key
(elee6ue@rosebud.ee.uh.edu).  How did that slip out? :-)
I must have extracted it instead of elee7h5@rosebud.ee.uh.edu.

Anyway, that one should be stable - I've used it for various scripts
hacks and testing, and I restored it to plain form recently.

In fact, it may become the preferred remailer on rosebud - the account
it is in is still "valid"; it belongs to a friend of mine who is
currently working in New Hampshire (he has no telnet access).  His
password is still valid, and the remailer is set up with his
permission (even blessings).

I mention this since I have been told by a lawyer that running a
remailer on an account I no longer have legitimate access to breaks
about three laws here in Texas.  So I attempted to re-legitimize my
account (described below).

Once upon a time that was my account, but I'm through with that grad
area, and university, so the account is locked now... but my directory
structure is still there.  So, I mailed to two people in charge on
rosebud and told them to get back to me.  So far, I haven't heard
anything, so maybe they don't care!  Actually, if it doesn't impose a
cpu burden (it doesn't) or take up much space (it doesn't), they might
not give a crap.

elee7h5@rosebud.ee.uh.edu:
-----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----
Version: 2.3a

mQCNAiscKOYAAAED/jmrZbh5t5HgEHDGE2zzFZx3sIplEjIFRFsLpCfJYBfN36Rm
uT8VGIyCcUSmCTqEOJ5HJZF58CUCOsy3B215ptOvbZdGijC3Qs7FbtGHKGA49q0v
gBgVIcjjyppRI9YjfqlI2gUKDLPceCTw20ODAA7UTKYIa3IBS32zjcrFq/uzAAUR
tCZyZW1haWxlcjAzIDxlbGVlN2g1QHJvc2VidWQuZWUudWguZWR1PokAlQIFECtk
lUeDgOzqS1rWMwEBUdAEAIosaOm/+kTsQI53GAqPXr08v5AAfwup5lDiUbCWp17C
ueYHZrP4zolAqQ7kyWrkIeHgJHkX3yB6YH/jQ0MeDZERXS69kq2SGVQSH6inGoF9
3WerfGRpdONa597JVcRpklzMUz6bmXnhsiEm/K1FP9pNOZYyS6h/3gs92ikezq3X
=tUXb
-----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----

catalyst@netcom.com
-----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----
Version: 2.3a

mQCNAiyBTjoAAAEEAMIKpRnqXb82TOQpx/vEDwGPXndXaxtfiZeSLZqullWCEbd4
YkCHG/F1i3Wzq4Pgz6nSbb58vMS5RonY7+ZC6IHI8zBpp9oMW3u+lqbk8Z61x49d
xwAKlE7Zsk/pOeGrqbsidm83WUqlSGgyOpvq0A8LzT4+WPra8ZvHue9jwOpJAAUR
tChBbm9ueW1vdXMgUmVtYWlsZXIgPGNhdGFseXN0QG5ldGNvbS5jb20+iQCVAgUQ
LIaqhIOA7OpLWtYzAQH4sgQAsc6s3X75LwWTV65Dw76wdSRKuoI57F2ZZWjSOIQK
n1CWUn6YEYOIs3kkdHNd0uz9Mspoy+6BsnWGSW11r8k88VThEoVpJ74o91apR1ML
yCEdD7O/+nZK8N484+mN2BcKOdeze4QvgTt+qHHUd+Q5alW9VfXtbNImmSnI3FC/
8n4=
=Hh6a
-----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----


-- 
Karl L. Barrus: klbarrus@owlnet.rice.edu         
keyID: 5AD633 hash: D1 59 9D 48 72 E9 19 D5  3D F3 93 7E 81 B5 CC 32 

"One man's mnemonic is another man's cryptography" 
  - my compilers prof discussing file naming in public directories



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: nobody@nyx.cs.du.edu
Date: Tue, 14 Sep 93 15:00:06 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: REMAIL: list
Message-ID: <9309142159.AA14129@nyx.cs.du.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Here is an interim release of the list, which includes the elee9sf@menudo
and elee6ue@rosebud remailer.  (And you thought I was joking when I said
that some people run remailers that aren't announced :-)

I cleaned up the scripts at elee6ue@rosebud, and in the process of creating
the proper directories for caching (which is NOT implemented just yet) I
zapped the pgp directory and the keyrings... so now there is a new key
for elee6ue@rosebud.ee.uh.edu, keyid = BBC00D.  Sorry about that!

Also, my key klbarrus@owlnet.rice.edu, keyid = 5AD633 has an A.K.A. on
it for elee9sf@menudo.uh.edu.  This is NOT the public key to the remailer,
whose keyid is DC9EE9.

I sign the public keys of remailers I have verified as working, so if you
get the latest pubkeys.tar.gz file from soda or the keys from me, you
will find a signature from 5AD633 on them.

Lastly, thanks to folks who are contributing programs to help other use
the remailers!  I decided to keep my offerings as shell scripts or batch
files, but there is only so much these languages can do, so I welcome
"high" level help programs (source included :-).  Nate's program is
mentioned, but not Alex's (yet) since it isn't available via ftp (yet).
I'll try to keep on top of this stuff.

Cypherpunk anonymous remailers, 9/15/93

Q1: What are the anonymous remailers?

A1:

 1: nowhere@bsu-cs.bsu.edu
 2: hh@cicada.berkeley.edu
 3: hh@pmantis.berkeley.edu
 4: hh@soda.berkeley.edu
 5: 00x@uclink.berkeley.edu
 6: cdodhner@indirect.com
 7: hal@alumni.caltech.edu
 8: cs60a-qu@cory.eecs.berkeley.edu
 9: ebrandt@jarthur.claremont.edu
10: catalyst@netcom.com
11: sameer@netcom.com
12: remailer@rebma.mn.org
13: elee6ue@rosebud.ee.uh.edu
14: elee7h5@rosebud.ee.uh.edu
15: hfinney@shell.portal.com
16: remail@tamsun.tamu.edu
17: remail@tamaix.tamu.edu
18: remailer@utter.dis.org
19: remailer@entropy.linet.org
20: elee9sf@menudo.uh.edu
21: remail@extropia.wimsey.com

NOTES: 

1-6		no encryption of remailing requests
7-20		support encrypted remailing requests
21		special - header and message must be encrypted together
12,18,19,21	introduce larger than average delay (not direct connect)
12,18,21	running on privately owned machines
20              supports RIPEM encryption, caches all requests

======================================================================

Q2: What help is available?

A2:

Check out the pub/cypherpunks/remailer directory at soda.berkeley.edu
(128.32.149.19).  

chain.zip             - program that helps with using remailers
dosbat.zip            - MSDOS batch files that help with using remailers
hal's.instructions.gz - in depth instruction on how to use
hal's.remailer.gz     - remailer code
pubkeys.tar.gz        - public keys of remailers which support encryption
pubkeys.zip           - MSDOS zip file of public keys
scripts.tar.gz        - scripts that help with using remailers

Also, at 129.82.156.104 in /pub/pgpc/ are two files: pgp22.tar.gz,
pgp22.tar.Z which assist in using the anonymous remailers, including
anon.penet.fi.

Mail to me (klbarrus@owlnet.rice.edu) for further help and/or questions.

======================================================================

Q3.  Email-to-Usenet gateways?

A3.

 1: group-name@cs.utexas.edu
 2: group.name.usenet@decwrl.dec.com
 3: group.name@news.demon.co.uk
 4: group.name@news.cs.indiana.edu
 5: group-name@pws.bull.com
 6: group-name@ucbvax.berkeley.edu

NOTES:

*  This does not include ones that work for single groups, like twwells.com.
#1 apparently blocks anonymous remailer posts
#6 blocks from non-berkeley sites (so use the berkeley remailers :-)




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: peter honeyman <honey@citi.umich.edu>
Date: Tue, 14 Sep 93 13:09:02 PDT
To: doug@netcom5.netcom.com (Doug Merritt)
Subject: Re: authoritative definition of cryptography?
Message-ID: <9309142005.AA13289@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


according to denning's book, "cryptography is the science and study of 
secret writing."  webster's 7th says cryptography is "the enciphering 
and deciphering of messages in secret code."  kahn says "the methods of
cryptography ... render [a secret message] unintelligible to outsiders 
by various transformations of the plaintext."

	peter





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Karl Lui Barrus <klbarrus@owlnet.rice.edu>
Date: Tue, 14 Sep 93 14:44:04 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: REMAIL: list
Message-ID: <9309142142.AA15094@flammulated.owlnet.rice.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


::
Anon-To: cypherpunks@toad.com

Here is an interim release of the list, which includes the elee9sf@menudo
and elee6ue@rosebud remailer.  (And you thought I was joking when I said
that some people run remailers that aren't announced :-)

I cleaned up the scripts at elee6ue@rosebud, and in the process of creating
the proper directories for caching (which is NOT implemented just yet) I
zapped the pgp directory and the keyrings... so now there is a new key
for elee6ue@rosebud.ee.uh.edu, keyid = BBC00D.  Sorry about that!

Also, my key klbarrus@owlnet.rice.edu, keyid = 5AD633 has an A.K.A. on
it for elee9sf@menudo.uh.edu.  This is NOT the public key to the remailer,
whose keyid is DC9EE9.

I sign the public keys of remailers I have verified as working, so if you
get the latest pubkeys.tar.gz file from soda or the keys from me, you
will find a signature from 5AD633 on them.

Lastly, thanks to folks who are contributing programs to help other use
the remailers!  I decided to keep my offerings as shell scripts or batch
files, but there is only so much these languages can do, so I welcome
"high" level help programs (source included :-).  Nate's program is
mentioned, but not Alex's (yet) since it isn't available via ftp (yet).
I'll try to keep on top of this stuff.

Cypherpunk anonymous remailers, 9/15/93

Q1: What are the anonymous remailers?

A1:

 1: nowhere@bsu-cs.bsu.edu
 2: hh@cicada.berkeley.edu
 3: hh@pmantis.berkeley.edu
 4: hh@soda.berkeley.edu
 5: 00x@uclink.berkeley.edu
 6: cdodhner@indirect.com
 7: hal@alumni.caltech.edu
 8: cs60a-qu@cory.eecs.berkeley.edu
 9: ebrandt@jarthur.claremont.edu
10: catalyst@netcom.com
11: sameer@netcom.com
12: remailer@rebma.mn.org
13: elee6ue@rosebud.ee.uh.edu
14: elee7h5@rosebud.ee.uh.edu
15: hfinney@shell.portal.com
16: remail@tamsun.tamu.edu
17: remail@tamaix.tamu.edu
18: remailer@utter.dis.org
19: remailer@entropy.linet.org
20: elee9sf@menudo.uh.edu
21: remail@extropia.wimsey.com

NOTES: 

1-6		no encryption of remailing requests
7-20		support encrypted remailing requests
21		special - header and message must be encrypted together
12,18,19,21	introduce larger than average delay (not direct connect)
12,18,21	running on privately owned machines
20              supports RIPEM encryption, caches all requests

======================================================================

Q2: What help is available?

A2:

Check out the pub/cypherpunks/remailer directory at soda.berkeley.edu
(128.32.149.19).  

chain.zip             - program that helps with using remailers
dosbat.zip            - MSDOS batch files that help with using remailers
hal's.instructions.gz - in depth instruction on how to use
hal's.remailer.gz     - remailer code
pubkeys.tar.gz        - public keys of remailers which support encryption
pubkeys.zip           - MSDOS zip file of public keys
scripts.tar.gz        - scripts that help with using remailers

Also, at 129.82.156.104 in /pub/pgpc/ are two files: pgp22.tar.gz,
pgp22.tar.Z which assist in using the anonymous remailers, including
anon.penet.fi.

Mail to me (klbarrus@owlnet.rice.edu) for further help and/or questions.

======================================================================

Q3.  Email-to-Usenet gateways?

A3.

 1: group-name@cs.utexas.edu
 2: group.name.usenet@decwrl.dec.com
 3: group.name@news.demon.co.uk
 4: group.name@news.cs.indiana.edu
 5: group-name@pws.bull.com
 6: group-name@ucbvax.berkeley.edu

NOTES:

*  This does not include ones that work for single groups, like twwells.com.
#1 apparently blocks anonymous remailer posts
#6 blocks from non-berkeley sites (so use the berkeley remailers :-)




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: nobody@rosebud.ee.uh.edu
Date: Tue, 14 Sep 93 16:09:04 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: REMAIL: new remailer
Message-ID: <9309142307.AA15536@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

Hm... something weird happened since I didn't send out four copies of
the remailer list.

And a message I sent a while ago hasn't appeared yet...?

First, I've been told that some people are concerned about my
signature appearing on the remailer keys.  I sign every remailer key I
verify, hopefully in addition to the signature already present from
the remailer operator... so if you run a remailer, sign the key if you
haven't, and mail it to me, preferable with your public key because I
don't like "unknown signator" messages.  I will include it in the
pubkeys.tar.gz distribution I put (with Eric's help) on soda.  That
way it won't look like I'm signing every remailer key all by myself :-)

Anyway, this is a remailer I've been using for various testing
purposes, but haven't announced (and you thought I was joking when I
said people are running remailers they haven't announced :-) It is set
up in a friend's account with his permission since he is away working
in NH with no telnet priveleges.

This may become the preferred remailer on rosebud.  I have been told
by a lawyer that running a remailer from an account I no longer have
legitimate access to breaks about three laws in Texas.  :(  Maybe
eventually I'll spring for a commercial setup where I have a little
more say.

My old account (elee7h5@rosebud.ee.uh.edu) has been locked since I am
no longer in that graduate group (or at that university for that
matter).  However, the remailer still works, since my directory
structure remains. So, I mailed to two people in charge on rosebud,
and have asked them to get back to me if they want the remailer
cancelled.  I haven't heard back, so maybe they support it!  Actually
though, since the remailer doesn't take up much space nor does it eat
much cpu, they may very well not care.

But my friend's account is still going strong :-)

I've retested the remailing functions, and here is the key (keyid BBC00D)

- -----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----
Version: 2.3a

mQCNAiyWMdIAAAEEAMjEKj+hSQa1pJlIdAo3DH0qhKIqiNIPiyiDoxXctXR/wix7
lapUizd/Kj1FeYvMgKe1/rYKwgC1oHrCzKXoZ44ipsmaVArj++d3nfjblp/mh0Rd
fCnQDt0PZ8wcx0gE87N6vJ77K8iW/dS9D1z9bax77HGl3i3A0kbfRR3Gu8ANAAUR
tChNci4gUmVtYWlsZXIgPGVsZWU2dWVAcm9zZWJ1ZC5lZS51aC5lZHU+iQCVAgUQ
LJYx1oOA7OpLWtYzAQGUjgQAsimuSOXkjvQubyQc3jjjvgFnV+Vce7TQnlZtjd2P
A2S8Yafk/3rcBnVKGQ3ZBmYHc2AcvXwjZEQsTQYiKOQJ8/qzqQsbq7Juwg/Op4Fu
GwtCuGERq9qA7lFrKwvbowQWb9kos9Hdor8v/DZREz8IOTbWKYRb8uyjH0jGw57Q
b/c=
=DWkv
- -----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----

It isn't the original key since I zapped it when I was shuffling
around directories to support caching (which I have not enabled).
Sorry!


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.3a

iQCVAgUBLJZOSoOA7OpLWtYzAQHkNQQAxdOIX3L+vKoo8OaC8mB5cyGfSEOKULdQ
OdbcA4gYKllTea82VLXZxCyYTyYNzIcGJ4v/E3Hod2BKC8wkISuOS0/QG9TXz9hm
bDBzmdLNxQApTTbMmVV78o8wX2ol42Tw3pvqvhws61Z8rxBVnoNaV47OsQLYlo77
UJNOzAJtMws=
=ADxw
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Anonymous <nowhere@bsu-cs.bsu.edu>
Date: Tue, 14 Sep 93 18:10:07 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: A E-mail to Usenet kludge for cs.texas.edu
Message-ID: <9309150112.AA14248@bsu-cs.bsu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>  1: group-name@cs.utexas.edu
>  2: group.name.usenet@decwrl.dec.com
>  3: group.name@news.demon.co.uk
>  4: group.name@news.cs.indiana.edu
>  5: group-name@pws.bull.com
>  6: group-name@ucbvax.berkeley.edu
>
> NOTES:
>
> *  This does not include ones that work for single groups, like
> twwells.com.
> #1 apparently blocks anonymous remailer posts
> #6 blocks from non-berkeley sites (so use the berkeley remailers :-)
>  for further help and/or questions.
 
 The comment concerning #1 (group-name@cs.utexas.edu) does not exactly
 hold true. Apparantly, by simply pasting in the -
 
 
    ::
    Request-Remailing-To: group-name@cs.utexas.edu
 
 
 header does not suffice. As a general rule of thumb, you must add the
 minimum in the pasted header -
 
 
    ::
    Request-Remailing-To: group-name@cs.utexas.edu
    Subject:
    Organization:
 
 
 Thanks to Chael Hall for helping me "troubleshoot" this little
 feature.
 





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: remail@tamsun.tamu.edu
Date: Tue, 14 Sep 93 18:24:08 PDT
To: Cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: No Subject
Message-ID: <9309150121.AA13893@tamsun.tamu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> If people are willing to go to these measures to steal Intel
> microprocessors, which are generally available, imagine what people
> will do in order to steal unprogrammed Skipjack chips.  In the volume
> the Government would like to see them made, the physical security
> which one might want to give to a classified production facility will
> be difficult or impossible.

They thought of this. The Skipjack algorithm is programmed into the
chip at the same time the escrowed keys are. If you steal the unprogrammed
chips you may learn the list of basic operations that are part of
Skipjack. However there are also basic operations implemented on the
chip which are *not* part of Skipjack but are there just to confuse
someone who would disassemble a chip.

Btw. This also means that the actual chip assembly line does not require
cleared workers.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: stig@netcom.com (Stig)
Date: Tue, 14 Sep 93 21:29:07 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: more than spread spectrum
In-Reply-To: <9309150353.AA06198@ellisun.sw.stratus.com>
Message-ID: <9309150426.AA00948@netcom2.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


In <9309150353.AA06198@ellisun.sw.stratus.com>, Carl Ellison wrote...
> There are alternatives to spread spectrum, if we're threatened with
> loss of freedom to communicate.
> 
> We could lay our own wires/fibers.
> 

Well, we'd like crypto for the masses and I don't think that the masses are
yet ready to put out the bucks for spread spectrum boards and infrared laser
communications gear...  It'd be really nice to have such a decentralized
network, though.

> We could set up a mesh network of infrared lasers through the air.  Last
> time I looked, there were no laws against shining lights out your window as
> long as they didn't bother anyone.  An infrared laser could hardly bother
> anyone.
> 
...
> very low range radio, ....  Each card would connect to three or more
> neighbors and become part of the global mesh.  Adaptive routing with no
> global map would suffice for the card and would keep the whole system
> peer-to-peer with no need for central control and no chance for central
> tapping.
> 

This would be the perfect network in which to deploy DC nets....  (dining
cryptographers).



;; __________________________________________________________________________
;; Stig@netcom.com                            netcom.com:/pub/stig/00-PGP-KEY
;; It's hard to be cutting-edge at your own pace...   32 DF B9 19 AE 28 D1 7A
;; Bullet-proof code cannot stand up to teflon bugs.  A3 9D 0B 1A 33 13 4D 7F




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: doug@netcom.com (Doug Merritt)
Date: Tue, 14 Sep 93 22:44:13 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: more than spread spectrum
Message-ID: <9309150541.AA10786@netcom2.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


cme@ellisun.sw.stratus.com (Carl Ellison) said:
>The benefit isn't just for Cypherpunks.  It's a free network for the masses...
>I'll volunteer to do the software for the node card.  Does anyone have
>hardware design/fab to donate to the effort?

You might want to contact the Garden project, which I believe is operational
in San Jose and in Santa Cruz. I'm not up on all the details, but it is
far too similar to what you're talking about to ignore.
        Doug




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: mjr@TIS.COM
Date: Tue, 14 Sep 93 20:00:08 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re:  Testing randomness of PGP-generated IDEA keys
Message-ID: <13737.9309150258@otter.TIS.COM>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>Hi, you may remember a few weeks back I was going to take a look at
>the randomness of PGP random number generation.... well, I finally
>got round to it. Since the MD5 of the file being encrypted is used
>as part of the random number generation process to prevent anyone 
>copying the randseed.bin file and generating all future keys from it, [...]

	I found myself embroiled in a similar exploration of random
number generation as part of some other work, and it took me a while
to realize that running statistics on the output of the PRNG is
almost useless, if you're using a cryptosystem or cryptographic hash
as the PRNG. With any decent cryptosystem, one bit change in the
input to the PRNG will cause every bit of the output to have a
50% chance of being different - that's a desirable property in a
cryptosystem. DES, and I assume IDEA, show this property.

	What you've got to look at is the predictability of the
input to the PRNG. PGP is in really good shape here, because it
bootstraps its PRNG with its input, which presumably is unknown
to the attacker. An example of a weak PRNG would be:

	`date | md5`

	For example:

otter-> cat foo
#!/bin/sh
date | /usr/local/bin/md5
date | /usr/local/bin/md5
sleep 1
date | /usr/local/bin/md5
otter-> foo
f4a66f827a8e62ad9c419f7e2117abc6
f4a66f827a8e62ad9c419f7e2117abc6
bcfa24d319ccdcad56a99be2e203e787

	As you expect the first two runs are exactly the same.
The second run is completely different. The seed, however, is
only very slightly changed (by one second). You could run
statistical analyses on the output for a long time and never
realize that your random number is really extremely easy to
crack. If I knew roughly what day you generated the "random"
number on, I could crack it in only 86,400 MD5 hashes, and
it's an operation that parallelizes trivially. *MUCH* cheaper
to attack the PRNG than the cryptosystem! And if you used a
toy PRNG to generate your RSA key, then you're lunchmeat.

	Anyhow, I've been over-long winded. I think PGP is
in good shape because of the aforementioned property of
using the message as a seed. Messages that don't change
much, or that change predictably, are subject to exhaustive
searching. A means of analysing the unpredictability of
the seed is more worthwhile. I made some basic starts at
doing this by ad hoc measures (generating repeated seeds
and running them through a program to count a minimum-bit
edit similar to diff) but I wasn't sure enough of the
validity of my approach to bother continuing it. My hat
is off to the guy who came up with the idea of seeding
the PRNG with the message. That was *clever*.

mjr.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: HFinney@shell.portal.com
Date: Wed, 15 Sep 93 06:09:10 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Remail: errors
Message-ID: <9309150646.AA29585@jobe.shell.portal.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

I have been out of town for the last week, so I missed some CP mail.
It looks like some good things are happening with remailers, though.
Kudos to Karl, Sameer, and the others for their work!

I have received many messages to my remailer in the last week which
came from remail@tamsun.tamu.edu, which were PGP-encrypted apparently
in an effort to get my remailer to send them.

They did not work, though, because there was no "Encrypted: PGP" header
to trigger the remailer's decryption.  This can be arranged by
creating the message something like this:

========================================================
::
Request-Remailing-To: hfinney@shell.portal.com

::
Encrypted: PGP

- -----BEGIN PGP MESSAGE-----
<rest of message>
- -----END PGP MESSAGE------
========================================================

This would then be sent to remail@tamsun.tamu.edu.

I don't know whether the multiplicity of such erroneous messages is
just due to one person stubbornly re-trying, or whether there is an
error in one of the new programs for creating chained remailer messages.

Hal Finney
hfinney@shell.portal.com

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.2

iQCVAgUBLJaNuKgTA69YIUw3AQHrNwQAowMEQwuH6YyHoj6T7AqZFLNdTf+eqJ9L
LhAatHS94nmC1smkfVNq0dZmigmkvBdMNEPlBZemmxALz+KJw6OSY/ULSBmuVNEq
5rJANh3XimoJWqLISy2lZiuC5Fw2R7UvRadcdM94pncSVvev92Fyf7CqEOOtrGAK
PUzRds7BVNo=
=FpLa
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: hfinney@shell.portal.com
Date: Wed, 15 Sep 93 06:09:17 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: caching scripts
Message-ID: <9309150646.AA29593@jobe.shell.portal.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

I am very excited to hear about Karl's progress in experimenting with
caching (batching) mail messages.  Karl, if it becomes convenient, I'd
appreciate seeing a copy of your scripts.

I have two thoughts about batching.  The first regards the mechanism
for arranging for activation of the batch scripts at regular intervals.
Karl mentioned at and crontab as two ways of arranging for this.  Some
users may not be allowed use of these functions.  I am not sure I can
use them on the systems which I use.

Another possibility, it occurs to me, would be an "activation" message
sent to each remailer from some system where crontab usage is allowed -
one of the systems which is owned by a remailer operator, for example.
This system would send out an activation message at midnight every night
to each remailer which had requested this function.  The activation
message would have a special header field which could be trapped by the
slocal program and cause it to run the batch script.

The other idea I had was to increase the volume of messages passing
through the remailers.  This way we could batch at more frequent intervals
while still having good "mixing" at each step.  Suppose some remailer
system took on the task of periodically injecting messages into the remailer
web.  Each message would be a large chain, perhaps through a dozen randomly-
chosen remailers, which would end up disappearing by being sent to a
"bit bucket" address like nobody@soda.berkeley.edu.  With the new
scripts appearing for producing random remailer message chains such a
program would be quite easy to write.

The message injection rate would be adjusted to give each remailer in
the system an average load large enough that batching would usually
have (say) ten or more messages to work with.  Perhaps nine of those ten
would be these dummy messages, while one is an actual user message.  But it
would not be easy to tell these apart, at least for user messages which
are in the middle of their chain; each message, dummy and real, is from
another remailer and to another remailer.  There is no hint as to which
are the actual messages.

It is true that user messages can be distinguished from dummy ones when
they are on their first or last stage in the chain; on the first stage,
they are the only messages coming from non-remailer addresses, and on the
last stage they are the only messages going to non-remailer addresses.
One way to fix this would be, instead of having the final destination
of the message be a "bit bucket" address, to instead choose a random
Internet address (say, from one of the "whois"-type databases), and to
send a message whose body starts with "Test message, please ignore".
With the tens or hundreds of thousands of addresses available (and with
the geometric growth of the Internet), it should not be necessary ever
to repeat an address.  So perhaps this slight annoyance to Internet users
would be tolerable.  Only a small fraction of users would ever receive
such a message.

The increase in traffic brought about by this dummy message source would
not be large in terms of the net as a whole.  It would only need to
introduce messages at the rate of (# messages per batch) * (# of remailers) /
(size of chain per message) per (batch interval).  Plausible values might
be:
# messages per batch:      10
# of remailers:            20
size of chain per message: 10
batch interval:             6 hours

This works out to about 3 messages per hour, not too large a load.

Of course, this message injection system would only be maintained as long
as user message traffic remained too low to provide good mixing in a
batch system.  As user message traffic increases, the injection rate would
be decreased to compensate, until finally it might be possible to eliminate
the dummy-message injection completely.

Comments are appreciated, as usual.

Hal Finney
hfinney@shell.portal.com

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.2

iQCVAgUBLJaN5agTA69YIUw3AQECnwP9F+0gMxoL4xoLPyAJS4/owHOmTGW2OE0a
nOLkjop+vT388LyZjbj40cRwm0OWpjNXwvsxsmY+Uhc8EYyTu/H1wKn2N2PR0Ufu
TD/EYxLFuvXQGviGKftMfM/VbwRXUf1SiUnPovZ7jVaBhacp62y4+C6BQtFSZIft
l3T2U1KI+Y4=
=11AS
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: cme@ellisun.sw.stratus.com (Carl Ellison)
Date: Tue, 14 Sep 93 20:54:10 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: more than spread spectrum
Message-ID: <9309150353.AA06198@ellisun.sw.stratus.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


There are alternatives to spread spectrum, if we're threatened with
loss of freedom to communicate.

We could lay our own wires/fibers.

We could set up a mesh network of infrared lasers through the air.  Last
time I looked, there were no laws against shining lights out your window as
long as they didn't bother anyone.  An infrared laser could hardly bother
anyone.

We could produce a line of cheap cards to plug into a PC which would do
packet routing, using a variety of physical links -- our own wires, lasers,
very low range radio, ....  Each card would connect to three or more
neighbors and become part of the global mesh.  Adaptive routing with no
global map would suffice for the card and would keep the whole system
peer-to-peer with no need for central control and no chance for central
tapping.

Of course all of these solutions require a high density of users.  A
college campus might be the right place to start.  We could then branch out
to cities.  I suspect that a place like Chicago or NYC with high rise
apartments might be the place to start -- many options for line-of-sight
communications.


The benefit isn't just for Cypherpunks.  It's a free network for the masses
-- like the original USENET (with each user donating routing and
store/forward) but with unrestricted, low-range, continuously operating
physical links.


I'll volunteer to do the software for the node card.  Does anyone have
hardware design/fab to donate to the effort?

 - Carl




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: an31185@anon.penet.fi (Anon of Ibid)
Date: Tue, 14 Sep 93 16:59:04 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Testing randomness of PGP-generated IDEA keys
Message-ID: <9309142358.AA14909@anon.penet.fi>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Hi, you may remember a few weeks back I was going to take a look at
the randomness of PGP random number generation.... well, I finally
got round to it. Since the MD5 of the file being encrypted is used
as part of the random number generation process to prevent anyone 
copying the randseed.bin file and generating all future keys from it, 
I wrote a program to read in /usr/dict/words, and loop around generating 
files containing a random number (using the unix random() call) of random 
sentences using the words in the dictionary, and encrypt them with a test 
384-bit key. 

The copy of PGP I was using was modified to dumped the 24-byte key/random 
prefix combination into a file, which the main program read out and processed.
Firstly, it maintained a table of counts for each byte value, and secondly
(since I gave up statistics years ago), XOR-ed all the bytes in each 24-byte
sample together and maintained a table of frequency of XOR values as a
simple check for randomness in each 24-byte sample.

After running for a few days, the results were:

Total bytes generated : 3000504 (125021 runs)
 
Frequency : High: 11960 Low : 11377 Mean: 11721 Spread: 584 (4 %, +2 %, -2 %)
            Within 50% of mean : 2505989 (83 %)
 
XOR Freq  : High: 553 Low : 432 Mean: 488 Spread: 122 (25 %, +13 %, -11 %)
            Within 50% of mean : 107652 (86 %)
 
Since, as I said, I'm not a statistician, my definitions of the above
categories are : 

Mean   - expected frequency, i.e. total number of bytes generated/256, 
Spread - absolute difference between frequencies of rarest and most common 
         byte values, plus difference as percentage of mean, and spread above
         and below the mean as a percentage of the mean (rounded to nearest)

Lastly, the program summed the frequencies of the bytes whose frequency
was between (mean-(mean-low)/2) and (mean+(high-mean)/2), giving the result
as an absolute value and a percentage of the total number of bytes generated.

From this, it looks to me like the random number generation is, indeed, pretty 
random, and if you're trying to break an arbitrary PGP-encrypted file by a 
brute-force attack on the IDEA-encrypted section, then you don't have any 
shortcuts based on frequency of bytes in the key. If anyone with a better 
grasp of statistics wants the original data to look at (25k, containing 24 
arrays of byte frequencies and one of XOR frequencies), let me know and I'll 
email it to you.

So, if there is a 'fatal flaw' in PGP, it looks like it must be either the
known plaintext, or it must be somewhere in the prime generation code. Since
I know nothing about fast methods of testing primality, someone else is
going to have to look into that.... (Unless I get bored enough to hunt
out some books on the subject)


-------------------------------------------------------------------------
To find out more about the anon service, send mail to help@anon.penet.fi.
Due to the double-blind, any mail replies to this message will be anonymized,
and an anonymous id will be allocated automatically. You have been warned.
Please report any problems, inappropriate use etc. to admin@anon.penet.fi.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Jiva De Voe <tigger@indirect.com>
Date: Wed, 15 Sep 93 00:15:13 PDT
To: nate@vis.colostate.edu
Subject: Re: PGPC 2.2 available
In-Reply-To: <9309141739.AA08520@nagel.VIS.ColoState.EDU>
Message-ID: <199309150712.AA17262@indirect.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> 
> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
> 
> PGPC 2.2 is available for anonymous ftp from 129.82.156.104
> in /pub/pgpc/pgpc22.tar.[Z,gz]
> 
> It is available in either gnuzip or regular compress.
> 

I still can't get this critter decompressed.  Is this some sort of joke or
something?  Has anyone been able to decompress it?  gnuzip sez not a
zipped file.  Uncompress sez, not a compressed file, gunzip won't read it,
tar won't read it.  I'd really like to try this fellow's product, but have
received no reply to my email about how to decompress it and can't make it
work.

Mebbe some kind person could send me a tar version?

(Don't mean to sound flamish BTW, just frustrated)

Tigger@indirect.com





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: J. Michael Diehl <mdiehl@triton.unm.edu>
Date: Wed, 15 Sep 93 00:49:08 PDT
To: doug@netcom.com (Doug Merritt)
Subject: Re: more than spread spectrum
In-Reply-To: <9309150541.AA10786@netcom2.netcom.com>
Message-ID: <9309150747.AA15660@triton.unm.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


According to Doug Merritt:
>cme@ellisun.sw.stratus.com (Carl Ellison) said:
>>The benefit isn't just for Cypherpunks.  It's a free network for the masses...
>>I'll volunteer to do the software for the node card.  Does anyone have
>>hardware design/fab to donate to the effort?
> 
> You might want to contact the Garden project, which I believe is operational
> in San Jose and in Santa Cruz. I'm not up on all the details, but it is
> far too similar to what you're talking about to ignore.

....and keep us posted!  Thanx in advance.




J. Michael Diehl   ;^)  |*The 2nd Amendment is there in case the 
mdiehl@triton.unm.edu   | Government forgets about the 1st!  <RL>
Mike.Diehl@f29.n301.z1  |*God is a good Physicist, and an even 
    .fidonet.org        | better Mathematician.  <Me>
al945@cwns9.ins.cwru.edu|*I'm just looking for the opportunity to 
 (505) 299-2282 (voice) | be Politically Incorrect! <Me>
Can we impeach him yet? |*Protected by 18 USC 2511 and 18 USC 2703. 
PGP Key = 7C06F1 = A6 27 E1 1D 5F B2 F2 F1  12 E7 53 2D 85 A2 10 5D



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "George A. Gleason" <gg@well.sf.ca.us>
Date: Wed, 15 Sep 93 02:05:14 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re:  more than spread spectrum
Message-ID: <93Sep15.020336pdt.14247-1@well.sf.ca.us>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Re. Carl's suggestion to "lay our own wires/fibers..."

That's exactly what I'm up to with the Community Dialtone project.
Basically it comes down to having a neighborhood switch.  We may be doing
our first installation in the Winter, about 800 lines if all goes well.
Seems to me that owning the switching & transmission infrastructure has a
lot of possibilities.  Anyway, more news to come on this in a few weeks...

The thing is, I've looked into things like having infrared laser networks
and various non-switched message relay systems... these just don't have the
overall reliability of a decent switched system, for a large number of
reasons which essentially boil down to the fact that each individual link is
weak enough that even a redundant system can break down badly at points
where the link density is relatively thin.  Then also there's the question
of economic feasilbility; to make a decentralised/non-switched system work,
you need an application that is *so* popular that everyone in an area will
want to be in.  This comes down to subscriber density, and the issue is
basically the same with telephone lines, but everyone needs a phone line...
cable TV has high market penetration but satellite TV doesn't... how can we
expect a lot of average folks to set up an infrared relay, eh...?  Seems to
me the best thing is to have the IR relays located where they can connect
among the switching systems serving the various blocks and neighborhoods.
(and if anyone's figured out how to do that at 2.048 Mb, i.e. approx double
T1, please email me ASAP).  

-gg




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: loki@convex1.TCS.Tulane.EDU (the mischeivious god)
Date: Wed, 15 Sep 93 08:29:10 PDT
To: tigger@indirect.com (Jiva De Voe)
Subject: Re: PGPC 2.2 available...Problems with GNUZIP??
In-Reply-To: <199309150712.AA17262@indirect.com>
Message-ID: <9309151527.AA15762@convex1.tcs.tulane.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> 
> > 
> > -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
> > 
> > PGPC 2.2 is available for anonymous ftp from 129.82.156.104
> > in /pub/pgpc/pgpc22.tar.[Z,gz]
> > 
> > It is available in either gnuzip or regular compress.
> > 
> 
> I still can't get this critter decompressed.  Is this some sort of joke or
> something?  Has anyone been able to decompress it?  gnuzip sez not a
> zipped file.  Uncompress sez, not a compressed file, gunzip won't read it,
> tar won't read it.  I'd really like to try this fellow's product, but have
> received no reply to my email about how to decompress it and can't make it
> work.
> 
> Mebbe some kind person could send me a tar version?

Ok nate@monet.vis.colostate.edu sez that you can trick the host ftp site 
into decompressing 4 U!!!1

Use "get" instead of the easier wildcard "mget" and the ftp site does the rest
just follow the prompts...if any.

However, I am not sure that the ftp sites appreciate this practice so
don't do this if you can find alternate means...

Also, ftp time takes a LOT longer...so get a cup of tea and sit by your 
terminal as you need to do some typing if you are going to "get" several
.gz files.

LOKI on a crippled convex with a fucked kermrc (send me a good one please)
and no gnuzip util on the site at all.





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: cme@ellisun.sw.stratus.com (Carl Ellison)
Date: Wed, 15 Sep 93 08:14:19 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: FTP location for sci.crypt FAQ
Message-ID: <9309151511.AA07423@ellisun.sw.stratus.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>sci.crypt Usenet newsgroup FAQ. It's posted occasiuonally to sci.crypt,
>but I can't think of a site (offhand) where you can FTP it.

[from the FAQ]

The sections of this FAQ are available via anonymous FTP to rtfm.mit.edu 
as /pub/usenet/news.answers/cryptography-faq/part[xx]. The Cryptography 
FAQ is posted to the newsgroups sci.crypt, sci.answers, and news.answers 
every 21 days.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Anonymous <nowhere@bsu-cs.bsu.edu>
Date: Wed, 15 Sep 93 18:49:15 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Odds and Ends (Books) (fwd)Re: Books: wanted to buy
Message-ID: <9309160148.AA13320@bsu-cs.bsu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


In article p00122@psilink.com, "BSW Gateway" <p00122@psilink.com> () writes:
>I am searching for two out-of-print books. I would like to purchase one
>copy each in reasonably good condition. If you have either and are willing
>to part with it, please contact me by email. Thanks.
>
>Tutorial: The Security of Data in Networks
>by Davies
>IEEE Computer Society Press, 1981
>
>Kahn on Codes
>by Kahn
>Macmillan, 1983
>
>Note: the second book is NOT "The Codebreakers" but a later book by Kahn.
 
        I tried e-mail but the message is bouncing around like a
        kangaroo on certain controlled substances.  The following is
        a list of bookstores dealing, more or less specifically with
        espionage and intelligence and include some coverage of
        crypto.  My recommendation for the first title would be
        to try Elm.  If you contact C&D, ELM, or NIBC, mentioning
        my name _might_ help.
        
        Alec Chambers
 
        Cloak and Dagger Books,
        9 Eastman Avenue
        Bedford, NH 03110-6701
 
        Phone: (603) 668-1629 (evenings)
 
        Proprietor: Dan Halpin Jr.
 
        Dealer in out of print and rare books relating to nonfiction
        espionage, crypto, terrorism and partisan and guerilla warfare.
        Stocks more than 10,000 books and will do searches.  Dan is
        extraordinarily amiable and helpful, but does ask that you send
        $2.50 for a catalog.  I have dealt happily with him for some
        time.
 
        Elm Spy Books,
        P.O.Box 9753
        Arnold, MD 21012
 
        Phone: (301) 544-9014.
 
        Proprietor: Emil Levine
 
        Has a coverage similar to Cloak and Dagger, but is interested
        in specializing in crypto (he's not too far from Ft. George
        mmmmmmmfff...).  Another helpful individual with whom I have
        dealt.  Catalog costs $2.00.
 
        Military Bookman,
        29 East 93rd Street
        New York, NY 10128.
 
        Mail Order (212) 348-1280
 
        Large collection of military titles, including military
        intelligence.  Catalogs available
 
        National Intelligence Book Center,
        1700 K Street NW, Suite 607
        Washington DC
 
        Phone: (202) 785-4334
        FAX:   (202) 331-7456
        e-mail: 70346.1166@COMPUSERVE.COM
 
        Publishes an annotated, bimonthly publication, Surveillant:
        Acquisitions for the Intelligence and Security Professional,
        listing new books, paperback editions, foreign language titles,
        US government documents on intelligence, video, and audio
        tapes, forthcoming books and works in progress, and news and events.
        Annual subscription is $96 in the U.S.  The Book Center will also
        compile bibliographies on _specific_ intelligence on request.
        All sales are now conducted through Olsson's Books,
        1200 F Street, NW, Washington DC 20004 (202) 337-8084.
 
        Q.M.Dabney&Co.,
        11910-P Parklawn Drive,
        Rockville, MD 20852
        Phone (301) 881-1470
 
        Very large military collection with some intelligence titles.
        Carries only out-of-print books.  Not a browsing bookstores,
        phone orders only, catalogs available.  I have dealt happily
        with them for years although they are SLOW on actually sending
        the stuff out.
 
        Ruth Koffsky Books,
        5515 Greystone Street,
        Chevy Chase, MD 20815
 
        Phone: (301) 656-5587
 
        Specializes in ex-library and reader's copies of works on
        intelligence, politics, and world affairs.  Open by appointment
        only or by mail.  Upon request will send a list of titles on
        a very specific topic.
 
        Sidney Kramer Books,
        1825 I Street, NW
        Washington, DC 20006.
 
        Mail order: (202) 293-2685
        Fax:        (202) 835-9756
 
        Large collection of intelligence-related titles in sections on
        "intelligence," "military affairs," and "regional studies."
        Offers catalogs and will special order.
 
        Sky Books,
        48 E. 50th Street,
        Second Floor,
        New York, NY 10022
 
        Mail Order: (212) 688-5086.
 
        Large selection of titles on military intelligence and espionage.
        Offers book club with selection of intelligence titles.





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Timothy Newsham <newsham@wiliki.eng.hawaii.edu>
Date: Wed, 15 Sep 93 15:45:31 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Random numbers
Message-ID: <9309152245.AA03105@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Anon Wrote
> mjr@TIS.COM writes:
> >So figure you want more than 56 bits of pure unpredictability as your
> >seed. This is a tricky problem. One option is to give the user a typematic
> >buffer: "hit keys for 30 seconds" - you NEED unpredictability!
> 
> So, it sounds like what we *really* need is a little box with a shot-noise
> generator that attaches to a serial port and generates truly random
> numbers to use for the key. Anyone out there feel like designing one for us ? 

Last time I was fingering through an analog parts catalog under the
telephony section I noticed a bunch of parts that generate audio-noise.
Maybe some of these would be suitable (if they dont use an internal
digital state machine to generate the noise).




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: wcs@anchor.ho.att.com (Bill_Stewart_HOY002_1305)
Date: Wed, 15 Sep 93 10:49:22 PDT
To: hfinney@shell.portal.com
Subject: Re: caching scripts
Message-ID: <9309151749.AA03778@anchor.ho.att.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text


Hal writes, on the subject of filler messages

> It is true that user messages can be distinguished from dummy ones when
> they are on their first or last stage in the chain; on the first stage,
> they are the only messages coming from non-remailer addresses, and on the
> last stage they are the only messages going to non-remailer addresses.
> One way to fix this would be, instead of having the final destination
> of the message be a "bit bucket" address, to instead choose a random
> Internet address (say, from one of the "whois"-type databases), and to
> send a message whose body starts with "Test message, please ignore".
> With the tens or hundreds of thousands of addresses available (and with
> the geometric growth of the Internet), it should not be necessary ever
> to repeat an address.  So perhaps this slight annoyance to Internet users
> would be tolerable.  Only a small fraction of users would ever receive
> such a message.

This is a way to increase the public's annoyance with remailers,
when what we need to do is increase their acceptance of them.
It also doesn't work - a cleartext message saying "Please ignore"
is visible to any eavesdropper, an encrypted message to a real person
is annoying and non-readable, and an encrypted message to a bogus person
will usually generate bounce-mail (which is obvious to eavesdroppers),
or will at least drop on an operator's floor, annoying the operator.

If we can get a reasonable number of remailers operating,
it makes much more sense to have standard bit-bucket addresses,
and if we want to get more traffic to sites that aren't obviously remailers,
we need to get their permission.  This can either be done by asking people
(which the Bad Guys can watch), or perhaps by providing some semi-useful service,
like a netnews test sink or mail-a-joke or something; 
even those tend to be obvious - unless they can also be remailers or at least 
require crypto or other illegible data input.

		Bill Stewart



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Anonymous <nowhere@bsu-cs.bsu.edu>
Date: Wed, 15 Sep 93 12:44:23 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: No Subject
Message-ID: <9309151944.AA16459@bsu-cs.bsu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Hi,

Can someone clue me in to a location of a VMS version of PGP?

Thanks




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: mjr@TIS.COM
Date: Wed, 15 Sep 93 12:09:12 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Testing randomness of PGP-generated IDEA keys
Message-ID: <16690.9309151905@otter.TIS.COM>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Anonymous writes:
>Yes, obviously you're right. PGP seems to take the randseed.bin file,
>the MD5 of the input, and the current time, and munge all of them together
>using the IDEA encryption routines to create the final results.

	Assume the current time is a wash. Any message sent is going
to have an approximate time (in seconds) inserted in the header as
the MTA moves it, so that value is searchable trivially. For example,
this message nicely contains a timestamp:

Date: Wed, 15 Sep 1993 18:22:10 UTC

	I figure searching all the seeds within 12 hours of that will
eliminate the time as a seed, and that's only 84,000 searches, which
is huge orders of magnitude easier than searching DES. You don't even
need gnarly fictional $1.5million DES-searching machines to do it.

	That leaves the MD5 of the input and randseed.bin. The MD5 of
the input is by definition unknown to the attacker in MOST cases,
right? If you're using this for confidentiality, that is. If the
input is known, then you're left with just randseed.bin.

>The contents of randseed.bin are created by generating some random bytes 
>using the same generation routine as the key and encrypting it with the key, 
>so they should be as random as the sample I created.

	I'm not entirely clear on this. It uses the same mechanism
as the key and feeds it back through itself? What is the input into
this process? Again: ignore the apparent randomness of the output,
you need to look at the unpredictability of the input seed. Randseed.bin
should be kept secret, clearly, as it's part of your key.

>What bearing might this have on the suggestions of using electronic cheques
>(presumably encrypted with PGP) ? If the cheque is a standard format, that 
>might open up some possibilities with this kind of approach, especially if 
>you know who it came from and/or who it's payable to.

	If I know the layout of the check and know that the only values
that will change are a serial number which increases monotonically, and
a value, which averages around $1,000, I can probably crack your PRNG in
an hour or two, depending on how many processors I throw at it. Remember
that this parallelizes trivially. Also, when you crack the PRNG with a
public key system, you *KNOW* instantly that you've gotten the correct
key, so the entire process is very hands off.

	One way of thinking about the problem is trying to count how many
bits of unpredictability go into your PRNG seed. If you're willing to
assume your adversary can brute-force search DES' 56-bit keyspace, then
you'd better assume he's also willing to brute-force search your PRNG.
So figure you want more than 56 bits of pure unpredictability as your
seed. This is a tricky problem. One option is to give the user a typematic
buffer: "hit keys for 30 seconds" - you NEED unpredictability!

mjr.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Sandy <72114.1712@CompuServe.COM>
Date: Wed, 15 Sep 93 12:49:12 PDT
To: <cypherpunks@toad.com>
Subject: SKIPJACK IN POPULAR SCI
Message-ID: <930915194156_72114.1712_FHF44-1@CompuServe.COM>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
  SANDY SANDFORT               Reply to:  ssandfort@attmail.com
 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Cypherpunks,

There is a short piece about Skiptap, er, Skipjack, in the
electronics section of the October "Popular Science."  It has a
pretty good diagram and a photo of the Mykotronx chip.

It says "Bill Clinton himself decided that the U.S. government
will promote a new encoding chip for communications."  It also
quotes a guy from NIST who says, "Once you accept the fact that
law enforcement has to do its job, this is a good solution."
(Fortunately, Cypherpunks generally *don't* accept that "fact.")

A vice president at Mykotronx, John Droge, tried to create the
impression that Skipjack just sort of happened to them.  He also
gave away the real party at interest.  He said, "They [the NSA]
came to us with a neat equation and said, `Here you go.'"

The article mentioned that 85% of the comments at recent federal
hearings were hostile or skeptical.  Amazingly, the article never
quoted May, Hughes or Gilmore.  Where has this writer been?

 S a n d y

>>>>>>    Please send e-mail to:  ssandfort@attmail.com    <<<<<<
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: mgream@acacia.itd.uts.edu.au (Matthew Gream)
Date: Tue, 14 Sep 93 23:40:32 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com (Cypherpunks List)
Subject: Re: more than spread spectrum
In-Reply-To: <9309150353.AA06198@ellisun.sw.stratus.com>
Message-ID: <9309150640.AA02395@acacia.itd.uts.EDU.AU>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



In reply to (Carl Ellison):

| I'll volunteer to do the software for the node card.  Does anyone have
| hardware design/fab to donate to the effort?

Hmm, this is nice timing I guess :-)

Over the last 3-4 weeks I have been mulling over in my head (you know,
that process before you actually start putting down on paper) a design
for a relatively 'simple' learning bridge, using off the shelf support
chips. I'm currently in the middle of an academic semester, and if I
don't happen to work during the coming break (for the non-australians,
our academic year is mar->nov), then this is something I will take up.

The actual design I have in mind has a 839X IEEE802.3 CSMA/CD ethernet
controller on the network side plus an 8088 embedded controller to do
all the work (or, maybe something else, but 8088 assembly is familiar 
to me and its a real cheap chip). The output stage is a synchronous 
HDLC varient (SABM mode, cut down for pp operation) running at a select-
able synch rate (anywhere from 19.2k to 10mbps, obviously @ 19.2k you 
would have problems on a loaded ethernet).

One of the main reasons for starting this is that another colleague of
mine has an interest in constructing the 2mbps microwave (10GHz) project
as seen in your local ARRL handbook. This would tie in nicely, but
further to this, it has the possibility to interface to any communications
medium you desire (as long as it can handle a synch incoming data stream).
It oculd plug into the other side of a spread-spectrum board, it could
be used with an async interface and a pc to tunnel traffic across
another network, and so on.

There is also a possibility to use some of the HDLC initialisation
phases to exchange public keys :-), and to encrypt information frames
(headers == plaintext) on the fly. 'Generic' and 'Modular' is a basic
philosophy of mine. If I do have the time, and complete this project,
then I hope to make it 'available' to the masses (so to speak). I can
envisage that there would be people interested in such a setup.

As an undergrad Computer Systems Engineer student, there are no problems
with access to appropriate design and testing equipment, its just a 
matter of me getting the time.

Of course, all this is 'in my head' at the moment, so nothing is definite.
Discussion, ideas and pointers are welcome, although the technical side
of things maybe straying from the cypherpunk agenda.

Matthew.
-- 
Matthew Gream,, M.Gream@uts.edu.au -- Consent Technologies, 02-821-2043.





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: doug@netcom.com (Doug Merritt)
Date: Wed, 15 Sep 93 17:10:33 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Joke of the Day
Message-ID: <9309160010.AA17092@netcom.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


an23412@anon.penet.fi said:
>My actual horoscope for today:

Uh-oh...your anonymity is partially compromised; we can now narrow down
your identity 91.7 percent more closely than before!

A few more slips like that and we'll have it down to one of several
thousand choices...

Speaking of privacy violations, a coworker relates a story from his
father (ok, just a FOAF story, but it's still interesting): He needed
to find his wife, who'd headed off for some errand and thence to the
airport, leaving her spending cash at home. He called her on her cellular
car phone, but she'd turned it off. He called Cellular One and explained
the problem, and they told him over the phone where she was...he sped off
and caught up with her.

Although this was handy for him, it's an obvious privacy problem for
Cellular One to tell someone where one of their customers is.
	Doug




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: williacw@vuse.vanderbilt.edu (Charles Williams)
Date: Wed, 15 Sep 93 15:35:50 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Unix version of PGP
Message-ID: <9309152234.AA29816@necs.vuse>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Is there a UNIversion of PGP?
Please Email me the location at:
WESLEY@ctrvax.vanderbilt.edu

Thanks




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: an31185@anon.penet.fi (Anon of Ibid)
Date: Wed, 15 Sep 93 11:24:22 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Testing randomness of PGP-generated IDEA keys
Message-ID: <9309151822.AA11900@anon.penet.fi>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


mjr@TIS.COM said:
>	I found myself embroiled in a similar exploration of random
>number generation as part of some other work, and it took me a while
>to realize that running statistics on the output of the PRNG is
>almost useless, if you're using a cryptosystem or cryptographic hash
>as the PRNG. 

Yeah, this is a good point. I was assuming that there was no simple
way of determining the possible keys from the time and other information
you'd get with a random PGP-encrypted file that you wanted to crack. *If* 
that is the case, then looking at the output of the PRNG is useful to show 
that the worst-case of a brute force attack using all possible keys cannot
be improved by taking the relative frequencies into account when creating
the possible keys. It would be embarassing if 0x2A appeared 100 times
more frequently than any other byte value, or if there was a strong
correlation between the bytes in each key, for example.

Whatever the case, we can probably write off any idea of brute force attack
like the DES one, unless you have a few billion years to play with. (In
which case, you'll do better attacking the RSA key anyway)

>	What you've got to look at is the predictability of the
>input to the PRNG. PGP is in really good shape here, because it
>bootstraps its PRNG with its input, which presumably is unknown
>to the attacker. An example of a weak PRNG would be:

[ Description deleted ] 

>	Anyhow, I've been over-long winded. I think PGP is
>in good shape because of the aforementioned property of
>using the message as a seed. Messages that don't change
>much, or that change predictably, are subject to exhaustive
>searching. A means of analysing the unpredictability of
>the seed is more worthwhile. 

Yes, obviously you're right. PGP seems to take the randseed.bin file,
the MD5 of the input, and the current time, and munge all of them together
using the IDEA encryption routines to create the final results. So, it's
not at all clear how to test this end of things (one of the reasons why
I decided to look at the output rather than the input). I'll have to poke
around more in the code and see if I can work out what it's actually
doing with all this stuff to get some idea of how to test it, if possible. 

The contents of randseed.bin are created by generating some random bytes 
using the same generation routine as the key and encrypting it with the key, 
so they should be as random as the sample I created. I could easily rewrite 
the program to generate the files and just calculate the MD5 and look at that, 
but, like you, I'm not sure that will tell us anything. Still, I can easily 
afford the CPU time, so it might be worthwhile anyway. Overall, I'm willing 
to accept that the key generation works pretty well at this point.

What bearing might this have on the suggestions of using electronic cheques
(presumably encrypted with PGP) ? If the cheque is a standard format, that 
might open up some possibilities with this kind of approach, especially if 
you know who it came from and/or who it's payable to.

>My hat
>is off to the guy who came up with the idea of seeding
>the PRNG with the message. That was *clever*.
>
>mjr.

Definitely. In fact, I wonder if this explains the 'fatal flaw' that people
have mentioned. According to the comments in the code, the MD5 was introduced
as an improvement over the previous method of generating the key, so perhaps
there really was a flaw in this key generation that has now been fixed, or
at least greatly improved.


-------------------------------------------------------------------------
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From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: loki@convex1.TCS.Tulane.EDU (the mischeivious god)
Date: Wed, 15 Sep 93 17:09:14 PDT
To: nowhere@bsu-cs.bsu.edu (Anonymous)
Subject: where is VMS PGP 23??????
In-Reply-To: <9309151944.AA16459@bsu-cs.bsu.edu>
Message-ID: <9309160007.AA21239@convex1.tcs.tulane.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> 
> Hi,
> 
> Can someone clue me in to a location of a VMS version of PGP?
> 
> Thanks
> 
Send me the info as well at loki@convex1.tcs.tulane.edu
 Thank you

 LOKI





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: loki@convex1.TCS.Tulane.EDU (the mischeivious god)
Date: Wed, 15 Sep 93 17:14:28 PDT
To: 72114.1712@CompuServe.COM (Sandy)
Subject: SKIPJACK & Police...the real rear entry.
In-Reply-To: <930915194156_72114.1712_FHF44-1@CompuServe.COM>
Message-ID: <9309160013.AA21301@convex1.tcs.tulane.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> Cypherpunks,
> 
> There is a short piece about Skiptap, er, Skipjack, in the
> electronics section of the October "Popular Science."  It has a
> pretty good diagram and a photo of the Mykotronx chip.
> 
> It says "Bill Clinton himself decided that the U.S. government
> will promote a new encoding chip for communications."  It also
> quotes a guy from NIST who says, "Once you accept the fact that
> law enforcement has to do its job, this is a good solution."
> (Fortunately, Cypherpunks generally *don't* accept that "fact.")


Ok...Police = TO PROTECT AND SERVE.

	To protect us from ourselves....self-righteous fucks decide what
	to protect us from...with little or no democratic feedback

	To serve...a long hard disease ridden penis with no condom
	much less lubrication.. in the butt...part of the S & M
	appeal of control and authority...

Loki





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: an31185@anon.penet.fi (Anon of Ibid)
Date: Wed, 15 Sep 93 15:05:31 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Random numbers
Message-ID: <9309152204.AA24574@anon.penet.fi>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



mjr@TIS.COM writes:
>So figure you want more than 56 bits of pure unpredictability as your
>seed. This is a tricky problem. One option is to give the user a typematic
>buffer: "hit keys for 30 seconds" - you NEED unpredictability!

So, it sounds like what we *really* need is a little box with a shot-noise
generator that attaches to a serial port and generates truly random
numbers to use for the key. Anyone out there feel like designing one for us ? 

Also, what's the recommended book/books on cryptanalysis ? Looks like
I have a fair amount to read up on.....



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From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: an23412@anon.penet.fi
Date: Wed, 15 Sep 93 16:44:28 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Joke of the Day
Message-ID: <9309152342.AA10070@anon.penet.fi>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



My actual horoscope for today:

"A paradox: Someday, millions will read your words, and yet you shall be 
anonymous!  Your ability to mediate makes you friends with opposing 
parties."

The joke of the day from an AP report on the veep's Information Highway 
press conference:

"American industry already is out front in high-tech development, but a 
fear exists that better coordinated government-industry relationships in 
other countries may give an edge to foreign competition."

-------------------------------------------------------------------------
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Due to the double-blind, any mail replies to this message will be anonymized,
and an anonymous id will be allocated automatically. You have been warned.
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From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "George A. Gleason" <gg@well.sf.ca.us>
Date: Thu, 16 Sep 93 02:04:33 PDT
To: wcs@anchor.ho.att.com
Subject: Re: caching scripts
Message-ID: <93Sep16.020153pdt.14499-3@well.sf.ca.us>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


filler messages....


Little Jack Horner
sat in the corner
decrypting a long email letter.
The letter was dull
but the humorous "null"
that it ended with made him feel better!

-gg




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Mike Ingle <MIKEINGLE@delphi.com>
Date: Thu, 16 Sep 93 00:14:32 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Random Numbers
Message-ID: <01H300QM3KUI8ZG7IN@delphi.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


an31185@anon.penet.fi writes:

>So, it sounds like what we *really* need is a little box with a shot-noise
>generator that attaches to a serial port and generates truly random
>numbers to use for the key. Anyone out there feel like designing one
>for us? 

That sounds doable. Tune a radio to a spot where there is static, plug it
into the audio in port of a SoundBlaster card, sample a few Kbytes, and
MD5 it to get your key. Nobody is going to reconstruct that.

                                     < MikeIngle@delphi.com >

P.S. Has anyone called Mykotronx lately? I called a while ago and asked for
any databooks and appnotes on Clipper. They said the databooks weren't
ready yet, and offered to put me on a mailing list for appnotes when they
were ready. I got the impression Mykotronx isn't too happy about the status
of the Clipper/Spooktap project.  :-)


  




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: I am not a number. I am an unbound variable.  16-Sep-1993 0950 <yerazunis@aidev.enet.dec.com>
Date: Thu, 16 Sep 93 06:54:39 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Digital noise
Message-ID: <9309161351.AA02771@enet-gw.pa.dec.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Timothy Newsham writes:

>Last time I was fingering through an analog parts catalog under the
>telephony section I noticed a bunch of parts that generate audio-noise.
>Maybe some of these would be suitable (if they dont use an internal
>digital state machine to generate the noise).

Unfortunately, last time I checked, they used a fairly short internal
PRNG to generate the "noise" (which means it's not noise at all, it's 
completely correllated and repeating, it just _sounds_ like noise to
a human ear.

To get real random noise, try using a transistor "backwards", as a 
zener diode.  Then look at the voltage- it's quite "noisy", esp. if you
use a decent-sized series resistor (try 100Kohms).

	-Bill (done this before)...





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: freeman@MasPar.COM (Jay R. Freeman)
Date: Thu, 16 Sep 93 08:30:46 PDT
To: yerazunis@aidev.enet.dec.com
Subject: Re:  Digital noise
Message-ID: <9309161529.AA05681@cleo.MasPar.Com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> To get real random noise, try using a transistor "backwards", as a
> zener diode.  Then look at the voltage- it's quite "noisy", esp. if you
> use a decent-sized series resistor (try 100Kohms).

When I was in graduate school, a colleague built a gadget based on this
principle as a source of Poisson-distributed pulses for testing the
post-detector electronics of X-ray and extreme-ultraviolet astronomical
instruments.  I don't remember the precise source of the noise, but it
was similar to the "zener" trick cited in that it was based on quantum
phenomena rather than a mathematical generator.  The idea was to get
random pulses of varying amplitudes, amplify them up and use only those
bigger than a threshold to generate output pulses.  The instrument
also averaged the output rate and used it via feedback to adjust the
amplifier, so as to obtain a desired average rate of outputs.

I think that for a while at least there was a commercial random-noise
generator available that used this principle, though I don't remember
whose (and it's been long enough that it probably doesn't matter).
Try scientific-instrument catalogs, et cetera.

                                            -- Jay Freeman




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: stig@netcom.com (Stig)
Date: Thu, 16 Sep 93 10:29:21 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Fwd: PERSONAL COMMUNICATIONS SERVICES (PCS) SPECTRUM AUCTION
Message-ID: <9309161725.AA28448@netcom2.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



I thought the Cypherpunks might take an interest in this...

In <9309151633.AA29877@essential.org>, james love wrote...
> 
> Taxpayer Assets Project
> Information Policy Note
> September 15, 1993
> 
> 
>      TAXPAYER ASSETS PROJECT FILES COMMENTS WITH FCC ON
>      PERSONAL COMMUNICATIONS SERVICES (PCS) SPECTRUM AUCTION
> 
>      On Friday September 10, 1993 the Taxpayer Assets Project
> (TAP) filed comments with the Federal Communications Commission
> (FCC) on the proposed auction of spectrum for Personal
> Communications Services (PCS).  PCS is the name for a new class
> of wireless telecommunications services that industry groups
> claim will generate more than $200 billion in revenue by the year
> 2010.
> 
>      TAP's comments addressed two issues, the size of the
> spectrum blocks to be auctioned, and the bidding methods used to
> allocate the PCS licenses.
> 
> BACKGROUND
> 
>      Congress and the Clinton Administration will use auctions to
> award licenses to use new spectrum that was previously allocated
> to the government and other uses.  Industry groups are engaged in
> intense lobbying over the terms of the auctions, which will be
> designed by the FCC.  A key issue is the number of licenses to be
> awarded in each market.  PCS Action, Inc., an industry trade
> group, wants the FCC to limit the number of licenses in each
> market, in order to limit "excessive" competition, that would
> "marginalize" PCS services.  PCS Action prefers two licenses per
> market, and "certainly no more than three."  PCS Action, Inc. has
> also argued that large blocks of spectrum (40 Mhz) are needed for
> each license for technical reasons.  If the large 40 Mhz blocks
> are used the FCC can award no more than 3 license per market.
> 
>      Other potential license holders or PCS competitors have
> argued that much smaller spectrum blocks are technically
> feasible, and would provide more post auction competition.  MCI
> and Bell Atlantic have filed comments with the FCC saying that 20
> Mhz blocks are adequate, and some PCS bidders have indicated that
> blocks as small as 10 Mhz may be large enough.  The issue of the
> size of spectrum blocks is important, since it will determine the
> maximum number of licenses that can be issued in each local
> market.
> 
>      A second issue that has received less attention concerns the
> methods used to receive revenues from winning bidders.  The
> government can require bidders to submit up front cash payments,
> or payments over time, including royalties against future PCS
> revenues.
> 
> 
> 
> TAP COMMENTS ON THE SIZE OF PCS SPECTRUM BLOCKS
> 
>      Regarding the size of the spectrum blocks to be auctioned,
> TAP said:
> 
>      The FCC should allow bidders to purchase the smallest
>      possible blocks of the spectrum, while providing for
>      mechanisms that will allow bidders to aggregate or
>      consolidate blocks, subject to FCC approval. . .
> 
>      By choosing the smallest possible blocks of spectrum to
>      auction, the FCC will assign the initial rights to use the
>      spectrum to a potentially large group of license holders,
>      who can be expected to consider a wider range on innovative
>      PCS services.  However, some important PCS services may
>      require the larger bandwidth.  The FCC can easily
>      accommodate this problem by allowing bidders to aggregate
>      and consolidate spectrum blocks, in order to offer higher
>      bandwidth services.  The aggregation and consolidation of
>      spectrum blocks should be subject to an FCC finding that the
>      new allocation is in the public interest. This procedure
>      would allow more flexibility in determining the size of
>      allocation blocks with each market, and provide better
>      opportunities for smaller firms to bid on spectrum.
> 
>      The initial size of spectrum blocks will be an important
> decision, since it is unlikely that the FCC will "split"
> licenses, even if it turns out that smaller blocks are adequate
> to provide useful PCS services.  By beginning with the "smallest
> possible blocks," the FCC can always allow license holders to
> aggregate and consolidate blocks, if the larger blocks are truly
> needed.  This will also allow local markets to consider a wider
> range of configurations, including combinations of small and
> large blocks, as PCS markets develop.
> 
> 
> TAP CAUTIONS AGAINST BIDDING METHODS THAT RELY EXCESSIVELY UPON
> UP FRONT CASH PAYMENTS
> 
>      TAP also told the FCC the auction should not rely
> excessively on up front cash payments.  The federal government
> can structure the payments on the license in a number of ways,
> including up front cash payments, fixed payments spread out over
> several years, or payments which are contingent on future cash
> flows, such as royalties on future revenues or units of services
> provided.
> 
>      The PCS spectrum auction will be the largest non-financial
> auction held by the federal government.  But the economic value
> of a PCS license will depend upon a highly uncertain cash flow
> over the long period of time.  If the FCC auctions the licenses
> to the highest cash bidders, the government will be asking firms
> to pay now for the rights to enter a business that will not be
> fully developed for many years.
> 
>      TAP raised two objections to excessive reliance upon up
> front cash payments to auction the spectrum.  First, many smaller
> firms will be unlikely to raise enough cash to bid against the
> larger incumbents in the telecommunications markets.  Second,
> bidders will discount the future "economic rents" from licenses
> by a higher "discount rate" than the government's costs of
> capital (the rate of interest on its bonds), leading to excessive
> discounting of license revenues.
> 
>      In order to promote more competition in the auctions, and
> also to increase the present value of license payments, TAP urges
> the FCC to consider a bidding system that combines cash payments
> with payments that are contingent upon future PCS revenues, such
> as a royalty on future PCS revenues.  We believe that over the
> long run, the government (the taxpayers) will earn more from
> royalties on a mature PCS market, than it will earn from up front
> cash payments for licenses.
> 
> ---------------------------------------------------------------
> Taxpayer Assets Project, P.O. Box 19367, Washington, DC 20036
> v. 202/387-8030; f. 202/234-5176; internet:  tap@essential.org
> ---------------------------------------------------------------
> Subscriptions to tap-info are available by sending an email
> message to listserver@essential.org with the folowing message:
> subscribe tap-info your name
> ---------------------------------------------------------------




;; __________________________________________________________________________
;; Stig@netcom.com                            netcom.com:/pub/stig/00-PGP-KEY
;; It's hard to be cutting-edge at your own pace...   32 DF B9 19 AE 28 D1 7A
;; Bullet-proof code cannot stand up to teflon bugs.  A3 9D 0B 1A 33 13 4D 7F




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: cme@ellisun.sw.stratus.com (Carl Ellison)
Date: Thu, 16 Sep 93 08:49:20 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re:  Random Numbers
Message-ID: <9309161545.AA09335@ellisun.sw.stratus.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>Date: Thu, 16 Sep 1993 02:38:26 -0400 (EDT)
>From: Mike Ingle <MIKEINGLE@delphi.com>
>Subject: Random Numbers
>Message-Id: <01H300QM3KUI8ZG7IN@delphi.com>
>

>That sounds doable. Tune a radio to a spot where there is static, plug it
>into the audio in port of a SoundBlaster card, sample a few Kbytes, and
>MD5 it to get your key. Nobody is going to reconstruct that.

A poster a while back on sci.crypt pointed out that if you plug nothing
in to the audio input (eg., /dev/audio on a Sun), what you get is
circuit noise.  If you then compress it, you get pretty good random input.
It's not something someone else can monitor or interfere with.
If you then pull off some bits for encryption keys and encrypt the
rest using those keys, ....

I have a small C program to do that -- do any left-over compression
and build a shell script to drive IDEA for encryption.  It's avbl by
mail if anyone wants it.  If enough want it, I'll post it on sci.crypt.

>                                     < MikeIngle@delphi.com >
[p.s.]
> I got the impression Mykotronx isn't too happy about the status
>of the Clipper/Spooktap project.  :-)

Yeah?  Do tell.  What did they say?





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: bart@netcom.com (Harry Bartholomew)
Date: Thu, 16 Sep 93 11:54:43 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Government agenda on cryptography
Message-ID: <9309161853.AA13914@netcom5.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


    From the National Information Infrastructure Agenda for Action:

       Action:  Review privacy concerns of the NII.  The IITF has
         developed a work plan to investigate what policies are
         necessary to ensure individual privacy, while recognizing
         the legitimate societal needs for information, including
         those of law enforcement.  The IITF has also developed a
         work plan to investigate how the government will ensure that
         the infrastructure's operations are compatible with the
         legitimate privacy interests of its users.  

         Action:  Review of encryption technology.  In April, the
         President announced a thorough review of Federal policies on
         encryption technology.  In addition, Federal agencies are
         working with industry to develop new technologies that
         protect the privacy of citizens, while enabling law
         enforcement agencies to continue to use court-authorized
         wiretaps to fight terrorism, drug rings, organized crime,
         and corruption.  Federal agencies are working with industry
         to develop encryption hardware and software that can be used
         for this application.

    MUST reading I suggest. Sources for FTP:

   The package is available in ASCII format through
         both FTP and Gopher.  The name of the file is
         "niiagenda.asc".  Access information and directories are
         described below.

         FTP:
                 Address:  ftp.ntia.doc.gov
                 Login as "anonymous".  Use your email address or guest
                 as the password.  Change directory to "pub".
                          
                 Address:  enh.nist.gov
                 Login as "anonymous" using "guest" as the password.

                 Address:  isdres.er.usgs.gov
                 Login as "anonymous". Use your email address or "guest"
                 as the password. Change directory to npr.
         
                 The package also may be present in a self extracting
                 compressed file named "niiagend.exe".  Remember to
                 issue the binary command before "getting" the
                 compressed file. 

    I also have it here on Netcom in /u4/bart/public with read
    permissions set I think so it can be copied.





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: gnu (John Gilmore)
Date: Thu, 16 Sep 93 11:59:20 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Whit Diffie on satellite TV, Sept 28th
Message-ID: <9309161858.AA20873@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


----------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                        The Florida SunFlash

                     Sunergy #7 Satellite Broadcast
                           September 28, 1993

SunFLASH Vol 57 #14                                           September 1993
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
57.14   Sunergy #7 Satellite Broadcast September 28, 1993
        Live Satellite Broadcast. Theme is "Cyberjockying in the 21st
        Century".  This next Sunergy live broadcast will focus on the
        issues and technologies surrounding the worldwide movement of
        information.  It will take a look at the internet, information
        suppliers, information retrievers and the other related
        resources.  Discussions will also include regulation and
        security on the internet.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
Note: the Ft. Lauderdale office will be hosting this event in our
office at 500 Cypress Creek Rd West, Ft. Lauderdale 305 776 7770
12 noon to 1:45 EDT. -johnj
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
Contact:    sunergy@sun.com
phone:      +1 415/336-5847

If you have satellite receive capabilities and wish to downlink this
program please send email to sunergy@sun.com.  We will add your name to
our alias and send the appropriate satellite and transponder
information when it becomes available.

                #####################################

                  Sunergy #7 Satellite Broadcast
                        September 28, 1993
                        9:00 - 10:45 am PDT
                   Cyberjockying in the 21st Century

                ######################################

How will supernetworks transport you to the far reaches of the data
galaxy?  What is the current status of the internet and other
"information highways"? What can these "highways" do for you today?

This next Sunergy live broadcast will focus on the issues and
technologies surrounding the worldwide movement of information.  It
will take a look at the internet, information suppliers, information
retrievers and the other related resources.  Discussions will also
include regulation and security on the internet.

Demonstrations will include:
- a live teleconference over workstations between 3-4 geographies
- sending white papers over the vertical blanking interval of a
  satellite signal to various sites
- the use of WAIS to access information
- others TBA

Guests include:

John Gage -        Director of the Science Office, SMCC
Whitfield Diffie - Distinguished Engineer, Security - SMCC
Carl Malamud -     President, Internet Multicasting Service
Brewster Kahle -   President, WAIS Inc

If you wish to downlink this broadcast, please send email to
sunergy@Sun.COM or phone the Sunergy office at +1 415/336-5847

Program is available on satellites over Europe (west, central and east),
Canada, Latin America and the US.

_______________________________________________________________________
Biographies:

John Gage
Director, Science Office
Sun Microsystems Computer Corporation

John Gage works for Bill Joy, the Chief Technical Officer of Sun, and
is responsible for Sun's relationships with the world scientific and
public policy communities, international scientific institutions and
groups developing new forms of scientific research involving
computing.

He is on scientific and advisory panels of the United States National
Science Foundation, the US Congress Office of Technology Assessment,
the European institute of Technology and the United States National
Academy of Sciences. He has recently been appointed to the US National
Research Council Mathematical Sciences Education Board.

He is a member of ACM, IEEE, SIAM, AMS, AAAS, and SMPTE.

He attended the Harvard Business School and the Harvard Graduate School
of Public Policy.  He did doctoral work in economics and mathematics at
the university of Berkeley at the same time as Bill Joy.  Gage
subsequently left Berkeley with Joy to start Sun in 1982.

Gage is on the Board of Directors of Unicode, an industry consortium of
IBM, Microsoft, Apple, Novell, Sun, GO Corporation, and others to
provide multilingual capability in all world scripts for all documents
and applications.

_______________________________________________________________________

Carl Malamud
President
Internet Multicasting Service

Carl Malamud is the author of seven professional reference books
including STACKS (Prentice Hall), Analyzing Sun Networks (Van Nostrand
Reinhold), and Exploring the Internet: A Technical Travelogue (Prentice
Hall).

Currently, Carl is producing the Internet Town Hall and Internet Talk
Radio series for the Internet Multicasting Service and conducts
research on integration of telephone systems into the Internet.

________________________________________________________________________

Whitfield Diffie
Distinguished Engineer
Sun Microsystems

Whitfield Diffie is best known for his 1975 discovery of the concept of
public key cryptography, for which he was recently awarded a Doctorate
in Technical Sciences (Honoris Causa) by the Swiss Federal Institute of
Technology.

For a dozen years prior to assuming his present position in 1991,
Diffie was Manager of Secure Systems Research for Northern Telecom,
functioning as the center of expertise in advanced security
technologies throughout the corporation.  Among his achievements in
this position was the design of the key management architecture for
NT's recently released PDSO security system for X.25 packet networks.

Diffie received a Bachelor of Science degree in mathematics from the
Massachusetts Institute of Technology in 1965.  Prior to becoming
interested in cryptography, he worked on the development of the Mathlab
symbolic manipulation system --- sponsored jointly at Mitre and the MIT
Artificial Intelligence Laboratory --- and later on proof of
correctness of computer programs at Stanford University.  He is the
recipient of the IEEE Information Theory Society Best Paper Award for
1979 and the IEEE Donald E. Fink award for 1981.

_________________________________________________________________________

Brewster Kahle
President
Wide Area Information Servers, Inc.

Inventor and architect of the WAIS electronic publishing system,
Brewster Kahle has lead the multi-company effort to build a practical
system for end-users to find and retrieve information from servers
worldwide.  Before this work, he helped design and build parallel
supercomputers at Thinking Machines Corporation.

Brewster was schooled at MIT in Computer Science and Artificial Intelligence.
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From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: mjr@TIS.COM
Date: Thu, 16 Sep 93 09:49:20 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re:  Random Numbers
Message-ID: <18957.9309161647@otter.TIS.COM>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



	I admit I'm guilty of being somewhat ignorant of how PGP
implements randseed.bin.  My experience with PGP indicates that
it's pretty well-thought-out in general, so perhaps I'm repeating
the obvious.

	One possibility is to treat part of the random seed as
if it was your secret RSA key. Systems like PEM store the RSA
key encrypted on disk someplace - you could also store an
encrypted random seed which you decrypt when you retrieve the
secret key, use to bootstrap your PRNG, and then replace with
some output from the PRNG when you're done. That way, the seed
is (by definition) hidden, and an attacker is going to have
much more trouble attacking your PRNG by searching your random
seed space.

mjr.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Thomas W. Strong, Jr." <strong+@CMU.EDU>
Date: Thu, 16 Sep 93 12:04:43 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Random Numbers
In-Reply-To: <18957.9309161647@otter.TIS.COM>
Message-ID: <kga=Sey00WB98ukHco@andrew.cmu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


mjr@TIS.COM writes:
>         One possibility is to treat part of the random seed as
> if it was your secret RSA key. Systems like PEM store the RSA
> key encrypted on disk someplace - you could also store an
> encrypted random seed which you decrypt when you retrieve the
> secret key, use to bootstrap your PRNG, and then replace with
> some output from the PRNG when you're done. That way, the seed
> is (by definition) hidden, and an attacker is going to have
> much more trouble attacking your PRNG by searching your random
> seed space.

You don't want to do that...  that would amount to using one seed
(probably when you created your key) and then generating a key from
that.  Since the relationship between a random seed and the IDEA key is
known, one can be reproduced from the other.  (to go from key to seed
would take considerably longer, but it's doable)  Since you are storing
what effectively amounts to the random number generated from the seed in
place of the seed, all an adversary has to do is get one of your IDEA
keys from a message that he can read.  Once he has that, he gets the
seed used, and then just works it forward from there.  Instead of having
2^128 possible keys, you've just let him narrow it down to a couple
hundred or so.  There's a reaason that you have to give it a new seed
rather often.

 -----------------------------------------------------------------
  Tom Strong              N3NBB              ts49+@andrew.cmu.edu




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Peter Wayner <pcw@access.digex.net>
Date: Thu, 16 Sep 93 12:59:21 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: CSSPAB meeting of September 1 and 2.
Message-ID: <199309161955.AA19000@access.digex.net>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



I'm sorry that this is so late, but I got backed up doing too many
other things. Feel free to go to the anonymous mailers and post
sarcastic remarks, straight-forward discussions or other comments.

--Peter



-----------------------


Here's my report from what I saw attending the Computer System
Security and Privacy Advisory Board meeting on September 1st and
2nd in Baltimore, MD. This group is a Congressionally chartered
organization with the responsibity to render advice on questions
of cryptography and computer security. It's members are made
up of people from government and industry. One member must be
a representative from the National Security Agency. 

The meeting this time was at the Hyatt in Baltimore and there were
several differences between this meeting and the last two which
were held at the National Institute of Standards and Technology
in Gaithersburg, MD. First, there were coffee, juice and doughnuts
available in the morning. Second, I did not notice any recording
devices or stenographers keeping track of what was said. Previous
meetings at NIST had been both video and audio taped. 

There were two major parts to the meeting: 1) listening presentations
from a variety of different people and 2) debating resolutions about
the government's proposed Key Escrow standard. I attended most of the
presentations, but I skipped most of the debate about the resolutions.
The remarks that follow are basically my personal recollections.

The most interesting bit of information I learned on the first day
concerned a software version of the Key Escrow system. The strongest
and least controversial arguments against deploying all revolve around
the fact that the proposed chips we've seen so far are all based in
hardware. Adding an additional chip to computers and phones costs
money ($25-100), adds weight (bad for portable phones) and increases
power consumption. None of these are desirable attributes. More
importantly, a hardware standard not very flexible and the nation's
entire computer system could be compromised for 6 months to a year
if the key escrow agents went bad. That's my estimate for the amount
of time it would take us to replace all the chips. 

NIST, in recognition of these facts, has announced a "Cooperative
Research and Development" plan (called CRADA-- the "A" might
stand for agreement). This would allow members of industry and
academia to join together with NIST and the NSA to try and discover
a good, software based, Key Escrow scheme. Ray Bonner, deputy director
of NIST, discussed the plan and said that he wasn't sure that it 
would lead to anything but that it was worth a try. He also said
that we should keep a copy of the Federal Register containing the
announcement (Vol 58, #162, Tues,  Aug 24 1993, pg 44662) because
it could be the only CRADA ever involving the NSA. It could become
a collectors item. 

If anyone is interested in getting involved with this project, they
should call Dennis Branstad at NIST (301-975-2913). To me, it seems
like it is easy to accomplish a key escrow plan in software. It
just depends how many features you want to add. A simple method is
to encrypt the session key with the government's public key(s)and
append this in a LEAF. If the cops wanted to listen in, they could
decrypt the LEAF using the private key(s that would be kept by the
escrow agency. Naturally, this could be compromised if the keys got
out. 

More sophisticated methods could involve a three-way Diffie-Hellman
key exchange at the start of each conversation on the phone system.
Or the government might want to explore Silvio Micali's work at MIT.
It would also be possible to use Gus Simmon's subliminal channels to
implement a signature/escrow scheme. The LEAF would be a DSS signature
and the session key would be held in subliminal channel. The other
half of the conversation would be able to verify that the LEAF was
there and the conversation was authentic, and the LE people could
get the key if they so desired. (This could be easily broken. I can't 
remember the details of Simmons's solution at this moment.) There
are several other answers that come to mind. 

The traditional objections to software implementations of the Key
Escrow plan are (1) easy tamperability and (2) publication of NSA
secrets. While software may be easier to change, people have also
proposed very simple ways to circumvent Clipper. If both halves of the
conversation coordinate themselves beforehand, any amount of duplicity
is possible whether or not a hardware chip is part of the standard. It
is possible to super-encrypt the entire data stream in software and
the LEAF would be foiled. It doesn't seem as if there is that much
difference on a relative scale.

The critical problem to developing a software key escrow system is
finding a way to prevent a modified piece of software from working
with an unmodified piece of software. This would stop people from
establishing links without prior arrangements for extra security.
I believe that this may be possible to do this using two different
types of LEAFS and shifting session keys every so often. 

Of course, sending out a software version of an algorithm will
leak information from the NSA-- something that really worries
them. But the CRADA says that the NSA will work on the software
Key escrow plan on a complete unclassifed basis. People on the CSSAB
made light of the strangeness of all of this.

Other Presentations

Most of the rest of the meeting was devoted to people not saying
anything on purpose. The plan to give the DSS to the RSA to resolve
patent differences and give the nation a standard has not generated
any new facts. Mike Rubin, the lawyer in charge, was not at the meeting
and he is apparently processing the public comments as I write. Some
summarized the comments as uniformly stating, "Free is good, paying
is bad." 

A group of computer scientists from NIST came to discuss their plan
for the Federal Criteria for secure systems and the new "Common
Criteria" that may emerge. This is an updated version of the old
Orange Book classification scheme of C2 and B1 and stuff like that.
The scientists said the draft is being finished but it isn't ready
for release. But now, they're working on "Something Better." This
is a new plan to standardize the grading of secure systems with 
other countries and evolve a "Common Criteria." In general, the 
board groused about the fact that the public and industry have never
been invited to give comments during the process. The summary
of this talk is: "We might be able to tell you something someday." 

Geoff Greiveldinger took up a whole hour in the afternoon to tell
us that it would be impolite for him to discuss the key escrow system
with the CSSAB before talking about it with Congress. He is the 
lawyer from the Justice department responsible for setting up the
system. Some members of the board mentioned that the board was
chartered by Congress and so he could speak freely, but others
refused to be so impolite as to question his polite excuse. 

He filled the hour with more descriptions with all of the restrictions
that they place on wiretaps at the Justice department. Once again, I
found myself wondering why they are going through so much trouble 
over something that just seems to cause them grief. The taps cost
money. They divert manpower. Etc. Yet, the FBI and the rest of the 
community is willing to go through a full court press on this topic.
The taps are essential in crime encapsulated in conversations (i.e.
influence peddling, bribery). 

Perhaps those of us outside of government (sadly only 4 out 5 people)
should quit worrying about this topic. The crimes we're likely to
commit all involve action: grand theft auto, drunk driving,
pickpocketting, murder, rape, illegal parking etc. No one really cares
what we say. It's just if we _do_ something and violate a property
right. Usually, members of the government are the ones who could 
break the law just by openning their mouth. 

Some people from the Social Security Agency came to tell the board
about their internal security procedures that they use to track down
people inside the agency generating information for outsiders like
private detectives. They routinely run sting operations where they
call up information brokers and ask them to get a Social Security
file for an individual. Then they watch for accesses to that record
and flag the miscreant.

One of the old hobbies at the agency was looking up the records
of stars. (When your job is sitting around watching people get
old, you've got to have something to do.) The agency keeps a watch
list of the celebrity's real name and SS number. Special programs now
watch for inquiries into these records. 

A nice guy from ARPA (Steve Squires) came and showed us complicated
slides representing the various factions at ARPA who are going about
developing the National Information Infrastructure. It seemed to be
more a polite introduction than a fact-based briefing about what 
might come out of Al Gore's dreams. 

Dorothy Denning came to say that there was no final report from the
outside team performing an outside review of the Clipper algorithm.
In general, she said that the comments have been favorable to their
work. Several members of the board questioned the independence of the
review given that it was done at the NSA using NSA's computers and
NSA's programmers. They also wondered about the depth of the review
because it was apparent that Denning leaned heavily on the NSA's
analysis. 

The EFF and Clipper

The final presentation came from Jerry Berman from the EFF. In
reality, he was representing the "Digital Privacy and Security
Working Group" which is a group of industry and political groups
that have joined together to say something about Clipper. This 
was the last presentation of the meeting and it became sort of 
a climax because people kept saying, "We'll see what the EFF
has to say." 

Their statement was simple. The group feels that it can accept
Clipper if any participation in the key escrow program is completely
volutary. They proposed to test the administration's committment
to volunteerism by noting whether they relaxed export requirements.

To me, the statement was little more than a political gambit. All
of the companies involved in the DPSWG really, really, really want
export restrictions eased. So they offered their support for 
Clipper as a quid pro quo. Let us export anything (not just Clipper)
and we'll support it. 

If you ask me, they shouldn't have been so bald about their horse
trading, but then I'm not a regular in Washington log rolling. It should
be possible to make a statement about Clipper without involving
the other issue, but maybe it's a smart deal. The main members of the
group are companies and the group had to standardize its message on
what its members want.

The Debate

The rest of the meeting was centered around the debate on the board's
resolution on Clipper. I missed most of this because it really seemed
very petty. Most of the board wanted to say that the Clipper chip was
a pain in the neck that wasn't worth the trouble but they couldn't
come up with the right words. Is it "expensive", "more expensive than
software", "more expensive than other alternatives", etc. 

The fight seemed to break down between government employees and
non-government employees. Those outside the government kept arguing
for stronger language and those inside kept saying things like,
"But expensive relative to what? We don't have any concrete cost
estimates." 

In the end, they passed resolutions that recorded reservations and
a call for "public" debate on the topic including a decision by
Congress on the needs of key escrow. 

If you have any questions about this summary, feel free to contact
me at pcw@access.digex.com.

--Peter Wayner






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: wcs@anchor.ho.att.com (Bill_Stewart_HOY002_1305)
Date: Thu, 16 Sep 93 21:44:52 PDT
To: strong+@CMU.EDU
Subject: Re: Random Numbers
Message-ID: <9309162016.AA23078@anchor.ho.att.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text


> mjr@TIS.COM writes:
> >         One possibility is to treat part of the random seed as
> > if it was your secret RSA key. Systems like PEM store the RSA
> > key encrypted on disk someplace - you could also store an
> > encrypted random seed which you decrypt when you retrieve the
> > secret key, use to bootstrap your PRNG, and then replace with
> > some output from the PRNG when you're done. That way, the seed
> > is (by definition) hidden, and an attacker is going to have
> > much more trouble attacking your PRNG by searching your random
> > seed space.
> 
> You don't want to do that...  that would amount to using one seed [...]

I was under the impression that mjr's suggestion was to use the randseed
the same way it's being used now, only to store it encrypted instead of clear.
This has some advantages - stealing it is now much less useful.

On the other hand, it means you need to use your secret key when
encrypting files, as well as when decrypting or signing them,
which increases the exposure of your secret key as well as being annoying.

> Since the relationship between a random seed and the IDEA key is
> known, one can be reproduced from the other.

If the IDEA key is generated by a one-way function such as MD5,
it's ostensibly 2**128 work to duplicate an MD-5 hash, and
potentially 2**400-2**500 work to generate the input to the hash
(which is essentially impossible, since the input:hash is N:1, not 1:1.)
Of course, it's still easy to implement wrong, leading to lossage :-)
But even something as simple-minded as
	sessionkey  = MD5(randseed+constant)
	newrandseed = MD5(randseed+differentconstant)
would be pretty secure (and the real thing also includes timestamp and 
MD5 of the message, further randomizing it; haven't looked at the randseed code.)

# Bill Stewart    wcs@anchor.ho.att.com  +1-908-949-0705 Fax-4876
# AT&T Bell Labs, Room 4M-312, Crawfords Corner Rd, Holmdel, NJ  07733-3030



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: norm@netcom.com (Norman Hardy)
Date: Thu, 16 Sep 93 16:34:47 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Abstract: of The Digital Silk Road
Message-ID: <9309162332.AA03396@netcom3.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


 
Existing and proposed mechanisms for digital money all require large overhead
to transfer money between parties. This overhead makes them unsuitable for
extremely low cost activities such as delivering and routing packets.
We propose a money system with extremely low transaction cost built into the
communication protocols. The money introduced by this system is much more
like coins than like bank accounts; it supports only small transactions,
requires limited trust among the participants, and requires no central bank.
With this as a foundation, we then describe elements of an open system that
fully supports network resource management, routing, interconnection with
the Internet, and other information services, across trust boundaries with
competing providers for all services. This supports a style of informal
information commerce.
 
To appear in "Agoric Systems: Market Based Computation",
edited by Wm. Tulloh, Mark S. Miller and Don Lavoie.
 
A draft of this paper is available thru anonymous ftp at
netcom.com:pub/joule/DSR1.ps.gz, DSR1.rtf and DSR1.txt.
The file format, .rtf, (Rich Text Fotmat) can be read by many different
word processors including those from Microsoft, MacWrite II,
and some Unix systems. I will produce other formats with a bit of pressure.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: ferguson@fiber.sprintlink.net (Paul Ferguson x2044)
Date: Thu, 16 Sep 93 13:54:45 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: CRADA
Message-ID: <9309162151.AA18816@fiber.sprintlink.net>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



On Thu, 16 Sep 1993 15:55:22 -0400,
 Peter Wayner <pcw@access.digex.net> wrote -


> NIST, in recognition of these facts, has announced a "Cooperative
> Research and Development" plan (called CRADA-- the "A" might
> stand for agreement). This would allow members of industry and
> academia to join together with NIST and the NSA to try and discover
> a good, software based, Key Escrow scheme. Ray Bonner, deputy director
> of NIST, discussed the plan and said that he wasn't sure that it
> would lead to anything but that it was worth a try. He also said
> that we should keep a copy of the Federal Register containing the
> announcement (Vol 58, #162, Tues,  Aug 24 1993, pg 44662) because
> it could be the only CRADA ever involving the NSA. It could become
> a collectors item.

Where could one find an ASCII copy of the pertinent portion of 
the Federal Register (specifically, Vol. 58, #162, Tues., Aug 24 
1993, pg 44662) that includes this "CRADA"?

If anyone manages to obtain a copy, please let us (me) know.
 
_____________________________________________________________________________
Paul Ferguson                                                               
Mindbank Consulting Group                                    fergp@sytex.com   
Fairfax, Virginia  USA                                       ferguson@icp.net




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: norm@netcom.com (Norman Hardy)
Date: Thu, 16 Sep 93 18:19:24 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: How to use cipher programs without trusting them.
Message-ID: <9309170117.AA13564@netcom2.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


The shortest summary of all this is that cipher program should be
deterministic and written to a public spec so that they may be checked
short of the hazardous task of reading code.
 
This may be quixotic but that has never stopped me. I propose here a way
to choose secret random numbers and random primes without having
to trust a single program exclusively. Suppose that you want to choose a
random n bit number. You type text while trying to make it random in some
subjective sense. The text accepts only space and letters and ignores all
else. The text is interpreted as a base 53 number and reduced modulo 2^n.
Note that 53 and 2^n are relatively prime. Experiments have shown that
this type of "typewriter random" produces about one or two bits of
information per character depending on the typist. This assumes an unspecified
form of information compression which I do not recall. It did, however,
look for patterns that were specific to people trying to type random
characters at a keyboard. One caution: if choosing random numbers this way
becomes routine one falls into habits that makes the numbers no longer
independent.
 
Different programs can easily be written according to such a standard and
their results compared. The skeptic runs two or three programs and
compares the output. After a few trials it may be reasonable to trust
one of the programs. A natural adjunct of such a program is a prime tester
that seeks primes in some arithmetic sequence. The sequence is chosen
according to published rules from keyboard selected random numbers.
 
I hear that PGP pads messages with random information in order to thwart
known plaintext attacks. This is wise but the paranoid wonders how
the random information is selected. The padding prevents output from two
programs from being compared for compliance.
 
Some will argue that if the cipher program were malicious it could stash
your secrets somewhere on your disk that was destined for export for
reasons unrelated to ciphering. The SoftPC story below indicates that
there are problems even when the cipher program is programmed to spec.
I know of operating systems where cipher programs may be installed so as
not to have the authority to stash your secrets away. I don't know
whether such operating systems will ever see commercial use.
 
There are several problems with keyboard timing. The first that I saw
mentioned arises when running such a program on SoftPC which is a clever
program to execute programs designed for IBM PCs on the Macintosh. The clock
appears not to run (I think the story is) and while the random numbers
look impressive they depend only on the number of keystrokes and nothing else!
There is much more technology such as SoftPC coming down the pike.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: stig@key.amdahl.com (Jonathan Stigelman)
Date: Thu, 16 Sep 93 20:10:51 PDT
To: wombat@key.amdahl.com
Subject: Trust fund to support free software.  Backed, in part, by PGP.
Message-ID: <9309170308.AA01240@stigma.key.amdahl.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Path: key!amdahl!pacbell.com!decwrl!decwrl!concert!samba.oit.unc.edu!sunSITE!mdw
From: callis@noc.usfca.edu (Kim C. Callis)
Newsgroups: comp.os.linux.announce
Subject: Re: The Linus Fund (EVERYONE READ THIS THREAD)
Followup-To: comp.os.linux.misc
Date: 13 Sep 1993 18:09:55 GMT
Organization: Linux. It's not just for breakfast anymore.
Lines: 76
Approved: linux-announce@tc.cornell.edu (Matt Welsh)
Message-ID: <272d1j$2i5@samba.oit.unc.edu>
References: <270rt7$jrv@vixen.cso.uiuc.edu> <270sih$do@nigel.msen.com>
NNTP-Posting-Host: calypso.oit.unc.edu
Keywords: Linux fund money donations
Originator: mdw@sunSITE

[Forwarded from c.o.l.d at request of Jeff Kopmanis. --mdw]

In article <26ung9$n2m@noc.usfca.edu> callis@noc.usfca.edu (Kim C. Callis)  
writes:
>> 
>> Fellow Linux Users,
>> 
>> I have read the messages regarding donations to Linus in order for hime
>> to continue the development of Linux. I will even admit that I am
>> surprised that people are genuinely interested in rewarding the creator
>> of Linux for his contributions.
>> This has moved me in ways I can understand, so I am going to do the
>> following. On Monday, September 13, I will open and deposit $100.00 in a
>> trust account. Anyone interested in contributing to the Linus Dream
>> Machine Fund can send a donation which will be deposited in the account.
>> During this time, we will find out from Linus what his dream machine
>> consists of and figure out the ammount of money needed to achieve this
>> machine. At the time when we receive the amount, a machine will be
>> configured to meet Linus' specifications and sent off to him.
>> 
>> Of course the question will be how can you confirm that I am not taking
>> this money in Linus name and going to have a big party with it. Well, I
>> am hoping that the goodwill of the net will out-weigh any pessimistic
>> views but if not, I have come up with a plan.
>> 
>> All monies received will be amounts will be publicly posted. When money
>> is received, I will send the person a receipt which will be signed with
>> a public key signature of mine (using PGP 2.0). Each week, I will post
>> to the net a total of all monies received, and a person can check to see
>> if his or her name is on the list. The account will be set up as a trust
>> account with myself as administrator limited to withdrawing of funds to
>> be distributed to one Linus Torvald (Sorry, I have the spelling of the
>> name somewhere...) in Finland. So, that will limit the money
>> distrubution. Also to all interested parties in the united States, I
>> will send via e-mail the (800) automated account inquiry number for BoA,
>> as well as account information and any needed access number need to find
>> the status of the account.
>> 
>> As mentioned above, when an amount is reached which will allow Linus to
>> purchase his dream machine (Please bear in mind Linus, that you need to
>> monitor the posting and vary your list according to funds available),
>> BoA will cut a certified funds check to Linus, and only to Linus.
>> 
>> Considering what we have received from Linus, I think that this would be
>> a noble gesture on the part of all of us who without Linus would have
>> been doomed to buying some version of Un*x and paying a stiff prices for
>> all the add-ons which the Linux provides us for free. Furthermore, this
>> would serve to show the goodwill of a community based not on race,
>> color, or creed, but upon content of character. Let's face it, few of us
>> ever get to meet people who post via netnews or write programs which we
>> tend to use day to day. Yet we communicate with each other as if we have
>> known each other for long periods of time. We instruct each other, we
>> learn from each other, we argue (flame) each other, and we grow from all
>> of this. I believe that the Internet serves as a moderator of
>> internation goodwill. Let's see if we can take it one step forward, and
>> see if the goodwill extends all the way to rewarding someone for a great
>> contibution to our community.
>> 
>> If anyone has any suggestions, rebuttals, or general comments on how to
>> make this idea of mine work, please feel free to e-mail me or post for
>> general discussion.
>> 
>> --
>> *******************************************************************
>> * Kim C. Callis                                                   * 
>> * Univ. of San Francisco, San Francisco, CA                       *
>> * EMAIL: callis@usfca.edu or callis@dons.ac.usfca.edu             *
>> *******************************************************************
>> DISCLAIMER: As long as nothing I say attempts to represent the 
>> views of the Univ. of San Francisco, they could care less what I 
>> have to say. Meaning that anything said, like it or not, is strictly
>> my own personal opinion and views.


-- 
Send submissions for comp.os.linux.announce to: linux-announce@tc.cornell.edu




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Duncan Frissell <frissell@panix.com>
Date: Thu, 16 Sep 93 17:59:23 PDT
To: CYPHERPUNKS@toad.com
Subject: Fortune Mag Article
Message-ID: <199309170055.AA17939@panix.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Foutune Magazine has a special issue (dated Autumn 1993) called Making 
High Tech Work for You on the stands now with much of interest to our 
activities.

Look particularly at the last non-ad page (162) "Your Wallet in the Year 
2000" filled with digital signatures, public key crypto, and digital cash. 
Likewise gambling, remailers, etc.

Sample quote:

"The global cash economy is growing so fast that President-elect Clinton 
says she's worried about the government's ability to regulate and tax 
commerce."

There's also an article on the movement of commerce and enterprise 
networks to Internet.

Be sure to catch the hot hot tub photo of JG and the profile of Cygnus 
Support on page 57.

Duncan Frissell

What is the most toxic hazardous waste dump on earth?

Highgate cemetary in north London.

Karl Marx's brain (the earth's most hazardous substance) is buried there 
(together with the rest of him>.



--- WinQwk 2.0b#0
                                                                                          




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "L. Detweiler" <ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Date: Thu, 16 Sep 93 21:05:52 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: KEY ESCROW PROCEDURES
Message-ID: <9309170404.AA28623@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


(Disclaimer: in no way should any of my own writings on this subject be
construed as supportive of key escrow.)

Key escrow procedures as revealed in Congress, received via M. Godwin
and J. Berman of EFF.  First is J. Berman analysis followed by text
itself, covering the various types of interception under 3 laws:
omnibus Crime Control & Safe Streets (1968), Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act (FISA), and finally under state statutes. (Perhaps
someone can identify the differences in the various procedures buried
in the bureacratese, but they are all largely verbatim copies.) Notes:

1) escrow agencies (finally) IDENTIFIED: NIST and `non-law enforcement
component of the Dept. of Treasury' as `tentative' choices to be
finalized in `the next few days'.

2) LE agents have to get `black boxes' (a PC) to extract/read the LEAF
(ID field) of the communications. Each box has an ID.

3) according to Berman, the LE agency *faxes* (?) the device ID number
to the agents along with certifications on interception authority, ID
of the black box, and the length of authorization.

4) agencies transmit the keys to the black box in a secure, encrypted
channel. `key components will only work with that particular black box,
and only for the state duration of the intercept'.

5) the most ominous sounding paragraph is the following, which
specifically *revokes* any rights or guarantees to privacy or `due
process' based on the technology & procedures:

>These procedures do not create, and are not intended to create, 
>any substantive rights for individuals intercepted through 
>electronic surveillance, and noncompliance with these procedures 
>shall not provide the basis for any motion to suppress or other 
>objection to the introduction of electronic surveillance evidence 
>lawfully acquired.

that is, this disclaimer seems to be an attempt to evade the
`exclusionary rule' and `poisoned tree' legal doctine (the practice of
courts in excluding evidence illegally obtained and other evidence
therefrom) by legislative fiat.
 
Major criticisms *not* addressed by this protocol: 

- why isn't the link *to* the encryption agencies, wherein the Clipper
phone ID is sent, secure & encrypted itself? If police `fax' these
ID's, what is to prevent them from trading them and misrepresenting
them on the warrants seen by the agencies?

- Berman writes that the LE agents tell the key escrow agencies how
long they are requesting the warrant. Now, this is strange. Does the
escrow agency ever refuse a warrant if the time period is not legal
under the applicable law? and is any police agent going to request
*less* than the maximum  period allowed by law?

- we have claim that records are kept on many sides, such as the
requesting side and the granting sides. are records kept of *failed*
requests? or do all `illegally-phrased requests' rejected by the key
escrow agencies simply disappear?

- In fact, do the key escrow agencies *ever* reject a request? this
plan below says nothing of the grounds under which requests may be
denied. What's the point?

- NO indication of the critically important key generation protocol.
Are we to take Denning's American Scientist article as authoritative?
if so, forget it.

- If there is no legal penalty in court for violating the protocols, as
the disclaimer seems to attempt to evoke, what's the point? at the
*bare minimum* there is required exclusion of tainted taps, and other
penalties for infringing parties are wholly in order.

Berman also reveals very fascinating glimpses: `The Administration
rejects the argument that voice encryption is readily available.' The
AT&T product `posed a unique threat in terms of voice quality,
affordability, portability and strength of the encryption' -- strong
confirmation of the theories that Clipper was rushed out, prematurely,
to face it. They are clearly strongly concerned about new Motorola
products, the `next voice encryption product in the pipeline'. (NSA is
in *big* trouble when there is more than one pipeline to choke, as is
rapidly becoming the case).

Interesting insights into administration psyche with Berman's quotes of
government officials:

1) `Clipper market share' will cause momentum to the standard (hee, hee)

2) `careless bad guys' will use Clipper (yeah, right)

3) why private key agencies rejected, but also the NSA: the former,
concerns on longevity and security related to profit, the latter, `for
credibility reasons' (snicker)

4) `key criterion' for escrow agents: `experience in and an
infrastructure for handling sensitive information'

5) `briefers admitted it is not really a key escrow system'. (!)
escrows' obligation `will be to the government' with `no duties or
responsibilities to users' (?!)

>        Both John Podesta and Mark Richard stated that there is no plan on 
>or over the horizon to outlaw non-escrowed encryption.

6) International aspects `thorniest to deal with'. Clipper exportable
with a license (surprise). `Other nations would not participate in the
escrow system.' Hm, I doubt it. Not if the NSA can help it.

Cypherpunks: one can sense the undertone of confusion, hopelessness and
despair in these accounts. Let's keep up the heat until the omelette
has completely vaporized.

------- Forwarded Message

Date: Thu, 16 Sep 1993 17:31:54 -0400
From: jberman (Jerry Berman)
Subject: CLIPPER ESCROW AGENTS CHOSEN

         In the next several days, the Administration will announce it has
chosen at least one escrow agency and has developed procedures for
accessing escrow keys pursuant to warrant.  Here is an account of an
Administration hill staff briefing on September 16, 1993 and the draft
procedures for law enforcement, foreign intelligence, and state and local
law enforcement wiretapping. We are looking for comments and analysis.
Please circulate widely. 

Jerry Berman, EFF.

  ==================                                                      

RE:     Clipper Escrow Agent Briefing for Congressional Staff

        Yesterday, September 15, 1993, a briefing was held for congressional 
 staff regarding the status of the 
Clipper project.  The lead briefers for the Administration were Mark 
Richard, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division, DOJ; Jim 
Kallstrom, FBI; Geoff Greiveldinger, Special Counsel, Narcotic and Dangerous 
Drug Section, DOJ; and John Podesta.  Also present were Mary Lawton, 
Counsel for Intelligence Policy and Review, DOJ; Mike Waguespack, NSC; 
and Dwight Price, National District Attorneys Association.

        The Administration has tentatively settled on NIST and a yet to be 
determined non-law enforcement component of the Department of the 
Treasury as the "escrow agents."  The Administration will finalize the 
choices in the next few days, according to John Podesta.  The Attorney 
General will make an announcement, in what form has not been 
determined, but it will probably not be a Federal Register notice.  The 
Attorney General will announce that she has adopted, and the escrows 
have agreed to follow, the attached procedures.

        The system will work as follows:

(1) A black box (actually a PC) in the possession of a law enforcement 
agency will be able to read the Law Enforcement Access Field in a 
Clipper encrypted data stream and extract the identification number 
specific to the Clipper chip being used by the intercept target.  Cost of 
the black box yet undetermined.  How many will be purchased by 
law enforcement yet undetermined, although if use of Clipper 
becomes common, the black boxes will be in great demand, by 
federal as well as state and local agencies.  They will be available 
only to law enforcement, with yet to be specified controls on their 
sale.  Each black box will have a unique identifier.

        (2)  The law enforcement agency will fax the device ID  number to 
each of the escrow agents, along with a certification that the agency 
has authority to conduct the intercept, the ID number of the 
intercepting agency's black box, and the time period for which the 
intercept is authorized (in the case of Title III's, up to thirty days, 
with extensions).

(3)     The escrow agents will transmit the key components by 
encrypted link directly into the black box of the requesting law 
enforcement agency.  The key components will only work with that 
particular black box, and will only work for the stated duration of 
the intercept.  If the intercept is extended, the law enforcement 
agency will have to send a new request to the escrow agents to 
extend the life of the key components.
        The escrow agents will maintain logs of the requests. Greiveldinger 
stressed that the system is "replete with recordation of the transactions 
that will occur."  The escrow agents also have a responsibility for 
maintaining the integrity of the chip manufacturing process.

        In opening remarks describing the need for the Clipper escrow 
system, Kallstrom had stressed that the AT&T product posed a unique 
threat in terms of voice quality, affordability, portability and strength of 
the encryption.  The Administration rejects the argument that voice 
encryption is readily available. The AT&T product, which isn't available 
yet, is unique, and competing products, the Administration argues, are yet 
further in the future.

        The next voice encryption product in the pipeline is Motorola's, and 
Motorola has expressed interest in using Clipper in its product.  The 
Administration argued that the need for compatibility would drive a 
significant share of the market to Clipper or Capstone-based products.  
Escrow coverage will not be complete, but the bad guys are careless and 
are expected to use Clipper products.

        The key criterion used in selecting the escrow agents was whether 
the agency had experience in and an infrastructure for handling sensitive 
information.  The Administration did not want to use a law enforcement or 
national security component, for credibility reasons.  It did not want to use 
private entities based on concerns about longevity and not wanting 
security to be governed by the need to make a profit.
 
        The briefers admitted that the proposed system is not really an 
escrow.  The agencies holding the key components will not have any duties 
or responsibilities to the Clipper users.  The escrows' obligation will be to 
the government, and they will be liable to Clipper users only under the 
Bivens doctrine, where any failure must be shown to be wilful.

        Both John Podesta and Mark Richard stated that there is no plan on 
or over the horizon to outlaw non-escrowed encryption.

        John and Mark said that the international aspects of the 
escrow/encryption issue are the thorniest to deal with, and there are no 
answers yet.  Clipper products would be exportable with a license, 
although other countries may try to keep them out. (Nobody asked 
questions about changes in the rules governing export of non-Clipper 
encryption.)  Other nations would not participate in the escrow system, 
nor, presumably, would they be allowed to buy the black boxes. E.G., if the 
British intercepted an IRA communication that appeared to be encrypted 
with Clipper, and came to the FBI for help, the anticipated escrow system 
would not allow the FBI to get the key from the escrow agents.             

==================
PROPOSED PROCEDURES

AUTHORIZATION PROCEDURES FOR RELEASE OF ENCRYPTION KEY COMPONENTS
IN CONJUNCTION WITH INTERCEPTS PURSUANT TO TITLE III

 
The following are the procedures for the release of escrowed key 
components in conjunction with lawfully authorized interception 
of communications encrypted with a key-escrow encryption method. 
These procedures cover all electronic surveillance conducted 
pursuant to Title III of the omnibus Crime Control and Safe 
Streets Act of 1968, as amended (Title III), Title 18, United 
States Code, Section 2510 et seq.

1)      In each case there shall be a legal authorization for 
the interception of wire and/or electronic 
communications.

2)      All electronic surveillance court orders under Title 
III shall contain provisions authorizing after-the-fact 
minimization, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 2518(5), permitting 
the interception and retention of coded communications, 
including encrypted communications.

3)      In the event that federal law enforcement agents 
discover during the course of any lawfully authorized 
interception that communications encrypted with a key 
escrow encryption method are being utilized, they may 
obtain a certification from the investigative agency 
conducting the investigation, or the Attorney General 
of the United States or designee thereof. Such 
certification shall

(a) identify the law enforcement agency or other 
authority conducting the interception and the person 
providing the certification; 
(b) certify that necessary legal authorization has been 
obtained to conduct electronic surveillance regarding 
these communications; 
(c) specify the termination date of the period for 
which interception has been authorized; 
(d) identify by docket number or other suitable method 
of specification the source of the authorization; 
(e) certify that communications covered by that 
authorization are being encrypted with a key-escrow 
encryption method; 
(f) specify the identifier (ID) number of the key 
escrow encryption chip providing such encryption; and
(g) specify the serial (ID) number of the key-escrow 
decryption device that will be used by the law 
enforcement agency or other authority for decryption of 
the intercepted communications.

4)      The agency conducting the interception shall 
submit this certification to each of the 
designated key component escrow agents. If the 
certification has been provided by an 
investigative agency, as soon thereafter as 
practicable, an attorney associated with the 
United States Attorney's Office supervising the 
investigation shall provide each of the key 
component escrow agents with written 
confirmation of the certification.

5)      Upon receiving the certification from the 
requesting investigative agency, each key 
component escrow agent shall release the 
necessary key component to the requesting 
agency. The key components shall be provided in 
a manner that assures they cannot be used other 
than in conjunction with the lawfully 
authorized electronic surveillance for which 
they were requested.

6)      Each of the key component escrow agents shall 
retain a copy of the certification of the 
requesting agency, as well as the subsequent 
confirmation of the United States Attorney's 
office. In addition, the requesting agency 
shall retain a copy of the certification and 
provide copies to the following:

(a) the United States Attorney's office 
supervising the investigation, and 
(b) the Department of Justice, Office of 
Enforcement operations .

7) Upon, or prior to, completion of the electronic 
surveillance phase of the investigation, the ability of 
the requesting agency to decrypt intercepted 
communications shall terminate, and the requesting agency 
may not retain the key components.

These procedures do not create, and are not intended to create, 
any substantive rights for individuals intercepted through 
electronic surveillance, and noncompliance with these procedures 
shall not provide the basis for any motion to suppress or other 
objection to the introduction of electronic surveillance evidence 
lawfully acquired.

AUTHORIZATION PROCEDURES FOR RELEASE OF ENCRYPTION KEY COMPONENTS
IN CONJUNCTION WITH INTERCEPTS PURSUANT TO FISA

The following are the procedures for the release of escrowed key 
components in conjunction with lawfully authorized interception 
of communications encrypted with a key-escrow encryption method. 
These procedures cover all electronic surveillance conducted 
pursuant to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA), 
Pub. L. 9S-511, which appears at Title 50, U.S. Code, Section 
1801 et seq.

1)      In each case there shall be a legal authorization for 
the interception of wire and/or electronic 
communications.

2)      In the event that federal authorities discover during 
the course of any lawfully authorized interception that 
communications encrypted with a key-escrow encryption 
method are being utilized, they may obtain a 
certification from an agency authorized to participate 
in the conduct of the interception, or from the 
Attorney General of the United States or designee 
thereof. Such certification shall

(a) identify the agency participating in the conduct of 
the interception and the person providing the 
certification; 
(b) certify that necessary legal authorization has been 
obtained to conduct electronic surveillance regarding 
these communications; 
(c) specify the termination date of the period for 
which interception has been authorized; 
(d) identify by docket number or other suitable method 
of specification the source of the authorization; 
(e) certify that communications covered by that 
authorization are being encrypted with a key-escrow 
encryption method; 
(f) specify the identifier (ID) number of the key 
escrow encryption chip providing such encryption; and
(g) specify the serial (ID) number of the key-escrow 
decryption device that will be used by the agency 
participating in the conduct of the interception for 
decryption of the intercepted communications.

4)      This certification shall be submitted to each of the 
designated key component escrow agents. If the 
certification has been provided by an agency authorized 
to participate in the conduct of the interception, as 
soon thereafter as practicable, an attorney associated 
with the Department of Justice, office of Intelligence 
Policy and Review, shall provide each of the key 
component escrow agents with written confirmation of 
the certification.

5)      Upon receiving the certification, each key component 
escrow agent shall release the necessary key component to 
the agency participating in the conduct of the 
interception. The key components shall be provided in a 
manner that assures they cannot be used other than in 
conjunction with the lawfully authorized electronic 
surveillance for which they were requested.

6)      Each of the key component escrow agents shall retain a 
copy of the certification, as well as the subsequent 
written confirmation of the Department of Justice, Office 
of Intelligence Policy and Review.

7)      Upon, or prior to, completion of the electronic 
surveillance phase of the investigation, the ability of 
the agency participating in the conduct of the 
interception to decrypt intercepted communications shall 
terminate, and such agency may not retain the key 
components.

These procedures do not create, and are not intended to 
create, any substantive rights for individuals intercepted through 
electronic surveillance, and noncompliance with these procedures 
shall not provide the basis for any motion to suppress or other 
objection to the introduction of electronic surveillance evidence 
lawfully acquired.


AUTHORIZATION PROCEDURES FOR RELEASE OF ENCRYPTION KEY COMPONENTS
IN CONJUCTION WITH INTERCEPTS PURSUANT TO STATE STATUTES

Key component escrow agents may only release escrowed key 
components to law enforcement or prosecutorial authorities for use 
in conjunction with lawfully authorized interception of 
communications encrypted with a key escrow encryption method. 
These procedures apply to the release of key components to State 
and local law enforcement or prosecutorial authorities for use in 
conjunction with interceptions conducted pursuant to relevant 
State statutes authorizing electronic surveillance, and Title III 
of the omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, as 
amended, Title 18, United States Code, Section 2510 et seq.

1)      The State or local law enforcement or prosecutorial 
authority must be conducting an interception of wire 
and/or electronic communications pursuant to lawful 
authorization.

2)      Requests for release of escrowed key components must be 
submitted to the key component escrow agents by the 
principal prosecuting attorney of the State, or of a 
political subdivision thereof, responsible for the 
lawfully authorized electronic surveillance.

3)      The principal prosecuting attorney of such State or 
political subdivision of such State shall submit with the 
request for escrowed key components a certification that 
shall

(a) identify the law enforcement agency or other 
authority conducting the interception and the prosecuting 
attorney responsible therefore; 
(b) certify that necessary legal authorization for 
interception has been obtained to conduct electronic 
surveillance regarding these communications; 
(c) specify the termination date of the period for which 
interception has been authorized 
(d) identify by docket number or other suitable method of 
specification the source of the authorization; 
(e) certify that communications covered by that 
authorization are being encrypted with a key-escrow 
encryption method; 
(f) specify the identifier (ID) number of the key escrow 
chip providing such encryption; and 
(g) specify the serial (ID) number of the key-escrow 
decryption device that will be used by the law 
enforcement agency or other authority for decryption the 
intercepted communications.

4)      Such certification must be submitted by the principal 
prosecuting attorney of that State or political 
subdivision to each of the designated key component 
escrow agents.

5)      Upon receiving the certification from the principal 
prosecuting attorney of the State or political 
subdivision, each key component escrow agent shall 
release the necessary key component to the intercepting 
State or local law enforcement agency or other authority. 
The key components shall be provided in a manner that 
assures they cannot be used other than in conjunction 
with the lawfully authorized electronic surveillance for 
which they were requested.

6)      Each of the key component escrow agents shall retain a 
copy of the certification of the principal prosecuting 
attorney of the State or political subdivision. In 
addition, such prosecuting attorney shall provide a copy 
of the certification to the Department of Justice.

7)      The U.S. Department of Justice may, to assure conformance 
with these procedures, make inquiry of the certifying 
prosecuting attorney regarding, inter alia, the 
genuineness of the certification and confirmation of the 
existence of lawful authorization to conduct the relevant 
electronic surveillance. The inquiry of the U.S. 
Department of Justice will not involve intrusion into 
matters that must, under relevant statute, be kept from 
public disclosure.

8) Upon, or prior to, completion of the electronic 
surveillance phase of the investigation, the ability of 
the intercepting law enforcement agency or other 
authority to decrypt intercepted communications shall 
terminate, and the intercepting law enforcement agency or 
other authority may not retain the key components.

These procedures do not create, and are not intended to 
create, any substantive rights for individuals intercepted through 
electronic surveillance, and noncompliance with these procedures 
shall not provide the basis for any motion to suppress or other 
objection to the introduction of electronic surveillance evidence 
lawfully acquired.

- -----------------------------------------------------------



------- End of Forwarded Message





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: khijol!erc@colossus.apple.com (Ed Carp)
Date: Thu, 16 Sep 93 23:21:22 PDT
To: stig@key.amdahl.com (Jonathan Stigelman)
Subject: Re: Trust fund to support free software.  Backed, in part, by PGP.
In-Reply-To: <9309170308.AA01240@stigma.key.amdahl.com>
Message-ID: <m0odYZ2-00023NC@khijol>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text


> [Forwarded from c.o.l.d at request of Jeff Kopmanis. --mdw]

I object to the list being made a vehicle to ask for donations - I don't
think that this is the place for such things, and I doubt that this has
more than a passing relationship to most of the lists posted on.
-- 
Ed Carp, N7EKG			erc@apple.com			510/659-9560
                            anon-0001@khijol.uucp
If you want magic, let go of your armor.  Magic is so much stronger than
steel!        -- Richard Bach, "The Bridge Across Forever"



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: kelly@netcom.com (Kelly Goen)
Date: Fri, 17 Sep 93 00:24:55 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: No Subject
Message-ID: <9309170724.AA09162@netcom.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



------- Forwarded Message

Subject: (fwd) *FLASH* Moby SUBPOENA served
Newsgroups: comp.org.eff.talk,sci.crypt,alt.security.pgp,talk.politics.crypto
Organization: NETCOM On-line Communication Services (408 241-9760 guest)

Xref: netcom.com comp.org.eff.talk:20002 sci.crypt:17638 alt.security.pgp:4909 talk.politics.crypto:102
Newsgroups: comp.org.eff.talk,sci.crypt,alt.security.pgp,talk.politics.crypto
Path: netcom.com!grady
From: grady@netcom.com (Grady Ward)
Subject: *FLASH* Moby SUBPOENA served
Message-ID: <gradyCDHF2s.Gto@netcom.com>
Organization: Moby lexicons
X-Newsreader: TIN [version 1.1 PL8]
Date: Fri, 17 Sep 1993 04:56:51 GMT
Lines: 22

FLASH

At 10:30 PM EST  9/16/93 a subpoena was served on
the Austin Code Works of Austin TX relating
"any and all correspondence, contracts, payments,
records, incluing computer data relating to
Moby Crypto and any other commercial product relating 
to PGP and RSA"

you are commanded to give to Michael J. Yamaguchi
United States Attorney
Northern District of California
served by Theodore R. Siggins, special agent
Department of Treasury, US Customs Service

More details later.

- -- 
Grady Ward                                         grady@netcom.com
3449 Martha Ct.                           compiler of Moby lexicons
Arcata, CA  95521-4884            e-mail or finger grady@netcom.com
(707) 826-7715  (voice/24hr FAX)               for more information

------- End of Forwarded Message





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: kelly@netcom.com (Kelly Goen)
Date: Fri, 17 Sep 93 00:34:55 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: (fwd) Subpoena served on Crypto
Message-ID: <9309170734.AA10493@netcom.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Xref: netcom.com alt.wired:475 comp.lang.c:62219 alt.activism:50763 misc.legal:62914 alt.censorship:19449
Newsgroups: alt.wired,comp.lang.c,alt.activism,misc.legal,alt.censorship
Path: netcom.com!grady
From: grady@netcom.com (Grady Ward)
Subject: Subpoena served on Crypto
Message-ID: <gradyCDHKrr.46E@netcom.com>
Organization: Moby lexicons
X-Newsreader: TIN [version 1.1 PL8]
Date: Fri, 17 Sep 1993 06:59:50 GMT
Lines: 180

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE
 
Subpoena served on Austin Code Works for
material related to Moby Crypto.
 
 
At 10:30 PM EDT  Thursday, 16 Sept 1993 Theodore R. Siggins,
special agent for the Department of Treasury, U.S.
Customs Service office of enforcement for
Austin, TX (512) 482-5502 served the following
subpoena:
 
United States District Court
Northern District of California
 
TO:
 
Custodian of Records
Austin Code Works
11100 Leafwood Lane
Austin, TX
(512) 258-0785
 
SUBPOENA TO TESTIFY BEFORE GRAND JURY
documents of object(s)
 
 
PLACE
 
U.S. Courthouse & Federal Building
280 South First Street
San Jose, CA  95113
 
Grand Jury Room 2115
September 22, 1993  9:00 AM
 
YOU ARE ALSO COMMANDED to bring with you
 
Any and all correspondence, contracts, payments, and record,
including those stored as computer data, relating to the
international distribution of the commercial product "Moby
Crypto" and any other commercial product related to PGP and RSA
Source Code for the time period June 1, 1991 to the present.
 
 
CLERK
 
RICHARD W. WIERKING
by deputy  clerk (illegible)
 
This subpoena is issued on application of the United States of America
Michael J. Yamaguchi
United States Attorney
 
Assistant U.S. Attorney
William P. Keane
280 S. First St., Suite 371
San Jose, CA  95113
(408) 291-7221
s/a Robin Sterzer, Customs
93-1348(SJ) 93-1(SJ)
 
9 September 1993
 
 
served by
 
Theodore R. Siggins
special agent
Department of Treasury
U.S. Customs Service
Office of Enforcement
P.O. Box 99
Austin, TX 78767
 
(FTS) 770-5502
(512) 482-5502
 
 
--------------------------- BACKGROUND ----------------------------
 
The day before yesterday I faxed the following to the NSA:
 
 
 
Grady Ward
3449 Martha Ct.
Arcata, CA  95521
(707) 826-7715
grady@netcom.com
 
 
 
Charlotte Knepper
National Security Agency
301 688 7834
FAX 301 688 8183
 
									14 Sep 93
 
 
Re:  Moby Crypto and the Austin Code Works
 
 
Recently you phoned Maria Guthery at the Austin Code Works (512-258-0785)
to voice your concern about the publication for export
of my product 'Moby Crypto'.
 
As the editor and author of the compilation I made sure not to include
any executable code -- only the algorithmic description in C source code
that can be found (and exported) from scores of books and journals from
the US distributed throughout the world.
 
I believe that this material qualifies for the 'public domain' technical
documentation exception under the current DTR rules.
It seems to me that proscribing the publication of material because it is
conveyed on a magnetic media rather than paper pulp is an NSA initiative
that is both destructive to our basic freedom of expression and to the
trade renaissance that Vice President Al Gore and the Clinton Administration
are trying to foster.
 
Even the Supreme Court recognizes the role of the computer media in
protecting our freedom; beginning this 1993 calendar year all decisions
will be provided in electronic form. Further, as you may know, it was
recently decided that White House records in electronic form must be
protected as a permanent archive of our government.  Clearly, magnetic
media must be treated as a logical extension of the power and fundamental
right of the print media.
 
Please phone, fax, e-mail or post your ideas or any literature to me that
you think useful if I have misapprehended the situation.
 
Of course if you wish I will send you a gratis copy of the software
(about nine megabytes of sources for DES, RSA, IDEA, Lucifer, PGP, SHA,
and so on) for your advice and comments.
 
Very truly yours,
 
 
GRADY WARD
 
 
--------------------- WHAT YOU SHOULD DO ---------------------
 
NSA and the US Treasury has started a new, agressive campaign to
prevent the spread of cryptographic ideas, algorithms, sources,
and documentation.  The subpoena was served on the ACW in the night
because they MIGHT have sold a copy of source code, already available
worlwide, to a foreign national.
 
If you value the freedom to disseminate ideas on both paper and magentic
and electronic media, you should immediately preserve your right to
have such knowledge by obtaining a copy of the source to Pretty Good Privacy
and all other cryptographic materials before a possible complete blackout
of such material is attempted by the US authorities.
 
It is not yet against the law to possess source code to PGP, the world's
foremost encryption application in the United States.  Source is available
for a variety of platforms including MS-DOS, Unix, and Macintosh from
the following sites:
 
soda.berkeley.edu
ghost.dsi.unimi.it
nic.funet.fi
ota.ox.ac.uk
van-bc.wimsey.bc.ca
 
and many other sites
 
For more information about PGP,
send a blank mail message to:
pgpinfo@mantis.co.uk
 
 

-- 
Grady Ward                                         grady@netcom.com
3449 Martha Ct.                           compiler of Moby lexicons
Arcata, CA  95521-4884            e-mail or finger grady@netcom.com
(707) 826-7715  (voice/24hr FAX)               for more information




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: kelly@netcom.com (Kelly Goen)
Date: Fri, 17 Sep 93 00:55:56 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: (fwd) New pgp-public-keys server!
Message-ID: <9309170752.AA11832@netcom.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Newsgroups: alt.security.pgp
Path: netcom.com!netcomsv!decwrl!uunet!pipex!sunic!trane.uninett.no!news.eunet.no!nuug!news.eunet.fi!KremlSun!kiae!relcom!rd.relcom.msk.su!blaster
From: blaster@rd.relcom.msk.su (Victor A. Borisov)
Subject: New pgp-public-keys server!
Sender: usenet@newcom.kiae.su (Mr. Usenet)
Organization: Relcom R&D
Date: Thu, 16 Sep 1993 09:21:20 GMT
X-Newsreader: TIN [version 1.1 PL6]
Message-ID: <1993Sep16.092120.15509@newcom.kiae.su>
Lines: 28

Hello everybody.
     

     I am  glad to  introduce my  pgp public  keys  server.  This
server  has   Internet  address:   "pgp-public-keys@kiae.su".  It
physically placed  in Relcom corp. (Moscow). I will maintain this
server (my  name is  Victor  Borisov  aka  blaster,  my  Internet
address  is   "blaster@rd.relcom.msk.su").   For   beginning   of
interaction with  server, you  can (as usually) send empty letter
with header:

To: pgp-public-keys@kiae.su
From: your@internet.address
Subject: help


     I use  0.16a version of Michael Graff server as software. My
server exchange  added keys with other servers. All messages from
server will also contain Russian text.


Sincerely your, Victor Borisov.

--
Victor A. Borisov aka blaster;	Relcom R&D;
Email: blaster@rd.relcom.msk.su;
Phone: +7(095)-943-4735; +7(095)-198-9510;
	=== Don`t panic! ==




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: kelly@netcom.com (Kelly Goen)
Date: Fri, 17 Sep 93 00:54:56 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: (fwd) pgpwin11
Message-ID: <9309170754.AA11959@netcom.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Path: netcom.com!netcomsv!decwrl!usenet.coe.montana.edu!netnews.nwnet.net!henson!news.reed.edu!usenet
From: pwilk@reed.edu (The Cannibal)
Newsgroups: alt.security.pgp
Subject: pgpwin11
Date: 13 Sep 1993 21:02:23 GMT
Organization: Reed College,  Portland, Oregon
Lines: 12
Message-ID: <272n4v$pco@scratchy.reed.edu>
NNTP-Posting-Host: reed.edu

I just downloaded pgpwin11.zip from garbo.uwasa.fi.  It is in the 
/windows/util directory i think.  I haven't tried it out, but I am all
in a froth to try it out.  just thought you might like to know.

it's a windows pgp shell you ninny.


--
The      _O_ "Darkness may cover me:  midnight may steal along my living veins;
Cannibal  |   yea and the ultimate futility, the ghastly nothing on which all
              things play may break ice-thin crust and freeze my soul"
pwilk@reed.edu   -=public key available on finger=-   - John Cowper Powys




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: kelly@netcom.com (Kelly Goen)
Date: Fri, 17 Sep 93 00:59:26 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Sorryabout the very last mailing
Message-ID: <9309170756.AA12137@netcom.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


 Sorry about the very last mailing about the PGP shell... BUT
the earliers forwards about the Mobycrypt distrbution were
indeed critical... MUCH more is happening on this front in the next week...
will report as I get details.

     cheers
     kelly
-- 




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: kelly@netcom.com (Kelly Goen)
Date: Fri, 17 Sep 93 00:59:56 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: PGP Customs investigation subpoena (fwd)
Message-ID: <9309170757.AA12199@netcom.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Forwarded message:



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Philip Zimmermann <prz@columbine.cgd.ucar.EDU>
Date: Fri, 17 Sep 1993 02:32:46 -0500
To: kelly@netcom.com
Subject: PGP Customs investigation subpoena
Message-ID: <9309170735.AA23358@columbine.cgd.ucar.EDU>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I will be posting a note similar to this one later on Friday 
to various newsgroups.  You saw it here first.

-prz

--------------------------------------------------------------

On Tuesday, 14 September 93, Leonard Mikus, president of ViaCrypt,
also known as LEMCOM Systems, in Phoenix, Arizona, was served a
Subpoena to Testify Before Grand Jury, to produce documents.  The
subpoena was issued by the US District Court of Northern California,
by Assistant US Attorney William P. Keane in San Jose, as part of an
investigation from the San Jose office of US Customs, conducted by
Special Agent Robin Sterzer.  The US Attorney above Keane is Michael
J. Yamaguchi.

ViaCrypt is the company that will be selling a fully licensed
commercial version of PGP, starting in November.  ViaCrypt has a
license from PKP to sell products that embody the patents held by
PKP.  That includes PGP, using the RSA algorithm.

The subpoena, dated 9 September, orders the production of "Any and
all correspondence, contracts, payments, and records, including those
stored as computer data, involving international distribution related
to ViaCrypt, PGP, Philip Zimmermann, and anyone or any entity acting
on behalf of Philip Zimmermann for the time period June 1, 1991 to
the present."  The date specified for the production of documents is
22 September 93.

The written agreement between ViaCrypt and myself explicitly states
that US State Department cryptographic export controls will be
adhered to.

The implications of this turn of events are that this US Customs
investigation has escalated to the level of a Federal Grand Jury and
a US Attorney.  US Customs says that this change was precipitated by
a ruling recently handed down from the State Department that PGP is
not exportable.  Other subpoenas and/or search warrants are expected.

I am the principal target of the investigation.  I have advised EFF,
CPSR, and my other attorneys of the situation.  A legal defense fund
will be set up by my lead attorney (Phil Dubois, 303 444-3885) here
in Boulder. 

This case raises some serious public policy questions regarding First
Amendment rights to publish, rights to privacy as affected by
widespread availability of cryptographic technology, the equivalance
of electronic publication with paper publication, the availablity of
lawful domestic cryptographic technology in the face of export
controls, and certain other Constitutional rights.  This may turn into
the test case for these issues.


-Philip Zimmermann
 prz@acm.org
 303 541-0140
 



-- 




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: karn@qualcomm.com (Phil Karn)
Date: Fri, 17 Sep 93 01:00:55 PDT
To: kelly@netcom.com
Subject: (fwd) Subpoena served on Crypto
In-Reply-To: <9309170734.AA10493@netcom.netcom.com>
Message-ID: <9309170759.AA02702@servo>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Get on the phone to EFF ASAP.

Here's the bibliography I promised earlier. If someone would put this up
on soda and perhaps even add to the list, I'd really appreciate it. --Phil

------

As a few people have requested, here's my current bibliography of DES
source code listings found in various widely published books or
magazines. Note that I have explicitly excluded the dozens of books
and publications that merely *describe* the DES algorithm -- even
descriptions complete enough to use as a basis for implementation.
They don't count because, as we all know, only Americans are smart
enough to turn an algorithm description into C code (or so our
government believes.)

Additions or corrections to this list are welcome. Again, I'm only
interested in actual code listings.  --Phil


"The Standard Data Encryption Algorithm", Harry Katzan Jr, Petrocelli
Books, 1977 ISBN 0-89433-016-0 (APL).

"Computer Networks", Andrew S. Tanenbaum, Prentice Hall (both
editions; second edition is ISBN 0-13-162959-X). (Pascal)

"Numerical Recipes", William H. Press et al, Cambridge University
Press.  (Fortran and Pascal version is ISBN 0-521-30811-9.  Also in
"Numerical Recipes in C").

"UNIX System Security", Wood and Kachan, Hayden. ISBN 0-8104-6267-2.

Byte Magazine, April 1977 (6502 Assembler).

"Cryptography: An Introduction to Computer Security", Seberry and Pieprzyk,
Prentice Hall Australia. (C)

"Mathematical Cryptology for Computer Scientists and Mathematicians",
Wayne Patterson, Rowman and Littlefield, 1987. ISBN 0-8476-7438-X.

Introduction to the Analysis of the Data Encryption Standard (DES),
by Wayne G. Barker, ISBN 0-89412-169-3 (soft cover), 0-89412-170-7 (library
bound), 1991, Aegean Park Press, Appendix G. (Basic, of all things).





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: kelly@netcom.com (Kelly Goen)
Date: Fri, 17 Sep 93 01:01:23 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: PGP Customs investigation subpoena (fwd)
Message-ID: <9309170759.AA12315@netcom.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Forwarded message:



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: kelly@netcom.com (Kelly Goen)
Date: Fri, 17 Sep 93 02:04:57 PDT
To: prz@acm.org
Subject: (fwd) Korea now accepts secret US patent applications (fwd)
Message-ID: <9309170902.AA15463@netcom.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Forwarded message:



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: kelly (Kelly Goen)
Date: Fri, 17 Sep 93 01:08:07 -0700
To: kelly, junem, dwight
Subject: (fwd) Korea now accepts secret US patent applications
Message-ID: <9309170808.AA12777@netcom.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Xref: netcom.com misc.legal.computing:4115 misc.int-property:2011
Newsgroups: misc.legal.computing,misc.int-property
Path: netcom.com!csus.edu!wupost!cs.utexas.edu!uunet!world!srctran
From: srctran@world.std.com (Gregory Aharonian)
Subject: Korea now accepts secret US patent applications
Message-ID: <CD3H47.3Kz@world.std.com>
Organization: The World Public Access UNIX, Brookline, MA
Date: Thu, 9 Sep 1993 16:14:30 GMT
Lines: 15

    On July 29, 1993, the republic of South Korea became the 17th country
to sign an agreement with the United States to protect patent rights of
patent applications fild in the United States for which the government
has classified secret and indefinitely delay the prosecution of the patent.
Existing countries, mostly COCOM members, are: Australia, Belgium, Canada,
Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands,
Norway, Portugal, Sweden, Turkey and United Kingdom.

    For more information on secrecy aspects of US patents, contact Robert
Garrett at the Patent Office, 703-308-0753.
-- 
**************************************************************************
 Greg Aharonian                                      srctran@world.std.com
 Source Translation & Optimization                            617-489-3727
 P.O. Box 404, Belmont, MA 02178


-- 




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: rjc@gnu.ai.mit.edu (Ray)
Date: Thu, 16 Sep 93 23:14:54 PDT
To: HFinney@shell.portal.com
Subject: Re: Remail: errors
In-Reply-To: <9309150646.AA29585@jobe.shell.portal.com>
Message-ID: <9309170610.AA29796@geech.gnu.ai.mit.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


HFinney@shell.portal.com () writes:
> 
> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
> 
> I have been out of town for the last week, so I missed some CP mail.
> It looks like some good things are happening with remailers, though.
> Kudos to Karl, Sameer, and the others for their work!
> 
> I have received many messages to my remailer in the last week which
> came from remail@tamsun.tamu.edu, which were PGP-encrypted apparently
> in an effort to get my remailer to send them.
> 
> They did not work, though, because there was no "Encrypted: PGP" header
> to trigger the remailer's decryption.  This can be arranged by
> creating the message something like this:

  Opps, that was me. When I was debugging/testing my anonymous
forwarding/anonymous list software I sent multiple messages before
looking for the reply. (because the software randomly chooses a chain, and
I wasn't sure which remailers introduce a delay)  The problem was that
Encrypted: PGP was only being added for the first remailer in the chain
but the body was being re-encrypted for each remailer.


-- Ray Cromwell        |    Engineering is the implementation of science;    --
-- EE/Math Student     |       politics is the implementation of faith.      --
-- rjc@gnu.ai.mit.edu  |                         - Zetetic Commentaries      --




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Anonymous <nowhere@bsu-cs.bsu.edu>
Date: Fri, 17 Sep 93 01:15:55 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: No Subject
Message-ID: <9309170816.AA08549@bsu-cs.bsu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



We need to get the 9 megs of Moby Crypto stuff mentioned 
out to as many sites as we can before the 
boots of the Feds seal our doom.
Before the hearing next Wednesday.

Use the Cypherpunks remailers to send as much out as you can. Janet
Reno and her BATF/DEA/narcoterrorist New World Order fascist goons are
now taking action against one of our own fellow privacy activists
, Grady Ward, and the Austin Code Works.

Use the remailers to post ftp sites we should send stuff too. 

As some of our more paranoid members have said, odds are high that
this list is high on the list of places they're watching. 

USE THE FUCKIN' REMAILERS, FOLKS!!!!

> From: grady@netcom.com (Grady Ward)
> Subject: Subpoena served on Crypto
> Message-ID: <gradyCDHKrr.46E@netcom.com>
> Organization: Moby lexicons
> X-Newsreader: TIN [version 1.1 PL8]
> Date: Fri, 17 Sep 1993 06:59:50 GMT
> Lines: 180
> 
> FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE
>  
> Subpoena served on Austin Code Works for
> material related to Moby Crypto.
......

> SUBPOENA TO TESTIFY BEFORE GRAND JURY
> documents of object(s)
>  
...
> U.S. Courthouse & Federal Building
> 280 South First Street
> San Jose, CA  95113

So I guess this means the guys in the San Fran area won't get inside.
Grand Juries are sealed.

Remember these sites:

> soda.berkeley.edu
> ghost.dsi.unimi.it
> nic.funet.fi
> ota.ox.ac.uk
> van-bc.wimsey.bc.ca
>  
> and many other sites
>  

The ones outside the States may be OK for a while. Until the NEW WORLD
ORDER and the U.N. Crypto Authority gets control.

Yours in fear,


-TURING













From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "George A. Gleason" <gg@well.sf.ca.us>
Date: Fri, 17 Sep 93 04:35:01 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: more on AT&T
Message-ID: <93Sep17.043111pdt.13955-3@well.sf.ca.us>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Compared to the recent news of subpoenas, the following is pretty mild
stuff, but nonetheless it may be of some value:

An AT&T companywide newsletter sent to 300,000 employees, contained a
cartoon showing people all over the world talking together on the phone.  In
every continent there was a picture of a human, except for the continent of
Africa, where a **monkey** was pictured.  Upon having the obvious racist
significance of this pointed out, AT&T issued an apology.  

Okay, anyone who can come up with a copy of this thing, email me:
gg@well.sf.ca.us.

LEt's get it into circulation; it will help make things hot for the company
which sells Phones With Big Brother Inside.  


Hey, re these subpoenas: time for an emergency meeting to discuss legal
strategies, publicity strategies, and all that stuff, yes?  How about
Sunday?  

-gg




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Anonymous <nowhere@bsu-cs.bsu.edu>
Date: Fri, 17 Sep 93 05:21:03 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Pasting syntax
Message-ID: <9309171222.AA15326@bsu-cs.bsu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Regarding pasting headers for remailers -
 
How does one paste in a "Cc"?
 
Can it be done by adding it to the paste header, like so?

  ::
  Request-Remailing-To:
  Subject:
  Organization:
  Cc:

I guess I'll find out....






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Anonymous <nowhere@bsu-cs.bsu.edu>
Date: Fri, 17 Sep 93 05:35:02 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Moby Crypto
Message-ID: <9309171233.AA15782@bsu-cs.bsu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Punkz,
 
With the recent turn of events concerning the subpoenas for Austin
Code Works, Grady Ward and Phil Zimmerman, I would suggest that
each of us do our parts to disseminate PGP and all other forms of
crypto FAR AND WIDE, as quickly as possible.
 
The battle has been joined!
 





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: doug@netcom.com (Doug Merritt)
Date: Fri, 17 Sep 93 09:09:28 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Trust fund to support free software.  Backed, in part, by PGP.
Message-ID: <9309171608.AA25945@netcom2.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Although that's an interesting scheme, it would be even more trustworthy
to send the money directly to the trust bank account, which can be done
in simple ways. We need better algorithms than the one suggested.
        Doug




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: gtoal@an-teallach.com (Graham Toal)
Date: Fri, 17 Sep 93 03:29:27 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: PGP Customs investigation subpoena (fwd)
Message-ID: <9819@an-teallach.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


In article <9309170757.AA12199@netcom.netcom.com> kelly@netcom.com writes:
 > The subpoena, dated 9 September, orders the production of "Any and
 > all correspondence, contracts, payments, and records, including those
 > stored as computer data, involving international distribution related
 > to ViaCrypt, PGP, Philip Zimmermann, and anyone or any entity acting
 > on behalf of Philip Zimmermann for the time period June 1, 1991 to
 > the present."  The date specified for the production of documents is
 > 22 September 93.

Fun fun fun!  Now we also get to find out if someone can be forced
to disclose his pgp key!

G
-- 
Personal mail to gtoal@gtoal.com (I read it in the evenings)
Business mail to gtoal@an-teallach.com (Be careful with the spelling!)
Faxes to An Teallach Limited: +44 31 662 4678  Voice: +44 31 668 1550 x212





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: nobody@rosebud.ee.uh.edu
Date: Fri, 17 Sep 93 08:35:09 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: RE: REMAIL pasting syntax
Message-ID: <9309171534.AA07928@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Earlier, an anonymous person asked about pasting syntax, about how to
paste in a CC: header.

The answer is: it depends on which remailer you use.  For a Hal-style
cypherpunks remailer, you would do something like this:

----------8< cut here >8----------
::
Request-Remailing-To: someone@somwhere

##
CC: I am pasting this into the header as the mail leaves

Here is my message
----------8< cut here >8----------

But, if you use Chael's remailer (since I beleive he wrote his own
software!), you would do this:

----------8< cut here >8----------
::
Request-Remailing-To: someone@somewhere
CC: I am pasting this into the header as the mail leaves

Here is my message
----------8< cut here >8----------

Of course, you would only want to paste at the last hop since the
remailers would trim it out otherwise.

For example, this message should have an "X-CC:" header I pasted in.

-- 
Karl L. Barrus: klbarrus@owlnet.rice.edu         
keyID: 5AD633 hash: D1 59 9D 48 72 E9 19 D5  3D F3 93 7E 81 B5 CC 32 

"One man's mnemonic is another man's cryptography" 
  - my compilers prof discussing file naming in public directories




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: cman@IO.COM (Douglas Barnes)
Date: Fri, 17 Sep 93 10:35:10 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: New info on Austin subpoena
In-Reply-To: <9309170734.AA10493@netcom.netcom.com>
Message-ID: <9309171732.AA15873@illuminati.IO.COM>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Cypherpunks:

I spoke just now with Maria Nekam, the owner of Austin Code Works. She is 
doing fine, has complied with the request for documents, and believes that
her company has nothing to hide. She believes that they have taken all
reasonable precautions to prevent the export of the DES materials.

Interestingly enough, she had been contacted by the NSA a couple of weeks
ago, and informed of the restrictions on exporting DES, although she was
already complying with these restrictions.

I asked if there was anything that the various organizations could do 
to help; she feels that the situation is under control.

When asked about her opinion of the DES export restrictions, she declined
to comment, saying that her company was just a small player and she didn't
want to get involved. 

I told her about the crypto conference we are having (coincidentally?) on
the same day as the hearing. Since her presence is not required at the
hearing, she will try to attend.

As I was writing the above, my phone call to Theodore R. Siggins, the
customs agent mentioned in the subpoena was returned. We spoke briefly;
he was friendly but felt "it would be inappropriate for me to comment on 
any matters concerning the grand jury." When I asked him if this was part
of an overall crackdown on cryptography export, he referred me 
to the special agent in charge, Leonard Lindheim, (202) 229-4561.

Doug

-- 
----------------                                             /\ 
Douglas Barnes            cman@illuminati.io.com            /  \ 
Chief Wizard         (512) 447-8950 (d), 447-7866 (v)      / () \
Illuminati Online          metaverse.io.com 7777          /______\



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: ssteele@eff.org (Shari Steele)
Date: Fri, 17 Sep 93 11:25:10 PDT
To: prz@acm.org
Subject: Crypto Witchhunt?
Message-ID: <199309171821.AA24935@eff.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


To the 'net community:
EFF is very concerned about the Customs Department-initiated grand jury
investigation into encryption export violations.  Two U.S. companies have
been subpoenaed to produce documents related to the "international
distribution" of commercial products utilizing PGP and RSA source code. 
Neither of these companies are engaged in the international distribution of
any illegal materials.  EFF is working with the concerned parties and is
trying to find out the scope of the grand jury investigation. 
Unfortunately for us in this case, grand jury investigations are secret, so
learning the scope is proving to be quite difficult.

What we do know is this:

Austin Code Works, a software publisher in Austin, Texas (heavy sigh), has
been planning to publish a code document written by Grady Ward called Moby
Crypto.  Grady describes Moby Crypto as simply containing descriptive
source code, not executable object code, describing many cryptographic
routines that are freely available around the world.  Most of this material
has been released in print form already.  The important distinction seems
to be that Moby Crypto will be released in machine-readable format.  Austin
Code Works has told Customs Agents that it does not intend to release Moby
Crypto outside of the U.S., yet the company has been subpoenaed to release
all documents related to this product.  (Incidently, if Moby Crypto
contains no executable code, it should be exportable under ITAR, just as
textbooks containing such materials are exportable.)

ViaCrypt, a Phoenix, Arizona,-based (heavy sigh again -- man, does this
ring familiar) software producer that has a license to sell software
products that use the RSA algorithm, was issued a similar subpoena. 
ViaCrypt has recently contracted with Phil Zimmermann, creator of the PGP
encryption code, to sell a commercial version of PGP.  ViaCrypt only
distributes its products containing the RSA algorithm within the United
States, since RSA is not exportable under ITAR.

EFF has been in touch with Phil Zimmermann and his attorney, Grady Ward,
and the owner of Austin Code Works.  We have advised everyone that there is
nothing to hide and that they should abide by the subpoenas and produce the
documents requested.  We will not know what the appropriate response should
be until the grand jury makes its determinations.  In the meantime, we want
everyone to know that EFF is committed to ensuring that the right to use
and publish whatever encryption method an individual chooses to use is
protected.  Jerry Berman, EFF's Executive Director, issued the following
internal message this morning:

>I've assured Phil that he is not alone, and I have talked with his attorney.
>If Phil is charged with export control violations based on making PGP
>available in the US on a non-commercial basis and it happens to get
>published or copied overseas, First Amendment issues indeed may be joined.
>As of now, ViaCrypt has done no "exporting" and does not intend to. I have
>the subpoena.

Indeed, EFF has copies of both subpoenas.  We will continue to keep you
informed of what's going on as we learn the facts.  EFF is deeply
concerned, and we want Phil and everyone else involved to know that they
are not alone.  As soon as it becomes clear what specifically is being
investigated, EFF will respond.
Shari
******************************************************************************

Shari Steele
Director of Legal Services
Electronic Frontier Foundation
1001 G Street, NW
Suite 950 East
Washington, DC  20001
202/347-5400 (voice), 202/393-5509 (fax)
ssteele@eff.org





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Lyle_Seaman@transarc.com
Date: Fri, 17 Sep 93 11:35:10 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: CHAUM CHIMES IN
In-Reply-To: <9309091550.AA23383@ellisun.sw.stratus.com>
Message-ID: <ggaU_aCSMUgER_s=ID@transarc.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Excerpts from internet.cypherpunks: 9-Sep-93 Re: CHAUM CHIMES IN Carl
Ellison@ellisun.sw. (1183)


> ..From:
> >  SANDY SANDFORT               Reply to:  ssandfort@attmail.com
>  [ . . . ]
> >Of course, the next letter to the editor calls for the adoption
> >of systems to track every vehicle at all times.  The genius who
> >wrote the letter, thinks it would be a good way to prevent
> >nuclear, biological or chemical terrorism.  Geeeeez.

> It was signed by Dorothy Denning, right?

Actually, it was signed by...  John Locke
I thought it was satire, but maybe not.   It gets so hard to tell, these days. 








From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: cme@ellisun.sw.stratus.com (Carl Ellison)
Date: Fri, 17 Sep 93 11:59:30 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re:  KEY ESCROW PROCEDURES
Message-ID: <9309171855.AA00716@ellisun.sw.stratus.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Meanwhile, where is the proof that the key being requested corresponds to
a person on whom a wiretap has been ordered?





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: cme@ellisun.sw.stratus.com (Carl Ellison)
Date: Fri, 17 Sep 93 12:25:11 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: remail Moby Crypto?  nonsense.
Message-ID: <9309171922.AA00786@ellisun.sw.stratus.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>Date: Fri, 17 Sep 93 03:16:48 -0500
>Message-Id: <9309170816.AA08549@bsu-cs.bsu.edu>
>
>We need to get the 9 megs of Moby Crypto stuff mentioned 
>out to as many sites as we can before the 
>boots of the Feds seal our doom.
>Before the hearing next Wednesday.


This is silly.

The Moby Crypto stuff is already available worldwide.  That's what makes
the government's case so incredibly stupid -- but of course, I'm not
a lawyer.  :-|

 - Carl




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: cme@ellisun.sw.stratus.com (Carl Ellison)
Date: Fri, 17 Sep 93 13:11:09 PDT
To: grady@netcom.com
Subject: Moby Crypto
Message-ID: <9309172009.AA00893@ellisun.sw.stratus.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I hope you keep in mind that the existence of optical character readers
puts printed pages in the domain of machine-readable media.

 - Carl




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Peter Wayner <pcw@access.digex.net>
Date: Fri, 17 Sep 93 14:01:38 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Ke Escrow Procedures...
Message-ID: <199309172100.AA00640@access.digex.net>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Carl Ellison writes:


Meanwhile, where is the proof that the key being requested corresponds to
a person on whom a wiretap has been ordered?


When I saw a preliminary briefing given to the CSSPAB, the DOJ suggested
that there would be no list kept equating names to Clipper Chip ID #.
Of course such a list would be a real disaster because people would
routinely be shifting hardware left and right. Any list would become
immediately out of date. 

This means that there is really no feasible way to discover misuse.

-Peter




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: frc%bwnmr4@harvard.harvard.edu (Fred Cooper)
Date: Fri, 17 Sep 93 16:25:15 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com (Cypherpunks)
Subject: No Mail in 24 hours....
Message-ID: <9309172301.AA11151@bwnmr4.harvard.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Did somebody die or what?

FRC





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: fergp@sytex.com (Paul Ferguson)
Date: Fri, 17 Sep 93 18:45:16 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: The lighter side
Message-ID: <5ws20B1w165w@sytex.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


And on a lighter note:
 
Newsgroups: comp.org.eff.talk,sci.crypt,alt.security.pgp,talk.politics.cry
pto
From: john@iastate.edu (John Hascall)
Subject: Re: *FLASH* Moby SUBPOENA served
Organization: Iowa State University, Ames, IA
Date: Fri, 17 Sep 1993 13:39:39 GMT
Lines: 21
 
grady@netcom.com (Grady Ward) writes:
 
}SUBPOENA TO TESTIFY BEFORE GRAND JURY
   ..
}YOU ARE ALSO COMMANDED to bring with you
 
}Any and all correspondence, contracts, payments, and record,
}including those stored as computer data, relating to the
}international distribution of the commercial product "Moby
}Crypto" and any other commercial product related to PGP and RSA
}Source Code for the time period June 1, 1991 to the present.
 
   I don't suppose they'd see the humor of bringing
   it on a disk and encrypted...
 
John
-- 
John Hascall                   ``An ill-chosen word is the fool's 
messenger.''
Systems Software Engineer
Project Vincent
Iowa State University Computation Center  +  Ames, IA  50011  +  
515/294-9551
 
Newsgroups: comp.org.eff.talk,sci.crypt,alt.security.pgp,talk.politics.cry
pto
From: grady@netcom.com (Grady Ward)
Subject: Re: *FLASH* Moby SUBPOENA served
Followup-To: comp.org.eff.talk,sci.crypt,alt.security.pgp,talk.politics.cr
ypto
Organization: Moby lexicons
X-Newsreader: TIN [version 1.1 PL8]
Date: Fri, 17 Sep 1993 14:44:34 GMT
Lines: 18
 
John Hascall (john@iastate.edu) wrote:
 
:    I don't suppose they'd see the humor of bringing
:    it on a disk and encrypted...
 
HEhe obstruction of justice  he he  ten years ho ho heh he
 
 
But seriously, encryption makes it possible to take the fifth
amendment and *mean* it...  (Not that anyone here has anything to
hide, of course.)
 
 
-- 
Grady Ward                                         grady@netcom.com
3449 Martha Ct.                           compiler of Moby lexicons
Arcata, CA  95521-4884            e-mail or finger grady@netcom.com
(707) 826-7715  (voice/24hr FAX)               for more information

Paul Ferguson               |   privacy \'pri-va-see\ n, pl, -cies;
Mindbank Consulting Group   |   1: the quality or state of being apart
Fairfax, Virginia USA       |   from others  2: secrecy
fergp@sytex.com             |
ferguson@icp.net            |   Privacy -- Use it or lose it.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Date: Fri, 17 Sep 93 21:19:33 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Check out "EFFector Online 6.1"
Message-ID: <9309180417.AA08798@netcom5.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



The latest "EFFector Online," available in the usual places, is
oriented toward crypto, having a lengthy summary of the
Skipjack/Capstone issue (more legalese about escrow than crypto) and a
nice Barlow piece on crypto (updating his piece a year ago in CACM).

Barlow even mentions "unless you're a real cypherpunk," so we're
entering the language.

I'd post the whole thing here, except that it's 1100+ lines. 

Definitely check it out!

-Tim

-- 
..........................................................................
Timothy C. May         | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,  
tcmay@netcom.com       | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
408-688-5409           | knowledge, reputations, information markets, 
W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA  | black markets, collapse of governments.
Higher Power: 2^756839 | Public Key: PGP and MailSafe available.
Note: I put time and money into writing this posting. I hope you enjoy it.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Timothy Newsham <newsham@wiliki.eng.hawaii.edu>
Date: Sat, 18 Sep 93 01:15:22 PDT
To: binder@well.sf.ca.us (Matt Binder)
Subject: Re: reporter seeking interview subjects
In-Reply-To: <93Sep17.230857pdt.14382-4@well.sf.ca.us>
Message-ID: <9309180811.AA21373@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> 
> Hi, my name is Matt Binder.  Please help me...
>         I'm a radio reporter in the SF Bay area working on a series
> of pieces about invasions of privacy in the computer age.  I'm
> looking for interesting "case studies" that I can use to horrify
                                                           ^^^^^^^^
> my listeners out of their complacency.  My most immediate need is
 ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
> to find someone whose medical records were used (perused!)
> improperly, and/or whose records were incorrect and resulted in
> the denial of insurance, employment, loans, adoptions, etc.  But
[...]

Just what I love from the media, using sensationalism to convey a
preconceived idea instead of looking at the facts and reporting it.
Does it matter that he is reporting on our side and not the other
side?




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: remailer@netcom.com
Date: Fri, 17 Sep 93 22:15:20 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Crypto crackdown - this is it!
Message-ID: <9309180507.AA04586@mail.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Well, we knew that this had to happen eventually. Isn't it ironic
that, as we read that crypto is flourishing in the Soviet Union,
that their supreme court has just accepted the validity of digital
signatures, we find ourselves under attack here at home! Seems like
we're putting up walls just as fast as they are tearing them down
over there. I just sent e-mail to those crypto developers in the
Soviet Union; maybe I'll get a visit from the Thought Police. After
all, I did mention RSA, IDEA, and PGP in the message, and there's
not much doubt the bad guys monitor the link to the Soviet Union,
now is there? In fact, everyone who has a public key on the key
servers could be a suspect.

This crackdown can serve no legitimate security purpose, since the
algorithms involved are all readily available worldwide. This can
only serve two purposes: (1) to intimidate any company which might
consider publishing useful cryptographic software and information,
and (2) to establish a precedent and set up the machinery for a
drug-war-style crackdown on all privacy and digital speech.

Why is the government so reluctant to treat digital media as
equivalent to paper media? Real simple. Paper requires an
organization to distribute it. If the government really wants to,
they can conduct a Gestapo raid and confiscate everything (Steve
Jackson Games) and prevent the publication of anything on paper.
With electronic media, they can't do anything. Once it's on a disk
or on the Usenet, information is forever beyond their control. The
government is about to lose all control over information, and the
idea scares the hell out of them.

What is happening is that the network is replacing the hierarchy as
the basic unit of human organization. Naturally, those who run the
hierarchies don't want this to happen.

The bad guys have been trying to figure out what to do since PGP
was released. Being leftover cold warriors, they really don't know
how to attack freeware distribution. The idea of free distribution
of information is totally alien to them. But as soon as commercial
sales were mentioned, they knew what to do. Yes, we should fight
them tooth and nail on this one, but we should also learn a
valuable lesson from it: they can't handle freeware! It's only when
we go commercial, with a visible base of operations, that they know
how to attack us.

We need a method of zero-knowledge collaboration on software
development. People could work together on a project without
knowing anything about each other. This would involve a newsgroup
for discussion of projects, anonymously of course, and the exchange
of pseudonymous PGP keys. Private mail would be sent by posting
with the recipient's key id in the subject, making it easy to grep
for. Development could be broken up among different people,
functions and code fragments could be posted and exchanged, and the
whole program compiled and released, in such a way as to be totally
untraceable.

Code we need now!

Windows NT, OS/2, and UNIX implementations of PGP, set up as a
server so that any application can access PGP primitives. This
would establish PGP as a standard encryption server outside the US.
People use what is easy, so make it easy.

A program to transparently encrypt hard drives on the fly, similar
to KOH or Norton Diskreet (except don't use DES, and allow only part
of the drive to be encrypted, like Diskreet), to protect people 
against unreasonable search and seizure. Let's face it, with the 
drug war, the Constitution's search and seizure protections are DEAD! 
They may not be able to prosecute you based on illegal evidence, but
they can take everything you own and keep it until you are broke 
and homeless.

A tape backup program which securely (IDEA or similar) encrypts
streaming tapes. This would protect people from seizure of their
records and archives. Government loves to seize paper; give the
bastards something they can't read!

The next few weeks and months may be decisive. This is it. If we
succeed, we could have a future of freedom, privacy and equality
brought about by the inherently democratic nature of networks in
general and public key crypto in particular. A world in which
digital cash has starved the dinosaurs of government and digital
media have made censorship forever impossible. But, if we fail:

"There was of course no way of knowing whether you were being
watched at any given moment. How often, or on what system, the
Thought Police plugged in on any individual wire was guesswork. It
was even conceivable that they watched everybody all the time. But
at any rate they could plug in your wire whenever they wanted to.
You had to live - did live, from habit that became instinct - in
the assumption that every sound you made was overheard, and, except
in darkness, every movement scrutinized." -- 1984

BTW: when setting up encrypted remailer bounces, be sure to change
the subject at every bounce to defeat traffic analysis based on the
subject line being the same all the way through. For example:

::
Request-Remailing-To: <put address here>
Subject: <put new subject here>

Be careful, write code, spread PGP, we might actually win this thing!





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Timothy Newsham <newsham@wiliki.eng.hawaii.edu>
Date: Sat, 18 Sep 93 01:20:22 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Crypto crackdown - this is it!
Message-ID: <9309180820.AA21475@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Anon Said:
> Code we need now!
> 
> Windows NT, OS/2, and UNIX implementations of PGP, set up as a
> server so that any application can access PGP primitives. This
> would establish PGP as a standard encryption server outside the US.
> People use what is easy, so make it easy.

I would love to see this happen.  The programs I have written 
(Circ and link) are currently using an implementation of RSA
I grabbed off of the ghost site in italy.  It is slow and the
interface is poor.  I would love to have a library of routines
that will use PGP key files,  use PGP random number generation
etc.  
It would also be nice if this library allowed access to the
math primatives as well, for implementing other schemes not
in the library like DH (which maybe should be part of the library).
Alls that needs be done is to rip out all the crypto routines, the
random number routines and the key management routines and placing
them in seperate modules.   PGP could be rewritten with this
new structure which would probably make it alot easier to manage
and find bugs in (due to modularity).  This would also ease
recofinguring PGP to do other encryptions (like triple DES).
The PGP command interface would just be a front end, and graphical
front ends could access internals directly instead of hacking
around the normal PGP front end.

Is this something we could see happen?  What do PGP people have
to say about it?

                             ...




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Matt Binder <binder@well.sf.ca.us>
Date: Fri, 17 Sep 93 23:11:20 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: reporter seeking interview subjects
Message-ID: <93Sep17.230857pdt.14382-4@well.sf.ca.us>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Hi, my name is Matt Binder.  Please help me...
        I'm a radio reporter in the SF Bay area working on a series
of pieces about invasions of privacy in the computer age.  I'm
looking for interesting "case studies" that I can use to horrify
my listeners out of their complacency.  My most immediate need is
to find someone whose medical records were used (perused!)
improperly, and/or whose records were incorrect and resulted in
the denial of insurance, employment, loans, adoptions, etc.  But
please also let me know about privacy invasions in other areas
(employer e-mail monitoring, workplace drug testing, credit
problems, weird solicitations, etc.) for future stories.
        I've been a science and technology reporter for ten years,
the first five at KPFA in Berkeley.  This series of reports will
air on a number of different stations and networks including
Pacifica, KPFA, KQED and The Christian Science Monitor radio
network.
                Feel free to circulate this request as you like.

                                                        Thanks, Matt
p.s. I will be really busy until 9/23 so don't give up on me if you
don't hear back right away.
I'm binder@well.sf.ca.us




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "L. Detweiler" <ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Date: Fri, 17 Sep 93 22:36:19 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: WE'RE UNDER ATTACK
Message-ID: <9309180534.AA27719@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



First of all, the attacks on Moby Crypto (Grady Ward) and on PGP are
*clearly* linked in the SAME systematic assault on cryptographic
distribution, as S. Steele of EFF has indicated.  Both the subpoenas
were served by US District Court of Northern California, San Jose. The
head attorney mentioned in both cases is Michael J. Yamaguchi. The
subpoenas are virtually identical. Both mention W. P. Keane, Assistant
attorney, and special agent Robin Sterzer. They appear to have been
served on the same *day*, perhaps even the same *time*. (Rule X of
systematic warfare: coordinate attack timing on all fronts.)

Here is where the dissimilarity seems to start. Grady Ward was
unequivocally being harassed by the *NSA* prior to this date as he
reported on various newsgroups. Is the summons related to this NSA
inquiry? It would be inconceivable at this point to believe that it wasn't.

PGP & PRZ were being harassed by *customs officials* prior to this
date, possibly under the complaints of PKP. Now, these two situations
have been totally aligned in the simultaneous serving of the subpoenas.
Is this a systematic assault by the NSA, PKP, or Customs Officials?
Does it have something to do with the ink-still-drying agreement
between PRZ and Viacrypt? Who convened the grand jury? *somebody* is
targeting cryptographic distribution in a devastating initial
two-pronged blow. The curious coincidence of clearcut NSA harassment of
Moby Crypto on one hand and the PKP harassment of PGP on the other,
*united* in the subpoena, with the chocolate ViaCrypt agreement timing
on top, is extremely unsettling, and perhaps altogether the strongest
fodder so far for NSA-PKP conspiracy theories.

We must try to determine whose rules we are playing by. Is this a
customs investigation? Treasury Dept.?  The situation with NSA is that
they don't really ever act directly, they always go through some other
henchmen to do the dirty work. This smells like them. But the case of
the NSA convening a grand jury does not appear to have a historical
precedent. What's going on here?

ATTACK PLAN

At this early date it is impossible to formulate something sensible.
Everyone is completely disoriented. This is like a grenade going off in the room.

However, my initial reaction is that the subpoenas seem to be
OVERBROAD. They could be argued by a competent attorney, given the
simultaneous targeting of two completely disparate cryptographic
enterprises, to represent an OUTRAGEOUS FISHING EXPEDITION. Isn't there
a way to contest a subpoena in court? these legal mechanisms need to be
employed IMMEDIATELY.

what is the significance of the date June 1, 1991, the date back to
which all cryptographic materials are requested? Does this have any
meaning to PGP or some law? If anyone can figure out the meaning, it
may be a route to a counterattack.





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "L. Detweiler" <ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Date: Fri, 17 Sep 93 23:30:22 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Clipper production problems
Message-ID: <9309180628.AA28163@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


This is a vague hint that Clipper development is not going quite as
planned -- delayed at least 2 quarters (half year!). I sure wonder what
is going on in the trenches. All you Mycotronx employees out there,
feel free to post anonymously :)

===cut=here===

From: koontzd@nebula.lrcs.loral.com (David Koontz )
Newsgroups: alt.privacy.clipper,talk.politics.crypto
Subject: MYK-78 Clipper Chip Availability
Date: 16 Sep 93 18:53:13 GMT
Organization: Loral Rolm Computer Systems


I just got off the phone with someone at AT&T Surety Communications, the
date given for availability of clipper chips for inclusion in products
is  1st quarter '94 (January).  The previous date was 3rd quarter '93
(September), which was obviously missed.  The date originated with a
U.S. government agency.

Will the date get further out still?

[I got confirmation Mykotronx is unhappy about the delay]

{ I know some people who might be happy .. djf}

For those not willing to wait, you can purchase Telephone Security Devices now,
and for an extra $100 you can get a free upgrade to the Escrow Encryption
Standard latter.  Any more delays and I might not bet on it.  The existing
nongovernment TSDs used a Type IV proprietary encryption algorithm and NOT
DES.

(I'll wait for January before ordering a pair)





------- End of Forwarded Message





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "L. Detweiler" <ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Date: Fri, 17 Sep 93 23:35:23 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: SEA Internet party, NY
Message-ID: <9309180630.AA28278@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Society for Electronic Access.

===cut=here===

Date: Fri, 17 Sep 1993 16:46:17 -0400 (EDT)
From: steven cherry <stc@panix.com>
Subject: Electronic flyer for Sept 27th Intro to Internet event


What follows is the flyer for the upcoming Intro to Internet event on Sept
27th. Please feel free to post this far and wide (or at least wide). 
A physical flyer will also be available this weekend. If you have already
volunteered to post these and I have not contacted you by Sunday, or if
you have not volunteered yet but would like to, contact me.

- --
  stc@panix.com
  Steven Cherry


- -cut here-


 ####### ######  ####### #######      ###   #     # ####### ######   #######
 #       #     # #       #             #    ##    #    #    #     #  #     #
 #       #     # #       #             #    # #   #    #    #     #  #     #
 #####   ######  #####   #####         #    #  #  #    #    ######   #     #
 #       #   #   #       #             #    #   # #    #    #   #    #     #
 #       #    #  #       #             #    #   # #    #    #   #    #     #
 #       #     # ####### #######      ###   #     #    #    #     #  #######


##### ######      ###   #     # ##### ###### ######  #     # ###### #####
  #   #    #       #    ##    #   #   #      #     # ##    # #        #
  #   #    #       #    # #   #   #   #      #     # # #   # #        #
  #   #    #       #    #  #  #   #   ####   ######  #  #  # ####     #
  #   #    #       #    #   # #   #   #      #   #   #   # # #        #
  #   #    #       #    #    ##   #   #      #    #  #    ## #        #
  #   ######      ###   #     #   #   ###### #     # #     # ######   #



Date: Monday, September 27, 1993

Time: 6:30 PM

Place: Chambers St. (bet. Centre St. and Broadway) in Manhattan




The Society for Electronic Access (SEA), a New York metro area group 
focusing on electronic civil liberties and access issues will be holding 
an "Introduction the Internet" event.

Topics that will be covered:

  +  What is the Internet?
  +  Electronic mail
  +  Usenet Newsgroups
  +  Using the Internet for research
  +  Interactive real-time communications (IRC, talk, MUDs) using the Internet
  +  What do you need to get connected?

Our speakers will include Clay Irving, who is a Unix systems 
analyst and captain of the winning Team.Panix Internet Hunt crew; 
Karen Schneider, a public librarian and Internet trainer; 
Shabbir Safdar, an expert at computer games and interactive 
services; and Joe King, a publisher and the producer of the 
award-winning Personal Computer Show.

In addition, several Internet-access providers in the 212/718 
area will be present to tell you about their systems including 
rates, features, and how you can sign up.

Refreshments will be served.

RSVP..........RSVP...........RSVP..........RSVP..........RSVP

The event is free, but *reservations are required* to attend. 
To make a reservation to attend, or for more information: 
leave voice-mail at (212) 592-3801 or send E-mail to gab@sea.org.

For additional information about the SEA (including the time 
and place of the next SEA meeting), call via modem (212) 787-3100 
and enter "sea-info" at the "login: " prompt, or send E-mail to 
"sea-info@sea.org" (you will receive an automatic reply); 
or you may leave voice mail request at (212) 592-3801.




------- End of Forwarded Message





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: J. Michael Diehl <mdiehl@triton.unm.edu>
Date: Sat, 18 Sep 93 01:49:34 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: To: an5877@anon.penet.fi
Message-ID: <9309180846.AA21442@triton.unm.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Sorry folks.  This person anonymously sent me a message to which he expects
a reply.  But it is impossible for me to reply to this person anonymously
since he would be able to place my anonymous Id with my real Id.  I know I
should learn how to "bounce" anonymous messages, but there seems to be a
lack of standardization in this area which I don't want to deal with at the
moment.  Sorry for the bandwidth.
 
 
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tfgz05vIrelBI8XYJuZtmid1cxQzXBwML9r9skgF7Scp8q+1pDeAUz4yAp/Oyw==
 




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: J. Michael Diehl <mdiehl@triton.unm.edu>
Date: Sat, 18 Sep 93 01:55:23 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: To: an5877@anon.penet.fi, again.
Message-ID: <9309180852.AA21489@triton.unm.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Sorry folks.  This person anonymously sent me a message to which he expects
a reply.  But it is impossible for me to reply to this person anonymously
since he would be able to place my anonymous Id with my real Id.  I know I
should learn how to "bounce" anonymous messages, but there seems to be a
lack of standardization in this area which I don't want to deal with at the
moment.  Sorry for the bandwidth.
 
 
-----BEGIN PGP MESSAGE----- 
Version: 2.2 
 
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0N8qvutz0PouNBlcMHpTUxon7VTR10oSRV/JieQqYVJ+nlT8WBj+mVxsU2ZGD2mH
peg8ZpJWP3X7tW7518BQRH95fLcEoX4Fcnb509hGv9+F+JTH30eG6H5R1aDD6ZXT
tfgz05vIrelBI8XYJuZtmid1cxQzXBwML9r9skgF7Scp8q+1pDeAUz4yAp/Oyw==
=tHfY
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From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: XXCLARK@indst.indstate.edu
Date: Sat, 18 Sep 93 01:16:21 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Escrow what ain't
Message-ID: <9309180813.AA21395@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain




   Extract from EFFector Online Volume 6 No. 1

        "... The briefers admitted that the proposed system is not really
 an escrow.  The agencies holding the key components will not have any
 duties or responsibilities to the Clipper users.  The escrows' obligation
 will be to the government, and they will be liable to Clipper users only
 under the Bivens doctrine, where any failure must be shown to be wilful.
 ..."

        If it isn't really an "escrow", why do we continue to use the
   term?

        If keys are, in effect, surrendered before the fact, why not
   call it the "key surrender system" when we write or speak about
   this miasma? Or any other term more nearly accurate than what it
   is not...

        Haven't seen a single post promoting tax evasion all day.
   How curious.

  ---------------------------------------------------------------------
              internet      : xxclark@indst.indstate.edu
                  Vanilla BITNET: XXCLARK@INDST
                   We're all Bozos on this bus...
  ---------------------------------------------------------------------





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: collins@newton.apple.com (Scott Collins)
Date: Sat, 18 Sep 93 06:06:53 PDT
To: xiaozhou@phoenix.Princeton.EDU
Subject: anon.penet.fi
Message-ID: <9309181302.AA09384@newton.apple.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


  >What is your policy on chaining to anon.penet.fi?

Hmmm, it would be bad to post to anon.penet.fi through a remailer, as the
anon id assigned by penet would be associated with the remailer, _not_ with
you.  Therefore, people who responded to the message would actually be
sending mail to the operator of the remailer that was the hop into penet. 
Not to mention the fact if the remailer account were also a personal
account, and the operator was a client of penet, that his anon id could be
compromised in this way (if he was foolish enough not to have a password).

Therefore, it seems reasonable that remailers should refuse to mail into
penet, unless and until a non-anonymous reply to anonymous mail facility
becomes available there.

To the penet knowledgeable: is my understanding correct?


Scott Collins         | "Few people realize what tremendous power there
                      |  is in one of these things."     -- Willy Wonka
......................|................................................
BUSINESS.   voice:408.862.0540  fax:974.6094   collins@newton.apple.com
Apple Computer, Inc.   1 Infinite Loop, MS 301-2C   Cupertino, CA 95014
.......................................................................
PERSONAL.   voice/fax:408.257.1746    1024:669687   catalyst@netcom.com





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Duncan Frissell <frissell@panix.com>
Date: Sat, 18 Sep 93 05:35:27 PDT
To: CYPHERPUNKS@toad.com
Subject: Crypto crackdown - this i
Message-ID: <199309181233.AA23795@panix.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


R >They may not be able to prosecute you based on illegal evidence, but
R >they can take everything you own and keep it until you are broke 
R >and homeless.

Unless you are judgement proof.  For a small fee, I am always willing to 
teach people how to become judgment proof (which is *not* the same thing 
as poor).

Duncan Frissell

::Exclude *.gov




--- WinQwk 2.0b#0
           




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: hughes@ah.com (Eric Hughes)
Date: Sat, 18 Sep 93 09:36:57 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: anon.penet.fi
In-Reply-To: <9309181302.AA09384@newton.apple.com>
Message-ID: <9309181636.AA21944@ah.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>Therefore, it seems reasonable that remailers should refuse to mail into
>penet, unless and until a non-anonymous reply to anonymous mail facility
>becomes available there.

There is already non-pseudonymizing reply available for pseudonymous
mail.  It periodically comes up on the list, and is periodically
corrected.  The irony of the situation is that the solution was
invented on this list a few months ago.

Solution: if you send to na12345@anon.penet.fi, then your mail won't
be pseudonymized; if you send to an12345@anon.penet.fi, then your mail
will be pseudonymized.

	an = anonymous
	na = not anonymous

Eric




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Eli Brandt <ebrandt@jarthur.Claremont.EDU>
Date: Sat, 18 Sep 93 10:45:30 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: anon.penet.fi
In-Reply-To: <9309181302.AA09384@newton.apple.com>
Message-ID: <9309181743.AA28411@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> To the penet knowledgeable: is my understanding correct?

It depends on the remailer.  Mine, for example, sends messages with a
From: line of "eli-remailer@jarthur...", and some others do similar
things.  I believe this address already has a penet address.  I have
no problems with chaining from here to penet, though I suggest making
it clear that 1) attempts to reply will result in an ugly bounce, and
2) the persona using the chained ID can be identified only by
continuity of digital signature.  IMHO, this is useful way of bumping
the anonymity level up a notch over posting directly with penet -- an
attacker needs both penet's lists and a bunch of sendmail logs.
Others, including Julf, may feel differently, as this provides some
degree of "hit-and-run anonymity".

	 PGP 2 key by finger or e-mail
   Eli   ebrandt@jarthur.claremont.edu




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: A1 ray arachelian (library)  <rarachel@ishara.poly.edu>
Date: Sat, 18 Sep 93 11:50:31 PDT
To: rees@cs.bu.edu (David Rees)
Subject: Re: Does this seem illegal to you?
In-Reply-To: <9309181829.AA17045@csa.bu.edu>
Message-ID: <9309181446.AA06998@ishara.poly.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Actually you don't have to give the exact phone number.  In most dense areas
the phone number prefix should be enough to get you in the proximity of
where you want to go.  Then when you get there, find a pay phone call up
the person you want to reach and ask for directions from your current
location.

Of course, it becomes an invasion of privacy if you use the guy's real
number and he hasn't invited you!




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Date: Sat, 18 Sep 93 12:00:31 PDT
To: rees@cs.bu.edu (David Rees)
Subject: Re: Does this seem illegal to you?
In-Reply-To: <9309181829.AA17045@csa.bu.edu>
Message-ID: <9309181859.AA04438@netcom5.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



>     Hi.  Just picked this up from alt.dcom.telecom.  Doesn't it seem like
> an illegal invasion of privacy to do something like this?  Or maybe
> I just don't have the whole picture. Anyway, here it is:
> 
> 
> >GOING FROM A TO B.  You're in your car.  You're at A.  You want to go
> >to B.  You have no idea where B is.  So you go to a Sprint payphone
> >and use its TeleMap service, give the telephone number of your
> >destination, and receive precise directions. (Tampa Tribune 9/12/93
> >B&F 5)  Of course, if you have a wrong phone number, that may be a
> >problem.  You may go to C, wherever that is.
> 
>    -Dave  (rees@cs.bu.edu)

No. Phone area codes and prefixes already are "public knowledge"
pointers to neighborhoods...I don't know if the last 4 digits are, but
probably.

The "right to privacy" debate is often clouded, in my opinion, by
confusing ideas of what is and isn't mine, what others are "allowed"
to type into their computers or write in their address books, etc. In
a free sociey, if I come across a piece of information, I can write it
down, sell it, etc.

In a true free market, some phone companies might offer more privacy
features. Credit card companies know they will lose their card
subscribers if they go "too far" (a market issue) in disclosing credit
records to third parties. This is quite analogous to your scenario
described here.

Your friend at "B" needs to consider other options, such as using
remote message services for his phone needs, switches of the sort
George Gleason and others have talked about, and so on. (I don't think
merely having an unlisted number is enough, though.)

Market solutions generally are better than coercive laws.

-Tim May


-- 
..........................................................................
Timothy C. May         | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,  
tcmay@netcom.com       | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
408-688-5409           | knowledge, reputations, information markets, 
W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA  | black markets, collapse of governments.
Higher Power: 2^756839 | Public Key: PGP and MailSafe available.
Note: I put time and money into writing this posting. I hope you enjoy it.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Date: Sat, 18 Sep 93 12:11:32 PDT
To: rarachel@ishara.poly.edu (A1 ray arachelian)
Subject: Re: Does this seem illegal to you?
In-Reply-To: <9309181446.AA06998@ishara.poly.edu>
Message-ID: <9309181909.AA05282@netcom5.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


A1 Ray A. writes:

> Actually you don't have to give the exact phone number.  In most dense areas
> the phone number prefix should be enough to get you in the proximity of
> where you want to go.  Then when you get there, find a pay phone call up
> the person you want to reach and ask for directions from your current
> location.
> 
> Of course, it becomes an invasion of privacy if you use the guy's real
> number and he hasn't invited you!

Nonsense! (Not to sound like David Sternlight, or anything.)

This is what doors and locks are all about: to keep out folks who come
to our houses uninvited.

Anyone is free to look up the publically available information (or
privately available, if they get access to it...another matter) and go
to a physical location. My house, your house, Dorothy Denning's house,
whatever.

Trespass is another matter entirely. So is "stalking" (though I fear
the concept is being increasingly overused and may infringe other
basic rights).

-Tim May


-- 
..........................................................................
Timothy C. May         | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,  
tcmay@netcom.com       | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
408-688-5409           | knowledge, reputations, information markets, 
W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA  | black markets, collapse of governments.
Higher Power: 2^756839 | Public Key: PGP and MailSafe available.
Note: I put time and money into writing this posting. I hope you enjoy it.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: gnu (John Gilmore)
Date: Sat, 18 Sep 93 14:15:33 PDT
To: ferguson@fiber.sprintlink.net (Paul Ferguson x2044)
Subject: Re: CRADA
In-Reply-To: <9309162151.AA18816@fiber.sprintlink.net>
Message-ID: <9309182113.AA01102@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


You can get large parts of the Federal Register online on the Internet
from gopher.internet.com, using the gopher protocol.  Unfortunately,
the people who run the service claim to not permit republication.  I
tried to sign up as their real customer, but this bogosity got in
the way.  Why pay money to these people for access to public domain
info that you then can't use?

Here is as much as you can get without being a subscriber:

<ARTICLE>
Date="08/24/93"
Citation="58 FR 44662"
Group="NONE"
Type="NOTICE"
Department="DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE"
Agency="NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF STANDARDS AND TECHNOLOGY (NIST), COMMERCE"
Subject="Opportunity To Join a Cooperative Research and Development Consortium To Develop Secure Software Encryption With Integrated Cryptographic Key Escrowing Techniques"
<HEADER>
------------------------------------------------------------

National Institute of Standards and Technology

[Docket No. 930789-3189]

Opportunity To Join a Cooperative Research and Development Consortium 
To Develop Secure Software Encryption With Integrated Cryptographic 
Key Escrowing Techniques

AGENCY: National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), 
Commerce.

ACTION: Notice of opportunity to join a cooperative research 
and development consortium.
</HEADER>
------------------------------------------------------------

National Institute of Standards and Technology

[Docket No. 930789-3189]

Opportunity To Join a Cooperative Research and Development Consortium 
To Develop Secure Software Encryption With Integrated Cryptographic 
Key Escrowing Techniques

AGENCY: National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), 
Commerce.

ACTION: Notice of opportunity to join a cooperative research 
and development consortium.
..
------------------------------------------------------------
SUMMARY: The National Institute of Standards and Technology 
(NIST) seeks industrial and academic parties interested in entering 
into a cooperative research consortium on the development of 
new technology for secure software encryption with integrated 
cryptographic key escrowing techniques. The program will be 
undertaken within the scope and confines of The Federal Technology 
Transfer Act of 1986 (15 U.S.C. 3710a), which provides federal 
laboratories including NIST, with the authority to enter into 
cooperative research agreements with qualified parties. Under 
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
Full access to this file is restricted to subscribers only.  To become a
subscriber to this service, please read the information provided at the
top level of the Counterpoint Publishing Internet Federal Register Gopher.

Please send any and all comments to 'fedreg@internet.com'  -- Thanks.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: rees@cs.bu.edu (David Rees)
Date: Sat, 18 Sep 93 11:31:31 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Does this seem illegal to you?
Message-ID: <9309181829.AA17045@csa.bu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text


    Hi.  Just picked this up from alt.dcom.telecom.  Doesn't it seem like
an illegal invasion of privacy to do something like this?  Or maybe
I just don't have the whole picture. Anyway, here it is:


>GOING FROM A TO B.  You're in your car.  You're at A.  You want to go
>to B.  You have no idea where B is.  So you go to a Sprint payphone
>and use its TeleMap service, give the telephone number of your
>destination, and receive precise directions. (Tampa Tribune 9/12/93
>B&F 5)  Of course, if you have a wrong phone number, that may be a
>problem.  You may go to C, wherever that is.

   -Dave  (rees@cs.bu.edu)







From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Mike Godwin <mnemonic@eff.org>
Date: Sat, 18 Sep 93 11:55:31 PDT
To: cme@ellisun.sw.stratus.com (Carl Ellison)
Subject: Re: KEY ESCROW PROCEDURES
In-Reply-To: <9309171855.AA00716@ellisun.sw.stratus.com>
Message-ID: <199309181851.AA05084@eff.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


 
Carl writes:
 
> Meanwhile, where is the proof that the key being requested corresponds to
> a person on whom a wiretap has been ordered?

The authorized key request will normally occur after law-enforcement
officials have snagged the chip serial number from the LEAF
(law-enforcement field) of the signal they captured with an authorized
wiretap.


--Mike






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Marc Horowitz <marc@MIT.EDU>
Date: Sat, 18 Sep 93 12:59:38 PDT
To: "L. Detweiler" <ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Subject: Re: WE'RE UNDER ATTACK
In-Reply-To: <9309180534.AA27719@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Message-ID: <9309181957.AA24648@deathtongue.MIT.EDU>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>> However, my initial reaction is that the subpoenas seem to be
>> OVERBROAD. They could be argued by a competent attorney, given the
>> simultaneous targeting of two completely disparate cryptographic
>> enterprises, to represent an OUTRAGEOUS FISHING EXPEDITION. Isn't there
>> a way to contest a subpoena in court? these legal mechanisms need to be
>> employed IMMEDIATELY.

Lance, calm down.  PRZ and ViaCrypt have their own lawyers.  Mike
Godwin in contact with PRZ, and we all saw Shari's message from the
exec dir of the EFF, so they are involved.

We are technologists, not lawyers.  For now, I'll let the lawyers
formulate the response to this attack.  They know the game better than
you or I do.  When my help is requested, they'll get it.

For now, we need to continue doing what we've been doing: distributing
technology, experimenting with remailers, and increasing awareness.
Not taking the government on with no tools, no experience, and no
clue.

		Marc



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Karl Lui Barrus <klbarrus@owlnet.rice.edu>
Date: Sat, 18 Sep 93 15:19:39 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Cypherpunks & GOPHER
Message-ID: <9309182215.AA01627@flammulated.owlnet.rice.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

Cypherpunks,

I'd like to announce the Cypherpunks Gopher Site - dedicated to
putting up information for access, and meant to be a list resource.

I'm running the gopher site at chaos.bsu.edu, thanks to Chael Hall,
who graciously donated an account to me to be used for any and all
projects.  This is something I've been wanting to do for quite some
time but have been unable to.  But now I have an account and a
sympathetic system administrator...!

Chaos.bsu.edu is 147.226.53.28, and the port is 2000.  That is port
2000 and not the usual port 70 - when Chael and I have some more time
I will ask him to perform the various and necessary incantations
(chown) and I'll move it to the usual place.

So: try 'gopher 147.226.53.28 2000' and browse around.

The site doesn't have much stuff yet...  I plan to add more
information sometime in the future.  Currently the site consists of
some old back articles from the list, some faq's, etc.  I plan to sift
for more stuff, especially Clipper related, and add it in.

In posting back articles, I have attempted to give proper credit at
the BOTTOM of the article, unless a signature already appears.  I
figure that posts sent to the list are meant to be seen, but if the
original author of something wants is taken off, mail me.  If lots of
people want stuff removed, I'll probably just solve the whole problem
with 'rm -rf ~/gopher-data'

I will sift through my archives of the list, incomplete as they are,
and add files when I have time.

Direct questions to: klbarrus@owlnet.rice.edu

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.3a

iQCVAgUBLJuILIOA7OpLWtYzAQFcjgP+K2MOSFKX1M+Y903DKTSdEAOoVdLSl/N4
/1eukQ5B8f09Rw6zU2AjpxcGa4uQcKQ2brNGXzEG4n3+SK5WcEq5t5+oLQ679jrM
/aWcWLJWT9sNoiJPQt0li26BWhKhFQSanqbDr+MZ+5JRWu5FBIFgM4cOe0gwK3p1
5S9NokdBBfE=
=gMFB
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "L. Detweiler" <ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Date: Sat, 18 Sep 93 16:21:37 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: analysis: attack PKP driven? significance of June 1, 1991
Message-ID: <9309182319.AA10597@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



June 1 1991 is the date that both the MobyCrypt and PRZ subpoenas reach
to. What is the significance? the early indication: this is the date
of the 'official' release of PGP 1.0.

C'punks: upon further reflection this dual assault seems to be ostensibly PKP 
motivated/driven.  It is possible the prior NSA harassment of Moby Crypto was 
just a shocking coincidence. As reported on this list by D. Barnes 
<cman@io.com>, NSA had been prodding Austin Code Works (Maria Nekam) over 
DES export many months prior to this date. Does ACW currently deal with 
cryptographic software? how is it NSA was bugging them *months* ago?
did Grady Ward indicate that long ago publicly (Usenet) his intent to use
them as a publisher? This reminds me of stories of censorship of Yardley
from Kahn (The Codebreakers) and censorship of Kahn reported by Bamford 
(Puzzle Palace) -- somehow, the NSA just *knows* when publishers are coming
out with information related to cryptography or the NSA (I wonder how? 
<wink, wink>). We need more information: 

- how long has the NSA been harassing Austin Code Works?
- does Austin Code works currently deal with cryptographic code?
- or is this all entirely due to Grady Ward's Moby Crypto project?
- was NSA complaining about (1) DES or (2) something else? export?
- how did NSA find out that Austin Code Works was involved with Moby Crypto?

On the other hand, the evidence that this is primarily PKP motivated seems
to be in the primarily *PGP* and *RSA* oriented aspect of the subpoena 
queries. My current pet theory is that PKP has seen Grady Ward talking about
his cryptographic recipe book on newsgroups (Bidzos has been known to track
and respond on sci.crypt) and lumped him in an accusation & complaint, 
filed with the customs office, that ITAR laws on cryptographic export of 
cryptographic algorithms have been violated -- hence the investigation by a 
customs agency, the PGP 1.0 release date, the Viacrypt timing, etc. Maybe
PKP got the impression that G. Ward was including RSA Source code -- has he
said so on Usenet? -- this would be very inflammatory for them. RSA has
virtually *no* international protection, all the patents only apply in the
U.S. Finally, there is some other peripheral evidence regarding PRZ in this 
line I'm not really at liberty to state.

that's the current 'conventional wisdom', anyway, subject to nanosecond
fluctuation.

Point: I think this new episode will without any doubt resolve whose side PKP
is on. They've successfully remained in the shadows, like the NSA, until
now, but like the NSA is discovering, continuing this will be impossible...

Another point: remember the amazing scrutiny given to the E911 document,
its *exact* and *precise* path of geneological distribution and leaking
in the court proceedings and subsequent literature (e.g. B. Sterling, 
Hacker Crackdown)? I suspect, very soon, the same laserlike magnifying-glass
pinpoint attention is going to be focused on exactly *who* first made
PGP available *internationally* outside the U.S. -- anyone who can come
forward with information on this (it all appears to have transpired in 1991)
will be momentously affected. I don't know if this can be traced as effectively,
however. The tracks are bit cool, and some people may not want to exactly
*announce* this information.








From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: collins@newton.apple.com (Scott Collins)
Date: Sat, 18 Sep 93 18:05:36 PDT
To: hughes@ah.com (Eric Hughes)
Subject: Re: anon.penet.fi
Message-ID: <9309190057.AA01078@newton.apple.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


  >Solution: if you send to na12345@anon.penet.fi, then your mail won't
  >be pseudonymized; if you send to an12345@anon.penet.fi, then your mail
  >will be pseudonymized.

Good.  Therefore, remailers should translate 'Request-Remailing-To:'
addresses like this:

        if ( /an(\d+@anon.penet.fi)/ )  { s//na$1/; }

That is unless there are fifty other ways to say @anon.penet.fi.  In which
case, I would need to know the fifty ways.

Is this reasonable?


Scott Collins         | "Few people realize what tremendous power there
                      |  is in one of these things."     -- Willy Wonka
......................|................................................
BUSINESS.   voice:408.862.0540  fax:974.6094   collins@newton.apple.com
Apple Computer, Inc.   1 Infinite Loop, MS 301-2C   Cupertino, CA 95014
.......................................................................
PERSONAL.   voice/fax:408.257.1746    1024:669687   catalyst@netcom.com





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Karl Lui Barrus <klbarrus@owlnet.rice.edu>
Date: Sat, 18 Sep 93 16:39:39 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: gopher site
Message-ID: <9309182336.AA08747@flammulated.owlnet.rice.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I forgot to mention I will take suggestions for what to place at the
gopher site - for example, what 10 or so Clipper articles from the
archives at soda.berkeley.edu MUST be available?  I haven't read them
all and won't have the time for the forseeable future to do so.

Pointers and suggestions to other docs and files are welcome.  Should
I put stuff like appropriate rfc's and documentation (pgp and ripem,
etc.) or not?  All of this is subject to disk space and it may be I'll
give preference to shorter items.

I am leaning towards including the rfc's for PEM and the two for
Rivest's MD4/MD5 hash algorithms.

-- 
Karl L. Barrus: klbarrus@owlnet.rice.edu         
keyID: 5AD633 hash: D1 59 9D 48 72 E9 19 D5  3D F3 93 7E 81 B5 CC 32 

"One man's mnemonic is another man's cryptography" 
  - my compilers prof discussing file naming in public directories



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: doug@netcom.com (Doug Merritt)
Date: Sat, 18 Sep 93 19:15:38 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: NIST proposes software key escrow development
Message-ID: <9309190211.AA17219@netcom.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


an12070@anon.penet.fi said:
>I think it would be utmost folly for software developers to work with the NIST
>and NSA on this or invest any time or capital.

Clearly this is true for cypherpunk sw developers, but others see an
opportunity to make some bucks.

>The fundamental 
>requirement for NSA approval is the implementation of Skipjack in 
>*software* in such a way that the algorithm is *protected* like it is in 
>the booby trapped Clipper chips-- that is, impossible to deduce.
>
>But this appears to be complete *fantasy*. Any such system must rely on
>some kind of a hardware approach.

Not necessarily. Zero knowledge proof techniques, for instance, can be
applied to make source code as impenetrable as one wishes. This tends to
carry a heavy runtime overhead, of course.

And even hardware solutions can be reverse engineered. In fact, it's
guaranteed to happen eventually. Triple layer metal interconnect chips
can be selectively peeled via ion beam etching to reveal them to scanning
tunneling electron microscope probing. Camouflage in the form of unnecessary
functional units that mask actual operation can be uncovered by data flow
analysis. Such a project would be extremely expensive...but someone will
eventually do it. The Mafia or the KGB, for instance, if no one else.

>Doesn't anyone have the faint glimmer of the idea that NSA, the *premier*
>cryptographic agency in the *world*, with unsurpassed technological and
>engineering prowess in the area, would have already *figured out* how to do 
>this if it was *at all* feasible?

I think everyone assumes that the NSA is technologically several steps
ahead of the game at all times, and clearly they have their own agenda.
Some people just don't see their hidden agendas as threatening. C'est
la vie. I think it makes for a very interesting chess game, myself. The
NSA is attempting checkmate, but they're not strongly enough positioned
to do so. In chess parlance, it's a bluff, but one with enough steel behind
it to force a response, which gives them a minor but real tactical advantage.
The obvious counter-response is to advance a pawn towards queening...which
is already in progress.

I'm reasonably happy with what the NSA appears to be doing in regard to
foreign intelligence gathering; it's their domestic agenda that threatens
the constitution. But that's in the nature of spook organizations.

"Eternal vigilance is the price of liberty."
	Doug




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Peter Wayner <pcw@access.digex.net>
Date: Sat, 18 Sep 93 16:31:36 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: CRADA robber
Message-ID: <199309182329.AA09416@access.digex.net>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



I spoke with Dennis Branstad at length a couple of days ago
about just what it means to get involved with NIST in the 
Software Key Escrow CRADA. It was a nice conversation and
he told me that he personally didn't seem to think that a workable
system would emerge, but that others felt differently. Plus
the push for a software solution meant that the agency felt
that it should at least explore the topic before dismissing it.

The system seems to be quite commercial. A group of people 
and companies petition NIST to get involved with the project
and then a group forms out of a subset of these applications.
Usually this is the team that is most likely to get the job
done. For that reason, people need to bring something to the
project be it expertise, capital or whatever. 

At the end, the group owns the intellectual property rights to
what is discovered. This may be something patentable and it could
be worth some money. I don't know how likely this is, but it 
seems possible. In fact, it is probably the reason many of the
participants are willing to enter into the project. 

The role of NIST is both gatekeeper and fascilitator. They get
everyone together and occasionally push things along. In this
case, they'll also offer some technical assistance which will
include feedback from the NSA. Dennis Branstad said that this would
most likely take the form of Siskel and Ebert-like ratings of the
systems proposed. The NSA would suggest, "Yes" or "No" but they
probably wouldn't go into details. This is because the procedure
would be unclassified and the NSA usually won't relate technical
details without classifying them. 

I've read the Federal Register announcement and it really isn't 
that interesting. There are only two columns of text and most of
it is devoted to the formatting and standard operating procedures. 
This note contains much more information than the announcement itself.

This leaves me with several questions:

* Is this process intended to fail? Will NIST just keep saying that
software isn't good enough and that way they'll be able to answer
the criticism that hardware is too expensive?

* How selective is the group formation process? Are people really
out for money? 

* There are supposedly several other groups interested in participating.
Who are they? Is it RSA and PKP? 

* Is a software process really that much more insecure than a hardware
based approach? Sure, it is easier to tamper with software, but given
that we can always tamper with the software shell around the Clipper
hardware, it shouldn't be _that_ much different.

-Peter




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: khijol!erc@apple.com (Ed Carp)
Date: Sat, 18 Sep 93 20:15:39 PDT
To: doug@netcom.com (Doug Merritt)
Subject: Re: NIST proposes software key escrow development
In-Reply-To: <9309190211.AA17219@netcom.netcom.com>
Message-ID: <m0oeF8h-00021LC@khijol>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text


> Not necessarily. Zero knowledge proof techniques, for instance, can be
> applied to make source code as impenetrable as one wishes. This tends to
> carry a heavy runtime overhead, of course.

Could you go into more detail on this?  Thanks!
-- 
Ed Carp, N7EKG			erc@apple.com			510/659-9560
                            anon-0001@khijol.uucp
If you want magic, let go of your armor.  Magic is so much stronger than
steel!        -- Richard Bach, "The Bridge Across Forever"



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: strick -- henry strickland <strick@versant.com>
Date: Sat, 18 Sep 93 20:16:39 PDT
To: Karl Lui Barrus <klbarrus@owlnet.rice.edu>
Subject: Re: gopher site
In-Reply-To: <9309182336.AA08747@flammulated.owlnet.rice.edu>
Message-ID: <9309190315.AA26187@versant.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


THUS SPAKE Karl Lui Barrus <klbarrus@owlnet.rice.edu>:
# I forgot to mention I will take suggestions for what to place at the
# gopher site - for example, what 10 or so Clipper articles from the
# archives at soda.berkeley.edu MUST be available?  I haven't read them
# all and won't have the time for the forseeable future to do so.

My archives of SURFPUNK are archived at "http://www.acns.nwu.edu/surfpunk/"
via WWW (or XMosaic).  In the past I've appropriated a lot of
cypherpunk emails.  You might look through there for ideas.
 
# Pointers and suggestions to other docs and files are welcome.  Should
# I put stuff like appropriate rfc's and documentation (pgp and ripem,
# etc.) or not?  All of this is subject to disk space and it may be I'll
# give preference to shorter items.

I wonder if these are not already gophered somewhere.  Then you can
merely hyperlink to them.  Perhaps Mark could run a gopher with his
latest RIPEM docs for you, and others could do the same for their wares.

(Just for the halibut I tried "gopher gopher.uu.net" and
"gopher ftp.uu.net" but no dice.  If you were using WWW instead
of gopher, you could link "ftp://ftp.uu.net/inet/rfc/rfc1321".)

There are probably other gopherdatahavens (and WWW webs) with
cryptostuff that you could link to, en masse, in an "other gophers" section.

BTW, I took a look, Karl, and I think your gopher is off to a good start.     

						strick




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Date: Sat, 18 Sep 93 20:36:39 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Definition of "Zero Knowledge"
In-Reply-To: <m0oeF8h-00021LC@khijol>
Message-ID: <9309190335.AA22435@netcom5.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



> > Not necessarily. Zero knowledge proof techniques, for instance, can be
> > applied to make source code as impenetrable as one wishes. This tends to
> > carry a heavy runtime overhead, of course.
> 
> Could you go into more detail on this?  Thanks!
> -- 
> Ed Carp, N7EKG			erc@apple.com			510/659-9560

I didn't write the item above, but I'll add my comments anyway.

Zero knowledge interactive proof systems are a critical part of modern
crypto. Here's the brief summary from the Cypherpunks Glossary,
available by anon. ftp at soda.berkeley.edu in pub/cypherpunks/misc as
glossary.text.gz.

***     zero knowledge proofs -- proofs in which no 
knowledge of the actual proof is conveyed. Peggy the Prover 
demonstrates to Sid the Skeptic that she is indeed in 
possession of some piece of knowledge without actually 
revealing any of that knowledge. This is useful for access to 
computers, because eavesdroppers or dishonest sysops cannot 
steal the knowledge given. Also called minimum disclosure 
proofs. Useful for proving possession of some property, or 
credential, such as age or voting status, without revealing 
personal information.


By the way, this Glossary was distributed at the very first
Cypherpunks meeting, a year ago. While never intended as an FAQ, it
still may be of value to subscribers here.

-Tim May

-- 
..........................................................................
Timothy C. May         | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,  
tcmay@netcom.com       | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
408-688-5409           | knowledge, reputations, information markets, 
W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA  | black markets, collapse of governments.
Higher Power: 2^756839 | Public Key: PGP and MailSafe available.
Note: I put time and money into writing this posting. I hope you enjoy it.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: khijol!erc@apple.com (Ed Carp)
Date: Sat, 18 Sep 93 21:20:38 PDT
To: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Subject: Re: Definition of "Zero Knowledge"
In-Reply-To: <9309190335.AA22435@netcom5.netcom.com>
Message-ID: <m0oeGCo-00021LC@khijol>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text


> > > Not necessarily. Zero knowledge proof techniques, for instance, can be
> > > applied to make source code as impenetrable as one wishes. This tends to
> > > carry a heavy runtime overhead, of course.
> > 
> > Could you go into more detail on this?  Thanks!
> > -- 
> > Ed Carp, N7EKG			erc@apple.com			510/659-9560
> 
> I didn't write the item above, but I'll add my comments anyway.
> 
> Zero knowledge interactive proof systems are a critical part of modern
> crypto. Here's the brief summary from the Cypherpunks Glossary,
> available by anon. ftp at soda.berkeley.edu in pub/cypherpunks/misc as
> glossary.text.gz.

Thanks for the definition (but I knew that, anyway).  Sorru I wasn't clear -
what I was looking for was examples of how zero-knowledge proof techniques
could make source code impenetrable.

Source would be nice, too... ;)
-- 
Ed Carp, N7EKG			erc@apple.com			510/659-9560
                            anon-0001@khijol.uucp
If you want magic, let go of your armor.  Magic is so much stronger than
steel!        -- Richard Bach, "The Bridge Across Forever"



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: strick -- henry strickland <strick@versant.com>
Date: Sat, 18 Sep 93 21:39:42 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: gopher links
Message-ID: <9309190439.AA26663@versant.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


<root> writes to me:
# strick wrote:
# > (Just for the halibut I tried "gopher gopher.uu.net" and
# > "gopher ftp.uu.net" but no dice.  If you were using WWW instead
# > of gopher, you could link "ftp://ftp.uu.net/inet/rfc/rfc1321".)
# 
# Gopher can link to ftp directly without the destination being served by a
# gopher server.  RT*M: (p.s. I have no idea why they call them "cool" links)

Actually, I have RT*Protocols, but the original protocols, not the one
you describe here.

Come to think of it, it looks like this is executed by the gopher
server, since it also has a "exec" option.  Not so efficient for ftp, 
but the old client-server protocol would still work.

Karl, if this works with your gopherd, you should abuse it ...    strick

 
# GOPHERD(8)
# 
# 
#    ADDING COOL LINKS
#        One cool thing you can do with .Links is to add neato ser-
#        vices to your gopher server.  Adding a link like this:
# 
#            Name=Cool ftp directory
#            Type=1
#            Path=ftp:hostname@path/
#            Host=+
#            Port=+
# 
#            Name=Cool ftp file
#            Type=0
#            Path=ftp:hostname@file
#            Host=+
#            Port=+
# 
#        Will  allow  you to link in any ftp site into your gopher.
#        Make sure that there is a  /tmp  directory  to  store  the
#        files  for the gateway.  Note that if you're running with-
#        out the -c option, you must create a  "tmp"  directory  at
#        the top level of the gopher-data directory.
# 
#        Another neat thing you can do is to execute shell scripts:
# 
#            Name=Execed command name
#            Type={a type}
#            Path=exec:"args":/scriptname
#            Host=+
#            Port=+
# 
#        This is usually used by other types  of  gateway  scripts.
#        For instance, The first script might take a search and get
#        a few hits.  It could then generate  "exec"  scripts  that
#        would retrieve the actual document the hit referred to.
# 
#        Note that the scriptname *must* begin with the magic char-
#        acter "#!/".  It also must be executable.
# 




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "L. Detweiler" <ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Date: Sat, 18 Sep 93 22:32:10 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: more deranged lunatic ravings -- just delete 'em!
Message-ID: <9309190530.AA15035@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



 From: "Perry E. Metzger" <pmetzger@lehman.com>
>Why all this silly speculation? We will all know the complete answers
>soon enough. There is no need for us to reach out and "investigate".

ah yes, just like everyone 'soon enough' knew the 'complete answers' behind
the Steve Jackson Games investigation. All we have to do is sit around and
wait for it to be handed to us by everyone involved, including The Enemy.

Look at that E911 investigation -- this was an example of *community* 
involvement. Laywers on *both* sides were unaware of the fact that E911
documents were publicly available, that they could even be *ordered* from
Mountain Bell with no restriction, until someone 'out there' made the link
and pointed it out -- and this was a *very* significant aspect of the
defense case.

>"We" need no information. We are not the attorneys. EFF and the rest
>are involved and have fine lawyers and investigators. Anything "We"
>uncover will be useful only for personal amusement. 

the situation *directly affects* us *now*. what is the scope of the grand
jury investigation? could it potentially be *expanded* beyond this initial
inquiry? what about sites that are currently distributing PGP outside the
U.S.? what about the fact that cypherpunks have *always* been closely
involved with PGP and its international distribution?

>"We" don't even
>have our facts right -- the "NSA" has not been directly harassing
>ANYONE. 

say *what*?! Grady Ward has been posting for over a week on a bazillion
Usenet groups that Agent X from the NSA has contacted him, with a phone
number, fax, and identification standard for NSA employees (I forwarded one
of his early messages here). A representative from Austin Code Works informed 
a Cypherpunk (who wasn't afraid to do a little poking around himself) 
they have been prodded by the NSA months prior over DES export. And 
"the NSA has not been directly harassing ANYONE." well, yes, I guess 
they haven't stuck anybody on the rack, if that's what you mean.

>I'd calm down, Mr. Detweiler. Write some code -- its a productive
>persuit.

ah yes, I'm 'persuing' the sequels to PGP and Moby Crypt right now <g>

you seem to be fundamentally averse to excitement. this is the Cryptographic
Case of a decade, and we're all to just wait patiently for the bleached 
official reports prior to a proper, dainty discussion? not I.

but in deference to you, Mr. Metzger, and others, I will not post any more 
speculation ...  without some new juicy articles to speculate on :)






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: cme@ellisun.sw.stratus.com (Carl Ellison)
Date: Sat, 18 Sep 93 21:15:39 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: software key escrow ruse
Message-ID: <9309190411.AA03947@ellisun.sw.stratus.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Isn't it obvious?

1.	People try to do key escrow in S/W (rather than refuse to play
	along with key registration)

2.	By doing so, they lend apparent approval to the idea of
	registration.

3.	The S/W effort fails, of course.

4.	Conclusion: S/W encryption is no good and must be abandoned because
	you can't do key registration that way.

It is important not to entertain the notion of registration, even as an
academic exercise, lest the effort be used to claim that some reasonable
person believes key registration is OK.

 - Carl




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Perry E. Metzger" <pmetzger@lehman.com>
Date: Sat, 18 Sep 93 21:41:39 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: analysis: attack PKP driven? significance of June 1, 1991
In-Reply-To: <9309182319.AA10597@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Message-ID: <9309190439.AA02129@snark.lehman.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



"L. Detweiler" says:
> 
> C'punks: upon further reflection this dual assault seems to be ostensibly PKP
> motivated/driven.  It is possible the prior NSA harassment of Moby Crypto was
> just a shocking coincidence.

Why all this silly speculation? We will all know the complete answers
soon enough. There is no need for us to reach out and "investigate".
There are lots of better uses of our time. Cypherpunks CODE, remember?
Go out and code or give radio interviews. Trying to second guess facts
that we will soon have directly in our hands seems unnecessary.

> We need more information: 
> 
> - how long has the NSA been harassing Austin Code Works?
> - does Austin Code works currently deal with cryptographic code?
> - or is this all entirely due to Grady Ward's Moby Crypto project?
> - was NSA complaining about (1) DES or (2) something else? export?
> - how did NSA find out that Austin Code Works was involved with Moby Crypto?

"We" need no information. We are not the attorneys. EFF and the rest
are involved and have fine lawyers and investigators. Anything "We"
uncover will be useful only for personal amusement. "We" don't even
have our facts right -- the "NSA" has not been directly harassing
ANYONE. Although we may speculate with some likely accuracy that the
NSA has been involved, it is the Commerce and State departments that
enforce the crypto export laws.

I'd calm down, Mr. Detweiler. Write some code -- its a productive
persuit.

Perry




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: jkhastings@aol.com
Date: Sat, 18 Sep 93 22:07:10 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: So. Calif. Cypherpunks Outreach
Message-ID: <9309190053.tn53627@aol.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


"State Evader" comes out of the Green 
Dragon Tavern BBS   (213) 365-1132
pseudonym closet to shamelessly promote
his upcoming speeches at the 
H.L. Mencken Forum and the 
Libertarian Party of CA Region 62
Los Angeles Westside:
------------------------------------------------------------
State Evader
 = J. Kent Hastings
Assistant Director of the Agorist Institute,
"Techtics" columnist for the Tactics of the 
Movement of the Libertarian Left 
newsletter, internet cypherpunk, and 
ham radio 
operator WA6ZFY.
Both speeches will be on the topic:
"Cyber Cash: Free Market Money 
Comes of Age"
 I will talk about untraceable 
digital cash, public-key cryptography, 
spread-spectrum radio, un
manned vehicles, 
and the latest government actions that 
threaten everyone's privacy: The Clipper/
Skipjack key escrow agents and the 
subpoenas served to the Austin Code Works
and ViaCrypt for all PGP, RSA export info.
--------------------------------------------------------------
Mencken info: (310) 289-3234 
(reserve now!)
L.P. info: (310) 477-6491
--------------------------
Mencken location: 
The Old Spaghetti Factory
5939 Sunset Blvd 
near Hollywood Freeway in L.A.
Wednesday September 22, 1993
6:30 Libatio
ns, 7:00 Dinner,
8:00 Speaker, 10:00 Adjournment
First time "virgins" reserved: $3
--------------------------------------------------
L.P. of CA Region 62 L.A. Westside:
Chris's Italian Restaurant
10105 Venice Blvd. at Clarington Ave
Thursday, September 23, 1993
Cocktails 6:30, Dinner 7:00, Talk 8:30
Not sure if admission is charged.
----------------------------------------------
Kent - <jkhastings@aol.com>




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: an12070@anon.penet.fi (S. Boxx)
Date: Sat, 18 Sep 93 18:19:40 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: NIST proposes software key escrow development
Message-ID: <9309190114.AA08060@anon.penet.fi>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Peter Wayner <pcw@access.digex.net> writes of the NIST announcements to
develop software-based key escrow.

I think it would be utmost folly for software developers to work with the NIST
and NSA on this or invest any time or capital. The fundamental 
requirement for NSA approval is the implementation of Skipjack in 
*software* in such a way that the algorithm is *protected* like it is in 
the booby trapped Clipper chips-- that is, impossible to deduce.

But this appears to be complete *fantasy*. Any such system must rely on
some kind of a hardware approach. But then we're back to where we've
started -- Clipper and Capstone. Only the NSA has enough inbred, insular 
self-delusion to propose that 'secure' software is even a *possibility*.
These companies could better spend their time proving that Fermat's Last
Theorem is FALSE.

(Hey Cypherpunks! I KNOW! what we need is a Secure Clipper Encryption 
Server that handles encryption via Email! Let's get the NSA to run it!
Then it would *really* be secure! <SMIRK>)

Furthermore, anyone who submits to this development is giving the NSA
valuable (free?) development time for the purpose of, fundamentally, 
a KEY ESCROW SYSTEM. Now, perhaps someone can explain to me why a software
system for depriving us of our rights is superior to one in hardware?

Doesn't anyone have the faint glimmer of the idea that NSA, the *premier*
cryptographic agency in the *world*, with unsurpassed technological and
engineering prowess in the area, would have already *figured out* how to do 
this if it was *at all* feasible?

Personally, I think this stinks putridly of an NSA decoy to simply claim or 
suggest that they're responsive to alternative solutions.  This is nothing
but a *cruel mirage* in a *barren desert*.

>At the end, the group owns the intellectual property rights to
>what is discovered. This may be something patentable and it could
>be worth some money. I don't know how likely this is, but it 
>seems possible. In fact, it is probably the reason many of the
>participants are willing to enter into the project. 

yes, that's *exactly* what we need -- another software patent. But this is
just a meaningless dangling carrot. (They damn well *better* have rights to
whatever they develop under private capital.)

>The role of NIST is both gatekeeper and fascilitator. They get 
>everyone together and occasionally push things along. In this
>case, they'll also offer some technical assistance which will
>include feedback from the NSA. Dennis Branstad said that this would
>most likely take the form of Siskel and Ebert-like ratings of the
>systems proposed. The NSA would suggest, "Yes" or "No" but they
>probably wouldn't go into details. This is because the procedure
>would be unclassified and the NSA usually won't relate technical
>details without classifying them. 

Take a LOOK at what you've written, and ask if this project has
ANY CHANCE of succeeding. The NIST is proposing that a lot of companies
put in work into a key escrow system in software, that the NSA has
ultimate overruling veto power with *no explanation* of negative answers.
This all to come up with something that the NSA ultimately must *accept*
under the whole point of the proposal. What's the POINT?! Yes, sign me
up today to do DEVELOPMENT WORK for the NSA on a KEY ESCROW SYSTEM.
Let's put in thousands of man-hours to come up with something as fundamentally
feasible in principle as perpetual motion! All for the sheer joy of the 
thought the NSA *might* pat us on the back! how could this
be anything but the most PRODUCTIVE and REWARDING experience?! A company 
would have to be INSANE to go with this as presented!

>* Is this process intended to fail? Will NIST just keep saying that
>software isn't good enough and that way they'll be able to answer
>the criticism that hardware is too expensive?

you mean the NSA -- and does that answer your question?

>* How selective is the group formation process? Are people really
>out for money? 

I think NIST would be overjoyed to hear that anyone outside of NSA
consultants is interested.

>* There are supposedly several other groups interested in participating.
>Who are they? Is it RSA and PKP? 

RSA, PKP, RSADSI, Bidzos -- that makes at least four, right? the KGB would 
also like a secure software system. Sternlight & Denning would surely sign up.
Just another dangling carrot -- or rather, an apple with a razor blade
inside.

>* Is a software process really that much more insecure than a hardware
>based approach? Sure, it is easier to tamper with software, but given
>that we can always tamper with the software shell around the Clipper
>hardware, it shouldn't be _that_ much different.

is an ASCII text file really that much more pliable than a silicon 
computer chip?!

I'm trying to be gentle, but you simply don't seem to get it! the NSA
wants a software implementation of Clipper that is TAMPERPROOF and 
INVISIBLE. This is like asking for a way to send locked lead safes through
phone lines! it's based on a fundamentally *bizarre* premise!

We *cannot* tamper with Skipjack in its present forms of use -- Clipper and
Capstone -- they would not exist unless the NSA had the tamperproof technology.

And the first rule of software is that it is 'TAMPERLADEN'!

-------------------------------------------------------------------------
To find out more about the anon service, send mail to help@anon.penet.fi.
Due to the double-blind, any mail replies to this message will be anonymized,
and an anonymous id will be allocated automatically. You have been warned.
Please report any problems, inappropriate use etc. to admin@anon.penet.fi.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "George A. Gleason" <gg@well.sf.ca.us>
Date: Sun, 19 Sep 93 01:26:43 PDT
To: rees@cs.bu.edu
Subject: Re:  Does this seem illegal to you?
Message-ID: <93Sep19.012433pdt.14190-1@well.sf.ca.us>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Sprint TeleMap:

You've been after this woman who gives you the ultimate hard-on, but she    
won't play.  Every night you write her another letter, pouring out your     
heart, begging for her hand, telling her all the lucious things you'll do   
with her once she comes to her senses and lets you into her life.  Lately
you've been getting your letters back,"return to sender, no such addressee"
in purple Post Office ink.  But no matter, you call her number, and get the
recording with her new number.  You've been getting angrier lately, as she's
changed her number three times now.  If only she would let you into her
life, you'd make wonderful music together by the moonlight- but No!, she
just won't play.  The anger has been building, and lately you've been taking
to leaving more and more desperate messages on her answering machine.  She's
really getting to you now, you want to teach her a lesson, a lesson she'll
never forget.  You've been trying to follow her car home from work, but for
some reason she's not driving the same car or taking the same route; she
might even have changed jobs.  Boy oh boy, you'll teach *her* a lesson,
teach *her* to say No to you!  You feel inside your jacket, where your .38
is carefully tucked.  Yeah, teach her a lesson for sure!  And lo, a Sprint
payphone!  You dial the 1-800 number and ask for directions... give them her
last known phone number... the seconds tick by, your head whirling with the
things you're going to tell her and make her plead with you.... a second or
two later, the operator comes back on the line.   Go right at Harbor... left
at Main... two blocks down to Third, second house on the left.  Aha, there
we go.  Thank you, operator.  A warm bulge rises in your pants as you
contemplate your next move.  Boy are you going to teach her a lesson!

This special moment brought to you by Sprint TeleMap.  
,




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Karl Lui Barrus <klbarrus@owlnet.rice.edu>
Date: Sat, 18 Sep 93 23:31:41 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: GOPHER: misc
Message-ID: <9309190629.AA02026@flammulated.owlnet.rice.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Thanks for the feedback about links - I didn't read that far in the
server.doc!  It looks like I could point to the EFF gopher for
legislation and stuff, if they wouldn't mind...?

But, stuff I link to has to be available from another gopher, right?
I mean, I just can't point to a directory on some machine and have
gopher retrieve the file for viewing?  Or can I?  Because I definitely
would like to have the RFC's and message digest stuff viewable, or
pointed to.  Also, will gopher uncompress a file before displaying?

I think I should read the gopher FAQ :-)  And look at WWW when I have
some time.

Also, where is the "Digital Silk Road" paper?  I'd like to put the
text version in the "Digital Cash" section.  I'd also like to put the
two reports at cwi up, but those are postscript...

gopher.wustl.edu has a TANTALIZING menu item for the ftp site, but I
got a connection refused message.  I need to talk to Chael to see
exactly what kind of disk space we have to work with - it looks like
to me an ftp option retrieves files to the gopher site (chaos).

I put up some more stuff, including remailer public keys, but not much
more on anonymous mail and still nothing on clipper.

-- 
Karl L. Barrus: klbarrus@owlnet.rice.edu         
keyID: 5AD633 hash: D1 59 9D 48 72 E9 19 D5  3D F3 93 7E 81 B5 CC 32 

"One man's mnemonic is another man's cryptography" 
  - my compilers prof discussing file naming in public directories



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: nate@VIS.ColoState.EDU
Date: Sun, 19 Sep 93 06:39:45 PDT
To: klbarrus@owlnet.rice.edu (Karl Lui Barrus)
Subject: Re: GOPHER: misc
In-Reply-To: <9309190629.AA02026@flammulated.owlnet.rice.edu>
Message-ID: <9309191336.AA10883@monet.VIS.ColoState.EDU>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Karl Lui Barrus coersed the electrons into symbolizing:
>I think I should read the gopher FAQ :-)  And look at WWW when I have
>some time.

Speaking of WWW, I am working on a DoE project (the "Computational
Science Education Project", CSEP for short), and part of this prject
involves the development of a WWW-able book.... so what i am saying is
that I have quite a lot of experience with WWW, and would be more than
happy to help develop (or just plain develop) a set of HTML (the type
of document that WWW readers (such as NCSA Mosaic) read)...  I don't
think that I would feel comfortable running it from the machines in my
laboratory, but I will speak to my boss about it when the time is right,
maybe I'll ask about letting people have their own home pages... that are
defined as being separate from the project or something.

Anyway, if anyone is willing to donate some drive space, and wants to
set up a WWW server, I know how, and I can get it done.

Just trying to do my part,

-nate sammons

-- 
+--------------------------------------------------------------------
| Nate Sammons   email: nate@VIS.ColoState.Edu
|      Colorado State University Computer Visualization Laboratory
|      Finger nate@monet.VIS.ColoState.Edu for my PGP key
|      #include <std.disclaimer>
|                                    Always remember "Brazil"
+----------------------+



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: doug@netcom.com (Doug Merritt)
Date: Sun, 19 Sep 93 08:59:46 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: gopher links
In-Reply-To: <strick@versant.com>
Message-ID: <9309191557.AA16407@netcom4.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


henry strickland <strick@versant.com> said:
>(p.s. I have no idea why they call them "cool" links)

"cool" links are the opposite of "hot links". The latter are active;
nontrivial computation is done when the link is followed. The former
are passive and merely point to information.

Hypertext jargon.

Then again, the man page you quoted implies that the author just
thinks that such things are cool.
	Doug




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: doug@netcom.com (Doug Merritt)
Date: Sun, 19 Sep 93 09:16:50 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Definition of "Zero Knowledge"
Message-ID: <9309191615.AA18299@netcom4.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


From: khijol!erc@apple.com (Ed Carp)
>Thanks for the definition (but I knew that, anyway).  Sorru I wasn't clear -
>what I was looking for was examples of how zero-knowledge proof techniques
>could make source code impenetrable.

An arbitrary algorithm can be translated into a zero proof theory model
that is intractable to functionally analyze. Its operations on inputs and
outputs can take place within the realm of the intractable model, with
the inputs and outputs being transformed from the encoding of the outside
realm into an encoding useful to the realm of the model. The inputs and
outputs are the queries and answers of zero proof theory.

With such a thing, knowing every detail of the registers and instructions
being executed at all times still wouldn't tell you what you really
wanted to know.

I'm unsure whether this has been published, let alone implemented; I just
thought it was an obvious corollary back when ZPT itself was first published.
It might have been discussed in the literature at the time, but if so,
I've forgotten.

I'm also not claiming this is necessarily a useful approach in practice,
because the obvious ways of implementing such a thing would be more than
a little slow. I suspect that it could be done efficiently with a little
algorithmic cleverness, but I don't have evidence of that this instant.

I'm currently designing something with very much the same flavor, but
with somewhat different goals, and computational expense of the operators
in the model is precisely the difficulty with that, too, so far.
	Doug
--
Doug Merritt				doug@netcom.com
Professional Wild-eyed Visionary	Member, Crusaders for a Better Tomorrow

Unicode Novis Cypherpunks Gutenberg Wavelets Conlang Logli Alife HC_III
Computational linguistics Fundamental physics Cogsci SF GA VR CASE TLAs




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: doug@netcom.com (Doug Merritt)
Date: Sun, 19 Sep 93 09:29:46 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: NIST proposes software key escrow development
In-Reply-To: <huntting@glarp.com>
Message-ID: <9309191627.AA19045@netcom4.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Brad Huntting <huntting@glarp.com> said:
>> And even hardware solutions can be reverse engineered. In fact, it's
>
>Why?  The easiest way to foil SlipJack is to simply run another
>encryption mechanism on top of it.

Because we weren't (just then) talking about foiling it, we were talking
about whether it could be figured out. Unless I misunderstood the discussion
from careless reading, the point seemed to be that they wanted to make
the workings of the chip secret.

I was furthmore assuming that there would be motivation for people to
figure out such secrets because it would help them do their own illicit
decryptions, but that's getting slightly off subject.

>> I'm reasonably happy with what the NSA appears to be doing in regard to
>> foreign intelligence gathering; it's their domestic agenda that threatens
>> the constitution. But that's in the nature of spook organizations.
>
>I dont know about you, but many of my best friends are "foreigners",
>and many of them live in riskier situations than I do (both in the
>US and abroad).  Their need for privacy is at least as pressing as
>mine.  The argument that "we" can abuse the rights of "foreigners"
>is nationallistic at best and jingoistic at its worst.

That's not what I said. The charter of the NSA isn't to abuse the rights
of your foreign friends. Now that you've raised the subject, I wouldn't
be happy with the NSA doing so, either. I have friends outside the U.S.
too. I just meant that countries do intelligence gathering on each other
all the time as a matter of course, and most of that isn't abusive in
nature, it's just the usual game of politics and defense etc.

But I suppose it's silly of me to say something like that on a list with
so many rabid paranoids; how could I possibly imagine that not *every*
act of the NSA is inherently ***EVIL***!?

Sigh.
	Doug




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: hfinney@shell.portal.com
Date: Sun, 19 Sep 93 10:19:46 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Restrictions on crypto exports
Message-ID: <9309191700.AA28106@jobe.shell.portal.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Like L. Detweiler, I can't resist the temptation to speculate a little
bit on the apparent legal crackdown on export of crypto.

The relevant section of the law is the Arms Export Control Act of
1968, codified in sections 2751 and following of Title 22 of the U.S.
Code.  Section 2778 deals with control of arms exports and imports.  In
that section, the President is authorized to determine what are "defense
articles"; the articles so designated constitute the "Munitions List".

"Any person who willfully violates any provision of this section...
shall upon conviction be fined for each violation not more than
$1,000,000 or imprisoned not more than ten years, or both."

So there are potentially very serious sanctions for violations of this Act.

One interesting point is the use of the word "willfully".  This has been
held in several court cases to mean that the government must show that an
accused not only exported munitions, but that he did so knowing that it
was illegal.  Legally, this means that there must be a showing of "specific
intent".  For example, in U.S. v Lizarraga-Lizarraga, the appellate court
wrote (in 541 F2d 826),

"At trial and on appeal, the defendant admits that he purchased the
ammunition and that he intended to export it to Mexico.  His defense is
bsed on the contention that he had no knowledge that his conduct violated
the law.  Hence, the appellant claims that to be found guilty under
22 U.S.C. 1934 [the predecessor to 22 U.S.C. 2778], the government must
prove that he intended to violate the statute....  We agree, and hold
that he was entitled to a specific intent instruction.  Accordingly, we
reverse his conviction and remand for a new trial."

The justice discusses several reasons for concluding that "willfully"
implies a need to show specific intent, among them that the articles on
the Munitions List are not obviously illegal to export, finally concluding:

"Accordingly, we hold that in order for a defendant to be found guilty of
exporting under 22 U.S.C. 1934, the government must prove that the
defendant voluntarily and intentionally violated a known legal duty not
to export the proscribed articles, and the jury should be so instructed."

There are several other court cases which agree with this conclusion.

Therefore, the government will have to show not only that PGP was exported,
but that whoever did it knew that the export was illegal.  For example,
the headnotes to U.S. v Malsom state, "Conviction for violation of 22 USC
2778 requires showing of criminal intent; use of circuitous shipment
route to ship replacement parts for military airplanes supports finding
of criminal intent."  Apparently in that case the parts were shipped in a
circuitous manner designed to prevent detection, and this fact itself was
evidence that the defendants knew they were breaking the law.

If PGP were exported overseas in some straightforward manner, such as being
made available for FTP in the U.S., it would be much harder for the
government to show criminal intent than if it had been written onto a floppy
hidden in a crate of frozen vegetables or something.  So it will be interesting
to see how the government approaches the intent issue.

Other interesting points come from the ITARs themselves, which implement
this section of the U.S. Code.  Subchapter M of Title 22 of the Code of
Federal Regulations is the International Traffic in Arms Regulations.
This subchapter encompasses sections 120 and following of that Title.
Section 120 has mostly definitions, section 121 has the Munitions List
itself, and the remaining sections deal mostly with regulations and reporting
requirements.

Category XIII of the Munitions List, Auxiliary Military Equipment, includes:
"Cryptographic (including key management) systems, equipment, assemblies,
modules, integrated circuits, components or software with the capability
of maintaining secrecy or confidentiality of information or information
systems".  It is followed by a long list of exceptions, and exceptions to
the exceptions, none of which appear to apply to PGP or RSA.  So on the
face of it, this appears to be a fairly broad prohibition on the export
of cryptographic software.

However, there is an interesting sentence in part 125 of this subchapter.
In 125.1(a), it says, "Information which is in the 'public domain' (see
section 120.18) is not subject to the controls of this subchapter."  Note
that by "this subchapter" it must mean Subchapter M, the entire ITAR.

"Public domain" is defined in 120.18:  "Public domain means information
which is published and which is generally accessible to the public:
(a) Through sales at newsstands and bookstores; (b) Through subscriptions
which are available without restriction to any individual who desires
to obtain or purchase the published information; (c) Through second class
mailing privileges granted by the U.S. Government; or, (d) At libraries
open to the public."

So, this is a possible defense against a charge that exporting PGP or
other RSA software violates the ITARs.  If one could argue that the software
was public domain, and that the software could be considered "information"
(hard to argue against if it was exported electronically), then it is
not covered by the ITARs.

The public domain issue is not completely clear, but one could certainly
make a case that software available on BBS sites or by FTP fell into
categories (b) or (d) of the public domain definition, or at a minimum
that the degree of public availability in these situations is very similar
to that envisioned by the authors of this definition.

Alternatively, the defense could argue that irrespective of whether a
particular implementation was public domain, that the main cryptographic
algorithm involved, the RSA cryptosystem, was certainly public domain by
the letter of the definition.

So, if there is a court case, I'd expect that this might be one of the main
issues of contention between defense and prosecution.

The last issue I'll mention is the meaning of "Export".  This is defined
in 120.10.  "Export means, for purposes of this subchapter: (a) Sending
or taking defense articles out of the United States in any manner, or...
(d) Disclosing or transferring technical data to a foreign person,
whether in the United states or abroad..."

I've just listed the most relevant parts here.  Several months ago, Jim
Bidzos of RSADSI published a document attacking the legality
of PGP, and in that document he claimed that making PGP available for
FTP constituted export, and in fact that posting it to your neighborhood
BBS also constituted export.  (Ironically, a few weeks later there was
a flap when RSADSI made its own RSA software available for FTP, and some
foreign nationals downloaded it.)  The presumed justification for this
reasoning would be that making the information publically available in
this way could "disclose" it to a foreign person.

A similar argument was described in a very interesting post Dan Bernstein
made to sci.crypt a few months ago.  Dan was trying to get permission to
export information about a cryptographic technique he had developed:

   Excerpts from a State Department conversation
   Daniel J. Bernstein
   22 July 1993
   
   Here are some excerpts, edited for legibility, from a conversation I had 
   with Charles Ray of the Office of Defense Trade Controls on 26 March 
   1993. These excerpts are now in the public record. Please do not assume 
   that the comments below reflect any official State Department position, 
   although my notes list Charles Ray as a ``special assistant'' to DTC 
   Director William B. Robinson.
   
   Dots represent omissions, not pauses. DJB means me. CR means Ray.
   
   DJB: What I'm trying to understand is: Suppose somebody makes some
   technical data which is a defense article, it's on the Munitions List,
   and goes to a library. The library agrees, and puts it on their shelves.
   Then ... doesn't that make it public domain, assuming that there are no 
   contractual problems or anything?
   
   CR: Actually, that could be argued a number of ways. But it could also
   be argued that if the person made something that was a Munitions List
   item, and particularly if they did it knowingly and they put it in a
   public library where anyone has access to it, that it could be 
   considered a violation of the Arms Export Control Act. It would I think
   depend a lot on their motives for doing it.
   
   [Material elided]
   
   CR: ... Hypothetically, if a person deliberately created a Munitions 
   List item, and deliberately placed it in a public library so as to evade 
   the restrictions ... I think that person might still find himself or 
   herself subject to certain sanctions should there be an incident of this 
   information falling into the hands of a foreign entity.

So, here Ray is basically making that same argument, that putting something
into the public domain by putting it into a library could itself be
considered "export" if it resulted in a foreign entity getting access.

So, the government may be trying to set up a "Catch 22" situation here,
where any attempt to make information "public domain" will be automatically
considered an attempt to export it.

I would think that the defense could come up with some good replies to
any attempt by the prosecution to make this argument.  The ITARs are
intended to control foreign export, and it appears to be a large extension
of their power to attempt to control what things American citizens may take
to their own domestic libraries.

Of course, people should remember that the investigation is still at
an early stage now.  The grand jury may or may not decide to issue criminal
charges; if they do, the accused may choose to plead guilty to a lesser
charge rather than take the risk of a court battle; even if the matter
goes to court, the accused will of course choose his defense based on
his own considerations of advantage.  It's not clear that even a favorable
court decision will free the flow of cryptographic software.

Hal Finney
hfinney@shell.portal.com




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: khijol!erc@apple.com (Ed Carp)
Date: Sun, 19 Sep 93 10:29:46 PDT
To: pmetzger@lehman.com
Subject: Re: more deranged lunatic ravings -- just delete 'em!
In-Reply-To: <9309191513.AA08482@snark.lehman.com>
Message-ID: <m0oeSXT-00021tC@khijol>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text


> As I've noted in private mail to you, *WE* are not conducting this
> investigation. *WE* are not involved. *WE* haven't been summoned to
> provide evidence in court.

First off, 'we' ARE involved.  This case is IMPORTANT, and can have far-
reaching consequences for us.  This reminds me of the old story that starts
out 'they came and got the Jews, and I said nothing because I wasn't a Jew...'.

> Well, yes. I don't get easily excited about court cases. The case is
> IMPORTANT, but having had long experience with courts, I know that

Agreed, it IS important!

> I have a great deal of trouble getting excited over something that
> will take years to resolve, yes. This is not like watching the D-Day
> invasion, or even like watching trench warfare in WWI. This is very
> much like watching people playing chess while immersed in ice cold
> molasses. Hard to get thrilled by the pace, Mr. Detweiler.

The attorneys and other experts looking at this case apparantly don't share
your lack of enthuasism.  Even in the very early stages, the groundwork that
is laid in a case like this is of TREMENDOUS importance to the outcome of
the case, regardless of how long it takes to be resolved.  Frankly, I'm
surprised at your lackadaisical attitude - if you had been involved in the
justice system in this country for any length of time, you'd have realized
that EVERY step taken along the way is IMPORTANT, regardless of how trivial
or unimportant those steps appear now.  Cases involving billions of dollars
have been decided by trivial details.
-- 
Ed Carp, N7EKG			erc@apple.com			510/659-9560
                            anon-0001@khijol.uucp
If you want magic, let go of your armor.  Magic is so much stronger than
steel!        -- Richard Bach, "The Bridge Across Forever"



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Date: Sun, 19 Sep 93 11:15:50 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Bobby Ray Inman wants ciphers restricted!
Message-ID: <9309191812.AA20377@netcom5.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Here's another one of those apparent "trial balloons," this time from
an influential former Director of the NSA.  As DIRNSA, Admiral Inman
was the one who in the late 1970s proposed restrictions on the use of
public key cryptography, at least according to Bamford in "The Puzzle
Palace."

Inman later was in the CIA, then MCC in Austin, and is now involved in
venture capital in various ways. I believe his VC firm invested in
Cylink, one of the four partners in Public Key Partners (the others
being RSADSI, Stanford, and MIT). (Paranoids like us might look for
links to Mykotronx....)

Enough speculation for now. Here's the item:


From: howard@hal.com (Howard Gayle)
Newsgroups: talk.politics.crypto,alt.politics.libertarian,comp.org.eff.talk,alt.privacy.clipper
Subject: von Mises Inst. Free Market article on Clipper
Date: 19 Sep 1993 16:29:34 GMT
Message-ID: <27i1de$edv@hal.com>
Reply-To: howard@hal.com (Howard Gayle)
Summary: Government subsidies imply government control.
Keywords: Bobby Ray Inman, NSA, registration, EFF

The September 1993 issue of "The Free Market" has an article by
Gary McGath about Clipper.  "The Free Market" is a monthly
non-technical newsletter from the Ludwig von Mises Institute.
Gary McGath is the publisher of the "Thomas Paine Review." Here's
a quote:
   "Bobby Ray Inman, former director of the NSA, has even
   proposed `a registry of institutions which can legally use
   ciphers,' as he explained in his recent book.  `If you get
   somebody using one who isn't registered, then you go after
   him.'"

McGath also mentions the EFF:
   "The Electronic Frontier Foundation, which opposes the
   Clipper, still applauds legislation to subsidize network
   access.  But by inviting the government to build their
   `highway,' EFF is inviting in the traffic cops.

   "The only way to keep our communications free of governmental
   intrusion is to keep them free of governmental involvement."
--
Howard Gayle
HAL Computer Systems, Inc.
1315 Dell Avenue
Campbell, California 95008
USA
howard@hal.com
Phone: +1 408 379 7000 extension 1080
FAX  : +1 408 379 5022

--





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Perry E. Metzger" <pmetzger@lehman.com>
Date: Sun, 19 Sep 93 08:15:48 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: more deranged lunatic ravings -- just delete 'em!
In-Reply-To: <9309190530.AA15035@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Message-ID: <9309191513.AA08482@snark.lehman.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



"L. Detweiler" says:
> 
>  From: "Perry E. Metzger" <pmetzger@lehman.com>
> >Why all this silly speculation? We will all know the complete answers
> >soon enough. There is no need for us to reach out and "investigate".
> 
> ah yes, just like everyone 'soon enough' knew the 'complete answers' behind
> the Steve Jackson Games investigation.

We did, yes. You see, the ATTORNEYS, who were being PAID, because they
were PROFESSIONALS, handled things.

As I've noted in private mail to you, *WE* are not conducting this
investigation. *WE* are not involved. *WE* haven't been summoned to
provide evidence in court.

> Look at that E911 investigation -- this was an example of *community* 
> involvement. Laywers on *both* sides were unaware of the fact that E911
> documents were publicly available, that they could even be *ordered* from
> Mountain Bell with no restriction, until someone 'out there' made the link
> and pointed it out -- and this was a *very* significant aspect of the
> defense case.

Well, yes -- so what?  If you wanted to go out and make a systematic
list of encryption software available overseas for the defense, that
would indeed be a useful act. It seems, however, that you are intent
on yammering. Its one thing if you were looking for useful evidence,
but it seems that you are simply going around screaming about how the
NSA is out to get us. Well, the yammering is not an "investigation".
If you do want to help, find something productive.

> >"We" need no information. We are not the attorneys. EFF and the rest
> >are involved and have fine lawyers and investigators. Anything "We"
> >uncover will be useful only for personal amusement. 
> 
> the situation *directly affects* us *now*. what is the scope of the grand
> jury investigation?

Thats a secret. Even if you found out, which would require subborning
a juror (a crime) or otherwise bribing an official (a crime), you
would be put in jail for contempt of court if you told anyone.

> could it potentially be *expanded* beyond this initial inquiry?

Of course. Anything can be expanded. It could also fail to bring
indictments -- but thats unlikely. It is said, not without truth, that
a grand jury will indict a ham sandwich if the prosecutor asks.

> what about sites that are currently distributing PGP outside the
> U.S.?

They are beyond the scope of U.S. law. 

None of these are hard questions. They are all, in fact, trivial.

You know, many of the decafinated brands taste just as good as the
real thing nowadays. I'd try them.

> you seem to be fundamentally averse to excitement.

Well, yes. I don't get easily excited about court cases. The case is
IMPORTANT, but having had long experience with courts, I know that
things are going to take years to resolve. I was once involved in a
civil suit that required five years to resolve -- and there are
probate cases around that have required decades.

Look at the process here. The Grand Jury investigation gets followed,
possibly, with indictments, which are followed, some very long period
of time later, by a trial, which also takes a long period. It could be
a year or even several before we even finish the trial phase on this,
and by the time it goes through all the levels of appeal to the
Supreme Court (assuming fundamental questions of constitutional law
come up_ it could be many years before its all over.

I have a great deal of trouble getting excited over something that
will take years to resolve, yes. This is not like watching the D-Day
invasion, or even like watching trench warfare in WWI. This is very
much like watching people playing chess while immersed in ice cold
molasses. Hard to get thrilled by the pace, Mr. Detweiler.

Perry




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Perry E. Metzger" <pmetzger@lehman.com>
Date: Sun, 19 Sep 93 08:25:48 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Does this seem illegal to you?
In-Reply-To: <93Sep19.012433pdt.14190-1@well.sf.ca.us>
Message-ID: <9309191523.AA08506@snark.lehman.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



If he has her phone number, and its listed, he can check any reverse
phone directory, get her address, and do this anyway. He doesn't need
spring telemap. If she's stupid enough not to get an unlisted number,
then Sprint Telemap isn't going to do anything worse than what can be
done already.

Perry


"George A. Gleason" says:
> Sprint TeleMap:
> 
> You've been after this woman who gives you the ultimate hard-on, but she    
> won't play.  Every night you write her another letter, pouring out your     
> heart, begging for her hand, telling her all the lucious things you'll do   
> with her once she comes to her senses and lets you into her life.  Lately
> you've been getting your letters back,"return to sender, no such addressee"
> in purple Post Office ink.  But no matter, you call her number, and get the
> recording with her new number.  You've been getting angrier lately, as she's
> changed her number three times now.  If only she would let you into her
> life, you'd make wonderful music together by the moonlight- but No!, she
> just won't play.  The anger has been building, and lately you've been taking
> to leaving more and more desperate messages on her answering machine.  She's
> really getting to you now, you want to teach her a lesson, a lesson she'll
> never forget.  You've been trying to follow her car home from work, but for
> some reason she's not driving the same car or taking the same route; she
> might even have changed jobs.  Boy oh boy, you'll teach *her* a lesson,
> teach *her* to say No to you!  You feel inside your jacket, where your .38
> is carefully tucked.  Yeah, teach her a lesson for sure!  And lo, a Sprint
> payphone!  You dial the 1-800 number and ask for directions... give them her
> last known phone number... the seconds tick by, your head whirling with the
> things you're going to tell her and make her plead with you.... a second or
> two later, the operator comes back on the line.   Go right at Harbor... left
> at Main... two blocks down to Third, second house on the left.  Aha, there
> we go.  Thank you, operator.  A warm bulge rises in your pants as you
> contemplate your next move.  Boy are you going to teach her a lesson!
> 
> This special moment brought to you by Sprint TeleMap.  
> ,




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Stanton McCandlish <mech@eff.org>
Date: Sun, 19 Sep 93 08:37:18 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: reporter seeking interview subjects
In-Reply-To: <9309180811.AA21373@toad.com>
Message-ID: <199309191535.AA11204@eff.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> > Hi, my name is Matt Binder.  Please help me...
> >         I'm a radio reporter in the SF Bay area working on a series
> > of pieces about invasions of privacy in the computer age.  I'm
> > looking for interesting "case studies" that I can use to horrify
> > my listeners out of their complacency.  My most immediate need is
>  ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
> 
> Just what I love from the media, using sensationalism to convey a
> preconceived idea instead of looking at the facts and reporting it.
> Does it matter that he is reporting on our side and not the other
> side?

Why of course it does.  No wishing and praying will make the media suddely
become pure and holy.  This is a propaganda war, and there's no reason
for both sides not to get in on the act.  Otherwise, it's like fighting
guns with slingshots. 

-- 
DISCLAIMER: This message represents only my OWN opinion, not that of EFF.
Stanton McCandlish    Electronic Frontier Foundation Online Activist & SysOp
mech@eff.org          NitV-DataCenter BBS SysOp
Fido: <tba>           IndraNet: 369:111/1



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: khijol!erc@apple.com (Ed Carp)
Date: Sun, 19 Sep 93 11:55:50 PDT
To: pmetzger@lehman.com
Subject: Re: more deranged lunatic ravings -- just delete 'em!
In-Reply-To: <9309191818.AA08784@snark.lehman.com>
Message-ID: <m0oeTnW-00021tC@khijol>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text


> Ed Carp says:
> > > As I've noted in private mail to you, *WE* are not conducting this
> > > investigation. *WE* are not involved. *WE* haven't been summoned to
> > > provide evidence in court.
> > 
> > First off, 'we' ARE involved.
> 
> Oh? Have you been hired as an attorney for either side?

Nope.  That's not the point, and you know it.  The point being (and I'm not
even sure why I'm bothering to explain this to you - you're intelligent)
this case has the potential to affect ALL of us, not just the participants
in the case.

> > This case is IMPORTANT, and can have far-
> > reaching consequences for us.
> 
> Yes, thats fine and well, but this is very different from saying that
> "*WE* have to conduct an investigation and get to the bottom of this"
> as if "we" are even a group or in possession of resources to do any
> such thing. Indeed, what Mr. Detweiler has largely been proposing is
> yammering.

*I* proposed no such thing.  Get your facts straight.

> Cypherpunks CODE. Quit yammering and start coding. I'm coding. Its

Yeah, and women are supposed to stay home, barefoot and preggers.  Yeah,
right.

> fine to keep up to date. Its fine to send big checks to EFF. Its fine
> to do some legwork if you think it can help. However, what is the
> point in saying inane things like "we have to find out what the grand
> jury is investigating" when its a bloody secret and we don't get to
> find out until they unseal their indictments?

I think it's pretty clear what they're investigating.

> > > I have a great deal of trouble getting excited over something that
> > > will take years to resolve, yes. This is not like watching the D-Day
> > > invasion, or even like watching trench warfare in WWI. This is very
> > > much like watching people playing chess while immersed in ice cold
> > > molasses. Hard to get thrilled by the pace, Mr. Detweiler.
> > 
> > The attorneys and other experts looking at this case apparantly don't share
> > your lack of enthuasism.  Even in the very early stages, the groundwork that
> > is laid in a case like this is of TREMENDOUS importance to the outcome of
> > the case, regardless of how long it takes to be resolved.  Frankly, I'm
> > surprised at your lackadaisical attitude
> 
> Not lackadaisical. Simply not in a state of hyperactive disarray. WE
> are not doing the groundwork. The attorneys are. WE are not about to
> be charged with a crime. WE have no reason to go into a frenzy of
> activity -- I see nothing that WE can do. It isn't up to us.

Oh, Jesus-Christ-on-a-crutch...It *IS* up to us!  WE are THE PEOPLE ... or
do you believe that the words "We, the People" on the Declaration of
Independence have no meaning?  WE are going to decide the outcome of this
case.  WE are going to be sitting on the jury, WE are going to be writing
letters to the local newspapers, WE are going to be watching the trial (if
one ever comes about).

> You sound like someone upset that the supreme court is about to rule
> about abortion and screaming "WE HAVE TO DO SOMETHING". Well what,
> precisely, do you propose to do? Take over the legal work when you
> aren't a lawyer? Complain? Scratch your crotch and look important?

Well, scratching my crotch and looking important HAD crossed my mind. :)

What do you think, that even the Supreme Court works in a social and
political vacumm?  If you believe that, you are pretty naive.  Public
opinion shapes everything we do, everything we see.  If we aren't out there
helping to shape puyblic opinion, SOMEONE is going to be doing it, and
they might not be so supportive of individual rights.

> This isn't in our hands. If you think you have information of use to
> the lawyers, give it to them and be done with it -- there is nothing
> else you can do.
> 
> > Cases involving billions of dollars have been decided by trivial details.
> 
> Oh? How many cases involving billion dollar settlements can you name?
> Care to give us a list?

Many.  The Getty Oil deal of several years back comes to mind, as does the
Texaco vs. Pennzoil deal.  You don't think that Roe v. Wade didn't have an
economic impact?
-- 
Ed Carp, N7EKG			erc@apple.com			510/659-9560
                            anon-0001@khijol.uucp
If you want magic, let go of your armor.  Magic is so much stronger than
steel!        -- Richard Bach, "The Bridge Across Forever"



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Karl Lui Barrus <klbarrus@owlnet.rice.edu>
Date: Sun, 19 Sep 93 09:56:50 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: GOPHER: cpsr
Message-ID: <9309191655.AA06177@flammulated.owlnet.rice.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I just discovered the CPSR gopher (gopher.cpsr.org) mirrors the
cypherpunk soda archive, including the clipper directory there.  So
I'll figure out how to create a link to it.

I don't know about cool links though; the only gopher sever and client
I could compile on chaos (net BSD some.version) was gopher1.12S, and I
don't think is has that functionality.  Later, I'll give the
gopher2.06 a try again.

Plus, I've noticed that sometimes the name resolver can find
chaos.bsu.edu, sometimes not, for whatever reason.  So maybe I'll talk
to Chael and see if we can't make a gopher login for telnet access.

-- 
Karl L. Barrus: klbarrus@owlnet.rice.edu         
keyID: 5AD633 hash: D1 59 9D 48 72 E9 19 D5  3D F3 93 7E 81 B5 CC 32 

"One man's mnemonic is another man's cryptography" 
  - my compilers prof discussing file naming in public directories



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: doug@netcom.com (Doug Merritt)
Date: Sun, 19 Sep 93 12:19:47 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: more deranged lunatic ravings -- just delete 'em!
Message-ID: <9309191916.AA05457@netcom4.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


erc@apple.com said:
>Nope.  That's not the point, and you know it.  The point being (and I'm not
>even sure why I'm bothering to explain this to you - you're intelligent)
>this case has the potential to affect ALL of us, not just the participants
>in the case.

True. But the question is, specifically what are you suggesting "all of us"
do right now? When I say specifically, I mean for instance not just
"find out information about XYZ" like you said before, I mean the
"and then what?" part as well. Most of us will probably do our best to
learn whatever we can rather than ignoring the situation. But *then* what?
What's your suggestion?

>Well, scratching my crotch and looking important HAD crossed my mind. :)

Besides that, I mean. :-)
	Doug




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Date: Sun, 19 Sep 93 12:22:20 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: What can we do in the next few days?
Message-ID: <9309191920.AA25767@netcom5.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Lots of flames lately about "lunatic ravings" and what Cypherpunks can
or can't do to help in the next few days.

Here's my take on the situation:

* Keep current, read all the various groups covering this.

* Add articles and comments whenever you have something to say. Your
argument might help one of the lawyers make his case. (One of "our"
lawyers, one hopes.) Hal Finney's article this morning falls squarely
into this category.

We may have few lawyers amongst us, but we can contribute comments and
background items that the lawyers may find useful. Not much time left
before the grand jury convenes on Wednesday, but time to help after
that.

I agree of course with the sentiment that "Cypherpunks write code," or
at least write text on semi-technical topics, and agree with the
current focus of our group on stuff like remailers, digital cash, data
havens, and the like. The EFF, CPSR, and ACLU are already focussed on
issues of legal cases, privacy laws, etc., and are staffed with mostly
lawyers and legal-background folks. We fill a niche they cannot fill.

* Phil Karn and others have written about DES implementations that are
already described, published, etc., both inside and outside the U.S.
This may help with the precedent issue, namely, establishing that DES
is already widely available (in case this is an important issue).

In particular, see the messages a few days back about compiling a list
of published DES (and IDEA, too) codings. Add to the list if you can.

Cypherpunks can help on this, if they have some experience with DES,
IDEA, and the like.

Perhaps after the indictment (I'm guessing there'll be one) we can
find out from the lawyers if our backgrounds in hacking and crypto can
be tapped to help in the defense.

--Tim May

-- 
..........................................................................
Timothy C. May         | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,  
tcmay@netcom.com       | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
408-688-5409           | knowledge, reputations, information markets, 
W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA  | black markets, collapse of governments.
Higher Power: 2^756839 | Public Key: PGP and MailSafe available.
Note: I put time and money into writing this posting. I hope you enjoy it.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Philip Zimmermann <prz@columbine.cgd.ucar.EDU>
Date: Sun, 19 Sep 93 11:35:50 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com (Cypherpunks)
Subject: Statement from Zimmermann on PGP investigation
Message-ID: <9309191832.AA24906@columbine.cgd.ucar.EDU>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Some of you may have received my Internet message of a couple of days
ago about the ongoing U.S. Customs investigation of the exportation
of PGP, which has now progressed to the level of Federal Grand Jury
subpoenas.  This earlier message was intended by me for distribution
to a very small group of friends who previously communicated their
concern about me and the investigation and asked to be kept
informed.  I did not send the message to anyone outside this group. 
Unfortunately, I did not adequately assert my desire that the message
not be further disseminated.  It appears that the message has gone
completely public.  This was not my intention.

My lawyer, Phil Dubois, has been in touch with the Assistant U.S.
Attorney (William Keane) assigned to the investigation.  We have no
reason to believe that Mr. Keane is anything other than a professional
and reasonable person.  He made it clear that no decision has been
made regarding any prosecution of anyone for any offense in this
matter.  Such decisions will not be made for some time, perhaps
several months.  Mr. Keane also made clear his willingness to listen
to us (me and my lawyer) before making any decision.  It appears that
both Mr. Keane's mind and the lines of communication are open.

My fear is that public dissemination of my message will close the
lines of communication and put Mr. Keane into an irretrievably
adversarial position.  Such a result would not serve any of our
interests.  My lawyer tells me that nothing irritates a prosecutor
more than being the subject of what he perceives to be an
orchestrated publicity campaign.  He also tells me that his
nightmares involve FOAs (Friends Of the Accused), invariably people
with good intentions, doing things on their own.  I understand that
the issues involved in this investigation are of the greatest
importance and transcend my personal interests.  Even so, I would
rather not turn an investigation into a full-scale federal
prosecution.  I ask that everyone keep in mind that the government's
resources are limitless and that mine are not.

Speaking of resources, many of you have offered help, and I am
grateful.  Those wishing to contribute financially or otherwise
should contact either me or Philip L. Dubois, Esq., at dubois@csn.org
or by phone at 303-444-3885 or by mail at 2305 Broadway, Boulder, CO,
80304.  Mr. Dubois has just got on the Internet and is still learning
how to use it.  Donated funds will be kept in a trust account, and all
contributions will be accounted for.  If this whole thing somehow goes
away with money left in the account, the balance will be refunded to
contributors in proportion to the amounts of their contributions.

This message can be widely circulated on public forums.

Philip Zimmermann
prz@acm.org
303 541-0140






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: strick -- henry strickland <strick@osc>
Date: Sun, 19 Sep 93 14:19:47 PDT
To: Karl Lui Barrus <klbarrus@owlnet.rice.edu>
Subject: Re: GOPHER: dealing with postscript
In-Reply-To: <9309190629.AA02026@flammulated.owlnet.rice.edu>
Message-ID: <9309191943.AA02835@versant.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


THUS SPAKE Karl Lui Barrus <klbarrus@owlnet.rice.edu>:
# 
# Also, where is the "Digital Silk Road" paper?  I'd like to put the
# text version in the "Digital Cash" section.  I'd also like to put the
# two reports at cwi up, but those are postscript...

Suggestion:  Put them under a gopher subdirectory named "Postscript
Files" inside the directory they are appropriate to.  Then by default
people see the plaintext files and the "Postscript Files"
subdirectory.  If people are postscript-capable, they can then go down
the next level.

Or append "(Postscript)" to the displayed file name, to make
it clear that way.

As MIME becomes integrated into internet tools and widely
available, this problem will solve itself. "application/postscript"
is already a standard MIME Content-Type.

In the meantime, don't shy away from making information available,
especially if it is in a format as "widely accessible" as postscript is.

						strick




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: khijol!erc@apple.com (Ed Carp)
Date: Sun, 19 Sep 93 13:09:47 PDT
To: doug@netcom.com (Doug Merritt)
Subject: Re: more deranged lunatic ravings -- just delete 'em!
In-Reply-To: <9309191916.AA05457@netcom4.netcom.com>
Message-ID: <m0oeUqA-00021tC@khijol>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text


> erc@apple.com said:
> >Nope.  That's not the point, and you know it.  The point being (and I'm not
> >even sure why I'm bothering to explain this to you - you're intelligent)
> >this case has the potential to affect ALL of us, not just the participants
> >in the case.
> 
> True. But the question is, specifically what are you suggesting "all of us"
> do right now? When I say specifically, I mean for instance not just
> "find out information about XYZ" like you said before, I mean the
> "and then what?" part as well. Most of us will probably do our best to
> learn whatever we can rather than ignoring the situation. But *then* what?
> What's your suggestion?
> 
> >Well, scratching my crotch and looking important HAD crossed my mind. :)
> 
> Besides that, I mean. :-)

Hehehe... :)  Gee, I don't *know* - but I'm not the high-powered brains behind
this outfit - that's Tim's job.  ;)  And he has made good suggestions, too!

I just don't agree with Perry's apparant advice that we all just sit around on
our collective asses with our heads in the sand, waiting for Big Brother to
come and roll over us. :)
-- 
Ed Carp, N7EKG			erc@apple.com			510/659-9560
                            anon-0001@khijol.uucp
If you want magic, let go of your armor.  Magic is so much stronger than
steel!        -- Richard Bach, "The Bridge Across Forever"



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Alan E. Mason" <vznquest@well.sf.ca.us>
Date: Sun, 19 Sep 93 13:35:52 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Cypherbusts, etc.
Message-ID: <93Sep19.133139pdt.14391-4@well.sf.ca.us>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I just heard about the grand jury BS going down around PGP, etc, via the
EFF forum on the Well and would like to do whatever I can to support the
defense effort (when it comes) etc.  I am a writer with some small access to
local media and a big interest in the outcome of this test of our 1st
amendment rights.

I would also like to get on your "mailing list" if you have one.

Mail should be sent to vznquest@netcom.com

Thanks, and keep up the good work!

Alan Mason




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: rwalters@gtech.com (Walters, Randy)
Date: Sun, 19 Sep 93 09:59:46 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Delete Me
Message-ID: <9308197484.AA748456788@ccgate.gtech.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Hi, there...

Please delete me from the cypherpunks mailing list. It's a little greater 
traffic than I expected...

Sorry about the hassle, and thanks. R.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Perry E. Metzger" <pmetzger@lehman.com>
Date: Sun, 19 Sep 93 11:19:47 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: more deranged lunatic ravings -- just delete 'em!
In-Reply-To: <m0oeSXT-00021tC@khijol>
Message-ID: <9309191818.AA08784@snark.lehman.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Ed Carp says:
> > As I've noted in private mail to you, *WE* are not conducting this
> > investigation. *WE* are not involved. *WE* haven't been summoned to
> > provide evidence in court.
> 
> First off, 'we' ARE involved.

Oh? Have you been hired as an attorney for either side?

> This case is IMPORTANT, and can have far-
> reaching consequences for us.

Yes, thats fine and well, but this is very different from saying that
"*WE* have to conduct an investigation and get to the bottom of this"
as if "we" are even a group or in possession of resources to do any
such thing. Indeed, what Mr. Detweiler has largely been proposing is
yammering.

Cypherpunks CODE. Quit yammering and start coding. I'm coding. Its
fine to keep up to date. Its fine to send big checks to EFF. Its fine
to do some legwork if you think it can help. However, what is the
point in saying inane things like "we have to find out what the grand
jury is investigating" when its a bloody secret and we don't get to
find out until they unseal their indictments?

> > I have a great deal of trouble getting excited over something that
> > will take years to resolve, yes. This is not like watching the D-Day
> > invasion, or even like watching trench warfare in WWI. This is very
> > much like watching people playing chess while immersed in ice cold
> > molasses. Hard to get thrilled by the pace, Mr. Detweiler.
> 
> The attorneys and other experts looking at this case apparantly don't share
> your lack of enthuasism.  Even in the very early stages, the groundwork that
> is laid in a case like this is of TREMENDOUS importance to the outcome of
> the case, regardless of how long it takes to be resolved.  Frankly, I'm
> surprised at your lackadaisical attitude

Not lackadaisical. Simply not in a state of hyperactive disarray. WE
are not doing the groundwork. The attorneys are. WE are not about to
be charged with a crime. WE have no reason to go into a frenzy of
activity -- I see nothing that WE can do. It isn't up to us.

You sound like someone upset that the supreme court is about to rule
about abortion and screaming "WE HAVE TO DO SOMETHING". Well what,
precisely, do you propose to do? Take over the legal work when you
aren't a lawyer? Complain? Scratch your crotch and look important?
This isn't in our hands. If you think you have information of use to
the lawyers, give it to them and be done with it -- there is nothing
else you can do.

> Cases involving billions of dollars have been decided by trivial details.

Oh? How many cases involving billion dollar settlements can you name?
Care to give us a list?

Perry




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: erc@wetware.com (Ed Carp)
Date: Sun, 19 Sep 93 15:29:48 PDT
To: erc@wetware.com
Subject: (fwd) New Intel Slogan
Message-ID: <m0oeX6M-00021vC@khijol>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Path: khijol!wetware!iggy.GW.Vitalink.COM!pacbell.com!ames!agate!howland.reston.ans.net!europa.eng.gtefsd.com!uunet!uunet.ca!wildcan!news2.uunet.ca!xenitec!looking!funny-request
Message-ID: <S5d6.528@clarinet.com>
Date: Sat, 18 Sep 93 19:30:02 EDT
Newsgroups: rec.humor.funny
Subject: New Intel Slogan
From: shah@santur.nuo.dec.com (Amitabh Shah)
Keywords: topical, smirk, original
Approved: funny@clarinet.com
Lines: 17

[This is original.]

In view of the recent burglaries at computer warehouses in the Silicon Valley,
where the burglars have stolen Intel's x86 processor chips, Intel has decided
to use a new corporate slogan. The idea for this slogan is based on the
theft-resistant stickers seen on the windows of cars in NYC.

All stores carrying/manufacturing PCs made with Intel's processors, as well
as the PCs themselves will now bear a sticker that says:

	"No Intel Inside".

--
Selected by Maddi Hausmann.  MAIL your joke (jokes ONLY) to funny@clarinet.com.

Please!  No copyrighted stuff.  Also no "mouse balls," dyslexic agnostics,
Iraqi driver's ed, Administratium, strings in bar or bell-ringer jokes.

--
Ed Carp, N7EKG			erc@apple.com			510/659-9560
                            anon-0001@khijol.uucp
If you want magic, let go of your armor.  Magic is so much stronger than
steel!        -- Richard Bach, "The Bridge Across Forever"





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Tiffany Lee Brown <magdalen@well.sf.ca.us>
Date: Sun, 19 Sep 93 16:26:57 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: re: more deranged lunatic ravings ...
Message-ID: <93Sep19.162406pdt.14406-3@well.sf.ca.us>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



The recent flood of rantmail between Perry Metzger, E. Carp, etc., started
as an interesting and relevant argument but has degenerated to the point of
annoyance.  The former suggested calming down and writing some code -
perhaps he could go off and do just that, rather than wasting his time (and
ours) trying to keep folx from encouraging others to engage in personal
investigation of an issue which concerns them.  If you think writing code's
the only thing to do - go do it.  If you think getting people riled up about
the situation is important - go do it.  Yammering at each other ain't gonna
make the world a safer and more private place.

-magdalen




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Perry E. Metzger" <pmetzger@lehman.com>
Date: Sun, 19 Sep 93 14:09:48 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: What can we do in the next few days?
In-Reply-To: <9309191920.AA25767@netcom5.netcom.com>
Message-ID: <9309192107.AA09104@snark.lehman.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Timothy C. May says:
> 
> Lots of flames lately about "lunatic ravings" and what Cypherpunks can
> or can't do to help in the next few days.
> 
> Here's my take on the situation:
> 
[rest elided.]

What he said. Thank you, Tim.

Perry






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Perry E. Metzger" <pmetzger@lehman.com>
Date: Sun, 19 Sep 93 14:25:54 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: more deranged lunatic ravings -- just delete 'em!
In-Reply-To: <m0oeUqA-00021tC@khijol>
Message-ID: <9309192122.AA09137@snark.lehman.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Ed Carp says:
> > True. But the question is, specifically what are you suggesting "all of us"
> > do right now? When I say specifically, I mean for instance not just
> > "find out information about XYZ" like you said before, I mean the
> > "and then what?" part as well. Most of us will probably do our best to
> > learn whatever we can rather than ignoring the situation. But *then* what?
> > What's your suggestion?
> > 
> Gee, I don't *know* - but I'm not the high-powered brains behind
> this outfit - that's Tim's job.  ;)  And he has made good suggestions, too!
> 
> I just don't agree with Perry's apparant advice that we all just sit
> around on our collective asses with our heads in the sand, waiting
> for Big Brother to come and roll over us.

Thats not my advice. I just recommend that we leave the lawyering to
the lawyers or those who, like John Gilmore or Dan Bernstein, have
learned enough that they might be able to tell valuable things to
them. The rest of us have many things we can do, which Tim has already
said, but among them are...

1) Code! Code! Code! The more stuff is out there, the less they will
   be able to do.
2) Spread cryptographic software.
3) Catalog publically available cryptographic software overseas on the
   net. The lawyers might need this.
4) Catalog publically available cryptographic software and textbook
   descriptions in the U.S. -- the lawyers might need this.
5) Write articles describing the overall picture and get them
   published.
6) Keep informed.

etc.

Perry




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: doug@netcom.com (Doug Merritt)
Date: Sun, 19 Sep 93 17:40:55 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Definition of "Zero Knowledge"
Message-ID: <9309200038.AA04119@netcom.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


bill@twwells.com (T. William Wells) said:
>Got a good reference for ZPT? Something that the mathematically
>inclined, who wants just the facts, all the facts, and none of
>the BS that passes for explanations and which usually obscures
>more than it clarifies?

In the current context, the best reference that I know of is to
the methodology of Goedel's Theorem rather than to ZPT; it has each
of the properties that I mentioned except for the ZPT operations,
which can be added in a conceptually straightforward way. The most
readable in depth treatment of that that I know of is "Goedel's Proof"
by Ernest Nagel and James R. Newman, c. 1958 and still in print as
a cheap paperback.

If someone has good ZPT references that would be interesting too; I've
lost the stuff I used to have on that.
	Doug




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Stanton McCandlish <mech@eff.org>
Date: Sun, 19 Sep 93 14:49:48 PDT
To: vznquest@netcom.com
Subject: Re: Cypherbusts, etc.
In-Reply-To: <93Sep19.133139pdt.14391-4@well.sf.ca.us>
Message-ID: <199309192147.AA15250@eff.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> I just heard about the grand jury BS going down around PGP, etc, via the
> EFF forum on the Well and would like to do whatever I can to support the
> defense effort (when it comes) etc.  I am a writer with some small access to
> local media and a big interest in the outcome of this test of our 1st
> amendment rights.

Great!  One thing to do would be to do editorials for as many papers as
possible.  The greatest problem facing "us" (meaning anyone opposing the
clipper fiasco), is that the general populace are ignorant, by and large
of the following things:

1) what encryption/cryptography is, and why they should care.
2) that any successful attempt to squash public cryptography and replace it
   with govt. spy-mechanisms sets a really terrible precedent.  In following
   decades we would likely see the removal of more rights and privacy, and
   the approval of ever more invasive "law enforcement" techniques.
3) what the history of agencies such as NSA and the SS is, and why they
   are not to be trusted (noting that Treasury controls not only Customs, who
   are responsible for enforcing many of the laws affecting crypto, but
   the SS, and BATF, could be of use.  We are supposed to trust some
   unspecified Treasury sub-bureaucracy [not to mention NIST] to hold the
   keys to our privacy in the right hand, while menacing users of private
   cryptography via subpoenas and grand juries with the left hand?)
4) that BILLIONS of dollars every year are lost by US businesses to the
   industrial espionage of foreign competitors, who are under no ITARish 
   restrictions on how they protect what they hold.
5) that the ITAR and the Clipper/Capstone/Clipjack scheme threatens to destroy
   the US market for cryptographic applications, while this market, with a 
   potential easily in the billions of dollars per year, goes to other
   nations.  With one exception of course: PKP/RSADSI, who have a virtual 
   monopoly on crypto in this country due to patents on algorithms (aka
   "ownership" of properties of mathematics, "possession" of natural
   processes of the universe.  What next?  Will GE get a trademark on
   sunlight?)  Ask the hard question: What is the relationship between PKP/RSA
   and the US Government?  Why is RSA granted these patents?  Why does
   NIST insist on giving exclusive license on DSA encryption to RSA, despite
   the fact that DSA was developed with YOUR tax money, not the capital of a
   private business entity?
6) that it is painfully obvious that the "to stop drug dealers, child
   molesters, and terrorists" rhetoric is a very lame and transparent excuse.
   Not even a stupid criminal would use crypto that the govt. freely admits
   was designed with wiretapping in mind.  The ONLY way that Clipper could
   be useful is if all other forms of cryptography that the govt. cannot crack
   are BANNED outright.  Given that it seems clear that the targets are
   not nebulous Bad Guys (TM), but the US citizenry at large.  Lest this sound
   paranoid, note that even when directly asked, the govt. has yet to deny
   it is NOT considering banning non-Clipper cryptographic applications.
   Beyond this, the original proposal hinted strongly that the "key escrow
   agents" would not be govt. agencies.  So much for that.  NSA's lackey,
   NIST, on one hand, and our friends the Treasury on the other.  Boy, I sure
   feel safe, don't you?

There's plenty of other issues, but that's a good place to start.  As has
been adequately hashed out here, there's not much for J. Random Citizen to do
about the subpoenas.  This does not hold true of the entire Clipper
scheme, nor of the NIST/PKP scandal.  Make it plain to your readers that
crypto is important, and is for them.  Make it obvious that they DO have a
stake in what is going on right now, and they can play a part.

 > I would also like to get on your "mailing list" if you have one.

Send a message with "SUBSCRIBE <full name, not email address>" in the BODY
of the message to cypherpunks-request@toad.com.


-- 
DISCLAIMER: This message represents only my OWN opinion, not that of EFF.
Stanton McCandlish    Electronic Frontier Foundation Online Activist
mech@eff.org          NitV-DataCenter BBS SysOp
Fido: <tba>           IndraNet: 369:111/1



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: an36440@anon.penet.fi
Date: Sun, 19 Sep 93 11:05:51 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: more deranged lunatic ravings -- just delete 'em!
Message-ID: <9309191802.AA23218@anon.penet.fi>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>Look at the process here. The Grand Jury investigation gets followed,

Finally, a voice of reason.  The justice system must be followed by all
sides, not just the defendant.  While this is an important case, it's
important to see it in perspective.  The EFF and others have set themselves
up to provide defense in just such situations.  If you want to help them by
gathering "evidence", good for you.  But you aren't doing ANY good by
ranting on a Internet mail list.  We can all read the non-hysterical
informational postings to see what's happening.  Mr. Detweiler, you
are just adding noise and confusion.

-------------------------------------------------------------------------
To find out more about the anon service, send mail to help@anon.penet.fi.
Due to the double-blind, any mail replies to this message will be anonymized,
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From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Date: Sun, 19 Sep 93 18:15:55 PDT
To: doug@netcom.com (Doug Merritt)
Subject: Re: Definition of "Zero Knowledge"
In-Reply-To: <9309200038.AA04119@netcom.netcom.com>
Message-ID: <9309200113.AA27507@netcom5.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



> In the current context, the best reference that I know of is to
> the methodology of Goedel's Theorem rather than to ZPT; it has each
> of the properties that I mentioned except for the ZPT operations,
> which can be added in a conceptually straightforward way. The most
> readable in depth treatment of that that I know of is "Goedel's Proof"
> by Ernest Nagel and James R. Newman, c. 1958 and still in print as
> a cheap paperback.
> 
> If someone has good ZPT references that would be interesting too; I've
> lost the stuff I used to have on that.
> 	Doug

Doug, I am not aware that the zero knowledge results of Goldwasser,
Micali, Rackoff, etc., circa 1984-5, are actually implied by Godel's
results of the 1930s.

I'd be very intrigued to hear more about this.

-Tim May


-- 
..........................................................................
Timothy C. May         | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,  
tcmay@netcom.com       | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
408-688-5409           | knowledge, reputations, information markets, 
W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA  | black markets, collapse of governments.
Higher Power: 2^756839 | Public Key: PGP and MailSafe available.
Note: I put time and money into writing this posting. I hope you enjoy it.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: khijol!erc@apple.com (Ed Carp)
Date: Sun, 19 Sep 93 18:41:58 PDT
To: doug@netcom.com (Doug Merritt)
Subject: Re: Definition of "Zero Knowledge"
In-Reply-To: <9309200038.AA04119@netcom.netcom.com>
Message-ID: <m0oea40-00021vC@khijol>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text


> In the current context, the best reference that I know of is to
> the methodology of Goedel's Theorem rather than to ZPT; it has each
> of the properties that I mentioned except for the ZPT operations,
> which can be added in a conceptually straightforward way. The most
> readable in depth treatment of that that I know of is "Goedel's Proof"
> by Ernest Nagel and James R. Newman, c. 1958 and still in print as
> a cheap paperback.

This reminds me of a science fiction story that I read once, published in
Analog: the smart-ass encrypted the solution of how to produce stable
antimatter, or cold fusion, or something similar, using Godel's Theorem.

The politicos back on Earth said that it would take them 200 years to
factor the N-size number that was sent back to Earth.  :)

Now, if I could just remember the name of the story and the issue...
-- 
Ed Carp, N7EKG			erc@apple.com			510/659-9560
                            anon-0001@khijol.uucp
If you want magic, let go of your armor.  Magic is so much stronger than
steel!        -- Richard Bach, "The Bridge Across Forever"



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: an36440@anon.penet.fi
Date: Sun, 19 Sep 93 11:59:47 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: more deranged lunatic ravings -- just delete 'em!
Message-ID: <9309191856.AA03213@anon.penet.fi>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>First off, 'we' ARE involved.  This case is IMPORTANT, and can have far-
>reaching consequences for us.  This reminds me of the old story that starts
>out 'they came and got the Jews, and I said nothing because I wasn't a Jew...'.

Funny thing about some people on this list and alt.conspiracy,  the first
line of defense to accusations of hysteria is often "Look at what happened
to the Jews...".  The Jews didn't have professionals employed to fight for
their side of the argument, didn't have the justice system to provide a
legal framework within which both sides must maneuver, didn't have a
lot of what prz, et al., have.

>The attorneys and other experts looking at this case apparantly don't share
>your lack of enthuasism.  Even in the very early stages, the groundwork that

You make my case.  "The attorneys".  What exactly are YOU doing with all
your yammering, besides making a loud noise?

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From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: remailer@netcom.com
Date: Sun, 19 Sep 93 19:26:59 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: reporter seeking interview subjects
Message-ID: <9309200220.AA14061@mail.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


At 11:35 AM 9/19/93 -0400, Stanton McCandlish wrote:
>> > looking for interesting "case studies" that I can use to horrify
>> > my listeners out of their complacency.  My most immediate need is
>>  ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
>> 
>> Just what I love from the media, using sensationalism to convey a
>> preconceived idea instead of looking at the facts and reporting it.
>> Does it matter that he is reporting on our side and not the other
>> side?
>
>Why of course it does.  No wishing and praying will make the media suddely
>become pure and holy.  This is a propaganda war, and there's no reason
>for both sides not to get in on the act.  Otherwise, it's like fighting
>guns with slingshots. 

No horror, no story. Who wants to hear a story about how they're perfectly
safe letting the world look at their medical history? If that was true, no
one would want to hear about it on the radio.





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "L. Detweiler" <ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Date: Sun, 19 Sep 93 18:35:56 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Attn: P. Metzger and an36440, please delete this immediately
Message-ID: <9309200134.AA00413@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Forwarded from J. Bidzos.

this actually *strengthens* the NSA theories. 

(go ahead, flame me some more. I've been called, culling from all the
best, a ``screaming, ranting, hysterical, yammering lunatic running
about like a headless barnyard fowl  just adding noise and confusion''
-- can anyone top that?)

I'm leaving out Bidzos' email address so he is not harassed any further
than I've already done :)

------- Forwarded Message

Date: Sun, 19 Sep 93 11:17:18 PDT
Message-Id: <9309191817.AA10201@RSA.COM>
To: ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu
In-Reply-To: "L. Detweiler"'s message of Sat, 18 Sep 93 17:24:41 -0600
<9309182324.AA10638@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Subject: PGP & Moby Crypto investigation


PKP, RSA, nor I have anything to do with this subpoena business. No
complaint has been filed.  This looks to be an investigation into
violation of export laws, but I don't know.


------- End of Forwarded Message





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: frc%bwnmr4@harvard.harvard.edu (Fred Cooper)
Date: Sun, 19 Sep 93 17:36:57 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com (Cypherpunks)
Subject: Re: Definition of "Zero Knowledge" (fwd)
Message-ID: <9309200033.AA17197@bwnmr4.harvard.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Forwarded message:

> From frc Sun Sep 19 20:22:47 1993
> Subject: Re: Definition of "Zero Knowledge"
> To: erc@apple.com
> Date: Sun, 19 Sep 93 20:22:47 EDT
> In-Reply-To: <m0oeGCo-00021LC@khijol>; from "Ed Carp" at Sep 18, 93 9:16 pm

> > Thanks for the definition (but I knew that, anyway).  Sorru I wasn't clear -
> > what I was looking for was examples of how zero-knowledge proof techniques
> > could make source code impenetrable.

> > Source would be nice, too... ;)

> Check out a product called C-Shroud by ??Gimpel Software...
> I think it does this.. or at least tries....

> FRC

I meant to send this across the list, and not just to erc.  Here's it is
for everyone else.

FRC




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: stig@netcom.com (Stig)
Date: Sun, 19 Sep 93 20:39:50 PDT
To: Matt Binder <cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: reporter seeking interview subjects
In-Reply-To: <binder@well.sf.ca.us>
Message-ID: <9309200337.AA13543@netcom3.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


In <93Sep17.230857pdt.14382-4@well.sf.ca.us>, Matt Binder wrote...
> Hi, my name is Matt Binder.  Please help me...
>         I'm a radio reporter in the SF Bay area working on a series
> of pieces about invasions of privacy in the computer age.  I'm
> looking for interesting "case studies" that I can use to horrify
> my listeners out of their complacency.  

I think it's really important that if you're looking to shock your audience
that you also show a glimpse of not only the "light at the end of the
tunnel" but also a glimpse of the reasons that people would be better off
making a dash for the end of the tunnel than trying to run back to the
tunnel's start.  Otherwise, you're just fueling the anxieties of countless
luddites and techonophobes.  

> My most immediate need is
> to find someone whose medical records were used (perused!)

I hardly speak for all of the cypherpunks, of course, but generally we work
the "Big Brother" side of the street.  There are others who are more on top
of this sort of thing.  Judyc@well might be a good resource for this sort of
thing.

    Stig


;; __________________________________________________________________________
;; Stig@netcom.com                            netcom.com:/pub/stig/00-PGP-KEY
;; It's hard to be cutting-edge at your own pace...   32 DF B9 19 AE 28 D1 7A
;; Bullet-proof code cannot stand up to teflon bugs.  A3 9D 0B 1A 33 13 4D 7F




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: ANSPRING@delphi.com
Date: Sun, 19 Sep 93 18:30:56 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Restrictions on crypto exports
Message-ID: <01H35AR2BPS68ZEFI2@delphi.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain




hal finney quotes:

"Public domain" is defined in 120.18:  "Public domain means information
which is published and which is generally accessible to the public:
(a) Through sales at newsstands and bookstores; (b) Through subscriptions
which are available without restriction to any individual who desires
to obtain or purchase the published information; (c) Through second class
mailing privileges granted by the U.S. Government; or, (d) At libraries
open to the public."

I'm way out of my depth here, but can it be argued that what constitutes

ublic domain" is not being exhaustively defined here?  That is, does the
legalese here mean that ONLY a,b,c, and d publishing modes are PD, or can you
argue that a,b,c, and d are just *examples* of PD publishing, and that there
are other modes that just weren't mentioned.  If making something available
for anonymous FTP is not putting it in the public domain, then what the hech
is it?




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "L. Detweiler" <ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Date: Sun, 19 Sep 93 20:52:00 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: key escrow procedures
In-Reply-To: <199309181851.AA05084@eff.org>
Message-ID: <9309200349.AA03036@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


C. Ellison:
> Meanwhile, where is the proof that the key being requested corresponds to
> a person on whom a wiretap has been ordered?

M. Godwin:
>The authorized key request will normally occur after law-enforcement
>officials have snagged the chip serial number from the LEAF
>(law-enforcement field) of the signal they captured with an authorized
>wiretap.

This begs the question. 

Does anybody pay any attention to what I write? I addressed this in my
posting -- if the police send the device ID of the LEAF field via *fax*
what is to prevent different officers from trading IDs? the fundamental
point is that the key escrow agency *only* gets a request for a key
based on an ID -- how do they know the `warrant' given them actually
applies to *that* key ID? answer: they don't. and as I wrote: is there
*any* circumstance under which a key escrow agency rejects a key
request? if not, WHAT'S THE POINT? ah yes, what we need is a PHONE
REGISTRATION DATABASE (BWAHAHAHA <- insane depraved mad laugh).

T.C. May wrote a long time ago about the possibility of a `black
market' in key ID exchange among the police. What's to prevent it? the
point is that the NSA in its wretchedly naive way is treating the
police as a SECURE COMPONENT.

there might be ways of alleviating this, such as ensuring that the link
from the `black box' to the key escrow agency is secure, as I wrote. We
have to wait for this idea to penetrate the brain of Mr. GraveDigger of
the NSA who's in charge of the design.

again, though, this all only shows the sheer intellectual bankruptcy of
the key escrow aspect of the Key Escrow Proposal. if I heard that NSA
was improving their thought control techniques based on anything I
write I would burn all my email...

NSA Clipper Slogan:
KEY ESCROW: LEAVE THE DETAILS TO US.





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "L. Detweiler" <ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Date: Sun, 19 Sep 93 21:07:01 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Bidzos on ITAR
Message-ID: <9309200405.AA03325@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Responding to H. Finney's probing, sterling, and brilliant analysis of
ITAR (which I was utterly embarrassed to see buried and sandwiched in
sordid flames) J. Bidzos claims that ``The ITAR specifically exempts
software from being considered public domain'' and points out that the
PKP FTP site in question that H. refers to as `causing a big stink' was
*non-anonymous*.

I would like to see J. Bidzos' sci.crypt posting reposted here *ASAP*
by some bored cypherpunk who would like to ``contribute''! Major
cyberspace points await!




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: doug@netcom.com (Doug Merritt)
Date: Sun, 19 Sep 93 22:16:00 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Definition of "Zero Knowledge"
Message-ID: <9309200512.AA11486@netcom4.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


khijol!erc@apple.com (Ed Carp) said:
>This reminds me of a science fiction story that I read once, published in
>Analog: the smart-ass encrypted the solution of how to produce stable
>antimatter, or cold fusion, or something similar, using Godel's Theorem.
>
>The politicos back on Earth said that it would take them 200 years to
>factor the N-size number that was sent back to Earth.  :)
>
>Now, if I could just remember the name of the story and the issue...


"The Gold at the Starbow's End", Frederik Pohl, Ballantine Books, 1972.
Serialized in Analog in '71 or 72. Great book!

You're showing your age. ;-)
( Like I'm not...if anyone on the list wasn't born at that point, I don't
wanna hear about it :-)

I think this was the first place I ever heard of Go"del numbering.
	Doug




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Perry E. Metzger" <pmetzger@lehman.com>
Date: Sun, 19 Sep 93 19:15:57 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Attn: P. Metzger and an36440, please delete this immediately
In-Reply-To: <9309200134.AA00413@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Message-ID: <9309200214.AA09657@snark.lehman.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



"L. Detweiler" says:
> Forwarded from J. Bidzos.
> 
> this actually *strengthens* the NSA theories. 

What theories? We *know* they are the ones who care about crypto and
have been trying to keep it restricted. This is as interesting as
saying "you know, I think that France is in Europe." Some have
accurately made the statement that the NSA does not directly enforce
any anti crypto export regulations but has to act through the commerce
department and the department of state, but we all know that they are
the ones who care in the long run. As for who in particular set off
this investigation, well, what does that matter? Lets say that it was
the NSA. Does this change anyone's strategy here?

> (go ahead, flame me some more. I've been called, culling from all the
> best, a ``screaming, ranting, hysterical, yammering lunatic running
> about like a headless barnyard fowl  just adding noise and confusion''
> -- can anyone top that?)

Nah. I think that I pretty much summarized it the first time, although
you are misquoting me, in so far as I didn't use all those terms in
one phrase.

Perry




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: doug@netcom.com (Doug Merritt)
Date: Sun, 19 Sep 93 22:19:53 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Does this seem illegal to you?
Message-ID: <9309200517.AA12216@netcom4.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


mgream@acacia.itd.uts.edu.au (Matthew Gream) said:
>Although, it must be said that CDROM whitepages are available, and i'm 
>ignorant of what limitations have been built into them to stop people 
>(i.e. corporations) turning them into reverse directories.

In the U.S., you can buy CD-ROM white pages for the entire US for $99,
and the same database reverse-directoried for another $99. (Approximately;
this is from memory from a magazine ad I saw 4 days ago.)

Such things have been available on paper for a long time, but this media
and these prices will doubtless have social repercussions.

As before, people can make a point of having their address not listed
in any such directory, forward or reverse, if they're careful enough.

However, the need to do so probably increases as reverse indexing becomes
so vastly more available.
	Doug




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Mike Ingle <MIKEINGLE@delphi.com>
Date: Sun, 19 Sep 93 19:25:57 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Cryptophone
Message-ID: <01H35CYYEGKY91WN6Y@delphi.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Where is the cryptophone project? I haven't seen anything about it for a
while. Last I read, a company had a commercial triple-DES product with no
public key - has anyone seen this? How is the sound quality? The cryptophone
is the best way to drive a stake through the heart of Clipper.

Suppose someone writes a crypto program and gives it to some friends. One of
the friends uploads it to a BBS. Someone calls up from a foreign country and
downloads it from the BBS. Who is at fault? The person who wrote it, for not
retaining control over his product? The friend who uploaded it, for placing
it where a foreigner could access it? The operator of the BBS, for not
screening the file and preventing the foreigner from downloading it? Or the
foreigner himself, who is probably out of range of U.S. law in any case?

Suppose someone writes a crypto program and makes it generally available to
anyone who wants it. It goes out of the country, but there is no way to know
who sent it out of the country or how. Can they prosecute the person who
wrote it for not maintaining control over it? If they can, this means, among
other things, that selling the Norton Utilities to someone without checking
to see that they are a citizen is illegal, and that having PKZIP on your BBS
is illegal. If the precedent gets established that the person who writes
such a program is responsible for keeping it out of the hands of foreigners,
that would be a big problem. All crypto would have to be published
anonymously, because nobody could risk signing their name to it.
This must not happen!

The flamewar going on here is counterproductive; they must be laughing down
at the fort.              --- MikeIngle@delphi.com




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Duncan Frissell <frissell@panix.com>
Date: Sun, 19 Sep 93 19:29:50 PDT
To: CYPHERPUNKS@toad.com
Subject: Crypto crackdown - this i
Message-ID: <199309200226.AA17164@panix.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


F >Unless you are judgement proof. 

Since I have received 4 pieces of E-mail asking for a definition, I will 
beg the indulgance of the list...

Being 'judgement proof' means that even if a civil judgement is obtained 
against you, it cannot be satisfied.  It means that you have no attachable 
property.  The property can be in the name of another person or 
entity or in another jurisdiction.  It is a very relaxing feeling.

In the mid '80s for example when Roy Cohn (of the Army-McCarthy Hearings) 
was dying of AIDS, he had outstanding judgments of almost $1.5 
million against him from the IRS and private parties.  Meanwhile, he lived 
in a brownstone on the upper east side of Manhattan, used a house in the 
Hamptons, and regularly flew Concorde to Europe.  The judgements were 
never executed against him, however because he had no money.  He was 
judgment proof.  The houses and other perks were supplied to him by the 
law firm of which he was an obviously valuble employee.

Judgement proofing yourself is a powerfull concept.

Duncan Frissell

Who has remained judgment proof for years by employing the oldest trick in 
the book -- transferring all of his assets to the brains of his children 
(via various educational institutions) where they are immune to siezure.  
 
 




--- WinQwk 2.0b#0
                                                                                                  




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Perry E. Metzger" <pmetzger@lehman.com>
Date: Sun, 19 Sep 93 19:55:57 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Cryptophone
In-Reply-To: <01H35CYYEGKY91WN6Y@delphi.com>
Message-ID: <9309200251.AA09720@snark.lehman.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Mike Ingle says:
> Where is the cryptophone project?

There is no one such project. There are several of them that I know
of. If you think its an interesting thing to do, I strongly encourage
working on it on your own -- its not the sort of thing that requires
lots of people working on it, but it is the sort of thing that more
people talk about than do.

> I haven't seen anything about it for a while. Last I read, a company
> had a commercial triple-DES product with no public key - has anyone
> seen this? How is the sound quality? The cryptophone is the best way
> to drive a stake through the heart of Clipper.

I fully agree.

Recent developments have been interesting on other fronts. 24kbps and
28kbps modems have arrived on the market, albeit at high prices. When
the final V.Fast standard comes in, 28kbps modems should cost only a
few hundred dollars. Although ordinary workstations can't do CELP fast
enough, GSM appears to be easily workable even on "normal" computers.

> Suppose someone writes a crypto program and gives it to some friends. One of
> the friends uploads it to a BBS. Someone calls up from a foreign country and
> downloads it from the BBS. Who is at fault? The person who wrote it, for not
> retaining control over his product? The friend who uploaded it, for placing
> it where a foreigner could access it? The operator of the BBS, for not
> screening the file and preventing the foreigner from downloading it? Or the
> foreigner himself, who is probably out of range of U.S. law in any case?

There is no case law or statute on this. The folks writing the laws
didn't understand computers and had no notion of the fact that it was
possible for someone physically outside the country to access
information physically inside the country. With luck, the case will
simply be overturned, and there may never be any case law defining
this silly form of "export".

Perry




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Eli Brandt <ebrandt@jarthur.Claremont.EDU>
Date: Sun, 19 Sep 93 22:55:59 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Definition of "Zero Knowledge" (fwd)
In-Reply-To: <9309200033.AA17197@bwnmr4.harvard.edu>
Message-ID: <9309200552.AA25175@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> Check out a product called C-Shroud by ??Gimpel Software...
> I think it does this.. or at least tries....
 
C-Shroud does nothing with zero-knowledge proofs, or anything nearly
that sophisticated.  It simply mungs identifiers, strips comments and
whitespace, and things of that sort.  The idea is to get the machine
independence (heh) of C, with the unreadability (heh) of object code.
It can't really be that hard to read -- after all, most of the
human-work in disassembly is precisely the job of analyzing an
uncommented HLL program with meaningless identifiers.

   Eli   ebrandt@jarthur.claremont.edu




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: bill@twwells.com (T. William Wells)
Date: Sun, 19 Sep 93 17:06:57 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Definition of "Zero Knowledge"
In-Reply-To: <9309191615.AA18299@netcom4.netcom.com>
Message-ID: <CDMJCD.8FC@twwells.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


In article <9309191615.AA18299@netcom4.netcom.com>,
Doug Merritt <doug@netcom.com> wrote:
: An arbitrary algorithm can be translated into a zero proof theory model
: that is intractable to functionally analyze. Its operations on inputs and
: outputs can take place within the realm of the intractable model, with
: the inputs and outputs being transformed from the encoding of the outside
: realm into an encoding useful to the realm of the model. The inputs and
: outputs are the queries and answers of zero proof theory.
:
: With such a thing, knowing every detail of the registers and instructions
: being executed at all times still wouldn't tell you what you really
: wanted to know.

So, with such a translated algorithm, even if I had the complete
source code, I would be unable to determine what it does? If you
create one of these, be sure to submit it to the Obfuscated C
contest; it'll be the ultimate! :-)

: I'm unsure whether this has been published, let alone implemented; I just
: thought it was an obvious corollary back when ZPT itself was first published.
: It might have been discussed in the literature at the time, but if so,
: I've forgotten.

Got a good reference for ZPT? Something that the mathematically
inclined, who wants just the facts, all the facts, and none of
the BS that passes for explanations and which usually obscures
more than it clarifies?





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Eli Brandt <ebrandt@jarthur.Claremont.EDU>
Date: Sun, 19 Sep 93 23:19:51 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Stegno and DAT and digital music...
In-Reply-To: <199309131414.AA07464@access.digex.net>
Message-ID: <9309200619.AA25512@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> improved the sound. He says that the original CD format was
> limited to 16 bits of sound because of costs. But many audiophiles
> reacted very negatively to the tinny, metalic quality to the music.

Heh.  Lack of sufficient bits for digital sound results in a floor of
uniformly-distributed white noise for complex signals such as music.
If audiophiles really hear "tinny" or "metallic" sound in double-blind
tests, it would more likely be due to the sampling rate.  The 44kHz
rate means that skimping on the lowpass filter will push the cutoff
into the audible range, which means you lose some upper harmonics and
get to hear any phase nonlinearity in the filter.

> For this reason, the companies have developed 20 bit DAT recording
> tape and then come up with ways to "dither" this into 16 bits. 
> 
> I am curious if anyone knows the details of these algorithms. 

Round to 16 bits.  The higher-precision recording format is good
because it lets noise (e.g. from mixing up a quiet signal) chew off
four bits before it gets on the CD.  You can do a little better than
rounding, but not much.

> Also, his point suggests that flipping the least significant 
> bit of 16 bit music may not be imperceptable to some ears.

It may well not be, particularly if you do it without regard to the
piece's amplitude.  That 6dB of hiss may be perceptible during
pauses.

A more subtle flaw is that the signal will have artificial statistical
characteristics.  Natural noise in recordings is typically Gaussian,
not uniform noise covering exactly one bit.  What this means is that
if the LSB is total uncorrelated hash, the bit above will have some
noise.  Look at a quiet passage.  If the LSB is noise city and the
14th is uniformly zero, somebody twiddled with the digital data.  This
is a more reasonable way of screening for this sort of steganography
than hiring a bunch of audiophiles.  

One fix is to cover your nefarious LSB activities by first adding
sufficient Gaussian noise.  My intuition, however, is that any amount
short of microwaving the CD will leave a little bit of correlation
between the original and the noised lower bits.  With sufficient data,
I think you can burn through the Gaussian noise and get enough
information to make a call on whether the LSB has been twiddled.  And
a CD is a lot of data.

> -Peter Wayner

   Eli   ebrandt@jarthur.claremont.edu




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Christian Void <cvoid@netcom.com>
Date: Sun, 19 Sep 93 23:22:30 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Newsgroup...
Message-ID: <Pine.3.05.9309192343.A161-9100000-9100000@netcom3>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


So, is there a specific reason why someone hasn't created an
<alt.cypherpunks> newsgroup? It seems appropriate, as most of the current
mass amounts of traffic are dedicated to paranoia and bickering...

Christian Void /T71 | "I don't like it, and I'm sorry I | VMResearch, Inc.
cvoid@netcom.COM    | ever had anything to do with it." | P.O. Box 170213
Tel. 1+415-807-5491 |  -Erwin Schrodinger  (1887-1961)  | SF, CA  94117
                * PGP v2.3a Public Key Available Via Finger *






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: jkhastings@aol.com
Date: Sun, 19 Sep 93 20:40:57 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Retry flyer
Message-ID: <9309192329.tn62002@aol.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I got some strange mail failure messages from my speech flyer. This attempt
won't include any "cc:" to extropians.
---------------------------------------------------
"State Evader" comes out of the Green 
Dragon Tavern BBS   (213) 365-1132
pseudonym closet to shamelessly promote
his upcoming speeches at the 
H.L. Mencken Forum and the 
Libertarian Party of CA Region 62
Los Angeles Westside:
------------------------------------------------------------
State Evader = J. Kent Hastings
Assistant Director of 
the Agorist Institute,
"Techtics" columnist for the Tactics of the 
Movement of the Libertarian Left 
newsletter, internet cypherpunk, and 
ham radio operator WA6ZFY.
Both speeches will be on 
the topic:
"Cyber Cash: Free Market Money 
Comes of Age" I will talk about untraceable 
digital cash, public-key cryptography, 
spread-spectrum radio, unmanned vehicles, 
and the latest government 
actions that 
threaten everyone's privacy: The Clipper/
Skipjack key escrow agents and the 
subpoenas served to the Austin Code Works
and ViaCrypt for all PGP, RSA export info.
--------------------------------------------------------------
Mencken info: (310) 289-3234 
(reserve now!)
L.P. info: (310) 477-6491
--------------------------
Mencken location: 
The Old Spaghetti Factory
5939 Sunset Blvd 
near Hollywood Freeway in L.A.
Wednesday September 22, 1993
6:30 Libations, 7:00 Dinner,
8:00 Speaker, 10:00 Adjourn
ment
First time "virgins" reserved: $3
--------------------------------------------------
L.P. of CA Region 62 L.A. Westside:
Chris's Italian Restaurant
10105 Venice Blvd. at Clarington Ave
Thursday, September 23, 1993
Cocktails 6:30, Dinner 7:00, Talk 8:30
Not sure if admission is charged.
----------------------------------------------
Kent - <jkhastings@aol.com>




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Mike Godwin <mnemonic@eff.org>
Date: Sun, 19 Sep 93 20:35:57 PDT
To: ANSPRING@delphi.com
Subject: Re: Restrictions on crypto exports
In-Reply-To: <01H35AR2BPS68ZEFI2@delphi.com>
Message-ID: <199309200332.AA16970@eff.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


 
ANSPRING asks:

> hal finney quotes:
> 
> "Public domain" is defined in 120.18:  "Public domain means information
> which is published and which is generally accessible to the public:
> (a) Through sales at newsstands and bookstores; (b) Through subscriptions
> which are available without restriction to any individual who desires
> to obtain or purchase the published information; (c) Through second class
> mailing privileges granted by the U.S. Government; or, (d) At libraries
> open to the public."
> 
> I'm way out of my depth here, but can it be argued that what constitutes
> 
> ublic domain" is not being exhaustively defined here?

It matters not, IMHO, since an ftp archive site qualifies as a library
open to the public.


--Mike






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Jeremy R. Smith" <jersmit@eis.calstate.edu>
Date: Mon, 20 Sep 93 00:32:30 PDT
To: Cypherpunks <cypherpunks@toad.com>
Subject: Message to the net (fwd)
Message-ID: <Pine.3.07.9309200016.A24220-b100000@eis.calstate.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



	This is a message a friend of mine wanted me to post on the 'Net. 
I figured the Cypherpunk list would be one of the best places to start.

Jeremy Smith


---------- Forwarded message ----------
Date: 20 Sep 93 02:02:13 EDT
From: Ole Grunbaum, 75320,672
To: Jeremy Smith, >INTERNET:jersmit@eis.calstate.edu
Date: , 22:47
Subject: 

I am a Danish journalist, stationed in the US, writing for a daily newspaper in Copenhagen, mostly about technology, but also gennerally about culture. I am particularly interested in the political and ethical questions that computers and networks pose, pa
rticularly in regards to government and large corporations. I have covered a lot of hacker cases, and right now I am interested in the Kevin Poulsen, alias Dark Dante, case. I am looking for people who know Kevin. I can not understand why he has been 30 mo
nths now in custody without a court case. 

If anyone can help me, and are willing to talk to me, please write to my compuserve account, 75320,672 or internet: ogrunba@eis.calstate.edu - my name is Ole Grunbaum, and my newspaper is Politiken.
 






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "L. Detweiler" <ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Date: Sun, 19 Sep 93 23:49:53 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Congrats to STANTON MCCANDLISH - EFF Online Activist
Message-ID: <9309200646.AA06246@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Congratulations to S. McCandlish, a longtime BBS operator, cypherpunk
loyalist and PGP promoter, who, if nobody else noticed, just won the
coveted Online Activist position advertised by EFF some weeks ago. He
has plans to put together an EFF BBS and archive on a fast machine with
Internet connectivity. He'll be moving to Washington D.C. by October
and running his previous BBS from there.  Hope to hear more from him
here on his progress! Maybe he can sneak a few subversive cypherpunk
rants onto the archive! :)





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "L. Detweiler" <ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Date: Mon, 20 Sep 93 00:46:02 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: meaningless rumor
Message-ID: <9309200742.AA07328@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


From a high-level source in contact with an *extremely* high level source:

Rumor: Moby Crypto was targeted because G. Ward intended to include PGP
on distribution disks. The investigation is primarily PGP oriented, and
G. Ward is just a bystander who got caught up. PRZ & PGP is the essential target.

Notes

(1)  phrasing of the subpoenas definitely confirms this -- PGP is mentioned in both.

(2) can we find any Usenet postings where G. Ward announced intent to
distribute PGP with Moby Crypto to help confirm this?

(3) Current Underground Digest just came out -- it (contrarily) hypes
the Moby Crypto `attack' as foremost, and *mislabels* PRZ's comments as
`reaction to Moby Crypto attack' -- in fact, there is no indication
that he knew of Moby Crypto when he wrote those.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: bill@twwells.com (T. William Wells)
Date: Sun, 19 Sep 93 20:07:27 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Definition of "Zero Knowledge"
In-Reply-To: <9309200038.AA04119@netcom.netcom.com>
Message-ID: <CDMs7n.AuB@twwells.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


In article <9309200038.AA04119@netcom.netcom.com>,
Doug Merritt <doug@netcom.com> wrote:
:                                                           The most
: readable in depth treatment of that that I know of is "Goedel's Proof"
: by Ernest Nagel and James R. Newman, c. 1958 and still in print as
: a cheap paperback.

I have that book. It's a good one. It's exactly the sort of thing
I was referring to.





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: an15348@anon.penet.fi (Gideon)
Date: Sun, 19 Sep 93 21:15:57 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Does this seem illegal?
Message-ID: <9309200412.AA03705@anon.penet.fi>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain




 * Reply to msg originally in CYPHERPUNKS

 Uu> From: gg@well.sf.ca.us ("George A. Gleason")

 Uu> ...Thank you, operator.  A warm bulge rises in your pants as
 Uu> you contemplate your next move.  Boy are you going to teach her a
 Uu> lesson!
 Uu> This special moment brought to you by Sprint TeleMap.

Wait.  You've done this before, right?



___ Blue Wave/QWK v2.12
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
To find out more about the anon service, send mail to help@anon.penet.fi.
Due to the double-blind, any mail replies to this message will be anonymized,
and an anonymous id will be allocated automatically. You have been warned.
Please report any problems, inappropriate use etc. to admin@anon.penet.fi.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: smb@research.att.com
Date: Mon, 20 Sep 93 04:29:54 PDT
To: "L. Detweiler" <ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Subject: Re: meaningless rumor
Message-ID: <9309201128.AA29694@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


	 From a high-level source in contact with an *extremely* high
	 level source:

	 Rumor: Moby Crypto was targeted because G. Ward intended to
	 include PGP on distribution disks. The investigation is
	 primarily PGP oriented, and G. Ward is just a bystander who
	 got caught up. PRZ & PGP is the essential target.

	 Notes

	 (1)  phrasing of the subpoenas definitely confirms this -- PGP
	 is mentioned in both.

	 (2) can we find any Usenet postings where G. Ward announced
	 intent to distribute PGP with Moby Crypto to help confirm
	 this?

Ward posted a note that (in essence) asked for help in evading the ITARs.
(Well, I suppose it could have been someone forging a posting...).  He
went so far as to offer to provide mailing labels to someone abroad who
would redistribute Moby Crypto, though from a country where that would
be legal -- but never said how the first copy would get to the trans-
shipment point.  Some reasons were given why this sequence was going to
be technically legal -- but if you were a U.S. attorney investigating
the export of cryptographic software, it's the sort of thing that almost
has to be investigated.  Face it -- if Ward *wanted* to generate a test
case, he couldn't have done a much better job; a private note to the
authorities could have been ``misfiled'', but an announcement to tens
of thousands of readers around the world?  C'mon -- they may or may not
be stupid, and they may or may not be paranoid, but their entire raison
d'etre is to wield power, and Grady just slapped that authority in the
face.  Spitting at your local traffic cop would have been a lot safer.

As for PKP -- *somehow*, it wandered out of the U.S.  Probably, someone
in power decided that that finally needed investigating in detail, to see
if a law was broken.  And Sternlight is right -- if they decide to indict,
they may throw in charges of importing IDEA, though I doubt that they'd
indict just on those grounds; in an era of key escrow, they'd certainly
like a court to rule they had the power to exclude subversive foreign
crypto....


		--Steve Bellovin




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: paul@poboy.b17c.ingr.com (Paul Robichaux)
Date: Mon, 20 Sep 93 05:52:37 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: What can we do in the next few days? (fwd)
Message-ID: <199309201250.AA11675@poboy.b17c.ingr.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> I wrote Grady Ward under separate cover about Bruce Schneier's
> upcoming book, published by John Wiley & Sons.. Last I heard, its
> title was "Practical Cryptography," and it's scheduled to hit the
> streets around November 1st.

> The book includes source code for DES, RSA, DH, IDEA, and several
> others (Snefru and Lucifer?). IMHO its most salient feature is the
> inclusion of that source code _on a floppy._

> This should probably be added to the reference list; I've emailed
> Bruce to get the ISBN number and will post it when he responds.

> Illegitimus nil carborundum,
> -Paul

-- 
Paul Robichaux, KD4JZG     | "Change the world for a better tomorrow. But
perobich@ingr.com          |  watch your ass today." - aaron@halcyon.com
Intergraph Federal Systems | Be a cryptography user- ask me how.





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Matt Blaze <mab@crypto.com>
Date: Mon, 20 Sep 93 06:06:05 PDT
To: smb@research.att.com
Subject: Re: meaningless rumor
In-Reply-To: <9309201128.AA29694@toad.com>
Message-ID: <9309201255.AA14286@crypto.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


....
>they may throw in charges of importing IDEA, though I doubt that they'd
>indict just on those grounds; in an era of key escrow, they'd certainly
>like a court to rule they had the power to exclude subversive foreign
>crypto....
.....
>		--Steve Bellovin

Steve,

Assuming that whoevever implemented PGP did not himself import the cipher, but
based the implementation on the EUROCRYPT '90 paper that was 'imported'
by Springer-Verlag, I don't understand what the basis would be for such a
charge.  Now an indictment against Springer for shipping the proceedings
(which contained C source code for IDEA) into the US - that would be
interesting...

-matt




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Perry E. Metzger" <pmetzger@lehman.com>
Date: Mon, 20 Sep 93 06:07:08 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: meaningless rumor
In-Reply-To: <9309200742.AA07328@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Message-ID: <9309201302.AA14912@snark.lehman.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



"L. Detweiler" says:
> From a high-level source in contact with an *extremely* high level source:
> 
> Rumor: Moby Crypto was targeted because G. Ward intended to include
> PGP on distribution disks. The investigation is primarily PGP
> oriented, and G. Ward is just a bystander who got caught up. PRZ &
> PGP is the essential target.

Thanks. That one was REALLY hard to figure out from the fact that the
subpoena mentioned only PGP. Your high level source could be anyone in
the continental U.S.

If you are going to act like a conspiracy theory type, could you at
least maybe stick to *interesting* rumors?

Perry




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: hfinney@shell.portal.com (Hal Finney)
Date: Tue, 21 Sep 93 03:47:30 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Timing of Moby subpoena
Message-ID: <9309201606.AA24301@jobe.shell.portal.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


From: smb@research.att.com

> Ward posted a note that (in essence) asked for help in evading the ITARs.

Since Moby Crypto is, as I understand it, composed of material which is
generally available all over the world, it may not be necessary that it
be exported from the U.S. in order to exist in a foreign country.  One should
be careful about accusing others of conspiracy to violate the ITARs, even
qualifying it with "in essence".

> Face it -- if Ward *wanted* to generate a test
> case, he couldn't have done a much better job; a private note to the
> authorities could have been ``misfiled'', but an announcement to tens
> of thousands of readers around the world?  C'mon -- they may or may not
> be stupid, and they may or may not be paranoid, but their entire raison
> d'etre is to wield power, and Grady just slapped that authority in the
> face.  Spitting at your local traffic cop would have been a lot safer.

The note that Steve is referring to is presumably this.  Note the date:

> Newsgroups: talk.politics.crypto
> From: grady@netcom.com (Grady Ward)
> Subject: Want to drop-ship Moby Crypto?
> Message-ID: <gradyCDCqqr.MpC@netcom.com>
> Date: Tue, 14 Sep 1993 16:20:50 GMT
> 
> Is there anyone receiving this feed outside the
> United States who would like to act as my foreign
> drop-ship agent for Moby Crypto?
> [...]

I think the relative timing of this announcement and the subpoena makes
it questionable whether the subpoena was in response to this posting.
According to Ward's later post:

> Newsgroups: comp.org.eff.talk,sci.crypt,alt.security.pgp,talk.politics.crypto
> From: grady@netcom.com (Grady Ward)
> Subject: Re: *FLASH* Moby SUBPOENA served
> Message-ID: <gradyCDHKDC.3Lu@netcom.com>
> Date: Fri, 17 Sep 1993 06:51:11 GMT
> [...]
> At 10:30 PM EDT  Thursday, 16 Sept 1993 Theodore R. Siggins,
> special agent for the Department of Treasury, U.S.
> Customs Service office of enforcement for
> Austin, TX (512) 482-5502 served the following
> subpoena:

This is two days after Ward's message, which is pretty fast response
for law enforcement.  But this is the date of service.  The subpoena
had to be issued and signed before this.  Did that occur after Ward's
Sep 14 posting?  It's not 100% clear, but what the subpoena itself, as
posted by Grady, says is:

> This subpoena is issued on application of the United States of America
> Michael J. Yamaguchi
> United States Attorney
>  
> Assistant U.S. Attorney
> William P. Keane
> 280 S. First St., Suite 371
> San Jose, CA  95113
> (408) 291-7221
> s/a Robin Sterzer, Customs
> 93-1348(SJ) 93-1(SJ)
>  
> 9 September 1993

If Sep 9 is the date on which the subpoena was actually issued, this was
five days before Grady Ward's post which supposedly triggered the subpoena.
Unless the Feds are prescient, they must have been planning to subpoena
Austin Code Works about Moby Crypto, PGP, and RSA long before Ward's post.

Hal
hfinney@shell.portal.com




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: smb@research.att.com
Date: Mon, 20 Sep 93 06:16:06 PDT
To: Matt Blaze <mab@crypto.com>
Subject: Re: meaningless rumor
Message-ID: <9309201313.AA01100@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


	 Assuming that whoevever implemented PGP did not himself import
	 the cipher, but based the implementation on the EUROCRYPT '90
	 paper that was 'imported' by Springer-Verlag, I don't
	 understand what the basis would be for such a charge.  Now an
	 indictment against Springer for shipping the proceedings
	 (which contained C source code for IDEA) into the US - that
	 would be interesting...

As you say, ``assuming''.  The Feds can afford to lose that count
because of the facts of this case; they can't afford to lose on a point
of law.  I don't know what the facts are, or what they can prove about
them.  They may not, either, at this point, pending the results of the
grand jury probe.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: doug@netcom.com (Doug Merritt)
Date: Mon, 20 Sep 93 09:17:13 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: a quote
Message-ID: <9309201615.AA12922@netcom4.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Sorry to add to the S/N ratio, but I can't resist passing on this
(unattributed) quote I saw in someone's .sig:

> Giving power and money to the government is like giving whiskey and
> keys to a 17 year old.

Well, I thought it was amusing. :-)
	Doug




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: lefty@apple.com (Lefty)
Date: Mon, 20 Sep 93 09:37:13 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: a quote
Message-ID: <9309201626.AA02479@internal.apple.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>Sorry to add to the S/N ratio, but I can't resist passing on this
>(unattributed) quote I saw in someone's .sig:
>
>> Giving power and money to the government is like giving whiskey and
>> keys to a 17 year old.

P. J. O'Rourke, _A_ _Parliament_ _of_ _Whores_


--
Lefty (lefty@apple.com)
C:.M:.C:., D:.O:.D:.






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Forrest Aldrich <visgraph!forrie>
Date: Mon, 20 Sep 93 08:39:55 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Encrypted logins?
Message-ID: <199309201329.AA04289@visgraph.uucp>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Is there a way to set up an encrypted login session, whereby the calling
program would need a 'key' in order to decrypt the connection to even
see the 'login: ' prompt?  I thought I saw something like this for the
ham-radio enthusiasts.  It uses plain-DES to do the work.  But this would
require that your calling program be some type of comm prog with the
decryption/encryption abilities within.

I understand that some gov logins use this type of scheme.






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Brad Huntting <huntting@glarp.com>
Date: Mon, 20 Sep 93 08:56:10 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: meaningless rumor
In-Reply-To: <9309201255.AA14286@crypto.com>
Message-ID: <199309201553.AA01896@misc.glarp.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



> Assuming that whoevever implemented PGP did not himself import the
> cipher, but based the implementation on the EUROCRYPT '90 paper
> that was 'imported' by Springer-Verlag, I don't understand what
> the basis would be for such a charge.  Now an indictment against
> Springer for shipping the proceedings (which contained C source
> code for IDEA) into the US - that would be interesting...

Wait a minute.  Does ITAR actuall prohibit importing crypto _to_
the US? I've never heard of it being used this way.


brad




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: cme@ellisun.sw.stratus.com (Carl Ellison)
Date: Mon, 20 Sep 93 07:16:07 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: KEY ESCROW PROCEDURES
Message-ID: <9309201410.AA06972@ellisun.sw.stratus.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>From: Mike Godwin <mnemonic@eff.org>
>Message-Id: <199309181851.AA05084@eff.org>
>Subject: Re: KEY ESCROW PROCEDURES
>Date: Sat, 18 Sep 1993 14:51:57 -0400 (EDT)

> 
>Carl writes:
> 
>> Meanwhile, where is the proof that the key being requested corresponds to
>> a person on whom a wiretap has been ordered?
>
>The authorized key request will normally occur after law-enforcement
>officials have snagged the chip serial number from the LEAF
>(law-enforcement field) of the signal they captured with an authorized
>wiretap.

Mike,

	that's the theory but there is no proof that the signal was captured
with an authorized wiretap.  For that, the  key registration agents have
to trust the law enforcement agency.

	If the LE agency can be trusted, there's no need for the
key registration agencies.

	Part of the reason for encryption of communications is to guard
against illegal actions by law enforcement agencies.

 - Carl




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Perry E. Metzger" <pmetzger@lehman.com>
Date: Mon, 20 Sep 93 08:57:12 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Encrypted logins?
In-Reply-To: <199309201329.AA04289@visgraph.uucp>
Message-ID: <9309201554.AA15303@snark.lehman.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Forrest Aldrich says:
> Is there a way to set up an encrypted login session, whereby the calling
> program would need a 'key' in order to decrypt the connection to even
> see the 'login: ' prompt?

There are many such systems. I suppose the kerberos suite's "klogin"
is the most popular these days, and options were being defined in
telnet to allow end to end encryption, though I don't know where
they've gotten to at this point.

> I thought I saw something like this for the
> ham-radio enthusiasts.  It uses plain-DES to do the work.  But this would
> require that your calling program be some type of comm prog with the
> decryption/encryption abilities within.

Of course it would require a special communications program on both
ends -- there is no other way to do it.

Perry




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: hughes (Eric Hughes)
Date: Mon, 20 Sep 93 11:59:57 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: META: list topicality
Message-ID: <9309201858.AA06108@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I just received this unsubscribe note here on toad.com.

>Noise to signal ratio is worse than sci.crypt. Please unsubscribe me.

I, personally, am getting tired of worthwhile people unsubscribing
from the list because the impropriety of others.

Recommendations:

1.  Send more private e-mail.  Keep your flames of _all_ types off the
list.  

2.  If something offends you, _do_ respond, and only in private.  I
have the suspicion that certain members of the list are not receiving
enough hostile email in response to inappropriate postings.  We want
more negative and postive reinforcement.

3.  This is not a list for paranoids.  Shut up here and go somewhere
else.  If enough people tell you you're paranoid, then it is likely
that you _are_ paranoid.

4.  Do not immediately reply to postings.  Wait, be thoughtful, and
make sure you're not going to make an ass out of yourself.  And to be
sure, there are some asses being made on this list.

5.  Exercise restraint.  If you must make a response to something,
first make sure it shouldn't go in private email.

Eric




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Perry E. Metzger" <pmetzger@lehman.com>
Date: Mon, 20 Sep 93 09:46:10 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: a quote
In-Reply-To: <9309201615.AA12922@netcom4.netcom.com>
Message-ID: <9309201640.AA15403@snark.lehman.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Doug Merritt says:
> Sorry to add to the S/N ratio, but I can't resist passing on this
> (unattributed) quote I saw in someone's .sig:
> 
> > Giving power and money to the government is like giving whiskey and
> > keys to a 17 year old.

Its from P.J. O'Rourke's "Parliament of Whores".

Perry




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Brian D Williams <talon57@well.sf.ca.us>
Date: Mon, 20 Sep 93 12:47:15 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: MISC: thought for the dat
Message-ID: <93Sep20.124245pdt.14224-2@well.sf.ca.us>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain




thought for the day;


 In Starfleet, all communications are encrypted automatically.
Although there is no honor in knowledge gained through stolen
transmissions, some of our enemies have no honor. A true Klingon
does not "sneak"-he shouts into the face of his enemy. But I have
seen many types of dishonor, and so I am prepared for it.

               -Lieutenant Worf,chief of security, U.S.S.Enterprise


 From the star trek next generation book "20th century computers
and how they worked" by Jennifer Flynn published by alpha books.
ISBN 1-56761-257-1




                                           Brian Williams
                                           Cypherpatriot





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: mgream@acacia.itd.uts.edu.au (Matthew Gream)
Date: Sun, 19 Sep 93 19:49:50 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com (Cypherpunks)
Subject: Re: Does this seem illegal to you?
In-Reply-To: <9309191523.AA08506@snark.lehman.com>
Message-ID: <9309200247.AA03875@acacia.itd.uts.EDU.AU>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


In reply to (Perry E. Metzger):

| If he has her phone number, and its listed, he can check any reverse
| phone directory, get her address, and do this anyway. He doesn't need
| spring telemap. If she's stupid enough not to get an unlisted number,
| then Sprint Telemap isn't going to do anything worse than what can be
| done already.

A company over here in Australia rekeyed the telephone directory offshore
and offered a reverse-directory on our 0055 system (analogous to your
900s), there was considerable uproar over the facility. Firstly the police
and community groups (including privacy groups) were of course angered
at the ability for criminals to reverse lookup targets. The 'teleco' also
made some vague allegations about the legitimacy of rekeying their phone-
books. 

Anyway, under considerable pressure, reverse directory lookups were removed
for all 'residential' numbers, although the director of the company was
adamant that he was under no legal obligation to do so, but took the action
due to 'public concern'. It should also be noted that from the outset the
company did provide the ability for people to dial up a secondary number
and have their entry removed.

Although, it must be said that CDROM whitepages are available, and i'm 
ignorant of what limitations have been built into them to stop people 
(i.e. corporations) turning them into reverse directories.

I thought it was interesting enough when the original poster talked about 
the TeleMap service, but to now find out that reverse directories are 
'common', ho hum.

Matthew.
-- 
Matthew Gream,, M.Gream@uts.edu.au -- Consent Technologies, 02-821-2043.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Peter Wayner <pcw@access.digex.net>
Date: Mon, 20 Sep 93 10:09:57 PDT
To: doug@netcom.com
Subject: Re:  a quote
Message-ID: <199309201706.AA03915@access.digex.net>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I seem to think the quote should be attributed to P.J. O'Rourke.
I'm also pretty sure it came from _Parliament of Whores._ 

-Peter




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: wcs@anchor.ho.att.com (Bill Stewart +1-908-949-0705 wcs@anchor.ho.att.com)
Date: Mon, 20 Sep 93 11:39:58 PDT
To: mnemonic@eff.org
Subject: Re: Restrictions on crypto exports
Message-ID: <9309201723.AA21359@anchor.ho.att.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text


Mike - you write that an FTP archive is a library open to the public.
While it looks like one to me, the important thing is convincing a grand jury
or jury that it's true, or heading off a prosecutor who'll try to paint
ftp archives as 'subversive hacker BBSs' or nonsense like that.
(Which won't stop them from treating them as libraries if it's useful
for other things they're doing.)  Until there are some court cases setting
precedent one way or the other, they can try to construe it narrowly when 
they want narrow and broadly when they want broad.  It would seem that some
cheap insurance in cases like this is to make sure that most of the interesting
material finds its way into paper libraries, and start documenting it.

Do you know if anyone's doing this in an organized fashion?
(I'm in the process of moving west, so I can't start doing this with my
friendly town librarian, but I may try once I'm resettled.)

				Bill Stewart
				



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Date: Mon, 20 Sep 93 13:42:17 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Need to Declare Policies on Remailer Record-Keeping
Message-ID: <9309202040.AA29073@netcom5.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


(I hope this is not considered "off-topic" by anyone.)

It would be nice if the operators of the current remailers made clear
their archiving/record-keeping policies on remailer traffic.

An "ideal mix" is like an "ideal op amp": very hard to build in
practice, but very useful as a concept. David Chaum's 1981 paper
anticipated many of the issues some of us later discovered, and which
are dwell upon at length on this list.

Some brief descriptions of the "ideal mix" (remailer):

1. Records. No records kept of incoming or outgoing traffic (in Chaum's mix,
done by tamper-resistant hardware implementing software that keeps no
records; in DC-Net approach, no single entity knows traffic, so only
collusion can reveal traffic).

Score: Many remailers keep records/logs, either explicitly ("to help
in debugging") or by default (Unix records, system requirements, etc.)

I have been shocked on a couple of occasions--a useful, educational
shock--to get e-mail messages from the operators of remailers, saying
things like "I couldn't help noticing your comments--I agree with you
that...." Now partly this was my problem, in that I was not using PGP
to chain my transmissions (in which case no snooping remailer operator
will be able to get my true name except by colluding or traffic
analyis), but it also indicated that some remailers are not taking a
sufficiently hands-off policy...more on this point later.

2. Encryption, obviously, to hide mapping between ingoing and outgoing
traffic.

Score: Pretty good (no pun intended), though use of encryption is
reported to be low. PGP has helped immensely.

3. Latency: some number N of messagers needs to be stored (securely,
unobservably, as in #1) and then sent out in an order that obscures
order of arrival. (Lex order, for example.)

Score: Someone has been trying to implement this, but it is not
widespread. (People want fast response, and in a low overall message
volume environment, this could be impossible. If N = 100, could be a
very long wait.)

4. Padding of message lengths in such a way that messages cannot be tracked by
message length.

Score: I don't think this is being implemented. We've talked about
"quantizing" to several standard message lengths ("short," "medium,"
and "long," uncreatively enough) for this reason.

5. Other issues can be found in Chaum's papers, in the attacks on
DC-Nets (one of which I distributed with the 70 pages of printed
material handed out at the first Cypherpunks meeting), and in the many
messages on remailers here on this list. Hal Finney's analysis, for
example.

In light of the recent subpoena, I urge that #1, record-keeping, be
addressed quickly. If the authorities are seeking sources of crypto
material, or routes used in conveying such material, they may
conceivably issue subpoenas for site records.

Some suggestions, which protect the remailer operators and the users:

a. Keep no records, use scripts to delete records that may be
generated that you have control over.

b. The "best" remailers will be on systems under the control of the
remailer operator himself (there seem to be a few of these), as he can
control archiving and logs.

c. Remailer operators should announce their policies on logs,
announcing their philosophy (e.g., "to protect myself, I keep copies
of all traffic through my remailer," or, "I keep no records
whatsover--once it's through my system, all traces are deleted."). 

d. Trust in what they remailer operators say is another big issue...if
the FBI operated a remailer, would you trust what they say? One avenue
for helping here is to have independent agents reporting on their
experiences, and perhaps confronting the remailers with evidence (such
as the "helpful messages" I 've sometimes gotten) of their actual
policies.

e. Increased use of encryption.

Lots more here. For now, just getting the remailers to publically
state their policies will be helpful. To us, in allowing better market
choice in which remailers we use, and to them by making their lack of
record-keeping (for example) a matter of public record.

Let's plan ahead for the day when Cypherpunks traffic, and remailer
records, get subpoenaed. That _could_ be the next test case.

I don't think I'm being paranoid. In any case, there are some fairly
easy _social_ changes to the remailer system that we can make that
will improve the security against traffic analysis and subpoenas.

-Tim May


-- 
..........................................................................
Timothy C. May         | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,  
tcmay@netcom.com       | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
408-688-5409           | knowledge, reputations, information markets, 
W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA  | black markets, collapse of governments.
Higher Power: 2^756839 | Public Key: PGP and MailSafe available.
Note: I put time and money into writing this posting. I hope you enjoy it.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Date: Mon, 20 Sep 93 13:47:45 PDT
To: smb@research.att.com
Subject: Re: MISC: thought for the dat
In-Reply-To: <9309202019.AA07247@toad.com>
Message-ID: <9309202045.AA00314@netcom5.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> 	                -Lieutenant Worf,chief of security, U.S.S.Enterprise
> 
> 
> 	  From the star trek next generation book "20th century computers
> 	 and how they worked" by Jennifer Flynn published by alpha books.
> 	 ISBN 1-56761-257-1
> 
> Hardly a new sentiment.  From Kahn:
> 
> 	``Gentlemen do not read each other's mail''.  Henry Stimson,
> 	Secretary of State, 1929, shutting down the American Black Chamber.
> 

Speaking of crypto in "Star Trek," wasn't this in "The Wrath of Kahn"?


-Tim


(Sorry, Eric, for wasting bandwidth...at least it's not a flame.)


-- 
..........................................................................
Timothy C. May         | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,  
tcmay@netcom.com       | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
408-688-5409           | knowledge, reputations, information markets, 
W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA  | black markets, collapse of governments.
Higher Power: 2^756839 | Public Key: PGP and MailSafe available.
Note: I put time and money into writing this posting. I hope you enjoy it.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Derek Atkins <warlord@MIT.EDU>
Date: Mon, 20 Sep 93 11:16:13 PDT
To: Brad Huntting <huntting@glarp.com>
Subject: Re: meaningless rumor
In-Reply-To: <199309201553.AA01896@misc.glarp.com>
Message-ID: <9309201812.AA24475@toxicwaste.MEDIA.MIT.EDU>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> Wait a minute.  Does ITAR actuall prohibit importing crypto _to_
> the US? I've never heard of it being used this way.

Most of the interpretation that I have heard, including an
interpretation from Jim Bidzos, say that crypto imports _INTO_ the US
are LEGAL, unless that piece of crypto was *illegally* exported from
the US first.

So, if A was illegally exported, you cannot import it and expect it to
be legal.  However, if it was developed outside the US, you can
legally bring it into the US, according to this interpretation.

David Sternlight has a different opinion.  (Which I'm sure he'd gladly
fill you mailbox explaining :-).

-derek

         Derek Atkins, SB '93 MIT EE, G MIT Media Laboratory
     Secretary, MIT Student Information Processing Board (SIPB)
         PGP key available from pgp-public-keys@pgp.mit.edu
            warlord@MIT.EDU       PP-ASEL        N1NWH




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: an5877@anon.penet.fi (deadbeat)
Date: Mon, 20 Sep 93 07:26:08 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: meaningless rumor
Message-ID: <9309201423.AA25630@anon.penet.fi>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

> Assuming that whoevever implemented PGP did not himself import the cipher, but
> based the implementation on the EUROCRYPT '90 paper that was 'imported'
> by Springer-Verlag, 

According to idea.c in the PGP sources:

 *      Algorithm developed by Xuejia Lai and James L. Massey, of ETH Zurich.
 *      This implementation modified and derived from original C code
 *      developed by Xuejia Lai.

Of course, idea.c and PGP as a whole have been substantially improved
by an international community; importing their warez may be as much of
an "offense" as importing IDEA.  (Certainly the prosecution of these
actions is equal in absurdity.)

DEADBEAT <na5877@anon.penet.fi>

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.3

iQBFAgUBLJ26yfFZTpBW/B35AQEOlQF/WiYCKSLEDU9XDL57YIHGIRxaBae3vIiA
BkTK/sLzZKsVPM87Ol2qGRa4n5kttHfU
=MCTV
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
To find out more about the anon service, send mail to help@anon.penet.fi.
Due to the double-blind, any mail replies to this message will be anonymized,
and an anonymous id will be allocated automatically. You have been warned.
Please report any problems, inappropriate use etc. to admin@anon.penet.fi.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: gtoal@an-teallach.com (Graham Toal)
Date: Mon, 20 Sep 93 07:39:56 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Newsgroup...
Message-ID: <10249@an-teallach.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


In article <Pine.3.05.9309192343.A161-9100000-9100000@netcom3> cvoid@netcom.com writes:
 > So, is there a specific reason why someone hasn't created an
 > <alt.cypherpunks> newsgroup? It seems appropriate, as most of the current
 > mass amounts of traffic are dedicated to paranoia and bickering...

Erm... because this is the only place left we can have a sensible discussion
without Sternlight bringing any argument down to the level of
the absurd?

G
-- 
Personal mail to gtoal@gtoal.com (I read it in the evenings)
Business mail to gtoal@an-teallach.com (Be careful with the spelling!)
Faxes to An Teallach Limited: +44 31 662 4678  Voice: +44 31 668 1550 x212





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Mike Godwin <mnemonic@eff.org>
Date: Mon, 20 Sep 93 12:01:12 PDT
To: doug@netcom.com (Doug Merritt)
Subject: Re: a quote
In-Reply-To: <9309201615.AA12922@netcom4.netcom.com>
Message-ID: <199309201858.AA24064@eff.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


 
Doug Merritt writes:

> Sorry to add to the S/N ratio, but I can't resist passing on this
> (unattributed) quote I saw in someone's .sig:
> 
> > Giving power and money to the government is like giving whiskey and
> > keys to a 17 year old.
> 
> Well, I thought it was amusing. :-)

Comes from P.J. O'Rourke's PARLIAMENT OF WHORES.


--Mike






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Mike Godwin <mnemonic@eff.org>
Date: Mon, 20 Sep 93 12:07:14 PDT
To: jrk@sys.uea.ac.uk (Richard Kennaway)
Subject: Re: a quote
In-Reply-To: <1048.9309201714@s5.sys.uea.ac.uk>
Message-ID: <199309201904.AA24115@eff.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


 
Richard Kennaway writes of P.J. O'Rourke:

> He is American, I presume?  Sorry to draw this tangent even further out,
> but I can't resist pointing out that in the UK it is perfectly legal to
> give whiskey and keys (car keys, I assume) to a 17 year old, and the
> heavens have not fallen.

The issue for O'Rourke is not the legality of doing so; it's the wisdom of
doing so. I can't resist pointing out that it's no wiser to give drunken
teenagers the car keys in the UK than it is in the USA.


--Mike







From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Jim McCoy <mccoy@ccwf.cc.utexas.edu>
Date: Mon, 20 Sep 93 13:12:16 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: money money money...
Message-ID: <199309202009.AA17310@flubber.cc.utexas.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text


I have been tossing some of the electronic money ideas around in my head,
and the two things that seemed to be the hardest problems were how to keep
the feds from stomping on such a bank and how to give its currency value.
Here are a couple of thoughts on these problems:

Legalities:

Why does it need to be a bank?  Actually, it seems to me that the first
step is to actually create the "currency" for use as a means of exchange
and let the net provide the banking structure.  Once currency exists
cryptography will allow for the banking structure to be created in whatever
manner the market demands.  The hard part seems to be the jump-starting
necessary to create the currency and get the system going.  So why not
approach this as a currency problem and not as a banking problem.  In other
words, how much easier is it to set up a "currency exchange and check
cashing" operation compared to a bank or credit union? 

All the digital currency exchange would need to take in the money from
users, and pay out digital coins in cash.  Once such an operation existed
the formation of a digital economy would be possible by just migrating
existing services to work with the system.  Such an operation could support
itself by charging a small transaction fee (e.g. $0.25 for deposits and
$0.25 for withdrawls plus the postage for sending the check...)

Products and Value:

I have only glanced over the papers available, but the IMP archive stuff
(internet mercantile protocols) might just provide the immediate market for
us to piggy-back upon.  The imp people seem to be oriented towards using
PEM for monetary transactions, but it seems to me that it would be possible
to subvert such a system for our own use by simply setting up a server
similar to an anonymous remailer that allows one to deposit electronic
currency from the previously mentioned currency exchange and then creates a
imp system PEM message coming from the remailer.  The remailer can ask as a
sort of purchasing agent, converting the digital coins created by the
currency exchange into whatever type of imp certificates the user wants and
it uses the purchasing agents identity to provide the anonymity that the
imp schemes seem to not care about... 


So, what say you fellow cypherpunks?


jim


p.s. Anyone coming to the crypto conference in Austin Wednesday?  If so and
you want a copy of my most recent draft of a "Musings on a Crypto-Secure
Linux" let me know and I will bring a few printed copies...



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Mike Godwin <mnemonic@eff.org>
Date: Mon, 20 Sep 93 12:17:43 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Restrictions on crypto exports
Message-ID: <199309201915.AA24268@eff.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Bill Stewart writes:

"Mike - you write that an FTP archive is a library open to the public.
While it looks like one to me, the important thing is convincing a grand
jury or jury that it's true, or heading off a prosecutor who'll try to paint
ftp archives as 'subversive hacker BBSs' or nonsense like that."

I don't think we disagree here.

"Do you know if anyone's doing this in an organized fashion?"

No. I'm really just making a prediction of what the likely outcome
of such cases will be.


--Mike






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Peter Wayner <pcw@access.digex.net>
Date: Mon, 20 Sep 93 12:46:14 PDT
To: mnemonic@eff.org
Subject: Re: a quote
Message-ID: <199309201943.AA27701@access.digex.net>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Nah. When I'm drunk and driving I always use the left
side of the road. If I was in Britain, there would be
no problem!





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: smb@research.att.com
Date: Mon, 20 Sep 93 13:19:58 PDT
To: Brian D Williams <talon57@well.sf.ca.us>
Subject: Re: MISC: thought for the dat
Message-ID: <9309202019.AA07247@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


	 

	 thought for the day;


	  In Starfleet, all communications are encrypted automatically.
	 Although there is no honor in knowledge gained through stolen
	 transmissions, some of our enemies have no honor. A true Klingon
	 does not "sneak"-he shouts into the face of his enemy. But I have
	 seen many types of dishonor, and so I am prepared for it.

	                -Lieutenant Worf,chief of security, U.S.S.Enterprise


	  From the star trek next generation book "20th century computers
	 and how they worked" by Jennifer Flynn published by alpha books.
	 ISBN 1-56761-257-1

Hardly a new sentiment.  From Kahn:

	``Gentlemen do not read each other's mail''.  Henry Stimson,
	Secretary of State, 1929, shutting down the American Black Chamber.

In 1940, Stimson was Secretary of War, and a recipient of MAGIC....




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: wcs@anchor.ho.att.com (Bill_Stewart_HOY002_1305)
Date: Mon, 20 Sep 93 14:01:14 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: meaningless rumor
Message-ID: <9309202028.AA03562@anchor.ho.att.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text


Matt writes:
> [Steve writes:]
> >they may throw in charges of importing IDEA, though I doubt that they'd
> >indict just on those grounds; in an era of key escrow, they'd certainly
> >like a court to rule they had the power to exclude subversive foreign
> >crypto....
> 
> Assuming that whoevever implemented PGP did not himself import the cipher, but
> based the implementation on the EUROCRYPT '90 paper that was 'imported'
> by Springer-Verlag, I don't understand what the basis would be for such a
> charge.  Now an indictment against Springer for shipping the proceedings
> (which contained C source code for IDEA) into the US - that would be
> interesting...

If memory serves me correctly, Phil's original PGP offered DES and bass-o-matic,
and the IDEA encryption was implemented in the Europeans PGP2.0 version
(though I don't know if it was done by Phil or by Europeans, I think the latter.)
This means that the IDEA implementation was imported by person or persons unknown,
presumably including Phil and many others.  During one round of Sternlight Wars,
I proposed doing a U.S. implementation, but John Gilmore convinced me that
importing software is legal under the then-existing ITAR wording.
This could be an opportunity to test it in court.
		Bill



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: nobody@soda.berkeley.edu
Date: Mon, 20 Sep 93 16:31:17 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: your mail
Message-ID: <9309202328.AA12607@soda.berkeley.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


What do you put in the Subject: line of an encrypted or anonymous
message?

We need something standard to prevent traffic analysis on this field.

My suggestion is always to put "Subject: Re: your mail", since so much
mail already has that, due to a feature of the popular mailer elm.

If there is no standard, one could correlate Subject: patterns with
people.

Notice this message has been sent through "fmt" (and almost through
"spell") to remove more nuances.  Next we need an
English-to-bland-English translator that smooths over individual
language features (unless you're practicing stegonagraphy, then you
want one that inserts them!)




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: cjl@micro.med.cornell.edu (Chris Leonard)
Date: Mon, 20 Sep 93 13:59:58 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: nonrandom string
Message-ID: <9309202102.AA02623@ micro.med.cornell.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



I address this to the list at large hoping that one or more of you can 
explain something unusual that I observed.  A friend of mine and I have been 
using PGP for several months and I just recently noted that in at least three
of the recent posts to me that the first 18 characters of the encrypted 
message were identical.  The first words of the plaintexts were not identical
and so I assume that these characters are something else, perhaps the stuffer
that I have heard mention of on this list.  This repeating string is of 
concern for obvious reasons (e.g. so much for anonymity),  and I would like to 
understand the cause of its recurrence. 

Please post to me and I will post a precis of the most reasonable suggestions.

cjl





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: sameer@netcom.com (Sameer Parekh)
Date: Mon, 20 Sep 93 18:16:18 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: REMAIL: policy
Message-ID: <9309210111.AA19275@netcom.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Remailers:
	sameer@soda.berkeley.edu
	sameer@netcom.com
	cs60a-qu@cory.eecs.berkeley.edu

Policy:
	At this point I log everything and delete it daily, manually.
This will change, RSN. (It was for debugging purposes.) I will change
it so that the archive.* files are not created. (By editing the
maildelivery file.)
	It's run on two school systems, and netcom. The cory account
will disappear at the end of the semester, but I will hopefully be
able to have that mail forwarded to sameer@netcom, and once I get my
semi-permanent class account next semester I'll try to get stuff
forwarded to there.
	Soon I will have linux running on my roommate's computer with
a net connection via UUCP (Hopefully SLIP eventually) and I'll run a
remailer there, under my physical control.

-- 
Sameer
sameer@netcom.com




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: jrk@sys.uea.ac.uk (Richard Kennaway)
Date: Mon, 20 Sep 93 10:16:12 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: a quote
Message-ID: <1048.9309201714@s5.sys.uea.ac.uk>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Lefty writes:
>>Sorry to add to the S/N ratio, but I can't resist passing on this
>>(unattributed) quote I saw in someone's .sig:
>>
>>> Giving power and money to the government is like giving whiskey and
>>> keys to a 17 year old.
>
>P. J. O'Rourke, _A_ _Parliament_ _of_ _Whores_

He is American, I presume?  Sorry to draw this tangent even further out,
but I can't resist pointing out that in the UK it is perfectly legal to
give whiskey and keys (car keys, I assume) to a 17 year old, and the
heavens have not fallen.  "Petrol and matches to a 5 year old" might be a
better comparison.

--                                  ____
Richard Kennaway                  __\_ /    School of Information Systems
Internet:  jrk@sys.uea.ac.uk      \  X/     University of East Anglia
uucp:  ...mcsun!ukc!uea-sys!jrk    \/       Norwich NR4 7TJ, U.K.





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Eli Brandt <ebrandt@jarthur.Claremont.EDU>
Date: Mon, 20 Sep 93 18:27:21 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Need to Declare Policies on Remailer Record-Keeping
In-Reply-To: <9309202040.AA29073@netcom5.netcom.com>
Message-ID: <9309210126.AA11150@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Tim said:
> It would be nice if the operators of the current remailers made clear
> their archiving/record-keeping policies on remailer traffic.

Here's the policy paragraph from my remailer blurb:

--------------------
	Policy, security, and legal cruft:
The remailer has the capability to log source and destination
addresses, as well as full message text.  This is presently turned
off.  If I need to debug some weirdness, though, I'll turn it on
again.  I cannot guarantee, for both technical and political
reasons, that anonymous mail will be secure.  In particular, I
explicitly disclaim the security of messages which are in themselves
harmful and illegal, such as extortion and libel.  I will block mail
from my remailer to any particular address upon request of its
owner.  I may request some form of verification, to thwart
denial-of-service attacks based on this mail blocking.
   By sending a message through my remailer, you are trusting me,
like it or not.  I could be a sting operation, or a blackmailer
gathering information -- it *will* happen eventually.  If you do not
trust me, ask someone you do trust to do the remailing.
   Please remember that anti-social behavior or truly excessive
traffic through the remailer will probably cause my sysadmins to
ask me to remove it.  Thank you for being polite.  Please ask me
if you have any questions.
------------------------------

Addenda to the above: I do keep usage logs ("date >>log"), which
perhaps I should mention.  jarthur is not my machine (fortunately!),
so it keeps mail logs and I can't do anything about it (unless we
make the remailers avoid getting logged in the first place...).  I'd
like to run a personal linux box, but I really can't unless somebody
would like to give me a second machine.  
   The muttering about "disclaiming the security" of extortion
threats is pretty much moot, because I can't do do any outing unless
somebody says "I'm going to extort an upstanding citizen through
your server; please turn logging on."

Mail logs are a problem, because lots of machines keep them and most
remops (uh, that coinage is a lose) can't fix this.  I think that
the user-mode orientation of the remailer package should extend to
letting J. User install it and *have it be secure*, too.  Really,
anonymity with mail logs is security only through obscurity.

I presume you can do socket coding in perl.  It should be possible
to have the remailer interpret mailings to "<keyword>@<machine>" to
mean "open a socket to the remailer on <machine> and dump the message
to it."  The remailers do their own mail handling; all the transport
system does is dump it in their laps.  To fix logging on the final
transmission to the recipient would require batching, which if most
people get sufficient traffic (I don't) might be preferable to this
whole mess.

   Eli   ebrandt@jarthur.claremont.edu




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Karl Lui Barrus <klbarrus@owlnet.rice.edu>
Date: Mon, 20 Sep 93 16:29:59 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: REMAIL: policy
Message-ID: <9309202326.AA20134@flammulated.owlnet.rice.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

Tim asks about remailer policy: here is mine.

About logging: I think there are two kinds of logs remailers can keep.
By default, the "archive.remail" and "archive.pgp" (and
"archive.ripem") files are kept, which record messages as they pass
through.  Also, there is debugging logging, which records stuff like
the return value of pipes, user environment variables, whether pasting
tokens and message delimiters are found, etc.  Further, Hal showed how
the maildelivery file can be extended to log usage only - an entry
appended to a file for every use (see the cypherpunks gopher site :-)
in "Anonymous Mail" for how to do this).

I don't keep debugging logging or archive logging - I unlink the
archive.* files every time slocal is invoked.  Actually, I don't keep
usage logs either.  However, I haven't had a chance to drop in a
sendmail agent, so there is always the syslog file I can't control.

Hm.. I suppose I could just remove the relevant lines from the
maildelivery file and avoid the archive.* files completely.  I will do
that.

Errors (malformed messages) are dropped in the elee7h5@rosebud and
elee6ue@rosebud remailers, and get forwarded to me
(klbarrus@owlnet.rice.edu) from the elee9sf@menudo.uh.edu remailer.
This is so mail intended for me but sent to my old address still gets
here.

Furthermore, the elee7h5@rosebud remailer is locked - I can't log in
anymore.  But, the directory structure is preserved, the remailer
still works last time I tried, and I mailed to the admin asking him to
contact me about this about two weeks ago, and haven't heard back. 

Encryption: elee7h5@rosebud, elee6ue@rosebud, elee9sf@menudo support
PGP encryption.  Also elee9sf@menudo supports RIPEM.

Caching: elee9sf@menudo caches messages, remailing in a random order
at midnight.  More precisely, it caches them in random order and mails
out every midnight.  So if you wrap your PGP encrypted message inside
a RIPEM encryption, it will stay until midnight the first day to
unwrap the RIPEM, and then will stay till midnight the next day to
unwrap PGP to get the remailing request.

Message padding: I'm experimenting with this, but not in production
mode just yet.  It's easy enough to pad so the messages waiting to be
remaild are the same size, but I want to extend this so what leaves
via sendmail or it's replacement is also the same size.

Ownership: well, these are all school accounts so I don't have final
authority over the machines.  

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.3a

iQCVAgUBLJ47zYOA7OpLWtYzAQECcgP/ZuQ/zT5hJx3yIITTmq7RGLX5s4FUoHN0
cf0LXhNKZGIbINeI6wGxn1edCFrwrm9DujuAQpf0J+9yVgENlvU9VB2Z5BhorRQW
zoFKMrEW6mwPHYR/ga7l0FKqG2WVLSo4DE37Tba6VnFY5vOEnt+KCkDaQXyNcOIc
EbYcehaYafE=
=irE+
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: hfinney@shell.portal.com (Hal Finney)
Date: Tue, 21 Sep 93 03:46:29 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re:  REMAIL: policy
Message-ID: <9309210156.AA16050@jobe.shell.portal.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Remailers:
  hfinney@shell.portal.com
  hal@alumni.caltech.edu

I keep logs only of the date/time at which my remailers get used; no
logging is kept of the message contents.  I do this only to get a
picture of the overall volume of messages passing through my remailer.

The Unix systems on which I run these remailers may also do some
logging; I haven't been able to determine exactly what is done.  I
presume this might include incoming and outgoing addresses as well as
message date/time and possibly size.  (I am familiar only with uucp
mail and don't know where to look on these net-connected Unix systems
for sendmail logs.)

My account on alumni.caltech.edu is free, based on my membership in the
school alumni association (for which I paid some $300 about fifteen years
ago for a life membership).  My account on shell.portal.com costs my about
$20 a month in fixed costs, plus $2/hour connect charges which typically
run another $30 a month or so.  So I am paying these people quite a bit and
I hope therefore that this will give me some bargaining strength if political
problems arise from the remailers.

However, due to the large number of users on these systems, there are many
restrictions on my usage.  I cannot leave daemon processes running, nor can
I use at or cron to schedule periodic jobs.  The nice thing about the
current remailer scripts is that they can be triggered by incoming mail
without having a high profile to system administrators.

Both of these systems appear to be well connected on the net and are almost
always available.  Both support PGP encryption.

I am hoping to add batch capabilities to the remailers soon, based on Karl's
scripts.  I also like Karl's suggestion to add message padding to outgoing
messages.  If this system were used in conjunction with batching then if
all messages in a batch were outgoing-padded (undetectably) to the size of
the largest message in the batch then there would be total hiding of the
incoming-to-outgoing message mapping.

Earlier I had assumed that both incoming and outgoing messages would have to
be standardized in size but now I see that padding of outgoing-only messages
would be sufficient.

Hal Finney
hfinney@shell.portal.com




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: baumbach@atmel.com (Peter Baumbach)
Date: Mon, 20 Sep 93 18:46:18 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: pgp by mail
Message-ID: <9309210044.AA08240@bass.chp.atmel.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Hello all,

  Would someone with full internet access please do a favor for those
of us who only have email access.  I am looking for a detailed list of
ftp sites that carry pgp.  I need directory names and exact file names.
With this information I can write up some mail-ftp scripts to get the
files.  These mail-ftp servers take a while to respond, and they only
allow one "ls" per message.  Looking for the files is very inconvenient.
I'll post the scripts (they are very simple) to the list and elsewhere.

  I'm looking for source and executables that run on IBM, Mac, SPARC, and
Amiga.  Specific pointers to documentation, FAQ, etc. is also useful.

  An example of using a mail-ftp server:

To: FTPMAIL@decwrl.dec.com
Subject: Any thing of interest to you

connect ftp.the.site.with.the.goods
cd /the/directory/with/the/files
ls
uuencode
binary
get the.file.I.want1
get the.file.I.want2
quit




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: strick -- henry strickland <strick@versant.com>
Date: Mon, 20 Sep 93 21:07:52 PDT
To: Mike Ingle <MIKEINGLE@delphi.com>
Subject: Re: Public-Key Crypto Toolkit
In-Reply-To: <01H36SZHSIAC8WX5BI@delphi.com>
Message-ID: <9309210404.AA16790@versant.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


THUS SPAKE Mike Ingle <MIKEINGLE@delphi.com>:
# Any ideas as
# to what language/method would be best for implementing a PK toolbox?  This
# could really get the "Cypherpunks write code" ideal moving. Anyone want to
# help?

Yeah, let's write some code!

"TCL" is my language of choice for this -- it was designed specifically
for wrapping other libraries and embedding inside other tools. 

I've been wanting to build the crypto-toolkit, too, and have started with RSAREF wrappers.

There's a nice TCP module for TCL that lets you implement clients and
servers.  There's also the "TK" X-windows toolkit, for seamless graphical 
interfaces to TCL stuff.

Ftp to sprite.berkeley.edu and ftp down TCL or TK (which will include TCL).
(A lot of people may suggest perl, but perl was designed with a different
set of goals in mind.)


					strick
					strick@versant.com




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: rjc@gnu.ai.mit.edu (Ray)
Date: Mon, 20 Sep 93 18:30:01 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Anonymous Forwarding Software Available
Message-ID: <9309210126.AA12586@geech.gnu.ai.mit.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



  I wrote some quickie installation docs and put a copy of my anonymous
forwarding software in soda.berkeley.edu:pub/cypherpunks/incoming/aforward.shar
If you don't know what the software is used for check the cypherpunks
gopher for a file like "Forwarding for multiple accounts"

-Ray

p.s. I am not supporting it right now because of my workload. If it's bugged,
wait for a new version.


-- Ray Cromwell        |    Engineering is the implementation of science;    --
-- EE/Math Student     |       politics is the implementation of faith.      --
-- rjc@gnu.ai.mit.edu  |                         - Zetetic Commentaries      --




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: greg@ideath.goldenbear.com (Greg Broiles)
Date: Mon, 20 Sep 93 22:10:02 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Standard Headers for Anonymous Remailers
In-Reply-To: <9309210352.AA18893@indial1.io.com>
Message-ID: <RZN80B1w164w@ideath.goldenbear.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


uunet!indial1.io.com!mentor (Loyd Blankenship) writes:

> Cpunks:
> 	We've been kicking around the pros and cons of anonymous remailers
> here at io.com. One of the big problems is anonymous bombardment of a 
> helpless newsgroup. This (and the problem of auto-screening anonymous
> mail) could be solved if there was a standard header keyword (or maybe 
> even a new header field) that could be screened from a newsgroup. The
> group would have to be semi-moderated -- an automatic filter passes on
> all posts except those with the keyword in the appropriate header field.

Some people think that "the problem of auto-screening anonymous mail" refers 
to other folks' desire to screen anonymous mail. If a significant fraction 
of the net community responds to wider access to anonymity by filtering out 
anonymous mail, my prediction (and suggestion :) is that people who truly 
(a) wish to be heard, and (b) wish to be anonymous will resort to mail which 
is non-obviously anonymous. Forging mail in the names of actual persons, and 
using bits of real names to assemble real-looking pseudonyms (say, "Perry 
Detweiler"?) would seem to be two solutions. Posters of that flavor of 
anonymous mail might or might not make it clear that the posting isn't 
actually who it purports to be from.

I think it's probably better for us to deal with this problem now, rather 
than trying to hide from it with more shell scripts. Anonymity and its 
connection with accountability, responsibility, and coercion is a social 
issue, not a technological one. Technological attempts to address that 
social issue (or ignore it) will fail.


--
Greg Broiles
greg@goldenbear.com                     Baked, not fried.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "L. Detweiler" <ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Date: Mon, 20 Sep 93 21:36:22 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: FLASH - SUBPOENA SERVED
Message-ID: <9309210432.AA07839@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


 From: paul@poboy.b17c.ingr.com (Paul Robichaux)
> I wrote Grady Ward under separate cover about Bruce Schneier's
> upcoming book, published by John Wiley & Sons.. Last I heard, its
> title was "Practical Cryptography," and it's scheduled to hit the
> streets around November 1st.
>
> The book includes source code for DES, RSA, DH, IDEA, and several
> others (Snefru and Lucifer?). IMHO its most salient feature is the
> inclusion of that source code _on a floppy._

FLASH: SUBPOENA SERVED ON BRUCE SCHNEIER, JOHN WILEY & SONS

CYBERSPACE -- On April 1, 1994 Bruce Schneier and his book publisher
John Wiley and Sons were served a subpoena for `any and all materials
related to the national distribution of Julius Caesar code, in
particular ROT13' by agents of the U.S. Cryptography Ideas & Other
Miscellaneous Illegal Substances Control Police, Domestic Division (USCIOMISCPDD).

B. Schneier has posted to Usenet newsgroup "alt.lawbreaking" previously
regarding his intent to publish the book, and recently asked for people
who would `be my drop shippers for Practical Cryptography, and smuggle
ROT13 code out of the U.S., particularly to foreign national
subversives while thumbing their nose at the NSA.'  Some have suggested
the National Spooks Anonymous (parent organization of USCIOMISCPDD, the
White House, and Congress in that order of importance) may have been
clued to the threat from their dual newsfeed and artificially
unintelligent disinformation device, code named Sternlight. Sternlight
denies the charge, calling it a `make-wrong, given the NSA can
routinely multiply large numbers' but does claim to have ``unsurpassed
Unintelligence Training from many years at a Fortune 500 Psychiatric Ward''.

Colorado entrepreneur Phil Zimmerman, winner of the Nobel Prize for
International Cryptographic Terrorism, Criminality, and Guerilla
Warfare, speaking from exile in Switzerland, stated that he fully
extended his personal `web of trust' in support of Schneier, and mailed
him other private communications on a postcard: ``Would you like to buy
some Pretty Good Snake Oil?'' Austin writer Grady Ward, author of the
one-page pamphlet ``ROT0 and Other Neat USCIOMISCPDD-Approved Codes For
Wholesome Fun and Entertainment'' branded Schneier an ``arrogant young
troublemaker''.

A central component of the relevant law related to the investigation
comes from the International Traffic in Unpleasant and Distasteful
Things Regulations, which prohibits import and export of ``blatantly
unusual or unorthodox breakthroughs or techniques, derived from
excessive ingenuity or creativity, particularly those with practical
applications leading directly to ventures that are commercially profitable.''

Renowned experts such as D. Denning note the Regulations do allow
exceptions for free export and import of `public domain' material,
defining it as `any inert and useless mass with no significant value or
purpose, such as air'.  The act bars, without exception,
``trans-U.S.-border electricity flow structures for the purpose of
communications, particularly wires, and any written or oral use of the
term `cyberspace'.''

The Cypherpansies, a club dedicated to the discussion of cryptographic
codes, other than those which scramble plaintext, in various
implementations on abacus-based systems, as well as frequent tag team
blindfolded messenger pigeon competitions, uniformly condemned
Schneier's book, and praised the investigation:

TM: ``The sky is falling! the redcoats are coming! man the
battlestations! flush the toilets! I told you this would happen!''
LD: ``Sources say the grassy knoll is key.''
PM: ``That's a good point. But you're a yammering idiot.''
SB: ``Of course its ridiculous, but they did it because they're required to.''
HF: ``I'm not a lawyer, but I play one on the net.''
EH: ``will everyone just SHUT UP!''

The Electonic Frontier Federation, Milky Way Galaxy division, has
announced their intent to defend Schneier in the case. Lawyer Mike
Godwin indicates ``We plan to plead insanity.''





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: mentor@indial1.io.com (Loyd Blankenship)
Date: Mon, 20 Sep 93 21:00:01 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Standard Headers for Anonymous Remailers
Message-ID: <9309210352.AA18893@indial1.io.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Cpunks:
	We've been kicking around the pros and cons of anonymous remailers
here at io.com. One of the big problems is anonymous bombardment of a 
helpless newsgroup. This (and the problem of auto-screening anonymous
mail) could be solved if there was a standard header keyword (or maybe 
even a new header field) that could be screened from a newsgroup. The
group would have to be semi-moderated -- an automatic filter passes on
all posts except those with the keyword in the appropriate header field.

	If anonymous posts aren't annoying enough to instigate the 
creation of such a filtered newsgroup, then they probably aren't enough
of a problem in that group to worry about.

	Words such as "anon" and "anonymous" might occur naturally in
the headers. I'd propose something like "ANONYPOST" or "ANONPOST" that 
isn't likely to occur in nature.

	Voluntary adoption of this type of standard by remailers would
take away some of the ammo that the anti-anon frothers are shooting,
and would go a long way toward improving the image of remailers in 
general.

	Comments?
	Loyd

*************************************************************************
* Loyd Blankenship        mentor@io.com                  ^              *
* Steve Jackson Games     CI$: [73407,515]              / \             *
* PO Box 18957            GEnie: SJGAMES               / O \            *
* Austin, TX  78760                                   /_____\           *
* 512/447-7866                                                          *
*************************************************************************




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Mike Ingle <MIKEINGLE@delphi.com>
Date: Mon, 20 Sep 93 20:16:20 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Public-Key Crypto Toolkit
Message-ID: <01H36SZHSIAC8WX5BI@delphi.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


What we need is a toolkit which makes it easy to write public-key
applications. This would be an easy interface to the routines in PGP.
I was thinking of doing this in Clisp under Linux, since Lisp makes it easy
to put together and take apart complex objects, and makes it easy to kick
around objects of arbitrary size. Unfortunately Clisp does not seem to
support calling C functions! Perhaps it could be hacked right into the
Clisp source code, giving it a fast modmult, idea, md5, etc. Any ideas as
to what language/method would be best for implementing a PK toolbox? This
could really get the "Cypherpunks write code" ideal moving. Anyone want to
help?

It should not contain any cryptography in itself - you should link it with
the crypto from pgp, optionally applying diffs to the source files first, so
that there is no fear of distributing crypto or violating patents.

--- MikeIngle@delphi.com

Brought to you by AT&T ClipperPhones - reach out and tap someone!





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: remailer@netcom.com
Date: Mon, 20 Sep 93 23:20:04 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Master Key: A Clipper Story
Message-ID: <9309210612.AA19084@mail.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


                           MASTER KEY
                           ~~~~~~ ~~~

                         by Infocalypse
                      an36586@anon.penet.fi

                       September 21, 2002

This file contains important information regarding the Skipjack
standard encryption system. Please read this file through before
coming to any conclusions. Please do not ask me who I am. I have 
no intention of revealing my identity.

I will start at the beginning. The Skipjack encryption system,
initially known as Clipper, was first publicly announced in mid-
1993. After an initial storm of controversy died down, escrow
agents were selected and the chip went into production in early
1994. Several major hardware vendors used Skipjack, and sales began
to accelerate in the third quarter of 1994 as business users
recognized the advantages of the convenient, inexpensive, and
highly secure system. By the first quarter of 1995, Mykotronx could
no longer keep up with the orders, and demand was still increasing
rapidly.

Several other electronics companies came forward, arguing that they
could manufacture Skipjack chips more cheaply than Mykotronx, in
larger volume, and with at least equal security. The NSA hesitated
to give more companies its classified algorithm, but at the same
time, they certainly did not want Skipjack to die from lack of
available hardware just as it was becoming a standard. After a
delay and threats of restraint-of-trade lawsuits, NIST released a
set of security requirements. Any company which met them could
receive the classified algorithm and make Skipjack chips. Numerous
companies jumped in immediately.

By Christmas 1995, the price of Skipjack chips had fallen sharply.
Secure telephones were rapidly becoming a consumer product, just as
the telecom companies started their Christmas advertising drive.
Remember these slogans?

"This Christmas, Give The Gift Of Privacy. AT&T Secure Telephones!"

"Motorola Secure Cellular Network. Because It's Nobody's Business 
 But Yours!"

The promotion worked - secure phones were the hottest-selling
product of the season. At the start of 1996, there was an installed
base of over ten million, with no end in sight. Companies were
making secure faxes, secure modems, secure LAN's, and secure
microwave systems. The long-awaited crypto revolution had begun,
and NSA was thrilled. Skipjack would soon be used for all types of
business communications as well as telephones - everything which
needed protection could be taken care of with a single solution.

At the time, I was a senior in college and working evenings for a
company which had just received its security clearance. I did not
have access to any classified data; my job was to operate and
maintain their front-end system, which took orders, kept track of
stock, etc. There was a separate, isolated LAN for the classified
work of designing and programming chips. The company tried to
follow all of the technical rules, but the people were hackers and
businesspeople, not spooks. And most security problems are people
problems.

My boss did have a security clearance. He was working late one
Friday on one of the classified machines used to write microcode.
When everyone else had left, he asked me to fix a problem with the
network. That was a violation of security, but I did know more
about networks than he did, and all the classified data was
supposed to be locked up for the weekend. The safe had a time lock,
which could not be opened until Monday.

My boss had made a mistake while he was logged in as root, and he
did an excellent job of hosing the file server. He was not supposed
to have the root password at all. He'd had an argument with his
supervisor about computer access. The supervisor refused to give
him the password, so he stole it. Now his ass was on the line - if
the file server wasn't fixed by the next morning, he was history.
He didn't exactly admit it all at once, but that's what happened.

We took a look at the damage, and began the long, slow job of
recreating the filesystems, reinstalling Unix, restoring the data
from backup tapes, and, most importantly, hiding the evidence. By
8 o'clock, we were both starved. I was doing most of the work - he
was watching, reading manuals, and sweating bullets - so he decided
to go for food.

While waiting for a backup tape to run, I opened the desk drawer
out of boredom, and - whoops! - there was a manual stamped SECRET.
Some programmer was using it to write the microcode for a new low-
power CMOS Skipjack chip, and he hadn't locked it up. After all,
this is a secure building. Nobody without a security clearance is
even allowed in this room, right? So what's the big deal? People
problems! I couldn't resist taking a look, and there was a complete
description of the Skipjack algorithm, among other things, with
each page marked SECRET at the top and bottom. I had about 20
minutes until my boss returned. There was a Xerox machine, warmed
up and ready to go, in the next room. What would you do?

So I stood there, turning pages and hitting the button, listening
to my heart pound, waiting for the click of the outer door as my
boss walked in. I wasn't hungry any more. If I heard that click, I
had just enough time to toss everything behind the copier, run back
to the workstation, and hope to put the manual back later.

But there was no click. By the time my boss returned with a pizza,
the copies were in my car and the manual was in the drawer. My
appetite returned with a vengeance as the adrenaline wore off. By
2 am, the machine was restored to normal. My boss shook my hand and
thanked me, and then I went home and passed out cold.

The next day, I woke up around noon and took a look at my loot. The
algorithm strongly resembles DES. It's a highly improved DES, of
course, but the structure is similar. It uses 32 rounds, and an 80-
bit key, and they process the key before using it to eliminate weak
keys. I started coding it at home in C to hack around with, not
having any particular plans as to what I'd do with it. I was just
enjoying the thrill of having something few others had.

The program worked, but it was horribly slow. Skipjack is optimized
for a pipelined hardware implementation, using 32 processing
elements, one for each round. Even a good software implementation
is almost uselessly slow.

Once I had the basic electronic-codebook function working, I
started implementing the rest of the Skipjack protocol around it.
After a month of on-and-off hacking, I had a complete software
clone of a Skipjack chip, which could be assigned any serial number
and device-unique key. Without the family key, however, there was
no way to create a proper LEAF. The version of Skipjack in this
file is much improved, but similar in structure, to the original.

For a long time, that was all I did with it. Without hardware, it
wasn't fast enough for a no-LEAF secure telephone. I scanned the
copies I'd made, encrypted the image files, and made a bonfire with
the paper copies. Not the kind of thing one should keep around.

Then I started experimenting with a programming technique called
genetic algorithms. These are algorithms which evolve their outputs
by creating successively better results. Multiple results are
generated and evaluated, the best are copied, the rest erased. The
remaining ones are then "crossed", simulating sexual reproduction,
and the cycle repeats.

Looking for an application, I decided to see how far a genetic
algorithm could go in attacking Skipjack. At the time, I'd have
been thrilled if it broke one round. What happened next - I didn't
do it! I didn't know then and don't know now how it works.

Using keys as the strings my algorithm would create was no good.
Genetic algorithms make incremental progress; with crypto, if one
bit is off, it's useless. Instead, my strings were programs written
in a little interpreted language, specifically designed for
cryptography. The genetic algorithm would evolve programs. This
approach has been used for various things in the past.

I started out with less than a round, with only the first
transformation of the first round. The genetic algorithm wrote a
program to solve that, no problem. But as I made it harder, using
more of the round, it failed to progress. So I tried something new:
there are programs which clean up spaghetti code, making readable
and usable code out of it. They are used to make 30-year-old Cobol
maintainable. I used one to take the most successful programs which
evolved, clean them up, and add them to the language itself as new
commands. When it got to the second round, the blocks out of which
those programs were built included the most successful methods used
against the first round. This way the program could build on its
own successes.

The computer ran 24 hours a day, and it progressed as far as the
fifth round. I was surprised that it worked at all, but I didn't
know if five rounds was good or bad. There has never been any
public research with Skipjack, but DES is much easier to break if
fewer rounds are used, so I assumed I hadn't really done much.

Before leaving for a weekend, I made several changes to the
program: improvements to the crossover routines, removing old,
nonuseful commands added by the evolver, and code which increased
the difficulty, one piece of one round at a time, each time the
programs were successful. There were a few other changes. There
were also several bugs in the program, including at least one wild
pointer which scrambled some of the evolved functions. How these
bugs affected the ultimate outcome, I don't know. Something like
Frankenstein's lightning, I suppose.

When I got back Sunday evening, I turned on the monitor and
couldn't believe it. It had gone through all 32 rounds - cracked
the code! Impossible, had to be a program bug. So I encrypted some
text using the function I'd written, fed it in, and went to bed.
The next morning, I expected the program to be crashed. Instead,
there was the key. Somehow, I don't have a clue how, the algorithms
evolve to fit each piece of ciphertext. They go down, like a diver
taking treasure from a sunken ship, and pull those patterns to the
surface. I've never been able to trace it. All the data looks
random, but the solution emerges in the end. Much like neural
networks: they can solve a problem, but they can't tell you how
they did it. That's one reason why people don't trust neural nets.

The next day, I kept trying it with different pieces of text.
Imagine opening your trunk and finding it stuffed with cash - I
kept opening it and looking to see if the money was really there.
Sometimes it was faster than others, but it always worked as long
as there was a pattern to the plaintext.

I started acquiring equipment and components. 32 RAM-based logic
array chips, similar to PAL's but using SRAM instead of ROM. One
for each round. These I connected to form the equivalent of a
Skipjack chip, equally fast but fully controllable. A used minivan.
Nonmetallic composites are popular for car bodies - they may stop
a bullet, but radio signals go right through them. No need for
visible antennas on the outside. A new 8-gigabyte hard drive.
Plenty of RAM for a disk cache. A software encryption program - I
wasn't about to use Skipjack, and my hard drive would need
encrypting. A small microwave dish and receiver - they've replaced
cable, carrying TV and all kinds of data transmissions. Encrypted
with Skipjack, of course.

By this time, mid-1997, Skipjack had already gone global. Most of
the money transferred around the world moves by Skipjack. Almost
all large corporations use it for their voice, data, and fax
networks. It has been designed into the lowest levels of the new
Information Superhighway under construction, and has replaced RIPEM
as the official privacy standard on the Internet.

Each country keeps escrows for all chips manufactured and used
within its borders. These are used for national law enforcement.
The United Nations has a master escrow, containing all of the keys
in the world. This is used to police international terrorism, arms
and drug trafficking, etc. There are, of course, very strict rules
governing when and to whom the UN will release keys.

This system works very well. It has put the squeeze on drug money
like nothing that came before it, because the large cash
transaction stands out in a world of electronic money. All major
crimes are difficult - the Mafia is nearly extinct. ATM and credit
card fraud are almost a thing of the past - the Skipjack smart card
has replaced the mag stripe and the card number. New phones have a
slot, rather than a built-in chip, allowing people to carry their
identities wherever they go.

I didn't counterfeit electronic money - that would eventually be
noticed, and besides, I'm not a thief. Nor did I secretly transfer
money to myself. I just drove to New York, one of many places where
information worth billions of dollars moves everyday over microwave
beams. Then I parked in the path of one, turned on my inverter -
connected to four marine batteries; running out of power during a
hot intercept is highly annoying - and powered up my scanner.
Having cracked the family key, I could quickly extract the serial
number from each transmission. The hardest part is deciding what,
out of the gigabytes flowing by, to tap. Once I choose a
transmission, I feed it to the genetic algorithm. If I get anything
interesting, I keep that serial number, and I know to tap that chip
again when I see the serial number.

Perhaps I intercept the draft of your lousy quarterly earnings
report, bouncing from one suit to another as they try to cover
their asses. Then I sell your company short. Or if I intercept good
sales figures, I buy your stock. Sometimes I buy options, although
it's easier to lose your shirt that way. They aren't all winners -
the market reacts strangely sometimes - but enough of them are to
make me a millionaire in a couple of years. Besides, it wouldn't
work if all my picks were accurate. Someone would get suspicious.

I've really made very poor use of my luck. A corporation could have
practically taken over the world. But it would have been detected
eventually. By keeping it small and being careful, I've been
successful. For the last five years, I've lived as a parasite,
feeding on information and using it to my advantage. For a while,
I went through a voyeuristic phase, driving down the freeway,
tapping phone calls at random. That didn't stay interesting for
very long; most phone calls are boring.

So why am I revealing this now? Why would I give up my master key?
Not willingly, I assure you. But I feel that I have no choice.
Recently, there have been two unexplained crimes: large amounts of
money have been electronically transferred from corporate accounts,
simply vanishing. In both cases, the police have suspected an
inside job. MIS and finance managers were arrested - and released,
because there was absolutely no evidence against them. There was,
in fact, no evidence at all. The money was just gone.

The police may suspect an inside job, but I think otherwise. I am
very familiar with such crimes, because I spent much of that first
year planning them, thinking about how they could be accomplished.
Someone else, I am convinced, has discovered the master key. I
would suspect an organization, not an individual. Either they have
corrupted the escrow system, or they have cracked the code too. And
they do not intend to stop at personal wealth. From an offshore
base, they could, in one day of frantic activity, hold the world
economy hostage. Or they could drain us more slowly, over a period
of a few weeks. The thefts were intended to provide them with
capital and experience for what could be the greatest heist in the
history of money.

So what can I do to prevent this? I could go to the NCPI - the
National Cryptography and Privacy Institute, formerly the NSA - and
show them my system. They might throw me in the slammer for
espionage and securities fraud. More likely, they would make me a
deal - my freedom for my silence - and begin the long process of
designing a new encryption algorithm. But they would not believe me
when I told them that someone else had also cracked the code. The
idea is almost too horrible for them to contemplate - the whole
world runs on Skipjack - and without convincing evidence, there is
no way they would believe me. I don't have any convincing evidence.

Action has to be taken now, before it's too late, and there's only
one way to cause that. Tell the secret. Publish the algorithm,
publish the method of breaking it, and of course, publish this
file, so people will understand why I did what I did. I will be
flamed, called every name in the book and some that will be made up
for the occasion. They may try to hunt me down. There will be chaos
for a few days, maybe a few weeks. The world financial system will
grind to a halt, as programmers work frantically around the clock.
Software cryptography will have to be quickly installed, until a
new hardware system can be designed. For now, incompatibility will
return, efficiency will be reduced, and a lesson will be learned.
Hopefully, the NCPI will not make the same mistake twice.
Hopefully, they won't classify the algorithm next time.

                    --==<< Infocalypse >>==--

         (Binary file transmission follows this message)




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "L. Detweiler" <ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Date: Mon, 20 Sep 93 22:26:23 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: more musings
Message-ID: <9309210522.AA08729@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Included:

- why PGP, not Moby Crypto, is (probably) the focus
- including more juicy rumors about the *overall* customs office investigation
- I open my mailbag and talk about Bidzos & the ITAR again
- points and questions about grand jury investigations in general

* * *

First, some (e.g. Steve Bellovin) have raised the point that Grady Ward
just days ago announced on the newsgroups that he was looking for
people to `drop ship' Moby Crypto to in apparent violation of the ITAR.
Now, this does sound very incriminating and subversive, but the fact is
that our legal system grinds with the utmost sluggishness, as one
lately rather vocal cypherpunk (to say the least) pointed out. I think
it is *highly* unlikely that these subpoenas were due directly to this
*particular* statement at all. The grand jury has probably been
convened weeks, or at least many days, ago. There has already probably
been some deliberations just to get a basic familiarity with the case
-- remember, these are regular citizens as jurors, right? surely, all
this cryptography and export business sounds pretty abstruse, bizarre,
and convoluted -- even to people who dwell on it daily!

Furthermore, other clues I've come across suggest that the customs'
office investigation or inquiry has been in progress for *many months*
if not even a *year*, and that this grand jury convening and subpoena
serving is simply the latest development. Not only that, but at least
one other highly prominent and reputable cryptographic company
*apparently* has been `visited' under the same general inquiry --
moreover, the agents were requesting information on *PGP*.

And get this: there was supposedly some confusion over PGP (private
software by PRZ) and the public company itself by the visiting agents!
This from a *top* source: ``When they came to see us, they already had
a lot of documents from the net, but I don't think they knew how to
make sense of them.''  Again, *all* this supports the conjecture that
*international distribution of PGP* is the primary target and Moby
Crypto, G. Ward mostly secondary, or perhaps even just a bystander.

We track this stuff every day, but we have to understand that to
government bureacrats and the average citizen, ``any sufficiently
advanced technology is indistinguishable from magic'' -- A. C. Clark --
and the details of the last few year's `cryptographic fault slips &
earthquakes' are very formidable, overwhelming, and sometimes
impenetrable even to experts. In fact, if the specifics of the E911
document were confusing to a jury, imagine them trying to grasp the
epic tale of PGP, RSA, PKP, NSA, ITAR, ad infinitum ad nauseam...

* * *

I've been getting a wide variety of hot and emotional reaction lately,
both public and private, directly or indirectly, by prominent heroes
and lowly villains, both electronic back-pats and flames. The last,
from someone I deeply respect:

>what's going on?
>
>It feels like you're inviting a flame war not much unlike our
>favorite-enemy David Sternlight.

Yikes. My stomach turns. This was apparently in reaction (the sole one
so far, a wretched return) to my report that Bidzos of PKP believed
that software was *specifically exempt* from the `public domain'
exception clauses of the ITAR, commenting on H. Finney's exceptional
and thoroughly researched (but of course not exhaustively authoritative
by admission) ITAR analysis posted herein. The point of my posting was:

I grudgingly accede that Bidzos is an *extremely knowledgeable expert*
of the *highest caliber* on the ITAR code, and others should recognize
this too. His company and its army of lawyers deals with it daily. They
have explored every nook and cranny. They live and die by it. (In fact,
I've urged him to share the company's extremely valuable knowledge and
experience in the area with EFF this week--perhaps there is something
already going on, I don't know.)

Hence, if software is `exempt' from `public domain' exceptions to the
restrictions on cryptographic export, according to Bidzos, that's quite
shocking. So far no one has responded. Is the claim groundless? Or is
there something in the ITAR that supports it? Cypherpunk extraordinaire
H. Finney has tracked this very closely in his posting, but did not
note any such exception.

(I'm still trying to track down Bidzos' posting that claimed that PGP
export was illegal under the ITAR, as well as possible archives for the
ITAR itself. I hope some cypherpunk hears the call.)

* * *

S. Steele of EFF & others have been kind enough to correct some of my
misunderstandings about grand jury investigations. Since nobody else
has previously volunteered any information, I will feel free to ignore
rude flames criticizing me for its ``obviousness'', which for some
unfathomable reason have increased tremendously lately. I'm unfazed
because I find this all a great educational opportunity.

First, I was grasping at straws (I knew it, but I just wanted to know
what could be done). Of course there's no such thing as a `overbroad
subpoena' (although some warrants are ruled that). The grand jury
investigation is simply a fact-finding mission to determine whether
indictments are necessary. This is a bit surprising -- In a grand jury
hearing, e.g. what PRZ and G. Ward face on Wednesday, the person
summoned is *not* entitled to an attorney. The hearings are broad in
their scope. She notes that `information that would be excluded from
evidence in a trial is perfectly proper to put before a grand jury.' I
still wonder what kind of legal tactics are available at this point in
investigations of this type to the subpoenaed.

I would like some more information on the following: how are jurors on
the grand jury selected? by the head Attorney of the State? what are
his requirements and constraints in selecting them? Is there any kind
of judge involved at this point? (That reminds me -- I wonder why
California of all places is the site of the grand jury. What is the
significance of that? it is not the location of either PGP or Grady
Ward.  Isn't PKP in California? just curious :)

Secondly, under what situations does the State Prosecutor have the
authority to convene a grand jury? can he convene them anytime there is
some suspicion? here is a situation where there can be a burden on the
`subjects' *prior* to even there being a court trial. Everyone has to
fly to California in this case -- not quite as simple as paying a
parking ticket (note: Grady Ward was subpoenaed to appear, but PRZ was
not so far, only the president of ViaCrypt, Leonard Mikus, although at
this point it seems *highly likely* PRZ will be subpoenaed). This is
one of those situations & compromises in our judicial system wherein
people have to sacrifice some rights just to exist in the system,
without even being accused (I certainly acknowledge that these
tradeoffs are crucial to law enforcement and a functional judicial
system, but its a delicate balance).

Also, I'm curious: what is known about previous Customs investigations
of this type? have there ever been grand juries convened before for
cryptographic inquiries? what were the circumstances and cases? is this
a typical thing for the Customs Office to be doing, or is this current
situation fundamentally novel? Somehow, I just can't picture the
Customs Office regularly going about and investigating and hassling
cryptography companies. From my point of view, the present situation
appears extremely unique, to say the least.





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "L. Detweiler" <ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Date: Mon, 20 Sep 93 22:36:23 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Bidzos on PGP and ITAR verbatim
Message-ID: <9309210531.AA09003@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Bidzos comments on PGP related to ITAR, from sci.crypt a while ago (not
sure of date). Essential argument: it was illegally exported, and ITAR
prohibits re entry of things illegally exported, therefore it is
illegally imported. Relevant section, Software export: Section 123.2 of
the ITAR reads:
 
>"123.2 Imports.
>
>No defense article may be imported into the United States unless (a)
>it was previously exported temporarily under a license issued by the
>Office of Munitions Control; or (b) it constitutes a temporary
>import/intransit shipment licensed under Section 123.3; or (c) its
>import is authorized by the Department of the Treasury (see 27 CFR
>parts 47, 178, and 179)."

There is a section on `illegal export of unclassified technical data to
foreign nationals' (paraphrase) and Bidzos claims it applies to PGP
export. But he appears to me to be using a bit of sleight of hand to
conflate this category with *cryptographic software* mentioned
elsewhere (sections also as quoted also by H. Finney).

I'll let others pick it apart for the loopholes.

===cut=here===

Date: Mon, 20 Sep 93 19:31:08 PDT
Message-Id: <9309210231.AA16113@RSA.COM>
To: ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu
In-Reply-To: "L. Detweiler"'s message of Mon, 20 Sep 93 19:57:35 -0600
<9309210157.AA04992@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Subject: PGP & ITAR


Here's the ITAR part. (This was posted in 1992, so I don't know, since
pgp has changed since then I understand, how it would apply.) Also,
the ITAR has changed recently, and I haven't studied the changes to
see how they would affect these comments.


Risks of using pgp

One should be careful about assuming that the documentation in
electronically distributed software is accurate, especially where
law is concerned.  There are a few things the documentation for
a program called "pgp" does not tell you about patent and export
law that you should be aware of.  Further, there are a number of 
claims and offered interpretations of patent and export law that 
are simply false.

pgp seems to be an attempt to mislead netters into joining an
illegal activity that violates patent and export law, letting them
believe that they run no serious risk in doing so.  

EXPORT LAW

pgp leads users to believe that it has circumvented export controls
"...since it is not illegal to import..."  You are led to believe that
since you didn't import it, it's legal to use it. The "no import
restrictions" claim has been made so many times, many people probably
believe it.

One would be well advised not to accept this legal opinion.  While
stated as if it were a well-known fact, the claim that "there are no
import restrictions" is simply false.  Section 123.2 of the ITAR
(International Traffic in Arms Regulations) reads:
 
"123.2 Imports.

No defense article may be imported into the United States unless (a)
it was previously exported temporarily under a license issued by the
Office of Munitions Control; or (b) it constitutes a temporary
import/intransit shipment licensed under Section 123.3; or (c) its
import is authorized by the Department of the Treasury (see 27 CFR
parts 47, 178, and 179)."

Was pgp illegally exported? Was pgp illegally imported?  Of course.
It didn't export or import itself.  pgp 1 was illegally exported from
the U.S., and pgp 2, based on pgp 1, is illegally imported into the
U.S.  Is a license required? According to the ITAR, it is.
 
125.2 Exports of unclassified technical data. Paragraph (c) reads:

"(c) Disclosures. Unless otherwise expressly exempted in this
subchapter, a license is required for the oral, visual, or documentary
disclosure of technical data to foreign nationals in connection with
visits by U.S. persons to foreign countries, visits by foreign persons
to the United States, or otherwise.  A license is required regardless
of the manner in which the technical data is transmitted (e.g., in
person, by telephone, correspondence, electronic means, telex, etc.)."
                   ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^                

What is "export?" Section 120.10, "Export," begins:

"'Export' means, for purposes of this subchapter: ...(c) Sending or
taking technical data outside of the United States in any manner
except that by mere travel outside of the United States by a person
whose technical knowledge includes technical data; or..."

Crypto software is controlled by the ITAR. See Part 121, the Munitions
List, includes Category XIII, of which paragraph (b) reads, in part,
"...privacy devices, cryptographic devices and software (encoding and
decoding), and components specifically designed or modified
therefore,..."

A further definition in 121.8, paragraph (f) reads: "Software 
includes but is not limited to the system functional design, 
logic flow, algorithms, application programs, ..."

pgp encourages you to post it on computer bulletin boards.  Anybody
who considers following this advice is taking quite a risk.  When you
make a defense item available on a BBS, you have exported it.

pgp's obvious attempts to downplay any risk of violating export law
won't help you a bit if you're ever charged under the ITAR.

Penalties under the ITARs are quite serious.  The ITARs were clearly
designed to put teeth into laws that make exporting munitions illegal.
It's unfortunate that cryptography is on the munitions list. But it
is.  pgp is software tainted by serious ITAR violations.








------- End of Forwarded Message





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Timothy Newsham <newsham@wiliki.eng.hawaii.edu>
Date: Tue, 21 Sep 93 02:42:30 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Public-Key Crypto Toolkit
Message-ID: <9309210942.AA18954@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> THUS SPAKE Mike Ingle <MIKEINGLE@delphi.com>:
> # Any ideas as
> # to what language/method would be best for implementing a PK toolbox?  This
> # could really get the "Cypherpunks write code" ideal moving. Anyone want to
> # help?
> 
> Yeah, let's write some code!
> 
> "TCL" is my language of choice for this -- it was designed specifically
> for wrapping other libraries and embedding inside other tools. 

good choice,  I think a crypto library written for TCL or TCL/TK would
be nice.

> I've been wanting to build the crypto-toolkit, too, and have started with RSAREF wrappers.
> 
> There's a nice TCP module for TCL that lets you implement clients and
> servers.  There's also the "TK" X-windows toolkit, for seamless graphical 
> interfaces to TCL stuff.
> 
> Ftp to sprite.berkeley.edu and ftp down TCL or TK (which will include TCL).
> (A lot of people may suggest perl, but perl was designed with a different
> set of goals in mind.)

I havent had alot of luck getting different add ons compiled for tcl/tk,
perhaps because I use one of the newer versions of tcl,  the tcp module
was one of them.


> 					strick
> 					strick@versant.com

What we need most of all is an interface.  This is basically what
you are proposing.  Since tcl add-ons are usually written in C
I think it would be best off to start with a C library calling interface.
Once this is made, you could build a tcl shell (or a wish shell) on
top of it.  I expressed what I would like to see in a C library
interface a few days ago.  It would be based on PGP routines and
the PGP "shell" would be re-implemented over it.  I have gotten
no feedback on the idea at all.  Are there any members of the PGP
team on this list?  If not how could I get in touch with them?
This is an idea I really would like to see done, and which would
pave the way to coding alot of applications and interfaces to
PGP.  I would gladly work on such a project myself, but I am
afraid if I do my code will be both un-exportable and non standard
and will hence go unused.

                                     ...





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: doug@netcom.com (Doug Merritt)
Date: Tue, 21 Sep 93 00:17:55 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Master Key: A Clipper Story
Message-ID: <9309210715.AA29447@netcom.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> Somehow, I don't have a clue how, the algorithms
>evolve to fit each piece of ciphertext.

Several thoughts come to mind:

- The difference between science fiction and fantasy can be very sharp.

- If wishes were horses then beggars would ride.

- Preaching to the choir is remarkably pointless.

I would also add that genetic algorithms are much too nice to
treat as mysterious magic that can solve any and all problems, but that's
doubtless obvious.
	Doug




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: catalyst-remailer@netcom.com
Date: Tue, 21 Sep 93 00:52:28 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Master Key: A Clipper Story
Message-ID: <9309210745.AA24335@mail.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


                           MASTER KEY
                           ~~~~~~ ~~~

                         by Infocalypse
                      an36586@anon.penet.fi

                       September 21, 2002

This file contains important information regarding the Skipjack
standard encryption system. Please read this file through before
coming to any conclusions. Please do not ask me who I am. I have 
no intention of revealing my identity.

I will start at the beginning. The Skipjack encryption system,
initially known as Clipper, was first publicly announced in mid-
1993. After an initial storm of controversy died down, escrow
agents were selected and the chip went into production in early
1994. Several major hardware vendors used Skipjack, and sales began
to accelerate in the third quarter of 1994 as business users
recognized the advantages of the convenient, inexpensive, and
highly secure system. By the first quarter of 1995, Mykotronx could
no longer keep up with the orders, and demand was still increasing
rapidly.

Several other electronics companies came forward, arguing that they
could manufacture Skipjack chips more cheaply than Mykotronx, in
larger volume, and with at least equal security. The NSA hesitated
to give more companies its classified algorithm, but at the same
time, they certainly did not want Skipjack to die from lack of
available hardware just as it was becoming a standard. After a
delay and threats of restraint-of-trade lawsuits, NIST released a
set of security requirements. Any company which met them could
receive the classified algorithm and make Skipjack chips. Numerous
companies jumped in immediately.

By Christmas 1995, the price of Skipjack chips had fallen sharply.
Secure telephones were rapidly becoming a consumer product, just as
the telecom companies started their Christmas advertising drive.
Remember these slogans?

"This Christmas, Give The Gift Of Privacy. AT&T Secure Telephones!"

"Motorola Secure Cellular Network. Because It's Nobody's Business 
 But Yours!"

The promotion worked - secure phones were the hottest-selling
product of the season. At the start of 1996, there was an installed
base of over ten million, with no end in sight. Companies were
making secure faxes, secure modems, secure LAN's, and secure
microwave systems. The long-awaited crypto revolution had begun,
and NSA was thrilled. Skipjack would soon be used for all types of
business communications as well as telephones - everything which
needed protection could be taken care of with a single solution.

At the time, I was a senior in college and working evenings for a
company which had just received its security clearance. I did not
have access to any classified data; my job was to operate and
maintain their front-end system, which took orders, kept track of
stock, etc. There was a separate, isolated LAN for the classified
work of designing and programming chips. The company tried to
follow all of the technical rules, but the people were hackers and
businesspeople, not spooks. And most security problems are people
problems.

My boss did have a security clearance. He was working late one
Friday on one of the classified machines used to write microcode.
When everyone else had left, he asked me to fix a problem with the
network. That was a violation of security, but I did know more
about networks than he did, and all the classified data was
supposed to be locked up for the weekend. The safe had a time lock,
which could not be opened until Monday.

My boss had made a mistake while he was logged in as root, and he
did an excellent job of hosing the file server. He was not supposed
to have the root password at all. He'd had an argument with his
supervisor about computer access. The supervisor refused to give
him the password, so he stole it. Now his ass was on the line - if
the file server wasn't fixed by the next morning, he was history.
He didn't exactly admit it all at once, but that's what happened.

We took a look at the damage, and began the long, slow job of
recreating the filesystems, reinstalling Unix, restoring the data
from backup tapes, and, most importantly, hiding the evidence. By
8 o'clock, we were both starved. I was doing most of the work - he
was watching, reading manuals, and sweating bullets - so he decided
to go for food.

While waiting for a backup tape to run, I opened the desk drawer
out of boredom, and - whoops! - there was a manual stamped SECRET.
Some programmer was using it to write the microcode for a new low-
power CMOS Skipjack chip, and he hadn't locked it up. After all,
this is a secure building. Nobody without a security clearance is
even allowed in this room, right? So what's the big deal? People
problems! I couldn't resist taking a look, and there was a complete
description of the Skipjack algorithm, among other things, with
each page marked SECRET at the top and bottom. I had about 20
minutes until my boss returned. There was a Xerox machine, warmed
up and ready to go, in the next room. What would you do?

So I stood there, turning pages and hitting the button, listening
to my heart pound, waiting for the click of the outer door as my
boss walked in. I wasn't hungry any more. If I heard that click, I
had just enough time to toss everything behind the copier, run back
to the workstation, and hope to put the manual back later.

But there was no click. By the time my boss returned with a pizza,
the copies were in my car and the manual was in the drawer. My
appetite returned with a vengeance as the adrenaline wore off. By
2 am, the machine was restored to normal. My boss shook my hand and
thanked me, and then I went home and passed out cold.

The next day, I woke up around noon and took a look at my loot. The
algorithm strongly resembles DES. It's a highly improved DES, of
course, but the structure is similar. It uses 32 rounds, and an 80-
bit key, and they process the key before using it to eliminate weak
keys. I started coding it at home in C to hack around with, not
having any particular plans as to what I'd do with it. I was just
enjoying the thrill of having something few others had.

The program worked, but it was horribly slow. Skipjack is optimized
for a pipelined hardware implementation, using 32 processing
elements, one for each round. Even a good software implementation
is almost uselessly slow.

Once I had the basic electronic-codebook function working, I
started implementing the rest of the Skipjack protocol around it.
After a month of on-and-off hacking, I had a complete software
clone of a Skipjack chip, which could be assigned any serial number
and device-unique key. Without the family key, however, there was
no way to create a proper LEAF. The version of Skipjack in this
file is much improved, but similar in structure, to the original.

For a long time, that was all I did with it. Without hardware, it
wasn't fast enough for a no-LEAF secure telephone. I scanned the
copies I'd made, encrypted the image files, and made a bonfire with
the paper copies. Not the kind of thing one should keep around.

Then I started experimenting with a programming technique called
genetic algorithms. These are algorithms which evolve their outputs
by creating successively better results. Multiple results are
generated and evaluated, the best are copied, the rest erased. The
remaining ones are then "crossed", simulating sexual reproduction,
and the cycle repeats.

Looking for an application, I decided to see how far a genetic
algorithm could go in attacking Skipjack. At the time, I'd have
been thrilled if it broke one round. What happened next - I didn't
do it! I didn't know then and don't know now how it works.

Using keys as the strings my algorithm would create was no good.
Genetic algorithms make incremental progress; with crypto, if one
bit is off, it's useless. Instead, my strings were programs written
in a little interpreted language, specifically designed for
cryptography. The genetic algorithm would evolve programs. This
approach has been used for various things in the past.

I started out with less than a round, with only the first
transformation of the first round. The genetic algorithm wrote a
program to solve that, no problem. But as I made it harder, using
more of the round, it failed to progress. So I tried something new:
there are programs which clean up spaghetti code, making readable
and usable code out of it. They are used to make 30-year-old Cobol
maintainable. I used one to take the most successful programs which
evolved, clean them up, and add them to the language itself as new
commands. When it got to the second round, the blocks out of which
those programs were built included the most successful methods used
against the first round. This way the program could build on its
own successes.

The computer ran 24 hours a day, and it progressed as far as the
fifth round. I was surprised that it worked at all, but I didn't
know if five rounds was good or bad. There has never been any
public research with Skipjack, but DES is much easier to break if
fewer rounds are used, so I assumed I hadn't really done much.

Before leaving for a weekend, I made several changes to the
program: improvements to the crossover routines, removing old,
nonuseful commands added by the evolver, and code which increased
the difficulty, one piece of one round at a time, each time the
programs were successful. There were a few other changes. There
were also several bugs in the program, including at least one wild
pointer which scrambled some of the evolved functions. How these
bugs affected the ultimate outcome, I don't know. Something like
Frankenstein's lightning, I suppose.

When I got back Sunday evening, I turned on the monitor and
couldn't believe it. It had gone through all 32 rounds - cracked
the code! Impossible, had to be a program bug. So I encrypted some
text using the function I'd written, fed it in, and went to bed.
The next morning, I expected the program to be crashed. Instead,
there was the key. Somehow, I don't have a clue how, the algorithms
evolve to fit each piece of ciphertext. They go down, like a diver
taking treasure from a sunken ship, and pull those patterns to the
surface. I've never been able to trace it. All the data looks
random, but the solution emerges in the end. Much like neural
networks: they can solve a problem, but they can't tell you how
they did it. That's one reason why people don't trust neural nets.

The next day, I kept trying it with different pieces of text.
Imagine opening your trunk and finding it stuffed with cash - I
kept opening it and looking to see if the money was really there.
Sometimes it was faster than others, but it always worked as long
as there was a pattern to the plaintext.

I started acquiring equipment and components. 32 RAM-based logic
array chips, similar to PAL's but using SRAM instead of ROM. One
for each round. These I connected to form the equivalent of a
Skipjack chip, equally fast but fully controllable. A used minivan.
Nonmetallic composites are popular for car bodies - they may stop
a bullet, but radio signals go right through them. No need for
visible antennas on the outside. A new 8-gigabyte hard drive.
Plenty of RAM for a disk cache. A software encryption program - I
wasn't about to use Skipjack, and my hard drive would need
encrypting. A small microwave dish and receiver - they've replaced
cable, carrying TV and all kinds of data transmissions. Encrypted
with Skipjack, of course.

By this time, mid-1997, Skipjack had already gone global. Most of
the money transferred around the world moves by Skipjack. Almost
all large corporations use it for their voice, data, and fax
networks. It has been designed into the lowest levels of the new
Information Superhighway under construction, and has replaced RIPEM
as the official privacy standard on the Internet.

Each country keeps escrows for all chips manufactured and used
within its borders. These are used for national law enforcement.
The United Nations has a master escrow, containing all of the keys
in the world. This is used to police international terrorism, arms
and drug trafficking, etc. There are, of course, very strict rules
governing when and to whom the UN will release keys.

This system works very well. It has put the squeeze on drug money
like nothing that came before it, because the large cash
transaction stands out in a world of electronic money. All major
crimes are difficult - the Mafia is nearly extinct. ATM and credit
card fraud are almost a thing of the past - the Skipjack smart card
has replaced the mag stripe and the card number. New phones have a
slot, rather than a built-in chip, allowing people to carry their
identities wherever they go.

I didn't counterfeit electronic money - that would eventually be
noticed, and besides, I'm not a thief. Nor did I secretly transfer
money to myself. I just drove to New York, one of many places where
information worth billions of dollars moves everyday over microwave
beams. Then I parked in the path of one, turned on my inverter -
connected to four marine batteries; running out of power during a
hot intercept is highly annoying - and powered up my scanner.
Having cracked the family key, I could quickly extract the serial
number from each transmission. The hardest part is deciding what,
out of the gigabytes flowing by, to tap. Once I choose a
transmission, I feed it to the genetic algorithm. If I get anything
interesting, I keep that serial number, and I know to tap that chip
again when I see the serial number.

Perhaps I intercept the draft of your lousy quarterly earnings
report, bouncing from one suit to another as they try to cover
their asses. Then I sell your company short. Or if I intercept good
sales figures, I buy your stock. Sometimes I buy options, although
it's easier to lose your shirt that way. They aren't all winners -
the market reacts strangely sometimes - but enough of them are to
make me a millionaire in a couple of years. Besides, it wouldn't
work if all my picks were accurate. Someone would get suspicious.

I've really made very poor use of my luck. A corporation could have
practically taken over the world. But it would have been detected
eventually. By keeping it small and being careful, I've been
successful. For the last five years, I've lived as a parasite,
feeding on information and using it to my advantage. For a while,
I went through a voyeuristic phase, driving down the freeway,
tapping phone calls at random. That didn't stay interesting for
very long; most phone calls are boring.

So why am I revealing this now? Why would I give up my master key?
Not willingly, I assure you. But I feel that I have no choice.
Recently, there have been two unexplained crimes: large amounts of
money have been electronically transferred from corporate accounts,
simply vanishing. In both cases, the police have suspected an
inside job. MIS and finance managers were arrested - and released,
because there was absolutely no evidence against them. There was,
in fact, no evidence at all. The money was just gone.

The police may suspect an inside job, but I think otherwise. I am
very familiar with such crimes, because I spent much of that first
year planning them, thinking about how they could be accomplished.
Someone else, I am convinced, has discovered the master key. I
would suspect an organization, not an individual. Either they have
corrupted the escrow system, or they have cracked the code too. And
they do not intend to stop at personal wealth. From an offshore
base, they could, in one day of frantic activity, hold the world
economy hostage. Or they could drain us more slowly, over a period
of a few weeks. The thefts were intended to provide them with
capital and experience for what could be the greatest heist in the
history of money.

So what can I do to prevent this? I could go to the NCPI - the
National Cryptography and Privacy Institute, formerly the NSA - and
show them my system. They might throw me in the slammer for
espionage and securities fraud. More likely, they would make me a
deal - my freedom for my silence - and begin the long process of
designing a new encryption algorithm. But they would not believe me
when I told them that someone else had also cracked the code. The
idea is almost too horrible for them to contemplate - the whole
world runs on Skipjack - and without convincing evidence, there is
no way they would believe me. I don't have any convincing evidence.

Action has to be taken now, before it's too late, and there's only
one way to cause that. Tell the secret. Publish the algorithm,
publish the method of breaking it, and of course, publish this
file, so people will understand why I did what I did. I will be
flamed, called every name in the book and some that will be made up
for the occasion. They may try to hunt me down. There will be chaos
for a few days, maybe a few weeks. The world financial system will
grind to a halt, as programmers work frantically around the clock.
Software cryptography will have to be quickly installed, until a
new hardware system can be designed. For now, incompatibility will
return, efficiency will be reduced, and a lesson will be learned.
Hopefully, the NCPI will not make the same mistake twice.
Hopefully, they won't classify the algorithm next time.

                    --==<< Infocalypse >>==--

         (Binary file transmission follows this message)





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Date: Tue, 21 Sep 93 00:51:25 PDT
To: mentor@indial1.io.com (Loyd Blankenship)
Subject: Re: Standard Headers for Anonymous Remailers
In-Reply-To: <9309210352.AA18893@indial1.io.com>
Message-ID: <9309210748.AA05014@netcom5.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Loyd Blankenship writes:

> 	We've been kicking around the pros and cons of anonymous remailers
> here at io.com. One of the big problems is anonymous bombardment of a 
> helpless newsgroup. This (and the problem of auto-screening anonymous
> mail) could be solved if there was a standard header keyword (or maybe 
> even a new header field) that could be screened from a newsgroup. The
> group would have to be semi-moderated -- an automatic filter passes on
> all posts except those with the keyword in the appropriate header field.

Which reminds me of something I forgot to mention in my post yesterday
about remailer policies and the properties of "ideal mixes." Remailer
bombing (by volume, not the content) can of course be solved by
*digital postage*, the fee charged by a remailer. As with ordinary
postage, this reduces junk mail somewhat.

However, digital postage (and digital money in more general forms) is
not available now. A remailer could sell lists of numbers that act as
postage, using reputation/trust to "honor" them. (To avoid using them
for tracing, the lists could be bought from others, or traded with
others, or possibly even "blinded" a la Chaum. Digital postage is
sufficiently low-value (money-wise) that not as much attention to
detail is needed, at least not for trial use of "Pretty Good Digital
Postage.")

> 	Words such as "anon" and "anonymous" might occur naturally in
> the headers. I'd propose something like "ANONYPOST" or "ANONPOST" that 
> isn't likely to occur in nature.
> 
> 	Voluntary adoption of this type of standard by remailers would
> take away some of the ammo that the anti-anon frothers are shooting,
> and would go a long way toward improving the image of remailers in 
> general.
> 
> 	Comments?

I think it's a good idea. Eric Messick has already proposed replacing
the message names in mail with something to maker traffic analysis
harder.

For anonymous postings to newsgroups, a prefix system voluntarily
adopted by users is another approach, e.g., "ANON: The Virtues of
Anonymity."

It's doubtful that all users, or all remailers for that matter, will
ever adopt the same conventions for signalling an anonymous message,
so the problems will persist, albeit on a different scale.

Long range, a combination of pay-for-what-you-use digital postage and
"positive reputation filters" will be what a. keeps newsgroups from
being flooded with anonymous posts, and b. allows readers to find the
messages they want to read out of a huge pool of messages.


-Tim May


-- 
..........................................................................
Timothy C. May         | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,  
tcmay@netcom.com       | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
408-688-5409           | knowledge, reputations, information markets, 
W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA  | black markets, collapse of governments.
Higher Power: 2^756839 | Public Key: PGP and MailSafe available.
Note: I put time and money into writing this posting. I hope you enjoy it.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: catalyst-remailer@netcom.com
Date: Tue, 21 Sep 93 01:00:05 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Master Key: A Clipper Story
Message-ID: <9309210753.AA24723@mail.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


                           MASTER KEY
                           ~~~~~~ ~~~

                         by Infocalypse
                      an36586@anon.penet.fi

                       September 21, 2002

This file contains important information regarding the Skipjack
standard encryption system. Please read this file through before
coming to any conclusions. Please do not ask me who I am. I have 
no intention of revealing my identity.

I will start at the beginning. The Skipjack encryption system,
initially known as Clipper, was first publicly announced in mid-
1993. After an initial storm of controversy died down, escrow
agents were selected and the chip went into production in early
1994. Several major hardware vendors used Skipjack, and sales began
to accelerate in the third quarter of 1994 as business users
recognized the advantages of the convenient, inexpensive, and
highly secure system. By the first quarter of 1995, Mykotronx could
no longer keep up with the orders, and demand was still increasing
rapidly.

Several other electronics companies came forward, arguing that they
could manufacture Skipjack chips more cheaply than Mykotronx, in
larger volume, and with at least equal security. The NSA hesitated
to give more companies its classified algorithm, but at the same
time, they certainly did not want Skipjack to die from lack of
available hardware just as it was becoming a standard. After a
delay and threats of restraint-of-trade lawsuits, NIST released a
set of security requirements. Any company which met them could
receive the classified algorithm and make Skipjack chips. Numerous
companies jumped in immediately.

By Christmas 1995, the price of Skipjack chips had fallen sharply.
Secure telephones were rapidly becoming a consumer product, just as
the telecom companies started their Christmas advertising drive.
Remember these slogans?

"This Christmas, Give The Gift Of Privacy. AT&T Secure Telephones!"

"Motorola Secure Cellular Network. Because It's Nobody's Business 
 But Yours!"

The promotion worked - secure phones were the hottest-selling
product of the season. At the start of 1996, there was an installed
base of over ten million, with no end in sight. Companies were
making secure faxes, secure modems, secure LAN's, and secure
microwave systems. The long-awaited crypto revolution had begun,
and NSA was thrilled. Skipjack would soon be used for all types of
business communications as well as telephones - everything which
needed protection could be taken care of with a single solution.

At the time, I was a senior in college and working evenings for a
company which had just received its security clearance. I did not
have access to any classified data; my job was to operate and
maintain their front-end system, which took orders, kept track of
stock, etc. There was a separate, isolated LAN for the classified
work of designing and programming chips. The company tried to
follow all of the technical rules, but the people were hackers and
businesspeople, not spooks. And most security problems are people
problems.

My boss did have a security clearance. He was working late one
Friday on one of the classified machines used to write microcode.
When everyone else had left, he asked me to fix a problem with the
network. That was a violation of security, but I did know more
about networks than he did, and all the classified data was
supposed to be locked up for the weekend. The safe had a time lock,
which could not be opened until Monday.

My boss had made a mistake while he was logged in as root, and he
did an excellent job of hosing the file server. He was not supposed
to have the root password at all. He'd had an argument with his
supervisor about computer access. The supervisor refused to give
him the password, so he stole it. Now his ass was on the line - if
the file server wasn't fixed by the next morning, he was history.
He didn't exactly admit it all at once, but that's what happened.

We took a look at the damage, and began the long, slow job of
recreating the filesystems, reinstalling Unix, restoring the data
from backup tapes, and, most importantly, hiding the evidence. By
8 o'clock, we were both starved. I was doing most of the work - he
was watching, reading manuals, and sweating bullets - so he decided
to go for food.

While waiting for a backup tape to run, I opened the desk drawer
out of boredom, and - whoops! - there was a manual stamped SECRET.
Some programmer was using it to write the microcode for a new low-
power CMOS Skipjack chip, and he hadn't locked it up. After all,
this is a secure building. Nobody without a security clearance is
even allowed in this room, right? So what's the big deal? People
problems! I couldn't resist taking a look, and there was a complete
description of the Skipjack algorithm, among other things, with
each page marked SECRET at the top and bottom. I had about 20
minutes until my boss returned. There was a Xerox machine, warmed
up and ready to go, in the next room. What would you do?

So I stood there, turning pages and hitting the button, listening
to my heart pound, waiting for the click of the outer door as my
boss walked in. I wasn't hungry any more. If I heard that click, I
had just enough time to toss everything behind the copier, run back
to the workstation, and hope to put the manual back later.

But there was no click. By the time my boss returned with a pizza,
the copies were in my car and the manual was in the drawer. My
appetite returned with a vengeance as the adrenaline wore off. By
2 am, the machine was restored to normal. My boss shook my hand and
thanked me, and then I went home and passed out cold.

The next day, I woke up around noon and took a look at my loot. The
algorithm strongly resembles DES. It's a highly improved DES, of
course, but the structure is similar. It uses 32 rounds, and an 80-
bit key, and they process the key before using it to eliminate weak
keys. I started coding it at home in C to hack around with, not
having any particular plans as to what I'd do with it. I was just
enjoying the thrill of having something few others had.

The program worked, but it was horribly slow. Skipjack is optimized
for a pipelined hardware implementation, using 32 processing
elements, one for each round. Even a good software implementation
is almost uselessly slow.

Once I had the basic electronic-codebook function working, I
started implementing the rest of the Skipjack protocol around it.
After a month of on-and-off hacking, I had a complete software
clone of a Skipjack chip, which could be assigned any serial number
and device-unique key. Without the family key, however, there was
no way to create a proper LEAF. The version of Skipjack in this
file is much improved, but similar in structure, to the original.

For a long time, that was all I did with it. Without hardware, it
wasn't fast enough for a no-LEAF secure telephone. I scanned the
copies I'd made, encrypted the image files, and made a bonfire with
the paper copies. Not the kind of thing one should keep around.

Then I started experimenting with a programming technique called
genetic algorithms. These are algorithms which evolve their outputs
by creating successively better results. Multiple results are
generated and evaluated, the best are copied, the rest erased. The
remaining ones are then "crossed", simulating sexual reproduction,
and the cycle repeats.

Looking for an application, I decided to see how far a genetic
algorithm could go in attacking Skipjack. At the time, I'd have
been thrilled if it broke one round. What happened next - I didn't
do it! I didn't know then and don't know now how it works.

Using keys as the strings my algorithm would create was no good.
Genetic algorithms make incremental progress; with crypto, if one
bit is off, it's useless. Instead, my strings were programs written
in a little interpreted language, specifically designed for
cryptography. The genetic algorithm would evolve programs. This
approach has been used for various things in the past.

I started out with less than a round, with only the first
transformation of the first round. The genetic algorithm wrote a
program to solve that, no problem. But as I made it harder, using
more of the round, it failed to progress. So I tried something new:
there are programs which clean up spaghetti code, making readable
and usable code out of it. They are used to make 30-year-old Cobol
maintainable. I used one to take the most successful programs which
evolved, clean them up, and add them to the language itself as new
commands. When it got to the second round, the blocks out of which
those programs were built included the most successful methods used
against the first round. This way the program could build on its
own successes.

The computer ran 24 hours a day, and it progressed as far as the
fifth round. I was surprised that it worked at all, but I didn't
know if five rounds was good or bad. There has never been any
public research with Skipjack, but DES is much easier to break if
fewer rounds are used, so I assumed I hadn't really done much.

Before leaving for a weekend, I made several changes to the
program: improvements to the crossover routines, removing old,
nonuseful commands added by the evolver, and code which increased
the difficulty, one piece of one round at a time, each time the
programs were successful. There were a few other changes. There
were also several bugs in the program, including at least one wild
pointer which scrambled some of the evolved functions. How these
bugs affected the ultimate outcome, I don't know. Something like
Frankenstein's lightning, I suppose.

When I got back Sunday evening, I turned on the monitor and
couldn't believe it. It had gone through all 32 rounds - cracked
the code! Impossible, had to be a program bug. So I encrypted some
text using the function I'd written, fed it in, and went to bed.
The next morning, I expected the program to be crashed. Instead,
there was the key. Somehow, I don't have a clue how, the algorithms
evolve to fit each piece of ciphertext. They go down, like a diver
taking treasure from a sunken ship, and pull those patterns to the
surface. I've never been able to trace it. All the data looks
random, but the solution emerges in the end. Much like neural
networks: they can solve a problem, but they can't tell you how
they did it. That's one reason why people don't trust neural nets.

The next day, I kept trying it with different pieces of text.
Imagine opening your trunk and finding it stuffed with cash - I
kept opening it and looking to see if the money was really there.
Sometimes it was faster than others, but it always worked as long
as there was a pattern to the plaintext.

I started acquiring equipment and components. 32 RAM-based logic
array chips, similar to PAL's but using SRAM instead of ROM. One
for each round. These I connected to form the equivalent of a
Skipjack chip, equally fast but fully controllable. A used minivan.
Nonmetallic composites are popular for car bodies - they may stop
a bullet, but radio signals go right through them. No need for
visible antennas on the outside. A new 8-gigabyte hard drive.
Plenty of RAM for a disk cache. A software encryption program - I
wasn't about to use Skipjack, and my hard drive would need
encrypting. A small microwave dish and receiver - they've replaced
cable, carrying TV and all kinds of data transmissions. Encrypted
with Skipjack, of course.

By this time, mid-1997, Skipjack had already gone global. Most of
the money transferred around the world moves by Skipjack. Almost
all large corporations use it for their voice, data, and fax
networks. It has been designed into the lowest levels of the new
Information Superhighway under construction, and has replaced RIPEM
as the official privacy standard on the Internet.

Each country keeps escrows for all chips manufactured and used
within its borders. These are used for national law enforcement.
The United Nations has a master escrow, containing all of the keys
in the world. This is used to police international terrorism, arms
and drug trafficking, etc. There are, of course, very strict rules
governing when and to whom the UN will release keys.

This system works very well. It has put the squeeze on drug money
like nothing that came before it, because the large cash
transaction stands out in a world of electronic money. All major
crimes are difficult - the Mafia is nearly extinct. ATM and credit
card fraud are almost a thing of the past - the Skipjack smart card
has replaced the mag stripe and the card number. New phones have a
slot, rather than a built-in chip, allowing people to carry their
identities wherever they go.

I didn't counterfeit electronic money - that would eventually be
noticed, and besides, I'm not a thief. Nor did I secretly transfer
money to myself. I just drove to New York, one of many places where
information worth billions of dollars moves everyday over microwave
beams. Then I parked in the path of one, turned on my inverter -
connected to four marine batteries; running out of power during a
hot intercept is highly annoying - and powered up my scanner.
Having cracked the family key, I could quickly extract the serial
number from each transmission. The hardest part is deciding what,
out of the gigabytes flowing by, to tap. Once I choose a
transmission, I feed it to the genetic algorithm. If I get anything
interesting, I keep that serial number, and I know to tap that chip
again when I see the serial number.

Perhaps I intercept the draft of your lousy quarterly earnings
report, bouncing from one suit to another as they try to cover
their asses. Then I sell your company short. Or if I intercept good
sales figures, I buy your stock. Sometimes I buy options, although
it's easier to lose your shirt that way. They aren't all winners -
the market reacts strangely sometimes - but enough of them are to
make me a millionaire in a couple of years. Besides, it wouldn't
work if all my picks were accurate. Someone would get suspicious.

I've really made very poor use of my luck. A corporation could have
practically taken over the world. But it would have been detected
eventually. By keeping it small and being careful, I've been
successful. For the last five years, I've lived as a parasite,
feeding on information and using it to my advantage. For a while,
I went through a voyeuristic phase, driving down the freeway,
tapping phone calls at random. That didn't stay interesting for
very long; most phone calls are boring.

So why am I revealing this now? Why would I give up my master key?
Not willingly, I assure you. But I feel that I have no choice.
Recently, there have been two unexplained crimes: large amounts of
money have been electronically transferred from corporate accounts,
simply vanishing. In both cases, the police have suspected an
inside job. MIS and finance managers were arrested - and released,
because there was absolutely no evidence against them. There was,
in fact, no evidence at all. The money was just gone.

The police may suspect an inside job, but I think otherwise. I am
very familiar with such crimes, because I spent much of that first
year planning them, thinking about how they could be accomplished.
Someone else, I am convinced, has discovered the master key. I
would suspect an organization, not an individual. Either they have
corrupted the escrow system, or they have cracked the code too. And
they do not intend to stop at personal wealth. From an offshore
base, they could, in one day of frantic activity, hold the world
economy hostage. Or they could drain us more slowly, over a period
of a few weeks. The thefts were intended to provide them with
capital and experience for what could be the greatest heist in the
history of money.

So what can I do to prevent this? I could go to the NCPI - the
National Cryptography and Privacy Institute, formerly the NSA - and
show them my system. They might throw me in the slammer for
espionage and securities fraud. More likely, they would make me a
deal - my freedom for my silence - and begin the long process of
designing a new encryption algorithm. But they would not believe me
when I told them that someone else had also cracked the code. The
idea is almost too horrible for them to contemplate - the whole
world runs on Skipjack - and without convincing evidence, there is
no way they would believe me. I don't have any convincing evidence.

Action has to be taken now, before it's too late, and there's only
one way to cause that. Tell the secret. Publish the algorithm,
publish the method of breaking it, and of course, publish this
file, so people will understand why I did what I did. I will be
flamed, called every name in the book and some that will be made up
for the occasion. They may try to hunt me down. There will be chaos
for a few days, maybe a few weeks. The world financial system will
grind to a halt, as programmers work frantically around the clock.
Software cryptography will have to be quickly installed, until a
new hardware system can be designed. For now, incompatibility will
return, efficiency will be reduced, and a lesson will be learned.
Hopefully, the NCPI will not make the same mistake twice.
Hopefully, they won't classify the algorithm next time.

                    --==<< Infocalypse >>==--

         (Binary file transmission follows this message)





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: wcs@anchor.ho.att.com (Bill_Stewart_HOY002_1305)
Date: Mon, 20 Sep 93 22:46:23 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: MISC: thought for the day
Message-ID: <9309210458.AA08302@anchor.ho.att.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text


> 	  In Starfleet, all communications are encrypted automatically.
> 	 Although there is no honor in knowledge gained through stolen
> 	 transmissions, some of our enemies have no honor. A true Klingon
> 	 does not "sneak"-he shouts into the face of his enemy. But I have
> 	 seen many types of dishonor, and so I am prepared for it.
> 	                -Lieutenant Worf,chief of security, U.S.S.Enterprise
.... and of course
> 	``Gentlemen do not read each other's mail''.  Henry Stimson,

The classic Roman Republic policy on information from enemy traitors was
to accept it, use it, kick the enemy's butt, and then kill the traitor. 
By the time of the Empire, haggling over price was a bit more flexible.
After all, if you're trying to protect your own city, winning is everything.
And if you're off trying to conquer other cities to increase the riches 
and power of the generals who run your army, honor's not a concept you
want to over-analyze :-)   For more precise references, and less cynicism,
you'll need to contact my 8th grade Latin teacher...
				Pedantically,				
# Bill Stewart    wcs@anchor.ho.att.com  +1-908-949-0705 Fax-4876
# AT&T Bell Labs, Room 4M-312, Crawfords Corner Rd, Holmdel, NJ  07733-3030



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: pierre@shell.portal.com (Pierre Uszynski)
Date: Tue, 21 Sep 93 03:47:58 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Standard Headers for Anonymous Remailers
Message-ID: <9309210809.AA08533@jobe.shell.portal.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> From: mentor@indial1.io.com (Loyd Blankenship)
> 
> One of the big problems is anonymous bombardment of a 
> helpless newsgroup. This (and the problem of auto-screening anonymous
> mail) could be solved if there was a standard header keyword (or maybe 
> even a new header field) that could be screened from a newsgroup.
> [Any thoughts?]

Yeah, some thoughts,

> From: greg@ideath.goldenbear.com (Greg Broiles)
> 
> If a significant fraction 
> of the net community responds to wider access to anonymity by filtering out 
> anonymous mail, my prediction (and suggestion :) is that people [...]
> will resort to mail which is non-obviously anonymous.

The possibilities for
	1) (more or less) anonymous posting,
	2) forged headers,
	3) general obnoxiousness
	4) automatic abuse of netnews facilities,
	5) secret or forged "identities",
all already exist on netnews.

Many have already been used in offensive action as in the following
recent examples (I'd welcome more data and pointers about these and
similar cases, and some of these may have been rumors only. I'm also
sure some good ones happened before my time :-)

1) anonymous posting services (penet),
2) forged headers are very popular of course, and do not really
surprise anybody anymore,
3) I'll avoid naming examples of direct obnoxiousness, thank you :-)
4) (semi-?)automatic newsgroup re-creation after rmgrouping (Becker),
4) post-moderation via cancel messages (who was that guy again?),
5) SRIA vote-taker, accused of being the same person as the main
proponent of the group (with syslogs as evidence),
5) "It was not me, I left my terminal logged on..."
5) suspect votes from generic accounts, all posted at the same time...

And some other mechanisms scream for new forms of abuse :-) It's amazing
that everybody is resisting the temptation...

The responses have been:
- A few flame wars (some pretty entertaining),
- The most exposed newsgroups, like religious groups, are systematically
moderated (to improve signal to noise ratio, but also to try to prevent
attacks),
- The most obnoxious people have been posting away under their own name,
proudly disdaining (that we know of) the possibilities of technology :-)
- and overall, the net as we know it goes on, with just some minor
flamage overhead.

So, as you can see, I'm pretty optimistic (I actually found most
of these actions at least interesting, if maybe ...errr... crude). I do not
think you really want to go to the trouble of really preventing people
from posting (more or less) anonymously if they want to simply because
that's too much trouble.

One the other hand, most offensive action on the net has in the past been
proudly done under the perpetrator's real name, or under Real Thin
disguise. Of course, if it's possible, it will happen, and so eventually
netnews will have to shut down for a few days under an attack of the
magnitude of the one that stroke down the Internet itself. And somebody
will end up in court...

It's not also that I deny groups the right to express their disgust towards
anonymous posting, but rather that I think they are wasting their time
until much more infrastructure is available for accountability (that may
not be so far away, but that's a different story).


A remailer "tag" would help (at least politically), but at this stage,
would be deceiving in that it does not really solve any user's problem
(if there ever was any). Still, delusion and all, it may make remailers
more socially acceptable... errr... tolerable :-) It could also create
a distinction between "nice" remailers (obediently tagged) and "naughty"
remailers (proudly un-tagged).

Pierre "What emphasys?".
pierre@shell.portal.com




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "L. Detweiler" <ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Date: Tue, 21 Sep 93 00:42:55 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: remailer ideas
Message-ID: <9309210740.AA11569@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


T.C. May requests information on operator's remailer policies. I would
like to go a step further and suggest that *all* operators
*standardize* on a single email address for policy queries, in
ping-like fashion. the user just sends mail to policies@remailer.com
and gets back the policies. Of course, maybe that's not the best name,
because some names are fixed. So maybe a standard header field request syntax.

This sheet returned should include all the information about headers
and cryptographic use, too. I would like it to have *standard headings*
across remailers. That is, it would list categories and the variations
that the particular remailer implements. His list of points is a good
place to start of policy headings. Off the top of my head -

remailer address
header syntax
how to cut and paste headers
pitfalls
cryptography support
additional features
oversight & logging

etc.

I'd also like some *history* of the remailer. Whose code is it based
on? what modifications have been added? how reliable is it? -- even a
standard `uptime field' or `% lost messages' would be interesting. are
there any `close calls' in shutting it down? what kind of support does
the operator enjoy? (e.g. sysadmin, student acct, etc.)

If anyone would like to come up with a comprehensive `boilerplate'
document, that'd certainly be useful.

I think all this could increase the `userfriendliness' of the remailers
and ultimately there use signficantly. just a humble suggestion from a
fellow cypherpunk.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "L. Detweiler" <ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Date: Tue, 21 Sep 93 00:56:24 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Standard Headers for Anonymous Remailers
In-Reply-To: <9309210352.AA18893@indial1.io.com>
Message-ID: <9309210754.AA11724@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


mentor@indial1.io.com (Loyd Blankenship)
>We've been kicking around the pros and cons of anonymous remailers
>here at io.com. One of the big problems is anonymous bombardment of a 
>helpless newsgroup.

you are talking about a problem associated with a *mail to new
gateway*. this is not the same as a *remailer*. In fact, the latter
operators should not have to worry about the former.

>This (and the problem of auto-screening anonymous
>mail) could be solved if there was a standard header keyword (or maybe 
>even a new header field) that could be screened from a newsgroup.\

although I think the idea of anonymous identification tags in the
header has `some' merit. but its an extremely problematic issue,
because it could have the effect of censoring anonymous posting.

the best goal is to allow the end user to make the decision, i.e. kill
files, and *never* put any kind of a choke upstream that would prevent
them from making that decision.

hence, the solution is to have the mail-to-news gateway reject overly
voluminous posting -- either posts that are too long, or too frequent
posting from the same address or (the latter which of course can be
thwarted to some degree) in overall frequency of accepting articles,
such that some might get bounced back to the user if the site is being bombarded.

of course, remailer operators have to guard against mail bombs too, but
not in the overly sensitive, distributed way that NNTP servers do.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: STEAKMAN@delphi.com
Date: Tue, 21 Sep 93 00:16:25 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: PGP algorithm needed
Message-ID: <01H3713O7L868WXNRP@delphi.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


     I am currently working on an encryption program for the Apple II 
user's on the net (there's quite a few of us out there) but without the
PGP algorithm it will be a useless utility.  Can someone E-mail it to me,
a



long with an credits that should be included so as not to step on
anyones toes.  Thanks in advance...

The SteakMan
SteakMan@Delphi.Com

Oh by the way, I had to drop from this list due to it's volume and my 
slailish 1200 baud modem

snailish 1200 baud modem.

Later D00dz




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: bart@netcom.com (Harry Bartholomew)
Date: Tue, 21 Sep 93 05:20:08 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: archie search on pgp
Message-ID: <9309211217.AA25447@netcom3.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


    In response to the request I ran a search on the UNL archie server
    to see how many locations had pgp. The count of all versions and
    devivatives like docs and shells is 556. There is quite a bit of
    obsolete stuff though.

    >grep pgp10 pgp.lst |wc
          40     265    2593
    >grep pgp20 pgp.lst |wc
          54     363    3440
    >grep pgp21 pgp.lst | wc
          74     518    4767
    >grep pgp22 pgp.lst | wc
         153     951    9042
    >grep pgp23 pgp.lst | wc
          36     252    2313





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: gnu (John Gilmore)
Date: Tue, 21 Sep 93 08:46:30 PDT
To: cypherpunks, gnu
Subject: Gopher access to Federal Register
Message-ID: <9309211544.AA23924@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Gopher to gopher.internet.com, port 2002, and you will find the Federal
Register online.  For most documents, you can only get the first
100 lines, but the use of the indexes is free, and many documents
are useful in this form.

You can pay them for access to the full documents, but they prohibit
republishing online -- though you're free to print the documents out.
What heart these guys have!

	John




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Eli Brandt <ebrandt@jarthur.Claremont.EDU>
Date: Tue, 21 Sep 93 10:47:38 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Standard Headers for Anonymous Remailers
In-Reply-To: <10560@an-teallach.com>
Message-ID: <9309211746.AA25747@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> From: gtoal@an-teallach.com (Graham Toal)
> Actually it wasn't the content of the articles that narked me, it was
> that I actually wanted to *reply* to the authors.  However the subjects
> were way too off-topic to be worth responding to in public, which is
> the only option the anonymous remailers allows.

Though it's a bit clunky to use, the present remailers do support
return addressses.  I will admit that I haven't seen anybody
supply one.

   Eli   ebrandt@jarthur.claremont.edu




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: anon@avon.org (smells huh?)
Date: Tue, 21 Sep 93 07:48:03 PDT
To: internet.cypherpunks@avon.org
Subject: Re: Re: your mailRe: Re: your mail
In-Reply-To: <9309202328.AA12607@soda.berkeley.edu>
Message-ID: <sorryhoney@culater.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


nobody@soda.berkeley.edu writes:
> "spell") to remove more nuances.  Next we need an
> English-to-bland-English translator that smooths over individual
> language features (unless you're practicing stegonagraphy, then you
> want one that inserts them!)

i just eliminate all my caps - the better to emulate a net.personality.
and add expletives, grinning all the while.

pardon the poor forgery







From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: greg@ideath.goldenbear.com (Greg Broiles)
Date: Tue, 21 Sep 93 11:23:09 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Bidzos on PGP and ITAR verbatim
In-Reply-To: <9309210531.AA09003@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Message-ID: <TRo90B1w164w@ideath.goldenbear.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



"L. Detweiler" <uunet!longs.lance.colostate.edu!ld231782> writes:

> There is a section on `illegal export of unclassified technical data to
> foreign nationals' (paraphrase) and Bidzos claims it applies to PGP
> export. But he appears to me to be using a bit of sleight of hand to
> conflate this category with *cryptographic software* mentioned
> elsewhere (sections also as quoted also by H. Finney).

If Bidzos is using the term "technical data" as it's defined in $120.21
of the ITAR, I think it's debatable. Can we come up with data to support
that IDEA and RSA are "commonly taught .. in academia"? The public (and
published) nature of both IDEA and RSA seems to place them far away from
the general thrust of the "technical data" definition, which seems oriented
towards preventing disclosure of data/information that's not available to
the general public. Def'n follows:

    $120.21 Technical data.

        Technical data means, for purposes of this subchapter:
            (a)     Classified information relating to defense articles
                    and defense services;
            (b)     Information covered by an invention secrecy order;
            (c)     Information, in any form, which is directly related
                    to the design, engineering, development, production,
                    processing, manufacture, use, operation, overhaul,
                    repair, maintenance, modification, or reconstruction
                    of defense articles. This includes, for example,
                    information in the form of blueprints, drawings,
                    photographs, plans, instructions, computer software,
                    and documentation. This also includes information
                    which advances the state of the art of articles on
>                   the U.S. Munitions List. This definition does not
>                   include information concerning general scientific,
>                   mathematical, or engineering principles commonly
>                   taught in academia. It also does not include basic
                    marketing information or general system descriptions
                    of defense articles.

        [emphasis added, of course]

I'm working my way through the ITAR and am going to leave the majority
of Bidzos' message alone until I feel like I have a stronger grasp on the
legal issues here.

He did, however, say two things which look pretty shaky to me:

> When you make a defense item available on a BBS, you have exported it.

The definitions of export that I've seen have concerned transferring
information or physical things, or providing services to, persons,
corporations, or nations which are not U.S. citizens. They have not
addressed placing these things where "foreign persons" might conceivably
get them. Under Bidzos' interpretation, making RSAREF available via FTP
sounds like export to me. My interpretation is based on ITAR; other
relevant statutes may define it more broadly, but those definitions
aren't relevant when talking about violations of the ITAR.

> pgp is software tainted by serious ITAR violations.

I interpret this to mean, assuming that Bidzos is right on all points, that:
(1) all copies (and their descendants?) of PGP 1.0 which have been taken
outside of the U.S. are "tainted" and cannot be re-imported legally; and
(2) all copies (and their descendants?) of PGP 2.x which were written outside
of the U.S. are "tainted" once they enter the U.S.; U.S. citizens will need
to re-write (sigh) PGP 2.x inside the U.S., using the published algorithms
for IDEA and RSA.

I can't see any basis for saying that "PGP", a standard for interoperable
crypto software, is tainted - only particlar implementations of that
standard are, depending on who wrote them and what country the author is
from, where the copy is located, and where it's been before.

Surely Bidzos won't claim that RSA licensees in the U.S. are somehow
"tainted" by the illegal export of other copies of RSA, hmm?


--
Greg Broiles
greg@goldenbear.com                     Baked, not fried.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Eli Brandt <ebrandt@jarthur.Claremont.EDU>
Date: Tue, 21 Sep 93 12:06:34 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: jarthur is running pgp 2.3
Message-ID: <9309211903.AA26864@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Just tested a 2.3-encrypted message through here, and it seems to
be working.  Share and enjoy.

   Eli   ebrandt@jarthur.claremont.edu




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Perry E. Metzger" <pmetzger@lehman.com>
Date: Tue, 21 Sep 93 09:08:04 PDT
To: gnu@toad.com (John Gilmore)
Subject: Re: Gopher access to Federal Register
In-Reply-To: <9309211544.AA23924@toad.com>
Message-ID: <9309211605.AA22029@snark.lehman.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



John Gilmore says:
> Gopher to gopher.internet.com, port 2002, and you will find the Federal
> Register online.  For most documents, you can only get the first
> 100 lines, but the use of the indexes is free, and many documents
> are useful in this form.
> 
> You can pay them for access to the full documents, but they prohibit
> republishing online -- though you're free to print the documents out.
> What heart these guys have!

This can't be legal. You can copyright a collection, true, but you
can't hold copyright on an element of a collection of public domain
information. I'd check with a lawyer first, but I don't think they can
actually legally stop you.

Perry




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Date: Tue, 21 Sep 93 12:16:33 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Master Key: A Clipper Story
In-Reply-To: <9309210612.AA19084@mail.netcom.com>
Message-ID: <9309211914.AA17965@netcom5.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I enjoyed the Cypherpunk short story, "Master Key." Not perfect, maybe
longer than some would like, but generally entertaining.

It seems to me that writing scenarios for the future is a useful thing
to do, allowing exploration of various developments in a fictional
setting. This is a time-honored thing to do when new technologies
appear, and is something I've been trying to do for several years now
(writing a novel about the development of crypto anarchy, and have
been--gulp!--since 1988...maybe someday, unless events overtake me).

An editor might tighten up "Infocalypse"'s writing, and the whole idea
that Skipjack will fall to genetic programming techniques seems to be
a reach. But who knows....the truth is often stranger than fiction.

And the transition to a Clipper world seems to happen a bit faster
than I think is likely.

But these are quibbles. 

Highlighting the "house of cards" effect in using a centralized,
monolithically controlled crypto system (the Skipjack algorithm) is an
important contribution. If the public is to understand the
consequences of the kind of centralization favored by the Feds, e.g.,
Skipjack and the National Data Superhighway, then they'll need
understandable pieces like this.

As to the repeat mailing, this needs to be addressed by Infocalypse.
Maybe he sent it once, didn't see it within some reasonable time, and
sent it again.

As to length, and the "Hey, I pay for my mail" comments, bear in mind
that this story undoubtedly took Infocalypse a tremendous amount of
time to craft, whereas many of the many "forwardings" we get here on
this list are just as long and yet took almost no effort to send to
the list.

Thus, we should cut Infocalypse some slack. And congratulate him, in
fact.

Well done!


-Tim May

-- 
..........................................................................
Timothy C. May         | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,  
tcmay@netcom.com       | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
408-688-5409           | knowledge, reputations, information markets, 
W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA  | black markets, collapse of governments.
Higher Power: 2^756839 | Public Key: PGP and MailSafe available.
Note: I put time and money into writing this posting. I hope you enjoy it.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: gnu (John Gilmore)
Date: Tue, 21 Sep 93 12:47:39 PDT
To: smb@research.att.com
Subject: Re: crypto import
In-Reply-To: <9309201128.AA29694@toad.com>
Message-ID: <9309211947.AA27682@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> if a law was broken.  And Sternlight is right -- if they decide to indict,
> they may throw in charges of importing IDEA ...

THERE IS NO LAW AGAINST THE IMPORT OF CRYPTOGRAPHY!

How many times does this idiocy have to be squashed?

	John

PS:  I heard a rumor it's against the law to breathe.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: mgream@acacia.itd.uts.edu.au (Matthew Gream)
Date: Mon, 20 Sep 93 20:26:20 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Interse
Message-ID: <9309210322.AA24032@acacia.itd.uts.EDU.AU>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



-- 
Matthew Gream,, M.Gream@uts.edu.au -- Consent Technologies, 02-821-2043.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Timothy Newsham <newsham@wiliki.eng.hawaii.edu>
Date: Tue, 21 Sep 93 16:30:11 PDT
To: sommerfeld@orchard.medford.ma.us (Bill Sommerfeld)
Subject: Re: Bidzos on PGP and ITAR verbatim
In-Reply-To: <199309212037.QAA00299@orchard.medford.ma.us>
Message-ID: <9309212329.AA01621@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> 
>    If Bidzos is using the term "technical data" as it's defined in $120.21
>    of the ITAR, I think it's debatable. Can we come up with data to support
>    that IDEA and RSA are "commonly taught .. in academia"? 
> 
> The RSA public key algorithm is taught at MIT in the math course
> 18.063, which is required for an undergraduate computer science
> degree.
> 
> That's one data point...
> 
> 					- Bill

It was taught in one of my digital design classes as an example
of why (and how) we need modular arithmetic circuitry, and how
it is made.  If it is taught in such a non-related class what does
that say to the commonness of it?





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: catalyst@netcom.com (Scott Collins)
Date: Tue, 21 Sep 93 13:51:35 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: REMAIL: policy
Message-ID: <9309212043.AA26897@newton.apple.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


What follows is the policy for the remailer running at catalyst@netcom.com
as of 21 Sept 1993:

  - 1 -  I don't normally keep logs because (a) I lack the time to examine
         them; (b) I lack the space to keep them; and (c) frankly, I would
         rather _not_ know.  If some exceptional situation requires it, I
         will temporarily log to resolve that situation.

  - 2 -  I will block remailing to a given address on request and proof of
         identity by the owner.  I run a remailer because I believe privacy
         is an inaliable human right.  However, "Your right to swing your
         fist ends where my nose begins!".  I will not condone, promote or
         aid the violation of other human rights in the name of privacy.
         Because I don't keep logs, I can do no more than block (nor would
         I wish to), although, see - 1 -.

  - 3 -  I do not own the machine my remailer is running on.  In fact it is
         a commercial system.  Be nice.  If they ask me to stop running my
         remailer on their system... I will.  Additionally, you implicitly
         accept all the risks associated with trusting somebody elses machine.

  - 4 -  I don't read mail that goes through my remailer _BUT_ it is my
         personal account, and personal mail addressed to me passes through it,
         therefore, if a message doesn't look like it contains remailer
         commands, the remailer assumes it must be to me and I get it.

         I read all mail that is addressed to me.  The consequence is that
         poorly addressed messages intended to be remailed will be read by me.
         I will throw these messages away without responding, correcting, or
         forwarding them, as soon as I realize they were to have been remailed.
         Be aware that this can happen.  I'm sure there is some threshold
         beyond which the content would force me to action in some way.  What
         the content, threshold and possible actions are, I do not know.

         Protect yourself from this result by using multiple remailers and
         encrypting at each stage.

  - 5 -  I am an engineer.  I like to play.  I probably cannot stop myself
         from constantly tweaking and growing the remailer code.  It is,
         after all, an expermental system.  The remailer you use today may
         not be the same one you get tomorrow.

  - 6 -  I am a human being and suffer from all the associated frailties.
         When someone points a gun (actually or metaphorically) at me or my
         family, I must almost certainly comply with that entities wishes.
         I do NOT advocate law breaking and will comply with the law to the
         extent required and enforced; e.g., if the FBI comes to my door and
         says: "start logging your remailer, or shut it down" ("shut it down"
         might only be inferred <and, _no_, I didn't mean 'implied'>), then
         it is likely that I will comply to the extent required and enforced.

  - 7 -  As with my kids: I reserve the right to change the rules at any time
         and for any reason; though I seldom exercise this right to explicitly
         revoke previously explicitly granted freedoms.

  - 8 -  I run this remailer as a personal activity.  It is in no way
         associated with my place of employment, my employer or the activities
         I engage in on the behalf of my employer.  I run it out of a personal
         account on a commercial system that I pay for with my own money.  If
         you have problems with the remailer, please talk to me first.  If we
         can't resolve it, of course you can always report it to NetCom.

  - 9 -  Finally, be aware that I am not _providing_ privacy.  I am allowing
         it.  That is, _you_ are the caretaker of your rights and must actively
         seek to protect them.  I will help, but that is all I can do.  If
         you wish to protect your privacy, I urge you to learn how and why
         these remailers (and other associated tools) work so that you can use
         them to the best advantage.



Scott Collins         | "Few people realize what tremendous power there
                      |  is in one of these things."     -- Willy Wonka
......................|................................................
BUSINESS.   voice:408.862.0540  fax:974.6094   collins@newton.apple.com
Apple Computer, Inc.   5 Infinite Loop, MS 305-2B   Cupertino, CA 95014
.......................................................................
PERSONAL.   voice/fax:408.257.1746    1024:669687   catalyst@netcom.com





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: khijol!erc@apple.com (Ed Carp)
Date: Tue, 21 Sep 93 13:56:35 PDT
To: pmetzger@lehman.com
Subject: Re: Why RSA?
In-Reply-To: <9309211943.AA22383@snark.lehman.com>
Message-ID: <m0ofEbN-00021tC@khijol>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text


> Derek Zahn says:
> > 
> > Is there some reason that we shouldn't pick a different
> > public key encryption algorithm than RSA to use as a
> > freely-available standard?  The PGP docs imply that "almost"
> > all practical such schemes are patented, implying that
> > some are not.
> 
> All are patented in so far as one of the patents covers ALL public key
> schemes. Some, like Rabin's scheme, have possible technical advantages
> over RSA.

How about that public key scheme they came up with in Australia a while
back?  And why should RSA's patent be so construed as to cover ALL public
key schemes?  Because Jim Bidzos says so?
-- 
Ed Carp, N7EKG			erc@apple.com			510/659-9560
                            anon-0001@khijol.uucp
If you want magic, let go of your armor.  Magic is so much stronger than
steel!        -- Richard Bach, "The Bridge Across Forever"



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Karl Lui Barrus <klbarrus@owlnet.rice.edu>
Date: Tue, 21 Sep 93 11:56:33 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: GOPHER: now on port 70
Message-ID: <9309211852.AA14265@flammulated.owlnet.rice.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Cypherpunks,

Chael has made the necessary changes, and the cypherpunks gopher now 
listens to port 70 as standard gophers do...

So 'gopher chaos.bsu.edu' or 'gopher 147.226.53.28'.

I will look into announcing the site to the gopher list maintainers at
UMN; perhaps some sites that are able to look up chaos.bsu.edu
consistently will consider including a pointer to us!

Karl Barrus
<klbarrus@owlnet.rice.edu>




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: gtoal@an-teallach.com (Graham Toal)
Date: Tue, 21 Sep 93 05:56:29 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Standard Headers for Anonymous Remailers
Message-ID: <9309211251.AA26597@big.l1135.att.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


In article <9309210809.AA08533@jobe.shell.portal.com> pierre@shell.portal.com writes:
 > > of the net community responds to wider access to anonymity by filtering out 
 > > anonymous mail, my prediction (and suggestion :) is that people [...]
 > > will resort to mail which is non-obviously anonymous.

Just to let you know, this *is* happening.  I got so pissed off at the
postings here from anonymous remailers that I've now put them in my
kill file. (I gate this stuff into a local newsgroup and read it with
a newsreader).

Actually it wasn't the content of the articles that narked me, it was
that I actually wanted to *reply* to the authors.  However the subjects
were way too off-topic to be worth responding to in public, which is
the only option the anonymous remailers allows.  I've no objections
(and haven't kill'd) articles from penet etc that I can reply to.

I'm not entirely happy with the whole concept of 'hit&run' anonymous
remailers - they're only good for throwaway comments on public lists, 
or whistleblowing.  That's not how they're being used - they're forcing
people to have private conversations in public lists like this, which
I think is unfair to the rest of the list community - I'm *sure* it's
contributed to the number of people dropping off this list lately.

G
-- 
Personal mail to gtoal@gtoal.com (I read it in the evenings)
Business mail to gtoal@an-teallach.com (Be careful with the spelling!)
Faxes to An Teallach Limited: +44 31 662 4678  Voice: +44 31 668 1550 x212





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: gtoal@an-teallach.com (Graham Toal)
Date: Tue, 21 Sep 93 07:06:31 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Master Key: A Clipper Story
Message-ID: <10565@an-teallach.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


For god's sake, how many copies of this trash are we going to get?
If you're going to use anonymous remailers to mailbomb our list, at
least learn to use them properly and just send us one copy!  That makes
three so far - two of them via the same remailer even!

G
PS To the person who was bragging about using a spelling checker to
hide his anonymity, erm... have a closer look at your post, buddy!
I don't think it would take more than 10 minutes with an index of
all usenet postings over the last month or two to find you :)
-- 
Personal mail to gtoal@gtoal.com (I read it in the evenings)
Business mail to gtoal@an-teallach.com (Be careful with the spelling!)
Faxes to An Teallach Limited: +44 31 662 4678  Voice: +44 31 668 1550 x212





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: derek@cs.wisc.edu (Derek Zahn)
Date: Tue, 21 Sep 93 12:02:39 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Why RSA?
Message-ID: <9309211900.AA15359@lynx.cs.wisc.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Is there some reason that we shouldn't pick a different
public key encryption algorithm than RSA to use as a
freely-available standard?  The PGP docs imply that "almost"
all practical such schemes are patented, implying that
some are not.

The legitimacy problems of PGP are a major roadblock to
widespread use of encryption, IMO.  Let's get something
in the public domain!

derek





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Karl Lui Barrus <klbarrus@owlnet.rice.edu>
Date: Tue, 21 Sep 93 12:21:33 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: MAIL: anonymous, positive reputations
Message-ID: <9309211918.AA17309@flammulated.owlnet.rice.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

Earlier, Graham mentioned some concerns about anonymous mail;
specifically it isn't easy to respond to the author, most messages are
off topic, etc.  (hopefully not referring to my posts sent through
remailers :-) on topics like the cypherpunks gopher and caching
remailers...)

And some people are asking about marking anonymous mail (gopher plug:
check the article "Why Mark Anonymous Mail?" at the gopher site in the
"Anonymous Mail" section, contributed by Hal Finney sometime ago).

Currently, I sign my posts sent through anonymous remailer, sometimes
including my address at the bottom of the post itself.  I know others
do this as well - Hal Finney, probably others I can't think of.

I am working on (and off as time constraints crop up) a positive
reputation scheme for anonymous mail.  My stab at this is somewhat
modest: a program that sifts through elm mail folders (similar to the
elm frm command) and produces a formatted list containing message
number, email address of author (frm sometimes reports name and I like
email addresses instead), and subject.  

BUT, instead of printing email address, if the message is pgp signed,
report the signature instead.  Under this program, the fact that an
anonymous remailer was used is somewhat transparent since you would
see who signed the document sent through a remailer.  This would allow
somebody to build up a positive reputation attached to a pgp signature
(which could be fairly anonymous) and possibly help guide anonymous
mail kill file users.

Naturally, it would be best if it were easy to respond to an anonymous
mail, if this were incorporated into mail programs, etc. but I have
two problems: time constraints, and disk quota (I can't lay out the
source code for elm, pgp, whatever else).

I'm to the point where the script I include below does what I want
expect check for digital signatures on letters.  Since there isn't a
pgp library (yet), the next step will be difficult since I'd rather
not pipe the message through pgp just to get the signature, although
for testing I'll implement something in the next few weeks.

Here is the script: if anybody has input, speak up!  I named it scan
after the mh command it is a poor imitation of.

Usage: 'scan foldername returns a formatted list of mail in the folder
"foldername"
Ug, I see an improvement I will make tonight: using getenv() to get my
home directory instead of plugging it in directly:

- ----------8< cut here >8----------
#!/usr/local/bin/perl
#report email address and subject of messages in an elm folder
#frm sometimes reports name and not email address - not that I
#  guarantee this works in all cases
#simple version of mh scan command
#Karl L. Barrus <klbarrus@owlnet.rice.edu>

chdir "/home/klbarrus/Mail" || die "Can't cd to ~/Mail\n";

while (@ARGV) {
  $file = shift @ARGV;

  if (-T $file) {
    if (-z $file) { #zero length folders with no messages
      print "Folder $file has no messages\n";
    }
    elsif (!open(FOLDER, "/home/klbarrus/Mail/$file")) {
      print STDERR "Can't open $file\n";
    }
    else {
      $state = 1;          #Look for a new message
      $num = 0;

      while (<FOLDER>) {
        if (/^From[^:]/) { #Delimits a new message
          $num++;          
          $from = "";
          $subject = "";
          $state = 2;      #Look for From: and Subject:
        }
        if ($state == 2) { #Already found a message; looking for headers

          /^Subject: (.*)/ && ($subject = $1);    #match subject
          /^From: (.+)/ && ($from = $1);          #match "From: add"
          /^From: (.+) <(.+)>/ && ($from = $2);   #match "From: name <add>"
          /^From: (.+) \((.+)\)/ && ($from = $1); #match "From: add (name)"

          if ($from ne "" && $subject ne "") { #found both headers
            $state = 1; #go back to looking for message delimiter
            write;
          }
        }
      }
    }
  }
  elsif (-d $file) {
    print STDERR "$file is a directory\n";
  }
}

exit;

format STDOUT_TOP =




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: nowhere@bsu-cs.bsu.edu (Chael Hall)
Date: Tue, 21 Sep 93 12:36:35 PDT
To: klbarrus@owlnet.rice.edu (Karl Lui Barrus)
Subject: Re: Cypherpunks & GOPHER
In-Reply-To: <9309182215.AA01627@flammulated.owlnet.rice.edu>
Message-ID: <9309211935.AA13896@bsu-cs.bsu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>
>I'm running the gopher site at chaos.bsu.edu, thanks to Chael Hall,
>who graciously donated an account to me to be used for any and all
                                                        ^^^ ^^^ ^^^
>projects.  This is something I've been wanting to do for quite some
 ^^^^^^^^
>time but have been unable to.  But now I have an account and a
>sympathetic system administrator...!

    Hmmm...  In other words, everything that you have suggested so
far has been alright with me.  But a project to render the Internet
useless would not be okay.

>Chaos.bsu.edu is 147.226.53.28, and the port is 2000.  That is port
>2000 and not the usual port 70 - when Chael and I have some more time
>I will ask him to perform the various and necessary incantations
>(chown) and I'll move it to the usual place.

     It has been moved to port 70 like all other gopher sites.  You
should be able to do 'gopher 147.226.53.28' or 'gopher chaos.bsu.edu' now.

     Once again, anyone who wants an account on here, apply for one by
telnetting to chaos.bsu.edu (147.226.53.28) and logging in as guest.

--
Chael Hall
nowhere@bsu-cs.bsu.edu  00CCHALL@BSUVC.BSU.EDU
nowhere@chaos.bsu.edu   chall@bsu.edu




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Perry E. Metzger" <pmetzger@lehman.com>
Date: Tue, 21 Sep 93 12:46:34 PDT
To: derek@cs.wisc.edu (Derek Zahn)
Subject: Re: Why RSA?
In-Reply-To: <9309211900.AA15359@lynx.cs.wisc.edu>
Message-ID: <9309211943.AA22383@snark.lehman.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Derek Zahn says:
> 
> Is there some reason that we shouldn't pick a different
> public key encryption algorithm than RSA to use as a
> freely-available standard?  The PGP docs imply that "almost"
> all practical such schemes are patented, implying that
> some are not.

All are patented in so far as one of the patents covers ALL public key
schemes. Some, like Rabin's scheme, have possible technical advantages
over RSA.

(For the curious, Rabin's scheme is provably equivalent to factoring,
whereas RSA is not. Rabin's scheme is, however, vulnerable to chosen
plaintext attacks, but adding things like initialization vectors stops
that from being a problem.)

Perry




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: derek@cs.wisc.edu (Derek Zahn)
Date: Tue, 21 Sep 93 13:52:42 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Why RSA?
Message-ID: <9309212049.AA00561@lynx.cs.wisc.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


First, the ViaCrypt version:  I realize that it is legal.
It's also very expensive when compared to the price of
email readers/composers that people normally use (often
weighing in at about $50 / seat).  A $200 add-on is not
likely to be universally accepted.  It's as if somebody
had patented car door locks and claimed that $40,000 was
a reasonable price to have them included on a $10,000
car.  I'm not complaining about the price; people can
charge whatever they want for their products.  However
it does seem kind of high, creating market pressure...
that market pressure surfaces in messages like this one
and hopefully someday competing products from somebody.

Perry Metzger:

> All are patented in so far as one of the patents covers ALL public key
> schemes. Some, like Rabin's scheme, have possible technical advantages
> over RSA.

I am just beginning to study the mathematics behind public
key crypto (got Simmons's _Contemporary Cryptology_ from
the library this morning), but I haven't seen anything
about what exactly this means (that is, I haven't been
able to "look it up").  I was under the impression that
many people participated in the development of P.K.Crypto...
how can somebody patent all of their work?  Don't these
kind of patents apply only to specific algorithms?  Begging
the indulgence of this list, two more questions:

* is there a reference I can read that covers the scope of
  public key crypto patents?

* in broad terms, what would I have to do to develop an
  algorithm that works from a user's perspective like
  p.k.c. (ie public/private keys, the central functional
  point of all the wonderful schemes based on pkc) but
  doesn't violate patents?

Thanks!

derek





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Dave Banisar <banisar@washofc.cpsr.org>
Date: Tue, 21 Sep 93 13:46:35 PDT
To: CYPHERPUNKS <CYPHERPUNKS@toad.com>
Subject: NIST Comment Deadline
Message-ID: <00541.2831472385.5544@washofc.cpsr.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


  NIST Comment Deadline

The September 28 deadline for the submission of comments on NIST's 
proposal to establish the "Skipjack" key-escrow system as a 
Federal Information Processing Standard (FIPS) is rapidly 
approaching.  The full text of the NIST Federal Register notice 
follows.

CPSR is urging all interested individuals and organizations to 
express their views on the proposal and to submit comments 
directly to NIST.  Comments need not be lengthy or very detailed; 
all thoughtful statements addressing a particular concern will 
likely contribute to NIST's evaluation of the key-escrow proposal.  

The following points could be raised about the NIST proposal
(additional materials on Clipper and the key escrow proposal, including
comments already submitted to NIST,  may be found at the CPSR ftp site,
cpsr.org /cpsr/crypto/clipper):

* The potential risks of the proposal have not been assessed and 
many questions about the implementation remain unanswered.  The 
NIST notice states that the current proposal "does not include 
identification of key escrow agents who will hold the keys for the 
key escrow microcircuits or the procedures for access to the 
keys."  The key escrow configuration may also create a dangerous 
vulnerability in a communications network.  The risks of misuse of 
this feature should be weighed against any perceived benefit.

* The classification of the Skipjack algorithm as a "national 
security" matter is inappropriate for technology that will be used 
primarily in civilian and commercial applications.  Classification 
of technical information also limits the computing community's 
ability to evaluate fully the proposal and the general public's 
right to know about the activities of government.
 
* The proposal was not developed in response to a public concern 
or a business request.  It was put forward by the National 
Security Agency and the Federal Bureau of Investigation so that 
these two agencies could continue surveillance of electronic 
communications. It has not been established that is necessary for 
crime prevention.  The number of arrests resulting from wiretaps 
has remained essentially unchanged since the federal wiretap law 
was enacted in 1968.

* The NIST proposal states that the escrow agents will provide the 
key components to a government agency that "properly demonstrates 
legal authorization to conduct electronic surveillance of 
communications which are encrypted."  The crucial term "legal 
authorization" has not been defined.  The vagueness of the term 
"legal authorization" leaves open the possibility that court-
issued warrants may not be required in some circumstances.  This 
issue must be squarely addressed and clarified. 

* Adoption of the proposed key escrow standard may have an adverse 
impact upon the ability of U.S. manufacturers to market 
cryptographic products abroad.  It is unlikely that non-U.S. users 
would purchase communication security products to which the U.S. 
government holds keys.


Comments on the NIST proposal should be sent to:

Director, Computer Systems Laboratory
ATTN: Proposed FIPS for Escrowed Encryption Standard
Technology Building, Room B-154
National Institute of Standards and Technology
Gaithersburg, MD 20899

Written submissions must be received by September 28, 1993 (CPSR 
asked NIST that provisions be made to allow for electronic 
submission of comments, but the agency recently rejected that 
suggestion).

Please also send copies of your comments on the key escrow 
proposal to CPSR for inclusion in the CPSR Internet Library, our 
ftp site.  Copies should be sent to <clipper@washofc.cpsr.org>. 



================================================================= 

                         FEDERAL REGISTER
                         VOL. 58, No. 145
 
                     DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE (DOC)
        National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST)

                     Docket No. 930659-3159
                         RIN 0693-AB19

A Proposed Federal Information Processing Standard for an Escrowed 
Encryption Standard (EES)

                        58 FR 40791

                     Friday, July 30, 1993

Notice; request for comments.

SUMMARY: A Federal Information Processing Standard (FIPS) for an 
Escrowed Encryption Standard (EES) is being proposed. This 
proposed standard specifies use of a symmetric-key 
encryption/decryption algorithm and a key escrowing method which 
are to be implemented in electronic devices and used for 
protecting certain unclassified government communications when 
such protection is required. The algorithm and the key escrowing 
method are classified and are referenced, but not specified, in 
the standard.

   This proposed standard adopts encryption technology developed 
by the Federal government to provide strong protection for 
unclassified information and to enable the keys used in the 
encryption and decryption processes to be escrowed. This latter 
feature will assist law enforcement and other government agencies, 
under the proper legal authority, in the collection and decryption 
of electronically transmitted information. This proposed standard 
does not include identification of  key escrow  agents who will 
hold the keys for the  key escrow  microcircuits or the procedures 
for access to the keys. These issues will be addressed by the 
Department of Justice.

   The purpose of this notice is to solicit views from the public, 
manufacturers, and Federal, state, and local government users so 
that their needs can be considered prior to submission of this 
proposed standard to the Secretary of Commerce for review and 
approval.

   The proposed standard contains two sections: (1) An 
announcement section, which provides information concerning the 
applicability, implementation, and maintenance of the standard; 
and (2) a specifications section which deals with the technical 
aspects of the standard. Both sections are provided in this 
notice.


DATES: Comments on this proposed standard must be received on or 
before September 28, 1993.


ADDRESSES: Written comments concerning the proposed standard 
should be sent to: Director, Computer Systems Laboratory, ATTN: 
Proposed FIPS for Escrowed Encryption Standard, Technology 
Building, room B-154, National Institute of Standards and 
Technology, Gaithersburg, MD 20899.

   Written comments received in response to this notice will be 
made part of the public record and will be made available for 
inspection and copying in the Central Reference and Records 
Inspection Facility, room 6020, Herbert C. Hoover Building, 14th 
Street between Pennsylvania and Constitution Avenues, NW., 
Washington, DC 20230.


FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Dr. Dennis Branstad, National 
Institute of Standards and Technology, Gaithersburg, MD 20899, 
telephone (301) 975-2913.


   SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: This proposed FIPS implements the 
initiative announced by the White House Office of the Press 
Secretary on April 16, 1993. The President of the U.S. approved a 
Public Encryption Management directive, which among other actions, 
called for standards to facilitate the procurement and use of 
encryption devices fitted with  key-escrow  microcircuits in 
Federal communication systems that process sensitive, but 
unclassified information.

   Dated: July 26, 1993.

 Arati Prabhakar,
 Director.(NIST)


----------------------------------------------------
 Federal Information Processing Standards Publication XX
 1993 XX
 Announcing the Escrowed Encryption Standard (EES)

   Federal Information Processing Standards Publications (FIPS 
PUBS) are issued by the National Institute of Standards and 
Technology (NIST) after approval by the Secretary of Commerce 
pursuant to section 111(d) of the Federal Property and 
Administrative Services Act of 1949 as amended by the Computer 
Security Act of 1987, Public Law 100-235.
 
 Name of Standard: Escrowed Encryption Standard (EES).

 Category of Standard: Telecommunications Security.

 Explanation: This Standard specifies use of a symmetric-key 
encryption (and decryption) algorithm and a Law Enforcement Access 
Field (LEAF) creation method (one part of a  key escrow  system) 
which provide for decryption of encrypted telecommunications when 
interception of the telecommunications is lawfully authorized. 
Both the algorithm and the LEAF creation method are to be 
implemented in electronic devices (e.g., very large scale 
integration chips). The devices may be incorporated in security 
equipment used to encrypt (and decrypt) sensitive unclassified 
telecommunications data. Decryption of lawfully intercepted 
telecommunications may be achieved through the acquisition and use 
of the LEAF, the decryption algorithm and escrowed key components.

   To escrow something (e.g., a document, an encryption key) means 
that it is "delivered to a third person to be given to the grantee 
only upon the fulfillment of a condition" (Webster's Seventh New 
Collegiate Dictionary). A key escrow  system is one that entrusts 
components of a key used to encrypt telecommunications to third 
persons, called key component escrow agents. In accordance with 
the common definition of "escrow", the key component escrow agents 
provide the key components to a "grantee" (i.e., a government 
agency) only upon fulfillment of the condition that the grantee 
properly demonstrates legal authorization to conduct electronic 
surveillance of communications which are encrypted using the 
specific device whose key component is requested. The key 
components obtained through this process are then used by the 
grantee to reconstruct the device unique key and obtain the 
session key (contained in the LEAF) which is used to decrypt the 
telecommunications that are encrypted with that device. The term, 
"escrow", for purposes of this standard, is restricted to the 
dictionary definition.

   The encryption/decryption algorithm has been approved for 
government applications requiring encryption of sensitive 
unclassified telecommunications of data as defined herein. The 
specific operations of the algorithm and the LEAF creation method 
are classified and hence are referenced, but not specified, in 
this standard.

   Data, for purposes of this standard, includes voice, facsimile 
and computer information communicated in a telephone system. 
Telephone system, for purposes of this standard, is limited to 
systems circuit-switched up to no more than 14.4 kbs or which use 
basic-rate ISDN, or to a similar grade wireless service.

   Data that is considered sensitive by a responsible authority 
should be encrypted if it is vulnerable to unauthorized disclosure 
during telecommunications. A risk analysis should be performed 
under the direction of a responsible authority to determine 
potential threats and risks. The costs of providing encryption 
using this standard as well as alternative methods and their 
respective costs should be projected. A responsible authority 
should then make a decision, based on the risk and cost analyses, 
whether or not to use encryption and then whether or not to use 
this standard.

 Approving Authority: Secretary of Commerce.

 Maintenance Agency: Department of Commerce, National Institute of 
Standards and Technology.

 Applicability: This standard is applicable to all Federal 
departments and agencies and their contractors under the 
conditions specified below. This standard may be used in designing 
and implementing security products and systems which Federal 
departments and agencies use or operate or which are operated for 
them under contract. These products may be used when replacing 
Type II and Type III (DES) encryption devices and products owned 
by the government and government contractors.

   This standard may be used when the following conditions apply:

   1. An authorized official or manager responsible for data 
security or the security of a computer system decides that 
encryption is required and cost justified as per OMB Circular A-
130; and

   2. The data is not classified according to the National 
Security Act of 1947, as amended, or the Atomic Energy Act of 
1954, as amended.

   However, Federal departments or agencies which use encryption 
devices for protecting data that is classified according to either 
of these acts may use those devices also for protecting 
unclassified data in lieu of this standard.

   In addition, this standard may be adopted and used by non-
Federal Government organizations. Such use is encouraged when it 
provides the desired security.
 
Applications: Devices conforming to this standard may be used for 
protecting unclassified communications.

 Implementations: The encryption/decryption algorithm and the LEAF 
creation method shall be implemented in electronic devices (e.g., 
electronic chip packages) that can be physically protected against 
unauthorized entry, modification and reverse engineering. 
Implementations which are tested and validated by NIST will be 
considered as complying with this standard. An electronic device 
shall be incorporated into a cyptographic module in accordance 
with FIPS 140-1. NIST will test for conformance with FIPS 140-1. 
Cryptographic modules can then be integrated into security 
equipment for sale and use in an application. Information about 
devices that have been validated, procedures for testing equipment 
for conformance with NIST standards, and information about 
obtaining approval of security equipment are available from the 
Computer Systems Laboratory, NIST, Gaithersburg, MD 20899.

 Export Control: Implementations of this standard are subject to 
Federal Government export controls as specified in title 22, Code 
of Federal Regulations, parts 120 through 131 (International 
Traffic of Arms Regulations -ITAR). Exporters of encryption 
devices, equipment and technical data are advised to contact the 
U.S. Department of State, Office of Defense Trade Controls for 
more information.   Patents: Implementations of this standard may 
be covered by U.S. and foreign patents.

 Implementation Schedule: This standard becomes effective thirty 
days following publication of this FIPS PUB.

 Specifications: Federal Information Processing Standard (FIPS 
XXX)(affixed).

 Cross Index:

   a. FIPS PUB 46-2, Data Encryption Standard.

   b. FIPS PUB 81, Modes of Operation of the DES

   c. FIPS PUB 140-1, Security Requirements for Cryptographic 
Modules.


 Glossary:

   The following terms are used as defined below for purposes of 
this standard:

   Data-Voice, facsimile and computer information communicated in 
a telephone system.

   Decryption-Conversion of ciphertext to plaintext through the 
use of a cryptographic algorithm.

   Device (cryptographic)-An electronic implementation of the 
encryption/decryption algorithm and the LEAF creation method as 
specified in this standard.

   Digital data-Data that have been converted to a binary 
representation.

   Encryption-Conversion of plaintext to ciphertext through the 
use of a cryptographic algorithm.

   Key components-The values from which a key can be derived 
(e.g., KU sub 1 + KU sub 2).

   Key escrow -A process involving transferring one or more 
components of a cryptographic key to one or more trusted key 
component escrow agents for storage and later use by government 
agencies to decrypt ciphertext if access to the plaintext is 
lawfully authorized.

   LEAF Creation Method 1-A part of a  key escrow  system that is 
implemented in a cryptographic device and creates a Law 
Enforcement Access Field.

   Type I cryptography-A cryptographic algorithm or device 
approved by the National Security Agency for protecting classified 
information.

   Type II cryptography-A cryptographic algorithm or device 
approved by the National Security Agency for protecting sensitive 
unclassified information in systems as specified in section 2315 
of Title 10 United State Code, or section 3502(2) of Title 44, 
United States Code.

   Type III cryptography-A cryptographic algorithm or device 
approved as a Federal Information Processing Standard.

   Type III(E) cryptography-A Type III algorithm or device that is 
approved for export from the United States.

 Qualifications. The protection provided by a security product or 
system is dependent on several factors. The protection provided by 
this standard against key search attacks is greater than that 
provided by the DES (e.g., the cryptographic key is longer). 
However, provisions of this standard are intended to ensure that 
information encrypted through use of devices implementing this 
standard can be decrypted by a legally authorized entity.

 Where to Obtain Copies of the Standard: Copies of this 
publication are for sale by the National Technical Information 
Service, U.S. Department of Commerce, Springfield, VA 22161. When 
ordering, refer to Federal Information Processing Standards 
Publication XX (FIPS PUB XX), and identify the title. When 
microfiche is desired, this should be specified. Prices are 
published by NTIS in current catalogs and other issuances. Payment 
may be made by check, money order, deposit account or charged to a 
credit card accepted by NTIS.
 Specifications for the Escrowed Encryption Standard


 1. Introduction

   This publication specifies Escrowed Encryption Standard (EES) 
functions and parameters.


 2. General

   This standard specifies use of the SKIPJACK cryptographic 
algorithm and the LEAF Creation Method 1 (LCM-1) to be implemented 
in an approved electronic device (e.g., a very large scale 
integration electronic chip). The device is contained in a logical 
cryptographic module which is then integrated in a security 
product for encrypting and decrypting telecommunications.

   Approved implementations may be procured by authorized 
organizations for integration into security equipment. Devices 
must be tested and validated by NIST for conformance to this 
standard. Cryptographic modules must be tested and validated by 
NIST for conformance to FIPS 140-1.


 3. Algorithm Specifications

   The specifications of the encryption/decryption algorithm 
(SKIPJACK) and the LEAF Creation Method 1 (LCM-1) are classified. 
The National Security Agency maintains these classified 
specifications and approves the manufacture of devices which 
implement the specifications. NIST tests for conformance of the 
devices implementing this standard in cryptographic modules to 
FIPS 140-1 and FIPS 81.


 4. Functions and Parameters


 4.1 Functions

   The following functions, at a minimum, shall be implemented:

   1. Data Encryption: A session key (80 bits) shall be used to 
encrypt plaintext information in one or more of the following 
modes of operation as specified in FIPS 81: ECB, CBC, OFB (64) CFB 
(1, 8, 16, 32, 64).

   2. Data Decryption: The session key (80 bits) used to encrypt 
the data shall be used to decrypt resulting ciphertext to obtain 
the data.

   3.  Key Escrow:  The Family Key (KF) shall be used to create 
the Law Enforcement Access Field (LEAF) in accordance with the 
LEAF Creation Method 1 (LCM-1). The Session Key shall be encrypted 
with the Device Unique Key and transmitted as part of the LEAF. 
The security equipment shall ensure that the LEAF is transmitted 
in such a manner that the LEAF and ciphertext may be decrypted 
with legal authorization. No additional encryption or modification 
of the LEAF is permitted.


 4.2 Parameters

   The following parameters shall be used in performing the 
prescribed functions:

   1. Device Identifier (DID): The identifier unique to a 
particular device and used by the  Key Escrow  System.

   2. Device Unique Key (KU): The cryptographic key unique to a 
particular device and used by the  Key Escrow  System.

   3. Cryptographic Protocol Field (CPF): The field identifying 
the registered cryptographic protocol used by a particular 
application and used by the  Key Escrow  System (reserved for 
future specification and use).

   4. Escrow Authenticator (EA): A binary pattern that is inserted 
in the LEAF to ensure that the LEAF is transmitted and received 
properly and has not been modified, deleted or replaced in an 
unauthorized manner.

   5. Initialization Vector (IV): A mode and application dependent 
vector of bytes used to initialize, synchronize and verify the 
encryption, decryption and key escrow  functions.

   6. Family Key (KF): The cryptographic key stored in all devices 
designated as a family that is used to create the LEAF.

   7. Session Key (KS): The cryptographic key used by a device to 
encrypt and decrypt data during a session. 

   8. Law Enforcement Access Field (LEAF): The field containing 
the encrypted session key and the device identifier and the escrow 
authenticator.


 5. Implementation

   The Cryptographic Algorithm and the LEAF Creation Method shall 
be implemented in an electronic device (e.g., VLSI chip) which is 
highly resistant to reverse engineering (destructive or non-
destructive) to obtain or modify the cryptographic algorithms, the 
DID, the KF, the KU, the EA, the CPF, the operational KS, or any 
other security or  Key Escrow  System relevant information. The 
device shall be able to be programmed/personalized (i.e., made 
unique) after mass production in such a manner that the DID, KU 
(or its components), KF (or its components) and EA fixed pattern 
can be entered once (and only once) and maintained without 
external electrical power.

   The LEAF and the IV shall be transmitted with the ciphertext. 
The specifics of the protocols used to create and transmit the 
LEAF, IV, and encrypted data shall be registered and a CPF 
assigned. The CPF shall then be transmitted in accordance with the 
registered specifications.

   The specific electric, physical and logical interface will vary 
with the implementation. Each approved, registered implementation 
shall have an unclassified electrical, physical and logical 
interface specification sufficient for an equipment manufacturer 
to understand the general requirements for using the device. Some 
of the requirements may be classified and therefore would not be 
specified in the unclassified interface specification.








From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: smb@research.att.com
Date: Tue, 21 Sep 93 13:27:40 PDT
To: gnu@toad.com
Subject: Re: crypto import
Message-ID: <9309212027.AA28484@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


	 > if a law was broken.  And Sternlight is right -- if they decide to i
	ndict,
	 > they may throw in charges of importing IDEA ...

	 THERE IS NO LAW AGAINST THE IMPORT OF CRYPTOGRAPHY!

	 How many times does this idiocy have to be squashed?

Perhaps not now, but the statutory and regulatory provisions exist:
From the ITAR:

120.1 -- General authorities and eligibility.
   (a) Section 38 of the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2778) authorizes the
   President to control the export and import of defense articles and defense
   services.

120.5 -- Relation to regulations of other agencies.
   If an article or service is covered by the U.S. Munitions List, its export is
   regulated by the Department of State, except as indicated otherwise in this
   subchapter. For the relationship of this subchapter to regulations of the
   Department of Commerce, the Department of Energy and the Nuclear Regulatory
   Commission, see ^U 123.20 of this subchapter. The Treasury Department controls
   permanent imports of articles and services covered by the U.S. Munitions Import
   List from foreign countries by persons subject to U.S. jurisdiction (31 CFR part
   505).

123.2 -- Import jurisdiction.
   The Department of State regulates the temporary import of defense articles.
   Permanent imports of defense articles into the United States are regulated by
   the Department of the Treasury (see 27 CFR parts 47, 178 and 179).

etc.

I confess that I don't happen to have a copy of the Munitions Import List.
Are you certain that crypto gear isn't on it?  Are you certain it wasn't
added last week?  Or next?  But the same authority -- dubious though it
may be -- that lets them ban export of crypto would let them ban import
if they chose to try.

	 	John

	 PS:  I heard a rumor it's against the law to breathe.

Only if there's a coded message in the timing.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Marc Horowitz <marc@GZA.COM>
Date: Tue, 21 Sep 93 13:30:09 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Master Key: A Clipper Story
In-Reply-To: <9309211914.AA17965@netcom5.netcom.com>
Message-ID: <9309212027.AA09946@dun-dun-noodles.aktis.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>> An editor might tighten up "Infocalypse"'s writing, and the whole idea
>> that Skipjack will fall to genetic programming techniques seems to be
>> a reach. But who knows....the truth is often stranger than fiction.

It was once said to me by a writer friend that the key to good science
fiction is to choose one absurdity, and build logically on that.
Consider that faster-than-light travel is an absurdity today.  That
doesn't stop good SF from being based on it. That's what makes it
"fiction" after all.  The point of the story is that if Key Escrow
falls, the results could be catastrophic.  How it falls is a plot
device; the technical merit is not of intrinsic importance.

>> Well done!

I agree!

		Marc




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: sommerfeld@orchard.medford.ma.us (Bill Sommerfeld)
Date: Tue, 21 Sep 93 15:36:38 PDT
To: greg@ideath.goldenbear.com
Subject: Re: Bidzos on PGP and ITAR verbatim
In-Reply-To: <TRo90B1w164w@ideath.goldenbear.com>
Message-ID: <199309212037.QAA00299@orchard.medford.ma.us>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


   If Bidzos is using the term "technical data" as it's defined in $120.21
   of the ITAR, I think it's debatable. Can we come up with data to support
   that IDEA and RSA are "commonly taught .. in academia"? 

The RSA public key algorithm is taught at MIT in the math course
18.063, which is required for an undergraduate computer science
degree.

That's one data point...

					- Bill






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Perry E. Metzger" <pmetzger@lehman.com>
Date: Tue, 21 Sep 93 14:10:11 PDT
To: erc@apple.com
Subject: Re: Why RSA?
In-Reply-To: <m0ofEbN-00021tC@khijol>
Message-ID: <9309212105.AA22690@snark.lehman.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Ed Carp says:
> > Derek Zahn says:
> > > 
> > > Is there some reason that we shouldn't pick a different
> > > public key encryption algorithm than RSA to use as a
> > > freely-available standard?  The PGP docs imply that "almost"
> > > all practical such schemes are patented, implying that
> > > some are not.
> > 
> > All are patented in so far as one of the patents covers ALL public key
> > schemes. Some, like Rabin's scheme, have possible technical advantages
> > over RSA.
> 
> How about that public key scheme they came up with in Australia a while
> back?

I don't know why I should trust it, and there are schemes I do trust
available that work fine, like Rabin's or even RSA.

> And why should RSA's patent be so construed as to cover ALL public
> key schemes?  Because Jim Bidzos says so?

No, because the patent says so. The patent might be overbroad --
indeed, I'd say that it is, but the only way to get it thrown out is
to have it reexamined or get the courts to toss it. If you have
several hundred thousand dollars available I'll gladly arrange to have
this done.

Perry




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Perry E. Metzger" <pmetzger@lehman.com>
Date: Tue, 21 Sep 93 14:12:41 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Why RSA?
In-Reply-To: <9309212049.AA00561@lynx.cs.wisc.edu>
Message-ID: <9309212109.AA22702@snark.lehman.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Derek Zahn says:
> I was under the impression that
> many people participated in the development of P.K.Crypto...
> how can somebody patent all of their work?

Three people essentially were involved -- Diffie, Helman, and Merkle.
Two of them (I forgot which) filed a patent on the idea itself.

> Don't these
> kind of patents apply only to specific algorithms?

It can be easily argued that at the time the patent was filed
algorithm patents were impermissable, and it can also be argued that
the patent was overbroad. However, no one has ever tried to challenge
the patent properly. It would be a very expensive proposition.

> * in broad terms, what would I have to do to develop an
>   algorithm that works from a user's perspective like
>   p.k.c. (ie public/private keys, the central functional
>   point of all the wonderful schemes based on pkc) but
>   doesn't violate patents?

My interpretation is that there isn't anything you could do that
wouldn't be seen to violate the patents. Personally, I feel the
patents are invalid. Care to donate enough money to challenge them?

Perry




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: cme@ellisun.sw.stratus.com (Carl Ellison)
Date: Tue, 21 Sep 93 14:17:42 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Master Key: A Clipper Story
Message-ID: <9309212114.AA10366@ellisun.sw.stratus.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>Message-Id: <9309212027.AA09946@dun-dun-noodles.aktis.com>
>Date: Tue, 21 Sep 1993 16:27:24 -0400
>From: Marc Horowitz <marc@GZA.COM>

>>> Well done!
>
>I agree!

Yes -- only -- I wish there were more than 1/2 sentence on breaking into the
escrow agencies.  That's clearly where the first break would be.





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: David Colston <0005542837@mcimail.com>
Date: Tue, 21 Sep 93 10:46:32 PDT
To: cypherpunks <cypherpunks@toad.com>
Subject: Source code
Message-ID: <54930921171645/0005542837NA1EM@mcimail.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


In case any one is interested, I have the source code for a non-RSA
public key system. I wrote it in Microsoft PDS 7.1, which is a
version of quick basic. It does 1024 bit keys and I can out run PGP
in Basic<G>.

If anyone out there is a semi-mathematical type, I will also furnish
a paper on the subject. Since this is non-RSA and I'm sure everyone
reading this is in the U.S., I don't think I'm involation of ITAR<G>.

Uncle Dave




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Marc Horowitz <marc@GZA.COM>
Date: Tue, 21 Sep 93 14:23:09 PDT
To: derek@cs.wisc.edu (Derek Zahn)
Subject: Re: Why RSA?
In-Reply-To: <9309212049.AA00561@lynx.cs.wisc.edu>
Message-ID: <9309212121.AA10002@dun-dun-noodles.aktis.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>> * is there a reference I can read that covers the scope of
>>   public key crypto patents?

One of the PKP patents (don't remember which) covers the concept of
the encryption and decryption keys being different.  The RSA algorithm
(covered under a separate patent) is one way to implement this idea.

>> * in broad terms, what would I have to do to develop an
>>   algorithm that works from a user's perspective like
>>   p.k.c. (ie public/private keys, the central functional
>>   point of all the wonderful schemes based on pkc) but
>>   doesn't violate patents?

Write your code, sell it, wait for PKP to sue you, challenge them in
court, and win.

The problem here is that PKP has algorithmic patents (which many
people think should never have been valid in the first place) which
are very broad (covering pretty much all PKC) and cover ideas which
some people think are "obvious" (making them theoretical
unpatentable).  However, once a patent is granted, the only way to get
it thrown out is to challenge it in court.  This is very expensive.
So expensive that Uncle "Infinite Pockets" Sam himself didn't want to
try to free their own algorithm from PKP, and instead licensed it to
them exclusively (or so they claimed).

PKP's patents have never been tested in court.  This means that they
*may be* rotten to the core.  But before you try to sell your own
PKC-based system, make sure you have a bank account and an army of
lawyers as big as Jim's.

The other answer to this question is "leave the US".  This has nothing
to do with ITAR.  The PKP patents, for various reasons, only apply to
the US.

		Marc




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Marc Horowitz <marc@GZA.COM>
Date: Tue, 21 Sep 93 15:00:13 PDT
To: greg@ideath.goldenbear.com (Greg Broiles)
Subject: Re: Bidzos on PGP and ITAR verbatim
In-Reply-To: <TRo90B1w164w@ideath.goldenbear.com>
Message-ID: <9309212157.AA10055@dun-dun-noodles.aktis.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>> If Bidzos is using the term "technical data" as it's defined in $120.21
>> of the ITAR, I think it's debatable. Can we come up with data to support
>> that IDEA and RSA are "commonly taught .. in academia"? 

>                   the U.S. Munitions List. This definition does not
>                   include information concerning general scientific,
>                   mathematical, or engineering principles commonly
>                   taught in academia. It also does not include basic

Well, I learned about the RSA algorithms in 18.063 (Introduction to
Algebraic Systems), which is a required mathematics course at MIT for
an undergraduate CS degree.  It is normally taken by sophomores and
juniors.  MIT isn't exactly a "common" school, but it's certainly
academia.  Unfortunately, there is no textbook for this course.

Public Key Cryptosystems are also discussed in the textbook
(Introduction to Algorithms, Corman/Leiserson/Rivest, MIT Press) for
6.046 (Introduction to Algorithms), but are not discussed extensively
in the class.

As I know foreign nationals who have graduated, they must have taken
these courses.

		Marc




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Timothy Newsham <newsham@wiliki.eng.hawaii.edu>
Date: Tue, 21 Sep 93 21:10:13 PDT
To: pmetzger@lehman.com
Subject: Re: a horrible conspiracy revealed
In-Reply-To: <9309220341.AA23923@snark.lehman.com>
Message-ID: <9309220409.AA05518@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> 
> 
> "L. Detweiler" says:
> > I was thinking. What is the significance that PRZ was not actually
> > cited in any subpoena so far? This is very puzzling. It seems to
> 
> I wonder what the significance of L. Detweiler's name is? Obviously
> its a Germanic name. Perhaps he's a Nazi... in fact, he might be the
[...]

What was the point of this letter?  Is this example output of a
new stegonagrphy program you just wrote?  where can I get it?
Do you know mr. subliminal from saturday night live?  Can I meet
him?  Can I have a porsche ?




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Perry E. Metzger" <pmetzger@lehman.com>
Date: Tue, 21 Sep 93 15:13:11 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Bidzos on PGP and ITAR verbatim
In-Reply-To: <9309212157.AA10055@dun-dun-noodles.aktis.com>
Message-ID: <9309212210.AA22904@snark.lehman.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Marc Horowitz says:
> >> If Bidzos is using the term "technical data" as it's defined in $120.21
> >> of the ITAR, I think it's debatable. Can we come up with data to support
> >> that IDEA and RSA are "commonly taught .. in academia"? 
> 
> Well, I learned about the RSA algorithms in 18.063 (Introduction to
> Algebraic Systems), which is a required mathematics course at MIT for
> an undergraduate CS degree.

I learned about lots of this stuff in an advanced course in
cryptography taught by Zvi Galil and some of his students and
colleagues (like Stu Haber and Joan Feigenbaum) at Columbia.

I suspect that there is an academic discipline here (lots of PhDs
specializing in cryptography) and papers and academic journals and
conferences make it fairly clear that this data is common in academia.

Perry




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: fnerd@smds.com (FutureNerd Steve Witham)
Date: Tue, 21 Sep 93 15:32:45 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Subjects in anon msgs
Message-ID: <9309212218.AA09396@smds.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Someone writes:
 
> What do you put in the Subject: line of an encrypted or anonymous
> message?
> 
> We need something standard to prevent traffic analysis on this field.
...

Isn't it okay to have the subject appear in the last hop,
according to a :: field in the second-to-last message?
::Remail-with-Subject: All Right Bugsy Lets Get Down To Brass Tacks

With remailers that unencrypt at each hop, this doesn't seem a
problem to me.

With remailers that accept unencrypted input, this is no more of a
steganoweakness than the body of the message already is.

-fnerd@smds.com




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: nate@VIS.ColoState.EDU
Date: Tue, 21 Sep 93 17:26:39 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com (Cypherpunks)
Subject: Coding vs. Raving.... please don't fight amongst yourselves!!
In-Reply-To: <9309191818.AA08784@snark.lehman.com>
Message-ID: <9309220023.AA05337@nagel.VIS.ColoState.EDU>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


[much bickering between Perry and Detweiler deleted]

OK, why don't you guys bounce flaming email back and forth
between yourselves after the first volley...  So that everyone
knows, Perry wants us to shut up and write code, and Detweiler
wants us to get up and fight...

Well, do both...  Perry, you write some really awesome code,
and Detweiler and some others will go off and investigate what
they feel to be important...  If Perry does not want to listent to
Detweiler's calls to action, don't - just delete the message and
move on.

We need to recognize that some of us are prone to get agitated
more easily than others are, but that's OK...  we all want basically
the same thing.  What we want done will never get done if all of us
write code, and it won't get done if we all rant and rave, either.

Just don't fucking bicker about wether we should investigate things
or write code.  It's getting annoying!

-nate



-- 
+--------------------------------------------------------------------
| Nate Sammons   email: nate@VIS.ColoState.Edu
|      Colorado State University Computer Visualization Laboratory
|      Finger nate@monet.VIS.ColoState.Edu for my PGP key
|      #include <std.disclaimer>
|                                    Always remember "Brazil"
+----------------------+



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Eli Brandt <ebrandt@jarthur.Claremont.EDU>
Date: Tue, 21 Sep 93 18:27:46 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Bidzos on PGP and ITAR verbatim
In-Reply-To: <9309212329.AA01621@toad.com>
Message-ID: <9309220126.AA03184@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> It was taught in one of my digital design classes as an example
> of why (and how) we need modular arithmetic circuitry, and how
> it is made.  If it is taught in such a non-related class what does
> that say to the commonness of it?

Similarly, it was taught in an advanced discrete math course at the
Univ. of Massachusetts as an application of the Chinese-remainder
bignum system we'd been working with.

   Eli   ebrandt@jarthur.claremont.edu




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: doug@netcom.com (Doug Merritt)
Date: Tue, 21 Sep 93 19:46:42 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Bidzos on PGP and ITAR verbatim
In-Reply-To: <ebrandt@jarthur.Claremont.EDU>
Message-ID: <9309220242.AA15993@netcom4.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>Similarly, it was taught in an advanced discrete math course at the

Since no one else has mentioned it...the NSA tried to head off the
original publication of public key cryptography, threatening star
chambers, national security directives, and jail terms. This was thwarted
by profs at a hundred colleges across the U.S. immediately assigning
the algorithm as homework to every software class they were teaching
at the same time, thus rather letting the cat out of the bag. The NSA
then backed off, and publications followed.

The material has been a natural part of certain courses ever since,
depending on tastes of the prof.

Part of the above story I experienced directly, since I was at Berkeley
at the time, and other parts I heard from Ralph Merkle, who was either
still there or had just gone to Stanford...I can't recall which.

So if someone is collecting stories about the commonality of teaching
such things, I imagine there must be some hundreds of thousands of
eye witness reports.

I implemented a 512 bit pubkey algorithm for kicks on a Z80 CPM system
around 1982 based on a paper in the open literature that aimed at
non-mathematicians and gave details such as efficient GCD algorithms.
There cannot be any question about how widely known these techniques are.
	Doug




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: wcs@anchor.ho.att.com (Bill_Stewart_HOY002_1305)
Date: Wed, 22 Sep 93 08:06:53 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Why RSA?
Message-ID: <9309212347.AA26247@anchor.ho.att.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text


Derek writes:
> First, the ViaCrypt version:  I realize that it is legal.
> It's also very expensive when compared to the price of
If you buy it now, it's $100; even $199 is within the
realm of what corporate customers consider non-annoying,
especially since volume discounts kick in very rapidly.
(Q5 = $120 each, Q20 = $83 ea, Q50+ = negotiable.)

$100 is within my pain threshhold, and that of most serious
non-student cypherpunks, though I'd be much happier at $49.95,
and I'd guess they'd get more up-front cypherpunk revenue.
I'm not sure the legalities of buying ViaCrypt PGP and then using
the latest off-the-net version with trustable source and fewer bugs,
but I'd feel better about that than just using PGP without a license.

I don't know if ViaCrypt includes any distinguishing features
that let you tell a ViaCrypt PGP message from a Real PGP message -
they could do subtle stuff like make the session keys all 
include some checksum (e.g. be a multiple of N mod M),
or crude stuff like put "Version 2.3ViaCrypt" in the headers,
which would let them detect non-ViaCrypt PGP users.
I assume not, but I haven't seen it.

> * is there a reference I can read that covers the scope of
>   public key crypto patents?
Basically, there are the patents themselves.
Check your favorite FTP sites, including rsa.com,
and ask your favorite mathematically-trained patent lawyer
how realistic the claims are and how much broad the interesting ones are.

> * in broad terms, what would I have to do to develop an
>   algorithm that works from a user's perspective like
>   p.k.c. (ie public/private keys, the central functional
>   point of all the wonderful schemes based on pkc) but
>   doesn't violate patents?

To avoid patent problems, either get a license from PKP,
or do any implementations outside the US (it's ok to use the
math as math, you just can't apply it for encrypting stuff),
or work for the U.S. government which gets use of at least RSA free.
If you develop a new public-key algorithm that's any good,
PKP may be willing to make a deal with you.

# Bill Stewart    wcs@anchor.ho.att.com  +1-908-949-0705 Fax-4876
# AT&T Bell Labs, Room 4M-312, Crawfords Corner Rd, Holmdel, NJ  07733-3030
#
#		goin' where the climate suits my clothes ....



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Zeek <zeek@bongo.cc.utexas.edu>
Date: Tue, 21 Sep 93 18:21:40 PDT
To: eff-austin@tic.com
Subject: New York Times: Federal Inquiry on Software...
Message-ID: <199309220117.AA11227@bongo.cc.utexas.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text


----------------------------
The New York Times
Tuesday, September 21, 1993
Business Day
----------------------------
 
      Federal Inquiry on Software Examines Privacy Programs

                         By John Markoff

SAN FRANCISCO, Sept. 20 -  In a Government investigation with
implications for free speech and privacy in the information age, a
Federal grand jury in San Jose, Calif., has issued subpoenas to two
software publishers selling versions of a program that protects the
privacy of electronic mail and other computer data.  

The investigation appears to focus on whether the program has been
illegally exported in violation of State Department regulations
that control the sale of weapons and other technologies whose
export the Government believes may compromise national security. 
The relevance of such regulations in the post-cold war era is the
topic of growing debate in Washington, where communications and
computer executives plan to testify before Congress on Wednesday.
[Page C3.]

The software program, known as Pretty Good Privacy, or P.G.P., was
written several years ago by an independent programmer in response
to Federal threats to crack down on the distribution of encryption
software which is used to protect computer data by converting them
into secret code.  No one can read the encoded information without
access to mathematical keys - one that is publicly known, a second
known only to the recipient of the coded message.  

The program has since been freely distributed around the world,
used on thousands of personal computers and work stations.  

Receiving the Federal subpoenas were Viacrypt, a Phoenix company
that plans to sell a licensed version of P.G.P., and Austin Code
Works of Austin, Tex., which is selling a version of P.G.P. for
other software developers to incorporate their own programs.  The
grand jury subpoenas, which the companies received Sept. 9, ordered
them to supply all correspondence and records related to the
international distribution of P.G.P. and other information related
to computer cryptography.  

A Customs Department official refused to comment on the case today. 
William P. Keane, the assistant United States attorney who signed
the subpoenas, confirmed that there was a grand jury investigation,
but said he could not comment.  

Both publishers said they had no plans to sell their products
abroad.  

"I think they're more concerned with our intentions than what we've
done," said Leonard Mikus, president of Viacrypt, which is a
division of the software company Lemcom Systems Inc. of Phoenix. 
"They're on a fishing expedition, but this could become a landmark
case that sets the limits that distinguish between electronic and
conventional publishing."

Battling the N.S.A.

The investigation is the latest round in a growing battle in recent
years between the National Security Agency and a variety of groups
in this country, including high-technology companies, computer
researchers and civil libertarians, over the role of coding
software in protecting computer data.  The N.S.A., whose role is to
monitor electronic communications around the world, has
consistently acted to block the adoption of new technologies that
would make its mission more difficult.

But the widespread availability of high-speed digital communication
links and inexpensive personal computers may make it impossible to
enforce technology restrictions in the future - as the widespread
international dissemination of P.G.P. has already indicated.  

President Clinton alluded to the problems of controlling
distribution of software technology in a speech last week promoting
the North American Free Trade Agreement.  

"Nothing we do in this great capital can change the fact that
factories or information can flash across the world, that people
can move money around in the blink of an eye," the President said.
"Nothing can change the fact that technology can be adopted, once
created, by people all across the world and then rapidly adapted in
new and different ways by people who have a little different take
on the way that technology works."

Question of Legality

Government regulations, enforced by the State Department, make it
illegal to export cryptographic software without a special
munitions export license issued for weapons sales.  

Those restrictions have angered many computer industry executives
who argue that encryption software is the crucial technology
underlying a variety of information-age services, ranging from
secure electronic mail to computerized payment of bills.  

Last year, a number of United States software companies,
represented by the Software Publishers Association, a trade group,
struck a deal with the N.S.A. permitting them to export software
that contained coding functions.  Those codes, however, are
believed to be easily cracked by the N.S.A. The P.G.P. software
under investigation is thought to defy most N.S.A. code-cracking
efforts.  

The legitimacy of the export regulations is also disputed by legal
scholars who argue that they restrict freedom of speech.  

"There is a First Amendment right to speak in a encrypted way,"
said Eben Moglen, a professor of law and legal history at Columbia
University who is familiar with the case.  "The right to speak
P.G.P. is like the right to speak Navajo.  The Government has no
particular right to prevent you from speaking in a technical manner
even if it is inconvenient for them to understand."

Protection from Code-Breaking

P.G.P. has been controversial since it was written by the
programmer, Philip Zimmerman, because it uses a coding formula that
many researchers believe powerful enough to protect information
from even the National Security Agency's high-speed code-cracking
computers.  The formula was developed by three well known computer
scientists: Ronald Rivest, Adi Shamir, and Leonard Adelman.  
--------------   





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Perry E. Metzger" <pmetzger@lehman.com>
Date: Tue, 21 Sep 93 17:36:39 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Coding vs. Raving.... please don't fight amongst yourselves!!
In-Reply-To: <9309220023.AA05337@nagel.VIS.ColoState.EDU>
Message-ID: <9309220032.AA23618@snark.lehman.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



nate@vis.colostate.edu says:
> Well, do both...  Perry, you write some really awesome code,
> and Detweiler and some others will go off and investigate what
> they feel to be important...  If Perry does not want to listent to
> Detweiler's calls to action, don't - just delete the message and
> move on.

Its not as simple as that. Phil Zimmermann has explicitly asked, on
advice of his attorneys, that people stay calm on this and not start
spewing accusations out or agitating so as not to cause harm to his
case.  Detweiler thinks he's "helping" even though Phil and others
don't want his help and feel that they could end up in jail as a
result of it.

Perry




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "L. Detweiler" <ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Date: Tue, 21 Sep 93 19:47:47 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: (1) PRZ excluded (2) PM vs. LD (3) grand jury procedure
Message-ID: <9309220241.AA11556@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I was thinking. What is the significance that PRZ was not actually
cited in any subpoena so far? This is very puzzling. It seems to
contradict the theory that the investigation is primarily PGP oriented.
On one hand, we might attribute it to the idea that the grand jury &
the Attorneys don't have a very clear idea of what exactly is going on
with PGP anyway, which would fit in with some of the tidbits I've
posted. The president of ViaCrypt *was* subpoenaed -- but he has only
been in associated with PGP for a few weeks, since the commercial
announcement. But, still, how could they *not* query PRZ if they are
inquiring on PGP?  This is what I call a `conspicuous omission'.

Also, the targeting of ViaCrypt and not PRZ directly is very
interesting to contemplate. It definitely suggests that the move of PGP
to a commercial company was critical in the timing of the subpoenas.
Was it critical in convening a grand jury in the first place? what is
it about the situation that caused action after a company was involved?
are relevant laws only applicable to companies, not individuals? surely
not, but there is very likely something going on here beneath the surface.

(BTW, let the record show I have only replied directly to PM's
voluminous onslaught of public flames [to say nothing of my vast,
superb private collection] in one message on the list, which I think is
sufficient [or more precisely, nothing could be sufficient, but it is
the minimum]. If there is any `bickering' going on beyond this, it is
only the reader's fertile imagination that I was *engaged* [*targeted*?
definitely]. Or, feel free to cite the messages to contradict me, in
email. I say all this only because I fear I am becoming a symbol in
everyone's psyche of any message that challenges PM, no matter who
wrote it, quite to the contrary of actual developments.)

Here's a bit more which is helpful in describing a grand jury
investigation (although I'd like to see more) from someone who gives me
too much credit :)

===cut=here===

Date: Tue, 21 Sep 1993 11:49:33 -0400
From: [...]
To: ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu
Subject: Re:  more musings

You are absolutely right about the Grand Jury proceedings. They are simply
a fact finding venture. They are secret hearings and I doubt that Phil
Zimmerman will even be able to talk about the proceedings after they are done. 

In addition to this, you are also correct that attorneys are not permitted
inside the grand jury hearing (although the witness may leave the room to
confer with the attorney). Once inside the room, you will only have the Grand
Jury (of 23 people I believe) and the D.A. While it may seem nice to believe
that Phil Zimmerman will be able to make a grand Perry Mason like speech in
front of the Grand Jury. In reality, he will be under the control of the
D.A. and will probably not have much of a chance to say much of anything
except to answer the questions of the D.A.

On the last point, yes you are also right, since the Grand Jury is NOT a 
criminal trial. Any evidence that would normally be held as illegally obtained,
or just generally inadmissable in court (ie. hearsay) is perfectly acceptable
for a Grand Jury, and I'm sure that it will be used.

The grand jury's only purpose is to pass either an indictment (called a True
Bill ) or no indictment, they are not there to determine guilt. 





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "L. Detweiler" <ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Date: Tue, 21 Sep 93 20:17:47 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: the $64K question?
In-Reply-To: <TRo90B1w164w@ideath.goldenbear.com>
Message-ID: <9309220314.AA12039@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


FTP site for complete ITAR is:

ripem.msu.edu:/pub/crypt/docs/itar-july-93.txt.

sci.crypt archives are there also. Thanks to M. Riordan for this
valuable service. I also understand that D. Bernstein may have helped
in getting the ITAR on specifically. Both are sci.crypt FAQ
contributors & maintainers.

* * *

greg@ideath.goldenbear.com (Greg Broiles) quotes an *extremely*
interesting section of the ITAR, perhaps the *critical section* for
this issue at hand. But he seemed to skip right over a critical piece.

The thread, as it stands: we have seen the ITAR sections that bar
disclosure (export) of `technical data' to `foreign nationals' and
sections that state that anything illegally exported cannot be legally
imported, and now we find technical data defined as:


   $120.21 Technical data.

        Technical data means, for purposes of this subchapter:
            (a)     Classified information relating to defense articles
                    and defense services;
            (b)     Information covered by an invention secrecy order;
            (c)     Information, in any form, which is directly related
                    to the design, engineering, development, production,
                    processing, manufacture, use, operation, overhaul,
                    repair, maintenance, modification, or reconstruction
                    of defense articles. This includes, for example,
                    information in the form of blueprints, drawings,
1                   photographs, plans, instructions, computer software,
1                   and documentation. This also includes information
                    which advances the state of the art of articles on
2                   the U.S. Munitions List. This definition does not
2                   include information concerning general scientific,
2                   mathematical, or engineering principles commonly
2                   taught in academia. It also does not include basic
                    marketing information or general system descriptions
                    of defense articles.

*wow* -- we find that (1) `computer software and documentation'
`related to [verb1,verb2,verb3 ad infinitum] of defense articles' is
*banned*. but in the same paragraph, (2) `general scientific or
commonly taught mathematical or engineering principles' are *not*
banned. Surely, (1) is the clause that Bidzos would claim applies --
restricting the export of technical data in the form of software.

The $64K Question: Is PGP `computer software related to defense' or
`technical documentation encompassing general scientific & engineering principles'?

so, likely, that paragraph will be the focus of attention, and perhaps
the fulcrum of the case, for both the prosecution and defense, of a
hypothetical trial.

another point to make: the naive prejudices of those who crafted this
list are apparent as being from the
agency-which-will-remain-anonymous-but-has-the-initials-NSA. They seem
to think that `defense articles' and `general scientific, mathematical,
and engineering principles' are mutually exclusive. Hee, hee. They
might as well just have a law that bans `everything we don't approve
of' with no loss of ambiguity.

G.B. again
>The definitions of export that I've seen have concerned transferring
>information or physical things, or providing services to, persons,
>corporations, or nations which are not U.S. citizens. They have not
>addressed placing these things where "foreign persons" might conceivably
>get them.

another *very* critical aspect of the case, noted also by H. Finney and
others. I have a theory about this (surprise! :) Bidzos indicated how
the ITAR is very recent. It appears to be being updated all the time.
This is a bit scary how easy it is for `the powers that be' (the most
verminous expression, hence my use) to slip in to modifications to the
ITAR. I wonder how much these various paragraphs have changed between
versions of the ITAR -- I suspect that if we looked at it in a linear
historical progression, we would find an increasing desperation in the
writing, representing the futile attempt to encompass all the data
leaking all over cyberspace, like trying to hold onto a handful of
greased vibrating marbles, or chain down electrons. This is another
`conspicuous omission' that suggests the likelihood that it is `in the
works' to get in clauses that *specifically address* the concept of
`broadcast' of information similar to an FTP site, perhaps even
underway at this moment in the labyrinthine catacombs of our government.

* * *

My sincere thanks to everyone who has contributed to the ITAR analysis
associated with the case dispassionately. We shouldn't delude ourselves
in thinking all this is happening in anything other than a mailing list
vacuum, and the EFF/PRZ laywers (`the Professionals') surely have
entirely different perspectives on the matter, but for me at least I
find it extraordinarily educational and intellectually stimulating --
in a sort of depraved way.

On the other hand, reading between the lines of our comments, the ITAR
itself is probably close to the most totalitarian document our country
has yet produced. It is sort of like `constitutional antimatter'. Look
at how pliant this enterprise-constricting law is to burdensome and
insideous modifications, in total defiance of open and public
legislative procedure! The people that are *experts* on it can't keep
up with all the shadowy knob-twiddling. In restricting *technical data*
to `foreign nationals' (the latter phrase a rather atrocious coinage in
itself) we seem to find the same institutionalized paranoia against the
spread of simple *information* that was associated with copier machines
in the cold-war-era Soviet Union. The irony is that to a totalitarian
state, that paranoia is not comical -- it is entirely justified and
critical to its self preservation.





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "L. Detweiler" <ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Date: Tue, 21 Sep 93 20:37:47 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: the public key minefield
In-Reply-To: <9309212049.AA00561@lynx.cs.wisc.edu>
Message-ID: <9309220335.AA12499@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


 derek@cs.wisc.edu (Derek Zahn)
>* in broad terms, what would I have to do to develop an
>  algorithm that works from a user's perspective like
>  p.k.c. (ie public/private keys, the central functional
>  point of all the wonderful schemes based on pkc) but
>  doesn't violate patents?

others have well addressed how patent issues are involved in this. but
this appears to be a simple technical question on one level. What does
it take to come up with a good public key system?

Answer: far more than you would think. RSA for example has gained its
current degree trust only after about a decade and a half of careful
and intense scrutiny in the literature,  with many new caveats and
modifications invented along the way. Furthermore, the mathematical &
computational journals are strewn with failed attempts at getting a
workable public key system by the most brilliant experts in the field
(actually, in many fields). In particular, there was a lot of
excitement about Knapsack cyphers, related to something called the
Subset Sum problem, and a flurry of papers proposed, broke, and refined
subsequent variations. Currently it appears to have really gotten a
stake through its heart from the last authoritative paper (who?). (I
would be curious for more details from the academically adept.)

The rewards to a public key system are enormous, but the obstacles are
tremendous as well. just getting a good *theoretical* model is very
difficult, as the above attests. Then, this theoretical model has to be
*efficient* when encoded in an algorithm -- another big stumbling
block. Then, in the real world of ugly litigation, it has to tiptoe
around the field of all the national and international patents, and,
ahem, byzantine export laws.

A very grim picture currently, in many ways, and to a large degree why
RSA--and PGP/PRZ-- are so celebrated. Hopefully the future holds
something less bleak.

note: the new sci.crypt FAQ will have a much-improved section on public
key cryptography. watch for it on the newsgroup or
rtfm.mit.edu:/pub/usenet/news-answers/cryptography-faq if you want it right away.





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Duncan Frissell <frissell@panix.com>
Date: Tue, 21 Sep 93 19:16:41 PDT
To: CYPHERPUNKS@toad.com
Subject: Health Security Card
Message-ID: <199309220212.AA26308@panix.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Senator Harris Wafford (sp?) on Larry King Live just flashed a mockup of 
the Health Security Card.  It is white.  It has a red, white, and blue 
flag on it.  It looks like it has a 7 digit number on it in the EIN split 
pattern 99 99999.  It was hard to count digits though.  It might have 9 
digits rather than 7.  Wafford did use the term "smartcard."  I'm sure 
Willy will feature one in his speech tomorrow night.

Duncan Frissell

"Where's your Health Security Smartcard."

"Sorry, I'm don't believe in that sort of thing.  I'm an anarchist.  You 
know, that's an alternative life style sort of like sodomy.  They're 
starting to teach it in the schools and everything."

--- WinQwk 2.0b#0
                                                                        




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "L. Detweiler" <ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Date: Tue, 21 Sep 93 21:36:43 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: list split?
Message-ID: <9309220433.AA13611@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


this has been discussed a long time ago, but there is definitely some
serious volume lately on the list. of course, its been a problem for as
long as I can remember. I still like the mailing list flavor vs. a
newsgroup, but the piles are really deep recently. (right now some
people are thinking `of all the people to point this out' or `some nerve' :)

anyway, here's what I propose. I think a split to mailing lists

cpunk-remailers (policies, modifications, etc.)
cpunk-code (PGP, encryption software, phones, etc.)
cpunk-issues (Clipper, PGP investigation, etc.)
cpunk-announce (news articles, fwds from elsewhere on internet
services, etc. -- very low volume)

would probably come pretty close to chopping up the current traffic in popular ways.

NOTE!

since meta list discussions like this generate a notorious amount of
traffic, *please* DO NOT POST to the list on this subject immediately.
Send your mail to list moderator hughes@soda.berkeley.edu, who just
recently complained about the volume and urged that things be kept to
private mail. If EH does not want to do this, let him speak up and say
so and let the froth awash us on the list instead. But maybe he could
come to some kind of conclusion from the email and describe a course of
action. IMHO, a split is the most pragmatic approach to dealing with
the volume, and we really should be a bit embarrassed not to have done it before.

now, of course, the major headache for EH is that he currently has to
handle subscription requests manually. So I wonder if he would like to
explore automated list software, of which there is a great deal.

Like EH I'm genuinely concerned about the really high-class people that
are finding no signals in the noise, despite their basic. The attrition
is really a pity.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: nobody@soda.berkeley.edu
Date: Tue, 21 Sep 93 23:00:15 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Sorry about that...
Message-ID: <9309220556.AA24109@soda.berkeley.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Aargggh! Sorry about the multiple postings of Master Key. The mailer
here has been very strange lately. Sometimes it's down, and when it
comes back up, things which were sent get sent again...
--==<< Infocalypse >>==--





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Sandy <72114.1712@CompuServe.COM>
Date: Tue, 21 Sep 93 20:18:16 PDT
To: <cypherpunks@toad.com>
Subject: PGP IN SF CHRONICLE
Message-ID: <930922031058_72114.1712_FHF61-1@CompuServe.COM>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
  SANDY SANDFORT               Reply to:  ssandfort@attmail.com
 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Punksters,

Remind me someday to explain why I think there are only 10-20
million people in the world, max.  One "proof" is all the
"coincidences" we experience.  Anyway, here's another one.

Because I have written for MONDO 2000, WIRED and FUTURE SEX, a
friend sent me a newspaper clipping about some new culture and
technology oriented magazines.  She thought I should try to crack
them.

FAST COMPANY sounded interesting, so I called the column's writer
to find out where it is published.  We talked for a while and he
mentioned he had an article in today's paper about the PGP
indictments, Phil Zimmermann, etc.  Hey, there are no accidents.
If I'm lyin' I'm flyin'.

The article was neutral to sympathetic.  The factual content was
okay-doke except for one misguided reference to "cypherfreaks."
Oh well, what's in a name?

The article was on the first page of the business section of the
21 September San Francisco Chronicle.  "Cypherfreak" John Gilmore
got in some good quotes.

 S a n d y

>>>>>>    Please send e-mail to:  ssandfort@attmail.com    <<<<<<
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Perry E. Metzger" <pmetzger@lehman.com>
Date: Tue, 21 Sep 93 20:46:43 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: a horrible conspiracy revealed!
In-Reply-To: <9309220241.AA11556@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Message-ID: <9309220341.AA23923@snark.lehman.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



"L. Detweiler" says:
> I was thinking. What is the significance that PRZ was not actually
> cited in any subpoena so far? This is very puzzling. It seems to

I wonder what the significance of L. Detweiler's name is? Obviously
its a Germanic name. Perhaps he's a Nazi... in fact, he might be the

> contradict the theory that the investigation is primarily PGP oriented.
> On one hand, we might attribute it to the idea that the grand jury &

reincarnation of all Nazis, somehow having been transfered into a
single body via the transmigration of souls. We certainly know from

> the Attorneys don't have a very clear idea of what exactly is going on
> with PGP anyway, which would fit in with some of the tidbits I've

open yogic literature that the transmigration of souls is possible.
Then there is his mysterious first name, which, as we know, starts

> posted. The president of ViaCrypt *was* subpoenaed -- but he has only
> been in associated with PGP for a few weeks, since the commercial

with an "L", which is the first letter in the name "Lucifer" too,
which is both a cryptosystem AND the name of the Lord of Hell. Could

> announcement. But, still, how could they *not* query PRZ if they are
> inquiring on PGP?  This is what I call a `conspicuous omission'.

this possibly be a coincidence? No way! In fact, I suspect that the
people who developed it at IBM must in fact be Satanists, as is

> Also, the targeting of ViaCrypt and not PRZ directly is very
> interesting to contemplate. It definitely suggests that the move of PGP

evinced by fact that "IBM" is a three letter acronym, and "GOD" is a
three letter word, but "IBM" is certainly not "GOD", and what could be

> to a commercial company was critical in the timing of the subpoenas.
> Was it critical in convening a grand jury in the first place? what is

further from GOD than the devil! Perhaps, in fact, this is a
conspiracy between the minions of Satan and the transmigrated souls of

> it about the situation that caused action after a company was involved?
> are relevant laws only applicable to companies, not individuals? surely

the Nazis I mentioned earlier! Then there is the odd coincidence of no
one ever having seen "L. Detweiler" and Jim Bidzos' mother in the same

> not, but there is very likely something going on here beneath the surface.
> 
> (BTW, let the record show I have only replied directly to PM's

place at once. Could this possibly be a coincidence? I doubt it. I
suspect that the Grey Aliens may be involved in this, having failed in

> voluminous onslaught of public flames [to say nothing of my vast,
> superb private collection] in one message on the list, which I think is

their attempt to capture Contraterra by placing it in an equilateral
relationship with earth and Jupiter, it appears that they have decided

> sufficient [or more precisely, nothing could be sufficient, but it is
> the minimum]. If there is any `bickering' going on beyond this, it is

instead to kidnap Jim Bidzos' mother and brainwash her into thinking
she was "L. Detweiler"! She may not even know she is being used this

> only the reader's fertile imagination that I was *engaged* [*targeted*?
> definitely]. Or, feel free to cite the messages to contradict me, in

way! I still, however, don't quite yet know how this meshes with the
Nazis and the satanists, but I've been rifling through the garbage

> email. I say all this only because I fear I am becoming a symbol in
> everyone's psyche of any message that challenges PM, no matter who

cans behind the Seeley Wintersmith Mudd building at Miskatonic
University, and I'm certain that the papers may show up any day now

> wrote it, quite to the contrary of actual developments.)

which prove the links between these nefarious forces.





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: peter honeyman <honey@citi.umich.edu>
Date: Tue, 21 Sep 93 20:47:47 PDT
To: ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu
Subject: Re:  the $64K question?
Message-ID: <9309220347.AA05149@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>                                              This definition does not
>                     include information concerning general scientific,
>                     mathematical, or engineering principles commonly
>                     taught in academia. 

as a matter of fact, i am teaching a graduate course in cryptography
this semester and am using pgp as a pedagogical tool.

	peter




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "L. Detweiler" <ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Date: Tue, 21 Sep 93 22:56:45 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: NYT article - WOW
Message-ID: <9309220552.AA15068@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Markoff has written a BRILLIANT article. Virtually all the facts are
right on, and he dances around the technical issues expertly, cutting
to the core. This is FANTASTIC fodder for the cypherpunk cause!
Probably just what PRZ dreamed of when he first wrote PGP :) Does
anyone know Markoff's email address?

Some minor idiosyncrasies, though.

>Receiving the Federal subpoenas were Viacrypt, a Phoenix company
>that plans to sell a licensed version of P.G.P., and Austin Code
>Works of Austin, Tex., which is selling a version of P.G.P. for
>other software developers to incorporate their own programs.

Say what? this is false, from what I understand. *Maybe* `selling a
version of RSA'? There is a rumor that G. Ward intended to include PGP
in distribution disks, unconfirmed. But so far it appears there is very
little related between G. Ward and PGP.

>The
>grand jury subpoenas, which the companies received Sept. 9

from what I can figure out so far, ViaCrypt got theirs on Tuesday, G.
Ward on Thursday. This from their online statements.

But it could have happened on the same day. Note that getting *served*
a subpoena on the same day is very interesting -- if they were just
dated on the same day and received at different times, that would be
more realistic. If they were *served* simultaneously, that implies some
kind of systematic coordination. Did somebody want to make sure that
both places were hit exactly at the same time? Did they anticipate the
rapid-fire explosion in cyberspace that would ensue? Remember, the
grand jury is in California -- it would take some planning to have the
summons *received* simultaneously. Don't they have to be delivered in
person by agents?

>Both publishers said they had no plans to sell their products
>abroad.  

hee, hee. I wonder what Austin Code Works would think of G. Ward's
Usenet postings...

Pres. Leonard Mikus of ViaCrypt
>"They're on a fishing expedition [...]

hm, I wonder where I saw that term used before?

>President Clinton alluded to the problems of controlling
>distribution of software technology in a speech last week promoting
>the North American Free Trade Agreement.  
>
>"Nothing we do in this great capital can change the fact that
>factories or information can flash across the world, that people
>can move money around in the blink of an eye," the President said.
>"Nothing can change the fact that technology can be adopted, once
>created, by people all across the world and then rapidly adapted in
>new and different ways by people who have a little different take
>on the way that technology works."

holy *cow* -- this sounds like something John Barlow of EFF would
write! he almost appears to be alluding to *digital cash*! Obviously,
Mr. President forgot to clear his remarks with the NSA first! Saying
things like this, perhaps we should start a cypherpunk feed to
president@whitehouse.com!  cypherpunks, who'd ever have thought we'd
have something from Mr. President for our signatures?! `technology
rapidly adapted in new and different ways by people who have a little
different take on the way that technology works' -- this is virtually
from the Cypherpunk Charter. GAD!

>"There is a First Amendment right to speak in a encrypted way,"
>said Eben Moglen, a professor of law and legal history at Columbia
>University who is familiar with the case.  "The right to speak
>P.G.P. is like the right to speak Navajo.  The Government has no
>particular right to prevent you from speaking in a technical manner
>even if it is inconvenient for them to understand."

wow, this is *awesome* press. First time I've seen the constitutional
aspect of cryptography dealt with. Markoff has got to be my absolute
favorite writer. 

this is all what is called `bitter joy' ...




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: trestrab@GVSU.EDU (BETH TRESTRAIL)
Date: Tue, 21 Sep 93 21:13:17 PDT
To: David Colston <cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Source code
Message-ID: <9308227486.AA748681677@GVSU.EDU>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


          I would be interested in taking a look at the source for the
          encryption program you mentioned in your post. Thanks. I
          would also be interested in your paper on the subject.

          Jeff
          trestrab@gvsu.edu




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: bart@netcom.com (Harry Bartholomew)
Date: Wed, 22 Sep 93 00:50:16 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: minor address correction
Message-ID: <9309220747.AA18138@netcom5.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Forwarded message:

> Date: Tue, 21 Sep 93 21:35:16 -0600
> From: "L. Detweiler" <ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
    ...
> 
> note: the new sci.crypt FAQ will have a much-improved section on public
> key cryptography. watch for it on the newsgroup or
> rtfm.mit.edu:/pub/usenet/news-answers/cryptography-faq if you want it right away.
> 
> 
    You'll do better in:

/pub/usenet-by-group/news.answers/cryptography-faq" is current directory.
     ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^     ^




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: greg@ideath.goldenbear.com (Greg Broiles)
Date: Wed, 22 Sep 93 01:10:15 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: the $64K question?
In-Reply-To: <9309220314.AA12039@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Message-ID: <qsq00B3w164w@ideath.goldenbear.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


"L. Detweiler" <uunet!longs.lance.colostate.edu!ld231782> writes:

> *wow* -- we find that (1) `computer software and documentation'
> `related to [verb1,verb2,verb3 ad infinitum] of defense articles' is
> *banned*. but in the same paragraph, (2) `general scientific or
> commonly taught mathematical or engineering principles' are *not*
> banned. Surely, (1) is the clause that Bidzos would claim applies --
> restricting the export of technical data in the form of software.


ITAR seems to contemplate (at least) two different classes of things relevant
here: "defense articles" and "technical data". While RSA and IDEA 
implementations may well escape being technical data by way of the academic 
exemption, they are pretty clearly defense articles.

$121.1 General. The United States Muntions List.

(a) The following articles, services, and related technical data are 
designated as defense articles and defense services pursuant to sections 38 
and 47(7) of the Arms Export Control Act (22 USC 2778 and 2794(7)). Changes 
in designations will be published in the Federal Register.

[ . . .]

(c)

[. . .]
Category XIII - Auxiliary Military Equipment

(b) Information Security Systems and equipment, cryptographic devices, 
software, and components, specifically designed or modified therefore, 
including:

(1) Cryptographic (including key management) systems, equipment, assemblies, 
modules, integrated circuits, components or software with the capability of 
maintaining secrecy or confidentiality of information or information 
systems, except cryptographic equipment of software as follows:
   (long list of narrow applications of crypto deleted, none seem relevant.)
(2) [Crypto systems making use of spread spectrum tech.]
(3) Cryptanalytic systems, equipment, assemblies, modules, integrated 
circuits, components, or software.
(4) [Systems for multiuser security of B2 or better, or certification 
software]
(5) Ancillary equipment specifically designed or modified for paragraphs (b) 
(1), (2), (3), (4), or (5) of this category;

[. . .]


[end of quoted ITAR text]

Sorry if the subdivisions/deleted text there is confusing - will snarf the 
full ITAR text tomorrow, perhaps it'll be more nicely formatted.


--
Greg Broiles
greg@goldenbear.com                     Baked, not fried.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: msattler@netcom.com
Date: Wed, 22 Sep 93 01:11:47 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Stunned and amazed
Message-ID: <9309220809.AA09150@netcom.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>Perry Metzger
>Puzzled and incredulous

I'm not one to snivel about bandwidth ('cause I think the Internet can
deal with a lot more text messages from us to ourselves), but the
kind of thing that's gotten Perry in the state he's in reminds me of a
time-honored way of dealing with trivial, nonsensical, toxic waste
messages: IGNORE THEM AND THEY'LL GO AWAY.  It's the attention
that's craved.

We now return you to your insightful cypherpunks list, already in
progress.  :-)  M

-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
Michael S. Sattler         msattler@netcom.com        +1 (415) 358-3058
Digital Jungle Software    Encrypt now; ask me how.   (finger for PGP key)
  "Don't Panic!" -- Douglas Adams     "Don't Panic.  Stay Cool."  -- PRZ 






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "George A. Gleason" <gg@well.sf.ca.us>
Date: Wed, 22 Sep 93 03:13:26 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Master Key: A Clipper Story
Message-ID: <93Sep22.031023pdt.14635-2@well.sf.ca.us>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


This is odd,... I never got the original posting; if anyone can email it to
me I'd be thrilled (gg@well.sf.ca.us)... thanks-
-gg




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: miron@extropia.wimsey.com (Miron Cuperman)
Date: Tue, 21 Sep 93 21:52:48 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: REMAIL: policy
In-Reply-To: <9309210156.AA16050@jobe.shell.portal.com>
Message-ID: <1993Sep22.035655.320@extropia.wimsey.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

My remailer: remail@extropia.wimsey.com
My policy:

- - Logs are kept, encrypted with my public key.  IF you trust me,
and you trust PGP, this should be no problem.  Logs are deleted
once every two weeks.

- - Encryption is required with my remailer.

- - I own the machine extropia.wimsey.com.

- - I am outside the U.S. (in Canada).
- -- 
        Miron Cuperman <miron@extropia.wimsey.com> | NeXTmail/Mime ok
        Unix/C++/DSP,  consulting/contracting      | Public key avail
        AMIX: MCuperman                            |
Laissez faire, laissez passer. Le monde va de lui meme.



-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.3

iQCVAgUBLJ/M6pNxvvA36ONDAQFR/QP+JWqR58p1n9m0u3Mv/eD+pi2ISC0+RlXk
F/UPm3JMcOTfIAhCbTIPT/nDnzPfqoOGPh8toCFt0T7pEvGC54+Smute9RwlxxYB
wYFJlxGgiCzRALTEZVIzR3iwUi1pzlcJFDn3NmvMkQowV8Q57ECU0FjrW3PXyAz5
ynTBO5yqpvc=
=P3Qw
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: koontzd@lrcs.loral.com (David Koontz )
Date: Wed, 22 Sep 93 07:21:53 PDT
To: smb@research.att.com
Subject: Re: crypto import
Message-ID: <9309221417.AA28415@nebula.lrcs.loral.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>123.2 -- Import jurisdiction.
>   The Department of State regulates the temporary import of defense articles.
>   Permanent imports of defense articles into the United States are regulated by
>   the Department of the Treasury (see 27 CFR parts 47, 178 and 179).

Mayhaps this explains why the Treasury is involved with Grady/Zimmerman




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Perry E. Metzger" <pmetzger@lehman.com>
Date: Wed, 22 Sep 93 04:46:52 PDT
To: Timothy Newsham <newsham@wiliki.eng.hawaii.edu>
Subject: Re: a horrible conspiracy revealed
In-Reply-To: <9309220406.AA06728@lehman.com>
Message-ID: <9309221143.AA28956@snark.lehman.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Timothy Newsham says:
> > 
> > 
> > "L. Detweiler" says:
> > > I was thinking. What is the significance that PRZ was not actually
> > > cited in any subpoena so far? This is very puzzling. It seems to
> > 
> > I wonder what the significance of L. Detweiler's name is? Obviously
> > its a Germanic name. Perhaps he's a Nazi... in fact, he might be the
> [...]
> 
> What was the point of this letter?  Is this example output of a
> new stegonagrphy program you just wrote?  where can I get it?
> Do you know mr. subliminal from saturday night live?  Can I meet
> him?  Can I have a porsche ?

If I told you what the point was, there would be no point in having
written it.

Perry




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: khijol!erc@apple.com (Ed Carp)
Date: Wed, 22 Sep 93 08:41:53 PDT
To: gtoal@an-teallach.com (Graham Toal)
Subject: Re: a horrible conspiracy revealed!
In-Reply-To: <9309221433.AA25846@an-teallach.com>
Message-ID: <m0ofVsb-00023cC@khijol>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text


> 	 > I wonder what the significance of L. Detweiler's name is? Obviously
> 	 > its a Germanic name. Perhaps he's a Nazi... in fact, he might be the
> 
> 		Graham> I sincerely *hope* this article was a forgery,
> 		Graham> otherwise Perry you're digging yourself a big
> 		Graham> credibility hole.  Drop it, please.
> 
> 	I guess you didn't get it huh? 
> 	I'm really sick of the flame wars on here, but this one had me laughing
> 	on the floor.
> 
> No, I did get the joke, I just didn't think it was funny.  I *do* remember the

I didn't think it was funny, either - regardless of the motivation.  It was a
rude comment, regardless of the context.  I think someone owes someone else
an apology...
-- 
Ed Carp, N7EKG			erc@apple.com			510/659-9560
                            anon-0001@khijol.uucp
If you want magic, let go of your armor.  Magic is so much stronger than
steel!        -- Richard Bach, "The Bridge Across Forever"



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: b44729@achilles.ctd.anl.gov (Samuel Pigg)
Date: Wed, 22 Sep 93 06:48:30 PDT
To: gtoal@an-teallach.com
Subject: a horrible conspiracy revealed!
In-Reply-To: <10842@an-teallach.com>
Message-ID: <9309221345.AA08006@achilles.ctd.anl.gov>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>>>>> On Wed, 22 Sep 93 11:34:49 GMT, gtoal@an-teallach.com (Graham Toal) said:

	Graham> In article <9309220341.AA23923@snark.lehman.com> pmetzger@lehman.com writes:
 > I wonder what the significance of L. Detweiler's name is? Obviously
 > its a Germanic name. Perhaps he's a Nazi... in fact, he might be the

	Graham> I sincerely *hope* this article was a forgery,
	Graham> otherwise Perry you're digging yourself a big
	Graham> credibility hole.  Drop it, please.

I guess you didn't get it huh? 
I'm really sick of the flame wars on here, but this one had me laughing
on the floor.

But then again, PERHAPS it *WAS* a forgery.. by the BACKBONE cabal...
in COLLABORATION with THE masons AND the ILLUMINATI!!!!!!!! AND....

(insert some more paranoid conspiracy rantings with every other word
in all caps and wildly excessive exclamation points....)

... in an EFFORT the DISCREDIT the MOVEMENT!!!! Let us RALLY together
BROTHERS to FIGHT the EVIL conspiracy that THREATENS our very LIVES!!!!!!!
(BEFORE its too LATE!)


Oh yes.. I agree.. we should split this list.. into:

cypherpunks-list (original charter)

     and

cypherparanoid-list (for those that want to robo-repost articles from other
                     newsgroups with paranoid comments.)

-Sam
(no smiley)







From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: James Still <still@kailua.colorado.edu>
Date: Wed, 22 Sep 93 07:56:53 PDT
To: 'Cypherpunks List' <cypherpunks@toad.com>
Subject: Former S.O.F. Editor Supports PGP in Newspaper
Message-ID: <2CA074F8@kailua.colorado.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Local boy makes good at home.  The Federal Grand Jury's PGP/RSA test
case, as reported in the NYT has hit full circle here in Boulder.
Boulder's own Paul Danish (former editor and writer for Soldier of
Fortune magazine, based in Boulder) has come out in support of PGP/privacy
issues with an excellent op-ed piece in today's Colorado Daily.

The Colorado Daily is read by over 50,000 students, fac/staff and
residents of Boulder and the Univ. of Colorado.  Danish's piece
does an amazing job of backgrounding the issues, presenting them
in layman's terms, and he even goes into the Clipper chip proposal.

Could it be that the NSA/U.S. Customs investigation is causing a
huge backlash of public support in favor of PGP?












From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: doug@netcom.com (Doug Merritt)
Date: Wed, 22 Sep 93 09:26:54 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Why no publication?
In-Reply-To: <0005542837@mcimail.com>
Message-ID: <9309221623.AA25473@netcom2.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


David Colston <0005542837@mcimail.com> said:
>     I have not published for several reasons. The main one is that
>I have no academic creditials.

That is not generally required for publication; what counts is whether
the submitted paper follows the norms.

In some instances referees may want to see that the paper has the support
of someone else in the field who is known or at a known institute to
save themselves wasted time, if the paper is novel and would require
nontrivial time to check, but that's easy enough to obtain.

Page fees can often be waived, too, when someone doesn't have a grant
or institution to pay them.
	Doug




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: paul@poboy.b17c.ingr.com (Paul Robichaux)
Date: Wed, 22 Sep 93 07:53:00 PDT
To: MIKEINGLE@delphi.com (Mike Ingle)
Subject: Re: Public-Key Crypto Toolkit
In-Reply-To: <01H36SZHSIAC8WX5BI@delphi.com>
Message-ID: <199309221449.AA29478@poboy.b17c.ingr.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I'd really like to see the toolkit in plain ol' C. I realize that
other languages and systems have great advantages over C, but C is
portable beyond belief.

It would be nice to have something built & documented like RSAREF but
with the capabilities of PGP (plus D-H exchange) built in. It would
probably see widespread and immediate adoption.

-Paul

-- 
Paul Robichaux, KD4JZG     | "Change the world for a better tomorrow. But
perobich@ingr.com          |  watch your ass today." - aaron@halcyon.com
Intergraph Federal Systems | Be a cryptography user- ask me how.





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Timothy Newsham <newsham@wiliki.eng.hawaii.edu>
Date: Wed, 22 Sep 93 13:50:21 PDT
To: derek@cs.wisc.edu (Derek Zahn)
Subject: Re: Why RSA?
In-Reply-To: <9309221814.AA23907@balder.cs.wisc.edu>
Message-ID: <9309222048.AA20361@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> Regarding the recent proposals for the construction of a toolkit,
> I'm all in favor and would personally welcome the opportunity to
> contribute to such an effort as a hands-on supplement to my
> crypto education.  I have extensive experience with C and C++,
> and am VERY familiar with TCL (pronounced 'tickle', for those
> not in the know).  A good start would be a clear statement of
> purpose.

purpose: to make routines implemented and implemented well within
the PGP program available to programmers.

future purpose: to make a general purpose library of routines
helpful in implementing various crypto systems and protocols.

plan:  Take the PGP source and rip it apart into tiny pieces
and put it back together in an organized way.  Change the
Makefile structure to build various libraries and isolate
the main user interface routines into a seperate group of
files.  Basically a restructuring of PGP that will provide
various intermediate libraries that may be used by other programers
for linking within their program.

*IF* this becomes part of the standard PGP distribution all
non-portable code will be rewritten for various platforms and
you will be able to find a lib for just about any platform
you are coding or porting to.

I havent read through the PGP code myself, but I suggest
at least libraries for the random number routines (including
the system-specific keyboard routines for getting random
seeds), a library for the RSA and IDEA routines, and a library
of the lower-than-RSA math routines.

After this is done then various projects such as a tcl shell
can be written on top of the libraries.

If the library is successful then various additions can be made
to it to make it a true crypto library rather than just a
PGP library.  This could also benefit PGP if it is changed
to allow various crypto systems.

The benefits of this approach are many:  When implementing
PGP front ends you usually dont want the normal PGP front
end at all, and would rather just re-write your own on
top of the PGP code.  When you are coding simple crypto
libraries (like 'link' and 'Circ') it is nice to have a
drop-in cryptosystem library.  The advantages to import-
export are nice as well, you can write code that has no
crypto code in it at all and let the users grab the crypto
library to compile.

> 
> derek
> 




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: gtoal@an-teallach.com (Graham Toal)
Date: Wed, 22 Sep 93 03:52:55 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: New York Times: Federal Inquiry on Software...
Message-ID: <10791@an-teallach.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


In article <199309220117.AA11227@bongo.cc.utexas.edu> zeek@bongo.cc.utexas.edu writes:
 > ----------------------------
 > The New York Times
 > Tuesday, September 21, 1993
 > Business Day
 > ----------------------------
 >  
 >       Federal Inquiry on Software Examines Privacy Programs
 > 
 >                          By John Markoff

John Markoff regularly writes good and informed articles that he has
clearly researched (if that's the right word) by reading usenet and
possibly lists like this one.  Yet I've *never* seen the guy post.  John,
if you're reading this, drop me a line to say hello just so I have your
email address, in case I ever want to mail you something.

Graham
-- 
Personal mail to gtoal@gtoal.com (I read it in the evenings)
Business mail to gtoal@an-teallach.com (Be careful with the spelling!)
Faxes to An Teallach Limited: +44 31 662 4678  Voice: +44 31 668 1550 x212





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Date: Wed, 22 Sep 93 10:50:18 PDT
To: jrk@sys.uea.ac.uk (Richard Kennaway)
Subject: Re: META: Re:  a horrible conspiracy revealed!
In-Reply-To: <26826.9309221459@s5.sys.uea.ac.uk>
Message-ID: <9309221747.AA27907@netcom5.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



> I was about to dFrom owner-cypherpunks  Wed Sep 22 11:13:30 1993
Received: by toad.com id AA18101; Wed, 22 Sep 93 11:11:55 PDT
Received: by toad.com id AA18098; Wed, 22 Sep 93 11:11:39 PDT
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Date: Wed, 22 Sep 93 11:09:48 -0700
From: freeman@MasPar.COM (Jay R. Freeman)
Message-Id: <9309221809.AA14353@cleo.MasPar.Com>
To: broitman@bucrf4.bu.edu, cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re:  NY Times Article...

Oops, mismanaged mailer ... -- Jay Freeman




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: freeman@MasPar.COM (Jay R. Freeman)
Date: Wed, 22 Sep 93 11:13:00 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re:  NY Times Article...
Message-ID: <9309221809.AA14350@cleo.MasPar.Com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> Now, the real question is, will those who still call themselves "post-
> human" in a million years have learned much worthwhile since the
> extinction of homo sapiens? :)

  Fellow post-Australopithecines, how goes it?     8:)

                                      -- Jay Freeman




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Perry E. Metzger" <pmetzger@lehman.com>
Date: Wed, 22 Sep 93 08:16:53 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Public-Key Crypto Toolkit
In-Reply-To: <199309221449.AA29478@poboy.b17c.ingr.com>
Message-ID: <9309221511.AA29362@snark.lehman.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Paul Robichaux says:
> I'd really like to see the toolkit in plain ol' C. I realize that
> other languages and systems have great advantages over C, but C is
> portable beyond belief.

I agree. By having a good toolkit in C, we'd have an easy time not
just prototyping applications but building real and portable ones.

I'd suggest that a streams mechanism, so you could attach various
processes to a bunch of data in sequence the way unix filters work,
would also be nice. That way sequences like

compress -- des -- tran -- des -- idea -- radix-64ify

could be really easily built.

Perry




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: gtoal@an-teallach.com (Graham Toal)
Date: Wed, 22 Sep 93 04:41:51 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: a horrible conspiracy revealed!
Message-ID: <10842@an-teallach.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


In article <9309220341.AA23923@snark.lehman.com> pmetzger@lehman.com writes:
 > I wonder what the significance of L. Detweiler's name is? Obviously
 > its a Germanic name. Perhaps he's a Nazi... in fact, he might be the

I sincerely *hope* this article was a forgery, otherwise Perry you're
digging yourself a big credibility hole.  Drop it, please.

G
-- 
Personal mail to gtoal@gtoal.com (I read it in the evenings)
Business mail to gtoal@an-teallach.com (Be careful with the spelling!)
Faxes to An Teallach Limited: +44 31 662 4678  Voice: +44 31 668 1550 x212





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Eric.K.Kuecherer@Dartmouth.EDU (Eric K. Kuecherer)
Date: Wed, 22 Sep 93 12:31:56 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: No Subject
Message-ID: <5412341@blitzen.Dartmouth.EDU>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Please remove me from the list.

-kuech-




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: strick -- henry strickland <strick@versant.com>
Date: Wed, 22 Sep 93 12:06:56 PDT
To: pmetzger@lehman.com
Subject: Re: Public-Key Crypto Toolkit
In-Reply-To: <9309221511.AA29362@snark.lehman.com>
Message-ID: <9309221906.AA03782@versant.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


THUS SPAKE "Perry E. Metzger" <pmetzger@lehman.com>:
# 
# Paul Robichaux says:
# > I'd really like to see the toolkit in plain ol' C. I realize that
# > other languages and systems have great advantages over C, but C is
# > portable beyond belief.

It should be at two layers.  TCL (pronounced "tickle") is merely a
layer on top of C.  

(By the way, GENERIC TCL is Plain Old C, and Portable Beyond Belief.  A
lot more portable than mediocre C.  GENERIC TCL is an #ifdef that shuts
off all commands that use any operating system services (besides
malloc() and free()) -- it's merely a string-based language
interpreter, with designed with friendly conventions for adding new
commands that are wrappers of C API.  Supplement GENERIC TCL with
some stdio.h routine wrappers (fopen, fclose, fgets, fputs), and you'll
be happy.  Compiled instantly on my macintosh, even.)

# I agree. By having a good toolkit in C, we'd have an easy time not
# just prototyping applications but building real and portable ones.

Yes, you want a complete C api.    I don't argue against that.

First you assemble your C API at a complete layer.  It'll look a lot
like the RSAREF API.  In fact, the RSAREF portion of it *will be* the
RSAREF API.

You see, RSAREF already is a crypto toolkit.  Not as full as you may
like, but enough to do most basic public-key-cryptosystem stuff.  The
reference implementations of MD2 and MD5 are also part of the C toolkit
API.   And the bignumber packages.  We've already got *lots* of these.

But have you tried using RSAREF API to do anything?  C API are a
notorious pain in the butt to use -- allocating & deallocating memory,
twiddling bits, writing functions to copy one data format to another,
etc.  They're the reason we're not writing code!  When you elevate to a
"scrypting" language, it becomes really easy (even fun) to experiment
and hack stuff together.

# I'd suggest that a streams mechanism, so you could attach various
# processes to a bunch of data in sequence the way unix filters work,
# would also be nice. That way sequences like
# 
# compress -- des -- tran -- des -- idea -- radix-64ify
# 
# could be really easily built.

Yes, but now you just suggested Shell and Streams rather than C as the
easy-to-use interface into this kit.

You've rejected then rediscovered the reason for a "scrypting"
language.  I think you don't yet understand how TCL is used.  You'll be
much more productive in TCL than hacking weird data flows and futzing
with temporary files and klutzy syntax and counting your nested escape
and quote characters in Shell.  (Most shell things are not one simple
pipe from front to end.)

There's still a time and a place for shell stuff -- fortunately there
(finally) is a standard "tclsh" unix (or POSIX) main.c that you can use to
mix your TCL scripts with Unix Shell scripts.  (You could do it before,
but it was more of a "test" program or homegrown driver than part of a
standard main.c)



ANYWAY -- I should quit ranting and Just Start Writing Code.

Unfortunately I'll be out of town till early October....
Perhaps I can suggest some specs before then.

                                                             _
                                               menya zavoot cmpuk
                                               strick@versant.com



TCL is available via ftp from sprite.berkeley.edu and is freely distributable.
UNIX is a registered trademark of whomever bought it last.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Matthew B. Landry <mbl@ml7694a.leonard.american.edu>
Date: Wed, 22 Sep 93 09:20:18 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: NYT article - WOW
Message-ID: <9309221619.AA16509@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


"L. Detweiler" writes:
>write! he almost appears to be alluding to *digital cash*! Obviously,
>Mr. President forgot to clear his remarks with the NSA first! Saying
        He doesn't have to clear it with the spooks first. _They_ work for 
_him_! Maybe we'll all get really lucky and have someone in charge who realizes 
that. (Personally, I'm not holding my breath, but there's always some hope.)
--
Matthew B. Landry
ml7694a@american.edu
(Finally!) mbl@ml7694a.leonard.american.edu




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: derek@cs.wisc.edu (Derek Zahn)
Date: Wed, 22 Sep 93 11:18:00 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Why RSA?
Message-ID: <9309221814.AA23907@balder.cs.wisc.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text



First, my sincere gratitude for the replies to my queries
regarding public key cryptography patents.  To pay back
such generosity, I will summarize.  Also, I have done a
little more digging and will present my findings, even
though those findings include more questions!

My original question was why cypherpunks don't just
pick some non-RSA public key algorithm to achieve
widespread distribution of cryptographic tools.  My
contention is that for such widespread distribution
to occur, the price must be small in comparison to
the average user's electronic communication outlay,
and the tools must be beyond reproach legally so that
it can be distributed by commercial email tool providers
in a form that is elegantly integrated into the user's
environment.  My mother will not fetch, install, and
configure PGP, though she might pay $10 - $20 more for
an email product with "privacy enhancements".  My
reading of the comp.patents FAQ leads me to understand
that any use of PGP by an individual in the U.S. is in
violation of U.S. law (though the chances of being
prosecuted are vanishingly small).  Cypherpunks probably
don't care too much about that, but the masses waiting
for conversion probably do.

The reasons for the desirability of widespread public
key tools are obvious, even without considering the
collapse of governments.  For example, digital signatures
can be used to authenticate electronically-distributed
software upgrades, and so on (but this is all old hat
to the folks on this list!).

Unfortunately, as Perry Metzger pointed out:

> All are patented in so far as one of the patents covers ALL public key
> schemes. Some, like Rabin's scheme, have possible technical advantages
> over RSA.

First, a note:  "Rabin's scheme" is (as Perry said) the one provably linked
to factoring (a major advance!) and I assume it's the one implemented in
RPEM.  According to the RIPEM FAQ, PKP squashed that development by claiming
that their patents were broad enough to cover Rabin's scheme, and the
effort was abandoned "for pragmatic reasons" (another example of how
superior technology can be suppressed by monopolies).  

Now, I've looked a little further into the patent issue, and I remain
kind of confused.  I went to the library and read the four patents
in question (but only made a hardcopy of the first chronologically).
I found the documents difficult to understand (for legal rather than
crypto-tech reasons).  All four applications were made in 1977-1978,
and the patents were granted variously from 1980-1984.  The earliest
one has Hellman, Diffie, and Merkle as inventors; the second just
Hellman and Merkle.  Both are assigned to Stanford University.  It
seems to me that one of these is the one that covers, broadly, public
key cryptography -- presumably the earliest one (4,200,770), since 
it has all three major players as inventors and the language of the
eight claims seems to be rather broad (though only the second patent,
4,218,582, has the phrase "public key" in its title).

Patent 4,405,829, granted in 1983, is for the RSA algorithm [footnote:
the RSA patent apparently celebrated its tenth birthday two days ago;
was there a party?].  There is no overlap between this patent's
inventors and assignees and the earlier more general patent.  Here's
a question for somebody in the know:  if the earlier patents cover
all public key cryptography and RSA is a public key system, isn't it
in violation of the earlier broader patent?  Does PKP pay license
fees to Stanford, or were they granted exclusive rights by Stanford
as well as MIT?

Similarly, apparently a public-key scheme called Warlock has been
granted patent protection.  How is this possible if somebody else
holds patents covering all of public key encryption?

If I understand patents correctly (hah!) they last for 17 years from
the time they are granted.  This means that the earliest public key
patent will expire in about 3.5 years.  After that presumably
there will be no restrictions on new public key systems.  The RSA
patent would expire in 2000.

If somebody could clarify which patent is the "broad" public key
patent, I'd appreciate it (even with them right in front of me,
I can't tell)!  My guess is that it would have to be either
4,200,770 or 4,218,582 -- if it's the latter, how did Merkle
get squeezed out of inventorship?

Respondents to my initial questions pointed out that the patents
may be over-broad and could be challenged on those grounds; given
the history of how public key crypto was invented, it seems to
me that it would be difficult to contend that the idea is obvious
(Simmons says that the idea "stunned" the crypto community) -- but
I'm no lawyer, and I'll leave that issue to those with more skill,
brains, and money than me!

For now, then, my conclusion is that for four more years at least,
licensing RSA from PKP is probably the only viable commercial option
for companies who wish to give their users public key crypto capabilities.

It seems that the designers of Internet Privacy Enhanced Mail (PEM)
agreed with this assessment, as they took the unusual step of including
proprietary RSA in their standard.  For their part, in RFC 1170, PKP
states:

  "We assure the interested parties that Public Key Partners will comply
  with all of the policies of ANSI and the IEEE concerning the availability
  of licenses to practice this art.  Specifically, in support of any RSA
  signature standard which may be adopted, Public Key Partners hereby
  gives its assurance that licenses to practice RSA signatures will be
  available under reasonable terms and conditions on a non-discriminatory
  basis."

That sounds good -- but is troublingly vague.  I have stated earlier what
*I* think is are "reasonable terms" for the inclusion of a minor feature
like PEM-compliance in an email processing system, but I don't get
to decide that.  If anybody knows more specifically how the standards
bodies interpreted "reasonable", please let me know.  As I am contemplating
developing a PEM-compliant product, I will be writing to PKP to discuss
licensing arrangements, but information from others (best: expressed
publicly) would be helpful.  If RSA is the only game in town, let's at
least be clear about the price of admission.

There seems to be a chance that manufacturing PGP-aware products
(but not distributing PGP itself) could slide by, but it could also
be interpreted as "inducement to infringe" which would apparently
be actionable.

The second point in my earlier message, largely obsoleted by the answer to
the first, involved the development of new public key systems.  Given that
selling or otherwise using or distributing a new system now would invite
litigation, the question is rather moot, but I'd like to thank L.
Detweiler and P. Metzger for their comments on the all-important
issue of trusting new algorithms.

Finally, I suppose that it's always possible to come up with some
radically new encryption technique that could be used to support
authentication and yet have nothing to do with public key crypto...
but I'm not holding my breath.

Regarding the recent proposals for the construction of a toolkit,
I'm all in favor and would personally welcome the opportunity to
contribute to such an effort as a hands-on supplement to my
crypto education.  I have extensive experience with C and C++,
and am VERY familiar with TCL (pronounced 'tickle', for those
not in the know).  A good start would be a clear statement of
purpose.

If this "Why RSA" thread has been too basic and has caused
frustration for that reason, please forgive me.  I have learned
a great deal, and I hope that somebody somewhere else has
profited as well.

derek



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: David Colston <0005542837@mcimail.com>
Date: Wed, 22 Sep 93 06:38:28 PDT
To: cypherpunks <cypherpunks@toad.com>
Subject: PKZ and NON-RSA
Message-ID: <60930922131606/0005542837NA1EM@mcimail.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


When I posted the offer for source code to a non-RSA public key
yesterday, little did I know that I would be beseiged by requests.
I will therefore send the paper on the matter to cypherpunks and
ask that anyone wanting a copy of the source send me a floppy. 
Any size or density is okay.

As a preamble to this paper, I'd like to note why and how it was
developed. After the first release of PGP, Phil told me he was 
worried about using RSA. I offered to come up with another scheme
and originally designed a version of Rabin. I asked Phil to post
a copy of that paper on sci.crypt since I do not have internet
access. There were few responces, none of which attacked the 
safety of the method, but mainly stated that it was a version of
Rabin.

Nothing was ever done with that proposal. A year latter, 2.0 PGP
was due to be released and I came up with the current public key
system. Again, Phil ignored it. Posts on sci.crypt were totally
ignored by anyone with the ability to judge the math. Phil was
then approached by the customs folks and I recieved a call from
him in December of last year. By that time I was tired of waiting
around for Phil and had coded QPK (Quick Public Key) in PDS 7.1.

At any rate, I suggested that Phil foward a copy of the program to
RSA and see if they would challenge that program in court. He
declined. It became apparant that Phil wanted to stick with the
original RSA concept and would refuse to do anything with another
approach, although he did stick an bite in 2.1 to flag an encryption
as being non-RSA.

At any rate, I believe that RSA would not attempt to defend the 
original public key patent in court, since it smacks of over kill.
They attempt in the RSA pattent to claim any encryption method 
involving a polynomial modulo another number. This is clearly prior
art, since Ceaser used m+1 mod n as an encrytion method.

The program I generated has been posted on Compuserve, Bix, and GEnie
for over a year with no feed back from anyone, even though I am
resonably sure that RSA is aware of its existance. They have not
challenged it because there has been no publicity. I would welcome
a court challenge on the whole idea of crypto patents. The customs
thing is meerly a way for RSA to challenge Phil and scare off others
while avoiding a test of their patents.


The "paper" follows.




   FOR THE MATHEMATICALLY ORIENTED - HOW A QUICK PUBLIC KEY WORKS.

Math notation:
+                 plus
-                 minus
+-                plus or minus
*                 multiplication
/                 division
^                 exponent
<>                unequal
=                 equals
==                congruent
<                 less than
>                 greater than
INT               truncated integer round
SQR               square root
(                 open expression
)                 close expression
x^-1  modulo p    the multiplicative inverse of x in the field of p
x... y            the range of values
XOR               exclusive or
N                 a number equal to P times Q, where P and Q are prime

Variables in capital letters are permanent and those in small letters
are temporary.

                              BACKGROUND

Because the "secret key" function of many public keys  methods are so
slow, most cryptographers use these functions only to "boot strap"
into a conventional key system, which is faster to send the actual
message. Most of the conventional key systems use comparatively small
numbers in relation to the size of the public N as a "random seed
number". The holder of the secret key may actually have a larger
amount of computer time to decipher the starting point of the
conventional algorithm than to decipher the actual message. It would
seem to be a good idea, if a public key function could take advantage
of the actual message size required to speed up the public key
process. The range of message sizes is described below, but generally
speaking we a discussing messages less than SQR(Q) in actual size.

Imagine a series of related equations modulo a prime, P. These
equations have the formula ((e * e + e)/2 * L + C) modulo P. The
value, C, is a constant determined by the rule (L - 1) * (1 / (2 * L))
modulo P == C. For L = 1, C = 0. Therefore, if L is known, the
expression ((e * e + e)/2) modulo P may be determined, even if e is
unknown.

Each value of L has an area or series of areas, in which the value of
e becomes discoverable, WITHOUT resorting to a modular square root.
ie. Let r == ((e * e + e)/2 * L + C) modulo P. If e is in the correct
range relative to L, then (r * L * 8 + (L - 2) * (L - 2)) will have an
integer square root and the value, e, may be determined with ease. The
range of values of e, for any value of L, which have this property and
the location of those values vary greatly. The following illustrates a
public key approach for L = 12, but other values of L may also be
used. Perhaps I should also note that the particular L, which a secret
key holder uses need not be public knowledge, but is not all that
sensitive.

       ESTABLISHING A QUICK PUBLIC KEY (Q.P.K.) BASED ON L = 12

A person wishing to receive public messages, which he/she alone can
decrypt calculates N = P * Q. Where P and Q are a randomly selected
prime numbers, Q being the larger.

A == (11 * 24^-1 ) modulo Q
B == (2 * A) modulo Q
D = Q - B
If D > (Q - 1)/2 then set D = Q - D - 1.
F = (Q - 1)/2 - D

NOTE: We may chose to use the F for all of the following calculations
      instead of D. This applies to no value of L lower than 12 and F
      is not valid for most sequences higher than 12. F may be an even
      safer value to use, for reasons which are too long to discuss
      here. L is NOT super-sensitive information.

Let Y1 ... Y2 be a range of numbers with in the limits:
(D - k) and (D + k), where k = INT(SQR(2 * Q / 12)).  Y1 may be
randomly selected from any point in this range, but Y2 may not be
larger than (D + k), and Y2 - Y1 is the maximum message size.

A message range for N, public information, is then created by using
Chinese remainder theorem to find the modular intersection Q == Y1
and P == x, x being a random number in the range x > 0, x < P.
This intersection is called S. A check is made to verify the
following:

A' = (11 * 24^-1) modulo N
B' == (2 * A') modulo N
D' = N - B'
If D' > (N - 1)/2 then Set D' = N - D' - 1
NOTE: P, Q, D, F, Y1, Y2, k, A, AND B are secret values.

                          Q.P.K. ENCRYPTION

A public key for short messages consists of S and N.

To send a Message the sender calculates:
e = (S + Message)
((e * e + e)/2) modulo N == Cipher

                          Q.P.K. DECRYPTION

t ==  Cipher modulo Q
f == (t * 12 + A) modulo Q
g = SQR(f * 8 * 12 + 100)

NOTE: If g is NOT an integer value, the message is rejected as
      invalid. If g modulo (2 * L) <> (L - 2) then Q is repetitively
      added to g until g modulo (2 * L) == (L - 2).

z = (g - 10)/24
e == ((B - 1) + z) modulo Q
If e > (Q - 1)/2 then set e = (Q - 1) - e.
Message = e - Y1

For other values of L:
A == ((L - 1) * 2^-1* L^-1)) modulo Q
k = INT(SQR(2 * Q / L))
NOTE: If L = 1 then D = 0 and the message range is 1... k.
      If L = 2 then the message range is D... (Q - 1)/2 and these
      values modulo Q are already perfect squares < Q.
f == (t * L + A) modulo Q
g = SQR(f * 8 * L + (L - 2) ^ 2)
z = (g - (L - 2)/(L * 2))

If anyone wants the source code for this drop a disk to:

Colston & Associates
5111 Rogers Ave. Suite 507
Fort Smith, AR 72903





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: accom!erc%accom@uunet.UU.NET (Ed Carp)
Date: Wed, 22 Sep 93 13:42:00 PDT
To: uunet!cs.wisc.edu!derek@uunet.UU.NET
Subject: Re: Why RSA?
Message-ID: <9309222034.AA10004@accom.accom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> My
> reading of the comp.patents FAQ leads me to understand
> that any use of PGP by an individual in the U.S. is in
> violation of U.S. law (though the chances of being
> prosecuted are vanishingly small).

I doubt it - the reason why is because under patent law, ther is an
exclusion granted for educational, research, or experimental purposes.  So,
if you're using PGP to make money, you are in violation of PKP's patents
(assuming they are, in fact PKP's patents to begin with and that Stanford
and MIT had the right to reassign exclusive rights to something that was
developed with public funds) and they would be quite right (legally speaking)
to come and sue your ass off.  ;)

> in violation of the earlier broader patent?  Does PKP pay license
> fees to Stanford, or were they granted exclusive rights by Stanford
> as well as MIT?

I doubt that this would stand up in court.  Universities often grant development
and marketing rights to patents for stuff developed by them, but I seriously
doubt that this is what either the original drafters of the patent laws or
Stanford had in mind when they granted rights to PKP to develop and market
the stuff.

-- Ed




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: broitman@bucrf4.bu.edu (Jeff Broitman)
Date: Wed, 22 Sep 93 10:46:55 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: NY Times Article...
Message-ID: <9309221741.AA21943@bucrf4.bu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Could someone post the entire article (that is if you have nothing
else to do with your time....)

-jZb
%#%#%#%#%#%#%#%#%#%#%#%#%#%#%#%#%#%#%#%#%#%#%#%#%#%#%#%#%#%#%#%#%#%#%#%#%#%#%#%
		               Internet:broitman@koala.bu.edu
J.Z.Broitman				broitman@radon.bu.edu
Dept. of Chemistry       		broitman@carbon.bu.edu
Boston University			broitman@xenon.bu.edu
			          Snail:42 Maynard St. W.Newton MA. 02165
%#%#%#%#%#%#%#%#%#%#%#%#%#%#%#%#%#%#%#%#%#%#%#%#%#%#%#%#%#%#%#%#%#%#%#%#%#%#%#%




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: baumbach@atmel.com (Peter Baumbach)
Date: Wed, 22 Sep 93 11:23:31 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: the public key minefield
Message-ID: <9309221759.AA09589@bass.chp.atmel.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>  derek@cs.wisc.edu (Derek Zahn)
> >* in broad terms, what would I have to do to develop an
> >  algorithm that works from a user's perspective like
> >  p.k.c. (ie public/private keys, the central functional
> >  point of all the wonderful schemes based on pkc) but
> >  doesn't violate patents?
L. Detweiler writes:
> others have well addressed how patent issues are involved in this. but
> this appears to be a simple technical question on one level. What does
> it take to come up with a good public key system?

How about a poor public key system?  What is the simplest public key
system you can invent, if you didn't care that it is trivial to break?
If the NSA can crack RSA, does that change the fact that it is a pkc?

message=99

public_key= 1/3
private_key= 3

encrypted_message= message * public_key
message= encrypted_message * private_key

Would PKP reading of their patent claims cover this pkc?  Seems overbroad!

Peter Baumbach
baumbach@atmel.com




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Duncan Frissell <frissell@panix.com>
Date: Wed, 22 Sep 93 12:20:19 PDT
To: CYPHERPUNKS@toad.com
Subject: News You Can Use
Message-ID: <199309221916.AA17396@panix.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


AP 09/21 0844  Encryption Software

Copyright, 1993. The Associated Press. All rights reserved.

   SAN JOSE, Calif. (AP) -- A federal grand jury is investigating exports 
of a controversial computer program in a case that could affect how 
software is distributed worldwide.
   U.S. Customs officials asked for an investigation into ViaCrypt of 
Phoenix and Austin Code Works of Austin, Texas, and the companies' plans 
for foreign distribution of software, including PGP, a program that turns 
data into an indecipherable code using encryption technology.
   William Keane, an assistant U.S. attorney, confirmed that an 
investigation is continuing, but declined to comment on the case.
   The PGP program has been distributed worldwide over computer networks 
by some computer enthusiasts who oppose the U.S. government's trade 
regulations on encryption.
   The National Security Agency, which monitors international 
communications, has supported strict encryption technology export 
regulations, arguing that it would be difficult to keep tabs on hostile 
governments and foreign terrorists.
   But opponents say the restrictions hurt sales and violate the First
Amendment that protects the right to publish information about encryption.
   "I wrote PGP to make democracy healthier. I didn't do it to make 
money," said Philip Zimmermann, a computer consultant who developed PGP.
   "We believe everything we are doing is above board and well within the 
law," said ViaCrypt president Leonard Mikus. He said the company had no 
intentions of violating export regulations.



WP (Washington Post) 09/18  Encryption Program Stirs Security Debate

By John Mintz and John Schwartz
Washington Post Staff Writers

    Computer industry officials and civil-liberties activists are 
launching new attacks on the Clinton administration's plan to make the 
so-called clipper computer chip the national standard for encrypting, or 
scrambling, data and voice communications.
    Under the clipper plan announced this year by the Clinton White House,
police agencies that receive court authorization for a wiretap to 
intercept encrypted communications would then need the technological 
cooperation of two independent "escrow" agents to crack the code.
    Earlier this week administration officials told congressional staff 
members that the two escrow agents will be officials of two government 
agencies: the Commerce Department's National Institute of Standards and 
Technology (NIST), and a non-law enforcement section of the Treasury 
Department that has not been selected.
    Yesterday industry and civil-liberties groups criticized that 
selection because they said NIST and Treasury are not independent, but 
arms of the same federal government that could some day be called upon to 
listen in on their communications.
    Douglas Miller, government affairs representative of the Software
Publishers Association, made up of U.S. software firms, said his group has
"grave doubts" that foreign corporations will encrypt their communications 
with the clipper chip because "the U.S. government holds the key."
    A main reason the administration is promoting clipper is that the U.S.
National Security Agency, the super-secret code-breaking agency, wants to
discourage use of highly capable, non-clipper encryption programs that are
becoming increasingly popular but  that  the NSA can't pierce.
    Industry officials for years have regarded NIST as a stalking horse 
for the NSA.
    Jerry Berman, director of the Washington office of the Electronic 
Frontier Foundation, which promotes public-interest causes in 
technology-policy areas, said NIST is "so close to the NSA that it can't 
give the public comfort that this is a true escrow system."
    John Podesta, assistant to the president and a key White House staff 
member on this issue, said such objections are "a phony issue."
    "We clearly are looking for procedures and escrow agents that would
maintain privacy and confidentiality and security of the keys," Podesta 
said.  "Cryptography lends itself to a certain degree of paranoia."
    Kate Martin, director of the Center for National Security Studies of 
the American Civil Liberties Union, mocked use of the term "escrow" in 
this case. An escrow agent is someone who is independent of two parties 
potentially in conflict, like a settlement attorney at a real estate 
closing, she said.
    "As long as the escrow agents are government agencies, it's misleading 
to call them that," she said. "The government doesn't have a fiduciary 
obligation to the people whose (communications) keys it holds," but only 
to the government.
    "The whole idea continues to be structurally flawed," said Bruce 
Heiman, attorney for the Business Software Alliance, a group of top U.S. 
software firms, such as Microsoft, Novell, Lotus and Apple. Companies and 
individuals who transmit secure information "will have serious doubts 
about the integrity of the system."
    Since the government currently prevents the export of many powerful
U.S.-made encryption techniques, the administration's attempts to promote 
its clipper chip "will discourage use of encryption, period, or hand over 
the market for encryption to foreigners."
    When one listens to an encrypted conversation, it sounds like a 
crackle or buzz.
    Under the plan, every law-enforcement agency will have a special 
personal computer or "black box" to descramble that crackle, but the 
device will work only when they have been given a special key from the 
escrow agents.
    When police get a judge's permission to intercept an encrypted 
conversation or stream of computerized data, they would use the box to 
determine the special encryption identifier or label assigned to that 
particular encryption device.
    A detective would notify NIST and Treasury that he or she has 
permission to listen in on the party. NIST and Treasury would have a list 
of the secret encryption key numbers - extremely long lists of 0s and 1s - 
for every encryption device sold in the  United States.  NIST and Treasury 
would find the appropriate one on the list, and then they would send the 
needed key number to the police over telephone lines. The police would 
then insert that decoder number into the black box to tap the phone line 
in question.
    The ACLU's Martin said the government, given lists of secret 
encryption numbers, "has an enormously greater ability to eavesdrop than 
it's ever had." Government officials deny that.


Duncan Frissell

The $1 Trillion/year Health Security Act of 1993, the most expensive 
government program in the hisotry of mankind.

--- WinQwk 2.0b#0
                                                                                                                      




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: gtoal@an-teallach.com (Graham Toal)
Date: Wed, 22 Sep 93 07:37:59 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re:  a horrible conspiracy revealed!
Message-ID: <9309221433.AA25846@an-teallach.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


	 > I wonder what the significance of L. Detweiler's name is? Obviously
	 > its a Germanic name. Perhaps he's a Nazi... in fact, he might be the

		Graham> I sincerely *hope* this article was a forgery,
		Graham> otherwise Perry you're digging yourself a big
		Graham> credibility hole.  Drop it, please.

	I guess you didn't get it huh? 
	I'm really sick of the flame wars on here, but this one had me laughing
	on the floor.

No, I did get the joke, I just didn't think it was funny.  I *do* remember the
thread some time ago of Perry being accused of being a Nazi because a well-
known Illinois Nazi has the same surname. I meant he was losing credibility
for indulging in childish games, not for meaning whatever he said literally.
I'd rather the pair of them just let it drop, instead of trying to outsmart
each other.

G




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: David Colston <0005542837@mcimail.com>
Date: Wed, 22 Sep 93 09:06:54 PDT
To: Carl Ellison <cme@ellisun.sw.stratus.com>
Subject: Why no publication?
Message-ID: <72930922153527/0005542837NA4EM@mcimail.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Carl,
     I have not published for several reasons. The main one is that
I have no academic creditials. My masters is in Rehab Counseling. I
haven't had a math course since high school in 1964. I am mainly
self taught in the area of math and crypto, but have had a lot of
assistance from Charlie Merritt and Joel Benston. They were two of
the 3 authors of Dedicate 32, the first public key crypto program
for the PC, which was released in the early 80's. 
     As I have noted, the paper was sent to sci.crypt by PKZ.
/s




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: J. Michael Diehl <mdiehl@triton.unm.edu>
Date: Wed, 22 Sep 93 14:48:37 PDT
To: erc@apple.com
Subject: Re: a horrible conspiracy revealed!
In-Reply-To: <m0ofVsb-00023cC@khijol>
Message-ID: <9309222145.AA23428@triton.unm.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


According to Ed Carp:
> > 	 > I wonder what the significance of L. Detweiler's name is? Obviously
> > 	 > its a Germanic name. Perhaps he's a Nazi... in fact, he might be the
> > 		Graham> I sincerely *hope* this article was a forgery,
> > 		Graham> otherwise Perry you're digging yourself a big
> > 		Graham> credibility hole.  Drop it, please.
> > 	I guess you didn't get it huh? 
> > 	I'm really sick of the flame wars on here, but this one had me laughing
> > 	on the floor.
>>No, I did get the joke, I just didn't think it was funny.  I *do* remember the
> I didn't think it was funny, either - regardless of the motivation.  It was a
> rude comment, regardless of the context.  I think someone owes someone else
> an apology...

Ditto!  I also propose that the next person who continues this thread gets
sent a flame-mail from everyone else on this list who thinks this is silly.

So how about it?


J. Michael Diehl   ;^)  |*The 2nd Amendment is there in case the 
mdiehl@triton.unm.edu   | Government forgets about the 1st!  <RL>
Mike.Diehl@f29.n301.z1  |*God is a good Physicist, and an even 
    .fidonet.org        | better Mathematician.  <Me>
al945@cwns9.ins.cwru.edu|*I'm just looking for the opportunity to 
 (505) 299-2282 (voice) | be Politically Incorrect! <Me>
Can we impeach him yet? |*Protected by 18 USC 2511 and 18 USC 2703. 
PGP Key = 7C06F1 = A6 27 E1 1D 5F B2 F2 F1  12 E7 53 2D 85 A2 10 5D




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: jrk@sys.uea.ac.uk (Richard Kennaway)
Date: Wed, 22 Sep 93 08:00:18 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: META: Re:  a horrible conspiracy revealed!
Message-ID: <26826.9309221459@s5.sys.uea.ac.uk>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I was about to do an ::exclude on this thread, when I realised that it was
the cypherpunks list and not the extropians.  Any chance of cypherpunks
running the extropian list software?  Or maybe it does already?

--                                  ____
Richard Kennaway                  __\_ /    School of Information Systems
Internet:  jrk@sys.uea.ac.uk      \  X/     University of East Anglia
uucp:  ...mcsun!ukc!uea-sys!jrk    \/       Norwich NR4 7TJ, U.K





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: derek@cs.wisc.edu (Derek Zahn)
Date: Wed, 22 Sep 93 14:26:59 PDT
To: warlord@MIT.EDU (Derek Atkins)
Subject: Toolkit
In-Reply-To: <9309222117.AA01001@toxicwaste.MEDIA.MIT.EDU>
Message-ID: <9309222124.AA24232@balder.cs.wisc.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text


> If you plan to do this yourself, I can guarantee you, 100%, that
> *NONE* of your work will go into the next release of PGP!
> 
> The work you suggest is underway.  Please be patient, for if you
> did look at the PGP code, you would see what spaghetti it really
> is!  If you remain patient, and wait for the next release, then
> maybe things will be a lot better for you!)

Well, this highlights an issue -- should a Toolkit be based
on PGP or RSAREF?  If the releasers of PGP are disinclined
toward the project, perhaps RSAREF would make more sense
(though I suppose that depends on how much cypherpunks hate
RSAREF).

> -derek

derek
(er, damn, the *other* derek)



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: danodom@matt.ksu.ksu.edu (Dan Odom)
Date: Wed, 22 Sep 93 14:52:00 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com (Cypherpunks)
Subject: IDEA implementation
Message-ID: <9309222148.AA02182@matt.ksu.ksu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



With all this talk about various libraries going on, I figure I might
as well ask this:

Is there an implementation of IDEA that will let me do something like
this:

encryptedbuf = encypher (databuf, buflen, passphrase);

Where the arguments mean the obvious, and databuf can be of arbitrary
length?

If not, I may do it, but I wouldn't want to duplicate efforts :-)

-- 
Dan Odom
danodom@matt.ksu.ksu.edu -- Kansas State University, Manhattan, KS

PGP key by finger or request.



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Derek Atkins <warlord@MIT.EDU>
Date: Wed, 22 Sep 93 14:20:21 PDT
To: Timothy Newsham <newsham@wiliki.eng.hawaii.edu>
Subject: Re: Why RSA?
In-Reply-To: <9309222048.AA20361@toad.com>
Message-ID: <9309222117.AA01001@toxicwaste.MEDIA.MIT.EDU>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> plan:  Take the PGP source and rip it apart into tiny pieces
> and put it back together in an organized way.  Change the
> Makefile structure to build various libraries and isolate
> the main user interface routines into a seperate group of
> files.  Basically a restructuring of PGP that will provide
> various intermediate libraries that may be used by other programers
> for linking within their program.

If you plan to do this yourself, I can guarantee you, 100%, that
*NONE* of your work will go into the next release of PGP!

The work you suggest is underway.  Please be patient, for if you
did look at the PGP code, you would see what spaghetti it really
is!  If you remain patient, and wait for the next release, then
maybe things will be a lot better for you!)

---A concerned citizen who hates people who re-invent the wheel
or duplicate others' efforts!!!

-derek




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Derek Atkins <warlord@MIT.EDU>
Date: Wed, 22 Sep 93 14:48:04 PDT
To: derek@cs.wisc.edu (Derek Zahn)
Subject: Re: Toolkit
In-Reply-To: <9309222124.AA24232@balder.cs.wisc.edu>
Message-ID: <9309222144.AA01084@toxicwaste.MEDIA.MIT.EDU>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> Well, this highlights an issue -- should a Toolkit be based
> on PGP or RSAREF?  If the releasers of PGP are disinclined
> toward the project, perhaps RSAREF would make more sense
> (though I suppose that depends on how much cypherpunks hate
> RSAREF).

No, you misunderstand.  The "releasers of PGP" are ***NOT***
disinclined towards the project.  They are implementing your
suggestions for the next release!!!!!  The next release will, short of
actually BUILDING the library, have a set of functions that a
programmer can use to access the crypto routines and let anyone, for
example, put a front end on the pgp system!!!

No, the PGP implementors are not ignoring you.  Rather, they are in
the process of doing just as you have asked, and have been doing so
for some months now.  If you start work with the current (2.3A) PGP
release, then you will just be re-implementing something that the PGP
developers have been working on for a long time!

As I said, be patient.  What you want is right around the corner, but
if you jump out too soon, you might get hit by that proverbial truck
which is right in front of it!!!!  It will come to you soon enough!!

> > -derek
> 
> derek
> (er, damn, the *other* derek)

-derek  Damn, this is confusing!!! ;-)




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: judic@netcom.com (Judi Clark)
Date: Wed, 22 Sep 93 18:53:40 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: reporter seeking interview subjects
Message-ID: <9309230151.AA05313@netcom.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>In <93Sep17.230857pdt.14382-4@well.sf.ca.us>, Matt Binder wrote...
>> Hi, my name is Matt Binder.  Please help me...
>>         I'm a radio reporter in the SF Bay area working on a series
>> of pieces about invasions of privacy in the computer age.  I'm
>> looking for interesting "case studies" that I can use to horrify
>> my listeners out of their complacency.  
>
>I think it's really important that if you're looking to shock your audience
>that you also show a glimpse of not only the "light at the end of the
>tunnel" but also a glimpse of the reasons that people would be better off
>making a dash for the end of the tunnel than trying to run back to the
>tunnel's start.  Otherwise, you're just fueling the anxieties of countless
>luddites and techonophobes.  
>
>> My most immediate need is
>> to find someone whose medical records were used (perused!)
>

Thanks, Stig, for forwarding this for my "more immediate <ahem> attention."

Matt, I agree with Stig that it's important not to horrify anyone out of
anything unless you also give them something concrete that they can do
about it. In most cases, invasions of privacy aren't something empowering,
nor can most people do anything about them but know and worry. I don't
find this too constructive.

There are a couple of stories that you might be interested in, in any case.
One is that San Francisco (and other counties across the state) is testing
a plan to fingerprint all General Assistance recipients. You can get
testimony from hearings conducted earlier this year from a friend of mine,
Jim Davis <jdav@igc.apc.org>. I know that CPSR in Berkeley is planning on 
holding a meeting in late October to explore and talk more about this issue.
Fingerprinting will be on the November ballot, btw.

Second, the state has had a database system designed to track all recipients
of state money. That is, if a day care center receives any state aid, all
the kids go into the database. (They can't be removed, once added, until 
they turn 18 and file a petition with the state.) State aid is another
part of this package, as are jail participants, and other state-oriented 
program participants. You can see this is just a short step from adding
tax-payers, businesses, and everyone else that has anything to do with
the state...

The scary part of the above story, in case that wasn't enough, is that
state hospitals and medicaid recipients are also in the database. The idea
is that if a patient goes to another county, they can get consistent care,
and not be able to "double-dip" from state agencies. Of course, that also
means that many state agencies have access to confidential medical info
about a lot of people (who, by nature of their being on the state's
systems, are powerless). Furthermore, the designer of this system hasn't
shown any priority or sophistication in creating levels of security
so that people that aren't supposed to have access really don't.
A friend just reminded me that there was a radio program on recently,
This Week in California (KQED) which talked about the Alameda Co. system.
This is an expensive system, and they didn't find any evidence of fraud.

Good luck with your stories. I hope this gives you something to start
with.

  yours in scary things,
  judi





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: hfinney@shell.portal.com
Date: Thu, 23 Sep 93 04:08:11 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: First amendment and ITARs
Message-ID: <9309230510.AA06301@jobe.shell.portal.com.shell.portal.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


In U.S. v Posey, 864 F2d 1487, the defendant was convicted of violating
the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act ("CAAA") and the Arms Export Control
Act ("AECA") by sending design documents relating to the C-130 aircraft
to South Africa.  Posey obtained these documents from the U.S. government
via the Freedom of Information Act.  The U.S. government agreed that these
documents were technically public domain within the meaning of the ITAR's.
However, the CAAA, which applies only to exports to South Africa, does
not contain the "public domain" exemption that the AECA (which applies to
exports in general) does.  The recent grand jury action regarding PGP
appears to involve possible violations of the AECA.

Posey appealed on several grounds, one of which was that these Acts
violated his first amendment rights, since the information was, after
all, freely available.  The court rejected this argument, with a lengthy
(and, to my mind, somewhat confused) discussion, which is worth repeating:

  VII. FIRST AMENDMENT

  Appellant's final argument is that the First Amendment bars the
  government from restricting the export of information that is already
  available to the public.  He insists that the data he sent abroad
  was available under the Freedom of Information Act, and therefore
  could be legally obtained by virtually everyone in the world.  He contends
  that the First Amendment prohibits the application of the AECA and
  CAAA to the export of such publicly available information.

  Our Court has already considered and rejected this argument.  In
  United States v. Edler Industries, 579 F2d 516 (9th Cir. 1978), we
  rejected an essentially identical challenge to the predecessor of the
  AECA.  The defendant was convicted of exporting certain manufacturing
  designs that were on the Munitions List but were not classified.  He
  challenged his conviction on First Amendment grounds, arguing that the
  government could not constitutionally prohibit the export of techno-
  logical data that was widely distributed within the United States.  In
  rejecting that claim, we explained that even assuming that the First
  Amendment offers some protection to the dissemination of technical data,
  the government has a strong interest in regulating the export of
  military information:

    The federal government undeniably possesses the power to regulate the
    international arms traffic....  As a necessary incident to the power
    to control arms export, the President is empowered to control the
    flow of information concerning the production and use of arms.  The
    authority to regulate arms traffic would be of negligible practical
    value if it encompassed only the exportation of particular military
    equipment but not the exportation of blueprints specifying the
    construction of the very same equipment.
  
  579 F2d at 520.  We accordingly concluded that the government could
  permissibly restrict the flow abroad of data included in the Munitions
  List.  579 F2d at 521.  Finally, we held that the government's power
  to issue such restrictions was not affected by the domestic availability
  of the regulated data:

    Given the unquestionable legitimacy of the national interest in
    restricting the dissemination of military information, the claim of
    public availability in the United States is not a defense recognized
    by the Constitution.
  
  579 F2d at 522.

  Appellant attempts to distinguish Edler from the present case by pointing
  out that the exported data in Edler was "cutting edge" technology and
  was not widely used in this country.  [Citation].  Whether or
  not this was factually true of the technology at issue in Edler, however,
  the Edler decision clearly assumed for purposes of its decision that
  the material was extensively available in the United States.  See 579
  F2d at 518, 522.

  Moreover, we believe Edler should not be read as permitting the govern-
  ment to restrict the export of only that information which is not
  widely available domestically.  Under appellant's reading of Edler,
  if the government wished to prevent technical data from being sent to
  foreign powers, it would be required to suppress the information alto-
  gether, at home as well as abroad.  This outcome would blur the fact
  that national security concerns may be more sharply implicated by the
  export abroad of military data than by the domestic disclosure of such
  data.  Technical data that is relatively harmless and even socially val-
  uable when available domestically may, when sent abroad, pose unique
  threats to national security.  It would hardly serve First Amendment
  values to compel the government to purge the public libraries of every
  scrap of data whose export abroad it deemed for security reasons
  necessary to prohibit.  We conclude that appellant's conviction does
  not violate the First Amendment.

(Hal speaking again here.)  The thing I find somewhat ironic about this
decision is this last paragraph.  The court is saying that if the First
Amendment implied that domestically available information could be exported,
then the government might have to restrict domestically available
information.  But, this ignores the fact that the AECA already contains
an explicit exemption for public domain information.  So, the court is
going to some length in this last paragraph to consider an argument which
is mooted by the public domain exemption in the AECA.  And in fact, as
we have seen, at least one government official is daring to argue that
this provision of the AECA does in fact give the U.S. government the
power to keep Munitions List information out of public libraries!

In any case, this decision and the earlier one it quotes both represent
rejections by the 9th circuit appellate court (which includes California,
where the grand jury investigations are taking place) of the argument
that the ITARs infringe on First Amendment rights.  This will make it more
difficult to use the First Amendment defense in any new charges of arms
export violations.

Hal Finney
hfinney@shell.portal.com




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: hfinney@shell.portal.com
Date: Thu, 23 Sep 93 04:07:12 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Propriety of crypto on Munitions List
Message-ID: <9309230510.AA06305@jobe.shell.portal.com.shell.portal.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


In U.S. v Martinez, Elizabeth Martinez and her fiance were convicted
of violating the Arms Export Control Act by exporting cryptographic
hardware, namely "Videocipher II" video descrambling devices.  (I
believe these are used to descramble satellite TV broadcasts of HBO and
other networks.)  Defendants appealed, asking the court to overturn
their conviction on the grounds that "the inclusion of 'cryptographic
devices and software (encoding and decoding)' on the [Munitions] list is
overbroad because this heading includes items already in the public domain
whose dissemination would pose no security threat, and which lack any
characteristic that is inherently or predominantly military."

The 11th circuit appellate court rejected this argument in 904 F2d 601.
The court decided that the question of whether an item properly belongs
on the Munitions List is inherently political and is excluded from judicial
review.  "The question whether a particular item should have been placed
on the Munitions List possesses nearly every trait that the Supreme
Court has enumerated traditionally renders a question 'political'....
No satisfactory or manageable standards exist for judicial determination
of the issue, as defendants themselves acknowledge the disagreement
among experts as to whether Videocipher II belongs on the List....
Neither the courts nor the parties are privy to reports of the intelligence
services on which this decision, or decisions like it, may have been
based....  The consequences of uninformed judicial action could be grave."

In these days of judicial activism, it is ironic that one time when civil
libertarians might wish the court to take a hand and reverse a decision
made by the other branches of government, the court chooses not to do so.

Shortly before this decision was issued, the AECA was amended by adding
the following section, 22 USC 2778(h): "The designation by the President
(or by an official to whom the President's functions under subsection (a)
have been duly delegated), in regulations issued under this section, of
items as defense articles or defense services for purposes of this
section shall not be subject to judicial review."

So Congress and the court agree that the propriety of an item's placement
on the Munitions List is not a matter for the courts to decide.  There
appears to be little chance that any prosecution for AECA violations
will result in the judical removal of cryptographic equipment from the
Munitions List.

Hal Finney
hfinney@shell.portal.com




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: J. Michael Diehl <mdiehl@triton.unm.edu>
Date: Wed, 22 Sep 93 21:23:07 PDT
To: newsham@wiliki.eng.hawaii.edu (Timothy Newsham)
Subject: Re: Why RSA?
In-Reply-To: <9309222048.AA20361@toad.com>
Message-ID: <9309230419.AA14209@triton.unm.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


According to Timothy Newsham:
> 
> > Regarding the recent proposals for the construction of a toolkit,
> > I'm all in favor and would personally welcome the opportunity to
> > contribute to such an effort as a hands-on supplement to my
> > crypto education.  I have extensive experience with C and C++,
> > and am VERY familiar with TCL (pronounced 'tickle', for those
> > not in the know).  A good start would be a clear statement of
> > purpose.

I'd also like to help.  I'm pretty good with C.  And I'm finishing my BS in
Mathematics.  I'm no expert,(yet) but I'd love to learn.  BTW, I did get an
'A' in Numerical Computation. ;^)  Lagers,


J. Michael Diehl   ;^)  |*The 2nd Amendment is there in case the 
mdiehl@triton.unm.edu   | Government forgets about the 1st!  <RL>
Mike.Diehl@f29.n301.z1  |*God is a good Physicist, and an even 
    .fidonet.org        | better Mathematician.  <Me>
al945@cwns9.ins.cwru.edu|*I'm just looking for the opportunity to 
 (505) 299-2282 (voice) | be Politically Incorrect! <Me>
Can we impeach him yet? |*Protected by 18 USC 2511 and 18 USC 2703. 
PGP Key = 7C06F1 = A6 27 E1 1D 5F B2 F2 F1  12 E7 53 2D 85 A2 10 5D



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "L. Detweiler" <ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Date: Wed, 22 Sep 93 22:23:08 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: P. Wayner on CSSPAB meeting
Message-ID: <9309230520.AA18417@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


an eternity ago in cyberspatial time (a few days ago in real time) P.
Wayner posted some comments about the latest CSSPAB meeting. He hasn't
appeared to have gotten any direct feedback on the list to that report,
which I think is a pity, because he's one of the few cypherpunk
`infiltrators' not only consistently attending important national
government meetings, but conscientiously reporting them on the list
(which involves a significant amount of labor) often to no reward but
flames! (there's been quite a bit of indirect reaction to the `software
Skipjack CRADA proposal he illuminated.) Anyway, my personal thanks!

Cypherpunks, its in these kinds of reports that very important clues of
future NSA directions are buried, and I'll start off with a gem:

>A group of computer scientists from NIST came to discuss their plan
>for the Federal Criteria for secure systems and the new "Common
>Criteria" that may emerge. This is an updated version of the old
>Orange Book classification scheme of C2 and B1 and stuff like that.
>The scientists said the draft is being finished but it isn't ready
>for release. But now, they're working on "Something Better." This
>is a new plan to standardize the grading of secure systems with 
>other countries and evolve a "Common Criteria." In general, the 
>board groused about the fact that the public and industry have never
>been invited to give comments during the process. The summary
>of this talk is: "We might be able to tell you something someday." 

`other countries'? `Common Criteria'? holy cow, this is something *very
big* in the works. The U.S. can barely figure out its *own*
cryptographic policies, and imagine the sheer logistical nightmare of
trying to come to an agreement between the most isolated and imperious
agencies! I suspect GCHQ (Britain's NSA) would be involved in this at
least. (There is a very cozy relationship between NSA and GCHQ that
Kahn was harassed for revealing in _CodeBreakers_.)What other agencies?

Mr. GraveDigger, the man in charge of NSA's Key Escrow:
>He filled the hour with more descriptions with all of the restrictions
>that they place on wiretaps at the Justice department. Once again, I
>found myself wondering why they are going through so much trouble 
>over something that just seems to cause them grief. The taps cost
>money. They divert manpower. Etc. Yet, the FBI and the rest of the 
>community is willing to go through a full court press on this topic.
>The taps are essential in crime encapsulated in conversations (i.e.
>influence peddling, bribery). 

but this only suggests how much of a crutch they have become for these
agencies. They are terrified of losing this tool, for which they have
come to rely on disproportionately. They have come to associate their
job security with wiretapping -- a very dangerous proposition for freedom.

>Some people from the Social Security Agency came to tell the board
>about their internal security procedures that they use to track down
>people inside the agency generating information for outsiders like
>private detectives. They routinely run sting operations where they
>call up information brokers and ask them to get a Social Security
>file for an individual. Then they watch for accesses to that record
>and flag the miscreant.

fascinating. has this ever been noted before? the IRS would have
benefited from this a few months ago. Or, on second thought, nevermind!
all the tax evaders on the list will object to the IRS getting any help!

>Dorothy Denning came to say that there was no final report from the
>outside team performing an outside review of the Clipper algorithm.
>In general, she said that the comments have been favorable to their
>work. Several members of the board questioned the independence of the
>review given that it was done at the NSA using NSA's computers and
>NSA's programmers. They also wondered about the depth of the review
>because it was apparent that Denning leaned heavily on the NSA's
>analysis. 

reassuring to hear Dingaling is still alive and plugging away... I
wonder what her next Lead Balloon will be?

[EFF's Digital Privacy & Security Working Group]

>The group feels that it can accept
>Clipper if any participation in the key escrow program is completely
>volutary. They proposed to test the administration's committment
>to volunteerism by noting whether they relaxed export requirements.

>To me, the statement was little more than a political gambit. All
>of the companies involved in the DPSWG really, really, really want
>export restrictions eased. So they offered their support for 
>Clipper as a quid pro quo. Let us export anything (not just Clipper)
>and we'll support it. 

This is a very interesting stance, and IMHO not a bad tradeoff, if
`support' means `lack of active attack and criticism'. But the NSA
would never agree to this in a cyberspatial lifetime. We *still* don't
even have any substantial promise that Clipper is guaranteed to be
voluntary, let alone export restrictions relaxed. (Hypocritically, the
announcements have always touted Clipper as Voluntary, the last
redeeming feature cited by scoundrels like Dingaling and Sternlight,
without ever guaranteeing it, and potentially even hiding the plan of
*revoking* that aspect.) The plan, very likely, is quite to the
contrary: increase market penetration of Clipper to the point that
restricting other cryptography in subtle and insideous ways becomes
possible. And I'm still waiting for the announcement in blaring fanfare
that Clipper-based hardware can be freely exported, nothing else. I
think its close on the horizon. Once they get chips that work :)

[crafting official group report]
>Most of the board wanted to say that the Clipper chip was
>a pain in the neck that wasn't worth the trouble [...]
>The fight seemed to break down between government employees and
>non-government employees. Those outside the government kept arguing
>for stronger language and those inside kept saying things like,
>"But expensive relative to what? We don't have any concrete cost
>estimates." 

hee, hee. the U.S. Civilization in a microcosm.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Jiva De Voe <tigger@indirect.com>
Date: Wed, 22 Sep 93 23:28:09 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Bill O Rights
Message-ID: <199309230624.AA17149@indirect.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Lil while back someone posted something about "Our rights are dropping
like flies"  aboiut various violations of the Bill Of Rights.. could
someone re-email that to me?  Thanks! :)






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: remail@tamsun.tamu.edu
Date: Wed, 22 Sep 93 21:37:05 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: nonrandom string
Message-ID: <9309230431.AA13921@tamsun.tamu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> Return-Path: <@CORNELLC.cit.cornell.edu:cjl@micro.med.cornell.edu>
> Date: Mon, 20 Sep 93 17:02:49 EDT
> From: cjl@micro.med.cornell.edu (Chris Leonard)
> To: cypherpunks@toad.com
> Subject: nonrandom string
> 
> 
> I address this to the list at large hoping that one or more of you can 
> explain something unusual that I observed.  A friend of mine and I have been 
> using PGP for several months and I just recently noted that in at least three
> of the recent posts to me that the first 18 characters of the encrypted 
> message were identical.  The first words of the plaintexts were not identical
> and so I assume that these characters are something else, perhaps the stuffer
> that I have heard mention of on this list.  This repeating string is of 
> concern for obvious reasons (e.g. so much for anonymity),  and I would like to 
> understand the cause of its recurrence. 
> 
> Please post to me and I will post a precis of the most reasonable suggestions.

This is normal. PGP labels each message with a byte that defines its type
(for messages between people this is a byte that indicates that what follows
is public key encrypted) followed by type dependant information. Among the
things in the first bunch of bytes are the KeyID (low order 64 bits, so this
is eight of the bytes you see) of the destination's key. If you are always
sending to the same person (i.e., the same key) these will always be the same.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: rjc@gnu.ai.mit.edu (Ray)
Date: Wed, 22 Sep 93 21:48:07 PDT
To: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Subject: Re: META: Re:  a horrible conspiracy revealed!
In-Reply-To: <9309221747.AA27907@netcom5.netcom.com>
Message-ID: <9309230444.AA13578@geech.gnu.ai.mit.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Timothy C. May () writes:
> 
> 
> > I was about to do an ::exclude on this thread, when I realised that it was
> > the cypherpunks list and not the extropians.  Any chance of cypherpunks
> > running the extropian list software?  Or maybe it does already?
> > 
> > --                                  ____
> > Richard Kennaway                  __\_ /    School of Information Systems
> 
> The "Extropians list software" is not currently being run on the
> Cypherpunks list, nor any other list. The software was developed by
> Ray Cromwell and Harry Shapiro, and was based apparently on original
> list software developed by Perry Metzger (yes, our own Perry). 

  Actually the code was developed from scratch except for Perry's
"X-Extropian-Date" and header format. Perry's code with minor
modification (message numbers, configuration files, and digestification) 
form the old list software. This would still be good software to
run Cypherpunks off of. Atleast it would add a Reply-To: line.
 
> Ray is on our list, Harry once was (haven't seen him post lately,
> so...), and Perry of course is. They may comment also.
> 
> The software allows a variety of modes, special commands, etc. One
> such command is:
> 
> ::exclude user foobar.baz.edu
>
> Eric Hughes is aware of the Extropians list software and mentioned
> recently that is may be released a la GNU, that is, available.

  The list software still isn't ready for general usage yet. I still
haven't finished the remote list administration system, the "moderated
threads" I talked about, or most importantly, the docs. As a consequence,
I would have to give extensive support to anyone running it. Which is fine
as long as they are willing to pay me.

> On the other hand, the Extropians would like defray their development
> costs, so they are considering various ideas. I'm sure Ray and Harry
> can comment.

  Yes. I am mainly trying to defray the cost of devoting time from my
school work to development/support and what I could be earning if I had
a real job. However, I doubt Harry/ExI is going to sell the software
since it's too much of a hassle. The major cost for them is the cost of
running the list from a commercial unix site. (we have to pay for CPU/Disk
space/mail bandwidth)

  One of the neat things we are thinking of doing is digicash. Each user
incurs a $5-10 cost for their yearly use of the list. Then there
are the special features our software offers (which require a lot of
CPU) A current proposal is to charge a subscription fee (~$5-10) per year
and give each user electronic money and an account. List operations
bill you and mail requires digital postage. Users are free to trade their
cash on the "free market" within the list or on the HEX Exchange, etc.
To prevent list admins from monitoring the motion of e-money, some form
of Chaum-like cash could be used. This provides a real backing for
digicash which is the "goods and services" of the list software. Theoretically,
my software can network allowing users to spend their cash anywhere it is used.
(e.g. spend cash on cypherpunks or extropians list operations assuming
cypherpunks was running my software) I'm assuming none of this is illegal.

  I'll talk more about this in the future when it comes even close
to being implemented. Right now it is just an idea "on the table."

 
-- Ray Cromwell        |    Engineering is the implementation of science;    --
-- EE/Math Student     |       politics is the implementation of faith.      --
-- rjc@gnu.ai.mit.edu  |                         - Zetetic Commentaries      --




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: karn@qualcomm.com (Phil Karn)
Date: Thu, 23 Sep 93 01:03:46 PDT
To: cme@ellisun.sw.stratus.com
Subject: more than spread spectrum
In-Reply-To: <9309150353.AA06198@ellisun.sw.stratus.com>
Message-ID: <9309230800.AA10225@servo>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


This idea of setting up your own independent network isn't as far fetched
as it sounds, at least in a relatively local area with critical mass.

The router nodes already exist, in the form of my own TCP/IP code for
the PC, or any of several other packages including the various freeware
UNIX clones.

Radio transmission equipment operating under Part 15 of the FCC rules
is already available. Under Part 15, you don't need a license; the
radio transmitter does have to be "type accepted" by the FCC but since
you buy that as a prepackaged box you don't have to worry about it.

The section of Part 15 that is particularly interesting is either
15.247 or 15.249 (can't remember which).  It allows you to run up to 1
watt of power, quite a bit for an unlicensed service, on any of
several "ISM" (aka "garbage") bands as long as you use spread spectrum
with a minimum processing gain of 10dB. The most popular is 902-928
Mhz, with another band in the vicinity of 2450 Ghz coming up fast.
Ahthough most Part 15 equipment is designed primarily for use within
office environments, it can be and is used over point-to-point paths
of 5-10 km with the proper directional antennas.

Although Part 15 users are not allowed to cause harmful interference
and must accept interference from other users (microwave ovens
generally operate on 2450 Mhz), in practice these nets seem to work
pretty well if they're properly engineered. Besides, the inherent
distributed redundancy available in a packet network should be able to
compensate for momentary outages due to interference.

Unlike the amateur service, which has some particularly draconian
"acceptable use" policies (despite a recent liberalization, encryption
is still illegal), there are *no* restrictions on the use of Part 15
equipment. Encryption is not only legal, some boards have hardware
encryption support (e.g., the NCR Wavelan has a DES chip). This
particular board operates at 2 megabits/sec on the 902-928 Mhz band
with 250 mW of power.

There is an even more interesting development in the works: "data
PCS".  In essence, this is "Part 15" style operation on dedicated
spectrum, i.e., new spectrum in the 1.8-2.2 Ghz band that will not
have to be shared.  The specific intent of data PCS is to allow users
to build their own ad-hoc networks without having to rely on the facilities
of (and pay money to) carriers such as telephone companies.

Phil





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: karn@qualcomm.com (Phil Karn)
Date: Thu, 23 Sep 93 06:38:13 PDT
To: hfinney@shell.portal.com
Subject: First amendment and ITARs
In-Reply-To: <9309230510.AA06301@jobe.shell.portal.com.shell.portal.com>
Message-ID: <9309231334.AA13005@servo>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Hal,

Many thanks for posting those opinions. It doesn't look good at first glance.

On the other hand, there are some differences with the present case. Here
there is no question that the technical data on which PGP was based is already
extremely widespread around the world, so there is a question about whether
the form (algorithm description vs source code) makes a difference. And
there's a question about whether it's enough to simply make something available
for FTP within the US to get in trouble, and if so, how one reconciles this
with the First Amendment.

Phil




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Anonymous <nowhere@bsu-cs.bsu.edu>
Date: Thu, 23 Sep 93 05:28:12 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Red Ryder decoder rings declared illegal (fwd)
Message-ID: <9309231227.AA04430@bsu-cs.bsu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I apologize if this has already been posted to the list, as I have
been extremely busy the past couple of days and have not had the
luxury of reading every message that has been posted. If this
is old news -- sorry. ,-)

Begin excerpted message ---------------------------

> Subject:      Cu Digest, #5.74 - More on Moby Crypto

------------------------------

Date: Tue, 21 Sep 1993 21:13:17 GMT
From: Grady Ward <grady@netcom.com>
Subject: File 2--NEW State Dept FLASH on Moby Clipper (Grady Ward)

(please edit follow-ups)

In a fresh (to me, stunning) development, the Austin Code Works
received a letter today (Tuesday 9/21/93) from the State Department,
Bureau of Politico Military Affairs, Office of Defense Trade Controls
advising them, in part, of their need to register as an International
Arms Trafficker *even if* their crypto material is intended solely for
*domestic* publication, regardless of whether they are selling
executables, source, descriptions, algorithms of any crypto (and
presumably viral detection) software or documentation, as defined by
ITAR.

This requirement literally implies that a Cereal manufacturer is
required to register as an arms trafficker if it wants to include a
secret de/coder ring in the box, has a cardboard outline of a de/coder
printed on the box, or even a description how to construct or use a
de/coder ring.

Complete text of the letter follows:

(State Department Seal)
United States Department of State

Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs
Office of Defense Trade Controls

Washington, D.C. 20522-0602

AUG 31 1993

Austin Code Works
11100 Leafwood Lane
Austin, TX  78750-3587

Dear Sir:

It has come to the attention of this office that your company is
making cryptographic source code and technical data available
for commercial export claiming a technical data exemption
from the International Traffic in Arms Regulations.
Cryptographic software, including source code, is a munitions
article as defined in 22 CFR # 120.1, category XIII(b).  Further,
the exemptions listed in 22 CFR # 125.4 for technical data do
not apply to cryptographic software and source code.  A valid
Department of State license is required to export cryptographic
source code.  As such, it would be a violation of the
International Traffic in Arms Regulations to export
cryptographic source code without a valid Department of State
export license.

We take this opportunity of advise you that any company or
individual who engages in the United State in the business of
either manufacturing or exporting defense articles or
furnishing defense services is required to register for a fee
with the Office of Defense Trade Controls (DTC) pursuant to 22
U.S.C. # 2778(b)(1)(A) and 22 C.F.R. Part 122.  Furthermore, the
export of such defense articles and related technical data must
be licensed by the Department of State in accordance with 22
U.S.C # 2778(b)(1)(B)(2) and 22 D.F.R. Parts 120-130
(International Traffic in Arms Regulations).  A booklet entitled
"REGISTRATION: The First Step in Defense Trade" is enclosed.

If you are unsure whether an article is on the U.S. Munitions
List, you may send five (5) copies of descriptive literature
about the product and request a commodity jurisdiction
determination from this office according to 22 C.F.R # 120.5 of
the ITAR.

If you have any questions regarding the matters discussed in
this letter, please do not hesitate to contact this office at (703)
875-6650.

Sincerely,

(signed) Clyde G. Bryant, Jr., Chief
Compliance and Enforcement Branch

++++++++++++++++

I guess this means that all FTP sites who implement the GET command
and have anything to do with crypto or viral detection, including
RFCs, overviews or discussions of specific techniques or algorithms,
etc. must be registered as International Arms Traffickers *even if*
they disallow all but domestic FTP connections.

What to do now.

My advice to this new twist of the NSA and State Department regulating
activities *within* the United States is twofold:

(1) GET and FAMILIARIZE yourself with PGP sources or other crypto
options NOW and upload it to your local BBS (if you deem it still
legal for you to do these things) and

(2) Consider supporting the Electronic Freedom Foundation.


PGP sites:

        black.ox.ac.uk          (129.67.1.165)
        src.doc.ic.ac.uk        (146.169.2.1)
        ftp.demon.co.uk         (158.152.1.65)
        ghost.dsi.unimi.it      (149.132.2.1)
        nic.funet.fi            (128.214.6.100)
        soda.berkeley.edu       (128.32.149.19)

Electronic Freedom Foundation
1001 G Street, NW
Suite 950 East
Washington, D.C.  20001
202/347-5400 voice
202/393-5509 FAX
FTP  ftp.eff.org

End excerpted message ------------------------------





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: koontzd@lrcs.loral.com (David Koontz )
Date: Thu, 23 Sep 93 07:57:15 PDT
To: hfinney@shell.portal.com
Subject: Re:  Propriety of crypto on Munitions List
Message-ID: <9309231453.AA29903@nebula.lrcs.loral.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>From: hfinney@shell.portal.com

>In U.S. v Martinez, Elizabeth Martinez and her fiance were convicted
>of violating the Arms Export Control Act by exporting cryptographic
>hardware, namely "Videocipher II" video descrambling devices.

I would guess that they have good grounds for an appeal now that the ITAR
has been changed to except the VideocypherII (unless they were exporting
studio or professional quality equipment):

                                FEDERAL REGISTER
                                VOL. 58, No. 139
                             Rules and Regulations
                              DEPARTMENT OF STATE
                       Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs
       22 CFR Parts 120, 121, 122, 123, 124, 125, 126, 127, 128, and 130
                              [Public Notice 1832]
          Amendments to the International Traffic in Arms Regulations
                                    Part II
                                  58 FR 39280
DATE: Thursday, July 22, 1993
...
  Enumeration of Articles
   121.1 -- General. The United States munitions list.
   (a) The following articles, services and related technical data are
designated as defense articles and defense services pursuant to sections 38 and
47(7) of the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2778 and 2794(7)). Changes in
designations will be published in the Federal Register. Information and
clarifications on whether specific items are defense articles and services unde
this subchapter may appear periodically in the Defense Trade News published by
the Center for Defense Trade.
...
  Category XIII-Auxiliary Military Equipment

   (a) Cameras...

   (b) Information Security Systems and equipment, cryptographic devices,
software, and components specifically designed or modified therefor, including:
   (1) Cryptographic (including key management) systems, equipment, assemblies,
modules, integrated circuits, components or software with the capability of
maintaining secrecy or confidentiality of information or information systems,
except cryptographic equipment and software as follows:
...
   (viii) Limited to receiving for radio broadcast, pay television or similar
restricted audience television of the consumer type, without digital encryption
and where digital decryption is limited to the video, audio or management
functions.

(The VideocypherII falls here)

What were the dates of the conviction and appellate court decisions?





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: doug@netcom.com (Doug Merritt)
Date: Thu, 23 Sep 93 08:32:16 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: more than spread spectrum
Message-ID: <9309231528.AA25859@netcom2.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Phil Karn said:
>This idea of setting up your own independent network isn't as far fetched
>as it sounds, at least in a relatively local area with critical mass.

A little while ago I mentioned an SF Bay Area grass roots internet
connection project. When I talked to Qarin about it almost 1.5 years
ago, I'd thought that she was proposing an actual independent network
beginning in Santa Cruz, which is why I brought it up. However apparently
it is simply a connection to existing sub-Inets. After chasing down some
leads, Tom Jennings' .vacation notice says to contact John Gilmore
regarding SF area Little Garden business while Tom is away.

This naturally leads me to suspect that everyone here except me is
already well acquainted with all this...I've no idea what's going
on with Little Garden myself.

I like Phil's ideas, just for the record. :-)

Anyway, here's what I found on the Santa Cruz project, as long as I've
got it lying around.

P.S. The following does not include some rumors I heard some months ago,
that this project ran into opposition from commercial Internet providers
around here. It also says nothing about Qarin's radio wave internet link
ideas, so maybe that fell through.

---------------------- Item 1 of 2 ---------------------------
>From netcomsv!darkstar.UCSC.EDU!injectnews 20 Sep 93 23: 11 PDT Wed Sep 22 18:55:52 PDT 1993
From: matthew kaufman <matthew@klinzhai.echo.com>
Newsgroups: scruz.sysops
Subject: Santa Cruz Community Internet (scruz-net) STATUS UPDATE
Date: 20 Sep 1993 23:18:03 -0700
Organization: University of California, Santa Cruz


Santa Cruz Community Internet (scruz-net)
903 Pacific Ave. #203-A
Santa Cruz, CA 95060
(408) 426-6771   [for now...until new line is installed]
matthew@echo.com, queue@echo.com, garlick@echo.com

SEPTEMBER 20, 1993 STATUS UPDATE

Summary: Full speed ahead. Full Service Begins November 1st.

- We now have an office leased for the hub. Address is above.
  This is also our new mailing address.

- We have ordered the 56kbps digital line to Mtn. View.

- RGNet (formerly TLG, The Little Garden) has signed their agreement
   with Sprint for a new Internet feed. They will switch to Sprint
   on or about November 1st, coincident with our beginning of full
   service.

- scruz-net has a registered domain name for our hub equipment
   and FTP/name servers (scruz.net)

- scruz-net has a Class B IP address space to be used to provide IP
   addresses to sites that haven't already obtained an IP address
   (165.227.x.x)  (initial sites... your IP address will be assigned
   this week)

- Santa Cruz Community Internet (scruz-net) is now a registered
   fictitous business name. We also have a City of Santa Cruz
   business license. We are a partnership.

- We have a checking account, so all the founding connection checks
   have been deposited.

- We have some of the equipment required (donated and/or loaned),
   and we will be purchasing the rest over the next few weeks.

- We will be obtaining a pager so that we can be contacted 24hrs
   in case of network problems.

Latest timeline:

  October 1  - we move equipment into office space and begin wiring
               everything up.

  October 13 - 56kbps line installation should be complete.

  October 15 - Testing begins. We bring up 56kbps connection to
               Mountain View, begin software configuration of
               routers and terminal servers. Sites which want
               to participate in initial testing can start
               dropping off their modems and we'll assign phone
               lines. Full IP routing will NOT be in effect,
               but you (and we) will be able to test SLIP/PPP
               software, failure recovery, local routing.
               Initial sites: before connecting, you'll need to
               sign an actual agreement, which we're writing up.

  November 1 - Sprint begins routing our addresses to RGnet, who
               then routes them to us. Full operation begins.
               Any sites which have paid initial fees can begin
               full operation.  (Note that this item depends upon
               the Sprint-RGnet arrangement)

  December 1 - First monthly payment due for connected sites.

Thanks to the 9 people who've already gotten us checks for their
initial connection, and the 3 whose checks we'll have soon. Without
your commitment we wouldn't have been able to get started.

Anyone else who wants to be included in the initial startup, you're
welcome to join... a check for $406 to "scruz-net" will sign you up
for a 14.4kbps connection. (That's $250 startup, $70 for the first month,
$70 for the phone line at our end, and $16 for the first month of
phone service at our end... you provide both modems, phone line at
your end, and all equipment at your end needed for a SLIP/PPP
connection).  After this, fees are $86/month ($70 for IP, $16 for phone
at our end.

Faster connections (56kbps leased line, 128kbps over ISDN)
are available... just ask.

-Matthew Kaufman       Qarin Van Brink      Tim Garlick
 matthew@echo.com      queue@echo.com       garlick@echo.com


---------------------- Item 2 of 2 ---------------------------
>From matthew@klinzhai.echo.com Wed Sep 22 23:11:09 1993
Date: Wed, 22 Sep 93 23:14:34 PDT
From: matthew@klinzhai.echo.com (matthew kaufman)
To: doug@netcom.com
Subject: Re: Santa Cruz Community Internet (scruz-net) STATUS UPDATE

well, the best source of information is to just ask us questions.
The most interesting piece of information that someone who wants
to start something similar should know is that there's a group
like us in the Bay Area (San Francisco, Palo Alto and Mountain View)
called The Little Garden, and they're in fact who we're working
with to get IP connectivity to Santa Cruz. The contact person
for that is Tom Jennings (tomj@wps.com)

If they want to do something substantially south of Mountain View,
it might be cheaper to connect to us, or perhaps we could work
out an arrangement to reduce the digital line charges somehow,
so definitely they should keep in touch with us as well.

-matthew





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: hfinney@shell.portal.com (Hal Finney)
Date: Thu, 23 Sep 93 10:20:32 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Mail outage
Message-ID: <9309231643.AA28704@jobe.shell.portal.com.shell.portal.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


My remailer at hfinney@shell.portal.com is apparently unable to receive
mail today and last night.  I have complained to customer service about this
and hopefully the problem will be resolved soon.

Hal Finney
hfinney@shell.portal.com




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Anonymous <nowhere@bsu-cs.bsu.edu>
Date: Thu, 23 Sep 93 09:17:17 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: No Subject
Message-ID: <9309231614.AA16610@bsu-cs.bsu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


OK, now for something completely different:

A few years back, a sculpture was created and presented to the CIA by
an artist who inscribed the base of the work with a cyphertext.  He
refused to tell anyone what it said, but I think he later acquiesced
and told the DCI.  Has anyone heard anything more about this?  Was
the cypher cracked?





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: mentor@indial1.io.com (Loyd Blankenship)
Date: Thu, 23 Sep 93 09:38:55 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: problems?
Message-ID: <9309231632.AA09393@indial1.io.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I've received no list traffic for 3 days. Is it live, memorex, or a 
problem with my address?

Loyd
-- 
*************************************************************************
* Loyd Blankenship        mentor@io.com                  ^              *
* Steve Jackson Games     CI$: [73407,515]              / \             *
* PO Box 18957            GEnie: SJGAMES               / O \            *
* Austin, TX  78760                                   /_____\           *
* 512/447-7866                                                          *
*************************************************************************




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: gtoal@an-teallach.com (Graham Toal)
Date: Thu, 23 Sep 93 05:07:14 PDT
To: harwell@panam.edu
Subject: Forwarded Article
Message-ID: <11181@an-teallach.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


This article was forwarded to you by gtoal@an-teallach.com (Graham Toal):

--------------------------------- cut here -----------------------------

Newsgroups: mail.cypher
Received: from post.demon.co.uk by mailhost.an-teallach.com with SMTP
        id AA11163 ; Thu, 23 Sep 93 12:41:47 GMT
Received: from relay2.uu.net by post.demon.co.uk id aa07673; 23 Sep 93 9:14 BST
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 Sep 93 01:03:08 PDT
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        sendmail 5.65/QC-main-2.1 via SMTP
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Received: by servo; id AA10225
        sendmail 5.67/QC-subsidiary-2.1
        Thu, 23 Sep 93 01:00:39 -0700 for cypherpunks@toad.com
Date: Thu, 23 Sep 93 01:00:39 -0700
From: Phil Karn <karn@qualcomm.com>
Message-Id: <9309230800.AA10225@servo>
To: cme@ellisun.sw.stratus.com
Cc: cypherpunks@toad.com
In-Reply-To: Carl Ellison's message of Tue, 14 Sep 93 23:53:23 EDT
 <9309150353.AA06198@ellisun.sw.stratus.com>
Subject: more than spread spectrum

This idea of setting up your own independent network isn't as far fetched
as it sounds, at least in a relatively local area with critical mass.

The router nodes already exist, in the form of my own TCP/IP code for
the PC, or any of several other packages including the various freeware
UNIX clones.

Radio transmission equipment operating under Part 15 of the FCC rules
is already available. Under Part 15, you don't need a license; the
radio transmitter does have to be "type accepted" by the FCC but since
you buy that as a prepackaged box you don't have to worry about it.

The section of Part 15 that is particularly interesting is either
15.247 or 15.249 (can't remember which).  It allows you to run up to 1
watt of power, quite a bit for an unlicensed service, on any of
several "ISM" (aka "garbage") bands as long as you use spread spectrum
with a minimum processing gain of 10dB. The most popular is 902-928
Mhz, with another band in the vicinity of 2450 Ghz coming up fast.
Ahthough most Part 15 equipment is designed primarily for use within
office environments, it can be and is used over point-to-point paths
of 5-10 km with the proper directional antennas.

Although Part 15 users are not allowed to cause harmful interference
and must accept interference from other users (microwave ovens
generally operate on 2450 Mhz), in practice these nets seem to work
pretty well if they're properly engineered. Besides, the inherent
distributed redundancy available in a packet network should be able to
compensate for momentary outages due to interference.

Unlike the amateur service, which has some particularly draconian
"acceptable use" policies (despite a recent liberalization, encryption
is still illegal), there are *no* restrictions on the use of Part 15
equipment. Encryption is not only legal, some boards have hardware
encryption support (e.g., the NCR Wavelan has a DES chip). This
particular board operates at 2 megabits/sec on the 902-928 Mhz band
with 250 mW of power.

There is an even more interesting development in the works: "data
PCS".  In essence, this is "Part 15" style operation on dedicated
spectrum, i.e., new spectrum in the 1.8-2.2 Ghz band that will not
have to be shared.  The specific intent of data PCS is to allow users
to build their own ad-hoc networks without having to rely on the facilities
of (and pay money to) carriers such as telephone companies.

Phil



--------------------------------- cut here -----------------------------





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Duncan Frissell <frissell@panix.com>
Date: Thu, 23 Sep 93 09:28:16 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Your signature line
Message-ID: <199309231624.AA11164@panix.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


A response to my .sig forwarded to the list because this is a "hot" issue 
with cypherpunk implications.  My improved HSA93 .sig:

"The $1,000,000,000,000 a year Health Security Act of 1993 -- the most 
expensive government program in the history of mankind."

The response:

W >1 Trillion 1993-dollars is about 300 billion 1980-dollars - how much
W >was the government spending then?

I don't think prices have increased by more than 300% since 1980.  General 
price inflation during most of the 80s was in the 4% or lower range per 
year. During the '80s, the Fed and State governments spent about 40% of 
the US health care dollars.  Total 1992 spending public & private was 
circa $850 billion.  Which would make government spending about $350 
billion which I think it was. By January 1, 1997 when HSA93 is due to take 
full effect, health spending including inflation and the $70-$100 Billion 
in extra annual spending Slick Willie has plotted will push annual health 
spending up to circa $1,000,000,000,000.00 per annum.

Granted, my .sig is marketing puffery.  Note it does *not* say that the 
government will spend $1x10^12, but since the *program* is designed to 
encompass the whole health "system" it is correct to characterize the cost 
(to someone) of the program as $1x10^12 per year.  They want the credit, 
they deserve the blame.   

W >World War II was much more expensive - maybe fewer direct dollars
W >(even inflation-adjusted), but the cost in human lives was 
W >staggering, and even if you only value those lives in terms of lost
W >earnings and losses to the market from lost consumption, that's a huge
W >cost. (Don't know what it is, but it's likely to be much larger than
W >the $1T/year times the 2-3 more years before Clinton gets thrown out on
W >his ear :-)

WWII was over in 5 years.  HSA93 (like a baseball game) *could* go on 
forever.  Also, we don't know how many people have died because of medical 
regulation (though, of course, medical regulation is larger in scope even 
than HSA93).  Could be more than WWII.

I don't expect the system to last that long, however.

Duncan Frissell

"If they want a name give them a name, if they want an address give them 
an address, if they want an SSN give them an SSN, if they want a Health 
Security Smartcard programmed with your entire medical and psychiatric 
history + xrays + CAT scans + MRIs + your genotype; give them a puddle of 
melted aluminum."


--- WinQwk 2.0b#0
                                                                                                     




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: David Colston <0005542837@mcimail.com>
Date: Thu, 23 Sep 93 05:57:14 PDT
To: Charlie Merritt <charliemerritt@bix.com>
Subject: QPK, SOURSE, FTP
Message-ID: <64930923123646/0005542837NA3EM@mcimail.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Hi, I do agree with your concepts for a public key voice system.
I don't think Joel will be up to speed for a long time<G>.

Re: SOURCE CODE

I will snail mail you the Call Security source and exe's today. You
should have them by tomorrow or Saturday. Please post them on an FTP,
so that any of the cypherpunks can get a copy.

TO ALL EAVES DROPPERS<G>

If you need the source snail mailed to you, then send a floppy any
size to:

Colston & Associates
5111 Rogers Ave. Suite 507
Fort Smith, AR 72903

I'll stand good the return postage, but the disks will help out.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Timothy Newsham <newsham@wiliki.eng.hawaii.edu>
Date: Thu, 23 Sep 93 16:12:24 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: DC nets for network access?
Message-ID: <9309232311.AA11880@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



DC Nets allow a single person to talk in a group of people without
giving away the identity of the talker.  

Telnet servers are programs that are easily set up from a user account
that allow a you to connect in to and then back out of a machine with
little or no logging.

Would it be possible/practical to marry these two concepts?  Make a
network of clients who wish to have anonymous access at some point
or another and ahve them transmit information by using a DC-NET 
protocol and then having a listener which is a telnet server and 
allows connections to the outside world.  The biggest problem I see 
is 'sessioning',  keeping data originating from one user seperate
from data originating from another user without giving away the
users identity.  If data is allowed to mix then there will be a
resulting security problem of course.

Any comments?




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Karl Lui Barrus <klbarrus@owlnet.rice.edu>
Date: Thu, 23 Sep 93 12:17:20 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: MAIL: positive reputations
Message-ID: <9309231913.AA10882@arcadien.owlnet.rice.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

Earlier, I mentioned my stab at a positive reputation scheme for
anonymous mail.  I made some changes to the script I posted earlier
(which I discovered was truncated because of a lone period on a line -
PERL's marker for ending a format specifier).

The script sifts through an elm folder, reporting message number,
email address of author, and subject.  When a pgp signed message is
found, it sends the message through pgp, extracting the signature and
reports that instead.  (At the moment I'm not sure what happens if the
public key needed to verify the signature isn't on your keyring, or if
a signature is bad).

Positive reputations, digital postage, and easier methods for replying
are a solution for the "how to mark anonymous mail" question which
crops up from time to time.  That is, you don't mark anonymous mail -
instead, in the future, mail readers will be capable of getting the
digital signature from a mail message and reporting it, of replying to
anonymous mail, etc.

I mean, who wrote the message is what you are really interested in,
now so much how it got to you (via anonymous remailing chains, etc.).

Positive reputations and digital postage are more appealing to me
because I'm a "purist" - I'm more interested in "pulling it off"
(anonymous mail) than in other concerns.  Marking anonymous mail with
certain subject headers and so forth is an unacceptable solution to
me.

Now, there isn't a requirement that the signature on the message be
for a "real" person - a good positive reputation system would allow a
person to adopt a pseudonym (ala Demosthenes and Locke in Card's
_Ender's Game_) and speak via that pseudonym.  When you read your mail
and you note messages are from "Demosthenes" and you agree with the
opinions expressed, you will mentally note that Demosthenes is
intelligent, and be willing to read further message.  On the other
hand, if you feel Locke is an idiot, you will skip messages, or set
your advanced email filters to reject the messages.

I thought about a possible real life example, and this came to mind:
suppose David Sternlight, heartened by a legal PGP, decided he was
going to blow off USENET and instead participate here, on cypherpunks.
He knows that for many, merely seeing the email address
"strnlght@netcom.com" will cause a variety of reactions :-).  So he
could form a pseudonym for himself and participate, allowing himself
to start afresh.

Following is the script.  It is inefficient (the while loop that
drives the thing needs massive reworking, pgp is called to get a
signature from a document) but eventually these will be fixed (I'll
rewrite the loop, a pgp library will be made available).  Plus, as I
said above, I'm not sure what happens with bad signatures or missing
public keys.  Also, to prevent some mailer from truncating this post,
I'll move the formatting period over by a space - this will cause a
"format not terminated" error if you try to run this script without
moving the period back!

Here's how I use it: scan cypher

where cypher is an elm mail folder.  I get back a report that looks
like this:

   1  collins@newton.apple.com   blank lines v. the remailer
   2* Karl L. Barrus <klbarrus@o REMAIL: cache
   3  collins@newton.apple.com   Re: anon.penet.fi
   4  hfinney@shell.portal.com   Restrictions on crypto exports
   5  mccoy@ccwf.cc.utexas.edu   money money money...
   6  nobody@soda.berkeley.edu   Re: your mail
   7  ld231782@longs.lance.colos remailer ideas
   8  ld231782@longs.lance.colos list split?
   9  0005542837@mcimail.com     PKZ and NON-RSA
  10  derek@cs.wisc.edu          Re: Why RSA?
  11  hfinney@shell.portal.com   Propriety of crypto on Munitions List
  12  hfinney@shell.portal.com   First amendment and ITARs
  13  hfinney@shell.portal.com   Mail outage
  14  frissell@panix.com         Propriety of crypto on Mu
  15  frissell@panix.com         Regulating the Nets

The asterisk means message 2 is pgp signed by "Karl L. Barrus" - the
rest of what pgp reports is truncated.

- --------------------8< cut here >8--------------------
#!/usr/local/bin/perl
#report email address and subject of messages in an elm folder
#frm sometimes reports name and not email address - not that I
#  guarantee this works in all cases
#if the message is pgp signed, report signature instead of address
#simple version of mh scan command
#Karl L. Barrus <klbarrus@owlnet.rice.edu>

($name,$passwd,$uid,$gid,$quota,$comment,$gcos,$dir,$shell)=getpwuid($<);

chdir "$dir/Mail" || die "Can't cd to ~/Mail\n";

while (@ARGV) {
  $file = shift @ARGV;

  if (-T $file) {
    if (-z $file) { #zero length folders with no messages
      print "Folder $file has no messages\n";
    }
    elsif (!open(FOLDER, "./$file")) {
      print STDERR "Can't open $file\n";
    }
    else {
      $state = 1;          #Look for a new message
      $num = 0;

      while (<FOLDER>) { #this whole loop need massive reworking!!!

        if ($state == 1) { #Delimits a new message
          $num++;          
          $from = "";
          $subject = "";
          $sig = "";
          $state = 2;      #Look for From: and Subject:
        }

        if ($state == 2) { #Already found a message; looking for headers

          /^Subject: (.*)/ && ($subject = $1);    #match subject
          /^From: (.+)/ && ($from = $1);          #match "From: add"
          /^From: (.+) <(.+)>/ && ($from = $2);   #match "From: name <add>"
          /^From: (.+) \((.+)\)/ && ($from = $1); #match "From: add (name)"

          if ($from ne "" && $subject ne "") { #found both headers
            $state = 3; #look for possible pgp signed message
          }
        }

        if ($state == 3) { #Found a message, found headers, look for pgp
          if (/^-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----$/) {
            $sig = "*";
            $temp = "./.tmp_" . $num . "_" . $$;
            $tempsig = "./.tmp_sig_" . $num . "_" . $$;
            open (OUT1, "> $temp");
            $state = 4; #write out pgp signed message to a file
          }
        }

        if ($state == 4) { #writing pgp signed message to a file
          print OUT1 $_;

          if (/^-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----$/) {
            close (OUT1);
            system ("$dir/bin/pgp -f < ./$temp 1>/dev/null 2>$tempsig");

            open (PGPOUT, $tempsig);
            while (<PGPOUT>) {
              /^Good signature from user "(.+)"\.$/ && ($from = $1);
            }
            close (PGPOUT);
            unlink $temp, $tempsig;
          }
        }

        if ($state >= 3 && /^From[^:]/) {
          $state = 1; #go back to looking for a new message
          write;
        }          
      }
    }
  }
  elsif (-d $file) {
    print STDERR "$file is a directory\n";
  }
}

exit;

format STDOUT =
@###@<@<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<< @<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<
$num, $sig, $from, $subject
 .
- --------------------8< cut here >8--------------------

 ^--- remember to move this back a space!


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.3a

iQCVAgUBLKH09IOA7OpLWtYzAQH7mwP/QsgQ9cbj8lPIu0o9eLzH38JFCP948DNO
NnoUdoyk+gJtx6ohIyv6uWmX3sDh5ACDTd9SyT91XbyuHz/dWBCMYGY8S1hfvsJG
JhK1Dr3p5PubS/neHro1cYR33Ex2QbZ/NNBgKPNpPF+lPg2RcO7WWpL8kFofD/Cs
HCakIr/s0SE=
=A69F
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Duncan Frissell <frissell@panix.com>
Date: Thu, 23 Sep 93 11:30:16 PDT
To: CYPHERPUNKS@toad.com
Subject: Regulating the Nets
Message-ID: <199309231825.AA00814@panix.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


A talk.politics.crypto post of mine forwarded because of my ego:

T >I can't imagine any combination of events or circumstances which would
T >keep the government out of the net.regulation business if they want to
T >get in,

Watch.  We already know how to set up an "enterprise" network that 
excludes anyone the operators wish to exclude.  We also know how to 
encrypt the traffic such that only authorized persons can read it.  We 
also know how to do traffic mixes that make tracing difficult or 
impossible.  And, finally, we know how to do this offshore, or in other 
countries, or using split processes running on different (or virtual 
networked) machines in many different locations at the same time.  These 
virtual processes can shift around the physical world on a random basis.

Rather difficult to regulate particularly since loads of people will be 
able to make their money while living anywhere on earth.  In any 
(changing) jurisdiction.

T >and I really don't see what private financing has to do with it

It does provide a little more flexibility plus lower costs and better 
service.  This would speed up the networking process.  But you're right, 
we can use the National Information Infrastructure for our own purposes if 
we like.

T >The net will be kept free of idiotic restrictions only if the 
T >majority of people want it kept that way and see to it the government
T >hears them, and financing doesn't have much to do with it.

The views of the majority (or the minority) are relevant only if someone 
can figure out a way to regulate the beast in the first place.  Not a 
non-trivial problem.

T >Do you really think Time-Warner management has a vision of a high 
T >bandwidth two-way communications network in which individual artists
T >could offer their productions to the public in competition with the
T >mindless network bilge? Or is it more likely Time-Warner imagines a
T >future in which they have a stranglehold on a big chunk of the net and
T >take the lions share of any profit associated with information that
T >flows over it,

I don't know what TW "imagines" but the competition -- Continental Cable 
-- is already planning to put 10 mbps Internet connections into the homes 
of any subscribers that want it by the end of 1994.  They will not be 
controlling content.  IBM was not able to kill "open systems" either.

T >I can certainly speculate about which path is most likely to occur
T >without any government interference with the be-all end-all cure-all
T >magic bullet of the pure libertarian free market.

You must realize by looking around you that there is no noticeable 
increase in obedience to authority going on.  Even with decent enforcement 
techniques, the government will have a hard time controlling the nets.  
People will just choose to disobey as they increasingly do in other areas 
of their lives these days.  In the *absence* of decent regulatory tools, 
obedience will be even lower.

What are the powerful regulatory techniques that will bring the nets to 
heel?  What is the government's magic bullet?

Duncan Frissell

You don't have to be nice to nation states you meet on the way up if 
you're not coming back down.



--- WinQwk 2.0b#0
                                                                                                                  




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Duncan Frissell <frissell@panix.com>
Date: Thu, 23 Sep 93 11:28:56 PDT
To: CYPHERPUNKS@toad.com
Subject: Propriety of crypto on Mu
Message-ID: <199309231825.AA00822@panix.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


H>So Congress and the court agree that the propriety of an item's 
H>placement on the Munitions List is not a matter for the courts to
H>decide.  There appears to be little chance that any prosecution for AECA
H>violations will result in the judical removal of cryptographic equipment
H>from the Munitions List.

However, cryptographic software being writings not equipment could be 
protected.  Thanks for your postings Hal but I note that the Supremes 
haven't spoken yet.  Even though it is tough to get a grant of cert, if we 
were able to a different result might occur.

Note that in a number of "regulatory" first amendment cases, the appeals 
courts decided in favor of the government while the Supremes voted 
unanimously in favor of freedom of communication.  Sometimes you have to 
make it up the ladder.

Two examples (sans names because I'm doing this from memory):  The 
Newsletter Case of 1985.  SEC tried for years to get investment 
newsletters to register as security advisors.  They picked a good test 
case.  Man was barred from security industry for perfidity kept running 
newsletters, SEC sued to force registration (which would have been 
rejected), SEC lost at trial, C of A went for the government, Supremes 
voted 8-0 for the defendent.

Minnesota or Wisconsin case -- man speaks at public hearing held by school 
board, State Labor Commissioner sues him for "unfair labor practice", he 
is a teacher and they accused him of 'negotiating with his employer 
outside of the collective bargaining process,' he loses at every level 
until he wins unanimously at State Supreme Court Level.

It ain't over 'till it's over.

Why don't UK companies produce PGP software for sale in the US?  They 
couldn't be reached as easily.

Duncan Frissell

A little war poetry for our current war:

(brought to you as a public service by Frissell & Associates, Privacy 
Consultants)


"FOR ALL WE HAVE AND ARE"

1914   by You Know Who

FOR all we have and are,
For all our children's fate,
Stand up and take the war.
The Hun is at the gate!
Our world has passed away,
In wantonness o'erthrown.
There is nothing left to-day
But steel and fire and stone!
Though all we knew depart,
The old Commandments stand:--
"In courage keep your heart,
In strength lift up your hand."

(cont in next msg)



--- WinQwk 2.0b#0
                                                                                                                




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: mjr@TIS.COM
Date: Thu, 23 Sep 93 11:53:17 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: DES binaries for Mac -
Message-ID: <10409.9309231849@otter.TIS.COM>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



	I'm looking for DES encryption software for a Mac that can
read cbc-encrypted data created with the "des" command on a UNIX
box. I found one version of DES for Macs (powers-MacDES.sit.hqx)
that appears to do DES properly but uses the resource fork in some
way such that it won't try to decrypt files it didn't create.

	Anyone out there a Mac wizard who can point me at a
compatible binary? I've no access to a compiler, and I'm under
too tight a schedule to port something myself. Please, buddy,
can you spare some crypto?

mjr.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "L. Detweiler" <ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Date: Thu, 23 Sep 93 14:47:23 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: H. Finney: #1 Cyberspatial Lawyer
Message-ID: <9309232142.AA11493@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I'm truly in awe. H. Finney gets my vote as Cypherpunk of the Week for
uncovering all this dazzlingly appropos information.

[U.S. vs. Posey decision]
>Technical data that is relatively harmless and even socially val-
>  uable when available domestically may, when sent abroad, pose unique
>  threats to national security. 

gad -- they simply don't understand that cyberspace has no boundaries,
subject to the same delusions of the NSA. Maybe they should read that
extraordinary quote by Mr. President uncovered by Markoff.

>In any case, this decision and the earlier one it quotes both represent
>rejections by the 9th circuit appellate court (which includes California,
>where the grand jury investigations are taking place) of the argument
>that the ITARs infringe on First Amendment rights.  This will make it more
>difficult to use the First Amendment defense in any new charges of arms
>export violations.

either that, or we're TAKING THIS TO THE SUPREME COURT!

hee, hee. for the mentally challenged, that's *satire*, folks, don't get excited.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: gtoal@an-teallach.com (Graham Toal)
Date: Thu, 23 Sep 93 07:53:15 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Apologies for brain-damaged mailer failure! :-(
Message-ID: <9309231448.AA05746@an-teallach.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Sorry folks - I forwarded an article from this group to my wife that's
relevant to her work, and it appears to have been sent to the people
in the To: line contained in the article body rather than in the
address I asked to send it to.

This is almost certainly because I'm beta-testing a new local version
of snews (a DOS newsreader) and I think I've just found its first
major bug :-(

Sincere apologies and I'll be *much* more careful in future what I do
with this version of the newsreader.  Meanwhile, excuse me while I
step next door and beat up a certain programmer :-)

Graham




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: David Sobel <dsobel@washofc.cpsr.org>
Date: Thu, 23 Sep 93 14:23:59 PDT
To: Cypherpunks <cypherpunks@toad.com>
Subject: NIST Explains Clipper "Revi
Message-ID: <00541.2831649112.5583@washofc.cpsr.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


  NIST Explains Clipper "Review"

     The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) has 
clarified the role of five experts selected by the agency to 
evaluate the government's Clipper Chip proposal and the underlying 
SKIPJACK cryptographic algorithm.  In a recent letter to the CPSR 
Washington Office, NIST asserts that the panel was not established 
to provide "advice or recommendations" to the government.  Rather, 
according to NIST, the reason for convening the group was "to 
provide the opportunity for independent experts to satisfy 
themselves as to the strength and effectiveness of the algorithm 
in order to encourage widespread acceptance of it in the 
marketplace."  NIST concludes that the panel's evaluation 
therefore falls outside the scope of the Federal Advisory 
Committee Act, which opens the work of advisory panels to public 
scrutiny.

     In response to CPSR's request for documents relevant to the 
panel's review, the agency reveals that

     NIST has no records which were made available to or prepared
     for the five experts for the purpose of enabling them to
     evaluate the Clipper Chip proposal.  Any such records would
     be in the possession of the National Security Agency, where
     all activities related to the work of the experts were
     conducted.

This disclosure provides further confirmation that NSA, and not 
NIST, is the driving force behind the Clipper proposal, despite 
NIST's public role as the "proposing" agency.

     The only NIST document released to CPSR is a copy of the 
invitation sent to the five experts who participated in the 
evaluation.  That letter describes the "key escrow" system and 
states that the escrowed keys will be made available "only to 
authorized government officials under proper legal authorizations, 
usually a court order."  This language -- "usually a court order" 
--  suggests that there will be instances in which the escrow keys 
will be provided to government agents without presentation of a 
judicial warrant.  The government has never clearly defined what 
will constitute "legal authorization" under the Clipper system.

David L. Sobel
CPSR Legal Counsel
<dsobel@washofc.cpsr.org>







From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Lyle_Seaman@transarc.com
Date: Thu, 23 Sep 93 15:12:23 PDT
To: frissell@panix.com>
Subject: Re: Propriety of crypto on Mu
In-Reply-To: <199309231825.AA00822@panix.com>
Message-ID: <sgcVq4z0BwwbQ5caAC@transarc.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Duncan Frissell <frissell@panix.com> writes:
> Note that in a number of "regulatory" first amendment cases, the appeals 
> courts decided in favor of the government while the Supremes voted 
> unanimously in favor of freedom of communication.  Sometimes you have to 
> make it up the ladder.

Pardon my cynicism, but I think I know why.
These little judges really, really, want to be appointed Supremes.  So
they aren't likely to rule in a fashion which will threaten the
potential interests of a current or future US president.  Since the
natural goal of government is to accrue power, there seems to be a
safe prediction of what those future interests will be. 

Lyle		Transarc		707 Grant Street
412 338 4474	The Gulf Tower		Pittsburgh 15219




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: msattler@netcom.com
Date: Thu, 23 Sep 93 18:57:26 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Why RSA?
Message-ID: <9309240153.AA14374@netcom.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>I don't know if ViaCrypt includes any distinguishing features
>that let you tell a ViaCrypt PGP message from a Real PGP message -
>they could do subtle stuff like make the session keys all 
>include some checksum (e.g. be a multiple of N mod M),
>or crude stuff like put "Version 2.3ViaCrypt" in the headers,
>which would let them detect non-ViaCrypt PGP users.
>I assume not, but I haven't seen it.

PRZ has specifically said that it is his intention to have no difference
between the output of the PGP and ViaCrypt so that users of the
free-ware version can't be ferreted out.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
Michael S. Sattler         msattler@netcom.com        +1 (415) 358-3058
Digital Jungle Software    Encrypt now; ask me how.   (finger for PGP key)

  "Don't Panic!" -- Douglas Adams     "Don't Panic.  Stay Cool."  -- PRZ 






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "L. Detweiler" <ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Date: Thu, 23 Sep 93 18:14:02 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Front Line Dispatch -or- Conspiracy Theories on the PTB
Message-ID: <9309240110.AA16875@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Here is an update on recent and past developments.

- Why PRZ was not subpoenaed
- Clarifications on the NYT article - simultaneous serve dates?
- The Grady Ward PGP connection
- the Scarlet Letter
- Conclusion
- EFF and *your* support

PRZ unsubpoenaed so far
----

First, in the message I posted to the cypherpunk list that PM
transformed into one of the most side-splittingly hilarious, foaming,
delirious flames I've ever had the joy to experience, there were some
misleading comments, and I'm rather surprised that no one has noticed
and chastised me for them, publicly or privately. (In this way PM
succeeded precisely in his intent of distracting attention from the
actual contents, in a rather pitiably desperate way.) However, I do
have to admit that it was probably my weakest posting here on the
affair -- nevertheless, I was actually quite dazzled by the ensuing
fireworks, which IMHO comprise the most spectacular flame war I've ever
seen on the list, and I'd *not* have done anything differently knowing
this in retrospect! (And this characteristically prolix commentary is
my tribute in response!)

Anyway, I've been relying on `cyberspatial connections' (email & the
phone, and *many* key people) *intensely* lately as a tool to
crystallize my thoughts and further The Cause. Let me post some clarifications.

First, I said, 
>What is the significance that PRZ was not actually
>cited in any subpoena so far? This is very puzzling. It seems to
>contradict the theory that the investigation is primarily PGP oriented.

Actually, what I meant was this: why do the subpoenas ask
representatives to appear who have very little personal knowledge of
the situation: ``how could they *not* query PRZ if they are inquiring
on PGP''? The Austin Code Works one is not even directed to anyone in
particular (!) but to the `custodian of records'. And as I noted the
ViaCrypt one is directed to the president, Leonard Mikus -- who of
course would be extremely knowledgeable of the recent ViaCrypt deal,
but virtually *entirely clueless* as to the original PGP distribution
(happening over 2 *years* ago!).

The ViaCrypt subpoena of course *does* mention PRZ repeatedly. Here are
the two side by side for comparison. I got this from Current Underground Digest:

[Viacrypt]
>"Any and all
>correspondence, contracts, payments, and records, including those
>stored as computer data, involving international distribution related
>to ViaCrypt, PGP, Philip Zimmermann, and anyone or any entity acting
>on behalf of Philip Zimmermann for the time period June 1, 1991 to the
>present."  

[Moby Crypto]
>Any and all correspondence, contracts, payments, and record,
>including those stored as computer data, relating to the
>international distribution of the commercial product "Moby
>Crypto" and any other commercial product related to PGP and RSA
>Source Code for the time period June 1, 1991 to the present.

The letter I quoted in my own, from the person describing grand jury
investigations, erroneously implied that Phil Zimmermann was
subpoenaed, which regrettably my own report above it confused as well.
Phil Zimmermann, to this point, has *not* been subpoenaed.

I think the simple answer to this curiosity is as follows, and is not
idle speculation but cuts to the core of the case and the intentions of
those behind it. As indicated, I have heard  indications that the
subpoenas are only the latest development in a customs investigation
that perhaps extends up to many months or even over a *year* in span.
Very likely PRZ has been contacted on a previous occasion. The primary
focus of these subpoenas is *records*, not *testimony*. Possibly, the
investigation has already exhaustively uncovered testimony short of
written records. In fact, this suggests a model `ladder of severity' of
an investigation of this type, of which there appears to be almost no
historical precedent, but this might serve as in the future:

(1) start with queries to people involved, with no warrants. Maximize
the information obtained. track down all leads to people mentioned freely.
(2) When this has been exhausted, possibly, attempt to gain any records
available without a warrant.
(3) If no directly incriminating evidence has been obtained to this
point, but there is still some prod to go further (more on this later),
convene the grand jury.
(4) subpoena (a) documents and (b) witnesses. 

Now, in (4), if significant oral accounts had already been obtained
*freely*, the former (a) is more important than the latter (b) at that
stage. Or, it might be that the investigators thought that a mere
subpoena for records would be less explosive than one for documents.
Also, it is definitely less of a burden on some people (the Austin Code
Works `records custodian' notwithstanding). These are all plausible
conjectures of the inquiry situation at this point in the case.

NYT article & the simultaneous date?
---

From the CuD account, I have pieced together the following, which forms
part of a letter I hope will be accepted by one of the premier online
electronic computer journals (watch for it!):

>As reported in many places, such as Current Underground Digest, New
>York Times (Sept 21) and on AP, subpoenas were served on
>representatives from the companies ViaCrypt and Austin Code Works for
>materials related to a grand jury investigation in California
>associated with the U.S. Customs Office. Both warrants are dated 9
>Sept., but were served and received two days apart (contrary to the NYT
>account), with the ViaCrypt on Tues 14 Sept and ACW on Thur 16 Sept [...]

I've talked to J. Markoff (the NYT writer) and he's indicated that the
following statement in the article

>The
>grand jury subpoenas, which the companies *received* Sept. 9

(my emphasis) was based on the date *on* the subpoenas, not their
actual `serving time'. (Note: subpoenas are delivered by government
agents, not the post office.)

Markoff also misspelled Zimmermann's name with one 'n', a pitfall I
must confess my own guilt on occasion! Finally, I have to admit now
that theories about a `coordinated simultaneous attack' in expectation
of the `cyberspatial reaction' are not supported by this datum. This is
not to say it was not on the minds of `the powers that be', which I
will henceforth coin the PTB, and let it serve as the hypothetical TLA
responsible for all *unsolved* conspiracies in existence. (Note that
the expression is not my own but the abbreviation is.)

The PGP connection
---

Finally, I also wrote, an eternity ago in cyberspatial time (EA in CT):

>Rumor: Moby Crypto was targeted because G. Ward intended to include PGP
>on distribution disks. The investigation is primarily PGP oriented, and
>G. Ward is just a bystander who got caught up. PRZ & PGP is the essential target.

G. Ward has just confirmed this to me directly. Since he's referring to
public Usenet postings, I'm going to quote him:

Date: Thu, 23 Sep 93 05:50:13 -0700
Message-Id: <9309231250.AA17688@netcom6.netcom.com>
>I believe that I did announce on sci.crypt that my
>Moby Crypto tutorial was to contain a full source
>to PGP as an excellent example of a full crypto and
>digital signature application.
>
>Because I do not have a license from PK partners, I
>was careful to document their patent rights and to only
>publish the source (and I got two patent attorneys opinions
>that source is not infringing as long as it wasn't
>just an attempt at evasion).

also, I asked cypherpunks to find this message. so far, no bites. I
would figure it would have *really* stood out, but no one seems to
remember it. This is *prime* material for us to pore over. We can
determine how fast someone may have reacted if we know the date of his message.

Now, call me a conspiracy theorist, but personally, this statement,
taken along with the subpoenas and the glaring NSA pokes G. Ward has
been the butt end of as reported on Usenet crypto groups and alluded
here, is all perhaps the strongest indication I've ever seen that the
NSA (the most common PTB) is directly monitoring newsgroups -- not only
monitoring, but beginning to respond directly to taunts.

The Scarlet Letter
---

I'll have much more to say about the latest letter bestowed on Grady
later. The major point I want to make here is to tie it in with the
current investigation. First of all, it now implicates fairly high
levels of the State Department and the Office of Defense and Trade
controls as being engaged in all this as well. Secondly, it gives us
some EXTREMELY valuable intelligence on which of our interpretations of
the ITAR are relevant, and how the PTB (synonymous with The Enemy here)
interprets them. There are *direct references* of sections, and I'm
just salivating for the next H. Finney posting to rebut their fantasies:

>Further,
>the exemptions listed in 22 CFR # 125.4 for technical data do
>not apply to cryptographic software and source code. 

The most EXTRORDINARY section, upon which Grady Ward bases his claims
that this appears to be a DOMESTIC CONSTRICTION of cryptographic
knowledge dissemination:

>We take this opportunity of advise you that any company or
>individual who engages in the United State in the business of
>either manufacturing or exporting defense articles or
>furnishing defense services is required to register for a fee
>with the Office of Defense Trade Controls (DTC) pursuant to 22
>U.S.C. # 2778(b)(1)(A) and 22 C.F.R. Part 122. 

The apparent claim is that mere *U.S. `manufacturing' alone* (*not* any
trans-border condition such as export or import) requires `registration
for a fee' -- this is tantamount, in the case of cryptography, to
PRIVACY LICENSES. HORRORS!

This appears to be an extraordinarily audacious, egregious, and perhaps
a WHOLLY UNTENABLE interpretation of the ITAR by the PTB. Here G.
Ward's comical vision of Cereal Decoder Ring Registration reaches the
depths of irony and absurdity -- and the heights of our anxiety and apprehension.

BTW, I've come to the conclusion that we could not have *wished* for
better `victims' in a lifetime. If we are going to win anything for
`the cause' from all this, Phil Zimmerman and Grady Ward are the
greatest shining heroes we have to offer in this affair, which is going
to turn out, desperately hopefully, as the Two Davids vs. Goliath, and
not the latest human sacrifice to the PTB.

Conclusion
---

What does all this mean to the spread of cryptography? Its far too
premature to comment authoritatively. Instead I wrote the `Schneier
Satire' because I'm *extremely* concerned by all these recent
developments. I think they respresent a desperate struggle by the NSA
to minimize the *future* spread of cryptographic ideas and
implementations through any government agencies available, particularly
in the *domestic* U.S. arena. PGP to this point has been `out of the
bag' but not in a potentially enormous *commercial* way.

Apparently, the ViaCrypt agreement shifted the `institutional paranoia'
into high gear of the extraordinary future potential of PGP and public,
widespread cryptography.  This represents a fundamental policy change
from `benign neglect' to `active harassment' and perhaps, more
melodramatically, *attack*. The Zimmermann-Ward affair is going to be a
critical keystone to future developments in cryptographic freedom, in
either limiting and checking this latest alarming manifestation of the
severe, constricting, repressive influence of the NSA, or in heralding
a new, basic, bold expansion of it.


EFF and *your* support
---

It greatly pains me to have to bring this up, but I've received
multiple top confirmations that EFF is `less than fully engaged' on
this for a variety of practical reasons. In particular, it is not
possible for them to provide attorneys or financial support at this
early stage. I fully believe they are wholly committed to the overall
battle, but have talked to key observers who are disenchanted and even
alienated by their lukewarm response so far. I hope something
beneficial to everyone and "The Crypto Cause" can stabilize as soon as
possible. In the meantime, I'm going to close with H. Kennedy's
beconing call in Current Underground Digest:

===cut=here===

Date: Tue, 21 Sep 1993 05:36:08 GMT
From: hugh@GARGOYLE.UCHICAGO.EDU(Hugh Miller)
Subject: File 1--Phil Zimmerman Comments on Encryption Flap

Phil asked me to forward this to the Digest.  It points up the
problems of keeping _ANYTHING_ secret in the electronic world (unless,
of course, it is SECURELY encrypted \;-}).

    It is more or less self-explanatory.  Let me square his remark at
the end, though: whatever happens, Phil is facing some pretty vast
legal bills.  Now is the time for all of us who favor crypto for the
masses to pony up and put our wallets where our mouths are.  I pledge
$100 NOW, and challenge every one of you to match or exceed me.  I'll
keep it up until Phil's out of the hole.  ($100 on a regular basis is
a lot of money on an assistant professor's salary with 3 kids.)

    Examine your conscience and write that check.  Pronto.

    Hugh Miller
    Asst. Prof.
    Dept. of Philosophy
    Loyola University Chicago


Date--Sun, 19 Sep 1993 13:38:44 -0500
From--Philip Zimmermann
Subject--Zimmermann statement on PGP investigation

[...]

I understand that
the issues involved in this investigation are of the greatest
importance and transcend my personal interests.  Even so, I would
rather not turn an investigation into a full-scale federal
prosecution.  I ask that everyone keep in mind that the government's
resources are limitless and that mine are not.

Speaking of resources, many of you have offered help, and I am
grateful.  Those wishing to contribute financially or otherwise
should contact either me or Philip L. Dubois, Esq., at dubois@csn.org
or by phone at 303-444-3885 or by mail at 2305 Broadway, Boulder, CO,
80304.  Mr. Dubois has just got on the Internet and is still learning
how to use it.  Donated funds will be kept in a trust account, and all
contributions will be accounted for.  If this whole thing somehow goes
away with money left in the account, the balance will be refunded to
contributors in proportion to the amounts of their contributions.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: baumbach@atmel.com (Peter Baumbach)
Date: Thu, 23 Sep 93 17:37:25 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: First amendment and ITARs
Message-ID: <9309232336.AA10998@bass.chp.atmel.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>     The federal government undeniably possesses the power to regulate the
>     international arms traffic....  As a necessary incident to the power
>     to control arms export, the President is empowered to control the
>     flow of information concerning the production and use of arms.  The
>     authority to regulate arms traffic would be of negligible practical
>     value if it encompassed only the exportation of particular military
>     equipment but not the exportation of blueprints specifying the
>     construction of the very same equipment.
>   
>   579 F2d at 520.  We accordingly concluded that the government could
>   permissibly restrict the flow abroad of data included in the Munitions
>   List.  579 F2d at 521.  Finally, we held that the government's power
>   to issue such restrictions was not affected by the domestic availability
>   of the regulated data:
> 
>     Given the unquestionable legitimacy of the national interest in
>     restricting the dissemination of military information, the claim of
>     public availability in the United States is not a defense recognized
>     by the Constitution.

I question the legitimacy of ITAR.  There, it is no longer unquestioned.
Which enumerated power of the congress is the president enforcing here?

Raise all possible questions at the earliest convenience.  It is the
responsibility of your adversary, not the court, to argue the otherside.
Justice is supposed to be blind.  Anything else would IMHO be denial of
due proccess, and should be overturned on appeal on those grounds.

Peter Baumbach
baumbach@atmel.com




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "L. Detweiler" <ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Date: Thu, 23 Sep 93 19:50:32 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: the PTB etc. - errata
Message-ID: <9309240247.AA20262@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I wrote:

>Or, it might be that the investigators thought that a mere
>subpoena for records would be less explosive than one for documents.

That should read:

Or, it might be that the investigators thought that a mere subpoena for
records would be less explosive than one for key witnesses & testimony.

And to anticipate questions in email,

>This is
>not to say it was not on the minds of `the powers that be', which I
>will henceforth coin the PTB, and let it serve as the hypothetical TLA
>responsible for all *unsolved* conspiracies in existence.

TLA is a silly self-referential term: Three Letter Acronym.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: an12070@anon.penet.fi (S. Boxx)
Date: Thu, 23 Sep 93 15:37:23 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: CPSR NIST info
Message-ID: <9309232231.AA22024@anon.penet.fi>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


 David Sobel <dsobel@washofc.cpsr.org>
>This disclosure provides further confirmation that NSA, and not 
>NIST, is the driving force behind the Clipper proposal, despite 
>NIST's public role as the "proposing" agency.

SURPRISE!
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
To find out more about the anon service, send mail to help@anon.penet.fi.
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From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "L. Detweiler" <ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Date: Thu, 23 Sep 93 22:03:30 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: on the `R' in `RSA'
In-Reply-To: <9309221814.AA23907@balder.cs.wisc.edu>
Message-ID: <9309240500.AA23031@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


derek@cs.wisc.edu (Derek Zahn) posted a conscientious summary of
comments on the development of public key cryptographic techniques, a
subject discussed with a particular urgency and irony lately. I'd like
to comment on one paragraph:

>Respondents to my initial questions pointed out that the patents
>may be over-broad and could be challenged on those grounds; given
>the history of how public key crypto was invented, it seems to
>me that it would be difficult to contend that the idea is obvious
>(Simmons says that the idea "stunned" the crypto community) -- but
>I'm no lawyer, and I'll leave that issue to those with more skill,
>brains, and money than me!

Public key cryptography is not just a `stunning' idea -- it is
fundamentally revolutionary, because it solves `cryptography's
catch-22'.  This is a paragraph from a tentative version of the
cryptography faq (not available yet):

===

6.2. How does public-key cryptography solve cryptography's Catch-22?

  In a classic cryptosystem, if you want your friends to be able to
  send secret messages to you, you have to make sure nobody other than
  them sees the key K. In a public-key cryptosystem, you just publish
  X, and you don't have to worry about spies. Hence public key
  cryptography `solves' one of the most vexing problems of all prior
  cryptography: the necessity of establishing a secure channel for the
  exchange of the key. To establish a secure channel one uses
  cryptography, but private key cryptography requires a secure channel!
  In resolving the dilemma, public key cryptography has been considered
  by many to be a `revolutionary technology,' representing a
  breakthrough that makes routine communication encryption practical
  and potentially ubiquitous.

===

Public key cryptography also represents a throbbing, excruciating,
perhaps even *deadly* black eye for the NSA. The subject is given a
brief treatment in the final chapter of _Puzzle_Palace_ by Bamford, all
that was evident in 1980 (very close to its inception), but at even
that early time it was regarded as `stunning'. That chapter also notes
how the NSA had viewed with increasing desperation the academic
community's increasing interest in cryptographic research, and this
manifested itself in an atmosphere of increased tension between
researchers and the agency, such that the latter attempted to stifle
the former at the patent office and the journal submission boxes in
outrageous and insideous ways -- P. Karn had a delicious expression for
this a long time ago on the list, something like `poking from the
shadows'. In addition to this, handfuls of scattered cryptographic
enterprises and budding entrepreneurs have been harassed as well. This
always happens behind the facade of some other government agency. In
fact, many victims battled for a long time before they even discoverd
the NSA was behind their sorry, wretched plight or dismal failures.
Maybe a term better connoting the NSA's true unique depravity in our
free society would be `shadow molesting'.

The NSA was fundamentally in fear of, and continues to be terrified by
and repress, new discoveries that would render old cryptographic
ciphers breakable or yield new unbreakable ones, either outside of its
control. Nowhere else than in the NSA or cryptography itself are
doctrines regarding `security in obscurity', and `information is
power', more tenaciously held, or more prominent. Only in cryptography
is the mere *knowledge* of an efficient factoring algorithm paramount
and priceless -- in mathematics it would only be a curiosity.

But beyond this, public key cryptography in general and the RSA
algorithm in particular represent an *extraordinary* breakthrough in
cryptographic research that apparently caught the NSA totally unaware
and off guard. It may have been a very humbling experience for the
agency, which has sought the `cream of the crop' in engineers,
technicians, mathematicians and theorists, spending tens of billions of
dollars a year for decades to cultivate its own secret research, to
find that it had been outdone in a few years of intense and focused
outside research (I have the opinion that the NSA did *not* discover it
secretly, others may differ--it would be interesting to analyze their
reaction to try to determine that aspect in particular). Public key
cryptography is a `stunning' testament to the power and tradition of
open dialog in scientific research, and the fundamentally lackluster
performance of any government agency, no matter how well funded or
tightly coordinated, in comparison to the combined, vast, disconnected,
worldwide talent and ingenuity that feeds voraciously off open
scientific journals. Public key cryptography stands in bold, victorious
defiance of NSA suppression.

The final point to make is that RSA and public key systems have led to
an amazing cornucopia of scientific results and spurred other critical
mathematical theories. In particular the field of *complexity theory*
has been to a large part driven directly by questions associated with
public key cryptography. The unsolved perplexities in cryptographic
research seem to cut to the core of the frontiers of interesting
mathematical and computational ideas, such as factoring, that the
world's foremost minds have grappled with for millenia -- Gauss,
Fermat, Euler, et. al. (with new modern heroes). Cryptographic
algorithms embodied in RSA in particular represent one of the most
beautiful examples of the interplay between theoretical and practical
science. What other program in the world simultaneously utilizes
Fermat's Little Theorem to test for primes and guarantees privacy to
multitudes in daily email?

By the way, D. Zahn's `Simmons' reference above may be to the following
(if he pointed out what it was, I missed it):

  [SIM91] G. Simmons (ed.), Contemporary Cryptology: the Science of
          Information Integrity. IEEE press, 1991.

I'd also be interested in hearing of any other accounts that match my
own passion for the subject :)  Also, if others have any educated
opinion, evidence, or theories of whether public key crypto was
*undiscovered* by the NSA prior to the publication of Diffie and
Hellman and RSA, I'd read them with great fascination. Note that this
is *not* quite the same as `attempts to bar its publication' although
those are always eye opening as well.

p.s. feel free to redistribute this anywhere, but email me where you sent it.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Sameer Parekh <sameer@soda.berkeley.edu>
Date: Fri, 24 Sep 93 00:02:30 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: PGP question
Message-ID: <9309240659.AA18309@soda.berkeley.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text


	I have run into a rather embarrasing problem with PGP. I
accidentally deleted the secret key to my cory remailer. Luckily, I
have kept a backup of all my remailer keys in a safe place, so I still
have it. Unfortunately, I can't figure out how to extract the cory
secret key from the keyring containing the secret keys for my other
remailers.
	pgp -kx and pgp -kr work quite fine for the public keys, but I
can't get them to work for the secret keys. (All 6 keys were on the
same keyring.)
	Any help?

	(Because of this problem, PGP on cs60a-qu@cory.eecs.berkeley
isn't working-- if you want to do pGP through one of my remailers, use
sameer@soda.berkeley.edu or sameer@netcom.com)



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Anonymous <nowhere@bsu-cs.bsu.edu>
Date: Fri, 24 Sep 93 03:43:32 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: NIST Explains Clipper "Review" (fwd)
Message-ID: <9309241042.AA17103@bsu-cs.bsu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


In case you haven't heard:
 
 
To: Cypherpunks <toad.com!cypherpunks>
Date: Thu, 23 Sep 1993 16:51:12 EST    
Subject: NIST Explains Clipper "Revi 
 
  NIST Explains Clipper "Review"
 
     The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) has 
clarified the role of five experts selected by the agency to 
evaluate the government's Clipper Chip proposal and the underlying 
SKIPJACK cryptographic algorithm.  In a recent letter to the CPSR 
Washington Office, NIST asserts that the panel was not established 
to provide "advice or recommendations" to the government.  Rather, 
according to NIST, the reason for convening the group was "to 
provide the opportunity for independent experts to satisfy 
themselves as to the strength and effectiveness of the algorithm 
in order to encourage widespread acceptance of it in the 
marketplace."  NIST concludes that the panel's evaluation 
therefore falls outside the scope of the Federal Advisory 
Committee Act, which opens the work of advisory panels to public 
scrutiny.
 
     In response to CPSR's request for documents relevant to the 
panel's review, the agency reveals that
 
     NIST has no records which were made available to or prepared
     for the five experts for the purpose of enabling them to
     evaluate the Clipper Chip proposal.  Any such records would
     be in the possession of the National Security Agency, where
     all activities related to the work of the experts were
     conducted.
 
This disclosure provides further confirmation that NSA, and not 
NIST, is the driving force behind the Clipper proposal, despite 
NIST's public role as the "proposing" agency.
 
     The only NIST document released to CPSR is a copy of the 
invitation sent to the five experts who participated in the 
evaluation.  That letter describes the "key escrow" system and 
states that the escrowed keys will be made available "only to 
authorized government officials under proper legal authorizations, 
usually a court order."  This language -- "usually a court order" 
--  suggests that there will be instances in which the escrow keys 
will be provided to government agents without presentation of a 
judicial warrant.  The government has never clearly defined what 
will constitute "legal authorization" under the Clipper system.
 
David L. Sobel
CPSR Legal Counsel
<dsobel@washofc.cpsr.org>
 





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Timothy Newsham <newsham@wiliki.eng.hawaii.edu>
Date: Fri, 24 Sep 93 11:42:40 PDT
To: jazz@hal.com (Jason Zions)
Subject: Re: P. Wayner on CSSPAB meeting
In-Reply-To: <9309241531.AA13351@jazz.hal.com>
Message-ID: <9309241842.AA27176@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> The TCSEC and Common Criteria are really being developed by various Defense
> agencies; in the US, NIST is also involved, as I suppose DIN, BSI, AFNOR,
> etc. are. NSA is uninterested in making systems secure; their job is to
> break them anyway. Since the TCSEC doesn't specify mechanism, it's at too
> abstract a level for NSA to tamper with.
> 
> There are no boogie men from the Spy House involved here, at least in the
> US. You can sleep well again.

I wouldnt exactly say that (although I doubt the NSA's involvement
here is shady).  The NCSC which came out with the original Trusted Criterion
(rainbow books including the orange book) is stationed at Fort Meade
MD. (oddly enough right by NSA).  If you get information sent to you
from the NCSC sometimes the return address will say NSA on it instead
of NCSC.  If you read through the schedule of any of the conferences
they put on you will see a good percentage of people with NSA next to
their names.  The NSA *does* have alot of interests in trusted systems
and making systems secure.  They are the national *Security* Agency.
While half of the people at the NSA are working on how to break other
peoples security there is still a good fraction of them learning how to
make their own systems safe.

> Jason Zions




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: jrk@sys.uea.ac.uk (Richard Kennaway)
Date: Fri, 24 Sep 93 01:47:32 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Source for MacPGP2.3?
Message-ID: <18823.9309240844@s5.sys.uea.ac.uk>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I have MacPGP 2.3 (the Macintosh application).  From what ftp site can I
obtain the source?  soda only has Mac source for 2.2.

--                                  ____
Richard Kennaway                  __\_ /    School of Information Systems
Internet:  jrk@sys.uea.ac.uk      \  X/     University of East Anglia
uucp:  ...mcsun!ukc!uea-sys!jrk    \/       Norwich NR4 7TJ, U.K.





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: mjr@TIS.COM
Date: Fri, 24 Sep 93 06:52:37 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: NIST Explains Clipper "Review"
In-Reply-To: <1838400006@igc.apc.org>
Message-ID: <12104.9309241348@otter.TIS.COM>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



	One thing that occurs to me: rather than arguing Clipper's
technical merits, or whether or not it's Big Brother and therefore
evil, we should be making the press aware of the fact that Clipper
is going to cost major $$ for the taxpayers. This will be reflected
in terms of increased cost on consumer electronics, and in the cost
of administration of the key escrow system. Since both agencies for
the escrow will be government, the taxpayers are going to bear the
entire burden of the very complex (and presumably expensive) escrow
management.

	Our CEO, Steve Walker, has asked how many court ordered
wire taps are performed anually. Apparently, the number is very
low (under 1,000) - we must question the cost effectiveness of
a measure designed to protect wiretapping at a cost of hundreds
of millions of dollars, when apparently wiretapping is not that
important a tool in the arsenal of law enforcement.

	Recently, at the NCSC conference, a Mr. Brooks from NSA
spoke on the Clipper panel, and stated proudly that they had been
working hard on clipper for over 3 years. Unfortunately, NSA's
budget is classified, so we'll never find out how much this
B1-bomber of telecommunications has already cost the taxpayer,
but we need to bring the potential expense involved to the
attention of our various representatives. In a time when people
are losing their jobs and government is trying desperately to
cut costs, we must ask ourselves if it would be more cost effective
to spend the hundreds of millions of dollars clipper will cost
the taxpayer on hiring more police officers, or on social programs.

	I don't believe that our elected representatives or the
non-technical press understand the issues behind key escrow. We
need to make them understand that effectively clipper means that
the consumer will pay more for certain forms of electronics,
that the taxpayer will pay more for administering programs of
questionable usefulness, and that the government is using covert
budgets to subsidize an attempt to compete in the telecommunications
business.

	Our elected representatives and the press understand
$300 government toilet seats. Perhaps we need to come up with
a nice name for clipper. Rather than calling it the "big brother
chip" perhaps we should call it the "B1 bomber of data communications"
or point out that it is really an implicit tax on telecommunications.

mjr.


[PS - these are my personal opinions]




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Jason Zions <jazz@hal.com>
Date: Fri, 24 Sep 93 08:37:37 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: P. Wayner on CSSPAB meeting
Message-ID: <9309241531.AA13351@jazz.hal.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Mr. "Hyperbole-R-Us" Detweiller said:

>>A group of computer scientists from NIST came to discuss their plan
>>for the Federal Criteria for secure systems and the new "Common
>>Criteria" that may emerge. This is an updated version of the old
>>Orange Book classification scheme of C2 and B1 and stuff like that.
>>The scientists said the draft is being finished but it isn't ready
>>for release. But now, they're working on "Something Better." This
>>is a new plan to standardize the grading of secure systems with 
>>other countries and evolve a "Common Criteria." In general, the 
>>board groused about the fact that the public and industry have never
>>been invited to give comments during the process. The summary
>>of this talk is: "We might be able to tell you something someday." 
>
>`other countries'? `Common Criteria'? holy cow, this is something *very
>big* in the works. The U.S. can barely figure out its *own*
>cryptographic policies, and imagine the sheer logistical nightmare of
>trying to come to an agreement between the most isolated and imperious
>agencies!

It's a shame you understand so little of this.

The "Federal Criteria" they're discussing are the Trusted Computer Security
Evaluation Criteria, or TCSEC. This is also called the "Orange Book", since
it was published in an orange cover. It's a purely-US DOD document that
defines various levels of computer security - you remember, C2, B1, B3, all
that stuff. It talks about Mandatory Access Controls, Discretionary Access
Controls, Auditing, Authentication, etc.

Cryptography as such is not addressed by the TCSEC. I believe the TCSEC
discusses cryptographic authentication techniques in an abstract manner, but
not even to the degree of naming any.

The UK and other European countries have their equivalent to the TCSEC. The
security levels have different names, and the included features differ
slightly. The EC recognized that this difference in nomenclature and
definitions would act as a barrier to free trade, so they began a program
to harmonize these definitions. The "Common Criteria" would take this EC
stuff beyond Europe into the US, allowing vendors of secure systems to get
them rated once and sell them in a bunch of countries instead of building
country-specific secure systems as they are required to do today.

Another aspect of the Common Criteria is that they are expected to be a
little more commercial in focus. The TCSEC and its counterparts were
generally developed by the Defense organizations within their respective
countries of origin; the focus of control and security reflects the needs of
the developing organizations. Commercial users have been complaining for
years that the TCSEC et al don't meet their needs in a useful and flexible
manner; one desired goal for the Common Criteria is to meet this need.

Cryptography is almost completely unrelated to the actual criteria
themselves. Cryptography is one possible implementation mechanism for
several of the capabilities required by the TCSEC and its successors; it is
not the only such mechanism. The TCSEC does not prescribe or proscribe
implementation technology.

> I suspect GCHQ (Britain's NSA) would be involved in this at
>least. (There is a very cozy relationship between NSA and GCHQ that
>Kahn was harassed for revealing in _CodeBreakers_.)What other agencies?

The TCSEC and Common Criteria are really being developed by various Defense
agencies; in the US, NIST is also involved, as I suppose DIN, BSI, AFNOR,
etc. are. NSA is uninterested in making systems secure; their job is to
break them anyway. Since the TCSEC doesn't specify mechanism, it's at too
abstract a level for NSA to tamper with.

There are no boogie men from the Spy House involved here, at least in the
US. You can sleep well again.

Jason Zions




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: smb@research.att.com
Date: Fri, 24 Sep 93 08:28:37 PDT
To: derek@cs.wisc.edu (Derek Zahn)
Subject: Re: Why RSA?
Message-ID: <9309241524.AA24281@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Let me try to answer some of these questions by giving a broad overview
of patent law.  I'm not a lawyer, but I've spent a lot of time talking
to lawyers about patents during the last several years, and about what
they are and aren't.

First of all, a patent is (theoretically) a contract between an inventor
and society.  In return for the inventor teaching everyone about the
new idea, he or she gets a monopoly on use of that idea for a limited
period (normally 17 years in the U.S.).

Patents cover the right to build, make, import, or even *use* the
protected idea.

A patent is *not* a license to do something.  Rather, it is the right
to prevent others from doing it.  Thus, if I invented the pencil, and
you invented the eraser, neither of us could make a pencil+eraser without
permission from the other.

Patent infringement is not a crime; you cannot go to jail for it.  It is
a civil offense, and the patent holder has to sue you for infringing.

You can get a patent for things that are new, useful, and non-obvious.
All three criteria must be satisfied.  Note specifically that a new
use for an old idea is patentable.  R, S, and A did not patent particular
equations; rather, they patented certain specific uses for those
equations.  If you can find a new use for them, you're home free.
(I and a colleague almost did that.  We came up with a new application
for them, and we felt that the security of our scheme would be
strengthened tremendously by the work that's gone into RSA.  However,
our application was just different enough that I managed to crack
it.  Sigh.  But better that I cracked it before publishing...)

For our purposes, a patent consists of two major parts.  The first is
more or less a technical paper; this is what you're supposed to learn
from.  Some of the language is rather stylized, but for the most part
it will be comprehensible to someone who understands the field.
The second part is the ``claims''; these are written in very dense
legalese, and are supposed to delimit exactly what's new.  You infringe
a patent if your activity includes all of the elements of any one
claim.  Writing good claims is at the heart of a patent attorney's
skills.  You want to claim as much as you possibly can, even if you
think some of it is worthless -- but you have to make sure that what
you claim doesn't include prior art.  In the RSA patent, for example,
almost every claim speaks of both encryption and decryption.  The
idea of mine that I alluded to involved encryption only; thus, it
did not fall within the scope of all but one of the RSA claims.  For
various other reasons, it didn't fall within the scope of the other
one.

	 > All are patented in so far as one of the patents covers ALL public k
	ey
	 > schemes. Some, like Rabin's scheme, have possible technical advantag
	es
	 > over RSA.

	 First, a note:  "Rabin's scheme" is (as Perry said) the one
	 provably linked to factoring (a major advance!) and I assume
	 it's the one implemented in RPEM.  According to the RIPEM FAQ,
	 PKP squashed that development by claiming that their patents
	 were broad enough to cover Rabin's scheme, and the effort was
	 abandoned "for pragmatic reasons" (another example of how
	 superior technology can be suppressed by monopolies).

Well, Rabin's scheme has other problems as well, including the lack of
an unambiguous decryption algorithm.  You get a few answers, one of which
will be correct.

Under patent law, though, the ``superior'' technology hasn't been suppressed.
Rather, Rabin would need a license from RSA (and Diffie-Hellman) to
practice his invention.  And he couldn't have come up with his idea
unless RSA had been published.

	 Now, I've looked a little further into the patent issue, and I
	 remain kind of confused.  I went to the library and read the
	 four patents in question (but only made a hardcopy of the
	 first chronologically).  I found the documents difficult to
	 understand (for legal rather than crypto-tech reasons).  All
	 four applications were made in 1977-1978, and the patents were
	 granted variously from 1980-1984.  The earliest one has
	 Hellman, Diffie, and Merkle as inventors; the second just
	 Hellman and Merkle.  Both are assigned to Stanford
	 University.  It seems to me that one of these is the one that
	 covers, broadly, public key cryptography -- presumably the
	 earliest one (4,200,770), since it has all three major players
	 as inventors and the language of the eight claims seems to be
	 rather broad (though only the second patent, 4,218,582, has
	 the phrase "public key" in its title).

	 Patent 4,405,829, granted in 1983, is for the RSA algorithm
	 [footnote:  the RSA patent apparently celebrated its tenth
	 birthday two days ago; was there a party?].  There is no
	 overlap between this patent's inventors and assignees and the
	 earlier more general patent.  Here's a question for somebody
	 in the know:  if the earlier patents cover all public key
	 cryptography and RSA is a public key system, isn't it in
	 violation of the earlier broader patent?  Does PKP pay license
	 fees to Stanford, or were they granted exclusive rights by
	 Stanford as well as MIT?

As I explained above, a patent does not infringe per se.  However,
practicing RSA would indeed require a license from Stanford.  But
both Stanford and MIT assigned exclusive licensing rights to those
patents to Public Key Partners, a deal which arguably violates the
antitrust laws.  (Down, libertarians, down.  I know you don't believe
in such things...)

Anyway, patent 4200770 claims virtually all mechanisms for public key
distribution or exchange systems.  Exponential key exchange is the
particular example given; it's claimed, too.  Patent 4218582 claims
all of public-key cryptography.  The knapsack system was the particular
system given; it was claimed, as well.

I should note here -- to patent something, while you don't (as a rule)
have to build it, you do have to show that it's buildable.  If there's
any doubt, the patent examiner can order you to produce one.  This is
used to deal with perpetual motion machines and the like.  The concept
of public key cryptography couldn't have been patented without a
working example.  And, while knapsack systems were subsequently cracked,
at the time the patent was issued there were no (publicly) known attacks.

	 Similarly, apparently a public-key scheme called Warlock has
	 been granted patent protection.  How is this possible if
	 somebody else holds patents covering all of public key
	 encryption?

	 If I understand patents correctly (hah!) they last for 17
	 years from the time they are granted.  This means that the
	 earliest public key patent will expire in about 3.5 years.
	 After that presumably there will be no restrictions on new
	 public key systems.  The RSA patent would expire in 2000.

	 If somebody could clarify which patent is the "broad" public
	 key patent, I'd appreciate it (even with them right in front
	 of me, I can't tell)!  My guess is that it would have to be
	 either 4,200,770 or 4,218,582 -- if it's the latter, how did
	 Merkle get squeezed out of inventorship?

Have a look at "The first ten years of public key cryptography", Diffie, W.,
Proceedings of the IEEE 76:5, 1988, pp 560-577.

	 Respondents to my initial questions pointed out that the
	 patents may be over-broad and could be challenged on those
	 grounds; given the history of how public key crypto was
	 invented, it seems to me that it would be difficult to contend
	 that the idea is obvious (Simmons says that the idea "stunned"
	 the crypto community) -- but I'm no lawyer, and I'll leave
	 that issue to those with more skill, brains, and money than
	 me!

There was some question of prior art published more than one year before
the patent was filed.  See "Multi-user cryptographic techniques",
Diffie and Hellman, AFIPS Proceedings 45, pp109-112, June 8, 1976.
The patent apparently contains some language explaing why that doesn't
count, and in particular because there was no demonstration that it was
even possible to build such a thing as a public key cryptosystem.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: smb@research.att.com
Date: Fri, 24 Sep 93 08:27:38 PDT
To: baumbach@atmel.com
Subject: Re: the public key minefield
Message-ID: <9309241526.AA24310@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


	 >  derek@cs.wisc.edu (Derek Zahn)
	 > >* in broad terms, what would I have to do to develop an
	 > >  algorithm that works from a user's perspective like
	 > >  p.k.c. (ie public/private keys, the central functional
	 > >  point of all the wonderful schemes based on pkc) but
	 > >  doesn't violate patents?
	 L. Detweiler writes:
	 > others have well addressed how patent issues are involved in this. b
	ut
	 > this appears to be a simple technical question on one level. What do
	es
	 > it take to come up with a good public key system?

	 How about a poor public key system?  What is the simplest public key
	 system you can invent, if you didn't care that it is trivial to break?
	 If the NSA can crack RSA, does that change the fact that it is a pkc?

	 message=99

	 public_key= 1/3
	 private_key= 3

	 encrypted_message= message * public_key
	 message= encrypted_message * private_key

	 Would PKP reading of their patent claims cover this pkc?  Seems overbr
	oad!


No, because of the language in the patent which requires that it be
infeasible to find the deciphering key from the enciphering key.  Here's
the claim, from patent 4218582, that covers all of public key cryptography:

1. In a method of communicating securely over an insecure communication
channel of the type which communicates a message from a transmitter to
a receiver, the improvement characterized by:
  providing random numbers at the receiver;
  generating from said random numbers a public enciphering key at the
    receiver;
  generating from said random numbers a secret deciphering key at the
    receiver such that the secret deciphering key is directly related to
    and computationally infeasible to generate from the public enciphering
    key;
  communicating the public enciphering key from the receiver to the
    transmitter;
  processing the message and the public enciphering key at the
    transmitter and generating an enciphered message by an enciphering
    transformation, such that the enciphering transformation is easy to
    effect but computationally infeasible to invert without the secret
    deciphering key;
  transmitting the enciphered message from the transmitter to the
    receiver; and
  processing the enciphered message and the secret deciphering key at
    the receiver to transform the enciphered message with the secret
    deciphering key to generate the message.






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: smb@research.att.com
Date: Fri, 24 Sep 93 08:40:38 PDT
To: "L. Detweiler" <ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Subject: Re: on the `R' in `RSA'
Message-ID: <9309241539.AA24457@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


	 I'd also be interested in hearing of any other accounts that match my
	 own passion for the subject :)  Also, if others have any educated
	 opinion, evidence, or theories of whether public key crypto was
	 *undiscovered* by the NSA prior to the publication of Diffie and
	 Hellman and RSA, I'd read them with great fascination.

NSA claims to have developed public-key cryptography about ten years before
the public discovery.  See

@article{Diffie88,
   author = {Whitfield Diffie},
   journal = {Proceedings of the IEEE},
   month = {May},
   number = {5},
   pages = {560--577},
   title = {The First Ten Years of Public Key Cryptography},
   volume = {76},
   year = {1988}
}

a paper I hightly recommend to this entire list.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: sameer@netcom.com (Sameer Parekh)
Date: Fri, 24 Sep 93 11:40:39 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: cs60a-qu@cory.eecs.berkeley PGP back in operation
Message-ID: <9309241837.AA14986@netcom.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


	Thanks for the help with PGP. My cory remailer is again
working with PGP encryption.

-- 
Sameer
sameer@netcom.com




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: emv@mail.msen.com
Date: Fri, 24 Sep 93 10:17:39 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Beavis and Butthead on cryptography
Message-ID: <m0ogGge-0007u9C@venuti.aa.msen.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


FYI.  --Ed

To: emv@mail.msen.com
Cc: tritan@MIT.EDU, online-world@media.mit.edu, privacy@media.mit.edu
Subject: Re: pgp gets hit by Feds 
Date: Fri, 24 Sep 93 12:39:27 -0400
From: castillo@media.mit.edu

If this PGP case ever goes to trial it might just end once and for all
the idiocy of the US gov't trying to prevent the rest of the world from
reading what's already been published.  

Butthead: uh huh...uh huh...say Beevis, do you think they have computers
          in Europe?

Beevis: huh huh...huh huh...Nope, they don't have phones either...huh huh

Butthead: So, uh huh...this PGP thing is gonna stay in America?

Beevis: uh huh...yeah, that's right...uh huh...right here...huh huh

Butthead: Encryption is cool.

Beevis: Yeah.


------- End of Forwarded Message





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: peb@PROCASE.COM (Paul Baclace)
Date: Fri, 24 Sep 93 13:30:40 PDT
To: mjr@TIS.COM
Subject: Re: NIST Explains Clipper "Review"
Message-ID: <9309242026.AA02558@banff.procase.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



An economic analysis would indeed be useful, especially if it led to 
poll-type question like "Would you be willing to pay $100 extra for
a cellular phone to get secure communications that allowed government 
wiretaps?"

Or as a sound bite:  "At $100M+ a year, consumers and businesses are 
subsidizing government wiretapping at the minimum cost of 
$100,000 for each wiretap."

At that price, the government might as well give $100k to the suspects
under the condition that they stop doing whatever is considered illegal. ;^)


Paul E. Baclace
peb@procase.com





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: wcs@anchor.ho.att.com (Bill_Stewart_HOY002_1305)
Date: Fri, 24 Sep 93 14:07:43 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: NIST Comment Deadline - FAX NUMBER
Message-ID: <9309241727.AA01768@anchor.ho.att.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text


I called the person below; the person who answered the phone said that
the director is James Burrows, and his fax is 1-301-948-1784.
Branstad's fax is 948-1233.
-------------

ADDRESSES: Written comments concerning the proposed standard 
should be sent to: Director, Computer Systems Laboratory, ATTN: 
Proposed FIPS for Escrowed Encryption Standard, Technology 
Building, room B-154, National Institute of Standards and 
Technology, Gaithersburg, MD 20899.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Dr. Dennis Branstad, National 
Institute of Standards and Technology, Gaithersburg, MD 20899, 
telephone (301) 975-2913.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: derek@cs.wisc.edu (Derek Zahn)
Date: Fri, 24 Sep 93 11:50:39 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Patents
Message-ID: <9309241847.AA28116@balder.cs.wisc.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text



Cypherpunks:

Too often in email fora, when a substantive discussion results
in the presentation of interesting material, no effort is made
to integrate the result into a form that will be useful beyond
the heat of the exchange.  For this reason, I will impose once
more upon the bandwidth of Cypherpunks with a rewrite of my
previous mini-essay.  Because of the effort and generosity of
many correspondents, I hope that some of the clueless parts
have had clues plugged in.

Rather than equivocating, which is my usual practice when not
entirely certain of what I'm saying, I state some "facts" quite
plainly here because equivocation is kind of annoying to everybody.
If anybody notices that I'm "full of it" in some way, please let
me know... I have no desire to mislead or cause confusion.

Special thanks to:

E. Carp
L. Detweiler
P. Metzger
smb@research.att.com

MOTIVATION:

Starting with a premise that widespread use of Public-Key
Cryptography (PKC) would be in some sense a Good Thing
(and for our purposes here ignoring the interesting and
spirited reasons for *why* PKC is so cool), newbie
Cypherpunks may well wonder how this can be achieved.
My purpose here is not to complain about restrictions
or wonder about alternate worlds without those
restrictions; rather it's an attempt to assess what
the restrictions are and what their practical
implications are.

The important fact of life in this area is that PKC has
been granted patent protection and is proprietary
technology.  Exclusive licensing rights to PKC and
its dominant embodiment, the RSA algorithm, have been
assigned to Public Key Partners (PKP).

PATENT PROTECTION:

smb@research.att.com explained patents (only excerpts are quoted here):

> ... a patent is (theoretically) a contract between an inventor
> and society.  In return for the inventor teaching everyone about the
> new idea, he or she gets a monopoly on use of that idea for a limited
> period (normally 17 years in the U.S.).

> Patents cover the right to build, make, import, or even *use* the
> protected idea. ... A patent is *not* a license to do something.
> Rather, it is the right to prevent others from doing it.

> For our purposes, a patent consists of two major parts.  The first is
> more or less a technical paper; this is what you're supposed to learn
> from. ... The second part is the ``claims''; these are written in very dense
> legalese, and are supposed to delimit exactly what's new.  You infringe
> a patent if your activity includes all of the elements of any one
> claim.  ... you have to make sure that what your claim doesn't include
> prior art.

There are four patents of primary interest (I mention three because I'm
not certain what 4,424,414 [1984] is all about):

4,200,770, granted 1980.  This patent (smb again:) " claims virtually all
mechanisms for public key distribution or exchange systems.  Exponential
key exchange is the particular example given; it's claimed, too."  This
patent has Diffie, Hellman, and Merkle as inventors.  Diffie and Hellman
working together, and Merkle working independently, came up with the
ideas behind PKC.  The patent was assigned to Stanford University.
Since with PKC keys can be broadcast without requiring a secure channel,
it offers obvious advantages for key distribution.

4,218,582, granted 1980.  It (smb:) "claims all of public-key
cryptography.  The knapsack system was the particular system given;
it was claimed, as well."  Hellman and Merkle are the inventors
on this patent, also assigned to Stanford.  From reading Diffie's
"The First Ten Years of Public Key Cryptography," I get the impression
that Diffie was not on this patent because Hellman and Merkle
together devised the "trapdoor knapsack" that was the particular
system illustrating PKC.  At some financial cost to Merkle in lost
bets, that particular PKC system was broken, but that is only a
historical footnote.

4,405,829, granted 1983.  This patent is for the RSA algorithm,
and has Rivest, Shamir, and Adleman as inventors.  This patent
was assigned to MIT.  Diffie calls RSA "the single most spectacular
contribution to public key cryptography" and it is an un-"broken"
complete public key cryptosystem.  RSA is the overwhelmingly
dominant PKC system.  The difficulty of breaking RSA has not
been proven equal to the difficulty of factoring the product
of two large prime numbers, which would be desirable because
it would preclude some cracking scheme coming in from nowhere
(we'll say that factoring is "somewhere" because it's commonly
studied).  Rabin has come up with a RSA variant that is equivalent
to factoring, but has other technical problems.

IMPLICATIONS

Because PKP has been assigned all licensing rights to these
patents, which cover all of PKC to one extent or another,
we are not at present free to code up and sell PKC tools
without licensing the technology from PKP -- at least not
without risk of a lawsuit.  Some people believe that
one or more of the patents are invalid in some way.  A
patent must be for something new, useful, and non-obvious.
Given that PKC is useful, the other two criteria could
be challenged:
  * perhaps the ideas could be described as obvious
  * perhaps prior art could be demonstrated, so that the
    patented inventions aren't really "new".
Such an effort would cost a great deal of money and is
uncertain of success.

Other efforts to get around the PKP monopoly are possible.
One idea would be to claim an "experimental use exemption",
an unclear way of legitimately ignoring a patent for personal
experimental use (see the comp.patents FAQ for more information
on this and other patent issues).  Another idea is simply
to ignore the patent.  PKP would have to sue the infringer,
an expensive and time-consuming process and probably not worthwhile
for some small infringements -- but it's probably very unwise
to try making any money this way!  Another legal route would
be to claim that the assignment of rights by MIT and Stanford
to PKP violate anti-trust laws.

Users of the wonderful "underground" program PGP presumably
are doing so with the "experimental use" idea or the "ignore
the patent" idea in mind.  While this has caused some friction,
it appears not to be very dangerous for individual users.

The final approach to an end-run around the patents is to wait.
The broad PKC patents expire in less than four years, which
should allow non-RSA PKC schemes to be developed and sold
without restriction.  However, it is important not to
underestimate the difficulties of doing this.  Solid efficient
PKC schemes are most definitely not trivial to devise, and
an extended period of evaluation by professional cryptologists
is probably required in order to convince users that the
scheme offers good security.  The RSA patent expires in 2000.

The straightforward approach, and the only practical one for
small-time entrepreneurs wanting to develop PKC products now, is
to strike a deal with PKP for the use of RSA (as ViaCrypt has
done for the "legit" version of PGP).

It seems that the designers of Internet Privacy Enhanced Mail (PEM)
agreed with this assessment, as they took the unusual step of including
proprietary RSA in their standard.  For their part, in RFC 1170, PKP
states:

  "We assure the interested parties that Public Key Partners will comply
  with all of the policies of ANSI and the IEEE concerning the availability
  of licenses to practice this art.  Specifically, in support of any RSA
  signature standard which may be adopted, Public Key Partners hereby
  gives its assurance that licenses to practice RSA signatures will be
  available under reasonable terms and conditions on a non-discriminatory
  basis."

The exact meaning of "reasonable terms and conditions" is not clear.
For evidence we can look at the ViaCrypt product, which is apparently
available for less than $50 in quantity.  Since it includes the
extensive facilities of PGP, as well as support overhead, in addition
to the cost of the RSA license.

Standards (for example, PGP and PEM) are key to widespread use of PKC.
It appears unlikely that standards will go to something besides RSA
any time in the near future.

The final option is to invent some new revolutionary technique, to
amaze and delight Cypherpunks everywhere.  Please do.  Good luck.

REFERENCES

  sci.crypt FAQ: information about PKC
  comp.patents FAQ: information about patents
  RIPEM FAQ: stuff about PKP stopping developement of an implementation
	of Rabin's scheme
  Diffie, W.: "The First Ten Years of Public Key Cryptography", chapter
    3 of: G. Simmons (ed.), Contemporary Cryptology: the Science of
    Information Integrity. IEEE press, 1991.
      which  might be the same as:
    "The first ten years of public key cryptography", Diffie, W.,
    Proceedings of the IEEE 76:5, 1988, pp 560-577.
  Cypherpunks list archive (there is one, right?):  many interesting
	comments, often highly-clued.

derek



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: cme@ellisun.sw.stratus.com (Carl Ellison)
Date: Fri, 24 Sep 93 12:17:41 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: NIST's call for comments
Message-ID: <9309241911.AA16528@ellisun.sw.stratus.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


cpsr.org's archive of comments is looking mighty thin, this close to
the deadline.  Is no one writing to NIST? ..or just not copying CPSR?

/cpsr/crypto/clipper/call-for-comments:

total 64
-rw-r--r--  1 cpsr     1000         2574 Sep 24 16:09 campbell_comments.txt
-rw-r--r--  1 cpsr     1000         3221 Aug 24 21:46 denn_comments.txt
-rw-r--r--  1 cpsr     1000        22895 Sep 24 16:10 ellison_comments_may_93.txt
-rw-r--r--  1 cpsr     1000         6079 Aug 19 13:32 howland-comments
-rw-r--r--  1 cpsr     1000         2286 Aug 21 15:08 mcallister-comments
-rw-r--r--  1 cpsr     1000         1955 Aug 24 21:54 nate_comments.txt
-rw-r--r--  1 cpsr     1000        21934 Aug 19 13:33 notice-for-comments
-rw-r--r--  1 cpsr     1000         1536 Sep 24 16:10 oram-comments.txt
-rw-r--r--  1 cpsr     1000         1295 Sep 24 16:11 riordan-comments.txt

..and I've just mailed them my comments for this round, yet to show up
in this directory.

 - Carl




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: ssimpson@eff.org (Sarah L Simpson)
Date: Fri, 24 Sep 93 14:40:39 PDT
To: com-priv@lists.psi.com
Subject: ACTIVIST ALERT
Message-ID: <199309242135.AA11095@eff.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


ACTIVIST ALERT - The Government Is Messin' With Your Privacy!

Computer Professionals for Social Responsibility (CPSR) posted the
following call for comments to the Net.  As the deadline for comments on
the proposed Escrow Encryption Standard (CLIPPER/SKIPJACK) looms near, EFF
wholeheartedly supports CPSR's work to bring attention to the proposal and
encourages everyone who reads this to respond with comments.

We have added a sample letter and additional information at the end of the
CPSR post.

====================
text of CPSR post
====================
Call for Clipper Comments

The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) has
issued a request for public comments on its proposal to establish
the "Skipjack" key-escrow system as a Federal Information
Processing Standard (FIPS).  The deadline for the submission of
comments is September 28, 1993.  The full text of the NIST notice
follows.

CPSR is urging all interested individuals and organizations to
express their views on the proposal and to submit comments
directly to NIST.  Comments need not be lengthy or very detailed;
all thoughtful statements addressing a particular concern will
likely contribute to NIST's evaluation of the key-escrow proposal.

The following points could be raised about the NIST proposal
(additional materials on Clipper and the key escrow proposal may
be found at the CPSR ftp site, cpsr.org):

* The potential risks of the proposal have not been assessed and
many questions about the implementation remain unanswered.  The
NIST notice states that the current proposal "does not include
identification of key escrow agents who will hold the keys for the
key escrow microcircuits or the procedures for access to the
keys."  The key escrow configuration may also create a dangerous
vulnerability in a communications network.  The risks of misuse of
this feature should be weighed against any perceived benefit.

* The classification of the Skipjack algorithm as a "national
security" matter is inappropriate for technology that will be used
primarily in civilian and commercial applications.  Classification
of technical information also limits the computing community's
ability to evaluate fully the proposal and the general public's
right to know about the activities of government.

* The proposal was not developed in response to a public concern
or a business request.  It was put forward by the National
Security Agency and the Federal Bureau of Investigation so that
these two agencies could continue surveillance of electronic
communications. It has not been established that is necessary for
crime prevention.  The number of arrests resulting from wiretaps
has remained essentially unchanged since the federal wiretap law
was enacted in 1968.

* The NIST proposal states that the escrow agents will provide the
key components to a government agency that "properly demonstrates
legal authorization to conduct electronic surveillance of
communications which are encrypted."  The crucial term "legal
authorization" has not been defined.  The vagueness of the term
"legal authorization" leaves open the possibility that court-
issued warrants may not be required in some circumstances.  This
issue must be squarely addressed and clarified.

* Adoption of the proposed key escrow standard may have an adverse
impact upon the ability of U.S. manufacturers to market
cryptographic products abroad.  It is unlikely that non-U.S. users
would purchase communication security products to which the U.S.
government holds keys.


Comments on the NIST proposal should be sent to:

Director, Computer Systems Laboratory
ATTN: Proposed FIPS for Escrowed Encryption Standard
Technology Building, Room B-154
National Institute of Standards and Technology
Gaithersburg, MD 20899

Submissions must be received by September 28, 1993.  CPSR has
asked NIST that provisions be made to allow for electronic
submission of comments.

Please also send copies of your comments on the key escrow
proposal to CPSR for inclusion in the CPSR Internet Library, our
ftp site.  Copies should be sent to <clipper@washofc.cpsr.org>.
===================
end of CPSR post
===================


EFF joins with CPSR in urging you to send your comments to NIST as soon as
possible.  To help get your creative juices flowing, we're attaching a
sample letter.  You will probably want to personalize any letter you
actually send.

And because time is so tight, EFF has set up an Internet address where you
can send your electronic comments in lieu of mailing them through the U.S.
Postal Service.  Send your letters to:

        cryptnow@eff.org

We will be printing out all letters and hand-delivering them before the
deadline, so please make sure to send us any letter you want included no
later than 8pm on Monday, September 27.

If you would like additional background materials, you can browse the
pub/EFF/crypto area of our anonymous ftp site (ftp.eff.org).  The original
solicitation of comments can be found there and is called
NIST-escrow-proposal.

DO NOT WAIT TO WRITE YOUR COMMENTS!  TIME IS SHORT!


======================
<<your name>>
<<your organization>>
<<your street address>>
<<your city, state, zip>>

<<date>>


National Institute for Standards and Technology (NIST)
ATTN:  Proposed FIPS for Escrowed Encryption Standard
Technology Building, Room B-154
National Institute of Standards and Technology
Gaithersburg, MD  20899

Mr. Director:

I am writing to oppose the Proposed Federal Information Processing Standard
(FIPS) for and Escrowed Encryption Standard, docket # 930659-3159.

Encryption is vital for the protection of individual privacy in the
Information Age.  As more and more personal information flows around
electronic networks, we all need strong encryption to safeguard information
from unwanted intrusion

NIST should not be moving forward with technical standards specification
until critical policy decisions are made.  These policy issues include:

o       Continued Legal Use of All Forms of Encryption:  When the Clinton
Administration announced the Clipper Chip, it assured the public that this
would be a purely voluntary system.  We must have legal guarantees that
Clipper isn't the first step toward prohibition against un-escrowed
encryption.

o       Legal Rights of Escrow Users:  If people choose to deposit their
keys with the government or any other escrow agent, they must have some
legal recourse in the event that those keys are improperly released.  The
most recent draft of the escrow procedures specifically states, however:

        "These procedures do not create, and are not intended to create,
any substantive rights for individuals intercepted through electronic
surveillance, and noncompliance with these procedures shall not provide the
basis for any motion to suppress or other objection to the introduction of
electronic surveillance evidence lawfully acquired."

        Leaving users with no recourse will discourage use of the system
and is a tacit acceptance of unscrupulous government behavior.

o       Open Standards:  People won't use encryption unless they trust it. 
Secret standards such as Clipper cannot be evaluated by independent experts
and do not deserve the public trust.

        In addition, the current proposed technical standard is incomplete.
 It should not be approved until futher comment on the complete proposal is
possible

o       Operating Procedures Unclear:  The full operating procedures for
the escrow agents has yet to be issued.  Public comment must be sought on
the complete procedures, not just the outline presented in the draft FIPS. 
Even the government-selected algorithm review group has declared that it
needs more information on the escrow process.

o       Identity of Escrow Agents:  The identity of one or both of the
escrow agents has not been firmly established.

o       Algorithm Classified:  Asking for comments on an algorithm that is
classified makes a mockery of citizen participation in government
decision-making.

NIST will be involved in making many critical decisions regarding the
National Information Infrastructure.  The next time NIST solicits public
comments, it should be ready to accept reply by electronic mail in addition
to paper-based media.

Sincerely,

<<name>>
<<title>>
******************************
Sarah L. Simpson
Membership Coordinator
Electronic Frontier Foundation
1001 G Street, NW
Suite 950 East
Washington, DC  20001
202/347-5400 tel
202/393-5509 fax





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: baumbach@atmel.com (Peter Baumbach)
Date: Fri, 24 Sep 93 16:07:46 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: the public key minefield
Message-ID: <9309242227.AA11743@bass.chp.atmel.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


[my silly public key example deleted]

> No, because of the language in the patent which requires that it be
> infeasible to find the deciphering key from the enciphering key.  Here's
> the claim, from patent 4218582, that covers all of public key cryptography:
> 
> 1. In a method of communicating securely over an insecure communication
> channel of the type which communicates a message from a transmitter to
> a receiver, the improvement characterized by:
>   providing random numbers at the receiver;
>   generating from said random numbers a public enciphering key at the
>     receiver;
>   generating from said random numbers a secret deciphering key at the
>     receiver such that the secret deciphering key is directly related to
>     and computationally infeasible to generate from the public enciphering
>     key;
>   communicating the public enciphering key from the receiver to the
>     transmitter;
>   processing the message and the public enciphering key at the
>     transmitter and generating an enciphered message by an enciphering
>     transformation, such that the enciphering transformation is easy to
>     effect but computationally infeasible to invert without the secret
>     deciphering key;
>   transmitting the enciphered message from the transmitter to the
>     receiver; and
>   processing the enciphered message and the secret deciphering key at
>     the receiver to transform the enciphered message with the secret
>     deciphering key to generate the message.

Doesn't a patent have to have enough information for a person skilled
in the art to construct a prototype?  

I publish for the first time here my invention.  I will patent it within
a years time.  
                       Striped Vegetables

----
This isn't enough for anyone to do anything.  If I were more specific, I
might have something patentable, but then by claims wouldn't be as broad.
If you figured out how to make an anti-gravity device.  That device would
be patentable.  The concept of "anti-gravity" device is not patentable.
If I could duplicate the effect of your anti-gravity device without using
any of the same novel mechanisms.  My device would be separately patentable.

Peter Baumbach
baumbach@atmel.com




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: charliemerritt@BIX.com
Date: Fri, 24 Sep 93 18:50:41 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: QPK SOURCE ONLINE
Message-ID: <9309242146.memo.17966@BIX.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Cypherpunks:
      I now have David Colston's [5542837@mcimail.com] source
      code for "CALL SECURITY".  I also have the IBM PC executables.

CALL SECURITY is an implementation of David's QPK (quick public key) algorithm.
If you are on BIX I can E-mail to you with binary attachments,
please specify which files.  I am not sure how to get this to an FTP,
BIX doesn't have FTP posting yet. I know it is done from BIX, help is welcome. 

  So, I will make this software available on my PC this *WEEKEND ONLY*

      The purpose is to S P R E A D this stuff around.  Please
      upload to an FTP, BBS or what-have-you.

      SEC_SRC.EXE 64668 bytes self extracting source code
      SEC_RUN.EXE 278542 bytes self extracting RUN TIME EXECUTABLES (PC) 
      2400 baud only  8n1 zmodem, ymodem, xmodem
      You will connect with Telix "qdhost" script.
      Enter full name (chrs (space) chrs)  please be truthful
      Password is   QPK   (in caps)
      Phone (501) 839-8579
      Voice (501) 839-3543
      I do not run a BBS, forget these numbers after this week end
      United States calls only,  honor system, please.

      email charliemerritt@bix.com





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Mike Ingle <MIKEINGLE@delphi.com>
Date: Fri, 24 Sep 93 20:24:28 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Clipper takes another hit...
Message-ID: <01H3CEGQ0YCI987NKX@delphi.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Looks like the Clipper fan club is growing by leaps and bounds...

PC/Computing, October 1993
Page 468 (opposite inside back cover).
Note: _abc_ indicates italics.

Illustration: several computers with keyholes in the screens.
Clinton's smiling face rises from the White House, as a long arm
reaches out with a key...

-----------------------------------------------------------------

                                Penn Jillette

Subterranean Clipper Chip Blues

"Phone's tapped anyway." So do it for Dylan and for Jefferson
(Airplane, Starship, and Thomas).

I'VE NEVER HAD a sip of alcohol, nor any recreational drugs (not
one puff to uninhale), but, being 38 years old, I feel I was part
of the hippie culture. I was young and rural in the sixties, but my
formative years were spent listening to music created by people who
chased the muse down many chemical alleys.
     Top 40 radio blared that the government wasn't to be trusted.
Dylan sang "Phone's tapped anyway," and his inflection said that
was a bad thing. But even as I was sucking up the culture, my
skeptical side said that all the "Tin soldiers and Nixon's
coming..." stuff might be a little dramatic. Romanticizing living
outside the law, coupled with the physiological effect of drugs,
might be making these artists a little paranoid, a little nutty.
     The joke was kinda on me. Paranoid or not, John Lennon _was_
on Nixon and FBI hate lists, the Vietnam War probably _was_ a very
bad idea, and the Watergate break-in and subsequent cover-up really
_did_ happen. No government is to be trusted. I could have gotten
a stronger lesson from the founding fathers, but they didn't have
any records out. "You say you want a revolution?"..."The government
that governs least governs best."
     Clinton is younger than any Rolling Stone (unless they replace
Bill Wyman with a new bass player from his ex-wife's generation).
It would seem that Bill _Jefferson_ Clinton would share the
mistrust of Big Brother that we tapped our collective foot to. But
remember, he's not Bob Dylan and Neil Young - he's Kenny G and
Fleetwood Mac. Watch him.
     Willy picked up Bush's evil encryption Clipper Chip fascist
football and ran with it ("Meet the new boss - same as the old
boss"). The Clipper Chip is supposed to give us more privacy, which
we need. An ex-friend of mine taped Madonna talking to her business
manager on her cordless phone, and some punk ("punk" in the prison
sense) broke into my Internet account and read my mail.
     The Clipper Chip, which was designed by government engineers,
would be used to scramble and decode information so that only the
addressee could read it. The government would sell this chip below
market value (some people believe they'd be getting something for
nothing; some people believe Elvis put syringes in Pepsi), and we'd
all have cheap privacy. Oh, by the way ("The large print giveth,
the small print taketh away"), the government would keep all the
keys so they could eavesdrop on might-be-bad-guys (with a subpoena,
of course).
     _What?!_
     The antl-Clipper Chip people sent me megs and megs of reasons
why the Clipper Chip sucks (the information on how it works is kept
secret, so private scientists wouldn't be able to check for
mistakes; trade with other countries would be difficult; how safe
could the codes be kept?; and so on). Big cheese computer people
yapped against it, and it got shot down the first time around on
the legislation front.
     On the tech front, there is a great cypherpunk ("punk" in the
rock and roll sense) alternative called Pretty Good Privacy, which
is nongovernment and free. One of my math-hip friends explained
public-key encryption to me, and it's pretty thinking; I'll try to
explain it in a future column. There was even talk of making
private encryption illegal (an evil idea, pure and simple).
     The more research I did, the simpler it got. You have
inalienable rights including life, liberty, and the pursuit of
happiness. That's it. We have a right to communicate with anyone we
choose without anyone listening in. The government works for us.
Power to the people.

-----------------------------------------------------------------

Wow. One of the better anti-Clipper flames I've seen so far. Simple
and to the point. Repost this one everywhere.

Technical question: from what I've read, Clipper is only a single-
key system, basically an 80-bit super-DES. So when you hit the
SECURE button on your AT&T ClipperPhone, how do the phones exchange
session keys? DH exchange or something similar? Is this implemented
in the Clipper chip itself, or in external hardware? Is the format
standardized? If not, there will be plenty of interoperability
problems with the first generation of phones. For that matter, there
will probably be problems even if it is standardized.

Will it work over a standard phone line? If so, the phone must be
using data compression and a 14.4 modem or something. They'd have to
use forward error correction, too, because a 1-bit error would cause,
upon decryption, at least an 8-byte error burst. That's a very noticeable
click at 6-8KHz sampling rate. I haven't been able to get any details.
I called Mykotronx and they told me that the app notes weren't ready yet,
and offered to put me on a waiting list for them.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Date: Sat, 25 Sep 93 00:35:48 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Contributions to Zimmermann--Where??
Message-ID: <9309250733.AA09491@netcom5.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I'm preparing to write out a check for the Phil Zimmermann defense
fund (lawyers, fees, even in advance of an indictment, and hopefully
to head one off), but I seem to have lost the address of the
lawyers--this was in a posting in the last couple of days here.

(I also looked in various threads in sci.crypt, talk.politics.crypto,
etc., but I can't seem to find it.)

So, I'd appreciate it if someone could send it to me, or, even better,
post it again on the List....sort of a reminder that this case means a
lot to our future. 

If Phil--who appears to be the main target, never
mind that the _document subpoena_ was not directed at him this time
around--is successfully indicted, sent to trial, etc., then this will
have a chilling effect on others.

I'll have more to say about this after I've actually put my check in
the mail.

-Tim May

-- 
..........................................................................
Timothy C. May         | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,  
tcmay@netcom.com       | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
408-688-5409           | knowledge, reputations, information markets, 
W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA  | black markets, collapse of governments.
Higher Power: 2^756839 | Public Key: PGP and MailSafe available.
Note: I put time and money into writing this posting. I hope you enjoy it.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: bart@netcom.com (Harry Bartholomew)
Date: Sat, 25 Sep 93 08:40:49 PDT
To: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Subject: Phil Zimmermans's statement (reposted)
Message-ID: <9309251540.AA27069@netcom5.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Date--Sun, 19 Sep 1993 13:38:44 -0500
From--Philip Zimmermann <prz@columbine.cgd.ucar.edu>
Subject--Zimmermann statement on PGP investigation

Some of you may have received my Internet message of a couple of days
ago about the ongoing U.S. Customs investigation of the exportation
of PGP, which has now progressed to the level of Federal Grand Jury
subpoenas.  This earlier message was intended by me for distribution
to a very small group of friends who previously communicated their
concern about me and the investigation and asked to be kept
informed.  I did not send the message to anyone outside this group.
Unfortunately, I did not adequately assert my desire that the message
not be further disseminated.  It appears that the message has gone
completely public.  This was not my intention.

My lawyer, Phil Dubois, has been in touch with the Assistant U.S.
Attorney (William Keane) assigned to the investigation.  We have no
reason to believe that Mr. Keane is anything other than a professional
and reasonable person.  He made it clear that no decision has been
made regarding any prosecution of anyone for any offense in this
matter.  Such decisions will not be made for some time, perhaps
several months.  Mr. Keane also made clear his willingness to listen
to us (me and my lawyer) before making any decision.  It appears that
both Mr. Keane's mind and the lines of communication are open.

My fear is that public dissemination of my message will close the
lines of communication and put Mr. Keane into an irretrievably
adversarial position.  Such a result would not serve any of our
interests.  My lawyer tells me that nothing irritates a prosecutor
more than being the subject of what he perceives to be an
orchestrated publicity campaign.  He also tells me that his
nightmares involve FOAs (Friends Of the Accused), invariably people
with good intentions, doing things on their own.  I understand that
the issues involved in this investigation are of the greatest
importance and transcend my personal interests.  Even so, I would
rather not turn an investigation into a full-scale federal
prosecution.  I ask that everyone keep in mind that the government's
resources are limitless and that mine are not.

Speaking of resources, many of you have offered help, and I am
grateful.  Those wishing to contribute financially or otherwise
should contact either me or Philip L. Dubois, Esq., at dubois@csn.org
or by phone at 303-444-3885 or by mail at 2305 Broadway, Boulder, CO,
80304.  Mr. Dubois has just got on the Internet and is still learning
how to use it.  Donated funds will be kept in a trust account, and all
contributions will be accounted for.  If this whole thing somehow goes
away with money left in the account, the balance will be refunded to
contributors in proportion to the amounts of their contributions.

This message can be widely circulated on public forums.

Philip Zimmermann
prz@acm.org
303 541-0140

------------------------------




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Derek Upham <upham@cs.ubc.ca>
Date: Sat, 25 Sep 93 11:55:51 PDT
To: Cypherpunks mailing list <cypherpunks@toad.com>
Subject: The "mpack" MIME encoder has just been released.
Message-ID: <199309251855.AA22173@grolsch.cs.ubc.ca>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


The newsgroup comp.sources.reviewed has just released the sources to
"mpack", a utility for encoding binary files into a MIME-compliant
format, then mailing them to recepients or posting them to a
newsgroup.  "munpack", a utility for decoding the files, is also
included.  The package is supposed to work on MS-DOS and MacOS
systems (and it's quite small), so people playing with PGP might be
able to get some use out of it.

Derek (the other other Derek)

Derek Lynn Upham                               University of British Columbia
upham@cs.ubc.ca                                   Computer Science Department
=============================================================================
"Ha!  Your Leaping Tiger Kung Fu is no match for my Frightened Piglet Style!"




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: nate@VIS.ColoState.EDU
Date: Sat, 25 Sep 93 11:20:52 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com (Cypherpunks)
Subject: a picture of the Clipper?
Message-ID: <9309251817.AA06585@monet.VIS.ColoState.EDU>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I seem to remember there being a picture of the clipper chip
in Popular Science or something.... does anyone remember
where this picture is?

-nate

-- 
+--------------------------------------------------------------------
| Nate Sammons   email: nate@VIS.ColoState.Edu
|      Colorado State University Computer Visualization Laboratory
|      Finger nate@monet.VIS.ColoState.Edu for my PGP key
|      #include <std.disclaimer>
|                                    Always remember "Brazil"
+----------------------+



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Zeek <zeek@bongo.cc.utexas.edu>
Date: Sat, 25 Sep 93 12:55:53 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Help Needed: PGP SIGNED MESSAGE
Message-ID: <199309251952.AA03277@bongo.cc.utexas.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text


{{
Please excuse the interruption.  I'm having problems signing
a text message with my secret key and creating output that leaves
the text message as is but with an ascii signature at the bottom.  
Or rather, I don't want the message encrypted, I just want the nifty sig
attached and email-able. 
{{
I've done this before using some combination of -sat or something similar
but I have since forgotten.  This is a rather embarrassing question, I
know it has to be a simple switch in the syntax but I spent 2 hours last
night and 1 hour this morning trying to figure the damn thing out... 
learned a few interesting things along the way.  

Any help would be greatly appreciated.  Please reply to me rather than
the list.  

Thank you, 

-z (kevink)



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Anonymous <nowhere@bsu-cs.bsu.edu>
Date: Sat, 25 Sep 93 14:30:53 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Clipper and Crayolas
Message-ID: <9309252132.AA27777@bsu-cs.bsu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


On Sat, 25 Sep 1993 12:17:32 -0700 (MDT),
 <uunet!VIS.ColoState.EDU!nate> wrote -
 
> I seem to remember there being a picture of the clipper chip
> in Popular Science or something.... does anyone remember
> where this picture is?
 
I know this is not what you're looking for, but I'm in a very
strange mood today:
 
 
Date: Mon, 19 Apr 93 9:21:53 EDT
Organization: FIRST, The Forum of Incident Response & Security Teams
Subject: Slide presented at White House briefing on Clipper Chip
 
Note:     The following material was handed out a press briefing on the
          Clipper Chip on 4/16.
 
                              Chip Operation
 
                         Microchip
User's Message      +----------------------+
------------------> |                      |      1.  Message encrypted
                    | Encryption Algorithm |          with user's key
                    |                      |
                    | Serial #             |      2.  User's key encrypted
                    |                      |-->       with chip unique key
                    | Chip Unique Key      |
User's Encryption   |                      |      3.  Serial # encrypted
Key                 | Chip Family Key      |          with chip family key
------------------> |                      |
                    |                      |
                    +----------------------+
 
 
              For Law Enforcement to Read a Suspect's Message
 
1.  Need to obtain court authorized warrant to tap the suspect's telephone.
 
2.  Record encrypted message
 
3.  Use chip family key to decrypt chip serial number
 
4.  Take this serial number *and* court order to custodians 
    of disks A and B
 
5.  Add the A and B components for that serial number = the chip
    unique key for the suspect user
 
6.  Use this key to decrypt the user's message key for 
    this recorded message
 
7.  Finally, use this message key to decrypt the recorded message.
 
 





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Zeek <zeek@bongo.cc.utexas.edu>
Date: Sat, 25 Sep 93 15:25:53 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Thanx 4 the help! (PGP SIGNED MESSAGE)
Message-ID: <199309252224.AA11815@bongo.cc.utexas.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text



Wait!!  

Ok, I've got it!  "pgp -sta +clearsig=on <file>" !

Big thanks to those of you that refreshed my memory. 

bye.

-z (kevink)



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: BRADLEY  ROBERT WESTON <bradleyr@ucsu.Colorado.EDU>
Date: Sat, 25 Sep 93 17:35:53 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: hi
Message-ID: <Pine.3.07.9309251802.A3388-a100000@ucsu.Colorado.EDU>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Hi.
	I don't know if this address connects to anyone or anything, but I
am giving it a shot. I saw an article in Wired and then another one in the
25th anniversary edition of Whole Earth, and wanted to get in touch with
you all. 
	#1 Thanks for exisiting....... I am real glad someone is on the
side of the angels technologically

	#2 Please put me on a list to get news. I prowl the newsnet very
occasionally, but I don't have a lot of time to do so and I am still
climbing up the looooong learning curve of internet. I am quite willing to
pay for good info feed from you.

	#3 Please help me get a clean copy of PGP. 

	I guess thats all I want to throw out unencrypted.....thanks...I
want to help.

					Wes Bradley

	The return address is my e-mail address at university of colorado
where I am a student in aerospace engineering.

	Thanks again.






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: ferguson@fiber.sprintlink.net (Paul Ferguson x2044)
Date: Sat, 25 Sep 93 18:05:52 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: A simpler way
Message-ID: <9309260103.AA05850@fiber.sprintlink.net>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
 
On Sat, 25 Sep 1993 17:24:16 -0500 (CDT),
 Zeek <uunet!bongo.cc.utexas.edu!zeek> writes -
 
> Wait!!
>
> Ok, I've got it!  "pgp -sta +clearsig=on <file>" !
>
> Big thanks to those of you that refreshed my memory.
 
 I can make life much easier for you simply by mentioning the fact
 that you can add the line:
 
     clearsig = on
 
 to your CONFIG.TXT file (Drive:\path\PGP\config.txt). Once you add
 this line (note to dox writers: add it to the next version release,
 especially as a #commented line in the default config), then you
 won't have to worry about adding that pesky argument on the command
 line ever again!
 
 Cheers,
 
 Paul Ferguson               |  "Laws are dumb in the midst of arms."
 Mindbank Consulting Group   |  (Silent enim leges inter arma.)
 Fairfax, Virginia USA       |
 fergp@sytex.com             |                   - Cicero, Pro Milone
 
                     The future is now.
 
 
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.3a
 
iQCVAgUBLKR3DpRLcZSdHMBNAQGUugP+JzDE7Z2seyxPHCifwud75qfYjwqk36Z9
ylGvyL+7pF4wL/tYWZTHx9/7yyH8qetd+L29jtu5m5GBDbfL+CIh6ArC+NeW33BM
llyAgJAgcnGxX+NmvPcR74nXxG0/e2cwGwwRv1ad+wPOpcpSVkKA0acAbM9i/Adp
MewUG3i9D5c=
=I5Y9
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: smb@research.att.com
Date: Sat, 25 Sep 93 18:35:52 PDT
To: baumbach@atmel.com
Subject: Re: the public key minefield
Message-ID: <9309260135.AA12967@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


	 Doesn't a patent have to have enough information for a person skilled
	 in the art to construct a prototype?  

	 I publish for the first time here my invention.  I will patent it with
	 in a years time.  
	                        Striped Vegetables

	 ----
	 This isn't enough for anyone to do anything.  If I were more
	 specific, I might have something patentable, but then by
	 claims wouldn't be as broad.  If you figured out how to make
	 an anti-gravity device.  That device would be patentable.  The
	 concept of "anti-gravity" device is not patentable.  If I
	 could duplicate the effect of your anti-gravity device without
	 using any of the same novel mechanisms.  My device would be
	 separately patentable.

You seem to have missed my earlier summary of how patents are structured.
A separate part of the patent from the claims describes how to build the
claimed device.  The claims aren't supposed to.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: nate@VIS.ColoState.EDU
Date: Sat, 25 Sep 93 20:40:58 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com (Cypherpunks Mailing List)
Subject: Picture of a REAL clipper chip?
Message-ID: <9309260340.AA08355@monet.VIS.ColoState.EDU>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Is there a picture of a REAL clipper chip out there anywhere?

Someone pointed out that the picture in PopularScience may not
be the real thing, just some other chip made by Mykotronics.


-nate

-- 
+--------------------------------------------------------------------
| Nate Sammons   email: nate@VIS.ColoState.Edu
|      Colorado State University Computer Visualization Laboratory
|      Finger nate@monet.VIS.ColoState.Edu for my PGP key
|      #include <std.disclaimer>
|                                    Always remember "Brazil"
+----------------------+



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: frc%bwnmr4@harvard.harvard.edu (Fred Cooper)
Date: Sat, 25 Sep 93 19:00:57 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com (Cypherpunks)
Subject: PGP Docs
Message-ID: <9309260158.AA11772@bwnmr4.harvard.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Punks,
    Does anyone have Postscript or preferably RTF versions of the PGP Docs?
I poked around on soda for them but I didn't see any.  


FRC
(please reply direct.. I hate to use the list for this myself.)





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "George A. Gleason" <gg@well.sf.ca.us>
Date: Sun, 26 Sep 93 01:50:58 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: saturation tactics?
Message-ID: <93Sep26.015035pdt.14005-3@well.sf.ca.us>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



In a discussion on the Well, some folks were speculating about the idea of
lots and lots of people & companies applying for those arms export licenses,
on the basis that they *might* sell crypto to a foreigner, or *might* go on
an overseas business trip with their laptop with a crypto program on it,
etc.  This is a great case of an old protest tactic which we used to call
"saturation," which involves lots and lots of people scrupulously obeying an
unfair or controversial law to the point where it starts to swamp the
system.  

Seeme like it might be worth looking into.  Any comments...?

-gg




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Christian D. Odhner" <cdodhner@indirect.com>
Date: Sun, 26 Sep 93 02:10:59 PDT
To: gg@well.sf.ca.us (George A. Gleason)
Subject: Re: saturation tactics?
In-Reply-To: <93Sep26.015035pdt.14005-3@well.sf.ca.us>
Message-ID: <199309260908.AA07538@indirect.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> In a discussion on the Well, some folks were speculating about the idea of
> lots and lots of people & companies applying for those arms export licenses,
> on the basis that they *might* sell crypto to a foreigner, or *might* go on
> an overseas business trip with their laptop with a crypto program on it,
> etc.  This is a great case of an old protest tactic which we used to call
> "saturation," which involves lots and lots of people scrupulously obeying an
> unfair or controversial law to the point where it starts to swamp the
> system.  
> 
> Seeme like it might be worth looking into.  Any comments...?
> 
> -gg

Sounds good to me. If anybody out there is knowledgeable enough to write
an initial form letter I'd be thrilled to paraphrase and send one in, as
well as persuading as many of my friends and aquaintences as possible to
respond, as I did with the NIST application for license to use DSA etc...

BTW, I have never received any response or aknowledgement from NIST
regarding my application... Do you think that means that it was accepted? <G>

Happy Hunting, -Chris.
______________________________________________________________________________
Christian Douglas Odhner     | "The NSA can have my secret key when they pry
cdodhner@indirect.com	     | it from my cold, dead, hands... But they shall
pgp 2.3 public key by finger | NEVER have the password it's encrypted with!"
  "If guns are outlawed, only the government will have guns." -E. Abbey
My opinions are shareware. For a registered copy, send me 15$ in DigiCash.
  Key fingerprint =  58 62 A2 84 FD 4F 56 38  82 69 6F 08 E4 F1 79 11 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------









From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Christian D. Odhner" <cdodhner@indirect.com>
Date: Sun, 26 Sep 93 03:05:54 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Big Brother Inside Stickers
Message-ID: <199309261001.AA11080@indirect.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Cypherpunks,

Although it seems the clipper chip's start-of-production date has been
delayed, it appears to me at least that it's eventual implimentation is
inevitable, and close at hand. At that time, a little civil disobediance
may be in order. I have made arrangements to produce 8,800 (that's the
minimum, I don't think we'll use more than that) "Big Brother Inside(tm)"
stickers for the price of 137.95, including shipping and handleing, etc. I
am of course quite willing to send quantities of stickers for free to
those that want them, however donations to defray my costs would be
_greatly_ appreciated, and will allow me to start putting out my
Cypherpunks teeshirt much sooner <hint hint> ;)

The stickers are one inch by one inch square, made of clear vinal with a
dark blue foreground (If there is a consensus that the foreground should
be some other color I'll change that) and I'm useing the _Excellent_ Logo
designed by Matt Thomlinson <phantom@u.washington.edu>.

If you would like some stickers, email me with the approximate number of
stickers you would like, your input on the foreground color, your
snailmail address, and how much money (if any) you plan to send me.
Assumeing I get a few offers for contributions (like I said, if you don't
have the money I'll send 'em to you anyway) I'll send in the order now,
and trust that the checks (or cash, or other forms of income) will show up.

My next project is a CP tshirt. On the front will be "Cypherpunks: There's
Safety in Numbers." and on the back:"Big, Big, _PRIME_ Numbers!". (Sorry,
I forgot who suggested that one... :} )  and in the background will be a
wraparound extended-tcmay-style list of related words and ideas. For about
triple the regular price you can get your pgp public key in RAD64 format
on the back also. Sounds crowded, but I think it'll work ok. Don't hold
your breath for it though, I expect at least a month before I get around
to that. BTW, although I am open to sugestions (In EMAIL please, not on
the list) for the tshirt, in the end if you don't like my ideas, just make
your own.

This weekend I have two days off IN A ROW! (sunday+monday) so I am
planning to try building a little truely random number generator with a
serial port connection. Anybody who has serious suggestions or advice
please email me.

And last but certainly not least...

My Remailer policy is as follows:

	1) I don't read mail that goes through my remailer. None.
	2) I have been keeping logs on the remailer in a failed effort to 
	fix the encrypted message handleing, but I have mostly given up
	until I have a chance to learn PERL better so those logs will be
	removed and turned off before I send this message.
	3) In otherwords, no logs are being kept (by me)
	4) The computer the account is on does not belong to me, however the
	sysadmins know of the remailer and have agreed to refer any complaints
	they receive back to me. If they ask me to remove it, I will do so.
	5) Any list shorter than five items is stupid.

Well, that about wraps things up for now.
Happy Hunting, -Chris.
______________________________________________________________________________
Christian Douglas Odhner     | "The NSA can have my secret key when they pry
cdodhner@indirect.com	     | it from my cold, dead, hands... But they shall
pgp 2.3 public key by finger | NEVER have the password it's encrypted with!"
  "If guns are outlawed, only the government will have guns." -E. Abbey
My opinions are shareware. For a registered copy, send me 15$ in DigiCash.
  Key fingerprint =  58 62 A2 84 FD 4F 56 38  82 69 6F 08 E4 F1 79 11 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------









From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: A1 ray arachelian (library)  <rarachel@ishara.poly.edu>
Date: Sun, 26 Sep 93 14:46:03 PDT
To: gg@well.sf.ca.us (George A. Gleason)
Subject: Re: saturation tactics?
In-Reply-To: <93Sep26.015035pdt.14005-3@well.sf.ca.us>
Message-ID: <9309261741.AA09655@ishara.poly.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


HEy, there was a recent 20/20 story on something like this.  Basically
the inmates in a lot of jails were swamping the legal system with bogus
lawsuits.  Some included were: the right to sacrifice animals due to religion,
the right to get to watch TV, and have a roast duck dinner every night also
due to religion.  Some were even more on the far side.  One guy sued the
jail for now allowing him to run a drug trafficking business out of his cell.

All of these get thrown out, but the cost to the legal system is a few thousand
per case!  This stuff can be >VERY< effective.

Mind you these guys didn't always do whatever they were granted a right to,
they were just badgering the hell out of the legal systems in their states.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Christian D. Odhner" <cdodhner@indirect.com>
Date: Sun, 26 Sep 93 14:56:02 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Big Brother Inside Stickers
Message-ID: <199309262154.AA12746@indirect.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Ok, so far I have orders for 2450 stickers and statements indicateing $65
in donations. I'll send the order in tomorrow morning. Note that if no
more orders come in I'll have 6350 stickers on my hands and not much to do
with them (I plan on keeping at least 250, maybe 500 for personal use.
Another 1000 could be distributed localy. That still leaves 4850
stickers.) and I'll be about 75$ in the hole (however that's not a .big.
stress on my finances for now). So if you want stickers I've got plenty to
give away, and if you have any cash with my name on it, well, I won't argue.
I have received a couple of encrypted messages that I beleive are sticker
orders, give me a few hours to decrypt and respond to those. Dito with
those requesting that I sign stuff. Also remember I need your address in
order to send you anything. 

My address for contributions is
Chris
14079 North 34th Place
Phoenix, Arizona 85032

Happy Hunting, -Chris
______________________________________________________________________________
Christian Douglas Odhner     | "The NSA can have my secret key when they pry
cdodhner@indirect.com	     | it from my cold, dead, hands... But they shall
pgp 2.3 public key by finger | NEVER have the password it's encrypted with!"
  "If guns are outlawed, only the government will have guns." -E. Abbey
My opinions are shareware. For a registered copy, send me 15$ in DigiCash.
  Key fingerprint =  58 62 A2 84 FD 4F 56 38  82 69 6F 08 E4 F1 79 11 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------









From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Michael Johnson <mpjohnso@nyx.cs.du.edu>
Date: Mon, 27 Sep 93 07:36:14 PDT
To: "George A. Gleason" <gg@well.sf.ca.us>
Subject: Re: saturation tactics?
In-Reply-To: <93Sep26.015035pdt.14005-3@well.sf.ca.us>
Message-ID: <Pine.3.05.9309270849.C26891-a100000@nyx>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain




On Sun, 26 Sep 1993, George A. Gleason wrote:

> 
> In a discussion on the Well, some folks were speculating about the idea of
> lots and lots of people & companies applying for those arms export licenses,
> on the basis that they *might* sell crypto to a foreigner, or *might* go on
> an overseas business trip with their laptop with a crypto program on it,
> etc.  This is a great case of an old protest tactic which we used to call
> "saturation," which involves lots and lots of people scrupulously obeying an
> unfair or controversial law to the point where it starts to swamp the
> system.  
> 
> Seeme like it might be worth looking into.  Any comments...?
 
Sounds expensive at $1,000 per five years per license.  Got any cheaper
ideas, like writing to your Congress person and the President?






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: bobi@vswr.sps.mot.com (Bob Izenberg)
Date: Mon, 27 Sep 93 06:41:13 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: QPK SOURCE ONLINE
Message-ID: <9309271336.AA23661@vswr.sps.mot.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text


#       The purpose is to S P R E A D this stuff around.  Please
#       upload to an FTP, BBS or what-have-you.
# 
#       SEC_SRC.EXE 64668 bytes self extracting source code
#       SEC_RUN.EXE 278542 bytes self extracting RUN TIME EXECUTABLES (PC) 

I've downloaded these.  To where shall I ftp them?  If someone's already done
so, then never mind.

Bob
--
 ==============================================================================
   Bob Izenberg                                     voice phone: 512-891-8680
   Motorola RISC Software                               bobi@vswr.sps.mot.com
 ==============================================================================



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: geoffw@nexsys.net (Geoff White)
Date: Mon, 27 Sep 93 09:16:14 PDT
To: ssteele@eff.org
Subject: Re: Wiretap Article by Dorothy Denning
Message-ID: <9309271553.AA00476@nexsys.nexsys.net>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



> From toad.com!owner-cypherpunks@cdp.igc.org Mon Sep 27 08:42:26 1993
> Return-Path: <ssteele@eff.org>
> Date: Mon, 27 Sep 1993 11:12:44 -0400
> To: cypherpunks@toad.com
> From: ssteele@eff.org (Shari Steele)
> Subject: Wiretap Article by Dorothy Denning
> Content-Length: 499
> X-Lines: 10
> Status: RO
> 
> Hi everyone.
> Dorothy Denning sent me a rather lengthy article entitled, "Wiretap Laws
> and Procedures:  What Happens When the U.S. Government Taps a Line," which
> she wrote with Don Delaney of the NYS Police, John Kay of the Monmouth
> County (NJ) Prosecutor's office, and Alan McDonald of the FBI.  I'm willing
> to send a copy to this list, but I wanted to make sure that I'm not in
> violation of list ettiquette to send a long (2 e-mail messages) post. 
> What's the proper course of conduct here?
> Shari
> 
> 
I'd definitely like to se it.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: bobi@vswr.sps.mot.com (Bob Izenberg)
Date: Mon, 27 Sep 93 08:21:19 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: QPK source and binaries on ftp.uu.net
Message-ID: <9309271517.AA23812@vswr.sps.mot.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text


#       The purpose is to S P R E A D this stuff around.  Please
#       upload to an FTP, BBS or what-have-you.
# 
#       SEC_SRC.EXE 64668 bytes self extracting source code
#       SEC_RUN.EXE 278542 bytes self extracting RUN TIME EXECUTABLES (PC) 

I've just ftp'd them (as sec_src.exe and sec_run.exe) to ftp.uu.net:/tmp .

Bob
--
 ==============================================================================
   Bob Izenberg                                     voice phone: 512-891-8680
   Motorola RISC Software                               bobi@vswr.sps.mot.com
 ==============================================================================



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Derek L Davis <Derek_L_Davis@ccm.hf.intel.com>
Date: Mon, 27 Sep 93 10:31:14 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re[2]: Wiretap Article by Dorothy Denning
Message-ID: <930927103702_1@ccm.hf.intel.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



I'd like to see it too (the Denning Wiretap Article).

Derek (the other other other Derek, apparently)





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: smb@research.att.com
Date: Mon, 27 Sep 93 07:51:13 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: An amusing coincidence
Message-ID: <9309271448.AA11858@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


The name of the official Russian news agency is -- Itar-TASS.  What
a lovely pair of names....




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: stig@netcom.com (Stig)
Date: Mon, 27 Sep 93 11:11:19 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Wiretap Article (2 of 2)
In-Reply-To: <199309271635.AA01892@eff.org>
Message-ID: <9309271809.AA12276@netcom4.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


In <199309271635.AA01892@eff.org>, Shari Steele wrote...
> >Date: Fri, 24 Sep 1993 16:31:55 -0400 (EDT)
> >From: denning@cs.georgetown.edu (Dorothy Denning)
> >Subject: Wiretap Article
> >To: ssteele@eff.org
> >Cc: denning@guvax.acc.georgetown.edu
> >Errors-To: Postmaster@cs.georgetown.edu
> >Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7BIT
> >
> >       combination, 289 other)
> >
> >   (4) major offenses involved (634 narcotics, 90 racketeering, 66
> >       gambling, 35 homicide/ assault, 16 larceny/theft, 9 kidnapping,
> >       8 bribery, 7 loansharking/usury/extortion, 54 other)
> >
> >   (5) average number of (a) persons intercepted (117), (b)
> >       interceptions (1,861), and (c) incriminating intercepts (347)
> >       per order where interception devices were installed
> >
> >   (6) average cost of interception ($46,492)
> >
> >   (7) type of surveillance used for the 846 interceptions installed
> >       (632 telephone, 38 microphone, 113 electronic, 63 combination)
> >
> >   (8) number of persons arrested (2,685) and convicted (607) as the
> >       result of 1992 intercepts
> >
> >   (9) activity taking place during 1992 as the result of intercepts
> >       terminated in years 1982-1991, including number of arrests
> >       (1211), trials (280), motions to suppress that are granted (14),
> >       denied (141), and pending (37), and convictions (1450) (there is
> >       a lag between interceptions, arrests, and convictions, with many
> >       arrests and most convictions associated with a wiretap that
> >       terminated in one year taking place in subsequent years)
> >
> >Most of the above data is broken down by jurisdiction.  Of the 919
> >authorized intercepts, 340 (37%) were federal.  New York State had 197,
> >New Jersey 111, Florida 80, and Pennsylvania 77.  The remaining 114
> >intercepts were divided among 18 states, none of which had more than 17
> >intercepts.  During the past decade, the average number of authorized
> >intercepts per year has been about 780.
> >
> >Individual law enforcement agencies also require internal reports.  For
> >example, the New York Sate Police requires that each week, the Troop or
> >Detail Captain prepare a report summarizing the status of all
> >eavesdropping activity within the unit, including the productivity and
> >plans for each electronic surveillance installation and a brief
> >synopsis of pertinent activity.  This is sent to the New York State
> >Police Division Headquarters Captain who prepares a report summarizing
> >the status of all eavesdropping installations.
> >
> >One of the reasons for the significant amount of post wiretap reporting
> >is to provide a substantial record for legislatures when considering
> >whether or not to reenact or modify wiretap statutes.
> >
> >
> >3.  FISA Interceptions
> >
> >Title 50 USC, Sections 1801-1811, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
> >Act (FISA) of 1978, covers electronic surveillance for foreign
> >intelligence purposes (including counterintelligence and
> >counterterrorism).  It governs wire and electronic communications sent
> >by or intended to be received by United States persons (citizens,
> >aliens lawfully admitted for permanent residence, corporations, and
> >associations of U.S. persons) who are in the U.S. when there is a
> >reasonable expectation of privacy and a warrant would be required for
> >law enforcement purposes; nonconsensual wire intercepts that are
> >implemented within the U.S.; and radio intercepts when the sender and
> >all receivers are in the U.S. and a warrant would be required for law
> >enforcement purposes.  It does not cover intercepts of U.S. persons who
> >are overseas (unless the communications are with a U.S. person who is
> >inside the U.S.).  Electronic surveillance conducted under FISA is
> >classified.
> >
> >FISA authorizes electronic surveillance of foreign powers and agents of
> >foreign powers for foreign intelligence purposes.  Normally, a court
> >order is required to implement a wiretap under FISA.  There are,
> >however, two exceptions.  The first is when the communications are
> >exclusively between or among foreign powers or involve technical
> >intelligence other than spoken communications from a location under the
> >open and exclusive control of a foreign power; there is no substantial
> >risk that the surveillance will acquire the communications to or from a
> >U.S.person; and proposed minimization procedures meet the requirements
> >set forth by the law.  Under those conditions, authorization can be
> >granted by the President through the Attorney General for a period up
> >to one year.  The second is following a declaration of war by
> >Congress.  Then the President, though the Attorney General, can
> >authorize electronic surveillance for foreign intelligence purposes
> >without a court order for up to 15 days.
> >
> >Orders for wiretaps are granted by a special court established by
> >FISA.  The court consists of seven district court judges appointed by
> >the Chief Justice of the United States.  Judges serve seven-year
> >terms.
> >
> >3.1  Application for a Court Order
> >
> >Applications for a court order are made by Federal officers and require
> >approval by the Attorney General.  Each application must include:
> >
> >  (1) the Federal officer making the application;
> >
> >  (2) the Attorney General's approval;
> >
> >  (3) the target of the electronic surveillance;
> >
> >  (4) justification that the target is a foreign power or agent of a
> >      foreign power (except no U.S person can be considered a foreign power
> >      or agent thereof solely based on activities protected by the First
> >      Amendment) and that the facilities or places where the surveillance
> >      is be directed will be used by the same;
> > 
> >  (5) the proposed minimization procedures, which must meet certain
> >      requirements to protect the privacy of U.S. persons;
> >
> >  (6) the nature of the information sought and type of communications
> >      subjected to surveillance;
> >
> >  (7) certification(s) by the Assistant to the President for National
> >      Security Affairs or other high-level official in the area of
> >      national security or defense (Presidential appointee subject to
> >      Senate confirmation) that the information sought is foreign
> >      intelligence information and that such information cannot
> >      reasonably be obtained by normal investigative methods;
> >
> >  (8) the means by which the surveillance will be effected;
> >
> >  (9) the facts concerning all previous applications involving the same
> >      persons, facilities, or places;
> >
> > (10) the period of time for the interception (maximum 90 days or,
> >      when the target is a foreign power, one year);
> >
> > (11) coverage of all surveillance devices to be employed and the
> >      minimization procedures applying to each.
> >
> >Some of the above information can be omitted when the target is a
> >foreign power.  
> >
> >Within the FBI, the process of applying for a court order under FISA is
> >as exacting and subject to review as under Title III.  The main
> >differences are that under FISA, the FBI Intelligence Division is
> >involved rather than the Criminal Investigative Division, the DOJ
> >Office of Intelligence Policy and Review (OIPR) is involved rather than
> >either the U.S. Attorney's Office or the DOJ Criminal Division, and the
> >application is approved by the Attorney General (or Acting Attorney
> >General) rather than by a lower DOJ official.
> >
> >3.2  Issuance of a Court Order
> >
> >Before a judge can approve an application, the judge must determine
> >that the authorizations are valid; that there is probable cause to
> >believe that the target of the electronic surveillance is a foreign
> >power or agent of a foreign power and that the facilities or places
> >where the surveillance is be directed will be used by the same; and
> >that the proposed minimization procedures meet the requirements set
> >forth in the law.  If the judge approves the application, an order is
> >issued specifying the relevant information from the application and
> >directing the communication carrier, landlord, custodian, or other
> >specified person to furnish all necessary information, facilities, and
> >technical assistance and to properly maintain under security procedures
> >any records relating to the surveillance.
> >
> >3.3  Emergencies
> >
> >In an emergency situation, the Attorney General or designee can
> >authorize the use of electronic surveillance provided the judge is
> >notified at the time and an application is made to the judge within 24
> >hours.  If such application is not obtained, then the judge notifies
> >any U.S. persons named in the application or subject to the
> >surveillance, though such notification can be postponed or forgone upon
> >showing of good cause.
> >
> >3.4  Use of Intercepted Communications as Evidence
> >
> >Like Title III, FISA places strict controls on what information can be
> >acquired through electronic surveillance and how such information can
> >be used.  No information can be disclosed for law enforcement purposes
> >except with the proviso that it may only be used in a criminal
> >proceedings under advance authorization from the Attorney General.  If
> >the government intends to use such information in court, then the
> >aggrieved person must be notified in advance.  The person may move to
> >suppress the evidence.
> >
> >3.5  Reports
> >
> >Each year, the Attorney General must give the Administrative Office of
> >the United States Courts (AO) a report of the number of FISA
> >applications and the number of orders and extensions granted, modified,
> >or denied.  In 1992, there were 484 orders.  Since 1979, there has been
> >an average of a little over 500 FISA orders per year.
> >
> >Because intercepts conducted under FISA are classified, detailed
> >information analogous to that required under Title III is not reported
> >to the AO, nor made available to the public.  However, records of
> >Attorney General certifications, applications, and orders granted must
> >be held for at least 10 years, and the Attorney General must inform two
> >Congressional oversight committees of all surveillance activity on a
> >semiannual basis.  These committees are the House Permanent Select
> >Committee on Intelligence and the Senate Select Committee on
> >Intelligence.
> >
> >
> >Acknowledgements
> >
> >We are grateful to Geoffrey Greiveldinger for many helpful suggestions
> >on an earlier draft of this report.
> >
> >
> >
> 


THIS IS THE SORT OF NOISE THAT'S BETTER KEPT OFF THE LIST.  Private messages
should be sent via private email.

        stig


;; __________________________________________________________________________
;; Stig@netcom.com                            netcom.com:/pub/stig/00-PGP-KEY
;; It's hard to be cutting-edge at your own pace...   32 DF B9 19 AE 28 D1 7A
;; Bullet-proof code cannot stand up to teflon bugs.  A3 9D 0B 1A 33 13 4D 7F




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: ssteele@eff.org (Shari Steele)
Date: Mon, 27 Sep 93 08:16:13 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Wiretap Article by Dorothy Denning
Message-ID: <199309271512.AA00839@eff.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Hi everyone.
Dorothy Denning sent me a rather lengthy article entitled, "Wiretap Laws
and Procedures:  What Happens When the U.S. Government Taps a Line," which
she wrote with Don Delaney of the NYS Police, John Kay of the Monmouth
County (NJ) Prosecutor's office, and Alan McDonald of the FBI.  I'm willing
to send a copy to this list, but I wanted to make sure that I'm not in
violation of list ettiquette to send a long (2 e-mail messages) post. 
What's the proper course of conduct here?
Shari





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: ferguson@fiber.sprintlink.net (Paul Ferguson x2044)
Date: Mon, 27 Sep 93 09:21:14 PDT
To: ssteele@eff.org
Subject: Denning paper (Post it!)
Message-ID: <9309271618.AA07561@fiber.sprintlink.net>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



On Mon, 27 Sep 1993 11:12:44 -0400,
 <ssteele@eff.org> Shari Steele writes -


> Dorothy Denning sent me a rather lengthy article entitled, "Wiretap Laws
> and Procedures:  What Happens When the U.S. Government Taps a Line," which
> she wrote with Don Delaney of the NYS Police, John Kay of the Monmouth
> County (NJ) Prosecutor's office, and Alan McDonald of the FBI.  I'm willing
> to send a copy to this list, but I wanted to make sure that I'm not in
> violation of list ettiquette to send a long (2 e-mail messages) post. 
> What's the proper course of conduct here?

Post it!

_____________________________________________________________________________
Paul Ferguson                                                               
Mindbank Consulting Group                                    fergp@sytex.com   
Fairfax, Virginia  USA                                       ferguson@icp.net




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Michael Johnson <mpjohnso@nyx.cs.du.edu>
Date: Mon, 27 Sep 93 10:41:14 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Challenge: break the MPJ Encryption Algorithm
Message-ID: <Pine.3.05.9309271122.A29490-d100000@nyx>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



I would like as many of you as are interested to take a serious look at a
private key block encryption algorithm that I invented and let me know if
there is any weakness in it that you can discover.

No, I will not insult you with a block of random data as a challenge text.  I
have published the full algorithm, including source code, in my Master's
Thesis.  It is available to callers in the USA only on my BBS at 303-938-9654
(local to the Denver/Boulder calling area) as CRYPTMPJ.ZIP and MPJ_PS.ZIP. 
CRYPTMPJ.ZIP contains a plain ASCII text version of my thesis, full Pascal
source code, and an executable program CRYPTMPJ.EXE that was used to test
it.  MPJ_PS.ZIP contains a PostScript version of my Thesis so that you can
print out the pictures and see the equations more normally.  Other sources: 
CompuServe, IBMSYS forum, as CRYPTM.ZIP; anonymous ftp to soda.berkeley.edu;
and on the disks bound in the back of the book "Network Security Secrets" by
David Stang and Sylvia Moon (ISBN1-56884-021-7; published by IDG Books
Worldwide, Inc.).

Here is a short description of the algorithm:

1.  Using a convoluted key expansion process, expand a 128 bit (16 byte) key
into 160 different, reversible 256 byte substitution boxes.

2.  Execute ten rounds of encryption, where each round consists of (1) alter
each byte of the input by replacing it with the value obtained by using the
input byte as an index into the corresponding substitution box, then (2)
perform a fixed "wire crossing" bit selection such that each output byte is
a function of one bit from each of 8 different input bytes.

Each substitution box is used only once in encrypting a block.  Block size is
16 bytes (128 bits).

Attacks I have considered:

1.  Brute force (both exhaustive key search and precomputation).  Good luck.

2.  Analytical solution for the contents of the substitition arrays with a
chosen plain text attack.  With 10 or more rounds, the complexity of the
matrix of boolean equations required and the quantity of known or chosen
plain text required seems to make this impractical, but I may be missing
something.

3.  Differential cryptanalysis.  Since the structure of the cipher algorithm
has no simpler subkeys than the arrays themselves, this can't be done in the
same sense as Biham and Shamir have discussed for DES, IDEA, etc.  There may
be a related attack, but I haven't thought of one yet (hardly a proof of
nonexistance!)

4.  Attack of the key expansion algorithm to simplify an analytical attack of
the contents of the substitution arrays.  This seems to me to be worse than a
frontal attack on the arrays, given the complexity of the key scheduling
algorithm.  Then again, I suffer inventor's blindness in this area.

The only complaints anyone has made so far are not fatal, in my humble
opinion:

1.  The key is fixed length.  OK, the key expansion could be done differently
to make this variable, but 128 bits is enough to preclude exhaustive key
search within the budgets of anyone I anticipate worrying about for the next
10 years, at least.  That assumes growth in computing power of a few orders
of magnitude, too.

2.  It is a symetric key algorithm, not a public key algorithm.  Guilty as
charged.  On the other hand, you don't have to pay royalties to PKP (or
anyone, including me) to use the algorithm in your own code or hardware.

3.  The user interface to CRYPTMPJ.EXE is confusing, archaic, and not as
simple as it should be.  True.  I plan to fix this some day, but it is still
not a problem with the algorithm.

4.  The source code is in Pascal, not C.  Easily fixed by porting.  If anyone
does this before I do, please send me a copy.

I wish I had the resources to offer a cash reward, but I don't.  On the other
hand,

If you break the MPJ encryption algorithm and post your solution, then you
will have the satisfaction of having beaten me in an intellectual game.

If no one succeeds in breaking the MPJ encryption algorithm after reasonable
effort has been applied, then there will be a secure, royalty free,
unpatented block cipher available for use in the USA.  (Where else would math
be patented?)

                                             -- Mike Johnson (mpj@csn.org)

This message contains speech and writings protected by the First Amendment of
the Constitution of the United States of America.







From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Paul Goggin <chaos@aql.gatech.edu>
Date: Mon, 27 Sep 93 08:46:14 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com (Cryptoanarchists are Us)
Subject: QPK sources and binaries
Message-ID: <9309271545.AA12881@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I have just added,

sec_run.exe
sec_src.exe

to a more permanent position than /tmp. It is available from the aql.gatech.edu
archive under /pub/crypto/applications/qpk.

Enjoy.
--
R  O    All Comments Copyright by  | Technofetisht
 A  N     Paul S. Goggin (1993)    | Cypher, Cyber, Chaos              
  V        Information Broker      | Ergoflux, Interzone
   E      chaos@aql.gatech.edu     | Carpe Diem: Stop the Clipper wiretap chip 
Finger account for latest _Phrack_ | Public Key: PGP and RIPEM available
      For anonymous communication:---> anon32940@anon.penet.fi
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Title 18 USC 2511 and 18 USC 2703 Protected -- Monitoring Absolutely Forbidden




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: stig@netcom.com (Stig)
Date: Mon, 27 Sep 93 12:06:14 PDT
To: stig@netcom.com (Stig)
Subject: Re: Wiretap Article (2 of 2)
In-Reply-To: <pmetzger@lehman.com>
Message-ID: <9309271904.AA21497@netcom4.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


In <9309271841.AA08215@snark.lehman.com>, "Perry E. Metzger" wrote...
> 
> Stig says:
> > 
> > 
> > THIS IS THE SORT OF NOISE THAT'S BETTER KEPT OFF THE LIST.  Private messages
> > should be sent via private email.
> > 
> >         stig
> 
> What? This is the fist bit of substantive stuff on a list filled with
> noise for months. What do you think the list is for? To provide a
> place for conspiracy theorists to jerk each other off?
> 
> Ms. Steele, it was perfectly appropriate. This is exactly the sort of
> thing the list is for.
> 
> Perry


Ms. Steele's forwarding of the Denning article was entirely appropriate.

Two people publicly asking Ms. Steele to forward it when email would have
sufficed was noise.

I replied to Paul, not Shari, so I figured that a careful reader would be able
to properly disambiguate my pronouns....  Oh well.

        Stig


;; __________________________________________________________________________
;; Stig@netcom.com                            netcom.com:/pub/stig/00-PGP-KEY
;; It's hard to be cutting-edge at your own pace...   32 DF B9 19 AE 28 D1 7A
;; Bullet-proof code cannot stand up to teflon bugs.  A3 9D 0B 1A 33 13 4D 7F




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Bill I. Gerrent" <psionic@wam.umd.edu>
Date: Mon, 27 Sep 93 09:11:14 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: sec.program
Message-ID: <199309271607.AA26189@rac2.wam.umd.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


The quick public key program sec_run.exe and sec_src.exe have been
FTP'd to wuarchive.wustl.edu

/pub/MSDOS_UPLOADS/misc
sec_run.exe 
sec_src.exe


=============================================================================
      ///    | psionic@wam.umd.edu | Fight the WIRETAP CHIP!! Ask me how!
 __  /// C=  | -Craig H. Rowland-  |
 \\\/// Amiga| PGP Key Available   | The U.S. Government doesn't trust its
  \///  1200 | By Request.         | own citizens. 
=============================================================================




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: ssteele@eff.org (Shari Steele)
Date: Mon, 27 Sep 93 09:36:15 PDT
To: mnemonic@eff.org (Michael Godwin)
Subject: Wiretap Article (1 of 2)
Message-ID: <199309271634.AA01886@eff.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Here it is.

>Date: Fri, 24 Sep 1993 16:31:55 -0400 (EDT)
>From: denning@cs.georgetown.edu (Dorothy Denning)
>Subject: Wiretap Article
>To: ssteele@eff.org
>Cc: denning@guvax.acc.georgetown.edu
>Errors-To: Postmaster@cs.georgetown.edu
>Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7BIT
>
>Shari,
>
>The following article on wiretap laws and procedures was written in
>response to the many questions and misunderstandings that have arisen
>in the context of escrowed encryption as well as Digital Telephony.  I
>would appreciate it if you would send it out through the eff-news
>mailing list and archive it in your database of papers.
>
>Thanks,
>Dorothy
>-------
>
>                        WIRETAP LAWS AND PROCEDURES
>             WHAT HAPPENS WHEN THE U.S. GOVERNMENT TAPS A LINE
>
>
>                   Donald P. Delaney, Senior Investigator
>                           New York State Police
>
>                  Dorothy E. Denning, Professor and Chair
>             Computer Science Department, Georgetown University
>
>                      John Kaye, County Prosecutor
>                      Monmouth County, New Jersey
>
>        Alan R. McDonald, Special Assistant to the Assistant Director
>        Technical Services Division, Federal Bureau of Investigation 
>
>
>                           September 23, 1993
>                                     
>
>
>1.  Introduction
>
>Although wiretaps are generally illegal in the United States, the
>federal government and the governments of thirty seven states have been
>authorized through federal and state legislation to intercept wire and
>electronic communications under certain stringent rules which include
>obtaining a court order.  These rules have been designed to ensure the
>protection of individual privacy and Fourth Amendment rights, while
>permitting the use of wiretaps for investigations of serious criminal
>activity and for foreign intelligence.
>
>This article describes the legal requirements for government
>interceptions of wire and electronic communications and some of the
>additional procedures and practices followed by federal and state
>agencies.  The legal requirements are rooted in two pieces of federal
>legislation: the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act (Title III
>of the Act (hereafter "Title III")), passed in 1968, and the Foreign
>Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA), passed in 1978.  Title III
>established the basic law for federal and state law enforcement
>interceptions performed for the purpose of criminal investigations,
>while FISA established the law for federal-level interceptions
>performed for intelligence and counterintelligence operations.  We will
>first describe Title III interceptions and then describe FISA
>interceptions.
>
>
>2.  Title III Interceptions
>
>Title III, as amended (particularly by the Electronic Communications
>Privacy Act of 1986), is codified at Title 18 USC, Sections 2510-2521.
>These statutes provide privacy protection for and govern the
>interception of oral, wire, and electronic communications.  Title III
>covers all telephone communications regardless of the medium, except
>that it does not cover the radio portion of a cordless telephone
>communication that is transmitted between the handset and base unit.
>The law authorizes the interception of oral, wire, and electronic
>communications by investigative and law enforcement officers conducting
>criminal investigations pertaining to serious criminal offenses, i.e.,
>felonies, following the issuance of a court order by a judge.  The
>Title III law authorizes the interception of particular criminal
>communications related to particular criminal offenses.  In short, it
>authorizes the acquisition of evidence of crime.  It does not authorize
>noncriminal intelligence gathering, nor does it authorize interceptions
>related to social or political views.
>
>Thirty seven states have statutes permitting interceptions by state and
>local law enforcement officers for certain types of criminal
>investigations.  All of the state statutes are based upon Title III
>from which they are derivative.  These statutes must be at least as
>restrictive as Title III, and in fact most are more restrictive in
>their requirements.  In describing the legal requirements, we will
>focus on those of Title III since they define the baseline for all
>wiretaps performed by federal, state, and local law enforcement
>agencies.
>
>In recent years, state statutes have been modified to keep pace with
>rapid technological advances in telecommunications.  For example, New
>Jersey amended its electronic surveillance statute in 1993 to include
>cellular telephones, cordless telephones, digital display beepers, fax
>transmissions, computer-to-computer communications, and traces obtained
>through "caller-ID".
>
>Wiretaps are limited to the crimes specified in Title III and state
>statutes.  In New Jersey, the list includes murder, kidnapping,
>gambling, robbery, bribery, aggravated assault, wrongful credit
>practices, terrorist threats, arson, burglary, felony thefts, escape,
>forgery, narcotics trafficking, firearms trafficking, racketeering, and
>organized crime.
>
>Most wiretaps are large undertakings, requiring a substantial use of
>resources.  In 1992, the average cost of installing intercept devices
>and monitoring communications was $46,492.  Despite budget constraints
>and personnel shortages, law enforcement conducts wiretaps as
>necessary, but obviously, because of staffing and costs, judiciously.
>  
>2.1  Application for a Court Order
>
>All government wiretaps require a court order based upon a detailed
>showing of probable cause.  To obtain a court order, a three-step
>process is involved.  First, the law enforcement officer responsible
>for the investigation must draw up a detailed affidavit showing that
>there is probable cause to believe that the target telephone is being
>used to facilitate a specific, serious, indictable crime.
>
>Second, an attorney for the federal, state, or local government must
>work with the law enforcement officer to prepare an application for a
>court order, based upon the officer's affidavit.  At the federal level,
>the application must be approved by the Attorney General, Deputy
>Attorney General, Associate Attorney General, any Assistant Attorney
>General, any acting Assistant Attorney General, or any Deputy Assistant
>Attorney General in the Criminal Division designated by the Attorney
>General.  At the state and local level, the application must be made
>and approved by the principal prosecuting attorney of the state (State
>Attorney General) or political subdivision thereof (District Attorney
>or County Prosecutor).  The attorney must be authorized by a statute of
>that state to make such applications.
>
>Third, the attorney must present the approved application ex parte
>(without an adversary hearing) to a federal or state judge who is
>authorized to issue a court order for electronic surveillance.  A state
>or local police officer or federal law enforcement agent cannot make an
>application for a court order directly to a judge.
>
>Typically, a court order is requested after a lengthy investigation and
>the use of a "Dialed Number Recorder" (DNR).  The DNR is used to track
>the outgoing calls from the suspect's phone in order to demonstrate
>that the suspect is communicating with known criminals.
>
>Title III requires that an application for a court order specify:
>
>   (a) the investigative or law enforcement officer making the
>       application and the high-level government attorney authorizing
>       the application;
>
>   (b) the facts and circumstances of the case justifying the
>       application, including details of the particular offense under
>       investigation, the identity of the person committing it, the
>       type of communications sought, and the nature and location of
>       the communication facilities;
>
>   (c) whether or not other investigative procedures have been tried
>       and failed or why they would likely fail or be too dangerous;
>   
>   (d) the period of time for the interception (at most 30 days -
>       extensions may be permitted upon reapplication);
>
>   (e) the facts concerning all previous applications involving any of
>       the same persons or facilities;
>
>   (f) where the application is for the extension of an order, the
>       results thus far obtained from the interception.
>
>The process of making an application for a court order is further
>restricted by internal procedures adopted by law enforcement agencies
>to ensure that wiretaps conform to the laws and are used only when
>justified.  The following describes the process for the FBI and the New
>York State Police.
>
>2.1.1  FBI Applications
>
>In order for an FBI agent to conduct an interception, the agent must
>follow procedures that go well beyond the legal requirements imposed by
>Title III and which involve extensive internal review.  In preparing
>the affidavit, the FBI agent in the field works with the field office
>principal legal advisor and also with an attorney in the local U.S.
>Attorney's Office, revising the documentation to take into account
>their comments and suggestions.  After the documents are approved by
>field office management, they are submitted to the Department of
>Justice's Office of Enforcement Operations (OEO) in the Criminal
>Division and to the FBI Headquarters (HQ).  At FBI HQ, the documents go
>to the Legal Counsel Division (LCD) and the Criminal Investigative
>Division (CID).  Within the CID, they are sent to the program manager
>of the criminal program unit relating to the type of violation under
>investigation, e.g., organized crime.  The program manager determines
>whether the subjects of the proposed interception are worthy targets of
>investigation and whether the interception is worth doing.  Attorneys
>in the FBI's LCD and the DOJ's OEO further refine the documents.
>
>After the documents are approved by the DOJ's OEO and by FBI HQ, they
>are referred to the Deputy Assistant Attorney General (or above), who
>reviews the documents and signs off on them.  At this point, the DOJ
>authorizes the local U.S. Attorney's Office to file the final version
>of the documents (application, affidavit, court order, and service
>provider order) in court.  The U.S. Attorney's Office then submits the
>documents and the DOJ authorization to a federal judge.  The entire
>process can take as long as a month.
>
>The following summarizes the people and organizations involved in the
>preparation or approval of the application and the issuance of a court
>order:
>
>   1.  FBI agent
>   2.  FBI field office attorney (principal legal advisor)
>   3.  FBI field office management
>   4.  Attorney in local U.S. Attorney's office
>   5.  DOJ Office of Enforcement Operations (OEO)
>   6.  FBI HQ Legal Counsel Division (LCD)
>   7.  FBI HQ Criminal Investigative Division (CID)
>   8.  DOJ Deputy Assistant Attorney General (or higher)
>   9.  Federal District Court judge
>
>
>2.1.2  New York State Police Applications
>
>Within the New York State Police, electronic surveillance is conducted
>by Senior Investigators in the Bureau of Criminal Investigation (BCI).  
>In preparing an affidavit, the investigator works with the District
>Attorney's Office (or, in the case of a federal investigation, the U.S.
>Attorney's office) and with the BCI Captain of the investigator's
>troop.  (Wiretap applications can be made and approved by the State
>Attorney General, but this is unusual.)  The Captain assesses whether
>review by Division Headquarters is necessary and confers with the
>Assistant Deputy Superintendent (ADS) or Headquarters Captain for final
>determination.  If Headquarters review is deemed necessary, then all
>documentation is sent to the ADS along with a memorandum, endorsed by
>the Troop Unit Supervisor and the Troop or Detail Commander, requesting
>approval.  If Headquarters review is deemed unnecessary, then the memo
>is sent without the documentation.  Once the ADS and District Attorney
>(DA) approve the application, the DA submits the application to a judge
>who grants or denies the court order.
>
>2.2  Issuance of a Court Order
>
>Not all judges have the authority to grant court orders for wiretaps.
>In New Jersey, for example, only eight judges are designated as
>"wiretap judges" for the entire state.  These judges are given special
>training to be sensitive to personal rights of privacy and to recognize
>the importance of telephone intercepts for law enforcement.
>
>Before a judge can approve an application for electronic surveillance
>and issue a court order, the judge must determine that:
>
>   (a) there is probable cause for belief that an individual is
>       committing, has committed, or is about to commit an offense
>       covered by the law;
>
>   (b) there is probable cause for belief that particular
>       communications concerning that offense will be obtained through
>       such interception;
>
>   (c) normal investigative procedures have been tried and have failed
>       or reasonably appear unlikely to succeed or to be too dangerous;
>
>   (d) there is probable cause for belief that the facilities from
>       which, or the place where the communications are to be
>       intercepted are being used, or are about to be used, in
>       connection with the commission of such offense, or are leased
>       to, listed in the name of, or commonly used by such person.
>
>In addition to showing probable cause, one of the main criterion for
>determining whether a court order should be issued is whether normal
>investigative techniques have been or are likely to be unsuccessful
>(criterion (c) above).  Electronic surveillance is a tool of last
>resort and cannot be used if other methods of investigation could
>reasonably be used instead.  Such normal investigative methods usually
>include visual surveillance, interviewing subjects, the use of
>informers, telephone record analysis, and DNRs.  However, these
>techniques often have limited impact on an investigation.  Continuous
>surveillance by police can create suspicion and therefore be hazardous;
>further, it cannot disclose the contents of telephone conversations.
>Questioning identified suspects or executing search warrants at their
>residence can substantially jeopardize an investigation before the full
>scope of the operation is revealed, and information can be lost through
>interpretation.  Informants are useful and sought out by police, but
>the information they provide does not always reveal all of the players
>or the extent of an operation, and great care must be taken to ensure
>that the informants are protected.  Moreover, because informants are
>often criminals themselves, they may not be believed in court.
>Telephone record analysis and DNRs are helpful, but do not reveal the
>contents of conversations or the identities of parties.  Other methods
>of investigation that may be tried include undercover operations and
>stings.  But while effective in some cases, undercover operations are
>difficult and dangerous, and stings do not always work. 
>
>If the judge approves the application, then a court order is issued
>specifying the relevant information given in the application, namely,
>the identity of the person (if known) whose communications are to be
>intercepted, the nature and location of the communication facilities,
>the type of communication to be intercepted and the offense to which it
>relates, the agency authorized to perform the interception and the
>person authorizing the application, and the period of time during which
>such interception is authorized.  A court order may also require that
>interim status reports be made to the issuing judge while the wiretap
>is in progress.
>
>2.3  Emergencies
>
>In an emergency situation where there is immediate danger of death or
>serious physical injury to any person, or conspiratorial activities
>threatening national security or characteristic of organized crime,
>Title III permits any investigative or law enforcement officer
>specially designated by the Attorney General, the Deputy Attorney
>General, or the Associate Attorney General, or by the principal
>prosecuting attorney of any state or subdivision thereof, to intercept
>communications provided an application for a court order is made within
>48 hours.  In the event a court order is not issued, the contents of
>any intercepted communication is treated as having been obtained in
>violation of Title III.
>
>In New York State, even an emergency situation requires a court order
>from a judge.  However, the judge may grant a temporary court order
>based on an oral application from the District Attorney.  The oral
>communication must be recorded and transcribed, and must be followed by
>a written application within 24 hours.  The duration of a temporary
>warrant cannot exceed 24 hours and cannot be renewed except through a
>written application.
>
>2.4  Execution of a Court Order 
>
>2.4.1  Installation of a Wiretap
>
>To execute a court order for a wiretap, the investigative or law
>enforcement officer takes the court order or emergency provision to the
>communications service provider.  Normally, the service provider is the
>local exchange carrier.  When served with a court order, the service
>provider (or landlord, custodian, or other person named) is mandated
>under Title III to assist in the execution of the interception by
>providing all necessary information, facilities, and technical
>assistance.  The service provider is compensated for reasonable
>expenses incurred.  In light of rapid technological developments
>including cellular telephones and integrated computer networks, the New
>Jersey statute also requires the service provider to give technical
>assistance and equipment to fulfill the court order.  This requirement
>has not yet been tested in court.
>
>Normally, the government leases a line from the service provider and
>the intercepted communications are transmitted to a remote government
>monitoring facility over that line.  In many cases, the bridging
>connection is made within the service provider's central office
>facility.  Alternatively, a law enforcement agency may request the
>service provider to give the "pairs and appearances" (a place to
>connect to the suspect's line) in the "local loop" for the suspect's
>phone.  A law enforcement technician then makes the connection.
>
>When a suspect's telephone is subject to change (e.g., because the
>person is attempting to evade or thwart interception), then a "roving"
>wiretap, which suspends the specification of the telephone, may be
>used.  In this case, prior to intercepting communications, the officer
>must use some other method of surveillance in order to determine the
>exact location and/or telephone number of the facility being used.
>Once determined, the location or telephone number is given to the
>service provider for coordination and prompt assistance.  The officer
>may not intercept communications randomly in order to track a person
>(random or mass surveillance is not permitted under any
>circumstances).
>
>2.4.2  Minimization
>
>Once any electronic surveillance begins, the law enforcement officer
>must "minimize" -- that is, attempt to limit the interception of
>communications to the specified offenses in the court order.  Prior to
>the surveillance, a federal or state attorney holds a "minimization
>meeting" with the investigators who will be participating in the case
>to ensure that the rules are followed.
>
>Minimization is normally accomplished by turning off the intercept and
>then performing a spot check every few minutes to determine if the
>conversation has turned to the subject of the court order.  This avoids
>picking up family gossip.  Special problems may arise where criminals
>communicate in codes that are designed to conceal criminal activity in
>what sounds like mundane household discussion.  If an intercepted
>communication is in a code or foreign language, and if someone is not
>reasonably available to interpret the code or foreign language, then
>the conversation can be recorded and minimization deferred until an
>expert in that code or language is available to interpret the
>communication.  Should a wiretap fail to meet the minimization
>parameters, all of the evidence obtained from the wiretap could be
>inadmissible.
>
>2.4.3  Recording
>
>All intercepted communications are to be recorded when possible.  As a
>practical mater, law enforcement officers make working copies of the
>original tapes.  In many instances at the state and local level, the
>originals are delivered to the prosecutor's office and maintained in
>the prosecutor's custody.  The copies are screened by the case officer
>for pertinent conversations (e.g., "I'll deliver the dope at 8:00
>pm.").  A compilation of the relevant conversations, together with the
>corroboratory surveillances often provides the probable cause for
>search warrants and/or arrest warrants.
>
>2.4.4  Termination of Electronic Surveillance
>
>Electronic surveillance must terminate upon attainment of the
>objectives, or in any event within 30 days. To continue an interception
>beyond 30 days, the officer, through a government attorney, must apply
>for and be granted an extension based upon a new application and court
>order.
>
>When the period of a court order, or extension thereof, expires, the
>original tapes must be made available to the issuing judge and sealed
>under court supervision.  The tapes must be maintained in such fashion
>for 10 years.
>
>2.5  Notification and Use of Intercepted Communications as Evidence
>
>Upon termination of an interception, the judge who issued the court
>order must notify the persons named in the order that the interception
>took place.  Normally, this must be done within 90 days, but it may be
>postponed upon showing of good cause.  If the judge determines that it
>would be in the interest of justice to make portions of the intercepted
>communications available to the subjects, the judge may do so.
>
>The contents of the communications may not be used as evidence in any
>trial or hearing unless each party has received a copy of the
>application and court order at least 10 days in advance of the trial,
>and has been given the opportunity to move to suppress the evidence.  A
>motion to suppress the evidence may be made on the grounds that it was
>not obtained in complete conformance with the laws.
>
>2.6  Reports
>
>Within 30 days after the expiration or denial of a court order, Title
>III requires that the judge provide information about the order to the
>Administrative Office of the United States Courts (AO). Each year the
>Attorney General (or a designated Assistant Attorney General) must
>report, on behalf of the federal government, to the AO a summary of all
>orders and interceptions for the year; reports for state and local
>jurisdictions are made by the principal prosecuting attorney of the
>jurisdiction.  The AO then integrates these summaries into an annual
>report: "Report on Applications for Orders Authorizing or Approving the
>Interception of Wire, Oral, or Electronic Communications (Wiretap
>Report)" covering all federal and state electronic surveillance,
>including wiretaps.  The 1992 report is about 200 pages and includes
>information about each interception authorized in 1992, update
>information for interceptions authorized in 1982-1991, and summary
>statistics.  The summary statistics include the following data (numbers
>in parenthesis are the 1992 figures):
>
>   (1) number of interceptions authorized (919), denied (0), and
>       installed (846)
>
>   (2) average duration (in days) of original authorization (28) and
>       extensions (30)
>
>   (3) the place/facility where authorized (303 single family dwelling,
>       135 apartment, 3 multi-dwelling, 119 business, 4 roving, 66
>
>





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: ssteele@eff.org (Shari Steele)
Date: Mon, 27 Sep 93 09:36:15 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Wiretap Article (2 of 2)
Message-ID: <199309271635.AA01892@eff.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>Date: Fri, 24 Sep 1993 16:31:55 -0400 (EDT)
>From: denning@cs.georgetown.edu (Dorothy Denning)
>Subject: Wiretap Article
>To: ssteele@eff.org
>Cc: denning@guvax.acc.georgetown.edu
>Errors-To: Postmaster@cs.georgetown.edu
>Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7BIT
>
>       combination, 289 other)
>
>   (4) major offenses involved (634 narcotics, 90 racketeering, 66
>       gambling, 35 homicide/ assault, 16 larceny/theft, 9 kidnapping,
>       8 bribery, 7 loansharking/usury/extortion, 54 other)
>
>   (5) average number of (a) persons intercepted (117), (b)
>       interceptions (1,861), and (c) incriminating intercepts (347)
>       per order where interception devices were installed
>
>   (6) average cost of interception ($46,492)
>
>   (7) type of surveillance used for the 846 interceptions installed
>       (632 telephone, 38 microphone, 113 electronic, 63 combination)
>
>   (8) number of persons arrested (2,685) and convicted (607) as the
>       result of 1992 intercepts
>
>   (9) activity taking place during 1992 as the result of intercepts
>       terminated in years 1982-1991, including number of arrests
>       (1211), trials (280), motions to suppress that are granted (14),
>       denied (141), and pending (37), and convictions (1450) (there is
>       a lag between interceptions, arrests, and convictions, with many
>       arrests and most convictions associated with a wiretap that
>       terminated in one year taking place in subsequent years)
>
>Most of the above data is broken down by jurisdiction.  Of the 919
>authorized intercepts, 340 (37%) were federal.  New York State had 197,
>New Jersey 111, Florida 80, and Pennsylvania 77.  The remaining 114
>intercepts were divided among 18 states, none of which had more than 17
>intercepts.  During the past decade, the average number of authorized
>intercepts per year has been about 780.
>
>Individual law enforcement agencies also require internal reports.  For
>example, the New York Sate Police requires that each week, the Troop or
>Detail Captain prepare a report summarizing the status of all
>eavesdropping activity within the unit, including the productivity and
>plans for each electronic surveillance installation and a brief
>synopsis of pertinent activity.  This is sent to the New York State
>Police Division Headquarters Captain who prepares a report summarizing
>the status of all eavesdropping installations.
>
>One of the reasons for the significant amount of post wiretap reporting
>is to provide a substantial record for legislatures when considering
>whether or not to reenact or modify wiretap statutes.
>
>
>3.  FISA Interceptions
>
>Title 50 USC, Sections 1801-1811, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
>Act (FISA) of 1978, covers electronic surveillance for foreign
>intelligence purposes (including counterintelligence and
>counterterrorism).  It governs wire and electronic communications sent
>by or intended to be received by United States persons (citizens,
>aliens lawfully admitted for permanent residence, corporations, and
>associations of U.S. persons) who are in the U.S. when there is a
>reasonable expectation of privacy and a warrant would be required for
>law enforcement purposes; nonconsensual wire intercepts that are
>implemented within the U.S.; and radio intercepts when the sender and
>all receivers are in the U.S. and a warrant would be required for law
>enforcement purposes.  It does not cover intercepts of U.S. persons who
>are overseas (unless the communications are with a U.S. person who is
>inside the U.S.).  Electronic surveillance conducted under FISA is
>classified.
>
>FISA authorizes electronic surveillance of foreign powers and agents of
>foreign powers for foreign intelligence purposes.  Normally, a court
>order is required to implement a wiretap under FISA.  There are,
>however, two exceptions.  The first is when the communications are
>exclusively between or among foreign powers or involve technical
>intelligence other than spoken communications from a location under the
>open and exclusive control of a foreign power; there is no substantial
>risk that the surveillance will acquire the communications to or from a
>U.S.person; and proposed minimization procedures meet the requirements
>set forth by the law.  Under those conditions, authorization can be
>granted by the President through the Attorney General for a period up
>to one year.  The second is following a declaration of war by
>Congress.  Then the President, though the Attorney General, can
>authorize electronic surveillance for foreign intelligence purposes
>without a court order for up to 15 days.
>
>Orders for wiretaps are granted by a special court established by
>FISA.  The court consists of seven district court judges appointed by
>the Chief Justice of the United States.  Judges serve seven-year
>terms.
>
>3.1  Application for a Court Order
>
>Applications for a court order are made by Federal officers and require
>approval by the Attorney General.  Each application must include:
>
>  (1) the Federal officer making the application;
>
>  (2) the Attorney General's approval;
>
>  (3) the target of the electronic surveillance;
>
>  (4) justification that the target is a foreign power or agent of a
>      foreign power (except no U.S person can be considered a foreign power
>      or agent thereof solely based on activities protected by the First
>      Amendment) and that the facilities or places where the surveillance
>      is be directed will be used by the same;
> 
>  (5) the proposed minimization procedures, which must meet certain
>      requirements to protect the privacy of U.S. persons;
>
>  (6) the nature of the information sought and type of communications
>      subjected to surveillance;
>
>  (7) certification(s) by the Assistant to the President for National
>      Security Affairs or other high-level official in the area of
>      national security or defense (Presidential appointee subject to
>      Senate confirmation) that the information sought is foreign
>      intelligence information and that such information cannot
>      reasonably be obtained by normal investigative methods;
>
>  (8) the means by which the surveillance will be effected;
>
>  (9) the facts concerning all previous applications involving the same
>      persons, facilities, or places;
>
> (10) the period of time for the interception (maximum 90 days or,
>      when the target is a foreign power, one year);
>
> (11) coverage of all surveillance devices to be employed and the
>      minimization procedures applying to each.
>
>Some of the above information can be omitted when the target is a
>foreign power.  
>
>Within the FBI, the process of applying for a court order under FISA is
>as exacting and subject to review as under Title III.  The main
>differences are that under FISA, the FBI Intelligence Division is
>involved rather than the Criminal Investigative Division, the DOJ
>Office of Intelligence Policy and Review (OIPR) is involved rather than
>either the U.S. Attorney's Office or the DOJ Criminal Division, and the
>application is approved by the Attorney General (or Acting Attorney
>General) rather than by a lower DOJ official.
>
>3.2  Issuance of a Court Order
>
>Before a judge can approve an application, the judge must determine
>that the authorizations are valid; that there is probable cause to
>believe that the target of the electronic surveillance is a foreign
>power or agent of a foreign power and that the facilities or places
>where the surveillance is be directed will be used by the same; and
>that the proposed minimization procedures meet the requirements set
>forth in the law.  If the judge approves the application, an order is
>issued specifying the relevant information from the application and
>directing the communication carrier, landlord, custodian, or other
>specified person to furnish all necessary information, facilities, and
>technical assistance and to properly maintain under security procedures
>any records relating to the surveillance.
>
>3.3  Emergencies
>
>In an emergency situation, the Attorney General or designee can
>authorize the use of electronic surveillance provided the judge is
>notified at the time and an application is made to the judge within 24
>hours.  If such application is not obtained, then the judge notifies
>any U.S. persons named in the application or subject to the
>surveillance, though such notification can be postponed or forgone upon
>showing of good cause.
>
>3.4  Use of Intercepted Communications as Evidence
>
>Like Title III, FISA places strict controls on what information can be
>acquired through electronic surveillance and how such information can
>be used.  No information can be disclosed for law enforcement purposes
>except with the proviso that it may only be used in a criminal
>proceedings under advance authorization from the Attorney General.  If
>the government intends to use such information in court, then the
>aggrieved person must be notified in advance.  The person may move to
>suppress the evidence.
>
>3.5  Reports
>
>Each year, the Attorney General must give the Administrative Office of
>the United States Courts (AO) a report of the number of FISA
>applications and the number of orders and extensions granted, modified,
>or denied.  In 1992, there were 484 orders.  Since 1979, there has been
>an average of a little over 500 FISA orders per year.
>
>Because intercepts conducted under FISA are classified, detailed
>information analogous to that required under Title III is not reported
>to the AO, nor made available to the public.  However, records of
>Attorney General certifications, applications, and orders granted must
>be held for at least 10 years, and the Attorney General must inform two
>Congressional oversight committees of all surveillance activity on a
>semiannual basis.  These committees are the House Permanent Select
>Committee on Intelligence and the Senate Select Committee on
>Intelligence.
>
>
>Acknowledgements
>
>We are grateful to Geoffrey Greiveldinger for many helpful suggestions
>on an earlier draft of this report.
>
>
>





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: wcs@anchor.ho.att.com (Bill_Stewart_HOY002_1305)
Date: Mon, 27 Sep 93 13:21:16 PDT
To: ssteele@eff.org
Subject: Re: Wiretap Article by Dorothy Denning
Message-ID: <9309271653.AA29243@anchor.ho.att.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text


It would probably be ok to send to the list, though I suspect most of us have 
ftp access (it's available on ftp.vortex.com in pub/privacy/wiretap.laws.Z)
either directly by mail, and somebody will probably post it to Usenet soon.
Kaye is my local prosecutor, and while he's not as rabidly corrupt about 
forfeiture as some of the nearby county prosecutors, he's been relatively
energetic about using and supporting it and finding new things to 
forfeit property for.

			Bill Stewart



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Perry E. Metzger" <pmetzger@lehman.com>
Date: Mon, 27 Sep 93 11:46:14 PDT
To: stig@netcom.com (Stig)
Subject: Re: Wiretap Article (2 of 2)
In-Reply-To: <9309271809.AA12276@netcom4.netcom.com>
Message-ID: <9309271841.AA08215@snark.lehman.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Stig says:
> 
> 
> THIS IS THE SORT OF NOISE THAT'S BETTER KEPT OFF THE LIST.  Private messages
> should be sent via private email.
> 
>         stig

What? This is the fist bit of substantive stuff on a list filled with
noise for months. What do you think the list is for? To provide a
place for conspiracy theorists to jerk each other off?

Ms. Steele, it was perfectly appropriate. This is exactly the sort of
thing the list is for.

Perry




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Lyle_Seaman@transarc.com
Date: Tue, 28 Sep 93 01:41:24 PDT
To: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Subject: Re: Contributions to Zimmermann--Where??
In-Reply-To: <9309250733.AA09491@netcom5.netcom.com>
Message-ID: <YgdnqI=0Bwwb0vqa9o@transarc.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May) writes:
> If Phil--who appears to be the main target, never
> mind that the _document subpoena_ was not directed at him this time
> around--is successfully indicted, sent to trial, etc., then this will
> have a chilling effect on others.

*Somebody* will be indicted.  That's what Grand Juries do.  

Lyle		Transarc		707 Grant Street
412 338 4474	The Gulf Tower		Pittsburgh 15219




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: ssimpson@eff.org (Sarah L Simpson)
Date: Mon, 27 Sep 93 12:51:16 PDT
To: com-priv@lists.psi.com
Subject: ACTIVIST ALERT -The Clock is Ticking!
Message-ID: <199309271949.AA04775@eff.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



That's right - the clock is ticking.  The deadline to get things to
cryptnow@eff.org is 8:00pm EST.  It is now just before 4pm - that's 4 short
hours to go.  Don't let this deadline pass!  Please note - my previous
message offered a sample letter directed to "Mr. Director".  NIST's
director is actually a woman, so please omit the "Mr.".


=============================
And because time is so tight, EFF has set up an Internet address where you
can send your electronic comments in lieu of mailing them through the U.S.
Postal Service.  Send your letters to:

        cryptnow@eff.org

We will be printing out all letters and hand-delivering them before the
deadline, so please make sure to send us any letter you want included no
later than 8pm on Monday, September 27.

If you would like additional background materials, you can browse the
pub/EFF/crypto area of our anonymous ftp site (ftp.eff.org).  The original
solicitation of comments can be found there and is called
NIST-escrow-proposal.

DO NOT WAIT TO WRITE YOUR COMMENTS!  TIME IS SHORT!


======================
<<your name>>
<<your organization>>
<<your street address>>
<<your city, state, zip>>

<<date>>


National Institute for Standards and Technology (NIST)
ATTN:  Proposed FIPS for Escrowed Encryption Standard
Technology Building, Room B-154
National Institute of Standards and Technology
Gaithersburg, MD  20899

Mr. Director:

I am writing to oppose the Proposed Federal Information Processing Standard
(FIPS) for and Escrowed Encryption Standard, docket # 930659-3159.

Encryption is vital for the protection of individual privacy in the
Information Age.  As more and more personal information flows around
electronic networks, we all need strong encryption to safeguard information
from unwanted intrusion

NIST should not be moving forward with technical standards specification
until critical policy decisions are made.  These policy issues include:

o       Continued Legal Use of All Forms of Encryption:  When the Clinton
Administration announced the Clipper Chip, it assured the public that this
would be a purely voluntary system.  We must have legal guarantees that
Clipper isn't the first step toward prohibition against un-escrowed
encryption.

o       Legal Rights of Escrow Users:  If people choose to deposit their
keys with the government or any other escrow agent, they must have some
legal recourse in the event that those keys are improperly released.  The
most recent draft of the escrow procedures specifically states, however:

        "These procedures do not create, and are not intended to create,
any substantive rights for individuals intercepted through electronic
surveillance, and noncompliance with these procedures shall not provide the
basis for any motion to suppress or other objection to the introduction of
electronic surveillance evidence lawfully acquired."

        Leaving users with no recourse will discourage use of the system
and is a tacit acceptance of unscrupulous government behavior.

o       Open Standards:  People won't use encryption unless they trust it. 
Secret standards such as Clipper cannot be evaluated by independent experts
and do not deserve the public trust.

        In addition, the current proposed technical standard is incomplete.
 It should not be approved until futher comment on the complete proposal is
possible

o       Operating Procedures Unclear:  The full operating procedures for
the escrow agents has yet to be issued.  Public comment must be sought on
the complete procedures, not just the outline presented in the draft FIPS. 
Even the government-selected algorithm review group has declared that it
needs more information on the escrow process.

o       Identity of Escrow Agents:  The identity of one or both of the
escrow agents has not been firmly established.

o       Algorithm Classified:  Asking for comments on an algorithm that is
classified makes a mockery of citizen participation in government
decision-making.

NIST will be involved in making many critical decisions regarding the
National Information Infrastructure.  The next time NIST solicits public
comments, it should be ready to accept reply by electronic mail in addition
to paper-based media.

Sincerely,

<<name>>
<<title>>
******************************
Sarah L. Simpson
Membership Coordinator
Electronic Frontier Foundation
1001 G Street, NW
Suite 950 East
Washington, DC  20001
202/347-5400 tel
202/393-5509 fax





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: baumbach@atmel.com (Peter Baumbach)
Date: Mon, 27 Sep 93 18:21:21 PDT
To: smb@research.att.com
Subject: Re: the public key minefield
Message-ID: <9309272035.AA25846@bass.chp.atmel.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> You seem to have missed my earlier summary of how patents are structured.
> A separate part of the patent from the claims describes how to build the
> claimed device.  The claims aren't supposed to.

Do you agree or disagree that:

 'the concept of "anti-gravity" device is not patentable.
  If I could duplicate the effect of your anti-gravity device without
  using any of the same novel mechanisms.  My device would be
  separately patentable.' ?

If you agree, then how can you patent "public key systems" as a concept?

If you disagree, then we can leave it at that.

Peter Baumbach
baumbach@atmel.com




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Bruce R Koball <bkoball@well.sf.ca.us>
Date: Mon, 27 Sep 93 17:41:21 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Verilog encryption broken
Message-ID: <93Sep27.173714pdt.14125-3@well.sf.ca.us>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


The following is an article that I posted in the EFF conf on the WELL.
Though it's written for non-tech readers, I thought it might be of 
interest to the cypherpunks. -- Bruce

--------
A recent anonymous posting in the comp.lang.verilog newsgroup on Usenet
has generated a raging controversey and threatens to shake up the
electronic design automation (EDA) community.  The posting was a program
that broke the encryption scheme used to protect the proprietary
libraries that are part of Cadence Design Systems high-end IC design
tool Verilog-XL.  Verilog is a sophisticated CAD tool that allows
engineers to design and simulate new chips before they are
manufacturered.

These libraries contain detailed descriptions of integrated circuit
building blocks (called cells) and are usually supplied by different
chip manufacturers in an encrypted format because their information
could be used to reverse engineer the proprietary cells and the chips
built with them.  Cadence also uses the encryption to prevent these
libraries from being used with lower-cost Verilog clones that are
available.

The anonymous poster claimed that he was doing this in protest of
Cadence's pricing policies.  The program was written in Perl, a Unix
scripting language, and contained Verilog encryption tables.  It
exploited debugging features that were left in Verilog by Cadence
programmers to break Verilog's rather simple encryption scheme.
Cadence's response on the net was swift and strongly worded:
 
> 
> Newsgroups: comp.lang.verilog
> From: robert@cadence.com (Robert Donohue)
> Subject: Cadence Official Position on Protected Code
> Organization: Cadence Design Systems, Inc.
> Date: Thu, 16 Sep 1993 00:11:36 GMT
> 
>   On September 14, 1993, someone posted on the 'Internet' a program
> relating to Cadence Design Systems Verilog technology.  This disclosure was
> unauthorized by Cadence and is illegal.  Any copying of the program or any
> use of it would be unlawful, subjecting the infringer to substantial civil
> and, potentially, criminal penalties.
> 
>   Cadence is investigating this unauthorized disclosure and copying, and
> will take all available legal actions against the person who made the
> disclosure when his or her identity is learned.  Any person or entity using
> such illegally posted code will also be the subject of the same legal
> action.  You should immediately destroy any copy you may have made of the
> program.  Anyone having information about the illegal posting should contact
> Robert Donohue, Cadence's General Counsel, at 'robert@cadence.com' or
> telephone (408) 944-7748 or fax at (408) 944-0215 in the United States.
> 
 
As might be expected, much heat has been generated in subsequent
net discussions. Several issues are at stake. There has been some
discussion over the legality of the posting and potential subsequent use
of the Perl script.  Cadence has apparently received heat from its users
for what some have perceived as its heavy-handed reaction. Some Verilog
users have complained that hacking on the libraries is sometimes
necessary because of the insufficient documentation of their contents.

Perhaps the most serious implication for the EDA community is the
apparent ease with which the protection of numerous ASIC vendor's
intellectual property was broached. The data contained in these
libraries are the "crown jewels" for these chip manufacturers and are
typically protected by non-disclosure agreements between the
manufacturers and their customers. There has been some mention of
liability on Cadence's part for any unauthorized disclosure that may
occur.

Finally, this incident will undoubtedly provide more ammunition for
those who have been criticising the growing phenomenon of anonymous
remailing services on the net.

--------

P.S. Does anyone on this list know if the offending post was made
through an anonymous remailer?  -brk






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: doug@netcom.com (Doug Merritt)
Date: Mon, 27 Sep 93 18:46:19 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Verilog encryption broken
In-Reply-To: <bkoball@well.sf.ca.us>
Message-ID: <9309280144.AA10672@netcom.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Bruce R Koball <bkoball@well.sf.ca.us> said:
>P.S. Does anyone on this list know if the offending post was made
>through an anonymous remailer?  -brk

In looking at the newsgroup in question, it appears that someone
cancelled the controversial article, but it is clear from responses
that the poster was "an33929@anon.penet.fi".
	Doug




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Ed Frankenberry <ezf@osf.org>
Date: Mon, 27 Sep 93 17:21:21 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: mailing list addition request
In-Reply-To: <199309271949.AA04775@eff.org>
Message-ID: <9309280020.AA27583@postman.osf.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Please add "ezf@osf.org" to the "cypherpunks" e-mail list.
	Thank you,
	Ed




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: VACCINIA@UNCVX1.OIT.UNC.EDU
Date: Mon, 27 Sep 93 18:11:21 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: PGP Business Week article
Message-ID: <01H3GGRLXRQQ006YNP@UNCVX1.OIT.UNC.EDU>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


In case anyone is interested, there is a very sympathetic article in the Oct.
4, 1993 "Business Week" magazine about PGP and encryptation in general. It's 
on page 43. I'll just hit the highlights, but check it out.



>Oddly, the crackdown on software {re:PGP} comes just as the administration is 
>loosening export controls on computer hardware. But the schizophrenia may be 
>more apparent than real."I don't think they've got the export policy together 
>enough to be split", says a key congressional staffer..... "This is an area 
>that has essentially been turned over to the spooks".

>Meanwhile, there is growing concern in congress about possible damage to 
>exports. Quality encryptation software, "is available from foreign 
>manufacturers... and is easily transmitted using only a long-distance 
>telephone line and a modem," complained Representative Sam Gejdenson 
>(D-Conn.) and a high-powered bipartisan group of collegues in a Sept. 20
>letter to the President.

>Still, the NSA can't stave off the inevitable for long. Gejdenson hopes to 
>produce legislation by early next year to revamp government policy on high-
>tech exports. The result will probably include looser restrictions on 
>encryptation software- and a victory for Phil Zimmermann in his battle to 
>keep snoops out of his cyberspace.

Hee-Hee, write Rep. Gejdenson via compuserve or any other way and let him know
you support him on this one. I think if we keep at it we win.

Scott G. Morham              ! The First, 
Vaccinia@uncvx1.oit.unc.edu  !            Second
                             !                   and Third
                             !                              Levels of
                             !               Information Storage and Retrieval
                             ! DNA,                       
                             !      Biological Neural Nets,
                             !                              Cyberspace




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: markh@wimsey.bc.ca (Mark C. Henderson)
Date: Mon, 27 Sep 93 21:31:23 PDT
To: Bruce R Koball <cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Verilog encryption broken
Message-ID: <m0ohWe6-0001EbC@vanbc.wimsey.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> A recent anonymous posting in the comp.lang.verilog newsgroup on Usenet
> has generated a raging controversey and threatens to shake up the
> electronic design automation (EDA) community.  The posting was a program
> that broke the encryption scheme used to protect the proprietary
> libraries that are part of Cadence Design Systems high-end IC design
> tool Verilog-XL.  Verilog is a sophisticated CAD tool that allows
...

This does bring up an interesting ethical question.

What should one do when one discovers that a vendor is marketing
an encryption scheme for the protection or to limit the use of
specific information, which is easy to break.

Obviously, one is neither doing the vendor nor the customers of that
vendor a favour by posting a detailed account of the weakness of
the system.

One the other hand, if one justs sits on the information, it is clear 
that other people will be able to deduce the weakness in the system 
and actually use it to steal information; and why not, I suppose 
anyone who puts trust in "smoke and mirrors security" probably 
deserves exactly what they get. 

The world abounds with weak encryption algorithms which are being 
used to protect information of consderable value. The case with 
Verilog, and their use of an easily "crackable" scheme is far from 
unique. 

Still I don't have an answer. Say one discovers that a vendor is 
protecting its customers' information using a simple "crackable" 
linear encryption function. Is that information something to reveal, 
something to keep secret or what? If one were to approach the
vendor in question with that kind of information, I can imagine
all sorts of legal entanglements that might arise. 

There are other instances which are similar. Information on the
(in)security of various operating systems comes to mind.

Comments?

-- 
Mark Henderson      markh@wimsey.bc.ca (personal account)
RIPEM key available by key server/finger/E-mail
  MD5OfPublicKey: F1F5F0C3984CBEAF3889ADAFA2437433




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: smb@research.att.com
Date: Mon, 27 Sep 93 18:41:21 PDT
To: baumbach@atmel.com
Subject: Re: the public key minefield
Message-ID: <9309280140.AA22526@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


	 > You seem to have missed my earlier summary of how patents are struct
	ured.
	 > A separate part of the patent from the claims describes how to build
	 the
	 > claimed device.  The claims aren't supposed to.

	 Do you agree or disagree that:

	  'the concept of "anti-gravity" device is not patentable.
	   If I could duplicate the effect of your anti-gravity device without
	   using any of the same novel mechanisms.  My device would be
	   separately patentable.' ?

	 If you agree, then how can you patent "public key systems" as a
	 concept?

	 If you disagree, then we can leave it at that.

The question is phrased improperly.  Apart from the fact that the
concept (though not the reality) of anti-gravity is prior art, they
didn't patent the concept of public-key cryptography.  Rather, they
patented a class of devices fitting a certain description, with one
public key cryptosystem as an example and as a separate set of claims.
To use your analogy, I could patent anti-gravity achieved by interposing
a screen of some substance opaque to gravity, and patent Cavorite as
an instance of that class.  If you had another use for Cavorite, you'd
be home free.  Or if you found a way to neutralize gravity by beaming
anti-gravitons downward, you'd probably be clear, too.  But if you
found another substance besides Cavorite that was opaque to gravity --
yes, that would be covered by my patent.  (Fortunately, H.G. Wells didn't
patent his literary device.  But I can't think of another science
fiction author who used that technique....)

It's certainly possible that all possible cryptosystems that achieve the
same effect would be covered by their description.  That, of course, is
the mark of a good patent attorney's work -- that he or she managed to
fashion so broad a claim.  But maybe you can find a better way to do what
you really want to do, which is trade keys and authenticate messages.
And if you do -- well, then, the patent system has succeeded in its goals,
in that the monopoly assigned to someone else has stimulated you to find
another way to do things, and thus furthered the useful arts and sciences.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Christian Void <cvoid@netcom.com>
Date: Mon, 27 Sep 93 22:06:18 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Phil Zimmerman on 'The Death of DES'
Message-ID: <Pine.3.05.9309272220.A26747-b100000@netcom3>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I found the following on Usenet, and was curious as to the validity of the
statements made. If anyone has any other information regarding this,
please post or mail it private. I don't know if any of it already floated
through here, but thought you might be interested in it.

---

Seen on the PRIVACY FORUM mailing list:

  -----------------------
  Date:    Wed, 8 Sep 93 13:13:12 -0400
  From:    "Alan (Gesture Man) Wexelblat" <wex@media.mit.edu>
  Subject: DES is a dead dog...
  
    From: Philip Zimmermann <prz@columbine.cgd.ucar.EDU>
    Subject: Re: DES Key Search Paper (fwd)

    Michael Weiner presented a paper at Crypto93 that describes a fast
    DES key search engine that uses a special inside-out DES chip that
    he designed.  This chip takes a single plaintext/ciphertext pair
    and quickly tries DES keys until it finds one that produces the
    given ciphertext from the given plaintext.  Weiner can get these
    chips made for $10.50 each in quantity, and can build a special
    machine with 57000 of these chips for $1 million.  This machine can
    exhaust the DES key space in 7 hours, finding a key in 3.5 hours on
    the average.  He works for Bell Northern Research in Ottawa, and
    says they have not actually built this machine, but he has the chip
    fully designed and ready for fabrication.

    This is a stunning breakthrough in the realization of practical DES
    cracking.  BTW-- note that PEM uses straight 56-bit DES.

---

Christian Void /T71 | "I don't like it, and I'm sorry I | VMResearch, Inc.
cvoid@netcom.COM    | ever had anything to do with it." | P.O. Box 170213
Tel. 1+415-807-5491 |  -Erwin Schrodinger  (1887-1961)  | SF, CA  94117
                * PGP v2.3a Public Key Available Via Finger *








From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Mike Ingle <MIKEINGLE@delphi.com>
Date: Mon, 27 Sep 93 21:11:23 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Clinton UN Speech / Msg to Prez/VP
Message-ID: <01H3GN1EBEV690N1NN@delphi.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


In his UN speech this morning, Clinton talked about cracking down on nuke
and missile proliferation, and he also mentioned eliminating cold-war-era
restrictions which are harming American business. Let's put together a
message to president@whitehouse.gov and vice-president@whitehouse.gov
(since Gore is the info-highway guru) stating our position. 

Points we should make: (please modify and add to this list)

* Crypto export restrictions are among the most obsolete and oppressive
  of these restrictions.

* Americans can be jailed for exporting software which is widely used
  throughout the world (e.g. DES), and which in many cases was even
  developed outside the U.S.
 
* These restrictions have already hurt American software companies.

* They will prevent America from taking the lead in many crucial
  information technologies.

* They will leave American companies vulnerable to industrial espionage.

And our position on Clipper:

* Clipper should not be established as a mandatory standard
  for the general public or for business.

* Alternatives to Clipper should not be restricted.

* Telecommunications companies should not be coerced into using Clipper.

* Clipper chips should not have any special export status due to the
  fact that we keep the keys. This would put American makers of crypto
  hardware at a serious disadvantage in the world market. 

* Clipper should be reserved for its stated purpose - protection of
  non-classified information within the Federal government.

* Use outside the government should be purely voluntary.

* The whole concept of key escrow needs serious public examination.
  While the government may have the right, with a warrant, to
  knock down your door, key escrow is equivalent to requiring every
  citizen to give the police a copy of his or her key. This is a major
  departure from the status quo, not a continuation of it.

--- MikeIngle@delphi.com

P.S. It could be worse. Remember Clipper was a Bush administration plan.
Bush was a former CIA head. He also had a dictatorial attitude and felt
no need to justify his actions to anyone. Bush would probably have tried
to ban crypto outright as soon as Clipper was ready.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "George A. Gleason" <gg@well.sf.ca.us>
Date: Tue, 28 Sep 93 01:01:24 PDT
To: mpjohnso@nyx.cs.du.edu
Subject: Re: saturation tactics?
Message-ID: <93Sep28.005832pdt.14165-1@well.sf.ca.us>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



yeah, here's a cheaper version.  Write to the arms excport license people
and pester them with questions: I'm a BBS operator, what should I do?; I'm a
businessperson travelling overseas and need my crypto to comm with the home
office what should I do?; all this kind of thing.  Swamp them with letters.
Every person and every circumstance which even remotely fits.  

An alternative version which would require more guts and perhaps a serious
conscientious decision about whether it's worth making this an act of civil
disobedience, is to write to them and say, "I'm a BBS operator, not an arms
merchant, and on the strength of my 1st-A rights I'm not going to censor my
board or get a license..."  or  "I'm a businessperson who travels & takes my
cryupto out of the country on my laptop to comm with the home office; I'm
not an arms dealer either and I don't intend to get a license..."  And
again, there is strength in numbers here.   

And of course, a good steganographic program or two would be a very nice
development indeed, Just In Case.  

-gg




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: khijol!erc (Ed Carp)
Date: Tue, 28 Sep 93 01:16:19 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Verilog encryption broken
In-Reply-To: <CE1xH2.1Dt@twwells.com>
Message-ID: <m0oha7n-00022PC@khijol>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text


Uh, anyone save that particular article?  <grin>
-- 
Ed Carp, N7EKG			erc@apple.com			510/659-9560
                            anon-0001@khijol.uucp
If you want magic, let go of your armor.  Magic is so much stronger than
steel!        -- Richard Bach, "The Bridge Across Forever"



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "George A. Gleason" <gg@well.sf.ca.us>
Date: Tue, 28 Sep 93 01:21:24 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re:  PGP Business Week article
Message-ID: <93Sep28.011745pdt.14161-2@well.sf.ca.us>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Re. Representative Sam Gejdenson (pronounced as if spelled "gaydenson",
accent on first syllable):  I went to one of his campaign appearances when
he first ran for office (this was Middletown Connecticut, 1980), and was
very much impressed by his positions on various issues, and in particular,
his background knowledge in a number of areas including engineering and
policy areas related to the environment.... he is definitely someone who has
a good ability to digest and utilise technical information in detail, and
I'd say he could be a very very key person on our side of these issues.  He
definitely deserves 100% support and all the solid detailed information we
can provide.  

-gg




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: technopagan priest <tedwards@wam.umd.edu>
Date: Mon, 27 Sep 93 22:21:24 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Easy cracking
Message-ID: <199309280518.AA18205@rac5.wam.umd.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



If you found out you could easily crack a commercial "protection"
method, what do you do?

First, you stay anonymous, because otherwise they will try to get
you, no matter what your intentions are.

I think it is best to send the information, anonymously, with a
working example to the company.  But chances are that they will
sit on it due to fear of loosing market share or being sued by
users.  

So the question is, is it more ethical to allow the userbase to
have their information cracked by "bad guys," possibly without
their knowledge, or publish the information so that the userbase is
aware of the security breach, and can do something about it?

It depends on the situation, of course.  But no one will believe you
if you say "I can crack xyz programs 'protected' data" without
showing how it works.

When it comes right down to it, individuals have to be responsible about
the cryptosystems they use.  And you are much better off knowing that
your data is possibly crackable rather than not knowing it, and having
hackers crack it without your knowledge.

Hopefully this whole incident will get software companies thinking more
seriously about using scholarly-tested secure cryptosystems.

-Thomas




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "George A. Gleason" <gg@well.sf.ca.us>
Date: Tue, 28 Sep 93 01:26:19 PDT
To: markh@wimsey.bc.ca
Subject: Re: Verilog encryption broken
Message-ID: <93Sep28.012251pdt.14162-1@well.sf.ca.us>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Re Mark's question about the ethics of revealing that a proprietary system
is crackable:

I believe there is every right and duty to make the vulnerability publicly
known.  However, this can be done without disclosing enough of the content
of the badly-protected information as to come in for heat.  For example, one
might post little snippets of a source code file which by themselves aren't
usable but which the original owners will instangly recognise.  This would
be akin to the "fair use" of quotations from literature and poetry in
critical reviews.  And I also believe it would stand up in court, because
the material which was revealed in the quotations could not be used in and
of itself to devalue the content of the original complete work.  

-gg




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Marc Horowitz <marc@MIT.EDU>
Date: Mon, 27 Sep 93 22:46:19 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Easy cracking
In-Reply-To: <199309280518.AA18205@rac5.wam.umd.edu>
Message-ID: <9309280541.AA00928@steve-dallas.MIT.EDU>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>> If you found out you could easily crack a commercial "protection"
>> method, what do you do?

I'd send it off to CERT anonymously.  They have good relationships
with vendors, who often put out patches CERT presents them with
security-related problems.  If I saw no response after 6-12 months
(about a vendor release cycle), I might start being more public about
it.

This solution means that the problem has a reasonable chance of
getting solved, without causing too much damage in the interim.

If I had reason to believe that some security hole was being used
heavily and maliciously by someone, I would explain this to CERT and
wait a significantly smaller period of time, like a week or two,
before going public.  This would prevent people from being unknowingly
hurt by a bug.

It's important not to go too public too quickly, because people have a
tendency to panic.  When the 1988 Internet Worm was discovered,
peoples' reaction was to pull the plug on the net.  This was
counterproductive, since it made it difficult to tell people how to
protect themselves against the Worm.  Parts of the MILNET remained
disconnected for weeks.

		Marc




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "L. Detweiler" <ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Date: Tue, 28 Sep 93 00:46:19 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Denning article - sites for retrieval
Message-ID: <9309280745.AA20360@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


The article has been placed in Privacy Forum archives:

===cut=here===

Date:    Fri, 24 Sep 1993 16:49:45 -0400 (EDT)
From:    denning@cs.georgetown.edu (Dorothy Denning)
Subject: Wiretap Article

The following article on wiretap laws and procedures was written in
response to the many questions and misunderstandings that have arisen
about wiretaps in the context of escrowed encryption as well as Digital
Telephony.  This article may be distributed.

Dorothy Denning
denning@cs.georgetown.edu

	[ I have included the introductory portion of the paper below.
	  The entire text (~33K bytes) has been placed into the
	  PRIVACY Forum archives.  To access:

	    Via Anon FTP: From site "ftp.vortex.com": /privacy/wiretap.laws.Z
					          or: /privacy/wiretap.laws

	    Via e-mail: Send mail to "listserv@vortex.com" with
	                the line:

			    get privacy wiretap.laws

		        as the first text in the BODY of your message.

	    Via gopher: From the gopher server on site "gopher.vortex.com"
		in the "*** PRIVACY Forum ***" area under "wiretap.laws".

							-- MODERATOR ]


   




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "L. Detweiler" <ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Date: Tue, 28 Sep 93 00:51:25 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: idiotic government regulations: DO SOMETHING!
Message-ID: <9309280748.AA20432@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Here's everyone's chance to do something *constructive* about idiotic
government regulations. Imagine this -- an email address to report them!


------- Forwarded Message

Date: Sun, 26 Sep 93 23:14:39 EDT
From: "Paul Jones" <pjones@sunsite.unc.edu>
Subject: REGO needs your suggestions - soon

	The following announcement comes from the Office of the 
National Performance Review- they are looking for anecdotes regarding 
useless government regulations, and reccomendations for eliminating 
needless bureaucracy. This is the Net's chance to have a say in fixing
what's wrong with the US government.



- ------


	Vice President Gore's task force on reinventing government (REGO)
called for many changes in the federal government.  Now that the report
has been issued, we have shifted to implementation of those
recommendations.  Successful implementation of those changes will require
the collective efforts of many people across government.  To provide support 
and to help implement the recommendations, a "network of networks" is being
established.  The network, dubbed "NetResults" will link together
government workers at the federal, state, and local levels, and will
provide ways for people in the private and non-profit sectors to
participate as well.  This message is an initial effort by  NetResults to
get information and support for these recommendations. 

	On September 11, 1993, President Clinton signed an executive order 
calling for the elimination of one-half of executive branch internal 
regulations within three years.  We'd like your assistance in helping us 
find the best examples of obsolete, redundant, or dysfunctional  federal 
regulations. This is your opportunity to let senior federal policy managers 
know about federal regulations or internal administration policies 
and procedures that prevent effective service to the taxpayer.  We plan 
to forward this information to the Federal Quality Institute for its use 
in helping agencies eliminate or reduce regulations. 

	Any replies should give a brief description of the regulation or
internal administrative procedures and a specific citation where this
regulation is found.  Please send us this information either through 
electronic mail to: 

	sillyreg@sunsite.unc.edu
	
or fax it to REGO at: 

	(202) 632-0390.  

For immediate impact, send your responses by electronic mail before 
September 28, 1993.

	If you are interested in more information on "NetResults", please
send an electronic mail message to Steve Butterfield at steveb@sunsite.unc.edu, 
Dennis Egan at dennise@tmn.com, or Andy Campbell at andy@tmn.com.  

We appreciate your interest and will look forward to your replies. 



------- End of Forwarded Message





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "L. Detweiler" <ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Date: Tue, 28 Sep 93 01:01:27 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Ringing Dingaling Rebuttal
Message-ID: <9309280756.AA20517@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Here's a cypherpunkesque rebuttal of the recent article.


===cut=here===

Date: Mon, 27 Sep 93 08:39:11 -0400
From: shap@viper.cis.upenn.edu (Jonathan Shapiro)
To: denning@cs.cosc.georgetown.edu
Subject: Re: Wiretap Article


Dorothy:

Recently you sent out a piece of mail providing information on wiretap
laws in connection with the Clipper chip.  I wish to draw to your
attention that the laws concerning wiretapping are largely irrelevant
to the issue at hand, and why.

Let us assume that the wiretap laws as they stand are sound (I do not
believe this, but it doesn't matter).  Let us ignore the fact that the
new Attorney General was recently asked to sign a large pile of blank
warrants in the interests of "National Security," and rightly went
through the roof.

Let us further imagine that the system is Good, and that the likes
likes of McCarthy, J. Edgar Hoover, Richard M. Nixon, G. Gordon Liddy,
and Ollie North are gone forever.  In fact, let's go so far as to
ignore that as the Federal Government grows and grows it is a
_necessary_ consequence that we will encounter more such people.

Let us ignore the abridgements of the First Amendment rights of
encryption technologists during the '60s and '70s by the NSA, and
discount their bleatings as the reactions of alarmists.

Finally, let us imagine that the timing of the munitions investigation
into Pretty Good Privacy is entirely accidental, and that this does
not amount to an attempt to make the only viable alternative
encryption technology illegal de facto.  As a personal matter, I'm
inclined to grant this point because the agencies involved are too
disorganized to have successfully coordinated.

Government is _not_ intrinsically evil.  It _is_ intrinsically amoral.
The propriety of a government is only as sound as its weakest member
in a position of relevant power.  We can sometimes catch the offenders
and subject them to due process, but doing so does not compensate
their victims for their abuses.

To be sure, this term's politicos are swearing themselves stupid
promising that other encryption technologies will not be outlawed.  By
them.  Of course, the policies change from term to term, and the
guarantees of this group of people are therefore irrelevant to the
long term.

The question, you see, is not _whether_ the Clipper technology will be
abused, but _how_soon_.

The lessons of history, Ms. Denning, are best not forgotten.


Jonathan S. Shapiro
Synergistic Computing Associates






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "L. Detweiler" <ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Date: Tue, 28 Sep 93 01:01:33 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Steve Jackson opposes Clipper FIPS
Message-ID: <9309280800.AA20584@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain




===cut=here===

Date: Sun, 26 Sep 93 21:15:13 GMT
From: sj@indial1.io.com (Steve Jackson)
Subject: Comments on Clipper/Skipjack proposal

 
 
Steve Jackson, President                              Sept. 26, 1993
Steve Jackson Games / Illuminati Online
PO Box 18957, Austin, TX 78760         
512-447-7866      sj@io.com
 
National Institute for Standards and Technology (NIST)
ATTN:  Proposed FIPS for Escrowed Encryption Standard
Technology Building, Room B-154
National Institute of Standards and Technology
Gaithersburg, MD  20899
 
Sirs:
 
I am writing in opposition to the Proposed Federal Information
Processing Standard (FIPS) for an Escrowed Encryption Standard,
docket # 930659-3159.
 
As a publisher of both printed and online materials, I am deeply 
concerned by the potential effect of the proposed standard, which
appears to me to have been produced in haste and to be lacking many
significant elements required for informed citizen comment.
 
I am in strong agreement with the points raised by the EFF and CPSR
in their comments opposing the proposed standard. Private access to
strong encryption is simply vital to protect the privacy of individuals
in today's online environment. Legitimate business requirements for
confidentiality also mandate free access to good encryption technology.
 
The manner in which this proposal has been put forward is improper and
incomplete. An algorithm intended for private and commercial purposes
should not be classified as a "national security matter." And it is 
wholly improper to ask for meaningful "citizen input" while the algo-
rithm itself is secret, the identities of the escrow agents are not
firmly established, complete operating procedures are not available,
and no legal recourse is yet proposed for the improper release of keys.
 
In particular, the proposal fails to define what "legal authorization,"
other than a court order, might be available to compel the escrow
agents to release a key. This omission is unacceptable. If keys are
to be released to any authority except a United States court, the
details must be made public immediately.
 
Finally, a strong guarantee is needed that the Clipper/Skipjack
system will never become mandatory, and that other forms of encryption
will remain freely and legally available to all Americans.
 
The proposal should be withdrawn until all these issues can be
addressed. Only then can a legitimate period of citizen comment begin.
 
Respectfully submitted -
 
 
Steve Jackson



------- End of Forwarded Message





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Phil Karn <karn@unix.ka9q.ampr.org>
Date: Tue, 28 Sep 93 02:01:25 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: My comments to NIST
Message-ID: <9309280902.AA09142@unix.ka9q.ampr.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


					7431 Teasdale Avenue
					San Diego, CA 92122
					karn@unix.ka9q.ampr.org
					September 27, 1993



Director, Computer Systems Laboratory
ATTN: Proposed FIPS for Escrowed Encryption Standard
Technology Building, Room B-154
National Institute of Standards and Technology
Gaithersburg, MD 20899

Re: A Proposed Federal Information Processing Standard for an Escrowed
Encryption Standard (EES)
Docket No 930659-3159
RIN 0693-AB19

		Comments of Philip R. Karn, Jr

Sirs:

I am writing in response to your call for comments on the
aforementioned matter that appeared in the Federal Register on July
30, 1993. I am writing as a concerned individual with BS and MS
degrees in electrical and computer engineering and 15 years of
professional experience in communications, computer networking and
security at leading edge R&D organizations. I currently work in the
digital cellular telephone industry, a ripe application for robust
encryption if there ever was one. I feel that my experience in this
field qualifies me to comment on the practicality of the proposed
standard.

First of all, I am totally opposed to the entire concept of key
escrow. It is a dangerous, un-American and fatally flawed idea that
should never have been proposed. In my opinion, everyone has the
Constitutional right to use the encryption scheme of their choice,
whether or not the government can break it. The impact of strong
encryption on the enforcement of legitimate laws is and will remain
minimal.  Even unbreakable encryption is incapable of thwarting
standard investigational techniques such as informants, testimony
compelled through grants of immunity, "end point" surveillance (e.g.,
hidden microphones), the gathering of physical evidence of crimes and
so forth.

Strong un-escrowed encryption will, on the other hand, finally put an
end to illegal, often politically motivated interceptions of private
electronic communications without having to rely on anyone's goodwill,
such as the still-unnamed "key escrow agencies". Precisely because
eavesdropping has been so easy to do and so hard to detect, the
government has repeatedly proven itself untrustworthy in this regard,
as documented in great detail by the Watergate investigations and the
Church Committee hearings of the 1970s. Why should we trust it now?

Although the government currently claims that the EES will be a
"voluntary" standard, many of its features make no sense whatsoever in
this context.  For example, why must the Skipjack algorithm be kept
secret if individuals remain free to use other algorithms such as
triple-key DES or IDEA that are quite probably even stronger?

The government's claim is completely transparent, as one simply cannot
escape the conclusion that the EES is a prelude to a ban on all other
encryption schemes, or at least a ban on those the government can't
crack. And this presents a profoundly disturbing threat to some very
important Constitutional principles.

Countless others have argued forcefully against the proposal on these
and other grounds. For example, see the points made by the Computing
Professionals for Social Responsibility (CPSR) in the attached
Appendix. I fully agree with CPSR and feel that they alone should have
been enough to stop the proposal long ago.

However, the fact that the Escrowed Encryption Standard has advanced
so quickly despite these serious problems reveals the totally
one-sided nature of the decision process. Far from being an
independent and impartial agency, NIST has proven itself to be merely
a pawn for the National Security Agency, the Federal Bureau of
Investigation and other powerful intelligence and law enforcement
agencies.  Despite (or perhaps because of) encryption's enormous
potential to put real "teeth" into the Constitutional principles of
privacy and freedom of speech and association, these agencies are
notably unsympathetic to tFrom owner-cypherpunks  Tue Sep 28 05:51:28 1993
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Date: Tue, 28 Sep 93 07:43:59 -0500
Message-Id: <9309281243.AA08271@bsu-cs.bsu.edu>
From: Anonymous <nowhere@bsu-cs.bsu.edu>
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
X-Remailed-By: Anonymous <nowhere@bsu-cs.bsu.edu>
X-Ttl: 0
X-Notice: This message was forwarded by a software-
	  automated anonymous remailing service.
Subject: Disturbing statistics on wiretaps
Organization: Coalition for Cryptographic Freedom 


In the paper written by Delaney, Denning and Kaye (Wiretap Laws and
Procedures -- What Happens when the U.S. Government Taps a  Line,
September 23, 1993), a few numbers were presented from a 1992 report
which reflect the wiretaps put into place during that year.
 
Without further details concerning the specifics surrounding some
of these numbers, it should certainly raise eyebrows on a couple
of points:

- All 919 "interceptions" were authorized. The numbers presented in
  this report indicate that none were denied.

- Out of this number, 303 were in single family homes, 135 were in
  apartments and 289 were categorized as placed in "other" locations.
  
- Out of 919, 634 were placed into service for interception of
  information involving narcotics. The closest contender in this
  area involved racketeering, in which 90 was the magic number.

- The number of persons arrested was 2,685. Of that number, only
  607 were convicted. 


These statistics alone should concern YOU.
 
 




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: bill@twwells.com (T. William Wells)
Date: Tue, 28 Sep 93 00:11:24 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Verilog encryption broken
In-Reply-To: <m0ohWe6-0001EbC@vanbc.wimsey.com>
Message-ID: <CE1xH2.1Dt@twwells.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


In article <m0ohWe6-0001EbC@vanbc.wimsey.com>,
Mark C. Henderson <markh@wimsey.com> wrote:
: What should one do when one discovers that a vendor is marketing
: an encryption scheme for the protection or to limit the use of
: specific information, which is easy to break.

Whatever you want to do. Contrary to what I suppose is a popular
opinion, this is not an ethical question *unless* you have some
sort of contractual obligation that makes it so or unless your
personal, *private* ethics says something on the subject.

People who rely on trade secrets are making a bet. The bet is as
follows: first, that all people who have access to the trade
secret will respect the agreements, both by not disclosing their
trade secret and by protecting it from disclosure; and, second,
that if someone does violate one of those agreements, he has deep
enough pockets that suing him will make up for the loss. When the
trade secret is exposed, *it is gone*. *Forever*. That's the law.
Those who once had a trade secret cannot legally demand of
(uninvolved) others that they help them protect it.

I would guess that it is *Verilog* whose ass is in the fire. If
you or I were to use that script to extract information from their
libraries, *unless* we had an agreement with Verilog not to, it
would be perfectly legal to do so. And it would be perfectly
legal to broadcast that information. However, Verilog, by not
adequately protecting the information in the libraries, may well
be liable for the disclosure. What it looks like from this
distance is that Verilog is running scared, trying to frighten
would be extractors into not spreading the information they would
get so that the amount of damage Verilog will have to take will be
limited.

Verilog, their customers, and library providers, made a bet. They
lost. No one (who is uninvolved) has *any* obligation to help
them minimize the loss from losing their bet. I have no doubt
that Verilog would like to have the discussion turn away from the
simple business aspects toward a touchie-feelie mass-debation
about ethics but to do so would simply be evading the real issues.





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Romana Machado <romana@apple.com>
Date: Tue, 28 Sep 93 08:16:19 PDT
To: ssteele@eff.org
Subject: Re:  GIF experts
Message-ID: <9309281512.AA28646@apple.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Hi Shari,

I am not quite an expert on GIFs, but I know a thing or two about
manipulating digital images to hide information - steganography,
and I am writing a shareware tool for the MAC that can embed data
undetectably within GIF images. The first release date is scheduled
for October 15. I am also working on providing an IBM version of this
about one month later. If this interests you, let me know.

Cheers,
Romana
romana@apple.com




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Perry E. Metzger" <pmetzger@lehman.com>
Date: Tue, 28 Sep 93 05:56:19 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Clinton UN Speech / Msg to Prez/VP
In-Reply-To: <01H3GN1EBEV690N1NN@delphi.com>
Message-ID: <9309281255.AA14898@snark.lehman.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Mike Ingle says:
> In his UN speech this morning, Clinton talked about cracking down on nuke
> and missile proliferation, and he also mentioned eliminating cold-war-era
> restrictions which are harming American business. Let's put together a
> message to president@whitehouse.gov and vice-president@whitehouse.gov
> (since Gore is the info-highway guru) stating our position. 

Messages sent to president@whitehouse.gov are weighed, not read. I
suspect this will have about as much effect on the president as a note
written in a bottle and tossed into the ocean.

However, on that basis, its perfectly harmless for you to send a
letter saying anything whatsoever other than a threat on the
president's life, so if you and others would like to spend time
writing such a thing, you can feel free. Just remember that there is
no cypherpunks organization, so you can't claim to represent us.

Perry





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Matt Blaze <mab@crypto.com>
Date: Tue, 28 Sep 93 06:21:28 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: my clipper letter
Message-ID: <9309281309.AA27963@crypto.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Matthew Blaze
55 River Drive South
Jersey City, NJ 07310

September 25, 1993

National Institute for Standards and Technology (NIST)
ATTN:  Proposed FIPS for Escrowed Encryption Standard
Technology Building, Room B-154
National Institute of Standards and Technology
Gaithersburg, MD  20899

Dear Director:

I am writing to express my opposition to the Proposed Federal
Information Processing Standard (FIPS) for an Escrowed Encryption
Standard, docket #930659-3159.

First, let me state my qualifications in this area.  I hold a Ph.D. in
computer science in the area of large-scale systems from Princeton
University.  I am presently employed as a Principal Investigator /
Member of Technical Staff in the Computing Systems Research Laboratory
of AT&T Bell Laboratories.  My research focuses on the design of
cryptographically secure networked computing and communications
systems and I have published several research papers in this field.  I
must emphasize, however, that I am making these comments as a private
citizen; nothing in this letter should be construed as representing
the opinion or position of my employer or any other organization.  I
state my affiliation only for the purpose of identification.

I believe that adoption of the proposed Escrowed Encryption Standard
would be harmful to the national interest in at least two ways.
First, it will harm us economically, putting our computing and
communications technology at a significant disadvantage against
foreign competition.  Second, it will hinder, rather than promote, the
increasingly vital efforts to improve the security of our information
infrastructure.

Several aspects of the proposed standard render the system inadequate
for our competitive and information security needs.  First, because
the proposed system relies on the use of a special, tamper-resistant
computer chip, it is impossible to manufacture equipment or design
systems that have their cryptographic security functions based
entirely in software.  The implementation of cryptographic systems in
software has only recently been made feasible by advances in computer
speed and has significant advantages over hardware (chip)-based
encryption.  Software encryption can be included in digital voice and
computer communications equipment, such as cellular telephones, at
virtually no increase in marginal cost.  Hardware-based encryption
(based on technologies such as the proposed standard), on the other
hand, can add over a hundred dollars to the end price of each unit.
This could represent an increase of several times the original price
for typical low-end consumer communications products.  Clearly,
devices that include the proposed standard will be at a significant
disadvantage compared with equivalent products (possibly from foreign
competitors) that employ software-based encrypFrom owner-cypherpunks  Tue Sep 28 06:46:18 1993
Received: by toad.com id AA03637; Tue, 28 Sep 93 06:41:30 PDT
Received: by toad.com id AA03607; Tue, 28 Sep 93 06:38:21 PDT
Return-Path: <cme@ellisun.sw.stratus.com>
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	id AA14444; Tue, 28 Sep 93 09:38:16 EDT
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	id AA25476; Tue, 28 Sep 93 09:38:15 EDT
Date: Tue, 28 Sep 93 09:38:15 EDT
From: cme@ellisun.sw.stratus.com (Carl Ellison)
Message-Id: <9309281338.AA25476@ellisun.sw.stratus.com>
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re:  saturation tactics?

>From: "George A. Gleason" <gg@well.sf.ca.us>
>Subject: saturation tactics?
>Message-Id: <93Sep26.015035pdt.14005-3@well.sf.ca.us>
>Date: 	Sun, 26 Sep 1993 01:50:31 -0700


>lots and lots of people & companies applying for those arms export licenses,

>"saturation," which involves lots and lots of people scrupulously obeying an
>unfair or controversial law to the point where it starts to swamp the
>system.  


I'd much rather not do it.  There won't be enough people out there to
really swamp the system.  Meanwhile, it lends credence to the stupid notion
that S/W crypto is arms.  I much prefer the statements in the READMEs at
soda.berkeley.edu ....


The official Stratus line on this issue, BTW, is that we don't want to deal
in munitions.  We have no intention of selling arms to anyone.  We sell
much of our product overseas and we sell only freely available crypto --
the stuff which is so widely documented and available that no terrorist or
unfriendly government could possible not already have it.  In particular,
we sell software DES and a few simpler systems for our customers to use as
they will.

Of course, ye olde US Gov't still forces not to export this except to
financial institutions (which is a reasonable fraction of our business) but
there are other customers pissed at us because we obey the stupid US export
laws.  Needless to say, Stratus as a company wants to see the export laws
changed.

 - Carl

Disclaimer: I don't speak for Stratus.  For the official company policy,
see the company's letter to NIST re: Skipjack.  [I certainly hope these
will be available to the public.]




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: ssteele@eff.org (Shari Steele)
Date: Tue, 28 Sep 93 06:16:19 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: GIF experts
Message-ID: <199309281314.AA13690@eff.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Hi everyone.
I know this is not the focus of the cypherpunks, but I was hoping one of
you folks out there might be able to point me in the direction of a
technoid who could testify about how easy it is to manipulate GIF images. 
Please respond by private message (ssteele@eff.org) so I don't cause any
more noise on the list.  Thanks.
Shari





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Lyle_Seaman@transarc.com
Date: Tue, 28 Sep 93 07:06:20 PDT
To: ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Subject: Re: idiotic government regulations: DO SOMETHING!
In-Reply-To: <9309280748.AA20432@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Message-ID: <wge3hVb0Bwwb4vqiZT@transarc.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


"L. Detweiler" <ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu> writes:
> Here's everyone's chance to do something *constructive* about idiotic
> government regulations. Imagine this -- an email address to report them!

Oh, beautiful.  Just like the government:

> ------- Forwarded Message
> 
> Date: Sun, 26 Sep 93 23:14:39 EDT
> From: "Paul Jones" <pjones@sunsite.unc.edu>
> Subject: REGO needs your suggestions - soon
...
>         On September 11, 1993, President Clinton signed an executive order 
...
> For immediate impact, send your responses by electronic mail before 
> September 28, 1993.

Yup, gives a lot of time for feedback.

Lyle		Transarc		707 Grant Street
412 338 4474	The Gulf Tower		Pittsburgh 15219




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Johan Helsingius <julf@penet.fi>
Date: Tue, 28 Sep 93 00:41:24 PDT
To: Bruce R Koball <bkoball@well.sf.ca.us>
Subject: Re: Verilog encryption broken
In-Reply-To: <93Sep27.173714pdt.14125-3@well.sf.ca.us>
Message-ID: <199309280736.AA20648@mail.eunet.fi>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



> A recent anonymous posting in the comp.lang.verilog newsgroup on Usenet
> has generated a raging controversey and threatens to shake up the
> electronic design automation (EDA) community.

> P.S. Does anyone on this list know if the offending post was made
> through an anonymous remailer?  -brk

It was posted using anon.penet.fi. I have already been contacted by Verilog's
legal representatives.

	Julf





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: stig@netcom.com (Stig)
Date: Tue, 28 Sep 93 09:51:30 PDT
To: Anonymous <cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Disturbing statistics on wiretaps
In-Reply-To: <nowhere@bsu-cs.bsu.edu>
Message-ID: <9309281647.AA25164@netcom4.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


It should be noted that although it is illegal for the cops/feds/spooks to tap
phone lines without a warrant, only illegally-obtained voice communications
are inadmissible in court.  This means that fax and modem communications can
be illegally intercepted and STILL used in court against you.

        Stig


;; __________________________________________________________________________
;; Stig@netcom.com                            netcom.com:/pub/stig/00-PGP-KEY
;; It's hard to be cutting-edge at your own pace...   32 DF B9 19 AE 28 D1 7A
;; Bullet-proof code cannot stand up to teflon bugs.  A3 9D 0B 1A 33 13 4D 7F




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Matt Blaze <mab@crypto.com>
Date: Tue, 28 Sep 93 09:46:19 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: FAX # for Clipper Comments
Message-ID: <9309281631.AA29750@crypto.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I just checked with NIST; they are accepting FAX comments
on the Escrowed Encryption Standard until close-of-business
today.

The number is 301-948-1784

-matt




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Michael Johnson <mpjohnso@nyx.cs.du.edu>
Date: Tue, 28 Sep 93 13:26:20 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: MPJ Encryption Algorithm comments
Message-ID: <Pine.3.05.9309281458.B7822-9100000@nyx>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Due to an unfortunate circumstance beyond my control, all of my mail from
this group for the last 30 hours got forwarded to /dev/null.  If anyone
had comments on the MPJ Encryption algorithm, please send them to me again
at mpj@csn.org or mpjohnso@nyx.cs.du.edu.

          Mike







From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: allan@elvis.tamu.edu (Allan Bailey)
Date: Tue, 28 Sep 93 12:51:32 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Disturbing statistics on wiretaps
In-Reply-To: <199309281919.AA17954@eff.org>
Message-ID: <9309281950.AA04308@elvis.tamu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Mike Godwin writes:
>Stig writes:
>> are inadmissible in court.  This means that fax and modem communications can
>> be illegally intercepted and STILL used in court against you.
>
>The same is true of e-mail over the Internet--there is no statutory
>exclusionary rule that would prvent its admissibility in court. It is at
>least theoretically possible, however, to exclude illegally seized
>communications of these sorts using a "pure 4th Amendment" (nonstatutory)
>exclusionary rule.
>
>Don't hold your breath, though.

  I don't think e-mail over the Intenet will ever be used in court
since anyone capable of reading the RFC would be able to forge email.
So, anyone could claim that the email being used as evidence is a
forgery _and_ be able to prove it by doing it or demonstrating it.

  At least, I think this would be a way to get it thrown out.

  :-)  I'm not a lawyer, I don't even pretend to be one on MUD.

Allan






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Mike Godwin <mnemonic@eff.org>
Date: Tue, 28 Sep 93 12:21:32 PDT
To: stig@netcom.com (Stig)
Subject: Re: Disturbing statistics on wiretaps
In-Reply-To: <9309281647.AA25164@netcom4.netcom.com>
Message-ID: <199309281919.AA17954@eff.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Stig writes:
 
> It should be noted that although it is illegal for the cops/feds/spooks to tap
> phone lines without a warrant, only illegally-obtained voice communications
> are inadmissible in court.  This means that fax and modem communications can
> be illegally intercepted and STILL used in court against you.

The same is true of e-mail over the Internet--there is no statutory
exclusionary rule that would prvent its admissibility in court. It is at
least theoretically possible, however, to exclude illegally seized
communications of these sorts using a "pure 4th Amendment" (nonstatutory)
exclusionary rule.

Don't hold your breath, though.


--Mike






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Michael Johnson <mpjohnso@nyx.cs.du.edu>
Date: Tue, 28 Sep 93 14:36:22 PDT
To: Carl Ellison <cme@ellisun.sw.stratus.com>
Subject: Re: Challenge: break the MPJ Encryption Algorithm
In-Reply-To: <9309282029.AA26018@ellisun.sw.stratus.com>
Message-ID: <Pine.3.05.9309281542.A16613-a100000@nyx>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain




On Tue, 28 Sep 1993, Carl Ellison wrote:

> Is each of your 160 permutation arrays a self-inverse or do you generate
> different arrays for encryption and decryption?
No, they are not self inverses.  The inverses are computed from the
forward arrays to decrypt in electronic codebook mode.  Note that in some
chaining modes, the reverse mode isn't even needed, and the arrays could
literally be filled with random numbers.

                                  Mike Johnson
Long live the U. S. Constitution!






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: ssimpson@eff.org (Sarah L Simpson)
Date: Tue, 28 Sep 93 13:21:32 PDT
To: com-priv@lists.psi.com
Subject: No Subject
Message-ID: <199309282015.AA18701@eff.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I'm happy to say that there were 225 letters offering comments on the
proposed key escrow system sent to the cryptnow@eff.org address.  They were
printed out and delivered today.  

Many thanks to all who responded to the call for action.  I've gotten
really positive responses to the post and our electronic mail mechanism. 
If you think that this sort of notice helped you to be informed and
participate in policy, please drop me a note at ssimpson@eff.org.  Let me
know if you think that this is an important service that EFF can provide
for the online community.

Below is the text of the comments that EFF filed with NIST today.

================================


September 27, 1993

National Institute for Standards and Technology
ATTN:  Proposed FIPS for Escrowed Encryption Standard
Technology Building, Room B-154
Gaithersburg, MD  20899

To The Director:

        The Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF) writes in strong
opposition to the Proposed Federal Information Processing Standard (FIPS)
for an Escrowed Encryption Standard, docket # 930659-3159.  We believe that
NIST's guidance in setting technical standards for security and privacy
protection is a critical part of the growth of the National Information
Infrastructure, but any action on the proposed escrow technical standards
must await the resolution of several fundamental policy issues.  Thus, at
this time, we oppose the proposed FIPS in all of its parts.  Well over 200
EFF members are also critical of the Proposed FIPS.  We believe this
demonstrates the depth of public concern about the implementation of key
escrow systems.

        EFF is a nonprofit, public interest organization whose public
policy mission is to ensure that the new electronic highways emerging from
the convergence of telephone, cable, broadcast, and other communications
technologies enhance free speech and privacy rights and are open and
accessible to all segments of society.

Introduction

        Widespread, affordable cryptography is vital for the protection of
individual privacy in the Information Age.  As more and more personal
information flows around electronic networks, we all need strong encryption
to safeguard information from unwanted intrusion.  Personal information,
such as health care records, private communications among friends and
families, and personal financial transactions, will also travel over this
information infrastructure.  The business community can only make full use
of the infrastructure if it is assured that the data it transmits is secure
from unauthorized interception.  In short, if communications in the new
infrastructure are vulnerable, all of our lives and businesses would be
subject to both damaging and costly privacy and security losses.


Resolve Policy Issues and Objectives Before Promulgating Technical Standards

        EFF has been in ongoing dialogue with NIST, the White House, and
Congress regarding the very complex public policy choices raised by
cryptography policy.  We are hopeful that this dialogue will result in a
positive, comprehensive set of cryptography and privacy policies.  But
until these issues are resolved, we believe any approval of technical
standards is premature.  Among the public policy issues to be resolved are
the following:

1.      Guaranteed Continued Legal Use of All Forms of Encryption

        When the Clinton Administration announced the Clipper Chip, it
assured the public that this would be a purely voluntary system.  We must
have legal guarantees that Clipper is not the first step toward prohibition
against un-escrowed encryption.  Yet the Administration has not offered any
such guarantees, either in the form of proposed legislation or even agency
rules.

2.      Identity of Escrow Agents

        When Clipper was first proposed, some in the Administration
suggested that one of the two escrow agents would be a government agency
and the other a private, non-governmental organization.  Now it appears
that plans for a private escrow agent have been dropped in favor of NIST
and the Department of Treasury, though there is still no final designation
of agents.  We are unable to comment on the security or reliability of
escrow procedures proposed here when we do not know who will be
administering the escrow databases.  We also note that there is active
consideration of having more than two escrow agents.  This option should be
explored from a policy perspective before a technical standard is adopted.

3.      Legal Rights of Escrow Users

        If individuals do choose to deposit their keys with the government,
or any other escrow agent, they must have some legal recourse in the event
that those keys are improperly released.  However, the most recent draft of
escrow procedures specifically states:

"These procedures do not create, and are not intended to create, any
substantive rights for individuals intercepted through electronic
surveillance, and noncompliance with these procedures shall not provide the
basis for any motion to suppress or other objection to the introduction of
electronic surveillance evidence lawfully acquired."

Leaving users with no recourse will discourage use of the system and
provides little disincentive against unscrupulous government behavior.

        In the Proposed FIPS, NIST also suggests an unusual and, we
believe, incorrect notion of what an escrow agent is.  The Proposed FIPS
adopts the incomplete definition of an escrow system found in Webster's
Dictionary.  The Proposed FIPS states:

To escrow something (e.g., a document, an encryption key) means that it is
"delivered to a third person to be given to the grantee only upon the
fulfillment of a condition."  (Webster's Seventh New Collegiate
Dictionary).

This definition omits the very basic notion that an escrow agent has
responsibilities to those who deposit things of value in the escrow
account.  Black's Law Dictionary, which we believe may be a more
appropriate source of information about escrow relationships, states that
an escrow contract is an:

Agreement between buyer, seller, and escrow holder setting forth rights and
responsibilities of each.

It is the general legal rule that one who deposits value with an escrow
agent is entitled to recover damages from the escrow agent in the event of
a breach of the agent's duty of care:

Depositor is entitled to recover damages sustained because of escrow
agent's unwarranted act, and where grantee participates in wrongful
delivery he also may be liable, but recovery is limited to damages actually
attributable to wrongful delivery.  Collier v Smith (Mo App) 308 SW2d 779. 
(See ANNOTATION:  Who must bear loss resulting from defaults or peculations
of escrow holder. 15 A.L.R.2d 870.)

The notion of an escrow agent who is insulated from all liability to the
depositor is wholly alien to American law and custom.  The government may,
of course, seek to establish escrow agents free of legal liability, but
this is fundamentally a policy choice, not a matter of technical standards.
 Until there is some agreement on the real responsibilities of the escrow
agents, NIST is not in a position to set technical and operating standards.

4.      Open, Trusted Standards:  

        A key goal of the Clipper Proposal is to promote widespread
encryption in the marketplace.  Yet people will not use encryption unless
they trust it.  Secret standards such as Clipper cannot be evaluated by
independent experts and do not deserve the public trust.  Other parties,
including Whitfield Diffie of Sun Microsystems, have commented extensively
on this issue.  EFF fully subscribes to those remarks.

Insufficient Technical and Operating Information Available for Comments

        Even aside from the major policy issues left unanswered, the
Proposed FIPS itself lacks the detail necessary to allow full public
comment.  First, the full operating procedures for the escrow agents has
yet to be issued.  Public comment must be sought on the complete
procedures, not just the outline presented in the draft FIPS.  Even the
government-selected algorithm review group has declared that it needs more
information on the escrow process.  Second, asking for comments on an
algorithm that is classified makes a mockery of citizen participation in
government decision-making.

Action on the Proposed FIPS Must Be Delayed to Allow Completion of
Public-Private Consultation Mandated by Presidential Decision Directive

        President Clinton's announcement of the Clipper initiative made
very clear that there should be "early and frequent consultations with
affected industries, the Congress and groups that advocate the privacy
rights of individuals as policy options are developed" (April 16, 1993
Press Statement).  EFF and other organizations have invested significant
effort in dialogue and policy review with the Administration.  We have made
some progress, but many issues remain unresolved.  EFF believes that for
NIST to rush forward with a FIPS in advance of resolving the fundamental
policy issues cited above would prematurely curtail the dialogue that the
President ordered.

        Finally, NIST will be involved in making many critical decisions
regarding the National Information Infrastructure.  The next time NIST
solicits public comments, it should be ready to accept reply by electronic
mail in addition to paper-based media.  Over 200 of EFF's members e-mailed
comments to our offices, which we then printed and hand-delivered to NIST. 
We hope that in the near future, NIST and other federal agencies will be
prepared to accept comments directly via the Internet.

Respectfully Submitted,


Jerry J. Berman                                                            
            Daniel J. Weitzner
Executive Director                                                         
            Senior Staff Counsel
******************************
Sarah L. Simpson
Membership Coordinator
Electronic Frontier Foundation
1001 G Street, NW
Suite 950 East
Washington, DC  20001
202/347-5400 tel
202/393-5509 fax





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Mike Godwin <mnemonic@eff.org>
Date: Tue, 28 Sep 93 13:31:33 PDT
To: allan@elvis.tamu.edu (Allan Bailey)
Subject: Re: Disturbing statistics on wiretaps
In-Reply-To: <9309281950.AA04308@elvis.tamu.edu>
Message-ID: <199309282026.AA18872@eff.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


 
Allan writes:

>   I don't think e-mail over the Intenet will ever be used in court
> since anyone capable of reading the RFC would be able to forge email.
> So, anyone could claim that the email being used as evidence is a
> forgery _and_ be able to prove it by doing it or demonstrating it.

This is not how evidence works. The fact that Internet mail can be forged
may cast doubt on the authenticity of a message, but it wouldn't result in
its inadmissibility. The jury can make its own decision about whether
the mail is authentic, based on full information about the possibility
of forgery.


--Mike






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: cme@ellisun.sw.stratus.com (Carl Ellison)
Date: Tue, 28 Sep 93 13:46:22 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re:  Phil Zimmerman on 'The Death of DES'
Message-ID: <9309282044.AA26047@ellisun.sw.stratus.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Single DES is weak, for a known plaintext attack.  I think we knew that.
We didn't know how weak.

We can extrapolate to an NSA machine with 1 second scan of all keys,
perhaps.

So -- 

1.	use triple DES

2.	before using DES, XOR with a stream from a decent PRNG (destroying
	the known plaintext)

3.	in between DES operations, mix bytes up as with	tran (posted on
	sci.crypt occasionally, avbl from me by mail or on ripem.msu.edu)
	-- spreading bytes out within a huge block, further hiding any
	known text

 - Carl




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: VACSC0D4@VAX.CSUN.EDU
Date: Tue, 28 Sep 93 17:16:22 PDT
To: SMTP@"cypherpunks@toad.com"
Subject: No Subject
Message-ID: <930928171300.3286@VAX.CSUN.EDU>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


A little over a month ago, I called Mykotronx and asked for information
about the Clipper chip. Their response was vague: we're working on some
ap notes, but they're not ready yet.

I called back today. The person who answered the phone put me on hold for
a minute, then came back and told me she had spoken to the VP of
engineering and that the ap notes would be ready in four weeks.
It looks like Clipper has really been put into high gear.

When they are ready, I'll try to get them and post the interesting
stuff here.  -- MikeIngle@delphi.com

(using my student account; don't reply here - reply to Delphi)





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: wcs@anchor.ho.att.com (Bill_Stewart_HOY002_1305)
Date: Wed, 29 Sep 93 02:31:40 PDT
To: allan@elvis.tamu.edu
Subject: Re: Disturbing statistics on wiretaps
Message-ID: <9309282139.AA18609@anchor.ho.att.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text


In cypherpunks, allan@elvis.tamu.edu (Allan Bailey) writes:
>   I don't think e-mail over the Intenet will ever be used in court
> since anyone capable of reading the RFC would be able to forge email.
> So, anyone could claim that the email being used as evidence is a
> forgery _and_ be able to prove it by doing it or demonstrating it.

Different standards of proof apply to different kinds of court cases.
Criminal cases need "proof beyond all reasonable doubt"; civil cases
tend to need "preponderance of evidence".  Forging email is similar
to forging typed documents - sometimes cases will heavily use evidence like
analysis of individual typewriter characteristics (which was more useful
when people had real manual typewriters than with laserprinters),
other cases won't examine those details unless one side or the other
claims the document isn't theirs or is forged (and remember, this is
typically subject to perjury if you're caught lying.)

If you're being accused of a serious crime with severe penalties,
like murder, an assertion that you didn't type/email something
will be taken seriously, and probably lead to more analysis;
if they can't *really* prove you sent it, that can be grounds for appeal.

But if you're being accused in a civil lawsuit with only monetary damages,
like libel/slander or whatever the legal form was in the case 
where somebody on a computer network disparaged a company's stock 
and the directors sued when stock value dropped, the assertion may
be listened to, but even if there aren't enough log-files to strongly
support the assertion that you didn't say it, the jury may decide there's
enough evidence to find for the plaintiff, especially if you were a user
of that computer network and didn't go net.screaming that you'd been impersonated.
(On the other hand, after you lose the libel/slander/etc. suit, if the
government decides to charge you with perjury for saying it wasn't your email,
the log-files and lack of provability become much more relevant.)

Of course, if you're accused of a minor offense with major penalties,
e.g. political crimes like drug possession or trespasses like the E911
document copying, lack of proof will be treated as evidence that you
know something about DRUGGZZZ or HACKING and are therefore EEEVILL and
your penalties will be tripled :-( 

# Bill Stewart    wcs@anchor.ho.att.com  +1-908-949-0705 Fax-4876
# AT&T Bell Labs, Room 4M-312, Crawfords Corner Rd, Holmdel, NJ  07733-3030
#
#		goin' where the climate suits my clothes ....



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: nate@VIS.ColoState.EDU
Date: Tue, 28 Sep 93 16:46:34 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com (Cypherpunks Mailing List)
Subject: Re: saturation tactics?
In-Reply-To: <93Sep28.005832pdt.14165-1@well.sf.ca.us>
Message-ID: <9309282346.AA20111@nagel.VIS.ColoState.EDU>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


George A. Gleason coersed the electrons into symbolizing:
>yeah, here's a cheaper version.  Write to the arms excport license people
>and pester them with questions: I'm a BBS operator, what should I do?; I'm a
>businessperson travelling overseas and need my crypto to comm with the home
>office what should I do?; all this kind of thing.  Swamp them with letters.
>Every person and every circumstance which even remotely fits.  
>
>An alternative version which would require more guts and perhaps a serious
>conscientious decision about whether it's worth making this an act of civil
>disobedience, is to write to them and say, "I'm a BBS operator, not an arms
>merchant, and on the strength of my 1st-A rights I'm not going to censor my
>board or get a license..."  or  "I'm a businessperson who travels & takes my
>cryupto out of the country on my laptop to comm with the home office; I'm
>not an arms dealer either and I don't intend to get a license..."  And
>again, there is strength in numbers here.   
>
>And of course, a good steganographic program or two would be a very nice
>development indeed, Just In Case.  
>
>-gg
>

I would favor this oprion, since each person could write several letters,
each addressing a separate topic/gripe/question.

BTW, what is the snail-mail address to send these letters to?

-nate

-- 
+--------------------------------------------------------------------
| Nate Sammons   email: nate@VIS.ColoState.Edu
|      Colorado State University Computer Visualization Laboratory
|      Finger nate@monet.VIS.ColoState.Edu for my PGP key
|      #include <std.disclaimer>
|                                    Always remember "Brazil"
+----------------------+



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: VACCINIA@UNCVX1.OIT.UNC.EDU
Date: Tue, 28 Sep 93 15:11:35 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Rep. Gejdenson's NET address
Message-ID: <01H3HOLMKMOY006CDY@UNCVX1.OIT.UNC.EDU>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>Still the NSA can't stave off the inevitable for long. Gejdenson hopes to
>produce legislation by early next year to revamp government policy on high 
>tech exports.

Rep. Gejdensons NET address is: bozrah@hr.house.gov for those of you who care
to write him. This is a receive address only, he can't as of yet respond.


Scott G. Morham              ! The First, 
Vaccinia@uncvx1.oit.unc.edu  !            Second
                             !                   and Third
                             !                              Levels of
                             !               Information Storage and Retrieval
                             ! DNA,                       
                             !      Biological Neural Nets,
                             !                              Cyberspace




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: baumbach@atmel.com (Peter Baumbach)
Date: Tue, 28 Sep 93 17:16:38 PDT
To: smb@research.att.com
Subject: Re: the public key minefield
Message-ID: <9309282214.AA01006@bass.chp.atmel.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> The question is phrased improperly.  Apart from the fact that the
> concept (though not the reality) of anti-gravity is prior art, they
> didn't patent the concept of public-key cryptography.  Rather, they
> patented a class of devices fitting a certain description, with one
> public key cryptosystem as an example and as a separate set of claims.
> To use your analogy, I could patent anti-gravity achieved by interposing
> a screen of some substance opaque to gravity, and patent Cavorite as
> an instance of that class.  If you had another use for Cavorite, you'd
> be home free.  Or if you found a way to neutralize gravity by beaming
> anti-gravitons downward, you'd probably be clear, too.  But if you
> found another substance besides Cavorite that was opaque to gravity --
> yes, that would be covered by my patent.  (Fortunately, H.G. Wells didn't
> patent his literary device.  But I can't think of another science
> fiction author who used that technique....)
> 
> It's certainly possible that all possible cryptosystems that achieve the
> same effect would be covered by their description.  That, of course, is
> the mark of a good patent attorney's work -- that he or she managed to
> fashion so broad a claim.  But maybe you can find a better way to do what
> you really want to do, which is trade keys and authenticate messages.

I think you have convinced me.  I don't want to be convinced, so maybe I
will try again later, when I have learned more about it. ;-)

This means to me, that you cannot patent a broad claim, until you have a
narrow specific example of it.  Anti-gravity had prior art, public key
systems did not.  If without inventing a public key system, someone had
described the concept in general terms, then prior art would exist for
this as well.  The person who invented the wheel (or sled?) might have
been able to have claims broad enough to cover hovercrafts.

> And if you do -- well, then, the patent system has succeeded in its goals,
> in that the monopoly assigned to someone else has stimulated you to find
> another way to do things, and thus furthered the useful arts and sciences.

At what expense?  Will our government win some battles, it might otherwise
lose to the cypherpunks?  Would legal access to pgp, now, be a deciding
factor to maintaining legal access to non-clipper encryption later?

Peter Baumbach
baumbach@atmel.com




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: plaz@netcom.com (Geoff Dale)
Date: Tue, 28 Sep 93 18:31:36 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Clinton UN Speech / Msg to Prez/VP
Message-ID: <9309290127.AA07856@netcom.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Perry Metzger states (perhaps incorrectly):
>Mike Ingle says:
>> In his UN speech this morning, Clinton talked about cracking down on nuke
>> and missile proliferation, and he also mentioned eliminating cold-war-era
>> restrictions which are harming American business. Let's put together a
>> message to president@whitehouse.gov and vice-president@whitehouse.gov
>> (since Gore is the info-highway guru) stating our position. 
>
>Messages sent to president@whitehouse.gov are weighed, not read. I
>suspect this will have about as much effect on the president as a note
>written in a bottle and tossed into the ocean.
>
>However, on that basis, its perfectly harmless for you to send a
>letter saying anything whatsoever other than a threat on the
>president's life, so if you and others would like to spend time
>writing such a thing, you can feel free. Just remember that there is
>no cypherpunks organization, so you can't claim to represent us.

Depends how you define harmless. If I recall the original e-mail release
correctly, they do archive all messages. No assurances are made that these
messages will not be used against you (ie- might end up in some file on
you; I doubt that it would be used in court).

To reenforce Perry's point: Any threats against the Prez or his clan WILL
get forwarded to the secret service, so DON'T pull that one. Death threats
are useless (and most likely counter-productive) tactics anyway.

But writing letters to that address are probably at least as effective as
writing to him via US Snail. Keep the message focused on one idea (remember
it will probably be tabulated as for or against an issue) and make sure
that  the message gets across clearly.

Who knows, if a enough messages get through on a subject, Bill or Al might
get a one line statement in one of there meetings saying that the online
community is "up in arms" about skipjack or the pgp subpoenas.


_______________________________________________________________________
Geoff Dale    -- insert standard disclaimers here --    plaz@netcom.com
"Communists! Those bug-brained motherfuckers are even worse than the 
             schmucks who think they run things here."
          - Norman Spinrad, from his novel "Little Heroes"






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Perry E. Metzger" <pmetzger@lehman.com>
Date: Tue, 28 Sep 93 16:11:35 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Phil Zimmerman on 'The Death of DES'
In-Reply-To: <9309282044.AA26047@ellisun.sw.stratus.com>
Message-ID: <9309282309.AA15986@snark.lehman.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



I personally favor triple DES + IDEA. The notion is that if triple DES
is weak maybe IDEA isn't, and vice versa -- you are no weaker than the
strongest of the two systems.

Perry

Carl Ellison says:
> Single DES is weak, for a known plaintext attack.  I think we knew that.
> We didn't know how weak.
> 
> We can extrapolate to an NSA machine with 1 second scan of all keys,
> perhaps.
> 
> So -- 
> 
> 1.	use triple DES
> 
> 2.	before using DES, XOR with a stream from a decent PRNG (destroying
> 	the known plaintext)
> 
> 3.	in between DES operations, mix bytes up as with	tran (posted on
> 	sci.crypt occasionally, avbl from me by mail or on ripem.msu.edu)
> 	-- spreading bytes out within a huge block, further hiding any
> 	known text
> 
>  - Carl




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: doug@netcom.com (Doug Merritt)
Date: Tue, 28 Sep 93 19:31:38 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: the public key minefield (fwd)
In-Reply-To: <svet@nrcbsa.bio.nrc.ca>
Message-ID: <9309290227.AA09947@netcom4.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


[ In the following 100 line post about the origin and philosophy of relevent
  law, I gradually lead in to privacy issues; I discuss U.S. laws
  regarding patents and privacy and such because I am largely unfamiliar
  with such laws in other countries; mea culpa.
  
  If you don't really care about legal issues, skip this. ]


Svetlana Borisova <svet@nrcbsa.bio.nrc.ca> said:
>smb@research.att.com wrote:
> And if you do -- well, then, the patent system has succeeded in its goals,
> in that the monopoly assigned to someone else has stimulated you to find
> another way to do things, and thus furthered the useful arts and
> sciences.

>  Of course, wonderful idea!  Hey, let's patent all irrigating systems
>so that people have to think of other ways to make plants grow.

I agree that the patent system in the U.S. (and elsewhere, 'though I
know much less about that) has severe faults in implementation. The entire
area of software patents is being grossly mishandled, for instance.

On the other hand, you seem to have a distaste for the entire *theory*
behind it, and I must differ on that point.

The legal philosophy of patents is to encourage invention that will be of
value to society in general. It is *not* directly intended for the benefit of
the person holding the patent, although it often seems to work out that way.

"smb" is referring to that philosophy. The alternative to the general
philosophy is to refuse to grant legal protection to invention.

>The goal of patents is to give a researcher a reward for his invention; to
>give him the opportunity to make money off it.

This is incorrect; ask any patent attorney. In the U.S., anyway. Ask
a Canadian patent attorney...but I'm 99.9% sure that Canada follows precisely
the same legal philosophy.

In the U.S., the legal philosophy is derived from the fundamental meta-
philosophy of its law which evolved out of British common law dating back
to at least the Magna Carta, which is that (loosely) the purpose of law is
for the common good. Every year there are cases in the U.S. where judges make
a "surprising" decision that overturns the apparent letter of the law
in favor of an appeal to the common good of society.

Case law is filled with such things.

There is always a tradeoff against rights of the individual. But the Magna
Carta itself was necessary in order to begin to establish some rights for
individuals against that of society (as represented in that time by the
sovereign). Similarly in the U.S., the Bill of Rights acts to establish
those minimal rights. But whereever the Bill of Rights is not explicit,
on average you can expect courts to rule in favor of the rights of society.
(And sometimes even then...)

There are some cases where this is easy to view as a bad thing, others
where it seems clearly a bad thing. But there is nonetheless many centuries
of tradition behind this approach.

Patent law is merely one more example. As smb said, it offers a monopoly
for an individual, which would usually be considered to be contrary to
the good of society. But it does so in order to foster more invention,
which is considered to be a good for society. It simply appeals to individual
avarice for the sake of the common good, trading off the global long term
good against the short term loss.

In short, it has an unusual lack of short-sightedness to it...in *theory*.

Patent law most certainly and unquestionably is *not* in existence for the
benefit of the inventor, like it or not.

If you are implying that you think that there should never be legal
protection for intellectual property of any sort, as e.g. Stallman has told
me he believes, then we'll just have to agree to disagree.

Stallman believes that such a philosophy is in favor of individual rights,
but historically that philosophy has resulted in a *loss* of individual
rights. But then, Stallman isn't too hot on history of law...

If on the other hand you merely mean that you disagree with the way
that the patent system is working out in a lot of cases currently in
the U.S., then you should be more careful to distinguish the legal
theory from the legal implementation of the theory.

It's very much like the U.S. Bill of Rights in theory versus practice;
the two can be quite different. Cypherpunks is in large part about privacy.
In Roe versus Wade, privacy was (rather amazingly) held to be an implication
of the U.S. Constitution, and as a side effect abortion was judicially
held to be legal.

The right to privacy is not explicitly spelled out in the Constitution nor
Bill of Rights, though, and so most courts, including the U.S. Supreme
Court, have far more often held that there is no automatic right to
privacy. That's why Roe vs. Wade was both amazing at the time, and has
been in such jeopardy since.

California is an interesting case, because its state constitution *does*
guarantee a right to privacy, but that doesn't slow down the right to life
protests, naturally, just as an aside. :-)

Public key cryptography is a mechanism for privacy. There are vast
complications because:
	1) Privacy is not explicitly guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution.
	2) Privacy is not generally guaranteed by case law, Roe vs. Wade aside.
	3) The patent claims for public key cryptography are overly broad,
	   demonstrating obvious incompetence on the part of the patent
	   examiners involved, yet to correct this injustice would require
	   a test case in which the plaintiff willingly exposed himself
	   to the potential of large damages.
	4) This effectively makes the only known methods for *technically*
	   private long distance communication via any media impractical
	   for *legal* reasons.
	5) Even in California, the state constitution is of no help, because
	   the applicable patent law and privacy case law are in the federal
	   domain, not the state's -- at least by default. Again it would
	   take an actual court decision to decide otherwise, which doesn't
	   appear likely.

The question is what to do given all of this.

If one works within the system, the answer is to find someone with bucks
for a defense and devise a test case...one intended to lose at every level
until it reaches the Supreme Court, where it is then intended to win and
thus establish ultimate precedent.

Chancy proposition. The other in-system approach is to lobby and to educate.
Also chancy. But worth doing.
	Doug
P.S. I am not a lawyer, nor do I play one on t.v.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Timothy Newsham <newsham@wiliki.eng.hawaii.edu>
Date: Tue, 28 Sep 93 22:46:24 PDT
To: karn@unix.ka9q.ampr.org (Phil Karn)
Subject: Re: My comments to NIST
In-Reply-To: <9309280902.AA09142@unix.ka9q.ampr.org>
Message-ID: <9309290543.AA17021@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> 
> 		Comments of Philip R. Karn, Jr

great letter!  I'm glad we have someone like you on our side.
Keep up the good work.

                                 Tim N.



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: smb@research.att.com
Date: Tue, 28 Sep 93 17:16:35 PDT
To: Mike Godwin <mnemonic@eff.org>
Subject: Re: Disturbing statistics on wiretaps
Message-ID: <9309290015.AA12269@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


	 The same is true of e-mail over the Internet--there is no
	 statutory exclusionary rule that would prvent its
	 admissibility in court. It is at least theoretically possible,
	 however, to exclude illegally seized communications of these
	 sorts using a "pure 4th Amendment" (nonstatutory) exclusionary
	 rule.

	 Don't hold your breath, though.

Do you really think that?  One could argue, fairly strongly, that the
rules set forth in the ECPA have created an expectation of privacy,
and that a violation of that expectation would be exactly the violation
of the 4th Amendment that the Supreme Court addressed in the 1967
decision that led to the original wiretap provisions in the Omnibus
Crime Control and Safe Streets Act.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Christian D. Odhner" <cdodhner@indirect.com>
Date: Tue, 28 Sep 93 20:31:36 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Stickers
Message-ID: <199309290329.AA27847@indirect.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I recently received email from Whit Diffie regarding some concerns he had
about the "Big Brother Inside(tm)" stickers. I asked for and received
permission to repost the message to the group, however I seemed to have
misplaced (ie, hit the wrong button) it, so I'll paraphrase.

Firstly, he suggested that I wait before ordering/distributing the
stickers because without clipper phones to put them on they may very well
be stuck in random places, and that could reduce the impact of a good,
focused, silmultanius distribution. 

Secondly, He asked that I try to add some more substantial information to
the stickers, such as a short note that basicly says this phone is
pre-tapped, use at your own risk.

After some thought, I sent in the order anyway. My reasons for this action
were that 1) Some people stated that they had already sent me money, and I
wouldn't want to change the facts of the matter after the money was sent,
and 2) Any more substantial information would increase the size of the
sticker, which would make it more visible, harder to place, and would
anger the owners of the property on which it was placed substantialy more.

I think it is appropriate at this time to restate the reason that these
stickers have been (are being) produced/distributed.

Everyone on the list is familiar I'm sure with the clipper wiretap chip
and the issues surrounding it.  Everyone on the list I am equaly sure has
seen at one time or another the "Intel Inside" stickers on Ibm and Dell
and other computers, and in ads for those computer and ads paid for by
intel itself. It is an image seen by a signifigant portion of the
population each and every day. I was in a local computer store not too
long ago when I heard a man ask a salesperson "Does this one have intel
inside?" and I'm sure that he had not a clue in the world what that meant.
Everyone on this list I'm fairly certain has either read George Orwell's
famous book, _1984_, or has at least been exposed to it's influence of
society through the introduction of such words and phrases as "Big
Brother", "Thought Police", "Doublespeak", etc.. Horible images of
goverment invasions of privacy, mass media mind control, and legalslation
run amok come to mind quite easily...

Our Big Brother Inside sticker has been designed to look as much like the
intel logo as possible, without breaking any copyright laws or anything
like that. But instead of conveying the message "This product contains
parts built by a company you know and trust" our sticker seems to say,
"This product is a tool built by the goverment to keep tabs on your
personal life".  It is intended to be descretely applied to telephones,
faxes, modems, computers, and other devices containing the clipper or
capstone chips or other key-escrowed technology.  It is intended to be
seen by those who would potentialy purchase such items, as an attempt to
dissuade them from doing so. It is intended _NOT_ to be seen by the owners
of establishments selling said items, as that would lead to thier removal
at least; prosocution at most.

I think another sticker, in brighter colors and containing informative
text, could be usefull for applying to clipper phones etc that have
already been deployed; a use at your own risk type thing. The time for
that has not yet come.

I hope I didn't leave anything out, Please use discretion regarding what
messages get sent to the list and what can be handled through email.

BTW; My total of sticker orders and contributions (not counting today) is:

6875 stickers sold                                      $166 contributed

I sent a check for $145 today, so everything past that is going to my cost
to mail out the stickers to the people who ordered them. Any funds left
over wil be used as a starting point for some cypherpunks tshirts, and
proceeds from the shirts (if I ever do them) will go to the eff.

Happy Hunting, -Chris
______________________________________________________________________________
Christian Douglas Odhner     | "The NSA can have my secret key when they pry
cdodhner@indirect.com	     | it from my cold, dead, hands... But they shall
pgp 2.3 public key by finger | NEVER have the password it's encrypted with!"
  "If guns are outlawed, only the government will have guns." -E. Abbey
My opinions are shareware. For a registered copy, send me 15$ in DigiCash.
  Key fingerprint =  58 62 A2 84 FD 4F 56 38  82 69 6F 08 E4 F1 79 11 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Svetlana Borisova <svet@nrcbsa.bio.nrc.ca>
Date: Tue, 28 Sep 93 17:51:35 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: the public key minefield (fwd)
Message-ID: <9309290047.AA02306@ nrcbsa.bio.nrc.ca>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


svet wrote:



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Anonymous
Date: Tue, 28 Sep 93 20:44:00 EDT
To: smb@research.att.com
Subject: Re: the public key minefield
In-Reply-To: <9309280140.AA22526@toad.com>
Message-ID: <f838a5797815e73623d6e879cfcc848d@NO-ID-FOUND.mhonarc.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


smb@research.att.com wrote:
> 
> 	 Do you agree or disagree that:
> 
> 	  'the concept of "anti-gravity" device is not patentable.
> 	   If I could duplicate the effect of your anti-gravity device without
> 	   using any of the same novel mechanisms.  My device would be
> 	   separately patentable.' ?
> 
> 	 If you agree, then how can you patent "public key systems" as a
> 	 concept?
> 
> 	 If you disagree, then we can leave it at that.
> 
> The question is phrased improperly.  Apart from the fact that the
> concept (though not the reality) of anti-gravity is prior art, they
> didn't patent the concept of public-key cryptography.  Rather, they
> patented a class of devices fitting a certain description, with one
> public key cryptosystem as an example and as a separate set of claims.
> To use your analogy, I could patent anti-gravity achieved by interposing
> a screen of some substance opaque to gravity, and patent Cavorite as
> an instance of that class.  If you had another use for Cavorite, you'd
> be home free.  Or if you found a way to neutralize gravity by beaming
> anti-gravitons downward, you'd probably be clear, too.  But if you
> found another substance besides Cavorite that was opaque to gravity --
> yes, that would be covered by my patent.  (Fortunately, H.G. Wells didn't
> patent his literary device.  But I can't think of another science
> fiction author who used that technique....)

  Since the patent seems to cover all public key cryptography (or at
least that's what PKP would like you to believe), the analogy would be
more like patenting a 'device that erradicates effects of
gravitational attraction in a localized area', ie. any anti-gravity
device, when you actually developed only the Cavorite method.  

> It's certainly possible that all possible cryptosystems that achieve the
> same effect would be covered by their description.  That, of course, is
> the mark of a good patent attorney's work -- that he or she managed to
> fashion so broad a claim.  But maybe you can find a better way to do what
> you really want to do, which is trade keys and authenticate messages.
> And if you do -- well, then, the patent system has succeeded in its goals,
> in that the monopoly assigned to someone else has stimulated you to find
> another way to do things, and thus furthered the useful arts and
> sciences.

  Of course, wonderful idea!  Hey, let's patent all irrigating systems
so that people have to think of other ways to make plants grow.  Let's
patent the combustion engine so that people will think of other engine
types.  Let's patent hydro-electric dams to give more incentive to the
controlled fusion researchers.  While we're at it, let's patent
electric devices altogether, so that people can think of other
brilliant ways to make things work.

  While necessity is mother of invention, one must not forget which is
more important: satisfying the necessity or making an invention.  The
goal of patents is to give a researcher a reward for his invention; to
give him the opportunity to make money off it.

-- 
===============================================================
Svetlana Borissova                       svet@nrcbsa.bio.nrc.ca
National Research Council Canada           Home: (613) 747-7820
Laboratory of Biological Sciences (M-54)   Work: (613) 990-7381
Protein Crystallographer                         (613) 991-6981
===============================================================


-- 
===============================================================
Svetlana Borissova                       svet@nrcbsa.bio.nrc.ca
National Research Council Canada           Home: (613) 747-7820
Laboratory of Biological Sciences (M-54)   Work: (613) 990-7381
Protein Crystallographer                         (613) 991-6981
===============================================================





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: charliemerritt@BIX.com
Date: Tue, 28 Sep 93 19:06:22 PDT
To: president@whitehouse.gov
Subject: CLIPPER CHIP /NO!
Message-ID: <9309282158.memo.25178@BIX.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Dear Mr. Prisident:
	I do not like the "Big Brother Inside" Clipper chip.
	Wire Taps need to be hard to do.
	I know you and Al are nice guys, but Richard Nixon
	and his plumbers could come back!
	A crypto chip with a government trapdoor (key escrow) is
	an idea fit for a J. Edgar Hoover, not nice people.

	Please dont make a techno-fool of your administration.

		A Razorback Fan from Arkansas...Charlie Merritt
		[charliemerritt@bix.com]




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Mike Godwin <mnemonic@eff.org>
Date: Tue, 28 Sep 93 19:31:36 PDT
To: smb@research.att.com
Subject: Re: Disturbing statistics on wiretaps
In-Reply-To: <199309290015.AA21015@eff.org>
Message-ID: <199309290230.AA22137@eff.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


 
smb@research.att.com writes

> 	 The same is true of e-mail over the Internet--there is no
> 	 statutory exclusionary rule that would prvent its
> 	 admissibility in court. It is at least theoretically possible,
> 	 however, to exclude illegally seized communications of these
> 	 sorts using a "pure 4th Amendment" (nonstatutory) exclusionary
> 	 rule.
> 
> 	 Don't hold your breath, though.
> 
> Do you really think that?  One could argue, fairly strongly, that the
> rules set forth in the ECPA have created an expectation of privacy,
> and that a violation of that expectation would be exactly the violation
> of the 4th Amendment that the Supreme Court addressed in the 1967
> decision that led to the original wiretap provisions in the Omnibus
> Crime Control and Safe Streets Act.
 
What's your point? One can argue all sorts of things. Are you saying you
have reason to believe an argument of this sort is likely to be a winner? 

Me, I just work from what I know about 4th Amendment caselaw.



--Mike







From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Phil Karn <karn@unix.ka9q.ampr.org>
Date: Tue, 28 Sep 93 22:56:23 PDT
To: newsham@wiliki.eng.hawaii.edu
Subject: Re: My comments to NIST
In-Reply-To: <9309290545.AA09638@unix.ka9q.ampr.org>
Message-ID: <9309290556.AA09654@unix.ka9q.ampr.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Thank you. Sternlight didn't like it, but what else is new? :-)

Phil




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "L. Detweiler" <ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Date: Tue, 28 Sep 93 22:11:38 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Orange book, the NSA, and the NCSC
In-Reply-To: <9309241531.AA13351@jazz.hal.com>
Message-ID: <9309290510.AA26874@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Mr. Jason Zions <jazz@hal.com> posted a clarification on a
misunderstanding that the Orange book has anything to do with
cryptographic algorithms, pointing out that it deals only with higher
level security issues.

However, his strong claim that the NSA is not involved with these
criteria whatsoever appears to be complete fantasy, as T. Newsham
pointed out, also indicating that the NCSC (Nat'l Center for Security &
Communications?) which ``came out with the original Trusted Criterion
rainbow books including the orange book'' is apparently just another
ugly NSA protrusion. In fact, I can remember people posting suggestions
when I first joined the list (a seeming eternity ago) that the NCSC is
*entirely* a front agency for the NSA, with no independent operation
whatsoever--supposedly essentially nothing but a reception office and a secretary.

I'm willing to accept that the Orange book doesn't specifically address
cryptography, and I appreciate the clarifications on something that is
one of the deepest, complex, and most obscure military handbooks, which
frankly I take some pride and relief in having very little knowledge
of, but I'm writing to correct another serious error in the original post:

>NSA is uninterested in making systems secure; their job is to
>break them anyway.

This is simply entirely incorrect. A *very* major aspect of the NSA
function, ever since its inception, involves the *creation* of secure
cryptographic algorithms and equipment. Skipjack is simply the first
`commercial' version ever introduced of a cryptographic algorithm. They
have supported virtually all branches of the U.S. military in the
code-making function. They are directly responsible for most encryption
schemes and devices used in military radio communication (tanks,
airplanes, ships, etc.). I understand the NSA even sells cryptographic
equipment to some countries (U.S. allies) making sure it can be
intercepted and decrypted -- this from claims of one of the `defectors'
of the agency, I believe. Bamford describes it all in _Puzzle_Palace_.

In fact, I've often stated the following position on the NSA, which
highlights its past dual role and future legitimate one: Since ``the
cold war is over'', if they are to exist at all, they should focus
their energy on something *constructive* like algorithm development and
not something *destructive* like its sinister vacuum-cleaner
intelligence slurping. Increasingly, the world is making the choice for them.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: karn@qualcomm.com (Phil Karn)
Date: Tue, 28 Sep 93 23:31:39 PDT
To: ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu
Subject: Clipper specifics
In-Reply-To: <9309290546.AA27506@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Message-ID: <9309290628.AA16515@servo>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


As I recall from a note from Denning some months back, the bits of the
LEEF (Law Enforcement Exploitation Field, its original and far more
descriptive name) are spread out among the ciphertext in some
unspecified way precisely to make it difficult or impossible to
remove.

Damn. Now I remember one of the points I meant to make in my NIST
comments, but forgot: if the LEEF is added periodically to the
ciphertext stream, that implies that the ciphertext data rate must be
greater than the plaintext rate. And that precludes just dropping the
Clipper chip into existing synchronous communication systems such as
our CDMA digital cellular telephone system without *major* system
redesign. Everything in our system is designed around four specific
fixed frame "rates", specifically 16, 40, 80 or 171 bits every 20 ms:
the vocoder, which generates these "frames", the CDMA modem, the
Viterbi decoder, everything.

Encryption that simply performs a 1-to-1 mapping between plaintext and
ciphertext would be easy to add to this system. But an encryption chip
that has to add something to each frame to encode an LEEF is useless
to me.

Anybody know if there is a "reply comments" cutoff date for the
Clipper proposal?  Under the rules that usually govern this sort of
thing, if you can find someone else's comments on file that address
the point you make, you can usually file "reply comments" that address
this point beyond the original due date -- as long as it arrives by
the "reply comments" date (usually a month or two later).

Phil






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: karn@qualcomm.com (Phil Karn)
Date: Tue, 28 Sep 93 23:36:22 PDT
To: jim@Tadpole.COM
Subject: Orange book, the NSA, and the NCSC
In-Reply-To: <9309290539.AA11755@tadpole.Tadpole.COM>
Message-ID: <9309290635.AA16536@servo>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Better yet, send them large PGP-encrypted messages using maximum-length
public keys that are not registered with the key servers. That should
keep their Crays busy for a while. :-)

Phil




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "L. Detweiler" <ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Date: Tue, 28 Sep 93 22:51:38 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Clipper specifics
In-Reply-To: <01H3CEGQ0YCI987NKX@delphi.com>
Message-ID: <9309290546.AA27506@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Mike Ingle <MIKEINGLE@delphi.com> asked some penetrating questions
about Clipper function, that deserve to be brought up again:

>Technical question: from what I've read, Clipper is only a single-
>key system, basically an 80-bit super-DES. So when you hit the
>SECURE button on your AT&T ClipperPhone, how do the phones exchange
>session keys? DH exchange or something similar? Is this implemented
>in the Clipper chip itself, or in external hardware? 

The following is based on some very faintly remembered technical data
once circulated by D. Denning. I'd be appreciative if anyone can point
out where it is located or elaborate on my description below.

The Clipper chip does *not* implement key exchange. It is essentially
nothing but a low-level encryption device. I would like to see the
specifications that are supposedly available or will be soon (I got the
impression that E. Hughes got some kind of Clipper specifications at
one point, a long time ago). However, as I understand it the chip sends
out the law enforcement exploitation field (LEEF) (the beautifully
apropos term `exploitation' has now been replaced with Access) along
with the encrypted data to the chip pins. 

Now, two Clipper chips will *not* work in conjuction with each other
unless each is fed a valid LEEF from the other. However, since the chip
does not accomplish this function (the communication, that is; it does
*create* the field), and it is handled outside the chip, there is no
guarantee that the system designer does not, for example, encrypt the
LEEF in the communications transit, thereby completely sabotaging the
`exploitative' tappability of the chip.

Hence there is a *very* real possibility that this scheme, or something
similar, could be used to gain Skipjack-level encryption without any
key escrow complications. I suspect the NSA is *extremely* worried
about this. They probably require that the chip purchaser promise to
use Clipper in a way that guarantees the LEEF is accessable
(plaintext). They may even create a contractual obligation wherein the
surrounding device (telephone or whatever) cannot be approved for sale
until it passes an NSA endorsed tapping test. (what fun!) I consider
this all very plausible and probable. (This would be a neat trick --
use the chip itself to encrypt LEEF fields -- hah! twist an insecure
chip into a secure one, and spit in the face of the NSA!)

The NSA probably would rather *not* come out with a Clipper type chip
because of the above weakness. But this is the absolute lowest level
chip they can get away with. There are many applications that would
reject a more sophisticated chip -- Clipper is already expensive enough as it is.

However, the Capstone chip *does* have key exchange functions built in
-- it uses Diffie Hellman, apparently. And I consider it likely that
the LEAF field transfer cannot be thwarted in the above way. This is a
do-everything chip with exponentiation and the DSA algorithm built in.
All these sweet-looking contortions to support `public debate' on the
Clipper proposal are rather pathetic given that the Capstone has been
in development for many years. Is there really any chance that its
production would be derailed by some annoying public comments? I
certainly hope so, but it's not a pretty picture.

Note that early in the Clipper debate, D. Denning and others were vague
on the Capstone and Clipper key exchange function. That's because
Clipper didn't have it, and Capstone used Diffie Hellman. Now, as we
are so familiar with, PKP holds a iron-fisted, vice-lock grip on *all*
public key cryptography. The government is supposedly able to use the
patented technology without prior arrangement (I believe this is a
qualification of the NSF research grants that led to the patents?) but
the chips would still not be able to be used in *commercial*
arrangements (the whole point) without a PKP agreement. 

Hence, it was *absolutely critical* that the government get the
*official endorsement* of PKP and a legal arrangement to allow the use
of public key cryptography in the Capstone and Clipper arrangements.
The wretched announcement was just a matter of time -- what was so
surprising was that PKP also got awarded a new iron-fisted, vice-lock
grip on the Digital Signature Standard. Apparently, the incredibly
lucrative revenues from public key licensing on Clipper and Capstone
alone just didn't cut it.

Conspiracy theorists can easily believe that this outrageous, scheming
arrangement was made *far prior* to its actual announcement (June? I
forget), and there is a lot of circumstantial evidence to support this.
The NSA's goal with Clipper and Capstone was *commercial* from the
*very beginning* -- now *officially* confirmed as at least 3 years! --
and they would be first to make sure it wasn't thwarted by those pesky
patents everyone else has to break their shins on. In fact, going just
a bit further, there is a lot of circumstantial evidence that PKP is
very closely allied with the NSA in various ways. How is it one company
has gotten public key patents that were developed at two different
universities (Stanford & MIT) and diverse researchers (Diffie, Hellman,
Rivest, Shamir, Adleman)?! Why is the government so eager to grant them
a critical *new* cryptgraphic algorithm stranglehold with DSA?

[key exchange]
>Is the format
>standardized? If not, there will be plenty of interoperability
>problems with the first generation of phones. For that matter, there
>will probably be problems even if it is standardized.

About the only company ready for Clipper chips is AT&T, and I think
they are using Diffie Hellman key exchange currently with some
proprietary algorithms (they have a license on Public Key directly from
PKP already) in their secure phones. I suspect any companies that come
out with new phone encryption equipment based on Clipper, if any are
insane enough to exist, will try to be compatible with the AT&T
`standard' (ug). As far as I know AT&T has not published their own key
exchange standard used by the phones, however. That is, it is
proprietary, and might even be protected by patents of their own! This
is a rare occasion where incompatibility is something to beam about!




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: jkreznar@ininx.com (John E. Kreznar)
Date: Tue, 28 Sep 93 23:56:22 PDT
To: ssimpson@eff.org
Subject: Question EFF yielding of crypto authority to NIST
In-Reply-To: <199309282015.AA18701@eff.org>
Message-ID: <9309290653.AA28234@ininx>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> Below is the text of the comments that EFF filed with NIST today.

> ...

>         When the Clinton Administration announced the Clipper Chip, it
> assured the public that this would be a purely voluntary system.  We must
> have legal guarantees that Clipper is not the first step toward prohibition
> against un-escrowed encryption.  Yet the Administration has not offered any
> such guarantees, either in the form of proposed legislation or even agency
> rules.

> ...

Actually, they have issued such legal guarantees.  They're in the form of the
administration's vow to uphold the US Constitution.  That document's 9th and
10th amendments preclude US Government denial or disparagement of the people's
right to use cryptography (and a whole lot of others).  The fact that these
legal guarantees are being ignored simply illustrates that their tyranny is
unbridled.

By engaging NIST on this subject, the EFF is implicitly yielding to them
authority which is not theirs to begin with.

	John E. Kreznar		| Relations among people to be by
	jkreznar@ininx.com	| mutual consent, or not at all.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Svetlana Borisova <svet@nrcbsa.bio.nrc.ca>
Date: Tue, 28 Sep 93 21:21:37 PDT
To: doug@netcom.com (Doug Merritt)
Subject: Re: the public key minefield (fwd)
In-Reply-To: <9309290227.AA09947@netcom4.netcom.com>
Message-ID: <9309290419.AA02815@ nrcbsa.bio.nrc.ca>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Doug Merritt wrote:
> >The goal of patents is to give a researcher a reward for his invention; to
> >give him the opportunity to make money off it.
> 
> This is incorrect; ask any patent attorney. In the U.S., anyway. Ask
> a Canadian patent attorney...but I'm 99.9% sure that Canada follows precisely
> the same legal philosophy.
> 
> In the U.S., the legal philosophy is derived from the fundamental meta-
> philosophy of its law which evolved out of British common law dating back
> to at least the Magna Carta, which is that (loosely) the purpose of law is
> for the common good. Every year there are cases in the U.S. where judges make
> a "surprising" decision that overturns the apparent letter of the law
> in favor of an appeal to the common good of society.

  I am sorry for not making my point clear.  What I was trying to say
is that the goal of a patent is to give a researcher a reward for his
invention *so that* there would be incentive for a researcher to do
research, thereby promoting invention, which is for the common good of
the society.  I was not implying, as it might have seemed from my
post, that the purpose of patents was that researchers could get rich
at the expense of the rest of the society.  I do not believe that
patents are intrisically bad.  True, the patent system has some flaws,
but it *does* provide an incentive for research, and I don't argue for
abolishment of patents since I can't think of a better system.

  My post's intention was to protest the statement that patents are
issued so that people could find alternate ways to achieve the same
purpose as the patented device does, which was my interpretation of
what the following paragraph said:

> >smb@research.att.com wrote:
> > And if you do -- well, then, the patent system has succeeded in its goals,
> > in that the monopoly assigned to someone else has stimulated you to find
> > another way to do things, and thus furthered the useful arts and
> > sciences.

  While patents are issued to provide incentive for research, it's not
by creating necessity for invention, but by giving a reward for
successful research.  Sorry for not making it clear the first time.

-- 
===============================================================
Svetlana Borissova                       svet@nrcbsa.bio.nrc.ca
National Research Council Canada           Home: (613) 747-7820
Laboratory of Biological Sciences (M-54)   Work: (613) 990-7381
Protein Crystallographer                         (613) 991-6981
===============================================================





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Eli Brandt <ebrandt@jarthur.Claremont.EDU>
Date: Wed, 29 Sep 93 00:36:22 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Clipper specifics
In-Reply-To: <9309290546.AA27506@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Message-ID: <9309290733.AA19505@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> From: "L. Detweiler" <ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
> *create* the field), and it is handled outside the chip, there is no
> guarantee that the system designer does not, for example, encrypt the
> LEEF in the communications transit, thereby completely sabotaging the
> `exploitative' tappability of the chip.
> 
> Hence there is a *very* real possibility that this scheme, or something
> similar, could be used to gain Skipjack-level encryption without any
> key escrow complications. I suspect the NSA is *extremely* worried
> about this.

Their spokesagency, NIST, has said that it will be illegal to encrypt
on top of Skipjack or to mung the LEEF.  Pre-encryption is not
mentioned, AFAIK, and would be borderline impossible to detect anyway.  

As I see it, this is already a restriction on non-Skipjack encryption,
issued in the same document that assured us that no such thing is being
considered.  It's a special case, to be sure, but it clearly asserts a
government power to restrict the means and manner of private
encryption performed entirely within the United States.  This is a key
issue, IMO.

   Eli   ebrandt@jarthur.claremont.edu




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: jim@Tadpole.COM (Jim Thompson)
Date: Tue, 28 Sep 93 22:41:38 PDT
To: ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu
Subject: Re:  Orange book, the NSA, and the NCSC
Message-ID: <9309290539.AA11755@tadpole.Tadpole.COM>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Keep yourself on the NSA watch list, send email to
someone@docmaster.ncsc.mil every once in a while.  :-)


Jim




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: khijol!erc (Ed Carp)
Date: Wed, 29 Sep 93 02:11:39 PDT
To: karn@qualcomm.com (Phil Karn)
Subject: Re: Orange book, the NSA, and the NCSC
In-Reply-To: <9309290635.AA16536@servo>
Message-ID: <m0ohwxY-00022PC@khijol>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text


> Better yet, send them large PGP-encrypted messages using maximum-length
> public keys that are not registered with the key servers. That should
> keep their Crays busy for a while. :-)

Even if a Cray can crack a PGP-encrypted message in, say, an hour, flooding
the system with messages would tend to obscure real traffic with obscure
junk.  Hey, I can encrypt /vmunix with a random key as fast as the next
person.  :)
-- 
Ed Carp, N7EKG			erc@apple.com			510/659-9560
                            anon-0001@khijol.uucp
If you want magic, let go of your armor.  Magic is so much stronger than
steel!        -- Richard Bach, "The Bridge Across Forever"



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "George A. Gleason" <gg@well.sf.ca.us>
Date: Wed, 29 Sep 93 02:36:22 PDT
To: stig@netcom.com
Subject: Re: Disturbing statistics on wiretaps
Message-ID: <93Sep29.023420pdt.14278-2@well.sf.ca.us>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


And of course it should be remembered that there is still an old drug-war
thing on the books which allows 72 hours' interception without a court
order.  Now depending on how that's interpreted, 72 hours are a lot of
conversations.  This stuff can be used for background intelligence and
investigation where it never winds up in court but is used to get
information to be used in other ways.  "It's what they don't tell you..."

-gg




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "George A. Gleason" <gg@well.sf.ca.us>
Date: Wed, 29 Sep 93 02:51:40 PDT
To: rjc@gnu.ai.mit.edu
Subject: Re:  Hacking ClipperPhones
Message-ID: <93Sep29.024627pdt.14278-2@well.sf.ca.us>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Re your suggestion of a cypherpunk daughterboard to substitute for Clipper
in "secure" phones etc.:

I have a sneaky suspicion that AT&T won't be quite so cooperative.  They
constantly do things in such a way as to make it darn hard to do anything
with their products except exactly what they intended to do.  It might be
worth a try though... OTOH anything that creates more demand for AT&T phones
is a not-good thing in my view... we need an entirely competing product, and
preferably cheaper than an AT&T clipperphone + daughterboard, for obvious
competitive reasons.  

There are plenty of telephone manufacturers in the world.  Some are
relatively small shops in Asia which make European knock-offs for the Asian
operating companies.  I know of another one in Portugal which at least ten
years ago was favorable to doing mildly custom stuff.  If nyone here is
seriously interested in competing cryptophones, I'd be willing to find an
appropriate telephone set manufacturer who makes quality phones and is
willing to put in a daughterboard socket or other useful mods.

-gg@well.sf.ca.us





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: rjc@gnu.ai.mit.edu (Ray)
Date: Wed, 29 Sep 93 00:31:38 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Hacking ClipperPhones
Message-ID: <9309290726.AA18034@geech.gnu.ai.mit.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



"Cypherpunks Hack Hardware"

  It seems logical that when the ClipperPhones come out, they will have
some kind of vocoder chip in them. (I doubt the (co)decoding will be
implemented on the Clipper chip itself) If so, cypherpunks can
take advantage of this situation. By hacking up a daugherboard, the phone's
vocoder/modem/sampler can be exploited and interfaced to a PC (possibility
via something as simple as a null modem cable or centronics). After that,
the software hackers can do their job.

  If the ClipperPhone becomes popular and the daughterboard is cheap to build
($25-50), it would serve as a massive hardware platform for cypherpunks
phone software. The alternative is to produce our own vocoder/sampler boards,
but I doubt we could approach the economy of scale that AT&T can, plus
we get to ride on the back of their advertising/marketing by having them
sell the basic hardware. (then we just release a hack for it)

 What do you think?

-Ray


-- Ray Cromwell        |    Engineering is the implementation of science;    --
-- EE/Math Student     |       politics is the implementation of faith.      --
-- rjc@gnu.ai.mit.edu  |                         - Zetetic Commentaries      --




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: smb@research.att.com
Date: Wed, 29 Sep 93 00:51:38 PDT
To: Mike Godwin <mnemonic@eff.org>
Subject: Re: Disturbing statistics on wiretaps
Message-ID: <9309290751.AA19846@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


	  
	 smb@research.att.com writes

	 > 	 The same is true of e-mail over the Internet--there is no
	 > 	 statutory exclusionary rule that would prvent its
	 > 	 admissibility in court. It is at least theoretically possible,
	 > 	 however, to exclude illegally seized communications of these
	 > 	 sorts using a "pure 4th Amendment" (nonstatutory) exclusionary
	 > 	 rule.
	 > 
	 > 	 Don't hold your breath, though.
	 > 
	 > Do you really think that?  One could argue, fairly strongly, that th
	e
	 > rules set forth in the ECPA have created an expectation of privacy,
	 > and that a violation of that expectation would be exactly the violat
	ion
	 > of the 4th Amendment that the Supreme Court addressed in the 1967
	 > decision that led to the original wiretap provisions in the Omnibus
	 > Crime Control and Safe Streets Act.
	  
	 What's your point? One can argue all sorts of things. Are you
	 saying you have reason to believe an argument of this sort is
	 likely to be a winner?

	 Me, I just work from what I know about 4th Amendment caselaw.


I realize that you know more about the relevant case law than I do.  It
would be pretty sad if you didn't.  But I'm not completely ignorant of
either this subject in particular, or constitutional law in gneral, and
I like to learn more.  I'm asking to be educated, and I don't like to
rely on assertions by authority.  I advanced what I thought was a
fairly strong argument against your point.  Further, the wording of the
statute seems pretty clear to me.  18 USC 2515:

		Prohibition of use as evidence of intercepted wire,
		       oral, or electronic communications

	     Whenever any wire, oral, or electronic communications has
	been intercepted, no part of the contents of such communication
	and no evidence derived therefrom may be received in evidence in
	any trial, hearing, or other proceeding in or before any court,
	grand jury, department, officer, agency, regulatory body, legis-
	lative committee, or other authority of the United States, a
	State, or a political subdivision thereof if the disclosure of
	that information would be in violation of this chapter.

As I read it, if the government doesn't follow the wiretap rules,
the evidence thereby obtained can't be used.  What have I missed?


		--Steve Bellovin




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: russell@eternity.demon.co.uk (Russell Earl Whitaker)
Date: Tue, 28 Sep 93 20:21:37 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: CONFERENCE: European Computers, Freedom & Privacy
Message-ID: <16612@eternity.demon.co.uk>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

ECFP '93:
The First European Conference on Computers, Freedom and Privacy

The New Cavendish Club
London, England

20th November 1993


Organised by ECFP Ventures Limited

Co-operating organisations :
  The Libertarian Alliance
  Privacy International, UK
  UK Cryptoprivacy Association


SCOPE
- ----------------------------------

The widespread use of computers and 
communication systems has brought considerable 
benefits to our business and personal lives and will 
continue to change and shape the way in which we 
live. However, with those benefits come unprecedented 
threats to our personal privacy and potential for abuse.

A variety of different models for protection of 
individual privacy in the electronic age have been 
suggested, ranging from state regulation to individual 
action through the use of strong cryptography. 
However, these solutions bring with them their own 
class of problems, including excessive state 
involvement in private matters and the frustration of 
law enforcement and national security objectives.

The First European Conference on Computers, 
Freedom and Privacy will both provide an introduction 
to these issues and the technological developments 
that drive them, and examine different ways in which 
individual rights can be guaranteed. These questions
are central to the preservation of a free society in the 
Information Age.

John M. Brimacombe
Conference Chair


KEYNOTE SPEAKER
- ----------------------------------

John Gilmore
Email: gnu@cygnus.com

JOHN GILMORE is Chairman of the Board of Cygnus
Support, who provide commercial support for free 
software. As founder and board member of the 
Electronic Frontier Foundation and the Cypherpunks, 
he has campaigned extensively for electronic privacy. 
John will speak on building a society in which 
personal privacy is guaranteed through the use of 
strong cryptography.



OTHER SPEAKERS
- ----------------------------------

John Brimacombe (Chairman)
Email: john@mantis.co.uk

JOHN BRIMACOMBE is the Managing Director of Jobstream Group
plc, developers of business software. A graduate in 
both law and computer science, he was an advisor to 
CFP '93 in San Francisco.  John will serve as conference
moderator.


Simon Davies
Email: davies@privint.demon.co.uk

SIMON DAVIES is Director General of Privacy International and
a member of the School of Law at the University of 
New South Wales.  He will be looking at new developments
in surveillance and ways of combating them.


Tom Burroughes
Email: tom@reptile.demon.co.uk (after 10 October 1993)

TOM BURROUGHES is Deputy Chief Reporter with the East Anglian Daily
Times in Ipswich, England. He will be giving a journalist's point
of view on privacy issues, including recent incidents involving
eavesdropping on cellular telephones, and the roles of various
corporate and government bodies in the recent adoption of
cellphone signal encryption standards in the UK.


David Chaum
Email: chaum@digicash.nl

DAVID CHAUM is head of the Cryptography Group at the Center for
Mathematics and Computer Science (CWI) in Amsterdam, and
founder of DigiCash, which develops electronic payments systems.
Dr. Chaum received his Ph.D. in computer science from the University of
California, Berkeley, in 1982, and joined CWI in 1984. He helped to
found the International Association for Cryptologic Research and
remains active on its board.  David also consults internationally on
cryptology.


Duncan Frissell
Email: frissell@panix.com

DUNCAN FRISSELL is an attorney, technical author and consultant
on matters of personal and financial privacy. Duncan will speak on
"Traditional Privacy in the Electronic Age".


Elaine Fletcher

ELAINE FLETCHER is Assistant Solicitor for Eric James Howe,
Data Protection Registrar (UK). Elaine will
speak on issues arising from the Data Protection 
regime established under the 1984 Data Protection Act.


Chris Tame

CHRIS TAME is the Director of the Libertarian Alliance
and Director of the smokers rights group FOREST, as well as UK
representative of the Libertarian International.  He
has written extensively for such academic journals as /Science
and Public Policy/, /Economic Affairs/, and /The Jewish Journal
of Sociology/, and such books as *The Case For Private
Enterprise* and *The Politics of Crime Control*. He appears
regularly on radio and television in the UK.  Chris will speak on the
libertarian views of data protection and privacy.


Russell Whitaker
Email: whitaker@eternity.demon.co.uk

RUSSELL WHITAKER, conference co-organiser, is a consultant
on electronic communications, a director of ECFP Ventures Ltd and
communications editor of Extropy magazine.  Russell will
speak on the composition of, and influences upon, the electronic
community in Britain today, and how public policy affects those
on computer bulletin boards and online services.



PROGRAMME
- ---------------------------------

Registration       9.30 - 10.00 am

First session     10.00 - 11.30 am
  BREAK           11.30 - 11.50 am

Second session    11.50 am - 1.20 pm
  BREAK            1.20 - 2.20 pm

Third session      2.20 - 3.50 pm
  BREAK            3.50 - 4.10 pm

Fourth session     4.10 - 5.40 pm

PANEL SESSION      5.40 - 6.20 pm
Closing remarks    6.20 - 6.30 pm


Lunchtime is the break after the second session, and lunch
itself is not included in the price of the conference.  There
are pubs and restaurants in the immediate vicinity.

Coffee, tea and biscuits will be on sale through the day, however.


Registration form:
- ---------------------------------

NAME                _____________________________________

JOB TITLE           _____________________________________

ORGANISATION/AFFILIATION        _________________________

              ___________________________________________


MAILING ADDRESS     _____________________________________

     ____________________________________________________

     ____________________________________________________

     ____________________________________________________


TELEPHONE     ___________________________________________

FAX           ___________________________________________

E-MAIL        ___________________________________________


IMPORTANT NOTE: only *fully* completed forms with full telephonic
details will be accepted, to be used in the event of any
emergency changes, such as change of venue.

This is not optional.


CLASS OF REGISTRATION :
[Prices are Pounds Sterling]

   Student                         10.00  ($16.00 U.S.)
   Normal                          17.50  ($28.00 U.S.)
     Normal before 1 Nov 93:       15.00  ($24.00 U.S.)
   Press                           (Contact for arrangements)

MEANS OF PAYMENT:

   - U.S. cheques/cash
   - U.K. cheques/cash
   - EuroCheques (tm)

Unfortunately, due to bank conversion charges, we are unable to
accept cheques drawn on other overseas accounts, for payment of
this year's attendance fees.


PROCEEDINGS AND AUDIO/VIDEOGRAPHY
- -------------------------------------------

You may pre-order copies of transcripts of the proceedings,
which will be shipped within 90 days after the conference:

    "Please send me ____ copies of the conference
     proceedings at 20 pounds each."

Video and audio recordings will be made of the conference, in
its entirety.  No pre-sales will be made; tapes go on sale in
December 93/January 94.


Cheques, made payable to "ECFP Ventures Limited",
should be sent with this form to :
   16 Circus Road
   MM Box 8593
   London  NW8 6PG
   England

Please direct any further enquiries to the above address, or:
   ecfp-1st@eternity.demon.co.uk  (Email)
   +44 81-812-2661  (Manned message service; quick response)


HOW TO FIND THE NEW CAVENDISH CLUB :
- ----------------------------------------------

The New Cavendish Club is 2 minutes walk from Marble Arch
Underground station.  Immediately turn right as you exit from
the station onto Oxford Street.  Then take the first turning on
the right, i.e. Great Cumberland Street.  The New Cavendish Club
is 3 blocks north on the northeast corner of the intersection
of Great Cumberland Street with Upper Berkeley Street.
 
Address:
  New Cavendish Club
  44 Great Cumberland Place
  London W1H 8BS


- ----- Text ends ---------

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Russell Earl Whitaker                   whitaker@eternity.demon.co.uk
Communications Editor                                 AMiX: RWhitaker
EXTROPY: The Journal of Transhumanist Thought
Board member, Extropy Institute (ExI)
    Co-organizer, 1st European Conference on Computers, Freedom and
    Privacy, London, 20 November 1993








From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: m5@vail.tivoli.com (Mike McNally)
Date: Wed, 29 Sep 93 05:36:23 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Carl Ellison on 'The Death of DES'
In-Reply-To: <9309282044.AA26047@ellisun.sw.stratus.com>
Message-ID: <9309291229.AA11549@vail.tivoli.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



 > Carl Ellison says:
 > > 3.	in between DES operations, mix bytes up as with	tran (posted on
 > > 	sci.crypt occasionally, avbl from me by mail or on ripem.msu.edu)
 > > 	-- spreading bytes out within a huge block, further hiding any
 > > 	known text

Can someone comment on the efficacy of this technique when used in
conjunction with encryption modes other than ECB, and/or with the
simple XOR "pre-scramble" technique?  I agree that it "couldn't hurt",
security-wise, but of course it does introduce a (slight) processing
overhead.  If it introduces no real additional security, I don't see
the point.  (Enlighten me!)

(This for some reason reminds me of the way little kids tie shoes;
they sometimes make enormous knots which, ultimately, are weaker than
a simple bow.)

--
Mike McNally




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Mike Godwin <mnemonic@eff.org>
Date: Wed, 29 Sep 93 05:11:42 PDT
To: smb@research.att.com
Subject: Re: Disturbing statistics on wiretaps
In-Reply-To: <199309290751.AA24066@eff.org>
Message-ID: <199309291205.AA25225@eff.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


 
Steve Bellovin writes:

> I realize that you know more about the relevant case law than I do.  It
> would be pretty sad if you didn't.  But I'm not completely ignorant of
> either this subject in particular, or constitutional law in gneral, and
> I like to learn more.  I'm asking to be educated, and I don't like to
> rely on assertions by authority.

This is both a fair comment and a fair request. Sorry for being irritable
yesterday.

> I advanced what I thought was a
> fairly strong argument against your point.  Further, the wording of the
> statute seems pretty clear to me.  18 USC 2515:
> 
> 		Prohibition of use as evidence of intercepted wire,
> 		       oral, or electronic communications
> 
> 	     Whenever any wire, oral, or electronic communications has
> 	been intercepted, no part of the contents of such communication
> 	and no evidence derived therefrom may be received in evidence in
> 	any trial, hearing, or other proceeding in or before any court,
> 	grand jury, department, officer, agency, regulatory body, legis-
> 	lative committee, or other authority of the United States, a
> 	State, or a political subdivision thereof if the disclosure of
> 	that information would be in violation of this chapter.
 
This is not an accurate presentation of 2515, Steve. "Electronic
communications" was not added to 18 USC 2515 by ECPA. The statutory
exclusionary rule applies only to wire and oral communications. 

> As I read it, if the government doesn't follow the wiretap rules,
> the evidence thereby obtained can't be used.  What have I missed?

You've missed the actual language of 18 USC 2515. I don't know where you
got this one.


--Mike





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Anonymous <nowhere@bsu-cs.bsu.edu>
Date: Wed, 29 Sep 93 06:06:27 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Triple DES products hitting market
Message-ID: <9309291308.AA19748@bsu-cs.bsu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


excerpted from:

Communications Week
No. 473, September 27, 1993
page 36


Cylink Triples Encryption
by Sharon Fisher


Sunnyvale, Calif. - Cylink Corp. has announced an encryption product
that improves security by encrypting data three times using current 
standards.

The Cylink product uses the Data Encryption Standard, which defines a 
56-bit key for scrambling messages to prevent access by unauthorized
users. DES was adopted in 1977 as the U.S. federal standard for data
encryption.

Skirting DES Limitations

Some users have expressed concern, however, that DES' 56 bits cannot
prevent a determined attacker from using more powerful hardware and
software to crack the code. The Cylink product addresses the problem
by using DES to encrypt the data more than once, according to company
officials.

Cylink's Cipher/Decipher-HSi offers triple-DES, which encrypts DES
data three times, and gives the 56-bit key the effect of a 112-bit key,
according to the company, based here. The triple-DES approach makes 
the Cylink product more secure than the government's proposed Clipper 
system, which uses an 80-bit key, the company said.

Users could get the triple-DES effect by manually encrypting data
three times, but the process would take three times as long as single
DES encryption, Cylink noted. Cidec-HSi uses improved circuit technology
that performs the three encryptions without taking that long, the
company said.

Cidec-HSi works at speeds of up to 2.048 million bits per second and
is available with a wide variety of interfaces, Cylink said. It
also includes a public key management system, which lets users
exchange keys so that they can read each other's messages. The device 
also offers an optional embedded channel service unit, which can
be connected directly to the public T1 carrier network, the company
said.

Cylink said it can retrofit current Cidec-HSi systems so they can
benefit from the new triple-DES technology.

AT&T Compatibitlity

The company said that Cidec-HSi meets compatibility standards for
use with AT&T's Accunet T1.5 and Extended Superframe Format services.

Cylink can be reached at 735-5800.






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Michael Johnson <mpj@csn.org>
Date: Wed, 29 Sep 93 08:01:51 PDT
To: Mike McNally <m5@vail.tivoli.com>
Subject: Re: Carl Ellison on 'The Death of DES'
In-Reply-To: <9309291229.AA11549@vail.tivoli.com>
Message-ID: <Pine.3.05.9309290818.A2965-b100000@teal.csn.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


On Wed, 29 Sep 1993, Mike McNally wrote:

>  > Carl Ellison says:
>  > > 3.	in between DES operations, mix bytes up as with	tran (posted on
>  > > 	sci.crypt occasionally, avbl from me by mail or on ripem.msu.edu)
>  > > 	-- spreading bytes out within a huge block, further hiding any
>  > > 	known text
> Can someone comment on the efficacy of this technique when used in
> conjunction with encryption modes other than ECB, and/or with the
> simple XOR "pre-scramble" technique?  I agree that it "couldn't hurt",
> security-wise, but of course it does introduce a (slight) processing
> overhead.  If it introduces no real additional security, I don't see
> the point.  (Enlighten me!)
> 
> (This for some reason reminds me of the way little kids tie shoes;
> they sometimes make enormous knots which, ultimately, are weaker than
> a simple bow.)

One integrated large block cipher is much more secure than this kind of
combination of ciphers, unless you repeat them in enough rounds to make a
compound product cipher out of it.  In other words, des | tran really
isn't much stronger than des, but des|tran|des|tran|des|tran|des|tran...
could be quite strong (not to mention slow).

                                       Mike Johnson
Long live the U. S. Constitution!






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: jhall@lambda.msfc.nasa.gov (Joel Hall)
Date: Wed, 29 Sep 93 08:06:27 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: unsubscribe
Message-ID: <9309291459.AA19130@lambda.msfc.nasa.gov>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


unsubscribe




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Date: Wed, 29 Sep 93 10:36:46 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Orange book, the NSA, and the NCSC
In-Reply-To: <9309291641.AA27012@matt.ksu.ksu.edu>
Message-ID: <9309291733.AA06497@netcom3.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Dan Odom clarifies some information about NSA, NCSC, Orange Book
series, etc.:


> > I'm willing to accept that the Orange book doesn't specifically address
> > cryptography, and I appreciate the clarifications on something that is
> > one of the deepest, complex, and most obscure military handbooks, which
> 
> Uh, any American citizen is entitled to one (1) free copy of the
> Orange Book (and every other book in the Rainbow series); all you have
> to do is ask.  The address on the inside of my copy says:
> 
> NCSC
> 9800 Savage Road
> Fort George G. Meade, MD 29755-6000

I got on this list of automatic books several years ago and now have
about a dozen or more different publications, in different colors,
from blue to green to the famous orange. All from the National
Computer Security Center.

Nothing juicy, and not much fun (for me) to read. Unix gurus trying to
get better security classifications for their machines and systems
have to read this stuff, though.


> Since every NSA address I've ever seen is 9800 Savage Road, I assume
> that it's some sort of secretarial thing.  But if you ask them for a
> copy of the Rainbow Series, they'll send it to you and also put you on
> the list to receive updates.  It is _not_ deep, complex, or obscure;

Savage Road is the actual address of the Agency; Fort Meade per se is
huge. NCSC as created in 1984 as part of NSDD-145 (National Security
Decision Directive-145, a very important one). Prior to that date it
had been called the DoD Computer Security Center, located smack dab in
the center of SIGINT City.

(I visited in May of 1991, strictly to satisfy my own curiousity. The
closest I got was the front gate, with the newly installed "National
Security Agency" signs. Signs said "Das Photographen ist Strictly
Verboten," but I took a bunch anyway out my car window.)


> And before anybody starts forming consipiracy theories, I am not
> related to Lieutenant General William Odom; we just share a name :-).

I'd long been meaning to ask Dan about this. General Odom once was
introduced at a speech he was giving to Jim Bamford. Odom recoiled and
said "Sir, I consider you to be an unindicted felon." 

-Tim

-- 
..........................................................................
Timothy C. May         | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,  
tcmay@netcom.com       | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
408-688-5409           | knowledge, reputations, information markets, 
W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA  | black markets, collapse of governments.
Higher Power: 2^756839 | Public Key: PGP and MailSafe available.
Note: I put time and money into writing this posting. I hope you enjoy it.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: ssteele@eff.org (Shari Steele)
Date: Wed, 29 Sep 93 07:41:47 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: saturation tactics?
Message-ID: <199309291438.AA26395@eff.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Nate asks:

>BTW, what is the snail-mail address to send these letters to?

Willam B. Robinson
United States Department of State
Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs
Office of Defense Trade Controls
Washington, DC  20522-0602

George suggests:

>yeah, here's a cheaper version.  Write to the arms excport license people
>and pester them with questions: I'm a BBS operator, what should I do?; I'm a
>businessperson travelling overseas and need my crypto to comm with the home
>office what should I do?; all this kind of thing.  Swamp them with letters.
>Every person and every circumstance which even remotely fits.  
>
>An alternative version which would require more guts and perhaps a serious
>conscientious decision about whether it's worth making this an act of civil
>disobedience, is to write to them and say, "I'm a BBS operator, not an arms
>merchant, and on the strength of my 1st-A rights I'm not going to censor my
>board or get a license..."  or  "I'm a businessperson who travels & takes my
>cryupto out of the country on my laptop to comm with the home office; I'm
>not an arms dealer either and I don't intend to get a license..."  And
>again, there is strength in numbers here.   

I like the first idea.  As an attorney (stop with the hissing out there!),
I feel a need to remind you that these State Department guys are serious. 
They can really make your life miserable -- just ask Phil Z.  I strongly
suggest that you keep that in mind before openly suggesting that you intend
to export encryption.  I agree that the export laws stink.  I'm hoping we
can get the law nixed without anyone going to jail.
Shari





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: jdwilson@shell.portal.com (James D Wilson)
Date: Wed, 29 Sep 93 19:56:50 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Clinton UN Speech / Msg to Prez/VP
In-Reply-To: <9309281255.AA14898@snark.lehman.com>
Message-ID: <9309291743.AA00866@jobe.shell.portal.com.shell.portal.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text


I agree that messages to president@whitehouse.gov, or to the whitehouse
area on Compu$erve are not acknowledged.  I have sent several to each as well
as a letter direct to President Hillary, none of which were acknowledged.  I
wrote about a major money-waster in government medical care systems which could
easily save the government in the three-digit millions.  For what its worth,
the boondoggle is this:  When DOD decided to automate their medical facilities
they put out an RFP.  A company called SAIC was aware that the entire software
system that VA uses to automate its 1000 bed hospitals is available for free
under the FOIA.  SAIC got a copy of all the VA software, and bid to DOD to 
take this VA software which the government already owns, and sell it back to
DOD for giga-bucks.  Now they (DOD) must negotiate with and pay for every 
change they want to that software.  Meanwhile the VA programmers continue
to improve the VA software (DHCP) as salaried government employees.  In fact,
now DOD is looking to pay SAIC to write interface routines to allow the DOD
software (CHCS) to share info with the VA software (DHCP).  You would think
that this would get their attention, but no.  Instead we continue to pay a 
private firm to sell us our own software.  Hows this for medical care cost
over-runs?

 -Kimo




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: khijol!erc (Ed Carp)
Date: Wed, 29 Sep 93 11:11:46 PDT
To: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Subject: Re: Orange book, the NSA, and the NCSC
In-Reply-To: <9309291733.AA06497@netcom3.netcom.com>
Message-ID: <m0oi5rq-00022EC@khijol>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text


> I got on this list of automatic books several years ago and now have
> about a dozen or more different publications, in different colors,
> from blue to green to the famous orange. All from the National
> Computer Security Center.
> 
> Nothing juicy, and not much fun (for me) to read. Unix gurus trying to
> get better security classifications for their machines and systems
> have to read this stuff, though.

I had to wade through all that government stuff a while back.  I've got the
complete series, but haven't gotten any updates. :(  It's all pretty dry
and stuffy, but it did have some useful stuff, like the password guidelines
and how they figure out which machines can be trusted and which can't.

> Savage Road is the actual address of the Agency; Fort Meade per se is
> huge. NCSC as created in 1984 as part of NSDD-145 (National Security
> Decision Directive-145, a very important one). Prior to that date it
> had been called the DoD Computer Security Center, located smack dab in
> the center of SIGINT City.

Why is Directive 145 important?  <curious>

> I'd long been meaning to ask Dan about this. General Odom once was
> introduced at a speech he was giving to Jim Bamford. Odom recoiled and
> said "Sir, I consider you to be an unindicted felon." 

<snicker>  I got a good laugh out of that one!! :) :)
-- 
Ed Carp, N7EKG			erc@apple.com			510/659-9560
                            anon-0001@khijol.uucp
If you want magic, let go of your armor.  Magic is so much stronger than
steel!        -- Richard Bach, "The Bridge Across Forever"



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: thug@phantom.com (Murdering Thug)
Date: Wed, 29 Sep 93 08:41:45 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Triple DES Wanted
Message-ID: <m0oi3fO-0009GjC@mindvox.phantom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text



I'm looking for a Triple DES file encryption program that takes arguments
in the same form as /bin/crypt or /usr/bin/des.  Is there a /bin/3des out
there somewhere?  Has anyone come across 3des.c?  And if so, can you
point me in the direction where it may be found.  Thanks..

If no such program exists, I think it would be very useful to the
cypherpunks community if it were made available.  I'd also like to see a
similar stand-alone version of IDEA (/usr/bin/idea?), but since it is
patented, that's probably not going to happen, which is why I'm looking
for something like /bin/3des. 


l8r, thug



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: J. Michael Diehl <mdiehl@triton.unm.edu>
Date: Wed, 29 Sep 93 10:46:47 PDT
To: jim@Tadpole.COM (Jim Thompson)
Subject: Re: Subterranean Clipper Chip Blues
In-Reply-To: <9309291653.AA16344@tadpole.Tadpole.COM>
Message-ID: <9309291744.AA17276@triton.unm.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


According to Jim Thompson:
> 
>   Subject: Subterranean Clipper Chip Blues
>   
>   PC/Computing, October 1993
>   Page 468 (opposite inside back cover).
>   Note: _abc_ indicates italics.
>   
>   Illustration: several computers with keyholes in the screens.
>   Clinton's smiling face rises from the White House, as a long
>   arm reaches out with a key...
>   

Anyone out there with a color scanner???  PLEASE scan this puppy!  Distributing
.gif images represents the next generation of Electronic Propaganda!  So, if 
anyone has a scanner, please scan this one and make if available to us.

Thanx in advance.


J. Michael Diehl   ;^)  |*The 2nd Amendment is there in case the 
mdiehl@triton.unm.edu   | Government forgets about the 1st!  <RL>
Mike.Diehl@f29.n301.z1  |*God is a good Physicist, and an even 
    .fidonet.org        | better Mathematician.  <Me>
al945@cwns9.ins.cwru.edu|*I'm just looking for the opportunity to 
 (505) 299-2282 (voice) | be Politically Incorrect! <Me>
Can we impeach him yet? |*Protected by 18 USC 2511 and 18 USC 2703. 
PGP Key = 7C06F1 = A6 27 E1 1D 5F B2 F2 F1  12 E7 53 2D 85 A2 10 5D




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Date: Wed, 29 Sep 93 11:56:46 PDT
To: erc@apple.com
Subject: Re: Orange book, the NSA, and the NCSC
In-Reply-To: <m0oi5rq-00022EC@khijol>
Message-ID: <9309291855.AA19302@netcom3.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I mentioned NSDD-145 and Ed Carp asked for more information:

> > Savage Road is the actual address of the Agency; Fort Meade per se is
> > huge. NCSC as created in 1984 as part of NSDD-145 (National Security
> > Decision Directive-145, a very important one). Prior to that date it
> > had been called the DoD Computer Security Center, located smack dab in
> > the center of SIGINT City.
> 
> Why is Directive 145 important?  <curious>

National Security Decision Directive 145 (NSDD-145) was signed by
Reagan in 1984 as the "National Policy on Telecommunications and
Automated Information Security."

It extended the charter of the NSA from just the protection of
government information (I'm talking about the COMSEC part of NSA, of
course) to commercial, non-gov't information as well. The "Commercial
COMSEC Endorsement Program" (CCEP).

(I believe COMSEC, Communications Security, has since been changed to
INFOSEC. One thing the Agency does is to frequently change the names
of groups, departments, functions. Security by bureaucracy I guess.)

You may recall that the Feds said around this time that DES was
basically dead, that the CCEP would result in a new line of crypto
systems...several companies, including Cylink, Intel, etc., developed
products for inclusion on the Evaluated Products List (EPL).

NSDD-145 also created the NCSC, as noted earlier. As everyone knows,
"DOCKMASTER" is a not-especially-secure machine used by
NCSC-affiliated researchers and vendors to send mail, etc. The
frequent comments about how the NSA/NCSC is "on the Net" are hardly
revelatory. Many machines are on the Net, and you can surely bet that
the important machines are not.

(And of course various nets exist. Milnet (or MILNET, or whatever) is
one, and various successors to the old AUTOVON and AUTODIN command and
control nets.)

The National Computer Security Act came later, circa 1987.

I have a lot more stuff in my files, but this ought to satisfy the
casually curious.

-Tim May


-- 
..........................................................................
Timothy C. May         | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,  
tcmay@netcom.com       | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
408-688-5409           | knowledge, reputations, information markets, 
W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA  | black markets, collapse of governments.
Higher Power: 2^756839 | Public Key: PGP and MailSafe available.
Note: I put time and money into writing this posting. I hope you enjoy it.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: wcs@anchor.ho.att.com (Bill_Stewart_HOY002_1305)
Date: Wed, 29 Sep 93 11:56:30 PDT
To: ebrandt@jarthur.Claremont.EDU
Subject: Re: Clipper specifics
Message-ID: <9309291709.AA01660@anchor.ho.att.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text


> Their spokesagency, NIST, has said that it will be illegal to encrypt
> on top of Skipjack or to mung the LEEF.  Pre-encryption is not
> mentioned, AFAIK, and would be borderline impossible to detect anyway.  

Actually, it won't be illegal, unless they get CONgress to pass some laws,
but they may be able to do some contractual constraints on it as part of
the process of getting your Skipjack products approved, either through
the current process of export approval, or through the approval process described
in the proposed FIPS (which basically says "Whatever NSA wants");
they could even place restrictions on selling Clipper chips to unapproved 
companies.

It *will* violate the FIPS, if the FIPS gets approved, so you won't be
able to sell SkipJack/LEAF products to the government unless they're capable
of operating without post-encryption.  That doesn't mean they won't buy
dual-mode products that are switchable between secure and FIPS modes,
though obviously the politics of the situation don't make that real likely :-)

An interesting question is whether the export or manufacturing approval processes
will ban the use of Clipper/etc. in programmable devices, either explicitly
user-programmable ones, or devices in which the PROMs are easily replaced.
It costs a little, but using flash-EPROM in a secure phone would make
firmware upgrades easy, and that could include a LEAF-masking option.



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Eli Brandt <ebrandt@jarthur.Claremont.EDU>
Date: Wed, 29 Sep 93 13:11:47 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Clipper specifics
In-Reply-To: <9309290733.AA19505@toad.com>
Message-ID: <9309292009.AA01715@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I said:
> Their spokesagency, NIST, has said that it will be illegal to encrypt
> on top of Skipjack or to mung the LEEF.

Checking the relevant document again, I think this is wrong:
--------------------
 Federal Information Processing Standards Publication XX
 1993 XX
 Announcing the Escrowed Encryption Standard (EES)

[blah blah]

The security equipment shall ensure that the LEAF is transmitted 
in such a manner that the LEAF and ciphertext may be decrypted 
with legal authorization. No additional encryption or modification 
of the LEAF is permitted.

[...]
--------------------

I remembered this text out of context.  Correctly interpreted, it
looks like it's just a specification for devices implementing the
(voluntary, natch) Escrowed Encryption Standard.  Sorry about that. 

   Eli   ebrandt@jarthur.claremont.edu




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Matt Blaze <mab@crypto.com>
Date: Wed, 29 Sep 93 09:06:27 PDT
To: Mike Godwin <mnemonic@eff.org>
Subject: Re: Disturbing statistics on wiretaps
In-Reply-To: <199309291646.AA28909@eff.org>
Message-ID: <9309291714.AA14997@crypto.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Mike Goodwin writes:
>Steve Bellovin writes:
> 
>
>Here's the actual language of 18 USC 2515 (note the omission of
>"electronic communications"):
>
>
>Sec. 2515. Prohibition of use as evidence of intercepted wire or oral
>communications
>
>Whenever any wire or oral communication has been intercepted, no part of
>the contents of such communication and no evidence derived therefrom may
>be received in evidence in any trial, hearing, or other proceeding in or
>before any court, grand jury, department, officer, agency, regulatory
>body, legislative committee, or other authority of the United States, a
>State, or a political subdivision thereof if the disclosure of that
>information would be in violation of this chapter.
>--Mike

Out of curiousity, what's "wire communication" for the purpose of this
statute?  How does that differ from electronic communication (other than,
perhaps, non-voice data traffic sent via cellular telephone)?

Thanks

-matt




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: jim@Tadpole.COM (Jim Thompson)
Date: Wed, 29 Sep 93 11:21:46 PDT
To: tcmay@netcom.com
Subject: Re: Orange book, the NSA, and the NCSC
Message-ID: <9309291820.AA17528@tadpole.Tadpole.COM>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Been to "the fort" twice, once on 'official business', once on
a joyride around the 'campus'.  :-)  ("See them big sat dishes?
Don't want to get too close to them, marines with guns up there.")

The visitor's center has a small, but facinating museum of crypto
stuff, everything from enigma-style machines to a device that does
I-don't-remember-how-many-but-it-was-huge gigaflops on a hand-rolled
chip made on site, to a device for intercepting (and decrypting) microwave
transmissions.  Not much satilite stuff.  Pretty cool.

The guards all wear big (loaded, I checked) guns.  You're issued a
little badge to carry around your neck.  Get too far from your escort,
or in a room without your escort, and they get really upset (from what
I was told, I didn't try).

Across the highway is a state camp for delinquent boys.

Jim





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Mike Godwin <mnemonic@eff.org>
Date: Wed, 29 Sep 93 10:31:46 PDT
To: mab@crypto.com (Matt Blaze)
Subject: Re: Disturbing statistics on wiretaps
In-Reply-To: <9309291714.AA14997@crypto.com>
Message-ID: <199309291730.AA29712@eff.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Matt Blaze writes:
 
> Out of curiousity, what's "wire communication" for the purpose of this
> statute?  How does that differ from electronic communication (other than,
> perhaps, non-voice data traffic sent via cellular telephone)?

Rather than type in the lengthy definition sections, which refer to each
other, let me just say that a "wire communication" includes an "aural
transfer"--that is, a human voice. An "electronic communication" may use
the phone lines, but the definition excludes anything that qualifies as a
"wire or oral communication". See 18 USC 2510 (12)(B).

The definition of "wire communication" is 18 USC 2510 (1).
The definition of "electronic communication" is 18 USC 2510 (12).
The definition of "aural transfer" is 18 USC 2510 (18).



--Mike






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Perry E. Metzger" <pmetzger@shearson.com>
Date: Wed, 29 Sep 93 10:36:30 PDT
To: Mike Godwin <mnemonic@eff.org>
Subject: Re: Disturbing statistics on wiretaps
In-Reply-To: <199309291646.AA28909@eff.org>
Message-ID: <9309291732.AA22615@snark.lehman.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Mike Godwin says:

> Sec. 2515. Prohibition of use as evidence of intercepted wire or oral
> communications
> 
> Whenever any wire or oral communication has been intercepted, no part of
> the contents of such communication and no evidence derived therefrom may
> be received in evidence in any trial, hearing, or other proceeding in or
> before any court, grand jury, department, officer, agency, regulatory
> body, legislative committee, or other authority of the United States, a
> State, or a political subdivision thereof if the disclosure of that
> information would be in violation of this chapter.

How does the statute define "wire" communication?

Perry




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Marc Horowitz <marc@GZA.COM>
Date: Wed, 29 Sep 93 10:46:31 PDT
To: jim@Tadpole.COM (Jim Thompson)
Subject: Re: Easy cracking
In-Reply-To: <9309291707.AA16624@tadpole.Tadpole.COM>
Message-ID: <9309291744.AA01511@dun-dun-noodles.aktis.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>> The same kind of thing happened at Sun, except with the
>> secure rpc stuff.  Had a guy send mail saying, "I know your
>> two primes."  Sun replied, "No way."  (And lauged internally.)

I'm not sure this is how it happened, but the person (maybe there's
more than one?) who did this is a cypherpunk, who will identify
himself if he wants.  He also wrote a paper on this.  The first
version of the paper had the private key at the top of the first page,
but it got removed because certain spooks got upset.

		Marc




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: peb@PROCASE.COM (Paul Baclace)
Date: Wed, 29 Sep 93 14:01:48 PDT
To: pmetzger@shearson.com
Subject: Re: soda.berkeley.edu
Message-ID: <9309292057.AA00345@banff.procase.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Name (soda.berkeley.edu:peb): anonymous
331 Guest login ok, send your complete e-mail address as password.
Password:
230-The disk drive which holds our anonymous FTP directory is dead; we are
230-unable to support anonymous FTP access until it is alive again.
230-
230 Guest login ok, access restrictions apply.
ftp> dir
221-
221 Server shutting down.  Goodbye.
421 Service not available, remote server has closed connection




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Mike Godwin <mnemonic@eff.org>
Date: Wed, 29 Sep 93 11:31:47 PDT
To: pmetzger@shearson.com
Subject: Re: Disturbing statistics on wiretaps
In-Reply-To: <9309291732.AA22615@snark.lehman.com>
Message-ID: <199309291829.AA00403@eff.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


 
Perry writes:

> How does the statute define "wire" communication?

Sigh. I hate typing stuff in, but I'll go ahead and type this one
in.

Sec. 2510. Definitions

As used in this chapter--

(1) "wire communication" means any aural transfer made in whole or in part
through the use of facilities for the transmission of communications by
the aid of wire, cable, or other like connection between the point of
origin and the point of reception (including the use of such connection in
a switching station) furnished or operated by any person engaged in
providing such facilities for the transmission of interstate or foreign
communications or communications affecting interstate or foreign commerce
and such term includes any electronic storage of such communication, but
such term does not include the radio portion of a cordless telephone
communication that is transmitted between the cordless telephone handset
and the base unit;.... 

-----

--Mike






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: smb@research.att.com
Date: Wed, 29 Sep 93 11:36:30 PDT
To: Marc Horowitz <marc@GZA.COM>
Subject: Re: Easy cracking
Message-ID: <9309291833.AA29821@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


	 >> The same kind of thing happened at Sun, except with the
	 >> secure rpc stuff.  Had a guy send mail saying, "I know your
	 >> two primes."  Sun replied, "No way."  (And lauged internally.)

	 I'm not sure this is how it happened, but the person (maybe there's
	 more than one?) who did this is a cypherpunk, who will identify
	 himself if he wants.  He also wrote a paper on this.  The first
	 version of the paper had the private key at the top of the first page,
	 but it got removed because certain spooks got upset.

??  As far as I know, Sun's secure RPC uses Diffie-Hellman with a
192-bit modulus.  LaMacchia and Odlyzko solved the discrete log problem
for that size, but there's no single private key to disclose.

For those who are interested, the reference is

@article{nfscrack,
   author = {Brian A. LaMacchia and Andrew M. Odlyzko},
   journal = {Designs, Codes, and Cryptography},
   pages = {46--62},
   title = {Computation of Discrete Logarithms in Prime Fields},
   volume = {1},
   year = {1991},
  xnote = "11211-900629-12TM"
}




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: pmetzger@shearson.com (Perry E. Metzger)
Date: Wed, 29 Sep 93 11:36:50 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: soda.berkeley.edu
Message-ID: <9309291836.AA13512@kublai.lehman.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Hi folks.

I just tried doing an anonymous ftp to soda.berkeley.edu and it
failed. Has something happened?

Perry




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: koontzd@lrcs.loral.com (David Koontz )
Date: Wed, 29 Sep 93 14:41:49 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Clipper specifics
Message-ID: <9309292138.AA04244@nebula.lrcs.loral.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>From: "L. Detweiler" <ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu>

>Now, two Clipper chips will *not* work in conjuction with each other
>unless each is fed a valid LEEF from the other. However, since the chip
>does not accomplish this function (the communication, that is; it does
>*create* the field), and it is handled outside the chip, there is no
>guarantee that the system designer does not, for example, encrypt the
>LEEF in the communications transit, thereby completely sabotaging the
>`exploitative' tappability of the chip.

>Hence there is a *very* real possibility that this scheme, or something
>similar, could be used to gain Skipjack-level encryption without any
>key escrow complications. I suspect the NSA is *extremely* worried
>about this. They probably require that the chip purchaser promise to
>use Clipper in a way that guarantees the LEEF is accessable
>(plaintext). They may even create a contractual obligation wherein the
>surrounding device (telephone or whatever) cannot be approved for sale
>until it passes an NSA endorsed tapping test. (what fun!) I consider
>this all very plausible and probable. (This would be a neat trick --
>use the chip itself to encrypt LEEF fields -- hah! twist an insecure
>chip into a secure one, and spit in the face of the NSA!)

Having read the chip spec for the MYK-78 carefully, being a chip/hardware
weenie type, having military experience in cryptographic systems, and
having exposure to Type I chips (which have a lot of similarity to
clipper) there is a fundamental architecture feature of the MYK-78 that
can be exploited.  The MYK-78 allows multiple cryptographic contexts 
(encryption or decryption sessions) to be processed at the same time.
This is intended to allow a chip with a single instantiation of the
cryptographic algorithm to be used for full duplex communications.
It requires all simultaneous encryption/decryption sessions to use the
same session key although multiple cryptographic vectors (from different
initial vectors) may be used.  The MYK-78 is fast enough (bandwidth wise)
to allow 20-30 duplex vocoder conversations, and could be used in a
secure phone bridge using a single clipper chip.

The undocumented or classified protocol requires that LEEFs be used for
each session, extracted for transmission and input for reception.  The
chip requires that for every initial vector generated/requested that
the included Law Enforcement Exploitation Field (LEEF or 'greened' LEAF)
be subsequently input to enable decryption.  The LEEF is output when
the IV is read, the IV is part of the LEEF.  (You can see that to use a 
single MYK-78 for multiple duplex conversations requires care in assuring
that the distant end supplies its IV.)

Cryptographic context for multiple sessions (send and receive sides for
a single duplex path) is save through the use of save and restore context
commands. 

To get around sending the LEEF we instead generate an IV,  followed 
immediately by a save crypto context command (which produces the IV
without the LEEF).  The feed the IV (actually the LEEF to our own 
chip to enable decryption.  We transmit the IV(sans LEEF) through separate 
protocol to the distant end.  We receive the distant ends LEEFless IV
and use it with the restore crypto context command to initialize the
decryption session.  This allows both ends to operate without actually
transmitting a LEEF.  Once decryption is enabled cryptographic resyncronization
can be limited to exchange of LEEFless IVs.

Securely exchanging IVs is not without difficulty.  The clipper chip can't 
be used without establishing secure communications.  Clipper chip modes
can't be changed without requiring IV (and LEEF) introduction for other
than ECB mode.  One possibility is to use the chip in ECB mode with external
XOR and feedback management to support a feedback mode.  Likewise you could
through the use of save/restore crypto context commands and by accepting
the necessity for cryptographic restarts, switch the chip to ECB mode and 
encrypt the IV, say in a special key, for transmission to the distant end.
A lot of dancing, but no one is allowed to cut in.
--

>About the only company ready for Clipper chips is AT&T, and I think
>they are using Diffie Hellman key exchange currently with some
>proprietary algorithms (they have a license on Public Key directly from
>PKP already) in their secure phones. I suspect any companies that come
>out with new phone encryption equipment based on Clipper, if any are
>insane enough to exist, will try to be compatible with the AT&T
>`standard' (ug). As far as I know AT&T has not published their own key
>exchange standard used by the phones, however. That is, it is
>proprietary, and might even be protected by patents of their own! This
>is a rare occasion where incompatibility is something to beam about!

>From: rjc@gnu.ai.mit.edu (Ray)

>"Cypherpunks Hack Hardware"

>  It seems logical that when the ClipperPhones come out, they will have
>some kind of vocoder chip in them. (I doubt the (co)decoding will be
>implemented on the Clipper chip itself) If so, cypherpunks can
>take advantage of this situation.

Not having seen a clipperphone (there are none currently available),
one wonders if it is possible to play the above described trick with
the clipper chip and implement your own communications protocol,
capturing program control of whatever processor is used.  This gives
you skipjack security without big brother being inside.  A mode switch
could include compatiblility with the Escrowed Encryption Standard (EES).

>From: "George A. Gleason" <gg@well.sf.ca.us>

>Re your suggestion of a cypherpunk daughterboard to substitute for Clipper
>in "secure" phones etc.:

>I have a sneaky suspicion that AT&T won't be quite so cooperative.  They
>constantly do things in such a way as to make it darn hard to do anything
>with their products except exactly what they intended to do.  It might be
>worth a try though... OTOH anything that creates more demand for AT&T phones
>is a not-good thing in my view... we need an entirely competing product, and
>preferably cheaper than an AT&T clipperphone + daughterboard, for obvious
>competitive reasons.

AT&T uses a proprietary vocoder known as ACELP, which will prevent
knock off products without licensing.

There are only a limited number of ways to prevent you from modifying their
hardware.  

1) Built In Test (BIT) features.  The processor operating the phone could
   perform system level integrity checks and could refuse to work if the 
   code space doesn't check out, say for valid memory contents being 
   unmodified, or unused memory space not showing up blank.  This could be
   defeated with access to instruction and data streams.

2) With a high enough level of integration no modification may be possible.
   (no visability or ability to modify instructions for operating the clipper
   chip)

3) Refuse to sell you the phones.  Seems silly, but they already have
   rules on who they can sell to (U.S. citizens, corporations), under State
   Department rules.  It seems probable they will do their own distributing
   and large customer could always be denied sales upon request of virtually
   any of the components of the U.S. government.

4) Tamperproof packaging of the phone (I don't think they'd get UL approval
   for self destruct devices), say erasing the vocoder algorithm.
   
   Sufficient numbers of false zeroizing should defeat this say, organizing
   a couple hundred customers to swamp the system.  You would think a phone
   would be vulnerable to false zeroizing from throwing it in your 
   briefcase.

5) Refuse to do maintenance and/or void the warranty.  With a sufficient
   level of integration the phones become throw-aways upon failure.  This 
   doesn't affect organized crime.

6) legal barriers, largely ineffective (making it a federal crime to
   tamper with a clipperphone is a joke).  Outlawing nonrecognizable
   encryption schemes (this could be spoofed, through the use of canned
   LEEFs with session keys you never intend to use, but allows some
   useful intelligence (the serial number) to leak.  A single stolen
   and subsequently destroyed phone could supply the LEEF, but still
   serves as a red flag.  The ability to not transmit the LEEF suggests
   the ability to recognize one.  Intercepting and storing several 
   thousand (over time) for use randomly as spoofed headers would
   hamper detection.
   
   This is all predicated on the assumption that at least NSA will
   test suspected crypto streams for clipper, and routinely do 
   traffic analysis.

You could imagine modifying the phone totally nondestructively, through
the use of chip clips or whatever.

--

>From: karn@qualcomm.com (Phil Karn)

>Damn. Now I remember one of the points I meant to make in my NIST
>comments, but forgot: if the LEEF is added periodically to the
>ciphertext stream, that implies that the ciphertext data rate must be
>greater than the plaintext rate.

There is no evidence of anything at the chip level requiring 
periodic LEEF extraction.  This would almost undoubtedly be handled
at the communications protocol level.  One would guess that the feds
would be happy to have the LEEF occur every time you require crypto
sync.  Byte counts could be used to verify all this.

---

All of this has to be apparent to at least the NSA, and I'm sure that
no disreputable manufacturer will get to play with the clipper chips
and build a product that doesn't adhere to EES.  Having seen the
certification process for implementations of Type I chips, product
certification seems likely.

Blackmarket demand can be generated from two sources: persons seeking
more absolute privacy and criminals seeking secure communications.
I am not at all bothered by the privacy aspect, but would be bothered
by supplying or modifying phones for criminals, depending on the crime.

It seems unlikely that there is any enforceable method to prevent
modification of clipperphones, although discovery of a safe modification
process could consume a large number of phones if  countermeasures
are included.  All this is very sensistive to economy of scale.  The more
phone there are out there, the more blackmarket demand for modified phones
and the easier it would be to avoid detection.

The question is whether given the potential black market for modified
clipperphones, whether skipjack is indeed secure against its creator.

(sounds paranoid, I know)




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: kelly@netcom.com (Kelly Goen)
Date: Wed, 29 Sep 93 14:46:48 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: (fwd) More on CIA's Internet Debut
Message-ID: <9309292147.AA09267@netcom.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Path: netcom.com!netcomsv!decwrl!spool.mu.edu!darwin.sura.net!udel!news!news.world.net!speedway.net!nyxfer!nyt
From: nyt@blythe.org (NY Transfer News)
Newsgroups: alt.conspiracy
Subject: More on CIA's Internet Debut
Keywords: pigs in the wire
Message-ID: <XHFiac4w165w@blythe.org>
Date: Sun, 26 Sep 93 20:35:32 EDT
Reply-To: nyt@blythe.org (NY Transfer News)
Distribution: world
Organization: NY Transfer News Collective
Lines: 93


/* Written  1:24 am  Sep 27, 1993 by cwarren@peg.apc.org in igc:gen.bigbro */
/* ---------- "CIA, watching, watching, watching" ---------- */


Topic 189       CIA, INTERNET - TRUE!   Response  2 of  3 agarton
cafe.australia   9:00 am  Sep 24, 1993

Internet From: <dlr@well.sf.ca.us> To: dlr@netcom.com Date:
Wed, 22 Sep 1993

Found the following on the Well and thought it may be of
interest.

*****************************************************************

The following appears in the premier issue of "The Internet
Letter."  I'm not sure what exactly is meant in the third
paragraph--it seems a bit garbled.   Paul Wallner is actually the
coordinator of the Intelligence Community's efforts on "open
source" (unclassified information useful to intelligence analysts,
etc.), and not just CIA's--technically he works for the Director
of Central Intelligence in his role as IC coordinator.

The Internet Letter is edited by Jayne Levin, and is apparently
premiering at Inet'93.
***************************************************************************


004) CIA, U.S. GOVERNMENT INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES DEVELOP INTERNET
LINK

	Fourteen U.S. government intelligence agencies, led by the
Central Intelligence Agency, are developing plans that would allow
them to share unclassified information via the Internet.
	"Everyone is using it [the Internet]," said Paul Wallner,
CIA Intelligence Community Open Source coordinator, in an
exclusive interview with The Internet Letter. "Why not take
advantage of it ourselves and use it.
	"We're not looking at the Internet as a way to gather
intelligence," Wallner said. "The Internet is not viewed as a
source of information for us."
	The agencies that would use Internet to exchange "public"
information are part of the National Foreign Intelligence program.
They include the National Security Agency, CIA and the Defense
Intelligence Agency.
	The intelligence community will use the Internet to share
information and ideas among themselves and the academic community,
Wallner said. For example, if the CIA were asked about the nuclear
waste problem in Russia, "a good way" to find out would be to talk
to the scientific community on the Internet, he said.
	The system in place now is inadequate. While each agency
has its own internal electronic communications network, two
intelligence analysts working at different agencies but on the
same project cannot send E-mail to one another. There also are no
electronic links between the intelligence and academic
communities. Communication is carried out mostly by telephone.
	 Because of security concerns, the internal community
network will not be connected directly to the Internet, Wallner
said. The CIA plans to address the issue of security by creating
"air gaps" between classified and unclassified information. An air
gap would create a physical space between an agency's internal
network and an Internet link.
	"That allows us to have another check on hackers and
potential viruses," Wallner said. He characterized the tone of the
discussion over security as "technical."
	There are three phases to the project, and the first phase
is expected to start next spring. It involves establishing nine
prototype Internet "nodes" that will connect to an Internet
backbone. The CIA plans to seek engineering support from private
industry to help design the network's overall architecture.
	Unclassified materials produced by the Foreign Broadcast
Information Service (FBIS) may be available for anonymous FTP
(file transfer protocol). No decision has been made on whether a
Gopher or WAIS (Wide Area Information Server) server will be used,
Wallner said.
	The government is grappling with whether public
distribution of FBIS publications via the Internet would violate
copyright law. Selected FBIS publications now are available in
print and microfiche to government agencies and universities. FBIS
publishes eight daily reports, one for each geographic region of
the world.
	The information is gleaned from news accounts,
commentaries and government statements from foreign broadcasts,
and it is translated into English from more than 80 languages.
---------------------

Big brother is here and watching :)


+        Join Us! Support The NY Transfer News Collective        +
+       We deliver uncensored information to your mailbox!       +
+ Modem:718-448-2358   Fax:718-448-3423   E-mail: nyt@blythe.org +




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: nate@rodin.VIS.ColoState.EDU
Date: Wed, 29 Sep 93 14:21:48 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com (Cypherpunks Mailing List)
Subject: Address/phone number for Micotronics?
Message-ID: <9309292120.AA20336@rodin.VIS.ColoState.EDU>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text


Does anyone out there have the Address and phone number of 
Micotronics?

-nate

-- 
+--------------------------------------------------------------------
| Nate Sammons   email: nate@VIS.ColoState.Edu
|      Colorado State University Computer Visualization Laboratory
|      Finger nate@monet.VIS.ColoState.Edu for my PGP key
|      #include <std.disclaimer>
|                                    Always remember "Brazil"
+----------------------+



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Brian A. LaMacchia <bal@martigny.ai.mit.edu>
Date: Wed, 29 Sep 93 12:41:47 PDT
To: honey@citi.umich.edu
Subject: Re: Easy cracking
Message-ID: <9309291937.AA01203@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


   Subject: Re: Easy cracking 
   From: smb@research.att.com
   To: Marc Horowitz <marc@GZA.COM>
   Cc: jim@Tadpole.COM (Jim Thompson), cypherpunks@toad.com, honey@citi.umich.edu
   Date: Wed, 29 Sep 93 14:32:27 EDT
   
      >> The same kind of thing happened at Sun, except with the
      >> secure rpc stuff.  Had a guy send mail saying, "I know your
      >> two primes."  Sun replied, "No way."  (And lauged internally.)
      
      I'm not sure this is how it happened, but the person (maybe there's
      more than one?) who did this is a cypherpunk, who will identify
      himself if he wants.  He also wrote a paper on this.  The first
      version of the paper had the private key at the top of the first page,
      but it got removed because certain spooks got upset.
      
   ??  As far as I know, Sun's secure RPC uses Diffie-Hellman with a
   192-bit modulus.  LaMacchia and Odlyzko solved the discrete log problem
   for that size, but there's no single private key to disclose.
   
The discrete log problem is "brittle" -- you have to do a lot of
precomputation work for any particular modulus, but once you've done
that work finding individual discrete logs is easy.  We had received a
"challenge number" from someone at Sun (i.e. they gave us g^x mod p, and
we had to find x).  We included both numbers in our paper.

Interestingly enough, although Sun used a 192-bit prime, the comments in
the source code refer to p as a 128-bit prime.  Also, g=3 for the Sun
RPC system, and code comments refer to g as a primitive root modulo p.
But 3 isn't a primitive root modulo this particular p.  We suspected
that someone at Sun decided 128 bits was too short, and increased the
length of the modulus to 192 (still too short) without changing the
comments and verifying the primitivity of g.

					--bal

P.S. I've put a PostScript version of the paper up for anonymous FTP, if
you're interested in the details.  Get the file
		 martigny.ai.mit.edu:/pub/bal/field.ps





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: pmetzger@shearson.com (Perry E. Metzger)
Date: Wed, 29 Sep 93 14:01:52 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Sun Secure RPC
Message-ID: <9309292058.AA16396@kublai.lehman.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


So if Sun Secure RPC has been cracked this wide open, why hasn't sun
taken any action? Indeed, why hadn't I heard before? I would have
expected this paper (which I am now reading) to have been disseminated
far and wide...

Perry




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "mycal (voices through your head @ 88.1MHz)" <mike@NetAcsys.com>
Date: Wed, 29 Sep 93 20:16:33 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: misc crypto stuff
Message-ID: <2caa2729.acsys@NetAcsys.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Cypherdudes,

First a prediction, soon the news media will pick up on a major story on
somthing like child porn being transfered around using something like
PGP.  It will get blown out of preportion, and there will be a call to
outlaw anything but government approved government decodeable encription.

The news media will do one of there steller jobs on how bad this encyption
problem is and how there needs to be somthing done about it (see there
handling of gun related stuph).  The cattle, I mean ppl of this country
that still don't know the first thing about computers, and even lots of
those who, do will support the idea that something needs to be done (to
protect those poor children) and congress will pass a law, call it the
"communication security act" (don't you just love the names they choose for
these laws that do the opposite of what they are titled).  And since there
is no crypto lobby that weilds much power (unlike the gun lobby), it will
get passed, despite the outcry on the net, overloaded government email
boxes and editorials from computer rags.

Second, ever wonder why they picked 80 bits for the key length for clipper?
I think they used the same criterea that they used when they picked 56 bits
for DES.  I'm somewhat sure that clipper, like DES is a sound encription
method, but I'm also somewhat sure that 80 bits is not out of the NSA's
realm of attacking if it was neccary (like there not being able to use the
giant back door called key escrow).   They probibly calculated that 80 bits
is strong enough to provide a good level of protection against most cracking
attemts that could be mustered from other governments and orginizations,
but not against theirselvs, at least scailed for the preposed release date.

3rdly and finally,  if anyone is interested I can send them, for educational
purposes only, the source code for Zipcrack.  It hacks Zip V1.1 only, and
does a brute force attack, but it is economical for <7 character passwords.
It could be modified to do things like a dictionary search, but I lost
intrest a couple years ago.  Anyway it is in C and is quite short.

mycal







From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: fnerd@smds.com (FutureNerd Steve Witham)
Date: Wed, 29 Sep 93 16:46:33 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: ATM info?
Message-ID: <9309292339.AA10574@smds.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Pardon the off-topic post, but I thought people here would know.
Does anyone know of a good, technical but readable summary of 
ATM? (Asomething Transfer Mode)  How are things addressed?
How do you request a channel?  What is the format of the
headers?  How do switches work?  Etc.

Thanks,
-fnerd@smds.com




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Christian Void <cvoid@netcom.com>
Date: Wed, 29 Sep 93 20:51:50 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Mykotoxin info (old repost)
In-Reply-To: <9309300241.AA07485@bsu-cs.bsu.edu>
Message-ID: <Pine.3.05.9309292014.A21632-8100000@netcom3>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



> able to grab out of the dumpsers outside Mykotronx.   I have

Now that the whole world knows, you probably won't be able to do it again. :(








From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: frc%bwnmr4@harvard.harvard.edu (Fred Cooper)
Date: Wed, 29 Sep 93 17:36:33 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com (Cypherpunks)
Subject: PGP Docs...
Message-ID: <9309300034.AA01423@bwnmr4.harvard.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Hiya Folks,
	I'm gonna assume that no one has the PGP docs in postscript or rtf
format because no one has responded to my post except a couple other ppl
looking for the same thing.  So...
	I have converted the ascii txt files to WfW2.0 docs.  I'll be
uploading (to my account) a uuencoded file of them for windows ppl, and
I'll do my best have a couple portable formats as well. (RTF, and probably PS)
	To folks who asked for copies: Gimme a couple days and I'll mail
them out to you.


	Later
		FRC






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "L. Detweiler" <ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Date: Wed, 29 Sep 93 19:56:33 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: (1) a cypherpunk gold mine (2) RSA-PKP patent treatise (3) registration saturation (4) L.D. cypherpunk awards
Message-ID: <9309300255.AA05515@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Cypherpunk Gold Mine
---

Hello, Mark Riordan runs ripem.msu.edu and this has some *hot* files of
interest to cypherpunks. He has a very complete DES library with many
versions, BigNum packages, and a *lot* of collected files from the net
on a wide variety of interesting topics. Many excellent and fascinating
bibliographies too.

Of particular current interest -- he also has the complete current ITAR
online (as I noted earlier). I'm enclosing various file lists at the
end of this document.



RSA-PKP patent treatise
---

Also, for everyone who has ever wondered about the RSA-PKP patent
claims (and there's been a recent flurry on the list): An excellent and
very authoritative posting on the subject was written by G. Irlam and
posted to sci.crypt, etc. on May 20 1991. His email address in the file
does not appear to work anymore, but this file is so well researched I
am considering turning it into a FAQ on Usenet.

pub/crypt/docs/public-key-partners-patents.txt

Thanks to S. Bellovin for holding on to this, sending it to me in
response to a query, and to M. Riordan for very quickly sticking it on
the site after I uploaded it yesterday.


Registration Saturation
---

But I'm writing chiefly on the following subject. H. Finney, in his
first brilliant post analyzing the ITAR relative to PGP distribution,
noted that D. Bernstein posted an interesting note about his trials and
tribulations in attempting to `export' a cryptographic algorithm
SNUFFLE on sci.crypt. All he wanted to do was *post* to the newsgroup.
He has a big batch of letters in a file he posted to sci.crypt that
show the interesting relationships between the Commerce and the State
Departments related to the `Arms registration' involved in legal
cryptographic documentation distribution.

This is an *extremely* important file for anyone that wants to see what
the actual process of getting approval for cryptographic distribution
entails, even for simply *publishing* simple algorithms. If anyone
wants to `saturate the process' as has been discussed repeatedly on
this list, this is a MUST READ.  D. Bernstein went through this
amazingly hilarious-at-times procedure as an academic exercise in
showing the world how obtuse and bizarre the actual U.S. bureacratic
structures are that regulate this stuff. Here's a guy that went through
the whole surreal process just to POST to SCI.CRYPT. Its MIND BOGGLING.

I've also uploaded the file to soda.berkeley.edu, but I don't know if
E.H. will put it online (space is apparently very tight on soda). In
the meantime, the file is

ripem.msu.edu:/pub/crypt/docs/shuffle-export-hassles.

for the hard-core cypherpunks who drool over code and algorithms, the
code itself is in

ripem.msu.edu:/pub/crypt/other/snuffle.zip

Note: this and other files on the site (e.g. DES code) require that you
submit an application attesting to U.S. citizenship and promising not
to further distribute the code.

(I don't know what has happened to D. Bernstein on the net. He used to
be a great dogged flamer of people like Sternlight and Silverberg, but
haven't seen him lately. I suspect he's working on a new important
project and hasn't time for all the noise!)


Cypherpunk Awards
---

Finally, I should note that M. Riordan and D. Bernstein are sci.crypt
FAQ editors, but other than that I don't know much about them except
that they have both been instrumental in providing some *fabulous*
public services over the internet, particularly to the cryptographic
community. I vote them Cypherpunks of the Month (even though they're
not on the list).

D. Koontz gets my vote as Cypherpunk of the Week for the *sharp*
analysis that twists Clipper into something useful -- sort of Security
by Exploiting Exploitation. I sure hope Mycotronx isn't listening! We
might find that LEEF/IV hole patched up in the next version! (nobody
sneezed at the dumpster post, so I tend to think some of this stuff
goes on in a vacuum.)  I've asked him to put the Clipper specs he has
pored over into a more public place (scanned for FTP site?) for other
scheming cypherpunks to poke at.



Ripem.msu.edu File Lists
---

Here are some ripem.msu.edu indexes. Don't forget, you have to register
to get some of these (particularly the code). Check out file
/pub/crypt/GETTING_ACCESS. Flames for including this will be ignored.


===cut=here==

FTP Directory /pub/crypt/docs

   Parent Directory 
   luc-algorithm.txt 
   dss-proposal.txt 
   tmp 
   nist-secure-hash.txt 
   nsa-letter.txt 
   merkle-khufu-khafre-snefru.txt 
   crypt-bookstores.txt 
   crypto-history-books.txt 
   crypt-journals.txt 
   secure-netnews.txt 
   getting-nist-pubs.txt 
   factoring-bibliography.txt 
   polygonal-pubkey-algorithm.txt 
   rsa-conf-93 
   ritter-cloak.txt 
   sci.crypt-faq.txt 
   crc-discussion.txt 
   blair-crypt-lesson.tex.Z 
   public-key-overview-by-nist.txt.Z 
   scientific-american-pgp-letter.txt 
   rabin-algorithm.txt 
   des-break.ps.Z 
   golding-weak-consistency-dissertation.ps.Z 
   password-certification-authority.ps.Z 
   fast-random-nums.txt 
   enigma-wiring.txt 
   shuffle-array.txt 
   crypt-sites.txt 
   md5-cryptanalysis.txt 
   crypto.bib 
   rsa-faq.ps.Z 
   rsa-public-key-cryptography-standards 
   secret-sharing.txt 
   des-validation.txt 
   arj-encryption.txt 
   playfair-challenge.txt 
   luc-public-key-paper.ps.Z 
   zero-knowledge-proofs.txt 
   goldbug-book-dedication.txt 
   nonlinear-combiners.txt 
   clipper-chip.txt 
   dss-subliminal-channels.txt 
   nist-capstone.txt 
   nist-dss-clipper-testimony.txt 
   dod-pmsp-messages.txt 
   msdos6.0-compression-calls.txt 
   software-cryptophones.txt 
   letters-against-clipper.txt 
   elgamal-using-dss.txt 
   english-trigram-frequencies.txt 
   privacy-anonymity-faq.txt 
   three-cryptographers-problem.txt 
   crypto-random-num.bib 
   kryptoknight-authentications-and-distribution.tar.Z 
   arms-controls-phone-number.txt 
   feal-algorithm.txt 
   warlock-matrix-pubkey-algorithm.txt 
   s-box-exam-question.txt 
   rsa-nist-dsa-agreement.txt 
   des-chip-paper-src-090.ps.Z 
   tis-pem-faq.txt 
   des-break-errata.txt 
   itar-export-bibliography.txt 
   dept-of-commerce-crypto-docs.txt 
   sbox-overview.txt 
   cpsr-statement.txt 
   letter-against-nist-dsa-giveaway.txt 
   shuffle-export-hassles.txt 
   sbox-bibliography.txt 
   ky-28-military-voice-encryptor.txt 
   itar-july-93.txt 
   williams-crc-guide.txt 
   british-intelligence-books.txt 
   des-key-search.ps 
   idea-eurocrypt90.ps 
   english-dictionary-ftp-site.txt 
   intelligence-bibliographies.txt 
   intelligence-journals.txt 
   public-key-partners-patents.txt 



file /pub/crypt/other/CRYPT-COLLECTION.TXT

=Index of Cryptology Programs 
=Compiled by Mark Riordan    mrr@scss3.cl.msu.edu
=Last updated 9 October 1992

Note:  I can't seem to keep this document up-to-date, especially
for the "docs" subdirectory on ripem.msu.edu.  So, I have tried
to create new files in the "crypt" tree with long, descriptive
filenames.  To find the latest on ripem.msu.edu, be sure to do
an FTP rather than relying on this document.   /mrr  22 Feb 93

Warning:  the .zip files here were created with zip 5.0, not
with pkzip.exe, and cannot be extracted with pkunzip.  Get
unzip.exe (also available at this site).

cbw.tar.Z
Robert W. Baldwin  baldwin@xx.lcs.mit.edu
Crypt Breaker's Workbench, circa Oct 1986.  Program to help you cryptanalyze
messages enciphered with the simple, obsolete program crypt(1).
Reportedly used to help decipher R. T. Morris's worm (after the fact) from 
source code found on backup tapes at Cornell.

enigma-peake.c
Philip Peake    (philip@axis.uucp in Paris)
C program inspired by the World War II Enigma cipher machine,
but the algorithm is not completely identical.  

enigma_2.zip
Devours, et al.
MS-DOS .EXE of a BASIC program that emulates the real
WWII Enigma cipher machine.  Unfortunately, source is not
included.

hill.zip
John Cowan <magpie.MASA.COM!cowan>
C program to implement Lester Hill's encryption scheme involving
matrix arithmetic.  I believe the algorithm dates to the 1920's.
This code is from comp.sources.unix, Volume 17 (Feb 1989).

i-hat-correlation-analysis.zip
Douglas A. Gwyn <Gwyn@BRL.MIL>  (Theory by many others)
C code for various cryptographically useful statistical analysis
functions:  Kullback's information measure for a 2-way contingency table,
Gamma and related functions (Poisson, Chi-squared, etc.),
Pearson's Chi-squareed, etc.

jones-splay-compression.zip
Jeffrey Chilton, Douglas W. Jones <jones@cs.uiowa.edu>
Compression/encryption program based on splay trees.
C functions.

linear-rng.zip
William S.England  (Theory by Stephen K. Park and Keith W. Miller)
High-quality linear congruential random number generator.
I doubt it's truly of cryptographic quality, though.
In C, with instructions for adding directly into Perl.

lucifer-outerbridge.c
Richard Outerbridge <71755.204@CompuServe.COM>
C implementation of IBM's Lucifer cipher, a predecessor of DES.
Speed-optimized version of April 1984, but the algorithm is 
inherently slow.  Includes program which implements CBC.

lucifer-smith.c
Jonathan M. Smith  (original by Arthur Sorkin)
C implementation of IBM's Lucifer cipher, a predecessor of DES.
Version of March 1991.  Includes main program.  Pretty slow.

md4dos.zip
Jouko Holopainen <jhol@stekt.oulu.fi> (Theory by Ron Rivest)
Fast DOS implementation of the MD4 message digest function.
With DOS executable and C and 8086 assembly code.

md5.zip
Ronald L. Rivest, RSA Data Security  rivest@theory.lcs.mit.edu
Fast and popular one-way hash function in C taken from RFC 1321.
Contains a test program.  Version of April 1992.

md5-karn.zip
Phil Karn
Very fast DOS 386 assembler implementation of Ron Rivest's
MD5 hash function.  
Contains the Transform routine only (the time-consuming part).
Uses Borland C.  Version of February 1992.

mrrcip.zip
Mark Riordan  <mrr@scss3.cl.msu.edu>
Implementations of many classical cipher schemes (simple substitution,
columnar transpostion, Playfair, "straddling checkerboard", Vigenere,
and so on).  Of historical interest only.  Main programs all,
most in C but some in FORTRAN (hey, I wrote 'em a long time ago).

nsea.zip
Peter C. Gutmann  <pgut1@cs.aukuni.ac.nz>
"Nonpatented Simple Encryption Algorithm"--actually fairly complex
block cipher similar to DES.  C functions and main program,
with optional 8086 assembler module.  In-depth description
of algorithm, invented by author.

okeefe_encrypt.tar.Z
R. A. O'Keefe, Edinburgh.
C code for a fairly simple block transposition cipher
based on linear congruential random number generators.

rot13.c
Unknown
This is the well-known "Rot-13" cipher used to obscure offensive
Usenet postings.  Complete C program (very short).

scott-newdes.zip
Robert Scott, Mark Riordan (mrr@scss3.cl.msu.edu)
C implementation of NEWDES, an unfortunately-named block
cipher (doesn't have much to do with DES, but probably
has similar security) designed by Robert Scott and
described in a 1985 issue of Cryptologia.  The algorithm
is fast and doesn't take much code.  C functions & driver program included.

setzer-trans.zip
William Setzer   <setzer@math.ncsu.edu>
"Quick hack" C program that does transposition of 8192-byte chunks
of its input, based on a random number generator.

snefru2.5a.tar.Z
Ralph C. Merkle   (merkle@xerox.com)
One-way fast hash function in C by a well-known cryptologist.
C functions and test main program.
Most people seem to use MD5 instead. 
Version of November 1990.

snuffle.zip
Dan Bernstein  <brnstnd@nyu.edu>
Encryption program which turns a secure hash function into
a very good cipher.  Oriented towards the Snefru hash function, which is not
included here.  Simple (but profound) C code.  May be an old version.

wpcrack.tar.Z
Ron Dippold   <rdippold@qualcomm.com>
Programs to crack the encryption on WordPerfect 5.1 encrypted files.
Source code in Borland C.

--- DES implementations ---

barrett-des.zip
David A. Barrett <barrett@asgard.cs.colorado.edu>
Fast DES implementation, with main program that works in Cipher Feedback
mode.  Sometimes known as "fast-des".  Vintage Feb 1991.

cdes-bishop.zip
Matt Bishop, NASA Ames <bishop@bear.dartmouth.edu>
Nice C main program/front-end to DES to implement just about every
known mode of DES:  ECB, CBC, CFB, OFB.  Does NOT include an actual
DES implementation.  Includes man page.

chalmers-des-1.0.tar.Z
Stig Ostholm  ostholm@ce.chalmers.se
DES implementation with several utility programs and many useful
extra functions.  Runs on a variety of Unix systems.  Pretty good
documentation.
Vintage October 1990.

crypt-bsd-4.3-reno.c
University of California at Berkeley
This is the "crypt" password hashing function from BSD Unix.  It 
necessarily includes an implementation of DES.  Code is marked
as being from 1990.  I haven't tested it, but I believe it
is probably quite slow.  Nevertheless, it's probably in wide use.

csu10des.zip
Phil Karn <karn@Qualcomm.COM>  (original by James Gillogly)
Famous public domain DES implementation by Phil Karn of KA9Q fame.
Includes C functions & main programs.  
This is one of the first public domain DES implementations,
and many minor variations of it are floating around.
This one, last modified March 1987, was posted to comp.sys.unix, Volume 10.
Karn's DES is not as fast as
most of the more recent DES implementations but it's a "classic".

d3des.zip
Richard Outerbridge <71755.204@CompuServe.COM>
Fast, compact DES implementation from a longtime DES programmer.
Includes optional double and triple DES encryption.
C functions only; skimpy but adequate documentation.
August 1992 version.

desCore-2-How.tar.Z
Dana How <how@isl.stanford.edu>
Portable, very fast implementation of basic DES routines only.
Supposedly the fastest C version around.  Not so fast at key-setting
(i.e., password hacking).  This code was submitted to comp.sources.misc
as Volume 29, Issue 80 and later updated in Volume 29, Issue 128.  
May 92 version.

des-dist.tar.Z
Antti Louko (alo@kampi.hut.fi)
Fast DES implementation, with main program and C function library
for arbitrary precision integer arithmetic.  Also known as "alodes".
Last modified September 1992, but most code seems to date from 1989.

fdes5-baldwin.zip
Robert W. Baldwin <BALDWIN@xx.lcs.mit.edu>
Fast DES/crypt implementation in C (functions only)  This seems to be
1989-vintage code.  Evidently it was/is a favorite of password crackers.

koontz-des.tar.Z
David G. Koontz  <2004ktz%ucsbuxa@hub.ucsb.edu>
Fast but large DES C functions and main program.
Dates to March 1991, at which time it was one of the fastest around.
Good verification suite included.

libdes-young-p2.tar.Z
Eric Young (eay@psych.psy.uq.oz.au)
This is one of the fastest DES implementations around.
These C library routines are designed to replace the MIT Athena
DES routines that MIT does not make available for export.
Includes a main program and a test program.
This is Patch level 2, from July 1992.  I believe an 
earlier version was known as eBones.

mitchell-des.zip
D. P. Mitchell
DES implementation in C, with minimal driver program.
Version of June 1983.  I don't know how fast this is.
There's no documentation and the code is uncommented.

pfdes.zip
Stuart Levy, Minnesota Supercomputer Center
Portable, fast DES implementation in C, from April 1988.
Includes demo & benchmark programs.
Warning: files need cleaning up (control-Z's and extra spaces in makefile).

ufc-crypt-pl1.tar.Z
Michael Glad, email: glad@daimi.aau.dk
Ultra Fast Crypt, fast replacement for crypt(3), patchlevel 1.
This comes from comp.sources.misc volume 28, issues 115-116, March 1992.

allen-des486.zip
Steve Allen, email: 73277.620@compuserve.com
DES source (Turbo C & Assembler) & executable for MS-DOS.  Requires
486 due to use of BSWAP instruction.  Runs at 108KB/sec on 486-33.
Includes triple-DES.  Main programs as well as functions provided.
June 1993.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Anonymous <nowhere@bsu-cs.bsu.edu>
Date: Wed, 29 Sep 93 19:41:50 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Mykotoxin info (old repost)
Message-ID: <9309300241.AA07485@bsu-cs.bsu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


This is for Nate et al. -
 
>Date: Sat, 15 May 93 20:32:35 PDT
 
Howdy.  The following is a sampling of the information I was
able to grab out of the dumpsers outside Mykotronx.   I have
much more than this, but I'm fucking tired of typing.  I 
found a used Selectric typewriter ribbon from the Exec Secretary,
and their entire general ledger.  Will post more as I get the
time.  Do not disclose the origin of this document (me) but
you can publish it if you like to show that the people the 
government wants us to trust to keep the Clipper design
secret, don't know jack shit about security.
 
Information:
 
Mykotronx Inc.
357 Van Ness Way (1 blk so. of Del Amo)
Suite 200
Torrance CA 90501
(310) 533-8100
fax (310) 533-0527
STU III (310) 533-0738
 
Founded 1979
 
Resale # SR-AB 12-711252
 
Dunn & Bradstreet # 00-611-5281
 
Banking: Shearson Lehman Brothers
         Attn: Steve Scerra
         Acct # 509 24261 12011
         21250 Hawthorne Bl
         Torrance, CA 90509
         (310) 540-9511
 
 
Employee Names:
 
Bob Gottfried, CEO
Leonard J. Baker, President
Ralph O' Connell, aka "The Father of COMSEC", NSA Lobbyist
Mike Furusawa, Space COMSEC Manager
Patti Linahan, Executive Secretary
Kikuo Ogawa, Buyer
R. Todd, W. Greenfield, KG-44B (Outrunner) Project
John C. Droge, Personnel
Bob Todd, Manufacturing Manager
Landy Riley, Engineering
 
Federal Express Acct # 1122-7492-8
 
NSA Contact Home Address:
 
Ralph O' Connell
1401 Woodbridge Road
Baltimore, MD 21228
(301) 747-6276
 
Principle NSA Technical Contact:
 
National Security Agency
Maryland Procurement Office
Attn: N244 (CEB) (MDA904-92-G-0354/J.O. 5001)
9800 Savage Road
Fort George G. Meade, MD 20755-6000
(301) 688-8086
 
NSA Accounting Contact:
 
National Security Agency
Maryland Procurement Office
Finance and Accounting Office
9800 Savage Road
Fort George G. Meade, MD 20755-6000
(301) 859-6715
 
 
KG-46 Tactical Decryptor Unit and
KG-48B Outrunner Provisioning Conference participants:
 
Robert Todd, Mykotronx
Bill Greenfield, Mykotronx
G. Burgio, NSA
J. Gochnour, NSA
J. Wimpy, Air Force Computer Systems Command
S. Solis, Air Force Computer Systems Command
 
To Be Discussed at meeting May 18 & 19, 1993
 
Outrunner Project Milestone Payments:
 
1.  Preliminary Studies                $268,074        2/14/92
 
2.  Place Subcontract w/ VLSI    $47,917        2/22/92
 
3.  Complete PDR KG-44B                 $61,431        4/13/92
 
4.  Complete PDR VLSI                 $71,090        5/19/92
 
5.  Complete SFA Review VLSI         $78,470        7/12/92
 
6.  Complete CDR VLSI                $106,638        7/17/92
 
7.  Complete first KG-44B        $166,641        8/12/92
 
8.  Complete CDR                $132,454        6/18/92
 
9.  Complete tests 1st KG-48B        $151,957        12/16/92
 
10. Complete fab VLSI                $203,941        11/17/92
 
11a.Deliver 2 KG-44B to NSA         $81,080        9/8/92
 
11b.Deliver 2 KG-44B to NSA         $81,081        10/7/92
 
12. Complete Cryto Verif VLSI        $152,223        12/16/92
 
13. Deliver 4 KG-44B to NSA        $171,571        3/2/93
 
14a.Deliver 2 KG-44B to NSA         $30,432        3/30/93
 
14b.Deliver 2 KG-44B to NSA          $30,432        4/20/93
 
15. Deliver 4 KG-44B to NSA         $60,864        4/24/93
 
16a.Deliver 1 KG-44B to NSA         $15,216        4/28/93
 
16b.Deliver 3 KG-44B to NSA         $45,648        5/12/93
 
17. Deliver 4 KG-44B to NSA         $42,840        5/13/93
 
Total:                              $2,000,000
 
 
KG-44 VLSI Procurement:
 
United Technologies Microelectronics Center
1575 Garden of the Gods Road
Colorodo Springs, CO 80907
(719) 594-8000 fax (719) 594-8032
PO#5703-44ACN1 Feb 19, 1992
Invoice Date Feb 5, 1993
 
"Customer to pick up parts.  Secret item handling.
Secret Design KG-44LSI.  Mykotronx P/N M20/00301XXX"
 
Government contract # MDA904-92-C-A027
 
Group C Testing:        $4,400
 
5 Parts @ $675ea        $3,375
 
Job #BE-7281 Group C Samples
 
PIC Number: HP67AG84WTDLC
 
"Note: Group B samples also included with this shipment (ref 
Packlist #10128"
 
"The export of this product is controlled by the US Government.
The export of this product or the disclosure of related technical
data to foreign nationals without the appropriate export license
is prohibited by law."
 
Test Plan for MYK-80:
 
Statement of Work for Exatron Inc. 5/13/93
 
Develop test interface board for MYK-80 (176 pin TQFP) and
I.M.S. tester.  Interface to utilize "particle interconnect"
system.  Data on MYK-80 I.O. and IMS tester to be supplied
by Mykotronx.
 
Interface board to be installed in a work station which utilizes
Exatron "PET" handler, tooled for the MYK-80; a vacuum pick-up
device (manual, pencil type); work surfaces for JEDEC tray
storage and operator support.  The IMS tester will mount directly
under the "PET" handler.  Two "PET" handlers are to be quoted
with two sets of specific nesting tools for the MYK-80.
 
Installation in place at Mykotronx and initial operator and
maintenance training to be included.
 
Design review of the interface board layout, prior to release of
the board to fabrication is to be held at Mykotronx.
 
Manuals and Training Manuals subcontracted to:
 
ELITE Technical Corporation
Warren A. Griswold, President
1903 B Marshallfield Lane
Redondo Beach, CA 90278 
(310) 372-5616
 
 
CAPSTONE Financial Commitments by Mykotronx
 
Basic VII Cap VLSI 10                        $212,000
 
Sun 1 Yr maint hw&sw                          $2,700
 
Compass                                        $159,400
 
IKOS Systems & sw                         $57,500
 
ELITE Technical Corp                          $8,000
 
IMS/Sun                                        $119,000
 
Versatec Plotter                         $36,500
 
SJ (1)                                         $71,200
 
SJ (2)                                         $76,200
 
Exatron Test System                         $78,000
 
ROM Cell                                 $60,000
 
AT&T                                        $100,000
 
Surf Mgt (real estate)                         $13,900
 
Universal Shielding (Tempest)                 $20,600
 
Plotter maint                                  $5,000
 
Litronics                                $225,000
 
Spyrus (1)                                 $45,600
 
Spyrus (2)                                 $44,800
 
Compass (2)                                $110,000
 
VLSI Tech                                 $30,000
 
VLSI Tech (2)                                $163,000
 
VLSI Tech CAPSTONE TQFP                         $10,000
 
New Media NRE Design                         $18,700
 
South Coast Designers                         $14,600
 
South Coast                                  $6,000
 
VLSI Tech Exponeniator Tamper Sys        $163,000
 
Conres logic analyzer                          $3,200
 
VLSI Myk-78 tester                         $33,800
 
 
Here are exerpts of the general ledger of Mykotronx,
the Torrance Based Big-Brother outfit that is going
to make the Clinton Clipper wiretap chip.
 
Period: 01/01/93 to 04/30/93  (first 4 months of 1993)
 
Acct Descr                Beg Bal                Debits                Credits
 
==1000 series==
 
Shearson Lehman                286,511                2,620,096        2,670,822
 
Paine Webber                95,602                868                0
 
Dean Whitter                55,391                484                0
 
Petty Cash                3,000                0                0
 
Union bank payroll act        13,408                900,000                816,443
 
Accts rcvbl -customer        1,185,829        1,981,356        2,562,064
 
Accts rcvbl - eployees        7,125                48,450                55,575
 
Franchise tx rcvbl        2,165                0                0
 
Unbilled costs&fees        567,792                533,347                0
 
Raw inventory                172,252                0                76,064
 
Prepaid taxes                1,116                0                0
 
Prepaid sales tax        688                0                688
 
Equp/mach/furn                383,038                20,695                0
 
Accum depreciation        234,425                0                23,000
 
Deposits                9,272                0                0
 
 
 
==2000 series==
 
Accts Payable                482,895CR        1,869,477        1,684,555
 
Sales tax payable        147CR                176                0
 
Sales tax paid                0                0                0
 
FIT withheld                0                10,854                135,741
 
FICA withheld                0                0                56,622
 
CA state IT withh        0                0                36,163
 
CA state disability        0                0                8,730
 
SUI pybl employer        0                0                5,788
 
FUTA payable                0                0                2,007
 
FICA employer                0                0                56,621
 
Pd Payroll txs withh        0                290,820                0
 
401K withheld                0                0                42,712
 
Accrued payroll                25,637CR        343,682                318,045
 
Dental withheld                0                0                674
 
Dental plan pd                0                674                0
 
Withh 401K pd                0                42,712                0
 
Accrued bonuses                214,040                341,240                127,200
 
(holy shit - I wish I worked for a place that paid bonuses like that!)
 
Accrued Vacation        44,252                0                0
 
Excess billings                139,216                154,706                55,036
 
Gross payroll                0                751,859                0
 
Gross payroll distrd        0                2,552                754,412
 
Lease obligations        4,911CR                0                0
 
 
 
==3000 series==
 
Common Stock                169,320                0                61,435
 
Capital disbursement        916,675                222,230                0
 
Retd Earnings, begng        2,385,020CR        0                0
 
 
==4000 series==
 
Sales, returns&allowc        0                6,014                2,577,323
 
Interest income                0                0                1,353
 
Int income tax free        0                0                2,490
 
 
==5000 series==
 
Consultants                0                47,395                47,395
 
Subcontracts                0                932,210                110,419
 
Other direct costs        0                62,265                5,454
 
Printing/repro costs        0                542                0
 
Equipment rental/leasg        0                1,537                1,537
 
Maint, repairs                0                1,761                0
 
Delivery                0                3,217                0
 
Postage                        0                960                0
 
Materials/parts                0                186,252                22,423
 
Telephone                0                93                0
 
Travel                        0                10,437                0
 
Inv Cost of Mfg Prod        0                76,064                0
 
Direct labor-Engnrg        0                240,341                54,172
 
Direct labor-Technician        0                129,839                37,459
 
Direct labor-Adminst        0                47,542                10,081
 
 
==6000 series==
 
Indirect labor                0                60,319                0
 
Holidays                0                32,867                27,331
 
Sick leave                0                3,276                0
 
Vacation                0                38,096                25,976
 
Retroactive pay                0                4,400                0
 
Job advertisments        0                655                0
 
Grp Med Ins non sharhl        0                25,522                1,818
 
Mykotronx pd payrl txs        0                64,417                0
 
Workers comp                0                9,554                1,418
 
Interest pd                0                0                0
 
Consultants                0                2,013                0
 
ADP Acctg                0                1,493                0
 
Real World Acct Suppt        0                1,485                0
 
Bank charges                0                155                0
 
Blueprints/repro        0                390                0
 
Proposals                0                2,817                0
 
Copier expense                0                514                0
 
Depreciation - elec eq        0                23,000                0
 
Dues & memberships        0                749                0
 
Education & Training        0                2,850                0
 
Employee relations        0                4,531                 0
 
Business expense        0                7,431                0
 
Equip rental/lsng        0                4,458                0
 
Computer software        0                2,114                0
 
Insurance                0                9,061                1,380
 
Janitorial                0                20                0
 
Licenses & Permits        0                175                0
 
Maint, repairs                0                2,096                0
 
Delivery                0                995                13
 
Postage                        0                942                0
 
Amort organiz expense        0                0                0
 
Taxes - franchise        0                2,763                0
 
Real & Pers prop tax        0                0                0
 
Rent                        0                54,080                0
 
Subscriptions/books        0                325                0
 
Office/lab supplies        0                14,183                446
 
Telephone                0                7,961                36
 
Travel                        0                10,296                1,303
 
Utilities                0                5,833                0
 
LTD Ins, non sharehld        0                2,877                594
 
401K Mykotronx contrib        0                17,411                0
 
 
==7000 series==
 
Special Bonus                0                132,200                123,200
 
(Double holy shit!)
 
G&A Labor                0                103,4520        0
 
Legal Services                0                5,895                0
 
Board of Dir Expnse        0                1,078                0
 
Financial Svc                0                7,505                0
 
 
 
Totals                        0                12,555,101        12,555,101
 
 
Other little items:
 
 
 
Locks at Mykotronx installed and maintained by Torrance Lock and Key,
2421 Torrance Bl.  Torrance, CA 90501  (310) 320-8840  For some
reason, Mykotronx is over 90 days late paying a lousy $50 invoice.
 
Mykotronx has a Mossler safe.  It cost $1,693 when they bought it
11/27/90.  They have never changed the combination.
 
 
Outstanding VLSI purchase orders:
 
VLSI Tech (Capstone)                $212,000
 
AT&T (Myk-78)                        $71,200
 
Motorola (Myk-77)                $76,200
 
AT&T (Misc)                        $100,000
 
Compass (Software)                $159,400
 
VLSI Tech (Myk-78)                $66,200
 
Litronics (PCMCIA Crypto)        $225,000
 
VLSI Tech (Expoteniator)        $163,000
 
VLSI Tech (Capstone TFQP)        $10,000
 
VLSI Tech (Myk-78 fix)                $68,500
 
VLSI Tech (Myk-78A proto)        $11,000
 
VLSI Tech (Myk-78A prod.)        $220,000
 
VLSI Tech (Myk-80 #1)                $48,000
 
VLSI Tech (Myk-80 #2)                $33,750
 
VLSI Tech (Myk-82)                $80,000
 
VLSI Tech (Myk-79)                $79,500
 
Their LAN was installed by Strategies, Inc for about $14,000.
 
 





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: markh@wimsey.bc.ca (Mark C. Henderson)
Date: Wed, 29 Sep 93 21:46:33 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Triple DES Wanted
Message-ID: <m0oiFr9-0001TXC@vanbc.wimsey.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> 
> I'm looking for a Triple DES file encryption program that takes arguments
> in the same form as /bin/crypt or /usr/bin/des.  Is there a /bin/3des out
> there somewhere?  Has anyone come across 3des.c?  And if so, can you
> point me in the direction where it may be found.  Thanks..
> 
> If no such program exists, I think it would be very useful to the
> cypherpunks community if it were made available.  I'd also like to see a
You could write one based on Richard Outerbridge's d3des.
The essential routines are provided in the package, all you'd
need to provide is the wrapper. d3des is the basis of what is currently
used in RIPEM 1.1

I also used it in munge, which is an experimental encryption program 
I distributed a while back which encrypts with either IDEA or triple 
DES or a composition of the two in CFB mode. munge has an interface 
much like that of Unix "compress" (munge, unmunge, mcat &c.) I'd do 
things somewhat differently if I were going to redo it, but you can 
have it if you want it. Just don't ask me to maintain it or port it 
to anything else, as I don't want to put any more effort into it. 
There is significant ugliness in the code due to the fact that I was 
always maintaining backwards compatibility with previous versions. 

(if you want either munge or d3des, you can get by ftp it from either 
wimsey.bc.ca or ripem.msu.edu. Please don't export munge or anything 
from wimsey.bc.ca outside of the U.S. and Canada). 

Mark

-- 
Mark Henderson      markh@wimsey.bc.ca (personal account)
RIPEM key available by key server/finger/E-mail
  MD5OfPublicKey: F1F5F0C3984CBEAF3889ADAFA2437433




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: hfinney@shell.portal.com
Date: Wed, 29 Sep 93 23:21:50 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: REMAIL: Message expansion
Message-ID: <9309300550.AA26673@jobe.shell.portal.com.shell.portal.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

One of the problems with chaining remailers as we do it now is that
the message becomes quite a bit larger as you wrap encryption layers
around it, one for each remailer in the chain.

Currently, the remailers are all text-based, which requires that the
message be re-ascii'd at each stage of the encryption nesting.  But
ascii'ing a binary file using PGP's method increases its size by 1/3.

If this asciification could be avoided at each step, the message would
still grow as we add the PGP header and the remailing instructions at
each step, but this would be more moderate.  The PGP header is about
170 bytes, and the remailing instructions should not be more than
70 or 80 bytes, bringing the total to something less than 250 bytes
per step.

I did some calculations.  Suppose you wanted to start with a message
of, say, 4000 bytes which you will send through ten remailers.  First
off, we get an advantage because PGP will compress the message before
encrypting it the first time.  Let's suppose it manages to compress
it by a factor of two.  This means that we have a 2000-byte binary
message as our actual starting point.

In one model, we assume that we add 250 bytes per step.  This is what
it would be if we did not have to do the ASCII'ing process at each
nesting.  In the other model, we assume that we add 170 bytes, multiply
by 4/3, then add 65 bytes for the "-----BEGIN PGP MESSAGE-----" stuff,
and then another 80 bytes for the remailing instruction.  This is how
most of the chaining software actually works now.

Setting up for a ten step chain, the first method produces an output
file of 4500 bytes, while the second produces a file of 54046 bytes.
This is quite a difference.

If we wanted to add three more steps because we feel paranoid, the
first method increases to 5250 bytes, while the second balloons to over
120K bytes!

As a more extreme example, if the initial message was 10K bytes as we
have sometimes seen here, a ten-step chain would produce an output of
7500 bytes without expansion, and over 100K bytes with expansion.
(The smaller-than-input size in the non-expansion case is due to the
assumed 2-to-1 PGP compression of the original message.)

I think we should consider enhancing the remailers so this asciifying
step is not necessary.  It could be done something like this.

As each remailer receives the message, it must be in ASCII since that
is the only thing that makes it across the mail connections.  It decrypts
and de-ascii's it by running it through PGP just like it does now.
Suppose this produces something like the following:

::
Request-Remailing-To: <next remailer in chain>

<binary data>

The first part is in ASCII and is terminated by two new-line characters
in a row.  The rest of the message can be easily determined to be binary;
in fact, it is a binary PGP file, one readable for the NEXT remailer
in the chain.  This could be detected because PGP puts special bytes at
the front of the file.

All the remailer has to do specially is to asciify the binary portion of
the message, add the "Encrypted: PGP" header if we still use that,
and send it off as it normally would.  The next remailer receives a proper
ASCII PGP message which it can handle by the same rules.

Making this enhancment to the remailers would reduce the problems of
message bloat caused by the redundant asciifying of the message for each
stage of the remailer chain.  As we move towards remailers which do batching
and which do message padding so that all outgoing messages are the same
size, it will be more important to avoid this bloat since one big message
will force all others in the batch to be padded to that size by the
remailer.

Hal Finney
hfinney@shell.portal.com

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.2

iQCVAgUBLKpGOqgTA69YIUw3AQGLCQQAgGTXKgPOtgbqs3Dab/PZZNR1XPmLqJIH
nuf5Znj3bpOGGPFGPG5pBfSBmDn3U5uEnG7lMwKovSpXI6zxLv3IEd93X6oGaL5L
5SlZtqzWNgGGXIIVCwNkaio/W5DCvwYq3ZXPtOTWgDH4ZtKOPaifEFF885qv/VCw
heGzkqREjWM=
=qwkV
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: nate@VIS.ColoState.EDU
Date: Wed, 29 Sep 93 22:21:50 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com (Cypherpunks Mailing List)
Subject: spookey PGP problem... HELP!
Message-ID: <9309300518.AA04623@monet.VIS.ColoState.EDU>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text


OK, I'm running PGP 2.3a on an SGI Indigo R4000 (not that the machine
really matters, but it might help).  My keys were generated with
PGP 2.2 (on teh Mac), and I have since (obviously) upgraded to 2.3 
then to 2.3a.

I just recently started to encrypt a lot of things with my own public
key, and also noticed that the files encrypted with my pubkey were not
necessarily decypherable by my secret key.  I replaced my keyrings 
from backups make a while ago (they're just missing most of my public
keys), and still no luck.  I get the following error:

Pretty Good Privacy 2.3a - Public-key encryption for the masses.
(c) 1990-1993 Philip Zimmermann, Phil's Pretty Good Software. 1 Jul 93
Date: 1993/09/30 05:14 GMT

File is encrypted.  Secret key is required to read it.
Key for user ID: Nathaniel David Sammons <nate@VIS.ColoState.Edu>
1022-bit key, Key ID AE9C65, created 1993/05/24

You need a pass phrase to unlock your RSA secret key.
Enter pass phrase: Pass phrase is good.  Just a moment...
Error: RSA-decrypted block is corrupted.
This may be caused either by corrupted data or by using the wrong RSA key.

For a usage summary, type:  pgp -h
For more detailed help, consult the PGP User's Guide.

What the hell?  Sometimes it will decrypt the file (and sometimes not).
I am very reluctant to issue a key-revocation certificate, since I would
like to avoid this as much as possible, but it's not looking good.

This is really worrying me.  The data I encrypted is not that important,
but it's still a MAJOR problem I am having.

thanks,

-nate

-- 
+--------------------------------------------------------------------
| Nate Sammons   email: nate@VIS.ColoState.Edu
|      Colorado State University Computer Visualization Laboratory
|      Finger nate@monet.VIS.ColoState.Edu for my PGP key
|      #include <std.disclaimer>
|                                    Always remember "Brazil"
+----------------------+



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: nate@VIS.ColoState.EDU
Date: Wed, 29 Sep 93 22:31:50 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com (Cypherpunks Mailing List)
Subject: spookey PGP problem... gets spookier...
Message-ID: <9309300527.AA04638@monet.VIS.ColoState.EDU>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text


I just compiled 2.3a on a sun 4/280 in my Lab, and I was able
to decrypt the files fine.  The Mac version (2.3a) was also
able to decrypt the files just fine.


Hmmmmm.....

-nate

-- 
+--------------------------------------------------------------------
| Nate Sammons   email: nate@VIS.ColoState.Edu
|      Colorado State University Computer Visualization Laboratory
|      Finger nate@monet.VIS.ColoState.Edu for my PGP key
|      #include <std.disclaimer>
|                                    Always remember "Brazil"
+----------------------+



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Mike Ingle <MIKEINGLE@delphi.com>
Date: Wed, 29 Sep 93 20:46:33 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Active Eavesdropping of Clipper Phones
Message-ID: <01H3JEQNSDGS90NQOF@delphi.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


From what I've read, the basic Clipper chip provides no key management, and
AT&T is going to use DH. If there is no key certification involved, wouldn't
this be vulnerable to active eavesdropping?

In other words, cut the victim's phone line somewhere between his house and
the central office. Connect up your tap. It just passes voice through, but
when he goes secure, it breaks in and hijacks the key exchange. Instead of
the two phones exchanging keys with each other, both exchange keys with your
tap. Now you have two keys. Load each into a Clipper chip. Send the received
data to one chip to decrypt, then to the other to encrypt with the other
key, and send it on its way. Neither party would know he's being had - it is
much like feeding someone a phony PGP key.

The tap could use stock Clipper chips, with no need to reverse engineer,
since they will be used for their intended purpose - to communicate with
another Clipper at the far end. You could probably reduce it to a notebook
computer and the guts of two AT&T ClipperPhones.

There must be something to prevent this - isn't there?

--- MikeIngle@delphi.com

"Hey hey, NSA, how many phones did you tap today?"





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: strick -- henry strickland <strick@versant.com>
Date: Wed, 29 Sep 93 23:51:50 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Files on DH, HM, RSA, & HP patents
Message-ID: <9309300651.AA01982@versant.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I've been spending the week in Washington DC, so I went by the Public
Search Room of the U S Patent and Trademark office and requested the
complete files on the four patents named in rfc1424 (see below).

I have photocopies of nearly the complete folders, which include the
initial proposed patent and all the written communication between the
patent attorney and the patent examiner.  (I think all four of these
patents had all of their claims rejected on the first pass.)  You see
the patent examiner explain what is wrong, criticizing the patent, and
the subsequent ammendments and more rejections until the patent is granted.
(This is important information if one wishes to challenge a patent.  You
can see how various arguments were dealt with before and what likely
responses from patent examiners are.)

I'll bring all of this to the October Mountain View cypherpunks
meeting, assuming it is Sat Oct 9.  I'll also try and be ready to
summarize the history of each patent.  

What are missing from my copies are mostly legal communications that
had no techincal interest -- powers of attorney & calculations of
fees.   I also omitted most of the published articles that were
referenced (several other patents and some scholarly papers) and some
seemingly redundant diagrams.  Of course, I also have copies of the
final patents granted.

The Search Room is an interesting place.  I pulled several faux pas
and got quite an education in patents and federal offices....

			strick







-------------- excerpt follows --------------

RFC 1424        Key Certification and Related Services     February
1993


   The Massachusetts Institute of Technology and the Board of Trustees
   of the Leland Stanford Junior University have granted Public Key
   Partners (PKP) exclusive sub-licensing rights to the following
   patents issued in the United States, and all of their corresponding
   foreign patents:

      Cryptographic Apparatus and Method
      ("Diffie-Hellman")............................... No. 4,200,770

      Public Key Cryptographic Apparatus and Method
      ("Hellman-Merkle").................... No. 4,218,582

      Cryptographic Communications System and Method
      ("RSA")................................... No. 4,405,829

      Exponential Cryptographic Apparatus and Method
      ("Hellman-Pohlig").................... No. 4,424,414

   These patents are stated by PKP to cover all known methods of
   practicing the art of Public Key encryption, including the
   variations collectively known as El Gamal.





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: cme@ellisun.sw.stratus.com (Carl Ellison)
Date: Wed, 29 Sep 93 20:51:57 PDT
To: karn@qualcomm.com
Subject: Re:  Clipper specifics
Message-ID: <9309300351.AA28935@ellisun.sw.stratus.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I'd be surprised if they allow you a month or two for more comments.

My current fantasy about Clipper is that the NSA did a deal with AT&T,
demanding removal of DES chips in favor of Skipjack, getting AT&T to buy
into a limited delay in product introduction with the gov't promising to
get the Skipjack standard in place by Summer so that the AT&T phones
weren't held up too long.

That's all out of my own head, but it hangs together.

Does anyone know specifics about AT&T's prior plans?  Was there
a DES version?

 - Carl




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Andrew Thomas <athomas@hydra.acs.uci.edu>
Date: Wed, 29 Sep 93 23:56:36 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Two basic questions...
Message-ID: <199309300655.AA16855@hydra.acs.uci.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



First:  

Is there an FTP site with the excellent cypherpunk article from Whole Earth
Review online?  If there isn't, would someone be willing to email me a 
copy?

Second:

I couldn't find a clear answer from the pgp docs, is there any reason to
upgrade your public key with newer versions of pgp?  I generated my
keys with 2.2 and am now using 2.3a, does this matter at all? 

I'm sorry if these questions have been addressed recently, I'm a little out 
of touch (I've got 700+ unread cypherpunks messages in my folder 8(

Thanks,

Andrew Thomas  <aethomas@uci.edu>
Distributed Computing Support - Office of Academic Computing
University of California, Irvine
dcs@uci.edu  (714)856-8383

-----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----
Version: 2.2

mQBNAixX9koAAAECANP9I4cYQFIIspJ/GtCjgMh1F0mHSlNvdN+HoMy7mBN9xegI
rxLEw1cKIK1pQNYhZBoI63kohSoqN5tYgDWU80kABRG0IEFuZHJldyBUaG9tYXMg
PGFldGhvbWFzQHVjaS5lZHU+
=Pk2n
-----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Mike Ingle <MIKEINGLE@delphi.com>
Date: Wed, 29 Sep 93 21:01:50 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Digicash: good description
Message-ID: <01H3JF7JM47M8WXVML@delphi.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Does anyone know where I can get a good, lucid ASCII description
of digicash systems?

--- MikeIngle@delphi.com





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: rjc@gnu.ai.mit.edu (Ray)
Date: Wed, 29 Sep 93 21:01:56 PDT
To: MIKEINGLE@delphi.com (Mike Ingle)
Subject: Re: Hacking ClipperPhones
In-Reply-To: <01H3JEO8NAZM90NQOF@delphi.com>
Message-ID: <9309300358.AA29944@geech.gnu.ai.mit.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Mike Ingle () writes:
> 
> > What do you think?
> 
> I think I definitely want to see Clipper Phones hacked and slashed out of
> existence, but as long as hardware hacking is required, their availability
> will be limited to a small group of people who know how to use a soldering
> iron. Why not concentrate on using commercial hardware (fast modems,
> soundblaster cards with DSP, voicemail cards with hardware compression, etc)
> to make a plug-and-play cryptophone using 3DES or IDEA, and PGP keys? That
> will appeal to a much larger audience. We should definitely learn all we can
> about the Clipper system, however.

  In a way, I agree, but I am skeptical on the price point we will be able
to achieve compared to just cannibalizing a ClipperPhone for spare parts.
Ideally, the "cypherpunk phone" should consist of
1) cheap v.32 modem (<$200)
2) cheap 8bit sampler/audio card
3) CELP vocoder ardware, or cheap DSP with it implemented in software
4) a fast 486 (to do real time 3DES/IDEA @ CELP rates)

   Most people already have 1,4, they need 2,3 which will cost anywhere from
$300-600 depending on what kind of DSP you get. This is too much money
for such a standard to proliferate. If the ClipperPhones are cheaper, we
could do better to buy those and cannibalize them for parts.

(maybe we could convince ZyXeL to add an "auto-CELP-comp" mode like v.42
to their modems with built in CELP? )



-- Ray Cromwell        |    Engineering is the implementation of science;    --
-- EE/Math Student     |       politics is the implementation of faith.      --
-- rjc@gnu.ai.mit.edu  |                         - Zetetic Commentaries      --




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: J. Michael Diehl <mdiehl@triton.unm.edu>
Date: Wed, 29 Sep 93 23:06:36 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: key-server down?
Message-ID: <9309300605.AA27084@triton.unm.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


     Hi guys.  I've been using the pgp key server for some time now, but
lately I've been having problems with it.  I send it commands (last 30 for
example) and never get a reply.  I believe I'm using the one on toxicwaste,
but can't be sure since I have an alias for it and I'm not at my email
account at the moment.  Is this site down or am I just impatient?  Thanx in
advance.
 
Lagers,
J. Michael Diehl   ;^)  |*The 2nd Amendment is there in case the 
mdiehl@triton.unm.edu   | Government forgets about the 1st!  <RL>
Mike.Diehl@f29.n301.z1  |*God is a good Physicist, and an even 
    .fidonet.org        | better Mathematician.  <Me>
al945@cwns9.ins.cwru.edu|*I'm just looking for the opportunity to 
 (505) 299-2282 (voice) | be Politicly Incorrect! <Me>
Can we impeach him yet? |*Protected by 18 USC 2511 and 18 USC 2703. 
PGP Key = 7C06F1 = A6 27 E1 1D 5F B2 F2 F1  12 E7 53 2D 85 A2 10 5D




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: catalyst@netcom.com (Scott Collins)
Date: Thu, 30 Sep 93 00:26:36 PDT
To: Mike Ingle <MIKEINGLE@delphi.com>
Subject: Re: Active Eavesdropping of Clipper Phones
Message-ID: <9309300715.AA02851@newton.apple.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


What you are describing is the classic 'man-in-the-middle' attack.  It is
not avoidable short of out of band signalling i.e., you know some
fact/secret about the person you really want to talk to (like their public
key) that does not go through the man-in-the-middle (to possibly be
replace), and can't be faked.

Even with such knowledge, you still have to design your protocol with care.
 The essence of one protocol that is proof against this attack is this:

        Diffie-Hellman key exchange, during which the two parties seeking
        privacy also exchange challenge data which is returned after being
        concatenated with the other parties a^x, and signed with their
        private key.

These are only the central parts.  Additionally, certificates might be
exchanged etc.  But even slight changes to this would make it less secure:
e.g. if each party only sent the cryptographically signed a^x, then an
attacker willing to build the log table to (much later) derive x (this
person could even be the intended recipient) could use saved portions of a
real exchange to mount a 'replay' attack.  Also, choosing a system wide 'a'
and 'p' increase the incentive to build the tables, much better to let
people put their personal choice for 'a' and 'p' in their signed & sealed
key certificate.

This protocol is described in detail in a paper (that is not in front of me
right now, so I'm a little fuzzy) that was published in 'Designs, Codes and
Cryptograpy', a periodical originating in the Netherlands.  I believe the
authors were Diffie and van Oorschot(?), but I'm just can't remember off
the top of my head.  If Whit Diffie is reading this message, then surely he
will know, I think, even if he wasn't the author.

Without 'out of band' signalling, the clipper chip would certainly be
subject to this kind of attack.  My understanding is that Skipjack is
symmetric, so that's no help.  We already noted that straight DH key
exchange is vulnerable.  The only remaining hope, then, is that your phone
knows some serial number or such about the phone you _intend_ to be
communicating with, and that this fact is an unavoidable part of the IV
such that once you know who the message is supposed to be coming from, you
couldn't decrypt it unless it really did, and no one else could fake it. 
This is possible, but obviously teetering on the brink of asymmetry, and
therefore, I think, unlikely.

The man-in-the-middle attack is so well known, however, that clipper must
have _some_ provision for it, and I just haven't read the right paragraph
yet.

Hope this helps,


Scott Collins         | "Few people realize what tremendous power there
                      |  is in one of these things."     -- Willy Wonka
......................|................................................
BUSINESS.   voice:408.862.0540  fax:974.6094   collins@newton.apple.com
Apple Computer, Inc.   5 Infinite Loop, MS 305-2B   Cupertino, CA 95014
.......................................................................
PERSONAL.   voice/fax:408.257.1746    1024:669687   catalyst@netcom.com





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: khijol!erc (Ed Carp)
Date: Thu, 30 Sep 93 00:36:58 PDT
To: mdiehl@triton.unm.edu (J. Michael Diehl)
Subject: Re: fido encryption.
In-Reply-To: <9309300633.AA27652@triton.unm.edu>
Message-ID: <m0oiIHr-00022cC@khijol>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text


> 2)   They seem to be afraid to pass/store encrypted messages on their
> system.  This indicates to me a lack of understanding of the concept of
> privacy.  They seem to buy into the idea that "only BAD people encrypt
> email."

Most of them are scared to death over possible liability, like if someone
is selling credit card numbers and using their BBS to forward the messages,
they feel they could be legally liable.  There have been too many instances
of folks getting their computers confiscated over this sort of thing.

Personally, I feel like it's all a scam, cooked up by those in the DA's
office who are jealous because ours are bigger than theirs are.  ;)  A 486/50
with a couple of GB HD and a SVGA monitor and a couple of 1.4K modems is a
pretty hard thing to pass up if you're short on computing power in the DA's
office ... and short on $$$...  :(
-- 
Ed Carp, N7EKG			erc@apple.com			510/659-9560
                            anon-0001@khijol.uucp
If you want magic, let go of your armor.  Magic is so much stronger than
steel!        -- Richard Bach, "The Bridge Across Forever"



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: cme@ellisun.sw.stratus.com (Carl Ellison)
Date: Wed, 29 Sep 93 21:26:33 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Carl Ellison on 'The Death of DES'
Message-ID: <9309300422.AA29026@ellisun.sw.stratus.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>Date: Wed, 29 Sep 1993 08:56:21 -0600 (MDT)
>From: Michael Johnson <mpj@csn.org>
>Subject: Re: Carl Ellison on 'The Death of DES' 
>To: Mike McNally <m5@vail.tivoli.com>
>In-Reply-To: <9309291229.AA11549@vail.tivoli.com>
>Message-Id: <Pine.3.05.9309290818.A2965-b100000@teal.csn.org>

> In other words, des | tran really
>isn't much stronger than des

des | tran is exactly as secure as des.  A final tran adds nothing.  It
looks messed up to a human, but there's no cryptographic value added.

tran is of value *only* between two strong ciphers and its only value is to
increase the size of the block affected by the surrounding ciphers.

> , but des|tran|des|tran|des|tran|des|tran...
>could be quite strong (not to mention slow).

Try the new tran. The one originally posted had a slow (LC) PRNG.
The new one uses subtract-with-borrow and it's faster.

Another consumer warning:  the s-w-b PRNG has a huge period but that doesn't
make it cryptographically secure.  If anything, this is probably the easiest
PRNG to break.

 - Carl




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: J. Michael Diehl <mdiehl@triton.unm.edu>
Date: Wed, 29 Sep 93 23:36:36 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: fido encryption.
Message-ID: <9309300633.AA27652@triton.unm.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


     Hi all!  I just conducted an experiment whose results indicate how far
we (Cypherpunks) have to go in educating the American Public WRT encryption
technology:  
 
I send an encrypted message via fidonet! (awk!)
 
     I had heard a rumor that fidonet forbade encrypted e-mail, but I had to
find out for myself.  Well, they do.  Now I understand that these sysops are
spending their own money and equipment to provide these services and have
the right to regulate it in any way they see fit.  That's not the point. 
The point(s) is/are:
 
1)   They ACTIVELY enforce this policy.  They don't simply say "no," they
check (presumably) all of their user's email to enforce this policy.
 
2)   They seem to be afraid to pass/store encrypted messages on their
system.  This indicates to me a lack of understanding of the concept of
privacy.  They seem to buy into the idea that "only BAD people encrypt
email."
 
     We need to educate the electronic community before we can hope to
educate the general public.  The text of the messages follow with the names
removed.  BTW, the text of the plaintext message was "this is a test."  Just
thought you'd be interested.  Comments?
 
 
=========================================================================== 
 BBS: The Tech Source 
Date: 09-16-93 (00:00)             Number: 261 
  To: MIKE DIEHL                    Recvd: YES (PVT) 
Subj: Encrypted Mail                 Conf: (0) PrivateE-M 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
This is a test. 
-----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK----- 
version: 2.2 
 mQCNAiu/jPkAAAEEAMGeUcJS+AfY32cDfy/v/UcA9JdqNOBOl/K37jFOBuCkXCSp 
lBa 
---END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK----- 
 
Mike, Please advise the sender of this message that I DO NOT allow 
encrypted mail to pass thru this system. I expect folks to abide by this 
rule voluntarily... 
 
I would hate to have to block all messages from this source becuase 
someone wishes to violate my policy :) 
 
BTW, the debate about "encrypted" mail with me is MOOT...  I will not vary 
from my position... (just thought I'd let you know in case you wanted to 
try to convince me it is OK to allow encrypted mail...) please have the 
other person send encrypted mail directly to your machine... 
 
Thank you.. 
 
Sysop of Another BBS? 




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: jet@netcom.com (J. Eric Townsend)
Date: Wed, 29 Sep 93 17:46:33 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: need the verilog decryptor script...
Message-ID: <9309300042.AA07832@netcom6.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



I'll do something very nice for the person who sends me, either
electronically or on paper, the verilog decryptor.  I'm not going to
use it to crack verilog code for gain.  (I need it for a demonstration
for some folks.)


jet
4546 B10 El Camino Real #189
Los Altos, CA 94022

or if you want to encrypt:

-----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----
Version: 2.2

mQCNAiuStukAAAEEALzis/ofetFmRbpxV+33Bj1ptYdkPpgBelpU9mW51C0yJi3I
8jPmBlQ3AAbkqoFWiSCvsw9QkkszT5KMuHocGgMO6SAubH+eneBVoZaSZBEddVsT
QZLsf2yKMMr6qDA0hkACeFeCmtM95KzeaePTCc/Hm91AxNcsduZT0W0+vi3bAAUR
tCNKLiBFcmljIFRvd25zZW5kIDxqZXRAbmFzLm5hc2EuZ292Pg==
=WFox
-----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: msattler@netcom.com (Michael Sattler)
Date: Thu, 30 Sep 93 00:56:36 PDT
To: J. Michael Diehl <cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: fido encryption.
Message-ID: <9309300753.AA29492@netcom.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


At 00:33 9/30/93 -0600, J. Michael Diehl wrote:
>We need to educate the electronic community before we can hope to
>educate the general public.

Damn straight.

>BTW, the debate about "encrypted" mail with me is MOOT...  I will not vary 
>from my position... (just thought I'd let you know in case you wanted to 
>try to convince me it is OK to allow encrypted mail...) please have the 
>other person send encrypted mail directly to your machine...

Scary, isn't it?

-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
Michael S. Sattler         msattler@netcom.com        +1 (415) 358-3058
Digital Jungle Software    Encrypt now; ask me how.   (finger for PGP key)

  "Don't Panic!" -- Douglas Adams     "Don't Panic.  Stay Cool."  -- PRZ 






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: jet@netcom.com (J. Eric Townsend)
Date: Wed, 29 Sep 93 18:06:32 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: thx, anon person
Message-ID: <9309300103.AA10021@netcom6.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



thanks to the anon person who sent me the crypto code.

-eric, vainly attempting to improve security throughout the valley...




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Matthew B. Landry <mbl@ml7694a.leonard.american.edu>
Date: Wed, 29 Sep 93 22:31:58 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Triple DES Wanted
Message-ID: <9309300526.AA09069@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>wimsey.bc.ca or ripem.msu.edu. Please don't export munge or anything 
>from wimsey.bc.ca outside of the U.S. and Canada). 
        This admonition rings a bell in my mind. Most of the US export laws 
seem to be based on "export outside US or Canada". So I'm wondering, are the 
comparable Canadian laws as strict about export of crypto software? 
Specifically, if US authorities won't stop us from exporting to Canada (placing 
files on Canadian FTP sites), will Canadian authorities stop us from exporting 
to Europe, et al. (foreign users FTPing the files from the deposit site)?
        Yes, it's a longshot. No, I don't have all the facts. Yes, I will 
probably get enough "clueless newbie" flames to set my Ethernet card on fire. I 
know all of these things. Could someone please answer the question?
--
Matthew B. Landry
ml7694a@american.edu
(Finally!) mbl@ml7694a.leonard.american.edu




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: J. Michael Diehl <mdiehl@triton.unm.edu>
Date: Thu, 30 Sep 93 02:11:52 PDT
To: jrk@sys.uea.ac.uk (Richard Kennaway)
Subject: Re: soda.berkeley.edu
In-Reply-To: <8826.9309300858@s5.sys.uea.ac.uk>
Message-ID: <9309300907.AA03671@triton.unm.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


According to Richard Kennaway:
> 
> BTW, when anon ftp servers ask you to give your email address as a
> password, how many of you do?

PFfffft!  On which planet?  ;^)

Mike.



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: catalyst@netcom.com (Scott Collins)
Date: Thu, 30 Sep 93 04:16:37 PDT
To: Mike Ingle <MIKEINGLE@delphi.com>
Subject: Re: Active Eavesdropping of Clipper
Message-ID: <9309301111.AA04034@newton.apple.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Mike Ingle quotes Matt Blaze (and I paraphrase):

  >[...] so the procedure for placing a secure call is to recognize
  >each other's voice in the clear mode, go secure, and read the hash
  >value to each other [...] you have to rely on prior knowledge of each
  >other's voice. [...]

This is out of band WRT the encryption engine.  Note that it can be used
exactly like an asymmetric encryption key for authentication.  You know the
other persons signature/voice in advance and it is hard for an attacker to
reproduce it.


  >[an attacker could] trick you into saying some numbers, digitally record
  >them, and then rearrange them and play them back.

The 'replay' attack.  Of course you always make the other person say the
hash _and_ some (never reused?) data in a lump (re: my earlier post --
concatenate your challenge data with their a^x before signing) for
instance: "Bob, please sing me the hash to the tune of 'Raindrops Keep
Fallin' on My Head'" (Security can be fun).


  >Or introduce enough line noise so the person couldn't recognize your
  >voice, and read the fake key

Signature not valid.  Sorry Bob, I'll have to call you back.  That is, _if_
it's really you.


Scott Collins         | "Few people realize what tremendous power there
                      |  is in one of these things."     -- Willy Wonka
......................|................................................
BUSINESS.   voice:408.862.0540  fax:974.6094   collins@newton.apple.com
Apple Computer, Inc.   5 Infinite Loop, MS 305-2B   Cupertino, CA 95014
.......................................................................
PERSONAL.   voice/fax:408.257.1746    1024:669687   catalyst@netcom.com





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Just-in-time terraforming  30-Sep-1993 1008 <yerazunis@aidev.enet.dec.com>
Date: Thu, 30 Sep 93 07:11:54 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: FIDOnet encryption (or lack thereof)
Message-ID: <9309301408.AA18400@enet-gw.pa.dec.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>Mike, Please advise the sender of this message that I DO NOT allow 
>encrypted mail to pass thru this system. I expect folks to abide by this 
>rule voluntarily... 
> 
>I would hate to have to block all messages from this source becuase 
>someone wishes to violate my policy :) 
> 
>BTW, the debate about "encrypted" mail with me is MOOT...  I will not vary 
>from my position... (just thought I'd let you know in case you wanted to 
>try to convince me it is OK to allow encrypted mail...) please have the 
>other person send encrypted mail directly to your machine... 

Heh.  OK.  Well, if one behaves "ethically", then I guess *that* closes
the issue.  It's his machine and he gets to make the rules.  (this is
my personally-adhered-to point of view)

On the other hand, he doesn't seem to have protected himself against
steganographic users (though the low bandwidth of steganography compared
to obvious encryption may make the steg channel less useful).  Others
may choose to take this point of view- but it's your karma.

	-Bill




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: nobody@shell.portal.com
Date: Thu, 30 Sep 93 09:16:54 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Communications Week Article
Message-ID: <9309301527.AA17927@jobe.shell.portal.com.shell.portal.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


In the Sept 28 issue of Communication Week, Pg 35-36.

_Who will hold the Clipper Keys?_

*Last Paragraph*

The administration will choose the escrow agents based on experience
in handling sensitive information, according to the EFF report.  It
will avoid choosing low enforcement agencies to avoid conflicts of
interest and it will not choose private companies because of concerns
about the companies' longevity, the report said.

Well hmm...  what about the longevity of governmental agencies, or
even the government itself?





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: doug@netcom.com (Doug Merritt)
Date: Thu, 30 Sep 93 09:01:54 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: FIDOnet encryption (or lack thereof)
In-Reply-To: <mdiehl@triton.unm.edu>
Message-ID: <9309301559.AA23757@netcom4.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


J. Michael Diehl <mdiehl@triton.unm.edu> said:
According to Mike Godwin:
>> examining the mail that passes through his system, it seems likely that he
>> is violating the Electronic Communications Privacy Act.
>
>That was my first question.  Then it occured to me that I have seen bbs's which
>have disclaimers wrt email privacy.  That is the loophole he is exploiting.

I haven't kept up on this, so correct me if I'm wrong, but I thought that
BBS's had a choice as to whether to operate as Common Carriers or not,
as long as they were strictly consistent. If they want to be categorized
as Common Carriers then they have to have strict policies of hands-off
privacy, are not liable for the content of messages on their board,
and the ECPA applies. But if they do not guarantee privacy, do not perform
any kind of censorship or other control of message contents, then they
are not Common Carriers and the ECPA does not apply.

Prodigy would be an example of the former, Internet email & news would
be an example of the latter.

Yes? No? Is this stale, ancient, and incorrect info? Or if the concept
is correct, is the problem that they are merely forwarding email from
systems that *are* CC's, and so the ECPA applies to that particular
service, whether or not it applies to the rest of what they do?
	Doug




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: J. Michael Diehl <mdiehl@triton.unm.edu>
Date: Thu, 30 Sep 93 08:36:38 PDT
To: mnemonic@eff.org (Mike Godwin)
Subject: Re: FIDOnet encryption (or lack thereof)
In-Reply-To: <199309301507.AA09112@eff.org>
Message-ID: <9309301533.AA11734@triton.unm.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


According to Mike Godwin:
> Bill writes:
> > Heh.  OK.  Well, if one behaves "ethically", then I guess *that* closes
> > the issue.  It's his machine and he gets to make the rules.  (this is
> > my personally-adhered-to point of view)
> 
> My question is this: how does he know that the mail is encrypted if he's
> not examining the mail that passes through his system? If he *is*
> examining the mail that passes through his system, it seems likely that he
> is violating the Electronic Communications Privacy Act.

That was my first question.  Then it occured to me that I have seen bbs's which
have disclaimers wrt email privacy.  That is the loophole he is exploiting.


J. Michael Diehl   ;^)  |*The 2nd Amendment is there in case the 
mdiehl@triton.unm.edu   | Government forgets about the 1st!  <RL>
Mike.Diehl@f29.n301.z1  |*God is a good Physicist, and an even 
    .fidonet.org        | better Mathematician.  <Me>
al945@cwns9.ins.cwru.edu|*I'm just looking for the opportunity to 
 (505) 299-2282 (voice) | be Politically Incorrect! <Me>
Can we impeach him yet? |*Protected by 18 USC 2511 and 18 USC 2703. 
PGP Key = 7C06F1 = A6 27 E1 1D 5F B2 F2 F1  12 E7 53 2D 85 A2 10 5D



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: koontzd@lrcs.loral.com (David Koontz )
Date: Thu, 30 Sep 93 09:36:54 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: DES  Implementations
Message-ID: <9309301635.AA04850@nebula.lrcs.loral.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



>koontz-des.tar.Z
>David G. Koontz  <2004ktz%ucsbuxa@hub.ucsb.edu>
>Fast but large DES C functions and main program.
>Dates to March 1991, at which time it was one of the fastest around.
>Good verification suite included.

I have three or four faster versions, when I think about it I try and
produce smaller code (Cache size limits, don't you know)




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: jrk@sys.uea.ac.uk (Richard Kennaway)
Date: Thu, 30 Sep 93 01:56:35 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: soda.berkeley.edu
Message-ID: <8826.9309300858@s5.sys.uea.ac.uk>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


It seems to be ok now.

ftp> open soda.berkeley.edu
Connected to soda.berkeley.edu.
220 soda FTP server (Version wu-2.1c(17) Wed Sep 22 18:58:23 PDT 1993) ready.
Name (soda.berkeley.edu:jrk): anonymous
331 Guest login ok, send your complete e-mail address as password.
Password:
230-Welcome to soda.berkeley.edu.  We have recently upgraded our ftpd to
230-version 2.1c; it may still have some problems.
230-Mail bug reports to root@soda.berkeley.edu.
230-
230-Please read the file README
230-  it was last modified on Wed Jun  2 17:02:13 1993 - 120 days ago
230 Guest login ok, access restrictions apply.
ftp>

The cypherpunks directory is still there too.

BTW, when anon ftp servers ask you to give your email address as a
password, how many of you do?

--                                  ____
Richard Kennaway                  __\_ /    School of Information Systems
Internet:  jrk@sys.uea.ac.uk      \  X/     University of East Anglia
uucp:  ...mcsun!ukc!uea-sys!jrk    \/       Norwich NR4 7TJ, U.K.





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: an12070@anon.penet.fi (S. Boxx)
Date: Thu, 30 Sep 93 03:46:37 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Business Week on PGP subpoenas
Message-ID: <9309301044.AA16225@anon.penet.fi>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



BusinessWeek, October 4, 1993

p. 43, Washington Outlook


SPY VS. COMPUTER NERD: THE FIGHT OVER DATA SECURITY

Philip Zimmermann wanted to strike a blow for freedom.  To help
computer users keep data safe from snoopers, the Boulder (Colo.)
software consultant and self-described "privacy activist" wrote
a program making it easy to encode messages with an all-but-unbreakable
cipher.  And he offered it free through the network known as the
Internet.

Now, Zimmermann's gift to cyberspace has exposed an enormous gap in
the Administration's vision of a high-tech future.  The White House
is promoting a data superhighway as a key to a competitive future.
But the National Security Agency is trying to restrict the use of
high-quality encryption, which experts believe business will need
to take full advantage of the "information infrastructure."

The focus of the fight is a program Zimmermann calls "pretty good
privacy" (PGP).  On Sept. 9, two software companies in Texas and
Arizona that have been involved in publishing PGP received federal
grand-jury subpoenas requesting documents and information about
the program.

CRACKDOWN.  Although the government won't discuss the investigation,
the computer world has a pretty good idea what's going on.  Because
sophisticated encryption allows friends and foes alike to protect
communications, the software is subject to the same export controls
as munitions.  But PGP has popped up all over the world.  The probe,
says Zimmermann's lawyer, Philip Dubois, is aimed at "finding out how
it occurred and whether an offence was committed."

Oddly, the crackdown on software comes just as the Administration is
loosening export controls on computer hardware.  But the schizophrenia
may be more apparent than real.  "I don't think they've got the export
policy together enough to be split," says a key congressional staffer.
The underlying problem, explains Paul Freedenberg, a Washington attorney
and export-controls specialist, is that "Clinton is very cautious about
dabbling in national security.  This is an area that has essentially been
turned over to the spooks."

Meanwhile, there is growing concern in Congress about possible damange
to exports.  Quality encryption software "is available from foreign
manufacturers...and is easily transmitted using only a long-distance
telephone line and a modem," complained Representative Sam Gejdenson
(D-Conn.) and a high-powered bipartisan group of colleagues in a Sept.
20 letter to the President.  "Yet the U.S. continues to control this
computer software as a Munitions List item."  Says Douglas Miller of
the Software Publishers Assn.: "The U.S. government is succeeding only
in crippling an American industry's exporting ability."

While the goal of the NSA and other security agencies - keeping U.S.
messages secure while allowing Uncle Sam to read those of both
domestic and foreign bad guys - is laudable, technology may be rendering
it impossible.  "Law enforcers no longer have the inside track," says
Eben Moglen of Columbia University law school.

Experts agree that NSA officials are smart enough to see the writing
on the wall, encrypted or not.  But, says James Bitzos [sic], president
of RSA Data Security Inc. in Redwood City, Calif., the agency wants to
maintain as much control as possible for as long as possible.  Today,
intelligence agencies still have a shot at finding "needles in the
haystack," he says.  "If they lift export controls, they might as well
go home."

Still, the NSA can't stave off the inevitable for long.  Gejdenson hopes
to produce legislation by early next year to revamp government policy
on high-tech exports.  The result will probably include looser
restrictions on encryption software - and a victory for Phil Zimmermann
in his battle to keep snoops out of his cyberspace.

By John Carey





-------------------------------------------------------------------------
To find out more about the anon service, send mail to help@anon.penet.fi.
Due to the double-blind, any mail replies to this message will be anonymized,
and an anonymous id will be allocated automatically. You have been warned.
Please report any problems, inappropriate use etc. to admin@anon.penet.fi.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Duncan Frissell <frissell@panix.com>
Date: Thu, 30 Sep 93 07:51:53 PDT
To: CYPHERPUNKS@toad.com
Subject: A Word From Bill
Message-ID: <199309301447.AA04744@panix.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Since president@whitehouse.gov is not yet a full duplex operation, I 
wanted to take this opportunity to speak personally to all you 
cypherpunkian-Americans (and the odd foreigner) out there.  I feel your 
pain.  I understand your concerns.  Your concerns are my concerns.  As I 
said on September 14th:

I want to say to my fellow Americans, when you live in a time of change, 
the only way to recover your security and broaden your horizons is to 
adapt to the change, to embrace it, to move forward.  

Nothing we do, nothing we do in this great capital can change the fact 
that factories or information can flash across the world, that people can 
move money around in the blink of an eye.  Nothing can change the fact 
that technology can be adopted, once created, by people all across the 
world and then rapidly adapted in new and different ways by people who 
have a little different take on the way that technology works...

...I tell you my fellow Americans, that if we learn anything from the 
collapse of the Berlin Wall and the fall of the governments of Eastern 
Europe, even a totally controlled society cannot resist the winds of 
change that economics, and technology, and information flow have imposed 
on this world of ours.  That is not an option.  Our only realistic option 
is to embrace these changes...

William Jefferson Blythe Clinton



--- WinQwk 2.0b#0
                        




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Date: Thu, 30 Sep 93 11:06:36 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: FIDONet Censorship?
Message-ID: <9309301806.AA27173@netcom5.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


FIDONet operators are sometimes blocking encrypted messages. So what
else is new?

Their machines, their rules. Strictly speaking, this is not
censorship.

However, we can try to get them to change their rules. Better, route
around such machines.

John Gilmore has one of the best lines I've seen on this, quoted in
the new book by Howard Rheingold (something about "Living on the
Virtual Frontier," just out in the stores). John says something along
these lines:

"The Net tends to view censorship as damage and routes around it."



-Tim May

-- 
..........................................................................
Timothy C. May         | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,  
tcmay@netcom.com       | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
408-688-5409           | knowledge, reputations, information markets, 
W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA  | black markets, collapse of governments.
Higher Power: 2^756839 | Public Key: PGP and MailSafe available.
Note: I put time and money into writing this posting. I hope you enjoy it.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Mike Godwin <mnemonic@eff.org>
Date: Thu, 30 Sep 93 08:12:00 PDT
To: yerazunis@aidev.enet.dec.com (Just-in-time terraforming  30-Sep-1993 1008)
Subject: Re: FIDOnet encryption (or lack thereof)
In-Reply-To: <9309301408.AA18400@enet-gw.pa.dec.com>
Message-ID: <199309301507.AA09112@eff.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


 
Bill writes:

> Heh.  OK.  Well, if one behaves "ethically", then I guess *that* closes
> the issue.  It's his machine and he gets to make the rules.  (this is
> my personally-adhered-to point of view)

My question is this: how does he know that the mail is encrypted if he's
not examining the mail that passes through his system? If he *is*
examining the mail that passes through his system, it seems likely that he
is violating the Electronic Communications Privacy Act.


--Mike






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: trestrab@GVSU.EDU (BETH TRESTRAIL)
Date: Thu, 30 Sep 93 08:11:53 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Availability of ACM papers on Net ?
Message-ID: <9308307494.AA749412627@GVSU.EDU>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Are any of Chaum's papers on untraceable mail and digital cash
available on the Net?  Advise and thanks.

          Jeff




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Brad Huntting <huntting@glarp.com>
Date: Thu, 30 Sep 93 10:17:02 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: How about a pgp RFC...
Message-ID: <199309301716.AA17376@misc.glarp.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



If you've followed the PEM working group in recent years, you may
have come to the conclusion as I have that it is not going anywhere,
and probably never will.

In an effort to make e-mail crypto more wide spread, I suggest we
draw up an internet-draft on the PGP message format, and the
algorithms used to send and receive messages.

At the moment I can think of nothing PEM can do that PGP cant.
Granted there are problems scaling the web-of-trust model, but PGP
is also capable of using a top down model (really just a subset of
the web model).

One thing such a draft is sure to do is send a clear signal to the
PEM group that they must either start swimming or sink.


brad




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: koontzd@lrcs.loral.com (David Koontz )
Date: Thu, 30 Sep 93 11:22:03 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Clipper specifics (more)
Message-ID: <9309301819.AA04996@nebula.lrcs.loral.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>From MIKEINGLE@delphi.com Wed Sep 29 20:44:02 1993

>Where do you get the MYK spec?

From:

Mykotronx, Inc.
357 Van Ness Way, Suite 200
Torrance, CA 90501
    (310) 533-8100
FAX (310) 533-0527

The cover title is "VLSI Encryption/Decryption Device Data"
The title block on the first page is "MYK-78 Encryption/Decryption Device"

There is no copyright notice, I'm a bit vague on whether such notice is
required at present.  Each page bears the trademark of Mykotronx.

>Do Type 1 chips use 80-bit keys like Clipper?

One of the characteristics of data sheets for type I chips incommon with
the MYK-78, is that no where are byte counts mentioned.  The specs instead
refer to reading or writing requisite bytes to satisfy testable flags.

Even examining key storage device specs (Crypto Ignition Key, etc.) no
byte counts are mentioned, rather a count value is specified in the header
structure.  One could assume that the key size of a type I device is
classified.  Some with exposure to Type I implementations believe that 
independent round keys are loaded, requiring a lot more storage.  Having
seen references to the cryptographic check word in Type I specs, I don't.

Type I chip Cryptographic Algorithms (CA) are not specified in theire
unclassified spec sheets and are presumeably classified.

It is my personal belief that the cryptographic algorithm (SKIPJACK) may be
the same as used in Type I devices.

Major differences other than ambiguity with respect to the cryptographic
algorithm, between Clipper and Type I devices includes:

1) No Red/Black Separation
   the MYK-78 has a single data port

2) The MYK-78 allows you to "fish" for the Cryptographic Check Word (CCW),
   a value used to verify the key has been loaded correctly.  Type I devices
   require the CCW be correct, otherwise requiring passing through reset.
   This implies a central key management authority.

3) Strict certification requirements for Type I implementations, similar
   to that done for devices/firmware/software used for controling and 
   releasing nuclear weapons.  One presumes the level of testing for
   Escrow Encryption Standard compliant devices will be done to the
   black box level if conducted by NIST.

4) Some Type I chips include two sets of Cryptographic Algorithm hardware
   for FULL DUPLEX operatiion in a communications environment.  There are
   otherwise higher levels of integration as well.

5) Type I chips generally contain provision for remote rekeying and remote
   zeroizing.  Presumeably these same facilities are instead dedicated to
   the Law Enforcement Exploitation Field in the MYK-78.

6) At least one Type I chip is a hybrid, also cotaining an Intel 8051 type
   microprocessor.

It is possible that the same silicon is used for clipper and Type I devices,
were two different I/O pads (red and black ports) located adjacent but
interleaved, with the same package pin bonded to both pads.  Enabling
CCW fishing could be a bonding option.  While one could argue that red/black
area partitioning might be employed on the silicon it is worth remembering 
that during encryption, only the final product is black, and  for decryption
the final product is red.  The flexibility in control programming mentioned
for the MYK-78 could reflect the requisite ability to control red and black
ports as well as using remote rekeying/remote zeroizing facilities for LEEF.

>How far ahead of such cyphers as IDEA and 3DES are the Type 1 cyphers?
>Much more secure, or are we pretty close to *them*?

Judging from the clipper chip, not much.  The number of clocks for executing
the CA in a Type I chip is the same as the clipper chip (64 clocks).
The MYK-78 has been publicly stated to perform 32 rounds (one could image
64 rounds in 64 clocks).  

#From: wcs@anchor.ho.att.com (Bill Stewart +1-908-949-0705)
...
#There's a little more information than that, though not much.
#The Mykotronix blurb says that the algorithm uses S-boxes, and takes
#64 clocks to do the encryption; I think someone said it's 32 rounds of
>S-boxes, which would correspond well with this.
...
#My personal speculation is that it's probably about 24-key-bits
#stronger than DES, but I don't have a good guess on the weak keys issue.

In Dorthy Dennings preliminary report on Skipjack there were several points
of interest brought up in the overview on the cryptographic algorithm:

1) Differential Cryptanalysis
 				           ...We concluded it was not
+   possible to perform an attack based on differential cryptanalysis in
+   less time than with exhaustive search.

--
    Increasing the number of rounds descreases the S/N ratio.  Changing
    The XOR for mixing key and data iin the cryptographic function f(R,K)
    to an adder would likewise make exhaustive search faster than differential
    cryptanalysis for DES (Chapter 4 of E. Biham and A. Shamir "Differential
    Cryptanalysis of the DES Encryption Algorithm", 1993 Springer-Verlag.)
    
2) Weak Keys

+                            ... We saw no pattern of symmetry in the
+   SKIPJACK algorithm which could lead to weak keys.

-- 
   A key is weak when the encryption function and decryption function
   are identical (the same key works for either)

3) Symmetry Under Complementation

+			...We tested SKIPJACK for this property and found
+  that it did not hold.

--
   In DES K XOR E(R) == !K XOR E(!R).
   
All three of these can be defeated by exchanging the XOR between key and
data in f(R,K) with adders.  The carry is a good place to introduce more
key bits per round (8 bits when modulo 64).  Subtraction is used for 
decryption and addition for encryption (or vice versa).  The key schedule
is relatively easy to extend to 80 bits from 56.  It might not be this
easy, but then again it could.

DES also has a property of the S boxes that collectively map a 32 bit
input value (R) to a 32 bit output value (SboxP) according to a 48 bit
subkey (Kn) that for a large portion of the keys, there are not 2^32
distinct output values.  Where the holes occur in the output domain
are dependent on the key, and key and not key have the same holes.
Exploring this property has led investigators to discover differential
cryptanalysis and linear cryptanalysis.  If it were possible to "see"
the output of the P permutation directly you could discover the round
key (Kn) over a large amount of chiphertext by simply checking for 32 bit 
symbols that don't show up.  Correlating missing symbols to keys is a momentous
task, potentially requiring years.  It is possible that a 4th category of 
cryptanalysis attack (Brute  force is the other method) is predicated on this
property (D.W. Davies cryptically :) mentions a method of discovering 16 key 
bits in his book published in the U.S. in 1983, I believe). 

Skipjack may have provision for defeating this hypothetical attack.






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Date: Thu, 30 Sep 93 11:26:37 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Availability of ACM papers on Net ?
In-Reply-To: <9308307494.AA749412627@GVSU.EDU>
Message-ID: <9309301823.AA29101@netcom5.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> 
> Are any of Chaum's papers on untraceable mail and digital cash
> available on the Net?  Advise and thanks.
> 
>           Jeff

Chaum's paper on the "Dining Cryptographers Problem," which appeared
in Vol. 1, No. 1 of the "Journal of Cryptology," was posted to the
list by the ILF (Information Liberation Front). It has appeared a
couple of times, so check the Cypherpunks archives.

The earlier CACM (the 1981 paper on "mixes," the seminal 1985 paper on
untraceable cash) papers are not likely to appear, I would guess.
First, these journals are widely available. Chaum's article in
"Scientific American" last summer is easy to find. Second, the many
diagrams and equations make ASCII presentation problematic. (Chaum's
DC-Net paper was mostly text, with no diagrams, so ASCII versions were
faithful.) Third, it takes a lot fo work ot scan and OCR a paper, even
one without equations and diagrams, and the payback just isn't there.

I will repeat here what I have said before: Anyone serious about this
stuff should take the few hours it will take to find a decent-sized
library and make copies of these and other important papers. ASCII
versions are not adequate.

The "crypto" section of libraries also will expose the visitor to the
whole universe of crypto--the journals, the Proceedings, the various
books. 

And Xeroxes of specific papers are cheap--a lot cheaper than having
someone spend several hours scanning and OCRing a paper, correcting
the many flaws, figuring out an ASCII representation of equations and
diagrams, etc. (Non-OCRed images are of course prohibitively large,
and I doubt my friends in the ILF are interested in this avenue.)

This is not a flame directed at Jeff, just a call for people to do
things the old-fashioned way, namely, to read the sources.


-Tim May

-- 
..........................................................................
Timothy C. May         | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,  
tcmay@netcom.com       | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
408-688-5409           | knowledge, reputations, information markets, 
W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA  | black markets, collapse of governments.
Higher Power: 2^756839 | Public Key: PGP and MailSafe available.
Note: I put time and money into writing this posting. I hope you enjoy it.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: wcs@anchor.ho.att.com (Bill_Stewart_HOY002_1305)
Date: Thu, 30 Sep 93 09:21:54 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Active Eavesdropping of Clipper Phones
Message-ID: <9309301536.AA21844@anchor.ho.att.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text


There are a variety of ways around  Diffie-Hellman spoofing.
The current STU-III phones from AT&T, Motorola, etc., use several
approaches - there's the Crypto Igniter Key dongles that you need
to authorize your phone, which provides one form of out-of-band
authentication (partly authentication of the DH keys, but more important
is authentication that the person at the other end is probably cleared
for the level of classification you're running the call at);
there's also an LCD display on the phone that shows the other person's
DH half-key, so you can do voice verification if you want.
They may do other stuff as well.

Scott Collins mentioned the "digital signature on RSA keys",
which the Capstone phones probably do even though Clipperphones 
probably won't.  There are also tricks about sending half the key
at a time, though they're apparently still hackable.

	Bill




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Mike Godwin <mnemonic@eff.org>
Date: Thu, 30 Sep 93 08:46:54 PDT
To: mdiehl@triton.unm.edu (J. Michael Diehl)
Subject: Re: FIDOnet encryption (or lack thereof)
In-Reply-To: <9309301533.AA11734@triton.unm.edu>
Message-ID: <199309301545.AA09637@eff.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


 
J. Michael Diehl writes:

> That was my first question.  Then it occured to me that I have seen bbs's which
> have disclaimers wrt email privacy.  That is the loophole he is exploiting.

Well, there's no doubt that users of his system can agree to allow
the sysop to read their mail. But what about people whose mail passes
*through* his system on the way to somewhere else?

He has no agreement with them.


--Mike







From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: koontzd@lrcs.loral.com (David Koontz )
Date: Thu, 30 Sep 93 12:06:55 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Clipper specifics (more)
Message-ID: <9309301906.AA18597@monolith.lrcs.loral.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>From MIKEINGLE@delphi.com Wed Sep 29 20:44:02 1993

>Where do you get the MYK spec?

From:

Mykotronx, Inc.
357 Van Ness Way, Suite 200
Torrance, CA 90501
    (310) 533-8100
FAX (310) 533-0527

The cover title is "VLSI Encryption/Decryption Device Data"
The title block on the first page is "MYK-78 Encryption/Decryption Device"

There is no copyright notice, I'm a bit vague on whether such notice is
required at present.  Each page bears the trademark of Mykotronx.

>Do Type 1 chips use 80-bit keys like Clipper?

One of the characteristics of data sheets for type I chips incommon with
the MYK-78, is that no where are byte counts mentioned.  The specs instead
refer to reading or writing requisite bytes to satisfy testable flags.

Even examining key storage device specs (Crypto Ignition Key, etc.) no
byte counts are mentioned, rather a count value is specified in the header
structure.  One could assume that the key size of a type I device is
classified.  Some with exposure to Type I implementations believe that 
independent round keys are loaded, requiring a lot more storage.  Having
seen references to the cryptographic check word in Type I specs, I don't.

Type I chip Cryptographic Algorithms (CA) are not specified in theire
unclassified spec sheets and are presumeably classified.

It is my personal belief that the cryptographic algorithm (SKIPJACK) may be
the same as used in Type I devices.

Major differences other than ambiguity with respect to the cryptographic
algorithm, between Clipper and Type I devices includes:

1) No Red/Black Separation
   the MYK-78 has a single data port

2) The MYK-78 allows you to "fish" for the Cryptographic Check Word (CCW),
   a value used to verify the key has been loaded correctly.  Type I devices
   require the CCW be correct, otherwise requiring passing through reset.
   This implies a central key management authority.

3) Strict certification requirements for Type I implementations, similar
   to that done for devices/firmware/software used for controling and 
   releasing nuclear weapons.  One presumes the level of testing for
   Escrow Encryption Standard compliant devices will be done to the
   black box level if conducted by NIST.

4) Some Type I chips include two sets of Cryptographic Algorithm hardware
   for FULL DUPLEX operatiion in a communications environment.  There are
   otherwise higher levels of integration as well.

5) Type I chips generally contain provision for remote rekeying and remote
   zeroizing.  Presumeably these same facilities are instead dedicated to
   the Law Enforcement Exploitation Field in the MYK-78.

6) At least one Type I chip is a hybrid, also cotaining an Intel 8051 type
   microprocessor.

It is possible that the same silicon is used for clipper and Type I devices,
were two different I/O pads (red and black ports) located adjacent but
interleaved, with the same package pin bonded to both pads.  Enabling
CCW fishing could be a bonding option.  While one could argue that red/black
area partitioning might be employed on the silicon it is worth remembering 
that during encryption, only the final product is black, and  for decryption
the final product is red.  The flexibility in control programming mentioned
for the MYK-78 could reflect the requisite ability to control red and black
ports as well as using remote rekeying/remote zeroizing facilities for LEEF.

>How far ahead of such cyphers as IDEA and 3DES are the Type 1 cyphers?
>Much more secure, or are we pretty close to *them*?

Judging from the clipper chip, not much.  The number of clocks for executing
the CA in a Type I chip is the same as the clipper chip (64 clocks).
The MYK-78 has been publicly stated to perform 32 rounds (one could image
64 rounds in 64 clocks).  

#From: wcs@anchor.ho.att.com (Bill Stewart +1-908-949-0705)
...
#There's a little more information than that, though not much.
#The Mykotronix blurb says that the algorithm uses S-boxes, and takes
#64 clocks to do the encryption; I think someone said it's 32 rounds of
>S-boxes, which would correspond well with this.
...
#My personal speculation is that it's probably about 24-key-bits
#stronger than DES, but I don't have a good guess on the weak keys issue.

In Dorthy Dennings preliminary report on Skipjack there were several points
of interest brought up in the overview on the cryptographic algorithm:

1) Differential Cryptanalysis
 				           ...We concluded it was not
+   possible to perform an attack based on differential cryptanalysis in
+   less time than with exhaustive search.

--
    Increasing the number of rounds descreases the S/N ratio.  Changing
    The XOR for mixing key and data iin the cryptographic function f(R,K)
    to an adder would likewise make exhaustive search faster than differential
    cryptanalysis for DES (Chapter 4 of E. Biham and A. Shamir "Differential
    Cryptanalysis of the DES Encryption Algorithm", 1993 Springer-Verlag.)
    
2) Weak Keys

+                            ... We saw no pattern of symmetry in the
+   SKIPJACK algorithm which could lead to weak keys.

-- 
   A key is weak when the encryption function and decryption function
   are identical (the same key works for either)

3) Symmetry Under Complementation

+			...We tested SKIPJACK for this property and found
+  that it did not hold.

--
   In DES K XOR E(R) == !K XOR E(!R).
   
All three of these can be defeated by exchanging the XOR between key and
data in f(R,K) with adders.  The carry is a good place to introduce more
key bits per round (8 bits when modulo 64).  Subtraction is used for 
decryption and addition for encryption (or vice versa).  The key schedule
is relatively easy to extend to 80 bits from 56.  It might not be this
easy, but then again it could.

DES also has a property of the S boxes that collectively map a 32 bit
input value (R) to a 32 bit output value (SboxP) according to a 48 bit
subkey (Kn) that for a large portion of the keys, there are not 2^32
distinct output values.  Where the holes occur in the output domain
are dependent on the key, and key and not key have the same holes.
Exploring this property has led investigators to discover differential
cryptanalysis and linear cryptanalysis.  If it were possible to "see"
the output of the P permutation directly you could discover the round
key (Kn) over a large amount of chiphertext by simply checking for 32 bit 
symbols that don't show up.  Correlating missing symbols to keys is a momentous
task, potentially requiring years.  It is possible that a 4th category of 
cryptanalysis attack (Brute  force is the other method) is predicated on this
property (D.W. Davies cryptically :) mentions a method of discovering 16 key 
bits in his book published in the U.S. in 1983, I believe). 

Skipjack may have provision for defeating this hypothetical attack.






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: jrk@sys.uea.ac.uk (Richard Kennaway)
Date: Thu, 30 Sep 93 05:01:54 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Source for MacPGP 2.3
Message-ID: <18775.9309301202@s5.sys.uea.ac.uk>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I wrote:
>I have MacPGP 2.3 (the Macintosh application).  From what ftp site can I
>obtain the source?  soda only has Mac source for 2.2.

In fact, I've found that I do have the source for MacPGP 2.3 (although
someone told me the source wasn't released yet).  I can't remember where I
got it though.

I won't undertake to email it to anyone, nor to place it on anonftp
indefinitely, as the only anonftp area I have is on my desktop machine.
However, I'm not going to be around for about a week, so I'm willing to
make it available during that time.

Any last-minute demands for me not to do this for some reason?  Tough, I'm
about to leave, after which it's out of my hands.



                One-time offer, valid for one week only!!
                =========================================

MacPGP2.3 application, documentation, and source (for Symantec (Think) C
5.0.4), will be available by anon ftp on jrk.sys.uea.ac.uk, from Thurs 30
Sep (today) 14:00 GMT until Fri 8 October 08:00 GMT.  Note that this
machine is in the UK.  It is the responsibility of those accessing it to
satisfy themselves of the legality of their actions.  These files are
available strictly on an "as-is" basis, with no warranty, express or
implied, concerning their contents.


Instructions:

ftp to jrk.sys.uea.ac.uk and give the following commands.

        user anonymous
(Give your email name as password...or not.  All transfers will be logged.)
        cd "RK's Public Folder"
(Yes, there are spaces in the name of the directory.  This is a Macintosh.)
        ascii
        get macpgp2.3src.sea.hqx.pgp
(NB. If you are ftp-ing from anything but another Mac, the above file must
be transferred in ASCII mode.)
        binary
        get macpgp2.3.sit

Once you have these files, you need to do the following steps:

0.  Put both files on a Mac, if they aren't there already.

1.  Use Stuffit 1.5.1 or any decoder (such as DownLine) which understands
that format to decode macpgp2.3.sit.  This will give several files, one of
which is the MacPGP 2.3 application.

2.  Use the application to verify the signature on macpgp2.3src.sea.hqx.pgp
and to strip the ascii armoring from it, creating a file
macpgp2.3src.sea.hqx.  (If you already have PGP on a unix machine, you can
do this there and then transfer the .hqx file to the Mac.)

3.  Use a BinHex decoder to decode macpgp2.3src.sea.hqx.  This yields an
application macpgp2.3src.sea.

4.  Run that application, and it will decode itself into the source for
MacPGP2.3.


Paranoids should note that macpgp2.3.sit is not PGP-signed, and you only
have my word that it does what I say it does.  macpgp2.3src.sea.hqx.pgp is
signed, but not by me, and I am not in a position to certify its signature.
 I use MPW C, so I haven't even compiled the source myself.

I am *not* able to answer any questions about MacPGP itself, nor will I or
anyone else be available during the coming week to sort out any ftp
problems.  I will probably be out of reach of email during that time as
well.

--                                  ____
Richard Kennaway                  __\_ /    School of Information Systems
Internet:  jrk@sys.uea.ac.uk      \  X/     University of East Anglia
uucp:  ...mcsun!ukc!uea-sys!jrk    \/       Norwich NR4 7TJ, U.K.





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: stig@netcom.com (Stig)
Date: Thu, 30 Sep 93 13:21:55 PDT
To: Mike Ingle <cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Digicash: good description
In-Reply-To: <MIKEINGLE@delphi.com>
Message-ID: <9309302016.AA13280@netcom3.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


In <01H3JF7JM47M8WXVML@delphi.com>, Mike Ingle wrote...
> Does anyone know where I can get a good, lucid ASCII description
> of digicash systems?
> 
> --- MikeIngle@delphi.com
> 


I haven't tested it, but I pulled a postscript to ascii converter off the net 
recently (alt.hackers I think)...  I'll make it available as
netcom.com:/pub/stig/src/gsascii.shar.gz

        Stig


;; __________________________________________________________________________
;; Stig@netcom.com                            netcom.com:/pub/stig/00-PGP-KEY
;; It's hard to be cutting-edge at your own pace...   32 DF B9 19 AE 28 D1 7A
;; Bullet-proof code cannot stand up to teflon bugs.  A3 9D 0B 1A 33 13 4D 7F




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: stig@netcom.com (Stig)
Date: Thu, 30 Sep 93 13:56:38 PDT
To: msattler@netcom.com (Michael Sattler)
Subject: Re: fido encryption.
In-Reply-To: <9309300753.AA29492@netcom.netcom.com>
Message-ID: <9309302054.AA15926@netcom3.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


At CFP (or maybe it was an event at Modern Times in SF just before CFP...) I
remember some people talking about this fidonet pickiness.  There is also a
large number of fido sites that DO pass encrypted traffic.  They have their
own "backbone" for encrypted traffic, too.

I think that Tom Jennings was one of the people who was talking about
this...which makes perfect sense, since I think he started fidonet...

    Stig


;; __________________________________________________________________________
;; Stig@netcom.com                            netcom.com:/pub/stig/00-PGP-KEY
;; It's hard to be cutting-edge at your own pace...   32 DF B9 19 AE 28 D1 7A
;; Bullet-proof code cannot stand up to teflon bugs.  A3 9D 0B 1A 33 13 4D 7F





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Perry E. Metzger" <pmetzger@lehman.com>
Date: Thu, 30 Sep 93 10:46:37 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: How about a pgp RFC...
In-Reply-To: <199309301716.AA17376@misc.glarp.com>
Message-ID: <9309301743.AA01457@snark.lehman.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Actually, an application type for MIME would seem to be more than
sufficient...

Perry

Brad Huntting says:
> 
> If you've followed the PEM working group in recent years, you may
> have come to the conclusion as I have that it is not going anywhere,
> and probably never will.
> 
> In an effort to make e-mail crypto more wide spread, I suggest we
> draw up an internet-draft on the PGP message format, and the
> algorithms used to send and receive messages.
> 
> At the moment I can think of nothing PEM can do that PGP cant.
> Granted there are problems scaling the web-of-trust model, but PGP
> is also capable of using a top down model (really just a subset of
> the web model).
> 
> One thing such a draft is sure to do is send a clear signal to the
> PEM group that they must either start swimming or sink.
> 
> 
> brad




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Sandy <72114.1712@CompuServe.COM>
Date: Thu, 30 Sep 93 10:56:37 PDT
To: <cypherpunks@toad.com>
Subject: POISON PILL
Message-ID: <930930175113_72114.1712_FHF68-1@CompuServe.COM>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
  SANDY SANDFORT               Reply to:  ssandfort@attmail.com
 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Punksters,

Here is probably one of those dumb questions we non-technical
types ask from time to time on this list.  Please indulge me
though, in case there is something to it.

In today's America, we live under the constant threat of police
seizure of our computer equipment and other assets.  Of course,
we can encrypt the information our files, but this is, at best, a
passive solution.  Are there any positive actions we can take?

POISON PILL--What, if anything, can be done to booby-trap a
computer?  Once the cops have a machine, one would expect that
they will paw through everything in it.  In addition, they will
probably use the stolen computer for their own data processing
needs.  What could be done have the computer screw up the cop's
data days, weeks or months after the seizure?  Of course, I would
never do such a thing myself, nor would I advise anyone else to
do so.  I do, however, have a passing academic interest in the
subject.  Same for you folks too, right?

 S a n d y

>>>>>>    Please send e-mail to:  ssandfort@attmail.com    <<<<<<
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: greg@ideath.goldenbear.com (Greg Broiles)
Date: Thu, 30 Sep 93 13:51:56 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Fidonet, policies, privacy, and power.
Message-ID: <VuJPac1w164w@ideath.goldenbear.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


The following is from Fidonet Policy Documet 4.06, dated May 5 1989.
It's marked as not being in force yet, as it's awaiting ratification;
dunno if it ever was or not.

----------

2.1.3  Responsible for All Traffic Entering FidoNet Via the Node
The sysop listed in the nodelist entry is responsible for all traffic
entering FidoNet via that system.  This includes (but is not limited to)
traffic entered by users, points, and any other networks for which the system
might act as a gateway.  If a sysop allows "outside" messages to enter
FidoNet via the system, the gateway system must be clearly identified by
FidoNet node number as the point of origin of that message, and it must act
as a gateway in the reverse direction.  Should such traffic result in a
violation of Policy, the sysop must rectify the situation.

2.1.4  Encryption and Review of Mail
FidoNet is an amateur system.  Our technology is such that the privacy of
messages cannot be guaranteed.  As a sysop, you have the right to review
traffic flowing through your system, if for no other reason than to ensure
that the system is not being used for illegal or commercial purposes.
Encryption obviously makes this review impossible.  Therefore, encrypted
and/or commercial traffic that is routed without the express permission of
all the links in the delivery system constitutes annoying behavior.  See
section 1.3.6 for a definition of commercial traffic.

[...]

2.1.6  Private Netmail
The word "private" should be used with great care, especially with users of a
BBS.  Some countries have laws which deal with "private mail", and it should
be made clear that the word "private" does not imply that no person other
than the recipient can read messages.  Sysops who cannot provide this
distinction should consider not offering users the option of "private mail".

If a user sends a "private message", the user has no control over the number
of intermediate systems through which that message is routed.  A sysop who
sends a message to another sysop can control this aspect by sending the
message direct to the recipient's system, thus guaranteeing that only the
recipient or another individual to whom that sysop has given authorization
can read the message.  Thus, a sysop may have different expectations than a
casual user.

2.1.6.1  No Disclosure of in-transit mail

Disclosing or in any way using information contained in private netmail
traffic not addressed to you or written by you is considered annoying
behavior, unless the traffic has been released by the author or the recipient
as a part of a formal policy complaint.  This does not apply to echomail
which is by definition a broadcast medium, and where private mail is often
used to keep a sysop-only area restricted.

2.1.6.2  Private mail addressed to you

The issue of private mail which is addressed to you is more difficult than
the in-transit question treated in the previous section.  A common legal
opinion holds that when you receive a message it becomes your property and
you have a legal right to do with it what you wish.  Your legal right does
not excuse you from annoying others.

In general, sensitive material should not be sent using FidoNet.  This ideal
is often compromised, as FidoNet is our primary mode of communication.  In
general, if the sender of a message specifically requests in the text of the
message that the contents be kept confidential, release of the message into a
public forum may be considered annoying.

There are exceptions.  If someone is saying one thing in public and saying
the opposite in private mail, the recipient of the private mail should not be
subjected to harassment simply because the sender requests that the message
not be released.  Judgement and common sense should be used in this area as
in all other aspects of FidoNet behavior.

2.1.7  Not Routing Mail

You are not required to route traffic if you have not agreed to do so.  You
are not obligated to route traffic for all if you route it for any, unless
you hold a Network Coordinator or Hub Coordinator position.  Routing traffic
through a node not obligated to perform routing without the permission of
that node may be annoying behavior.  This includes unsolicited echomail.

If you do not forward a message when you previously agreed to perform such
routing, the message must be returned to the sysop of the node at which it
entered FidoNet with an explanation of why it was not forwarded.  (It is not
necessary to return messages which are addressed to a node which is not in
the current nodelist.)  Intentionally stopping an in-transit message without
following this procedure constitutes annoying behavior.  In the case of a
failure to forward traffic due to a technical problem, it does not become
annoying unless it persists after being pointed out to the sysop.

[...]

4.2  Routing Inbound Mail (Net Coordinator Responsibilities)

It is your responsibility as Network Coordinator to coordinate the receipt
and forwarding of host-routed inbound netmail for nodes in your network.  The
best way to accomplish this is left to your discretion.
[...]
You are not required to forward encrypted, commercial, or illegal mail.
However, you must follow the procedures described in section 2.1.7 if you do
not forward the mail.

----------

(end of Fidonet policy quote)

The gist of Section 9 of the policy document, together with the Appendix
of Fidonet "case histories" seems to be that the various Fidonet Czars
can kick you out of the net if they consider you "excessively annoying".

As far as I can tell, the ability (perhaps the right) to fuss around in
other folks' business and other folks' mail is one of the factors (along
with the ability to create and enforce any number of rules and regulations)
which makes people think it's fun to run a BBS. The opportunity to exercise
power seems to be a powerful motivator, whether it's on the net, on a BBS,
or otherwise. Suggesting that we need to address that tendency in the
"online" community before we address it in the general populace seems
misguided to me.


--
Greg Broiles
greg@goldenbear.com                     Baked, not fried.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Mike Godwin <mnemonic@eff.org>
Date: Thu, 30 Sep 93 11:11:55 PDT
To: doug@netcom.com (Doug Merritt)
Subject: Re: FIDOnet encryption (or lack thereof)
In-Reply-To: <9309301559.AA23757@netcom4.netcom.com>
Message-ID: <199309301808.AA10882@eff.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


 
Doug Merritt writes:

> I haven't kept up on this, so correct me if I'm wrong, but I thought that
> BBS's had a choice as to whether to operate as Common Carriers or not,
> as long as they were strictly consistent. If they want to be categorized
> as Common Carriers then they have to have strict policies of hands-off
> privacy, are not liable for the content of messages on their board,
> and the ECPA applies. But if they do not guarantee privacy, do not perform
> any kind of censorship or other control of message contents, then they
> are not Common Carriers and the ECPA does not apply.

ECPA is not limited to common carriers.
 
> Prodigy would be an example of the former, Internet email & news would
> be an example of the latter.
 
ECPA applies both to Prodigy and to Internet message traffic.


--Mike






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: derek@cs.wisc.edu (Derek Zahn)
Date: Thu, 30 Sep 93 12:11:55 PDT
To: pmetzger@lehman.com
Subject: Re: How about a pgp RFC...
In-Reply-To: <9309301743.AA01457@snark.lehman.com>
Message-ID: <9309301909.AA11406@balder.cs.wisc.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text


Perry Metzger:

> Actually, an application type for MIME would seem to be more than
> sufficient...

That's perfect!

type: application
subtype: pgp

The registration procedure is pretty simple.  I'd be happy to
help work out a specification.  If anybody tackles this,
with or without help, please let me (or us) know.

derek




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Mike Godwin <mnemonic@eff.org>
Date: Thu, 30 Sep 93 11:16:38 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: EFF RESPONDS IN PGP CASE
Message-ID: <199309301812.AA10948@eff.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Forwarded message:
From jberman Thu Sep 30 13:54:51 1993
Date: Thu, 30 Sep 1993 13:54:45 -0400
Message-Id: <199309301754.AA10784@eff.org>
To: mnemonic@eff.org (Mike Godwin)
From: Mike Godwin <mnemonic> (by way of jberman@eff.org (Jerry Berman))
X-Sender: jberman@eff.org
Subject: Re: PGP/Constitutional Defense, Take IV (fwd)

EFF TO DEFEND CRYPTO RIGHTS LEGALLY

Washington, D.C. -- The Electronic Frontier Foundation has committed
itself this week to legal defense efforts in response to what is
apparently a U.S. government campaign against the use and export of
cryptographic technology.

EFF's response to the anti-cryptography campaign, which has been directed
initially against the "Pretty Good Privacy" (PGP) encryption program
written by Phil Zimmermann, is three-fold:

o EFF and EFF board members will immediately contribute
funds to Phil Zimmermann's current legal expenses as they relate
to constitutional issues, and will encourage others to make donations
for this legal effort.

o EFF will continue to vigorously investigate the facts of the PGP case
and other cryptography-related cases that may arise, in order
to spotlight the constitutional issues raised by such cases.

o EFF is now planning to launch in the near future a First Amendment
campaign aimed both at raising funds to support legal work on the
Constitutional issues raised by these cases, and at educating policymakers
and the general public about need to reform our outmoded export control laws . 

The basic facts of the PGP case(s) are as follows:

The Customs Bureau has interviewed Phil Zimmermann and others involved in
PGP. A San Jose grand jury, convened by Assistant US Attorney William
Keane, subpoenaed documents relating to PGP from Zimmermann, as well
as ViaCrypt and Austin Code Works, two companies who intend to offer
commercial products related to PGP. Finally, the State Department has sent
a letter to the Austin Code Works requiring them to register as an arms
dealer, even if they don't plan to export cryptography. 

In light of these developments, the Electronic Frontier Foundation Board of
Directors met in Austin on Sept 22-23 to plan EFF's response. 

EFF's Board of Directors believes that this case may involve fundamental
issues in the application of the U.S. Constitution to digital media. At
stake is the right of privacy, public access to secure cryptography, the
right to publish digital writings, and the right of equal protection under
the law. We are resolved to take this matter very seriously.

For this reason, EFF will undertake a vigorous investigation of the facts
in this and any other PGP related cases which might arise.  

If the Grand Jury issues indictments that would, in the view of EFF,
threaten the future of digital liberty, we are prepared to assist in the case 
and any others which might have similar adverse effects. We are also 
prepared to seek to amend the export laws to protect constitutional speech 
and the right to disseminate and use encryption to protect the citizens'
right to privacy and to the security of their communications.

In the short run, EFF will assist Phil and others involved with PGP to find
criminal defense attorneys, explore ways to get any cases handled pro
bono publico, or for expenses only, and contribute funds to Phil and other 
possible defendants for preindictment constitutional research, and we 
encourage others to do the same. As of this announcement, several thousand
dollars have been pledged by EFF and EFF board members including John Gilmore, 
Mitchell Kapor, John Perry Barlow.  

In the near future, EFF will launch a national campaign designed to provide
legal and financial support for cases or legislative efforts that would
promote the Constitutionally guaranteed rights to develop, discuss, and
use cryptographic technology. 

We urge you to help Phil Zimmermann in preparing his constitutional defense 
by contacting Phil's lawyer, Philip Dubois (dubois@csn.org, +1 303 444 3885,
or 2305 Broadway, Boulder, CO   80304, USA). He is accepting legal defense 
contributions relating directly to Phil's defense as an individual.
 
Board of Directors
Electronic Frontier Foundation








From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Perry E. Metzger" <pmetzger@lehman.com>
Date: Thu, 30 Sep 93 11:21:55 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: POISON PILL
In-Reply-To: <930930175113_72114.1712_FHF68-1@CompuServe.COM>
Message-ID: <9309301812.AA01574@snark.lehman.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Sandy says:
> POISON PILL--What, if anything, can be done to booby-trap a
> computer?  Once the cops have a machine, one would expect that
> they will paw through everything in it.  In addition, they will
> probably use the stolen computer for their own data processing
> needs.  What could be done have the computer screw up the cop's
> data days, weeks or months after the seizure?  Of course, I would
> never do such a thing myself, nor would I advise anyone else to
> do so.

Why wouldn't you? Its your machine, so what you do to it is perfectly
legal. You are under no obligation to make your equipment suitable for
people who wish to steal it.

Nothing you can do in software will actually work, because people can
always boot off a fresh disk and start from scratch.

I suggest that the best way, which is not easy, is to alter the roms
on the disk controllers so they will only work properly with a special
version of the operating system. Then, run the special version of the
operating system, which should require that you do something
periodically or it will self destruct. Even if they reformat the disk,
they still won't have the proper information to feed the controller so
that it doesn't do unfortunate things.

Perry




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Matthew J Miszewski <MJMISKI@macc.wisc.edu>
Date: Thu, 30 Sep 93 12:21:55 PDT
To: CYPHERPUNKS@toad.com
Subject: POISON PILL
Message-ID: <23093014195422@vms2.macc.wisc.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Sandy,
 
  There are a number of ways in which you can set up *your* machine
to self-destruct.  The best way to accomplish this is through
Perry's suggestion of a regular security check to which you must
reply or the PILL is activated.
 
  If all you are concerned about is private mail or the like, a
simple batch wipe file would work (hide the wipe program).  Putting
any prompt at boot and turning off obvious ways of defeating *your*
security will help.
 
  Not to start everyone flaming, but there is nothing wrong with
destroying your own computer thru infamous combinations of
interrupt hooks and the like (was that cryptic enough to avoid
a virii flame?)
 
--Matt
______________________________________________________________________________
"This new technology (the printing press) threatened the Crown, which shuddered
at the thought of widespread dissemination of works advocating religious heresy
and political upheaval.  The Crown's solution to the problem was a system of
regulation designed to control this "dangerous" art."
         -From my Copyright Law Text (refrencing the Statute of Anne -
                                           the first Copyright Statute)
(c)1993
______________________/___________________________________mjmiski@macc.wisc.edu




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: m5@vail.tivoli.com (Mike McNally)
Date: Thu, 30 Sep 93 12:26:38 PDT
To: jet@netcom.com (J. Eric Townsend)
Subject: misc crypto stuff
In-Reply-To: <2caa2729.acsys@NetAcsys.com>
Message-ID: <9309301919.AA17782@vail.tivoli.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



J. Eric Townsend writes:
 > "mycal (voices through your head @ 88.1MHz)" writes:
 >  > First a prediction, soon the news media will pick up on a major story on
 >  > somthing like child porn being transfered ...
 >
 > Already happened.  The fellow used something like PGP...
 > No call for banning of encryption by The Media(tm).

Ahh, but recall how The Media operates.  There will come a case
involving encrypted data that for some reason can be made spectacular
by the law enforcement agency involved.  The agency will ensure that
The Media paints as threatening a picture of "the encryption crisis"
as desired.

Even better would be the reaction to encryption involved in some
Threat to National Security.  In a situation anything like the Gulf
War, any ominous words in a Pentagon press briefing will be siezed
upon hungrily by The Media.

All it'll take is one memorable incident.  Even if mountains of
evidence turn up later to show that the case was bogus, it won't
matter.  A suitable majority of the public will only remember the
original terror, the few soundbytes about national security/drug
dealers/cocaine cartels/child snuff films/Islamic extremists, and
there'll be no stopping the Government from enacting whatever laws it
pleases.

--
Mike McNally




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Derek Atkins <warlord@MIT.EDU>
Date: Thu, 30 Sep 93 11:51:55 PDT
To: J. Michael Diehl <mdiehl@triton.unm.edu>
Subject: Re: key-server down?
In-Reply-To: <9309300605.AA27084@triton.unm.edu>
Message-ID: <9309301826.AA05639@toxicwaste.MEDIA.MIT.EDU>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Hi.

I Know that the toxicwaste (pgp.mit.edu) keyserver is working.  It had
some problems when I installed a new mail-handler script, but that has
since been fixed.

The Last command should work fine (I used it a few days ago).

Hope this helps.

-derek





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: nobody@rosebud.ee.uh.edu
Date: Thu, 30 Sep 93 12:31:56 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: REMAIL: digicash
Message-ID: <9309301926.AA20380@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

Cypherpunks,

I've been experimenting with a primitive digital cash system for
remailers.  Originally I had hoped to combine the remailing and
banking functions of the elee7h5@rosebud remailer, but for now I have
an even more primitive cash system implemented at elee6ue@rosebud.  It
seems to be performing as expected.

A digital cash accepting remailer, along with a good positive
reputation system, is the "crypto-anarchist" answer to labeling
anonymous mail with subjects and/or usernames.  (Of course, a subject
that enables anonymous mail to blend in is great - such as "Re: your
mail").  (Incidentally, since running pgp to get the signature from a
pgp-signed message is expensive, I patched the script I use for
positive reputation to give the option of checking signatures or not,
if anybody is interested.)  Currently, the only objection I've heard
to anonymous mail is "somebody can abuse it"; future remailers will
require payments, helping to address this concern.

Basically, the remailer recognizes a Digicash pasting token, and for
now the cash is a string of letters and numbers.  Before remailing,
the digicash is extracted and looked up in a cash list (which I
create).  If the cash is in the list, it is assumed to be valid, and
the list is rewritten minus the cash string just used.  If the cash
isn't present, it is assumed to be invalid, and an insufficient funds
message is remailed instead.  The remailer does not keep a list of
"spent" cash strings, so there is the possibility of duplication (once
in every 36^60 times).  As far as correlating the cash used to
individual and a message, I can only assure you I could care less
about the required bookkeeping.

The pasting token looks like the others, and you use it in a similar
way -

- ----------8< cut here >8----------
::
Digicash: <here is the string>

- ----------8< cut here >8----------

For example, I "paid" for the remailing of this message with

- ----------8< cut here >8----------
::
Digicash: BcKjSoUEQaTam9xPs0oso2j0UVVb1M6OyxTn8QSX0rdT3eUIH4Vq1rXEpYH1D

- ----------8< cut here >8----------

(Now, the above cash string should be invalid! :-)

The way I'm distributing valid cash for the remailer is by email -
mail me and I'll send you some valid cash strings.  No charge :-)

Karl L. Barrus
<klbarrus@owlnet.rice.edu>


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.3a

iQCVAgUBLKsyGYOA7OpLWtYzAQG/QAQAwNbDbKOdnWJ4g/tt8+0AdtR+5TzETfaU
DaodN1LDs7+w46/KlyIoI/B9+C710U1f46dnd81MxMm6eTGcbwnkrTBhz7QlO7NH
1joVaoe8TVljk2RZnCYmpYbzXjuogZcAuuZKVWY3ES2iElKZLr24oCZbHWljPV4o
griHzfbmHYI=
=54L7
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Andrew Purshottam <andy@autodesk.com>
Date: Thu, 30 Sep 93 18:42:28 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: fido encryption.
In-Reply-To: <9309300633.AA27652@triton.unm.edu>
Message-ID: <9309302131.AA03025@meefun.autodesk.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Doesn't Fidonet have a long tradition of feuding and splitting
into "subnets", which is facilitated by the way they maintain their 
nodelist files? An excited Fido'er expalined it to me one night at usenix
several years ago, but I had little interest in pc networking then.
Perhaps a encryption ok subset of fidonet could form? Anyone who knows
more about this care to comment?

Andy



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Mike Godwin <mnemonic@eff.org>
Date: Thu, 30 Sep 93 12:01:55 PDT
To: jet@netcom.com (J. Eric Townsend)
Subject: Re: misc crypto stuff
In-Reply-To: <9309301833.AA13178@netcom6.netcom.com>
Message-ID: <199309301856.AA11463@eff.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


 
J. Eric writes:

> Already happened.  The fellow used something like PGP, if not PGP, to
> encrypt stuff to disk.  If I remember correctly (Mike G., help me out
> here) he was asked to cough up the passwords in court as part of the
> legal proceedings. (I remember this only because of the following
> discussion of 'can a court make me give out my passwords?)  No call
> for banning of encryption by The Media(tm).

I'm not sure which case you're thinking of, Eric. I know of no case in
which the defendant was forced to disclose his keys.



--Mike






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "mycal (voices through your head @ 88.1MHz)" <mike@NetAcsys.com>
Date: Thu, 30 Sep 93 16:02:27 PDT
To: "J. Eric Townsend" <jet@netcom.com>
Subject: Re: misc crypto stuff
Message-ID: <2cab57ba.acsys@NetAcsys.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


On Thu, 30 Sep 93 18:33:08 GMT, "J. Eric Townsend" <jet@netcom.com> wrote:
> "mycal (voices through your head @ 88.1MHz)" writes:
>> [my prediction deleted]
> 
> Already happened.  The fellow used something like PGP, if not PGP, to
> encrypt stuff to disk.  If I remember correctly (Mike G., help me out
> here) he was asked to cough up the passwords in court as part of the
> legal proceedings. (I remember this only because of the following
> discussion of 'can a court make me give out my passwords?)  No call
> for banning of encryption by The Media(tm).
> 

Yes but if this is true it still was an isolated case, was they guy sending
stuff to other ppl encrypted?  Was he receiveing porn from over seas? Or
was he just protecting his personal notes?

The Media and the sheep, i mean ppl, wouldn't be moved to take a hard
position if it is just one guy protecting his diary, even if it contained
lots of evidance. But give them a network of child porno guys, and a well
done under cover operation that gives just enough information that
uncrackable crypto was used and that the police were lucky in catching
these guys with inside info and that there are many encrypted messages
flowing in and out, and throughout the US that could be pornographers just
like these guys, or worse, and the police are powerless to do anything,
even if they suspect wrong doing.  Just watch the Media jump all over
this one.

mycal










From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Jim McCoy <mccoy@ccwf.cc.utexas.edu>
Date: Thu, 30 Sep 93 13:22:04 PDT
To: pmetzger@lehman.com
Subject: Re: POISON PILL
In-Reply-To: <9309301812.AA01574@snark.lehman.com>
Message-ID: <199309302019.AA01877@flubber.cc.utexas.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text


> From: "Perry E. Metzger" <pmetzger@lehman.com>
> 
> Sandy says:
> > POISON PILL--What, if anything, can be done to booby-trap a
> > computer?  Once the cops have a machine, one would expect that
> > they will paw through everything in it. [...]
> 
> Why wouldn't you? Its your machine, so what you do to it is perfectly
> legal. You are under no obligation to make your equipment suitable for
> people who wish to steal it.

Well, you can do this, but you are taking your liberty into your own hands
by doing so.  Once your computer is siezed as part of a valid search
warrant it is no longer "your computer" but is evidence in an ongoing
investigation.  If you were to booby trap your system so that there was
actual descruction of components or data you would do two things:

	-1 Really, really piss off those investigating you.  Nothing like
	   giving people who can make your life a living hell a reason to
	   want to make your life hell...

	-2 Opening yourself up for destruction of evidence and obstruction
	   of justice charges in addition to whatever else they may have
	   had on you.

If you want to protect your data is such situations you need to set up your
system so that even if they have the data it does them nothing (e.g.
encryptiong), not so that it will destroy the data.


jim




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: J. Michael Diehl <mdiehl@triton.unm.edu>
Date: Thu, 30 Sep 93 14:41:57 PDT
To: huntting@glarp.com (Brad Huntting)
Subject: Re: How about a pgp RFC...
In-Reply-To: <199309301716.AA17376@misc.glarp.com>
Message-ID: <9309302137.AA06516@triton.unm.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


According to Brad Huntting:
> 
> At the moment I can think of nothing PEM can do that PGP cant.
> Granted there are problems scaling the web-of-trust model, but PGP
> is also capable of using a top down model (really just a subset of
> the web model).

So where do I get PEM?  I have pgp and ripem.  Thanx in advance.

J. Michael Diehl   ;^)  |*The 2nd Amendment is there in case the 
mdiehl@triton.unm.edu   | Government forgets about the 1st!  <RL>
Mike.Diehl@f29.n301.z1  |*God is a good Physicist, and an even 
    .fidonet.org        | better Mathematician.  <Me>
al945@cwns9.ins.cwru.edu|*I'm just looking for the opportunity to 
 (505) 299-2282 (voice) | be Politically Incorrect! <Me>
Can we impeach him yet? |*Protected by 18 USC 2511 and 18 USC 2703. 
PGP Key = 7C06F1 = A6 27 E1 1D 5F B2 F2 F1  12 E7 53 2D 85 A2 10 5D



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: J. Michael Diehl <mdiehl@triton.unm.edu>
Date: Thu, 30 Sep 93 14:42:05 PDT
To: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Subject: Re: FIDONet Censorship?
In-Reply-To: <9309301806.AA27173@netcom5.netcom.com>
Message-ID: <9309302141.AA06835@triton.unm.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


According to Timothy C. May:
> 
> FIDONet operators are sometimes blocking encrypted messages. So what
> else is new?
> Their machines, their rules. Strictly speaking, this is not
> censorship.

I believe I stated this in my original post.  I have no problems with their
right to do this.  I simply wanted to make the point that we need to educate
these people.

> However, we can try to get them to change their rules. Better, route
> around such machines.
> 
> "The Net tends to view censorship as damage and routes around it."

I like it!


J. Michael Diehl   ;^)  |*The 2nd Amendment is there in case the 
mdiehl@triton.unm.edu   | Government forgets about the 1st!  <RL>
Mike.Diehl@f29.n301.z1  |*God is a good Physicist, and an even 
    .fidonet.org        | better Mathematician.  <Me>
al945@cwns9.ins.cwru.edu|*I'm just looking for the opportunity to 
 (505) 299-2282 (voice) | be Politically Incorrect! <Me>
Can we impeach him yet? |*Protected by 18 USC 2511 and 18 USC 2703. 
PGP Key = 7C06F1 = A6 27 E1 1D 5F B2 F2 F1  12 E7 53 2D 85 A2 10 5D



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Sandy <72114.1712@CompuServe.COM>
Date: Thu, 30 Sep 93 13:56:56 PDT
To: <cypherpunks@toad.com>
Subject: POISON PILL :-)
Message-ID: <930930204341_72114.1712_FHF65-1@CompuServe.COM>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
  SANDY SANDFORT               Reply to:  ssandfort@attmail.com
 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

I wrote:

    . . . What could be done have the computer screw up the
    cop's data days, weeks or months after the seizure?  Of
    course, I would never do such a thing myself, nor would
    I advise anyone else to do so.  I do, however, have a
    passing academic interest in the subject.  Same for you
    folks too, right?

Perry responded:

    Why wouldn't you? Its your machine, so what you do to it
    is perfectly legal. You are under no obligation to make
    your equipment suitable for people who wish to steal it.

Well duh, Perry.  Let me rephrase that:

    . . . nor would I advise anyone else to do so.  I do,
    however, have a passing academic interest in the
    subject.  Same for you folks too, right?

                              * *
    >>> please note! >>>>      |     <<<< please note! <<<
                             \___/

              (smiley face for the humor impaired)


But all seriousness aside, Perry also offers a suggestion about
altering the ROMs on the disk controllers and then using a
special operating system.  Sounds like a terrific idea.  Just how
hard is this to do?  How about somebody writing a how-to manual
for this?

Or maybe all we need is a sticker that says:

                           !!WARNING!!
                  This Machine is Booby-Trapped
                      Use at Your Own Risk

 S a n d y

>>>>>>    Please send e-mail to:  ssandfort@attmail.com    <<<<<<
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Date: Thu, 30 Sep 93 16:47:27 PDT
To: mbl@ml7694a.leonard.american.edu (Matthew B. Landry)
Subject: Re: Disturbing statistics on wiretaps
In-Reply-To: <9309302319.AA24431@toad.com>
Message-ID: <9309302347.AA09695@netcom5.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Matthew Landry has written a nice piece on the craziness of the current
system. "Political" stuff like this is nice to see, even though he's
preaching to the choir here.

....
>         This is the kind of hysteria-backed power that Joe McCarthy most likely 
> dreamed about. This is the kind of power that Hitler had. This, incidentally, 
> is very much like what Castro did in Cuba that made him so unpopular here in 
> the US.
> 
>         So think before you say "that couldn't be true", because it probably 
> is.


Well done!

P.S. Your line length is too long. Try trimming it to 72-76
characters, to make quoting less problematic.

-Tim May



-- 
..........................................................................
Timothy C. May         | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,  
tcmay@netcom.com       | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
408-688-5409           | knowledge, reputations, information markets, 
W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA  | black markets, collapse of governments.
Higher Power: 2^756839 | Public Key: PGP and MailSafe available.
Note: I put time and money into writing this posting. I hope you enjoy it.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: lowton@typhon.dra.hmg.gb (Andy Lowton)
Date: Thu, 30 Sep 93 08:51:54 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: reading mail
In-Reply-To: <9309301525.AA17869@jobe.shell.portal.com.shell.portal.com>
Message-ID: <9309301653.AA28776@typhon.dra.hmg.gb>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



 > My question is this: how does he know that the mail is encrypted if he's
 > not examining the mail that passes through his system? If he *is*
 > examining the mail that passes through his system, it seems likely that he
 > is violating the Electronic Communications Privacy Act.
 > 
 > 
 > --Mike

He could be using an automatic search for the string at the beginning of
pgp encrypted messages.  Maybe someone on his system could check this out
by removing the strings and seeing if he notices it then.  Not that I'm
encouraging anyone to break the rules of the system you understand :)

mr lotion




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: cme@ellisun.sw.stratus.com (Carl Ellison)
Date: Thu, 30 Sep 93 14:06:39 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Orange book, the NSA, and the NCSC
Message-ID: <9309302103.AA05016@ellisun.sw.stratus.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>Message-Id: <m0ohwxY-00022PC@khijol>
>From: khijol!erc@uunet.UU.NET (Ed Carp)
>Subject: Re: Orange book, the NSA, and the NCSC
>Date: Wed, 29 Sep 1993 01:32:27 -0800 (PDT)

>Even if a Cray can crack a PGP-encrypted message in, say, an hour, flooding
>the system with messages would tend to obscure real traffic with obscure
>junk.  Hey, I can encrypt /vmunix with a random key as fast as the next
>person.  :)


I still have my copy of (what I call) pgp-ran.  I forgot what it was
called when it was posted and I can't find the sources now.
It puts rannos in PGP format.  Does a copy of the sources exist on one
of the servers?

It's too fast to be doing any encryption but it would be good to have
one which produces messages PGP recognizes as real, only for a public
key which isn't on file.  If PGP rejects a message, it wouldn't take
up any Cray cracking time.

 - Carl

Sample:

-----BEGIN PGP MESSAGE-----
Version: 2.1
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=7W70
-----END PGP MESSAGE-----




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: cme@ellisun.sw.stratus.com (Carl Ellison)
Date: Thu, 30 Sep 93 14:16:58 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Disturbing statistics on wiretaps
Message-ID: <9309302116.AA05298@ellisun.sw.stratus.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>From: "George A. Gleason" <gg@well.sf.ca.us>
>Subject: Re: Disturbing statistics on wiretaps
>Message-Id: <93Sep29.023420pdt.14278-2@well.sf.ca.us>
>Date: 	Wed, 29 Sep 1993 02:34:18 -0700


>And of course it should be remembered that there is still an old drug-war
>thing on the books which allows 72 hours' interception without a court
>order.  Now depending on how that's interpreted, 72 hours are a lot of
>conversations.  This stuff can be used for background intelligence and
>investigation where it never winds up in court but is used to get
>information to be used in other ways.  "It's what they don't tell you..."


This can't be true.

I read DERD's paper on wiretap law and she certainly didn't mention
anything like this.

You must be making it up.

:-) ?

No,  :-(

 - Carl




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: koontzd@lrcs.loral.com (David Koontz )
Date: Thu, 30 Sep 93 18:07:08 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Who is clipper spying on?
Message-ID: <9310010105.AA06462@nebula.lrcs.loral.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>From:  Bill Stewart
...
>Subject: Comments on Proposed FIPS for Escrowed Encryption Standard
...
>USAGE AND RISK ANALYSIS
...
>While some proprietary protocols are weak, the strengths of DES and
>variants such as Triple-DES are relatively well-known,
>and DES implementations can be performed in software at substantially
>lower cost than the customized hardware required for compliance with
>this proposed FIPS - because the FIPS specifies that it is only
>applicable to low-speed data, e.g. less than ISDN's 64000 bits/second,
>software implementation requires minimal computational effort,
>even for Triple-DES.

From the Federal Register:

   This proposed standard adopts encryption technology
developed by the Federal government to provide strong
protection for unclassified information and to enable
the keys used in the encryption and decryption processes
to be escrowed. This latter feature will assist law
enforcement and other government agencies, under the
proper legal authority, in the collection and decryption
of electronically transmitted information.
...
From the proposed FIPS Escrow Encryption Standard:

   Data, for purposes of this standard, includes voice,
facsimile and computer information communicated in a
telephone system. Telephone system, for purposes of this
standard, is limited to systems circuit-switched up to
no more than 14.4 kbs or which use basic-rate ISDN, or
to a similar grade wireless service.

-------
I would be willing to believe the baud rate limit is entirely artificial
and predicated on the equipment the NSA is providing for LE use. 

Then again it is pointed directly at telecommunications (voice, data),
and appears to discourage the use of link encryption, perhaps for 
traffic flow analysis reasons.  It would appear that someone is very
interested in who uses cryptography and who they talk to with it.

I wonder what Capstone will bring.

-------

From the proposed FIPS Escrow Encryption Standard:

   The encryption/decryption algorithm has been approved
for government applications requiring encryption of
sensitive unclassified telecommunications of data as
defined herein.

---

You don't suppose all this is to simply allow one part of the government
to spy on another, do you?  Is this really some disguised power play?

I mean really, less than a 1000 authorized wiretaps in 1992?  Someone is
spending some big bucks here.





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Marc Horowitz <marc@GZA.COM>
Date: Thu, 30 Sep 93 15:27:29 PDT
To: Mike Godwin <mnemonic@eff.org>
Subject: Re: FIDOnet encryption (or lack thereof)
In-Reply-To: <199309301808.AA10882@eff.org>
Message-ID: <9309302227.AA02421@dun-dun-noodles.aktis.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>> ECPA applies both to Prodigy and to Internet message traffic.

Could you define "Internet message traffic"?  The ECPA says:

                     "(3)(a) Except as provided in
                     paragraph (b) of this subsection, a
                     person or entity providing an
                     electronic communication service to
                     the public shall not intentionally
                     divulge the contents of any
                     communication (other than one to such
                     person or entity, or an agent thereof)
                     while in transmission on that service
                     to any person or entity other than an
                     addressee or intended recipient of
                     such communication or an agent of such
                     addressee or intended recipient.

Does this apply to anyone who provides a service to the public?  Is it
legal for me to say "I'm gonna provide private email, but I reserve
the right to read it" in the service contract?  How is "public"
defined here?

Non-lawyers want to know :-)

		Marc




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: jet@netcom.com (J. Eric Townsend)
Date: Thu, 30 Sep 93 11:36:55 PDT
To: "mycal (voices through your head @ 88.1MHz)" <mike@NetAcsys.com>
Subject: misc crypto stuff
In-Reply-To: <2caa2729.acsys@NetAcsys.com>
Message-ID: <9309301833.AA13178@netcom6.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


"mycal (voices through your head @ 88.1MHz)" writes:
 > First a prediction, soon the news media will pick up on a major story on
 > somthing like child porn being transfered around using something like
 > PGP.  It will get blown out of preportion, and there will be a call to
 > outlaw anything but government approved government decodeable encription.

Already happened.  The fellow used something like PGP, if not PGP, to
encrypt stuff to disk.  If I remember correctly (Mike G., help me out
here) he was asked to cough up the passwords in court as part of the
legal proceedings. (I remember this only because of the following
discussion of 'can a court make me give out my passwords?)  No call
for banning of encryption by The Media(tm).






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: jet@netcom.com (J. Eric Townsend)
Date: Thu, 30 Sep 93 11:36:38 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: fido encryption.
In-Reply-To: <9309300633.AA27652@triton.unm.edu>
Message-ID: <9309301835.AA13352@netcom6.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


J. Michael Diehl writes:
 > 2)   They seem to be afraid to pass/store encrypted messages on their
 > system.  This indicates to me a lack of understanding of the concept of
 > privacy.  They seem to buy into the idea that "only BAD people encrypt
 > email."

However, they do understand the US Gov's policy of 'we found it on
your system, we're taking everything, it doesn't matter if you knew it
was there or not'.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "mycal (voices through your head @ 88.1MHz)" <mike@NetAcsys.com>
Date: Thu, 30 Sep 93 20:17:09 PDT
To: "Jim McCoy" <mccoy@ccwf.cc.utexas.edu>
Subject: Re: POISON PILL
Message-ID: <2cab89d1.acsys@NetAcsys.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


On Thu, 30 Sep 1993 15:19:44 -0500 (CDT), "Jim McCoy" <mccoy@ccwf.cc.utexas.edu> wrote:
> 
> If you want to protect your data is such situations you need to set up your
> system so that even if they have the data it does them nothing (e.g.
> encryptiong), not so that it will destroy the data.
> 

OK, here is the twist that should work .  If the computer
falls into the wrong hands the computer could just lock down all the data
on the hard disk, encripting it.

None of the data would be lost, just encripted.  You'd need the recovery
program boot disk and the password/phrase to unlock the hard disk.

This program could be hidden in a modified copy of the operating system,
you could also add the modified prom code so the computer wouldn't work
without the modified operating system.

So they would have a useless computer, but the data wouldn't be recoverable
and if they reformatted the HD, they still couldn't use it.  I don't think
they would be smart enough to know that the prom had been replaced.

Then again, there are probibly already programs out there that encript
the HD already.

mycal





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: jet@netcom.com (J. Eric Townsend)
Date: Thu, 30 Sep 93 11:41:55 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: FIDOnet encryption (or lack thereof)
In-Reply-To: <199309301507.AA09112@eff.org>
Message-ID: <9309301840.AA13551@netcom6.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Mike Godwin writes:
 > My question is this: how does he know that the mail is encrypted if he's
 > not examining the mail that passes through his system? If he *is*
 > examining the mail that passes through his system, it seems likely that he
 > is violating the Electronic Communications Privacy Act.


With UNIX it's quite simple to grep for "-----BEGIN PGP
MESSAGE-----"... and ditch messages that match.

I guess one could also run the incoming mail through a spell-checker
and reject messages with greater than %99 failure rate.

Neither of these require actual examination of the message by a human,
neither reveal content of a message to a human.  







From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: doug@netcom.com (Doug Merritt)
Date: Thu, 30 Sep 93 18:52:29 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Ultimate privacy/security
Message-ID: <9310010151.AA25664@netcom5.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


The following starts out in a very philosophical way, but that's only to
explain the thinking behind an algorithm I've been developing. The algorithm
is nonetheless extremely unorthodox, so if you've no taste for that sort
of thing, skip this.

On the other hand, the following long term thinking is what lead me to
join cypherpunks, so it's not just a passing fancy.

* 1. Pitfalls of every previous scheme:

It would be nice to find ultimate measures of security and privacy,
but there always seems to be a hole somewhere. The point of passwords
and encryption keys is to verify identity, but of course they can be
stolen/intercepted/etc. If you have a highly secure 10K bit password,
preferably generated by an analog hardware random number generator,
you'll have to store it somewhere, e.g. in your wristwatch, and *that*
could be stolen or taken by search warrant.

Similar comments apply to favorite science fictional devices that are
now becoming possible or even commercially available, such as retinal
pattern checkers and prompted voice signatures...e.g. it's quite possible
to record someone's voice print (a staple of movies by now), or in
principle even synthesize their voice uttering a brand new sentence
in response to a challenge.  DNA authentication is *almost* possible in
real time (give it a few years), but pretty much the same problem there:
someone could easily steal a few of your skin cells.

So is there any ultimate method of identity authentication? I thought of
one, but it is philosophically unsettling, not to mention problematic
in implementation.

* 2. Getting to the roots of the issue:

Why do we care about authenticating identity? It comes down to a matter
of trust. Different people have different goals. We can't trust everyone
else to share our goals; they may be malevolent from our point of view.
We trust ourselves, in the sense of security issues, but to be on the
safe side, we trust no one else. Therefore our identity is the issue.

The problem is that passwords, voice prints, retinal prints, handwriting
signatures, DNA signatures...none of these things actually guarantee
identity. All of those can potentially be usurped by those who do not
share our personal goals.

And that points to a solution:

* 3. Goals as the definition of identity:

If we had a method of authentication that assured that the person in
question shared our personal goals, then we would have the ultimate
security/privacy scheme. If we cloned our mental selves, then that
second occurrence of our own minds would be as trustworthy to us
as *we* are to ourselves. So a hypothetical authentication scheme that
managed to somehow authenticate the (relevant) goals of the person being
tested as being identical to our own would assure us that the person
may or may not be us, but is nonetheless trustworthy.

In fact, such a scheme would have the unusual safety factor that it
would protect against we ourselves having a change of heart and "going
over to the enemy."

Sounds good. Also sounds impossible. Maybe. However, I do have an
algorithm in mind that *partially* satisfies the above criteria. In its
current form, it is susceptible to forgery...what's to prevent bad guys
from pretending to philosophies and goals that they don't truly believe
in?

This is essentially the same weakness as all previous schemes, so there
would be no advancement in that sense (without some further strengthening
of the scheme, if possible). But at least now we're operating on the
absolute fundamentally direct level, where other schemes are indirect.
Is this a strength or a weakness? (And what if the forgery-hole were
plugged somehow?)

I don't have an answer for that yet. I'm working on it, but it may be
an insoluble problem...or maybe not, we shall see. Meanwhile, aside
from the details of the algorithm, I'm interested in hearing people's
thoughts about the strengths and weaknesses of this general approach
as opposed to other authentication philosophies.

Getting feedback about this is why I joined this list, but I've been
a bit shy about bringing up such an unorthodox approach...not to mention
learning what people here are like, and learning from the example of
Tim, who consistently teaches me by being simultaneously insightful
and supportive of people here. That is an approach that I long to emulate...
thank you for the example.
	Doug
P.S. Some of you high powered people out there will shoot the above full
of holes, which is fine, that is helpful in itself; others *might* find
some material to use in their professional research. Also fine, if that
happens, but please mention my name if it leads to anything. I rarely
manage to take things to the point of publication, so an acknowledgement
here and there is gratifying. Thanks. :-)





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: doug@netcom.com (Doug Merritt)
Date: Thu, 30 Sep 93 18:57:08 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: POISON PILL
Message-ID: <9310010154.AA25936@netcom5.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Actually, you'd be surprised what is recoverable in the aftermath of
an explosion. Bombs truly are no guarantee of unrecoverability of data,
at least not simple things like dynamite and pipe bombs.

Furthermore, pipe bombs throw shrapnel, and as such are anti-personnel
devices. The goal was to destroy data, not FBI agents. Booby traps that
take lives are considered in court as 1st degree murder.

There are more elegant approaches.
        Doug




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: doug@netcom.com (Doug Merritt)
Date: Thu, 30 Sep 93 19:07:07 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: steganography & fidonet
Message-ID: <9310010206.AA27468@netcom5.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


In regard to things like Fidonet sysops noting forbidden encryption
pasing through their systems:

Encrypted messages could be encoded in a final pass as English sentences.
A 2000 line C program with a 200,000 word dictionary could encode and
decode sentences that were roughly grammatical, even if they sounded
really weird on average.

Although I've never heard of this being done, it's pretty obvious in one
sense, so I'm sure it's no surprise to the spooks. It surely wouldn't
be obvious to snoopy Fidonet sysops, though, so it may have its uses.

BTW a more complex program + dictionary could confine the encoded utterances
to topical words and therefore sound even less weird. With enough
sophistication, such an encoding could generally pass muster as
"confusing and poorly worded jargon" to anyone but the most devoted analyst.

I've got enough (or almost enough) sw & dictionaries & word clusters on hand
to implement such a thing, but I've personally no purpose to use it for.
	Doug




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Matthew B. Landry <mbl@ml7694a.leonard.american.edu>
Date: Thu, 30 Sep 93 16:22:28 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Disturbing statistics on wiretaps
Message-ID: <9309302319.AA24431@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>>And of course it should be remembered that there is still an old drug-war
>>thing on the books which allows 72 hours' interception without a court
>>order.  Now depending on how that's interpreted, 72 hours are a lot of
>>conversations.  This stuff can be used for background intelligence and
>>investigation where it never winds up in court but is used to get
>>information to be used in other ways.  "It's what they don't tell you..."
>
>This can't be true.
>
        I don't know if this specific law is true or not, but a lot of those 
drug war laws are the type of thing that would make a sane person say "This 
can't be true". Only it is.
        For example, say that I mow lawns for spare cash as a teenager. When I 
go off to college here at AU, I pay some of my tuition with money from my lawn 
savings. AU takes some of my tuition and pays Mariott for providing meal plan 
service. Mariott pays its staff's wages with the money from AU. The staff pays 
their rent out of their wages. Perfectly natural chain of events, and it 
happens all the time.
        Now we introduce a new factor. One of my lawn customers, without my 
knowledge (because it was none of my business) sold drugs. He put some of the 
proceeds from the drug sale into my pocket when he paid me for services 
rendered. _All_ of the assets of _every single person and organization I 
mentioned above_ are now considered tainted with drug money, and are legally 
government property. The Mariott corporation would suddenly belong to the DEA. 
So would everything else. Every single piece of property involved could be 
auctioned off to the highest bidder, and the government would keep it all.
        Fortunately for AU and Mariott, I never mowed lawns in High School. 
Thus, I couldn't possibly have drug dealers for customers.
        This is the kind of hysteria-backed power that Joe McCarthy most likely 
dreamed about. This is the kind of power that Hitler had. This, incidentally, 
is very much like what Castro did in Cuba that made him so unpopular here in 
the US.

        So think before you say "that couldn't be true", because it probably 
is.
--
Matthew B. Landry
ml7694a@american.edu
(Finally!) mbl@ml7694a.leonard.american.edu




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: J. Michael Diehl <mdiehl@triton.unm.edu>
Date: Thu, 30 Sep 93 18:32:28 PDT
To: 72114.1712@compuserve.com (Sandy)
Subject: Re: POISON PILL
In-Reply-To: <931001002401_72114.1712_FHF27-1@CompuServe.COM>
Message-ID: <9310010129.AA19728@triton.unm.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Well, I have to say that I love this idea!  I have a few suggestions, tho.  How
about we take a copy of the public domain bios source, or disassemble one 
ourselves.  We hack the code a bit...  Then we burn a new prom to install into
our machines.  AND WE EPOXY THE MOTHER TO THE DAMNED BOARD!  We build a card to
stick in our machine which receives a radio signal which contains a decription
key to be supplied to the bios hacks mentioned above.  So we use a protable
radio transmitter to send the password to our machine.  Our bios waits for this
password for use in decripting the filesystem.  If the bios doesn't get this
password, it trashes the cmos and does whatever other mean things it wants to.
Perhapse part of the card could have login in it which would short the power-
supply to the memory bus... shit!  Hypothetically, we have two passwords for
our system, one for the Feds, and one for Honest people.  When the bios receives
the Fed-password, it acts normally, (for a time?) except it also unleashes a 
*nasty* virus from within it's own rom!  This would take "care" of the Fed's 
data in adition to screwing up the machine.

Just my two cents....


J. Michael Diehl   ;^)  |*The 2nd Amendment is there in case the 
mdiehl@triton.unm.edu   | Government forgets about the 1st!  <RL>
Mike.Diehl@f29.n301.z1  |*God is a good Physicist, and an even 
    .fidonet.org        | better Mathematician.  <Me>
al945@cwns9.ins.cwru.edu|*I'm just looking for the opportunity to 
 (505) 299-2282 (voice) | be Politically Incorrect! <Me>
Can we impeach him yet? |*Protected by 18 USC 2511 and 18 USC 2703. 
PGP Key = 7C06F1 = A6 27 E1 1D 5F B2 F2 F1  12 E7 53 2D 85 A2 10 5D



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Sandy <72114.1712@CompuServe.COM>
Date: Thu, 30 Sep 93 17:32:28 PDT
To: <cypherpunks@toad.com>
Subject: POISON PILL
Message-ID: <931001002401_72114.1712_FHF27-1@CompuServe.COM>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
  SANDY SANDFORT               Reply to:  ssandfort@attmail.com
 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Jim says I shouldn't booby-trap my computer because:

 -1 Really, really piss off those investigating you.  Nothing like
    giving people who can make your life a living hell a reason to
    want to make your life hell...

Too late, Jim, if the situations has gotten as far as warrants
and seizures, they are already making my life a living hell.
Investigation my ass; this is war!

He further states:

 -2 Opening yourself up for destruction of evidence and obstruction
    of justice charges in addition to whatever else they may have
    had on you.

Well, I haven't done the relevant legal research lately, but
that's not the way I remember things.  Plus please remember the
subject of this note--POISON PILL.  I not only want my *data*
unavailable to the bastards, I want my *computer* unavailable to
them, too.  And if possible, I would love to have it fuck up
*their data* as well.  Eh...theoretically speaking, of course.

 S a n d y

>>>>>>    Please send e-mail to:  ssandfort@attmail.com    <<<<<<
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: thug@phantom.com (Murdering Thug)
Date: Thu, 30 Sep 93 18:02:28 PDT
To: 72114.1712@CompuServe.COM (Sandy)
Subject: Re: POISON PILL
In-Reply-To: <931001002401_72114.1712_FHF27-1@CompuServe.COM>
Message-ID: <m0oiYre-0009FJC@mindvox.phantom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text


Sandy Sandfort writes:

> Well, I haven't done the relevant legal research lately, but
> that's not the way I remember things.  Plus please remember the
> subject of this note--POISON PILL.  I not only want my *data*
> unavailable to the bastards, I want my *computer* unavailable to
> them, too.  And if possible, I would love to have it fuck up
> *their data* as well.  Eh...theoretically speaking, of course.

Simple.  Wire yourself up a peripheral bus card (ISA for PCs or NuBus for
Macs) that contains a software/interrupt triggered relay.  That relay is
wired to a stick of dynamite, an electric match (available in hobby
rocketry stores), and a 9v battery all glued to the peripheral bus card.
If a stick of dynamite is not available, you may use a pipe bomb filled
with flash powder from emptied m-80's.  Then write yourself a boot-up
password program that will trigger the bomb if the wrong password is
entered.  A 10" pipe bomb should make any PC or Mac quite useless in a
matter of microseconds.  For added effect, the pipe bomb may be strapped
to the underside of the hard disk in your computer to make sure that data
recovery is out of the question.


Thug





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: jet@netcom.com (J. Eric Townsend)
Date: Thu, 30 Sep 93 14:01:56 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: misc crypto stuff
In-Reply-To: <199309301856.AA11463@eff.org>
Message-ID: <9309302102.AA24247@netcom6.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Mike Godwin writes:
 > I'm not sure which case you're thinking of, Eric. I know of no case in
 > which the defendant was forced to disclose his keys.

I don't think I dreamed this, but...

I remember hearing that one of the people hit by the bamse sting had
encrypted a bunch of stuff on their system.  I also remember some
discussion of whether or not the person in question could be ordered
to reveal their keys.  (Maybe I *inferred* that the person had been
ordered to reveal their keys since there was a discussion of whether
or not it was legal.)


-eric




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "L. Detweiler" <ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Date: Thu, 30 Sep 93 20:12:28 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: HELP! I lost a message
Message-ID: <9310010308.AA15153@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I have been *drowning* in email lately, and I think I accidentally
deleted a message that appeared on the list. It had the following text.
Could anyone send me the original message ASAP? this is a matter of
critical importance. Also, could the original author contact me if
possible? I thought I sent you email but I can't find that either. Yes,
I've got a bad case of cyberspatial insanity.

tx.

===cut=here===

Date: Wed, 29 Sep 1993 10:43:47 -0700 (PDT)

I agree that messages to president@whitehouse.gov, or to the whitehouse
area on Compu$erve are not acknowledged.  I have sent several to each as well
as a letter direct to President Hillary, none of which were acknowledged.  I
wrote about a major money-waster in government medical care systems which could
easily save the government in the three-digit millions.  For what its worth,
the boondoggle is this:  When DOD decided to automate their medical facilities
they put out an RFP.  A company called SAIC was aware that the entire software
system that VA uses to automate its 1000 bed hospitals is available for free
under the FOIA.  SAIC got a copy of all the VA software, and bid to DOD to
take this VA software which the government already owns, and sell it back to
DOD for giga-bucks.  Now they (DOD) must negotiate with and pay for every
change they want to that software.  Meanwhile the VA programmers continue
to improve the VA software (DHCP) as salaried government employees.  In fact,
now DOD is looking to pay SAIC to write interface routines to allow the DOD
software (CHCS) to share info with the VA software (DHCP).  You would think
that this would get their attention, but no.  Instead we continue to pay a
private firm to sell us our own software.  Hows this for medical care cost
over-runs?




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: jet@netcom.com (J. Eric Townsend)
Date: Thu, 30 Sep 93 14:21:57 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Fidonet, policies, privacy, and power.
In-Reply-To: <VuJPac1w164w@ideath.goldenbear.com>
Message-ID: <9309302120.AA26088@netcom6.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Greg Broiles writes:
 > of Fidonet "case histories" seems to be that the various Fidonet Czars
 > can kick you out of the net if they consider you "excessively annoying".

s/Fidonet/USENET/





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "L. Detweiler" <ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Date: Thu, 30 Sep 93 20:42:28 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: FIDONet Mail filtering - a course of action
Message-ID: <9310010341.AA15892@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


FIDONet mail filtering came up many months ago. It is indeed an
atrocious policy. Are these people in the same cyberspace we are? This
is like hearing neanderthals inhabit many houses in the neighborhood.

As for what *we* can do, well, if premier cyberspatial laywer Mike
Godwin considers himself a hardcore cypherpunk, I'd expect that a
letter on EFF stationary would have a pretty significant effect. It
wouldn't have to be hostile or intimidating, just something along the
tone of `please join the cyberspatial community and your concerned
peers.' It could mention the strict legal significance of the ECPA --
that a strong case can be made that *any* filtering is in violation of
it, and that one cannot screen encrypted mail without breaking it. In
fact, ideally the letter would be general enough to give to anyone who
is engaged in unwholesome activities along the same lines.

If this is all too much work, I think just quoting his cypherpunk-list
letters that suggest the ECPA does not exactly condone their behavior
might have an effect too...

Hee, hee, though I'd say the actual letter would be worth a coveted
L.D. Cypherpunk of the Week award <g>  I'm just waiting for an excuse
to give M.G. one. I don't think everyone realizes how lucky we are to
have him and Gilmore in the same room with us!




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Karl Lui Barrus <klbarrus@owlnet.rice.edu>
Date: Thu, 30 Sep 93 19:52:37 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: REMAIL: digicash II
Message-ID: <9310010251.AA18893@flammulated.owlnet.rice.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Heh, my math is slightly off: the chances of a duplication are
actually 1/(62^60) since valid characters are [a-zA-Z0-9], and each
cash string is of length 61, 60 characters taken randomly from the set
of valid characters, and an initial 'B' (since all the cash issued
from elee7h5@rosebud starts with an 'A').  On the other hand, I'm not
using a cryptographically strong random number generator (I'm waiting
for the soon to be released PGP library :-)

Remailing seems to a bit slower, probably because the perl hacks I
added slurp the entire file of valid strings, check payment, and
rewrite the file, minus valid payment.  

Also, the more enterprising and devious among you :-) will soon note
that the remailer elee6ue@rosebud passes along the subject line even
when payment fails.  Thus, if you collapse your entire message into
the subject, you can still get a message through.  I will fix this
problem soon!

-- 
Karl L. Barrus: klbarrus@owlnet.rice.edu         
keyID: 5AD633 hash: D1 59 9D 48 72 E9 19 D5  3D F3 93 7E 81 B5 CC 32 

"One man's mnemonic is another man's cryptography" 
  - my compilers prof discussing file naming in public directories



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: baumbach@atmel.com (Peter Baumbach)
Date: Thu, 30 Sep 93 19:52:28 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: POISON PILL
Message-ID: <9310010221.AA11014@bass.chp.atmel.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


What you need to do, is take advantage of the paranoia of the policemen.

-Have fake bombs all over your computer.  Police tend to blow up fake
 bombs just in case they are real. :-)

-You need to add the signature of a virus to all your encrypted files.
 file.pgp is infected with Stoned type virus.   Delete [y]:


Peter Baumbach
baumbach@atmel.com


Now that I've thought of it, that bomb idea has many more applications!
Let the police blow up the evidence.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: J. Michael Diehl <mdiehl@triton.unm.edu>
Date: Thu, 30 Sep 93 21:32:38 PDT
To: ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu (L. Detweiler)
Subject: Re: FIDONet Mail filtering - a course of action
In-Reply-To: <9310010341.AA15892@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Message-ID: <9310010429.AA27615@triton.unm.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


According to L. Detweiler:
> 
> As for what *we* can do, well, if premier cyberspatial laywer Mike
> Godwin considers himself a hardcore cypherpunk, I'd expect that a
> letter on EFF stationary would have a pretty significant effect. It
> wouldn't have to be hostile or intimidating, just something along the
> tone of `please join the cyberspatial community and your concerned
> peers.' It could mention the strict legal significance of the ECPA --
> that a strong case can be made that *any* filtering is in violation of
> it, and that one cannot screen encrypted mail without breaking it. In
> fact, ideally the letter would be general enough to give to anyone who
> is engaged in unwholesome activities along the same lines.

Well, I have no ethical problems with giving out the guy's name...

> Hee, hee, though I'd say the actual letter would be worth a coveted
> L.D. Cypherpunk of the Week award <g>  I'm just waiting for an excuse
> to give M.G. one. I don't think everyone realizes how lucky we are to
> have him and Gilmore in the same room with us!

We are indeed lucky people.  There are a lot of "quality people" on this list.
I am very gratefull to all of you.


J. Michael Diehl   ;^)  |*The 2nd Amendment is there in case the 
mdiehl@triton.unm.edu   | Government forgets about the 1st!  <RL>
Mike.Diehl@f29.n301.z1  |*God is a good Physicist, and an even 
    .fidonet.org        | better Mathematician.  <Me>
al945@cwns9.ins.cwru.edu|*I'm just looking for the opportunity to 
 (505) 299-2282 (voice) | be Politically Incorrect! <Me>
Can we impeach him yet? |*Protected by 18 USC 2511 and 18 USC 2703. 
PGP Key = 7C06F1 = A6 27 E1 1D 5F B2 F2 F1  12 E7 53 2D 85 A2 10 5D



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: nobody@Menudo.UH.EDU
Date: Thu, 30 Sep 93 22:02:33 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Anonymous Forwarding Software Available
Message-ID: <199310010500.AA05647@Menudo.UH.EDU>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


At  9:26 PM 9/20/93 +0000, Ray wrote:
>put a copy of my anonymous
>forwarding software in soda.berkeley.edu:pub/cypherpunks/incoming/aforward.shar

Can't find it. Was I too slow?





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: nobody@Menudo.UH.EDU
Date: Thu, 30 Sep 93 22:02:38 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: PERL: creating pgp look-alike messages
Message-ID: <199310010500.AA05658@Menudo.UH.EDU>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

In case you lost your random PGP look-alike message generator :-),
here is one in PERL.  Run it with an argument (number of lines of
"encrypted" text to produce).  Such a message won't pass pgp itself,
since magic bytes and checksums aren't there.

- ----------8< cut here >8----------
#!/usr/local/bin/perl

#creates random messages that look like PGP messages

@pgpchars = (a .. z, A .. Z, '+', '=', '/');
$lenpgpchars = @pgpchars;
$pgplinelength = 64;

$numlines = shift @ARGV;

print "-----BEGIN PGP MESSAGE-----\n";
print "Version 2.3a\n\n";

foreach $i (0 .. $numlines) {
  foreach $j (0 .. $pgplinelength) {
    $char = $pgpchars[rand $lenpgpchars];
    print $char;
  }
  print "\n";
}

print "-----END PGP MESSAGE-----\n";

- ----------8< cut here >8----------
Karl L. Barrus
<klbarrus@owlnet.rice.edu>

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.3a

iQCVAgUBLKuzBIOA7OpLWtYzAQHJZgP+PE0kcLVyHr2Ml/D0QEYJqVh58x8h0UGD
U8aShHVcryrKk7Uj2xXNtC8OAH1ltoi98jiEuJvqi3rcLaj8lui+gTSe96vpoWRP
iQSMuQUn0NNMOP3BooeCoeV2KY7Kd4511Km8yOtzJflwPrk2AyeI8Bra4tpuVxnH
6eErL3MBUzU=
=Xcys
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Mike Godwin <mnemonic@eff.org>
Date: Thu, 30 Sep 93 21:37:09 PDT
To: ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu (L. Detweiler)
Subject: Re: FIDONet Mail filtering - a course of action
In-Reply-To: <9310010341.AA15892@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Message-ID: <199310010434.AA16852@eff.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


 
Lance writes:

> As for what *we* can do, well, if premier cyberspatial laywer Mike
> Godwin considers himself a hardcore cypherpunk, I'd expect that a
> letter on EFF stationary would have a pretty significant effect.

This is a possibility, but perhaps we could do something subtler. I
suggest that someone forward my cypherpunk-list letters to this sysop
along with my phone number (202-347-5400) and let the guy know that he can
call me to discuss the possible legal liability he is creating for
himself.

Outside of the issue of passing encrypted information, it seems common
among Fido sysops to screen for other kinds of content. That can be
way uncool, legally.


--Mike






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Karl Lui Barrus <klbarrus@owlnet.rice.edu>
Date: Thu, 30 Sep 93 22:37:30 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: FIDO, steganography, PGP
Message-ID: <9310010537.AA05696@flammulated.owlnet.rice.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

I've had fun writing this!

This is a PERL script that takes as input a PGP encrypted, ascii
output file.  It skips the headers and stuff, and converts every
character in the body into a geographic name.  I don't think I'll have
a chance to write the reverse script tonight, but it will coming along
soon.

So maybe this can be used to mail other people lists of geographic
names rather than encrypted messages since I've heard some networks
frown upon encrypted mail :-)

Generate your PGP file, and invoke the script like this:

pgpsteg < encrypted_file_ascii_output > steg.out

and steg.out will contain a list of places derived from your input
file.

- ----------8< cut here >8----------
#!/usr/local/bin/perl

#simple minded steganography for pgp encrypted messages
#Karl L. Barrus <klbarrus@owlnet.rice.edu>

%conversion = (
  '0', 'canada', '1', 'united states', '2', 'mexico',
  '3', 'pacific ocean', '4', 'atlantic ocean', '5', 'arctic ocean',
  '6', 'gulf of mexico', '7', 'north america', '8', 'allegheny mountains',
  '9', 'rocky mountains',
  'a', 'alabama',  'b', 'alaska', 'c', 'arizona', 
  'd', 'new mexico', 'e', 'arkansas', 'f', 'california',
  'g', 'colorado', 'h', 'connecticut', 'i', 'rhode island',
  'j', 'delaware', 'k', 'maryland', 'l', 'florida',
  'm', 'georgia', 'n', 'hawaii', 'o', 'idaho',
  'p', 'illinois', 'q', 'indiana', 'r', 'iowa',
  's', 'kansas', 't', 'kentucky', 'u', 'louisiana',
  'v', 'maine', 'w', 'massachusetts', 'x', 'michigan',
  'y', 'minnesota', 'z', 'mississippi', 'A', 'missouri',
  'B', 'montana', 'C', 'nebraska', 'D', 'nevada',
  'E', 'utah', 'F', 'new hampshire', 'G', 'vermont',
  'H', 'new jersey', 'I', 'new york', 'J', 'north carolina',
  'K', 'north dakota', 'L', 'south dakota', 'M', 'ohio',
  'N', 'oklahoma', 'O', 'oregon', 'P', 'pennsylvania', 
  'Q', 'south carolina', 'R', 'tennessee', 'S', 'texas',
  'T', 'virginia', 'U', 'washington', 'V', 'west virginia',
  'W', 'wisconsin', 'X', 'wyoming', 'Y', 'washington d.c.',
  'Z', 'bermuda', '+', 'guam', '/', 'puerto rico',
  '=', 'virgin islands',
);

while (<>) {
  last if /^-----BEGIN PGP/;
}

while (<>) {
  last if /^$/;
}

while (<>) {
  last if /^-----END PGP/;

  $line = $_;
  chop $line;
  @pgpchars = split(//,$line);

  while (@pgpchars) {
    $convert = shift @pgpchars;
    print $conversion{$convert}, "\n";
  }
  print "\n";
}

- ----------8< cut here >8----------

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.3a

iQCVAgUBLKvBOYOA7OpLWtYzAQGsAwP/Y5xZx5nZdKYM785zQSmPAU60UqqqU7X+
bAZ6+6f0foC2bo7AfClSTcAcCmZkCyPAL10toB6Qs0Qzkoe6eZKSlRVJgy9WzDdB
oZhJV/jlvYxxlgpBJXz95sJ7ADxmtIBw6jIbfRYPjX1zva7GenTeBzXcMTabJUZJ
SPG853ZqWeA=
=0MEu
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Panzer Boy <panzer@drown.slip.andrew.cmu.edu>
Date: Thu, 30 Sep 93 22:27:11 PDT
To: Cypherpunk Mailing List <cypherpunks@toad.com>
Subject: Re: POISON PILL
In-Reply-To: <931001002401_72114.1712_FHF27-1@CompuServe.COM>
Message-ID: <Pine.3.05.1.9310010138.B6471-b100000@drown.slip.andrew.cmu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Bombs.  Electro-Magnectic Pulse would be good.  But the only way I know
how to generate one of these is via a nuke... Probably a little over kill.

Blowing things up is nice and all but also lacks style (unless you nuke).

Basically a permently encrypted harddrive would be fine.  Every boot up
you need to enter a password.  If the screen saver kicks in, you have to
enter a password, or it reboots.  Stuff like this.

If you want to, enter the wrong password and it still boots up.  But when
it does, there is a virus running or something else.  Basically, if you
are arrested for stuff, and they confiscate your equipment, they already
are pretty sure of your guilt, if you are guilty or not.  Pissing them off
and destroying things makes you seem more guilty.  Encryption is still
viewed as something you do if you have something to hide.  Why encrypt,
unless you are guilty?

Now that I think about it.  When the wrong password is entered, the
computer should still boot.  But all the files that are encrypted are
deleted from the directories.  And they appear as bad blocks, or something
else.

I'm sure people could go on, and on with this stuff.  Whatever happened to
the Crypto-Stacker stuff?

-Matt
(panzer@drown.slip.andrew.cmu.edu)

Do you use IRC?  Try connecting to drown.slip.andrew.cmu.edu 6667 with a
standard IRC client.







From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: pierre@shell.portal.com (Pierre Uszynski)
Date: Fri, 1 Oct 93 10:58:10 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: POISON PILL
Message-ID: <9310010831.AA03417@jobe.shell.portal.com.shell.portal.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> From: Panzer Boy <panzer@drown.slip.andrew.cmu.edu>
> 
[...]
> Blowing things up is nice and all but also lacks style (unless you nuke).

ROTFL ... I'd also second whoever mentioned not destroying evidence (and
your own data remember? if there is actually a chance you get it back)

> Basically a permently encrypted harddrive would be fine.  Every boot up
> you need to enter a password.  If the screen saver kicks in, you have to
> enter a password, or it reboots.  Stuff like this.

Yes, that's probably the best way as otherwise moving disks to an other
machine would bypass the protection.

Still booting if no or wrong password is good too.

But let's add something else:

It may be possible (easy?) to hide a partition on the disk: buy two hard
drives from a family with different capacity and same packages. Move the
labels of the small one to the big one. Discard the small one :-) Use
partitions corresponding to the capacity of the small one to store
boring un-encrypted material, software, etc... Fix the scsi controller
on the drive (re-program) to self-identify with the smaller format,
but to obey access commands to the hidden area.

You now have a computer and disk drive that boots as a boring system,
with a medium size drive, but if you know about it, you can access
an other partition of encrypted stuff.

The (even not so) casual inspection of the stolen or confiscated system
reveals only stuff that is not worth spending time on. Only a very
detailed inspection, or a leak, reveals the encrypted stuff, still
encrypted... Very frustrating.

Of course, if your backups were not encrypted or if you wrote
down the keys...

This solution is even compatible with using a BIOS ROM glued to the
motherboard that prevents unauthorized use of the computer. The hard
drive and the motherboard are protected by two different mechanisms.

Pierre.
pierre@shell.portal.com




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: rjc@gnu.ai.mit.edu (Ray)
Date: Thu, 30 Sep 93 23:02:31 PDT
To: nobody@menudo.uh.edu
Subject: Re: Anonymous Forwarding Software Available
In-Reply-To: <199310010500.AA05647@Menudo.UH.EDU>
Message-ID: <9310010557.AA13033@geech.gnu.ai.mit.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


nobody@menudo.uh.edu () writes:
> 
> At  9:26 PM 9/20/93 +0000, Ray wrote:
> >put a copy of my anonymous
> >forwarding software in soda.berkeley.edu:pub/cypherpunks/incoming/aforward.shar
> 
> Can't find it. Was I too slow?

 No, it's there. Just ftp to soda and do "cd pub/cypherpunks/incoming"
then "get aforward.shar"  It's an invisible file. Eric hasn't moved it
into another (more visible) directory yet.


-- Ray Cromwell        |    Engineering is the implementation of science;    --
-- EE/Math Student     |       politics is the implementation of faith.      --
-- rjc@gnu.ai.mit.edu  |                         - Zetetic Commentaries      --




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: remail@tamsun.tamu.edu
Date: Fri, 1 Oct 93 02:58:05 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: POISON PILL
Message-ID: <9310010931.AA24784@tamsun.tamu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Just because you lose physical possesion of your data, does
not have to mean you lose all control over it.

How about modifying the electronics in a pager to sit
on a disk drive card?  Call up the pager number to disable
the card or trigger the encryption or erasure of the
disk.  The caller might also give a password as a pager 
message.

Also, can we make an EMP emitter that hides inside a fake
3 1/4" "floppy"?  This would sit inside a box of floppies
and could also be triggered by pager.  Flash media.

Remote control has the following advantages:
	* Doesn't bother normal operations (eg having
	virus strings precluces normal checking for
	viruses, requiring a password or floppy key
	every time you log on is a pain, etc.)
	* Can be triggered after the raid has already
	taken place, if you didn't get advanced warning.

Has anybody done a marketing study for secure-computer
items like these ideas, CryptoStacker, etc?






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: an12070@anon.penet.fi (S. Boxx)
Date: Fri, 1 Oct 93 00:32:31 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: FIDONet policies
Message-ID: <9310010728.AA15983@anon.penet.fi>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>If a user sends a "private message", the user has no control over the number
>of intermediate systems through which that message is routed.  A sysop who
>sends a message to another sysop can control this aspect by sending the
>message direct to the recipient's system, thus guaranteeing that only the
>recipient or another individual to whom that sysop has given authorization
>can read the message.  Thus, a sysop may have different expectations than a
>casual user.

translated: we have a hierarchy of rights. sysop-gods have a right and
expectation to private mail. the user-peons have neither.

>Disclosing or in any way using information contained in private netmail
>traffic not addressed to you or written by you is considered annoying
>behavior, unless the traffic has been released by the author or the recipient
>as a part of a formal policy complaint.

"annoying behavior" -- what a cute PC euphemism. who's the idiot
academic who came up with that? try "moral & ethical bankruptcy" instead.

>As far as I can tell, the ability (perhaps the right) to fuss around in
>other folks' business and other folks' mail is one of the factors (along
>with the ability to create and enforce any number of rules and regulations)
>which makes people think it's fun to run a BBS.

the "paternal paranoia instinct". ask wells or kleinpaste for a lecture on it.
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
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Due to the double-blind, any mail replies to this message will be anonymized,
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From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: doug@netcom.com (Doug Merritt)
Date: Fri, 1 Oct 93 08:58:18 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: POISON PILL
Message-ID: <9310011555.AA27460@netcom2.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


nate@VIS.ColoState.EDU (CVL staff member Nate Sammons) said:
>Well, as far as I know, it's hard to recover much of anything
>if the bomb is a Thermite one....  they seem to do lots-o-damage
>to metallic objects... and, OK, FBI agents.

Yeah, I guess thermite would be better than a shock wave bomb in some ways.
I could believe that, with sufficiently careful attention to detail, it might
be able to heat 100% of the magnetic material beyond the medium's Curie point
and therefore beyond all recovery. If on the other hand the thermite were
simply tucked next to the drive...well, it's amazing what forensic
investigators sometimes recover from things intended to be destroyed
by thermite. A lot can go wrong in real world situations.

>possibly a strong EMP?

Conceivably. I'm unclear about the effects of EMP on magnetic media.
Also, really good EMP requires fairly powerful shaped charges. Perhaps
a simple degaussing coil would do the trick. Not sure. Seems like it should.
Do any modern hard drives attempt magnetic shielding in their cases?

Now that prices on recordable CD ROM drives are down to $4K, personal
CDROM archiving will become more and more common; thermite would be
handy there, too, again assuming very careful design & placement.

This little discussion is all just for the fun of it from my point of view; I
agree with other comments here that leaving your data encrypted is more to
the point, not to mention far more reliable than just about any other
trick.
	Doug




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Timothy Newsham <newsham@wiliki.eng.hawaii.edu>
Date: Fri, 1 Oct 93 12:18:10 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: D.C Nets
Message-ID: <9310011917.AA10860@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



some people mentioned that they want to set up local (neighborhood)
networks and that they are "ideal" for making D.C. Nets with.

I have a question about DC Nets.  Is there anyway to use a DC Net
to create sessions?  The DC Net protocol is bit based right?  So
if you set up a session how do you tell which bits came from one
person and belong to one session, and which came from another and
belong to another session?  Especially since the whole point of
a DC Net is to make it undetectable where the bit originated from.
Also once you solved that,  what is to stop someone else from
injecting bits into your session?

                                   ...




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: mgream@acacia.itd.uts.edu.au (Matthew Gream)
Date: Thu, 30 Sep 93 17:27:08 PDT
To: 72114.1712@compuserve.com (Sandy)
Subject: Re: POISON PILL
In-Reply-To: <930930175113_72114.1712_FHF68-1@CompuServe.COM>
Message-ID: <9310010028.AA19383@acacia.itd.uts.EDU.AU>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


In reply to (Sandy):

| POISON PILL--What, if anything, can be done to booby-trap a
| computer?  Once the cops have a machine, one would expect that
| they will paw through everything in it.  In addition, they will
| probably use the stolen computer for their own data processing
| needs.  What could be done have the computer screw up the cop's
| data days, weeks or months after the seizure?  Of course, I would
| never do such a thing myself, nor would I advise anyone else to
| do so.  I do, however, have a passing academic interest in the
| subject.  Same for you folks too, right?

How about this:

Encrypted disk controller that uses 3DES (at a minimum) where the keys
are modified by a low power localised RF transmission. Quite simply one
could use a DDS receiver which looks at any one of X locations for a 
signal strength above some threshold (ie, say 2^16 frequency slots and
only 3 * 56 of these are transmitting), this provides the XOR for the
DES key. In fact, one could almost patch this into an existing DES
controller given some assumptions about the onboard logic.

Your transmitter should be like somewhere else in your flat, preferably
hidden. Of course, once the feds get your computer and it doesn't work,
they will ask you why, and you need some way here to keep them off.

Actually, another idea, how about if the DES key(s) for your controller
are hardwired onto it, an RF detector monitors a carrier on some specific
frequency, if the carrier is not present at bootup, you could leak a high
voltage into the 'key holder' and blow all the connected links.

Once this is gone, there is no way to get back the data, and the feds
can't force you, because 1) you can show how the key was random in the 
first place 2) you can show how the device blew it all (and that there was
no return), and your justification can be for 'data security' reasons
(ie, if theives get your system, they couldn't have extracted anything).

They could probably example the chip substrate itself and see what was
blown recently, so this needs work I guess. Another problem is that
the above assumes they don't examine the disk, realise it is encrypted,
realise the controller is custom, and then work back to figure out
what is going on, and then question you before they do anything.

Disclaimer: the above represents unsubstantiated theorising.

Matthew.

ps; when the feds take your computer (at least here in Australia) they
    take lots of nice pictures of it and take all the cables and 
    stuff. Of course, half of them don't know the fucking difference
    between msdos and unix.

-- 
Matthew Gream, M.Gream@uts.edu.au. "... encryption is the ultimate means of
Consent Technologies, 02-821-2043.  protection against an Orwellian state."




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: mgream@acacia.itd.uts.edu.au (Matthew Gream)
Date: Thu, 30 Sep 93 17:37:08 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: POISON PILL :-)
In-Reply-To: <930930204341_72114.1712_FHF65-1@CompuServe.COM>
Message-ID: <9310010035.AA19779@acacia.itd.uts.EDU.AU>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


In reply to (Sandy):

| Or maybe all we need is a sticker that says:
| 
|                            !!WARNING!!
|                   This Machine is Booby-Trapped
|                       Use at Your Own Risk

I have Australian Defence Security Clearance stickers on my computer,
they are so cool, these little yellow and red stickers that authorise
the computer for secure use (and something else I can't remember).

Of course, the Feds found these stickers funny.

Matthew.
-- 
Matthew Gream, M.Gream@uts.edu.au. "... encryption is the ultimate means of
Consent Technologies, 02-821-2043.  protection against an Orwellian state."




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: msattler@netcom.com (Michael Sattler)
Date: Fri, 1 Oct 93 11:33:38 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: POISON PILL
Message-ID: <9310011831.AA10015@netcom.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


At 19:29 9/30/93 -0600, J. Michael Diehl wrote:
>How about we take a copy of the public domain bios source, or disassemble one 
>ourselves.  We hack the code a bit...  Then we burn a new prom to install into
>our machines.  AND WE EPOXY THE MOTHER TO THE DAMNED BOARD!  We build a card to
>stick in our machine which receives a radio signal which contains a decription
>key to be supplied to the bios hacks mentioned above.  So we use a protable
>radio transmitter to send the password to our machine.  Our bios waits for this
>password for use in decripting the filesystem.  If the bios doesn't get this
>password, it trashes the cmos and does whatever other mean things it wants to.

What interests me the most about this (and similar proposals) is who will
be signing up to test this baby on their own computers.  Oh well, I guess
that's what employer's hardware is for :-)


-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
Michael S. Sattler         msattler@netcom.com        +1 (415) 358-3058
Digital Jungle Software    Encrypt now; ask me how.   (finger for PGP key)

  "Don't Panic!" -- Douglas Adams     "Don't Panic.  Stay Cool."  -- PRZ 






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: baldwin@LAT.COM (Bob Baldwin)
Date: Fri, 1 Oct 93 12:03:38 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Media declassification
Message-ID: <9310011853.AA10783@LAT.COM>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Eric Townsend writes:
> The US Gov policy for the disposal of any media that has been used to
> store classified data is:
> wipe  -- demagnatize with a *massive* demag unit
> grind -- toss in a thing that'd make ground chuck out of godzilla
> incenerate -- at some amazingly high temperature.
> The media is treated as if it had classified data until after step #3.

	In addition to degaussing, crushing, and incenerating 
classified disks, the US Government has approved a number of software
systems that overwrite the media with ones and zeros.  Different agencies
have different rules and defense contractors have to obey the rules of
the agency that they are servicing.  The NSA and DOE require four
passes over the data with the patterns 0x00, 0x55, 0xAA, and 0x41 (these
are hex byte values).  The last value is the Ascii letter 'A', which
is then verified by spot checking.  This pattern flips each bit at least
once after setting all bits to zero.
	With a scanning electron microscope it is possible to pick up
fringe regions of the magnetic domains and reconstruct the last dozen
or so values for a particular domain.  This result means that if a
disk has really sensitive information, and it is leaving the secure
facility (i.e., not just being re-used for another project, or being
transfered to another secure location), then the four-pass overwrite
program must be run at least three times.
	There are also low-level considerations.  The main one is that
the disk head must be wiggled back and forth as it moves along the
disk to vary the alignment between the head and the track to maximize
the erasure of outlying magetic domains.  If the head is simply stepped
from track to track, all tracks will miss the same outlying domains
because the head stepping error rate (e.g., 2% off true alignment in
the inbound direction) tends to remain constant as the head moves
inward.
	Another low-level consideration is to be sure to erase all
the data surfaces including sector headers, bad blocks, alternate
cylinders, disk label regions, and sectors reserved for holding
redundant copies of the disk geometry information or the disk controller
microcode.  All this requires going below the operating system to
directly issue SCSI or IDE disk commands.
	LAT sells the only overwrite program that has been approved
for Unix platforms.

		--Bob
----------------------------------------------------------------------
Director of Development                 Our mission is to provide
Los Altos Technologies, Inc.            the best solutions to our
Voice: 415/988-4848                     customers' key computer
Fax:   415/988-4860                     security problems while
email: baldwin@lat.com                  increasing their productivity.
----------------------------------------------------------------------






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: nate@VIS.ColoState.EDU (CVL staff member Nate Sammons)
Date: Fri, 1 Oct 93 11:18:10 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com (Cypherpunks Mailing List)
Subject: Re: POISON PILL
In-Reply-To: <9310011555.AA27460@netcom2.netcom.com>
Message-ID: <9310011816.AA27240@vangogh.VIS.ColoState.EDU>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Doug Merritt coersed the electrons into symbolizing:
>
>This little discussion is all just for the fun of it from my point of view; I
>agree with other comments here that leaving your data encrypted is more to
>the point, not to mention far more reliable than just about any other
>trick.
>	Doug
>

I agree, but the fake bombs sound like fun...  modeling clay is
quite cheap, you know ;-)

-nate


-- 
+--------------------------------------------------------------------
| Nate Sammons   email: nate@VIS.ColoState.Edu
|      Colorado State University Computer Visualization Laboratory
|      Finger nate@monet.VIS.ColoState.Edu for my PGP key
|      #include <std.disclaimer>
|                                    Always remember "Brazil"
+----------------------+



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Dave Banisar <cpsr@access.digex.net>
Date: Fri, 1 Oct 93 09:23:20 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: CPSR Comments to NIST
Message-ID: <199310011619.AA02082@access.digex.net>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



>Path: digex.net!lynx.unm.edu!pacs.sunbelt.net!udel!wupost!howland.reston.ans.net!agate!ames!sgi!cdp!dsobel
>Newsgroups: alt.privacy.clipper
>Subject: CPSR Key Escrow Comments (long)
>Message-ID: <1838400007@igc.apc.org>
>From: David L. Sobel <dsobel@igc.apc.org>
>Date: 27 Sep 93 10:58 PDT
>Sender: Notesfile to Usenet Gateway <notes@igc.apc.org>
>Lines: 200



                                   September 27, 1993




Director, Computer Systems Laboratory
ATTN: Proposed FIPS for Escrowed Encryption Standard
Technology Building, Room B-154
National Institute of Standards and Technology
Gaithersburg, MD 20899

  Re: Request for Comments; Docket No. 930659-3159

     This letter constitutes the formal comments of Computer 
Professionals for Social Responsibility (CPSR) on the proposed 
Federal Information Processing Standard for an Escrowed Encryption 
Standard (EES), as described in the Federal Register on July 30, 
1993 (58 FR 40791).  CPSR, a national organization of 
professionals in the computing field, has a long-standing interest 
in government policies concerning cryptography and computer 
security.  During the past several years we have pursued an 
extensive study of cryptography policy in the United States.  We 
have organized several public conferences, conducted litigation 
under the Freedom of Information Act, and appeared on a number of 
panels to discuss the importance of cryptography for privacy 
protection and the need to scrutinize carefully government 
proposals designed to limit the use of this technology.  While we 
do not represent any particular computer company or trade 
association, we do speak for a great many people in the computer 
profession who value privacy and are concerned about the 
government's key escrow initiative.

     To properly evaluate the key escrow proposal, it is necessary 
to consider the Computer Security Act of 1987, which made clear 
Congress' intent that in the area of unclassified computing 
systems NIST -- and not the National Security Agency (NSA) -- 
would be responsible for the development of technical standards.  
The Act emphasizes public accountability and stresses open 
decision-making. 

     In the spirit of the Act, NIST set out in 1989 to develop a 
public key cryptography standard.  According to documents obtained 
by CPSR through the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), NIST 
recommendFrom owner-cypherpunks  Fri Oct  1 10:30:15 1993
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Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"
To: mgream@acacia.itd.uts.edu.au (Matthew Gream), cypherpunks@toad.com
From: msattler@netcom.com (Michael Sattler)
Subject: Re: POISON PILL :-)

At 10:35 10/1/93 -0500, Matthew Gream wrote:
>
>I have Australian Defence Security Clearance stickers on my computer,
>they are so cool, these little yellow and red stickers that authorise
>the computer for secure use (and something else I can't remember).

Any chance of getting a few sent to me in San Francisco?

-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
Michael S. Sattler         msattler@netcom.com        +1 (415) 358-3058
Digital Jungle Software    Encrypt now; ask me how.   (finger for PGP key)

  "Don't Panic!" -- Douglas Adams     "Don't Panic.  Stay Cool."  -- PRZ 






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Hastings@courier8.aero.org
Date: Fri, 1 Oct 93 13:08:10 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Single Value Pseudonyms
Message-ID: <00083D17.MAI*Hastings@courier8.aero.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Someone posted a way to resist altered bank notes if the consumer's random
blinding factor signed by the bank wasn't really so random, by something
called (if I remember right) a "cut-and-choose" protocol.
 
To make things very simple for a bank, I suggest having fixed value digital
pseudonyms for each value of bank note. For example, the Bank of Hastings on
Kent would use "AU 500 mg from HoK Bank" as the user name for all signed 500
milligram gold certificates.
 
When a merchant or ultimately the bank verifies the note, it will see
"AU 500 mg" as the message, or will not accept it. No worry about spoofing.
 
Kent - <jkhastings@aol.com>




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Al Billings <mimir@u.washington.edu>
Date: Fri, 1 Oct 93 13:13:39 PDT
To: Mike Godwin <mnemonic@eff.org>
Subject: Re: FIDOnet encryption (or lack thereof)
In-Reply-To: <199309301507.AA09112@eff.org>
Message-ID: <Pine.3.05z.9310011332.A15318-a100000@carson.u.washington.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain




On Thu, 30 Sep 1993, Mike Godwin wrote:

> Bill writes:
> 
> > Heh.  OK.  Well, if one behaves "ethically", then I guess *that* closes
> > the issue.  It's his machine and he gets to make the rules.  (this is
> > my personally-adhered-to point of view)
> 
> My question is this: how does he know that the mail is encrypted if he's
> not examining the mail that passes through his system? If he *is*
> examining the mail that passes through his system, it seems likely that he
> is violating the Electronic Communications Privacy Act.

 Only if he has stated that he allows private mail. Most sysops have
specifically worded policy statements for their systems that say that the
sysop can read any and all messages on the system and may do so at any
time. Bulletin boards do not normally offer truely private mail because of
some of the legal implications.







From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: anonymous@extropia.wimsey.com
Date: Fri, 1 Oct 93 13:33:38 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: No Subject
Message-ID: <199310012013.AA24686@xtropia>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


 * Reply to msg originally in CYPHERPUNKS

> From: mdiehl@triton.unm.edu (J. Michael Diehl)

> I had heard a rumor that fidonet forbade encrypted e-mail, but I
> had to find out for myself.  Well, they do.

No, they do not.  This is a myth, and you have drawn a mistaken
conclusion from your experiment.

This thread has already run off into left field by the time I got to it,
but to try to drag a little reality back in, I submit the following:

FIDOnet has within it SECURENET, which is a netmail-handling network
specifically for encrypted netmail.  Mail points not wishing to handle
PGPed or other encrypted netmail are provided with software to
automatically remove PGP netmail and re-route it into the FIDO SECURENET
network.

FIDOnet has at least two conferences specifically for PGP and other
public-key encryption system discussions and key exchange, PUBLIC_KEYS
and KEY_DROP (if I remember correctly).

Now, the point most internet people forget is that FIDOnet hosts are
hobbyists with 100% privately-owned machines and generally pay for the
entire participation of their userbase out of their own pockets,
excepting a few who get some dollars here and there from their generous
callers.  As a completely justified consequence, they can decide if they
allow encrypted traffic _on their individual BBSs_.  In that there is
considerable fear of the consequences of illegal activity being
conducted on their BBSs via encrypted mail, many sysops (such as the one
you mention, leaving aside, for now, that he apparently confused a PGP
key with an encrypted message) do not wish to take the risk and forbid
encrypted traffic.  They also monitor e-mail, if only incidentally
during the course of routine system maintenance, and notices to this
effect are generally contained in log-on screens and new-user info
files.

In that these sysops are extremely, _personally_ vulnerable, they are
generally more cautious than those internet folks who can hide behind
institutions and businesses.

In spite of this, there are a very large number of FIDOnet sysops who
participate in SECURENET and encourage the spread of encryption
technology to the general public.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: eb15@postoffice.mail.cornell.edu (Edward Bade)
Date: Fri, 1 Oct 93 10:33:37 PDT
To: "Perry E. Metzger" <pmetzger@lehman.com>
Subject: Re: POISON PILL
Message-ID: <199310011729.AA24994@postoffice.mail.cornell.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>You know, if people are going to discuss breaking blowing up computers
>and killing people, they could at least have the taste to discuss it
>elsewhere. Myself, I'm not a believer in violence, and I don't think
>this list is devoted to explosives. Newgroup alt.terrorism.techniques
>if you insist.
>
>Perry
>

I agree.  Besides, there are much more tasteful and aesthetic ways to get
the job done.  A degaussing coil is a good idea, or why not sell a 'simple'
add on (requiring making a hole in the hard-drive's casing), which, at the
appropriate moment would quickly inject a fast drying epoxy laced with
powdered aluminum, to which was applied a (well-grounded) high voltage/low
amperage electric charge from a capacitor built into the case?  There are
cheap epoxies on the market that could harden in 3-4 minutes at that volume
(rule w/ epoxies: spread out they take longer, in a glob as inside the
casing of a hardrive, the reaction would run much faster).  It will take
them a while to chip the media out, and the electric field should do the
rest....

-----------------------------------------------------------------
Ned Bade                    | And you all you sanctified moneybags
City and Reg. Planning      | Bandits anointed and crowned
Cornell University          | Your counterfeit towers of justice
eb15@cornell.edu            | and ethics will crash to the ground.
                            |                -Dick Gaughan.
----------------------------------------------------------------- 






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Marc Horowitz <marc@GZA.COM>
Date: Fri, 1 Oct 93 11:08:10 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: POISON PILL
In-Reply-To: <9310011741.AA01857@netcom6.netcom.com>
Message-ID: <9310011806.AA02726@dun-dun-noodles.aktis.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


This thread stopped having anything to do with cryptography a long
time ago.  Please take it somewhere else.

		Marc




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Reply to: hahn@lds.loral.com" <HAHN@lds.loral.com>
Date: Fri, 1 Oct 93 11:13:39 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Unsubscribe (temporary)
Message-ID: <931001141015.2164f@lds.loral.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Unsubscribe

I will be away for a week and my sys admin will not like all c.p. stuff
accumulating and taking up disk space.  I'll re-up on 11-Oct-93.  Thanks.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Perry E. Metzger" <pmetzger@lehman.com>
Date: Fri, 1 Oct 93 11:18:38 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: POISON PILL
In-Reply-To: <9310011641.AA23975@triton.unm.edu>
Message-ID: <9310011818.AA11211@snark.lehman.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



> 2)  Refuse, and spend the rest of your life in jail for contempt of court.

You can't be placed in jail for life for contempt. Eventually, they
release you even if you haven't given them the information.

Perry




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Al Billings <mimir@u.washington.edu>
Date: Fri, 1 Oct 93 14:28:11 PDT
To: Mike Godwin <mnemonic@eff.org>
Subject: Re: FIDOnet encryption (or lack thereof)
In-Reply-To: <199310012040.AA23053@eff.org>
Message-ID: <Pine.3.05z.9310011445.A10475-b100000@carson.u.washington.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



On Fri, 1 Oct 1993, Mike Godwin wrote:

> Al Billings writes:
> 
> >  Only if he has stated that he allows private mail. Most sysops have
> > specifically worded policy statements for their systems that say that the
> > sysop can read any and all messages on the system and may do so at any
> > time.
> 
> That's all very nice, but it doesn't enable a FIDO sysop to intercept
> messages from people who are not users of his or her particular system.
> Those people did not waive their rights to privacy under the ECPA.

 As has already been shown from Fidonet policy, Fidonet does not guarantee
private mail  in any from and, in fact, advises that mail will be going
through many sites and can be read along the way.

> > Bulletin boards do not normally offer truely private mail because of
> > some of the legal implications.
> 
> This is a common myth. First of all, there are many BBSs that do
> offer truly private mail, or whose sysops, as a matter of policy, do not
> read others' private mail. Secondly, there's no legal liability associated
> with allowing e-mail privacy. Third, federal law (the ECPA) bars
> sysops from examining mail except under some very precisely defined
> circumstances.

 The third point does not apply if the sysops offer no private mail in the
first place.

> I suggest that you inform sysops who tell you otherwise that they can
> contact me at the Legal Services Department of EFF. You've got my e-mail
> address already--my phone number is 202-347-5400.

 I don't need sysops to tell me otherwise. I've been running my own BBS
for over three years. My system has a very clear policy statement that
refers to the ECPA and states VERY clearly who can read the messages
posted on my system in different areas. As I'm not a Fido hub (and barely
participate in that network at all), I don't have to worry about passing
other mail through my system.

Wassail,
Al Billings,
Sysop of The Sacred Grove 1:343/56







From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: dmandl@lehman.com (David Mandl)
Date: Fri, 1 Oct 93 11:23:38 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: POISON PILL
Message-ID: <9310011819.AA18178@disvnm2.lehman.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> From: jet@netcom.com (J. Eric Townsend)
>
> The US Gov policy for the disposal of any media that has been used to
> store classified data is:
> 
> wipe  -- demagnatize with a *massive* demag unit
> grind -- toss in a thing that'd make ground chuck out of godzilla
> incenerate -- at some amazingly high temperature.
> 
> -eric

At last!  I've always wondered that the mysterious "certain government
conventions for wiping files" in the Norton Utilities Wipe Disk program
referred to.  Glad I never selected that option.

   --Dave.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: peb@PROCASE.COM (Paul Baclace)
Date: Fri, 1 Oct 93 14:23:39 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: POISON PILL
Message-ID: <9310012123.AA00940@banff.procase.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



All this talk of booby-traps reminds me of this booby-trap expert who
had written books and had his house set up completely.  He was found 
dead one day when one of the traps got him...

[This anecdote is vaguely remembered from a short note in Whole Earth Review.
I remember seeing a review in the '70s on the book itself when it was 
originally reviewed.]


Paul E. Baclace
peb@procase.com




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Date: Fri, 1 Oct 93 14:33:39 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: BlackNet Investigations--the Truth (fwd)
Message-ID: <9310012129.AA15204@netcom5.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Cypherians,

Here's a posting I sent to the "Extropians" list, which many of you
are already on..sorry about getting this twice.

Hit "delete" now if you are not interested in the "crypto-anarchy"
side of what we are doing. I say this because when I post on these
topics, which are apparently of interest to some, I often get notes or
postings saying "Not all of us are anarchists, so keep this stuff off
the list!"

Now we are a diverse bunch. Some of us are fairly radical libertarians
and see strong crypto as the technological tool to demolish
governments (including the U.S. government). Others of us are anti-big
business and see crypto as a means of reducing the power of large
corporations over individuals. Others are socialists, acid freaks,
even military cadets. Whatever. 

Some want to talk about using thermite bombs to melt hard disks (a
current hot topic, as it were). Others are deeply into Perl scripts,
MIME, and so on. For others, patent law and the ins and outs of the
ECPA are the big excitement. The point is, there are a lot of loosely related
items in the Cypherpunks agenda.

What follows is related to _my_ main interest, the colonization of
cyberspace and the institutions and methods which will arise. Don't
read it if it doesn't interest you.

And if you're scared that talking about using technology to bypass
laws and ultimately overthrow national governments as we know them
today will get you into trouble with the authorities or with your
company, well, then this list is probably not for you.

Me, I say what I think. Others can say what they think, too.

-Tim May



Forwarded message:
To: Extropians@extropy.org
Date: Fri, 1 Oct 93 14:06:16 -0700
From: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Subject: BlackNet Investigations--the Truth



BlackNet Investigations Announces New Dossier Services


FLASH: BlackNet Investigations is pleased to announce the immediate
availability of dossiers from the former East Germany (DDR) and the former
Soviet Union. We have obtained tens of millions of dossiers on activists,
dissidents, extropians, and ordinary people and have meticulously scanned
and digitized the essence of these files (many of these files were already
in magnetic format, albeit primitive).

Now you can learn what the KGB had on your business associates! Now you can
discover if that little German pastry is as innocent as she seems. And you
can even find out what the GRU had on you from your visit to Vienna in
1984.

Contact us for details. Competitive rates, as always.

And coming soon: the previously secret files of the KriminalStaatsPolizei.
Plus, the now-privatized dossiers of the South American police states!

Sources close to the FBI may soon make their files available as well!

We are also negotiating with personnel at hospitals and insurance companies
to obtain black market copies of insurance records, describing in gory
detail all medical and psychiatric conditions for tens of millions of
Americans.

Onward and Upward!

-BlackNet Investigations, a Cyberspace Entity


.........


By now many of you know that BlackNet Investigations is not quite
real...yet. More than just a Klaus!-style put-on, it's a basically
plausible implication of current trends.

Some of you requested your dossiers, others even wrote threatening notes.
And a few of you even played along, saying how "shocked, simply shocked"
you were to see the dossiers compiled on you. (Thanks! You know who you
are.)

As Dave Krieger noted in his piece on BlackNet Investigations, folks need
to keep the inevitability of such dossier-based systems in mind. Others may
not "advertise" the way BlackNet does, but they're just as surely keeping
dossiers. I don't think it's overly paranoid to suggest that things you
write on Usenet, or in mailing lists like Extropians and Cypherpunks, are
being compiled by some into dossiers of sorts...call them "databases" if
you like, but they're still dossiers.

And in fact I do have a lot of Extropians and Cypherpunks postings tucked
away in places that my Mac databases can access them easily, via keyword
searches, tagged fields, etc. I'm quote sure a lot of people are doing
this, quite likely some TLA agencies.

All of the Extropians and Cypherpunks traffic for the past couple of years,
and a lot more, fits on a single 128 MB magneto-optical cartridge...and
I've got 10 or so of them. All Usenet postings are archived on CD-ROMs,
available by subscription (Walnut Creek Software, or somesuch...and maybe
multiple sources). Easy to obtain. Expect ftp sites to carry these back
postings, if they aren't already available.

In the next 10 years it'll be essentially a trivial exercise for any
person--your child, your potential employer, credit agencies, etc.--to sift
through the 20 or 30 gigabyes of Usenet traffic for a 10-year period and
look for juicy items, for admissions of unusual sexual practices, for
extreme political statements, etc. Data storage increases (CDs, DATs, MOs,
new media) and processor speed increases will make searches easy and fast.

Rather than having all this data on one's own machine, many people will
compile it into files or dossiers, and then charge access fees. Customized
searches, specialized grepping, and database "engines" optimized for search
(like the Connection Machines, the Teradata hypercubes, neural net and
fuzzy logic engines, etc.) will make this even easier.

As jurisdictions attempt to pass laws restricting these accesses, as with
the convoluted U.S. laws regarding credit, tenant (renter) credit, medical
malpractice databases, etc. (the whole credit market, in other words),
these databases will be moved offshore. Or the access may go offshore, and
then back again! (You can set up the databases in your bedroom, then sell
access through "cut-outs" that lie beyond the reach of U.S. laws.)

Private investigation as we know it today will be radically changed.
(Actually, much of current P.I. work is already accessing records and
databases, so-called "skip-tracing" work, to see where vanished people have
ended up...deadbeat dads, missing children, etc.)

Entities like BlackNet will flourish in the crypto-anarchic world of
cyberspace (or "cypherspace," as John Draper dubbed it). Positive
reputations will be of utmost importance, as we've discussed so many times.
Digital pseudonyms will of necessity become more widespread.

Offshore data havens, credit agencies that aren't restricted to the "7
years" allowed by U.S. law, repositories of stolen software, all will be
accessible by "BlackNet"-style "wormholes" (the public key access methods
that allow entities to communicate anonymously and untraceably).


Wake up and prepare for this future. Embrace it, or be left behind.


Crypto-anarchy is inevitable, and changes everything.


-Tim May


--
Timothy C. May         | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,  
tcmay@netcom.com       | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
408-688-5409           | knowledge, reputations, information markets, 
W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA  | black markets, collapse of governments.
Higher Power: 2^756839 | Public Key: by arrangement
Note: I put time and money into writing this posting. I hope you enjoy it.      





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: eb15@postoffice.mail.cornell.edu (Edward Bade)
Date: Fri, 1 Oct 93 12:38:10 PDT
To: baldwin@lat.com (Bob Baldwin)
Subject: Re: Media declassification
Message-ID: <199310011935.AA29595@postoffice.mail.cornell.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Can you suggest the best overwrite programs for other platforms and where
to get them?

Ned

>        LAT sells the only overwrite program that has been approved
>for Unix platforms.
>
>                --Bob






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Sandy <72114.1712@CompuServe.COM>
Date: Fri, 1 Oct 93 12:53:38 PDT
To: <cypherpunks@toad.com>
Subject: TRAVELLER'S ADVISORY
Message-ID: <931001194816_72114.1712_FHF24-4@CompuServe.COM>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
  SANDY SANDFORT               Reply to:  ssandfort@attmail.com
 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Punksters,

Here's a scary (but so far imaginary) news item:

                    MILLIONAIRE HIPPIE HACKER
                     ARRESTED FOR SMUGGLING
                          WAR MATERIEL

    (San Francisco)  Silicon Valley entrepreneur and
    self-styled "cypherpunk," John Gilmore, was arrested
    today at San Francisco International Airport.

    A Secret Service spokesperson said Gilmore was
    attempting to smuggle restricted software to England
    where he was to have been a speaker at a hackers'
    conference.  The spokesperson added that the Secret
    Service has reason to believe that Gilmore intended to
    meet with members of a radical Islamic terrorist group,
    but declined to elaborate on this charge.

    Apparently, airport security personnel received an
    anonymous tip that Gilmore had hidden the software in
    his laptop computer.  The computer and several computer
    disks were seize as evidence.

Think it couldn't happen?  I'm not so sure.  It would be child's
play to plant PGP in someone's seized laptop or to put a PGP disk
in their luggage.  While they were at it, a little marijuana or
crack cocaine could be put in there too.  Think of the photo op
as John is lead away in handcuffs.  What a PR coup for the Feds.

I think this is a real danger for outspoken Cypherpunks or other
high-profile individuals such as Phil Zimmermann.  Unfortunately,
I don't have any bullet-proof solutions.  Suggestions?

 S a n d y

>>>>>>    Please send e-mail to:  ssandfort@attmail.com    <<<<<<
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: m5@vail.tivoli.com (Mike McNally)
Date: Fri, 1 Oct 93 13:58:12 PDT
To: anonymous@extropia.wimsey.com
Subject: re: FIDOnet encrypted mail issues
In-Reply-To: <199310012013.AA24686@xtropia>
Message-ID: <9310012049.AA22935@vail.tivoli.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



anonymous@extropia.wimsey.com writes:
 > Now, the point most internet people forget is that FIDOnet hosts are
 > hobbyists with 100% privately-owned machines and generally pay for the
 > entire participation of their userbase out of their own pockets,
 > excepting a few who get some dollars here and there from their generous
 > callers.

While I agree that this is laudable (in fact, I hereby laud such
sysops), I don't think this is much different than small, medium, and
large businesses and some private individuals which route Internet and
USENET mail without question and without charge on a constant basis.

 > As a completely justified consequence, they can decide if they
 > allow encrypted traffic _on their individual BBSs_.  

Encrypted "traffic"?  Encrypted traffic to/from the BBS itself, maybe.
However, it seems to me that it's an open question in this discussion
as to whether it's legal for the BBS operator to enforce such a
restriction on traffic flowing through the machine as part of a
multi-hop route.

 > In that there is
 > considerable fear of the consequences of illegal activity being
 > conducted on their BBSs via encrypted mail, many sysops (such as the one
 > you mention, leaving aside, for now, that he apparently confused a PGP
 > key with an encrypted message) do not wish to take the risk and forbid
 > encrypted traffic.

This is the issue: are such sysops, in the quest to prevent illegal
activity, engaging in an illegal activity?

 > They also monitor e-mail, if only incidentally
 > during the course of routine system maintenance, and notices to this
 > effect are generally contained in log-on screens and new-user info
 > files.

Well, it seems to me that to actually prevent encrypted traffic from
flowing through the site, pretty much *all* mail would have to be
screened.

 > In that these sysops are extremely, _personally_ vulnerable, they are
 > generally more cautious than those internet folks who can hide behind
 > institutions and businesses.

But the sad truth may be that they're damned if they do and damned if
they don't.  Being the owner of the machine and providing a free
service don't seem to be relevant facts when examining the practice of
e-mail filtering by examination in light of the ECPA.

--
Mike McNally




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Mike Godwin <mnemonic@eff.org>
Date: Fri, 1 Oct 93 13:13:44 PDT
To: jet@netcom.com (J. Eric Townsend)
Subject: Re: FIDONet Mail filtering - a course of action
In-Reply-To: <9310011746.AA02062@netcom6.netcom.com>
Message-ID: <199310012011.AA22848@eff.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



J. Eric writes:

> So how do I prevent what happened to SJG, killer, etc from happening
> to me?

What gives you the impression that there is *anything* you can do to
prevent it? The BBS seized in the SJG case did not have illegal material
on it. 

> How do I prevent the LE types from showing up one day and
> saying 'hey, did you know there's a meg of kiddie porn on your machine
> and we're taking it all away'?

You can't prevent it. You can minimize the risk of it by destroying any
kiddie porn you find uploaded to your system. Unless the kiddie porn has
been included as part of an electronic communication, it's just a file,
and not covered by ECPA. Nothing in ECPA prevents you from looking at any
GIFs uploaded to your system, but ECPA does prevent your interception or
disclosure of electronic messages that pass through your system if you're
not the intended recipient.

> Do I have pull my machine off the net and go back to pre-bangnet
> times?

Pulling your system off the net does not eliminate the possibility that it
will be seized. Nothing does.


--Mike






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Mike Godwin <mnemonic@eff.org>
Date: Fri, 1 Oct 93 13:43:40 PDT
To: mimir@u.washington.edu (Al Billings)
Subject: Re: FIDOnet encryption (or lack thereof)
In-Reply-To: <Pine.3.05z.9310011332.A15318-a100000@carson.u.washington.edu>
Message-ID: <199310012040.AA23053@eff.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


 
Al Billings writes:

> On Thu, 30 Sep 1993, Mike Godwin wrote:
> > 
> > My question is this: how does he know that the mail is encrypted if he's
> > not examining the mail that passes through his system? If he *is*
> > examining the mail that passes through his system, it seems likely that he
> > is violating the Electronic Communications Privacy Act.
> 
>  Only if he has stated that he allows private mail. Most sysops have
> specifically worded policy statements for their systems that say that the
> sysop can read any and all messages on the system and may do so at any
> time.

That's all very nice, but it doesn't enable a FIDO sysop to intercept
messages from people who are not users of his or her particular system.
Those people did not waive their rights to privacy under the ECPA.

> Bulletin boards do not normally offer truely private mail because of
> some of the legal implications.

This is a common myth. First of all, there are many BBSs that do
offer truly private mail, or whose sysops, as a matter of policy, do not
read others' private mail. Secondly, there's no legal liability associated
with allowing e-mail privacy. Third, federal law (the ECPA) bars
sysops from examining mail except under some very precisely defined
circumstances.

I suggest that you inform sysops who tell you otherwise that they can
contact me at the Legal Services Department of EFF. You've got my e-mail
address already--my phone number is 202-347-5400.


--Mike






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Mike Godwin <mnemonic@eff.org>
Date: Fri, 1 Oct 93 14:23:45 PDT
To: m5@vail.tivoli.com (Mike McNally)
Subject: Re: FIDOnet encrypted mail issues
In-Reply-To: <9310012049.AA22935@vail.tivoli.com>
Message-ID: <199310012116.AA23333@eff.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain




anonymous@extropia.wimsey.com writes:
 > Now, the point most internet people forget is that FIDOnet hosts are
 > hobbyists with 100% privately-owned machines and generally pay for the
 > entire participation of their userbase out of their own pockets,
 > excepting a few who get some dollars here and there from their generous
 > callers.

I have never forgotten this. But their commitment and efforts do not
amount to an amendment to federal law.

 > As a completely justified consequence, they can decide if they
 > allow encrypted traffic _on their individual BBSs_.  

Under what legal theory do they get an ECPA exemption as a "completely
justified consequence"?

 > In that there is
 > considerable fear of the consequences of illegal activity being
 > conducted on their BBSs via encrypted mail, many sysops (such as the one
 > you mention, leaving aside, for now, that he apparently confused a PGP
 > key with an encrypted message) do not wish to take the risk and forbid
 > encrypted traffic.

What they don't realize is that, rather than reducing the risk of legal
liability, they are increasing it.

 > They also monitor e-mail, if only incidentally
 > during the course of routine system maintenance, and notices to this
 > effect are generally contained in log-on screens and new-user info
 > files.

Any monitoring that results *directly* as a function of system maintenance
is okay--it's sanctioned by ECPA.

 > In that these sysops are extremely, _personally_ vulnerable, they are
 > generally more cautious than those internet folks who can hide behind
 > institutions and businesses.

If they were really cautious, they'd talk to a lawyer before setting
policy based on some guess as to what their legal liabilities may be.


--Mike







From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Mike Johnson" <exabyte!smtplink!mikej@uunet.UU.NET>
Date: Fri, 1 Oct 93 16:43:40 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: MPJ Encryption Algorithm
Message-ID: <9309017495.AA749522149@smtplink.exabyte.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Bill Stewart writes:
> Sounds interesting; do you have any comparisons between it and IDEA
> about either encryption strength, speed, or design philosophy?

The full design philosophy for MPJ is in my thesis.  Since then, I learned
about differential cryptanalysis and was relieved to see that MPJ is fairly
resistant to that.  Here is a short summary:

Algorithm Key size Block size Rounds    Strength*  SW Speed   HW Speed

DES        56 bits  64 bits   16/2       22-55     slow       fast
3DES      112 bits  64 bits   (16*3)/2   24-58     slower     fast
IDEA      128 bits 128 bits   16         65-110    fast       fast
Skipjack   80 bits 128 bits   32            79     ?          ?
MPJ       128 bits 128 bits   10         70-120    medium     very fast
MPJ2     >=64 bits 128 bits   >=10       50-128    <=medium   <=very fast

*Strength is a GUESS at log base 2 of the complexity of breaking it.

Algorithm Legal status       Back door?  Origin

DES       Public Domain      No          IBM/NBS->NIST/NSA
3DES      Public Domain      No          IBM
IDEA      Patented           No          Switzerland
Skipjack  Classified         LEAF        NSA
MPJ       Public Domain      No          USA - University of Colorado at
                                               Colorado Springs (UCCS)
MPJ2      Not yet released   No          USA

DES Design philosophy:
(1) Fit in small chip

(2) Use involution for reversibility (only half of block changes with each
round)

(3) Use polyalphabetic nonlinear s-boxes of limited size (requires great care
to avoid differential cryptanalysis)

(4) Some design criteria still classified.

3DES Design philosophy:

(1) Cascade existing known algorithm

(2) Avoid weak key situations

(3) Try not to require too much more key than the strength of the algorithm
justifies (i.e. just 2 instead of 3 keys are used).

(4) Apply a bandaid.  Making one compound block cipher would have been more
secure, but not all the s-box design criteria are known.

IDEA Design philosophy:

(1) Use unrelated arithmetic operations on different fields.

(2) Use only 32 bit arithmetic operations for speed on a computer.

(3) Arrange the structure of the algorithm to do proper confusion/diffusion.

(4) Very small code and memory space used in computer.

Skipjack design philosophy (guessed):

(1) Similar to DES, but with a block size of 128 bytes.

(2) No attack known to the NSA will be more than a bit or two better than
exhaustive key search.

(3) Learn from the mistakes of DES (i.e. avoid weak keys and complementation
symmetries DES suffers from).

(4) Restrict knowledge of the algorithm as much as possible.

MPJ Design philosopy:  

(1) Relax some of the size limits of DES & IDEA to gain security, but make
sure it fits on a PC.  

(2) Avoid fragile fixed s-box & subkey design of DES, but copy its product
cipher structure.  

(3) Change the whole block with each round instead of just half (i.e. 10 MPJ
rounds is as effective as 20 DES-type rounds).  

(4) Make every output bit a strong function of every bit of the input and
every bit of the key within 3 rounds.

(5) Use such simple operations in a complex and nonlinear fashion that
mathematical breakthroughs are not a threat (as with RSA).  

(6) Make the substitution steps reversible through a very clever construction
of reversible substitution arrays directly from the key.  

(7) Make key scheduling slow (to discourage exhaustive search for keys), but
make the algorithm very fast, especially in dedicated hardware.  

(8) Make creative use of nonlinearity, bit twiddling, and rounds to thwart an
analytical attack using massive quantities of known or chosen plain text.

MPJ2 Design philosophy:

(1) Generalize the key scheduling to accommodate variable length keys.

(2) Generalize to n rounds.

(3) Attempt to do key scheduling on the fly in cases where the memory
required for precomputed internal keys take up too much RAM.

Common elements:  All of these block cipher algorithms use repeating rounds
of "confusion and diffusion" or "substitution and permutation" weaker ciphers
to form a stronger product cipher.  All of them are secure, even if the
cipher becomes known.  Skipjack is classified more to prevent knowledge of
design criteria and cryptanalysis secrets, and to allow the forced insertion
of a back door (LEAF) than for the security of the algorithm (just ask Dr.
Denning).  DES and 3DES can raise the price of unauthorized disclosure of
secrets above the average individual's means.  The others have the potential
of raising the price of eavesdropping by breaking crypto algorithms to above
the budgets of organized crime, hostile governments, and terrorists.  None of
them prevent other technological solutions to spying, such as placing bugs
closer to the target individual, office, or computer system.

General rules of the game in CRYPTOGRAPHY and CRYPTANALYSIS:

1.  There is always a way to crack any practical cryptosystem.

2.  Your opponent will not tell you if she has broken your cryptosystem and
is reading your mail.

3.  The longer any one cryptosystem is in use, and the more widely it is
used, the more likely it is that someone has broken it, or at least
discovered a weakness in it and not told anyone about it.

4.  The more widely used a cryptosystem is, the more profitable it is to try
to break it (for either noble or ignoble purposes).

5.  Exclusive control of the ability to communicate securely is a powerful
force that can easily be corrupted.

6.  Putting all your eggs in one basket is unwise.  Use more than one
cryptosystem, and change keys regularly -- even if you don't suspect
compromise.

7.  Insecure cryptosystems often appear on the surface to be secure.  They
are often sold for good money.

DISCLAIMERS:

DISCUSSIONS ABOVE ARE FROM MEMORY AND MAY NOT BE ACCURATE.  ALL DATA CLAIMING
TO BE GUESSWORK IS.  PROVING ANY CRYPTOSYSTEM SECURE IS USUALLY IMPOSSIBLE. 
INVENTERS OF CRYPTO ALGORITHMS ARE NOT QUALIFIED TO JUDGE THEM.

                                         Mike Johson
                                         mpj@csn.org

This message contains writings protected under the First Amendment of the
Constitution of the United States of America.  Censorship is forbidden.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: doug@netcom.com (Doug Merritt)
Date: Fri, 1 Oct 93 17:38:14 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: secretive API
Message-ID: <9310020037.AA06794@netcom6.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I don't know if this is old hat, but I was amused to see a moment ago
on another mailing list the following quote from the Windows NT API:

    ERROR_TOO_MANY_SECRETS -The maximum number of secrets has been exceeded.
	-Win32 (NT) API.

Doug




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Peter Capek (TL-863-6721)" <capek@watson.ibm.com>
Date: Fri, 1 Oct 93 14:38:39 PDT
To: CYPHERPUNKS@toad.com
Subject: Medium destruction
Message-ID: <9310012138.AA12841@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I have no firsthand knowledge, but a friend who was into this a few years ago
told me that the following is used for NSA's "best stuff" on paper...

     First, it is shredded.
     Then, it is burned.
     Then, the ashes are soaked in acid
     Then the acid is allowed to evaporate and the resulting mass is formed
          into bricks.
     The bricks are dumped at sea at a classified location which is changed
          weekly.

Maybe he was putting me on, but...

A few years ago, the American embassy in (I think) Teheran was invaded by
mobs of locals.   They apparently managed to get hold of a lot of classified
documents which had been shredded in the minutes before they managed to
break in.  But a few months later, there appeared in the New York Times
reconstructions of a few pages of the original material, based on a lot of
tedious labor.  So, maybe the procedures above aren't excessive...




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Mike Godwin <mnemonic@eff.org>
Date: Fri, 1 Oct 93 14:43:39 PDT
To: mimir@u.washington.edu (Al Billings)
Subject: Re: FIDOnet encryption (or lack thereof)
In-Reply-To: <Pine.3.05z.9310011445.A10475-b100000@carson.u.washington.edu>
Message-ID: <199310012140.AA23553@eff.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


 
Al Billings writes:

>  As has already been shown from Fidonet policy, Fidonet does not guarantee
> private mail  in any from and, in fact, advises that mail will be going
> through many sites and can be read along the way.
 
You could be extrapolating from Fidonet's refusal to *guarantee* e-mail
privacy (after all, how could Fidonet *enforce* it?) that all users
of every Fido BBS everywhere have waived their rights under ECPA.

My understanding is that Fidonet policy was drafted not in order to comply
with ECPA, but to acknowledge that, in this decentralized network, there
was no authority a user a could appeal to if his e-mail was not kept
private. But I'd be interested in seeing a direct quote of the policy
provision you're alluding to here. 

And what about me? I don't post from a Fido BBS, so even if there's a
Fidonet-wide waiver of ECPA rights, it's not a waiver *I* have agreed to.
What if mail from me passes through a Fido node on its way to a non-Fido
destination? 

>  The third point does not apply if the sysops offer no private mail in the
> first place.
 
Certainly, if they offer no mail at all, they're not liable, since no mail
passes through their systems.

But the interesting case is this: let's assume that you're right that all
Fido users everywhere have agreed to waive their ECPA rights. Then are the
sysops who reserve their right to read e-mail reading *all* e-mail that
passes through their systems?

If not, this puts the lie to the claim that they're limiting their
liability by reserving their right to read e-mail. After all, the
criminally significant communications may be the ones they're skipping.

In general, criminal liability depends on *knowledge*--you normally can't
be held criminally liable for acts and communications you didn't know
about.

I know of no case in which a sysop has been held *civilly* liable for
failing to read all e-mail on his system. So, in terms of classic risk
analysis, what does that statistic tell you?

> > I suggest that you inform sysops who tell you otherwise that they can
> > contact me at the Legal Services Department of EFF. You've got my e-mail
> > address already--my phone number is 202-347-5400.
> 
>  I don't need sysops to tell me otherwise.

I wasn't referring you to any sysops.

> I've been running my own BBS
> for over three years. My system has a very clear policy statement that
> refers to the ECPA and states VERY clearly who can read the messages
> posted on my system in different areas. As I'm not a Fido hub (and barely
> participate in that network at all), I don't have to worry about passing
> other mail through my system.

If all your users have agreed to waive their e-mail privacy rights, and
you're not dealing with any mail that does not either originate or
terminate on your system, then you're not in violation of ECPA.


--Mike






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: jet@netcom.com (J. Eric Townsend)
Date: Fri, 1 Oct 93 10:43:38 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: POISON PILL
In-Reply-To: <9310010154.AA25936@netcom5.netcom.com>
Message-ID: <9310011741.AA01857@netcom6.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Doug Merritt writes:
 > Actually, you'd be surprised what is recoverable in the aftermath of
 > an explosion. Bombs truly are no guarantee of unrecoverability of data,
 > at least not simple things like dynamite and pipe bombs.


The US Gov policy for the disposal of any media that has been used to
store classified data is:

wipe  -- demagnatize with a *massive* demag unit
grind -- toss in a thing that'd make ground chuck out of godzilla
incenerate -- at some amazingly high temperature.

The media is treated as if it had classified data until after step #3.

-eric




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: jet@netcom.com (J. Eric Townsend)
Date: Fri, 1 Oct 93 10:48:10 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: FIDONet Mail filtering - a course of action
In-Reply-To: <199310010434.AA16852@eff.org>
Message-ID: <9310011746.AA02062@netcom6.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Mike Godwin writes:
 > Outside of the issue of passing encrypted information, it seems common
 > among Fido sysops to screen for other kinds of content. That can be
 > way uncool, legally.

So how do I prevent what happened to SJG, killer, etc from happening
to me?  How do I prevent the LE types from showing up one day and
saying 'hey, did you know there's a meg of kiddie porn on your machine
and we're taking it all away'?

Do I have pull my machine off the net and go back to pre-bangnet
times?





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Karl Lui Barrus <klbarrus@owlnet.rice.edu>
Date: Fri, 1 Oct 93 15:53:40 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: FIDO, encryption
Message-ID: <9310012250.AA19691@arcadien.owlnet.rice.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

Here is the companion script to the other one I posted. It takes the
output of the previous script (which takes PGP encrypted ascii to a
list of geopraphic name), and turns it back into a PGP file.

Not really stegonography since it's really just a substitution cipher.
But, with a more sophisticated output grammar, you could embed your
encrypted file in a bizarre vacation itinerary :-)

pgphide < file.asc | mail -s "not encryped at all" user@host

and then

pgpuhide < mail_file_from_sneaky_person > pgpfile.asc

will allow your friend decrypt pgpfile.asc.

- ----------
#!/usr/local/bin/perl

#pgpunhide - converts a geographic file back to pgp
#Karl L. Barrus <klbarrus@owlnet.rice.edu>

%conversion = (
  'canada', '0', 'united states', '1', 'mexico', '2', 
  'pacific ocean', '3', 'atlantic ocean', '4', 'arctic ocean', '5', 
  'gulf of mexico', '6', 'north america',  '7', 'allegheny mountains', '8', 
  'rocky mountains', '9', 'alabama',  'a', 'alaska', 'b', 
  'arizona', 'c', 'new mexico', 'd', 'arkansas', 'e', 
  'california', 'f', 'colorado', 'g', 'connecticut', 'h', 
  'rhode island','i', 'delaware', 'j', 'maryland', 'k', 
  'florida','l', 'georgia', 'm', 'hawaii', 'n', 
  'idaho','o', 'illinois', 'p', 'indiana', 'q', 
  'iowa','r', 'kansas', 's', 'kentucky', 't', 
  'louisiana','u', 'maine', 'v', 'massachusetts', 'w', 
  'michigan','x', 'minnesota', 'y', 'mississippi', 'z', 
  'missouri','A', 'montana', 'B', 'nebraska', 'C', 
  'nevada','D', 'utah', 'E', 'new hampshire', 'F', 
  'vermont','G', 'new jersey', 'H', 'new york', 'I', 
  'north carolina','J', 'north dakota', 'K', 'south dakota', 'L', 
  'ohio','M', 'oklahoma', 'N', 'oregon', 'O', 
  'pennsylvania', 'P', 'south carolina', 'Q', 'tennessee', 'R', 
  'texas','S', 'virginia', 'T', 'washington', 'U', 
  'west virginia','V', 'wisconsin', 'W', 'wyoming', 'X', 
  'washington d.c.','Y', 'bermuda', 'Z', 'guam', '+', 
  'puerto rico','/', 'virgin islands','=', 
);

print "-----BEGIN PGP MESSAGE-----\n";
print "Version: 2.3a\n\n";

while (<>) {
  $line = $_;
  chop $line;

  if ($line eq "") {
    print "\n";
  }
  else {
    print $conversion{$line};
  }
}

print "-----END PGP MESSAGE-----\n";

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.3a

iQCVAgUBLKyz4YOA7OpLWtYzAQF3JAP9EjWnj7pix65fJLFf9mE+gLkw719nX0Xa
jMgHFxmDIdeOxewi9ZnuzE99QqQHv4+TO3dO+CGg0zxGhCMO8/mu4vQtK6825kHl
9fESP/f2oSVLDPd2/Zv3c0/kMKe9UnMModNgl7tngzsMeBkFJVCnKjkQNGsJGCSz
C5Z4uXaZccs=
=M+N2
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: doug@netcom.com (Doug Merritt)
Date: Fri, 1 Oct 93 18:08:13 PDT
To: an36440@anon.penet.fi
Subject: Re: TRAVELLER'S ADVISORY
Message-ID: <9310020108.AA11545@netcom6.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


an36440@anon.penet.fi said:
>> [ Sandy said: ]
>>Unfortunately,
>>I don't have any bullet-proof solutions.  Suggestions?
>
>Yes.  Seek professional help.  And try Xanax.

Now, now. Sandy's got a point, John could in fact get zapped by
overly zealous authorities. It may be mildly paranoid to think that they'd
plant evidence on him...the suits only do that if they're *REALLY*
pissed at someone, and even then only sometimes...they're risking their
jobs every time they do that, after all.

Actual conspiracies are comparatively rare, if only because they take a
lot of high level carefully planning and support to execute well. It's
not like John is a key figure in South American politics or something.
:-)

But nonetheless, there's still the chance that they'd get a fixation on
the notion that he was carrying something illicit out of the country
and interfere with his travel in a very unpleasant way.

It wouldn't be the first time such a thing happened purely out of
misplaced zealousness.

As for solutions, the age-old approach is to be a high profile
philanthropic and campaign contributor and elbow-rubber, so that one
has a lot of community support if one gets leaned on. This would be a
private matter for John, though, and not up to us to discuss. I mention
it simply because it *is* a well known partial solution. I actually
don't exactly recommend it, for complicated reasons.

Considering certain recent posts (and considering the Internet at
large, for that matter), I'll still give you points for showing signs
that you paid attention to everything Sandy said and responded to what
he actually said. I wish everyone would do that. ;-)
	Doug




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Doug Humphrey <digex@access.digex.net>
Date: Fri, 1 Oct 93 16:13:40 PDT
To: ssimpson@eff.org
Subject: [Question EFF yielding of crypto authority to NIST]
Message-ID: <199310012306.AA11714@access.digex.net>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



[stuff deleted]

>Actually, they have issued such legal guarantees.  They're in the form of the
>administration's vow to uphold the US Constitution.  That document's 9th and
>10th amendments preclude US Government denial or disparagement of the people's
>right to use cryptography (and a whole lot of others).  The fact that these
>legal guarantees are being ignored simply illustrates that their tyranny is
>unbridled.

When I first scanned this, I saw  "... illustrates that their tyranny is
unbundled" 

And I thought, what a concept!  

Doug




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "L. Detweiler" <ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Date: Fri, 1 Oct 93 20:48:26 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Apple's PowerTalk: *breakthrough* in crypto export?
Message-ID: <9310020345.AA01020@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


From the TidBITS Mac newsletter: (I'd be more specific but don't have
it from my source -- perhaps someone can post the info on how to
retrieve the whole article.)

>PowerTalk Arrives
>-----------------
>  by Wolfgang Naegeli -- wnn@ornl.gov

Powertalk is Apple's new `Collaborative Environment' client software,
supposedly to be released next week. Its a sort of groupware-email
package with some significant security & cryptography mechanisms.
Sounds like its very intuitive and a very highly refined user
interface. I suspect this whole platform could have a *major* effect in
bringing seamless, invisible, secure cryptography to the masses -- at
least, reading all the promotional hype, the *potential* is there.

>  Apple claims that PowerTalk is more secure than most other off-
>  the-shelf software solutions since those use less secure
>  algorithms to avoid export restrictions. Apple is the first
>  company to receive an export license for a DES-based product.

1st? *WOW*

Cypherpunks we need more intelligence on this ASAP! Does this represent
a fundamental *breakthrough* in export policy? Why are they the first?
Is it real live DES and not some strange crippled bit length version?
What does this *mean*?!

red warning flag:

>RSA always is at the
>  root of the issuing process and signatures expire after two years.

Not sure if this means what it seems to say -- that RSA is *generating*
the private keys and passing them on? We just had that big discussion
about this issue with some other software from Apple, didn't we?

Here's some more from the article of interest to cypherpunks.

===cut=here===

  Digital signatures, based on RSA Public Key Encryption, provide a
  secure way of ensuring data has not been altered and was signed by
  a particular person. The mechanism is similar to Kerberos [a
  security system developed at MIT -Adam], which was not mature
  enough at the critical point in PowerTalk development. Apple
  anticipates supporting Kerberos in a future PowerTalk release.
 
  To sign a document, simply drops it on a Signer icon. A prompt for
  the personal signer code then appears on the screen. If the
  content of the signed document later changes in any way, the
  signature becomes invalid. While being signed, a file
  automatically is locked to avoid inadvertent invalidation. The Get
  Info window of a signed file is used to uncheck the file lock, and
  it contains a Verify button with which the recipient can assert
  the integrity of the file and authenticity of its signature.

  Large companies can become trusted signature issuing agents for
  their employees by obtaining a titanium blackbox with key
  interlocks from RSA. The box contains a certain number oFrom owner-cypherpunks  Sat Oct  2 03:18:43 1993
Received: by toad.com id AA25713; Sat, 2 Oct 93 03:14:17 PDT
Received: by toad.com id AA25695; Sat, 2 Oct 93 03:13:54 PDT
Return-Path: <sameer@soda.berkeley.edu>
Received: from soda.berkeley.edu ([128.32.149.19]) by toad.com id AA25690; Sat, 2 Oct 93 03:13:51 PDT
Received: by soda.berkeley.edu (5.65/KAOS-1)
	id AA09739; Sat, 2 Oct 93 03:13:44 -0700
Date: Sat, 2 Oct 93 03:13:44 -0700
Message-Id: <9310021013.AA09739@soda.berkeley.edu>
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
From: nobody@soda.berkeley.edu
Subject: Sternlight's Key
Remailed-By: Sameer Parekh <sameer@netcom.com>

As an official Key Escrow Agent of the United States Gubberment, I have
decided that David Sternlight, being a controversial public figure, needs 
cryptographic protection for his private communications.

Accordingly, a key has been created for him. He has been provided with his
public and secret keys via e-mail. A copy of the secret key will be held
in escrow. In the event that Mr. Sternlight is ever served with a subpoena,
the key will be released to appropriate authorities.

Since Mr. Sternlight has been a vocal advocate of key escrow, I'm sure he
will have no problems with his key being created by an unknown person.
In the absence of a subpoena, Mr. Sternlight, your key is safe.

Trust me. I'm from the gubberment and I'm here to help you.

pub  1024/5C4E59 1993/10/02  David Sternlight <strnlght@netcom.com>
Available from a keyserver near you.





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: an36440@anon.penet.fi
Date: Fri, 1 Oct 93 17:33:42 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: TRAVELLER'S ADVISORY
Message-ID: <9310020031.AA05043@anon.penet.fi>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>Unfortunately,
>I don't have any bullet-proof solutions.  Suggestions?

Yes.  Seek professional help.  And try Xanax.

-------------------------------------------------------------------------
To find out more about the anon service, send mail to help@anon.penet.fi.
Due to the double-blind, any mail replies to this message will be anonymized,
and an anonymous id will be allocated automatically. You have been warned.
Please report any problems, inappropriate use etc. to admin@anon.penet.fi.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: hiscdcj@lux.latrobe.edu.au  (Dwayne)
Date: Fri, 1 Oct 93 07:53:18 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: laying our own wires?
Message-ID: <9310011448.AA26371@lux.latrobe.edu.au>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



>> We could lay our own wires/fibers.

>Well, we'd like crypto for the masses and I don't think that the masses are
>yet ready to put out the bucks for spread spectrum boards and infrared laser
>communications gear...  It'd be really nice to have such a decentralized
>network, though.

Sure, the masses wouldn't do it, but how many are needed?
How many users are thereb on the net, compared to how many sites?
All it would take is a dozen or so people in each city, and itt could 
be done. Don't know about intercity stuff, though.

A friend of mine is putting together some ideas regarding what he calls
'punknet', using a bundle of small, solar-powered relays, maybe microwave
links, or infra-red, or short-distance packet radio, whcih could
be manufactured in bulk and stuck all over a city, disguised as bits of
construction, ettc, so tthey would be hard to see, acting as switching devices
so that we could have a completely open and untraceable network within a city.

>> We could set up a mesh network of infrared lasers through the air.  Last
>> time I looked, there were no laws against shining lights out your window as
>> long as they didn't bother anyone.  An infrared laser could hardly bother
>> anyone.
>> 
>...
>> very low range radio, ....  Each card would connect to three or more
>> neighbors and become part of the global mesh.  Adaptive routing with no
>> global map would suffice for the card and would keep the whole system
>> peer-to-peer with no need for central control and no chance for central
>> tapping.

Serves me right for not reading through the message first. Yes, this is what
my friend was thinking of.

>This would be the perfect network in which to deploy DC nets....  (dining
>cryptographers).

dining?

Dwayne.
              (Dwayne Jones-Evans  IRC: ddraig  )
     ( SCA: Cynon Yscolan ap Myrddin, Stormhold, Lochac, West)
        PGP public key available. finger me.  be gentle.
           internet---> hiscdcj@lux.latrobe.edu.au





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: hiscdcj@lux.latrobe.edu.au  (Dwayne)
Date: Fri, 1 Oct 93 07:53:12 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com (cypherpunks mailing list)
Subject: spread spectrum: request for a summary (so I can catch up)
Message-ID: <9310011449.AA26422@lux.latrobe.edu.au>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Hiyas,
  I think I missed the discussion on spread spectrum. Can someone email
me a summary?

Dwayne.

hiscdcj@lux.latrobe.edu.au
              (Dwayne Jones-Evans  IRC: ddraig  )
     ( SCA: Cynon Yscolan ap Myrddin, Stormhold, Lochac, West)
        PGP public key available. finger me.  be gentle.
           internet---> hiscdcj@lux.latrobe.edu.au





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: hiscdcj@lux.latrobe.edu.au (Dwayne)
Date: Fri, 1 Oct 93 08:57:52 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: spread spectrum
Message-ID: <9310011554.AA27275@lux.latrobe.edu.au>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Hiyas,
  I think I missed the discussion on spread spectrum. Can someone email
me a summary?

Dwayne.

hiscdcj@lux.latrobe.edu.au




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "George A. Gleason" <gg@well.sf.ca.us>
Date: Sat, 2 Oct 93 04:04:18 PDT
To: remail@tamsun.tamu.edu
Subject: Re:  POISON PILL
Message-ID: <93Oct2.035952pdt.14623-1@well.sf.ca.us>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Remote control via pagers is subject to false-positives, i.e. you'd need a
passcode to activate it or otherwise the first wrong number which dialed
your pager would wipe you out... and also, you're not in any position to
dial your pager if some hypothetical robber was holding you hostage while
trying to get at your data.  




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: hughes@ah.com (Eric Hughes)
Date: Sat, 2 Oct 93 09:38:47 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: No Subject
In-Reply-To: <199310020422.AA01659@xtropia>
Message-ID: <9310021623.AA09378@ah.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>I have personally reconstructed many shredded
>documents done with commercial-grade shredders.  It's extremely easy and
>I wonder why the "security conscious" even bother with the waste of
>time.

Cost.

It's much more expensive to read a shredded document than an integral
one.  As always, though, if the expense to reconstruct is smaller than
the value of the documents, one should use a better method.

Eric




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: hughes@ah.com (Eric Hughes)
Date: Sat, 2 Oct 93 09:58:47 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Single Value Pseudonyms
In-Reply-To: <00083D17.MAI*Hastings@courier8.aero.org>
Message-ID: <9310021641.AA09412@ah.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>Someone posted a way to resist altered bank notes [...] by something
>called (if I remember right) a "cut-and-choose" protocol.

Karl Barrus posted this, and I've been meaning to respond to it.
Basically, Karl's scheme doesn't work.  With any cut-and-choose
protocol, there must be some assurance that the two things offered are
the same thing, and, in a series of them, that all the things offered
are the same thing.

With a blind signature, the signature itself is that which has value,
not the thing signed.  

>To make things very simple for a bank, I suggest having fixed value digital
>pseudonyms for each value of bank note. For example, the Bank of Hastings on
>Kent would use "AU 500 mg from HoK Bank" as the user name for all signed 500
>milligram gold certificates.

Basically yes.  More accurately, the bank has one key for each
denomination for each particular time range.  The key is the
significant entity here, not the user name.  The blind signer could
make a regular signature attaching a name to that key, of course.

Eric




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Christian D. Odhner" <cdodhner@indirect.com>
Date: Sat, 2 Oct 93 11:08:48 PDT
To: mgream@acacia.itd.uts.edu.au (Matthew Gream)
Subject: Re: POISON PILL
In-Reply-To: <9310020332.AA21867@acacia.itd.uts.EDU.AU>
Message-ID: <199310021802.AA18099@indirect.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> Something else you can do is use a cipher which takes two input streams
> and merges them into the one file, with one key extracting the 'harmless'
> information and another extracting the 'harmfull' information. 
> 
> Matthew.
> --
> Matthew Gream, M.Gream@uts.edu.au. "... encryption is the ultimate means of
> Consent Technologies, 02-821-2043.  protection against an Orwellian state."

Has anybody writen one? Can we try for this as a feature in the next pgp?
Should I write it myself? Of course I should... silly question... Ok does
anybody have any suggestions or wishlists? Lemme know.

Happy Hunting, -Chris
______________________________________________________________________________
Christian Douglas Odhner     | "The NSA can have my secret key when they pry
cdodhner@indirect.com	     | it from my cold, dead, hands... But they shall
pgp 2.3 public key by finger | NEVER have the password it's encrypted with!"
  "If guns are outlawed, only the government will have guns." -E. Abbey
My opinions are shareware. For a registered copy, send me 15$ in DigiCash.
  Key fingerprint =  58 62 A2 84 FD 4F 56 38  82 69 6F 08 E4 F1 79 11 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: David Buckley <dbuckley@esl-hub.demon.co.uk>
Date: Sat, 2 Oct 93 09:14:21 PDT
To: an12070@anon.penet.fi
Subject: Re: FIDONet policies
In-Reply-To: <9310010728.AA15983@anon.penet.fi>
Message-ID: <749585059snx@esl-hub.demon.co.uk>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


In article <9310010728.AA15983@anon.penet.fi> you write:
> >If a user sends a "private message", the user has no control over the number
> >of intermediate systems through which that message is routed.  A sysop who
> >sends a message to another sysop can control this aspect by sending the
> >message direct to the recipient's system, thus guaranteeing that only the
> >recipient or another individual to whom that sysop has given authorization
> >can read the message.  Thus, a sysop may have different expectations than a
> >casual user.
> 
> translated: we have a hierarchy of rights. sysop-gods have a right and
> expectation to private mail. the user-peons have neither.

Translated back to the real world:  The sysop can always choose to pay
for a direct connect to deliver mail items directly from his machine to
the target machine, rather than route mail through intermediate systems.

That priveledge, (and this is the important bit, so I'll shout) AND THE
COST of providing such a facility may or may not be extended to customers
of the system.

FIDONet is, in general, payed for out of the pockets of ordinary folks.

A typical BBS system is owned by an ordinary folk (bad singular), who
owns the system. It's their system, they make the rules (what internet
folks call "Acceptable Use Policy") that customers of the service have
to abide by.

If the Sysop wants his stand alone BBS to join an network (ANY NETWORK),
then their system has to abide by the Acceptable Use Policy of that network.

If a customer of a service doesn't like a service (any service), he
can:
    (a) put up and shut up
    (b) go to somewhere that does provide satisfaction
    (c) start his own service on the basis there is a market opportunity

The bottom line of communications is: someone has to pay for it.

You're sitting out there, shouting from an anonymous remailer, access to
which somebody else probably paid for anyway, about things of which you
have little comprehension.  If you feel FIDONet policy is wrong, and you
want to do something about it, get involved.  Otherwise, don't use
FIDOnet, and don't just winge.

(Never thought I'd have to get into this kind of discussion in a high
quality mailing list like this one.  Please note none of the above is
intended as a statement of support for FIDOnet politics, which are as
<fill in your choice of description here> as internet politics...)

----------------------------------------+------------------------------------
David Buckley of Electric Solutions Ltd | Email: dbuckley@cix.compulink.co.uk
 Services to the Computing,Electronics  |        dbuckley@esl-hub.demon.co.uk
  and Entertainment industries.         |        2:254/90@fidonet
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Date: Sat, 2 Oct 93 11:28:48 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: (fwd) ITAR registration package
Message-ID: <9310021826.AA13664@netcom5.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Cypherpunks,

This is slightly long, but I think it's important for you all to see.

Grady Ward requested the information packet needed to become a
"Munitions Dealer." It seems that nearly all of us are supposed to be
paying a $250 yearly fee and filling out many forms before we post
files to ftp sites (including the "soda" machine), publish chunks of
code on Usenet or on this list, and so on.

The Crypto Crackdown could be messy.

-Tim May


Newsgroups: talk.politics.crypto,comp.org.eff.talk,misc.legal
From: grady@netcom.com (Grady Ward)
Subject: ITAR registration package
Date: Sat, 2 Oct 1993 15:54:14 GMT

(edit followups as appropriate)

I asked the State Department for a "Munitions Manufacturer"
registration package and they promptly sent me three
documents in a 8 1/2 x 11 envelope.
 
The first booklet was a copy of the Federal Register of
22 CFR Part 120, et al. ("ITAR") that is available via
anonymous ftp.  This gives the official 'munitions list'
("USML") and information on registration, licensing,
governing authority and so on.
 
The second enclosed document was a twenty page booklet
titled 'REGISTRATION: the first step in the defense trade'
which gives sample registration forms, fee schedules and
so on. The paperwork for registration is one page to fill
out where you identify the people manufacturing munitions
and pay the yearly $250 fee.
 
The third item was a copy of the "Defense Trade News" a
folksy bulletin produced monthly by the Department of
State to ostensibly clarify points of munitions manufacturing
or export.
 
Reading the January & April 1993 (combined issue) V4,1 & 2
the State Department makes it clear that it considers all
software, including algorithms in any form and source code
to be a munitions items as per 121.8(f) of ITAR.  For example,
 
Software, Using DES for Data Encryption                 USML XIII(b)(1)
 
Software, Using DES for Password Encryption
                  In Object Code                     (Dept of Commerce)
		  In Source Code                        USML XIII(b)(1)
		  
Algorithm, for Data Encryption, not
Incorporated into a Finished Software Product           USML XIII(b)(1)
 
This language makes it clear that at least the State Department
does consider any kind of privacy software description to be a
munition, including pseudocode, block diagrams, etc.
They explicitly deny that software can ever be a 'public domain'
item as per 120.11 ITAR (as D.J. Bernstein has been telling us
all along).
 
Under 122.1(b) of ITAR, people are exempt from registration if
they "engage only in the fabrication of articles for experimental
or scientific purposes, including research and development."
 
This means presumably that while posting code to an ftp site is
still considered 'manufacturing a munition' such a manufacturer
does not have to register as per 122.1(b)(4). But a business such
as Compuserve that has excellent NewDE source code available for
downloading by anyone, the Austin Code Works, or Dr. Dobb's who
is planning a December article on the IDEA algorithm, including
source listing, for example, would definitely have to register,
unless they could argue they are exempt under 122.1(b) as well.

>From my lay perspective, it seems the most fruitful way to attack
the ITAR restriction on dissemination of strong crypto is right
in section 120.3 of ITAR 'Policy on designating and determining
defense articles and services' because it claims that a member of
the USML: '(a) Is specifically designed, adapted, or modified for a
military application, and (i) Does not have predominant civil
application, and (ii) Does not have performance equivalent (defined
by form, fit, and function) to those of an article or service
used for civil applications.'
 
PGP *does*, of course, predominantly has a civil application (privacy)
and certainly was *not* specifically designed for any military application.

 
My conclusion:
 
Crypto software suitable for mass market PCs ought to be removed from the US
Munitions List.


Appendix.  Portions of ITAR.
 
The USML includes:
 121.8 -- End-items, components, accessories, attachments parts,
 firmware, software and systems. 
   (a) An end-item is an assembled article ready for its intended use.
   Only ammunition, fuel or another energy source is required to place
   it in an operating state. 
   (b) A component is an item which is useful only when used in conjunction
   with an end-item. A major component includes any assembled element
   which forms a portion of an end-item without which the end-item is
   inoperable. (Example: Airframes, tail sections, transmissions, tank
   treads, hulls, etc.) A minor component includes any assembled element
   of a major component. 
   (c) Accessories and attachments are associated equipment for any component,
   end-item or system, and which are not necessary for their operation, but
   which enhance their usefulness or effectiveness. (Examples: Military 
riflescopes,
   special paints, etc.) 
   (d) A part is any single unassembled element of a major or a minor component,
   accessory, or attachment which is not normally subject to disassembly without
   the destruction or the impairment of design use. (Examples: Rivets, wire,
   bolts, etc.) 
  (e) Firmware and any related unique support tools (such as computers, linkers,
   editors, test case generators, diagnostic checkers, library of functions and
  ystem test diagnostics) specifically designed for equipment or systems covered
   under any category of the U.S. Munitions List are considered as part of the
   end-item or component. Firmware includes but is not limited to circuits into
   which software has been programmed. 
 (f) Software includes but is not limited to the system functional design, logic
 flow, algorithms, application programs, operating systems and support software
 for design, implementation, test, operation, diagnosis and repair. A person who
 intends to export software only should, unless it is specifically enumerated in
  121.1 (e.g., XIII(b)), apply for a technical data license pursuant to part 125
  of this subchapter. 
   (g) A system is a combination of end-items, components, parts, accessories,
   attachments, firmware or software, specifically designed, modified or adapted
   to operate together to perform a specialized military function. 
 
 
USML XIII:
Category XIII-Auxiliary Military Equipment 
   (a) Cameras [including space cameras] and specialized processing equipment
   therefor, photointerpretation, stereoscopic plotting, and photogrammetry
   equipment which are specifically designed or modified for military purposes,
   and components specifically designed or modified therefor; 
(b) Information Security Systems and equipment, cryptographic devices, software,
   and components specifically designed or modified therefor, including: 
   (1) Cryptographic (including key management) systems, equipment, assemblies,
   modules, integrated circuits, components or software with the capability of
   maintaining secrecy or confidentiality of information or information systems,
   except cryptographic equipment and software as follows: 
   (i) Restricted to decryption functions specifically designed to allow the execution
   of copy protected software, provided the decryption functions are not user-
accessible. 
(ii) Specially designed, developed or modified for use in machines for banking or
   money transactions, and restricted to use only in such transactions. Machines for
   banking or money transactions include automatic teller machines, self-service
  statement printers, point of sale terminals or equipment for the encryption of
   interbanking transactions. 
  (iii) Employing only analog techniques to provide the cryptographic processing
   that ensures information security in the following applications: 
   (A) Fixed (defined below) band scrambling not exceeding 8 bands and in which the
   transpositions change not more frequently than once every second; 
   (B) Fixed (defined below) band scrambling exceeding 8 bands and in which the
   transpositions change not more frequently than once every ten seconds; 
   (C) Fixed (defined below) frequency inversion and in which the transpositions
   change not more frequently than once every second; 
   (D) Facsimile equipment; 
   (E) Restricted audience broadcast equipment; 
   (F) Civil television equipment. 
   Note: Special Definition. For purposes of this subparagraph, fixed means that
the coding or compression algorithm cannot accept externally supplied parameters
   (e.g., cryptographic or key variables) and cannot be modified by the user. 
   (iv) Personalized smart cards using cryptography restricted for use only in
   equipment or systems exempted from the controls of the USML. 
  (v) Limited to access control, such as automatic teller machines, self-service
statement printers or point of sale terminals, which protects password or personal
 identification numbers (PIN) or similar data to prevent unauthorized access to
  facilities but does not allow for encryption of files or text, except as directly
   related to the password of PIN protection. 
   (vi) Limited to data authentication which calculates a Message Authentication Code
  (MAC) or similar result to ensure no alteration of text has taken place, or to
   authenticate users, but does not allow for encryption of data, text or other media
   other than that needed for the authentication. 
   (vii) Restricted to fixed data compression or coding techniques. 
   (viii) Limited to receiving for radio broadcast, pay television or similar
 restricted audience television of the consumer type, without digital encryption
   and where digital decryption is limited to the video, audio or management functions. 
(ix) Software designed or modified to protect against malicious computer damage,
   (e.g., viruses). 
 
Registration and exemptions:
 122.1 -- Registration requirements. 
   (a) Any person who engages in the United States in the business of either
   manufacturing or exporting defense articles or furnishing defense services
   is required to register with the Office of Defense Trade Controls. Manufacturers
   who do not engage in exporting must nevertheless register. 
   (b) Exemptions. Registration is not required for: 
   (1) Officers and employees of the United States Government acting in an official
   capacity. 
  (2) Persons whose pertinent business activity is confined to the production of
   unclassified technical data only. 
 (3) Persons all of whose manufacturing and export activities are licensed under
   the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended. 
  (4) Persons who engage only in the fabrication of articles for experimental or
   scientific purpose, including research and development. 
   (c) Purpose. Registration is primarily a means to provide the U.S. Government
   with necessary information on who is involved in certain manufacturing and
   exporting activities. Registration does not confer any export rights or privileges.
 It is generally a precondition to the issuance of any license or other approval
   under this subchapter. 
 
-------------------------------
 
(Note: order copies of the ITAR for $4.50 a copy
from the GPO at +1 202 783 3238, or FAX +1 202 512 2250.
Order stock number 069-001-000-58-1.
 
Or get your 'Munitions Manufacturer' registration package
free from the State Dept by calling (703) 875-6650
or writing Dept. State, PM/DTC Rm. 200 SA-6,
Washington, D.C. 20522-0602)
 


-- 
Grady Ward                                         grady@netcom.com
3449 Martha Ct.                           compiler of Moby lexicons
Arcata, CA  95521-4884            e-mail or finger grady@netcom.com
(707) 826-7715  (voice/24hr FAX)               for more information

--




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: anonymous@extropia.wimsey.com
Date: Sat, 2 Oct 93 12:28:48 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: PGP in FIDO
Message-ID: <199310021906.AA13098@xtropia>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


 * Reply to msg originally in CYPHERPUNKS

 > My question is this: how does he know that the mail is encrypted if he's
 > not examining the mail that passes through his system? If he *is*
 > examining the mail that passes through his system, it seems likely that he
 > is violating the Electronic Communications Privacy Act.

In that FIDOnet mail points (or individual BBSs) are not required to
pass or accept encrypted FIDO traffic under FIDOnet rules, some run a
specific program that scans for the "PGP MESSAGE" string and bumps it to
a SECURENET mail hub (or, in some cases, _kills_ it).  It is not done by
individual, personal inspection - at least not at mail hub level.

Anyway, the ECPA is basically irrelevant in the BBS world, as 1] almost
every BBS states at log-on that there is no such thing as truly
"private" e-mail on the system as the sysop can, will and does see
messages in all areas, and 2] he is personally _liable_ for any illegal
activity on his BBS, so he can reasonably be expected to keep an eye on
e-mail for anything that will put his ass in a sling.

There has been a very heated war in FIDOland over PGP and other
encryption.  Considering the risk that sysops take on by permitting
secure (?) communication on their BBSs, I must say I admire their
courage when they allow it and participate on SECURENET.  Personally,
_I_ would never stick my neck out like that, though I convinced many
FIDOnet BBSs to do so for my own political and purely selfish reasons.

BTW, this message comes via FIDOnet and was originally PGP encrypted for
the remailer, and the cypherpunks@toad.com mailing is converted to a
conference on a FIDO BBS where I read the message to which I am
responding.





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: remail@tamsun.tamu.edu
Date: Sat, 2 Oct 93 10:14:21 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: RSA in new Apple productRSA in new Apple product
Message-ID: <9310021713.AA29525@tamsun.tamu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


From a discussion of Powertalk in TidBITS#195/27-Sep-93, an online zine
published by "Adam C. Engst" <ace@tidbits.com>:


------------------- forward ---------------------------------------

Key Chain
  The Key Chain is the third new Desktop icon and perhaps the most
  important PowerTalk feature. It provides quick, transparent access
  to any number of password-protected servers or services through a
  single system-wide logon password. All applications and services
  are integrated with a single security model. For every service,
  the user creates a key. Each key has account information,
  communications settings (such as. modem settings, addresses, and
  system identifiers), and an encrypted password. After this one-
  time setup, the user attaches the key to the Key Chain and can
  forget the password. From now on, the system will automatically
  and transparently connect to the protected service when needed.

  Apple feels that this mechanism is especially secure since a user
  will find it easier to remember a single, frequently-used password
  and will be less likely to write down a list of passwords. At any
  time, you can lock the Key Chain by issuing a command or through
  an inactivity time-out. When the Key Chain locks, all windows
  containing information from protected services are hidden.

  Apple claims that PowerTalk is more secure than most other off-
  the-shelf software solutions since those use less secure
  algorithms to avoid export restrictions. Apple is the first
  company to receive an export license for a DES-based product.

  A new "I am at..." menu item (e.g. Home, Office, Car, Hotel) lets
  the system know which services are accessible and automatically
  resets communications settings for Ethernet, modem connection,
  packet radio, etc. so the system can continue to transparently
  establish connections over available media.

  A PowerTalk server can act as a trusted party in establishing
  authenticated communications across the net. Network traffic is
  encrypted with the RC4 algorithm of RSA and delivered via ASDSP
  (Apple Secure Datastream Protocol). ASDSP adds only about ten
  percent to the communication overhead. At least in the initial
  release, peer-to-peer traffic cannot be encrypted. [Sorry for all
  the acronyms! RSA is a company. -Tonya]

  Digital signatures, based on RSA Public Key Encryption, provide a
  secure way of ensuring data has not been altered and was signed by
  a particular person. The mechanism is similar to Kerberos [a
  security system developed at MIT -Adam], which was not mature
  enough at the critical point in PowerTalk development. Apple
  anticipates supporting Kerberos in a future PowerTalk release.

  To sign a document, simply drops it on a Signer icon. A prompt for
  the personal signer code then appears on the screen. If the
  content of the signed document later changes in any way, the
  signature becomes invalid. While being signed, a file
  automatically is locked to avoid inadvertent invalidation. The Get
  Info window of a signed file is used to uncheck the file lock, and
  it contains a Verify button with which the recipient can assert
  the integrity of the file and authenticity of its signature.

  Large companies can become trusted signature issuing agents for
  their employees by obtaining a titanium blackbox with key
  interlocks from RSA. The box contains a certain number of key
  combinations and can be connected to a Macintosh which runs an
  RSA-signed signature issuing application. Individuals can acquire
  a personal signature code through a notary. RSA always is at the
  root of the issuing process and signatures expire after two years.
  The issuing cost of a digital signature runs about $25.

  One limitation of the signature mechanism, at least in the initial
  implementation, is that only one signature can be attached to a
  document. This may be worked around by designing forms such that
  each signatory vouches for the authenticity of the previous
  sender's signature.

 For an APS price list, send email to: <aps-prices@tidbits.com>

 For information on TidBITS: how to subscribe to our mailing list,
 where to find back issues, how to search issues on the Internet's
 WAIS, and other useful stuff, send email to: <info@tidbits.com>
 Otherwise, contact us at: ace@tidbits.com * CIS: 72511,306
 AppleLink & BIX: TidBITS * AOL: Adam Engst * Delphi: Adam_Engst
 TidBITS * 1106 North 31st Street * Renton, WA 98056 USA
 ----------------------------------------------------------------









From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: mgream@acacia.itd.uts.edu.au (Matthew Gream)
Date: Fri, 1 Oct 93 20:33:54 PDT
To: pierre@shell.portal.com (Pierre Uszynski)
Subject: Re: POISON PILL
In-Reply-To: <9310010831.AA03417@jobe.shell.portal.com.shell.portal.com>
Message-ID: <9310020332.AA21867@acacia.itd.uts.EDU.AU>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


In reply to (Pierre Uszynski):

| But let's add something else:
| 
| It may be possible (easy?) to hide a partition on the disk: buy two hard
[..]
| The (even not so) casual inspection of the stolen or confiscated system
| reveals only stuff that is not worth spending time on. Only a very
| detailed inspection, or a leak, reveals the encrypted stuff, still
| encrypted... Very frustrating.

I think this approach is the safest of all mentioned. An earlier poster
commented on the fact that attempting to play 'smart-ass' to your investigators
is only going to result in more problems for you. Its a non-ideal world,
and they definitely have the ability to cause you substantial problems.

Essentially, you need an encryption system that is non-obvious and looks
like totally unrelated data. Of course, it would be pointless to have your
system looking _totally_ clean, because the fact they have seized it
implies they know/suspect something is on there (essentially, the magnitude
of what is on there is what they don't know, and in some cases they are
entirely off track and find nothing).

Encrypting your hard-drive entirely is only going to make them press you
for its key, and become aggrivated at your non co-operation. I am no expert
on investigation techniques, but having been involved in all 3 aspects (
investigator, investigatee and 3rd party viewer), I feel it is essential to
show them everything that they think is there, and convince them (as they
will not be as competent in cryptographic analysis as yourself [at least
you hope]) that there is nothing hidden. 

This topic has been dealt with before on sci.crypt. An example I can think
of at the moment is something like say you have some software which does
known plaintext attacks using sets of word dictionaries. These word 
dictionaries could infact be encrypted information using some appropriate
algorithm that maps words from /usr/dict/words into a new sequence. Of
course the only problem with this approach is that your input information
rate div output data rate is going to be quite small.

Something else you can do is use a cipher which takes two input streams
and merges them into the one file, with one key extracting the 'harmless'
information and another extracting the 'harmfull' information. 

Matthew.
--
Matthew Gream, M.Gream@uts.edu.au. "... encryption is the ultimate means of
Consent Technologies, 02-821-2043.  protection against an Orwellian state."




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: alk@et.msc.edu (Anthony L. Kimball)
Date: Sat, 2 Oct 93 14:04:25 PDT
To: pmetzger@lehman.com
Subject: PGP in FIDO
In-Reply-To: <9310022023.AA19386@snark.lehman.com>
Message-ID: <9310022059.AA18202@et.msc.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


   However, the law
   is the law. 

And as such is an ass, yes.

   Disagreeing with it or consciously deciding to violate it
   is one thing, but smug amateur lawyering in which you pretend that it
   isn't supposed to apply to you is another.

I don't see the good in this sort of thing.  The FIDOnet operators
in question are probably operating in good faith, whether mistakenly
or no, their smugness or lack thereof is not in evidence, and if there
is anyone you should be annoyed with, it is the federal agencies which
have created such a chilling atmosphere that their belief resulted.
Put another way, they're terrified of the feds.  Terrified people make 
stupid mistakes.  The root of the problem is the cause of the
terror, not the mistakes that result.  

I think it would be more constructive, instead of trying to imprison
the BBS operator for offending your aethetic judgement (I realize you
were not serious, of course -- please accept my rhetorical license as 
no less broad than your own), to document to them the reasoned legal
opinion of the appropriately credentialled M. Godwin, so that they may
protect themselves from legal assault.






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Marc Horowitz <marc@MIT.EDU>
Date: Sat, 2 Oct 93 13:04:23 PDT
To: anonymous@extropia.wimsey.com
Subject: Re: PGP in FIDO
In-Reply-To: <199310021906.AA13098@xtropia>
Message-ID: <9310022001.AA11355@snorkelwacker.MIT.EDU>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>> Anyway, the ECPA is basically irrelevant in the BBS world, as ....

I'm truly amazed.  Mike Godwin, who is a lawyer who *specializes* in
this sort of thing, has rebuffed this statement several times, and
given his phone number for interested BBS sysops to call him.   And
yet, people continue to spew disbelief.

Of course, without real case law, Mike's opinion is still just that,
but when some BBS sysop gets nailed by the ECPA, I'm gonna laugh.

		Marc




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: bobi@vswr.sps.mot.com (Bob Izenberg)
Date: Sat, 2 Oct 93 14:14:33 PDT
To: pmetzger@lehman.com
Subject: Re: PGP in FIDO
In-Reply-To: <9310022011.AA19354@snark.lehman.com>
Message-ID: <9310022109.AA16172@vswr.sps.mot.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text


Perry E. Metzger wrote:

# They take NO risk. They are common carriers if they stop censoring
# their mail.

Not long after I moved here, I had a discussion with a local lawyer on common
carrier status.  Take my recollections for what they're worth after three years
rattling around in the head of a non-attorney.
One doesn't become a common carrier by virtue of personal policy.  It's a
label that must be applied for with the local communications regulatory
authority (public utilities commission or what have you.)  You must publish
a tariff of your rate structure and other operating information.  There's
probably a lot more to do, but what it comes down to is paperwork, paperwork,
paperwork, and (depending upon the lawyer) no small amount of legal time and
expense.
What I also heard that day was that this particular lawyer, who was obviously
familiar with the process of consideration for common carrier status, would be
unable to submit an application because of a conflict of interest his company
would have.  They represent the local telephone company, which had then, and
still has now (in an unimpressive way,) an interest in getting into information
services.  I didn't make an exhaustive search for legal representation then,
but I could imagine it taking a real expedition to find somebody that wasn't
soaking up *some* of the money/influence that SWBT throws around in town (this
being the state capitol.)

[ Insert what Mike Godwin says next here.  :-) ]

Bob
--
 ==============================================================================
   Bob Izenberg                                     voice phone: 512-891-8680
   Motorola RISC Software                               bobi@vswr.sps.mot.com
 ==============================================================================



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Perry E. Metzger" <pmetzger@lehman.com>
Date: Sat, 2 Oct 93 13:14:24 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: PGP in FIDO
In-Reply-To: <199310021906.AA13098@xtropia>
Message-ID: <9310022011.AA19354@snark.lehman.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



anonymous@extropia.wimsey.com says:
> Anyway, the ECPA is basically irrelevant in the BBS world, as 1] almost
> every BBS states at log-on that there is no such thing as truly
> "private" e-mail on the system as the sysop can, will and does see
> messages in all areas, and 2] he is personally _liable_ for any illegal
> activity on his BBS, so he can reasonably be expected to keep an eye on
> e-mail for anything that will put his ass in a sling.

You haven't been listening at all to Mr. Godwin, have you?

1) The ECPA *DOES* apply to the BBSes whether they want it to or not.
   All the hoping in the world doesn't make a statute go away. Merely
   declaring that the ECPA doesn't apply to you doesn't work -- try
   declaring the tax laws don't apply to you some time and see if that
   works.
2) The BBS operators are NOT liable UNLESS they censor the mail. If
   they censor the mail, they are liable for anything they fail to
   censor. If they do not censor, they are common carriers, and have
   no liability.

In other words, jackasses pretending they understand the law have both
broken the law and made themselves more, not less, liable for anthing
left on their machines.

> There has been a very heated war in FIDOland over PGP and other
> encryption.  Considering the risk that sysops take on by permitting
> secure (?) communication on their BBSs,

They take NO risk. They are common carriers if they stop censoring
their mail. People don't seem to understand that the law on this is
very clear.

By the idiotic logic the FIDO operators are using, the phone company
could be siezed if two people have a conversation about a crime over
the phone. The notion is, of course, absurd, and so is the stupid
half-assed amateur lawyering the people who wrote the FIDO policies
used.

> Personally, _I_ would never stick my neck out like that, though I
> convinced many FIDOnet BBSs to do so for my own political and purely
> selfish reasons.

Actually, as I've just noted, you have not protected yourself. You
have opened yourself up for massive legal liability where you had none
before.

The depths of human folly never cease to amaze me. This case is as if
a group of bankers, deciding that they were scared that they might be
held liable if one of their clients were a drug dealer (which they
aren't) decides to embezzle all the client accounts instead to "keep
themselves safe".

Perry




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: khijol!erc (Ed Carp)
Date: Sat, 2 Oct 93 16:39:35 PDT
To: pmetzger@lehman.com
Subject: Re: PGP in FIDO
In-Reply-To: <9310022205.AA19553@snark.lehman.com>
Message-ID: <m0ojGBH-00022EC@khijol>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text


> Many sorts of status do not require that anyone GRANT you anything.
> Lets say, for example, that you live in state that permits common law
> marriage. In such a state, it is sufficient to think of yourself and
> your S.O. as married, and behave in that manner -- at that point you
> legally are married. (Note that common law marriages are now only
> possible in a few state -- 9 I believe.)

FYI, to be married in this way, you have to declare yourself in public as
married - introducing yourself as someone's husband or wife, for example, is
enough.  But being "common law" married, it's only "legally" - that is, if
one or both parties want to dissolve the marriage and don't want to exercise
their rights, they can just walk away from the marriage.

Texas is such a state.
-- 
Ed Carp, N7EKG			erc@apple.com			510/659-9560
                            an38299@anon.penet.fi
If you want magic, let go of your armor.  Magic is so much stronger than
steel!        -- Richard Bach, "The Bridge Across Forever"



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: khijol!erc (Ed Carp)
Date: Sat, 2 Oct 93 16:39:26 PDT
To: pmetzger@lehman.com
Subject: Re: PGP in FIDO
In-Reply-To: <9310022011.AA19354@snark.lehman.com>
Message-ID: <m0ojGEu-00022EC@khijol>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text


> By the idiotic logic the FIDO operators are using, the phone company
> could be siezed if two people have a conversation about a crime over
> the phone. The notion is, of course, absurd, and so is the stupid
> half-assed amateur lawyering the people who wrote the FIDO policies
> used.

You know, I wouldn't put it past some district attorneys to try... :( :(

If you use the phone to make a drug deal, well, bye-bye Pac Bell!!!  Hehehe...
-- 
Ed Carp, N7EKG			erc@apple.com			510/659-9560
                            an38299@anon.penet.fi
If you want magic, let go of your armor.  Magic is so much stronger than
steel!        -- Richard Bach, "The Bridge Across Forever"



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: khijol!erc (Ed Carp)
Date: Sat, 2 Oct 93 16:39:33 PDT
To: marc@MIT.EDU (Marc Horowitz)
Subject: Re: PGP in FIDO
In-Reply-To: <9310022001.AA11355@snorkelwacker.MIT.EDU>
Message-ID: <m0ojGFp-00022EC@khijol>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text


> I'm truly amazed.  Mike Godwin, who is a lawyer who *specializes* in
> this sort of thing, has rebuffed this statement several times, and
> given his phone number for interested BBS sysops to call him.   And
> yet, people continue to spew disbelief.
> 
> Of course, without real case law, Mike's opinion is still just that,
> but when some BBS sysop gets nailed by the ECPA, I'm gonna laugh.

Could someone post the relevent parts of this?  I'd like to upload this
to several BBS's out here...
-- 
Ed Carp, N7EKG			erc@apple.com			510/659-9560
                            an38299@anon.penet.fi
If you want magic, let go of your armor.  Magic is so much stronger than
steel!        -- Richard Bach, "The Bridge Across Forever"



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Perry E. Metzger" <pmetzger@lehman.com>
Date: Sat, 2 Oct 93 13:24:23 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: PGP in FIDO
In-Reply-To: <9310022001.AA11355@snorkelwacker.MIT.EDU>
Message-ID: <9310022023.AA19386@snark.lehman.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Marc Horowitz says:
> >> Anyway, the ECPA is basically irrelevant in the BBS world, as ....
> 
> I'm truly amazed.  Mike Godwin, who is a lawyer who *specializes* in
> this sort of thing, has rebuffed this statement several times, and
> given his phone number for interested BBS sysops to call him.   And
> yet, people continue to spew disbelief.
> 
> Of course, without real case law, Mike's opinion is still just that,
> but when some BBS sysop gets nailed by the ECPA, I'm gonna laugh.

I have half a mind to get a FIDO account, try to send a message the
sysop doesn't understand so he'll stop it, and then call the U.S.
Attorney's office.

Actually, I wouldn't ever do that -- my libertarian ethics stop me,
since there is no real contract to get private mail between me and the
operator, never mind how stupid what is is doing is. However, the law
is the law. Disagreeing with it or consciously deciding to violate it
is one thing, but smug amateur lawyering in which you pretend that it
isn't supposed to apply to you is another.

Perry




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: bobi@vswr.sps.mot.com (Bob Izenberg)
Date: Sat, 2 Oct 93 14:58:50 PDT
To: pmetzger@lehman.com
Subject: Re: PGP in FIDO
In-Reply-To: <9310022113.AA19467@snark.lehman.com>
Message-ID: <9310022150.AA12197@vswr.sps.mot.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text


Perry E. Metzger wrote:

# Mike Godwin will have to confirm this, but to my knowledge Common
# Carrier is NOT a status you have to apply for. UUNET operates as a
# common carrier and has never registered with anyone.

Well, we won't really know until the legal beagles deliver their opinions
(and perhaps not even then, if they disagree.)  What I wonder is, what does
the phrase "operates as a common carrier" mean?  Who has to grant you that
status before it has any meaning as a legal protection?

Bob
--
 ==============================================================================
   Bob Izenberg                                     voice phone: 512-891-8680
   Motorola RISC Software                               bobi@vswr.sps.mot.com
 ==============================================================================



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Perry E. Metzger" <pmetzger@lehman.com>
Date: Sat, 2 Oct 93 14:14:25 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: PGP in FIDO
In-Reply-To: <9310022109.AA16172@vswr.sps.mot.com>
Message-ID: <9310022113.AA19467@snark.lehman.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Bob Izenberg says:
> Perry E. Metzger wrote:
> 
> # They take NO risk. They are common carriers if they stop censoring
> # their mail.
> 
> Not long after I moved here, I had a discussion with a local lawyer
> on common carrier status.  Take my recollections for what they're
> worth after three years rattling around in the head of a
> non-attorney.  One doesn't become a common carrier by virtue of
> personal policy.  It's a label that must be applied for with the
> local communications regulatory authority (public utilities
> commission or what have you.) 

Mike Godwin will have to confirm this, but to my knowledge Common
Carrier is NOT a status you have to apply for. UUNET operates as a
common carrier and has never registered with anyone.

Perry




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Perry E. Metzger" <pmetzger@lehman.com>
Date: Sat, 2 Oct 93 15:08:49 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: PGP in FIDO
In-Reply-To: <9310022150.AA12197@vswr.sps.mot.com>
Message-ID: <9310022205.AA19553@snark.lehman.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Bob Izenberg says:
> Perry E. Metzger wrote:
> 
> # Mike Godwin will have to confirm this, but to my knowledge Common
> # Carrier is NOT a status you have to apply for. UUNET operates as a
> # common carrier and has never registered with anyone.
> 
> Well, we won't really know until the legal beagles deliver their opinions
> (and perhaps not even then, if they disagree.)  What I wonder is, what does
> the phrase "operates as a common carrier" mean?  Who has to grant you that
> status before it has any meaning as a legal protection?

Many sorts of status do not require that anyone GRANT you anything.
Lets say, for example, that you live in state that permits common law
marriage. In such a state, it is sufficient to think of yourself and
your S.O. as married, and behave in that manner -- at that point you
legally are married. (Note that common law marriages are now only
possible in a few state -- 9 I believe.)

As for what "common carrier" means, it means that the law recognizes
that you are a carrier of things, not a creator of them, and that you
are not responsible for what you carry. That means that the phone
company can transmit as many criminal phone conversations as it likes
without having its switches siezed.

In order to be a common carrier, you have to transmit all the messages
you receive without differentiating between them, paying attention to
what they are, or censoring them.

Perry




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: khijol!erc (Ed Carp)
Date: Sat, 2 Oct 93 19:08:50 PDT
To: pmetzger@lehman.com
Subject: Re: PGP in FIDO
In-Reply-To: <9310022344.AA19737@snark.lehman.com>
Message-ID: <m0ojInL-00022EC@khijol>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text


> Ed Carp says:
> > FYI, to be married in this way, you have to declare yourself in public as
> > married - introducing yourself as someone's husband or wife, for example, is
> > enough.  But being "common law" married, it's only "legally" - that is, if
> > one or both parties want to dissolve the marriage and don't want to exercise
> > their rights, they can just walk away from the marriage.
> 
> Untrue. Common law marriage is a real marriage in every single sense.
> There is no legal difference in states that recognize it. You need a
> real honest to god divorce in order to end one. Look it up if you
> don't believe me.

Not at all.  I *did* look it up.  Technically, you are correct - but that
marriage is recorded by no government agency, you won't find it in any
public records - hell, if you still file 'single' on your tax return, who's
going to know?  You can just walk away - and if your spouse agrees with
you, you *can*.  I'm not talking about 'what would do in court' - I'm
talking real life.

How do I know?  I'm an ex-cop.  I worked on one of those 'common law'
marriage cases.
-- 
Ed Carp, N7EKG			erc@apple.com			510/659-9560
                            an38299@anon.penet.fi
If you want magic, let go of your armor.  Magic is so much stronger than
steel!        -- Richard Bach, "The Bridge Across Forever"



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Mike Godwin <mnemonic@eff.org>
Date: Sat, 2 Oct 93 16:18:50 PDT
To: anonymous@extropia.wimsey.com
Subject: Re: PGP in FIDO
In-Reply-To: <199310021906.AA13098@xtropia>
Message-ID: <199310022314.AA02590@eff.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


 
anonymous writes:

> In that FIDOnet mail points (or individual BBSs) are not required to
> pass or accept encrypted FIDO traffic under FIDOnet rules, some run a
> specific program that scans for the "PGP MESSAGE" string and bumps it to
> a SECURENET mail hub (or, in some cases, _kills_ it).  It is not done by
> individual, personal inspection - at least not at mail hub level.
 
Absent waiver by users, this may still be an ECPA violation.

> Anyway, the ECPA is basically irrelevant in the BBS world, as 1] almost
> every BBS states at log-on that there is no such thing as truly
> "private" e-mail on the system as the sysop can, will and does see
> messages in all areas, and 2] he is personally _liable_ for any illegal
> activity on his BBS, so he can reasonably be expected to keep an eye on
> e-mail for anything that will put his ass in a sling.
 
Item (1) is the relevant item--if users agree to waive their ECPA rights,
there's no legal problem, although there may be ethical ones.

As for (2), well, there's no legal theory that says that a sysop is liable
for for any illegal activity on his BBS. The criminal law, in general,
does not make people liable for the conduct of others in the absence of
knowledge of that conduct.

Please, please don't make assertions about criminal liability based on
FIDO mythology.

> There has been a very heated war in FIDOland over PGP and other
> encryption.  Considering the risk that sysops take on by permitting
> secure (?) communication on their BBSs, I must say I admire their
> courage when they allow it and participate on SECURENET.

When you refer to the risk they're taking, could you be precise? What
statistics do you have that support the statement that FIDO sysops are at
risk if they allow encrypted communications? To my knowledge as a lawyer
who works in this area, no sysop has been held liable for allowing
encrypted communications on his or system.

 

--Mike






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Mike Godwin <mnemonic@eff.org>
Date: Sat, 2 Oct 93 16:28:51 PDT
To: marc@MIT.EDU (Marc Horowitz)
Subject: Re: PGP in FIDO
In-Reply-To: <9310022001.AA11355@snorkelwacker.MIT.EDU>
Message-ID: <199310022317.AA02609@eff.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


 
Marc writes:

> I'm truly amazed.  Mike Godwin, who is a lawyer who *specializes* in
> this sort of thing, has rebuffed this statement several times, and
> given his phone number for interested BBS sysops to call him.   And
> yet, people continue to spew disbelief.

One reason I gave out my number is to allow people to ask me specific
questions that refer to how they run their *specific* systems--it may be
that they're not risking ECPA liability, given the particular conditions
they're working under. 

But one think I think sysops need to realize is that ECPA is the *default*
setting.
 
> Of course, without real case law, Mike's opinion is still just that,
> but when some BBS sysop gets nailed by the ECPA, I'm gonna laugh.

On some of my interpretations of ECPA, reasonable lawyers may disagree,
but at this point most FIDO sysops who assert that ECPA doesn't apply
haven't read the statute.


--Mike






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Mike Godwin <mnemonic@eff.org>
Date: Sat, 2 Oct 93 16:24:26 PDT
To: pmetzger@lehman.com
Subject: Re: PGP in FIDO
In-Reply-To: <9310022011.AA19354@snark.lehman.com>
Message-ID: <199310022322.AA02641@eff.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


 
Perry writes:

> 1) The ECPA *DOES* apply to the BBSes whether they want it to or not.
>    All the hoping in the world doesn't make a statute go away. Merely
>    declaring that the ECPA doesn't apply to you doesn't work -- try
>    declaring the tax laws don't apply to you some time and see if that
>    works.

That said, it should be noted that sysops can contract with users for
users to waive their privacy rights under ECPA. But I think sysops should
do this *explicitly*, and should not justify doing so because of vague
perceptions of vaguely understood legal liability.

I also have to take exception to the statement by some people here that
sysops never allow private e-mail. I knew sysops who routinely did so when
I lived in Austin. But maybe Austin is more enlightened than the rest of
the country.

> 2) The BBS operators are NOT liable UNLESS they censor the mail. If
>    they censor the mail, they are liable for anything they fail to
>    censor. If they do not censor, they are common carriers, and have
>    no liability.
 
I wouldn't say this quite so strongly, but Perry has the gist of it right.
If you take on the duty of monitoring e-mail, you risk creating liability
for yourself if something problematic doesn't get censored. And the sysops
here generally admit that they don't real *all* e-mail.


--Mike






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Mike Godwin <mnemonic@eff.org>
Date: Sat, 2 Oct 93 16:38:50 PDT
To: bobi@pets.sps.mot.com
Subject: Re: PGP in FIDO
In-Reply-To: <9310022150.AA12197@vswr.sps.mot.com>
Message-ID: <199310022336.AA02791@eff.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



In my opinion, few if any BBSs qualify as common carriers. Common carriers
hold themselves out as accepting all goods or passengers (or, in the case
of communications, all messages) indifferently. I know of no sysop who
operates under such a policy, or who would want to. 

uunet, in contrast, probably does qualify as a common carrier.

My discussions of legal liability are not grounded in common-carrier law
(in which I'm not yet an expert) but in criminal law and tort law.


--Mike






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Perry E. Metzger" <pmetzger@lehman.com>
Date: Sat, 2 Oct 93 16:48:50 PDT
To: erc@apple.com
Subject: Re: PGP in FIDO
In-Reply-To: <m0ojGBH-00022EC@khijol>
Message-ID: <9310022344.AA19737@snark.lehman.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Ed Carp says:
> FYI, to be married in this way, you have to declare yourself in public as
> married - introducing yourself as someone's husband or wife, for example, is
> enough.  But being "common law" married, it's only "legally" - that is, if
> one or both parties want to dissolve the marriage and don't want to exercise
> their rights, they can just walk away from the marriage.

Untrue. Common law marriage is a real marriage in every single sense.
There is no legal difference in states that recognize it. You need a
real honest to god divorce in order to end one. Look it up if you
don't believe me.

Perry





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: doug@netcom.com (Doug Merritt)
Date: Sat, 2 Oct 93 20:14:27 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: PGP in FIDO
Message-ID: <9310030314.AA20581@netcom5.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


khijol!erc@uunet.UU.NET (Ed Carp) said:
>Not at all.  I *did* look it up.  Technically, you are correct - but that
>marriage is recorded by no government agency, you won't find it in any
>public records - hell, if you still file 'single' on your tax return, who's
>going to know?  You can just walk away - and if your spouse agrees with
>you, you *can*.  I'm not talking about 'what would do in court' - I'm
>talking real life.
>
>How do I know?  I'm an ex-cop.  I worked on one of those 'common law'
>marriage cases.

Practical experience is a good thing. However, you are neglecting something:
the case where your spouse doesn't agree. This is real life, and such
things do happen.

Your ex-common-law wife can retroactively file for alimony, or even for
getting hold of your property during divorce proceedings, and use
testimony from mutual acquaintances to establish that a common law
marriage had been in effect.

The details vary from state to state, but I would be surprised if it
were as few as 9 states. There also tends to be a time interval involved...
for instance, if you live together and apparently share a budget,
pooling resources, and other such things, for N years, then if that
can be established by witnesses, then you've got a common law marriage.

The point that if no one knows, what difference does it make?... is
a lot like the proverbial tree falling in the forest. The difference
is that, in real life, people *will* know if you lived with an SO for
many years in a relationship that resembled marriage, and they can 
and often will testify to that fact.

Having a baby during that period certainly helps nail down the legal
status, but is not required.

Introductions as husband and wife helps, but is not required.

"Technically correct" versus pragmatics is often just a matter of whether
one's ex-SO is vindictive enough and knowledgeable enough to nail you.

I am not a lawyer; the above is merely my lay understanding of laws,
and hence may be completely incorrect.

P.S. Let me guess, despite the length of time that this issue has been
kicked around here, I'll get nailed for posting something that's not
apropos to cypherpunks. So let me point out how it is apropos: privacy.
If no one knew about your 10 year live-in lover, you wouldn't be able to get
nailed on such an issue. I'll leave it as an exercise to the reader
to figure out how to use cryptography to ensure the secret. :-)

Cryptographic sex? Naw....
	Doug




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: anonymous@extropia.wimsey.com
Date: Sat, 2 Oct 93 21:28:51 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: PGP in Fidonet
Message-ID: <199310030409.AA15860@xtropia>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


 * Reply to msg originally in CYPHERPUNKS

 > You haven't been listening at all to Mr. Godwin, have you?

Frankly, no.  I have however followed this same endless debate among
lawyers in BBS_LAW, however, and (if I understand all parties correctly)
their assessment for the most part disagrees with the one you cite here.

 > 1) The ECPA *DOES* apply to the BBSes whether they want it to or not.

Perhaps we misunderstand each other; I do not mean, literally, that
"hobby BBSs are exempt from ECPA," but that the situations addressed are
generally avoided by sysop policies.  Let me make sure I understand your
point; are you saying that:

1]  On a privately-owned computer...
2]  Operating a noncommercial BBS without monetary compensation...
3]  On which a repeating log-on notice informs users that all messages
    are subject to sysop viewing...
4]  Sysop/sole owner viewing of non-public (as opposed to "private")
    messages during system maintenance or monitoring for unlawful
    activity...
5]  Is prosecutable under ECPA?  If so, has such a prosecution been
    successful?

 > 2) The BBS operators are NOT liable UNLESS they censor the mail. If
 > they censor the mail, they are liable for anything they fail to
 > censor. If they do not censor, they are common carriers, and have
 > no liability.

It is my understanding that noncommercial FIDOnet participants are not
in fact common carriers and that technical, legal common carrier status
requires more than simply ignoring e-mail.  I understand it also brings
more potential liabilities than FIDO can handle.

In any case, I am informed hobby sysops have been arrested and their
systems seized for allegedly illegal traffic on their systems of which
they claim to have had no knowledge.  I believe this is the case in the
CT case pending.  Even if these cases are eventually dismissed, the
legal expense and personal disruption to a private party (usually a
young person of very limited means) is catastrophic and without
practical recourse.

 -> There has been a very heated war in FIDOland over PGP and other
 -> encryption.  Considering the risk that sysops take on by permitting
 -> secure (?) communication on their BBSs,

 > They take NO risk. They are common carriers if they stop censoring
 > their mail. People don't seem to understand that the law on this is
 > very clear.

As I say, there seems to be a great deal more to legal "common carrier"
status than simply ignoring e-mail.  In FIDOdom common carrier status is
regarded as a much larger can of worms, with more potential problems and
liabilities for sysops than other options.

 > Actually, as I've just noted, you have not protected yourself. You
 > have opened yourself up for massive legal liability where you had none
 > before.

I believe you are confusing me with someone else.  I am not, nor would I
_ever_ be, a BBS sysop.  This thread gives a perfect example of why not.
As far as I can tell, it's purely a fool's errand:  Paying good money
and personal time and trouble to no better end than incurring grief and
liabilities with unpleasant, ungrateful and parasitic users, as well as
potential hassles with cops, lawyers and bureaucrats.

There's zero payback here; BBS sysops are crazy.

Direct followup to FIDOnet BBS_LAW.






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: bobi@vswr.sps.mot.com (Bob Izenberg)
Date: Sat, 2 Oct 93 19:18:50 PDT
To: pmetzger@lehman.com
Subject: Re: PGP in FIDO
In-Reply-To: <9310022205.AA19553@snark.lehman.com>
Message-ID: <9310030213.AA12552@vswr.sps.mot.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text


Perry E. Metzger wrote:

# As for what "common carrier" means, it means that the law recognizes
# that you are a carrier of things, not a creator of them, and that you
# are not responsible for what you carry.

I've got that part, but what needs to be done / provided before the
benefits of being a common carrier can be claimed?

Bob
--
 ==============================================================================
   Bob Izenberg                                     voice phone: 512-891-8680
   Motorola RISC Software                               bobi@vswr.sps.mot.com
 ==============================================================================



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: doug@netcom.com (Doug Merritt)
Date: Sat, 2 Oct 93 21:44:27 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Ultimate privacy/security
In-Reply-To: <marc@MIT.EDU>
Message-ID: <9310030441.AA03513@netcom5.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Email conversations have made me realize that I didn't sufficiently
explain an important aspect of this hypothetical algorithm.

I understand that there are times that privacy, and authentication
schemes that aim at establishing unique identity for the purpose of
guaranteeing privacy, are an end in themselves.

The speculative algorithm I mentioned, which would authenticate intentions
and goals and such, was intended only to address situations where
authentication of identity for privacy was a means to an end, not
an end in itself.

In situations where only privacy and authentication of individual
identity of such will do, for arbitrary reasons as opposed to functional
reasons, I've nothing to say (for the moment. ;-)

But in situations where there is a *functional* reason to authenticate
identity, then and only then do I propose to consider a hypothetical
algorithm in which goals and/or motivations and/or philosophy and/or
ethics and/or etc is called in to play.

Thanks for all the responses and feedback to date.
        Doug




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: hiscdcj@lux.latrobe.edu.au (Dwayne)
Date: Sat, 2 Oct 93 04:54:19 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: POISON PILL :-)
In-Reply-To: <9310011727.AA01395@netcom.netcom.com>
Message-ID: <9310021150.AA03263@lux.latrobe.edu.au>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


In <9310011727.AA01395@netcom.netcom.com> msattler@netcom.com (Michael Sattler) writes:
>>
>>I have Australian Defence Security Clearance stickers on my computer,
>>they are so cool, these little yellow and red stickers that authorise
>>the computer for secure use (and something else I can't remember).

>Any chance of getting a few sent to me in San Francisco?

And perhaps me in Melbourne?   :-)

Dwayne




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Mike Ingle <MIKEINGLE@delphi.com>
Date: Sat, 2 Oct 93 21:04:28 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: ITAR: Business?
Message-ID: <01H3NM64Z30Y91Y2B6@delphi.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Registration and exemptions:
 122.1 -- Registration requirements. 
   (a) Any person who engages in the United States in the business of either
   manufacturing or exporting defense articles or furnishing defense
   services is required to register with the Office of Defense Trade
   Controls. Manufacturers who do not engage in exporting must nevertheless
   register. 

   (4) Persons who engage only in the fabrication of articles for
   experimental or scientific purpose, including research and development.

What definition of business do they use? Usually business refers to
something involving money changing hands. This might be another
way around ITAR, at least for domestic registration. Providing free
copies of crypto software would not seem to be "engaging in a business".

P.S. Heard on the news about how Syria is flooding us with near-perfect
counterfeit $100's? Complete with magnetic ink and security strip. Treasury
is scared green, and the CIA is helping to stop it. We need digicash now! 




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: an12070@anon.penet.fi (S. Boxx)
Date: Sat, 2 Oct 93 17:34:26 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: FIDOnet troglodyte MIND RAPISTS _unrepentant_!
Message-ID: <9310030030.AA20202@anon.penet.fi>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Perry Metzger writes:

>The depths of human folly never cease to amaze me. This case is as if
>a group of bankers, deciding that they were scared that they might be
>held liable if one of their clients were a drug dealer (which they
>aren't) decides to embezzle all the client accounts instead to "keep
>themselves safe".

nah. I propose we call 'em TROGLODYTE MIND RAPISTS.

please cut out the following message and send it to every FIDONET operator
in existence. also, try comp.org.fidonet. moderation complicates the
posting.

===


Subject: STOP THE TROGLODYTE FIDONET MIND-RAPISTS *NOW*!


does routine FIDOnet email INVASION by operators VIOLATE the U.S. 
Electronic Communications Privacy Act? EFF's lawyer M. Godwin speaks
with FIDOnet operator Al Billings <mimir@u.washington.edu> on the 
cypherpunks mailing list. Resident list crank Perry Metzger offers
his own whitehot flame.

this forward brought to you by

cypherpunks
Cyberspatial Reality Advancement Movement (CRAM)
Information Liberation Front (ILF)
Blacknet


===

From: Mike Godwin <mnemonic@eff.org>
Subject: Re: FIDOnet encryption (or lack thereof)
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Date: Fri, 1 Oct 1993 16:40:09 -0400 (EDT)
 
Al Billings writes:

> On Thu, 30 Sep 1993, Mike Godwin wrote:
> > 
> > My question is this: how does he know that the mail is encrypted if he's
> > not examining the mail that passes through his system? If he *is*
> > examining the mail that passes through his system, it seems likely that he
> > is violating the Electronic Communications Privacy Act.
> 
>  Only if he has stated that he allows private mail. Most sysops have
> specifically worded policy statements for their systems that say that the
> sysop can read any and all messages on the system and may do so at any
> time.

That's all very nice, but it doesn't enable a FIDO sysop to intercept
messages from people who are not users of his or her particular system.
Those people did not waive their rights to privacy under the ECPA.

> Bulletin boards do not normally offer truely private mail because of
> some of the legal implications.

This is a common myth. First of all, there are many BBSs that do
offer truly private mail, or whose sysops, as a matter of policy, do not
read others' private mail. Secondly, there's no legal liability associated
with allowing e-mail privacy. Third, federal law (the ECPA) bars
sysops from examining mail except under some very precisely defined
circumstances.

I suggest that you inform sysops who tell you otherwise that they can
contact me at the Legal Services Department of EFF. You've got my e-mail
address already--my phone number is 202-347-5400.


-------------------------------------------------------------------------
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Due to the double-blind, any mail replies to this message will be anonymized,
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Please report any problems, inappropriate use etc. to admin@anon.penet.fi.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Mike Ingle <MIKEINGLE@delphi.com>
Date: Sat, 2 Oct 93 21:38:51 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Offline Digicash ?
Message-ID: <01H3NNHIHQGI90ONDC@delphi.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


According to the Chaum-protocol description on chaos.bsu.edu, this is an
online system - both parties must talk to the bank before a transaction is
concluded. Are there any true offline systems? i.e. I can send you an email
which is worth money, with no third parties involved, and there is no audit
trail or means of tracing.

The main problem is that there is no digital "coin" or object which can
be passed around but not duplicated. Other than the bank method, I've read
about an "observer" chip which keeps you honest, but the design of the chip
would have to be secret, or at least the chip would have to know a secret
(i.e. a key) which it would never tell you. If you could extract the key,
you could write a "cheater". Shades of Clipper.

Is there a system which allows anonymity and at the same time prevents
people from double-spending their cash? How does it work?

--- MikeIngle@delphi.com




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: an12070@anon.penet.fi (S. Boxx)
Date: Sat, 2 Oct 93 17:44:26 PDT
To: talk.politics.crypto@anon.penet.fi
Subject: Zimmermann's PGP: "A Cure for the Common Code"
Message-ID: <9310030043.AA22045@anon.penet.fi>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Denver Westword, Vol. 17 Number 5, Sept. 29 1993

Cover Story:

Secrets Agent

The Government wants to break him, but Boulder's prince of privacy
remains cryptic.


Contents:

A Cure for the Common Code, p.12
Worried about your privacy? Your secret is safe with this guy.


This post brought to you by

Information Liberation Front (ILF)
Cyberspatial Reality Advancement Movement (CRAM)
BlackNet
cypherpunks


===

Late last month, much to the satisfaction of sheriff's deputies in
Sacramento County, California, William Steen began serving 68 months in
prison for trafficking in child pornography over computers and then
attempting to hire a man to kill one of the teenagers who had testified
against him. Detectives who worked on the case say the sentence
represents an almost entirely gratifying end to the two-year-old effort
to track down and convict Steen.

The prosecution was not quite perfect, though. Police were unable to
nail any of Steen's network of child porn associates, which officials
suspect was extensive.  Neither were Sacramento County law enforcement
officers-- nor outside computer experts, for that matter-- able to read
Steen's computer diary, which police think may contain the names of his
other teenage victims.

The reason is that Steen, of Santa Clara, California, had installed a
powerful code on his computer to electronically scramble what he had
written.  Although experts were quickly able to determine the name of
the encoding program-- called Pretty Good Privacy, or PGP-- efforts to
break it failed miserably.  "The task was given to us to decrypt this
stuff," recalls William Sternow, a California computer-crime expert
called in on the case. "And to this day we have not been able to do it."

Sternow and the other experts-- including the Los Angeles Police
Department, which tired to dismantle PGP as well-- probably shouldn't
hold their breaths waiting for a breakthrough. It is unlikely that they
will crack Steen's diaries anytime soon, probably not in their
lifetimes.

Forget your cereal-box decoder rings. Pretty Good Privacy, a computer
program designed by a short, slightly round Boulder programmer named
Philip Zimmermann, is, as far as the current technology is concerned,
about as accessible as Fort Knox.

While PGP has frustrated the California cops, it has done wonders for
its inventor's reputation among a thriving underground network of
electronic cowboys. In the two years since he published Pretty Good
Privacy, the program has propelled Zimmermann from a struggling Colorado
software author missing mortgage payments to something of a folk hero
among hackers, both in the U.S. and across the world, where the program
has been translated into nearly a dozen languages. "I can go anywhere in
Europe," boasts Zimmermann, "and not have to buy lunch."

Not everyone wants to feed Phil Zimmermann. Count among his enemies the
U.S. Customs Service, which is investigating him for violating export
laws.  Add RSA DAta Security, a Redwood City, California, company that
says it is considering taking him to court for swiping its encoding
technology. And of course, top off the list with any number of
frustrated law enforcement agencies, from the supersecret National
Security Agency (NSA) all the way down to the Sacramento sheriff's
department.

"Phil Zimmermann? He's a dirtbag," spits out Brian Kennedy, the
detective who headed up the Steen investigation. "He's an irresponsible
person who takes credit for his invention without taking responsibility
for its effect. He's protected people who are preying on children. I
hope that someday he'll get what he deserves."

===

What Phil Zimmermann deserves more than anything this gray morning is a
few more hours of sleep. "I was up until four this morning working on
the computer," he grumbles with not-very-well-disguised irritation.
"Give me 45 minutes to become human."

One hour later, this is what Phil Zimmermann looks like, human: a short
guy, a little paunchy. He wears large aviator glasses, a heavy beard and
an easy elfin grin. Today he is also wearing beige pants, a green shirt,
and blue Etonic sneakers. Although separately none of the parts looks
askew, for some reason the package still looks rumpled.

His living room feels small and is crammed with books, a respectable
percentage of which are bona fide, Noam Chomsky-certified leftist
tracts.  The back room of the north Boulder house serves as Zimmermann's
computer lab. Three machines are on-line. Outside light is denied
entrance by shaded windows. Books and magazines-- _The_ _Journal_ _of_
_Cryptology_-- carpet the floor in no discernible order.

In the southwest corner of the room lies a small mattress, where for the
past several days a Toronto college student has slept.  The student,
whose name is Colin Plumb, learned about the Boulder programmer about a
year ago after plucking PGP off a computer network. He composed a letter
to Zimmermann expressing admiration for the encrypting software, one of
the thousands of pieces of fan mail that have poured into Zimmermann's
mailbox and computer since June 1991, when PGP was first published.

Now Plumb is here for two weeks as a volunteer assistant, helping
Zimmermann update Pretty Good Privacy. He is not the first admirer to
make the hajj to Boulder. "I get people here all the time," says
Zimmermann. "A month ago I got a visit from a guy from Brazil. He used
PGP back in Rio de Janeiro, and he was touring the country and he wanted
to meet the guy who invented it."

Zimmermann continues: "I get mail from people in the Eastern Bloc saying
how much they appreciate PGP-- you know, 'Thanks for doing it.' When I'm
talking to Americans about this, a lot of them don't understand why I'd
be so paranoid about the government. But people in police states, you
don't have to explain it to them. They already get it. And they don't
understand why we don't."

What we don't understand, at least according to an explanation of Pretty
Good Privacy that accompanies the software, is this: "You may be
planning a political campaign, discussing your taxes, or having an
illicit affair. Or you may be doing something that you feel shouldn't be
illegal, but is. Whatever it is, you don't want your private electronic
mail or confidential documents read by anyone else. There's nothing
wrong with asserting your privacy. Privacy is as apple-pie as the
Constitution."

Simple stuff, But Zimmermann and PGP have done more than provide an
electronic cloak for the steamy computer messages of a few straying
husbands. In fact, the publication of Pretty Good Privacy has probably
done more than any other single event to shove the arcane-- and, until
recently, almost exclusively government-controlled-- science and art of
cryptology into the public consciousness.

Much of that is inevitable. The explosion of electronic mail and other
computer messaging systems begs a megabyte of privacy questions. While a
1986 federal law prevents people from snooping into computer mail
without legal authorization, the fact remains that electronic
eavesdropping is relatively simple to do.

To an experienced hacker, unprotected computer communications are like
so many postcards, free for the reading. Encryption systems simply put
those postcards inside secure electronic envelopes. This may sound
innocuous. But it is highly distressing to those branches of the
government that say they occasionally need to listen in to what citizens
are saying.

In recent public debates in Congress and in private meetings,
representatives of the FBI and the NSA have argued vigorously that they
need high-tech tools to provide for the public and national security.
They contend that this includes the capability to read any and all
encoded messages that whip across the ether. To these computocops,
widely available encryption in general-- and specifically, PGP-- is
dangers.

"PGP," warns Dorothy Denning, a Georgetown University professor who has
worked closely with the National Security Agency, "could potentially
become a widespread problem."

To those who increasingly rely on the swelling network of computer
superhighways to send, receive, and store everything from business memos
to medical records to political mailing lists, however, the idea of a
CIA spook or sheriff's department flunky listening in to their
conversations and peeking at their mail is chilling. They fear that
without basic privacy protection, the promise of the Information Age
also carries with it the unprecedented threat of an electronic Big
Brother more powerful than anything ever imagined by George Orwell.

===

When Phil Zimmermann moved to Boulder from Florida in 1978, he had every
intention of earning a master's degree in computer science. Instead he
went to work for a local software company. And he began fighting the
good fight against big bombs.

"In the early 1980s it looked like things were going to go badly," he
recalls. "There was talk of the Evil Empire. Reagan was going berserk
with the military budget. Things looked pretty hopeless. So my wife and
I began preparing to move to New Zealand. By 1982 we had our passports
and traveling papers. That year, though, the national nuclear freeze
campaign had their conference in Denver. We attended, and by the time
the conference was over we'd decided to stay and fight."

He attended meetings. He gave speeches. He marched on nuclear test sites
in Nevada. ("I've been in jail with Carl Sagan and Daniel Ellsberg," he
says. "Daniel Ellsberg twice.") He taught a course out of the Boulder
Teacher' Catalogue called "Get Smart on the Arms Race." ("The class is
not anti-U.S.; it is anti-war," a course summary in the 1986 catalogue
explains."

In the snatches of free time between nuke battles, Zimmermann continued
feeding a lifelong fascination with secret codes. "I've always been
interested in cryptology, ever since I was a kid," he says. "I read
_Codes_ _and_ _Secret_ _Writings_ by Herbert Zimm, which showed you how
to make invisible ink out of lemon juice. It was pretty cool."

"When I got to college I discovered that you could use computers to
encode things. I started writing codes, and I thought they were so cool
and impossible to break. I know they were trivial and extremely easy to
break."

For Zimmermann, who is 39 years old, writing and breaking codes had
always been just a hobby, albeit an increasingly intensive one. Up until
1976, that is, when his hobby became an obsession that would absorb the
next fifteen years of his life. That's because, like everyone else who
had been dabbling in encryption at the time, Phil Zimmermann was swept
away by the revolutionary concept of public-key cryptography and the RSA
algorithms.

===

Secret codes have been used for thousands of years, but they have always
operated on the same principle: The words or letters of the message to
be encoded-- called the "plaintext"-- are replaced by other words,
letters, numbers and symbols. These are then shuffled, rendering the
communication incomprehensible.

As spies and other secretive sorts began to use computers, the basic
idea remained the same. But the substitution and shuffling became
increasingly complex. (Just how complex is difficult to grasp. This
summer a panel of experts met to evaluate the NSA's most recent
encryption system. They concluded that it would take a Cray
supercomputer 400 billion years of continuous operation to exhaust all
the possible substitutions.)

Yet even with the most scrambled substitutions, encryption always
suffered from a glaring weakness: A code is only as secure as the
channel over which it travels. What this has meant practically is that
messages-- whether flown by pigeon or broadcast over a shortwave-- could
always be intercepted by the enemy.

This was particularly dangerous when it came time to share the code's
"key."  Traditionally, codes were always encrypted by a key that would
garble, say, plain English into unreadable gobbledygook. The encoded
message would then be sent to the recipient, who would use the same key
to translate the message back into English.

The problem with this, of course, is: How do you get the key from one
place to another without danger of its being intercepted? After all,
once a key is swiped by the bad guys, the entire code is rendered
useless. Worse yet, what if you had no idea the key had been stolen, and
your enemies continued to freely read messages you thought were
protected? This is especially troublesome when you're trying to
maintain a large network of secret sharers.

Surprisingly, this ancient glitch was not cleared up until the spring of
1975. That's when a Stanford computer junkie named Whitfield Diffie
created a crypto-revolution called public-key cryptology, a system
simple in theory-- but complicated in practice-- that effectively solved
the problem of key sharing.

What Diffie did was imagine a system with two mathematically related
keys, one public and one private. The public key could be as public as a
published address. The private key would not be shared with anyone.  The
connection was that a message encoded with one key could be decoded by
the other. 

To understand how this works, imagine the keys as public and private
telephone numbers. The sender garbles a message with the receiver's
public key, obtained from the computer equivalent of a phone book. Once
sent, the only way the message can be decoded is with the receiver's
mathematically related private key.

Since each receiver has his own private key, no one has to share keys,
and there is no danger of having the solution to the code intercepted.
Equally important, each encoded message could bear the unique signature
of its sender. (The sender encodes the message with his private key. The
receiver affirms the message's authenticity by using the sender's
mathematically related public key to unscramble the communication.) This
eliminates the potential for some meddling third part to send a false
message.

Diffie's idea of two keys instead of one ignited a bomb among the
burgeoning community of computer hackers and academic math types, who
immediately began toying with public-key encryption. Not surprisingly,
it didn't take long for the theory to be applied to real-life
codemaking.

In 1977 three MIT scientists named Ronald Rivest, Adi Shamir and Leonard
Adelman constructed a series of algorithms, or mathematical
instructions, that put Diffie's idea into practice. The three men named
their public-key encryption system RSA, after their initials. They
patented the algorithms and formed a company, RSA Data Security.

Today the company practically enjoys a monopoly on public-key
encryption. It puts out an eye-catching advertising pamphlet ("RSA.
BEcause some things are better left unread." and sells millions of
dollars' worth of encoding packages (one example: BSAFE 2.0).

RSA's president is D. James Bidzos. He is not lining up to buy lunch for
Phil Zimmermann. In fact, he claims that Zimmermann is little more than
a poseur whose only real contribution to cryptology was to swipe RSA's
technology.

"Phil seems very eager to let people believe what he wants them to
believe," complains Bidzos. "He like to perpetuate the idea of his being
a folk hero."

===

Phil Zimmermann says that while he became fascinated with public-key
encryption in the mid-1970s, he didn't begin seriously contemplating
designing a useful application until 1984, when he was researching an
article about the subject for a technical magazine. In 1986 he began
fiddling with the RSA algorithms-- what he describes as "RSA in a petri
dish." He says he enjoyed some mathematical successes, but that his
work was still a far cry from any program that could be used to encode
information."

After dabbling in crypto-math and computers for four years, Zimmermann
decided at the end of 1990 to construct a workable encoding package. In
December, he says, he began working twelve-hour days exclusively on what
was to become pretty Good Privacy. The work took its toll-- he neglected
his software consulting business and missed five payments on his house--
 but by the middle of 1991, the program was ready to go.

In June Pretty Good Privacy was released over the Internet as software
free for the taking. It was faster and simpler to use than other public-
key encryption programs on the market, and the price was right. The
feedback was almost instantaneous. Thousands of people quickly
downloaded PGP and began using it to encrypt their own messages.

Although PGP didn't contribute a lot to the theory of encryption, it did
make cryptology usable and available to the average computer jock, says
David Banisar, an analyst for the nonprofit Computer Professionals for
Social REsponsibility in Washington, D.C. "Phil didn't invent the
engine," he says, "but he did fit it inside the Ford."

Indeed, the father of public-key cryptology himself says Zimmermann's
proletarian privacy program is the closest thing yet to what he had in
mind when he invented public-key encryption nearly two decades ago-- a
nongovernment encoding system that would give the average computer user
the means to communicate without fear.

"PGP has done a good deal for the practice of cryptology," says
Whitfield Diffie, who now works for Sun Microsystems near San Francisco.
"It's close to my heart because it's close to my original objectives."

In perhaps the greatest testimony to Zimmermann's program, even those
who condemn the programmer for irresponsibly releasing PGP continue to
use his software. "It's a great program," concedes Sacramento computer
expert Sternow. "We recommend in our training to cops that they use it
to encrypt their stuff." Sternow estimates that more than 500 law
enforcement officers currently use PGP.

PGP also spurred a loose-knit California-based group of computer users
with a passion for cryptology to form a new organization to carry the
torch. The group, whose members call themselves the Cypherpunks,
espouses an unabashed libertarian philosophy when it comes to electronic
privacy-- specifically, that privacy is far too crucial a civil right
to be left to the governments of the world, and that the best way to
head off government control of cryptology is to spread the capability to
shroud messages to everyone.

"Phil showed that an ordinary guy just reading the papers that already
existed could put together an encryption system that the Nation Security
Agency could break," says John Gilmore, one of three founders o the
Silicon Valley-based Cypherpunks. "It took a certain amount of bravery
to put this out, because at the time the government was talking about
restrictions on cryptography."

James Bidzos failed to see Zimmermann's courage, however. In fact, all
he saw was theft. after concluding that Pretty Good Privacy was based on
RSA's patented algorithms, he placed a call to Boulder. Basically," he
recalls, "we said, 'What the fuck?' "

Bidzos also contends that Zimmermann hardly wrote the program out of
altruism, even through Pretty Good Privacy is technically free.  "The
documentation he distributes with PGP is misleading," he says. "It does
give the impression that Zimmermann is a hero hell-bent on saving you
from the evil government and an evil corporation. Gee, strike a blow for
freedom."

Yet, Bidzos continues, "he did this with every intention of making
money. It was clearly to make money, no doubt about it. He told me just
before he released it, 'Hey, I've been working on it for six years, I've
put my whole life into it, I'm behind on my mortgage payments and I need
to get something out of it."

Bidzos says he approached Zimmermann again several months later after
PGP was published and it was clear the free privacy program was not
going to go away anytime soon. "We told him that if he stopped
distributing PGP, we wouldn't sue, and he signed an agreement," Bidzos
recalls. "He was very quick to sign it. But he's been violating the
agreement ever since he signed it."

Zimmermann replies that at one time he did entertain the idea of making
some money off PGP. But he insists he gave that up before the software
package was published.

"I decided to give PGP away in the interests of changing society, which
it is now doing," he says. "The whole reason I got involved was
politics. I did not miss mortgage payments in the hopes of getting rich.
Just look at my bookshelf. I'm a politically committed person with a
history of political activism."

Zimmermann adds he's uncertain whether he's violated any of RSA's
patents, but he contends that if he did, the law doesn't make much sense
to him. "I respect copyrights," he says. "But what we're talking about
there is a patent on a math formula. It's like Isaac Newton patenting
Force = Mass x Acceleration. You'd have to pay royalty every time you
threw a baseball."

He also acknowledges that he signed a nondistribution agreement with RSA
Data Security for Pretty Good Privacy. But he insists that the has
abided by it-- although admittedly only in the strictest legal sense.
For example, while Zimmermann says he doesn't update or distribute PGP
himself, he concedes that he freely gives direction to a worldwide
"cadre of volunteers," who then implement the advice.

The legal problems stemming from Zimmermann's invention don't end with
James Bidzos and RSA. In February two agents from the U.S. Customs
Service flew to Boulder to meet with Zimmermann and his lawyer, Phil
Dubois, According to Dubois, the two agents said they were investigating
how PGP had found its way overseas, a violation of U.S. law forbidding
the export of encryption systems.

Contacted at their San Jose office, the agents declined to comment on
the investigation. Yet there is little doubt as to the agency's intent.
On September 14, Leonard Mikus, the president of ViaCrypt, and Arizona
company that recently signed a deal with Zimmermann to distribute a PGP-
like encryption package, received a grand jury subpoena asking him to
turn over the U.S. Attorney's office any documents related to PGP and
Phil Zimmermann.

Two days later the Austin, Texas, publisher of "Moby Crypto," a software
encryption collection that includes PGP on it, received a similar
subpoena. The subpoena demanded that the company, Austin Codeworks, turn
overall documents related to the international distribution of "Moby
Crypto," as well as "any other commercial product related to PGP."

The San Jose-based assistant U.S. attorney who signed the subpoenas,
William Keane, acknowledges only that since subpoenas have been issued,
a federal grand jury investigation is in process. Beyond that, he says,
"I can't comment on the investigation."

Zimmermann acknowledges that with thousands of people copying and
distributing PGP, it was inevitable the program would make its way to
Europe and Asia. But he adds that he had nothing to do with exporting
Pretty Good Privacy-- and says he couldn't have prevented it if he
tried. "When thousands and thousands of people have access to it, how
could it not be exported?" he asks.

Adds Dubois: "The law just can't keep up with the technology. Somebody
in Palo Alto learns something, and pretty soon somebody in Moscow is
going to know about the same thing. There's nothing you can do about
it."

===

No that the U.S. government hasn't made a very serious effort to do
something about the spread of unofficial encryption systems. Indeed,
until very recently, governments have enjoyed what amounted to an
exclusive franchise for the science of codes and codebreaking. Advances
have been made in fits and starts, with much activity occurring during
times of national tension and war. In that past forty years,
Washington's attraction to encryption has been kept humming by the spy-
fest of the Cold War.

Because the government has always controlled the medium of codes, it has
controlled the message as well. In _The_ _Codebreakers_, a 1967 book
widely considered the definitive history of cryptology, David Kahn wrote
that the U.S. government hasn't been shy about exercising censorship and
grand-scale privacy invasions in the name of breaking enemy codes,
perceived or real.

Fearful of encoded messages slipping to and from traitors, for instance,
the U.S. government by the end of World War II had constructed a
censorship office that employed nearly 15,000 people and occupied 90
building throughout the country. These censors open a million pieces of
versus mail a day, listened in on telephone conversations and cast a
suspicious eye on movies and magazine articles that flooded across their
desks.

The code watchdogs were not content simply with intercepting and
examining communications, though. Officials also found reason to ban
some communications even before they could be written. Incomplete
crossword puzzles were pulled from letters in case their answers
contained some secret code. Chess games by mail were stopped for fear
they concealed directions to spies. Knitting instructions, who numbers
might hide some security-threatening message, were intercepted.

The government's interest in controlling secret codes did not evaporate
with the end of World War II, or even with the thawing of the Cold War.
RSA Data Security's Bidzos says the inventors of the RSA algorithms were
approached by the NSA in the mid-1970s and discouraged from publishing
their discovery. And Washington still classifies encoding systems as
munitions, right alongside tanks and missiles. As a result, the export
of any encryption system is against the law, considered a breach of the
national security.

As technology has surged forward, lawmakers have tried to maintain a
grip on encryption through legislation. In 1991 a  version of the U.S.
Senate's Omnibus Crime Bill contained a provision that would have
effectively mandated that any private encoding system contain a "back
door" that law enforcement agencies could enter if they suspected any
misdeeds by the sender or receiver of a message. The clause was pulled
after an uproar from computer users, data security companies and civil
liberty organizations.

Despite the failure of the 1991 bill (as well as a 1992 FBI-sponsored
version that would have outlawed the use of tap-proof cryptology over
digital phone systems), the government has not given up on its attempt
to control encryption. Rather, it has simply shifted strategy.

Six months ago the Clinton administration announced plans to flood the
market with the government's own public-key electronic voice-encoding
system, called, alternative, "Clipper" or "Skipjack". The catch: An as-
yet unnamed federal agency or agencies would hold the private keys in
case any legally appropriate eavesdropping was necessary.

The administration has stopped short of saying it will outlaw private
encoding devices and mandate the use of the new Clipper system. "The
standard would be voluntary," assures Jan Kosko, a spokeswoman for the
National Institute of Standards and Technology in Maryland, which teamed
up with the NSA to develop the system.

That said, officials acknowledge that the federal government will smile
on those companies that choose Clipper over other, private encryption
systems.  If, for example, a private company is seeking to do business
with a federal government agency requiring encoding, that company would
be well advised to use Clipper if it wants to win contracts. "A
manufacture not using it," Kosko points out, "could not compete very
well" for federal contracts.

On the same day the administration revealed its intention  to implement
Clipper, AT&T announced it would use the system in its new secure-
telephone product line, thereby becoming the first company to agree to
spread the government's encryption throughout the country.

And, while AT&T will continue to sell other, non-government-approved
encoding devices for its phones, the new Clipper model will sell for
less than half the price of AT&T's in-house encryption model, according
to David Arneke, a spokesman for the company's Secure Communications
System division in North Carolina. He says the first models-- which
with a price tag of $1,200 will appeal mostly to law enforcement
agencies and businesses hoping to keep their industrial secrets secret--
 should hit the shelves by the end of the year.

-------------------------------------------------------------------------
To find out more about the anon service, send mail to help@anon.penet.fi.
Due to the double-blind, any mail replies to this message will be anonymized,
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From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Al Billings <mimir@u.washington.edu>
Date: Sun, 3 Oct 93 01:04:29 PDT
To: Marc Horowitz <marc@MIT.EDU>
Subject: Re: PGP in FIDO
In-Reply-To: <9310022001.AA11355@snorkelwacker.MIT.EDU>
Message-ID: <Pine.3.05z.9310030102.A11917-a100000@carson.u.washington.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain




On Sat, 2 Oct 1993, Marc Horowitz wrote:

> >> Anyway, the ECPA is basically irrelevant in the BBS world, as ....
> 
> I'm truly amazed.  Mike Godwin, who is a lawyer who *specializes* in
> this sort of thing, has rebuffed this statement several times, and
> given his phone number for interested BBS sysops to call him.   And
> yet, people continue to spew disbelief.
> 
> Of course, without real case law, Mike's opinion is still just that,
> but when some BBS sysop gets nailed by the ECPA, I'm gonna laugh.

 Hasn't happened yet and the ECPA was passed in what? 1986? I really doubt
if a BBS sysop is going to get nailed over someone's view of e-mail on
their system.







From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Al Billings <mimir@u.washington.edu>
Date: Sun, 3 Oct 93 01:28:51 PDT
To: "S. Boxx" <an12070@anon.penet.fi>
Subject: Re: FIDOnet troglodyte MIND RAPISTS _unrepentant_!
In-Reply-To: <9310030030.AA20202@anon.penet.fi>
Message-ID: <Pine.3.05z.9310030124.A11917-a100000@carson.u.washington.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



On Sun, 3 Oct 1993, S. Boxx wrote:

> please cut out the following message and send it to every FIDONET operator
> in existence. also, try comp.org.fidonet. moderation complicates the
> posting.
> 
> ===
> 
> 
> Subject: STOP THE TROGLODYTE FIDONET MIND-RAPISTS *NOW*!
> 
> 
> does routine FIDOnet email INVASION by operators VIOLATE the U.S. 
> Electronic Communications Privacy Act? EFF's lawyer M. Godwin speaks
> with FIDOnet operator Al Billings <mimir@u.washington.edu> on the 
> cypherpunks mailing list. Resident list crank Perry Metzger offers
> his own whitehot flame.

 Oh great. I can see my mailbox filling as soon as this makes Fidonews.
Thanks, guys.







From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: an12070@anon.penet.fi (S. Boxx)
Date: Sat, 2 Oct 93 18:34:26 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: troglodyte MIND RAPIST flames, take II
Message-ID: <9310030132.AA28944@anon.penet.fi>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



anon.penet.fi cut my message. now I know how Infocalypse feels.

send this EVERYWHERE in cyberspace it might make a difference.


===


Subject: STOP THE TROGLODYTE FIDONET MIND-RAPISTS *NOW*!


does routine FIDOnet email INVASION by operators VIOLATE the U.S. 
Electronic Communications Privacy Act? EFF's lawyer M. Godwin speaks
with FIDOnet operator Al Billings <mimir@u.washington.edu> on the 
cypherpunks mailing list. Resident list crank Perry Metzger offers
his own whitehot flame.

this forward brought to you by

cypherpunks
Cyberspatial Reality Advancement Movement (CRAM)
Information Liberation Front (ILF)
Blacknet


===

From: Mike Godwin <mnemonic@eff.org>
Subject: Re: FIDOnet encryption (or lack thereof)
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Date: Fri, 1 Oct 1993 16:40:09 -0400 (EDT)
 
Al Billings writes:

> On Thu, 30 Sep 1993, Mike Godwin wrote:
> > 
> > My question is this: how does he know that the mail is encrypted if he's
> > not examining the mail that passes through his system? If he *is*
> > examining the mail that passes through his system, it seems likely that he
> > is violating the Electronic Communications Privacy Act.
> 
>  Only if he has stated that he allows private mail. Most sysops have
> specifically worded policy statements for their systems that say that the
> sysop can read any and all messages on the system and may do so at any
> time.

That's all very nice, but it doesn't enable a FIDO sysop to intercept
messages from people who are not users of his or her particular system.
Those people did not waive their rights to privacy under the ECPA.

> Bulletin boards do not normally offer truely private mail because of
> some of the legal implications.

This is a common myth. First of all, there are many BBSs that do
offer truly private mail, or whose sysops, as a matter of policy, do not
read others' private mail. Secondly, there's no legal liability associated
with allowing e-mail privacy. Third, federal law (the ECPA) bars
sysops from examining mail except under some very precisely defined
circumstances.

I suggest that you inform sysops who tell you otherwise that they can
contact me at the Legal Services Department of EFF. You've got my e-mail
address already--my phone number is 202-347-5400.


-Mike


From: Mike Godwin <mnemonic@eff.org>
Subject: Re: FIDOnet encrypted mail issues
Date: Fri, 1 Oct 1993 17:16:48 -0400 (EDT)
To: cypherpunks@toad.com


anonymous@extropia.wimsey.com writes:
 > Now, the point most internet people forget is that FIDOnet hosts are
 > hobbyists with 100% privately-owned machines and generally pay for the
 > entire participation of their userbase out of their own pockets,
 > excepting a few who get some dollars here and there from their generous
 > callers.

I have never forgotten this. But their commitment and efforts do not
amount to an amendment to federal law.

 > As a completely justified consequence, they can decide if they
 > allow encrypted traffic _on their individual BBSs_.  

Under what legal theory do they get an ECPA exemption as a "completely
justified consequence"?

 > In that there is
 > considerable fear of the consequences of illegal activity being
 > conducted on their BBSs via encrypted mail, many sysops (such as the one
 > you mention, leaving aside, for now, that he apparently confused a PGP
 > key with an encrypted message) do not wish to take the risk and forbid
 > encrypted traffic.

What they don't realize is that, rather than reducing the risk of legal
liability, they are increasing it.

 > They also monitor e-mail, if only incidentally
 > during the course of routine system maintenance, and notices to this
 > effect are generally contained in log-on screens and new-user info
 > files.

Any monitoring that results *directly* as a function of system maintenance
is okay--it's sanctioned by ECPA.

 > In that these sysops are extremely, _personally_ vulnerable, they are
 > generally more cautious than those internet folks who can hide behind
 > institutions and businesses.

If they were really cautious, they'd talk to a lawyer before setting
policy based on some guess as to what their legal liabilities may be.


-------------------------------------------------------------------------
To find out more about the anon service, send mail to help@anon.penet.fi.
Due to the double-blind, any mail replies to this message will be anonymized,
and an anonymous id will be allocated automatically. You have been warned.
Please report any problems, inappropriate use etc. to admin@anon.penet.fi.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Christian Void <cvoid@netcom.com>
Date: Sun, 3 Oct 93 01:38:51 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: NPR?
Message-ID: <Pine.3.05.9310030101.A14156-9100000@netcom3>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Has anyone considered forwarding and/or send NPR an information packet to
help bring the encryption/clipper issues to the general public, or is that
looked upon as a bad idea?

Christian Void /T71 | "I don't like it, and I'm sorry I | VMResearch, Inc.
cvoid@netcom.COM    | ever had anything to do with it." | P.O. Box 170213
Tel. 1+415-807-5491 |  -Erwin Schrodinger  (1887-1961)  | SF, CA  94117
                * PGP v2.3a Public Key Available Via Finger *






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: an12070@anon.penet.fi (S. Boxx)
Date: Sat, 2 Oct 93 18:44:26 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: troglodyte MIND RAPIST flames, take III
Message-ID: <9310030143.AA00548@anon.penet.fi>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



really, it's not my fault. blame Mike Godwin <g>


===


Subject: STOP THE TROGLODYTE FIDONET MIND-RAPISTS *NOW*!


does routine FIDOnet email INVASION by operators VIOLATE the U.S. 
Electronic Communications Privacy Act? EFF's lawyer M. Godwin speaks
with FIDOnet operator Al Billings <mimir@u.washington.edu> on the 
cypherpunks mailing list. Resident list crank Perry Metzger offers
his own whitehot flame.

this forward brought to you by

cypherpunks
Cyberspatial Reality Advancement Movement (CRAM)
Information Liberation Front (ILF)
Blacknet


===

From: Mike Godwin <mnemonic@eff.org>
Subject: Re: FIDOnet encryption (or lack thereof)
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Date: Fri, 1 Oct 1993 16:40:09 -0400 (EDT)
 
Al Billings writes:

> On Thu, 30 Sep 1993, Mike Godwin wrote:
> > 
> > My question is this: how does he know that the mail is encrypted if he's
> > not examining the mail that passes through his system? If he *is*
> > examining the mail that passes through his system, it seems likely that he
> > is violating the Electronic Communications Privacy Act.
> 
>  Only if he has stated that he allows private mail. Most sysops have
> specifically worded policy statements for their systems that say that the
> sysop can read any and all messages on the system and may do so at any
> time.

That's all very nice, but it doesn't enable a FIDO sysop to intercept
messages from people who are not users of his or her particular system.
Those people did not waive their rights to privacy under the ECPA.

> Bulletin boards do not normally offer truely private mail because of
> some of the legal implications.

This is a common myth. First of all, there are many BBSs that do
offer truly private mail, or whose sysops, as a matter of policy, do not
read others' private mail. Secondly, there's no legal liability associated
with allowing e-mail privacy. Third, federal law (the ECPA) bars
sysops from examining mail except under some very precisely defined
circumstances.

I suggest that you inform sysops who tell you otherwise that they can
contact me at the Legal Services Department of EFF. You've got my e-mail
address already--my phone number is 202-347-5400.


-Mike


From: Mike Godwin <mnemonic@eff.org>
Subject: Re: FIDOnet encrypted mail issues
Date: Fri, 1 Oct 1993 17:16:48 -0400 (EDT)
To: cypherpunks@toad.com


anonymous@extropia.wimsey.com writes:
 > Now, the point most internet people forget is that FIDOnet hosts are
 > hobbyists with 100% privately-owned machines and generally pay for the
 > entire participation of their userbase out of their own pockets,
 > excepting a few who get some dollars here and there from their generous
 > callers.

I have never forgotten this. But their commitment and efforts do not
amount to an amendment to federal law.

 > As a completely justified consequence, they can decide if they
 > allow encrypted traffic _on their individual BBSs_.  

Under what legal theory do they get an ECPA exemption as a "completely
justified consequence"?

 > In that there is
 > considerable fear of the consequences of illegal activity being
 > conducted on their BBSs via encrypted mail, many sysops (such as the one
 > you mention, leaving aside, for now, that he apparently confused a PGP
 > key with an encrypted message) do not wish to take the risk and forbid
 > encrypted traffic.

What they don't realize is that, rather than reducing the risk of legal
liability, they are increasing it.

 > They also monitor e-mail, if only incidentally
 > during the course of routine system maintenance, and notices to this
 > effect are generally contained in log-on screens and new-user info
 > files.

Any monitoring that results *directly* as a function of system maintenance
is okay--it's sanctioned by ECPA.

 > In that these sysops are extremely, _personally_ vulnerable, they are
 > generally more cautious than those internet folks who can hide behind
 > institutions and businesses.

If they were really cautious, they'd talk to a lawyer before setting
policy based on some guess as to what their legal liabilities may be.


-Mike




To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: PGP in FIDO 
Date: Sat, 02 Oct 1993 16:11:04 -0400
From: "Perry E. Metzger" <pmetzger@lehman.com>


anonymous@extropia.wimsey.com says:
> Anyway, the ECPA is basically irrelevant in the BBS world, as 1] almost
> every BBS states at log-on that there is no such thing as truly
> "private" e-mail on the system as the sysop can, will and does see
> messages in all areas, and 2] he is personally _liable_ for any illegal
> activity on his BBS, so he can reasonably be expected to keep an eye on
> e-mail for anything that will put his ass in a sling.

You haven't been listening at all to Mr. Godwin, have you?

1) The ECPA *DOES* apply to the BBSes whether they want it to or not.
   All the hoping in the world doesn't make a statute go away. Merely
   declaring that the ECPA doesn't apply to you doesn't work -- try
   declaring the tax laws don't apply to you some time and see if that
   works.
2) The BBS operators are NOT liable UNLESS they censor the mail. If
   they censor the mail, they are liable for anything they fail to
   censor. If they do not censor, they are common carriers, and have
   no liability.

In other words, jackasses pretending they understand the law have both
broken the law and made themselves more, not less, liable for anthing
left on their machines.

> There has been a very heated war in FIDOland over PGP and other
> encryption.  Considering the risk that sysops take on by permitting
> secure (?) communication on their BBSs,

They take NO risk. They are common carriers if they stop censoring
their mail. People don't seem to understand that the law on this is
very clear.

By the idiotic logic the FIDO operators are using, the phone company
could be siezed if two people have a conversation about a crime over
the phone. The notion is, of course, absurd, and so is the stupid
half-assed amateur lawyering the people who wrote the FIDO policies
used.

> Personally, _I_ would never stick my neck out like that, though I
> convinced many FIDOnet BBSs to do so for my own political and purely
> selfish reasons.

Actually, as I've just noted, you have not protected yourself. You
have opened yourself up for massive legal liability where you had none
before.

The depths of human folly never cease to amaze me. This case is as if
a group of bankers, deciding that they were scared that they might be
held liable if one of their clients were a drug dealer (which they
aren't) decides to embezzle all the client accounts instead to "keep
themselves safe".

Perry

-------------------------------------------------------------------------
To find out more about the anon service, send mail to help@anon.penet.fi.
Due to the double-blind, any mail replies to this message will be anonymized,
and an anonymous id will be allocated automatically. You have been warned.
Please report any problems, inappropriate use etc. to admin@anon.penet.fi.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: an12070@anon.penet.fi (S. Boxx)
Date: Sat, 2 Oct 93 20:24:27 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Zimmermann's PGP: "A Cure for the Common Code" (fixed)
Message-ID: <9310030322.AA13552@anon.penet.fi>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Denver Westword, Vol. 17 Number 5, Sept. 29 1993

<sigh> I've been thwarted by anon.penet.fi and the two characters
'--' at least FIVE times today. better than losing anonymity though!

The complete version *should* appear in

alt.security.pgp,talk.politics.crypto,sci.crypt,alt.politics.org.nsa,
comp.org.eff.talk

the initial cypherpunk and talk.politics.crypto versions are missing the 
following closing paragraphs. also the cypherpunk version did not credit 
author ERIC DEXHEIMER.

===

Despite the notoriety and acclaim Pretty Good Privacy has brought him,
Zimmermann admits he is not entirely comfortable with some of the
popular reaction to his software. "PGP tends to attract fringe elements-
- radicals, conspiracy theorists and so on-- and I'm a little
embarrassed by it," he says.

For instance, Zimmermann says he recently received a packet of fan mail
from a group of people whose obsession is cryogenics-- the notion that
newly dead people ought to be frozen until the technology that can
revive them is developed. While the group seemed enthusiastic about PGP,
Zimmermann says their recognition did little for his ego. "I don't want
to be admired by people who are loonies," he says.

He also concedes that, despite what law enforcement officers say about
him being irresponsible for publishing PGP he is trouble by people who
use the software for unsavory purposes. The William Steen case, for
instance, unnerved him. "This is not a black-and-white issue to me,"
Zimmermann says. "The thought of a child molester out there using PGP
does keep me up at nights. I think the benefits will outweigh the cost
to society, though."

Despite his misgivings about it, after nearly two years Pretty Good
Privacy may be paying off for Zimmermann. Not only is his software
consulting business hopping ("If you're a consultant , you get more work
as a famous consultant"), but four weeks ago he finalized the deal with
ViaCrypt to sell a version of PGP. The Arizona company has purchased a
license from RSA Data Security to use its algorithms. So in theory,
anyway, Zimmermann should be out of reach of RSA's patent-infringement
claims. 

In the meantime, Zimmermann says he simply is pleased to have gotten a
rise out of the government. "In the nuclear freeze movement, it was like
I was a flea on the back of a dinosaur," he says. "Now I feel like I'm a
hamster on the back of a dinosaur. Or maybe a poodle."

-------------------------------------------------------------------------
To find out more about the anon service, send mail to help@anon.penet.fi.
Due to the double-blind, any mail replies to this message will be anonymized,
and an anonymous id will be allocated automatically. You have been warned.
Please report any problems, inappropriate use etc. to admin@anon.penet.fi.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Matthew B. Landry <mbl@ml7694a.leonard.american.edu>
Date: Sun, 3 Oct 93 00:28:51 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: PGP in FIDO
Message-ID: <9310030727.AA16994@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>"Technically correct" versus pragmatics is often just a matter of whether
[...]
>P.S. Let me guess, despite the length of time that this issue has been
>kicked around here, I'll get nailed for posting something that's not
>apropos to cypherpunks. So let me point out how it is apropos: privacy.
        I think it's entirely appropriate as a discussion re:pragmatics versus 
law. That's exactly what the PGP in FIDO thread has been about lately. But 
you're right. We can think of more appropriate examples.
--
Matthew B. Landry
ml7694a@american.edu
(Finally!) mbl@ml7694a.leonard.american.edu




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Mike Godwin <mnemonic@eff.org>
Date: Sun, 3 Oct 93 00:38:51 PDT
To: an12070@anon.penet.fi
Subject: Re: troglodyte MIND RAPIST flames, take III
In-Reply-To: <9310030143.AA00548@anon.penet.fi>
Message-ID: <199310030736.AA04039@eff.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



I'm beginning to feel like a virus.


--Mike






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Mike Godwin <mnemonic@eff.org>
Date: Sun, 3 Oct 93 00:58:51 PDT
To: anonymous@extropia.wimsey.com
Subject: Re: PGP in Fidonet
In-Reply-To: <199310030409.AA15860@xtropia>
Message-ID: <199310030757.AA04131@eff.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


 
anonymous writes:

> Frankly, no.  I have however followed this same endless debate among
> lawyers in BBS_LAW, however, and (if I understand all parties correctly)
> their assessment for the most part disagrees with the one you cite here.
 
I don't want to play duelling credentials, and, as I said earlier, there
are some parts of ECPA over which reasonable lawyers can disagree. But
many of the assumptions some sysops make about a) whether they're exempt
from ECPA and b) whether they're at risk if they don't read e-mail, and c)
whether it helps to have a sysop-can-read-e-mail policy when the sysop
does not in fact read all e-mail, and d) whether encryption creates a
special risk of liability for sysops strike me as pretty uninformed.

Note: even if the courts were to decide that I'm wrong on point (a), it's
irrelevant to points (b), (c), and (d) above. The notion that sysops have
some *legal* reason to ban encrypted messages is profoundly silly, and
unsupported by any caselaw anywhere. And you can quote me on that.

> Perhaps we misunderstand each other; I do not mean, literally, that
> "hobby BBSs are exempt from ECPA," but that the situations addressed are
> generally avoided by sysop policies.

Avoidable, yes, but not by policies per se--sysops can avoid ECPA
liability by contracting with users or by limiting their viewing of
private mail to the specific restrictions of ECPA.

> 5]  Is prosecutable under ECPA?  If so, has such a prosecution been
>     successful?
 
They're as frequent and successful as prosecutions of sysops for carrying
encrypted mail. Which is to say, there are no cases on point regarding
ECPA, but at least we know what the statute says. On the other hand,
there's no statute that says sysops will be criminally liable if they
don't ban encrypted communications.

> It is my understanding that noncommercial FIDOnet participants are not
> in fact common carriers and that technical, legal common carrier status
> requires more than simply ignoring e-mail.  I understand it also brings
> more potential liabilities than FIDO can handle.
 
The issue of common-carrier status isn't relevant to the points I've been
making here. I'm assuming that no BBS qualifies as a common carrier.

> In any case, I am informed hobby sysops have been arrested and their
> systems seized for allegedly illegal traffic on their systems of which
> they claim to have had no knowledge.

Please do not make the common layman mistake of supposing that arrest or
seizure equals criminal liability. If you want to talk about specific
cases, please cite them. 

It should be noted, however, that the Steve Jackson Games seizure occurred
even though there was no illegal material on his system.

> I believe this is the case in the
> CT case pending.

You are mistaken.

> Even if these cases are eventually dismissed, the
> legal expense and personal disruption to a private party (usually a
> young person of very limited means) is catastrophic and without
> practical recourse.
 
But you still don't get it--there's no correlation between these seizures
and the use of truly private or encrypted e-mail.

No connection at all. Period. The link is entirely in some sysops' minds.

> As I say, there seems to be a great deal more to legal "common carrier"
> status than simply ignoring e-mail.  In FIDOdom common carrier status is
> regarded as a much larger can of worms, with more potential problems and
> liabilities for sysops than other options.
 
As well it should be. But common-carrier status is not the only way to
avoid legal liability.



--Mike







From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: doug@netcom.com (Doug Merritt)
Date: Sun, 3 Oct 93 08:58:58 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: troglodyte MIND RAPIST flames, take III
In-Reply-To: <mnemonic@eff.org>
Message-ID: <9310031557.AA05277@netcom.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Mike Godwin <mnemonic@eff.org> said:
>I'm beginning to feel like a virus.

An interesting form of immortality. :-)
	Doug




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: a2@ah.com (Arthur Abraham)
Date: Sun, 3 Oct 93 09:28:58 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: a2 test
Message-ID: <9310031615.AA10763@ah.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text


This message is steganographically encrypted to look like a test.
-a2



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: doug@netcom.com (Doug Merritt)
Date: Sun, 3 Oct 93 10:04:32 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: PGP in FIDO
In-Reply-To: <pmetzger@lehman.com>
Message-ID: <9310031703.AA08643@netcom.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


"Perry E. Metzger" <pmetzger@lehman.com> said:
> This is why, for instance, the maker of a knife can't
>be arrested because the knife is used to kill someone instead of
>cutting bread. The law is actually reasonable.

Sometimes it is and sometimes it isn't. I recall some years ago when
bartenders were getting convicted for their patron's drunk driving
accidents.

One can't always count on laws being reasonable, and if they are, you
still can't always count on courts interpreting them reasonably.
	Doug




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: doug@netcom.com (Doug Merritt)
Date: Sun, 3 Oct 93 10:09:32 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: a2 test
Message-ID: <9310031708.AA08924@netcom.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


a2@ah.com (Arthur Abraham) said:
>This message is steganographically encrypted to look like a test.

With a bit of wrestling I was able to decrypt this. It's a compressed
digitized image of Arthur; the background is out of focus, but it looks
like Wendy's holding up an A-Squared logo. Looks like one of his test
images from some years back.

Amazing compression ratio.
	Doug




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: mgream@acacia.itd.uts.edu.au (Matthew Gream)
Date: Sat, 2 Oct 93 17:38:50 PDT
To: hiscdcj@lux.latrobe.edu.au (Dwayne)
Subject: Re: POISON PILL :-)
In-Reply-To: <9310021152.AA03375@lux.latrobe.edu.au>
Message-ID: <9310030037.AA04847@acacia.itd.uts.EDU.AU>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Earlier, Dwayne wrote:

> In <9310011727.AA01395@netcom.netcom.com> msattler@netcom.com (Michael Sattler) writes:
> >>
> >>I have Australian Defence Security Clearance stickers on my computer,
> >>they are so cool, these little yellow and red stickers that authorise
> >>the computer for secure use (and something else I can't remember).
> 
> >Any chance of getting a few sent to me in San Francisco?
> 
> And perhaps me in Melbourne?   :-)

As I replied directly to the previous poster, they were one off things that
came via a friend who was contracted to do work for the Defence Dept. The
few I did manage to obtain all went into use.

The computer they are stuck on is in the hands of a 'higher' entity, so I
don't even remember the exact details of them <sigh>.

Matthew.
-- 
Matthew Gream, M.Gream@uts.edu.au. "... encryption is the ultimate means of
Consent Technologies, 02-821-2043.  protection against an Orwellian state."




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: khijol!erc (Ed Carp)
Date: Sun, 3 Oct 93 11:18:58 PDT
To: pmetzger@lehman.com
Subject: Re: PGP in Fidonet
In-Reply-To: <9310031721.AA26808@snark.lehman.com>
Message-ID: <m0ojXWd-00022EC@khijol>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text


> > In any case, I am informed hobby sysops have been arrested and their
> > systems seized for allegedly illegal traffic on their systems 
> 
> Mike Godwin, council to the EFF, has never heard of such a case. If
> you believe one has occured, why don't you tell us precisely where and
> when it occured?

How about that case recently posted about here?  Doesn't that count?
-- 
Ed Carp, N7EKG			erc@apple.com			510/659-9560
                            an38299@anon.penet.fi
If you want magic, let go of your armor.  Magic is so much stronger than
steel!        -- Richard Bach, "The Bridge Across Forever"



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Perry E. Metzger" <pmetzger@lehman.com>
Date: Sun, 3 Oct 93 08:59:32 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: PGP in FIDO
In-Reply-To: <m0ojInL-00022EC@khijol>
Message-ID: <9310031554.AA26661@snark.lehman.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Ed Carp says:
> > Untrue. Common law marriage is a real marriage in every single sense.
> > There is no legal difference in states that recognize it. You need a
> > real honest to god divorce in order to end one. Look it up if you
> > don't believe me.
> 
> Not at all.  I *did* look it up.  Technically, you are correct - but that
> marriage is recorded by no government agency, you won't find it in any
> public records - hell, if you still file 'single' on your tax return, who's
> going to know?

If you still file "single" on your tax returns, you haven't met the
common law standard of acting in every way as if you were married.

> You can just walk away - and if your spouse agrees with
> you, you *can*.  I'm not talking about 'what would do in court' - I'm
> talking real life.

This is true even of normal marriages. If you and your spouse simply
agreed never to make an issue of it, you could walk away and no one
would ever know.

I fail to see what your point is, but in any case this is NOT the
mailing list for discussing this topic.

Perry




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Perry E. Metzger" <pmetzger@lehman.com>
Date: Sun, 3 Oct 93 09:14:32 PDT
To: bobi@pets.sps.mot.com
Subject: Re: PGP in FIDO
In-Reply-To: <9310030213.AA12552@vswr.sps.mot.com>
Message-ID: <9310031601.AA26677@snark.lehman.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Bob Izenberg says:
> Perry E. Metzger wrote:
> 
> # As for what "common carrier" means, it means that the law recognizes
> # that you are a carrier of things, not a creator of them, and that you
> # are not responsible for what you carry.
> 
> I've got that part, but what needs to be done / provided before the
> benefits of being a common carrier can be claimed?

I noted it in the rest of my message. You have to act like a utility
-- you do not discriminate between your customers, you do not read,
censor, or otherwise differentiate in the carriage of their mail. If
you behave like a utility, you become a common carrier. The law in
this regard is somewhat complicated, so I would consult an attorney if
I wanted to be sure about it.

I will point out, though, that even if you are not a common carrier
you have no liability for things you don't know about and don't
participate in. This is why, for instance, the maker of a knife can't
be arrested because the knife is used to kill someone instead of
cutting bread. The law is actually reasonable.

However, if you partially censor the mail going through your system,
not only are you liable for ECPA violations, but you become liable for
the content of the mail. Why? Because you are now taking
responsibility for stopping things from going through, and should you
fail to stop something from going through that is now a conscious
decision on your part for which you have liability.

Perry





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Sandy <72114.1712@CompuServe.COM>
Date: Sun, 3 Oct 93 10:08:58 PDT
To: <cypherpunks@toad.com>
Subject: TEST
Message-ID: <931003170618_72114.1712_FHF41-1@CompuServe.COM>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Please ignore






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Perry E. Metzger" <pmetzger@lehman.com>
Date: Sun, 3 Oct 93 10:24:32 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: PGP in Fidonet
In-Reply-To: <199310030409.AA15860@xtropia>
Message-ID: <9310031721.AA26808@snark.lehman.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



anonymous@extropia.wimsey.com says:
>  * Reply to msg originally in CYPHERPUNKS
> 
>  > You haven't been listening at all to Mr. Godwin, have you?
> 
> Frankly, no.

The rest of your posting is therefore 100% irrelevant.

> Let me make sure I understand your
> point; are you saying that:
> 
> 1]  On a privately-owned computer...
> 2]  Operating a noncommercial BBS without monetary compensation...
> 3]  On which a repeating log-on notice informs users that all messages
>     are subject to sysop viewing...
> 4]  Sysop/sole owner viewing of non-public (as opposed to "private")
>     messages during system maintenance or monitoring for unlawful
>     activity...
> 5]  Is prosecutable under ECPA?

Gee, you are starting to catch on, aren't you? 

>  > 2) The BBS operators are NOT liable UNLESS they censor the mail. If
>  > they censor the mail, they are liable for anything they fail to
>  > censor. If they do not censor, they are common carriers, and have
>  > no liability.
> 
> It is my understanding that noncommercial FIDOnet participants are not
> in fact common carriers

Lets say that you operate a magazine, and decide what can and can't be
placed in it. You are then liable for the contents.

Lets say that instead you operate a courier service, and censor
nothing. You are then not responsible for what your clients.

Forget the common carrier question. If you actively decide what can
and cannot go through, then any time you fail to stop something you
are liable. If, on the other hand, you exercise no control, you have
no legal liability.

> In any case, I am informed hobby sysops have been arrested and their
> systems seized for allegedly illegal traffic on their systems 

Mike Godwin, council to the EFF, has never heard of such a case. If
you believe one has occured, why don't you tell us precisely where and
when it occured?

Perry




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: nobody@alumni.cco.caltech.edu
Date: Sun, 3 Oct 93 13:29:00 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: TRAVELLER'S ADVISORY
Message-ID: <9310032022.AA24512@alumni.cco.caltech.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


At  3:48 PM 10/1/93 -0400, Sandy wrote:
>
>I think this is a real danger for outspoken Cypherpunks or other
>high-profile individuals such as Phil Zimmermann.  Unfortunately,
>I don't have any bullet-proof solutions.  Suggestions?
>
> S a n d y

Speak softly and carry a big magnet?





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Perry E. Metzger" <pmetzger@lehman.com>
Date: Sun, 3 Oct 93 10:34:33 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: PGP in FIDO
In-Reply-To: <9310031703.AA08643@netcom.netcom.com>
Message-ID: <9310031733.AA26853@snark.lehman.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Doug Merritt says:
> "Perry E. Metzger" <pmetzger@lehman.com> said:
> > This is why, for instance, the maker of a knife can't
> >be arrested because the knife is used to kill someone instead of
> >cutting bread. The law is actually reasonable.
> 
> Sometimes it is and sometimes it isn't. I recall some years ago when
> bartenders were getting convicted for their patron's drunk driving
> accidents.

Most states have laws that specifically assign liability to bartenders
for serving intoxicated patrons. That is why they are liable in this
instance. The rule does not generalize, however. A supermarket is not
liable for the heart attack that an overweight patron gets from eating
too much ice cream, for instance, since there is no law specifically
altering the default legal rules to assign liability in such an instance.

> One can't always count on laws being reasonable,

Thats true, but in this instance they are not unreasonable.

Perry




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Sandy <72114.1712@CompuServe.COM>
Date: Sun, 3 Oct 93 11:48:57 PDT
To: <cypherpunks@toad.com>
Subject: POISON PILL WIMPS
Message-ID: <931003184257_72114.1712_FHF56-1@CompuServe.COM>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
  SANDY SANDFORT               Reply to:  ssandfort@attmail.com
 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Punksters,

I've just about had it with posts like Matthew Gream's:

    . . . attempting to play 'smart-ass' to your
    investigators is only going to result in more problems
    for you. Its a non-ideal world, and they definitely have
    the ability to cause you substantial problems.

    . . . I feel it is essential to show them everything
    that they think is there, and convince them (as they
    will not be as competent in cryptographic analysis as
    yourself [at least you hope]) that there is nothing
    hidden.

Didn't any of you appeasers and apologists read and *understand*
HACKER CRACKDOWN?  Once you are the focus of an investigation,
they are already causing you substantial problems.  Cooperation
only gives your tormentors more ammunition.  You are not going
to convince them of anything.  You cannot talk your way out of
anything.  What you can--and will--do is dig yourself in deeper.
After that, you will probably try to get off the hook by rolling
over--like a bitch in heat--on your friends and associates.

The ONLY thing that works is (a) stonewall, stonewall, stonewall
until you get competent legal representation, then (b) do what
your lawyer's says.  Period.

Consider this your wimp wakeup call.

 S a n d y

>>>>>>    Please send e-mail to:  ssandfort@attmail.com    <<<<<<
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: an36440@anon.penet.fi
Date: Sun, 3 Oct 93 07:54:32 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: ITAR: Business?
Message-ID: <9310031451.AA05060@anon.penet.fi>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>P.S. Heard on the news about how Syria is flooding us with near-perfect
>counterfeit $100's? Complete with magnetic ink and security strip. Treasury
>is scared green, and the CIA is helping to stop it. We need digicash now! 

Where did you hear of this?

-------------------------------------------------------------------------
To find out more about the anon service, send mail to help@anon.penet.fi.
Due to the double-blind, any mail replies to this message will be anonymized,
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Please report any problems, inappropriate use etc. to admin@anon.penet.fi.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Perry E. Metzger" <pmetzger@lehman.com>
Date: Sun, 3 Oct 93 12:08:57 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: PGP in Fidonet
In-Reply-To: <m0ojXWd-00022EC@khijol>
Message-ID: <9310031908.AA27027@snark.lehman.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Ed Carp says:
> > > In any case, I am informed hobby sysops have been arrested and their
> > > systems seized for allegedly illegal traffic on their systems 
> > 
> > Mike Godwin, council to the EFF, has never heard of such a case. If
> > you believe one has occured, why don't you tell us precisely where and
> > when it occured?
> 
> How about that case recently posted about here?  Doesn't that count?

Which one are you refering to? Be specific.

.pm




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Date: Sun, 3 Oct 93 15:28:59 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: a2 test
In-Reply-To: <9310032153.AA16008@bwnmr4.harvard.edu>
Message-ID: <9310032228.AA20304@netcom5.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



> > This message is steganographically encrypted to look like a test.
> > -a2
> 
> If this is an image, Would any of the gurus who have cracked it care to
> share how it was done?
> 
> FRC


No, no, no! Arthur's one-line message actually was of course a 3-hour
MPEG movie, which I've been watching since I decompressed, decrypted,
and reformatted the file to run on my computer screen.


-Tim May

P.S. to Arthur: Who was that woman in the second reel? Some kind of
steganographic stripper?


-- 
..........................................................................
Timothy C. May         | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,  
tcmay@netcom.com       | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
408-688-5409           | knowledge, reputations, information markets, 
W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA  | black markets, collapse of governments.
Higher Power: 2^756839 | Public Key: PGP and MailSafe available.
Note: I put time and money into writing this posting. I hope you enjoy it.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Matthew J Ghio <mg5n+@andrew.cmu.edu>
Date: Sun, 3 Oct 93 12:38:58 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Offline Digicash ?
In-Reply-To: <01H3NNHIHQGI90ONDC@delphi.com>
Message-ID: <Ugfma3a00VoyFmKmYK@andrew.cmu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


MikeIngle@delphi.com writes:

> According to the Chaum-protocol description on chaos.bsu.edu, this is
> an online system - both parties must talk to the bank before a
> transaction is concluded. Are there any true offline systems? i.e. I
> can send you an email which is worth money, with no third parties
> involved, and there is no audit trail or means of tracing.
>
> The main problem is that there is no digital "coin" or object which
> can be passed around but not duplicated. Other than the bank method,
> I've read about an "observer" chip which keeps you honest, but the
> design of the chip would have to be secret, or at least the chip
> would have to know a secret (i.e. a key) which it would never tell
> you. If you could extract the key, you could write a "cheater".
> Shades of Clipper.
>
> Is there a system which allows anonymity and at the same time
> prevents people from double-spending their cash? How does it work?

Well, one thing that could be done is to write an "electronic check". 
Someone would deposit money in a bank, and then pay money to other
people by writing checks, encrypting each check with with their private
key for authentication, and then with the recipient's public key to
protect against the possibility that the message might be intercepted. 
The recipient would then decode the first layer of encryption with his
private key (leaving the sender's key-authentication), add his account
number to the message and send it to the bank (preferrably, encoding it
with the bank's public key).  The bank would be able to verify the
authenticity of the check by means of the sender's public key, and would
then transfer the funds to the recipient's account.  Basically, this
works the same way paper checks work today, and might be a feasible
system.  This eliminates the need for both parties to talk to the bank
before making the transaction; only the recipient would need to talk to
the bank - to cash his check.  This doesn't completely solve the
traceability issue however.  Although accounts could be numbered and the
owner's identity kept "secret", it is still theoretically possible to
trace the money from one account to another.

However there is another way to do it.  The bank could simply issue
numbered "bills" in exchange for conventional cash, and this would be
done completely anonymously.  Each number would be worth a certian set
value, such as a US dollar, a gram of gold, etc.  The numbers could be
of a form such that there would be one valid number in a billion or a
trillion (or more possible) combinations, eliminating the possibility
that someone might find a valid number by random guessing.  (As a side
comment: Creating different unique numbers is not too difficult. 
Suppose a bank was going to issue one million bills out of a trillion
combinations.  They could number the valid bills 0-999999, leaving
numbers 1000000-999999999999 as invalid combinations.  Each number would
then be encrypted with a conventional private-key system, meaning that
the valid combinations would end up randomly distrubited thruout the
possible domain of numbers.  The bank would easily be able to tell
anyone who asked weather or not a number was valid, by using its cipher
to decode the number, but nobody else would know how to find valid
combinations because the bank would keep its cipher secret.)  When
someone wanted to spend some money, he would give the recipient the
numbers of the bills he wanted to spend.  To eliminate the possibility
of double-spending the same numbers, the recipient would then call the
bank, and give them the numbers, and the bank would flag those numbers
in its database as being spent (so they couldn't be spent again), and
issue new numbers.  Since all calls to the bank would be anonymous,
there would be effectively no way to trace the money, while security
against double spending would be maintained.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Mike Ingle <MIKEINGLE@delphi.com>
Date: Sun, 3 Oct 93 12:54:33 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Excessive Crap & Flamage
Message-ID: <01H3OJEA3NU68WYIKJ@delphi.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


This list is becoming completely unreadable! First the POISON PILL and now
PGP IN FIDO just seem to go on and on. And how many before that?
(Troglodyte mind-rapists, etc) I've got about a meg of utter crap in my
email file, most of it unread or skimmed. If people want to fight, why not
do it in private mail, back up your positions, and then post your
conclusions if you manage to come up with any. Please don't CC all your
flames to the list. And please don't echo a three-page post to add one
line of comments to it.

What happened to all the idealism? Total privacy, cryptophones, digital
cash, zero-knowledge cooperation, bringing down governments and setting the
world free? That's what the list is for, not mindless flaming.

Aargggh! MikeIngle@delphi.com




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Christian D. Odhner" <cdodhner@indirect.com>
Date: Sun, 3 Oct 93 16:08:59 PDT
To: lex@mindvox.phantom.com (Lex Luthor)
Subject: Re: The right to remain silent
In-Reply-To: <H38uac10w165w@mindvox.phantom.com>
Message-ID: <199310032307.AA06568@indirect.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> although no one is asking me, I'll admit that perhaps this message itself
> is guilty of the above. And I am on the verge of unsubscribing after a
> couple of months being on the list because the daily time requirement to
> keep on top of the messages is exceeding an hour. Perhaps splintering the
> list into the following 2 main areas is an option: 
> 
> 1) A fairly lean-bandwidth list containing technical facts, news articles,
> bibliographic info, short source code, etc.
> 
> 2) A more fluffy-content list containing general comments, opinions, flames,
> etc.

Yat Yat. (That means I agree.) Let's split the list. Cypherpunks-Announce
						     Cypherpunks-Agenda
						     Cypherpunks-Politics
						     Cypherpunks-Code
						     Cypherpunks-Clipper
Something like that. We (whats this we shit white man?) might need
different list software...


Happy Hunting, -Chris.
______________________________________________________________________________
Christian Douglas Odhner     | "The NSA can have my secret key when they pry
cdodhner@indirect.com	     | it from my cold, dead, hands... But they shall
pgp 2.3 public key by finger | NEVER have the password it's encrypted with!"
  "If guns are outlawed, only the government will have guns." -E. Abbey
My opinions are shareware. For a registered copy, send me 15$ in DigiCash.
  Key fingerprint =  58 62 A2 84 FD 4F 56 38  82 69 6F 08 E4 F1 79 11 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Anonymous <nowhere@bsu-cs.bsu.edu>
Date: Sun, 3 Oct 93 14:09:42 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Internet SEcurity Scanner (ALERT)
Message-ID: <9310032108.AA05992@bsu-cs.bsu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


===========================================================================
CA-93:14                        CERT Advisory
                              September 30, 1993
                       Internet Security Scanner (ISS)
 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 
The CERT Coordination Center has received information concerning
software that allows automated scanning of TCP/IP networked computers
for security vulnerabilities.  This software was posted to the
comp.sources.misc Usenet newsgroup.  The software package, known as ISS
or Internet Security Scanner, will interrogate all computers within a
specified IP address range, determining the security posture of each
with respect to several common system vulnerabilities.  The software
was designed as a security tool for system and network administrators.
ISS does not attempt to gain access to a system being tested.
However, given its wide distribution and ability to scan remote
networks, CERT feels that it is likely ISS will also be used to locate
vulnerable hosts for malicious reasons.
 
While none of the vulnerabilities ISS checks for are new, their
aggregation into a widely available automated tool represents a higher
level of threat to networked machines.  CERT has analyzed the
operation of the program and strongly recommends that administrators
take this opportunity to re-examine systems for the vulnerabilities
described below.  Detailed below are available security tools
that may assist in the detection and prevention of malicious use of
ISS.  Finally, common symptoms of an ISS attack are outlined to allow
detection of malicious use.
 
 
Vulnerabilities probed by ISS
-----------------------------
 
The following vulnerabilities are currently tested for by the ISS tool.
Administrators should verify the state of their systems and perform
corrective actions as indicated.
 
Default Accounts   The accounts "guest" and "bbs", if they exist, should
                   have non-trivial passwords.  If login access to these
                   accounts is not needed, they should be removed, or
                   disabled by placing a "*" in the password field and the
                   string "/bin/false" in the shell field in /etc/passwd.
                   See the system manual entry for "passwd(1)" for more
                   information on changing passwords and disabling
                   accounts.
 
                   For example, the /etc/passwd entry for a disabled guest
                   account should resemble the following:
 
                   guest:*:2311:50:Guest User:/home/guest:/bin/false
 
lp Account         The account "lp", if it exists, should not allow logins.
                   It should be disabled by placing a "*" in the password
                   field and the string "/bin/false" in the shell field in
                   /etc/passwd.
 
Decode Alias       Mail aliases for decode and uudecode should be disabled
                   on UNIX systems.  If the file /etc/aliases contains
                   entries for these programs, they should be removed, or
                   disabled by placing a "#" at the beginning of the line
                   and then executing the command "newaliases".  Consult
                   the manual page for "aliases(1)" for more information on
                   UNIX mail aliases.
 
                   A disabled decode alias should appear as follows:
 
                   # decode: "|/usr/bin/uudecode"
 
Sendmail           The sendmail commands "wiz" and "debug" should be 
                   disabled.  This may be verified by executing the 
                   following commands:
 
                   % telnet <hostname> 25
                   220 host Sendmail 5.65 ready at Wed, 29 Sep 93 20:28:46 EDT
                   wiz
                   You wascal wabbit!  Wandering wizards won't win!
                   (or 500 Command unrecognized)
                   quit
 
                   % telnet <hostname> 25
                   220 host Sendmail 5.65 ready at Wed, 29 Sep 93 20:28:46 EDT
                   debug
                   500 Command unrecognized
                   quit
 
                   If the "wiz" command returns "Please pass, oh mighty
                   wizard", your system is vulnerable to attack.  The
                   command should be disabled by adding the following
                   line to the sendmail.cf configuration file containing
                   the string:
 
                   OW*
 
                   For this change to take effect, kill the sendmail
                   process, refreeze the sendmail.cf file, and restart
                   the sendmail process.
 
                   If the "debug" command responds with the string
                   "200 Debug set", you should immediately obtain a newer
                   version of sendmail software from your vendor.
 
Anonymous FTP      Anonymous FTP allows users without accounts to have
                   restricted access to certain directories on the system.
                   The availability of anonymous FTP on a given system may
                   be determined by executing the following commands:
 
                   % ftp hostname
                   Connected to hostname.
                   220 host FTP server ready.
                   Name (localhost:jdoe): anonymous
                   530 User anonymous unknown.
                   Login failed.
 
                   The above results indicate that anonymous FTP is not
                   enabled.  If the system instead replies with the
                   string "331 Guest login ok" and then prompts for a 
                   password, anonymous FTP access is enabled.
 
                   The configuration of systems allowing anonymous FTP
                   should be checked carefully, as improperly configured
                   FTP servers are frequently attacked.  Refer to CERT
                   Advisory CA-93:10 for more information.
 
NIS                ISS attempts to guess the NIS domainname.  The program
                   will try to grab the password file from ypserv.
 
                   See CERT Advisory CA-92:13 for more information regarding
                   SunOS 4.x machines using NIS.
 
                   See CERT Advisory CA-93:01 for more information regarding
                   HP machines using NIS.
 
NFS                Filesystems exported under NFS should be mountable only
                   by a restricted set of hosts.  The UNIX "showmount"
                   command will display the filesystems currently exported
                   by a given host:
 
                   % /usr/etc/showmount -e hostname
                   export list for hostname:
                   /usr          hosta:hostb:hostc
                   /usr/local    (everyone)
 
                   The above output indicates that this NFS server is
                   exporting two partitions: /usr, which can be mounted by
                   hosta, hostb, and hostc; and /usr/local which can be
                   mounted by anyone.  In this case, access to the
                   /usr/local partition should be restricted.  Consult the
                   system manual entry for "exports(5)" or "NFS(4P)" for more
                   information.
 
rusers             The UNIX rusers command displays information about
                   accounts currently active on a remote system.  This may
                   provide an attacker with account names or other
                   information useful in mounting an attack.  To check for
                   the availability of rusers information on a particular
                   machine, execute the following command:
 
                   % rusers -l hostname
                   hostname: RPC: Program not registered
 
                   If the above example had instead generated a list of
                   user names and login information, a rusers server is
                   running on the host.  The server may be disabled by
                   placing a "#" at the beginning of the appropriate line
                   in the file /etc/inetd.conf and then sending the SIGHUP
                   signal to the inetd process.  For example, a disabled
                   rusers entry might appear as follows:
 
                   #rusersd/2 dgram rpc/udp wait root /usr/etc/rusersd rusersd
 
rexd               The UNIX remote execution server rexd provides only
                   minimal authentication and is easily subverted.  It
                   should be disabled by placing a "#" at the beginning of
                   the rexd line in the file /etc/inetd.conf and then
                   sending the SIGHUP signal to the inetd process.  The
                   disabled entry should resemble the following:
 
                   #rexd/1 stream rpc/tcp wait root /usr/etc/rexd rexd
 
                   See CERT Advisory CA-92:05 for more information regarding
                   IBM AIX machines using rexd.
 
Available Tools
---------------
 
There are several available security tools that may be used to prevent or
detect malicious use of ISS.  They include the following:
 
COPS               The COPS security tool will also detect the
                   vulnerabilities described above.  It is available via
                   anonymous FTP from cert.org in the directory
                   /pub/tools/cops/1.04.
 
ISS                Running ISS on your systems will provide you with the
                   same information an attacker would obtain, allowing you
                   to correct vulnerabilities before they can be exploited.
                   Note that the current version of the software is known
                   to function poorly on some operating systems.
 
                   ISS may be obtained via anonymous FTP from ftp.uu.net
                   in the directory /usenet/comp.sources.misc/volume39/iss.
 
TCP Wrappers       Access to most UNIX network services can be more closely
                   controlled using software known as a TCP wrapper.  The
                   wrapper provides additional access control and flexible
                   logging features that may assist in both the prevention
                   and detection of network attacks.  This software is
                   available via anonymous FTP from cert.org in the
                   directory pub/tools/tcp_wrappers.
 
 
Detecting an ISS Attack
-----------------------
 
Given the wide distribution of the ISS tool, CERT feels that remote
attacks are likely to occur.  Such attacks can cause system warnings
to be generated that may prove useful in tracking down the source of
the attack.  The most probable indicator of an ISS attack is a mail
message sent to "postmaster" on a scanned system similar to the
following:
 
    From: Mailer-Daemon@hostname (Mail Delivery Subsystem)
    Subject: Returned mail: Unable to deliver mail
    Message-Id: <9309291633.AB04591@>
    To: Postmaster@hostname
 
       ----- Transcript of session follows -----
    <<< VRFY guest
    550 guest... User unknown
    <<< VRFY decode
    550 decode... User unknown
    <<< VRFY bbs
    550 bbs... User unknown
    <<< VRFY lp
    550 lp... User unknown
    <<< VRFY uudecode
    550 uudecode... User unknown
    <<< wiz
    500 Command unrecognized
    <<< debug
    500 Command unrecognized
    421 Lost input channel to remote.machine
 
       ----- No message was collected -----
 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The CERT Coordination Center would like to thank Steve Weeber from
the Department of Energy's CIAC Team for his contribution to this advisory.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
If you believe that your system has been compromised, contact the CERT
Coordination Center or your representative in FIRST (Forum of Incident
Response and Security Teams).
 
Internet E-mail: cert@cert.org
Telephone: 412-268-7090 (24-hour hotline)
           CERT personnel answer 8:30 a.m.-5:00 p.m. EST(GMT-5)/EDT(GMT-4),
           and are on call for emergencies during other hours.
 
CERT Coordination Center
Software Engineering Institute
Carnegie Mellon University
Pittsburgh, PA 15213-3890
 
Past advisories, information about FIRST representatives, and other
information related to computer security are available for anonymous FTP
from cert.org (192.88.209.5).
 
 





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: mccoy@binky.cc.utexas.edu
Date: Sun, 3 Oct 93 14:24:42 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Austin Cypherpunks organizational meeting
Message-ID: <199310032125.AA13722@binky.cc.utexas.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



		 Digital Freedom: By any means necessary.


			Austin Cypherpunks Meeting
			 October 9, 1993 1:00 pm
		      Taylor Hall 2.006 -- UT Campus
			    (24th and Speedway)


The Austin Cypherpunks chapter will be holding its first local
meeting on Saturday the 9th of October at 1:00 pm in room 2.006 of
Taylor Hall (UT Campus).  This will be an organizational meeting 
for the local chapter and will give you an opportunity to meet 
other cypherpunks from the Austin area.

For the first time, information technology is giving people the 
opportunity for more privacy instead of less. For instance, we will 
have digital money soon; will it be used to track you every time you 
spend, or will it give you more security and convenience than a credit 
card with the anonymity of cash?

Both are possible outcomes, but you will only keep your privacy if 
people get together and take action. Please join us, either in person 
or through our mailing lists, and help work towards a future where
your privacy is guaranteed, not just legally, but by the best
encryption and authentication tools available.

Some of the items on the agenda for this first meeting include:

	-Education
		Hands-on demonstration of encryption tools and anonymous
		remailers; we will be distributing PGP (bring your disks!)
		and handing out information about the infamous "Clipper
		Chip". We should also have the latest information on the
		subpoenas served on various distributors of cryptographic
		software.	

	-Political action
		Strong tools for privacy are perceived by most 
		governments as a threat; cypherpunks have joined the 
		fight against government attempts to restrict or
		ban encrypted communications, as well as the now-useless
		export ban on effective cryptographic software.

	-Public Key Exchange.
 		Swap public keys with other members.  We will
 		have Macs and PCs on hand for you to sign and
 		exchange public keys with other cypherpunks
 		members.  


 	-Digital Credit Union Project
		Local cypherpunks are already working on forming a
		new credit union which will provide secure banking 
		and commerce across the net using strong cryptography.

[Location Instructions: Go to Taylor Hall on the UT campus.  This building
is at 24th and Speedway.  The directions to room 2.006 are a little
complicated for words, but a map will be posted on all of the doors to
Taylor hall.]

To subscribe to our full mailing list, send mail to: 
     austin-cypherpunks-request@bongo.cc.utexas.edu

To subscribe to our announcement-only mailing list, send mail to: 
     austin-cypherpunks-announce-request@bongo.cc.utexas.edu

Put the word 'subscribe' in the subject of your mail.

Our file archives are available in /pub/cypherpunks via anonymous
ftp at: ftp.cc.utexas.edu


The Austin Cypherpunks chapter will continue to meet on the second 
saturday of each month in conjunction with local cypherpunk chapters
across the country.  The location of future meetings will be announced
on local newsgroups and the local cypherpunks mailing list.

Cypherpunks:  There is safety in numbers... large primes.

Local contacts for your questions...:

	Jim McCoy	<mccoy@bongo.cc.utexas.edu>
	Doug Barnes	<barnes@io.com>









From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Jim.Cannell@f21.n216.z1.fidonet.org (Jim Cannell)
Date: Sun, 3 Oct 93 14:09:34 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: fido encryption.
Message-ID: <43861.2CAF3D72@ns.fidonet.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

In a msg on <Sep 30 06:18>, mdiehl@triton.unm.edu of 1:216/21 writes:

 m>      Hi all!  I just conducted an experiment whose results 
 m> indicate how far we (Cypherpunks) have to go in educating the 
 m> American Public WRT encryption technology:  

Agreed.  There is a large education project ahead.


 m> I send an encrypted message via fidonet! (awk!)
 m>  
 m>      I had heard a rumor that fidonet forbade encrypted e-mail, 
 m> but I had to find out for myself.  Well, they do.  Now I 
 m> understand that these sysops are spending their own money and 
 m> equipment to provide these services and have the right to 
 m> regulate it in any way they see fit.  That's not the point. 

This is _NOT_ true.  There is no prohibition on encrypted messages
within FidoNet.  There is a large number of people within FidoNet that
use wishful thinking to support such a ban.

FidoNet policy states only that routing of encrypted traffic through
a system that has not previously authorized such traffic is considered
annoying behavior.  Contrary to what many would have you believe,
that is the _ONLY_ rule about encrypted traffic in FidoNet.



 m> The point(s) is/are:
 m>  
 m> 1)   They ACTIVELY enforce this policy.  They don't simply say 
 m> "no," they check (presumably) all of their user's email to 
 m> enforce this policy.

There is a great deal of paranoia within FidoNet about encryption.
There are many who will not allow encrypted traffic on their systems.
Of course, most of these have never heard of the term, steganography.
I have a simple message that I like to send to these folks.  Even
though the hidden message is just reading down the first column,
many people, especially those who claim they don't allow encrypted
messages on their system, miss it.

When PGP 2.0 first came out, I ran into these paranoids who said "There
will never be any encryption on my system".  I decided that an end run
around these bozos was in order, so I created the SecureMail system.
SecureMail is a group of FidoNet sysops who have agreed to route any
and all mail through their systems without any form of censorshiop
or monitoring.  It now covers every part of the U.S., with some overseas
links.

I can post a list of those participating if you would like.

Encrypted traffic now flows regularly through the SecureMail system.


 m> 2)   They seem to be afraid to pass/store encrypted messages on 
 m> their system.  This indicates to me a lack of understanding of 
 m> the concept of privacy.  They seem to buy into the idea that 
 m> "only BAD people encrypt email."

I fully agree with this assesment.  They do not understand that they
cannot be responsible for a message that they cannot read.  I
continually run into the "What have I got to hide attitude".  There
are a number of us in FidoNet actively promoting privacy and the use
of PGP.  We are making slow and painful progress.


 m>      We need to educate the electronic community before we can 
 m> hope to educate the general public.  The text of the messages 
 m> follow with the names removed.  BTW, the text of the plaintext 
 m> message was "this is a test."  Just thought you'd be 
 m> interested.  Comments?

I can probably guess the names that you deleted.  I get this type
of message frequently.  It's sad, but true that these people do need
educating.  Unfortunately, there are many with the closed minds so
well demonstrated in the message that you posted.



The primary internet/FidoNet gateway system (zeus.ieee.org) has
agreed to pass encrypted traffic from FidoNet to the internet and
vice versa.  However, much of the internet/FidoNet traffic passes
through other gateway systems which do not necessarily allow
encrypted traffic.  Even traffic that passes through zeus.ieee.org
may be routed through FidoNet systems that don't allow encrypted
traffic.


The trick in passing encrypted traffic between the internet and
FidoNet is in making sure that the routing sends it through a
gateway system that allows encrypted traffic and provides a direct
link into the SecureMail system.

You can send mail to any FidoNet system by addressing the message
to me at:

      Jim.Cannell@f21.n216.z1.fidonet.org

Put a line at the beginning of the text identifying the ultimate
addressee and his FidoNet address.  Right now, I will have to
manually process all such messages, but maybe if I get enough
traffic, it will motivate me to write a remailer program.  Then
we can can have anonymous remailing within FidoNet as well.  That
really ought to set the paranoids off :-).

There are others that will probably provide this service as well.
I'll post their names as they give permission.


By the time I received this message (I only get updates to this list
three times a week), the discussion has been extensive.  I have neither
the time nor the desire to respond to everything on the thread.  Rest
assured that I have read it.  Since it has stirred up so much controversy,
I will introduce the topic in the approritate places in FidoNet.  It
needs exposure there.  Since FidoNet systems are for the most part
privately owned, it is there especially that privacy needs to be
encouraged. 



Jim
PGP key 1024/72C6A7
fingerprint = F5 74 29 3D 9C F8 A7 32  C7 98 F1 FE C4 85 FA 70

Protect your right to privacy. Say no to Clipper/Skipjack and key escrow

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.3a

iQCVAgUBLK8sq5uaN9X1csanAQFEHAP/U0L8SFiz7L1MgtmsTYP5utBp1/mXjq9k
QT3th/KWZqKJ6wqrAt0q97/04EFdazYKGJqme63CTBzaTAonorOX4HJP6zT/56z9
+fGbK84uAL+ilgE5kxQ5OB0eY0MF6H/k0F7eBQk392nz9b9wecdhdmM70ozTTL1b
FhvTXiIaBvg=
=7tus
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
--  
=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=
            (Gated via FidoNet Node 1:1/31)
 Jim Cannell      Internet: Jim.Cannell@f21.n216.z1.fidonet.org




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: doug@netcom.com (Doug Merritt)
Date: Sun, 3 Oct 93 17:38:59 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: PGP in Fidonet
In-Reply-To: <mnemonic@eff.org>
Message-ID: <9310040039.AA14817@netcom6.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> I know of no case in which a
>sysop has been "arrested" merely because of allowing so-called "illegal
>traffic" that he or she didn't know about.

Some time back (maybe quite a long time ago, I forget) I heard rumors
that a BBS that someone had uploaded child porn or some such to,
without the sysop's knowledge, resulted in the sysop's arrest. Was that
merely a rumor?

Or is that a different category than the mail traffic you're commenting on?
	Doug




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: doug@netcom.com (Doug Merritt)
Date: Sun, 3 Oct 93 17:49:01 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: NPR?
Message-ID: <9310040048.AA15221@netcom6.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


DON_HENSON@delphi.com said:
>I'm in favor of getting the word out on the Clipper/Skipjack problem but 
>I don't think sending a note to NPR is going to do it.  They have a long 
>history of extremely biased (toward the government view) reporting.

So phrase it in a slick way that gets past their bias. For instance,
lie and say that "other government agencies are concerned that..."

Anyone biased towards the govt will be willing to believe that some
part of it is a benevolent avuncular sort. It's part of that mind set.
	Doug




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: frc%bwnmr4@harvard.harvard.edu (Fred Cooper)
Date: Sun, 3 Oct 93 14:54:35 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com (Cypherpunks)
Subject: Re: a2 test
In-Reply-To: <9310031615.AA10763@ah.com>
Message-ID: <9310032153.AA16008@bwnmr4.harvard.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



> This message is steganographically encrypted to look like a test.
> -a2

If this is an image, Would any of the gurus who have cracked it care to
share how it was done?

FRC





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Jim.Cannell@f21.n216.z1.fidonet.org (Jim Cannell)
Date: Sun, 3 Oct 93 14:09:00 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: FIDOnet encryption (or lack thereof)
Message-ID: <43862.2CAF3D72@ns.fidonet.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

In a msg on <Sep 30 12:15>, mnemonic@eff.org of 1:216/21 writes:

 m> From  owner-cypherpunks@toad.com
 m> From: mnemonic@eff.org (Mike Godwin)
 m> To:   mdiehl@triton.unm.edu (J. Michael Diehl)
 m> Date: Thu, 30 Sep 1993 11:45:09 -0400 (EDT)
 m> Cc:   yerazunis@aidev.enet.dec.com, cypherpunks@toad.com

 m> Well, there's no doubt that users of his system can agree to 
 m> allow the sysop to read their mail. But what about people 
 m> whose mail passes *through* his system on the way to somewhere 
 m> else?

 m> He has no agreement with them.


FidoNet policy has a statement allowing monitoring of all intransit
mail.  I guess I'm going to have to dig my copy of Policy out of the
archives to post the relevant paragraphs.

This is a very shortsighted policy.

Although financial restraints have curtailed my operations here making
a lot of this moot, my own policy allows all users and passthru mail to be
encrypted.  I neither monitor nor censor.



Jim
PGP key 1024/72C6A7
fingerprint = F5 74 29 3D 9C F8 A7 32  C7 98 F1 FE C4 85 FA 70

Protect your right to privacy. Say no to Clipper/Skipjack and key escrow

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.3a

iQCVAgUBLK8tCZuaN9X1csanAQFh6QP/bcfC21gOOnBMAAKoGTVON7u7NEda9Nqr
JtH1voGXQKArnRveoVffSTTlESjBC+yaBzi3t4Z1E37uELkd31r70M6OLIWDmw8o
QLvZXtoQJgCTzyzHUlY+K94XW3QznHllMVx2oYVJ53tKPn/HmrjwIN5Ml0orBU70
vhek/pyCXnk=
=f+Pj
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
--  
=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=
            (Gated via FidoNet Node 1:1/31)
 Jim Cannell      Internet: Jim.Cannell@f21.n216.z1.fidonet.org




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: lex@mindvox.phantom.com (Lex Luthor)
Date: Sun, 3 Oct 93 15:54:33 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: The right to remain silent
Message-ID: <H38uac10w165w@mindvox.phantom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Quoting a previous message:

>Date: 03 Oct 93 14:42:57 EDT
>From: Sandy <72114.1712@CompuServe.COM>
>To: <cypherpunks@toad.com>
>Subject: POISON PILL WIMPS
>
>~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
>  SANDY SANDFORT               Reply to:  ssandfort@attmail.com
> . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
>
>Punksters,
>
>I've just about had it with posts like Matthew Gream's:
>
>    . . . attempting to play 'smart-ass' to your
>    investigators is only going to result in more problems
>    for you. Its a non-ideal world, and they definitely have
>    the ability to cause you substantial problems.
>
>    . . . I feel it is essential to show them everything
>    that they think is there, and convince them (as they
>    will not be as competent in cryptographic analysis as
>    yourself [at least you hope]) that there is nothing
>    hidden.
>
>Didn't any of you appeasers and apologists read and *understand*
>HACKER CRACKDOWN?  Once you are the focus of an investigation,
>they are already causing you substantial problems.  Cooperation
>only gives your tormentors more ammunition.  You are not going
>to convince them of anything.  You cannot talk your way out of
>anything.  What you can--and will--do is dig yourself in deeper.
>After that, you will probably try to get off the hook by rolling
>over--like a bitch in heat--on your friends and associates.
>
>The ONLY thing that works is (a) stonewall, stonewall, stonewall
>until you get competent legal representation, then (b) do what
>your lawyer's says.  Period.
>
>Consider this your wimp wakeup call.
>
> S a n d y
>~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

A wise mindvox user said recently on the round-table forum:
"If you have nothing to hide and did nothing wrong then you have absolutely
 nothing to lose by keeping quiet"

Having seen many a hacker (and non-hacker) get into trouble over the years,
I'd have to say that Sandy's assesment is correct in the majority of cases.

as for "rolling over--like a bitch in heat-- on your friends and associates"
this too I have seen all too often and many times to little benefit to the
rat who is talking. Dragging other people down with you serves little 
purpose IMHO and is a particularly dispicable and all too common trend among
hackers of recent years.

oh and sandy, I did read the Hacker Crackdown :-)



Let me quote a second recent post:

>Date: Sun, 03 Oct 1993 15:51:55 -0400 (EDT)
>From: Mike Ingle <MIKEINGLE@delphi.com>
>Subject: Excessive Crap & Flamage
>To: cypherpunks@toad.com
>
>This list is becoming completely unreadable! First the POISON PILL and now
>PGP IN FIDO just seem to go on and on. And how many before that?
>(Troglodyte mind-rapists, etc) I've got about a meg of utter crap in my
>email file, most of it unread or skimmed. If people want to fight, why not
>do it in private mail, back up your positions, and then post your
>conclusions if you manage to come up with any. Please don't CC all your
>flames to the list. And please don't echo a three-page post to add one
>line of comments to it.
>
>What happened to all the idealism? Total privacy, cryptophones, digital
>cash, zero-knowledge cooperation, bringing down governments and setting the
>world free? That's what the list is for, not mindless flaming.
>
>Aargggh! MikeIngle@delphi.com
>

although no one is asking me, I'll admit that perhaps this message itself
is guilty of the above. And I am on the verge of unsubscribing after a
couple of months being on the list because the daily time requirement to
keep on top of the messages is exceeding an hour. Perhaps splintering the
list into the following 2 main areas is an option: 

1) A fairly lean-bandwidth list containing technical facts, news articles,
bibliographic info, short source code, etc.

2) A more fluffy-content list containing general comments, opinions, flames,
etc.

Subscription to list 2 would probably necessitate subscription to list 1.
But for those who want the meat without the potatoes, subscription to list 1
is all that would be required.

I recall this coming up about a month and a half ago, more calls for
keeping the messages "pertinent" to the cypherpunk agenda. The problem has
only grown worse.  

Lex








From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: hfinney@shell.portal.com (Hal Finney)
Date: Sun, 3 Oct 93 19:19:03 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: ECPA and Remailers?
Message-ID: <9310040129.AA03083@jobe.shell.portal.com.shell.portal.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Not being a lawyer (despite my recent spate of "legal" posts, which were
based on several hours browsing through the library), I wonder whether any
provisions of the ECPA would apply to anonymous remailers.  Several
operators keep logs of messages and read them, occasionally rebuking
or perhaps even blocking users who send inappropriate messages.  (As
far as I know, no cypherpunks have done blocking, but other remailer
operators have.  Several cypherpunks have said they read messages.)

My feeling is that it is better for me as a remailer operator to have as
little to do with the content of the messages as possible.  I just don't
want to know.  If someone complains I will have, to the best of my ability,
NO POSSIBILITY of breaking the anonymity of the message they were upset
about.  Paradoxically, this very blindness to the content of messages
will, I hope, protect me if and when abusive or illegal messages are sent.

Frankly, I find it paradoxical for remailer operators to try to keep
secret information which will allow them to break the very service they
are providing, anonymity.  I think it represents confusion about just what
they are trying to accomplish.  And I think it could even get them into
trouble if illegal messages go through their systems.  Like the Fido sysops,
in trying to protect themselves they may be exposing themselves to even
more liability.

Hal Finney
hfinney@shell.portal.com




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: fergp@sytex.com (Paul Ferguson)
Date: Sun, 3 Oct 93 16:48:59 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: CuD forward
Message-ID: <610uac1w165w@sytex.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


excerpted from:

>Date:         Sun, 3 Oct 1993 16:49:01 CDT
>From: Cu-Digest <uunet!CMUVM.CSV.CMICH.EDU!tk0jut2%mvs.cso.niu.edu>
>Subject:      Cu Digest, #5.77

- ---

Date: Fri, 1 Oct 93 06:55:38 -0700
From: grady@NETCOM.COM(Grady Ward)
Subject: File 1--Grady Ward DOES NOT Encourage Illegality

Jerry Leichter's <leichter@LRW.COM> comments about me in CuD, Volume 5,
Issue 76 are flatly wrong. I do not and never have encouraged people
to copy or use PGP illegally whatever their jurisdiction.

In this country they ought not to "make, use, or sell" RSA without a
license from PK Partners of Sunnyvale, CA.  Similarly, the IDEA cipher
ought not to be used commercially without a specific commercial
license from Ascom-Tech AG of Switzerland.

If they are non North American nationals then they need to obtain a
copy of PGP from one of several foreign sites such as:

black.ox.ac.uk          (129.67.1.165)
ghost.dsi.unimi.it      (149.132.2.1)
nic.funet.fi            (128.214.6.100)

Depending, of course, on their local laws.

I have been assured by two attorneys that source is NOT an infringing
"device" and can be copied or studied as long as its distribution is
not simply a ploy to evade patent law.  The whole constitutional idea
of a patent centers on the wide dissemination of the underlying ideas
that can be reduced to practice by a "person of ordinary skill" in the
field. Disseminating the ideas underlying a patent is explicitly a
patriotic act in the United States.

In any event individuals become moral creatures by actively making
their own personal choices and not having the ideas that could lead to
an informed choice restricted by the State.

I support the widespread use of strong crypto in the world for two
reasons: It assists physically separate individuals to freely exchange
ideas in greater safety from State interference.  And it
preferentially helps less powerful people since the more powerful
dominating group can simply use the raw force of its state apparatus
to advance its program. It is an equalizer in the quest for coalition
and social justice.

Strong crypto creates communities, not conspiracies.

------------------------------

Date: Thu, 30 Sep 93 17:49:12 -0600
From: "L. Detweiler" <ld231782@LONGS.LANCE.COLOSTATE.EDU>
Subject: File 2--Response to Jerry Leichter in re Moby Crypto

Editor: I strongly object to comments by Jerry Leichter
<leichter@LRW.COM> on the PGP subpoenas in CuD, Volume 5 :  Issue 76.
Mr. Leichter appears to be making contradictory points: even though
the ITAR may be casting FUD and chilling people's actions based on
`poorly drafted regulations whose coverage no one can determine, by
threats and insinuations from government spokesmen that some action is
illegal', he on the other hand admonishes G. Ward for his actions to
date in challenging the law. "Ward is deliberately flaunting it.
Stupid, dangerous idea. Being a revolutionary, putting yourself in
direct opposition to the power of the state, isn't fun and games.
People get hurt that way."

Mr. Leichter does not appear to realize that the most egregious laws
created tend only to be overturned by the most dramatic challenges.
Our own American Revolution is a dramatic instance of this fact. I
have praised G. Ward in email previously as a compelling cyberspatial
hero for his actions in publicizing over Usenet the NSA and State
Department molestations he has been subject to over the past weeks.
Very dramatic constitutional issues are at stake.

Another major reality lapse in Mr. Leichter's somewhat desultory
argument (that appears to have the fundamental message of minimizing
the significance of the Zimmermann-Ward affair) is the following.
Citizens in a society do not live by the laws -- they live by the
*effect* of those laws on their everyday life. Some laws are widely
ignored, such as speed limits. Some are revered with the utmost
respect, such as the rulings of the Supreme Court and the directives
of the President.

Even if no case had ever been brought to court on the ITAR, the
fundamental issue is that the law has an extraordinary dampening force
on certain aspects of current cyberspatial development and enterprise
-- in particular, cryptographic technology intrinsic to a wide variety
of transforming technologies such as digital cash and signatures --
all critical to future progress. An analogy might be this: even though
our judicial system has evolved an elaborate protocol for granting
search warrants, that system is meaningless if people voluntarily
allow police to search their homes. We do *not* live in a world
described by government laws, we live in one that interacts with them
in sometimes unpredictable ways.

Now, let me abandon these vague platitudes immediately for some
cutting specifics relevant to this case. What is the effect on the
ITAR on *domestic* cryptographic development?  The ITAR supposedly
only deals with import and export and in fact that is all the
authority granted by its enabling law, the Arms Export Control Act, to
cover. But the use of the ITAR in practice by government bureaucrats is
apparently to stifle free speech and free press rights of domestic
U.S. citizens. This situation is transparently clear from Grady Ward's
wretched predicament and other noxious affairs that have escaped the
focused attention of many.

In particular, I would like to draw attention to an outstanding effort
by D. Bernstein to demonstrate the sheer oppressive force of the ITAR
as interpreted by the relevant U.S. agencies. In the anonymous FTP
file

ripem.msu.edu:/pub/crypt/docs/shuffle-export-hassles.

is an extraordinary compilation of letters sent between D.  Bernstein
and the Bureau of Politico-Military affairs regarding the ITAR rules.
Mr. Bernstein sought permission to *post* a simple message to the
Usenet group sci.crypt describing a cryptographic technique. The sheer
obstruction he encountered is absolutely appalling. It approaches the
grotesque torture of a totalitarian society in suppressing
information. He required the intervention of his California state
representative merely to get simple mail responses from the
asphyxiating bureaucracy! Moreover, the exchange demonstrates very
clearly that the government *applies* the ITAR not as a law regarding
import and export of material (as the *law* constrains it) but *in
practice* as an instrument to stifle otherwise lawful 1st Amendment
scientific publication. From a letter of 14 July 1993 to A.  A.
Henderson:

>Please note that the State Department is engaging in
>unconstitutional censorship of material which I privately
>developed and which I wish to publish. What you are
>witnessing is a battle over the First Amendment. I believe
>that the [Office of Defense Trade Controls, Bureau of
>Politico-Military Affairs] is acting in violation of the
>Bill of Rights. [They] failed to answer this question:
>"Does ITAR exert prior restraint on otherwise lawful
>publication"?

In these paragraphs I seek to emphasize that the debate goes far
deeper than the mere obnoxious classification of widespread,
public-domain cryptgraphic algorithms and techniques as `munitions'.
The debate surrounding the ITAR cuts to the core of many democratic
issues. The ITAR is updated with alarming frequency and changed with
disturbing ease. Its revision seems to occur in complete defiance of a
regular and open legislative process. Even top *experts* on the law
cannot keep up with all the modifications. As a frightening example of
this, take the case of U.S. vs.  Martinez, where Elizabeth Martinez
and her fiance were convicted of violating the Arms Export Control Act
by exporting `cryptographic hardware' -- a satellite TV video
descrambling device, `Videocipher II'. Apparently, by some magic
bureaucratic whim, it is now *legal* to export such equipment under the
ITAR! I doubt Mrs. Martinez is consoled by this news, after being
consumed and rebuffed even on appeal.

I consider the ITAR one of the most totalitarian documents our
government has ever produced. G. Ward and P. Zimmerman are modern
cyberspatial heroes for their bold, direct challenges of it. In
classifying `disclosure of information to foreign nationals' as
*export* we find the same institutional paranoia and cyberspatial
ignorance seen in the Cold-War era Soviet Union in e.g. restricting
Xerox machines. The irony is that in both cases, the paranoia is
entirely justified, even necessary, within the context of preserving
the illegitimate status quo. This oppression forms the basic
foundation of support for the two most totalitarian systems of the
20th century -- one defunct, the other with the initials N.S.A.

------------------------------

Paul Ferguson               |   privacy \'pri-va-see\ n, pl, -cies;
Mindbank Consulting Group   |   1: the quality or state of being apart
Fairfax, Virginia USA       |   from others  2: secrecy
fergp@sytex.com             |
ferguson@icp.net            |   Privacy -- Use it or lose it.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: christophe m johnson <cmj@acsu.buffalo.edu>
Date: Sun, 3 Oct 93 16:44:34 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: How do I subscribe to the cypherpunks list, or join the group?
Message-ID: <199310032343.TAA19879@autarch.acsu.buffalo.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


-----BEGIN PGP MESSAGE-----
Version: 2.3a

hDwCGdGCGGWZy6cBAX9US8GSMhlaG5XC2oJcVm6SEOe5xWw7Gb0rNfp7NJ/x245Y
y2Jth6LrZRf+sVhzE3imAAACF69mSFFgfX1Ho2OAfdnFwIi3E7GJi+BPV5/BTNo9
+JPSsmZMObddH8VLqXMFvHcbdJJvNzDq9r4cgkmYHHUknvZIKKzJ7QTnAoGr0XW4
N34Zshejxs+KgogJxwq8pnBnspBZ3qYp9z5BtmcaexAjY8VZNVQ4CiZC3uAZf2TH
pKj/Y4ufvS+TBVbTZM0jNyjzNpOC+owQcotkDFJdmiBC/9f83rPz323r2ksSyUwU
vabHRqDRzryqNvhsKBkV8bW80ZMXmom16Eq8lgBtzbM/SR69+Pjbu+g0vczy07c0
Q8zNO7G60YcJuS8/D0TGBHH97H7SYs1fsL1gvR/OFmvtwhjTMNx2XjNgBThWoKyP
0rGYBAwnC3CxaK+quGOB9HDvfPZhtYHw7fP5uYGF8uFiia/fz0x28ngS6edzPILE
HWhV/4bT8RWTBBNaP6enciY/bTIOFRfXvg4eVBvLfPTxfO8hY7lvD5xr207JYGsu
YIKnr/Vcq+q7z/8govz+YgXF/Egx4xRzIYkwy6Igg4+aIUl+NC0nxwyhQZeg3ov6
WZqnM799GC3qddPIcAOUzEWuBTr0M67O7Op4ipeFzf5wypEpESdnEZHd+VfBfzvC
rZn7K3aOnPJ8nwNgd4JHjiZzXM0R17+V6FPSx/pP1kyHtOfNA3G+18eTyAK2wMko
VUOhy3/jNcQNePGreeYT/qBg/lNcx1tEsP0=
=hYSg
-----END PGP MESSAGE-----




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Mike Godwin <mnemonic@eff.org>
Date: Sun, 3 Oct 93 16:49:34 PDT
To: mimir@u.washington.edu (Al Billings)
Subject: Re: PGP in FIDO
In-Reply-To: <Pine.3.05z.9310030102.A11917-a100000@carson.u.washington.edu>
Message-ID: <199310032349.AA06425@eff.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


 
Al Billings writes:

>  Hasn't happened yet and the ECPA was passed in what? 1986? I really doubt
> if a BBS sysop is going to get nailed over someone's view of e-mail on
> their system.

There's a new consciousness of ECPA thanks in part to the efforts of EFF
and to Steve Jackson's successful ECPA case.

But, Al, the issue is less whether a particular sysop is going to be
prosecuted under ECPA than it is whether that sysop's conduct is *both*
legal and ethical.

Even if a sysop's policies fit within ECPA exceptions, it's dishonest to
justify such policies in terms of risks that don't exist. There is no
documented risk that a sysop will be at greater legal liability if he or
she allows encrypted mail.


--Mike






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Eli Brandt <ebrandt@jarthur.Claremont.EDU>
Date: Sun, 3 Oct 93 19:54:34 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: ECPA and Remailers?
In-Reply-To: <9310040129.AA03083@jobe.shell.portal.com.shell.portal.com>
Message-ID: <9310040253.AA03023@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> or perhaps even blocking users who send inappropriate messages.  (As
> far as I know, no cypherpunks have done blocking, but other remailer
> operators have.  Several cypherpunks have said they read messages.)

Speaking of which... I thought I had been keeping a collection of
remailer policies as posted here, but it seems to have evaporated.
If anyone else has been logging these, could you mail me a copy,
or perhaps send the gist to the list?  (ack, sorry)

   Eli   ebrandt@jarthur.claremont.edu




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Mike Godwin <mnemonic@eff.org>
Date: Sun, 3 Oct 93 17:19:34 PDT
To: pmetzger@lehman.com
Subject: Re: PGP in Fidonet
In-Reply-To: <9310031721.AA26808@snark.lehman.com>
Message-ID: <199310040016.AA06558@eff.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


 
Perry Metzger writes:

> > 1]  On a privately-owned computer...
> > 2]  Operating a noncommercial BBS without monetary compensation...
> > 3]  On which a repeating log-on notice informs users that all messages
> >     are subject to sysop viewing...
> > 4]  Sysop/sole owner viewing of non-public (as opposed to "private")
> >     messages during system maintenance or monitoring for unlawful
> >     activity...
> > 5]  Is prosecutable under ECPA?
> 
> Gee, you are starting to catch on, aren't you? 
 
Perry, he actually does touch on one exception under ECPA--viewing of
non-public messages during normal system maintenance. Also, a sysop can't
monitor for unlawful activity in general, but he or she can monitor
activity that may relate to the protection of the system from, say,
intruders. Think of this latter as the Cuckoo's Egg exception.

> > In any case, I am informed hobby sysops have been arrested and their
> > systems seized for allegedly illegal traffic on their systems 
> 
> Mike Godwin, council to the EFF, has never heard of such a case. If
> you believe one has occured, why don't you tell us precisely where and
> when it occured?

Let me be precise. I do know of systems that have been seized, not for
some crime of "illegal traffic," but because law enforcement believed that
the system contained evidence of a crime. I know of no case in which a
sysop has been "arrested" merely because of allowing so-called "illegal
traffic" that he or she didn't know about.



--Mike






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Mike Godwin <mnemonic@eff.org>
Date: Sun, 3 Oct 93 17:18:58 PDT
To: erc@apple.com
Subject: Re: PGP in Fidonet
In-Reply-To: <m0ojXWd-00022EC@khijol>
Message-ID: <199310040018.AA06573@eff.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


 
Ed Carp writes:

> How about that case recently posted about here?  Doesn't that count?

If you're talking about the Connecticut case, no, it doesn't count. That
case doesn't involve mail.


--Mike






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Mike Godwin <mnemonic@eff.org>
Date: Sun, 3 Oct 93 17:24:34 PDT
To: Jim.Cannell@f21.n216.z1.fidonet.org (Jim Cannell)
Subject: Re: FIDOnet encryption (or lack thereof)
In-Reply-To: <43862.2CAF3D72@ns.fidonet.org>
Message-ID: <199310040022.AA06627@eff.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


 
Jim writes:

> FidoNet policy has a statement allowing monitoring of all intransit
> mail.  I guess I'm going to have to dig my copy of Policy out of the
> archives to post the relevant paragraphs.
>  Jim Cannell      Internet: Jim.Cannell@f21.n216.z1.fidonet.org
If all users of FidoNet systems read this and agree with it prior to using
mail, then there's probably not an ECPA problem.


--Mike






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Al Billings <mimir@u.washington.edu>
Date: Sun, 3 Oct 93 20:29:02 PDT
To: Mike Godwin <mnemonic@eff.org>
Subject: Re: PGP in FIDO
In-Reply-To: <199310032349.AA06425@eff.org>
Message-ID: <Pine.3.05z.9310032042.A4683-a100000@carson.u.washington.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



On Sun, 3 Oct 1993, Mike Godwin wrote:

> But, Al, the issue is less whether a particular sysop is going to be
> prosecuted under ECPA than it is whether that sysop's conduct is *both*
> legal and ethical.
> 
> Even if a sysop's policies fit within ECPA exceptions, it's dishonest to
> justify such policies in terms of risks that don't exist. There is no
> documented risk that a sysop will be at greater legal liability if he or
> she allows encrypted mail.

True and if I had netmail set up for my system, I would probably allow
encrypted netmail. I already offer the latest version of PGP (source and
executable) to my users. The sysop ultimately has the right to choose if
he or she allows encrypted mail on his or her system. After all, the sysop
owns the machine and pays the bills, especially since most Fidonet sites
are hobby sites with no fees for access.

Wassail,
Al Billings







From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: DON_HENSON@delphi.com
Date: Sun, 3 Oct 93 17:28:58 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: NPR?
Message-ID: <01H3OT0XYV288ZF0E2@delphi.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


cvoid wirtes: -->

Has anyone considered forwarding and/or send NPR an information packet to
help bring the encryption/clipper issues to the general public, or is that
looked upon as a bad idea?

<--

I'm in favor of getting the word out on the Clipper/Skipjack problem but 
I don't think sending a note to NPR is going to do it.  They have a long 
history of extremely biased (toward the government view) reporting.

Don Henson
PGP key on server or on request





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "L. Detweiler" <ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Date: Sun, 3 Oct 93 19:44:34 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: BBS seizures
Message-ID: <9310040243.AA28056@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


some annoying anonymous FIDONet apologist writes:
>In any case, I am informed hobby sysops have been arrested and their
>systems seized for allegedly illegal traffic on their systems of which
>they claim to have had no knowledge.  I believe this is the case in the
>CT case pending.  

First of all, the Connecticut case you seem to be referring to is that
of Michael Elansky (Hartford). See Computer Underground Digest for full
details. This was *not* email. He had file downloads and kept around
(uh) "fireworks recipes".

We've got to track down these supposed cases where boards were seized
for content. I consider them minor *anomalies*, and I think a rational
analysis of statistics will bear that out. Turning a board into a
systematic exercise in privacy violation is *not* the proper response
to paranoia about law enforcement seizures. This punishes users for the
misdeeds of overzealous officers. Sort of like ``because Steve Jackson
was raided we have to monitor all traffic'' or ``because there are 50K
missing children a year, you can't go outside to play''. Read the
*scalding* decision handed down by the judge in the S.J. case on T.
Foley and decide what the law *really* says about BBS seizures and
operator responsibility.

Don't these Fidonet operators *understand* that by perpetuating the
myth that they are responsible for all traffic on their machines, that
they are actually *playing into* the hands of authorities? they are
*strengthening* the paranoid atmosphere. And in fact I am quite
repulsed by their policies, posted here, that seem to cutely
rationalize systematic invasion of privacy. IMHO FIDOnet operators are
perpetuating that sort of media-hysteria-frenzy associated with illegal
activities on boards by their warped policies. The outcome of Steve
Jackson case should foster glasnost, ease, and freedom among the
operators, but instead it appears to have had the opposite effect on
FidoNet operators, who have done a fine job of erecting a vast,
oppressive network of systematic surveillance more appropriate to the NSA.

>Even if these cases are eventually dismissed, the
>legal expense and personal disruption to a private party (usually a
>young person of very limited means) is catastrophic and without
>practical recourse.

But this is absurd. There may be legal expenses associated with any
illegal seizure. One may be subject to seizure and involved in a
judicial process no matter *what* the policies. Would you rather
approach that process saying that `I have no knowledge of illegal
activity, I don't monitor any email traffic' or `uh, as far as I've
seen nothing illegal is going on, and I know *everything* that's going
on' or worse, `gee, somehow that one slipped by'?

At the *very minimum* there should be no restrictions on cryptography
use. And if they want to join cyberspatial society, they are going to
have to drop their silly paranoias and bizarre policies and routine
privacy invasion.

Fidonet operators wallowing in delusion and hysteria appear to have
missed an article by Joe Abernathy in the  Houston Chronicle ~Feb 1, 1993:

  > AUSTIN -- An electronic civil rights case against the Secret
  > Service closed Thursday with a clear statement by federal
  > District Judge Sam Sparks that the Service failed to conduct a
  > proper investigation in a notorious computer crime crackdown,
  > and went too far in retaining  custody of seized equipment.
  >
  > Secret Service Special Agent Timothy Foley of Chicago, who was in
  > charge of three Austin computer search-and-seizures on March 1,
  > 1990, that led to the lawsuit, stoically endured Spark's rebuke
  > over the Service's poor investigation and abusive computer
  > seizure policies.  While the Service has seized dozens of
  > computers since the crackdown began in 1990, this is the first
  > case to challenge the practice.
  >
  > Sparks grew visibly angry when it was established that the Austin
  > science fiction magazine and game book publisher was never
  > suspected of a crime, and that agents did not do even marginal
  > research to establish a criminal connection between the firm and
  > the suspected illegal activities of an employee, or to determine
  > that the company was a publisher. Indeed, agents testified that
  > they were not even trained in the Privacy Protection Act at the
  > special Secret Service school on computer crime.
  >
  > "How long would it have taken you, Mr. Foley, to find out what
  > Steve Jackson Games did, what it was?" asked Sparks. "An hour?
  >
  > "Was there any reason why, on March 2, you could not return to
  > Steve Jackson Games a copy, in floppy disk form, of everything
  > taken?
  >
  > "Did you read the article in Business Week magazine where it had
  > a picture of Steve Jackson -- a law-abiding, tax-paying citizen
  > -- saying he was a computer crime suspect?
  >
  > "Did it ever occur to you, Mr. Foley, that seizing this material
  > could harm Steve Jackson economically?"
  >
  > Foley replied, "No, sir," but the judge offered his own answer.
  >
  > "You actually did, you just had no idea anybody would actually go
  > out and hire a lawyer and sue you."
  >
  > More than $200,000 has been spent by the Electronic Frontier
  > Foundation in bringing the case to trial. The EFF was founded by
  > Mitchell Kapor amid a civil liberties movement sparked in large
  > part by the Secret Service computer crime crackdown.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Karl Lui Barrus <klbarrus@owlnet.rice.edu>
Date: Sun, 3 Oct 93 19:04:34 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Single Value Pseudonyms
Message-ID: <9310040200.AA12533@flammulated.owlnet.rice.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> Karl Barrus posted this, and I've been meaning to respond to it.
> Basically  Karl's scheme doesn't work.  With any cut-and-choose
> protocol, there must be some assurance that the two things offered

What?  It doesn't work?  Care to elaborate?

I mean, a person can satisfy to any degree desired that the last
unblinded document is of a particular value.

I agree that it becomes real expensive to do so, and for digital
banking purposes, there are several alternatives: 1) all cash is of
same denomination, 2) different exponents for different
denominations, 3) different keys for different denominations.

I think I mentioned the application towards digital cash is a bit
forced because of the above.  The real point is in avoiding signing
a blinded document that is later unblinded to reveal something
undesirable, in which case the signature and the document signed
have value.  The application of cut-and-choose I described applies
best when for some reason (poor choices of the bank?) the document
itself contains value, like the denomination it represents.

-- 
Karl L. Barrus: klbarrus@owlnet.rice.edu         
keyID: 5AD633 hash: D1 59 9D 48 72 E9 19 D5  3D F3 93 7E 81 B5 CC 32 

"One man's mnemonic is another man's cryptography" 
  - my compilers prof discussing file naming in public directories



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "L. Detweiler" <ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Date: Sun, 3 Oct 93 20:54:43 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: FBI on BBS operator liability (fwd)
Message-ID: <9310040350.AA28995@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


also from

Computer underground Digest    Sun  Oct 3 1993   Volume 5 : Issue 77
                           ISSN  1004-042X

===cut=here===

Date: Thu, 30 Sep 1993 11:38:00 -0400 (EDT)
From: "Daniel P. Lieber - (617) 642-7697." <LIEBER_DANI@BENTLEY.EDU>
Subject: File 4--Summary of BBLISA meeting (CuD 5.75)

         Account of BBLISA Meeting (posted in CuD #5.75)

     On Wed., Sept. 29, the BBLISA (Back Bay [Boston] Large
Installation Systems Administration Group) group had their monthly
meeting where they hosted both an FBI agent and a federal
prosecutor from the U.S. Attorney General's office.  Both speakers
were knowledgeable about the subject and tried to answer all of the
questions that they could. (I am omitting names as I am not sure of
the correct spelling or titles -- both were substitutes for the
original speakers.)

     After a brief welcoming by the leader of the group, the
prosecutor spoke extensively on the different types of intruders
into systems.  Her particular area of expertise in the field of
"computer crime" is with kiddie porn.  However, she was
knowledgeable on the major topic at hand -- intrusions.

     The most common and least threatening type of break-in artists
are the solo hackers and crackers (usually young males) who break
into systems for the thrill and to brag about their accomplishment.
Usually, they cause little or no damage and no crime is
prosecutable (just utilizing resources is not prosecutable).  By
far, the most serious threat is internal.  Disgruntled workers and
recently dismissed employees cause the most damage and are usually
motivated by revenge and want to inflict injury.  The third type of
intrusion, for-profit, is growing rapidly.  This includes bank and
ATM fraud, among other types of information theft.

     The FBI agent relayed stories about cases he has worked on and
the scope of the FBI office in Boston.  To be investigatable by the
FBI, a monetary or equivalent loss must be $100,000 or the loss
must be shared amongst many different parties.  He also informed us
that there are no agents that just cruise around BBSs looking for
crime.  The FBI is too busy to do that.

     From the information discussed at the meeting, there were some
conclusions and suggestions that were brought out:
  *  System banners informing all users that unauthorized access is
     prohibited and that privacy is limited are helpful.
  *  E-mail is usually considered private unless specifically
     stated otherwise.
  *  System administrators are not obligated to report illegal
     activities that they detect on their systems.
  *  Law enforcement does not like to confiscate systems and will
     usually get the information out of the machine without taking
     it.
  *  To be prosecuted for a crime utilizing a computer, the
     defendant must have prior knowledge of the criminal materials
     or intent.

     For more information on BBLISA, send a message to
majordomo@cs.umb.edu with the subject line: subscribe bblisa.  Next
month's meeting will discuss large-site Internet services.

                                             --Daniel Lieber,
                                               Systems Manager-
                                               _The Vanguard_
                                               at Bentley College




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: nate@VIS.ColoState.EDU (CVL staff member Nate Sammons)
Date: Sun, 3 Oct 93 20:59:34 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com (Cypherpunks Mailing List)
Subject: Elm 2.4 patch
Message-ID: <9310040359.AA11447@vangogh.VIS.ColoState.EDU>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----


I have written an Elm 2.4 patch for remailing, anon service, and
signing/encrypting of mail.

ftp://129.82.156.104/pub/elmhack/*

- -nate

- -- 
+--------------------------------------------------------------------
| Nate Sammons   email: nate@VIS.ColoState.Edu
|      Colorado State University Computer Visualization Laboratory
|      Finger nate@monet.VIS.ColoState.Edu for my PGP key
|      #include <std.disclaimer>
|                                    Always remember "Brazil"



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Mike Godwin <mnemonic@eff.org>
Date: Sun, 3 Oct 93 19:14:34 PDT
To: doug@netcom.com (Doug Merritt)
Subject: Re: PGP in Fidonet
In-Reply-To: <9310040039.AA14817@netcom6.netcom.com>
Message-ID: <199310040212.AA07208@eff.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


 
Doug writes:

> Some time back (maybe quite a long time ago, I forget) I heard rumors
> that a BBS that someone had uploaded child porn or some such to,
> without the sysop's knowledge, resulted in the sysop's arrest. Was that
> merely a rumor?
> 
> Or is that a different category than the mail traffic you're commenting on?

Uploading a GIF to a BBS is definitely a different issue from those raised
by ECPA, which has to do with electronic mail. For one thing, presumably
an uploaded GIF is not a private message, so there's no reason for the
sysop or anyone else not to look at it.

In a child-porn case, the sysop may be arrested, but his criminal
liability will likely depend on whether he knows about the image and his
knowledge can be proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.

Nothing I have written here should be construed as telling sysops they
can't look at a) public files on their systems, and b) private files on
their systems that aren't communications.


--Mike







From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Christian Void <cvoid@netcom.com>
Date: Sun, 3 Oct 93 22:49:02 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: NPR?
In-Reply-To: <9310040301.AA28351@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Message-ID: <Pine.3.05.9310032222.A10859-b100000@netcom3>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain




On Sun, 3 Oct 1993, L. Detweiler wrote:

> >Has anyone considered forwarding and/or send NPR an information packet to
> >help bring the encryption/clipper issues to the general public, or is that
> >looked upon as a bad idea?
> 
> I think I may have called them once. didn't get a call back.
                     ^^^^^^

They do have a mail address via AOL, and IMHO are not biased towards anything
except the left wing. Getting them to discuss the Clipper/Crypto issue on the
science program could help get it out in the open in a positive manner,
rather than waiting for someone to have his equipment/life seized, or some
other such thing making it's way into the mainstream, and thus causing the
general public to be biased towards the government (which is what we don't
want).

Christian Void /T71 | "I don't like it, and I'm sorry I | VMResearch, Inc.
cvoid@netcom.COM    | ever had anything to do with it." | P.O. Box 170213
Tel. 1+415-807-5491 |  -Erwin Schrodinger  (1887-1961)  | SF, CA  94117
                * PGP v2.3a Public Key Available Via Finger *







From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Perry E. Metzger" <pmetzger@lehman.com>
Date: Sun, 3 Oct 93 19:54:43 PDT
To: Mike Godwin <mnemonic@eff.org>
Subject: Re: FIDOnet encryption (or lack thereof)
In-Reply-To: <199310040022.AA06627@eff.org>
Message-ID: <9310040250.AA27817@snark.lehman.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Mike Godwin says:
>  
> Jim writes:
> 
> > FidoNet policy has a statement allowing monitoring of all intransit
> > mail.  I guess I'm going to have to dig my copy of Policy out of the
> > archives to post the relevant paragraphs.
> >  Jim Cannell      Internet: Jim.Cannell@f21.n216.z1.fidonet.org
> If all users of FidoNet systems read this and agree with it prior to using
> mail, then there's probably not an ECPA problem.

Mike;

Wouldn't users outside of Fidonet sending mail to Fidonet users also
have to agree to the terms, or is it sufficient for all Fidonet users
to have agreed?

Perry




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Karl Lui Barrus <klbarrus@owlnet.rice.edu>
Date: Sun, 3 Oct 93 20:54:34 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: ECPA and Remailers?
In-Reply-To: <9310040253.AA03023@toad.com>
Message-ID: <9310040352.AA24438@flammulated.owlnet.rice.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Eli Brandt wrote:
>
>Speaking of which... I thought I had been keeping a collection of
>remailer policies as posted here, but it seems to have evaporated.
>If anyone else has been logging these, could you mail me a copy,
>or perhaps send the gist to the list?  (ack, sorry)

Sure, but there is also a copy of posted remailer policies at the
gopher site, in a directory under "Anonymous Mail".  

Except for Christian Odhner's since I haven't extracted it out of the
message it was in yet :-)

-- 
Karl L. Barrus: klbarrus@owlnet.rice.edu         
keyID: 5AD633 hash: D1 59 9D 48 72 E9 19 D5  3D F3 93 7E 81 B5 CC 32 

"One man's mnemonic is another man's cryptography" 
  - my compilers prof discussing file naming in public directories



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Martin.Greifer@f28.n125.z1.FIDONET.ORG (Martin Greifer)
Date: Mon, 4 Oct 93 04:49:07 PDT
To: Cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: ...
Message-ID: <3220.2CAFCCBB@shelter.FIDONET.ORG>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


@>1:125/1@fidonet

To: hal@alumni.caltech.edu

::
Request-Remailing-To: remail@extropia.wimsey.com

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___ Blue Wave/QWK v2.12
--  
Martin Greifer - via FidoNet node 1:125/1
UUCP: ...!uunet!kumr!shelter!28!Martin.Greifer
INTERNET: Martin.Greifer@f28.n125.z1.FIDONET.ORG




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: remail@tamsun.tamu.edu
Date: Sun, 3 Oct 93 22:09:57 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Another application for stego (was POISON PILL)
Message-ID: <9310040509.AA25224@tamsun.tamu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Matthew Gream:
> ....if you have something
> you _don't_ want found, then simply encrypting it leaving it sitting on 
> your system is probably not going to work. You may decide not to answer
> any questions about it, you may refuse and so on, but they are going to
> want the magic little key and keep pressing (maybe while you are under
> oath). To prevent any of this occuring, the best approach (in my mind) is
> to encrypt it into a form that will never be suspect as anything more than
> harmless, trivial, information.

Interesting: an application of steganography that is quite useful
even where crypto is legal.






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "L. Detweiler" <ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Date: Sun, 3 Oct 93 23:19:01 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: WestWord article - YOW!
Message-ID: <9310040618.AA01365@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I've been putting off responding to the WestWord Zimmermann article
immediately to digest the spectacular prose -- This is a FANTASTIC
article! It *almost* surpasses Markoff for sheer color and technical
mastery! (<g>) This is INCREDIBLE propaganda for the cypherpunk cause.
E. Dexheimer writes like he is a cypherpunk list subscriber! We have
*everything*: *pricelessly* memorable quotes by Gilmore, Bidzos,
Denning, Zimmermann, Diffie, Rotenberg. We have a mention of the
Cypherpunks. We have the NSA. Dexheimer has a *dazzling* nose for the
essential areas and most  momentous, and cutting quotes.

A few points to be made. First, it brings deals with the PGP-pedophile
aspect head on and in an ultimately redeeming way. We have to face that
concealing criminal behavior is very intrinsic to cryptographic
techniques, but, as PRZ says, the bottom line is:

>He also concedes that, despite what law enforcement officers say about
>him being irresponsible for publishing PGP he is trouble by people who
>use the software for unsavory purposes. The William Steen case, for
>instance, unnerved him. "This is not a black-and-white issue to me,"
>Zimmermann says. "The thought of a child molester out there using PGP
>does keep me up at nights. I think the benefits will outweigh the cost
>to society, though."

This is characteristic of the article's outstanding balance. Virtually
every point of contention is mapped out in critical detail on both
sides. Another example of this is how PRZ rebuts claims of the software
being for personal profit as saying he `has a history of political activism'.

Other amazingly ironic observations in the article stand out. Perhaps
the most damaging quote is completely nullified by a later element of the story:

"Phil Zimmermann? He's a dirtbag," spits out Brian Kennedy, the
detective who headed up the Steen investigation. "He's an irresponsible
person who takes credit for his invention without taking responsibility
for its effect. He's protected people who are preying on children. I
hope that someday he'll get what he deserves."

Later the  ``California computer-crime expert William Sternow called in
on the case'' says:

>In perhaps the greatest testimony to Zimmermann's program, even those
>who condemn the programmer for irresponsibly releasing PGP continue to
>use his software. "It's a great program," concedes Sacramento computer
>expert Sternow. "We recommend in our training to cops that they use it
>to encrypt their stuff." Sternow estimates that more than 500 law
>enforcement officers currently use PGP.

So we have the stark irony that the `authorities' simultaneously
condemn and praise Zimmermann -- the former when it obstructs their
job, the latter when it aids it.

The other main point to be made is that the author has an
*extraordinary* grasp of the public key and RSA technology (and
virtually every other aspect of the entire complex story). In fact, his
technical description for the layman is so masterful I simply find it
hard to believe Dexheimer has not had previous exposure to the topic.

The quotes are absolutely so sterling I *have* to cut them out.
Cypherpunks, please stick 'em in your signatures.

Finally, regarding the posting, does anybody know anything about all
those groups that were listed by `S. Boxx'? I think I might have been
the first to come up with `CRAM' (in a satirical post on the NY
cybertax) but all those others I thought were disconnected. It looks
like the person is just throwing in a lot of sinister-sounding labels
to upset the police and NSA! a little electronic graffiti!

One other thing -- why is a Colorado newspaper breaking that California
Steen case wide open? Isn't there any press reports on it in
California? Why haven't we seen any from you lazy CA cypherpunks, anyway? <g>


===cut=here===

``The task was given to us to decrypt this stuff. And to this day we
have not been able to do it.''
--William Sternow, California computer-crime expert.

(yeah, right -- a `computer crime expert' has a chance at discovering a
polynomial-time factoring algorithm!)

``Phil Zimmermann? He's a dirtbag.  He's an irresponsible person who
takes credit for his invention without taking responsibility for its
effect. He's protected people who are preying on children. I hope that
someday he'll get what he deserves.''
--Brian Kennedy, Sacramento head detective.

``I get mail from people in the Eastern Bloc saying how much they
appreciate PGP-- `Thanks for doing it.' When I'm talking to Americans
about this, a lot of them don't understand why I'd be so paranoid about
the government. But people in police states, you don't have to explain
it to them. They already get it. And they don't understand why we don't.''
--PRZ

``PGP could potentially become a widespread problem.''
--Dorothy Denning, Georgetown University professor and National
Security Agency consultant

(good lord, what a FANTASTIC quote! there is a god!)

``Phil seems very eager to let people believe what he wants them to
believe.  He likes to perpetuate the idea of his being a folk hero.''
--D. James Bidzos, President, RSA Data Securities Inc.

``Phil didn't invent the engine, but he did fit it inside the Ford.''
--David Banisar, analyst, Computer Professionals for Social
Responsibility in Washington, D.C. 

``PGP has done a good deal for the practice of cryptology.  It's close
to my heart because it's close to my original objectives.''
--Whitfield Diffie, Sun Microsystems

``It's a great program. We recommend in our training to cops that they
use it to encrypt their stuff.''
--Sacramento computer expert William Sternow

``Phil showed that an ordinary guy just reading the papers that already
existed could put together an encryption system that the Nation
Security Agency could break "It took a certain amount of bravery to put
this out, because at the time the government was talking about
restrictions on cryptography.''
--John Gilmore, Cypherpunk founder

``Basically, we said, `What the fuck?' ''
--D. James Bidzos, President, RSA Data Securities Inc.

``I decided to give PGP away in the interests of changing society, which
it is now doing. The whole reason I got involved was politics. I did
not miss mortgage payments in the hopes of getting rich. Just look at
my bookshelf. I'm a politically committed person with a history of
political activism.''
--PRZ

``I respect copyrights. But what we're talking about there is a patent
on a math formula. It's like Isaac Newton patenting Force = Mass x
Acceleration. You'd have to pay royalty every time you threw a baseball.''
--PRZ

``I can't comment on the investigation.''
--William Keane, assistant U.S. attorney, San Hose

``The law just can't keep up with the technology. Somebody in Palo Alto
learns something, and pretty soon somebody in Moscow is going to know
about the same thing. There's nothing you can do about it.''
--PRZ lawyer Phil Dubois

``This is not a black-and-white issue to me.  The thought of a child
molester out there using PGP does keep me up at nights. I think the
benefits will outweigh the cost
to society, though.''
--PRZ

``In the nuclear freeze movement, it was like I was a flea on the back
of a dinosaur," he says. "Now I feel like I'm a hamster on the back of
a dinosaur. Or maybe a poodle.''
--PRZ




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "L. Detweiler" <ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Date: Mon, 4 Oct 93 00:44:35 PDT
To: Christian Void <cvoid@netcom.com>
Subject: Re: NPR?
In-Reply-To: <Pine.3.05.9310032222.A10859-b100000@netcom3>
Message-ID: <9310040740.AA02625@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


you have committed a major faux paux. please DO NOT QUOTE MY PRIVATE
EMAIL TO CYPHERPUNKS WITH MY NAME. furthermore DO NOT APOLOGIZE TO THE
LIST on this. although, I definitely deserve one privately.

[NPR]
>They do have a mail address via AOL

what is it?




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: greg@ideath.goldenbear.com (Greg Broiles)
Date: Mon, 4 Oct 93 04:24:39 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: BBS seizures
In-Reply-To: <9310040243.AA28056@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Message-ID: <DL2Vac1w164w@ideath.goldenbear.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


"L. Detweiler" <uunet!longs.lance.colostate.edu!ld231782> writes:

> We've got to track down these supposed cases where boards were seized
> for content. I consider them minor *anomalies*, and I think a rational

I think a man named Tom Tcimpidis was busted in the L.A. area in the early
eighties because of content; if I remember the facts correctly, codes
were posted to his board without his knowledge, and he was convicted for 
illegal possession of long distance access codes. I grepped through early 
copies of Phrack and poked around on the EFF archive, but can't find 
anything relevant; does anyone else remember this? Anyone have access to 
LEXIS/Westlaw?


--
Greg Broiles
greg@goldenbear.com                     Baked, not fried.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: habs@panix.com (Harry S. Hawk)
Date: Mon, 4 Oct 93 00:29:04 PDT
To: Mike Godwin <doug@netcom.com (Doug Merritt)
Subject: Re: PGP in Fidonet
Message-ID: <199310040726.AA03042@panix.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


At 10:12 PM 10/3/93 -0400, Mike Godwin wrote:
>Uploading a GIF to a BBS is definitely a different issue from those raised
>by ECPA, which has to do with electronic mail.

> private files ontheir systems that aren't communications.

Situtation:

I assume this is a gray area. But let's say at a meeting of friends
in one state (e.g., Boulder Creek, Ca), we create a Video message, 
digitize it, and sent it to that friend, by uploading into an 
account that I (habs) and the friend (rjc) has joint access to?

Questions:

Is that communications? Is it private? What if the message contains
images that might be considered "adult"?

Would it be different if that file was e-mailed or FTPed rather
than uploaded.


Or, let's say I put in some very public FTP site, but used RSA to
legally encrypt it with my friend's public key? Would it be 
private communications or public?


--
Harry S. Hawk           ON Vacation






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: geoffw@nexsys.net (Geoff White)
Date: Mon, 4 Oct 93 06:44:41 PDT
To: sfraves@techno.stanford.edu
Subject: News: where to get them
Message-ID: <9310041334.AA03053@nexsys.net>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Topic 553News: where to get themRUSSIA@ARIZVM1.ccit.arizona.edubitl.russia 1:30 pm  Oct  3, 1993

Reply-To: Russia & her neighbors <RUSSIA@ARIZVM1.ccit.arizona.edu>
From: Serge Viznyuk <VIZNYUK@MPS.OHIO-STATE.EDU>
Subject:      News: where to get them

---------------------- Information from the mail header -----------------------
Sender:       Russia & her neighbors <RUSSIA@ARIZVM1.BITNET>
Poster:       Serge Viznyuk <VIZNYUK@MPS.OHIO-STATE.EDU>
Subject:      News: where to get them
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------

The latest news from Interfax and Postfactum
in Russian (KOI-8) are available also on
newcom.kiae.su  NNTP server
on relcom.politics newsgroup

newcom.kiae.su  network address is 144.206.136.5




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: smb@research.att.com
Date: Mon, 4 Oct 93 03:54:38 PDT
To: "L. Detweiler" <ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Subject: Re: FBI on BBS operator liability (fwd)
Message-ID: <9310041054.AA10031@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


	 (just utilizing resources is not prosecutable).

It's worth mentioning that that's true of Federal law, but isn't
necessarily true of state law.  For example, California Penal Code
section 502 provides for the conviction of anyone who ``knowingly and
without permission accesses or causes to be accessed any computer,
computer system, or computer network''.  Some other states have similar
provisions.

			--Steve Bellovin




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Mike Godwin <mnemonic@eff.org>
Date: Mon, 4 Oct 93 04:34:39 PDT
To: pmetzger@lehman.com
Subject: Re: FIDOnet encryption (or lack thereof)
In-Reply-To: <9310040250.AA27817@snark.lehman.com>
Message-ID: <199310041132.AA08645@eff.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Perry writes:

> Wouldn't users outside of Fidonet sending mail to Fidonet users also
> have to agree to the terms, or is it sufficient for all Fidonet users
> to have agreed?

If the recipients of mail originating outside of Fidonet agree to disclose
their communications to sysops, there's no ECPA violation.


--Mike







From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: m5@vail.tivoli.com (Mike McNally)
Date: Mon, 4 Oct 93 05:49:47 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: PGP in FIDO
In-Reply-To: <199310021906.AA13098@xtropia>
Message-ID: <9310041243.AA29441@vail.tivoli.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



anonymous@extropia.wimsey.com writes:
 > Anyway, the ECPA is basically irrelevant in the BBS world, as 1] almost
 > every BBS states at log-on that there is no such thing as truly
 > "private" e-mail on the system as the sysop can, will and does see
 > messages in all areas, and 2] he is personally _liable_ for any illegal
 > activity on his BBS, so he can reasonably be expected to keep an eye on
 > e-mail for anything that will put his ass in a sling.

Ok, this is really getting bizarre.  Why is it so hard to accept that
the ECPA---federal law of the land---applies to BBS operators in the
United States?  It may be a pain in the butt, and it may be an insult
to the noble souls who operate FIDOnet nodes out of the goodness of
their hearts, but that's Life In The Big City.

Perhaps some of the confusion stems from ignorance on my (and,
perhaps, other Internet weenies') part about the topology and
operation of FIDOnet.  As I understand it, ECPA applies if private
third party communications are routed through some FIDOnet agent.
Does this ever happen?

--
Mike McNally




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Mike Godwin <mnemonic@eff.org>
Date: Mon, 4 Oct 93 04:55:03 PDT
To: greg@ideath.goldenbear.com (Greg Broiles)
Subject: Re: BBS seizures
In-Reply-To: <DL2Vac1w164w@ideath.goldenbear.com>
Message-ID: <199310041154.AA08736@eff.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


 
Greg writes:

> I think a man named Tom Tcimpidis was busted in the L.A. area in the early
> eighties because of content; if I remember the facts correctly, codes
> were posted to his board without his knowledge, and he was convicted for 
> illegal possession of long distance access codes.

So far as I know, this case did not involve electronic mail.


--Mike






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: peb@PROCASE.COM (Paul Baclace)
Date: Mon, 4 Oct 93 10:49:05 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: NPR?
Message-ID: <9310041746.AA01307@banff.procase.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain




totn@aol.com for Talk of the Nation, if I recall correctly.  aol.com
is an unknown host here, so I can't finger the account to verify.

BTW, I think they changed from NPR to APR, unless both of these organizations
exist independently.


Paul E. Baclace
peb@procase.com






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: cme@ellisun.sw.stratus.com (Carl Ellison)
Date: Mon, 4 Oct 93 08:24:41 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re:  POISON PILL :-)
Message-ID: <9310041520.AA15034@ellisun.sw.stratus.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>Date: 30 Sep 93 16:43:41 EDT
>From: Sandy <72114.1712@CompuServe.COM>
>Subject: POISON PILL :-)


>                           !!WARNING!!
>                  This Machine is Booby-Trapped
>                      Use at Your Own Risk


What about the stickers on car windows announcing that the radio, if stolen,
will be unusable?  ...seems to me the precedent has been set.

 - Carl




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: karn@qualcomm.com (Phil Karn)
Date: Mon, 4 Oct 93 11:44:43 PDT
To: ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu
Subject: WestWord article - YOW!
In-Reply-To: <9310040618.AA01365@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Message-ID: <9310041842.AA03990@servo>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>``Phil showed that an ordinary guy just reading the papers that already
>existed could put together an encryption system that the Nation
>Security Agency could break "It took a certain amount of bravery to put
		 ^^^^^
>this out, because at the time the government was talking about
>restrictions on cryptography.''
>--John Gilmore, Cypherpunk founder

I noticed this apparent typo in the original article. I assume it is
indeed a typo (there were several others in the article as well).

Phil




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Date: Mon, 4 Oct 93 11:59:07 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Who's Most Receptive to Our Message?
In-Reply-To: <9310041825.AA16278@toad.com>
Message-ID: <9310041859.AA16939@netcom5.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Matthew Landry writes:


>         In fact, NPR has a very good journalistic record, and many of its 
> reporters have proven themselves willing to take on the government when they 
> feel the government is wrong.

Though my sympathies are not "leftist" and though I often grimace when
I hear the slant given by NPR, I suspect the NPR/left/ACLU side is
more amenable to crypto and crypto privacy than the Right/American
Heritage/Falwell side is.

(As most of you know, whether you agree or not, the libertarian axis
is generally orthogonal to the axis defined by Left and Right.)

My point is that I think liberal left reporters are likely to be more
sympathetic to our views--even when they involve such libertarian
"extremes" as crypto-anarchy--than are right wing reporters. I'm not
sure why this is (I have some guesses), but it seems to be the case.

I can imagine a right winger saying "You mean your system will allow
faggots to plan their crimes in private? You mean enemies of our
country will be able to to use electronic black markets to trade
military secrets untraceably?"

So, while I don't place much faith in converting the masses--this
despite the interviews I gave for "Wired," "Whole Earth Review,"
and "The Village Voice"--I suspect that NPR is in fact a more
receptive place than, say, the Rush Limbaugh show would be.

(If I don't favor converting the masses, what *do* I favor?
Technology. It was technology and markets that created the revolutions
in personal computers, fax machines, VCRs, whatever, not proselyting
in the media. Strong crypto is like strong locks: if cheap enough and
easy to use, it will be used automatically by many people.)


--Tim May


-- 
..........................................................................
Timothy C. May         | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,  
tcmay@netcom.com       | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
408-688-5409           | knowledge, reputations, information markets, 
W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA  | black markets, collapse of governments.
Higher Power: 2^756839 | Public Key: PGP and MailSafe available.
Note: I put time and money into writing this posting. I hope you enjoy it.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "mycal (voices through your head @ 88.1MHz)" <mike@NetAcsys.com>
Date: Mon, 4 Oct 93 12:34:42 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: secure phone quest
Message-ID: <2cb075b0.acsys@NetAcsys.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Has anyone had any luck in getting a sound blaster card to work full duplex?

This would seem to be the first step in getting a workable low cost secure
phone line.

Also How about a half duplex secure voice link for the internet?  Heck
you could call anyone up if they are logged in and were equipped, crypto
optional.

mycal







From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Hastings@courier8.aero.org
Date: Mon, 4 Oct 93 13:19:43 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Oops
Message-ID: <000848B2.MAI*Hastings@courier8.aero.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> you have committed a major faux paux. please DO NOT QUOTE MY PRIVATE
> EMAIL TO CYPHERPUNKS *\WITH MY NAME\. furthermore **\DO NOT APOLOGIZE\
> TO THE LIST on this. although, I definitely deserve one privately.
* Notice - no name disclosed \emphasis added\ Call me Mr. Literal
** There may be a non-disclosure contract in effect, but I'll apologize,
or say anything else, if \I\ determine that it is appropriate. I'm not
aware of any non-apology clause on cypherpunks.
 
I had 115 messages waiting for me from the weekend when I got into work
today. The only mail reflector list I belong to is cypherpunks. When we
had QUICKMAIL, the headers were included with the messages. I used to
save headers plus messages into one file, then run a program to strip out
headers for reading. Headers took up half of a daily "mailbag" file.
 
If I just HAD to find out who sent a message, I could browse the unstripped
file and find the origin. But now with MS-MAIL, the X400 internet messages
are all saved as attachments. The Windoze macro I use appends each attachment
to an ASCII text file, then deletes the message, because of network limits.
It works for me, and most users put address trailers on their messages. No
headers are saved from cypherpunks anymore on my system.
 
So the point is, WHO sent this? Was it directed at ME? It is true that I
forward calls for participation in projects, meeting announcements, and
technical information. I try to credit the source. I consider that a
feature, not a bug of my ethical program. You should welcome whatever
publicity I give you. WHAT prompted your (whoever you are) objections? If
it is some personal detail, unrelated to digital privacy and untraceable
cash, I sincerely apologize. Especially if I disclosed something from a
private e-mail exchange (it's possible).
 
Otherwise, I'll fake being sorry to stay on the list. If I get kicked off,
I'll appear as a new subscriber under a pseudonym. Go ahead, make my day.
This, by the way is a problem with anonymity. At least Chaum discusses this
unauthorized duplicate problem with "is-a-person" bureaus.
 
Perhaps you mean something else. "Do not quote my private e-mail to
cypherpunks with my name." Private e-mail to cypherpunks. Maybe you
think messages posted to an international mail reflector are private?
Sometimes I circulate info from cypherpunks printed on paper at libertarian
meetings to get some action on an issue. Like forwarded messages from the
EFF. All messages I post here are global broadcasts, are public domain,
and you're fooling yourself if you think the NSA, Treasury, the CIA,
the press, or anyone else isn't getting everything posted here directly.
 
But I'll humor you if you're that naive.
 
Kent - <hastings@courier8.aero.org>
<jkhastings@aol.com> is defunct for now. Why I'm in such a good mood :^(




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: mgream@acacia.itd.uts.edu.au (Matthew Gream)
Date: Sun, 3 Oct 93 20:09:02 PDT
To: 72114.1712@compuserve.com (Sandy)
Subject: Re: POISON PILL WIMPS
In-Reply-To: <931003184257_72114.1712_FHF56-1@CompuServe.COM>
Message-ID: <9310040306.AA26350@acacia.itd.uts.EDU.AU>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Earlier, Sandy wrote:

>     . . . attempting to play 'smart-ass' to your
>     investigators is only going to result in more problems
>     for you. Its a non-ideal world, and they definitely have
>     the ability to cause you substantial problems.
[..]
> Didn't any of you appeasers and apologists read and *understand*
> HACKER CRACKDOWN?  Once you are the focus of an investigation,
> they are already causing you substantial problems.  Cooperation
> only gives your tormentors more ammunition.  You are not going
> to convince them of anything.  You cannot talk your way out of
> anything.  What you can--and will--do is dig yourself in deeper.
> After that, you will probably try to get off the hook by rolling
> over--like a bitch in heat--on your friends and associates.
> 
> The ONLY thing that works is (a) stonewall, stonewall, stonewall
> until you get competent legal representation, then (b) do what
> your lawyer's says.  Period.

What I said shouldn't have come out that way if you have interpreted
it as such. I don't advocate becoming a subordinate to the wishes of
what the 'authority' wants, and I don't mean for an individual to lay
out everything and anything as a 'narc'.  Co-operation doesn't have
to mean giving your investigators ammunition.

Firstly, methods that destroy your equipment after it has been seized
are most probably illegal (I'm no expert on legal things) and are only
going to cause you trouble. Part of the thread was about this, and I was
disagreeing. 

Further to this, I was attempting to point out that if you have something
you _don't_ want found, then simply encrypting it leaving it sitting on 
your system is probably not going to work. You may decide not to answer
any questions about it, you may refuse and so on, but they are going to
want the magic little key and keep pressing (maybe while you are under
oath). To prevent any of this occuring, the best approach (in my mind) is
to encrypt it into a form that will never be suspect as anything more than
harmless, trivial, information.

Say you do have something encrypted, and you are being pressed for its key,
then (as you say), your legal representitive is the ONLY solution you
should take, and you should be as co-operative as you can within the bounds
of your legal rights. 

The last thing I want to be is an apologist for law enforcement in terms
of the electronic medium. Those who know me would tell you that I am
outspoken about the Australian Federal Police and their activities in
the area of Computer Crime and Investigation.

Matthew.
-- 
Matthew Gream, M.Gream@uts.edu.au. "... encryption is the ultimate means of
Consent Technologies, 02-821-2043.  protection against an Orwellian state."




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: khijol!erc (Ed Carp)
Date: Mon, 4 Oct 93 13:39:07 PDT
To: marc@GZA.COM (Marc Horowitz)
Subject: Re: secure phone quest
In-Reply-To: <9310041948.AA03441@dun-dun-noodles.aktis.com>
Message-ID: <m0ojwDj-00021IC@khijol>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text


> >> Also How about a half duplex secure voice link for the internet?  Heck
> >> you could call anyone up if they are logged in and were equipped, crypto
> >> optional.
> 
> If you have a Sparc or a DEC, there's a program called "vat" whcih
> does this, full-duplex over IP.  Unfortunately, I don't remember where
> to get it (lbl?), and archie isn't responding.

How about 'netphone'?
-- 
Ed Carp, N7EKG			erc@apple.com			510/659-9560
                            an38299@anon.penet.fi
If you want magic, let go of your armor.  Magic is so much stronger than
steel!        -- Richard Bach, "The Bridge Across Forever"



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Hastings@courier8.aero.org
Date: Mon, 4 Oct 93 13:49:08 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: L.A. Times Sunday Column One
Message-ID: <000848FB.MAI*Hastings@courier8.aero.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Sunday, October 3, 1993 Los Angeles Times Front Page Column One:
Headline: DEMANDING THE ABILITY TO SNOOP
Afraid new technology may foil eavesdropping efforts, U.S. officials want
phone and computer users to adopt the same privacy code. The government
would hold the only key.
by Robert Lee Hotz
Times Science Writer
 
The article covers PGP, Skipjack in graphic detail (picture of Mykotronix
chip), the growth in dossiers and information requests from the Federal
Crime Info Center, and all our pet issues. This and a related article take
up more than a full page. Eric Hughes is quoted. My mail inbox was
crammed full, so I may have missed it before. If not, whoop, there it is.
 
Kent - <hastings@courier8.aero.org>




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Christian Void <cvoid@netcom.com>
Date: Mon, 4 Oct 93 13:34:44 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: NPR?
In-Reply-To: <9310041746.AA01307@banff.procase.com>
Message-ID: <Pine.3.05.9310041358.A21991-a100000@netcom3>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



> totn@aol.com for Talk of the Nation, if I recall correctly.  aol.com
> is an unknown host here, so I can't finger the account to verify.

Also, I beleive, <scifry@aol.com> for the science program. I am not 100%
sure on the address, so if I'm wrong, please correct me.

Christian Void /T71 | "I don't like it, and I'm sorry I | VMResearch, Inc.
cvoid@netcom.COM    | ever had anything to do with it." | P.O. Box 170213
Tel. 1+415-807-5491 |  -Erwin Schrodinger  (1887-1961)  | SF, CA  94117
                * PGP v2.3a Public Key Available Via Finger *







From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Perry E. Metzger" <pmetzger@lehman.com>
Date: Mon, 4 Oct 93 11:04:42 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: NPR?
In-Reply-To: <9310041746.AA01307@banff.procase.com>
Message-ID: <9310041803.AA03856@snark.lehman.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Paul Baclace says:
> BTW, I think they changed from NPR to APR, unless both of these organizations
> exist independently.

Yes, they both exist independently.

.pm




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: karn@qualcomm.com (Phil Karn)
Date: Mon, 4 Oct 93 14:19:44 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: 2-part LA Times story
Message-ID: <9310042117.AA06240@servo>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I'm surprised no one has yet mentioned the *large* 2-part story that
appeared starting yesterday (Sunday October 3) in the LA Times. It
appeared in the top of column 1 on page 1 with the title "Demanding
the Ability to Snoop".  It deals primarily with Clipper, with sidebars
on the FBI Digital Telephony stuff.

Monday's article also appears in column 1 of page 1, but at the
bottom. It is titled "Computer Code's Security Worries Privacy
Watchdogs" and it begins with a quote from Mykotronix's president
commenting on how he felt about the Internet message carrying stuff
found in his garbage. The article is primarily about Mykotronix's
involvement with Clipper.

Inside is a sidebar on Dorothy Denning, complete with photograph
suitable for a dartboard.

It is *really* becoming a challenge to keep up with all the media
coverage lately!

Phil





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Matthew B. Landry <mbl@ml7694a.leonard.american.edu>
Date: Mon, 4 Oct 93 11:29:07 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: NPR and bias
Message-ID: <9310041825.AA16278@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


        I'd just like to add a comment on the question of NPR's biases. Yes, 
they do get most of their funding from the govt, which leads them to take a 
stance on some issues which agrees with the govt position. On the other hand, 
virtually the entire mainstream media would be considered biased in favor of 
the govt by this standard.
        In fact, NPR has a very good journalistic record, and many of its 
reporters have proven themselves willing to take on the government when they 
feel the government is wrong.
        Another factor in this equation is the fact that this list does not 
exactly reach a wide audience, politically or population-wise. We are (as TC 
May eloquently put it when responding to one of my posts) preaching to the 
choir here (and a relatively small choir at that). The rest of the world does 
not necessarily see things the way we do, and we aren't likely to get much 
sympathy from the owners of commercial media outlets.
        Basically, I think that NPR is the best we're going to get, as far as 
good exposure is concerned. Yes, they have their faults, but I challenge anyone 
to show me a single major national media outlet that doesn't.
--
Matthew B. Landry
ml7694a@american.edu
(Finally!) mbl@ml7694a.leonard.american.edu




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Mike Johnson" <exabyte!smtplink!mikej@uunet.UU.NET>
Date: Mon, 4 Oct 93 14:14:46 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re[2]: POISON PILL
Message-ID: <9309047497.AA749770184@smtplink.exabyte.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



>> Something else you can do is use a cipher which takes two input streams
>> and merges them into the one file, with one key extracting the 'harmless'
>> information and another extracting the 'harmfull' information. 

>AFAIK, the only way to do this is with a Vernam OTP.  You have a key file (A)
>the same length as your real data (B) -- encrypt the data by XOR to get (C).
>Then you take an innocent text (D) and XOR with (C) to get an alleged key
>file (E).  You hide (A) someplace, destroy (B) and (D).  Leave (C) around and
>put up just enough resistence in letting folks have (E).

>Does anyone know a simpler way?  I'm willing to bet that it can be proved
>that the key would have to be at least 1/8 the length of the message in order
>for this to work but I don't know of any schemes using less than the message
>length to do it.

Yes.  Make "noise addition" (really multiplexing) part of the cipher.  You
could throw away every other bit based on the parity of the key.  The
ciphertext would be twice as big, but if you compressed both plain text
streams first, this effect might not be very obvious.  Of course, if your
encryption program were disassembled, you might be found out...




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "C. Luchini (UIUC High energy physics Dept)" <CBL@UIHEPA.HEP.UIUC.EDU>
Date: Mon, 4 Oct 93 12:34:50 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: damn fine compression....
Message-ID: <01H3PUSO34SI95MTA1@UIHEPA.HEP.UIUC.EDU>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I'm trying to find out about the remailer, but of course the files in
soda.berkeley.edu:pub/cyperhpunks/remailer are compressed or some
such  ie :hal's.instructions.gz.   I don't have anything other
than zip and uued/decode, so could some kind person send me a clear
text of the remiler instructions?
-c




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: cme@ellisun.sw.stratus.com (Carl Ellison)
Date: Mon, 4 Oct 93 11:39:08 PDT
To: cdodhner@indirect.com
Subject: Re: POISON PILL
Message-ID: <9310041835.AA15292@ellisun.sw.stratus.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



>> Something else you can do is use a cipher which takes two input streams
>> and merges them into the one file, with one key extracting the 'harmless'
>> information and another extracting the 'harmfull' information. 
>> 
>> Matthew.
>> --
>> Matthew Gream, M.Gream@uts.edu.au. "... encryption is the ultimate means of
>> Consent Technologies, 02-821-2043.  protection against an Orwellian state."
>
>Has anybody writen one? Can we try for this as a feature in the next pgp?
>Should I write it myself? Of course I should... silly question... Ok does
>anybody have any suggestions or wishlists? Lemme know.
>

AFAIK, the only way to do this is with a Vernam OTP.  You have a key file (A)
the same length as your real data (B) -- encrypt the data by XOR to get (C).
Then you take an innocent text (D) and XOR with (C) to get an alleged key
file (E).  You hide (A) someplace, destroy (B) and (D).  Leave (C) around
and put up just enough resistence in letting folks have (E).

Does anyone know a simpler way?  I'm willing to bet that it can be proved that
the key would have to be at least 1/8 the length of the message in order for
this to work but I don't know of any schemes using less than the message
length to do it.

 - Carl




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Martin.Greifer@f28.n125.z1.FIDONET.ORG (Martin Greifer)
Date: Mon, 4 Oct 93 18:19:07 PDT
To: Cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: ...
Message-ID: <3245.2CB0A6D8@shelter.FIDONET.ORG>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


 Uu> -----BEGIN PGP MESSAGE-----
 Uu> Version: 2.3a

Sorry.  Mistaken netmail packet upload.  My fault.

        MG
___ Blue Wave/QWK v2.12
--  
Martin Greifer - via FidoNet node 1:125/1
UUCP: ...!uunet!kumr!shelter!28!Martin.Greifer
INTERNET: Martin.Greifer@f28.n125.z1.FIDONET.ORG




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: bryan@fegmania.wustl.edu (bryan o'connor)
Date: Mon, 4 Oct 93 13:19:08 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: secure phone quest
In-Reply-To: <2cb075b0.acsys@NetAcsys.com>
Message-ID: <9310042017.AA26812@fegmania.wustl.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Marc Horowitz writes:
| >> Also How about a half duplex secure voice link for the internet?  Heck
| >> you could call anyone up if they are logged in and were equipped, crypto
| >> optional.
| 
| If you have a Sparc or a DEC, there's a program called "vat" whcih
| does this, full-duplex over IP.  Unfortunately, I don't remember where
| to get it (lbl?), and archie isn't responding.

vat is available from ftp.ee.lbl.gov.  There's no source at the moment
but there are binaries for different architectures.  (And the dynamically
linked SunOS 4.1.x versions do work for Solaris 2.x)

vat is intended for use as a IP multicast multi-user chat program, but I
believe that it is useable for point-to-point communication also.  Using
it for IP Multicast may require kernel patches (depending on your OS).

[I have no connection with vat other than I use it for MBONE stuff
 here at Washington University]

--
Bryan D. O'Connor                            Internet: bryan@fegmania.wustl.edu
Software Engineer, wuarchive development        UUCP: ...!uunet!wuarchive!bryan
Office of the Network Coordinator                    BITNET: bryan@wunet.bitnet
Washington University in Saint Louis                     Phone: +1 314 935 7048



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: hughes@ah.com (Eric Hughes)
Date: Mon, 4 Oct 93 15:44:46 PDT
To: CBL@UIHEPA.HEP.UIUC.EDU
Subject: damn fine compression....
In-Reply-To: <01H3PUSO34SI95MTA1@UIHEPA.HEP.UIUC.EDU>
Message-ID: <9310042230.AA12592@ah.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Read README.DOWNLOAD in the pub/cypherpunks directory.

Eric




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Marc Horowitz <marc@GZA.COM>
Date: Mon, 4 Oct 93 12:49:07 PDT
To: "mycal (voices through your head @ 88.1MHz)" <mike@NetAcsys.com>
Subject: Re: secure phone quest
In-Reply-To: <2cb075b0.acsys@NetAcsys.com>
Message-ID: <9310041948.AA03441@dun-dun-noodles.aktis.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>> Also How about a half duplex secure voice link for the internet?  Heck
>> you could call anyone up if they are logged in and were equipped, crypto
>> optional.

If you have a Sparc or a DEC, there's a program called "vat" whcih
does this, full-duplex over IP.  Unfortunately, I don't remember where
to get it (lbl?), and archie isn't responding.

		Marc




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: ssteele@eff.org (Shari Steele)
Date: Mon, 4 Oct 93 12:54:43 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Who's Most Receptive to Our Message?
Message-ID: <199310041952.AA12564@eff.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I've been interviewed on NPR twice.  The first reporter was Margot Adler,
212/878-1435.  She was doing a story about cops hanging out on BBSs.  She
seemed to have a very basic understanding of the technology, but she was
clearly interested in the social implications of the story.

I've been banging my head trying to recall the name of the second reporter,
who called last month after the DoJ held its press conference announcing
indictments in Operation Longarm, the big bust on child pornography.  Her
name was something like Fee Lay.  Does that sound familiar to anyone?

Also, I'm sending a note to Mitch.  He was interviewed by NPR a few months
ago about the National Information Infrastructure.  I'll see if he can
suggest a reporter.
Shari





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Lyle_Seaman@transarc.com
Date: Mon, 4 Oct 93 13:39:44 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Triple DES products hitting market
In-Reply-To: <9309291308.AA19748@bsu-cs.bsu.edu>
Message-ID: <Igg82nf0BwwbR52tMd@transarc.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Anonymous <nowhere@bsu-cs.bsu.edu> writes:
> Cylink Triples Encryption
> by Sharon Fisher
...
> Cylink's Cipher/Decipher-HSi offers triple-DES, which encrypts DES
> data three times, and gives the 56-bit key the effect of a 112-bit key,
> according to the company, based here. The triple-DES approach makes 
> the Cylink product more secure than the government's proposed Clipper 
> system, which uses an 80-bit key, the company said.

Umm.  How does this make a system much more resistant to an attack
like Weiner's?  If there's only a single 56-bit key, the brute-force
known-plaintext + ciphertext attack still only needs to do < 2^56
trial encrypt/decrypt operations.   

Lyle		Transarc		707 Grant Street
412 338 4474	The Gulf Tower		Pittsburgh 15219




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: cme@ellisun.sw.stratus.com (Carl Ellison)
Date: Mon, 4 Oct 93 13:34:50 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re:  Sternlight's Key
Message-ID: <9310042029.AA15529@ellisun.sw.stratus.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>Date: Sat, 2 Oct 93 03:13:44 -0700
>Message-Id: <9310021013.AA09739@soda.berkeley.edu>
>To: cypherpunks@toad.com
>From: nobody@soda.berkeley.edu
>Subject: Sternlight's Key


>As an official Key Escrow Agent of the United States Gubberment, I have
>decided that David Sternlight, being a controversial public figure, needs 
>cryptographic protection for his private communications.


You're missing the point.  You need to make sure there's some way to
guarantee that all his postings and mail are encrypted to himself
while you lose the private key.





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: strat@uunet.uu.net (Bob Stratton)
Date: Mon, 4 Oct 93 13:35:08 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: PGP in FIDO
In-Reply-To: <9310022109.AA16172@vswr.sps.mot.com>
Message-ID: <9310042033.AA09765@cfmartin.UU.NET>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Perry> Mike Godwin will have to confirm this, but to my knowledge Common
Perry> Carrier is NOT a status you have to apply for. UUNET operates as a
Perry> common carrier and has never registered with anyone.

Interesting assertion. I suspect that you could say the same of any
other regional IP provider. A lot of service providers leap to claim the
appelation "common carrier", in the hope that it will absolve them of
responsibility for their users' actions. In the real world, most
providers, including UUNET and PSI, make their customers sign
agreements that said customers won't use the networks for nefarious
ends. Note that the phone company doesn't do this. 

It'll be a while (and a few court cases) before I have any confidence
that the U.S. Gov't recognizes IP service providers as common carriers
in any real sense. 

--strat

NOTE: I don't speak for anyone but little old me, besides it's
only my 2nd week here. :-)


Bob Stratton					strat@uunet.uu.net
UUNET Technologies, Inc.			uunet!strat
3110 Fairview Park Dr., Suite 570		Voice) +1 703 204 8000
Falls Church, Va 22042				Fax)   +1 703 204 8001




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: ssteele@eff.org (Shari Steele)
Date: Mon, 4 Oct 93 13:40:08 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: NPR reporter
Message-ID: <199310042039.AA13370@eff.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Mitch suggests Dan Charles out of NPR's office in DC.
Shari





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Mike Godwin <mnemonic@eff.org>
Date: Mon, 4 Oct 93 13:44:44 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: ASCII version of ECPA (interception, stored comm, pen registers) (fwd)
Message-ID: <199310042040.AA13376@eff.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain




In response to a number of requests from different sources, I've compiled
and edited an ASCII version of the Electronic Communications Privacy Act,
including all amendments to the original Wiretap Act (18 USC 2510 et
seq.), the complete chapter on stored communications (18 USC 2701 et
seq.), and the amendments to pen-register and trap-and-trace procedures
(18 USC 3121 et seq.)

Please let me know if you catch any errors or typos. 


--Mike Godwin
  Online Counsel
  Electronic Frontier Foundation
  mnemonic@eff.org


-----------




TITLE 18.  CRIMES AND CRIMINAL PROCEDURE  


PART I.  CRIMES  


CHAPTER 119.  WIRE AND ELECTRONIC COMMUNICATIONS INTERCEPTION AND
INTERCEPTION OF ORAL COMMUNICATIONS


Sec. 2510.  Definitions


   As used in this chapter --


   (1) "wire communication" means any aural transfer made in whole or in
part through the use of facilities for the transmission of communications
by the aid of wire, cable, or other like connection between the point of
origin and the point of reception (including the use of such connection in
a switching station) furnished or operated by any person engaged in
providing or operating such facilities for the transmission of interstate
or foreign communications or communications affecting interstate or
foreign commerce and such term includes any electronic storage of such
communication, but such term does not include the radio portion of a
cordless telephone communication that is transmitted between the cordless
telephone handset and the base unit;


   (2) "oral communication" means any oral communication uttered by a
person exhibiting an expectation that such communication is not subject to
interception under circumstances justifying such expectation, but such
term does not include any electronic communication;


   (3) "State" means any State of the United States, the District of
Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, and any territory or possession
of the United States;


   (4) "intercept" means the aural or other acquisition of the contents of
any wire, electronic, or oral communication through the use of any
electronic, mechanical, or other device.


   (5) "electronic, mechanical, or other device" means any device or
apparatus which can be used to intercept a wire, oral, or electronic
communication other than--


   (a) any telephone or telegraph instrument, equipment or facility, or
any component thereof, (i) furnished to the subscriber or user by a
provider of wire or electronic communication service in the ordinary
course of its business and being used by the subscriber or user in the
ordinary course of its business or furnished by such subscriber or user
for connection to the facilities of such service and used in the ordinary
course of its business; or (ii) being used by a provider of wire or
electronic communication service in the ordinary course of its business,
or by an investigative or law enforcement officer in the ordinary course
of his duties;


   (b) a hearing aid or similar device being used to correct subnormal
hearing to not better than normal;


   (6) "person" means any employee, or agent of the United States or any
State or political subdivision thereof, and any individual, partnership,
association, joint stock company, trust, or corporation;


   (7) "Investigative or law enforcement officer" means any officer of the
United States or of a State or political subdivision thereof, who is
empowered by law to conduct investigations of or to make arrests for
offenses enumerated in this chapter, and any attorney authorized by law to
prosecute or participate in the prosecution of such offenses;


   (8) "contents," when used with respect to any wire, oral, or electronic
communication, includes any information concerning the substance, purport,
or meaning of that communication;


   (9) "Judge of competent jurisdiction" means--


   (a) a judge of a United States district court or a United States court
of appeals; and


   (b) a judge of any court of general criminal jurisdiction of a State
who is authorized by a statute of that State to enter orders authorizing
interceptions of wire, oral, or electronic communications;


   (10) "communication common carrier" shall have the same meaning which
is given the term "common carrier" by section 153(h) of title 47 of the
United States Code;


   (11) "aggrieved person" means a person who was a party to any
intercepted wire, oral, or electronic communication or a person against
whom the interception was directed;


   (12) "electronic communication" means any transfer of signs, signals,
writing, images, sounds, data, or intelligence of any nature transmitted
in whole or in part by a wire, radio, electromagnetic, photoelectronic or
photooptical system that affects interstate or foreign commerce, but does
not include--


   (A) the radio portion of a cordless telephone communication that is
transmitted between the cordless telephone handset and the base unit;


   (B) any wire or oral communication;


   (C) any communication made through a tone-only paging device; or


   (D) any communication from a tracking device (as defined in section
3117 of this title);


   (13) "user" means any person or entity who--


   (A) uses an electronic communication service; and


   (B) is duly authorized by the provider of such service to engage in
such use;


   (14) "electronic communications system" means any wire, radio,
electromagnetic, photooptical or photoelectronic facilities for the
transmission of electronic communications, and any computer facilities or
related electronic equipment for the electronic storage of such
communications;


   (15) "electronic communication service" means any service which
provides to users thereof the ability to send or receive wire or
electronic communications;


   (16) "readily accessible to the general public" means, with respect to
a radio communication, that such communication is not--


   (A) scrambled or encrypted;


   (B) transmitted using modulation techniques whose essential parameters
have been withheld from the public with the intention of preserving the
privacy of such communication;


   (C) carried on a subcarrier or other signal subsidiary to a radio
transmission;


   (D) transmitted over a communication system provided by a common
carrier, unless the communication is a tone only paging system
communication; or


   (E) transmitted on frequencies allocated under part 25, subpart D, E,
or F of part 74, or part 94 of the Rules of the Federal Communications
Commission, unless, in the case of a communication transmitted on a
frequency allocated under part 74 that is not exclusively allocated to
broadcast auxiliary services, the communication is a two-way voice
communication by radio;


   (17) "electronic storage" means--


   (A) any temporary, intermediate storage of a wire or electronic
communication incidental to the electronic transmission thereof; and


   (B) any storage of such communication by an electronic communication
service for purposes of backup protection of such communication; and


   (18) "aural transfer" means a transfer containing the human voice at
any point between and including the point of origin and the point of
reception.


Sec. 2511.  Interception and disclosure of wire, oral, or electronic
communications prohibited


   (1) Except as otherwise specifically provided in this chapter any
person who--


   (a) intentionally intercepts, endeavors to intercept, or procures any
other person to intercept or endeavor to intercept, any wire, oral, or
electronic communication;


   (b) intentionally uses, endeavors to use, or procures any other person
to use or endeavor to use any electronic, mechanical, or other device to
intercept any oral communication when--


   (i) such device is affixed to, or otherwise transmits a signal through,
a wire, cable, or other like connection used in wire communication; or


   (ii) such device transmits communications by radio, or interferes with
the transmission of such communication; or


   (iii) such person knows, or has reason to know, that such device or any
component thereof has been sent through the mail or transported in
interstate or foreign commerce; or


   (iv) such use or endeavor to use (A) takes place on the premises of any
business or other commercial establishment the operations of which affect
interstate or foreign commerce; or (B) obtains or is for the purpose of
obtaining information relating to the operations of any business or other
commercial establishment the operations of which affect interstate or
foreign commerce; or


   (v) such person acts in the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of
Puerto Rico, or any territory or possession of the United States;


   (c) intentionally discloses, or endeavors to disclose, to any other
person the contents of any wire, oral, or electronic communication,
knowing or having reason to know that the information was obtained through
the interception of a wire, oral, or electronic communication in violation
of this subsection; or


   (d) intentionally uses, or endeavors to use, the contents of any wire,
oral, or electronic communication, knowing or having reason to know that
the information was obtained through the interception of a wire, oral, or
electronic communication in violation of this subsection;


   shall be punished as provided in subsection (4) or shall be subject to
suit as provided in subsection (5).


   (2)(a)(i) It shall not be unlawful under this chapter for an operator
of a switchboard, or an officer, employee, or agent of a provider of wire
or electronic communication service, whose facilities are used in the
transmission of a wire communication, to intercept, disclose, or use that
communication in the normal course of his employment while engaged in any
activity which is a necessary incident to the rendition of his service or
to the protection of the rights or property of the provider of that
service, except that a provider of wire communication service to the
public shall not utilize service observing or random monitoring except for
mechanical or service quality control checks.


   (ii) Notwithstanding any other law, providers of wire or electronic
communication service, their officers, employees, and agents, landlords,
custodians, or other persons, are authorized to provide information,
facilities, or technical assistance to persons authorized by law to
intercept wire, oral, or electronic communications or to conduct
electronic surveillance, as defined in section 101 of the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 if such provider, its officers,
employees, or agents, landlord, custodian, or other specified person, has
been provided with--


   (A) a court order directing such assistance signed by the authorizing
judge, or


   (B) a certification in writing by a person specified in section 2518(7)
of this title or the Attorney General of the United States that no warrant
or court order is required by law, that all statutory requirements have
been met, and that the specified assistance is required, setting forth the
period of time during which the provision of the information, facilities,
or technical assistance is authorized and specifying the information,
facilities, or technical assistance required. No provider of wire or
electronic communication service, officer, employee, or agent thereof, or
landlord, custodian, or other specified person shall disclose the
existence of any interception or surveillance or the device used to
accomplish the interception or surveillance with respect to which the
person has been furnished an order or certification under this
subparagraph, except as may otherwise be required by legal process and
then only after prior notification to the Attorney General or to the
principal prosecuting attorney of a State or any political subdivision of
a State, as may be appropriate. Any such disclosure, shall render such
person liable for the civil damages provided for in section 2520. No cause
of action shall lie in any court against any provider of wire or
electronic communication service, its officers, employees, or agents,
landlord, custodian, or other specified person for providing information,
facilities, or assistance in accordance with the terms of a court order or
certification under this chapter.


   (b) It shall not be unlawful under this chapter for an officer,
employee, or agent of the Federal Communications Commission, in the normal
course of his employment and in discharge of the monitoring
responsibilities exercised by the Commission in the enforcement of chapter
5 of title 47 of the United States Code, to intercept a wire or electronic
communication, or oral communication transmitted by radio, or to disclose
or use the information thereby obtained.


   (c) It shall not be unlawful under this chapter for a person acting
under color of law to intercept a wire, oral, or electronic communication,
where such person is a party to the communication or one of the parties to
the communication has given prior consent to such interception.


   (d) It shall not be unlawful under this chapter for a person not acting
under color of law to intercept a wire or oral communication where such
person is a party to the communication or where one of the parties to the
communication has given prior consent to such interception unless such
communication is intercepted for the purpose of committing any criminal or
tortious act in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States
or of any State.


   (e) Notwithstanding any other provision of this title or section 705 or
706 of  the Communications Act of 1934 , it shall not be unlawful for an
officer, employee, or agent of the United States in the normal course of
his official duty to conduct electronic surveillance, as defined in
section 101 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, as
authorized by that Act.


   (f) Nothing contained in this chapter or chapter 121, or section 705 of
the Communications Act of 1934, shall be deemed to affect the acquisition
by the United States Government of foreign intelligence information from
international or foreign communications, or foreign intelligence
activities conducted in accordance with otherwise applicable Federal law
involving a foreign electronic communications system, utilizing a means
other than electronic surveillance as defined in section 101 of the
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, and procedures in this
chapter and the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 shall be the
exclusive means by which electronic surveillance, as defined in section
101 of such Act, and the interception of domestic wire, oral, or
electronic communications may be conducted.


   (g) It shall not be unlawful under this chapter or chapter 121 of this
title for any person--


   (i) to intercept or access an electronic communication made through an
electronic communication system that is configured so that such electronic
communication is readily accessible to the general public;


   (ii) to intercept any radio communication which is transmitted--


   (I) by any station for the use of the general public, or that relates
to ships, aircraft, vehicles, or persons in distress;


   (II) by any governmental, law enforcement, civil defense, private land
mobile, or public safety communications system, including police and fire,
readily accessible to the general public;


   (III) by a station operating on an authorized frequency within the
bands allocated to the amateur, citizens band, or general mobile radio
services; or


   (IV) by any marine or aeronautical communications system;


   (iii) to engage in any conduct which--


   (I) is prohibited by section 633 of the Communications Act of 1934; or


   (II) is excepted from the application of section 705(a) of the
Communications Act of 1934 by section 705(b) of that Act;


   (iv) to intercept any wire or electronic communication the transmission
of which is causing harmful interference to any lawfully operating station
or consumer electronic equipment, to the extent necessary to identify the
source of such interference; or


   (v) for other users of the same frequency to intercept any radio
communication made through a system that utilizes frequencies monitored by
individuals engaged in the provision or the use of such system, if such
communication is not scrambled or encrypted.


   (h) It shall not be unlawful under this chapter--


   (i) to use a pen register or a trap and trace device (as those terms
are defined for the purposes of chapter 206 (relating to pen registers and
trap and trace devices) of this title); or


   (ii) for a provider of electronic communication service to record the
fact that a wire or electronic communication was initiated or completed in
order to protect such provider, another provider furnishing service toward
the completion of the wire or electronic communication, or a user of that
service, from fraudulent, unlawful or abusive use of such service.


   (3)(a) Except as provided in paragraph (b) of this subsection, a person
or entity providing an electronic communication service to the public
shall not intentionally divulge the contents of any communication (other
than one to such person or entity, or an agent thereof) while in
transmission on that service to any person or entity other than an
addressee or intended recipient of such communication or an agent of such
addressee or intended recipient.


   (b) A person or entity providing electronic communication service to
the public may divulge the contents of any such communication--


   (i) as otherwise authorized in section 2511(2)(a) or 2517 of this
title;


   (ii) with the lawful consent of the originator or any addressee or
intended recipient of such communication;


   (iii) to a person employed or authorized, or whose facilities are used,
to forward such communication to its destination; or


   (iv) which were inadvertently obtained by the service provider and
which appear to pertain to the commission of a crime, if such divulgence
is made to a law enforcement agency.


   (4)(a) Except as provided in paragraph (b) of this subsection or in
subsection (5), whoever violates subsection (1) of this section shall be
fined under this title or imprisoned not more than five years, or both.


   (b) If the offense is a first offense under paragraph (a) of this
subsection and is not for a tortious or illegal purpose or for purposes of
direct or indirect commercial advantage or private commercial gain, and
the wire or electronic communication with respect to which the offense
under paragraph (a) is a radio communication that is not scrambled or
encrypted, then--


   (i) if the communication is not the radio portion of a cellular
telephone communication, a public land mobile radio service communication
or a paging service communication, and the conduct is not that described
in subsection (5), the offender shall be fined under this title or
imprisoned not more than one year, or both; and


   (ii) if the communication is the radio portion of a cellular telephone
communication, a public land mobile radio service communication or a
paging service communication, the offender shall be fined not more than $
500.


   (c) Conduct otherwise an offense under this subsection that consists of
or relates to the interception of a satellite transmission that is not
encrypted or scrambled and that is transmitted--


   (i) to a broadcasting station for purposes of retransmission to the
general public; or


   (ii) as an audio subcarrier intended for redistribution to facilities
open to the public, but not including data transmissions or telephone
calls,


   is not an offense under this subsection unless the conduct is for the
purposes of direct or indirect commercial advantage or private financial
gain.


   (5)(a)(i) If the communication is--


   (A) a private satellite video communication that is not scrambled or
encrypted and the conduct in violation of this chapter is the private
viewing of that communication and is not for a tortious or illegal purpose
or for purposes of direct or indirect commercial advantage or private
commercial gain; or


   (B) a radio communication that is transmitted on frequencies allocated
under subpart D of part 74 of the rules of the Federal Communications
Commission that is not scrambled or encrypted and the conduct in violation
of this chapter is not for a tortious or illegal purpose or for purposes
of direct or indirect commercial advantage or private commercial gain,


   then the person who engages in such conduct shall be subject to suit by
the Federal Government in a court of competent jurisdiction.


   (ii) In an action under this subsection--


   (A) if the violation of this chapter is a first offense for the person
under paragraph (a) of subsection (4) and such person has not been found
liable in a civil action under section 2520 of this title, the Federal
Government shall be entitled to appropriate injunctive relief; and


   (B) if the violation of this chapter is a second or subsequent offense
under paragraph (a) of subsection (4) or such person has been found liable
in any prior civil action under section 2520, the person shall be subject
to a mandatory $ 500 civil fine.


   (b) The court may use any means within its authority to enforce an
injunction issued under paragraph (ii)(A), and shall impose a civil fine
of not less than $ 500 for each violation of such an injunction.


Sec. 2512.  Manufacture, distribution, possession, and advertising of
wire, oral, or electronic communication intercepting devices prohibited


   (1) Except as otherwise specifically provided in this chapter, any
person who intentionally--


   (a) sends through the mail, or sends or carries in interstate or
foreign commerce, any electronic, mechanical, or other device, knowing or
having reason to know that the design of such device renders it primarily
useful for the purpose of the surreptitious interception of wire, oral, or
electronic communications;


   (b) manufactures, assembles, possesses, or sells any electronic,
mechanical, or other device, knowing or having reason to know that the
design of such device renders it primarily useful for the purpose of the
surreptitious interception of wire, oral, or electronic communications,
and that such device or any component thereof has been or will be sent
through the mail or transported in interstate or foreign commerce; or


   (c) places in any newspaper, magazine, handbill, or other publication
any advertisement of--


   (i) any electronic, mechanical, or other device knowing or having
reason to know that the design of such device renders it primarily useful
for the purpose of the surreptitious interception of wire, oral, or
electronic communications; or


   (ii) any other electronic, mechanical, or other device, where such
advertisement promotes the use of such device for the purpose of the
surreptitious interception of wire, oral, or electronic communications,


   knowing or having reason to know that such advertisement will be sent
through the mail or transported in interstate or foreign commerce,


   shall be fined not more than $ 10,000 or imprisoned not more than five
years, or both.


   (2) It shall not be unlawful under this section for--


   (a) a provider of wire or electronic communication service or an
officer, agent, or employee of, or a person under contract with, such a
provider, in the normal course of the business of providing that wire or
electronic communication service, or


   (b) an officer, agent, or employee of, or a person under contract with,
the United States, a State, or a political subdivision thereof, in the
normal course of the activities of the United States, a State, or a
political subdivision thereof, to send through the mail, send or carry in
interstate or foreign commerce, or manufacture, assemble, possess, or sell
any electronic, mechanical, or other device knowing or having reason to
know that the design of such device renders it primarily useful for the
purpose of the surreptitious interception of wire, oral, or electronic
communications.


Sec. 2513.  Confiscation of wire, oral, or electronic communication
intercepting devices


   Any electronic, mechanical, or other device used, sent, carried,
manufactured, assembled, possessed, sold, or advertised in violation of
section 2511 or section 2512 of this chapter may be seized and
forfeited to the United States. All provisions of law relating to (1) the
seizure, summary and judicial forfeiture, and condemnation of vessels,
vehicles, merchandise, and baggage for violations of the customs laws
contained in title 19 of the United States Code, (2) the disposition of
such vessels, vehicles, merchandise, and baggage or the proceeds from the
sale thereof, (3) the remission or mitigation of such forfeiture, (4) the
compromise of claims, and (5) the award of compensation to informers in
respect of such forfeitures, shall apply to seizures and forfeitures
incurred, or alleged to have been incurred, under the provisions of this
section, insofar as applicable and not inconsistent with the provisions of
this section; except that such duties as are imposed upon the collector of
customs or any other person with respect to the seizure and forfeiture of
vessels, vehicles, merchandise, and baggage under the provisions of the
customs laws contained in title 19 of the United States Code shall be
performed with respect to seizure and forfeiture of electronic,
mechanical, or other intercepting devices under this section by such
officers, agents, or other persons as may be authorized or designated for
that purpose by the Attorney General.


Sec. 2515.  Prohibition of use as evidence of intercepted wire or oral
communications


   Whenever any wire or oral communication has been intercepted, no part
of the contents of such communication and no evidence derived therefrom
may be received in evidence in any trial, hearing, or other proceeding in
or before any court, grand jury, department, officer, agency, regulatory
body, legislative committee, or other authority of the United States, a
State, or a political subdivision thereof if the disclosure of that
information would be in violation of this chapter.


Sec. 2516.  Authorization for interception of wire, oral, or electronic
communications


   (1) The Attorney General, Deputy Attorney General, Associate Attorney
General, or any Assistant Attorney General, any acting Assistant Attorney
General, or any Deputy Assistant Attorney General in the Criminal Division
specially designated by the Attorney General, may authorize an application
to a Federal judge of competent jurisdiction for, and such judge may grant
in conformity with section 2518 of this chapter an order authorizing or
approving the interception of wire or oral communications by the Federal
Bureau of Investigation, or a Federal agency having responsibility for the
investigation of the offense as to which the application is made, when
such interception may provide or has provided evidence of--


   (a) any offense punishable by death or by imprisonment for more than
one year under sections 2274 through 2277 of title 42 of the United States
Code (relating to the enforcement of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954),
section 2284 of title 42 of the United States Code (relating to sabotage
of nuclear facilities or fuel), or under the following chapters of this
title: chapter 37 (relating to espionage), chapter 105 (relating to
sabotage), chapter 115 (relating to treason), chapter 102 (relating to
riots), chapter 65 (relating to malicious mischief), chapter 111 (relating
to destruction of vessels), or chapter 81 (relating to piracy);


   (b) a violation of section 186 or section 501(c) of title 29, United
States Code (dealing with restrictions on payments and loans to labor
organizations), or any offense which involves murder, kidnapping, robbery,
or extortion, and which is punishable under this title;


   (c) any offense which is punishable under the following sections of
this title: section 201 (bribery of public officials and witnesses),
section 215 (relating to bribery of bank officials), section 224 (bribery
in sporting contests), subsection (d), (e), (f), (g), (h), or (i) of
section 844 (unlawful use of explosives), section 1032 (relating to
concealment of assets), section 1084 (transmission of wagering
information), section 751 (relating to escape), section 1014 (relating to
loans and credit applications generally; renewals and discounts), sections
1503, 1512, and 1513 (influencing or injuring an officer, juror, or
witness generally), section 1510 (obstruction of criminal investigations),
section 1511 (obstruction of State or local law enforcement), section 1751
(Presidential and Presidential staff assassination, kidnaping, and
assault), section 1951 (interference with commerce by threats or
violence), section 1952 (interstate and foreign travel or transportation
in aid of racketeering enterprises), section 1958 (relating to use of
interstate commerce facilities in the commission of murder for hire),
section 1959 (relating to violent crimes in aid of racketeering activity),
section 1954 (offer, acceptance, or solicitation to influence operations
of employee benefit plan), section 1955 (prohibition of business
enterprises of gambling), section 1956 (laundering of monetary
instruments), section 1957 (relating to engaging in monetary transactions
in property derived from specified unlawful activity), section 659 (theft
from interstate shipment), section 664 (embezzlement from pension and
welfare funds), section 1343 (fraud by wire, radio, or television),
section 1344 (relating to bank fraud), sections 2251 and 2252 (sexual
exploitation of children), sections 2312, 2313, 2314, and 2315 (interstate
transportation of stolen property), section 2321 (relating to trafficking
in certain motor vehicles or motor vehicle parts), section 1203 (relating
to hostage taking), section 1029 (relating to fraud and related activity
in connection with access devices), section 3146 (relating to penalty for
failure to appear), section 3521(b)(3) (relating to witness relocation and
assistance), section 32 (relating to destruction of aircraft or aircraft
facilities), section 1963 (violations with respect to racketeer influenced
and corrupt organizations), section 115 (relating to threatening or
retaliating against a Federal official), and section 1341 (relating to
mail fraud), or section 351 (violations with respect to congressional,
Cabinet, or Supreme Court assassinations, kidnaping, and assault), section
831 (relating to prohibited transactions involving nuclear materials),
section 33 (relating to destruction of motor vehicles or motor vehicle
facilities), section 175 (relating to biological weapons), or section 1992
(relating to wrecking trains);


   (d) any offense involving counterfeiting punishable under section 471,
472, or 473 of this title;


   (e) any offense involving fraud connected with a case under title 11
or the manufacture, importation, receiving, concealment, buying, selling,
or otherwise dealing in narcotic drugs, marihuana, or other dangerous
drugs, punishable under any law of the United States;


   (f) any offense including extortionate credit transactions under
sections 892, 893, or 894 of this title;


   (g) a violation of section 5322 of title 31, United States Code
(dealing with the reporting of currency transactions);


   (h) any felony violation of sections 2511 and 2512 (relating to
interception and disclosure of certain communications and to certain
intercepting devices) of this title;


   (i) any felony violation of chapter 71 (relating to obscenity) of this
title;


   (j) any violation of section 11(c)(2) of the Natural Gas Pipeline
Safety Act of 1968 (relating to destruction of a natural gas pipeline) or
subsection (i) or (n) of section 902 of the Federal Aviation Act of 1958
(relating to aircraft piracy);


   (k) any criminal violation of section 2778 of title 22 (relating to the
Arms Export Control Act);


   (l) the location of any fugitive from justice from an offense described
in this section; 


   (m) any felony violation of sections 922 and 924 of title 18, United
States Code (relating to firearms);


   (n) any violation of section 5861 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986
(relating to firearms); and


   (o) any conspiracy to commit any offense described in any subparagraph
of this paragraph.


   (2) The principal prosecuting attorney of any State, or the principal
prosecuting attorney of any political subdivision thereof, if such
attorney is authorized by a statute of that State to make application to a
State court judge of competent jurisdiction for an order authorizing or
approving the interception of wire or oral communications, may apply to
such judge for, and such judge may grant in conformity with section 2518
of this chapter and with the applicable State statute an order
authorizing, or approving the interception of wire or oral communications
by investigative or law enforcement officers having responsibility for the
investigation of the offense as to which the application is made, when
such interception may provide or has provided evidence of the commission
of the offense of murder, kidnapping, gambling, robbery, bribery,
extortion, or dealing in narcotic drugs, marihuana or other dangerous
drugs, or other crime dangerous to life, limb, or property, and punishable
by imprisonment for more than one year, designated in any applicable State
statute authorizing such interception, or any conspiracy to commit any of
the foregoing offenses.


   (3) Any attorney for the Government (as such term is defined for the
purposes of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure) may authorize an
application to a Federal judge of competent jurisdiction for, and such
judge may grant, in conformity with section 2518 of this title, an order
authorizing or approving the interception of electronic communications by
an investigative or law enforcement officer having responsibility for the
investigation of the offense as to which the application is made, when
such interception may provide or has provided evidence of any Federal
felony.


Sec. 2517.  Authorization for disclosure and use of intercepted wire,
oral, or electronic communications


   (1) Any investigative or law enforcement officer who, by any means
authorized by this chapter, has obtained knowledge of the contents of any
wire, oral, or electronic communication, or evidence derived therefrom,
may disclose such contents to another investigative or law enforcement
officer to the extent that such disclosure is appropriate to the proper
performance of the official duties of the officer making or receiving the
disclosure.


   (2) Any investigative or law enforcement officer who, by any means
authorized by this chapter, has obtained knowledge of the contents of any
wire, oral, or electronic communication or evidence derived therefrom may
use such contents to the extent such use is appropriate to the proper
performance of his official duties.


   (3) Any person who has received, by any means authorized by this
chapter, any information concerning a wire, oral, or electronic
communication, or evidence derived therefrom intercepted in accordance
with the provisions of this chapter may disclose the contents of that
communication or such derivative evidence while giving testimony under
oath or affirmation in any proceeding held under the authority of the
United States or of any State or political subdivision thereof.


   (4) No otherwise privileged wire, oral, or electronic communication
intercepted in accordance with, or in violation of, the provisions of this
chapter shall lose its privileged character.


   (5) When an investigative or law enforcement officer, while engaged in
intercepting wire, oral, or electronic communications in the manner
authorized herein, intercepts wire, oral, or electronic communications
relating to offenses other than those specified in the order of
authorization or approval, the contents thereof, and evidence derived
therefrom, may be disclosed or used as provided in subsections (1) and (2)
of this section. Such contents and any evidence derived therefrom may be
used under subsection (3) of this section when authorized or approved by a
judge of competent jurisdiction where such judge finds on subsequent
application that the contents were otherwise intercepted in accordance
with the provisions of this chapter. Such application shall be made as
soon as practicable.



Sec. 2518.  Procedure for interception of wire, oral, or electronic
communications


   (1) Each application for an order authorizing or approving the
interception of a wire, oral, or electronic communication under this
chapter shall be made in writing upon oath or affirmation to a judge of
competent jurisdiction and shall state the applicant's authority to make
such application. Each application shall include the following
information:


   (a) the identity of the investigative or law enforcement officer making
the application, and the officer authorizing the application;


   (b) a full and complete statement of the facts and circumstances relied
upon by the applicant, to justify his belief that an order should be
issued, including (i) details as to the particular offense that has been,
is being, or is about to be committed, (ii) except as provided in
subsection (11), a particular description of the nature and location of
the facilities from which or the place where the communication is to be
intercepted, (iii) a particular description of the type of communications
sought to be intercepted, (iv) the identity of the person, if known,
committing the offense and whose communications are to be intercepted;


   (c) a full and complete statement as to whether or not other
investigative procedures have been tried and failed or why they reasonably
appear to be unlikely to succeed if tried or to be too dangerous;


   (d) a statement of the period of time for which the interception is
required to be maintained. If the nature of the investigation is such that
the authorization for interception should not automatically terminate when
the described type of communication has been first obtained, a particular
description of facts establishing probable cause to believe that
additional communications of the same type will occur thereafter;


   (e) a full and complete statement of the facts concerning all previous
applications known to the individual authorizing and making the
application, made to any judge for authorization to intercept, or for
approval of interceptions of, wire, oral, or electronic communications
involving any of the same persons, facilities or places specified in the
application, and the action taken by the judge on each such application;
and


   (f) where the application is for the extension of an order, a statement
setting forth the results thus far obtained from the interception, or a
reasonable explanation of the failure to obtain such results.


   (2) The judge may require the applicant to furnish additional testimony
or documentary evidence in support of the application.


   (3) Upon such application the judge may enter an ex parte order, as
requested or as modified, authorizing or approving interception of wire,
oral, or electronic communications within the territorial jurisdiction of
the court in which the judge is sitting (and outside that jurisdiction but
within the United States in the case of a mobile interception device
authorized by a Federal court within such jurisdiction), if the judge
determines on the basis of the facts submitted by the applicant that--


   (a) there is probable cause for belief that an individual is
committing, has committed, or is about to commit a particular offense
enumerated in section 2516 of this chapter;


   (b) there is probable cause for belief that particular communications
concerning that offense will be obtained through such interception;


   (c) normal investigative procedures have been tried and have failed or
reasonably appear to be unlikely to succeed if tried or to be too
dangerous;


   (d) except as provided in subsection (11), there is probable cause for
belief that the facilities from which, or the place where, the wire, oral,
or electronic communications are to be intercepted are being used, or are
about to be used, in connection with the commission of such offense, or
are leased to, listed in the name of, or commonly used by such person.


   (4) Each order authorizing or approving the interception of any wire,
oral, or electronic communication under this chapter shall specify--


   (a) the identity of the person, if known, whose communications are to
be intercepted;


   (b) the nature and location of the communications facilities as to
which, or the place where, authority to intercept is granted;


   (c) a particular description of the type of communication sought to be
intercepted, and a statement of the particular offense to which it
relates;


   (d) the identity of the agency authorized to intercept the
communications, and of the person authorizing the application; and


   (e) the period of time during which such interception is authorized,
including a statement as to whether or not the interception shall
automatically terminate when the described communication has been first
obtained.


   An order authorizing the interception of a wire, oral, or electronic
communication under this chapter shall, upon request of the applicant,
direct that a provider of wire or electronic communication service,
landlord, custodian or other person shall furnish the applicant forthwith
all information, facilities, and technical assistance necessary to
accomplish the interception unobtrusively and with a minimum of
interference with the services that such service provider, landlord,
custodian, or person is according the person whose communications are to
be intercepted. Any provider of wire or electronic communication service,
landlord, custodian or other person furnishing such facilities or
technical assistance shall be compensated therefor by the applicant for
reasonable expenses incurred in providing such facilities or assistance.


   (5) No order entered under this section may authorize or approve the
interception of any wire, oral, or electronic communication for any period
longer than is necessary to achieve the objective of the authorization,
nor in any event longer than thirty days. Such thirty-day period begins on
the earlier of the day on which the investigative or law enforcement
officer first begins to conduct an interception under the order or ten
days after the order is entered. Extensions of an order may be granted,
but only upon application for an extension made in accordance with
subsection (1) of this section and the court making the findings required
by subsection (3) of this section. The period of extension shall be no
longer than the authorizing judge deems necessary to achieve the purposes
for which it was granted and in no event for longer than thirty days.
Every order and extension thereof shall contain a provision that the
authorization to intercept shall be executed as soon as practicable, shall
be conducted in such a way as to minimize the interception of
communications not otherwise subject to interception under this chapter,
and must terminate upon attainment of the authorized objective, or in any
event in thirty days. In the event the intercepted communication is in a
code or foreign language, and an expert in that foreign language or code
is not reasonably available during the interception period, minimization
may be accomplished as soon as practicable after such interception. An
interception under this chapter may be conducted in whole or in part by
Government personnel, or by an individual operating under a contract with
the Government, acting under the supervision of an investigative or law
enforcement officer authorized to conduct the interception.


   (6) Whenever an order authorizing interception is entered pursuant to
this chapter, the order may require reports to be made to the judge who
issued the order showing what progress has been made toward achievement of
the authorized objective and the need for continued interception. Such
reports shall be made at such intervals as the judge may require.


   (7) Notwithstanding any other provision of this chapter, any
investigative or law enforcement officer, specially designated by the
Attorney General, the Deputy Attorney General, the Associate Attorney
General, or by the principal prosecuting attorney of any State or
subdivision thereof acting pursuant to a statute of that State, who
reasonably determines that--


   (a) an emergency situation exists that involves--


   (i) immediate danger of death or serious physical injury to any person,


   (ii) conspiratorial activities threatening the national security
interest, or


   (iii) conspiratorial activities characteristic of organized crime,


   that requires a wire, oral, or electronic communication to be
intercepted before an order authorizing such interception can, with due
diligence, be obtained, and


   (b) there are grounds upon which an order could be entered under this
chapter to authorize such interception,


   may intercept such wire, oral, or electronic communication if an
application for an order approving the interception is made in accordance
with this section within forty-eight hours after the interception has
occurred, or begins to occur. In the absence of an order, such
interception shall immediately terminate when the communication sought is
obtained or when the application for the order is denied, whichever is
earlier. In the event such application for approval is denied, or in any
other case where the interception is terminated without an order having
been issued, the contents of any wire, oral, or electronic communication
intercepted shall be treated as having been obtained in violation of this
chapter, and an inventory shall be served as provided for in subsection
(d) of this section on the person named in the application.


   (8)(a) The contents of any wire, oral, or electronic communication
intercepted by any means authorized by this chapter shall, if possible, be
recorded on tape or wire or other comparable device. The recording of the
contents of any wire, oral, or electronic communication under this
subsection shall be done in such way as will protect the recording from
editing or other alterations. Immediately upon the expiration of the
period of the order, or extensions thereof, such recordings shall be made
available to the judge issuing such order and sealed under his directions.
Custody of the recordings shall be wherever the judge orders. They shall
not be destroyed except upon an order of the issuing or denying judge and
in any event shall be kept for ten years. Duplicate recordings may be made
for use or disclosure pursuant to the provisions of subsections (1) and
(2) of section 2517 of this chapter for investigations. The presence of
the seal provided for by this subsection, or a satisfactory explanation
for the absence thereof, shall be a prerequisite for the use or disclosure
of the contents of any wire, oral, or electronic communication or evidence
derived therefrom under subsection (3) of section 2517.


   (b) Applications made and orders granted under this chapter shall be
sealed by the judge. Custody of the applications and orders shall be
wherever the judge directs. Such applications and orders shall be
disclosed only upon a showing of good cause before a judge of competent
jurisdiction and shall not be destroyed except on order of the issuing or
denying judge, and in any event shall be kept for ten years.


   (c) Any violation of the provisions of this subsection may be punished
as contempt of the issuing or denying judge.


   (d) Within a reasonable time but not later than ninety days after the
filing of an application for an order of approval under section 2518(7)(b)
which is denied or the termination of the period of an order or extensions
thereof, the issuing or denying judge shall cause to be served, on the
persons named in the order or the application, and such other parties to
intercepted communications as the judge may determine in his discretion
that is in the interest of justice, an inventory which shall include
notice of--


   (1) the fact of the entry of the order or the application;


   (2) the date of the entry and the period of authorized, approved or
disapproved interception, or the denial of the application; and


   (3) the fact that during the period wire, oral, or electronic
communications were or were not intercepted.


   The judge, upon the filing of a motion, may in his discretion make
available to such person or his counsel for inspection such portions of
the intercepted communications, applications and orders as the judge
determines to be in the interest of justice. On an ex parte showing of
good cause to a judge of competent jurisdiction the serving of the
inventory required by this subsection may be postponed.


   (9) The contents of any wire, oral, or electronic communication
intercepted pursuant to this chapter or evidence derived therefrom shall
not be received in evidence or otherwise disclosed in any trial, hearing,
or other proceeding in a Federal or State court unless each party, not
less than ten days before the trial, hearing, or proceeding, has been
furnished with a copy of the court order, and accompanying application,
under which the interception was authorized or approved. This ten-day
period may be waived by the judge if he finds that it was not possible to
furnish the party with the above information ten days before the trial,
hearing, or proceeding and that the party will not be prejudiced by the
delay in receiving such information.


   (10)(a) Any aggrieved person in any trial, hearing, or proceeding in or
before any court, department, officer, agency, regulatory body, or other
authority of the United States, a State, or a political subdivision
thereof, may move to suppress the contents of any wire or oral
communication intercepted pursuant to this chapter, or evidence derived
therefrom, on the grounds that--


   (i) the communication was unlawfully intercepted;


   (ii) the order of authorization or approval under which it was
intercepted is insufficient on its face; or


   (iii) the interception was not made in conformity with the order of
authorization or approval.


   Such motion shall be made before the trial, hearing, or proceeding
unless there was no opportunity to make such motion or the person was not
aware of the grounds of the motion. If the motion is granted, the contents
of the intercepted wire or oral communication, or evidence derived
therefrom, shall be treated as having been obtained in violation of this
chapter. The judge, upon the filing of such motion by the aggrieved
person, may in his discretion make available to the aggrieved person or
his counsel for inspection such portions of the intercepted communication
or evidence derived therefrom as the judge determines to be in the
interests of justice.


   (b) In addition to any other right to appeal, the United States shall
have the right to appeal from an order granting a motion to suppress made
under paragraph (a) of this subsection, or the denial of an application
for an order of approval, if the United States attorney shall certify to
the judge or other official granting such motion or denying such
application that the appeal is not taken for purposes of delay. Such
appeal shall be taken within thirty days after the date the order was
entered and shall be diligently prosecuted.


   (c) The remedies and sanctions described in this chapter with respect
to the interception of electronic communications are the only judicial
remedies and sanctions for nonconstitutional violations of this chapter
involving such communications.


   (11) The requirements of subsections (1)(b)(ii) and (3)(d) of this
section relating to the specification of the facilities from which, or the
place where, the communication is to be intercepted do not apply if--


   (a) in the case of an application with respect to the interception of
an oral communication--


   (i) the application is by a Federal investigative or law enforcement
officer and is approved by the Attorney General, the Deputy Attorney
General, the Associate Attorney General, an Assistant Attorney General, or
an acting Assistant Attorney General;


   (ii) the application contains a full and complete statement as to why
such specification is not practical and identifies the person committing
the offense and whose communications are to be intercepted; and


   (iii) the judge finds that such specification is not practical; and


   (b) in the case of an application with respect to a wire or electronic
communication--


   (i) the application is by a Federal investigative or law enforcement
officer and is approved by the Attorney General, the Deputy Attorney
General, the Associate Attorney General, an Assistant Attorney General, or
an acting Assistant Attorney General;


   (ii) the application identifies the person believed to be committing
the offense and whose communications are to be intercepted and the
applicant makes a showing of a purpose, on the part of that person, to
thwart interception by changing facilities; and


   (iii) the judge finds that such purpose has been adequately shown.


   (12) An interception of a communication under an order with respect to
which the requirements of subsections (1)(b)(ii) and (3)(d) of this
section do not apply by reason of subsection (11) shall not begin until
the facilities from which, or the place where, the communication is to be
intercepted is ascertained by the person implementing the interception
order. A provider of wire or electronic communications service that has
received an order as provided for in subsection (11)(b) may move the court
to modify or quash the order on the ground that its assistance with
respect to the interception cannot be performed in a timely or reasonable
fashion. The court, upon notice to the government, shall decide such a
motion expeditiously.


Sec. 2519.  Reports concerning intercepted wire, oral, or electronic
communications


   (1) Within thirty days after the expiration of an order (or each
extension thereof) entered under section 2518, or the denial of an order
approving an interception, the issuing or denying judge shall report to
the Administrative Office of the United States Courts--


   (a) the fact that an order or extension was applied for;


   (b) the kind of order or extension applied for (including whether or
not the order was an order with respect to which the requirements of
sections 2518(1)(b)(ii) and 2518(3)(d) of this title did not apply by
reason of section 2518(11) of this title);


   (c) the fact that the order or extension was granted as applied for,
was modified, or was denied;


   (d) the period of interceptions authorized by the order, and the number
and duration of any extensions of the order;


   (e) the offense specified in the order or application, or extension of
an order;


   (f) the identity of the applying investigative or law enforcement
officer and agency making the application and the person authorizing the
application; and


   (g) the nature of the facilities from which or the place where
communications were to be intercepted.


   (2) In January of each year the Attorney General, an Assistant Attorney
General specially designated by the Attorney General, or the principal
prosecuting attorney of a State, or the principal prosecuting attorney for
any political subdivision of a State, shall report to the Administrative
Office of the United States Courts--


   (a) the information required by paragraphs (a) through (g) of
subsection (1) of this section with respect to each application for an
order or extension made during the preceding calendar year;


   (b) a general description of the interceptions made under such order or
extension, including (i) the approximate nature and frequency of
incriminating communications intercepted, (ii) the approximate nature and
frequency of other communications intercepted, (iii) the approximate
number of persons whose communications were intercepted, and (iv) the
approximate nature, amount, and cost of the manpower and other resources
used in the interceptions;


   (c) the number of arrests resulting from interceptions made under such
order or extension, and the offenses for which arrests were made;


   (d) the number of trials resulting from such interceptions;


   (e) the number of motions to suppress made with respect to such
interceptions, and the number granted or denied;


   (f) the number of convictions resulting from such interceptions and the
offenses for which the convictions were obtained and a general assessment
of the importance of the interceptions; and


   (g) the information required by paragraphs (b) through (f) of this
subsection with respect to orders or extensions obtained in a preceding
calendar year.


   (3) In April of each year the Director of the Administrative Office of
the United States Courts shall transmit to the Congress a full and
complete report concerning the number of applications for orders
authorizing or approving the interception of wire, oral, or electronic
communications pursuant to this chapter and the number of orders and
extensions granted or denied pursuant to this chapter during the preceding
calendar year. Such report shall include a summary and analysis of the
data required to be filed with the Administrative Office by subsections
(1) and (2) of this section. The Director of the Administrative Office of
the United States Courts is authorized to issue binding regulations
dealing with the content and form of the reports required to be filed by
subsections (1) and (2) of this section.


Sec. 2520.  Recovery of civil damages authorized


   (a) In general. Except as provided in section 2511(2)(a)(ii), any
person whose wire, oral, or electronic communication is intercepted,
disclosed, or intentionally used in violation of this chapter may in a
civil action recover from the person or entity which engaged in that
violation such relief as may be appropriate.


   (b) Relief. In an action under this section, appropriate relief
includes--


   (1) such preliminary and other equitable or declaratory relief as may
be appropriate;


   (2) damages under subsection (c) and punitive damages in appropriate
cases; and


   (3) a reasonable attorney's fee and other litigation costs reasonably
incurred.


   (c) Computation of damages.


   (1) In an action under this section, if the conduct in violation of
this chapter, is the private viewing of a private satellite video
communication that is not scrambled or encrypted or if the communication
is a radio communication that is transmitted on frequencies allocated
under subpart D of part 74 of the rules of the Federal Communications
Commission that is not scrambled or encrypted and the conduct is not for a
tortious or illegal purpose or for purposes of direct or indirect
commercial advantage or private commercial gain, then the court shall
assess damages as follows:


   (A) If the person who engaged in that conduct has not previously been
enjoined under section 2511(5) and has not been found liable in a prior
civil action under this section, the court shall assess the greater of the
sum of actual damages suffered by the plaintiff, or statutory damages of
not less than $ 50 and not more than $ 500.


   (B) If, on one prior occasion, the person who engaged in that conduct
has been enjoined under section 2511(5) or has been found liable in a
civil action under this section, the court shall assess the greater of the
sum of actual damages suffered by the plaintiff, or statutory damages of
not less than $ 100 and not more than $ 1000.


   (2) In any other action under this section, the court may assess as
damages whichever is the greater of--


   (A) the sum of the actual damages suffered by the plaintiff and any
profits made by the violator as a result of the violation; or


   (B) statutory damages of whichever is the greater of $ 100 a day for
each day of violation or $ 10,000.


   (d) Defense. A good faith reliance on--


   (1) a court warrant or order, a grand jury subpoena, a legislative
authorization, or a statutory authorization;


   (2) a request of an investigative or law enforcement officer under
section 2518(7) of this title; or


   (3) a good faith determination that section 2511(3) of this title
permitted the conduct complained of; is a complete defense against any
civil or criminal action brought under this chapter or any other law.


   (e) Limitation. A civil action under this section may not be commenced
later than two years after the date upon which the claimant first has a
reasonable opportunity to discover the violation.


Sec. 2521.  Injunction against illegal interception


   Whenever it shall appear that any person is engaged or is about to
engage in any act which constitutes or will constitute a felony violation
of this chapter, the Attorney General may initiate a civil action in a
district court of the United States to enjoin such violation. The court
shall proceed as soon as practicable to the hearing and determination of
such an action, and may, at any time before final determination, enter
such a restraining order or prohibition, or take such other action, as is
warranted to prevent a continuing and substantial injury to the United
States or to any person or class of persons for whose protection the
action is brought. A proceeding under this section is governed by the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, except that, if an indictment has been
returned against the respondent, discovery is governed by the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure.





 CHAPTER 121.  STORED WIRE AND ELECTRONIC COMMUNICATIONS AND TRANSACTIONAL
RECORDS ACCESS


Sec. 2701.  Unlawful access to stored communications


   (a) Offense. Except as provided in subsection (c) of this section
whoever--


   (1) intentionally accesses without authorization a facility through
which an electronic communication service is provided; or


   (2) intentionally exceeds an authorization to access that facility; and
thereby obtains, alters, or prevents authorized access to a wire or
electronic communication while it is in electronic storage in such system
shall be punished as provided in subsection (b) of this section.


   (b) Punishment. The punishment for an offense under subsection (a) of
this section is--


   (1) if the offense is committed for purposes of commercial advantage,
malicious destruction or damage, or private commercial gain--


   (A) a fine of not more than $ 250,000 or imprisonment for not more than
one year, or both, in the case of a first offense under this subparagraph;
and


   (B) a fine under this title or imprisonment for not more than two
years, or both, for any subsequent offense under this subparagraph; and


   (2) a fine of not more than $ 5,000 or imprisonment for not more than
six months, or both, in any other case.


   (c) Exceptions. Subsection (a) of this section does not apply with
respect to conduct authorized--


   (1) by the person or entity providing a wire or electronic
communications service;


   (2) by a user of that service with respect to a communication of or
intended for that user; or


   (3) in section 2703, 2704 or 2518 of this title.


Sec. 2702.  Disclosure of contents


   (a) Prohibitions. Except as provided in subsection (b)--


   (1) a person or entity providing an electronic communication service to
the public shall not knowingly divulge to any person or entity the
contents of a communication while in electronic storage by that service;
and


   (2) a person or entity providing remote computing service to the public
shall not knowingly divulge to any person or entity the contents of any
communication which is carried or maintained on that service--


   (A) on behalf of, and received by means of electronic transmission from
(or created by means of computer processing of communications received by
means of electronic transmission from), a subscriber or customer of such
service; and


   (B) solely for the purpose of providing storage or computer processing
services to such subscriber or customer, if the provider is not authorized
to access the contents of any such communications for purposes of
providing any services other than storage or computer processing.


   (b) Exceptions. A person or entity may divulge the contents of a
communication--


   (1) to an addressee or intended recipient of such communication or an
agent of such addressee or intended recipient;


   (2) as otherwise authorized in section 2517, 2511(2)(a), or 2703 of
this title;


   (3) with the lawful consent of the originator or an addressee or
intended recipient of such communication, or the subscriber in the case of
remote computing service;


   (4) to a person employed or authorized or whose facilities are used to
forward such communication to its destination;


   (5) as may be necessarily incident to the rendition of the service or
to the protection of the rights or property of the provider of that
service; or


   (6) to a law enforcement agency, if such contents--


   (A) were inadvertently obtained by the service provider; and


   (B) appear to pertain to the commission of a crime.


Sec. 2704.  Backup preservation


   (a) Backup preservation.


   (1) A governmental entity acting under section 2703(b)(2) may include
in its subpoena or court order a requirement that the service provider to
whom the request is directed create a backup copy of the contents of the
electronic communications sought in order to preserve those
communications. Without notifying the subscriber or customer of such
subpoena or court order, such service provider shall create such backup
copy as soon as practicable consistent with its regular business practices
and shall confirm to the governmental entity that such backup copy has
been made. Such backup copy shall be created within two business days
after receipt by the service provider of the subpoena or court order.


   (2) Notice to the subscriber or customer shall be made by the
governmental entity within three days after receipt of such confirmation,
unless such notice is delayed pursuant to section 2705(a).


   (3) The service provider shall not destroy such backup copy until the
later of--


   (A) the delivery of the information; or


   (B) the resolution of any proceedings (including appeals of any
proceeding) concerning the government's subpoena or court order.


   (4) The service provider shall release such backup copy to the
requesting governmental entity no sooner than fourteen days after the
governmental entity's notice to the subscriber or customer if such service
provider--


   (A) has not received notice from the subscriber or customer that the
subscriber or customer has challenged the governmental entity's request;
and


   (B) has not initiated proceedings to challenge the request of the
governmental entity.


   (5) A governmental entity may seek to require the creation of a backup
copy under subsection (a)(1) of this section if in its sole discretion
such entity determines that there is reason to believe that notification
under section 2703 of this title of the existence of the subpoena or court
order may result in destruction of or tampering with evidence. This
determination is not subject to challenge by the subscriber or customer or
service provider.


   (b) Customer challenges.


   (1) Within fourteen days after notice by the governmental entity to the
subscriber or customer under subsection (a)(2) of this section, such
subscriber or customer may file a motion to quash such subpoena or vacate
such court order, with copies served upon the governmental entity and with
written notice of such challenge to the service provider. A motion to
vacate a court order shall be filed in the court which issued such order.
A motion to quash a subpoena shall be filed in the appropriate United
States district court or State court. Such motion or application shall
contain an affidavit or sworn statement--


   (A) stating that the applicant is a customer or subscriber to the
service from which the contents of electronic communications maintained
for him have been sought; and


   (B) stating the applicant's reasons for believing that the records
sought are not relevant to a legitimate law enforcement inquiry or that
there has not been substantial compliance with the provisions of this
chapter in some other respect.


   (2) Service shall be made under this section upon a governmental entity
by delivering or mailing by registered or certified mail a copy of the
papers to the person, office, or department specified in the notice which
the customer has received pursuant to this chapter. For the purposes of
this section, the term "delivery" has the meaning given that term in the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.


   (3) If the court finds that the customer has complied with paragraphs
(1) and (2) of this subsection, the court shall order the governmental
entity to file a sworn response, which may be filed in camera if the
governmental entity includes in its response the reasons which make in
camera review appropriate. If the court is unable to determine the motion
or application on the basis of the parties' initial allegations and
response, the court may conduct such additional proceedings as it deems
appropriate. All such proceedings shall be completed and the motion or
application decided as soon as practicable after the filing of the
governmental entity's response.


   (4) If the court finds that the applicant is not the subscriber or
customer for whom the communications sought by the governmental entity are
maintained, or that there is a reason to believe that the law enforcement
inquiry is legitimate and that the communications sought are relevant to
that inquiry, it shall deny the motion or application and order such
process enforced. If the court finds that the applicant is the subscriber
or customer for whom the communications sought by the governmental entity
are maintained, and that there is not a reason to believe that the
communications sought are relevant to a legitimate law enforcement
inquiry, or that there has not been substantial compliance with the
provisions of this chapter, it shall order the process quashed.


   (5) A court order denying a motion or application under this section
shall not be deemed a final order and no interlocutory appeal may be taken
therefrom by the customer.


Sec. 2705.  Delayed notice


   (a) Delay of notification.


   (1) A governmental entity acting under section 2703(b) of this title
may--


   (A) where a court order is sought, include in the application a
request, which the court shall grant, for an order delaying the
notification required under section 2703(b) of this title for a period not
to exceed ninety days, if the court determines that there is reason to
believe that notification of the existence of the court order may have an
adverse result described in paragraph (2) of this subsection; or


   (B) where an administrative subpoena authorized by a Federal or State
statute or a Federal or State grand jury subpoena is obtained, delay the
notification required under section 2703(b) of this title for a period not
to exceed ninety days upon the execution of a written certification of a
supervisory official that there is reason to believe that notification of
the existence of the subpoena may have an adverse result described in
paragraph (2) of this subsection.


   (2) An adverse result for the purposes of paragraph (1) of this
subsection is--


   (A) endangering the life or physical safety of an individual;


   (B) flight from prosecution;


   (C) destruction of or tampering with evidence;


   (D) intimidation of potential witnesses; or


   (E) otherwise seriously jeopardizing an investigation or unduly
delaying a trial.


   (3) The governmental entity shall maintain a true copy of certification
under paragraph (1)(B).


   (4) Extensions of the delay of notification provided in section 2703 of
up to ninety days each may be granted by the court upon application, or by
certification by a governmental entity, but only in accordance with
subsection (b) of this section.


   (5) Upon expiration of the period of delay of notification under
paragraph (1) or (4) of this subsection, the governmental entity shall
serve upon, or deliver by registered or first-class mail to, the customer
or subscriber a copy of the process or request together with notice that--


   (A) states with reasonable specificity the nature of the law
enforcement inquiry; and


   (B) informs such customer or subscriber--


   (i) that information maintained for such customer or subscriber by the
service provider named in such process or request was supplied to or
requested by that governmental authority and the date on which the
supplying or request took place;


   (ii) that notification of such customer or subscriber was delayed;


   (iii) what governmental entity or court made the certification or
determination pursuant to which that delay was made; and


   (iv) which provision of this chapter allowed such delay.


   (6) As used in this subsection, the term "supervisory official" means
the investigative agent in charge or assistant investigative agent in
charge or an equivalent of an investigating agency's headquarters or
regional office, or the chief prosecuting attorney or the first assistant
prosecuting attorney or an equivalent of a prosecuting attorney's
headquarters or regional office.


   (b) Preclusion of notice to subject of governmental access. A
governmental entity acting under section 2703, when it is not required to
notify the subscriber or customer under section 2703(b)(1), or to the
extent that it may delay such notice pursuant to subsection (a) of this
section, may apply to a court for an order commanding a provider of
electronic communications service or remote computing service to whom a
warrant, subpoena, or court order is directed, for such period as the
court deems appropriate, not to notify any other person of the existence
of the warrant, subpoena, or court order. The court shall enter such an
order if it determines that there is reason to believe that notification
of the existence of the warrant, subpoena, or court order will result in--


   (1) endangering the life or physical safety of an individual;


   (2) flight from prosecution;


   (3) destruction of or tampering with evidence;


   (4) intimidation of potential witnesses; or


   (5) otherwise seriously jeopardizing an investigation or unduly
delaying a trial.



Sec. 2706.  Cost reimbursement


   (a) Payment. Except as otherwise provided in subsection (c), a
governmental entity obtaining the contents of communications, records, or
other information under section 2702, 2703, or 2704 of this title shall
pay to the person or entity assembling or providing such information a fee
for reimbursement for such costs as are reasonably necessary and which
have been directly incurred in searching for, assembling, reproducing, or
otherwise providing such information. Such reimbursable costs shall
include any costs due to necessary disruption of normal operations of any
electronic communication service or remote computing service in which such
information may be stored.


   (b) Amount. The amount of the fee provided by subsection (a) shall be
as mutually agreed by the governmental entity and the person or entity
providing the information, or, in the absence of agreement, shall be as
determined by the court which issued the order for production of such
information (or the court before which a criminal prosecution relating to
such information would be brought, if no court order was issued for
production of the information).


   (c) Exception. The requirement of subsection (a) of this section does
not apply with respect to records or other information maintained by a
communications common carrier that relate to telephone toll records and
telephone listings obtained under section 2703 of this title. The court
may, however, order a payment as described in subsection (a) if the court
determines the information required is unusually voluminous in nature or
otherwise caused an undue burden on the provider.


Sec. 2707.  Civil action


   (a) Cause of action. Except as provided in section 2703(e), any
provider of electronic communication service, subscriber, or customer
aggrieved by any violation of this chapter in which the conduct
constituting the violation is engaged in with a knowing or intentional
state of mind may, in a civil action, recover from the person or entity
which engaged in that violation such relief as may be appropriate.


   (b) Relief. In a civil action under this section, appropriate relief
includes--


   (1) such preliminary and other equitable or declaratory relief as may
be appropriate;


   (2) damages under subsection (c); and


   (3) a reasonable attorney's fee and other litigation costs reasonably
incurred.


   (c) Damages. The court may assess as damages in a civil action under
this section the sum of the actual damages suffered by the plaintiff and
any profits made by the violator as a result of the violation, but in no
case shall a person entitled to recover receive less than the sum of $
1,000.


   (d) Defense. A good faith reliance on--


   (1) a court warrant or order, a grand jury subpoena, a legislative
authorization, or a statutory authorization;


   (2) a request of an investigative or law enforcement officer under
section 2518(7) of this title; or


   (3) a good faith determination that section 2511(3) of this title
permitted the conduct complained of; is a complete defense to any civil or
criminal action brought under this chapter or any other law.


   (e) Limitation. A civil action under this section may not be commenced
later than two years after the date upon which the claimant first
discovered or had a reasonable opportunity to discover the violation.


Sec. 2708.  Exclusivity of remedies


   The remedies and sanctions described in this chapter  are the only
judicial remedies and sanctions for nonconstitutional violations of this
chapter.


Sec. 2709.  Counterintelligence access to telephone toll and
transactional records


   (a) Duty to provide. A wire or electronic communication service
provider shall comply with a request for subscriber information and toll
billing records information, or electronic communication transactional
records in its custody or possession made by the Director of the Federal
Bureau of Investigation under subsection (b) of this section.


   (b) Required certification. The Director of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation (or an individual within the Federal Bureau of Investigation
designated for this purpose by the Director) may request any such
information and records if the Director (or the Director's designee)
certifies in writing to the wire or electronic communication service
provider to which the request is made that--


   (1) the information sought is relevant to an authorized foreign
counterintelligence investigation; and


   (2) there are specific and articulable facts giving reason to believe
that the person or entity to whom the information sought pertains is a
foreign power or an agent of a foreign power as defined in section 101 of
the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1801).


   (c) Prohibition of certain disclosure. No wire or electronic
communication service provider, or officer, employee, or agent thereof,
shall disclose to any person that the Federal Bureau of Investigation has
sought or obtained access to information or records under this section.


   (d) Dissemination by bureau. The Federal Bureau of Investigation may
disseminate information and records obtained under this section only as
provided in guidelines approved by the Attorney General for foreign
intelligence collection and foreign counterintelligence investigations
conducted by the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and, with respect to
dissemination to an agency of the United States, only if such information
is clearly relevant to the authorized responsibilities of such agency.


   (e) Requirement that certain Congressional bodies be informed. On a
semiannual basis the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation shall
fully inform the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House
of Representatives and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate
concerning all requests made under subsection (b) of this section.


Sec. 2710.  Wrongful disclosure of video tape rental or sale records


   (a) Definitions. For purposes of this section--


   (1) the term "consumer" means any renter, purchaser, or subscriber of
goods or services from a video tape service provider;


   (2) the term "ordinary course of business" means only debt collection
activities, order fulfillment, request processing, and the transfer of
ownership;


   (3) the term "personally identifiable information" includes information
which identifies a person as having requested or obtained specific video
materials or services from a video tape service provider; and


   (4) the term "video tape service provider" means any person, engaged in
the business, in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce, of rental,
sale, or delivery of prerecorded video cassette tapes or similar audio
visual materials, or any person or other entity to whom a disclosure is
made under subparagraph (D) or (E) of subsection (b)(2), but only with
respect to the information contained in the disclosure.


   (b) Video tape rental and sale records.


   (1) A video tape service provider who knowingly discloses, to any
person, personally identifiable information concerning any consumer of
such provider shall be liable to the aggrieved person for the relief
provided in subsection (d).


   (2) A video tape service provider may disclose personally identifiable
information concerning any consumer--


   (A) to the consumer;


   (B) to any person with the informed, written consent of the consumer
given at the time the disclosure is sought;


   (C) to a law enforcement agency pursuant to a warrant issued under the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, an equivalent State warrant, a grand
jury subpoena, or a court order;


   (D) to any person if the disclosure is solely of the names and
addresses of consumers and if--


   (i) the video tape service provider has provided the consumer with the
opportunity, in a clear and conspicuous manner, to prohibit such
disclosure; and


   (ii) the disclosure does not identify the title, description, or
subject matter of any video tapes or other audio visual material; however,
the subject matter of such materials may be disclosed if the disclosure is
for the exclusive use of marketing goods and services directly to the
consumer;


   (E) to any person if the disclosure is incident to the ordinary course
of business of the video tape service provider; or


   (F) pursuant to a court order, in a civil proceeding upon a showing of
compelling need for the information that cannot be accommodated by any
other means, if--


   (i) the consumer is given reasonable notice, by the person seeking the
disclosure, of the court proceeding relevant to the issuance of the court
order; and


   (ii) the consumer is afforded the opportunity to appear and contest the
claim of the person seeking the disclosure.


   If an order is granted pursuant to subparagraph (C) or (F), the court
shall impose appropriate safeguards against unauthorized disclosure.


   (3) Court orders authorizing disclosure under subparagraph (C) shall
issue only with prior notice to the consumer and only if the law
enforcement agency shows that there is probable cause to believe that the
records or other information sought are relevant to a legitimate law
enforcement inquiry. In the case of a State government authority, such a
court order shall not issue if prohibited by the law of such State. A
court issuing an order pursuant to this section, on a motion made promptly
by the video tape service provider, may quash or modify such order if the
information or records requested are unreasonably voluminous in nature or
if compliance with such order otherwise would cause an unreasonable burden
on such provider.


   (c) Civil action.


   (1) Any person aggrieved by any act of a person in violation of this
section may bring a civil action in a United States district court.


   (2) The court may award--


   (A) actual damages but not less than liquidated damages in an amount of
$ 2,500;


   (B) punitive damages;


   (C) reasonable attorneys' fees and other litigation costs reasonably
incurred; and


   (D) such other preliminary and equitable relief as the court determines
to be appropriate.


   (3) No action may be brought under this subsection unless such action
is begun within 2 years from the date of the act complained of or the date
of discovery.


   (4) No liability shall result from lawful disclosure permitted by this
section.


   (d) Personally identifiable information. Personally identifiable
information obtained in any manner other than as provided in this section
shall not be received in evidence in any trial, hearing, arbitration, or
other proceeding in or before any court, grand jury, department, officer,
agency, regulatory body, legislative committee, or other authority of the
United States, a State, or a political subdivision of a State.


   (e) Destruction of old records. A person subject to this section shall
destroy personally identifiable information as soon as practicable, but no
later than one year from the date the information is no longer necessary
for the purpose for which it was collected and there are no pending
requests or orders for access to such information under subsection (b)(2)
or (c)(2) or pursuant to a court order.


   (f) Preemption. The provisions of this section preempt only the
provisions of State or local law that require disclosure prohibited by
this section.


Sec. 2711.  Definitions for chapter


   As used in this chapter--


   (1) the terms defined in section 2510 of this title have, respectively,
the definitions given such terms in that section; and


   (2) the term "remote computing service" means the provision to the
public of computer storage or processing services by means of an
electronic communications system.





 TITLE 18.  CRIMES AND CRIMINAL PROCEDURE  


PART II.  CRIMINAL PROCEDURE  


CHAPTER 206.  PEN REGISTERS AND TRAP AND TRACE DEVICES


Sec. 3121.  General prohibition on pen register and trap and trace device
use; exception


   (a) In general. Except as provided in this section, no person may
install or use a pen register or a trap and trace device without first
obtaining a court order under section 3123 of this title or under the
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1801 et seq.).


   (b) Exception. The prohibition of subsection (a) does not apply with
respect to the use of a pen register or a trap and trace device by a
provider of electronic or wire communication service--


   (1) relating to the operation, maintenance, and testing of a wire or
electronic communication service or to the protection of the rights or
property of such provider, or to the protection of users of that service
from abuse of service or unlawful use of service; or


   (2) to record the fact that a wire or electronic communication was
initiated or completed in order to protect such provider, another provider
furnishing service toward the completion of the wire communication, or a
user of that service, from fraudulent, unlawful or abusive use of service;
or


   (3) where the consent of the user of that service has been obtained.


   (c) Penalty. Whoever knowingly violates subsection (a) shall be fined
under this title or imprisoned not more than one year, or both.


Sec. 3122.  Application for an order for a pen register or a trap and
trace device


   (a) Application.


   (1) An attorney for the Government may make application for an order or
an extension of an order under section 3123 of this title authorizing or
approving the installation and use of a pen register or a trap and trace
device under this chapter, in writing under oath or equivalent
affirmation, to a court of competent jurisdiction.


   (2) Unless prohibited by State law, a State investigative or law
enforcement officer may make application for an order or an extension of
an order under section 3123 of this title authorizing or approving the
installation and use of a pen register or a trap and trace device under
this chapter, in writing under oath or equivalent affirmation, to a court
of competent jurisdiction of such State.


   (b) Contents of application. An application under subsection (a) of
this section shall include--


   (1) the identity of the attorney for the Government or the State law
enforcement or investigative officer making the application and the
identity of the law enforcement agency conducting the investigation; and


   (2) a certification by the applicant that the information likely to be
obtained is relevant to an ongoing criminal investigation being conducted
by that agency.


Sec. 3123.  Issuance of an order for a pen register or a trap and trace
device


   (a) In general. Upon an application made under section 3122 of this
title, the court shall enter an ex parte order authorizing the
installation and use of a pen register or a trap and trace device within
the jurisdiction of the court if the court finds that the attorney for the
Government or the State law enforcement or investigative officer has
certified to the court that the information likely to be obtained by such
installation and use is relevant to an ongoing criminal investigation.


   (b) Contents of order. An order issued under this section--


   (1) shall specify--


   (A) the identity, if known, of the person to whom is leased or in whose
name is listed the telephone line to which the pen register or trap and
trace device is to be attached;


   (B) the identity, if known, of the person who is the subject of the
criminal investigation;


   (C) the number and, if known, physical location of the telephone line
to which the pen register or trap and trace device is to be attached and,
in the case of a trap and trace device, the geographic limits of the trap
and trace order; and


   (D) a statement of the offense to which the information likely to be
obtained by the pen register or trap and trace device relates; and


   (2) shall direct, upon the request of the applicant, the furnishing of
information, facilities, and technical assistance necessary to accomplish
the installation of the pen register or trap and trace device under
section 3124 of this title.


   (c) Time period and extensions.


   (1) An order issued under this section shall authorize the installation
and use of a pen register or a trap and trace device for a period not to
exceed sixty days.


   (2) Extensions of such an order may be granted, but only upon an
application for an order under section 3122 of this title and upon the
judicial finding required by subsection (a) of this section. The period of
extension shall be for a period not to exceed sixty days.


   (d) Nondisclosure of existence of pen register or a trap and trace
device. An order authorizing or approving the installation and use of a
pen register or a trap and trace device shall direct that--


   (1) the order be sealed until otherwise ordered by the court; and


   (2) the person owning or leasing the line to which the pen register or
a trap and trace device is attached, or who has been ordered by the court
to provide assistance to the applicant, not disclose the existence of the
pen register or trap and trace device or the existence of the
investigation to the listed subscriber, or to any other person, unless or
until otherwise ordered by the court.


Sec. 3124.  Assistance in installation and use of a pen register or a
trap and trace device


   (a) Pen registers. Upon the request of an attorney for the government
or an officer of a law enforcement agency authorized to install and use a
pen register under this chapter, a provider of wire or electronic
communication service, landlord, custodian, or other person shall furnish
such investigative or law enforcement officer forthwith all information,
facilities, and technical assistance necessary to accomplish the
installation of the pen register unobtrusively and with a minimum of
interference with the services that the person so ordered by the court
accords the party with respect to whom the installation and use is to take
place, if such assistance is directed by a court order as provided in
section 3123(b)(2) of this title.


   (b) Trap and trace device. Upon the request of an attorney for the
Government or an officer of a law enforcement agency authorized to receive
the results of a trap and trace device under this chapter, a provider of a
wire or electronic communication service, landlord, custodian, or other
person shall install such device forthwith on the appropriate line and
shall furnish such investigative or law enforcement officer all additional
information, facilities and technical assistance including installation
and operation of the device unobtrusively and with a minimum of
interference with the services that the person so ordered by the court
accords the party with respect to whom the installation and use is to take
place, if such installation and assistance is directed by a court order as
provided in section 3123(b)(2) of this title. Unless otherwise ordered by
the court, the results of the trap and trace device shall be furnished,
pursuant to section 3123(b) or section 3125 of this title, to the officer
of a law enforcement agency, designated in the court order, at reasonable
intervals during regular business hours for the duration of the order.


   (c) Compensation. A provider of a wire or electronic communication
service, landlord, custodian, or other person who furnishes facilities or
technical assistance pursuant to this section shall be reasonably
compensated for such reasonable expenses incurred in providing such
facilities and assistance.


   (d) No cause of action against a provider disclosing information under
this chapter. No cause of action shall lie in any court against any
provider of a wire or electronic communication service, its officers,
employees, agents, or other specified persons for providing information,
facilities, or assistance in accordance with the terms of a court order
under this chapter or request pursuant to section 3125 of this title.


   (e) Defense. A good faith reliance on a court order under this chapter,
a request pursuant to section 3125 of this title, a legislative
authorization, or a statutory authorization is a complete defense against
any civil or criminal action brought under this chapter or any other law.


Sec. 3125.  Emergency pen register and trap and trace device installation


   (a) Notwithstanding any other provision of this chapter, any
investigative or law enforcement officer, specially designated by the
Attorney General, the Deputy Attorney General, the Associate Attorney
General, any Assistant Attorney General, any acting Assistant Attorney
General, or any Deputy Assistant Attorney General, or by the principal
prosecuting attorney of any State or subdivision thereof acting pursuant
to a statute of that State, who reasonably determines that--


   (1) an emergency situation exists that involves--


   (A) immediate danger of death or serious bodily injury to any person;
or


   (B) conspiratorial activities characteristic of organized crime,


   that requires the installation and use of a pen register or a trap and
trace device before an order authorizing such installation and use can,
with due diligence, be obtained, and


   (2) there are grounds upon which an order could be entered under this
chapter to authorize such installation and use "may have installed and use
a pen register or trap and trace device if, within forty-eight hours after
the installation has occurred, or begins to occur, an order approving the
installation or use is issued in accordance with section 3123 of this
title."


   (b) In the absence of an authorizing order, such use shall immediately
terminate when the information sought is obtained, when the application
for the order is denied or when forty-eight hours have lapsed since the
installation of the pen register or trap and trace device, whichever is
earlier.


   (c) The knowing installation or use by any investigative or law
enforcement officer of a pen register or trap and trace device pursuant to
subsection (a) without application for the authorizing order within
forty-eight hours of the installation shall constitute a violation of this
chapter.


   (d) A provider for a wire or electronic service, landlord, custodian,
or other person who furnished facilities or technical assistance pursuant
to this section shall be reasonably compensated for such reasonable
expenses incurred in providing such facilities and assistance.


Sec. 3126.  Reports concerning pen registers and trap and trace devices


   The Attorney General shall annually report to Congress on the number of
pen register orders and orders for trap and trace devices applied for by
law enforcement agencies of the Department of Justice.


Sec. 3127.  Definitions for chapter


   As used in this chapter--


   (1) the terms "wire communication", "electronic communication", and
"electronic communication service" have the meanings set forth for such
terms in section 2510 of this title;


   (2) the term "court of competent jurisdiction" means--


   (A) a district court of the United States (including a magistrate of
such a court) or a United States Court of Appeals; or


   (B) a court of general criminal jurisdiction of a State authorized by
the law of that State to enter orders authorizing the use of a pen
register or a trap and trace device;


   (3) the term "pen register" means a device which records or decodes
electronic or other impulses which identify the numbers dialed or
otherwise transmitted on the telephone line to which such device is
attached, but such term does not include any device used by a provider or
customer of a wire or electronic communication service for billing, or
recording as an incident to billing, for communications services provided
by such provider or any device used by a provider or customer of a wire
communication service for cost accounting or other like purposes in the
ordinary course of its business;


   (4) the term "trap and trace device" means a device which captures the
incoming electronic or other impulses which identify the originating
number of an instrument or device from which a wire or electronic
communication was transmitted;


   (5) the term "attorney for the Government" has the meaning given such
term for the purposes of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure; and


   (6) the term "State" means a State, the District of Columbia, Puerto
Rico, and any other possession or territory of the United States. 








From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: cme@ellisun.sw.stratus.com (Carl Ellison)
Date: Mon, 4 Oct 93 14:19:07 PDT
To: Lyle_Seaman@transarc.com
Subject: Re: Triple DES products hitting market
Message-ID: <9310042115.AA15693@ellisun.sw.stratus.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


poor writing.

It uses 112 bits of key

	E(k1, D(k2, E(k1, x ) ) )

and they use CFB(1) mode around an ECB triple-DES, using their
own silicon which runs triple-DES at least 2M encryptions/sec.

(I called earlier today to get the info.)

 - Carl




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Peter Wayner <pcw@access.digex.net>
Date: Mon, 4 Oct 93 14:24:45 PDT
To: ssteele@eff.org
Subject: Re: Who's Most Receptive to Our Message?
Message-ID: <199310042122.AA00109@access.digex.net>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I'm pretty sure that there was a NPR reporter at the CSSPAB meetings.
He brought a tapedeck and taped interviews with people like Steve
Walker.

-Peter Wayner




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: cme@ellisun.sw.stratus.com (Carl Ellison)
Date: Mon, 4 Oct 93 14:24:51 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: multiple-file encryption
Message-ID: <9310042122.AA15704@ellisun.sw.stratus.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>Date: Mon, 04 Oct 93 14:29:44 MDT
>From: "Mike Johnson" <exabyte!smtplink!mikej@uunet.UU.NET>
>Message-Id: <9309047497.AA749770184@smtplink.exabyte.com>
>Subject: Re[2]: POISON PILL

>Yes.  Make "noise addition" (really multiplexing) part of the cipher.  You
>could throw away every other bit based on the parity of the key.  The
>ciphertext would be twice as big, but if you compressed both plain text
>streams first, this effect might not be very obvious.  Of course, if your
>encryption program were disassembled, you might be found out...


Yup -- I was assuming no padding.

If you allow padding, I already have a secret-key cipher which uses random
padding in order to frustrate known-plaintext attacks.  My favorite method
uses a key to initialize a PRNG whose output gives the number of bytes of
each stream to put in the output stream -- then encipher the PRNG key
followed by the multiplexed stream.  One of the streams being multiplexed
(and there can be a huge number, if you're encrypting an archive, for
example) can and should be random -- so that if you make a small change
and re-encrypt, you don't end up with cribs.

For this purpose, you'd need to have several files hanging around your
machine of random numbers yet to be used for padding.

Meanwhile, I have several files of random numbers which I keep around for
running simulations.

My favorite random number generator is

	compress - </dev/audio | idea | tran | idea | tran | idea

where the idea keys are chosen randomly and there's no mic plugged in
at /dev/audio.

Other people might generate random numbers other ways. :-)
[but you might keep my method around, for demonstrating to the cops.]

 - Carl





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "L. Detweiler" <ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Date: Mon, 4 Oct 93 16:59:08 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: German writer seeks simple RSA numerical example (fwd)
Message-ID: <9310042357.AA01088@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


actually, something like this should be in a FAQ. but please help him out.

===cut=here===

Date: Mon, 4 Oct 93 02:10:36 CET
From: simons@peti.GUN.de (Peter Simons)
Subject: RSA exmaples required


I'm authoring an article for a german computer magazine about PGP and
the RSA public key scheme and I'd like to include an exmaple for my
mathematical explaination. The problem is, that both factors have to
be quite large to get nice examples.

        p = 5    q = 7

        xy = 4*6+1 = 25         x=5
                                y=5

You see, with smaller factors, x and y are equal or 1 and xy. But a
larger set of factors would require a serious amount of calculations.
:-))

So, does somebody have a nice example for the RSA algorithm ready??

        bye, Peter


- ----- Peter Simons, Germany

                     Bye's First Law of Model Railroading:
        Anytime you wish to demonstrate something, the number of faults
                   is proportional to the number of viewers.





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: WKHALL@delphi.com
Date: Mon, 4 Oct 93 15:39:09 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: unscubscribe
Message-ID: <01H3Q3GXMP7Q96VKO9@delphi.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


please unsubscribe jhall@lambda.msfc.nasa.gov




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Date: Mon, 4 Oct 93 19:19:07 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: EFF GIF file recall notice: is EFF the new CERT?
In-Reply-To: <9310050151.AA05050@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Message-ID: <9310050217.AA10971@netcom5.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


L. Dettweiler writes:

> Ug. Blech. What the heck is EFF doing something like this? This strikes
> me as promoting hysteria and paranoia over image content and BBS
> operator liability. I hope Mr. T.C. May will have something eloquent to
> say about how silly, useless, and damaging this is. Didn't anyone talk
> to M. Godwin about this?! Is EFF the new CERT? Are we going to have new
> periodic EFF Pornographic GIF warnings?

No, I won't say it was silly, useless, or damaging.

EFF is just sending out some free legal advice, neither demanding
removal of these files nor threating SYSOPS in any way. The EFF didn't
make decided the files were obscene (actually, I'm not sure anybody
has...and of course my view, which may be L.D. was thinking of, is
that no files, no images can be called obscene).

I don't have to support the obscenity laws to realize that EFF is
doing SYSOPS a favor by notifying them that certain files are very
likey to be treated as obscene (and subjecting their boards to
seizure, a la several recent cases, including one near me).

Do I hear any volunteers to become a test case?


-Tim May


-- 
..........................................................................
Timothy C. May         | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,  
tcmay@netcom.com       | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
408-688-5409           | knowledge, reputations, information markets, 
W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA  | black markets, collapse of governments.
Higher Power: 2^756839 | Public Key: PGP and MailSafe available.
Note: I put time and money into writing this posting. I hope you enjoy it.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Robert J Woodhead <trebor@foretune.co.jp>
Date: Mon, 4 Oct 93 09:44:41 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: subscribe
Message-ID: <9310041033.AA13535@dink.foretune.co.jp>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Here's hoping I haven't made an ass out of myself.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "L. Detweiler" <ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Date: Mon, 4 Oct 93 18:54:47 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: EFF GIF file recall notice: is EFF the new CERT?
Message-ID: <9310050151.AA05050@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Enclosed, a `GIF file recall' warning from EFF & S. Steele.

Ug. Blech. What the heck is EFF doing something like this? This strikes
me as promoting hysteria and paranoia over image content and BBS
operator liability. I hope Mr. T.C. May will have something eloquent to
say about how silly, useless, and damaging this is. Didn't anyone talk
to M. Godwin about this?! Is EFF the new CERT? Are we going to have new
periodic EFF Pornographic GIF warnings?

S. Steele, I think we deserve better. This gets a definite Cypherpunk
Razzberry award. (And that will probably be the *least* of the
criticism.) Whose idea was this?

This reminds me. There is a whole new class of urban legends that are
starting. Technology does not mean the eradication of urban legends, it
only seems to mean they are propagated faster. Did anyone hear the
rumor (now totally debunked) that California police were warning
motorists not to blink their lights, because it was a signal to gangs
to shoot in an `initation ceremony'? This flashed across the nation in
a few days due to well-meaning, but totally indiscriminating, public
who transmitted it via email and fax machines. Didn't anyone stop to
just say `uh, waitaminit!'

They think *we* (cypherpunks) are paranoid, and easily subscribe to
conspiracy theories. Hah! The public at large is frighteningly
gullible, even *without* the media. In fact, as bad as the media is, it
actually has a dampening force to this kind of sheer hysteria.
`extraordinary public delusions and the madnesses of crowds'.

The trick is to try to get networks to allow urban myths to meet the
dampening force faster. Imagine if early in the spread someone
authoritative comes on and says `there is no substance to this, and we should know'.


------- Forwarded Message

Date: Sun, 3 Oct 1993 12:02:02 -0400
From: farber@central.cis.upenn.edu (David Farber)
Subject: Warning re some gif files (from EFF News)


************************************************************
***VERY IMPORTANT***  Critical Files to Remove from Your BBS
************************************************************

EFF has learned that the following graphic image files have been the
subject of a recent federal indictment alleging receipt and possession of
child pornography and transportation of obscene materials through
interstate commerce.  ***EFF STRONGLY ADVISES ALL SYSOPS TO REMOVE THESE
FILES FROM THEIR ELECTRONIC BULLETIN BOARD SYSTEMS IMMEDIATELY IN ORDER TO
AVOID LEGAL REPERCUSSIONS.***  Please distribute this message widely and
quickly.

Alleged child pornography files:

PPO4@.GIF
FAMO3.GIF
CHERRYA.GIF
CHERRYB.GIF
CHERRYC.GIF
WC221501.GIF
LITSIS.GIF
MBON006.JPG
MBON007.JPG
DS-X-219.GIF
INOCNT.JPG
KID013.GIF

Alleged adult obscenity files:

ORGY6.ZIP (A DL FILE)
WC1C2332.GIF
BAMS-039.JPG
________________________________________
Shari Steele
Director of Legal Services
Electronic Frontier Foundation
1001 G Street, NW
Suite 950 East
Washington, DC  20001
202/347-5400 (voice), 202/393-5509 (fax)
ssteele@eff.org




------- End of Forwarded Message





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "L. Detweiler" <ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Date: Mon, 4 Oct 93 19:04:47 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: PGP mailer integration mailing list announcement
Message-ID: <9310050203.AA05340@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



===cut=here===

Subject: PGP Mail Integration Project
From: simons@peti.GUN.de (Peter Simons)
Date: Son Oct 03, 1993 17:12:04

- -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

Anybody interested in the integration of PGP in the "normal" e-mail
enviroment (seems to be a lot of people here :->), should subscribe to
out PGPMIP mailing list and contribute their ideas there.

- - ------8<-------------------------------------------------------------------

               Pretty Good Privacy -- Mail Integration Project
               ===============================================


             An Introduction by Peter Simons <simons@peti.GUN.de>


 Edition 1                                                 Bonn, 14-Sep-93



What is it?
- - -----------

        Pretty Good(tm) Privacy (PGP), from Phil's Pretty Good Software, is
a high security cryptographic software application for MSDOS, Unix,
AmigaOS, and other computers.  PGP allows people to exchange files or
messages with privacy and authentication.  Privacy means that only those
intended to receive a message can read it.  Authentication means that
messages that appear to be from a particular person can only have
originated from that person.  Additionally, no secure channels are needed
to exchange keys between users!  This is because PGP is based on a powerful
new technology called "public key" cryptography.

        All in all, PGP is a very useful and important program.  However it
is a little bit...uh...  overkill for the average Joe Dow to install this
rather complex package, just to encrypt his few e-mail, which are not so
private anyway.  PGP comes with dozens of options, switches and
configuration possibilities, far too many to 'just install and run'.

        This has prevented many potential users from using PGP for their
private mail.  Also it is significantly more complicated to encrypt every
single outgoing mail and, of course, to decrypt each incoming mail
individually.

        This is what the PGP Mail Integration Project wants to improve.  In
our opinion man-kind should stay superior and leave the 'dirty-work' to the
machines.  :-))

        Our idea was to integrate PGP, as far as possible, into common UUCP
packages so the user needn't be concerned with how PGP itself works.
Outgoing or incoming mail should be en-/decrypted automatically and the
software should do all the basics of controlling PGP.


The mailing list:
- - -----------------

        What looked like a quite trivial task, that could be managed by a
few simple scripts, grew into a full project.  Too many cases have to be
covered, too many setups have to be recognized, etc, etc...

        We realized that we'd need quite a number of beta testers and of
course a supporting cast of users, contributing ideas and requests, to make
PGPMIP fit their needs.

        If you want to participate in the development of this project or
just want to get further information about the project, feel free to
contact either myself or any other member of the development team.
Additionally, there's a mailing list available which provides the latest
information and allows for an on going discussion about the future of the
project.

Send a message like this TO the list itself to be re-sent to all concerned;

   To: pgpmip@edex.edu.au
   Subject: Whatever...

   Hi pgpmip people, ...


A message to the below can be used to sign on and off a list;

   To: pgpmip-request@edex.edu.au
   Subject: Whatever...

   join FirstName LastName pgpmip

or

   leave FirstName LastName pgpmip


Note: ADD/SUB/JOIN = join
      UNSUB/LEAVE  = leave


Any errors will be, and any problems should be, reported to;

   To: pgpmip-owner@edex.edu.au


        Our project concentrates on the Amiga platform, but programmers and
users of other operating systems are welcome to contribute, maybe we can
expand the project to UNIX, MS-DOS and other platforms.

You can find the current version of PGP on aminet in util/crypt/.

- - ------8<-------------------------------------------------------------------

        bye, Peter

 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
  Peter Simons  | Usenet: simons@peti.GUN.de       | PGP  v2.x  public  key
  Europaring 20 | CBMNet: simons@peti.adsp.sub.org | available  on  request
  53123 Bonn    |  Phone: +49 228 746061           | or via GET from almost
  Germany       |    CBM: ETG207                   | any keyserver. Use it!
 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------


- -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.3a

iQCVAgUBLK8HLA9HL1s0103BAQHXNgQAldTmlNXiPOrGvr6+L9AAMR7VMyfradD6
85iuQCEgS7hzhJoShZn08hFW1ofX7rcjshwfsT+PlCJvmoei8opBmVtUqJPYRqC3
XIDAy9pWhfAc32anT0GncwkYDK4zIuiFGdzOWmWC3yoGaE1z4NNSUkFcjM3vyMf2
q3ddaA/he/E=
=fFNy
- -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----




------- End of Forwarded Message





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Derek Atkins <warlord@MIT.EDU>
Date: Mon, 4 Oct 93 17:19:08 PDT
To: "L. Detweiler" <ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Subject: Re: German writer seeks simple RSA numerical example (fwd)
In-Reply-To: <9310042357.AA01088@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Message-ID: <9310050015.AA20691@oliver.MIT.EDU>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I've already sent him an example....

-derek




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: nobody@alumni.cco.caltech.edu
Date: Mon, 4 Oct 93 20:54:48 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Crypto Idea; Multi-Part Sigs
Message-ID: <9310050349.AA04200@alumni.cco.caltech.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I've been thinking of an idea I've heard kicking around the list somewhat;
that of digital pseudonyms and groups of people going by one name; likewise
single people going by names that sound like groups.

Let's say that three people decide to create a digital identity for
themselves,
maybe they plan on dealing with Blacknet as a group. So one of the first
things they might do after getting together might be to create a pgp keypair
with the name of the group on it. But who gets to hold the secret key?
Remember
they wish to be thought of and treated like a single entity. However they all
need to be able to decrypt documents addressed to them, and none of them
should be able to sign a document without the consent of the others.

Is it possible to produce a set of keys (for example, 3 private 1 public)
such that       -all three private keys are needed to sign a message from that
                I.D.  and
                -any of the private keys can decrypt anything encrypted with
                the single pubkey.

The way I see it, three (or more) people could have a joint keyID, and if
they wanted to post a message from that ID, the first person would write
the message and sign it with his/her segment of the key. She/he would then
encrypt with the second member's pubkey and annonymously remail it to #2, who
would sign with the second key segment, re-encrypt with #3's pubkey, and send
it on to #3, who would sign with the final key segment and anonymously
post to
the 'Pool'. If a response were posted, all three could read it without
depending on the others.

Is this possible?  In whole or in part? I don't know the math well enough to
figure it out myself, sorry if this is an obvious one.

Happy Hunting, -Chris
<cdodhner@indirect.com>
______________________________________________________________________________
Christian Douglas Odhner     | "The NSA can have my secret key when they pry
cdodhner@indirect.com	     | it from my cold, dead, hands... But they shall
pgp 2.3 public key by finger | NEVER have the password it's encrypted with!"
  "If guns are outlawed, only the government will have guns." -E. Abbey
My opinions are shareware. For a registered copy, send me 15$ in DigiCash.
  Key fingerprint =  58 62 A2 84 FD 4F 56 38  82 69 6F 08 E4 F1 79 11 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: anonymous@extropia.wimsey.com
Date: Mon, 4 Oct 93 21:29:47 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: More Anonymous "Annoyance"
Message-ID: <199310050409.AA02605@xtropia>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> First of all, the Connecticut case you seem to be referring to is that
> of Michael Elansky (Hartford). See Computer Underground Digest for
> full details. This was *not* email. He had file downloads and kept
> around (uh) "fireworks recipes".

I did not say it was e-mail; I said it was _traffic_.  The uploading and
downloading of files constitutes traffic.

> We've got to track down these supposed cases where boards were seized
> for content.

Elansky was busted for a very juvenile anti-cop rant, according to one
news release I read regarding the case.  As I remember, this was written
by a caller rather than by Elansky.

 >I consider them minor *anomalies*, and I think a rational
 > analysis of statistics will bear that out.

They are anomalies until they happen to you, at which point they become
_major disasters_.  For every bust there must be many more cases of
harassment.

 > Turning a board into a
 > systematic exercise in privacy violation is *not* the proper response
 > to paranoia about law enforcement seizures. This punishes users for
 > the misdeeds of overzealous officers.

Here's a hot message from the real world.  Feel free to print it out and
attach it to the bathroom window so that you may save the personal
expense of buying a clue:

        Ultimately:
        The Law is irrelevant.
        Right and Wrong are irrelevant.
        Your "rights" are irrelevant.
        Ethical niceties are irrelevant.
        Mishnaic wrangling over gored oxes is irrelevant.
        Offended high principle is irrelevant.

        All that is relevant is what _happens_ to you.
        When the cops show up, you've _already_ lost.

I have been watching Law, Office and Power abuse the innocent without
remedy my entire life.  The future promises more rather than less of
this, in not the least of theatres than that of digital information
transfer.

The Elansky case appears to be nonsense from this remove, something no
reasonable Constitutionalist would entertain for five minutes.  Despite
this, Elansky was held on one half million dollars bail.  It is
extremely unlikely that he will find remedy, or that his young life will
return to normal any time soon.  At best, the charges against him will
be dropped, after traumatizing his family and exhausting their finances.
He cannot win and "law enforcement" cannot lose, however absurd the
charges against him actually are.

I wonder how many BBSs were shut down, or began rigorously
"self-censoring," as a result of the Elansky publicity.

Unlike Internet's government and business sites that can hide behind
their size, or institutions of Higher Ignorance that can shield
themselves behind "academic freedom," the hobbyist BBS is a sitting duck
for any ambitious crank with a badge and an axe to grind.

A small California network, "NirvanaNet," that features encryption,
radical political discussion and "dangerous" text files had their home
node visited by the FBI earlier this year and in short order were
libeled in the local press in an inflammatory hatchet-piece as (and I
quote) "a clearinghouse for crime," despite the fact that no charges
were filed nor any criminal activity detected on the part of any
individual caller.

This harassment is probably more common than we guess.  There are a
couple of other cases I know of personally.  The chilling effect it has
is incalculable.  At least one NirvanaNet node went off line almost
immediately, another moved and there was an apparent inventory made of
the filebase with some judicious culling.

The effect - ultimately - is that it is safer for a BBS operator to risk
violating a caller's rights than to face trouble from the authorities
on some fishing expedition.

Check it out:  Earlier this year, the sysop of a BBS affiliated with an
NPR FM station discovered that two users had been using PGP for private
messages for some months.  Despite the fact that the BBS had never had a
policy on encryption, nor had any request been made by the sysop to
cease PGP traffic, both callers discovered their accounts deleted
without notice, their access denied and all public and private messages
ever made to or from either caller erased from the system.  After some
time, the sysop announced that he felt that PGP was a threat to his BBS
(and the radio station) and that he had expelled those users without
notice.  The traffic, as it turned out, consisted of the development and
testing of an e-mail PGP adaptation for QEdit, a popular text editor
used in offline reader programs.  Much of the work resident in the BBS
was destroyed.  In the uproar that followed, the panicked sysop secretly
distributed forged messages alleged to be from one of the parties,
apparently to justify his expulsion.

The fascinating thing was that when all of this came to light and the
offended parties talked of seeking legal remedy, other sysops with
critical knowledge of the affair refused to co-operate, believing that
even though the offending sysop was absolutely in the wrong, bringing
legal action against him _threatened the BBS community at large_.  The
message was clear, "Don't make a big _schande_ out of this..."

"I don't care if he did lift your wallet, don't call the cops and break
up the party."

This is the ultimate effect that meritless law enforcement harassment
has had on the BBS community. 

> Don't these Fidonet operators *understand* that by perpetuating the
> myth that they are responsible for all traffic on their machines, that
> they are actually *playing into* the hands of authorities? they are
> *strengthening* the paranoid atmosphere. And in fact I am quite
> repulsed by their policies, posted here, that seem to cutely
> rationalize systematic invasion of privacy.

Yes, they know it, but they also know that, in the minds of most
lowbrow law-enforcement personnel, encryption is synonymous with
criminal activity.  They don't want heat.  _When the cops come, you've
already lost_.  The only question is how badly.  These sysops are
usually scrimping and saving for a new modem; they can't afford lawyers.

_To law enforcement, snooping around the messagebase looking for criminal
activity is infinitely more civic-minded and responsible than permitting
secure encryption._  Policing your callers shows more good faith (to
Constable Bubba) than permitting them terrorist PGP.

If it comes down to either having a caller pissed off or having the cops
pissed off, the bigger threat is obvious to even a seventeen-year-old
Trekkie with zits and a BBS running on his dad's old XT.

There may be a theoretical application of the ECPA that suggests a right
of some non-paying parasite to use PGP on your personally-owned BBS, but
it doesn't seem to account for much compared to a visit from knuckle-
dragging local cops responding to a busibody mom's hysterical complaint
that her kid is being sucked into a secret ring of computer terrorists
who use "spy codes."  Everyone from the NSA to the Sacramento County
Sheriff's Department has it out for PGP, and the SCSD's public
pronouncements and name-calling at Zimmermann no doubt have been
filtering down through law enforcement channels to Constable Bubba with
the message that PGP is "some computer thing" associated with California
child pornography rings.  Great.  Just what you want on your kid's hobby
BBS in small-town Alabama.





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: charliemerritt@BIX.com
Date: Mon, 4 Oct 93 19:09:07 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Mycotronix garbage
Message-ID: <9310042204.memo.37357@BIX.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I was thinking of sending a *registered* letter to
the NSA tech contact.  His home address.  Was going to ask him
if he thought such a company was qualified to handle all
of our secrets.  Would the escrow agents be the only ones to
know, or maybe the trash guys too.

QUESTION: is there a legal problem with this?
    Is there a legal problem with a CC:My congresscritter?
I think these jerks *have* violated the most basic security.
If the NSA continues to deal with these *fools* then
a congressional investigation of NSA is called for.

Hey - NSA - got your ears on?
You gonna letum get away with it?
Still consider these security *idiots* the ones to deal with?




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: trestrab@GVSU.EDU (BETH TRESTRAIL)
Date: Mon, 4 Oct 93 19:29:07 PDT
To: extropians@extropy.org
Subject: "Reason" mag.article on PK Crypto
Message-ID: <9309047497.AA749798732@GVSU.EDU>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


The Nov 93 "Reason" magazine has a five page article on Public Key
Crypto written by Lee Dembart, who "is a longtime journalist,
science writer, and editorial writer at The New York Times and the LA
Times who has written extensively about computers, mathematics,
and public policy. He recently graduated from Stanford Law School."

I don't have time to type the whole article in and don't have a
scanner, so I'll quote a few paragraphs to give you a taste of his
presentation, which I found very good.

          Given the multiplicitity of current and potentail uses
          for cryptography, it's not surprising that the Clinton
          administration provoked a storm of protest last spring
          when it proposed a standard set of computer codes for
          telephone calls and computer data. The plan envisions
          two chips, one called Clipper, for encoding digital
          telephone signals, and another called Capstone, for digital
          information from computers. The government would hold
          the keys to all electronic encryption, and it would split
          them between tow agencies chosen by the attorney general.
          Law-enforcement officials would need a search warrant to
          get access to the codes. Eric Hughes, a computer security
          expert in Berkeley, CA, observes: "The government is
          saying, ' If you want to lock something up, you have to
          [give us] the key.'"

          An editorial in "Communications Week" observed: "This
          isn't the first time that the government has proposed an
          authoritarian scheme that goes after a few people's
          crimes while stomping on the majority's civil liberties."

          It is technically illegal to take out of the US versions of
          some very popular computer programs - including the Norton
          Utilities, for example. But these efforts have proved
          largely ineffectual. You can buy a disk containing a good
          public-key cryptosystem in software stores in Moscow.
          Here again, the problem is that it is all but impossible
          to restrict the flow of knowledge. In the era of the
          Internet, barring people from physically taking information
          out of the country is no bar at all. Digitized data moves
          freely by satellite. And when it doesn't, it is virtually
          impossible to prevent anyone from walking into a software
          store in the US, buying encrypted software on a floppy disk,
          and then putting it into a suitcase.

          Rumors abound that the NSA has built a trap door into the
          Clipper chip that would enable it to read any messages, with
          or without a court order. It's hard to say whether this is
          a legitimate concern. But it's a second example of the
          government saying, "Trust us." Many people would rather
          use public-key cryptography, which does not require them to
          trust anybody or to decide whether the government is
          trustworthy.

          Ultimately, it's unlikely the government can prevent the
          spread of information and knowledge, regardless of what it
          decides to do. Washington can force government contractors
          to sue the CLipper chip and not use any other encryption
          scheme. But as a practical matter, it cannot prevent
          individuals from using whatever encryption scheme they want.
          For those who want the strongest encryption possible, RSA
          public-key cryptography is the system of choice. For
          better or worse, the genie is out of the bottle.

Please excuse the typos, I was in a hurry.

          Jeff




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Tiffany Lee Brown <magdalen@well.sf.ca.us>
Date: Mon, 4 Oct 93 22:49:47 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: unsubscribe
Message-ID: <93Oct4.224902pdt.14645-4@well.sf.ca.us>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



please drop me from the list ... magdalen@well.sf.ca.us .... there's just
not enough flaming on the list!  (heh).




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: charliemerritt@BIX.com
Date: Mon, 4 Oct 93 19:59:07 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: RSA EXAMPLE
Message-ID: <9310042253.memo.37458@BIX.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


cc:simons@peti.GUN.de (peter simons)

Dear Peter Simons,

In your example P=5 Q=7 you are indeed using small numbers.
Dont forget that D*E should equal 1 mod ( (p-1)*(q-1)/G).
G=gcd(p-1,q-1) so in your example D*E=1 mod 12.
D*E can not have common factors with 12 (2,3,4,6) etc.

If E=5  then D=5, a nonsense situation.
   E=7       D=7
   E=11      D=11
your key will not work
* * * * * * *

Try this:  P=5  Q=11  N=55   G=2  (gcd(4,10)=2)
           (p-1)*(q-1)=40  /G  = 20

	E=3  D=7  (D*E=21)        21 mod 20 = 1
Good key!
 Message = 31
    31^3=29791  mod 55=36 so cyphertext=36
    36^7=78364164096  mod 55 = 31 so recovered message is indeed 31.
I hope this helps.  Charlie Merritt  [charliemerritt@bix.com]




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: rcooke@conicit.ve (Robert E. Cooke (CCXBBS))
Date: Mon, 4 Oct 93 20:04:47 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: quit
Message-ID: <9310050253.AA25284@dino.conicit.ve>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


delete unsubscribe 




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: rcooke@conicit.ve (Robert E. Cooke (CCXBBS))
Date: Mon, 4 Oct 93 20:30:16 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: quit
Message-ID: <9310050323.AA03364@dino.conicit.ve>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


quit delete unsubscribe please




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: an12070@anon.penet.fi (S. Boxx)
Date: Mon, 4 Oct 93 18:34:47 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Mycotronix Garbage
Message-ID: <9310050132.AA07357@anon.penet.fi>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


karn@qualcomm.com (Phil Karn) on LA Times article:
>Monday's article also appears in column 1 of page 1, but at the
>bottom. It is titled "Computer Code's Security Worries Privacy
>Watchdogs" and it begins with a quote from Mykotronix's president
>commenting on how he felt about the Internet message carrying stuff
>found in his garbage.

HALLELUJAH! they FINALLY NOTICED!
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
To find out more about the anon service, send mail to help@anon.penet.fi.
Due to the double-blind, any mail replies to this message will be anonymized,
and an anonymous id will be allocated automatically. You have been warned.
Please report any problems, inappropriate use etc. to admin@anon.penet.fi.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: nobody@rosebud.ee.uh.edu
Date: Tue, 5 Oct 93 05:44:51 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: criminal gif upload
Message-ID: <9310051243.AA02245@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> ************************************************************
> ***VERY IMPORTANT***  Critical Files to Remove from Your BBS
> ************************************************************

fuck that, just point me at them gifs.  henh henh hmm hmm hmm.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Mike Godwin <mnemonic@eff.org>
Date: Tue, 5 Oct 93 05:00:19 PDT
To: an25184@anon.penet.fi
Subject: Re: More Anonymous "Annoyance"
In-Reply-To: <199310050409.AA02605@xtropia>
Message-ID: <199310051159.AA20241@eff.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


 
anonymous writes, among other things:

> A small California network, "NirvanaNet," that features encryption,
> radical political discussion and "dangerous" text files had their home
> node visited by the FBI earlier this year and in short order were
> libeled in the local press in an inflammatory hatchet-piece as (and I
> quote) "a clearinghouse for crime," despite the fact that no charges
> were filed nor any criminal activity detected on the part of any
> individual caller.
 
<text deleted>

> The effect - ultimately - is that it is safer for a BBS operator to risk
> violating a caller's rights than to face trouble from the authorities
> on some fishing expedition.

This posting illustrates the common logic problem behind rationales for
e-mail snooping. Note that, according to anonymous, there was no criminal
activity detected on this NirvanaNet node. Yet it was still searched.

What triggered the search of NirvanaNet seems to have been the unencrypted
discussions and text files, not the encrypted or private mail.

The notion that e-mail snooping has some kind of magic power to prevent
police searches still has no evidence to support it.


--Mike






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: cdmorgan@mosaic.uncc.edu (Charles D Morgan)
Date: Tue, 5 Oct 93 06:09:11 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Criminal gif's
Message-ID: <9310051305.AA11782@mosaic.uncc.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Look around there everywhere
In fcat those are not so bad
L8r
Charles




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: hfinney@shell.portal.com (Hal Finney)
Date: Tue, 5 Oct 93 11:34:57 PDT
To: cdodhner@indirect.com
Subject: Crypto Idea; Multi-Part Sigs
Message-ID: <9310051612.AA03681@jobe.shell.portal.com.shell.portal.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Some parts of what Christian asks about can be done; some can't.

You can't have it that each of three individuals can decrypt messages
sent to a key, while they all have to cooperate to sign messages.
Generally speaking, decryption and signing are identical in the RSA
cryptosystem.  Having enough information to do one implies teh a  the
ability to do the other.

However, you can divide a key so that people must cooperate to sign OR
decrypt.  Normally, in RSA, you choose a public exponent e, and find d,
the secret exponent, such that e*d = 1 mod (p-1)(q-1), where p and q are
the primes.  Instead, you can choose d1..d3 such that e*d1*d2*d3 = 1.
Choose d1 and d2 at random, choose e, and find d3 as in regular RSA.
Give d1, d2, and d3 to each of the three people.  Now they must apply
their exponents to the RSA block in order to sign or decrypt.

Hal Finney
hfinney@shell.portal.com




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: ssteele@eff.org (Shari Steele)
Date: Tue, 5 Oct 93 07:49:09 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: digital cash
Message-ID: <199310051447.AA22472@eff.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Hey 'punks.
Anyone know of an elementary primer on digital cash?  I'm trying to get up
to speed on this.  You can send me private e-mail at ssteele@eff.org. 
Thanks!
Shari





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: dobrowol@husc.harvard.edu
Date: Tue, 5 Oct 93 08:09:09 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: unsub
Message-ID: <9310051509.AA23496@husc8.harvard.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



	Please take me off the list.

	Txanx a lot.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: jpinson@fcdarwin.org.ec
Date: Tue, 5 Oct 93 11:25:23 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Need Suggestions for Random Numbers
Message-ID: <9310051201.aa27619@pay.pay.ecua.net.ec>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Greetings from the Galapagos islands!

I am working on a PC implementation of a one-time pad cipher, and
am trying to develop a way to produce an "acceptable" random file
to be xor'd with the plaintext.

I have seen here and elsewhere descriptions of hardware random
number generators (Geiger counters measuring random nuclear
decay, microphones picking up background hiss etc.), but I need
something that can be implemented entirely in software.

I recognize that there is probably no "perfect" software
solution, but some techniques are better that others.  (i.e.:
I want to avoid making a REALLY stupid mistake here!)

Listed below are a few ideas I have come up with, but I need some
feedback from more knowledgeable sources.    Any suggestions or
comments would be greatly appreciated.  If you reply to me
directly, I will summarize for the list.

Please don't suggest book/journal references that are not
accessible via the internet.  It would take me about 6 months to
order books from here.  (Everything I know about the
outside world arrives via my Pegasus/KA9Q mailer :-)

Also, can anyone recommend a statistical test for randomness, or
for detecting repeating patterns in a "random" file?

(I remember some years back someone demonstrated the Apple II random
number generator was flawed by converting the random numbers to
screen coordinates and "painting" the screen.  No matter how long
you ran the program, certain areas of the screen were never filled
in. In other words, certain numbers were never generated.)

Thanks in advance for any assistance.


Jim Pinson                    Galapagos Islands, Ecuador.
jpinson@fcdarwin.org.ec       PGP public key available by finger


----------Possible methods------------
(note: using the Borland C++ compiler)

- Generate a random file using Borland's random number
  generator, then run the output through an encryptor (PGP,
  DES etc.).   Possible variation: running through several
  different encryptors or multiple passes through a single
  encryptor.

- Generate two random files using different random number
  generators, then xor'ing the two files together to
  produce the final file.

- Generate a "bunch" of small random number files, reseeding the
  generator before each run.  The resulting files would then be
  concatenated to produce the final file.  (my thought here is to
  keep the random files small enough to avoid the eventual repeat
  of sequences that I understand occur in random number
  generators).

- Combinations of the above?

- Other:  Suggestions welcome.

-------------end-------------

On the subject of using audio input for generating random
numbers:  has any one tried using an audio file created by the
Windows sound recorder program?

What would be a good source of random meaningless sound? (an
quiet room, ocean surf, repeats of Gilligan's Island, old
presidential speeches (pick your favorite president). :-)






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: ssteele@eff.org (Shari Steele)
Date: Tue, 5 Oct 93 08:49:09 PDT
To: "L. Detweiler" <ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Subject: Re: EFF GIF file recall notice: is EFF the new CERT?
Message-ID: <199310051547.AA23289@eff.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I included the GIF warning in EFFector Online for unsuspecting BBS
operators.  Child pornography is not protected speech, and challenging
child pornography laws is not currently on EFF's agenda -- but protecting
BBS sysops from having their systems seized is.  I figured those who sought
to challenge the child pornography laws would poo poo the message.  I guess
I figured right.

BTW, before I ran the article, Mike Godwin and I had a discussion about
whether the *cops* would be angry, thinking we were obstructing justice.  I
guess I just can't win!

I'd like to request that this discussion be taken off the cypherpunks list,
since it is not on point to the list.  O.k. by you?
Shari





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: dmandl@lehman.com (David Mandl)
Date: Tue, 5 Oct 93 08:49:53 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: On Unsubscribing
Message-ID: <9310051549.AA26135@disvnm2.lehman.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I'm certainly not encouraging anyone to unsubscribe, but
I'm continually surprised at how many people don't know
how to do it.  Folks, if you want to send a message to the
administrator of any list (this includes subscribes,
unsubscribes, address changes, etc.), please don't send
it to everyone on the list.

The administrator of

xxx@yyy.zzz

can almost always be found at

xxx-request@yyy.zzz.

If you don't get an answer right away, please be patient--
don't scream about it to everyone on the list.  Most list
administrators do it out of the goodness of their hearts,
not for pay, and they may not be able to get to it right
away.  It's funny seeing people who are complaining
about the high volume on a list increase that volume with
messages that don't belong there.

   --Dave.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: hughes@ah.com (Eric Hughes)
Date: Tue, 5 Oct 93 13:19:09 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Crypto Idea; Multi-Part Sigs
In-Reply-To: <9310051612.AA03681@jobe.shell.portal.com.shell.portal.com>
Message-ID: <9310052004.AA13975@ah.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>You can't have it that each of three individuals can decrypt messages
>sent to a key, while they all have to cooperate to sign messages.

You can, but the key can't be a regular RSA key.

>Generally speaking, decryption and signing are identical in the RSA
>cryptosystem.

That's right, don't use RSA as such.

Choose two RSA keys.  Make one as Hal describes for signing.  Use the
other one for receiving.  The public key in this system is a pair of
public RSA keys.  You break symmetry, and lose automatic PGP support,
but it seems to have the characteristics required.

Eric




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: freeman@MasPar.COM (Jay R. Freeman)
Date: Tue, 5 Oct 93 13:55:02 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Need Suggestions for Random Numbers
Message-ID: <9310052053.AA29645@cleo.MasPar.Com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



> Also, can anyone recommend a statistical test for randomness, or
> for detecting repeating patterns in a "random" file?

  Try using consecutive calls to your random-number generator to
generate two-dimensional coordinate pairs, and plot them.  That is,
you do something like:

     for( i = 0; i < LOTS; ++i ) {
        x[i] = rand();
        y[i] = rand();
        }
     for( i = 0; i < LOTS; ++i ) {
        plot_point( x[i], y[i] );
        }

It's surprising how fast this will demolish many psuedorandom
generators (and how good the eye is at pulling patterns out of plots).

  And as far as nominal sources of "white" noise, be careful to avoid
contamination from 60-cycle power-line noise and its harmonics.  Do
a Fourier transform and look for peaks, for sure.

  I'm sure that the pros know lots of tricks like this.

                                 -- Jay "not a pro" Freeman




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Mike Johnson" <exabyte!smtplink!mikej@uunet.UU.NET>
Date: Tue, 5 Oct 93 13:15:00 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Need Suggestions for Random Numbers
Message-ID: <9309057498.AA749854878@smtplink.exabyte.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



>I have seen here and elsewhere descriptions of hardware random
>number generators (Geiger counters measuring random nuclear
>decay, microphones picking up background hiss etc.), but I need
>something that can be implemented entirely in software.

There is no such thing as real random numbers implemented purely in software.
The best you can do in pure software is a cryptographically strong
pseudorandom number sequence, started at a random point -- like continually
feeding the output of DES back to its input.

>Also, can anyone recommend a statistical test for randomness, or
>for detecting repeating patterns in a "random" file?

Try compressing the file with PKZIP & see if it gets smaller.  If it does, it
flunks.  If it doesn't, it may still have some patterns to it.

>What would be a good source of random meaningless sound? (an
>quiet room, ocean surf, repeats of Gilligan's Island, old
>presidential speeches (pick your favorite president). :-)

Not bad, but be sure to compress the output to remove the regular patterns of
the surf, etc, then use the compressed output -- after stripping off any
headers applied by the encryption program.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: af391@freenet.carleton.ca (Peter Hum)
Date: Tue, 5 Oct 93 11:19:57 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: digital cash
Message-ID: <9310051812.AA18298@freenet.carleton.ca>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



>
>Hey 'punks.
>Anyone know of an elementary primer on digital cash?  I'm trying to get up
>to speed on this.  You can send me private e-mail at ssteele@eff.org. 
>Thanks!
>Shari
>
I'm also very slow on this topic, and hope to get faster so as to write
about it in a Canadian newspaper. Suggestions?

Cheers,


--
Peter Hum                           
af391@Freenet.carleton.ca       
(613) 596-3761 (voice)          
(613) 726-1198 (fax)             




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Kent Hastings" <kent_hastings@qmail2.aero.org>
Date: Tue, 5 Oct 93 15:25:05 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Waa waa waa waa waah.
Message-ID: <199310052223.AA08645@aerospace.aero.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


                      Waa waa waa waa waah.
I want to go to Krustyland!

Anyway, if this escapes, be advised that hastings@courier8.aero.org is dead.
Like you gave a rat's 
ankle in the first place.

The Martians have shut down my X400 access. They probably couldn't take any
more of this foolishness. 

As the most Homeric of philosophers would say: "Dhoh!"

Looks like I'm forced to get Netcom now, but until then - 
"UNSUBSCRIBE." Thanks.

I'll be back.

Kent - <kent_hastings@qmail2.aero.org> for who knows how long.






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Mike Godwin <mnemonic@eff.org>
Date: Tue, 5 Oct 93 11:39:09 PDT
To: habs@panix.com (Harry S. Hawk)
Subject: Re: PGP in Fidonet
In-Reply-To: <199310040726.AA03042@panix.com>
Message-ID: <199310051838.AA25590@eff.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


 
habs writes:

> Situtation:
> 
> I assume this is a gray area. But let's say at a meeting of friends
> in one state (e.g., Boulder Creek, Ca), we create a Video message, 
> digitize it, and sent it to that friend, by uploading into an 
> account that I (habs) and the friend (rjc) has joint access to?
> 
> Questions:
> 
> Is that communications? Is it private? What if the message contains
> images that might be considered "adult"?
> 
> Would it be different if that file was e-mailed or FTPed rather
> than uploaded.
> 
> 
> Or, let's say I put in some very public FTP site, but used RSA to
> legally encrypt it with my friend's public key? Would it be 
> private communications or public?

These questions are sufficiently absorbing that I think I'll defer dealing
with them until they actually come up.


--Mike






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: cypher01@eternity.demon.co.uk (Russell Earl Whitaker)
Date: Tue, 5 Oct 93 08:14:53 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: REFERENCE: Data Communications Int'l - August
Message-ID: <17858@eternity.demon.co.uk>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


McGraw Hill's *Data Communications* magazine (int'l edition) of
August '93 has a long and informative article on the Clipper
issue.

Reference:

  "Clinton's Clipper: Can It Keep a Secret?
   - The administration's new encryption chip should have been
     code-named 'Controversy'"
   by Salvatore Salamone
   *Data Communications*, August 1993
   pp 53-54, 56, 58

   Vol. 22, No. 11
   ISSN 0363-6399

No mention is made of PGP.  However, general DES and RSA are
covered in some detail, with some mention made of DSS.



Russell Earl Whitaker                   whitaker@eternity.demon.co.uk
Communications Editor                                 AMiX: RWhitaker
EXTROPY: The Journal of Transhumanist Thought
Board member, Extropy Institute (ExI)
    Co-organizer, 1st European Conference on Computers, Freedom and
    Privacy, London, 20 November 1993






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Stanton McCandlish <mech@eff.org>
Date: Tue, 5 Oct 93 11:49:09 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Standard Headers for Anonymous Remailers
In-Reply-To: <9309210352.AA18893@indial1.io.com>
Message-ID: <199310051845.AA25784@eff.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


says Loyd Blankenship:

> 	We've been kicking around the pros and cons of anonymous remailers
> here at io.com. One of the big problems is anonymous bombardment of a 
> helpless newsgroup. This (and the problem of auto-screening anonymous
[...]
> 	Words such as "anon" and "anonymous" might occur naturally in
> the headers. I'd propose something like "ANONYPOST" or "ANONPOST" that 
> isn't likely to occur in nature.
> 	Voluntary adoption of this type of standard by remailers would
> take away some of the ammo that the anti-anon frothers are shooting,
> and would go a long way toward improving the image of remailers in 
> general.
> 
> 	Comments?

Sorry to respond to such an old post, but I can't let this one slip by.
Why not encourage people to be responsible for their OWN mail/news?
Relying on moderators to wipe noses and spank boodies is not going to 
help anyone in the long run.  FidoNet has had a great deal of difficulty
with moderators, and there is no need to spread this problem to UseNet.

The responsibility for you reading or not reading anon posts lies on YOUR
head.  If you do not like them, then learn to use the filtering
capabilities of your software.  If you don't have a news reader that will
do elaborate filters, try strn. 

At any rate, it is my firm opinion that moderation belongs in academic and
hard-science conferences, and those that require a very firmly focussed
range of topics to be of use.  The encouragement of more moderation, and
more moderator "jobs" like filtering out anonymous postings is a very bad
idea, and in particular, the inclusion of special headers for this purpose
will simply suggest to moderators that they filter all such mail by
default, and not even bother to try to determine relative merits.  It's
counterproductive to the entire idea of anonymous posting. 

-- 
DISCLAIMER: This message represents only my OWN opinion, not that of EFF.
Stanton McCandlish    Electronic Frontier Foundation Online Activist
mech@eff.org          NitV-DataCenter BBS SysOp
Fido: <tba>           IndraNet: 369:111/1



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: cme@ellisun.sw.stratus.com (Carl Ellison)
Date: Tue, 5 Oct 93 12:15:24 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re:  Crypto Idea; Multi-Part Sigs
Message-ID: <9310051915.AA17416@ellisun.sw.stratus.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Yes, it's possible to have a variant of RSA in which multiple people are
needed to sign anything.

I don't know a way to use the same key for privacy and allow any of the people
to decrypt, using RSA, since for RSA signatures and decryption are the
same operation.

 - Carl




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: SZARAC@guvax.acc.georgetown.edu
Date: Tue, 5 Oct 93 19:29:11 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: In need of help for a paper
Message-ID: <01H3RBQBOE829BVYJ7@guvax.acc.georgetown.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


	I am in need of source material, both technical and analytical 
in nature, for a paper I am writing. My topic is a discussion of the 
current data encryption debate within the administration. 
	I am a student at Georgetown University (home of the infamous 
Dorothy Denning) in its National Security Studies Program. This paper 
is for a class on Intelligence and National Security. My goal is to 
try to inform my fellow students about the right to privacy crisis 
going on in the data encryption area. Basically I am looking for any 
references to good articles and books about this topic. They can be 
discussions or very technical, I don't care. So if you know of 
anything that could help, please let me know. 

	Thanks,
	Chris    <szarac@guvax.georgetown.edu>





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: John Gibb - Computer Centre <jon@computer-science.paisley.ac.uk>
Date: Tue, 5 Oct 93 08:34:53 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: subscribe please
Message-ID: <2102.9310051610@chaos.cs.paisley.ac.uk>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


subscribe jon@cs.paisley.ac.uk
quit
(That's if this is NOT an invite only mail list)




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: peter honeyman <honey@citi.umich.edu>
Date: Tue, 5 Oct 93 13:39:09 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Chaum on the wrong foot?
Message-ID: <9310052038.AA09338@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


yes, i am replying to a message that is six weeks old.

hal, chaum may be barking up the wrong tree, but that doesn't mean
that his students are.  i read a couple of digital cash papers last
night and was struck by this statement in one of them:

    Techniques have been developed that ... allow the construction of
    off-line electronic cash systems that are secure for the bank, yet
    at the same time honest users of the system are guaranteed to
    remain completely anonymous.  This holds in a very strong sense:
    the security of banks is not compromised even if all users and
    shops collaborate in such an attempt, and the privacy of honest
    users cannot be violated in any cryptanalytic way even under
    adversarial behavior of the bank in coalition with all the shops.

					  Stefan Brands, CWI

this is very encouraging: digital cash technology is very far advanced,
and offers almost everything you might want.  (i think the jury is
still out on the question of k-spendability.)  but then there is the
bad news:  the mathematics and the protocols underlying the technology
are still too complex to be practical.  but there is also good news:
much of the current work intends to simplify the protocols and to
lessen the computational requirements of digital cash systems.

	peter




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: abajian@esca.com (paradigm shift happens)
Date: Tue, 5 Oct 93 16:55:06 PDT
To: "cypherpunks@toad.com"@esca.com
Subject: I'm outta here
Message-ID: <9310052353.AA20611@flash.esca.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Ditto Paul's post.  I thought this would be interesting. Instead, it's
eating disk with pointless noise.  How about using my cypherpunks mailings
as a random number generator?  No, too many repeating patterns.
I'll hang out on the notice list just in case the sky falls.  Yeesh.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Matthew J Ghio <mg5n+@andrew.cmu.edu>
Date: Tue, 5 Oct 93 14:15:03 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: criminal gif upload
In-Reply-To: <9310051243.AA02245@toad.com>
Message-ID: <QggS=pa00awJQEOpo1@andrew.cmu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


nobody@rosebud.ee.uh.edu writes in "criminal gif upload":

> > ************************************************************
> > ***VERY IMPORTANT***  Critical Files to Remove from Your BBS
> > ************************************************************
>
> fuck that, just point me at them gifs.  henh henh hmm hmm hmm.
>

ha ha.  Seriously tho, just posting a list of MS-DOS filenames is rather
useless as filenames do get changed.  It is highly likely that a sysop
or user might have changed the filenames to something else, especially
if their operating system supported filenames longer than 8 characters.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Mike Godwin <mnemonic@eff.org>
Date: Tue, 5 Oct 93 15:00:07 PDT
To: mg5n+@andrew.cmu.edu (Matthew J Ghio)
Subject: Re: criminal gif upload
In-Reply-To: <QggS=pa00awJQEOpo1@andrew.cmu.edu>
Message-ID: <199310052159.AA28270@eff.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


 
> ha ha.  Seriously tho, just posting a list of MS-DOS filenames is rather
> useless as filenames do get changed.  It is highly likely that a sysop
                                              ^^^^^^^^^^^^^
> or user might have changed the filenames to something else, especially
> if their operating system supported filenames longer than 8 characters.

I'm interested in the source of that probability calculation. In 
my experience, sysops dealing with a large volume of files normally
don't bother to change the names of a few of them, unless they see a
compelling reason to do so.


--Mike





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Eli Brandt <ebrandt@jarthur.Claremont.EDU>
Date: Tue, 5 Oct 93 18:15:07 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Need Suggestions for Random Numbers
In-Reply-To: <oggTBZu00awJIEOqNB@andrew.cmu.edu>
Message-ID: <9310060114.AA13172@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> From: Matthew J Ghio <mg5n+@andrew.cmu.edu>
> 1,1,2,3,5,8,13,21,34,55,89,144,233...
> 
> Taking modulo 10, we get:
> 
> 1,1,2,3,5,8,3,1,4,5,9,4,3,7,0,7,7,4,1,5,6,1,7,8,5,3,8,1,9,0,9,9,8...
> 
> Which gives a fairly random distribution of numbers from 0 to 9.

This is a very simple linear congruential generator:
	a_n = a_n-1 + a_n-2	mod 10
It is decidedly *not* suitable for "producing an `acceptable' random
file to be xor'd with the plaintext."  It's not a cryptographically
strong PRNG (it's not even a particularly good PRNG).  To break such
a system, try Boyar's paper, "Inferring Sequences Produced by
PRNGs", in JACM 36(1): 129-141.  I believe it takes time logarithmic
in the modulus, which is not a recipe for security.

   Eli   ebrandt@jarthur.claremont.edu




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Matthew J Ghio <mg5n+@andrew.cmu.edu>
Date: Tue, 5 Oct 93 15:25:10 PDT
To: jpinson@fcdarwin.org.ec
Subject: Re: Need Suggestions for Random Numbers
In-Reply-To: <9310051201.aa27619@pay.pay.ecua.net.ec>
Message-ID: <oggTBZu00awJIEOqNB@andrew.cmu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


jpinson@fcdarwin.org.ec writes:

> I am working on a PC implementation of a one-time pad cipher, and
> am trying to develop a way to produce an "acceptable" random file
> to be xor'd with the plaintext.

My favorite is the fibbonachi (sp?) series.  You've probably seen this
before: The series begins with the first two numbers being ones, and
each number after if being the sum of the two preceeding numbers. 
Therefore, we have:

1,1,2,3,5,8,13,21,34,55,89,144,233...

Taking modulo 10, we get:

1,1,2,3,5,8,3,1,4,5,9,4,3,7,0,7,7,4,1,5,6,1,7,8,5,3,8,1,9,0,9,9,8...

Which gives a fairly random distribution of numbers from 0 to 9.  You
can take a different mod value to adjust the range of numbers produced. 
This will eventually repeat (in the mod 10 example example I believe it
will repeat after around 60 numbers - you'll never be able to get all
possible combinations, for example 0,0 is not possible) but the
distribution is fairly random.  Increasing the randomness, (and the
legnth before it will repeat) is easy.  For example if you make the
series the sum of the first two of the last five numbers you get (modulo
10 for simplicity):

1,1,1,1,1,2,2,2,2,3,4,4,4,5,7,8,8,9,2,5,6,7,1,7,1,3,8...

Although this starts off slowly, the randomness picks up, and this will
generate a series which will go for thousands of digits without
repeating.  By the way, I don't reccomend adding more than two numbers
together to get the next number in the series.  If you try adding three,
four, or more numbers together, it causes the series to increase faster,
which causes it to reach the point where it repeats sooner, plus it
complicates your software and slows down the computation.

Anyway, if after extending the series, it's still not random enough, try
this: Change your program so that after it adds the first two numbers,
it looks at the third number.  If this third number is greater, less
than, or equal to some arbritrary value, add the fourth number to the
first two and then uses that as the next digit in the series.  This will
greatly increase the random effect.  This makes an excellent cipher, as
you can generate different series based on what substitutions you make
in the series.  Of course, your ideas about randomizing further by
combining random noise files is good, just be careful when using xor,
because you could end up cancelling out the beginnings of your serieses,
(since all these series begin with 1,1, xoring them would give you
zeros.)  Of course also try changing the initial conditions of the
fibbonachi series, just be sure you don't use something that will lock
the series (such as 5,5 which will produce 5,5,0,5,5,0,5,5,0...) 
Re-encrypting the noise file is also a good idea, multiplying each byte
by three and then doing a mod 256 works well for these purposes.

> (I remember some years back someone demonstrated the Apple II
> random number generator was flawed by converting the random
> numbers to screen coordinates and "painting" the screen.  No
> matter how long you ran the program, certain areas of the screen
> were never filled in. In other words, certain numbers were never
> generated.)

Well, I've programmed on Apple II computers for years, and there were
two very common systems used for random number generation.  Applesoft
Basic simply read bytes in the ROM and used them as random numbers. 
6502 code looks pretty random when you're just looking at the numeric
opcodes and data.  The other popular thing to do was to read the video
count.  This works best when your program is interacting with a human,
because people don't always respond to prompts in exactly the same
amount of time every time, so the position the video circuitry was
scanning would be different almost every time the program was run.  This
method works best for providing a seed for a series generator like the
ones described above.  If your computer has a clock, just read the time,
and that will have the same random effect.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: cman@IO.COM (Douglas Barnes)
Date: Tue, 5 Oct 93 16:39:09 PDT
To: mech@eff.org (Stanton McCandlish)
Subject: Re: Standard Headers for Anonymous Remailers
In-Reply-To: <199310051845.AA25784@eff.org>
Message-ID: <9310052336.AA04757@illuminati.IO.COM>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Stanton:

Actually, I think you're missing Loyd's point here. Basically, we 
really wanted to set up an anonymous remailer here at Illuminati
Online. We encountered opposition from a certain individual on the
grounds that "anonymous posts can destroy civil conversation" and
individuals, groups and lists "should have the right to easily 
filter out posts from anonymous remailers."

Although this is highly debatable (and I myself am opposed to it),
it has nothing to do with inflicting moderation where none 
exists now, and is rather a call for a voluntary standard for
tagging of posts that have been anonymized so that they can be 
filtered out wholesale. (Rather than the retail filtering that
I'm sure goes on already in some quarters.)

The advantage of this is that if a group or list or individual
decides they want nothing to do with anonymous postings in general,
they need not see them. The chief disadvantage in my mind is that
it poisons the infrastructure against the strong pseudonymous 
entities that I think will be key to an underground digital economy.
Other defects will be left as an exercise to the reader. :-)

Doug

> 
> says Loyd Blankenship:
> 
> > 	We've been kicking around the pros and cons of anonymous remailers
> > here at io.com. One of the big problems is anonymous bombardment of a 
> > helpless newsgroup. This (and the problem of auto-screening anonymous
> [...]
> > 	Words such as "anon" and "anonymous" might occur naturally in
> > the headers. I'd propose something like "ANONYPOST" or "ANONPOST" that 
> > isn't likely to occur in nature.
> > 	Voluntary adoption of this type of standard by remailers would
> > take away some of the ammo that the anti-anon frothers are shooting,
> > and would go a long way toward improving the image of remailers in 
> > general.
> > 
> > 	Comments?
> 
> Sorry to respond to such an old post, but I can't let this one slip by.
> Why not encourage people to be responsible for their OWN mail/news?
> Relying on moderators to wipe noses and spank boodies is not going to 
> help anyone in the long run.  FidoNet has had a great deal of difficulty
> with moderators, and there is no need to spread this problem to UseNet.
> 
> The responsibility for you reading or not reading anon posts lies on YOUR
> head.  If you do not like them, then learn to use the filtering
> capabilities of your software.  If you don't have a news reader that will
> do elaborate filters, try strn. 
> 
> At any rate, it is my firm opinion that moderation belongs in academic and
> hard-science conferences, and those that require a very firmly focussed
> range of topics to be of use.  The encouragement of more moderation, and
> more moderator "jobs" like filtering out anonymous postings is a very bad
> idea, and in particular, the inclusion of special headers for this purpose
> will simply suggest to moderators that they filter all such mail by
> default, and not even bother to try to determine relative merits.  It's
> counterproductive to the entire idea of anonymous posting. 
> 
> -- 
> DISCLAIMER: This message represents only my OWN opinion, not that of EFF.
> Stanton McCandlish    Electronic Frontier Foundation Online Activist
> mech@eff.org          NitV-DataCenter BBS SysOp
> Fido: <tba>           IndraNet: 369:111/1
> 

-- 
----------------                                             /\ 
Douglas Barnes            cman@illuminati.io.com            /  \ 
Chief Wizard         (512) 448-8950 (d), 447-7866 (v)      / () \
Illuminati Online          metaverse.io.com 7777          /______\



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Matthew J Ghio <mg5n+@andrew.cmu.edu>
Date: Tue, 5 Oct 93 15:49:09 PDT
To: Mike Godwin <mnemonic@eff.org>
Subject: Re: criminal gif upload
In-Reply-To: <199310052159.AA28270@eff.org>
Message-ID: <cggTWzm00awJQEOrRt@andrew.cmu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> > ha ha.  Seriously tho, just posting a list of MS-DOS filenames is rather
> > useless as filenames do get changed.  It is highly likely that a sysop
>                                              ^^^^^^^^^^^^^
> > or user might have changed the filenames to something else, especially
> > if their operating system supported filenames longer than 8 characters.
>
> I'm interested in the source of that probability calculation. In
> my experience, sysops dealing with a large volume of files normally
> don't bother to change the names of a few of them, unless they see
> a compelling reason to do so.

I suppose my choice of words was bad, but it does happen.  You're right,
most sysops don't change the filenames.  Usually the filenames get
changed when someone is moving the image to a different computer
platform, such as an Amiga user uploading a GIF to a IBM-compatible BBS
where the OS differences would necessitate a filename change.  And of
course there are some punks who just change the filename to get more
upload credits on ratio systems.  I didn't mean to put down the EFF's
efforts to protect sysops, I was just pointing out the possibility for
potential problems.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: plmoses@unix.cc.emory.edu (Paul L. Moses)
Date: Tue, 5 Oct 93 16:25:07 PDT
To: kent_hastings@qmail2.aero.org
Subject: Re:  Waa waa waa waa waah.
Message-ID: <9310052322.AA03358@emoryu1.cc.emory.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


UNSUBSCRIBE ME from this list.  I know this is the "wrong" place to send it,
but I have just spent the past 2 days sorting out 700+ cypherpunks messages
that piled up while i was out of email range.

_ I HAD some sympathy for the ideals of this project when I signed up, but now
I am finding all the bickering and phoney legalese to be too much.
The extensive post from EFF was the last straw.  For God's sake, what purpose
could it serve?  Why not just type in all House debates on Clipper.
Better yet, get an optical character reader and scan them in.  

Believe me, I have no interest in being told "how" I may communicate by the
government.  Thanks for the info and best of luck.  Goodbye.

- Paul




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: peter honeyman <honey@citi.umich.edu>
Date: Tue, 5 Oct 93 16:35:06 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Chaum on the wrong foot?
Message-ID: <9310052333.AA11994@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> Can you post the references for these papers?

sure.  i got them from ftp.cwi.nl in directory /pub/CWIreports/AA/.

CS-R9318.ps.Z is N. Ferguson "Single Term Off-Line Coins."  it is 13 pp.

CS-R9323.ps.Z is Stefan Brands "An Efficient Off-line Electronic Cash
System Based On The Representation Problem."  it is 77 pp.

does anyone else have any digital cash papers on-line?

	peter




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Eli Brandt <ebrandt@jarthur.Claremont.EDU>
Date: Tue, 5 Oct 93 20:00:29 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Need Suggestions for Random Numbers
In-Reply-To: <IggWg0W00Vp=NOUEhj@andrew.cmu.edu>
Message-ID: <9310060300.AA14566@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> From: Matthew J Ghio <mg5n+@andrew.cmu.edu>
>      if a_n-2 < 195  then  a_n = a_n-4 + a_n-3   mod 256
>      if a_n-2 > 194  then  a_n = a_n-4 + a_n-3 + a_n-1   mod 256
> 
> This is considerably less easy to break.

True.  However, there are some fairly general attacks on
congruential PRNGs, and I wouldn't be willing to place much of a
prize on the unbreakability of schemes such as the above.  There
are simple techniques whose security is better tested.

> What PRNGs would you suggest using?

I'm hardly the person to ask, but here's a simple one:
  Given a cryptohash function hash(), and a key K,
  generate your series S as S_i = hash(K+i).
There are plenty of other games you can play with a secure hash
function.  They have a practical advantage over PRNGs built on
top of ciphers: there's no problem exporting them.  There are
also "pure" cryptographically-strong RNGs, but I don't know
anything about them.  (The name "Blum-Blum-Shub" springs to
mind, but how could it not?)

   Eli   ebrandt@jarthur.claremont.edu




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Alan Mason <vznquest@netcom.com>
Date: Tue, 5 Oct 93 21:59:10 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Cyphertrivia
In-Reply-To: <9310060452.AA03396@netcom5.netcom.com>
Message-ID: <Pine.3.05.9310052151.B29273-b100000@netcom5>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> 
> OK, so if you were really paranoid, you wouldn't even let 'THEM' know you
> were using pgp.
> 
> But... if you were only mildly paranoid, you would:
> 
> 1.  Break your message into several short blocks
> 
> 2.. Encrypt them with your friends public pgp key in ascii format
> 
> 3.  Change the parts of the messages that say "BEGIN (END) PGP MESSAGE" to
> read  "BEGIN (END) PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK"
> 
> 4.  Post them in an innocuous place and let the recipient know that they
> are there.  When he/she decypts them, he/she doesn't even need to change
> "PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK" back to "PGP MESSAGE".  Thanks, Phil :).
> 
> In this way, you can console your paranoia by telling it that while the
> cryptocops may know you HAVE pgp, they don't know you are using it
> to send messages.
> 
> Trivial, I know, but hey - it was one of those trivial days........
> 
>    
> -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
> A Paranoid 2		|   Any time you find a simple answer to a question,
> aka vznquest@netcom.com	|   The odds are you asked the wrong question.
> *******************     |
> ----------------------------------------------------------------------------







From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Matthew J Ghio <mg5n+@andrew.cmu.edu>
Date: Tue, 5 Oct 93 19:20:07 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Need Suggestions for Random Numbers
In-Reply-To: <9310060114.AA13172@toad.com>
Message-ID: <IggWg0W00Vp=NOUEhj@andrew.cmu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Eli Brandt <ebrandt@jarthur.Claremont.EDU> writes:

> This is a very simple linear congruential generator:
> 	a_n = a_n-1 + a_n-2	mod 10
> It is decidedly *not* suitable for "producing an `acceptable' random
> file to be xor'd with the plaintext."  It's not a cryptographically
> strong PRNG (it's not even a particularly good PRNG).

The pseudo-random number generator:

     a_n = a_n-1 + a_n-2   mod 10

is easy to break.  One could guess the pattern from only a few numbers
of the series.  My point is that that series can be used as a basis for
better PRNGs.  I suggested using something like:

     if a_n-2 < 195  then  a_n = a_n-4 + a_n-3   mod 256
     if a_n-2 > 194  then  a_n = a_n-4 + a_n-3 + a_n-1   mod 256

This is considerably less easy to break.  Even if one could surmise that
the (n-1) term was being added in sometimes and not others, you'd still
have to examine a large section of the series to figure out exactly what
method was being used to determine when the extra term was being
inserted (you'd have to see an example where a_n-2=194 and note that the
term was not included, and you'd have to see the situation a_n-2=195 and
note that it was included.  Plus, double-encryption could be used to
increase the security.

What PRNGs would you suggest using?




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Karl Lui Barrus <klbarrus@owlnet.rice.edu>
Date: Tue, 5 Oct 93 20:39:11 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Crypto Idea; Multi-Part Sigs
In-Reply-To: <9310050349.AA04200@alumni.cco.caltech.edu>
Message-ID: <9310060336.AA11903@flammulated.owlnet.rice.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


nobody@alumni.cco.caltech.edu wrote:

>Is it possible to produce a set of keys (for example, 3 private 1 public)
>such that       -all three private keys are needed to sign a message from that
>                I.D.  and
>                -any of the private keys can decrypt anything encrypted with
>                the single pubkey.
>

An excellent paper (author and title have slipped my mind - the paper
describes key-and, key-or, and other operations) describes how to do
something related to part 2 of the above.

In that scheme, you would have the three key pairs for the
individuals, Pa, Sa, Pb, Sb, Pc, Sc, and the "joint" keypair Pj, Sj.  

A message encrypted with Pj can only be unlocked with Sj, which in
turn is encrypted with Pa, Pb, Pc.  Thus, the final message looks like

E(M, Pj); E(Sj, Pa); E(Sj, Pb); E(Sj, Pc)

where the four parts are passed around as one, and E(a,b) means a
encrypted with b.  Thus, each of the individuals, knowing their own
private keys, can extract Sj, and then the message M.

Offhand, I'm not sure if the paper describes joint signings in this
manner.

-- 
Karl L. Barrus: klbarrus@owlnet.rice.edu         
keyID: 5AD633 hash: D1 59 9D 48 72 E9 19 D5  3D F3 93 7E 81 B5 CC 32 

"One man's mnemonic is another man's cryptography" 
  - my compilers prof discussing file naming in public directories



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "L. Detweiler" <ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Date: Tue, 5 Oct 93 21:55:09 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: EFF pornography file warning
Message-ID: <9310060453.AA10453@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Boy, I sure have gotten flamed by the best on this one. And its rather
deafeningly silent on the list. I'm bleeding from shrapnel wounds and
hung out to die. Let me justify a few things. Enclosed:

- why I posted the announcement
- why I flamed EFF
- things that have upset me about this affair
- a classic cypherpunk rant on child pornography worthy of T.C. May

* * *

I posted the announcement to the cypherpunks because

1) there has been a long past history of interest in BBS type investigations

2) there was a huge flame war over CERT sending a notice to E.Hughes
for his FTP site, saying `please look into this'-- this EFF
announcement struck me as amazingly similar. (BTW, I had virtually
nothing to do with that flame war, which was incredibly prolonged)

3) EFF of course is very close to the cypherpunk cause with S.Steele,
M.Godwin, and J.Gilmore regular readers and contributors.

4) consider that comp.org.eff.talk would be another forum, but I
rejected it, because this forum is more private and still watched by EFF.

* * *

Now, why did I flame EFF for this action? In one word: quagmire. I said
it was `silly, useless, and damaging'

1) this opens them up to having to do this *regularly*. Is this what
they want to be doing?

2) since when does EFF help federal BBS investigations?

3) M. Godwin just got done informing us the beauty of *non* liability
with a hands-off BBS operator policy.

4) its silly to post a notice about given filenames. They simply are as
amorphous as cyberspace itself.

5) a recall of any type is a notorious way to generate paranoia,
perhaps a cure worse than the affliction. this kind of message spreads
like wildfire. `What? EFF says file [x] is child pornography?' There
are tens of thousands of BBS operators in the U.S. -- is this a service
or a disservice to them? hence my urban myth ramblings.

6) Releasing this kind of notice only draws more attention to those
files. Suddenly, they become collectors items. People start hunting
them down. People create empty files with the same name as a joke. All
because `EFF says file [x] is child pornography'

7) many other reasons that will become obvious and important in
retrospect, but look like hypersensitivity at this point.

* * *

I'm very upset that

1) everybody on the list is hiding, and refuses to criticize EFF
despite the strong parallels to CERT. at best this is cowardice and at
worst hypocrisy. this tiptoeing and silence is very reprehensible, IMHO.

2) it does not appear to me that EFF has thought this through. this
announcement reflects on EFF. why couldn't they have phrased it
differently? e.g. Agents [x] of government agency [x] have requested
that operators remove these files. As it stands, EFF associates its own
reputation with this investigation and the file recall.

3) there have been requests from EFF representatives to `let it drop'.
well, yes, that is one way of dealing with the issue, but IMHO more
appropriate to a species of animal called `ostriches'.

4) in general, I object to this philosophy found elsewhere on the list
of `if its in our backyard then don't criticize it'. the Fidonet
operators are like this. EFF is like this. The former, in their
cryptophobia and surveillance, are implicitly supportive of the
philosophy of Clipper and the NSA. The latter, EFF, has a critical role
in promoting coolness, not hysteria, among BBS operators.

5) In a rather low blow, S. Steele writes ``I figured those who sought
to challenge the child pornography laws would poo poo the message.  I
guess I figured right.'' For the record, I do not seek to challenge
child pornography laws or federal investigations. My message made
rather clear that I was objecting to the role of *EFF* in the affair.

* * *

Lastly, I guess I'm a little confused.

tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
>No, I won't say it was silly, useless, or damaging.
>[...]
>Do I hear any volunteers to become a test case?

I tweaked T.C. May in the hope of seeing a message analyzing child
pornography in digitized images over cyberspace, because I thought I
recall him writing a rather amazing essay on the subject some months
ago on the list. Apparently, based on my recent private email exchange,
he wasn't associated with that. I guess I just misremembered because it
seemed like such a classic cypherpunkesque rant in the spirit of his best.

Anyway, as I recall, *someone* about 3 or 4 months ago posted to the
list a remarkable analysis of a brouhaha surrounding the creation of
the group `alt.pictures.erotica.children'. The person talked about
posting a PGP file to the group, as I recall with an anonymous
remailer, and then talked about the fierce reaction (melee?) involved.
The person stated that the group appeared to have been created as a
joke, and the file itself as PGP code was actually not legal syntax for
`plausible deniability' of the author, but nevertheless raised important questions.

The essay talked about the fruitlessness of trying to track down actual
`child pornography' over cyberspace. One of the main points was that
child pornography is not illegal everywhere, as I recall the person
mentioned Denmark as a place where it particularly flourishes. Is a GIF
illegal if it was taken in a country that prohibits it? that's easy.
But what about if it was taken in a country where it was legal and
imported? well, in the U.S. this is illegal too.

But the poster raised a lot of other very fascinating questions that
were highly relevant to pornography in cyberspace. Digital composition
tools allow artist to cut and paste pictures with astonishing realism.
What about a situation where adult models (as young as possible) are
used and child's faces are plastered on top? Or how about the situation
where *entirely imaginary pictures* are created? These are very real
possibilities. Are they illegal too? How is it that just a particular
configuration of pixels constitutes illegal pornography, and another
does not? I think the poster made various humorous remarks about baby
pictures too -- the type of children on bearskin rugs. Shall we
imprison all parents that have taken these? (ug, I can't wait for all
silly flames on the `I know it when I see it' definition of pornography.)

This was my point with the EFF warning: the whole area is a quagmire,
and the only consistent and enforceable philosophy seems to be a `hands
off' approach. It is very likely to evolve in the long-term future
because of all the quandaries. And in particular I was hoping the essay
would pop up again on the list so they could see that perspective.

Anyway, the poster then made some characteristic comments about the
changes that cyberspace will introduce to these kind of pornography
laws. The whole essay was such a brilliant exercise, IMHO, and involved
actual `research' and `analysis', that I guess I just sort of
misremembered T.C. May writing it, but apparently this is not the case.
Anyway, I apologize for the misattribution. Just `attribute the
misattribution' to my degenerating memory for specifics after 35
hundred cypherpunk postings <g>

(But I would be fascinated to see that essay again, if anyone has a
clue of what I'm talking about. Hopefully the writer is still on the
list, has it in archives, and can post it. It's highly germane to the
EFF warning, and was a really brilliant cypherpunk document, IMHO. If
I'm just hallucinating over the whole thing, well, maybe its time for
me to unsubscribe <g> )




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: rjc@gnu.ai.mit.edu
Date: Tue, 5 Oct 93 19:55:07 PDT
To: honey@citi.umich.edu (peter honeyman)
Subject: Re: Chaum on the wrong foot?
In-Reply-To: <9310052038.AA09338@toad.com>
Message-ID: <9310060253.AA19384@kropotkin.gnu.ai.mit.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


peter honeyman writes:
>i am replying to a message that is six weeks old.
> 
> hal, chaum may be barking up the wrong tree, but that doesn't mean
> that his students are.  i read a couple of digital cash papers last
> night and was struck by this statement in one of them:
> 
>     Techniques have been developed that ... allow the construction of
>     off-line electronic cash systems that are secure for the bank, yet
>     at the same time honest users of the system are guaranteed to
>     remain completely anonymous.  This holds in a very strong sense:
>     the security of banks is not compromised even if all users and
>     shops collaborate in such an attempt, and the privacy of honest
>     users cannot be violated in any cryptanalytic way even under
>     adversarial behavior of the bank in coalition with all the shops.
> 
> 					  Stefan Brands, CWI

  This could refer to observer based protocols. I don't see anything in the
above paragraph to indicate that they have invented a digital coin. I don't
see how offline non-observer based cash could possibly work. (e.g.
I send a copy of my cash to someone in Europe and we "spend" them 
simultaneously)


-- Ray Cromwell        |    Engineering is the implementation of science;    --
-- EE/Math Student     |       politics is the implementation of faith.      --
-- rjc@gnu.ai.mit.edu  |                         - Zetetic Commentaries      --




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: nobody@rosebud.ee.uh.edu
Date: Tue, 5 Oct 93 21:15:08 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: No Subject
Message-ID: <9310060411.AA15718@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


At  1:04 PM 10/4/93 -0700, Hastings@courier8.aero.org wrote:
>Maybe you
>think messages posted to an international mail reflector are private?

Time to start up those digital pseudonyms!

Eternal!Optimist@anon.penet.fi




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: greg@ideath.goldenbear.com (Greg Broiles)
Date: Wed, 6 Oct 93 04:20:22 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: BBS seizures
In-Reply-To: <DL2Vac1w164w@ideath.goldenbear.com>
Message-ID: <R9kZac1w164w@ideath.goldenbear.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


uunet!ideath.goldenbear.com!greg (Greg Broiles) writes:

> I think a man named Tom Tcimpidis was busted in the L.A. area in the early
> eighties because of content; if I remember the facts correctly, codes
> were posted to his board without his knowledge, and he was convicted for 
> illegal possession of long distance access codes. I grepped through early 

I did more checking. Tcimpidis was arrested in May 1984 when an access code 
was posted to his BBS while he was on vacation. Charges were dropped in 1985 
because there was insufficient evidence to establish that he knew that the 
code was there. One person mentioned in E-mail that Tcimpidis' equipment
was returned to him, albeit in a damaged condition.

Publication of a telephone credit card number is a misdemeanor in California 
if it is done "with the intent that it be used or with knowledge or reason 
to believe it will be used" for toll fraud. CA Penal Code Section 
502.7(1)(c). Publication means (for these purposes) communicating the number
to at least one other person either orally or in writing of any kind.

I'll leave this subject alone now; just wanted to correct earlier mistake 
about Tcimpidis.


--
Greg Broiles
greg@goldenbear.com                     Baked, not fried.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Karl Lui Barrus <klbarrus@owlnet.rice.edu>
Date: Tue, 5 Oct 93 22:05:18 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Chaum on the wrong foot?
In-Reply-To: <9310060253.AA19384@kropotkin.gnu.ai.mit.edu>
Message-ID: <9310060504.AA20656@flammulated.owlnet.rice.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


rjc@gnu.ai.mit.edu wrote:
>
>  This could refer to observer based protocols. I don't see anything in the
>above paragraph to indicate that they have invented a digital coin. I don't
>see how offline non-observer based cash could possibly work. (e.g.

The other paper at CWI "Single Term Off-Line Coins" (which I have read
but haven't really studied in depth) isn't an observer based protocol.

Ferguson represents cash as 3 numbers.  When Alice wants to spend, she
gets two RSA-signatures from the bank (which are derived from the hash
functions and the 3 numbers).  Alice pays by sending the 3 numbers to
the store, which replies with a challenge, which she responds to using
information derived from both signatures.  She can spend several coins
by using the same challenge and sending the product of her responses
to the store.  At the end of the day, the bank sends the 3 numbers,
the challenge and response to the bank, which then verifies the
credit.

If Alice spends a coin twice, she allows the bank to determine her
identity.  (The bank must make sure the penalty is severe enough to
discourage this behavior).  One nice feature is that it is very
difficult (infeasible) for the bank to frame Alice and claim she
double spended.

It seems from this paper, and I think one other I read, that offline
protocols presented cannot prevent double spending but rather reveal
the identity of such a person.

--
Karl L. Barrus: klbarrus@owlnet.rice.edu         
keyID: 5AD633 hash: D1 59 9D 48 72 E9 19 D5  3D F3 93 7E 81 B5 CC 32 

"One man's mnemonic is another man's cryptography" 
  - my compilers prof discussing file naming in public directories



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Karl Lui Barrus <klbarrus@owlnet.rice.edu>
Date: Tue, 5 Oct 93 22:20:09 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Crypto Idea, Multi-Party Sigs
Message-ID: <9310060519.AA21999@flammulated.owlnet.rice.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Forcing all three people for signing the document can be done as
by merely splitting the secret key into three parts.  Then, all three
must be used to reassemble secret key in order to sign the document.

If both methods co-exist, then each individual can sign the document
from information they know from being able to decrypt.

Unless you go to a modified RSA system like Eric described.

(it's much easier to force all three to sign and all three to decrypt
:-)

-- 
Karl L. Barrus: klbarrus@owlnet.rice.edu         
keyID: 5AD633 hash: D1 59 9D 48 72 E9 19 D5  3D F3 93 7E 81 B5 CC 32 

"One man's mnemonic is another man's cryptography" 
  - my compilers prof discussing file naming in public directories



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: peter honeyman <honey@citi.umich.edu>
Date: Tue, 5 Oct 93 21:25:07 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Chaum on the good foot?
Message-ID: <9310060424.AA15907@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>   This could refer to observer based protocols. I don't see anything in the
> above paragraph to indicate that they have invented a digital coin. I don't
> see how offline non-observer based cash could possibly work. (e.g.
> I send a copy of my cash to someone in Europe and we "spend" them 
> simultaneously)

well, actually, it's very neat how this works.  here, i'll quote from
n. ferguson's paper  "single term off-line coins."

  The most difficult fraud to counter in electronic cash systems is
  the double-spending.  A user can always spend the same coin in two
  different shops.  This fraud cannot be detected at the time of
  spending as the payments are off-line.  The solution that all
  electronic cash systems use is to detect the double-spending after
  the fact.  At each payment the user is required to release some
  information in response to a challenge from the shop.  One such
  release of information provides no clue to the user's identity, but
  two such releases are sufficient to identify the user uniquely.

this is based on shamir's "how to share a secret" cacm v22n11 1979.

in the stefan brands quote ("the privacy of honest users cannot be
violated in any cryptanalytic way") the emphasis is on honest users.
dishonest users are traceable.

after reading these two papers, i really think off-line cash works -- it
offers divisibility, multi-party security, privacy, and untraceability. 
the major impediments seem to be the complexity of the protocols and the
large computational price to be paid.

	peter




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Pat Farrell" <pfarrell@gmu.edu>
Date: Tue, 5 Oct 93 21:29:11 PDT
To: ssteele@eff.org
Subject: Identifying GIFs, was Re: criminal gif upload
Message-ID: <1743.pfarrell@gmu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


In message Tue,  5 Oct 1993 17:11:17 -0400 (EDT),
  Matthew J Ghio <mg5n+@andrew.cmu.edu>  writes:
>  Seriously tho, just posting a list of MS-DOS filenames is rather
> useless as filenames do get changed.  It is highly likely that a sysop
> or user might have changed the filenames to something else, especially
> if their operating system supported filenames longer than 8 characters.

Doesn't this bring up a fundamental question: when is a file equivalent?
we can easily use MD5 or brik to identify identical files.
But GIFs, and other image files (MPEG, JPEG, TIFF, etc.) are subject to both
lossey compression and stegnagraphic [sic, sorry] coding techniques.
If you change  one pixel of the background, the checksums are different, but
it will still show *porm or whatever to a judge who "knows it when he sees
it."

We can prove statistical insignificance of duplication using strong
hashing functions. Can we find a way to statistically prove "looks like"
on a numerical basis?

Pat

Pat Farrell      Grad Student                 pfarrell@cs.gmu.edu
Department of Computer Science    George Mason University, Fairfax, VA
Public key availble via finger          #include <standard.disclaimer>




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: peter honeyman <honey@citi.umich.edu>
Date: Tue, 5 Oct 93 21:45:18 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Need Suggestions for Random Numbers
Message-ID: <9310060445.AA16280@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> What PRNGs would you suggest using?

i don't know, but my friend don mitchell knows about these things,
and the last time i asked him about prngs he recommended that i check
out marsaglia's paper in annals of applied probability v1n3 1991.

	peter




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Karl Lui Barrus <klbarrus@owlnet.rice.edu>
Date: Tue, 5 Oct 93 22:50:08 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Standard Headers for Anonymous Remailers
In-Reply-To: <9310052336.AA04757@illuminati.IO.COM>
Message-ID: <9310060549.AA24434@flammulated.owlnet.rice.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Douglas Barnes wrote:

>Actually, I think you're missing Loyd's point here. Basically, we 
>really wanted to set up an anonymous remailer here at Illuminati
>Online. We encountered opposition from a certain individual on the
>grounds that "anonymous posts can destroy civil conversation" and
>individuals, groups and lists "should have the right to easily 
>filter out posts from anonymous remailers."

Hey Doug,

Well, as I mentioned in an earlier post, I'm one who doesn't favor
labelling anonymous mail - I'd rather work on positive reputation
schemes, cash accepting remailers, etc.  An anonymous remailer that
charges will discourage people from using it for frivolous purposes;
digital signature combined with positive filters will let people
filter out posters they consider stupid.

After all, you are more interested in who sent the mail than where it
originated from.

(I've been working on a script that checks elm mail folders for pgp
signed messages and reports the signature instead of From: address;
and a cash accepting remailer).

The attitude expressed by the individual on io.com shows a problem we
will have in educating others - "anonymous posts CAN destroy a civil
conversation".  Yes, maybe so, but in my experience on mailing lists,
bbses, etc. I've noticed that "flame wars" and "anonymous posts" have
NO correlation, and are quite independent of one another.  

Since I've seen "flame wars" on systems with absolutely no anonymous
posting facilities (or none that were used), I conclude that civil
conversation is destroyed by strongly held differences in opinions (or
some other factor I can't pin down).

However, I would be interested in hearing if filtering anonymous
mail/posts does significantly cut down on or eliminate the destruction
of civil conversation.

-- 
Karl L. Barrus: klbarrus@owlnet.rice.edu         
keyID: 5AD633 hash: D1 59 9D 48 72 E9 19 D5  3D F3 93 7E 81 B5 CC 32 

"One man's mnemonic is another man's cryptography" 
  - my compilers prof discussing file naming in public directories



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: cme@ellisun.sw.stratus.com (Carl Ellison)
Date: Tue, 5 Oct 93 22:05:09 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Strong PRNGs
Message-ID: <9310060502.AA20205@ellisun.sw.stratus.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I  can think of two:

1.	a long-period PRNG (like subtract-with-carry) feeding a
	cryptographically strong hash function (perhaps triple-DES
	in ECB  mode with both key nad input taken from the PRNG
	and output becoming the new PRNG output;

2.	Russell Imagliazzo's (sp?) PRNG as strong as subset-sum.

	Reference:
	R. Imagliazzo, M. Naor, 
	``Efficient Cryptographic Schemes Provably as Secure as Subset Sum.''
	FOCS89.


	For example:  (if I  remember correctly)


	Algorithm:

	Take an array of 512 numbers, each 521 bits long.
	Fill those with true random bits (coin flips, etc.).

	fill a 512 bit register with random bits.

	associate each bit of the register with one entry in the array.

   loop:

	for each bit in the 512-bit register, if the bit is a 1, add the
	corresponding array entry into a 521-bit accumulator (init'd to 0
	at the start of this pass), modulo a 521-bit prime.

	at the end of the pass over all 512 bits, take the low order
	8 bits of the accumulator as your output byte (a pseudo random
	value) and the next 512 bits as the new register for the next round.
	Toss the top bit.

	goto loop





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: cme@ellisun.sw.stratus.com (Carl Ellison)
Date: Tue, 5 Oct 93 22:10:09 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Need Suggestions for Random Numbers
Message-ID: <9310060509.AA20233@ellisun.sw.stratus.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



>Message-Id: <9310060445.AA16280@toad.com>
>From: peter honeyman <honey@citi.umich.edu>
>Date: Wed, 06 Oct 1993 00:44:29 -0400
>Subject: Re: Need Suggestions for Random Numbers 
>
>... recommended that i check
>out marsaglia's paper in annals of applied probability v1n3 1991.

I have this algorithm coded in C -- and will send it to anyone who wants
it.  It's not strong -- just long period.

It's also part of the new "tran", as posted on sci.crypt and available for
FTP on ripem.msu.edu

 - Carl




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: pierre@shell.portal.com (Pierre Uszynski)
Date: Wed, 6 Oct 93 19:45:24 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Standard Headers for Anonymous Remailers
Message-ID: <9310060822.AA17640@jobe.shell.portal.com.shell.portal.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> From: Karl Lui Barrus <klbarrus@owlnet.rice.edu>
>
> The attitude expressed by the individual on io.com shows a problem we
> will have in educating others - "anonymous posts CAN destroy a civil
> conversation".  Yes, maybe so, but in my experience on mailing lists,
> bbses, etc. I've noticed that "flame wars" and "anonymous posts" have
> NO correlation, and are quite independent of one another.  
> 
> Since I've seen "flame wars" on systems with absolutely no anonymous
> posting facilities (or none that were used), I conclude that civil
> conversation is destroyed by strongly held differences in opinions (or
> some other factor I can't pin down).

I'll second that. The main menaces against "civil conversations" have been,
on Netnews, flame wars and wars between two individuals. After
the first few messages, the flamers and the opponents are clearly
identified. They are usually proudly posting under their usual Name (as
they are all fighting for their Reputation, and for establishing their
opponent's Incompetence) (... do we recognize anybody yet :-? ) I actually
can't remember such a war involving an anonymous poster (as in "using
penet or similar").

What destroys discussions (and forces people to leave them...) is the
tendency of threads to start genuine, and to end as flame wars.
Certainly, for-money systems would tend to shorten flame wars..

On the other hand in the few discussions against anonymous posting, some
people were arguing for "accountability" who were clearly forgetting
the proportion of people who use handles or pseudonyms as their default
setup. These are not anonymous per se, but in the current fickle netnews,
what's the difference? (BlackNet would make a difference :-) Only in the
most outrageous fraud cases (votes, forgery...) are pseudonyms tracked back
to their account holder.

Solution (1/2 kidding): Build an anonymous remailer that gives a choice
of "obviously anonymous output", or "random pseudonym output". You
could even take the pseudonym from the phone book, or from the names
of the people who used the newsgroup in the past :-)

Pierre.
pierre@shell.portal.com




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Mike Ingle <MIKEINGLE@delphi.com>
Date: Tue, 5 Oct 93 23:45:09 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Crypto Toolkit Suggestions
Message-ID: <01H3RYOHPK4I8ZE0SY@delphi.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I'm writing a toolkit to allow crypto programs to be written using
pipes and shell/perl scripts. There will be several small programs, most
of which will act as filters, to give direct access to rsa, idea, md5,
keyrings, etc. This should allow quick and easy coding of digicash,
zero-knowledge servers, and other interesting things.

So far I've got the MD5 and IDEA functions. MD5 is just a filter - it takes
whatever you feed it and outputs the MD5 hash in hex. IDEA takes e or d for
encrypt or decrypt, a key, and (if encrypting) an initialization block. Then
it acts as a filter. The output is ten bytes longer than the input - init
block and two key check bytes - just like the idea_file function in PGP's
crypto.c file. MD5 links with md5.c and md5.h, and IDEA links with idea.c
and idea.h from pgp23a.

For example, you could do:
key=`md5`
passphrase^D
init=(16 random hex digits - another MD5 is okay, it will ignore excess)
export key init
idea e key init < infile > outfile
idea d key < outfile > decrypted

Questions: what is the best way to pass a key?
The command line is definitely out, because ps shows it. Right now, IDEA
takes the name of an exported environment variable containing the hex key.
Can you securely wipe an environment variable? Is there a better way?
(A temporary file could be dangerous; a key could be left lying around.)

What else should I write? Ideas: direct access to rsa with hex numbers,
direct access to modmult, etc, for dh and stuff, a filter for armor/dearmor
and zip/unzip. A program to pull key material out of a keyring in hex, so
you could use PGP keys with the rsa routines. What would really be nice is a
filter that could generate pgp-compatible packets, so you could make up any
"pgp object" using a pipe. You could also use the hex output directly.

--- MikeIngle@delphi.com

The enemy is not just the federal government.
The enemy is centralized power, wherever it may exist.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: nobody@pmantis.berkeley.edu
Date: Wed, 6 Oct 93 07:35:22 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Enough already!
Message-ID: <9310061433.AA12074@pmantis.berkeley.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Has everyone on this list lost their minds?  Can't someone give
a well-intentioned piece of advice without getting bogged down
in a ten-day flame war?  I don't think anyone here questions
the integrity of the EFF.  They were trying to help by giving
the names of those outlaw GIFs.  What's the big deal?

If there's someone smoking a cigarette on the subway platform
and I see a cop coming, I'll tip the person off.  Common courtesy.
(I'm not saying this is the exact same thing that the EFF is doing,
just making an analogy.)  Why blow this all out of proportion?

Please do your part to save bandwidth and keep S/N as high as
possible.  If you're going to harangue people, do it via private
email.  Probably 40% of cypherpunk posts in the last few weeks
have been stupid bickering that never should have started and
probably persuaded quite a few people to unsubscribe besides.

There's no need to let everyone on the list know about every
tiny disagreement you have with someone's opinion.  Especially
when that person clearly has the best of intentions.

Maybe we SHOULD make people pay to post the list.

-Mr. Funn




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Mike Godwin <mnemonic@eff.org>
Date: Wed, 6 Oct 93 05:09:14 PDT
To: ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu (L. Detweiler)
Subject: Re: EFF pornography file warning
In-Reply-To: <9310060453.AA10453@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Message-ID: <199310061207.AA02851@eff.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


 
Lance writes:

> 1) this opens them up to having to do this *regularly*. Is this what
> they want to be doing?
 
I doubt that EFF is regularly going to have a list of graphics files that
the feds are using as the basis of a child-porn investigation.

> 2) since when does EFF help federal BBS investigations?
 
I don't see how letting people know what the feds are looking for is
"helping" the feds.

> 3) M. Godwin just got done informing us the beauty of *non* liability
> with a hands-off BBS operator policy.
 
In particular, I've been talking about noninterference with electronic
mail. But look at our choices, Lance. The alternative, when we knew what
files were being looked for, was *not to let anyone know*. It strikes me
as difficult, ethically, to justify *not* letting people know what
particular files are being looked for.

The issue of letting people know about these files is logically separate
from the issue of whether a sysop will be held legally liable for files he
or she doesn't know about.

> 4) its silly to post a notice about given filenames. They simply are as
> amorphous as cyberspace itself.

Not quite. In real life, those who traffic in GIFs normally deal in such a
volume of files that they rarely trouble to change their names.

> 5) a recall of any type is a notorious way to generate paranoia,
> perhaps a cure worse than the affliction. this kind of message spreads
> like wildfire. `What? EFF says file [x] is child pornography?' There
> are tens of thousands of BBS operators in the U.S. -- is this a service
> or a disservice to them? hence my urban myth ramblings.
 
Sometimes telling the truth *does* generate paranoia. Look, it is
difficult for me to justify *not* giving sysops information that a *lot*
of sysops (although perhaps not you, Lance) would very much like to have.
What's more, a sysop can determine whether he's had files with these names
uploaded to his system *without snooping through someone's e-mail*.

Tell you what, Lance: if you can find a number of sysops who would *rather
not know* the kind of information that Shari disclosed in her message, we
will weigh their reluctance to know carefully if this situation should
ever come up again.

> 6) Releasing this kind of notice only draws more attention to those
> files. Suddenly, they become collectors items. People start hunting
> them down. People create empty files with the same name as a joke. All
> because `EFF says file [x] is child pornography'
 
I think I'll wait until I see this actually happen before I regard it as a
serious possibility.
> 2) it does not appear to me that EFF has thought this through. this
> announcement reflects on EFF. why couldn't they have phrased it
> differently? e.g. Agents [x] of government agency [x] have requested
> that operators remove these files. As it stands, EFF associates its own
> reputation with this investigation and the file recall.
 
If what you are doing here is criticizing the *wording* of the
announcement, that undercuts your other comments here. You seem to be
saying it would be *okay* to release the list of graphics files if we had
written the announcement differently.

If that is the substance of your criticism, fine. Send us a redrafted
announcement--the way you think it should be written. 

> 4) in general, I object to this philosophy found elsewhere on the list
> of `if its in our backyard then don't criticize it'. 

Personally, I don't mind your taking the trouble to criticize EFF over
this. But I hope you understand us well enough to realize that reasonable
people can disagree over this issue. Again, it strikes me as hard to
justify *not* giving sysops the info that at least *some* of them would
want.

> 5) In a rather low blow, S. Steele writes ``I figured those who sought
> to challenge the child pornography laws would poo poo the message.  I
> guess I figured right.'' For the record, I do not seek to challenge
> child pornography laws or federal investigations. My message made
> rather clear that I was objecting to the role of *EFF* in the affair.
 
Lance, I personally don't think your criticisms here imply any opposition
to the child-porn laws.

For all that you may be write that "the whole area is a quagmire," it
seems important to stress that EFF wasn't dealing with "the whole
area"--only with the particular issue of whether to let people know what
we had discovered about a particular federal investigation.

We were trying to be helpful. If it's your position that publishing that
list of files was *wholly unhelpful*, that it will turn out to have been a
mistake, well, perhaps you're right. But I don't think our action here is
so obviously wrong in the black-and-white way you seem to be implying
here.


--Mike






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: m5@vail.tivoli.com (Mike McNally)
Date: Wed, 6 Oct 93 06:39:14 PDT
To: "L. Detweiler" <ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Subject: EFF pornography file warning
In-Reply-To: <9310060453.AA10453@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Message-ID: <9310061332.AA07867@vail.tivoli.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



As a quickie preface, I state that I feel no guilt posting this to
cypherpunks, even in light of the many recent complaints about
bandwidth.  This issue seems quite germaine to me, though it's
only tangentially related to cryptography.

"L. Detweiler" writes:
 > I posted the announcement to the cypherpunks because
 > 
 > 2) there was a huge flame war over CERT sending a notice to E.Hughes
 > for his FTP site, saying `please look into this'-- this EFF
 > announcement struck me as amazingly similar.

It doesn't strike me as similar at all.  One was a specifically
targeted notice, and the other was a broadcast for general
consumption.

 > Now, why did I flame EFF for this action? In one word: quagmire. 

You flamed because "quagmire"?  What does that mean?  (I know what
"quagmire" means; I can't parse the sentence "I flamed the EFF because
quagmire.")

 > I said it was `silly, useless, and damaging'

Silly?  Seemed pretty serious to me.  Useless?  Well, it was
dissemination of pertinent information; given the signal to noise
ratio of the electronic infonet world, that's saying a lot.  Damaging?
Well, that's the debatable point.

 > 1) this opens them up to having to do this *regularly*. Is this what
 > they want to be doing?

I don't agree with this, though it may be true that such expectations
will be established.  (After this uproar, I doubt it.)

 > 2) since when does EFF help federal BBS investigations?

Help?!?  Was the EFF passing along names of suspect BBSes?  Indeed,
I'd say they were *hindering* the investigation, if anything; they're
suggesting that "evidence" be destroyed.

 > 3) M. Godwin just got done informing us the beauty of *non* liability
 > with a hands-off BBS operator policy.

There's a BIG difference between non-liability and immunity from
seizure.

 > 4) its silly to post a notice about given filenames. They simply are as
 > amorphous as cyberspace itself.

Is it really silly?  Though I'll of course agree that the names
*could* be changed, are they?  How common is that?  Isn't it probably
true that if those files exist somewhere it's highly likely that they
have those names?  If so, is it still "silly" to publish the names?

(Is it "silly" for "Wanted" posters to contain photos and descriptions
of hair length, facial hair, body weight, and so on, given that such
things can easily be changed?)

 > 5) a recall of any type is a notorious way to generate paranoia...

I don't think that EFF would claim to have the power of "recall".

 > `What? EFF says file [x] is child pornography?'

No, EFF says file X is a hot topic in some particular investigation of
child pronography being conducted by some law enforcement
organization.  It's a statement of fact.

 > 6) Releasing this kind of notice only draws more attention to those
 > files. Suddenly, they become collectors items. People start hunting
 > them down. People create empty files with the same name as a joke. All
 > because `EFF says file [x] is child pornography'

I don't see why this should be an argument against posting the
warning.  Hurricane warnings generally bring many people who want to
surf or just look aat and experience the hurricane; would it be better
to just keep a lid on the whole tropical depression thing?

 > 7) many other reasons that will become obvious and important in
 > retrospect, but look like hypersensitivity at this point.

My breath is held.

 > I'm very upset that
 > 
 > 1) everybody on the list is hiding, and refuses to criticize EFF
 > despite the strong parallels to CERT. at best this is cowardice and at
 > worst hypocrisy. this tiptoeing and silence is very reprehensible, IMHO.

Whoa, podner.  Speak for yourself.  You're giving us (a) cowardice or
(b) hypocrisy; why not (c) a difference of opinion with L Detweiler?

 > 2) it does not appear to me that EFF has thought this through. this
 > announcement reflects on EFF. why couldn't they have phrased it
 > differently? e.g. Agents [x] of government agency [x] have requested
 > that operators remove these files. As it stands, EFF associates its own
 > reputation with this investigation and the file recall.

I can't argue with this; the fact of this conversation proves your
point.

 > 3) there have been requests from EFF representatives to `let it drop'.
 > well, yes, that is one way of dealing with the issue, but IMHO more
 > appropriate to a species of animal called `ostriches'.

I also agree with this: the subject bears discussion.  I think it's
relevant to cypherpunks because the topic could someday be "files
foo.X and bar.X are suspected of being encrypted Top Secret Stuff, and
are being sought in an investigation of pirate cryptography".

--
Mike McNally




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: wcs@anchor.ho.att.com (Bill_Stewart_HOY002_1305)
Date: Wed, 6 Oct 93 05:49:14 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: POISON PILL
Message-ID: <9310061246.AA04754@anchor.ho.att.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text


> Furthermore, pipe bombs throw shrapnel, and as such are anti-personnel
> devices. The goal was to destroy data, not FBI agents. Booby traps that
> take lives are considered in court as 1st degree murder.
> There are more elegant approaches.

Thermite, for instance :-)

Actually, that could get you nicked for arson of Federal property,
which carries substantial jail terms (a couple of anarchists who
burned a government-owned flag a few years ago got 10+ years for it.)

Releasing viruses can also get heavy penalties; keeping the malfunction 
(excuse me, "different data storage parameters") within your own
machine is more likely to be safe, though destroying data on 
"Federal interest computers" (which manages to include banks and a few
other things as well as government-owned systems) is also illegal,
and your machine becomes a Federal interest machine if they steal it.

You could do something really hostile, like have it boot OS/2 
if someone gives the wrong password :-)

		Bill
		



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Perry E. Metzger" <pmetzger@lehman.com>
Date: Wed, 6 Oct 93 06:19:15 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Need Suggestions for Random Numbers
In-Reply-To: <IggWg0W00Vp=NOUEhj@andrew.cmu.edu>
Message-ID: <9310061317.AA16857@snark.lehman.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Matthew J Ghio says:
> What PRNGs would you suggest using?

Don't use PRNGs for one time pads. To quote Don Knuth, anyone using
software methods to generate random numbers "is living in a state of
sin."

One time pads require REAL random numbers. If you are willing to, say,
use DES to generate your random numbers, you might as well encrypt
with DES instead of pretending that you have random numbers.

If you want a one time pad, do the logical thing -- go out and buy or
build a hardware random number generator. Don't pretend that if you
only make things "complicated enough" your numbers will be effectively
random, because they won't. See Knuth's huge section on random numbers
in "The Art of Computer Programming" for a demonstration of how a
really obscenely complex algorithm can yield bad numbers.

Perry





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: dewayne@netcom.com (Dewayne Hendricks)
Date: Wed, 6 Oct 1993 12:41:00 -0400
To: Peter Wayner <pcw@access.digex.net>
Subject: TAL Press Releases
Message-ID: <9310061641.AA25684@netcom5.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Peter:

        I thought that you would be interested in our rollout press
releases from Monday.  We are now ready for prime time.

Best,
-- Dewayne

TETHERLESS ACCESS LTD. ANNOUNCES STRATEGIC ALLIANCES FOR WIRELESS MAN DEPLOYMENT

October 4, 1993, Fremont, California-Tetherless Access, Ltd. (TAL), a leader  in
the  development  of  user-provided  wireless  metropolitan area networks (MAN),
today  announced  the  formation  of  three  separate  strategic  business   and
technology alliances.   The alliances envision the provision of wireless access,
applications development, packet radio hardware development and new services for
wireless connectivity to the worldwide Internet.

TAL has developed a "plug-and-play" interface for the Macintosh platform for the
unlicensed operation  of  packet radio systems.  The systems enable peer-to-peer
wireless connectivity over AppleTalk networks within a  MAN  environment.    The
system software also provides transparent connectivity to TCP/IP networks and to
services available on the worldwide Internet.

User-provided wireless networking allows anyone within range of  another  system
to automatically  make  a  network connection.  This "ad hoc" network means that
each node not only generates its own traffic, but also relays the  transmissions
of nearby  nodes.  Each system owner becomes a "de facto" member of the network.
The system provides a low-cost connectivity  solution  for  community  networks,
libraries,   schools,   businesses,   telecommuters,   and  an  easily  deployed
communications infrastructure for developing countries.   "In  association  with
our strategic alliances we will deploy wireless MANs on a worldwide basis with a
focus on providing access to the Internet" said Dewayne Hendricks, President  of
TAL.

Pandora Systems of  San  Francisco,  CA,  a  software  development  and  network
operations  company, will design Internet-based wireless networking products and
services.  Pandora's principals have  been  involved  in  the  establishment  of
PeaceNet,  GreenNet,  The WELL and have developed numerous Internet applications
including Veronica,  one  of  the  most  popular  and  useful  navigation  tools
available on  the Internet today.  "The Internet and wireless communications are
both experiencing dramatic growth.  The combination of these environments  offer
unparalleled applications development opportunities" said Mark Graham, President
of Pandora Systems.

InterNex Information Services, Inc. of  Menlo  Park,  CA,  a  provider  of  high
bandwidth  connectivity  to the Internet, will provide wireline access points to
the Internet for wireless MANs in major metropolitan areas throughout  the  U.S.
InterNex and TAL will jointly market network services to businesses, educational
institutions, communities and individuals.

Cylink  of  Sunnyvale,  CA,  the  leading  worldwide  supplier   of   commercial
communications  security  products    and       spread spectrum wireless  modems
and  systems, is cooperating in the supplying  of  spread  spectrum  radios  for
deployment in TAL's  MAN  packet   radio  systems on a worldwide basis. Cylink's
founders  are leading  authorities    in    encryption    and    spread spectrum
technologies,    and  the  company  currently  services  customers  in  over  40
countries.

Tetherless   Access,  Ltd.,  based  in  Fremont,  California, is a leader in the
development  and  deployment  of  "plug-and-play"  wireless  metropolitan   area
networks.    The  company's  products  allow  customers  to  achieve  efficient,
low-cost,  flexible, high-quality wireless data communications  in  metropolitan
network environments and to the worldwide Internet.

TETHERLESS ACCESS, LTD. ANNOUNCES NET/MAC PRO WITH SUPPORT FOR POWERTALK
 
October 4, 1993, Fremont, California-Tetherless Access, Ltd. (TAL), a leader  in
the  development  of  user-provided  wireless  metropolitan area networks (MAN),
today announced NET/Mac Pro, a new version  of  its  NET/Mac  Internet  Protocol
application for  packet  radio  environments.    NET/Mac  Pro adds support for a
personal gateway that allows PowerTalk users to exchange mail with SMTP servers
over a  TCP/IP network.  PowerTalk is Apple's new mail and messaging technology,
built in to System 7 Pro.
 
This combination provides convenient  Internet  access  for  Apple(r)  Macintosh(r)
users through wireless Metropolitan Area Networks.  TAL's standard products have
led the way for wireless TCP/IP network access on  the  Macintosh.    Now,  with
System  7  Pro,  this  access  is  simplified  even  more by not having to use a
separate SMTP client program to transfer mail. "The PowerTalk universal  mailbox
and  drag  send  capability  integrated  with our NET/Mac Pro product allows our
users to deploy wireless MANs on a worldwide basis with  a  focus  on  providing
easy  access to the Internet mail services" said Dewayne Hendricks, President of
TAL.
 
TAL has formed strategic alliances with InterNex Information Services, Inc.  of
Menlo  Park,  CA,  Cylink of Sunnyvale, CA and Pandora Systems of San Francisco,
CA. Together the four companies will provide  hardware,  software  and  services
which  can  be used to provide low-cost MAN connectivity solutions for community
networks, libraries, schools, businesses, telecommuters, and an easily  deployed
communications infrastructure  for  developing  countries.  "In association with
our strategic alliances we will deploy wireless MANs on a worldwide basis with a
focus  on providing access to the Internet" said Dewayne Hendricks, President of
TAL.
 
Tetherless Access, Ltd., based in Fremont,  California,  is  a  leader  in  the
development   and  deployment  of  "plug-and-play"  wireless  metropolitan  area
networks.   The  company's  products  allow  customers  to  achieve   efficient,
low-cost,  flexible,  high-quality  wireless data communications in metropolitan
network environments and to the worldwide Internet.
 
Apple and Macintosh are registered trademarks and PowerTalk and  System  7  are
trademarks of Apple Computer, Inc.


-----------
Dewayne Hendricks, WA8DZP        ! CIS: 75210,10    AppleLink: D6547
Tetherless Access Ltd.           ! Packet Radio: WA8DZP @ K3MC.#NOCAL.CA.USA.NA
43730 Vista Del Mar              ! AOL: HENDRICKS
Fremont, CA 94539-6250           ! Internet: dewayne@netcom.com
Phone: (510) 659-0809            ! Fax: (510) 770-9854
-----------








From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Marc Horowitz <marc@GZA.COM>
Date: Wed, 6 Oct 93 07:00:34 PDT
To: Mike Ingle <MIKEINGLE@delphi.com>
Subject: Re: Crypto Toolkit Suggestions
In-Reply-To: <01H3RYOHPK4I8ZE0SY@delphi.com>
Message-ID: <9310061359.AA04461@dun-dun-noodles.aktis.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I'd rather see this done as a tcl (not tk, tcl) toolkit, rather than
as a bunch of separate shell programs.  This will allow users to do
real programming, not just play around.  This solves the key problem
by keeping it in core in one process, or at worst, in a pipe.  And you
could always use it as a standalone program by putting the command you
wanted to use on the command line.

		Marc




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Tom Libert <libert@citi.umich.edu>
Date: Wed, 6 Oct 93 07:05:15 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Living in a state of sin
Message-ID: <9310061403.AA24120@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


	Don't use PRNGs for one time pads. To quote Don Knuth, anyone
	using software methods to generate random numbers "is living in
	a state of sin."

Knuth quoted John von Neumann:

"Anyone who considers arithmetical methods of producing random digits
is, of course, in a state of sin." (1951)




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Perry E. Metzger" <pmetzger@lehman.com>
Date: Wed, 6 Oct 93 07:35:15 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Strong PRNGs
In-Reply-To: <9310060502.AA20205@ellisun.sw.stratus.com>
Message-ID: <9310061432.AA16969@snark.lehman.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Carl Ellison says:
> I  can think of two:
> 
> 1.	a long-period PRNG (like subtract-with-carry) feeding a
> 	cryptographically strong hash function (perhaps triple-DES
> 	in ECB  mode with both key nad input taken from the PRNG
> 	and output becoming the new PRNG output;

What would the point of using this for a one time pad be, though? Why
not just use triple-DES and be done with the bulk and complexity?

Perry




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: cme@ellisun.sw.stratus.com (Carl Ellison)
Date: Wed, 6 Oct 93 08:15:15 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Strong PRNGs
Message-ID: <9310061511.AA21028@ellisun.sw.stratus.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>Message-Id: <9310061432.AA16969@snark.lehman.com>
>Subject: Re: Strong PRNGs 
>Date: Wed, 06 Oct 1993 10:32:26 -0400
>From: "Perry E. Metzger" <pmetzger@lehman.com>



>Carl Ellison says:
>> I  can think of two:
>> 
>> 1.	a long-period PRNG (like subtract-with-carry) feeding a
>> 	cryptographically strong hash function (perhaps triple-DES
>> 	in ECB  mode with both key nad input taken from the PRNG
>> 	and output becoming the new PRNG output);
>
>What would the point of using this for a one time pad be, though? Why
>not just use triple-DES and be done with the bulk and complexity?

I'm not advocating it as a replacement for triple-DES.  I was answering
a question.

I have many uses for random numbers and none of them is XOR encryption.

However, I can even see a point for using this for XOR encryption [I prefer
not to call anything using a PRNG One-Time-Pad].  I can see two points,
even:

1.	You might have traffic which operates in very high speed bursts
	(faster than your triple-DES can go) but for which the average
	throughput is well within the speed of your triple-DES.  So, you
	keep your PRNG/DES grinding and building a buffer of bytes to be
	used, then you use them at high speed during the burst.


2.	Knuth's Algorithm M (from someone else) mixes two PRNG streams and
	the result is stronger than either of the two sources.  I haven't
	read the paper he references, so I don't know how much stronger,
	but if there's any strength to be gained, someone might want to use
	it.

 - Carl




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: msattler@netcom.com (Michael Sattler)
Date: Wed, 6 Oct 93 11:39:13 PDT
To: Mike Godwin <mnemonic@eff.org>
Subject: Re: PGP in Fidonet
Message-ID: <9310061836.AA14135@netcom.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


The real question is, what attorney jokes do *you* know?  Do you tell
programmer jokes?


-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
Michael S. Sattler         msattler@netcom.com        +1 (415) 358-3058
Digital Jungle Software    Encrypt now; ask me how.   (finger for PGP key)

      Evil will certainly triumph if good people do nothing at all.






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: bobi@vswr.sps.mot.com (Bob Izenberg)
Date: Wed, 6 Oct 93 09:59:13 PDT
To: trebor@foretune.co.jp (Robert J. Woodhead)
Subject: Re: Enough already!
In-Reply-To: <9310061539.AA09997@dink.foretune.co.jp>
Message-ID: <9310061655.AA18086@vswr.sps.mot.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text


Robert J. Woodhead wrote:

# This is an excellent idea.  A modest suggestion: build a email-based
# digital cash system; allot each reader a certain amount of cash
# per month

I obviously need to read up on the digital cash idea.  The messages
that I've read make the concept sound like play money...  I mean, does
the coin of the realm in my pocket become the ethereal coin in a
digital bank?  What protections are there from digital embezzlers?
Whither the FDIC?  (Why is the sky blue?  :-)  et cetera.)

If the whole subject is just a classroom exercise in economics and
authentication theory, then I'll be a little disappointed.

Bob
--
 ==============================================================================
   Bob Izenberg                                     voice phone: 512-891-8680
   Motorola RISC Software                               bobi@vswr.sps.mot.com
 ==============================================================================



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: cme@ellisun.sw.stratus.com (Carl Ellison)
Date: Wed, 6 Oct 93 09:05:15 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: OTP random number sources
Message-ID: <9310061600.AA21132@ellisun.sw.stratus.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>Message-Id: <9310061539.AA09997@dink.foretune.co.jp>
>Subject: Re: Enough already! 
>Date: Thu, 07 Oct 93 00:39:42 JST
>From: "Robert J. Woodhead" <trebor@foretune.co.jp>


>On a totally different topic, has anyone investigated using the
>LSbit of CD sound tracks as the source of a 1-time pad?

This was discussed, some, in the internet draft on random numbers.

The one which just expired was draft-ietf-security-randomness-00.txt.

A new one has been submitted to replace it.  I'd recommend it to those
interested in the topic.





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: bhayes@CS.Stanford.EDU
Date: Wed, 6 Oct 1993 15:24:17 -0400
To: pcw@access.digex.net
Subject: [Glenn Trewitt: Sorry I'm late to work, I stopped to watch the war...]
Message-ID: <9310061924.AA06740@Xenon.Stanford.EDU>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


FYI ..
------- Forwarded Message

Forwarded: Wed, 06 Oct 93 12:15:48 PDT
Forwarded: "Simon.Read@umist.ac.uk "
Forwarded: Wed, 06 Oct 93 12:14:34 PDT
Forwarded: "cak@parc.xerox.com "
Forwarded: Wed, 06 Oct 93 12:12:45 PDT
Forwarded: "glassner@parc.xerox.com "
Return-Path: @Sunburn.Stanford.EDU:trewitt@pa.dec.com
Return-Path: <@Sunburn.Stanford.EDU:trewitt@pa.dec.com>
Received: from Sunburn.Stanford.EDU by Xenon.Stanford.EDU with SMTP (5.61+IDA/25-CS-eef) id AA24117; Wed, 6 Oct 93 11:09:02 -0700
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Received: by miasma.pa.dec.com; id AA17136; Wed, 6 Oct 93 11:07:51 -0700
Message-Id: <9310061807.AA17136@miasma.pa.dec.com>
To: Barry Hayes <bhayes@cs.stanford.edu>, Kim Rachmeler <kim@wpd.sgi.com>,
        Julie King <julie_king@qm.sri.com>, Warren Cory <warren@cadence.com>,
        Joe Hughes <eefacjl@prism.gatech.edu>, Lia Adams <lia@wpd.sgi.com>,
        Lucy Berlin <Lucy_Berlin@taligent.com>
Subject: Sorry I'm late to work, I stopped to watch the war...
Organization: DEC Network Systems Laboratory (Palo Alto, CA / WRL-1)
Phones: H:408-773-9239, W:415-688-1324, DTN:543-1324, Fax:415-324-2797
Date: Wed, 06 Oct 93 11:07:50 -0700
From: Glenn Trewitt <trewitt@pa.dec.com>
X-Mts: smtp

In case you didn't know, SUN has a branch office in Moscow.
	- Glenn

- ------- Forwarded Message

From: John (Most modern computers would break if you stood on them) Mackin <john@civil.su.oz.au>
Date: 	Thu, 7 Oct 1993 03:44:54 +1000
To: hackers@vix.com
Subject: Feeling bored? Why not work for Sun's Moscow office!
Message-Id: <199310070344.852.hackers.balus@civil.su.oz.au>
X-Face: 39seV7n\`#asqOFdx#oj/Uz*lseO_1n9n7rQS;~ve\e`&Z},nU1+>0X^>mg&M.^X$[ez>{F
 k5[Ah<7xBWF<un6={nlL7Om5<0UsuHKjCxs)C$`DP.N'-LLb8=8)"a@d2bG-f7qD2AJ#UZ>-@-ru?&
 @4K4-b`ydd^`(n%Z{

[Forwards deleted]

From: mpiech@angkorwat.Russia.Sun.COM
Subject: Another Day in Moscow
Date: Tue, 05 Oct 93 11:42:31 +0300

			Another Day in Moscow

Last night (Sunday) around 6:00pm Yevgeny, one of our Russian SE's,
called and said I shouldn't leave my apartment because there was a
civil war going on in the streets of Moscow.  During the day I had
walked from my apartment, just east of the Kremlin, through the center
over to the Irish House to do some shopping, and everything seemed
pretty normal (for Moscow).  Anyway, Yevgeny said that a crowd was
heading for the Ostankina TV building.

So I layed around for a while on my couch, watching some very slow
movie about peasant romance, and then Winnie the Pooh (in Russian),
and then this really outstanding animation done with Legos (what an
obvious and killer idea! maybe old hat for animation buffs, but it was
the first time I had seen it) when the screen cuts out and this
editor-kinda guy comes on with

"cevodnya...bil ochen...tizholi dyen.  ...Tyzholi, potomu
shto...--trudna guvarit--"
"today...was a very...difficult day.  ...Difficult, because...--it is
hard to speak--"

and then the screen went blank.  So I switched to the only channel of
the eight that was working (no cable, no CNN at my place), and a news
report came on and said the TV building had been stormed.  Then this
station (broadcast from somewhere else in Moscow) played that stupid
airplane hijacking Love-Boat movie with Mike Brady as the captain (I
never did catch the name, but that it was in Russian didn't seem to
reduce the content I could get from it) interrupted every so often
with little news blurbs, including a pitch from Yuri Gaidar.  I could
understand maybe half of all this Russian news and speeches, but the
few clips of fighting in the TV building were pretty clear.  I finally
bailed on the whole scene around 11, after hearing what the BBC had to
say about it on the shortwave.

I woke up around 6:30 with that strange feeling like the first time as
a kid when you find a beehive in your back yard: at first you were
really afraid to go near it, but you went a few steps closer, nothing
happened, and now you just want to walk up and see what the hell's in
the damn thing.

I left my apartment around 7:30, and when I got to the street it
seemed like just another day in Moscow.  Business as usual.  I got to
the corner and thought, I can just go the the metro and go to work,
or--if I just walk down to the Kremlin and see what's going on at Red
Square, it'll only add twenty minutes to my commute.  Hell, I had
taken my backpack instead of the briefcase, and had two cameras in it,
might as well have a look.

About halfway there I heard a few explosive noises, but they could
very well have been a dump truck going over metal plates in the
street...

I got to Red Square and it was basically quiet.  At the north end were
some bogus token barricades I'd heard about on the news.  As I walked
toward them I heard the unmistakable sound of machine-gun fire.  Damn,
must be just around the corner.  The only other time in my life I'd
ever heard machine-gun fire was at ROTC boot camp.  I got to the other
side of the history museum, but again, basically nothing was going on.
I could hear all this bloody racket--there *was* a war going on
somewhere--but couldn't see anything.

I thought about getting on the metro and going to work, but then I
thought I'd have a peek at Tverskaya St. (the main street in
downtown).  It was blocked off,  and as I started to walk toward the
Pushkin monument I could see the four huge barriers made of old
crates, park benches, playground monkey-bar sets, etc.  Lots of people
were standing around little bonfires, drinking and smoking--kind of
like a vigil at Berkeley except for the vodka.  There was an armored
personnel carrier (APC) in front of Pizza Hut (I hope the picture
turns out...).

I got up past the City Council building where there was a large crowd
of Yeltsin supporters waving tri-colors, but basically nothing was
going on (relatively).  Still lots of war noises.

At this point I figured the war must all be around the White House.  I
wasn't sure what to do, but somehow I slid into this flow heading
toward the noise and wandered through unfamiliar streets of Moscow to
the soundtrack from Apocalypse Now.

When I got to the American Embassy, I joined a crowd of a few hundred
people and watched occaisonal sniper flashes from the back corner of
the White House, which I could see in the distance.  Riot police
occasionally pushed us back.  After about twenty minutes, I figured
I'd seen as much as I'd be able to, and started to head toward the
metro to go to work.

I got to Noviy Arbat, and there was a huge line of APCs waiting
patiently for action.  And then the tanks came.  About a dozen T-80s,
from where I'd just walked.  Ok, I'll get to work a little late.

After I'd shot a half a roll of film--tanks in a line, tanks turning
the corner, tank boys playing with the guns (what a spooky scene, tanks
in the street!)--I started to walk south again on the Garden Ring to
go to the metro.  

But then at the next cross street, which leads to the next bridge down
from the White House, I decided I just had to go down to the river and
see what everything looked like from there.  I got down there and
could see the front of the White House, and at this point the sounds
of gunfire were rolling down the river and echoing off buildings in a
violent cacophony of death-noise.  Mesmerised, I slid again into the
flow of people heading through the parked cars toward the cauldron,
assuming we'd soon reach the police barricade.  I felt like I was
going to an AC-DC concert.  A few minutes later there was a huge
explosion, which I later learned was the sound of a T-80 firing its
148mm shell, and several hundred car alarms went off simultaneously.

The police barricade wasn't there.  Before I knew it, I'd passed the
burning hulks of two bombed out busses and was standing in a huge
crowd at the base of the bridge in front of the White House, watching
thousands of bullets fly between the building and the half-dozen or so
APCs in front of it.  I couldn't believe I was there: how could people
be aloud this close to a bloody war?

I kept going.  I pushed through the crowd, and worked my way up *onto
the bridge*, several hundred yards in front of the now famous but no
longer white House.  Yes, war as a spectator sport.  Why the hell was
I here?  Why did I *want* to be here?  Who let us here?  The range of
a Kalashnikov automatic rifle is 2km, and I'm standing on a bridge
500m in front a building filled with hardline terrorists armed with
these things.  It didn't seem to bother the hundreds of other people
standing around me, so I pulled out a Canon EOS and started my own
shooting.

There were already two very large chunks of stone knocked out of the
House, and next to the smoking remnant of the Meria building and with
the burning busses on the embankment road, the whole picture was kind
of grisly.  The gunfire stopped for short periods, but mostly just
kept going.

About fifteen minutes later several bullets ricocheted somewhere
within a few tens of yards of us; we all ducked down behind some
concrete and then ran towards the middle of the bridge.  It felt a
*little* safer, anyway, behind one of the metal stanchions of the
bridge railing.  I ended up this time standing next to couple of
British guys, and exchanged a few war-watching pleasantries ("I wonder
if the pub's open" "Where's the hot-dog stand?" "You'd think if
they're going to have a war, they could at least put out some
porta-potties" etc.)  

There were four T-80s on the bridge, and six directly accross the
river from the White House (to the left of our priviledged position;
the House was on the right).  Through all the noise, I'd assumed the
tanks were firing too; it was difficult to tell what was doing what
with the sound bouncing everywhere.  But then, there was an explosive
noise like I've never experienced in my life: the bridge shook, my
heart skipped a few beats.  All the nonsense murmuring in the crowd
died in a nanosecond.  Under a huge cloud of smoke, *all* of the
remaining glass on the upper part of the House started falling, as if
in slow motion.  One of the T-80s had fired.  

I was scared.  "Man, these boys aren't playing," one of the Brits
mumbled as we crouched meekly behind our railing.  After about five
minutes my hands stopped shaking just enough to get my camera aimed at
the House to get ready for the second T-80 blast.  Somehow this was a
little different from taking photos of canons firing blanks at Civil
War reenactments I went to as a kid.

I stayed around for another half hour or hour (time is kind of
irrelevant in this situation...) for a third T-80 blast, an ammo truck
hit (the thing blew off like a brick of fire crackers for 15 minutes
straight), another gunfight in the distance (which I later read was at
the Itar-TASS building), and another spray of shots into the crowd
where I was standing.  This one was more serious--louder and more
shots, and the crowd went a little crazier and started running off the
bridge.  They eventually regained confidence and retook their former
positions (I ended up a little farther from the House again).

Finally I figured I'd taken enough pictures, wouldn't get much more
out of the last few tank shots, and probably wouldn't be able to see
much of the surrender when it finally happened; so I walked off the
bridge a bit, jumped in a taxi, and went to work.  Business as usual.

- - --Mike Piech

- ------- End of Forwarded Message


------- End of Forwarded Message






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Date: Wed, 6 Oct 93 12:30:39 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Options for Speech on Cypherpunks
In-Reply-To: <199310061842.AA17128@access.digex.net>
Message-ID: <9310061931.AA16528@netcom5.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I'll be brief, to same tempers and bandwidth.

Lots of options for dealing with too much volume, too much flamage,
too little content, too many diverse interests, whatever. Not all
options are feasible for the Sysadmin (Eric Hughes), of course, and
software is not always available.

The Extropians list dealt with this problem in the past year (too many
messages for everyone's liking, too much rancor at times). The
Cypehrpunks list may want to adopt the software they use, and I know
discussions along these lines continue. (Indeed, Ray Cromwell has
talked about his software here, I believe.)

* the Extropians software allows nice filters:

- users can be filtered by the "::exclude user paranoid@clueless.rant"
command. None of his posts will be seen by the excluder. Threads can
also be excluded. And so on.

Makes for a more civil experience. Not perfect, though.

(This consumes some CPU time. Issues to be discussed.)

(Why filter at the source and not the destination? First, there are
several dozen mailers people are using--often multiple mailers per
person. Second, the Extropians have an idea of eventually using
"reputations" derived from and related to the popularity (or lack
thereof) of various posters.)

Anyway, I need to be brief.

* Dividing the List into two or more pieces has been debated several
times. There are some advantages that go linearly with the number of
sublists, but also some disadvantages that scale unpredictably
(cross-posts ot several sublists, missed posts, etc.).

Also, maintaining several sublists and the adds/drops to each
multiplies the management effort. (Unless "majordomo" is used....)

* "Paying to post" has many downsides....

* "Paying _not_ to post" is even stranger.

* All of these schemes to control volume via pricing of posts are
hindered by several things:

- lack of a currency, as personal checks and credit card numbers won't
be used

- lack of any real concept of "value"--if I have the time to post, for
example, should I be "penalized" by paying? By what logic? And if I
try to "sell" my posts, how do I enforce redistribution limitations?

(As an anarcho-capitalist, free market supporter, I am not against
schemes to charge or collect for things. But I just don't see an
environment that is conducive to the such schemes. The proposals for
"rationing" of one sort or another fail miserably. To wit, do we
really want to tell Mike Godwin or Hal Finney that they've exceeded
their limits, while J. Random Lurker never posts?)

Just as the Extropians are now showing new interest in digital cash,
reputation markets, crypto-anarchy, and so on, I suggest we on this
list get more interested in what they are doing with their list
software, with their "HEx" reputation market, etc.

By the way, I think a real business could be made out of selling "list
server machine" access. Put the Cypherpunks and Extropians mailing
lists on a machine with good connectivity and then sell subscriptions,
just like magazines. The rates could be negotiated to be flat, as in
$20/year per user, or based on volume, processing time, etc.

Imagine locating these machines physically in offshore locations, safe
from seizure, but still on the Net.

Needless to say, these ideas are swirling around in many minds.
"Abraham-Hughes" described their ideas along these lines at a
Cypherpunks meeting, the Extropians are debating releasing or selling
their list filtering software, and services like "Netcom" are
spreading rapidly across the country. Lots of opportunities.


-Tim May

-- 
..........................................................................
Timothy C. May         | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,  
tcmay@netcom.com       | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
408-688-5409           | knowledge, reputations, information markets, 
W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA  | black markets, collapse of governments.
Higher Power: 2^756839 | Public Key: PGP and MailSafe available.
Note: I put time and money into writing this posting. I hope you enjoy it.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Stanton McCandlish <mech@eff.org>
Date: Wed, 6 Oct 93 10:20:15 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Standard Headers for Anonymous Remailers
In-Reply-To: <199310052035.AA27555@eff.org>
Message-ID: <199310061719.AA07224@eff.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>         It seems to me that his suggestion would work to make it easier for 
> readers to do that. There are people who don't want to read anonymous posts. It 
> seems only fair to give them a reasonable opportunity to kill them as a group 
> _from their own newsreaders_. This job is very difficult in the present, and it 
> requires that the person know the email addresses of every anonymous remailer 
> in the world, so he/she can killfile all of them. On the other hand, a single 
> word added to a special header would enable them to identify anonymous posts as 
> a group, saving everyone a lot of hassle.

Which will result in newgroups banning anon mail wholesale.  There are
other filtration methods besides using the full address of the remailer.
Simply filtering out all mail from userIDs "anonymous" and "nobody" will
kill most anon mail as it is.

>         This isn't necessarily related to the banning of anonymous posts from a 
> whole newsgroup. This is about an individual choice by individual readers.

But of course it is related to banning anon postings in whole groups. 

>         What it suggests is a matter of opinion, and I'm sure that you will 
> give yours (as will I) to anyone who tries to ban anoymous posting in "normal" 
> groups. On the other hand, the academic and hard-science conferences you 
> addressed would be served by this feature.

They can already filter out this stuff without that much of a hassle as
can anyone.  Really, the idea of standardizing the anon remailers is not
that big a deal, I just see it as a step in the wrong direction, at least
until anon mail is more  accepted.  It will just make it slightly more
easy to filter out anon mail, and at a time when lots of admins and
moderators are frowning up anon mail, is this such a good idea?

>         It is a bad idea to try to stop a technical development just because 
> some people might misuse it. Yes, the anon-marker heeader may be misused. PGP 
> has been and will continue to be misused, as will the remailers. That doesn't 
> mean we should get rid of them. It only means that we should behave 
> intelligently and make our own choices about who to believe and what to 
> support.

Hahahah, I'm not trying to stop a [useful] technological development, just
slowdown a potentially worse-than-useless one until anon mail is more
accepted, at which point standardizing would be a good idea.  Your last
sentence above...when do I ever advocate otherwise? :)

>         Usenet is hardly an autocratic medium. If a normal Usenet group 
> suddenly banned anon traffic entirely, there would be ample opportunities for 
> you and I and all the other cypherpunks (both in membership and in spirit) to 
> raise objections. And it's not only cypherpunks who would object. The traffic 
> in the normally conservative news.admin.policy showed the disapproval of 
> oppressive top-down regulations during the ARMM/UDP incidents.
>         I just think that the creation of a special anon header is not a real 
> problem, since it would do no real damage, and might improve the image of 
> remailers considerably.

This argument I really don't follow.  I don't see how standardizing this
mailing software to produce a specific header line will change anyone's
opinion or remailers or anonymity on the net.  Well over a year ago, some
Fido-tech software authors came up with a similar idea for marking
encrypted mail (specifically they created the ^enc PID kluge line, which
is pretty much analogous to a type of mail header).  The result was that
no one's opinion of crypto in FidoNet appears to have changed, and the
debate rages on just as before.

> >Fido: <tba>           IndraNet: 369:111/1
>         Oh, a Fido member? What's your opinion on the recent squabble over 
> encryption/mail censorship there?

Well I'm temp. out of Fido, for a week or so, due to the move, but if you
mean the CP argument, I'm still sorting through it (again, due to moving,
I have a major backlog, like 600+ emails). If you mean the general idea of
le crypto en Phydeaux, well that's been raging for a year or 2 or 4. 
Quite a few of us decided 'heck with it', and started a secondary hub
backbone system called the SecureMail system, which WILL carry encrypted
mail.  Just search the nodelist for the UNSMH and URSMH flags (that's Net
SecureMail Hub, and Region SM Hub.)  The EFF-BBS that's coming soon will
likely been one such hub.

-- 
DISCLAIMER: This message represents only my OWN opinion, not that of EFF.
Stanton McCandlish    Electronic Frontier Foundation Online Activist
mech@eff.org          NitV-DataCenter BBS SysOp
Fido: <tba>           IndraNet: 369:111/1



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Anonymous <nowhere@bsu-cs.bsu.edu>
Date: Wed, 6 Oct 93 11:25:17 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: No Subject
Message-ID: <9310061825.AA00943@bsu-cs.bsu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> and cause people not to buy their next posting. 2) People would 
> have an incentive to contribute to the group because they would
> start running out of cash if they didn't say something valuable. 

Yes, but it would also discourage lurkers like me who are here to learn
- and don't have much to contribute so far.  If you have to pay to read,
and to get more money you have to post something useful that people want
to read, the "startup cost" associated with the list would grow as time
goes on.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: cme@ellisun.sw.stratus.com (Carl Ellison)
Date: Wed, 6 Oct 93 10:55:16 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Strong PRNGs
Message-ID: <9310061753.AA21992@ellisun.sw.stratus.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Someone wrote:

>	for each bit in the 512-bit register, if the bit is a 1, add the
>	corresponding array entry into a 521-bit accumulator (init'd to 0
>	at the start of this pass), modulo a 521-bit prime.
>                                            ^^^
>                                           is this correct?
>

Yup.  512 + 8 + 1 = 521

512:	for the seed for next time
8:	for the output byte
1:	slop, since numbers mod a 521 bit prime won't give a uniform
	distribution of the top bit

 - Carl




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Peter Wayner <pcw@access.digex.net>
Date: Wed, 6 Oct 93 10:59:14 PDT
To: bobi@pets.sps.mot.com
Subject: Re: Enough already!
Message-ID: <199310061755.AA11647@access.digex.net>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Given that the cypherpunks are limited to text lately, it might
be interesting to convert our mailing list into a version of 
Ted Nelson's Xanadu Hypertext system. He had some plan where people
would pay the author several coins for the priviledge to reading
their text. 

This could have several advantages. 1) People would quit posting
random stuff because they knew that it would dillute their "brand name"
and cause people not to buy their next posting. 2) People would 
have an incentive to contribute to the group because they would
start running out of cash if they didn't say something valuable. 

Of course there are downsides to this. Posters like Sternlight might
find themselves unread. Or neo-Sternlights might be rewarded for the
controversy they generate by attracting high readership. The need to
post or run out of money would discourage low-volume neophiles and
those without hours of idle time to burn.

-Peter




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Eli Brandt <ebrandt@jarthur.Claremont.EDU>
Date: Wed, 6 Oct 93 14:15:21 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Strong PRNGs
In-Reply-To: <9310061511.AA21028@ellisun.sw.stratus.com>
Message-ID: <9310062111.AA00649@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>Carl Ellison says:
> However, I can even see a point for using this for XOR encryption [I prefer
> not to call anything using a PRNG One-Time-Pad].  I can see two points,
> even:

Another point: it raises the possibility of an interesting loophole
in the ITAR.  Cryptographic hash functions are exportable, as "systems
for authentication", or something to that effect.  A random-number
generator based on a hash function should be exportable.  After all,
as you say, 
> I have many uses for random numbers and none of them is XOR encryption.

But such an RNG *could* be used for encryption.  If you package and
market it as such, you're asking for trouble.  But packaged as a
library routine in a simulation library?  It's not a fast PRNG, but
it should be pretty good statistically.

   Eli   ebrandt@jarthur.claremont.edu




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Peter Wayner <pcw@access.digex.net>
Date: Wed, 6 Oct 93 11:45:16 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Start up costs and paying for speech...
Message-ID: <199310061842.AA17128@access.digex.net>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Of course there would need to be some mechanism associated with
letting new people into the system. In the real world, the parents
and to some extent the government bear the responsiblity to bring
up the young and provide for them. Perhaps some form of welfare
could be instituted without offending the strict libertarians?
Each month, the smartest and wittiest would be taxed and their
success redistributed to the new and the epistolarily challenged.

Ack... I don't know if digital money is such a great idea. A worl
d without it seems so free.

-Peter




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Mike Godwin <mnemonic@eff.org>
Date: Wed, 6 Oct 93 11:49:13 PDT
To: msattler@netcom.com (Michael Sattler)
Subject: Re: PGP in Fidonet
In-Reply-To: <9310061836.AA14135@netcom.netcom.com>
Message-ID: <199310061846.AA08848@eff.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


 
Michael Sattler writes:

> The real question is, what attorney jokes do *you* know?  Do you tell
> programmer jokes?

I know every attorney joke you've ever heard, plus some I made up.

As for programmer jokes, did you hear about the programmer who could never
get out of the shower?


--Mike







From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Joe Thomas <jthomas@pawpaw.mitre.org>
Date: Wed, 6 Oct 93 12:09:13 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Start up costs and paying for speech...
Message-ID: <9310061906.AA28917@pawpaw.mitre.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


On cypherpunks, Peter Wayner <pcw@access.digex.net> writes:

> Each month, the
> smartest and wittiest would be taxed and their
> success redistributed to the new and the
> epistolarily challenged.
> 

> Ack... I don't know if digital money is such a
> great idea. A worl d without it seems so free.

I wouldn't worry about either.  I don't see how enforcement of  
copyright will be possible under crypto-anarchy any more than  
taxation will be.  If one person pays for a posting, what's to keep  
him from sharing it anonymously with whomever he wants?  Is there any  
way that crypto-anarcy won't bring the death of "intellectual  
property"?

Joe




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: cme@ellisun.sw.stratus.com (Carl Ellison)
Date: Wed, 6 Oct 93 12:10:16 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: From the LA Times story
Message-ID: <9310061909.AA22134@ellisun.sw.stratus.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Robert Lee Hotz did a good job with this one -- except he tripped over my
favorite soapbox, as do most people.

Is he on the list?  Does anyone know how to reach him?

He wrote: "Not so many years ago, powerful encryption techniques were the
monopoly of military and intelligence agencies."

If this was true, it was for a short span of years -- perhaps 1932 to about
1975 -- but even then, Vernam's one-time-tape was published in 1920 and you
can't get any stronger than that.

What *was* true is that the gov't agencies and the press made it sound like
real encryption was the property of the governments while we peons played
around with simple substitution preserving word separation.

I wish more people would read the history chapters of Kahn...especially the
one about the dominance of the amateurs (in the early polyalphabetic days).

Ah, well.....


 - Carl




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: ssteele@eff.org (Shari Steele)
Date: Wed, 6 Oct 93 12:25:16 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Possible Change In Crypto Export Controls
Message-ID: <199310061921.AA09591@eff.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I haven't had time to confirm this yet, but I thought everyone here would
want to see it ASAP.  I'll get back to the list with confirmation.
Shari

>Date: Wed, 6 Oct 1993 15:06:09 -0400
>From: Christopher Davis <ckd@kei.com>
>To: editors@eff.org
>Subject: [alt.security.pgp] Possible Change In Crypto Export Controls
>X-Attribution: ckd
>
>------- Start of forwarded message -------
>Newsgroups: talk.politics.crypto,alt.security.pgp,comp.org.eff
>From: dave@blackjoke.bsd.uchicago.edu (Dave Griffith)
>Subject: Possible Change In Crypto Export Controls
>Organization: University of Chicago -- Academic & Public Computing
>Date: Thu, 30 Sep 1993 20:26:43 GMT
>
>
>What I know:
>  Yesterday, Secretary of Commerce Ron Brown presented to Congress a report on
> 
>export policy, including proposals for legislation.  Included in this was a  
>proposal for updating the Export Control Act to allow export of many items  
>currently restricted for out-dated security purposes.  The Commerce Department
> 
>estimates that $40 billion per year in sales are lost to such restrictions.  
>  Attempting to get a copy of this report lead me into a bureaucratic maze,  
>eating up an unknown amount of telephone charges and producing no results.
>
>What I want to know:
>  Is crypto on the suggested list of changes?  If not, whose office should we  
>call to get it on such a list?  
>
>In any case, it seemed like something the EFF would want to know about, hence  
>the crossposting.  
>
>- --
>Dave Griffith, Information Resources, University of Chicago,
>Biological Sciences Division               dave@delphi.bsd.uchicago.edu
>Will build secret weapon for food.
>
>------- End of forwarded message -------
>
>





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: ssteele@eff.org (Shari Steele)
Date: Wed, 6 Oct 93 12:29:12 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: oops!
Message-ID: <199310061928.AA09710@eff.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Sorry about that last post -- just noticed the date.  Now I realize what
they were talking about.  Please disregard.
Shari





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: mandk@aol.com
Date: Wed, 6 Oct 93 12:55:20 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Unsubscribe
Message-ID: <9310061548.tn09759@aol.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Please Unsubscribe me.  M AND K@aol.com




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Matthew J Ghio <mg5n+@andrew.cmu.edu>
Date: Wed, 6 Oct 93 13:35:20 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Quantifying similar graphic images (was Re: criminal gif upload)
In-Reply-To: <1743.pfarrell@gmu.edu>
Message-ID: <cggmhoe00VolIKwEcW@andrew.cmu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


"Pat Farrell" <pfarrell@gmu.edu> writes:

> We can prove statistical insignificance of duplication using strong
> hashing functions. Can we find a way to statistically prove "looks like"
> on a numerical basis?

Yes.  If you were to take an image and divide it into let's say about 20
sections horizontally, and 20 sections vertically, and then average the
intensities of all pixels in each of the 400 rectangles formed, you
would create a fuzzy low-resolution version of the original picture
which could be used to compare other pictures to it to determine weather
they look like the orginal by using the same averaging method, and then
comparing the block-pixel averages.  If the pictures differed by less
than +/- 5% or so for each block, the original pictures probably look
very much alike.  This method works well even if one of the images had
been converted to a different resolution, or if it's color pallete had
been changed slightly to fit a different graphic format, or if one was
converted to black & white.

Such a system would probably be very helpful to sysops to get rid of
duplicate pictures on their systems, but unfortunanently it would also
give the cops an automated system for busting people. :(





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: habs@panix.com (Harry S. Hawk)
Date: Wed, 6 Oct 93 13:45:20 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Start up costs and paying for speech...
Message-ID: <199310062042.AA06185@panix.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



We are planing on adding pay for use features to the
Extropian Mailing List software. However it is a bit
on the back burner. However, If there is serious
interest on using a digi-cash system for pay-as-you post
mailing list we should "TALK."

Hal do you have any free time?

/hawk


--
Harry S. Hawk           ON Vacation






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: cme@ellisun.sw.stratus.com (Carl Ellison)
Date: Wed, 6 Oct 93 14:10:20 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re:  Quantifying similar graphic images (was Re: criminal gif upload)
Message-ID: <9310062109.AA22515@ellisun.sw.stratus.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>Message-Id: <cggmhoe00VolIKwEcW@andrew.cmu.edu>
>Date: Wed,  6 Oct 1993 16:32:52 -0400 (EDT)
>From: Matthew J Ghio <mg5n+@andrew.cmu.edu>
>Subject: Quantifying similar graphic images (was Re: criminal gif upload)

>"Pat Farrell" <pfarrell@gmu.edu> writes:
>
>> We can prove statistical insignificance of duplication using strong
>> hashing functions. Can we find a way to statistically prove "looks like"
>> on a numerical basis?
>
>Yes.  If you were to take an image and divide it into let's say about 20
>sections horizontally, and 20 sections vertically, and then average the
>intensities of all pixels in each of the 400 rectangles formed, you
>would create a fuzzy low-resolution version of the original picture
>which could be used to compare other pictures


You would have a better chance if you took just the low frequency components
of a 2D Fourier transform of the pictures in question -- perhaps at only
certain frequencies -- to get a vector describing features of the picture.

You'd have to choose your 2D frequencies and build a set of such indicators
and then look to see what distance between two vectors suggests that the
pictures are the same.

You'd want to use only the magnitude of the transform, to remove translation
effects.  You could use a sum around a circle of frequencies to remove
rotation effects.

The low res picture by averaging is easily confused by any translation
or rotation of the image.


 - Carl




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Paul Goggin <chaos@aql.gatech.edu>
Date: Wed, 6 Oct 93 14:39:13 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com (Cryptoanarchists are Us)
Subject: FOIA requests reworded
Message-ID: <9310062135.AA00959@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Thought this might be of interest to us cypherpunks and the EFF, in case you 
have not heard. Excerpted from the most recent issue of ALAWON.

***************************************************************************

                 JUSTICE DEPARTMENT ISSUES NEW FOIA POLICY

On October 4, President Clinton and Attorney General Reno rescinded a 1981
rule which encouraged federal agencies to withhold information requested
under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) whenever there was "a
substantial legal basis" for doing so.  In its place, agencies are directed
to apply a "presumption of disclosure."  A memorandum from President
Clinton urged agencies to take a fresh look at their administration of the
FOIA, to reduce backlogs of requests, and to enhance public access to
information.  (See below for the full text of the memorandum.)

In a memorandum sent to heads of departments and agencies, Attorney General
Reno stated that
     ...we must ensure that the principle of openness in government is
     applied in each and every disclosure and nondisclosure decision that
     is required under the Act....It shall be the policy of the Department
     of Justice to defend the assertion of a FOIA exemption only in those
     cases where the agency reasonably foresees that disclosure would be
     harmful to an interest protected by that exemption.  Where an item of
     information might technically or arguably fall within an exemption, it
     ought not to be withheld from a FOIA requester unless it need be.

At a Department of Justice briefing, Associate Attorney General Webster
Hubbell acknowledged that there was a huge backlog of FOIA requests, and
said the Department of Justice wanted to hear of the problems requestors
were having.  He said that the Department would review all pending FOIA
lawsuits, but would not provide additional funding to fill FOIA requests.
When asked about FOIA access to electronic records, John Podesta, White
House Staff Secretary, replied that agencies would work with users to get
information to them in a usable way.  He added that OMB, the White House,
and the Department of Justice were all committed to making information
available.

One person at the briefing asked about privacy issues, and noted that the
FBI would not search for records on an individual because of concerns about
privacy.  Hubbell replied that the FBI should ask the individual first, but
that the new FOIA regulations presumed disclosure.  He added that the
Department of Justice would discuss the matter with the FBI director.

***************************************************************************

                TEXT OF FOIA MEMO ISSUED BY THE WHITE HOUSE

                              The White House
                                Washington
                              October 4, 1993

MEMORANDUM FOR HEADS OF DEPARTMENTS AND AGENCIES

SUBJECT:  The Freedom of Information Act

I am writing to call your attention to a subject that is of great
importance to the American public and to all Federal departments and
agencies -- the administration of the Freedom of Information Act, as
amended (the "Act").  The Act is a vital part of the participatory system
of government.  I am committed to enhancing its effectiveness in my
Administration.

For more than a quarter century now, the Freedom of Information Act has
played a unique role in strengthening our democratic form of government.
The statute was enacted based upon the fundamental principle that an
informed citizenry is essential to the democratic process and that the more
the American people know about their government the better they will be
governed.  Openness in government is essential to accountability and the
Act has become an integral part of that process.

The Freedom of Information Act, moreover, has been one of the primary means
by which members of the public inform themselves about their government.
As Vice President Gore made clear in the National Performance Review, the
American people are the Federal Government's customers.  Federal
departments and agencies should handle requests for information in a
customer-friendly manner.  The use of the Act by ordinary citizens is not
complicated, nor should it be.  The existence of unnecessary bureaucratic
hurdles has no place in its implementation.

I therefore call upon all Federal departments and agencies to renew their
commitment to the Freedom of Information Act, to its underlying principles
of government openness, and to its sound administration.  This is an
appropriate time for all agencies to take a fresh look at their
administration of the Act, to reduce backlogs of Freedom of Information Act
requests, and to conform agency practice to the new litigation guidance
issued by the Attorney General, which is attached.

Further, I remind agencies that our commitment to openness requires more
than merely responding to requests from the public.  Each agency has a
responsibility to distribute information on its own initiative, and to
enhance public access through the use of electronic information systems.
Taking these steps will ensure compliance with both the letter and the
spirit of the Act.

                           (signed) William J. Clinton

***************************************************************************

ALAWON (ISSN 1069-7799) is an irregular publication of the American Library
Association Washington Office, 110 Maryland Avenue, N.E., Washington, DC
20002-5675.  Internet: alawash@alawash.org; Phone: 202-547-4440;
Fax: 202-547-7363.  Editor and List Owner: Fred King (fdk@alawash.org).
All or part of ALAWON may be redistributed, with appropriate credits.


--
R  O    All Comments Copyright by  | Technofetisht
 A  N     Paul S. Goggin (1993)    | Cypher, Cyber, Chaos              
  V        Information Broker      | Ergoflux, Interzone
   E      chaos@aql.gatech.edu     | Carpe Diem: Stop the Clipper wiretap chip 
Finger account for latest _Phrack_ | Public Key: PGP and RIPEM available
      For anonymous communication:---> anon32940@anon.penet.fi
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Title 18 USC 2511 and 18 USC 2703 Protected -- Monitoring Absolutely Forbidden




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: wcs@anchor.ho.att.com (Bill_Stewart_HOY002_1305)
Date: Wed, 6 Oct 93 15:05:22 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: digicash
Message-ID: <9310062202.AA15494@anchor.ho.att.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text


Yes, as Bob said, digicash *does* sound like play money,
as any fiat currency is.  Gold and silver are, in many cultures,
useful real money, partly because they're useful or decorative,
durable, and hard to make more of, occasional gold rushes excepted :-)
It's also hard to debase, though some coin-makers have short-weighted their
coinage, or even talked people into accepting cheaper metals.
Leaves are also pretty and conveniently grow on trees, but aren't good money.
Ultimately, it's worth whatever goods and services people are willing
to give you in exchange for it.

Paper money with numbers on it is easy to print more of;
some governments realize that and abuse people's trust of them,
leading to mild-to-medium inflation rates in many countries,
and hyper-inflation in countries that think they can print it faster
than people can switch to less volatile currencies (Israel went through
a period where their pound was inflating so fast that most people
switched over to dollar-based price indexing until the government started
behaving again; governments like the U.S. realize they can steal a lot more
money if they do it slowly.)  I once saw a board game that used real
Nicaraguan 50,000 cordoba notes as money - they were cheaper than 
printing good-looking play money from scratch :-)

Bits are also easy to make more of, though it may be more work if you want
them to be prime numbers or whatever.  In order to make them useful and
not inflated, they either have to be directly pegged to a good or service
that people want, and offered by someone reasonably trustworthy,
or otherwise tied to something of stable value.  Metro or BART tickets
are magnetic cards with bits on them, which people are willing to pay money for
because they know they'll get subway rides in return for them,
and aren't likely to be defaulted on.  Telephone cards are 
easy for the phone to make, but people accept them for the same reason.

For digicash tokens that _aren't_ tied to a single service provider,
you typically need some other reason to trust the issuers not to make 
lots of them - people accept EFT, money orders, travellers' checks, and personal
checks from a variety of issuers because they know they can get regular cash
in return for them, and because business and legal relationships are there
to such an extent that people don't usually default on them, though
merchants often charge service charges to make up for the costs of redemption
and the risk of defaults, especially for foreign transactions.
Digicash could work the same way, only instead of Western Union accepting cash
at one office and telegraphing a request to pay cash at another office,
we're hauling the email around ourselves.  

Authentication theory is fun, and a good subject for university research,
and the economics are important as well, since you'd need to make a profit
to bother running all the computation that the system costs,
but ultimately, it won't happen until some entrepreneur or group of
fanatics :-) decides to get down and do it.  Most of the current similar 
systems either don't give you anonymity, or do so by using pre-paid tokens;
anything fancier is cutting into relatively untapped markets.

			Bill




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: wcs@anchor.ho.att.com (Bill_Stewart_HOY002_1305)
Date: Wed, 6 Oct 93 15:15:30 PDT
To: mech@eff.org
Subject: Re: Standard Headers for Anonymous Remailers
Message-ID: <9310062211.AA15617@anchor.ho.att.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text


X-Anonymousity: none

Putting anonymity indications in message headers is a useful courtesy;
it's not foolproof, since somebody can always go run their own remailer,
but standardization would make it easier for most people to use them
consistently from their mail/news readers.  There are times when people
really need to get rid of lots of anonymous messages, such as harassment
or mailbombs or freaked-out gateways, basically for self-defense,
and this will make it more convenient.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: wcs@anchor.ho.att.com (Bill_Stewart_HOY002_1305)
Date: Wed, 6 Oct 93 15:25:23 PDT
To: hfinney@shell.portal.com
Subject: Re: Crypto Idea; Multi-Part Sigs
Message-ID: <9310062222.AA15672@anchor.ho.att.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text


Carl's comment that, for RSA, decryption and signing are really identical,
gets to the heart of the matter.  Hal posted a method for letting N people
together do the operations.  For N people separately, a trusted mailer
run by one of the people can solve the decryption problem
(RSA-decrypts the session key using its private key, RSA-encrypts it with 
the public keys for all the recipients, retransmits), and it's ok to trust it
since the list-runner is allowed to see the messages anyway.
This nethod tends to require the sign-N-times method of encryption or signature,
whish is boring but adequate for many needs, unless you want the
users to be anonymous.  The N of M signature method from Shamir doesn't work
will if you want to preserve anonymity of members of the group, and giving
everybody in the group their own copy of the key also may have drawbacks.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Matthew B. Landry <mbl@ml7694a.leonard.american.edu>
Date: Wed, 6 Oct 93 15:25:43 PDT
To: Eli Brandt <ebrandt@jarthur.Claremont.EDU>
Subject: Re: Strong PRNGs
Message-ID: <9310062225.AA01850@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>Another point: it raises the possibility of an interesting loophole
>in the ITAR.  Cryptographic hash functions are exportable, as "systems
>for authentication", or something to that effect.  A random-number
>generator based on a hash function should be exportable.  After all,
>as you say, 
>> I have many uses for random numbers and none of them is XOR encryption.
>
>But such an RNG *could* be used for encryption.  If you package and
>market it as such, you're asking for trouble.  But packaged as a
>library routine in a simulation library?  It's not a fast PRNG, but
>it should be pretty good statistically.
        Does it strike you as ironic that in this atmosphere where "exporting" 
basically secure products like PGP is illegal, that exporting the tools to 
generate one of the best possible (in the security sense) encryption systems 
known to current technology (better than anything that can be implemented in 
software, anyway) would be _legal_, because it also has ample uses that are 
unrelated to cryptography?
        If only One Time Pad style systems weren't so kludgey, this would 
present the _perfect_ solution to our problems with ITAR and the like. 
Unfortunately, there are some things they can't do. Oh well...
        Please don't bother to tell me that we'd need to physically build 
hardware to generate seeds for the hash functions, because I already know that. 
I didn't say it was entirely practical, just that it was an interesting bit of 
irony.
--
Matthew B. Landry
ml7694a@american.edu
(Finally!) mbl@ml7694a.leonard.american.edu




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: KENUNGER@delphi.com
Date: Wed, 6 Oct 93 15:39:15 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: PGP removal
Message-ID: <01H3SVRL8EHU8WWDZL@delphi.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I first got pgp2.2 from compuserve ibmsys forum downloads.
A few day ago the file finder on cis listed PGP2.3. When I actually looked
neither program was there. Sysop says the were removed on advice of his 
lawyer(not compuserve management ) because of government crakdown.
and questios of legality.  The not so subtle hand of intimidation by
rumor seems to be at work here. Just thought this would be of interest.
p.s. I FTPed it from the INTERNET anyway.=======Ken
PPUBLIC KEY AVAILABLE ON PGP KEY SERVERS .




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: an5877@anon.penet.fi (deadbeat)
Date: Wed, 6 Oct 93 11:55:16 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: How to Share a Secret
Message-ID: <9310061850.AA05936@anon.penet.fi>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

How to Share a Secret

Adi Shamir
Massachusetts Institute of Technology

In this paper we show how to divide data D into n pieces in such a way that D
is easily reconstructable from any k pieces, but even complete knowledge of
k - 1 pieces reveals absolutely no information about D.  This technique enables
the construction of robust key management schemes or cryptographic schemes that
can function securely and reliably even when misfortunes destroy half the
pieces and security breaches expose all but one of the remaining pieces.

Key Words and phrases: cryptography, key management, interpolation.
CR Categories: 5:39, 5.6

1.  Introduction

In [4], Liu considers the following problem:

    Eleven scientists are working on a secret project.  They wish to lock up
    the documents in a cabinet so that the cabinet can be opened if and only if
    six or more of the scientists are present.  What is the smallest number of
    locks needed?  What is the smallest number of keys to the locks each
    scientist must carry?

It is not hard to show that the minimal solution uses 462 locks and 252 keys
per scientist.  These numbers are clearly impractical, and they become
exponentially worse when the number of scientists increases.

In this paper we generalize the problem to one in which the secret is some data
D (e.g., the safe combination) and in which nonmechanical solutions (which
manipulate this data) are also allowed.  Our goal is to divide D into n pieces
D1, ..., Dn in such a way that:

(1) knowledge of any k or more Di pieces makes D easily computable;

(2) knowledge of any k - 1 or fewer Di pieces leaves D completely undetermined
    (in the sense that all its possible values are equally likely).

Such a scheme is called a (k, n) threshold scheme.

Efficient threshold schemes can be very helpful in the management of
cryptographic keys.  In order to protect data we can encrypt it, but in order
to protect the encryption key we need a different method (further encryptions
change the problem rather than solve it).  The most secure key management
scheme keeps the key in a single, well-guarded location (a computer, a human
brain, or a safe).  This scheme is highly unreliable since a single misfortune
(a computer breakdown, sudden death, or sabotage) can make the information
inaccessible.  An obvious solution is to store multiple copies of the key at
different locations, but this increases the danger of security breaches
(computer penetration, betrayal, or human errors).  By using a (k, n) threshold
scheme with n = 2k - 1 we get a very robust key management scheme: We can
recover the original key even when floor(n/2) = k - 1 of the n pieces are
destroyed, but our opponents cannot reconstruct the key even when security
breaches expose floor(n/2) = k - 1 of the remaining k pieces.

In other applications the tradeoff is not between secrecy and reliability, but
between safety and convenience of use.  Consider, for example, a company that
digitally signs all its checks (see RSA [5]).  If each executive is given a
copy of the company's secret signature key, the system is convenient but easy
to misuse.  If the cooperation of all the company's executives is necessary in
order to sign each check, the system is safe but inconvenient.  The standard
solution requires at least three signatures per check, and it is easy to
implement with a (3, n) threshold scheme.  Each executive is given a small
magnetic card with one Di piece, and the company's signature generating device
accepts any three of them in order to generate (and later destroy) a temporary
copy of the actual signature key D.  The device does not contain any secret
information and thus it need not be protected against inspection.  An
unfaithful executive must have at least two accomplices in order to forge the
company's signature in this scheme.

Threshold schemes are ideally suited to applications in which a group of
mutually suspicious individuals with conflicting interests must cooperate.
Ideally we would like the cooperation to be based on mutual consent, but the
veto power this mechanism gives to each member can paralyze the activities of
the group.  By properly choosing the k and n parameters we can give any
sufficiently large majority the authority to take some action while giving any
sufficiently large minority the power to block it.

2.  A Simple (k, n) Threshold Scheme

Our scheme is based on polynomial (*) interpolation: given k points in the
2-dimensional plane (x1, y1), ... (xk, yk) with distinct xi's, there is one and
only one polynomial q(x) of degree k - i such that q(xi) = yi for all i.
 --------
(*) The polynomials can be replaced by any other collection of functions which
are easy to evaluate and to interpolate.
 --------
Without loss of generality, we can assume that the data D is (or can be made) a
number.  To divide it into pieces Di, we pick a random k - 1 degree polynomial
q(x) = a[0] + a[1] * x + ... a[k-1] * x^(k-1) in which a[0] = D, and
evaluate:

D1 = q(1), ..., Di = q(i), ..., Dn = q(n).

Given any subset of k of these Di values (together with their identifying
indices), we can find the coefficients of q(x) by interpolation, and then
evaluate D = q(O).  Knowledge of just k - 1 of these values, on the other hand,
does not suffice in order to calculate D.

To make this claim more precise, we use modular arithmetic instead of real
arithmetic.  The set of integers modulo a prime number p forms a field in which
interpolation is possible.  Given an integer valued data D, we pick a prime p
which is bigger than both D and n.  The coefficients a[1], ..., a[k-1], in q(x)
are randomly chosen from a uniform distribution over the integers in [0, p),
and the values D1, ..., Dn are computed modulo p.

Let us now assume that k - 1 of these n pieces are revealed to an opponent.
For each candidate value D' in [O, p) he can construct one and only one
polynomial q'(x) of degree k - 1 such that q'(0) = D' and q'(i) = Di for the
k - 1 given arguments.  By construction, these p possible polynomials are
equally likely, and thus there is absolutely nothing the opponent can deduce
about the real value of D.

Efficient O(n log^2 n) algorithms for polynomial evaluation and interpolation
are discussed in [11 and [3], but even the straightforward quadratic algorithms
are fast enough for practical key management schemes.  If the number D is long,
it is advisable to break it into shorter blocks of bits (which are handled
separately) in order to avoid multiprecision arithmetic operations.  The blocks
cannot be arbitrarily short, since the smallest usable value of p is n + 1
(there must be at least n + 1 distinct arguments in [0, p) to evaluate q(x)
at).  However, this is not a severe limitation since sixteen bit modulus (which
can be handled by a cheap sixteen bit arithmetic unit) suffices for
applications with up to 64,000 Di pieces.

Some of the useful properties of this (k, n) threshold scheme (when compared to
the mechanical locks and keys solutions) are:

(1) The size of each piece does not exceed the size of the original data.

(2) When k is kept fixed, Di pieces can be dynamically added or deleted (e.g.,
    when executives join or leave the company) without affecting the other D,
    pieces.  (A piece is deleted only when a leaving executive makes it
    completely inaccessible, even to himself.)

(3) It is easy to change the Di pieces without changing the original data D --
    all we need is a new polynomial q(x) with the same free term.  A frequent
    change of this type can greatly enhance security since the pieces exposed
    by security breaches cannot be accumulated unless all of them are values of
    the same edition of the q(x) polynomial.

(4) By using tuples of polynomial values as Di pieces, we can get a
    hierarchical scheme in which the number of pieces needed to determine D
    depends on their importance.  For example, if we give the company's
    president three values of q(x), each vice-president two values of q(x), and
    each executive one value of q(x), then a (3, n) threshold scheme enables
    checks to be signed either by any three executives, or by any two
    executives one of whom is a vice-president, or by the president alone.

A different (and somewhat less efficient) threshold scheme was recently
developed by G.R.  Blakley [2].

References

1. Aho, A., Hopcroft, J., and Ullman, J.  The Design and Analysis of Computer
   Algorithms.  Addison-Wesley, Reading, Mass., 1974.

2. Blakley, G.R.  Safeguarding cryptographic keys.  Proc.  AFIPS 1979 NCC,
   Vol. 48, Arlington, Va., June 1979, pp. 313-317.

3. Knuth, D.  The Art of Computer Programming, Vol.  2:  Seminumerical
   Algorithms.  Addison-Wesley, Reading, Mass., 1969.

4. Liu, C.L.  Introduction to Combinatorial Mathematics.  McGraw-Hill, New
   York, 1968.

5. Rivest, R., Shamir.  A., and Adleman, L.  A method for obtaining digital
   signatures and public key cryptosystems.  Comm.  ACM 21, 2 (Feb.  1978),
   120-126.

Communications of the ACM
November 1979
Volume 22
Number 11

Permission to copy without fee all or part of this material is granted provided
that the copies are not made or distributed for direct commercial advantage,
the ACM copyright notice and the title of the publication and its date appear,
and notice is given that copying is by permission of the Association for
Computing Machinery.  To copy otherwise, or to republish, requires a fee and/or
specific permission.

Author's present address: A. Shamir, Laboratory for Computer Science,
Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, MA 02139.

This research was supported by the Office of Naval Research under contract no
N00014-76-C-0366.

Received April 1979; revised September 1979.

(c) 1979 ACM 0001-0782/79/1100-0612 $00.75.

Brought to you by the Information Liberation Front, and

DEADBEAT <na5877@anon.penet.fi>

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Version: 2.3

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oaV5nje6JIS+QIW+lfuFWs0hobrgQz6V
=u17f
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
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From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: msattler@netcom.com (Michael Sattler)
Date: Wed, 6 Oct 93 19:05:24 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Macintosh System 7 Pro, e-mail, encryption
Message-ID: <9310070203.AA18842@netcom.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I installed Macintosh System 7 Pro (7.1.1) onto my PowerBook today.  I'd
heard that e-mail was part of the new package, but I was amazed to see how
integral it is.  When you start up for the first time you are asked for a
userid and a password to protect your "PowerTalk Keychain".

A mailbox and a "catalog" appear on your desktop; the latter is a list of
entries in different domains (like AppleTalk, EtherTalk, etc.) so that you
can authenticate yourself on all the places you exist with one login. 
E-mail comes free with the system and works automagically when multiple
users install the new system.

I haven't used a lot of this system since it's so new, but I sent this
message because it heralds a new era of turnkey mail/network-identity.  I'm
investigating how this works with AppleEvents to see how PGP can be
seamlessly integrated.

A friend of mine went to the product launch at Apple and got a free
"signed" RSA user identification voucher.

I'd be very interested in hearing from others who have a clue about this stuff.


-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
Michael S. Sattler         msattler@netcom.com        +1 (415) 358-3058
Digital Jungle Software    Encrypt now; ask me how.   (finger for PGP key)

      Evil will certainly triumph if good people do nothing at all.






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Phil G. Fraering" <pgf@srl.cacs.usl.edu>
Date: Wed, 6 Oct 93 17:35:32 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re:  Crypto Toolkit Suggestions
Message-ID: <199310070031.AA09974@srl03.cacs.usl.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Re: Hiding processes and data via subordinate processes, variables,
et cetera... it will probably be a _lot_ better and easier to
simply assume that a multi-user unix system isn't secure to
begin with, and work out alternatives from there.

Phil




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Date: Wed, 6 Oct 93 19:55:24 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Digital Cash Primer
In-Reply-To: <01H3T29C12CW90N39U@delphi.com>
Message-ID: <9310070254.AA20578@netcom5.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



> Shari Steele writes: ->
> 
> Hey 'punks.
> Anyone know of an elementary primer on digital cash?  I'm trying to get up
> to speed on this.
> 
> <--
> 
> I would like an elementary primer also.  How about posting the info to 
> the list vice just to Shari.
> 
> Thanks,
> Don Henson

What is it people want, exactly?

The Chaum paper in "Scientific American," July or August of 1992, has
been mentioned many times here. It also cites in its references the
"Communications of the ACM" paper, "Transaction Systems to Make Big
Brother Obsolete," November 1985.

And several times the Brands paper on off-line digital coinns,
available by ftp, has been cited.

Likewise, the Simmons books on "Contemporary Crytology" has good stuff
on digital money (and lots of other stuff you'll need to
cross-reference to understand digital money). Ditto for the "Crypto"
Proceedings papers.

There may someday be easier stuff to read, but these items--especially
Chaum's papers cited above--are very basic and must be assumed to have
been read by anyone interested in digital money.

If you want something more basic, a truly primerly "primer," I'm
afraid you're out of luck.

(I know of some plans to author such very basic intros, popular books
on "modern" crypto, but they are off in the future.)

-Tim May


-- 
..........................................................................
Timothy C. May         | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,  
tcmay@netcom.com       | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
408-688-5409           | knowledge, reputations, information markets, 
W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA  | black markets, collapse of governments.
Higher Power: 2^756839 | Public Key: PGP and MailSafe available.
Note: I put time and money into writing this posting. I hope you enjoy it.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: fergp@sytex.com (Paul Ferguson)
Date: Wed, 6 Oct 93 21:19:16 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: A new twist on the electronic horizon...
Message-ID: <P6Z1ac1w165w@sytex.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


excerpted from:

RISKS-FORUM Digest  Tuesday 5 October 1993  Volume 15 : Issue 06

- --

Date: Fri, 1 Oct 1993 11:43:00 -0600
From: tmplee@tis.com (Theodore M.P. Lee)
Subject: RISKs of trusting e-mail

Until such time as either the general population learns what to expect or
digital authentication (such as PEM) becomes widespread, I suspect we will
hear more of this kind of incident. This academic year the University of
Wisconsin started providing e-mail accounts to all students at its Madison
campus. (6,000?, maybe) The students, both technical and non-technical, are
being encouraged to use e-mail as a way of interacting with their instructors.
They access the accounts either through University-supplied machines scattered
throughout the campus or through dial-up Serial Link Protocol (SLIP)
connections. A mix of Macintosh's, PC's and other assorted workstations are
involved.

Last week (note how early in the school year) a group of five students,
several from the Honors floor of one of the freshman dorms, were caught having
forged several pieces of e-mail. Most potentially damaging was a note saying
it was from the Director of Housing, to the Chancellor of the University,
David Ward; note that the previous Chancellor is now Pres.  Clinton's
Secretary of HHS, so the present Chancellor is new to the job.  The forged
message was a submission of resignation. Ward's secretary had just returned
from vacation and apparently assumed the proferred resignation was legitimate.
The secretary accepted it and started to act upon it -- it was only during the
course of that that it was discovered to be a fake.

The students also sent messages purporting to be from the Chancellor to 
other students asking them to pay their tuition. They also forged a message 
from the Chancellor (my information doesn't say who it went to) saying he 
was going to "come out of the closet" and announce it Sept. 25. 

The students were only caught through a combination of circumstances.  First,
since they used one of the dial-in connections there were logs of who dialed
in when. Secondly, during the course of their experiments they botched some
addresses which caused enough traffic to go to the dead-letter office that the
investigation could narrow what was happening. (It should be pointed out that
the forgery was fairly easy to accomplish using the Eudora mail client on a
Macintosh: the user has complete choice over the "from:" field of a message.)

The FBI is investigating whether any federal crime was involved and, 
needless-to-say, the students are likely to be expelled at the least.

Ted Lee, Trusted Information Systems, Inc., PO Box 1718, Minnetonka, MN  55345
   612-934-5424   tmplee@tis.com


Paul Ferguson               |   privacy \'pri-va-see\ n, pl, -cies;
Mindbank Consulting Group   |   1: the quality or state of being apart
Fairfax, Virginia USA       |   from others  2: secrecy
fergp@sytex.com             |
ferguson@icp.net            |   Privacy -- Use it or lose it.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: DON_HENSON@delphi.com
Date: Wed, 6 Oct 93 18:49:16 PDT
To: Cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Network Etiquette Question
Message-ID: <01H3T288M2YW90N39U@delphi.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Just a quick question on network etiquette.  Shouldn't it be considered 
bad form to post a PGP-encrypted message (readable by only one person) 
to a list like Cypherpunks?

Don Henson
PGP key on server or on request





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: DON_HENSON@delphi.com
Date: Wed, 6 Oct 93 18:50:32 PDT
To: Cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Posting Long Documents
Message-ID: <01H3T28G745A90N39U@delphi.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


In the interest of saving money (for those of us who have to pay for our 
internet access), please DO NOT post long reference documents, such as 
the 'ASCII version of ECPA' directly to the list.  A much better way to 
get this information out would be to post an anonymous FTP site where 
the document can be obtained.  Would appreciate muchly.

Don Henson
PGP key avail on server or on request





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: DON_HENSON@delphi.com
Date: Wed, 6 Oct 93 18:50:24 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Digital Cash Primer
Message-ID: <01H3T29C12CW90N39U@delphi.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Shari Steele writes: ->

Hey 'punks.
Anyone know of an elementary primer on digital cash?  I'm trying to get up
to speed on this.

<--

I would like an elementary primer also.  How about posting the info to 
the list vice just to Shari.

Thanks,
Don Henson
PGP key avail on server or on request





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: David Colston <0005542837@mcimail.com>
Date: Wed, 6 Oct 93 15:15:22 PDT
To: Moderator <cypherpunks@toad.com>
Subject: Cancel
Message-ID: <85931006220258/0005542837NA4EM@mcimail.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


This message traffic is out of hand. Please take me off the list.
/s




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: strick -- henry strickland <strick@versant.com>
Date: Wed, 6 Oct 93 22:40:46 PDT
To: na5877@anon.penet.fi
Subject: Re: need deadbeat pubkey
In-Reply-To: <9310070037.AA15662@anon.penet.fi>
Message-ID: <9310070543.AA13364@versant.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


# 
# Here is my public key.  Would you sign it?
# 
# DEADBEAT <na5877@anon.penet.fi>
# 

heh heh ...   

i won't, but my friend will.

it doesn't take much of this to polute the pgpspace, does it?


-----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----
Version: 2.2

mQBNAivfNEsAAAECALxgaciRLaLJDPE1VxeOggXf600OrQksi3pN6DGaYFOIS0TU
yFmklmcG2dwTQnwxL3cSYoTrYj1sCrcgyAwlQ2UABRGwAQC0KHN0cmlja3BlcnNv
biAjMSA8c3RyaWNrQG9zYy52ZXJzYW50LmNvbT6wAQCJAJUCBRAr+HB7P4P8NX9Y
9rMBAd79BADUf4llIbsBvZ8on9AFNn6prbYmQxH/vRi7IIhIF/g3QInpJZBhw8jF
ZPBfn1KdimGUj8J0q5cP3oHA/SUYfzY4b/W0uoqQ+YReXW2y8bBpodFY2aq2mndP
3NXt4BbZbBmlaFyVXyHmGKbaS0nDhhX9e/UUWm4cPWVh61JXoHth8bABAIkARAIF
ECv4a8fSnR8fnm9wlQEB0fcBd0a+FOwGASUhJD7943gOGaPpFsbzplZHEy5648jl
x6liXrdHT8pjGV/j4O6UzGrlsAFAiQBVAgUQK/h5bkozmKNUUeyZAQEoYQH6A93U
C1SdZKEMxzUNwcrbW5eMaeI6vcRRuE7oSQ/ESIOMltPb4/qnFHd8T16muM6xCDb4
nBPEBxhkzDClLu1hU7ABAIkAVQIFECvfZWgKtyDIDCVDZQEBUkECAJHjGr9vRG6H
/cURrvJk65/GyRQ8tRZ+mXsByBIGZvlBO7Joee9yXh6Uz0JHeohq30MoJr2wPn/9
gukJ83NF426wAUCZAD0CK0u0jAAAAQGAuiPN8WeiSbPqMic9gc2eRG1EWK4c2hVZ
tfKDtO3ubfAR5cIvUmDoj/FZTpBW/B35AAURsAEAtB9ERUFEQkVBVCA8bmE1ODc3
QGFub24ucGVuZXQuZmk+sAEAiQBEAgUQLLOx3NKdHx+eb3CVAQG7PgF2NoQ/MUc7
SmZz8hz3dn71zOurlOik1XtBR1gsh/EkKKiPhXg7RYXTAglGhgZIabqwAUC0H2Rl
YWRiZWF0IDxhbjU4NzdAYW5vbi5wZW5ldC5maT6wAQCZAD4CK99mfAAAAQF3Y8xT
4Ml6MtaBmKqcpl78nO8mNdb3/tNgQqtyiXcNoL6c1jOIlPUw0p0fH55vcJUAEQEA
AbABALQSYm9ndXMgYmlsbCBibG93am9isAEAiQBVAgUQK/h2awq3IMgMJUNlAQEH
eQH/R12f2Q8xU/SiUSWrTLGcbKWt8RxQhFPEppPUcClrjWFrfcYVXaOBUEiADBWx
zHIomhejqkEMlnTuJomVJvUV6bABQIkARAIFECv4dj/SnR8fnm9wlQEBfiUBdRmv
5eSfhbyqVNGXDgw7qM7xeg/sQZ9bBFKwdOQdEBiUo5HkFZPUGggwd2UF7mWSsAFA
=smHT
-----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Larry Gadallah <larry@owrlakh.wl.aecl.ca>
Date: Wed, 6 Oct 93 21:09:16 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: What happened to FEE
Message-ID: <9310070406.AA01977@owrlakh.wl.aecl.ca>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



I wonder what happened to the fast elliptical encryption (FEE) 

encryption software that NeXT was working on about two years 

ago? I heard that the US authorities took a very dim view of
it and I assume that this was because it was either very fast 

or very strong or both. Pardon my ignorance if this is an old
thread, but I haven't seen it mentioned anywhere for quite some
time and certainly not in the last month since I was on the
cypherpunks mailing list.

Thanks,
---
---------------------------------------------------------------------
Larry Gadallah                                   Amateur Radio VE4TCP
Lac Du Bonnet, Manitoba, Canada                    IP: [44.135.114.9]
SMTP: larry@owrlakh.wl.aecl.ca     AX25: VE4TCP@VE4PIN.#PIN.MB.CAN.NA
---------------------------------------------------------------------





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: peter honeyman <honey@citi.umich.edu>
Date: Wed, 6 Oct 93 20:19:16 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: brin on privacy
Message-ID: <9310070319.AA05744@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


david brin spoke in ann arbor recently at a library science school
alumni meeting.  his talk was titled "Information and the 21st
Century:  Privacy, Wealth and the Newest Threat to Freedom."  here are
my recollections; hopefully they're not too dim or biased.

getting right to the punch line, tNTtF is this:

    privacy laws will be used as a weapon by the Rich and Powerful to
    restrict the free flow of information.

brin feels that privacy laws will be ineffective against the RaP, will
be sold to the rest of us through effective propaganda, and that they
will be used by the RaP as a means to cement their power base.  he
argues that complete and open access to information provides the
greatest social benefit and best serves The American Dream.

asked about clipper, he suggested that key escrow was exactly the sort
of tool that the RaP would use, and that we would all benefit by
banning cryptography.

asked whether private citizens should be barred from insuring personal
electronic privacy, he replied that he felt that such measures would be
ineffective agianst the RaP.  (i concluded from these answers that 
cryptography is not brin's strong point.)

brin's message was basically a populist one.  he is concerned that the
moguls of data will have the opportunity to control what we see and
hear.  what i found most fascinating about his talk was that while i
generally agree with the social objectives he backs, i am in 180 degree
disagreement on how to accomplish these ends.

	peter

ps:  anybody else get the willies (as it were) reading paul goggin's
note about foia, where the asst atty genl was asked about fbi foias
against individuals, and replied that the new foia regs presumed
disclosure?  hey brin, there oughtta be a law!




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: peter honeyman <honey@citi.umich.edu>
Date: Wed, 6 Oct 93 21:25:34 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Start up costs and paying for speech...
Message-ID: <9310070421.AA06096@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> I wouldn't worry about either.  I don't see how enforcement of  
> copyright will be possible under crypto-anarchy any more than  
> taxation will be.  If one person pays for a posting, what's to keep  
> him from sharing it anonymously with whomever he wants?  Is there any  
> way that crypto-anarcy won't bring the death of "intellectual  
> property"?

well, i wouldn't equate reading with spending (if i may simplify).

i think the thing that mystifies me about off-line digicash is the
cryptographic protocol that constitutes spending.  other people are
asking about it, too.  it seems to be on everyone's mind.

so here, for the very first time on cpunx ;-) well maybe not
but who's counting is the protocol from chaum's crypto '88
paper "untraceable electronic cash":

   to pay bob one dollar, alice and bob proceed as follows:
   
   1.  alice sends C to bob
   2.  bob chooses a random binary string z sub 1, z sub 2, ... ,
       z sub {k over 2}
   3.  alice responds as follows forall 1 <= i <= {k over 2}
       a.  if s sub i = 1, then alice sends bob a sub i, c sub i,
           and y sub i.
       b.  if z sub i = 0, then alice sends bob x sub i, d sub i,
	   and a sub i xor ( u || (v + i)).
   4.  bob verifies that C is of the proper form and that alice's
       responses fit C.
   5.  bob later sends C and alice's responses to the bank, which
       verifies their correctness and credits his account.

not very illuminating so far ... let's go on.

   the bank must store C, the binary string z sub 1, z sub 2, ... ,
   z sub k and the values a sub i (for z sub i = 1)
   and a sub i xor (u || v) (for z sub i = 0).

gee, what is that "||" operator, anyway?  ah, concatenation.  ok.
going on ...

   if alice uses the same coin C twice, then she has a high
   probablility of being traced: with high probability, two
   different shopkeeprs will send complementary binary values
   for at least one bit z sub i for which B sub i was of the
   proper form.  the bank can easily search its records to
   ensure that C has not been used before.  If alice uses C
   twice, then, with high probability, the bank has both
   a sub i and a sub i xor (u || (v +i)) with high probability. 
   thus the bank can isolate u and trace the payment to alice's
   account.

hmmm.   hmmm.  well, this is very complicated.  with high probability,
i mean.  i'm going to have to study this paper.

	peter

ps:  what are the B sub i you ask?  don't ask.  oh golly, they are
blinded candidates, formed by alice and sent to the bank.  hmmm.
hmmmmmm sup k mod 1/p.

   




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Derek Atkins <warlord@MIT.EDU>
Date: Wed, 6 Oct 93 21:25:25 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: RSA examples required
Message-ID: <9310070420.AA25310@marinara>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Here is the response I sent to Peter Simons:

Well, your example that you sent isn't even correct!  Your example
said:

        p = 5    q = 7

        xy = 4*6+1 = 25         x=5
                                y=5

Well, you just chose some bad primes.  Here is a better example:

     p = 5   q = 11  N = pq = 55
     m = (p-1)(q-1) = 4*10 = 40

Now, we need to choose our public and private decryptors, E and d,
such that Ed = 1 mod (m):
     E = 3   d = 27

So, the Public Key (N, E) is (55, 3) and the Private (Secret)
Key (p, q, m, d) is (5, 11, 40, 27).  Now, to encrypt a message,
S, you take C = S^E mod N, and to decrypt you get S = C^d mod N.

So, say the message you want to send is, oh, "8" (for lack of a
better example off the top of my head).  So, you try to encrypt this
message, and you get:
     C = 8^3 mod 55 = 512 mod 55 = 17

You then send this message to the recipient, who then calculates
the message back:
     S = 17^27 mod 55 = 1667711322168688287513535727415473 mod 55 = 8

And you get the original message back.

-derek




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "L. Detweiler" <ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Date: Wed, 6 Oct 93 23:35:26 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: academician seeks critique of cryptographic paper
Message-ID: <9310070630.AA17189@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Maybe a cypherpunk will be interested in this.

BTW - Look at the disclaimer this guy has in his signature. The effect
of this ITAR nonsense is absolutely chilling. He says he has talked to
`the NSA & State Dept.' before he `publishes' to the INTERNET!

I have some other examples of how the Zimmermann-Ward affair is
chilling e.g. current book publishers.

Sorry, header lost in transit.

===cut=here===

To anyone with a technical interest in cryptography:

I am finishing the draft of a paper detailing a new mathematical
approach to cryptography and am looking for a few technical peer
reviewers who would be willing to critique the paper prior its to
publication via the Internet. 

A quick summary:

   - the revised paper will be published via the Internet and the
     mathematical basis, theory and concepts will be _freely_
     available to everyone and may be freely redistributed for non-
     commercial use (ie, non-resale).  (The paper is copyrighted
     and all rights are reserved)

          [see footnote regarding ITAR/export issues]

   - this approach to cryptography is strongly based on physical
     laws, particularly the laws of thermodynamics, to achieve its
     security (instead of the normal approach of relying on "hard"
     number-theoretic problems).  [I am a physicist be training,
     not a pure mathematician, hence the bias].  The technology to
     be presented is believed to provide a level of cryptographic
     security that is totally immune to cryptanalysis.

   - Summary of content
       :  mathematical and physical principles involved
       :  encryption methodology  (general approaches)
            :  substitution ciphers, transposition ciphers and
               superencipherment
       :  application to key management 
       :  application to secure Identification and Authorization
       :  application to data, fax, video and voice encryption

   - Sample software implementations, detailed algorithms and
     detailed technical information will be made freely available
     to U.S. and Canadian citizens as provided for by ITAR and U.S.
     State Department regulations  [see ITAR/export footnote]

   - the technology and sample implementations have been reviewed
     and evaluated by the National Security Agency, which found
     them to be cryptographically "robust".  

   - reviewers' comments and criticisms will be greatly appreciated
     and used to clarify and improve the presentation of the
     concepts and methodology.

Anyone who is interested to peer reviewing this paper should
contact me via e-mail at richardr@netcom.com .  In addition, if you
know someone who you feel would be an appropriate reviewer, please
either forward this message to them or, alternatively, send me
their e-mail address and I will contact them to see if they are
interested.  

If you are interested also reviewing the detailed algorithms,
technical data and sample programs, please include the following
information in your e-mail message to me:

     1.   Your citizenship (must be USA or Canadian) 
     2.   Your willingness to comply with relevant export laws.
     3.   Your willingness to comply with relevant usage terms 
          (ie, no commercial, resale use).
     4.   Your Internet e-mail address and the country in which
          your e-mail host resides.

Sorry for the inconvenience but this is necessary to avoid legal
hassles that I have neither the resources nor the inclination to
get involved with at this time.  This information is required
_only_ if you want a copy of the detailed technical information. 
The paper on the mathematical basis and principles is available to
anyone.



Richard Robertson          richardr@netcom.com

- ------------------------------------------------------------------

*****    ITAR/Export footnote  --  Editorial Disclaimer   ******

To avoid (or at least limit) the inevitable political discussion
about public domain / technical data / XIII(b) controls and whether
this should or should not be export controlled, please be advised
that I have spoken to the relevant entities in the State Department
Office of Defense Technology Control and the National Security
Agency and I am freely complying with their interpretation of what
can be published and how it can be published.  

I have _no_ intent to circumvent the established process and law by
publishing this paper and have received oral assurances from both
sources that I am complying with U.S. laws.  I am publishing only
general scientific and engineering principles and am acting in my
role as a private research scientist.  

While I admire and support the efforts of Phil Zimmermann, Ward
Grady, Viacrypt, EFF and others, I do not encourage anyone to
violate any laws and will not assist anyone to violate the law. 
However, I cannot assume any responsibility for the actions of
anyone over whom I have no direct authority or control.  Anyone who
disagrees with the official government interpretation of any law
must assume the consequences of his or her actions and be prepared
to defend them to the extent necessary.

****   End of footnote / Editorial disclaimer   *****




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Eli Brandt <ebrandt@jarthur.Claremont.EDU>
Date: Thu, 7 Oct 93 00:39:16 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Epistle Whit Speaks in Maryland
In-Reply-To: <9310070653.AA17668@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Message-ID: <9310070737.AA07408@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


A speaking epistle?  Is that like some kind of singing telegram or something?

   Eli




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Robert J. Woodhead" <trebor@foretune.co.jp>
Date: Wed, 6 Oct 93 08:40:14 PDT
To: trebor@foretune.co.jp
Subject: Re: Enough already!
In-Reply-To: <9310061433.AA12074@pmantis.berkeley.edu>
Message-ID: <9310061539.AA09997@dink.foretune.co.jp>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


nobody@pmantis.berkeley.edu writes:

>Maybe we SHOULD make people pay to post the list.

This is an excellent idea.  A modest suggestion: build a email-based
digital cash system; allot each reader a certain amount of cash
per month; charge a fee for posting.  We'd have to figure out a way
to give extra income to posters that other posters agree with, or
vice-versa, in a non-onerous way...

On a totally different topic, has anyone investigated using the
LSbit of CD sound tracks as the source of a 1-time pad?





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "L. Detweiler" <ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Date: Wed, 6 Oct 93 23:55:27 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Epistle Whit Speaks in Maryland
Message-ID: <9310070653.AA17668@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


What a guy.

``PGP has done a good deal for the practice of cryptology.  It's close
to my heart because it's close to my original objectives.''
--Whitfield Diffie, Sun Microsystems

Conference in Maryland? Maybe some of those NSA spooks will learn something :)

------- Forwarded Message

Date: Tue, 5 Oct 1993 21:20:10 -0400
From: farber@central.cis.upenn.edu (David Farber)
Subject: UMBC talk 10/20: Diffie on "Key Escrow, Privacy, and Good Business"
Precedence: list

                    Distinguished Lecture Series
                              sponsored by
 
                   The Department of Computer Science
                 The Department of Information Systems
          The Maryland Center for Telecommunications Research
 
                University of Maryland Baltimore County
 
 
 
                 KEY ESCROW, PRIVACY, AND GOOD BUSINESS
 
 
                            WHITFIELD DIFFIE
                            SUN MICROSYSTEMS
 

The U.S. Federal Government is pushing a plan to adopt a federal
standard cryptographic system whose workings are secret and which
enables the government to read messages whenever it considers this
necessary.

We will examine the implications not only for personal privacy, but for
the future of the American computer and communications industries in a
global economy in which no country is any longer big enough to dictate
the rules.

                                -- o --

Whitfield Diffie, who holds the position of Distinguished Engineer at
Sun Microsystems, is best known for his 1975 discovery of the concept of
public key cryptography, for which he was recently awarded a Doctorate
in Technical Sciences (Honoris Causa) by the Swiss Federal Institute of
Technology.

For a dozen years prior to assuming his present position in 1991, Diffie
was Manager of Secure Systems Research for Northern Telecom, functioning
as the center of expertise in advanced security technologies throughout
the corporation.  Among his achievements in this position was the design
of the key management architecture for NT's recently released PDSO
security system for X.25 packet networks.

Diffie received a Bachelor of Science degree in mathematics from the
Massachusetts Institute of Technology in 1965.  Prior to becoming
interested in cryptography, he worked on the development of the Mathlab
symbolic manipulation system --- sponsored jointly at Mitre and the MIT
Artificial Intelligence Laboratory --- and later on proof of correctness
of computer programs at Stanford University.  He is the recipient of the
IEEE Information Theory Society Best Paper Award for 1979 and the IEEE
Donald E. Fink award for 1981.
 
 
 
                   1:00pm Wednesday, October 20, 1993
                             Lecture Hall 5
               Engineering and Computer Science Building
                University of Maryland Baltimore County
                           Baltimore Maryland
 
            coffee and discussion  2:00pm-3:00pm in ECS 210I
 
   For additional information, contact Angie Silanskis, 410-455-3000.






------- End of Forwarded Message





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Huba J. Leidenfrost" <leide871@uidaho.edu>
Date: Thu, 7 Oct 93 01:19:18 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Help people help themselves
Message-ID: <Pine.3.02.9310070128.A13483-a100000@crow.csrv.uidaho.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Yikes!  So how does one unsubscribe to this list?  Not that I want to
unsubscribe, but from the number of people that post their subscribe and
unsubscribe messages directly to the listserver, I take it this is a
problem?  Or are they simply illiterate?

Could somone please email me or post the proper method to unsubscribe and
resubscribe?  Thanks.

-- 
   ---   O    | HUBA LEIDENFROST  
   --   <^-   | leide871@snake.cs.uidaho.edu 
  --  -\/\    | `No it's not an original--I stole it off the net!' 
  ---     \   | ADVICE AVAILABLE 
                                                       







From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "L. Detweiler" <ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Date: Thu, 7 Oct 93 00:45:27 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: on the cypherpunks mailing list & me
Message-ID: <9310070742.AA18491@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Note: please do not forward this. This is for cypherpunk readers only.

- list inundation & splitting
- an introspective note
- anonymous feedback

* * *

List moderator E.Hughes has repeatedly stated on the list that he is
not going to split it, although the exact reason is unclear (and I
don't think has ever been stated). A few weeks ago I posted a
suggestion of a possible list split in desperation of the piles of
incoming messages, hoping popular opinion would change his mind or
evince a proactive solution. I too was very saddened and frustrated by
the apparent attrition of list subscribers not because of lack of
interest but because of traffic.

I am under the impression that there is an extraordinary recent
interest in the `cause' from recent press reports, and that a 3x
increase in subscribers, say, would mean a 3x increase in traffic, to
which a split is a natural solution (like with newsgroups). But
apparently E.H. thinks that increasing flames are the fundamental
problem. I guess I'm a bit perplexed by this, because there have been
knee-deep flames ever since I started subscribing over a half year ago,
and I think they are a bit unavoidable, especially given the inherently
ornery and raucous nature of the crowd and the `cause'. Apparently he
didn't get any significant support for a split from my posting.

Anyway, the bottom line is that E.H. is vehemently opposed to
personally implementing any list split whatsoever, but is supportive of
anyone starting another.

I'd like to send out a CALL to anyone who has the capability and
commitment to create some new lists. Also, an alt.cypherpunk group
would be very easy to create, and certainly does not preclude anyone
from staying here. The newsgroup might be more appropriate to much of
the traffic on the list and might help relieve it of all the postings
E.H. considers extraneous. There are disadvantages (`the Sternlight
factor') but on the other hand we're all drowing in email. It really is
a pity all the fresh neophytes and enthusiastic souls that are
hemorraging or scared away from the `cypherpunks' because of too much
traffic that could be channelled better -- keeping everyone that's
interested `wired'. We have reached `critical mass' as far as press
coverage IMHO, and now is the time to act.

Finally, E.H. was a bit annoyed by my message calling for list split
suggestions, which gave his private mail box instead of the service
address cypherpunks-request@toad.com. My reasoning in posting his other
address was that I thought he didn't want the subscribe/unsubscribe
hotline cluttered with a lot of list split suggestions. I guess my only
consolation is that there weren't too many. So, my apology Mr. Hughes
for indirectly cluttering your mailbox with annoying stuff.

* * *

ahem, well, I tend to post a lot to the cypherpunk list out of sheer
enthusiasm, and tend to get a lot of flames publicly and in my mailbox
for dancing around especially controversial topics. But my mail tends
to be very contradictory in reaction to posts. In particular, its been
simultaneously encouraging and very excruciating lately, and
specifically I have gotten extraordinarily hostile mail from some
prominent cypherpunks I desperately wish to respect. They suggest that
my postings have gotten alarmingly out of hand, maybe even to the point
that it would be better if I stopped altogether, or even was *barred* from posting.

So, I'm rather teetering on a precipice right now in very serious ways
you can't imagine, and in the interest of better serving the group and
the cypherpunk cause, if you have strong feelings on the
appropriateness of various subjects that I post frequently on, please
send me some email. I'm enclosing various anonymous comments below to
help spur your own.

I guess of all the things I do regularly here, to me the most upsetting
reaction below is that my `L.D. cypherpunk awards', which I intend in
the best spirit to help recognize fellow cypherpunks for their
especially commendable efforts and contributions to the list, in what I
thought was a completely frivolous, harmless, and facetious way, are
considered poor or bad taste. I get quite a kick out of `handing them
out', and have gone to some trouble in at least one case to ask the
recipient beforehand, and thought that everyone thought they were good
clean fun,  but apparently not. If I have offended anyone in the past
for them, let me apologize right now.

One thing I have gone through a lot of trouble for a long time is to
forward relevant material. I think this is one of the best ways I have
served the group, and it takes a lot of time, attention, and poring
through other mailing lists. And in fact I think a major part of future
cyberspace will reward this kind of effort in directing raw information
more readily. Right now, its not only a thankless job, but one to get
flamed over. I've hinted about it before and got strong reaction that
even important Usenet postings are appreciated, esp. for some people
that don't have news access and also like it as a way of filtering the
noise. And I'm very hurt by strong comments below that complain about
this.

I think it strange when some people complain they have seen something
I've posted before. Am I a mindreader? Seeing something more than once
in cyberspace is something *everyone* has to deal with. Why am I the
scapegoat? The things I foward, mostly from obscure mailing lists, I
think are generally *not* found on various newsgroups prior to my
posting it. And I am always greatly both amused and annoyed when
someone reposts something that I was the first to post to the list.
OTOH, though, in light of all these comments, I have decreased my
forwarding activity to a large degree lately to some extent because of
this critical mail.

Another fairly common complaint in the comments is `acting bossy'. I
guess this ties in with the cypherpunk awards. I want to make it clear
that all my posts urging action are mere suggestions. I guess I
volunteer them in the spirit of sitting around a table, saying `what
can we do?' and throwing in my own shot. This is also a way of spurring
other people's comments. Also, I often make `calls to cypherpunks'--but
these are partly satirical. I'm nothing but another string of ASCII
characters. Whenever I get out of hand, though, please call me on it --
but quote the text. I guess some people might have gotten especially
annoyed when I went from `[x] gets my vote as cypherpunk of the week'
to `[x] gets an L.D. cypherpunk award.' I thought it was an innocuous
and natural progression but apparently not.

One respondent below really focused on my excitement as `causing
flames' or `inviting flames'. It seems to me the only thing that truly
`invites flames' is a direct personal insult, and I've stayed away from
that from my whole experience. If my postings are controversial, I
can't really be responsible for  hostile reactions. The whole essence
of cypherpunk ideology is controversial.  Part of the point of a
mailing list is to be provocative and get a discussion going, explore
all the points. And yes, it leads to a high profile. I don't feel
apologetic for any of this.

Not coincidentally, some of the hottest flame wars I've been involved
in have been over the most basic cypherpunk causes. Some time ago
someone, I forget who, suggested we abandon PGP for RSADSI software
because of the patent problem. You can imagine the flames that caused.
Another person suggested we change the name `cypherpunk' to something
less `subversive' like the Privacy Group or something equally bland. I
flamed searingly against both and stand by my positions proudly today.
(Curiously, these anomalous sentiments have not reappeared after the
blaring NYT article touting the *cypherpunks* or even after the recent
PGP subpoenas.) I'm also proud to have flamed people like Denning and
Bidzos long before it was fashionable. <g> (Seriously, though, there
was a time when saying that she had anything to do with the NSA would
be branded a `conspiracy theory'. Actually, that's what I flamed her for.)

Many posters object to my verbosity. Yes, I tend to be verbose,
especially when in an especially excited or analytical mood. But both
the English language use and average attention span has decayed
steadily over time, perhaps due to `television stupor' and `educational
passivity'. If anyone has seen old newspapers or classic writing, `big
sentences' are no big deal. I don't feel like apologizing for
exercising a large vocabulary or writing complex sentences.

Another bone of contention was my analytical postings, wherein I pick
apart an article. I don't think people realize how tricky this is.
Criticism is a very subtle and delicate art. In many ways it is more
difficult than simple writing itself. And I object to anyone asking for
less analysis on the list. This is where we get valuable `intellgence'
that *demands* analysis. IMHO, if anything, we need more of it -- we
already have plenty of Usenet-style one-liner replies. I think its a
pity not more people do this in a systematic way.

I have not actually always attached much significance to analysis since
being on the list.  I got the idea that systematic critiques were
really fascinating for list readersfrom one I read by someone, I forget
who, regarding the initial Newsweek article on Clipper. It pointed out
what a favorable article it was for the cypherpunk cause. After that, I
realized how energizing a cogent analysis can be and have been making a
habit of it ever since. I must admit the technique is dear to my heart.
Anyway, I've gotten both positive and negative feedback on my analyses.

Some people complain of my volume of postings. I generally give little
credence to comments along the lines ``you post too much.'' In a simple
way these sometimes amount to ``I'm drowning in email, and I've seen a
lot of your posts lately.'' (Well, I bang my head on my disk quota
everyday too.) Worse, though, some strike me as petty and meanspirited
-- seeming to me to amount to only slightly less rude euphemisms for
``sit down and shut up'' or ``get lost, jerk''. Unless you can point to
particular postings that you think were not relevant, please don't
complain to me. I simply don't have any idea how to adjust unless you are specific.

Interestingly, some of these comments also seem to amount to the
strangely paradoxical sentiment `your posts take too long to read'. I
think I have gone to great trouble to index and organize my comments to
the list for convenient reading. No one is forcing anybody to read them
and it takes about one second to hit the delete button. I think this is
a no-win situation for me too -- someone tells me to break up all my
multi-subject letters into separate posts, but, leaning in that
direction, I get flamed for posting too much. <sigh>

For me the most disheartening and alienating comment of all below was
that there is `no cypherpunk cause' and that my delusions in thinking
so are the root of not only all the list problems but personal ones!
Perhaps I've seriously misjudged the intended purpose of the list. For
me, though, the beauty of the cypherpunks mailing list (which I thought
was highly representative of `the' cause, or a least `a' cause) is that
anyone anywhere, not necessarily at just the physical meetings in
California, can feel like they are plugged in to a sort of club of
associates -- a sort of `virtual community' -- and make positive
contributions, meet people, yack, and keep in touch with the premier
issues of our day. But maybe I've just made a grave, embarrassing
mistake in taking it all too seriously.

* * *

<shew> all this has been rather difficult for me to bang out on the
keyboard. (I've noticed that the most emotional and draining prose has
a high occurence of the words `I' and `you'.) I hope no one will flame
me for this post. I think every 1000 or so I'm entitled to a little
public introspection (<g>), to reflect back and try to figure out what
was the most helpful to everyone out there. 

In particular, if you wish to make comments to me or anyone else
posting to the list, I urge you to quote sections of the text that you
think are inappropriate or offensive or whatever. Unfortunately
virtually all the critical comments I have ever gotten never do this,
and its exceedingly difficult to make adjustments when the feedback is
vague.  I generally ignore comments along the lines of `there is a
reason people are flaming you,' chalking it up to my e-personality,
without quoting relevant material. I simply won't apologize for
excitement or enthusiasm for the cypherpunk cause, and am rather hurt
by people who tell me I should.

One thing for sure: I don't think anyone is getting very much positive
feedback for their posts here. I have always sent out a lot of private
email in this vein when I see things I like, but nobody is receiving
any significant amount of it, from what I can figure out. I am lucky to
receive one email response every ten messages. In fact, this is one
reason I was fiddling with the `cypherpunk awards' -- to fill a vacuum
of positive reinforcement.

Please, don't just email to flame. Email when you have read something
you really appreciated or would like to see more of. *especially* say
something when you forward material elsewhere, this is the sincerest
form of flattery. This the absolute best method, IMHO, to improve
signal-to-noise and even E.H. agrees. Consider that positive feedback
is in many ways the only `payment' for sometimes much time invested.
Sort of like T.C. May's signature: ``I put time and money into my
posts, I hope you appreciate them.''

Anyway, here's some feedback I've received. I think this is a
comprehensive and representative selection. Hopefully this exercise
will let you help me and anyone posting to the list in determining what
is acceptable and interesting. I'm quoting it all anonymously of
course, in classic cypherpunk spirit <g>.  There are 5 people
represented here,  2 of them supportive, both rather terse, and 3 of
them hostile, all rather verbose and redundant. (At times I wonder if 2
of the 3 are members of a secret L.D. Hate Society, but that's just my
characteristic paranoia <g>. Actually, I have other excellent reasons
to be paranoid.)

Truthfully, I have been propelled in cypherpunk list posting in the
hope that people's sentiments at large are not represented accurately
by my mail, which can be quite ego-shattering at times, and I'm writing
this message with quite a bit of edgy desperation and anxiety. If in
response to all this I get a lot of complaints along the same `3' lines
I guess I'll have to seriously consider unsubscribing in the best
interests of the group. <snif>


===cut=here===


A:
>Let me be blunt.  I consider that there are three specific people
>which are responsible for any deteriorating quality of the list.  You
>are number one on that list, more than the other two combined.
>
>Many list processing packages allow the maintainer to block certain
>individuals from posting, or at least pre-approve all of their posts.
>
>Do you get the hint?
>
>I would suggest you go find out what censorship is.  If you are denied
>access to this mailing list, that is not censorship.


B:
>I won't respond to any more of your paranoid rants, your
>florid hyperbole, your announcements of "Detweiler Awards," or your
>"you really disappoint me" nonsense.
>
>You take this stuff entirely too personally and are much too quick to
>judge the motivations of others.
>
>Too tiresome for me.


C:
>I believe that you personally are responsible,
>directly and in responses, for much of the noise on this list.
>
>There is no cypherpunks cause.  Neither is there a cypherpunks
>movement.  Get these delusions out of your head.  There is, however,
>cypherpunks software.
>
>I repeat, the cause and movement are in your own head.


D:
>BTW: despite any flammage you may receive from the Metzgerly, I'd like
>to express some degree of thanks for the effort you've put into your
>analyses of the various issues at hand.  Not to say I agree with them
>all, but for the most part they seem sound, and in any case it's nice to
>see someone giving the matters a lot of hard thought.  


E:
>It is my opinion that the list would be a better if you put less time
>and energy into it.
>I would rather have you learn self-restraint and quality thought and
>writing than to prevent you from posting.


F:
>I guess -- coming back to your postings -- that I'd be more comfortable if
>you were to quietly compose and send a letter to your congresscritters
>proposing a correction to ITAR rather than post your theories and anger and
>fears to the safe cypherpunks audience.


G:
>1.  No awards.  If you wish to congratulate someone, do so privately.
>If you wish to denigrate someone, do so privately.
>
>2.  No news analysis.  Your detailed examinations are uninformed
>(witness the Orange Book) and condescending.  A text speaks for
>itself.  If something puzzles you, ask, don't tell.
>
>3.  No ranting.  Your ranting creates other ranting.  I cannot offer a
>specific criterion to determine ranting, but I can tell you that about
>three-fourths of your stuff is rant.
>
>4.  Check your facts.  Use a library.  If you don't know what
>something is, do not invent an identity for it.  If you don't
>understand something, it is wiser to ask a question than to create a
>paranoid explanation.
>
>5.  One topic per post.  There are a number of people who read the
>list traffic with newsreaders; it is mere civility to have one thread
>per Subject: line.
>
>6.  Do not reply to Perry Metzger in public.  This should be a
>redundant instruction, but unfortunately I feel the need to emphasize
>this particular interaction.
>
>7.  Listen to other people's opinion of you.  A single interpersonal
>conflict is indeterminable, but when several people have the same
>complaints, it is time to start listening.
>
>8.  Remain technical.  cypherpunks is a technical list informed by
>politics, not a political list informed by technicalities.  Learn the
>difference.  Technology is primary, politics is secondary.


H:
>From my reading of your posts, you sound:
>
>1.      really worked up
>2.      somewhat bossy (telling cypherpunks what they should do)
>3.      quite verbose
>
>Meanwhile, I observe the reactions you're getting -- and it's clearly a
>flame war starting.
>
>My assumption is that people are reacting to your non-verbal message (the 3
>points above) more than to your verbal one.
>
>As for being bossy -- read your own posts.  They are sometimes arrogant.
>You sometimes sound like you have analyzed the situation and know what is
>to be done and you're sharing your wisdom with the list.
>
>As I said, it comes across as if you're excited.  I appreciate that.  I'm
>excited too.  Now that we've conveyed that information, there's no other
>use for what you're writing in such high volume.  I grant its theraputic
>effect *for you*, perhaps, but it does nothing for me.


I:
>I am writing to suggest that there is valid reason for people to complain
>about your posts and to hope that you step back and consider that
>possibility.  I don't like seeing you invite such attacks.


J:
>It's the [...] journalist e-mailing you. Thanks for posting your
>response to the Westworld story. I'm much too busy ( [...] ) 
>to concentrate on encryption and digital cash
>features, but one day I will get around to it. And when I do, I'll be
>calling you and other cypherpunks for help.


K:
>I don't want to write you off...so instead, I
>sent you a message.  I don't think you're flame-baiting the way he was
>but rather by adding volume without new content (without information, in the
>communications theory sense) and by showing your agitation without doing
>anything about it, you have clearly invited flames.


L:
>I'm concerned, too.  However, a "go out and do this" message to cypherpunks
>comes across as:
>
>1.      preaching to the choir (therefore a waste of bandwidth)
>2.      officious (acting as if you were in charge when you're not)
>
>Both of these are cause for offense -- not "unnerving", just offensive and
>therefore an invitation for flaming.


M:
>Those sentences sound like they're coming from a wounded person who is
>trying to get back at an attacker rather than from a calm adult who is
>cooperating in the stated goals of cypherpunks.  In other words, it sounds
>like you're hooked into a flame war -- and that, alone, sounds paranoid.
>It has nothing to do with the NSA.


N:
>I know the situation.  So does everyone else on the list.  We don't need
>reposts from newsgroups.  We don't need lectures.  We're as worried ad you
>and some people on the list are actually doing things to fight this battle.
>Your posts don't appear to contribute to this effort.  They might make you
>feel better -- make it feel like you're doing something -- but it's the
>wrong audience and the wrong words.  The result is personal flames.


O:
>I value your work in sci.crypt and hate to see you maligned.  I especially
>hate to see you invite it.  Lately in cypherpunks, it looks like you're
>inviting it.


P:
>I read everything you send -- or
>start to read it -- but when I find a re-post of something I've read on a
>newsgroup, I get pissed.  My mailbox is gaining about 200 messages a day,
>not counting real work messages.  My time is too valuable to waste in
>re-reading something (often for the 5th time).


Q:
>I'm favorably disposed
>toward you but I am telling you that your flood of information -- both
>reposts and rehashes of your opinion at great length but offering nothing
>I haven't already thought of -- have led me to delete your messages with
>my own frustration -- over wasted reading time, discovering that I've
>seen this before and nothign of value has been added.  That takes time.





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "L. Detweiler" <ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Date: Thu, 7 Oct 93 01:15:27 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: writing & copyrights in cyberspace
In-Reply-To: <9310061906.AA28917@pawpaw.mitre.org>
Message-ID: <9310070812.AA19016@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Joe Thomas <jthomas@pawpaw.mitre.org>

>I don't see how enforcement of  
>copyright will be possible under crypto-anarchy any more than  
>taxation will be.  If one person pays for a posting, what's to keep  
>him from sharing it anonymously with whomever he wants?  Is there any  
>way that crypto-anarcy won't bring the death of "intellectual  
>property"?

This subject has interested me for a long time and I've posted on it to
the list a long time ago. There was a recent article by someone in CUD
(I forget who) that closely reflects my own thinking. Since this is
kind of a borderline relevant list topic, I won't include it here, I'll
just give the reference:

>Computer underground Digest    Wed  Sep 29 1993   Volume 5 : Issue 76
>                           ISSN  1004-042X
>
>File 2--the Cyberspatial Copyright

The author talks about using digital cash and a sort of shareware
system, and also makes reference to the idea of hypertext links that
charge tolls when traversed, all based on the idea of digital cash.

There are numerous CUD FTP sites, but see e.g.

ftp.eff.org:/pub/cud/cud/cud5.76.z

note: if you retrieve the file without the .z suffix the system will
automatically decompress on the fly.

Also, this is not the first time I've seen a reference to the Xanadu
system. It must be pretty influential but I haven't gotten around to
reading about it yet. Anyway, precise reference:

AUTHOR(s):       Nelson, Theodor Holm.
TITLE(s):        Literary machines :  the report on, and of, Project Xanadu
                   concerning word processing, electronic publishing,
                   hypertext, thinkertoys, tomorrow's intellectual revolution,
                   and certain other topics including knowledge, education and
                   freedom /  Theodor Holm Nelson.
                 Ed. 87.1.

                 Swarthmore, Pa. :  Theodor H. Nelson,  1987.
                 1 v. (various pagings) :  ill. ;  22 cm.
                 Includes bibliographical references.

OTHER ENTRIES:   Word processing (Office practice)
                 Microcomputers  Programming.
                 Electronic publishing.
                 Self-publishing  Data processing.
                 Project Xanadu.

Finally, I have a lot of collections of postings from mailing lists on
the subject, e.g. related to an article in Wired by M. Chrichton ``The
Death of the Media'', but will not dig them out without a sufficient incentive <g>




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Date: Thu, 7 Oct 93 02:15:28 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: HACKERS: Crypto Session Being Planned
Message-ID: <9310070915.AA07202@netcom5.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


The Hackers Conference is coming up in early November at Lake Tahoe.
Many of you will be attending.

I've agreed to put together a session on "Crypto" for Saturday
afternoon, for a 90 minute period, in the main room. Pretty much like
last year. Every year the crypto theme grows stronger, and the events
of the past year should make crypto a really hot topic at this year's
conference. 

There are lots of things we could focus on: the Clipper/Skipjack
controversy, PGP (Zimmermann may be there...I'm not sure), the general
Cypherpunks agenda, and so on.

I'd like to hear any ideas you folks may have, whether or not you'll
be attending. And also any volunteers to talk (briefly!) or be on a
panel discussion, depending on what structure we follow.

Since there are so many folks on this list who'll be at Hackers, it'd
be nice to get some fresh faces and hear about some new and exciting
work. However, the audience will probably want to hear about the
PGP-Zimmermann case (best in its own session, or a "BOF" session,
IMHO), the Clipper and key escrow situation, and new legal issues.

Perhaps we can split the session into two parts. First, several
short (4-6 minute) speeches/talks on subjects, then a panel discussion
and questions from the audience. 

Alternatively, make the whole thing a panel discussion with about 6-8 panelists
and really try to hit a wide range of topics, with lots of audience
participation. 

I think it best that we not let politics dominate, as most Hackers
attendees share much the same disdain we have for certain government
actions, and a political focus usually turns into a gripe session,
besides not being very "hackerish." Also, political and legal issues
surrounding crypto and cyberspace will likely surface in other
sessions, as they did last year when Mike Godwin gave a Friday talk on
EFF sorts of legal issues, and then key registration and hacker
crackdowns got discussed in the usual marathon Sunday gripe session.

(This does not mean we should concentrate on PERL scripts and MIME
agents, as I'm sure few in the audience would be interested. A
delicate balance is needed, to keep the discussion interesting and
informative.)

I will *not* speak myself, but will instead *ruthlessly* moderate and
control the time schedule....it is far too easy for discussion of
remailer software or key escrow issues, for example, to soak up all
available time.  I'll also try to head off the questions about "the
basics," the things that clearly can't be covered in the time
available.

Last year's speakers can certainly speak again this year, but it may
be better to pump in some fresh blood if possible. (If one of the
talks is a recap of the first year of Cypherpunks, which I think would
make a nice segment, then Eric Hughes would be the natural speaker,
even though he spoke last year. We can work out something.)

If you know someone who is going to Hackers, who is not on
Cypherpunks, but who is doing something interesting in crypto, pass
this message on. (And if you are reading this message because someone
forwarded it to you for this reason, please get in touch with me if
you're interested in participating.)

Send in your suggestions, either to me personally or (gulp) to the
overall list, but only if you think others would benefit.

I have some ideas myself about the themes and topics, but it's best
that I say no more for now.

Thanks for your help!

-Tim May


-- 
..........................................................................
Timothy C. May         | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,  
tcmay@netcom.com       | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
408-688-5409           | knowledge, reputations, information markets, 
W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA  | black markets, collapse of governments.
Higher Power: 2^756839 | Public Key: PGP and MailSafe available.
Note: I put time and money into writing this posting. I hope you enjoy it.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: catalyst@netcom.com (Scott Collins)
Date: Thu, 7 Oct 93 03:49:19 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: on the cypherpunks mailing list & me
Message-ID: <9310071045.AA29465@newton.apple.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Though I am loathe to add social commentary, I am responding on the list to
"L. Detweiler's" missive, rather than in private mail, because I don't
think any one person is the problem (in fact, I think every one person is
the problem).

 -- the caveat of individualism --
The battle for privacy is an inherently _personal_ one.  Individuals seek
it.  Communities seek to withhold it.  On one side is a cooperating
organism with psychological machinery sharpened by a millenia of evolution:
machinery that keeps the organism together -- and forces it to attack those
qualities of individuals not conducive to its own survival.  On the other
side is a loose collection of individuals whose 'unifying' quality is that,
for one reason or another, they desire to keep their privacy.

Individuals will always find it difficult to 'hang together', particularly
for the purpose of 'hanging apart'.  We have graduated from citizenship to
adulthood.  Instinct no longer suffices for cooperation; it now requires
volition.  We who seek the reigns, it turns out, must also wear the yoke.

 -- to "L. Detweiler" --
Don't leave the list.  Without doubt, you are a voluminous poster.  It
heartens me to see such effort, even while it pains me to wade through it. 
You provide insight, perspective, and data.  However, you could make your
input incalculably more valuable by honing some of your posts.  There are
ideas that _need_ many words to express, others only _want_ many words. 
Compression takes energy.  Succinct writing is difficult; but worthwile. 
In my humble opinion, the only person on this list who has _never_ used
more words than required is Eric Hughes.  (In fact, the very post you are
reading embarasses me with its length, considering its moral).

 -- my perfect world --
Long ago I read a story about a utopian society.  So long ago, in fact,
that all the details have faded save this -- central to their society was
their law, comprising but two directives:

        1. Don't annoy other people too much.
        2. Don't be too easily annoyed.

It may sound obsequious, but (when I remember) I try to live by these rules.

 -- summary --
Because, energy is lost in transmission, it is practical to treat others
with _more_ consideration than you would be willing to accept from them.  A
mailing list is not a conversation.  Posters owe readers the respect of
polished expression.  Readers owe posters respect for effort expended, but
note that it is harder to post something cogent and succint than it is to
type in a page of thoughts and press 'send'.  You could sift a ton of coal
dust by hand and not find the diamond that it could have become, were it
squeezed down to its essence.


Scott Collins         | "Few people realize what tremendous power there
                      |  is in one of these things."     -- Willy Wonka
......................|................................................
BUSINESS.   voice:408.862.0540  fax:974.6094   collins@newton.apple.com
Apple Computer, Inc.   5 Infinite Loop, MS 305-2B   Cupertino, CA 95014
.......................................................................
PERSONAL.   voice/fax:408.257.1746    1024:669687   catalyst@netcom.com





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: msattler@netcom.com (Michael Sattler)
Date: Thu, 7 Oct 93 07:45:30 PDT
To: Mike Godwin <mnemonic@eff.org>
Subject: Re: PGP in Fidonet
Message-ID: <9310071441.AA03954@netcom.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


At  2:46 PM 93/10/06 -0400, Mike Godwin wrote:

>As for programmer jokes, did you hear about the programmer who could never
>get out of the shower?

No, I hate to admit.  How does it go?


-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
Michael S. Sattler         msattler@netcom.com        +1 (415) 358-3058
Digital Jungle Software    Encrypt now; ask me how.   (finger for PGP key)

      Evil will certainly triumph if good people do nothing at all.






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: msattler@netcom.com (Michael Sattler)
Date: Thu, 7 Oct 93 07:45:40 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Mea Culpa - Don't "devalue" my postings :-(
Message-ID: <9310071442.AA03981@netcom.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>> The real question is, what attorney jokes do *you* know?  Do you tell
>> programmer jokes?
>
>        Why did you post this to the list?

Argh!  I'm using a new mailer that copies *everyone* to the reply field,
which I've noticed only after investigating (prompted by someone's gentle
query).

I'm sending this apology to the list because I'm sensitive to preserving a
high signal-to-noise ration, and I understand that my exchange of attorney
and programmer's jokes with Mike @ EFF should be private mail.  I'll me
more mindful in the future.  Sorry.

Now let me try and make this message add something.  I love the idea of
implementing a digicash system monitored by the list server even though we
haven't finished discussing whether it's play money, or how to charge
exactly.  Getting it up and running and generating usage statistics so we
can see the flow of digicash.

Again, I aplogize for having my private email replies leak onto the list.


-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
Michael S. Sattler         msattler@netcom.com        +1 (415) 358-3058
Digital Jungle Software    Encrypt now; ask me how.   (finger for PGP key)

      Evil will certainly triumph if good people do nothing at all.






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: James Still <still@kailua.colorado.edu>
Date: Thu, 7 Oct 93 07:30:40 PDT
To: 'Cypherpunks List' <cypherpunks@toad.com>
Subject: RE: PGP removal
Message-ID: <2CB43647@kailua.colorado.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



>I first got pgp2.2 from compuserve ibmsys forum downloads.
>A few day ago the file finder on cis listed PGP2.3. When I actually looked
>neither program was there. Sysop says the were removed on advice of his
>lawyer(not compuserve management ) because of government crakdown.
>and questios of legality.  The not so subtle hand of intimidation by
>rumor seems to be at work here. Just thought this would be of interest.

Several months ago I uploaded a program I wrote called PGPShell (which is
a DOS front-end for PGP) to Compu$erve's IBMSYS forum.  For most people in
Russia who do not have FTP access or reliable links to the West, CS is their
only way of obtaining PGP or related utilities.

Even though it performs no encryption on its own, PGPShell was soon deleted
from the IBMSYS forum.  I assumed it a mistake, and uploaded it a second 
time.
Same thing.  It has been three times now, and I'm certain that it has been
deleted again; my only hope is that during those brief periods when it was
there, my new-found friends in Russia had a chance to snatch it.

Ironically, while Yeltsin dissolves free speech and authoritarianism returns 

to Russia, Compu$erve has been further trivializing its already 
"top-40"-esque,
politically-correct venture.

+------------------------------------------------------------------+
 The novelist Philip Roth says that there are only 60,000 serious  |
 readers in the U.S., and every 20 years that number is halved...  |
                                              |
              ------------------ still@kailua.colorado.edu --+









From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: peter honeyman <honey@citi.umich.edu>
Date: Thu, 7 Oct 93 06:15:29 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Start up costs and paying for speech...
Message-ID: <9310071315.AA11604@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>        a.  if s sub i = 1, then alice sends bob a sub i, c sub i,
>            and y sub i.

i put that typo in to see if you were paying attention.  it's
z sub i, not s sub i.  there, it's all clear, now, right?

	peter




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: crunch@netcom.com (John Draper)
Date: Thu, 7 Oct 93 09:49:20 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Hackers Conf discussions
Message-ID: <9310071647.AA14631@netcom3.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Re: Hackers Conf,  Tim says..

>I'd like to hear any ideas you folks may have, whether or not you'll
>be attending. And also any volunteers to talk (briefly!) or be on a
>panel discussion, depending on what structure we follow.

Yes!!   I would like to participate in this discussion,  as I am now
in position where I have ability to communicate with thousands of young
ravers and PGP wannabes and soon I'm going to want to communicate with
these folks on several issues:

   ** Getting LOTS of people to use PGP
   
   ** Voter registration and political actions such as letter writing
      to local representitives,  etc.
   
   ** Other actions where large masses of people can make SOME influence
      on our officials.
   




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: hughes@ah.com (Eric Hughes)
Date: Thu, 7 Oct 93 09:55:42 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: ADMIN: required knowledge--how to get removed from the list
In-Reply-To: <Pine.3.02.9310070128.A13483-a100000@crow.csrv.uidaho.edu>
Message-ID: <9310071652.AA01271@ah.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I have a form letter, included below, which I send to people who ask
the list at large to be removed.

Unfortunately, I suspect that many of the people who wish to be
removed have already stopped reading the list, so that messages which
explain how to get removed are not read.

Eric
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
The cypherpunks list is for discussions on implementing cryptography.
To mail to the whole list, send mail to

	cypherpunks@toad.com

Every mail message sent to this address will be forwarded to everyone
on the list.  Make sure that the message you wish to send is
appropriate for such a broad delivery.


If you want to be added or removed from the cypherpunks list, or have
any other questions which pertain to list management, send mail to

	cypherpunks-request@toad.com

I don't manage the list from my regular account, so such mail which
ends up in my ah.com account will just get you another copy of this
file.

Eric Hughes 
   maintainer of the lists cypherpunks@toad.com and
   cypherpunks-announce@toad.com






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: hughes@ah.com (Eric Hughes)
Date: Thu, 7 Oct 93 10:35:32 PDT
To: cypherpunks-announce@toad.com
Subject: Monthly Bay Area cypherpunks meeting
Message-ID: <9310071728.AA01313@ah.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



ANNOUNCEMENT
============

What: October monthly cypherpunks meeting
When: Saturday, October 10, 1993
      12:00 noon - 6:00 p.m.
Where: Cygnus Support offices, Mountain View, California
       (directions below)

The Bay Area cypherpunks meeting is the second Saturday of the month,
every month, at the Cygnus Support offices.  All are welcome and
encouraged to attend.


Agenda
------

Here's what I know about for Saturday's meeting:

-- Norm Hardy on Harvest
-- Arthur Abraham on the DES cracking machine
-- a presentation either on electronic voting or copyright (TBA)
-- a report on the Austin-EFF cryptography conference
-- the usual reports from the attendees


Directions
----------

[Directions to Cygnus provided by John Gilmore. -- EH]

	Cygnus Support
	1937 Landings Drive
	Mt. View, CA  94043
	+1 415 903 1400   switchboard
	+1 415 903 1418   John Gilmore

Take US 101 toward Mt. View.  From San Francisco, it's about a
40-minute drive.  Get off at the Rengstorff Ave/Amphitheatre Parkway
exit.  If you were heading south on 101, you curve around to the
right, cross over the freeway, and get to a stoplight.  If you were
heading north on 101, you just come right off the exit to the
stoplight.  The light is the intersection of Amphitheatre and
Charleston Rd.  Take a right on Charleston; there's a right-turn-only
lane.

Follow Charleston for a short distance.  You'll pass the
Metaphor/Kaleida buildings on the right.  At a clump of palm trees and
a "Landmark Deli" sign, take a right into Landings Drive.  At the end
of the road, turn left into the complex with the big concrete
"Landmark" sign.  Follow the road past the deli til you are in front
of the clock tower that rises out of one of the buildings, facing you.
Enter through the doors immediately under the clock tower.  They'll be
open between noon and 1PM at least.  (See below if you're late.)

Once inside, take the stairs up, immediately to your right.  At the top
of the stairs, turn right past the treetops, and we'll be in 1937 on 
your left.  The door is marked "Cygnus".

If you are late and the door under the clock tower is locked, you can
walk to the deli (which will be around the building on your left, as
you face the door).  Go through the gate in the fence to the right of
the deli, and into the back lawns between the complex and the farm
behind it.  Walk forward and right around the buildings until you see
a satellite dish in the lawn.  Go up the stairs next to the dish,
which are the back stairs into the Cygnus office space.  We'll prop
the door (or you can bang on it if we forget).

Or, you can find the guard who's wandering around the complex, who
knows there's a meeting happening and will let you in.  They can be
beeped at 965 5250, though you'll have trouble finding a phone.

Don't forget to eat first, or bring food at noon!  I recommend hitting
the burrito place on Rengstorff (La Costen~a) at about 11:45.  To get
there, when you get off 101, take Rengstorff (toward the hills) rather
than Amphitheatre (toward the bay).  Follow it about ten blocks until
the major intersection at Middlefield Road.  La Costen~a is the store
on your left at the corner.  You can turn left into the narrow lane
behind the store, which leads to a parking lot, and enter by the front
door, which faces the intersection.  To get to the meeting from there,
just retrace your route on Rengstorff, go straight over the freeway,
and turn right at the stoplight onto Charleston; see above.

See you there!

	John Gilmore







From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Date: Thu, 7 Oct 93 10:50:32 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: HACKERS: Crypto Session Being Planned
In-Reply-To: <m0okugE-00021HC@khijol>
Message-ID: <9310071749.AA11356@netcom5.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Whoops!

I've already gotten half a dozen messages similar to this one:


> > The Hackers Conference is coming up in early November at Lake Tahoe.
> > Many of you will be attending.
> 
> Can you send more info about this?  First time I've heard of it...thanks!

Let me clarify something: the Hackers Conference is an invitational
event, for better or for worse. The best way to get an invitation is
to do something "hackerish" that gets you noticed. I don't necessarily
mean hackerish in the breaking-and-entering vein, either.

The Hackers Conference began in 1984, sponsored initially by Steward
Brand and others, and presumably based partly on the Steven Levy book
"Hackers: Heroes of the Computer Revolution." (Levy has attended in
some years, and you may also recall he wrote the excellent "Wired"
article on crypto and "Crypto Rebels"--us.) For the first several
years it was in a rustic jewish boy's camp in the Santa Cruz
Mountains, above Saratoga, where we slept (if we slept...) 10 to a
room in either unheated or overheated cabins. In 1990 it moved to
luxurious digs at the Granlibakken Lodge at Lake Tahoe, where we get
ski lodge-type rooms (it's before skiing season starts, though, but
this also holds the cost down somewhat).

The Conference lasts for about 48 hours, from Friday afternoon to
Sunday afternoon, and many people stay up the entire time. Lots of
interesting people, guest speakers, all-night hacking sessions,
machine room demos, "work in progress," etc.

At the 1987 Conference, John Walker of Autodesk met Ted Nelson, Roger
Gregory, and others and the funding of Xanadu and AMIX commenced.
Many interesting business contacts have been made at Hackers,
especially in areas of VR and multimedia.

"Prose hackers" also show up. Vernor Vinge has attended, as has Marc
Stiegler. Jerry Pournelle is a regular. Too many people to mention.
(BTW, Vernor was very interested in the public key crypto implications
when he attended in 1989...I wonder if the P-K references in his
Hugo-winning novel "A Fire Upon the Deep" were affected by our
discussions?)

My first Hackers was in 1988, shortly after the "Crypto '88"
conference, where I described my "crypto anarchy" ideas to some
folks....probably this is partly why I got invited that year. I gave a
talk on public key crypto, along with John Gilmore, at the 1990
session. The next year Eric Hughes (whom I had just met a few months
earlier) talked about digital money and the Chaum stuff. And last year
I was asked to lead a main session on crypto (I was slightly infamous
at the time for having written the "A Trial Balloon to Ban
Encryption?" piece in sci.crypt, which alerted many readers to the
"key escrow" ideas of Dorothy Denning, which presaged the "Clipper"
proposal six months later).

At that session we had several speakers, including Stu Haber on
digital time-stamping, Eric Hughes on digital money, John Gilmore on
EFF and FOIA-type activites, and so on.

The EFF activities are always a big deal at Hackers, what with Mitch
Kapor often attending and so forth. Mike Godwin is our "legal hacker,"
so to speak (aren't all lawyers hacks?), and he'll be at this year's
Hackers. 

Well, that's enough of a summary.

The best way to get invited is to do something that brings you to the
attention of the attendees, as every year they ask us to make
nominations. 

Yes, there are many of you out there who are better hackers than many
of us who (somehow) got on the invite list. That's life, I guess.
Don't take it too seriously.

--Tim



-- 
..........................................................................
Timothy C. May         | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,  
tcmay@netcom.com       | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
408-688-5409           | knowledge, reputations, information markets, 
W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA  | black markets, collapse of governments.
Higher Power: 2^756839 | Public Key: PGP and MailSafe available.
Note: I put time and money into writing this posting. I hope you enjoy it.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: jrk@sys.uea.ac.uk (Richard Kennaway)
Date: Thu, 7 Oct 93 02:49:19 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: MacPGP 2.3 sources
Message-ID: <14687.9310070951@s5.sys.uea.ac.uk>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


According to the ftp log, 10 people have so far obtained copies of the
MacPGP 2.3 source that I offered.  Unfortunately, a local problem
unconnected with ftp brought all processes on my machine to a halt at the
weekend, and no further sessions were possible until I cleared the fault
this morning.

Connected with the fault, if anyone knows of the domain name or whereabouts
of the machine with IP number 179.135.226.153, I would be most interested
in contacting its manager.

I'm back from my travels a day earlier than I expected, but I'll leave the
PGP stuff available until I said I would, i.e. 8:00 GMT Friday 8.

--                                  ____
Richard Kennaway                  __\_ /    School of Information Systems
Internet:  jrk@sys.uea.ac.uk      \  X/     University of East Anglia
uucp:  ...mcsun!ukc!uea-sys!jrk    \/       Norwich NR4 7TJ, U.K.





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: owen@autodesk.com (D. Owen Rowley)
Date: Thu, 7 Oct 93 11:39:20 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Standard Headers for Anonymous Remailers
Message-ID: <9310071839.AA11794@lux.YP.acad>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



 > From: pierre@shell.portal.com (Pierre Uszynski)
 > > From: Karl Lui Barrus <klbarrus@owlnet.rice.edu>
 > > The attitude expressed by the individual on io.com shows a problem we
 > > will have in educating others - "anonymous posts CAN destroy a civil
 > > conversation".  Yes, maybe so, but in my experience on mailing lists,
 > > bbses, etc. I've noticed that "flame wars" and "anonymous posts" have
 > > NO correlation, and are quite independent of one another.  
 
 > > Since I've seen "flame wars" on systems with absolutely no anonymous
 > > posting facilities (or none that were used), I conclude that civil
 > > conversation is destroyed by strongly held differences in opinions (or
 > > some other factor I can't pin down).
 
 > I'll second that. The main menaces against "civil conversations" have been,
 > on Netnews, flame wars and wars between two individuals.

There is another level of *menace* which I suppose many of you are unaware.
The queer newsgroups of usenet, have been experiencing waves of 
net-terrorism for the last couple of years. I don't mean the usual
mean-spirited or dogma-driven type of uninformed posting that 
echoes the stereotypical stuff we are used to dealing with in 
daily life. Nor do I mean the occasional 
*ALL FAGS SHOULD DIE POSTED IN ALL CAPS FROM SOMEONES ACCT THAT THEY 
LEFT LOGGED IN ON A PUBLIC TERMINAL AT AN INSTITUTION OF -ahem- 
HIGHER LEARNING*

I mean people who exploit insecure sites and networking skill to forge
mail and articles as part of a concerted and ongoing campaign of
harrasement.
Stuff that has resulted in very serious consequences.

Theres no need to go into detail here about the array of tactics and
the widening scope of the phenomenon, but I think it needs to be looked
at as an example of how and why systems are abused.

If anti-social immaturity can easily find shelter for puerile behavior,
then any socipathic agenda or ruthless competitor can do likewise.


 > the flamers and the opponents are clearly
 > identified. They are usually proudly posting under their usual Name (as
 > they are all fighting for their Reputation, and for establishing their
 > opponent's Incompetence) (... do we recognize anybody yet :-? ) I actually
 > can't remember such a war involving an anonymous poster (as in "using
 > penet or similar").

soc.motss and other newsgroups have seen a long list of pseudo-persons
posting from non existent sites, and yes.. penet has been used to this
effect.

 > What destroys discussions (and forces people to leave them...) is the
 > tendency of threads to start genuine, and to end as flame wars.
 > Certainly, for-money systems would tend to shorten flame wars..

I think that there is no shortage of contributing factors to the
shortcomings of network distributed ascii based communication.

Bottom line is that when we have our full range of auditory clues,
and visual context, we use all of that and more in order to convey
meaning, and in network distributed ascii communication the clues and
context are missing unless we *spell it out*.

Most of us aren't that diligent or patient.

I think it is interesting to also note that people will engage in
levels of flaming that tehy would never do to another person 
face to face. That is also a form of non-acountability by being unreachable
when your content might otherwise earn you a fist in your face.

Personally, I believe that some levels and forms of anonymity are 
highly desireable. Reality is that some levels and forms of anonymity
are too easily subverted by sociopaths who don't care about the 
consequences of their acts, or the restrictions that may come about
due to their abuse.

Not to get too far past the scope of mailers and netnews, but
these issues have importance to the growth of Networked commerce
in general.

I think that the design of privacy systems needs to take these
dark-side issues seriously and do their best to minimise the potential
for abuse. 

If for no other reason, where there is money, there is abuse
and criminally sociopathic predators who will do anything in their
power to gain advantage over their competition.

Perhaps a *zoning* concept is needed, in such that transactions would
have qualifying conditions - or in such that *zones* exist as data-space
with authentication qualifications for *entry* or transaction.


LUX ./. owen




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: hughes@ah.com (Eric Hughes)
Date: Thu, 7 Oct 93 12:05:32 PDT
To: cypherpunks-announce@toad.com
Subject: Correction in Bay Area meeting announcement
Message-ID: <9310071858.AA01476@ah.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


CORRECTION
==========

The meeting is Saturday the 9th, not Sunday the 10th.  Sorry for the
typo.

The Bay Area meetings are always on Saturdays.

Eric




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Derek Atkins <warlord@MIT.EDU>
Date: Thu, 7 Oct 93 09:55:32 PDT
To: "Huba J. Leidenfrost" <leide871@uidaho.edu>
Subject: Re: Help people help themselves
In-Reply-To: <Pine.3.02.9310070128.A13483-a100000@crow.csrv.uidaho.edu>
Message-ID: <9310071652.AA05661@toxicwaste.MEDIA.MIT.EDU>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Here is a form letter I send to people who send sub/unsub messages to
mailing lists.  This explains how to do it properly.  

-derek

--------- Included Message Follows ---------
Hi.

Please do not send subscribe or unsubscribe messages to the list.
That is what the -request list is for, so you can inform the maintainers
of the list.  When you send to large mailing lists with sub and unsub
requests, you just increase the bandwidth used, and annoy a lot of
people, since almost everyone on the list has absolutely no power
with maintaining the list.

Please remember that the Internet is not made up of listservs, and
the Internet Approved method of sending requests is to send to 
listname-request.  I suggest you read RFC's 1325 and 1396, as well as
FYI 17 about mailing lists...

Thank you for your time.

-derek




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: pierre@shell.portal.com (Pierre Uszynski)
Date: Thu, 7 Oct 93 13:39:20 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Standard Headers for Anonymous Remailers
Message-ID: <9310072018.AA14402@jobe.shell.portal.com.shell.portal.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> From: owen@autodesk.com (D. Owen Rowley)
> 
> There is another level of *menace* which I suppose many of you are unaware.
[...]
> I mean people who exploit insecure sites and networking skill to forge
> mail and articles as part of a concerted and ongoing campaign of
                                 ?????????????????????
> harrasement.
> Stuff that has resulted in very serious consequences.
                             ?????????????????????????
> 
> Theres no need to go into detail here about the array of tactics and
> the widening scope of the phenomenon, but I think it needs to be looked
> at as an example of how and why systems are abused.

On the contrary, let's hear the details.

If what we are considering here is how to fight abuse while encouraging
(what we think is) positive use of anonymous systems, then we need to
know the details. If you are not comfortable posting that here, I'd
welcome a private email (as well as the people at io.com would, I
expect). Still, I don't think cypherpunks is anywhere close to the stage
where we should withold that kind of detail (except for OS bugs that go
to CERT first)...

> soc.motss and other newsgroups have seen a long list of pseudo-persons
> posting from non existent sites, and yes.. penet has been used to this
> effect.

ok, and anonymous remailers don't change that possibility one way or the
other. I'll go hang out there for a while anyway...

> I think that the design of privacy systems needs to take these
> dark-side issues seriously and do their best to minimise the potential
> for abuse. 

Sure, but consider that extremist systems will exist nonetheless.

> Perhaps a *zoning* concept is needed, in such that transactions would
> have qualifying conditions - or in such that *zones* exist as data-space
> with authentication qualifications for *entry* or transaction.

Who qualifies whom, based on what info, and to eliminate whom?

Pierre
pierre@shell.portal.com




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: doug@netcom.com (Doug Merritt)
Date: Thu, 7 Oct 93 13:45:34 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Good editorial in the Merc
Message-ID: <9310072044.AA22854@netcom.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


The Thursday Oct 7 San Jose Mercury News lead editorial contains a note
acknowledging a sane point of view about cryptographic exports.

(It's titled "Unshackled Tech -- Looser export rules will boost Silicon
Valley Sales", and it discusses Clinton's decision last week to boost
the speed limit for exportable computers.)

The *good* part, though, is:

  "  * Congress should update the Export Administration Act.
     A 1990 version would have lifted export controls on
  telecommunications and software with encryption codes, which give
  the software users a better way to keep data secret. President Bush
  vetoed it. His administration wanted to deprive the Chinese and
  Russians of the latest, hard-to-bug telecommunications equipment, and
  the latest encrypted software.
     Well, the Chinese already know how to make the new
  telecommunications equipment. The encryption software is in the
  hands of anyone who can find a pirated copy."

Awareness is beginning to grow out there.
	Doug




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: charliemerritt@BIX.com
Date: Thu, 7 Oct 93 10:49:20 PDT
To: warlord@MIT.EDU
Subject: WEAK RSA KEYS
Message-ID: <9310071345.memo.43629@BIX.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



On cypherpunks
warlord@MIT.EDU (Derek Atkins) posted an example of a (small) RSA key.
He is perpetuating a dangerous myth about RSA.
He probably believes, along with most people, that for each
encryption exponent there is ONLY ONE decription exponent.
In fact there are AT LEAST TWO.  Yes, you have a "spare key".
Maybe many.  In fact I can generate RSA keys with "good" primes
that are hard to factor, yet the keys are WEAK - easy to break.

This is part of Derek Atkins' example:

> Here is a better example:
>
>     p = 5   q = 11  N = pq = 55
>     m = (p-1)(q-1) = 4*10 = 40
>
>Now, we need to choose our public and private decryptors, E and d,
>such that Ed = 1 mod (m):
>     E = 3   d = 27

In his example the decrypt exponent is 27.
The "spare" is 7.  The "spare" runs faster, too.  Go ahead, try it.

The myth is that "ED = 1 mod (m)".
The truth is as follows:
	G = gcd( p-1 , q-1)  in this example G=2
	F = m/G              in this example F=20
	ED = 1 mod (F)

I showed this to Phillip Zimmermann and PGP keys are generated
this way.  At first PRZ checked to be sure G=2.  Then he found
that with random large primes G was almost always small, say < 17 or so.
So now he doesn't check.

HERE IS WHY IT IS IMPORTANT TO KNOW THIS:

Let's say my name is Denning.  Lets say there is a new government chip they want
certified.  They describe the (RSA) algorithm to me, in secret.  I look at
it from every angle I *can think of*.  Yes the skipj--- RSA algorithm
is good.  I say so in public.  No, I can't reveal how it works, but trust me,
my name is Denning and I know what I speak of.
Now the government starts producing KEYS for this new algorithm.  They
key escrow them to two agencies.  They also make sure that G IS LARGE.
The algorithm can be brute force attacked (search for spares).  They don't
give a da*m about warrants and escrow, the TLA can brute force any keys
they need.

Think about it, Dorothy.  We aint in Kansas any more.

Here is an example (using small numbers) of a weak key.

P=607   q=1213   n=736291
phi=(p-1)*(q-1)=734472    G=606
F = phi/g = 1212

E=5  D=485     (D*E)=1 mod F

M=40 (message)  M^E mod n = 55551   cyphertext=55551

55551^D mod n = 40

A spare key can be found every 1212 numbers, just add 1212 to D:
1697, 2909, 4121, 5333.....etc    They are all spares.

Charlie Merritt's rule of cryptography:
"Don't trust even RSA if you don't generate the keys; Know your source (code)."




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Karl Lui Barrus <klbarrus@owlnet.rice.edu>
Date: Thu, 7 Oct 93 12:05:42 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Weak RSA keys?
Message-ID: <9310071903.AA25719@flammulated.owlnet.rice.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I don't mean to flame you, but before you rush off and publish your
results somewhere you may want to step back and check over your premise
and the steps it involves a few times.

> The "spare" is 7.  The "spare" runs faster, too.  Go ahead, try it.
> The myth is that "ED = 1 mod (m)".
> The truth is as follows:
>	G = gcd( p-1 , q-1)  in this example G=2
>	F = m/G              in this example F=20
>	ED = 1 mod (F)

Now how exactly do you calculate this "F"?  Does it involve, say,
knowing phi(n), information ONLY available to you if you happen to
know the factorization of n?  In which case the whole thing collapses
anyway?

How can you use this information to decrypt a message?  If I were to
give you the 200 digit product of two primes, could you find the
"spare" key?  

If I get some time I'd like to look over your method to see if it's
really there or an artifact of the numbers you chose.  There is a
"weakness" easily shown in RSA in that for some keys, up to 9 messages
encrypt to themselves!  That is, M^e = M mod n.  Now, if you pick
large primes, these 9 messages will get lost in the 100 trillion
numbers every atom in the universe can have allocated, so it really
isn't a problem.

-- 
Karl L. Barrus: klbarrus@owlnet.rice.edu         
keyID: 5AD633 hash: D1 59 9D 48 72 E9 19 D5  3D F3 93 7E 81 B5 CC 32 

"One man's mnemonic is another man's cryptography" 
  - my compilers prof discussing file naming in public directories



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: hughes@ah.com (Eric Hughes)
Date: Thu, 7 Oct 93 14:35:56 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Weak RSA keys?
In-Reply-To: <9310071956.AA02596@flammulated.owlnet.rice.edu>
Message-ID: <9310072135.AA01702@ah.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Re: finding weak keys

The point with weak RSA keys is not that one can find other decryption
exponents deterministically given public information, but rather
probabilistically.  If gcd( p-1, q-1 ) is large with respect to pq,
then one can simply do a random search for these other exponents.

Greatest common divisors are quick to calculate, so there's no
practical problem with making sure that one does not generate weak
keys.

The rest of this message is a mathematical explanation of _why_ there
are at least two decryption exponents.

Warning: technical algebra follows.

Short answer: (Z/pqZ)^* is not a cyclic group, and therefore does not
contain elements of maximum order, i.e. of order (p-1)(q-1).
(Notation: the group above is the multiplicative group of numbers
modulo pq.)  The largest order of any element is lcm(p-1,q-1).

Longer answer: (Z/pqZ)^* is isomorphic to (Z/pZ)^* x (Z/qZ)^*.  The
isomorphism map is I: x mod pq |--> ( x mod p, x mod q ).  Let f =
gcd(p-1,q-1) and F = lcm(p-1,q-1).  Define f_p = (q-1)/f and f_q =
(p-1)/f; both are integers.

Note that since Ff = (p-1)(q-1), F = (p-1)f_p = (q-1)f_q.

I( x^F mod pq )
	= ( x^F mod p, x^F mod q )
	= ( x^((p-1)f_p) mod p, x^((q-1)f_q) mod q )
	= ( (x^(f_p))^(p-1) mod p, (x^(f_q))^(q-1) mod q )
	= ( 1 mod p, 1 mod q )

The last step follows by Fermat's Little Theorem.  Since the
isomorphic image of x^F is (1,1), we conclude that x^F == 1 (mod pq),
for all x.  (To see this, use the Chinese Remainder Theorem.)

Since p and q are both odd, p-1 and q-1 are both even.  Thus their gcd
must be at least two.

Out of curiosity, does anybody here know how to calculate any
expectations for gcd(p-1,q-1) for, say, 2^n < p < q < 2^(n+1) ?  I
don't know enough number theory myself.

Eric




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: peb@PROCASE.COM (Paul Baclace)
Date: Thu, 7 Oct 93 14:39:21 PDT
To: pierre@shell.portal.com
Subject: Re: Standard Headers for Anonymous Remailers
Message-ID: <9310072136.AA02054@banff.procase.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



>From: pierre@shell.portal.com

>Who qualifies whom, based on what info, and to eliminate whom?

As the Internet becomes more diverse and less the domain of programmers
and scientists, it is natural that other means of selection are needed
for membership in a group.  The traditional academic atmosphere of
mailing lists will evolve away from total openenss.  Here are some 
possibilities:

	1. By invitation only--members sponsor new members.
	2. By trial period--new members are lurkers on the main list
		and a subset of the members can see their postings
		or they must first be moderated.
	3. Qualifications--could range widely.
	4. Tests.
	5. All of the above.

>From: owen@autodesk.com

>with authentication qualifications for *entry* or transaction

The Extropians list already does this--not totally secure, to be sure, 
but you must let the list administrators know all your posting nodes.


Paul E. Baclace
peb@procase.com





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Derek Atkins <warlord@MIT.EDU>
Date: Thu, 7 Oct 93 11:55:32 PDT
To: charliemerritt@BIX.com
Subject: Re: WEAK RSA KEYS
In-Reply-To: <9310071345.memo.43629@BIX.com>
Message-ID: <9310071851.AA06231@toxicwaste.MEDIA.MIT.EDU>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


No, I never said anything about Weak keys, nor did I ever say that
what I chose was a strong key.  I just showed, as I stated, "An
Example" of an RSA key.  Please do not put words in my mouth.

I agree that the myth of only one decryption exponent is a bad thing
to keep going.  I, however, was only trying to give an example of how
RSA works, with numbers, rather than prove that certain sets of RSA
numbers give weak keys.

And I'm also sure that you can much more easily find a set of weak
keys than you can find strong keys, but let's not get into that
argument, please!

Thank you for pointing this out to people.

-derek




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Karl Lui Barrus <klbarrus@owlnet.rice.edu>
Date: Thu, 7 Oct 93 12:59:20 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Weak RSA keys?
Message-ID: <9310071956.AA02596@flammulated.owlnet.rice.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



>He probably believes, along with most people, that for each
>encryption exponent there is ONLY ONE decription exponent.
>In fact there are AT LEAST TWO.  Yes, you have a "spare key".

Yes, it does look like there are two possible decryption exponents,
but one is derived from the other and information only known to the
person who can factor n, so it isn't clear to me how this is a big
weakness.  If you pick good factors of n and the primes are large, the
problem is just as infeasible as it was before, and you get ONLY two
decryption exponents.

In fact, if you look on page 92 of "Cryptography; An Introduction to
Data Security" by Seberry and Pieprzyk, you will see that they make it
more explicit than some other texts: they give this as the formula
relating then encryption and decryption exponents:

			 e d = 1 mod gamma(n)

		   where gamma(n) = lcm (p-1, q-1)

So they use the least common multiple of p-1 and q-1.

With good choices of p and q, there will be 2 decryption exponents: d
and (d + phi(n)/gamma(n)).  If you have more than 2 decryption
exponents, you have made poor choices of primes.

Again, to calculate the "spare" key you nee need to know how n factors,
which makes the whole thing moot.

Example with better choices for p and q:

p = 107; q = 167; n = 17869
phi(n) = 106 * 166 = 17596
e = 43

d = 43^-1 mod 17596 = 7775

71^43 mod 17869 = 10073 (the encrypted message)
to decrypt: 10073^7775 mod 17869 = 71.

If you use 

e d = 1 mod gamma(n) 

you get

d = 43^-1 mod 8798 = 7775, which is the same d you got above.  Thus,
the spare key is 7775 + 8798 = 16573, which does work as a decryption
exponent.  


-- 
Karl L. Barrus: klbarrus@owlnet.rice.edu         
keyID: 5AD633 hash: D1 59 9D 48 72 E9 19 D5  3D F3 93 7E 81 B5 CC 32 

"One man's mnemonic is another man's cryptography" 
  - my compilers prof discussing file naming in public directories



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Karl Lui Barrus <klbarrus@owlnet.rice.edu>
Date: Thu, 7 Oct 93 13:25:32 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Weak RSA keys, 2nd post
Message-ID: <9310072023.AA06352@flammulated.owlnet.rice.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

(sorry for posting this twice, but as I sent the previous message, line
noise or something overtook me)

It does appear that there can be multiple decryption keys, but with good
choices of p and q, there will be only two.

Whether or not "ed = 1 mod phi(n)" is a myth or not... depends.  Look at
"Cryptography: an Intoduction to Computer Security" by Seberry and
Pieprzyk.  On page 92, equation 3.9 gives the relation between encryption
and decryption keys as "ed = 1 mod gamma(n)" where gamma(n) = lcm(p-1,q-1).
Which is what the "F" function described before is.

With proper choices of p and q, the d calulcated by the first forumla and
the d calculated by the second will be the same.

Of course, since you must know how to factor n to calculate the "spare" key,
it isn't clear to me how it will help you decrypt a message.  With large
enough properly chosen primes, it won't matter.  Solution: pick good primes.

An example with better choices for p and q:

p = 107; q = 167; n = pq = 17869
phi(n) = (p-1)(q-1) = 17596
e = 43

Method 1: d = 43^-1 mod 17596 = 7775
Method 2: lcm(p-1, q-1) = 8798      
          d = 43^-1 mod 8798 = 7775 

Either method: message M = 71
               encrypted M' = 71^43 mod 17869 = 10073
               decrypt = 10073^7775 mod 17869 = 71

The "spare" key is 7775 + 8798 = 16573, which does indeed work.

But again, I don't see how an attacker can use info about the existence of
a second key.

Karl L. Barrus <klbarrus@owlnet.rice.edu>


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From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: djw@eff.org (Daniel J. Weitzner)
Date: Thu, 7 Oct 93 12:25:32 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Fiberpunks?  (Was - Really Cheap Crypto)
Message-ID: <199310071924.AA21393@eff.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>>>From today's New York Times:
>> 
>>"- - - General Aidid was brazenly speaking out on his own clandestine radio 
>>station this week, assailing United Nations colonialism. Today, Pentagon 
>>officials said they believed the Somali clan-leader had foiled their 
>>efforts to locate him in part by communicating with his forces on simple 
>>walkie-talkies difficult to monitor with high-technology American 
>>listening gear". 
>> 
>>Now, is the time for Dorothy D. to suggest, as she did with Clipper, that
>>all dissident Somalis be required by law to use high-tech comm gear. Let's
>>hope that the criminal element against which the escrowed key crap is 
>>oriented doesn't hear about the Somali answer to communications intercept.
>>In the off chance that they might, I'm going to buy stock in oatmeal boxes
>>and wax string. 

String is, indeed, an critical privacy-protecting technology, but alas, a
threat to national security as well.  Perhaps someone will have to start a
fiberpunks movement.




...................................................................

Daniel J. Weitzner, Senior Staff Counsel <djw@eff.org>
Electronic Frontier Foundation
1001 G St, NW
Suite 950 East
Washington, DC 20001
202-347-5400 (v) 
202-393-5509 (f)






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Karl Lui Barrus <klbarrus@owlnet.rice.edu>
Date: Thu, 7 Oct 93 13:35:32 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Standard Headers for Anonymous Remailers
In-Reply-To: <9310071839.AA11794@lux.YP.acad>
Message-ID: <9310072034.AA08000@flammulated.owlnet.rice.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


D. Owen Rowley wrote:

>I think that the design of privacy systems needs to take these
>dark-side issues seriously and do their best to minimise the potential
>for abuse. 

Yes, but it's more than just the privacy systems that need good
designs; applications like mailers could benefit from (say) digitally
signing every message and reporting the signature on a document rather
than where it came from.

At the risk of sounding like a broken record, I will quote some
private email I sent to another indiviual concerned with these things
(hopefully eveybody else who is going to post in about needing to
minimize abuses and stuff will read this and find out such things are
being worked on!)

>I hope this is because people really feel like schmucks taking
>anonymous pot-shots :-)  I mean, I wouldn't like to see anonymous
>remailers abused either.

>As I mentioned, a more "satisfying" solution to me is to be using a
>positive reputation system along with a pay-per-remail anonymous
>remailer.  The problem is infrastructure - there exist anonymous
>remailers, but right now positive reputations and pay-remailers aren't
>at the same level.  

>A good positive reputation system would require people to habitually
>sign their messages and posts, even if the key they used can't be
>traced (say, the username is a pseudonym).  Plus, you'd need software
>(built in to the mail software you use would be best) that reports
>signatures instead of email address.  This would allow you to see who
>sent the message (who signed it) rather than where it originated from.

>A good pay-remailer would charge enough per letter so as to make
>everyone think before firing off a letter in haste.

-- 
Karl L. Barrus: klbarrus@owlnet.rice.edu         
keyID: 5AD633 hash: D1 59 9D 48 72 E9 19 D5  3D F3 93 7E 81 B5 CC 32 

"One man's mnemonic is another man's cryptography" 
  - my compilers prof discussing file naming in public directories



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: owen@autodesk.com (D. Owen Rowley)
Date: Thu, 7 Oct 93 16:49:20 PDT
To: pierre@shell.portal.com
Subject: Re: Standard Headers for Anonymous Remailers
Message-ID: <9310072339.AA12738@lux.YP.acad>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



 > From: pierre@shell.portal.com (Pierre Uszynski)
  > From: owen@autodesk.com (D. Owen Rowley)
  > There is another level of *menace* which I suppose many of you are unaware
 > > I mean people who exploit insecure sites and networking skill to forge
 > > mail and articles as part of a concerted and ongoing campaign of
 >                                  ?????????????????????
 > > harrasement.
 > > Stuff that has resulted in very serious consequences.
 >                              ?????????????????????????
 > > Theres no need to go into detail here about the array of tactics and
 > > the widening scope of the phenomenon, but I think it needs to be looked
 > > at as an example of how and why systems are abused.
 > 
 > On the contrary, let's hear the details.

There are three personas in particular, who stand out in the crowd, they are:

The Dark Knight
    Obvious psuedonym, claims that he was disciplined or fired because
    the nasty queers on soc.motss complained to his management about
    his honestly stated opinions. during two periods of his unwanted
    attentions and homophobic ranting there were several serious sendsys 
    bombing incidents. I know of one in which an SGI employee was 
    mail bombed with enough garbage to clog their whole mail system for
    quite a while.   
 
    Interuption of net connectivity to a whole company in order to 
    amuse some creep who fancys himself as a fag-bashing super hero,
    fits my definition of sociopath, and I suspect that if it happened
    to any of us, filling up our disk real estate, delaying our business
    as usual, we would consider it a serious situation.

    I'm not sure how many there were, but during the worst phases,
    there  could be two or three such incidents per day, involving 
    gigabytes of data.

RALF, or RLF
	bizarre and aggresively homophobic, tends to rant
	about how homos victimised him in some way or another.
	Claimed to be Church of RALF, has a  numerological
        hangup over his birthdate , pretty much your basic
        testosterone poisoned megalomaniac.
	
	also present and gloating during or around periods of mail bombing.
	like dark Knight, the home site of the acct changes,
	or is forged.

Dr Artimus Page
	Phoney acct claiming to have succesfull therapies to turn
	disgusting homos into natural men like him. Posts long
	and surreal accounts, projecting his anal fantasys onto
	the nasty homos and promising to cure them.. uh huh!

	Claimed that phoney name and acct were to protect him from
        the roving gangs of hetero-bashers who are out to get him.

    In another incident from that same period an individual was 
    targetted who did not have a very understanding employer, 
    he was fired as a result. 
    A very serious matter for the guy, who's life got turned 
    upside down because he was the target of these acts.

    Sendsys messages would be forged, ton_o_byte mail bombings would be
    forged in the name of other soc.motss regulars, usually those who 
    posted uppity responses to these *honestly stated opinions*.
    Punitive repostings of months of back traffic 
    Oh.. yes.. there were denials.. but the common factors between
    all three of these guys and the harrasement
    showed more than a casual relationship between the appearance of
    this character and patterns of e-harrasement.


There were occasional other minor players who would come around, usually
obvious forgerys from accts claiming to have been succesfully cured
by the sagely Dr Page, and trying to date the Lesbians in order to
help them too.

Rarely would more than one be present at a time, they seemed to run
in a patterned sequence that has consistently covered the last two years.

A good deal of it starts as nuisance stuff, forged addresses, forged 
cancelations. And you can look at sendsys and mail_bombing as the 
functional equivelant of ordering pizzas or other deliveries to 
a third party, but I see it as a pattern borrowed from terrorists,
purposeful and repeated , intent to wear down the spirit, and keep
their prey on the defensive so recovery doesn't happen. 
I have no illusion that it takes a rocket scientist to pull off these
stunts, nor that given the state of our net,  anything can really
be done to stop it now.

However the real world effect was that the real
people of soc.motss were subjected to severe psychological harrasement,
of the type that wouldn't be tolerated for a minute in real-space.

That we currently have no choice but to tolerate it in cyberspace is
not an acceptable prospect. Having experienced the personal cost of
this sort of thing on my own psyche, I can tell you that it is 
maddening while it is going on, and sobering  afterwards when you realise 
how vulnerable you are.

There are others of course, actually quite a few who are more than willing
to display there ignorance from their real accts. Why I bet some of 'em
probably are on this list.

lets see.. heres just a partial list of proud defenders of heterosexuality
who find it amusing to taunt the queers on soc.motss.

Daniel J Karnes, Walter Smith, Gary Lang, Ted Kaldis, Clayton Cramer,
and more.. many many more.

 > > soc.motss and other newsgroups have seen a long list of pseudo-persons
 > > posting from non existent sites, and yes.. penet has been used to this
 > > effect.
 
 > ok, and anonymous remailers don't change that possibility one way or the
 > other. I'll go hang out there for a while anyway...

I understand that, and for that matter I feel strongly enough about wanting 
my own freedom that I'll join you.

 > > I think that the design of privacy systems needs to take these
 > > dark-side issues seriously and do their best to minimise the potential
 > > for abuse. 
 
 > Sure, but consider that extremist systems will exist nonetheless.

oh .. of course, I'm only arguing for diligence and design criterea
that will buy us optimum freedom, and minimise opportunity for abuse.

 > > Perhaps a *zoning* concept is needed, in such that transactions would
 > > have qualifying conditions - or in such that *zones* exist as data-space
 > > with authentication qualifications for *entry* or transaction.
 
 > Who qualifies whom, based on what info, and to eliminate whom?

Well.. I suppose that in the case of commerce, the vendor will, and that 
market forces will ultimately detrmine the succesful strategys.

Think of it in terms of reliability, and trustiness. Accountability
optimises both, anonymity diminishes both - in fact can potentially
dispense with accountability. when your transaction involves value
don't you want reliability and accountability? 
I do.

If providing my identity as collateral for reliability is required in
some transactions, I think thats reasonable to offer as an option.

I tend to think of cyberspace in terms of the UnReal Estate business.
If I have some data space, then I think I should be able to determine
who gets in and what they do there.

regarding common data-space and whether there should be rules and 
accountability, would you move yourself or your family to a 
neighborhood where you couldn't determine who gets into your place
or hold them accountable for what they do there?

Perhaps you have a higher opinion regarding the negative aspects of
human nature than I.

LUX ./. owen




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: cman@IO.COM (Douglas Barnes)
Date: Thu, 7 Oct 93 15:25:35 PDT
To: pierre@shell.portal.com (Pierre Uszynski)
Subject: Re: Standard Headers for Anonymous Remailers
In-Reply-To: <9310072018.AA14402@jobe.shell.portal.com.shell.portal.com>
Message-ID: <9310072218.AA01673@illuminati.IO.COM>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Owen wrote:
> > Perhaps a *zoning* concept is needed, in such that transactions would
> > have qualifying conditions - or in such that *zones* exist as data-space
> > with authentication qualifications for *entry* or transaction.
> 

Pierre wrote:
> Who qualifies whom, based on what info, and to eliminate whom?
> 

I don't think that Owen (and certainly not any party to the argument
at io.com) is suggesting a high-handed Big Brother approach to qualifying
transactions. At least I hope not...

However, I think that as the means of defining data spaces (whether in
Usenet space, mailing list space, or IRC space) become more sophisticated
and also more accessible, that the people who establish these spaces
will want to also establish authentication qualifications. And whether
this will be a Good Thing or a Bad Thing depends on whether it's based
on reputation or on knee-jerk anti-anonymity bigotry.

Individuals or groups that wish to create a data space, or who currently 
conduct transactions in a data space, *should* have the right to establish 
rules for entry and transaction ranging from "anything goes" to "established 
members of the foo-ology research community using digital signatures." I
think that the best remedy for the tyranny and stagnation that can arise from 
this is to keep a very low barrier to entry for the creation of new data spaces.

Despite this, I think that discrimination solely on the basis on anonymity
is *dead wrong* and is on equivalent moral ground with discrimination on
the basis of skin color, religion or unnatural fondness for aquatic mammals.
I think it is much more useful to put the new anonymous entity on the same
ground as, say, a first semester college freshman, and allow that entity
meaningful channels for acquiring reputation, up to and including becoming
an "established member of the foo-ology research community."

Doug Barnes
Founder of foo-ology and the 'foo' mailing list
To subscribe, send e-mail to: foo-request@indial1.io.com

-- 
----------------                                             /\ 
Douglas Barnes            cman@illuminati.io.com            /  \ 
Chief Wizard         (512) 448-8950 (d), 447-7866 (v)      / () \
Illuminati Online          metaverse.io.com 7777          /______\



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: an5877@anon.penet.fi (deadbeat)
Date: Thu, 7 Oct 93 10:35:51 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: MacPGP 2.3 sources
Message-ID: <9310071735.AA05805@anon.penet.fi>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

> Connected with the fault, if anyone knows of the domain name or whereabouts
> of the machine with IP number 179.135.226.153, I would be most interested
> in contacting its manager.

You have been hacked.  IP addresses above 168.xxx.xxx.xxx have not
yet been allocated.

DEADBEAT <na5877@anon.penet.fi>

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.3

iQBFAgUBLLQZrPFZTpBW/B35AQEcPgGArD2mpFu4Sd7oj+s95XRgJtfW9lo/I/Ln
y14lstlkI1wS0XsHDPZnC/6FOZrokyOK
=57Jo
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
To find out more about the anon service, send mail to help@anon.penet.fi.
Due to the double-blind, any mail replies to this message will be anonymized,
and an anonymous id will be allocated automatically. You have been warned.
Please report any problems, inappropriate use etc. to admin@anon.penet.fi.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: jamie@netcom.com (Jamie Dinkelacker)
Date: Thu, 7 Oct 93 18:19:21 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Newbie reading: Bamberg
Message-ID: <9310080117.AA03461@netcom.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Newbie cypheroids and cypherettes,

Tim May has pointed to _The Puzzle Palace_ by Bamberg several times here
and on the Extropians list. If like me you're a newbie, it's a quick,
excellent read. Don't miss it. It'll give context for the quote, "gentlemen
don't read each other's mail."
--
................................
Jamie Dinkelacker   Palo Alto CA 
Jamie@netcom.com    415.941.4782    





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: charliemerritt@BIX.com
Date: Thu, 7 Oct 93 15:29:21 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Weak Keys? explained
Message-ID: <9310071823.memo.44198@BIX.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain




No, I did not mean I can find the spares of a well constructed key.
And yes, the best key has at least one spare.
What I meant was, if I were the NSA and wrote the keygen for
a crypto system I could guarantee that each key would have
a huge number of spares.  Enough, that if I were the NSA I
could find them.

How to generate a weak RSA key:

	Start with a prime R
	S=R*2

L1	If S+1 is prime then P=S+1
	If S+1 Not prime S=S* next_odd_number   (3,5,7,9,11...)
		Loop to L1
   else

L2	If S+1 is prime then Q=S+1
	If S+1 Not prime S=S* next_odd_number
		Loop to L2
   else

	N=P*Q   #spare keys => 2*R					

In the example I gave R was 101  p=1+(101*2*3)  q=1+(101*2*2*3)
                      spare keys=606

There are many BETTER ways to make a keygen that will produce keys
the author can break.  RSA has no government trap door, but
I, and certainly the NSA can write a keygen that makes trap-doored
keys.  Ones YOU can't break, but I can, knowing my secret.

My example was a put-down of Denning's assurance that skipjack
is good.  RSA is good, skipjack MAY be good.  Look out for
booby trapped keys.





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Date: Thu, 7 Oct 93 18:59:19 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Bamford's "The Puzzle Palace"
In-Reply-To: <9310080117.AA03461@netcom.netcom.com>
Message-ID: <9310080159.AA21187@netcom5.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



> Newbie cypheroids and cypherettes,
> 
> Tim May has pointed to _The Puzzle Palace_ by Bamberg several times here
                                                ^^^^^^^
> and on the Extropians list. If like me you're a newbie, it's a quick,
> excellent read. Don't miss it. It'll give context for the quote, "gentlemen
> don't read each other's mail."

"My name is Bamford, _James_ Bamford."

Bamford's "The Puzzle Palace" is a bit dry in places, but is very
well-researched. I first read it in hardback in 1982 and the stuff
about intercepts of commercial intelligence (stock trades, corporate
secrets, etc.) got me to thinking about how the NSA may be _using_
the fruits of its corporate intercepts. This motivated the plot of the
novel I've been working on, and my interest in the "BlackNet" aspects
of crypto, so I can honestly say Bamford's book changed my life.

He also describes in previously-nonpublicized detail the "Harvest" and
"Lodestone" systems installed at NSA headquarters at Fort Meade around
1963. Our own Norm Hardy was involved in this and will be describing
his "Harvest" experiences at this Saturday's Cypherpunks meeting.

See (some of) you there!

--Tim


-- 
..........................................................................
Timothy C. May         | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,  
tcmay@netcom.com       | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
408-688-5409           | knowledge, reputations, information markets, 
W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA  | black markets, collapse of governments.
Higher Power: 2^756839 | Public Key: PGP and MailSafe available.
Note: I put time and money into writing this posting. I hope you enjoy it.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: jamie@netcom.com (Jamie Dinkelacker)
Date: Thu, 7 Oct 93 19:50:36 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Bamford's "The Puzzle Palace"
Message-ID: <9310080248.AA13480@netcom.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>> Newbie cypheroids and cypherettes,
>> 
>> Tim May has pointed to _The Puzzle Palace_ by Bamberg several times here
>                                                ^^^^^^^
>> and on the Extropians list. If like me you're a newbie, it's a quick,
>> excellent read. Don't miss it. It'll give context for the quote, "gentlemen
>> don't read each other's mail."
>
>"My name is Bamford, _James_ Bamford."
>
ooops, Tim's right. I was listening to David Bromberg (urg?) while writing
that post and it slipped out. Thanks, Tim.
--
................................
Jamie Dinkelacker   Palo Alto CA 
Jamie@netcom.com    415.941.4782    





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Alexander Reynolds <chrome@jhunix.hcf.jhu.edu>
Date: Thu, 7 Oct 93 17:25:35 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Digital Cash Primer (fwd)
Message-ID: <Pine.3.05.9310072018.B13879-a100000@jhunix.hcf.jhu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


---------- Forwarded message ----------
Date: Wed, 6 Oct 1993 21:34:37 -0400
From: DON_HENSON@delphi.com
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Digital Cash Primer

Shari Steele writes: ->

Hey 'punks.
Anyone know of an elementary primer on digital cash?  I'm trying to get up
to speed on this.

<--

I would like an elementary primer also.  How about posting the info to 
the list vice just to Shari.

Thanks,
Don Henson
PGP key avail on server or on request

<--

could i also get some beginning info on this subject as well?

thanks in advance,
alex reynolds






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Jim McCoy <mccoy@ccwf.cc.utexas.edu>
Date: Thu, 7 Oct 93 19:25:35 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: The death of the list as we know it (tm)
In-Reply-To: <9310080056.AA27566@dink.foretune.co.jp>
Message-ID: <199310080225.AA19451@minnie.cc.utexas.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text


trebor@foretune.co.jp (Robert J Woodhead) writes:
> I've only been monitoring the list for a couple of days, but already it
> is clear to me that the traffic is _way_ too high to manage as a mailing
> list.

It has been worse, it will get better.  This list goes through phases where
the discussion ranges from the good technical to the annoying op-ed that it
has been recently.  If it is way too high for you might I suggest you try
getting better software on your side to manage the traffic.

> A humble suggestion: someone undertake to create alt.cyperpunks and
> shadow the newsgroup and the mailing list (so that posts to one also go
> to the other). 

Has been proposed and shot down quite frequently.  The signal to noise
ratio of a newsgroup is much higher than a list.  A mailing list has a
self-regulating feature in that when the traffic becomes high and the
signal low everyone gets annoyed and _people learn to shut up!_  A
newsgroup does not have this feature and flamefests and other bullshit has
a tendency to feed upon itself until it drowns out everything else.

Just take a look at sci.crypt at the moment if you want a quick example.
There is a group dedicated to political crypto issues.  People still
insist on posting info to what should be a technical group even though
there is already a talk group for this stuff, and no amount of chastising or
reminders will dissuade them.

If someone were to do this to the cypherpunks group I would not be
surprised if someone just started a new mailing list and limited it to
invitation only for those who are interested in the real mission of this
group (cypherpunks write code, remember?  whining about bbs legal bullshit
and other topics just doesn't seem to fit the purpose.)

> In my case this would cut my reading time in half and increase my "harvest"
> by a factor of two.

You can set up an easy filter and gateway so that at your site the list
does go to a local newsgroup (some people already do this), but please do
not presume to make such a decision for the rest of us.  If you want to
make it easy for yourself please feel free to do so.  There is apparently a
lot of software out there for handling this kind of traffic volume that you
are just not aware of.

> The mailing list would still be available for those who
> cannot get the group.

Only the traffic would triple with even more bullshit as Sternlight and the
like takes notice of our little world.  More people would drop from the
list as you open the floodgates.

> Also, even an unmoderated alt group can be made moderated (and thus,
> filter out most of the forgery, etc) by appropriate use of technology
> described in this mailing list.

It takes someone about 5 seconds to figure out how to get around all of
that.  One advantage a mailing list gives us is the ability to maintain at
least on central point of administration so that if we did select a scheme
such as that on the extropians list we still have that option.  Once
something becomes a newsgroup we lose _all_ control we might have on the
list.  

Do not split the list, do not dip it in the mediocrity of the usenet, get
better software and let the system regulate itself; have some patience. 

jim





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: ferguson@icm1.icp.net (Paul Ferguson x2044)
Date: Thu, 7 Oct 93 19:39:20 PDT
To: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Subject: The ungalvanized understanding
In-Reply-To: <9310080159.AA21187@netcom5.netcom.com>
Message-ID: <9310080339.AA07722@icm1.icp.net>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text



> He also describes in previously-nonpublicized detail the "Harvest" and
> "Lodestone" systems installed at NSA headquarters at Fort Meade around
> 1963. Our own Norm Hardy was involved in this and will be describing
> his "Harvest" experiences at this Saturday's Cypherpunks meeting.
> 
> See (some of) you there!

Maybe. ,-)
   
I've wanted to "cut loose" and post a gut-load before this moment,
but perhaps it just wasn't appropriate at the time. Now that I've
seen all the puking about excessive posts etc., I've got to reiterate
why it is that list is important.
 
It is certainly not a community bulletin board for folks to just happen-in
and check out what's going on -- the traffic has always been too high for
that!
 
I've been here and will remain here through the mail-bombs (remember
our friend George?) and implicit/oblivious core dumps that result
in 5 mb mail sorties. ,-)
 
I live in an agenda called technology. Tim understands the implications
on the development of governments, cultures and history. I can only hope
that theose of you that tag along understand the extreme importance
that goes hand in hand, mano a mano. Peter Honeyman, John Draper,
John Gilmore, Eric Hughes, and the list of luminaries (no pun intended)
that DO hang on should clue you folks on the situation. 
 
We're here. We're shifting -- forever, to secure our foundation in
cypherspace. 
 
Where we were two or six or twelve months ago is no longer sufficient.
We move into positions which galvanize our foothold and grip on the
platforms which propel us.
 
From pauper to pawn. From knight to provocatuer.
 
The keepers of the keep. ,-)




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: ferguson@icm1.icp.net (Paul Ferguson x2044)
Date: Thu, 7 Oct 93 19:49:22 PDT
To: mccoy@ccwf.cc.utexas.edu (Jim McCoy)
Subject: Re: The death of the list as we know it (tm)
In-Reply-To: <199310080225.AA19451@minnie.cc.utexas.edu>
Message-ID: <9310080349.AA07778@icm1.icp.net>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text



> Do not split the list, do not dip it in the mediocrity of the usenet, get
> better software and let the system regulate itself; have some patience. 
>

I strongly agree with Jim -- if you don't like the surf, get the fuck
out of the water. Sorry.
 
 



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: doug@netcom.com (Doug Merritt)
Date: Thu, 7 Oct 93 23:09:22 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: that internet security scanner
In-Reply-To: <mech@eff.org>
Message-ID: <9310080607.AA26069@netcom5.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Stanton McCandlish <mech@eff.org> said:
>anyone actually seen that thing? (to refresh: CERT posted some warning
>about a security scanner for Internet systems that might be the evil work
>of themthere hackers so you just better delete it, etc etc.)  

(A) The "evil" in question was posted to comp.sources.misc (or some other
similarly obvious group). (B) The advisory was about as neutral as such
a thing can be.

Further comment fails me.
        Doug




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "gtoal@gtoal.com" <gtoal@pizzabox.demon.co.uk>
Date: Fri, 8 Oct 93 17:29:27 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: POISON PILL
Message-ID: <9310072311.AA22607@pizzabox.demon.co.uk>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


In article <9310011625.AA10686@snark.lehman.com> you write:
>You know, if people are going to discuss breaking blowing up computers
>and killing people, they could at least have the taste to discuss it
>elsewhere. Myself, I'm not a believer in violence, and I don't think
>this list is devoted to explosives. Newgroup alt.terrorism.techniques
>if you insist.

Much as it pains me to agree with Perry when he's in his traditional
'wet blanket' mode, I feel I ought to point out that the kid who's
currently in jail under half a million bail is there because files
on his system apparently suggested direct violent action against
law enforcement officers.  While I understand that the comments made
here are in fun, I'd be willing to bet there are some tight-assed LE
types reading this who don't see the joke, and that the people who
suggested various forms of bombs as data protection devices are now
in the list of people to bust first when the revolution doesn't come.

By the way, all schemes that rely on your computer detecting some
change are useless.  Any half-intelligent cop raiding your machine
is just going to take the drive out and put it on one of his own
machines.  The only thing you can do is encrypt the drive.  And we'll
find out soon enough how the land lies on divulging of encryption
keys when prz ends up in court.

If anyone seriously implemented a dead-man's-handle to destroy his
data, I can promise you that all that will happen is that you'll
accidentally destroy your own data.

G







From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Perry E. Metzger" <pmetzger@lehman.com>
Date: Thu, 7 Oct 93 21:05:37 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: The death of the list as we know it (tm)
In-Reply-To: <9310080056.AA27566@dink.foretune.co.jp>
Message-ID: <9310080359.AA25676@snark.lehman.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Robert J Woodhead says:
> 
> I've only been monitoring the list for a couple of days, but already
> it is clear to me that the traffic is _way_ too high to manage as a
> mailing list.

All the excess traffic is metatraffic about how bad the traffic is.
Quit talking about the excess traffic and the problem will end.

Perry
Who gets 300-500 email messages a day and still gets his work done,
and who doesn't complain lightly about volume.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Duncan Frissell <frissell@panix.com>
Date: Thu, 7 Oct 93 21:20:37 PDT
To: CYPHERPUNKS@toad.com
Subject: Re: FIDONet Mail filterin
Message-ID: <199310080419.AA02439@panix.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


J >So how do I prevent what happened to SJG, killer, etc from happening
J >to me?  How do I prevent the LE types from showing up one day and
J >saying 'hey, did you know there's a meg of kiddie porn on your 
J >machine and we're taking it all away'?

As soon as you get the 10mbps line into the home (next year for you 
Continental cable customers), mirror your machine with another located 
overseas (or just run the machine overseas).

Duncan Frissell

--- WinQwk 2.0b#0
                                       




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Stanton McCandlish <mech@eff.org>
Date: Thu, 7 Oct 93 21:45:38 PDT
To: ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu (L. Detweiler)
Subject: Re: on the cypherpunks mailing list & me
In-Reply-To: <9310070742.AA18491@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Message-ID: <199310080441.AA26373@eff.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Hmmm well to make a short reply to a long post:

1) your reposts are useful
2) splitting the list likely won't work, but yes something must be done.
alt.cypherpunk is probably the answer.  Most of the "junk posters" would
much rather get this stuff on a flee-able newsgroup, than have it
inescapably dumped in their mbox.
3) your analyses are useful, either negatively or positively, depending
upon the reader's position, but they are not out of place, though some
times a wee bit long.

Just an opinion.

That's about all I have to say on it, though I'm disappointed that you
sorely misinterp'ed the "kiddieporn" list posting.  EFF just want's to
keep people out of jail.  We aren't lackeys for the Justice Dept., nor are
we in favour of the sexual abuse of children.  Either interpretation, by
anyone, is simply not warranted.  The posting of the list is simply to
serve as a means to keep a few more people out of trouble for the time
being, and so far the response is overwhelmingly positive.
 -- 
DISCLAIMER: This message represents only my OWN opinion, not that of EFF.
Stanton McCandlish    Electronic Frontier Foundation Online Activist
mech@eff.org          NitV-DataCenter BBS SysOp
Fido: <tba>           IndraNet: 369:111/1



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: khijol!erc (Ed Carp)
Date: Fri, 8 Oct 93 01:49:21 PDT
To: doug@netcom.com (Doug Merritt)
Subject: Re: that internet security scanner
In-Reply-To: <9310080607.AA26069@netcom5.netcom.com>
Message-ID: <m0olDH9-000214C@khijol>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text


> Stanton McCandlish <mech@eff.org> said:
> >anyone actually seen that thing? (to refresh: CERT posted some warning
> >about a security scanner for Internet systems that might be the evil work
> >of themthere hackers so you just better delete it, etc etc.)  
> 
> (A) The "evil" in question was posted to comp.sources.misc (or some other
> similarly obvious group). (B) The advisory was about as neutral as such
> a thing can be.

It was, indeed.  If anyone wants a copy, they can email me.  It's 19K,
gzipped and uuencoded.
-- 
Ed Carp, N7EKG			erc@apple.com			510/659-9560
                            an38299@anon.penet.fi
If you want magic, let go of your armor.  Magic is so much stronger than
steel!        -- Richard Bach, "The Bridge Across Forever"



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Stanton McCandlish <mech@eff.org>
Date: Thu, 7 Oct 93 22:45:37 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: that internet security scanner
Message-ID: <199310080541.AA26696@eff.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


anyone actually seen that thing? (to refresh: CERT posted some warning
about a security scanner for Internet systems that might be the evil work
of themthere hackers so you just better delete it, etc etc.)  

-- 
DISCLAIMER: This message represents only my OWN opinion, not that of EFF.
Stanton McCandlish    Electronic Frontier Foundation Online Activist
mech@eff.org          NitV-DataCenter BBS SysOp
Fido: <tba>           IndraNet: 369:111/1



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Dean Van Dyke <dean@ucc.su.OZ.AU>
Date: Thu, 7 Oct 93 09:29:20 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: please unsubscribe me !!!
Message-ID: <Pine.3.85.9310080100.A22901-0100000@extro.ucc.su.OZ.AU>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


please unsubscribe me from the cypherpunks mailing list.

thanks for the interesting reading but I have to move on now.






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Stanton McCandlish <mech@eff.org>
Date: Thu, 7 Oct 93 22:55:48 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: on the cypherpunks mailing list & me
In-Reply-To: <199310080441.AA26373@eff.org>
Message-ID: <199310080555.AA26780@eff.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> 2) splitting the list likely won't work, but yes something must be done.
> alt.cypherpunk is probably the answer.  Most of the "junk posters" would
> much rather get this stuff on a flee-able newsgroup, than have it
> inescapably dumped in their mbox.

I'd better clarify that.  I think a CP newsgroup that is NOT gated to the
list would be beneficial.  Making this list into a NG would of course be a
nasty nasty mess.

-- 
DISCLAIMER: This message represents only my OWN opinion, not that of EFF.
Stanton McCandlish    Electronic Frontier Foundation Online Activist
mech@eff.org          NitV-DataCenter BBS SysOp
Fido: <tba>           IndraNet: 369:111/1



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: russell@eternity.demon.co.uk (Russell Earl Whitaker)
Date: Fri, 8 Oct 93 02:25:40 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: MEETING: UK Cryptoprivacy Association
Message-ID: <18411@eternity.demon.co.uk>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

UK Cryptoprivacy Association meeting

Date:  Sunday, 31 October 1993
Time:  1430

At the offices of:

   FOREST
   4th floor
   2 Grosvenor Gardens
   London   SW1W 0DH

[ FOREST is located at the corner of Grosvenor Gardens and Hobart
  Place, a couple of blocks west of Victoria Station. There is a 
  taxi shelter across the street from the office. Those who have 
  trouble finding this location can page Russell Whitaker on  
  081-812-2661, and stand by the payphone or cellphone for a callback. ]

The UK Cryptoprivacy Association has its roots in the U.S. cypherpunk 
advocacy of strong personal cryptography.  The next UKCA meeting, to be 
held at the offices of FOREST (see the above), will feature roundtable 
discussion on such issues as:

    - The recent well-publicised discovery of a larger number of U.S. 
        National Security Agency (NSA) electronic listening posts 
        than had been previously suspected;
    - Further news on the spread of freely-available public key 
        cryptography software in Eastern Europe, Russia, and the 
        Transcaucasian states;
    - The status of the various UK and Moscow PGP public key servers and 
        software archive sites, with input from a couple of maintainers 
        of these services in the UK;
    - The implications of the legal controversy surrounding the 
        development and distribution of PGP encryption software in the 
        U.S., with further discussion on the possibility of volunteer 
        contributions to Phil Zimmermann's legal defence fund;
    - Introduction to public key cryptography for novices

Attendees are encouraged to bring and exchange diskettes with their 
PGP public keys.  A few of us will bring along our MS-DOS laptops, to 
sign public keys on site.  In the interest of speeding things along, it is 
recommended that all keys signed at the meeting be submitted later, with 
their newly appended signatures, to the PGP Key Server at Demon 
Internet Services.  Send a message with the subject line "help" to 
pgp-public-keys@demon.co.uk, for more information.  PGP (Phil 
Zimmermann's "Pretty Good Privacy") public key encryption software can 
be obtained by ftp from, among other places, ftp.demon.co.uk in the 
directory /pub/pgp.  Versions include, but are not limited to, Unix, 
MS-DOS, Archimedes, and MacOS.  Full source code is available.

This meeting will also feature discussion on the upcoming First European 
Conference on Computers, Freedom and Privacy (ECFP '93) to be held on 
20 November 1993, which will feature speakers including John Gilmore, 
David Chaum, and Duncan Frissell, as well as a representative of the 
UK's Data Protection Registry.

Russell Earl Whitaker
ECFP Ventures Ltd

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.3

iQCVAgUBLLTAC4Tj7/vxxWtPAQGxdQP9G7uFHCcLJeSTTOBKYFBck2PpVk/jvWyM
bxRg0stdjuWpHkIIZHAq4koh9BfUo46N3WOIG95SlfuRLVxzm3WmvKV7PJKhyfdh
pFoYIwB2UcAknLPJva5eFBpi1VdDAMqv9G7qQfkoJQGXNAOlmh9GKhZkeLIeqVwv
qfb7Q2SjLaI=
=4OyJ
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

Russell Earl Whitaker                   whitaker@eternity.demon.co.uk
Communications Editor                                 AMiX: RWhitaker
EXTROPY: The Journal of Transhumanist Thought
Board member, Extropy Institute (ExI)
    Co-organizer, 1st European Conference on Computers, Freedom and
    Privacy, London, 20 November 1993








From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: remail@tamsun.tamu.edu
Date: Fri, 8 Oct 93 02:45:40 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Internet Security Scanner, description
Message-ID: <9310080944.AA07038@tamsun.tamu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Just in case you think your machine on the Internet is secure enough for
remailers, storing private files, etc. here's the author's description 
from the source code shell archive as posted to comp.sources.misc.
It would be a big confidence booster if remailer sites demonstrate
that they have passed ISS and other Internet security tests.
----------------------
Internet Security Scanner (ISS) is one of the first multi-level security
scanners available to the public.  It was designed to be flexible and easily
portable to many unix platforms and do its job in a reasonable amount of
time.  It provides information to the administrator that will fix obvious
security misconfigurations.

ISS does a multi-level scan of security, not just searching for one
weakness in the system.  To provide this to the public or at least to the
security conscious crowd may cause people to think that it is too dangerous
for the public, but many of the (cr/h)ackers are already aware of these
security holes and know how to exploit them.

These security holes are not deep in some OS routines, but standard
misconfigurations that many domains on Internet tend to show.  Many of these
holes are warned about in CERT and CIAC advisories.  This is the first
release of ISS and there is still much room for improvement.

ISS is a project that I started as I became interested in security.  As I
heard about (cr/h)ackers breaking into NASA and universities around the
world, I wanted to find out the deep secrets of security and how these people
were able to gain access to expensive machines that I would think were
secure.  I searched Internet for relative information, such as Phrack and
CERT advisories.

Most information was vague and did not explain how intruders were able to
gain access to most systems.  At most the information told administrators to
make password security tighter and to apply the vendor's security patches.
They lacked real information on how an intruder would look at a site to try
to gain access.  Having talked with security experts and reading CERT
advisories, I started trying to look for various security holes within my
domain.

To my surprise, I noticed that many of machines were adequately secured,
but within a domain there remained enough machines with obvious holes that
anyone wanted into any machine could attack the weak 'trusted' machine and
from there could gain access to the rest of the domain. From this project, I
have not learned any new deep secret to cracking systems, but with the right
tools that most domains on Internet are insecure.  These holes will not be a
surprise to any advanced intruder, but with this tool administrators will be
able to quickly search for obvious holes and prepare to fix them.
  





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Duncan Frissell <frissell@panix.com>
Date: Fri, 8 Oct 93 03:49:23 PDT
To: CYPHERPUNKS@toad.com
Subject: Re: FIDONet Mail filterin
Message-ID: <199310081047.AA24879@panix.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


J >So how do I prevent what happened to SJG, killer, etc from happening
J >to me?  How do I prevent the LE types from showing up one day and
J >saying 'hey, did you know there's a meg of kiddie porn on your 
J >machine and we're taking it all away'?

As soon as you get the 10mbps line into the home (next year for you 
Continental cable customers), mirror your machine with another located 
overseas (or just run the machine overseas).

Duncan Frissell

--- WinQwk 2.0b#0
                                       




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: smb@research.att.com
Date: Fri, 8 Oct 93 04:59:24 PDT
To: Stanton McCandlish <mech@eff.org>
Subject: Re: that internet security scanner
Message-ID: <9310081157.AA25996@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


	 anyone actually seen that thing? (to refresh: CERT posted some warning
	 about a security scanner for Internet systems that might be the evil
	 work of themthere hackers so you just better delete it, etc etc.)  

CERT isn't that stupid.  What they said was that ISS has been posted,
and that it was likely that some folks would try to use it to break
into various systems.  Do you disagree with that statement? They also
said that you should consider running it yourself, so that you can
close the holes first.  They even gave the pointer to the directory on
UUNET where it's stored.  What good would it possibly do to delete it
on your own machine, when many thousands of other machines around the
world have copies?  Again -- CERT isn't stupid.


		--Steve Bellovin




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: hfinney@shell.portal.com (Hal Finney)
Date: Fri, 8 Oct 93 14:05:47 PDT
To: honey@citi.umich.edu
Subject: Re:  second order homophonic substitution
Message-ID: <9310081626.AA17600@jobe.shell.portal.com.shell.portal.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


This homophonic cypher sounds interesting.  If the authorities demand
your keys, you could scramble each row of the matrix (scrambling each
row separately), so that only the dummy message can be recovered.

Real ascii messages have a character set of about 2^6, so the actual
size of the key matrix will be 2^12, and that means that each entry will
be about 12 bits.  For full generality in handling binary data the
character set would be 2^8, meaning a matrix of size 2^16 entries with
each entry being 16 bits.  This is a 128K byte key, which is pretty
cumbersome.  Also, the cyphertext is twice as big as the plaintext,
which will stand out too.

Plus, once the authorities see your decryption algorithm it may be
pretty obvious that it was designed for this specific purpose, and
whatever pressures they applied to make you reveal the key may now
be redoubled until you reveal the "real" key.

A one-time-pad has the advantage that the key is the same size as the
file, and there is no size expansion in encryption, plus it's a plausible
approach to use for high-security encryption.  It will take less space
and still allows for multiple decryption.

Hal
hfinney@shell.portal.com




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Stanton McCandlish <mech@eff.org>
Date: Fri, 8 Oct 93 06:29:23 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: that internet security scanner
In-Reply-To: <9310081256.AA07636@illuminati.IO.COM>
Message-ID: <199310081328.AA29733@eff.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Well, seems some folks took exception to my remarks about the CERT post.
I was simply kidding, and have no problem with CERT warning SysAdmins
about possible hazards.  I  thought it might be humourous to sound
mock-alarmist, in response to some shouting and nay-saying over EFF warning
SysOps about possible hazards. 

-- 
DISCLAIMER: This message represents only my OWN opinion, not that of EFF.
Stanton McCandlish    Electronic Frontier Foundation Online Activist
mech@eff.org          NitV-DataCenter BBS SysOp
Fido: <tba>           IndraNet: 369:111/1



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: khijol!erc (Ed Carp)
Date: Fri, 8 Oct 93 10:09:23 PDT
To: mech@eff.org (Stanton McCandlish)
Subject: Re: that internet security scanner
In-Reply-To: <199310081328.AA29733@eff.org>
Message-ID: <m0olL1n-00021GC@khijol>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text


> Well, seems some folks took exception to my remarks about the CERT post.
> I was simply kidding, and have no problem with CERT warning SysAdmins
> about possible hazards.  I  thought it might be humourous to sound
> mock-alarmist, in response to some shouting and nay-saying over EFF warning
> SysOps about possible hazards. 

Well, it's certainly generated *me* enough email, asking for ISS! :)  Hehehe...
-- 
Ed Carp, N7EKG			erc@apple.com			510/659-9560
                            an38299@anon.penet.fi
If you want magic, let go of your armor.  Magic is so much stronger than
steel!        -- Richard Bach, "The Bridge Across Forever"



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Robert J Woodhead <trebor@foretune.co.jp>
Date: Thu, 7 Oct 93 17:59:20 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: The death of the list as we know it (tm)
Message-ID: <9310080056.AA27566@dink.foretune.co.jp>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



I've only been monitoring the list for a couple of days, but already it is clear
to me that the traffic is _way_ too high to manage as a mailing list.  Apart
from the volume, the very structure of Email tends to dis-associate message
from reply, and make it difficult to do any filtering before reading (one of
the great joys of using _nn_ IMHO).

A humble suggestion: someone undertake to create alt.cyperpunks and shadow the
newsgroup and the mailing list (so that posts to one also go to the other).
In my case this would cut my reading time in half and increase my "harvest"
by a factor of two.  The mailing list would still be available for those who
cannot get the group.  In addition, as the number of people getting the mailing
list would decrease, it would probably delay the death of the net by bandwidth
overload for a few hours (currently, it is scheduled for sometime in June 1997,
last time I checked).

Also, even an unmoderated alt group can be made moderated (and thus, filter out
most of the forgery, etc) by appropriate use of technology described in this
mailing list.

+---------------------------------------------------------------------------+ 
| Robert J. Woodhead, Biar Games / AnimEigo, Incs.    trebor@forEtune.co.jp |
| AnimEigo US Office Email (for general questions): 72447.37@compuserve.com |




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Perry E. Metzger" <pmetzger@lehman.com>
Date: Fri, 8 Oct 93 07:25:42 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: FIDONet Mail filterin
In-Reply-To: <199310080419.AA02439@panix.com>
Message-ID: <9310081425.AA01087@snark.lehman.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Duncan Frissell says:
> J >So how do I prevent what happened to SJG, killer, etc from happening
> J >to me?  How do I prevent the LE types from showing up one day and
> J >saying 'hey, did you know there's a meg of kiddie porn on your 
> J >machine and we're taking it all away'?
> 
> As soon as you get the 10mbps line into the home (next year for you 
> Continental cable customers), mirror your machine with another located 
> overseas (or just run the machine overseas).

I think this is a bit extreme.

In any case, from what I can tell, none of the incidents the original
poster mentions involved any illegal activity, and none of them
involved email on a system. Everyone was aquitted or no charges were
brought. So, obviously there was nothing they could have done to
prevent them. Any time you do anything in an only semi-free country
like the U.S. you risk having the storm troopers break down your door,
regardless of what sort of anything that might be. You might be
arrested tomorrow because you share the same name as a drug dealer.
You might be killed like the heir to the Scott fortune was because the
state wishes to sieze your property. Who knows what could happen to
you. The point is, however, that there is very little you can do,
other than following the law, to stop unlawful arrests, so why not
just relax and quit worrying about things you have no control over?

Censoring your users mail will not lower your risk, so why do it?

Perry





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Date: Fri, 8 Oct 93 10:45:53 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: The death of the list as we know it (tm)
In-Reply-To: <9310081719.AA25273@shaddam.usb.ve>
Message-ID: <9310081743.AA28221@netcom5.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Patrick O'Callaghan writes:

> I strongly support this idea, so I'll mention a further advantage:
> kill files! No more wading through boring message about anonymous
> remailers, digital cash an so on (or RSA weaknesses, or
> crypto-legality or whatever your personal bug happens to be).

Well, my mailer program (Eudora) has better "kill file" capabilities
than my newsreader program (tin), so converting the mailing list into a
newsgroup would be a lose for me. Not that what's convenient for me is
what we have to use, just that _your_ particular situation is not
universal. 

My point is this: there are many sound reasons to keep a group such as
ours a mailing list and not open it to every freshman in college who
can grep for "punk" and stumble across us, or for every
Sternlight-type bozo who delights in creating noise and rancor in
groups.

As others have mentioned, tools exist to locally feed mailing list
traffic into pseuodo-newsgroups, which can then be treated as the
newsgroup format some folks desire.

We debate this issue every couple of months. Give it up. Or start your
own newsgroup. Or use one of the existing newsgroups.

--Tim May


-- 
..........................................................................
Timothy C. May         | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,  
tcmay@netcom.com       | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
408-688-5409           | knowledge, reputations, information markets, 
W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA  | black markets, collapse of governments.
Higher Power: 2^756839 | Public Key: PGP and MailSafe available.
Note: I put time and money into writing this posting. I hope you enjoy it.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Ron McCoy - Yale Security <rmccoy@rock.concert.net>
Date: Fri, 8 Oct 93 07:45:42 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Phone Privacy
Message-ID: <9310081444.AA00136@rock.concert.net>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


There was mention on this list, some time ago, of a 1-900 number which
could be used to ensure non-tracibility. Does anyone have this number?

Thanks,

Rmccoy@rock.concert.net





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: peter honeyman <honey@citi.umich.edu>
Date: Fri, 8 Oct 93 07:55:42 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: second order homophonic substitution
Message-ID: <9310081453.AA27788@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


a faq on this list (and other places) is whether it is possible to
encipher a message in such a way that the resulting ciphertext can be
deciphered into a different (harmless?) message.  i mentioned on
sci.crypt that a second-order homphonic substitution does just this,
but it seems to have been missed by the cpunx readership.  so, just to
prove that i can read denning and still type, here is a brief
explanation.  (not brief enuf, sorry.)

a homophonic substitution maps letters from the plaintext alphabet into
sets of letters from the ciphertext alphabet.  to encipher, you pick an
arbitrary letter from the image of each plaintext letter.  usually the
intent is to disguise single letter frequency statistics.  it's still
not very strong, since it doesn't disguise digram or trigram
statistics.  (also, it seems to me that it would be vulnerable to the
same sort of attack used on running key ciphers.)

need an example?  see denning, p. 70.

to build a second order homophonic substitution cipher, you construct
an n by n table, where n is the size of the plaintext alphabet.  (say n
= 26).  initialize each entry in the table by a unique element from the
ciphertext alphabet.  (say, the integers from 0 to 26 * 26, permuted
arbitrarily.)  this table constitutes the key.

to encipher a message, select a "dummy" message (say the itar regs).
to encipher the i-th plaintext letter, say p sub i, grab the i-th
dummy letter, say d sub i, and output table[d sub i, p sub i].

to decipher, find the ciphertext letter (or number, in this case) in
the table at row i and column j.  to recover the actual message, output
the j-th plaintext alphabet letter.  to recover the dummy message,
output the i-th plaintext alphabet letter.  i.e., the rows give the
dummy message, while the columns give the actual message.

simple stuff.  here's an example.

table:

	
	D	E	G	I	N	O	S	T	U
D	01	02	03	04	05	06	07	08	09

E	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18

G	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27

I	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	35	36

N	37	38	39	40	41	42	43	44	45

O	46	47	48	49	50	51	52	53	54

S	55	56	57	58	58	60	61	62	63

T	64	65	66	67	68	69	70	71	72

U	73	74	75	76	77	78	79	80	81

here is some ciphertext: 64 11 05 32 49 77 57.

it's clear how to extend this to n-th order.

	peter




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: lear@cp10.es.xerox.com (Russell Lear)
Date: Fri, 8 Oct 93 11:25:45 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Newbie question on PGP
Message-ID: <9310081821.AA08878@kingtut.cp10.es.xerox.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I had heard about PGP and have been meaning to get and use it Real Soon Now for a few weeks.  When I heard it was an endangered species, I started looking around seriously.  Haven't found it yet, but I did find cypherpunks (I'm not sure if this is a blessing or a curse, but it is entertaining).  Anyway, can someone point me to an ftp site that still stocks PGP?  I'm running SunOS4.1.1 if that matters.

Thanks,
Russell.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: accom!erc%accom@uunet.UU.NET (Ed Carp)
Date: Fri, 8 Oct 93 11:39:23 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: iss source
Message-ID: <9310081831.AA08119@accom.accom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I've been rather swamped by folks asking for the ISS source code, so would
anyone mind if I posted it here?  It's only 19K tarred, gziped, and uuencoded...

-- Ed




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Peter Wayner <pcw@access.digex.net>
Date: Fri, 8 Oct 93 08:41:07 PDT
To: honey@citi.umich.edu
Subject: Re:  second order homophonic substitution
Message-ID: <199310081540.AA22858@access.digex.net>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Another way of thinking about this is:

Compress with one Huffman compression scheme based on the message
text

then

Decompress with the Huffman scheme based on the desired statistics.





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: owen@autodesk.com (D. Owen Rowley)
Date: Fri, 8 Oct 93 12:45:46 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: This just in..
Message-ID: <9310081912.AA15641@lux.YP.acad>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


What an incredible coincidence, this is excerpted from the RISKS digest.

LUX ./. owen


------------------------------

Date: Thu, 7 Oct 93 08:40:21 -0700
>>From: Tom Hanrahan <hanrahan@sequent.com>
Subject: Epitope suit uses computer bulletin board

>>From The Oregonian (Portland, Oregon), October 7, 1993, by Vince Kohler

Epitope Inc. used information subpoenaed from the computer bulletin- board
service Prodigy to prepare a $5 million federal lawsuit against a Kidder,
Peabody vice president in Kansas City, Mo.  

Lois Rosenbaum, a lawyer for Epitope, said the company used information from
Prodigy Services Co. to track down A. Karl Kipke, who works for Kidder,
Peabody in Kansas City, Mo.  The lawsuit claims that Kipke used a false name,
William Smith, to log onto a Prodigy electronic bulletin board on three
occasions in August.  Each time, the lawsuit contends, Kipke wrote lengthy
commentaries he knew were false and defamatory about Epitope, the company's
management practices and its attempts to gain federal approval of an oral
device used to detect the AIDS virus.

[...] "We certainly believe the price of the stock is lower than it would've
been but for these false allegations, Rosenbaum said.  "And I think it's clear
that the articles were written for the purpose of negatively influencing the
price of the stock."  [...] Epitope's lawsuit says Kipke and his clients were
holders of short positions in Epitope stock.  [...] Epitope's lawsuit seeks $5
million in punitive damages from Kipke and alleges defamation, manipulation of
security prices, securities fraud and intentional interference with business
relations.

Rosenbaum acknowledged that the lawsuit's electronic dimension is "a very
unusual situation."

Submitter note: The omitted sections of text basically say that Kipke was
unavailable for comment and explain what holding a "short position" means.

-- Tom Hanrahan, hanrahan@sequent.com

------------------------------





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: blaster@rd.relcom.msk.su (Victor A. Borisov)
Date: Fri, 8 Oct 93 03:29:22 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Can I conect to cypherpunks list?
Message-ID: <AAY4JjiG2C@rd.relcom.msk.su>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Hello!

     I want to conect to  cypherpunks  mailing list. What  I
must made  for  conect  to  this list? Do you welcame people
from Russia?

Thank you in advance.

PS. Sorry for my poor English.
--- 
Victor A. Borisov aka blaster;	Relcom R&D;
Email: blaster@rd.relcom.msk.su;
Phone: +7(095)-943-4735; +7(095)-198-9510;
	=== Don`t panic! ===




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: accom!erc%accom@uunet.UU.NET (Ed Carp)
Date: Fri, 8 Oct 93 12:25:45 PDT
To: uunet!ccwf.cc.utexas.edu!mccoy@uunet.UU.NET
Subject: Re: iss source
Message-ID: <9310081923.AA08514@accom.accom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



> > I've been rather swamped by folks asking for the ISS source code, so would
> > anyone mind if I posted it here?  It's only 19K tarred, gziped, and
> > uuencoded... 
> 
> Why don't you just tell all of these people to get it via anonymosu ftp
> from ftp.uu.net in the /usenet/comp.sources.misc/volume39/iss directory.
> If they only have access to mail they should find a nice ftp-to-mail
> gateway to do the job for them.  

Because someone reported to me that the copy on uunet was corrupted or
something... :(

-- Ed




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: pierre@shell.portal.com (Pierre Uszynski)
Date: Fri, 8 Oct 93 14:05:56 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Standard Headers for Anonymous Remailers
Message-ID: <9310081955.AA00974@jobe.shell.portal.com.shell.portal.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> I wrote:
> Who qualifies whom, based on what info, and to eliminate whom?

> Paul mentions organizational qualification methods

> Douglas defends the rights of private groups, and anonymity

Yes, I meant that as a pointer to further problems. I did not mean
that it is very difficult to find organizational or technical solutions
(although in practice, it may very well be), nor was I lashing back at
an Orwellian suggestion. (I still get caught in the way email gets read,
not that I have much more luck in person :-)

Even though there may be technical solutions to "limited access"
groups, it is not clear how compatible each of these is with anonymity.
And at the same time it will become harder and harder to figure out
whether somebody is using hir Real Name or some Assumed Name. The
book publishing market surprises people because an author's pseudonym
is not obviously a pseudonym. Any "limited access" policy has to
address the problem of pseudonyms, and of individuals offering their
pseudonym for un-accredited public access.

But the problem at hand is not even that...

In the case of io.com, and current remailers, the problem is netnews
newsgroups that don't like anonymous abuse without really understanding
how hard it could be to eliminate it... Netnews, until now, is here to
provide open discussion and "publishing" space. The idea of
qualification can be implemented via automatic moderation for example,
but it has to contend with:

1) votes by the general public, and acceptance by sysadmins who will
carry the traffic (although they don't have much of a say about
mailing list traffic...)

2) superset groups and cross-posting. If a "qualify"-only newsgroup is
created, then a super-set newsgroup could be created that copies
everyhting from the "qualified" groups, and adds open traffic. That
superset still carries interesting traffic from people who shun
administrative overhead. Qualified people who want to pursue the thread
they started now read the superset newsgroup.

3) If you publish, and expect email responses, you need to publish your
email address. That makes you vulnerable to mail bombing. It does not
matter if the newsgroups carries only filtered traffic.




And thanks to Owen for posting the description of some of these
net.wars. It will take me a while to go through that.

pierre.
pierre@shell.portal.com




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Patrick O'Callaghan <poc@usb.ve>
Date: Fri, 8 Oct 93 10:11:10 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: The death of the list as we know it (tm)
In-Reply-To: <9310080056.AA27566@dink.foretune.co.jp>
Message-ID: <9310081719.AA25273@shaddam.usb.ve>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


In message <9310080056.AA27566@dink.foretune.co.jp>, Robert J Woodhead writes:

> A humble suggestion: someone undertake to create alt.cyperpunks and shadow th
> e
> newsgroup and the mailing list (so that posts to one also go to the other).
> In my case this would cut my reading time in half and increase my "harvest"
> by a factor of two.  The mailing list would still be available for those who
> cannot get the group.

I strongly support this idea, so I'll mention a further advantage:
kill files! No more wading through boring message about anonymous
remailers, digital cash an so on (or RSA weaknesses, or
crypto-legality or whatever your personal bug happens to be).

Patrick O'Callaghan			Internet: poc@usb.ve
Departamento de Computacion		NICNAME: PO22
Universidad Simon Bolivar 		Tel: +058 (2) 906 3242, 906 3254
Sartenejas, Baruta, Edo. Miranda	FAX: +058 (2) 93 71 28
Caracas, Venezuela			"Just messing about in quotes"




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: accom!erc%accom@uunet.UU.NET (Ed Carp)
Date: Fri, 8 Oct 93 13:25:45 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: wireless LANs
Message-ID: <9310082021.AA08733@accom.accom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Well, I've got a wireless LAN up and running at home between my 486/25 and
a 386 laptop - it provides uucp/cu connectivity, and I'll be adding SLIP soon.

If anyone wants to see it working, let me know - I might be able to lug stuff
to the next Cypherpunks meeting.

I've had it running for several months now, and it was put together using all
off-the-shelf compoments.  The controllers cost $110 apiece, the radios are just
amateur radio 2m rigs. It runs at 1200 baud, but it's enough to show that the
system works, and is reliable.  The controllers provide end-to-end reliable
transport, so uucico doesn't have to do so much work.  cu displays are a
bit jerky, but *much* cleaner than on a standard voice-grade (yuck!) PacBell
line here.

-- Ed




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: peter honeyman <honey@citi.umich.edu>
Date: Fri, 8 Oct 93 10:35:44 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Digital Cash Primer
Message-ID: <9310081731.AA29536@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> Likewise, the Simmons books on "Contemporary Crytology" has good stuff
> on digital money

no it doesn't.  (or am i blind?)

	peter




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: wcs@anchor.ho.att.com (Bill_Stewart_HOY002_1305)
Date: Fri, 8 Oct 93 10:55:45 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: FIDONet Mail filterin
Message-ID: <9310081753.AA07684@anchor.ho.att.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> > J >So how do I prevent what happened to SJG, killer, etc from happening
> > J >to me?  How do I prevent the LE types from showing up one day and
> > J >saying 'hey, did you know there's a meg of kiddie porn on your 
> > J >machine and we're taking it all away'?

Well, keeping things encrypted helps, especially backup disks -
one site was being generally harassed and may be convicted because of 
possible child pornography that the sysop had deleted but was still on 
backup floppies in his re-use bin.  (Police got a 15-year-old kid to log in 
for them and find some adult material, but dropped that attempt
probably because it would have been thrown out as entrapment;
the child-porn gave them a much nastier charge to use to steal the computer.)

Perry> Censoring your users mail will not lower your risk, so why do it?

On the other hand, making sure your users *have* email on the system,
especially mail in transit to other systems, is good protection,
since the ECPA limits what they can do with it.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Matthew B. Landry <mbl@ml7694a.leonard.american.edu>
Date: Fri, 8 Oct 93 11:09:23 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: The death of the list as we know it (tm)
Message-ID: <9310081807.AA00251@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>I strongly support this idea, so I'll mention a further advantage:
>kill files! No more wading through boring message about anonymous
>remailers, digital cash an so on (or RSA weaknesses, or
>crypto-legality or whatever your personal bug happens to be).
        I really think that the powers that be should consider the newsgroup 
idea. The reasoning above is really the best justification, even though I'd 
personally kill the code and concentrate on the politics, that's just me. 
Newsreaders really have much better tools for handling this sort of traffic. 
(Back when my account was on msen.com, the absolute _only_ way I could possibly 
read this list was through the gateway to list.cypherpunks. My mailbox couldn't 
handle a subscription, and I was able to concentrate my time on the _good_ 
stuff instead of the noise.)
        To the people who say that Usenet has a worse s/n ratio than mail, I 
have two points. First, not all of Usenet has a bad s/n ratio (and this 
particular list _does_ have a _very_ bad s/n ratio). Second, the traditionally 
lower s/n ratio on Usenet has led to the development of better tools to deal 
with it than are available in mail. (I'd dearly love to see an ignore feature 
on this list, as I understand that the Extropians have, but I realize that's 
unrealistic. Even that wouldn't be as effective as a well-designed killfile.)
        I really think this idea deserves at least serious consideration.
--
Matthew B. Landry
ml7694a@american.edu
(Finally!) mbl@ml7694a.leonard.american.edu




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: cme@ellisun.sw.stratus.com (Carl Ellison)
Date: Fri, 8 Oct 93 11:16:09 PDT
To: richardr@netcom.com
Subject: Re:  academician seeks critique of cryptographic paper
Message-ID: <9310081815.AA26257@ellisun.sw.stratus.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>Message-Id: <9310070630.AA17189@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
>Subject: academician seeks critique of cryptographic paper
>Date: Thu, 07 Oct 93 00:30:51 -0600

Richard,


This reminds me of what I had to go through to get approved to get married
in the Roman Catholic Church.  I ended up having to say, for the record, "I
have no intention of using mechanical methods of birth control"
(pre-safe-sex days) when what they wanted was for me to say I would avoid
all birth control.

I'm now ashamed I stooped to that non-confrontive statement (especially
since the marriage didn't last :-).  I should have said, "No, I don't
accept your view of birth control and have every intention of using it."
At least I did say that my fiancee was on the pill and we intended to
continue using it.



I would be happy to review your paper and to suggest others who might
be good reviewers.  Furthermore, I have no intention of violating the
export laws (even though I disagree with them and work very hard to
change them).

However, I do not grant the NSA the power to control the publication of
theoretical information.  I have published papers on cryptology in the
international press, without offering the NSA the chance to review what I
write ahead of time, and I intend to continue doing so.  They have their
internal publications, no doubt, and we have our public ones.  I don't tell
them what to publish internally and I will not allow them to tell me what I
can publish out here in the public.

That is my policy, for my own writing.

If you send me your paper to review, I will not disseminate it.  That's
a matter of respecting your wishes -- not the NSA's.  My acceptance of
your paper will not constitute any agreement on my part to give the NSA
control over publications of ideas.

 - Carl
 - <<Disclaimer: All opinions expressed are my own, of course.>>
 - Carl Ellison                                        cme@sw.stratus.com
 - Stratus Computer Inc.       M3-2-BKW                TEL: (508)460-2783
 - 55 Fairbanks Boulevard ; Marlborough MA 01752-1298  FAX: (508)624-7488

-----BEGIN RIPEM PUBLIC KEY-----
User: cme@ellisun.sw.stratus.com
PublicKeyInfo:
 MIGbMAoGBFUIAQECAgP+A4GMADCBiAKBgCl79/jl0DEVl1GQzOHlzjDmChDDxnWO
 Acd7jShj2x1vclFh6vbHx9IJqkQdwNhNAWf8XnTrqBDN+VSBc1qdT6nSEAbNPxHD
 XcvY2DudhuRaRBVLgUQ4scTK657m90Q+bTL5yIh2MaFipUw9BgbIXPTDlksSskWP
 9oHjo+pCJC+lAgMBAAE=
MD5OfPublicKey: 39D9860686A9F075A9A83D49589C677A
-----END RIPEM PUBLIC KEY-----




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Jim McCoy <mccoy@ccwf.cc.utexas.edu>
Date: Fri, 8 Oct 93 12:19:23 PDT
To: erc@apple.com
Subject: Re: iss source
In-Reply-To: <9310081831.AA08119@accom.accom.com>
Message-ID: <199310081916.AA16214@foghorn.cc.utexas.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text


> 
> I've been rather swamped by folks asking for the ISS source code, so would
> anyone mind if I posted it here?  It's only 19K tarred, gziped, and
> uuencoded... 

Why don't you just tell all of these people to get it via anonymosu ftp
from ftp.uu.net in the /usenet/comp.sources.misc/volume39/iss directory.
If they only have access to mail they should find a nice ftp-to-mail
gateway to do the job for them.  

jim



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Jason Asbahr <Asbahr@UH.EDU>
Date: Fri, 8 Oct 93 12:20:45 PDT
To: hiscdcj@lux.latrobe.edu.au (Dwayne)
Subject: Re: distributed autonomous networks
In-Reply-To: <9310081716.AA13288@lux.latrobe.edu.au>
Message-ID: <199310081918.AA06860@Menudo.UH.EDU>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Greets...

>    well, after reading through the backlog of spread spectrum stuff, I was
> surprised to read about the radio-network-on-a-board (Julieboard) article
> that someone posted. A couple of us here in Australia have been kicking
> around the idea of a cheap network, running via repeaters in _very_
> small boxes tossed all around a city, which would be indestructible through
> sheer numbers (a la the arpanet).
>    So: anyone got any ideas, schematics, information?

Haha!  That's exactly how I got hyped about the Julieboard --
rummaging in the backlog of the voluminous-but-valuable cpunk posts...

My question:  Exactly how cheap can we make these things?  Mass
produced boards, a bag of appropriate components, and a few dozen
cpunks working in parallel could work wonders.  

What about surface mount components?  Harder to assemble, and fewer
people have the skills, but the resulting box would be very small
and more easily concealed.

> The main idea is a huge number of small, low-power and CHEAP nodes which
> would handle through traffic which anyone with a radio modem could tap into,
> with the nodes disguised and placed in extremely hard to get to places (tops
> of telephone poles, buildings, on bridges and overpasses, etc).


> Possible power sources: batteries (but they need to be changed)
>                         solar power (Australia leads the world in solar power
>                                      technology, and I know people who know
>                                      people).
>                          Near Field Interaction and EMF pickups (stick 'em
>                             near high-frequency power transmission lines).
>                          Something that convert heat to electrical energy

If you are hiding boxes on telco poles, an obvious source of power
presents itself.  :-)

I like the EMF idea!  Ideologically and technically interesting...
Is it practical?   Heat to electricity?  hmm...

> I have no idea how this could be done across interstate or international 
> distances, but I'm sure people might have ideas. Bounce signals off
> satellites (are those big shiny things from the 50's still about?); send
> stuff encrypted via the internet, etc etc.

Someone suggested general use of IR laser links, but someone else 
mentioned that it would be a bitch to operate a decentralized network 
of IR links.  Well, lasers and microwave are probably best suited for
mid-range connections betweens clusters of boxes.

(Ham radio tinkers with microwave and laser communication experience
 should probably comment here...  )

Since the FCC frowns on encrypted amateur radio, I doubt we could
openly use the ham nets or satellites...but how about bit fiddling
with slow-scan TV?  :-)  The list has generated many good ideas
on tunneling naughty data in otherwise innocent exchanges...

How many people are interested in this idea?  Is it time for
a radiopunk task force?  Does one already exist?  :-)

Jason Asbahr                           116 E. Edgebrook #603
asbahr@uh.edu                          Houston, Texas  77034
asbahr@tree.egr.uh.edu (NeXTmail)      (713) 941-8294  voice
asbahr@gothamcity.jsc.nasa.gov         UH NeXT Consultant











From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: cman@IO.COM (Douglas Barnes)
Date: Fri, 8 Oct 93 12:56:09 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Diffie-Helman example in g++
Message-ID: <9310081951.AA12236@illuminati.IO.COM>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Here is a little demo using the big Integer routines from libg++
illustrating how Diffie-Hellman key exchange works. Basically,
I wanted to prove to myself that it works, and thought others might
appreciate it.

Doug
===============================================================


// Demo of mathematics for Diffie-Hellman type key exchange
//
// Useful to convince oneself that it really does work and that
// a patent on it is pretty silly. 
//
// Douglas Barnes (cman@io.com)
//
// Based on algorithm from Cryptography and Data Security, by Dorothy E.
// Denning, 1983, Addison-Wesley. 
//

// Note: you will need to have GNU libg++, or hack it to use big integer
//       math you do have.

#include <stdlib.h>
#include <time.h>
#include <sys/types.h>
#include "Integer.h"

Integer& RandBigInt(int bits);
Integer& FastExp(Integer& A, Integer& B, Integer& p);

#define keysize 644

main()
{

Integer p;
Integer a;
Integer XA, XB, K1, KA, KB, YA, YB, T;

char state[256];

pow(2, keysize, p);
p = p - 1;

// Does anyone have a clue what good values of 'a' are in this
// algorithm?

a = 127;

// Set up random stuff
initstate(time(0), state, 256);

cout << "A and B pick random numbers in the Galois field [0, p - 1]\n";
cout << "where p is (2^" << keysize << ") - 1:\n" << p << "\n";

XA = RandBigInt(keysize);
cout << "\nA picks a random secret XA: \n" << XA << "\n";

XB = RandBigInt(keysize);
cout << "\nB picks a random secret XB: \n" << XB << "\n";

YA = FastExp(a, XA, p);
YB = FastExp(a, XB, p);

cout << "\nA gives B a message YA (a^XA mod p): \n" << YA << "\n";
cout << "\nB gives A a message YB (a^XB mod p): \n" << YB << "\n";

KA = FastExp(YB, XA, p);
cout << "\nA now knows the key is (YB^XA mod p): \n" << KA << "\n";

KB = FastExp(YA, XB, p);
cout << "\nB now knows the key is (YA^XB mod p): \n" << KB << "\n";

cout << "\nComputing the key (which is a^XA^XB mod p) from (a^XA mod p) and\n"; 
cout << "(a^XB mod p) is equivalent to performing two discrete log calculations;\n";
cout << "the number of steps to perform discrete logs grows exponentially\n";
cout << "in proportion to the # of bits in the field. For a 'p' of 644 bits,\n";
cout << "Denning estimates 1.2 x 10^23 steps.\n";

}

// Calculate a^z mod n
//
// Based on the fact that (a^3 mod n) is the same thing
// as: (((a * a) mod n) * a) mod n
//
// Gets its speed from the fact that, for example, n^18 is the 
// same as (n^2)^9

Integer&
FastExp(Integer& a, Integer& z, Integer& n)
{
   Integer a1, z1, two; 
   static Integer x;

   a1 = a; 
   z1 = z;
   x = 1;
   two = 2;
   
   while(z1 != 0)
   {
      while((z1 % 2) == 0)
      {
         div(z1, two, z1);
         a1 = (a1 * a1) % n;
      }
      z1 = z1 - 1;
      x = (x * a1) % n;
   }

   return x;
      
}

// Yes, I know the random stuff is lame. This is a demo.
Integer& 
RandBigInt(int bits)
{
   int i;
   int randval;
   static Integer retval;

   retval = 0;
   for(i = 0; i<bits; i++)
   {
      retval |= (random()&01);
      lshift(retval, 1, retval);
   }

   return retval;
}



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Alan Mason <vznquest@netcom.com>
Date: Fri, 8 Oct 93 15:30:48 PDT
To: Anonymous <nowhere@bsu-cs.bsu.edu>
Subject: Re: your mail
In-Reply-To: <9310061825.AA00943@bsu-cs.bsu.edu>
Message-ID: <Pine.3.05.9310081540.A9635-a100000@netcom5>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


DITTO!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!

-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
Alan Mason		|   Any time you find a simple answer to a question,
vznquest@netcom.com	|   The odds are you asked the wrong question.
*******************     |
----------------------------------------------------------------------------

On Wed, 6 Oct 1993, Anonymous wrote:

> > and cause people not to buy their next posting. 2) People would 
> > have an incentive to contribute to the group because they would
> > start running out of cash if they didn't say something valuable. 
> 
> Yes, but it would also discourage lurkers like me who are here to learn
> - and don't have much to contribute so far.  If you have to pay to read,
> and to get more money you have to post something useful that people want
> to read, the "startup cost" associated with the list would grow as time
> goes on.







From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Peter Wayner <pcw@access.digex.net>
Date: Fri, 8 Oct 93 12:49:23 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Radio, Radio...
Message-ID: <199310081947.AA03532@access.digex.net>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



I thought it was interesting that people on this net are getting
interested in placing a discrete network of spread-spectrum 
boxes around the area. It turns out that a company, Tetherless
Access Limited, is just beginning plans to do this right now.
Here is a press release I just got:

-Peter




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Peter Wayner <pcw@access.digex.net>
Date: Fri, 8 Oct 93 12:55:45 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Sorry about that last message
Message-ID: <199310081952.AA04342@access.digex.net>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



I didn't mean to append that note about Moscow at the end of
the press release. It happened by mistake. You can enjoy it
but please delete it afterwards. I've gotten about three copies
in the mail through different forwarding paths. 

-Peter




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Matthew B. Landry <mbl@ml7694a.leonard.american.edu>
Date: Fri, 8 Oct 93 12:55:55 PDT
To: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Subject: Re: The death of the list as we know it (tm)
Message-ID: <9310081954.AA01533@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>We debate this issue every couple of months. Give it up. Or start your
>own newsgroup.
        I'm strongly thinking of doing that. However, I think it would be a 
shame if we had to operate the newsgroup and the list in paralell, without 
connections.
        And frankly, I don't think it would be entirely a disadvantage to have 
wider exposure. Sure, we would get some more noise (but we're used to noise by 
now), but we would also get a much larger readership. We would still be 
preaching to the choir, but we would have a "choir" large enough that it would 
no longer be a disadvantage.

        As a compromise solution, perhaps we could have a one-way gateway to a 
general distribution newsgroup, where posts to the list would automatically go 
to the newsgroup as well, but posts to the group would only go to the group 
(unless the person also mailed to the list). The list.cypherpunks group at Msen 
(where my account was before) was set configured like a moderated group, so all 
posts got sent to the list, but there's no reason it _has_ to be that way.
        Really, I think there are ways to solve this so that everyone will get 
what he needs.
--
Matthew B. Landry
ml7694a@american.edu
(Finally!) mbl@ml7694a.leonard.american.edu




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: ferguson@icm1.icp.net (Paul Ferguson x2044)
Date: Fri, 8 Oct 93 12:59:23 PDT
To: julf@penet.fi (Johan Helsingius)
Subject: Re: The death of the list as we know it (tm)
In-Reply-To: <199310081838.AA07011@mail.eunet.fi>
Message-ID: <9310082057.AA14946@icm1.icp.net>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text



>  If cyperpunks becomes a  newsgroup, count on me dropping off.

 Ditto.

_____________________________________________________________________________
Paul Ferguson                                                               
Mindbank Consulting Group                                    fergp@sytex.com   
Fairfax, Virginia  USA                                       ferguson@icp.net



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Duncan Frissell <frissell@panix.com>
Date: Fri, 8 Oct 93 13:15:45 PDT
To: CYPHERPUNKS@toad.com
Subject: Re: FIDONet Mail filterin
Message-ID: <199310082012.AA23966@panix.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


J >So how do I prevent what happened to SJG, killer, etc from happening
J >to me?  How do I prevent the LE types from showing up one day and
J >saying 'hey, did you know there's a meg of kiddie porn on your 
J >machine and we're taking it all away'?

As soon as you get the 10mbps line into the home (next year for you 
Continental cable customers), mirror your machine with another located 
overseas (or just run the machine overseas).

Duncan Frissell

--- WinQwk 2.0b#0
                                       




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Jiva De Voe <tigger@indirect.com>
Date: Fri, 8 Oct 93 16:15:47 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Boy!
Message-ID: <199310082313.AA16930@indirect.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Things got quite atround here *real* quick eh?





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: catalyst@netcom.com (Scott Collins)
Date: Fri, 8 Oct 93 16:19:22 PDT
To: Matthew J Ghio <mg5n+@andrew.cmu.edu>
Subject: Re: distributed autonomous networks
Message-ID: <9310082312.AA02297@newton.apple.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


  >[stuff about possible power sources and transmission media]

A television report on 'Beyond 2000' described meteor-bounce radio.  The
technique extends the idea of bouncing radio waves off the ionosphere (for
distance), to bouncing off the atmospheric trails of micro meteors. 
Reported applications are economical (at least run-time economical,
start-up cost was not discussed) weather telemetry stations in remote
areas.  A solar panel provides the power, a small computer is needed to
direct transmission.

I don't know how reliable 'Beyond 2000' is, but they did show both the
alleged transmitters and telemetry stations using them.

This technique may not be feasible in the context you are describing, but
the telemetry application was parallel in that it also comprises many
independent, self-contained transmitters.


Scott Collins         | "Few people realize what tremendous power there
                      |  is in one of these things."     -- Willy Wonka
......................|................................................
BUSINESS.   voice:408.862.0540  fax:974.6094   collins@newton.apple.com
Apple Computer, Inc.   5 Infinite Loop, MS 305-2B   Cupertino, CA 95014
.......................................................................
PERSONAL.   voice/fax:408.257.1746    1024:669687   catalyst@netcom.com





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: wcs@anchor.ho.att.com (Bill_Stewart_HOY002_1305)
Date: Fri, 8 Oct 93 13:39:22 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: The death of the list as we know it (tm)
Message-ID: <9310082037.AA10090@anchor.ho.att.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Another crypto newsgroup would be superfluous - we can talk technical
on sci.crypt, politics on talk.politics.crypto, and get away with talking
about implementation on sci.crypt, especially if sci.crypt.research gets
created to provide a more pure crypto newsgroup.  Yes, cypherpunks is
already too high volume, but it does serve a purpose, and most of us
could hack a forwarder into digesters or local newsgroups to feed our favorite
newsreaders if we really wanted to....		Bill





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: lear@cp10.es.xerox.com (Russell Lear)
Date: Fri, 8 Oct 93 16:49:23 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Newbie question on PGP
Message-ID: <9310082347.AA12225@kingtut.cp10.es.xerox.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Thanks all for the pointers (I came back from a meeting to find > 20 messages telling me where to go!  Now that's response).

Thanks all who responded.

Russell.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: habs@panix.com (Harry S. Hawk)
Date: Fri, 8 Oct 93 14:45:47 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Future of the list
Message-ID: <199310082141.AA09211@panix.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


We (ExI) have offered the software now being used to operate
the Extropians list to the operators of the cypherpunks list.

Our software is not quite ready for prime-time, but it is a
solid and interesting program. It allows for kill files by
user, and subject (reg. exp.), and allows for retrival of 
messages by subject (reg. exp.) and full body text (agrep).

It is very modular with one part of the program databasing all
incoming messages and other modules actings as agents for
various list members. Each agent can support one or more
users (subscribers).

In addition to kill files, all messages can be excluded and
then specfic messages can be Included.

I feel it or similar software will solve the programs that 
some members of this list are complaining about. (Mailing
List vs. News Group). 

I strongly urge that a newsgroup NOT be formed.


/hawk


--
Harry S. Hawk           ON Vacation






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Paul Goggin <chaos@aql.gatech.edu>
Date: Fri, 8 Oct 93 14:59:24 PDT
To: erc@apple.com
Subject: Re: iss source
In-Reply-To: <9310081923.AA08514@accom.accom.com>
Message-ID: <9310082156.AA02979@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Ed thus said:

>> > I've been rather swamped by folks asking for the ISS source code, so would
>> > anyone mind if I posted it here?  It's only 19K tarred, gziped, and
>> > uuencoded... 

I guess I should have spoken up sooner, but I did not realize the need was so
great. It is for ftp at aql.gatech.edu under /pub/security/iss. Updates will
be posted there as they appear.

Paul
--
R  O    All Comments Copyright by  | Technofetishist
 A  N     Paul S. Goggin (1993)    | Cypher, Cyber, Chaos              
  V        Information Broker      | Ergoflux, Interzone
   E      chaos@aql.gatech.edu     | Carpe Diem: Stop the Clipper wiretap chip 
Finger account for latest _Phrack_ | Public Key: PGP and RIPEM available
      For anonymous communication:---> anon32940@anon.penet.fi
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Title 18 USC 2511 and 18 USC 2703 Protected -- Monitoring Absolutely Forbidden




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Martin Janzen <janzen@idacom.hp.com>
Date: Fri, 8 Oct 93 16:56:13 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: TAL Press Releases
Message-ID: <9310082355.AA18364@loki.idacom.hp.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



I had to reformat the TAL press releases to make them readable, so I
thought I'd save others the trouble...


TETHERLESS ACCESS LTD. ANNOUNCES STRATEGIC ALLIANCES FOR WIRELESS MAN
DEPLOYMENT

October 4, 1993, Fremont, California

Tetherless Access, Ltd. (TAL), a leader in the development of
user-provided wireless metropolitan area networks (MAN), today announced
the formation of three separate strategic business and technology
alliances.  The alliances envision the provision of wireless access,
applications development, packet radio hardware development and new
services for wireless connectivity to the worldwide Internet.

TAL has developed a "plug-and-play" interface for the Macintosh platform
for the unlicensed operation of packet radio systems.  The systems
enable peer-to-peer wireless connectivity over AppleTalk networks within
a MAN environment.  The system software also provides transparent
connectivity to TCP/IP networks and to services available on the
worldwide Internet.

User-provided wireless networking allows anyone within range of another
system to automatically make a network connection.  This "ad hoc"
network means that each node not only generates its own traffic, but
also relays the transmissions of nearby nodes.  Each system owner
becomes a "de facto" member of the network.  The system provides a
low-cost connectivity solution for community networks, libraries,
schools, businesses, telecommuters, and an easily deployed
communications infrastructure for developing countries.  "In association
with our strategic alliances we will deploy wireless MANs on a worldwide
basis with a focus on providing access to the Internet" said Dewayne
Hendricks, President of TAL.

Pandora Systems of San Francisco, CA, a software development and network
operations company, will design Internet-based wireless networking
products and services.  Pandora's principals have been involved in the
establishment of PeaceNet, GreenNet, The WELL and have developed
numerous Internet applications including Veronica, one of the most
popular and useful navigation tools available on the Internet today.
"The Internet and wireless communications are both experiencing dramatic
growth.  The combination of these environments offer unparalleled
applications development opportunities" said Mark Graham, President of
Pandora Systems.

InterNex Information Services, Inc. of Menlo Park, CA, a provider of
high bandwidth connectivity to the Internet, will provide wireline
access points to the Internet for wireless MANs in major metropolitan
areas throughout the U.S.  InterNex and TAL will jointly market network
services to businesses, educational institutions, communities and
individuals.

Cylink of Sunnyvale, CA, the leading worldwide supplier of commercial
communications security products and spread spectrum wireless modems and
systems, is cooperating in the supplying of spread spectrum radios for
deployment in TAL's MAN packet radio systems on a worldwide basis.
Cylink's founders are leading authorities in encryption and spread
spectrum technologies, and the company currently services customers in
over 40 countries.

Tetherless Access, Ltd., based in Fremont, California, is a leader in
the development and deployment of "plug-and-play" wireless metropolitan
area networks.  The company's products allow customers to achieve
efficient, low-cost, flexible, high-quality wireless data communications
in metropolitan network environments and to the worldwide Internet.



TETHERLESS ACCESS, LTD. ANNOUNCES NET/MAC PRO WITH SUPPORT FOR POWERTALK

October 4, 1993, Fremont, California

Tetherless Access, Ltd. (TAL), a leader in the development of
user-provided wireless metropolitan area networks (MAN), today announced
NET/Mac Pro, a new version of its NET/Mac Internet Protocol application
for packet radio environments.  NET/Mac Pro adds support for a personal
gateway that allows PowerTalk81 users to exchange mail with SMTP servers
over a TCP/IP network.  PowerTalk is Apple's new mail and messaging
technology, built in to System 781 Pro.

This combination provides convenient Internet access for Apple Macintosh
users through wireless Metropolitan Area Networks.  TAL's standard
products have led the way for wireless TCP/IP network access on the
Macintosh.  Now, with System 7 Pro, this access is simplified even more
by not having to use a separate SMTP client program to transfer mail.
"The PowerTalk universal mailbox and drag send capability integrated
with our NET/Mac Pro product allows our users to deploy wireless MANs on
a worldwide basis with a focus on providing easy access to the Internet
mail services" said Dewayne Hendricks, President of TAL.

TAL has formed strategic alliances with InterNex Information
Services, Inc.  of Menlo Park, CA, Cylink of Sunnyvale, CA and Pandora
Systems of San Francisco, CA.  Together the four companies will provide
hardware, software and services which can be used to provide low-cost
MAN connectivity solutions for community networks, libraries, schools,
businesses, telecommuters, and an easily deployed communications
infrastructure for developing countries.  "In association with our
strategic alliances we will deploy wireless MANs on a worldwide basis
with a focus on providing access to the Internet" said Dewayne
Hendricks, President of TAL.

Tetherless Access, Ltd., based in Fremont, California, is a leader in
the development and deployment of "plug-and-play" wireless metropolitan
area networks.  The company's products allow customers to achieve
efficient, low-cost, flexible, high-quality wireless data communications
in metropolitan network environments and to the worldwide Internet.

Apple and Macintosh are registered trademarks and PowerTalk and System 7
are trademarks of Apple Computer, Inc.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Eric Blossom <eb@srlr14.sr.hp.com>
Date: Fri, 8 Oct 93 18:25:48 PDT
To: trebor@foretune.co.jp
Subject: The death of the list as we know it (tm)
In-Reply-To: <9310090057.AA08696@dink.foretune.co.jp>
Message-ID: <9310090122.AA02316@srlr14.sr.hp.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Please table the mailing list vs news discussion.

	- Eric Blossom




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Matthew J Ghio <mg5n+@andrew.cmu.edu>
Date: Fri, 8 Oct 93 15:25:47 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: distributed autonomous networks
In-Reply-To: <199310081918.AA06860@Menudo.UH.EDU>
Message-ID: <MghSVRS00Vp2BH7Uc=@andrew.cmu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> > Possible power sources: batteries (but they need to be changed)
> >                         solar power (Australia leads the world in
solar power
> >                                      technology, and I know people who know
> >                                      people).
> >                          Near Field Interaction and EMF pickups (stick 'em
> >                             near high-frequency power transmission lines).
> >                          Something that convert heat to electrical energy
>
> If you are hiding boxes on telco poles, an obvious source of power
> presents itself.  :-)
>
> I like the EMF idea!  Ideologically and technically interesting...
> Is it practical?   Heat to electricity?  hmm...

haha...  Well, telephone lines are not a good source of power, because
if you draw too much current, you will get caught very easily when the
customer starts having problems and complains.  I like the EMF idea tho!
 It would probably work fairly well, and would be undetectable unless
they actually went up to check it out.  In most areas, power is carried
by high voltage lines (several thousand volts) and then they have a
transformer every block or so to convert it down to 120v (or 240v or
whatever).  But those high voltage lines do produce a large magnetic
field.  If you strung wires parallel to them, you could get a pretty
sizeable amount of power out of it (enough to run a transmitter at
least).

Heat to electricity: possible but not practical.  Thermocouples can be
expensive and don't produce too much power.  You'd need to place it by
something constantly warm, especially at night.  Solar panels with
rechargeable batteries would probably work best.  That way, the box
could be located in a tall tree or somewhere away from other obvious
power sources, or in other less conspicuous locations.

> > I have no idea how this could be done across interstate or international 
> > distances, but I'm sure people might have ideas. Bounce signals off
> > satellites (are those big shiny things from the 50's still about?); send
> > stuff encrypted via the internet, etc etc.
>
> Someone suggested general use of IR laser links, but someone else
> mentioned that it would be a bitch to operate a decentralized network
> of IR links.  Well, lasers and microwave are probably best suited for
> mid-range connections betweens clusters of boxes.
>
> (Ham radio tinkers with microwave and laser communication experience
>  should probably comment here...  )
>
> Since the FCC frowns on encrypted amateur radio, I doubt we could
> openly use the ham nets or satellites...but how about bit fiddling
> with slow-scan TV?  :-)  The list has generated many good ideas
> on tunneling naughty data in otherwise innocent exchanges...

Well, for international, we might be able to pirate a few unused
frequencies on satellites, altho this might piss off some big name guys
just enuff to get the cops after us.  There's the possibility of
reflecting radio waves off the moon, but of course this would not work
all the time.

Infrared:  IR works well for short distances, and can not be intercepted
easily, but can scattered by rain and fog.  (Polarized light might help
filter noise somewhat tho.)  Furthermore, it has to be direct line of
sight, and can't be situated where something might move in the path of
the beam.  Perhaps someone living on a hill could put up a big aluminum
reflector, and people could focus beams of light onto it.

As for hiding messages in other signals, there's always the possibility
of using ultrasound on a voice frequency...(if the frequency is high
enuff to make it feasible)

> How many people are interested in this idea?  Is it time for
> a radiopunk task force?  Does one already exist?  :-)

Yep, I think so...  I like the idea.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: jrk@sys.uea.ac.uk (Richard Kennaway)
Date: Fri, 8 Oct 93 10:45:44 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: MacPGP 2.3 source
Message-ID: <7468.9310081744@s5.sys.uea.ac.uk>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Apparently there's a basic incompatibility between ftp and the auto-backup
program which runs every now and then on my Mac, which brings everything to
a halt if anyone connects to ftp while the backup is being done, so I'll
have to remove the MacPGP source from the ftp area on my Mac.  But I'd only
promised to keep it there until this morning anyway.

However, the sysadmins happen to have just set up a properly supported anon
ftp area, so I've put the stuff there instead, where it can probably remain
indefinitely.  The site to ftp to is ftp.sys.uea.ac.uk, and the files are
in the directory ftp/Macintosh.  (Ignore the .finderinfo and .resource
subdirectories -- it's an AppleShare thing, your computer wouldn't
understand, at least not over the Internet.)

--                                  ____
Richard Kennaway                  __\_ /    School of Information Systems
Internet:  jrk@sys.uea.ac.uk      \  X/     University of East Anglia
uucp:  ...mcsun!ukc!uea-sys!jrk    \/       Norwich NR4 7TJ, U.K.






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Matthew J Ghio <mg5n+@andrew.cmu.edu>
Date: Fri, 8 Oct 93 16:15:59 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: distributed autonomous networks
In-Reply-To: <9310081716.AA13288@lux.latrobe.edu.au>
Message-ID: <cghTCtm00Vp21H7V5z@andrew.cmu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> A couple of us here in Australia have been kicking
> around the idea of a cheap network, running via repeaters
> in _very_ small boxes tossed all around a city, which would be
> indestructible through sheer numbers (a la the arpanet).
>   So: anyone got any ideas, schematics, information?
>
> The main idea is a huge number of small, low-power and CHEAP nodes which
> would handle through traffic which anyone with a radio modem could tap into,
> with the nodes disguised and placed in extremely hard to get to places (tops
> of telephone poles, buildings, on bridges and overpasses, etc).

Well, building the transmitter wouldn't be too hard, and you could
probably transmit much larger amounts of data than over a modem if you
used high frequencies.  The most difficult thing as I see it is that
you'd have to build a small computer for each box, and program it to
route data packets, error-check them, and so on.

> The idea being that we would have an untraceable, unbreakable network. Sure,
> you may have an address (perhaps we could set it up as a FQDN domain?), but
> that address would not correspond to any actual physical location. And, it
> would be free, aside from the cost of the equipment. No more phone calls
> to pay for!

A Fully-Qualified-Domain-Name type of network would create
complications.  Since the network will be constantly expanding and
changing, you'd probably need relative domain names. (you'd have to
specify: send packet thru site #10 thru site #34 and deliver to site #19)
To have fully qualified domain names, you'd need to have something on
the net cataloging them.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Date: Fri, 8 Oct 93 19:19:30 PDT
To: trebor@foretune.co.jp (Robert J. Woodhead)
Subject: Re: The death of the list as we know it (tm)
In-Reply-To: <9310090057.AA08696@dink.foretune.co.jp>
Message-ID: <9310090216.AA17737@netcom5.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Robert Woodhead writes:

> This is called "security through obscurity."  I'm shocked to see it
> advocated in this list!  ;^>

And I'm shocked--:-}-- that people keep beating a dead horse,
expecting that if they repeat their arguments enough times, something
will miraculously change. This rarely works, and mainly just dilutes
the content of the list further.

> Opening up the list into a newsgroup has risks, but they can be mitigated
> and doing so would make it easier to use, and reduce the load on toad.

I won't repeat my own arguments for the 7th or 8th time. In any case,
Eric Hughes has the final say and he has said it will not happen in no
uncertain terms.

If you vote otherwise, send your votes to dev/null. They'll count more
that way. (There is no pretense that the list is a democracy.)

> Bottom line, isn't one of the goals of punkery in general (whatever
> flavor) to _spread_ knowledge.  Shouldn't this stuff be shouted from
> the digital treetops?

Not one of the major goals, from my perspective. We don't advertise,
we don't lobby, we aren't even _set up_ to do such a thing. And when
we're interviewed (and anybody _can_ be), nobody spouts off the
"Cypherpunks agenda."

Books and magazines spread knowledge. Notice that we don't even have a
FAQ? We're hardly in the education business.

We're a loose collection of folks, bound by the mailing list and the
various physical meetings (and those of you out in the hinterlands
should simply organize your own gatherings). The interest in
remailers, digital money, code, etc., is the main glue.

Political action is a detour. The Clipper debate was one such detour,
occuoying too much time for several months, though I suspect some good
came out of it.

Anyway, it's not for me to say what the Cypherpunks are, but all those
folks shouting that "we" are a lobbying group, or whatever, are
misguided, I think.

One of the advantages of a mailing list is the implied sense of
community and of a shared history. It is expected that most on the
list have seen the traffic go by, even if they skipped many of the
messages. Newsgroups, on the other hand, encourage people to dip in
for a few days, ignore for several weeks, dip in again, and so on.
Thus, a huge number of repeat topics as people dip in and out and miss
the context of comments, the history, and so on. Progress stalls, even
more so than progress may've stalled in some areas on this List.

And while I agree that TLAs may be reading this list, one way or
another, making it a newsgroup would open it up for archiving around
the world, for appearance on those CD-ROMS filled with Usenet traffic,
and for easy grepping by future employers and future government
snoops. In other words, a public forum.

That's great if the goal is to educate people about crypto, not so
great if the goal is frank discussion of tough problems.

--Tim

-- 
..........................................................................
Timothy C. May         | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,  
tcmay@netcom.com       | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
408-688-5409           | knowledge, reputations, information markets, 
W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA  | black markets, collapse of governments.
Higher Power: 2^756839 | Public Key: PGP and MailSafe available.
Note: I put time and money into writing this posting. I hope you enjoy it.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Arthur Chandler <arthurc@crl.com>
Date: Fri, 8 Oct 93 19:59:30 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Virtual City (tm) Network FAQ 1.0 (fwd)
Message-ID: <Pine.3.05.9310081945.A6588-f100000@crl.crl.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain




 Greetings. I hope that I'm not spamming the list with this monster
forwarded FAQ. But since the author(s) are proposing, as one of the stated
goals of Virtual City(tm): 
      The Virtual City(tm) Network will also be a
      proving ground for privacy technologies such as public key
      cryptography, PGP, and Digital Cash(tm).

I thought that folks here might be interested. Has anyone heard of this
outfit? Is it for real or a huge slice of lemon meringue in the sky?

---------- Forwarded message ----------
Date: Fri, 8 Oct 1993 02:36:43 PDT
From: Strata Rose <strata@apple.com>
To: strata@virtual.net
Subject: Virtual City (tm) Network FAQ 1.0

		
		VIRTUAL CITY (TM) NETWORK FAQ, REV 1.0



SO WHAT EXACTLY IS THE VIRTUAL CITY (tm) NETWORK?

The Virtual City(tm) Network is an ambitious Networked Virtual Reality
Infrastructure which will link current Internet information technology
with the emerging capabilities of on-line virtual reality
environments.  Using existing software which implements shared,
interactive virtual spaces we will extend the paradigm of the FreeNet
community into virtual reality by creating online cities and
communities in which people may share text, graphics, and multimedia
in a cooperative real-time environment.  These online communities will
be able to make use of cutting edge tools such as network
conferencing, collaboration & visualization tools, multimedia
electronic mail, online access to government data, networked library
catalogs & facilities, electronic books online and Internet-accessible
public data repositories.  The Virtual City(tm) Network will also be a
proving ground for privacy technologies such as public key
cryptography, PGP, and Digital Cash(tm).


DIDN'T YOU RUN AN AD IN _WIRED_ RECENTLY?

NO.  And again, No.  The Virtual City (tm) Network is the brainchild
of one M. Strata Rose, longtime net.lurker and sometime visionary, who
has been developing the concept since roughly June 1992.  I started
serious feasibility exploration in December of '92 and have been on
track on a timeline which formally started in May '93.  The folks who
put an ad in _WIRED_ are Objective Communications of Illinois.
Virtual City (tm) is a trademark of M. Strata Rose and VirtualNet
(currently undergoing formal incorporation).  We are registered with
the NIC as VIRTUAL.NET and VIRTUAL-CITY.COM.


OH, COME ON-- TRADEMARKING THE PHRASE "VIRTUAL CITY"?

The concept of creating virtual communities in a Mush/MUD/MOO
environment has been kicking around for many years, and quite a bit of
work has been done by a great many people.  However, there is a
particular on-line public access service concept which I call the
Virtual City (tm) Network.  As it says in the terrifying amount of
paperwork required to file a trademark, "this application in no way
attempts to restrict the usage of the terms 'virtual' or 'city',
merely their usage in conjunction where applicable to services in this
class".  Or something highly similar but in stricter legalese, as per
professional advice.



WELL, HOW IS YOUR "VIRTUAL CITY (tm) NETWORK" DIFFERENT 
FROM THEIR "VIRTUAL CITY"?

Obviously there is a limit to the extent to which I can comment, as
both of our offerings seem to be in a pre-release state.  However, a
brief telephone conversation with an individual at Objective
Communications indicated some important differences:


1) The Virtual City (tm) Network will be free for individuals to
access; charges will only be levied on entities attempting to conduct
profitable business activities.  My understanding is that Objective
plans to charge fees at all levels of participation in their service.

2) The Virtual City (tm) Network has been designed for multimedia and
information service access from the ground up.  My understanding is
that Objective's service is text-only and the gentleman on the phone
indicated that they had no current plans to expand it to multimedia.

3) VirtualNet incorporates both a for-profit corporation and a 
not-for-profit research arm.  One of our primary goals for the Virtual
City(tm) Network is to take the Cleveland FreeNet model into virtual
space.  The Virtual City (tm) Metropolitan Transit Authority, VCMTA,
is being designed concurrently as an object transport model between
instantiations of various Virtual City (tm) Sites.  We will be
offering templates for instantiations of our city model to be used by
communities and organizations, with a true distributed model allowing
users and information to flow freely throughout the Virtual City (tm)
Network.

We are attempting to build an expandable, scalable piece of Internet
infrastructure that will support a rich model of growth and
self-determination as well as support research on virtual communities
and cyberspaces in general.  Look for abstracts, research papers,
RFC's and API's from us in the coming year.


NO KIDDING.  TELL ME MORE.

One of my design goals in building the Virtual City(tm) Network is to
challenge people's assumptions about "the real world" versus "the
virtual world"; many if not most of people's interactions today
take place in a virtual world which has been largely co-opted by the
real world.  Newspapers, television, and radio are all prime
examples-- most of these rely on mental constructions based on
primarily verbal input or on finely crafted presentations which have
little to do with "reality", yet few people consider to what degree
these omnipresent factors constitute much of their information flow.

A wonderful example is the Android Sisters' "Money" (radioplay "Ruby",
ZBS Productions).  The Sisters hold up two items, described as two
pieces of paper, to a "viewer" and ask for her description.  Her
reply, "well, one is a piece of paper, but the other is money" elicits
the ruefully exasperated reply "two pieces of paper!".  The well-made
point is that people's cognitive mappings have become so rigidly
codified that they view their world through highly constrained filters
to the point of shutting out other options.

In the Virtual City(tm) Network, the line between the real and the
virtual has the inherent ability to be deliberately blurred.
Information from "the real world" can be presented as often as
possible in a matter of fact way.  I hope to feature several space
station designs from the cutting edge of the aerospace industry, and
the reported weather in the outdoor sections of the city will come
from weather data live from local feeds, updated to the San Mateo
Bridge area, the putative location of the site.  Our virtual
coffeehouses will tie into Internet game servers of various sorts and
we are investigating links to real-world coffeehouses via terminals
in the field.  Imagine chatting on a virtual terminal via the Internet
to folks on real terminals in coffeehouses.  Now who's real and who's
virtual?


OKAY, WHAT'S YOUR TECHNOLOGY BASE?

We are currently using LambdaMOO, an object-oriented virtual
environment designed at Xerox PARC.  Instantiations of LambdaMOO are
already being used to provide virtual spaces in which researchers,
educators, and interested folks can meet and interact online, such as
MIT Media Lab's "MediaMOO", "JaysHouseMOO". the original "LambdaMOO"
and a growing plethora of others.  Various university and individual
projects are adding the capability to access certain Internet
information resources such as the "archie" FTP search engine and
University of Minnesota's Internet Gopher browser [JaysHouse MOO].
Xerox PARC is working on a project called "AstroVR" in which
extensions to the text-based MOO software allow astrophysicists to
share graphical images and data.  The PARC team is also working on
MBONE extensions to LambdaMOO; these extensions will allow LambdaMOO
users to use the Multicast Backbone to do real-time audio and video
conferencing using tools which are being developed concurrently by the
greater networking community.  We are working on extensions which will
combine the functionality of NCSA's Mosaic information browser with
the virtual environment capabilities of LambdaMOO.

Mosaic is a hypertext browser through which individuals may access
various Internet services such as World Wide Web, Gopher, WAIS, and
archie.  The World Wide Web in particular uses a format called HTML
(HyperText Markup Language) to create documents which can access other
documents with a single mouse click from the browser.  We are adding
the ability for SGML or HTML documents to be valid MOO objects; this
single extension opens up a significant range of possibilities which
represent needed interconnectivity between the MOO environment and the
wider world of Internet information.  Virtual spaces in the MOO can
then lead directly to an information cache, and information browsers
on the Internet can interact with MOO spaces as well.

This is just the beginning.  In particular, the Virtual City (tm)
Network is being designed to allow encapsulation of other information
formats and explicit handoff to both public and proprietary
information servers.  Our model is very similar to the one which NCSA
developed with Mosaic.  You interact with our virtual spaces using
custom clients or browsers which can invoke various service handlers
or interaction programs on your host machine.  Just as Mosaic will
bring up a GIF viewer when you reference a GIF file, the Virtual City
(tm) browser could invoke Virtus Walkthrough (tm Virtus) or the BRL-CAD
environment on a virtual space.  You might enter a virtual space with
encapsulated or referenced data available in several formats that your
client or browser could handle.


WHY IS THIS IMPORTANT?

Ah, this is one of the really great parts-- if we can hand you off to
some other viewer or program or even another server, then the Virtual
City (tm) Network is truly expandable and extensible.  We will be able
to offer services that no one has even thought of yet as long as they
run over the Internet infrastructure (ie, TCP/IP or something that can
encapsulate itself in it).  The Virtual City (tm) Network will grow
along with virtual reality and internet information technology, since
new services can be accessed in a plug-and-play fashion.  What we're
trying to do here is essentially spawn a meta-infrastructure context
in which to tie together highly varied services.  This is also where
VCMTA comes in.


WHAT'S VCMTA?


VCMTA, the Virtual City(tm) Metropolitan Transit Authority, will be
developed concurrently.  This facility will provide authentication
services for moving database objects between servers on different
hosts, as well as implementing state-of-the-art privacy enhancements
for secure communication & transactions.  VCMTA will allow us to
network instances of the Virtual City (tm) Template together and allow
people to "move" between them in one ever-growing virtual space.

We realize that there are hard problems to solve in building any sort
of object transport facility; however, our philosophy is that we can't
work miracles but can make something that works, is customizable and
configurable, and will make most people happy.

Obviously you can't "move" objects, however you can build objects
which rely on a core object library, are "registered" with VCMTA, and
follow certain rules as to their behavior on other servers and in
other conditions.  The nature of our distributed architecture already
means that resources you access are not necessarily on the VC server,
this is the logical next step.


WELL THIS IS ALL VERY NICE, BUT I DON'T PROGRAM AT ALL SO I 
PROBABLY WON'T BE ABLE TO USE IT MUCH.

Current implementations of MOOs and MUDS require that users be able to
program at a fairly sophisticated level in order to enjoy the full
power of MOO/MUD environments, especially in constructing new objects.
We feel that this encourages "second-class citizen" status for those
virtual citizens who cannot or will not learn to program proficiently.

Accordingly, the Virtual City(tm) Network is being designed with
virtual storehouses of objects which can be drawn from and user
friendly front-ends with which to customize those objects to create
personalized and useful virtual spaces.  The full power of the MOO
internal programming language will still be available to those who
care to use it, but those who have neither the time nor desire to do
so will be able to interact as fully as the programming hoi-polloi.

As part of this effort, we are designing interactive front-ends to
interface with the storehouses of objects and handle simple
customization.  Certain "city services" such as phones, chat lines,
radios, gopher slates, etc will be available as well as common objects
(and unusual ones!) from various individuals.  By the way, if you
register an object for public use and it passes the Virtual City (tm)
Architectural Board (no Trojan horses or duds, please!), it no longer
counts against your quota.  Keen, eh?


THIS IS STARTING TO SOUND PRETTY COOL.  ARE YOU SURE IT'S 
FREE?

There will be no charge for private individuals to access the Network
and to engage in building and programming activities (up to a generous
initial quota, as in most other MOOs or MUDs).  Non- profit and
government organizations will be allocated space at no charge in the
Virtual City(tm) Marketplace, Business District, and other public
areas.  Cultural attractions such as art galleries, museums, and music
halls are placed throughout the Virtual City(tm) Network; space in
these attractions will be donated to artists and community projects to
publicize their work.  The several museums will feature examples of
the growing number of online exhibits such as the Library of Congress'
current Vatican Project.

Corporations and other for-profit entities may be charged membership
fees on a monthly basis, as well as rent for virtual spaces in which
to transact business.  Our basic paradigm is that if you're in the
Virtual City (tm) Network to generate professional profitable activity
then you should pay a fee to do so.  Ie., the customary net.forsale or
net.jobs type of stuff is just fine, whereas setting up a virtual
office in which to run a real-time on-line consulting business would
require paying rent.  Arrangements can be made on a rental or
percentage basis, or both.

We are very interested in supporting subscription-based services where
subscribers are allowed access to custom objects or facilities.  This
can be a very economical way to do rich text or multimedia electronic
publishing in a small-press model, or provide specialized databases or
services at a modest cost to subscribers.  


WHAT SORT OF FACILITIES ARE YOU PLANNING?

In addition to those mentioned above, we will have all the standard
amenities-- Alexandria, the Virtual Library, a business district,
arcade and game areas, residential streets, a campus area where
several interesting projects are being designed, transit facilities,
and so on.  We're choosing to leave MBONE facilities out on this pass
due to bandwidth considerations; however, we plan on supporting such
diverse applications and protocols as Netjam MIDI, CUSeeMe network
video conferencing, various whiteboard tools, IRC with local client
enhancements, connections to other MOOs/MUDS, NCSA & BRL-CAD
visualization environments, group collaboration tools, interactive
game servers, Internet Talk Radio, etc.  We're exploring support for
proprietary and vendor environments as well, such as Autodesk, Virtus,
SGI, and other virtual reality software interfaces.

We also have several original-design projects up our virtual sleeves
such as the Virtual Coffeehouses, the Twilight Lands where
storytellers roam the campfires, the UpAbove and DownBelow space and
marine research station simulators, a Virtual Physics Lab, and so on.

Not to mention the Virtual City (tm) Marketplace, Information Center,
and On-Line Technical Support Center where you can sell your products
or services with minimal overhead and rely on our expertise to deliver
your information to the Internet community.  


WOW, I'M CONVINCED.  HOW DO I LOG ON? 

We're terribly sorry, but you can't log in quite yet.  We will be
opening the database to key implementors once we finish the C
modifications to the LambdaMOO server and to the LambdaCore.  We had
planned a general announcement in mid to late November, but
circumstances required otherwise.  We are taking lists of pre-
registrants, though.  Send email to "vcreg@virtual.net" with pertinent
info: your name, your requested character name, and a short blurb
which will become your initial description.  Oh yes, and your Public
Key.

Don't have one?  Tsk, tsk, they're a good thing to have in general; go
out and connect to a public key server and get yourself a key-- we'll
send out your initial password encrypted to you, and you can decipher
it with our public key.  Fun, eh?  If you're a sufficiently
enthusiastic cyberspace denizen to pre-reg, you probably already have
a public key...

We are planning a Virtual New Year's Party at the very least, even if
all net services are not on-line yet.  The HTML/SGML capability is
really the critical factor-- we will open as soon as that is reliably
running and add other services as our range of interfaces expands.
Even if our (free) custom browser is not finished by then you will
still be able to use standard MUD/MOO clients in conjunction with
Mosaic or similar HTML browsers to enjoy the multimedia capabilities.


WELL, DO YOU NEED ANY HELP?  HOW DO I GET INVOLVED?

I'm glad you asked that question.  :-) Since a critical aspect of our
project is free public access, we need volunteers!  Our schedule has
been accelerated fairly rapidly at this point and we could use a hand
fairly soon.  Send email to "vcbuild@virtual.net" with some brief
notes about what you're interested in implementing and your level of
familiarity with MOO coding.  If you have experience with server and
core-level mods, there may be funding in it as well, though we are
primarily looking for volunteers at this time.


ISN'T THIS GETTING PRETTY LONG FOR A "FAQ" FOR SOMETHING 
NEW THAT NOT MANY FOLKS OUTSIDE OF THE BAY AREA HAVE 
EVEN HEARD OF?

Totally correct.  Send questions, suggestions, pointers, flames, and
so on to "vc@virtual.net".  If you'd like to be on a mailing list for
discussion of virtual communities, network services, and other Virtual
City (tm) Network related themes, send mail to
"virtual-citizens@virtual.net".  There's plenty more where this came
from, look for technology updates, facility updates, and GIF &
Postscript (tm Adobe) maps.  See you in cyberspace!


Virtual City (tm) Network FAQ 1.0 copyright 1993 M. Strata Rose &
VirtualNet; permission to distribute in its entirety, including this
notice, freely granted.








From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: wcs@anchor.ho.att.com (Bill_Stewart_HOY002_1305)
Date: Fri, 8 Oct 93 17:05:48 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: distributed autonomous networks
Message-ID: <9310090005.AA11624@anchor.ho.att.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Obviously, if we do a radio solution, the equipment ought to be attached
to cans marked W.A.S.T.E  :-)

At least in the US, you don't have to pirate radio frequencies;
there are a few bands that are available for uncensored low-power use,
though some of them may require spread-spectrum.

Meteor Burst is real stuff, though the last time I knew a little about it
the bandwidth was pretty low; e.g. you got 300 baud average throughput
doing bursts of 4800 baud with really heavy-duty forward error correction,
since it's a pretty sporadic medium.  Power usage is really low,
and typical applications are things like telemetry from snow-depth recorders
out in the mountains, where line-of-sight is essentially unavailable.
I don't know how much bandwidth or area you get out of it, or how traceable
it is - our meteor expert retired years ago, and was looking at problems like
how to build radio data networks that weren't bothered by nuclear explosions.

If there's a spare satellite slot available, ALOHANET technology is a reasonably
efficient way to use it.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Pat Farrell" <pfarrell@netcom.com>
Date: Fri, 8 Oct 93 17:15:48 PDT
To: mbl@ml7694a.leonard.american.edu
Subject: Re: The death of the list as we know it (tm)
Message-ID: <72951.pfarrell@netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


In message Fri, 8 Oct 93 14:08:50 EST,
  Matthew B. Landry <mbl@ml7694a.leonard.american.edu>  writes:
> I really think that the powers that be should consider the
> newsgroup  idea.

I have to comment. Many on this list believe strongly in privacy. This
implies that no one admits to being a PTB (power that be).

Others are anarchists and don't believe in PTB. And occasional person wants
to be in charge of the anarchy movement.

Options include:
1. get a rational mail reader (nupop, eudora, etc.) and a rational vendor
  (netcom, digex, world, well, etc.) and read at your leisure.
2. convert it locally to a local newgroup. then use rn, tin, etc. with kill
   files.
3. unsubscribe.
4. alternate plan X.

I have no problem with the volume. The S/N ratio could be better, but so
could my bank account.

Pat

Pat Farrell      Grad Student                 pfarrell@netcom.com
Department of Computer Science    George Mason University, Fairfax, VA
Public key availble via finger          #include <standard.disclaimer>




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: owen@autodesk.com (D. Owen Rowley)
Date: Fri, 8 Oct 93 23:50:54 PDT
To: hfinney@shell.portal.com
Subject: who you callin a homo, and a few other random thoughts
Message-ID: <9310090329.AA17021@lux.YP.acad>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


 > From: hfinney@shell.portal.com (Hal Finney)
 > This homophonic cypher sounds interesting.  If the authorities demand
 > your keys, you could scramble each row of the matrix (scrambling each
 > row separately), so that only the dummy message can be recovered.

hmm.. how about rendering the document as a bitmap (or other picture
format), uuencode it ( or something similar with encryption of its own )
and then interleaving the ascii dummy message with the ascii of the
uuencoded picture before applying this scheme. 
 
 > Real ascii messages have a character set of about 2^6, so the actual
 > size of the key matrix will be 2^12, and that means that each entry will
 > be about 12 bits.  For full generality in handling binary data the
 > character set would be 2^8, meaning a matrix of size 2^16 entries with
 > each entry being 16 bits.  This is a 128K byte key, which is pretty
 > cumbersome.  Also, the cyphertext is twice as big as the plaintext,
 > which will stand out too.

right, so some kind of squeezing it down one more time maybe ?  :-)

 > Plus, once the authorities see your decryption algorithm it may be
 > pretty obvious that it was designed for this specific purpose, and
 > whatever pressures they applied to make you reveal the key may now
 > be redoubled until you reveal the "real" key.

In all seriousness, we are rapidly approaching enough multimedia
saturation that we will also have sound file formats, picture file formats,
animation and video formats which can all be used as vehicles for
homowhatever schemes. 
Have a text to speach application record your words into
a sound file format, and apply some of your crypto wizardry to make
it into weird music, use rhythym tracks mixed in as convincing cover
and maybe some harmonic riffs as a red herring to keep snoops from realising
that the file might not be what it seems to be.

how about encoding real time video signals used in desktop vid-conferencing.
and slip encoded documents into the picture as colorful border graphics.

Govt snoops tend to act out their information gathering rituals like  
squirels that have eating disorder, they can't find enough empty holes to 
fill with nuts (ie: important data ) that they might need to analyse later.

so instead of trying to be elegant, be pigs. Bloat your content with
obfuscated bric a brac, and banal tracts on technical issues that 
put hard core nerds to sleep. Our net-universe has vast resources
to tap for source material to be used this way.

Solid Engineering technique and clever hacks applied to your
method, will probably leave trails and artifacts that another
crypto engineer can smell! Apply art, and be eratic in order to
facilitate keeping your adversary off the track he expects to find.

-----    ------    ----- 
In a previous incarnation, I lived in a house on the same piece of land
as  an individual who was suspected of engaging in illicit horticultural 
activities. 

It soon became evident that my phone was also being monitered.

Silly bastards couldn't get anything straight! I actually got a call 
inquiring about a person with his first name and my last name.

:-)

and then a day or so later my phone rang and when I picked up the receiver 
before I said anything I heard the sounds of a dispatch center, and then 
a womans voice chirped. "operations- may I help you"

I replied... *uh... you called me*.
she hung up abruptly.

It would almost be humorous if they weren't so clueless as they waste
our tax dollars in their characteristicly inept fashion!

anyway, I gathered that their recorders operated automaticaly, so I took
up the habit of dialing into my VAX at work, and playing rogue for hours 
and hours.
Bet somebody made overtime while they assaulted their eardrums with the
modulated hiss representing my little ascii hero getting lost in the maze
of twisty little passages that all look the same.

 > A one-time-pad has the advantage that the key is the same size as the
 > file, and there is no size expansion in encryption, plus it's a plausible
 > approach to use for high-security encryption.  It will take less space
 > and still allows for multiple decryption.

so .. the dummy file you pad with, you'd just have one?
or do you mean you'd make a new one each time?

it would get pretty obvious if the same file kept popping up .
I guess you could claim to have obsessive compulsive disorder and
that this file is your obsession?

If you really want to buffalo them  you would need an intelligent
agent application to compose dummy text for padding that would be 
reasonably unique each time.

I would think that if you could write such an agent it wouldn't be much
more work to have it encode whole words with other whole words and 
apply some linguistic formula, leaving the encrypted file looking
like an ordinary, and uninteresting file. 

It might even be fairly simple
to apply a word exchange scheme similar to the classic mentalists routines
before encrypting the file, thus obscuring the meaning while still allowing
the gestapo to feel that you've complied satisfactorally with giving them 
access.

I find that left brain analytical types tend to only apply left brain
methodology and thinking in their designs. Throwing right brain
methodology into the equation could add just enough incongruence to
the process that it might serve to confuse the shit out of the 
cryptographer trying to make sense of it through left brain analysis.

In fact it might serve to heighten the incongruence factor  when the 
crypt-breaker is a two-left-brain type..  present company
who relate to that chosen lifestyle, please take no offense BTW !
:-)

So, anyway, my humble apologys to those who may think my flights of fancy
are malicious fluff, or an annoyingly gross abuse of S/N here.

My mind actually does work this way, 
I don't know what I can't do.

LUX ./. owen

By the way, Monday - Oct 11th is National Coming Out of the Closet Day.

write an encryption scheme that encodes man pages as homo-erotic
sonnets, and send the output to your congress-critter(TM), sign
them with Sam Nunns name for bonus points.



 
 




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: wcs@anchor.ho.att.com (Bill_Stewart_HOY002_1305)
Date: Fri, 8 Oct 93 17:39:28 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re:  second order homophonic substitution
Message-ID: <9310090038.AA11774@anchor.ho.att.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


You don't need to do a full table of 2^16 bytes to handle real data -
you could use 4-bit nibbles if you wanted, so each byte of steganotext has
4 bits of real data (which is cyphertext) and 4 bits of fake data.
The steganotext is still twice the size of the plaintext, though.

However, your key doesn't need to contain the whole table - you can use
a much shorter key to describe a tour through the table or other method of 
filling it, where the key is the seed to a PRNG, which doesn't even need
to be cryptographically strong, just decently random.  This approach lets you 
use either 4x4 tables for compactness or 8x8 tables for efficiency.
One way to make the decryption algorithm not reveal its purpose is to have
one of the key parameters be a bitmask showing which 4 or 8 bits
to keep out of the 8 or 16 output bits from the table.
The (fake) encryption algorithm should have some feature
to generate random bits using a hard-to-reproduce PRNG (e.g. the middle
4 or 8 bits of a 64-bit-wide PRNG), or something else obfuscatory,
allowing the real cyphertext to be patched in through a less visible program,
or through an obvious-functionality program like a one-time-pad xor.
(Perhaps the PRNG could have parameters that, given all-zero input,
produces all-zero output, or something similar that lets you use the
same program for real and fake.)

Now, the Bad Guys, if they're any good, will notice the 2:1 compression,
and may suspect something's up, since they're archiving this posting :-).
You can also do ratios other than 2:1, if you're willing to waste space.
However, the algorithm does look like something an amateur would come up
with to be the latest "nobody can crack my new complicated cypher",
and it's tough to prove otherwise, since the real cyphertext is just
raw bits unless you have the keys...   

Its effectiveness depends on whether they know that I know that they know that...
and on whether they ask you in court, under penalties of perjury,
whether this is the only key to the cypher, and whether you're really obligated
to tell the whole truth in addition to telling them the truth and nothing
but the truth.  But truth is pretty complicated stuff, and once you start
explaining the mathematical details of the PRNGs you use and how you know
they're good stuff, and how quantum mechanics relates to the ability to
send keys without eavesdropping, and the effects of quantum on epistemology,
and what Knuth was talking about on page N of volume 2, they'll probably give
up and decide it's irrelevant technicalities...

	said Bill, increasingly verbosely




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Johan Helsingius <julf@penet.fi>
Date: Fri, 8 Oct 93 11:45:45 PDT
To: "Matthew B. Landry" <mbl@ml7694a.leonard.american.edu>
Subject: Re: The death of the list as we know it (tm)
In-Reply-To: <9310081807.AA00251@toad.com>
Message-ID: <199310081838.AA07011@mail.eunet.fi>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



>         To the people who say that Usenet has a worse s/n ratio than mail, I 
> have two points. First, not all of Usenet has a bad s/n ratio (and this 
> particular list _does_ have a _very_ bad s/n ratio). Second, the traditionally
> lower s/n ratio on Usenet has led to the development of better tools to deal 
> with it than are available in mail. (I'd dearly love to see an ignore feature
> on this list, as I understand that the Extropians have, but I realize that's 
> unrealistic. Even that wouldn't be as effective as a well-designed killfile.)

My mh gives me all the same capabilities as any newsreader. If you want to use
a newsreader, do the gatewaying at your own site. If cyperpunks becomes a
newsgroup, count on me dropping off.

	Julf





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: charliemerritt@BIX.com
Date: Fri, 8 Oct 93 17:55:49 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: PHONE PRIVACY
Message-ID: <9310082052.memo.46724@BIX.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> A 1-900 number to ensure non-tracibility. Does anyone have this number?

I would not trust this for hiding from law enforcement.
You can get the 900 service's fone records with a warrant.
If not law enforcement, then who do you need this to hide from?
You can use a pay fone to fool caller-id boxes.  Well, I guess
they dont hide the city.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: gtoal@an-teallach.com (Graham Toal)
Date: Fri, 8 Oct 93 13:59:23 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: secure phone quest
Message-ID: <2308@an-teallach.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


In article <9310042017.AA26812@fegmania.wustl.edu> you write:
>vat is available from ftp.ee.lbl.gov.  There's no source at the moment
>but there are binaries for different architectures.  (And the dynamically
>linked SunOS 4.1.x versions do work for Solaris 2.x)
>
>vat is intended for use as a IP multicast multi-user chat program, but I
>believe that it is useable for point-to-point communication also.  Using
>it for IP Multicast may require kernel patches (depending on your OS).

There's also nevot, last seen in gaia.cs.umass.edu:~ftp/pub

G
--
Personal mail to gtoal@gtoal.com (I read it in the evenings)
Business mail to gtoal@an-teallach.com (Be careful with the spelling!)
Faxes to An Teallach Limited: +44 31 662 4678  Voice: +44 31 668 1550 x212





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: gtoal@an-teallach.com (Graham Toal)
Date: Fri, 8 Oct 93 14:29:23 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: WE'RE UNDER ATTACK
Message-ID: <2320@an-teallach.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


In article <9309180534.AA27719@longs.lance.colostate.edu> you write:
>We must try to determine whose rules we are playing by. Is this a
>customs investigation? Treasury Dept.?  The situation with NSA is that
>they don't really ever act directly, they always go through some other
>henchmen to do the dirty work. This smells like them. But the case of
>the NSA convening a grand jury does not appear to have a historical
>precedent. What's going on here?

Here's my guess: the NSA isn't actually behind this - it was just unfortunate
that Grady was getting up their nose at the time.  

Let's imagine someone who is an arse-licking toady and wants to keep in well
with the government.  Let's suppose he's the sort of person who, to paint
the personality type, would go around hassling ftp site managers getting them
to remove pgp.  Then imagine that the cheeky bastards promoting pgp taunt
him by offering it loudly from sites outside the US and there's nothing
he can do about it.  What does this person do now?  Has a quiet word with
his friends in the US Customs (you never know, he might have some connection
with the government and exporting, for all we can imagine...) and points
out as a loyal concerned citizen that a cryptographic munition has been
illegally exported.  He maybe even forwards them some postings by Grady
saying that he was planning to publish these programs (and Grady is well
known to publish his Moby Words through the Austin Code Works - anyone
who gets Byte can tell you that...)

If such a drittsekk came to the US Customs with such a story, I think
they'd be duty bound to investigate it; *especially* when all they'll
have heard until now is this persons highly one-sided view of the matter.

Now, *I* can't imagine for a minute that any of our cypherpunks or sci.crypt
readers would do such a thing, but then I always do tend to overestimate
the common sense of the net.educated public...

G





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "gtoal@gtoal.com" <gtoal@pizzabox.demon.co.uk>
Date: Sat, 9 Oct 93 15:25:59 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: POISON PILL
Message-ID: <9310082121.AA03537@pizzabox.demon.co.uk>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Stuart mailed this to me by accident and asked me to forward it to the list.

G
:From: "Stuart W. Card" <swc@uc1.ucsu.edu>

:How's this as a dead man encryption protocol:

:1) don't keep any sensitive stuff of your own on your own hardware,
:put it on other peoples' machines (and let them put their stuff
:on yours);

:2) encrypt all of your stuff before transferring it to other peoples'
:boxes;

:3) send the keys that you used to do the encryption to other folks'
:boxes as well (not the same ones on which you stored the files);

:4) if you are really paranoid, Shamir share the keys;

:5) don't keep any local copies of the plaintext, cyphertext or keys;

:6) periodically send messages to the boxes where you have stashed
:your files, saying "Everything is still cool, don't wipe my files
:or my keys.";

:7) if/when it hits the fan and you are pressured to reveal your stuff,
:stop sending those messages -- the dead man switch goes off and your
:files/keys are wiped.

:There are countless variations on this theme, each offering a
:different compromise between security against prying versus
:overhead and the chance of unintended deletion.
:------------------------------------------------------------------------
:Stuart W. Card, Consultant, Card & Associates -- Research & Development
:Box 153 RR 1 Newport Rd Utica NY 13502         315-735-1717 / FAX -8469
:swc@uc1.ucsu.edu or cards@top.cis.syr.edu           "Who is John Galt?"






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "John W. Redelfs" <TSJWR@acad2.alaska.edu>
Date: Fri, 8 Oct 93 22:35:51 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Cypherpunks Cause
Message-ID: <01H3VV9GBC788X13HP@mr.alaska.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


You bet there is a cypherpunks cause, and if there isn't there should be.
The cypherpunks cause: to promote encryption and other privacy software
usage on the Internet until it is beyond the control of totalitarian
governments.  In other words, to protect the privacy rights of all by 
making privacy universal.

Any questions?

John W. Redelfs, tsjwr@acad1.alaska.edu





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Forrest Aldrich <visgraph!forrie>
Date: Fri, 8 Oct 93 20:46:04 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: PHONE PRIVACY
Message-ID: <199310090152.AA01311@visgraph.uucp>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Through e-mail, charliemerritt@BIX.com writes:
| 
| > A 1-900 number to ensure non-tracibility. Does anyone have this number?
| 
| I would not trust this for hiding from law enforcement.
[ ... ]

	I wouldn't either.  Anybody with a bit of sense shouldn't trust
	something like that.  If anything, it's likely a setup to
	attract certain types of callers anyways.

| If not law enforcement, then who do you need this to hide from?
| You can use a pay fone to fool caller-id boxes.  Well, I guess
| they dont hide the city.
[ ... ]

	Well, let's not assume someone wants to hide, but what about
	assuring the privacy of the phone call?  Afterall, this is
	what we use PGP for: for email privacy... though there has
	been speculation about just how secure this is.

	I correspond with people all over the world.  If the government
	is keeping a tab on people that correspond and is watching their
	email, then they must know me pretty well.  They can't be
	too concerned that I'm using PGP to correspond with someone
	in Moscow.  It's been over a year, and noone's came knocking
	on my door.  ;)

	Back to the subject:  

	What about phone privacy?  In this day and age, how can we
	absolutely guarantee a private phone call?  Even if we are
	using voice-encryption tech, the call can still be traced.  
	I think even more quickly than we are lead to believe.  For
	example, I never bought the notion that they had to keep
	the call on for a certain amount of time before an actual
	trace could be performed. Maybe in the stone-age of Ma Bell,
	but not today.  I suppose if one were able to use a setup
	like a remailer only on a phone network, whereby you got
	your call forwarded through different places to prevent a
	trace (doubt that's reasonably accomplished), it might make
	the trace a bit more difficult.

	There doesn't appear to be anything even cryptographically
	that we can do other than encrypting the voice and selectively
	using pay fones.  It would be neat if there were some way to
	interfere with Ma Bell's computer, in a non-destructive way,
	to alter what information they get when we dial out.  For instance,



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "John W. Redelfs" <TSJWR@acad2.alaska.edu>
Date: Fri, 8 Oct 93 23:25:51 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Atari and VAX
Message-ID: <01H3VWZ6ZIO08X1J5D@mr.alaska.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


If I owned a PC clone or a Mac, I'd be sitting pretty.  If my host machine
was Unix, I'd be fine.  But I'm using an Atari emulating vt100 off a 
VAX 6510.  Is there any help for me?  How can I be a cypherpunk?

I want to be using PGP, but I haven't found it for either machine I'm on.

Any suggestions?

John W. Redelfs, tsjwr@acad1.alaska.edu





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Michael Edward Marotta <mercury@well.sf.ca.us>
Date: Fri, 8 Oct 93 22:25:51 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Future of Digital Cash
Message-ID: <93Oct8.222520pdt.14270-4@well.sf.ca.us>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Digital Cash: A Probable Future   by Michael E. Marotta   
                                  mercury@well.sf.ca.us
 
Kinkos Copy Centers have instituted a debit-card.  You put your federal 
reserve notes in a machine and increment the electronic card.  Then you 
use the card in their public copiers.  The card is anonymous.  I have two 
because Kinko's doesn't warranty the cards:  I don't carry more than $5 
on a card.  I have yet to trade the card anywhere else for goods or 
services.  This is the sine qua non of money:  money is any medium of 
indirect exchange.  So far, you can only use the Kards to buy Kopies. 
 
Digital cash will not replace other forms.  Federal Reserve paper passes
on the street, perhaps, but gold and silver coins are still being made
anew by the USA, PRC, other governments, and several private mints. 
Plastic, checks, and fiat banknotes have not removed the need for gold 
nd silver.  If anything, government money reinforces the need for real 
cash: "Aurem non olet" means "Gold doesn't smell" i.e., cash leaves no 
traces.  
 
Digital cash could come from banks via ATMs.  You increment your DigiKash 
card from your demand account or from FRNs in your wallet.  You goto a 
store, pick what you want.  You pass through the Exit.  You wand or scan 
your goods.  This clears their security.  You insert your DigiKash card.
It is debited.  You package your goods (or put them in your cloth 
shopping bag) and you leave the store.
 
There was a time when the Grocery Store had clerks.  You gave one your 
shopping list or told them what you wanted and they got it for you.  Then 
came the "supermarket."  Self-serve.  What a concept.  This paradigm 
shift occured about 1945.  We will see another. The retail clerk is on 
the way out.  MacDonald's already ordered 75 robots.  Debit cards remove 
the cost of employees.  You'll use your DigiKard for fastfood.  You'll 
use it at the gas pump.  (They already take credit cards.) 
 
The assumption today is that you will use your BANK debit card for all of 
this.  I'm not sure.  I think that the first bank that offers anonymous 
debit cards will make a fortune.  
 
How?  Well, for one thing, here in Michigan, Kinko's takes 4% off top for 
sales tax. Also, I'm walking around with unspent money on my card while 
Kinko's has my money earning a return.  ATMs already cost me 75 cents per 
transaction.  Make it an even buck and it will work for debit cards. 
Debit cards would be sure winners at Computer Rental stores.  The MSU 
library has a bank of gopher terminals and Gov. Engler just separated 
property taxes from public education.  Gophers seem like a fungible to 
me.  The library already sells pens and copying is a cash business for 
them now.  Public transit is another obvious choice -- the famous Orange 
card of Japan.  Commuter trains in Chicago that toddlin' town had them in 
place in 1977. 
 
But debit cards don't _promise_ universality.  You can't use your Kinkos 
Kard on the train -- yet.
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
 ( )  "Money rests on the axiom that every man is the owner of his mind.
  O    Money is made possible by the men who produce it.  The words 'to 
  +    make money' hold the essence of human morality. "
  |                                           Francisco d'Anconia, 1957
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
 
 




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: hfinney@shell.portal.com (Hal Finney)
Date: Fri, 8 Oct 93 23:49:30 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re:  Virtual City (tm) Network FAQ 1.0 (fwd)
Message-ID: <9310090525.AA29378@jobe.shell.portal.com.shell.portal.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


This Virtual City project does have an interesting conceptual link to
cypherpunk philosophy.  Many of us have been influenced by the fiction
of Vernor Vinge, particularly his "True Names".  In this story we find
many elements of our cypherpunks mythology introduced:  digital
pseudonyms, anonymous mail, untraceable identities.  The heroes of the
story are hackers, powerful on the net, but with their real identies
unknown.  Having your true name discovered was the worst disaster that
could occur, as it made you vulnerable to many kinds of attacks, both
from other hackers and from the government.

In Vinge's story, people online interact in virtual environments.
This Virtual City and the other projects like it are trying to move
towards an online virtual environment similar to that described in
Vinge's story (and cyberpunk fiction).  It would be nice if they had
crypto anonymity and digital pseudonyms built in from the beginning.

Unfortunately, although they talk it up, the author of the FAQ doesn't
seem to really understand PK crypto:

> Send email to "vcreg@virtual.net" with pertinent
> info: your name, your requested character name, and a short blurb
> which will become your initial description.  Oh yes, and your Public
> Key.
> 
> Don't have one?  Tsk, tsk, they're a good thing to have in general; go
> out and connect to a public key server and get yourself a key-- we'll
> send out your initial password encrypted to you, and you can decipher
> it with our public key.  Fun, eh?  If you're a sufficiently
> enthusiastic cyberspace denizen to pre-reg, you probably already have
> a public key...

This is not how keys work: you don't need to connect to a public key
server to get yourself a key; and if they send something encrypted "to you"
then you wouldn't decipher it with their public key, but rather with your
private key.  Also, they should say whether they are using PGP, RIPEM,
PEM, or some new system for the public keys.  My guess is that they
haven't gotten that far yet.

Still, it might make sense for someone from this list to give them some
help on the crypto aspects.  This could be a safe and fun environment
in which people could be introduced to crypto, and it could even expand
eventually to include cryptographically protected business
relationships.  Tim May has suggested that strong crypto could be
initially deployed as part of a game, and this could be a beginning.

Hal
hfinney@shell.portal.com




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: ferguson@icm1.icp.net (Paul Ferguson x2044)
Date: Fri, 8 Oct 93 19:35:48 PDT
To: trebor@foretune.co.jp (Robert J. Woodhead)
Subject: Re: The death of the list as we know it (tm)
In-Reply-To: <9310090057.AA08696@dink.foretune.co.jp>
Message-ID: <9310090337.AA16899@icm1.icp.net>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text



> Bottom line, isn't one of the goals of punkery in general (whatever
> flavor) to _spread_ knowledge.  Shouldn't this stuff be shouted from
> the digital treetops?

No, not necessarily. I think that you're missing the mechanics behind
the list. 
 
In any case, I think you can pretty much forget about shifting this
list anywhere from where it is now -- it (we) are doing _exactly_
what the recipe calls for....
 
Cheers!

_____________________________________________________________________________
Paul Ferguson                                                               
Mindbank Consulting Group                                    fergp@sytex.com   
Fairfax, Virginia  USA                                       ferguson@icp.net



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: cman@IO.COM (Douglas Barnes)
Date: Fri, 8 Oct 93 20:45:50 PDT
To: mgream@acacia.itd.uts.edu.au (Matthew Gream)
Subject: Re: Diffie-Helman example in g++
In-Reply-To: <9310090216.AA20577@acacia.itd.uts.EDU.AU>
Message-ID: <9310090340.AA16954@illuminati.IO.COM>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> The only restriction placed on /a/ is that it be a primitive root of
> /p/. To do this, you choose /a/ at random until you find the condition
> (/a/, /p/-1) == 1 is satisfied. Since there are lots of primitive roots,
> this shouldn't take long. I wonder though, are there any strengths in
> choosing higher values of /a/?
> 
> Feel free to correct me if I'm wrong, my engineering background means
> my number theory isn't as strong as it could be (but I'm working on it
> :-).
> 

a is a constant, known to all (especially to both A and B).

Doug

-- 
----------------                                             /\ 
Douglas Barnes            cman@illuminati.io.com            /  \ 
Chief Wizard         (512) 448-8950 (d), 447-7866 (v)      / () \
Illuminati Online          metaverse.io.com 7777          /______\



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: wcs@anchor.ho.att.com (Bill_Stewart_HOY002_1305)
Date: Fri, 8 Oct 93 19:46:00 PDT
To: honey@citi.umich.edu
Subject: Re: brin on privacy
Message-ID: <9310090242.AA12484@anchor.ho.att.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


peter writes
> david brin spoke in ann arbor recently [...]
> 
>     privacy laws will be used as a weapon by the Rich and Powerful to
>     restrict the free flow of information.
>
> brin feels that privacy laws will be ineffective against the RaP, will
> be sold to the rest of us through effective propaganda, and that they
> will be used by the RaP as a means to cement their power base. 

He's probably right.  (Of course, *most* laws made by the Rich and Powerful
will be used to cement their power base, so this is just a special case....)

Some examples that have been discussed on the net include the British
data privacy laws that limit the personal-information databases that you 
can keep without formal notification to the people contained in them
(and to the government.)  The fact that you've got a computer
and are using it in ways that indicate you have *some* database capability
but haven't registered has been used as an excuse to search people's computers.
Of course, if you *have* registered, then they can search to be sure
you don't have any data you've forgotten to mention....

> brin's message was basically a populist one.  he is concerned that the
> moguls of data will have the opportunity to control what we see and
> hear.  what i found most fascinating about his talk was that while i
> generally agree with the social objectives he backs, i am in 180 degree
> disagreement on how to accomplish these ends.

It's not an uncommon thing to find among people who believe in things
but don't think about the implications of implementing those beliefs, 
as well as with people who are messing with really complicated technology.

		Bill




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Matthew B. Landry <mbl@ml7694a.leonard.american.edu>
Date: Fri, 8 Oct 93 19:45:49 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Newsgroup?
Message-ID: <9310090244.AA05818@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


        I still think that people are looking at this idea wrong. If we made 
the list->news gateway work one-way, so that news traffic wouldn't end up on 
the list, all of the stated problems could be solved. Except, that is, for TC 
May's theory about archived postings being grepped by spooks.
        Personally, I think that this is a rather far-fetched idea. If the 
spooks thought we posed a real threat to them (they might; I don't know), they 
would have very little trouble grabbing every single character sent to the list 
now and archiving it all with the best dossier-style cross-indeces in the 
business. I just think that a newsgroup wouldn't affect that one way or 
another.
        On the other hand, if the Extropians software is as good as it sounds 
(and if we actually start using it here), we might not need to have newsreaders 
to get the same functionality. Sending an "ignore" message to the list software 
to be processed at the source is a kludge, but it seems to be a Politically 
Correct kludge, so we might as well use it.
--
Matthew B. Landry
ml7694a@american.edu
(Finally!) mbl@ml7694a.leonard.american.edu




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: DON_HENSON@delphi.com
Date: Fri, 8 Oct 93 19:49:29 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Cypherpunk Cause
Message-ID: <01H3VXEBY9AG9353JT@delphi.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


The following was posted by L. Detweiler as an example of a typical response to his 
cypherpunk postings: -->

>There is no cypherpunks cause.  Neither is there a cypherpunks
>movement.  Get these delusions out of your head.  There is, however,
>cypherpunks software.
>
>I repeat, the cause and movement are in your own head.

<--

If there is no cypherpunks cause or movement, please let me know.  Being 
able to interact with people who believe in the cypherpunks cause is the 
only reason I subscribe to this list and if there is no cause, I would 
like to unsubscribe and spend my time elsewhere.  Can we have a simple 
survey of the list?  If you believe there is a cypherpunks cause and you 
believe in it, please post a short note to that effect to the list.  
Anyone who is interested can keep count.  I suppose to be fair, you 
should also post a note if you believe there is no cause.

Don Henson
PGP key on serve or on request





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: ferguson@icm1.icp.net (Paul Ferguson x2044)
Date: Fri, 8 Oct 93 20:09:30 PDT
To: wcs@anchor.ho.att.com (Bill_Stewart_HOY002_1305)
Subject: The core definitive
In-Reply-To: <9310090242.AA12484@anchor.ho.att.com>
Message-ID: <9310090410.AA17091@icm1.icp.net>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text



> It's not an uncommon thing to find among people who believe in things
> but don't think about the implications of implementing those beliefs, 
> as well as with people who are messing with really complicated technology.

Bill's right as rain -- how else would you explain engineers from
(normally) competitive companies coming together on this list?
  
Of course, I work for peanuts, so who cares? ,-)
 
I think you _should_ see the point by now...
 
Cheers!

____________________________________________________________________________
Paul Ferguson                         |
Sprint Managed Router Network Group   |                 tel: 703.904.2437 
Herndon, Virginia  USA                |              e-mail: ferguson@icp.net



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: ferguson@icm1.icp.net (Paul Ferguson x2044)
Date: Fri, 8 Oct 93 20:19:29 PDT
To: DON_HENSON@delphi.com
Subject: Re: Cypherpunk Cause
In-Reply-To: <01H3VXEBY9AG9353JT@delphi.com>
Message-ID: <9310090415.AA17106@icm1.icp.net>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text


> >There is no cypherpunks cause.  Neither is there a cypherpunks
> >movement.  Get these delusions out of your head.  There is, however,
> >cypherpunks software.
> >
> >I repeat, the cause and movement are in your own head.
> 
> <--
> 
> If there is no cypherpunks cause or movement, please let me know

What the hell are you talking about? 

From owner-cypherpunks  Fri Oct  8 23:37:20 1993



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: nkaplins@reed.edu (nick kaplinsky)
Date: Fri, 8 Oct 93 23:35:51 PDT
To: owen@autodesk.com
Subject: Re:  This just in..
Message-ID: <m0olXt5-0003ElC@romulus.reed.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Sweet, thats rad.  You know al wbalderson worked for epitope for a long time.
Hey , I 'm writing this on my Toshiba 1950 from home.....  pretty cool.
I'll see you later
N




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Date: Sat, 9 Oct 93 02:45:52 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Agenda, Goals, Flames...Comments
Message-ID: <9310090945.AA03379@netcom5.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



I wrote this reply to Matthew Landry, who raised some complaints about
the direction of this list, the role of the "leaders," and so on. I
sent it to him personally, so as not to add to the already heavy
volume of stuff on this list, especially the complaints of the last
few days.

I think the term "leader" is inappropriate. Several of us got the group
rolling a little over a year ago, but the anarchic nature of the
mailing list (source of strengths as well as weaknesses).

In Matthew's post he on the one hand blasts the elitist attitude of
Eric Hughes and myself while in the next paragraph blasting the lack
of action taken by the "leaders" to control flames and set up systems
to help newcomers.

Anyway, I enjoyed a political piece Matthew wrote a couple of weeks or
so ago, and I told him this. So his piece tonight (2:30 a.m) merited a
response.

And though some of you are no doubt sick of seeing these issues
debated, I've decided to forward my letter to him to all of you, as I
think some points need to be made.

I've removed one or two sentences from the version I mailed to
Matthew.

Forwarded message:



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: tcmay (Timothy C. May)
Date: Sat, 9 Oct 93 2:15:32 PDT
To: mbl@ml7694a.leonard.american.edu (Matthew B. Landry)
Subject: Re: Safe and fun environment?
Message-ID: <cc69877935c8567d4593ab65d436ac6a@NO-ID-FOUND.mhonarc.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Matthew, 

I think you're taking the stuff here too personally. Not all the
feedback to you has been negative--I recall congratulating you on a
nice political piece.

But you have raised issues about elitism and unwillingness to teach
newcomers that others have raised. And you ought to see some of the
abusive e-mail I get! Whew! 

Whenever I disagree with some of the paranoids and ranters, I am
called a traitor, a hypocrite, a lackey of Eric Hughes, a member of
the "Clique," and on and on.

Let me comment on a few of your points:

> a "safe and fun environment" to introduce new people to anything. At the 
> moment, in order to get anything out of it, one has to devote large quantities 
> of queue space and time to the subscription, and sift through the flames and 
> other noise to locate the rare bit of truly valuable info. There are very few 
> people on this list who routinely post things worth reading, and many who 
> _never_ post things worth reading, and seem to be only around for the flame 
> wars.

I'm sorry to hear you're getting so little new stuff here. Many of us
have spent many hour typing in (or scanning and OCRing, in my case)
papers and articles, from Chaum's "Dining Cryptographers" paper
(every bloody word of it!) to Shamir's "How to Share a Secret" to
scads of shorter articles and whatnot.

And the debate ranges from random number generators to Perl scripts
and TCL to digital money to ECPA to .... well, to about 20 major
topics, by my estimate.

>         And god forbid that a newcomer should ask a QUESTION! Dear lord no. 
> That newcomer will be flamed so totally that no burn unit around will be able 
> to save them.

This is simply not true. I have answered--when I could--the questions
of many people over the past 12 months. And I've repeatedly posted
reading lists, pointers to the Glossary at the soda site, and so on.

It is true that I sometimes am exasperated by people who have clearly
not been reading the list who ask "Can anyone tell me about digital
money?" when the topic has just been discussed!

(A FAQ would be nice. I was about to agree to do it a year ago, when
...comments on status of the FAQ elided to reduce flamage and angry
feelings.... 

Fortunately, there are many other newsgroups that beginners can read
ot learn crypto....Cypherpunks was not set up to compete with
sci.crypt and all the other sources.


>         The vast majority of people who post on this list and respond to other 
> people's posts are obnoxious idiots who are willing to flame at the slightest 
> provocation, and will do so until the person they attack backs down or simply 
> gives up.

I think this is uncalled for. I haven't seen this kind of flaming,
except in the XXXXX case, and that has its own dynamic. (And
please, Matthew, try to find a post where I have flamed XXXXX in
public...I don't believe you can easily find one.)

>         No one on this list is entirely to blame, nor is anyone entirely 
> blameless for this. Several of the top figures on the list (TC May and Eric 
> Hughes to name two) have recently adopted an inappropriately elitist attitude 
The mailing list cannot be run by "democratic means." Nor can
"teaching assigments" be handed out. 

The list is like a party at someone's home. The will of the herd is
not the will of the organizers.

Nor is the Cypherpunks agenda all that clear. I, for example, want to
see strong crypto deployed in ways very different than what others
favor. Are we to take a majority vote on an agenda, a charter?

It's better to just leave the agenda loose and unwritten, so as not to
have to grapple with this collision of goals. We can all pretend the
agenda is what we favor.

> running the _list_ however he wants, but the _movement_ belongs to all of us, 
> thank you. Even though I respect the crypto-political opinions that they 

The _movement_ belongs to what gets written and what gets responded
to. In other words, if you want to be listened to, you have to get
people's attention by the quality of your arguments. 

You can't rail against "leaders" (an ironic choice of words you used)
like Hal Finney or Duncan Frissell just because their posts get
reaction. You can't argue that the "herd" didn't have a chance to
vote. In fact, people vote with their own posts. Market democracy.

> express a great deal, I think that they and their supporters have taken this 
> too far. And worse, they have not taken a firm stand against the kind of flame 
> war that is continually erupting over individual posts on the list. For the 
> leaders to sit back and watch this go on is simply not the appropriate way to 
> handle things.

The "leaders"? I have commented many times on issues of rancor and
flames, even recently, and for this I am accused by some of being part
of "the Clique" that "runs" Cypherpunks. Nonsense.

>         Until we fix the serious problems in this list, it will never be an 
> appropriate environment for newcomers to learn about crypto-privacy, just a 
> training ground for flame-throwers.

About 70% of the flames would subside if XXXXX would cool his jets,
and stop ranting and raving. 

As for "training newcomers," it's not easy. Lots of books exist, and
many of the really solid contributors (Barrus, Honeyman, Collins,
Stewart, etc.) learned their crypto in exactly this way.

Many of us wrote _very long_ articles of a tutorial nature when the
list was getting started. Newcomers who are unwilling to read some of
the technical books on crypto should not expect us to write customized
tutorials.  

> mountains of flame wars. Questions could be referred to qualified personnel, 
> instead of going to the list where they act like little flame magnets.

May I ask which "qualified personnel" you have in mind? As per the
earlier comment, not many of the crypto experts I know have any
interest in hand-holding, not when at least a dozen good books on
crypto are readily available.

>         This newsgroup would not replace the list, nor would it be more than 
> marginally connected (because of the selected cross-postings), but it would 
> provide the kind of environment that the list does not or cannot provide.

How is this group you propose any different from sci.crypt,
talk.politics.crypto, the various *.privacy groups, the *.clipper
group, or the *.security groups? Seems to me sci.crypt is exactly what
you're looking for. (But don't expect hand-holding for newcomers
there, either!)

>         Oh, and for those of you that are tired of seeing me post, you can rest 
> assured that you will never see it again. Contributing to this list has brought 
> nothing but trouble to my life, and I have better things to do with my time 
> than wade through piles of flamage in my personal mail box.


Matthew, threatening to leave is not going to have much effect. But if
you have decided to leave, good luck in all your endeavours.

-Tim May

-- 

..........................................................................
Timothy C. May         | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,  
tcmay@netcom.com       | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
408-688-5409           | knowledge, reputations, information markets, 
W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA  | black markets, collapse of governments.
Higher Power: 2^756839 | Public Key: PGP and MailSafe available.
Note: I put time and money into writing this posting. I hope you enjoy it.





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "George A. Gleason" <gg@well.sf.ca.us>
Date: Sat, 9 Oct 93 02:49:29 PDT
To: trebor@foretune.co.jp
Subject: Re:  Spread-spectrum net (vulnerability of)
Message-ID: <93Oct9.024904pdt.14281-3@well.sf.ca.us>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Re. wireless networks that know where you are without making that info
available to anyone incl. net operators:  I think I might have something for
this.  Ericsson wireless PBX; essentially similar to a cellular system.
However, calls within the network are considered "intercom" calls and so the
system's "call detail recorder" won't keep track of them.   Ericsson is way
hot in wireless voice and data networks; and we're their local distributor
for PBX products.  I haven't got prices on hand since we haven't gotten a
request for something like this yet.  However, if anyone's seriously
interested, drop a line via email or phone me at 510-644.8085.

-george gleason, gg@well.sf.ca.us





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: hiscdcj@lux.latrobe.edu.au (Dwayne)
Date: Fri, 8 Oct 93 10:19:23 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: distributed autonomous networks
Message-ID: <9310081716.AA13288@lux.latrobe.edu.au>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Hi guys,
   well, after reading through the backlog of spread spectrum stuff, I was
surprised to read about the radio-network-on-a-board (Julieboard) article
that someone posted. A couple of us here in Australia have been kicking
around the idea of a cheap network, running via repeaters in _very_
small boxes tossed all around a city, which would be indestructible through
sheer numbers (a la the arpanet).
   So: anyone got any ideas, schematics, information?

The main idea is a huge number of small, low-power and CHEAP nodes which
would handle through traffic which anyone with a radio modem could tap into,
with the nodes disguised and placed in extremely hard to get to places (tops
of telephone poles, buildings, on bridges and overpasses, etc).
   This would mean that it would cost an awful lot of money to remove each of 
these things, IF they could be found.

Possible power sources: batteries (but they need to be changed)
                        solar power (Australia leads the world in solar power
                                     technology, and I know people who know
                                     people).
                         Near Field Interaction and EMF pickups (stick 'em
                            near high-frequency power transmission lines).
                         Something that convert heat to electrical energy
       or combinations of all of the above.

The idea being that we would have an untraceable, unbreakable network. Sure,
you may have an address (perhaps we could set it up as a FQDN domain?), but
that address would not correspond to any actual physical location. And, it
would be free, aside from the cost of the equipment. No more phone calls
to pay for!

I have no idea how this could be done across interstate or international 
distances, but I'm sure people might have ideas. Bounce signals off
satellites (are those big shiny things from the 50's still about?); send
stuff encrypted via the internet, etc etc.

This could well mean that we would have a truly private network, with 
strong encryption and no centralised source of transmission (I mean, most
of the internet traffic into and from Australia goes via a single link, 
so far as I know).

Comments?

Dwayne





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Matthew B. Landry <mbl@ml7694a.leonard.american.edu>
Date: Sat, 9 Oct 93 01:19:29 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Safe and fun environment?
Message-ID: <9310090817.AA10656@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>Still, it might make sense for someone from this list to give them some
>help on the crypto aspects.  This could be a safe and fun environment
>in which people could be introduced to crypto, and it could even expand
        Unless this list undergoes some VERY radical changes, it will never be 
a "safe and fun environment" to introduce new people to anything. At the 
moment, in order to get anything out of it, one has to devote large quantities 
of queue space and time to the subscription, and sift through the flames and 
other noise to locate the rare bit of truly valuable info. There are very few 
people on this list who routinely post things worth reading, and many who 
_never_ post things worth reading, and seem to be only around for the flame 
wars.
        And god forbid that a newcomer should ask a QUESTION! Dear lord no. 
That newcomer will be flamed so totally that no burn unit around will be able 
to save them.
        Most of those that are persistent or resiliant enough to survive what 
this list can often put people through may or may not decide to stay. I would 
imagine that such negative experiences would turn a lot of people off to the 
whole idea of crypto-privacy. If I hadn't already been committed to privacy 
when I joined the list, I would have immediately unsubscribed, called Fort 
Meade, and asked what I could do to help. 
        The vast majority of people who post on this list and respond to other 
people's posts are obnoxious idiots who are willing to flame at the slightest 
provocation, and will do so until the person they attack backs down or simply 
gives up.

        No one on this list is entirely to blame, nor is anyone entirely 
blameless for this. Several of the top figures on the list (TC May and Eric 
Hughes to name two) have recently adopted an inappropriately elitist attitude 
toward the direction of the list, and the movement. No one can stop Eric from 
running the _list_ however he wants, but the _movement_ belongs to all of us, 
thank you. Even though I respect the crypto-political opinions that they 
express a great deal, I think that they and their supporters have taken this 
too far. And worse, they have not taken a firm stand against the kind of flame 
war that is continually erupting over individual posts on the list. For the 
leaders to sit back and watch this go on is simply not the appropriate way to 
handle things.

        Until we fix the serious problems in this list, it will never be an 
appropriate environment for newcomers to learn about crypto-privacy, just a 
training ground for flame-throwers.

        Dare I suggest (why not? I'm already burning to a crisp, how much worse 
could it get?) that we create a moderated newsgroup that would gateway the 
substantive traffic from this list into a more accessible forum (but NOT the 
other way around). In that manner, we could provide a place for newcomers to 
learn about cryptography and the movement, without forcing them to sift through 
mountains of flame wars. Questions could be referred to qualified personnel, 
instead of going to the list where they act like little flame magnets.
        This newsgroup would not replace the list, nor would it be more than 
marginally connected (because of the selected cross-postings), but it would 
provide the kind of environment that the list does not or cannot provide.
        Go ahead and dump flames in my mailbox. I've long since gotten used to 
it. I'm not going to back down until someone convinces me that a hospitable 
environment with informative traffic and a high s/n ratio is a bad idea. Or, 
you can save bandwidth and send the flames to /dev/null, because that's where 
anything that doesn't make sense will go. Rational comments are welcome, 
though.

        Oh, and for those of you that are tired of seeing me post, you can rest 
assured that you will never see it again. Contributing to this list has brought 
nothing but trouble to my life, and I have better things to do with my time 
than wade through piles of flamage in my personal mail box.
--
Matthew B. Landry
ml7694a@american.edu
(Finally!) mbl@ml7694a.leonard.american.edu




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: bill@twwells.com (T. William Wells)
Date: Sat, 9 Oct 93 01:09:29 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: distributed autonomous networks
In-Reply-To: <MghSVRS00Vp2BH7Uc=@andrew.cmu.edu>
Message-ID: <CEMCHw.DF2@twwells.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I recall an SF novel that used small solar-powered planes as
repeaters. Add batteries for night time, make 'em cheap enough,
fly 'em high enough, give them smarts to avoid destructive
weather, and keep them light enought to avoid giving airplanes
indigestion should they hit, and I think you could solve a lot of
problems.





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: lazylion@netcom.com (Ben Weiss)
Date: Sat, 9 Oct 93 08:55:56 PDT
To: hiscdcj@lux.latrobe.edu.au (Dwayne)
Subject: Re: distributed autonomous networks
Message-ID: <9310091552.AA08006@netcom.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I've thought about this a lot.  Right now, there's an international (very
low speed) sort-of internet based in Amateur Packet Radio.  Everyone has a
2meter FM (range 5-10 miles over flat turrain; up to 300 to a tall mountain
through a repeater) handi-talky on their belts and a 1200 (a little 2400)
*half duplex* modem with which they check into whatever bbs is near by and
get their mail from all over the world.  There are 19.2 & I think 56kpbs
backbones operating over satelittes & High Frequency.  It works.  It's
intolerably slow.  It's operating legally on ham frequencies which do not
(legally) allow encryption.

The main reason it's so slow is that the protocal was designed by these
guys in Phoenix 10 years ago to use the radios popularly off the shelf
then.

Now, however, there are *FULL DUPLEX* radios available cheap ($400) off the
shelf that use separate bands for tx & rx to make them cheap.  (Most of
these are 144 MHz <-> 440 MHz, Transmit on one, receive on the other,
either way)

I'm working on a new protocal which instead of using the current CSMA/CD,
has local repeaters serving an area which do full duplex & pass a token
around.  Unfortunately, I'll probably only be able to increase bandwidth
enough to bring the current 4-5 users per frequency up to 15 or 20.  This
is still nowhere near enough to do what you want, but it does still use
off-the-shelf radios & modems you can build for $20 in parts & connect to
your PC or Mac (Software will also be req'd- mods to current stuff will
work)

My roomate, tvr@cnmat.CNMAT.Berkeley.EDU (KD6PAG), is working on custome
radios that raise that 2400 bps barrier to 19.2 or 38kpbs.  I think that
without my full duplex protocal, he'll still have to wait around dealing
with transmit-receive turnover latency, but hey- if it works, wow!

Anyone else with any cool ideas?

+---------------------------  Ben Weiss  ------------------------------+
! Telephone: (510) 841-5709 voice     Internet: LazyLion@Netcom.com    !
!            (415) 325-9600 fax                 Ben_D._Weiss@bmug.org  !
+-------------- Packet Radio: WB5QAL@N6EEG.#NOCAL.CA.US ---------------+



From an-teallach.com!demon!uknet!pipex!howland.reston.ans.net!paladin.american.edu!gatech!kd4nc!rsiatl!jgd Sun Oct 10 18:30:52 GMT 1993
Article: 460 of news.groups
Xref: an-teallach.com news.groups:460 alt.dcom.telecom:66 comp.dcom.telecom:401
Newsgroups: news.groups,alt.dcom.telecom,comp.dcom.telecom
Path: an-teallach.com!demon!uknet!pipex!howland.reston.ans.net!paladin.american.edu!gatech!kd4nc!rsiatl!jgd
From: jgd@dixie.com (John De Armond)
Subject: Pat Townson's latest escapades
Message-ID: <cb8zj7l@dixie.com>
Date: Sat, 09 Oct 93 09:18:35 GMT
Organization: Dixie Communications Public Access.  The Mouth of the South.
References: <10-06-93.311bed@telecom.chi.il.us>
Approved: jgd@dixie.com
Lines: 231

Thought you guys might be interested in seeing Pat the Moderator's
latest escapades.  Just when you thought he couldn't get any 
more sleazy.

John

-------------------------------------------------------------------------------

                      DIGITAL DETECTIVE
                     2241 W. Howard #208
                      Chicago, IL 60645   
                     
                      Phone: 312-465-0707
                        Fax: 312-743-0002

I wish to announce my recent aquisition of some databases which are
primarily used by skip-tracing, investigative and government agencies
to locate people, any assets they may have, and other pertinent and
personal details of their lives.

These databases are being made available to anyone who wishes to have
access to them. The charges are simply being passed along, 'at cost'
based on what I am paying. 

First, a description of what is available and the cost for access.
Then, information on how to obtain the information you want.

SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER TRACING:
===============================

You provide an SSN. I will advise you of all the names which have
been used with this SSN, and the addresses which go with each. Or
it can be the other way around: you supply an exact name and address
(it can sometimes be a former address), and I will supply you with
the SSN used by that person.

      Cost for each lookup, either direction is $60.00

PEOPLE FINDER:
==============

You provide a name. Any name okay, but very common names will
render a useless list. Middle initials and last known address is
requested if possible.  You'll receive a listing of every person who
has that name, along with other data:

     New address if they moved;
     Telephone number provided the number is published;
     Residence type;
     Length of residence;
     Gender;
     Date of birth;
     Up to four other household members and their dates of birth.

For additional information, People Finder also can provide a neighbor
listing which includes up to ten neighbors, their addresses, phone
numbers and residence types. 

The People Finder database has 120 million names, 80 million house-
holds and 61 million telephone numbers. 

It can be searched by telephone number only: You provide the phone
number, I will respond with the person's profile and neighbor listing.
Ot it can be searched by address only, with the same results.

      Cost for each lookup is based on how extensive the search
      is. 
                Within a single state only,   $80
                Checking two or three states, $95
                Checking nationwide,          $120

                Address or phone trace,       $50  (either one)
                Both address/phone trace      $90

People Finder comes with a guarentee: if I cannot produce at least
one person with the name you request plus an address for that
person, then there is no charge.

CONSUMER CREDIT REPORTS:
========================

Consumer Credit reports availale from one bureau,     $60
Consumer Credit reports available from three bureaus, $100

I need two things:

  1. The name and address of the person, plus SSN if possible.
  2. A *signed* statement that your request is for bonafide,
     legal reasons, i.e. you are considering an extension of
     credit to the person, or possibly employing them, etc. I
     cannot proceed without this signed statement.

OTHER DATABASE FEATURES:
========================

Has someone ever filed bankruptcy?  The database will tell you
if they have or not. Not all federal districts are yet installed
but for those that are in the database, I can get you the details:
                            
                                 Any one district               $40
                                 Checking all districts avail.  $160

Commercial Credit reports available on any business in file,    $95
About fourteen million businesses and corporations included.

Criminal History records available at $75-100 per jurisdiction you
request searched. 
      Want to know if someone has ever been in prison?
      Want to know if someone has ever been sued, or been a
        defendant in a criminal action?

      I need the exact name, SSN and DOB  of the person. (If needed,
      get the SSN and DOB by using the lookups mentioned earlier.)
      If you have a good idea *where* such action or incarceration
      may have taken place, it will greatly reduce your costs in
      using this database. 

Death Records can be provided in various formats:

      By SSN only - is the holder of that SSN deceased or not?  $30
      By name - a more detailed account of their demise         $40

Drivers Records can be pulled but the exact name and DOB
is essential; otherwise if you have the full driver's license
number, the search can be reversed, providing a name and DOB
plus address. (Then use People Finder address trace on them.)   $65

Education and degree verification is possible, and frequently
used to expose those people who are not what they claim to be.  $35

Real Property Asset Locator database                            $75
I can do this, but need to know *which* areas to search. With
this information, you know whether or not it is advisable to
sue someone 'for everything he has got' or not.

Who is the real owner of the corporation with which you are
having a dispute?  The name(s) and address(es) of the officers
of corporations are available in many places. Sometimes you
get their home address and phone number in the process.         

           If you know what state the corporation is based in   $45
           If you wish to have a search of 30 states done       $165

Would you like to know if soeone is getting workers comp money?
           
            If you know what state they are likely to get it
            from, I can verify it  (only in selected areas)     $63


Uniform Commercial Code filings by state                        $52

VIN (vehicle identification numbers) checked by state           $50

               ==================================

Now those are the basic items available in the databases. There are
other features and further, more detailed searches can be done at
the rate of $100 per hour. 

Some caveats:

You have to pay for the lookup whether or not it is successful
because *I* have to pay each time I access the databases. The better
the information you provide to start with, the more likely you will
get positive results.  The exception is 'People Finder'. If I cannot
provide you with *at least one name* which matches your request or
*at least one person* at the specified address or phone number,
then there is no charge. 'People Finder' may or may not include
unlisted/non-pub phone numbers. Don't count on it. It won't work
with PO Box addresses.

Regards SSN Trace, it does not work well if the person to whom the
number is issued is less than 21-22 years of age. The number has to
be circulating for a year or so in order for it to make its way into
the database. Meaning, a person has to have credit, have entered into
various agreements, etc ... and they may have done this as early as
age 18, but best results are obtained on these traces if the person
is at least a few years older.

On the Drivers Records checks, CA only lists names without addresses
and MA/GA are difficult to work with. 

If you want a credit bureau report on someone, I repeat: you must
send a signed statement (by fax is okay) stating that you have a 
bonafide, legal reason for this information. Spouses are *not*
legally entitled to the credit bureau file of their 'other half'
without permission. 

                      ==================

How to obtain the information you want:

Payment can be by credit card, electronic funds transfer from 
your USA bank account, or check sent with your inquiry. If you 
pay by credit card or EFT, then transactions can be handled by phone
or fax entirely. With your request, include your VISA/MC number,
the name on the account, and date of expiration. Or, include the
name of your bank, the exact name on the checking account, and
*all* the numbers across the bottom of your check. 

Telephone: 312-465-0707   or Fax: 312-743-0002

Generally, your search results will be returned to you within 24-36
hours under most conditions.

If you prefer to send a letter, you can include your check or
relevant credit card information in the letter addressed to:

Patrick Townson
2241 West Howard Street #208
Chicago, IL 60645

      ------------------------------------------------------
Information should be available to everyone, not just the lawyers
and bankers and government agencies. I'll provide information to
anyone, at anytime from the categories above. Hope to hear from
you soon with your requests.

Here's to successful snooping! Get the goods on your friends and
enemies alike. An imposter/fraud/con-artist on the net? Expose them
in a detailed message with stuff you get from the database. 


Patrick Townson
for DIGITAL DETECTIVE
-- 
John De Armond, WD4OQC                   | For a free sample magazine, send
Performance Engineering Magazine(TM)     | a digest-size 52 cent SASE 
Marietta, Ga     "Hotrods'n'computers"   | (Domestic) to PO Box 669728
jgd@dixie.com    "What could be better?" | Marietta, GA 30066
Email may be published at my sole discretion.







From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Arthur Chandler <arthurc@crl.com>
Date: Sat, 9 Oct 93 09:35:56 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Digital Cash
In-Reply-To: <93Oct8.222520pdt.14270-4@well.sf.ca.us>
Message-ID: <Pine.3.05.9310090932.A24660-b100000@crl.crl.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



   I thought some folks here might get a kick out of this ascii note:


||====================================================================||
||//$\\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\//$\\||
||(100)==================| FEDERAL RESERVE NOTE |================(100)||
||\\$//        ~         '------========--------'                \\$//||
||<< /        /$\              // ____ \\                         \ >>||
||>>|  12    //L\\            // ///..) \\         L38036133B   12 |<<||
||<<|        \\ //           || <||  >\  ||                        |>>||
||>>|         \$/            ||  $$ --/  ||        One Hundred     |<<||
||<<|      L38036133B        *\\  |\_/  //* series                 |>>||
||>>|  12                     *\\/___\_//*   1989                  |<<||
||<<\      Treasurer     ______/Franklin\________     Secretary 12 />>||
||//$\                 ~|UNITED STATES OF AMERICA|~               /$\\||
||(100)===================  ONE HUNDRED DOLLARS =================(100)||
||\\$//\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\\$//||
||====================================================================||
  








From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Timothy Newsham <newsham@wiliki.eng.hawaii.edu>
Date: Sat, 9 Oct 93 12:35:57 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: DC-Net proposal,  comments requested
Message-ID: <9310091935.AA17001@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain




proposal:
   Dining Cryptographer's (DC) net built on top of TCP/IP.

purpose:
   To explore the problems in implementing a useable DC net.  

description:
   The Net would allow connections to a PAD machine,  the PAD machine
   would be used to establish a "connection" across the DC-Net to
   another PAD machine which would then allow an outgoing TCP connection.
   The connection through the DC-NET would be transparent and untraceable.
   Machines that are part of the DC-NET could talk to each other 
   untraceably through the network.

discussion:
   This net would allow a user to set up an 'untraceable' connection
from one point on the internet to another.  The NET would be made
up of one or more actual DC-Nets.  

A DC-NET
   This net is broadcast in nature (data written by one machine can be
seen by all other machines on the network) but with the characteristic 
that it is impossible to tell which machine on a particular DC-Net 
wrote out the data (except if all other machines are controlled by the 
same person?).  The DC-NET itself is bit oriented.  Such a DC-network would
be the underlying layer for the packet network.  The actual DC-Network
would be made up of processes on various (or even the same,  for testing 
purposes) machines all connected together with TCP.  
 

The Packet Net
   The Packet Network would be built with the DC-Net as a base.  In order
to send useful information across the network a single node would form
data into packets.  These packets would be outputted to the network a
bit at a time.  Since the DC-Net is bit oriented it is possible for
another node to send some bits after one node has started to write out
its packets.  As a node writes out a packet it should listen to the
network for "collisions" and if a collision is detected it would 
"give up" on the current transmission and wait for some time to start
again.  Packets from one machine to another must have some sort of
addressing.  The packet could be encrypted entirely in the public
key of the destination if there is only a single DC net.  If there
are multiple DC-Nets with packet forwarding between them then there
must be some sort of plaintext address information in the packets.
The return address should *never* be in plaintext.  Probably the
data and return address of a packet would be encrypted in the public
key of the destination or in a private key shared with the destination.

Sessions
  Virtual connections can be built on top of the packet network in
the same way as they are on top of other packet networks.  Some protocol
like TCP (or even the TCP protocol) could be used.


Why should this be built on the internet?
    Writting and debugging a network of this sort on top of the internet
should be easier than writing it and implementing it from scratch.  Some
people have proposed neighborhood networks that would be used to
implement untraceable and unstoppable connections.  This is an excellent
way to develop and debug such a network.

What needs to be resolved
   Alot!  This is just something I threw together.  There are alot of
   questions.  In fact most of it is still a question.  The protocol
   of the underlying DC-Net needs to be written.  A packet layer must
   be written or adapted from current protocols.  The issues of addressing
   need to be addressed.  There are also sure to be alot of politically
   oriented questions as well.


                                  Tim N.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Alan Mason <vznquest@netcom.com>
Date: Sat, 9 Oct 93 09:55:56 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Safe and fun environment?
In-Reply-To: <9310090817.AA10656@toad.com>
Message-ID: <Pine.3.05.9310090853.D10267-b100000@netcom5>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


As a newcomer here, I too detected what I saw as an elitist attitude at
first.  I also got 'spoken to' about low-content messages.

My present feeling is that - with the exception of flames - things are
going just about the way they should here.  As Tim May and others have
pointed out, there are Usenet groups covering cryptography, as well as an
increasing amount of coverage in the popular press (for what its worth). 
I will go there for hard news.  And there is email.

My understanding of a list is that it isn't intended as a newsgroup.  It
is a way for people with common interests AND KNOWLEDGE to share those
interests and that knowledge.  An intermediate level between 1-to-1 email
and a newsgroup with the qualities of each but performing a new function
unique to itself.  The power of the Net is that it allows the users to
create tools to fit their needs, vs having to work with generic tools
created by others.  Please correct me if I am wrong, but it seems to me that
this tool was created by the folks working on the crypto frontlines to
exchange information, not as an alternative to sci.crypto, etc.  Given
that, the only appropriate thing for me to do as a bystander, IMHO, is to sit 
back and keep quiet until I have something to contribute.  I don't know if
this post violates that, but it seemed like something that needed to be said.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
Alan Mason		|   Any time you find a simple answer to a question,
vznquest@netcom.com	|   The odds are you asked the wrong question.
*******************     |
----------------------------------------------------------------------------










From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Robert J. Woodhead" <trebor@foretune.co.jp>
Date: Fri, 8 Oct 93 17:59:29 PDT
To: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Subject: Re: The death of the list as we know it (tm)
In-Reply-To: <9310081743.AA28221@netcom5.netcom.com>
Message-ID: <9310090057.AA08696@dink.foretune.co.jp>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Timothy May writes:

>My point is this: there are many sound reasons to keep a group such as
>ours a mailing list and not open it to every freshman in college who
>can grep for "punk" and stumble across us, or for every
>Sternlight-type bozo who delights in creating noise and rancor in
>groups.

This is called "security through obscurity."  I'm shocked to see it
advocated in this list!  ;^>

Opening up the list into a newsgroup has risks, but they can be mitigated
and doing so would make it easier to use, and reduce the load on toad.

One way to mitigate the effect on the list itself is (1) make the
connection 1 way (list->group), with postings to the group sent through
and anon remailer and (2) postings to the group from the list could
be signed to authenticate them.

Bottom line, isn't one of the goals of punkery in general (whatever
flavor) to _spread_ knowledge.  Shouldn't this stuff be shouted from
the digital treetops?





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Robert J Woodhead <trebor@foretune.co.jp>
Date: Fri, 8 Oct 93 18:35:49 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Spread-spectrum net (vulnerability of)
Message-ID: <9310090132.AA08927@dink.foretune.co.jp>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



You can put up such a network, but given that your boxes have to receive
the signal, it will be detectable (but not understandable) to 3rd parties.

Anyone who wants to take you down will only need (1) a detector that can
point out your boxes and (2) a small caliber rifle.

Since the cost to find and destroy is much less than the cost to make and
deploy, a covert network of this sort wouldn't last long.  An _overt_
network, perhaps a commercial entity that networks an entire city, would
be an interesting prospect.

The techniques for maintaining location information on actual machines
connected to the net, and for updating them as they move, are actually
quite simple and well understood (cellular telephones are a simple,
dumb version of the technology).  The trick is to find out a way that
the network can know where you are but not give that information out
(even to the owners of the network), without unacceptable overheads.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "John W. Redelfs" <TSJWR@acad2.alaska.edu>
Date: Mon, 11 Oct 93 00:29:47 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Kiss My Elbow!
Message-ID: <01H3YOP2T5FM9QV1NC@mr.alaska.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


To those obnoxious codeheads who flipped me off with a suggestion that I
do my own port of PGP to the Atari and/or VAX:

Kiss my elbow!

Anyone ignorant enough to write code before doing a search to see if the 
code is already available deserves to take your brain dead advice.  Foolishly
thinking that the cypherpunks were interested in spreading encryption
technology on the Internet, I logically assumed an inquiry on this list
would be part of such a search.

Maybe the cypherpunks are a government front organization set up for 
_preventing_ the spread of encryption technology on the Internet.

Stranger things have happened.


--------------- John W. Redelfs, tsjwr@acad1.alaska.edu -----------------
--------- All my opinions are tentative pending further data. -----------





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: nobody@soda.berkeley.edu
Date: Sat, 9 Oct 93 11:40:57 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: No Subject
Message-ID: <9310091839.AA07718@soda.berkeley.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Covert Action article on Clipper/Skipjack by D. Sobel is out.  I thought
he was on this list?  Did I miss mention of this?  Looked good, but
didnt have the $5.50, and they wouldnt accept my $100 DigiKash!
 
Mr. Sobel, Can you post an electronic version of yer article please?
 
[[Nonewsgroup, no cypherpunk cause/agenda, no leaders, no organization]]
(There that didnt take up to much time now did it?)
 
C. A. Informatik




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: jamie@netcom.com (Jamie Dinkelacker)
Date: Sat, 9 Oct 93 11:39:32 PDT
To: Matthew B. Landry <mbl@ml7694a.leonard.american.edu>
Subject: Re: Safe and fun environment?
Message-ID: <9310091839.AA19624@netcom.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


[Cypherlings, excuse the bandwidth]

Matthew,

As a fresh newbie allow me to react for the record to your recent post.

>a "safe and fun environment" to introduce new people to anything. 

I've never found a safe and fun environment anywhere, anytime if I looked
closely enough to see what was going on; hence I never expect it anywhere,
anytime.

>        And god forbid that a newcomer should ask a QUESTION! Dear lord no. 
>That newcomer will be flamed so totally that no burn unit around will be able 
>to save them.

My questions have been answered graciously, thoroughly, and when I've been
corrected, I should've been due to inattentive typing (e.g., author's
names).


>        No one on this list is entirely to blame, nor is anyone entirely 
>blameless for this. Several of the top figures on the list (TC May and Eric 
>Hughes to name two) have recently adopted an inappropriately elitist attitude 
>toward the direction of the list, and the movement. 

Movement? Like in 'bowel'? I don't see the elitest approach; from my
perspective it looks like people with knowledge being exasperated when
others want private tutoring and don't RTFM. I'm pretty much the same way
in my areas of expertise.

>No one can stop Eric from 
>running the _list_ however he wants, but the _movement_ belongs to all of us, 

Let me get this straight -- you're claiming property rights to spontaneous
behavior of other individuals?

>        Until we fix the serious problems in this list, it will never be an 
>appropriate environment for newcomers to learn about crypto-privacy, 

It's been good for me. Why do you think that might be?


--
................................
Jamie Dinkelacker   Palo Alto CA 
Jamie@netcom.com    415.941.4782    





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Philip Zimmermann <prz@columbine.cgd.ucar.EDU>Philip Zimmermann <prz@acm.org>
Date: Sat, 9 Oct 93 10:59:32 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com (Cypherpunks)
Subject: Zimmermann testimony to House subcommittee
Message-ID: <9310091757.AA04856@columbine.cgd.ucar.EDU>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



		  Testimony of Philip Zimmermann to
     Subcommittee for Economic Policy, Trade, and the Environment
		     US House of Representatives
			     12 Oct 1993



Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, my name is Philip
Zimmermann, and I am a software engineer who specializes in
cryptography and data security.  I'm here to talk to you today about
the need to change US export control policy for cryptographic
software.  I want to thank you for the opportunity to be here and
commend you for your attention to this important issue.   

I am the author of PGP (Pretty Good Privacy), a public-key encryption
software package for the protection of electronic mail.  Since PGP
was published domestically as freeware in June of 1991, it has spread
organically all over the world and has since become the de facto
worldwide standard for encryption of E-mail.  The US Customs Service
is investigating how PGP spread outside the US.  Because I am a
target of this ongoing criminal investigation, my lawyer has advised
me not to answer any questions related to the investigation.


 
I.  The information age is here.

Computers were developed in secret back in World War II mainly to
break codes.  Ordinary people did not have access to computers,
because they were few in number and too expensive.  Some people
postulated that there would never be a need for more than half a
dozen computers in the country.  Governments formed their attitudes
toward cryptographic technology during this period.  And these
attitudes persist today.  Why would ordinary people need to have
access to good cryptography?

Another problem with cryptography in those days was that
cryptographic keys had to be distributed over secure channels so that
both parties could send encrypted traffic over insecure channels. 
Governments solved that problem by dispatching key couriers with
satchels handcuffed to their wrists.  Governments could afford to
send guys like these to their embassies overseas.  But the great
masses of ordinary people would never have access to practical
cryptography if keys had to be distributed this way.  No matter how
cheap and powerful personal computers might someday become, you just
can't send the keys electronically without the risk of interception. 
This widened the feasibility gap between Government and personal
access to cryptography.

Today, we live in a new world that has had two major breakthroughs
that have an impact on this state of affairs.  The first is the
coming of the personal computer and the information age.  The second
breakthrough is public-key cryptography. 

With the first breakthrough comes cheap ubiquitous personal
computers, modems, FAX machines, the Internet, E-mail, digital
cellular phones, personal digital assistants (PDAs), wireless digital
networks, ISDN, cable TV, and the data superhighway.  This
information revolution is catalyzing the emergence of a global
economy.

But this renaissance in electronic digital communication brings with
it a disturbing erosion of our privacy.  In the past, if the
Government wanted to violate the privacy of ordinary citizens, it had
to expend a certain amount of effort to intercept and steam open and
read paper mail, and listen to and possibly transcribe spoken
telephone conversation.  This is analogous to catching fish with a
hook and a line, one fish at a time.  Fortunately for freedom and
democracy, this kind of labor-intensive monitoring is not practical
on a large scale.

Today, electronic mail is gradually replacing conventional paper
mail, and is soon to be the norm for everyone, not the novelty is is
today.  Unlike paper mail, E-mail messages are just too easy to
intercept and scan for interesting keywords.  This can be done
easily, routinely, automatically, and undetectably on a grand scale. 
This is analogous to driftnet fishing-- making a quantitative and
qualitative Orwellian difference to the health of democracy.

The second breakthrough came in the late 1970s, with the mathematics
of public key cryptography.  This allows people to communicate
securely and conveniently with people they've never met, with no
prior exchange of keys over secure channels.  No more special key
couriers with black bags.  This, coupled with the trappings of the
information age, means the great masses of people can at last use
cryptography.  This new technology also provides digital signatures
to authenticate transactions and messages, and allows for digital
money, with all the implications that has for an electronic digital
economy.  (See appendix)

This convergence of technology-- cheap ubiquitous PCs, modems, FAX,
digital phones, information superhighways, et cetera-- is all part of
the information revolution.  Encryption is just simple arithmetic to
all this digital hardware.  All these devices will be using
encryption.  The rest of the world uses it, and they laugh at the US
because we are railing against nature, trying to stop it.  Trying to
stop this is like trying to legislate the tides and the weather. It's
like the buggy whip manufacturers trying to stop the cars-- even with
the NSA on their side, it's still impossible.  The information
revolution is good for democracy-- good for a free market and trade. 
It contributed to the fall of the Soviet empire.  They couldn't stop
it either.

Soon, every off-the-shelf multimedia PC will become a secure voice
telephone, through the use of freely available software.  What does 
this mean for the Government's Clipper chip and key escrow systems?

Like every new technology, this comes at some cost.  Cars pollute the
air.  Cryptography can help criminals hide their activities.  People
in the law enforcement and intelligence communities are going to look
at this only in their own terms.  But even with these costs, we still
can't stop this from happening in a free market global economy.  Most
people I talk to outside of Government feel that the net result of
providing privacy will be positive.

President Clinton is fond of saying that we should "make change our
friend".  These sweeping technological changes have big implications,
but are unstoppable.  Are we going to make change our friend?  Or are
we going to criminalize cryptography?  Are we going to incarcerate
our honest, well-intentioned software engineers?

Law enforcement and intelligence interests in the Government have
attempted many times to suppress the availability of strong domestic
encryption technology.  The most recent examples are Senate Bill 266
which mandated back doors in crypto systems, the FBI Digital
Telephony bill, and the Clipper chip key escrow initiative.  All of
these have met with strong opposition from industry and civil liberties
groups.  It is impossible to obtain real privacy in the information
age without good cryptography.

The Clinton Administration has made it a major policy priority to 
help build the National Information Infrastructure (NII).  Yet, some
elements of the Government seems intent on deploying and entrenching
a communications infrastructure that would deny the citizenry the
ability to protect its privacy.  This is unsettling because in a
democracy, it is possible for bad people to occasionally get
elected-- sometimes very bad people.  Normally, a well-functioning
democracy has ways to remove these people from power.  But the wrong
technology infrastructure could allow such a future government to
watch every move anyone makes to oppose it.  It could very well be
the last government we ever elect.

When making public policy decisions about new technologies for the
Government, I think one should ask oneself which technologies would
best strengthen the hand of a police state.  Then, do not allow the
Government to deploy those technologies.  This is simply a matter of
good civic hygiene.


II.  Export controls are outdated and are a threat to privacy and
     economic competitivness. 

The current export control regime makes no sense anymore, given 
advances in technology.

There has been considerable debate about allowing the export of
implementations of the full 56-bit Data Encryption Standard (DES). 
At a recent academic cryptography conference, Michael Wiener of Bell
Northern Research in Ottawa presented a paper on how to crack the DES
with a special machine.  He has fully designed and tested a chip that
guesses DES keys at high speed until it finds the right one.  
Although he has refrained from building the real chips so far, he can
get these chips manufactured for $10.50 each, and can build 57000 of
them into a special machine for $1 million that can try every DES key
in 7 hours, averaging a solution in 3.5 hours.  $1 million can be
hidden in the budget of many companies.  For $10 million, it takes 21
minutes to crack, and for $100 million, just two minutes.  That's
full 56-bit DES, cracked in just two minutes.  I'm sure the NSA can
do it in seconds, with their budget.  This means that DES is now
effectively dead for purposes of serious data security applications. 
If Congress acts now to enable the export of full DES products, it
will be a day late and a dollar short.

If a Boeing executive who carries his notebook computer to the Paris
airshow wants to use PGP to send email to his home office in Seattle,
are we helping American competitivness by arguing that he has even
potentially committed a federal crime?  

Knowledge of cryptography is becoming so widespread, that export 
controls are no longer effective at controlling the spread of this
technology.  People everywhere can and do write good cryptographic
software, and we import it here but cannot export it, to the detriment
of our indigenous software industry.

I wrote PGP from information in the open literature, putting it into
a convenient package that everyone can use in a desktop or palmtop
computer.  Then I gave it away for free, for the good of our
democracy.  This could have popped up anywhere, and spread.  Other
people could have and would have done it.  And are doing it.  Again
and again.  All over the planet.  This technology belongs to
everybody.


III.  People want their privacy very badly.

PGP has spread like a prairie fire, fanned by countless people who
fervently want their privacy restored in the information age.

Today, human rights organizations are using PGP to protect their
people overseas.  Amnesty International uses it.  The human rights
group in the American Association for the Advancement of Science uses
it.

Some Americans don't understand why I should be this concerned about 
the power of Government.  But talking to people in Eastern Europe, you
don't have to explain it to them.  They already get it-- and they
don't understand why we don't.

I want to read you a quote from some E-mail I got last week from
someone in Latvia, on the day that Boris Yeltsin was going to war
with his Parliament:  

   "Phil I wish you to know: let it never be, but if dictatorship 
   takes over Russia your PGP is widespread from Baltic to Far East 
   now and will help democratic people if necessary.  Thanks."




Appendix -- How Public-Key Cryptography Works
---------------------------------------------

In conventional cryptosystems, such as the US Federal Data Encryption
Standard (DES), a single key is used for both encryption and
decryption.  This means that a key must be initially transmitted via
secure channels so that both parties have it before encrypted
messages can be sent over insecure channels.  This may be
inconvenient.  If you have a secure channel for exchanging keys, then
why do you need cryptography in the first place?

In public key cryptosystems, everyone has two related complementary
keys, a publicly revealed key and a secret key.  Each key unlocks the
code that the other key makes.  Knowing the public key does not help
you deduce the corresponding secret key.  The public key can be
published and widely disseminated across a communications network.
This protocol provides privacy without the need for the same kind of
secure channels that a conventional cryptosystem requires.

Anyone can use a recipient's public key to encrypt a message to that
person, and that recipient uses her own corresponding secret key to
decrypt that message.  No one but the recipient can decrypt it,
because no one else has access to that secret key.  Not even the
person who encrypted the message can decrypt it.  

Message authentication is also provided.  The sender's own secret key
can be used to encrypt a message, thereby "signing" it.  This creates
a digital signature of a message, which the recipient (or anyone
else) can check by using the sender's public key to decrypt it.  This
proves that the sender was the true originator of the message, and
that the message has not been subsequently altered by anyone else,
because the sender alone possesses the secret key that made that
signature.  Forgery of a signed message is infeasible, and the sender
cannot later disavow his signature. 

These two processes can be combined to provide both privacy and
authentication by first signing a message with your own secret key,
then encrypting the signed message with the recipient's public key. 
The recipient reverses these steps by first decrypting the message
with her own secret key, then checking the enclosed signature with
your public key.  These steps are done automatically by the
recipient's software.



-- 
  Philip Zimmermann
  3021 11th Street
  Boulder, Colorado 80304
  303 541-0140
  E-mail: prz@acm.org






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: mgream@acacia.itd.uts.edu.au (Matthew Gream)
Date: Fri, 8 Oct 93 19:15:48 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Diffie-Helman example in g++
In-Reply-To: <9310081951.AA12236@illuminati.IO.COM>
Message-ID: <9310090216.AA20577@acacia.itd.uts.EDU.AU>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Earlier, Douglas Barnes wrote:

> // Demo of mathematics for Diffie-Hellman type key exchange
[..]
> // Does anyone have a clue what good values of 'a' are in this
> // algorithm?
> 
> a = 127;

The only restriction placed on /a/ is that it be a primitive root of
/p/. To do this, you choose /a/ at random until you find the condition
(/a/, /p/-1) == 1 is satisfied. Since there are lots of primitive roots,
this shouldn't take long. I wonder though, are there any strengths in
choosing higher values of /a/?

Feel free to correct me if I'm wrong, my engineering background means
my number theory isn't as strong as it could be (but I'm working on it
:-).

Matthew.
-- 
Matthew Gream, M.Gream@uts.edu.au. "... encryption is the ultimate means of
Consent Technologies, 02-821-2043.  protection against an Orwellian state."




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Perry E. Metzger" <pmetzger@lehman.com>
Date: Sat, 9 Oct 93 09:39:28 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: This just in..
In-Reply-To: <m0olXt5-0003ElC@romulus.reed.edu>
Message-ID: <9310091637.AA08575@snark.lehman.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



nick kaplinsky says:
> Sweet, thats rad.  You know al wbalderson worked for epitope for a long time.
> Hey , I 'm writing this on my Toshiba 1950 from home.....  pretty cool.
> I'll see you later
> N

People who want to post bizarre messages are directed to learn how the
"Delete" key works.

Perry




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Matthew J Ghio <mg5n+@andrew.cmu.edu>
Date: Sat, 9 Oct 93 09:49:29 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: PHONE PRIVACY
In-Reply-To: <9310082052.memo.46724@BIX.com>
Message-ID: <wghifsK00VonEJikwR@andrew.cmu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> I would not trust this for hiding from law enforcement.
> You can get the 900 service's fone records with a warrant.
> If not law enforcement, then who do you need this to
> hide from?  You can use a pay fone to fool caller-id boxes.
> Well, I guess they dont hide the city.

Well, if you have a pair of pay phones nearby, and the wires are
concealed but accessable, you could rig it to answer calls on one line
and then let the caller dial out on the other line.  Only problem is
that you have to use a calling card...unless you have a red box or rig a
COCOT. ;)




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: speth@cats.ucsc.edu
Date: Sat, 9 Oct 93 13:09:31 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Wireless Networks info request...
Message-ID: <9310092009.AA14789@am.ucsc.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



This is beginning to stray from the realm of the cypherpunks, but the thread
on wireless networks has gotten me interested, and I'd like pointers to more
information.

Does anyone have plans for building wireless network controllers?  What
commercial companies are out there besides TAL?  Where is this sort of thing
discussed regularly (usenet, mailing lists, etc.)?

Any intel would be appreciated.

________________________________________________________________________________
james speth       email for pgp compatible public-key        speth@cats.ucsc.edu
________________________________________________________________________________
               Have you ever had your phones tapped by the government?  YOU WILL
                              and the company that'll bring it to you...  AT&T




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: VACCINIA@UNCVX1.OIT.UNC.EDU
Date: Sat, 9 Oct 93 10:15:56 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: List Protocol
Message-ID: <01H3WQR28QVQ0002W4@UNCVX1.OIT.UNC.EDU>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I have been on the list for only 2 months now and I must say I enjoy the
communication. Yes, there is alot of noise that comes thru the list but alot of
it could be eliminated by not CC: to the list and communicating privately with
those who have posted information of interest to you. I find alot of the back
and forth communication annoying. Perhaps, if one notes something of interest 
to them from the list, they should communicate more with those who write them 
and evince interest in that subject and less with the list. I have found that
when I see something I like on the list (it is usually a first posting) and
contact that person directly they are very gracious and glad to help me out.
I'm not particularly technisavvy yet, but when I have asked people directly for
some pointer to information so that I can then go out and learn about it myself
(rather then expecting them to educate me), they respond very positively. Also,
those who do not think that there is a crypto-movement should hope that there
is, otherwise they may soon find themselves outlaws of a much higher level.
This is just my two cents, and sorry for the noise but I've seen a bit too much
negativism posted lately to allow myself to remain silent.

Scott G. Morham              ! The First, 
Vaccinia@uncvx1.oit.unc.edu  !            Second
                             !                   and Third
                             !                              Levels of
                             !                 Information Storage and Retrieval
                             ! DNA,                       
                             !      Biological Neural Nets,
                             !                              Cyberspace




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: swc@uc1.ucsu.edu (Stuart W. Card)
Date: Sat, 9 Oct 93 10:19:32 PDT
To: mg5n+@andrew.cmu.edu
Subject: Re: distributed autonomous networks
Message-ID: <9310091720.AA28167@uc1.ucsu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Meteor bounce is real.  Ask anyone in military communications.
It is not easy and it is not cheap (in present equipment volumes).
The antennas tend to be bulky as well.  But it is an option.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Stuart W. Card, Consultant, Card & Associates -- Research & Development
Box 153 RR 1 Newport Rd Utica NY 13502         315-735-1717 / FAX -8469
swc@uc1.ucsu.edu or cards@top.cis.syr.edu           "Who is John Galt?"




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: swc@uc1.ucsu.edu (Stuart W. Card)
Date: Sat, 9 Oct 93 10:20:56 PDT
To: mg5n+@andrew.cmu.edu
Subject: Re: distributed autonomous networks
Message-ID: <9310091723.AA28176@uc1.ucsu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Don't try to forward messages to their destination.  Instead, forward
them to several sites distributed around the net, and folks can check
their messages via the net from whatever site is closest to them.
I would suggest using public keys in lieue of MAC addresses, and
Shamir sharing really sensitive stuff.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Stuart W. Card, Consultant, Card & Associates -- Research & Development
Box 153 RR 1 Newport Rd Utica NY 13502         315-735-1717 / FAX -8469
swc@uc1.ucsu.edu or cards@top.cis.syr.edu           "Who is John Galt?"




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: swc@uc1.ucsu.edu (Stuart W. Card)
Date: Sat, 9 Oct 93 10:21:22 PDT
To: wcs@anchor.ho.att.com
Subject: Re: distributed autonomous networks
Message-ID: <9310091725.AA28179@uc1.ucsu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


At present, nobody knows how to RDF (radio direction find) the sources
of meteor burst transmissions.  But I know for a fact (from R&D proposal
solicitations) that the military is trying to figure out how.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Stuart W. Card, Consultant, Card & Associates -- Research & Development
Box 153 RR 1 Newport Rd Utica NY 13502         315-735-1717 / FAX -8469
swc@uc1.ucsu.edu or cards@top.cis.syr.edu           "Who is John Galt?"




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Matthew J Ghio <mg5n+@andrew.cmu.edu>
Date: Sat, 9 Oct 93 10:29:32 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Atari and VAX
In-Reply-To: <01H3VWZ6ZIO08X1J5D@mr.alaska.edu>
Message-ID: <YghjEhC00VonMJils2@andrew.cmu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> Date: 08 Oct 1993 22:25:10 -0800
> From: "John W. Redelfs" <TSJWR@acad2.alaska.edu>
> Subject: Atari and VAX
> To: cypherpunks@toad.com
>
> If I owned a PC clone or a Mac, I'd be sitting pretty.  If my host machine
> was Unix, I'd be fine.  But I'm using an Atari emulating vt100 off a 
> VAX 6510.  Is there any help for me?  How can I be a cypherpunk?
>
> I want to be using PGP, but I haven't found it for either machine I'm on.
>
> Any suggestions?
>
> John W. Redelfs, tsjwr@acad1.alaska.edu

Well, you'll probably need to get the source and port it yourself, or
give it to someone who can.  If anyone has any suggestions or
well-commented source code that could be ported easily let me know as
well.  I know several people using Apple II computers who would probably
be interested.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Duncan Frissell <frissell@panix.com>
Date: Sat, 9 Oct 93 10:31:23 PDT
To: CYPHERPUNKS@toad.com
Subject: Re: Who`s Most Receptive
Message-ID: <199310091731.AA02951@panix.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


S >Also, I'm sending a note to Mitch.  He was interviewed by NPR a few 
S >months ago about the National Information Infrastructure.  I'll see if
S >he can suggest a reporter.
S >Shari

I uploaded a transcript of NPR's report on the Clipper announcement to 
the list last April if anyone would like a copy.  Dan Charles was the 
reporter and Whit Diffy was interviewed.  It was favorable.

I don't know why right wingers aren't as sympathetic to strong crypto.  I 
used to be one and I am.  Strong crypto protects us against the 
Trilateral Commission and the Bilderbergers.  They can't put the number of 
the beast on us if we use it and crypto is obviously handy for financial 
privacy.

After all would you want the dope smoking lesbian communist dominated 
Justice Department reading *your* mail, financial records, and medical 
records.

Duncan Frissell

"Nuke 'em 'till they glow then shoot them in the dark."

--- WinQwk 2.0b#0
                                                                                         




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: swc@uc1.ucsu.edu (Stuart W. Card)
Date: Sat, 9 Oct 93 10:35:56 PDT
To: trebor@foretune.co.jp
Subject: Re: Spread-spectrum net (vulnerability of)
Message-ID: <9310091736.AA28215@uc1.ucsu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I do not know of any way that the network can know where you are
without there being a way that someone (net operators or authorities)
can use that knowledge.  I feel it is better to let the user go get
his stuff via the net, versus have his stuff come to him.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Stuart W. Card, Consultant, Card & Associates -- Research & Development
Box 153 RR 1 Newport Rd Utica NY 13502         315-735-1717 / FAX -8469
swc@uc1.ucsu.edu or cards@top.cis.syr.edu           "Who is John Galt?"




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: mgream@acacia.itd.uts.edu.au (Matthew Gream)
Date: Fri, 8 Oct 93 21:15:50 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Diffie-Helman example in g++
In-Reply-To: <9310090340.AA16954@illuminati.IO.COM>
Message-ID: <9310090414.AA22491@acacia.itd.uts.EDU.AU>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Earlier, Douglas Barnes wrote:

> a is a constant, known to all (especially to both A and B).

Yes, that is true, but it still must be a primitive root w.r.t p. 
Unfortunately I am not well versed enough to explain the mathematical
reasoning behind this, but in the texts I have read, they all stated
this fact.

In an implementation of D-H I did for a project once, I ensured that
these conditions were met. Some probablistic analysis showed that approx
37-38% of numbers < p are primitive roots (done by sampling primes and
testing all n < p to see if n was primitive root), so finding a primitive
root was trivial.

Matthew.
-- 
Matthew Gream, M.Gream@uts.edu.au. "... encryption is the ultimate means of
Consent Technologies, 02-821-2043.  protection against an Orwellian state."




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: jvarley@netcom.com (Laconic)
Date: Sat, 9 Oct 93 14:16:05 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: PGP help for dos
Message-ID: <9310092116.AA16152@netcom5.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain




I just got PGP 2.3a for Dos and I'm having trouble adding keys to my
keyring.  It seems it can only accept two keys.  When I type 
pgp keyfile
It says something like "Key found, add this key to pubring.pgp?" I hit Y,
and then it tells me "No keyfile found in keyfile.$00".  I've encountered
this before.  Last time, it was only my key in the pubring.  When I went to
add a second key, it wouldn't accept it.  I wound up deleting my pubring,
re-doing it, and then I could add a second key, but no more.
-- 
jvarley@netcom.com            |   "...Soul of a woman was created below!"
Tomes on IRC                  |           -- Led Zeppelin
		PGP key available via finger




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Duncan Frissell <frissell@panix.com>
Date: Sat, 9 Oct 93 11:55:57 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: EFF GIF file recall n
Message-ID: <199310091851.AA01370@panix.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


To: cypherpunks@toad.com
S >Child pornography is not protected speech, and challenging
S >child pornography laws is not currently on EFF's agenda

Didn't the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals decide that the transport and sale 
provisions (unknowing posession) of the federal kiddie porn law were 
unconstitutional?  Wouldn't a warning like yours risk converting unknowing 
to knowing posession.

Duncan Frissell

--- WinQwk 2.0b#0
                                                                                     




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Matthew J Miszewski <MJMISKI@macc.wisc.edu>
Date: Sat, 9 Oct 93 14:35:58 PDT
To: CYPHERPUNKS@toad.com
Subject: Wireless Net
Message-ID: <23100916244253@vms2.macc.wisc.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Sorry to put this on the list but I forgot who posted the original.
 
I believe it was Ed Carp that mentioned he had a wireless net set
up between his 486 and his laptop.  Could you detail this setup a
bit more (hardware and code necessary).  Also, is the connection
(or lack thereof) encrypted end-to-end?
 
--Matt
______________________________________________________________________________
"This new technology (the printing press) threatened the Crown, which shuddered
at the thought of widespread dissemination of works advocating religious heresy
and political upheaval.  The Crown's solution to the problem was a system of
regulation designed to control this "dangerous" art."
         -From my Copyright Law Text (refrencing the Statute of Anne -
                                           the first Copyright Statute)
(c)1993
______________________/___________________________________mjmiski@macc.wisc.edu




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: A1 ray arachelian (library)  <rarachel@ishara.poly.edu>
Date: Sat, 9 Oct 93 18:10:59 PDT
To: DON_HENSON@delphi.com
Subject: Re: Cypherpunk Cause
In-Reply-To: <01H3VXEBY9AG9353JT@delphi.com>
Message-ID: <9310092105.AA03310@ishara.poly.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Yes, I believe there is a cause: the freedom to use crypto tools to protect
our conversations with others, be they text, voice, video, or even our 
conversations between our terminals/machines with other machines, and most
importantly our conversations with data storage devices.  Ie: an encrypted
diary, database, an encrypted method of distributing licensed software (a la
the Aldus On Call font CD, or whatever company it came from, etc.)

The method to have this cause succede is partially to have the good folks of
the land realize that "Honest folk don't have anything to hide" is in a great
conflict with "Locks and gates keep people honest."  If honest people don't
have anything to hide or protect, they may as well open all their doors and
windows, and put it "Rob me" signs on their lawns.

I by all means feel that the government should be able to do its job, and
especially the law enforcement branches, >WITHOUT< violating any of a person's
rights by snooping through their files.  Cries about child porno and other
assorted crap (drug dealers included) are just the price we have to pay to
have privacy.  As cypherpunks (and you guys know I've not really participated
in too much other than just throwing in my two cents here and there) we know
that outlawing crypto won't make it vanish.  Rather it will only put it in
the hands of the criminals and prevent everyone else from having it.  Hell
I can forsee making a lot of money if crypto is illegal by simply selling
copies of PGP and other packages for thousands to drug dealers.

It's not exactly a too far fetched idea.  The bigger issue is that the gubment
flunkies are also aware of this.  They're just using it as an excuse to be able
to spy on the public.  Hell I remember one of my professors (Computer Ethics)
stating that at one point Uncle Sam appointed a brain tank to see if it were
possible to spy on the private individuals at will whenever they wished.

The unsurprising answer to this is that the system is already in place.
Credit card info, anything passing through the post office, anything leaving
your house via the garbage route, telephones, etc. can be used.  Most of it
is easy to get without direct spying.  Any creditor will tell you "yes." So
is it any surprise to possibly imagine Uncle Sam having the ability to use
these readily availabe channels of information?

Now I'm not saying the government is corrut.  I don't need to.  It has done
a good job at that all by itself, and hell, it's the business of politics to
have a fringe of impurity, if not a downright streak straight through its
core.  The most accepted form of this is "No new taxes" spewed by the very
people who later raise taxes.

Is it surprising to understand that one of the principal reasons that the
thirteen colonies rebelled and broke off from mother England was taxes?  Of 
course no one in his right mind would think of revolt.  There's no need to.
Just vote.  But the trouble is once they're in office, there's nothing to
make sure they make good on their promisses.  It would be great to have
a bi-monthly way of electing them out of office if they're not performing,
or living up to their promises.

Hey being stuck for even a year with a person who has claimed to do everything
under the sun for you is the same as buying a sugar coated drug, only to find
that it not only doesn't heal what it said it would, but causes cancer, 
brain damage, and other unmentioned side effects.

Perhaps it is time we create something like the FDA for politicians?  Label
them as containing the intent to do as they say?  And put some teeth into
being able to sue them if they don't deliver.  Perhaps even making a rule that
any elected offical is bound by his word as if it were a signed contract?

Gee, is there a single senator or house representative out there that would
vote for such a bill?

But hey, if there was, it would be easy to remove those who want abortion
to be illegal, or strong crypto, etc.





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: PSDAA%LSUVM.BITNET@RICEVM1.RICE.EDU
Date: Sat, 9 Oct 93 15:15:59 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: PGP,etc.
Message-ID: <9310092213.AA19008@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I am very interested in PGP, anonymous mailers,etc. but I'm pretty new to the n
et and I'm having trouble finding PGP and any other info.  Please send me info.
 Thanks.
Drew
PSDAA@LSUVM.SNCC.LSU.EDU




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Ian Smith <iansmith@cc.gatech.edu>
Date: Sat, 9 Oct 93 16:45:59 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: PGP Interface
Message-ID: <199310092340.AA17343@haring.cc.gatech.edu.cc.gatech.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



As part of class project here at Ga. Tech, we are designing/implementing a new
(graphical) interface for the program PGP, Pretty Good Privacy. 

To do this well, we need information about the potential user community of
such an interface, and the pros/cons of the existing PGP interface...
thus we are sending out this questions

As mentioned in the survey, the data collected will be kept confidential,
and we encourage the replies to this survey to be sent via anonymous
remailers.

------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                         CS 6144 Design Project
                           User Questionnaire
                                  
         The following questionnaire is for a Computer Science Class
         project assignment.  The information that you provide will be
         used for designing a computer interface for an electronic
         mail enhancement.  Data collected in this survey will be kept
         STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL and will only be reported in an
         aggregated form.  We would appreciate it if you would take a
         few minutes to complete it.  Completed questionnaires, or any
         questions you may have concerning this questionnaire may be
         mailed to iansmith@cc.gatech.edu. Please complete it and
         return it as soon as possible.
 
         Thank you very much for your time and cooperation.


Please mark an 'X' under the column that most closely describes your
response.
-------------------------------------------------------------------
GENERAL COMPUTER  USAGE
-------------------------------------------------------------------
1. How often do you use:

                           Frequently      Occasionally   Seldomly
                                3               2              1
        a. a computer
                               ---             ---            ---
        b. Electronic Mail
                               ---             ---            ---

                                                     
2. Do you use a computer for:
                                      Yes     No
                a. business use?
                                      ---     ---
                b. personal use?
                                      ---     ---
                c. file transfer?
                                      ---     ---

3. In what type of environment do you MOST OFTEN use a computer?
   (Please mark only ONE of the following)
                                                Use Most
                     LAN (Local Area Network):
                                                ---
        WAN (Wide Area Network  e.g.Internet):
                                                ---
              Laptop or Portable WITH a modem:
                                                ---
           Laptop or Portable WITHOUT a modem:
                                                ---
   Stand alone PC (not a laptop) WITH a modem:
                                                ---
Stand alone PC (not a laptop) WITHOUT a modem:
                                                ---
Other (please specify):
                        _________________________________________


----------------------------------------------------------------------
ELECTRONIC MAIL
----------------------------------------------------------------------
4.  Which of the following interfaces do you most often use for
    electronic mail (e-mail)?
                                       Use Most
                  Text only interface:
                                       ---
             Graphical only interface:
                                       ---
     Combination (text and graphical):
                                       ---
               Other (please specify):
                                      -------------------------------
         
5. Do you ever send e-mail messages you ONLY want the recipient(s) to read?
                        Often     Sometimes    Seldomly      Never
                          3           2           1           0
        
                         ---         ---         ---         ---     


6.  Have you ever had occasion to believe a mail message you recieved
was forged?
                Yes              No             

                ---             ---

         
7.  When sending/receiving e-mail, how much additional time would you
be willing to spend to:

                        Less than  5 to 30   30 sec.      More than
                        5 seconds  seconds   to a minute   a minute
  Digitially 'sign' your
                message:
                        ---          ---        ---          ---
Authenticate the sender:
                        ---          ---        ---          ---
  Prevent eavesdropping:
                        ---          ---        ---          ---


8.  Does the amount of time you would be willing to spend in the
previous question depend on:
                                        Yes             No
Person the info was being sent to:
                                        ---             ---
        Your workload at the time:
                                        ---             ---
         Contents of the mail/msg:
                                        ---             ---


9.  Encryption is a common method of protecting information
transmitted.  The basic mechanism works as follows: 
              
         The information or message (text) is encoded from its initial
         readable form, to an internal form by means of a 'key'.  This
         internal text form (ciphertext), although readable, does not
         make any sense.  To make sense of the cipher text, the
         receiver must decode it (with a 'key') back into its initial
         readable form. If the encoded information is accessed by an
         unauthorized person, it will be useless unless it can be
         decoded (i.e. a person has a 'key' for it).
              
                                                Yes     No
    9A. Are you familiar with this concept?
                                                ---     ---
    
    9B. Have you ever used encryption?
                                                ---     ---
         
    9C. Have you ever encrypted files or mail?
                                                ---     ---
    
The following questions relate to specifics about encryption use.  If
you answered 'NO' to ANY of the three questions above (9A, 9B, or 9C),
please skip to the Background Information Section (questions 19-23).
----------------------------------------------------------------------
ENCRYPTION USERS ONLY
----------------------------------------------------------------------
    
10. What encryption software have you used?
                            PGP:
                                 ---
                          Crypt:
                                 ---
         Other (please specify):
                                 -------------------------------
         
         
11. Have you used the encryption software because
                                                        Yes     No
                                        You like it:
                                                        ---     ---
                It was the industry/school standard:
                                                        ---     ---
                        It was the only one you had:
                                                        ---     ---
      It was used by others that you interract with:
                                                        ---     ---
                Industry/school required it be used:
                                                        ---     ---
         
         
         
12. Would you say the size of file(s) or message(s) you usually encrypt
tend(s) to be:
    
        (4Kb+)          (1Kb-4Kb)       (100b-1Kb)      (<100b)
        VERY large      Large           Medium          Small
    
         ---             ---             ---             ---


13.  Have you ever spent multiple attempts trying to encrypt
something? 
                Yes             No

                ---             ---


14.  What is the most common error you have encounterd trying to
encrypt something?

Most common error:
                -----------------------------------------------



15. What is the frequency that you have made the following errors when
encrypting something:
                                Very often  Sometimes  Seldomly   Never
                                    3           2          1        0
                 Typing mistakes:
                                   ---         ---        ---      ---
            Forgetting passwords:
                                   ---         ---        ---      ---
      Misusing options/functions:
                                   ---         ---        ---      ---
             Losing others' keys:
                                   ---         ---        ---      ---

          Other (please specify):
                                --------------------------------------



16. Please rate the following features of encryption software
in terms of the importance of the feature to you:
    
                                Very      Somewhat   Not Very     Not
                                Important  Important  Important  Important
                                   3           2         1         0
    Integration with other tools: 
                                   ---       ---       ---        ---
        Time it takes to encrypt:
                                   ---       ---       ---        ---
        Time it takes to decrypt:
                                   ---       ---       ---        ---
 Time it takes to digitally sign:
                                   ---       ---       ---        ---
   Time it takes to authenticate:
                                   ---       ---       ---        ---
          Distribution of 'Keys':
                                   ---       ---       ---        ---   
    Security of message contents:
                                   ---       ---       ---        ---
          Other (please specify):
                                 ----------------------------------

17.  Please indicate which of the two attributes in each pair is MORE
important to you:

  How long it takes ME            vs.     How long it takes the recipient

        ---                                          ---

  Difficulty to encrypt           vs.     Security gained by encryption
        
        ---                                          ---

  Security gained by encryption   vs.     Time it takes to encrypt

        ---                                          ---
    

18.  Overall, how satisfied are you with the encryption software that you use?

        Very            Somewhat        Not very        Not at all
        Satisfied       Satisfied       Satisfied       Satisfied
          3                 2              1                0

         ---               ---            ---               ---


(optional comments:)
                -------------------------------------------------


----------------------------------------------------------------------
BACKGROUND INFORMATION
----------------------------------------------------------------------
19. What is your age (in years)?
                                ------------------

20. Are you Male?            Female?
                ---                ---

21. What is the highest level of an educational degree that you hold?
        HS      AA      BA/BS   MA/MS   PhD     other(specify)

        ---     ---     ---     ---     ---    -------------------


                                        Yes     No
22. Are you currently a college student? 
                                        ---     ---

   22a. If (YES) you are a student, what is your major field of study?
        Major:
        --------------------------------------------------

   22b. If (NO) you are NOT a student, what is your occupation?
        Occupation:
        ---------------------------------------------------


23.  We welcome any additional comments that you might have.  Please
feel free to add any comments, questions, or suggestions in the space
below:




=====================================================================
THANK YOU VERY MUCH FOR TAKING THE TIME TO COMPLETE THIS
QUESTIONNAIRE.  
(Please return it to iansmith@cc.gatech.edu as soon as possible.)
======================================================================







From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: cman@IO.COM (Douglas Barnes)
Date: Sat, 9 Oct 93 18:30:59 PDT
To: newsham@wiliki.eng.hawaii.edu (Timothy Newsham)
Subject: Re: DC-Net proposal,  comments requested
In-Reply-To: <9310091935.AA17001@toad.com>
Message-ID: <9310100127.AA23557@illuminati.IO.COM>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> A DC-NET
>    This net is broadcast in nature (data written by one machine can be
> seen by all other machines on the network) but with the characteristic 
> that it is impossible to tell which machine on a particular DC-Net 
> wrote out the data (except if all other machines are controlled by the 
> same person?).  The DC-NET itself is bit oriented.  Such a DC-network would

Actually, a single collusion between two processes could isolate a 
single non-colluding process, if that process was "between" them 
on the graph. One of the hard problems with DC Nets is how to minimize
the need for trust among the members, and how to arrange for net
formation and re-formation in a way that minimizes the ability to
deliberately or systematically partition all of the processes over
a period of time as part of a "fishing expedition" to determine the
source of some perceived-noxious output from the net.

We talked about DC Nets at the Austin cypherpunks meeting, and played
the "Dining Cryptographers Game" (complete with snazzy pieces provided
by yours truly). It was fun, but folks were a little nonplussed about 
the degree of trust required among participants.

> be the underlying layer for the packet network.  The actual DC-Network
> would be made up of processes on various (or even the same,  for testing 
> purposes) machines all connected together with TCP.  
>  
> 
> The Packet Net
>    The Packet Network would be built with the DC-Net as a base.  In order
> to send useful information across the network a single node would form
> data into packets.  These packets would be outputted to the network a
> bit at a time.  Since the DC-Net is bit oriented it is possible for

I've been looking at this problem as well, Tim, and it doesn't seem to 
me that you have to output a bit at a time. In fact, the DC net machines
should probably be operating on blocks that fit nicely into single IP
packets. Just consider the blocks to be the result of N coin tosses.

> another node to send some bits after one node has started to write out
> its packets.  As a node writes out a packet it should listen to the
> network for "collisions" and if a collision is detected it would 
> "give up" on the current transmission and wait for some time to start
> again.  Packets from one machine to another must have some sort of
> addressing.  The packet could be encrypted entirely in the public
> key of the destination if there is only a single DC net.  If there
> are multiple DC-Nets with packet forwarding between them then there
> must be some sort of plaintext address information in the packets.
> The return address should *never* be in plaintext.  Probably the
> data and return address of a packet would be encrypted in the public
> key of the destination or in a private key shared with the destination.
> 
> Sessions
>   Virtual connections can be built on top of the packet network in
> the same way as they are on top of other packet networks.  Some protocol
> like TCP (or even the TCP protocol) could be used.
> 
> 
> Why should this be built on the internet?
>     Writting and debugging a network of this sort on top of the internet
> should be easier than writing it and implementing it from scratch.  Some
> people have proposed neighborhood networks that would be used to
> implement untraceable and unstoppable connections.  This is an excellent
> way to develop and debug such a network.
> 
> What needs to be resolved
>    Alot!  This is just something I threw together.  There are alot of
>    questions.  In fact most of it is still a question.  The protocol
>    of the underlying DC-Net needs to be written.  A packet layer must
>    be written or adapted from current protocols.  The issues of addressing
>    need to be addressed.  There are also sure to be alot of politically
>    oriented questions as well.
> 

One head scratcher I've been considering is whether it would be better
to simulate a token-passing scheme, or to have comparisons broadcast
to all participants. Since in a broadcast scheme, the number of packets
per round generated is n^2, it seems prima facie that token passing would
be faster (it would certainly consume a much smaller % of the net's total
bandwidth), but actually for reasonable n, the accumulated latencies from
a few slow links could very well make the token passing slower. 

Also, I have thought of some ways of dealing with "slacker" processes
or folks who suddenly drop out that work better with a broadcast approach,
but there's probably a way to deal with them in the token-based scheme.

Another issue is whether or not your processes need to elect a "lead" process 
to handle synchronization issues and serve as an arbiter in net formation
and re-formation.


-- 
----------------                                             /\ 
Douglas Barnes            cman@illuminati.io.com            /  \ 
Chief Wizard         (512) 448-8950 (d), 447-7866 (v)      / () \
Illuminati Online          metaverse.io.com 7777          /______\



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: msattler@netcom.com (Michael Sattler)
Date: Sat, 9 Oct 93 20:59:34 PDT
To: A1 ray arachelian (library)  <DON_HENSON@delphi.com
Subject: Re: Cypherpunk Cause
Message-ID: <9310100357.AA07056@netcom.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


At 17:05 93/10/09 -0400, A1 ray arachelian (library) wrote:

>But hey, if there was, it would be easy to remove those who want abortion
>to be illegal, or strong crypto, etc.

Your presentation is interesting, but I believe your conclusion is based
upon a majority sharing your beliefs.  You are in good company.  The
architect of our country, Thomas Jefferson, based his plans on an informed
and educated citizenry.  What we have, however, is a poorly-educated,
easily-swayed populace that considers TV Guide a magazine, makes Married
With Children a hit, and only voted Ronald Raygun / George Bush out of
office only because they saw all their jobs dissapearing (and not even then
understanding it's because of unrestrained spending).


-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
Michael S. Sattler         msattler@netcom.com        +1 (415) 358-3058
Digital Jungle Software    Encrypt now; ask me how.   (finger for PGP key)

               All that is required for evil to triumph is
                for {wo}men of good will to do nothing.






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "L. Detweiler" <ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Date: Sat, 9 Oct 93 20:25:59 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Richard Stallman speaks at Michigan
Message-ID: <9310100322.AA14929@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


some cypherpunks may be interested in this ...

===cut=here===

From: "Theodore C. Belding" <streak@engin.umich.edu>
Subject: Richard Stallman to speak at the University of Michigan
Date: Fri, 08 Oct 1993 23:55:25 +0100
Sender: streak%nv.engin.umich.edu@srvr4.engin.umich.edu


[Please redistribute WIDELY, to anyone who may be interested.  Thanks!]

        Richard Stallman will give a talk entitled "Protecting the Freedom to 
Write Software: The new software monopolies, and what we can do about them" on
Wednesday, November 17, from 7pm to 9pm, in Auditorium 3 of the Modern 
Languages Building (MLB).  The MLB is at the corner of E. Washington St. and
Thayer St. on U of M's Central Campus in Ann Arbor.  All are welcome to attend,
and admission is free.
        Stallman is one of the founders of the League for Programming Freedom,
an organization whose goal is to protect the freedom to write programs. 
Specifically, the League aims to abolish two recently established legal
concepts which it feels restrict programmers' freedom to do their work: 
interface copyright and software patents.  Stallman will speak about how 
interface copyright and software patents originated and why they hurt both 
computer users and programmers.
        In the field of software, Richard Stallman is best known for 
developing the popular Emacs text editor while working at the MIT Artifical 
Intelligence lab between 1971 and 1984.  Today he is working to develop the 
free UNIX-compatible software system known as GNU.  In 1990,  Stallman received
a MacArthur Foundation Fellowship; he also received the 1990 ACM Grace Hopper
Award for his work on Emacs. 
        Stallman's talk is being sponsored by the U of M and Ann Arbor
chapters of the Association for Computing Machinery (ACM), the Wayne State 
University ACM, the Wayne State University CS Department, and the CSE Divison 
of the University of Michigan.  The Association for Computing Machinery was
formed in 1947 as the society for the computing community; its members are
students and professionals interested in all aspects of computing.  For more 
information on this or other UMACM activities, contact Ted Belding 
(Ted.Belding@umich.edu, streak@engin.umich.edu, or (313) 994-9573) or 
Sarah Granger (sgranger@engin.umich.edu or (313) 741-9318).  For information 
about the Ann Arbor ACM, contact Susan Haynes (haynes@emunix.emich.edu or 
(313) 487-4446).
 
Ted Belding, UMACM Chair





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "L. Detweiler" <ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Date: Sat, 9 Oct 93 20:49:34 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Health Reform Smart Cards
Message-ID: <9310100348.AA15302@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


in respect to D. Frissnell <g>

- ------- Forwarded message

Date: Sat, 9 Oct 1993 06:49:28 -0400
From: farber@central.cis.upenn.edu (David Farber)
Subject: and you wondered what would take the place of Star Wars


A review of the 
 ****Clinton Health Care Plan To Focus On Computer Support 10/07/93
WASHINGTON, DC, U.S.A., 1993 OCT 7 (NB)

"The Clinton Administration proposal would put smart cards in the
hands of every US citizen and some legal aliens that would
provide billing reference identification as well as carry up to
about 30 pages of medical data about the individual.

That change, along with a simplification of medical billing
forms, would literally save billions of dollars that could be
used to treat patients, and it looks as if there is growing
pressure from the public to actually force the health care
industry to take advantage of computer technology that has been
available for at least 10 years.

If health care reform really does take off, industry insiders say
that computer sales, and especially integration services, will
really explode, with health care taking on the same sort of high-
profile, high-profit role that was, until recently, the sole
purview of the military."




------- End of Forwarded Message





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: ferguson@icm1.icp.net (Paul Ferguson x2044)
Date: Sat, 9 Oct 93 19:30:59 PDT
To: TSJWR@acad2.alaska.edu (John W. Redelfs)
Subject: Re: Cypherpunks Cause (tm)
In-Reply-To: <01H3VV9GBC788X13HP@mr.alaska.edu>
Message-ID: <9310100331.AA21287@icm1.icp.net>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text



> 
> You bet there is a cypherpunks cause, and if there isn't there should be.
> The cypherpunks cause: to promote encryption and other privacy software
> usage on the Internet until it is beyond the control of totalitarian
> governments.  In other words, to protect the privacy rights of all by 
> making privacy universal.
> 
> Any questions?

No, but it really should have sounded more like this:

 
   Cypherpunks assume privacy is a good thing and wish there were more
of it.  Cypherpunks acknowledge that those who want privacy must
create it for themselves and not expect governments, corporations, or
other large, faceless organizations to grant them privacy out of
beneficence.  Cypherpunks know that people have been creating their
own privacy for centuries with whispers, envelopes, closed doors, and
couriers.  Cypherpunks do not seek to prevent other people from
speaking about their experiences or their opinions.
 
   The most important means to the defense of privacy is encryption. To
encrypt is to indicate the desire for privacy.  But to encrypt with
weak cryptography is to indicate not too much desire for privacy.
Cypherpunks hope that all people desiring privacy will learn how best
to defend it.
 
   Cypherpunks are therefore devoted to cryptography.  Cypherpunks wish
to learn about it, to teach it, to implement it, and to make more of
it.  Cypherpunks know that cryptographic protocols make social
structures.  Cypherpunks know how to attack a system and how to
defend it.  Cypherpunks know just how hard it is to make good
cryptosystems.
 
   Cypherpunks love to practice.  They love to play with public key
cryptography.  They love to play with anonymous and pseudonymous mail
forwarding and delivery.  They love to play with DC-nets.  They love
to play with secure communications of all kinds.
 
   Cypherpunks write code.  They know that someone has to write code to
defend privacy, and since it's their privacy, they're going to write
it.  Cypherpunks publish their code so that their fellow cypherpunks
may practice and play with it.  Cypherpunks realize that security is
not built in a day and are patient with incremental progress.
 
   Cypherpunks don't care if you don't like the software they write.
Cypherpunks know that software can't be destroyed.  Cypherpunks know
that a widely dispersed system can't be shut down.
 
   Cypherpunks will make the networks safe for privacy.
 
   If the government (or any other oppressor that behaves like one) can
effectively monitor communications, it can control or suppress them.  And
it will do so, because the natural tendency of controllers is always to
seek more control.
 
   The government cannot be relied on to protect your privacy rights.
Nor can anyone else --- certainly not your employer, or the corporations
that want to know all about you so they can sell you things.
 
   Given half the chance, governments and corporations will always push
for security standards that protect *them*, but not *you*.
 
   Computer technology can help protect you against would-be snoopers,
but only if somebody is sufficiently smart and dedicated to build the
tools.
 
   The Cypherpunks list exists to build and propagate privacy software.
Our aim is to give you the tools to keep your private information
private, and to communicate with other people and computers in ways
snoopers cannot tap.
 

_____________________________________________________________________________
Paul Ferguson                                                               
Mindbank Consulting Group                                    fergp@sytex.com   
Fairfax, Virginia  USA                                       ferguson@icp.net



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Date: Sat, 9 Oct 93 22:40:59 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: DC-Net proposal,  comments requested
In-Reply-To: <9310100127.AA23557@illuminati.IO.COM>
Message-ID: <9310100540.AA03355@netcom5.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Doug Barnes writes about Tim Newsham's work on DC-Nets:

> I've been looking at this problem as well, Tim, and it doesn't seem to 
> me that you have to output a bit at a time. In fact, the DC net machines
> should probably be operating on blocks that fit nicely into single IP
> packets. Just consider the blocks to be the result of N coin tosses.

Exactly. The "coin tosses" can be arranged far in advance and shared
on CD-ROM (for example) or whatever's convenient. Chaum, Bos,
Pfaltzman (I think...I don't have my paper handy) consider even using
ciphers to generate the tosses, though then the DC-Net ceases to be
information theoretically secure and is no more secure than the cipher
itself.

To see this in a simple way, forget about the "classical" DC-Net
situation of n participants in a ring or other graph. Instead,
consider only 2 participants, Alice and Bob.

Alice and Bob share a sequence of random numbers, essentially a
one-time pad. The sequence they share is, as an example:

1 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 .....

As a pair they can send 1s or 0s by the one of them sending the
message XORing his message with the sequence and then both of them
output the sequence.

Let us imagine Bob wished to send the "message": 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 1
1...

Alice: 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 .....

Bob:   1 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 ....   (his message, before he sends it)

XOR:   0 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 0..... (this is what Bob sends out)

The outside world sees two different bit streams and recovers the
message by XORing the streams put out by Alice and Bob:

XOR:   1 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 1....

Thus, Bob's "message" has been sent out, but since the outside world
does not the original one time pad Alice and Bob were using, it cannot
know which of Bob or Alice was sending the pad and which was "lying,"
that is, XORing the message with the pad and outputting that.

Of course, Alice knows it was Bob who sent the message (becuase she
knows she didn't). Extending the protocol to the ring
Alice-Bob-Charles in the classical DC-Net way completes the picture.

But you can see how precomputed, preexchanged pads--or a very secure
cipher (a good pseudorandom number generator, really)--would be used
in practice to eliminate coin tosses, real or simulated. No DC-Nets
would do things one bit a time, that I can see.

> Also, I have thought of some ways of dealing with "slacker" processes
> or folks who suddenly drop out that work better with a broadcast approach,
> but there's probably a way to deal with them in the token-based scheme.

"Disruption" by sending of spurious messages, to deny service by
flooding the DC-net, seems to be the biggest problem, and Chaum and
Bos devote most of their papers to schemes for handling this.

I have some of these papers--let me know if you don' yet have them,
especially the hard to find Jurgen Bos Ph.D. thesis.

Great to see work on DC-Nets again! Yanek Martinson, who I've not seen
on the list in many months, was working on an implementation, and at
today's Cypherpunks meeting, Strick expressed interest in implementing
DC-nets in his TCL-based crypto toolkit.


--Tim May


-- 
..........................................................................
Timothy C. May         | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,  
tcmay@netcom.com       | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
408-688-5409           | knowledge, reputations, information markets, 
W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA  | black markets, collapse of governments.
Higher Power: 2^756839 | Public Key: PGP and MailSafe available.
Note: I put time and money into writing this posting. I hope you enjoy it.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: szabo@netcom.com (Nick Szabo)
Date: Sat, 9 Oct 93 23:20:58 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: PHONE PRIVACY: real-time billing with digital postage
In-Reply-To: <wghifsK00VonEJikwR@andrew.cmu.edu>
Message-ID: <9310100621.AA08523@netcom5.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



We take for granted that long distance companies must record who 
called whom, and when, in order to tally the bill.  The 900 redialer 
doesn't obviate this; it simply adds an expensive level of
indirection.  Could not the need for such records be eliminated by 
real-time payment of digital postage?  Debit cards for phone calls
already exist along these lines, but they are restricted to
public phones; I envision home use to eliminate the need for
monthly bills and the accompanying recordkeeping.

Scenario: long distance company receives a call from one of its
customer phones.  It doesn't know which phone, only that the phone's
local service area provider is requesting a connection.  It notes 
the area code/country to and from to determine the rate, and receives
the proper digital postage payment from the calling phone.  It 
notes the destination phone number only in order to pass it on and 
complete the circuit.  The long distance provider doesn't know 
the caller's phone number and doesn't keep a permanent record of the 
other information.

The incoming d-stamp serial numbers are checked to make sure they have 
not already been used, added to the used list, and a corresponding amount 
of time is added to the call.  A simple LED on the customer's phone 
displays the duration and amount of billing as the call progresses.  
When the phone runs out of d-stamps it could be refreshed from magnetic 
strips on cards bought at the local drugstore.

In addition to new-found privacy, real-time billing would be more 
customer-friendly, providing the real-time feedback on 
charges that is expected for most other transactions (eg retail 
purchase of a good).  No more phone bill surprises!
(But please, let's not replace bills with rude robot operators: 
"deposit fifty cents, please").

Alas, there might be regulations requiring some kind of traffic recording
to be dealt with in some jurisdictions.  But then again maybe not,
since such recording has been taken for granted.

During the Ma Bell breakup here in the U.S. there sprung up a bunch 
of Mom & Pop long distance companies.  Some of these, providing 
specialized services, still exist.  Assuming no deadly flaws in this 
real-time postage scheme, if none of the major long-distance companies 
are willing to implement it, a small startup might rent bulk long-distance 
time from the majors and concentrate on the anonymous real-time billing
system.

Nick Szabo					szabo@netcom.com




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "George A. Gleason" <gg@well.sf.ca.us>
Date: Sun, 10 Oct 93 01:49:36 PDT
To: mg5n+@andrew.cmu.edu
Subject: Re: PHONE PRIVACY
Message-ID: <93Oct10.014758pdt.14325-4@well.sf.ca.us>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Re. wiring two payphone lines together: uh, NO.  From a practical
standpoint, it will probably drop trouble cards at the CO.  From a legal
standpoint, it's theft of service, and especially with red boxes etc.;
again, a dumb place to make your stand in court.  

Again, I want to suggest that the best thing to do is get a group of folks
together to establish a PBX which can be used as a concentrator/diverter.  

-gg




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: zeek@IO.COM (zeek)
Date: Sun, 10 Oct 93 00:19:37 PDT
To: austin-cypherpunks@mcfeeley.cc.utexas.edu (acp)
Subject: The Bank of the Internet!? (fwd)
Message-ID: <9310100715.AA27486@illuminati.IO.COM>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain




No, I didn't read this entire message, but I thought it may be relevant...

Forwarded message:
*> From dummy Wed Feb  29 12:12:12 1990
*> X-EB: ------------------------------
*> Date:    Fri, 8 Oct 1993 16:01:46 -0700
*> From:    Arthur Chandler <arthurc@SFSUVAX1.SFSU.EDU>
*> Subject: The Bank of the Internet!?
*> 
*>   Yesterday I went to hear a very interesting talk by Eric Hughes, one of
*> the founding members of the Cypherpunk list/organization. Unlike most
*> encryption pop journalists, who seem to limit themselves to PGP, this
*> fellow brought up several boggling ideas:
*>   1) "Cryptography is all economics."
*>      In other words, all encryption schemes come down to: how much $ am I
*> willing to spend to keep you from getting into my secret info, and how
*> much $ are you willing to spend to get it?"
*>   2) There are two methods to keeping secrets on the NET (or IRL): trust
*> some one, or trust an algorithm. And, in general, human trust is cheaper
*> than technology.
*>   3) The US government classifies encryption schemes as munitions, and is
*> accordingly places all encryption technology under export restrictions
*> controlled by the state department.
*>   4) Claude Shannon's two basic principles of encryption: confusion and
*> diffusion.
*> 
*>   He also mentioned something called a "blind signature" -- a special form
*> of digital signature that keeps users unknown (through encryption) to both
*> the bank they deposit with and sellers they transact with. I didn't
*> understand this "blind digital signature" idea. Can anyone out here explain?
*> 
*>   But the real boggler is that this fellow Eric is, with the backing of
*> the Electronic Frontier Foundation, going to start a Credit Union based on
*> up-to-date encryption schemes and using the Internet as the monetary
*> highway! It involves using something called digital money -- a system of
*> encrypted data that expires over time, but that a highly flexible ability
*> to purchase quantities or services. The data itself will be located
*> over several nodes, so that no one site has all the info about your
*> account, but that any "quorum number" of bank nodes can reconstruct the
*> whole picture of your assets. Anyone trying to crack the system would
*> have to crack, not just one or two nodes, but a quorum number. Such nodes
*> will be distributed internationally, though favoring nations with
*> encryption-favorable legislation.
*>             **************************************
*>   I'm oversimplifying all this. But the whole notion of a Bank of the
*> Internet, backed by the EFF and running encrypted international monetary
*> transactions seems... well, this is Future Culture: what do you think?
*> 




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: major@dcd.wa.gov.au
Date: Sat, 9 Oct 93 14:36:11 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Atari and VAX
Message-ID: <199310091958.AA04025@belfast.>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



"John W. Redelfs" <TSJWR@acad2.alaska.edu> writes:

> If I owned a PC clone or a Mac, I'd be sitting pretty.  If my host machine
> was Unix, I'd be fine.  But I'm using an Atari emulating vt100 off a 
> VAX 6510.  Is there any help for me?  How can I be a cypherpunk?
> 
> I want to be using PGP, but I haven't found it for either machine I'm on.

PGP version 2.3A contains conditionals for both Atari and VMS, The
distribution includes a file vmsbuild.com which presumably does the
obvious. 

I have no facilities to check if either of these actualy work.

Major

+------------------------------------------------+------------------------+
| Snail: Box T1680 GPO, Perth WA 6001, Australia | Phone: + 61 9 357-5076 |
| email: major@dcd.wa.gov.au                     | FAX:   + 61 9 370-3692 |
+------------------------------------------------+------------------------+

Netware 4.0 slogan: Know no bounds; Internet slogan: Have no bounds





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "M. Strata Rose" <strata@FENCHURCH.MIT.EDU>
Date: Sun, 10 Oct 93 01:46:00 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: PGP misunderstanding
Message-ID: <CMM.0.90.0.750242954.strata@fenchurch>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Hi Hal & others, this is Strata, author of the Virtual City (tm) 
Network "faq" (which raises more questions than it answers, rev 1.1 will 
be more customarily faq-like.)   Someone forwarded me your posting re
the faq and I thought I would take a moment to reply.  Please direct
any correspondence to me directly, I am only on cypherpunks-announce
and not the list itself.

I had a misunderstanding about the PGP key servers, not
realizing they existed to register your keys with and not to generate them. 
I have planned from the beginning to include serious privacy technology in
the Virtual City, up to and including objects in the master database which
can only be decrypted at runtime by those who have keys for them.  I have
been talking with Hugh Daniel about making his ideas on NYM's an integral
part of the infrastructure and plan to include Digital Cash as soon as a
version is ready to go.  I was at today's Cypherpunks meeting to get
more info on PGP and discuss details of the infrastructure with folks.
I will be posting a slightly revised 1.0.1 faq which corrects some
minor mistakes and also gives correct info about PGP key generation in
detail.

I will be writing up details of how I am thinking of implementing
some of the privacy structure mentioned in the faq and above
and posting it here for people to shoot at.  I am very interested in
doing this "right".   In the last 48 hours since I posted the faq
a number of messages from folks asking how they can get a public key, so I
want to head them in the right direction.  If I were to admit something
seditious in public, which I  never do, I might say that one of my many goals
for the Virtual City (tm) Network was to get Joe & Jane Undergrad or
Salaryperson casually using privacy tech in a matter of fact way-- they'll
use it to protect their identity and privacy in the VC environment and to
perform commercial transactions online.  

I think that people are not using the privacy tech that's out there
simply because they feel they have no compelling reason to do so.  If
people start needing to use it to get at things they think are
interesting or cool they will become familiar with the use of the tech
and begin to use it casually elsewhere.  That would seem to be the Right
Thing.

To spread usage out beyond Virtual City (tm) Network, 
I've also been thinking that later on when the service is established I
should start an encrypted "vcn" news hierarchy.  This will get randoms 
using PGP to read the news feed. I'm not familiar enough with the most
recent news control mechanisms to feel certain that I can somehow
"bounce" cleartext posts to these groups, I might have to make it
unidirectional and gatewayed solely through a hacked mail filter that
requires encrypted text.  My worry is that sites that
do satellite feeds might balk at carrying it, thinking it might violate some
FCC regs about non-cleartext data over public airwaves.  They might be right,
I need to learn more about possible legal ramifications before doing that.

Cheerfully educable,
_Strata

PS- I will support folks choosing their own encryption on data envelopes, but
after seeing Arthur's presentation today I think I'd better make it
abundantly clear that we can in no way be held liable if they insist on DES

M. Strata Rose
Unix & Network Consultant, SysAdmin & Internet Information 
Virtual City (TM) Network
strata@virtual.net | strata@hybrid.com | strata@fenchurch.mit.edu




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: hughes@ah.com (Eric Hughes)
Date: Sun, 10 Oct 93 07:56:04 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: DC-Net proposal,  comments requested
In-Reply-To: <9310100540.AA03355@netcom5.netcom.com>
Message-ID: <9310101455.AA08173@ah.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>Doug Barnes writes about Tim Newsham's work on DC-Nets:

>> I've been looking at this problem as well, Tim, and it doesn't seem to 
>> me that you have to output a bit at a time. 

Indeed, the DC-net protocol operates in any abelian (commutative)
group, such as, say, integers mod 2^56 (the size of a ping packet
body).  The modulus need not be a power of two, but there's little
advantage if it's not.  The vectors in a linear code might also be
appropriate for certain side effects.

>[... some people] consider even using
>ciphers to generate the tosses, though then the DC-Net ceases to be
>information theoretically secure and is no more secure than the cipher
>itself.

In practice, this is a small problem.  Since many of the messages that
a deployed DC-net sends out will be text encrypted for some particular
destination, one needs no greater computational security than that of
the cipher used to encode the message.

There are several random number generators provably as secure as the
hard number-theoretic problems used for public key cryptography.  The
problems include quadratic residuosity, factoring, and discrete log.

Eric




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: hughes@ah.com (Eric Hughes)
Date: Sun, 10 Oct 93 08:21:05 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: The Bank of the Internet!? (fwd)
In-Reply-To: <9310100715.AA27486@illuminati.IO.COM>
Message-ID: <9310101517.AA08200@ah.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Zeek forwarded a message written by Arthur Chandler which appears to
have appeared on Future Culture.  This reply is going both to the
cypherpunks list (worldwide) and also to the austin-cypherpunks list
(a locality); some comments may be obvious for one group or the other.

There are several small factual details incorrect in this post, most
of which I will not try to correct.  As he said, "I'm oversimplifying
all this."

One in particular, though, should be.  The EFF is not "backing" a
credit union, at least not the national organization.  Members of
EFF-Austin, a local chapter of the EFF, (well, the only local chapter,
but that's another story) are looking to form their own credit union.
Their efforts will provide a model for other such efforts.

True, it will use the "internet as the monetary highway" (a phrase I
delight in), but at least at the outset will neither issue digital
money nor deploy internationally distributed secret sharing.  I did
talk about both of these, but not as specifically regards any
particular financial project.

Eric




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: hughes@ah.com (Eric Hughes)
Date: Sun, 10 Oct 93 09:06:05 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Virtual City (tm) Network FAQ 1.0 (fwd)
In-Reply-To: <9310090525.AA29378@jobe.shell.portal.com.shell.portal.com>
Message-ID: <9310101606.AA08264@ah.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


On money in Virtual City:

First, a note of history.  Strata and I have been talking about money
in MUD-type environments (virtual, social, text-based).  These
discussions are reflected in her document.  I had decided after much
thought that the MUD type of environment would be a good place to
prototype electronic money.  I asked Strata about technical details,
since I knew that she was setting one up; discussions ensued.

A comment from Joichi Ito, a self-professed MUD enthusiast, which he
made to me at CFP-93 in March, started this train of thought: "I would
pay real money for MUD money."  He spends enough time on MUD's that
his personal life would be improved by spending cash dollars in
exchange for increased ability on the MUD.  

One of the big problems in creating electronic money is that there
must be something to spend it on, that is, some notion of actual value
upon which to base the derived value of the electronic money.  MUD's
seem to have that property.  I don't know exactly whence that value
arises, but certainly it does factually exist.  This question, the
origin of value in MUD's, will develop a life of its own, no doubt, as
various explanations arise, but this question is not central to any
monetary system.  What is needed is only that such value exists.  Let
us stipulate this for the purposes of discussion.

Once there is value, an economy develops when there is a means of
exchange for such value, typically coins.  So the MUD needs a notion
of exchange and a notion of representation of value.  For exchange,
I've designed a conceptual MUD object which is a simultaneous
transacter.  You put your stuff on the tray in front of you, likewise
does your trading partner.  After you both press the big red buttons
in front of you, the contents of the two trays are magically
interchanged. (Magically, of course, since this is a MUD.)  Recall
the big rotating lucite contraptions that post offices are using.

In the MOO (MUD, Object Oriented), one can subclass this transacter
and attach robot servers to the other side of the glass, creating
vending machines.  One particular vending machine could take the coin
of the realm and exchange it for a bank note of the same amount.  The
bank note, digitally signed by the MUD bank, is an informational
object.  Because it is information and not a MUD object, the note can
be freely transmitted _outside of the MUD_.

Once you have the existence of such notes, one can set up inter-MUD
currency exchanges, test the theory of free banking, and the like.

Eric




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: hughes@ah.com (Eric Hughes)
Date: Sun, 10 Oct 93 09:29:42 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Diffie-Helman example in g++
In-Reply-To: <9310090216.AA20577@acacia.itd.uts.EDU.AU>
Message-ID: <9310101629.AA08295@ah.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>Earlier, Douglas Barnes wrote:

>> // Demo of mathematics for Diffie-Hellman type key exchange
>[..]
>> // Does anyone have a clue what good values of 'a' are in this
>> // algorithm?
>> 
>> a = 127;

Notation: here 'a' is the base of the D-H exponentials.

>Feel free to correct me if I'm wrong, [...]

Certainly.  ;-)

>The only restriction placed on /a/ is that it be a primitive root of
>/p/. 

D-H works, i.e. a key is agreed upon, even if 'a' is not a primitive
root mod p, but the security may be adversely affected if it is not.

If 'a' is not a primitive root, then size of the search space which
the exponentials may take will be less than maximal.  In fact, the
order of the element 'a' gives the number of such possibilities.  (The
order is the smallest power of an element that is equal to the
identity.)

>To do this, you choose /a/ at random until you find the condition
>(/a/, /p/-1) == 1 is satisfied. 

Nope.  Being relatively prime to p-1 is not even involved.  Here is
the actual condition for primitivity:

   For every prime q which divides p-1, a^((p-1)/q) != 1 (mod p)

By Fermat's Little Theorem, x^(p-1) == 1 (mod p), for all 'x'.  Now
'a' is primitive if p-1 is the smallest such number.  Since the order
of an element much divide the order of the group, if no divisor d of
p-1 is such that x^d == 1 (mod p), then p-1 must be the smallest.

Burt Kaliski, of RSA Labs, told be he picked a D-H modulus p such that
p = 2q+1, where both p and q are prime.  It took a long time to find
such a pair.  The advantage is that almost half the elements of such
a field are primitive roots.

Eric




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Brad Huntting <huntting@glarp.com>
Date: Sun, 10 Oct 93 09:49:42 PDT
To: szabo@netcom.com (Nick Szabo)
Subject: Re: PHONE PRIVACY: real-time billing with digital postage
In-Reply-To: <9310100621.AA08523@netcom5.netcom.com>
Message-ID: <199310101648.AA17331@misc.glarp.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



> We take for granted that long distance companies must record who 
> called whom, and when, in order to tally the bill.  The 900 redialer 
> doesn't obviate this; it simply adds an expensive level of
> indirection.  Could not the need for such records be eliminated by 
> real-time payment of digital postage?

Better yet, use an Internet based phone system.  The phone companies
draconian policies of billing for distance, time, and social standing
are antiquated With the Internets method of billing for maximum
usable bandwidth or connect time, it costs the same to send e-mail
to another continent or just accross town costs the same.  Distance
based billing isolates people by preventing them from communicating
with anyone but their neighbors.  Internet style billing serves to
create a sense of global unity limited more by language and access
to technologie instead of geographical or political boundaries.

A side effect of simplified billing and connectionless systems is
that no records are kept of who contacted whom.  In fact, it would be
difficult even to make such records w/o having a specific target.


brad




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: swc@uc1.ucsu.edu (Stuart W. Card)
Date: Sun, 10 Oct 93 08:19:42 PDT
To: szabo@netcom.com
Subject: Re: PHONE PRIVACY: real-time billing with digital postage
Message-ID: <9310101522.AA02031@uc1.ucsu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I am presently looking into leasing fiber plant to set up a secure net
with some of the attributes Nick Szabo mentions.  Without enhancements
to his scheme, however, I do not see how my cuso tomers can be sure
that I am not recording traffic routine g, even if I claim that I am not.
Furthermore, what is to prevent third parties from taping my      ping my trunks
and decoding the signalling which is used to direct the route switching?
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Stuart W. Card, Consultant, Card & Associates -- Research & Development
Box 153 RR 1 Newport Rd Utica NY 13502         315-735-1717 / FAX -8469
swc@uc1.ucsu.edu or cards@top.cis.syr.edu           "Who is John Galt?"




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Arthur Chandler <arthurc@crl.com>
Date: Sun, 10 Oct 93 11:56:04 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: The Bank of the Internet!? (fwd)
In-Reply-To: <9310101517.AA08200@ah.com>
Message-ID: <Pine.3.05.9310101141.A11495-b100000@crl.crl.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



   It's quite a jolt, to see one's post on one list (FutureCulture) pop up
on another list (Cypherpunks). Well, it pays to stay networked.  :<)
   I understand -- and believe I stated in the post -- that all these
efforts seem to be in the future conditional tense (or is it future
optimistic tense?).  But I'll repeat what I mentioned to Eric at the meeting:
  It jarred me to see someone so blithely planning to enter into the world
of international finance from an essentially "outsider" frame of
reference. As impressed as I was by the range and depth of Eric's
understanding of the technical aspects of encryption, I have the feeling
that setting up such a revolutionary scheme -- which would threaten both
traditional banking enterprises and the governments that monitor and tax
them -- is bound to encounter opposition much more massive and
sophisticated than he indicated.
  To be fair, he could only talk about the high points of his plans in
the context of the afternoon talk. But I kept having flashbacks to the1960s
and 70s, when counterculture groups laid intricate plans to overwhelm or
endrun "the system." 
  Put bluntly, any plans to enter international finance without a
substantial component aimed at lining up political and traditional
financial clout seems to me to be doomed to the dustbin of visionary
schemes.  After the smoke clears, we are far more likely to see Chase
Manhattan with a platoon of hired cryptologists than EFF or Cypherpunks
wheeling and dealing on a global scale.

  That's my &v$>{/!  worth.     <--- Encrypted digital $.02









From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Perry E. Metzger" <pmetzger@lehman.com>
Date: Sun, 10 Oct 93 09:11:20 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Cypherpunk Cause
In-Reply-To: <9310100357.AA07056@netcom.netcom.com>
Message-ID: <9310101611.AA11630@snark.lehman.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Michael Sattler says:
> With Children a hit, and only voted Ronald Raygun / George Bush out of
> office only because they saw all their jobs dissapearing (and not even then
> understanding it's because of unrestrained spending).

If you want to spew nonsense, please do so on one of the politics
newsgroups. This is for cryptography discussion.

Perry 
Who suspects that not one in five of the so-called "intellectuals" in
this country (who are all contemptuous of their own culture) even
knows what the cause of inflation is, and that not one in twenty
understands why increasing tax rates can lower tax revenues.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Matthew J Miszewski <MJMISKI@macc.wisc.edu>
Date: Sun, 10 Oct 93 10:26:05 PDT
To: CYPHERPUNKS@toad.com
Subject: PHON PRIVACY
Message-ID: <23101012250005@vms2.macc.wisc.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Our favorite Corporate entity, McDonald's, actually attempted
a play on Mr. Szabo's idea.  Here in Wisconsin, a while back,
they distributed 3 minutedsErase
they distributed 3 minutedsErase
Erase
Erase
Select Mail
Erase
Erase
Erase
Extract/Mail
Extract/Mail
Help
Erase
______________________________________________________________________________
"This new technology (the printing press) threatened the Crown, which shuddered
at the thought of widespread dissemination of works advocating religious heresy
and political upheaval.  The Crown's solution to the problem was a system of
regulation designed to control this "dangerous" art."
         -From my Copyright Law Text (refrencing the Statute of Anne -
                                           the first Copyright Statute)
(c)1993
______________________/___________________________________mjmiski@macc.wisc.edu




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Matthew J Miszewski <MJMISKI@macc.wisc.edu>
Date: Sun, 10 Oct 93 10:29:43 PDT
To: CYPHERPUNKS@toad.com
Subject: oops
Message-ID: <23101012270256@vms2.macc.wisc.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Anyways.  As i was saying....
 
McDonalds distributed 3 minute long distance cards that came with your
favorite value meal.  Completely anonymous when used from a payphone,
and the same service as regular LD.
 
--Matt
______________________________________________________________________________
"This new technology (the printing press) threatened the Crown, which shuddered
at the thought of widespread dissemination of works advocating religious heresy
and political upheaval.  The Crown's solution to the problem was a system of
regulation designed to control this "dangerous" art."
         -From my Copyright Law Text (refrencing the Statute of Anne -
                                           the first Copyright Statute)
(c)1993
______________________/___________________________________mjmiski@macc.wisc.edu




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Matthew J Ghio <mg5n+@andrew.cmu.edu>
Date: Sun, 10 Oct 93 11:39:46 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: PHONE PRIVACY: real-time billing with digital postage
In-Reply-To: <9310100621.AA08523@netcom5.netcom.com>
Message-ID: <cgi5NbC00awT8CglBU@andrew.cmu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Nick Szabo <szabo@netcom.com> writes:

> Scenario: long distance company receives a call from one of its
> customer phones.  It doesn't know which phone, only that the
> phone's local service area provider is requesting a connection.  It
> notes the area code/country to and from to determine the rate, and
> receives the proper digital postage payment from the calling phone.
> It notes the destination phone number only in order to pass it on and
> complete the circuit.  The long distance provider doesn't know
> the caller's phone number and doesn't keep a permanent record of the
> other information.

It's been tried before.  That's how calling cards worked in the mid
1980's.  The long distance company had no idea where the call was coming
from when it went into their credit card port.  It didn't take the
hackers long to figure out how to exploit the anonimnity of that system!
 Now all credit card calls are automatically traced.

I like the billing indicator on a LED on the phone tho...  It would be
easy to implement too.  Right after the call was dialed, the phone
company could send a short tone to indicate the cost per minute, which
would be interpreted by a microchip in the display.  When the receiving
party answered, a second connect tone (or even a click by change in
voltage) could signal the indicator to start counting time...  The call
would still be billed at the end of the month, but at least you could
see what your phone bill would be before you got it.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Matthew J Ghio <mg5n+@andrew.cmu.edu>
Date: Sun, 10 Oct 93 11:46:05 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: PHONE PRIVACY
In-Reply-To: <93Oct10.014758pdt.14325-4@well.sf.ca.us>
Message-ID: <Igi5TAS00awTACgldJ@andrew.cmu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> Re. wiring two payphone lines together: uh, NO.  From a practical
> standpoint, it will probably drop trouble cards at the CO.  From a
> legal standpoint, it's theft of service, and especially with red boxes etc.;
> again, a dumb place to make your stand in court.  

Well, the suggestion wasn't meant to be taken all too seriously; note
the smiley face. :)

(Altho I wouldn't be too surprised if someone has actually tried it -
you never know...)




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Sandy <72114.1712@CompuServe.COM>
Date: Sun, 10 Oct 93 12:11:04 PDT
To: <cypherpunks@toad.com>
Subject: PHONE PRIVACY
Message-ID: <931010190721_72114.1712_FHF49-3@CompuServe.COM>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
  SANDY SANDFORT               Reply to:  ssandfort@attmail.com
 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Punksters,

Ron McCoy asked about the 1-900 number I posted some time ago.
The number is 1-900-STOPPER.

Though I originally mentioned STOPPER, I would recommend that the
better solution is to use a pre-paid calling card.  Several
companies offer them, including AT&T (buy them at AT&T Phone
Stores) and Western Union (buy them at authorized Western Union
agents).  They both charge you about sixty cents per minute for
US domestic calls (more for overseas).  They come in various
denominations ($5, $10, $20, etc.)

To use them, you dial a special 800 number.  When you get a beep,
you dial in the card's unique serial number.  When you get a
second dial tone, you dial the area code and phone number you
wish to call.  Depending upon the card you have, there will be
some method for determining how much time/money you have left
after each call.

Since I have not yet found out whether or not the issuers retain
*your* phone number (captured by ANI), or for how long, it would
be prudent to use the cards at payphones for any highly sensitive
communications.

 S a n d y

>>>>>>    Please send e-mail to:  ssandfort@attmail.com    <<<<<<
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: cman@IO.COM (Douglas Barnes)
Date: Sun, 10 Oct 93 14:19:47 PDT
To: arthurc@crl.com
Subject: Re: The Bank of the Internet!? (fwd)
In-Reply-To: <Pine.3.05.9310101141.A11495-b100000@crl.crl.com>
Message-ID: <9310102114.AA02874@illuminati.IO.COM>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Arthur Chandler writes:
>   Put bluntly, any plans to enter international finance without a
> substantial component aimed at lining up political and traditional
> financial clout seems to me to be doomed to the dustbin of visionary
> schemes.  After the smoke clears, we are far more likely to see Chase
> Manhattan with a platoon of hired cryptologists than EFF or Cypherpunks
> wheeling and dealing on a global scale.
> 

I think that somehow you have acquired a rather distorted impression of
what is actually being proposed, at least here in Austin. Also, I think
you are rather underestimating the knowledge and experience of the
participants.

When Eric came out here to be a guest speaker at our EFF-Austin crypto
conference, we had been corresponding since last spring on the topic
of establishing a fully digital Credit Union. I had planned to spend
the summer working on it, but I got roped into creating Illuminati 
Online. Although things had been on the back burner, I had continued to
do legal and regulatory research, make contacts, visit Credit Unions 
and talk to their staff, etc.

Credit Unions have an interesting history and philosophy that places
them somewhere between an "outsider" movement and an "insider" movement.
They are legal (obviously), but can be started by any reasonably large 
group or combination of groups of like-minded individuals in a geographical 
area. They are non-profit, member-controlled financial institutions that 
nowadays are permitted to offer the same range of banking services as a 
"bank." Many successful ones started from extremely modest beginnings.

I get the feeling you think that we are going into this blindly or naively.
In the process of researching this project, I have consumed over forty
hours of pro-bono legal time from a local lawyer, and have spent about as 
long reading the relevant laws and regulations myself. I know that Eric
has certainly done even more legal research in this area than I have.
Eric's crypto research at the moment is heavily focused towards financial
transactions; I worked in banking MIS for three years. I have an offer
from the CFO of the largest CU in Austin to act as an advisor. 

At the moment we are beginning the process of surveying members of local
groups and employers in the high tech field to see if they are interested 
in being part of the field of membership of a fully digital Credit Union. 
We had our first Austin cypherpunks meeting yestereday, and it's clear that 
they will be the core of the new CU.

I don't deny that the venture faces serious obstacles (writing 
software, putting together a field of membership, starting operations,
etc.) Certainly it could fail, and end up on the "dustbin." I think that 
compared to many of the schemes that have been proposed on this list it 
is a good middle-ground approach. If other, similar Credit Unions are 
established, it would be the beginning of a national network that could 
pool resources for the purpose of creating or embellishing software and 
purchasing third-party services.

This proposal is not about "wheeling and dealing", but rather about
providing high-quality, secure banking services to average people,
delivered by a democratic, member-centered institution. This may
sound like some fantasy out of the 60's, but it's actually a extension
of a fantasy out of the 19th century that has taken root all over the 
world.

Also, I would like to emphasize, while these institutions are dedicated
to the establishing of new or modified digital transactions, they are
not intended, in any way, to break the law, avoid taxes, or push what I
can't help but think of as the "Tim May .sig agenda" outside the bounds
of the law. Many of us believe in aspects of that agenda, but this is an 
approach to push the envelope from the legal side. 

Doug

-- 
----------------                                             /\ 
Douglas Barnes            cman@illuminati.io.com            /  \ 
Chief Wizard         (512) 448-8950 (d), 447-7866 (v)      / () \
Illuminati Online          metaverse.io.com 7777          /______\



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: J. Michael Diehl <mdiehl@triton.unm.edu>
Date: Sun, 10 Oct 93 16:21:39 PDT
To: gtoal@gtoal.com
Subject: Was: POISON PILL
In-Reply-To: <9310082121.AA03537@pizzabox.demon.co.uk>
Message-ID: <9310102321.AA14258@triton.unm.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


According to gtoal@gtoal.com:
> 
> :1) don't keep any sensitive stuff of your own on your own hardware,
> :put it on other peoples' machines (and let them put their stuff
> :on yours);
> :2) encrypt all of your stuff before transferring it to other peoples'
> :boxes;
> :3) send the keys that you used to do the encryption to other folks'
> :boxes as well (not the same ones on which you stored the files);

Good stuff.

> :4) if you are really paranoid, Shamir share the keys;

Please explain this to me.  What is "Shamir?"

> :5) don't keep any local copies of the plaintext, cyphertext or keys;
> :6) periodically send messages to the boxes where you have stashed
> :your files, saying "Everything is still cool, don't wipe my files
> :or my keys.";
> 
> :7) if/when it hits the fan and you are pressured to reveal your stuff,
> :stop sending those messages -- the dead man switch goes off and your
> :files/keys are wiped.

Or how about if the "cool" messages stop comming in, you are to send the files
to someone else.  This way, if you "can't" send the "OK" message for some 
reason, the "right" people will get the data anyway.  Is there any interest in
setting this kind of think up.  I'm currently "holding onto" some data for a 
friend, and could probably manage a few Megs more if someone has the need.  In
an ideal world, this would be done on an anonymous, distributed basis.  Any
comments?


J. Michael Diehl   ;^)  |*The 2nd Amendment is there in case the 
mdiehl@triton.unm.edu   | Government forgets about the 1st!  <RL>
Mike.Diehl@f29.n301.z1  |*God is a good Physicist, and an even 
    .fidonet.org        | better Mathematician.  <Me>
al945@cwns9.ins.cwru.edu|*I'm just looking for the opportunity to 
 (505) 299-2282 (voice) | be Politically Incorrect! <Me>
Can we impeach him yet? |*Protected by 18 USC 2511 and 18 USC 2703. 
PGP Key = 7C06F1 = A6 27 E1 1D 5F B2 F2 F1  12 E7 53 2D 85 A2 10 5D



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Arthur Chandler <arthurc@crl.com>
Date: Sun, 10 Oct 93 18:09:47 PDT
To: Eric Hughes <hughes@ah.com>
Subject: Virtual City (tm) and Virtual Capitalism
In-Reply-To: <9310101606.AA08264@ah.com>
Message-ID: <Pine.3.05.9310101713.A26661-b100000@crl.crl.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


  I'm still not clear as to exactly what MUD money would purchase. In a MOO,
such as MediaMOO or BayMOO, I can't conceive of what anyone could "buy"
with virtual money. The one real item of scarcity in a MOO -- from the
player's standpoint -- is quota. You are normally assigned a specific
number of objects or features that you can own -- say, 20 -- and once you use
that number up, you have to prove to the wizards that you really do need
an increase in your quota, and that you haven't just gobbled up disk space
with superfluous rooms or little-used objects.
  Any system of monetary exchange that would involve manipulating quotas,
or translating them into a kind of tradeable commodity would, I think, be
vigorously resisted by most MOO wizards. "I'll help you code that virtual
Harley if you'll pay me two quota" would be antithetical to the whole
spirit of cooperation I've seen in most (though not all) MOOs. In
addition, it would be an ironic commentary on the old cyberpunk
"Information should be free!" if Joe/Jane MOOwhiz sets up shop as a
for-hire expert in coding, amassing virtual capital off of newbies.
  If we're talking about RPG money -- gold and jewels that have value
within a MUD/RPG universe -- well, OK; but I think this would be a fairly
trivial use of what I thought was supposed to be a sophisticated model for
future monetary transactions on a global scale. And if, as part of your
post suggests, RL money would be gratefully paid for increased power
within a MUD -- shades of *Snow Crash*! And who would have guessed that
it was cypherpunks in executive clothing that brought such a system into
the MUD/MOO world.









From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: anonymous@extropia.wimsey.com
Date: Sun, 10 Oct 93 18:29:48 PDT
To: edgar@spectrx.Saigon.COM (Edgar W. Swank)
Subject: Criminal GIF's "Offshore" Data Haven
Message-ID: <199310110057.AA05796@xtropia>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Charles Morgan said:

  Look around there everywhere
  In fcat those are not so bad
  L8r
  Charles

Charles and anyone else who has examples of these "criminal GIF's"
please send copies to a good home

   WhiteBeard 77308D  <pool0@extropia.wimsey.com>

As you might expect from "pool0", this is a pool address; all messages
received at this address are remailed to a "pool" of subscribers,
including WhiteBeard.  Please encrypt your "criminal GIF's" with
public key

Type bits/keyID   Date       User ID
pub  1024/77308D 1993/08/05  WhiteBeard 77308D  <pool0@extropia.wimsey.com>
-----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----
Version: 2.3

mQCNAixg1V4AAAEEAK7+65Tb+IlceOkXbYr8KegFqJBsATfvHn0jWDhLomU1Bu9a
N4QnUA7O7EA4klVjOkvFsizN+Ex94aAzSeEr2YEKA08wdCcDnOupTy5sGRcvJL3i
e17y3/HS5zRq9bUrw/zVFWnF5XFaa0WXqEJF0mKNmIhQoUS0GWSPDqT/dzCNAAUT
tC5XaGl0ZUJlYXJkIDc3MzA4RCAgPHBvb2wwQGV4dHJvcGlhLndpbXNleS5jb20+
=KKxu
-----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----

Note that the pool0 remailer does NOT attempt to conceal the
identity of the SENDER. If you don't want your own identity
attached to your message or file, send it through a remailer.  Also,
of course, you probably want to encrypt but NOT sign with PGP.

WhiteBeard is also looking for the "politically incorrect" (and
illegal outside the USA) program "Concentration Camp Commander".

WhiteBeard will keep your "criminal GIF's" safely encrypted on
diskettes.  Should your own copies ever be lost or confiscated,
just send WhiteBeard a call for help and he will send your
GIF's (and any others he's collected you might want) to your
anonymous remailer address.

WhiteBeard already has a small collection of "interesting" GIF's
dealing with beastiality and scatological domination. If you want
a free sample, send WhiteBeard a request with an anonymous return
address and pseudonymous public key.

Please feel free to post this announcement to other mailing lists
and newsgroups.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Mike Ingle <MIKEINGLE@delphi.com>
Date: Sun, 10 Oct 93 15:21:07 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Bank of the Internet
Message-ID: <01H3YGMZ9AP48WXW7P@delphi.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


"arthurc@crl.com"  "Arthur Chandler" wrote:

>  It jarred me to see someone so blithely planning to enter into the world
>of international finance from an essentially "outsider" frame of
>reference. As impressed as I was by the range and depth of Eric's
>understanding of the technical aspects of encryption, I have the feeling
>that setting up such a revolutionary scheme -- which would threaten both
>traditional banking enterprises and the governments that monitor and tax
>them -- is bound to encounter opposition much more massive and
>sophisticated than he indicated.
>  To be fair, he could only talk about the high points of his plans in
>the context of the afternoon talk. But I kept having flashbacks to the1960s
>and 70s, when counterculture groups laid intricate plans to overwhelm or
>endrun "the system." 
>  Put bluntly, any plans to enter international finance without a
>substantial component aimed at lining up political and traditional
>financial clout seems to me to be doomed to the dustbin of visionary
>schemes.  After the smoke clears, we are far more likely to see Chase
>Manhattan with a platoon of hired cryptologists than EFF or Cypherpunks
>wheeling and dealing on a global scale.

The reason such "counterculture" plans didn't work is because they
are hard to do. They are a pain. People may talk about them, but they
aren't that anxious to actually "live underground." They are also
hard to coordinate. It is easier to just get a job and live a normal
life. Even with PGP, more people talk about it than use it on a
regular basis. I've even been flamed for sending people PGP messages,
even when those people promote their PGP keys in their .sigs!

All we have to do is make it technically easy. We are tool makers.
Make the tools and it will happen. As for opposition from governments
and the banking establishment, governments are right now being
held hostage by capital. If they don't do what capital wants, capital
gets up and leaves. East Germany used the Berlin Wall to contain its
capital. When the wall came down, the capital left.

The forces against us may seem overwhelming, but we have one huge
advantage. They are limited to a specific region, or at least to one
country. International collaboration is difficult and slow for those
who enforce the status quo. Data crosses borders with impunity, and
short of cutting all the wires and turning a country into Albania,
there isn't much the governments can do about it.

--- MikeIngle@delphi.com




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: smb@research.att.com
Date: Sun, 10 Oct 93 17:26:08 PDT
To: "J. Michael Diehl" <mdiehl@triton.unm.edu>
Subject: Re: Was: POISON PILL
Message-ID: <9310110021.AA04637@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


	 According to gtoal@gtoal.com:

	 > :4) if you are really paranoid, Shamir share the keys;

	 Please explain this to me.  What is "Shamir?"

The reference is to the following paper:

@article{sharesecret,
   author = {Adi Shamir},
   journal = {Communications of the ACM},
   number = {11},
   pages = {612--613},
   title = {How to Share a Secret},
   volume = {22},
   year = {1979}
}

More generally, see the article on shared control systems:

@incollection{Simmons92,
        author = {Gustavus J. Simmons},
        title = {An Introduction to Shared Secret and/or Shared Control Schemes
and Their Application},
        booktitle = {Contemporary Cryptology:  The Science of Information Integr
ity},
        year = 1992,
        pages = {441--497},
        editor = {Gustavus J. Simmons},
        publisher = {{IEEE} Press}
}

I'm especially fond of this article:


@article{sealing,
   author = {David K. Gifford},
   journal = {Communications of the ACM},
   number = {4},
   pages = {274--286},
   title = {Cryptographic Sealing for Information Secrecy and Authentication},
   volume = {25},
   year = {1982}
}

since it shows how to implement a variety of access mechanisms,
including key-AND, key-OR, m-of-n, etc.
	
	 > :6) periodically send messages to the boxes where you have stashed
	 > :your files, saying "Everything is still cool, don't wipe my files
	 > :or my keys.";

Folks who contemplate such schemes should investigate the false alarm
rate.  Most automated systems experience a much higher rate of false
triggers than true.  Of course, as described here, you'd only get one,
since your data would be gone after that...




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: szabo@netcom.com (Nick Szabo)
Date: Sun, 10 Oct 93 20:56:23 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Virtual City (tm) and Virtual Capitalism (fwd)
Message-ID: <9310110354.AA10813@netcom.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Arthur Chandler:
>   Any system of monetary exchange that would involve manipulating quotas,
> or translating them into a kind of tradeable commodity would, I think, be
> vigorously resisted by most MOO wizards.

Great!  One of the main strengths of Virtual City seems
to be to that its gets rid of the fascist heirarchy of "wizards",
the virtual equivalent of factory managers in the old Soviet
Union.  (Caveat: these are just my impressions of the V.C. project,
I'm not personally involved in it).  Also the quote is "information 
_wants to_ be free", not "should be".  Alas, it is easy to bottle up 
information by restricting it to small cliques of wizards.  

On the other hand, many of the world-wiser wizards may be able
to use their MUD building skills to become Virtual City tycoons.  There
are probably plenty of wizards pissed off by politically-dominated MUDs,
where access to resources has increasingly become a function of
sharing beers with the "god" and less a function of contribution
to the MUD.  Wizards who are better MUD builders than beer buddies
have incentive to jump ship and carve themselves out nice niches in a 
free-enterprise MUD.

I suspect Virtual City, and net commerce in general,
will evolve to where people buy and sell some information as
services, and exchange other information freely.  The distinguishing 
feature between valuable services and free information will likely be
that services will be hard to copy, the end result of obscure, logically 
deep computations, providing information unique to each customer order or 
dependent on hard-to-duplicate phyiscal hardware.  Freely copyable 
information typically will be sellable only a few times, and even then 
the sale price will depend on it being hot/unique news, uniquely valuable 
to a specific customer or temporary situation, or conveniently located.
Old news, educational material, etc. will be free, barring fascist
patent/copyright enforcement, but the customers will often pay for more
convenient methods of distribution (eg smart filter services).

Content _per se_ will want to be free, so one will not be able
to generate revenue simply based on popularity of content.
Content generation will not pay and will not dominate the economy.  
A good example is the distinction between the freely copyable GNU 
and X-Windows, and the for-pay consultation, customization, porting, 
help desks, etc. that have sprung up around them.   Most of the effort 
goes into the latter: since people like to make a living, most of the
economic effort will go into services rather than the exchange of 
free information.  

As bandwidth becomes cheaper the free info exchange will expand, but
the incentive for creation is limited to self-sacrificing 
efforts or side-effects of government or consulting businesses 
or corporate charity (eg GNU, X, PGP).  I look forward to
something like Virtual City providing a free-market alternative 
to the heirarchical control of information (crypto key authorities, 
Unix file permissions model, MUD Wizard model, ad nauseum); I do not see
it replacing the GNU free software model.

Nick Szabo				szabo@netcom.com




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Date: Sun, 10 Oct 93 21:46:09 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: The Bank of the Internet!? (fwd)
In-Reply-To: <9310102114.AA02874@illuminati.IO.COM>
Message-ID: <9310110445.AA18639@netcom5.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Doug Barnes writes:

> Also, I would like to emphasize, while these institutions are dedicated
> to the establishing of new or modified digital transactions, they are
> not intended, in any way, to break the law, avoid taxes, or push what I
> can't help but think of as the "Tim May .sig agenda" outside the bounds
> of the law. Many of us believe in aspects of that agenda, but this is an 
> approach to push the envelope from the legal side. 

And I think this is a wise thing to do. I comment these folks for
pursuing this, all the more so becuas a "credit union" is not the
sexiest thing I can think of (not compared to data havens at least).
But it'll be the solidly middle class apps like digital credit unions
that wil help further colonized cyberspace (and cypherspace).

Meanwhile, I'm fairly "out" about my crypto preferences, and intend to
continue talking about crypto anarchy. I'm sure you folks wouldn't
want it any other way.

Good luck!

-Tim (infamous .sig follows)


-- 
..........................................................................
Timothy C. May         | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,  
tcmay@netcom.com       | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
408-688-5409           | knowledge, reputations, information markets, 
W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA  | black markets, collapse of governments.
Higher Power: 2^756839 | Public Key: PGP and MailSafe available.
Note: I put time and money into writing this posting. I hope you enjoy it.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: ferguson@icm1.icp.net (Paul Ferguson x2044)
Date: Sun, 10 Oct 93 19:31:08 PDT
To: grady@netcom.com
Subject: The rubber and the road
Message-ID: <9310110332.AA25892@icm1.icp.net>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Grady,
 
If this is a silly question, then chastise me later -- but when do
you actually appear in court? I noticed PRZ's statement dated 12 Oct.
Does your appearance fall shortly?
 
Cheers and Support.





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Jim McCoy <mccoy@ccwf.cc.utexas.edu>
Date: Sun, 10 Oct 93 20:56:09 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: The Bank of the Internet!?
In-Reply-To: <Pine.3.05.9310101141.A11495-b100000@crl.crl.com>
Message-ID: <199310110355.AA15157@tramp.cc.utexas.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text


Arthur Chandler <arthurc@crl.com> writes:
>
>   It jarred me to see someone so blithely planning to enter into the world
> of international finance from an essentially "outsider" frame of
> reference. [...]
>
>   Put bluntly, any plans to enter international finance without a
> substantial component aimed at lining up political and traditional
> financial clout seems to me to be doomed to the dustbin of visionary
> schemes.  After the smoke clears, we are far more likely to see Chase
> Manhattan with a platoon of hired cryptologists than EFF or Cypherpunks
> wheeling and dealing on a global scale.

It has to start somewhere pal.  We are trying to start something small for
a specific reason (at least I am, I do not presume to speak for Doug or the
other cypherpunks working with us on the austin digital credit union):

	We want to be the ones who will define the protocol for currency on
	the net.

We have specific goals regarding privacy and security which may be at odds
with certain members of the traditional finance power structure.  If you
know anything about how network protocols really come into being it is
because someone actually goes out, does the damn coding, and then people
refine that work later.  We want to score first so that others are forced
to follow our lead, it only takes a small push at the beginning to
determine the course of certain phenomena.

I could care less if eventually the Citicorps and Chase Manhattans enter
our arena and provide real banking services to the net.  In fact, I one day
hope to pitch them on that very idea.  The point of our work down here is
that we want to define the currency.  We want to make it secure, private,
and anonymous.  What kind of standards your future net.bank may have on
transaction records and other items relating to the net currency is between
you and your bank, I want to make sure that the currency itself gives the
possiblity for the highest possible levels of these "cypherpunk qualities". 

We are staring small and have no real plans on becoming future banking
powerhouses (The Gnomes of Austin perhaps... :) but we would rather it be
us who define the standard than Chase Manhattan or the US Government.

jim mccoy



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: jkreznar@ininx.com (John E. Kreznar)
Date: Sun, 10 Oct 93 23:19:47 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Spread-spectrum net (vulnerability of)
In-Reply-To: <9310090132.AA08927@dink.foretune.co.jp>
Message-ID: <9310110617.AA05506@ininx>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



> You can put up such a network, but given that your boxes have to receive
> the signal, it will be detectable (but not understandable) to 3rd parties.

Not necessarily.  Done right, direct sequence spread spectrum transmissions
cannot feasibly be detected except by a receiver using the right code.  To be
sure, ``feasibility'' here is being used in a weaker sense that cryptologists
are accustomed to, but the effect is similar.  Here are selected passages from
"Modern Communications and Spread Spectrum" by George R. Cooper and Clare D.
McGillem (McGraw-Hill, 1986) pp 309--311:

	...another objective in using spread-spectrum techniques is to make it
	more difficult for an unauthorized observer to detect the presence of
	the signal....

	When an unknown spread-spectrum signal is to be detected, it is
	necessary to assume something about what is known.  In particular it is
	assumed that the spread-spectrum code is not known, and that it is
	desired only to determine the existence of the spread-spectrum signal
	and not to decode it.  This implies then that some form of noncoherent
	detection must be employed and that the existence of a spread-spectrum
	signal can be determined only by noting a change in energy between the
	signal present and the signal not present.  Thus it is necessary to
	consider an energy detector. ...

[Engineering mathematics omitted.]

	...However, in the case of noncoherent detection, the detectability
	depends upon the square of [a specific signal-to-noise ratio that they
	define], rather than upon the first power; thus operating with small
	values of E/N_0 makes things more difficult for the interceptor than it
	does for the desired signal receiver.

> Anyone who wants to take you down will only need (1) a detector that can
> point out your boxes and (2) a small caliber rifle.

First he may need (0) the spread-spectrum code.  These can be made strong, in a
sense similar cryptographically strong random number generators.

> Since the cost to find and destroy is much less than the cost to make and
> deploy, a covert network of this sort wouldn't last long.

This cost comparison might be reversed by forcing the adversary to use
incoherent detection.

	John E. Kreznar		| Relations among people to be by
	jkreznar@ininx.com	| mutual consent, or not at all.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Jim McCoy <mccoy@ccwf.cc.utexas.edu>
Date: Sun, 10 Oct 93 21:36:09 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: DC-Net proposal,  comments requested
In-Reply-To: <9310100127.AA23557@illuminati.IO.COM>
Message-ID: <199310110432.AA15221@tramp.cc.utexas.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text


cman@IO.COM (Douglas Barnes) writes:
> [dc nets stuff]
> 
> One head scratcher I've been considering is whether it would be better
> to simulate a token-passing scheme, or to have comparisons broadcast
> to all participants. [...]

Doug has already heard a lot of this over dinner discussions we have had on
dc nets and networking, but here are a few more things I have been thinking
about in regards to this.

The idea we hashed around in the token passing realm was that members of
the net would begin by knowing only thier partners (I will assume people
are being honest in the network for the moment...)  Each person will pass
packets to the left, the person they share thier data with in the dc setup
(i.e. the person whose menu they look behind and whose coin they compare
thier toss with.)  The "packets" will have two sizes, the small one for
token negotiation and a large one for data transmission.  Token-sized
packets are passed until someone suceeds in transmitting the "i speak"
token, then a data packet, and then token negotiation begins again.

Everyone prepares two random numbers, one for the data sharing that is part
of the dc net and another to use in the communications ring.  When people
have checked thier neighbors and are ready to transmit, they send thier
second random number (and a random signed token so they know when they see
thier token come back to them) to the person on thier left.  When a packet
is recieved, each number is incremented or not for the "same/different"
message and passed to the next member.  When your token finally gets back
to you it is possible to check for the message sent by the net, you know
your original random number and the number of passes necessary for you to
get your token back tell you how many people are participating.

Doug and I thought that perhaps if the broadcast signal was something like
"1111(rand 8 bits)1111" and people backed down when they sensed collision,
so that unless the 16 bits ended with 1111 people would know there was no
token in that round (0 is the default message, when people colliding stop
trying to send the negotiotion falls to zero for that round) and they would
try again.  Eventually someone would be able to transmit the sequence and
because the number in the middle is random only they would know that they
have the send token.  Then people communicate for the preset length of the
data packet and begin negotiating for the token again.

As far as breaking up and reforming the network I am still looking for
ideas, but have been reading some old crypto proceedings and I am going to
play around with some ideas and see if Chaum's blind signature stuff
coupled with a ZNP for proving identity might work (it happens to be the
article I was reading on the way over to work and it has gotten me
thinking...)

> Also, I have thought of some ways of dealing with "slacker" processes
> or folks who suddenly drop out that work better with a broadcast approach,
> but there's probably a way to deal with them in the token-based scheme.

Yes and no.  The internet is not a connection-oriented medium and it is
impossible to know whether or not a particular packet made it through.
"Broadcasting" is also tricky for the same reason.  The designers of the
net have worked out several schemes for getting around these problems, it
makes no sense not to lift a few good ideas for this...  


jim



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Jim McCoy <mccoy@ccwf.cc.utexas.edu>
Date: Sun, 10 Oct 93 22:06:09 PDT
To: arthurc@crl.com
Subject: Re: Virtual City (tm) and Virtual Capitalism
In-Reply-To: <Pine.3.05.9310101713.A26661-b100000@crl.crl.com>
Message-ID: <199310110504.AA15258@tramp.cc.utexas.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text


Arthur Chandler <arthurc@crl.com> writes:
> 
>   I'm still not clear as to exactly what MUD money would purchase. In a MOO,
> such as MediaMOO or BayMOO, I can't conceive of what anyone could "buy"
> with virtual money.

What would one buy with any digital cash?  Whatever anyone is willing to
sell them.  How about programs, stock quotes, orders for physical items,
newspapers and magazines, etc...

> [quotas as the scarese resource on MOOs...]
>   Any system of monetary exchange that would involve manipulating quotas,
> or translating them into a kind of tradeable commodity would, I think, be
> vigorously resisted by most MOO wizards.

Quota is simply a manifestation of the only real resources that limit the
size of a virtual world, storage space and computation time.  There is no
reason to think that any currency exchanges on such systems would need to
limit themselves to this (but it does give one ideas as I will mention
later.) 

>   If we're talking about RPG money -- gold and jewels that have value
> within a MUD/RPG universe -- well, OK; but I think this would be a fairly
> trivial use of what I thought was supposed to be a sophisticated model for
> future monetary transactions on a global scale. And if, as part of your
> post suggests, RL money would be gratefully paid for increased power
> within a MUD -- shades of *Snow Crash*! And who would have guessed that
> it was cypherpunks in executive clothing that brought such a system into
> the MUD/MOO world.

Well, I do not know much about what the virtual city people are doing, but
I can tell you a little bit about what I know of another MOO that is
working on such a virtual marketplace, the metaverse MOO being run right
now by Steve Jackson Games (metaverse.io.com port 7777)  While people are
still working on setting things up (the system is fairly new) a lot of
ideas have been tossed around such as real online games done by
professionsal corperations (sjg, etc) or online orders for magazines such
as wired or mondo, or perhaps ordering equipment at computer sales outlet
on the MOO.  All one needs is currency and then the buyers and sellers can
determine what the market will be.

I find the MOO system interesting because it provides a structure of
objects (data) and interaction of people and the objects.  One of the
reasons I have been interested in dc nets, encrypted filesystems, and the
like is because I think it would be interesting to set up a completely
distributed and secure/private computing system.  I have figured out a lot
of the filesystem and communications (i/o) issues through dc nets and
various encrypted filesystem ideas.  The stumbling block I kept running
into was how to build a network CPU.  What about a MOO?  The MOO
programming language itself is rather primitive, but it only concerns
itself with negotiation of the objects within the system and simple
interactions with those connected to the system; if one were to hook a
perl, C, and tcl interpreter into such a system and add flags to objects to
signal that they should be run through a particular interpreter then one
would have the necessary CPU(s).  One could use MOO money to pay for the
data storage and CPU time (object quota and server ticks) and those
providing cycles or storage space for the MOO would be compensated and the
system could theoretically grow without bounds.

Just an idea or two and perhaps a hint of things to come...

jim



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: doug@netcom.com (Doug Merritt)
Date: Mon, 11 Oct 93 00:11:09 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Virtual City (tm) and Virtual Capitalism (fwd)
Message-ID: <9310110711.AA29044@netcom4.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Er...there are a *lot* of different kinds of mu*'s, and at least as
many different definitions of "wizard". In some worlds they call people
wizards who would simply be players elsewhere; in other worlds "wizards"
have godlike status. Similarly with "programmer"; it can mean an advanced
builder, or it can mean somebody who actually hacks the C underpinnings.
You'd have to be a hardcore afficionado of the whole range to have basis
for sweeping statements.

(The kind that I'm least familiar with is apparently the most common,
where people earn wizard status by advancing in some kind of game, but
there's endless variation. When people create their own worlds, they
tend to create ranks to suit their own tastes, too. Gonna legislate
world creation? ;-)
        Doug -- a sometime but partially cured mu* wizard and programmer




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: DON_HENSON@delphi.com
Date: Sun, 10 Oct 93 21:26:09 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Cypherpunks Cause
Message-ID: <01H3YTBWAA0891X6YA@delphi.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


ferguson@icm1.icp.net writes: -->

> >There is no cypherpunks cause.  Neither is there a cypherpunks
> >movement.  Get these delusions out of your head.  There is, however,
> >cypherpunks software.
> >
> >I repeat, the cause and movement are in your own head.
> 
> <--
> 
> If there is no cypherpunks cause or movement, please let me know

What the hell are you talking about? 

<--

Well, I thought I was pretty clear in the first place so if you don't 
know what I am talking about, I guess I don't know either.

Don Henson
PGP key on server or on request





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: DON_HENSON@delphi.com
Date: Sun, 10 Oct 93 21:26:23 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Cypherpunks Cause
Message-ID: <01H3YTC2SZ8U91X6YA@delphi.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Eric Blossom writes: -->

> If you believe there is a cypherpunks cause and you believe in it, 
> please post a short note to that effect to the list.  
> Anyone who is interested can keep count. 

What difference will any of this make?  It is completely off topic for
the list.

	Cypherpunks write code.

<--

This was pretty typical of the response I got to my question about the 
cypherpunks cause.  Apparently, I misinterpreted the intent of the list.  
Thanks for clearing it up for me.  Goodbye.

Don Henson
PGP key avail on server or on request





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "L. Detweiler" <ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Date: Sun, 10 Oct 93 23:36:44 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Identity Tracking through Databases (fwd)
Message-ID: <9310110636.AA12175@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


from

PRIVACY Forum Digest       Sunday, 10 October 1993       Volume 02 : Issue 32

          Moderated by Lauren Weinstein (lauren@vortex.com)
            Vortex Technology, Woodland Hills, CA, U.S.A.

===cut=here===

Date:    Sun, 10 Oct 93 16:52 PDT
From:    lauren@vortex.com (Lauren Weinstein; PRIVACY Forum Moderator)
Subject: Personal Privacy vs. the "Digital Detective"? 

Greetings.  This is going to be a somewhat complex message, but I feel
that it's an important one, so please try to bear along with me.

Also, I must ask that anyone who wishes to forward any information from this
message please forward the entire message and keep it intact and complete
with all attributions--any further excerpting from this material could be
extremely confusing, to say the least.

A few days ago, in my capacity as PRIVACY Forum moderator, I received an
e-mail submission from Patrick Townson, politely asking if I would consider
publishing it in the digest.  (Pat is moderator of the TELECOM digest; we
have various communications regarding digest matters from time to time.)

The submission was essentially an ad promoting a new service he is 
offering.  I informed him that my policy is not to run ads, though
particular products and services may be mentioned in the context
of informational or discussion messages submitted to the Forum.  

However, the particular ad in question is potentially of significant
importance to readers of PRIVACY Forum, and brings to a sharp focus
a number of issues which we've had bouncing around for sometime, with
seemingly little action.  So, I asked for and received permission from
Pat to publish excerpts from his ad, as well as excerpts from our
private communications that occurred after I read his original submission.
I've attempted to keep these excerpts in context, and I'll have additional
comments as we go along.  Once again, I'm sorry about the complexity of
this message. 

   ----
EXCERPTED MATERIAL BEGINS BELOW.  Omitted material is indicated by
"..." in the text.  The original complete message was widely distributed
on Usenet, as indicated by the "Newsgroups" field below.

			***************

From: ptownson@telecom.chi.il.us
Newsgroups: comp.society.privacy,alt.privacy,misc.consumers,
	misc.legal,misc.misc,chi.general
Subject: Digital Detective At Your Service
Date: Wed, 6 Oct 1993 15:35:00 CDT

                      DIGITAL DETECTIVE
		
...

I wish to announce my recent aquisition of some databases which are
primarily used by skip-tracing, investigative and government agencies
to locate people, any assets they may have, and other pertinent and
personal details of their lives.

These databases are being made available to anyone who wishes to have
access to them. The charges are simply being passed along, 'at cost'
based on what I am paying. 

...

SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER TRACING:
===============================

You provide an SSN. I will advise you of all the names which have
been used with this SSN, and the addresses which go with each. Or
it can be the other way around: you supply an exact name and address
(it can sometimes be a former address), and I will supply you with
the SSN used by that person.

      Cost for each lookup, either direction is $60.00

PEOPLE FINDER:
==============

You provide a name. Any name okay, but very common names will
render a useless list. Middle initials and last known address is
requested if possible.  You'll receive a listing of every person who
has that name, along with other data:

     New address if they moved;
     Telephone number provided the number is published;
     Residence type;
     Length of residence;
     Gender;
     Date of birth;
     Up to four other household members and their dates of birth.

For additional information, People Finder also can provide a neighbor
listing which includes up to ten neighbors, their addresses, phone
numbers and residence types. 

...

It can be searched by telephone number only: You provide the phone
number, I will respond with the person's profile and neighbor listing.
Or it can be searched by address only, with the same results.

...

      Cost for each lookup is based on how extensive the search
      is. 

...

                Both address/phone trace      $90

...

CONSUMER CREDIT REPORTS:
========================

Consumer Credit reports availale from one bureau,     $60
Consumer Credit reports available from three bureaus, $100

I need two things:

  1. The name and address of the person, plus SSN if possible.
  2. A *signed* statement that your request is for bonafide,
     legal reasons, i.e. you are considering an extension of
     credit to the person, or possibly employing them, etc. I
     cannot proceed without this signed statement.

...

Has someone ever filed bankruptcy?  The database will tell you
if they have or not. Not all federal districts are yet installed
but for those that are in the database, I can get you the details:

...

Criminal History records available at $75-100 per jurisdiction you
request searched. 
      Want to know if someone has ever been in prison?
      Want to know if someone has ever been sued, or been a
        defendant in a criminal action?

...

Death Records can be provided in various formats:

      By SSN only - is the holder of that SSN deceased or not?  $30
      By name - a more detailed account of their demise         $40

Drivers Records can be pulled but the exact name and DOB
is essential; otherwise if you have the full driver's license
number, the search can be reversed, providing a name and DOB
plus address. (Then use People Finder address trace on them.)   $65

    [ Various other information types listed omitted.  -- MODERATOR ]

...

Information should be available to everyone, not just the lawyers
and bankers and government agencies. I'll provide information to
anyone, at anytime from the categories above. Hope to hear from
you soon with your requests.

Here's to successful snooping! Get the goods on your friends and
enemies alike. An imposter/fraud/con-artist on the net? Expose them
in a detailed message with stuff you get from the database. 

Patrick Townson
for DIGITAL DETECTIVE

			***************

      >>> End of excerpted material from original submission <<<

After reading the original ad, I had a number of exchanges with Pat
regarding the possible negative reactions to this service among
the PRIVACY Forum readership.  Here are some excerpts from
that discussion.

   ----- Excerpts from followup messages begin below -----

>From Pat:

Say whatever you like. I would ask that you point out a couple of
pertinent things however:

1. All the information is gleaned from public sources. You'll find
very few non-pub phone numbers for example unless the person used it
someplace. And *yes* there are public sources of SSN's ... I know 
where, you don't know where, so you pay me to tell you where or at
least produce the results.

2. All information is available free of charge to anyone who wants to
go to the sources and get it himself. I'm placing myself in the middle
as the 'gopher' ...I'll go fetch the information if you pay me. When
I say 'free of charge if you get it yourself' I am not including the
occassional cost of making copies, etc. That much is assumed.

Regards criminal histories for example, if someone does not like the
information being given out, then their real beef is with the concept
of free, open to the public trials in the USA. In every courthouse in
America, anyone is free to walk in, sit down and observe a trial going
on. We do not have secret trials in the USA.  So I am free to observe
you on trial, and you are free to observe me on trial. It should
follow then that we are free to exchange information with each other
about trials we have observed. 

About 85 percent of the counties in the USA gladly supply transcripts
and summaries of judgments regards criminal cases in their jurisdiction
to anyone who asks for them (plus again, the copy costs etc). It is not
feasable for you to come to Chicago and visit our courthouse, nor for me
to visit the courthouses in California. So we cooperate with each other
by you looking up things for me there and me looking up things for you
here. It then should follow that a logical next step is to put it all
on a computer; all researchers contibute their data to the common
database. 

And so it goes. All I do is fetch the records you have created about
yourself as a service for people who don't want to go to the trouble
of fetching them for themselves.

3. Regards credit bureaus:  Anyone can be a commissioned sales agent
for the credit bureaus as long as they sign up with the bureaus to do
that. You'll note I refuse to pull bureau files without your signed
statement saying that you have a lawful purpose, ie an extension of
credit or possible employment, etc. This puts the burden on you. In
fact the bureaus themselves say in their contracts that they release
information to their clients making the assumption the client has a
lawful right to the information. If not, its your ass .. not theirs.
If a bureau is pulled on you, you later find out and ask me why,
I refer you to the person who purported to be lawfully inquiring.
Doing so, I've met the requirements of the law.

It is all public information except for the consumer credit reports,
and for those the people who own the data base which I use absolutely
insist on meeting all legal requirements.

4. Finally, it is only because we have computers that we can keep
records in the prolific way we do.  Do you also object to manual
record keeping?  Or is your complaint only that because it is
computerized it has become so much easier for the average person to
obtain?

Remember, YOU are the person who gave out your SSN (I do not do the
trace from government records but from public collections) ...

YOU are the person who registered your telephone number in a
directory of same with your address, etc. 

If you don't like people collecting information, don't give them any
to collect, and get the law changed so that like in Russia you can
be tried in secret and taken away in the middle of the night. Then
there won't be any information for the public to look at regards what
you were convicted of.

Please summarize the above as my response to negative comments.

Pat


[ Below, text after ">" is from Lauren, other text is from Pat ]:

Lauren:
> I'm not disagreeing with your statements that it's all (presumably)
> public information.  In effect, that's what needs to be stopped!

Pat:
Well, then you better go to work on getting the First Amendment
repealed or greatly modified addressing the issue of what people are 
permitted to say to other people, etc. If you feel I should be  forbidden
to speak about your SSN, so be it.  Get the law changed and make sure
it is constitutional.

> In any case, publicizing your service may well have the effect of helping to
> foster efforts to pass pending and future legislation to control the reuse
> and distribution of such info, simply because so many people would get so
> irate that such a service existed with such simple access.  

I want people to see how easy it is. I want enough people doing it
that the cost of accessing the databases comes down from sixty dollars
for an SSN to sixty cents!  I want getting all sorts of info on your
neighbors, enemies, employers and employees to be as easy as pushing
a few keys on your keyboard. 

...

Nope, won't affect business at all because people have a short
attention span. They will read it, cluck their tongues and by next
week have forgotten. At my former employment I used to give seminars
on how to collect bills. I gave these to employees of companies
working collection. Afraid it would cut back the business they sent to
our firm?  Not at all. For a week or two, yes .. then they forget and
go back to their old ways.  Same thing here.

...

Big firms, lawyers, bankers, law enfocement; they all get into the same
information I use. Why shouldn't you be able to get into it also?  You think
if the laws are changed the lawyers won't somehow exempt themselves anyway?
<grin> ... 

And as my ex-employer used to say, there is plenty of money to be made
in collections and investigations by staying one hundred percent within
the law ... no need to hack government data bases, no need to steal
files from the credit bureau, no need to break into computers ... 

Someone wrote me and said getting into the NCIC was illegal (they were
referring to my criminal histories database) ... hell, I get no where
near NCIC .. I just use the combined efforts of researchers all over
the USA who visit their courthouse daily to pull the new files for
review; ditto with the Real Property transactions, tax records, voting
records, etc .. 

... but bear in mind if you try to censor the information
you are treading dangerously into First Amendment stuff ...

...

I thought it would make for great fun. Other than yours, the only
letters I am answering on this are the ones which contain credit card
numbers or EFT instructions ... and orders are coming in already.

The neat thing about public information is you cannot be guilty of
libel or slander when you distribute it as long as you do not 
embellish upon it.  And my answers to inquiries go out ALWAYS as
follows:

  "In consulting the XXX database, I noted the XXX database
  made the following statement(s) and/or allegation(s):

    (then the record)

  "If what was recorded in the XXX database is not correct,
  then the subject of the inquiry made at your request should
  notify the XXX database management of the error(s) and take
  appropriate action to correct the database record."

It is never me claiming or alleging anything.... just telling
you what I found out when I read the record. Same as the old
credit bureau routine. Since I dont personally keep the rcords like
the credit bureau does, it is not even within my power to correct
the records.

Obviously, that old First Amendment needs to be greatly modified, eh?

Pat

    ----- End of excerpts from followup messages -----


Lauren here again.  I think the above should give the flavor of the
discussion and the related issues.  We had some other discussions where I
pointed out that the First Amendment wasn't really the issue, since it was
not absolute, and that I felt some form of required "informed consent"
(e.g., requiring firms to get written permission from customers from whom
they obtain SS#, etc. before making it available to any commercial
databases) would be a big help.

But here's the *real* issue.  If we assume that Pat is right in his
statements that all of the information to which he has access is
legally distributable, it goes far to pointing out what an utter
disgrace the state of privacy and privacy laws in this country
have become.   

Pat is certainly correct that many organizations already apparently have
access to all of this data.  All he's doing, seemingly, is trying to make a
buck by providing "broader" access to the info.  While one can argue that
this is a very unfortunate thing to be doing, due to the range of new abuse
that could potentially occur, it is also true that many crooks *already*
have access to all this info, and that the information is already widely
abused.

Pat also suggests that there won't be any sustained opposition to
such information releases--that most people have a very short attention
span, will just read the message, and promptly forget about it.
Is he right?

The real problem is not with Pat's service, of course.  The problem is that
what should be private information is flowing around with such utter lack of
sensible controls.  If there were reasonable controls, it would be
impossible for Pat's service, or many other similar services that cater to
other customers out there, to be operational.

There is certainly a philosophical underpinning to all of this.  By analogy,
Pat's view that everyone should have access to all the information available
on everybody seems similar to the view that the way to solve the violent
crime problem is to make sure that everyone in the country is carrying a gun
at all times and is provided with plenty of ammunition.  While some will no
doubt agree with both of these concepts, hopefully many of us do not.

It should now be crystal clear that the privacy situation in this country
is in shambles.  You can't just sit there, read this, and then file it
off and forget it.  Sooner or later, and most likely sooner, *you*
are going to be affected.

And just exactly what, my friends, are we going to do about it?

--Lauren--




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "L. Detweiler" <ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Date: Sun, 10 Oct 93 23:39:47 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Clipper Q&A (fwd)
Message-ID: <9310110637.AA12183@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


from

PRIVACY Forum Digest       Sunday, 10 October 1993       Volume 02 : Issue 32

          Moderated by Lauren Weinstein (lauren@vortex.com)
            Vortex Technology, Woodland Hills, CA, U.S.A.

===cut=here===

Date:    Thu, 30 Sep 93 14:31:41 EST
From:    "Tom Zmudzinski" <zmudzint@cc.ims.disa.mil>
Subject: Key Escrow Panel at 16th NCSC

21 Sep 93; 14:00-15:30; Room 317 of the Baltimore Convention Center
Track "E" (Tutorials & Presentations) -- KEY ESCROWING ISSUES

{ This is an incomplete "transcribble" of what was said, a personal
  precis if you will, not a court-ordered wiretap. ;{D }

Cast: Mr. Len McNulty (National Security Standards & Technology),
Dr. Clinton Brooks (Advisor to the Director, NSA),
Mr. Al MacDonald (Special Assistant to the Assistant Director of
                  Technical Services, FBI),
Dr. Dorothy Denning (Georgetown University),
Mr. Miles Schmidt (Manager of Security Advisory Group, NIST),
Mr. Daniel Weitzner (Senior Staff Council, Electronic Frontier Foundation)

{ Transcribbler's Note: I've done the best I can with what I heard,
  but cross-checking against the Preliminary Participants List proved
  to be useless so there may be some misheard/spelled names & titles. }

McNulty chaired the panel and gave a background briefing on the "Clipper
Chip/Skipjack Algorithm" broughaha.  Bottom line: NIST saw a requirement
for high grade encryption for voice and data throughout the private sector
but also saw the need to retain the ability to wiretap under court order.

{ Transcribbler's Note: Anyone needing background details (1) hasn't been
  paying attention to the media or fora and (2) can get them there. }

Brooks gave the NSA side -- NIST came to NSA in search of help with the
encryption.  The policy folks wrangled long and hard over installing a
backdoor, but concluded that any such weakening would be self-defeating.
Brooks went into detail about the workings of the key escrow process.
Bottom line: The algorithm HAS to be kept secret other wise someone could
reverse-engineer a box that would interoperate with an escrowed Clipper.
This box could then "lie" in the LEAF (Law Enforcement Access Field) and
thus be invulnerable to court-ordered breakback.

MacDonald gave the FBI's version -- Wiretap is a rarely used, last ditch
technique necessary to protect the country and the private individual.
MacDonald cited the use of wiretap in a "kiddy porn" kidnap/murder case.
Unfortunately, he presented NO hard data on the pros & cons, just opinion.
Bottom line: Wiretap is too useful a tool for Law Enforcement to give up
without a fight, so they're fighting.

Denning gave a synopsis of the work to date on breaking Skipjack.  (The
interim report is available on the Internet.)  Bottom line:  Recognizing
that the analysis was done under considerable time pressure, it bears out
NSA's claim that Skipjack is high quality (comparable to military grade)
encryption.

Weitzner presented the EFF position -- The EFF Electronic Privacy Working
Group shares the Government's goal of providing the users with choice as
to how (or if) they would protect their privacy.  A truly voluntary, well
functioning escrow system is appropriate to look at and test as one of the
many alternatives that people who need security and privacy have to work
with.  They are not taking the position that no escrow system should be
implemented at all (although there is an EFF faction that doubts that the
government is the appropriate escrow agent).  For the EFF, the critical
test will be whether or not the US export restrictions on cryptography
are relaxed.  Bottom line: EFF wants to make certain that it is a truly
voluntary system, not mandated by law.

( Various questions from the floor to the panel )

(Someone questioned the academic rigor of the Skipjack Analysis.)
A: Analysis was as good as could be done in the time available.

(Cliford Ockersmith, Intel, wanted to know why Intel had been excluded
from manufacturing the Clipper chip.) A: They haven't been.  (There IS an
issue because Clipper is a hardware standard, and Intel doesn't want to
retool to meet this standard.)

(It appears that the only time Clipper is vulnerable is when it is being
keyed.) A: The various parts of the Skipjack keys are NEVER in the clear
outside of the box that does the keying, even during a legal breakback.

(What happens to a chip once it's been brokenback?) A: The wiretap process
includes notifying the chip owner that it has been wiretapped. (What about
a gift certificate for a new chip in the letter?) A: [ laughter ]

(Someone asked again about making the algorithm public.) A: [ see above ]
Also, this is a voluntary standard, you don't have to use it.

(Question about terrorists voluntarily using other high grade encryption.)
A: No change from today.

(Question about identifying with whom one is securely conversing.)
A: Not part of Clipper.  (Phone companies market Caller-Id.)

(Unidentified person handed out "A Scientific Statement on Clipper Chip
Technology and Alternatives" at the exits.) A: Thank you. [ adjourn ]

                          -----------

The preceding has the legal status of hearsay, so don't quote anybody.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: loki@convex1.TCS.Tulane.EDU (the mischeivious god)
Date: Mon, 11 Oct 93 00:16:09 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Walk ME thru PGP por favor...
Message-ID: <9310110712.AA12793@convex1.tcs.tulane.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Dear Cypherpunks,

Ok I have been interacting now with the list for 2 months now in order to 
have circumvented what I am about to ask. I figured if I just pay attention
to what all the chat is about I could figure out how to "casually"
implement PGP and anon remailers into my daily routine..which is one of 
the objectives of the list or is it??

I have read the documentation, and I tried to compile the pgp2.3a on the convex
but then I decided I had better keep all the secret stuff at home and not on
the remote time share computer.

HOwever I need to know some practical answers before I get going...and 
please respond as a layman please...I am not holding a contest for elliptical
jargon users to show off.

Having created a military grade secret key, where do I go from there.

1. I need public keys....how to get them? How to have them certified?
How to certify the certifications? 

2. I use PC DOS ( I have the Beta version of PGP2.3a for windows but it 
does not seem to work well if at all...). So with my pgp23a for DOS I want 
to write a letter....use a text editor?
probably. So how should Save as the file ? Do I need a suffix especially for PGP?

3. Uploading is a bitch as our Kermit (yes we do not have zmodem and the server 
sports a 9600 baud top speed...what a pile of crap but it is PHREE.) ...
as our Kermit server glitches most things sent. Hence the letter will be worthless by the time it gets to its destination. I hear about emacs and mime and 
other other goodies....how can I use these or should I bother?

4. Given that I have successfully encrypted how do I know it worked? I mean is
it at all possible that my copy of pgp was tainted such that it looks encrypted
but someone tacked on a backdoor to my downloaded version of PGP?

5. Now then given a successful upload how do I mail it? I use elm and vi is
the default editor (VI=vile for novices) how do I pull up the file into the
mailer via VI? Ok.
6. to recieve a letter just tell me the reverse...by the way I do not have 
problems downloading only uploading...everyone on our host who uses a modem
instead of the newly installed campus LAN (which means anyone who has a life
and needs more room than a shoebox sized dormroom).

EXTRA note : The dorms at Tulane University got rewired for the new school year.
It almost makes me want to go back to school _and_ live in the dorms. 
You see they put coax to all the rooms which has integrated the library catalog,cablevision with 32 channels (a hack infiltrated already and gave everyone 
PLAYBOY channel for 2 days...just imagine all the freshmen glued to the set.), 
and on the same cable we have IP access to the net though if you set up your ownnode it can only be temporary,,,they figured out a way to enforce this.
Kind of makes drool as I am stuck with copper wire phone lines in a 100 year oldapartment building with my 2400 baud modem...the kids today get all the breaks!

LOKI

PS send all responses to me privately please
loki@convex1.tcs.tulane.edu
subject:LOKI:USE YOUR PGP COPY!!!





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: msattler@netcom.com (Michael Sattler)
Date: Mon, 11 Oct 93 09:09:49 PDT
To: arthurc@crl.com
Subject: Re: The Bank of the Internet!? (fwd)
Message-ID: <9310111609.AA01224@netcom.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


At 16:14 93/10/10 -40962758, Douglas Barnes wrote:

>At the moment we are beginning the process of surveying members of local
>groups and employers in the high tech field to see if they are interested 
>in being part of the field of membership of a fully digital Credit Union. 
>We had our first Austin cypherpunks meeting yestereday, and it's clear that 
>they will be the core of the new CU.

And when you look further... I'm ready!


-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
Michael S. Sattler         msattler@netcom.com        +1 (415) 358-3058
Digital Jungle Software    Encrypt now; ask me how.   (finger for PGP key)

               All that is required for evil to triumph is
                for {wo}men of good will to do nothing.






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Perry E. Metzger" <pmetzger@lehman.com>
Date: Mon, 11 Oct 93 06:46:15 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: The Bank of the Internet!?
In-Reply-To: <199310110355.AA15157@tramp.cc.utexas.edu>
Message-ID: <9310111341.AA18008@snark.lehman.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Jim McCoy says:
> We want to be the ones who will define the protocol for currency on
> the net.
[...]
> We are staring small and have no real plans on becoming future banking
> powerhouses (The Gnomes of Austin perhaps... :) but we would rather it be
> us who define the standard than Chase Manhattan or the US Government.

I don't care for the Government, but I suspect that Chase Manhattan
has a much better idea of the problems involved in cash transfer and
accounting systems than you guys do. People who've never worked for
financial institutions rarely understand where the real problems are.

I don't mean this to be patronizing -- I have a good deal of respect
for the smarts of people like Eric Hughes -- but its simply the truth.
I remember the first time I did some research into back office systems
and discovered where the real expenses at an institution were -- and
nearly fell over in shock. Real world bank people have to worry about
things like how to make sure that exceptional cases involving manual
intervention (which represent well over 95% of expense) are minimized,
they worry about auditing and making sure that systems are structured
in such a way as to avoid constructing the capacity to embezzle into
the system. They have to worry about downtime, clearing regulations,
imaging documents, and other gunk.  I say gunk because its all largely
unglamorous in the same way that 99% of mechanical engineering is now
both unglamorous and yet still critical to the safety of, say,
automobiles.

Doing these all right are skills which I have gained a good deal of
respect for over the years. A bunch of hackers with experience in
nothing but cryptography might get some of the privacy aspects right
at the expense of producing a system which is otherwise unworkable. I
wish you luck, but I want to warn you in advance that there is a good
reason that computer people doing design work at banking institutions
are usually a rare breed that get paid six figure salaries. If you set
out to do this, it isn't going to be a part time job, and it isn't
going to be something you can do without a good deal of expertise,
either learned the hard way or hired.

Perry




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: paul@poboy.b17c.ingr.com (Paul Robichaux)
Date: Mon, 11 Oct 93 07:59:49 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: [META] [LIST] Let the market decide
Message-ID: <199310111456.AA26530@poboy.b17c.ingr.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I write this in the hope that it'll finish off the list/newsgroup
discussion and with the fear that it will make it worse.

"Let the market decide." If you feel that a newsgroup is the right way
to go, then start one. If it offers something valuable to current
cypherpunks subscribers, they'll read it.

Likewise with alternate mailing lists. If you want a crypto-politics
list, start one. If it offers valuable material, people will
subscribe.

Do not presume to dictate to the folks like Eric and Tim who created,
and have since nurtured, this list. Build a better mousetrap, and all
that.

-Paul

-- 
Paul Robichaux, KD4JZG     | "Change the world for a better tomorrow. But
perobich@ingr.com          |  watch your ass today." - aaron@halcyon.com
Intergraph Federal Systems | Be a cryptography user- ask me how.





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: cme@ellisun.sw.stratus.com (Carl Ellison)
Date: Mon, 11 Oct 93 08:19:49 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re:  Weak RSA keys?
Message-ID: <9310111518.AA01724@ellisun.sw.stratus.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>Date: Thu, 7 Oct 93 14:35:52 -0700
>From: hughes@ah.com (Eric Hughes)
>Message-Id: <9310072135.AA01702@ah.com>

>Out of curiosity, does anybody here know how to calculate any
>expectations for gcd(p-1,q-1) for, say, 2^n < p < q < 2^(n+1) ?  I
>don't know enough number theory myself.


Eric,

	I don't think it's number theory you want so much as probability
theory.  I'm going to look at this to get the answer to the problem as you
formulated it, but for values of n large enough (or, for values of 0
greater than (2^{-n}) :-) there's a simple form for that expected value.
You can take it as an upper bound for the actual one:

[note: I haven't verified this more than once...]


	E = sum_i sum_m p_i^{-m}

where p_i is the i-th prime.

 - Carl




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: cman@IO.COM (Douglas Barnes)
Date: Mon, 11 Oct 93 09:26:15 PDT
To: msattler@netcom.com (Michael Sattler)
Subject: Re: The Bank of the Internet!? (fwd)
In-Reply-To: <9310111609.AA01224@netcom.netcom.com>
Message-ID: <9310111620.AA23813@illuminati.IO.COM>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> 
> At 16:14 93/10/10 -40962758, Douglas Barnes wrote:
> 
> >At the moment we are beginning the process of surveying members of local
> >groups and employers in the high tech field to see if they are interested 
> >in being part of the field of membership of a fully digital Credit Union. 
> >We had our first Austin cypherpunks meeting yestereday, and it's clear that 
> >they will be the core of the new CU.
> 
> And when you look further... I'm ready!
> 

Because of (archaic) formation regulations, *a* Credit Union is restricted
pretty much to a single, distinct geographical region, i.e. Travis County,
Texas. CUs with national field of membership are apparently allowed, but an 
extremely tight associative bond is required (the somewhat scattershot 
associative bonds we hope to use in Austin would never fly on a national 
level.)

There is nothing, however, to prevent multiple CUs from being created,
with similar philosophies, that share software, expertise, etc. 

Doug

-- 
----------------                                             /\ 
Douglas Barnes            cman@illuminati.io.com            /  \ 
Chief Wizard         (512) 448-8950 (d), 447-7866 (v)      / () \
Illuminati Online          metaverse.io.com 7777          /______\



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: cman@IO.COM (Douglas Barnes)
Date: Mon, 11 Oct 93 09:46:15 PDT
To: pmetzger@lehman.com
Subject: Re: The Bank of the Internet!?
In-Reply-To: <9310111341.AA18008@snark.lehman.com>
Message-ID: <9310111642.AA26409@illuminati.IO.COM>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> I don't care for the Government, but I suspect that Chase Manhattan
> has a much better idea of the problems involved in cash transfer and
> accounting systems than you guys do. People who've never worked for
> financial institutions rarely understand where the real problems are.
> 
> I don't mean this to be patronizing -- I have a good deal of respect

Oh really? :-)
I worked for First City National Bank in MIS for three years... I'm
sure Chase has the drop in terms of experience, but you need to realize
that these institutions are the IBMs of the financial world. How
much truly innovative tech do you see out of IBM, despite all the 
centuries of experience locked up in meetings? (I went to work for
them after First City, so I got to see it frist hand.)

Also, the Credit Union movement was started by amateurs in the 19th
century, and the bulk of CUs are still started by rank amateurs today,
albeit the regulators like to see some folks who have at least a
basic grasp of accounting (of which do indeed have.) 

I think that you are overestimating the sexiness of this project, as
did an earlier poster. It's really quite ordinary, except that rather
than being driven merely by a desire to get low-cost loans and a 
customer-centered approach, our field of membership gets all the digital
banking services we can legally provide.... and if a few standards
get set on the way, all the better :-). 

Doug

-- 
----------------                                             /\ 
Douglas Barnes            cman@illuminati.io.com            /  \ 
Chief Wizard         (512) 448-8950 (d), 447-7866 (v)      / () \
Illuminati Online          metaverse.io.com 7777          /______\



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: cme@ellisun.sw.stratus.com (Carl Ellison)
Date: Mon, 11 Oct 93 08:51:32 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: E[gcd(p-1,q-1)]
Message-ID: <9310111549.AA01795@ellisun.sw.stratus.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I just wrote:
>
>	E = sum_i sum_m p_i^{-m}
>
>where p_i is the i-th prime.

That didn't take into account that p and q were knwn to be odd.   So,
assuming p and q are randomly chosen odd numbers:

	E[gcd(p-1,q-1)] < 2.5 + sum_j 1/(p_j - 1)

where p_j is the j-th odd prime.

It's "<" because this doesn't take into account that there are (relatively
small) values of m such that p_i^m > min(p,q).  It also doesn't take into
account the second order probability effects from depeltion of range.

 - Carl





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Jim McCoy <mccoy@ccwf.cc.utexas.edu>
Date: Mon, 11 Oct 93 09:59:48 PDT
To: pmetzger@lehman.com
Subject: Re: The Bank of the Internet!?
In-Reply-To: <9310111341.AA18008@snark.lehman.com>
Message-ID: <199310111657.AA16129@tramp.cc.utexas.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text


Perry E. Metzger <pmetzger@lehman.com> writes:
> 
> Jim McCoy says:
> > We want to be the ones who will define the protocol for currency on
> > the net.
> [...]
> 
> I don't care for the Government, but I suspect that Chase Manhattan
> has a much better idea of the problems involved in cash transfer and
> accounting systems than you guys do. People who've never worked for
> financial institutions rarely understand where the real problems are.
> [...]

This is true.  We are not trying to do this alone.  We are working with a
major local credit union to be able to handle these sorts of things.  We
also have people involved who have some real experience in this area.  I
guess I will say that we are trying to cover all of the bases as best we
can (if you want a real fun mind-warp examine commercial paper and
electronic wire transfer law...) and that we are going to do something.
Enough has been bounced around in conversation here, we are going to try to
get something done now...

jim



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: peb@PROCASE.COM (Paul Baclace)
Date: Mon, 11 Oct 93 13:01:19 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: RSA Security
Message-ID: <9310112000.AA00873@banff.procase.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



> if someone were to discover a efficient method for
>factoring, I don't believe that we would know about it for a long time.

Yes, but consider that being world famous has its advantages for contracting
and lecture fees...

If factoring were discovered to cost polynomial time, then it would require
an international math hooligan conspiracy to keep it quiet.


Paul





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Perry E. Metzger" <pmetzger@lehman.com>
Date: Mon, 11 Oct 93 10:16:19 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: The Bank of the Internet!?
In-Reply-To: <9310111642.AA26409@illuminati.IO.COM>
Message-ID: <9310111713.AA18358@snark.lehman.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Douglas Barnes says:
> Oh really? :-)
> I worked for First City National Bank in MIS for three years... I'm
> sure Chase has the drop in terms of experience, but you need to realize
> that these institutions are the IBMs of the financial world. How
> much truly innovative tech do you see out of IBM, despite all the 
> centuries of experience locked up in meetings?

Plenty. Find me a workstation with the sort of uptime a 3090 running
MVS will give you. I think this is a matter of neglect and a lack of
market pressure, but let it never be said that IBM's problem was a
lack of technological expertise. They have possibly the finest
manufacturing technology engineers in the world, and world class
computer jocks, even in the mainframe world. They have expertise in
scads. Their problem has always been an inability to understand that
they are in a competitive marketplace. Thats why they are always
suprised when their machines don't sell even though they are priced
too high. They are also too big to manage.

> Also, the Credit Union movement was started by amateurs in the 19th
> century, and the bulk of CUs are still started by rank amateurs today,
> albeit the regulators like to see some folks who have at least a
> basic grasp of accounting (of which do indeed have.) 

Hey, thats fine, but if you aspire to revolutionize a business you
should first understand it. To my knowledge, most credit unions do not
produce financial innovations.

> I think that you are overestimating the sexiness of this project, as
> did an earlier poster. It's really quite ordinary, 

Thats my point. The ordinary day to day problems of producing good
banking software are not trivial. Designing a dam for a large river
presents no technological challenges whatsoever. Try doing it without
a lot of specialized knowledge.

So you are starting a bank. Tell me -- can you tell me what a bankers
acceptance is? What the clearing time is for checks? What sort of
securities instruments a bank is allowed to invest in? If you find
yourself with fractional pennies in a transaction, what do you do with
them? Can you tell me what organization sets accounting practices in
the U.S., and what the name of their major publication is? Whats a
CUSIP number? If one of your credit union's members cashes a savings
bond, what sort of tax information must your accounting system keep,
and what forms are you obligated to file, and when? How do you clear a
check from an out of country bank? Indeed, how do you clear a a check
from an american bank? What, legally, is a check? What language is
needed on a loan document to make the loan transferable?

This stuff isn't difficult. There is just scads of it. Getting the
software to handle all of it properly isn't a part time job. Stating
that you are setting out to produce "the" banking protocols of the
future when you don't grok banking yet is a bit on the hubristic side.


Perry




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Perry E. Metzger" <pmetzger@lehman.com>
Date: Mon, 11 Oct 93 10:19:48 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: The Bank of the Internet!?
In-Reply-To: <199310111657.AA16129@tramp.cc.utexas.edu>
Message-ID: <9310111716.AA18369@snark.lehman.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Jim McCoy says:
> Perry E. Metzger <pmetzger@lehman.com> writes:
> > 
> > Jim McCoy says:
> > > We want to be the ones who will define the protocol for currency on
> > > the net.
> > [...]
> > 
> > I don't care for the Government, but I suspect that Chase Manhattan
> > has a much better idea of the problems involved in cash transfer and
> > accounting systems than you guys do. People who've never worked for
> > financial institutions rarely understand where the real problems are.
> > [...]
> 
> This is true.  We are not trying to do this alone.  We are working with a
> major local credit union to be able to handle these sorts of things.  We
> also have people involved who have some real experience in this
> area.

Well, I'm glad that you understand that there is a problem here.

> I guess I will say that we are trying to cover all of the bases as
> best we can (if you want a real fun mind-warp examine commercial
> paper and electronic wire transfer law...)

I have. Commercial paper isn't actually too bad -- its pretty logical
once you understand the principles.

> and that we are going to do something.
> Enough has been bounced around in conversation here, we are going to try to
> get something done now...

I wish you luck.

Perry




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: doug@netcom.com (Doug Merritt)
Date: Mon, 11 Oct 93 13:51:08 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: RSA Security
Message-ID: <9310112047.AA11247@netcom.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


peb@PROCASE.COM (Paul Baclace) said:
>Yes, but consider that being world famous has its advantages for contracting
>and lecture fees...

That's also more attractive considering that the U.S. government is
quite capable of demanding the secret of the factorization method and
generally throw their weight around as "justified" by national security...
I'm not generally very paranoid, but I *would* be in a situation like that.
Just about any and all other laws go out the window once they invoke
national security.
	Doug
--
Doug Merritt				doug@netcom.com
Professional Wild-eyed Visionary	Member, Crusaders for a Better Tomorrow
     (The above is a joke; the following are mailing lists:)
Unicode Novis Cypherpunks Gutenberg Wavelets Conlang Logli Alife HC_III
Computational linguistics Fundamental physics Cogsci SF GA VR CASE TLAs




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: habs@panix.com (Harry S. Hawk)
Date: Mon, 11 Oct 93 11:29:50 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: The Bank of the Internet!?
Message-ID: <199310111827.AA22615@panix.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Perry
>> I don't care for the Government, but I suspect that Chase Manhattan
>> has a much better idea of the problems involved in cash transfer and
>> accounting systems than you guys do. People who've never worked for
>> financial institutions rarely understand where the real problems are.

>Douglas Barnes           
>I worked for First City National Bank in MIS for three years... I'm
>sure Chase has the drop in terms of experience, but you need to realize
>that these institutions are the IBMs of the financial world. How
>much truly innovative tech do you see out of IBM, despite all the 
>centuries of experience locked up in meetings? (I went to work for
>them after First City, so I got to see it frist hand.)

There is a huge difference between the back office transactions at
a brokerage house and those in a small bank/credit union. A point of
reference, in 1990 Shearson Lehman brokerage services used 18 gigabytes of
data for client records (PER Month). Unable to keep all that data on disk
(they were planning to go optical), they had huge costs in microfilm, esp.
in paying folks to retrieve data by hand.

A major problem with Brokerage back office is physically keeping track of
where stocks are and where they are going (they can be sold, bought, held,
borrowed and lent). Other rules, as Perry mentions, include suffering
economic loss at certain points if you are unable to document certain transactions.
 
I don't, however, see how any of this could impact a simple credit
union type bank opperated over the Internet. Such a back office 
should be far simpler. The trick will be growing such a enterprise
into a business that can offer any degree of sophisicated financial
services. A major plus is that if digital signatures can be used,
and strorage space allows, little if no paper records need be kept,
which will allow the entire operation to exist in "cypherspace."

I do agree with Perry in that it will be a full time activity, and
that much learning will have to take place. I am more optimistic than
Perry in feeling it can be done. 

From Jan of 1988 to March of 1990 I worked in the Advanced Technology and
Office Systems Consulting deptments of Shearson Lehman Brothers (now
Smith Barney Shearson). I was involved in their efforts to implement
optical storage systems for both data and images.


--
Harry S. Hawk           ON Vacation






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: nobody@rosebud.ee.uh.edu
Date: Mon, 11 Oct 93 12:29:50 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: RSA Security
Message-ID: <9310111927.AA16653@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Everyone here, of course, knows that breaking the RSA encryption scheme
can be no harder than factoring huge numbers. The present security in
RSA rests in the fact that nobody has found an efficient way to do it.
At the same time, however, nobody has been able to show that it can't
be done. We are simply going on faith and past history.

The problem is that if someone were to discover a efficient method for
factoring, I don't believe that we would know about it for a long time.
For example, if by some stroke of genius, I were to discover an efficient
way to factor, you would never hear about it from me! Being the greedy
person that I am, I would say to myself: "How can I make a buck from
this?". I would probably go to the government or some company (quietly)
and say to them: "For X dollars each, I will break RSA keys for you."
The beauty is that I would not need to disclose the algorithm for
factoring. They could easily check if the results that I gave them
were correct!




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Peter Wayner <pcw@access.digex.net>
Date: Mon, 11 Oct 93 12:26:19 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Zimmerman on the Hill....
Message-ID: <199310111925.AA15091@access.digex.net>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



What time will Zimmerman be delivering his telegram to the
Hill tomorrow? Does anyone know the date and time and location? 
I would appreciate the information.

Thanks,
'
Peter Wayner




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Duncan Frissell <frissell@panix.com>
Date: Mon, 11 Oct 93 12:49:50 PDT
To: CYPHERPUNKS@toad.com
Subject: Why X/Open in London?
Message-ID: <199310111947.AA04793@panix.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I noted that Novell was supposed, today, to assign its rights to Unix to 
the X/Open consortium based in London.

You don't suppose that X/Open was founded in London so that future Unix 
versions could integrate crypto without bothering with US export laws.  
<G>

Another blow to America's competitiveness.

Duncan Frissell



--- WinQwk 2.0b#0
                                      




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: lefty@apple.com (Lefty)
Date: Mon, 11 Oct 93 16:09:51 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: The Bank of the Internet!?
Message-ID: <9310112247.AA09195@internal.apple.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Harry S. Hawk writes:
> 
>I don't, however, see how any of this could impact a simple credit
>union type bank opperated over the Internet.

I would be surprised to discover that running a bank "over the Internet"
didn't stand a fair chance of running afoul of interstate banking laws...


--
Lefty (lefty@apple.com)
C:.M:.C:., D:.O:.D:.






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: djw@eff.org (Daniel J. Weitzner)
Date: Mon, 11 Oct 93 13:19:50 PDT
To: Peter Wayner <pcw@access.digex.net>
Subject: Re: Zimmerman on the Hill....(the details)
Message-ID: <199310112016.AA21592@eff.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Phil Zimmermann will be testifying Tuesday October 12th at 1:30 pm:

Rayburn Room 2172 
House Foreign Affairs Committee
Subcommittee on Economic Policy, Trade, and the Environment

Also featured will be demos of DES downloaded from foreign ftp sites and a
large array of foreign-produced DES-based security packages.

[It's always wise to check the room assigned on the day of the hearing.]



...................................................................

Daniel J. Weitzner, Senior Staff Counsel <djw@eff.org>
Electronic Frontier Foundation
1001 G St, NW
Suite 950 East
Washington, DC 20001
202-347-5400 (v) 
202-393-5509 (f)






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: an41418@anon.penet.fi (wonderer)
Date: Mon, 11 Oct 93 09:56:17 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Breaking DES
Message-ID: <9310111652.AA29091@anon.penet.fi>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


My understanding of how an exhaustive search on the key space
can be used to break DES is that for every key, K, D(K,Cipher)
is applied until the output matches something legible.

Say that some random string, to be thrown out, is added
to the beginning of the plain text, and that DES is applied
in cbc mode, then how could such an attack work? 

My point, I don't see how DES can be broken if the initial
block is a grabage block, and cipher block chaining is used.
Please enlighten me (gently).

One other point... is the decision to encrypt - decrypt -encrypt
when applying triple des arbitrary? Why not just encrypt
with k1 and then encrypt with k2. Isn't the effect the same?

Thanks a lot,
Wonderer
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
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From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Jim McCoy <mccoy@ccwf.cc.utexas.edu>
Date: Mon, 11 Oct 93 15:01:22 PDT
To: an41418@anon.penet.fi
Subject: Re: Security through obscurity
In-Reply-To: <9310111947.AA02379@anon.penet.fi>
Message-ID: <199310112157.AA16726@tramp.cc.utexas.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text


an41418@anon.penet.fi (wonderer) writes:
> [regarding security through obscurity and the clipper/skipjack stuff] 
> 
> All of the known plaintext attacks on algorithms such as
> DES, that involve exhaustive key search are based on knowledge
> of the algorithm. Wouldn't keeping the algorithm a secret
> render such chips, as the one presented in Eurocrypt '93
> useless?
>
> [...] I wouldn't give the
> cracker a head start by publishing my algorithm. 

You are not going to be able to keep your algorithm secret, period.
Those who are determined enough will be able to dig it out of any
programs or chips you use to implement your algorithm.  Security through
obscurity is stupid because no matter how smart you may think you are
in hiding your method, there is always someone smarter who will dig it 
out and changing technology constantly lowers the barrier of how smart 
people need to be to dig information out of old locks using new tools.

The problem with security through obscurity is that if it is set up as
a part of a system people have a tendency to think that they can use
the obscurity to hide weaknesses in the system.  Once your system or chip
is out there in quantity there will be nothing on it you can hide, and any
weaknesses will be impossible to fix without a recall (severely damaging
trust and reputation with your users...)

If the algorithm is truly secure, then very little will be gained by
letting everyone know the method used, and by letting others examine and
test the system it is possible to have others establish the strength or
weaknesses of your method for you.  I do not trust you, I do not trust the
NSA, I do trust the cryptography community in general because they have
nothing to gain by misleading me.

> Clipper has
> proven how difficult it is to reverse engineer an algorithm.

Clipper has proven nothing because _no one has had a chance to reverse
engineer the algorithm_.  Give me clipper in software or give some of the
people on this list the clipper chips and see we'll see how long the method
remains secret.  So far clipper/skipjack is vapor.  When I can hold one in
my hand and tweak inputs and outputs then we shall see how difficult it is
to reverse engineer an algorithm.

jim



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Karl Lui Barrus <klbarrus@owlnet.rice.edu>
Date: Mon, 11 Oct 93 14:59:50 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Breaking DES
In-Reply-To: <9310111652.AA29091@anon.penet.fi>
Message-ID: <9310112158.AA11809@flammulated.owlnet.rice.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


wonderer wrote:

>One other point... is the decision to encrypt - decrypt -encrypt
>when applying triple des arbitrary? Why not just encrypt
>with k1 and then encrypt with k2. Isn't the effect the same?

Encrypting with k1 and then k2 leaves you open to the "meet in the
middle" attack.

Say I get a copy of the plaintext and ciphertext.  I could encrypt the
plaintext with 2^56 keys, and decrypt the ciphertext with 2^56 keys.
Then by matching results of the above steps, I could figure out k1 and
k2.

The work for this attack is 2^56 + 2^56 = 2^57, which suggests that
double encryption doesn't increase the complexity of breaking your
text very much.  It only increases it from 2^56 to 2^(56+1).  So if
you use the same k1 and k2 for all your documents and it is worth my
time and money to figure out k1 and k2, favoring double encryption
over single encryption doesn't make much sense.

Otherwise, there was fear that DES was a group (encrypting with k1 and
k2 is equivalent to encrypting once with k3), but I think this got
buried (?) recently.

Also, with the triple encrypt-decrypt-encrypt, if you pick the same
key for each step, it is equivalent to just single encryption.  Which
may be of importance in compatibility issues, etc.

-- 
Karl L. Barrus: klbarrus@owlnet.rice.edu         
keyID: 5AD633 hash: D1 59 9D 48 72 E9 19 D5  3D F3 93 7E 81 B5 CC 32 

"One man's mnemonic is another man's cryptography" 
  - my compilers prof discussing file naming in public directories



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: smb@research.att.com
Date: Mon, 11 Oct 93 14:16:21 PDT
To: an41418@anon.penet.fi
Subject: Re: Breaking DES
Message-ID: <9310112113.AA18057@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


	 My understanding of how an exhaustive search on the key space
	 can be used to break DES is that for every key, K, D(K,Cipher)
	 is applied until the output matches something legible.

	 Say that some random string, to be thrown out, is added
	 to the beginning of the plain text, and that DES is applied
	 in cbc mode, then how could such an attack work? 

	 My point, I don't see how DES can be broken if the initial
	 block is a grabage block, and cipher block chaining is used.
	 Please enlighten me (gently).

	 One other point... is the decision to encrypt - decrypt -encrypt
	 when applying triple des arbitrary? Why not just encrypt
	 with k1 and then encrypt with k2. Isn't the effect the same?

There are two reasons for that, one of which no longer applies.

The one that still matters is that if you set k1==k2, then the operation
is equivalent to single encryption with k1, thus providing backwards
compatibility.

The other reason is that it was initially feared that DES was a group.
That is, encryption with k1 and k2 might be equivalent to single encryption
with some unknown (to you and me) key k3.  But a cryptanalyst or a brute-
force cracker would neither know nor care that you double-encrypted.

It has now been proved that DES is not a group.  What isn't clear to me
is whether it's ``mostly closed'', though I suspect not.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "M. Strata Rose" <strata@FENCHURCH.MIT.EDU>
Date: Mon, 11 Oct 93 15:16:23 PDT
To: derek@cs.wisc.edu
Subject: Re: PGP misunderstanding
Message-ID: <CMM.0.90.0.750377993.strata@fenchurch>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Derek writes:
And just what is the point of an encrypted newsgroup?  What key(s) would
you use to encrypt the messages, and why?


I would create a pair of keysets, VCNPoster and VCNReader and have both the
public and private keys accessible via finger.  The outbound news would be
encrypted as if these two nyms were exchanging messages.  It's not a security
thing, it's just that people who won't bother to learn how to use the
technology won't be able to read or post there.  That will be enough
incentive to get another class of folks using it, IMHO.

_Strata

M. Strata Rose
Unix & Network Consultant, SysAdmin & Internet Information 
Virtual City (TM) Network
strata@virtual.net | strata@hybrid.com | strata@fenchurch.mit.edu




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: cman@IO.COM (Douglas Barnes)
Date: Mon, 11 Oct 93 16:29:50 PDT
To: lefty@apple.com (Lefty)
Subject: Re: The Bank of the Internet!?
In-Reply-To: <9310112247.AA09195@internal.apple.com>
Message-ID: <9310112326.AA02036@illuminati.IO.COM>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> 
> Harry S. Hawk writes:
> > 
> >I don't, however, see how any of this could impact a simple credit
> >union type bank opperated over the Internet.
> 
> I would be surprised to discover that running a bank "over the Internet"
> didn't stand a fair chance of running afoul of interstate banking laws...
> 

1) It's a Credit Union, not a bank.
2) The field of membership for the individual CUs would be restricted
   to a local area.

-- 
----------------                                             /\ 
Douglas Barnes            cman@illuminati.io.com            /  \ 
Chief Wizard         (512) 448-8950 (d), 447-7866 (v)      / () \
Illuminati Online          metaverse.io.com 7777          /______\



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Perry E. Metzger" <pmetzger@lehman.com>
Date: Mon, 11 Oct 93 15:59:50 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Breaking DES
In-Reply-To: <9310112158.AA11809@flammulated.owlnet.rice.edu>
Message-ID: <9310112259.AA19226@snark.lehman.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Karl Lui Barrus says:
> Encrypting with k1 and then k2 leaves you open to the "meet in the
> middle" attack.
> 
> Say I get a copy of the plaintext and ciphertext.  I could encrypt the
> plaintext with 2^56 keys, and decrypt the ciphertext with 2^56 keys.
> Then by matching results of the above steps, I could figure out k1 and
> k2.

Tell you what, Karl -- when you build the device that can store 2^56
encryptions, let us know. You'll make a mint in the storage technology
business. Also let us know how you'll index and fetch the encryptions
in any reasonable time while you are at it, but by comparison thats a
tiny problem.

> The work for this attack is 2^56 + 2^56 = 2^57, which suggests that
> double encryption doesn't increase the complexity of breaking your
> text very much.

Karl, are you sure that you want people to think you believe this?

Perry




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: msattler@netcom.com (Michael Sattler)
Date: Mon, 11 Oct 93 19:41:25 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Cypherpunk Cause
Message-ID: <9310120239.AA00773@netcom.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


At 12:10 93/10/10 -0400, Perry E. Metzger wrote:
>
>If you want to spew nonsense, please do so on one of the politics
>newsgroups. This is for cryptography discussion.

(Donning asbestos undies...)

This kind of knee-jerk reaction dismays me.  My response *was* about
cryptography.  Perhaps the following test would prevent you from (1)
wasting bandwidth and (2) turning off people who are trying to put the
flood of crypto info into perspective:

   "Does this email add any value to the discussion?"

Give the rest of us a break; your usual postings are worth reading.


-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
Michael S. Sattler         msattler@netcom.com        +1 (415) 358-3058
Digital Jungle Software    Encrypt now; ask me how.   (finger for PGP key)

               All that is required for evil to triumph is
                for {wo}men of good will to do nothing.






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: an41418@anon.penet.fi (wonderer)
Date: Mon, 11 Oct 93 12:51:10 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Security through obscurity
Message-ID: <9310111947.AA02379@anon.penet.fi>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I know that it is pretty much accepted by the security
community that security through obscurity is useless. There
are countless references to this, and it is a strong
argument in favor of publishing algorithms. 

From time to time, however, it is healthy to question policies
such as these and ask ourselves whether or not this is a good
idea. It seems that Denning has changed her mind on this by
advocating the secrecy of the skipjack algorithm. 

All of the known plaintext attacks on algorithms such as
DES, that involve exhaustive key search are based on knowledge
of the algorithm. Wouldn't keeping the algorithm a secret
render such chips, as the one presented in Eurocrypt '93
useless?

I agree that analysis is more difficult when you don't know
if an intruder has compromised your algorithm, but if it were
my data that I wanted kept secret I wouldn't give the
cracker a head start by publishing my algorithm. Clipper has
proven how difficult it is to reverse engineer an algorithm.

Let me just say that I know I have violated an accepted
doctrine of computer security, but I think it's okay to
question even the most accepted ideas every once in a while.
I thought this would be a bit provocative.

Wonderer
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From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: doug@netcom.com (Doug Merritt)
Date: Mon, 11 Oct 93 19:56:43 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Breaking DES
In-Reply-To: <pmetzger@lehman.com>
Message-ID: <9310120254.AA04001@netcom6.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


pmetzger@lehman.com said:
>Karl Lui Barrus says:
>> plaintext with 2^56 keys, and decrypt the ciphertext with 2^56 keys.
>
>Tell you what, Karl -- when you build the device that can store 2^56
>encryptions, let us know.

2^56 bytes equals 10^7 gigabytes. At roughly $1000 per gigabyte,
that equals 10^10 bucks...10 billion dollars. Or say there's a quantity
discount in orders totalling a million units, and you get the whole
capacity for 1 billion dollars.

Well, that's a bit steep for me, but there's no question but that the
NSA could afford it. Still, what do you say I wait a few years until it
comes down to 10 million dollars, which I happen to have available in
the year 2003 in my company budget? Ten years should do it, estimating
conservatively.

> Also let us know how you'll index and fetch the encryptions
>in any reasonable time while you are at it, but by comparison thats a
>tiny problem.

That ten years also means that rather than searching 10^7 units in parallel,
we will then be searching only 10^5 units in parallel. It'll still take
a few hours, but that's ok.

This all suggests that the NSA could do such a thing *now* if they *really*
cared to, and could do so fairly trivially in 10 years.

>> The work for this attack is 2^56 + 2^56 = 2^57, which suggests that
>> double encryption doesn't increase the complexity of breaking your
>> text very much.
>
>Karl, are you sure that you want people to think you believe this?

I did a double take on this at first too, since naively one would expect
the search to be (2^56)^2. However, this can be improved, for instance
by sorting each set in N lg N time (56 * 2^56 operations), and then doing
interleaved comparisons in N lg N time again, which can be mostly parallelized
over those 10^5 computers that are running those 10^5 disks, so that the
total time would be (since 10^16 = 2^56) 10^16 / 10^5 machines = 10^11 cycles,
and given 10^3 MIP machines, this gives 10^4 seconds (20 minutes) for each
phase...call it an hour total.

(In other words, as a first approximation, Karl is accurate to assume
linear rather than quadratic speed for this.)

This neglects coordination of the networked machines, which one might
expect to add a factor of 5 to 10 to those numbers.

This rough analysis demonstrates that Karl's scenario is merely expensive
now, and "cheap" (by NSA standards) ten years from now, rather than
completely inconceivable.

I guess the weakest point of the above back-of-the-envelope estimate
is that each e.g. plaintext & cyphertext is assumed to be representable
within one byte, but that's *not* fatal. You could use hashing to get
down to one byte, and when a hit is detected, try again using two
bytes. When hits are detected there, use four bytes...and so on. That
approach allows the real world scheme to be reasonably close to the
back of the envelope gross assumptions.
	Doug




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: smb@research.att.com
Date: Mon, 11 Oct 93 17:16:42 PDT
To: an41418@anon.penet.fi
Subject: Re: Breaking DES
Message-ID: <9310120012.AA21398@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


	  My understanding of how an exhaustive search on the key space
	  can be used to break DES is that for every key, K, D(K,Cipher)
	  is applied until the output matches something legible.

	  Say that some random string, to be thrown out, is added
	  to the beginning of the plain text, and that DES is applied
	  in cbc mode, then how could such an attack work?

	  My point, I don't see how DES can be broken if the initial
	  block is a grabage block, and cipher block chaining is used.
	  Please enlighten me (gently).

The decryption equation for CBC mode is

	P[n] <- D(C[n]) ^ C[n-1]

In other words, decrypt the current ciphertext block, and XOR with the
previous ciphertext block.  Note carefully: the previous ciphertext
block.  That implies that you can start at any point in the string
and do your decryption.  You don't have to know the plaintext of the
previous block to proceed, which is what you're implying.

The property of CBC mode is related to its error propagation character-
istics, which are important in some environment.  Suppose that ciphertext
block C[n] is garbled, either by a bird sitting on a phone line or by
hostile action.  That will garble two blocks of output:  P[n] and P[n+1].
(Derivation is left as an exercise for the reader.)  But P[n+2] will
be decrypted properly, since it depends on P[n+1] and P[n+2].  (N.B.
I'm deliberately ignoring insertion/deletion errors.  If those are a
concern, use CFB mode.)

In accordance with my usual habits, I'll cite an excellent reference
on how to use cipher systems, and what the properties of the different
encryption modes are:

	@book{daviesprice,
	   author = {Donald W. Davies and Wyn L. Price},
	   edition = {second},
	   publisher = {John Wiley \& Sons},
	   title = {Security for Computer Networks},
	   year = {1989}
	}

Bruce Schneier's excellent book ``APPLIED CRYPTOGRAPHY: PROTOCOLS, ALGORITHMS,
AND SOURCE CODE IN C'' is due out next month; it covers this, too.  (I'll
forbear to cite my own book till it's nearer completion...)




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Perry E. Metzger" <pmetzger@lehman.com>
Date: Mon, 11 Oct 93 19:26:25 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Breaking DES
In-Reply-To: <9310120035.AA17275@netcom6.netcom.com>
Message-ID: <9310120225.AA19589@snark.lehman.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



J. Eric Townsend says:
> "Perry E. Metzger" writes:
>  > Tell you what, Karl -- when you build the device that can store 2^56
> 
> I have 1/72nd of that storage capacity in the next room, using
> off-the-shelf technology.  Also, 8GB RAM, and another 300-500GB of
> 'fast' storage local to the CPU.

My bogometer just triggered, so I decided to check your math.

(2^56)*8 = 576,460,752,303,423,488 
((2^56)*8)/72 = 8,006,399,337,547,548 or eight quadrillion bytes.

> (Cray C90, 1GW main memory, .5TB drive storage of various types, 9
> tape silos)

Gee, half a terrabyte. Thats 16,000 times less than you claimed.

> Again, all off-the-shelf technology.  Tape robots are a few years old,
> actually. :-)

Your off the shelf slow speed tape technology isn't even 1/16,000 of
what you claimed, and its over a million times less storage than you
would need, in *RAM*, for the proposed task.

Perry




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Perry E. Metzger" <pmetzger@lehman.com>
Date: Mon, 11 Oct 93 19:31:05 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: whoops!
In-Reply-To: <9310120045.AA18250@netcom6.netcom.com>
Message-ID: <9310120228.AA19597@snark.lehman.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



J. Eric Townsend says:
> 
> I just sent mail saying I had 1/72 of 2^56 bytes of storage.  I was
> wrong, it seems I dropped 'a few' zeros.
> 
> In reality, there's 1/72057th or so next door.  That's a bit different
> than 1/72.

Ah, reality catches up.

You also forgot a factor of 8...

Perry




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: nobody@entropy.linet.org
Date: Mon, 11 Oct 93 21:59:50 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Digital Bank
Message-ID: <m0omZYW-0003ETC@entropy.linet.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>I don't mean this to be patronizing -- I have a good deal of respect

>respect for over the years. A bunch of hackers with experience in
>nothing but cryptography might get some of the privacy aspects right
>at the expense of producing a system which is otherwise unworkable. I

Good Lord.  This debate over how to get a digital bank started reminds
me of an excellent humor book I read, called "29 Reasons not to go to
Law School".

>From the book (as my memory serves):

How to start a company in Japan
1) buy land
2) build a factory
3) hire workers
4) produce widgets

How to start a company in America:
1) hire property lawyers to examine zoning laws
2) hire employment lawyers to examine compliance with various Federal
   statutes (child labor, equal oppurtunity, fair wage, osha, etc.)
3) hire corporate lawyers to examine your competitors
4) file tons of paperwork to incorporate
5) hire workers
6) train them since they probably can't do the job
7) fend off lawsuits from your competitors
8) etc. etc.

Some people have expressed a desire to start a digital bank.  I say,
go for it, and work out the problems as they arise.  Naturally, plan
ahead as much as possible, but get working on something.

There wouldn't by anything if people sat around and answered every
single question before starting.





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: an41418@anon.penet.fi (wonderer)
Date: Mon, 11 Oct 93 16:16:23 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Breaking DES
Message-ID: <9310112312.AA12510@anon.penet.fi>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I am sorry to have asked two questions in my original
post. A few people have made me aware of the reason
for encrypting EDE in triple DES for backward compatability
and the issue of whether or not DES is a group.
So, I'd like to redirect this thread to my other
question:

         My understanding of how an exhaustive search on the key space
         can be used to break DES is that for every key, K, D(K,Cipher)
         is applied until the output matches something legible.

         Say that some random string, to be thrown out, is added
         to the beginning of the plain text, and that DES is applied
         in cbc mode, then how could such an attack work?

         My point, I don't see how DES can be broken if the initial
         block is a grabage block, and cipher block chaining is used.
         Please enlighten me (gently).

Wonderer
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From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Dave Banisar <banisar@washofc.cpsr.org>
Date: Mon, 11 Oct 93 21:06:44 PDT
To: CYPHERPUNKS <CYPHERPUNKS@toad.com>
Subject: CPSR Alert 2.03
Message-ID: <00541.2833227469.217@washofc.cpsr.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


  CPSR Alert 2.03
     =============================================================
  
      @@@@  @@@@   @@@   @@@@        @    @     @@@@  @@@@  @@@@@
      @     @  @  @      @  @       @ @   @     @     @  @    @
      @     @@@     @    @@@       @@@@@  @     @@@   @@@     @
      @     @        @   @  @      @   @  @     @     @  @    @
      @@@@  @     @@@    @   @     @   @  @@@@  @@@@  @   @   @
  
     =============================================================
     Volume  2.03                                 October 12, 1993
     -------------------------------------------------------------
  
                           Published by
           Computer Professionals for Social Responsibility
                         Washington Office
                     (Alert@washofc.cpsr.org)
    
     -------------------------------------------------------------
  
Contents
  
    [1] Administration Continues NII Initiative
    [2] White House Announces New FOIA Procedures
    [3] Health Care and Privacy
    [4] CPSR Panel on Medical Privacy
    [5] CPSR Annual Meeting - October 16-17
    [6] New Documents in the CPSR Internet Library
    [7] Upcoming Conferences and Events
  
     -------------------------------------------------------------

[1] Administration Continues NII Initiative

Following the announcement of the "The National Information
Infrastructure: Agenda for Action" in mid-September, the Administration
is pushing forward the NII program.  An open forum was held at the
Department of Commerce at the end of September with high ranking
officials, private sector representatives, and public advocates
exchanging views on the NII program.  The National Telecommunications
and Information Administration is planning a series of hearings later
this year on an updated concept of "universal service," and the
Information Infrastructure Task Force working group on privacy has
already held several meetings to examine privacy implications of the NII
program.

To obtain a copy of the NII report, FTP the document from
ftp.ntia.doc.gov. Log in as "anonymous" with the password "guest" and
change to directory "pub."  Retrieve "niiagenda.asc."  (The document is
also available from the CPSR FTP site).

CPSR will be submitting formal comments on the NII program later this
month.  To send comments directly to the administration, send email to
nii@ntia.doc.gov.

     -------------------------------------------------------------
  
[2] Clinton Issues FOIA Directive

Noting that "openness in government is essential to accountability,"
President Clinton issued a memorandum to all federal agencies on October
4 directing them to comply with "both the letter and spirit" of the
Freedom of Information Act (FOIA).  Clinton noted that the FOIA "is a
vital part of the participatory system of government" and stated that "I
am committed to enhancing its effectiveness in my Administration."  The
President also urged federal agencies "to enhance public access through
the use of electronic information systems."

The Clinton memorandum is a marked departure from directives issued
during the Reagan and Bush Administrations, when most official
pronouncements on FOIA tended to discourage agency disclosures.

Attorney General Janet Reno simultaneously rescinded the Justice
Department's 1981 guidelines for the defense of federal agencies in FOIA
litigation.  Under those guidelines, issued in the early months of the
Reagan administration, the Department defended agency decisions to
withhold information if there was merely a "substantial legal basis" for
the withholding.  Under the new Reno guidelines, the Department will
only defend FOIA actions in which agencies can demonstrate that
disclosure would result in some specific harm.  Under the new policy,
"Where an item of information might technically or arguably fall within
an exemption, it ought not to be withheld from a FOIA requester unless
it need be."  The Attorney General directed that all pending FOIA cases
be reviewed to determine compliance with the new policy and also called
for a government-wide review of processing "backlogs" that have resulted
in substantial delays in the disclosure of requested information.

CPSR has several FOIA cases pending in federal court and has long urged
that the federal information disclosure process be reformed to maximize
the disclosure of requested agency records. The NII initiative also
provide an opportunity to improve citizen access to government
information. A copy of the White House and Atty General's memos is
available at the CPSR Internet Library /cpsr/foia/clinton_foia_10_93.txt.
  
     -------------------------------------------------------------
  
[3] Health Care Reform and Privacy

The recently released President's Health Security Plan includes
important new provisions on privacy protection.  The plan recommends new
federal legislation based on a Code of Fair Information Practices.
Currently, there is no federal protection for medical records.

The new proposal also includes a provision for a national medical
identity card, which is described in the plan as "like ATM cards, the
health security card allows access to information about health coverage
through an integrated national network. The card itself contains a
minimal amount of information."

President Clinton was asked about the privacy implications of the
medical security card at a town hall meeting in Sacramento, CA on
October 4.  He replied that the card will be used to ensure that in an
emergency that a person could be identified and that it "will have the
same sort of protections that a Social Security card would..." He
recalled opposition to the past attempts to expand the use of the SSN
and noted that the card was only "for the purposes of establishing that
you belong to the health care system."

Another important aspect of the proposal is the identifying number. The
proposal calls for  the establishment of "a system of universal
identifiers for the health care system." The proposal notes that "The
unique identifier may be the Social Security Number or a newly created
number limited to the health care system...In either case, the national
privacy policy explicitly forbids the linking of health care and other
information through the identification number."   This will be
determined by the National Health Board.

In April 1992  CPSR sent a letter to Hillary Clinton with the
endorsement of over two dozen privacy and computer experts requesting
that  the SSN not be used as  the identifier.  The letter cited privacy,
security, and fraud problems and pointed out that other countries, such
as Canada, have created limited purpose identifiers for medical record
information.

Other Privacy Provisions

o The creation of mechanisms for effective enforcement including
significant penalties.

o Establishing a privacy framework based on the Code of Fair Information
Practices including a right to know about and approve the uses of the
data, assurance of no secret data systems, right to review and correct
data, assurances that the data is only collected for legitimate
purposes.

o Issue effective security standards and guidance for health care
information

o Establishing as Data Protection and Security Panel to set privacy and
security standards and monitor implementation of the standards, sponsor
of conduct research, studies and investigations, and developing of fair
consent forms.

The relevant privacy provisions of the health care plan are available at
the CPSR Internet Library /medical_privacy/
clinton_health_reform_plan.txt. A copy of the letter sent to Hillary
Clinton is also available as hillary_letter.txt
  
     -------------------------------------------------------------
  
[4] CPSR Panel on Health Care and Privacy

CPSR Annual Meeting - Sunday Evening - Special Session - Free to the
general public

7:30 - 9:30  Special Panel Discussion "Health Care Reform and the
National Information Infrastructure: Opportunities and Risks"

The White House Task Force on Health Care reform has called for the
development of community-based health data-management systems. A working
paper from the task force notes: "Workgroup has vision for a community
health information systems (CHIS) based on a computerized medical
record. The CHIS will link all key parties in the healthcare delivery
systems and service all their clinical and administrative requirements."

The task force has estimated that the following areas: 1. Medical
Electronic Data Interchange networking 2. Community Health Information
Networks 3. Outcomes Analysis and 4. Computerized Patient Records. offer
the near term potential (less than 5 years) to save 100 billion dollars
a year via the development of standards, administrative reform, and
federal leadership in using the existing networking infrastructure to
promote electronic medical commerce. However, with these opportunities
for improved efficiency and cost containment come risks - specifically
privacy and access.

The panel will include experts in medical information systems and
privacy advocates. Come and learn about this important area. Join in
this national discussion. Be part of the solution.
  
  Panelists:
  
       Richard Reuben, Executive Director, 
            Foundation for Healthcare Quality
       Lance Heineccius, Director of Policy,
            Washington Health Services Commission
       David Flaherty, Information and Privacy Commissioner, 
            British Columbia
       Irwin Goverman, CIO, Group Health Cooperative
  
This special event is free and open to the public. It will be held in
Kane Building room 210, University of Washington
  
       -------------------------------------------------------------
  
[5] CPSR Annual Meeting - October 16-17

        COMPUTER PROFESSIONALS FOR SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY
                        ANNUAL MEETING
                    October 16 - 17, 1993
         University of Washington, South Campus Center
                  Seattle, Washington, USA

        Envisioning the Future: A National Forum on the
    National Information Infrastructure and Community Access

The National Information Infrastructure (NII) is the proposed medium or
"electronic highway" that will connect schools, libraries, government
agencies, and citizens using state-of-the-art computer and
communications technology.  Media, computer, and telecommunications
companies are also acutely interested in the NII as it dramatically
increases their opportunity for delivery of communication, services, and
entertainment. CPSR is convening this meeting for both computer
professionals and the informed public to discuss the broad range of
choices facing society regarding the NII.

Saturday, October 16

Keynote Address - Bruce McConnell, Office of Management and Budget

           "Shaping National Information Infrastructure Policy"

Bruce McConnell, Chief of Information Policy at the Office of
Information and Regulatory Affairs in the Office of Management and
Budget (OMB), will present his views on the major NII issues now facing
the administration.  He has been with OMB since 1985 and became head of
Information Policy in 1992.  He now chairs the inter-agency task force
responsible for developing federal information policy for the
Information Infrastructure Task Force.

Other Panels:

                      "Public Access to Internetworks"

Public access to the Internet (and other major networks) is a critical
issue in any discussion about an "electronic highway".  Panelists
representing a wide variety of perspectives, including representatives
from the Pacific Northwest, will present their views.

                   "Municipal Information Infrastructure"

City and other government agencies are exploring possibilities for
developing municipal networks.  In this panel a city official as well as
a representative from the state regulatory agency and a representative
of commercial interests will offer their insights and interests.

                       "Networking in the Community"

Community networks exist and are being developed all over the U.S.
Panelists from various community networks will present their
perspectives on the state of community networking now and in the future.

             "Computers and Democracy - What's the Connection?"

How might computers facilitate the democratic process?  How might they
pervert it?  "Electronic Democracy" is currently in the public eye and
aspects of it will probably be tested soon.  What can be done to promote
wise uses of computers in this critical area?

+ Presentation of the 1993 Norbert Wiener Award to The Institute for
Global Communications (IGC)

+ Banquet Address and Interactive Event -  Kit Galloway, Electronic Cafe
International

Kit Galloway of Electronic Cafe International in Santa Monica,
California will present his innovative approach to electronic
communication using phone lines, slow-scan television, and other
technology.  Using videotapes and a live demonstration with CPSR
chapters in Los Angeles and other locations, Kit will discus how the
Electronic Cafe concept has been used in a variety of settings.
Electronic Cafe International has staged global events with poets,
children, and communities in France, Nicaragua, Japan, as well as a
variety of American cities.

Sunday, October 17th

The second day of the conference will feature a more interactive format
including several workshops, a discussion of CPSR's NII vision, and a
special - free and open to the public - panel discussion on "Privacy
Implications of Health Care Reform" Sunday evening.

      Gender Relations in Networking

      Information Policy: A Framework for Action
 
      Computer Professionals and Social Action
 
      Towards Participatory Design of Community Oriented Systems and
      Services

      CPSR NII Vision Document Discussion

	     "Health Care Reform and the National Information
	     Infrastructure: Opportunities and Risks"

      For more information, contact the National Office at
cpsr@cpsr.org, or Aki Namioka, Annual Meeting Chair, at aki@cpsr.org.

       -------------------------------------------------------------
  
[6] The CPSR Internet Library

Nearly 40 people who submitted comments to NIST have forwarded their
remarks to CPSR. These comments are now archived by last name in
/crypto/clipper/call-for-comments/ Submit your comments to
clipper@washofc.cpsr.org

Dr. Dorothy Denning and several law enforcement officials have prepared
a paper on the law enforcement perspective on wiretapping and procedures
need to obtain permission for conducting a wiretap.
/communications_privacy/wiretap/denning_wiretap_procedure.txt

The CPSR Internet Library is available via FTP/WAIS/Gopher from cpsr.org
/cpsr. Materials from Privacy International, the Taxpayers Assets
Project and the Cypherpunks are also archived. For more information,
contact: Al Whaley (al@sunnyside.com)
  
       -------------------------------------------------------------
  
[7] Upcoming Conferences and Events

"Universal Service: New Challenges and New Options in Tomorrow's Network
of Networks." Sponsored by the Benton Foundation & the Columbia
Institute for Tele-Information. Washington, DC October 15. Contact: Andy
Blau (ablau@cap.gwu.edu)

CPSR Annual Meeting, "Envisioning the Future: The National Information
Infrastructure and Local Access." Seattle, WA.  October 16-17, Contact:
Aki Namioka (aki@atc.boeing.com).

"International Symposium on Technology and Society '93." Washington DC.
October 22-23. Deadline for submission: February 28. Contact:
m16805@mwvm.mitre.org.

"Technology: Whose Cost?. . .Whose Benefits?" Sponsored by IEEE, George
Washington University, MITRE. Washington, DC. October 22-23. Contact:
wjkelly@mitre.org

"Cyberculture Houston 93." Houston, Tx. December 10-12,  Contact:
cyber@fisher.psych.uh.edu

"Computers, Freedom and Privacy 94." Chicago, Il. March 23-26. Sponsored
by ACM and The John Marshall Law School. Contact: George Trubow,
312-987-1445 (CFP94@jmls.edu).

DIAC-94 "Developing an Effective, Equitable, and Enlightened Information
Infrastructure." MIT Media Lab, Cambridge, MA. April 1994 (tentative).
Contact: Doug Schuler (douglas@grace.rt.cs.boeing.com).

5th Conference On Women Work And Computerization "Breaking Old
Boundaries: Building New Forms." UMIST, Manchester, UK. July 2-5.
Abstracts by 10/1/93. Contact: Andrew Clement (clement@vax.ox.ac.uk)

(Send calendar submissions to Alert@washofc.cpsr.org)

     ==============================================================
  
To subscribe to the Alert, send the message:

"subscribe cpsr <your name>" (without quotes or brackets)

to listserv@gwuvm.gwu.edu.  Back issues of the Alert are available at
the CPSR Internet Library FTP/WAIS/Gopher cpsr.org /cpsr/alert

Computer Professionals for Social Responsibility is a national,
non-partisan, public-interest organization dedicated to understanding
and directing the impact of computers on society. Founded in 1981, CPSR
has 2000 members from all over the world and 22 chapters across the
country. Our National Advisory Board includes a Nobel laureate and three
winners of the Turing Award, the highest honor in computer science.
Membership is open to everyone.

For more information, please contact: cpsr@cpsr.org
  
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        Palo Alto, CA  94301
  
  ------------------------ END CPSR Alert 2.03-----------------------
  
  







From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: an38793@anon.penet.fi
Date: Mon, 11 Oct 93 16:41:41 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Security through obscurity
Message-ID: <9310112341.AA18180@anon.penet.fi>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> You are not going to be able to keep your algorithm secret, period.
> Those who are determined enough will be able to dig it out of any
> programs or chips you use to implement your algorithm.  Security through
> obscurity is stupid because no matter how smart you may think you are
> in hiding your method, there is always someone smarter who will dig it 
> out and changing technology constantly lowers the barrier of how smart 
> people need to be to dig information out of old locks using new tools.
I agree with this 100%.

The interesting fact is, a lot of commercial programs rely on security
through obscurity. Often, anyone who takes the time to disassemble
the interesting routines, can crack the encryption.

Yes it is stupid. But, a lot of people and companies rely on 
"security through obscurity" to protect their applications/data. 

Part of this is due to export restrictions, but a large part is just
due to lack of awareness.

One of my favorite applications has embedded in its license
agreement:

"...nor shall the Licensee attempt to decrypt
any Passwords that may enable the Software's functionality..."

This is not a substitute for real security.
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From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: P.V.McMahon@rea0803.wins.icl.co.uk
Date: Mon, 11 Oct 93 16:26:23 PDT
To: Duncan Frissell <frissell@panix.com>
Subject: RE: Why X/Open in London?
In-Reply-To: <199310111947.AA04793@panix.com>
Message-ID: <"7381*/I=PV/S=McMahon/OU=rea0803/O=icl/PRMD=icl/ADMD=gold 400/C=GB/"@MHS>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain








Duncan Frissell writes:
>
> I noted that Novell was supposed, today, to assign its rights to Unix to 
> the X/Open consortium


>                       based in London.
> 
> You don't suppose that X/Open was founded in London so that future Unix 

X/Open is based in Reading, Berkshire (a short walk from my office). Urban
sprawl hasn't quite connected Reading and London yet.


> versions could integrate crypto without bothering with US export laws.  
> <G>

X/Open doesn't integrate UNIX implementations; it publishes specifications
for a Common Application Environment and defines branding schemes which
permit users to use an independent yardstick to measure the openness of
vendors' systems.

 
> Another blow to America's competitiveness.
> 

Apart from hinting that material considered to be munitions by US law may
actuallly be available and in use outside the US (through the presence of
interfaces such as crypt(), setkey(), and encrypt() in XPG4), I can't think
of any relevance of X/Open's work to the burdens which cryptographic export
controls may impose on US companies.

Note that similar export constraints as are enjoyed in the US are applied
by the national authorities of the UK, and other countries .



> Duncan Frissell
> 
> 
> 
> --- WinQwk 2.0b#0




-------------------------------------------------------
Piers McMahon                                   12OCT93
ICL
post:  Kings House, 33 Kings Road, Reading, RG1 3PX, UK
email: p.v.mcmahon@rea0803.wins.icl.co.uk
  OR   p.mcmahon@xopen.co.uk
phone: +44 734 586211 extension 3285
fax:   +44 734 855106
-------------------------------------------------------

                                      




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: jet@netcom.com (J. Eric Townsend)
Date: Mon, 11 Oct 93 17:36:24 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Breaking DES
In-Reply-To: <9310112259.AA19226@snark.lehman.com>
Message-ID: <9310120035.AA17275@netcom6.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


"Perry E. Metzger" writes:
 > Tell you what, Karl -- when you build the device that can store 2^56

I have 1/72nd of that storage capacity in the next room, using
off-the-shelf technology.  Also, 8GB RAM, and another 300-500GB of
'fast' storage local to the CPU.

(Cray C90, 1GW main memory, .5TB drive storage of various types, 9
tape silos)

Again, all off-the-shelf technology.  Tape robots are a few years old,
actually. :-)




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: jet@netcom.com (J. Eric Townsend)
Date: Mon, 11 Oct 93 17:46:24 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: whoops!
Message-ID: <9310120045.AA18250@netcom6.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



I just sent mail saying I had 1/72 of 2^56 bytes of storage.  I was
wrong, it seems I dropped 'a few' zeros.

In reality, there's 1/72057th or so next door.  That's a bit different
than 1/72.

Never mind,





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Date: Tue, 12 Oct 93 01:36:45 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: NSA Can Spend a Billion on a Computer
In-Reply-To: <9310120254.AA04001@netcom6.netcom.com>
Message-ID: <9310120836.AA22300@netcom5.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Doug Merritt wrote:

> 2^56 bytes equals 10^7 gigabytes. At roughly $1000 per gigabyte,
> that equals 10^10 bucks...10 billion dollars. Or say there's a quantity
> discount in orders totalling a million units, and you get the whole
> capacity for 1 billion dollars.
> 
> Well, that's a bit steep for me, but there's no question but that the
> NSA could afford it. Still, what do you say I wait a few years until it

Probably. But I suspect we'd know it had been built.

Norm Harrdy described for us his experiences with the "Harvest"
machine at NSA in the early 60s. (Bamford also describes this in some
detail...worth taking a quick look at, I think.)

Harvest was built by IBM as a special-purpose add-on, or auxiliary
processor I suppose, to the IBM "Stretch," then the fastest computer
in the world.

Harvest was quite impressive for its time, as Norm explained it to us.
A 300 nanonsecond cycle time, with a 64-bit word. Lots of core memory,
special tractor tape drives to load in data.

The Harvest machine was particularly good at brute force breaking of
Hagelin-type rotor machines, the "DES of its day" (the NSA had
encouraged foreign governments to buy surplus U.S. rotor machines,
assuring them that changing to their own rotor settings would make
them good as new...this did not, and NSA's knowledge of the machine
designs gave them a headstart on cracking the ciphers).

So, I would imagine that the effort put into Harvest in 1962, and
later into the financing of both Cray Research (confirmed) and
Thinking Machines (suspected by many), would possibly be put into the
breaking of modern ciphers.

Cost for Stretch (in 1962 dollars): $13 million.
Cost for Harvest (in 1962 dollars): $13 million.
Cost for special tape drives:   $5 million

Total Cost (in 1962 dollars): approximately $30 million.
Total Cost (in 1993 dollars): approximately $100-200 million,
depending on what inflation index one uses.

Would NSA spend $200 million on cipher-busting machines?

Well, modern spy satellites often cost upwards of a bilion apiece, so
this seems possible.

Note that NSA contracted with National Semiconductor several years
back to have a dedicated wafer fab in a secure area of Fort Meade, to
supply custom chips. 

But could such a project escape notice--and publicity--outside the
NSA? CPU desiginers would have to be brought it, and no doubt much of
the work would be contracted out.

Any rumors floating around?

--Tim May

-- 
..........................................................................
Timothy C. May         | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,  
tcmay@netcom.com       | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
408-688-5409           | knowledge, reputations, information markets, 
W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA  | black markets, collapse of governments.
Higher Power: 2^756839 | Public Key: PGP and MailSafe available.
Note: I put time and money into writing this posting. I hope you enjoy it.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: jet@netcom.com (J. Eric Townsend)
Date: Mon, 11 Oct 93 19:39:50 PDT
To: pmetzger@lehman.com
Subject: Re: Breaking DES
In-Reply-To: <9310120225.AA19589@snark.lehman.com>
Message-ID: <9310120238.AA25432@netcom4.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


"Perry E. Metzger" writes:
 > My bogometer just triggered, so I decided to check your math.

As I said, I was off by a few orders of magnitude or so.
 > 
 > > (Cray C90, 1GW main memory, .5TB drive storage of various types, 9
 > > tape silos)
 > Gee, half a terrabyte. Thats 16,000 times less than you claimed.

The .5TB is *local* storage.  The 9 tape silos hold a couple of
terabytes, uncompressed.

 > what you claimed, and its over a million times less storage than you
 > would need, in *RAM*, for the proposed task.

Wouldn't need to be in RAM.  Would interleave the search in some banks
with loads of data into other banks.  Stream the damn thing. 






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Drunkfux <drunkfux@cypher.com>
Date: Tue, 12 Oct 93 01:16:25 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: HoHoCon '93 : Official Announcement
Message-ID: <9310120308.aa09620@zero.cypher.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text




[Official Announcement / Call For Participation - October 11, 1993]
(Distribute Freely)



  dFx, Phrack Magazine and cDc - Cult Of The Dead Cow proudly present :


                            The Fourth Annual


                              H O H O C O N


                       "Cliff Stoll My K0DEZ!@$#!"


Who:   All Hackers, Journalists, Security Personnel, Federal Agents,
       Lawyers, Authors, Cypherpunks, Virtual Realists, Modem Geeks,
       Telco Employees, and Other Interested Parties.


Where:        Austin North Hilton & Towers and Super 8 Motel
                        6000 Middle Fiskville Road
                           Austin, Texas  78752
                                  U.S.A.
                 Hilton : (800) 347-0330 / (512) 451-5757
                 Super 8: (800) 800-8000 / (512) 467-8163


When:      Friday December 17 through Sunday December 19, 1993



                             What is HoHoCon?
                             ----------------

HoHoCon is the largest annual gathering of those in, related to, or
wishing to know more about the computer underground. Attendees generally
include some of the most notable members of the "hacking" and "telecom"
community, journalists, authors, security professionals, lawyers, and a
host of others. Previous speakers include John Draper (Cap'n Crunch), Ray
Kaplan, Chris Goggans (Erik Bloodaxe), Bruce Sterling, and many more. The
conference is also one of the very few that is completely open to the
public and we encourage anyone who is interested to attend.


                            Hotel Information
                            -----------------

The Austin North Hilton recently split its complex into two seperate
hotels; the Hilton and the newly added Super 8. HoHoCon guests have the
choice of staying in either hotel. Group rates are as followed :

Super 8: Single - $46.50, Double - $49.50, Triple - $52.50, Quad - $55.50
Hilton : Single - $69.00, Double - $79.00, Triple - $89.00, Quad - $99.00

Once again, the hotel has set aside a block of rooms for the conference
and we recommend making your reservations as early as possible to
guarantee a room within the block, if not to just guarantee a room period.
Rooms for the handicapped are available upon request. To make your
reservations, call the the number listed above that corresponds with where
you are and where you want to stay and make sure you tell them you are
with the HoHoCon conference or else you'll end up throwing more money
away. The hotel accepts American Express, Visa, Master Card, Discover,
Diner's Club, and Carte Blanche credit cards.

Check-in is 3:00 p.m. and check-out is 12:00 noon. Earlier check-in is
available if there are unoccupied rooms available. Please note that in
order for the hotel to hold a room past 6:00 p.m. on the date of arrival,
the individual reservation must be secured by a deposit or guaranteed
with one of the credit cards listed above. Also, any cancellations of
guaranteed reservations must be made prior to 6:00 p.m. on the date of
arrival. You will be responsible for full payment of any guaranteed
reservations which are not cancelled by this time.

The hotel provides transportaton to and from the airport and will give
you full information when you make your reservations.


                                Directions
                                ----------

For those of you who will be driving to the conference, the following
is a list of directions provided by the hotel (so, if they're wrong,
don't blame me): 

Dallas : Take IH 35 south to exit 238-B, the Houston exit. At the first
         stop light, turn right on to 2222. Turn off of 2222 onto Clayton
         Lane (by the Greyhound Station). At the stop sign, turn right
         onto Middle Fiskville, the hotel is on the left.

San Antonio : Take IH 35 north to exit 238-B, the Houston exit. At the
              second stop light, turn left onto 2222. Turn off 2222 onto
              Clayton Lane (by the Greyhoud Station). At the stop sign,
              turn right onto Middle Fiskville, the hotel is on the left.

Houston (on 290) : Take 290 west into Austin. Exit off of 290 at the IH35
                   exit (do not get on 35). Stay on the access road
                   heading west, you will pass two stop lights. Turn off
                   the access road onto Clayton Lane (by the Greyhound
                   Station). At the stop sign, turn right onto Middle
                   Fiskville, the hotel is on the left.

Houston (on 71) : Take 71 west into Austin. Exit onto 183 north. Take
                  183 north to 290 west. Take 290 west to the IH 35 exit.
                  Exit off of 290 at the IH 35 exit (do not get on 35).
                  Stay on the access road heading west, you will pass two
                  stop lights. Turn off the access road onto Clayton Lane
                  (by the Greyhound Stattion). At the stop sign, turn
                  right onto Middle Fiskville, the hotel in on the left.

Airport : Exit the airport parking lot and turn right onto Manor Road.
          Take Manor Road to Airport Boulevard and turn right. Take
          Airport Boulevard to IH 35 north. Take IH 35 to exit 238-B. At
          the second stop light, turn left onto 2222. Turn off of 2222
          onto Clayton Lane (by the Greyhound Station). At the stop sign,
          turn right onto Middle Fiskville, the hotel is on the left.

Call the hotel if these directions aren't complete enough or if you need
additional information.


                            Conference Details
                            __________________

HoHoCon will last 3 days, with the actual conference being held on
Saturday, December 18 starting at 11:00 a.m. and continuing until 5 p.m.
or earlier depending on the number of speakers. Although a few speakers
have confirmed their attendance, we are still in the planning stages and
will wait until the next update to release a speaking schedule. We welcome
any speaker or topic recommendations you might have (except for, say, "Why
I Luv Baked Potatos On A Stik!"), or, if you would like to speak yourself,
please contact us as soon as possible and let us know who you are, who you
represent (if anyone), the topic you wish to speak on, a rough estimate of
how long you will need, and whether or not you will be needing any
audio-visual aids.

We would like to have people bring interesting items and videos again this
year. If you have anything you think people would enjoy having the chance
to see, please let us know ahead of time, and tell us if you will need any
help getting it to the conference. If all else fails, just bring it to the
con and give it to us when you arrive. Any organization or individual that
wants to bring flyers to distribute during the conference may do so. You
may also send your flyers to us ahead of time if you can not make it to
the conference and we will distribute them for you. Left over flyers are
included with information packets and orders that we send out, so if you
want to send extras, go ahead.


                                   Cost
                                   ----

Unlike smaller, less informative conferences, we do not ask you to shell
out hundreds of dollars just to get in the door, nor do we take your money
and then make you sleep in a tent. We are maintaining the motto of "give
$5 if you can", but due to the incredibly high conference room rate this
year, we may step up to "$5 minimum required donation" or "give us $5 or
we'll smash your head in". Five dollars is an outrageously low price
compared to the suit infested industry conferences or even the new "Cons
are k00l and trendy, I gotta do one too!" conferences that are charging
up to $50 for admission alone.

To encourage people to donate, we will once again be having our wonderless
"Raffle For The Elite" during the conference. We will issue a prize list
in a future update, but we can guarantee that this year there will be a
lot more (and better) prizes than last year, including a full system (and,
no, it's not a c64 or 286). Anyone who wishes to donate worthwhile items
to the raffle, please let us know ahead of time, or if it's a last minute
aquirement, just bring it to the conference.


                           Miscellaneous Notes
                           -------------------

To save myself some time by mailing responses to a lot of the same
questions I expect to get, I'll answer a few of them here.

Although I have not talked to him myself yet, Steve Ryan has told me that
Bruce Sterling will indeed be in attendance and may say a few words.

As far as I know, there will not be any visitors from any other planets
at the conference. Scot Chasin is still on Earth and will be making an
appearance.

Video cameras will *not* be allowed inside the conference room without
prior consent due to previous agreements made with speakers who do not
wish for certain parts of their speech to be rebroadcast. Still cameras
and Etch-A-Sketch's are fine and tape recorders are too easily hidden
for us to be able to control.

Videos and T-Shirts from last year's conference are still available, and
will also be on hand during the conference. We do not handle the LoD World
Tour shirts, but I can tell you that that the old ones are gone and a
*new* LoD shirt will be unveiled at the conference. The HoHoCon shirts are
$15 plus $3 shipping ($4.00 for two shirts). At this time, they only come
in extra large. We may add additional sizes if there is a demand for them.
The front of the shirt has the following in a white strip across the
chest:

                               I LOVE FEDS

      (Where LOVE = a red heart, very similar to the I LOVE NY logo)


                          And this on the back:

                            dFx & cDc Present

                               HOHOCON '92

                              December 18-20
                              Allen Park Inn
                              Houston, Texas


   There is another version of the shirt available with the following:

                               I LOVE WAREZ


The video includes footage from all three days, is six hours long and
costs $18 plus $3 shipping ($4.00 if purchasing another item also). Please
note that if you are purchasing multiple items, you only need to pay one
shipping charge of $4.00, not a charge for each item. If you wish to send
an order in now, make all checks or money orders payable to O.I.S.,
include your phone number and mail it to the street address listed below.
Allow a few weeks for arrival.

There will be new HoHoCon '93 shirts available at the conference and a
video of the festivities will be out early next year.


                              Correspondence
                              --------------

If anyone requires any additional information, needs to ask any questions,
wants to RSVP, wants to order anything, or would like to be added to the
mailing list to receive the HoHoCon updates, you may mail us at:


                            hohocon@cypher.com
                           drunkfux@cypher.com
                              cDc@cypher.com
                          drunkfux@crimelab.com
                           dfx@nuchat.sccsi.com
                         drunkfux@5285 (WWIV Net)

                           or via sluggo mail at:

                                 HoHoCon
                            1310 Tulane, Box 2
                              Houston, Texas
                                77008-4106


We also have a VMB which includes all the conference information and is
probably the fastest way to get updated reports. The number is:

                               713-867-9544

You can download any of the conference announcements and related
materials by calling Metalland Southwest at 713-468-5802, which is the
offical HoHoCon BBS. The board is up 24 hours a day and all baud rates
are supported.

Those of you with net access can ftp to cypher.com and find all the
HoHoCon information available in /pub/hohocon. The .gifs from previous
cons are *not* currently online.

Conference information and updates will most likely also be found in most
computer underground related publications and mailing lists, including
CuD, CSP, Mondo 2000, 2600, Phrack, TUC, phn0rd, cypherpunks, etc. They
should also appear in a number of newsgroups including comp.dcom.telecom,
alt.security, comp.org.eff.talk, and sci.crypt. We completely encourage
people to use, reprint, and distribute any information in this file.
                                                                         

     Same stupid ending statement from last year to make us look good
     ----------------------------------------------------------------

HoHoCon '93 will be a priceless learning experience for professionals and
gives journalists a chance to gather information and ideas direct from the
source. It is also one of the very few times when all the members of the
computer underground can come together for a realistic purpose. We urge
people not to miss out on an event of this caliber, which doesn't happen
very often. If you've ever wanted to meet some of the most famous people
from the hacking community, this may be your one and only chance. Don't
wait to read about it in all the magazines and then wish you had been
there, make your plans to attend now! Be a part of what we hope to be our
largest and greatest conference ever.





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: an12070@anon.penet.fi (S. Boxx)
Date: Mon, 11 Oct 93 22:16:25 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: codehead flames
Message-ID: <9310120512.AA20789@anon.penet.fi>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



cypherpunks. there seems to be some tension on this list lately. 
in particular some newbies are getting flamed for not being "codeheads".
please send me any flames on the subject you have received in email. 
i plan to try to do something that will help resolve the tension.

-------------------------------------------------------------------------
To find out more about the anon service, send mail to help@anon.penet.fi.
Due to the double-blind, any mail replies to this message will be anonymized,
and an anonymous id will be allocated automatically. You have been warned.
Please report any problems, inappropriate use etc. to admin@anon.penet.fi.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: an24519@anon.penet.fi
Date: Mon, 11 Oct 93 22:49:50 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: An idea.
Message-ID: <9310120547.AA26215@anon.penet.fi>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


     With the rise in lucrative computer thefts perpetrated by TLE's, I foresee
the day when undercover investigations (aka entrapment) will be much more common
place.  In an effort to enable people to know whom they are communicating with
electronically, (without ever meeting them face-to-face) I suggest that it might
be a good idea for people to release and sign a short bio on themselves.  These
could be validated by trusted third-parties and traded like a commodity.  We of
course, wouldn't incriminate ourselves, just state who we are, what we do for
a living, and what our interests are.  This would open up one more avenue for
communications security, and a good use for digital-cash.  Any comments?  
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
To find out more about the anon service, send mail to help@anon.penet.fi.
Due to the double-blind, any mail replies to this message will be anonymized,
and an anonymous id will be allocated automatically. You have been warned.
Please report any problems, inappropriate use etc. to admin@anon.penet.fi.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Michael E. Marotta" <MERCURY@lcc.edu>
Date: Tue, 12 Oct 93 05:29:54 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Summa Pro Credit Union
Message-ID: <624CCE1380A01E6B@sleepy.egr.msu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Tangential to the "Credit Union" Question
by Michael E. Marotta
   mercury@well.sf.ca.us
 
Most of this "Bank of the Internet" stuff blew past me, but I was 
stopped short by Perry Metzger's assertion that credit unions are 
not innovative. 
 
Here in Michigan, we have World Computer Corporation, a Data 
General VAR.  They serve the largest and smallest credit unions.  
I have written about them twice for FOCUS, a DG user magazine.  
The first time, I spent 30 hours onsite with customer service.  
In fact, our household does most of our financials through a 
credit union, having been members of one since 1985. 
 
In truth credit unions are light years ahead of banks in 
innovation.  For instance, we have long enjoyed voice-response 
and touchtone dial-in account services.  I never use my 
statement. I dial in and reconcile.  Banks are only now coming 
online.
 
Banks are IBM mainframe environments.  Credit Unions go with DG, 
NCR, Digital, anyone who can give them an edge.  Banks argue 
about "outsourcing."  CUs have been doing this all along.  Most 
CUs don't even have data processing departments any more than 
they plow their own drive ways.  You contract services that are 
not in your line of business.  Credit Unions borrow and lend 
money.  Data processing can be done inhouse and often is, but no 
one's brass plate gets polished as a result.  
 
CUs are small.  They don't have (other people's) money to throw
around. Credit Unions are member-owned.  They can't by law lend 
money they don't have. They must by law have a defined (sometimes 
CLOSELY defined) market which restricts them.  As a result of all 
of this, they look to _technology_ for wins.
 
All the nay-saying here has come from the pudknockers while those 
who do, did.
 
Good luck. You deserve it.
 
 




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: geoffw@nexsys.net (Geoff White)
Date: Tue, 12 Oct 93 07:56:28 PDT
To: tcmay@netcom.com
Subject: Re: NSA Can Spend a Billion on a Computer
Message-ID: <9310121452.AA01668@nexsys.nexsys.net>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> 
> But could such a project escape notice--and publicity--outside the
> NSA? CPU desiginers would have to be brought it, and no doubt much of
> the work would be contracted out.
> 
> Any rumors floating around?
> 
Note: I doubt that they will have to "bring in" CPU designers.
Back when I was an EE undergrad in Massachusetts, I had a part-time
job at a small outfit that did custom VLSI design work, the guy who
ran the mass. office was the best VLSI designer that I had ever seen,
he eventually became the chief enginneer on a couple of major CPU
projects for a very large well know computer company (not IBM) headquarted
in eastern massaachusetts.  He was also the mentor to some of the people
who made RISC work at berkeley.  He learned his trade at the NSA.  He told me
so himself.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Hastings@courier8.aero.org
Date: Tue, 12 Oct 93 08:19:53 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Spread Spectrum Decoys
Message-ID: <00086F64.MAI*Hastings@courier8.aero.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Part of the "hunt and destroy vs. cost to deploy" equation thread about
spread spectrum networks was forwarded to me. How about putting several
cheap noise generators on the air as decoys? This might tip the cost
balance in favor of the network.
 
The Julieboard Direct Digital Synthesizer board, which only needs numbers
fed to it from a PC printer port or microcontroller output, can be bought
wired and tested for $125. Production in volume should be cheaper. So who
is hunting down transmitters and killing them, and risking a confrontation
with an armed opponent, for this paltry sum?
 
Kent - <hastings@courier8.aero.org>




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "mycal (voices through your head @ 88.1MHz)" <mike@NetAcsys.com>
Date: Tue, 12 Oct 93 09:31:48 PDT
To: "Duncan Frissell" <frissell@panix.com>
Subject: Re: Why X/Open in London?
Message-ID: <2cbadb11.acsys@NetAcsys.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


On Mon, 11 Oct 1993 15:47:03 -0400, "Duncan Frissell" <frissell@panix.com> wrote:
> You don't suppose that X/Open was founded in London so that future Unix 
> versions could integrate crypto without bothering with US export laws.  
> <G>
> 
> Another blow to America's competitiveness.
> 

I know several small companies from canada that had offices in the us that
moved them back to canada so they wouldn't be bothered by the US export
laws since they use RSA in there product.

The US is blowing it.

mycal





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: doug@netcom.com (Doug Merritt)
Date: Tue, 12 Oct 93 09:39:54 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Breaking DES
In-Reply-To: <pmetzger@lehman.com>
Message-ID: <9310121637.AA21284@netcom6.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> pmetzger@lehman.com said:
>Doug Merritt says:
>> 2^56 bytes equals 10^7 gigabytes.
>
>First off, you are forgetting a factor of eight.

No, I'm not. I *am* assuming disk, obviously, since I quoted $1000 per
gigabyte, which is disk price range, not RAM.

> and if you use disk storage your whole device is going
>to run far, far, far slower.

Untrue. The disks will be used in a predictably serial fashion, and therefore
read-ahead can be arranged such that everything is in RAM by the time
the algorithm is ready to use it, so the whole thing runs at RAM speeds.

>however, and have to factor in the cost of the rest of the equipment,
>like power supplies, enclosures, controller cards, computers to run
>the whole thing, I'd say we are talking a trillion dollars, give or
>take a factor of 20%.

It's true I didn't factor in the cost of the systems, but that doesn't
give more than a factor of 2 to 5 in cost (depending on assumptions about
the precise kind of pc clone used), where you seem to have come up
with a factor of 100.

>> Or say there's a quantity discount in orders totalling a million
>> units,
>
>Say that my aunt was a Greyhound Bus if you like. You're dreaming, bub.

Skip the sarcasm and pick a different quantity discount. If you don't
like my 90% discount for quantity 1 million disk drives, pick another
one. There is always some discount for quantity, and this is just a back
of the envelope estimate, so I don't care much what you pick. 0% discount
leaves the estimate in the region of $10 billion...that's still not
inconceivable, merely expensive.

That was my only point, that this *could* be done, and I've proven that,
despite your misunderstandings.
	Doug




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Perry E. Metzger" <pmetzger@lehman.com>
Date: Tue, 12 Oct 93 08:21:29 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Summa Pro Credit Union
In-Reply-To: <624CCE1380A01E6B@sleepy.egr.msu.edu>
Message-ID: <9310121520.AA25245@snark.lehman.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



"Michael E. Marotta" says:
> In truth credit unions are light years ahead of banks in 
> innovation.  For instance, we have long enjoyed voice-response 
> and touchtone dial-in account services.  I never use my 
> statement. I dial in and reconcile.  Banks are only now coming 
> online.

Chem Bank has offered this in New York for at least five years and
possibly longer.  Systems like this are commercially available. I don't
think its an "innovation".  Citibank offered banking by modem
("Pronto") about nine years ago. None of this stuff is new or
thrilling, and it was all pioneered by the big New York banks.

Anyway, I stand by my general statement, but it really wasn't that
important. Lets get off the topic.

Perry




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Date: Tue, 12 Oct 93 11:21:29 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Meteor-bounce Communications
In-Reply-To: <9310121421.AA25625@lux.latrobe.edu.au>
Message-ID: <9310121821.AA02456@netcom5.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Dwayne asks about meteor-bounce communications:

> >technique extends the idea of bouncing radio waves off the ionosphere (for
> >distance), to bouncing off the atmospheric trails of micro meteors. 
> 
> Are these particularly common? Or only when there are meteor showers...

The micro-meteors are frequently showering the earth...I seem to
recall most systems having to wait on the order of tens of seconds for
a suitable trail to appear (and then only for fractions of a second).

The transmitters have to be "opportunistic," waiting for a suitable
ionization trail and then blasting away for the few hundred
milliseconds the trail is active.

I think trucks are big users of this system, that is, radio
communication with home bases. The data rates don't have to be high,
and the sporadic, opportunistic nature is OK.

(The same would apply to Net-type communications, of a personal sort,
but not the backbone links, of course.)

Qualcomm builds truck systems that use other techniques, so perhaps
Phil can comment on the current status of meteor-bounce comm systems.

--Tim May


-- 
..........................................................................
Timothy C. May         | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,  
tcmay@netcom.com       | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
408-688-5409           | knowledge, reputations, information markets, 
W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA  | black markets, collapse of governments.
Higher Power: 2^756839 | Public Key: PGP and MailSafe available.
Note: I put time and money into writing this posting. I hope you enjoy it.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: swc@uc1.ucsu.edu (Stuart W. Card)
Date: Tue, 12 Oct 93 08:41:28 PDT
To: msattler@netcom.com
Subject: Re: The Bank of the Internet!? (fwd)
Message-ID: <9310121543.AA11365@uc1.ucsu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Douglas Barnes writes --

> There is nothing, however, to prevent multiple CU's from being created

IMHO, this is part of the answer to Perry's concerns regarding the
difficulty of getting it right.  Multiple digital CU's and other
similar projects will try different approaches; eventually creativity
and natural selection will evolve a usable system through market forces.
Although I have not had Perry's experience with this sort of thing,
I tend to agree with him that the magic will be in the details, and
mostly in the NON-technical details, making this an EXTREMELY difficult
project.  But lay on! I applaud your daring, and wish you success, and
recognize that even if you fail, you will have
contributed much in the process.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Stuart W. Card, Consultant, Card & Associates -- Research & Development
Box 153 RR 1 Newport Rd Utica NY 13502         315-735-1717 / FAX -8469
swc@uc1.ucsu.edu or cards@top.cis.syr.edu           "Who is John Galt?"




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: cman@IO.COM (Douglas Barnes)
Date: Tue, 12 Oct 93 09:56:29 PDT
To: barrett@daisy.ee.und.ac.za (Alan Barrett)
Subject: What is a Credit Union?
In-Reply-To: <Pine.3.03.9310120822.A19995-9100000@daisy.ee.und.ac.za>
Message-ID: <9310121650.AA13076@illuminati.IO.COM>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



I received this very good question from one of the list readers, and
thought it might be of some interest to those following the Digital
Credit Union discussion:

> 
> Doug,
> 
> Could you tell me what a Credit Union *is*?  I don't know enough about
> USAan culture.

Actually, they started out in Germany, where I believe they still exist.
They are one of the earliest forms of institutionalized cooperation, one
of the founding pillars of the cooperative movement of the 19th c.

Basically, they were a reaction to the big landowners and manufacturers
controlling all the financial institutions; they have their roots in
somewhat informal 'lending societies' which were groups of folks who would,
rather than put their money in banks, pool it and lend it to members of
their group. (A practice still common in Asia; even my students at various
banks there engaged in this practice, and in fact were quite discursive on
how they operated.)

Nowadays Credit Unions are sanctioned by the government; however they still 
retain many of their desirable features. They can be created with as few as
300 members, they (legally) require only $1,000 starting capital, they are 
democractically controlled by their members, they are essentially non-
competitive (old ones are often glad to help a new one get started), and they
already operate as a national network to combine buying power for many
third-party transaction processing services.

Generally, Credit Unions are able to provide credit at rates lower than
banks, and have generally had a much more customer-focused approach than
traditional banks, although many large banks are catching on to this and
have maintained parity on some of the technical innovations; it's hard 
though to duplicate the lending ecnonomies and general coziness of a bank 
that is owned by its members, all of whom either know each other or share 
a common bond.

Also, to be a federally sanctioned CU, you have to have deposit insurance; 
the most common provider of CU insurance is the National Credit Union 
Asssociation, which also devotes a large part of its resources to assisting
new or troubled Credit Unions. So, if for some odd reason I forget 
round fractional cents in transactions, I can pick up the phone and ask.

Doug




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Robert J. Woodhead" <trebor@foretune.co.jp>
Date: Mon, 11 Oct 93 19:56:25 PDT
To: nobody@rosebud.ee.uh.edu
Subject: Re: RSA Security
In-Reply-To: <9310111927.AA16653@toad.com>
Message-ID: <9310120254.AA25692@dink.foretune.co.jp>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


You write:

>I would probably go to the government or some company (quietly)
>and say to them: "For X dollars each, I will break RSA keys for you."

You are very naive.  Your secret would be very valuable, and there
would be great incentive for an unscrupulous customer to get the
secret from you.

Put yourself in the position of DIRNSA.  He is most likely an honorable
person who wouldn't think of torturing the information out of you (and
I'm not just saying that because the NSA is most likely reading this
list -- most people in government are honorable).  However, he has a
problem:

1) Secrets leak - and sooner or later, someone who would stoop to nasty
methods will find out about you.

2) He is responsible for protecting the country against certain threats.
You are, in a sense, a threat -- because you might unintentionally do
something really stupid with your knowledge.

He must now balance your rights in our society vs. his responsibility
to protect it.  It is a difficult situation.  I think the best you
could hope for is to sell the secret to them and be made a job offer
you can't refuse.

If you figure out a cheap way to factor, I would advise you to publish
it as widely as possible, most likely via multiple postings to multiple
newsgroups on the net.  As people are going to be very interested in
your identity, I suggest you do it anonymously.  VERY anonymously.

Spookily yours,
Robert "reads too many spy novels" Woodhead





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: swc@uc1.ucsu.edu (Stuart W. Card)
Date: Tue, 12 Oct 93 09:29:53 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: transmission facilities
Message-ID: <9310121633.AA11635@uc1.ucsu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Perhaps I am stating the obvious, but...

There has been a fair amount of discussion regarding setting up our
own networks of various kinds so that we don't have to live within
the strictures imposed upon us by providers (and regulators) of
'conventional' WAN's and financial networks.  This is good.  However,
thinking that this is a final solution is a delusion.  We are too few
in number; they COULD shut us down if they wanted to badly enough.

To become 'ineradicable', we must proliferate our approaches:
use LOTS of different physical plants and protocols, etc., with
numerous interrconnecting gateways.  That way, taking down a single
physical network, protocol, encryption algorithm or business strategy
does not eradicate the underground internet.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Stuart W. Card, Consultant, Card & Associates -- Research & Development
Box 153 RR 1 Newport Rd Utica NY 13502         315-735-1717 / FAX -8469
swc@uc1.ucsu.edu or cards@top.cis.syr.edu           "Who is John Galt?"




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Perry E. Metzger" <pmetzger@lehman.com>
Date: Tue, 12 Oct 93 09:41:49 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Why X/Open in London?
In-Reply-To: <2cbadb11.acsys@NetAcsys.com>
Message-ID: <9310121641.AA25367@snark.lehman.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



"mycal (voices through your head @ 88.1MHz)" says:
> > Another blow to America's competitiveness.
> 
> I know several small companies from canada that had offices in the us that
> moved them back to canada so they wouldn't be bothered by the US export
> laws since they use RSA in there product.

The free trade pact and COCOM regs mean that Canada is as restrictive
as the U.S.  This makes your story hard to swallow.

Perry




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: blaster@rd.relcom.msk.su (Victor A. Borisov)
Date: Tue, 12 Oct 93 02:59:54 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: RE: Breaking DES
Message-ID: <AAqydkiSCE@rd.relcom.msk.su>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>   The other reason is that it was initially feared that DES was a group.
>   That is, encryption with k1 and k2 might be equivalent to single encryption
>   with some unknown (to you and me) key k3.  But a cryptanalyst or a brute-
>   force cracker would neither know nor care that you double-encrypted.
>
>   It has now been proved that DES is not a group.  What isn't clear to me
>   is whether it's ``mostly closed'', though I suspect not.
It can be right, but we can use some intermidiant operation. For example:
DES(randomHeader+DES(zip(DES (text, k1)), k2), k3)

        DES (text, k) - encryption text "text" by key k;
        randomHeader - some good random text;
        zip - some archiver.
--- 
Victor A. Borisov aka blaster;	Relcom R&D;
Email: blaster@rd.relcom.msk.su;
Phone: +7(095)-943-4735; +7(095)-198-9510;
	=== Don`t panic! ===




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Perry E. Metzger" <pmetzger@lehman.com>
Date: Tue, 12 Oct 93 10:21:49 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Breaking DES
In-Reply-To: <9310121637.AA21284@netcom6.netcom.com>
Message-ID: <9310121721.AA25429@snark.lehman.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Doug Merritt says:
> > pmetzger@lehman.com said:
> >Doug Merritt says:
> >> 2^56 bytes equals 10^7 gigabytes.
> >
> >First off, you are forgetting a factor of eight.
> 
> No, I'm not.

Look, I'll repeat the calculation again for anyone who cares to see
it, ok?

(2^56)*8 = 576,460,752,303,423,488

(2^56)*8*1000/(10^9) = 576,460,752,303

Assuming your very own figure of $1000 per gigabyte, the total comes
to $576 BILLION dollars, just for disk storage, without anything else.
You can scream your head off and the calculations still will come out
the same way.

> > and if you use disk storage your whole device is going
> >to run far, far, far slower.
> 
> Untrue. The disks will be used in a predictably serial fashion,

Lets think for a moment, shall we? You are encrypting every possible
block with DES, which results in lots of random blocks. You really
want to search through the lot of them serially without any indexing
whatsoever? Seems like you haven't thought this out.

Oh, now I just realized -- you are going to have to store each source
block with each output block. That means that even if you don't do any
indexing, you are going to need twice the disk space I just mentioned,
or over $1 TRILLION in disk for a very slow DES cracker.

Sorry, but you lose.

> and therefore
> read-ahead can be arranged such that everything is in RAM by the time
> the algorithm is ready to use it, so the whole thing runs at RAM speeds.

Never designed a disk system, have you? Sorry, but you can't actually
read a disk as fast as you can read RAM. Caching only works if you
have frequently accessed blocks -- if you are reading a whole disk you
can't go faster than the disk transfer rate no matter how many gods
you pray to. Your technical credibility is rapidly plunging.

> >however, and have to factor in the cost of the rest of the equipment,
> >like power supplies, enclosures, controller cards, computers to run
> >the whole thing, I'd say we are talking a trillion dollars, give or
> >take a factor of 20%.
> 
> It's true I didn't factor in the cost of the systems, but that doesn't
> give more than a factor of 2 to 5 in cost (depending on assumptions about
> the precise kind of pc clone used), where you seem to have come up
> with a factor of 100.

Guess you can't read my calculations, can you?

And I was off by a factor of two as well, which I just discovered. My
current estimate for real cost is about 1.5 Trillion, which is over
the national federal budget.

> >> Or say there's a quantity discount in orders totalling a million
> >> units,
> >
> >Say that my aunt was a Greyhound Bus if you like. You're dreaming, bub.
> 
> Skip the sarcasm and pick a different quantity discount. If you don't
> like my 90% discount for quantity 1 million disk drives, pick another
> one.

Sort of like saying "if you don't like the laws of physics, pick
different laws"? 

Perry




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Duncan Frissell <frissell@panix.com>
Date: Tue, 12 Oct 93 10:29:53 PDT
To: CYPHERPUNKS@toad.com
Subject: Health Reform Smart Cards
Message-ID: <199310121728.AA03421@panix.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


L.>"The Clinton Administration proposal would put smart cards in the
L.>hands of every US citizen and some legal aliens that would
L.>provide billing reference identification as well as carry up to
L.>about 30 pages of medical data about the individual.

"The long-term strategy for health care information envisions creation of 
a Point-of-Service information system that brings valuable information to 
consumers, health providers, payers and policymakers." [the FBI, the NSA, 
the DIA, the CIA, Janet, Donna, Chelsea, Socks in real time]

The President's Health Security Plan -- Page 127

No smartcard initially.  They start with cards "much like ATM cards".  The 
"unique identifier" may be the SS# or it may be another number (they 
haven't decided yet but not to worry because it will be illegal (or at 
least against policy) to link health and other records.

This is a continueing cypherpunks issue because it means we have to finish 
our deployment before January 1, 1997.  That should be plenty of time.

Today's messages:  THE COW IS LAME, THE COW IS LAME.  THE BALD MAN ATE 
CHILI, THE BALD MAN ATE CHILI.  THE CORN RIPENED EARLY THIS YEAR, THE CORN 
RIPENED EARLY THIS YEAR.  And now back to our regular program already in 
progress...

Duncan Frissell

"In the 20th Century, Health became the most important thing in men's 
lives so naturally they started to kill each other for Health."

--- WinQwk 2.0b#1165                                                                                                                 




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Stanton McCandlish <mech@eff.org>
Date: Tue, 12 Oct 93 13:06:50 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Virtual City (tm) and Virtual Capitalism
In-Reply-To: <Pine.3.05.9310101713.A26661-b100000@crl.crl.com>
Message-ID: <199310122006.AA04422@eff.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>   I'm still not clear as to exactly what MUD money would purchase. In a MOO,
> such as MediaMOO or BayMOO, I can't conceive of what anyone could "buy"

Well, this is true of MOOs in general but not MUDs most of which are D&D-style
combat games, wherein virtual money already plays a strong role; many
muds have banks, which have fees, interest rates, etc., and loan sharks
abound.  RL money does not come into it, and barter is usually quite
acceptable.  

I agree that the whole idea is rather trivial, but it would seem to be a
good test, at least: see if MUDdom will cooperate enough to have a
networked form of MUDbucks.  I don't think most MUDs would go for the
players being able to buy power(s) outright, but goods should not be a
problem.  Anyway, the difference between the typical MOO and typical MUD
community is very great in many ways and it doesn't do to conflate them.

>   Any system of monetary exchange that would involve manipulating quotas,
> or translating them into a kind of tradeable commodity would, I think, be
> vigorously resisted by most MOO wizards. "I'll help you code that virtual
> Harley if you'll pay me two quota" would be antithetical to the whole
> spirit of cooperation I've seen in most (though not all) MOOs. In
> addition, it would be an ironic commentary on the old cyberpunk
> "Information should be free!" if Joe/Jane MOOwhiz sets up shop as a
> for-hire expert in coding, amassing virtual capital off of newbies.

The capitalists here probably think that's a great idea, though the LPF
fans here would disagree.  This strikes me as remarkably similar to a BBS-
based idea that went around for a while, to have BBSbucks, that one could
spend to get online time on any participating BBS.  One got the bucks by
uploading to file oriented boards, posting on msg. oriented boards, etc.  Of
course, sysops in general slammed the idea, since it was immediately
obvious to most of them that people would manipulate the less popular and
more open (by necessity) boards.  People would call some newbie board, and
upload garbage to it, knowing that the sysop would not say much about it,
being in the process of trying to get new users and keep them, then take
the electricash to the popular boards.  If one looks at BBSs like
countries, it would be as if they were 3rd world nations being farmed for
their cheap resources and labour, and all the money goes out of the
country to the Big Empires.

> future monetary transactions on a global scale. And if, as part of your
> post suggests, RL money would be gratefully paid for increased power
> within a MUD -- shades of *Snow Crash*! And who would have guessed that
> it was cypherpunks in executive clothing that brought such a system into
> the MUD/MOO world.

Well, one can remove the necessity, for now, that RL money be paid.  What
then is the real objection?  I can see nothing keeping the idea from working.
As for the RL for digicash scenario, well *I* wouldn't play, having better
things to waste money on, but if some will, why not?  Why should MUD
programmers and site providers have to do it all for free, while their
game-programming counterparts in the online services rake in good salaries?

At times I shudder to think what it's costing in bandwidth to keep all
these NeTrek players going, night and day.  Make them PAY a little for it
(not much, but enough that they notice), place the financial burden where
it belongs. 

Note: my commentary on MUD/MOO practices dates from 92, so it may be
outdated by this point, seeing how fast that virtcom changes. 

--  
-=> mech@eff.org <=-
Stanton McCandlish     Electronic Frontier Foundation Online Activist & SysOp
NitV-DC BBS 202-232-2715, Fido 1:109/? IndraNet 369:111/1, 14.4V32b 16.8ZyX



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: cme@ellisun.sw.stratus.com (Carl Ellison)
Date: Tue, 12 Oct 93 13:59:56 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: E[gcd(p-1,q-1)]
Message-ID: <9310122057.AA04053@ellisun.sw.stratus.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Sorry, folks -- the formulae I posted yesterday are flawed.
More later.

 - Carl




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Arthur Chandler <arthurc@crl.com>
Date: Tue, 12 Oct 93 17:29:55 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Native American Encryption?!
Message-ID: <Pine.3.05.9310121729.A27002-a100000@crl.crl.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



  I remember hearing many years ago that one of the branches of the armed
aervices during WWII used a native American -- Cherokee? Apache? --
language to communicate. The Japanese (the story goes) went nuts trying to
crack the code -- unsuccessfully.
  Two questions:
  1) Can anyone give me a reference for this story (assuming it's true)?
  2) If one used a natural language for encryption, and the would-be code
crackers did not know it was natural language (say, Hittite), could they crack
it? I seem to remember that hieroglyphs were undecipherable until the
Rosetta Stone was discovered. But maybe current techniques would do a
better job....?






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Date: Tue, 12 Oct 93 17:51:32 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: NSA Can Spend a Billion on a Computer
Message-ID: <9310130051.AA27641@netcom5.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Whit Diffie has some more info, including a clarification, on the
differences between Hagelin and rotor machines:

Forwarded message:
To: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
From: whitfield.diffie@Eng.Sun.COM
Date: Tue, 12 Oct 1993 at 08h00
Subject: NSA Can Spend a Billion on a Computer

		    Minor technical point

> The Harvest machine was particularly good at brute force breaking of
> Hagelin-type rotor machines, the "DES of its day"

    Hagelin machines aren't considered rotor machines even though
their main moving elements do rotate.  Rotor machines had rotating
elements that were wired wheels implementing table look-ups, i.e.,
S-boxes.  The six wheels in a Hagelin machine merely have setable bits
around their edges.  The are in effect pieces of binary key that
rotate --- much like the C and D registers in DES.

    Feel free to redisseminate this if you like.
							Whit







From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Date: Tue, 12 Oct 93 17:59:55 PDT
To: arthurc@crl.com (Arthur Chandler)
Subject: Re: Native American Encryption?!
In-Reply-To: <Pine.3.05.9310121729.A27002-a100000@crl.crl.com>
Message-ID: <9310130059.AA28188@netcom5.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



>   I remember hearing many years ago that one of the branches of the armed
> aervices during WWII used a native American -- Cherokee? Apache? --
> language to communicate. The Japanese (the story goes) went nuts trying to
> crack the code -- unsuccessfully.
>   Two questions:
>   1) Can anyone give me a reference for this story (assuming it's true)?

They were the Navajo (or Navaho) code talkers. Kahn's "The
Codebreakers" has a discussion of this, as I recall. Probably the
"Encyclopedia Britannica" will also a mention of it.

>   2) If one used a natural language for encryption, and the would-be code
> crackers did not know it was natural language (say, Hittite), could they crack
> it? I seem to remember that hieroglyphs were undecipherable until the
> Rosetta Stone was discovered. But maybe current techniques would do a
> better job....?

These are codes, not ciphers, and are of course not very secure. The
Germans and Japanese in WW II obviously did not have enough time to
find native Navajo speakers, and I suspect few books on that language
were available at that time, hence the scheme was temporarily secure.

Otherwise, forget it.

-Tim


-- 
..........................................................................
Timothy C. May         | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,  
tcmay@netcom.com       | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
408-688-5409           | knowledge, reputations, information markets, 
W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA  | black markets, collapse of governments.
Higher Power: 2^756839 | Public Key: PGP and MailSafe available.
Note: I put time and money into writing this posting. I hope you enjoy it.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: hughes@ah.com (Eric Hughes)
Date: Tue, 12 Oct 93 18:26:34 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Virtual City (tm) and Virtual Capitalism
In-Reply-To: <199310122006.AA04422@eff.org>
Message-ID: <9310130126.AA11689@ah.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>I agree that the whole idea is rather trivial, but it would seem to be a
>good test, at least: see if MUDdom will cooperate enough to have a
>networked form of MUDbucks.  

I wish to clarify a point here.  The system as I envision it would not
have a single currency.  Rather, each MUD/MOO would create its own
currency or currencies.  Interdomain transfer would be accomplished by
trading promissory notes.

As to what the money buys, at the very least it could buy those things
which resolve down to CPU time and disk space and network bandwidth.

Eric




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Stanton McCandlish <mech@eff.org>
Date: Tue, 12 Oct 93 15:39:55 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: WinPGP
Message-ID: <199310122238.AA06178@eff.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


anyone have a site name for this beta of Windows PGP?  Or just a filename,
so it can be archiefied? 

-- 
-=> mech@eff.org <=-
Stanton McCandlish     Electronic Frontier Foundation Online Activist & SysOp
NitV-DC BBS 202-232-2715, Fido 1:109/? IndraNet 369:111/1, 14.4V32b 16.8ZyX



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: System Operator <anagld!decode!system@uunet.UU.NET>
Date: Tue, 12 Oct 93 18:59:55 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Internet Security Scanner available
Message-ID: <2wwBBc1w165w@decode.UUCP>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


For those of you without FTP access who would like to take
a look at the Internet Security Scanner, it is available on
my BBS in /public/crypto.  Call +1 410 730 6734, 12/24/96,
login "cypher" password "punk".

Dan

--
system@decode.UUCP (System Operator)
Cryptography, Security, Privacy BBS  +1 410 730 6734   Data/FAX




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: doug@netcom.com (Doug Merritt)
Date: Tue, 12 Oct 93 19:29:57 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Breaking DES
In-Reply-To: <pmetzger@lehman.com>
Message-ID: <9310130229.AA09377@netcom5.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> pmetzger@lehman.com said:
>(2^56)*8 = 576,460,752,303,423,488
>
>(2^56)*8*1000/(10^9) = 576,460,752,303

I was originally assuming a one byte result per calculation and gave a
hashing justification. (I glossed over the overhead for this approach,
but we could analyze this, too, if anyone's interested.) You however are
multiplying by 8 for no clear reason. Feel free to explain, but the way I see
it, the calculation is:

(2^56 calculations) * (1 byte per) * ($1000/disk) / (10^9 bytes/disk)

...which comes to 72 billion dollars. This is significantly larger than
my first calculation, and the difference is purely due to roundoff error,
because I said that 2^56 = 10^16, where it's actually 10^16.8576.

10^16 * $1000 / 10^9 does indeed equal my original figure of $10 billion,
so it's just that I should have left another digit of precision in rounding
the exponent.

Now I agree that 72 billion dollars is a lot. Even 10 billion is a lot.
But all I was trying to establish was that these numbers are not *completely*
impossible, because you were giving Karl a hard time about this.

Ridiculously expensive is a very different thing than *impossible*.
There are schemes that result in figures like 10^9 billion dollars...
*that* I call plainly impossible.

I also projected forward 10 years to let prices come down by a factor
of 10...that's another way of underscoring *possibility*. Over the
last 10 years disk drive prices have fallen significantly more than
a factor of 10 per megabyte, so I am being quite cautious here. A
factor of 30 is justifiable, but I won't go that far, I'll continue
to be conservative.

Even your own figure of $576 billion becomes $57.6 billion in 10 years,
which is merely too expensive, not *impossible*...if WW III were underway
and such a project were of critical importance, it would happen...
$50 billion would not be too much under *those* circumstances. That's
the difference between "impossible" and "expensive".

>Lets think for a moment, shall we? You are encrypting every possible
>block with DES, which results in lots of random blocks. You really
>want to search through the lot of them serially without any indexing
>whatsoever? Seems like you haven't thought this out.

If you want to critique this part of my back-of-the-envelope, its
weakest part is the sorting, in which it is very hard to effectively
serialize disk access.

For the benefit of the doubt, let's give that a factor of 100 slowdown...
so that 10 years from now we have an *average* disk transfer rate of 10^7
bytes per second for this algorithm rather than the 10^9 that I was assuming.
I think it could be done faster, but even so, this increases the time from 1
hour to 4 days...still not an impossibility, just not as *nice* as 1 hour.

Again, I need only establish possibility for the algorithm Karl related;
I'm not saying the NSA *will* do this.

>Oh, now I just realized -- you are going to have to store each source
>block with each output block. That means that even if you don't do any
>indexing, you are going to need twice the disk space I just mentioned,
>or over $1 TRILLION in disk for a very slow DES cracker.

Ok, so figures are doubled...my 72 billion becomes 144 billion. Pretty
expensive. Not *impossible*.

>Sorry, but you lose.

I never claimed this was likely...all I was after was to see whether it
worked out to e.g. 10^9 trillion dollars...*that* I would call impossible.

>Never designed a disk system, have you?

Actually, yes I have; I've been a hardware and software systems architect
in all kinds of different subspecialties. The fact that we may disagree
doesn't make me an idiot...hell, I may even make drastic mistakes and say
things that *are* idiotic. It still doesn't make me an idiot...it would
make me "someone who made a mistake".

Considering that I was doing a quickie back-of-the-envelope, I'm not even
embarassed about such mistakes.  No one else did an estimate. 2^56 *sounds*
ridiculously huge; I'm content to be within a factor of 100 in showing that
it is merely quite expensive. I daresay that you yourself have a better
feel for the expense now than you did when you first critiqued Karl's post.

Flaming me is a poor way to win an inherently technical argument. Stick to
the point.

>Sorry, but you can't actually
>read a disk as fast as you can read RAM. Caching only works if you
>have frequently accessed blocks -- if you are reading a whole disk you
>can't go faster than the disk transfer rate no matter how many gods
>you pray to. Your technical credibility is rapidly plunging.

It is true that you can't do better than the average transfer rate,
and here you have a valid point, I neglected this. It would be unrealistic
given the other assumptions to assume better than 10^7 bytes per second
transfer rate with technology 10 years hence. In fact even 100 megabytes
per second might seem high to you, so let's call it 50Mb/s (surely a
very conservative figure), for a total of 20 times slower than I estimated.

That increases the 4 days to 80 days. Not very nice...but *possible*.

You see the pattern here...you are raising valid technical objections, 
a whole series of good points that I glossed over with my back-of-the-
envelope calculations.

But even so, it doesn't change my basic point that the approach is *possible*.
You need to find a factor of perhaps 1000 in cost and a factor of perhaps
1000 in time in order to demonstrate that this approach is inherently
*impossible*.

The fact that you spot flaws in my back-of-the-envelope also doesn't mean
that it's called for to flame me. Again, let's stick to technical discussion.

>Guess you can't read my calculations, can you?

Tsk, another flame.

>> Skip the sarcasm and pick a different quantity discount. If you don't
>> like my 90% discount for quantity 1 million disk drives, pick another
>> one.
>
>Sort of like saying "if you don't like the laws of physics, pick
>different laws"? 

Even for a flame, I don't get this. I said, if you think that a 90%
discount for quantity-million is unrealistic, tell me what discount
you think *is* realistic. That's a valid question. The $1000 per
gigabyte drive is roughly accurate *today* in quantity *one*. The
higher the quantity you buy, the better a discount you get; that's the
way it works, and I'm sure you know that as well as I. So perhaps my
90% discount is overly optimistic...fine, I say...tell me a different
figure. If you say 10% I'll argue. Anything between 10% and 90% is
conceivable, so pick your figure.

It still doesn't affect the bottom line argument as to whether the algorithm
Karl mentioned will be possible in 10 years. It clearly would be very very
expensive. It would also clearly *not* be completely impossible.

Karl posted something which is theoretically reasonable but that is
nontrivally expensive even ten years from now. He deserves credit for
discussing a theoretical possibility which is even marginally conceivable.
He does not deserve a harsh response...and I think you *were* harsh to
him.

Do me a favor and skip the flames in your future responses; they're not
very much fun.
	Doug
--
Doug Merritt				doug@netcom.com
Professional Wild-eyed Visionary	Member, Crusaders for a Better Tomorrow
     (The above is a joke; the following are mailing lists:)
Unicode Novis Cypherpunks Gutenberg Wavelets Conlang Logli Alife HC_III
Computational linguistics Fundamental physics Cogsci SF GA VR CASE TLAs




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: wak@next0.math.pitt.edu
Date: Tue, 12 Oct 93 16:36:32 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: PGP,etc. by PSDAA
Message-ID: <9310122332.AA01982@next0.math.pitt.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Look (anon ftp) in soda.berkeley.edu/pub/cypherpunks.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: jel@sutro.SFSU.EDU (John E. Levine)
Date: Tue, 12 Oct 93 19:41:34 PDT
To: anagld!decode!system@uunet.uu.net
Subject: Internet Security Scanner available
In-Reply-To: <2wwBBc1w165w@decode.UUCP>
Message-ID: <9310130238.AA02302@sutro.SFSU.EDU>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


In your post to the Cypherpunks list of Tue, 12 Oct 93 18:42:12 EDT
your said

> For those of you without FTP access who would like to take
> a look at the Internet Security Scanner, it is available on
> my BBS in /public/crypto.  Call +1 410 730 6734, 12/24/96,
> login "cypher" password "punk".

Can you tell me please where it is available by anon. ftp?
Thanks.  It would be a lot easier for me than a call to
area code 410.  :-)

Thanks,
jel@sutro.sfsu.edu




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: jkreznar@ininx.com (John E. Kreznar)
Date: Tue, 12 Oct 93 19:41:55 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Spread-spectrum net (vulnerability of)
In-Reply-To: <Ugip0Ky00awQIzQl9m@andrew.cmu.edu>
Message-ID: <9310130241.AA06390@ininx>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> Secondly, the
> transmitter doesn't necessarily have to be exposed, it could be kept
> hidden and only the antenna would need to be exposed.

Not even the antenna should be visible.  Remember, for spread spectrum radio
detectable only by the intended receivers (which use the correct spread-spectrum
code for coherent detection), the power density should be hardly distinguishable
from the ambient noise.  One way to arrange this is to put the antenna inside of
a physically secure perimeter, outside of which the power density is too low for
noncoherent detection.  The perimeter can be optically opaque (e.g. a building),
as long as it leaks enough r.f. in the direction of the receiver(s) for coherent
detection.  Preventing noncoherent detection may often require _attenuation_ of
an otherwise too-powerful signal, and the building may serve part of this
function.

> Plus the antenna would be easy to disguise or hide in many places.

Yup.

	John E. Kreznar		| Relations among people to be by
	jkreznar@ininx.com	| mutual consent, or not at all.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Karl Lui Barrus <klbarrus@owlnet.rice.edu>
Date: Tue, 12 Oct 93 17:56:53 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Breaking DES
In-Reply-To: <9310112259.AA19226@snark.lehman.com>
Message-ID: <9310130056.AA06298@flammulated.owlnet.rice.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Perry E. Metzger wrote:

>Tell you what, Karl -- when you build the device that can store 2^56
>encryptions, let us know. You'll make a mint in the storage technology
>business. Also let us know how you'll index and fetch the encryptions
>in any reasonable time while you are at it, but by comparison thats a
>tiny problem.

Maybe I'm being overly sensitive, but lately some of my posts are
getting attacked for being wrong or impractical.

I did not invent the cut-and-choose protocol (previously described as
incorrect), nor did I invent the "meet in the middle" attack outlined
in a previous post which Perry has so eloquently described above as
infeasible.

I am just passing along information about an attack against double DES
which demonstrates that double DEs encryption does not increase
complexity very much at all.

>Karl, are you sure that you want people to think you believe this?

"I" do not care what "people" think of "this" attack, since it is
valid and I didn't invent it.

So maybe it's only of theoretical interest, sort of like differential
cryptanalysis against the DES - which requires 10^47 chosen
plaintexts.

Why don't you mail Biham and Shamir that their method sucks.  It's
fairly infeasible as well.

I think I need a long vacation from this list.  Naturally, I'm not so
egotistical to think anybody gives a damn.

-- 
Karl L. Barrus: klbarrus@owlnet.rice.edu 
keyID: 5AD633 hash: D1 59 9D 48 72 E9 19 D5  3D F3 93 7E 81 B5 CC 32

"One man's mnemonic is another man's cryptography" 
  - my compilers prof discussing file naming in public directories



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: doug@netcom.com (Doug Merritt)
Date: Tue, 12 Oct 93 20:36:35 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Spread-spectrum net (vulnerability of)
In-Reply-To: <mg5n+@andrew.cmu.edu>
Message-ID: <9310130301.AA12952@netcom5.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Matthew J Ghio <mg5n+@andrew.cmu.edu> said:
>Depends how you place them. If you put them _on top_ of things, you'd need 
>a helicopter to shoot 'em.

I used to work with the person who set up 80% of the West Coast ham
radio digital packet system repeaters. He had a bit of money to burn,
and he set up a *bunch* of these repeaters on various mountain tops up
and down the West Coast. This was circa '85 by the way.

Each repeater required:
	1) a source of power -- this is easy to forget, but it is
	   nontrivial. Batteries just don't cut it. Rather than explain
	   about batteries, I invite people to ponder power requirements
	   for given broadcast distances and guess battery lifetime.

	   Anyway, he had a PG&E (electric power) hookup and a monthly
	   bill for each of these. Good thing he had all that money...
	   
	   He had trouble finding people who were willing to allow his
	   stations; people who live on mountain-tops tend to be
	   rugged individualists. :-) But he managed.

	2) Line of sight reception and transmission. The higher the
	   frequency used, the more that line of sight is required by
	   the physics of the situation. Even if line of sight isn't
	   strictly required, signal strength drops when you get out
	   of line of sight -- if you depend on radio wave diffraction
	   to get the signal to you and from you, you can count on heavy
	   signal loss in the process.

	3) Protection from the elements. He used rack-mounted 286 cards
	   in an industrial enclosure, but there was *no way* he could
	   leave the boxes exposed to the elements. A roof was required.

	   This is the kind of issue that is easy to neglect, but is
	   absolutely essential for real life conditions: weatherproofing
	   of the assembly. If you don't use as roof and walls, you'd
	   better have a genius mechanical engineer design the enclosure.
	   This is a lot harder than it sounds.

>Someone walking around a city shooting a rifle is likely to attract a
>lot more attention than a secret network would.

Your opponents wouldn't do that...the "enemy" here is simply the FCC,
count on it. They have field agents who triangulate illicit transmitters,
and once they find one, they simply get all the warrants and court orders
needed to deal with it.

>Secondly, the
>transmitter doesn't necessarily have to be exposed, it could be kept
>hidden and only the antenna would need to be exposed.  You'd have to be
>a damn good shot to hit a wire antenna.  Plus the antenna would be easy
>to disguise or hide in many places.

Sure, this is possible. But it doesn't help *that* much. Triangulation
of signal spots any antenna quickly, and they cut that off immediately.
You can get increasingly elaborate about hiding the signal source, and
restoring antennae quickly as they're pinched, but it's sort of a losing
battle unless you assume real time response by the underground lead by
a brilliant EE type.

I am not saying that an underground wireless net is impossible. I *am*
saying that the difficulties are much higher than they may seem at first
blush.

I think doing something like this is possible, and it would have definite
benefits. But anyone moving on this would do well to get in touch with
the existing ham radio crowd who have dealt with the pragmatic issues
involved for the better part of a decade (or more).

>  Hence we have achieved
>our objective - you know how to contact site #3 in netspace - it has a
>cybernetic location relative to other sites, but that tells you nothing
>about it's actual physical location.

Right...in a sense, this is the easy part. Definitely one can hide
physical locations if everything is set up carefully.
	Doug




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: an41418@anon.penet.fi (wonderer)
Date: Tue, 12 Oct 93 13:06:29 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Breaking DES
Message-ID: <9310122004.AA26442@anon.penet.fi>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Since I started this thread, and because I have always
had a problem with the rude way many people discuss things
in this group, I was wondering, Perry Metzger, what
contribution your sarcastic tone and occasional insults
make to your argument.

I believe it is possible to continue this debate and
stick to the technical issues without getting personal
or being rude. I wish more people would realize this.

Wonderer (peacemaker?)
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
To find out more about the anon service, send mail to help@anon.penet.fi.
Due to the double-blind, any mail replies to this message will be anonymized,
and an anonymous id will be allocated automatically. You have been warned.
Please report any problems, inappropriate use etc. to admin@anon.penet.fi.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Stanton McCandlish <mech@eff.org>
Date: Tue, 12 Oct 93 17:36:32 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: EFF GIF recall/Duncan's question
Message-ID: <199310130035.AA07326@eff.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Forwarded message:
From ssteele Tue Oct 12 17:19:10 1993
Date: Tue, 12 Oct 1993 17:19:08 -0400
Message-Id: <199310122119.AA05257@eff.org>
To: Stanton McCandlish <mech>
From: ssteele (Shari Steele)
Subject: Re: EFF GIF file recall n (fwd)

Hi Stanton.

Duncan asked:

>Didn't the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals decide that the transport and sale 
>provisions (unknowing posession) of the federal kiddie porn law were 
>unconstitutional?  Wouldn't a warning like yours risk converting unknowing 
>to knowing posession.

The case to which Duncan is referring is U.S. v. X-Citement Video, Inc.,
decided last December in Pasadena, CA.  The Ninth District Court didn't
hold that the transport and sale provisions of the federal child porn
statute were unconstitutional.  What it did hold was that the statute was
unconstitutional in that it did not require knowledge by the prosecuted
individual of the age of the depicted youth.  The court was clear to
distinguish the lack of a knowledge requirement of the age of the depicted
youth (which was unconstitutional) from the lack of knowledge that the
files were sent (in this case mailed, which the court held was not really
an issue.)  My warning to sysops simply said that these files were listed
on a federal indictment, so the "lack of knowledge of the age of the
depicted people" defense remains -- I did not identify the people depicted
as being under the age of 18.  (I couldn't have done so -- I haven't seen
the files.  I was only passing on the info contained on the indictment.)

In addition, provisions of a federal statute are not officially
unconstitutional in all jurisdictions until the U.S. Supreme Court declares
them to be so.  (In other words, the court's decision is only binding on
the 9th Circuit.)

Shari

P.S. Say hi to the 'punks for me.  I really enjoyed the list, but the
volume was just prohibitive.



-- 
-=> mech@eff.org <=-
Stanton McCandlish     Electronic Frontier Foundation Online Activist & SysOp
NitV-DC BBS 202-232-2715, Fido 1:109/? IndraNet 369:111/1, 14.4V32b 16.8ZyX



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: doug@netcom.com (Doug Merritt)
Date: Tue, 12 Oct 93 20:46:35 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Native American Encryption?!
Message-ID: <9310130343.AA20536@netcom5.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May) said:
>They were the Navajo (or Navaho) code talkers. Kahn's "The
>Codebreakers" has a discussion of this, as I recall. Probably the
>"Encyclopedia Britannica" will also a mention of it.

It's mentioned in a bunch of crypto sources, but coincidentally, PBS
just ran an entire show about this precise subject a couple weeks back.
Not just passing mention...the whole show was about this.

Therefore talking to PBS people would likely yield some good info...
and possibly videos.

>>   2) If one used a natural language for encryption, and the would-be code
>> crackers did not know it was natural language (say, Hittite), could they crack
>> it? I seem to remember that hieroglyphs were undecipherable until the
>> Rosetta Stone was discovered. But maybe current techniques would do a
>> better job....?
>
>These are codes, not ciphers, and are of course not very secure.

Err...."of course"??? Codes are (all else being equal) quite a bit
more secure than ciphers.

(or do I have "code" and "cypher" reversed...whatever. :-)

There's a classic SF story, whose title I forget, about anthropologists
trying to figure out writings of a dead species on Mars. The table of
elements finally proved to be the Rosetta Stone equivalent.

The interesting thing about codes, which in a sense includes all natural
languages, versus ciphers, is that code systems represent semantics. If
the underlying semantics is radically different than what the code-breaker
knows...too bad.

>Germans and Japanese in WW II obviously did not have enough time to
>find native Navajo speakers, and I suspect few books on that language
>were available at that time, hence the scheme was temporarily secure.
>
>Otherwise, forget it.

It was more complicated than that. They used a hybrid system that native
Navajo speakers could not decrypt, because the system used not only Navajo,
but on top of that, arbitrary (and newly invented) metaphors for concepts,
and (newly invented) puns to represent ciphers, too.

It is certainly true that part of the security was "through obscurity",
but (A) that part was effective..."security through obscurity" can be
effective over short periods of time...and (B) they layered ciphers on
top of codes.

The obscure linguistic aspects of Navajo vs. other modern languages is also
said to have played a part, but I haven't researched this yet, so I won't
comment.

Arthur Chandler <arthurc@crl.com> said:
>I seem to remember that hieroglyphs were undecipherable until the
>Rosetta Stone was discovered. But maybe current techniques would do a
>better job....?

In the absence of a Rosetta-Stone-sort-of-thing, we're still lost. For
instance, the Easter Island hieroglyphs are still completely mystifying.

Some of Nyquist's mathematical results are still classified, so one
never knows, but...

Arbitrary semantic systems encoded in writings are not decipherable,
period, barring some breakthrough in mathematical semantics...don't hold
your breath. :-)
	Doug




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Matthew J Ghio <mg5n+@andrew.cmu.edu>
Date: Tue, 12 Oct 93 17:49:55 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Spread-spectrum net (vulnerability of)
In-Reply-To: <9310090132.AA08927@dink.foretune.co.jp>
Message-ID: <Ugip0Ky00awQIzQl9m@andrew.cmu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>>Anyone who wants to take you down will only need (1) a detector that can
>>point out your boxes and (2) a small caliber rifle.
>
>Errrrr. Hadn't thought of that. Placement will be a major factor, I
>beleieve.
>
>>Since the cost to find and destroy is much less than the cost to make and
>>deploy, a covert network of this sort wouldn't last long.  An _overt_
>>network, perhaps a commercial entity that networks an entire city, would
>>be an interesting prospect.
>
>Depends how you place them. If you put them _on top_ of things, you'd need 
>a helicopter to shoot 'em.

Someone walking around a city shooting a rifle is likely to attract a
lot more attention than a secret network would.  Secondly, the
transmitter doesn't necessarily have to be exposed, it could be kept
hidden and only the antenna would need to be exposed.  You'd have to be
a damn good shot to hit a wire antenna.  Plus the antenna would be easy
to disguise or hide in many places.

>>The techniques for maintaining location information on actual machines
>>connected to the net, and for updating them as they move, are actually
>>quite simple and well understood (cellular telephones are a simple,
>>dumb version of the technology).  The trick is to find out a way that
>>the network can know where you are but not give that information out
>>(even to the owners of the network), without unacceptable overheads.
>
>This is true.
>But if we make the things in thick boxes (well, slightly bullet-proof,
>anyway), and put them in places where theyare hard to shoot at, then we 
>should be right. We would only need a few each suburb.

Well, you may know that you can reach a certain person thru site #127,
and that stie #127 can be reached thru site 35 or site 68, and so
on...which gives you a sort of virtual-space map, which would reveal
nothing about actual phyical location of the sites or the person you are
contacting.  Suppose you were connected to site #1 and you were
communicating with site #3 thru site #2.  Site #3 could be 50 meters
away, or 2 km, and you would never know the difference because you
didn't have any way to directly contact site #3.  Hence we have achieved
our objective - you know how to contact site #3 in netspace - it has a
cybernetic location relative to other sites, but that tells you nothing
about it's actual physical location.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Stanton McCandlish <mech@eff.org>
Date: Tue, 12 Oct 93 17:51:53 PDT
To: thesegroups@tic.com
Subject: TIS testimony
Message-ID: <199310130051.AA07457@eff.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Just in...got "Testimony by Stephen T. Walker, President, Trusted
Information Systems, Inc., for Subcommittee on Economic Policy, Trade and
Environment, Committee on Foreign Affairs, U.S. House of Representatives,
October 12, 1993".  This is about a 75k document, and is to be found via
FTP as:

 ftp.eff.org: /pub/eff/temp/testimon.tis

It begins thusly:

"I am pleased to testify today about the negative impact that U.S. export
control regulations on cryptography are having on one of the few
industries where the U.S.  remains dominant worldwide:  the information
system software industry.  The major point of my testimony are that U.S.
export controls do not prevent the international availability of good
quality cryptography but do penalized the U.S. software industry and U.S.
business in general."

I'd post it, but it's 1500+ lines.

--  

-=> mech@eff.org <=-
Stanton McCandlish     Electronic Frontier Foundation Online Activist & SysOp
NitV-DC BBS 202-232-2715, Fido 1:109/? IndraNet 369:111/1, 14.4V32b 16.8ZyX



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: doug@netcom.com (Doug Merritt)
Date: Tue, 12 Oct 93 21:06:36 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Spread-spectrum net (vulnerability of)
Message-ID: <9310130403.AA23351@netcom5.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


jkreznar@ininx.com (John E. Kreznar) said:
>Not even the antenna should be visible.  Remember, for spread spectrum radio
>detectable only by the intended receivers (which use the correct spread-
>spectrum code for coherent detection), the power density should be hardly
>distinguishable from the ambient noise.

This is true only for casual observers. If the FCC were after you, they
could most definitely triangulate on unusual noise sources as well as
they could a coherent signal. Power signals are a giveaway.

>One way to arrange this is to put the antenna inside of a physically
>secure perimeter, outside of which the power density is too low for
>noncoherent detection.  The perimeter can be optically opaque (e.g. a
>building), as long as it leaks enough r.f. in the direction of the
>receiver(s) for coherent detection.  Preventing noncoherent detection
>may often require _attenuation_ of an otherwise too-powerful signal,
>and the building may serve part of this function.

Good enough as far as it goes. But this implies a large drop in efficiency
of the transmitted signal. That's not a stopper...*if* you've got power
to spare. But that implies enough power for bad guys to triangulate your
noise source...ouch.

If they pin you down to within a building, you've lost.

There are other approaches...phase-sweeping...phase-conjugation...
	Doug




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Matthew J Ghio <mg5n+@andrew.cmu.edu>
Date: Tue, 12 Oct 93 18:09:55 PDT
To: hiscdcj@lux.latrobe.edu.au (Dwayne)
Subject: Secret network
Message-ID: <QgipGDu00awQIzQlhb@andrew.cmu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


There is something else that we can use for secret communications and
that is ...  (don't laugh, I'm serious) - water pipes.  Many places
still use metal pipes, thru which radio waves can travel quite well.  I
read an article in a science magazine a few weeks ago, where a team of
researchers were tracking various electromagnetic emissions in
residential households.  They fould that a lot of background magnetic
fields and radio emissions were coming from the water pipes.  When the
neighbors used certain appliances, they could detect it because the EM
emmissions were picked up and carried by the metal water pipes.  And
that's was just background noise.  Imagine what we could transmit by
intentionally broadcasting signals thru the metal pipes!  Also, most of
the "noise" was low frequency, and since our transmitters would be high
frequency, it would probably work pretty well (unless, of course, you
had plastic pipes).  Most of the local net traffic could be handled thru
the pipe-network, while the radio transmitters, lasers & microwave stuff
could be used for longer distance stuff.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: doug@netcom.com (Doug Merritt)
Date: Tue, 12 Oct 93 21:09:58 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Breaking DES
In-Reply-To: <pmetzger@lehman.com>
Message-ID: <9310130408.AA24361@netcom5.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Thank you, Perry, for some good comments that were flame-free. I
personally appreciate that, especially considering that your comments
are both apropos and good food for thought.
	Doug

>pmetzger@lehman.com said:
>Karl Lui Barrus says:
>> So maybe it's only of theoretical interest, sort of like differential
>> cryptanalysis against the DES - which requires 10^47 chosen
>> plaintexts.
>> 
>> Why don't you mail Biham and Shamir that their method sucks.  It's
>> fairly infeasible as well.
>
>It *IS* infeasable, and they realize it. The breakthrough was
>differential cryptanalysis itself, and the discovery that DES was
>fairly resistant to it. The fact that they made ANY crack in it was
>kind of neat, by the way.
>
>A huge number of chosen plaintexts is of course pretty much not
>possible in practice, especially since you might not get any chosen
>plaintexts at all!




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: doug@netcom.com (Doug Merritt)
Date: Tue, 12 Oct 93 21:16:35 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Breaking DES
In-Reply-To: <pmetzger@lehman.com>
Message-ID: <9310130416.AA25367@netcom5.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


pmetzger@lehman.com said:
>Each DES block is eight bytes. You can't use hashing -- the idea is
>nonsense in context. Did you read the original post?

Yes, I did. If hashing doesn't work, you'll have to say why not. It's a
technique that works in most other situations.

>First of all, its actually twice that because you really need 16
>bytes.

As I said, we can tackle this if anyone cares to...it's unclear that
this is an invitation, but assuming it is: hashing gives a first-pass
screening good for every 1/256 calculations, given the assumptions I
stated. For each collision more work is needed...but you haven't invited
that analysis, nor addressed it yourself.

>Second of all, the method is still impractical. I was merely
>giving the easiest and most obvious attack on it.

Impractical? Your response to Karl implied that it was *impossible*. If
you wish to apologize to Karl, and say that it is merely "impractical",
then I will agree with you and drop the subject. The expense required
definitely indicates that it is "impractical."

>I see no reason to continue this. I don't think your argument has
>credibility.

Clearly you are preparing to drop the argument because you sense that
your tactic of flaming didn't work. I welcome the lessening of flames,
so thank you for that. We could use less flames here.
	Doug





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Matthew J Ghio <mg5n+@andrew.cmu.edu>
Date: Tue, 12 Oct 93 18:36:35 PDT
To: Hastings@courier8.aero.org
Subject: Re: Spread Spectrum Decoys
In-Reply-To: <00086F64.MAI*Hastings@courier8.aero.org>
Message-ID: <cgipdVi00awQEzQm9O@andrew.cmu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> Part of the "hunt and destroy vs. cost to deploy" equation thread about
> spread spectrum networks was forwarded to me. How about putting several
> cheap noise generators on the air as decoys? This might tip the cost
> balance in favor of the network.
>
> The Julieboard Direct Digital Synthesizer board, which only needs numbers
> fed to it from a PC printer port or microcontroller output, can be bought
> wired and tested for $125. Production in volume should be cheaper. So who
> is hunting down transmitters and killing them, and risking a confrontation
> with an armed opponent, for this paltry sum?

Decoys would be easy to build, just build a cruddy receiver, tune it to
a dead station, add an amplifier, and retransmit the noise at another
frequency, and presto, you have a decoy.  Incredibly cheap to build,
(nothing more than a few transistors, capacitors, and resistors, which
don't have to be good quality either); the most expensive thing would
probably be the power supply.  Since the signals would be encrypted,
they wouldn't know static from data (well, they could probably figure it
out if they tried, it just depends on how much effort they want to put
into it).

As for the Julieboard, $125 sounds a bit steep.  If we build the boards
ourselves, it could be done a lot cheaper.  Making rough guesses, we
would need: 8088 (or similiar capacity chip): $2-3.  Small amount of
low-power static RAM (16K or less): $5   eproms: $2-3   UART or
something similiar: $2-3  cpu clock, transistors, TTLs, logic gates,
other paraphinelia to interface CPU to transmitter: $??  Transmitter and
receiver: <$10.  (This is USA $$$ btw...  also I haven't been following
the electronics market too closely lately so correct my guesses if
they're wrong.)  The only problem is finding people experienced enuff to
build the boards.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Date: Tue, 12 Oct 93 21:36:36 PDT
To: phoenix@ugcs.caltech.edu (Median)
Subject: Re: Native American Encryption?!
In-Reply-To: <9310130200.AA09164@pride.ugcs.caltech.edu>
Message-ID: <9310130436.AA28397@netcom5.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Median writes:

> I may be in trouble for not knowing basic literature, but if so so be
> it.  Would a code you created yourself be secure?  If you create your
> own language from scratch, and the 'enemy' never gets something to act
> as Rosetta Stone, is it still not secure?  Or is the "aliens figure out
> our language with lots of computers" cliche bogus?
> 

I want to avoid casually dismissing Median's question without writing
a mini-essay on code-breaking. Especially when so many fine and
accessible (easy to read) books on code-breaking are available.

(To find them, cruise your local library. I recall the Herbert S. Zim
book as being a very fine introduction. Basic, and nonmathematical.
But a good start. I read it in junior high school, many years ago. I
was reminded of it recently, when I think Whit Diffie cited it as an
influence on him as well--he obviously was more influenced by it than
I was, as he went into crypto and I went into physics, a much less
interesting field.)

Basically, word-frequency analysis kill simple codes. Replace the word
"the" with the string "globflq" and it's still going to be fairly
obvious that "globflq" means "the." And so on.

And, as Median mentioned, a few words may become known, in all the
usual ways, and thus a Rosetta Stone has been found.

The issue of communication with extraterrrestrials--some day
perhaps--is an interesting one. I have no idea what work has been done
on "breaking the code" when almost no clues exist. Some SF writers
have explored this idea.

But in summary, codes are a poor approach. The entropy of coded
messages gives clues about the underlying plaintext and eventually the
code falls. Usually fairly quickly.

Ciphers (or cyphers) are superior, as the entropy of the ciphertext
can be very high (roughly, "maximally random," though I don't want to
get into what randomness means here).

Kahn's "The Codebreakers" remains the definitive book. All Cypherpunks
should at least read the paperback abridgment of the original massive
book. "Kahn on Codes" is also pretty good.

--Tim May


-- 
..........................................................................
Timothy C. May         | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,  
tcmay@netcom.com       | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
408-688-5409           | knowledge, reputations, information markets, 
W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA  | black markets, collapse of governments.
Higher Power: 2^756839 | Public Key: PGP and MailSafe available.
Note: I put time and money into writing this posting. I hope you enjoy it.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Stanton McCandlish <mech@eff.org>
Date: Tue, 12 Oct 93 18:56:35 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: TEST: ignore.me
Message-ID: <199310130155.AA08226@eff.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


testing blahb lahblahblabhblhalblah blah
sorry folks...
-- 
-=> mech@eff.org <=-
Stanton McCandlish     Electronic Frontier Foundation Online Activist & SysOp
NitV-DC BBS 202-232-2715, Fido 1:109/? IndraNet 369:111/1, 14.4V32b 16.8ZyX



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: swc@uc1.ucsu.edu (Stuart W. Card)
Date: Tue, 12 Oct 93 19:16:39 PDT
To: mg5n+@andrew.cmu.edu
Subject: Re: Spread-spectrum net (vulnerability of)
Message-ID: <9310130219.AA14828@uc1.ucsu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Has anyone pointed out that the ideal location for these packet repeaters
is in the cars of as many people as possible?
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Stuart W. Card, Consultant, Card & Associates -- Research & Development
Box 153 RR 1 Newport Rd Utica NY 13502         315-735-1717 / FAX -8469
swc@uc1.ucsu.edu or cards@top.cis.syr.edu           "Who is John Galt?"




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: swc@uc1.ucsu.edu (Stuart W. Card)
Date: Tue, 12 Oct 93 19:26:55 PDT
To: mg5n+@andrew.cmu.edu
Subject: Re: Secret network
Message-ID: <9310130226.AA14844@uc1.ucsu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Alas, water pipes are much better for

1) noise and unintentional transmissions (which can be quite garbled
and no one cares), and

2) low frequency transmissions (which can carry only low bandwidth
communications).

Trying to transmit meaningful communications at high data rates
over water pipes would be a TREMENDOUS technical challenge,
requiring a vast amount of signal processing to compensate
for multipath reflections, impedance mismatches, thermal noise,
pickup of an almost variety of interference soures  ces,                                infinite variety of interference sources. ,
nonstationary channel characteristics, intermittent grounds,
etc etc ad infinitum (or at least ad nauseam).  Sorry about
the cold water, I have seriously considered this scheme and
believe that it can be used only for very short haul, very low
bandwidth communications (say intra-building at 300 baud).  ,
although that's a guess not a simulation result).
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Stuart W. Card, Consultant, Card & Associates -- Research & Development
Box 153 RR 1 Newport Rd Utica NY 13502         315-735-1717 / FAX -8469
swc@uc1.ucsu.edu or cards@top.cis.syr.edu           "Who is John Galt?"




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: swc@uc1.ucsu.edu (Stuart W. Card)
Date: Tue, 12 Oct 93 19:26:34 PDT
To: mg5n+@andrew.cmu.edu
Subject: Re: Spread Spectrum Decoys
Message-ID: <9310130228.AA14849@uc1.ucsu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Building boards from scratch always sounds a lot cheaper than it is.
You'll find it hard to build any kind of electronics for less than $126 5.
The manufacturing cost almost always exceeds the component cost, and
you always needs l    lots of little components that you didn't think of
at first (miscellaneous glue logic, power supply, enclosure, etc.).
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Stuart W. Card, Consultant, Card & Associates -- Research & Development
Box 153 RR 1 Newport Rd Utica NY 13502         315-735-1717 / FAX -8469
swc@uc1.ucsu.edu or cards@top.cis.syr.edu           "Who is John Galt?"




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Matthew J Ghio <mg5n+@andrew.cmu.edu>
Date: Tue, 12 Oct 93 20:09:57 PDT
To: swc@uc1.ucsu.edu (Stuart W. Card)
Subject: Re: Spread-spectrum net (vulnerability of)
In-Reply-To: <9310130219.AA14828@uc1.ucsu.edu>
Message-ID: <Qgir4Hm00VpH4LN18t@andrew.cmu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> Has anyone pointed out that the ideal location for these
> packet repeaters is in the cars of as many people as possible?

This would defeat many detection methods, but would complicate the
software further, because it would need to be able to quickly compensate
for repeaters which travelled out of range.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: wmo@rebma.rebma.mn.org (Bill O'Hanlon)
Date: Tue, 12 Oct 93 22:51:36 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Breaking DES
Message-ID: <m0omxsQ-0004UTC@rebma.rebma.mn.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Whenever Perry Metzger defends an opinion of his well, somebody whines.

Whenever Perry Metzger disagrees with someone's arguments, someone else
crys "unfair! He's using his WITS on me!"

Whenever Perry Metzger has to stop and demonstrate something as simple as
arithmetic to end an argument, someone cries "foul! sarcasm!  Hey, he's not
playing nice!"

Y'all need to develop slightly thicker skins.  Perry's efforts could serve to 
raise the thought level of other posters to this list, if they'd stop reacting
to each prod with an irritated swipe back at the prodder.

I like the strife on this list. Happy people getting along famously are dull.

(Someone could consider adding to the cypherpunk philosophy: Cypherpunks write
code, and cypherpunks are irritable.)

-Bill




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "L. Detweiler" <ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Date: Tue, 12 Oct 93 22:39:57 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: pornography & the ``cypherpunk cause''
Message-ID: <9310130537.AA23327@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


First of all, a clarification. I raised this issue with EFF because I'm
utmostly concerned about upholding their sterling image, not because I
am trying to start a flame war or engage in a sniper attack. If I had
sent email to a few key people there I would have gotten nowhere (as my
email actually proves). Here we have a *small personal forum* to
discuss this in *unemotional* terms. I raised it in that spirit and am
very disillusioned to see it all dragged through the gutter by many
respondents. People are reacting like I've said, There Is No Cypherpunk
Cause or Eric Hughes and T.C. May Are Traitors.

So, I'm quite relieved that D. Frissell has posted some cool comments
on case law and others who have focused on the issue of *operator
knowledge* related to the law, which was one of my chief concerns from
the beginning.

* * *

S. Steele <ssteele@eff.org>

>My warning to sysops simply said that these files were listed
>on a federal indictment, so the "lack of knowledge of the age of the
>depicted people" defense remains

The bulletin strongly suggests that the files constitute illegal child
pornography. therefore, that would imply to a sensible operator that
the age of the people pictured is not above that allowed for legal pornography.

The point of *requiring knowledge of age*, in my view, seems to be a
subset of a more important idea of *knowing the pictures violate the
law*. Knowing the age of the participants is *one* way that one might
know that the pictures violate the law. But one may come to that
conclusion otherwise. For example, learning that they are the target of
a federal investigation into child pornography would imply to a high
degree of probability they are `illegal'. Of course, I don't claim to
be a lawyer, and this is just one interpretation. perhaps it is
mistaken. feel free to correct and insult me at the same time (what fun
is it without both?).

* * *

I would like to say the following.  My analogy to the CERT warning that
appeared here seems to have completely escaped many, or perhaps
everyone is intentionally evading it. The metaphor is extremely
compelling. Both are sent to operators in order to bring something to
their attention they `might' need to fix by an outside party generally
interested in the operators own best interests. While I'm not sure that
what CERT did was apropos, that warning was so *delicately worded*. In
contrast the EFF announcement SHOUTS IN YOUR EAR. the CERT announcement
was extremely diplomatic. the EFF announcement was SCREECHING.

Do `we' have *any* consistency, sophistication, or coherence as a
group? Recent messages have DISMAYED me. is `our' philosophy nothing
but Beavis&Butthead style ``Gubberment and the Fedz and Pigs are THINGS
THAT SUCK and EFF is a THING THATS COOL.'' Or do `we' have no
philosophy at all? Are `we' just blind, crosseyed, and elitist
`codeheads' that char newbies for cruel sport? Is it better to just
ignore the `politics of cryptography' which coincidentally involves
things like what has been called the `Tim May .sig Agenda' because some
people might have strong opinions?

If `we' don't have our own house in order, `we' are nothing but LOUD
HYPOCRITES. If you don't clean your dirty laundry, IT STINKS.

Excuse me, but I think the press adores the Cypherpunk cause, and `we'
got press exposure such as the NYT and Wired article, because there
appears to be LEADERS and a DEFINITE POLITICAL AGENDA. It appears,
reading from those, that perhaps we even view the whole matter of free
cryptography use as a MORAL ISSUE, which of course would seem to imply
we possess some MORALITY to so claim. Oh yes, what was that
hand-wringing a few months ago on the list about the ``MOVEMENT
STALLING''? I wonder why! who posted that, anyway? I forget.

p.s. I dare someone to post that old CERT announcement sent to E.H.
that was posted here and caused such a noxious stink here. Look at how
gentle it really is. In fact, I would recommend that future
announcements of this sort look to it as a model. It clearly has been
finetuned past many revisions. As much as I hate to admit it, CERT has
a lot of expertise in dealing with this kind of thing. If anyone wants
to emulate them, don't reinvent the wheel.

p.p.s. go ahead, flame me into oblivion. ah, anonymously is even
better! from people we've never *heard* of before on the list! yes, 
let everone up to the top tell me what a jerk I am for caring. please
be as *emotional* as possible. defend the silly announcement or the
Cypherpunk Status Quo as if I had accused *you* of being a child
pornographer or traitor. Even better, banish me from the list for my
thoughtcrimes! Yes, cyberspatial hemlock is what I need right now.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Perry E. Metzger" <pmetzger@lehman.com>
Date: Tue, 12 Oct 93 20:49:58 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Breaking DES
In-Reply-To: <9310130056.AA06298@flammulated.owlnet.rice.edu>
Message-ID: <9310130349.AA00794@snark.lehman.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Karl Lui Barrus says:
> So maybe it's only of theoretical interest, sort of like differential
> cryptanalysis against the DES - which requires 10^47 chosen
> plaintexts.
> 
> Why don't you mail Biham and Shamir that their method sucks.  It's
> fairly infeasible as well.

It *IS* infeasable, and they realize it. The breakthrough was
differential cryptanalysis itself, and the discovery that DES was
fairly resistant to it. The fact that they made ANY crack in it was
kind of neat, by the way.

A huge number of chosen plaintexts is of course pretty much not
possible in practice, especially since you might not get any chosen
plaintexts at all!

Perry




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: hiscdcj@lux.latrobe.edu.au (Dwayne)
Date: Tue, 12 Oct 93 07:27:03 PDT
To: Asbahr@UH.EDU
Subject: Re: distributed autonomous networks
In-Reply-To: <199310081918.AA06860@Menudo.UH.EDU>
Message-ID: <9310121421.AA25614@lux.latrobe.edu.au>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>Haha!  That's exactly how I got hyped about the Julieboard --
>rummaging in the backlog of the voluminous-but-valuable cpunk posts...

:-)
Yeah, they are useful. I got on this list only a couple of months ago, so
I am sure I have missed a lot.

>My question:  Exactly how cheap can we make these things?  Mass
>produced boards, a bag of appropriate components, and a few dozen
>cpunks working in parallel could work wonders.  

This is what I thought. If they are made so that they are self-powering,
and tuned via crystals, there is no reason why we couldn't have them
mass-produced wherever the hell they are cheapest to manufacture, as 
part of a big world-wide single order. My friend over here suggested
we <we being anyone vaguely interested in a free and unbreakable net> get
in touch with the ham radio set, plus the bbs scene. The more the merrier,
I say.
The advantage of crystals, or at least a tunable set, is that we can then 
tune them to whetever local frequency is appropriate...

>What about surface mount components?  Harder to assemble, and fewer
>people have the skills, but the resulting box would be very small
>and more easily concealed.

Well, the smaller the better, I think. Ideally they'd be match box or 
cigarette packet sized, or smaller. But I have no idea how big the julieboard
is....

>If you are hiding boxes on telco poles, an obvious source of power
>presents itself.  :-)

Phone lines are underground, here. Power lines aren't, though  :-)

>I like the EMF idea!  Ideologically and technically interesting...
>Is it practical?   Heat to electricity?  hmm...

The EMF isea IS practical. Apprently they have things in the train stations 
which induce a hum in a loop in a hearing aid so blind people can navigate
the platforms. This is in the undergroun stations in central melbourne.
I know nothing about EMF, but my freind does, and he think it's practicable.
I don't know about the heat-to-power idea, and neither does he, he's just
heard of it.

>Someone suggested general use of IR laser links, but someone else 
>mentioned that it would be a bitch to operate a decentralized network 
>of IR links.  Well, lasers and microwave are probably best suited for
>mid-range connections betweens clusters of boxes.

This is what I thought. I thought of using IR lasers for the net-to-Internet
link. What sort of traffic can an IR laser carry, and how cheap are they?
Is this sort of stuff easily done?

>(Ham radio tinkers with microwave and laser communication experience
> should probably comment here...  )

>Since the FCC frowns on encrypted amateur radio, I doubt we could
>openly use the ham nets or satellites...but how about bit fiddling
>with slow-scan TV?  :-)  The list has generated many good ideas
>on tunneling naughty data in otherwise innocent exchanges...

Well, the idea behind this is that even if the authorities DID frown on
the whole thing, there is nothing they can do about it. there is no 
centralised switching mechanism, just lots of cheap nodes scattered (and
hidden) all over the place. The concept of ARPAnet as an uninterruptible net
was what set me off on this track. Even if they could find the nodes, we
just put more up. they could jam the links, but if we make them so that
we can remotely change the frequncy, or use spread-spectrum tech, then
what can they do?  The radio direction finding bunch in the government
here has been shut down due to cost-cutting <heh heh> so there is bugger
all that could be done to stop it, in this country at least.
If we make the whole thing into suburban cells, and run each cell on a 
different frequency, then it wuld be impossible to jam the network.

>How many people are interested in this idea?  Is it time for
>a radiopunk task force?  Does one already exist?  :-)

Well, there is one over here, so i'll co-ordinate it if people are 
interested. People can mail me directly, and in a couple of weeks I'll 
have my own UUCP site so I can set up a maling list if the traffic gets 
too big.
I think this is a very good idea. Sure, we can encrypt our data, but we are 
still transmitting it over =someone else's net=
So, let's build our own!

Dwayne.









From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: hiscdcj@lux.latrobe.edu.au (Dwayne)
Date: Tue, 12 Oct 93 07:22:03 PDT
To: catalyst@netcom.com
Subject: Re: distributed autonomous networks
In-Reply-To: <9310082312.AA02297@newton.apple.com>
Message-ID: <9310121421.AA25625@lux.latrobe.edu.au>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>  >[stuff about possible power sources and transmission media]

>A television report on 'Beyond 2000' described meteor-bounce radio.  The
>technique extends the idea of bouncing radio waves off the ionosphere (for
>distance), to bouncing off the atmospheric trails of micro meteors. 

Are these particularly common? Or only when there are meteor showers...

>Reported applications are economical (at least run-time economical,
>start-up cost was not discussed) weather telemetry stations in remote
>areas.  A solar panel provides the power, a small computer is needed to
>direct transmission.

Right. what sort of computer? Would it be possible to run this sort
of setup from an 8088? They are pretty cheap at the moment.
:-)

>This technique may not be feasible in the context you are describing, but
>the telemetry application was parallel in that it also comprises many
>independent, self-contained transmitters.

Ahh. Well, I'll have to look into it.

Dwayne.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: hiscdcj@lux.latrobe.edu.au (Dwayne)
Date: Tue, 12 Oct 93 07:24:54 PDT
To: mg5n+@andrew.cmu.edu
Subject: Re: distributed autonomous networks
In-Reply-To: <9310081716.AA13288@lux.latrobe.edu.au>
Message-ID: <9310121421.AA25634@lux.latrobe.edu.au>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>Well, building the transmitter wouldn't be too hard, and you could
>probably transmit much larger amounts of data than over a modem if you
>used high frequencies.  The most difficult thing as I see it is that
>you'd have to build a small computer for each box, and program it to
>route data packets, error-check them, and so on.

Could an 8088 do this? (he says, having just asked this in a previous 
message).
The thing would be to do it via as cheap and readily availabe a chip as is 
possible.

>A Fully-Qualified-Domain-Name type of network would create
>complications.  Since the network will be constantly expanding and
>changing, you'd probably need relative domain names. (you'd have to
>specify: send packet thru site #10 thru site #34 and deliver to site #19)
>To have fully qualified domain names, you'd need to have something on
>the net cataloging them.

Erp. Right. Hmmm. I just thought it wuld be kind of nice to have an internet
address for some of the nodes, so we can mail to and from the internet,
while preserving the geographical invisibility that punknet would provide.

Dwayne




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: hiscdcj@lux.latrobe.edu.au (Dwayne)
Date: Tue, 12 Oct 93 07:26:28 PDT
To: wcs@anchor.ho.att.com
Subject: Re: distributed autonomous networks
In-Reply-To: <9310090005.AA11624@anchor.ho.att.com>
Message-ID: <9310121421.AA25641@lux.latrobe.edu.au>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>Meteor Burst is real stuff, though the last time I knew a little about it
>the bandwidth was pretty low; e.g. you got 300 baud average throughput
>doing bursts of 4800 baud with really heavy-duty forward error correction,

Hmm, not much use unless you had some sort of massivley parallel setup.
Still, it's an idea.

>since it's a pretty sporadic medium.  Power usage is really low,
>and typical applications are things like telemetry from snow-depth recorders
>out in the mountains, where line-of-sight is essentially unavailable.

Yes, but I assume that we are talking about moving a bit more data than this.

>I don't know how much bandwidth or area you get out of it, or how traceable
>it is - our meteor expert retired years ago, and was looking at problems like
>how to build radio data networks that weren't bothered by nuclear explosions.

I don't think the Powers That Be will get _that_ heavy...  :-)

>If there's a spare satellite slot available, ALOHANET technology is a reasonably
>efficient way to use it.

Err, which is?

Dwayne.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: hiscdcj@lux.latrobe.edu.au (Dwayne)
Date: Tue, 12 Oct 93 07:26:49 PDT
To: trebor@foretune.co.jp
Subject: Re: Spread-spectrum net (vulnerability of)
In-Reply-To: <9310090132.AA08927@dink.foretune.co.jp>
Message-ID: <9310121422.AA25737@lux.latrobe.edu.au>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>You can put up such a network, but given that your boxes have to receive
>the signal, it will be detectable (but not understandable) to 3rd parties.

That is why we try to make them as cheaply as possible. Then if they
are hard to get hold of (hidden/camouflaged/stuck up cliffs and flagpoles)
the cost to retrieve them will be prohibitively high.

>Anyone who wants to take you down will only need (1) a detector that can
>point out your boxes and (2) a small caliber rifle.

Errrrr. Hadn't thought of that. Placement will be a major factor, I
beleieve.

>Since the cost to find and destroy is much less than the cost to make and
>deploy, a covert network of this sort wouldn't last long.  An _overt_
>network, perhaps a commercial entity that networks an entire city, would
>be an interesting prospect.

Depends how you place them. If you put them _on top_ of things, you'd need 
a helicopter to shoot 'em.

>The techniques for maintaining location information on actual machines
>connected to the net, and for updating them as they move, are actually
>quite simple and well understood (cellular telephones are a simple,
>dumb version of the technology).  The trick is to find out a way that
>the network can know where you are but not give that information out
>(even to the owners of the network), without unacceptable overheads.

This is true.
But if we make the things in thick boxes (well, slightly bullet-proof,
anyway), and put them in places where theyare hard to shoot at, then we 
should be right. We would only need a few each suburb.

Dwayne.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Dean Van Dyke <dean@ucc.su.OZ.AU>
Date: Tue, 12 Oct 93 07:46:28 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: PLEASE REMOVE ME !!!
In-Reply-To: <624CCE1380A01E6B@sleepy.egr.msu.edu>
Message-ID: <Pine.3.85.9310130043.A9018-0100000@extro.ucc.su.OZ.AU>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


please unsubscribe me from "cypherpunks" NOW !

thank-you.






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Kragen J Sittler <xentrac@phobos.unm.edu>
Date: Wed, 13 Oct 93 00:21:36 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: MEETING?: Albuquerque cypherpunks
Message-ID: <9310130721.AA02042@phobos.unm.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Sorry to waste yet more list bandwidth... but I have seen many meeting
announcements posted on cypherpunks.  I would love to attend a cypherpunks
meeting, but unfortunately, I have seen none within a thousand miles.

So, Albuquerque cypherpunks, such as Mike Diehl, the Mystic Homeboy, and any
others whom I don't know, please email me at this address.  I don't know if
there are enough of us to have an actual meeting, but it would be nice to get
together and talk even if not.

Kragen
p.s. I am subscribed at to1sittler@apsicc.aps.edu.  Please do NOT email me
there.  Use only xentrac@phobos.unm.edu. (Kragen Sittler)




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "George A. Gleason" <gg@well.sf.ca.us>
Date: Wed, 13 Oct 93 03:37:01 PDT
To: mg5n+@andrew.cmu.edu
Subject: Re: Spread-spectrum net (vulnerability of)
Message-ID: <93Oct13.033350pdt.13932-3@well.sf.ca.us>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


RE your item, 

"a sort of virtual-space map, which would reveal
nothing about actual phyical location of the sites or the person you are
contacting."

I'm not so sure... in cellular systems, cells must know where the handsets
are located in order to send incoming calls.  Your transmitter has a
physical location which could presumably be tracked in the normal manner,
and I would expect the overall routing information in a net to be
susceptible to traffic analysis in any case.  An individual who is using the
system to communicate wouldn't be able to find the physical address of
another user, but e.g. an intelligence agency which was looking at the
entire network would.  Even assuming spread-spectrum and various link
encryption techniques on top of whatever end-user encryption is supplied;
with enough traffic and enough time, it should be possible to do TA.  

Or have I missed something....?

-gg




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Kasuga Jingoro <jingoro@rahul.net>
Date: Wed, 13 Oct 93 06:57:02 PDT
To: pmetzger@lehman.com
Subject: Re: The Bank of the Internet!?
In-Reply-To: <9310111713.AA18358@snark.lehman.com>
Message-ID: <199310131356.AA13313@bolero.rahul.net>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> Plenty. Find me a workstation with the sort of uptime a 3090 running
> MVS will give you.

Since you asked...  I don't know what the average uptime of a 3090 is,
but from several years of experience as a Unix sysadmin, most of the
Sun systems I've been involved with easily had uptimes ranging months
at a time.  Powering down a system for maintenance or adding equipment
was more common than crashes.  If you insist on promoting the reliability
of the 3090, perhaps you'd be so kind as to cite some figures.  I'd
hazard to guess though that a 3090 could be sufficiently mismanaged to
produce dismal uptimes as well as a workstation can.

In any case, your rather condescending attitude about workstations only
seems to reinforce what I percieve as a condescending attitude towards
the people inteding to start the digital credit union.  And since some
of the more high-profile cypherpunks are not just workstation users but
inventors of the technology, I would think that your comments have
probably similiarly affected other members of this group.

Aside: welcome to Robert Woodhead who is in the best position to know
what my username means.

---- jingoro@tcp.com -- Jim Lick -- jingoro@rahul.net -- jIngOrO@CaveMUCK ----
--:):-- perfect little dream the kind that hurts the most -- |\| | |/| --:(:--
--- CaveMUCK is back! --- Telnet to cave.tcp.com (128.95.10.106) port 2283 ---
-- Finger me for fun,  excitement or for my PGP Public Key Encryption Block --



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: m5@vail.tivoli.com (Mike McNally)
Date: Wed, 13 Oct 93 05:56:38 PDT
To: "L. Detweiler" <ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Subject: pornography & the ``cypherpunk cause''
In-Reply-To: <9310130537.AA23327@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Message-ID: <9310131248.AA27665@vail.tivoli.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



"L. Detweiler" writes:
 > For example, learning that they are the target of
 > a federal investigation into child pornography would imply to a high
 > degree of probability they are `illegal'. 

Seems to me it only implies that the files are central to a particular
investigation.  Unless you take the Ed Meese line that if you're a
suspect then ipso facto you're a criminal, the implication has no
legal weight (says this non-lawyer).

 >                                                While I'm not sure that
 > what CERT did was apropos, that warning was so *delicately worded*. In
 > contrast the EFF announcement SHOUTS IN YOUR EAR. the CERT announcement
 > was extremely diplomatic. the EFF announcement was SCREECHING.

Think of it this way.  If I'm tooling down the Interstate at 75 and my
passenger says

	Though ultimately you will have to make this decision for
	yourself, because in your capacity as driver of this motor
	vehicle you are solely responsible for adherence to state
	and local traffic ordinances, you should be aware that an
	official affiliated with a law enforcement organization is
	at this moment using a speed measurement device from his
	vehicle parked ahead of us behind a bush, and that there
	may be legal ramifications to his detection of your current
	speed.

I'd be like real pissed off while the ticket was being written.  If,
on the other hand, my companion said

	TROOPER! SLOW DOWN!

we'd probably make it to Stuckey's before they ran out of pecan log
roll.

--
Mike McNally




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: koontzd@lrcs.loral.com (David Koontz )
Date: Wed, 13 Oct 93 08:26:39 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re:  Native American Encryption?!
Message-ID: <9310131525.AA03957@nebula.lrcs.loral.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Navajo (Navaho) Indians.  Referred to as Code Talkers.  I believe you'll
find something in David Kahns "The Code Breakers".  They were used in
tactical situations.

To break an otherwise unknown language would require context, such as
good traffic flow analysis and otherwise good intelligence.  I beleive
there was a program on A&E (TV) on the Navajo code talkers in the Pacific
(WWII).  Navajo code talkers used lots of colloquilisms and all new
each other more or less.  You could have ended up attacking language
code in sets between two code talkers.





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: paul@poboy.b17c.ingr.com (Paul Robichaux)
Date: Wed, 13 Oct 93 06:39:59 PDT
To: gg@well.sf.ca.us (George A. Gleason)
Subject: Re: Spread-spectrum net (vulnerability of)
In-Reply-To: <93Oct13.033350pdt.13932-3@well.sf.ca.us>
Message-ID: <199310131338.AA02798@poboy.b17c.ingr.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> I'm not so sure... in cellular systems, cells must know where the handsets
> are located in order to send incoming calls.  Your transmitter has a
> physical location which could presumably be tracked in the normal manner,
> and I would expect the overall routing information in a net to be
> susceptible to traffic analysis in any case.  An individual who is using the
> system to communicate wouldn't be able to find the physical address of
> another user, but e.g. an intelligence agency which was looking at the
> entire network would.  Even assuming spread-spectrum and various link
> encryption techniques on top of whatever end-user encryption is supplied;
> with enough traffic and enough time, it should be possible to do TA.  

Cell systems have to know which cell you're in (visualize each cell as
a circle centered on the cell site) to know how to route a call _to_
you. I believe the MTSO (== cellular CO) will route the call directly
to the cell site for the cell you're in.

Of course, the cell will also know what cell you're in when you
originate a call. This knowledge is useful for traffic analysis, but
it's also required for the system to be able to route incoming and
outgoing calls.

An alternative is the ham packet radio-style addressing of
user@node@node..., where "user" represents the call sign of the
intended receiver and each node represents the call of a digipeater
between the sender and recipient. The hard part here is that you must
be able to dynamically generate a route between Alice and Bob if
either of them move from their last known location.

Of course, there's always store-and-forward. A spread-spectrum network
of small digipeaters, combined with crypto remailing and pool
software, would really be something. I'm not sure that it would work
well for spread-spectrum SLIP, though.

-Paul

-- 
Paul Robichaux, KD4JZG     | "Change the world for a better tomorrow. But
perobich@ingr.com          |  watch your ass today." - aaron@halcyon.com
Intergraph Federal Systems | Be a cryptography user- ask me how.





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: koontzd@lrcs.loral.com (David Koontz )
Date: Wed, 13 Oct 93 09:11:40 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Native American Encryption?!
Message-ID: <9310131610.AA04035@nebula.lrcs.loral.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>If nothing else, adding encryption on top of the Navajo
>language makes known-plaintext much more difficult.

Navajo has no written language.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: doug@netcom.com (Doug Merritt)
Date: Wed, 13 Oct 93 09:16:42 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Spread-spectrum net (vulnerability of)
Message-ID: <9310131614.AA28603@netcom4.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


jkreznar@ininx.com (John E. Kreznar) said:
>Are you taking into account that as the power is dropped, coherent
>communication can compensate by dropping the data rate

Very low power transmitters are actually legitimate, at least in some
bands, so you don't have to drop the signal to the point where it'd
merge seamlessly with ambient noise.

However I doubt that extremely low power transmitters will accomplish what
is desired.

I also wonder whether extremely low data rates are desired.

>> There are other approaches...phase-sweeping...phase-conjugation...
>Do you have a reference for these?  Neither appears in the index of any of the
>books in my spread-spectrum library.  Maybe they're not spread-spectrum?

Different topic. Try "phase conjugate mirrors" in optical and physics
journals. I'm not positive that this would be good enough to help avoid
detection.
	Doug




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: nate@rodin.VIS.ColoState.EDU
Date: Wed, 13 Oct 93 08:27:02 PDT
To: jingoro@rahul.net (Kasuga Jingoro)
Subject: Re: The Bank of the Internet!?
In-Reply-To: <199310131356.AA13313@bolero.rahul.net>
Message-ID: <9310131522.AA00413@rodin.VIS.ColoState.EDU>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text


writes Kasuga Jingoro:
>
>> Plenty. Find me a workstation with the sort of uptime a 3090 running
>> MVS will give you.
>
>Since you asked...  I don't know what the average uptime of a 3090 is,
>but from several years of experience as a Unix sysadmin, most of the
>Sun systems I've been involved with easily had uptimes ranging months
>at a time.  Powering down a system for maintenance or adding equipment
>was more common than crashes.  If you insist on promoting the reliability
>of the 3090, perhaps you'd be so kind as to cite some figures.  I'd
>hazard to guess though that a 3090 could be sufficiently mismanaged to
>produce dismal uptimes as well as a workstation can.

I have (well, I manage) a sun 4/280 server, and it was once up for
180 days straight, but we restarted it just because it had been up
for what we thought was a really long time...  In my experience, Big Blue
machines only talk to themselves correctly, and don't talk to much else.

Just my $0.02

-nate

-- 
+-----------------------------------------------------------------------+
| Nate Sammons   email: nate@VIS.ColoState.Edu
|   Colorado State University Computer Visualization Laboratory
|   Finger nate@monet.VIS.ColoState.Edu for my PGP key
|   #include <std.disclaimer>
|   Title 18 USC 2511 and 18 USC 2703 Protected --> Monitoring Forbidden
+--------+                          Always remember "Brazil"



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: doug@netcom.com (Doug Merritt)
Date: Wed, 13 Oct 93 09:42:03 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Breaking DES
In-Reply-To: <pmetzger@lehman.com>
Message-ID: <9310131642.AA01905@netcom4.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>When I use a hash table, it is never a substitute for storing the
>actual value of the thing I'm hashing. Its always just a way of
>rapidly FINDING the underlying object. I have to store the underlying
>object in order to compare to it. As an example, in a hashed symbol
>table, I store the actual symbols.

Instead of storing the underlying value, I am assuming that it is *thrown
away*, and recalculated whenever there is a collision. This cuts down
on the expense of this disk drives, at the cost of increasing runtime
by roughly a factor of 7 (log_base_256(2^56)). I didn't include that
cost in my previous estimates because I was doing a very rough back of
the envelope calculation, but I accept that it should be included.

>> Impractical? Your response to Karl implied that it was *impossible*.
>
>The two are very similar in our field. Cracking RSA with a 2000 bit
>key is merely impractical, not impossible, where "impractical" is
>defined as completely beyond human ability.

It's a question of where you draw the line. A budget of one hundred billion
dollars and a runtime of say a year, I'm willing to call "impractical".
A budget of 10 trillion dollars and a runtime of 100 years, I'd be
willing to call "impossible".

The 2000 bit key is over everyone's threshold.
	Doug




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: lefty@apple.com (Lefty)
Date: Wed, 13 Oct 93 09:56:42 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Native American Encryption?!
Message-ID: <9310131653.AA08213@internal.apple.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>  I remember hearing many years ago that one of the branches of the armed
>aervices during WWII used a native American -- Cherokee? Apache? --
>language to communicate. The Japanese (the story goes) went nuts trying to
>crack the code -- unsuccessfully.

It was Navajo.

>  Two questions:
>  1) Can anyone give me a reference for this story (assuming it's true)?

There was a recent (i.e. within the past year) article in Smithsonian
magazine on the "code talkers".  I believe only one or two of them are
still surviving.

This sort of thing doesn't constitute what would properly be called a
cipher; it's either a code, or perhaps a species of steganography.


--
Lefty (lefty@apple.com)
C:.M:.C:., D:.O:.D:.






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: A little like having bees live in your head.  13-Oct-1993 1306 <yerazunis@aidev.enet.dec.com>
Date: Wed, 13 Oct 93 10:16:42 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Native American Encryption
Message-ID: <9310131712.AA09184@enet-gw.pa.dec.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



>>If nothing else, adding encryption on top of the Navajo
>>language makes known-plaintext much more difficult.
>
>Navajo has no written language.

Not so.  There has been a written form for Navajo for the last
few decades (at least).  It uses the Roman alphabet but the mapping
of sound-to-character is not the same as for English.  Vowels aren't 
even a, e, i, o, and u, which certainly doesn't help speakers of English
trying to form syllables.

To my eye, it more closely resembles modem noise on an ASCII terminal 
than anything else, but it does exist.  (no, I can't read it)

Navajo code talkers spoke with Navajo words, but not with Navajo 
meanings.  Parts of speech that should be nouns became adjectives,
etc.  Navajo Elders who heard the code talkers commented "It
sounds like Navaho, but it doesn't make any _sense_!".

	-Ya-ha'-tey!
	 Bill Yerazunis




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Alan Mason <vznquest@netcom.com>
Date: Wed, 13 Oct 93 10:26:42 PDT
To: "Victor A. Borisov" <blaster@kiae.su>
Subject: Re: New aproach in pgp-randomizer!!!
In-Reply-To: <AA1kykiW95@kiae.su>
Message-ID: <Pine.3.05.9310131049.A12482-b100000@netcom5>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



I experienced the same thing the first time I ran pgp 23 on my stone
generic 286 fossil.  In fact, I was shocked when, a few weeks later, it
asked for keystrokes when doing -kg.   Anyone have any ideas about this???

-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
Alan Mason		|   Any time you find a simple answer to a question,
vznquest@netcom.com	|   The odds are you asked the wrong question.
*******************     |
----------------------------------------------------------------------------

On Wed, 13 Oct 1993, Victor A. Borisov wrote:

> Hello!
> 
> Today I saw paraphysics randomizer in pgp:
> pgp -kg was run;
> it ask me about user id and passphrase;
> then it run generation (it wrote like this: ............ ++++);
> 
> But, as we see, it did not ask about key typing!!! The most intresting
> pgp generate key pair and rendseed.bin-file. I thinck this is related to
> new topsecret paraphysics randomyser (today is 13.10.93).:)
> Some words about technical ditails:
> Hardwate - i486; Software - MS-DOS 3v30 (I boot from protected floppy and
> ran good antivitus utility before keypair generation). PGP 2v3a was run.
> I have expiriance in pgp (i maintain pgp-keys server).
> 
> I keep keypair and randseed file and try to repiad this fantastic result, but
> paraphysic energy is go out :).
> 
> Mr. Zimmermann, I hope, that this was really paraphysic (or my mistake:(),
> because the trust to crypt-program is very unstable thing.
> 
> 







From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Grendel Grettisson <mimir@u.washington.edu>
Date: Wed, 13 Oct 93 10:29:59 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Internet Security Scanner available
In-Reply-To: <2wwBBc1w165w@decode.UUCP>
Message-ID: <Pine.3.85.9310131035.C7602-0100000@stein1.u.washington.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain




On Tue, 12 Oct 1993, System Operator wrote:

> For those of you without FTP access who would like to take
> a look at the Internet Security Scanner, it is available on
> my BBS in /public/crypto.  Call +1 410 730 6734, 12/24/96,
> login "cypher" password "punk".

 How about for those of us WITH FTP access?






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Perry E. Metzger" <pmetzger@lehman.com>
Date: Wed, 13 Oct 93 07:36:40 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Breaking DES
In-Reply-To: <9310130416.AA25367@netcom5.netcom.com>
Message-ID: <9310131433.AA06289@snark.lehman.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Doug Merritt says:
> pmetzger@lehman.com said:
> >Each DES block is eight bytes. You can't use hashing -- the idea is
> >nonsense in context. Did you read the original post?
> 
> Yes, I did. If hashing doesn't work, you'll have to say why not.

> It's a technique that works in most other situations.

You don't know anything about hashing, then.

When I use a hash table, it is never a substitute for storing the
actual value of the thing I'm hashing. Its always just a way of
rapidly FINDING the underlying object. I have to store the underlying
object in order to compare to it. As an example, in a hashed symbol
table, I store the actual symbols.

If you tried to work out your proposed cracking algorithm instead of
requesting that other people do all your thinking for you, you'd see
what was wrong with it. 

> >Second of all, the method is still impractical. I was merely
> >giving the easiest and most obvious attack on it.
> 
> Impractical? Your response to Karl implied that it was *impossible*.

The two are very similar in our field. Cracking RSA with a 2000 bit
key is merely impractical, not impossible, where "impractical" is
defined as completely beyond human ability.

> Clearly you are preparing to drop the argument because you sense that
> your tactic of flaming didn't work.

You can lead a horse to water, but you can't make him think.

Perry




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Stanton McCandlish <mech@eff.org>
Date: Wed, 13 Oct 93 08:07:03 PDT
To: thesegroups@tic.com
Subject: bad news from Georgia (the Republic of)
Message-ID: <199310131441.AA13653@eff.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


This might be interesting, though international, to many of you.  Seems a
certain Internet node is perceived as vital to the Georgians in their
struggles.



Forwarded message:
From brown Tue Oct 12 13:55:42 1993
Date: Tue, 12 Oct 1993 17:55:42 -0400
Message-Id: <199310122155.AA28753@yfn.ysu.edu>
From: aq528@yfn.ysu.edu (Rita M. Rouvalis)
To: eff@eff.org
Subject: [NFJAD@acad3.alaska.edu: Republic of Georgia]
Reply-To: aq528@yfn.ysu.edu
Sender: brown



    ================= Begin forwarded message =================

    From: NFJAD@acad3.alaska.edu (Joe Davis)
    To: rita@eff.org
    Subject: Republic of Georgia
    Date: Tue, 12 Oct

    
    Hi,
    Speaking of fronteers and freedom, here is a need for communications
    equiptment for which I have been unable to get any direct help. Any
    chance of posting this on the EFF? 
    Good Wishes,
    Joe
    Joe Davis
    nfjad@alaska.bitnet
    
    Joe Davis
    Box 15301, Fritz Creek, AK 99603 (907) 235.4069 Email: afcrrjoe@aol.com
    Oct. 12, 1993
    
    Senator Stevens
    Washington DC
    
    Attn: Senator Stevens
             Anna Kerttula
             Anna KerttulaUs replacement
    
    Dear Senator Stevens,
    
    It is appalling what goes on in Georgia. It is a chaos of crime and needs
    direct attention now. Is there nothing that the US can do? Cannot Russia
    control her own boarders and disallow weapons and soldiers to assist in the
    murder of Georgians? How can we loan money to the Russians while this
    continues? And where is the United Nations during this critical time? I am
    faxing you the latest and perhaps the last information from the office of Mr.
    Shevardnadze and his assistant, Dr. Gomelauri. They need medical help,
    communications help, but mostly, UN peace keeping forcer and Russia to keep
    her word on helping to keep the peace. I realize the Russians have had their
    own problems this past week but that does not excuse them for their lack of
    help and allowing of arms and soldiers to attack the Georgians. Please read
    these two short letters I just received via email. Please pass them on to Dr.
    Butros-Ghali of the UN as I have neither his fax number or email address. 
    
    I am very actively searching for grants relative to the communications needs
    of Georgia and as soon as I can find one I will apply and notify you of the
    same. Is there a way to get equipment for a node over there now? You will see
    that they need the freedom to communicate. Dr. Gomelauri of the Georgian
    Academy of Sciences working in conjunction with Mr. Shevardnadze would be the
    first level of priority to receive such equipment. If I can be of any
    assistance, please call on me. 
    
    To sum up this letter:
    1) Georgia needs peace keeping enforcement now.
    2) Georgian needs humanitarian relief now
    3) Georgia needs independent communication abilities now
    4) Georgia needs American friendship
    
    Thank you,
    
    
    Joe Davis
    
    Attached: letter from Dr. Gomelauri
                    letter from Mr. Shevardnadze
    both posted for general distribution
    From:     ggom
    Subject:  Re: URGENT from Paul M. Palo Alto
    From:     ggom@coira.kheta.georgia.su
    
    Dear Paul,
    
    Thanks to you and all who are trying to support democratically-
    oriented forces in Georgia and personally Mr. Shevardnadze.
    Every day the situation is more and more tragic in Georgia. Our entrance in
    the Mow. computer node (the only canal to the Internet)
    is practically closed. I received your mail after 3 days you send it to me.
    
    WE NEED DIRECT ENTRANCE IN TO THE INTERNET to give the possibility
    our users including Brian to send you information from here promptly.
    
    The port POTI was occupied earlier few days ago by Kobalia supported
    by killers, Kazak and North-Caucasus Russian citizens.
    So Georgia can not be reached from the Black Sea. That means hunger
    will start fast.
    Separatist forces continued to move to the east.
    Pleas try to explain to ISF it is vital for Georgia TODAY to keep the
    node GGOM@CIT.GE in operation. My proposal about the Support and
    Renovation today is vital not only for the Academy but whole country.
    Big plans for future with many VAXes may not be needed if Georgia does
    not exist at all. To my Proposal satellite line must be added because
    as I see the dish of Georgian Foundation will not arrive this year. 
    Please try to find someone who will donate CIT few mobile laptops
    (second hand PC/XT compatible) with modems, satellite canal and
    necessary hardware + software. You know we will put it in operation in
    few hours. This is tremendously important. We can not reach Moscow node few
    days so I am afraid you will get my mail too late if ever. Here is very
    important information from the Head of the State for the posting worldwide on
    the networks. Please continue to do this.
    
    George
    Tbilisi   October 03, 1993
    
    From:     ggom
    Subject:  Tragedy in Svaneti - Georgian Caucasus
    From:     ggom@coira.kheta.georgia.su
    
                  D E C L A R A T I O N
    
         On September 16, 1993 the Gudauta side once again violated the July 27
    Sochi cease-fire agreement and began a large-scale assault upon the city of
    Sukhumi. Disarmed pursuant to the above agreement the defenders of Sukhumi
    after selflessly fighting a fierce battle left the city along with the tens of
    thousands of civilians. However, the Gudauta separatists were not content with
    this and continued hostilities in the direction of Ochamchira and Gali. The
    only safe area where the refugees could hide themselves from the barbaric
    atrocities, perpetrated by the mercenaries hired by the Gudauta side, was the
    mountainous region of Svaneti. Therefore, over one hundred thousand refugees
    among whom the overwhelming majority are women, children and old people are
    currently seeking shelter in the mountains.
    
         This created a very difficult situation in Svaneti. It has been snowing
    for some time now.
         Dozens of people have already died of hunger and cold, and what is
    particularly tragic there are infants among the dead. The Georgian leadership
    is taking all possible
    measures to help people. Food and warm clothes as well as various conveyances
    to bring the refugees out of Svaneti are being sent there. This, however, is
    not enough. The acute economic crisis raging in Georgia makes it impossible to
    use every means to save those in trouble. Unless immediate decisive measures
    are taken, the current disastrous situation will turn tragic. The overall
    situation is being seriously aggravated by the supporters of the ex-president,
    who have cut off the major communication arteries.
    
         Considering the present situation Svaneti shall be declared the zone of
    distress. I request all the neighboring countries, the people of good will -
    to empathize with the Georgians in trouble. Do not let tens of thousands of
    children, women, old men die of hunger and cold. The quickest and the most
    convenient way to bring them out is by helicopters. However, Georgia has only
    a few. We are also in dire need of warm clothes, foodstuffs and medications.
    
         I want you to know that Georgia expects and believes that you will help
    promptly. The delay is tantamount to death.
    
         May God bless you.
    
                                    Eduard Shevardnadze.
    
    
    



-- 
-=> mech@eff.org <=-
Stanton McCandlish     Electronic Frontier Foundation Online Activist & SysOp
NitV-DC BBS 202-232-2715, Fido 1:109/? IndraNet 369:111/1, 14.4V32b 16.8ZyX



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Edward Elhauge <ee@lever.com>
Date: Wed, 13 Oct 93 11:26:43 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: pornography & the ``cypherpunk cause''
In-Reply-To: <9310131248.AA27665@vail.tivoli.com>
Message-ID: <m0onAEq-0001ZdC@lever.lever.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


In message <9310131248.AA27665@vail.tivoli.com>, Mike McNally writes:
>Think of it this way.  If I'm tooling down the Interstate at 75 and my
>passenger says
>	Though ultimately you will have to make this decision for
>	yourself, because in your capacity as driver of this motor
>	vehicle you are solely responsible for adherence to state
>	and local traffic ordinances, you should be aware that an
>	official affiliated with a law enforcement organization is
>	at this moment using a speed measurement device from his
>	vehicle parked ahead of us behind a bush, and that there
>	may be legal ramifications to his detection of your current
>	speed.
>I'd be like real pissed off while the ticket was being written.  If,
>on the other hand, my companion said
>	TROOPER! SLOW DOWN!

A counter-example might be:
	1) Someone breaks down my door while I am eating. As per California law
there is a REBUTABLE PRESUMPTION (embedded in statutory law) that my life is
in danger and that deadly force is justified. Consequently, my response to the
situation is ruled justifiable homicide.
	2) Someone breaks down my door while I am eating. A feeble minded guest
of mine shouts out "I don't think he's armed." Consequently, the police find
that the man is either not armed or had a water pistol. I might do 5-10 for
manslaughter or 2nd degree murder.

Your example doesn't involve a law that requires knowledge or a state of mind
to be guilty. Laws about the transport of illegal information do!
--
  Edward Elhauge  |  "The only thing worse than being talked about
 Lever Industries |   is not being talked about."
   San Francisco  |              -- Oscar Wilde
   ee@lever.com   |




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Date: Wed, 13 Oct 93 10:56:43 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Dangers of skipping too many messages
Message-ID: <9310131754.AA23663@netcom5.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Folks, part of the list volume problem is apparently that a lot of us
are skipping a lot of the messages. Sounds paradoxical, but hear me
out.

Someone asked about the Indian code talkers used in World War II, and
suggested they might be Apache or Cherokee.

Well, to date, about half a dozen responses have all pointed out they
were the famous Navajo code talkers. Nice to see such knowledge.

But the responses seem to indicate no awareness that several others
have already answered the question. And this is not a "response
cluster" phenomenon, as the answers have been straggling in for
a few days. (However, it may be that some folks are way behind in
their reading and fired off an answer when they read the first
question.)

I don't have an answer to either of these problems (people skipping
messages, people behind in reading), but both appear to be symptomatic
of an overloaded list. Eric H. tells me we're well over 500
subscribers now. Gulp!

--Tim May


-- 
..........................................................................
Timothy C. May         | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,  
tcmay@netcom.com       | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
408-688-5409           | knowledge, reputations, information markets, 
W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA  | black markets, collapse of governments.
Higher Power: 2^756839 | Public Key: PGP and MailSafe available.
Note: I put time and money into writing this posting. I hope you enjoy it.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: djw@eff.org (Daniel J. Weitzner)
Date: Wed, 13 Oct 93 08:06:39 PDT
To: com-priv@psi.com
Subject: Notes from House Hearing on Cryptography Export Controls
Message-ID: <199310131504.AA14248@eff.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


October 12, 1993
House Foreign Affairs Committee
Subcommittee on Economic Policy, Trade, and the Enviornment
Hearing on mass market cryptography and export controls
Rep. Sam Gejdenson (D-Conn.), Chair

[A hopefully informative and probably biased account of the hearing by EFF]

Committee Members present:

Gejdenson, Cantwell (D-Wash.), Fingerhut (D-Ohio), Rohrbacher (R-Calif.)
Manzullo (R-Ill.) 

Witnesses:

PANEL 1 (Open)

J. Hendren, Arkansas Systems (A data security firm that does a lot of
international banking work)

Ray Ozzie, IRIS Associates for Business Software Alliance (Lotus Notes
developer)

Stephen Walker, Trusted Information Systems for Software Publishers Association

Philip Zimmermann, PGP developer

Don Harbert, Digital Eqiupment Corp.

PANEL 2 (Secret Session)

NSA representative


Opening Statement of Gejdenson: 

"This hearing is about the well intentioned attempts of the National
Security Agency to try to control the uncontrollable....  The NSA itself
acknowledges that if you have a long distance telephone line and a modem,
you can send this software anywhere in the world.  If you have a computer
and a modem you can take this software off of the Internet anywhere in the
world....  I do not question the value of the information sought by the
National Security Agency.  But once it is determined that the dispersion of
this software cannot be controlled, then however much we might want to
protect our ability to obtain information, it is beyond our means to do so.
 Just as in the case of telecommunications, the National Security Agency is
attempting to put the genie back in the bottle.  It won't happen; and a
vibrant and productive sector of American indsutry may be sacrificed in the
process."

The main points raised by witnesses were these:

1. DES and other strong encryption which is barred by ITAR is in the public
domain and available on the global market from foreign software
manufacturers:

-Ray Ozzie used his laptop and a modem to show how to get a DES
implementation from ftp.germany.eu.net.  The committee loved it and most of
them seemed to understand what was going on on the screen, even though they
had never heard of ftp.

-Stephen Walker described the results of an SPA study which uncovered over
250 cryptography packages which offer DES-based or stronger algorithms.

-Phil Zimmermann testified that he designed PGP from publicly available
information.

2. Foreign DES implementations are just as good as US versions. 
Surprisingly enough, this is a contentious issue.  Some members of the
committee seemed to have been told by someone or another that foreign
versions of DES may not be as strong as those that are made in the USA.  If
this were true, then export controls might still be justified despite the
numerous foreign versions of DES on the market.  In my view, this is a
pretty desperate argument.

-Steve Walker demonstrated that all DES works the same way by encrypting a
passage from Mozart's Eine Kleine Nachtmusik with several different foreign
DES packages, and then decrypting them.  Surprise!  They all sounded just
the same.

3. Lots of money is being lost by US software/hardware vendors:

-Don Harbert from DEC told of loses of over $70 Million in just the last
few months.

-BSA estimates that export controls exclude access to a global market the
is $6-9 Billion.

4. People want their privacy

-Phil Zimmermann told the committee about his experience with PGP users and
how badly people need and want to protect their privacy in electronic
environments

Committee Responses:

Overall, the committee was quite sympathetic to the witnesses.  Chairman
Gejdenson seemed very supportive of changing export controls.  Rep. Dana
Rohrbacher, no flaming liberal, said, "the cold war is over.  I sympathize
with everything that has been said here."  



...................................................................

Daniel J. Weitzner, Senior Staff Counsel <djw@eff.org>
Electronic Frontier Foundation
1001 G St, NW
Suite 950 East
Washington, DC 20001
202-347-5400 (v) 
202-393-5509 (f)






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Perry E. Metzger" <pmetzger@lehman.com>
Date: Wed, 13 Oct 93 08:19:59 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: The Bank of the Internet!?
In-Reply-To: <199310131356.AA13313@bolero.rahul.net>
Message-ID: <9310131517.AA06375@snark.lehman.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Kasuga Jingoro says:
> > Plenty. Find me a workstation with the sort of uptime a 3090 running
> > MVS will give you.
> 
> Since you asked...  I don't know what the average uptime of a 3090 is,
> but from several years of experience as a Unix sysadmin, most of the
> Sun systems I've been involved with easily had uptimes ranging months
> at a time.

This isn't cypherpunks stuff. I'll happily argue with you elsewhere.

Perry




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Stanton McCandlish <mech@eff.org>
Date: Wed, 13 Oct 93 08:29:59 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: from a source who said "NOT FOR ATTRIBUTION" re: National Performance Review (fwd)
Message-ID: <199310131527.AA14771@eff.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


A "National Privacy Protection Board" ?!


Forwarded message:
> Posted-Date: Wed, 13 Oct 1993 08:35:15 -0400
> Message-Id: <9310131235.AA08993@linc.cis.upenn.edu>
> X-Sender: farber@linc.cis.upenn.edu
> Mime-Version: 1.0
> Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"
> Date: Wed, 13 Oct 1993 08:35:15 -0400
> From: farber@central.cis.upenn.edu (David Farber)
> Subject: from a source who said "NOT FOR ATTRIBUTION" re: National Performance Review
> Precedence: list
> 
> 
> "The Vice President's recent report "From Red Tape to Results: Creating a
> Government that Works Better and Costs Less (National Performance Review)
> is peppered with recommendations about how to use information technology to
> "reinvent government."  They would put in place an administrative
> infrastructure that empowers agencies and tracks progress, and undoing much
> of the entrenched bureaucracy that evolved and got ossified in the single
> vendor-mainframe era. 
> 
> The meat behind the recommendations, teased together with much help from
> industry and information technology experts, is in a yet unreleased
> technical report, and it appears that it may never be vetted in public. The
> reason seems to be fears within the VP's public relations hirearchy, that
> the background report may generate controversy. This one should- among the
> ossified. Early and inaccurate drafts have begun circulating, raising risks
> that many of the good ideas will be stillborn as bureaucratic barriers that
> threaten the status quo are errected. 
> 
> The recommendations include no-brainers (placing all agencies on the
> Internet and spreading e-mail through all agencies), huge $ savers
> (generating agency agreements for integrating tactical law enforcemnt
> network technology) and actual innovations (replacing the infamous "GSA
> Schedule" (which slows federal procurement of IT and raises costs) with a
> real time electronic marketplace. Some short acronym agencies appear
> sensitive to a proposal for a National Privacy Protection Board.
> 
> Curious? Take a look at the report on the UNC Sunsite Gopher. Want to know
> more contact the VP and tell him!"
> 
> 
> 


-- 
-=> mech@eff.org <=-
Stanton McCandlish     Electronic Frontier Foundation Online Activist & SysOp
NitV-DC BBS 202-232-2715, Fido 1:109/? IndraNet 369:111/1, 14.4V32b 16.8ZyX



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Perry E. Metzger" <pmetzger@lehman.com>
Date: Wed, 13 Oct 93 08:36:39 PDT
To: djw@eff.org (Daniel J. Weitzner)
Subject: Re: Notes from House Hearing on Cryptography Export Controls
In-Reply-To: <199310131504.AA14248@eff.org>
Message-ID: <9310131531.AA06409@snark.lehman.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Daniel J. Weitzner says:
> 
> Committee Responses:
> 
> Overall, the committee was quite sympathetic to the witnesses.  Chairman
> Gejdenson seemed very supportive of changing export controls.  Rep. Dana
> Rohrbacher, no flaming liberal, said, "the cold war is over.  I sympathize
> with everything that has been said here."  

Rohrbacher was once a libertarian, although he's done much to cover up
that fact over the years since.

Perry




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: wcs@anchor.ho.att.com (Bill_Stewart_HOY002_1305)
Date: Wed, 13 Oct 93 08:42:03 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Spread Spectrum Nets (Way to do safely)
Message-ID: <9310131541.AA22489@anchor.ho.att.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Robert Woodhead writes:
> Succinctly, use the purloined letter technique -- hide it in plain sight.
> There are RF bands set aside for unlicensed low-power operation; some
> new phones use spread-spectrum techniques in these bands.

It's more than just purloined-letter issues - it's *legal*.
That means that the FCC won't be triangulating around to find and destroy
your transmitters, which is good.  So you're back to threats from
the CIA/DEA/NSA/FBI, pigeons, vandals, etc., and encryption and spread-spectrum
make it a lot easier to avoid problems from frustrated cops.





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Hastings@courier8.aero.org
Date: Wed, 13 Oct 93 12:06:42 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Electronic Production Costs
Message-ID: <00087B6A.MAI*Hastings@courier8.aero.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


When I mentioned the cost of the Julieboard at $125 wired and tested, I said
that volume (say 1,000,000 units) would bring the cost down. I didn't mean to
say that I could build one board from parts myself for less than $125. Using
a commercial manufacturing assembly line on the final product should
lower the cost, figuring efficiency and volume discounts on the components,
and getting the Hell out of Ontario with its high income and value added
taxes will make a big difference.The Julieboard performance/price ratio was
unheard of a few years ago when I looked at the A&A Williams synthesizer.
 
The author/designer of Julieboard says he has done frequency-hopping spread
spectrum designs, and the next project he publishes for the ham radio market
could be a digital transceiver.
 
Kent - <hastings@courier8.aero.org> "Ask not for whom the bill tolls."




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: blaster@kiae.su (Victor A. Borisov)
Date: Wed, 13 Oct 93 03:36:37 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: New aproach in pgp-randomizer!!!
Message-ID: <AA1kykiW95@kiae.su>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Hello!

Today I saw paraphysics randomizer in pgp:
pgp -kg was run;
it ask me about user id and passphrase;
then it run generation (it wrote like this: ............ ++++);

But, as we see, it did not ask about key typing!!! The most intresting
pgp generate key pair and rendseed.bin-file. I thinck this is related to
new topsecret paraphysics randomyser (today is 13.10.93).:)
Some words about technical ditails:
Hardwate - i486; Software - MS-DOS 3v30 (I boot from protected floppy and
ran good antivitus utility before keypair generation). PGP 2v3a was run.
I have expiriance in pgp (i maintain pgp-keys server).

I keep keypair and randseed file and try to repiad this fantastic result, but
paraphysic energy is go out :).

Mr. Zimmermann, I hope, that this was really paraphysic (or my mistake:(),
because the trust to crypt-program is very unstable thing.





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Arthur R. McGee" <amcgee@netcom.com>
Date: Wed, 13 Oct 93 13:27:15 PDT
To: Stanton McCandlish <mech@eff.org>
Subject: Re: bad news from Georgia (the Republic of)
In-Reply-To: <199310131441.AA13653@eff.org>
Message-ID: <Pine.3.05.9310131312.D25120-8100000@netcom4>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


GlasNet
Ulitsa Yaroslovaskaya 8, Korpus 3, Komnata 111,
129164 Moscow, Russia

Phone: +7 (095) 217-6182

Email: support@glas.apc.org






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Date: Wed, 13 Oct 93 13:49:59 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Dangers of skipping...my solution for now
Message-ID: <9310132048.AA16584@netcom5.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Earlier I wrote about the dangers of skipping too many messages, of a
kind of "response cluster" when the same question gets answered
many times.

Somewhat making their point, several people have responded to me
privately saying they try to answer questions in e-mail and then let
the questioner summarize the responses in public, if he wishes.

Advantages of this approach:
- reduces repetitive answers (saves list bandwidth)
- questioner can synthesize from all answers

Disadvantages:
- others may want to see the answers and may, under this approach,
flood the list with "me too" lines (seen in many newsgroups, when
"send answer in e-mail" gets met by "Hey, I'd be interested, too"
follow-ups).
- others may not know the question has already been answered,
resulting in much wasted time (e.g., 30 private e-mail messages all
addressing the Navajo code talker question).

(Aside: there's a standard game theory example on how often one should
help...it works better in game theory than in practice.)

Finally, to me the most serious problem with moving more responses to
private e-mail is that the discussion group aspect of the list gets
lost.

So I still don't have an answer. However, as an experiment, I plan to
try to move as many of my responses off the list proper as possible.

Things that are clearly of interest to a reasonable fraction of the
entire list, I'll still post to the list.

(Note again, as many of us have described, the Extropians list
software allows threads to be ::excluded, as well as authors, so
repetitive traffic can be reduced. It takes a minute or so to send off
the ::exclude, so many of us prefer to just hit the "D" key promptly.
Still, a portent of things to come.)

-Tim

-- 
..........................................................................
Timothy C. May         | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,  
tcmay@netcom.com       | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
408-688-5409           | knowledge, reputations, information markets, 
W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA  | black markets, collapse of governments.
Higher Power: 2^756839 | Public Key: PGP and MailSafe available.
Note: I put time and money into writing this posting. I hope you enjoy it.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Arthur Chandler <arthurc@crl.com>
Date: Wed, 13 Oct 93 14:32:16 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Too Many Messages? Not!
Message-ID: <Pine.3.05.9310131401.A10224-a100000@crl.crl.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



  As the culprit who started the "Native American Encryption" thread, I'd
like to speak out in thanks and in favor of many answers to a question.
It's true that lots of folks correctly identified Navajo as the source pf
the language used. But lots of other details came in, one post at a time,
that clarified the picture, and made it both more accurate and more
interesting to folks interested in this fascinating chapter in the history
of coding. The fact that Navajo was originally all-oral, but is now
written; that the talkers used a compound of Navajo and on-the-fly slang;
that real-language systems are immeasurably harder to crack than encrypted
messages if you don't know they are real-life languages; etc. etc.
-- I for one got a great deal out of the thread, including some references
to follow up on.
 And all this has made me wonder if real-life languages, as opposed to
algorthymic encryption schemes,....
 Well, that's another thread.






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: an41418@anon.penet.fi (wonderer)
Date: Wed, 13 Oct 93 08:39:59 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Native American Encryption?!
Message-ID: <9310131538.AA25657@anon.penet.fi>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


If nothing else, adding encryption on top of the Navajo
language makes known-plaintext much more difficult.

Wonderer
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
To find out more about the anon service, send mail to help@anon.penet.fi.
Due to the double-blind, any mail replies to this message will be anonymized,
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Please report any problems, inappropriate use etc. to admin@anon.penet.fi.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: lefty@apple.com (Lefty)
Date: Wed, 13 Oct 93 16:07:16 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: FLAME: breaking DES
Message-ID: <9310132306.AA15145@internal.apple.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


According to <an42035@anon.penet.fi>
>
>Well, if Perry were to have the BALLS to make impracticality arguments
>against the experts who actually created the protocols and methods,
>instead of taking cowardly pot-shots, maybe we wouldn't think he's
>full of shit.

Firstly, these are bold words coming from someone posting through an
anonymous remailer.

Secondly, what do you mean "we", kimosabe?  I can only imagine that you're
referring to yourself and your intestinal parasites.


--
Lefty (lefty@apple.com)
C:.M:.C:., D:.O:.D:.






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: holland@CS.ColoState.EDU (douglas craig holland)
Date: Wed, 13 Oct 93 17:10:01 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: !FLAME: breaking DES
Message-ID: <9310140009.AA06153@beethoven>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text


     OK, I sort of wanted to break up the constant flaming on this thread,
so I thought I would introduce my own (admittedly ignorant) way to break
DES.

     1. Start with a full keysearch of all 2^56 possible DES keys.

     2. If you have plaintext to work with, compare each sample 
decryption with the plaintext.

     2a. If you don't have plaintext, I would try washing the decryptions
through a pattern searching algorithm that would include a dictionary,
patterns from compression programs like PKZip, machine language instructions,
and any other possible form of communication that can be represented as
a binary string.

     At least that's how I would do it.  If anyone has any suggestions,
corrections, etc.  I wouldn't mind hearing them.

Doug




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Matthew J Ghio <mg5n+@andrew.cmu.edu>
Date: Wed, 13 Oct 93 15:19:59 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Spread-spectrum net (vulnerability of)
In-Reply-To: <9310130301.AA12952@netcom5.netcom.com>
Message-ID: <Qgj7uXW00awI9RBUdi@andrew.cmu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> Sure, this is possible. But it doesn't help *that* much. Triangulation
> of signal spots any antenna quickly, and they cut that off immediately.
> You can get increasingly elaborate about hiding the signal source, and
> restoring antennae quickly as they're pinched, but it's sort of a losing
> battle unless you assume real time response by the underground lead by
> a brilliant EE type.

Switching frequencies rapidly to prevent triangulation is still the best
defense.  In my previous post I was just pointing out the silliness in
worrying about someone going around and shooting at transmitters.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Matthew J Ghio <mg5n+@andrew.cmu.edu>
Date: Wed, 13 Oct 93 16:02:16 PDT
To: gg@well.sf.ca.us>
Subject: Re: Spread-spectrum net (vulnerability of)
In-Reply-To: <93Oct13.033350pdt.13932-3@well.sf.ca.us>
Message-ID: <ogj8WPO00awIJRBV5g@andrew.cmu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> "a sort of virtual-space map, which would reveal
> nothing about actual phyical location of the sites
> or the person you are contacting."
>
> I'm not so sure... in cellular systems, cells must know where the handsets
> are located in order to send incoming calls.  Your transmitter has a
> physical location which could presumably be tracked in the normal manner,
> and I would expect the overall routing information in a net to be
> susceptible to traffic analysis in any case.  An individual who is using the
> system to communicate wouldn't be able to find the physical address of
> another user, but e.g. an intelligence agency which was looking at the
> entire network would.

You've hit the key concept - motion.  If you are operating from a fixed
transmitter, finding locations is very difficult.  The problem is that
if someone was to drive around the city in a radio equipped truck, and
log into lots of different nodes, they could at least get a partial map
of where various nodes are located.  This could be countered by
additional software which would emulate the node you logged in on even
tho it actually switched you to another node (you communicate with a
virtual fixed node which may or may not be the actual one you are
communicating with).  hmm...  Which leaves us with the problem of
developing software to do that, and developing some method of logging
into the system which would not be node-specific (if you had to do
something special for each node, it would immediately reveal what areas
the nodes were in.)  That creates the problem of developing something
that is not a plainly obvious "log-in" signal that the FCC could look
for.  Ideas?




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: doug@netcom.com (Doug Merritt)
Date: Wed, 13 Oct 93 19:26:46 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: pornography & the ``cypherpunk cause''
In-Reply-To: <ee@lever.com>
Message-ID: <9310140227.AA02879@netcom2.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Edward Elhauge <ee@lever.com> said:
>A counter-example might be:
>	1) Someone breaks down my door while I am eating. As per California law
>there is a REBUTABLE PRESUMPTION (embedded in statutory law) that my life is
>in danger and that deadly force is justified. Consequently, my response to the
>situation is ruled justifiable homicide.

Doesn't this need to be phrased more cautiously? As I understand it, you
need to demonstrate to the jury that you feared for your life, and someone
breaking down your door is not enough for that. Unlike in some other states,
in California it is essential that there be a clear threat to your life.

>	2) Someone breaks down my door while I am eating. A feeble minded guest
>of mine shouts out "I don't think he's armed." Consequently, the police find
>that the man is either not armed or had a water pistol. I might do 5-10 for
>manslaughter or 2nd degree murder.

The phrasing of this makes me think that you and I have the same impression
of the law, but that you just were a bit terse in phrasing #1.

>Your example doesn't involve a law that requires knowledge or a state of mind
>to be guilty. Laws about the transport of illegal information do!

I tend to be concerned about arguments that don't take the infamous
"ignorance of the law is no excuse" into account. That is, one needs to
make a clear distinction between ignorance of the law and ignorance of the
action itself.

There have been times in this particular thread when I wasn't clear whether
people were making that distinction.
	Doug




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Timothy Newsham <newsham@wiliki.eng.hawaii.edu>
Date: Wed, 13 Oct 93 22:41:17 PDT
To: swc@uc1.ucsu.edu (Stuart W. Card)
Subject: Re: Spread-spectrum net (vulnerability of)
In-Reply-To: <9310140508.AA23738@uc1.ucsu.edu>
Message-ID: <9310140537.AA03804@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



> XYZ can cut off an anonymous user who fails to pay his bill by telling the
> telcos/PCS operators to stop accepting calls from that ID (nobody needs to
> know who the deadbeat connected to that ID is).  As long as there is
> sufficient prepayment by unit users to XYZ, that meritorious company can
> avoid losing its shirt to repeat deadbeats who keep registering
> (anonymously) for new accounts, running up big bills and not paying.
> What important point am I missing here? Thanks in advance to all the
> professional flamers out there who will make it clear to me :-)

XYZ can also cut off an anonymous user who has paid all his bills.
The user will then either lose his money or get in contact with
the company to resolve the issue.  This is an excellent opportunity
to match an ID with a face.

> Stuart W. Card, Consultant, Card & Associates -- Research & Development
> Box 153 RR 1 Newport Rd Utica NY 13502         315-735-1717 / FAX -8469
> swc@uc1.ucsu.edu or cards@top.cis.syr.edu           "Who is John Galt?"




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Godzilla's Home Boy <glidedw@sfsuvax1.sfsu.edu>
Date: Wed, 13 Oct 93 19:36:46 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: RSA crap
Message-ID: <Pine.3.07.9310131926.C19216-8100000@sfsuvax1.sfsu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Howzsa battles going. What are the chances of getting caught using pgp out
of this country? I have friends in Russia, I'd like to use more than
ordinary encryption getting to them.






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: doug@netcom.com (Doug Merritt)
Date: Wed, 13 Oct 93 19:46:47 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Spread-spectrum net (vulnerability of)
In-Reply-To: <mg5n+@andrew.cmu.edu>
Message-ID: <9310140244.AA04580@netcom2.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Matthew J Ghio <mg5n+@andrew.cmu.edu> said:
>Switching frequencies rapidly to prevent triangulation is still the best
>defense.

Think from the point of view of the spotters. They can look at a
broad-spectrum scan, gradually eliminate known sources, and end up
homing in on the remaining high power signals.
	Doug




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: jdblair@nextsrv.cas.muohio.EDU
Date: Wed, 13 Oct 93 16:56:45 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Midwest Cypherpunk Meeting
Message-ID: <9310140014.AA08021@ nextsrv.cas.muohio.EDU >
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Are there enough Cypherpunks in the Midwest to have a meeting, no matter how
small?  I've been following the list (rarely posting) for quite a while now,
but I'd like to discuss these issues in person, and maybe feel a little less
isolated here in Ohio.

E-mail me back directly if there is any interest.

John Blair
jdblair@nextsrv.cas.muohio.edu



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Godzilla's Home Boy <glidedw@sfsuvax1.sfsu.edu>
Date: Wed, 13 Oct 93 20:26:46 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: RSA crap
Message-ID: <Pine.3.07.9310132026.A26078-7100000@sfsuvax1.sfsu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I don't want to give the program pgp 2.2 to russians, since i got it from
them!






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: an42035@anon.penet.fi (Shimrod)
Date: Wed, 13 Oct 93 13:51:45 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: FLAME: breaking DES
Message-ID: <9310132049.AA21296@anon.penet.fi>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



I have been following this argument, and I cannot let this post slide
without comment.

As near as I can tell, Karl pointed out an attack which shows that
double encrypting really doesn't buy you much security over single
encrypting.  Perry has chosen to ridicule this for impracticality.

(Incidentally, I notice a slight error in a followup post by Karl,
undoubtedly a typo on his part.  The number of chosen plaintexts
needed by differential cryptanalysis is 2^47 and not 10^47.  While
still a large number at more than 100 trillion, it is at least much
smaller than 10^47!)

This fact seems to have eluded Perry, despite his apparent expertise.

There are other meet-in-the-middle attacks, such as the one Chaum and
Evertse use against a DES variant (fewer number of rounds), described
in "Cryptanalysis of the DES with a reduced number of rounds" at
CRYPTO '85.

The meet-in-the-middle attack Karl posted is by Merkle and Hellman,
from the 1981 paper "On the Security of Multiple Encryption",
Communications of the ACM.  Strange, but I don't recall Perry asking
if Merkle and Hellman were worried that others might think they
beleived this.

Incidentally, the complexity of factoring a 2000 bit number is on the
order of 2.4 X 10^43 steps.

>Whenever Perry Metzger defends an opinion of his well, somebody whines.
>Whenever Perry Metzger disagrees with someone's arguments, someone else
>crys "unfair! He's using his WITS on me!"
>Whenever Perry Metzger has to stop and demonstrate something as simple as
>arithmetic to end an argument, someone cries "foul! sarcasm!  Hey, he's not
>playing nice!"

Well, if Perry were to have the BALLS to make impracticality arguments
against the experts who actually created the protocols and methods,
instead of taking cowardly pot-shots, maybe we wouldn't think he's
full of shit.  The attack is impractical, and if Perry weren't so
strung out he could have written a coherent post stating despite the
cleverness of the attack, it is out-of-reach with today's technology,
with some calculations showing this.

In the 1980 paper by Helleman "A Cryptanalytic Time-Space Tradeoff",
Helleman suggests it is possible to pre-compute and store 2^56
results, and use this information to lookup keys.  Cost: estimated at
$5 million.  (Although this is for singly encrypted text).

Funny, but I don't recall any dissenting papers by Perry on this
subject.  He didn't ask if Helleman really wanted people to think he
beleived this.

>Y'all need to develop slightly thicker skins.  Perry's efforts could serve to 
>raise the thought level of other posters to this list, if they'd stop reacting
>to each prod with an irritated swipe back at the prodder.

First off, Perry Metzger had treated this list to such CYPHERPUNK (?) gems as:

1) his dripping sarcasm
2) posts about theories on government, anarchy, and nazis
3) riduling posts obviously mistakenly sent (one such post with
   several ^H in it)
4) mailing list vs. newsgroup and how he can handle 300 mails a day
   and get work done
5) posts on the wide variety of services banks offer in New York
6) posts on the former libertarian orientation of Rep. Dana Rohrbacher
7) other pointless garbage

If Perry wanted to raise the thought level of other posters, he would
quit posting such bilge.  Ah, but then, he wouldn't be posting at all!

If he would take his BULLSHIT to private email, this list would
improve vastly.  If I missed the cypherpunk content in the above
examples, point it out.

He has a rather inflated ego and is quick to insult others:

>You don't know anything about hashing, then.

So if Perry feels that "you can lead a horse to water but can't make
him think" he could perhaps pull his head out of his ass, wipe the
shit from his eyes and ears, buy a fucking clue at the nearest store,
and shut up.
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
To find out more about the anon service, send mail to help@anon.penet.fi.
Due to the double-blind, any mail replies to this message will be anonymized,
and an anonymous id will be allocated automatically. You have been warned.
Please report any problems, inappropriate use etc. to admin@anon.penet.fi.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Robert J Woodhead <trebor@foretune.co.jp>
Date: Wed, 13 Oct 93 05:36:39 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Spread Spectrum Nets (Way to do safely)
Message-ID: <9310131234.AA13625@dink.foretune.co.jp>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Succinctly, use the purloined letter technique -- hide it in plain sight.
There are RF bands set aside for unlicensed low-power operation; some
new phones use spread-spectrum techniques in these bands.

Build and sell wireless ethernet nodes that talk using these techniques.
Customers will demand strong encryption to prevent their data leaking
out and outsiders sneaking in, so you have a good reason for adding
this to the product.

Develop a robust set of protocols that automatically manage the net,
which is logically dynamic (movement of nodes and episodes of interference
are logically equivalent to dynamic modification of the topology of the
net. You can consider each node to be on N ethernets, where N is the
number of nodes it is currently able to talk to, each ethernet
having only two members.)

Now the kicker; the nodes can be programmed to only talk to other nodes
known to them (ie: the office work-group, building, etc), or to freely
accept and route messages from "alien" nodes.

Given a population of "liberal" message passing nodes, one can then
add a new layer of routing protocols that do regional networking,
with dynamic re-routing as needed.

Purchasers of the wireless nodes should be encouraged to enable the
"pass-through" option, and the protocols should guarantee that assisting
in the passing on of messages does not affect local net performance.

If you do it this way, you'll succeed much faster because people will
be paying you to do it.  You'll have more money for R&D, and you'll
have a lot more people bitching if someone tries to take your toys
away.

The protocol design is, as they say, left as an exercise to the reader.
It isn't all that difficult.





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Karl Lui Barrus <klbarrus@owlnet.rice.edu>
Date: Wed, 13 Oct 93 20:19:59 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: DES: breaking, attacking
Message-ID: <9310140317.AA06605@flammulated.owlnet.rice.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

On the method Douglad Holland posted about breaking the DES... an
interesting property of DES is that of complimentation.  That is, if
encryption of plaintext P under key K produces ciphertext T, then
encryption of plaintext P' under key K' produces ciphertext T', where
the primes (') mean bitwise complement.

If:       T  = DES(P ,K)
then      T' = DES(P', K')

Cryptanalysis can exploit this if two pairs are available such that 
T' = T or P' = P.

What this boils down to is a 50% reduction in work.  So now instead of
taking 10 billion years it'll just take you 5 billion :-) Complexity
wise, it's just 2^55 steps instead of 2^56, so it may not buy you too
much.

A more interesting attack I read of is a probabilistic attack against
DES.  Suppose you encrypt sensitive data, and change keys once a
month.  I can attack you by trying as many decryptions as possible
within the month.  Sure, I am not guarenteed success, but the point is
that if I do this month after month, I have a decent chance of success
at some point during the year.  And if the information you encrypt is
valuable, once success during the year is all I'll need.

An upcoming book on cryptanalysis details this attack; the author
calculates success rates given various estimates for hardware (speed
and number) and frequency of key shifting.  It is quite arresting:
even if you change keys every week, if I can muster enough computer
power to give me a 1% chance of success, the chances are "good" that
at some time during the year I'll succeed in decrypting a message.

For example, if I can be guarenteed of breaking your DES encrypted
message in a year (say I can mount a brute force attack that does 2^56
encryptions and takes a year), there is an 8% chance the key will be
recovered in one month.  So even if you change your key every month, I
have an 8% chance of success.  If your key is needed to conduct
financial transactions and you are a bank, I can profit greatly from
one success.

So basically, DES is looking more and more disadvantaged with its
relatively small key size (64 bits, of which 8 are predictable parity
bits).

Karl Barrus <klbarrus@owlnet.rice.edu>



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From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: szabo@netcom.com (Nick Szabo)
Date: Wed, 13 Oct 93 23:26:52 PDT
To: newsham@wiliki.eng.hawaii.edu (Timothy Newsham)
Subject: Pseudonymous & anonymous billing & credit
In-Reply-To: <9310140537.AA03804@toad.com>
Message-ID: <9310140623.AA01295@netcom5.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



[Attribution lost, sorry] 
> > XYZ can cut off an anonymous user who fails to pay his bill...

Stuart Card:
> XYZ can also cut off an anonymous user who has paid all his bills.
> The user will then either lose his money or get in contact with
> the company to resolve the issue.  This is an excellent opportunity
> to match an ID with a face.

A pseudonymous customer has the opportunity to either file a
tort under their pseudonymous ID or to publicize the fraud,
either under their pseudonymous ID or anonymously.  Either
way the service provider's reputation is damaged if it
cannot disprove the allegation.

In general, the difficulty of anonymous credit is a good argument
for making the payments as fine-grained as possible (eg digital postage), 
instead of tallying up bills.  A trusted bank that knows the customer's 
True Name, long term reputation, or co-signers can handle extensions 
of credit to that customer for various purposes.  With such streamlined
credit and postage there's no reason for most service providers 
to be concerned about a customer's credit.

Nick Szabo				szabo@netcom.com




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Darren Reed <avalon@coombs.anu.edu.au>
Date: Wed, 13 Oct 93 07:06:39 PDT
To: jel@sutro.SFSU.EDU (John E. Levine)
Subject: Re: Internet Security Scanner available
In-Reply-To: <9310130238.AA02302@sutro.SFSU.EDU>
Message-ID: <9310131404.AA22060@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> In your post to the Cypherpunks list of Tue, 12 Oct 93 18:42:12 EDT
> your said
> 
> > For those of you without FTP access who would like to take
> > a look at the Internet Security Scanner, it is available on
> > my BBS in /public/crypto.  Call +1 410 730 6734, 12/24/96,
> > login "cypher" password "punk".
> 
> Can you tell me please where it is available by anon. ftp?
> Thanks.  It would be a lot easier for me than a call to
> area code 410.  :-)

coombs.anu.edu.au:/pub/net/misc/iss1.21
coombs.anu.edu.au:/pub/net/misc/ypx2.2

Those are the posts from Usenet of the rspective items.  There are .tar.Z's
for those that wish to bother.  It is probably elsewhere too, ask archie.

Both are required for full operation of ISS.

darren



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: swc@uc1.ucsu.edu (Stuart W. Card)
Date: Wed, 13 Oct 93 22:06:53 PDT
To: swc@uc1.ucsu.edu
Subject: Re: Spread-spectrum net (vulnerability of)
Message-ID: <9310140508.AA23738@uc1.ucsu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


PCS is coming.  It will support data communications at moderate rates
to and from portable (handheld) units.  We may achieve some gains by
simply using PCS with encryption.  You (I don't know who:-) may object:
every PCS unit will have an ID will   hich will be traceable to a person.
But this need not be so.  What if XYZ cmpany were to buy thousands of
PCS units to issue to its independent agents and accept billing
responsibility for all of them? XYZ could use anonymous account registration
and pseudonyms from there on out.  Thus the telcos and PCS operators get
paid (by XYZ corp.) without having to know who the individual unit users are.
XYZ can cut off an anonymous user who fails to pay his bill by telling the
telcos/PCS operators to stop accepting calls from that ID (nobody needs to
know who the deadbeat connected to that ID is).  As long as there is
sufficient prepayment by unit users to XYZ, that meritorious company can
avoid losing its shirt to repeat deadbeats who keep registering
(anonymously) for new accounts, running up big bills and not paying.
What important point am I missing here? Thanks in advance to all the
professional flamers out there who will make it clear to me :-)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Stuart W. Card, Consultant, Card & Associates -- Research & Development
Box 153 RR 1 Newport Rd Utica NY 13502         315-735-1717 / FAX -8469
swc@uc1.ucsu.edu or cards@top.cis.syr.edu           "Who is John Galt?"




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Mike Ingle <MIKEINGLE@delphi.com>
Date: Wed, 13 Oct 93 22:36:53 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: New aproach in pgp-randomizer!!!
Message-ID: <01H432GVY4HE91XV2I@delphi.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


blaster@kiae.su writes:

>Hello!

>Today I saw paraphysics randomizer in pgp:
>pgp -kg was run;
>it ask me about user id and passphrase;
>then it run generation (it wrote like this: ............ ++++);

>But, as we see, it did not ask about key typing!!! The most intresting
>pgp generate key pair and rendseed.bin-file. I thinck this is related to
>new topsecret paraphysics randomyser (today is 13.10.93).:)
>Some words about technical ditails:
>Hardwate - i486; Software - MS-DOS 3v30 (I boot from protected floppy and
>ran good antivitus utility before keypair generation). PGP 2v3a was run.
>I have expiriance in pgp (i maintain pgp-keys server).

>I keep keypair and randseed file and try to repiad this fantastic result,
>but paraphysic energy is go out :).

>Mr. Zimmermann, I hope, that this was really paraphysic (or my mistake:(),
>because the trust to crypt-program is very unstable thing.

This is not a bug. PGP times your keystrokes when you type your
key id and passphrase, using the timing information for randomness.
If it gets enough randomness from these keystrokes (i.e. if you type
a long id and passphrase), it does not need you to type randomly
because it already has enough random material to generate the key.
You can re-create this by choosing a short (384-bit) key, typing a
long id and passphrase, and typing slowly so that PGP gets a good
random byte from each keystroke. This does not make the key predictable
or cause a loss of security.

-------------------------------------------------------------------------

an42035@anon.penet.fi, writer of "FLAME: breaking DES":

anon wrote: (a rather crude and profane personal attack against
             Perry Metzger, which I have no intention of echoing)

Anonymous personal attacks usually say more about the attacker than
about the target. This one is no exception. You have a lot of nerve to talk
about Perry's  "balls" when you don't even have the "balls" to sign your
name to your flame against him. This attack is at about the same cowardly
level as most bathroom-wall graffiti.

P.S. Go ahead and flame me. My address is "mikeingle@delphi.com", make
sure you spell it right. The longer and more venomous your flame, the
bigger idiot you reveal yourself to be for wasting all that time in
taking an anonymous potshot at someone. 




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: cman@IO.COM (Douglas Barnes)
Date: Thu, 14 Oct 93 01:16:52 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Dining Sternlight Net
Message-ID: <9310140810.AA27651@illuminati.IO.COM>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



The Dining Sternlight Net
=========================

Objective:
----------

To create a system of communication among N parties that features sender 
and recipient untraceability, while frivolously expending Usenet bandwidth.


Protocol (Net formation):
-------------------------

N participants (up to 25) post the following to alt.fan.david-sternlight:

Subject: Join DS Net

BEGIN DS NET
<128-bit hexadecimal random number>
<pgp public key>
END DS NET

Net moderator (initially mccoy@binky.cc.utexas.edu) posts a close of
entries message containing a full list of net participants, along with
their random numbers and PGP keys. Moderator will also chose a Net Name, 
which will be employed by participants to indicate what net they are 
participating in. Hereafter Subject lines will read: 
<Net Name> <Post Type> <Round>

A MD5 digest hash of the postings to cypherpunks dated by toad.com between 
midnight and noon of the day following close of entries is generated.
Random numbers are encrypted using DES with the lower 56 bits of the hash
as key, thus creating the "Ordering Value" of each participant. 

The "Ordering Values" of the participants will be posted by the moderator
with Post Type "Net Order", but the values can be checked by all.


Protocol (Message passing):
---------------------------

Participants all generate and save Int(N + (N * .2)) * 1024 random bits, 
which are encrypted using the PGP public key of the person whose Ordering
Value places them immediately before theirs, except for the participant
with the lowest Ordering Value, who encrypts with the PGP key of the
participant with the highest Ordering Value.  The encrypted block is
posted to alt.fan.david-sternlight with Post Type: "Pass Left"

Participants now build the "Difference Block" from their saved random
bits and the random bits they retrieve from the newsgroup encrypted with
their public key. The block is initially constructed by XOR of the
saved bits with the bits retrieved in the "Pass Left" posting. 

The Difference Block is to be viewed as a collection of 1K sub-blocks. 
Participants will randomly choose one of the blocks to attempt to 
transmit their message, by XOR of their message with the bits of the
selected sub-block. The resulting block is posted to the newsgroup
with Post Type: "Difference".

After retrieving all of the posted Difference Blocks, anyone can
XOR the blocks together and view the "Result Block". Moderator will
post official results with Post Type "Results", which will be 
conveniently separated into separate messages.

If the 1k sub-block selected by a participant does not yield their
original message in the Result Block they have suffered a collision.
All participants who collide should not overlay a message in the 
following round. After observing the following round, participants
who have collided select randomly from the empty blocks of that round,
and attempt to send again.

Wash, Rinse, Repeat.


Additional Aspects:
-------------------

To send a private message, participants should encrypt with the 
public key of the indended recipient.

All participants who have not collided in the previous round must
post a message (even if it is just random gibberish).

If the net must be re-formed for any reason, the remaining participant 
with the Ordering Value closest to the MD5 digest of the last complete
round of Result Blocks following the announcement by the previous moderator 
that the net must be reformed, or following three days of no postings by 
the moderator to alt.fan.david-sternlight.

Although it was initially decided to announce this on both cypherpunks
and the newsgroup, to maintain the proper degree of rude shock and 
befuddlement on alt.fan.d-s, we recommend that the protocol simply 
commence.


Brought to you by:
------------------
The letter K, the number 2^644 - 1, and the Austin Cryptographer's 
Workshop.


Acknowledgements:
-----------------
The ACW wishes to thank Katz's Deli for providing the caffeine and
bagels which made this project possible.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: wcs@anchor.ho.att.com (Bill_Stewart_HOY002_1305)
Date: Thu, 14 Oct 93 09:32:15 PDT
To: swc@uc1.ucsu.edu
Subject: Re: Spread-spectrum net (vulnerability of)
Message-ID: <9310140715.AA20064@anchor.ho.att.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Stuart Card suggests that, even if PCS devices are individually billed,
a company could buy a herd of PCS accounts and rent them out to prepaid
anonymous users, without the PCS vendor having to know individual IDs;
the risk is that anonymous deadbeat users can rent them, run up big bills,
and not pay.  ("Let's rent sushi-net and not pay!")
"What important point am I missing here?"

Well, if PCS billing options are sufficiently flexible, XYZ corp could
keep each account registered for a certain amount of usage with the PCS vendor;
the user pays the rent to XYZ in digicash, and prepays for however many 
minutes of sushi-net he wants, and can update payments as he goes along,
akin to putting more coins in a payphone.
If you want convenience, prepay a lot, and only send updates occasionally;
if you only make small payments, you may get hit with more transaction  charges
by paying more often.  The exposure of the reseller is limited by the amount
of deposit kept with the PCS accounts, or equivalently, the maximum charge
permitted for the PCS accounts, and this may get handled by a prepayment deposit.
The exposure of the customer is limited both by the prepayment amount he selects,
and on the ability to tell the bank which digibucks were ripped off if the
reseller defaults, if the digicash system supports that.

Similarly, my exposure to ripoffs by the subway system is limited to how
much I want to spend on metro tickets, as well as my ability to take
(at the cost of anonymity) a bad metro ticket into the office and
yell at people :-)

		Bill
# Bill Stewart    wcs@anchor.ho.att.com  +1-908-949-0705 Fax-4876
# AT&T Bell Labs, Room 4M-312, Crawfords Corner Rd, Holmdel, NJ  07733-3030
After 10/15, NCR, Pleasanton CA, Beeper 510-224-7043, Phone/email TBD




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: koontzd@lrcs.loral.com (David Koontz )
Date: Thu, 14 Oct 93 08:30:00 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: DES: breaking, attacking
Message-ID: <9310141529.AA04661@nebula.lrcs.loral.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>From: Karl Lui Barrus <klbarrus@owlnet.rice.edu>
>interesting property of DES is that of complimentation.  That is, if

Thats complementation.  T is the complement of T'.  T is not complimenting
T' on a new pair of shoes.

>An upcoming book on cryptanalysis details this attack; the author
>calculates success rates given various estimates for hardware (speed
>and number) and frequency of key shifting.

Whose book?

There is a recent paper on brute force DES breaking:

ripem.msu.edu:/pub/crypt/docs/des_key_search.ps, which discusses 
pipelined DES chips capable of doing 50 Million DES iterations per second.
(I believe the rate is conservative, and can be increased by 50 percent.) 

The point being that any concept of time to attack DES found in print
is in danger of being inaccurate shortly after publication.

Also DES runs 1,000 - 2,000 times faster in hardware than software 
implementations (although someone sent mail saying they had a CRAY MP
software version).

NSA tried to get DES decertified for unclassified government data in
1987-88.  I would guess they either saw the handwriting on the wall or
have a key breaking machine.  The machine in the paper cited above could
break a key in 3 1/2 hours for $1 million in hardware costs, or a few minutes 
for $10 million worth of hardware.

There are several criteria involved in cost/protection.  NSA is still
discouraging the spread of DES.  Enough people using DES everywhere would
make it harder to pick who they target, or require lots of key breaking
machines to search for keys to lots of traffic.  Assuming that an adversary
had a machine capable of doing a search in 3 1/2 minutes that he could
dedicate to finding your key, how often would you have to change keys to
make it not worth while?  If he was very interested in your traffic, it
becomes a question of volume - can he decrypt all the traffic you generate
in 24 hours in a 24 hour interval?  A dedicated target search with unlimited
money would make DES totally insecure.  If on the other hand they have
to wade through lots of encrypted traffic (Because there is no Law Enforcement
Access Field ala clipper) from various parties, and it all needs to
be decrypted, the cost/benefit ratio goes to hell.  The real world falls
somewhere in between.

Hardware key attack machines can be defeated by using variants of
the cryptographic algorithm they attack.  Most variations of DES have
been shown to be cryptographically weaker (Biham-Shamir, "Differential
Cryptanalysis of the Digital Encryption Standard", (Chap 4), Springer-Verlag
1993).  The Biham-Shamir book does point to at least one method of
modifying DES that doesn't weaken it, incidently closing the complementation
property.  A lot of people have been using triple DES for years.
There are several other schemes, or algorithms that are supposed to be
harder to break for that matter.  DES has had the lions share of non-government
attention in the last several decades.






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Jamie Jamison <jamie@apl.washington.edu>
Date: Thu, 14 Oct 93 08:56:58 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: DES
Message-ID: <Pine.3.07.9310140846.A20680-a100000@hopper>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Two questions about DES. 

1) If the current, 56 bit, DES system is so easy to break why don't people
switch over to a DES system that uses a larger key space, say 128 bits?
People obviously aren't, so what's the barrier to this? 

2) How much longer would it take to break triple DES versus standard DES
using one of the key-breaking machines described? 

	As an aside I'll point out that I go by the Yakima Research Station once a
month when I'm out with my National Guard unit, this is the radio dish
that's on the cover of _The Puzzle Palace_. It's not a very large
installation.



Jamie Jamison
niteowl@u.washington.edu







From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Robert J. Woodhead" <trebor@foretune.co.jp>
Date: Wed, 13 Oct 93 17:26:45 PDT
To: wcs@anchor.ho.att.com (Bill_Stewart_HOY002_1305)
Subject: Re: Spread Spectrum Nets (Way to do safely)
In-Reply-To: <9310131541.AA22489@anchor.ho.att.com>
Message-ID: <9310140025.AA17210@dink.foretune.co.jp>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


You write:

>Robert Woodhead writes:
>> Succinctly, use the purloined letter technique -- hide it in plain sight.
>> There are RF bands set aside for unlicensed low-power operation; some
>> new phones use spread-spectrum techniques in these bands.

>It's more than just purloined-letter issues - it's *legal*.

You miss the point.  The point is, rather than build an underground net,
build an overt one that has the features you want, that lots of people
would like to use.

The classic example of this technique, of course, is the Internet itself.
I'm sure there are people who would hold that it has resulted in the
dissemination of lots of "classified" cryptographic munitions.  Yet
you don't see anyone trying to shut it down.

Why?  Because it is useful and has a large user community of good folks
who would get royally p'od at anyone who tried.

Same thing with cellular phones.  With TV.  And on and on.





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: baldwin@LAT.COM (Bob Baldwin)
Date: Thu, 14 Oct 93 09:46:58 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Generating random numbers from english text
Message-ID: <9310141629.AA15178@LAT.COM>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Hello,
	With the current random number discussion going on, I thought
I would point out one convenient way to generate random numbers in
the situation where you do not need to generate them frequently.  I believe
that Claude Shannon (Dr. Information Theory) proposed this:

1. Ask a person to speak about any topic for a paragraph or two.
   Instruct them to generate original sentences, not just repeats of
   some passage of a written work.  Write down what they say.

2. The english language has an entropy of 1.0 to 1.5 bits per letter,
   so it is safe to extract one bit per character.  If you read Shannon's
   work and its modern interpretation, you will understand that this
   bit per character is truely random.  It is uncorrelated with all
   the other bits.  The reason for avoiding a pre-existing written
   work (poem, article, story, etc), is to avoid a brute force search
   of the source language space.

	The modern version of this algorithm, is to compute the
MD5 digest of a long text string.  For a 128 bit digest, you need
at least 128 characters of source language.  For a larger random number,
you can concatenate multiple MD5 values from multiple pieces of source text.

	If the random numbers form the basis of crypto keys, then it
is important to make sure no one can uncover the original source text.

		--Bob





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: todd@tivoli.com
Date: Thu, 14 Oct 93 07:40:01 PDT
To: pmetzger@lehman.com
Subject: Re: Breaking DES
In-Reply-To: <9310130416.AA25367@netcom5.netcom.com>
Message-ID: <9310141442.AA07423@palomar.tivoli.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


"Perry E. Metzger" writes:
 > 
 > Doug Merritt says:
 > > pmetzger@lehman.com said:
 > > >Each DES block is eight bytes. You can't use hashing -- the idea is
 > > >nonsense in context. Did you read the original post?
 > > 
 > > Yes, I did. If hashing doesn't work, you'll have to say why not.
 > 
 > > It's a technique that works in most other situations.
 > 
 > You don't know anything about hashing, then.
 > 
 > When I use a hash table, it is never a substitute for storing the
                                  ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
 > actual value of the thing I'm hashing. Its always just a way of
                                              ^^^^^^
 > rapidly FINDING the underlying object. I have to store the underlying
 > object in order to compare to it. As an example, in a hashed symbol
 > table, I store the actual symbols.
 > 

I haven't been following this thread very closely, but I do want to
point out some serious errors in Perry's previous paragraph.  Hashing
can indeed be a substitute for storing the actual value of the thing
being hashed, and it can often be used to reduce storage requirements.
I'm not sure if it can be used in the case of a meet in the middle
attack on double DES encryption; I'll have to leave the answer to that
question up to those that are following this thread.

I have used hashing in ways other than for *FINDING* the underlying
object.  Often, I don't need to know the correct answer to a question
with 100% confidence.  When I'm satisfied with an algorithm that gives
the correct answer 99.999999999999999995% of the time I can use a good
64 bit hash as a surrogate for the actual value that may be too costly
to store, compare, look up, or compute.  The use of a message digest,
like MD5, to insure message integrity is an example of this kind of
"hashing".  Other uses include keeping a short (say 32 bit) hash value
in memory for every record stored in secondary storage.  This allows
very fast lookups that return negative answers, if the hash value
isn't found there is no need to examine the values stored in secondary
storage.  For a large class of problems one expects not to find an
entry for the record at all for most lookups. (Knuth uses the example
of a hyphenation dictionary that stores exceptions to some hyphenation
algorithm.  Before applying the general algorithm consult the
in-memory table to see if the word being hyphenated might even appear
in the exception dictionary; there is no need to search the exception
dictionary if it contains no words with the same hash value as the
word being hyphenated.  An example more appropriate for this group
might be detecting replay attempts.  One doesn't expect replay attacks
to happen so the algorithm should be performance optimized with this
in mind.)  Finally, there are times when space-time kinds of
trade-offs are being made in the design of an algorithm where hashing
can be used.  For example, if computing some value takes too long it
may be possible to pre-compute it or cache previous computations of
the value.  Techniques like this are easy to apply and are frequently
used, but there are times when it is infeasible to store all of the
values one would like to for space or even security reasons.  Instead
one can store a hash of each value (presumably, the hash is smaller
than the value like a 32 bit hash instead of a 64 byte value) and only
bother to recompute the value when a matching hash indicates a high
likelyhood that it will be useful to compute the value and check for
an actual match.

> You can lead a horse to water, but you can't make him think.

The discussion on this thread doesn't seem to warrant statements like
this.  I've had the pleasure of working with some of the world's most
talented computer scientists over the years, and I simply can't
imagine one of them using a statement like this in the context of this
topic thread.  Statements like this are cute and impress me with the
cleverness and humor of the author, but in writing they are so easy to
misinterpret.  In my opinion, they are best saved for use in social
situations where some friendly kidding is going on, not mail groups
where people are simply asking for help in understanding a subject
they are unfamiliar with.

Todd
-- 
Todd Smith                                     TIVOLI Systems, Inc.
todd@tivoli.com                                6034 West Courtyard Dr.
                                               Suite 210
(512) 794-9070 [794-0623 fax]                  Austin, TX   78730










From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: whitfield.diffie@Eng.Sun.COM
Date: Thu, 14 Oct 93 11:52:01 -0600
To: "L. Detweiler" <ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Subject: Re: PK patents
In-Reply-To: <9310140527.AA28238@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Message-ID: <9310141751.AA15104@lion.Eng.Sun.COM>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> I forget if your name is on any patents.

    My name is on the exponential key exchange patent (4,200,770).  I
wasn't much involved in the filing process and the for all that it
pays me royalties and is of commercial significance, I didn't pay a
lot of attention to it.

    I can believe someone might write an entertaining article called
the ``The Public Key Patent Squabble,'' but I have no interest at
all in doing so.  What exactly do you think I should have included?

> I understand that the NSA tried to deny the RSA patent . . .
> Do you know anything about what I'm talking about?

    No.  But after all, the RSA patent was filed from MIT by people
(R, S, and A) that I didn't know well till much later.  There may have
been some hankey pankey I didn't know about, but I certainly don't
recall the New York Times article you refer to.  The statement that
``They just got the application back rejected.''  Doesn't sound right
to me.  I presume that the Patent Office has to state why an
application is returned.  It's decisions, after all, are a constant
subject of litigation and it must have to be very careful about
following its own procedures.

    There was an interference between the RSA patent and the
Pohlig-Hellman patent, which is the reason RSA didn't issue till '83.

> I'm very concerned about some anomalies on the cypherpunk list.
> Are you on it?

    Yes.  Is that irregular or are you referring to something I
haven't noticed?

> In particular some messages you may have traded with T.C. May have
> shown up lately and I'm a bit suspicious of some irregularities.

    That's because, as discussed one of Tim's messages yesterday, I
normally send comments only to the people who posted and leave it to
them to repost to the whole list if they think what I said is
worthwhile.  Like Tim, I have noticed that the list is cluttered with
multiple responses to the same question.
						Whit





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: an12070@anon.penet.fi (S. Boxx)
Date: Thu, 14 Oct 93 03:31:55 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: cypherpunk mindfucking
Message-ID: <9310141031.AA23760@anon.penet.fi>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


there is some serious mindfucking going on recently with pseudo
addresses in postings to the list. it has reached critical mass. i've
been monitoring the list for some time.

_pure_ cypherpunks, go back through your archives to discover the
stinky irregularities. send the instances to the list and cc: me.
something needs to be done about the fucking perversions. we are being
mindfucked by traitors. a _large_ amount of list traffic is originating
from a _few_ real identities. you know what they say about 90% of
everything being crap, eh? 90% of the crap here is poison "from above".

you want to know why there are too many postings? too much out-of-order
crap? a lot of bizarre & abusive flames? strange newbies? _desperate_
opposition to changing the list status quo? heh. guess. it's called
"damage control". the frauds are among us. they are under a lot of
stress lately <evil grin> in fact, a lot of vomit from one or _two_
depraved persons through different sites, with lax authentication, say
netcom.com, crl.com, anon.penet.fi, or io.com could look a lot like a
"clique" eh? and if "they" were to do their cybermasturbation in
public, it might look like "elitism" eh? there is quite a bit of
jacking around lately... yeh, paranoid rants are really the only
problem! heh. gee, i wonder how _long_ this has been going on ... since
the beginning, i'm sure. that's the point.

do not be afraid of "status". be sickened by it. you know why
"leadership" is a bad word around here? heh, do a grep for "qualified
personel" or "the agenda" or "a traitor, a hypocrite, a lackey" or
"Clique" or "newbie" or "Bamberg" because there is nothing but mindfucking.

"we can all pretend the agenda is what we favor"

thanks to everyone who has sent me mail. keep it coming. i intend to
get to the ugly bottom of this if i have to. there is a putrid rotten
stench here, i pray to GOD that others will finally smell it. i'm
getting closer. i'm breaking it _wide_ open. the pretenders and
traitors will be shot. the Cause has been stalled. the Cause will
conquer. the Cause will live on.

beware of anyone who tells you to throw away your Cypherpunk archives.
they are a record of treason.

C.R.A.M.
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
To find out more about the anon service, send mail to help@anon.penet.fi.
Due to the double-blind, any mail replies to this message will be anonymized,
and an anonymous id will be allocated automatically. You have been warned.
Please report any problems, inappropriate use etc. to admin@anon.penet.fi.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: VACCINIA@UNCVX1.OIT.UNC.EDU
Date: Thu, 14 Oct 93 07:30:00 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Glitches in PGP Messages
Message-ID: <01H43KOVVS5U000TY4@UNCVX1.OIT.UNC.EDU>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


And now for something completely different, a question. Lately I have been the
recipient of PGP encoded messages which look like this:
------Begin PGP Message-------
ssdfkighjsdw'kjojnhsfkassofka[ofk[oaekfowwjkg[owlketglks[orkg[wpokloekfgtfoweo
sadifhjwpiejfowjieffgoweito[ikweo[gikw[oekjg[owkjgokjweljkgw[jfowjhygwrkoettf[
sadfflo
sadkpjfpajf[oqwkfo[qkfo[qekf[oekqffoekfg[wekfgoejfgoiwqekjkff;lqfpkqwep
sd;kljfgfgv'pkisjdfgf'pskjmdgvmeduwelgl;wleiogl;ed;h,./rthledky,elky;elrth;rel
------End PGP Message--------

PGP gives me an error message if I try to decrypt this ciphertext. However, if
I edit the ciphertext beforehand (connecting the two truncated lines) , the
ciphertext can be decrypted. Is this just a glitch in the transmission? What
would cause a text line to be disrupted onto two lines? I suppose it could
occur during downloading or when it is sent thru the NET. My friend uses MacPGP
2.3. This has happened the last two times I have gotten my buddies messages.
Any ideas as to what the possible causes of this simple glitch could be? Thanks.

Scott G. Morham              ! The First, 
Vaccinia@uncvx1.oit.unc.edu  !            Second
                             !                   and Third
                             !                              Levels of
                             !               Information Storage and Retrieval
                             ! DNA,                       
                             !      Biological Neural Nets,
                             !                              Cyberspace




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: nobody@alumni.cco.caltech.edu
Date: Thu, 14 Oct 93 10:52:16 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Generating random numbers from english text
Message-ID: <9310141748.AA11655@alumni.cco.caltech.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


On Thu, 14 Oct 93 09:29:16 PDT., baldwin@LAT.COM (Bob Baldwin) writes:

<  	With the current random number discussion going on, I thought
<  I would point out one convenient way to generate random numbers in
<  the situation where you do not need to generate them frequently.  I believe
<  that Claude Shannon (Dr. Information Theory) proposed this:
<  
<  1. Ask a person to speak about any topic for a paragraph or two.
<     Instruct them to generate original sentences, not just repeats of
<     some passage of a written work.  Write down what they say.
<  
<  2. The english language has an entropy of 1.0 to 1.5 bits per letter,
<     so it is safe to extract one bit per character.  If you read Shannon's
<     work and its modern interpretation, you will understand that this
<     bit per character is truely random.  It is uncorrelated with all
<     the other bits.  The reason for avoiding a pre-existing written
<     work (poem, article, story, etc), is to avoid a brute force search
<     of the source language space.

   can you provide a citation?  i recently read a paper Shannon wrote [1] on
   a study of randomness in english text, and this is definitely not the 
   impression i got from it.

   in this study Shannon demonstrates that english-speaking humans are very
   capable of predicting the next letter of an unknown text given the letters
   up to that point (he also shows this for the reverse direction; that is,
   starting at the end of the text and working forward, subjects were almost
   as capable of predicting correctly as they were starting from the front of
   the text).  this seems to imply that there is some non-random relationship
   (statistical or otherwise) among the letters in a text.  might this
   redundancy be carried over into any encoding (MD5 hash, e.g.) of the text?

   theoretically, at least, this may compare to Vigne're ciphers; the key
   is based on some text other than the plaintext.

<  	The modern version of this algorithm, is to compute the
<  MD5 digest of a long text string.  For a 128 bit digest, you need
<  at least 128 characters of source language.  For a larger random number,
<  you can concatenate multiple MD5 values from multiple pieces of source text.

   could someone here describe how this compares to other pseudo-random sources?
   how well would this function as a seed to some other pseudo-random number
   generation process?



[1]  Shannon, Claude E., "Prediction and Entropy of Printed English," Bell
     System Technical Journal, vol. XXX, No. 1, Jan. 1951, pp. 50-64.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Philippe_D_Nave" <pdn@dwroll.dw.att.com>
Date: Thu, 14 Oct 93 16:37:03 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: cypherpunk mindWHAT?
Message-ID: <9310142335.AA19400@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Hello, all! 

I assume all of you saw the message about 'cypherpunk mindfucking' today.
It appears to have come from an anonymous mail system (unless S. Boxx is
the name of the sender- but then, that name sounds a lot like the S-box
used in the DES encryption scheme. Call me paranoid, or give me a point
for catching an inside joke.)
 
That said, it seems that the point of the message is that there is a lot
of smoke coming from people who use aliases or anonymous remailer
services to post to the cypherpunks list. Does this posting contribute 
to that problem, or have I missed something? 

>  i've been monitoring the list for some time.

>  something needs to be done about the fucking perversions. we are being
>  mindfucked by traitors.

>  thanks to everyone who has sent me mail. keep it coming. i intend to
>  get to the ugly bottom of this if i have to. there is a putrid rotten
>  stench here, i pray to GOD that others will finally smell it. i'm
>  getting closer. i'm breaking it _wide_ open. the pretenders and
>  traitors will be shot. the Cause has been stalled. the Cause will
>  conquer. the Cause will live on.
 
What the hell ?!? I've either missed something significant (and would 
appreciate enlightenment) or this is a candidate for 'strangest post
of the year'. If 'S. Boxx' really exists and is the author of this 
posting, I apologize- if not, then come out from behind your damn
remailer and quit contributing to the problem. As for monitoring the
list for traitors, go ahead- I post under my own name, and I don't
give a shit what you do with the text. If I was concerned about lurkers
building 'traitor files', I'd encrypt my messages and happily watch you
choke on them.
........................................................................
Philippe D. Nave, Jr.   | The person who does not use message encryption
pdn@dwroll.dw.att.com   | will soon be at the mercy of those who DO...
Denver, Colorado USA    | PGP public key: by arrangement.



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Matthew J Miszewski <MJMISKI@macc.wisc.edu>
Date: Thu, 14 Oct 93 11:21:58 PDT
To: VACCINIA@UNCVX1.OIT.UNC.EDU
Subject: Glithces in PGP Message
Message-ID: <23101411384099@vms2.macc.wisc.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Ummm...
 
Thats not a PGP message ya got thare, but rather someone who likes
to type gibberish and send it as a message.  Look at your keyboard
and then look at the message.  Now keep your hands in the normal position
and type random (pseudo) keys.  Hmm...I tend to hit 'sadf' an awful lot too.
 
--Matt
______________________________________________________________________________
"This new technology (the printing press) threatened the Crown, which shuddered
at the thought of widespread dissemination of works advocating religious heresy
and political upheaval.  The Crown's solution to the problem was a system of
regulation designed to control this "dangerous" art."
         -From my Copyright Law Text (refrencing the Statute of Anne -
                                           the first Copyright Statute)
(c)1993
______________________/___________________________________mjmiski@macc.wisc.edu




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: jrk@sys.uea.ac.uk (Richard Kennaway)
Date: Thu, 14 Oct 93 03:56:55 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: cypherpunk mindfucking
Message-ID: <12172.9310141057@s5.sys.uea.ac.uk>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Used to be that it was only Usenet that got pestered by children at the
start of every academic year.  Now they're getting wise to mailing lists.
Inevitable, I suppose.

Do the owners of this list have any policy on kicking people off?  Or is it
better to just ignore them, lest, like antibiotic-resistant bacteria, they
learn to disguise themselves more effectively?

--                                  ____
Richard Kennaway                  __\_ /    School of Information Systems
Internet:  jrk@sys.uea.ac.uk      \  X/     University of East Anglia
uucp:  ...mcsun!ukc!uea-sys!jrk    \/       Norwich NR4 7TJ, U.K.






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: P.V.McMahon@rea0803.wins.icl.co.uk
Date: Thu, 14 Oct 93 04:20:00 PDT
To: an12070@anon.penet.fi
Subject: RE: cypherpunk mindfucking
In-Reply-To: <9310141031.AA23760@anon.penet.fi>
Message-ID: <"7437*/I=PV/S=McMahon/OU=rea0803/O=icl/PRMD=icl/ADMD=gold 400/C=GB/"@MHS>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Shouldn't this sort of posting be directed a news group where
its qualities of invective and use of powerful English may be
better appreciated? It doesn't seem very relevant to privacy,
cryptography or code, & merely serves to exercise delete key..






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Perry E. Metzger" <pmetzger@lehman.com>
Date: Thu, 14 Oct 93 09:17:15 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: DES
In-Reply-To: <Pine.3.07.9310140846.A20680-a100000@hopper>
Message-ID: <9310141616.AA11778@snark.lehman.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Jamie Jamison says:
> 
> Two questions about DES. 
> 
> 1) If the current, 56 bit, DES system is so easy to break why don't people
> switch over to a DES system that uses a larger key space, say 128 bits?
> People obviously aren't, so what's the barrier to this? 

DES only takes 56 bit keys.

> 2) How much longer would it take to break triple DES versus standard DES
> using one of the key-breaking machines described? 

Using brute force, it would take the cube of the time it takes to break
single DES. Whether a more sophisticated techinque is possible is unknown.

Perry




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Matthew J Ghio <mg5n+@andrew.cmu.edu>
Date: Thu, 14 Oct 93 10:06:57 PDT
To: doug@netcom.com (Doug Merritt)
Subject: Re: Spread-spectrum net (vulnerability of)
In-Reply-To: <9310140244.AA04580@netcom2.netcom.com>
Message-ID: <AgjMNry00awLA=V1Vw@andrew.cmu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Matthew J Ghio <mg5n+@andrew.cmu.edu> said:
>Switching frequencies rapidly to prevent triangulation is still the best
>defense.

Doug Merritt <doug@netcom.com> wrote in reply:
>Think from the point of view of the spotters. They can look at a
>broad-spectrum scan, gradually eliminate known sources, and end up
>homing in on the remaining high power signals.

This is similar to the discussion of breaking advanced cryptographic
techniques, comparing possibility to practicality.  Sure anything is
possible, given enuff resources.  But the question is weather or not its
feasible for them to try to track it down.  If it takes them a month and
costs them $10000 in equipment and salaries to track down one
transmitter, then they haven't really accomplished much.

I would say frequency switching would be better than a continuous signal
spread across many frequencies.  Here's why: Once you've locked onto a
signal and try to triangulate, it's gone.  After one transmitter has
swithced off a certain frequency, another transmitter can use it. 
Multiple broadcast sources on a frequency give confusing readings which
makes locating them difficult.  Finally, why would the FCC or equivilent
be trying to shut down such a network?  Someone would have to complain
first.  And why would someone complain?  They would only complain if the
broadcast was interfering with their transmissions.  This can be solved
easily.  While data was not being received, have the receivers monitor
noise levels on various frequencies, and select only those not being
used for transmission.  This could be implemented without additional
hardware, as we will already have an onboard computer for routing data,
this would simly make use of idle time.  (BTW many cordless phones
already do this.)




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Matthew J Miszewski <MJMISKI@macc.wisc.edu>
Date: Thu, 14 Oct 93 11:06:58 PDT
To: CYPHERPUNKS@toad.com
Subject: SADF
Message-ID: <23101413042150@vms2.macc.wisc.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Scott,
 
  While the timing of the -kg keystrokes is 'more' pseudo-random (heh.) than
is the obviously repititive nature of your first post you do bring up a valid
concern that Im sure someone of the many PRNG people on the list can, and will
answer.
 
  This particularly ties in with the thread coming in from the previous
poster whom refered to the new pgp23a process of -kg.  I would think that
my typing while entering my pass phrase is *definitely* less random than
when I am consciously aware that I am generating a key.  (This very
awareness of course makes the randomness less random, ugh! where is
chaos when you need/want it?)
 
--Matt
______________________________________________________________________________
"This new technology (the printing press) threatened the Crown, which shuddered
at the thought of widespread dissemination of works advocating religious heresy
and political upheaval.  The Crown's solution to the problem was a system of
regulation designed to control this "dangerous" art."
         -From my Copyright Law Text (refrencing the Statute of Anne -
                                           the first Copyright Statute)
(c)1993
______________________/___________________________________mjmiski@macc.wisc.edu




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: VACCINIA@UNCVX1.OIT.UNC.EDU
Date: Thu, 14 Oct 93 10:36:57 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: SADF
Message-ID: <01H43RKY0IVM000NKJ@UNCVX1.OIT.UNC.EDU>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Matt wrote me:
>Look at the keyboard and then look at the message. Now keep your hands in the
>normal position and type random (psuedo) keys. Hmm... I tend to hit 'sadf' an
>awful lot too.

The text that I typed as an example (not an actual PGP message) does seem to
have many repeating characteristics; I wonder if this affects the generation of
PGP keys? If Matt tends to hit 'sadf' alot, maybe it happens with others as
well. Perhaps random typing is not as random as one might think. Could this be
true for both letters and keystroke time? What would be the consequences of
this for key generation?

Scott G. Morham              ! The First, 
Vaccinia@uncvx1.oit.unc.edu  !            Second
                             !                   and Third
                             !                              Levels of
                             !               Information Storage and Retrieval
                             ! DNA,                       
                             !      Biological Neural Nets,
                             !                              Cyberspace




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Stanton McCandlish <mech@eff.org>
Date: Thu, 14 Oct 93 10:56:58 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: notes on Gejdenson's House hearing on mass-mkt. crypto export ctrls.
Message-ID: <199310141753.AA03361@eff.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I have a document, described in the subject line, by EFF's Danny Weitzner

If you'd like this posted (it's about 100 lines) let me know.  It's FTPable
at ftp.eff.org, /pub/eff/Temp, gejcrypt.exp

-- 
Stanton McCandlish     Electronic Frontier Foundation Online Activist & SysOp
"A nation that is afraid to let its people judge the truth and falsehood of
ideas in an open market is a nation that is afraid of its people." -JFK
-=> mech@eff.org   NitV-DC BBS 202-232-2715, Fido 1:109/? IndraNet 369:111/1



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: henry strickland <strick@osc.versant.com>
Date: Thu, 14 Oct 93 14:00:00 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: about Cypherpunks (fwd) "instant faq"
Message-ID: <9310142100.AA29030@osc.versant.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Someone on the FutureCulture list asked about Cypherpunks.

I took the opportunity to be the first to reply, to try to
get 1) hard information there and 2) some practical advice
on how to participate.  I hope my tone was not too discouraging.

Others might want to take advantage of the "instant faq" I threw
together, if you see queries in other places.

					strick
					cypherpunks write code



Forwarded message:
# Subject: about Cypherpunks 
# To: FUTUREC@UAFSYSB.UARK.EDU
# Date: Thu, 14 Oct 93 13:54:27 PDT
# From: henry strickland <strick@osc.versant.com>
# 
# #   Does anyone here know about Cypherpunks? 
# 
# The list is pretty high volume, and is currently experiencing
# signal/noise problems, but that should be nothing new to FCers :-)
# 
# 		 <cypherpunks-request@toad.com>
# 
# You might first check out the archives
# 
# 	ftp://soda.berkeley.edu:/pub/cypherpunks
# 
# to see if it holds your interest.  It is a list on which you 
# should do some serious reading before beginning to post. 
# 
# 
# 
# 					cypherpunk strick
# 					cypherpunks love to practice
# 
# 
# 
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
# 
# Cypherpunks assume privacy is a good thing and wish there were more
# of it.  Cypherpunks acknowledge that those who want privacy must
# create it for themselves and not expect governments, corporations, or
# other large, faceless organizations to grant them privacy out of
# beneficence.  Cypherpunks know that people have been creating their
# own privacy for centuries with whispers, envelopes, closed doors, and
# couriers.  Cypherpunks do not seek to prevent other people from
# speaking about their experiences or their opinions.
# 
# The most important means to the defense of privacy is encryption. To
# encrypt is to indicate the desire for privacy.  But to encrypt with
# weak cryptography is to indicate not too much desire for privacy.
# Cypherpunks hope that all people desiring privacy will learn how best
# to defend it.
# 
# Cypherpunks are therefore devoted to cryptography.  Cypherpunks wish
# to learn about it, to teach it, to implement it, and to make more of
# it.  Cypherpunks know that cryptographic protocols make social
# structures.  Cypherpunks know how to attack a system and how to
# defend it.  Cypherpunks know just how hard it is to make good
# cryptosystems.
# 
# Cypherpunks love to practice.  They love to play with public key
# cryptography.  They love to play with anonymous and pseudonymous mail
# forwarding and delivery.  They love to play with DC-nets.  They love
# to play with secure communications of all kinds.
# 
# Cypherpunks write code.  They know that someone has to write code to
# defend privacy, and since it's their privacy, they're going to write
# it.  Cypherpunks publish their code so that their fellow cypherpunks
# may practice and play with it.  Cypherpunks realize that security is
# not built in a day and are patient with incremental progress.
# 
# Cypherpunks don't care if you don't like the software they write. 
# Cypherpunks know that software can't be destroyed.  Cypherpunks know
# that a widely dispersed system can't be shut down.
# 
# Cypherpunks will make the networks safe for privacy.
# 
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
# 
# 
#                    A Cypherpunk's Manifesto
# 
#                         by Eric Hughes
# 
# Privacy is necessary for an open society in the electronic age.
# Privacy is not secrecy.  A private matter is something one doesn't
# want the whole world to know, but a secret matter is something one
# doesn't want anybody to know. Privacy is the power to selectively
# reveal oneself to the world.  
# 
# If two parties have some sort of dealings, then each has a memory of
# their interaction.  Each party can speak about their own memory of
# this; how could anyone prevent it?  One could pass laws against it,
# but the freedom of speech, even more than privacy, is fundamental to
# an open society; we seek not to restrict any speech at all.  If many
# parties speak together in the same forum, each can speak to all the
# others and aggregate together knowledge about individuals and other
# parties.  The power of electronic communications has enabled such
# group speech, and it will not go away merely because we might want it
# to.
# 
# Since we desire privacy, we must ensure that each party to a
# transaction have knowledge only of that which is directly necessary
# for that transaction.  Since any information can be spoken of, we
# must ensure that we reveal as little as possible.  In most cases
# personal identity is not salient. When I purchase a magazine at a
# store and hand cash to the clerk, there is no need to know who I am. 
# When I ask my electronic mail provider to send and receive messages,
# my provider need not know to whom I am speaking or what I am saying
# or what others are saying to me;  my provider only need know how to
# get the message there and how much I owe them in fees.  When my
# identity is revealed by the underlying mechanism of the transaction,
# I have no privacy.  I cannot here selectively reveal myself; I must
# _always_ reveal myself.
# 
# Therefore, privacy in an open society requires anonymous transaction
# systems.  Until now, cash has been the primary such system.  An
# anonymous transaction system is not a secret transaction system.  An
# anonymous system empowers individuals to reveal their identity when
# desired and only when desired; this is the essence of privacy.
# 
# Privacy in an open society also requires cryptography.  If I say
# something, I want it heard only by those for whom I intend it.  If 
# the content of my speech is available to the world, I have no
# privacy.  To encrypt is to indicate the desire for privacy, and to
# encrypt with weak cryptography is to indicate not too much desire for
# privacy.  Furthermore, to reveal one's identity with assurance when
# the default is anonymity requires the cryptographic signature.
# 
# We cannot expect governments, corporations, or other large, faceless
# organizations to grant us privacy out of their beneficence.  It is to
# their advantage to speak of us, and  we should expect that they will
# speak.  To try to prevent their speech is to fight against the
# realities of information. Information does not just want to be free,
# it longs to be free.  Information expands to fill the available
# storage space.  Information is Rumor's younger, stronger cousin;
# Information is fleeter of foot, has more eyes, knows more, and
# understands less than Rumor.
# 
# We must defend our own privacy if we expect to have any.  We must
# come together and create systems which allow anonymous transactions
# to take place.  People have been defending their own privacy for
# centuries with whispers, darkness, envelopes, closed doors, secret
# handshakes, and couriers.  The technologies of the past did not allow
# for strong privacy, but electronic technologies do.
# 
# We the Cypherpunks are dedicated to building anonymous systems.  We
# are defending our privacy with cryptography, with anonymous mail
# forwarding systems, with digital signatures, and with electronic
# money.
# 
# Cypherpunks write code.  We know that someone has to write software
# to defend privacy, and since we can't get privacy unless we all do,
# we're going to write it. We publish our code so that our fellow
# Cypherpunks may practice and play with it. Our code is free for all
# to use, worldwide.  We don't much care if you don't approve of the
# software we write.  We know that software can't be destroyed and that
# a widely dispersed system can't be shut down. 
# 
# Cypherpunks deplore regulations on cryptography, for encryption is
# fundamentally a private act.  The act of encryption, in fact, removes
# information from the public realm.  Even laws against cryptography
# reach only so far as a nation's border and the arm of its violence.
# Cryptography will ineluctably spread over the whole globe, and with
# it the anonymous transactions systems that it makes possible. 
# 
# For privacy to be widespread it must be part of a social contract.
# People must come and together deploy these systems for the common
# good.  Privacy only extends so far as the cooperation of one's
# fellows in society.  We the Cypherpunks seek your questions and your
# concerns and hope we may engage you so that we do not deceive
# ourselves.  We will not, however, be moved out of our course because
# some may disagree with our goals.
# 
# The Cypherpunks are actively engaged in making the networks safer for
# privacy.  Let us proceed together apace.
# 
# Onward.
# 
# Eric Hughes
# <hughes@soda.berkeley.edu>
# 
# 9 March 1993
# 
# 





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Perry E. Metzger" <pmetzger@lehman.com>
Date: Thu, 14 Oct 93 11:11:58 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: DES
In-Reply-To: <9310141751.AA06344@anon.penet.fi>
Message-ID: <9310141809.AA11855@snark.lehman.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



wonderer says:
> I don't think it takes the cube of it. There are 56 bits in
> one key, and 112 bits in two keys, so there could not be
> an entropy of more than 112 bits to triple DES. It is no
> more cryptographically secure than double DES because it
> uses 2 keys.

In spite of the "standard" most people do triple DES with three keys.
With the two key system, it would take T^2+T time to do the
calculation, where T is the time to crack single DES on your machine.

Perry




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Joe Thomas <jthomas@pawpaw.mitre.org>
Date: Thu, 14 Oct 93 11:16:58 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: DES
Message-ID: <9310141814.AA14779@pawpaw.mitre.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> > 2) How much longer would it take to break triple DES versus  
standard DES
> > using one of the key-breaking machines described? 

> 

> Using brute force, it would take the cube of the
> time it takes to break single DES.

Hmm...  I can't figure out what it would mean to cube time.  For  
two-key (112 bit) triple DES, it should be 2^56 times longer to  
exhaustively search the keyspace, with three keys, 2^112 times  
longer.  This assumes the keysearch engine is pipelined, so each  
trial encryption takes the same amount of time, despite the  
additional rounds.  Such a machine would cost more, of course, since  
it would have a longer pipeline, but wouldn't otherwise be  
significantly different in design.

Back-of-the-envelope calculation:  a design like the "7-hour  
exhaustive keysearch" engine for 2-key triple DES would take 50  
trillion years or so to exhaust the keyspace.  That's for a cost on  
the order of $1 million (it should be buildable for less than three  
times the cost of the 56-bit key version).

Seems secure, but as Perry says,

> Whether a more sophisticated techinque is possible is unknown. 

 

Joe




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Perry E. Metzger" <pmetzger@lehman.com>
Date: Thu, 14 Oct 93 11:51:59 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: DES
In-Reply-To: <9310141814.AA14779@pawpaw.mitre.org>
Message-ID: <9310141850.AA11890@snark.lehman.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Joe Thomas says:
> > > 2) How much longer would it take to break triple DES versus
> > > standard DES using one of the key-breaking machines described?
> 
> > Using brute force, it would take the cube of the
> > time it takes to break single DES.
> 
> Hmm...  I can't figure out what it would mean to cube time.  For  
> two-key (112 bit) triple DES, it should be 2^56 times longer to  
> exhaustively search the keyspace, with three keys, 2^112 times  
> longer.

Lets assume we are using three keys, which I what I meant. Lets say 1
is the time do one encryption. (On a parallel machine, just think of
things as being on a uniprocessor going N times faster.) It would take
2^56*N time to break single DES. My claim is that it should take
(2^56)^3 = 2^56*2^56*2^56 = 2^168.  Your claim, which is that it would
take 2^56*2^112=2^168, which is the same. The only difference is that
I didn't assume piplineing so there is a constant factor different
floating around somewhere.

Perry




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: catalyst@netcom.com (Scott Collins)
Date: Thu, 14 Oct 93 15:00:01 PDT
To: baldwin@LAT.COM
Subject: Re: Generating Random Numbers...
Message-ID: <9310142157.AA12040@newton.apple.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Bob Baldwin writes:
  >The english language has an entropy of 1.0 to 1.5 bits per letter, so it
  >is safe to extract one bit per character.  [Shannon's work et al
  >demonstrates] that this bit per character is truely random.

  - entropy -
In information theory, a visceral meaning of the term 'entropy' is 'a
measure of surprise', or unpredictability.  Entropy is the amount of
information in some chunk of data, that could not be deduced.  Equating
entropy with randomness is a tautology.  Entropy (like velocity) is
relative, however, to the observer.  If the observer has a good model of
the data, the entropy will be low (not much information present).  If the
observer has a bad model, the entropy will be high.  One example that
demonstrates a difference in relative entropies is a block of ciphertext. 
The entropy of the block with respect to its intended recipient (who has
the key) is low; with respect to an interloper (no key), it is high.

  - the entropy of english text -
The paper cited by nobody, and alluded to by Bob Baldwin, is a landmark
paper in estimating the entropy of english text.  Note that these estimates
are not lower bounds, but empirical values with respect to the human
'predictors'; and that the (1, 1.5) bits per character are an _average_
across an entire message.  For example, if the message begins "Four score
", then, with respect to a typical American history student, there is very
little entropy in the remainder of the sentence, should it continue " and
seven years ago".

  - turning entropy into random numbers -
From reading Bob Baldwin's post, I am not sure how he intended to extract
this 'one bit per character'.  You would certainly not just pick the n-th
bit from every byte.  A good way to turn entropy into actual bits is to
build a compressor.  A compressor is usually a combination of a predictor
(or model) and an encoder.  The predictor plays the role of the human
'predictors' in Shannon's experiment, and for each new symbol of the
message, generates a probability that represents (inversely) its 'surprise'
at seeing that symbol.  A good encoder uses the probabilities from the
predictor to encode the symbol in the smallest number of bits.  The better
the predictor, the less it is suprised, the larger the probabilities it
returns to the encoder, the fewer number of bits output.  Thus, good
predictors (and competent encoders) lead to efficient compressors.

See Bell, Cleary, & Witten, "Text Compression" Prentice Hall, 1990.  ISBN
0-13-911991-4.  Especially Ch. 5 'From Probabilities to Bits'.

  - entropy and transformations -
Both Bob Baldwin and nobody discuss the use of hash functions on the text
to get random numbers, and wonder if redundancy in the underlying message
will 'show through'.  Cryptographically secure deterministic hash function
are designed with this criteria in mind.  That is, one goal is that the
entropy in the bits of the hash itself, relative to an observer who knows
the input stream, is 0; to an observer who does not know the input stream,
it is maximal (i.e., has a lower bound related to your predictability in
selecting an input).

nobody asks:
  >could someone here describe how this compares to other pseudo-random
  >sources?  how well would this function as a seed to some other
  >pseudo-random number generation process?

Using hashes as random number generators is as secure as the hash which
(for a cyptographically poor hash) may be dependent on the entropy of the
input, and your use of it (e.g., don't always hash the 'Gettysburg Address'
to get your random numbers).  Using compression to convert the entropy in a
message (with respect to the compression model) into a random number is
dependent on the quality of the model.  If you use a poor model, someone
else will be able to find, and perhaps capitalize on, redundancy in your
output.

Related to this, in a conversation on this topic with Ron Rivest he noted
that good enough compression might be secure in itself (with the model and
its initial state as the key), and that he had students who were
researching this.

Hope this helps,


Scott Collins         | "Few people realize what tremendous power there
                      |  is in one of these things."     -- Willy Wonka
......................|................................................
BUSINESS.   voice:408.862.0540  fax:974.6094   collins@newton.apple.com
Apple Computer, Inc.   5 Infinite Loop, MS 305-2B   Cupertino, CA 95014
.......................................................................
PERSONAL.   voice/fax:408.257.1746    1024:669687   catalyst@netcom.com





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Stanton McCandlish <mech@eff.org>
Date: Thu, 14 Oct 93 12:17:00 PDT
To: ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu (L. Detweiler)
Subject: Re: pornography & the ``cypherpunk cause''
In-Reply-To: <9310130537.AA23327@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Message-ID: <199310141912.AA04581@eff.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


LD:

[the comparison of EFF's note to CERT's, from L. Detweiler, that]
> appeared here seems to have completely escaped many, or perhaps
> everyone is intentionally evading it. The metaphor is extremely
> compelling. Both are sent to operators in order to bring something to
> their attention they `might' need to fix by an outside party generally
> interested in the operators own best interests. While I'm not sure that
> what CERT did was apropos, that warning was so *delicately worded*. In
> contrast the EFF announcement SHOUTS IN YOUR EAR. the CERT announcement
> was extremely diplomatic. the EFF announcement was SCREECHING.
> 
> Do `we' have *any* consistency, sophistication, or coherence as a
> group? Recent messages have DISMAYED me. is `our' philosophy nothing
> but Beavis&Butthead style ``Gubberment and the Fedz and Pigs are THINGS
> THAT SUCK and EFF is a THING THATS COOL.'' Or do `we' have no
[...]
> things like what has been called the `Tim May .sig Agenda' because some
> people might have strong opinions?

I won't speak for CPs at large on what is important to them, but I think
several things are a little off here.  To keep it short, and hopefully end
this marginal thread, the important difference between the "warnings" from
EFF and CERT [the old one, not the recent one about the security tester]
is INTENT.  CERT is not Officer Friendly.  They can sometimes be OK, but
the message in question was rather big brotherish.  Does anyone here
really WANT to have CERT telling you what they think you should do?  I don't.
The EFF on the other hand posted this material specifically to help people
AVOID being trapped in a situation that may result in prison terms.  The
other side of the fence entirely.  As I've explained to Lance in email,
it's like the difference between a cop saying "I don't think you should be
drinking", and a person warning their friend drinking in the park,"Better
ditch that beer, here come the cops."

That, and I really don't think that the TONE of "voice" of the messages in
question have anything whatsoever to do with their content. 

At any rate, I'd really like to just table this matter, it is getting
further and further afield.

-- 
Stanton McCandlish     Electronic Frontier Foundation Online Activist & SysOp
"A nation that is afraid to let its people judge the truth and falsehood of
ideas in an open market is a nation that is afraid of its people." -JFK
-=> mech@eff.org   NitV-DC  202-232-2715, Fido 1:109/? IndraNet 369:111/1




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: wak@next0.math.pitt.edu
Date: Thu, 14 Oct 93 12:12:29 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Reason Magazine Nov 1993
Message-ID: <9310141912.AA05170@next0.math.pitt.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Cypherpunks and Extropians,
I'd like to mention that the Nov 1993 issue of Reason ("Free Minds  
and Free Markets") magazine has an article addressing the issue of  
electronic privacy by Lee Dembart entitled "Hide and Peek".
Walter A. Kehowski
wak@next0.math.pitt.edu




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Stanton McCandlish <mech@eff.org>
Date: Thu, 14 Oct 93 12:27:00 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: multiposts...
Message-ID: <199310141926.AA04771@eff.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Many apologies for the multiple posts that emmanated from eff.org
yesterday.  I noiced that both mine and Danny's showed up twice.  No idea
what caused it, but it does not appear to be doing it now... 

-- 
Stanton McCandlish     Electronic Frontier Foundation Online Activist & SysOp
"A nation that is afraid to let its people judge the truth and falsehood of
ideas in an open market is a nation that is afraid of its people." -JFK
-=> mech@eff.org   NitV-DC BBS 202-232-2715, Fido 1:109/? IndraNet 369:111/1



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Mike Johnson" <exabyte!smtplink!mikej@uunet.UU.NET>
Date: Thu, 14 Oct 93 17:42:03 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Generating random numbers
Message-ID: <9309147506.AA750645992@smtplink.exabyte.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



If you have an audio input to your computer, try recording noise from a fan,
traffic on a busy street, or the roar of a crowd at a football game.  Then
compress the output to remove any obvious redundancies such as 60 Hz hum from
a fan motor or unused dynamic range of the input digitizer.  This results in
much better "randomness" than some keystroke timing techniques.

Of course, writing cryptographic software would be a whole lot easier if all
computers had a built in real random number generating device that could
produce quantum physics related data as fast as you could read it.  Anyone
want to build a serial or parallel port attachment that could be read by
any software needing random numbers for crypto or other applications?


                                        Mike Johnson
                                        mpjohnso@nyx.cs.du.edu




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Edward Elhauge <ee@lever.com>
Date: Thu, 14 Oct 93 18:07:03 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: pornography & the ``cypherpunk cause''
In-Reply-To: <9310140227.AA02879@netcom2.netcom.com>
Message-ID: <m0ondKj-0001ZaC@lever.lever.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


In message <9310140227.AA02879@netcom2.netcom.com>, Doug Merritt writes:
>Edward Elhauge <ee@lever.com> said:
>>A counter-example might be:
>>	1) Someone breaks down my door while I am eating. As per California law
>>there is a REBUTABLE PRESUMPTION (embedded in statutory law) that my life is
>>in danger and that deadly force is justified. Consequently, my response to th
>e
>>situation is ruled justifiable homicide.
>
>Doesn't this need to be phrased more cautiously? As I understand it, you
>need to demonstrate to the jury that you feared for your life, and someone
>breaking down your door is not enough for that. Unlike in some other states,
>in California it is essential that there be a clear threat to your life.

No the door breaking down is good enough.  The legislature explicitly said
that that was good enough regardless of what common law might say. The
phrasing refers to a "tumultuous" entry, so breaking through a window or wall
would count too. This does not apply if a family member is involved. Back to
the relevance to knowledge of illegal info; the presumption is REBUTABLE. For
instance if the person was searched before entering the property and it can be
proven that you knew that they were unarmed you would be guilty of some level
of murder.

A less jarring example might be the protection couriers such as UPS have. If
in the normal course of business they can't know what they are handling they
are not responsible for the contents.

Both these protections and the email protection revolve around letting people
carry on business in a routine way, without being second guessed latter.
Society needs common carrier like transport of mail and objects and it isn't
feasible to check each package so a cut and dried protection is extended.
Society realizes that most of the time a person breaking down a door is a
danger and that there is no time for the defender to research the situation if
they are going to protect their lives. Occasionally the rule of thumb turns
out wrong (what if my neighbor breaks down my door because they see a fire in
my house that I am not aware of). That is why we need these protections.

>>Your example doesn't involve a law that requires knowledge or a state of mind
>>to be guilty. Laws about the transport of illegal information do!
>
>I tend to be concerned about arguments that don't take the infamous
>"ignorance of the law is no excuse" into account. That is, one needs to
>make a clear distinction between ignorance of the law and ignorance of the
>action itself.

Exactly right. We are assumed to be knowledgeable of the law no matter how
unreasonable it is. [It is physically impossible for one person to keep up
with all law]. In certain cases ignorance of facts or actions is a protection
though.

I would rather not have seen the EFF warning and I never looked for those
files; it isn't my responsibility.
--
       Edward Elhauge -- ee@lever.com -- Lever Industries, San Francisco
"At every stage of history our concern must be to dismantle those forms of
authority and oppression that survive from an era when they might haave been
justified in terms of the need for security or survival or economic
development, but that now contribute to -- rather than alleviate -- material
and cultural deficit." -- Noam Chomsky




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: an41418@anon.penet.fi (wonderer)
Date: Thu, 14 Oct 93 10:51:59 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: DES
Message-ID: <9310141751.AA06344@anon.penet.fi>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I don't think it takes the cube of it. There are 56 bits in
one key, and 112 bits in two keys, so there could not be
an entropy of more than 112 bits to triple DES. It is no
more cryptographically secure than double DES because it
uses 2 keys.
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From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: wcs@anchor.ho.att.com (Bill_Stewart_HOY002_1305)
Date: Thu, 14 Oct 93 15:40:00 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Generating random numbers from english text
Message-ID: <9310142239.AA21234@anchor.ho.att.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Bob Baldwin, describing Shannon's info theory stuff, said:
> 1. Ask a person to speak about any topic for a paragraph or two.
>    Instruct them to generate original sentences, not just repeats of
>    some passage of a written work.  Write down what they say.
> 2. The english language has an entropy of 1.0 to 1.5 bits per letter, so

Actually, if you've got an audio input on your computer, one way to generate 
"true" randomness for use in keys or whatever would be to turn on the microphone
and _speak_ about any topic for a few seconds, and take the MD-5 of the sound
file; the differences in voice, timing background noise, microphone quality, etc.,
ought to add a lot to the randomness.  (Or else, turn on the mike and type
N random characters and record them :-)




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Matthew J Ghio <mg5n+@andrew.cmu.edu>
Date: Thu, 14 Oct 93 16:40:00 PDT
To: VACCINIA@UNCVX1.OIT.UNC.EDU
Subject: Re: Glitches in PGP Messages
In-Reply-To: <01H43KOVVS5U000TY4@UNCVX1.OIT.UNC.EDU>
Message-ID: <AgjS9TS00awVAXWVIJ@andrew.cmu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> PGP gives me an error message if I try to decrypt this ciphertext.
However, if
> I edit the ciphertext beforehand (connecting the two truncated lines) , the
> ciphertext can be decrypted. Is this just a glitch in the transmission? What
> would cause a text line to be disrupted onto two lines? I suppose it could
> occur during downloading or when it is sent thru the NET. My friend
uses MacPGP
> 2.3. This has happened the last two times I have gotten my buddies messages.
> Any ideas as to what the possible causes of this simple glitch could
be? Thanks.

It's probably an incompatible CR/LF setting.  Try asking your friend to
set up his software to add line feeds to carriage returns.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Matthew J Ghio <mg5n+@andrew.cmu.edu>
Date: Thu, 14 Oct 93 16:57:03 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: DES
In-Reply-To: <Pine.3.07.9310140846.A20680-a100000@hopper>
Message-ID: <QgjSNm200awV4XWVk7@andrew.cmu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Jamie Jamison <jamie@apl.washington.edu> wrote:

> Two questions about DES. 
>
> 1) If the current, 56 bit, DES system is so easy to break why don't people
> switch over to a DES system that uses a larger key space, say 128 bits?
> People obviously aren't, so what's the barrier to this?

It's not easy to break.  It is possible to break it with about $1
million worth of specialized computing hardware.  Many programs, such as
PGP, do use larger keys.

> 2) How much longer would it take to break triple DES versus standard DES
> using one of the key-breaking machines described?

If all combinations had to be tried, it would take 2^112 times longer to
break a triple DES (168 bit) code than to break the standard 56 bit code.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Sandy <72114.1712@CompuServe.COM>
Date: Thu, 14 Oct 93 17:20:02 PDT
To: <cypherpunks@toad.com>
Subject: KIDDY KRYPTO
Message-ID: <931015000719_72114.1712_FHF30-1@CompuServe.COM>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
  SANDY SANDFORT               Reply to:  ssandfort@attmail.com
 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Punksters,

I was just watching cartoons on TV with my granddaughter.  I
almost missed a commercial that is right up our alley.  Casio has
come out with something called, "My Magic Diary."  It's a kids'
version of the electronic pocket planner.

What caught my attention was its password protection of the kid's
privacy.  How subversive!  Kids can now buy an encryption product
to keep their secrets, secret.  I imagine the password system is
extremely unsophisticated, but I wouldn't be surprised if it were
parent-proof.  Sure beats the hell out of those pitiful little
traditional diaries with their oh-so-pickable "locks."

Want to raise the consciousness of the next generation?  Give "My
Magic Diaries" to the kids of your anti-privacy relatives and
acquaintances.  It will empower the kids, frustrate their parents
and help pave the way for a pro-privacy future.  Like the song
says, "Teach your children well" (or your neighbor's children).
Know any cops with kids?

 S a n d y

>>>>>>    Please send e-mail to:  ssandfort@attmail.com    <<<<<<
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: doug@netcom.com (Doug Merritt)
Date: Thu, 14 Oct 93 20:12:04 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Spread-spectrum net (vulnerability of)
In-Reply-To: <mg5n+@andrew.cmu.edu>
Message-ID: <9310150310.AA26447@netcom5.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Matthew J Ghio <mg5n+@andrew.cmu.edu> writes:
[ several good points ]

On the other hand, this particular approach to spread spectrum is
mostly depending on avoiding getting the FCC annoyed in the first place,
which means that bandwidth consumed per unit metropolitan area must be
below some particular threshold. If that net became very popular, it
might be difficult to hold down to the required level.

If the FCC *did* go after the transmitters, it wouldn't cost them anything
like $10K per to find. Well, I dunno, I suppose you could assume that
the transmitters are awfully hard to distinguish from ambient sources,
but it would take more than handwaving to establish such a high cost to
the FCC. I'm willing to believe some such design is possible, but I
wouldn't want to leave it to chance and oversight.

Also, let's say you had a good design that cost the FCC a fair amount of
bucks to design a specific detector using a targeted active filter, for
instance. Then you'd be safe right up to the point where it's not worth
their while, and the network grows, and then suddenly they invest the
time and money to build something that can catch dozens of transmitters
per day.

In other words, you'd want something that still worked even given growth
and success.
        Doug




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Matthew J Ghio <mg5n+@andrew.cmu.edu>
Date: Thu, 14 Oct 93 17:30:00 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: SADF
In-Reply-To: <01H43RKY0IVM000NKJ@UNCVX1.OIT.UNC.EDU>
Message-ID: <QgjSswq00awVAXWWAi@andrew.cmu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


VACCINIA@UNCVX1.OIT.UNC.EDU wrote:

> The text that I typed as an example (not an actual PGP message) does
> seem to have many repeating characteristics; I wonder if this affects the
> generation of PGP keys? If Matt tends to hit 'sadf' alot, maybe it
> happens with others as well. Perhaps random typing is not as random
> as one might think. Could this be true for both letters and keystroke
> time? What would be the consequences of this for key generation?

Actually, as you learn to type certain words or phrases very well, your
keystrokes do become very regular.  Many years ago, (around 1988 or so)
there was a popular online game called Spacer's Quest, which used
keyboard timings for random numbers.  Many people who played the game
regularly started noticing that they would repeatedly find the same
things in the same places, even tho it was supposed to be random,
because they were habitually responding to the prompts almost the same
way every time.  However, I suspect that this was an extreme example,
since the anti-random effect was intensified by slow modems, which could
not convey timing differences of less than 1/240 of a second at 2400 bps
or no less than 1/120 of a second at 1200 bps.
This probably would not happen with PGP, because on the local console
you could measure timing differences of a few millionths of a second
(well, at least less than a thousandth of a second), and it is very
difficult to be that precise in typing something the same way twice. 
Besides, even if your typing caused the same public key to be generated
twice (highly unlikely), that doesn't help anybody else generate it.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Matthew J Ghio <mg5n+@andrew.cmu.edu>
Date: Thu, 14 Oct 93 17:32:04 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: DES
In-Reply-To: <9310141751.AA06344@anon.penet.fi>
Message-ID: <IgjSvRm00awVMXWWcr@andrew.cmu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Wonderer wrote:

> I don't think it takes the cube of it. There are 56 bits in
> one key, and 112 bits in two keys, so there could not be
> an entropy of more than 112 bits to triple DES. It is no
> more cryptographically secure than double DES because it
> uses 2 keys.

Wouldn't "triple-DES" imply three keys, or did I miss something?




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: an41418@anon.penet.fi (wonderer)
Date: Thu, 14 Oct 93 13:40:00 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Digital cash
Message-ID: <9310142037.AA07131@anon.penet.fi>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Can someone explain to me how the system where
double spending can reveal the identity of a user,
but without double spending it is never discovered?

I read the paper over and over, but I think a clearer
explination would help. Thanks.
Wonderer
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From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Matthew J Ghio <mg5n+@andrew.cmu.edu>
Date: Thu, 14 Oct 93 18:02:03 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Secret network
In-Reply-To: <9310130226.AA14844@uc1.ucsu.edu>
Message-ID: <EgjTL3u00awVEXWX4J@andrew.cmu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Stuart W. Card <swc@uc1.ucsu.edu> wrote:

> Trying to transmit meaningful communications at high data rates
> over water pipes would be a TREMENDOUS technical challenge,
> requiring a vast amount of signal processing to compensate
> for multipath reflections, impedance mismatches, thermal noise,
> pickup of an almost variety of interference soures...

Well, I'm sure that multipath reflections would cause wave interference
which would garbel whatever was modulated on that signal, however, the
carrier wave itself would still be detectable.  Suppose you were to
broadcast a short burst of a signal at 250,000 hz into the water system.
 You would get lots of echos, noise, etc, but it would still be
detectable as a 250,000 hz signal.  It might not be possible to tell
exactly what that signal was, but you could still detect the frequency;
you could tell that, in fact, a 250,000 hz signal had been sent.  Now
you could determine the minimum interval of time necessary between
bursts for the receiver to be able to identify them as seperate bursts. 
Having done this, you could send 250,000 hz bursts at regular interals,
and then accompany some with 500,000 hz bursts (one bits) and leave the
other pulses without an accompanying transmission (zero bits).  I'm not
really sure what frequencies would work best, that would probably have
to be determined experimentally.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Arthur Chandler <arthurc@crl.com>
Date: Thu, 14 Oct 93 21:17:05 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: RE: Passwords (fwd)
Message-ID: <Pine.3.05.9310142114.A1012-d100000@crl.crl.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



  There's a thread on MOO-Cows -- a list primarily for folks interested in
the technical side of maintaining MOO databases (new releases of the core,
bugs in current core, questions about MOO-coding, etc.) -- that has to do
with passwords and encryption. It's been the fond hope of many people in
the MOO world that someone will come up with a kind of gateway that will
let players move from one MOO to another. There are lots of problems --
different ID numbers for the (essentially) same objects in each MOO,
different criteria for membership in different MOOs, etc. But one really
fundamental issue is: how can you use the same password to move from MOO
to MOO?
  I'm forwarding the essentials of the thread, plus one ambitious proposal
for solving the dilemma. Anyone here got any thoughts on the problem
and/or its solution(s)?



---------- Forwarded message ----------
Date: Thu, 14 Oct 1993 09:07:31 PDT
From: Off-path travel kills plants 14-Oct-1993 1122 <callas@eris.enet.dec.com>
To: "uso01@mailhost.unidata.com"@us2rmc.enet.dec.com
Cc: moo-cows.parc@xerox.com
Subject: RE: Passwords

    Somebody I know is trying to figure out a secure way to handle passwords in
    a MOO-to-MOO connection system.  The idea is to set it up so players can
    "walk" from MOO to MOO without worrying that their passwords are
    compromised.

    Something that occurred to me is that perhaps the first MOO could take the
    already-encrypted password of the player, and pass it to the second MOO. 
    Then a simple comparison to see if the encrypted passwords match.

    Does this work?

No!!!! It does not work, and as a matter of fact, it is worse than sending a
plaintext password.

The reason is that not only is your plaintext password a piece of valuable
information, but the encrypted password is, too. Possibly more valuable.

If you *merely* send the encrypted password, and then merely compare it against
what's in the database on the other side, then what you've done is manage to
reduce the problem of encrypted passwords to the previously solved problem of
plaintext passwords. All you're doing with the "encryption" is transforming the
plaintext password "alacazam" into "p9&5kgwqp%$3=l" which is less human
readable, but once snarfed off the net by an interloper, all they have to do is
hack up a client to send MOO2 a connect that says, "Hi, I'm an inter-MOO
connection, here's the encrypted password for Soandso." Poof, they're in.

If you want to have a secure login system you have to go to a little more work.
I'll describe a mechanism that is actually in place in a business oriented MUD
called "Meeting Space" today.

(1) Get yourself a 1-way hash algorithm. MD5 is good one. If you need MD5, send
me mail, I'll dredge it up for you. It's stuffed on my cognitive prosthesis
somewhere.

(2) The client to your MOO sends the server a message. The message says, "Hi, I
want to log in as Soandso."

(3) The server has in its database Soandso's password. The password has been
munched up with MD5 and also some random stuff, called "salt" in the trade.
It's there to simply make it harder for someone to grind up /etc/passwd and do
simple comparisons. The server sends back a message to the client that says,
"Cool. Do this for me. take the salt characters "fnord" and the string
"172355555" and grind them all up together, and send me back the answer. The
latter string is a quasi-random, non-repeating message. The easiest way to get
one of those is to call time() and turn it into a string. If you want to get
fancy, toss in some things like the number of pagefaults the system has done,
concatenated with the number of times that you've authenticated someone today,
and so on. The time is really good enough as it is, though tossing in the
number of times you've played this game makes it foolproof. The real point is
that you can't *ever* use this query again. How you construct such a message is
up to you. What you're doing is making a "one-time pad" in the lingo. 

(4) The client does all of this, using MD5 to grind up the plaintext password,
and the extra stuff (the client doesn't really need to know what the meaning of
the extra stuff is, it just has to grind it all up), and sends the server back
the result.

(5) The server mixes up the extra stuff with its already-hashed password and
compares the result to what the client sent. If they match, the client gets in.
If not, the server sends back a message that says, "No, sorry."

There are many other possible algorithms. The trick in thinking about them is
to assume that there are other people are listening. In our case, assume
there's an eavesdropper, with total knowledge of the algorithm. What have they
learned? Well, they learned what the system time on the server was. No harm in
that. They learned the client's password's salt. This is mildly irksome, but
only mildly. This potentially makes it easier for them to use a dictionary-
attack on the password, but not really. For anything that's really useful, it's
*far* easier for them to figure out how to hijack the whole database. All they
really know is that every time you log in, the magic question is going to have
a constant in it. Big deal.

Note that while not perfect, all forms of attack on this system involve both
hacking up a client and stealing the server's database. While not an
unattainable task, an authentication system like this is *more* secure than the
authentication system used to let you log into a privileged account on the host
operating system, even ones as reasonably secure as unix and VMS.

How's this, clear as mud?


Unsolved problems (left as an exercise to the reader):

(1) Securely changing Soandso's password in the presence of eavesdroppers.
	(very hard without a pubic-key crypto system)
(2) Managing the plaintext password on the client system (which is required
	here) so that it isn't compromised. (rather easy)

	Jon






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Date: Thu, 14 Oct 93 21:40:02 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Spread-spectrum net (vulnerability of)
In-Reply-To: <9310150310.AA26447@netcom5.netcom.com>
Message-ID: <9310150438.AA06433@netcom5.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Doug Merritt writes:

> On the other hand, this particular approach to spread spectrum is
> mostly depending on avoiding getting the FCC annoyed in the first place,
> which means that bandwidth consumed per unit metropolitan area must be
> below some particular threshold. If that net became very popular, it
> might be difficult to hold down to the required level.
> 
> If the FCC *did* go after the transmitters, it wouldn't cost them anything
> like $10K per to find. Well, I dunno, I suppose you could assume that
> the transmitters are awfully hard to distinguish from ambient sources,
> but it would take more than handwaving to establish such a high cost to
> the FCC. I'm willing to believe some such design is possible, but I
> wouldn't want to leave it to chance and oversight.

Reports in newspapers I've just been reading about the search for
"Warlord" Aidid in Modadishu indicate that tracking "low-tech"
transmitters (low-power walkie-talkies, small radios) has been a real
problem for the military, the CIA, and the NSA.

This week's "Newsweek" reports:

"Why can't Mohammed Farah Aidid be captured?...Aidid rarely talks on
the radio, preferring messengers. The Pentagon tries to use signal
direction-finding equipment to home in on his propaganda broadcasts.
But Aidid usesa mobile, low-power transmitter, turned on erratically,
making it impossible to fix his position. "Low tech is baffling high
tech," says a Pentagon aide."

("Newsweek," 10-18-93, p. 38)

Now this does not disprove Doug's point...I just submit it as evidence
that the combined forces of the CIA/military/NSA/etc. are probably
spending a whole lot more than "$10K per" and still can't find the
transmitters reliably.

Given many thousands of low-power transmitters, complying with "Part
15" FCC restrictions (i.e., down near the noise level of equipment and
consumer radio devices requiring no licenses), and given dispersion in
hundreds of cities, including some "just across the border" in Mexico
or Canada, and I'd expect few busts.

(And if the transmitters are really Part 15, what would be the grounds
of the bust? After all, computers put out RF at these levels, as do
many other sources.)

Food for thought. 

--Tim May


-- 
..........................................................................
Timothy C. May         | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,  
tcmay@netcom.com       | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
408-688-5409           | knowledge, reputations, information markets, 
W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA  | black markets, collapse of governments.
Higher Power: 2^756839 | Public Key: PGP and MailSafe available.
Note: I put time and money into writing this posting. I hope you enjoy it.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: VACCINIA@UNCVX1.OIT.UNC.EDU
Date: Thu, 14 Oct 93 19:02:20 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Spread Spectrum Net
Message-ID: <01H4491PRPG2000ZKW@UNCVX1.OIT.UNC.EDU>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I have been reading with interest about a wide variety of conduits for signals
that could be used for a spread spectrum net (water pipes, power lines, radio 
signals etc.). Is the electromagnetic signal which could be sent thru pipes and
electric power lines known as a carrier wave? I seem to remember a short story
by John Varley (The book of short stories is called 'Blue Champagne'), which 
somewhat chillingly described what a newly evolved AI entity could do with a 
spread spectrum net. To find out PRESS ENTER:

Scott G. Morham              ! The First, 
Vaccinia@uncvx1.oit.unc.edu  !            Second
                             !                   and Third
                             !                              Levels of
                             !                 Information Storage and Retrieval
                             ! DNA,                       
                             !      Biological Neural Nets,
                             !                              Cyberspace




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: hal@alumni.cco.caltech.edu (Hal Finney)
Date: Thu, 14 Oct 93 22:27:32 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: test post
Message-ID: <9310150523.AA24699@alumni.cco.caltech.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I apologize for the bandwidth waste, but I have sent four posts to the
list this week from my usual posting site and none of them have appeared.
Ironically, the first two (the second one was a re-typing of the first)
discussed the unreliability of email and its implications for mailing
digital cash.  I also sent a 13K byte message describing how Cah\\ Chaum
arranged to detect double-spenders of digital cash.  If this message
appears I'll try re-sending some of the others.  Is anyone else having
posting problems?
Hal
hal@alumni.caltech.edu




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: nobody@cicada.berkeley.edu
Date: Thu, 14 Oct 93 23:17:23 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Crackers Exposed!
Message-ID: <9310150611.AA22950@cicada.berkeley.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


COURTESY OF THE UNITED STATES SECRET SERVICE (WITHOUT PERMISSION)

THE MASTERS OF DECEPTION "MOD" CIRCA NOVEMBER 1990

GIF87A FORMAT, GREYSCALE

<cut here>
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`
end




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: zeek@IO.COM (zeek)
Date: Thu, 14 Oct 93 22:57:05 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: The Bank of the Internet!? (fwd)
Message-ID: <9310150551.AA09472@illuminati.IO.COM>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



More news from FUTURE-C in Re:gards to The Bank of the Internet.  I say
again that I know not much about this biz or crit... I only post it here
for your info:  

Forwarded message:

*> Date:    Tue, 12 Oct 1993 22:13:35 -0700
*> From:    John Frost <frost@NETCOM.COM>
*> Subject: Re: The Bank of the Internet!?
*> 
*> The Capitalization of the Internet. And I thought it was gonna come from the
*> outside. All this talk of AT&T or TCI buying parts of the net and eventually
*> kicking those who won't pay exorbinate prices (that is the nightmare, right>)
*> off the Internet (or the DataHighway, as it will then be called) is just dust
*> in the wind compared to what this Eric guy is planning.
*> 
*> Actually, his idea isn't that bad. It would certainly help those shareware
*> developers to earn some dough and us Authors could get a few pennies for our
*> words. It won't be too long before somebody thinks they have information that
*> people would be willing to pay for. They'll set up an email list and you'll
*> have to pay to be on it. Clarinews will make more money. The Electronic Zines
*> can recover some costs, and even the OTIS gallery could collect some dues.
*> Soon it will become obvious who has the capital to control the net's
*> information (my bet is on Bill Gates), and a new hierarchy based on the old
*> hierarchy of capitalism will soon run the Internet. (this is of course a bleak
*> vision, but I haven't been given reason to think otherwise.)
*> 
*> Chandler wrote this:
*> + But the real boggler is that this fellow Eric is, with the backing of
*> + the Electronic Frontier Foundation, going to start a Credit Union based on
*> + up-to-date encryption schemes and using the Internet as the monetary
*> + highway! It involves using something called digital money -- a system of
*> + encrypted data that expires over time, but that a highly flexible ability
*> + to purchase quantities or services. The data itself will be located
*> + over several nodes, so that no one site has all the info about your
*> + account, but that any "quorum number" of bank nodes can reconstruct the
*> + whole picture of your assets. Anyone trying to crack the system would
*> + have to crack, not just one or two nodes, but a quorum number. Such nodes
*> + will be distributed internationally, though favoring nations with
*> + encryption-favorable legislation.
*> 
*> Sounds Technically sound, but as a political entity? I don't think it will
*> hold water. Doesn't it have to pass the Federal Banking System board or
*> something. THat should take nearly 5 years. Buy then don't you suspect the net
*> will have morphed beyond the culture that would make this system needed?
*> 
*> This feels like just another introduction of what was bad in the ER (everyday
*> reality) that we might surpass in VR.
*> 
*> + I'm oversimplifying all this. But the whole notion of a Bank of the
*> + Internet, backed by the EFF and running encrypted international monetary
*> + transactions seems... well, this is Future Culture: what do you think?
*> 
*> It Stinks. Where do I sign up.
*> 
*> -indigo
*> ------------------------------




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: hiscdcj@lux.latrobe.edu.au  (Dwayne)
Date: Thu, 14 Oct 93 09:16:57 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com (cypherpunks mailing list)
Subject: spread spectrum net (punk net)
Message-ID: <9310141615.AA10497@lux.latrobe.edu.au>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Hiyas,
   I've been discussing this with my friend who came up with the idea,
and he said that if anyone wants to discuss this whole concept with him,
feel free, he just doesn't have a huge mailbox, so he hasn't subscribed
to the list.  His address is:

      jon@werple.apana.org.au

mention 'punk.net'  which is his term for the concept. I prefer it to
the current subject of 'spread spectrum nets' or whatever is the
current vogue.

Also, anyone know how to set up aliases under elm? Or is the list in
general happy with this discussion taking place under the aegis of
cypherpunks@toad.com ????

I'd set up an alias file under elm to handle this, and then we could
boot off cypherpunk (maybe post a weekly digest or something) but the
man page for elm is missing on this site  (derrr...)

Dwayne.

              (Dwayne Jones-Evans  IRC: ddraig  )
     ( SCA: Cynon Yscolan ap Myrddin, Stormhold, Lochac, West)
        PGP public key available. finger me.  be gentle.
           internet---> hiscdcj@lux.latrobe.edu.au





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Mike Ingle <MIKEINGLE@delphi.com>
Date: Thu, 14 Oct 93 23:32:05 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: ARTICLE: IRS learning how to spook
Message-ID: <01H44IW21L4E9370SR@delphi.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


InformationWeek, October 4, 1993, p. 38

Interview: Investigator Donald Vogel
Plans to Milk the IRS Go Sour
Computer-aided tax fraud is rising - and so is enforcement

    When executives at Stew Leonard's Dairy, a food retailer in Norwalk,
Conn., pleaded guilty in July to skimming $17 million in sales to avoid
paying $6.7 million in taxes, the case had a singular twist: It was the
largest instance of tax evasion to rely on a computer program. Inside a
hollowed-out book, Internal Revenue Service agents found the fraud
software - dubbed "Equity" - which a programmer had developed, maintained,
and enhanced at the direction of Leonard's managers.

    To find out just how prevalent high-tech tax fraud is becoming - and the
level of IS involvement and culpability - InformationWeek senior writer
Bruce Caldwell talked with Donald Vogel, assistant commissioner for criminal
investigation at the IRS.

What's different about IS-assisted tax fraud?

    These schemes are no differnet from those that use paper. But with
automation, entries can be adjusted quickly, while on paper it can take
hours or days. There's also a degree of comfort in knowing that records on
diskette can't be as easily accessed as journal entries.
    IS folks can be involved in the overall scheme, or can be doing things
at the direction of the business owner that they know are being done only to
perpetrate fraud. [But in other cases] they may not know the true purpose.

What happens to IS employees who assist in tax fraud?

    Every case stands on its own, but if an IS person is setting up these
accounts and working with an owner to tweak accounts, he or she can be
culpable for participating in a conspiracy to defraud the IRS. I would
equate IS people with accountants. In most cases, these people are not drawn
in as defendants; they're typically the ones who testify on behalf of the
government. They can talk about the system, its audit features, who gave the
instructions, etc. We have to prove intent as well as knowledge. Did the IS
person know that what he or she was doing helped perpetrate the crime? What
did this person do to continue the crime? What did he or she gain from this
involvement?
    I would suspect that most people setting up books and records know when
they're being asked to do something out of the ordinary, when something is
not right.

How do you investigate cases that involve information technology?

    We have 87 agents across the country who have been through computer
training. They understand the workings of a PC, and have a lot of
information about programming. They know how to pull out files that
were encrypted, or booby-trapped, or segmented. They know how to safely
download files and maintain a chain of custody for court purposes.
Those 87 agents represent about 3% to 4% of all agents. We also have two
transcription centers where software is run through programs to check for
problems. When we run into an unfamiliar program or operating system, we can
draw upon specialists in the examination division to help.

Was Leonard's a particularly difficult case to crack?

    What was unique in the Leonard's case was that we found software
specifically used to adjust for skim. Usually, there is compartmentalized
information that leads to skims or other audit trails. With Leonard's,
adjusting books for skim was facilitated because [the participants] could
adjust all accounts, including bank deposits, within seconds.

Is computer-aided tax fraud on the rise?

    It's expanding along with automation. We hope our prosecutions deter
such activity. But I'm not so naive to think that people won't try it.

--------------------------------------------------------------------------

Hmmm...87 agents specially trained for computer tax fraud, and they know
how to "pull out" encrypted files. Now, what if those files were encrypted
with, say, IDEA, or even DES? That would be a little harder to "pull out".
And what if "Equity" (great name for a tax-cheating program!) was on an
encrypted hard-drive partition instead of in a hollowed-out book? That might
create a real headache for the IRS. This could lead to some interesting
cases in the near future, especially if the person with the encryption keys
was also the defendant in the case.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: deltorto@aol.com
Date: Fri, 15 Oct 93 00:57:05 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Mom & Pop Operating Systems
Message-ID: <9310150350.tn57426@aol.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I saw this Letter to the Editors recently in a "family-oriented" Macintosh
weekly & thought you'd all enjoy it...   - dave

"Ma and Pa Finder Can Beat the Peter Pan Syndrome"
--------------------------------------------------

My mother was right. I am not capable of taking care of myself. Although I
haven't mislaid my head as she long predicted, I have lost nearly everything
else. I thought the Macintosh was going to help me organize my life, but it
let me down. My start-up volume, Moby Disk, is full of hundreds of folders
with names like Stuff, Stuff2 and Son of Stuff. The names are somewhat
accurate, they do contain stuff, but I have absolutely no idea what that
stuff is. The Macintosh doesn't help. For me, the Finder is more of a Loser.

I've noticed [MacWEEK columnist] Don Crabb's ongoing attempt in The Mac
Manager column to inspire Finder improvements and alternatves. These new
approaches will never succeed. The onus is still on the user to organize
data, and a lot of us are simply incapable of doing that.

A woman recently told me that many men suffer from the Peter Pan syndrome.
They refuse to grow up. I think she's right, and I qualify. I appreciate this
slander, because it provides me with a flimsy excuse for my lack of any
organizational maturity. I'm one of those fellows who believes that underwear
on the floor and socks in the hallway are easier to find.

If Apple wants to show off one of its new technologies and promote a better
user environment, it needs to incorporate psychology. For many of us, our
mothers are the only people who ever managed to exert some semblance of
control over our naturally messy selves. Bring out the Ma Finder. Using
PlainTalk's synthetic speech capabilities, the Ma Finder talks to you as you
perform tasks: "Now pick up that file and put it where it belongs!"

This is way cool. I'd love it if my mother took over my life. The real one
would never put up with my nonsense again, but the Ma Finder would. More disk
space: "Do you really need a seventh copy of TeachText?" Better descriptors:
"Nice people don't use file names like that!" Easier searches: "This folder
looks like a pigsty. Clean it up." Better moral values: "I found this GIF
file in your 'Hot' folder and, frankly, I'm a little disappointed." And old
fashioned motherly feedback: "So if George threw his System folder in the
Trash, would you have to do the same thing?"

You'd have to be careful, though. If the Ma Finder started getting on your
nerves, it is not as simple as going to the Sound control panel and pulling
the slider down to zero. "Don't you hush me, young man!" Try it, and you're
likely to hear from her partner, the Pa Finder.

The Pa Finder might have a very different way of communicating with you. "Get
your butt in here and empty the Trash! " Or perhaps, "Boy, what is wrong with
you?"

Apple can get a bit crazy when it comes to product introductions. We might
end up seeing a different Finder personality every six months. Bully Finder:
"Drop one more file in this folder and I'm going to sock you! " Cop Finder:
"Let me see your license and registration card." Doctor Finder: "Cough."
Boyfriend Finder: "Trust me." Girlfriend Finder: "No." Michael H. Spindler
Finder: "You need to toss out another 1,400 files."

I really would like a Macintosh that helped me intelligently manage massive
amounts of data. It is difficult to maintain schemes for organizing years of
work and thousands of files. I don't have time during the day to Iook for the
perfect algorithm, so I am hoping that Apple or a third-party developer
discovers the right solution.

  G Morgan Watkins
  Manager, Microcomputer Technologies
  University of Texas at Austin

---------------------------------------------------------------




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Duncan Frissell <frissell@panix.com>
Date: Fri, 15 Oct 93 04:10:05 PDT
To: CYPHERPUNKS@toad.com
Subject: ARTICLE: IRS learning how
Message-ID: <199310151109.AA21883@panix.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Stew Leonard (Hero of Capitalism) whose Stew Leonard's Dairy Store in 
Norwalk, CT has the highest sales per square foot of any retail store in 
the world (allegedly), was busted not because of a computer enforcement 
move by the IRS but because he was arrested smuggling cash out of the 
country.  He was taking 80K to the Bahamas or Caymans or somewhere on his 
private plane.  The Feds didn't say if they got a tip or if it was a spot 
check based on a flight plan.

That was a couple of years ago.  Finally, they raided his store and home 
and found the Equity software.  The programmer should market the code.  It 
would (probably) be legal to do so.

Just goes to show that you computer criminals out there can't neglect your 
physical privacy arrangements.  I could have taught Stew any one of a 
dozen ways to expatriate funds without risk of arrest.  Many of them would 
not even have involved a violation of the laws governing the international 
transfer of monetary instruments.

Duncan Frissell



--- WinQwk 2.0b#1165
                                                                                                                         




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: nobody@alumni.cco.caltech.edu
Date: Fri, 15 Oct 93 08:57:09 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Detecting double-spending (long)
Message-ID: <9310151550.AA01682@alumni.cco.caltech.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Here is an attempt to describe Chaum's digital cash from his paper,
Untraceable Electronic Cash, by Chaum, Fiat, and Naor, from the Crypto 
88 proceedings.  This cash has the property that the user of the cash 
can remain anonymous so long as she does not spend it more than once, 
but if she does double-spend then her identity is revealed.  The 
explanation is kind of complicated, but I'm hoping to improve this 
description to the point where people can actually understand it, so I'd 
appreciate feedback.

This is how it works in general terms:  Alice opens an account with a 
bank non-anonymously.  She shows ID so that the bank knows who she is; 
both she and the bank know her account number.  When she withdraws cash, 
she goes to the bank or contacts them electronically and presents some 
proof of who she is and what her account number is, and the bank gives 
her some digital cash.  The digital cash is an information pattern, 
perhaps stored in a computer file on a smart card or magnetic disk.  
Later, she spends the digital cash by sending or giving it to Bob, a 
merchant.  Bob can check and verify that the cash must have come from 
the bank.  He accepts the cash if it is valid, giving Alice the 
merchandise.  Later, he sends the cash to the bank to be added to his 
own account.

Note that this much could basically be done with a simple RSA signature.  
The bank could give Alice a statement saying, "this is worth $1", signed 
by the bank's public key.  Bob could verify that the statement was in 
fact signed by the bank, and know therefore that no one else than the 
bank could have created that statement.  He accepts it and sends it to 
the bank, which honors it since it recognizes its own signature.

One problem with this trivial money is that double-spending can not be 
detected or prevented since all the cash looks alike.  This can be 
remedied by having the cash include a unique serial number.  Now when 
Bob goes to accept the cash from Alice, he can call the bank and say, 
has anyone else deposited serial number 123456?  If not, he accepts the 
cash and deposits it.  This is called on-line electronic money; the 
merchant must check with the bank for each transaction.

This improved simple system does not deserve to be called cash, though, 
because it lacks the distinguishing characteristic of digital cash: it 
is not anonymous.  When the bank sees money with serial number 123456 
being deposited, the bank recognizes that this was the same bill that 
Alice withdrew.  The bank can therefore deduce that Alice spent the 
money at Bob's, and from this kind of information a dossier could be 
built up with all kinds of privacy-destroying information about her.

To allow anonymity, we have to get into the mathematics.  What we want 
is for Alice and the bank collectively to create an RSA signature from 
the bank that could not be forged, but one which the bank will not 
recognize as coming from Alice.  This is the first thing Chaum's paper 
discusses.

The money in this system is of the form (x, f(x)^(1/3)) mod n, where n 
is the bank's public modulus.  f() (and, below, g()) is a one-way 
function, one which can be calculated easily but for which it is 
infeasible to calculate the inverse.  It should also be infeasible to 
come up with two different y,z such that f(y) = f(z).  Today there are 
several suitable choices for one-way functions, the most common being 
the MD4 and MD5 algorithms from RSA.

The reason the expression above would be accepted as cash is two-fold.  
First, only the bank can calculate anything ^ (1/3) mod n.  This is 
basically the RSA signing operation for the exponent of 3.  Nobody else 
can find cube roots.  The reason f(x) is used is this.  Suppose we 
proposed that (x, x^(1/3)) should be the cash, for some random x, 
reasoning that only the bank could find the cube root of x.  Can you see 
how to forge cash like this?  (Take a few moments and try to see how you 
could construct a pair like this even if you can't take cube roots.)

The answer is that it is easy to forge this by first choosing a random 
y, and exhibiting the pair (y^3, y).  Now we have a number and then its 
cube root.  Yet we didn't have to take any cube roots to find it.  
That's why this kind of money would be no good.

Chaum's system avoids this by taking the cube root of a one-way function 
of x.  To forge it without taking a cube root you'd have to produce 
(finv(y^3),  y), which would match the above pattern, but you can't 
invert the one-way function like that.  So only the bank can create 
money of the proper form.  This can be thought of as the formal, 
mathematical form of my informal "money" above which was a digitally 
signed note with a serial number.  Here, x is the serial number, and 
it's digitally signed in this special way.  Nothing more is needed.

The nice thing about this money is that it allows for blinding, a method 
of having the bank sign the value without knowing what value it is 
signing.  It works like this.  Alice chooses x, which will be the x in 
the cash.  She calculates f(x), but instead of sending it to the bank to 
be signed (raised to the 1/3 power) she first chooses a random number r, 
and sends f(x)*r^3 to the bank.  The bank takes this number to the 1/3 
power, getting r * f(x)^(1/3).  Remember, though, that the bank doesn't 
see r or f(x) separately, but just their product.  It doesn't know what 
r or f(x) is.  They could each be anything, actually.

The bank sends this r * f(x)^(1/3) back to Alice, and she divides it by 
r, which she knows.  This gives her f(x)^(1/3), and she puts that 
together with x to get her digital cash: (x, f(x)^(1/3)).  She has a 
piece of money which could only have been signed by the bank, yet the 
bank won't recognize it when it is deposited.

Other, non-mathematical, things take place as this withdrawal goes on.  
Alice must prove her identity to the bank, as mentioned above.  And the 
bank will debit her account by the value of the cash.  In this system, 
we are assuming for simplicity that all cash has the same value.  In a 
real system, different values might be encoded by different exponents 
than 3.

When Alice deposits the money, Bob must call the bank to make sure that 
it hasn't been deposited before, this being an "on-line" system.  
Although the bank won't recognize x (it's never heard of it) it will 
remember all the x's which have been deposited and so can alert Bob if 
the money has been spent before.  Both Bob and the bank can verify the 
digital signature on the money and so will honor it.

All the material above takes up less than one page of Chaum's nine-page 
paper.  For Chaum, this much is trivial.  Now we get to the interesting 
part.  Now we will see the scheme that allows double-spenders to lose 
their anonymity.  This will allow for "off-line" electronic cash; Bob 
will no longer have to check with the bank to see if the money has 
already been spent.  He accepts it from Alice knowing that if she does 
cheat, the bank will honor the cash and sue Alice to make up the loss.

Let's start with the form of the cash itself.  It is the product of k/2 
numbers, where k is a "security parameter" that affects the chance of a 
cheater getting away with it.  Each number is of the form 
f(xi,yi)^(1/3), where f is a two-argument one-way function like the f 
above.  (The "xi", "yi", "ai", etc. here are separate values for each i 
from 0 to k/2.)

xi and yi are like this:  xi = g(ai, ci), where ai and ci are random, 
and g is another one-way function.  yi is kind of complicated.  It is 
basically g(ai xor <info>, di).  di is another random number, and 
<info>, the key to this whole operation, is identifying information 
about Alice's account!  It is her account number concatenated with a 
serial number for the cash.

Now, why go through all this?  Here's why.  If you could find out both 
ai and (ai xor <info>), for some i, you would know Alice's identity.  
(Xor'ing them would produce <info>.)  When Alice double-spends, both ai 
and ai xor <info> will be revealed.

What happens when Alice spends the coin is this.  For each i from 0 to 
k/2 Bob chooses 0 or 1 at random.  If he chooses 1 he gets told ai (and 
some other stuff).  If he chooses 0 he gets told ai xor <info> (and 
other stuff).  The other things he gets told are sufficient to let him 
confirm that the money is of the proper form.

Now, if Bob does this, he'll know a bunch of ai's, and he'll know a 
bunch of (ai xor <info>)'s, but they are for different i's.  He doesn't 
know both ai and (ai xor <info>) for any one i.  So he can't break 
Alice's anonymity.

When Bob deposits the money at the bank, he passes along the information 
he got from Alice regarding the ai's and such.

Now, suppose Alice cheats.  She spends the money again somewhere else, 
at Charlie's.  Charlie goes through the same procedure as Bob, choosing 
0 or 1 at random for each value of i.  Here is the catch.  Since he is 
choosing at random, it would be very unlikely that he will choose 
exactly the same 0's and 1's that Bob chose.  (Here is where the size of 
k matters - making it bigger makes it less likely that Charlie and Bob 
will choose the same pattern of 0's and 1's.  But it makes the 
calculations take longer.)  That means for one or more values of i, 
Charlie will probably choose a 0 where Bob chose a 1, or vice versa.

Because of this, if Bob got ai for that i, Charlie will get 
ai xor <info>.  Or if Bob got ai xor <info>, Charlie will get ai.  
Either way, when Charlie sends his record of this information to the 
bank, the bank will put Bob's and Charlie's information together and get 
both ai and ai xor <info>.  Xor'ing these together reveals <info>, and 
Alice is caught!  This is the main idea.

All the other things, the ci's and di's and such, are there so that Bob 
can confirm that the money is of the proper form.  For each value of i 
Alice has to give him enough information to calculate xi and yi.  If Bob 
chooses a 1, she gives him ai, ci, and yi.  Given ai and ci Bob can 
calculate xi (=g(ai,ci)), and with this and yi he can calculate 
f(xi,yi).  If Bob chooses a 0, she gives him (ai xor <info>), as 
described before, and also di and xi.  Given (ai xor <info>) and di, Bob 
calculates yi (=g(ai xor <info>, di)), and with this and xi he can 
calculate f(xi,yi).

So for each i, whether Bob gives a 0 or a 1 he gets enough information 
to calculate f(xi,yi).  He multiplies these all together and confirms 
that they are equal to Alice's original "money" value when it is taken 
to the 3rd power (recall the money was product of f(xi,yi)^(1/3) for all 
i).  Only the bank could have produced a signature on this one-way 
function f whose arguments take this special form.

One more complication exists.  (Well, actually, an almost infinite 
number of complications exist if you look hard enough.  But we'll just
focus on one more.)  Alice needs to get this special form of money 
from the bank in such a way that the bank won't recognize it.  That 
means she has to blind it.  But in this case the bank wants to be sure 
that the money is of the proper form when it signs it; in particular, it 
wants to make darned sure that Alice's <info> which is buried deep in 
all of those f's of g's is actually the right one for her.  But since 
the bank can't see what it is signing, this is hard to do.

Chaum uses cut-and-choose for this.  He has Alice prepare all these f's 
and g's according to the form above, carefully embedding her own 
incriminating <info> in each one.  Then she multiplies each f(xi,yi) by 
a blinding factor ri^3 just like in the first cash.  These are what she 
sends to the bank to be signed.

The trick, though, is that she sends twice as many as will be used.  She 
sends k of them, but only k/2 will be used.  (That's why the loop above 
used k/2 as the limit.)  The bank chooses k/2 at random out of the k she 
sent as the ones which will actually be used.  Alice then has to send 
the blinding ri values for the ones which the bank didn't pick.

The idea is that if Alice tries to cheat, embedding "Bozo" instead of 
"Alice" in that <info> field, she's taking a chance.  First, to be 
useful, she's going to have to embed it in a lot of <info> fields for 
different values of i.  When Bob and Charlie compare notes after she 
double-spends, every value of i for which they chose different 0's and 
1's, which will be on the average half of them, will reveal an <info> 
field.  If she only fakes a few, chances are her real identity will 
still be revealed.

But if she falsifies a great many of them, then when the bank chooses 
half, chances are at least some of the fake ones will be in the set the 
bank didn't choose.  Then when Alice has to reveal her blinding r's, the 
jig will be up.  The bank will un-blind all those f(xi,yi)'s which 
aren't being used, and see the fake <info> fields.

This cut-and-choose methodology has the disadvantage that Alice has to 
do twice as much work in preparing the money, half of which will just be 
thrown away.  But it is a simple, "brute force" way to make sure that 
blinding signatures are actually being done on properly-formed data.

So, there you have it.  Anonymity as long as you don't cheat, and 
double-spenders get caught.  It's a little complicated but that's what 
computers are for; Bob and Alice wouldn't do all this stuff by hand.  
Alice would push the "generate a money candidate" button and get 
something to be sent to the bank (lots of the new PDA's have infrared 
wireless communications that would be perfect for face-to-face 
transactions).  Bob would push the "check money" button when Alice spent 
it and it would flash red or green.  As long as the calculations don't 
actually take too much time, which they really wouldn't in this case 
despite this long-winded explanation, the people involved can ignore the 
details.

Hal Finney
hfinney@shell.portal.com




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Jonathan Keith Saville <cs93jks@brunel.ac.uk>
Date: Fri, 15 Oct 93 02:12:06 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Subscribe me...
Message-ID: <7135.9310150909@molnir.brunel.ac.uk>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


please could you subscribe me to the cypherpunks mailing list at the
following address. Thanks.

cs93jks@brunel.ac.uk

Jon
--
#      Jon Saville       |    'May'st not tell thy dreams?'    |
#  cs93jks@brunel.ac.uk  |  Keats, The Fall of Hyperion, 1819  |
#                        |    PGP 2.3a public key available    |




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Lyle_Seaman@transarc.com
Date: Fri, 15 Oct 93 07:27:08 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Monitor radiation overlooking.
In-Reply-To: <AA4Gdli8H0@rd.relcom.msk.su>
Message-ID: <4gjf9GqSMUgEIMznwj@transarc.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Excerpts from internet.cypherpunks: 15-Oct-93 Monitor radiation
overlooking. Victor A. Borisov@rd.rel (1286)

> Some words about DES - I spoke with one cryptoanalisyst from
> KGB and he sow, that for number crypto algotitm c(key, text)
> (key is keyLength tall) present f(key, text), that for all
> key1 and key2 present key with length keyLength, that
> c(key2, c(key1, text))==f(key, text).

> He also say, that now present f() for c()=des(), more f() wery
> like des().

> That`s why for decrypting of des(k1, des(k2, ... des(kN, text) ... ))
> we must try 2^56 keys with spetial function.


I had a little trouble with the English, but I think I followed the
math.  I believe Victor's KGB friend is claiming that DES is a group. 
Victor, does the following text contradict your claim?

From the Crypto FAQ:
Excerpts from netnews.sci.crypt: 4-Oct-93 Cryptography FAQ (05/10: Pr..
crypt-comments@math.ncsu (20767)

>   The security of multiple encipherment also depends on the
>   group-theoretic properties of a cipher. Multiple encipherment is an
>   extension over single encipherment if for keys K1, K2 there does
>   not exist a third key K3 such that

>   E_K2(E_K1(X)) == E_(K3)(X)                (**)

>   which indicates that encrypting twice with two independent keys
>   K1, K2 is equal to a single encryption under the third key K3. If
>   for every K1, K2 there exists a K3 such that eq. (**) is true then
>   we say that E is a group.

>   This question of whether DES is a group under this definition was
> extensively studied by Sherman, Kaliski, and Rivest [SHE88]. In their
> paper they give strong evidence for the hypothesis that DES is not a
> group. In fact DES is not a group [CAM93].

>   [CAM93] K. W. Campbell, M. J. Wiener, Proof the DES is Not a Group. In
> Proceedings of CRYPTO '92, 1993.

>   [SHE88] B. Kaliski, R. Rivest, A. Sherman, Is the Data Encryption
> Standard a Group. Journal of Cryptology, vol. 1, #1,
>           1--36, 1988.





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: cme@ellisun.sw.stratus.com (Carl Ellison)
Date: Fri, 15 Oct 93 08:02:08 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re:  An idea.
Message-ID: <9310151501.AA14843@ellisun.sw.stratus.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>Message-Id: <9310120547.AA26215@anon.penet.fi>
>From: an24519@anon.penet.fi
>Date: Tue, 12 Oct 1993 05:47:52 UTC
>Subject: An idea.


>I suggest that it might
>be a good idea for people to release and sign a short bio on themselves.

If all you're worried about is entrapment, you need only ask the person
in question if s/he works for any law enforcement or surveillance agency.
If they lie, then anything after that is entrapment.

I'm not a lawyer but I learned this from my masseuse in SLC UT, where
mixed-gender massage is considered a "sex act for hire" and she was
constantly subject to entrapment.

 - Carl




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Robert J. Woodhead" <trebor@foretune.co.jp>
Date: Thu, 14 Oct 93 19:17:03 PDT
To: Sandy <72114.1712@CompuServe.COM>
Subject: Re: KIDDY KRYPTO
In-Reply-To: <931015000719_72114.1712_FHF30-1@CompuServe.COM>
Message-ID: <9310150214.AA14778@dink.foretune.co.jp>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Sandy writes:

>I was just watching cartoons on TV with my granddaughter.  I
>almost missed a commercial that is right up our alley.  Casio has
>come out with something called, "My Magic Diary."  It's a kids'
>version of the electronic pocket planner.

Low tech.  Here in Japan the latest rage are these little pocket
devices that let you type in a message and IR beam it to your
buddy's device.  Great for the classroom, or when your friends
have been caged up by an evil demonic rock-star (as in the
commercial, starring the demon-rock-star who was on Larry King
when he was in Tokyo [fun guy, btw])





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Philippe_D_Nave" <pdn@dwroll.dw.att.com>
Date: Fri, 15 Oct 93 10:27:09 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Casio kid diary- Executive Toy?
Message-ID: <9310151725.AA02877@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Hello, all!

The post about the Casio kids' diary with password protection started me
thinking... has anyone tried to incorporate encryption into one of those
executive-toy memo-minders (Sharp 'Wizard', for example) or a PDA (EO,
Apple Newton, etc) for the business-suit crowd? That group is at least as
susceptible to market pressure and the 'I-want-the-newest-toy-NOW!' 
mindset as the kids. It would indeed be ironic to hear two suits 
exchanging PGP public keys as part of their corporate business-card-swap
ritual.
 
Obviously, you can run PGP off a laptop's disk drive in the conventional
manner. What I've got in mind is more like the PCMCIA (or EIEIO, whatever
that acronym is) cards that let you add functionality to your processor
by plugging hardware modules in. It seems to me that a PGP port to this
platform, with an E-Mail interface and some sort of user interface 
(apologies to Zimmermann) might very well sell like hotcakes and go a
long way toward the goal of educating the public about encryption.
Executives with room-temperature IQs can't be bothered to load software,
but plugging in a cartridge and following the bouncing ball would be easy.
Maintaining physical security of the card is easier than wagging the 
whole box around, too- PC repairs could be done without compromising PGP,
etc. Issues abound; any interest?

........................................................................
Philippe D. Nave, Jr.   | The person who does not use message encryption
pdn@dwroll.dw.att.com   | will soon be at the mercy of those who DO...
Denver, Colorado USA    | PGP public key: by arrangement.



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Perry E. Metzger" <pmetzger@lehman.com>
Date: Fri, 15 Oct 93 08:47:08 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: An idea.
In-Reply-To: <9310151501.AA14843@ellisun.sw.stratus.com>
Message-ID: <9310151546.AA16910@snark.lehman.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Carl Ellison says:
> If all you're worried about is entrapment, you need only ask the person
> in question if s/he works for any law enforcement or surveillance agency.
> If they lie, then anything after that is entrapment.

Not true. Its a common myth, though. I imagine Duncan Frissell or one
of the other lawyers on the list could expand on this.

Perry




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: an12070@anon.penet.fi (S. Boxx)
Date: Fri, 15 Oct 93 05:07:08 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: PROOF POSITIVE OF POISON
Message-ID: <9310151202.AA22292@anon.penet.fi>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


===

 From: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Subject: Options for Speech on Cypherpunks
Date: Wed, 6 Oct 93 12:31:04 PDT

 Lots of options for dealing with too much volume, too much flamage,
too little content, too many diverse interests, whatever.  Not all
options are feasible for the Sysadmin (Eric Hughes), of course, and
software is not always available.

Needless to say, these ideas are swirling around in many minds.
"Abraham-Hughes" described their ideas along these lines at a
Cypherpunks meeting,

===

 From: jamie@netcom.com (Jamie Dinkelacker)
Subject: Newbie reading: Bamberg
Date: Thu, 7 Oct 93 18:17:53 -0700

Newbie cypheroids and cypherettes,

Tim May has pointed to _The Puzzle Palace_ by Bamberg several times here
and on the Extropians list. If like me you're a newbie, it's a quick,
excellent read. Don't miss it. It'll give context for the quote, "gentlemen
don't read each other's mail."

===

 From: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Subject: Bamford's "The Puzzle Palace"
Date: Thu, 7 Oct 93 18:59:41 PDT

"My name is Bamford, _James_ Bamford."

Bamford's "The Puzzle Palace" is a bit dry in places, but is very
well-researched. I first read it in hardback in 1982 and the stuff
about intercepts of commercial intelligence (stock trades, corporate
secrets, etc.) got me to thinking about how the NSA may be _using_
the fruits of its corporate intercepts. This motivated the plot of the
novel I've been working on, and my interest in the "BlackNet" aspects
of crypto, so I can honestly say Bamford's book changed my life.

He also describes in previously-nonpublicized detail the "Harvest" and
"Lodestone" systems installed at NSA headquarters at Fort Meade around
1963. Our own Norm Hardy was involved in this and will be describing
his "Harvest" experiences at this Saturday's Cypherpunks meeting.

See (some of) you there!

===

 From: jamie@netcom.com (Jamie Dinkelacker)
Subject: Re: Bamford's "The Puzzle Palace"
Date: Thu, 7 Oct 93 19:48:17 -0700

ooops, Tim's right. I was listening to David Bromberg (urg?) while writing
that post and it slipped out. Thanks, Tim.

===

 From: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Subject: Re: The death of the list as we know it (tm)
Date: Fri, 8 Oct 93 10:43:05 PDT

My point is this: there are many sound reasons to keep a group such as
ours a mailing list and not open it to every freshman in college who
can grep for "punk" and stumble across us, or for every
Sternlight-type bozo who delights in creating noise and rancor in
groups.

As others have mentioned, tools exist to locally feed mailing list
traffic into pseuodo-newsgroups, which can then be treated as the
newsgroup format some folks desire.

We debate this issue every couple of months. Give it up. Or start your
own newsgroup. Or use one of the existing newsgroups.

===

 From: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Subject: Re: The death of the list as we know it (tm)
To: trebor@foretune.co.jp (Robert J. Woodhead)
Date: Fri, 8 Oct 93 19:16:36 PDT


Robert Woodhead writes:

> This is called "security through obscurity."  I'm shocked to see it
> advocated in this list!  ;^>

And I'm shocked--:-}-- that people keep beating a dead horse,
expecting that if they repeat their arguments enough times, something
will miraculously change. This rarely works, and mainly just dilutes
the content of the list further.

> Opening up the list into a newsgroup has risks, but they can be mitigated
> and doing so would make it easier to use, and reduce the load on toad.

I won't repeat my own arguments for the 7th or 8th time. In any case,
Eric Hughes has the final say and he has said it will not happen in no
uncertain terms.

If you vote otherwise, send your votes to dev/null. They'll count more
that way. (There is no pretense that the list is a democracy.)

> Bottom line, isn't one of the goals of punkery in general (whatever
> flavor) to _spread_ knowledge.  Shouldn't this stuff be shouted from
> the digital treetops?

Not one of the major goals, from my perspective. We don't advertise,
we don't lobby, we aren't even _set up_ to do such a thing. And when
we're interviewed (and anybody _can_ be), nobody spouts off the
"Cypherpunks agenda."

Books and magazines spread knowledge. Notice that we don't even have a
FAQ? We're hardly in the education business.

We're a loose collection of folks, bound by the mailing list and the
various physical meetings (and those of you out in the hinterlands
should simply organize your own gatherings). The interest in
remailers, digital money, code, etc., is the main glue.

Political action is a detour. The Clipper debate was one such detour,
occuoying too much time for several months, though I suspect some good
came out of it.

Anyway, it's not for me to say what the Cypherpunks are, but all those
folks shouting that "we" are a lobbying group, or whatever, are
misguided, I think.

One of the advantages of a mailing list is the implied sense of
community and of a shared history. It is expected that most on the
list have seen the traffic go by, even if they skipped many of the
messages. Newsgroups, on the other hand, encourage people to dip in
for a few days, ignore for several weeks, dip in again, and so on.
Thus, a huge number of repeat topics as people dip in and out and miss
the context of comments, the history, and so on. Progress stalls, even
more so than progress may've stalled in some areas on this List.

And while I agree that TLAs may be reading this list, one way or
another, making it a newsgroup would open it up for archiving around
the world, for appearance on those CD-ROMS filled with Usenet traffic,
and for easy grepping by future employers and future government
snoops. In other words, a public forum.

That's great if the goal is to educate people about crypto, not so
great if the goal is frank discussion of tough problems.

 --Tim

 -- 
..........................................................................
Timothy C. May         | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,  
tcmay@netcom.com       | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
408-688-5409           | knowledge, reputations, information markets, 
W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA  | black markets, collapse of governments.
Higher Power: 2^756839 | Public Key: PGP and MailSafe available.
Note: I put time and money into writing this posting. I hope you enjoy it.


===

Date: Sat, 9 Oct 93 04:18:31 EST
 From: Matthew B. Landry <mbl@ml7694a.leonard.american.edu>
Subject: Safe and fun environment?

>Still, it might make sense for someone from this list to give them some
>help on the crypto aspects.  This could be a safe and fun environment
>in which people could be introduced to crypto, and it could even expand

        Unless this list undergoes some VERY radical changes, it will never be 
a "safe and fun environment" to introduce new people to anything. At the 
moment, in order to get anything out of it, one has to devote large quantities 
of queue space and time to the subscription, and sift through the flames and 
other noise to locate the rare bit of truly valuable info. There are very few 
people on this list who routinely post things worth reading, and many who 
_never_ post things worth reading, and seem to be only around for the flame 
wars.
        And god forbid that a newcomer should ask a QUESTION! Dear lord no. 
That newcomer will be flamed so totally that no burn unit around will be able 
to save them.
        Most of those that are persistent or resiliant enough to survive what 
this list can often put people through may or may not decide to stay. I would 
imagine that such negative experiences would turn a lot of people off to the 
whole idea of crypto-privacy. If I hadn't already been committed to privacy 
when I joined the list, I would have immediately unsubscribed, called Fort 
Meade, and asked what I could do to help. 
        The vast majority of people who post on this list and respond to other 
people's posts are obnoxious idiots who are willing to flame at the slightest 
provocation, and will do so until the person they attack backs down or simply 
gives up.

        No one on this list is entirely to blame, nor is anyone entirely 
blameless for this. Several of the top figures on the list (TC May and Eric 
Hughes to name two) have recently adopted an inappropriately elitist attitude 
toward the direction of the list, and the movement. No one can stop Eric from 
running the _list_ however he wants, but the _movement_ belongs to all of us, 
thank you. Even though I respect the crypto-political opinions that they 
express a great deal, I think that they and their supporters have taken this 
too far. And worse, they have not taken a firm stand against the kind of flame 
war that is continually erupting over individual posts on the list. For the 
leaders to sit back and watch this go on is simply not the appropriate way to 
handle things.

        Until we fix the serious problems in this list, it will never be an 
appropriate environment for newcomers to learn about crypto-privacy, just a 
training ground for flame-throwers.

        Dare I suggest (why not? I'm already burning to a crisp, how much worse 
could it get?) that we create a moderated newsgroup that would gateway the 
substantive traffic from this list into a more accessible forum (but NOT the 
other way around). In that manner, we could provide a place for newcomers to 
learn about cryptography and the movement, without forcing them to sift through 
mountains of flame wars. Questions could be referred to qualified personnel, 
instead of going to the list where they act like little flame magnets.
        This newsgroup would not replace the list, nor would it be more than 
marginally connected (because of the selected cross-postings), but it would 
provide the kind of environment that the list does not or cannot provide.
        Go ahead and dump flames in my mailbox. I've long since gotten used to 
it. I'm not going to back down until someone convinces me that a hospitable 
environment with informative traffic and a high s/n ratio is a bad idea. Or, 
you can save bandwidth and send the flames to /dev/null, because that's where 
anything that doesn't make sense will go. Rational comments are welcome, 
though.

        Oh, and for those of you that are tired of seeing me post, you can rest 
assured that you will never see it again. Contributing to this list has brought 
nothing but trouble to my life, and I have better things to do with my time 
than wade through piles of flamage in my personal mail box.

===

 From: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Date: Sat, 9 Oct 93 2:45:26 PDT

I wrote this reply to Matthew Landry, who raised some complaints about
the direction of this list, the role of the "leaders," and so on. I
sent it to him personally, so as not to add to the already heavy
volume of stuff on this list, especially the complaints of the last
few days.

I think the term "leader" is inappropriate. Several of us got the group
rolling a little over a year ago, but the anarchic nature of the
mailing list (source of strengths as well as weaknesses).

In Matthew's post he on the one hand blasts the elitist attitude of
Eric Hughes and myself while in the next paragraph blasting the lack
of action taken by the "leaders" to control flames and set up systems
to help newcomers.

Anyway, I enjoyed a political piece Matthew wrote a couple of weeks or
so ago, and I told him this. So his piece tonight (2:30 a.m) merited a
response.

And though some of you are no doubt sick of seeing these issues
debated, I've decided to forward my letter to him to all of you, as I
think some points need to be made.

I've removed one or two sentences from the version I mailed to
Matthew.

===

 From: tcmay (Timothy C. May)
Subject: Re: Safe and fun environment?
To: mbl@ml7694a.leonard.american.edu (Matthew B. Landry)
Date: Sat, 9 Oct 93 2:15:32 PDT

Matthew, 

I think you're taking the stuff here too personally. Not all the
feedback to you has been negative--I recall congratulating you on a
nice political piece.

But you have raised issues about elitism and unwillingness to teach
newcomers that others have raised. And you ought to see some of the
abusive e-mail I get! Whew! 

Whenever I disagree with some of the paranoids and ranters, I am
called a traitor, a hypocrite, a lackey of Eric Hughes, a member of
the "Clique," and on and on.

Let me comment on a few of your points:

> a "safe and fun environment" to introduce new people to anything. At the 
> moment, in order to get anything out of it, one has to devote large quantities 
> of queue space and time to the subscription, and sift through the flames and 
> other noise to locate the rare bit of truly valuable info. There are very few 
> people on this list who routinely post things worth reading, and many who 
> _never_ post things worth reading, and seem to be only around for the flame 
> wars.

I'm sorry to hear you're getting so little new stuff here. Many of us
have spent many hour typing in (or scanning and OCRing, in my case)
papers and articles, from Chaum's "Dining Cryptographers" paper
(every bloody word of it!) to Shamir's "How to Share a Secret" to
scads of shorter articles and whatnot.

And the debate ranges from random number generators to Perl scripts
and TCL to digital money to ECPA to .... well, to about 20 major
topics, by my estimate.

>         And god forbid that a newcomer should ask a QUESTION! Dear lord no. 
> That newcomer will be flamed so totally that no burn unit around will be able 
> to save them.

This is simply not true. I have answered--when I could--the questions
of many people over the past 12 months. And I've repeatedly posted
reading lists, pointers to the Glossary at the soda site, and so on.

It is true that I sometimes am exasperated by people who have clearly
not been reading the list who ask "Can anyone tell me about digital
money?" when the topic has just been discussed!

(A FAQ would be nice. I was about to agree to do it a year ago, when
...comments on status of the FAQ elided to reduce flamage and angry
feelings.... 

Fortunately, there are many other newsgroups that beginners can read
ot learn crypto....Cypherpunks was not set up to compete with
sci.crypt and all the other sources.


>         The vast majority of people who post on this list and respond to other 
> people's posts are obnoxious idiots who are willing to flame at the slightest 
> provocation, and will do so until the person they attack backs down or simply 
> gives up.

I think this is uncalled for. I haven't seen this kind of flaming,
except in the XXXXX case, and that has its own dynamic. (And
please, Matthew, try to find a post where I have flamed XXXXX in
public...I don't believe you can easily find one.)

>         No one on this list is entirely to blame, nor is anyone entirely 
> blameless for this. Several of the top figures on the list (TC May and Eric 
> Hughes to name two) have recently adopted an inappropriately elitist attitude 
The mailing list cannot be run by "democratic means." Nor can
"teaching assigments" be handed out. 

The list is like a party at someone's home. The will of the herd is
not the will of the organizers.

Nor is the Cypherpunks agenda all that clear. I, for example, want to
see strong crypto deployed in ways very different than what others
favor. Are we to take a majority vote on an agenda, a charter?

It's better to just leave the agenda loose and unwritten, so as not to
have to grapple with this collision of goals. We can all pretend the
agenda is what we favor.

> running the _list_ however he wants, but the _movement_ belongs to all of us, 
> thank you. Even though I respect the crypto-political opinions that they 

The _movement_ belongs to what gets written and what gets responded
to. In other words, if you want to be listened to, you have to get
people's attention by the quality of your arguments. 

You can't rail against "leaders" (an ironic choice of words you used)
like Hal Finney or Duncan Frissell just because their posts get
reaction. You can't argue that the "herd" didn't have a chance to
vote. In fact, people vote with their own posts. Market democracy.

> express a great deal, I think that they and their supporters have taken this 
> too far. And worse, they have not taken a firm stand against the kind of flame 
> war that is continually erupting over individual posts on the list. For the 
> leaders to sit back and watch this go on is simply not the appropriate way to 
> handle things.

The "leaders"? I have commented many times on issues of rancor and
flames, even recently, and for this I am accused by some of being part
of "the Clique" that "runs" Cypherpunks. Nonsense.

>         Until we fix the serious problems in this list, it will never be an 
> appropriate environment for newcomers to learn about crypto-privacy, just a 
> training ground for flame-throwers.

About 70% of the flames would subside if XXXXX would cool his jets,
and stop ranting and raving. 

As for "training newcomers," it's not easy. Lots of books exist, and
many of the really solid contributors (Barrus, Honeyman, Collins,
Stewart, etc.) learned their crypto in exactly this way.

Many of us wrote _very long_ articles of a tutorial nature when the
list was getting started. Newcomers who are unwilling to read some of
the technical books on crypto should not expect us to write customized
tutorials.  

> mountains of flame wars. Questions could be referred to qualified personnel, 
> instead of going to the list where they act like little flame magnets.

May I ask which "qualified personnel" you have in mind? As per the
earlier comment, not many of the crypto experts I know have any
interest in hand-holding, not when at least a dozen good books on
crypto are readily available.

>         This newsgroup would not replace the list, nor would it be more than 
> marginally connected (because of the selected cross-postings), but it would 
> provide the kind of environment that the list does not or cannot provide.

How is this group you propose any different from sci.crypt,
talk.politics.crypto, the various *.privacy groups, the *.clipper
group, or the *.security groups? Seems to me sci.crypt is exactly what
you're looking for. (But don't expect hand-holding for newcomers
there, either!)

>         Oh, and for those of you that are tired of seeing me post, you can rest 
> assured that you will never see it again. Contributing to this list has brought 
> nothing but trouble to my life, and I have better things to do with my time 
> than wade through piles of flamage in my personal mail box.


Matthew, threatening to leave is not going to have much effect. But if
you have decided to leave, good luck in all your endeavours.

-Tim May


===

 From: jamie@netcom.com (Jamie Dinkelacker)
To: Matthew B. Landry <mbl@ml7694a.leonard.american.edu>
Date: Sat, 9 Oct 93 11:39:51 -0700
Subject: Re: Safe and fun environment?

[Cypherlings, excuse the bandwidth]

Matthew,

As a fresh newbie allow me to react for the record to your recent post.

>a "safe and fun environment" to introduce new people to anything. 

I've never found a safe and fun environment anywhere, anytime if I looked
closely enough to see what was going on; hence I never expect it anywhere,
anytime.

>        And god forbid that a newcomer should ask a QUESTION! Dear lord no. 
>That newcomer will be flamed so totally that no burn unit around will be able 
>to save them.

My questions have been answered graciously, thoroughly, and when I've been
corrected, I should've been due to inattentive typing (e.g., author's
names).

>        No one on this list is entirely to blame, nor is anyone entirely 
>blameless for this. Several of the top figures on the list (TC May and Eric 
>Hughes to name two) have recently adopted an inappropriately elitist attitude 
>toward the direction of the list, and the movement. 

Movement? Like in 'bowel'? I don't see the elitest approach; from my
perspective it looks like people with knowledge being exasperated when
others want private tutoring and don't RTFM. I'm pretty much the same way
in my areas of expertise.

>No one can stop Eric from 
>running the _list_ however he wants, but the _movement_ belongs to all of us, 

Let me get this straight -- you're claiming property rights to spontaneous
behavior of other individuals?

>        Until we fix the serious problems in this list, it will never be an 
>appropriate environment for newcomers to learn about crypto-privacy, 

It's been good for me. Why do you think that might be?

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From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Matthew B. Landry <mbl@ml7694a.leonard.american.edu>
Date: Fri, 15 Oct 93 09:17:08 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: PROOF POSITIVE OF POISON
Message-ID: <9310151613.AA01987@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


        "Proof Positive"? I didn't see any proof of anything except the fact 
that "S. Boxx" has enough time on his hands to repost messages that the list 
members have already read. Did anyone see any proof of anything (or even any 
hint of what he was getting at)? Please let me know if I'm missing something 
here.
--
mbl@ml7694a.leonard.american.edu
Speak for the University? HAHAHAHA! That's the craziest idea I've ever heard!




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: peb@PROCASE.COM (Paul Baclace)
Date: Fri, 15 Oct 93 12:32:09 PDT
To: frissell@panix.com
Subject: Re: ARTICLE: IRS learning how
Message-ID: <9310151931.AA02360@banff.procase.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



>He was taking 80K to the Bahamas or Caymans [...]

Well, obviously he should have taken tip from Ollie North and paid a
courier to fly back and forth with $9500 at a time.  No laws against
that.


Paul E. Baclace
peb@procase.com




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: nobody@alumni.cco.caltech.edu
Date: Fri, 15 Oct 93 12:52:31 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Detecting double-spending
Message-ID: <9310151948.AA06508@alumni.cco.caltech.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Wonderer asks about Alice guessing the bank's random choices of the
blinded f()'s that she creates.  Certainly this would let her cheat.
The bank would probably use a quantum-based hardware random number
generator (as a seed, at least) to make this impossible.

To take cube roots, the bank must find a d such that d*3 = 1 mod
(p-1)(q-1), where p and q are the secret primes in its RSA system.
Finding such a d is a simple application of Euclid's algorithm.  It
has the property that (m^d)^3 = (m^3)^d = m.  In other words, taking
a number to the power of d produces its cube root.  This is the basic
mathematics behind the RSA public-key cryptosystem.

Marc Horowitz asks about collusion between Bob and Charlier to pick the
same 1's and 0's.  It is true that this would defeat the scheme.  However,
the chances of this happening randomly are so low that the bank would
know that at least one of them was cheating, although it would not know
which.

Chaum discusses this threat in his paper.  He suggests that each merchant
in the system would have a unique ID number.  The 1's and 0's that the
merchant uses in the payment protocol would be partially random choices
as I described and partially based on the unique ID.  Since all ID's are
different this would guarantee that any two merchants would use different
patterns of 1's and 0's even if they were cheating.

Hal Finney
hfinney@shell.portal.com




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: blaster@rd.relcom.msk.su (Victor A. Borisov)
Date: Fri, 15 Oct 93 03:10:04 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Monitor radiation overlooking.
Message-ID: <AA4Gdli8H0@rd.relcom.msk.su>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Hello!

     I  read   about   overlooking  of  monitor   radiation.
Introder   can   scan   the  electron-beam  radiation   from
electron-gun. He  simple  transmit  this   radiation to self
electron-gun  and sinchronize  frequance. This  method  work
with b/w  monitor.  The  overlooking of  color-monitor  more
dificult - introder will see 4 gradation of gray  (all  guns
off, work one, two, three guns). But  we can select  spesial
colors (red-blue or blue-green) and  allways will  work only
one (or two) guns. In this way  introder will  see  dark (or
light) gray screen without any information!!!
     Is it  corect?  Do now present more improve overlooking
system?

Some words about DES - I spoke with one cryptoanalisyst from
KGB and he sow, that for number crypto algotitm c(key, text)
(key is keyLength tall) present f(key, text), that for all
key1 and key2 present key with length keyLength, that
c(key2, c(key1, text))==f(key, text).

He also say, that now present f() for c()=des(), more f() wery
like des().

That`s why for decrypting of des(k1, des(k2, ... des(kN, text) ... ))
we must try 2^56 keys with spetial function.


--- 
Victor A. Borisov aka blaster;	Relcom R&D;
Email: blaster@rd.relcom.msk.su;
Phone: +7(095)-943-4735; +7(095)-198-9510;
	=== Don`t panic! ===




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Perry E. Metzger" <pmetzger@lehman.com>
Date: Fri, 15 Oct 93 10:02:08 PDT
To: "Matthew B. Landry" <mbl@ml7694a.leonard.american.edu>
Subject: Re: PROOF POSITIVE OF POISON
In-Reply-To: <9310151613.AA01987@toad.com>
Message-ID: <9310151701.AA16987@snark.lehman.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Matthew B. Landry says:
>         "Proof Positive"? I didn't see any proof of anything except the fact 
> that "S. Boxx" has enough time on his hands to repost messages that the list 
> members have already read. Did anyone see any proof of anything

Yes. I saw proof that S. Boxx's posts are an annoying waste of time.
I suggest ignoring them, though -- whats the point in wasting MORE
time discussing them, given that he's unlikely to stop posting them no
matter what we do.

> (or even any hint of what he was getting at)?

I think he thinks there is some sort of elitist conspiracy going on
here where the people that know how to add and multiply are looking
down on the people who don't.

> Please let me know if I'm missing something  here.

Less than you imagine.

Perry




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: peb@PROCASE.COM (Paul Baclace)
Date: Fri, 15 Oct 93 13:27:09 PDT
To: pmetzger@lehman.com
Subject: Re: ARTICLE: IRS learning how
Message-ID: <9310152026.AA02401@banff.procase.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



>  You just have to fill out the right forms.

Yes, of course, that's what I meant.  There are no laws against skirting
the paperwork if you are under the limit.  Or, as you note, the "IRS 1040 
list of foreign bank accounts" is another matter completely. 


Paul




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: jim@chiba.Tadpole.COM (Jim Thompson)
Date: Fri, 15 Oct 93 11:32:30 PDT
To: pdn@dwroll.dw.att.com
Subject: Re: Casio kid diary- Executive Toy?
Message-ID: <9310151828.AA03222@chiba.tadpole.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Along the same lines, I'm fairly sure that the NSA had a RFQ out for
much the same kind of thing.  (Key management on PCMCIA memory cards.)

Jim



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: jim@Tadpole.COM (Jim Thompson)
Date: Fri, 15 Oct 93 11:40:10 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: NAFTA event
Message-ID: <9310151835.AA03297@chiba.tadpole.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Appologia to those of you who've seen this already.  Carl invites you to
send email.  I'd suggest some verbage about export controls for crypto.

Jim

From: carl@town.hall.org
Subject: White House NAFTA Event 
Org: Internet Multicasting Service
Channel: Internet Town Hall

On Wednesday, October 20, the White House is showcasing the
benefits of the North Amercian Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) to
American workers and the American economy.

President Clinton and Vice President Gore will highlight 
American-made products which are currently sold in Mexico.  
The range of products, and the number of American workers who 
make them is enormous and the White House would like to present 
to the American public the benefits of increased trade with our 
neighbors.

The White House has invited over 200 companies and their employees
to bring their products to the West Lawn of the White House.  
Sun Microsystems is one of the companies invited and they 
would like to use this opportunity to highlight the computer industry 
in general as a crucial technology for our global economy and in 
particular to highlight the significant role the Internet will 
play in fostering trade in the global marketplace.

Sun Microsystems, in conjunction with several other companies,
will put two Sparcstations on the lawn of the White House.  Using
a Persoft Intersect Remote Bridge wireless 2 Mbps spread-spectrum 
radio link, we will link the LAN on the White House lawn to our 
facilities in the National Press Building.  That network will in 
turn use the MFS Datanet national fiber backbone to link us at 10 
Mbps to Alternet, our IP service provider.

The workstations on the White House lawn will feature a variety
of Internet applications such as NCSA Mosaic for X, Gopher, and 
other applications that highlight the scope and diversity of the 
global Internet computer network.

Here is how you can participate!  Send your electronic mail to:

	nafta@town.hall.org 

The mail will be collected and will be available on the screen 
as well as being printed out on a laser printer.  

Tell the President, the Vice President, members of the Cabinet, 
members of the Congress, and the national media what you think 
about NAFTA. Help demonstrate to this important audience that 
the Internet is an important forum for the discussion of public 
affairs.  If you feel the need to flame pro or con on this subject, 
feel free to cc: nafta@town.hall.org in your discussions to the list.

For general information on the Internet Multicasting Service,
send mail to info@town.hall.org.









From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Marc Horowitz <marc@GZA.COM>
Date: Fri, 15 Oct 93 10:37:09 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Detecting double-spending (long)
In-Reply-To: <9310151550.AA01682@alumni.cco.caltech.edu>
Message-ID: <9310151736.AA13259@dun-dun-noodles.aktis.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Great description!  One question, which struck me when I heard Chaum
present this material at IETF Amsterdam:

>> Now, suppose Alice cheats.  She spends the money again somewhere else, 
>> at Charlie's.  Charlie goes through the same procedure as Bob, choosing 
>> 0 or 1 at random for each value of i.  Here is the catch.  Since he is 
>> choosing at random, it would be very unlikely that he will choose 
>> exactly the same 0's and 1's that Bob chose.  (Here is where the size of 
>> k matters - making it bigger makes it less likely that Charlie and Bob 
>> will choose the same pattern of 0's and 1's.  But it makes the 
>> calculations take longer.)  That means for one or more values of i, 
>> Charlie will probably choose a 0 where Bob chose a 1, or vice versa.

What if Alice, Bob, and Charlie are all colluding, and Bob and Charlie
present the same 1's and 0's to Alice?  The bank would know the same
bill was spent twice once it got it, but wouldn't be able to determine
that Alice was the spender.  Bob and Charlie could both claim "What a
cooincidence!"  and say they wanted their money.

I suppose the bank could just write the scenario down, and hand the
money to Bob and Charlie (who give their cut to Alice, in anonymous
digicash, of course).  If it happens again, the bank says "yeah,
right" and invokes the clause in their contract which allows the bank
to terminate its relationship with Bob and Charlie.  Assuming the
digicash economy is strong enough that people won't cut off the
relationship with the bank so easily, most people won't try this.  But
it will cause the bank to want to put an upper limit on transaction
size.

		Marc




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: trestrab@GVSU.EDU (BETH TRESTRAIL)
Date: Fri, 15 Oct 93 10:52:09 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Novell Leads Assault on Clipper Encryption Standard
Message-ID: <9309157507.AA750718171@GVSU.EDU>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


(taken from Nov '93 Computer Shopper, page 109)


          The Clinton administration's effort to establish a new
          encryption standard for the coming data superhighway has
          drawn a firestorm of criticism - with Novell the lead
          flamethrower.
          Joined by AT&T, Computer Associates, Citicorp, Hughes
          Aircraft, Motorola, and other major corporations, Novell
          argues that Clipper - intended to protect both government
          and private-sector data communications - was designed from
          the start as an easy nut to crack.
          Specifically, these companies suspect that Clipper's
          creators (the National Security Agency and the National
          Institute of Standards and Technology) made the encryption
          system child's play for government agencies to decrypt. True
          or not, Novell and its allies are adamently opposed to
          Clipper's adoption by corporate America.
          [3 paragraphs concerning Novell's NetWare ellided]
          What is clear, though, is that Clipper will be hardpressed
          to succeed in the private sector with such influential
          opponents.

If this article truly represents opposition to Clipper, and not just
jockeying for position to be included on the "inside", then Clipper is
in far bigger trouble than the Cypherpunks can make for it: MONEY
TALKS.

          Jeff




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: bgomes@netcom.com (Bill Gomes)
Date: Fri, 15 Oct 93 13:57:09 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Monitor radiation overlooking.
Message-ID: <9310152054.AA12419@netcom.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Victor A. Borisov (blaster@rd.relcom.msk.su) writes:

> Some words about DES - I spoke with one cryptoanalisyst from
> KGB and he sow, that for number crypto algotitm c(key, text)
> (key is keyLength tall) present f(key, text), that for all
> key1 and key2 present key with length keyLength, that
> c(key2, c(key1, text))==f(key, text).

> He also say, that now present f() for c()=des(), more f() wery
> like des().

> That`s why for decrypting of des(k1, des(k2, ... des(kN, text) ... ))
> we must try 2^56 keys with spetial function.

And Lyle_Seaman@transarc.com replies:

> I had a little trouble with the English, but I think I followed the
> math.  I believe Victor's KGB friend is claiming that DES is a group. 
> Victor, does the following text contradict your claim?
> 
> (Excerpt from sci.crypt faq deleted)

I think that Victor's friend proposes a second function, f(), which is
not the same as DES.  He is saying that for every set of three keys
used for triple-DES (k2,k3,k4), there is a key (k1) such that:

        f(k1,text) = DES(k2,DES(k3, DES(k4,text)))

It seems to me this is different than saying DES is a group, since f != DES.

Am I mistaken?






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Perry E. Metzger" <pmetzger@lehman.com>
Date: Fri, 15 Oct 93 13:07:09 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: ARTICLE: IRS learning how
In-Reply-To: <9310151931.AA02360@banff.procase.com>
Message-ID: <9310152003.AA17210@snark.lehman.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Paul Baclace says:
> 
> >He was taking 80K to the Bahamas or Caymans [...]
> 
> Well, obviously he should have taken tip from Ollie North and paid a
> courier to fly back and forth with $9500 at a time.  No laws against
> that.

No laws against taking 80k in cash out, either. You just have to fill
out the right forms. The problem is that taking that much out tends to
indicate that you have signature authority over a foreign bank account
which you neglected to mention on your 1040 form last year.

Perry




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: cme@ellisun.sw.stratus.com (Carl Ellison)
Date: Fri, 15 Oct 93 13:12:09 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: new magazine: Computer Telephony
Message-ID: <9310152010.AA15328@ellisun.sw.stratus.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I just saw Vol 1 No.1 in the corporate library.

Subtitle: The Magazine For Computer And Telephone Integration

Subscription info: 215-355-2886

 - Carl




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Sandy <72114.1712@CompuServe.COM>
Date: Fri, 15 Oct 93 14:00:13 PDT
To: <cypherpunks@toad.com>
Subject: IRS LEARNING . . .
Message-ID: <931015205509_72114.1712_FHF121-1@CompuServe.COM>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
  SANDY SANDFORT               Reply to:  ssandfort@attmail.com
 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Paul Baclace wrote:

    Well, obviously he should have taken tip from Ollie
    North and paid a courier to fly back and forth with
    $9500 at a time.  No laws against that.

Well, yes and no.  As Perry pointed out, there is no limit to how
much you can take out if you report it.  The trouble is, though
it is legal to take out less than $10,000 without reporting it,
you can't perform a series of such transactions in order to
ultimately move out an amount greater than $10k.  They call it
*structuring*, and it 'taint legal.

Of course, structuring may be difficult to detect, so as a
practical matter, you might get away with it.  (If, however, you
are found with $9500 in cash, they still might seize it under our
wonderful new "fruits of drug dealing" laws.)  But in any event,
there are better ways to accomplish the same result.  My favorite
*fun* solution would be to buy $80,000 in travellers cheques and
then *burn* them.  I leave the rest of the transaction as an
exercise for the student.

 S a n d y

>>>>>>    Please send e-mail to:  ssandfort@attmail.com    <<<<<<
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: an41418@anon.penet.fi (wonderer)
Date: Fri, 15 Oct 93 10:17:09 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Detecting double-spending (long)
Message-ID: <9310151710.AA01173@anon.penet.fi>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Very good summary!! It's much clearer now!

So, can I take it that if Alice or anyone else can
figure out how the bank randomly picks half of the
k values sent in, that Alice or anyone else can now
get free money by using bozo instead of her real
identity in the right k/2 messages?

Also, how does the bank calculate cube roots?

Wonderer
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
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From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: cme@ellisun.sw.stratus.com (Carl Ellison)
Date: Fri, 15 Oct 93 14:27:10 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re:  Generating random numbers
Message-ID: <9310152123.AA15536@ellisun.sw.stratus.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>Date: Thu, 14 Oct 93 17:46:32 MDT
>From: "Mike Johnson" <exabyte!smtplink!mikej@uunet.uu.net>
>Message-Id: <9309147506.AA750645992@smtplink.exabyte.com>
>Subject: Generating random numbers


>
>If you have an audio input to your computer, try recording noise from a fan,
>traffic on a busy street, or the roar of a crowd at a football game.  Then
>compress the output to remove any obvious redundancies such as 60 Hz hum from
>a fan motor or unused dynamic range of the input digitizer.  This results in
>much better "randomness" than some keystroke timing techniques.

True.

You get even better entropy if you turn off the mic (or unplug it)
and run the sampled audio output into compress -- assuming your mic
is like mine and lets a bit of electronic noise sneak through every byte
or two.

The fan noise sounds random to us but it's relatively simple, in Fourier
space.  The same applies to fluorescent light noise.  Although it's
simple, it can defeat compress - so you end up with low entropy per byte.

 - Carl




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: remail@tamsun.tamu.edu
Date: Fri, 15 Oct 93 16:17:11 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: NSA already has a key distribution card for us to use
Message-ID: <9310152316.AA22865@tamsun.tamu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> Along the same lines, I'm fairly sure that the NSA had a RFQ out for
> much the same kind of thing.  (Key management on PCMCIA memory cards.)

The card already exists. It is called the TESERA (sp?) card. Guess what,
it uses the Capstone chip (clipper + key exchange).

I have also heard a rumour that there is a proposal to use a similar version
of Capstone for the Administrations Health ID card.

Clipper, coming to a health care provider near you...




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: nobody@alumni.cco.caltech.edu
Date: Fri, 15 Oct 93 19:30:13 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Detecting double-spending (long)
Message-ID: <9310160224.AA12745@alumni.cco.caltech.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


(Actually, it _is_ from the person in the "from" address above.  The
Portal system, from which I usually post, seems to have lost the ability
to send mail to toad.com.)

Wonderer asks:
> So, this method relies on trusting the bank? After all,
> Alice must include her identity in the messages, so that
> double spending can be detected later. When the bank 
> verifies that it says 'Alice' and not 'Bozo', then it
> could keep track of her coins.

This method does not depend on trusting the bank not to reveal Alice's
identity.  That's why this is called "cash".  As long as she does not
double-spend, her identity is kept secret.

I'm not sure whether you are asking about the part of the protocol
where Alice withdraws her cash from the bank, or the later part where she
spends the money and the merchant sends it to the bank.  When she
withdraws the money, she blinds the f(xi,yi) candidates by multiplying
them by ri.  For half of those, she has to reveal the ri, but that half
IS NOT USED in the rest of the protocol.  The ones which are used are
blinded and so the bank never sees her <info> in those.

When she spends the money and reveals the values to the merchant,
Alice only includes her <info> in the form (ai xor <info>), where
ai is a random value that nobody knows unless she double-spends.  The
ai "blinds" the <info> so that (ai xor <info>) does not reveal <info>.
Only if she double-spends is both ai and (ai xor <info>) revealed for
some i, and only then is her <info> exposed.

Hal
hfinney@shell.portal.com




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: karn@qualcomm.com (Phil Karn)
Date: Fri, 15 Oct 93 20:40:13 PDT
To: 72114.1712@CompuServe.COM
Subject: IRS LEARNING . . .
In-Reply-To: <931016022542_72114.1712_FHF82-1@CompuServe.COM>
Message-ID: <9310160338.AA06519@servo>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>there are better ways to accomplish the same result.  My favorite
>*fun* solution would be to buy $80,000 in travellers cheques and
>then *burn* them.  I leave the rest of the transaction as an
>exercise for the student.

Well, yes, I suppose you could then leave the country, find an Amex
office and file a claim for the missing $80,000 of travelers checks,
but wouldn't this generate precisely the kind of paper trail you're
trying to avoid?

Anyway, back to cryptography, I do suspect that the government will
eventually point to digital cash as justification for controlling all
of cryptography. Or they will refuse to back it up in court as legal
tender, thus helping undermine it. I know there's this concept called
"reputation" that's supposed to take the place of the government
enforcing contracts, but I have a hard time understanding just how it
will work for very large transactions between individuals (like buying
a house or even a used car).

Phil




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: an41418@anon.penet.fi (wonderer)
Date: Fri, 15 Oct 93 15:17:10 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Detecting double-spending (long)
Message-ID: <9310152216.AA18612@anon.penet.fi>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


So, this method relies on trusting the bank? After all,
Alice must include her identity in the messages, so that
double spending can be detected later. When the bank 
verifies that it says 'Alice' and not 'Bozo', then it
could keep track of her coins.

Is this true? Is there a way of ever having an ananymous
cash system where the bank does not have to be trusted
at all? What I mean is, where the bank could not possible
know the identities of its customers under any circumstances
where no violation takes place?

Wonderer
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
To find out more about the anon service, send mail to help@anon.penet.fi.
Due to the double-blind, any mail replies to this message will be anonymized,
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Please report any problems, inappropriate use etc. to admin@anon.penet.fi.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Sandy <72114.1712@CompuServe.COM>
Date: Fri, 15 Oct 93 19:37:12 PDT
To: <cypherpunks@toad.com>
Subject: IRS LEARNING . . .
Message-ID: <931016022542_72114.1712_FHF82-1@CompuServe.COM>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
  SANDY SANDFORT               Reply to:  ssandfort@attmail.com
 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Paul Baclace wrote:

    Well, obviously he should have taken tip from Ollie
    North and paid a courier to fly back and forth with
    $9500 at a time.  No laws against that.

Well, yes and no.  As Perry pointed out, there is no limit to how
much you can take out if you report it.  The trouble is, though
it is legal to take out less than $10,000 without reporting it,
you can't perform a series of such transactions in order to
ultimately move out an amount greater than $10k.  They call it
*structuring*, and it 'taint legal.

Of course, structuring may be difficult to detect, so as a
practical matter, you might get away with it.  (If, however, you
are found with $9500 in cash, they still might seize it under our
wonderful new "fruits of drug dealing" laws.)  But in any event,
there are better ways to accomplish the same result.  My favorite
*fun* solution would be to buy $80,000 in travellers cheques and
then *burn* them.  I leave the rest of the transaction as an
exercise for the student.

 S a n d y

>>>>>>    Please send e-mail to:  ssandfort@attmail.com    <<<<<<
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: swc@uc1.ucsu.edu (Stuart W. Card)
Date: Sat, 16 Oct 93 22:00:18 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: "reputation"
Message-ID: <9310161354.AA06162@uc1.ucsu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Reputation is not the only thing available to depend upon when using
digital cash.  Escrow accounts coupled with Shamir sharing can push
the difficulty of cheating way beyond where it is profitable.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Stuart W. Card, Consultant, Card & Associates -- Research & Development
Box 153 RR 1 Newport Rd Utica NY 13502         315-735-1717 / FAX -8469
swc@uc1.ucsu.edu or cards@top.cis.syr.edu           "Who is John Galt?"




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Perry E. Metzger" <pmetzger@lehman.com>
Date: Sun, 17 Oct 93 17:52:03 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: IRS LEARNING . . .
In-Reply-To: <9310160338.AA06519@servo>
Message-ID: <9310161536.AA22525@snark.lehman.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Phil Karn says:
> Anyway, back to cryptography, I do suspect that the government will
> eventually point to digital cash as justification for controlling all
> of cryptography. Or they will refuse to back it up in court as legal
> tender, thus helping undermine it. I know there's this concept called
> "reputation" that's supposed to take the place of the government
> enforcing contracts, but I have a hard time understanding just how it
> will work for very large transactions between individuals (like buying
> a house or even a used car).

You don't need legal tender laws to make a currency worthwhile.

In many third world countries, U.S. Dollars and German Marks are more
accepted than local currencies for transactions. There are no laws in
those countries mandating that these currencies be accepted -- indeed
the laws usually make them illegal -- and yet they are accepted. If
Union Bank of Switzerland set up a digital cash system that officially
was not sanctioned for use in the U.S. but in practice could be, it
would make little difference whether the U.S. Government liked,
sanctioned, or even permitted it.

How could "reputation" take the place of government in the enforcement
of contracts? Well, I'd say that you don't quite have the right
question in mind, but I would direct you to Bruce Benson's "The
Enterprise of Law." Basically, I will start by pointing out that
modern contract law was developed entirely in private merchant courts
without any power of enforcement, and yet still worked. The system in
question, the Lex Mercatoria, was only co-opted fairly recently by
state-based legal systems. There are many ways that contracts can be
enforced without the use of the state, and I don't mean through the
use of mafia hit-men, either.

Perry





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: cme@ellisun.sw.stratus.com (Carl Ellison)
Date: Sat, 16 Oct 93 08:57:18 PDT
To: blaster@rd.relcom.msk.su
Subject: Triple-DES strength (was Re:  Monitor radiation overlooking.)
Message-ID: <9310161549.AA16807@ellisun.sw.stratus.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


You wrote:

>Some words about DES - I spoke with one cryptoanalisyst from
>KGB and he sow, that for number crypto algotitm c(key, text)
>(key is keyLength tall) present f(key, text), that for all
>key1 and key2 present key with length keyLength, that
>c(key2, c(key1, text))==f(key, text).
>
>He also say, that now present f() for c()=des(), more f() wery
>like des().
>
>That`s why for decrypting of des(k1, des(k2, ... des(kN, text) ... ))
>we must try 2^56 keys with spetial function.

I suspect that you will get several comments about the proof that DES
isn't a group.  That doesn't apply here since you have not claimed that
f() is DES -- only that it's DES-like.

I would expect the strength of triple-DES to show up in Diff.Cryp. attacks,
but maybe not.

Meanwhile, I stick to my sci.crypt suggestion:

	compress|des|tran|des|tran|des

If you could get more details from your KGB friend about that attack,
there are one or two people here who would be very interested. :-)

 - Carl




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: VACCINIA@UNCVX1.OIT.UNC.EDU
Date: Sat, 16 Oct 93 09:17:18 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re:Glitches in PGP messages
Message-ID: <01H46GXJ4Y2600175C@UNCVX1.OIT.UNC.EDU>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


To all who responded to my question about some truncation of lines in PGP
messages, my thanks. It did indeed turn out to be a CR/LF problem. The problem
being that there were none in the entire message! I looked at the messages I
had been getting in my text editor and found the text to be one long line. I
surmise that this has something to do with why PGP then truncates at line
16 of the ciphertext every time, interesting. My friend uses a program called
POPMAIL to post with, which I now advise people to avoid. It seems to be hard
to hack with a Mac. Thanks to y'all again.
   
Scott G. Morham            !The First, 
vaccinia@uncvx1.oit.unc.edu!          Second
                           !                and Third Levels
                           !        of Information Storage and Retrieval
                           !DNA,
                           !    Biological Neural Nets,
                           !                           Cyberspace

                                         




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Matthew J Ghio <mg5n+@andrew.cmu.edu>
Date: Sat, 16 Oct 93 09:30:16 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: IRS LEARNING . . .
In-Reply-To: <9310160338.AA06519@servo>
Message-ID: <8gk23ji00awHMvCUd3@andrew.cmu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Phil Karn <karn@qualcomm.com>

> Anyway, back to cryptography, I do suspect that the government
> will eventually point to digital cash as justification for
> controlling all of cryptography. Or they will refuse to back it up
> in court as legal tender, thus helping undermine it.

Well, credit cards aren't really legal tender either - nobody is
required to accept them.  People accept them because of convienience,
but the government doesn't recoginze it as legal tender (Try telling the
IRS you want them to charge it to your MasterCard hahaha...)  Digital
cash would probably be the same.  The government probably wouldn't take
it, but that wouldn't stop everyone else from using it.  Hmm...  if they
decalred it not legal tender, does that mean you could take $10,000 in
digicash out of the country and not be required to report it? 
hehehehe...  or maybe you could just spend your digicash out of a
foreign bank account.  (Bank of Oceania?  hmm...)





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: David Williams <dwwillia@cyclops.iucf.indiana.edu>
Date: Sat, 16 Oct 93 11:42:18 PDT
To: Sandy <72114.1712@CompuServe.COM>
Subject: Re: IRS LEARNING . . .
In-Reply-To: <931016173528_72114.1712_FHF53-1@CompuServe.COM>
Message-ID: <Pine.3.87.9310161230.A2011-0100000@hestia.iucf.indiana.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> Punksters, we live in a transnational world.  We work and play on
> the transnational Internet.  Our computers and our cryptography
> transcend the evil empires.  Transnationalize yourself; and swim
> like a fish through the sea of the nation-states.
> 
> With apologies to Mao,
> 
>  S a n d y
> 

I have found myself writing things with nearly the same revolutionary bent
to congresional e-mail addresses.  Reading what Sandy has written, it 
finally struck me that the world we are envisioning and fighting to 
can very easily be cast as a communist/socialist movement.

On the other-hand, you can also envision an anarchist future much like
Gibson's novells where everyone is a free agent and thus out for his
own good: capitalism.

Lets have a discussion as to what political organization we ultimately
want to bring about.  If this has already been done, then please send me
references. 

I hope a world to come with an omnipresent network and widespread public
key encryption.  

National governments remain, but in a much diminished roll.  A global
government comes into being.  Represenative democracy is augumented with
the option of direct representation.  Everyone has a professional
represenative who is authorized and required to cast their vote on issues
which are appropriate for his domain.  At anytime, a voter can exercise
his own right to vote directly, thus reducing my represenative's voting
power by one.  There are represenatives at levels which might be
consistent with the current scheme: city, county, state, national, and
global. I believe that the inertia of the massess will give represenatives
in the larger domains the leway they require to impliment necessary but
less than popular policies.  Perhaps it should be implimented so that the 
larger the domain, the larger the percentage required to change a policy 
in that domain.







From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Sandy <72114.1712@CompuServe.COM>
Date: Sat, 16 Oct 93 10:40:17 PDT
To: <cypherpunks@toad.com>
Subject: IRS LEARNING . . .
Message-ID: <931016173528_72114.1712_FHF53-1@CompuServe.COM>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
  SANDY SANDFORT               Reply to:  ssandfort@attmail.com
 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Punksters,

I wrote:

    My favorite *fun* solution would be to buy $80,000 in
    travellers cheques and then *burn* them.

To which Phil Karn responded:

    Well, yes, I suppose you could then leave the country,
    find an **Amex** office and file a claim for the missing
    $80,000 of travelers checks, but wouldn't this generate
    precisely the kind of paper trail you're trying to
    avoid?

    . . . I do suspect that **the** government will
    eventually point to digital cash as justification for
    controlling all of cryptography.  [**emphasis** added.]

Folks, you have to stop thinking so parochially.  The world is
full of travelers check companies.  Most of them protect their
clients' privacy.  Moreover, there is no *the government*.  At
any given time, their are 100-200 competing nation-states and
other semi-autonomous political entities.

Phil went on to say:

    Or they will refuse to back it [digital cash] up in
    court as legal tender, thus helping undermine it. I know
    there's this concept called "reputation" that's supposed
    to take the place of the government enforcing contracts,
    but I have a hard time understanding just how it will
    work for very large transactions between individuals
    (like buying a house or even a used car).

Think a minute here.  What legal tender laws back up the very
travelers checks we have been discussing?  What government says
merchants must accept your Amex/Bank of American/Citibank/Thomas
Cook/etc. travelers checks?

As for "very large transactions," I again leave that as an
exercise for the student.  (Hint:  How might an escrow be used?)

I apologize to Phil for using him as an example of the provincial
nature of the Cypherpunks list.  At least, he is working with the
concepts.  The Cypherpunks list, though nominally international,
is dominated by Americans.  Unfortunately, we Yanks bring our own
peculiar form of ethnocentrism to the list.  (I also apologize to
non-US list members for belaboring the obvious.)

Punksters, we live in a transnational world.  We work and play on
the transnational Internet.  Our computers and our cryptography
transcend the evil empires.  Transnationalize yourself; and swim
like a fish through the sea of the nation-states.

With apologies to Mao,

 S a n d y

>>>>>>    Please send e-mail to:  ssandfort@attmail.com    <<<<<<
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Anthony D Ortenzi <ao27+@andrew.cmu.edu>
Date: Sat, 16 Oct 93 11:52:18 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: IRS LEARNING . . .
In-Reply-To: <9310160338.AA06519@servo>
Message-ID: <sgk4_8S00WAtRMAkxN@andrew.cmu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>Anyway, back to cryptography, I do suspect that the government will
>eventually point to digital cash as justification for controlling all
>of cryptography. Or they will refuse to back it up in court as legal
>tender, thus helping undermine it. I know there's this concept called
>"reputation" that's supposed to take the place of the government
>enforcing contracts, but I have a hard time understanding just how it
>will work for very large transactions between individuals (like buying
>a house or even a used car).
>
>Phil

Think of ATM's... we use them and assume that our money is safe...
people are comparing credit cards to digital cash... the main difference
is that the credit-card companies guarantee payment, and it's NOT OUR
MONEY... also.. we get receipts for ATM transactions, would we get
encrypted receipts by e-mail that contained transaction info in a
verifiable format?  Would it be possible for a third party to somehow
carbon-copy all of your receipts to them?

It's mind-boggling, the need for security as the computer age rules our
lives...

			Anthony Ortenzi
			ao27+@andrew.cmu.edu




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Matthew J Ghio <mg5n+@andrew.cmu.edu>
Date: Sat, 16 Oct 93 12:37:18 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: crypto technique
Message-ID: <Agk4mNS00awY5cHkQU@andrew.cmu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I was recently doing a calculation involving polynomials when I noticed
the following: 

The function:


      1  2   1
y = ( - x  + - x + C ) mod P
      2      2

where C is any integar constant, and P is any integral exponent of 2,
given any positive integer less than P as input in x, will produce a
unique positive integer output in the same range, [0,P).  Hence we have
an encryption technique which works well for binary data.  Decrypting
this is a bit trickier.  It is possible to find the inverse equation for
this, (without the modulus) which is: x = SQR(2(y-c) + 1/4) - 1/2
(SQR=Square root)  Finding the square root of the modulus is the tricky
part, but it is possible, since for every number it is possible to add
some multiple of P and find a rational square root (There is a fairly
systematic way to do this; I don't want to bore you with the math right
now, I'll go into it later if anyone wants.  Just trust me for now; it's
possible to do without too much computation.)  Now, there are some ways
to beat this if you were encrypting one byte at a time, such as looking
for recurring spaces in ASCII text, but if you were to group 8 bytes
together and set p=2^64, it would be fairly difficult to crack.

Anyway, in case you're getting bored, here comes the fun part:

What happens when we double-encrypt with this technique?  Well,
obviously you need to use both keys (both values of C) in order to
unencrypt it.  For encrypting tho, we have a nested function of x:

    1   1  2   1        2   1   1  2   1
y = - ( - x  + - x + C )  + - ( - x  + - x + C ) + D
    2   2      2            2   2      2

where D is a second constant.  This multiplies out to a fourth degree
polynomial which can not be easily factored to find it's orininal
components.  Adding a third layer of encryption creates an eighth degree
polynomial which is hopelessly beyond factoring in any reasonable amount
of time.  Hence, it is impossible to determine the decryption key if one
has the encryption key.  Therefore, the multiplied polynomial can be
distributed as a public key, and the inverse functions needed to decrypt
are kept secret (private key).

Has this ever been tried before?  Has it been broken?  I don't see any
way to break this, but I could be overlooking something.  If this works
it seems like it might be simpler to generate keys for than RSA.

I wrote out an example of this on paper here, picking some values for C,
and got:

         4      3         2
y = .125x + .25x + 63.875x + 63.75x + 8159

and I was able to find values of x for values of y.  Go ahead, post a
number, I can decode it (can you?).  Oh, don't forget to say what P is.
:)

P.S.  In case you're wondering where that function came from, and why it
always produces integars, it's a representation of the series
1+2+3+4+5...




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Alexander Reynolds <chrome@jhunix.hcf.jhu.edu>
Date: Sat, 16 Oct 93 15:07:18 PDT
To: David Williams <dwwillia@cyclops.iucf.indiana.edu>
Subject: William Gibson
In-Reply-To: <Pine.3.87.9310161230.A2011-0100000@hestia.iucf.indiana.edu>
Message-ID: <Pine.3.05.9310161726.A6517-b100000@jhunix.hcf.jhu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



> On the other-hand, you can also envision an anarchist future much like
> Gibson's novells where everyone is a free agent and thus out for his
> own good: capitalism.

	It is only through theory that an pseudoanarchist capitalist State can
exist, read Ayn Rand's _Atlas Shrugged_ and you'll see my point.  Gibson's
futuristic view is not anarchy, it is multi-national oligarchy to an extreme.
 If you have read all his novels (I assume you have) you'll notice that he
mentions how the economy, and the resulting power from that pure
free-market economy, is of a corporate nature, and that power lies not in
the members of the board, but of the zaibatsus in themselves; that they
behave as organic beings.  His vision is far from anarchy, and his
version of free-market libertarian economics should never be confused with the
apolitical (antibehavior-control) aspects of anarchy. [also, I think that he
isn't trying to make political or economic statements with his books, but
that those details enhance the effect of his stories (just my opinion)] 
	All this talk about one particular form of digicash has me
wondering: why not multiple forms of digicurrency?  This would decentralize
any kind of power electronic banks would have through monetary strength, and
ensure that those banks do not add themselves to the system as inconspicuous
political parties (anarchy is the end, and reducing, not creating,
political power is the means, right?).
  






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Karl Lui Barrus <klbarrus@owlnet.rice.edu>
Date: Sat, 16 Oct 93 16:12:19 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: crypto technique
In-Reply-To: <Agk4mNS00awY5cHkQU@andrew.cmu.edu>
Message-ID: <9310162310.AA16785@flammulated.owlnet.rice.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Matthew J Ghio wrote:

>
>    1   1  2   1        2   1   1  2   1
>y = - ( - x  + - x + C )  + - ( - x  + - x + C ) + D
>    2   2      2            2   2      2
>
>         4      3         2
>y = .125x + .25x + 63.875x + 63.75x + 8159
>

By expanding the equation above (the top one), I got this:

y = 1/8*x^4 + 1/4*x^3 + (3/8 + c/2)*x^2 + (1/4 + c/2)*x + (1/2*c + 1/2*c^2 + d)

and by matching powers, got the following equations:

c/2 + 3/8 = 63.875

1/2*c^2 + 1/2*c + d = 8159

These equations are easily solved for c = 127, d = 31.  From there, I
can compute the required inverse equations, and so on.

I'm not too sure about the security of this method; it seems it
boils down to solving simultaneous equations, which yield the constant
terms.  And you even know how many nested equations there are from the
power of the leading term.

But, as a test, post a harder one (maybe four or more nestings) and
see if I can get it!

-- 
Karl L. Barrus: klbarrus@owlnet.rice.edu         
keyID: 5AD633 hash: D1 59 9D 48 72 E9 19 D5  3D F3 93 7E 81 B5 CC 32 

"One man's mnemonic is another man's cryptography" 
  - my compilers prof discussing file naming in public directories



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Date: Sat, 16 Oct 93 18:57:19 PDT
To: mg5n+@andrew.cmu.edu (Matthew J Ghio)
Subject: Re: crypto technique
In-Reply-To: <Agk4mNS00awY5cHkQU@andrew.cmu.edu>
Message-ID: <9310170152.AA00409@netcom5.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Matthew,

From what I can tell from your description, you (may) have created a
"one-way function." Nest enough terms and you indeed have a function
that is difficult to invert.

Cellular automata do the same thing...crunch for several generations,
and the inverse is very hard to find. (BTW, Steven Wolfram was once
touting cellular automata as an ideal encryption scheme. Indeed,
running a linear CA on a string can scramble it quite a bit. The
problem is that inverses cannot be easily found, and if they can, so
can the opponent. Also, someone later showed that CAs are essentially
equivalent to linear feedback shift register (LFSR) schemes, which
have been analyzed and are not P-K systems. I'm not saying your scheme
is the same, though.)

But what you need for crypto is a _trapdoor_ one-way function, one for
which a very fast (but secret, of course) inverse does exist. In RSA,
the knowledge of the originally chosen primes p and q allows the
"owner" of the public and private keys to quickly decrypt a message.

Anyone who does not know the p and q values cannot compute the inverse
in the ring (p -1)(q - 1), and so must try to factor n to find p and q.

In your scheme, a message may be easily turned into a jumble (as with
a cellular automata, an LFSR, etc.), but how will it be unjumbled
easily? If you can compute the inverse, so can anyone else.

The RSA scheme allows the owner to compute an inverse in a very clever
way, using number theory. I don't see how your systems allows this.

I could be missing something basic about your idea.

(And, in any case, I really like that you are trying to come up with
new schemes.)

-Tim May

-- 
..........................................................................
Timothy C. May         | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,  
tcmay@netcom.com       | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
408-688-5409           | knowledge, reputations, information markets, 
W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA  | black markets, collapse of governments.
Higher Power: 2^756839 | Public Key: PGP and MailSafe available.
Note: I put time and money into writing this posting. I hope you enjoy it.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: rjc@gnu.ai.mit.edu (Ray)
Date: Sat, 16 Oct 93 16:17:19 PDT
To: chrome@jhunix.hcf.jhu.edu
Subject: Re: William Gibson
In-Reply-To: <Pine.3.05.9310161726.A6517-b100000@jhunix.hcf.jhu.edu>
Message-ID: <9310162315.AA04893@geech.gnu.ai.mit.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Alexander Reynolds () writes:
> 
> 
> > On the other-hand, you can also envision an anarchist future much like
> > Gibson's novells where everyone is a free agent and thus out for his
> > own good: capitalism.
> 
> 	It is only through theory that an pseudoanarchist capitalist State can
> exist, read Ayn Rand's _Atlas Shrugged_ and you'll see my point.  Gibson's
> futuristic view is not anarchy, it is multi-national oligarchy to an extreme.

  The very same thing could be said about anarchosocialism. Without the
fictional non-selfinterested man and the postulate of non-scarcity it couldn't
possibly work. (taking 3. anarchy - "absolute and complete freedom")

   I have never seen someone argue economic theory by quoting _fiction_
books. Gibson (and Sterling) are as clueless on economic issues as they
are on computers (e.g. Gibson's plan to improve schools by forcing telephone
companies to give teachers "free" long distance)

   The only way the super corporations in Gibson's world could exist is
through government help (e.g. Japan's restrictions on trade, distribution,
and banking) The barriers to entry in many markets are historically
low, there's no way a natural monopoly could exist, for instance, in
software, unless software patents (e.g. GOVERNMENT) prevent you from
developing. Stop reading fiction for your education and pick up
David Friedman's _The Machinery of Freedom_.

  Anarchy is the non-existence of rulers, not the non-existence of rules.

-Ray, capitalist exploiter extraordinaire


-- Ray Cromwell        |    Engineering is the implementation of science;    --
-- EE/Math Student     |       politics is the implementation of faith.      --
-- rjc@gnu.ai.mit.edu  |                         - Zetetic Commentaries      --




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Alexander Reynolds <chrome@jhunix.hcf.jhu.edu>
Date: Sat, 16 Oct 93 17:32:19 PDT
To: Ray <rjc@gnu.ai.mit.edu>
Subject: Re: William Gibson
In-Reply-To: <9310162315.AA04893@geech.gnu.ai.mit.edu>
Message-ID: <Pine.3.05.9310162053.A22061-c100000@jhunix.hcf.jhu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


On Sat, 16 Oct 1993, Ray wrote:
> > > On the other-hand, you can also envision an anarchist future much like
> > > Gibson's novells where everyone is a free agent and thus out for his
> > > own good: capitalism.
> > 
> > 	It is only through theory that an pseudoanarchist capitalist State can
> > exist, read Ayn Rand's _Atlas Shrugged_ and you'll see my point.  Gibson's
> > futuristic view is not anarchy, it is multi-national oligarchy to an extreme.
> 
>   The very same thing could be said about anarchosocialism. Without the
> fictional non-selfinterested man and the postulate of non-scarcity it couldn't
> possibly work. (taking 3. anarchy - "absolute and complete freedom")

Freedom is a tricky word.  Is freedom from governoeconomic restrictions
"absolute and complete freedom?"  Skinner (the behaviorologist) would say
no, because the money which isn't under the government's control is under
some businessman's control.  Ayn Rand would say that non-scarcity isn't an
issue, i.e. when the sun dies, mankind will have found a substitute, etc.
You can't throw around terms like anarchy and anarchosocialism, etc. 
Anarchy means no rules, no rulers, period.  Rulers use many tools,
yes, including money, to coerce behavior out of people and enforce rules
upon them.  This includes the grand scheme of net-cash people are throwing
around.

> 
>    I have never seen someone argue economic theory by quoting _fiction_
> books. Gibson (and Sterling) are as clueless on economic issues as they
> are on computers (e.g. Gibson's plan to improve schools by forcing telephone
> companies to give teachers "free" long distance)
> 

Some authors (including Rand) use fiction as a means to present their
individual political and economical theories.  Aldous Huxley did so in his
_Brave New World_.  Using numerous Rand works I could argue a pseudoanarchist
"free-"market state.  Like I said before, I feel Gibson is not intending
to argue any economic theories but to add depth to his storytelling.


>    The only way the super corporations in Gibson's world could exist is
> through government help (e.g. Japan's restrictions on trade, distribution,
> and banking) 

	In this country, the same argument is wrong.  There are anti-trust
laws which prevent American zaibatsus to form.  Some theorize that this is
the reason Japan has grown so fast.

> The barriers to entry in many markets are historically
> low, 

	????  Go to Japan and try to start a business there!

> developing. Stop reading fiction for your education and pick up
> David Friedman's _The Machinery of Freedom_.

	I'll take that as a friendly jibe.
> 
>   Anarchy is the non-existence of rulers, not the non-existence of rules.
> 

	It's both.  Do some fiction and non-fiction reading.

	Alex Reynolds








From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: nobody@alumni.cco.caltech.edu
Date: Sat, 16 Oct 93 20:47:45 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re:  digital cash/legal tender
Message-ID: <9310170343.AA00165@alumni.cco.caltech.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


F. Griffith argues that a digital cash system in which the cash must
be exchanged at the bank between transactions is really just an electronic
checking system.

It is true that this is an inconvenient attribute of some digital cash
systems, but there is still an important difference between these systems
and digital checking.  The cash exchanges are anonymous.  Bob, the merchant,
does not know who is sending him (or handing him) the digital cash.  With
a checking system, OTOH, you know who is giving you the check, because
they sign their name to it.

There have been some cash proposals which don't require this bank exchange
at each step.  Barry Hayes had one which was analogous to a check which
was endorsed over from one person to the next at each transaction.  Alice
would write the check to Bob, who would endorse it over to Charlie, who
would endorse it over to Delores, and so on.  This doesn't sound very
anonymous, but Hayes was going to let people use pseudonyms rather than
their real names.  He used a variation on Chaum's double-spending detec-
tion that I posted that long message about to catch people who cheated.
This system was described in the AusCrypt proceedings.

It's important to be aware of the difference between digital cash and other
forms of digital money.  Cash protects privacy; most other proposals would
impair it.  Our goal here, insofar as we can still be said to have one, is
to protect privacy.

As far as the acceptability of digital cash, there are two issues that I
see.  One is whether the cash is legal, and the other is whether it would
be accepted.  My opinion is that if digital cash is or could be made
legal, it would be accepted.  As others have argued, we have many examples
(travelers checks, credit cards) where people accept money substitutes
without government backing.

As for its legality, I posted some research results on this earlier this
year.  Until the 1860's, private banks created and circulated their own
banknotes.  Around the time of the civil war, a 10% tax was created on
these notes by the federal government to drive them out of circulation,
which it did.  This tax is still on the books, but I'm not familiar with
its details.  The other way banks can issue cash is by holding certain
kinds of gold-backed federal certificates, but these certificates don't
exist any more.  So at this point my conclusion was that it would not be
legal for a bank to issue its own cash other than by paying the 10% tax,
which was considered prohibitive.

Hal Finney
hfinney@shell.portal.com




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: anonymous@phoenix.Princeton.EDU (anonymousmous)
Date: Sat, 16 Oct 93 19:30:18 PDT
To: Arthur Chandler <cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: RE: Passwords (fwd)
Message-ID: <9310170043.AA25680@Princeton.EDU>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>
>Unsolved problems (left as an exercise to the reader):
>
>(1) Securely changing Soandso's password in the presence of eavesdroppers.
>        (very hard without a pubic-key crypto system)
>(2) Managing the plaintext password on the client system (which is required
>        here) so that it isn't compromised. (rather easy)
>
>        Jon

Why not just have them use PGP? Pass out public keys. To get in, sign a
random string, different every time. 






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: rjc@gnu.ai.mit.edu (Ray)
Date: Sat, 16 Oct 93 18:42:19 PDT
To: chrome@jhunix.hcf.jhu.edu (Alexander Reynolds)
Subject: Re: William Gibson
In-Reply-To: <Pine.3.05.9310162053.A22061-c100000@jhunix.hcf.jhu.edu>
Message-ID: <9310170141.AA05687@geech.gnu.ai.mit.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Alexander Reynolds () writes:
> 
> On Sat, 16 Oct 1993, Ray wrote:
> > > > On the other-hand, you can also envision an anarchist future much like
> > > > Gibson's novells where everyone is a free agent and thus out for his
> > > > own good: capitalism.
> > > 
> > > 	It is only through theory that an pseudoanarchist capitalist State can
> > > exist, read Ayn Rand's _Atlas Shrugged_ and you'll see my point.  Gibson's
> > > futuristic view is not anarchy, it is multi-national oligarchy to an extreme.
> > 
> >   The very same thing could be said about anarchosocialism. Without the
> > fictional non-selfinterested man and the postulate of non-scarcity it couldn't
> > possibly work. (taking 3. anarchy - "absolute and complete freedom")
> 
> Freedom is a tricky word.  Is freedom from governoeconomic restrictions
> "absolute and complete freedom?"  Skinner (the behaviorologist) would say
> no, because the money which isn't under the government's control is under
> some businessman's control.  Ayn Rand would say that non-scarcity isn't an
> issue, i.e. when the sun dies, mankind will have found a substitute, etc.

   Absolute and complete freedom means "freedom from ALL restrictions" If
you collectively own property, you are under the restriction of the majority's
will to control that property.

   Non-scarcity _is_ an issue. If there is scarcity, there will be competition
for the limited resources -- whether it is individuals, businesses, or 
nations. We see this all throughout nature and all throughout history and
there isn't anything to indicate that you can just ignore it. Your brand
of anarchism won't work without massive reprogramming of the populace's
meme structures.  Since you're so keen on "proof by fiction", take a look
at Demolition Man, or perhaps Star Trek where everything is free and
replicated.

> You can't throw around terms like anarchy and anarchosocialism, etc. 

  Actually I can, I have a dictionary.

> Anarchy means no rules, no rulers, period.  Rulers use many tools,

 Well if that is what it means than anarchy is physically impossible. You can't
avoid the laws of physics. To survive, you must eat, to eat, you must work,
or someone must work for you. If you are forced to work, you are being
ruled, if someone else is, you are ruling them. No doubt someone will
bring up automation or nanotechnology, but they work because they
significantly lower scarcity, hence the non-scarcity requirement.

> yes, including money, to coerce behavior out of people and enforce rules
> upon them.  This includes the grand scheme of net-cash people are throwing
> around.

  If net-cash is a tool used by rules, then we are the rulers, and we are
ruling ourselves. I don't subscribe to these absurd socialist buzzwords
though. Money was invented for specific reasons which benefit everyone --
both rulers and the ruled. If you don't understand that, you don't understand
how economics works.
 
> > 
> >    I have never seen someone argue economic theory by quoting _fiction_
> > books. Gibson (and Sterling) are as clueless on economic issues as they
> > are on computers (e.g. Gibson's plan to improve schools by forcing telephone
> > companies to give teachers "free" long distance)
> > 
> 
> Some authors (including Rand) use fiction as a means to present their
> individual political and economical theories.  Aldous Huxley did so in his
> _Brave New World_.  Using numerous Rand works I could argue a pseudoanarchist
> "free-"market state.  Like I said before, I feel Gibson is not intending
> to argue any economic theories but to add depth to his storytelling.

   Rand did not present an economic theory, she presented a philosophy.
You can present a theory through fiction, but you can not prove or disprove
it through a story book world, hence I take object to your ridiculous
assertion:
 
>   It is only through theory that an pseudoanarchist capitalist State can
> exist, read Ayn Rand's _Atlas Shrugged_ and you'll see my point.  Gibson's

  Here you imply Atlas Shrugged proves that an anarchocapitalist
state can only exist in theory. Whoops, back to logic 101.

> 
> >    The only way the super corporations in Gibson's world could exist is
> > through government help (e.g. Japan's restrictions on trade, distribution,
> > and banking) 
> 
> 	In this country, the same argument is wrong.  There are anti-trust
> laws which prevent American zaibatsus to form.  Some theorize that this is
> the reason Japan has grown so fast.

  Actually, Japan has grown so fast because it came from so little. Look
at the growth rates of South American economies, many averaging 10+%
annual growth. Once you reach the level of complexity and bureaucracy of
a typical western economy, you start to slow down. (e.g. marginal returns)
It's easy to get 100% economic growth if your GNP is smaller than
McDonalds and you are just switching to a capitalist industrial system.

 Anyway, My argument was that zaibatsus are metastable and will break up 
without government restrictions in the market. Your argument is that I am wrong
because America has anti-trust laws?? Again, your argument is circular and 
makes no sense.  America's antitrust laws do more harm than good.

> > The barriers to entry in many markets are historically
> > low, 
> 
> 	????  Go to Japan and try to start a business there!

  Because they have an anti-capitalist INTERVENTIONIST system, this is an
argument against GOVERNMENT, not free markets.

> > developing. Stop reading fiction for your education and pick up
> > David Friedman's _The Machinery of Freedom_.
> 
> 	I'll take that as a friendly jibe.

   I intended for you to read it so you could learn something.

> > 
> >   Anarchy is the non-existence of rulers, not the non-existence of rules.
> > 
> 
> 	It's both.  Do some fiction and non-fiction reading.

  Fine, may I suggest you pick up a dictionary?

Anarchy: 1. the condition of a society without a government 2. an ideal
society having no government and made up of individuals who enjoy
complete freedom.

  Taken directly from Webster's.

-- Ray Cromwell        |    Engineering is the implementation of science;    --
-- EE/Math Student     |       politics is the implementation of faith.      --
-- rjc@gnu.ai.mit.edu  |                         - Zetetic Commentaries      --




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Alexander Reynolds <chrome@jhunix.hcf.jhu.edu>
Date: Sat, 16 Oct 93 19:31:53 PDT
To: Ray <rjc@gnu.ai.mit.edu>
Subject: Re: William Gibson
In-Reply-To: <9310170141.AA05687@geech.gnu.ai.mit.edu>
Message-ID: <Pine.3.05.9310162131.A1293-e100000@jhunix.hcf.jhu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> > > > > On the other-hand, you can also envision an anarchist future much like
> > > > > Gibson's novells where everyone is a free agent and thus out for his
> > > > > own good: capitalism.
> > > > 
> > > > 	It is only through theory that an pseudoanarchist capitalist State can
> > > > exist, read Ayn Rand's _Atlas Shrugged_ and you'll see my point.  Gibson's
> > > > futuristic view is not anarchy, it is multi-national oligarchy to an extreme.
> > > 
> > >   The very same thing could be said about anarchosocialism. Without the
> > > fictional non-selfinterested man and the postulate of non-scarcity it couldn't
> > > possibly work. (taking 3. anarchy - "absolute and complete freedom")
> > 
> > Freedom is a tricky word.  Is freedom from governoeconomic restrictions
> > "absolute and complete freedom?"  Skinner (the behaviorologist) would say
> > no, because the money which isn't under the government's control is under
> > some businessman's control.  Ayn Rand would say that non-scarcity isn't an
> > issue, i.e. when the sun dies, mankind will have found a substitute, etc.
> 
>    Absolute and complete freedom means "freedom from ALL restrictions" If
> you collectively own property, you are under the restriction of the majority's
> will to control that property.

That assumes that the majority has a will.

> 
>    Non-scarcity _is_ an issue. If there is scarcity, there will be competition
> for the limited resources -- whether it is individuals, businesses, or 
> nations. We see this all throughout nature and all throughout history and
> there isn't anything to indicate that you can just ignore it. Your brand
> of anarchism won't work without massive reprogramming of the populace's
> meme structures. 

You're also assuming that I am pushing Ayn Rand's pseudoanarchist
theories on you.  Quit it, I never made any statement defending her
stance.

> Since you're so keen on "proof by fiction", take a look
> at Demolition Man, or perhaps Star Trek where everything is free and
> replicated.

I am not "keen on proof by fiction."  You are putting words in my mouth
just so you can have a moral high ground upon which to stand!  Again, quit
it!

I'll make myself clear, OK?  Some fiction writers present ideas and
theories and philosophies, all of which are compatible metaphors in my
mind.  So if a writer takes 1000 pages to present her view of utopia, and
defends it with logic and clear-cut style, then she obviously has more on
her mind than a few opinions which she likes to spew.

Proof itself is circumspect; I could use statistics on almost anything to
run circles around you no matter where you might stand.  I never said you
could prove with fiction, but I did say that you could theorize using
fiction.  Ayn Rand did.  She said that people working for their own good
will prosper and that "resources be damned!" etc. etc.
 
> > You can't throw around terms like anarchy and anarchosocialism, etc. 
> 
>   Actually I can, I have a dictionary.

Yes, with only a dictionary and obviously a closed mind you can define and
isolate anything the world!

 > 
> > Anarchy means no rules, no rulers, period.  Rulers use many tools,
> 
>  Well if that is what it means than anarchy is physically impossible. You can't
> avoid the laws of physics. To survive, you must eat, to eat, you must work,
> or someone must work for you. 

I never said anarchy was easy.  If you want to starve, then that is your
choice; that is anarchy: nobody forcing you to behave as THEY want you to
by THEIR rules.  

> If you are forced to work, you are being
> ruled, if someone else is, you are ruling them. 

That is what a "free-"market economy does!  It removes government rule
over people and replaces it with business/oligarchial rule.

> No doubt someone will bring up automation or nanotechnology, but they work 
because they significantly lower scarcity, hence the non-scarcity requirement.
> 
> > yes, including money, to coerce behavior out of people and enforce rules
> > upon them.  This includes the grand scheme of net-cash people are throwing
> > around.
> 
>   If net-cash is a tool used by rules, then we are the rulers, and we are
> ruling ourselves. I don't subscribe to these absurd socialist buzzwords
> though. Money was invented for specific reasons which benefit everyone --
> both rulers and the ruled. If you don't understand that, you don't understand
> how economics works.

I have read a good deal on the nature of money; its history and its use. 
Money is a tool to perpetuate the power of its possessor.  Its use
doesn't neccessarily benefit the "ruled," but it certainly benefits the
ruler, otherwise it would not have been created.  Don't tell me that money
is a means to quantify value of product, and that it has no power effects,
because a Monetarist would show you why it does. 

  > > > 
> > >    I have never seen someone argue economic theory by quoting _fiction_
> > > books. Gibson (and Sterling) are as clueless on economic issues as they
> > > are on computers (e.g. Gibson's plan to improve schools by forcing telephone
> > > companies to give teachers "free" long distance)
> > > 
> > 
> > Some authors (including Rand) use fiction as a means to present their
> > individual political and economical theories.  Aldous Huxley did so in his
> > _Brave New World_.  Using numerous Rand works I could argue a pseudoanarchist
> > "free-"market state.  Like I said before, I feel Gibson is not intending
> > to argue any economic theories but to add depth to his storytelling.
> 
>    Rand did not present an economic theory, she presented a philosophy.

You didn't read the book.

> You can present a theory through fiction, but you can not prove or disprove
> it through a story book world, hence I take object to your ridiculous
> assertion:
>  
> >   It is only through theory that an pseudoanarchist capitalist State can
> > exist, read Ayn Rand's _Atlas Shrugged_ and you'll see my point.  Gibson's
> 
>   Here you imply Atlas Shrugged proves that an anarchocapitalist
> state can only exist in theory. Whoops, back to logic 101.
> 

Again you do not understand what anarchy is!  Read Skinner's Beyond Freedom or
Dignity!  That is a non-fiction book with an incredibly scientific view,
so you should have no moral qualms at least reading it!

> > 
> > >    The only way the super corporations in Gibson's world could exist is
> > > through government help (e.g. Japan's restrictions on trade, distribution,
> > > and banking) 
> > 
> > 	In this country, the same argument is wrong.  There are anti-trust
> > laws which prevent American zaibatsus to form.  Some theorize that this is
> > the reason Japan has grown so fast.
> 
>   Actually, Japan has grown so fast because it came from so little. Look
> at the growth rates of South American economies, many averaging 10+%
> annual growth. Once you reach the level of complexity and bureaucracy of
> a typical western economy, you start to slow down. (e.g. marginal returns)
> It's easy to get 100% economic growth if your GNP is smaller than
> McDonalds and you are just switching to a capitalist industrial system.
> 
I said : "SOME THEORIZE."  I did not say that I feel this way!  Stop
attacking me for total bullshit!

>  Anyway, My argument was that zaibatsus are metastable and will break up 
> without government restrictions in the market. Your argument is that I am wrong
> because America has anti-trust laws?? Again, your argument is circular and 
> makes no sense.  America's antitrust laws do more harm than good.

Ok, how is it a circular argument?  You feel that monopolies cannot exist
without government intervention, yet at the same time America cannot have
monopolies with government intervention.  Your argument is contradictory.

 >  >
> > The barriers to entry in many markets are historically > > > low, 
> > 
> > 	????  Go to Japan and try to start a business there!
> 
>   Because they have an anti-capitalist INTERVENTIONIST system, this is an
> argument against GOVERNMENT, not free markets.
> 
> > > developing. Stop reading fiction for your education and pick up
> > > David Friedman's _The Machinery of Freedom_.
> > 
> > 	I'll take that as a friendly jibe.
> 
>    I intended for you to read it so you could learn something.

Obviously we BOTH have some things to learn.

> 
> > > 
> > >   Anarchy is the non-existence of rulers, not the non-existence of rules.
> > > 
> > 
> > 	It's both.  Do some fiction and non-fiction reading.
> 
>   Fine, may I suggest you pick up a dictionary?

Fine, may I suggest you read something other than a dictionary?

> 
> Anarchy: 1. the condition of a society without a government 2. an ideal
> society having no government and made up of individuals who enjoy
> complete freedom.

Freedom from others monetary sytems?  Freedom from each others guns?

> 
>   Taken directly from Webster's.

Well, you can read alright, but can you _understand_?

> 
> -- Ray Cromwell        |    Engineering is the implementation of science;    --
> -- EE/Math Student     |       politics is the implementation of faith.      --
> -- rjc@gnu.ai.mit.edu  |                         - Zetetic Commentaries      --

Science IS faith, as much as religion is, but on a much more inconspicuous
level.





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: F_GRIFFITH@CCSVAX.SFASU.EDU
Date: Sat, 16 Oct 93 19:57:19 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: digital cash/legal tender
Message-ID: <931016215711.22e16048@CCSVAX.SFASU.EDU>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


  Legal tender is a quality given by government to certain forms of
money such that a creditor who refuses to accept that money in payment
of a debt loses certain rights (e.g. to collect further interest.
In our system, federal reserve notes are legal tender,your personal
check is not.

  It is acceptability, not government edict wich makes something
money. (Note the development of NOW accounts, e.g.).

  Credit cards are not money.  When you use a credit card, you are
promising to pay in the future.  The merchant sells this promise to
the credit card issuer.

  In order for electronic money to be true cash, it must be able to
circulate from Alice to Bob to Carl to Dave without the need to
contact the issuing bank.  Otherwise, it is merely an electronic
check, perhaps anonymous.  If Bob must deposit or validate the
money first in order to make sure Alice doesn't double spend it,
then it is no different from Alice having $200 in her checking
account and writing a $150 check to Bob and a $150 check to Carl.
The first one who gets it to her bank collects, the other one has
it bounced back.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: J. Michael Diehl <mdiehl@triton.unm.edu>
Date: Sat, 16 Oct 93 22:20:18 PDT
To: chrome@jhunix.hcf.jhu.edu
Subject: Re: William Gibson
In-Reply-To: <Pine.3.05.9310161726.A6517-b100000@jhunix.hcf.jhu.edu>
Message-ID: <9310170517.AA19826@triton.unm.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


According to Alexander Reynolds:
> 
> > On the other-hand, you can also envision an anarchist future much like
> > Gibson's novells where everyone is a free agent and thus out for his
> > own good: capitalism.

I agree.  I was relieved to read a sci-fi which wasn't socialistic.


> 	It is only through theory that an pseudoanarchist capitalist State can
> exist, read Ayn Rand's _Atlas Shrugged_ and you'll see my point.  Gibson's
> futuristic view is not anarchy, it is multi-national oligarchy to an extreme.

I have to differ here.  These mutli-national (all-powerfull?) corporations were
held powerless by those with the technology to do so.  This is the essence of 
why I have developed strong computer skills; technology is power.  Power to 
protect yourself from many threats.

> His vision is far from anarchy, and his
> version of free-market libertarian economics should never be confused with the
> apolitical (antibehavior-control) aspects of anarchy. [also, I think that he
> isn't trying to make political or economic statements with his books, but
> that those details enhance the effect of his stories (just my opinion)] 

Well, I don't think mankind will ever shed all forms of behavioral control.  Man
has an inherent set of norms which I doubt he will shed, and remain civilized.

J. Michael Diehl   ;^)  |*The 2nd Amendment is there in case the 
mdiehl@triton.unm.edu   | Government forgets about the 1st!  <RL>
Mike.Diehl@f29.n301.z1  |*God is a good Physicist, and an even 
    .fidonet.org        | better Mathematician.  <Me>
al945@cwns9.ins.cwru.edu|*I'm just looking for the opportunity to 
 (505) 299-2282 (voice) | be Politically Incorrect! <Me>
Can we impeach him yet? |*Protected by 18 USC 2511 and 18 USC 2703. 
PGP Key = 7C06F1 = A6 27 E1 1D 5F B2 F2 F1  12 E7 53 2D 85 A2 10 5D



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: rjc@gnu.ai.mit.edu (Ray)
Date: Sat, 16 Oct 93 22:57:19 PDT
To: chrome@jhunix.hcf.jhu.edu (Alexander Reynolds)
Subject: Re: William Gibson
In-Reply-To: <Pine.3.05.9310162131.A1293-e100000@jhunix.hcf.jhu.edu>
Message-ID: <9310170552.AA07373@geech.gnu.ai.mit.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Alexander Reynolds () writes:
> >   Absolute and complete freedom means "freedom from ALL restrictions" If
> > you collectively own property, you are under the restriction of the majority's
> > will to control that property.
> 
> That assumes that the majority has a will.

   Sooner or later there is going to be a conflict. If you can do anything
you desire with your body and the surrounding matter/energy, that is
equivalent to absolute property rights. If a sufficiently large group of 
people come along and restrict your activity, you don't have absolute and 
complete freedom, QED. 

> I never said anarchy was easy.  If you want to starve, then that is your
> choice; that is anarchy: nobody forcing you to behave as THEY want you to
> by THEIR rules.  

  And if you disagree with the way the majority of your "collective"/commune
is using the collective property? Love it or leave it? What happens
if a capitalist is magically transported to this society and he wishes
to start a business. No one is going to force him to not behave like
an entrepreneur?

> > If you are forced to work, you are being
> > ruled, if someone else is, you are ruling them. 
> 
> That is what a "free-"market economy does!  It removes government rule
> over people and replaces it with business/oligarchial rule.

  And anarchosocialism removes it from business and places it among
the group. Either way, a group of people has some control over your
life. By your definition of anarchism, it is an oxymoron.

> >    Rand did not present an economic theory, she presented a philosophy.
> 
> You didn't read the book.

  Objectivism is a _philosophy_, not an economic theory. Objectivists
tend to be pro-laissez-faire simply because it follows naturally from
individualism. That's why the objectivism usenet group is called
alt.philosophy.objectivism, not sci.econ.objectivism. If Atlas Shrugged
presented an economic theory, could you please define the model rigorously?
(If you have taken atleast Econ 101 you will know what I mean by "model")

>> You can present a theory through fiction, but you can not prove or disprove
>> it through a story book world, hence I take objection to your ridiculous
>> assertion:
>>>   It is only through theory that an pseudoanarchist capitalist State can
>>> exist, read Ayn Rand's _Atlas Shrugged_ and you'll see my point.  Gibson's
>> 
>>   Here you imply Atlas Shrugged proves that an anarchocapitalist
>> state can only exist in theory. Whoops, back to logic 101.
>> 
> 
> Again you do not understand what anarchy is!  Read Skinner's Beyond Freedom or

   You still didn't answer my criticism. In the quote above you state
"It is only through theory that a pseudoanarchist capitalist state can
exist" and as proof of this bald assertion, you state "read Atlas Shrugged"
The implication you made was, by reading a book of fiction book you 
can disprove a economic theory. Care to explain that? There are two
ways to disprove a theory: 1) show that it isn't self-consistent
2) apply the theory and produce a counter example from reality.
You haven't shown (1), and since Atlas Shrugged isn't reality and never
has been, (2) doesn't work either.

  This is my last message on the subject. You should think about what
cypher technology can do and compare that to your philosophy. A functioning
BlackNet(tm) won't produce a non-market non-laissez-faire system. If 
anything it will promote buying and selling of data, dossiers, stolen
designs, property, etc.


-- Ray Cromwell        |    Engineering is the implementation of science;    --
-- EE/Math Student     |       politics is the implementation of faith.      --
-- rjc@gnu.ai.mit.edu  |                         - Zetetic Commentaries      --




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "L. Detweiler" <ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Date: Sun, 17 Oct 93 01:30:19 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: solving polynomials modulo P
Message-ID: <9310170829.AA25652@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Matthew J Ghio suggested an encryption scheme based on polynomials mod
P. I haven't looked at this too thoroughly yet, but a quick read seemed
to suggest that it relies on the intractability of solving polynomial
equations mod P. If so, realize that this is a very tractable problem
with efficient (polynomial time) algorithms given by e.g. Knuth. If
anyone wants more info I'll post the reference. It's in his sections on
computer arithmetic. The algorithm was discovered by a researcher at
Bell Labs as I recall; the name escapes me.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: nobody@alumni.cco.caltech.edu
Date: Sun, 17 Oct 93 13:56:54 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: RISKS of using email for dcash
Message-ID: <9310171815.AA06166@alumni.cco.caltech.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

[It is with some trepidation that I try, for the third time, to send this
to the list.  Ever since I tried the first time my email to the list has
silently failed.  This is pretty strange, given the topic of the mail!]

If we have digital cash, we may want to send it through the mail.  Sending
regular cash through regular mail is not safe, as we all know.  The cash
could get lost or stolen.  With digital cash, stealing can be made less
of a problem; it can be encrypted with the public key of the person who
wants to receive it.

But loss is still a problem.  Email is not perfectly reliable.  All too
often we experience mail bounces, errors, or mysterious disappearances.
Given the heterogenous nature of the net and the many systems through which
mail must often pass, this is not too surprising.  People have to learn to
adapt to the vagaries and inconsistencies involved and take special care
when they are sending something important.  (I've been trying for the last
three days to send a particular message (part 7 of a 13-part archive) from
my school account to my work account.  So far I've sent it three times.  I'm
hoping it will come through today.)

With digital cash, this problem will come to the fore.  Many people never
send anything too important through email, but once they start sending cash,
they will care if it disappears.  Losing money gets people's attention.

The solution, generally, is to keep a copy of whatever important mail you
send, so that you can re-send it if it doesn't appear.  Then, if and when
you get confirmation that the mail has arrived, you can delete the copy.

It will complicate any implementation of digital cash if it has to be
aware of and concerned with this problem.  The protocols involved with
a secure cash system can be complicated enough on their own without having
also to deal with an unreliable transport system.

My suggestion is that this problem should be solved at the level of the
email system.  There should be a protocol for reliable email.

Software to implement reliable email would save copies of outgoing mail,
automatically send receipts when mail arrives, re-send mail which does
not arrive after a certain period of time, handle duplicate mail arrivals,
and so on.  It would present to the user a model of an email system which
is reliable as far as message delivery.  All the issues of dealing with
an unreliable network would be hidden by the reliable email system.

This would be analogous to how network protocols implement reliable stream
connections on top of unreliable datagram packet connections.  Imagine how
difficult it would be to write network software if all we had to work with
were unreliable packets.  The stream abstraction makes it far easier to use
the network.  It lets programmers concentrate on the protocols specific to
their application.

Reliable email would have advantages beyond digital cash, of course.  As
we move to a world where more commercial data travels on the network the
impact of lost email will increase.  I'm sure we can all think of applications
which would benefit from a truly reliable mail model.

I recognize that implementing reliable email would not be easy given the
vast range of mail agents which exist on the net.  I think the first step
would be to specify a protocol for receipt and re-transmission so that
"reliable-aware" mail agents would have the tools needed to implement the
reliable transmission.  Then it would be a matter of time and user pressure
to get this support built into more mail agents.

The real point of my suggestion is that implementors of digital cash should
not worry about message transmission.  I was trying to work out a dcash
system some time back and this became a big headache - when to safely delete
a digital "banknote" which had been sent to a vendor.  My feeling now is
that the digital cash system should ignore this problem, encouraging users
to put pressure on their email servers to provide them with reliable mail.

Hal Finney
hfinney@shell.portal.com

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vtGYytp0qv4=
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From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: nobody@soda.berkeley.eduhfinney@shell.portal.com
Date: Sun, 17 Oct 93 14:00:47 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Problems of anonymous posts
Message-ID: <9310171819.AA21961@soda.berkeley.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

(This is from Hal; I still can't post from Portal.)

After going to enormous efforts to create a network of anonymous remailers,
we are hoist by our own petard, as our list receives strange, irrelevant,
and argumentative posts through our own anonymous remailers.  (Not all
anonymous posts are like this, but there have been quite a few in the last
few weeks which fall into these categories.)

This should challenge us to reconsider the value of anonymity and remailers.
Are we working only to make the net safe for the immature and incoherent?
I would say not, but these posts should remind us of how incomplete is the
infrastructure needed for successful use of anonymity.

A brief recap of the benefits of anonymous mail: presently, on the net,
all mail is tagged with the sender and destination.  This means that not
only the recipient, but any net snoopers and sysops at systems through
which the mail passes, may be able to know that person A is sending mail
to person B.  This kind of information can be used to build up dossiers
of who talks to whom.

Worse, as we move into an era of electronic commerce, more and more of our
lives may begin to take place on the net.  We may shop, find entertainment,
do business, even work for a living across the network.  This will open up
even more opportunities for collecting data about how we live our lives.

In my opinion, the best way to preserve our privacy is to make it impossible
to collect this data.  Anonymous remailers, and their cousins, IP bouncers
(which perform an analogous function for telnet-type connections), can
prevent the collection of this kind of information by hiding exactly who is
communicating with whom.  These services can serve as the basis for the
other privacy-protecting technologies we've been discussing, such as digital
cash.  There's not much point in using digital cash to prevent tieing
customers to vendors if monitoring the net will provide that information
anyway.

This isn't just a futuristic concern, either.  Already today the government
is taking steps which could, under some not-so-far-fetched extrapolations,
get people on the list in trouble.  Many people on this list have communicated
with Phil Zimmermann, for example.  What if email logs were used to track
all those people down, and they became suspects in this criminal investigation
that the government seems to be pursuing?

It's not even impossible that the government could someday try to paint the
cypherpunks themselves as a subversive organization.  Think how much more
difficult any such diabolical attack would be if people subscribed to the
list via remailers, under digital pseudonyms.  These days, with the shaky
legal status of cryptography, we of all people should be able to see the
benefits of anonymous communication.

The problem is, then, how to gain the benefits of anonymity, while avoiding
the abuses.  One solution which we have long discussed is reputations and
pseudonyms; another is making people pay to use remailers.

The way reputations work is that people would digitally sign their anonymous
postings.  This way someone could post anonymously and build up a reputation
by means of a series of postings signed under the same name.  As time went
on, they would no more want to damage the reputation of their pseudonym
than they would want to damage their reputation under non-anonymous posting.

To make this work, people need to be able to easily filter their mail
on the basis of the pseudonym it came from, rather than the (irrelevant)
anonymous remailer which sent it.  Then they can choose to accept and read
mail from anonymous posters who have built up a good reputation while
ignoring that from those who have ruined their good (pseudo) name.

Karl Barrus has done some experiments along these lines.  He described
some time back a system he had for working with the elm mail reader,
one of the most common Unix-based mail agents.  The software will display
the true originator of PGP-signed posts (anonymous or not).  This allows
readers to apply the same standards to signed anonymous mail as to regular
mail.  It raises anonymous posters to the same level, and holds them to
the same standards, as other posters.  This software could allow anonymous
posters to build up their reputations, encouraging more responsibility on
their part.

The other solution, pay-for-use remailers, has also been pioneered by
Karl.  His idea is to make the remailer a little harder to use by forcing
the user to include some digital postage (based, I think, on what Tim May
called "poor man's postage stamps").  This could help reduce the volume
of anonymous mail and make it less likely that joke or trivial messages
would be posted.  (We could even consider applying Karl's approach to
the list as a whole; people would have to apply ahead of time for posting
tokens in order to post.  This might force people to take a little more
care and time in their postings.)

I don't think Karl's efforts have been sufficiently appreciated here.
He is quietly working to create the tools needed to allow anonymity to
be a useful and important part of the net architecture rather than the
annoying sideshow that it sometimes seems to be becoming.  We need to
support Karl, work to bring his innovations into other remailers and other
mail agents, if we want to gain the benefits from what we have done so far.

Hal Finney
hfinney@shell.portal.com

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iQCVAgUBLMFf3qgTA69YIUw3AQEp9QP/UyEvuQgM6GKiKdkZtHJw4/NhMwQDihrs
2D8weSeUQpKHPpxEnXiDEG6qswI0B4auq+hK3EDYIzccA6c6/+0Xa7SzESsujtjs
VDRY7BNphAQ8ix6vd4Ti2vuk8sWa7IHasuAF+UytJrUXPaMbJgH1u/84M9HstA4t
kNQ3venrgh4=
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From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Peter Wayner <pcw@access.digex.net>
Date: Sun, 17 Oct 93 16:51:59 PDT
To: mg5n+@andrew.cmu.edu
Subject: Re:  crypto technique
Message-ID: <199310171750.AA29851@access.digex.net>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


There is a patent by a fellow named Walter Anderson on 
a public-key crypto system that uses a similar principle. 
I believe that his patent might even cover the technique
described in your posting about multiplying polynomials
together. 

I wish I had the number, but it came out very recently.
Incidentally, I managed to break early versions of the 
system.

-Peter Wayner





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Karl Lui Barrus <klbarrus@owlnet.rice.edu>
Date: Sun, 17 Oct 93 14:00:44 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Crypto Technique
Message-ID: <9310171914.AA03297@arcadien.owlnet.rice.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

I think that the proposed one-way function is too easy to invert.  

To decrypt a message requires producing the inverses for each
function, which in turn requires knowing the constants (c1, c2, ...).

But these constants can be easily obtained from expanding the general
form of the equation and setting coefficients equal to one another.

The resulting equations are in an easy to solve form (I think it's
called upper triagonal form in linear algebra (?)).  As it turns out,
only a fraction of the simultaneous equations generated are needed to
solve for the constants.

For instance, at the end of this message is the polynomial obtained
from the following nested equations:

a = 1/2 x^2 + 1/2 x + c1
b = 1/2 a^2 + 1/2 a + c2
c = 1/2 b^2 + 1/2 b + c3
d = 1/2 c^2 + 1/2 c + c4

d is then the resulting 16th degree polynomial at the end of this
message.

[By the way, I used Mathematica to do this - the Expand[] function.]

The reason the resulting simultaneous equations can be solved so
easily is they are in a form convenient for back-substitution:

The coefficient for x^14 is (9/8192 + c1/2048)
                    x^12 is (139/16384 + c1 7/512 + 7/2048 c1^2 + c2/1024)
                    etc.

The first equation immediately yields c1; this in the next yields c2,
etc.

So the various constants can be obtained with no trouble.

Here is the polynomial d:

c1/8 + (7*c1^2)/32 + (7*c1^3)/32 + (25*c1^4)/128 + c1^5/8 + (5*c1^6)/64 + 
  c1^7/32 + c1^8/128 + c2/4 + (3*c1*c2)/8 + (9*c1^2*c2)/16 + (7*c1^3*c2)/16 + 
  (3*c1^4*c2)/8 + (3*c1^5*c2)/16 + (c1^6*c2)/16 + (3*c2^2)/8 + 
  (3*c1*c2^2)/8 + (9*c1^2*c2^2)/16 + (3*c1^3*c2^2)/8 + (3*c1^4*c2^2)/16 + 
  c2^3/4 + (c1*c2^3)/4 + (c1^2*c2^3)/4 + c2^4/8 + c3/2 + (c1*c3)/4 + 
  (3*c1^2*c3)/8 + (c1^3*c3)/4 + (c1^4*c3)/8 + (c2*c3)/2 + (c1*c2*c3)/2 + 
  (c1^2*c2*c3)/2 + (c2^2*c3)/2 + c3^2/2 + c4 + x/16 + (7*c1*x)/32 + 
  (21*c1^2*x)/64 + (25*c1^3*x)/64 + (5*c1^4*x)/16 + (15*c1^5*x)/64 + 
  (7*c1^6*x)/64 + (c1^7*x)/32 + (3*c2*x)/16 + (9*c1*c2*x)/16 + 
  (21*c1^2*c2*x)/32 + (3*c1^3*c2*x)/4 + (15*c1^4*c2*x)/32 + 
  (3*c1^5*c2*x)/16 + (3*c2^2*x)/16 + (9*c1*c2^2*x)/16 + (9*c1^2*c2^2*x)/16 + 
  (3*c1^3*c2^2*x)/8 + (c2^3*x)/8 + (c1*c2^3*x)/4 + (c3*x)/8 + (3*c1*c3*x)/8 + 
  (3*c1^2*c3*x)/8 + (c1^3*c3*x)/4 + (c2*c3*x)/4 + (c1*c2*c3*x)/2 + 
  (15*x^2)/128 + (49*c1*x^2)/128 + (159*c1^2*x^2)/256 + (45*c1^3*x^2)/64 + 
  (155*c1^4*x^2)/256 + (51*c1^5*x^2)/128 + (21*c1^6*x^2)/128 + 
  (c1^7*x^2)/32 + (21*c2*x^2)/64 + (57*c1*c2*x^2)/64 + (39*c1^2*c2*x^2)/32 + 
  (39*c1^3*c2*x^2)/32 + (45*c1^4*c2*x^2)/64 + (3*c1^5*c2*x^2)/16 + 
  (21*c2^2*x^2)/64 + (27*c1*c2^2*x^2)/32 + (27*c1^2*c2^2*x^2)/32 + 
  (3*c1^3*c2^2*x^2)/8 + (3*c2^3*x^2)/16 + (c1*c2^3*x^2)/4 + (7*c3*x^2)/32 + 
  (9*c1*c3*x^2)/16 + (9*c1^2*c3*x^2)/16 + (c1^3*c3*x^2)/4 + (3*c2*c3*x^2)/8 + 
  (c1*c2*c3*x^2)/2 + (35*x^3)/256 + (109*c1*x^3)/256 + (95*c1^2*x^3)/128 + 
  (105*c1^3*x^3)/128 + (185*c1^4*x^3)/256 + (49*c1^5*x^3)/128 + 
  (7*c1^6*x^3)/64 + (43*c2*x^3)/128 + (27*c1*c2*x^3)/32 + 
  (87*c1^2*c2*x^3)/64 + (35*c1^3*c2*x^3)/32 + (15*c1^4*c2*x^3)/32 + 
  (21*c2^2*x^3)/64 + (21*c1*c2^2*x^3)/32 + (9*c1^2*c2^2*x^3)/16 + 
  (c2^3*x^3)/8 + (7*c3*x^3)/32 + (7*c1*c3*x^3)/16 + (3*c1^2*c3*x^3)/8 + 
  (c2*c3*x^3)/4 + (305*x^4)/2048 + (127*c1*x^4)/256 + (855*c1^2*x^4)/1024 + 
  (495*c1^3*x^4)/512 + (755*c1^4*x^4)/1024 + (21*c1^5*x^4)/64 + 
  (7*c1^6*x^4)/128 + (21*c2*x^4)/64 + (243*c1*c2*x^4)/256 + 
  (339*c1^2*c2*x^4)/256 + (15*c1^3*c2*x^4)/16 + (15*c1^4*c2*x^4)/64 + 
  (75*c2^2*x^4)/256 + (9*c1*c2^2*x^4)/16 + (9*c1^2*c2^2*x^4)/32 + 
  (c2^3*x^4)/16 + (25*c3*x^4)/128 + (3*c1*c3*x^4)/8 + (3*c1^2*c3*x^4)/16 + 
  (c2*c3*x^4)/8 + (69*x^5)/512 + (475*c1*x^5)/1024 + (801*c1^2*x^5)/1024 + 
  (447*c1^3*x^5)/512 + (35*c1^4*x^5)/64 + (21*c1^5*x^5)/128 + 
  (135*c2*x^5)/512 + (207*c1*c2*x^5)/256 + (15*c1^2*c2*x^5)/16 + 
  (15*c1^3*c2*x^5)/32 + (3*c2^2*x^5)/16 + (9*c1*c2^2*x^5)/32 + (c3*x^5)/8 + 
  (3*c1*c3*x^5)/16 + (497*x^6)/4096 + (837*c1*x^6)/2048 + 
  (1437*c1^2*x^6)/2048 + (345*c1^3*x^6)/512 + (175*c1^4*x^6)/512 + 
  (7*c1^5*x^6)/128 + (231*c2*x^6)/1024 + (153*c1*c2*x^6)/256 + 
  (75*c1^2*c2*x^6)/128 + (5*c1^3*c2*x^6)/32 + (15*c2^2*x^6)/128 + 
  (3*c1*c2^2*x^6)/32 + (5*c3*x^6)/64 + (c1*c3*x^6)/16 + (391*x^7)/4096 + 
  (663*c1*x^7)/2048 + (531*c1^2*x^7)/1024 + (105*c1^3*x^7)/256 + 
  (35*c1^4*x^7)/256 + (81*c2*x^7)/512 + (45*c1*c2*x^7)/128 + 
  (15*c1^2*c2*x^7)/64 + (3*c2^2*x^7)/64 + (c3*x^7)/32 + (2337*x^8)/32768 + 
  (123*c1*x^8)/512 + (675*c1^2*x^8)/2048 + (105*c1^3*x^8)/512 + 
  (35*c1^4*x^8)/1024 + (99*c2*x^8)/1024 + (45*c1*c2*x^8)/256 + 
  (15*c1^2*c2*x^8)/256 + (3*c2^2*x^8)/256 + (c3*x^8)/128 + (101*x^9)/2048 + 
  (311*c1*x^9)/2048 + (175*c1^2*x^9)/1024 + (35*c1^3*x^9)/512 + 
  (25*c2*x^9)/512 + (15*c1*c2*x^9)/256 + (259*x^10)/8192 + 
  (85*c1*x^10)/1024 + (147*c1^2*x^10)/2048 + (7*c1^3*x^10)/512 + 
  (21*c2*x^10)/1024 + (3*c1*c2*x^10)/256 + (9*x^11)/512 + (77*c1*x^11)/2048 + 
  (21*c1^2*x^11)/1024 + (3*c2*x^11)/512 + (139*x^12)/16384 + 
  (7*c1*x^12)/512 + (7*c1^2*x^12)/2048 + (c2*x^12)/1024 + (7*x^13)/2048 + 
  (7*c1*x^13)/2048 + (9*x^14)/8192 + (c1*x^14)/2048 + x^15/4096 + x^16/32768

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From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: kelly@netcom.com (Kelly Goen)
Date: Sun, 17 Oct 93 14:16:53 PDT
To: chrome@jhunix.hcf.jhu.edu
Subject: ENOUGH ALREADY!!!(Was Re: Gibson
In-Reply-To: <Pine.3.05.9310161726.A6517-b100000@jhunix.hcf.jhu.edu>
Message-ID: <9310172117.AA26114@netcom.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


 Dear Sir,

          Without enrolling in yours and others discussion about
anarcho/capital/social/ isms Ad Nauseam... would you mind
taking this SOMPLACE ELSE... this discussion is NOT appropriate for the list
WE have REAL issues and problems to address... Thanx in advance...
    cheers
    kelly
-- 




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: slacker@netlink.nix.com (John Witteborg)
Date: Sun, 17 Oct 93 14:46:55 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: encryption
Message-ID: <ue4kBc4w165w@netlink.nix.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Is PGP hard to set up, use? does it wok with all communication software?
could you send me a copy, info? Thanks a ton....SLACKER

--                    
INTERNET:  slacker@netlink.nix.com (John Witteborg)
UUCP:   ...!ryptyde!netlink!slacker
Network Information eXchange * Public Access in San Diego, CA (619) 453-1115




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: ad620@freenet.buffalo.edu (Nick Janiga)
Date: Sun, 17 Oct 93 13:56:53 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Big Brother stickers..
Message-ID: <9310171945.AA11571@freenet.buffalo.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain




  I recently had a problem with my internet mailbox and I lost some
important posts to the list..ALso, bedcause of lack of time I have had to
drop the net..but I read a post a short while back about somebody
had a bunch of stickers made up of that gif that says Big Brother INside

  Would you email me with the price of the stickers..I'm interested in buying
some... Thankyou

Nick




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Matthew J Ghio <mg5n+@andrew.cmu.edu>
Date: Sun, 17 Oct 93 13:56:55 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: crypto technique
In-Reply-To: <9310170152.AA00409@netcom5.netcom.com>
Message-ID: <kgkO9UG00awF4Pr0lK@andrew.cmu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Timothy C. May <tcmay@netcom.com> wrote: 

> But what you need for crypto is a _trapdoor_ one-way function, one for
> which a very fast (but secret, of course) inverse does exist. In RSA,
> the knowledge of the originally chosen primes p and q allows the
> "owner" of the public and private keys to quickly decrypt a message.

Ah...  but I do have exactly such a "trapdoor".  Consider the output
produced by y = 0.5x^2 + 0.5x:  (p=2^3)

      y mod 8
x y  in binary
- -- ---------
0  0    000
1  1    001
2  3    011
3  6    110
4 10    010
5 15    111
6 21    101
7 28    100

Note that the last digit of the binary number repeats every four
numbers. From only the last number, I know that x mod 4 must be only one
of two values.  By looking at the second to last binary digit of y, I
can narrow my list further, by deducing that x mod 8 could only be one
of two values. I can then test those two values and determine x.
For example: Suppose I am given the value 1101 and p=16.  I first try
x=0.  That gives me zero, so that must be wrong.  I try x=1, and I get a
1 for the last digit.  That macthes what I have.  So next I try x=1 and
x=2.  x=1 goves me 01, so that's right. Next I try x=1 and x=6. (6
because 2^3-1=7, 7-x=6)  x=1 gives me 001, that's not it.  6 gives me
101, which is what I'm looking for.  Finally I try 6 and 9.  (because
2^4-1=15 and 15-6=9)  6 gives me 0101, which isn't it, so I try 9, which
gives me 1101.  So the answer is x=9.  (and in fact, .5(9)^2 + .5(9) =
.5(81) + .5(9) = 45, which in binary is 101101; mod 16 = 1101 , which is
what we started with.)  So the inverse does exist and can be solved with
relativly few calculations.  I suppose this is what L. Detweiler was
referring to, am I correct? 


Now, the public key part of the system:


Previously, I posted the following sample polynomial:

         4      3         2
y = .125x + .25x + 63.875x + 63.75x + 8159


Karl Lui Barrus quickly pointed out how easily he could solve it.  (I
really only intended it as an example, so I didn't try to make it too
difficult.)  But since we now have the values, I'll go ahead and use
this example again to show how to actually solve it, and point out ways
it could not be solved.

Since we have C=127, D=31, we can solve for any x, given y and p.  I
didn't give a value for p earlier, so let's use p=256 (one byte
encryption.  Of course this could be brute-force attacked, but let's
keep the math simple for this demonstration.)

Suppose we have y=61.  To solve for x, we first subtract D, conevert to
binary and solve with the above method.  To save space, I won't go into
the calculation here, but go ahead and try it yourself if you want.  You
should come up with 172.  This can be checked easily: (172^2)/2 + 172/2
+ 31 = 29584/2 + 172/2 + 31 = 14792 + 86 + 31 = 14909   Taking 14909 mod
256, we get 61, so it checks out.

Next we do the same step again, starting with y=172.  I fairly quickly
solved this to get x=9.  Nine is, in fact, what was put in originally. 
This can be shown by:

          4      3         2
y = (.125x + .25x + 63.875x + 63.75x + 8159) mod 256

            4        3           2
y = (.125(9) + .25(9) + 63.875(9) + 63.75(9) + 8159) mod 256

y = (.125(6561) + .25(729) + 63.875(81) + 63.75(9) + 8159) mod 256

y = (820.125 + 182.25 + 5173.875 + 573.75 + 8159) mod 256

y = 14909 mod 256

y = 61


Note that none of the preceeding could have been done without knowing
the values of C and D.  So if Karl Barrus can find C and D using his
clever factoring technique, does that defeat the system?  Actually,
Karl's trick is easy to avoid.  Since the entire polynomial is mod 256,
we can mod each term by 256.  Which gives:

          4      3         2
y = (.125x + .25x + 63.875x + 63.75x + 223) mod 256

which still produces the same values for y, but the factoring technique fails.

One other question which could be asked is, does the technique for
calculating roots of moduli work for the entire polynomial?  A view of a
sample of numbers reveals that it does not:

x  y  binary y
- --- --------
0 223 11011111
1  95 01011111
2  98 01100010
3 238 11101110
4  12 00001100
5 200 11001000
6  49 00110001
7  89 01011001

which reveals no repeating patterns in the last digits (or any digits).


In summary, I see no method which would yeild the original input without
knowing the values added to the nested polynomials (the private key),
and there is no way to determine the private key if the modulus is
applied to the resulting function.

P.S. I could beat the RSA system too, if the modulus was left out. :)




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Matthew J Ghio <mg5n+@andrew.cmu.edu>
Date: Sun, 17 Oct 93 15:26:56 PDT
To: slacker@netlink.nix.com
Subject: Re: encryption
In-Reply-To: <ue4kBc4w165w@netlink.nix.com>
Message-ID: <ggkQKEO00awF4RbkcV@andrew.cmu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


slacker@netlink.nix.com (John Witteborg) wrote:

> Is PGP hard to set up, use? does it wok with all communication software?
> could you send me a copy, info? Thanks a ton....SLACKER

You can get it from ftp.demon.co.uk in the directory pub/pgp




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Sandy <72114.1712@CompuServe.COM>
Date: Sun, 17 Oct 93 16:26:58 PDT
To: <cypherpunks@toad.com>
Subject: RE:  PROBLEMS OF ANONYMOUS . . .
Message-ID: <931017232243_72114.1712_FHF100-1@CompuServe.COM>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
  SANDY SANDFORT               Reply to:  ssandfort@attmail.com
 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Punksters,

Hal Finney wrote:

    It's not even impossible that the government could
    someday try to paint the cypherpunks themselves as a
    subversive organization.

Gee, Hal, that can't be right.  I've always thought we were a
subversive *dis*organization.

According to my online dictionary:

                     THE AMERICAN HERITAGE
               DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE
                         Third Edition
                         Copyright 1992
        Houghton Mifflin Company.  All rights reserved.

    subversive
    ========================================
    sub*ver*sive

    adjective
    (1) Intended or serving to subvert, especially intended
    to overthrow or undermine an established government:
    "Sex and creativity are often seen by dictators as
    subversive activities" Source: Erica Jong

Sounds good to me.

Say!  Do you think we could work that sex part in somehow?
("I'll show you mine, if you'll show me yours . . . public key,
that is.")

 S a n d y

>>>>>>    Please send e-mail to:  ssandfort@attmail.com    <<<<<<
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: ferguson@icm1.icp.net (Paul Ferguson x2044)
Date: Sun, 17 Oct 93 17:06:59 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: EFF servers down?
Message-ID: <9310180107.AA15898@icm1.icp.net>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I noticed that the EFF FTP server (FTP.EFF.ORG/KRAGAR.EFF.ORG) appears
to be down. Is this a scheduled outage (servicing, etc.) or are they
having problems.
 
Curiously,

_____________________________________________________________________________
Paul Ferguson                                                               
Mindbank Consulting Group                                    fergp@sytex.com   
Fairfax, Virginia  USA                                       ferguson@icp.net




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: nobody@soda.berkeley.eduhfinney@shell.portal.com
Date: Sun, 17 Oct 93 20:22:05 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Problems of anonymous posts
Message-ID: <9310180321.AA29436@soda.berkeley.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


From: "Robert J. Woodhead" <trebor@foretune.co.jp>
> Possible low-tech solution: mail-list software where the moderator has
> the ability to screen messages from particular sites and/or accounts.

I think the problem here is the amount of time which would be taken
by the moderator.  If you were going to go this route, you might as
well have a completely moderated list.  This slows down list turnaround
and is a lot of work for somebody.

> Question: how easy is it to use public information (ie: out of the
> phone book), PGP and an anon-remailer to create a "Fake ID"

I'm not sure what you mean here.  Perhaps you are talking about someone
who posts saying, "Hi, this is Bill Gates, I just joined your list, and
here's my PGP key, I'll just be posting through these anonymous remailers
for now.  Oh, and to prove it's really me, my annual salary is such-and-
such, which you can confirm by reading the most recent annual report from
Microsoft."  This wouldn't fool anyone for an instant.

Or, someone posts and says, "My name is Deadbeat, here is my PGP key, and
I'll just be posting through anon remailers," then he does so for months
on end.  This also doesn't "fool" anybody, but does represent an ID which
can get established and become as legitimate as other ID's on the net -
in a sense, a "Fake ID"; this is what we call a digital pseudonym.

Hal Finney




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: composer@Beyond.Dreams.ORG (Jeff Kellem)
Date: Sun, 17 Oct 93 17:37:01 PDT
To: ferguson@icm1.icp.net (Paul Ferguson x2044)
Subject: Re: EFF servers down?
Message-ID: <9310180029.AA02972@Beyond.Dreams.ORG>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


On the cypherpunks mailing list, Paul Ferguson wrote...
 > I noticed that the EFF FTP server (FTP.EFF.ORG/KRAGAR.EFF.ORG) appears
 > to be down. Is this a scheduled outage (servicing, etc.) or are they
 > having problems.

It's a scheduled downtime.  They're moving the machines from Cambridge, MA
to Washington, D.C.  The machines should be back up, hopefully, in the
next day or so.  Be patient... :)

			-jeff

Jeff Kellem
Internet: composer@Beyond.Dreams.ORG




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: zeek <zeek@bongo.cc.utexas.edu>
Date: Sun, 17 Oct 93 18:42:04 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: key management workshop
Message-ID: <199310180140.AA06726@bongo.cc.utexas.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----


I'm interested in starting a key management workshop for the purpose of
learning more about how to properly manage keys, the use of anon
remailers, hopping mail, and pgp in general.  

I would appreciate copies of your public key if you are interested in
participating.  

Please keep in mind this exersise is for EXPERIMENTAL PURPOSES ONLY.  I'm
running pgp on a shared system, therefore the security here is not fully
tamperproof (ie. passwords can be picked up on the line from this local
machine to the remote site). If you would rather submit a "test" key,
please do so. 

I would like to know if anyone on either list has objections to using the
cypherpunks@toad.com and/or austin-cypherpunks@mcfeeley.utexas.edu list as
places of exchange of group messages.  

One last thing; any information on the format for hopping mail through
encryption supported remailers would be appreciated.  

I look forward to your support and participation.  

Thank you,

- -z 

- -----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----
Version: 2.3a

mQCNAiy/d2oAAAEEAPEFrakegXbaR6SYC8/aG0Fy6I0BFF8jjzim/6ekJP3wdVXb
EGqjnRGoL9yJHNuLQudDBoHmV1LfJdsy1gzONcEbM2mmuxKGUSh1KUypbtZVc23Z
FD/LmQmOs1cl3yQgs5d8r1/2H1TWl80sWS+RAg02lMqkTxhL/GH4Xujemt89AAUR
tCtLZXZpbiBULiBLcnV6aWNoIDx6ZWVrQGJvbmdvLmNjLnV0ZXhhcy5lZHU+
=TgqV
- -----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.3a

iQCVAgUBLMHzrGH4Xujemt89AQG7ZQP/Qlbp/VVNRYp1J+z9IbFhGU1866rzxTyh
ErPNxyJ2HLIs4iSBQDMFRbHLCwtoZw7qnPXyBY4EH1Xjwdbp/bbq+vChH7n7mA0E
s05u4zKNklT5bTjX0WC0tNXSX87YrDvcnysCbdxQWpXJzu9TbHBJwfVFEPA+f98B
E8Cwl0/TMWs=
=un/i
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Duncan Frissell <frissell@panix.com>
Date: Sun, 17 Oct 93 17:57:01 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: IRS LEARNING . . .
Message-ID: <199310180053.AA29669@panix.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


To: cypherpunks@toad.com

D.>Lets have a discussion as to what political organization we 
D.>ultimately want to bring about.  If this has already been done, then
D.>please send me references. 

Don't give this one away:


Case 1

            A<----------->B     Free Trade - Free Market


Case 2
            A<----------->B     "Fair Trade" - Regulated Market
                   ^
                   |
                   |
                   C - A Government

Case 3 

          -------------------
          | A<----------->B |    Free Trade - Free Market
          -------------------  
            ^      |  
       _____|      |
       |           |
       |           |
       |           C - A Government
       |
       |
       |  
       |--Strong crypto, anonymous networks, digicash, etc.


We know what to call a political or economic system in which political 
intervention doesn't occur because it has been technologically excluded.  
It is called a free market and a voluntary society (to avoid the "A" 
word).

Duncan Frissell

--- WinQwk 2.0b#1165
                                                                                       




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: VACCINIA@UNCVX1.OIT.UNC.EDU
Date: Sun, 17 Oct 93 18:42:05 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re:Problems of anonymous posts
Message-ID: <01H48FNTQPJM0012K1@UNCVX1.OIT.UNC.EDU>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Continueing in the discussion that Hal recently posted:
>We need to support Karl, work to bring his innovations into other remailers
>and other mail agents, if we want to gain benefits from what we have done so 
>far.

Having received from Karl (using my own identity) some digicash strings to use 
as postage for his remailer, I know that my reputation, while using his 
remailer, is on the line (if he knows that I have these particular strings, I 
assume he does). This innovation suggests a method for implimenting a postive 
reputation scheme. One may apply to the operators of remailers for an initial
allotment of digicash to use as postage using a digital psuedonym and 
signature. The initial allotment would be a small number of strings. If the 
strings are used responsibly, then the person could reapply and receive more 
strings. Irresponsible use would result in refusal to grant postage and thus 
limit access to the remailer system. 

There does seem to be a problem with the concept of pseudoanonymous positive 
reputations; that is, how to prevent someone from establishing an endless 
string of digital identities to use irresponsibly? This problem is limited by 
granting a small number of postage strings at first, thus forcing the person 
to frequently discard and establish identities as he trashed them, but this 
nuisance may be only partially inhibitory.

The digital signature of a pseudonym would be required to be displayed at 
posts. Complaints about irresponsible use could then be attributed to a 
pseudonym, enough complaints would result in revocation of postage and denial 
of reapplication for postage.

Unfortunately, this places quite a burden on those who run remailers as they
would have to be the ones who decide what posts are acceptable and 
unacceptable (as well as hearing about an awful lot of stupid crap). But, it 
does have the effect of: 
1) limiting unacceptable use of remailers 
2) establishing a positive reputation (which could be used at other remailers)
3) maintaining anonymity
4) inhibiting endless strings of pseudonyns to be used bogusly (although not 
   eliminating the possibility)

The major problem in my mind is the undue burden placed on remailer operators.
However, there must be some clever folks out there who can figure out a way to
help out in this regard.

Also, could someone point me to some information about the IP bouncers Hal 
mentioned? Thanks.

Scott G. Morham              ! The First, 
Vaccinia@uncvx1.oit.unc.edu  !           Second
                             !                  and Third
                             !                            Levels of
                             !               Information Storage and Retrieval
                             ! DNA,                       
                             !     Biological Neural Nets,
                             !                            Cyberspace




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: nobody@alumni.cco.caltech.eduhfinney@shell.portal.com
Date: Sun, 17 Oct 93 21:52:06 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re:  Detecting double-spending (long)
Message-ID: <9310180444.AA12390@alumni.cco.caltech.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


For those of you who slogged through my description last week of Chaum's
"simple" digital cash which detects double-spending, I've realized on
further thought that a simplification is possible.  Writing that long
essay improved my own understanding of his system.

Recall that the double-spending cash is the product, for i from 0 to
k/2, of f(xi,yi)^(1/3), mod the bank's public modulus.  f() is a one-way
function, one which can't be inverted.  xi and yi were a little complicated,
and here is where my simplification comes in.

Let xi be g(ai), where ai is a random number and g is a one-way function.
Let yi be g(ai xor <info>), where <info> is Alice's identifying information,
her account number.  Normally the ai "blinds" that since it is random
and it is xor'd onto it.  But if ever both ai and ai xor <info> are known,
<info> is revealed and Alice's goose is cooked.

Everything else works as Chaum suggested; I have just eliminated his ci
and di random numbers.  In his proposal, g took two arguments, and ci and
di were appended for the xi and yi cases.  But I'm convinced now that
these are unnecessary for our purposes.

The purpose for ci and di are to provide "unconditional" anonymity to
Alice if she doesn't cheat.  Look what happens with my simpler system.
She tells Bob ai and yi for certain i's.  Now, g is a one-way function,
but suppose Bob had a big enough computer to try all possible arguments
to g.  Sooner or later he'd find a value Z for which g(Z) was yi.  So
then he could figure that Z equals ai xor <info>, and he knows ai, so
he could find <info>.  This means that in my simplified system Alice
is depending on Bob (and everyone else) being unable to crack g() in
order to stay anonymous.

Chaum's system is better.  By having a g with two arguments he creates
a huge number of solutions to g(Z1,Z2) = yi.  There is no way for Bob to
tell which one is right, so even with infinite computing resources he
can't crack Alice's anonymity.

My thought is, unconditional anonymity is really no better than
computational anonymity in the real world.  Eric Hughes often says
"all cryptograpy is economics".  In practice, beyond a certain point,
anonymity would not be broken by a direct computational attack, but rather
by other means - bribery, theft, etc.  In the real world there is no such
thing as "unconditional" anonymity.  In practice, computational anonymity
is enough.

So my feeling is that for implementation purposes the ci and di in Chaum's
system can be removed, simplifying the protocols somewhat, at the cost
of reducing Alice's anonymity from unconditional to computational.

Hal Finney
hfinney@shell.portal.com





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: na26540%anon.penet.fi@Princeton.EDU (Walter Mitty)
Date: Sun, 17 Oct 93 21:32:07 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: MacUser Security 1.1
Message-ID: <9310180347.AA29902@Princeton.EDU>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I came across the following in the comp.sys.mac.etc faq under security:

> If
>  you need to protect sensitive data I recommend that you encrypt it
>  with software such as MacUser Security 1.1.

Does anyone know anything about this program and whether or not it is worth
a damn?

Would this be more on-topic at sci.crypt or comp.security?

Walter Mitty <na26540@anon.penet.fi>






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: hughes@ah.com (Eric Hughes)
Date: Mon, 18 Oct 93 00:02:09 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: on anonymity, identity, reputation, and spoofing
In-Reply-To: <9310180605.AA13346@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Message-ID: <9310180658.AA01694@ah.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>I think the following guidelines are very
>reasonable, and might be part of a list charter agreed to by new members:

>1) list members are allowed *one* anonymous identity if any. [etc. ...]
[...] 
>spoofing is probably the #1 crime against cypherpunk ideology.


That which can never be enforced should not be prohibited.

The claim that a person should have only one pseudonym per forum
indicates profound misunderstanding.  If someone wants to have
multiple cryptographically protected pseudonyms, they will be able to;
that is one of the main goals of cypherpunks software.

The situations you despise will occur.  This is reality.  Change your
own psychology or change your own software.  You will not be able to
change the other person.

Eric




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "L. Detweiler" <ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Date: Sun, 17 Oct 93 23:07:08 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: on anonymity, identity, reputation, and spoofing
In-Reply-To: <9310171819.AA21961@soda.berkeley.edu>
Message-ID: <9310180605.AA13346@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


H.  Finney <hfinney@shell.portal.com>
>After going to enormous efforts to create a network of anonymous remailers,
>we are hoist by our own petard, as our list receives strange, irrelevant,
>and argumentative posts through our own anonymous remailers.  (Not all
>anonymous posts are like this, but there have been quite a few in the last
>few weeks which fall into these categories.)

I've been thinking about this a lot lately. I think a large part of the
problem as you indicate is associated with reputation. How does one
build up a reputation and identity in cyberspace in general? Part of
the problem IMHO is that this list software & the internet in general
is extremely vulnerable to a lot of different kinds of spoofing.

People are very sensitive to the perception of a `consensus' -- they
are deeply influenced by what they perceive to be the `majority
opinion'. What if that `opinion' was not an accurate representation of
reality? what if a few people were creating the illusion that some
different kind of consensus existed? what if that `agenda' were
actually something inherently wicked like lawlessness or anarchy? what
if a conspiracy created the impression that some project or progress
was underway when it really wasn't? or that some person was loudly
favored or condemned by the `group'? this could be especially
problematic if any kind of intimidation were happening `behind the
scenes' in email. who would ever know? unless the dissatisfaction
reached the list, how would we find out? another problem is that, at
the same time being strongly influenced by a lot of flames, people just
delete them out of sheer distaste and they may not be around later for inspection.

what really is our assurance that all these email addresses actually
exist and represent *unique* people? there really is very little currently. 

I think newsgroups are far less vulnerable to this kind of spoofing,
but unfortunately mailing lists are *extremely* vulnerable. (Keep in
mind, there are a whole set of other benefits and detriments in *other*
categories which I'm not talking about here.) In the former we have
thousands of subscribers all checking on each other's honesty. If a
suspicious address or opinion pops up, there is some probability
someone will notice, and cases of spoofing would probably be noise
drowned out in the representative opinion. Also, distribution is
centralized, so that `message blocking' is not very feasible.

In the latter case, i.e. mailing lists such as this one, there is a
much closer knit community that is geographically isolated. Individuals
on the list are far more susceptible to spoofing. People are more
likely to see *every* message including the `spoofed' ones. There are
far fewer people to `check up' and those that are there may not have
the technical expertise. What's worse, the list is not `distributed' in
a certain sense. If someone wants to get out the message that
`something wrong is going on' it could be censored because of the
centralization of the distribution. This wouldn't work with Usenet
because the distribution of the messages (e.g. NNTP servers) is
generally cleaved from the people with strong self-interests in the
traffic (e.g. people who post to group [x]).

This cyberspace stuff can be a *very* powerful influence on many. It is
an electronic community, and peer pressure is *extremely* powerful.
Many people do not have an extremely strong internal `moral compass'
and could be influenced by this kind of corrupt magnetism associated
with a `conspiracy of spoofing'. Note that reputations are crucial in
not only persuading us to listen attentively to those we respect, but
to `tune out' the lunatics and criminals.

* * *
Spoofing

Regarding the what also gets my vote as `strangest posting of the year'
by `S. Boxx',  Philippe D. Nave, Jr. <pdn@dwroll.dw.att.com> (based on
my email, a loyal cypherpunk and fellow Denverite!) wrote:

>[...] it seems that the point of the message is that there is a lot
>of smoke coming from people who use aliases or anonymous remailer
>services to post to the cypherpunks list. Does this posting contribute
>to that problem, or have I missed something?
[...]
>What the hell ?!? I've either missed something significant (and would
>appreciate enlightenment) or this is a candidate for 'strangest post
>of the year'. If 'S. Boxx' really exists and is the author of this
>posting, I apologize- if not, then come out from behind your damn
>remailer and quit contributing to the problem. As for monitoring the
>list for traitors, go ahead- I post under my own name, and I don't
>give a shit what you do with the text. If I was concerned about lurkers
>building 'traitor files', I'd encrypt my messages and happily watch you
>choke on them.

I think I speak for many here in saying that I weigh anonymous postings
very little, but don't consider the capability a serious problem. They
have very significant purposes in e.g. `whistleblowing' `within the
system' that I've always been attracted to.

On the other hand, I think there is an implicit assumption by virtually
everyone here that addresses on public posts and private email that are
not specifically anonymous represent *unique* people. That is, if some
people were taking advantage of the loose, free, and open atmosphere
here to influence opinion or perception of reputations by posting
messages under different presumably `real' identities (defined as
anything that is not obviously tagged as anonymous), I and probably
everyone else would feel very `upset' in the least and `violated' at
the most. It would seem like a very serious breach of community trust,
and might even have the effect of derailing positive contributions to
the `cypherpunk cause' (whether algorithmic or political, the two chief
schools of thought). I recall discussions of this related to the
Extropians list, which specifically bars this practice.

* * *
List suggestions

The fact that this `uniqueness of real identities' has always been
something of an implicit assumption here bothers me. I think anything
this delicate and important should be made formal and explicit. We
should not simply assume that `everone is honest and no one would be
depraved enough to do this.' I think the following guidelines are very
reasonable, and might be part of a list charter agreed to by new members:

1) list members are allowed *one* anonymous identity if any. They are
required to associate some name with all anonymous posts via that identity.
2) *no one* is allowed multiple `real' identities and in fact any
violation of this is considered an extremely serious breach of netiquette & honesty.
3) completely anonymous posts from `outside' the list are allowed; if
no pseudoidentity is given they are assumed to come from `outside'.

and if anyone has been posting under multiple `real' identies, I think
they owe it to everyone here to `come clean'. I don't see why anyone
would go to the trouble but if someone was just unstable or obsessive
enough to equate reputation with posting traffic, s/he might go off the
deep end. The practice amounts to `spoofing' and any patriotic
cypherpunk with some integrity ought to recognize that immediately and
condemn it, technical capabilities regardless. I would equate this
practice with `lying to one's colleagues'. spoofing is probably the #1
crime against cypherpunk ideology.

* * *
Reputations

As for reputations, what can we do about this? I think that there are a
lot of solutions to be experimented with in software. One of the best
is just to have archives that are searchable by ID. But archives are
very disk-consuming. I have some various other ideas that wouldn't
require much beyond the current database maintenance of email
addresses. Suppose that along with everyone's name, the following
statistics were presented:

1) how long they have been on the list in days, 0 if none at all
2) how many postings they have posted here
3) maybe a posting/age ratio -- some people seem to be very sensitive
or tune out people with a high one.
4) another idea: tracking the number of responses a given poster has,
average, per original post, measured by `re: [x]' subject tracking.

now, look what we get with all these. They are all simple to implement.
They all can tremendously help us weigh the various opinions that are
out there. They can set up a positive feedback system whereby `good'
posters potentially really are quantitatively identified.  Regarding
(4), one way to `punish' a poster for irrelevant postings is to simply
not respond, and they will not get any `credit' in this statistic. The
problem with this is that from my experience, sometimes my most
authoritative and finely-crafted postings generate the least response.
But note the point of all these things: they don't necessarily require
any digital signatures to implement. Authentication of postings
`allowed' to the group really seems like a separate problem to me.

Another simple idea is to have a voting system in response to postings.
People's `credit' associated with their postings could be listed in
headers too. This of course is far more ambitious, and the generally
complex problem of authentication rears its ugly head.

In addition to all this, I would like to see protocols that guarantee
honesty on the part of the list maintainer. When databases like this
are maintained, a little unilateral tweaking here and there can be
extremely deleterious to community integrity, honesty, and reputations.





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Perry E. Metzger" <pmetzger@lehman.com>
Date: Sun, 17 Oct 93 21:12:06 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: digital cash/legal tender
In-Reply-To: <931016215711.22e16048@CCSVAX.SFASU.EDU>
Message-ID: <9310180406.AA28399@snark.lehman.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



F_GRIFFITH@ccsvax.sfasu.edu says:
>   In order for electronic money to be true cash, it must be able to
> circulate from Alice to Bob to Carl to Dave without the need to
> contact the issuing bank.  Otherwise, it is merely an electronic
> check, perhaps anonymous.

No digicash system can possibly operate under this constraint. Mere
numbers, unlike gold, can be duplicated. Without some sort of central
verification involved the techniques cannot work. I suppose "true"
digitcal cash by your definition is impossible.

Perry




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: rjc@gnu.ai.mit.edu (Ray)
Date: Sun, 17 Oct 93 21:32:08 PDT
To: pmetzger@lehman.com
Subject: Re: digital cash/legal tender
In-Reply-To: <9310180406.AA28399@snark.lehman.com>
Message-ID: <9310180427.AA13871@geech.gnu.ai.mit.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Perry E. Metzger () writes:
> F_GRIFFITH@ccsvax.sfasu.edu says:
> >   In order for electronic money to be true cash, it must be able to
> > circulate from Alice to Bob to Carl to Dave without the need to
> > contact the issuing bank.  Otherwise, it is merely an electronic
> > check, perhaps anonymous.
> 
> No digicash system can possibly operate under this constraint. Mere
> numbers, unlike gold, can be duplicated. Without some sort of central
> verification involved the techniques cannot work. I suppose "true"
> digitcal cash by your definition is impossible.

   Doesn't Chaum's "observer" based system allow digi-coins to work?
(e.g. by carrying around copy protection which prevents you from 'cp'ing
cash instead of 'mv'ing it, or prevention of double spending?)

   Observer's may not be cypherpunk-correct technology but they might work
with legal (govt) backing. Counterfeiters who "copy" cash by breaking the
tamper-proof observers would be hunted down through traditional investigatory
means. The economy/banks might take a hit the way credit card companies
get hit by con-artists, but overall they would remain stable.

   Does anyone have a reference on Chaum's observers besides the SciAm
article (which I read a long time ago and have now forgotten)?

-Ray


-- Ray Cromwell        |    Engineering is the implementation of science;    --
-- EE/Math Student     |       politics is the implementation of faith.      --
-- rjc@gnu.ai.mit.edu  |                         - Zetetic Commentaries      --




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Perry E. Metzger" <pmetzger@lehman.com>
Date: Sun, 17 Oct 93 21:37:06 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: digital cash/legal tender
In-Reply-To: <9310180427.AA13871@geech.gnu.ai.mit.edu>
Message-ID: <9310180432.AA28418@snark.lehman.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Ray says:
> > No digicash system can possibly operate under this constraint. Mere
> > numbers, unlike gold, can be duplicated. Without some sort of central
> > verification involved the techniques cannot work. I suppose "true"
> > digitcal cash by your definition is impossible.
> 
>    Doesn't Chaum's "observer" based system allow digi-coins to work?
> (e.g. by carrying around copy protection which prevents you from 'cp'ing
> cash instead of 'mv'ing it, or prevention of double spending?)

Such a system would depend on people trying to break the system being
unsophisticated. I do not believe you can rely on trick hardware to
provide "copy protection" for digital coins.

Perry




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: jamie@netcom.com (Jamie Dinkelacker)
Date: Mon, 18 Oct 93 00:37:10 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: on anonymity, identity, reputation, and spoofing
Message-ID: <9310180737.AA14508@netcom.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>
>1) how long they have been on the list in days, 0 if none at all
>2) how many postings they have posted here
>3) maybe a posting/age ratio -- some people seem to be very sensitive
>or tune out people with a high one.
>4) another idea: tracking the number of responses a given poster has,
>average, per original post, measured by `re: [x]' subject tracking.
>

Each of these suggestions call for data that may contribute to identifying
individuals, tracking their behavior or providing information useful to
decypher some messages. This has a very NSA feel to it. 
--
................................
Jamie Dinkelacker   Palo Alto CA 
Jamie@netcom.com    415.941.4782    





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Karl Lui Barrus <klbarrus@owlnet.rice.edu>
Date: Sun, 17 Oct 93 22:42:07 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: crypto technique
In-Reply-To: <kgkO9UG00awF4Pr0lK@andrew.cmu.edu>
Message-ID: <9310180538.AA21321@flammulated.owlnet.rice.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Matthew J Ghio wrote:

>we can mod each term by 256.  Which gives:
>
>          4      3         2
>y = (.125x + .25x + 63.875x + 63.75x + 223) mod 256
>
>which still produces the same values for y, but the factoring technique fails.

I still don't know about that - I think all it does is remove the
problem one step from immediately solvable.

Is that P term public knowledge (here P = 256)?  If so, the revised
equations are:

c1/2 + 1/4 = 63.75   ===> c1 = 127

c1/2 + 1/4 x1^2 + c2 = 223 + 256k  ===> c2 = -7905 + 256k

And this will yeild either c2 = -225 or c2 = 31.  The computational
expense of trying both is small.

If it does turn out that the magnitude of the constants must be less
than P, I don't think taking the mod of each coefficient obscures the
problem very much at all.  It still boils down to solving systems
of simultaneous equations, which isn't the same complexity as solving
discrete logarithms or factoring.

-- 
Karl L. Barrus: klbarrus@owlnet.rice.edu         
keyID: 5AD633 hash: D1 59 9D 48 72 E9 19 D5  3D F3 93 7E 81 B5 CC 32 

"One man's mnemonic is another man's cryptography" 
  - my compilers prof discussing file naming in public directories



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "L. Detweiler" <ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Date: Mon, 18 Oct 93 00:57:10 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Internet show on PBS
Message-ID: <9310180753.AA14654@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


from author of `Zen & the Internet', don't miss it!

===cut=here===

Date: Thu, 14 Oct 1993 16:03:12 -0700
From: Brendan Kehoe <brendan@zen.org>

The Computer Chronicles (a show on PBS) will be doing a program about
the Internet, to be aired on your local PBS station the week of
November 1st.  It'll have stuff about World Wide Web (demo'd by April
Marine at NASA Ames), virtual communities (with Howard Rheingold), the
Net in general (me), Internet Talk Radio (with Carl Malamud), the
gigabit testbeds [I think] (with someone from Bellcore), and something
with Phil Kahn at ARPA.  The producer of it is really psyched; it
sounds like it's gonna be pretty cool.

Brendan

- --
Brendan Kehoe                                                  brendan@zen.org

                            Stop the murder!  Support dolphin-free networking.




------- End of Forwarded Message





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: szabo@netcom.com (Nick Szabo)
Date: Mon, 18 Oct 93 03:32:13 PDT
To: jamie@netcom.com (Jamie Dinkelacker)
Subject: Re: on anonymity, identity, reputation, and spoofing
In-Reply-To: <9310180737.AA14508@netcom.netcom.com>
Message-ID: <9310181029.AA03491@netcom6.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



It is suggested we can gather this information per pseudonym:
> >1) how long they have been on the list in days...
> >2) how many postings... 
> >3) ...posting/age ratio...
> >4) ...tracking the number of responses a given poster has...

Jamie Dinkalecker responds: 
> Each of these suggestions call for data that may contribute to identifying
> individuals, tracking their behavior or providing information useful to
> decypher some messages. 

Nevertheless, there is nothing to prevent such information being 
gathered by list subscribers, with the minor change that (1) would be 
time since first posting.  The NSA, BlackNet, Internet junk mailers,
or Extortions R Us might be gathering it now if they liked, and for many 
of us with our True Names to boot.  

In my limited experience creating Internet pseudonyms, I've been quite 
distracted by the continual need to avoid leaving pointers to my
True Name lying around -- excess mail to/from my True Name, shared 
files, common peculiarities (eg misspellings in written text), traceable 
logins, etc.   The penet.fi site explicitly maintains a list of pointers 
to the original address.  All kinds of security controls -- crypto, access, 
information, inference -- have to be continually on my mind when using 
pseudonymous accounts.  The hazards are everywhere.  With our current 
tools it's practically impossible to maintain an active pseudonym for a 
long period of time against a sufficiently determined opponent, and
quite a hassle to maintain even a modicum of decent security.  Pointers
to info and/or tools to enable the establishment and maintenance of a 
net.nym, beyond the standard cypherpunks PGP/remailer fare with which 
I'm now familiar, greatly appreciated.  Especially nice would be a list 
of commercial net providers that allow pseudonymous accounts.

Another big problem I see with pseudonymous reputations
is entry.  If most people are blocking posts from new pseudonyms, how 
does one get a new reputation established?   I've had several years
to establish a net.reputation for "Nick Szabo", and it
might take a long time for any of my pseudonyms to catch up.   
Altruistic sponsorship requires trusted friends knowing
the True Name, but that public sponsorship itself provides
important clues pointing to that Name.  Sponsorship by the True Name via 
an anonymous reputation market (like HEx, but securely anonymous and
perhaps tied to futures on the pseudonym's declared income), might 
be quite useful.  (For information on the HEx market, send
mail to hex@sea.east.sun.com with the subject line "commands").

I hope that we stick to experimenting with pure anonymity
in many venues.  I suggest we'll find out that purely anonymous
posts are not so bad, overall.  Some of the recent stuff has been weird
or rude, but so have been a lot of True Name flames that have passed 
thru this list.  We find True Name posts easier to deal with
because it's what we're used to.  Many are comforted by the thought
that as a last resort, if a flame is just too evil, the poster
can be tracked down and made to pay for his sins.   The WELL
was so threatened by the thought of anonymity that they required
all pseudonyms to be traceable to the True Name, as an explicit
policy right from the start of the system.  Pure anonymity in all 
its manifestations is a strange, threatening, fascinating beast
in our panoptic social-welfare world.  Even those of us at
the forefront of harnessing this monster shrink back in fear
when it whinnies.

Many of the recent anon posts have been quite productive, eg 
"Wonderer's" embarrassing newbie questions which motivated Hal 
Finney to first write a nice explanation of digital cash, then 
think of an interesting simplification of Chaum's scheme.  Under
any system falling short of truly intelligent filters,
Hal would not have filtered S. Boxx's first posts
without also filtering Wonderer's first posts.

Pure anonymity provide voice for a wide variety of new kinds
of expression that up until now have been suppressed.
Some kinds are good (whistleblowing), some bad
(slander).  Most are good or bad depending on the 
situation (asking embarrassing newbie questions, expressing politically 
incorrect opinions, discussing illegal activities, etc.)  I hope we 
continue experimenting with pure anonymity for a while longer, as well 
as experimenting with reputation-based pseudonymous systems.  Some of 
what comes out might look very strange, something like tapping into 
previously concealed areas of our social psyche.  I suspect the
result will be a more honest dialog, a more productive conversation
freed from posturing and, ironically, from the concealment of threatening 
truth.  I hope we will observe the resulting new forms of good and evil
with Zen patience and allow this quite interesting experiment to 
continue.

Nick Szabo				szabo@netcom.com




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "L. Detweiler" <ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Date: Mon, 18 Oct 93 02:42:12 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: PSEUDOSPOOFING
Message-ID: <9310180941.AA15703@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I'm absolutely *horrified* and *nauseated* that our eminent list
moderator E.H. has come out in total support of what I have been
calling `spoofing' or using pseudo-real addresses to post to the list. 

(It isn't `really' spoofing in the exact sense because as I noted there
has only been an *implicit assumption* by all of us here that opinions
from unique addresses were themselves unique. so, lets call it)

PSEUDOSPOOFING

the activity of misleading people into thinking that an identity is
unique when it really isn't! i.e. posting behind `real' addresses not
specifically noted as anonymous!

I consider pseudospoofing a *detestable* and *reprehensible* activity
if it exists. Am I the only one who finds this absolutely *repulsive*
and *abhorrent*? How long has this been going on? who has been doing
it? am I the first to suspect it is happening? how many debates have
been affected? how many people have been *harassed* or *intimidated* or
*burned* to a *crisp* by pseudospoofers? is this going on in *private
email* too? how many debates have been skewed? how many people here
DON'T EXIST? Are the other founders T.C.May and J.Gilmore in favor of
this too? how much have you guys been doing this? is this really part
of the cypherpunk agenda? who here supports this, anyway? does this
have anything to do with the bizarre conspiracy theories posts of
`S.Boxx'?! is this why `everyone' is opposed to a newsgroup or other
change in the `status quo'?! Is this why *I* get *flamed* so much? is
this polluting other mailing lists?!

E.H.
>The claim that a person should have only one pseudonym per forum
>indicates profound misunderstanding.  If someone wants to have
>multiple cryptographically protected pseudonyms, they will be able to;
>that is one of the main goals of cypherpunks software.

IMHO, this itself represents a `profound misunderstanding' under what
actually constitutes an OPEN FORUM. If we are merely conducting some
depraved experiment on the psychology of pseudonymity and
pseudospoofing on unwilling participants, please say so! I for one
never saw *that* announcement when I signed up! calling
`pseudospoofing' `one of the `main goals' of cypherpunks software'
sounds *criminal* to me. Or maybe I'm missing the point! I guess this
is what anarchy really *is* all about!

* * *

speaking of OPEN FORUMS, `Jamie Dinkelacker' <Jamie@netcom.com> objects
to my other proposals for reputation tracking statistics:

>>
>>1) how long they have been on the list in days, 0 if none at all
>>2) how many postings they have posted here
>>3) maybe a posting/age ratio -- some people seem to be very sensitive
>>or tune out people with a high one.
>>4) another idea: tracking the number of responses a given poster has,
>>average, per original post, measured by `re: [x]' subject tracking.
>>
>
>Each of these suggestions call for data that may contribute to identifying
>individuals, tracking their behavior or providing information useful to
>decypher some messages. This has a very NSA feel to it. 

A very ``NSA FEEL''?! all of these statistics could be generated by
*anyone* who subscribes to the list! is this an OPEN FORUM or not?! How
could *anyone* object to anything so innocuous? 

A *true* forum would be *representative*. For example, I already have
the impression that no one here supports my suggestions whatsoever on
list modifications & protocol  from E.H.'s comments and
jamie@netcom.com. Now, humor me, and take the hypothetical situation
that these are the same person! how can this be a `forum' if an opinion
is not *representative*? what if a single person just `ganged up' on
someone they didn't like by overwhelming them with pseudospoofs? what
if there was *truly* support for some project but a pseudospoofer
ganged up on the proponents and clobbered them with flames? does this
sound anything like what has happened on this list in the past? doesn't
it throw every `conversation' on this list into spectacularly
*grotesque* doubt? wouldn't that be a lot like intimidation at best and
*extortion* at worst? would it look like a `clique'? what if this was
happening *routinely*? what if people were being *influenced* by what
they perceived was the *majority opinion* or the *views of their peers*
that were really nothing but DECEPTION AND LIES? what if it was
*thwarting progress*? I would consider this nothing but TREACHERY and
HIGH TREASON. is all this  really one of the `main goals' of the
cypherpunk agenda? if so, SIGN ME OFF.

Regardless of whether anyone believes in democracy (a `lot' of people
here said they didn't a while ago, but now I have my doubts!) the idea
of `one man one vote' is SACRED. it means in essence, one man shall not
have UNFAIR INFLUENCE. anything less is just the `Golden Rule: He who
Has the Most Gold Makes the Rules'. or, `you can be here as long as I
always have more *power* than you do and you don't complain!' it is
*anti egaltarian*. it is a recipe for anarchy, dischord and chaos. Or
perhaps I'm MISSING THE POINT?! maybe that's what somebody *wants*. is
*this* what the Cypherpunks really stand for? UNFAIR INFLUENCE. ABUSE
OF POWER. MANIPULATION. DECEIT. TREACHERY. EXPLOITATION. SECRET CONSPIRACIES.

p.s. if anyone doesn't hear from me for awhile, assume I've been
`liquidated' and this isn't really an `open forum' ...




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Eli Brandt <ebrandt@jarthur.Claremont.EDU>
Date: Mon, 18 Oct 93 03:47:16 PDT
To: cypherpunks list <cypherpunks@toad.com>
Subject: Re: on anonymity, identity, reputation, and spoofing
In-Reply-To: <9310180605.AA13346@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Message-ID: <9310181044.AA06678@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> From: "L. Detweiler" <ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
> On the other hand, I think there is an implicit assumption by virtually
> everyone here that addresses on public posts and private email that are
> not specifically anonymous represent *unique* people.
[...]
> 1) list members are allowed *one* anonymous identity if any. They are
> required to associate some name with all anonymous posts via that identity.
> 2) *no one* is allowed multiple `real' identities and in fact any
> violation of this is considered an extremely serious breach of netiquette & honesty.
[...]
> deep end. The practice amounts to `spoofing' and any patriotic
> cypherpunk with some integrity ought to recognize that immediately and
[...]
> crime against cypherpunk ideology.
[...]

It's interesting to see the different mental models that people hold
of the net.  To me, this equation that one truename means one persona
is not realistic or reasonable.  People spawn personas (-ae?) for
many reasons, including psychological exploration, sociological
experiments, sexual thrills, or just for practice at maintaining
personas.  I know of several instances in which one person patted
himself on the back circularly, or took half a dozen sides in a
discussion -- and can surmise about others.  This sort of thing may
well happen routinely, particularly in the low-rent areas of Altnet,
where participation is a kind of game.

What's more, the privacy technology `we' espouse can only promote
this.  There is no way to maintain this one-to-one equation when
working with pseudonyms, when the human "dongle on the keyboard" is no
longer a viable identifier.  I think the Usenet motto, "Live with it",
applies.

   Eli   ebrandt@jarthur.claremont.edu




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "L. Detweiler" <ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Date: Mon, 18 Oct 93 02:57:12 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: THE CYPHERPUNK CAUSE
Message-ID: <9310180956.AA15929@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


now I understand why `someone' told me in private email,

`THERE IS NO CYPHERPUNKS CAUSE. GET THIS DELUSION OUT OF YOUR HEAD.'




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: szabo@netcom.com (Nick Szabo)
Date: Mon, 18 Oct 93 05:27:14 PDT
To: ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu (L. Detweiler)
Subject: SILLY FLAMES: pseudospoofing
In-Reply-To: <9310180941.AA15703@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Message-ID: <9310181225.AA06177@netcom6.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



L. Detweiler -- shocked, simply shocked, at the realization that
multiple pseudonyms are possible on the net -- explodes:

> ....how can this be a `forum' if an opinion
> is not *representative*? 

Perhaps there are differences between a forum and a voting booth?

> what if a single person just `ganged up' on
> someone they didn't like by overwhelming them with pseudospoofs? what
> if there was *truly* support for some project but a pseudospoofer
> ganged up on the proponents and clobbered them with flames?

Perhaps "support" is better measured by how many people are motivated
enough to go to the effort to make multiple but individually unique,
reputable posts in favor of a proposition, rather than by 
simple numerical polls that abstract away knowledge and
motivation, or by how many True Names position themselves 
with I'm-on-your-side posts. 

On cypherpunks' better days, "support" is measured by what kind 
of code gets written, not by who flames whom how often under
how many names.  Of course we all know that writing code
does not constitute *true* support, since only Democracy is 
The One True Way.

> doesn't
> it throw every `conversation' on this list into spectacularly
> *grotesque* doubt? 

Welcome to the Internet, Detweiler.  Perhaps you might get
together some physical meetings in Colorado, talk to more cypherpunks 
on the phone, look at the pictures in Wired magazine (perhaps also
faked?), etc. if you are so concerned about being ganged up on by 
unknown numbers of strangers.  (Is it better to be ganged up
on by known numbers of strangers?  Why of course, that's called
Democracy).

> the idea
> of `one man one vote' is SACRED.

Hallelujah!  Praise the Lord & pass the card punch!  Let's
vote ourselves bigger paychecks & unlimited medical care.
Let's take a vote on which cypherpunks tools we will implement.
Those who vote with the minority get to do the programming
work, those in the majority get to tell the minority what to write.
I nominate L. Detweiler President of the Cypherpunks.  All in favor 
say "aye" and bow down to His Holiness of the Veiled Booth!

> it is
> *anti egaltarian*. it is a recipe for anarchy

God forbid!  Quick, Detweiler, get out your garlic, raise
up your cross and abjure these crypto-anarchists 
before we spread any further!  Next thing you know
we'll get some elitist, anti-democratic development like
untraceable digital cash.  Some people will accumulate
more digicash than others, and Detweiler won't even know
who they are.  Horrors!  Quick Detweiler,
write your electronic leveling tax protocols before 
its too late.  Better yet, get the majority to vote on
making us evil crypto-anarchists -- only a small cypherpunk
minority once our pseudonyms are unmasked, of course -- make 
us write them for you.  After all, egalitarian software
is a basic human right!

> UNFAIR INFLUENCE. ABUSE
> OF POWER. MANIPULATION. DECEIT. TREACHERY. EXPLOITATION. SECRET CONSPIRACIES.
>...

Isn't it just dreadful?

> p.s. if anyone doesn't hear from me for awhile, assume I've been
> `liquidated' and this isn't really an `open forum' ...

Detweiler to be axed by untraceable crypto-moderator.  Can't figure 
out how to make a pseudonym or use a remailer to avoid his fate in 
Oblivion.  Graphic pictures at 11, may be unsuitable for children!

Nick Szabo				szabo@netcom.com




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: m5@vail.tivoli.com (Mike McNally)
Date: Mon, 18 Oct 93 06:07:15 PDT
To: "L. Detweiler" <ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Subject: PSEUDOSPOOFING
In-Reply-To: <9310180941.AA15703@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Message-ID: <9310181302.AA01381@vail.tivoli.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



"L. Detweiler" writes:
 > I'm absolutely *horrified* and *nauseated* ...

If digicash were a reality, I'd send you some with the proviso that
you only spend it on clues.

Repeat this chant until you attain enlightenment:

	Pseudospoofing cannot be prevented
	Pseudospoofing is a reality of online existance
	No amount of fear and loathing will make it go away

If it weren't for fundamentally new concepts like the ability to
pseudospoof (that's a lousy term, by the way), the net would not be
the quantum change in human communication and human thought it is.

 > p.s. if anyone doesn't hear from me for awhile, assume I've been
 > `liquidated' and this isn't really an `open forum' ...

No, I'll assume the ELF-2 running your pseudomind blew a fuse.

--
Mike McNally




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Arthur Chandler <arthurc@crl.com>
Date: Mon, 18 Oct 93 08:47:15 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Cypherwaffle on spoofing
Message-ID: <Pine.3.87.9310180817.B5320-0100000@crl.crl.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



  I understand Detweiller's frustration. On another list, someone posted 
as if he/she were William Gibson. That kind of fraud undermines 
confidence on several levels. It attempts to dupe us, and usurps the name 
and reputation of a well-known writer, and sets up an atmosphere of 
suspicion and doubt fatal to any community. 
  How would you like it if someone spoofmailed  to this list under your 
name, then published Nazi slogans and argued for the legalization of rape? 
  What I find odd is the number and  vehemence of posts ON A LIST DEVOTED 
TO ENCRYPTION saying "Hey, it's a  fact of life, accept it" -- even  
dragging out Machiavelli's profoundly  mistaken "if you can't enforce 
it,  don't prohibit it." Of all the groups  on the Internet, I would 
think that  this one would be in a special position to say "put your 
digital John Hancock on your post if you want to to taken seriously."





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: doug@netcom.com (Doug Merritt)
Date: Mon, 18 Oct 93 09:17:15 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Cypherwaffle on spoofing
In-Reply-To: <arthurc@crl.com>
Message-ID: <9310181616.AA18629@netcom6.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Arthur Chandler <arthurc@crl.com> said:
>  What I find odd is the number and  vehemence of posts ON A LIST DEVOTED 
>TO ENCRYPTION saying "Hey, it's a  fact of life, accept it" -- even  
>dragging out Machiavelli's profoundly  mistaken "if you can't enforce 
>it,  don't prohibit it."

I don't understand your point. If it really is impossible to prevent
people from creating multiple anonymous identities, what good does it
do for any or all of us to say that we abhor the results? I grant
you that there will be bad effects...but what precisely do you suggest
we do about it?

If you think that people *can* be somehow limited to a single anonymous
identity, you'd best explain how you think so.

If on the other hand you agree that such a limitation can't be enforced,
then I fail to see your point at all.
	Doug




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: nobody@alumni.cco.caltech.eduhfinney@shell.portal.com
Date: Mon, 18 Oct 93 09:27:19 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: your mailRe: on anonymity, identity, reputation, and spoofing
Message-ID: <9310181620.AA17894@alumni.cco.caltech.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I do sympathize with L. Detweiler's concern about multiple identities.
Human nature being what it is, if a series of posts appears quickly taking
one view, people who disagree may think, well, I guess I'm in the minority
on this, I won't make a stink about it.  That's just part of the herd
instinct, which, IMO, we all share.  The lesson is that it is even more
important on the net not to be afraid to take unpopular stands.  You may
find that there are more people who agree with you than you thought.

In particular, although I think Detweiler's posts could be tightened
up considerably, and I don't agree with his solutions in detail, I can
understand his paranoia, having shared it from time to time.

There are some possible technological solutions to some of the issues
raised.  Chaum, in his 1985 CACM paper, describes how "credentials" can
be exchanged among various pseudonyms a person may have.  A credential
can basically be any statement by a 3rd party about a person.  It could
be a statement by a college that he had a certain degree.  It could be
a statement by a government that he had a driver's license.  It could be
a statement by a business that he was an agent for that business.

The credential would be given to the person, then Chaum shows how it
could be re-blinded and shown under other pseudonyms.  The credential
can be verified, but it can't be linked to the True Name or other pseudonyms
of the holder.

We could think about using something like this for reputations.  Take
Nick's question about how a new pseudonym could get through the filters.
Maybe the person posts under his real name for a while, then some respected
person is willing to give him a "valued poster" credential.  He can
re-blind this credential and submit it with posts he starts to make under
his pseudonym.  People will know that the pseudonymous poster is at least
potentially capable of making sense, and give his words some weight.  But
there will be no connection to his True Name.

(Of course, this could lead occasionally to a Dr. Jekyll who makes
sensible and weighty posts under his own name, while under his Mr. Hyde
pseudonym he rants and raves.  But hopefully this would not happen too
often.)

Other credentials could be related to some of the other points Detweiler
raised, such as list membership > some number of months.  The point would
be that these credentials are voluntary, used to get past people's filters,
and that they retain poster anonymity while giving readers useful information
about the poster.

It's ironic that L. Detweiler, who has played a major part in spreading
awareness of Cypherpunks technology through his widely read Privacy and
Anonymity FAQ, is suggesting that people should be limited in their
use of this technology.  Still, the concerns he raises are going to be
shared by many people, and we should try to be ready with technological
solutions that are consistent with privacy protection.

Hal Finney
hfinney@shell.portal.com




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Mike Godwin <mnemonic@eff.org>
Date: Mon, 18 Oct 93 06:27:14 PDT
To: cme@ellisun.sw.stratus.com (Carl Ellison)
Subject: Re: An idea.
In-Reply-To: <9310151501.AA14843@ellisun.sw.stratus.com>
Message-ID: <199310181324.AA09911@eff.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


 
Carl Ellison writes:

> If all you're worried about is entrapment, you need only ask the person
> in question if s/he works for any law enforcement or surveillance agency.
> If they lie, then anything after that is entrapment.
 
Please. This is not a way to avoid entrapment. Undercover police lie all
the time, and their lying does not become a predicate for an entrapment
defense. 

> I'm not a lawyer but I learned this from my masseuse in SLC UT, where
> mixed-gender massage is considered a "sex act for hire" and she was
> constantly subject to entrapment.

One shouldn't generalize too much from massage-parlor cases.


--Mike






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Duncan Frissell <frissell@panix.com>
Date: Mon, 18 Oct 93 06:32:14 PDT
To: CYPHERPUNKS@toad.com
Subject: What, Me Worry?
Message-ID: <199310181329.AA10213@panix.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I realize that Blacknet debate was eons ago in net time (100 to 1 
compression net time vs real time?) but I failed to stick my oar in 
because I was trying to cope with the 500 messages accumulated while I 
took an innocent weekend off.  (Note to Perry -- Not *everyone* has a 
Sparc station at home and at work -- some of us can be swamped).

Aside from contract murder, which shouldn't be much more of a problem than 
it is now because most people still won't be worth the powder it takes to 
blow them up, I don't expect blackmail and dossier abuse to be more of a 
problem on Blacknet than it was, say, in 1925.

Why?  Because there may be fewer grounds for blackmail and the damage 
possible to a person's reputation will be greatly reduced because 
(to Moderns) reputations are much less important.

If you compare what a blackmailer might have threatened to reveal about a 
person in 1925 with what Madonna get's paid millions to do live on stage 
before thousands of people, you can see the problem.

After all, it doesn't make much sense for a blackmailer to say to you, 
"I'm going to tell everyone that you are the practitioner of an 
alternative life style that they are teaching in the schools these days."

Reputation was significant in the past because people were stuck in one 
small community for their whole lives and they, their children, and 
grandchildren would have to be living with their neighbors for the next 
hundred years.  This sort of intimacy with "strangers" ended with the 
advance of technology, markets, and mass migration.

The nets can only make this worse as even the strangest individuals can 
find a home with their fellow "deviates" somewhere in cyberspace.

With the President a philandering, dope smoking, draft dodger; at least 
two cabinet jobs held by homosexuals, the mayor of New York an admitted 
tax evader; and the rather straight organiation I contract for giving baby 
showers for the single mothers as they go off to reproduce; it is hard to 
see many grounds for blackmail.

Dope dealers   


--- WinQwk 2.0b#1165
                                                                                                          




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Duncan Frissell <frissell@panix.com>
Date: Mon, 18 Oct 93 06:32:16 PDT
To: CYPHERPUNKS@toad.com
Subject: What, Me Worry?
Message-ID: <199310181329.AA10216@panix.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I realize that Blacknet debate was eons ago in net time (100 to 1 
compression net time vs real time?) but I failed to stick my oar in 
because I was trying to cope with the 500 messages accumulated while I 
took an innocent weekend off. (Some of us don't have SPARC stations at 
home and *can* be swamped.) 

Aside from contract murder, which shouldn't be much more of a problem than 
it is now because most people still won't be worth the powder it takes to 
blow them up, I don't expect blackmail and dossier abuse to be more of a 
problem on Blacknet than it was, say, in 1925.

Why?  Because there may be fewer grounds for blackmail and the damage 
possible to a person's reputation will be greatly reduced because 
(to Moderns) reputations are much less important.

If you compare what a blackmailer might have threatened to reveal about a 
person in 1925 with what Madonna gets paid millions to do live on stage 
before thousands of people, you can see the problem.  What could one say 
about Ophra guests that is worse than what they say about themselves.

After all, it doesn't make much sense for a blackmailer to say to you, 
"I'm going to tell everyone that you are the practitioner of an 
alternative life style that they are teaching in the schools these days."

Reputation was significant in the past because people were stuck in one 
small community for their whole lives and they, their children, and 
grandchildren would have to be living with their neighbors for the next 
hundred years.  This sort of intimacy with "strangers" ended with the 
advance of technology, markets, and mass migration.

The nets can only make this worse as even the strangest individuals can 
find a home with their fellow "deviates" somewhere in cyberspace.

With the President a philandering, dope smoking, draft dodger; at least 
two cabinet jobs held by homosexuals, the mayor of New York an admitted 
tax evader; and the rather straight organization I contract for giving 
baby showers for the single mothers as they go off to reproduce; it is 
hard to see many grounds for blackmail.

Dope dealers don't much care if they are reported to the authorities.  
That is just another risk of doing business and they don't respect the 
authorities enough even to fear them.  The authorities are so swamped in 
any case that they find it hard to grab too many people.  Child molesters 
remain unpopular (unless they work for the local schools) but they seem 
almost alone in their openness to blackmail.

Bankrupts, drunks, drug addicts, homosexuals, single mothers, tax evaders, 
the politically incorrect, anarchists, people who run red lights, are all 
accepted as part of the glorious mosaic of American society.  Even if they 
are occassionally fired, the booming market for contingent employment 
means that they won't suffer much loss of income.  

Seems like Blacknet blackmailers are going to have slim pickins.

Duncan Frissell

"Jennifer!  Did Governor Clinton use a condom?"

   -- Unanswered question asked at Jennifer Flowers' March 1992 press 
conference.
--- WinQwk 2.0b#1165                                                                                                                   




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Robert J. Woodhead" <trebor@foretune.co.jp>
Date: Sun, 17 Oct 93 17:52:01 PDT
To: hfinney@shell.portal.com
Subject: Re: Problems of anonymous posts
In-Reply-To: <9310171819.AA21961@soda.berkeley.edu>
Message-ID: <9310180047.AA04439@dink.foretune.co.jp>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Hfinney writes some excellent comments on anon remailers and how to
deal with them.

Possible low-tech solution: mail-list software where the moderator has
the ability to screen messages from particular sites and/or accounts.
In other words:

	IF account is in <list of jerks> THEN
		let_me_see_it_first
	ELSE IF site is in <list of anon sites> THEN
		IF account is NOT in <list of trusted anons> THEN
			let_me_see_it_first

Question: how easy is it to use public information (ie: out of the
phone book), PGP and an anon-remailer to create a "Fake ID"





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Date: Mon, 18 Oct 93 10:17:15 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Uniqueness and "is-a-person" credentials
In-Reply-To: <9310181424.AA21853@ellisun.sw.stratus.com>
Message-ID: <9310181717.AA24067@netcom5.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Carl Ellison writes:

> I see no way to guarantee uniqueness of the person unless you manage to
> incorporate some unique characteristic of a person (right hand print, for
> example) into a digital signature.
> 
> PEM's key certificates might be an attempt to guarantee uniqueness but even
> there I can cheat by having a second job under a second name, for example,
> and getting a certificate in both.

I don't know if we've ever talked on this list about the "is-a-person"
protocols discussed in several "Crypto" papers, namely, the
Fiat-Shamir passport scheme for credentialling persons, the ability to spoof
with the complicity of states (e.g., Libya conspires to create false
"is-a-person" passports for its agents), etc.

I don't like the idea of state-run registries of "legal persons."
Better to live with the occasional vagaries of digital pseuodonyms
than to ban them.

(And multiple identies can have many uses, some good, some not.
Welcome to the future.)

Since it may touch on our "cypherpunks agenda," I plan to read up on
some of these proposals for "is-a-person" credentialling and see how
they might relate to schemes for centralized key registration or escrow.

Any suggestion besides the "Crypto" proceedings?

--Tim May

-- 
..........................................................................
Timothy C. May         | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,  
tcmay@netcom.com       | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
408-688-5409           | knowledge, reputations, information markets, 
W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA  | black markets, collapse of governments.
Higher Power: 2^756839 | Public Key: PGP and MailSafe available.
Note: I put time and money into writing this posting. I hope you enjoy it.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: cme@ellisun.sw.stratus.com (Carl Ellison)
Date: Mon, 18 Oct 93 07:27:17 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: uniqueness
Message-ID: <9310181424.AA21853@ellisun.sw.stratus.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



>what really is our assurance that all these email addresses actually
>exist and represent *unique* people? there really is very little currently. 

I see no way to guarantee uniqueness of the person unless you manage to
incorporate some unique characteristic of a person (right hand print, for
example) into a digital signature.

PEM's key certificates might be an attempt to guarantee uniqueness but even
there I can cheat by having a second job under a second name, for example,
and getting a certificate in both.

 - Carl




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Karl Lui Barrus <klbarrus@owlnet.rice.edu>
Date: Mon, 18 Oct 93 08:37:15 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: crypto technique
In-Reply-To: <kgkO9UG00awF4Pr0lK@andrew.cmu.edu>
Message-ID: <9310181535.AA27722@great-gray.owlnet.rice.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Matthew J Ghio wrote:

>In summary, I see no method which would yeild the original input without
>knowing the values added to the nested polynomials (the private key),
>and there is no way to determine the private key if the modulus is
>applied to the resulting function.

I've been thinking about this (well, not too much since I'm in the
midst of midterms week :-).

I beleive the equation leaks information.  When you expand the
equation symbolically, it is easy to solve for the constants by
matching the coefficients of the highest powers and working backwards.
If the constants can be negative as well as positive, the signs of
some of the terms will reflect this.

We know the magnitude of the constants must be less than P, which is
public.  But can they be negative - will the decoding process still
work?  Or, will you obtain the correct decoding for the correct choice
and an incorrect decoding for the incorrect choice?  If it turns out
that either choice will decode a number to the same value, or if the
decoding won't work with negative numbers, then this method is too
easy to invert.

If the constants can't be negative, or if they can be but it doesn't
make a difference in the decoding, then taking the modulus doesn't
obscure anything at all.

For example, suppose c = 127 and d = -225.  Then

y1 = 7903. + 63.75 x + 63.875 x  + 0.25 x  + 0.125 x

which becomes (after mod 256)

y1 = 223. + 63.75 x + 63.875 x  + 0.25 x  + 0.125 x

However, if c = 127, d = 31, then

y2 = 8159. + 63.75 x + 63.875 x  + 0.25 x  + 0.125 x

which becomes (after mod 256)

y2 = 223. + 63.75 x + 63.875 x  + 0.25 x  + 0.125 x

So y1 = y2.  Here, d = -225 and d = 31 yeild the same equation (after
mod operation).  

Now I need to try the decoding process to see if d = -225 or d = 31
yeild the same or different answers.

-- 
Karl L. Barrus: klbarrus@owlnet.rice.edu         
keyID: 5AD633 hash: D1 59 9D 48 72 E9 19 D5  3D F3 93 7E 81 B5 CC 32 

"One man's mnemonic is another man's cryptography" 
  - my compilers prof discussing file naming in public directories



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Date: Mon, 18 Oct 93 10:37:15 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: "True Names" and "Ender's Game" (was: Cypherwaffle...)
In-Reply-To: <9310181616.AA01727@vail.tivoli.com>
Message-ID: <9310181737.AA26709@netcom5.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Some novels to enjoy...

Earlier today Nick Szabo (not his True Name?) made some references to
True Names. I'm sure you all have heard many of us speak about Vernor
Vinge's "True Names." If you have not yet read it, buy a copy today
and read it tonight in lieu of reading this list!

Another novel is "Ender's Game," by Orson Scott Card, in which some
kids carry on a political debate on the Nets of the future under the
digital pseudonyms "Locke" and "Demosthenes." Over a period of months
and then years, these nyms ("True Nyms"?) develop a large following
and are demonstrably important entities.

About the way our own "S. Boxx" could be if he/she/it didn't
periodically lapse into rants and flames about "traitors," the "death
fo the cypherpunks cause," and so on. Actions have consequences, even
in cypherspace.

Anyway, I strongly recommend both "True Names" and "Ender's Game."

--Tim May (my True Name)


-- 
..........................................................................
Timothy C. May         | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,  
tcmay@netcom.com       | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
408-688-5409           | knowledge, reputations, information markets, 
W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA  | black markets, collapse of governments.
Higher Power: 2^756839 | Public Key: PGP and MailSafe available.
Note: I put time and money into writing this posting. I hope you enjoy it.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: cme@ellisun.sw.stratus.com (Carl Ellison)
Date: Mon, 18 Oct 93 07:47:16 PDT
To: blaster@rd.relcom.msk.su
Subject: Re: Monitor radiation overlooking.
Message-ID: <9310181439.AA21879@ellisun.sw.stratus.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>Once more, sorry for my poor English.

Your English is much better than my Russian. :-)

I've cleaned up spellings and punctuation in the quote below, to reflect my
understanding.  Was I correct?

>I want to say that DES isn`t group. We can`t say
>that:
>A k1, k2; E k0; ST des(k2, des(k1, text))=des(k0, text)
>        (A means "for all", E means "exist", ST means "such that");
>
>or: E k1, k2; A k0; ST des(k2, des(k1, text))!=des(k0, text)
>
>I say that:
>E f(k, text); A k1, k2; E k0 ST len(k0)=len(k1)=len(k2) and
>des(k2, des(k1, text))=f(k0, text)
>
>f() is like des() but f() is not des()!!!
>My friend says that the intruder must try only 2^56 keys for des(des()).


What's missing in the last statement is the qualification of <text>.
Is it

	A text
or
	E text

?

Meanwhile, some method of learning f would be nice :-).

Is it also claimed that:

E g(k,text); A k1,k2,text; E k0  ST len(k0)=len(k1)=len(k2) and
des(k2, f(k1, text)) = g(k0,text)

for f(,) as defined above?  (That is, does this method continue to
apply for an indefinite number of DES copies?)

 - Carl




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: hal@alumni.cco.caltech.edu (Hal Finney)
Date: Mon, 18 Oct 93 10:47:15 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re:  Uniqueness and "is-a-person" credentials
Message-ID: <9310181740.AA19147@alumni.cco.caltech.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I remembered about is-a-person credentials after I posted.  I had thought
this idea came from Chaum but I didn't see it in his 1985 paper.  I don't
recall the details of this credentialling mechanism, so take what I say
here with a grain of salt.  I hope someone can post a cite.

One point is, there is no need to associate these with states.  Private
corporations could easily issue is-a-person credentials.  You show up
and let them take your thumbprint (retina print, DNA scan, ...), and they
give you the credential.  They don't need to know your name, just that
you don't already have a credential.  (The different agencies would have
to share a database as is done in many industries today.)

Then, if L. Detweiler wants to accuse Eric and Jamie of being the same
person, they can disprove it by exhibiting their different is-a-person
credentials.  (They might not "exhibit" them, they might use some kind
of zero-knowledge proof to show they are different.)

If anonymity and spoofing get to be too bad a problem, most people may
refuse to have net.dealings with anyone who is not willing to show an
is-a-person credential.  Among your pseudonyms, only one can show it,
otherwise they will be linked.  This would force all but one of your
pseudonyms into second-class citizenhood on the net.

This may seem unfortunate, but as those who just got through flaming
Detweiler remind us, if something like this is possible then just because
you don't like it, that won't stop it from happening.  It may be that
in the future the net is not a very anonymous environment, just because
the technology exists to catch spoofers.  L. Detweiler may get his wish
after all.

Hal Finney
hfinney@shell.portal.com




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: m5@vail.tivoli.com (Mike McNally)
Date: Mon, 18 Oct 93 09:17:19 PDT
To: Arthur Chandler <arthurc@crl.com>
Subject: Cypherwaffle on spoofing
In-Reply-To: <Pine.3.87.9310180817.B5320-0100000@crl.crl.com>
Message-ID: <9310181616.AA01727@vail.tivoli.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Arthur Chandler writes:
 >   What I find odd is the number and  vehemence of posts ON A LIST DEVOTED 
 > TO ENCRYPTION saying "Hey, it's a  fact of life, accept it" -- even  
 > dragging out Machiavelli's profoundly  mistaken "if you can't enforce 
 > it,  don't prohibit it." 

Oh well, it's "profoundly" mistaken, so we'd better change our tune.
OK, let's prohibit it.  The net sure will be wonderful once that magic
wand is waved.

 > Of all the groups  on the Internet, I would 
 > think that  this one would be in a special position to say "put your 
 > digital John Hancock on your post if you want to to taken seriously."

Uhhhh...  That's the *point*.  It is a waste of time and energy to
prohibit anonymity/pseudonymity when it's so easy to render it
completely ineffective through the use of strong cryptography and
digital signature technology.

Note that if it weren't for the fact that humans can use sensory
mechanisms to determine with some confidence the identity of a human
they're talking to, we'd have been faced with the same problem for
quite some time.  That's one of the foundations of the whole
cypherpunk concept: freedom to develop and use strong cryptosystems
makes this confidence of identity possible over electronic networks.
(Please pardon my presumption at speaking for the "organization"; I'm
paraphrasing something Mike Godwin said at the Austin EFF Crypto
meeting.)

Note also that the problem *does* exist now: politicians recieve
letters about hot issues from constituents---or at least they're
*assumed* to be from constituents.  How many votes have been changed
over the years by clever miscreants sending many letters under
different assumed identities?

--
Mike McNally




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: hughes@ah.com (Eric Hughes)
Date: Mon, 18 Oct 93 11:22:15 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: ANON: _The Economist_ on South Korea
Message-ID: <9310181820.AA02600@ah.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


The 11 Sep 93 Economist had an article on South Korea called "Too
clean for comfort" about their president Kim Young Sam and his
political housecleaning.  I excerpt a relevant passage.

      [...] One of Mr Kim;s first presidential acts was to bare his
   assets.  Then ministers, MPs and top civil servants were all
   required to disclose their net worth.  To no one's surprise, while
   the president's people were mostly clean, many of the old guard
   turned out to be rolling in wealth whose origins they could not
   readily explain. Many resigned.

      The "real names" reform, announced on August 12th, was Mr Kim's
   most radical step yet.  The issue had been hotly debated for over a
   decade.  Hitherto South Koreans had been able to keep bank accounts
   in any name they cared to invent; convenient for tax evasion, and
   for recycling the cash-stuffed white envelopes that for decades
   have routinely oiled the country's wheels of business and
   politics alike.

      Mr Kim struck out of the blue.  Only the secret task force
   drawing up the plan knew about it; they had told their families
   that they were on a course in America.  Even Mr Kim's cabinet was
   informed only an hour before the public announcement.  Not a word
   leaked out.

   [...]

      Anyone who upsets so many applecarts risks making himself a lot
   of enemies.  But Mr Kim's positioning is good.  Anyone who speaks
   out against real names or asset-baring must surely have something
   to hide.  Conversely, the whole campaign is widely popular with the
   public, chiming as it does with the widespread perception (even in
   a country with one fo the world's most even distributions of
   income) that fat cats are licking off the cream.

A new target market?

Eric




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: cman@IO.COM (Douglas Barnes)
Date: Mon, 18 Oct 93 09:27:15 PDT
To: ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu (L. Detweiler)
Subject: Re: PSEUDOSPOOFING (lions and tigers and bears, oh my!)
In-Reply-To: <9310180941.AA15703@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Message-ID: <9310181621.AA11152@illuminati.IO.COM>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


L. Det writes:
> I for one
> never saw *that* announcement when I signed up! calling
> `pseudospoofing' `one of the `main goals' of cypherpunks software'
> sounds *criminal* to me. Or maybe I'm missing the point! I guess this
> is what anarchy really *is* all about!

It was one of the main reasons *I* signed up... we were working on
a TV show about cyberspace, and Paco Nathan explained public key
encryption, digital money, and nyms with reputations in his inimitably
cheerful and energetic fashion for our cameras.

The part he was most excited about (a part that still fascinates
me no end) is the possibility of spawning new identities that
can acquire reputations, property, prestige, ignominity, whatever,
without the need to appeal to a government bureaucracy for validation.

Furthermore, the whole notion that there is some kind of implied contract 
when you join a free mailing list completely absurd, second only to your 
notion that we are all pushing for the same political agenda (or should
be) because we put our names in the same hat at toad.com. It just ain't so,
and no amount of wishing will make it so.

And, to cap it all off, I have had more external validation of the 
physical existence of the key members of *this* data space than any 
other international data space I participate in; in addition to 
numerous pictures, I've met a number of the folks, who have, in turn,
met a number of the folks... cypherpunks is one of the meetingest
mailing lists I've ever seen or heard of.

Doug

PS: the show never got edited, because Steve and I decided to set up 
io.com. 

-- 
----------------                                             /\ 
Douglas Barnes            cman@illuminati.io.com            /  \ 
Chief Wizard         (512) 448-8950 (d), 447-7866 (v)      / () \
Illuminati Online          metaverse.io.com 7777          /______\



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Jim Demmers <jdemmers@noel.pd.org>
Date: Mon, 18 Oct 93 08:32:15 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: re: on anonymity, identity, reputation, and spoofing
Message-ID: <199310181525.AA25442@noel.pd.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain




> What if that `opinion' was not an accurate representation of
> reality? what if a few people were creating the illusion that some
> different kind of consensus existed? what if that `agenda' were
> actually something inherently wicked like ... anarchy?
                     ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
Nothing, absolutely nothing (IMVHO) is inherently wicked.  This is a 
virtual forum, and as such, it is not (nor should it be) subject to the
same laws that bound similar dialogues in actuality.  The cyberspacial 
medium begs the development of new and unique forms of interaction - and 
broadening one's means of expression through the use of multiple identities
is perfectly valid in my book.

As for conspiracies-to-mislead, I must have seen at least 20 or 30 last 
night while I was watching the World Series.  I don't know how many others
'buy' (pun intended) into the crap that passes between their ears during 
the course of any given day, but I consider myself intelligent enough to 
weed through the chaff unassisted.  Peer pressure has always been a 
powerful coercive - so what?  It's not my job to calibrate the 'moral 
compass' of others...I leave it to them as an exercise (to be turned in 
at check out time).

>
> 1) list members are allowed *one* anonymous identity if any. They are
> required to associate some name with all anonymous posts via that identity.
> 2) *no one* is allowed multiple `real' identities and in fact any
> violation of this is considered an extremely serious breach of netiquette
> & honesty. 
> 3) completely anonymous posts from `outside' the list are allowed; if
> no pseudoidentity is given they are assumed to come from `outside'.
>

Give me a break!  A little structure goes a long way but these rules call 
to mind elementary school experiences that I thought I'd left behind.   I 
can see it now:         The Cypherpunks List
                   (schizophrenics need not apply)

Let's move on...

[the preceeding has not been a flame but a commentary.  It should be taken 
as such.]
 
-jim 


|=========================================================================|
|                                                                         |
| Jim Demmers   Public Domain, Inc.	 INET: jdemmers@pd.org            |
|	       	P.O. Box 8899		       jim.demmers@oit.gatech.edu |
|       	Atlanta, GA  30306-0899        balder@gnu.ai.mit.edu      |
|       Phone: 	404-377-2627              FAX: 404-894-9135               |
|                                                                         |
|=========================================================================|

             











From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Christian D. Odhner" <cdodhner@indirect.com>
Date: Mon, 18 Oct 93 11:42:15 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Big Brother Inside Stickers
Message-ID: <199310181838.AA25403@indirect.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I received the stickers from the printer about 10 minutes ago. It'll take
me a day or three to get them all mailed out. ( they came pre-cut rather
than in sheets like I thought they would; Big orders of 1000 or more are
going to involve some substantial processing time ;)

Happy Hunting, -Chris.

______________________________________________________________________________
Christian Douglas Odhner     | "The NSA can have my secret key when they pry
cdodhner@indirect.com	     | it from my cold, dead, hands... But they shall
pgp 2.3 public key by finger | NEVER have the password it's encrypted with!"
My opinions are shareware. For a registered copy, send me 15$ in DigiCash.
  Key fingerprint =  58 62 A2 84 FD 4F 56 38  82 69 6F 08 E4 F1 79 11 





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: jrk@sys.uea.ac.uk (Richard Kennaway)
Date: Mon, 18 Oct 93 03:47:13 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: PSEUDOSPOOFING
Message-ID: <15143.9310181046@s5.sys.uea.ac.uk>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


An entity posting as "L. Detweiler" <ld231782@edu.colostate.lance.longs> writes:
>PSEUDOSPOOFING
>
>the activity of misleading people into thinking that an identity is
>unique when it really isn't! i.e. posting behind `real' addresses not
>specifically noted as anonymous!

Such as that posting itself?

BTW, someone has claimed in email to me that they wrote the "cypherpunk
mindfucking" rant as a satire.  Still an utter waste of time.

--                                  ____
Richard Kennaway                  __\_ /    School of Information Systems
Internet:  jrk@sys.uea.ac.uk      \  X/     University of East Anglia
uucp:  ...mcsun!ukc!uea-sys!jrk    \/       Norwich NR4 7TJ, U.K.






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: lefty@apple.com (Lefty)
Date: Mon, 18 Oct 93 13:02:15 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: PSEUDOSPOOFING
Message-ID: <9310181855.AA26688@internal.apple.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>what if people were being *influenced* by what
>they perceived was the *majority opinion* or the *views of their peers*
>that were really nothing but DECEPTION AND LIES? what if it was
>*thwarting progress*? I would consider this nothing but TREACHERY and
>HIGH TREASON. is all this  really one of the `main goals' of the
>cypherpunk agenda? if so, SIGN ME OFF.

Works for me.

--
Lefty (lefty@apple.com)
C:.M:.C:., D:.O:.D:.






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Mike Godwin <mnemonic@eff.org>
Date: Mon, 18 Oct 93 09:02:15 PDT
To: ferguson@icm1.icp.net (Paul Ferguson x2044)
Subject: Re: EFF servers down?
In-Reply-To: <9310180107.AA15898@icm1.icp.net>
Message-ID: <199310181557.AA11179@eff.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


 
Paul Ferguson writes:

> I noticed that the EFF FTP server (FTP.EFF.ORG/KRAGAR.EFF.ORG) appears
> to be down. Is this a scheduled outage (servicing, etc.) or are they
> having problems.

We were down over the weekend as eff.org moved from Cambridge to DC.


--Mike





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: sameer@netcom.com (Sameer Parekh)
Date: Mon, 18 Oct 93 12:07:15 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Introducing digital cash in a MOO
Message-ID: <9310181903.AA18518@netcom.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

	I remember Eric was talking at the 2nd last (September)
cypherpunks meeting about setting up some sort of digital cash system
in MU*s. It's a very good idea, yes.

	I was thinking that metaverse.io.com would be an interesting
ground to implement digital cash, because this MOO seems like a very
commercial-oriented system. I know that Fringe Ware, Inc. has set up
an office in the MOO where once it's up and running will serve
people's requests for information.
	Paco, in his article on Metaverse in the new Fringe Ware
Review, talks about how small start up companies can get offices in
metaverse, if they can't afford (like apple) an ftp site to serve
their customers.
	This might be extended to an actual *commerce* system. Someone
could lease a plot of MOO-space, set up a digital bank, issue bank
notes, and users could use these digicash notes to purchase products
at the offices of small companies located in the Metaverse.
	Because io.com is a commercial system, it might actually not
be that tough to implement a us-dollars-backed system. I.e.: a
digibank would take actual DOLLARS from users, give them digicash
notes, and users can use the notes to make transactions in MOOspace,
and vendors and users alike may redeem their digicash for us-standard
cash.
	In order to deal with the legal issues associated, it might be
easiest for io.com to actually run the digibank, but not necessary.
Personally, I'd prefer a digibank run by a third-party, but I have no
real problem with io.com running the thing.
	It certainly seems promising.

- -- 
Sameer
sameer@netcom.com

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.3a

iQCVAgUBLMLogwvya0ihLgutAQHU0QP/eib6YHPE3/dgipfy+WQ6pMM6TTq8lxl6
BnsxtOBC6jGALbZyCSp7ADfhEHYQAd0ZcgrvwE9bwJW05iRNb2U8H+QlrEovoPD3
0VBnmlL9ge2wr4bGnTZvSSob4ooODEgFj8BDjwfya8UVhgeGfcAIzvp8pEd4nsII
kpJ4i/Yqw4M=
=5vMg
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Stanton McCandlish <mech@eff.org>
Date: Mon, 18 Oct 93 09:42:15 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: German "NSA" has a Clipper plan too? + News of German conf.
Message-ID: <199310181637.AA11758@eff.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


More int'l. news of some interest.

**** Begin Forwarded message ****

From: Reiner Perivolaris <tutlaibe@w250zrz.zrz.TU-Berlin.DE>
Message-Id: <9310082023.AA03362@w250zrz.zrz.TU-Berlin.DE>
Subject: CCC'93 and You ...
To: fig@well.sf.ca.us
Date: 	Fri, 8 Oct 1993 13:23:34 -0700
Re-To: reiner@physik.tu-berlin.de
X-Mailer: ELM [version 2.4 PL5]
Content-Type: text
Content-Length: 1827      

The plan of the Clinton administration for the ISDN-Net (?!)
will be a part of a workshop or a own theme and the fight for 
private cryptos (eg. PGP), include the trouble of P. Zimmerman. 
The 'Clipper/Skipjack'-Chip can/will be a theme, because storys
are "on their way", that german BSI (*my* translation:Federal 
Office for Security of Informationsystems) and the TELEKOM 
(Telephoncompany) have a plan like the NSA.
  
Where all this and more? At the CCC'93 (10. Chaos Communication 
Congress 1993). 

  
         27. -29. Dec. 1993
  
         Eidelstedter Buergerhaus 
         Alte Elbgaustr. 12 
         Hamburg-Eidelstedt
         Germany 
  
         Organization: Choas Computer Club e.V.
  
         Address:      CCC e.V.
                       (Orga-CCC'93)
                       Schwenckestr. 85 
                       20255 Hamburg
                       Germany
  
I am one of the guys who organize this workshop and the congress.
We are reading 'comp.org.eff.news', 'comp.org.eff.talk' and other
information we can get.
But only to talk about the EFF *we thing* is not enough. It would 
be nice, if members of Your organization will be there and have 
the chance to explain what EFF is doing. And when You get new 
members *we hope so* it will be good for Your movement and the 
'global village'.

**** End Forwarded Message ****

-- 
-=> mech@eff.org <=-
Stanton McCandlish     Electronic Frontier Foundation Online Activist & SysOp
"A nation that is afraid to let its people judge the truth and falsehood of
ideas in an open market is a nation that is afraid of its people." -JFK
NitV-DC BBS 202-232-2715, Fido 1:109/? IndraNet 369:111/1, 14.4V32b 16.8ZyX



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Date: Mon, 18 Oct 93 12:47:15 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Time for me to come clean...
Message-ID: <9310181946.AA16825@netcom5.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


My experiment has gone far enough.

One of you has claimed that the Net entity "tcmay" (Timothy C. May,
putatively) is actually "jamie" (Jamie Dinkelacker, putatively). This
person has at other times claimed that perhaps Eric Hughes and Jamie
are the same person, and that the Net entity "tcmay" is the "lackey of Eric
Hughes."

It is all getting so confusing! 

Allow me to clarify.

I entered this list under a variety of pseudonyms, with the intent of
compiling information on all of you. I have been posting under the
identities of Tim May (who has actually never existed....the man
behind the mask on the cover of "Wired" was a hired actor, as were the
stand-ins for the personnas of Eric Hughes and John Gilmore), Sandy
Sandfort, Jamie Dinkelacker, and many others.

I disavow any connection to the paranoid "S. Boxx," however.

In fact, I think there are only five actual biological entities on
the list. Makes for some good conspiracy theories for the paranoids.

Finally, I also write under the nym de guerre of "Dorothy Denning."
The real Dorothy Denning is too busy grading papers for her freshman
crypto class to post, so I fill in.

My real name should be apparent to you all. I knew if I used it, the
other four of you would not take me seriously. But now the secret's
out.


David
     
--
     
David Sternlight         When the mouse laughs at the cat,
                         there is a hole nearby.--Nigerian Proverb
 




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: blaster@rd.relcom.msk.su (Victor A. Borisov)
Date: Mon, 18 Oct 93 04:02:13 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Monitor radiation overlooking.
In-Reply-To: <4gjf9GqSMUgEIMznwj@transarc.com>
Message-ID: <ABWKdmi8X0@rd.relcom.msk.su>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>   I had a little trouble with the English, but I think I followed the
>   math.  I believe Victor's KGB friend is claiming that DES is a group.
>   Victor, does the following text contradict your claim?
Sorry for my poor English. I want to saw, that DES is`t group. We can`t say,
that:
A k1, k2: E k0, that des(k2, des(k1, text))=des(k0, text)
        (A mean "for all", E mean "exist");

or: E k1, k2: A k0, that des(k2, des(k1, text))!=des(k0, text)

I saw, that:
E f(k, text): A k1, k2: E k0, len(k0)=len(k1)=len(k2), that
des(k2, des(k1, test))=f(k0, text)

f() like des(), but f() is not des()!!!
My friend saw, that introder must try only 2^56 keys for des(des()).
Once more, sorry for my poor English.

PS I am sorry for my stupid letter about PGP randomizer.
--- 
Victor A. Borisov aka blaster;	Relcom R&D;
Email: blaster@rd.relcom.msk.su;
Phone: +7(095)-943-4735; +7(095)-198-9510;
	=== Don`t panic! ===




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: smb@research.att.com
Date: Mon, 18 Oct 93 11:07:15 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: jrk@sys.uea.ac.uk (Richard Kennaway)
Message-ID: <9310181804.AA11971@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I have a fairly strong bias these days towards staying out of meta-
discussions on mailing lists and newsgroups, and primarily contributing
when I have some particular expertise I can bring to bear.  I'll break
that rule now...

There's a persistent tendency on this list to confuse technical
feasibility, political feasibility, and ultimate desirability.  The
whole business about pseudonyms is a good example.

Guess what -- the ability to use pseudonyms is not new.  Yes, the Net
makes it easier, but they're far from rare in the ``real world''.  The
potential for abuse is obvious -- and that's why the government has
tried to make it harder and harder to create truly-functional aliases,
to the point of criminalizing many aspects of it.

Nor is the concept of an anoymous spending mechanism new.  We speak of
``digital cash'' for a reason -- its essential properties are modeled
on those of real cash.  Of course, when real cash became problematic
for the government, they did the obvious -- they promulgated laws and
regulations regarding what you can do with it (i.e., the rules on forms
to be filled out when leaving the country, the bank rules on large cash
transactions, etc.).

Are any of these laws 100% effective?  Or even substantially
effective?  Of course not -- but they've accomplished two things.  One,
they've raised the ante for playing certain games that the government
doesn't want played.  Two -- and probably more important -- they've
provided the government with a new weapon to use against you.  Can't
convict Al Capone of racketeering?  No problem; just charge him with
tax evasion.

So it is with the net.  When email and digital cash become social
forces in the larger community, as opposed to our electronic
subcommunity, you'll start to see more regulation.  It might not even
be purely governmental; the large companies that want to run ``the''
net have their own agendas, which concern things like large profits and
keeping the government away, and have little to do with privacy.
Remember Prodigy?  I haven't noticed that it's lacking for customers
because of their policies.  Or -- envision, if you will, an ukase that
the FCC will regulate the Internet, and that anyone who wants to
connect will have to agree to an acceptable use policy that includes
the requirement that all mail be digitally signed, both by the
individual and by the site, and that mailers enforce this requirement.
Can't happen?

Nor do I think that ``offshore data havens'' will help.  Apart from the
fact that most major governments are basically in accord on the
question of who makes the rules (them, not the people -- or did you see
any governments denouncing Clipper?  I saw lots of endorsements), there
is a potent weapon that can be used:  mandatory disconnection from the
net for any country that doesn't co-operate enough.  (Even the famed
Swiss banking system is under a lot of pressure these days on such
issues, and they and the Swiss government are co-operating a lot more
with other countries.  Wanna place any bets on creating a whole new
anonymity structure?) For that matter, international bandwidth is a
matter for diplomats as well as technicians; permission to create new
circuits will simply be withheld.  If you doubt me, try placing a call
to Cuba, or to the former USSR.  After your Nth ``circuits busy''
message, don't bother asking why the long distance carriers haven't
installed more trunks, when there's obviously a demand for them.

Certainly, there are ways around some restrictions.  The inability to
call directly between Israel and the Arab countries has bred call-
forwarders.  But to the extent that these have come to official notice
of governments that care to suppress the traffic, they've been shut
down.  This is force majeure, friends, not bits on a wire.

Cryptographic technology is an enabling mechanism for various social
changes.  It by no means makes them inevitable.  Don't delude yourself
on that; the political will to do something is more important when
various alternatives exist.  To allude to fiction again, I've heard
people cite Margaret Atwater's ``The Handmaid's Tale'' as an argument
against electronic banking and the like.  In the book, at the stroke of
a pen all women's bank accounts were cancelled.  But that's the wrong
lesson; the real issue was the governmental decision to take the
action.  And throughout the centuries, governments have had no trouble
stripping hated minority groups of their assets, without any need for
computers.

If you want a Brave New Digital World, it isn't sufficient to build the
tools.  You also have to convince people that it's a good idea.  Oh,
the online world is coming; no doubt about that.  But people have to
be convinced that privacy and the like is in their interests, that
it will solve problems that *they* will have.  Equally important, they
have to be convinced that it will not create new problems, to their
perception (and the perception may have little to do with reality.
500 -- nay, 500,000 -- channels of digital information to the home
will do nothing to educate those who prefer to learn about the world
from McData Services, or from CBS/NBC/ABC/Fox/AP/UPI.  There are
myriad sources of information right now that most folks never see,
because they don't know of them, don't trust them, or just don't want
to bother.  Face it, it's easier to let someone else do the editing
-- but then you have to trust them.

Do you want an example?  Here's how to shut down an anonymous remailer.
First, find a name for a host that no longer exists.  Send a note through
the remailer to someone putatively on that host, making it appear like
a stolen account (bin@foo.bar.edu, or some such).  The mail should appear
to discuss criminal activity, and be signed with a name from the proper
ethnic group.  The message will be queued forever, of course, and will
likely be stored on the backup tapes for the mail spool directory.  Next,
send a message through the remailer to president@whitehouse.gov, threatening
the president.  Poof -- the Secret Service *will* come investigating
(those guys have no sense of humor).  They may or may not believe that
the planted note is genuine.  But they will approach the appropriate dean
to demand that this tool of criminal activity be shut down.

Quick -- how many remailers have the support of the university?  How many
boards of trustees -- at state universities, often linked to the government
-- will back them, if the Secret Service ``requests'' that they be shut
down.

The answer, of course, is to have a defense ready in terms that such
people can accept.  Show the good remailers can do (i.e., alt.abuse.recovery,
though I know of the controversy surrounding it).  Show them as a
paradigm for privacy.  And show that abuses are not tolerated by the
community.  The recent ``traitor mail'' here is actually a good example.
While there have been refreshingly few calls for limiting anonymity,
there's also been no tolerance for the ideas expressed.

I've gone on too long, and this message has started to ramble.  Enough
for now.

		--Steve Bellovin




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Anonymous <nowhere@bsu-cs.bsu.edu>
Date: Mon, 18 Oct 93 12:12:15 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Leisure Suit Larry
Message-ID: <9310181910.AA23049@bsu-cs.bsu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


On 18 Oct 93 14:18:10 EDT
 Sandy Sandfort <72114.1712@CompuServe.COM> wrote - 

> Punksters,
>
> Lance Detweiler finished his most recent rant thusly:
>
>    . . . is *this* what the Cypherpunks really stand for?
>    UNFAIR INFLUENCE. ABUSE OF POWER. MANIPULATION. DECEIT.
>    TREACHERY. EXPLOITATION. SECRET CONSPIRACIES.
>
> Lance, stop frothing at the mouth and get a life.

Uh, its not "Lance," its "Larry" Detweiler, as in Leisure Suit
Larry. (Sorry, Larry.)

Spooge 





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Sandy <72114.1712@CompuServe.COM>
Date: Mon, 18 Oct 93 11:27:15 PDT
To: <cypherpunks@toad.com>
Subject: DETWEILER
Message-ID: <931018181809_72114.1712_FHF80-1@CompuServe.COM>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
  SANDY SANDFORT               Reply to:  ssandfort@attmail.com
 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Punksters,

Lance Detweiler finished his most recent rant thusly:

    . . . is *this* what the Cypherpunks really stand for?
    UNFAIR INFLUENCE. ABUSE OF POWER. MANIPULATION. DECEIT.
    TREACHERY. EXPLOITATION. SECRET CONSPIRACIES.

Lance, stop frothing at the mouth and get a life.

 S a n d y  (aka Tim May, Eric Hughes, Nick Szabo, Perry Metzger,
            Duncan Frissell, Mao Tse-tung, George Herbert Walker
            Bush and a cast of thousands)

>>>>>>    Please send e-mail to:  ssandfort@attmail.com    <<<<<<
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Edward Elhauge <ee@lever.com>
Date: Mon, 18 Oct 93 15:12:29 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: ANON: _The Economist_ on South Korea
In-Reply-To: <9310181820.AA02600@ah.com>
Message-ID: <m0op2Bx-0001ZtC@lever.lever.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


In message <9310181820.AA02600@ah.com>, Eric Hughes writes:
>      [...] One of Mr Kim;s first presidential acts was to bare his
>   assets.  Then ministers, MPs and top civil servants were all
>   required to disclose their net worth.  To no one's surprise, while
>   the president's people were mostly clean, many of the old guard
>   turned out to be rolling in wealth whose origins they could not
>   readily explain. Many resigned.
>
>      The "real names" reform, announced on August 12th, was Mr Kim's
>   most radical step yet.  The issue had been hotly debated for over a
>   decade.  Hitherto South Koreans had been able to keep bank accounts
>   in any name they cared to invent; convenient for tax evasion, and
>   for recycling the cash-stuffed white envelopes that for decades
>   have routinely oiled the country's wheels of business and
>   politics alike.
>A new target market?

My first reaction to this post was, "Are we supposed to feel sorry for these
people?" But then I realized that the real problem was giving other people
enough power over you that you depend on them to be honest.
--
  Edward Elhauge  |  "The only thing worse than being talked about
 Lever Industries |   is not being talked about."
   San Francisco  |              -- Oscar Wilde
   ee@lever.com   |




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Mike Johnson" <exabyte!smtplink!mikej@uunet.UU.NET>
Date: Mon, 18 Oct 93 14:47:25 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Time for me to come clean...
Message-ID: <9309187509.AA750982510@smtplink.exabyte.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



>My experiment has gone far enough.

>One of you has claimed that the Net entity "tcmay" (Timothy C. May,
>putatively) is actually "jamie" (Jamie Dinkelacker, putatively). This
>person has at other times claimed that perhaps Eric Hughes and Jamie
>are the same person, and that the Net entity "tcmay" is the "lackey of Eric
>Hughes."

>It is all getting so confusing! 

>Allow me to clarify.

>I entered this list under a variety of pseudonyms, with the intent of
>compiling information on all of you. I have been posting under the
>identities of Tim May (who has actually never existed....the man
>behind the mask on the cover of "Wired" was a hired actor, as were the
>stand-ins for the personnas of Eric Hughes and John Gilmore), Sandy
>Sandfort, Jamie Dinkelacker, and many others.

>I disavow any connection to the paranoid "S. Boxx," however.

>In fact, I think there are only five actual biological entities on
>the list. Makes for some good conspiracy theories for the paranoids.

>Finally, I also write under the nym de guerre of "Dorothy Denning."
>The real Dorothy Denning is too busy grading papers for her freshman
>crypto class to post, so I fill in.

>My real name should be apparent to you all. I knew if I used it, the
>other four of you would not take me seriously. But now the secret's
>out.


>David
     
>--
     
>David Sternlight         When the mouse laughs at the cat,
>                         there is a hole nearby.--Nigerian Proverb
 
Oh, my!  I'm so confused!  I think I may have to sue myself for libel for 
connecting such two vastly different personas of myself with each other!

                       --Tim May (AKA George Bush, David Sternlight, etc.)




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: paul@poboy.b17c.ingr.com (Paul Robichaux)
Date: Mon, 18 Oct 93 13:27:15 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Leisure Suit Larry
Message-ID: <199310182026.AA12159@poboy.b17c.ingr.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


In-Reply-To: <9310181910.AA23049@bsu-cs.bsu.edu>; from "Anonymous" at Oct 18, 93 2:10 pm

> Uh, its not "Lance," its "Larry" Detweiler, as in Leisure Suit
> Larry. (Sorry, Larry.)

Well, Dorothy Denning referred to "Larry Detwiler"'s comments on the
ITAR in the latest RISKS, which I don't have handy.  I always thought
it was Lance.

Could there be more than one? Is "tcmay" also posing as one of the L.
Detwilers? Are we being pseudospoofed? Maybe someone should call Dan
Rather.


-- 
Paul Robichaux, KD4JZG     | "Change the world for a better tomorrow. But
perobich@ingr.com          |  watch your ass today." - aaron@halcyon.com
Intergraph Federal Systems | Be a cryptography user- ask me how.





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: XXCLARK@indst.indstate.edu
Date: Mon, 18 Oct 93 13:47:24 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Breath of...
Message-ID: <9310182045.AA13401@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain




> From: smb@research.att.com
> Received: by gryphon; Mon Oct 18 14:02:02 EDT 1993
> To: cypherpunks@toad.com
> Subject: jrk@sys.uea.ac.uk (Richard Kennaway)
> Date: Mon, 18 Oct 93 14:02:01 EDT

> There's a persistent tendency on this list to confuse technical
> feasibility, political feasibility, and ultimate desirability...

        ... a breath of fresh air.

  ---------------------------------------------------------------------
  PGP key           internet      : xxclark@indst.indstate.edu
  by request.       Vanilla BITNET: XXCLARK@INDST
                           Plus 
e la change, plus c'est la mme chose.
  ---------------------------------------------------------------------




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Alexander Reynolds <chrome@jhunix.hcf.jhu.edu>
Date: Mon, 18 Oct 93 13:02:19 PDT
To: Kelly Goen <kelly@netcom.com>
Subject: Re: ENOUGH ALREADY!!!(Was Re: Gibson
In-Reply-To: <9310172117.AA26114@netcom.netcom.com>
Message-ID: <Pine.3.05.9310181552.A1150-b100000@jhunix.hcf.jhu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


On Sun, 17 Oct 1993, Kelly Goen wrote:

> Date: Sun, 17 Oct 1993 17:17:19 -0400
> From: Kelly Goen <kelly@netcom.com>
> To: chrome@jhunix.hcf.jhu.edu
> Cc: cypherpunks@toad.com
> Subject: ENOUGH ALREADY!!!(Was Re: Gibson
> 
>  Dear Sir,
> 
>           Without enrolling in yours and others discussion about
> anarcho/capital/social/ isms Ad Nauseam... would you mind
> taking this SOMPLACE ELSE... this discussion is NOT appropriate for the list
> WE have REAL issues and problems to address... Thanx in advance...
>     cheers
>     kelly
> -- 

I said this once, and I guess I'll have to enlighten those who were
ignorant enough not to read the first time around!

My first message ended something like this:  "how about multiple forms of
digital cash?  This removes a centralized monopolized bank as a form of
electronic power, i.e. the bank president could refuse digi-loans to those
elements of society he figured would usurp his(her?) bank's power."

Does this figure into the ideological framework of your newsgroup?  It
looked like, but if you still think that I am way out of line with that
comment, just drop a line and I'll have myself removed from the list.  OK?
 That's all for now, and please don't hesitate if something else like thi
bothers you!

-Sincerely pissed off at everyone who keeps sending me mail like this,

-Alex Reynolds






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: peb@PROCASE.COM (Paul Baclace)
Date: Mon, 18 Oct 93 16:02:21 PDT
To: smb@research.att.com
Subject: Re: jrk@sys.uea.ac.uk (Richard Kennaway)
Message-ID: <9310182300.AA03078@banff.procase.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



I share many of these same concerns.  Ultimately, it's an arms race.

One thing is clear: the ways around restrictions lower bandwidth.
Examples: steganography and covert channels are low-bandwidth.  By 
analogy, successive transfers of small amounts of money gets around
the reporting to the "Benevolent Caretaker" is also a lowering of 
bandwidth.

However, it should be remembered that authorities attempted to outlaw
the printing press after its invention.  I'm not sure how long that
lasted, but since the Soviet Union kept tabs on all copiers, in some
sense, such repression lasted a long time.  (And in the U.S., it has
been said that color copiers are tracked, but this sounds like a bluff
to me since a color scanner+color printer is sufficient to duplicate
that capability.  Is it possible to buy a color copier anonymously?) 

Given this, it *is* possible that freedom of expression is going to 
win eventually.  Anonymous digital cash is more likely to be compromised
since, as you note, even the Swiss have been pressured into opening up 
their records of anonymous bank accounts.


Paul E. Baclace
peb@procase.com

P.S.: Prodigy is not yet profitable, last I heard.  

``Is that a real network or is that a Sears network?'' --Frank Zappa paraphased.





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Philippe_D_Nave" <pdn@dwroll.dw.att.com>
Date: Mon, 18 Oct 93 16:07:21 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Coffee, anyone?
Message-ID: <9310182305.AA15900@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Hello, _real_ people and cypher-crypto-pseudo-spoofs!

I almost fell out of my chair laughing at the recent post revealing the
TRUE identities of half the people (I use that term guardedly these
days) in the mail group. It did me a world of good.

Try this on for a quick reality check- this is how I view the issue of 
anonymity, trust, reputation, validity, etc. in the Cypherpunk forum:
 
I see the list as a coffee house, buried in the bowels of a machine at
Berkeley. People wander in and out, some to chat, others to listen. There
is no implied social contract in place among the participants, really,
just some common interests. For the price of a cup of coffee (my time
and my connection to Internet), I can enjoy stimulating conversation
and shoot the breeze. When people present their ideas, I take their 
identities at face value (asking for ID's before making small talk seems
a bit gauche). Every now and then, a message in a bottle comes sailing
through the (open) door- the waiter pulls the message out and reads an
anonymous posting. Those so motivated can put replies in the bottle and
sling it back outside, where the anonymous poster picks it up. Truly
obnoxious messages can be answered by Molotov cocktails in the same
manner <grin>.

My point is this: we're in a coffee house, not a courtroom. If I meet
someone in a coffee house and want to do serious business like buying a
car, co-publishing a paper, or betting my career on a set of equations,
I (we) would adjourn to a somewhat more formal setting and follow
entirely different rules for establishing trust and reputation. In the
same vein, I might listen to a chorus of voices spouting political
agendas while sipping my coffee, but I wouldn't expect the applause
and the catcalls to be tabulated and published as election results. I
agree entirely with Detweiler about the importance of being able to
validate people electronically, but I think it would be a shame to close
the door to the coffee house, take attendance, and charge admission.
........................................................................
Philippe D. Nave, Jr.   | The person who does not use message encryption
pdn@dwroll.dw.att.com   | will soon be at the mercy of those who DO...
Denver, Colorado USA    | PGP public key: by arrangement.



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: peb@PROCASE.COM (Paul Baclace)
Date: Mon, 18 Oct 93 17:12:20 PDT
To: pmetzger@lehman.com
Subject: Re: jrk@sys.uea.ac.uk (Richard Kennaway)
Message-ID: <9310190009.AA03154@banff.procase.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



>Go to you local copier store. Pay cash. No one will care.

I'm talking about buying the color *copier* itself.  In all the
copier businesses I've seen, none of them allowed one to make 
color copies unattended.  Is this because they are complicated 
or expensive per copy or because of some kind of technology 
restriction (e.g., high quality color copies cannot simultaneously
be anonymous and private).


Paul E. Baclace
peb@procase.com





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: jrk@sys.uea.ac.uk (Richard Kennaway)
Date: Mon, 18 Oct 93 09:37:15 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Cypherwaffle on spoofing
Message-ID: <28946.9310181639@s5.sys.uea.ac.uk>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Arthur Chandler writes:
>  What I find odd is the number and  vehemence of posts ON A LIST DEVOTED 
>TO ENCRYPTION saying "Hey, it's a  fact of life, accept it" -- even  
>dragging out Machiavelli's profoundly  mistaken "if you can't enforce 
>it,  don't prohibit it."

"It's a fact of life" is a fact central to the, ahem, cypherpunk cause.
Virtual personas are here.  The only question is how this will change the
way people deal with each other over the net.

>Of all the groups  on the Internet, I would 
>think that  this one would be in a special position to say "put your 
>digital John Hancock on your post if you want to to taken seriously."

That is one possibility: people start signing posts with IDs that
verifiably mean something over a wider range of net and RL spaces than just
a single small world like cypherpunks@com.toad.  Personas which consist
only of postings here might come to be taken less seriously, even if their
content appears useful and constructive.

I do not see what authoritarian action is needed, desirable, or practical. 
I would rather see a consensus emerge over how to behave in this new
environment.

I notice you didn't sign your post.  Can I conclude that you do not want it
to be taken seriously?

--                                  ____
Richard Kennaway                  __\_ /    School of Information Systems
Internet:  jrk@sys.uea.ac.uk      \  X/     University of East Anglia
uucp:  ...mcsun!ukc!uea-sys!jrk    \/       Norwich NR4 7TJ, U.K.






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: an41418@anon.penet.fi (wonderer)
Date: Mon, 18 Oct 93 10:57:16 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: on anonymity, identity, reputation, and spoofing
Message-ID: <9310181752.AA07689@anon.penet.fi>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I believe it is very valuable to have an anonymous
identity that nobody can associate with your
actual one. 

Besides asking embarsassing newbie questions (which I will
become more and more famous for), I am learning a lot about
what it means to build up an anonymous reputation. I have
posted to a few other newsgroups as well, and I am having
dialogues with people through e-mail. I feel as though I
have a real identity.

My actual identity also has reasons for not wanting to
appear on this mailing list. 

I wonder if I am catching some strain of multiple
personality disorder...

Wonderer
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
To find out more about the anon service, send mail to help@anon.penet.fi.
Due to the double-blind, any mail replies to this message will be anonymized,
and an anonymous id will be allocated automatically. You have been warned.
Please report any problems, inappropriate use etc. to admin@anon.penet.fi.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: catalyst-remailer@netcom.com
Date: Mon, 18 Oct 93 18:07:24 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Crypto Anarchy (jrk@...)
Message-ID: <9310190102.AA12700@mail.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


smb@research.att.com wrote:

>Do you want an example?  Here's how to shut down an anonymous remailer.
>First, find a name for a host that no longer exists.  Send a note through
>the remailer to someone putatively on that host, making it appear like
>a stolen account (bin@foo.bar.edu, or some such).  The mail should appear
>to discuss criminal activity, and be signed with a name from the proper
>ethnic group.  The message will be queued forever, of course, and will
>likely be stored on the backup tapes for the mail spool directory.  Next,
>send a message through the remailer to president@whitehouse.gov, threatening
>the president.  Poof -- the Secret Service *will* come investigating
>(those guys have no sense of humor).  They may or may not believe that
>the planted note is genuine.  But they will approach the appropriate dean
>to demand that this tool of criminal activity be shut down.

Well, this apocraphyl scene is easily avoided - remailers can be
configured to refuse remailing to whitehouse.gov.

But then this is the Secret Service.  Are they more likely to
a) seize all equipment peripherally related and a bunch that isn't
b) inquire about having anonymous mail blocked

Undoubtedly we could launch into a discussion of why it is anybody
with a pocket full of change can walk up to a payphone and leave a
variety of threats at the whitehouse switchboard - the phone
company need not fear having its equipment seized, while a computer
used in forwarding mail containing the same threats will probably be
taken along with anything else the SS feels like taking.

>Quick -- how many remailers have the support of the university?  How many
>boards of trustees -- at state universities, often linked to the government
>-- will back them, if the Secret Service ``requests'' that they be shut
>down.

Gee, I don't know.  Does the phone company have any government deals,
say to manufacture products using a government designed chip, that may
be at risk if its found out that phone company equipment is constantly
being used for threats??

The point is we are in a research & development stage (if you will)
with anonymous remailers, reputations, filters, digital cash, dc-nets,
etc.  It is very likely that the projected reality, desired reality,
and actual reality will be quite different; nevertheless,
experimentation continues.






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: owen@autodesk.com (D. Owen Rowley)
Date: Mon, 18 Oct 93 18:12:21 PDT
To: hfinney@shell.portal.com
Subject: Re: your mail Re: on anonymity, identity, reputation, and spoofing
Message-ID: <9310190105.AA23713@lux.YP.acad>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


 > Subject: Re: on anonymity, identity, reputation, and spoofing
 > From: hfinney@shell.portal.com
 > Comments: Ignore the comment above.
 > Content-Length: 2979
 > X-Lines: 55

 > I do sympathize with L. Detweiler's concern about multiple identities.
 > Human nature being what it is, 

Considering that human nature allows for pathological behavior in some 
individuals, and that anonymity seemingly decreases the potential for
being held acountable for pathological behavior, I think it follows that 
it would be unwise NOT to be concerned.

 > if a series of posts appears quickly taking
 > one view, people who disagree may think, well, I guess I'm in the minority
 > on this, I won't make a stink about it.  That's just part of the herd
 > instinct, which, IMO, we all share.  The lesson is that it is even more
 > important on the net not to be afraid to take unpopular stands.  You may
 > find that there are more people who agree with you than you thought.

You may also find that such gentile methodology as attempting to sway
opinion or unfairly weight ones opinion in order to alter the 
flow of disscussion are the least you can expect.

I bet that clever sociopaths will find ways to leverage anonymity
schemes to accomplish mayhem of magnitude well beyond these sort of things.

believe me, you don't want to find out by being subjected to such mayhem, 
and if it happens you will be much harder pressed to come up with ways
to patch things than if you take time to try and deal with it now.
 
 > There are some possible technological solutions to some of the issues
 > raised.  Chaum, in his 1985 CACM paper, describes how "credentials" can
 > be exchanged among various pseudonyms a person may have.  A credential
 > can basically be any statement by a 3rd party about a person.  It could
 > be a statement by a college that he had a certain degree.  It could be
 > a statement by a government that he had a driver's license.  It could be
 > a statement by a business that he was an agent for that business.

How about *credentials* that certify the capabilities or flag the 
potential dangers of a binary object.
Aren't there schemes out there that hold promise for that sort of
*trustworthiness* stamp of approval?
Aren't such schemes prone to the potential of cliquish abuse?

 > The credential would be given to the person, then Chaum shows how it
 > could be re-blinded and shown under other pseudonyms.  The credential
 > can be verified, but it can't be linked to the True Name or other pseudonyms
 > of the holder.

what are you credentialing? that someone *should* know what they are 
talking about? even so it would not preclude being burned, psychopaths
tend to be very clever?

 > We could think about using something like this for reputations.  Take
 > Nick's question about how a new pseudonym could get through the filters.
 > Maybe the person posts under his real name for a while, then some respected
 > person is willing to give him a "valued poster" credential.  He can
 > re-blind this credential and submit it with posts he starts to make under
 > his pseudonym.  People will know that the pseudonymous poster is at least
 > potentially capable of making sense, and give his words some weight.  But
 > there will be no connection to his True Name.

why not just build your reputation as the psuedo right from the start?

 > (Of course, this could lead occasionally to a Dr. Jekyll who makes
 > sensible and weighty posts under his own name, while under his Mr. Hyde
 > pseudonym he rants and raves.  But hopefully this would not happen too
 > often.)

Oh, I don't know anybody who does that sort of thing! :-)
do you ?

 > Other credentials could be related to some of the other points Detweiler
 > raised, such as list membership > some number of months.  The point would
 > be that these credentials are voluntary, used to get past people's filters,
 > and that they retain poster anonymity while giving readers useful information
 > about the poster.

If all you'r talking about is mail-list or newsgroup membership, why not just
have testing and stringent membership requirements?

 > It's ironic that L. Detweiler, who has played a major part in spreading
 > awareness of Cypherpunks technology through his widely read Privacy and
 > Anonymity FAQ, is suggesting that people should be limited in their
 > use of this technology.  Still, the concerns he raises are going to be
 > shared by many people, and we should try to be ready with technological
 > solutions that are consistent with privacy protection.

exactly.
I don't think it's ironic, I will be disapointed if the cypher-head
community doesn't pay attention to the disphoric aspects of the 
technology it wields. Would you like to be the Edward Teller of cypher ?

I don't think so.

I want privacy too, and I want as much free-wheeling as possible in the
matrix. Personally I think that accountability is going to be required
as the price for reasonably secure encryption, reasonably open access,
and reasonably secure privacy of data. 
IMNSHO, it is unreasonable to expect an anarcho-libertarian outcome to
these issues. If you can prove me wrong I will be thrilled.

The other thing that I am a bit surprized about is the relatively tight
focus in this group regarding text.

It seems to me that multimedia extensions have an *unfolding of the lotus*
like effect upon the issues involved.
I also see very little regarding potential for breaking the mind machine
link, or biologic interfaces?

core technologies are important, but an eye on the future is just as important.


LUX ./. owen






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: plaz@netcom.com (Geoff Dale)
Date: Mon, 18 Oct 93 18:12:19 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Introducing digital cash in a MOO, Metaverse
Message-ID: <9310190111.AA09519@netcom.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


sameer@netcom.com (Sameer Parekh):
>        I was thinking that metaverse.io.com would be an interesting
>ground to implement digital cash, because this MOO seems like a very
>commercial-oriented system. I know that Fringe Ware, Inc. has set up
>an office in the MOO where once it's up and running will serve
>people's requests for information.

I have been poking around in Metaverse this last week, (under the handle of
"PlasticBeethoven"). I think you are very right about this. They have a
whole area reserved for *REAL* business, called Freegate. WIRED, EFF,
Fringeware, BoingBoing, and of courese Steve Jackson Games all have virtual
offices there. In most cases the offices are just shadows of what they
could be. I'm also considering setting up an office there (details may
follow once I get it set up).

A hobby store has also set up shop, and will allow you to order from them.
Billing, alas, is done the old fashioned way.

I've noted, that there seems to be a vague interest in dealing with these
issues, if it does not represent a tremendous investment of time for them.

Also note that Doug Barnes (metaverse: CoffeeMan) and Lloyd Blankenship
(metaverse: Mentor), who are both "Wizards", also frequent this list. They
are also the very same Austin-Cypherpunks featured in the "Bank of the
Internet" thread about Internet Credit Unions. Looks like a possible
convergence.

>        Paco, in his article on Metaverse in the new Fringe Ware
>Review, talks about how small start up companies can get offices in
>metaverse, if they can't afford (like apple) an ftp site to serve
>their customers.
>        This might be extended to an actual *commerce* system. Someone
>could lease a plot of MOO-space, set up a digital bank, issue bank
>notes, and users could use these digicash notes to purchase products
>at the offices of small companies located in the Metaverse.
>        Because io.com is a commercial system, it might actually not
>be that tough to implement a us-dollars-backed system. I.e.: a
>digibank would take actual DOLLARS from users, give them digicash
>notes, and users can use the notes to make transactions in MOOspace,
>and vendors and users alike may redeem their digicash for us-standard
>cash.
>        In order to deal with the legal issues associated, it might be
>easiest for io.com to actually run the digibank, but not necessary.
>Personally, I'd prefer a digibank run by a third-party, but I have no
>real problem with io.com running the thing.
>        It certainly seems promising.

Well they already have credit card numbers for most of they're users, they
could do something like Compuserve's MALL and just set up a system were
they bill through connect fees. (At least that's how I thought CI$'s system
worked. I haven't used it much.)

State banking regulations might prohibit the creation of a bank in the
metaverse, if thier customers are all over the world.

My $.02, as citizen of the Metaverse.

_______________________________________________________________________
Geoff Dale    -- insert standard disclaimers here --    plaz@netcom.com
               "We are the shock troops of reality."
                - Voice of the Friends (Wild Palms)






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: ferguson@icm1.icp.net (Paul Ferguson x2044)
Date: Mon, 18 Oct 93 15:12:30 PDT
To: perobich@ingr.com
Subject: Dan Rather, et al. (WAS: Leisure Suit Larry)
In-Reply-To: <199310182026.AA12159@poboy.b17c.ingr.com>
Message-ID: <9310182312.AA02437@icm1.icp.net>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text



> > Uh, its not "Lance," its "Larry" Detweiler, as in Leisure Suit
> > Larry. (Sorry, Larry.)
> 
> Well, Dorothy Denning referred to "Larry Detwiler"'s comments on the
> ITAR in the latest RISKS, which I don't have handy.  I always thought
> it was Lance.
> 
> Could there be more than one? Is "tcmay" also posing as one of the L.
> Detwilers? Are we being pseudospoofed? Maybe someone should call Dan
> Rather.

I've been sitting back, watching the signal-to-noise on the list
fluctuate with a smidgeon of a grin on my face.
 
"Pay no attention to the man behind the curtain!"

Personally, I think that the list is just going through a few minor 
changes, the worst of which are new people checking into "something that 
they had heard about."

Face it -- the net grows a bit more "open" every day.

As far as Dan Rather goes, I'd bet he wouldn't even understand.

,-)

Cheers,

_____________________________________________________________________________
Paul Ferguson                                                               
Mindbank Consulting Group                                    fergp@sytex.com   
Fairfax, Virginia  USA                                       ferguson@icp.net



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: nate@VIS.ColoState.EDU
Date: Mon, 18 Oct 93 17:47:19 PDT
To: ferguson@icm1.icp.net (Paul Ferguson x2044)
Subject: Re: Dan Rather, et al. (WAS: Leisure Suit Larry)
In-Reply-To: <9310182312.AA02437@icm1.icp.net>
Message-ID: <9310190043.AA00862@seurat.VIS.ColoState.EDU>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text


writes Paul Ferguson x2044:
>
>Personally, I think that the list is just going through a few minor 
>changes, the worst of which are new people checking into "something that 
>they had heard about."
>
>Face it -- the net grows a bit more "open" every day.
>

The WIRED article helped with this, I am sure... there's a LOT of kids out
there on the net who just post to things for the hell of it, and seeing
refs in magazine like WIRED certainly helps!

-nate

+-----------------------------------------------------------------------+
| Nate Sammons   email: nate@VIS.ColoState.Edu
|   Colorado State University Computer Visualization Laboratory
|   Finger nate@monet.VIS.ColoState.Edu for my PGP key
|   #include <std.disclaimer>
|   Title 18 USC 2511 and 18 USC 2703 Protected --> Monitoring Forbidden
+--------+                          Always remember "Brazil"



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: peter honeyman <honey@citi.umich.edu>
Date: Mon, 18 Oct 93 15:52:21 PDT
To: ferguson@icm1.icp.net
Subject: Re:  Dan Rather, et al. (WAS: Leisure Suit Larry)
Message-ID: <9310182251.AA15673@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> As far as Dan Rather goes, I'd bet he wouldn't even understand.

kenneth, what is the frequency?!?

	peter




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: ferguson@icm1.icp.net (Paul Ferguson x2044)
Date: Mon, 18 Oct 93 16:22:20 PDT
To: hfinney@shell.portal.com
Subject: A valid, practical point
In-Reply-To: <9310181620.AA17894@alumni.cco.caltech.edu>
Message-ID: <9310190022.AA02744@icm1.icp.net>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text


Hal writes -

> It's ironic that L. Detweiler, who has played a major part in spreading
> awareness of Cypherpunks technology through his widely read Privacy and
> Anonymity FAQ, is suggesting that people should be limited in their
> use of this technology.  Still, the concerns he raises are going to be
> shared by many people, and we should try to be ready with technological
> solutions that are consistent with privacy protection.

.... And THAT is perhaps the most cognizant, practical and lucid
suggestion I have heard to date (not as an aside to those who have
proposed technical solutions, et al).

Let's face it -- the net will do nothing less than become larger, more
accessible, more complex and even easier to spoof, if a cryptographic
stop-gap does not materialize which provides a comfortable buffer for
those desire anonymity and those who are afraid of it.

We can do more than bicker amongst ourselves, cypherzoids.

_____________________________________________________________________________
Paul Ferguson                                                               
Mindbank Consulting Group                                    fergp@sytex.com   
Fairfax, Virginia  USA                                       ferguson@icp.net



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Perry E. Metzger" <pmetzger@lehman.com>
Date: Mon, 18 Oct 93 16:27:21 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: jrk@sys.uea.ac.uk (Richard Kennaway)
In-Reply-To: <9310182300.AA03078@banff.procase.com>
Message-ID: <9310182324.AA03908@snark.lehman.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Paul Baclace says:
> However, it should be remembered that authorities attempted to outlaw
> the printing press after its invention.  I'm not sure how long that
> lasted, but since the Soviet Union kept tabs on all copiers, in some
> sense, such repression lasted a long time.  (And in the U.S., it has
> been said that color copiers are tracked, but this sounds like a bluff
> to me since a color scanner+color printer is sufficient to duplicate
> that capability.  Is it possible to buy a color copier anonymously?) 

Go to you local copier store. Pay cash. No one will care.

> Anonymous digital cash is more likely to be compromised
> since, as you note, even the Swiss have been pressured into opening up 
> their records of anonymous bank accounts.

Others have not.

Perry




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: jamie@netcom.com (Jamie Dinkelacker)
Date: Mon, 18 Oct 93 20:07:20 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Shockwave Rider ( True Names, Enders Game, Islands In The Net)
Message-ID: <9310190303.AA07520@netcom.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Brunner's _The Shockwave Rider_ is also recommended readings, especially
for those most concerned with nyms, access rights/abilities and the net.
--
................................
Jamie Dinkelacker   Palo Alto CA 
Jamie@netcom.com    415.941.4782    





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: jamie@netcom.com (Jamie Dinkelacker)
Date: Mon, 18 Oct 93 20:07:25 PDT
To: Cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Nickname Nyms
Message-ID: <9310190303.AA07533@netcom.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Cypherpunks,

Pseudonyms are an everyday occurrence. The net just takes these things a
step further. At present, this is a quantitative, not necessarily
qualitative, distinction.

Many of us have nicknames; some easily derived from True Names (Jim from
James) others not so easily derived (Peggy from Margaret).

Many athletes have field nicknames, often which change every season, that
enable person to person communication on the field of play due to
familiarity of calling voice and nym. Opponents (often last year's former
teammates) don't know the nym and their chatter used to spoof ("Jamie, on
your right!) when the ball is actually on your left is easily filtered.

Performers often use nyms because they have a certain cachet: Rock Hudson,
Englebert Humperdink, Elton John. Writers use pen names.

Reputations are built around some of these names. Communication immediacy
works in other instances. And, pseudonymity allows others to go into malls
without being mobbed (e.g., well known radio personalities). 

Three cheers for Zachary Fox and the First Extropian Squirrel.  Nyms are
part of day to day discourse.

--
................................
Jamie Dinkelacker   Palo Alto CA  (almost a true name)
Jamie@netcom.com    415.941.4782    







From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: doug@netcom.com (Doug Merritt)
Date: Mon, 18 Oct 93 20:17:20 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: "True Names" and "Ender's Game" (was: Cypherwaffle...)
Message-ID: <9310190313.AA26304@netcom6.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May) said:
>Anyway, I strongly recommend both "True Names" and "Ender's Game."

I second that. Not only are they aropos, they are also some of the
better stories by those two excellent authors.
	Doug




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Perry E. Metzger" <pmetzger@lehman.com>
Date: Mon, 18 Oct 93 17:37:20 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: jrk@sys.uea.ac.uk (Richard Kennaway)
In-Reply-To: <9310190009.AA03154@banff.procase.com>
Message-ID: <9310190032.AA03963@snark.lehman.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Paul Baclace says:
> 
> >Go to you local copier store. Pay cash. No one will care.
> 
> I'm talking about buying the color *copier* itself.

So am I. Some of the low end units are only $5000-$7000.

People pay cash for things that expensive all the time. Its really not
such a big deal.

Perry




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Edward J OConnell <ejo@world.std.com>
Date: Mon, 18 Oct 93 18:07:19 PDT
To: "Perry E. Metzger" <pmetzger@lehman.com>
Subject: Re: jrk@sys.uea.ac.uk (Richard Kennaway)
In-Reply-To: <9310190032.AA03963@snark.lehman.com>
Message-ID: <Pine.3.07.9310182007.A5117-b100000@world.std.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I work at a graphic arts service bureau, and someone told me that they had
seen a canon representative, with a straight face, say at a trade show
that there was a chip in these machines that detected the pattern created
by currency, and blocked out the image. 

Easy to test. Of course, not true--at least, not the canon clc 300 I run.

The control panel of the canon has a list of things you are not supposed to
copy. That is the extent of the restriction. For some obscure reason I
follow these rules. I'm not sure why.

The chip thing made me laugh. What is amazing to me is that canon would
try to create this easily disprovable myth. Has anyone else heard this
story? My friend was adamant that he had heard this spiel (and not a
friend of his) but I suppose this could itself be an urban myth. 

I suppose I could call canon...but attracting that kind of attention to
myself seems really stupid...

E. Jay O'Connell____________________________________________________
"God does not play dice with the Universe"--A Einstein
"No, she plays SuperScratch-Card Wingo (TM)"--Me.
____________________________________________________________________
Information Wants to Be Free      PGP Public Key available by Finger







From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: cman@IO.COM (Douglas Barnes)
Date: Mon, 18 Oct 93 19:22:18 PDT
To: plaz@netcom.com (Geoff Dale)
Subject: Re: Introducing digital cash in a MOO, Metaverse
In-Reply-To: <9310190111.AA09519@netcom.netcom.com>
Message-ID: <9310190218.AA02522@illuminati.IO.COM>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Geoff writes:
> I have been poking around in Metaverse this last week, (under the handle of
> "PlasticBeethoven"). I think you are very right about this. They have a
> whole area reserved for *REAL* business, called Freegate. WIRED, EFF,
> Fringeware, BoingBoing, and of courese Steve Jackson Games all have virtual
> offices there. In most cases the offices are just shadows of what they
> could be. I'm also considering setting up an office there (details may
> follow once I get it set up).

Note that while we are technically 'open for business', we are the first
ones to admit we have a ways to go before we are 100% ready for prime
time.

> 
> A hobby store has also set up shop, and will allow you to order from them.
> Billing, alas, is done the old fashioned way.

This will change as better tools emerge. This is the plan.

> 
> I've noted, that there seems to be a vague interest in dealing with these
> issues, if it does not represent a tremendous investment of time for them.

The interest is considerably more than vague; we're hesitant to commit
to it or hype it while we're sorting out more fundamental issues. 
 
> Also note that Doug Barnes (metaverse: CoffeeMan) and Lloyd Blankenship
> (metaverse: Mentor), who are both "Wizards", also frequent this list. They
> are also the very same Austin-Cypherpunks featured in the "Bank of the
> Internet" thread about Internet Credit Unions. Looks like a possible
> convergence.

Imagine that... :-)

> Well they already have credit card numbers for most of they're users, they
> could do something like Compuserve's MALL and just set up a system were
> they bill through connect fees. (At least that's how I thought CI$'s system
> worked. I haven't used it much.)

We will (obvoiusly) be working very closely with the attempt to set up
the Digital Credit Unions, and will (obviously) be one of the first 
vendors to be able to process electronic checks written in the MOO etc.
Certainly various kinds of anonymous 'tokens' will be available as well, 
which could become a medium of exchange (although it is unclear at 
present whether these will be redeemable for cash).

Most of these things have been in the plan from the beginning; things
will be announced as they happen, and hopefully not too much before.

-- 
----------------                                             /\ 
Douglas Barnes            cman@illuminati.io.com            /  \ 
Chief Wizard         (512) 448-8950 (d), 447-7866 (v)      / () \
Illuminati Online          metaverse.io.com 7777          /______\



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: rjc@gnu.ai.mit.edu (Ray)
Date: Mon, 18 Oct 93 18:52:21 PDT
To: owen@autodesk.com (D. Owen Rowley)
Subject: Re: your mail Re: on anonymity, identity, reputation, and spoofing
In-Reply-To: <9310190105.AA23713@lux.YP.acad>
Message-ID: <9310190147.AA24417@geech.gnu.ai.mit.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


D. Owen Rowley () writes:
> I want privacy too, and I want as much free-wheeling as possible in the
> matrix. Personally I think that accountability is going to be required
> as the price for reasonably secure encryption, reasonably open access,
> and reasonably secure privacy of data. 

   Why should it be? Reasonably secure encryption, reasonably
open access, and reasonably secure privacy of data can all be
implemented without accountability. (I refer you to Public Key
cryptography, DC/Mix nets, and secret sharing) Perhaps in practice,
the majority of people will refuse to participate in such a network but
that does not stop crackers/pirates from using one. Crackers routinely
dick each other over because of lack of accountability, but the trade off
(getting free software/phone access) is better than (getting busted)

   Do you think I am accountable? If I didn't put my real name in my
sig you'd never be able figure out who I really am. Not even gnu, who
graciously allows me use of their machines, has my real address or phone.
The annex port that I log in on is set up incorectly allowing me to 
telnet anywhere without needing to use my student account (and thus not
linking rjc@ to my college where my really private info resides)

   rjc@ is simply my pseudonym. I could be Bill Clinton and you
wouldn't know, so why worry about it? What keeps me in line in the
reputation linked to rjc@ which I have spent a long time building up.
Acting like an asshole and choosing a new account name would waste a lot
energy that I put into posting these years.

   If you consider a BlackNet in terms of Interated Prisoner's Dilemma, it
makes sense that the good guys will outnumber the bad with a minority of
jerks (who can be controlled with intelligent filtering software)

> IMNSHO, it is unreasonable to expect an anarcho-libertarian outcome to
> these issues. If you can prove me wrong I will be thrilled.

  You made the assertion, the proof is up to you.

-- Ray Cromwell        |    Engineering is the implementation of science;    --
-- EE/Math Student     |       politics is the implementation of faith.      --
-- rjc@gnu.ai.mit.edu  |                         - Zetetic Commentaries      --




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Date: Mon, 18 Oct 93 21:52:22 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: backing?
In-Reply-To: <9310190423.AA07858@uc1.ucsu.edu>
Message-ID: <9310190450.AA03867@netcom5.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Stuart Card writes:

> I propose a simple basis for digicash: gold.
> REAL gold in a depositary, for which the digicash is
> basically a warehouse receipt.  Try this:
> 
> Alice purchases 10 ounces of gold and puts it in Bob the Banker's
> account at a depositary institution (like the big one in Zurich
> that holds much of the world's physical gold).  When she makes
> the deposit, she annotates the transaction with an encrypted
> message to Bob saying "This deposit from <long random number>."
> Alice then logs into Bob's public access system with a pseudonymous
> account (automatically generated by Bob's hacked login software).
> Alice sends another message to Bob saying "Hey, that deposit you
> got from <long randome number> was from me: pseudonym."
> Bob issues digicash to <pseudonym> (not knowing this is Alice),
> and Alice happily spends the money under a DIFFERENT pseudonym.
> 
> OK, fire away, my head is down :-)

Some points:

* When Alice deposits the gold, the many television cameras in the
Zurich bank take many pictures of her. When she later dials in and
uses the pseudonym "Clara," the bank can associate Clara with the
images (and other True Names data). Little is gained. None of the
"blinding" which is so elegant in Chaum's work (and recently described
by Hal Finney).

* The role of *gold* is tangential and secondary. Any stable currency
would suffice, and in fact gold bullion would be no more desirable
than yen or Deutschmarks.

* Also, how does this solve the problems of digital money (double
spending, transferrability, etc.) we've been talking about? After all,
there are still banks which allow "numbered" accounts (in
Lichtenstein, I hear), so this level of anonymity stil exists. And
where banking laws don't allow such numbered accounts, they likely
won't allow "gold bullion anonymous accounts."

* However, I have heard--as Stuart Card may have also--that "warehouse
receipts" could form the basis of a new type of bank. I don't know
anything beyond this, so maybe this idea could be developed.

--Tim May


-- 
..........................................................................
Timothy C. May         | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,  
tcmay@netcom.com       | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
408-688-5409           | knowledge, reputations, information markets, 
W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA  | black markets, collapse of governments.
Higher Power: 2^756839 | Public Key: PGP and MailSafe available.
Note: I put time and money into writing this posting. I hope you enjoy it.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: plaz@netcom.com (Geoff Dale)
Date: Mon, 18 Oct 93 22:02:21 PDT
To: Cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Cypherwaffle on spoofing
Message-ID: <9310190458.AA18671@netcom.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


-----BEGIN UNSIGNED MESSAGE-----
>  I understand Detweiller's frustration. On another list, someone posted 
>as if he/she were William Gibson. That kind of fraud undermines 
>confidence on several levels. It attempts to dupe us, and usurps the name 
>and reputation of a well-known writer, and sets up an atmosphere of 
>suspicion and doubt fatal to any community. 
>  How would you like it if someone spoofmailed  to this list under your 
>name, then published Nazi slogans and argued for the legalization of rape? 
>  What I find odd is the number and  vehemence of posts ON A LIST DEVOTED 
>TO ENCRYPTION saying "Hey, it's a  fact of life, accept it" -- even  
>dragging out Machiavelli's profoundly  mistaken "if you can't enforce 
>it,  don't prohibit it." Of all the groups  on the Internet, I would 
>think that  this one would be in a special position to say "put your 
>digital John Hancock on your post if you want to to taken seriously."

So where's your John Hancock? Put your money where your mouth is.

Anyone is free to delete unsigned messages, and many people do sign thier
messages, but cypherpunks is an informal mailing list. Why require silly
rules like this?

Over on Extropians this is called spontanious order. If you think something
is important, starting doing it, and encourage other people to do it. If
it's really as important as you think it is, it'll spread and become a
dominant meme. If it's useless drivel, it will be ignored.
-----END UNSIGNED MESSAGE-----

_______________________________________________________________________
Geoff Dale    -- insert standard disclaimers here --    plaz@netcom.com
               "We are the shock troops of reality."
                - Voice of the Friends (Wild Palms)






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: rjc@gnu.ai.mit.edu (Ray)
Date: Mon, 18 Oct 93 19:02:20 PDT
To: chrome@jhunix.hcf.jhu.edu (Alexander Reynolds)
Subject: Re: ENOUGH ALREADY!!!(Was Re: Gibson
In-Reply-To: <Pine.3.05.9310181552.A1150-b100000@jhunix.hcf.jhu.edu>
Message-ID: <9310190159.AA24469@geech.gnu.ai.mit.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Alexander Reynolds () writes:
> My first message ended something like this:  "how about multiple forms of
> digital cash?  This removes a centralized monopolized bank as a form of
> electronic power, i.e. the bank president could refuse digi-loans to those
> elements of society he figured would usurp his(her?) bank's power."

   Sounds good but money isn't fiction. If there's nothing of value backing
these "multiple forms of digital cash" you will still need to go to the
evil nasty bank president. Otherwise, it's just monopoly money.

   That's what the bank of the internet proposes to do (provide
digicash with backing). I doubt real banks would bother with digicash
anyway since they like having financial data on you.  The cost of
implementing such a system for the bank would be far more expensive
than the benefit received by the few customers who appreciate privacy.

   An enterprising credit card company might chance it sooner or later.

-- Ray Cromwell        |    Engineering is the implementation of science;    --
-- EE/Math Student     |       politics is the implementation of faith.      --
-- rjc@gnu.ai.mit.edu  |                         - Zetetic Commentaries      --




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Sandy <72114.1712@CompuServe.COM>
Date: Mon, 18 Oct 93 21:22:21 PDT
To: <cypherpunks@toad.com>
Subject: MORE PUBLICITY
Message-ID: <931019020707_72114.1712_FHF140-1@CompuServe.COM>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
  SANDY SANDFORT               Reply to:  ssandfort@attmail.com
 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Punksters,

A friend of mine gave me a copy of a newsletter called "Gary
North's REMNANT REVIEW."  It bills itself as "explicitly
Christian and pro-free market in perspective."

This issue covered the bad news:  the Waco Massacre cover-up,
mysterious death of White House attorney, Vince Foster and the
Randy Weaver case.

It also covered the good news:  Crypto Anarchy(!)  The article
was based on Kevin Kelly's piece in the "Whole Earth Review."
North paraphrased Tim May extensively and was very impressed with
the whole concept.  It was quite a valentine to Cypherpunks.  For
subscription information, call (800) 528-0559 (or -0550, it's
hard to read my copy).  I'll bring a photocopy to the SF meeting
in November.

 S a n d y

>>>>>>    Please send e-mail to:  ssandfort@attmail.com    <<<<<<
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Alexander Reynolds <chrome@jhunix.hcf.jhu.edu>
Date: Mon, 18 Oct 93 19:27:19 PDT
To: Ray <rjc@gnu.ai.mit.edu>
Subject: backing?
In-Reply-To: <9310190159.AA24469@geech.gnu.ai.mit.edu>
Message-ID: <Pine.3.05.9310182227.B12737-a100000@jhunix.hcf.jhu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> Alexander Reynolds () writes:
> > My first message ended something like this:  "how about multiple forms of
> > digital cash?  This removes a centralized monopolized bank as a form of
> > electronic power, i.e. the bank president could refuse digi-loans to those
> > elements of society he figured would usurp his(her?) bank's power."
> 
>    Sounds good but money isn't fiction. If there's nothing of value backing
> these "multiple forms of digital cash" you will still need to go to the
> evil nasty bank president. Otherwise, it's just monopoly money.
> 
>    That's what the bank of the internet proposes to do (provide
> digicash with backing). I doubt real banks would bother with digicash

	So what would back digicash?  A promise to pay?  That is all I can
see at the moment, other than the physical force of a government, which
would give digicash its worth, and somehow, human nature being what it is,
I doubt that would be a strong foundation for a digital economy.






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: doug@netcom.com (Doug Merritt)
Date: Mon, 18 Oct 93 22:32:23 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: backing?
Message-ID: <9310190531.AA07250@netcom6.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May) said:
>* The role of *gold* is tangential and secondary. Any stable currency
>would suffice, and in fact gold bullion would be no more desirable
>than yen or Deutschmarks.

You are a modern person in this thinking. Not all are. The uncoupling of
the U.S. dollar from a government-specified gold standard in the 1970's
is *still* a controversial issue with some people (not all of whom are
idiots, by the way, although I personally with disagree with 95% of them).

It is practically a truism that bull markets bring out modern thinking
about currency and that bear markets bring out gold-standard thinking
about currency.

Low-margin speculators regularly make money by predicting that kind of
psychological reaction alone. (The "low-margin" qualifier is a short-hand
to say that "no, *you* can't count on making money that way." :-) I assume
that some will disagree that *anyone* makes money that way, but that's not
really my point.

My point is, for digital currency, it makes sense to model non-digital
forms. There will be times that people feel insecure and believe (for
whatever reason) that gold-backed digital currency is the way to go.

Other people in other times won't be interested in gold-backed digital
currency, and that brings up different algorithms.

The psychology of the market (past, present and future) seems to me to
say that one shouldn't consider algorithms of only one form.

Anyone for digital currency mutual funds? :-)
	Doug




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Perry E. Metzger" <pmetzger@lehman.com>
Date: Mon, 18 Oct 93 19:37:19 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Crypto Anarchy (jrk@...)
In-Reply-To: <9310190102.AA12700@mail.netcom.com>
Message-ID: <9310190235.AA04079@snark.lehman.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



catalyst-remailer@netcom.com says:
> Well, this apocraphyl scene is easily avoided

Its "apocryphal".

I've finally figured out why all these people insist on posting
anonymously. They can't spell.

Perry




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Jeremy Smith <jersmit@eis.calstate.edu>
Date: Tue, 19 Oct 93 00:12:23 PDT
To: Cypherpunks <cypherpunks@toad.com>
Subject: IRC Servers
Message-ID: <Pine.3.07.9310190005.A4960-a100000@eis.calstate.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



	As a relative newbie to the Net, I have tried in vain to find an
IRC serve that is up and running.  Are there any current IRC servers that
I could telnet to?  Bradenville.andrew.cmu.edu does not exist and neither
does santefe.santafe.edu.  Those two were given to me as was 131.130.39.27
6668.  However, that site does not seem to respond to any login attempts.
	Frustrated, I turn to the Cypherpunks for help...

 -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
                Jeremy Smith -*jersmit@eis.calstate.edu*-
          My views are my own and nobody else can have them!
 -----------------------------------------------------------------------------






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: swc@uc1.ucsu.edu (Stuart W. Card)
Date: Mon, 18 Oct 93 21:22:23 PDT
To: rjc@gnu.ai.mit.edu
Subject: Re: backing?
Message-ID: <9310190423.AA07858@uc1.ucsu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I propose a simple basis for digicash: gold.
REAL gold in a depositary, for which the digicash is
basically a warehouse receipt.  Try this:

Alice purchases 10 ounces of gold and puts it in Bob the Banker's
account at a depositary institution (like the big one in Zurich
that holds much of the world's physical gold).  When she makes
the deposit, she annotates the transaction with an encrypted
message to Bob saying "This deposit from <long random number>."
Alice then logs into Bob's public access system with a pseudonymous
account (automatically generated by Bob's hacked login software).
Alice sends another message to Bob saying "Hey, that deposit you
got from <long randome number> was from me: pseudonym."
Bob issues digicash to <pseudonym> (not knowing this is Alice),
and Alice happily spends the money under a DIFFERENT pseudonym.

OK, fire away, my head is down :-)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Stuart W. Card, Consultant, Card & Associates -- Research & Development
Box 153 RR 1 Newport Rd Utica NY 13502         315-735-1717 / FAX -8469
swc@uc1.ucsu.edu or cards@top.cis.syr.edu           "Who is John Galt?"




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: XXCLARK@indst.indstate.edu
Date: Mon, 18 Oct 93 23:57:23 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Canon copier engine
Message-ID: <9310190654.AA23942@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



>From: Edward J OConnell <ejo@world.std.com>
>Subject: Re: jrk@sys.uea.ac.uk (Richard Kennaway)
>To: "Perry E. Metzger" <pmetzger@lehman.com>
>Cc: cypherpunks@toad.com


>seen a canon representative, with a straight face, say at a trade show
>that there was a chip in these machines that detected the pattern created
>by currency, and blocked out the image.

        Read something like this in either Electronic Design or Electronic
   Products, within the last nine months. Sorry, can't cite.

        Claims were for the _new_ color Canon copiers to be sold beginning
   1994.

        The article claimed the memory of the copier held representations
   of all major paper currencies. Any attempt to copy would produce only
   a black rectangle in stead of a bill.

        The worrisome item was the statement that the copiers would add
   some sort of unspecified marking to each copy made, allowing copies
   to be traced back to their source.

        No details on the latter, of course. Don't recall if there was
   even a hint of invisibility.

        With the SS concerned about money funnier than that we use each
   day, I had no trouble believing in a machine capable of currency
   recognition.

        What I could never decide to believe without proof, however,
   was the marking/traceability claim.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "George A. Gleason" <gg@well.sf.ca.us>
Date: Tue, 19 Oct 93 02:57:25 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: "ignore them"
Message-ID: <93Oct19.025613pdt.14421-4@well.sf.ca.us>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



The simple solution to pesky posts is, as soon as you see it's something
you're not interested in, press ctrl C and go on to the next posting.  
If someone's being a real online pest, ignore them and maybe they'll go
away. 

-gg




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: smb@research.att.com
Date: Tue, 19 Oct 93 01:37:23 PDT
To: an41418@anon.penet.fi
Subject: Re: Other forms of strong cryptography
Message-ID: <9310190836.AA26630@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


	 Why is it that the idea of taking a difficult problem, such
	 as a knapsack problem, and using it to encode ciphers,
	 was abandoned? Too many trapdoors? These NP-complete
	 type problems seem ideal since they can be verified
	 in polynomial time, but are practically impossible to
	 solve for any significant input. Verification of a solution
	 could be decryption, where the solution is the key,
	 and the problem could be used to encode the text somehow.

	 I understand that Shamir broke the knapsack problem. So,
	 is that enough reason to completely abandon this approach?
	 Nobody seems to talk about it anymore.

The approach hasn't been abandoned; it's just a lot harder than it
looks, for a number of reasons.

First is that complexity theory says nothing about the average difficulty
of solving a problem, as opposed to the worst case.  A cryptosystem that
only hides 1% of the messages isn't very useful.  Second, finding
a suitable problem -- one that has a keyed back door isn't that easy.
Third -- and this is what sunk the knapsack problem -- you need a
cryptosystem that exploits the full NP-complete problem, as opposed
to just a simple case.  (The knapsack problem was solvable by someone
who knew the key because it wasn't a general knapsack, but a super-
increasing sequence -- each number in it was greater than the sum
of all of its predecessors.  (This was the simplest version; there
were, I believe, some others.))




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: remail@tamsun.tamu.edu
Date: Tue, 19 Oct 93 04:27:26 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: on line books & credit card scams
Message-ID: <9310191126.AA28249@tamsun.tamu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Forwarded message:



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Tapen Sinha" <tapen_sinha@macmail.bond.edu.au>
Date: Tue Sep 07 12:40:06 1999
Subject: on line books (not just in risk mgmt)
Message-ID: <2449ef0c725cc01648335423491a45b8@NO-ID-FOUND.mhonarc.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


If you are looking for information on new books, how to buy them (on line!)
and review of these books, there is a neat way to do it on internet:

telnet books.com 

if the above does not work on your machine, try 

telnet 192.148.240.9

It will ask you a bunch of questions (like your name and address)
and then you can look at info on books by author, subject...
You can look at reviews of those books too.

You can order books by email even (have your credit card handy)!
It can be quite useful.  A word of caution: there are some unhappy users out
there who claim that they got billed for books they did not order.

tapen_sinha@macmail.bond.edu.au






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: nobody@cicada.berkeley.edu
Date: Tue, 19 Oct 93 06:42:26 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: jrk@sys.uea.ac.uk (Richard Kennaway)
Message-ID: <9310191332.AA16145@cicada.berkeley.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> From: peb@procase.com (Paul Baclace)
> 
> >Go to you local copier store. Pay cash. No one will care.
> 
> I'm talking about buying the color *copier* itself.  In all the
> copier businesses I've seen, none of them allowed one to make 
> color copies unattended.  Is this because they are complicated 
> or expensive per copy or because of some kind of technology 
> restriction (e.g., high quality color copies cannot simultaneously
> be anonymous and private).

I've got friends who've had unlimited, unsupervised access to color
copiers at their schools or offices (art students, designers).  It's
not such a big deal.  I have even color-xeroxed currency several times
(mainly for a zine I used to edit, wherein we encouraged people to
deface money).  The reactions of the employees of the copy shops ranged
from complete indifference to "you know, this is illegal," but I never
had anyone refuse.

-Mr. Funn




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Christian Void <cvoid@netcom.com>
Date: Tue, 19 Oct 93 07:42:23 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Remailer for DOS/Waffle...
Message-ID: <Pine.3.05.9310190720.B27706-9100000@netcom4>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Just so as not to re-invent the wheel, has anyone coded/kludged together a
remailer for Waffle1.65 or DOS? 

Christian Void /T71 | "I don't like it, and I'm sorry I | VMResearch, Inc.
cvoid@netcom.COM    | ever had anything to do with it." | P.O. Box 170213
Tel. 1+415-807-5491 |  -Erwin Schrodinger  (1887-1961)  | SF, CA  94117
                * PGP v2.3a Public Key Available Via Finger *






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: an42035@anon.penet.fi (the Surgeon)
Date: Tue, 19 Oct 93 00:52:24 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Crypto Anarchy ...
Message-ID: <9310190748.AA07082@anon.penet.fi>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Perry Metzger wrote:

>Its "apocryphal".
 ^^^
>I've finally figured out why all these people insist on posting
>anonymously. They can't spell.

What a useful post.  But look again - can you spot the grammar error?
It is underlined.

Perry must mean "it's" as in "it is"; not "its" as in "possessive".

Naturally, using bandwidth to point out spelling error and grammar
mistakes is POINTLESS, and WASTEFUL.  Perhaps a future requirement to
read this list will be: read and understand Emily Post-News
Nettiquette.

The height of irony is a non-anonymous post (with a grammar error)
with a humorous attempt to criticize an anonymous post (with a
spelling error).

I'll comment on Steve Bellovin's post: excellent overall and thought
provoking.  However, he is putting the cart before the horse and
worrying to much about future acceptance.  Technology is neither good
nor evil; progress in crypto-anarchy will grind to halt if the people
involved become overly concerned with future acceptance.

Would we have the phone system of today if AT&T would have waited for
Western Union's blessing?  We'd probably have some warped telegraph
system instead.
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
To find out more about the anon service, send mail to help@anon.penet.fi.
Due to the double-blind, any mail replies to this message will be anonymized,
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From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: doug@netcom.com (Doug Merritt)
Date: Tue, 19 Oct 93 07:57:29 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: backing?
In-Reply-To: <pmetzger@lehman.com>
Message-ID: <9310191453.AA03155@netcom6.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


pmetzger@lehman.com said:
>Average inflation between the elimination of gold drawing rights and
>the banning of gold ownership by private citizens and 1970 were higher
>than in the immediate period before that. [...]
>Seems to be a pattern to me, buddy boy. [...]
>we should follow the historical models. Gold cannot be printed, is
>cheap to store, and is widely recognized as having value.

Just in case I was unclear: my point was that it makes sense to have
digital currency that is backed by gold, not just the other forms which
are not thereby backed.

I expect that lots of folks will support their own idiosyncratic forms
of digital currency in the future, somewhat similarly to the way that
banks used to issue their own paper currency, and that therefore there
will not be just a single kind of digital currency.
	Doug




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: m5@vail.tivoli.com (Mike McNally)
Date: Tue, 19 Oct 93 05:57:28 PDT
To: owen@autodesk.com (D. Owen Rowley)
Subject: Re: your mail Re: on anonymity, identity, reputation, and spoofing
In-Reply-To: <9310190105.AA23713@lux.YP.acad>
Message-ID: <9310191253.AA02627@vail.tivoli.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



D. Owen Rowley writes:
 > Personally I think that accountability is going to be required as the
 > price for reasonably secure encryption, reasonably open access, and
 > reasonably secure privacy of data.  IMNSHO, it is unreasonable to
 > expect an anarcho-libertarian outcome to these issues. If you can
 > prove me wrong I will be thrilled.

By whom is accountability going to be required?  How will it (or how
can it) be implemented?  What sort of mechanisms can be expected to
reliably and universally evolve in the decentralized anarchic network
we know today that will make "paying the price" a meaningful concept?

I con't prove you wrong because I cannot understand what you predict.

 > It seems to me that multimedia extensions have an *unfolding of the lotus*
 > like effect upon the issues involved.

Explain: is it because of the medium itself or because of the nature
of information that'll be available with multimedia delivery systems?

 > I also see very little regarding potential for breaking the mind machine
 > link, or biologic interfaces?

Uhhhh, OK.

--
Mike McNally




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: an12070@anon.penet.fi (S. Boxx)
Date: Tue, 19 Oct 93 00:57:23 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: POISONOUS CYPHERPUNK TRAITORS
Message-ID: <9310190753.AA08212@anon.penet.fi>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


THE CYPHERPUNKS HAVE BEEN POISONED WITH LIES AND HIGH TREACHERY. THOSE
WHO DO NOT CONFESS WILL BE EXPOSED. THE FRAUDS AND THE POSEURS WILL BE
RUTHLESSLY PUNISHED. IF NECESSARY, ON TALK.POLITICS.CRYPTO OR IN THE
MAINSTREAM MEDIA. 

YOU HAVE BEEN WARNED.
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
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Due to the double-blind, any mail replies to this message will be anonymized,
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From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: an41418@anon.penet.fi (wonderer)
Date: Tue, 19 Oct 93 00:57:29 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Other forms of strong cryptography
Message-ID: <9310190754.AA08386@anon.penet.fi>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Why is it that the idea of taking a difficult problem, such
as a knapsack problem, and using it to encode ciphers,
was abandoned? Too many trapdoors? These NP-complete
type problems seem ideal since they can be verified
in polynomial time, but are practically impossible to
solve for any significant input. Verification of a solution
could be decryption, where the solution is the key,
and the problem could be used to encode the text somehow.

I understand that Shamir broke the knapsack problem. So,
is that enough reason to completely abandon this approach?
Nobody seems to talk about it anymore.

Wonderer

(My apologies to those who prefer to use this list to
 play games with pseudonyms and discuss their paranoid
 ideas. I prefer to use cypherpunks to learn about
 cryptography and its interesting applications)
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
To find out more about the anon service, send mail to help@anon.penet.fi.
Due to the double-blind, any mail replies to this message will be anonymized,
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From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Anonymous <nowhere@bsu-cs.bsu.edu>
Date: Tue, 19 Oct 93 06:07:28 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: No Subject
Message-ID: <9310191308.AA04219@bsu-cs.bsu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


S. Boxx wrote:
>THE CYPHERPUNKS HAVE BEEN POISONED WITH LIES AND HIGH TREACHERY. THOSE
>WHO DO NOT CONFESS WILL BE EXPOSED. THE FRAUDS AND THE POSEURS WILL BE
>RUTHLESSLY PUNISHED. IF NECESSARY, ON TALK.POLITICS.CRYPTO OR IN THE
>MAINSTREAM MEDIA. 
>
>YOU HAVE BEEN WARNED.

Jeez... switch to decaf.





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: nate@VIS.ColoState.EDU
Date: Tue, 19 Oct 93 07:37:34 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com (Cypherpunks Mailing List)
Subject: Re: jrk@sys.uea.ac.uk (Richard Kennaway)
In-Reply-To: <9310190112.AA17160@dink.foretune.co.jp>
Message-ID: <9310191433.AA02530@seurat.VIS.ColoState.EDU>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text


writes Robert J. Woodhead:
>
>Paul writes:
>
>However, I think the deeper question is worth considering: what is the
>justification for anonymous bank accounts?
>
>Avoiding taxes just doesn't cut it for me; much as I hate to pay them,
>I recognise the need to do so.
>

A while back someone posted a message about being immune to having
property, etc taken in law suits.  Imagine if all your money (or nearly 
all) was tied up in anonymous accounts and that all your property was
owned by digital pseudonyms (from whom you rented the property).  This
would be a nice defense if you were scared that the government (in
protecting National Security, of course) would take all your 
posessions and make life a living hell for you and your family.

-nate

-- 
+-----------------------------------------------------------------------+
| Nate Sammons   email: nate@VIS.ColoState.Edu
|   Colorado State University Computer Visualization Laboratory
|   Finger nate@monet.VIS.ColoState.Edu for my PGP key
|   #include <std.disclaimer>
|   Title 18 USC 2511 and 18 USC 2703 Protected --> Monitoring Forbidden
+--------+                          Always remember "Brazil"



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: an43512@anon.penet.fi
Date: Tue, 19 Oct 93 01:52:24 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: MIT Guide to Lockpicking
Message-ID: <9310190847.AA17601@anon.penet.fi>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



I want to share with you an interesting story about information
sharing, copyrights, artistic control and lockpicking.

Long ago I wrote the MIT Guide To Lockpicking, and wanted to limit
its distribution (for reasons that are no longer apparent).  I decided
to delete the electronic forms, and just allow the distribution of
hardcopy.  That worked for many, many years.  Over the summer, I started
taking steps to publish the Guide electronically, but I was beaten to
the punch-line by some cyberpunks who scanned it in, and posted it.

On the whole I don't mind, since I was planning to publish it anyways,
but it does feel wrong that as the author of this work I do not have
any say over its distribution anymore.  The copyright notice in the
Guide says that it can be feely distributed, but at the time, that
meant hardcopy form, because scanners were too expensive for anyone
to be likely to scan in the guide, and the printers had not reached
any standard for expressing pictures.  Thus, the original copyright
notice did what I wanted.  As technology changed, the term "feely"
came to mean "very feely in any form".  Oh well.

Is there any crypto technology that would allow an author to
control derivative works based on something that has been published
on the network as a postscript file, or a latex source file?
I know that a worked could be signed to indicate that it is
"authorized", but can any more be achieved?

For your information, I have attached the posting announcement I
sent to the alt.locksmithing.  Hopefully someone will place the
Guide in an FTP site soon (any volunteers from soda?), as I do
not want to be sending out email copies.

By the way, having a pseudonym to carry out correspondence as
"Ted The Tool" was an enabling technology for me to post the Guide,
and to request cooperation on producing the next revision.
Thank you for creating this technology.

Sincerely,
	Ted The Tool

-------------------------------------------------------------------------
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From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: nate@VIS.ColoState.EDU
Date: Tue, 19 Oct 93 07:57:34 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com (Cypherpunks Mailing List)
Subject: Re: POISONOUS CYPHERPUNK TRAITORS
Message-ID: <9310191452.AA02600@seurat.VIS.ColoState.EDU>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text


writes S. Boxx:
> THE CYPHERPUNKS HAVE BEEN POISONED WITH LIES AND HIGH TREACHERY. THOSE
> WHO DO NOT CONFESS WILL BE EXPOSED. THE FRAUDS AND THE POSEURS WILL BE
> RUTHLESSLY PUNISHED. IF NECESSARY, ON TALK.POLITICS.CRYPTO OR IN THE
> MAINSTREAM MEDIA. 
> 
> YOU HAVE BEEN WARNED.

Yikes, I'll be sure to run and hide.  Get a grip, you stupid fuck.

-- 
+-----------------------------------------------------------------------+
| Nate Sammons   email: nate@VIS.ColoState.Edu
|   Colorado State University Computer Visualization Laboratory
|   Finger nate@monet.VIS.ColoState.Edu for my PGP key
|   #include <std.disclaimer>
|   Title 18 USC 2511 and 18 USC 2703 Protected --> Monitoring Forbidden
+--------+                          Always remember "Brazil"



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Perry E. Metzger" <pmetzger@lehman.com>
Date: Tue, 19 Oct 93 06:02:24 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: backing?
In-Reply-To: <9310190531.AA07250@netcom6.netcom.com>
Message-ID: <9310191258.AA08710@snark.lehman.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Doug Merritt says:
> tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May) said:
> >* The role of *gold* is tangential and secondary. Any stable currency
> >would suffice, and in fact gold bullion would be no more desirable
> >than yen or Deutschmarks.
> 
> You are a modern person in this thinking. Not all are. The uncoupling of
> the U.S. dollar from a government-specified gold standard in the 1970's
> is *still* a controversial issue with some people (not all of whom are
> idiots, by the way, although I personally with disagree with 95% of them).

Average inflation since 1970 has been higher than before 1970.
Average inflation between the elimination of gold drawing rights and
the banning of gold ownership by private citizens and 1970 were higher
than in the immediate period before that.
Average inflation from the establishment of the Federal Reserve to the
depression was higher than in period before that, when inflation
scarcely occured for almost 120 years.

Seems to be a pattern to me, buddy boy.

> It is practically a truism that bull markets bring out modern thinking
> about currency and that bear markets bring out gold-standard thinking
> about currency.

Not bear markets. Inflation.

> My point is, for digital currency, it makes sense to model non-digital
> forms.

Lets model the non-digital forms. Non-digital currency for
approximately three thousand years was gold or promisary notes to pay
in gold. In every time and place that this was eliminated, the
currency eventually collapsed, from the systematic debasement of
currency by the last Roman Emperors to revolutionary France all the
way to Weimar Germany and soon the former Soviet Union.  I agree that
we should follow the historical models. Gold cannot be printed, is
cheap to store, and is widely recognized as having value.

Perry




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Anonymous <nowhere@bsu-cs.bsu.edu>
Date: Tue, 19 Oct 93 07:07:29 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: ISS
Message-ID: <9310191404.AA06184@bsu-cs.bsu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Can someone point me in the direction of this ISS program? BTW,
Is this a DOS or UNIX binary? Is it in source or already
compiled?

Thanks in advance...





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Perry E. Metzger" <pmetzger@lehman.com>
Date: Tue, 19 Oct 93 06:07:32 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: POISONOUS CYPHERPUNK TRAITORS
In-Reply-To: <9310190753.AA08212@anon.penet.fi>
Message-ID: <9310191307.AA08752@snark.lehman.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



S. Boxx says:
> THE CYPHERPUNKS HAVE BEEN POISONED WITH LIES AND HIGH TREACHERY. THOSE
> WHO DO NOT CONFESS WILL BE EXPOSED. THE FRAUDS AND THE POSEURS WILL BE
> RUTHLESSLY PUNISHED. IF NECESSARY, ON TALK.POLITICS.CRYPTO OR IN THE
> MAINSTREAM MEDIA. 
> 
> YOU HAVE BEEN WARNED.

Not taking your Prozac again I see.

Perry




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Robert J. Woodhead" <trebor@foretune.co.jp>
Date: Mon, 18 Oct 93 17:57:19 PDT
To: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Subject: Re: "True Names" and "Ender's Game" (was: Cypherwaffle...)
In-Reply-To: <9310181737.AA26709@netcom5.netcom.com>
Message-ID: <9310190052.AA16863@dink.foretune.co.jp>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Tim May writes:
>Anyway, I strongly recommend both "True Names" and "Ender's Game."

A very strong second for True Names.  Read it and find out who really
invented "Cyberspace" (It wasn't Gibson).  If you like it, try Vinge's
"A Fire Upon the Deep."





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Robert J. Woodhead" <trebor@foretune.co.jp>
Date: Mon, 18 Oct 93 18:02:21 PDT
To: "Christian D. Odhner" <cdodhner@indirect.com>
Subject: Re: Big Brother Inside Stickers
In-Reply-To: <199310181838.AA25403@indirect.com>
Message-ID: <9310190059.AA17013@dink.foretune.co.jp>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


You write:

>I received the stickers from the printer about 10 minutes ago. It'll take
>me a day or three to get them all mailed out. ( they came pre-cut rather
>than in sheets like I thought they would; Big orders of 1000 or more are
>going to involve some substantial processing time ;)

Don't count them.  Use a scale.  You'll be able to get it to +-10.
Close enough for government work, so to speak.





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Robert J. Woodhead" <trebor@foretune.co.jp>
Date: Mon, 18 Oct 93 18:17:23 PDT
To: peb@PROCASE.COM (Paul Baclace)
Subject: Re: jrk@sys.uea.ac.uk (Richard Kennaway)
In-Reply-To: <9310182300.AA03078@banff.procase.com>
Message-ID: <9310190112.AA17160@dink.foretune.co.jp>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Paul writes:

>Anonymous digital cash is more likely to be compromised
>since, as you note, even the Swiss have be>en pressured into opening up 
>their records of anonymous bank accounts.

I believe you are confusing cash with deposits.  Cash (either paper or
digital) can be passed untraceably from palm to palm (or palmtop to
palmtop, if you will).  Deposits, on the other hand, require a method
for the bank and the depositor to authenticate each other.  In the
past, anonymous authentication was rife with problems, but cryptography
might solve these problems.

However, I think the deeper question is worth considering: what is the
justification for anonymous bank accounts?

Avoiding taxes just doesn't cut it for me; much as I hate to pay them,
I recognise the need to do so.





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: pat@tstc.edu (Patrick E. Hykkonen)
Date: Tue, 19 Oct 93 08:22:23 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: ITAR to West Indies
Message-ID: <9310191519.AA09826@tstc.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


HELP!

I'm looking to find out about the ITAR regulations on export of crypto to
the West Indies.  A company that I do consulting for sends out demos that
contain some database crypto stuff and they are concerned now that they have
a request from outside the United States.  Any pointers to where I can 
find information on this would be extremely helpful.  Thanks.

-- 
Pat Hykkonen ** N5NPL ** pat@tstc.edu ** CNSA -- (817) 867-4831
Disclaimer:  This product may cause irritability in some users.  In cases of
allergic reaction, delete and consult a physician immediately.





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: peb@PROCASE.COM (Paul Baclace)
Date: Tue, 19 Oct 93 10:32:23 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Color Copiers/Re: jrk@sys.uea.ac.uk (Richard Kennaway)
Message-ID: <9310191728.AA03541@banff.procase.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Well, I'm glad to hear that use of color copiers isn't highly restricted, 
although there seems to be a good amount of misinformation (probably 
intentional from the SS).  

This is an example of a technology that cannot be controlled so the
government uses warnings and threats.  Similarly, (non-escrow) crypto 
could end up like this:  penalties could be applied if it is used
for illegal activity.  If such a law were proposed, it would be difficult
to oppose it on the basis of freedom of expression. 


Paul E. Baclace
peb@procase.com




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Mike Godwin <mnemonic@eff.org>
Date: Tue, 19 Oct 93 07:37:28 PDT
To: trebor@foretune.co.jp (Robert J. Woodhead)
Subject: Re: "True Names" and "Ender's Game" (was: Cypherwaffle...)
In-Reply-To: <9310190052.AA16863@dink.foretune.co.jp>
Message-ID: <199310191436.AA25823@eff.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


 
Robert Woodhead writes:

> Tim May writes:
> >Anyway, I strongly recommend both "True Names" and "Ender's Game."
> 
> A very strong second for True Names.  Read it and find out who really
> invented "Cyberspace" (It wasn't Gibson).

Elvis didn't invent rock 'n' roll, either.



--Mike






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: peb@PROCASE.COM (Paul Baclace)
Date: Tue, 19 Oct 93 10:47:31 PDT
To: XXCLARK@indst.indstate.edu
Subject: Re: Canon copier engine
Message-ID: <9310191742.AA03546@banff.procase.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



>        The worrisome item was the statement that the copiers would add
>   some sort of unspecified marking to each copy made, allowing copies
>   to be traced back to their source.

Steganographic signatures.  Similarly, signatures are being put into explosives 
(although they are somewhat traceable already) by using various mixtures of
trace elements.


Paul E. Baclace
peb@procase.com





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: owen@autodesk.com (D. Owen Rowley)
Date: Tue, 19 Oct 93 10:57:31 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: your mail Re: on anonymity, identity, reputation, and spoofing
Message-ID: <9310191747.AA26703@lux.YP.acad>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



 > D. Owen Rowley () writes:
 > > I want privacy too, and I want as much free-wheeling as possible in the
 > > matrix. Personally I think that accountability is going to be required
 > > as the price for reasonably secure encryption, reasonably open access,
 > > and reasonably secure privacy of data. 
 
 >    Why should it be? Reasonably secure encryption, reasonably
 > open access, and reasonably secure privacy of data can all be
 > implemented without accountability.

Yes, of course they can be implemented.  

 > (I refer you to Public Key
 > cryptography, DC/Mix nets, and secret sharing) Perhaps in practice,
 > the majority of people will refuse to participate in such a network but
 > that does not stop crackers/pirates from using one. Crackers routinely
 > dick each other over because of lack of accountability, but the trade off
 > (getting free software/phone access) is better than (getting busted)

Fine, spend your time in a network of this character.
But I'm trying to inject some real world values into this issue.
Heres a clue, when your just playing games, this scenario is fine, when its
bigtime finance, industrial secrets and intellectual property with high
value, and the process of managing these things, you will find that 
reliabile security will be the number one requirement. In my opinion, 
Accountability will win over anonymity if it comes down to a choice.

 >    Do you think I am accountable? If I didn't put my real name in my
 > sig you'd never be able figure out who I really am. Not even gnu, who
 > graciously allows me use of their machines, has my real address or phone.
 > The annex port that I log in on is set up incorectly allowing me to 
 > telnet anywhere without needing to use my student account (and thus not
 > linking rjc@ to my college where my really private info resides)


I'm sure you are quite clever, there are lots of clever people around.

 >    rjc@ is simply my pseudonym. I could be Bill Clinton and you
 > wouldn't know, so why worry about it? What keeps me in line in the
 > reputation linked to rjc@ which I have spent a long time building up.
 > Acting like an asshole and choosing a new account name would waste a lot
 > energy that I put into posting these years.

This is all fine and good in regard to the narrow focus you take on where
this technology is going, and what business needs from it.

 > > IMNSHO, it is unreasonable to expect an anarcho-libertarian outcome to
 > > these issues. If you can prove me wrong I will be thrilled.

 >   You made the assertion, the proof is up to you.

Sigh..
IMNSHO is an acronym for *In my NOT so humble opinion*.

LUX ./. owen





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: owen@autodesk.com (D. Owen Rowley)
Date: Tue, 19 Oct 93 11:22:31 PDT
To: catalyst-remailer@netcom.netcom.com
Subject: Re: Crypto Anarchy (jrk@...)
Message-ID: <9310191753.AA26732@lux.YP.acad>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


  > Undoubtedly we could launch into a discussion of why it is anybody
 > with a pocket full of change can walk up to a payphone and leave a
 > variety of threats at the whitehouse switchboard - the phone
 > company need not fear having its equipment seized, while a computer
 > used in forwarding mail containing the same threats will probably be
 > taken along with anything else the SS feels like taking.

Did you forget that the phone companies have a long history of co-operation
with federal authorities ?

 > >Quick -- how many remailers have the support of the university?  How many
 > >boards of trustees -- at state universities, often linked to the government
 > >-- will back them, if the Secret Service ``requests'' that they be shut
 > >down.
 
 > Gee, I don't know.  Does the phone company have any government deals,
 > say to manufacture products using a government designed chip, that may
 > be at risk if its found out that phone company equipment is constantly
 > being used for threats??

The phone companies have agreements with law enforcement that amount to
the same thing!
The reason that Law enforcement wants chip level intervention capability
is that they fear loosing capabilities they already have!


LUX ./. owen




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Date: Tue, 19 Oct 93 11:07:30 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Color Copier, Scanners, and Countereiting
In-Reply-To: <9310191728.AA03541@banff.procase.com>
Message-ID: <9310191806.AA03926@netcom5.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Paul Baclace writes:

> Well, I'm glad to hear that use of color copiers isn't highly restricted, 
> although there seems to be a good amount of misinformation (probably 
> intentional from the SS).  
> 
> This is an example of a technology that cannot be controlled so the
> government uses warnings and threats.  Similarly, (non-escrow) crypto 
> could end up like this:  penalties could be applied if it is used
> for illegal activity.  If such a law were proposed, it would be difficult
> to oppose it on the basis of freedom of expression. 

There was a very good PBS show, probably on "Nova," about modern
counterfeiting methods and what various countries are doing about it
(embedded fibers, special papers, holograms, etc.).

High-res color scanners (600 dpi minimum) are used to forge paychecks,
traveller's checks, and currency. The scanner allows the forger to use
packages like Photoshop to adjust serial numbers, payee names, etc.
Minor touch-ups, etc.

Pretty hard to control availability of these systems, and pretty hard
to force "hidden messages" to be (somehow) embedded in the final
output.

My personal guess is that these problems will accelerate the
conversion to government-mandated "digital money," albeit not of a
Chaumian sort and certainly not of the sort many of us favor. A way to
handle transfer payments (AFDC, SS, veterans, etc.), to reduce fraud
and theft, etc. Perhaps merged with the "National ID smartcard" being
talked about for the new national health care system?

We've debated this a couple of times (I'm not saying don't debate it
now, just letting folks know the history...). Duncan Frissell has
argued persuasively that the many advantages of cash will keep it
common. 

Maybe. In any case, something to think about.


--Tim May (according to Dettweiler, "List TRAITOR YYY" :-} )


-- 
..........................................................................
Timothy C. May         | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,  
tcmay@netcom.com       | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
408-688-5409           | knowledge, reputations, information markets, 
W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA  | black markets, collapse of governments.
Higher Power: 2^756839 | Public Key: PGP and MailSafe available.
Note: I put time and money into writing this posting. I hope you enjoy it.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Mike Godwin <mnemonic@eff.org>
Date: Tue, 19 Oct 93 08:07:28 PDT
To: jamie@netcom.com (Jamie Dinkelacker)
Subject: Re: Shockwave Rider ( True Names, Enders Game, Islands In The Net)
In-Reply-To: <9310190303.AA07520@netcom.netcom.com>
Message-ID: <199310191507.AA26726@eff.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Jamie writes:

> Brunner's _The Shockwave Rider_ is also recommended readings, especially
> for those most concerned with nyms, access rights/abilities and the net.

Cypherpunks may be interested in a course I'm teaching later this fall in
NYC at the School of Visual Arts:

Course Description: Law, Society, and the Electronic Frontier

Instructor: Mike Godwin, Legal Services Counsel, Electronic Frontier
Foundation

The purpose of this class is to give students familiarity with a range of
social and legal issues that arise when computers become a medium for
communication, an instrumentality of crime, and a new kind of community.
The class is designed to give students a sense of what kinds of social and
cultural challenges we will have to face as we enter the networked world
of the 21st century.

Students will read, on average, one book for each meeting, plus occasional
handout materials. Class meetings will be devoted to a short lecture,
followed by a discussion period. There will be one short research or
writing assignment.

This class will meet over six Saturdays from October 30 to December 18
(November 6 and Thanksgiving recess excluded). I will be available for
phone conferences from my office or home in Washington, DC:


(Office) 202-347-5400, ex. 204
(Home) 301-270-1703.


Please contact me if you have any questions.


Book list:


THE HACKER CRACKDOWN, Bruce Sterling
CYBERPUNK, Katie Hafner and John Markoff
HACKERS, Steven Levy
GIRLS LEAN BACK EVERYWHERE, Edward de Grazia
THE SHOCKWAVE RIDER, John Brunner
NEUROMANCER, William Gibson


(optional)
BURNING CHROME, William Gibson
TRUE NAMES, Vernor Vinge


There may also be some photocopied handouts distributed in class.



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: peb@PROCASE.COM (Paul Baclace)
Date: Tue, 19 Oct 93 11:22:25 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: backing?
Message-ID: <9310191819.AA03556@banff.procase.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



>From: pmetzger@lehman.com

>In every time and place that [gold backing] was eliminated, the currency 
>eventually collapsed

Non-gold backed currency is reputation based.  The debasement of a reputation
based currency looks a lot like the game theory strategy of "tit for tat, but
if you can get away with tricking them, go for it"; the tit for tat is needed
to keep the reputation and works both ways: (1) if a currency issuer debases 
value relative to another currency issuer, people will switch money to the better
currency (switching to a better reputation issuer, if possible), (2) counterfeiters
are tracked down and stopped to uphold the reputation.  

The "if you can get away with tricking them, go for it" can be easily be performed
when major currency issuers work together to debase all at the same time.
Luckily, this kind of collusion doesn't hold together well (like OPEC).

So we already have reputation based currency as represented by hard to reproduce
paper.  Similarly, a reputation based digital deposit could be built that is
based on ordinary currency.  (I view anonymous transaction as being completely
orthogonal to this.)


Paul E. Baclace
peb@procase.com





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Date: Tue, 19 Oct 93 12:42:32 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: "Is-a-person" Credentials, Fiat-Shamir paper
Message-ID: <9310191939.AA16837@netcom5.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I have here the Fiat-Shamir paper, "How to Prove Yourself: Practical
Solutions to Identification and Signature Problems," from the 1986
CRYPTO Conference Proceedings.

This is of course the defining paper of the Fiat-Shamir algorithm,
which I understand was patented (no idea of patent number, or
countries). And I hear from Chaum that Rupert Murdoch's publishing
outfit (including Sky Channel, a satellite system) bought the rights
to Fiat-Shamir. (Speaking of Chaum and patents, Chaum has also filed
for patents and reportedly has already gotten some. We spend a lot of
time talking about the RSA/PKP patents and when they'll run out
(1998-2002), but patents on digital money may be just as
constraining.)

Anyway, if there's sufficient interest (contact me via e-mail), I can
scan and OCR as much of the paper as is feasible (the equations and
Greek symbols are always problematic). I suspect serious students of
this stuff have access to the CRYPTO Proceedings at large university
libraries, and the Fiat-Shamir paper is definitely a nice little
intro, so I'm not sure it's worth the couple of hours it may take to
get a good clean copy suitable for uploading to the list.

The schemes for "is-a-person" credentialling should be of interest to
us for several reasons:

1. The non-PGP "models" that rely on centralized credentialling
agencies, be they private companies like Apple or RSA Data Security,
or be they government agencies like DMV or National Health Offices.
Carl Ellison noted this in connection with the PEM model.

(One of the most impoortant innovations of PGP, in my opinion, was the
"distributed trust" model used. Let's demand this of other packages we
may use.)

2. Key escrow schemes could ultimately involve a tie-in to
"is-a-person" databases. Someone wrote yesterday about an FCC-like
ruling that would demand that all messages sent over the Net(s) be
digitally signed with a signature associatable (sp?) with a True Name.

(I can't see how this would be enforced, and can think of many ways
around it. But it's important we think about what may be coming, the
better to head it off early.)

3. As I have speculated before, I see the talk of a National Health
Care Card--possibly a SmartCard of some sort--as naturally associated
with a National ID Card. The immigration "problem" is causing many to
call for such a card.

"Your papers, please! Schnell!" (I hope I did not trivialize my point
by bringing Nazis in.)

Cypherpunks need to worry about more than just the government snooping
on their messages--that's just one facet of the picture. The "dossier
society" aspects are just as important. Ditto for other areas.

So, let me know if there's real interest in this paper.

And I have several of these Proceedings, with access to all the rest
of the CRYPTO and EUROCRYPT Proceedings over at the UC Santa Cruz
Science Library. I can't scan them all  in, for obvious and compelling
reasons (even with the "assistance" of the Information Liberation
Front :-} ), but this is a resource that is available.

--Tim May

-- 
..........................................................................
Timothy C. May         | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,  
tcmay@netcom.com       | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
408-688-5409           | knowledge, reputations, information markets, 
W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA  | black markets, collapse of governments.
Higher Power: 2^756839 | Public Key: PGP and MailSafe available.
Note: I put time and money into writing this posting. I hope you enjoy it.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Date: Tue, 19 Oct 93 12:52:24 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: "Is-a-person" Credentials, Fiat-Shamir paper
Message-ID: <9310191949.AA18452@netcom5.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


A minor correction to my post:

"...this stuff have access to the CRYPTO Proceedings at large university
libraries, and the Fiat-Shamir paper is definitely a nice little
                                        ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^      
intro, so I'm not sure it's worth the couple of hours it may take to
get a good clean copy suitable for uploading to the list."

I left out a "not, " which alters the meaning. What I meant to say is
that the Fiat-Shamir paper is definitely *not* a nice little inro.
It's an academic paperr, not a primer on is-a-person credentialling.

Few primers on advanced cryptology exist, as I'm sure you've all
noticed. I'll be interested to see Bruce Schneier's new book,
"Practical Cryptography," to see if it covers any of these newer ideas.


--Tim May

-- 
..........................................................................
Timothy C. May         | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,  
tcmay@netcom.com       | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
408-688-5409           | knowledge, reputations, information markets, 
W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA  | black markets, collapse of governments.
Higher Power: 2^756839 | Public Key: PGP and MailSafe available.
Note: I put time and money into writing this posting. I hope you enjoy it.


-- 
..........................................................................
Timothy C. May         | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,  
tcmay@netcom.com       | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
408-688-5409           | knowledge, reputations, information markets, 
W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA  | black markets, collapse of governments.
Higher Power: 2^756839 | Public Key: PGP and MailSafe available.
Note: I put time and money into writing this posting. I hope you enjoy it.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: ferguson@icm1.icp.net (Paul Ferguson x2044)
Date: Tue, 19 Oct 93 10:02:23 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: (fwd) ViaCrypt CW Announcement
Message-ID: <9310191804.AA03822@icm1.icp.net>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text


From the "For What It's Worth" department -

Forwarded message:

> From: warlock@ACM.ORG
> Newsgroups: sci.crypt,talk.politics.crypto,comp.org.eff.talk
> Subject: ViaCrypt CW Announcement
> Date: 19 Oct 1993 13:46:36 GMT
> Organization: ACM Network Services
> Lines: 29
> Distribution: inet
> Message-ID: <2a0r3s$ahh@hopper.acm.org>
> Reply-To: warlock@ACM.ORG
> NNTP-Posting-Host: acm.org
> Xref: news.sprintlink.net sci.crypt:20523 talk.politics.crypto:874 comp.org.eff.talk:21553
> 
> } 
> In spite of the uproar over Phil and Grady, its apparently busi
> ness as usual at ViaCrypt as evidenced by  their software product
> announcement under "New Products" on page 39 of the Oct. ll,
> 1993 issue of Computerworld:
>  
> > ViaCrypt has announced ViaCrypt PGP, a high-security public key 
> > message encryption program designed to protect electronic-mail 
> > and data files.  Transmitted messages or exchanged files are 
> > secured against unauthorized readers, and the program provides
> > digital signature, data compression and key management.  Cost:
> >> $199.95 for a DOS single-user license, $599 for a five-user
> > license and $1,649.95 for a 20-user license. ViaCrypt, Phoenix 
> > (602) 944-0773.....
>   
> A company rep contacted by phone indicated that their offering 
> was licensed by RSA/PKP and that an export licence -- if needed 
> -- was "easy" to obtain provided the licensee was "at least a 
> "51%" American company".
>  
>  
>                           Bill Wilson
>  
> ##################################################################
>  
> "Even a blind pig finds an acorn once in a while"  Southern
> Appalachian saying.
>  
> ###################################################################
> 

_____________________________________________________________________________
Paul Ferguson                                                               
Mindbank Consulting Group                                    fergp@sytex.com   
Fairfax, Virginia  USA                                       ferguson@icp.net



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: ferguson@icm1.icp.net (Paul Ferguson x2044)
Date: Tue, 19 Oct 93 10:07:31 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: (fwd) Australians dump DES (from RISKS)
Message-ID: <9310191808.AA03841@icm1.icp.net>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text


Can anyone provide ant detailed information on 'Seneca'?

Forwarded message:

> From: darrell@cse.ucsc.edu (Darrell Long)
> Newsgroups: sci.crypt
> Subject: Australians dump DES (from RISKS)
> Date: 19 Oct 1993 03:11:34 GMT
> Organization: University of California, Santa Cruz (CE/CIS Boards)
> Lines: 32
> Distribution: world
> Message-ID: <29vlt6$82c@darkstar.UCSC.EDU>
> NNTP-Posting-Host: sequoia.cse.ucsc.edu
> 
> Date: Mon, 18 Oct 1993 17:14:08 +1000
> From: zaph@torps.apana.org.au (Kevin Burfitt)
> Subject: Australian government to replace DES
> 
> Here is something I found in an Australian computer magazine, which
> sounded like something for the Risks Forum...
> 
> Quoted from "PCWEEK October 20, 1993"
> 
>   The Australian Government has secretly developed its own data
>   encryption firmware and algorithm, killing its dependence on the
>   US DES (Data Encryption Standard) Algorithm.
> 
>   Called Seneca, the firmware element was developed as a joint project
>   of the Defence Science and Technology Organisation (DSTO) in Adelaide
>   and the Defense Signals Directorate (DSD) in Canberra.
> 
>   [...]
> 
>   "It is a symmetric encryption technology like DES, but can operate
>   at very high speeds" said the source. Seneca's original specifications
>   included a throughput of 2Mbps, but testing had achieved rates of
>   20Mbps.
> 
> Isn't part of the security with DES its slowness, which implies that this
> new encryption method will be inherently risky because of its speed ?
> 
> Kevin Burfitt
> 
> zaph@torps.apana.org.au  (Kevin Burfitt) Compuserve:  100240,2002
> Torps Productions: torps.apana.org.au    BBS +61-3-818-0986  FidoNet:
> 3:635/574
> 


_____________________________________________________________________________
Paul Ferguson                                                               
Mindbank Consulting Group                                    fergp@sytex.com   
Fairfax, Virginia  USA                                       ferguson@icp.net



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: m5@vail.tivoli.com (Mike McNally)
Date: Tue, 19 Oct 93 11:12:24 PDT
To: peb@PROCASE.COM (Paul Baclace)
Subject: Color Copiers/Re: jrk@sys.uea.ac.uk (Richard Kennaway)
In-Reply-To: <9310191728.AA03541@banff.procase.com>
Message-ID: <9310191811.AA03045@vail.tivoli.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Paul Baclace writes:
 > Well, I'm glad to hear that use of color copiers isn't highly restricted, 
 > although there seems to be a good amount of misinformation (probably 
 > intentional from the SS).  

Well, a prime-time newsmagazine recently reported on this, and the
Canon copier with the copier ID imprinting technology (or hoax) was
explicitly discussed.

I think that it's always important to keep in mind that manufacturers
of things like copiers & printers are primarily (almost exclusively!)
interested in one thing: profit.  If they detect heat from the Secret
Service, they call the legal department to get an estimate on how much
it will cost in direct expenditures and lost opportunity to fight
regulations in court, and simultaneously call the engineering
department to find out how much it'll cost to do what the Feds want.
The smaller number wins.  Though it might remain legal for you to
build your own color copier or dye sublimation printer in your garage,
the Feds would have been pretty much successful.

Seriously: how many Fortune 1000 companies will refuse to buy a Canon
copier because of the serial number thing?  A few might have some
reservations, but since so much material will be identifiable as
belonging to the company anyway it doesn't seem like a big deal.
Canon might even be able to sell it as a quality control feature.

--
Mike McNally




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Robert Brooks <rb@hprrb.rose.hp.com>
Date: Tue, 19 Oct 93 13:32:24 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: backing?
In-Reply-To: <9310190450.AA03867@netcom5.netcom.com>
Message-ID: <9310192031.AA08752@hprrb.rose.hp.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> 
> * The role of *gold* is tangential and secondary. Any stable currency
> would suffice, and in fact gold bullion would be no more desirable
> than yen or Deutschmarks.
> 
...
> ..........................................................................
> Timothy C. May         | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,  
> tcmay@netcom.com       | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
> 408-688-5409           | knowledge, reputations, information markets, 
> W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA  | black markets, collapse of governments.
                                          ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
Cognitive dissonance.  Care to explain?

I agree with Perry and Doug on this one--if not gold as backing, then
perhaps virtual-world resources instead, such as information, or storage
space, or CPU time.  But not existing, government-backed currencies, at
least in the long run.

Robert




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Sandy <72114.1712@CompuServe.COM>
Date: Tue, 19 Oct 93 10:42:22 PDT
To: <cypherpunks@toad.com>
Subject: JUDGMENT PROOFING
Message-ID: <931019173503_72114.1712_FHF72-1@CompuServe.COM>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
  SANDY SANDFORT               Reply to:  ssandfort@attmail.com
 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Robert J. Woodhead quoted Nate who wrote, in part:

    Imagine if all your money . . . was tied up in anonymous
    accounts and that all your property was owned by digital
    pseudonyms (from whom you rented the property).

To which Robert responded:

    . . . Do not be so quick to assume that these wonderful
    and interesting techniques we discuss will solve
    long-standing problems. . . .

No assumption necessary, Robert.  Non-digital variations of these
techniques have been used successfully for generations.  The rich
and politically savvy have always seen to it that exposure to
litigation and the burden of taxes fell only on the middle class.
Computers, the nets and crypto technology just make it easier for
the rest of us to get in on the same deal.  Once critical mass is
reached, governments can't survive.  The end, not with a bang,
but a whimper.

As for all the other nasty things governments can do to you:
Remember, they have to see you as a threat or a juicy victim
before they can focus in on you.  If you use traditional and
electronic privacy techniques, there is very little likelihood
that you will come to their attention.

                  Low Profile = Minimal Hassle

 S a n d y

>>>>>>    Please send e-mail to:  ssandfort@attmail.com    <<<<<<
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: roc@gasco.com (Ron Christian x1545)
Date: Tue, 19 Oct 93 13:47:36 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: why anon bank acct?
In-Reply-To: <mech@eff.org>
Message-ID: <m0opNtS-001EqYC@gasco.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



} > However, I think the deeper question is worth considering: what is the
} > justification for anonymous bank accounts?
} 
} How about: it's no one's damn business what my acct. number is, that I
} have one at all, what bank I use, how much money I have, etc.
 
Indeed.  I think I reached critical mass when I discovered that my
personal information and demographics were being sold for profit.

} > Avoiding taxes just doesn't cut it for me; much as I hate to pay them,
} > I recognise the need to do so.
} 
} Need?  Need to keep from being arrested or fined, yeah I can see that.

True, but avoiding taxes isn't really the point.  The point is preserving
privacy.  You don't have to be contemplating illegal acts to want to keep
your affairs private.  You may just want to be left the hell alone.


			Ron

-- 
-

"Don't rush a miracle man.  You rush a miracle man, you get rotten miracles."





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Philippe_D_Nave" <pdn@dwroll.dw.att.com>
Date: Tue, 19 Oct 93 13:02:24 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Article on Cashless Society
Message-ID: <9310191959.AA17717@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Hello, all!
 
There is an article in Information Week's October 11 issue titled "The 
Cashless Society" that discusses debit cards, smart cards, etc. This 
magazine is a management-type trade publication that bills itself as
"The newsmagazine for information management." A fair-sized article; it
may be of interest. Over the years, I've found this mag to be a fairly
good place to watch for trends; they carry the sort of articles that 
our brass photocopies and gives us with notes like "Can we do this?"
attached. FYI.
........................................................................
Philippe D. Nave, Jr.   | The person who does not use message encryption
pdn@dwroll.dw.att.com   | will soon be at the mercy of those who DO...
Denver, Colorado USA    | PGP public key: by arrangement.



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: jamie@netcom.com (Jamie Dinkelacker)
Date: Tue, 19 Oct 93 14:22:25 PDT
To: Cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: S Boxx blathering
Message-ID: <9310192119.AA02004@netcom.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>I've figured it out.  He's a Borg.

Seems there's more to the story. Borg do exhibit collective intelligence.

Punksters, it's such a feeling of raw power over lesser intelligences





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: cme@ellisun.sw.stratus.com (Carl Ellison)
Date: Tue, 19 Oct 93 11:27:32 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re:  Uniqueness and "is-a-person" credentials
Message-ID: <9310191824.AA24220@ellisun.sw.stratus.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>From: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
>Message-Id: <9310181717.AA24067@netcom5.netcom.com>
>Subject: Uniqueness and "is-a-person" credentials
>Date: Mon, 18 Oct 93 10:17:35 PDT

>I don't like the idea of state-run registries of "legal persons."
>Better to live with the occasional vagaries of digital pseuodonyms
>than to ban them.

Amen.

I kept trying to point out on pem-dev, until it became obvious that I was
speaking a foreign language, that the identity *is* a person's public key.
It's already unique and has a firm definition -- all the definition you
need.

It means:  "the person or people who have access to the matching private
key".

That's all you need.  Everything else comes from relationships and
relationships are established by message transmissions and files of
history.

The flesh and blood body doesn't matter in cyberspace unless/until you
start mixing the two worlds (eg., using money, trying to arrest someone,
pairing up for a sexual fling, ...).

 - Carl




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Stanton McCandlish <mech@eff.org>
Date: Tue, 19 Oct 93 11:57:32 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Crypto Anarchy (jrk@...)
In-Reply-To: <9310190102.AA12700@mail.netcom.com>
Message-ID: <199310191852.AA14096@eff.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> smb@research.att.com wrote:
> 
> >Do you want an example?  Here's how to shut down an anonymous remailer.
> >First, find a name for a host that no longer exists.  Send a note through
[...]
> >send a message through the remailer to president@whitehouse.gov, threatening
> >the president.  Poof -- the Secret Service *will* come investigating
[...]

> Well, this apocraphyl scene is easily avoided - remailers can be
> configured to refuse remailing to whitehouse.gov.

I don't think that's quite the point.  The point that's just one instance.
This is part of the problem of our current govt. and current law being
obsolete.  The recent child porn BBS busts are another good example.  The
law is clear on kiddie porn.  If you have it, and don't know it it doesn't
matter.  All someone has to do is upload a child porno file to your BBS in
the middle of the night and immediately call the cops and report you, to
get you arrested and quite possibly convicted.  All I have to do to shut
down your remailer, or your anything, is *tell* the SS that you want to kill
the president.  By policy, they treat all threats as real, so you WILL
probably get a visit from them (as I understand SS operating procedures,
anyway).

> But then this is the Secret Service.  Are they more likely to
> a) seize all equipment peripherally related and a bunch that isn't
> b) inquire about having anonymous mail blocked

Given the SJG case, I think they'd be much more cautious and thorough in
their preparations, and would not repeat the mistakes that would lead to
supposing outcome a). 

I don't think the SS would even understand what b). is.

The NSA, on the other hand... >:)

> Undoubtedly we could launch into a discussion of why it is anybody
> with a pocket full of change can walk up to a payphone and leave a
> variety of threats at the whitehouse switchboard - the phone
> company need not fear having its equipment seized, while a computer
> used in forwarding mail containing the same threats will probably be
> taken along with anything else the SS feels like taking.

Probably because the phone service is regulated, national, well established,
while BBSs or Internet sites are not.  This does not mean that the lack of
common carrier status is just, by any means, but I think this is the
rationale that would come into play, like it or not.
 
> The point is we are in a research & development stage (if you will)
> with anonymous remailers, reputations, filters, digital cash, dc-nets,
> etc.  It is very likely that the projected reality, desired reality,
> and actual reality will be quite different; nevertheless,
> experimentation continues.

Count on it.  Things are moving much too slowly on "our" side.  Entities
like AT&T, Warner, etc. stand a good chance of controlling much of what
becomes "the net" in the future, if much of this technology is not:

1) in place and functional
2) easy to use by the clueless and lazy as well as techies
3) accepted for use within the network, indeed considered *part of* the
   network both as "flavour" and technical specifications
4) impossible to remove - no govt/corporate turning back of the tide
 
VERY soon.  In addition the populace has to become aware of:

1) the fact that computers are not to be feared, but are an empowering tool
2) the fact that a computer that cost $2000 10 years ago costs $200 now.
3) what networking is, what it is good for, and how they can get in on it
4) HOW to do all of this - easy "newbie" software is needed - plug-n-play
5) that privacy is possible.  Most have forgotten this.
6) what good privacy and control over their electronic acitivies is for them
7) that it's easy
8) that the govt/corps/media do not like it and are not to be trusted to look
   after one's own rights.  They need to see that it is exactly this misplaced
   trust that has yielded wiretapping, work place monitoring, TRW, the
   ment to use SSN for almost everything, non-secure purchasing (credit
   cards, etc.)  Media falsehood, inaccuracy, and ignorance of important
   topics, even deliberate ignoring of relevant facts, in media "service"
   that is one-way, dictated, censored, and unexpandable.
9) what alternatives exist
10) what they can do about it.

There's a lot of work to do.


-- 
-=> mech@eff.org <=-
Stanton McCandlish     Electronic Frontier Foundation Online Activist & SysOp
"A nation that is afraid to let its people judge the truth and falsehood of
ideas in an open market is a nation that is afraid of its people." -JFK
NitV-DC BBS 202-232-2715, Fido 1:109/? IndraNet 369:111/1, 14.4V32b 16.8ZyX



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Eric Blossom <eb@srlr14.sr.hp.com>
Date: Tue, 19 Oct 93 14:57:36 PDT
To: peb@PROCASE.COM
Subject: Canon copier engine
In-Reply-To: <9310191742.AA03546@banff.procase.com>
Message-ID: <9310192154.AA22886@srlr14.sr.hp.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> Steganographic signatures.  Similarly, signatures are being put into
> explosives  (although they are somewhat traceable already) by using 
> various mixtures of trace elements.

I believe that they also use small (microscopic) color coded chips of
plastic.  There is an OTA report on this topic with a name something
like "Taggants in Explosives".  I believe that the report is about 10
years old.





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: owen@autodesk.com (D. Owen Rowley)
Date: Tue, 19 Oct 93 15:27:36 PDT
To: m5@vail.tivoli.com
Subject: Re: your mail Re: on anonymity, identity, reputation, and spoofing
Message-ID: <9310192205.AA00919@lux.YP.acad>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



  > From: m5@vail.tivoli.com (Mike McNally)
  > D. Owen Rowley writes:
 >  > Personally I think that accountability is going to be required as the
 >  > price for reasonably secure encryption, reasonably open access, and
 >  > reasonably secure privacy of data.  IMNSHO, it is unreasonable to
 >  > expect an anarcho-libertarian outcome to these issues. If you can
 >  > prove me wrong I will be thrilled.
 
 > By whom is accountability going to be required?  How will it (or how
 > can it) be implemented?  What sort of mechanisms can be expected to
 > reliably and universally evolve in the decentralized anarchic network
 > we know today that will make "paying the price" a meaningful concept?
 > I con't prove you wrong because I cannot understand what you predict.

The comercial use of internet is growing at a very fast rate, and it is 
predicted to overtake other uses in scope eventually.

wide scale networks provide capabilitys which are very attractive to
a variety of business enterprises.

I suspect that a first pass will be made to try and use internet and the 
current suite of protocols and services as they are now.
I also suspect that such attempts will flush out a whole raft of problems and
deficiencies along with  those who exploit such things.
Hopefully new protocols and services can be developed which will minimise 
vulnerability and maximise protection for bussiness assets while allowing
us as much freedom as possible.

Nobody really knows what those things will be, and it is sorta problematic to 
make public laundrey lists of vulnerabilitys without some sort of idea
how to deal with cleaning up the mess. We are going to have to learn by 
example.

My main point though is that eventually business will find decentralised
anarchic networks to be hostile territory, and will move on to less
vulnerable, more reliable networks where user authentication, and 
accountable security are provided.

It may be that there will be barriers between the anarchic networks and
the business-place networks,that require users to provide proof of identity
before they can pass.

 >>It seems to me that multimedia extensions have an *unfolding of the lotus
 >>like effect upon the issues involved.
 
 > Explain: is it because of the medium itself or because of the nature
 > of information that'll be available with multimedia delivery systems?

yes.
:-)
seriously.. note that you asked "because of the medium itself".
It's multiMedia, thats jargon for multiple mediums interacting with each
other, and presenting data interactively on multiple fronts.

It means an unfolding from two dimensional thinking ( text) to three
dimensional thinking ( virtual reality ).


 >  > I also see very little regarding potential for breaking the mind machine
 >  > link, or biologic interfaces?
  
 > Uhhhh, OK.

perhaps you are unaware of some of the more starling things that are being 
done with biofeedback interfaces.

but even more simply than that..

lets take something mundane and achievable like hand gestures sensed by
the data-glove.

you want to get a privileged message to a colleague. If you can 
both access a data-space in real time and view an interactive simulation
of each other in a prileged manner that insures no one else can capture
and render either view, all you need to do is communicate via
ASL or even a proprietary sign language, via the dataglove interface.
this is very doable.. right now.

let the Intelligence analysts chew on that!

BTW, that scenario was suggested to me by an individual of my 
aquaintance who lives on the other side of the --uh-- tracks.
he was very keen to be able to have such privileged communication,
and cost is no factor to him, he pays in cash.
(I should point out that I turned down the offer to contract the
application)


we are about to enter into an era of computing that provides quite a bit
of potential to evade surveilance just because of the sheer multitude
of possibilities. This is what is really driving those who want to do
surveilance mad. Don't be surprsed if the ultimate result is draconian
restriction in order to reduce the odds that are currently in our favor.
Don't be surprised if you see your decentralised anarchic net go away
and never return.

LUX ./. owen







From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: jrk@sys.uea.ac.uk (Richard Kennaway)
Date: Tue, 19 Oct 93 07:22:23 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: META: Re: jrk@sys.uea.ac.uk (Richard Kennaway)
Message-ID: <6715.9310191424@s5.sys.uea.ac.uk>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


It's all very flattering to see my name in lights, but could everyone
responding to this thread on color copiers please change to a more
informative title?

--                                  ____
Richard Kennaway                  __\_ /    School of Information Systems
Internet:  jrk@sys.uea.ac.uk      \  X/     University of East Anglia
uucp:  ...mcsun!ukc!uea-sys!jrk    \/       Norwich NR4 7TJ, U.K.






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Stanton McCandlish <mech@eff.org>
Date: Tue, 19 Oct 93 12:32:24 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: your mail Re: on anonymity, identity, reputation, and spoofing
In-Reply-To: <9310190105.AA23713@lux.YP.acad>
Message-ID: <199310191929.AA14743@eff.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> Considering that human nature allows for pathological behavior in some 
> individuals, and that anonymity seemingly decreases the potential for
> being held acountable for pathological behavior, I think it follows that 
> it would be unwise NOT to be concerned.
[...]
> You may also find that such gentile methodology as attempting to sway
> opinion or unfairly weight ones opinion in order to alter the 
> flow of disscussion are the least you can expect.
> I bet that clever sociopaths will find ways to leverage anonymity
> schemes to accomplish mayhem of magnitude well beyond these sort of things.
> believe me, you don't want to find out by being subjected to such mayhem, 
> and if it happens you will be much harder pressed to come up with ways
> to patch things than if you take time to try and deal with it now.

I think one thing this argument forgets is that we are not talking about a
herd of poor sheep vicimized by the big bad wolves.  This technology is
available to EVERYONE.  If you don't like being hassled by someone
anonymously, then be anonymous yourself.

Also, lets keep in mind that we are talking about email here.  What are
these sociopaths supposed to do?  >Bonk!< you?  Bug you to death with CTRL-Gs?
What sort of "mayhem"?  Clever pyramid scheme or credit card fraud scams?
Oh horrors.  Anyone idiotic enough to fall for ANY such scheme deserves
what they get.

Right now, I see the main real problem of anon mail to be spamming, and 
the main imaginary one (i.e. the main one people bring up when
discussing anon vs no anon, but of which there are no example cases, just
lots of what if'ing) to be liability for libel/slander.

I can't really see this changing anytime soon.  Perhaps in a world like
that in _True_Names_, but we don't have that right now.  By the time it
becomes possible, all sorts of checks and balances will be in place
(credentialling, digicash, proof of personhood, etc etc) that are only
gleams in our eyes right now.

> How about *credentials* that certify the capabilities or flag the 
> potential dangers of a binary object.
> Aren't there schemes out there that hold promise for that sort of
> *trustworthiness* stamp of approval?
> Aren't such schemes prone to the potential of cliquish abuse?

Sounds very much like [True?] brand names too me, in practice.  In fact I
cannot see the viability of an "It's ok" credential if used by anyone other
than a trusted author/company and from trusted reviewers/users.

> what are you credentialing? that someone *should* know what they are 
> talking about? even so it would not preclude being burned, psychopaths
> tend to be very clever?

This aversion to net.psychos seems very much like the fear of
net.pedophiles that's been evidenced by a few journalists.  Please point
me to some psychopaths.  Where are these folks.  I have a strong suspicion
that psychopaths are generally dysfunctional enough that they will not do
well in a medium like this.  And if there were a lot of them around, we'd
already be seen decidedly psychopathic abuse of the net; instead we get
immature spam, and other wastes of bandwidth but nothing particularly serious.
I think we need to draw some distinctions between what is a possible
threat or problem and was is a likely threat or problem.  

>  > (Of course, this could lead occasionally to a Dr. Jekyll who makes
>  > sensible and weighty posts under his own name, while under his Mr. Hyde
>  > pseudonym he rants and raves.  But hopefully this would not happen too
>  > often.)
> 
> Oh, I don't know anybody who does that sort of thing! :-)
> do you ?

I certainly side with you on this one.  I know quite a few people who do
this, both on "the" net, and in BBS-based networks (as if there's much
difference these days.)

>  > Other credentials could be related to some of the other points Detweiler
>  > raised, such as list membership > some number of months.  The point would
>  > be that these credentials are voluntary, used to get past people's filters,
>  > and that they retain poster anonymity while giving readers useful information
>  > about the poster.
> 
> I want privacy too, and I want as much free-wheeling as possible in the
> matrix. Personally I think that accountability is going to be required
> as the price for reasonably secure encryption, reasonably open access,
> and reasonably secure privacy of data. 

What is "reasonably secure"?  I can't think of any "reasonable" definition
of that.  Something secure from YOU, with your 386 or Mac, that is NOT
secure from the US govt. is not reasonably secure to me.  In fact it is
woefully insecure, IMNERHO.

> IMNSHO, it is unreasonable to expect an anarcho-libertarian outcome to
> these issues. If you can prove me wrong I will be thrilled.

Only time will tell.  I think it'd be utterly silly to expect things to
come out as any of us plan, 100%.  That is no reason to not work toward
whatever goals we have, as individuals, as "the Cypherpunks" or whatever.

> I also see very little regarding potential for breaking the mind machine
> link, or biologic interfaces?

There are other lists and groups for that, particularly alt.cyber*


-- 
-=> mech@eff.org <=-
Stanton McCandlish     Electronic Frontier Foundation Online Activist & SysOp
"A nation that is afraid to let its people judge the truth and falsehood of
ideas in an open market is a nation that is afraid of its people." -JFK
NitV-DC BBS 202-232-2715, Fido 1:109/? IndraNet 369:111/1, 14.4V32b 16.8ZyX



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Brian A. LaMacchia <bal@martigny.ai.mit.edu>
Date: Tue, 19 Oct 93 12:37:31 PDT
To: an41418@anon.penet.fi
Subject: Knapsack Cryptosystems
Message-ID: <9310191935.AA17292@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


   From: smb@research.att.com
   To: an41418@anon.penet.fi
   Cc: cypherpunks@toad.com
   Date: Tue, 19 Oct 93 04:34:58 EDT

For a good survey paper of knapsack cryptosystems, see [1].

   Third -- and this is what sunk the knapsack problem -- you need a
   cryptosystem that exploits the full NP-complete problem, as opposed
   to just a simple case.  (The knapsack problem was solvable by someone
   who knew the key because it wasn't a general knapsack, but a super-
   increasing sequence -- each number in it was greater than the sum
   of all of its predecessors.  (This was the simplest version; there
   were, I believe, some others.))

Even knapsack cryptosystems that exploit the full NP-complete problem
may still be susceptible to general attacks, depending on their density
(a property of the weights of the knapsack problem).  If the weights
$a_i$ are too large, you get a "low-density knapsack" (i.e. you're
sending lots of bits of cyphertext to hide few bits of plaintext).

Brickell [2] and Lagarias and Odlyzko [3] showed that there are general
attacks against subset-sum problems with density < 0.6463...  In [4] we
showed that this bound can be improved to about 0.9408...  Joux and
Stern came up with essentially the same result at about the same time
[5].  (Note that if your density is > 1, then you have the possibility
of two different plaintexts encrypting to the same ciphertext.  Without
more information, the encryption can be ambiguous.)

We combined our two techniques in a joint paper -- you can get it via
anon. FTP from martigny.ai.mit.edu in pub/bal/sumcc.ps, if you're
interested. 

					--bal

References:

[1] A. M. Odlyzko, The rise and fall of knapsack cryptosystems, {\it
Cryptology and Computational Number Theory}, C. Pomerance, ed., Am.
Math. Soc., Proc. Symp. Appl. Math. {\bf 42} (1990), 75-88.

[2] E. F. Brickell, Solving low density knapsacks, {\it Advances in
Cryptology, Proceedings of Crypto '83}, Plenum Press, New York (1984),
25-37.

[3] J. C. Lagarias and A. M. Odlyzko, Solving low-density subset sum
problems, {\it J. Assoc. Comp. Mach.\/} {\bf 32(1)} (January 1985),
229-246.

[4] M. J. Coster, B. A. LaMacchia, A. M. Odlyzko and C. P. Schnorr, An
improved low-density subset sum algorithm, {\it Advances in Cryptology:
Proceedings of Eurocrypt '91}, D. Davies, ed., to appear.

[5] A. Joux and J. Stern, Improving the critical density of the
Lagarias-Odlyzko attack against subset sum problems, to be published.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Stanton McCandlish <mech@eff.org>
Date: Tue, 19 Oct 93 12:42:23 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: why anon bank acct?
In-Reply-To: <9310190112.AA17160@dink.foretune.co.jp>
Message-ID: <199310191941.AA14999@eff.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> However, I think the deeper question is worth considering: what is the
> justification for anonymous bank accounts?

How about: it's no one's damn business what my acct. number is, that I
have one at all, what bank I use, how much money I have, etc.

> Avoiding taxes just doesn't cut it for me; much as I hate to pay them,
> I recognise the need to do so.

Need?  Need to keep from being arrested or fined, yeah I can see that.

-- 
-=> mech@eff.org <=-
Stanton McCandlish     Electronic Frontier Foundation Online Activist & SysOp
"A nation that is afraid to let its people judge the truth and falsehood of
ideas in an open market is a nation that is afraid of its people." -JFK
NitV-DC BBS 202-232-2715, Fido 1:109/? IndraNet 369:111/1, 14.4V32b 16.8ZyX



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Peter Capek (TL-863-6721)" <capek@watson.ibm.com>
Date: Tue, 19 Oct 93 12:57:31 PDT
To: CYPHERPUNKS@toad.com
Subject: Color Copiers
Message-ID: <9310191955.AA17646@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I suspect the desire to have color copiers "attended" is more a matter of
controlling cost than anything else.  I heard some years ago that the
Secret Service had asked manufacturers who were working on color copiers to
"strut their stuff" and demonstrate the best copies they could make of
US currency.  The SS was aghast at the results, and I believe these results
were at least part of the motivation for the anti-counterfeiting measures
recently introduced, such as the microprinting on $50 and $100 bills.  There
is also alleged to have been an effort by the government to degrade the
quality the machines could deliver, or to make "equal size" copying unavailable
(and provide only 5% reduction/increase at a minimum).  Apparently Xerox said
something to the effect of "Nothing doing; we worked for years to get it this
good and aren't going to degrade it to solve your problem."  Amen.

            Peter Capek




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: catalyst@netcom.com (Scott Collins)
Date: Tue, 19 Oct 93 16:17:37 PDT
To: Matthew J Ghio <mg5n+@andrew.cmu.edu>
Subject: Re: Photocopying money
Message-ID: <9310192316.AA26432@newton.apple.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


  >It's the same chip that's used in vending machines to scan dollar bills.

To my knowledge, vending machines don't do optical recognition.  They have
a pair of photo-sensors, it's true, but these are used in conjunction with
tractors only to measure the bill.  Another sensor decodes the magnetic ink
to determine validity and denomination.

I saw this demonstrated recently on a PBS science program.


Scott Collins         | "Few people realize what tremendous power there
                      |  is in one of these things."     -- Willy Wonka
......................|................................................
BUSINESS.   voice:408.862.0540  fax:974.6094   collins@newton.apple.com
Apple Computer, Inc.   5 Infinite Loop, MS 305-2B   Cupertino, CA 95014
.......................................................................
PERSONAL.   voice/fax:408.257.1746    1024:669687   catalyst@netcom.com





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Matthew J Ghio <mg5n+@andrew.cmu.edu>
Date: Tue, 19 Oct 93 14:52:25 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Photocopying money
In-Reply-To: <Pine.3.07.9310182007.A5117-b100000@world.std.com>
Message-ID: <Mgl60S600awIEM70Uk@andrew.cmu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Edward J OConnell <ejo@world.std.com> wrote:

> I work at a graphic arts service bureau, and someone told me that
> they had seen a canon representative, with a straight face, say at a
> trade show that there was a chip in these machines that detected
> the pattern created by currency, and blocked out the image. 
>
> Easy to test. Of course, not true--at least, not the canon clc 300 I run.
>
> The control panel of the canon has a list of things you are not
> supposed to copy. That is the extent of the restriction. For some
> obscure reason I follow these rules. I'm not sure why.
>
> The chip thing made me laugh. What is amazing to me is that
> canon would try to create this easily disprovable myth. Has
> anyone else heard this story? My friend was adamant that he
> had heard this spiel (and not a friend of his) but I suppose
> this could itself be an urban myth. 
>
> I suppose I could call canon...but attracting that kind of
> attention to myself seems really stupid...

It's true.  Canon did indeed create such a chip.  It's the same chip
that's used in vending machines to scan dollar bills.  They built a
prototype copier which prevented copying money, but I don't know if they
actually decided to install the chip in all their assembly-line
production copiers or not tho.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Matthew J Miszewski <MJMISKI@macc.wisc.edu>
Date: Tue, 19 Oct 93 16:37:37 PDT
To: CYPHERPUNKS@toad.com
Subject: Re: Backing
Message-ID: <23101918363654@vms2.macc.wisc.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


The problem with using a concrete anfd finite source to back
ypour currency is that it is just that...finite.  This causes
many economic problems for the social/economic system founded
on it.  I was barely a pup when the world first discovered this...
er...that is when everyone in the mainstream allowed economists to be heard.
 
Remember the Gold Standard?
 
 
--Matt
______________________________________________________________________________
"This new technology (the printing press) threatened the Crown, which shuddered
at the thought of widespread dissemination of works advocating religious heresy
and political upheaval.  The Crown's solution to the problem was a system of
regulation designed to control this "dangerous" art."
         -From my Copyright Law Text (refrencing the Statute of Anne -
                                           the first Copyright Statute)
(c)1993
______________________/___________________________________mjmiski@macc.wisc.edu




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: NAME GARY <GAR4026@ritvax.isc.rit.edu>
Date: Tue, 19 Oct 93 16:12:24 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: request for Pgp
Message-ID: <01H4B2CQVO3MA740EC@ritvax.isc.rit.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


 I'm new at this, and i don't want to ask any favors
(i've seen what can happen to others that do)
but i just need someone to tell me where i can find
the pgp program so i can start to learn for myselt.
all you have to do is give me the ftp site, and i
don't care how much i get flamed because it'll be
worth it.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Perry E. Metzger" <pmetzger@lehman.com>
Date: Tue, 19 Oct 93 17:42:29 PDT
To: Matthew J Miszewski <MJMISKI@macc.wisc.edu>
Subject: Re: Backing
In-Reply-To: <23101918363654@vms2.macc.wisc.edu>
Message-ID: <9310200036.AA10637@snark.lehman.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



This has nothing to do with crypto. Hit your delete button now...

Matthew J Miszewski says:
> The problem with using a concrete anfd finite source to back
> ypour currency is that it is just that...finite.  This causes
> many economic problems for the social/economic system founded
> on it.  I was barely a pup when the world first discovered this..

It causes no problems whatsoever, other than preventing unrestrained
printing of currency, which governments always detest.

The money supply in a fractional reserve banking system with note
issue is not limited, because this is a fractional reserve, and not
100% reserve, system.

In fact, this system functions far better than a central bank, because
of a planning problem that should be familiar to free market
economists.

The problem is this: central planning of the money supply leads to
shortages and surpluses of money, which produces giant artificial
swings in the economy. I can most easily explain this by analogy to
the problem of production in a socialist vs. a capitalist society. In
a centrally planned economy, virtually all goods exist in large
surpluses or shortages because they are produced by a plan that lacks
market information and priced without regard to market information. In
a capitalist economy, the law of supply and demand keep the market in
line, efficiently allocating the goods within the economy.

The Fed has to try to control the money supply with very poor
measurements of economic activity and blunt instruments like open
market purchases of treasury instruments. This is very much like the
problem of socialist production planning. On the other hand, in a free
banking system, there are none of the problems of the business cycle
artificially induced by central banking because the money supply will
always be controlled in a distributed manner by the market, and will
rise and fall naturally with the demand the market produces. Increased
economic activity will produce natural rises in interest rates
precisely tuned to the needs of the economy by the invisible hand --
similarly, decreases in economic activity will lower rates in the same
manner. The money supply itself will self regulate because of the
excess clearing rule that free banks issuing notes must follow. Its
all very elegant, very simple, and its remarkable that people didn't
realize how important an idea this was until fairly recently.

If you want to read up on this, I suggest George Selgin's "The Theory
of Free Banking". It was his PhD thesis at NYU.

> Remember the Gold Standard?

Yes. Fondly. However, the Gold Standard I fondly remember was the one
from the days when bank notes weren't taxed and banks were free to
issue them at will.

Perry




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: hfinney@shell.portal.com (Hal Finney)
Date: Tue, 19 Oct 93 22:47:40 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: JUDGMENT PROOFING
Message-ID: <9310200543.AA22959@jobe.shell.portal.com.shell.portal.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


[Something in the way of a test post, to see if I can get through to
toad.com yet...]

From: "Robert J. Woodhead" <trebor@foretune.co.jp>
> Thus, the difference is that today, it's much harder to be
> discreet -- the encryption is a red flag.  "What's he hiding?"
> And as any intelligence analyst can tell you, even traffic analysis
> can tell you a _lot_.

This is exactly what anonymous remailers are for - to defeat traffic
analysis.  The goal is a situation where you, and everyone else, receives
and sends out a bunch of encrypted traffic every day.  There will be
no way a snooper can find out exactly what you are reading, what you
are writing, or whom you are communicating with.  That's what I call
private.

Hal Finney
hfinney@shell.portal.com




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: rjc@gnu.ai.mit.edu (Ray)
Date: Tue, 19 Oct 93 19:57:38 PDT
To: trebor@foretune.co.jp (Robert J. Woodhead)
Subject: Re: why anon bank acct?
In-Reply-To: <9310200241.AA01659@dink.foretune.co.jp>
Message-ID: <9310200256.AA06017@geech.gnu.ai.mit.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Robert J. Woodhead () writes:
> >Need?  Need to keep from being arrested or fined, yeah I can see that.
> 
> Not at all.  I recognise that, however inefficient, taxes pay to maintain
> the legal and physical environment that makes my life more comfortable.
[...]
> ways to avoid a few bucks in taxes.  Rather than aspire to join the
> alleged clique of rich and powerful tax evaders, might it not be better
> to aspire to develop techniques that both maintain privacy but guaran-
> tee that they have to pay their share of the load.  Hint: develop
> something that makes it worth their while.

   Simple. Privatize those parts of government so they can chose
the services they want to buy. Rather than confiscate their money
for whatever subjective "share" is in vogue. (I've never seen this
share defined objectively. Just rants "they must pay more!!!  wah!!" Even in
other countries with much higher rates than our 36%, people are still demanding
more. )

-- Ray Cromwell        |    Engineering is the implementation of science;    --
-- EE/Math Student     |       politics is the implementation of faith.      --
-- rjc@gnu.ai.mit.edu  |                         - Zetetic Commentaries      --




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Matthew J Ghio <mg5n+@andrew.cmu.edu>
Date: Tue, 19 Oct 93 20:12:29 PDT
To: GAR4026@ritvax.isc.rit.edu>
Subject: Re: request for Pgp
In-Reply-To: <01H4B2CQVO3MA740EC@ritvax.isc.rit.edu>
Message-ID: <cgl_guS00VpQEcdV8B@andrew.cmu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


GAR4026@ritvax.isc.rit.edu writes:

> I'm new at this, and i don't want to ask any favors
>(i've seen what can happen to others that do)
>but i just need someone to tell me where i can find
>the pgp program so i can start to learn for myselt.
>all you have to do is give me the ftp site, and i
>don't care how much i get flamed because it'll be
>worth it.

Oh, you're looking to get flamed huh?  Well, in that case...  hehehe

I got my copy from ftp.demon.co.uk




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Matthew J Ghio <mg5n+@andrew.cmu.edu>
Date: Tue, 19 Oct 93 20:32:30 PDT
To: trebor@foretune.co.jp>
Subject: Re: Photocopying money
In-Reply-To: <9310200250.AA01843@dink.foretune.co.jp>
Message-ID: <cgl_zF_00VpQEcdWEh@andrew.cmu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


"Robert J. Woodhead" <trebor@foretune.co.jp> wrote:

In Japan they do.  Some banks recently got scammed by people putting
photocopied Y10,000 ($100) bills into changers at the banks (getting
10 Y1,000 in return).  They've now done a ROM upgrade on the machines.

Hmm... I wonder how many free cokes I could get with that method... hehe :)

There used to be a vending machine here where you could push 2 different
buttons at the same time and get two sodas for the price of one.  When I
lived in California, there was a pay phone where you could dial an 800
number and then dial another number and it would charge you as if you
were still connected to the 800 number (free calls!!!)  Oh man... some
vending machine companies overlook the most obvious things...  I guess
it can happen to anybody (remember identify #9 and get 1000000 ep? :)

Hmm... what does this have to do with cryptography?




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Robert J. Woodhead" <trebor@foretune.co.jp>
Date: Tue, 19 Oct 93 07:52:24 PDT
To: trebor@foretune.co.jp
Subject: S Boxx blathering
In-Reply-To: <9310190753.AA08212@anon.penet.fi>
Message-ID: <9310191447.AA26058@dink.foretune.co.jp>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



I've figured it out.  He's a Borg.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Matthew J Ghio <mg5n+@andrew.cmu.edu>
Date: Tue, 19 Oct 93 21:17:39 PDT
To: klbarrus@owlnet.rice.edu>
Subject: Unfactorable Polynomial Modulus PKC
In-Reply-To: <9310181535.AA27722@great-gray.owlnet.rice.edu>
Message-ID: <ggl=ebm00VpQAcdWo0@andrew.cmu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Karl Lui Barrus wrote:

> I beleive the equation leaks information.  When you expand the
> equation symbolically, it is easy to solve for the constants by
> matching the coefficients of the highest powers and working backwards.
> If the constants can be negative as well as positive, the signs of
> some of the terms will reflect this.

You're right.  You know that the x^2 term is (c/2 + 3/8)x^2 so you can
just solve for c from there.  Once you have c, you can solve for c2. 
So, if I could prevent you from finding c, then you couldn't solve it. 
How can I do this?  By adding another constant.

So far, I have just added a constant after each term.  This leaves open
the possibility that I could also add one at the beginning.  (I'll call
the constants A, B and C for simplicity).  Therefore I'd have something
like the following:

F(G(H(x))) where:

F(x) = (1/2)x^2 + (1/2)x + C
G(x) = (1/2)x^2 + (1/2)x + B
H(x) = x + A

Expanding this, we have something which begins:

(1/8)x^4 + ((A+1/2)/2)x^3 + ((3/2)a^2+(3/2)a+b+3/4) + ...

So you can still solve for A, which lets you solve for B, which lets you
break my cipher and find my private key.  But consider the following:

Up to now, I have simply added a constant before and after each nested
term.  I (or you) can easily reverse this process by subtracting the
constant, and then inverting the functions.  I can add an additional
layer of security by multiplying the result of the function by an odd
number and taking the modulus.  As long as I multiply by an odd number
and take the modulus of a power of 2, the process can be reversed.  Now
if I do this at the beginning and after each of the functions I get:
F(G(H(x))) where:

F(x) = (F/2)x^2 + (F/2)x + C
G(x) = (E/2)x^2 + (E/2)x + B
H(x) = Dx + A

Expanding this, I get:

(1/8)fe^2d^4x^4 + ((a+1/2)/2)fe^2d^3x^3 +
(1/2)((3/2)ea^2+(3/2)ae+b+e/4+1/2)fed^2x^2 +
(1/2)(ea^3+(3/2)ea^2+ea/2+2ab+b+a+1/2)fedx +
fe^2a^4/8+fe^2a^3/4+fea^2b/2+fe^2a^2/8+feab/2+fb^2/2+fea^2/4+fea/4+fb/2+c

Picking some random values for A, B, and C, and picking some random odd
numbers for D, E, and F, plugging them into the equation, and then
taking mod 256, I came up with the following:

136.375x^4 + 139.25x^3 + 33.625x^2 + 110.75x + 179

So what values for A,B,C,D,E,& F did I use?  Have fun factoring!  :)




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Matthew J Ghio <mg5n+@andrew.cmu.edu>
Date: Tue, 19 Oct 93 21:22:30 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: crypto technique
In-Reply-To: <9310181535.AA27722@great-gray.owlnet.rice.edu>
Message-ID: <sgl=lQO00VpQAcdXEw@andrew.cmu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Karl Lui Barrus wrote:

> We know the magnitude of the constants must be less than P, which is
> public.  But can they be negative - will the decoding process still
> work?  Or, will you obtain the correct decoding for the correct choice
> and an incorrect decoding for the incorrect choice?  If it turns out
> that either choice will decode a number to the same value, or if the
> decoding won't work with negative numbers, then this method is too
> easy to invert.
>
> If the constants can't be negative, or if they can be but it doesn't
> make a difference in the decoding, then taking the modulus doesn't
> obscure anything at all.

Moduli are always positive.

It is interesting to note that since x^2 mod y = (-x)^2 mod y, then
x^2 mod y = (y-x)^2 mod y.  So whenever you have a square root modulus,
you have at least two numbers in the domain which will produce the same
outcome.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Robert J. Woodhead" <trebor@foretune.co.jp>
Date: Tue, 19 Oct 93 08:37:29 PDT
To: nate@VIS.ColoState.EDU
Subject: Re: jrk@sys.uea.ac.uk (Richard Kennaway)
In-Reply-To: <9310191433.AA02530@seurat.VIS.ColoState.EDU>
Message-ID: <9310191532.AA26534@dink.foretune.co.jp>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Nate writes:

>A while back someone posted a message about being immune to having
>property, etc taken in law suits.  Imagine if all your money (or nearly 
>all) was tied up in anonymous accounts and that all your property was
>owned by digital pseudonyms (from whom you rented the property).  This
>would be a nice defense if you were scared that the government (in
>protecting National Security, of course) would take all your 
>posessions and make life a living hell for you and your family.

I think you are being dangerously naive if you think that such actions
would prevent someone (not necessarily the government, btw) from making
your life a living hell.

If you are a parent, for example, think what an accusation of child
abuse might do.

Do not be so quick to assume that these wonderful and interesting
techniques we discuss will solve long-standing problems.  Most likely,
they will merely solve new problems (ie: the increased ability of
third parties to intercept communications) that are created by the
very technologies that make the solutions possible.

Best
R





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "L. Detweiler" <ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Date: Wed, 20 Oct 93 00:17:42 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: pseudospoofed out
Message-ID: <9310200713.AA28851@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Cypherpunks, I use the internet for a lot of serious activities, and it
deeply troubles me to think that I have been vicitimized by
pseudospoofers in areas outside of merely the cypherpunks list such as
in the numerous FAQs I edit (a very time consuming endeavor) or in my
other favorite mailing lists. I feel like my blood has been drained by
parasites that suck my prose and passions. Since there is absolutely no
support for any `True Names' here whatsoever, I volunteer to drop the
subject. And of course I am just another blip on this list, so my ideas
for its improvement mean nothing, and I will not *ever* make a
proposition again here regarding the subject. however,

A PERSONAL REQUEST

I humbly request that ANYONE SENDING ME PERSONAL MAIL have the decency
to do so under their `True Name' or `obviously anonymously' under the
same identity. Do not deceive me for perverted sport. Do not try to
build up trust merely so that you can betray it. Do not manipulate me
simply because you have the capability or because I am a basically
trusting person. This sentiment is equivalent to something like `if a
woman doesn't carry a gun then it's OK to rape her' and it is one of
the most alarming aspects of what I have seen promoted here and in the
general `hacker' community. `nothing is wrong if you can get away with
it.' I believe that there is no such thing as a `consequentless
action'. Please, do not drag *me* into the gutter because you like to wallow there.

If anyone has deceived me in manipulating me with multiple pseudonyms
in my personal email, please inform me *now*. I believe this is the
absolute least that *anyone* could ask on the internet.

Another point to make is that Usenet & current mailing lists are far
from the future models. I fundamentally believe that `true name'
systems are entirely socially desirable and can be erected without
invading privacy. Anyone who claims that `true names' and `privacy' are
fundamentally incompatible is simply mistaken. Does `absolute privacy'
mean that no one *ever* knows who *anyone* is?

It seems to me the ability to differentiate identities or reject their
input based on `true names' is a basic right of the listener. You do
not have a right to bludgeon me with identical opinions from an
unrepresentative arsenal of imaginary identities. I suspect some of the
people advocating `absolute privacy' are themselves currently using
powerful tools to detect pseudospoofing others do not possess. Is that
the cypherpunk Utopian ideal? A place where you can manipulate people
without them knowing it? let others drown in mud while you trample atop their backs?

Also, please do not deceive the press. T.C. May has recently
satirically suggested that some of the Wired pictures are of hired
actors. I don't find this funny. If the `cypherpunks' are really
something other than that which they claim, it will eventually and
inevitably come back to haunt the `movement,' whatever it is
(algorithms or ideology? I no longer care). History and society is far
more shrewd than that. If pseudospoofing is really the #1 cypherpunk
agenda, please make that clear. `We want to fool everyone with
brainwashing techniques so they are at the mercy of our whim.'

One of my attractions to cyberspace was the promise of making online
friends, and I have made many over many months. But the idea that some
psychopaths are sending me email just to leech my strong emotions and
play with my passions, like a cat does a captured mouse, perhaps even
with the support of a large and complex software `arsenal' designed
specifically to promote camouflage and manipulation, perhaps on a very
widespread scale involving multiple lists, I find reprehensible and
inherently evil. Please, choose another lab rat victim.

My whole `cyberspatial reality' has been cast into doubt. Who's real?
Who's fake? I used to really look forward to reading and responding to
my mail, but now I approach it with dread, horror, and nausea. I don't
even know if who I am talking to on the phone is who they say they are
anymore, or if I really have any true cyberspatial friendships, because
of all the pseudospoofing in my mailbox. There are some among you who
say `welcome to the real world'. Are you people saying that man's
natural state is confusion, desperation, and paranoia?

I am not opposed to `pseudonymity' and multiple reputations of couse.
But the strong sentiments on this list that I should be kept *guessing*
I find abhorrent. What is most disturbing is the possibility of a
single entity attempting to stick someone's psyche in a vice by
systematic and concerted assaults from multiple supposedly `unique'
identities in private email. This is like dealing with a tentacled
octopus-monster. What could be more depraved? This is nothing but
vicious interrogation and brainwashing.

I'm simply in favor of truth in advertising, and I think this list has
been misrepresented as a `forum' when it's nothing but a hotbed of
pseudospoofing, possibly even aided by automatic software tools.
Someone tell me, how long have I been arguing with AI programs anyway?
Trully, I never would have subscribed if I had realized the `practice'
of pseudospoofing was epidemic. I mean, I suspected there were isolated
cases, but now it appears a large part of traffic is manufactured
flames and froth. Does anyone have any idea how much time has been
wasted wading or even arguing with opinions that were nothing but
mirages? I'm deeply disillusioned. But of course, who cares? Certainly
not the leadership or the followers.

I'm not sure that some of the `identities' I've been dealing with over
the past few months really have any basic morality. I suspect there are
some demagogues that tout `privacy' while really subtly and insideously
promoting dishonesty, sociopathism, treachery, and barbarianism.

An example: I am on another mailing list where I posted a long article
as a `gift' to the subscribers. I got some favorable comments, except
from the moderator who said that `people are shocked at what you did.'
I asked him. What people? What did they say? He backed down. But
imagine that someone slandered me with a worthless pseudonym? and, in
fact, even if they mailed *me* would I be able to tell that they didn't
care about the reputation of that pseudonym? It seems to me that there
is a basic idea of reputation and postings. To a degree, if you haven't
earned a reputation in some subject, you should be disqualified from
pontificating on it, irrelevant of your arsenal of pseudonyms. Filters
based on reputations may help make this a reality. (I would personally
like to ban my mailbox of all opinionated pseudonyms who have not read
more than 2 of my posts.)

I remember E.H. once announcing to the list that J. Markoff had
unsubscribed. Who's really in favor of privacy? Is everybody here
really interested in `privacy' as an `offensive weapon'? `Privacy' as a
way of evading taxes? `privacy' as a way of manipulating or betraying
the gullible and trusting for perverted pleasure? `privacy' as
destroying social order and promoting anarchy? Really, nevermind.
please, don't send me any more blistering flames. These are rhetorical
questions. In fact, this is a rhetorical essay.





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Sandy <72114.1712@CompuServe.COM>
Date: Tue, 19 Oct 93 23:07:40 PDT
To: <cypherpunks@toad.com>
Subject: ANNONYMOUS BANK ACCOUNTS
Message-ID: <931020053601_72114.1712_FHF42-1@CompuServe.COM>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
  SANDY SANDFORT               Reply to:  ssandfort@attmail.com
 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Punksters,

Robert J. Woodhead suggested:

    . . . Rather than aspire to join the alleged clique of
    rich and powerful tax evaders, might it not be better to
    aspire to develop techniques that both maintain privacy
    but guarantee that they have to pay their share of the
    load. . . .

Oh Robert, the clique is hardly alleged.  Their there whether you
like the idea or not.  Strong crypto can do far more than merely
maintain privacy while we try--in vain--to fairly share the load.
It can help us *reduce and ultimately eliminate* the load for
rich and poor alike.  If you want to submit to taxes to buy
piece, go right ahead.  I'll put my faith in crypto anarchy.

Mr. Woodhead went on in another post:

    . . . the difference is that today, it's much harder to
    be discreet -- the encryption is a red flag.  "What's he
    hiding?" And as any intelligence analyst can tell you,
    even traffic analysis can tell you a _lot_. . . .

Nope, where message volume is high, encryption is lost in the
noise.  When encryption is wide-spread, it's not a read flag.  If
steganography is used, there is no flag at all.  Remailers make
traffic analysis extremely difficult or impossible.  Finally, the
traditional methods are still just as effective as always.

I'll say it again:  We have already won.

 S a n d y

>>>>>>    Please send e-mail to:  ssandfort@attmail.com    <<<<<<
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: m5@vail.tivoli.com (Mike McNally)
Date: Wed, 20 Oct 93 06:17:42 PDT
To: owen@autodesk.com (D. Owen Rowley)
Subject: Re: your mail Re: on anonymity, identity, reputation, and spoofing
In-Reply-To: <9310192205.AA00919@lux.YP.acad>
Message-ID: <9310201314.AA03597@vail.tivoli.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



D. Owen Rowley writes:
 > The comercial use of internet is growing at a very fast rate...

Agreed.

 > wide scale networks provide capabilitys which are very attractive to
 > a variety of business enterprises.

Clearly; *right now* businesses are spending real money on it.

 > I suspect that a first pass will be made to try and use internet and the 
 > current suite of protocols and services as they are now.

Uhhh, it's already happening.

 > I also suspect that such attempts will flush out a whole raft of problems and
 > deficiencies along with  those who exploit such things.
 > Hopefully new protocols and services can be developed which will minimise 
 > vulnerability and maximise protection for bussiness assets while allowing
 > us as much freedom as possible.

Why does this preclude continuation of net services as they exist
today?  You seem to feel that there can only be one mode of use for
network resources.  If businesses want to use the net only under the
aegis of some authentication/credentialing scheme, fine!  That means I
may or may not choose too participate, or that I may choose to
participate as "myself" while still maintaining other digital
alter-egos for other purposes.

 > Nobody really knows what those things will be, and it is sorta problematic to 
 > make public laundrey lists of vulnerabilitys without some sort of idea
 > how to deal with cleaning up the mess. We are going to have to learn by 
 > example.

Why are you so stuck on the idea of "cleaning up a mess"?  The network
is a resource.  It can be used concurrently in lots of different ways.
You're free to start up your own set of authenticated services this
afternoon if you like.

 > My main point though is that eventually business will find decentralised
 > anarchic networks to be hostile territory, and will move on to less
 > vulnerable, more reliable networks where user authentication, and 
 > accountable security are provided.

Really?  So the presence of paying customers on the anarchic networks
won't be attractive?  We've had experience with lots of nasty problems
on the Internet already, and yet companies are all the time paying for
things like T1 channels for better service.

Of course, businesses are free as they've always been to implement
whatever communications systems they want.  This is old news.

 > It may be that there will be barriers between the anarchic networks and
 > the business-place networks,that require users to provide proof of identity
 > before they can pass.

Ok, fine.  So I pass if I want to and not if I don't.  What's the
point?  What does this have to do with being able to interact on other
net forums under different rules?

 > seriously.. note that you asked "because of the medium itself".
 > It's multiMedia, thats jargon for multiple mediums interacting with each
 > other, and presenting data interactively on multiple fronts.

Yes, I'm vaguely familiar with the concept :-)

 > It means an unfolding from two dimensional thinking ( text) to three
 > dimensional thinking ( virtual reality ).

I think you're selling text short, but that's another discussion.

 > perhaps you are unaware of some of the more starling things that are being 
 > done with biofeedback interfaces.

I'm aware of plenty of hype and pipe-dreams, but little reality.
Sure, it'd be neat though.  What does it have to do with
authentication and accountability?

 > lets take something mundane and achievable like hand gestures sensed by
 > the data-glove... [data glove communication deleted]

That'd be nice, I guess, but what's the point?  Are you suggesting
that someone tapping the communication line wouldn't be able to (1)
figure out what you were "saying" and (2) spoof the system?  (If
neither, then what does this technology have to do with
authentication?) 

 > BTW, that scenario was suggested to me by an individual of my 
 > aquaintance who lives on the other side of the --uh-- tracks.
 > he was very keen to be able to have such privileged communication,
 > and cost is no factor to him, he pays in cash.

Have you sent him PGP?  Seems a heck of a lot better and a heck of a
lot easier to implement.

 > Don't be surprised...

I'm losing track of what this has to do with "need" for
accountability.

--
Mike McNally




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: m5@vail.tivoli.com (Mike McNally)
Date: Wed, 20 Oct 93 06:22:42 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: pseudospoofed out
In-Reply-To: <9310200713.AA28851@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Message-ID: <9310201322.AA03608@vail.tivoli.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



"L. Detweiler" writes:
 > I feel like my blood has been drained by
 > parasites that suck my prose and passions. 

I hereby claim this as a .signature for at least one of my
identities.

--
Mike McNally




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: m5@vail.tivoli.com (Mike McNally)
Date: Wed, 20 Oct 93 06:32:30 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: pseudospoofed out
In-Reply-To: <9310200713.AA28851@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Message-ID: <9310201330.AA03617@vail.tivoli.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



"L. Detweiler"  writes:
 > [ the funniest thing I've read on the net in years. ]

Thank you, thank you, thank you *all* for making this possible.  The
hours of cleaning crud from my INBOX are *easily* worth this kind of
entertainment.  I am literally in tears, irritating my officemate with
incessant laughter.

Mr. Detweiler (if that really *is* your name), thank you especially.
You write well, kinda, even if I utterly disagree with you.  I think
I'll print this out and paste it into my big unabridged next to
"hyperbole".

--
Mike McNally




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: holland@CS.ColoState.EDU (douglas craig holland)
Date: Wed, 20 Oct 93 08:22:32 PDT
To: eb@srlr14.sr.hp.com (Eric Blossom)
Subject: Explosives tracers
In-Reply-To: <9310192154.AA22886@srlr14.sr.hp.com>
Message-ID: <9310201519.AA12207@beethoven>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text


> 
> > Steganographic signatures.  Similarly, signatures are being put into
> > explosives  (although they are somewhat traceable already) by using 
> > various mixtures of trace elements.
> 
> I believe that they also use small (microscopic) color coded chips of
> plastic.  There is an OTA report on this topic with a name something
> like "Taggants in Explosives".  I believe that the report is about 10
> years old.
> 
> 
I remember hearing about how one congress member removed the taggants
from a sample of gunpowder using tweezers during a terrorism hearing.
Taggants can't really be relied upon.

Doug




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: hfinney@shell.portal.com (Hal Finney)
Date: Wed, 20 Oct 93 09:27:46 PDT
To: doug@lm.net
Subject: Re: pseudospoofed out
Message-ID: <9310201623.AA21602@jobe.shell.portal.com.shell.portal.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Dug writes that he intentionally strips out all identifying information
from his incoming mail that would show who it is from.  Truly this is
a radical solution to the problem of spoofing.  A basic principle of
discourse is that the validity of an idea is independent of its source
(which is why ad hominem attacks are considered invalid).  Yet this
principle is not widely followed (which is why ad hominem attacks are
considered effective).  Dug's solution enforces the discipline of judging
each piece of mail on its own merits.  Maybe more people should consider
this approach.

Hal Finney
hfinney@shell.portal.com




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: System Operator <anagld!decode!system@uunet.UU.NET>
Date: Wed, 20 Oct 93 09:22:34 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: PRIVACY: Shredded trash doesn't cut it
Message-ID: <6N1PBc2w165w@decode.UUCP>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Fellow Cypherpunks,

As if there was any doubt, the following will show that even
shredded trash is not safe:

From _Search and Seizure Bulletin_, Vol 30, No. 9, September 1993

Shredded Documents - No Privacy Interest in Public Trash
Massachusetts
United States v. Scott, 975 F.2d 927 (1992)

The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) suspected Scott of filing false
income tax returns.  IRS agent's searched Scott's garbage bags which
were left in front of his house for collection and found shredded
documents.

The agents pieced the papers together and were able to establish
probable cause to request search warrants based on the evidence
revealed in the whole documents.  The IRS presented a 47-count
indictment against Scott.

Scott moved to suppress the evidence, claiming the search of his
garbage violated his privacy interests.  His motion was granted and
the United States appealed.

DECISION: Reversed and sent back to the lower court.

The Constitution does not prohibit the warrantless seizure of shredded
documents found in public trash.

Scott relinquished his reasonable expectation of privacy in the garbage
once he abandoned it outside his house to be collected or destroyed by
a third party.  That he may have desired secrecy by shredding the documents
does not change the fact he left the garbage in the public domain,
and the police were free to use their resources to collect the evidence.

A legitimate expectation of privacy is measured not by the individual's
desire to maintain secrecy, but by whether the government's action
violates constitutionally recognized privacy rights.  Because Scott
had no constitutionally protected privacy interest in this trash, the
appeals court decided his motion to suppress should have been denied.

California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 108 S.Ct. 1625, 100 L.Ed.2d 30 (1988)
United States v. Mustone, 469 F.2d 970 (1972)


Dan
uunet!anagld!decode!dan

--
system@decode.UUCP (System Operator)
Cryptography, Security, Privacy BBS  +1 410 730 6734   Data/FAX




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: jrk@sys.uea.ac.uk (Richard Kennaway)
Date: Wed, 20 Oct 93 01:37:41 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: pseudospoofed out
Message-ID: <5805.9310200836@s5.sys.uea.ac.uk>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


L. Detweiler writes:
>I'm simply in favor of truth in advertising, and I think this list has
>been misrepresented as a `forum' when it's nothing but a hotbed of
>pseudospoofing, possibly even aided by automatic software tools.
...
>I'm not sure that some of the `identities' I've been dealing with over
>the past few months really have any basic morality. I suspect there are
>some demagogues that tout `privacy' while really subtly and insideously
>promoting dishonesty, sociopathism, treachery, and barbarianism.

I note that "S.Boxx" is saying much the same.  Who is pseudospoofing whom?

>I would personally
>like to ban my mailbox of all opinionated pseudonyms who have not read
>more than 2 of my posts.

Well, go ahead.  Mail readers that support kill files exist already.

--                                  ____
Richard Kennaway                  __\_ /    School of Information Systems
Internet:  jrk@sys.uea.ac.uk      \  X/     University of East Anglia
uucp:  ...mcsun!ukc!uea-sys!jrk    \/       Norwich NR4 7TJ, U.K.






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: koontzd@lrcs.loral.com (David Koontz )
Date: Wed, 20 Oct 93 09:47:45 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re:  PRIVACY: Shredded trash doesn't cut it
Message-ID: <9310201644.AA11884@nebula.lrcs.loral.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Ah, the infamous Shred Scott decision.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: nobody@alumni.cco.caltech.edu
Date: Wed, 20 Oct 93 10:12:35 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: pseudospoofed out
Message-ID: <9310201704.AA02218@alumni.cco.caltech.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


on Wed, 20 Oct 93 09:23:03 PDT, hfinney@shell.portal.com (Hal Finney) writes:
< A basic principle of
< discourse is that the validity of an idea is independent of its source
< (which is why ad hominem attacks are considered invalid).  Yet this
< principle is not widely followed (which is why ad hominem attacks are
< considered effective).

i believe the reason this principle is not often followed is because 
so much context is gained from knowing who a person is.  not just the
message history, but knowing what a person's experience and profession
are can be extremely helpful in understanding the intent of the communication.

removing the sender's identity also removes a substantial amount of 
semantic information.  computers might be able to send billions of bits
per second over a network, but it's up to us humans to remove the degrees
of freedom and figure out what is really meant.

< Dug's solution enforces the discipline of judging
< each piece of mail on its own merits.  Maybe more people should consider
< this approach.

i don't think that's what he meant.  Doug Luce <doug@lm.net> says:

< if i can't figure out who it is by the context, the sender loses.

which means to me, doug is still using contextual information gained by
his knowledge of the sender.

as an example, i often find mr. detweiler's posts to this list difficult
to interpret, since i don't know him personally.  is he playing devil's
advocate? is he just trying to be entertaining? is he deliberately behaving
in a schizophrenic manner, or is he just a victim of MPD?  i can't tell 
from his posts alone.

which is why i believe that honest humans for the most part will have no
good reason to spoof.  trusted communication just won't work without
reputation.  both the sender and receiver rely on context provided by 
reputation to send comprehensible messages.

----

i liked the point made recently that e-mailing lists are often like
discussions at a coffee house, and are not formal environments for objective
culling of opinion.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: cme@ellisun.sw.stratus.com (Carl Ellison)
Date: Wed, 20 Oct 93 07:07:42 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: defeating traffic analysis
Message-ID: <9310201404.AA26853@ellisun.sw.stratus.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>Date: Tue, 19 Oct 93 22:43:46 PDT
>From: hfinney@shell.portal.com (Hal Finney)
>Message-Id: <9310200543.AA22959@jobe.shell.portal.com.shell.portal.com>
>Subject: Re: JUDGMENT PROOFING

>This is exactly what anonymous remailers are for - to defeat traffic
>analysis.  The goal is a situation where you, and everyone else, receives
>and sends out a bunch of encrypted traffic every day.  There will be
>no way a snooper can find out exactly what you are reading, what you
>are writing, or whom you are communicating with.  That's what I call
>private.

To really defeat traffic analysis you also have to remove any information
from volume of traffic.  If I don't know any message routing but I do know
that cme sent 10 MB of traffic and you received 10 MB of traffic and the
other 30 people on the anon subnet dealt with only 100B each, ....

So:  have everyone send and receive exactly the same size message to/from the
same sites at the same time every day.


 - Carl




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Doug Luce <doug@lm.net>
Date: Wed, 20 Oct 93 07:27:42 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: pseudospoofed out
In-Reply-To: <Pine.3.05.1.9310200440.A14021-e110000@drown.slip.andrew.cmu.edu>
Message-ID: <Pine.3.07.9310201027.a177-a100000@foxholly.pgh.pa.us>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain

to the individual with difficulties of a spoofing sort:  the answer is
procmail. 

my inbox script strips all recipiant header information.  it also chops
off signatures.  it puts in a bogus From: line with a sequence number. it
even parses the text for items like "My name is Joe Hoop," replacing them
with "My name is XXXX."

if i can't figure out who it is by the context, the sender loses.  my
outbox script matches the sequence number up with the proper recipient and
ships my response out.  rarely is the reply "I don't know who you are."

dug




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: henry strickland <strick@osc.versant.com>
Date: Wed, 20 Oct 93 11:17:45 PDT
To: cme@ellisun.sw.stratus.com (Carl Ellison)
Subject: Re: [TECH] defeating traffic analysis
In-Reply-To: <9310201404.AA26853@ellisun.sw.stratus.com>
Message-ID: <9310201810.AA27001@osc.versant.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


# From: cme@ellisun.sw.stratus.com (Carl Ellison)
# 
# So:  have everyone send and receive exactly the same size message to/from the
# same sites at the same time every day.

That seems so unfortunate that the "average utilizaton" and the
"peak throughput" [I use quotes because I may have the wrong 
technical buzzwords, but you know what I mean] have to be
one and the same.

I've been trying to think of ways around that.  Am I wasting my time?

I've thought of trying to find probabilistic ways of letting you
vary how much your read/write to the net each day, maintaining
some constant statisics (average amount you read/write, standard
deviation, ...), that allows you one day to read a lot more than
the average, when you need to, without giving away that it was
useful information instead of padding. 

But I'm afraid it still gives away partial bits of information --
it is still likely that the hungriest readers and the most verbose
writers match up.

This becomes more on my mind, as I work on DCNet protocols.

References?  Advice?                    strick





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: owen@autodesk.com (D. Owen Rowley)
Date: Wed, 20 Oct 93 11:42:34 PDT
To: trebor@foretune.co.jp
Subject: Re: why anon bank acct?
Message-ID: <9310201823.AA04755@lux.YP.acad>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



  > From: "Robert J. Woodhead" <trebor@foretune.co.jp>
  > Not at all.  I recognise that, however inefficient, taxes pay to maintain
 > the legal and physical environment that makes my life more comfortable.
 > There are many oppressive things about governments, but _by_and_large_
 > the US government is one of the least oppressive, and the vast majority
 > of the people who work in it are honest and well-intentioned.

I don't know if I'd go so far as to say that myself.
But the reality is that no matter how much some of us would like
to replace the current government with a more libertarian one,
or how much we would like to see the current government back off from
its current course, its not gonna happen.

 > What I hope comes out of groups like cypherpunks are ways to make the
 > government better and more responsive to the needs of the citizenry
 > (in other words, some good checks and balances), rather than petty
 > ways to avoid a few bucks in taxes.  Rather than aspire to join the
 > alleged clique of rich and powerful tax evaders, might it not be better
 > to aspire to develop techniques that both maintain privacy but guaran-
 > tee that they have to pay their share of the load.  Hint: develop
 > something that makes it worth their while.
 

exactly, this is exactly what I have been getting at.


LUX ./. owen




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Robert J. Woodhead" <trebor@foretune.co.jp>
Date: Tue, 19 Oct 93 21:47:39 PDT
To: Sandy <72114.1712@CompuServe.COM>
Subject: Re: JUDGMENT PROOFING
In-Reply-To: <931019173503_72114.1712_FHF72-1@CompuServe.COM>
Message-ID: <9310200229.AA01472@dink.foretune.co.jp>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


You write:

>                  Low Profile = Minimal Hassle

Bingo.  However, please note that one difference between the past
and the present is that the reason "hard" encryption is needed is
because electronic communication is so inherently insecure.  In
the past, communications tended to be hard to intercept but easy
to read, today the opposite is becoming true.

Thus, the difference is that today, it's much harder to be
discreet -- the encryption is a red flag.  "What's he hiding?"
And as any intelligence analyst can tell you, even traffic analysis
can tell you a _lot_.

Suggested Reading: The Spycatcher's Encyclopaedia of Espionage, by
Peter Wright.  VERY entertaining.





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Robert J. Woodhead" <trebor@foretune.co.jp>
Date: Tue, 19 Oct 93 19:42:29 PDT
To: Stanton McCandlish <mech@eff.org>
Subject: Re: why anon bank acct?
In-Reply-To: <199310191941.AA14999@eff.org>
Message-ID: <9310200241.AA01659@dink.foretune.co.jp>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Stanton writes:

>> Avoiding taxes just doesn't cut it for me; much as I hate to pay them,
>> I recognise the need to do so.

>Need?  Need to keep from being arrested or fined, yeah I can see that.

Not at all.  I recognise that, however inefficient, taxes pay to maintain
the legal and physical environment that makes my life more comfortable.
There are many oppressive things about governments, but _by_and_large_
the US government is one of the least oppressive, and the vast majority
of the people who work in it are honest and well-intentioned.

What I hope comes out of groups like cypherpunks are ways to make the
government better and more responsive to the needs of the citizenry
(in other words, some good checks and balances), rather than petty
ways to avoid a few bucks in taxes.  Rather than aspire to join the
alleged clique of rich and powerful tax evaders, might it not be better
to aspire to develop techniques that both maintain privacy but guaran-
tee that they have to pay their share of the load.  Hint: develop
something that makes it worth their while.





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Stanton McCandlish <mech@eff.org>
Date: Wed, 20 Oct 93 08:47:44 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: crypto anarchy
In-Reply-To: <9310201421.AB11672@anon.penet.fi>
Message-ID: <199310201547.AA06620@eff.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> If we need this stuff out VERY soon, then there is a serious problem:
> Time-Warner, AT&T, etc. can afford to spend major $$$ on implementing
> technology, including having employees work on these projects full
> time, while the cypherpunks work that goes on is largely on a part
> time basis by otherwise employed professionals, or students.

Hadn't meant to sound alarmist.  By "VERY soon" I mean, within the next
couple of years. 

> Many volunteers have spent countless man-hours working on PGP, and by
> no stretch of anybody's imagination is it "plug-n-play" ready.  I
> can't tell you how many announcements of upcoming Windows PGP
> front-ends I've seen.  I'm sure many hobbyists are working on it as
> much as they can, and I'm glad, but these people can't be expected to
> compete with real software development efforts.
> A software company that wants to make "plug-and-play" easy to use
> crypto software which meets #1 and #2 - including integration into
> popular mail software - will bury PGP or RIPEM by sheer numbers.  Most
> people fall into the "clueless and/or lazy" category.

Yes, this is so.  The problem however is not just that PGP is difficult. 
The entire UseNet/Internet experience is too difficult for the average
person, who probably doesn't even know which end of a diskette to insert
first.  The media conglomerates will bring a filtered and [surprise!]
TV-like version of the net to households and offices, that will be simple
and easy, point and shoot.  Useless, censored, commercialized to the
point of saturation.  I don't see any room for privacy in a network
like that.  *That's* what we're up against.

Sure, no one can afford to write cypherpunks code full time, but what can
be done should be done, and hopefully people will collaborate more.  Every
tool that makes it easier to integrate is a step in the right direction. 
The various scripts and utils that people have come up with for PGP use
on "the" net, GenMSG for Fido mail, the menu/shell programs, it's all a
step in the right direction.

-- 
-=> mech@eff.org <=-
Stanton McCandlish     Electronic Frontier Foundation Online Activist & SysOp
"A nation that is afraid to let its people judge the truth and falsehood of
ideas in an open market is a nation that is afraid of its people." -JFK
NitV-DC BBS 202-232-2715, Fido 1:109/? IndraNet 369:111/1, 14.4V32b 16.8ZyX



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Robert J. Woodhead" <trebor@foretune.co.jp>
Date: Tue, 19 Oct 93 19:52:38 PDT
To: catalyst@netcom.com (Scott Collins)
Subject: Re: Photocopying money
In-Reply-To: <9310192316.AA26432@newton.apple.com>
Message-ID: <9310200250.AA01843@dink.foretune.co.jp>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Scott writes:

>To my knowledge, vending machines don't do optical recognition. 

In Japan they do.  Some banks recently got scammed by people putting
photocopied Y10,000 ($100) bills into changers at the banks (getting
10 Y1,000 in return).  They've now done a ROM upgrade on the machines.

A cultural point: Japan is a very cash-oriented society, so nobody
blinked twice when someone went up to the changing machine and plunked
10 or 20 bills into it.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: owen@autodesk.com (D. Owen Rowley)
Date: Wed, 20 Oct 93 13:42:39 PDT
To: m5@vail.tivoli.com
Subject: Re: your mail Re: on anonymity, identity, reputation, and spoofing
Message-ID: <9310201857.AA04886@lux.YP.acad>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


 > From: m5@vail.tivoli.com (Mike McNally)
 >>I also suspect that such attempts will flush out a whole raft problems and
 >>deficiencies along with  those who exploit such things.
 >>Hopefully new protocols and services can be developed which will minimise 
 >>vulnerability and maximise protection for bussiness assets while allowing
 >>us as much freedom as possible.
 
 > Why does this preclude continuation of net services as they exist
 > today?  You seem to feel that there can only be one mode of use for
 > network resources.  

No, I have quite a bit of experience in network management.
It certainly does not preclude continuation of current services.
I am trying to get people to expand their scope of thinking beyond
the mere technical capabilitys and into the practical realities
and political/social consequences of said technology.
I am not championing any particular set of these, i am championing
efforts to get us as much freedom and as much privacy as possible.
I find that the limited scope of individuals who are *living
in science fiction* scenarios to be kinda short sighted however.

 > If businesses want to use the net only under the
 > aegis of some authentication/credentialing scheme, fine!  That means I
 > may or may not choose too participate, or that I may choose to
 > participate as "myself" while still maintaining other digital
 > alter-egos for other purposes.

of course, I am not saying otherwise!


 >>Nobody really knows what those things will be,and it is sorta problematic to
 >  > make public laundrey lists of vulnerabilitys without some sort of idea
 >  > how to deal with cleaning up the mess. We are going to have to learn by 
 >  > example.
 
 > Why are you so stuck on the idea of "cleaning up a mess"?  The network
 > is a resource.  It can be used concurrently in lots of different ways.
 > You're free to start up your own set of authenticated services this
 > afternoon if you like.

I and some others are indeed working on just that.
I hope you are too.

Surely you are aware that many of the currently used network services 
are woefully insecure and prone to abuse?

 >  > My main point though is that eventually business will find decentralised
 >  > anarchic networks to be hostile territory, and will move on to less
 >  > vulnerable, more reliable networks where user authentication, and 
 >  > accountable security are provided.
 
 > Really?  So the presence of paying customers on the anarchic networks
 > won't be attractive?  We've had experience with lots of nasty problems
 > on the Internet already, and yet companies are all the time paying for
 > things like T1 channels for better service.

yup, all you say here is true.
but thats for now.
I am predicting that there will be trouble in paradise, and that
when it gets to the point where business is loosing more than they
are gaining there will be hell to pay.

You are under no obloigation to agree or to even pay any attention to me.
But I warn you now, I'm a terrible *I-told-you-so*.

 >  > It means an unfolding from two dimensional thinking ( text) to three
 >  > dimensional thinking ( virtual reality ).
 
 > I think you're selling text short, but that's another discussion.

I am trying to put it in perspective, that doesn't mean I discount its
value.

 >>perhaps you are unaware of some of the more starling things that are being 
 >>done with biofeedback interfaces.
 
 > I'm aware of plenty of hype and pipe-dreams, but little reality.
 > Sure, it'd be neat though.  What does it have to do with
 > authentication and accountability?

Since you seem to believe these things to be mere hype, I'll leave it
to your imagination.

 > I'm losing track of what this has to do with "need" for
 > accountability.
 
you manged to mix up a great deal of what I was saying.
I don't have time or energy to untangle it for you.

but put simply.. 
accountability will be driven by the desire for it.
Those who *need* it .. will have it..

LUX ./. owen




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: ferguson@icm1.icp.net (Paul Ferguson x2044)
Date: Wed, 20 Oct 93 09:27:50 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: (fwd) Re: Error in RFC1 321 (MD5)?
Message-ID: <9310201725.AA14954@icm1.icp.net>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text


I thought (perhaps) this may be of interest -

Forwarded message:

> Newsgroups: sci.crypt
> Subject: Re: Error in RFC1 321 (MD5) ?
> Date: 18 Oct 93 09:10:29
> Organization: RSA Data Security, Inc.
> Lines: 27
> Distribution: world
> Message-ID: <BURT.93Oct18091029@chirality.rsa.com>
> References: <29u8jqINNn0s@umbc7.umbc.edu>
> NNTP-Posting-Host: chirality.rsa.com
> In-reply-to: olson@umbc.edu's message of 18 Oct 1993 10:18:34 -0400
> 
> In article <29u8jqINNn0s@umbc7.umbc.edu> olson@umbc.edu (Bryan G. Olson) writes:
> 
>    I just ftp'd RFC 1321 ( MD5 Message-Digest Algorithm ) from
>    rsa.com, and I believe there is a minor error in the 
>    specification of the algorithm.
> 
>    On page 5, the four operations used in the four rounds are
>    defined, and the operations for round 3 and 4 seem to have
>    mis-matched parameter names.  Specifically from page 5:
> 
>    [...]
>    >>     /* Round 3. */
>    >>     /* Let [abcd k s t] denote the operation
>    >>          a = b + ((a + H(b,c,d) + X[k] + T[i]) <<< s). */
>    >>     /* Do the following 16 operations. */
>    [...]
>    >>     /* Round 4. */
>    >>     /* Let [abcd k s t] denote the operation
>    >>          a = b + ((a + I(b,c,d) + X[k] + T[i]) <<< s). */
>    >>     /* Do the following 16 operations. */
>    [...]
> 
> Yes, the 't' should be an 'i'. Not a major source of confusion, but
> something that should be noted and corrected.
> 
> -- Burt Kaliski
> RSA Laboratories
> 

_____________________________________________________________________________
Paul Ferguson                                                               
Mindbank Consulting Group                                    fergp@sytex.com   
Fairfax, Virginia  USA                                       ferguson@icp.net



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Karl Lui Barrus <klbarrus@owlnet.rice.edu>
Date: Wed, 20 Oct 93 10:32:34 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: crypto technique
Message-ID: <9310201728.AA13517@screech.owlnet.rice.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----


>So, if I could prevent you from finding c, then you couldn't solve it. 
>How can I do this?  By adding another constant.

[...]

>136.375x^4 + 139.25x^3 + 33.625x^2 + 110.75x + 179

>So what values for A,B,C,D,E,& F did I use?  Have fun factoring!  :)

Sure, I'll give it a whirl as soon as my exams are over.

Offhand, it looks like you get five equations in six unknowns, which
is under-specified.  So possibly one parameter can take on any value
(or maybe any odd value), and the rest are then solved in terms of the
fixed variable.  The variable paramter can only take on values less
than P (maybe only odd values under P), the number of unknows is then
2*(nestings) - 1; everything still looks linear.

However, I haven't actually tried yet, so we'll see!

This isn't meant as a flame (in fact, this method is very
interesting), but you've posted two or three methods and declared them
all impossible to break.  Are you yourself trying to break these
schemes?  The very first method posted would have fallen under
scrutiny.

Also, mail any additional info to me directly; I'm behind on list
mail.

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.3a

iQCVAgUBLMV1CIOA7OpLWtYzAQGQRAP8CT79JpMKxVb/R//GVUfmCJ2ybtf8ASGY
BZa8bsL1VG49sxpoe7LsnQH2mJVAv3GloJhnuVN0d/MbTmohN6mgtGXbrQxvTdyn
r0eaTYcrXI0hiR5ahPp5SdfAHGuQ9LeQDermiiU+DK8I6lc+K6tzG0ZOUvs4r80n
cF4K9aXSaLQ=
=wMas
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: F_GRIFFITH@CCSVAX.SFASU.EDU
Date: Wed, 20 Oct 93 10:57:45 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re:backing
Message-ID: <931020125339.22e1cf04@CCSVAX.SFASU.EDU>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


From:	CCSVAX::F_GRIFFITH   19-OCT-1993 16:06:40.42
To:	SMTP%"owner-cypherpunks@toad.com"
CC:	F_GRIFFITH
Subj:	Re: backing?

peb:if a currency loses reputation (value) people will switch to a
better reputation (value) currency (paraphrase)

Greshams law: "bad money drives out good"
i.e. where people have a choice (e.g. gold vs greenbacks post Civil
War), in making payments, they will use the lesser value money and
keep the higher value.  Thus, the lesser value money will circulate,
the higher value money will not.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: holland@CS.ColoState.EDU (douglas craig holland)
Date: Wed, 20 Oct 93 12:22:37 PDT
To: mech@eff.org (Stanton McCandlish)
Subject: Re: crypto anarchy
In-Reply-To: <199310201547.AA06620@eff.org>
Message-ID: <9310201917.AA20166@beethoven>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text


> 
> Yes, this is so.  The problem however is not just that PGP is difficult. 
> The entire UseNet/Internet experience is too difficult for the average
> person, who probably doesn't even know which end of a diskette to insert
> first.  The media conglomerates will bring a filtered and [surprise!]
> TV-like version of the net to households and offices, that will be simple
> and easy, point and shoot.  Useless, censored, commercialized to the
> point of saturation.  I don't see any room for privacy in a network
> like that.  *That's* what we're up against.
> 
The candy-like "family oriented" overcommercialized network is already
here, known as Prodigy.  Those guys will bounce your email if you say
"I have a bridge in Brooklyn for sale" (implying gullibility) for posting
commercially.  My subscription to those losers didn't last two months.
Last that I heard, Prodigy was losing money, hope they go broke.

> Sure, no one can afford to write cypherpunks code full time, but what can
> be done should be done, and hopefully people will collaborate more.  Every
> tool that makes it easier to integrate is a step in the right direction. 
> The various scripts and utils that people have come up with for PGP use
> on "the" net, GenMSG for Fido mail, the menu/shell programs, it's all a
> step in the right direction.
> 
Agreed.  So far as I know, there are a few commercial services that don't
censor their customers and aren't afraid to let them have full access to
the Internet, such as the WELL and Colorado Supernet.

Doug

|  Doug Holland                       | Proud member of:
|  holland@beethoven.cs.colostate.edu | Mathematicians Against Drunk Deriving
|  Finger for PGP 2.2 key             | 



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Perry E. Metzger" <pmetzger@lehman.com>
Date: Wed, 20 Oct 93 10:22:35 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: why anon bank acct?
In-Reply-To: <9310200938.AA07858@dink.foretune.co.jp>
Message-ID: <9310201718.AA16248@snark.lehman.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



"Robert J. Woodhead" says:
> Ray writes:
> 
> >   Simple. Privatize those parts of government so they can chose
> >the services they want to buy.
> 
> An admirable solution, but it does not take into account the vested
> interests involved.  The only way to deal with them is to design a
> new system that is sufficiently more efficient (and/or wealth
> generating) that they are better off supporting it than opposing
> it.  The U.S. Government has been under construction for over 200
> years; you are not going to break it apart so easily.

Who needs to break it? At the current rate, it will have destroyed
itself within a decade. "Stability" in our fair land is an illusion.
The government cannot possibly pay for all the services it pretends it
can. The deficit is going to rise another $1 Trillion in the next four
years under Bill Clinton's very optimistic projections -- my suspicion
is that the slowdown in economic activity he is creating will make it
rise more like $2 Trillion or more. At some point, the bond buyers
stop buying, and thats the end of the game. The Clinton Administration
is currently pretending to itself that it can add the most expensive
government program of all time, a trillion dollar socialized medicine
program, while all this is happening. Well, let them dream.

Raising taxes at this point will only DECREASE revenue. They cannot
raise more money than they already consume. They can only lower the
deficit by cutbacks, and they are pressing ahead with more new
spending each year in spite of the claims. (When you hear them say
"budget cuts", that means "we are going to spend less than we wanted
to, not less than we spent last year".)

There are also trillions of dollars in off-books unfunded debt, such
as federal obligations to federal retirees, the invisible "social
security trust fund" (hah!), federal obligations associated with loan
guarantees, banking insurance schemes, etc. 

The party will be over soon enough. Humpty Dumpty doesn't need to be
pushed.

Perry





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: nobody@rosebud.ee.uh.edu
Date: Wed, 20 Oct 93 11:27:45 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Paper Shredders
Message-ID: <9310201824.AA10107@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Does anyone know of an AFFORDABLE shredder that really destroys documents
by cutting them into confetti, rather than the easy-to-reassemble strips
that the typical shredder does?




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: sameer@netcom.com (Sameer Parekh)
Date: Wed, 20 Oct 93 13:52:40 PDT
To: trebor@foretune.co.jp (Robert J. Woodhead)
Subject: Re: why anon bank acct?
In-Reply-To: <9310200938.AA07858@dink.foretune.co.jp>
Message-ID: <9310202047.AA07231@netcom.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Robert J. Woodhead said:
> 
> Ray writes:
> 
> >   Simple. Privatize those parts of government so they can chose
> >the services they want to buy.
> 
> An admirable solution, but it does not take into account the vested
> interests involved.  The only way to deal with them is to design a
> new system that is sufficiently more efficient (and/or wealth
> generating) that they are better off supporting it than opposing
> it.  The U.S. Government has been under construction for over 200
> years; you are not going to break it apart so easily.
> 
> 
	I'd suggest that the politics discussion be taken to another
forum?

-- 
Sameer
sameer@netcom.com




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: peb@PROCASE.COM (Paul Baclace)
Date: Wed, 20 Oct 93 14:07:50 PDT
To: F_GRIFFITH@CCSVAX.SFASU.EDU
Subject: Re:backing
Message-ID: <9310202105.AA03884@banff.procase.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



>Greshams law: "bad money drives out good"

Yes, but the money changers in Moscow are fairly busy converting bad money
to good.  Certainly, people will spend the bad money as soon as they get it,
so it circulates more, but for long term storage (which in Russia could mean
a few weeks at the rate of inflation they have (was in the quadrillions annually
a few months ago)), the higher quality money is used.


Paul E. Baclace
peb@procase.com





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: an42035@anon.penet.fi (the Surgeon)
Date: Wed, 20 Oct 93 07:22:33 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: crypto anarchy
Message-ID: <9310201421.AB11672@anon.penet.fi>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

>Count on it.  Things are moving much too slowly on "our" side.  Entities
>like AT&T, Warner, etc. stand a good chance of controlling much of what
>becomes "the net" in the future, if much of this technology is not:

>1) in place and functional
>2) easy to use by the clueless and lazy as well as techies
>3) accepted for use within the network, indeed considered *part of* the
>   network both as "flavour" and technical specifications
>4) impossible to remove - no govt/corporate turning back of the tide

>VERY soon.  In addition the populace has to become aware of:

>4) HOW to do all of this - easy "newbie" software is needed - plug-n-play
>5) that privacy is possible.  Most have forgotten this.

If we need this stuff out VERY soon, then there is a serious problem:
Time-Warner, AT&T, etc. can afford to spend major $$$ on implementing
technology, including having employees work on these projects full
time, while the cypherpunks work that goes on is largely on a part
time basis by otherwise employed professionals, or students.

Not to insult anybody; each contribution in anonymous mail, digital
cash, dc-nets, crypto software, etc. is GREATLY appreciated.  

However, the progress that has been made still has a fun oriented
research and development slant.  

But all the same, if what you are saying is that these
volunteer/hacker types have to battle for the future of the net,
there's no way.  I mean, look at all the stuff Phil Zimmerman went
through to put out one crypto program.  Can you expect anybody else to
do the same?

Many volunteers have spent countless man-hours working on PGP, and by
no stretch of anybody's imagination is it "plug-n-play" ready.  I
can't tell you how many announcements of upcoming Windows PGP
front-ends I've seen.  I'm sure many hobbyists are working on it as
much as they can, and I'm glad, but these people can't be expected to
compete with real software development efforts.

A software company that wants to make "plug-and-play" easy to use
crypto software which meets #1 and #2 - including integration into
popular mail software - will bury PGP or RIPEM by sheer numbers.  Most
people fall into the "clueless and/or lazy" category.

>There's a lot of work to do.

The Wired article may have called cypherpunks "millionaire hackers",
but I don't think the majority of this list can afford to work on
cypherpunks stuff full time like it probably needs to be worked on.

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Version: 2.3a

iQBVAgUBLMRcPcOOfkF1iwTdAQE7ygH+OixoYSJBqiH5HbLj4TSjnEaUJINZlndk
/zBYfigU0hFYB12rEpI1MBsqep9DNSzR4aOqyQMz4WQ45ayBCp4ekw==
=kQBw
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
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From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Dave Banisar <banisar@washofc.cpsr.org>
Date: Wed, 20 Oct 93 13:12:38 PDT
To: CYPHERPUNKS <CYPHERPUNKS@toad.com>
Subject: US Privacy Council Seminar
Message-ID: <00541.2833976342.141@washofc.cpsr.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


  US Privacy Council Seminar 10/22
  ***********************************************************
  
                          [please post]
  
        US Privacy Council Brown Bag Lunch Seminar Series
  
     "Privacy and the National Informational Infrastructure"
  
                        Patricia Faley
                 US Office of Consumer Affairs
  
  
                     CPSR Washington Office
                    Friday, October 22, 1993
                        12:00 - 2:00 pm
  

    Pat Faley is Acting Director of the United States Office of
Consumer Affairs and Chair of the Working Group on Privacy,
Information Policy Committee, Information Infrastructure Task Force.
She will discuss the Clinton Administration's privacy proposals for
the NII for the NII and for the health care reform program.
  
     Following Ms. Faley's talk, there will be a general meeting
of the US Privacy Council to discuss the agenda for the Clinton
administration on privacy issues such as health care, the SSN,  the
Clipper Chip, and amendments to the Fair Credit Reporting Act.
  
  
  	CPSR Washington Office
  	666 Pennsylvania Ave., SE
  	Suite 303
  	Washington, DC
  	202/544-9240
  	(one block from the Eastern Market metro)
  

  In cooperation with Computer Professionals for Social
Responsibility.

For more information on the US Privacy Council, please contact Evan
Hendricks at 202-829-3660.
  
  [if you would like to be notified of future USPC
  Seminars, please send a note with e-mail address to
  banisar@washofc.cpsr.org]
  
  ***********************************************************





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: kone@COURIER1.SHA.CORNELL.EDU
Date: Wed, 20 Oct 93 10:17:45 PDT
To: <cypherpunks@toad.com>
Subject: taggnets
Message-ID: <2CC59AF1@COURIER1.SHA.CORNELL.EDU>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Taggnets are also found in the main components of "home-made" bombs.  At least
as early as '85. (call it a childhood indiscretion.)  Components like high
nitrogen fertilizer and heating oil #5.  This alows the investigator to narrow
down about when and where the components were bought.  (I had bought a large
quanty with my fathers card.) Most cases are solved because the "mad-bomber"
is follish. i.e. keeps on buying more components or explosives, after the
first bombing.  Or, like me, bought in large quantys with no real reason too.
Just something to think about.
Kone. (yes it is a real name.)




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: edgar@spectrx.Saigon.COM (Edgar W. Swank)
Date: Wed, 20 Oct 93 23:42:52 PDT
To: Cypherpunks          <cypherpunks@toad.com>
Subject: TEMPEST: Re: Monitor radiation overlooking./DES weakness
Message-ID: <X5RqBc10w165w@spectrx.saigon.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Victor Borisov posted the following on Oct 15:

    I read about overlooking of monitor radiation.  Introder can scan
    the electron-beam radiation from electron-gun.  He simple transmit
    this radiation to self electron-gun and sinchronize frequance.
    This method work with b/w monitor.  The overlooking of
    color-monitor more dificult - introder will see 4 gradation of
    gray (all guns off, work one, two, three guns).  But we can select
    spesial colors (red-blue or blue-green) and allways will work only
    one (or two) guns.  In this way introder will see dark (or light)
    gray screen without any information!!!

    Is it corect?  Do now present more improve overlooking system?

We in the USA refer to this technology as TEMPEST, which is an acronym
for Transient ElectroMagnetic Pulse Emanation STandard or Transient
Electromagnetic Pulse Surveillance Technology. Victor, I have a long
(58K) document about this which I'll be glad to send you, just ask.  I
think I got it from this list last August maybe.

I haven't seen Victor's idea of adjusting screen colors before. I
suspect that it would take some balancing of the colors so the combo
for foreground/background would be the same strength to a close
tolerance. Certainly I wouldn't trust it without confirmation from
an experiment that a state-of-the-art TEMPEST device couldn't resolve
any information. Victor, could your friend in the KGB arrange for such
an experiment??

TEMPEST defenses considered here involve using metal cabinets and
other shielding.  One relatively inexpensive approach uses metallic
wallpaper! Here are some references:

  From: szebra!novavax.nova.edu!yanek (Yanek Martinson)
  Subject: INFO: TEMPEST companies
  To: toad.com!cypherpunks
  Date: Wed, 16 Dec 92 20:33:10 EDT
  X-Mailer: Elm [version 2.1 PL1]

  Lindgren RF Enclosures
  400 Gigh Grove Blvd.
  Glendale Heights, IL 60139

  Contact: Wayne Martin
  708-307-7200
  FAX: 708-307-7571

  "LT" Series Shielding System is a complete line of modular enclosures,
  equipment cabinets and custom enclosures available in virtually all
  shielding materials.  The system features exclusive Double Electrically
  Isolated construction for maximum attenuation.  All enclosures are fully
  tested and guaranteed.  Aplication assistance available.

  Secure Systems & Services
  Div. of The R/H Factor Corp.
  13990 Goldmark Dr., Ste.401
  Dallas, TX 75240

  Contact: Ray Helsop
  214-907-9288
  FAX: 214-669-9160

  TEMPEST Products, Systems & Services are for Military/Industrial firms
  concerned with threat of information security and protection by [sic]
  electronic eavesdroppoing; also commercial EMI/RFI, reduced emissions
  products.  We provide TEMPEST service and support, data encryption,
  F.I.S.A. Facility Information Security Assessment Studies, site planning,
  installation design, facility upgrades, etc.

  International Paper Co.
  Longmeadow Rd.
  Tuxedo, NU 10987

  Contact: Larry Fahy
  914-577-7247

  SAF'N SHIELDED (tm)

  International Paper provides a unique wallcovering that prevents
  electromagnetic interference (EMI), wireless electronic espionage, and
  other forms of electromagnetic eavesdropping.  The new wallcovering, a
  composite structure that incorporates a nonwoven mat of metallic fibers,
  has been TEMPEST-tested by the U.S. government and can achieve attenuation
  levels over 100dB.  The material, which eliminates the added costs of
  "hardening" or adding protective shielding to individual pieces of
  electronic equipment, is being used both in primary applications and to
  upgrade facilities to higher levels of protection.  It also provides a way
  to plug EMI leaks quickly and effectively.  Unlike woven or sheet metal,
  which typically require gutting entire rooms, this flexible, lightweight
  material goes up as quickly as wallpaper.  No special tools are needed, and
  downtime is minimal.

  Transaction Security, Inc.
  21 Industrial Ave.
  Upper Saddle River, NJ 07458

  Contact: O. Mark Hastings
  201-573-1150

  Steel TEMPEST-type enclosures for any size computer hardware.
  Subject: New number for Secure Systems & Services

            The new number for SS&S is (214) 907-9288
            Also, Lindgren RF Enclosures informed me that they
            now have exclusive license to market International Paper
            Company's SAF'N SHIELDED; and they give free samples ;-))

            JPW
  ====================================================================
  Date: Mon, 28 Dec 92 11:57:49 PDT
  From: szebra!jplpost.Jpl.Nasa.Gov!wendtj (Jeffrey P Wendt)
  To: toad.com!cypherpunks
  Subject: TEMPEST companies

            I have recieved information from Veratec re: the product
            Safe`n'Shield, and I have to say that for an inf0 packet,
            they have done a great job.

            The folder comes with 2 sample squares of the Safe`n'
            Shield material, and the specs for their product are as
            follows:
            >-----------------------------------------------------------
            > Shielding Effectiveness of SAFE`N'SHIELDED (R)
            >(in dB Attenuation)
            >___________________________________________________________
            >SAF`N'40 tm             10' x 20' x 8' Room
            >___________________________________________________________
            >    10KHz     1MHz      50MHz     400MHz    1GHz
            >-----------------------------------------------------------
            >    >100       76        53         57       62
            >___________________________________________________________

            >___________________________________________________________
            >SAF`N'60 tm              8' x 8' x 8' Room
            >___________________________________________________________
            >    10KHz     1MHz      50MHz     400MHz    1GHz
            >-----------------------------------------------------------
            >    >100      N/T*       67         72       87
            >___________________________________________________________

            >___________________________________________________________
            >SAF`N'80 tm              8' x 8' x 8' Room
            >___________________________________________________________
            >    10KHz     1MHz      50MHz     400MHz    1GHz
            >-----------------------------------------------------------
            >    >100      >81        100        90       90
            >___________________________________________________________

            In addition to some general notes and a customer list, they
            provide a 25 page booklet on construction techniques; both
            new and existing.  The material is very thin, about the same
            weight and feel as good bond paper.  The manufacturer states
            that this material meets the NSA 65-6 spec using this
            nonwoven material as the priamary shield.

            The material is applied just like wall paper, with comercial
            wallpaper glue, and from a construction point of view this
            stuff looks like you could do an 8x8x8 romm in a few hours.
            Alas, I did not recieve a price list on the material, but I
            am sure it will be a hell-of-a-lot cheaper that buying
            TEMPEST certified computers, and best of all...you don't
            have to register a damn thing ;-)).

            The address is:  Veretec
                             Long Meadow Road
                             Tuxedo, New York 10987
                             (919) 577-7447

Victor Continues:

    Some words about DES - I spoke with one cryptoanalisyst from KGB
    and he sow, that for number crypto algotitm c(key, text) (key is
    keyLength tall) present f(key, text), that for all key1 and key2
    present key with length keyLength, that c(key2, c(key1,
    text))==f(key, text).

    He also say, that now present f() for c()=des(), more f() wery
    like des().

    That`s why for decrypting of des(k1, des(k2, ...  des(kN, text)
    ...  )) we must try 2^56 keys with spetial function.

Victor seems to be saying that his friend is saying that DES is a
"group" (if I remember my terms correctly), which somebody was
supposed to have proven wasn't the case.  Although, strictly speaking,
a "group" was supposed to be f=des, where Victor just says it's "very
like DES."

But multiple encryptions as Victor describes are not used. Rather
alternating encryptions and DEcryptions.  For example triple DES
dese(k1, desd(k2, dese(k3, plaintext)))  where "dese" is DES
encryption and "desd" is DES decryption.  What does your friend in
the KGB have to say about that, Victor?  If triple-DES reduces to
any reasonable transformation of (some) 56-bit key then it's almost
as easy to break as single-DES which we now know only requires 3 hours
on a $1 million specialized machine.

Of more interest here, Victor, is what your KGB friend says about the
IDEA cipher, RSA Public Key encryption, and the MD5 message digest,
all of which are used in PGP.  We would also like to know if the KGB
has found any weaknesses in PGP or if they've even had occasion to try
to find any.

--
edgar@spectrx.saigon.com (Edgar W. Swank)
SPECTROX SYSTEMS +1.408.252.1005  Cupertino, Ca





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: edgar@spectrx.Saigon.COM (Edgar W. Swank)
Date: Wed, 20 Oct 93 23:42:40 PDT
To: Cypherpunks          <cypherpunks@toad.com>
Subject: Entrapment Defense
Message-ID: <k6RqBc11w165w@spectrx.saigon.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Carl Ellison posted here:

    If all you're worried about is entrapment, you need only ask the
    person in question if s/he works for any law enforcement or
    surveillance agency.  If they lie, then anything after that is
    entrapment.

    I'm not a lawyer but I learned this from my masseuse in SLC UT,
    where mixed-gender massage is considered a "sex act for hire" and
    she was constantly subject to entrapment.

I'm not at all sure if the above is true.  This came up on this list
a few months ago when I was suggesting that people might put a
statement, "I am/am not a Law Enforcement Officer or Agent" as part of
a "certificate of identity" they could mail to verify their PGP public
key.  At that time I think the concensus was that a LE officer could
sign (the negative form of) the statement and still observe crimes and
give testimony.

One example given was undercover narcotics officers who could not
answer affirmatively without jeopardizing their lives.

One defense attorney on another net told me that the entrapment
defense is rarely used anymore; "it's easier just to plead your client
guilty."  Apparently all the prosecuton has to show is that the
defendant had a "pre-existing disposition" to commit the crime.

Duncan Frissel, can you shed more light on this???

--
edgar@spectrx.saigon.com (Edgar W. Swank)
SPECTROX SYSTEMS +1.408.252.1005  Cupertino, Ca





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "I still don't know your name, stranger.  20-Oct-1993 1925" <yerazunis@aidev.enet.dec.com>
Date: Wed, 20 Oct 93 16:27:50 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Photocopying money
Message-ID: <9310202325.AA05280@enet-gw.pa.dec.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>It's true.  Canon did indeed create such a chip.  It's the same chip
>that's used in vending machines to scan dollar bills.  They built a
>prototype copier which prevented copying money, but I don't know if they
>actually decided to install the chip in all their assembly-line
>production copiers or not tho.

Nope.

There is no "chip" that scans dollar bills.  Dollar bill scanning is based
on the magnetic ink in a few simple stripes, the presence (actually, 
absence) of UV fluorescent inks, and not on optical recognition per se,
and besides, we all know how "reliable" such machines are.  NOT!

Besides, even if a pattern-match chip existed that could do it fast enough, 
simply turning the bill a few degrees (say, 45 degrees, across the glass)
would render the problem intractable...

And how about adding a background of stripes... something to really confuse
the chip....  

Sorry, no.

	-Bill 






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Karl Lui Barrus <klbarrus@owlnet.rice.edu>
Date: Wed, 20 Oct 93 14:32:48 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: crypto technique
Message-ID: <9310202130.AA09601@flammulated.owlnet.rice.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

One question before I work on this more at a later date.

Can you still decode properly if you take the modulus of each
coefficient?  I ask since if you can't, the modulus makes is harder to
find the constants, but as a side effect it also destroys the message.

Say I use

f = 29/2 x + 40
g = 135/2 f^2 + 135/2 f + 75

I get g = 110775 + 317155/4 x + 113535/8 x^2

This is easy to solve, so Matt takes the modulus of each coefficient
(some power of 2, I pick 32 here to keep it simple).

results in g' = 23 + 99/4 x + 127/8 x^2

Say I encode my message x = 5

g(5) = 6895725/8 mod 32 = 109/8

g'(5) = 4349/8 mod 32 = 253/8

Notice that these two results aren't equal at all!  

Am I misunderstanding the encoding (and decoding) process?  Aren't
these two results supposed to be equal?  I'm not getting the expected
result when each coefficient is reduced mod 32.


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.3a

iQCVAgUBLMWsI4OA7OpLWtYzAQHdMQP+Jy7gdjgyhg9vrwi8K+KkrVSDbciOy6Sb
BJQ1/zMg8inqmILbahO9SG3yTTh7+/k+OdUhiyxHYaaC5Jhv5n+QIvFTizHDA3VY
/M5uXpt883bBLBaCp3ICDsPJEtgzMePxySP3n+qKG+nZ9MUDQ7msLq7SDCqM6eUU
BXHHmjNjr+A=
=kjVG
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

-- 
Karl L. Barrus: klbarrus@owlnet.rice.edu         
keyID: 5AD633 hash: D1 59 9D 48 72 E9 19 D5  3D F3 93 7E 81 B5 CC 32 

"One man's mnemonic is another man's cryptography" 
  - my compilers prof discussing file naming in public directories



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Karl Lui Barrus <klbarrus@owlnet.rice.edu>
Date: Wed, 20 Oct 93 14:42:50 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: crypto technique - error
Message-ID: <9310202142.AA05100@great-gray.owlnet.rice.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Argh!

I made a math error reducing one of the terms.

g and g' do yield the same answer.

Whew, I thought something was messed up :-)

Karl




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Stanton McCandlish <mech@eff.org>
Date: Wed, 20 Oct 93 15:02:38 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Paper Shredders
In-Reply-To: <9310201824.AA10107@toad.com>
Message-ID: <199310202046.AA10197@eff.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> Does anyone know of an AFFORDABLE shredder that really destroys documents
> by cutting them into confetti, rather than the easy-to-reassemble strips
> that the typical shredder does?


Yeah, it's called fire.

-- 
-=> mech@eff.org <=-
Stanton McCandlish     Electronic Frontier Foundation Online Activist & SysOp
"A nation that is afraid to let its people judge the truth and falsehood of
ideas in an open market is a nation that is afraid of its people." -JFK
NitV-DC BBS 202-232-2715, Fido 1:109/? IndraNet 369:111/1, 14.4V32b 16.8ZyX



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: koontzd@lrcs.loral.com (David Koontz )
Date: Wed, 20 Oct 93 16:52:50 PDT
To: pmetzger@lehman.com
Subject: Re: Paper Shredders
Message-ID: <9310202349.AA12430@nebula.lrcs.loral.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Having been an AFSC 30670 (Electronic and Cryptographic Equipment Systems
Technician), and been assigned in hazardous areas you use document destroyers
on paper stuff - glass vials with grenade fuses).  Equipment destroyers
were 35 lb thermite charges, designed to sit on top of a standard piece
of equipment in a 19 inch relay rack.  I had orders to Iran but got diverted
when the Shah fell.  The liquid in the document destroyers was clear, and
we got to set one off for demo purposes twice a year (never did get to
set off thermite, though).  Had a one acre room half filled with crypto,
thermite would have brought the roof and lots of airconditioners down.

All the key cards were treated with lead acetate, they would burn without
leaving anything but a greasy wisp of ash.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: owen@autodesk.com (D. Owen Rowley)
Date: Wed, 20 Oct 93 17:32:39 PDT
To: pmetzger@lehman.com
Subject: Re: Paper Shredders
Message-ID: <9310210024.AA06006@lux.YP.acad>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



 > Stanton McCandlish says:
 > > > Does anyone know of an AFFORDABLE shredder that really destroys documents
 > > > by cutting them into confetti, rather than the easy-to-reassemble strips
 > > > that the typical shredder does?
 > > 
 > > Yeah, it's called fire.
 
 > Fire is, of course, an optimal solution, and those of us who live or
 > work in a building with a fireplace or incinerator would do well to
 > use it. However, its hard to spend every day burning things, and
 > besides that, many of us live and work in urban areas where fireplaces
 > and other places you can burn large numbers of papers are rare. The
 > question is thus not out of place.

brings back ugly memorys of burn detail, back when I was stationed
at a SAC command and control post up in the mountains near Westover AFB.

Every scrap of paper that was discarded had to be incinerated, and
we rotated through a schedule that made sure everybody got their
chance to share the experience.

 > By the way, the standard method for destroying embassy documents in
 > case of siezure (not done during the Iran hostage crisis) is
 > reportedly Thermit grenades. (Thermit would likely reduce a filing
 > cabinet to slag in moments.)
 
Sounds to me like an enterprising pyro could have a nice little 
operation, contracting with individuals to burn or blow up their
sealed bags of trash. I understand that Beavis and Butthead might
be looking for a new job, hey the little weinerheads might amount to 
something after all!

:-)

LUX ./. owen





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Karl Lui Barrus <klbarrus@owlnet.rice.edu>
Date: Wed, 20 Oct 93 16:07:52 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: crypto technique
Message-ID: <9310202303.AA20766@flammulated.owlnet.rice.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

Well,

I couldn't resist trying to find A, B, C, D, E, F.

You may be on to something, Matt.  The equations are underspecified,
and have many solutions - here are some I generated (any of them
match what you picked? :-)

> 103 110 10 1 51 139
> 103 156 251 1 151 19
> 103 169 254 1 157 43
> 103 72 17 1 191 195
> 103 111 5 1 209 99
> 103 1 18 1 237 203
> 103 202 16 1 251 187
> 5 237 10 5 43 139
> 5 201 4 5 99 91
> 5 64 3 5 113 83
> 5 200 23 5 129 243
> 5 62 8 5 173 123
> 5 164 21 5 185 227
> 5 198 12 5 189 155

Maybe you could look at what these alternate solutions are - it could
turn out that the mod operation creates extra valid solutions, which
would be quite undesirable.  But then, without the mod, the equation
may be too easy to pick apart.

Or maybe there is some other attack I haven't thought of or don't know
about.


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.3a

iQCVAgUBLMXDk4OA7OpLWtYzAQH/YwP/aTP4NwJ257A7GT1iWk7uhCYNEyJGTnkK
UrEm0Pw2n1yq3bMwzEem2EPbK+XOIzP1ql0VdgpLOyQ+7quMGWl1+IKY9Ht7wd2J
cy0ynJm8N1BZiJjJ2GHza+jAlqsOeVOICyT7f6Jxf/RU79/KSGQ/Jb0j52sHgrEi
LfIBPXZueUc=
=nzmt
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: baumbach@atmel.com (Peter Baumbach)
Date: Wed, 20 Oct 93 15:32:38 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Backing
Message-ID: <9310202203.AA23988@bass.chp.atmel.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


 Isn't a finite source of backing a problem since it rewards those who
hoard it?  

Also

 If neither Alice or Bob have a backed currency, does that mean they
cannot trade?  It has always frustrated me to see poor people stay
poor, because they believe they have to get their wealth from someone
else.  People can create their own wealth.  A currency that ignores
this possibillity seams bad to me.

 Has anyone invented a workable "barter currency"?  Can I.O.U.'s be
created such that they work like money?

Peter Baumbach
baumbach@atmel.com




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Matthew J Ghio <mg5n+@andrew.cmu.edu>
Date: Wed, 20 Oct 93 15:12:39 PDT
To: trebor@foretune.co.jp>
Subject: Re: Wizardry crypto
In-Reply-To: <9310200948.AA07977@dink.foretune.co.jp>
Message-ID: <4glPONa00VpLIvm0ZH@andrew.cmu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


"Robert J. Woodhead" <trebor@foretune.co.jp> wrote:

> Not much to do with encryption, but Wizardry encrypted it's
> game strings with a simple system that nobody broke (I guess
> tracing p-code was too much trouble).  It added X*the character
> position and Y*the line number+Z*the previous character, as I recall...

Yeah, that worked pretty well, considering that most people just looked
for text by scanning it with a sector editor.  Encrypting the text made
it undistinguishable from the program code.  Tracing the program code
would have been difficult, considering that it was written in the
original Apple pascal, which used a token compiler (I think).  But,
alas, the character files were in plaintext, and numerous people figured
out how to edit them.  So were the items and monsters.  One day when I
was very bored, I managed to decipher the maze data, and was then able
to build a map of the 10th level where dumapic didn't work.  As I
recall, it was just 2 bits to define each section of wall, arranged in
four groups of data defining each of the four directions, followed by
another block of data which used nybbles to define what was found in the
blocks created by the intersections of the walls.

One thing that I was able to break was the code book that was the
copy-protection for Return of Werdna.  As I recall, it was calculated in
base 9 (or some sort of nine number system which used the digits 1-9 but
excluded zero).  Once I realized that, breaking the code was just a
matter of simple arithmetic.  It was an interesting excercise in
code-breaking tho, and I did it without disassembling the program.
I must say that this was preferrable to the copy-protection in the
original Wizardry, in which my master disk eventually wore out from
overuse and developed bad sectors.  Gee...All this nostalgia has made me
want to play again.  It's a fun game, and the 3-D system was pretty
innovative for the time.  Does Sir-Tech still replace bad disks (from
the Apple II version)?




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Perry E. Metzger" <pmetzger@lehman.com>
Date: Wed, 20 Oct 93 15:17:49 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: why anon bank acct?
In-Reply-To: <9310202047.AA07231@netcom.netcom.com>
Message-ID: <9310202215.AA16533@snark.lehman.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Sameer Parekh says:
> 	I'd suggest that the politics discussion be taken to another
> forum?

Agreed. I'm partially responsible for continuing it, but I agree that
its irrelevant, no matter how interesting.

Perry




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Perry E. Metzger" <pmetzger@lehman.com>
Date: Wed, 20 Oct 93 15:32:49 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Paper Shredders
In-Reply-To: <199310202046.AA10197@eff.org>
Message-ID: <9310202230.AA16605@snark.lehman.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Stanton McCandlish says:
> > Does anyone know of an AFFORDABLE shredder that really destroys documents
> > by cutting them into confetti, rather than the easy-to-reassemble strips
> > that the typical shredder does?
> 
> Yeah, it's called fire.

Fire is, of course, an optimal solution, and those of us who live or
work in a building with a fireplace or incinerator would do well to
use it. However, its hard to spend every day burning things, and
besides that, many of us live and work in urban areas where fireplaces
and other places you can burn large numbers of papers are rare. The
question is thus not out of place.

By the way, the standard method for destroying embassy documents in
case of siezure (not done during the Iran hostage crisis) is
reportedly Thermit grenades. (Thermit would likely reduce a filing
cabinet to slag in moments.)

Perry




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Robert J. Woodhead" <trebor@foretune.co.jp>
Date: Wed, 20 Oct 93 02:42:30 PDT
To: rjc@gnu.ai.mit.edu (Ray)
Subject: Re: why anon bank acct?
In-Reply-To: <9310200256.AA06017@geech.gnu.ai.mit.edu>
Message-ID: <9310200938.AA07858@dink.foretune.co.jp>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Ray writes:

>   Simple. Privatize those parts of government so they can chose
>the services they want to buy.

An admirable solution, but it does not take into account the vested
interests involved.  The only way to deal with them is to design a
new system that is sufficiently more efficient (and/or wealth
generating) that they are better off supporting it than opposing
it.  The U.S. Government has been under construction for over 200
years; you are not going to break it apart so easily.





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Robert J. Woodhead" <trebor@foretune.co.jp>
Date: Wed, 20 Oct 93 02:52:30 PDT
To: Matthew J Ghio <mg5n+@andrew.cmu.edu>
Subject: Re: Photocopying money
In-Reply-To: <cgl_zF_00VpQEcdWEh@andrew.cmu.edu>
Message-ID: <9310200948.AA07977@dink.foretune.co.jp>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


(This is nostalgiaware - skip past it if you're only into messages
about encryption)

Matthew writes:

>Oh man... some
>vending machine companies overlook the most obvious things...  I guess
>it can happen to anybody (remember identify #9 and get 1000000 ep? :)

This is a reference to my game, Wizardry, an RPG that allowed each
character to have 8 items in inventory.  Alas, the code that checked
for valid keypresses in the "identify item" section had an error:

	IF (ch>='1') _or_ (ch<='8') then id_item(player,ord(ch)-ord('0'));

This allowed any key to be pressed, and ended up twiddling bits in
the data structure.  Pressing 9 gave you extra experience points.
Someone once sent me a list of what _all_ the keys on an Apple II
did.

We deliberately left this bug in the PC version of the game as it had
become part of the legend of the game.

Not much to do with encryption, but Wizardry encrypted it's game strings
with a simple system that nobody broke (I guess tracing p-code was
too much trouble).  It added X*the character position and Y*the line
number+Z*the previous character, as I recall...





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: mlshew@netcom.com (Mark Shewmaker)
Date: Wed, 20 Oct 93 18:52:51 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Clipper Chip report on 700 Club today (Wednesday)
Message-ID: <9310210149.AA23653@netcom6.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I hear there will be a report on the Clipper chip on today's
(Wednesday, October 20) 700 Club.  Sorry for the very late notice.

(The 700 Club, for those without benifit of a handy TV schedule,
will be on at 10:00 pm eastern on the Family Channel, and then at
2:00 am Thursday morning.  I don't know if there are different
feeds for the different time zones, so your milage might not vary.)




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Karl Lui Barrus <klbarrus@owlnet.rice.edu>
Date: Wed, 20 Oct 93 16:57:49 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: crypto technique
Message-ID: <9310202355.AA25861@flammulated.owlnet.rice.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

I think the modulus operation destroys uniqueness.

I don't have a proof, but after working symbolically for a while, I
tried an example:

f = a x + b
g = c f^2 + c f + d

where I picked a = 11/2, b = 8, c = 25/2, d = 3.  I also pick P = 16
to keep it small.

So g = 903 + 4675/4 x + 3025/8 x^2 mod 16

and if I reduce each coefficient mod 16, I get

  g' = 7 + 3/4 x + 81/8 x^2 mod 16

Great so far.  (And I checked to see that g and g' are equal).  So
let's look at all possible messages and their encryption:

x       g'(x)	x       g'(x)
- -       -----	-       -----
1	15/8	9	15/8
2	1	10	3
3	35/8	11	67/8
4	12	12	2
5	63/8	13	127/8
6	8	14	2
7	99/8	15	67/8
8	5	16	3

There is a serious problem in the above: the messages 10 and 16
encrypt to the same ciphertext; 11 and 15 also; and 12 and 14.  The
ciphertext 3 decodes to 10 or 16, 67/8 decodes to 11 or 15, 2 decodes
to 12 or 14.  That's 6 out of 16 messages, a sizeable 37.5%.

This behavior may have uses in fair coin flipping or some sort of
oblivious transfer (I am not claiming this in the general case, just
in the example above!), but not as encryption.

Besides, the fact that even messages encrypt to integers and odd
messages encrypt to fractions probably isn't good.

So Matt, with the numbers you used to generate the challenge problem,
see if any messages encrypt to the same ciphertext, just as a check.

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.3a

iQCVAgUBLMXPfIOA7OpLWtYzAQFoowP/XLN/poS5kB49IdCBxDe5lVUK05XZYNh+
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KmxlUE+1+8SSIsyyz6ctj7tLFp7wArxgVlOjjxQ7Yj92CIX81IShpvqWPu7rdqWN
1cCpphAwzHI=
=d0rL
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Gregory W. Kamen" <kgw@blkbox.COM>
Date: Wed, 20 Oct 93 17:07:50 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: subscribe
Message-ID: <9310201904.aa14163@blkbox.COM>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


subscribe




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Perry E. Metzger" <pmetzger@lehman.com>
Date: Wed, 20 Oct 93 16:22:38 PDT
To: baumbach@atmel.com
Subject: Re: Backing
In-Reply-To: <9310202203.AA23988@bass.chp.atmel.com>
Message-ID: <9310202317.AA16647@snark.lehman.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Not a cryptography message -- sorry but I thought I had to discuss it...

Peter Baumbach says:
>  Isn't a finite source of backing a problem since it rewards those who
> hoard it?  

No. It punishes those who hoard it -- they don't get interest on their
money.

>  If neither Alice or Bob have a backed currency, does that mean they
> cannot trade?

Depends if they consider what the other has to be of value. Its all up
to them.

>  Has anyone invented a workable "barter currency"?

I don't see what the point would be. Why not just deal in a medium of
exchange? 

> Can I.O.U.'s be created such that they work like money?

Sure. Thats what banknotes are.

Perry




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Karl Lui Barrus <klbarrus@owlnet.rice.edu>
Date: Wed, 20 Oct 93 17:42:39 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: crypto technique
Message-ID: <9310210038.AA00465@flammulated.owlnet.rice.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

Another possible problem with the technique is that the multiple
solutions are all valid.

For example, with two nestings and a = 11/2, b = 8, c = 25/2, d = 3, P = 16

I obtain g = 903 + 4675/4 x + 3025/8 x^2 mod 16
         g' = 7 + 3/4 x + 81/8 x^2 mod 16

where the g' is obtained from g by reducing the coefficients mod 16.

Solving the resulting equations yields two solutions:

a = 11/2, b = 8, c = 25/2, d = 3 (what I chose)

a = 31/2, b = 6, c = 17/2, d = 2

Plugging in the second solution:
 
         h = 359 + 6851/4 x + 16337/8 x^2 mod 16
         h' = 7 + 3/4 x + 81/8 x^2 mod 16

Notice that h' equals g'!

So the other solution can be used to form the same polynomial (which
we already saw doesn't encrypt uniquely).

Can this other solution be used for decryption as well?  I'd check but
I've REALLY got to go study now :-)

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.3a

iQCVAgUBLMXZsYOA7OpLWtYzAQFjMAP/Si1RuZjfnBNjLauB20rXaUXQMQqyiWBU
n/ur7ckXSEmWnADYQqZqCy1tb/+vf5zThQD2IpbF5IH8roxYG99nZQBvvtZAQfEO
3EdbM1esMTS/I0DwcLqkuG26GNNWYGZWi8MQ/0+eXfMa9BXZvkDTuuVBzzHBSXxW
84CVKvitZ68=
=FeJW
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: rjc@gnu.ai.mit.edu (Ray)
Date: Wed, 20 Oct 93 18:17:53 PDT
To: holland@cs.colostate.edu (douglas craig holland)
Subject: Re: crypto anarchy
In-Reply-To: <9310201917.AA20166@beethoven>
Message-ID: <9310210113.AA17741@geech.gnu.ai.mit.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


douglas craig holland () writes:
> Agreed.  So far as I know, there are a few commercial services that don't
> censor their customers and aren't afraid to let them have full access to
> the Internet, such as the WELL and Colorado Supernet.

  Panix and Digex doesn't censor either and they allow full access. I would bet
that netcom doesn't care either.


-- Ray Cromwell        |    Engineering is the implementation of science;    --
-- EE/Math Student     |       politics is the implementation of faith.      --
-- rjc@gnu.ai.mit.edu  |                         - Zetetic Commentaries      --




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Philippe_D_Nave" <pdn@dwroll.dw.att.com>
Date: Wed, 20 Oct 93 20:22:59 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Destroying data
Message-ID: <9310210322.AA17451@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Hello, data-killers!
 
After reading recent posts about how to keep data (and PC disk
drives) out of others' hands (shredders, double-layer encryption
schemes for 'revealing' a bogus plaintext while keeping the real
data hidden, etc), I had an evil thought....   >:)
 
Thermit grenades are pretty simple; all they do is provide a means
of initiating the "thermite reaction." (Look it up in a chemistry text.)
Equal parts aluminum powder and iron oxide (rust), finely ground and
ignited by (say) a burning magnesium strip, produce the same effect
and would quite satisfactorily destroy a disk drive in a matter of 
seconds. Likewise the PC, desk, floor - quite possibly setting the 
whole building on fire - "collateral damage," I guess.
 
Don't screw around with this stuff in your basement, people - it is a 
_very_ fast, _very_ hot reaction that produces a slug of superheated 
molten metal. For the truly paranoid among you, however, it might be
a viable last-ditch ploy to foil the Gestapo. Do be careful.
........................................................................
Philippe D. Nave, Jr.   | The person who does not use message encryption
pdn@dwroll.dw.att.com   | will soon be at the mercy of those who DO...
Denver, Colorado USA    | PGP public key: by arrangement.



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: mlshew@netcom.com (Mark Shewmaker)
Date: Wed, 20 Oct 93 21:32:38 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Clipper Chip report on 700 Club today (Wednesday)
Message-ID: <9310210429.AA09194@netcom6.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I was asked in private mail how the show went.

I'll write up a proper summary later, but for now, rest assured that it
was a most excellent report.  There were a few technical inaccuracies here
and there, (~"Clipper is the most secure encryption device they've come up
with yet"), but for the most part, if you were out to give a ten minute
explanation of the facts of life in regards to encryption to people who
would never read _Wired_, and actually spread useful and non-hostile memes,
you'd have a hard time outdoing that segment of the 700 club.

They interviewed a number of people, including a spokesman from NIST, EFF,
and Dorothy Denning herself.  The guy summarizing the situation at the
end mentioned how the government claims these regulations are just for
child molestors, terrorists, and criminals, but that after any regulatory
sytem is in place, there's nothing to keep them from redefining who the
criminals are, and so monitor anyone they like.

I'll write up a better summary in a few days.

(Remember: 10pm and 2am on the Family Channel.  I'd recommend watching it
if you still can.)

-Mark Shewmaker




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: jkyser@netcom.com (Jeff Kyser)
Date: Wed, 20 Oct 93 21:42:38 PDT
To: rjc@gnu.ai.mit.edu (Ray)
Subject: Re: crypto anarchy
In-Reply-To: <9310210113.AA17741@geech.gnu.ai.mit.edu>
Message-ID: <9310210442.AA15571@netcom2.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Thus didst Ray rise up and spake forth:
> 
> Panix and Digex doesn't censor either and they allow full access. I would bet
> that netcom doesn't care either.

Don't be so sure.  I heard that a netcom user was thrown off for posting cat 
torture messages in rec.pets.cats, among other things. 

>-- Ray Cromwell        |    Engineering is the implementation of science;    --
>-- EE/Math Student     |       politics is the implementation of faith.      --
>-- rjc@gnu.ai.mit.edu  |                         - Zetetic Commentaries      --
-- 
Jeff Kyser             PGP 2.3 public key available via finger 
jkyser@netcom.com      "Here we are now, entertain us." - Nirvana     



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Date: Wed, 20 Oct 93 21:52:52 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Something Silly, Something Serious
In-Reply-To: <9310210322.AA17451@toad.com>
Message-ID: <9310210451.AA27317@netcom5.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


SOMETHING SILLY:

A pseudospoofer who claims to be Philippe D. Nave (right!) sez:

> Don't screw around with this stuff in your basement, people - it is a 
> _very_ fast, _very_ hot reaction that produces a slug of superheated 
> molten metal. For the truly paranoid among you, however, it might be
                        ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^    
> a viable last-ditch ploy to foil the Gestapo. Do be careful.

Can I USE THIS to stop the PSEUDOSPOOFERS and TRAITORS who are
parasitically sucking the lifeblood out of my postings?

If I put this "termite" stuff on my terminal, can I stop the
MIND-GNAWING TERMITES AND RODENTS which are devouring my brilliance
and sapping my PRECIOUS BODILY FLUIDS?

Cypherpunk Mindmucking lives!

They are coming to take me away, ha ha, coming to take me away, hee hee.

Death to Traitors!


(This paranoid brought to you by the alleged pseuodospoofer Tim May,
in the hopes this will ease your S. Boxx-withdrawal symptoms.)

SOMETHING SERIOUS:

Seriously, I understand L. Dettweiler has asked to be unsubscribed.

For the record, I did not send him any e-mail these past several
weeks, either under my normal name or under any other names. I rarely
pseudonyms, and have never--that I recall right now--ever used them in
2-way communication. And never for the purposed Dettweiller/Boxx alleged.

I _have_ used remailers for several "demonstrations," which in most cases
I've later acknowledged. For example, the F-117 Stealth items six or so months
back, some "Information Liberation Front" articles (I won't say which
one, which provides me with enough "plausible deniability"...after
all, anybody can join the ILF merely by _acting_ like a member), and
some links to the "BlackNet" pieces (though, ironically, someone other
than me forwarded the main item to this list).

In other words, I do not use pseudonyms very often, and then never for
political debates, for taking "sides," etc. I also did not write the
short story "Master Key." Dettweiler wrote to me and claimed I was
being sly. I told him I did not write it, nor another piece--a
political piece that was quite good--that he claimed he "knew" I had
written. Then, after I publically indicated enjoyment with the story,
despite some weaknesses, he started ranting at me that I was using
pseudonyms and was congratulating myself.

But the cake was taken when he claimed I had invented the nym "Jamie
Dinkelacker," whom many of you know personally, to slant arguments!
Done humorously, as several of us have done recently, such a claim
would be funny (no offense meant, Jamie). But LD showed no awareness
of the absurdity of his claim.

With his florid hyperbole--or should I say "extremely and poisonously
florid hyperbole"-- and his paranoid rants, I chose to have nothing
more to do with him, and told him this in my last e-mail message to
him several weeks ago. (One of the messages he chose to quote in his
"introspective" message to the List...."thank you for sharing that,
Lance") 

He went ballistic when I--rather politely, I thought--averred on this
list that the EFF/Shari Steele advisory was not quite the Gestapo
pounding at the door. In e-mail, he called me "poison," "a traitor,"
"a lackey of Eric Hughes," and so on. I just shook my head and chose
not to respond. 

Paranoia can be fun to play with. I myself listen avidly to
"conspiracy theory" radio broadcasts (keywords: Inslaw, Wackenhut,
Iran-Contra, NSA, trapdoors, Casolaro, P-2 Lodge, Gehlen, MK-ULTRA,
and hundreds of others...) and I get a kick out of Robert Ludlum
novels. But becoming so isolated and perhaps even schizophrenic is not
a good thing.

(As an aside, I'll again urge folks to form local groups. It helps to
see actual faces and get to know folks. The surge in activity in
Austin is very encouraging. Ironically, some months back when
Lance/Larry (will we ever learn which was preferred?) was soliciting
my advice in e-mail--before I was seen to be the Puppetmaster's
Helper--he asked me how he could do things so far away from the Bay
Area. I pointed out to him the rich environment of the Denver-Colorado
Springs-Boulder-etc. corridor, and the presence of His PGPness Himself
in the area! Which he of course knew. Others, too. I can think of at
least a couple of others, Nate Sammons and Phillipe Nave, and maybe
others, who could form a nucleus of a group. I drive 60 miles north to
the Cypherpunks meetings, and Sandy Sandfort and Eric Blossom drive
about the same distance south, so that's 120 miles of range, about the
length of the urban corridor in Colorado. And a group can grow, of
course.)

And I *do* think there's a "Cypherpunks cause," loosely speaking. We all
know we have roughly similar goals, although our politics range across
the spectrum. But it's probably best that we nor formalize our goals
and our principles too much, for obvious reasons.

But getting so worked up in "the Cause" is not healthy. Especially
when anyone who deviates from one's own views is seen as a traitor, a
lackey, a stooge of the NSA, and so on.

What we're doing is demonstrably important, but there's no need to
demonize our opponents (in fact, that weakens us), to look for
traitors to the cause, and to take it all so _seriously_.

As someone says in their .sig, it's not as thought we're gonna get out
of this alive.

Cypherpunks write code. Cyperpunks write essays. Cypherpunks make puns
and jokes and even spoofs. Cypherpunks have fun.

Cheers, 

--Tim May (his True Name)


-- 
..........................................................................
Timothy C. May         | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,  
tcmay@netcom.com       | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
408-688-5409           | knowledge, reputations, information markets, 
W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA  | black markets, collapse of governments.
Higher Power: 2^756839 | Public Key: PGP and MailSafe available.
Note: I put time and money into writing this posting. I hope you enjoy it.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: doug@netcom.com (Doug Merritt)
Date: Wed, 20 Oct 93 21:52:39 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re:backing
Message-ID: <9310210452.AA27343@netcom5.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


F_GRIFFITH@CCSVAX.SFASU.EDU said:
>Greshams law: "bad money drives out good"
>i.e. where people have a choice (e.g. gold vs greenbacks post Civil
>War), in making payments, they will use the lesser value money and
>keep the higher value.  Thus, the lesser value money will circulate,
>the higher value money will not.

So in essence you're saying that poorly-backed digital currency will
win out over e.g. U.S. dollars?

That's an interesting concept.

(I mean the above literally, not sarcastically; I don't care to take
either one side or the other of this question right this instant,
although I will say that there must be some extra caveats to add.)
	Doug




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Perry E. Metzger" <pmetzger@lehman.com>
Date: Wed, 20 Oct 93 20:02:39 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Anon Bank Accounts / Imminent Demise of US Govt (Conclusion)
In-Reply-To: <9310210229.AA14636@dink.foretune.co.jp>
Message-ID: <9310210258.AA16901@snark.lehman.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



This is not cypherpunks related. I feel obligated to reply one last
time, but I won't discuss it further here -- I will gladly discuss it
with people in private email.

Robert J Woodhead says:
> 
> Stanton McCandlish asks:
> > If the govt is oppressive at all, why support this?
> 
> Perry E. Metzger posits:
> > Who needs to break it [government]? At the current rate,
> > it will have destroyed itself within a decade.
> 
> My answer is simple: the alternative is worse.  Anarchy is
> usually very uncomfortable, unless you have more guns and
> money than anyone else.

I would quite strongly disagree -- the evidence I have is that anarchy
can be far more comfortable for individuals of limited resources than
our current society. Don't believe the propaganda -- just because you
haven't seen certain functions you associate with government run by
the private sector does not mean they cannot be so run.

> Also, the current US government is, at it's core, based on sound
> principles.

I would strongly disagree. Democracy is a poor way to run things.
Imagine if people had to vote on what computer to use and there was
only one kind of computer available in a given year. Far better, I
think, to allow people the freedom to choose what they want in a free
market. Voting isn't, in and of itself, a good way to make decisions
-- it averages the intelligence of the voters rather than summing
their intelligence.

> If it crashes and burns, what is it more likely to be replaced by?

That I do not know. I can tell you what it COULD be replaced with, but
it is hard to know what it would actually be replaced with. Given the
pathetic state of education in our country, I'd say that a populist
dictatorship is a real possibility.

> Whether you like it or not, you live in and are supported by
> a society, in a myriad of ways.  The maintenance and improve-
> ment of that society, and the betterment of your fellow human
> beings, ought to be a primary goal.  It is for me.

I am not supported by society, and the betterment of Perry Metzger,
not my fellow man, is my primary goal. However, I would quite strongly
argue that if you truly want to better your fellow man, redistributive
methods like paying for services via taxation almost inevitably lead
to worse conditions for those with limited resources than they would
otherwise experience, which is exactly the opposite of wwhat most
redistributionists intend. All around the world, you can see example
upon example of countries, even democratic ones like India, that are
grotesquely impoverished because of the attempt to make things "fair"
and to "encourage development" and have an "industrial policy" and all
the other stigmata of statism. You can also find countries that are
developing nicely and have few regulations and low taxation (in spite
of claims by members of the media who never visit the places -- I'm
perpetually amused by reports in the media about how South Korea shows
why we need an industrial policy, when its a country that doesn't even
have welfare, social security or unemployment benefits and until
recently was known for the ease with which even the common man could
commit tax fraud. As for their "industrial policy", its rather weak
and can be argued to have held them back in the few areas where it is
strong. But I digress)

Perry

ps Repeating: This is not cypherpunks related. I feel obligated to
reply one last time, but I won't discuss it further here -- I will
gladly discuss it with people in private email.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: karn@qualcomm.com (Phil Karn)
Date: Wed, 20 Oct 93 23:17:52 PDT
To: mlshew@netcom.com
Subject: Clipper Chip report on 700 Club today (Wednesday)
In-Reply-To: <9310210429.AA09194@netcom6.netcom.com>
Message-ID: <9310210615.AA19919@servo>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Thanks to the heads-up note here, I caught the whole thing on tape
when it repeated here on the West Coast at 10pm PDT. (I see there are
some advantages to living out here!)

If I hadn't seen the show with my own eyes, I never would have
believed it. The Religious Right, so ready to mind everyone else's
personal business and to reshape the government in its own image,
opposes something that would make it easier for the government to
control the private lives of its citizens. This cryptography stuff
sure makes some strange bedfellows. Wow.

Of course, the Religious Right is at odds with the current government,
what with talk of using the federal racketeering laws against
anti-abortion demonstrators.  So perhaps they can be forgiven for
their current anti-government stance.  Their tune might well change if
they ever succeed in overturning Roe V Wade. Imagine their glee
turning to horror when they discover that those satanic pro-choice
people are using encryption to coordinate *their* protests and perhaps
even to coordinate travel by women seeking abortions to places where
it is still legal. :-)

And there's supreme irony in the right to encryption and the right to
abortion both being founded in the same basic concept: personal
privacy.  It all depends on whose ox is being gored, I guess.


Phil





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: charliemerritt@BIX.com
Date: Wed, 20 Oct 93 23:47:53 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Photo copy money
Message-ID: <9310202326.memo.70789@BIX.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Everyone seems to say, no, no pattern recognition in Cannon copiers.
This pattern recognition is more than urban legend!  I saw it demonstrated
on evening news  Dollar in  Black out.
If this is false it is a well orchestrated lie.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: rjc@gnu.ai.mit.edu (Ray)
Date: Wed, 20 Oct 93 20:52:38 PDT
To: trebor@foretune.co.jp (Robert J Woodhead)
Subject: Re: Anon Bank Accounts / Imminent Demise of US Govt (Conclusion)
In-Reply-To: <9310210229.AA14636@dink.foretune.co.jp>
Message-ID: <9310210328.AA18849@geech.gnu.ai.mit.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Robert J Woodhead () writes:
[...]
> Whether you like it or not, you live in and are supported by
> a society, in a myriad of ways.  The maintenance and improve-
> ment of that society, and the betterment of your fellow human
> beings, ought to be a primary goal.  It is for me.

   We are Robert J Woodhead of Borg. You will be assimilated. You will adapt
to service us and other borgs. Do not worry about the sacrifices you will 
make for the collective. After you are dead from your life of service, you
can take pleasure in knowing that the collective has survived to enslave
others like you.


   Resistance is futile, brother.


We are Designation 8672, subgroup 3f7




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: jamie@netcom.com (Jamie Dinkelacker)
Date: Wed, 20 Oct 93 23:47:55 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Something Silly, Something Serious
Message-ID: <9310210643.AA27104@netcom.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Tim May writes (and then Jamie takes a bend toward CypherRapture):


>SOMETHING SERIOUS:
>
>Seriously, I understand L. Dettweiler has asked to be unsubscribed.
>
>For the record, I did not send him any e-mail these past several
>weeks, either under my normal name or under any other names. I rarely
>pseudonyms, and have never--that I recall right now--ever used them in
>2-way communication. And never for the purposed Dettweiller/Boxx alleged.
>
>
>But the cake was taken when he claimed I had invented the nym "Jamie
>Dinkelacker," whom many of you know personally, to slant arguments!
>Done humorously, as several of us have done recently, such a claim
>would be funny (no offense meant, Jamie). But LD showed no awareness
>of the absurdity of his claim.                ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^


Tim's got a point. Why would Tim create the nym Jamie Dinkelacker? With so
many names to pick from, why pick one that is already in use and is fairly
visible in other networks (e.g., extropians, nano)? Perhaps LD didn't check
them, but others on the list are aware. Isn't it interesting that when a
writer doesn't know that two persons are different individuals, it's easy
to presume that when they agree in print or simply discuss similar topics,
that this implies nym-hood? Fascinating: This isn't a surface event.

The issue here is a root failing of LD's cognizance and scope to simply
check things out. Readers in the Bay Area or LA may have seen stuff Jamie
Dinkelacker has written in _Microtimes_, or in the _Foresight Update_, or
if you read the academic communication and mass media literature, there as
well. Plus, I'm a fairly voluble fellow speaking at conferences, trade
shows, some local discussion groups and the like. No, Jamie isn't an AI,
nor does he play one on the net. (Maybe someday...)  I've not used net nym.

What struck me about LD's vacuous pleas and S.Boxx's vapid rants was the
essential disturbed and juvenile nature they projected, hoping to ensure a
cause of CypherRapture (following CryptoAnarchy, natch) warranting true
names without ever any spoofing or deception. I have made a standing offer
to take S.Boxx to lunch (provided s/he eats with a fork and isn't already
out to lunch).

But spoofing and deception are not the same: more importantly, neither is
an emergent element of pseudonymity, anonymous remailers, or cypherjocks. I
found Blacknet to be entertaining. It seemed natural this has been going on
for years.  As far as deception, it's a matter of degree. It's common in
nature, sports, business, ... . I'm not advocating it -- but I accept it as
a fact of living in modern times.

This has been a good experience for me, and has raised many issues in the
big Venn of CryptoAnarchy: who owns their name, for how long, does it
matter? ... Who can tell the difference? Which John Smith is that?


... Tim continues ...
>
>Cypherpunks write code. Cyperpunks write essays. Cypherpunks make puns
>and jokes and even spoofs. Cypherpunks have fun.
>

I don't know if there is a Cypherpunk's cause. I doubt there's a movement,
but that's separate from my holding a belief that crypto and nyms and
digital cash and privacy and emergent social structures are crucial to a
preferable form of human survival.

With the net, we have a wonderous tool and opportunity. But the world isn't
a safe place. Every time I put a finger or toe into the lovely pacific
ocean I'm keenly aware of quickly entering the food chain at a much lower
point. These are times of challenge, to develop new tools and fresh
perspectives. But many elements of human nature remain the same.

I thank the Cypherpunks for writing code. I don't (anymore): I write words,
make videos and build organizations. We do need the code. We also need to
push at the edges of our understanding of social dynamics. And S.Boxx
clearly illustrated that puerile visciousness, wounded animal frenzy, and
pathetic behavior are also here in this new world. One of the brave ones,
s/he isn't. And Cypherpunks' creations even protect the likes of S.Boxx.
Reminiscent of Voltaire, yes?

Thanks for the bandwidth. If anyone would like to continue this, perhaps
moving it to the Extropians list would be reasonable.

James Dinkelacker (True name)
--
................................
Jamie Dinkelacker   Palo Alto CA  (almost a true name)
Jamie@netcom.com    415.941.4782    





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Mike Ingle <MIKEINGLE@delphi.com>
Date: Wed, 20 Oct 93 23:27:53 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Russian LanCrypto info
Message-ID: <01H4CRMYP3MW938S5H@delphi.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Here is some information about LanCrypto, a Russian public-key
encryption program. This one sounds interesting.

From:   IN%"alex@crypto.msk.su" 20-OCT-1993 14:36:24.72


                               CRYPTO  BANK

            System of programms of encryption (decryption) of files


             To work all users must have the files:

        afina.exe - programm for generation of new public and secret keys
        afinall.exe - programm for creation of a common list of public keys
        vesta.exe - programm for encryption/decryption of file
        NNNNN.pbl - file contains a new public key,NNNNN is a number of user
        secret.new - file contains a new secret key
        secret.key - file contains an old secret key


         FIRST stage. Generation of new secret and public keys by user

             User runs prigramm:

                                   afina.exe

             A message apears on the screen:

                                 Press any keys


             User begins to strike rand set of  keys.A  new  secret  key
        writes to floppy diskette A to file sekret.new.
             A public key writes to the current directory  in  the  file
        NNNNNN.pbl (NNNNNN is a number of user).
             If you want to write  your  secret  key  on  hard  disk  in
        current directory you run:

                                  afina.exe /k

             Then all  users  of sistem exchange their public keys(files
        NNNNNN.pbl.).We recommend thate users organise  a  CENTER  .(The
        CENTER  collects all public keys,creates a common list of public
        keys and sends it to users.)


           SECOND stage. Creation and sending a list of public keys.

             After exchanging  of  the files NNNNNN.pbl,  user( CENTER )
        has the files, received from his partners:

               N1.pbl
               N2.pbl
               ...
               NM.pbl

             To create common list of public keys ,  user( CENTER ) runs
        the programm

                    afinall.exe . (dot in the end)

             if files * .pbl lokate in current directory

                               afinall.exe [path]

             if files *.pbl lokate in other directory.
             Programm creates  a  common  list and writes it to the file
        publall.key.


                       THIRD stage. Encrypting of a file.


             If user number NNNNN encrypts file for  user  number  LLLLL
        ,user number NNNNN runs :

          vesta.exe  [path\]file_name  LLLLLL  [\k]                (1)

             (\k is  a parametre,  the programm vesta.exe finds a secret
        key  in   a   current   directory,   ;if   you   run   vesta.exe
        [path\]file_name  LLLLLL  ,the programm vesta.exe finds a secret
        key in floppy diskette )
             During the  process  of its work vesta.exe takes the secret
        key of user number NNNNN (from current directory(if you use  \k)
        or  from  ffloppy diskette),  takes the public key of user LLLLL
        (from file publall.key).Useing a secret key of user NNNNN and  a
        public  key  of  user  LLLLL  vesta.exe  creats  a common secret
        key.Then vesta.exe generates a rand session  key,useing  it  and
        the  comman secret key vesta.exe creats a secret session key and
        encrypts the file.  The rand session key is not secret ant it is
        added to the file.


                       FORTH stage. Decrypting of a file


             Encrypted file may be decrypted by two ways:
             1. by user NNNNN, if he repeats programm (1);
             2. by user LLLLL, if he runs :

                    vesta.exe  [path\]file_name NNNNN  [\k]


              EXAMPLE 1 ( We have user 000(CENTER)  and user 001):


             User 001  runs  afina.exe  \k.User 001 has files secret.new
        and 001.pbl in the current directory.
             User 001 sends 001.pbl to user 000(CENTR).
             User 000 runs afina.exe \k.User 000  has  files  secret.new
        and 000.pbl .User 000 receivs a file 001.pbl.He has:

                afinall.exe
                000.pbl
                001.pbl

             User 000 runs afinall.exe . (dot in the end ).He has:

                afinall.exe
                000.pbl
                001.pbl
                publall.key

             The file publall.key user 000(CENTER) sends to user 001.

                User 000 has :                !      User 001 has :
                                              !
                      vesta.exe               !      vesta.exe
                      publall.key             !      publall.key
                      000.pbl                 !      001.pbl
                      secret.key              !      secret.key
                      secret.new              !      secret.new
                      test0.txt

             User 000 encrypts file test.txt for user 001 .He runs :

                           vesta.exe test0.txt 001 /k

             User 001 receivs test0.txt and decrypts it :

                           vesta.exe test0.txt 000 /k


             User 001 encrypts file test1.txt for user 000.He runs :

                           vesta.exe test.txt1 000 /k

             User 000 receivs test1.txt and decrypts it:

                           vesta.exe test1.txt 001 /k



                  SIGNING AND CHECKING  OF ELECTRONIC MESSAGE

          To sign a message you must do:
                      sign.exe file
          To check yoy must do:
                      notary.exe file


          NOTALL.EXE  makes men.cat(list of all public keys of signatures )



                              A F I N A

                      PUBLIC KEY GENERATION SYSTEM


     AFINA is  a unique package of programs for automatic generation
of a common private key for a specific commynication session  between
two users.

     AFINA canbe  used  in  any  data   transmission   system   with
cryptographical protection.  It  rules  out  the  need  for  a  prior
distribution of private keys to users.


    AFINA uses  the  best  methods of public key generation between
two users that  have  been  tested  and  widely  aookied  by  Western
governments and commercial ventyres.

     Oyr original algorithm and programs have a four-fold increase in
the speed of generating a public  key  compared  to  the  best  known
standards while also improving data protection 100-fold.

     Having purchased  the  AFINA  program,  you  will  become fully
independent of  any  key  supplying  service.  AFINA   automatically
generates common private key for communication sessions with any user
in several seconds. You can choose the key length.

     It will take two users less than 3 seconds to generate a  common
private key of 256 bits useng an AT 286 pc operating at 16 MHg.

     AFINA uses  the  disk  operating system MS DOS 3.30 + and needs
32K of RAM memory. Any CGA, EGA or VGA graphic adapter can be used. A
hard disk is desirable to speed up processing.

     Delivery: AFINA  software  on  5.25  DS/DD  or  installation by
LAN-Ctypto. LAN-Cryoto provides guides and after-sales (warranty  and
post-warranty) service  of  the installed products as well as uodated
versions and supplies them on favourable terms.


                                 V E S T A
                           File encryption system

     VESTA is a package of programs providing the encryption of files
on a user's disk.

     VESTA employs  the  most  secure  methods  of cryptographic data
protection such as the Data Encryption Standart (DES),  a universally
recognized system  endrosed  by  Western  goverments  and  commercial
institutions, GOST 28147-89,  national data encryption  standards  in
computer networks  as  well  as  two  LAN-Crypto  algorithms for data
encryption providing processing speed of 200 Kbyte/sec. on AT-286 (12
Mhz) PC. This is a record time for encryption programs.

     VESTA will allow you to assure your PC's data integrity, provide
raw a "transparent"  mode  of  exchange  with  a  hard  disk  without
delaying data   processing.   By   choosing   the  appropriate  VESTA
encryption algorithm,  you will be able to have  secure  exchange  of
information with  most  encryption programm users in this country and
abroad. Encryption key input can be carried out  both  from  magnetic
mediums or keyboard.

     The number of keys of VESTA for cryptographic algorithms:
                            18
     - DES                10
                            77
     - GOST 28147-89      10
                            77
     - VESTA 1            10
                            77
     - VESTA 2            10

     The low boundary of the encryption security is determined by the
DES algoritm.
     For users   of   IBM   PC  ,  and  compatibles,  VESTA  provides
man-machine communicatin through the Disk  Operating  System  MS  DOS
3.30+.

     Program size of VESTA package:
     DES              - 6 Kb
     GOST 28146-89    - 2 Kb
     VESTA 1          - 2 Kb
     VESTA 2          - 2 Kb

     VESTA provides friendly interface and detailed help.

     DELIVERY: VESTA  software  on  5.25  DS/DD  or  installation  by
LAN-Crypto, guides.

     LAN-Crypto provides  after-sales  (warranty  and  post-warranty)
service of the installed products and information on updated versions
of programms and  makes  them  available  on  favourable  terms.  The
extrended reference services.


                              NOTARY
               SECURE ELECTRONIC SIGNATURE SYSTEM

        NOTARY is a system for generating electronic signature for PC
files  assuring  their  integrity and providing the ability to verify
the  identy  of  the  author  of the data auhor. You can use Notarius
while storing information  distributing floppy disks, or transmitting
information throw public  communication chanel. "Digital (electronic)
signature" is a full analogue of a handwritten signature.

        The NOTARY " digital  signature " employs two algorithms: one
which produces the  signature  is kept secret, while the other, which
verifies the identity of the author, is disseminated to recipients of
of the signed documents.

        The NOTARY "digital signature" procedure employs the  program
"SIGNATUR"  to  "sign"  a document file and creates a signature  file
which impossible to forge.

        The  NOTARY  checking  programm  analysizes  the  contents of
document  file  and quickly and securely checks that the signature is
authentic.

        NOTARY  allows  you  to  quickly  and  effectively  introduce
paperless  processing  into offices, local networks, banking systems,
exchanges system, data communication networks, etc.

        NOTARY employs more advanced method of "electronic signature"
than widely recognized RSA Digital Signature, which has been endorsed
by commercial and goverment institotions in the United States.

        NOTARY's original algorithms and programm solutions allow the
user  to  speed  up  the  operation  of  signing  documents four-fold
compared with best known standarts.

        NOTARY  employs the Disk Operating System MS DOS 3.30+ on IBM
PC, and compatibles with the graphic adapter EGA (VGA).

        NOTARY  needs 15 KB of RAM and offers a friendly interface and
detalied help.

        Delivery:  NOTARY  software  comes  on  5.25  DS/DD  or can be
installed by "LAN Crypto", stuff we also provide documentation.

        "LAN Crytpo"  provides  warranty  and post-warranty service of
the  installation  products  and  information  on  updated versions of
programs  when  avaiilable  offers them on favourable terms to current
users.


Best regards.

Alex Smirnov





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: karn@qualcomm.com (Phil Karn)
Date: Thu, 21 Oct 93 01:07:54 PDT
To: edgar@spectrx.Saigon.COM
Subject: TEMPEST: Re: Monitor radiation overlooking./DES weakness
In-Reply-To: <X5RqBc10w165w@spectrx.saigon.com>
Message-ID: <9310210805.AA23859@servo>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


From my own (admittedly limited) experience, it's not the electron
beam in the CRT that radiates, it's the electronics all around it.

I verified this years ago with an early Korean clone of the original
IBM PC monochome monitor. It was easy to demonstrate: when I turned
down the brightness control until the screen went completely dark, the
radio interference audible on a HF amateur rig was unchanged. When I
instead turned down the *contrast* control until the screen went dark,
however, the noise just about disappeared.

Why? In this particular monitor, the brightness control simply
controlled the DC bias on a CRT grid. It stopped the electron beam,
but did not change the RF noise level. That proved conclusively that
the noise wasn't coming from the electron beam.

Why not, given that the CRT contains the highest video signal levels
found in a monitor? Well, if you look at the back of a typical CRT,
you will notice that the sides are all coated, inside and out, by
conductive paints. These two painted surfaces -- ground on the
outside, B+ on the inside -- with the glass between them, form a
capacitor that filters the high voltage applied to the tube. (It is
vitally important to discharge this capacitor before you poke around
inside a monitor or TV!)  The inside of the screen must also be
conductive, since the electrons hitting it have to go somewhere. So in
effect, a CRT already comes with its own RF shielding.

On the other hand, the contrast knob was essentially a "video volume
control" just ahead of the (relatively high powered) video output
amplifier mounted on a daughter board plugged into the base of the
CRT, driving its cathode. The radiation came from the unshielded +70V
power supply lead into this daughter board.  Replacing that one wire
with shielded coax and bypassing both ends with capacitors reduced the
noise dramatically.

I got rid of what little noise was left by adding extra shielding to the
monitor's drive cable. I had already tediously painted the inside of
the cabinet with conductive paint, but that turned out to be largely
a waste of time; the noise level didn't seem to depend much on whether
the cabinet was on or off.

The bottom line: brute force shielding of an entire monitor is often
not required. It pays to figure out exactly where the radiation is
coming from, and work directly on the cause.

Caveat: this particular monitor, being very old, had no RFI mitigation
at all. Almost all newer monitors have much better RFI shielding. Open
them up and it will be obvious -- metal shields everywhere, ferrite
beads around cables, etc. Simply upgrading to a newer monitor may fix
the problem.

Phil






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: moormajb@vuse.vanderbilt.edu (Joseph Moorman)
Date: Thu, 21 Oct 93 00:27:54 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: politics
Message-ID: <9310210722.AA20629@necs.vuse>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



It has been suggested that the politcis discussion be taken to
another forum, which I am somewhat in agreement with (though
I've enjoyed reading all the messages).  I, however, want to
take issue with a point made by Robert J. Woodhead:

> The maintenance and improvement of [that] society, and the betterment
> of your fellow human beings, ought to be a primary goal.

Maybe it's your primary goal; it's certainly the goal of every Marxist/
Communist/Fascist regime that has every existed.  I'm not accusing you
of being any of these, but I wanted to point out that these ideologies
all support the idea that one's self-interest is somehow evil and that
only actions done for the benefit of society or "fellow human beings"
are worthwhile and moral.  

I contend that one's self-interest should be one's primary goal (it is
that one's choice however).  This self-interest when combined with honesty
and integrity is completely moral.  It implies a recognition of others'
right to be motivated by their own self-interests.  Governments are 
established in order to make sure that self-interests do not conflict
(e.g. my self-interest in having the money in your pocket and your
self-interest in keeping it for yourself).  The U.S. Government may have
initially served such a purpose, but it comes nowhere near that today.
I'm not saying there are any better places either; hopefully there will
be soon.  


----------------------------------------------------------------
|                                                              |
|    Joe Moorman <moormajb@vuse.vanderbilt.edu>                |
|                                                              |
|    To achieve Liberty in my time,                            | 
|    Ready to relocate to Oceania...                           |
|                                                              |
----------------------------------------------------------------

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Version: 2.3a

mQCNAizFpXwAAAEEAMSgDF2B19fKu9tjmKPQ8wxmzUFLNLvgHy6UAff6V3zr17g5
Qsg9iE9NPTzhzCmKDPb1r1NcpkcSK+K7K8pVwYU6fqTw+/q81yMZ6Ori305Gbyxt
QthNQ+JS5ixqCfzuxZ3h5cqtKXLM/XKTkVRMQGMN7z7+oBdV5AXMccsZHPSxAAUR
tCpKb2UgTW9vcm1hbiA8bW9vcm1hamJAdnVzZS52YW5kZXJiaWx0LmVkdT4=
=iu34
-----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "George A. Gleason" <gg@well.sf.ca.us>
Date: Thu, 21 Oct 93 03:52:41 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re:  PRIVACY: Shredded trash doesn't cut it
Message-ID: <93Oct21.035142pdt.14604-1@well.sf.ca.us>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Re shredding documents: the best thing I ever found was to tear papers into
strips about an inch wide and feed them to an ordinary household blender
which is about 3/4 full of water.  Turns the paper into mush.  Flush the
mush and that's that.  NOt recommended for hiding evidence of crimes; the
perfect crime is an illusion fostered by the media.  

-gg




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "George A. Gleason" <gg@well.sf.ca.us>
Date: Thu, 21 Oct 93 04:17:56 PDT
To: mech@eff.org
Subject: Re: Paper Shredders
Message-ID: <93Oct21.041413pdt.13829-1@well.sf.ca.us>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


RE fire: you can still read ashes, it's commonly done.  Now as an addendum
to my previous about the use of blenders: for larger amounts, the kitchen
sink disposall with lots of water running... for really large amounts, soak
in a large container full of water for a few days to let it get soft, then
mush it up with either an electric cement mixer or a 1/2" electric drill
with paint mixing attachment.  The key to these operations is lots of water
so the paper will essentially be a suspended solid that easily tumbles and
shreds.  Too much paper in the mix will lead to a soggy mat that won't break
up easily.  

-gg




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: John Farmer <jfarmer@cap.gwu.edu>
Date: Thu, 21 Oct 93 03:42:40 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: No Subject
Message-ID: <Pine.3.05.9310210655.A22893-5100000@cap.gwu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


signoff cypherpunks







From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: hfinney@shell.portal.com (Hal Finney)
Date: Thu, 21 Oct 93 08:32:45 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Mail delivery question
Message-ID: <9310211532.AA05517@jobe.shell.portal.com.shell.portal.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I have a somewhat dumb question about mail delivery.  This has a CP
connection because it relates to a remailer enhancement I am working
on.  When I receive mail from cypherpunks, this is a typical set of headers
for an incoming message:

  From owner-cypherpunks@toad.com  Wed Oct 20 23:57:11 1993
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  X-Mailer: Eudora
  To: cypherpunks@toad.com
  From: jamie@netcom.com (Jamie Dinkelacker)
  Subject: Re: Something Silly, Something Serious
  Status: RO

Now, my question is, when this mail is delivered to the Unix system which
I use, how does the local software know to deliver it to hfinney?  My name
does not seem to appear in the header at all.  In particular, the "To:"
address is not hfinney@shell.portal.com, as I would have expected, but rather
cypherpunks@toad.com.

I suppose there is some other information that is passed along with the
message when it is delivered to portal.com, information which tells my
user name.  It would be nice if this information were available to scripts
which would process the incoming mail.  Could someone explain how this
delivery process works?  Thanks -

Hal Finney
hfinney@shell.portal.com




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: awestrop@nyx.cs.du.edu (Alan Westrope)
Date: Thu, 21 Oct 93 07:32:44 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Something Silly, Something Serious
In-Reply-To: <9310210451.AA27317@netcom5.netcom.com>
Message-ID: <9310211432.AA29427@nyx.cs.du.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


In <9310210451.AA27317@netcom5.netcom.com> tcmay@netcom.com 
  (Timothy C. May) writes:

>I pointed out to him the rich environment of the Denver-Colorado
>Springs-Boulder-etc. corridor, and the presence of His PGPness Himself
>in the area! Which he of course knew. Others, too.

Yes, and Phil Z. is scheduled to speak to the Front Range Unix Users 
Group on Nov. 18.  The meeting is at 4:30 in room 123 of the Univ. of
Colo. Academic Computing Center.  A rare opportunity to hear The Man
in person...highly recommended.

Putatively yours,

-- 
Alan Westrope                  <awestrop@nyx.cs.du.edu>
                               <adwestro@ouray.denver.colorado.edu>
PGP fingerprint:  D6 89 74 03 77 C8 2D 43   7C CA 6D 57 29 25 69 23
finger for public key
--
"These nomads chart their courses by strange stars, which might
 be luminous clusters of data in cyberspace..." -- Hakim Bey




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: nate@VIS.ColoState.EDU
Date: Thu, 21 Oct 93 08:02:55 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com (Cypherpunks Mailing List)
Subject: Re: Something Silly, Something Serious
Message-ID: <9310211455.AA05053@seurat.VIS.ColoState.EDU>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text


writes Jamie Dinkelacker:
>
>... Tim continues ...
>>
>>Cypherpunks write code. Cyperpunks write essays. Cypherpunks make puns
>>and jokes and even spoofs. Cypherpunks have fun.
>>
>
>I don't know if there is a Cypherpunk's cause. I doubt there's a movement,
>but that's separate from my holding a belief that crypto and nyms and
>digital cash and privacy and emergent social structures are crucial to a
>preferable form of human survival.
>

I would have to disagree somewhat with this statement.  I think that there
are a loose set of opinions and goals shared between most of us.  We may
have out paranoids (personally, I always got a kick out of LD's rants...
some of them even put us back "on track" when we were straying (as have
many of Tim's posts)).  Most of us share ideas, mostly relating to wanting
widespread use and acceptance of strong cryptography.  There are many 
differing opinions here, but this reflects the fact that we are not some
kind of genetic experiment gone bad ;-)

writes Jamie Dinkelacker:
>
>With the net, we have a wonderous tool and opportunity. But the world isn't
>a safe place. Every time I put a finger or toe into the lovely pacific
>ocean I'm keenly aware of quickly entering the food chain at a much lower
>point. These are times of challenge, to develop new tools and fresh
>perspectives. But many elements of human nature remain the same.
>

Very true.

writes Jamie Dinkelacker:
>
>I thank the Cypherpunks for writing code. I don't (anymore): I write words,
>make videos and build organizations. We do need the code. We also need to
>push at the edges of our understanding of social dynamics. 
>

I agree... Code is good, but one of the most important resources we have
are people who can explain just what it is that we are doing here to the
"outside" world, and to reaise the level of the public's awarness, if not
understanding.

writes Jamie Dinkelacker:
>
>And S.Boxx
>clearly illustrated that puerile visciousness, wounded animal frenzy, and
>pathetic behavior are also here in this new world. One of the brave ones,
>s/he isn't. And Cypherpunks' creations even protect the likes of S.Boxx.
>Reminiscent of Voltaire, yes?
>

Strangely ironic, we hate what we protect.  I think it's important to note
that there will always be people like S.Boxx out there... lunatic ravings
and patheticly malformed logic.  There are also a great deal of good things
that have come out of the remailers and spoofing (not so much spoofing, but
posts to places like alt.whistlblowing, et al. through the remailers and
anon.penet.fi)  I think that the good outweighs the bad in this instance,
at least.

>
>James Dinkelacker (True name)
>--
>................................
>Jamie Dinkelacker   Palo Alto CA  (almost a true name)
>Jamie@netcom.com    415.941.4782    
>
>

Truly,

-nate

-- 
+-----------------------------------------------------------------------+
| Nate Sammons   email: nate@VIS.ColoState.Edu
|   Colorado State University Computer Visualization Laboratory
|   Finger nate@monet.VIS.ColoState.Edu for my PGP key
|   #include <std.disclaimer>
|   Title 18 USC 2511 and 18 USC 2703 Protected --> Monitoring Forbidden
+--------+                          Always remember "Brazil"



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: an41418@anon.penet.fi (wonderer)
Date: Thu, 21 Oct 93 01:57:54 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Paper Shredders
Message-ID: <9310210856.AA22927@anon.penet.fi>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


What about just burning the paper?
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
To find out more about the anon service, send mail to help@anon.penet.fi.
Due to the double-blind, any mail replies to this message will be anonymized,
and an anonymous id will be allocated automatically. You have been warned.
Please report any problems, inappropriate use etc. to admin@anon.penet.fi.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: nate@VIS.ColoState.EDU
Date: Thu, 21 Oct 93 08:02:43 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com (Cypherpunks Mailing List)
Subject: Re: Clipper Chip report on 700 Club today (Wednesday)
In-Reply-To: <9310210615.AA19919@servo>
Message-ID: <9310211458.AA05063@seurat.VIS.ColoState.EDU>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text


writes Phil Karn:
>
>Of course, the Religious Right is at odds with the current government,
>what with talk of using the federal racketeering laws against
>anti-abortion demonstrators.  So perhaps they can be forgiven for
>their current anti-government stance.  Their tune might well change if
>they ever succeed in overturning Roe V Wade. Imagine their glee
>turning to horror when they discover that those satanic pro-choice
>people are using encryption to coordinate *their* protests and perhaps
>even to coordinate travel by women seeking abortions to places where
>it is still legal. :-)
>

I wonder if they know that the idea was developed during a republican
administration?

>And there's supreme irony in the right to encryption and the right to
>abortion both being founded in the same basic concept: personal
>privacy.  It all depends on whose ox is being gored, I guess.
>
>
>Phil
>
>

-nate

-- 
+-----------------------------------------------------------------------+
| Nate Sammons   email: nate@VIS.ColoState.Edu
|   Colorado State University Computer Visualization Laboratory
|   Finger nate@monet.VIS.ColoState.Edu for my PGP key
|   #include <std.disclaimer>
|   Title 18 USC 2511 and 18 USC 2703 Protected --> Monitoring Forbidden
+--------+                          Always remember "Brazil"



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: rees@cs.bu.edu (David Rees)
Date: Thu, 21 Oct 93 06:22:44 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Photocopying mnoney
Message-ID: <9310211318.AA09059@csa.bu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text


     Hi.  Could anyone tell me an Online source of information that explains
stuff about how money is scanned by machines, etc?  Please send e-mail.  Thaks.
---Dave  (rees@cs.bu.edu)



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: an41418@anon.penet.fi (wonderer)
Date: Thu, 21 Oct 93 02:22:41 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: double encryption keys
Message-ID: <9310210920.AA26347@anon.penet.fi>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I would suggest that you use two different hash functions
on the pass phrase, and take however many bits you need
of what's left over.

Wonderer
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
To find out more about the anon service, send mail to help@anon.penet.fi.
Due to the double-blind, any mail replies to this message will be anonymized,
and an anonymous id will be allocated automatically. You have been warned.
Please report any problems, inappropriate use etc. to admin@anon.penet.fi.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: an41418@anon.penet.fi (wonderer)
Date: Thu, 21 Oct 93 02:27:55 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: double encryption keys
Message-ID: <9310210927.AA27497@anon.penet.fi>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Oops, please excuse that post, it went to the wrong
mailing list.
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
To find out more about the anon service, send mail to help@anon.penet.fi.
Due to the double-blind, any mail replies to this message will be anonymized,
and an anonymous id will be allocated automatically. You have been warned.
Please report any problems, inappropriate use etc. to admin@anon.penet.fi.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Brad Huntting <huntting@advtech.uswest.com>
Date: Thu, 21 Oct 93 09:02:47 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: PGP vs PEM discussion
Message-ID: <9310211601.AA01949@futureworld.advtech.uswest.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain

Perhaps someone on cypherpunks can help with this...



To: pem-dev@tis.com
Subject: Articulation of PGP point of view?
From: "Robert W. Shirey" <shirey@mitre.org>
Date: Thu, 21 Oct 1993 10:54:43 -0500

Is there anyone who has, or is able to, articulate
the PGP point of view for public key management and
compentently contrast it to the PEM point of view?

Is there, perhaps, someone who has written on this
subject or spoken publicly in an organized fashion?

I am seeking such a person for a presentation and
panel discussion at an international conference.

I need names ASAP!

Please feel free to forward this message to
appropriate newsgroups.


Regards, -Rob-
SHIREY@MITRE.ORG * tel 703.883.7210 * fax 703.883.1397
Robert W. Shirey, The MITRE Corporation, Mail Stop Z202
7525 Colshire Drive, McLean, Virginia  22102-3481  USA






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: jim@bilbo.suite.com (Jim Miller)
Date: Thu, 21 Oct 93 09:12:49 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Please add me to mailing list
Message-ID: <9310211608.AA28079@bilbo.suite.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain




I would like to be added to the cypherpunks mailing list.

Thanks,

Jim_Miller@suie.com


[Sorry for broadcasting this to the entire mailing list, but I don't know of  
any other address to use.]




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Date: Thu, 21 Oct 93 11:18:00 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Gold in them thar Bills...
In-Reply-To: <9310211721.AA22131@snark.lehman.com>
Message-ID: <9310211817.AA06108@netcom5.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Perry Metzger writes:

> As for "in my book, silicon is worth more than gold", I'll happily
> trade you 100 kilos of silicon for 100 kilos of gold any day you like.
> Assuming you aren't fibbing, you should take the trade, since the
> silicon is worth more to you.
> 
> Of course, you'd be a fool. Silicon is plentiful, and costs pennies
> the kilo. Gold is not plentiful -- the market value is around $10,000
> the kilo.

I suspect what Peter Wayner was referring to was either pure silicon,
which is indeed expensive (dollars per gram no longer in my memory
bank, alas), or silicon that has been processed into SuperSPARCS,
Pentia, and the like. Not raw-out-of-ground silicon (from beach sand
and even rice hulls...no lie). A tiny sliver of silicon is much more
valuable gram fro gram than gold is. Even a blank wafer of ultrapure
silicon may be...I'd have to do some calculations and get some current
prices. 

Be this as it may, electronic money depends on _reputation_, on the
expectation that a depositor or payee will get what he thinks he will,
whether in gold, in dollars, in francs, in Safeway discount coupons,
or in Get Out of Jail Free cards.

The stability of the final currency, inflation rates, etc., are
orthogonal to the issues of expectation and reputation. That is, when
one opens a bank account in dollars or rupees, one worries about the
bank returning the dollars or rupees, not the "meta" (and important,
but at a different level and time horizon) issues of the ultimate fate
of the rupee.

In any case, free banking means accounts can be denominated in
whatever the market wants...chunks of silicon, gold coins, Xeroxed
Slovenian currency, or whatever.

--Tim May


-- 
..........................................................................
Timothy C. May         | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,  
tcmay@netcom.com       | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
408-688-5409           | knowledge, reputations, information markets, 
W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA  | black markets, collapse of governments.
Higher Power: 2^756839 | Public Key: PGP and MailSafe available.
Note: I put time and money into writing this posting. I hope you enjoy it.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Robert J Woodhead <trebor@foretune.co.jp>
Date: Wed, 20 Oct 93 19:32:51 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Anon Bank Accounts / Imminent Demise of US Govt (Conclusion)
Message-ID: <9310210229.AA14636@dink.foretune.co.jp>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Stanton McCandlish asks:
> If the govt is oppressive at all, why support this?

Perry E. Metzger posits:
> Who needs to break it [government]? At the current rate,
> it will have destroyed itself within a decade.

My answer is simple: the alternative is worse.  Anarchy is
usually very uncomfortable, unless you have more guns and
money than anyone else.  Also, the current US government is,
at it's core, based on sound principles.  If it crashes and
burns, what is it more likely to be replaced by?

Whether you like it or not, you live in and are supported by
a society, in a myriad of ways.  The maintenance and improve-
ment of that society, and the betterment of your fellow human
beings, ought to be a primary goal.  It is for me.

And finally, Sameer Parekh opines:
> I'd suggest that the politics discussion be taken to another
> forum?

A good suggestion.  I've made my point, and perhaps infected
a few people with a meme or two.  Time to shut up.

Best,
R




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Robert J Woodhead <trebor@foretune.co.jp>
Date: Wed, 20 Oct 93 19:32:38 PDT
To: Matthew@foretune.co.jp
Subject: Wizardry's Encryption
Message-ID: <9310210229.AA14642@dink.foretune.co.jp>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Matthew writes (about how Wizardry was encrypted):

> But, alas, the character files were in plaintext, and
> numerous people figured out how to edit them.

They were that way for two reasons: performance (they were
always being read and written) and reality (it was a known
plaintext situation, since the user could change his character
in any manner of methods, like simply trading gold around
between the characters, and thus map out the database)

Encryption in those days wasn't intended to be strong; it was
intended to be strong enough to hold off the pirates for the
crucial first few months of sales.  Given that we were pushing
the machines to the limit of their performance envelopes, we
couldn't take too much of a hit (time or code-wise) for strong
encryption.

And I think Sir-tech still replaces Apple II discs, but I
am no longer involved in the company, so you'll have to
call and ask them.  ;^)




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Perry E. Metzger" <pmetzger@lehman.com>
Date: Thu, 21 Oct 93 08:47:56 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: backing
In-Reply-To: <9310210452.AA27343@netcom5.netcom.com>
Message-ID: <9310211543.AA22017@snark.lehman.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Doug Merritt says:
> F_GRIFFITH@CCSVAX.SFASU.EDU said:
> >Greshams law: "bad money drives out good"
> >i.e. where people have a choice (e.g. gold vs greenbacks post Civil
> >War), in making payments, they will use the lesser value money and
> >keep the higher value.  Thus, the lesser value money will circulate,
> >the higher value money will not.
> 
> So in essence you're saying that poorly-backed digital currency will
> win out over e.g. U.S. dollars?
> 
> That's an interesting concept.

A digital currency can be backed by gold held in some secure location
like the Zurich Free Transit Warehouse. U.S. Dollars are backed by
absolutely nothing other than blind faith in the U.S. Governement.
Who's kidding whom?

In any case, Gresham's Law applies to situations in which two coins of
differing metalic content are both made legal tender -- it doesn't
really apply in a general case.

Perry




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Perry E. Metzger" <pmetzger@lehman.com>
Date: Thu, 21 Oct 93 09:12:57 PDT
To: hfinney@shell.portal.com (Hal Finney)
Subject: Re: Mail delivery question
In-Reply-To: <9310211532.AA05517@jobe.shell.portal.com.shell.portal.com>
Message-ID: <9310211607.AA22056@snark.lehman.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Hal Finney says:
> Now, my question is, when this mail is delivered to the Unix system which
> I use, how does the local software know to deliver it to hfinney?  My name
> does not seem to appear in the header at all.  In particular, the "To:"
> address is not hfinney@shell.portal.com, as I would have expected, but rather
> cypherpunks@toad.com.

All mail has two sets of "To" addresses. There is the ENVELOPE
address, which you do not see, and the HEADER address, which is mere
window dressing. I could have the headers say "To: That Lousy Schmuck"
and the mail would still arrive. The envelope and header addresses
have to be kept seperated for all sorts of very sound reasons that I
could explain happily in private mail. The envelope address is passed
around using the "RCPT" command in SMTP and is never contained in the
mail message itself.

Perry




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: blaster@rd.relcom.msk.su (Victor A. Borisov)
Date: Thu, 21 Oct 93 02:22:55 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: TEMPEST and Public key programs
Message-ID: <AB5BbnimWD@rd.relcom.msk.su>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>   Electromagnetic Pulse Surveillance Technology. Victor, I have a long
>   (58K) document about this which I'll be glad to send you, just ask.
Please, send this paper direct to me.

>   any information. Victor, could your friend in the KGB arrange for such
>   an experiment??
Exuse me please, but I don`t see this man about two week! I also can`t
ask this man about all (I like fredom :( ). As security men saw: "if smaller
know then better sleep".

>   Victor seems to be saying that his friend is saying that DES is a
>   "group" (if I remember my terms correctly), which somebody was
>   supposed to have proven wasn't the case.  Although, strictly speaking,
>   a "group" was supposed to be f=des, where Victor just says it's "very
>   like DES."
DES is`t group - f() only like to DES (I think, that computing dificult of
f() like des() one).

>   But multiple encryptions as Victor describes are not used. Rather
>   alternating encryptions and DEcryptions.  For example triple DES
>   dese(k1, desd(k2, dese(k3, plaintext)))  where "dese" is DES
>   encryption and "desd" is DES decryption.  What does your friend in
>   the KGB have to say about that, Victor?  If triple-DES reduces to
>   any reasonable transformation of (some) 56-bit key then it's almost
>   as easy to break as single-DES which we now know only requires 3 hours
>   on a $1 million specialized machine.
I`ll ask he about this.

>   Of more interest here, Victor, is what your KGB friend says about the
>   IDEA cipher, RSA Public Key encryption, and the MD5 message digest,
>   all of which are used in PGP.  We would also like to know if the KGB
>   has found any weaknesses in PGP or if they've even had occasion to try
>   to find any.
He made same program (LanCrypto). That why, I hear only bad words from
he. :) You can read about this program in cypherpunks.
From other KGB-men, I hear, that prophesor Sidelnicov (the well known
cryptoanalisist from Russia) saw, that PGP has some weak places:
 - random number is`t "good" random number.
 - md5 has hole (but here man lapse into salence:( ).
 - PGP for DOS don`t have any anti-overloking tools.

BTW: LanCrypto play on last weakness: thay wrote litle resident DOS program.
This program crack PGP and than pgp sign (and check) only part of message.
LanCrypto public this resalt in buziness newspaper and show program on the big
computer-show. I think this is rough market, but it work well (as all, that
KGB made:))!!!

Now I know 3 powerful public-key Russian programs. All wrote by exKGB man:

- "LanCrypto" has vary fast algorithm, litle sign and several tools for anti-
  intruding.

- "Exelence" has number of anti-intruding tools and powerful cryptographic
  algorithms. This pakage also has inteligance hardware keys for prevent
  introding.

- "Blitc". The central bank try to use this program, but boys from LanCrypto
  find rough hole in hash function of this program and compromite this firm.

Now I contact with LanCrypto and Elias (autors of "Exelence"). I hope to
use thouse programs in my Computer Security Center. If you want I try to
write about this programs.

--- 
Victor A. Borisov aka blaster;	Relcom R&D;
Email: blaster@rd.relcom.msk.su;
Phone: +7(095)-943-4735; +7(095)-198-9510;
	=== Don`t panic! ===




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "W. Kinney" <kinney@ucsu.Colorado.EDU>
Date: Thu, 21 Oct 93 11:22:48 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Colorado Cypherpunks
Message-ID: <199310211818.AA24207@ucsu.Colorado.EDU>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Count another Colorado 'punk, Boulder. Writing code (slowly) for the Mac. That
pesky thesis keeps getting in the way...

                                 -- Will




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Karl Lui Barrus <klbarrus@owlnet.rice.edu>
Date: Thu, 21 Oct 93 10:27:56 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: MATH: factoring, # of bits
Message-ID: <9310211724.AA10107@arcadien.owlnet.rice.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

>First, we need an equation that tell us how difficult it is, in # of
>operations, to factor a number of N bits.  eg: N_ops(N) = # of
>operations it will take.

I think the fastest method that anyone admits to, by Odzyklo
(spelling?), has an order of magnitude defined by:

e^(sqrt(ln(x) ln(ln(x))))

I've been dusting off my Mathematica skills working on the crypto
techniques Matt posts :-) so it looks like this in Mathematica:

f[x_] := N[Exp[Sqrt[Log[x] Log[Log[x]]]]]

x in bits	difficulty

200		2.27 E11
384		5.54 E16	<- PGP casual
512		6.69 E19	<- PGP commercial
664		1.18 E23
1000		1.75 E29
1024		4.42 E29	<- PGP military
1500		8.11 E36
2000		3.11 E43
3000		5.49 E54
4000		2.44 E64
6000		7.06 E80
8000		8.99 E94

I don't know how many seconds until the end of the universe, but I
think you'll be covered using an 8000 bit key :-)



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Version: 2.3a

iQCVAgUBLMbFXYOA7OpLWtYzAQEwrwP9G60hCktxcj7MwkOV2H7QPQ1+i+j5ceTK
DEcj74ZFZdsp1vouMxtsN+zvqkdy1+DTzNUuXusWKhogDLFEPTuASZD3tcFgkoUT
Uk0B805mJi/gfiBa7+CBWHgjF0T7NSZe1lTjqfru1u+XeU/7iAq+erU0ojydL/xi
tqBAZZg3gEs=
=wkBt
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From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Matthew J Ghio <mg5n+@andrew.cmu.edu>
Date: Thu, 21 Oct 93 09:32:56 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Paper Shredders
In-Reply-To: <9310202230.AA16605@snark.lehman.com>
Message-ID: <4glfVrG00awJEWsVlT@andrew.cmu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


"Perry E. Metzger" <pmetzger@lehman.com>:

>By the way, the standard method for destroying embassy documents in
>case of siezure (not done during the Iran hostage crisis) is
>reportedly Thermit grenades. (Thermit would likely reduce a filing
>cabinet to slag in moments.)

Yup.  Actually you don't even need the gernade, you could just store
some thermit in the filing cabinet and then ignite it when necessary. 
It's very stable and very unlikely to ignite by accident.  In fact, just
dropping a burning match on it usually won't ignite it, usually you need
some sort of accelerator to make it explode.  Plus, it's easy to make
(Iron oxide (rust) + aluminum).




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Matthew J Ghio <mg5n+@andrew.cmu.edu>
Date: Thu, 21 Oct 93 09:32:49 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: crypto technique
In-Reply-To: <9310202355.AA25861@flammulated.owlnet.rice.edu>
Message-ID: <AglfWq600awJIWsWBv@andrew.cmu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I may have made a math error; I'll double-check it.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: henry strickland <strick@osc.versant.com>
Date: Thu, 21 Oct 93 12:42:58 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: pem-dev requests "Articulation of PGP point of view?"
Message-ID: <9310211941.AA04134@osc.versant.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


If someone wants to answer this, it may help the people on the Privacy
Enhanced Mailer Developer <pem-dev@tis-com> list add the capability for
the web-of-trust model of key distribution.

I think this is a chance to preach to the unconverted-but-convertable.

Notice one wants a speaker, one merely a posting.

Who's articulate?

						strick



Forwarded message:
# From pem-dev-request@magellan.TIS.COM Thu Oct 21 08:40:42 1993
# Message-Id: <9310211453.AA22593@smiley.mitre.org.sit>
# X-Sender: shirey@128.29.140.20
# Mime-Version: 1.0
# Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"
# Date: Thu, 21 Oct 1993 10:54:43 -0500
# To: pem-dev@tis.com
# From: "Robert W. Shirey" <shirey@mitre.org>
# Subject: Articulation of PGP point of view?
# 
# Is there anyone who has, or is able to, articulate
# the PGP point of view for public key management and
# compentently contrast it to the PEM point of view?
# 
# Is there, perhaps, someone who has written on this
# subject or spoken publicly in an organized fashion?
# 
# I am seeking such a person for a presentation and
# panel discussion at an international conference.
# 
# I need names ASAP!
# 
# Please feel free to forward this message to
# appropriate newsgroups.
# 
# 
# Regards, -Rob-
# SHIREY@MITRE.ORG * tel 703.883.7210 * fax 703.883.1397
# Robert W. Shirey, The MITRE Corporation, Mail Stop Z202
# 7525 Colshire Drive, McLean, Virginia  22102-3481  USA
# 
 
 

Forwarded message:
# From pem-dev-request@magellan.TIS.COM Thu Oct 21 09:41:29 1993
# Date: Thu, 21 Oct 93 16:27:16 +0100
# From: Ruediger Grimm <grimm@darmstadt.gmd.de>
# Message-Id: <9310211527.AA19289@ipsi.darmstadt.gmd.de>
# To: shirey@mitre.org
# Subject: Re: Articulation of PGP point of view?
# Cc: pem-dev@tis.com
# 
#  > Date: Thu, 21 Oct 1993 10:54:43 -0500
#  > To: pem-dev@tis.com
#  > From: "Robert W. Shirey" <shirey@mitre.org>
#  > Subject: Articulation of PGP point of view?
#  > 
#  > Is there anyone who has, or is able to, articulate
#  > the PGP point of view for public key management and
#  > compentently contrast it to the PEM point of view?
#  > 
# 
# How much I would like to read the output of this!
# Does such a statement exist? This list is certainly
# a thankful forum of interested readers.
# 
# Ruediger
# 




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Date: Thu, 21 Oct 93 12:52:59 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: CRYPTO + REPUTATIONS = A NEW ERA
In-Reply-To: <9310211855.AA09792@illuminati.IO.COM>
Message-ID: <9310211950.AA19355@netcom5.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Doug Barnes wrote:

> Actually, there is still an element of trust involved, that (as a
> previous poster pointed out) the entity who actually holds your gold
> won't run off with the gold, or give it to someone else, etc. Still
> (in the best of all worlds) rather have more solidly-backed currency, 
> but you still have to trust someone at some point. I'd rather have
> US dollars than gold-backed currency from an even less trustworthy gov't.
> 
> The important freedom is being able to choose whom and what you trust,
> without having to slide into a pure barter economy.

There is _always_ some element of trust involved. Crypto changes this
in a subtle way I'll get to later.

The Swiss bank that holds "your" gold (or whatever) can in theory tell
you "But, Herr Barnes, you of course withdrew your holdings
yesterday!" Likewise, your local bookie can refuse to pay you what he
owes you (I guess you can threaten to break _his_ legs!), or can claim
he already paid "you" the day before. Such "burnings" have always been
possible, and yet these systems work and are actually quite stable.

That these "trust" systems work is related to tit-for-tat strategies
in the iterated Prisoner's Dilemma problem, in expectation of future
business, and in the whole related area of _reputations_. Your local
bookie pays up because to not pay up would eventually have
repercussions for his future business...and he deems his _real_ business
is making book, not burning any one customer. Emergent behavior.
Spontaneous order. 

Secret accounts and crypto make the equation even more interesting.

Anyone depositing money (dollars, gold, who cares, really) into an
account and getting back some form of digital money can:

- test the system by redeeming small amounts of the money

- actually be a service which makes deposits and then redeems the
digital money as a "testing service" (issuing a signed report, for a
fee, which reprots on the reliability of banks...all privately done,
of course)

Digital money is a kind of shell game (with no insult intended to
either shell games or digital money). $10,000 converted into, say, 100
separate pieces of digital money issued by many different banks,
circulating around and being redeemed and reissued....well, it would
be apparent pretty quickly--and word would spread--if the money was
not being redeemed.

Some percentage of all the digital money "in circulation" will
actually be primarily "pinging" money, designed to ping (test) the
system.  (After a while, expect this to go down.) The beauty is that
the untraceability means a bank doesn't know it's being tested by a
"pinger" or by another bank, or if the money belows to some "Little
Guy" who might otherwise be fair game for a rip-off (putatively,
although "Little Guys" are not ripped-off by banks in the current
system, either).

I've said this before: CRYPTO + DIGITAL REPUTATIONS = A NEW ERA.
Crypto researchers like Chaum seem mostly oblivious to the nature of
reputations, of escrow services (untraceable, too). and of this whole
very natural aspect of transactions. Many of the currently "unsolved"
problems with digital money fade away--I contend, and will discuss if
there's interest--when the elements of reputation and reputation
capital are included.

(I can understand the reason cryptologists have for purely
mathematical or formal proofs, but the problems now stymieing them
with digital coins (e.g., the lack thereof) and the like are solvable
by injecting local reptutation considerations.)


The ecology of these banks, transfer channels, etc., will be quite
interesting to study. I expect fairly robust feedback mechanism will
evolve naturally be market forces.

Crypto makes a lot of interesting things possible.


-- 
..........................................................................
Timothy C. May         | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,  
tcmay@netcom.com       | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
408-688-5409           | knowledge, reputations, information markets, 
W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA  | black markets, collapse of governments.
Higher Power: 2^756839 | Public Key: PGP and MailSafe available.
Note: I put time and money into writing this posting. I hope you enjoy it.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: hfinney@shell.portal.com (Hal Finney)
Date: Thu, 21 Oct 93 12:52:48 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: backing
Message-ID: <9310211952.AA19206@jobe.shell.portal.com.shell.portal.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Perry wrote:
> > A digital currency can be backed by gold held in some secure location
> > like the Zurich Free Transit Warehouse. U.S. Dollars are backed by
> > absolutely nothing other than blind faith in the U.S. Governement.
> > Who's kidding whom?

Banks are contractually obligated to turn over mortgage notes in exchange
for U.S. dollars.  These contracts are valid over approximately 30
years, and provide unencumbered title to valuable property.  These and
similar contracts may be said to give value to dollars independent of
government promises.

Hal





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Peter Wayner <pcw@access.digex.net>
Date: Thu, 21 Oct 93 10:02:48 PDT
To: pmetzger@lehman.com
Subject: Gold in them thar Bills...
Message-ID: <199310211701.AA05024@access.digex.net>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Now, I realize that there is something romantic about Swiss bankaccounts,
but lets not fool ourselves. Gold in the Zurich Free Transit Warehouse
depends on the good graces of the Swiss government. After WWII, the Swiss 
ended up with a real pile of Nazi gold in their vaults because they had
been remaining neutral during all of these years. The US demanded the
gold because it won the war. Here is an account from Paul Erdman's
_The Swiss Account_, a docudrama about the time period. It is a work
of fiction, but the true parts are as true as any history book. He
gives footnotes.

   Where that gold was concerned, even before the war ended, the Allies
  threatened to maintain an economic boycott on Switzerland unless it was
  turned over to them. The Swiss government agreed and also promised to 
  relinquish all other German assets in Switzerland, such as bank accounts,
  once it was determined how much was involved. 

   So no embargo was imposed. This promise was subsequentally reaffirmed 
  in a formal agreement signed in Washington after which the Swiss simply
  stonewalled. There was no proof, they claimed, that they had received 
  any looted gold from Germany. And as to the Nazi bank deposits, there was
  no way under Swiss law that private property could be seized. They insisted
  that the netire matter be turned over to an international court of 
  arbitration... which would have taken years. 

   In the end, the Allies caved in. On August 28, 1952, in return for a lump
  sum settlement of ninety million dollars, the Allies concented to declare all
  of the claims against Switzerland arising out of World War II as
  satisfied. That amount represented no more than five cents on the dollar. 
  The rest was simply kept by the Swiss, although a small amount was eventually
  given to the Red Cross. 

Now, as it stands, I really don't think that gold in a Swiss vault is 
, without question, better than US paper money. I can pay my US taxes
in US currency, but I can't eat gold. It's just shiny and neat. It's great
if you need to make gold chains and rings, but it's not that great for
anything other than electronics. In my computer, the silicon is worth
more than the gold. 

-Pete
r





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Matthew J Ghio <mg5n+@andrew.cmu.edu>
Date: Thu, 21 Oct 93 10:12:48 PDT
To: hfinney@shell.portal.com (Hal Finney)
Subject: Re: Mail delivery question
In-Reply-To: <9310211532.AA05517@jobe.shell.portal.com.shell.portal.com>
Message-ID: <sglg7Lq00awJQWsX5w@andrew.cmu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I was pondering the same question awhile ago.  After poking around in
the system and reading the temporary scratch files that the system
created by the mailer, I noticed that the mail was being preceeded by a
seperate header packet which was not included in the message.  Sending
mail to myself caused the system to create two temporary files in the
process.  One of them was called "SF" and the other was "QF".  I don't
know what the letters stand for, and this is probably just how CMU does
it, other sites may be different.  Anyway, in my test mail to myself,
the SF file contained:

#From |<mg5n+@andrew.cmu.edu>|
#To |mg5n+@andrew.cmu.edu|
#Auth |26634;andrew.cmu.edu;Matthew J Ghio|

and the QF file contained the actual text of the message plus the
headers that you see.  So the email is actually sent as two seperate
packets of data, the headers you see are just there for looks, the
actual delivery info is hidden behind-the-scenes.  Does anyone else have
any description of "standard" methods of handling internet e-mail?




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: nate@rodin.VIS.ColoState.EDU
Date: Thu, 21 Oct 93 12:12:47 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com (Cypherpunks Mailing List)
Subject: Calling all Colorado CypherPunks
Message-ID: <9310211907.AA10673@rodin.VIS.ColoState.EDU>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text


I am planning (if it hasn't been done) to start the Colorado
branch of the CypherPunks.  If you are a CypherPunk interested
in this (and live in the vicinity), please send me email, 
I'll start thinking of things to do, and we can work out where
to meet and how often.

-nate

-- 
+-----------------------------------------------------------------------+
| Nate Sammons   email: nate@VIS.ColoState.Edu
|   Colorado State University Computer Visualization Laboratory
|   Finger nate@monet.VIS.ColoState.Edu for my PGP key
|   #include <std.disclaimer>
|   Title 18 USC 2511 and 18 USC 2703 Protected --> Monitoring Forbidden
+--------+                          Always remember "Brazil"



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Jim McCoy <mccoy@ccwf.cc.utexas.edu>
Date: Thu, 21 Oct 93 11:17:56 PDT
To: pcw@access.digex.net (Peter Wayner)
Subject: Re: Gold in them thar Bills...
In-Reply-To: <199310211701.AA05024@access.digex.net>
Message-ID: <199310211813.AA02031@flubber.cc.utexas.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text


Peter Wayner <pcw@access.digex.net> writes:
[...]
> Now, as it stands, I really don't think that gold in a Swiss vault is 
> , without question, better than US paper money.

Money will always be just paper, but gold will always be gold...

jim






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Perry E. Metzger" <pmetzger@lehman.com>
Date: Thu, 21 Oct 93 10:22:48 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Gold in them thar Bills...
In-Reply-To: <199310211701.AA05024@access.digex.net>
Message-ID: <9310211721.AA22131@snark.lehman.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Peter Wayner says:
> Now, as it stands, I really don't think that gold in a Swiss vault is 
> , without question, better than US paper money. I can pay my US taxes
> in US currency, but I can't eat gold. It's just shiny and neat. It's great
> if you need to make gold chains and rings, but it's not that great for
> anything other than electronics. In my computer, the silicon is worth
> more than the gold. 

As for "I can't eat gold", you can't eat U.S. Dollars, either. If you
need U.S. Dollars, Marks, Pounds, Yen, or anything else, and you have
gold, you can simply sell some gold. If you need food, you can buy it
with currency purchased with the gold, or can purchase it with the
gold directly.

As for "in my book, silicon is worth more than gold", I'll happily
trade you 100 kilos of silicon for 100 kilos of gold any day you like.
Assuming you aren't fibbing, you should take the trade, since the
silicon is worth more to you.

Of course, you'd be a fool. Silicon is plentiful, and costs pennies
the kilo. Gold is not plentiful -- the market value is around $10,000
the kilo.

Perry






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: pmetzger@lehman.com (Perry E. Metzger)
Date: Thu, 21 Oct 93 10:28:00 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: why an envelope
Message-ID: <9310211724.AA02906@kublai.lehman.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Enough people have asked that I'll explain why envelopes are seperated
from headers in mail.

Lets say I'm sending mail with the following header

To: foo, bar, baz

Mail gets stored and forwarded many times during its delivery process
on a large internet. If at every stage the only hint the mailer had
for delivery was the header address, every mailer along the way would
have to generate three copies of the mail in order to guarantee
delivery. Kind of nutty, eh?

Thats why there is a seperate envelope. When you generate the mail,
three seperate copies will be produced with seperate envelopes
indicating the mail whould be sent to "foo", "bar", and "baz", and the
mailers in between don't look at the headers at all.

This is a slight simplification because envelopes can contain multiple
addresses -- but thats when you are sending one message to many people
via a common path -- the mailer at the last step where the mail can
take a common path is expected to break the envelope up before sending
it further along.

Perry




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: hsuutala@fmdmfg2.intel.com (Howard Suutala - ICD)
Date: Thu, 21 Oct 93 13:37:58 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Gold in them thar Bills...
Message-ID: <9310212036.AA25191@tdws22>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



writes pmetzger@lehman.com (Perry E. Metzger)

>I can take the pound of gold to MTB down the block and have dollars,
>yen, or anything else I like, within 15 minutes. I can then take those
>to buy Big Gulps.

>Perry

Yes, as long it was been minted in a recognized form i.e. a gold eagle,
a panda, or gold peso.  A gob of yellow shinny stuff is just that until 
it has been assayed, and then it is only as good as the backing or 
reputation of the assayer. 

Howard

My opinion and mine alone, not the companies.........not by a long shot.
Howard Suutala    |  Intel Connectivity Division 
Intel Corporation |  m/s fm4-26  |  1900 Prarie City Road | Folsom | CA | 95630
[v] 916.356.4412  |  [f] 916.356.3455      | [email] hsuutala@fmdmfg2.intel.com





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: peter honeyman <honey@citi.umich.edu>
Date: Thu, 21 Oct 93 10:42:48 PDT
To: mg5n+@andrew.cmu.edu
Subject: Re: Mail delivery question
Message-ID: <9310211739.AA29665@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


i think you want to check out rfc 821, which describes smtp.

	peter




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: F_GRIFFITH@CCSVAX.SFASU.EDU
Date: Thu, 21 Oct 93 11:47:58 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: re:backing
Message-ID: <931021134500.22e25c67@CCSVAX.SFASU.EDU>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>workable barter currency?

Aug/Sept 93 Mother Earth News has an article "The Ultimate Barter" about
"A currency based on time-hours is a boon to a rural community."

>poorly-backed digital currency will win out over e.g. U.S. dollars?

Depends on legal tender status (see post by Perry).  Note too his
point that digital currency needn't be poorly backed.  However, also note
that government issued dollars would circulate in preference to gold
backed digital currency issued by someone else according to Greshams 
law (which was stated in reference to metal coins, but applies to
other forms as well).

Solution might be to denominate digital currency in something other
than $ (e.g. gold grams) & have parallel monetary system develop.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: cman@IO.COM (Douglas Barnes)
Date: Thu, 21 Oct 93 12:02:48 PDT
To: pmetzger@lehman.com
Subject: Re: backing
In-Reply-To: <9310211543.AA22017@snark.lehman.com>
Message-ID: <9310211855.AA09792@illuminati.IO.COM>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> 
> A digital currency can be backed by gold held in some secure location
> like the Zurich Free Transit Warehouse. U.S. Dollars are backed by
> absolutely nothing other than blind faith in the U.S. Governement.
> Who's kidding whom?
> 

Actually, there is still an element of trust involved, that (as a
previous poster pointed out) the entity who actually holds your gold
won't run off with the gold, or give it to someone else, etc. Still
(in the best of all worlds) rather have more solidly-backed currency, 
but you still have to trust someone at some point. I'd rather have
US dollars than gold-backed currency from an even less trustworthy gov't.

The important freedom is being able to choose whom and what you trust,
without having to slide into a pure barter economy.

Also note that I can draw numerous (albeit somewhat outlandish) scenaria 
involving the depreciation of gold; while it's very, very unlikely, it
might pay to be at least moderately diversified. Note what happened to the 
value of gold and silver in the 16th c.

Doug

-- 
----------------                                             /\ 
Douglas Barnes            cman@illuminati.io.com            /  \ 
Chief Wizard         (512) 448-8950 (d), 447-7866 (v)      / () \
Illuminati Online          metaverse.io.com 7777          /______\



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: ferguson@icm1.icp.net (Paul Ferguson x2044)
Date: Thu, 21 Oct 93 10:57:56 PDT
To: pmetzger@lehman.com
Subject: Re: Gold in them thar Bills...
In-Reply-To: <9310211721.AA22131@snark.lehman.com>
Message-ID: <9310211858.AA00917@icm1.icp.net>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text



> As for "in my book, silicon is worth more than gold", I'll happily
> trade you 100 kilos of silicon for 100 kilos of gold any day you like.
> Assuming you aren't fibbing, you should take the trade, since the
> silicon is worth more to you.
> 
> Of course, you'd be a fool. Silicon is plentiful, and costs pennies
> the kilo. Gold is not plentiful -- the market value is around $10,000
> the kilo.

Perry, I think its foolish to refute it simply on a literal basis, 
but then again, that's just lil' ole me. 

One could reasonably argue that you simply can't walk into the
corner 7-Eleven with a pound of gold and purchase 475 Big Gulps (tm),
but then again, there's an advocate for each point of view (ie,
Sternlight).

I personally like the gold/silicon comparison, if taken from a 
philosophical viewpoint. 

Information is arguably the gold of the future, and strong crypto
helps broaden the spectrum for each and every one of us.

Cheers,

_____________________________________________________________________________
Paul Ferguson                                                               
Mindbank Consulting Group                                    fergp@sytex.com   
Fairfax, Virginia  USA                                       ferguson@icp.net



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Date: Thu, 21 Oct 93 14:27:59 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Voice Escrow System
In-Reply-To: <9310212059.AA08477@bsu-cs.bsu.edu>
Message-ID: <9310212124.AA05911@netcom5.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



> Darn! They publicized a great spoof!

No, what CERT did was to illegally reveal a technique developed by law
enforcement, for the "LEAF" field (Law Enforcement Audio Field):

> The CERT Coordination Center has learned of several vulnerabilities
> affecting Sun Microsystems, Inc. (Sun) operating systems. Three
...
> III. /dev/audio Vulnerability
> 
>      This vulnerability affects all Sun systems with microphones. This
>      includes all versions of SunOS 4.1.x including 4.1.1, 4.1.2, 4.1.3,
...
>      A. Description
> 
>         /dev/audio is set to a default mode of 666. There is also no
>         indication to the user of the system that the microphone is on.
> 
>      B. Impact
> 
>         Any user with access to the system can eavesdrop on conversations
>         held in the vicinity of the microphone. 

This was all built-in to SunOS as part of the "Voice Escrow System."
RCA developed the special "Nipper" chip for the audio portion, DEC
handle the file transfer part with the "Pipper" chip, The Navy did
their part with the "Flipper" chip, and the whole thing was overseen
oby the Reagan Administration as the "Gipper Program."

Currently the "Data Superhighway" version is being supervised by Al
Gore and his wife, hence the "Tipper" chip.

--Tim

-- 
..........................................................................
Timothy C. May         | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,  
tcmay@netcom.com       | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
408-688-5409           | knowledge, reputations, information markets, 
W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA  | black markets, collapse of governments.
Higher Power: 2^756839 | Public Key: PGP and MailSafe available.
Note: I put time and money into writing this posting. I hope you enjoy it.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: lefty@apple.com (Lefty)
Date: Thu, 21 Oct 93 14:52:48 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Gold in them thar Bills...
Message-ID: <9310212144.AA18923@internal.apple.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>> Have you ever heard of doing an assay?
>
>Yes, but that would be at the expense of the owner, and if it looks like
>gold, feels heavy in the hand like gold, and if it has the word Canada and
>the number .999 stamped on it, then people (bankers) might take it at face
>value (or might not, depending on the stability of that country).

The "expense" of doing an assay is minimal.  As another poster has pointed
out, assaying is essentially trivial, given the right materials.


--
Lefty (lefty@apple.com)
C:.M:.C:., D:.O:.D:.






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: pmetzger@lehman.com (Perry E. Metzger)
Date: Thu, 21 Oct 93 12:07:58 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Gold in them thar Bills...
In-Reply-To: <9310211858.AA00917@icm1.icp.net>
Message-ID: <9310211906.AA04954@kublai.lehman.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Paul Ferguson x2044 says:
> One could reasonably argue that you simply can't walk into the
> corner 7-Eleven with a pound of gold and purchase 475 Big Gulps (tm),
> but then again, there's an advocate for each point of view (ie,
> Sternlight).

I can take the pound of gold to MTB down the block and have dollars,
yen, or anything else I like, within 15 minutes. I can then take those
to buy Big Gulps.

Perry




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Perry E. Metzger" <pmetzger@lehman.com>
Date: Thu, 21 Oct 93 12:12:57 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: backing
In-Reply-To: <931021134500.22e25c67@CCSVAX.SFASU.EDU>
Message-ID: <9310211911.AA22179@snark.lehman.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



F_GRIFFITH@ccsvax.sfasu.edu says:
> point that digital currency needn't be poorly backed.  However, also note
> that government issued dollars would circulate in preference to gold
> backed digital currency issued by someone else according to Greshams 
> law (which was stated in reference to metal coins, but applies to
> other forms as well).

This is not what Gresham's Law says.

Gresham's Law is that if there are two kinds of coins that are stated
by law to have equal value, the one thats actually worth less because
of metal content will be the one that you spend first. It doesn't
apply in this instance at all.

Perry




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: plaz@netcom.com (Geoff Dale)
Date: Thu, 21 Oct 93 15:12:52 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Metaverse info (was: Introducing digital cash in a MOO)
Message-ID: <9310212212.AA00583@netcom.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>can you send me info on how to gain access to metaverse?

I've had a couple of requests to this effect. I originally tried to keep it
off the list, but have decided that by sending business thier way I was
actually contributing to one of the few digital cash startups in existance.
Illuminatus wizards feel free to correct any mistakes.

you can access the metaverse via:

'telnet metaverse.io.com 7777'

That is domain name: metaverse.io.com port: 7777.

To login, type as instructed:

'connect guest'

At this point you can browse around with one of the pre-made characters.

To get your own character, you'll have to sign up for an account @io.com.
You can do this by:

'telnet io.com'

...and following instructions. Have a credit card ready. The base fees are
$10/month for telnet access only. Other structures are available.

Once you have an account, send mail to mentor@io.com from your io.com
account with character name and password.

You can find me in the 'verse as PlasticBeethoven. I am currently setting
up a branch office of the Extropians Institute (Freegate Virtual Branch).
Feel free to drop by and offer encouragement/suggestions/criticisms. ('go
to ExI' will get you there.)

   Forward, upward, outward, onward, and every which way but loose!
_______________________________________________________________________
Geoff Dale    -- insert standard disclaimers here --    plaz@netcom.com
               "We are the shock troops of reality."
                - Voice of the Friends (Wild Palms)






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: peb@PROCASE.COM (Paul Baclace)
Date: Thu, 21 Oct 93 15:18:05 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Eavedropping techniques revealed!
Message-ID: <9310212214.AA04188@banff.procase.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



>/dev/audio is set to a default mode of 666

NeXT had the same problem; a few years ago users eavesdropped over the
Internet.  The next release of the NeXT OS plugged the hole by limiting
access to whoever was logged into the console.  


Paul E. Baclace
peb@procase.com





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: QBOSWT@grace.tstc.edu
Date: Thu, 21 Oct 93 13:17:58 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: cyphrs
Message-ID: <49C90C594D@grace.tstc.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Longing to be free.
Send info encrypting gov't from privacy.
Who r cypherpunks?
Why a toad?




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Grendel Grettisson <mimir@u.washington.edu>
Date: Thu, 21 Oct 93 15:32:53 PDT
To: F_GRIFFITH@CCSVAX.SFASU.EDU
Subject: re:700 Club etc.
In-Reply-To: <931021162143.22e266bc@CCSVAX.SFASU.EDU>
Message-ID: <Pine.3.87.9310211537.C27560-0100000@goren2.u.washington.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


On Thu, 21 Oct 1993 F_GRIFFITH@CCSVAX.SFASU.EDU wrote:

> I find the paranoid reaction to the "Religious Right" strange.  Perhaps
> it is based on relying on the establishment media for a picture of it.
> Would you rely on such media to give you an accurate picture of what
> the government is doing with cryptography or of teh need for gun control?
> The media picture of the Religious Right is just as distorted.
> 
> The right to encryption and the "right" to abortion don't have the same
> basis - encryption kills no one.

 They are both based on the right of the individual to choose.






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Carl_Ellison@vos.stratus.com
Date: Thu, 21 Oct 93 12:32:48 PDT
To: prz@columbine.cgd.ucar.edu
Subject: (fwd) Articulation of PGP point of view?
Message-ID: <199310211931.PAA05363@transfer.stratus.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>Date: Thu, 21 Oct 1993 10:54:43 -0500
>From: "Robert W. Shirey" <shirey@mitre.org>
>Subject: Articulation of PGP point of view?

>Is there anyone who has, or is able to, articulate
>the PGP point of view for public key management and
>compentently contrast it to the PEM point of view?

>Is there, perhaps, someone who has written on this
>subject or spoken publicly in an organized fashion?

>I am seeking such a person for a presentation and
>panel discussion at an international conference.

>I need names ASAP!

>Please feel free to forward this message to
>appropriate newsgroups.


>Regards, -Rob-
>SHIREY@MITRE.ORG * tel 703.883.7210 * fax 703.883.1397
>Robert W. Shirey, The MITRE Corporation, Mail Stop Z202
>7525 Colshire Drive, McLean, Virginia  22102-3481  USA







From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Alexander Reynolds <chrome@jhunix.hcf.jhu.edu>
Date: Thu, 21 Oct 93 12:38:07 PDT
To: "Timothy C. May" <tcmay@netcom.com>
Subject: Re: Gold in them thar Bills...
In-Reply-To: <9310211817.AA06108@netcom5.netcom.com>
Message-ID: <Pine.3.05.9310211503.A2512-a100000@jhunix.hcf.jhu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> Be this as it may, electronic money depends on _reputation_, on the
> expectation that a depositor or payee will get what he thinks he will,
> whether in gold, in dollars, in francs, in Safeway discount coupons,
> or in Get Out of Jail Free cards.

	Since the topic of backing seems to go towards gold, what about
the purity of the bullion and who (which government) presses it?  Gold
pressed by the Canadian government at .999 troy oz might not be worth a
whole lot as backing if that government collapses tommorow. 
What's to say it isn't iron pyrite or any similar looking
material if the government isn't there to back it?  Anything to say on this,
Perry?  

-Alex Reynolds






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Alexander Reynolds <chrome@jhunix.hcf.jhu.edu>
Date: Thu, 21 Oct 93 12:42:48 PDT
To: "Perry E. Metzger" <pmetzger@lehman.com>
Subject: Re: backing
In-Reply-To: <9310211911.AA22179@snark.lehman.com>
Message-ID: <Pine.3.05.9310211533.B2512-9100000@jhunix.hcf.jhu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> This is not what Gresham's Law says.
> 
> Gresham's Law is that if there are two kinds of coins that are stated
> by law to have equal value, the one thats actually worth less because
> of metal content will be the one that you spend first. It doesn't
> apply in this instance at all.
> 
> Perry

I think Gresham's Law applies to authority-influenced currency.  I'm
trying to get a hold on this quote so hold on.

-Alex







From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Perry E. Metzger" <pmetzger@lehman.com>
Date: Thu, 21 Oct 93 12:47:59 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: backing
In-Reply-To: <Pine.3.05.9310211533.B2512-9100000@jhunix.hcf.jhu.edu>
Message-ID: <9310211942.AA22217@snark.lehman.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Alexander Reynolds says:
> > This is not what Gresham's Law says.
> > 
> > Gresham's Law is that if there are two kinds of coins that are stated
> > by law to have equal value, the one thats actually worth less because
> > of metal content will be the one that you spend first. It doesn't
> > apply in this instance at all.
> > 
> > Perry
> 
> I think Gresham's Law applies to authority-influenced currency.

Precisely what I said -- coinage stated BY LAW to ahve a certain value.

Perry




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Jim McCoy <mccoy@ccwf.cc.utexas.edu>
Date: Thu, 21 Oct 93 13:47:58 PDT
To: chrome@jhunix.hcf.jhu.edu (Alexander Reynolds)
Subject: Re: Gold in them thar Bills...
In-Reply-To: <Pine.3.05.9310211503.A2512-a100000@jhunix.hcf.jhu.edu>
Message-ID: <199310212043.AA02256@flubber.cc.utexas.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text


Alexander Reynolds <chrome@jhunix.hcf.jhu.edu> writes
>
> 	Since the topic of backing seems to go towards gold, what about
> the purity of the bullion and who (which government) presses it?  Gold
> pressed by the Canadian government at .999 troy oz might not be worth a
> whole lot as backing if that government collapses tommorow. 

Gold is gold.  As a jewelers son I can assure you that it is quite easy
with a touchstone and a few chemicals to assay the gold.  This is what
makes gold such an easily convertable currency, you can easily determine
the purity and weight of the bullion.  I have seen coins pressed by the
17th century spanish empire (from the Atocha, mostly silver, but a few of
the gold ones as well) that one could still negotiate today.  The value of
the coin or bullion is not that it has the backing of a particular
government, it comes from the material used.  

This very fact is what distinguishes gold and other scare materials from
paper currency.  If the U.S. government collapses your dollars are going to
be just paper, but your gold coins will always be gold and can always be
used for negotiation.  This is why gold increases in value as governments
and economies become unstable (e.g. the recent problems in Russia caused a
slight increase in the price of gold as more people bought it, just in
case...) because it will always have a value regardless of which government
happened to package it.  In fact, it need not even be packaged/minted by a
government; I could just as easily melt down some jewelry and package it as
bullion myself and anyone else who I wish to negotiate my gold with could
easily verify the weight and purity of the gold themselves.

jim



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Anonymous <nowhere@bsu-cs.bsu.edu>
Date: Thu, 21 Oct 93 13:57:59 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Eavedropping techniques revealed!
Message-ID: <9310212059.AA08477@bsu-cs.bsu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Darn! They publicized a great spoof!

excerpted:

CA-93:15                         CERT Advisory
                               October 21, 1993
            /usr/lib/sendmail, /bin/tar, and /dev/audio Vulnerabilities 

The CERT Coordination Center has learned of several vulnerabilities
affecting Sun Microsystems, Inc. (Sun) operating systems. Three
separate vulnerabilities are described in this advisory.  The first 
and third vulnerabilities affect all versions of SunOS 4.1.x and all
versions of Solaris 2.x.  The second affects all systems running any 
version of Solaris 2.x (but does not affect SunOS 4.1.x systems). 

Patches can be obtained from local Sun Answer Centers worldwide as
well as through anonymous FTP from the ftp.uu.net (192.48.96.9) system
in the /systems/sun/sun-dist directory.  In Europe, these patches are
available from ftp.eu.net in the /sun/fixes directory.

Information concerning specific patches is outlined below. Please note 
that Sun sometimes updates patch files.  If you find that the checksum 
is different, please contact Sun.

[...]

III. /dev/audio Vulnerability

     This vulnerability affects all Sun systems with microphones. This
     includes all versions of SunOS 4.1.x including 4.1.1, 4.1.2, 4.1.3,
     4.1.3c, and all versions of Solaris 2.x including Solaris 2.1 
     (SunOS 5.1) and Solaris 2.2 (SunOS 5.2).  Sun is addressing this 
     problem in Solaris 2.3.

     A. Description

        /dev/audio is set to a default mode of 666. There is also no
        indication to the user of the system that the microphone is on.

     B. Impact

        Any user with access to the system can eavesdrop on conversations
        held in the vicinity of the microphone. 

     C. Solution

        To prevent unauthorized listening with the microphone, the
        permissions of the audio data device (/dev/audio) should allow 
        only the user logged in on the console of the machine to read 
        /dev/audio. To prevent unauthorized changes in playback and record 
        settings, the permissions on /dev/audioctl should be similarly 
        changed.

        *** Any site seriously concerned about the security risks
        associated with the microphone should either switch off the
        microphone, or unplug the microphone to prevent unauthorized
        listening. ***

        1. Restricting access on 4.x systems

        Use fbtab(5) to restrict the access to these devices. See the
        man page for more information about this procedure.

        2. Restricting access on Solaris 2.x systems

        To restrict access to these devices to a specific users, the 
        permissions on the device files must be manually changed.

        As root:

        # chmod 600 /dev/audio
        # chown <console user's username>.<desired group> /dev/audio
        # chmod 600 /dev/audioctl
        # chown <console user's username>.<desired group> /dev/audio






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Perry E. Metzger" <pmetzger@lehman.com>
Date: Thu, 21 Oct 93 13:18:01 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Gold in them thar Bills...
In-Reply-To: <Pine.3.05.9310211503.A2512-a100000@jhunix.hcf.jhu.edu>
Message-ID: <9310212015.AA22256@snark.lehman.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Alexander Reynolds says:
> 	Since the topic of backing seems to go towards gold, what about
> the purity of the bullion and who (which government) presses it?  Gold
> pressed by the Canadian government at .999 troy oz might not be worth a
> whole lot as backing if that government collapses tommorow. 

Pardon, but what does the purity of the gold have to do with who mints it?

> What's to say it isn't iron pyrite or any similar looking
> material if the government isn't there to back it?

Have you ever heard of doing an assay?

Perry




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Perry E. Metzger" <pmetzger@lehman.com>
Date: Thu, 21 Oct 93 13:22:49 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: backing
In-Reply-To: <9310211952.AA19206@jobe.shell.portal.com.shell.portal.com>
Message-ID: <9310212018.AA22264@snark.lehman.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Hal Finney says:
> Perry wrote:
> > > A digital currency can be backed by gold held in some secure location
> > > like the Zurich Free Transit Warehouse. U.S. Dollars are backed by
> > > absolutely nothing other than blind faith in the U.S. Governement.
> > > Who's kidding whom?
> 
> Banks are contractually obligated to turn over mortgage notes in exchange
> for U.S. dollars.  These contracts are valid over approximately 30
> years, and provide unencumbered title to valuable property.  These and
> similar contracts may be said to give value to dollars independent of
> government promises.

The mortgage contracts are not equivalent to the property -- in
particular, the property can rise rapidly in dollar denominated value
while the mortgage notes become worthless in a hyperinflation
situation.

Perry




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: grand-central!amix!chip (Chip Morningstar -- "Software Without Moving Parts")
Date: Thu, 21 Oct 93 16:53:06 PDT
To: tcmay@netcom.netcom.com
Subject: Re:  CRYPTO + REPUTATIONS = A NEW ERA
Message-ID: <9310212319.AA10591@amix>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Tim May wrote:
>Some percentage of all the digital money "in circulation" will
>actually be primarily "pinging" money, designed to ping (test) the
>system.  (After a while, expect this to go down.) The beauty is that

Maybe this is what my mom was talking about when she told me she was
saving her ping money.

Or something like that.

--
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
| Chip Morningstar                             |"Going into VR is like        |
| Electric Communities                         | wearing a pair of rented     |
| 3339 Kipling, Palo Alto, CA 94306            | bowling shoes on your face." |
| 415-856-1130                                 |            -- Doug Crockford |
| chip@netcom.com or chip@amix.com             |                              |
------------------------------------------------------------------------------




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: F_GRIFFITH@CCSVAX.SFASU.EDU
Date: Thu, 21 Oct 93 14:22:49 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: re:700 Club etc.
Message-ID: <931021162143.22e266bc@CCSVAX.SFASU.EDU>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


This is another thread only slightly related to cypherpunks.

I find the paranoid reaction to the "Religious Right" strange.  Perhaps
it is based on relying on the establishment media for a picture of it.
Would you rely on such media to give you an accurate picture of what
the government is doing with cryptography or of teh need for gun control?
The media picture of the Religious Right is just as distorted.

The right to encryption and the "right" to abortion don't have the same
basis - encryption kills no one.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: peb@PROCASE.COM (Paul Baclace)
Date: Thu, 21 Oct 93 16:28:05 PDT
To: XXCLARK@indst.indstate.edu
Subject: Re: Canon copiers
Message-ID: <9310212323.AA04196@banff.procase.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



>   response was that "the machine would be virtually destroyed."

>        Anyone want to test this for us?

Stand back, the thermite grenade in the black box could be hot.

;^)

I'd like to know how they put the serial number into the copy.

Paul E. Baclace
peb@procase.com




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Peter G. Trei" <ptrei@bistromath.mitre.org>
Date: Thu, 21 Oct 93 13:32:48 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Articulation of PGP point of view?
Message-ID: <9310212029.AA12164@bistromath.mitre.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Robert W. Shirey writes:

>Date: Thu, 21 Oct 1993 10:54:43 -0500
>From: "Robert W. Shirey" <shirey@mitre.org>

>Is there anyone who has, or is able to, articulate the PGP point of
>view for public key management and compentently contrast it to the PEM
>point of view?

>Is there, perhaps, someone who has written on this subject or spoken
>publicly in an organized fashion?

>I am seeking such a person for a presentation and panel discussion at
>an international conference.

>I need names ASAP!

>Please feel free to forward this message to appropriate newsgroups.

>Regards, -Rob-
>SHIREY@MITRE.ORG * tel 703.883.7210 * fax 703.883.1397
>Robert W. Shirey, The MITRE Corporation, Mail Stop Z202
>7525 Colshire Drive, McLean, Virginia  22102-3481  USA

    I talked to Rob about this. What he's really looking for is not
really so much a spokesman for the PGP vs "Big Brother" type of
discussion, but rather someone who can discuss PGP key management
issues from a technical standpoint. He'd really like to find someone
who has dealt with managing a PGP key-server, thoroughly understands
the "web of trust" model used in PGP (contrasting it to the
certification authority hierarchy used in PEM) and is a good and
articulate public speaker. Being partisan for PGP is fine, but you'd
better be able to argue from a technical standpoint, not just an
ideological one.
							Peter Trei
							ptrei@mitre.org





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: msattler@netcom.com (Michael Sattler)
Date: Thu, 21 Oct 93 16:42:54 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Gold in them thar Bills...
Message-ID: <9310212340.AA13692@netcom.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>writes pmetzger@lehman.com (Perry E. Metzger)
>
>>I can take the pound of gold to MTB down the block and have dollars,
>>yen, or anything else I like, within 15 minutes. I can then take those
>>to buy Big Gulps.
>
>writes hsuutala@fmdmfg2.intel.com (Howard Suutala - ICD)
>
>Yes, as long it was been minted in a recognized form i.e. a gold eagle,
>a panda, or gold peso.  A gob of yellow shinny stuff is just that until 
>it has been assayed, and then it is only as good as the backing or 
>reputation of the assayer. 

Isn't that just part of the recognition process, like "is this bill a real
one, let me look..."


-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
Michael S. Sattler         msattler@netcom.com        +1 (415) 621-2903
Digital Jungle Software    Encrypt now; ask me how.   (finger for PGP key)

               All that is required for evil to triumph is
                for {wo}men of good will to do nothing.






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: m5@vail.tivoli.com (Mike McNally)
Date: Thu, 21 Oct 93 14:48:00 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: re:700 Club etc.
In-Reply-To: <931021162143.22e266bc@CCSVAX.SFASU.EDU>
Message-ID: <9310212146.AA05688@vail.tivoli.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



F_GRIFFITH@CCSVAX.SFASU.EDU writes:
 > The right to encryption and the "right" to abortion don't have the same
 > basis - encryption kills no one.

Yahooo!!!!!  An abortion debate on cypherpunks!  Thank Allah it isn't
one of those gun nuts or somebody idiotic enough to deny the obvious
truth of Velikovsky's work :-)

--
Mike McNally




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Alexander Reynolds <chrome@jhunix.hcf.jhu.edu>
Date: Thu, 21 Oct 93 14:18:00 PDT
To: "Perry E. Metzger" <pmetzger@lehman.com>
Subject: Re: backing
In-Reply-To: <9310211942.AA22217@snark.lehman.com>
Message-ID: <Pine.3.05.9310211721.A26026-a100000@jhunix.hcf.jhu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> Precisely what I said -- coinage stated BY LAW to ahve a certain value.

Ok, fine.  I'm listing the quote to add further detail to the topic:

	"Gresham's Law, like most of the 'laws' taught in State-supported
public schools, is not quite true (at least, not in the form in which it
is usually taught). 'Bad money drives out good' holds only in
authoritarian societies, not in libertarian societies.  (Gresham was
clear-minded enough to state explicitly that he was only describing
authoritarian societies; his formulation of his own 'Law' begins with
the words 'If the king issueth two moneys . . .,' thereby implying that
the State must exist if the 'Law' is to operate.)"
				-The Illuminatus! Trilogy
				Leviathan, pg. 766
				Shea and Wilson
 -Alex






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: lefty@apple.com (Lefty)
Date: Thu, 21 Oct 93 17:13:10 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Regarding serializing photo copies.....
Message-ID: <9310220012.AA21631@internal.apple.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Sean Swift suggests:
> 
>Why do they not just watermark every sheet of paper in a specific way that
>identifies it with which lot, from which manufacturer that it came from?

First off, who are "they"?

Second, how are "they" going to make people buy paper _with_ watermarks
that's twice as expensive?

Third, how will "they" keep paper manufacturers from producing cheaper
paper without watermarks to satisfy demand?

>Might as well take paranoia to an extreme.....

Taking _something_ to an extreme, anyway.


--
Lefty (lefty@apple.com)
C:.M:.C:., D:.O:.D:.






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Alexander Reynolds <chrome@jhunix.hcf.jhu.edu>
Date: Thu, 21 Oct 93 14:22:59 PDT
To: "Perry E. Metzger" <pmetzger@lehman.com>
Subject: Re: Gold in them thar Bills...
In-Reply-To: <9310212015.AA22256@snark.lehman.com>
Message-ID: <Pine.3.05.9310211719.B26026-b100000@jhunix.hcf.jhu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> > 	Since the topic of backing seems to go towards gold, what about
> > the purity of the bullion and who (which government) presses it?  Gold
> > pressed by the Canadian government at .999 troy oz might not be worth a
> > whole lot as backing if that government collapses tommorow. 
> 
> Pardon, but what does the purity of the gold have to do with who mints it?

My parents used to live in Canada and purchased some gold there; I was
using Canada merely as an example.  But the question of how the reputation
of a country might effect the reputation of its gold reserves stands.

> > What's to say it isn't iron pyrite or any similar looking
> > material if the government isn't there to back it?
> 
> Have you ever heard of doing an assay?

Yes, but that would be at the expense of the owner, and if it looks like
gold, feels heavy in the hand like gold, and if it has the word Canada and
the number .999 stamped on it, then people (bankers) might take it at face
value (or might not, depending on the stability of that country).

 







From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: XXCLARK@indst.indstate.edu
Date: Thu, 21 Oct 93 15:43:04 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Canon copiers
Message-ID: <9310212239.AA04736@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain




        Called a Canon copier dealer today. Here's what he said regarding
   the copying of currency [only after my convincing him I was not inter-
   ested in a career in funny money]:

        All Canon color copiers have _always_ marked their output with
   the serial number of the machine on which they were produced. [I failed
   to ask about non-color copiers.] He mentioned, specifically, currency,
   photographs and food stamps as examples of copied items from which the
   serial number could be recovered by Canon.

        Canon color laser copiers CL-300 and CL-500, not currently being
   produced, but still available, do _not_ have the anti-currency device
   included. They _do_, he said, place the machine serial number in copies
   made.

        Canon color laser copiers CL-350 and CL-550 _do_ have the anti-
   currency device included, which he said is a black box to local repair-
   men. He continued to say that not only would these models, when given
   currency to copy, produce only a black rectangle, but also:

        - store a copy of what one had attempted to copy in memory, and;
        - lock the machine in such a manner that only someone from the
          Canon factory "might" be able to render the machine useable.

        These machines also place the machine serial number in copies
   it allows to be made, he said.

        Only on the last item did his answer seem uncertain. His first
   response was that "the machine would be virtually destroyed."

        Anyone want to test this for us?

        He _did_ suggest which Canon copier would do a good job copying
   currency.

        I still haven't found the trade mag in which I originally read
   this...





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "W. Kinney" <kinney@ucsu.Colorado.EDU>
Date: Thu, 21 Oct 93 17:02:53 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: !#??@%&&!!!! it!
Message-ID: <199310212359.AA14673@ucsu.Colorado.EDU>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



...and if somebody can kindly inform me how I can get my name in the
"From" line on my postings instead of "To cypherpunks@..." I'll name
my firstborn child "Diffie-Hellmann <your-email-address-here> Kinney".
(I use elm).

                               -- Will



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: djw@eff.org (Daniel J. Weitzner)
Date: Thu, 21 Oct 93 15:22:54 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: re:700 Club etc.
Message-ID: <199310212221.AA27169@eff.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


At  4:21 PM 10/21/93 -0500, F_GRIFFITH@CCSVAX.SFASU.EDU wrote:

>The right to encryption and the "right" to abortion don't have the same
>basis - encryption kills no one.

I'm not sure that the FBI would agree with the second half of your statement...


...................................................................

Daniel J. Weitzner, Senior Staff Counsel <djw@eff.org>
Electronic Frontier Foundation
1001 G St, NW
Suite 950 East
Washington, DC 20001
202-347-5400 (v) 
202-393-5509 (f)






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Alexander Reynolds <chrome@jhunix.hcf.jhu.edu>
Date: Thu, 21 Oct 93 15:42:53 PDT
To: F_GRIFFITH@CCSVAX.SFASU.EDU
Subject: re:700 Club etc.
In-Reply-To: <931021162143.22e266bc@CCSVAX.SFASU.EDU>
Message-ID: <Pine.3.05.9310211837.A9616-b100000@jhunix.hcf.jhu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> This is another thread only slightly related to cypherpunks.

Well go to some other forum, we don't need your kind around here.  <just
kidding, I'm only being sarcastic to make a point to some other readers>

> I find the paranoid reaction to the "Religious Right" strange.  Perhaps
> it is based on relying on the establishment media for a picture of it.

Someone against the "religious right" would probably say they (those in that
group) are brainwashed.  Those in the "religious right" would say they
(anti-religion) are possessed.  (other readers: please don't try to debate
this, ok?  I lived in a very religious town in Texas, so I know how they
feel.)

> Would you rely on such media to give you an accurate picture of what
> the government is doing with cryptography or of the need for gun control?
> The media picture of the Religious Right is just as distorted.

The axiom of Mass Media follows: "Print, Show, Or Speak What Will Bring In
The Money."  Most folks get kicks out of watching cults like the RR
getting the bum rush, like most folks enjoy watching the accident scene. 
The Media plays no ideological favorites, it just gives the hungry masses
what they want. 

> The right to encryption and the "right" to abortion don't have the same
> basis - encryption kills no one.

I disagree here (a lot is done in the name of national security/encryption
which threatens innocent lives), but even I won't diverge this far from the
intent of the cypherpunks forum to debate this.  If you do want to carry
this further, please drop me a line directly.

-Alex Reynolds (chrome@jhunix.hcf.jhu.edu)






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Perry E. Metzger" <pmetzger@lehman.com>
Date: Thu, 21 Oct 93 15:33:04 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Gold in them thar Bills...
In-Reply-To: <9310212036.AA25191@tdws22>
Message-ID: <9310212228.AA22319@snark.lehman.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Howard Suutala - ICD says:
> 
> writes pmetzger@lehman.com (Perry E. Metzger)
> 
> >I can take the pound of gold to MTB down the block and have dollars,
> >yen, or anything else I like, within 15 minutes. I can then take those
> >to buy Big Gulps.
> 
> >Perry
> 
> Yes, as long it was been minted in a recognized form i.e. a gold eagle,
> a panda, or gold peso.

Of course. I will point out, by the way, that a Credit Suisse ingot
will do just as well for you. Its also fairly easy to determine if you
are dealing with nearly pure gold or not.

Perry




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: sswift@falcon.lhup.edu (Sean M. Swift)
Date: Thu, 21 Oct 93 16:52:53 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Regarding serializing photo copies.....
Message-ID: <9310212351.AA46885@falcon.lhup.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



 
Why do they not just watermark every sheet of paper in a specific way that
identifies it with which lot, from which manufacturer that it came from?

Might as well take paranoia to an extreme.....

Sean Swift
sswift@falcon.lhup.edu






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: baumbach@atmel.com (Peter Baumbach)
Date: Thu, 21 Oct 93 23:32:54 PDT
To: pmetzger@lehman.com
Subject: Re: Backing
Message-ID: <9310220047.AA29472@bass.chp.atmel.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


"Perry E. Metzger" says:
> Not a cryptography message -- sorry but I thought I had to discuss it...

But it is, if digital cash is your interest.  There may be more than one
way to think about money.
> 
> Peter Baumbach says:
> >  Isn't a finite source of backing a problem since it rewards those who
> > hoard it?  
> 
> No. It punishes those who hoard it -- they don't get interest on their
> money.

Where does this interest come from.  If you have a 100% backed currency
with a finite supply, those who hoard it can't lose.  If there is a 
total of 20,000 tons of gold in the world, and you own 1 ton, then don't
you own 1/20,000 of the worlds wealth.  As long as the total wealth of
the world increases, doesn't your wealth increase along with it?
> 
> >  If neither Alice or Bob have a backed currency, does that mean they
> > cannot trade?
> 
> Depends if they consider what the other has to be of value. Its all up
> to them.

If Alice needs her street cleaned and Bob can do it, and if Bob needs
some food prepared and Alice can prepare it, a currency is unneeded
for their trade.
> 
> >  Has anyone invented a workable "barter currency"?
> 
> I don't see what the point would be. Why not just deal in a medium of
> exchange? 

Continuing with Alice and Bob, let's add Carl.  If Carl needs his freezer
repaired and Bob can repair it, and Bob wants some vegetables and Carl
can supply them, a currency is still unneeded.  Suppose, however, Alice
wants the vegetables, but has nothing to offer Carl, a "barter currency"
would solve her need.  Alice pays Carl for the vegetables.  Carl pays
Bob for repairing his freezer.  Alice pays Bob for cleaning her street.
Bob pays Alice once for the vegetables, and once for her to prepare them
to his liking.  A small economy becomes facilitated.  Useful stuff has
been done without dealing with any outside parties.  Why should some of
these people own gold before their economy can function?

If Alice kicks over a stone and finds a nugget of gold, why should she
be any richer.  She hasn't done anything for anyone, except maybe
devalue the gold that everyone else already owns.

Gold makes a good currency because it be can't be created by those who
have done nothing of value for anyone else. (A government ;-)  Gold makes
a poor currency when it prevents the economy I describe above from existing
since none of the participants have any.  What medium of exchange can
Alice, Bob, and Carl use?  The answer to that, I would call a "barter
currency"

> 
> > Can I.O.U.'s be created such that they work like money?
> 
> Sure. Thats what banknotes are.

Your method requires another participant to the transaction.  Everyone
must trust that the bank doesn't print more banknotes than it can honor.
Also, what is the banknote an I.O.U. for? Gold?

An I.O.U. for particular services or goods are hard to use as a currency
since you may wish to trade with someone who does not know the person
whos name is on the I.O.U..  Carl might give Bob an I.O.U. for fixing
his freezer: "I Carl owe the holder of this I.O.U. two bushels of carrots."
It would be hard to give this in payment to someone who does not know
the quality of the carrots or the trustworthyness of Carl.
> 
> Perry
> 
> 
I have just been learning about call and put options on stocks.  If I sell
a call option, I am agreeing to sell a certain amount of stock at a certain
price at any time in the future until the option expires.  These options
behave something like the "barter currency" that I wish to have invented.
People trade these options instead of trading in the stocks.  Now if only
my broker would accept an I.O.U. for two bushels of carrots in payment
for ...

Peter Baumbach
baumbach@atmel.com




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Douglas Sinclair <dsinclai@acs.ucalgary.ca>
Date: Thu, 21 Oct 93 20:02:53 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: DC-nets
Message-ID: <9310220259.AA31438@acs1.acs.ucalgary.ca>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Can anyone point me to a detailed description
of the dining cryptographers' protocol?  I've
had some thoughts on how to modify it, and I
want to know if I'm just re-inventing the
wheel.  Please reply via e-mail.  Thanks.
-- 
PGP 2.3a Key by finger




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Robert J. Woodhead" <trebor@foretune.co.jp>
Date: Thu, 21 Oct 93 05:27:56 PDT
To: trebor@foretune.co.jp
Subject: Re: politics
In-Reply-To: <9310210722.AA20629@necs.vuse>
Message-ID: <9310211226.AA20850@dink.foretune.co.jp>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Joseph Moorman writes:

>Maybe it's your primary goal; it's certainly the goal of every Marxist/
>Communist/Fascist regime that has every existed.

>I contend that one's self-interest should be one's primary goal (it is
>that one's choice however).

I agree.  I am motivated by self-interest.  My self-interest, however,
is not just providing for myself now, but also improving my environment
for the future.  You will note that I didn't say "people should be
forced to do things my way."  I said "I think this is a worthwhile
goal for people."  THere is a big difference.





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Date: Thu, 21 Oct 93 21:32:53 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: An Intro to DC-Nets
Message-ID: <9310220432.AA18653@netcom.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Douglas Sinclair asks about DC-Nets. I'm not sure if he's read the Chaum
paper yet, but in any case there are probably others who would profit from
seeing some introductory material on DC-Nets.

Several folks are looking into this, including Henry Strickland (Strick)
and several folks in the Austin group. Several others have tried to get
something going in the past (Yanek Martinson, Marc Ringuette, etc.), but so
far no one has produced a working DC-Net. I don't know if even Chaum has,
and the several papers (Jurgen Bos, Pfaltzman, etc.) indicate the theory
needs more work (especially on disruption by malicious attackers).

Anyway, here's what Doug asked:

>Can anyone point me to a detailed description
>of the dining cryptographers' protocol?  I've
>had some thoughts on how to modify it, and I
>want to know if I'm just re-inventing the
>wheel.  Please reply via e-mail.  Thanks.
>-- 
>PGP 2.3a Key by finger

So here's an essay, a rather informal essay, I've posted a couple of times.
As the essay notes, a full copy of the 1988 paper by David Chaum was also
posted to the list by The Information Liberation Front. If there's interest
in DC-Nets this time around, perhaps one of us who kept copies of it can
post it again. <grin>

Enjoy it! It is truly an astounding concept. Simple, too, once you get the idea.

-Tim


Date: Tue, 23 Feb 93 10:08:34 -0800
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
From: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Subject: Dining Cryptographers Nets--An Introduction

Nickey MacDonald writes:

>Also, I have seen a number of references to DC nets...  I must confess I
>have never heard of the term before...  can someone enlighten me?

Here's a summary of the "dining cryptographers net" I wrote back in the
pre-Cypherpunks days (which I later posted to the nascent Cypherpunks
list). I'm posting it here because of the question just asked, thinking
that others may be similary confused. (A "Glossary" also exists, and is in
the "soda" archive site.)

(I could apologize for the volume, but cyherpunks ought to be able to
handle a few measly kilobytes of stuff. Besides, at least this won't go out
multiple times to the list!)

Understand that DC-Nets are further off in the future than the
Cypherpunks-PAX-PENET-style remailers being discussed these last few
months. Chaum-style mixes, based on his 1981 CACM letter, have yet to be
implemented, let alone the more advanced DC-Net-style systems. Hal Finney,
Marc Ringuette, and Yanek Martinson are some of the folks on this list who
are interested in working on DC-Nets....Yanek even claims to have a
primitive one running on his local machine and is interested in volunteers
to test it on a larger basis.

The "Information Liberation Front" also posted Chaum's entire 1988 paper,
"The Dining Cryptographers Problem: Unconditional Sender and Recipient
Untraceability." I suppose you could ask them to repost the article or
forward it to you.

Hope the newcomers enjoy this.


To: Extropians@gnu.ai.mit.edu
From: uunet!netcom.com!tcmay (Timothy C. May)
Subject: Dining Cryptographers
Date: Tue, 18 Aug 92 15:45:34 PDT
Reply-To: uunet!gnu.ai.mit.edu!Extropians

Marc R. has opened the door for me to get into some really exciting
stuff:
> 
> Tim May mentioned a new method from Chaum for defeating traffic analysis:
> 
> > Chaum has since improved the tamper-responding "mix" by going to a pure
> > software scheme which he calls "the Dining Cryptographers Protocol." It's
> > described in Vol. 1, Number 1 of "Journal of Cryptology," 1988. If there's
> > interest, I'll summarize it.
> 
> Yes, please, Tim!
> 
> 
> M.

Complexity Warning: This stuff (I'm being informal) is easy once you
get the basic idea. But getting the basic idea usually involves reading
several articles on what RSA, digital signatures, etc., are all about,
working out some examples, thinking about it, drawing pictures with
other folks, and finally having an "Aha!" experience (in Werner Erhard's
terms, you "get it"). The ASCII nature of the Net is not conducive to learning
this stuff, despite the excellent summaries of crypto by Marc R. and Perry M.

The almost-latest "Scientific American," August, has an article by David Chaum
on digital money, and the latest "Spectrum," available at selected newstands,
has several articles on security and cryptography. Also, there are lots of
books. Look 'em up in a university library or flip through them at a large
technical bookstore and pick the one you like the most. (I like a slim
Springer-Verlag paperback, "Modern Cryptology," by Gilles Brassard, 1988, as
a good intro to "modern"--as opposed to "classical"--crypto.)

If the stuff in this posting, and on crypto in general, is beyond your
current understanding, either ignore it, skim it and try to get the gist,
or dig into the articles and books. 

Anyway, back to "The Dining Cryptographers Problem: Unconditional Sender and
Recipient Untraceability," David Chaum, Journal of Cryptology, I, 1, 1988.
Since this journal is hard to get, I'll discuss the article in some detail.
(The techniques have major implications for anarchocapitalism and for
Extropian ideas.)

Abstract: "Keeping confidential who sends which messages, in a world where any 
physical transmission can be traced to its origin, seems impossible.
The solution presented here is unconditionally or cryptographically secure,
depending on whether it is based on one-time-use keys or on public keys.
respectively. It can be adapted to address efficiently a wide variety of 
practical considerations."

A word on terminology: "Unconditionally secure" means what it says: no
computer will ever crack it. One-time pads are unconditionally secure...no
code or cipher is involved, except the one-time pad, so the message is
secure as long as the pad has not been compromised. "Cryptographically
secure" means secure so long as various crypto ciphers are secure, which
may be for a very, very long time (e.g., with very large primes, in RSA).

Chaum describes some "dining cryptographers," which I will playfully change
to "dining Extropians." (The term is of course a variant of the seminal
"dining logicians problem" in computer science)

Three Extropians are having dinner, perhaps in New York City. Their waiter
tells them that their bill has already been paid, either by the NSA
or by one of them. The waiter won't say more.

The Extropians wish to know whether one of them paid, or the NSA paid. But
they don't want to be impolite and force the Extropina payer to 'fess up,
so they carry out this protocol (or procedure):

Each Extropian flips a fair coin behind a menu placed upright between himself
and the Extropian on his right. The coin is visible to himself AND to the
Extropian on his left. Each Extropian can see his own coin and the coin to his
right.

STOP RIGHT HERE! Please take the time to make a sketch of the situation I've
described. If you lost it here, all that follows will be a blur. I'm sparing
you folks my attempt at an ASCII drawing!

Each Extropians then states out loud whether the two coins he can see are the
SAME or are DIFFERENT, e.g., "Heads-Tails" means DIFFERENT, and so forth. For
now, assume the Extropians are truthful.

A little bit of thinking shows that the total number of "DIFFERENCES" must
be either 0 (the coins all came up the same), or 2. Odd parity is impossible.

Now the Extropians agree that if one of them paid, he or she will SAY THE
OPPOSITE of what they actually see. Remember, they don't announce what their
coin turned up as, only whether it was the same or different as their neighbor.

Suppose none of them paid, i.e., the NSA paid. Then they all report the truth
and the parity is even (either 0 or 2 differences). They then know the NSA
paid.

Suppose one of them paid the bill. He reports the opposite of what he actually
sees, and the parity is suddenly odd. That is, there is 1 difference reported.
The Extropians now know that one of them paid. But can they determine which
one?

Suppose you are one of the Extropians and you know you didn't pay. One of the
other two did. You either reported SAME or DIFFERENT, based on what your 
neighbor to the right (whose coin you can see) had. But you can't tell which
of the other two is lying! (You can see you right-hand neighbor's coin, but
you can't see the coin he sees to his right!)

This all generalizes to any number of people. If none of them paid, the parity
is even. If one of them paid, the parity is odd. But which one of them paid
cannot be deduced. And it should be clear that each round can transmit a bit,
e.g., "I paid" is a "1". The message "Attack at dawn" could thus be "sent"
untraceably with multiple rounds of the protocol.

The Crypto Ouija Board: I explain this to people as a kind of ouija board.
A message, like "I paid" or a more interesting "Transfer funds from.....,"
just "emerges" out of the group, with no means of knowing where it came 
from. Truly astounding.

Now there are many interesting wrinkles and elaborations to this protocol. I'll
note just a few.

1. Collusion. Obviously the Extropians can collude to deduce the payer. 
This is best dealt with by creating multiple subcircuits (groups doing the 
protocol amongst themselves). Lots more stuff here. Chaum devotes most of the
paper to these kind of issues and their solutions.

2. With each round of this protocol, a single bit is transmitted. Sending
a long message means many coin flips. Instead of coins and menus, the 
neighbors would exchange lists of random numbers (with the right partners,
as per the protocol above, of course. Details are easy to figure out.)

3. Since the lists are essentially one-time pads, the protocol is 
unconditionally secure, i.e., no assumptions are made about the difficulty
of factoring large numbers or any other crypto assumptions.

4. Participants in such a "DC-Net" (and here we are coming to the heart
of the "crypto anarchy" I have mentioned several times, and which is
perhaps foolishly advertised in my .sig) could exchange CD-ROMs or DATs,
giving them enough "coin flips" for zillions of messages, all untraceable!
The logistics are not simple, but one can imagine personal devices, like
smart card or Apple "Newtons," that can handle these protocols (early 
applications may be for untraceable brainstorming comments, secure
voting in corportate settings, etc.)

5. The lists of random numbers (coin flips) can be generated with standard
cryptographic methods, requiring only a key to be exchanged between the 
appropriate participants. This eliminates the need for the one-time pad,
but means the method is now only cryptographically secure, which is 
often sufficient. (Don't think "only cryptographically secure" means
insecure....the messages may remain encrypted for the next billion years)

6. Collisions occur when multiple messages are sent at the same time. Various
schemes can be devised to handle this, like backing off when you detect
another sender (when even parity is seen instead of odd parity). In large 
systems this is likely to be a problem. Solutions are left as an exercise.

7. Noise. Some participants may try to flood the circuit with spurious
messages, to defeat the system or for whatever other reasons. This is
still an issue. (If there's anything to take away from crypto, it's that
nothing is as simple as it looks, that there are always devious ways to 
spoof, jam, and forge. I expect you've seen this from some of the debate
on digital voting schemes.)

What Can "DC-Net" Be Used For?:

* Untraceable mail. Useful for avoiding censorship, for avoiding lawsuits,
and for all kinds of crypto anarchy things.

* Fully anonymous bulletin boards, with no traceability of postings or 
responses. Illegal materials can be offered for sale (my 1987 canonical
example, which freaked out a few people: "Stealth bomber blueprints for
sale. Post highest offer and include public key."). Think for a few minutes
about this and you'll see the profound implications.

* Decentralized nexus of activity. Since messages "emerge" (a la the ouija
board metaphor), there is no central posting area. Nothing for the government
to shut down, complete deniability by the participants.

* Only you know who your a partners are....in any given circuit. And you can
be in as many circuits as you wish. (Payments can be made to others,
to create a profit motive. I won't deal with this issue, or with the issue
of how reputations are handled, in this posting.)

* The tamper-responding "digital mixes" can still be useful, and may supplement
this purely software-based approach.

* Digital money gets involved, too, both for payments in this system, and in
terms of "alternative currencies." I'm not an economist, so I'll leave this 
for others to go into in more detail.

Enough for now. Chaum's work is just the start. These systems can initially be
set up for "innocuous" purposes like research into crypto techniques (not yet
banned in the U.S.), role-playing games, religions, and the like. Once
they get going, it'll be too late to stop the other things.

Hope you liked this summary. Please read the articles...there's just no way
my posting can do justice to them (though I admit I've concentrated my efforts
on the political aspects, which "respectable" crypto researchers rarely
mention, so perhaps the flavor here is a bit more Extropian than you'll
find elsewhere.)

--Tim (part of the "Too Many Tims!" Conspiracy)

-- 
..........................................................................
Timothy C. May         | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,  
tcmay@netcom.com       | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
408-688-5409           | knowledge, reputations, information markets, 
W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA  | black markets, collapse of governments.
Higher Power: 2^756839 | RSA MailSafe Public Key: by arrangement








From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: kone@COURIER1.SHA.CORNELL.EDU
Date: Thu, 21 Oct 93 16:08:04 PDT
To: <cypherpunks@toad.com>
Subject: Digital cash
Message-ID: <2CC73FD0@COURIER1.SHA.CORNELL.EDU>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


While looking for a copy of Gresham's law, I ran accross William Brough's book
"Open mints and Free Banking".  On page 35 he writes "The more efficent money
will always drive from circulation the less efficient if the individuals who
handel money are left free to act in their own interest.  It is only when bad
money is endorsed by the State with the proprty of legal tender that it can
drive good money from circulation."
I think that as a few of the bugs are worked out of digital cash, in a free
market, it would quickly drive out paper.
Kone@courier1.sha.cornell.edu




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: bill@twwells.com (T. William Wells)
Date: Fri, 22 Oct 93 15:03:01 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Mail delivery question
In-Reply-To: <9310211739.AA29665@toad.com>
Message-ID: <CF9pDq.9yD@twwells.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


In article <9310211739.AA29665@toad.com>,
peter honeyman <honey@citi.umich.edu> wrote:
: i think you want to check out rfc 821, which describes smtp.

I'll make a stronger statement. Do not run a remailer or other
network service unless you have read and understood the relevant
RFCs. Furthermore, don't start anything up for general use unless
you are a mail/Usenet/networking guru or you have checked with
someone that is. Finally, when you do first start your service
watch it carefully and continuously. Lose sleep until you're
_sure_ it is working according to your expectations.

Though the Internet is relatively robust, it is far from
completely so. And various parts of the net are not the Internet.
Things don't always work the way you would expect and only people
who have been around for awhile have much of a clue as to what
really is going on.

Reading the references and checking with knowledgable people is
essential if you aren't to do something stupid that will get
people pissed and might get you ostracized. And when, as most
likely will happen sooner or later, something you do does blow up
in your face, you'll only be being a pain in the ass instead of
an ignorant and willful pain in the ass. :-) Believe me, it will
make a big difference in dealing with your faux pas if you have
made the attempt to do the right thing.





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: mench@cs.unr.edu (Peter J Menchetti)
Date: Thu, 21 Oct 93 22:58:07 PDT
To: Cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: hi/.  .
Message-ID: <9310220557.AA00394@pyramid>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



hey, send me info on your movement!
pete




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: mench@cs.unr.edu (Peter J Menchetti)
Date: Thu, 21 Oct 93 23:38:07 PDT
To: thug@phantom.com  (Murdering Thug)
Subject: Re: hi/.  .
In-Reply-To: <m0oqFxS-0009KYC@mindvox.phantom.com>
Message-ID: <9310220634.AA00850@pyramid>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> > hey, send me info on your movement!
> > pete
> > 
> 
> Well, this morning I was a bit constipated, so I ate four bran muffins,
> and by late afternoon I succeeded in producing quite a decent bowl
> movement.  All in all I'd have to say I'm feeling much better now.  Thanks
> very much for asking.
> 
> l8r, thug
> 
Oh, thanks very much for the smartass reply. I take it this is a
list? so do I send to Cypherpunks-request@toad.com?

Also, I'd like to get a hold of Chris Odhner. Chris! email me!

pete





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Robert J Woodhead <trebor@foretune.co.jp>
Date: Thu, 21 Oct 93 07:47:56 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: What is the maximum # of bits a key could ever need to be?
Message-ID: <9310211444.AA21786@dink.foretune.co.jp>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



This occurred to me this morning in the inner sanctum of inspired cogitation,
aka the shower.  "What is the maximum # of bit a public-key would ever need
to be, given no breakthroughs in factoring?"

I came up with an answer, but it depends on some numbers that I don't have
handy; perhaps other people on the list can fill in the blanks.

First, we need an equation that tell us how difficult it is, in # of operations,
to factor a number of N bits.  eg: N_ops(N) = # of operations it will take.

Then all we need to do is find the N for which N_ops(N) is greater than

U_Duration * U_Particles * (1 / P_time)

Where U_Duration is the expected duration of the universe, U_Particles is the
number of particles in the universe (I am assuming that every particle can
be used as a processor; the programming I leave as an exercise to the
alert reader), and P_Time is the Planck time (damned if I can remember it)
in seconds, which ought to be a good upper bound for clock speed on the
Universal CPU.

A most likely useless number, but it would be interesting to know what it
comes out to.

Best,
R




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Karl Lui Barrus <klbarrus@owlnet.rice.edu>
Date: Thu, 21 Oct 93 21:58:07 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Subliminal Channels
Message-ID: <9310220454.AA24592@flammulated.owlnet.rice.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

A while ago I sent a post on subliminal channels - I had a chance to work
a larger example.

A subliminal channel is a communication channel that cannot be read by
those for whom it is not intended.  The problem is sometimes phrased as
a prisoner's dilemma: two prisoners are allowed to communicate with each
other by exchanging messages.  They are able to digitally sign the messages
to protect against spoofing.  However, the warden will not allow the
messages to be encrypted - only plaintext and the digital signature will
be passed.  All parties agree to these conditions and communication
begins.

Unknown to the warden, the prisoners are still able to coordinate their
plans by using a subliminal channel to communicate, in full view of the
warden!  Essentially, the prisoners use some piece of shared knowledge to
hide their real communication in the digital signature of an innocuous
message.  The warden sees the innocent message, checks that the signature
is valid, and passes it along.  The prisoner checks the signature to see
if the warden didn't alter the message, and then extracts the real message
from the digital signature.

This topic came up when previously on the list, people were discussing
the fact that encrypted communication over HAM radio is illegal - only
authentication codes may be transmitted.  I mentioned that actually, this
restraint can be sidestepped by embedding encrypted communication a la
subliminal channel style.  YES, I KNOW THIS IS ILLEGAL AND I'M NOT
SUGGESTING ANYBODY DO IT!  I just pointed it out.

What may be more important is that a subliminal channel may lurk in the
digital signature standard (DSS).  In turn, this is important because from
time to time proposals are made concerning national id cards, national
health cards, etc.  If some agency is going to authenticate or otherwise
digitally sign an identification card, they may also embed information
into the signature.  The DSS has been described as "very hospitable to
subliminal channels."  Imagine what records could be kept on you if various
information were embedded in the digital signature of documents you own.

First, a description and example of El Gamal authentication, and then of
the subliminal channel based on El Gamal.



El Gamal authentication:

The sender picks a prime p, primitive element g, and random integer r.
The public information is the triple (K,g,p), where 
K = g^r mod p

To authenticate a message M, the sender picks another random integer r'
such that gcd(r',p-1) = 1, and computes 
X = g^r' mod p

Then, the sender solves for Y in the equation 
M = r X + r' Y mod p-1

The triple (M,X,Y) is the message and the signature - this is what is 
transmitted to the receiver.  r and r' are kept secret.

The receiver computes
A = K^X X^Y mod p

and accepts the message as authentic if
A = g^M mod p



El Gamal Example:

p = 224737, r = 5135, g = 2
K = 2^5135 mod 224737 = 136800
The triple (136800, 2, 224737) is public.

To send the message M = 12345, the sender picks r' = 89321
gcd(89321,224736) = 1 so r' is ok.  Now compute X = 2^89321 mod 224737
                                                  = 87880

Solve for Y in: 12345 = 5135 87880 + 89321 Y mod 224736
          ==>   18433 = 89321 Y mod 224736
          ==>   Y = 207929

The triple (12345, 87880, 207929) is the message and the signature.

The receiver gets (12345, 87880, 207929) and knows (136800, 2, 224737).
A = 136800^87880 87880^207929 mod 224737 = 160740
g^M mod p = 2^12345 mod 224737 = 160740

These are equal and the message is accepted as authentic.



El Gamal Subliminal Channel:

Now the interesting part is the subliminal channel.  The sender and 
receiver must share the knowledge of random number r.

To send the subliminal message M, where gcd(M,p) = 1, using a cryptogram
C, the sender calculates 
X = g^M mod p

and solves for Y in
C = r X + M Y mod p-1

The triple (C,X,Y) is transmitted to the receiver.

The receiver computes 
A = (g^r)^X X^Y mod p 

and accepts the message as authentic if 
A = g^C mod p

To extract the subliminal message, the receiver calculates
M = Y^-1 (C - r X) mod p-1



El Gamal Subliminal Channel Example:

Suppose the sender and receiver share the knowledge r = 5135

The sender wants to send M = 11111 using the innocent message C = 12345.
The sender calculates X = 2^11111 mod 224737 = 20944
and solves for Y in : 12345 = 5135 20944 + 11111 Y mod 224736
               ==>    Y = 194447

The triple sent to the receiver is (12345, 20944, 194447).

The warden can check this if he wants, to very the signature:
A = 136800^20944 20944^194447 mod 224737 = 160740
g^C mod p = 2^12345 mod 224737 = 160740

so the warden verifies the signatures.  Convinced nothing fishy is
going on here, he passes on the message.

The receiver checks authenticity and is successful.  However, now the
subliminal message is extracted:
M = 194447^-1 (12345 - 5135 20944) mod 224736 = 11111

The subliminal message is successfully extraced, and the prisoners have
passed information right by the warden.

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From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: an41418@anon.penet.fi (wonderer)
Date: Thu, 21 Oct 93 19:02:53 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Sharing a secret
Message-ID: <9310220202.AA19936@anon.penet.fi>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I posed a newbie question a while ago that resulted
in a great summary of how detecting double spending in
Chaum's paper works. Not only do I understand it now, but
I'vee seen that explanation distributed on other mailing
lists at my institution by others who read cypherpunks.

Here's another question that most of you know the answer
to, but the rest of us would greatly benefit from a simple,
detailed expanation. In fact, if we get some more great
summaries that are simplified the way the digital cash
solution was simplified, we could produce an excellent
FAQ. I am keeping these with plans to make such a document
available (though a FAQ is probably not the form it will 
take).

I know that there is a way to have a key, K, divided into
n parts such that any i of them are needed to recunstruct
K. The property holds that no i-1 parts are sufficient,
and ANY i parts will do. How does this work exactly? Is
it really the case that no i-1 parts give information?
Is there a way to cheat? 

A good explanation would be great.

BTW, many of you are exposing your anonymous ID's to me
when you reply to my posts. If you are concerned with 
keeping your anonymous identity, you have to be careful.

One more thing - I posted something yesterday that took
about 12 hours from the time I posted it to Finland until
it appeared on Cypherpunks. I think this is because Julf's
remailer is a bit overloaded. Due to this, my post
(about burning instead of shredding) arrived after 3
other people had posted the same idea. Please pardon
such posts. The delay would make it appear that one
is not following the list, but I can think of no way
around it.

Wonderer
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
To find out more about the anon service, send mail to help@anon.penet.fi.
Due to the double-blind, any mail replies to this message will be anonymized,
and an anonymous id will be allocated automatically. You have been warned.
Please report any problems, inappropriate use etc. to admin@anon.penet.fi.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: nobody@rebma.rebma.mn.org
Date: Fri, 22 Oct 93 02:52:54 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: No Subject
Message-ID: <m0oqIXi-0004USC@rebma.rebma.mn.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Subject: spam ignore

this is a test

"To be responsive at this time, though I will simply say, and therefore
this is a repeat of what I said previously, that which I am unable to
offer in response is based on information available to make no such
statement."





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: koontzd@lrcs.loral.com (David Koontz )
Date: Fri, 22 Oct 93 07:22:55 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re:  Sharing a secret
Message-ID: <9310221418.AA13432@nebula.lrcs.loral.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>I know that there is a way to have a key, K, divided into
>n parts such that any i of them are needed to recunstruct
>K. The property holds that no i-1 parts are sufficient,
>and ANY i parts will do. How does this work exactly? Is
>it really the case that no i-1 parts give information?
>Is there a way to cheat?

With a key K of size j (goddamn fortran anyway), i parties can share
the secret with a threshold of i (requiring all i parties key part)
by generating i parts P such that K = Pi XOR Pi-1 XOR ... P1.  All
the parts P are the same size as K, which keeps the effort of guessing
a missing part equal to j, or the size of the key k itself. 

Such a scheme is not ideal for keys K that have a deterministic
characteristic.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Harry Shapiro <habs@panix.com>
Date: Fri, 22 Oct 93 04:38:13 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Canon copiers
In-Reply-To: <9310212239.AA04736@toad.com>
Message-ID: <199310221135.AA28283@panix.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Since the copiers in question have a digi interface and when connected
to Raster Image Processor (RIP) can act (for example) like a postscript
printer, one should have to scan in a dollar on a 600 dpi scanner,
and print is through the copier as a postscript file.

The question is would the black box catch that?

It is true about the Anti-Copy device, but I doubt it disables
the machine, probally just doesn't copy. These machines are
$50,000+ and up in price.

/hawk


a conscious being, XXCLARK@indst.indstate.edu wrote:
> 
> 
> 
>         Called a Canon copier dealer today. Here's what he said regarding
>    the copying of currency [only after my convincing him I was not inter-
>    ested in a career in funny money]:
> 
>         All Canon color copiers have _always_ marked their output with
>    the serial number of the machine on which they were produced. [I failed
>    to ask about non-color copiers.] He mentioned, specifically, currency,
>    photographs and food stamps as examples of copied items from which the
>    serial number could be recovered by Canon.
> 
>         Canon color laser copiers CL-300 and CL-500, not currently being
>    produced, but still available, do _not_ have the anti-currency device
>    included. They _do_, he said, place the machine serial number in copies
>    made.
> 
>         Canon color laser copiers CL-350 and CL-550 _do_ have the anti-
>    currency device included, which he said is a black box to local repair-
>    men. He continued to say that not only would these models, when given
>    currency to copy, produce only a black rectangle, but also:
> 
>         - store a copy of what one had attempted to copy in memory, and;
>         - lock the machine in such a manner that only someone from the
>           Canon factory "might" be able to render the machine useable.
> 
>         These machines also place the machine serial number in copies
>    it allows to be made, he said.
> 
>         Only on the last item did his answer seem uncertain. His first
>    response was that "the machine would be virtually destroyed."
> 
>         Anyone want to test this for us?
> 
>         He _did_ suggest which Canon copier would do a good job copying
>    currency.
> 
>         I still haven't found the trade mag in which I originally read
>    this...
> 
> 


-- 
Harry S. Hawk  				      habs@extropy.org
Electronic Communications Officer, Extropy Institute Inc. 
    	    The Extropians Mailing List, Since 1991
EXTROPY -- A measure of intelligence, information, energy, vitality,
experience, diversity, opportunity, and growth.  EXTROPIANISM -- The
philosophy that seeks to increase extropy.          



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: ferguson@icm1.icp.net (Paul Ferguson x2044)
Date: Fri, 22 Oct 93 04:48:14 PDT
To: mench@cs.unr.edu (Peter J Menchetti)
Subject: respond to: cypherpunks-request@toad.com
In-Reply-To: <9310220634.AA00850@pyramid>
Message-ID: <9310221247.AA11685@icm1.icp.net>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text



> > l8r, thug
> > 
> Oh, thanks very much for the smartass reply. I take it this is a
> list? so do I send to Cypherpunks-request@toad.com?
> 

> pete
> 
> 

Pay no attention to the thug-man, he seems to get a little irritable
when he hasn't had his daily enima.

For all new subscribers, send a message to <cypherpunks-request@toad.com>.

Cheers.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Mike Johnson" <exabyte!smtplink!mikej@uunet.UU.NET>
Date: Fri, 22 Oct 93 07:42:55 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: 700 club
Message-ID: <9309227513.AA751302845@smtplink.exabyte.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



> The right to encryption and the "right" to abortion don't have the same
> basis - encryption kills no one.

Amen!  But encryption IS regulated as a munition.  In military applications,
weak crypto could (and has) cost some people their lives.  Strong crypto 
reduces the power of governments or other entities to oppress people of
differing views.  Strong crypto is a powerful influence to resist oppression
of one group by another, just as Freedom of the Press, Freedom of Speech,
and the Right to Bear Arms do.  I don't see strong crypto as a threat to
Christians.  Strong crypto is a major threat to totalitarian governments,
spies, and criminals.  Strong crypto is a minor inconvenience for certain
law enforcement agencies in some circumstances.  Three out of four isn't
ideal, but life just isn't that simple.

By the way, if you think 700 Club support for strong crypto without key escrow 
is strange -- call my BBS for some amusement.  You will find Bible search 
software, church management tools, and two file areas devoted to cryptography.
Not everyone on this list is an athiest, anarchist, or whatever.

                                        Mike Johnson
                                        mpj@csn.org
                                        BBS 303-938-9654


                                     






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Perry E. Metzger" <pmetzger@lehman.com>
Date: Fri, 22 Oct 93 06:03:14 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Backing
In-Reply-To: <9310220047.AA29472@bass.chp.atmel.com>
Message-ID: <9310221258.AA27061@snark.lehman.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Peter Baumbach says:
> "Perry E. Metzger" says:
> > >  Isn't a finite source of backing a problem since it rewards those who
> > > hoard it?  
> > 
> > No. It punishes those who hoard it -- they don't get interest on their
> > money.
> 
> Where does this interest come from.  If you have a 100% backed currency
> with a finite supply, those who hoard it can't lose.

Traditionally, banknotes have NOT been 100% backed. Even if you chose
to have your digital cash itself fully backed, presumably few people
would place their money in checkable accounts (that is, counts upon
which drafts may be drawn) that were not at the very least invested
SOMEHOW. 100% reserve accounts might be available, with negative
interest to pay expenses, but I doubt many would use them for much
other than things like escrow accounts. Certainly whenever a bank
loaned you money or invested money it would do so with fractional
reserve instruments, as banks traditionally have.

> If there is a 
> total of 20,000 tons of gold in the world, and you own 1 ton, then don't
> you own 1/20,000 of the worlds wealth.  As long as the total wealth of
> the world increases, doesn't your wealth increase along with it?

If you own 1 ton, you just own one ton of gold. The medium of exchange
isn't a special commodity.  There isn't one dollar bill out there
somewhere for every dollar of value in property in the U.S. -- not
even one dollar bill for every hundred dollars in value! (I might be
slightly wrong on this exact figure, but the order of magnitude is
right.) Imagine I owned 1/20,000 of the dollar bills in the country
and kept them under my mattress. Would I own 1/20,000 of the wealth of
the U.S.? Would my "investment" grow in value as the U.S. economy
grew? Of course not, and of course not, but thats precisely what you
were implying.

> > >  If neither Alice or Bob have a backed currency, does that mean they
> > > cannot trade?
> > 
> > Depends if they consider what the other has to be of value. Its all up
> > to them.
> 
> If Alice needs her street cleaned and Bob can do it, and if Bob needs
> some food prepared and Alice can prepare it, a currency is unneeded
> for their trade.

Thats correct. On the other hand, most people don't want to trade
directly for services, because that would generate great
inefficiencies. Lets say you were a programmer -- not everyone you
would want to trade with would want or need your skills. How would you
buy bread, say? A medium of exchange is a wonderful way to securitize
barter -- thats basically what it is, you know.

> > >  Has anyone invented a workable "barter currency"?
> > 
> > I don't see what the point would be. Why not just deal in a medium of
> > exchange? 
> 
> Continuing with Alice and Bob, let's add Carl.  If Carl needs his freezer
> repaired and Bob can repair it, and Bob wants some vegetables and Carl
> can supply them, a currency is still unneeded.  Suppose, however, Alice
> wants the vegetables, but has nothing to offer Carl, a "barter currency"

Why not just have people use a normal currency? Seems like you have
some bizarre idea that the poor won't be able to afford the real
currency, which is silly.

> If Alice kicks over a stone and finds a nugget of gold, why should she
> be any richer.  She hasn't done anything for anyone, except maybe
> devalue the gold that everyone else already owns.

Untrue. She's done work. Replace "gold" with "diamond", which she
sells to a jeweler.

You have this strange view that the medium of exchange is somehow
different from any other commodity. It isn't. Get that idea out of
your head.

> Gold makes a good currency because it be can't be created by those who
> have done nothing of value for anyone else. (A government ;-)  Gold makes
> a poor currency when it prevents the economy I describe above from existing
> since none of the participants have any.

It doesn't prevent anything at all. If gold is expensive in terms of
human labor, than all the players involved will use small amounts of
gold for their transactions. IF gold is cheap, they will use large
amounts. In neither case, however, will they notice any difference in
outcome at all. In other words, you are thinking as though the medium
of exchange in and of itself mattered, which it doesn't. 

Replace "gold" with "dollars" in your exposition and see how silly it
now sounds.

> > > Can I.O.U.'s be created such that they work like money?
> > 
> > Sure. Thats what banknotes are.
> 
> Your method requires another participant to the transaction.  Everyone
> must trust that the bank doesn't print more banknotes than it can honor.

Actually, that part is very easy -- the excess clearings rule means
that the bank would go belly up within days or (in the modern world of
electronic banking) hours if it did that -- all the other banks it was
clearing with would notice massive outflow of the backing commodity
from the bank's accounts. Its very hard to cheat in this sort of
system. Thanks to computers, its easier than ever for people to check
on what banknotes (or their electronic equivalent) are good.

> Also, what is the banknote an I.O.U. for? Gold?

Or whatever. It really doesn't matter what the backing commodity is.

> An I.O.U. for particular services or goods are hard to use as a currency
> since you may wish to trade with someone who does not know the person
> whos name is on the I.O.U..  Carl might give Bob an I.O.U. for fixing
> his freezer: "I Carl owe the holder of this I.O.U. two bushels of carrots."
> It would be hard to give this in payment to someone who does not know
> the quality of the carrots or the trustworthyness of Carl.

I think you've just discovered why it is that people use a medium of
exchange and not some strange barter system. Fungibility is an issue,
and the use of a standard medium of exchange means that you can
securitize barter.

> I have just been learning about call and put options on stocks.  If I sell
> a call option, I am agreeing to sell a certain amount of stock at a certain
> price at any time in the future until the option expires.  These options
> behave something like the "barter currency" that I wish to have invented.

Not at all. Puts and calls are bets -- they have behaviors very much
unlike trading in the underlying stocks. Of course, you can build
"synthetics", which behave like the underlying stock, but the options
themselves are rarely used that way because the market is efficient
and thus you can't make money that way.

> People trade these options instead of trading in the stocks.

More accurately, they use options as a means of increasing leverage.

I suggest learning more about how banking and economics works before
discussing this further -- there are some basic assumptions we are
both making that are very different.

Perry




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: hfinney@shell.portal.com (Hal Finney)
Date: Fri, 22 Oct 93 09:12:56 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re:  Subliminal Channels
Message-ID: <9310221610.AA00302@jobe.shell.portal.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Steganography, the art of hiding a secret message inside of an openly
readable one, can be thought of as a subliminal channel.  In the prisoner
example, the prisoners could have pre-arranged that, say, every 10th
character in the typed messages they exchange would be used to spell out
a secret message.  Or perhaps word or sentence lengths or spacings could
send a message.

In general, in any system where there is ambiguity, more than one way of
expressing a valid message, there is a subliminal channel.  Since DSS
signatures are apparently not unique for a given message (unlike, say,
RSA signatures as specified in the PKCS standards), they have such a
channel.

Hal




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: root@satelnet.org (SatelNet SysAdmin)
Date: Fri, 22 Oct 93 06:02:54 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: dc-nets
Message-ID: <9310221315.AA24868@satelnet.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> Marc Ringuette, and Yanek Martinson are some of the folks on this list who
> are interested in working on DC-Nets....Yanek even claims to have a
> primitive one running on his local machine and is interested in volunteers
> to test it on a larger basis.

I did write a dc-net system in perl that uses e-mail as the transport
mechanism.  It worked quite well when all the "participants" were
on the same machine, and with immediat emessage delivery, no batching
or queuing.  As soon as I attempted to run it with a few people
over the net, there were severe synchronization problems.  E-mail
messages are not guaranteed to arrive in the same order as they
were sent, or to arrive to all the addressees within the same time
frame.  DC-nets work only if all the participants see the same set
of messages in the same sequence.

I have since decided that e-mail is not a very good transport
mechanism for a dc-net and am experimenting with tcp/socket
connections instead.  That seems to be working pretty well, but
has quite a high load on the network.

If someone does want to work on some sort of a synchronisation
protocol for the e-mail based dc-net, let me know and I will send
you the perl code.

The tcp version is not ready enough to give to anyone, and I have
been quite busy with a few other (only marginally cypherpunks-related)
projects and can't spend very much time on the dc-net system.





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: hfinney@shell.portal.com (Hal Finney)
Date: Fri, 22 Oct 93 09:18:17 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Canon copiers
Message-ID: <9310221617.AA00624@jobe.shell.portal.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


The thing that makes me skeptical about this copier story is this:  the
money could have any orientation and position on the page.  It would take
a large amount of computing power to look at an image and deteri\\ determine
whether there is a certain bitmap anywhere on it.  Look at how poorly
optical-character-reader technology does now, and that is when it knows
how the letters are oriented.  Adding random orientations would make the
problem far worse.  And, will it look at the whole dollar bill, or just
pieces of it?  It has to respond to all the different denominations, too.
Plus, if it makes a mistake and permanently locks up the customer's machine,
the manufacturer is going to have a big problem.

In short, I'm pretty sure that there is a lot of disinformation going around
designed to scare people away from trying it.

However, there is another possibility, which is to look at hte color of
the bills.  This does not take so much processing power, although bills
may vary somewhat in color.  Years ago, I'd read that these machines would
not accurately reproduce the color of money.  Perhaps today they will turn
that color to black.

Hal




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: hughes@ah.com (Eric Hughes)
Date: Fri, 22 Oct 93 09:28:17 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Backing
In-Reply-To: <9310221258.AA27061@snark.lehman.com>
Message-ID: <9310221621.AA01088@ah.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I have only one small quibble with Perry's recent comments.

>Why not just have people use a normal currency? Seems like you have
>some bizarre idea that the poor won't be able to afford the real
>currency, which is silly.

The question is not a bald one of access or no access, but one of
quantity obtainable in aggregate and timeliness of such accrual.

Experiments with LETS systems have shown that local economic activity
does improve in depressed cities when a barter currency is introduced
to supplement a paucity of the nominal national currency.  The city I
seem to remember is Manchester, England.

LETS (I forget the acronym expansion) is a barter system with a
virtual fiat currency.  Originally it used just a ledger; later, PC's
were used to keep the books.  The currency was zero-sum; all accounts
added to zero.  Reputation was provided by making all aggregate
balances public to the members of the system; you could decide not to
provide services to anybody, particularly if they had a large negative
balance.

Another example of how a dearth of transfer instruments affects an
economy was 16th/17th century Venice.  Coin hoarding did become
somewhat of a problem, and it affected the speed at which business
could be done.  This era was that of the rise of 'book-gold', or in
modern parlance, fractional reserves.

Perry is certainly correct that any commodity can be used as a
backing.  Recall, however, that promises are a commodity like any
other.  This is the unification of fiat currencies and gold
currencies.  It is also a basis for understanding that multiply
backed currencies can and do coexist stably.

Promises are not as fungible as gold is of course, which is one reason
that LETS systems do not scale well, since the characteristic effort
and communication needed to evaluate the worth of such a promise (even
an averaged promise as in a LETS system) is far greater.  One can
understand the rise of options markets as an effort to increase the
fungibility of the option promise, given that these markets are not
merely communications systems but also have some capacities as
guarantors and insurers (broadly construed).

Digital money has two characteristics that pertain to these issues:
denomination size and access.  The smallest denominable amount is not
limited in any virtual system (bank books included), whereas when in a
strict commodity system the unit of transactability may be too high
and cannot be infinitely subdivided.

For example, gold Spanish doubloons (from which the English 'dollar'
is a corruption) were too large for many transactions, so people made
them small by cutting them into eight 'bits', whence the equation of
'two bits' with a quarter.  But gold is not infinitely subdivisible,
but representations are.

The question of access arises as well.  Just as a LETS system is a
very econopunk system, digital money can be issued by any one person
or any group.  If no other backing is available, they can back it with
their own time and talent.  When these currencies can be easily traded
with other currencies, the problem of access to a more dominant
currency is alleviated.  These promises, being limited to a particular
geographic locale, are not fungible, but then lack of fungibility does
not so much prevent exchange as present some market-priced impediment
to it.

Eric




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: hfinney@shell.portal.com (Hal Finney)
Date: Fri, 22 Oct 93 09:38:17 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Sharing a secret
Message-ID: <9310221637.AA01633@jobe.shell.portal.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I will give a simple example of Shamir secret sharing.  Suppose you have
some data D which you want to split up into n pieces such that any 2
of them are sufficient to reconstruct D.  Shamir solves the problem for
any k of them being sufficient, but the case k=2 is especially simple.

Pick a random number m which will be the slope of a line.  Take the
equation y = mx + D, and substitute x = 1, x = 2, ... x = n.  Pass out
the y's for each value of x as the secret shares.

For example, if D=12, pick random m = 4, and pass out (1,16), (2,20),
(3,24), (4,28), and so on.

Now, suppose an enemy gets hold of one of these - say (2,20).  What does
this tell him about the value of D?  Nothing!  D could be anything,
depending on the value of m.

But suppose we have two of these values - say (1,16) and (2,20).  From
these it is easy to calculate m=4, and from that it is easy to see that
D=12.  Two points determine a line.

In the actual Shamir scheme, integers mod a prime p are used, where p>D.
The math is basically the same.  For k=3, a parabola is used instead of
a line, so that 3 points are needed; for k=4, a third-degree polynomial
is used, and for general k, a (k-1)-degree polynomial is used.  In each
case, knowing k-1 points tells you nothing, because there will be a
(k-1)-degree polynomial that would pass through any possible value of
D.

Hal




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Stanton McCandlish <mech@eff.org>
Date: Fri, 22 Oct 93 07:23:16 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Clipper chip stuff (fwd)
Message-ID: <199310221419.AA02752@eff.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Forwarded message:

> Could you forward this to cypherpunks for me?  Walter is a technoid and
> happened to be one of the plaintiffs in Steve Jackson Games (e-mail user on
> Illuminati).  I'm hoping one of the 'punks might be able to comment to him
> on his theory -- it sounds interesting to me, but I'm not technical enough
> to know if its got any merit.  Thanks.
> 
> >Date: Thu, 21 Oct 93 18:05 EDT
> >From: Walter Milliken <milliken@BBN.COM>
> >Subject: Clipper chip stuff
> >To: ssteele@eff.org
> >
> >Hi Shari -- it's been a while....
> >
> >I know you're probably not the right person to talk to about Clipper
> >chip stuff, but I figured you could forward this and tell me who is.
> >
> >Basically, I think I see NSA's backdoor in the whole scheme.  Probably
> >other people have noticed this too, but in case they haven't (and I
> >haven't seen any comment on these lines on comp.org.eff.talk), I figured
> >I'd point it out.
> >
> >The trick isn't necessarily in the algorithm (which I don't know, of
> >course).  I think it's in the key generation process.  I read Dorothy
> >Denning's description as posted to comp.org.eff.talk the other day, and
> >decided it sounded fishy.  Why are the secret per-chip keys generated
> >from the chip serial number (which is observable by anyone with the
> >law-enforcement key)?  To escrow keys, all you need is to 1) associate a chip
> >serial number with a secret key and 2) split the secret key into two,
> >unusuable parts for the escrow agents.  I can't see any reason why the
> >secret key isn't just a random number (or rather the XOR of two random
> >numbers, one for each escrow agent).
> >
> >Instead, we've got this complex algorithm for converting the chip serial
> >number into the chip secret key.  Thus, if you know the chip serial
> >number, the key generating algorithm, and the initialization states for
> >the key generator (provided by the two escrow agents) *you can compute
> >the chip secret key*!  (Or so it appears on a very superficial reading.)
> >
> >I suspect you could dispense with knowing the initialization states, if
> >you were NSA and could obtain any chip from the same batch -- you open
> >the chip up (I'm sure *they* know how to do that), extract its secret
> >key, and reverse-engineer the initialization data.  (This last step is
> >non-trivial, but I'd be surprised if NSA couldn't do it -- it's a
> >variant of known-plaintext attack.)  It's also possible that NSA may
> >*supply* the initialization states, or an algorithm for generating them,
> >or at least advice on how to pick them.  After all, it's their game,
> >they get to make the rules....
> >
> >In any case, I can see no way that using the *observable* chip serial
> >number to help generate the chip secret key can in *any* way improve the
> >security of the system.  You'd be much better off just sticking any old
> >random number into the chip as a secret key, and just noting it down
> >with the associated chip serial number in the escrow files.  Personally,
> >I think I'd use a non-algorithmic mechanism for generating random keys
> >-- perhaps a truly random number source, such as atomic decay processes.
> >There's only one of these things -- it can afford to get fancy.
> >
> >
> >Disclaimer: I'm not a cryptography expert, so it's possible I'm missing
> >something here.  Possibly factoring in the chip serial number makes it
> >harder to crack secret keys if you somehow manage to obtain a few chips
> >from the same batch and open them.  But it certainly seems suspicious to
> >me....
> >
> >---Walter


-- 
-=> mech@eff.org <=-
Stanton McCandlish     Electronic Frontier Foundation Online Activist & SysOp
"A nation that is afraid to let its people judge the truth and falsehood of
ideas in an open market is a nation that is afraid of its people." -JFK
NitV-DC BBS 202-232-2715, Fido 1:109/? IndraNet 369:111/1, 14.4V32b 16.8ZyX



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: abootch@sfsuvax1.sfsu.edu (Dog Face)
Date: Fri, 22 Oct 93 10:22:56 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: cellular
Message-ID: <9310221720.AA21055@sfsuvax1.sfsu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Hey Cypherites,

While taking a *study* break last night I caught the last couple of minutes
of a report on the cellular phone hacking on Prime Time Live - KABC(?) west 
coast. Someone, presumably, from one of the cellular phone co's came up
with a security scheme that would stop people from hacking into other
people's accounts - using digital signatures! When asked how long this
*technology*'s been around he answered its been out for awhile, only it
has been implemented yet because no one was willing to pay for it. I 
wonder....

Also, they mentioned something about 400 people being caught by the S.S.
so far this year(?) on cellular hacking charges. Is this correct? 

I didn't catch the whole show and am not sure if I ingested what was
being said properly (I was too tired to chew) so if anyone caught the
whole piece or knows more please post.

Thanks.





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Date: Fri, 22 Oct 93 10:52:56 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Message to Extropians...others ignore!
Message-ID: <9310221751.AA27149@netcom5.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


(Sorry to send a message this way, but you'll see why.)

The Extropians list has been down for several days as a result of the
security incident involving Panix, the systems off of which the
Extropians list is run. (The security incident is being discussed in
several of the *.security groups.)

Perry Metzger mentioned this a few days ago here, but I am still
getting several messages a day asking what happened to the List, hence
this message to you all.

By the way, a conclusion I draw from this is that an alternative way
to signal list members should exist, even if it's just a very long
list to send mail to from an unaffected system. Sort of an "Emergency
Broadcast System."

Harry Shapiro says Panix is back up and the Extropians list should be
restored sometime today, probably.

--Tim May


-- 
..........................................................................
Timothy C. May         | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,  
tcmay@netcom.com       | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
408-688-5409           | knowledge, reputations, information markets, 
W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA  | black markets, collapse of governments.
Higher Power: 2^756839 | Public Key: PGP and MailSafe available.
Note: I put time and money into writing this posting. I hope you enjoy it.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Robert J. Woodhead" <trebor@foretune.co.jp>
Date: Thu, 21 Oct 93 18:58:04 PDT
To: peb@PROCASE.COM (Paul Baclace)
Subject: Re: Canon copiers
In-Reply-To: <9310212323.AA04196@banff.procase.com>
Message-ID: <9310220156.AA27328@dink.foretune.co.jp>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Paul writes:

>I'd like to know how they put the serial number into the copy.

Most likely by modulating the Least Significant Bit of the color
intensity in some (or all) color-filled areas of the image.  A
set of sync-bits, serial number, and some more sync bits.  Repeat
every line, shifted by 1 bit, and you'll get a pattern that is
hard to differentiate from the background unless you _know_
what to look for.

I wouldn't be surprised if there isn't a time and date stamp
as well, plus batch # info.






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Date: Fri, 22 Oct 93 11:08:17 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Bidzos (RSA) on "Primetime Live" (was: cellular)
In-Reply-To: <9310221720.AA21055@sfsuvax1.sfsu.edu>
Message-ID: <9310221808.AA28681@netcom5.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Dog Face writes:

> While taking a *study* break last night I caught the last couple of minutes
> of a report on the cellular phone hacking on Prime Time Live - KABC(?) west 
> coast. Someone, presumably, from one of the cellular phone co's came up
> with a security scheme that would stop people from hacking into other
> people's accounts - using digital signatures! When asked how long this
> *technology*'s been around he answered its been out for awhile, only it
> has been implemented yet because no one was willing to pay for it. I 
> wonder....
> 
> Also, they mentioned something about 400 people being caught by the S.S.
> so far this year(?) on cellular hacking charges. Is this correct? 
> 
> I didn't catch the whole show and am not sure if I ingested what was
> being said properly (I was too tired to chew) so if anyone caught the
> whole piece or knows more please post.

Indeed, the whole piece was an obvious attempt to "scare" users of
illegal services into compliance, just as we saw some years back when
a lot of folks were "illegally" receiving cable.

Many immmigrant communities (Aremenians, Columbians, etc.) are using
these cellular phones in huge quantities.

What can or will be done?

A kind of "digital postage" of the sort we often discuss here would be
ideal: the various service providers (satellites, relays, etc.) only
carry the signal if payment is attached. With anonymous systems this
would be like using a payphone.

In fact, RSA's Jim Bidzos was intereviewed very briefly...no more than
20 seconds...and he alluded to the RSA products as being ideal. (I
sent him an e-mail message last night asking if he was implying some
form of digital money/postage...most likely not).

Unfortunately, the next topic in the segment was how audio
conversations (what about data?) might have unique voice ID patterns
encoded in them to foil rip-off artists. A voice registry? A scary
notion, and one we should be on the lookout for.

(I don't think it would work, as it would be even more unwieldy and
problematic than key escrow. And easy to alter voices, etc.)

--Tim May


-- 
..........................................................................
Timothy C. May         | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,  
tcmay@netcom.com       | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
408-688-5409           | knowledge, reputations, information markets, 
W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA  | black markets, collapse of governments.
Higher Power: 2^756839 | Public Key: PGP and MailSafe available.
Note: I put time and money into writing this posting. I hope you enjoy it.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: norm@netcom.com (Norman Hardy)
Date: Fri, 22 Oct 93 11:12:56 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Paper Shredders
Message-ID: <9310221811.AA25405@netcom4.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


The garbage disposal in a kitchen sink is very effective.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Philippe_D_Nave" <pdn@dwroll.dw.att.com>
Date: Fri, 22 Oct 93 12:42:57 PDT
To: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Subject: Emergency Broadcast System
In-Reply-To: <9310221751.AA27149@netcom5.netcom.com>
Message-ID: <9310221941.AA16004@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Tim May writes:
> 
> By the way, a conclusion I draw from this is that an alternative way
> to signal list members should exist, even if it's just a very long
> list to send mail to from an unaffected system. Sort of an "Emergency
> Broadcast System."
> 
 
Excellent idea! Here's a first blush at a specification for an EBS:
 
 1) Mailing list data should be distributed to "N" sites where "N" is a 
    magic number that minimizes the chance of losing all the copies.
    (Mathematicians, sharpen your pencils!)

 2) The list data should be encrypted somehow to address these concerns:
    A) The keepers of the EBS list can't screw around with its contents
    B) The exposure of the list itself is limited
    C) Duplicate copies of the list can be verified for authenticity

 3) Some sort of signalling protocol should exist for activating the EBS,
    testing, etc. This protocol might also involve authentication (key
    swaps, signatures, whatever) that would require a minimum of "X" 
    participants to accumulate enough data to unseal the encrypted copies
    of the list.

 4) Implementation of the EBS site function should not require involved
    systems programming tasks- a member should be able to recieve and store
    the encrypted EBS data and follow fairly simple procedures to activate
    and test the system without being a [your favorite language here] guru.
    I would guess that many cypherpunks are reluctant to go to their systems
    people and say, "Hey, can you give me unlimited access so I can develop
    an emergency broadcast system for the cypherpunks?"
 
Enough for now- I'll refill my coffee cup, sit back, and watch you pick 
this apart. 'Cypherpunks write code.' Well, here's your chance to implement
a system that has wide appeal, would be fun to play with, and incorporates
distributed data encryption.

........................................................................
Philippe D. Nave, Jr.   | The person who does not use message encryption
pdn@dwroll.dw.att.com   | will soon be at the mercy of those who DO...
Denver, Colorado USA    | PGP public key: by arrangement.



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: catalyst@netcom.com (Scott Collins)
Date: Fri, 22 Oct 93 13:58:19 PDT
To: na41418@anon.penet.fi
Subject: Re: Warning about exposing anon id
Message-ID: <9310222055.AA23514@newton.apple.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Wonderer says:
  >[direct replies to an anon id reveal _your_ anon id]

To avoid this, instead of replying to e.g., an41418@anon.penet.fi, reverse
the first two letters (mnemonic 'not anonymous') and thus reply instead to
na41418@anon.penet.fi.

It will go to the same person, but your reply will not by anonymized, and
thus your identity will not be revealed.

Hope this helps,


Scott Collins         | "Few people realize what tremendous power there
                      |  is in one of these things."     -- Willy Wonka
......................|................................................
BUSINESS.   voice:408.862.0540  fax:974.6094   collins@newton.apple.com
Apple Computer, Inc.   5 Infinite Loop, MS 305-2B   Cupertino, CA 95014
.......................................................................
PERSONAL.   voice/fax:408.257.1746    1024:669687   catalyst@netcom.com





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: cman@IO.COM (Douglas Barnes)
Date: Fri, 22 Oct 93 12:08:18 PDT
To: m5@vail.tivoli.com (Mike McNally)
Subject: Re: 700 Club etc.
In-Reply-To: <9310212146.AA05688@vail.tivoli.com>
Message-ID: <9310221904.AA24299@illuminati.IO.COM>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> 
> 
> F_GRIFFITH@CCSVAX.SFASU.EDU writes:
>  > The right to encryption and the "right" to abortion don't have the same
>  > basis - encryption kills no one.
> 
> Yahooo!!!!!  An abortion debate on cypherpunks!  Thank Allah it isn't
> one of those gun nuts or somebody idiotic enough to deny the obvious
> truth of Velikovsky's work :-)
> 

Now if someone just mentions 'Hitler' we've covered all the bases...

(oops, I guess I just did.)

-- 
----------------                                             /\ 
Douglas Barnes            cman@illuminati.io.com            /  \ 
Chief Wizard         (512) 448-8950 (d), 447-7866 (v)      / () \
Illuminati Online          metaverse.io.com 7777          /______\



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Matthew J Ghio <mg5n+@andrew.cmu.edu>
Date: Fri, 22 Oct 93 11:42:56 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Gold in them thar Bills...
In-Reply-To: <9310212036.AA25191@tdws22>
Message-ID: <0gm2_=q00awU86Y18a@andrew.cmu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> Yes, as long it was been minted in a recognized form i.e. a gold eagle,
> a panda, or gold peso.  A gob of yellow shinny stuff is just that until
> it has been assayed, and then it is only as good as the backing or
> reputation of the assayer. 

I can easily determine with reasonable precision weather or not a lump
of yellow stuff is gold or not.  All I need is:

1) A glass of water and a balance scale to use Archimedes method (which
is reasonably accurate since there are very few metals heavier than
gold.  If I remember correctly, they are platinum, iridium, osmium, and
uranium..there might be one or two more.  They are all rare metals which
are nearly equal or greater in value than gold, except for uranium which
I could rule out pretty easily on the basis of its radioactivity)

or

2) A drop of nitric acid.  Nitric acid, (and several other acids as
well) will not react with gold, but will quickly oxidize iron pyrite,
bronze alloys, etc.  In fact, some companies like Edmund Scientific sell
chemical tests to check gold.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: freeman@MasPar.COM (Jay R. Freeman)
Date: Fri, 22 Oct 93 14:18:19 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re:  Warning about exposing anon id
Message-ID: <9310222118.AA17944@cleo.MasPar.Com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



A very interesting warning, and an interesting conceptual loophole, if I
understand it correctly.  What I think I understand is, that if I reply
to an anonymous message, the remailer will create and maintain an anonymous
ID for me, of the form "an12345", which it will use for all subsequent
messages that I send through it.

If so, then the gotcha is this:  Suppose I am not interested in anonymity.
I read a message that looks interesting, and reply to it -- both to the
originator and to the newsgroup.  The remailer gives me an "anonymous" ID
which is promptly compromised because the same text went out both with
my name on it and with the anonymous ID attached.  But who cares -- as
I stipulated, at the time I was not interested in anonymity, and may not
even have realized that the message I was replying to was posted via an
anonymous remailer.

BUT suppose that six months from now I suddenly turn paranoid (or realist --
which term you choose depends on your world view), and decide I would like
to use the anonymous mailer.  Now I send messages to and through it, but
the mailer already has an "anonymous" ID for me -- the one long since
compromised -- so it keeps using it.

Sounds to me like an interesting way for a user to compromise anonymity
without it really being anybody's fault.  I hope this problem is
explained in the remailer documentation (which I haven't sent for -- at
the moment I am not interested in anonymity), and that there is an
easy way for a user to request a new anonymous ID.

A fair fraction of the readers of this list will probably be saying
"caveat emptor" or words to that effect, but I suggest that it would be
a desirable property of a service offering any kind of anonymity, to
lead users -- especially novices -- away from trivial beginner's mistakes.

                                  -- Jay Freeman




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "James K. Huggins" <huggins@eecs.umich.edu>
Date: Fri, 22 Oct 93 11:38:17 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Clipper Chip report on 700 Club today (Wednesday)
Message-ID: <199310221834.AA27149@quip.eecs.umich.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text


Phil Karn (karn@qualcomm.com) writes:
 
> If I hadn't seen the show with my own eyes, I never would have
> believed it. The Religious Right, so ready to mind everyone else's
> personal business and to reshape the government in its own image,
> opposes something that would make it easier for the government to
> control the private lives of its citizens. 

Let's be honest, though ... the "Non-Religious Left" is interested
in the same thing (though in different ways).  Just about everybody
in politics wants to change something or other.

> Of course, the Religious Right is at odds with the current government,
> what with talk of using the federal racketeering laws against
> anti-abortion demonstrators.  So perhaps they can be forgiven for
> their current anti-government stance.  

It ain't just governments that oppose the religious right.  There are 
a lot of moves on college campuses lately to kick conservative
religious groups off campus because they aren't PC.  I can easily
see a time when having cryptography might be very useful to me if
the administration at my university starts grepping my e-mail
to see if my group meets the latest PC test.  

Sure, the US government tends to like Christian folks right now.
But there are lots of governments around that don't -- ask people
who live in Muslim countries where being a Christian is illegal,
punishable by death as heresy.  Any applications for cryptography there?

> And there's supreme irony in the right to encryption and the right to
> abortion both being founded in the same basic concept: personal
> privacy.  It all depends on whose ox is being gored, I guess.

The problem ain't with privacy ... it's with what do you with privacy.
Should we all have microphones installed in our homes because the
privacy of my house out in the country means that I can beat my wife
and no-one will hear her scream?  The problem isn't that my house
is private ... the problem is that I'm a jerk.  So make being a jerk
illegal and forget the microphones.

Disclaimer: I don't have a house or a wife, and 4 out of 5 officemates
don't think I'm a jerk ...

Jim Huggins (huggins@eecs.umich.edu)



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Matthew J Ghio <mg5n+@andrew.cmu.edu>
Date: Fri, 22 Oct 93 12:02:55 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Canon copiers
In-Reply-To: <9310221617.AA00624@jobe.shell.portal.com>
Message-ID: <Mgm2rSy00awUM6Y1gR@andrew.cmu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I really doubt that they would make it lock up the machine.  If that
were true, I could just walk up to the copier, slap down a $1 bill, hit
the button and walk away.  Poof -
I've just created weeks of downtime and a hefty repair bill.  Gee sounds
like fun.  Now, how many businesses do you know of that would be willing
to take that kind of risk in buying a copier?




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Peter Capek (TL-863-6721)" <capek@watson.ibm.com>
Date: Fri, 22 Oct 93 12:18:18 PDT
To: CYPHERPUNKS@toad.com
Subject: 10/28 - Crypto Day at IBM Research, Yorktown Heights, NY
Message-ID: <9310221915.AA15826@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


   ***********************************************************
   Cryptography Day at IBM Yorktown           October 28, 1993
   Thomas J. Watson Research Center, Yorktown Heights New York
   ***********************************************************

Once the province of diplomats and spies, cryptography is assuming
a central role in civil applications, including digital telephony,
electronic mail, database access, software copy protection, funds
transfer and contract negotiation.  As these services become
more powerful and globally integrated, cryptographic techniques
provide the chief means of reconciling the conflicting goals of
privacy and accessibility.  This day-long symposium will explore
the emerging intersection of cryptographic algorithms, devices,
applications, and policy that is shaping the future of
information services.

Topics to be covered include

+ A survey of cryptography and related techniques
+ The role of cryptography in information distribution and licensing
+ Electronic privacy
+ Smart cards
+ Evolution of the regulatory framework and international standards


Speakers include

Richard Barth           Council on Competitiveness, Washington, DC
Gilles Brassard         Universite de Montreal, Canada
Whitfield Diffie        Sun Microsystems, Sunnyvale, CA
Charles Hartman         IBM Personal Systems Multimedia, Mountain View, CA
Jean-Jacques Quisquater Universite Catholique, Louvain,  Belgium

The symposium will involve no proprietary or confidential
information.  There will be no registration fee, but

           ADVANCE REGISTRATION IS REQUIRED.

To register or to obtain further information, contact Phyllis Helms by
electronic mail (easiest for us), fax, or phone, at the addresses below.

email:  PHELMS@watson.ibm.com
fax:    (914) 945-4001
phone:  (914) 945-1681


Organizing Committee

Nabil M. Amer          NABIL@watson.ibm.com
Charles H. Bennett     BENNETC@watson.ibm.com
Neil Gershenfeld       NEILG@media-lab.mit.edu





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Duncan Frissell <frissell@panix.com>
Date: Fri, 22 Oct 93 13:08:18 PDT
To: CYPHERPUNKS@toad.com
Subject: Net Regulation
Message-ID: <199310222007.AA07683@panix.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I know that this was a long time ago but I've been cut off from cyberspace 
for *days* (months in net time) while PANIX was down.

S >From: smb@research.att.com
S >Or  -- envision, if you will, an ukase that the FCC will regulate the
S >Internet, and that anyone who wants to connect will have to agree to an 
S >acceptable use policy that includes the requirement that all mail be
S >digitally signed, both by the individual and by the site, and that
S >mailers enforce this requirement.  Can't happen?

Since the Internet is an international entity, it is probably not subject 
to FCC regulation.  Even if domestic accounts are somehow regulated, it is 
no problem to telenet from my regulated account, (or make a long distance 
phone call) to Demon Internet Services in London and access my account 
there automatically downloading encrypted mail and news files.  As most of 
the comments on the Bell Atlantic/TCI merger suggest, there is little 
appetite even in the Clinton Administration for telecommunications 
reregulation.  Such a move would seem to run counter to the domestic and 
international trends in telecoms policy.  If the Bundesposte has had to 
surrender *its* monopoly, I doubt if mere US regulatory authorities can 
prevail in the winds that are blowing now.  Further, such rules do not now 
govern private networks and setting up a secure, encrypted "enterprise 
network" is simple and cheap these days.

The regulators will have enough on their plate trying to chase down all 
those people downloading porno from Zimbabwae and setting up their very 
own private "virtual" phone companies to compete with the licensed 
monopolies.  Each node on a network can be a network of its own as large 
or larger than the network of which it is a part.

S >Nor do I think that ``offshore data havens'' will help.  Apart from
S >the fact that most major governments are basically in accord on the
S >question of who makes the rules (them, not the people -- or did you
S >see any governments denouncing Clipper?  I saw lots of endorsements), 
S >there is a potent weapon that can be used:  mandatory disconnection
S >from the net for any country that doesn't co-operate enough.

The Feds can't even keep *me* off the nets (without arresting me), how can 
they keep a whole country off the nets.  Shutting off the nets would be 
the equivalent of shutting down the phone system (since those will both 
soon be the same thing).  You couldn't do that to one of the OECD 
countries at this point.  It would be an Act of War.  It would also cause 
a total financial panic since everyone would worry about other shutoffs 
and investors involved in the shutoff country would engage in a run to 
cash.  Global liquidity depends on a microsecond by microsecond flow of 
data.  This flow is bound to increase as time goes on.  There is not
even an international authority capable of imposing that sort of ban.  It 
would also be technically difficult since the nets are topologically 
complex.

S >Wanna place any bets on creating a whole new
S >anonymity structure?) For that matter, international bandwidth is a
S >matter for diplomats as well as technicians; permission to create new
S >circuits will simply be withheld.  If you doubt me, try placing a
S >call to Cuba, or to the former USSR.  After your Nth ``circuits busy"
S >message, don't bother asking why the long distance carriers haven't
S >installed more trunks, when there's obviously a demand for them.

That was then.  This is now.  There is a guy in Havana right now selling 
satellite dishes.  Thousands of Russian computers a month are joining 
Internet since the links were opened up a few months ago.  With all of the 
dark fiber now going into the ground/ocean and data compression and 
multiplexing continuing to improve, I doubt that the regulators will have 
much effect on bandwidth allocation which is a child of scarcity.  When 
lines are expensive, you can support expensive central switching and large 
monopolies.  When virtual "lines" are nearly free, even force majure can't 
cope with 5 billion people shopping 'till they drop for cheap telecoms.  

S >Cryptographic technology is an enabling mechanism for various social
S >changes.  It by no means makes them inevitable.  Don't delude 
S >yourself on that; the political will to do something is more important
S >when various alternatives exist.  

I've always considered the "action at a distance" capabilities of the nets 
to be more important than encryption per se.  Since governments are 
geographically-based entities, technologies which enable us to weaken the 
bonds of place reduce the ability of states to exact a "monopoly rent" 
based on their control of certain land areas.

S >And throughout the centuries, governments have had no trouble stripping
S >hated minority groups of their assets, without any need for computers.

True.  Computers, and jet travel, and other things don't make the 
government enormously more powerful than it's ever been but they *do* make 
us vastly more powerful than *we've* ever been.  Louis XIV and Slick Willy 
could both destroy a village "so that no stone was standing upon a stone" 
but we are not bound to the soil like the peasants of 18th century France.

S >If you want a Brave New Digital World, it isn't sufficient to build
S >the tools.  You also have to convince people that it's a good idea.
S >Oh, the online world is coming; no doubt about that.  But people have
S >to be convinced that privacy and the like is in their interests, that
S >it will solve problems that *they* will have. 

I think that a 30% to 50% increase in income via elimination of effective 
tax liability is quite an inducement.  The artificial profitability of 
untaxed over taxed income has been enough to support thousands of offshore 
financial subsidiaries of all the world's banks for years now.  This when 
they have had to pay substantial costs associated with offshore 
operations.  When the Bank of the Internet brings offshore banking as 
close as your terminal, such "arbitrage" between taxed and untaxed 
transactions will grow explosively.

S >Equally important, they have to be convinced that it will not create
S >new problems, to their perception (and the perception may have little
S >to do with reality.  500 -- nay, 500,000 -- channels of digital
S >information to the home will do nothing to educate those who prefer to
S >learn about the world from McData Services, or from
S >CBS/NBC/ABC/Fox/AP/UPI.  

What's this got to do with the price of Yak butter in Ulan Bator?  What 
does it matter what other people think in the fibersphere (thanks George) 
in which everyone who wants to controls their own switching capabilities. 
 In which there is no effective central control and no way to prevent 
communication between or among any individuals or groups that want to 
communicate.

"Early adopters" such as ourselves will develop the fibersphere and lots 
of others will follow.  As soon as they discover that they can make "free" 
LD video calls anywhere on earth, see any pictures, play any games, find 
work, "sex", and all things imaginable and unimaginable many more will 
come.  What they will find is freedom.  They will not be convinced by a 
close reading of "Human Action," they will *live* it.  Freedom is what you 
get when human interactions cannot be blocked.  

And don't tell me that we still have to live in the physical world.  If 
90% of the GWP (including *almost all* the money) consists of non-physical 
goods and services on the nets, government control over the remaining 10% 
is not statistically significant.  Since "unbundling" of services from 
physical goods is already going on and will be accelerated as people 
discover the tax consequences of non-physical services performed on the 
nets, large chunks of the GWP are bound to transfer to the nets.  Look at 
the explosion in the forex market on the nets (tripled in size since 1986) 
once it "slipped the surly bonds of earth." 


S >            --Steve Bellovin

Duncan Frissell

"Prediction -- The global information/communications phenomenon as 
highlighted by this week's Bell Atlantic-TCI merger will be at least as 
big in its impact on human society as the Industrial Revolution.  You 
heard it here first." -- John McLaughlin "The McLaughlin Group" NBC Sunday 
17 October 1993
--- WinQwk 2.0b#1165                                                                     




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: cme@ellisun.sw.stratus.com (Carl Ellison)
Date: Fri, 22 Oct 93 13:12:57 PDT
To: pdn@dwroll.dw.att.com
Subject: Re:  Emergency Broadcast System
Message-ID: <9310222011.AA01502@ellisun.sw.stratus.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



>Subject: Emergency Broadcast System
>Date: Fri, 22 Oct 1993 13:36:33 -0600 (MDT)
>From: "Philippe_D_Nave" <pdn@dwroll.dw.att.com>

> 1) Mailing list data should be distributed to "N" sites where "N" is a 
>    magic number that minimizes the chance of losing all the copies.
>    (Mathematicians, sharpen your pencils!)

I've done the math, if anyone is interested.  (part of the job here at
a producer of fault tolerant machines.)

BTW, we also have solutions for tolerating death of servers which I should
write up and post one of these days....  It's such second nature here at
Stratus that I don't pay much attention to the fact that not everyone has
seen the various solutions.

 - Carl

 - <<Disclaimer: All opinions expressed are my own, of course.>>
 - Carl Ellison                                        cme@sw.stratus.com
 - Stratus Computer Inc.       M3-2-BKW                TEL: (508)460-2783
 - 55 Fairbanks Boulevard ; Marlborough MA 01752-1298  FAX: (508)624-7488




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Arthur Chandler <arthurc@crl.com>
Date: Fri, 22 Oct 93 16:28:19 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Anonymity versus Responsibility
In-Reply-To: <9310210643.AA27104@netcom.netcom.com>
Message-ID: <Pine.3.87.9310211150.A4957-0100000@crl.crl.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



  It still seems to me that the spoofing issue has been oversimplified:
  "Hey, it's a fact of life. Accept it."
  "We're cypherpunks. We have a little fun once in a while. Lighten up!"
  "Spoofing and deception are not the same."
  Then Boxx gets dinged for using spoofs, and Detweiler gets dinged for 
objecting to them.
  Then May comes out with a G-rated spoof, and everyone (almost) has a 
chuckle. 
  But I think the issue is too sticky to pass off with flames and grins.
As I see it, the spoofing touches on one of the basic 
opportunities/dilemmas of the NET: anonymity versus responsibility. We 
can say things behind the cover of ascii that we wouldn't dare try IRL. 
So some folks do it. You can explore gender bending, being an asshole, 
etc. -- and no one has to know. Good therapy? Food for the exploring 
mind? Yeah, maybe. But also --
  Good for undermining credibility. Someone spoofs in a letter from 
William Gibson during a heated discussion of Cyberpunk. It LOOKS 
plausible. No one on the list knows Gibson personally. Do you take it at 
face value, or pass it off as a possible spoof? Folks, that ain't 
spoofing: it's impersonation. It's a form of lying. No harm done? Ask 
Gibson if he thinks so. Ask yourself if you would.
  Situation #2: someone writes in a bunch of outrageous opinions and puts 
YOUR name in the sender slot and fires the mess of to the cypherpunks list. 
What are you going to do about it? Quickly  post a denial, no doubt. But 
tell me you wouldn't feel furious. Someone  has used anonymity to 
misrepresent you. In essence, to lie about you in  an ingenious way made 
possible by a combo of human nature and the structure of the NET.
  So: You want to post/pose as *HeAvYd00d* -- hey, go right ahead. That's 
your biz, and I can  use a laugh (the whole scheme of building up an 
anonymous rep seems like juvenile fantasy or disguised cowardice, but 
chacun a son gout). You want to pose as William Gibson?  I've got a 
problem with  that -- and so do you, if the real WG finds out. 
You want to pose as  someone else on this list? Well, do YOU have a 
problem with that?










From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Matthew J Ghio <mg5n+@andrew.cmu.edu>
Date: Fri, 22 Oct 93 13:33:18 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Sharing a secret
In-Reply-To: <9310221637.AA01633@jobe.shell.portal.com>
Message-ID: <Mgm49j600VpQIGoUc0@andrew.cmu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


David Koontz <koontzd@lrcs.loral.com> writes:

> With a key K of size j (goddamn fortran anyway), i parties can share
> the secret with a threshold of i (requiring all i parties key part)
> by generating i parts P such that K = Pi XOR Pi-1 XOR ... P1.  All
> the parts P are the same size as K, which keeps the effort of guessing
> a missing part equal to j, or the size of the key k itself. 
>
> Such a scheme is not ideal for keys K that have a deterministic
> characteristic.

I might be missing something, but I don't see how this could be made to
work when you're missing more than one key.  For example, suppose you
create a system with 5 keys.  Take each of the five keys and XOR them to
create a known constant.  Now, if you have four keys, you can easily
find the fifth by xoring them with the known constant, and unlock the
cipher.  But, what if you wanted to have three of the five keys be able
to unlock the cipher.  There isn't any way to do this.

I worked with this system many years ago, trying to create an insurance
against data loss.  If you have some blocks of data, you take each byte
in each block and xor it with the same byte position in all of the other
blocks, and then save this new block that you created.  If you then lose
one of the blocks, you can recreate it from the remaining blocks.  But
if you lost two blocks, there is no way to recreate it.  I gave up on
the idea and never wrote the program.

I like the line/polynomial idea that Hal Finney posted tho...




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Eli Brandt <ebrandt@jarthur.Claremont.EDU>
Date: Fri, 22 Oct 93 17:38:21 PDT
To: cypherpunks list <cypherpunks@toad.com>
Subject: Re: Anonymity versus Responsibility
In-Reply-To: <Pine.3.87.9310211150.A4957-0100000@crl.crl.com>
Message-ID: <9310230035.AA18944@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>   It still seems to me that the spoofing issue has been oversimplified:
[...]
>   "Spoofing and deception are not the same."

What's overly simple about this?

>   Then Boxx gets dinged for using spoofs, 

I don't think anyone cared that "S. Boxx" posted pseudonymously.

[ Example of someone impersonating William Gibson ]
[ Example of someone impersonation *you* ]
> tell me you wouldn't feel furious. Someone  has used anonymity to 
> misrepresent you. In essence, to lie about you in  an ingenious way made 
> possible by a combo of human nature and the structure of the NET.

Anonymity has nothing to do with this.  Nor does pseudonymity.  This
is a simple case of exploiting technical loopholes the size of
Neptune.  Unfortunately, many people give more credence than they
should to the From: line, perhaps not realizing that present
protocols were never designed for security.  An easy way of making
reality conform to expectations is to spread the use of digital
signatures.

Your examples of "harmful spoofing" are problems, but they are old
problems having nothing to do with the use of nyms.  You can't,
for example, post to alt.cyberpunk as an47351@anon.penet.fi (William
Gibson) and expect to fool anybody.  Yes, forgery is obnoxious.
But this putative offense of "pseudospoofing", of having multiple
names, is very from forgery.

   Eli   ebrandt@jarthur.claremont.edu




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Karl Lui Barrus <klbarrus@owlnet.rice.edu>
Date: Fri, 22 Oct 93 15:43:00 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: ANON: revealing penet id
Message-ID: <9310222238.AA15930@flammulated.owlnet.rice.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Hm...

this topic seems to come up every few months - just today I was
reading the newest Risks digest and an32153 (or something like that)
was announcing the "risk" of using penet.  I mailed off a submission
describing how to avoid this.  I think people don't know about this
because it isn't published anywhere.  Or is it?

Maybe somebody could help Julf out and offer to write a new help file
that specifically mentions the an/na trick.  Last time I looked at the
penet help file, this wasn't mentioned.

It only takes a bit of work to avoid blowing your id - you just can't
hit 'r' and reply to the addressee; instead you must type in the
address manually (and be sure to type na#### instead of an####).  Last
week I responded to some email from a penet user.  I was careful to
respond to na####, or penet would have allocated me an id for
klbarrus@owlnet.rice.edu (since I don't have one for this account) and
thus someone would have been able to correlate my penet id and this
account.  As a matter of fact, I think that I revealed the penet id
for an old account of mine (elee9sf@menudo.uh.edu) this exact way,
although this was before the an/na functionality.

-- 
Karl L. Barrus: klbarrus@owlnet.rice.edu         
keyID: 5AD633 hash: D1 59 9D 48 72 E9 19 D5  3D F3 93 7E 81 B5 CC 32 

"One man's mnemonic is another man's cryptography" 
  - my compilers prof discussing file naming in public directories



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: plaz@netcom.com (Geoff Dale)
Date: Fri, 22 Oct 93 17:43:00 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Subliminal Channels (jsteg)
Message-ID: <9310230040.AA29444@netcom.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


replying to: Karl Lui Barrus <klbarrus@owlnet.rice.edu>
>Someone did write a program which embeds information in a JPEG, but I
>don't have any other info (like where to get it, who wrote it, etc.
>:-)

I saw jsteg on soda.berkeley.edu from the cypherpunks area
(/pub/cypherpunks/applications/jsteg). I haven't actually tried it, mind
you, but that's where I saw it.

It's actually in the form of jpeg source and a diff file to turn it into jsteg.

   Forward, upward, outward, onward, and every which way but loose!
_______________________________________________________________________
Geoff Dale    -- insert standard disclaimers here --    plaz@netcom.com
               "We are the shock troops of reality."
                - Voice of the Friends (Wild Palms)






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Karl Lui Barrus <klbarrus@owlnet.rice.edu>
Date: Fri, 22 Oct 93 16:03:00 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Subliminal Channels
In-Reply-To: <9310222041.AA00922@anon.penet.fi>
Message-ID: <9310222300.AA17989@flammulated.owlnet.rice.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


wonderer wrote:

>Is there any published work on hiding subliminal messages
>in pictures? It seems like that would be really easy.

Someone did write a program which embeds information in a JPEG, but I
don't have any other info (like where to get it, who wrote it, etc.
:-)

Actually though, embedding a message in a picture leans toward
steganography.

Subliminal channels, covert channels, and steganography are related to
one another, and seem to overlap.  I don't have precise definitions
(does anybody else?).  From reading, here is what I think these three
methods are:

Covert channel: you and I agree that if I mail you a letter with the
stamp affixed sideways, that messageA is communicated.  Or, we agree
that a post sent to alt.test with the subject "el mariachi" conveys
messageA.  Or that my running a process and killing before 9:30 p.m.
conveys messageA. 

Subliminal channel: you and I share a secret and convey our message in
the digital signature of innocent message we pass to one another.

Steganography: I write an innocent message, and I change the spacing
between words, to convey messageA.  Or, I embed the message in the low
order bits of a picture or a sound file.

So, it looks like that in subliminal channels and steganography, the
actual message is passed, while covert channels don't (it's like
winking at a friend - no message but lots of information).

Also, it seems that steganography alters the innocent message itself,
while a subliminal channel doesn't.

Obviously, there is great room for hair-splitting.  These are the
differences as I understand them!  Any other input?

-- 
Karl L. Barrus: klbarrus@owlnet.rice.edu         
keyID: 5AD633 hash: D1 59 9D 48 72 E9 19 D5  3D F3 93 7E 81 B5 CC 32 

"One man's mnemonic is another man's cryptography" 
  - my compilers prof discussing file naming in public directories



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: cme@ellisun.sw.stratus.com (Carl Ellison)
Date: Fri, 22 Oct 93 15:28:20 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re:  Subliminal Channels
Message-ID: <9310222227.AA01747@ellisun.sw.stratus.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>Message-Id: <9310222041.AA00922@anon.penet.fi>
>From: an41418@anon.penet.fi (wonderer)
>Date: Fri, 22 Oct 1993 20:41:37 UTC
>Subject: Re:  Subliminal Channels

>Big brother comes and tells you that you are not allowed
>to encrypt anything, and you say that you used a random
>number generator for this new form of art that appears
>to be total oblivion, but really represents a new way of
>looking at the meaning of life.

Have you seen random dot stereo pictures?  (cross-eye stereo)

There are 5 or 6 repetitions of a seemingly random dot field -- but the
first repetition really is random (I believe).

A friend of a friend has S/W for generating these.  I remember looking
at it once and it's not hard at all.  However, that was years ago.

 - Carl




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: hughes@ah.com (Eric Hughes)
Date: Fri, 22 Oct 93 18:32:59 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: crypto technique
Message-ID: <9310230129.AA01896@ah.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I've looked at Matthew Ghio's encryption technique and have some
comments.  First let me summarize the system.

private key: a sequence of polynomial functions f_1, f_2 ... f_n of the
  form a_i x (x+1)/2 + b_i, where a_i is odd.

public key: the composition of these functions f(x) = f_1 ( f_2 ( ... f_n(x)))
  and a modulus P = 2^k

plaintext: a value 't'

ciphertext: the value u = f(t)

decryption: finding t such that f(t)=u, by using of the f_i


Matthew has repeatedly claimed that it can't be broken.  Now one of
the first rules of cipher design is don't claim that unless you have
some good reason to believe that it can't be broken.  Merely saying "I
can't figure out how" is NOT sufficient.  No flame intended, Matthew,
this is probably the single most common failing of people interested
in crypto.

In particular, Matthew has made the claim that one must find the
coefficients of the f_i in order to decrypt and claims that finding
such coefficients is difficult.  He calls this operation factoring;
properly speaking this is a 'decomposition', since the operation used
to make f(x) is not multiplication by composition (called iteration
when all the functions are the same).

As I suspected and Karl has demonstrated, these decompositions are not
unique.  Since the plaintext, ciphertext pair does not depend on the
representation of the function, only upon the coefficients of the
polynomial function which is the public key, any such decomposition
will suffice for decryption.  In other words, you don't have to find
how the function was created in order to decode.  All you need is some
way of inverting the polynomial function f(x).

Note that I am using the phrase polynomial function here, and not just
the word polynomial.  There is a big difference.  Polynomial functions
are real functions with a domain and range.  Polynomials are elements
of a ring created by adjoining an indeterminate 'x' to some ring.
Polynomials can be 'evaluated' as polynomial functions under some
circumstances, but not always.

A side note.  The function Matthew picks, 1/2 x(x+1) is not, properly
speaking, a function with coefficients in Z/2^k (integers mod 2^k).
It is, however, a coefficient in Z/2^{k+1}

There's one significant difference for the purposes of this proposed
cipher: polynomials have arbitrarily large degree, but every
polynomial function over a finite ring (such as integers mod N) is
equal to some polynomial function of finite degree.  One can see this
easily be recalling Fermat's little theorem a^N == a (mod N).  Thus
x^N == x (mod N) for polynomial functions, which limits the degree.

Matthew has proposed that arbitrarily many compositions will give a
function which can't be inverted.  This is certainly not the case if N
= 2^k as he proposes.  The following relation holds for all integers
n > 0 and for all integers t:

	2^{2^n - 1} | \Product_{i=0}^{2^n - 1} ( t + i )

What this means is that as the 2^k grows larger, the maximum degree of
the polynomial functions grows as 'k', not as 2^k.  In other words,
the degree grows as the logarithm of the modulus, or linearly in the
number of bits in the modulus, if you prefer.  This is certainly not a
good sign.

Recommendation: don't use N=2^k.

It's a general rule of cryptosystems that if you use 2^k moduli to
speed your encryption, you will also speed the attack, and not just
from increased speed, but from algebraic properties of these moduli.
There have been some spectacular failures in this regard, notably a
chip which was built to do modular exponention for a particular 2^k
which was later found to be totally insecure.

Another property which decreases the security of the scheme is that
polynomials over Z/2^k don't have unique factorization.  Therefore the
polynomial functions don't have unique representations.  For example

	(x+1)(x+3) = (x+5)(x+7) (mod 8)
	(x+2)(x+4) = x (x+6) (mod 8)
	x (x+1)(x+2)(x+3) = 0 (mod 8) (from the expression above)

This makes it all the easier to invert the polynomial.  The reason
that you don't have unique factorization is that Z/2^k has zero
divisors: 2 x 4 = 0 (mod 8), so two divides zero.  The presence of
zero divisors means that you don't get unique factorization.

There is, however, a twist.  If you don't even see the zero-divisors,
you can pretend they aren't there.  This is exactly what RSA does,
since if you find a multiple of one of the factors of the modulus,
you've broken the system.

But if you use a modulus of the form pq, you're basically using RSA!
RSA picks a particularly easy polynomial function to invert, namely
f(x) = x^e.  Other polynomials would work as well, and, in fact,
appear in the patent application, albeit without examples.

Now if you pick a prime modulus, you don't have a public key system
anymore.  This is the Hellman-Pohlig patent, which uses x^e (mod p) as
its encryption.  In this scheme 'p' is kept secret, since otherwise
the exponentiation could be reversed.

In short, I don't think Matthew's scheme can be made to work.  There
is an open question about how the base field increases with each
composition because of the presence of the 1/2, but I don't think
currently that this makes it work.

For a specific reference, see the collection _Cryptology and
Computational Number Theory_ which contains an essay by Kevin McCurley
"Odds and Ends from Computational Number Theory."  Section 3 of this
essay discusses the breaking of some similar schemes by some
non-obvious means.  I quote: "Moreover, it holds a valuable lesson for
those who tend to believe that a computational problem is difficult
just because the only apparent solution is difficult."

Eric




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: anonymous@extropia.wimsey.com
Date: Fri, 22 Oct 93 20:03:00 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: No Subject
Message-ID: <199310230247.AA03638@xtropia>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



 > Maybe somebody could help Julf out and offer to write a new help file
 > that specifically mentions the an/na trick.  Last time I looked at the
 > penet help file, this wasn't mentioned.

Yes, and while he's at it, how about instructions for changing passwords
and nicknames?




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: judic@netcom.com (Judi Clark)
Date: Fri, 22 Oct 93 20:28:21 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: FYI - NSA going public (fwd)
Message-ID: <9310230328.AA13171@netcom3.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> >Date: Fri, 22 Oct 93 11:34:51 -0700
> >Subject: NSA call for proposals
> >
> >NSA is offering to support unclassified research in certain security-
> >related areas.
> >A description of the program is with Joyce.
> >There is a deadline of Nov. 8 for a letter of interest
> >(email to dld@tycho.ncsc.mil is apparently sufficient)
> >
> >They will send you an RFP in December if you reply by 11/8.
> >                                ---jdu
> >

Thought you'd be interested.

-- 
  judi  <judic@netcom.com>





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: an41418@anon.penet.fi (wonderer)
Date: Fri, 22 Oct 93 13:32:57 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Warning about exposing anon id
Message-ID: <9310222029.AA28647@anon.penet.fi>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I am a strong believer in the importance of being
able to have an anonymous identity with a reputation.
As such, let me post a warning about the most common
way people are revealing their identities to me.

If you see a post to cypherpunks from an anonymous
user of the Finish remailer. That is, an####@anon.penet.fi,
and you reply to cypherpunks and to that person, then
the article that appears on cypherpunks will have your
real name and e-mail address, but the message received by
the original poster will be from your anonymous id.
It's easy to put the two together and establish a list
of who is who. Personally, I am ignoring it when this happens,
but if I wanted to, I could have a list of about 15 of
you by now.

It's important to understand how an anonymous service
works if you want to rely on it. Also realize, that even
if you don't think you are using the service, it is
allocating an id for you when you reply to an anonymous
poster. You will receive a message about this auomatically
from the remailer.

Wonderer
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
To find out more about the anon service, send mail to help@anon.penet.fi.
Due to the double-blind, any mail replies to this message will be anonymized,
and an anonymous id will be allocated automatically. You have been warned.
Please report any problems, inappropriate use etc. to admin@anon.penet.fi.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: an41418@anon.penet.fi (wonderer)
Date: Fri, 22 Oct 93 13:42:58 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re:  Subliminal Channels
Message-ID: <9310222041.AA00922@anon.penet.fi>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Is there any published work on hiding subliminal messages
in pictures? It seems like that would be really easy.

The warden, so to speak, sees an innocent illustration
of a house and a garden, but the prisoners hide information
in the arrangement of the bricks and the flowers. In
video images, wouldn't it be very difficult to detect
that there was some encrypted data in the image? This
would be good for deniability.

Big brother comes and tells you that you are not allowed
to encrypt anything, and you say that you used a random
number generator for this new form of art that appears
to be total oblivion, but really represents a new way of
looking at the meaning of life. Meanwhile, your pal on
the other hand runs it through a processor and decrypts
the message.

Wonderer
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
To find out more about the anon service, send mail to help@anon.penet.fi.
Due to the double-blind, any mail replies to this message will be anonymized,
and an anonymous id will be allocated automatically. You have been warned.
Please report any problems, inappropriate use etc. to admin@anon.penet.fi.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: XXCLARK@indst.indstate.edu
Date: Fri, 22 Oct 93 18:58:21 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Conon redux
Message-ID: <9310230156.AA19479@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain




<trebor@fortune.co.jp> wrote:


>Most likely by modulating the Least Significant Bit of the color

        Thank you. Never would have thunk it.

        Attempted an off-list reply, but can't find the damn gateway.

        ec




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: cme@ellisun.sw.stratus.com (Carl Ellison)
Date: Fri, 22 Oct 93 18:48:21 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: random dot stereo
Message-ID: <9310230144.AA03721@ellisun.sw.stratus.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


My friend's code is still around.  I don't have permission to post it
but if there's interest I'll ask.

Each picture generated requires up to 2^17 random bits to seed the process.

 - Carl





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Mike Ingle <MIKEINGLE@delphi.com>
Date: Sat, 23 Oct 93 00:23:01 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Applied Steganography
Message-ID: <01H4FR1PIQ4291WDW2@delphi.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Here is an interesting application of steganography from Eric 
Isaacson's A86 assembler. This method would be low-bandwidth but
hard to detect.

6. A86 takes advantage of situations in which more than one set
   of opcodes can be generated for the same instruction.  (For
   example, MOV AX,BX can be generated using either an 89 or 8B
   opcode, by reversing fields in the following ModRM byte.  Both
   forms are absolutely identical in functionality and execution
   speed.)  A86 adopts an unusual mix of choices in such
   situations.  This creates a code-generation "footprint" that
   occupies no space in your program file, but will enable me to
   tell, and to demonstrate in a court of law, if a non-trivial
   object file has been produced by A86. The specification for
   this "footprint" is sufficiently obscure and complicated that
   it would be impossible to duplicate by accident.  I claim
   exclusive rights to the particular "footprint" I have chosen,
   and prohibit anyone from duplicating it.  This has at least
   two specific implications:

   a. Any assembler that duplicates the "footprint" is mine.  If
      it is not identified as mine and issued under these terms,
      then those who sell or distribute the assembler will be
      subject to prosecution.

   b. Any program marked with the "footprint" has been produced
      by my assembler.  It is subject to condition 5 above.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: hughes@ah.com (Eric Hughes)
Date: Sat, 23 Oct 93 10:43:06 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: ADMIN: proposed new policy on the mailing list
Message-ID: <9310231738.AA02831@ah.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Cypherpunks is an experiment in anarchy whose participants share
overlapping concerns with respect to privacy and cryptography.

One of the commonly shared goals of the participants in this group is
to change the technical context of the political debate about
cryptography.  This goal has not been reached, nor even has very close
approach been made as yet.  I believe that we have been successful in
inculcating, at least in ourselves, a set of values and attitudes
toward encryption .  Unfortunately this mental presence has not
blossomed into actual culture and practice, although we have attempted
and practiced.

Not all systems are self-organizing, and ours is not dissipative in
the right way.  Therefore in true micro-Keynesian fashion, I am
considering creating an artificial inducement toward cryptography on
this list.  You will be, of course, free not to participate.  The
rule I am considering is the following:

   Digitally sign your articles or their transmission will be delayed.

In terms of email privacy, we have not yet even reached the level
where content encryption is standard.  Since software to make digital
signatures is almost always the same software needed for encryption,
and likewise for signature verification and decryption, an inducement
to sign one's posts will be also an inducement to encrypt.  At the
very least it requires some change in the status quo of one's own
email system.

The hampering above will not be outright rejection, since the cost of
rejection creates a step function to participation, an insurmountable
hurdle for most of us.  Rather I am considering hampering posts by
delaying their transmission, by destroying some of their timeliness.
Timeliness, as I analyze it, will be one of the few things that have
economic worth in a post-copyright environment.

Delaying unsigned posts does not prevent people from participating,
merely from getting very close the topicality of discussion.  If you
are debating delayed against an undelayed correspondent, you will be
at a disadvantage, as your points may be immediately responded to, but
the other's points will stand unopposed for longer.  Truth, in other
words what _you_ believe, might triumph eventually, but practical
epistemology is more a matter of rhetoric than of validity.

Nor does it prevent occasional use of the forum by lurkers and
learners.  The first article on any new subject has very little time
value, rhetorically, but the question still gets asked.  Furthermore,
it will tend to slow down debate, at least for a while.

My initial thoughts are that the delay should be about six hours,
which would limit the number of salient responses of the unverifiable
to about one per topic per day.  As more and more people begin to sign
their posts, that delay would be increased.  I have considered more
sophisticated schemes, such as allowing automatic delayed moderation,
which sends you back a ticket that allows immediate posting, but after
some number of hours, or perhaps longer delays for unsigned repsonses
to signed articles, but I think that a simpler system will work
better, certainly at the outset where people are coming to grips with
delay's effect on the discussion.

I invite discussion of this proposal on the list itself.  If you only
wish to express approval or disapproval, that is, to "vote", please do
so only in private e-mail to me.  I welcome further analysis of this
idea as well as evaluations of its desirability or odiousness in your
own value system.

Unsigned,

Eric




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: hfinney@shell.portal.com (Hal Finney)
Date: Sat, 23 Oct 93 10:53:06 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Warning about exposing anon id
Message-ID: <9310231752.AA11323@jobe.shell.portal.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I agree with Alan's position that anonymization not be done automatically
on reply to mailers, but in fairness Julf has argued that the "least
astonishment" position goes the other way.  Apparently for several years
anonymous/pseudonymous servers have operated on the talk groups which
do the automatic anonymization.  People there have come to expect that
when they reply to an anonymous message their own identity will be protected.
Providing an anonymous server for which this established behavior does
not occur will no doubt astonish many experienced users of these services.

Still, I think the current behavior is wrong, and IMO the sooner people
learn a new way of using anonymous servers, the better.  When we do
deploy anonymous servers which allow replies, it will be important to
include disclaimers which remind people that their replies will not be
anonymous.  Unfortunately, some or most newsreaders do not show header
fields, and I dislike sticking disclaimers into the message body itself.

Hal




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: damiano@wyvern.wyvern.com (Christian O'dell)
Date: Sat, 23 Oct 93 10:13:04 PDT
To: cypherpunks@request@toad.com
Subject: mailing
Message-ID: <m0oqmWI-0000c1C@wyvern.wyvern.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text


Would you please add me to your mailing list...thanks

-- 
Damiano <damiano@wyvern.wyvern.com>



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: swc@uc1.ucsu.edu (Stuart W. Card)
Date: Sat, 23 Oct 93 10:13:26 PDT
To: tcmay@netcom.com
Subject: Re: Bidzos (RSA) on "Primetime Live" (was: cellular)
Message-ID: <9310231713.AA00766@uc1.ucsu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Voice registry is far easier than you imagine.  I am in defense contracting
and have seen demos here at Rome Laboratory.  I will NEVER feel secure on
the phone again.  They can easily identify speakers, languages, keywords and
gists of conversations.  Now they are working on dialiects.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Stuart W. Card, Consultant, Card & Associates -- Research & Development
Box 153 RR 1 Newport Rd Utica NY 13502         315-735-1717 / FAX -8469
swc@uc1.ucsu.edu or cards@top.cis.syr.edu           "Who is John Galt?"




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Douglas Sinclair <dsinclai@acs.ucalgary.ca>
Date: Sat, 23 Oct 93 12:33:06 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: DC-nets
Message-ID: <9310231931.AA56549@acs1.acs.ucalgary.ca>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


My thanks to Tim Newsham and Tim May for sending me information
on DC-networks.  It appears the modifications that I had been
thinking about were not discussed by Chaum in his original
paper, which gives me some hope I may have stumbled across
something new.

Chaum proposes the use of public key cryptography for secure
communication between vertices in a DC-net.  This leads to the
problem of secure key exchange, and the possibility that the
public key algorithm is not sound.

Instead, the interference properties of a DC-net may be used
to give unconditional security.  Say Alice wishes to send a message
M to Bob.

1.  Alice computes the hash of M, and appends it to M to
produce a packet P of p bits.

2.  Alice transmits on the net "Message of p bits for Bob"

3.  Bob receives this message, and prepares a packet R composed
    of p random bits.

4.  Alice transmits packet P.  Simultaniously, Bob transmits
    packet R.  The output of the DC­net is now X, where
    X = P XOR R

5.  Bob, computes P = X XOR R.  He verifies that the last bits of
    P are a valid hash for the first portion.  If so, he has
    succesfully recieved M and the transfer is over.  If not,
    there must have been interference from another party.  He
    would then transmit "Alice, resend message", and the
    procedure would be repeated.

All that Carol, another vertex in the net, can see is X.  She
cannot derive P from X as it has been encrypted with the
equivalent of a one-time pad.  Thus, P is unconditionally
secure.

Alice and Bob need no nothing about each other for this transfer
to work.  Indeed, Alice and Bob may well be pseudonyms.  The worst
that can happen is that two sites respond to the pseudonym of Bob,
and the transfer suffers from interference.  Hence the built in
hash.  Note that only Bob can see the valid hash, and only then
if the transfer has worked perfectly.  Thus, the hash need not
be secure.

I have not looked at the efffects of collusion on this protocol.
My gut feeling is that sufficient collusion would bring it down
in flames.  However, this is also true of the basic operation
of a DC-net.

I cannot claim that I came up with this protocol alone.  It was
concieved this summer at a seminar I taught on cryptography.
After sitting around a table and flipping coins to prove that
it actually did work, we started looking at the problems of
un-intentional interference.  This is the result of half an
hour of me trying to remember what little I had read of DC-nets
and the students making me look like a fool for not having
studied as much as I should have.

So, my first question to you is, does it work?  The next
question is has it been thought of before?  And finally,
is it useful?

-- 
PGP 2.3a Key by finger




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Jim McCoy <mccoy@ccwf.cc.utexas.edu>
Date: Sat, 23 Oct 93 11:53:26 PDT
To: barrett@daisy.ee.und.ac.za (Alan Barrett)
Subject: Re: Warning about exposing anon id
In-Reply-To: <Pine.3.03.9310231644.B3609-a100000@daisy.ee.und.ac.za>
Message-ID: <199310231848.AA06534@tigger.cc.utexas.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text


Alan Barrett <barrett@daisy.ee.und.ac.za> writes:
> Scott Collins says:
> > To avoid this [direct replies to an anon id reveal _your_ anon id],
> > instead of replying to e.g., an41418@anon.penet.fi, reverse > > the
> > first two letters (mnemonic 'not anonymous') and thus reply instead to
> > na41418@anon.penet.fi.
> 
> I believe that, [...] replies to anonymous IDs should, by default, not be
> double-blinded [...]  Perhaps the anon admins could [...] put na####
> instead of an#### in the FROM address, and educate their users. 

A better method might perhaps be to set the Reply-To field to automatically
be the na#### address.  This makes it easier for people with smart mailers
and doesn't mess around with who the message is actually from...

jim



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Eli Brandt <ebrandt@jarthur.Claremont.EDU>
Date: Sat, 23 Oct 93 14:03:06 PDT
To: cypherpunks list <cypherpunks@toad.com>
Subject: Re: ADMIN: proposed new policy on the mailing list
In-Reply-To: <9310231738.AA02831@ah.com>
Message-ID: <9310232101.AA26050@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>    Digitally sign your articles or their transmission will be delayed.

Under such a policy, I would be strongly tempted to move my PGP use
to jarthur (a public Unix box) rather than write software to snarf
text across a serial line, encrypt it, and spit it back.  As I'm
loath to give up my secret key in this way, I guess I'd just take the
delay.

While an incentive plan is a nice idea, I think most people on the
list would like to sign their messages.  Those who are prevented
from doing so are probably not going to be pushed the other way
by a delay of a few hours.

   Eli   ebrandt@jarthur.claremont.edu




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: hughes@ah.com (Eric Hughes)
Date: Sat, 23 Oct 93 14:18:29 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: ADMIN: proposed new policy on the mailing list
Message-ID: <9310232111.AA03150@ah.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


So far I have received six comments on the proposed sign-or-delay
system, two in public, four in private.  All have been supportive of
concept, but there have been specific technical issues with it.

-- security of keys at machines owned by someone other than the key owner.
-- standardization and legality of software

What I left out of my first posting was the particular algorithm used
at the server to verify signatures.  I was certainly going to accept
both PGP and PEM formats.  However, I had toyed with not using actual
crypto at all, but just recognizing message formats.

Given the objections I've received, I now amend my proposal from "sign
your messages, or else" to "make something that looks like a
signature, or else".  This has several consequences that I
particularly like.

The real goal of this plan is to change the software infrastructure so
that crypto can easily be inserted.  Certainly some software module
will be the only good way to create signed-format messages, and this
software, whatever it actually is, fits in exactly the same place that
real crypto does.  If, for some reason, a user does not use real
crypto but a replacement, their own system still supports crypto when
it is feasible or available or legal or whatever.

This modified plan addresses the legal issues, since a crypto-format
is not cryptographic.  In fact, it is exportable, since it is not
crypto.  There are no patent issues, since a crypto-format does not
use RSA.  It also addresses the key security issue, since there need
be no key involved.  It also implies no particular policy of key
distribution or verification, sticky issues that plague both PEM and
PGP.

Ironically, allowing pseudo-signatures _increases_ the real use of
cryptography, since no longer will there be the presumption that
because the message looks signed that it is actually signed by the
claimed signer.  The whole point of digital signatures is to allow a
verification mechanism, but using a permissive format creates the need
to use that mechanism.  Since no verification will be done at the
server, any verification desired will have to be done at the receiving
end.

There is the opportunity for a great rhetorical coup here.  Assume
that pseudosignature software exists.  Now there can be made the
argument to David Sternlight, who is nominally in favor of crypto but
who picks the least crypto-favorable interpretation of anything, to
show his support for crypto in theory but not in practice.

Comments?

Eric




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Eli Brandt <ebrandt@jarthur.Claremont.EDU>
Date: Sat, 23 Oct 93 14:18:27 PDT
To: cypherpunks list <cypherpunks@toad.com>
Subject: Re: Subliminal Channels
In-Reply-To: <Pine.3.05.9310231521.A9649-b100000@jhunix.hcf.jhu.edu>
Message-ID: <9310232117.AA26214@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


This is hardly germane to the list, but...

> Its been done for almost 50 years now, and started with the
>tachistoscope used in movie theatres to get people to consume popcorn
> and Coca-Cola(tm) in great quantities.  Sales went up by 60%.

Repeat this on alt.folklore.urban and watch the fun.  I believe this
particular legend was promulgated by a guy who was selling
tachistoscope equipment.  Gotta watch those Small Businessmen.  His
results were not replicable, and his company folded.

> Alex Reynolds

   Eli   ebrandt@jarthur.claremont.edu




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Matt Blaze <mab@crypto.com>
Date: Sat, 23 Oct 93 11:43:06 PDT
To: hfinney@shell.portal.com (Hal Finney)
Subject: Re: Warning about exposing anon id
In-Reply-To: <9310231752.AA11323@jobe.shell.portal.com>
Message-ID: <9310231826.AA08908@crypto.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


It seems that an anonymous remailer can operate in one of three ways -
it can reveal your psuedonym, it can reveal your identity, or it can
reveal nothing and simply give you a generaic "anonymous" identity.
Unfortunately each mode of operation is inapproprate as a default behavior:

- If it reveals your psuedonym, you could inadvertently expose map your
name to your psuedonym if you reply to a remailed message and include your
real identity.

- If it reveals your real identity, this could lead all sorts of obvious
problems with people who don't expect this behavior.

- If it simply strips out all identifying information and calls you some
generic anonymous name, this could lead to problems for people who expect
a reply to their messages.

I think the best solution is to require any message sent through a remailer
to include explicit instructions as to how it should be handled.  For example,
require something like an "X-Identify:" field that would be used to select the
return address behavior, with options like "real-id", "psuedonym", or
"anonymous".  Messages that don't include the field should bounce, probably
with some instructions as to how to fix the message to make it go through
properly.

-matt




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Eli Brandt <ebrandt@jarthur.Claremont.EDU>
Date: Sat, 23 Oct 93 14:38:27 PDT
To: cypherpunks list <cypherpunks@toad.com>
Subject: Re: Warning about exposing anon id
In-Reply-To: <9310231826.AA08908@crypto.com>
Message-ID: <9310232135.AA26409@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> From: Matt Blaze <mab@crypto.com>
> - If it simply strips out all identifying information and calls you some
> generic anonymous name, this could lead to problems for people who expect
> a reply to their messages.

One option I was thinking about was to separate the namespace into
"pseudonyms" and "anonyms".  The former would be persistent, the
equivalent of the present anXXXX addresses, and IMHO should have
some sort of human-readable `handle', even if it has to be randomly
generated from a dictionary.

When a non-user replies to a pseudonymous post (or a user does not
specify the pseudonym to use, if this is applicable), an anonym will
be allocated, consisting mostly of a largish random number.  To keep
the database size under control, anonyms should probably be deleted
after a certain period of disuse.

If someone later decides to create a `real' pseudonym, this system
ensures that they will not be unpleasantly surprised by finding that
they already *had* one, and put their signature under it.

   Eli   ebrandt@jarthur.claremont.edu




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Matt Blaze <mab@crypto.com>
Date: Sat, 23 Oct 93 11:43:26 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: ADMIN: proposed new policy on the mailing list
Message-ID: <9310231835.AA09172@crypto.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Oops, forgot to cc this to the list:

While I'm all for encouraging the use of digital signatures, I think this
is a bad idea.  The fact is there is not yet a truely generally available
method for digitally signing messages, and there are two competing standards
from which to choose as it is.  Just how should messages be signed?  PEM?
PGP?  What consititues a valid certificate?  (Actually, this question when
applied to your proposal underscores the inadequacy of both systems in
processing heterogeneous signatures - pgp imposes too little structure
and pem imposes too much.  But that's another story).

Then there's the practical problem that some people simply can't use a
particular signature technique with exisiting software and systems.
These people include:

- People outside the US and Canada, who can't legally use any PEM
implementation of which I'm aware because of restrictions on RSAREF.

- People in the US who can't use PGP because they're afraid to.

- People in the US who want to use PGP but can't because the people who
own/operate the computers they use won't let them.  Some people on public
access and university systems and many people in lawsuit-conscious large
companies with deep pockets are included here.

- People who would love to use PGP or PEM but don't see the point because
they don't fully trust the system on which they would sign their messages.
Anyone who uses anything but a private, single-user workstation SHOULD
be in this category.

- People who would love to use PGP or PEM but can't because they don't have
a working implementation of their secure mailer of choice for their particular
machine/OS.

Do we really want to exclude these people from full participation?  If so,
I suspect this would eliminate a few of the most valuable contributors to the
list.

Again, I don't thing this CONCEPT is a bad one, only that this particular
IMPLEMENTATION is premature in the absence of better and more ubiquitous
signature tools.

-matt (also unsigned, also known as mab@research.att.com)





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: peter honeyman <honey@citi.umich.edu>
Date: Sat, 23 Oct 93 11:53:06 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Mail delivery question
Message-ID: <9310231851.AA25213@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


well, i think bill overstates the case.  but then, i'm from the
slash/hack, no risk/no gain school of computer programming.

	peter




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Matt Blaze <mab@crypto.com>
Date: Sat, 23 Oct 93 12:28:26 PDT
To: Johan Helsingius <julf@penet.fi>
Subject: Re: Warning about exposing anon id
In-Reply-To: <199310231907.AA11705@mail.eunet.fi>
Message-ID: <9310231917.AA09665@crypto.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Julf writes:
>There is one more option - use two separate sets of anon id's. This is the
>way anon.penet.fi Mk II is going to operate.

How will this work?  Will you have a separate name space of "heavyweight"
anonymous IDs for messages that explicitly ask for a psuedonym (like with
a password) and those that don't?  If so, that sounds like a nice solution.

-matt




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Alexander Reynolds <chrome@jhunix.hcf.jhu.edu>
Date: Sat, 23 Oct 93 12:48:26 PDT
To: wonderer <an41418@anon.penet.fi>
Subject: Re: Subliminal Channels
In-Reply-To: <9310222041.AA00922@anon.penet.fi>
Message-ID: <Pine.3.05.9310231521.A9649-b100000@jhunix.hcf.jhu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> Is there any published work on hiding subliminal messages
> in pictures? It seems like that would be really easy.

Read R. Key's _The Clam-Plate Orgy_ for information on how advertising
companies (cigarette ana alcohol companies especially) add little
airbrushed renditions of subliminally pleasing sex scenes, with intent to
stimulate purchase of the product.  Its been done for almost 50 years now,
and started with the tachistoscope used in movie theatres to get people to
consume popcorn and Coca-Cola(tm) in great quantities.  Sales went up by 60%.

> Big brother comes and tells you that you are not allowed
> to encrypt anything, and you say that you used a random
> number generator for this new form of art that appears
> to be total oblivion, but really represents a new way of
> looking at the meaning of life. Meanwhile, your pal on
> the other hand runs it through a processor and decrypts
> the message.

If you tried to sell the idea that your random number generator is random,
then the government would come back and say that there is no way to
determine random numbers, and if there was, they'd ask you why you would
be able to run it through a processor and decrypt it.

But then again, laws on subliminal information are practically null, and
those that do exist are never enforced, thanks to Big Business
influence-peddling.

Alex Reynolds





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: ferguson@icm1.icp.net (Paul Ferguson x2044)
Date: Sat, 23 Oct 93 12:58:26 PDT
To: hughes@ah.com (Eric Hughes)
Subject: Re: ADMIN: proposed new policy on the mailing list
In-Reply-To: <9310231738.AA02831@ah.com>
Message-ID: <9310232100.AA00553@icm1.icp.net>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text


> 
>    Digitally sign your articles or their transmission will be delayed.
>

Then the messages that I compose on this host will simply have to
be delayed, as I still refuse to keep my private key on an "open" 
system. In fact, the _only_ time in which I attach a digital
signature to any of my messages is from my PC at home.

Call me a prude, but this is a fact of life I'm sure you will
encounter with other folks as well.

Cheers.
 
_____________________________________________________________________________
Paul Ferguson                                                               
Mindbank Consulting Group                                    fergp@sytex.com   
Fairfax, Virginia  USA                                       ferguson@icp.net



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Matthew J Miszewski <MJMISKI@macc.wisc.edu>
Date: Sat, 23 Oct 93 14:23:27 PDT
To: CYPHERPUNKS@toad.com
Subject: Sign this!
Message-ID: <23102316200504@vms2.macc.wisc.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


All due respect Eric,
 
...but requiring signatures could hinder this lists performance for
several reasons.
 
1.  New members of the list may have little knowledge of signing and
may become frustrated at the delay that results thus minimizing
the income of fresh talent to the list.
 
2.  Those with aversion to open system storage will have a harder time
signing their messages and thus security minded people will have their comments delayed.
 
3.  A false sense of security may actually result in this forum
since there is no _real_ compelling reason for me to check...lets say...
L. Detweiller's signature everytime he posts.  In a corporate contractual
situation there is an economically compelling reason to check.
 
...and with regard to 3. I would _suggest_ that for all 'sensitive'
or 'meant to be relied upon' information be signed by the author.  For example
I value Eric's vast knowledge of mathematical theory, and if 'he'
published an article to the list on some new breakthrough
algorithm I would be compelled to check his sig.  But, If he is
just flaming the hell out of LD, it is irrelevant to me if it
is him or anyone else.
 
--Matt
______________________________________________________________________________
"This new technology (the printing press) threatened the Crown, which shuddered
at the thought of widespread dissemination of works advocating religious heresy
and political upheaval.  The Crown's solution to the problem was a system of
regulation designed to control this "dangerous" art."
         -From my Copyright Law Text (refrencing the Statute of Anne -
                                           the first Copyright Statute)
(c)1993
______________________/___________________________________mjmiski@macc.wisc.edu




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Alan Barrett <barrett@daisy.ee.und.ac.za>
Date: Sat, 23 Oct 93 07:48:25 PDT
To: Scott Collins <catalyst@netcom.com>
Subject: Re: Warning about exposing anon id
In-Reply-To: <9310222055.AA23514@newton.apple.com>
Message-ID: <Pine.3.03.9310231644.B3609-a100000@daisy.ee.und.ac.za>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Scott Collins says:
> Wonderer says:
>   >[direct replies to an anon id reveal _your_ anon id]
> 
> To avoid this, instead of replying to e.g., an41418@anon.penet.fi, reverse
> the first two letters (mnemonic 'not anonymous') and thus reply instead to
> na41418@anon.penet.fi.

I believe that, according to the principle of least astonishment, replies
to anonymous IDs should, by default, not be double-blinded; and deliberate
action should have to be taken to request the double-blinding that
currently happens by default.  Perhaps the anon admins could be persuaded
to modify their systems accordingly;  They would just need to put na####
instead of an#### in the FROM address, and educate their users. 

Several months ago, I tried to persuade one of the anon admins to do this,
but I was not successful, and that server has since shut down. 

--apb
Alan Barrett, Dept. of Electronic Eng., Univ. of Natal, Durban, South Africa
RFC822: barrett@ee.und.ac.za







From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: bill@twwells.com (T. William Wells)
Date: Sat, 23 Oct 93 10:13:31 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Net Regulation
In-Reply-To: <199310222007.AA07683@panix.com>
Message-ID: <CFCzKr.HMB@twwells.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


[Many things I'll not take a stand on one way or another, right
now.]

In article <199310222007.AA07683@panix.com>,
Duncan Frissell <frissell@panix.com> wrote:
: And don't tell me that we still have to live in the physical world.  If
: 90% of the GWP (including *almost all* the money) consists of non-physical
: goods and services on the nets, government control over the remaining 10%
: is not statistically significant.

All too often, people look at one thing and imagine that the
numbers somehow outweigh reality. It ain't like that, folks.
Reality is complexly, intimately, and inseparately interconnected.
No matter what you do with the bits, physical reality cannot be
discounted.

"No matter how subtle the wizard, a knife in the back will always
cramp his style."

So, please, stop with the simplistic answers!

(What *did* happen at Panix, eh? I rest my case.)





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Panzer Boy <panzer@drown.slip.andrew.cmu.edu>
Date: Sat, 23 Oct 93 13:58:26 PDT
To: Eric Hughes <hughes@ah.com>
Subject: Re: ADMIN: proposed new policy on the mailing list
In-Reply-To: <9310231738.AA02831@ah.com>
Message-ID: <Pine.3.05.1.9310231606.C20719-a100000@drown.slip.andrew.cmu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


The problem that I see with this policy is that how are you going to
verify that the signature at the bottom is valid?  Anyone can generate PGP
keys pointing to anything.  Are you going to collect keys from
subscribers?  What about spoofing keys so that they apear valid, yet aren't?

I'm just curious to how this is going to be achieved.  I assume you don't
want to moderate the list (reading and approving everything).

-Matt  (panzer@drown.slip.andrew.cmu.edu)
(I would have signed this, but I lost the message on how to get pgp
to sign and leave the message in plaintext)

-------------Included Message---------------------
On Sat, 23 Oct 1993, Eric Hughes wrote:
> You will be, of course, free not to participate.  The
> rule I am considering is the following:
> 
>    Digitally sign your articles or their transmission will be delayed.
> 






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Panzer Boy <panzer@drown.slip.andrew.cmu.edu>
Date: Sat, 23 Oct 93 14:23:06 PDT
To: Cypherpunk Mailing List <cypherpunks@toad.com>
Subject: Paper Shredders
Message-ID: <Pine.3.05.1.9310231619.D20719-a100000@drown.slip.andrew.cmu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Awhile back someone asked about the cost of shredders.  Since I do some
work for a company that sells Mita copiers/fax/shredders, I talk to the
sales people and asked.

They sell a shredder that takes up to 5 sheets a paper at a time and turns
it into 1/8" x 7/8" particles.  This is considered low volume, and will
run you around $800.00 USD.  This is not suggested price, this is the
standard "good" discount that the sales people can give.  I wasn't able to
find out the price of the next step up.  But the sales brochure says that
NSA and DOD standard is 1/32" x 7/16" particles.  Standards for what
classification of paper, I don't know.

-Matt
(panzer@drown.slip.andrew.cmu.edu)

"That which can never be enforced should not be prohibited."






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: greg@ideath.goldenbear.com (Greg Broiles)
Date: Sat, 23 Oct 93 18:33:29 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Digital signatures to be required?
Message-ID: <36FwBc2w164w@ideath.goldenbear.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



My C-punks feed comes over a UUCP connection, and I only poll once or twice 
per day, under normal circumstances. I'd likely never notice a 6-hour delay, 
and hence wouldn't give a shit one way or the other.

Delaying message posting seems likely to exacerbate the "ask a question,
get the same answer 8 times" problem.

If we're going to reward some behaviors and punish others, I'd prefer to see 
something that'd create exponentially increasing delays for > 1 post per 
person per 24 hours; of course, remailers make that impractical.

Imposing a digital signature requirement strikes me as an arbitrary 
exercise of authority which would be largely without benefit. I doubt that 
people interested in the C-punks list are the folks who need to be dragged 
kicking & screaming into the 21st century; at least not in terms of personal 
use of technology. :)

Count mine as a "NO" vote; let's talk about the delay thing again when we 
come up with a filter that can spot "what is [anarchy|libertarianism] 
anyway?" or bogus pseudo-economic jibberish.


--
Greg Broiles
greg@goldenbear.com                     Baked, not fried.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Matt Blaze <mab@crypto.com>
Date: Sat, 23 Oct 93 15:13:08 PDT
To: hughes@ah.com (Eric Hughes)
Subject: Re: ADMIN: proposed new policy on the mailing list
In-Reply-To: <9310232111.AA03150@ah.com>
Message-ID: <9310232156.AA11711@crypto.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



>So far I have received six comments on the proposed sign-or-delay
>system, two in public, four in private.  All have been supportive of
>concept, but there have been specific technical issues with it.
>
Perhaps I wasn't clear.  The concept I support is encouraging signatures,
not some "sign or delay" scheme.  I think such schemes don't really help
encourage the use of signatures as much as they exclude people who
live in the wrong place or who don't have the right computers.  And a
"make it look signed or delay" scheme is even worse.  It just encourages
people to either give up on the list and go back to some place where the rules
make more sense or, even worse, waste their valuable time writing code that
produces funny "psuedosignatures" that serve no valuable purpose.

A much better way to spread cryptography is to work on developing new
and transparent mechanisms that help regular people securely integrate
signatures and encryption into their routine work without having to do
anything special or different. 

Trying to make life more inconvinient for people who already identify
themselves as "cypherpunks" but who for whatever reason don't have easy
access to the right tools seems not the way to do it.

-matt




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Karl Lui Barrus <klbarrus@owlnet.rice.edu>
Date: Sat, 23 Oct 93 16:03:28 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: ADMIN: proposed new policy
Message-ID: <9310232303.AA26424@flammulated.owlnet.rice.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


-----BEGIN PRIVACY-ENHANCED MESSAGE-----
Proc-Type: 2001,MIC-CLEAR
Originator-Name: klbarrus@owlnet.rice.edu
Originator-Key-Asymmetric:
 MFkwCgYEVQgBAQICAgADSwAwSAJBAM7KsFv7Dch7fCAN7eOwlL+AEL9XpkiLjf8x
 buBLdKhVttUO5OeycOBNOcJPCqwb1/GYKXwrni6+eck4kmImV7kCAwEAAQ==
MIC-Info: RSA-MD5,RSA,
 vEhLgb41mGdbMVTerMqViYmrSV7GwytHvfR1Iu9mrjBIUaxdpS6PypMitxiciJWC
 hOThe6DXSTfUU6aQ4CTAMA==

I like the idea of encouraging people to digitally sign messages.  I
also decided to try out ripem to see what its signed documents look
like.

I can't decide whether not people who don't should be "punished" by
having messages delayed... it is an inducement, but not too drastic.

We have an infrastructure problem: some crypto portions are in place,
some aren't, some are being developed.  Matt asked why he would want
to check the signatures on some posts... in the future, you won't have
to do anything extra since your mail software will do it for you.  Of
course, this will also help to screen anonymous mail - a person could
build a reputation for a pseudonym and your mail software will report
who signed it rather than where it came from.

So for some, it's convenient to sign posts, for other it isn't.  Maybe
unsigned posts could reflect out of toad.com with a header - something
like "X-Signed: not authenticated".  Rather than delay them, that is.

Also, another Matt asked how to use PGP to sign documents:

pgp -sat +clearsig=on file

You can specify this in config.txt also.

If you are using RIPEM:

ripem -e -m mic-clear < file > file.sign

Ray's solution for people fearing having their secret keys on a public
machine is perfect!  Just create another, for signing cypherpunk
postings.
-----END PRIVACY-ENHANCED MESSAGE-----




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: rjc@gnu.ai.mit.edu (Ray)
Date: Sat, 23 Oct 93 15:28:28 PDT
To: hughes@ah.com (Eric Hughes)
Subject: Re: ADMIN: proposed new policy on the mailing list
In-Reply-To: <9310232111.AA03150@ah.com>
Message-ID: <9310232227.AA18531@geech.gnu.ai.mit.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



     Why not create a new key on one's multiuser public unix box specifically
for cypherpunks? Then you can sign as many messages on your box as you want
and not care if anyone gets the secret key since the key will not be trusted
by anyone else. Messages posted by you will be understood to be signed
by you with the possibility that someone snooped your private key
and is pseudospoofing. Is the security of this any less than we currently
have? Not really, pseudospoofing can be done by a unix novice user.



-- Ray Cromwell        |    Engineering is the implementation of science;    --
-- EE/Math Student     |       politics is the implementation of faith.      --
-- rjc@gnu.ai.mit.edu  |                         - Zetetic Commentaries      --




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: cme@ellisun.sw.stratus.com (Carl Ellison)
Date: Sat, 23 Oct 93 15:58:28 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re:  Emergency Broadcast System
Message-ID: <9310232257.AA04098@ellisun.sw.stratus.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>Message-Id: <9310221941.AA16004@toad.com>
>Subject: Emergency Broadcast System
>Date: Fri, 22 Oct 1993 13:36:33 -0600 (MDT)
>From: "Philippe_D_Nave" <pdn@dwroll.dw.att.com>


> 1) Mailing list data should be distributed to "N" sites where "N" is a 
>    magic number that minimizes the chance of losing all the copies.
>    (Mathematicians, sharpen your pencils!)

I found the equations I mentioned earlier.  The following is a latex
file giving some.  The trend should be obvious.  You don't need many
nodes, if you can repair broken ones quickly enough.

[This is why Stratus has such a large FedEx bill.  When one of our machines
gets a broken component, it phones home automatically, reports the failure
and a new part is FedEx'ed immediately.  If the report comes in by
midnight, the new part is on the customer's desk for him/her to replace by
9am.  (Our current machines have N=2, K=1).  We prefer high speed mailaing
of parts (from a warehouse at FedEx's central sorting airport) over normal
mail in order to maximize $\mu$.]

------------------------------------------------------------------------------

\documentstyle[12pt]{article}

\begin{document}

\title{MTTF of Various Systems}
\author{Carl M. Ellison \thanks{Stratus Computer Inc., 55 Fairbanks Blvd.,
Marlborough MA 01752. Email address: {\tt cme@sw.stratus.com}.}}
\date{June 18, 1993}

\maketitle

\begin{abstract}
Equations are presented for the Mean Time To Failure (MTTF)
of various systems, as a function of
the number of nodes in the system, N, and the minimum number of nodes
in a working system, K.  Failure of a system is defined as having fewer
than K working nodes.
\end{abstract}

\section{Equations} 

Here are some equations for the Mean Time To Failure (MTTF) of various
systems, as a function of the number of nodes in the system, N, and
the minimum number of nodes in a working system, K.  Failure of a
system is defined as having fewer than K working nodes.  Typically,
K=1 and each node has a complete copy of each database.  However,
sometimes the data can be kept on multple nodes (as in a RAID-5 disk
array) which will tolerate some failures, down to a given threshold.

It is assumed that as soon as a failure occurs, a repair cycle will be
started.  There is then a race to see if the repair can be completed
before enough additional nodes fail to drop the working number below
K.  If that race is lost, it is assumed that information has been lost,
in the worst case, but at least that the service represented by the N nodes
is not available.

These equations do not give system availability (probability that a service
is available) but rather MTTF.  Availability equations can be found in
several good textbooks.  See, for example, Trivedi's text on Statistics.
MTTF is more difficult to compute.

The equations below were each a symbolic solution to a custom Markov
chain, built to model the choice of N and K.


N: number of nodes in a full system

K: number of nodes in a minimally functional system

$\lambda$: rate of failures (e.g., number of node failures per year)

$\mu$: rate of node repair (in the same units as $\lambda$)

Each fraction below is the MTTF of the whole system:  the mean time
until a system drops to only (K-1) working nodes.

N =  3 ;  K =  2

\begin{equation}
\frac{ 5\lambda + \mu }{ 6\lambda^2 }
\end{equation}

N =  4 ;  K =  2

\begin{equation}
\frac{ 26\lambda^2 + 6\lambda\mu + \mu^2 }{ 24\lambda^3 }
\end{equation}

N =  4 ;  K =  3

\begin{equation}
\frac{ 7\lambda + \mu }{ 12\lambda^2 }
\end{equation}

N =  5 ;  K =  2

\begin{equation}
\frac{ 154\lambda^3 + 36\lambda^2\mu + 7\lambda\mu^2 + \mu^3 }{ 120\lambda^4 }
\end{equation}

N =  5 ;  K =  3

\begin{equation}
\frac{ 47\lambda^2 + 8\lambda\mu + \mu^2 }{ 60\lambda^3 }
\end{equation}

N =  5 ;  K =  4

\begin{equation}
\frac{ 9\lambda + \mu }{ 20\lambda^2 }
\end{equation}

N =  6 ;  K =  2

\begin{equation}
\frac{ 1044\lambda^4 + 240\lambda^3\mu + 48\lambda^2\mu^2 + 8\lambda\mu^3 + \mu^4 }{ 720\lambda^5 }
\end{equation}

N =  6 ;  K =  3

\begin{equation}
\frac{ 342\lambda^3 + 60\lambda^2\mu + 9\lambda\mu^2 + \mu^3 }{ 360\lambda^4 }
\end{equation}

N =  6 ;  K =  4

\begin{equation}
\frac{ 74\lambda^2 + 10\lambda\mu + \mu^2 }{ 120\lambda^3 }
\end{equation}

N =  6 ;  K =  5

\begin{equation}
\frac{ 11\lambda + \mu }{ 30\lambda^2 }
\end{equation}

N =  7 ;  K =  2

\begin{equation}
\frac{ 8028\lambda^5 + 1800\lambda^4\mu + 360\lambda^3\mu^2 + 62\lambda^2\mu^3 + 9\lambda\mu^4 + \mu^5 }{ 5040\lambda^6 }
\end{equation}

N =  7 ;  K =  3

\begin{equation}
\frac{ 2754\lambda^4 + 480\lambda^3\mu + 75\lambda^2\mu^2 + 10\lambda\mu^3 + \mu^4 }{ 2520\lambda^5 }
\end{equation}

N =  7 ;  K =  4

\begin{equation}
\frac{ 638\lambda^3 + 90\lambda^2\mu + 11\lambda\mu^2 + \mu^3 }{ 840\lambda^4 }
\end{equation}

N =  7 ;  K =  5

\begin{equation}
\frac{ 107\lambda^2 + 12\lambda\mu + \mu^2 }{ 210\lambda^3 }
\end{equation}

N =  7 ;  K =  6

\begin{equation}
\frac{ 13\lambda + \mu }{ 42\lambda^2 }
\end{equation}

N =  8 ;  K =  2

\begin{equation}
\frac{ 69264\lambda^6 + 15120\lambda^5\mu + 3000\lambda^4\mu^2 + 520\lambda^3\mu^3 + 78\lambda^2\mu^4 + 10\lambda\mu^5
+ \mu^6 }{ 40320\lambda^7 }
\end{equation}

N =  8 ;  K =  3

\begin{equation}
\frac{ 24552\lambda^5 + 4200\lambda^4\mu + 660\lambda^3\mu^2 + 92\lambda^2\mu^3 + 11\lambda\mu^4 + \mu^5 }{ 20160\lambda^6 }
\end{equation}

N =  8 ;  K =  4

\begin{equation}
\frac{ 5944\lambda^4 + 840\lambda^3\mu + 108\lambda^2\mu^2 + 12\lambda\mu^3 + \mu^4 }{ 6720\lambda^5 }
\end{equation}

N =  8 ;  K =  5

\begin{equation}
\frac{ 1066\lambda^3 + 126\lambda^2\mu + 13\lambda\mu^2 + \mu^3 }{ 1680\lambda^4 }
\end{equation}

N =  8 ;  K =  6

\begin{equation}
\frac{ 146\lambda^2 + 14\lambda\mu + \mu^2 }{ 336\lambda^3 }
\end{equation}

N =  8 ;  K =  7

\begin{equation}
\frac{ 15\lambda + \mu }{ 56\lambda^2 }
\end{equation}

N =  9 ;  K =  3

\begin{equation}
\frac{ 241128\lambda^6 + 40320\lambda^5\mu + 6300\lambda^4\mu^2 + 888\lambda^3\mu^3 + 111\lambda^2\mu^4
+ 12\lambda\mu^5 + \mu^6 }{ 181440\lambda^7 }
\end{equation}

N =  9 ;  K =  4

\begin{equation}
\frac{ 60216\lambda^5 + 8400\lambda^4\mu + 1092\lambda^3\mu^2 + 128\lambda^2\mu^3 + 13\lambda\mu^4 + \mu^5 }{ 60480\lambda^6 }
\end{equation}

N =  9 ;  K =  5

\begin{equation}
\frac{ 11274\lambda^4 + 1344\lambda^3\mu + 147\lambda^2\mu^2 + 14\lambda\mu^3 + \mu^4 }{ 15120\lambda^5 }
\end{equation}

N =  9 ;  K =  6

\begin{equation}
\frac{ 1650\lambda^3 + 168\lambda^2\mu + 15\lambda\mu^2 + \mu^3 }{ 3024\lambda^4 }
\end{equation}

N =  9 ;  K =  7

\begin{equation}
\frac{ 191\lambda^2 + 16\lambda\mu + \mu^2 }{ 504\lambda^3 }
\end{equation}

N =  9 ;  K =  8

\begin{equation}
\frac{ 17\lambda + \mu }{ 72\lambda^2 }
\end{equation}

N = 10 ;  K =  4

\begin{equation}
\frac{ 662640\lambda^6 + 90720\lambda^5\mu + 11760\lambda^4\mu^2 + 1400\lambda^3\mu^3 + 150\lambda^2\mu^4
+ 14\lambda\mu^5 + \mu^6 }{ 604800\lambda^7 }
\end{equation}

N = 10 ;  K =  5

\begin{equation}
\frac{ 127860\lambda^5 + 15120\lambda^4\mu + 1680\lambda^3\mu^2 + 170\lambda^2\mu^3 + 15\lambda\mu^4 + \mu^5 }{ 151200\lambda^6 }
\end{equation}

N = 10 ;  K =  6

\begin{equation}
\frac{ 19524\lambda^4 + 2016\lambda^3\mu + 192\lambda^2\mu^2 + 16\lambda\mu^3 + \mu^4 }{ 30240\lambda^5 }
\end{equation}

N = 10 ;  K =  7

\begin{equation}
\frac{ 2414\lambda^3 + 216\lambda^2\mu + 17\lambda\mu^2 + \mu^3 }{ 5040\lambda^4 }
\end{equation}

N = 10 ;  K =  8

\begin{equation}
\frac{ 242\lambda^2 + 18\lambda\mu + \mu^2 }{ 720\lambda^3 }
\end{equation}

N = 10 ;  K =  9

\begin{equation}
\frac{ 19\lambda + \mu }{ 90\lambda^2 }
\end{equation}

\end{document}





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: cme@ellisun.sw.stratus.com (Carl Ellison)
Date: Sat, 23 Oct 93 16:43:07 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: MTTF expressions for K = 1
Message-ID: <9310232341.AA04130@ellisun.sw.stratus.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Sorry -- I left out the K=1 expressions from that paper.
They're a little more mundane (for Stratus) but of obvious interest here.
These are the most likely to be interesting to us.

Consider, for example, \lambda = 0.5 failures/year and
\mu = 52 repairs/year
for the kind of machines we're talking about (as opposed to Stratus
machines).  The resulting MTTF would be in years.

 - Carl


====================================================================

N =  2 ;  K =  1

\begin{equation}
\frac { 3\lambda + 1\mu }{ 2\lambda^2 }
\end{equation}


N =  3 ;  K =  1

\begin{equation}
\frac { 11\lambda^2 + 4\lambda\mu + 1\mu^2 }{ 6\lambda^3 }
\end{equation}


N =  4 ;  K =  1

\begin{equation}
\frac { 50\lambda^3 + 18\lambda^2\mu + 5\lambda\mu^2 + 1\mu^3 }{ 24\lambda^4 }
\end{equation}







From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: nobody@soda.berkeley.edu
Date: Sat, 23 Oct 93 20:03:29 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: ADMIN: proposed new policy on the mailing list
Message-ID: <9310240302.AA29510@soda.berkeley.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

I don't think the security problems of Eric's proposal are as bad as
some have suggested.  People could create a separate, "lower security,"
public key for use on multi-user systems, with a different pass phrase
than for their "high security" key.  Perhaps the key could have an
appropriately small size of about 400 bits.  It would still be far
more work to break the security of such a system than to forge mail across
the network (which is easy).  So such a system does enhance security over
the existing system of unsigned messages.

As for the argument that people don't have access to signature systems -
PGP illegal in the U.S., PEM/RIPEM unavailable outside the U.S. - just
turn these around: PGP legal and available outside the U.S., PEM/RIPEM
legal and available inside the U.S.  Everyone has access to legal encryption
and signature software.

One problem I see with Eric's suggestion is that it is couched in terms
which suggest our main business here is debate.  Eric suggests that a delay
in having your message appear is to your disadvantage because your opponent's
arguments will stand unrefuted for a time.

Recently the list has been pretty contentious, but historically there has been
much less debate here than on many other lists, and I would hope that we
could return to that approach.  It would be better if we could exchange
information, ideas, approaches for reaching the goals we share.  In such
an environment a delay in the posting of a good idea is to everyone's
detriment and does not particularly harm the person whose ideas were slow
to appear.

Still, I support Eric's basic goal of encouraging more use of the
technologies we talk so much about.  I will remind people that I make an
encrypted version of the cypherpunks list available to anyone who has a
PGP public key which includes their address.  There are only a few sub-
scribers now but if you'd like to try it send me your PGP public key and
I'll add you to the list.  I'd suggest trying it for a few days before
cancelling your regular CP subscription to make sure you can handle the
encrypted traffic.

Ironically, our anonymous posters, who have generated so much controversy
of late, are at least using the technology.  Maybe if we do implement some
form of Eric's idea we should give the preferential treatment to anonymous
posters as well as signed messages.  People can post anonymously without 
having to expose any secret information, which should address the security
concerns mentioned above.  I'm sending this message with the following
headers, which direct replies back to my address.  This reduces the
biggest inconvenience with using remailers, the inability to get replies:

::
Request-Remailing-To: cypherpunks@toad.com

##
Reply-To: hfinney@shell.portal.com

One more point.  I was the one who initially implemented the clear-sign
feature in PGP.  I copied the idea from PEM, but put the signature info
at the end.  (I still think that putting it at the beginning was a silly
idea.)  When I wrote it I didn't have the blank lines around the -----
separators.  Branko added those and also add the Version: line (which is
ignored by the software).  I still like my format better, as I think the
signatures should add as little as possible.

But have you seen what these PEM signatures look like?  I've seen a couple
on sci.crypt and I almost fell out of the chair laughing.  First, the guy
had to _manually_move_ the signature from the beginning to the end to get
it out of the way.  But, worse, the signature is like thirty or forty lines
long!  I kid you not.  The guy posts a message of about a (24-line) screenful
then it has like two screenfuls of signature information.  It looks ludicrous.
No wonder he had to move the signature to the end - otherwise people would
have given up before they even got to his message.  (In fairness, these PEM
signatures are self-checking; PGP signatures require you to get the key on
your own.  I'm not sure if a non-self-checking PEM signature mode exists.)

Hal Finney
hfinney@shell.portal.com

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.3a

iQCVAgUBLMnCI6gTA69YIUw3AQHs2AP5Ae64wUfiNa4/yborffvMry1MAt9chF05
9Bdz3NupXkWU1GNbmniFKDnU+GdGR+Tuu3HgwwV7N55EjLY7SclOaLBxKXySD25X
sAlwlH1yDZO/ly5UxKakdaPKR4nzIZZjPZ8ZoCkDszoNcxERj/nF7l7zLYP3eXF+
GG+YBHenSL4=
=/09p
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Eli Brandt <ebrandt@jarthur.Claremont.EDU>
Date: Sat, 23 Oct 93 20:18:29 PDT
To: cypherpunks list <cypherpunks@toad.com>
Subject: Re: Subliminal Channels
In-Reply-To: <Pine.3.05.9310232200.A4496-c100000@jhunix.hcf.jhu.edu>
Message-ID: <9310240318.AA28051@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> >   The subliminal movie images story is bunk, urban legend.
> 
> No, actually it is very true and scary as hell.

If this were a.f.u I would cry "MOTTO" at this point.

> >   Could it be that subliminal information effects have been found to be
> > practically null also? 
> 
> Could be, but the tachiscope experiment left me feeling that there is a
> lot left unexplained, and much of it at our expense.

Heh.  We are dealing with a single `experiment' (not, like,
published or peer-reviewed or anything) in an undisclosed location,
performed by a market researcher trying to sell the "subliminal
projector" in question.  Contrast this with follow-up experiments --
which *were* conducted in a scientific fashion -- which found that
the effect of the stimulus varied with its perceptibility, and under
no conditions had the fabled mind-control effect.  Yes, the popcorn
story is nifty, but it's totally bogus.  I know, I know, all of the
psychologists who got negative results were bribed by General
Motors...

Really, post your views on subliminal advertising to
alt.folklore.urban, with a cross-post to sci.skeptic for good
measure.  I dare you.  ;-)

   Eli   ebrandt@jarthur.claremont.edu




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Alan Barrett <barrett@daisy.ee.und.ac.za>
Date: Sat, 23 Oct 93 12:18:26 PDT
To: Matt Blaze <mab@crypto.com>
Subject: Re: Warning about exposing anon id
In-Reply-To: <9310231826.AA08908@crypto.com>
Message-ID: <Pine.3.03.9310232053.F3609-b100000@daisy.ee.und.ac.za>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Matt Blaze says:
> I think the best solution is to require any message sent through a
> remailer to include explicit instructions as to how it should be
> handled. [...] Messages that don't include the field should bounce,
> probably with some instructions as to how to fix the message to make
> it go through properly.

For messages that are deliberately sent through remailers, I agree
that the sender should provide explicit instructions to direct the
operation of the remailer.  However, I would note that the mere act of
deliberately using a particular remailer can constitute an explicit
instruction for the remailer to perform its "standard" processing.

Messages that are inadvertantly sent through remailers by innocent folk
who simply reply to a (pseudonymous) message that they have received,
or simply write to an address that they have seen advertised, are
different.  I think that such messages should function as much like
ordinary (non-anonymous) mail as possible, consistent with the goal of
protecting the recipient's identity, to avoid surprising the innocent
sender.  Servers like the present implementation of anon.penet.fi do not
satisfy this requirement.

--apb (Alan Barrett)






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Johan Helsingius <julf@penet.fi>
Date: Sat, 23 Oct 93 12:08:26 PDT
To: Matt Blaze <mab@crypto.com>
Subject: Re: Warning about exposing anon id
In-Reply-To: <9310231826.AA08908@crypto.com>
Message-ID: <199310231907.AA11705@mail.eunet.fi>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



> It seems that an anonymous remailer can operate in one of three ways -
> it can reveal your psuedonym, it can reveal your identity, or it can
> reveal nothing and simply give you a generaic "anonymous" identity.

There is one more option - use two separate sets of anon id's. This is the
way anon.penet.fi Mk II is going to operate.

> - If it simply strips out all identifying information and calls you some
> generic anonymous name, this could lead to problems for people who expect
> a reply to their messages.

Yeah. This problem is solved by the aforementioned "double" id approach...

> I think the best solution is to require any message sent through a remailer
> to include explicit instructions as to how it should be handled.  For example
 > ,
> require something like an "X-Identify:" field that would be used to select th
 > e
> return address behavior, with options like "real-id", "psuedonym", or
> "anonymous".  Messages that don't include the field should bounce, probably
> with some instructions as to how to fix the message to make it go through
> properly.

No way. 75% of my users just can't deal with the extra headers. I frequently
get messages like:

	"Dear Sir. I not understand you help. I not read English.
	I chinese. Send chinese help."

 Julf





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Alexander Reynolds <chrome@jhunix.hcf.jhu.edu>
Date: Sat, 23 Oct 93 19:03:08 PDT
To: "Robert J. Woodhead" <trebor@foretune.co.jp>
Subject: Re: Subliminal Channels
In-Reply-To: <9310240134.AA14181@dink.foretune.co.jp>
Message-ID: <Pine.3.05.9310232101.A28131-c100000@jhunix.hcf.jhu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> Alas, almost every study that has been done on "Subliminal Seduction"
> has generated negative results.  The famous Movie theatre experiment, for
> example, was totally uncontrolled -- and did Key mention that it was
> done during a heatwave, with broken air-conditioning in the theatre?

That wouldn't explain the rise in sales of popcorn, a hot food.

> Moreover, tests of the "embedded sex objects" hypothesis don't pan out.
> It turns out that (a) people don't notice them unless they have been
> predisposed to (ie:"find the penis in the photo") and (b) whether or
> not there is an embed in the photo has no meaningful effect on the
> viewer.

Advertisers have found that such "artists jokes" as you call them are
profit makers.  Explain why almost 90-95% of all hard liquor ads show a
glass filled with ice.  Ice is a subliminal artist's wet dream; there is
much to be airbrushed inside a piece of ice.  Explain why advertisers will
spend millions on an ad campaign in a magazine, where people only spend
1-2 sec MAXIMUM on that ad.  These guys who run the businesses know what
to spend the money on and where.

> Basically, human beings are pattern recognition machines.  We _love_
> patterns so much that we tend to see them even when they aren't there

The idea of subliminallity is that you _don't_ see it when it _is_ there.

> a big stimulus to you.  So guys like Key, who are looking for patterns,
> will find them everywhere.

Key tried to go on Canadian TV awhile back with a program about his
research.  It was pulled after direct intervention from advertisers
threatening to pull their ads if the show went on; the TV execs behaved
predictibily.  Why were they so scared of something which you see as a joke?

> Deliberate embeds in advertising are almost without exception artists
> jokes.  

That's right, advertising companies pay commercial artists dollars in lost
profit to play jokes.

> And most perceived embeds are simply random things about the 
> image that our minds are organizing for us. 
 
Yes, but on a conscious level organization takes place.  Subconscious
thought is different.

Alex Reynolds





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: gwt@eskimo.com (George Taylor)
Date: Sat, 23 Oct 93 22:03:30 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Proposed policy: look like sig
Message-ID: <199310240504.AA15243@eskimo.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Eric said,


>Given the objections I've received, I now amend my proposal from "sign
>your messages, or else" to "make something that looks like a
>signature, or else".  This has several consequences that I
>particularly like.

Wouldn't it "look like a signature" if I just copied at the end
of an article the actual signature of some other, signed, article?
That would be a true signature, just not mine and not for this
article.  It sounds as though it would meet the suggested requirement,
but I don't see how it would accomplish the goals.  I could do it
with a macro, or maybe use a special .sig for posts to this list.
It wouldn't add anything to my software.

What am I missing?

-George




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: rjc@gnu.ai.mit.edu (Ray)
Date: Sat, 23 Oct 93 19:13:08 PDT
To: chrome@jhunix.hcf.jhu.edu (Alexander Reynolds)
Subject: Re: Subliminal Channels
In-Reply-To: <Pine.3.05.9310231521.A9649-b100000@jhunix.hcf.jhu.edu>
Message-ID: <9310240211.AA19639@geech.gnu.ai.mit.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Alexander Reynolds () writes:
> 
> > Is there any published work on hiding subliminal messages
> > in pictures? It seems like that would be really easy.
> 
> Read R. Key's _The Clam-Plate Orgy_ for information on how advertising
> companies (cigarette ana alcohol companies especially) add little
> airbrushed renditions of subliminally pleasing sex scenes, with intent to
> stimulate purchase of the product.  Its been done for almost 50 years now,
> and started with the tachistoscope used in movie theatres to get people to
> consume popcorn and Coca-Cola(tm) in great quantities.  Sales went up by 60%.

  Balderdash. Key is just another Freudian conspiracy theorist. I found some
of the descriptions in his book laughable to absurd. His theories don't
pan out if you talk to anyone in the advertising business. Hidden messages
are noise compared to other dominate factors like humor and flashy
graphics. _Clam-Plate Orgy_ is an example of Key's imaginative and vulgar
mind, not science. (was anyone aroused by this image? Even after
he drew in the little outlines, I still had trouble seeing anything
worth a hormonal response. I also hate clams.)

  The subliminal movie images story is bunk, urban legend.

  I hope you didn't buy any of those $39.95 subliminal tapes from
infomercials.

> But then again, laws on subliminal information are practically null, and
> those that do exist are never enforced, thanks to Big Business
> influence-peddling.

  Could it be that subliminal information effects have been found to be
practically null also? I guess Key's asburd claims fit right into the
psychology of a leftist conspiracy theorist. I wonder if the Bilderburgers
are involved?

-Ray

HELP, I'm being put into a _psychological vice_ by pseudospoofers! My
urine is being sapped out of my bladder by viscious anonymous abusers!
And now, I am being controlled by advertisements containing assorted 
penile and vaginal shapes!


-- Ray Cromwell        |    Engineering is the implementation of science;    --
-- EE/Math Student     |       politics is the implementation of faith.      --
-- rjc@gnu.ai.mit.edu  |                         - Zetetic Commentaries      --




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Alexander Reynolds <chrome@jhunix.hcf.jhu.edu>
Date: Sat, 23 Oct 93 19:33:29 PDT
To: Ray <rjc@gnu.ai.mit.edu>
Subject: Re: Subliminal Channels
In-Reply-To: <9310240211.AA19639@geech.gnu.ai.mit.edu>
Message-ID: <Pine.3.05.9310232200.A4496-c100000@jhunix.hcf.jhu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>   Balderdash. Key is just another Freudian conspiracy theorist. I found some
> of the descriptions in his book laughable to absurd. His theories don't
> pan out if you talk to anyone in the advertising business. 

And exactly why should they be honest?  It doesn't profit to be honest.

> Hidden messages are noise compared to other dominate factors like humor
> and flashy graphics.

Yes, I agree, but to the _conscious_ level it is noise!

> _Clam-Plate Orgy_ is an example of Key's imaginative
> and vulgar mind, not science. (was anyone aroused by this image? Even after
> he drew in the little outlines, I still had trouble seeing anything
> worth a hormonal response. I also hate clams.)

If you don't want to accept something before first glance, you won't.

>   The subliminal movie images story is bunk, urban legend.

No, actually it is very true and scary as hell.

>   I hope you didn't buy any of those $39.95 subliminal tapes from
> infomercials.

I'm not needing to quit anything addictive.

>   Could it be that subliminal information effects have been found to be
> practically null also? 

Could be, but the tachiscope experiment left me feeling that there is a
lot left unexplained, and much of it at our expense.

> I guess Key's asburd claims fit right into the
> psychology of a leftist conspiracy theorist. I wonder if the Bilderburgers
> are involved?

They fit into any ideological conspiracy you choose to frame it in, but
what happened then is what is happening now because it makes money, and
people like money.

> And now, I am being controlled by advertisements containing assorted 
> penile and vaginal shapes!

You put too much faith in man's ability to control himself, you should
read up on Milgram's experiments as well as some Skinner and Pavlov.

> -- Ray Cromwell        |    Engineering is the implementation of science;    --
> -- EE/Math Student     |       politics is the implementation of faith.      --
> -- rjc@gnu.ai.mit.edu  |                         - Zetetic Commentaries      --

Science is the faith in believing the universe is explainable, don't
deceive yourself thinking otherwise.

-Alex Reynolds






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: rjc@gnu.ai.mit.edu (Ray)
Date: Sat, 23 Oct 93 19:33:33 PDT
To: chrome@jhunix.hcf.jhu.edu (Alexander Reynolds)
Subject: Re: Subliminal Channels
In-Reply-To: <Pine.3.05.9310232101.A28131-c100000@jhunix.hcf.jhu.edu>
Message-ID: <9310240228.AA19696@geech.gnu.ai.mit.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Alexander Reynolds () writes:
> 
> > Alas, almost every study that has been done on "Subliminal Seduction"
> > has generated negative results.  The famous Movie theatre experiment, for
> > example, was totally uncontrolled -- and did Key mention that it was
> > done during a heatwave, with broken air-conditioning in the theatre?
> 
> That wouldn't explain the rise in sales of popcorn, a hot food.

  It's easily explainable by the fact that it wasn't a scientifically valid
test. 
 
> Advertisers have found that such "artists jokes" as you call them are
> profit makers.  Explain why almost 90-95% of all hard liquor ads show a
> glass filled with ice.  Ice is a subliminal artist's wet dream; there is

  Possibly because you don't drink hard liquor warm? The ice examples
from Key's book are even more idiotic. He might have had a genuine article
with that cologne add which showed a penis about to be cut off with a knife
(along with numerous images of dead animals), but the ice images were 
so-convoluted even conciously looking at them I couldn't make out anything. 

> much to be airbrushed inside a piece of ice.  Explain why advertisers will
> spend millions on an ad campaign in a magazine, where people only spend
> 1-2 sec MAXIMUM on that ad.  These guys who run the businesses know what

  You do not understand how advertising works. The key word is CAMPAIGN,
repeated exposure over a long period, to a large group of people who
are in your target audience. Statistically, a certain percentage of
people will stop to read your ad after repeated exposure. They spend
millions because even if a _fraction_ of the target audience responds to
the ad, they make many more millions.

> > a big stimulus to you.  So guys like Key, who are looking for patterns,
> > will find them everywhere.
> 
> Key tried to go on Canadian TV awhile back with a program about his
> research.  It was pulled after direct intervention from advertisers
> threatening to pull their ads if the show went on; the TV execs behaved
> predictibily.  Why were they so scared of something which you see as a joke?

  The key to recognizing a conspiracy crackpot is the presence of a censoring
authority. Thus the oil companies conspiring to prevent the 200 mpg carburetor
from being used, the Bilderburger's preventing all of the media from
revealing that they forclosed on the US Govt 50 years ago, UFO data
being censored by people "above top secret", etc.
 
   Tim May can probably elaborate since he is a much better fan of conspiracy
theories than I am. I stopped reading alt.conspiracy after the JFK thread
was brought up for the 100th time.

   I suggest you take this thread to sci.skeptic if you dare. Try your
anecdotal evidence there to see if it works.

-- Ray Cromwell        |    Engineering is the implementation of science;    --
-- EE/Math Student     |       politics is the implementation of faith.      --
-- rjc@gnu.ai.mit.edu  |                         - Zetetic Commentaries      --




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Alexander Reynolds <chrome@jhunix.hcf.jhu.edu>
Date: Sat, 23 Oct 93 19:53:08 PDT
To: Ray <rjc@gnu.ai.mit.edu>
Subject: Re: Subliminal Channels
In-Reply-To: <9310240228.AA19696@geech.gnu.ai.mit.edu>
Message-ID: <Pine.3.05.9310232203.B4496-c100000@jhunix.hcf.jhu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> > That wouldn't explain the rise in sales of popcorn, a hot food.
> 
>   It's easily explainable by the fact that it wasn't a scientifically valid
> test.

Why?  Because you don't want to accept the fact that if you're out to make
money, you'll exploit any angle you can, including the dominance of the
subconcious over what the conscious perceives?

I also remember you saying in your last message that this was a hoax.  Why
a sudden change in tune?
  
I think it was a scientifically valid test (within reason) because the
control was a normal, non-tach show versus a tach/stimulus show.  This was
done repeatedly, and the results were conclusive, a 60% rise in popcorn
sales.  Other "tests" were done, changing "you want popcorn" to "do you
want popcorn?"  It was shown that adding the question provoked a stronger
stimulation to consume that without the question.
 
>   Possibly because you don't drink hard liquor warm? The ice examples
> from Key's book are even more idiotic. He might have had a genuine article
> with that cologne add which showed a penis about to be cut off with a knife
> (along with numerous images of dead animals), but the ice images were 
> so-convoluted even conciously looking at them I couldn't make out anything. 

Again: You will see what you want to see, and likewise you will not see
what you do not want to see.

>   You do not understand how advertising works. The key word is CAMPAIGN,

No, the key word is SALES.  Anything else is secondary to that goal.

> repeated exposure over a long period, to a large group of people who
> are in your target audience. Statistically, a certain percentage of
> people will stop to read your ad after repeated exposure. They spend
> millions because even if a _fraction_ of the target audience responds to
> the ad, they make many more millions.

The profit would certainly be lost to recover revenue without
subliminal stimuli and with your statisical exposure.

> > Key tried to go on Canadian TV awhile back with a program about his
> > research.  It was pulled after direct intervention from advertisers
> > threatening to pull their ads if the show went on; the TV execs behaved
> > predictibily.  Why were they so scared of something which you see as a joke?
> 
>   The key to recognizing a conspiracy crackpot is the presence of a censoring
> authority. Thus the oil companies conspiring to prevent the 200 mpg carburetor
> from being used, the Bilderburger's preventing all of the media from
> revealing that they forclosed on the US Govt 50 years ago, UFO data
> being censored by people "above top secret", etc.

But the govt. and the like deny all charges when they are faced
with them.  Ad companies pull their ads; they don't respond, they don't deny. 
And that is the difference between reality and hoax.  

>    Tim May can probably elaborate since he is a much better fan of conspiracy
> theories than I am. I stopped reading alt.conspiracy after the JFK thread
> was brought up for the 100th time.

Tim: Any input?

>    I suggest you take this thread to sci.skeptic if you dare. Try your
> anecdotal evidence there to see if it works.

Well, my anecdotal evidence and experience includes readings from noted
behaviorologists other than Key.  So maybe this is a little more
scientific than first glance appears?  Maybe, maybe...

Your e-mail address says you are from MIT, so act like the scientist
you're pretending to be and read a little behavioral science first.

-Alex Reynolds







From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: rjc@gnu.ai.mit.edu (Ray)
Date: Sat, 23 Oct 93 20:03:08 PDT
To: chrome@jhunix.hcf.jhu.edu (Alexander Reynolds)
Subject: Re: Subliminal Channels
In-Reply-To: <Pine.3.05.9310232200.A4496-c100000@jhunix.hcf.jhu.edu>
Message-ID: <9310240300.AA19882@geech.gnu.ai.mit.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



[I know this shouldn't be here, but I can't resist one more response. According
to Skinner, I have no choice anyway. This is the last, I promise.]

Alexander Reynolds () writes:
> > pan out if you talk to anyone in the advertising business. 
> And exactly why should they be honest?  It doesn't profit to be honest.

  Look, I know people who work in the advertising business. Not bosses,
but workers. People whose's money isn't on the line.  People who haven't
signed non-disclosure agreements, people who are my friends. The idea
that out of tens of thousands of artists in the advertising business, NOT ONE
would come out and openly state what they do is as ludicrous as UFO 
conspiracies which require thousands of people to keep their mouth shut.

> > Hidden messages are noise compared to other dominate factors like humor
> > and flashy graphics.
> 
> Yes, I agree, but to the _conscious_ level it is noise!

   Let me explain a simple concept. Humans send subliminal signals to each
other. It's called BODY LANGUAGE. And the visual system seems to be particulary
adapted to recognizing facial expressions, not penises or vaginas (things
which we do not look at as often).  Ads are dominated by people laughing,
smiling, and other positive images. They are also dominated by humor.
These psychological mechanisms are known to work. Advertisers would
much rather put their money in traditional proven techniques of appealing
to people than Freudian crackpot theories which have been shown to have
no effect by many studies. Do you think many of those subliminal tapes have
been removed from commercial sale by the govnernment because they work too
well, or because they never worked and people got ripped off?

> > _Clam-Plate Orgy_ is an example of Key's imaginative
> > and vulgar mind, not science. (was anyone aroused by this image? Even after
> > he drew in the little outlines, I still had trouble seeing anything
> > worth a hormonal response. I also hate clams.)
> 
> If you don't want to accept something before first glance, you won't.

   I don't accept it because it's bunk. I studied _Clam-Plate Orgy_ very
carefully in challenge to another crackpot who bet me to read it. Now
your argument resorts to religious tactics "if you don't believe in it,
you don't want to believe. Blah blah."  On the other hand, you are
too accepting. You accept theories which are published no where else,
which are not accepted by the scientific community, and which lack scientific
control.

> >   The subliminal movie images story is bunk, urban legend.
> No, actually it is very true and scary as hell.


  It wasn't a scientifically valid experiment. There are much more
simpler and credible explanations of why advertising works, and Occam's
Razor tells us to deposit Key in file #13.

> > -- Ray Cromwell        |    Engineering is the implementation of science;  
> > -- EE/Math Student     |       politics is the implementation of faith.    
> > -- rjc@gnu.ai.mit.edu  |                         - Zetetic Commentaries   
> Science is the faith in believing the universe is explainable, don't
> deceive yourself thinking otherwise.

  This is the second time you have attacked my signature. It is generally
acknowledged in net-culture that the attack of someone's sig represents
the loss of an argument. Should I be surprised that your attack on science
is nothing more than the simplistic "science is a religion" argument, that
you are succeptable to memes from non-scientific crackpots like Key, and
in the same message you reference Skinner and social-science which is at
best dismal. I bet you are a great follower of his Chomsky-ness too.

-Ray

P.S. I am taking this arguement off cypherpunks. I will probably repost
my respones to sci.skeptic tommorow, perhaps Alex will have the guts to
debate it there.


-- Ray Cromwell        |    Engineering is the implementation of science;    --
-- EE/Math Student     |       politics is the implementation of faith.      --
-- rjc@gnu.ai.mit.edu  |                         - Zetetic Commentaries      --




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Alexander Reynolds <chrome@jhunix.hcf.jhu.edu>
Date: Sat, 23 Oct 93 20:48:34 PDT
To: Ray <rjc@gnu.ai.mit.edu>
Subject: Re: Subliminal Channels
In-Reply-To: <9310240300.AA19882@geech.gnu.ai.mit.edu>
Message-ID: <Pine.3.05.9310232331.A14797-d100000@jhunix.hcf.jhu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> [I know this shouldn't be here, but I can't resist one more response. According
> to Skinner, I have no choice anyway. This is the last, I promise.]

Ego is such a strong influence.

>   Look, I know people who work in the advertising business. Not bosses,
> but workers. People whose's money isn't on the line.  People who haven't
> signed non-disclosure agreements, people who are my friends. The idea
> that out of tens of thousands of artists in the advertising business, NOT ONE
> would come out and openly state what they do is as ludicrous as UFO 
> conspiracies which require thousands of people to keep their mouth shut.

Funny how you keep trying to mention subliminal ads and UFOs in one
breath.  You don't have anything stronger going for your argument than
your relation between subliminal ads and flying saucers?

> > Yes, I agree, but to the _conscious_ level it is noise!
> 
>    Let me explain a simple concept. Humans send subliminal signals to each
> other. It's called BODY LANGUAGE. 

Boy, you are really ignorant or you're really confused!
If body language were subliminal, we wouldn't respond to it on a conscious
level.  When someone shakes, or their palms are sweaty, we consciously
connect that behavior with nervousness (or at least I do).  The Japanese
culture rely almost exclusively on body language to communicate; if it
were subliminal they'd be clueless on what to do next!!!

> Ads are dominated by people laughing,
> smiling, and other positive images. They are also dominated by humor.
> These psychological mechanisms are known to work.

Of course, but to quote youself, "that is all noise."  Subliminal
stimulus is much stronger than all three as a profit maker.

> Advertisers would
> much rather put their money in traditional proven techniques of appealing
> to people than Freudian crackpot theories which have been shown to have
> no effect by many studies.

On the contrary, it has been _them_ doing the studies, and them spending
the ad money, *because* *it* *works*.

> Do you think many of those subliminal tapes have
> been removed from commercial sale by the govnernment because they work too
> well, or because they never worked and people got ripped off?

I have seen subliminal tapes for sale in Edmund Scientific in N.J.

> > If you don't want to accept something before first glance, you won't.
> 
>    I don't accept it because it's bunk. I studied _Clam-Plate Orgy_ very
> carefully in challenge to another crackpot who bet me to read it. Now
> your argument resorts to religious tactics "if you don't believe in it,
> you don't want to believe. Blah blah."

Science uses the same tactics.  Actually you should know that I'm an
atheist before you rant and rave on how religious I am.  I didn't mention
that before, because I didn't figure it as any of your damn business, but
I am sick of hearing this "oh, another religious freak again bullshit."

> On the other hand, you are
> too accepting. You accept theories which are published no where else,
> which are not accepted by the scientific community, and which lack scientific
> control.

On the contrary, I accept and reject theories which are obscure and little
known as much as I accept and reject theories which are well-known in
history.  The difference between you and I is that I seem to be a little
more open-minded.  The fact is that we are discussing a topic which is
little-studied (as I mentioned before) so it is little surprise that you
call this "unscientific," etc. etc.


> No, actually it is very true and scary as hell.
>  
>   It wasn't a scientifically valid experiment. There are much more
> simpler and credible explanations of why advertising works, and Occam's
> Razor tells us to deposit Key in file #13.
> 
> > > -- Ray Cromwell        |    Engineering is the implementation of science;  
> > > -- EE/Math Student     |       politics is the implementation of faith.    
> > > -- rjc@gnu.ai.mit.edu  |                         - Zetetic Commentaries   
> > Science is the faith in believing the universe is explainable, don't
> > deceive yourself thinking otherwise.
> 
>   This is the second time you have attacked my signature. It is generally
> acknowledged in net-culture that the attack of someone's sig represents
> the loss of an argument. 

I'm not a part of your bloody net-culture.  I don't choose to be.  I
attacked you and your elitist "rationalist-scientific" attitude, not your
signature, not your argument.

> Should I be surprised that your attack on science
> is nothing more than the simplistic "science is a religion" argument, that
> you are succeptable to memes from non-scientific crackpots like Key,

Hmm...read a little Dawson I see... Don't make me quote Dawson on this
one, you are totally clueless as to what mnemes are.

> and
> in the same message you reference Skinner and social-science which is at
> best dismal.

Ah, I believe we are talking about behavior control theory right?  So Skinner
and Co. are excellent tie-ins to this discussion.  If you would like a
bibliography, just ask, dude.

> I bet you are a great follower of his Chomsky-ness too. 

Sure.  You betcha.  I've heard of him before, is he involved with
conspiracies and that b.s.?

> P.S. I am taking this arguement off cypherpunks. I will probably repost
> my respones to sci.skeptic tommorow, perhaps Alex will have the guts to
> debate it there.

You tell me how and we'll duke 'em out, dude.

> -- Ray Cromwell        |    Engineering is the implementation of science;
> -- EE/Math Student     |       politics is the implementation of faith.      --
> -- rjc@gnu.ai.mit.edu  |                         - Zetetic Commentaries      --

Remember Tacoma Bridge?  What a piece of engineering faith that was!  I
started to laugh at my physics teacher when he told us how it took
thousands of hours to figure out why a bridge suddenly started to twist.

-Alex Reynolds

"A scientist is a priest with more cool looking potions." -my sceptical
chem teacher.





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: nate@VIS.ColoState.EDU
Date: Sat, 23 Oct 93 22:23:09 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com (Cypherpunks Mailing List)
Subject: Viallage Voice article, etc
Message-ID: <9310240520.AA02860@seurat.VIS.ColoState.EDU>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text


Does anyone have a copy of the Viallage Voice article from the 3rd of 
August 1993?  I don't want to type it in, and I know I saw it on the list
a while back.

Also, I am compiling a list of articles that explain what we are all about 
(I know, there is no CypherPunks agenda per se, but there are common
goals here), to be given out to the public.  If you are in posession of 
such an article (or know of one, I'll type it in) send it to me, please.

Thanks,

-nate

-- 
+-----------------------------------------------------------------------+
| Nate Sammons   email: nate@VIS.ColoState.Edu
|   Colorado State University Computer Visualization Laboratory
|   Finger nate@monet.VIS.ColoState.Edu for my PGP key
|   #include <std.disclaimer>            Guerrilla Cryptographer
|   Title 18 USC 2511 and 18 USC 2703 Protected --> Monitoring Forbidden
+--------+                          Always remember "Brazil"



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: rjc@gnu.ai.mit.edu (Ray)
Date: Sat, 23 Oct 93 20:48:30 PDT
To: chrome@jhunix.hcf.jhu.edu (Alexander Reynolds)
Subject: Re: Subliminal Channels
In-Reply-To: <Pine.3.05.9310232203.B4496-c100000@jhunix.hcf.jhu.edu>
Message-ID: <9310240343.AA20076@geech.gnu.ai.mit.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Alexander Reynolds () writes:
> > repeated exposure over a long period, to a large group of people who
> > are in your target audience. Statistically, a certain percentage of
> > people will stop to read your ad after repeated exposure. They spend
> > millions because even if a _fraction_ of the target audience responds to
> > the ad, they make many more millions.
> 
> The profit would certainly be lost to recover revenue without
> subliminal stimuli and with your statisical exposure.

   Bull, prove it. Here's a real world example. Let an ad in Wired
cost $2000 (which I believe it does), and let Wired have between 10,000 and
100,000 subscribers (which I think it does), and let the product you'll be
selling cost $10. 2*$2000/$10=400 customers required for 100% profit.
400/100,000 subscribers=0.4% of viewing audience, or 4 in 1000 people must
read and respond to your add.  So we need 4 atypical people who take the
time to carefully read ads.  You can apply the same analysis to million
dollar campaigns and get the same result. Iterated campaigns with
repeated exposure increase my argument even more.

   Key's explaination of print advertising is simply bullshit. Academic
philosophers have little to no credibility when it comes to talking
about things in the real world.

> Your e-mail address says you are from MIT, so act like the scientist
> you're pretending to be and read a little behavioral science first.

   How typical.


-- Ray Cromwell        |    Engineering is the implementation of science;    --
-- EE/Math Student     |       politics is the implementation of faith.      --
-- rjc@gnu.ai.mit.edu  |                         - Zetetic Commentaries      --




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Perry E. Metzger" <pmetzger@lehman.com>
Date: Sat, 23 Oct 93 22:13:09 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Subliminal Channels
In-Reply-To: <Pine.3.05.9310232101.A28131-c100000@jhunix.hcf.jhu.edu>
Message-ID: <9310240508.AA03859@snark.lehman.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Alexander Reynolds says:
> > Moreover, tests of the "embedded sex objects" hypothesis don't pan out.
> > It turns out that (a) people don't notice them unless they have been
> > predisposed to (ie:"find the penis in the photo") and (b) whether or
> > not there is an embed in the photo has no meaningful effect on the
> > viewer.
> 
> Advertisers have found that such "artists jokes" as you call them are
> profit makers.

My friend Harry S. Hawk, who runs the Extropians list, works for an ad
agency. I remember his reaction once to a news report about the nose
on Joe Camel being a penis. He said, more or less...

"yeah, I can see it now. The big guys are all in a meeting in the
conference room, and they call in the artist and tell him 'It looks
good, but frankly, it needs to be more, well, penis shaped. The nose,
that is.'"

No credible studies have ever shown that people notice subliminal
messages. No credible studies have ever shown any of these "embedded
images", either. If you believe they are there, it should be easy to
find them. Take a scanner, scan in any newspaper image. Display only
small subsets of the grey levels at once and your supposed subliminal
messages should pop right out -- only you won't see a thing because
they aren't there.

Sure, sex sells -- look at any beer ad. But that is a different
question. The notion that advertisers are going around deliberately
incorporating hidden sexual imagery in an effort to boost sales has as
much credibility as "The Protocols of the Elders of Zion".

Perry

PS By the way, none of this paranoia has anything to do with cryptography.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Perry E. Metzger" <pmetzger@lehman.com>
Date: Sat, 23 Oct 93 22:18:31 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Subliminal Channels
In-Reply-To: <Pine.3.05.9310232200.A4496-c100000@jhunix.hcf.jhu.edu>
Message-ID: <9310240513.AA03867@snark.lehman.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Alexander Reynolds says:
> >   Balderdash. Key is just another Freudian conspiracy theorist. I found som
e
> > of the descriptions in his book laughable to absurd. His theories don't
> > pan out if you talk to anyone in the advertising business. 
> 
> And exactly why should they be honest?  It doesn't profit to be honest.

Yup. All those tens of thousands of people (including unpaid summer
interns) working in the Ad business have all been sworn to
secrecy. Yeah, thats the ticket. And none of them ever talked, because
ad people are like the mafia, and will kill each other for talking,
which is why all those ad men end up floating in the East River all
the time. Yeah, thats the ticket.

By the way, I've got some swampland in Florida to sell you. Along with
some subscriptions to some Lyndon Larouche publications that will give
you incontravertable proof that the Queen of England is the worlds
biggest drug trafficer.

Perry




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "L. Detweiler" <ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Date: Sun, 24 Oct 93 01:38:31 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: pseudospoofing survey
Message-ID: <9310240835.AA08908@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


punks:

The following is an essay followed by a survey on pseudospoofing. If
you are interested in participating in the survey please reply in email
to me under your `true name' only. I will post a summary to the list if
there is sufficient data and I'm convinced it isn't strewn with
manufactured lies from phantom identities (please do not waste my
precious time, pollute my mailbox, or disrupt this survey with any).

* * *

First, let's review. From my perspective a person can have cyberspatial
identities in about 5 basic categories. Under these definitions an
`identity' is what appears in the `from' line of a message or other
very obvious identifying characteristics of the message, for example, a
line at the beginning saying `This is [x], I couldn't post under my
regular account but ...', a signature at the end of the message, etc.
Under these definitions I'm leaving out the distinctions of `reply
capability' associated with anonymous servers etc.

1. `True Name' -- for our purposes let this be defined as the name on
your birth certificate, your legal identity.

2. `unique name' or `cyberspatial name' -- this would be a name you
associate with all your activities in cyberspace in postings to mailing
lists, email, etc. That is, I'm making a distinction about people
possibly using the net always under a single pseudonym.

3. `obviously anonymous' -- identifying characteristics in the message
(such as origination from an anonymous server, etc.) make it obvious
that *anyone* could have posted it. Sometimes called `hit and run'.

4. `pseudonymous' -- a variation of (3) where arbitrary identification
is used to build up a reputation under a presumed name, but
characteristics of the message make clear that the identity is an
*alias* for someone's *unique* identities under (1) or (2). The
nicknames associated with the Helsingius server ID's would be an example.

5. `pseudoanonymous' or `pseudospoofed' -- the message could either be
someone's `true name' or an invented alias, but *no* characteristics of
the message (including the message by the author) can discriminate
exactly *which*. This is something like `identity camouflage'. It is a
new category of identification that transcends (1) - (4) because it
encompasses all of them.

* * *

Now, I've written a lot on `anonymity' and am a strong supporter and
proponent of categories (2), (3), and (4), where the *receiver* of a
message is *informed* and *aware* that it can be from *anyone*.

However, I believe extreme restrictions should be placed on the use of
(5) in a civilized cyberspatial society (such as that which mailing
lists and Usenet groups attempt to represent, IMHO). Contrary to all
the flames on the list and in my mail box, I continue to believe that
this is not incompatible with privacy -- in fact, I believe it *promotes* it.

Very serious abuses of (5) can lead to insideous deception and
treachery, particularly in the interplay between public and private
messages, and I'm absolutely aghast to see the capability for (5)
championed as `privacy' here and in my mailbox by many people (or
phantoms, I'm in total confusion) I used to respect. But this is all another essay.

Above all, I'm *extremely* disturbed and alarmed to perceive what
appears to be a systematic propaganda and disinformation campaign on
this list and elsewhere in obfuscating the *obvious* and
*incontrovertable* distinction between (3) and (4) on one hand
(`anonymous' and `pseudonymous') and (5) on the other
(`pseudoanonymous' or `pseudospoofed'), ironically perhaps largely via
abuse of the lack of protective mechanisms against it here.

In (3) and (4), the reciever *knows* that the message can be from
*anyone*. In (5), the receiver does *not* know, and may even be
*misled* into believing that a message is in categories (1) or (2) when
it is in fact in fact `anonymous'. IMHO this is *very* dangerous.

To further emphasize this distinction, in some sense categories (1) -
(2) are *attributable* to *unique* identities. When I see messages in
categories (1) or (2) on a mailing list, in my mailbox, or in Usenet
postings, FTP articles, whatever, I can attribute them to unique people
by definition. We also might call (1) `accountable', and if an online
account under (2) can be traced to a legal identity, it would be also.

Categories (3) and (4) are *not* attributable to unique identities. A
single person could post anonymously multiple times or pseudonymously
under multiple identities. If a person has only one pseudonym, let's
say that's `quasi- or semi- accountable'.

But not only is (5) *not* attributable to *identities*, it is not
`attributable' to any of the previous *categories*! Hence, let's call
messages in the categories (1) - (2) `attributable', (3) - (4)
`nonattributable', (1) - (4) `uncamouflaged', `white', `open' or
`unsurreptitious', and (5) `nonattributable' and `camouflaged',
`black', or `surreptitious'. (I leave it to subsequent debate to
stabilize on the most descriptive and memorable terms.)

This *camouflage* that various cypherpunks promote, apparently up to
the highest levels of `leadership', is IMHO inherently subversive.
Because no one here seems to be afraid of subversion and anarchy, and
even embraces it, let me go further and say it is *destructive* not
only to societies but to *any* social interaction, even interpersonal.
IMHO It is not just a recipe for anarchy, it is a recipe for chaos and
barbarianism, *particularly* when associated with personal mail
(including mailing lists).

This was all a topic of discussion many months ago, and I paid scant
attention at the time because I didn't think it was the interest of the
majority of cypherpunks, part of the agenda, generally feasible, or in
widespread practice. Recent events suggest to me I am *utterly*
mistaken on all counts.

In fact, apparently not only are `some' cypherpunks in favor of `black'
postings, they are in favor of *concealing* the very existence of the
capability, so as to potentially manipulate and brainwash others in an
undetected concerted conspiracy! I think I will define this as `evil blackness'. <g>

Again, lots of specific examples, anecdotes, and horror stories are
another essay. Perhaps some would like to expand on this point (please
email me if you treat this in a comprehensive and thorough manner). For
now, I just want to make the distinctions clear for the survey, which
follows. The survey will help me determine the extent of `blackness'
and `evil blackness'. 

Please try to be as complete as possible in your responses. I will read
and be influenced by independent opinions in my mailbox, but again
request that you use your True Name only in any correspondence with me.

And anyone who flames that this survey is an invasion of privacy, get
lost. Let anyone reply under their own free will. I will keep all
responses strictly confidential. However, I would like to collect some
opinions under true names I can quote later. Please put the key `N/A'
(not for attribution) in front of any response you wish me to leave
unattributed or in front of the entire message like `message N/A'.
Also, I will try to start email conversations with anyone who is
particularly knowledgable.

* * *

1. What is your `true name'?

2. Do you have a unique online identity other than your true name?

3. How long have you been on the internet?

4. How many mailing lists are you on?

5. Are `black' / `camouflaged' identities feasible or possible on the
internet today? If so, how in particular? Comment on public access and
UUCP sites if possible.

6. To what extent do you think `camouflaged' identities exist on the
internet currently? Where are they used? What mailing lists or
newsgroups are particularly dense with `black' postings? Have you ever
received any in email?

7. Have you ever posted under a `camouflaged' identity? if so, where? How often?

8. Are you aware of any potential `abuses' of `black' messages? Has it
turned into a big problem anywhere? Do you have any horror stories? Are
there any `cabals' or `silent conspiracies'? have any debates or
projects been `poisoned' or `sabotaged'?

9. Are you neutral on the capability of `black'/`camouflaged' messages,
or do you strongly promote/support or condemn it? Is it harmless or dangerous?

10. Is society aware of `black messages'? if not, what would `they'
think in general? if so, what is the consensus on the practice?

11. Is it fundamentally technically impossible to prevent *widespread*
black messages if there was an incentive or consensus to do so? Or is
it feasible with technology?

12. What are internet policies in general on `black' messages? What
should they be? Should they be restricted and prevented? allowed? Keep
in mind the distinctions of posts to mailing lists, Usenet posts, and personal mail.

13. Please list any resources on this subject: email addresses of
specialists, pointers to papers, etc.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: jkreznar@ininx.com (John E. Kreznar)
Date: Sun, 24 Oct 93 02:53:12 PDT
To: hughes@ah.com
Subject: Re: ADMIN: proposed new policy on the mailing list
In-Reply-To: <9310232111.AA03150@ah.com>
Message-ID: <9310240951.AA14727@ininx>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I support your signature proposal in either iteration.  Don't be swayed by
armchair cypherpunks whining about how they might be inconvenienced by such a
policy.  And I say these things even though I am myself not yet fully positioned
to sign my messages (though I'm close).

	John E. Kreznar		| Relations among people to be by
	jkreznar@ininx.com	| mutual consent, or not at all.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: catalyst@netcom.com (Scott Collins)
Date: Sun, 24 Oct 93 03:18:35 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: impersonation
Message-ID: <9310241011.AA28640@newton.apple.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

I have recently read many arguments here which can be summarized:
"Cypherpunks technology makes impersonation easy, abuses unpunishable, and
communication untrustable."


This is not true.


There are two major thrusts to the tech discussed on this list.

  a) anonymity, i.e., stripping communication of provable identity;
  b) authentication, i.e., demonstrable proof of identity.

Impersonation based on the technology of the former, can have no more, and
likely much less, credibility than without.  Neither does this technology
afford any additional mechanism by which a user bent on forgery can
illicitly claim another's identity.  The technology of the latter category
(e.g., digital signatures) is, in fact, meant to be a significant obstacle
to this very act.


My identity is my own.  An impersonation of me is an unpermitted use of my
private property: identity and reputation.  It is as reprehensible as any
other theft, and -- at least to me -- is as deep an invasion of my privacy
as rape.  I'm pretty damn pleased that cryptography has provided me a
weapon against it: a weapon advocated by cypherpunks; a weapon wielded
frequently on this list; a weapon we are all armed with, in the bodies of
PGP and PEM.

With the honey, often come the bees, and vice versa.  The same people who
advocate a technology you fear, offer with it a solution far better than
unenforceable prohibition (even if we _had_ been the ones to let the genie
out of the bottle, we couldn't put it back in: dissemination of information
is non-ergodic).  Anonymity software adds no affordances to the already
considerable array of techniques for deceiving people, simply more reliable
'track covering', and conversely, less credibility.  Digital signatures, on
the other hand, provide a simple, tested, workable protection.


Scott Collins         | "Few people realize what tremendous power there
                      |  is in one of these things."     -- Willy Wonka
......................|................................................
BUSINESS.   voice:408.862.0540  fax:974.6094   collins@newton.apple.com
Apple Computer, Inc.   5 Infinite Loop, MS 305-2B   Cupertino, CA 95014
.......................................................................
PERSONAL.   voice/fax:408.257.1746    1024:669687   catalyst@netcom.com
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From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "L. Detweiler" <ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Date: Sun, 24 Oct 93 04:53:12 PDT
To: rjc@gnu.ai.mit.edu
Subject: Re: pseudospoofing survey
In-Reply-To: <9310241008.AA26937@kropotkin.gnu.ai.mit.edu>
Message-ID: <9310241148.AA20398@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


You justify all your arguments in favor of pseudospoofing by pointing
at existing criminal behavior. Interesting point of view, eh?

>  Bogus. You just went off the deep-end. If you're so concerned about this
>capability, why don't you go liberate the net.universe and tell them this
>amazing fact: you can forge identities on the net. Postings, mail, accounts,
>even whole domains.

I just did.

>NEWSFLASH: Great Cypherpunk Conspiracy Revealed! A california based group
>of cryptography fans conspire to cover up pseudoanonymous capabilities so
>they can continue their reign of abuse, exploitation, psychological combat,
>and the sapping of precious bodily fluids from net.novices.

yep. hope you don't mind.

>p.s. all this reminds me of the great mud gender identity debates. Many
>young males were extremely disturbed that the female MUD users they were
>practicing cybersex with were actually other males. As a result, most
>mud users are no longer as gullible. Evolution and natural selection at its
>best.

MUDs are games. Mailing lists, Usenet, and the Internet are not.

>p.p.s you will find that many of us aren't trying to cover pseudoanonymous
>capability up -- It is just that _we don't care_ I certainly don't care, and
>I don't think of myself of "the great protector of the ignorant" as you 
>seem to do either. 

so?

>The facts are, short of demanding digital signatures or
>passwords for posting to this list, there is nothing you can do to prevent
>me from forging "From" lines, I could probably forge Received: lines too
>if I had a well-positioned machine.

you are mistaking the form of the present internet with future cyberspace.

>One feature of my Extropian's list
>software is that it only allows people who are on the list to post to it, and
>a user can turn on a "password" feature that only allows his address to post
>if a password is supplied.

it's a start.

ltr.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: rjc@gnu.ai.mit.edu
Date: Sun, 24 Oct 93 03:13:13 PDT
To: ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu (L. Detweiler)
Subject: Re: pseudospoofing survey
In-Reply-To: <9310240835.AA08908@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Message-ID: <9310241008.AA26937@kropotkin.gnu.ai.mit.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


L. Detweiler writes:
> 5. `pseudoanonymous' or `pseudospoofed' -- the message could either be
> someone's `true name' or an invented alias, but *no* characteristics of
> the message (including the message by the author) can discriminate
> exactly *which*. This is something like `identity camouflage'. It is a
> new category of identification that transcends (1) - (4) because it
> encompasses all of them.

  So don't give credit to any pseudoanonymous messages which aren't signed
by a trusted public key. It's as easy as that.
 
> * * *
> 
> Now, I've written a lot on `anonymity' and am a strong supporter and
> proponent of categories (2), (3), and (4), where the *receiver* of a
> message is *informed* and *aware* that it can be from *anyone*.

  All five categories can be spoofed easily. Even birth certificates.
If the hardest (true names) can be spoofed, what kind of person
would reason that (5) can't be from anyone?
 
> However, I believe extreme restrictions should be placed on the use of
> (5) in a civilized cyberspatial society (such as that which mailing
> lists and Usenet groups attempt to represent, IMHO). Contrary to all

   Who is going to place these restrictions? The FCC?

> Very serious abuses of (5) can lead to insideous deception and
> treachery, particularly in the interplay between public and private

  The same case can be made for free speech. Allowing hate speech
mongers the protection of free speech could lead to negative public
opinion about the first amendment. So what? With every technology there
comes the capability for both abuse and benefit. Live with it, and adapt.
Crypto gives people the ability to post anonymously, it also gives you a
more concrete way to authenticate (digital signatures, zero knowledge
proofs, etc) which are in many ways, better than hand written signature and
photo-id.
   
> Above all, I'm *extremely* disturbed and alarmed to perceive what
> appears to be a systematic propaganda and disinformation campaign on
> this list and elsewhere in obfuscating the *obvious* and
> *incontrovertable* distinction between (3) and (4) on one hand
> (`anonymous' and `pseudonymous') and (5) on the other
> (`pseudoanonymous' or `pseudospoofed'), ironically perhaps largely via
> abuse of the lack of protective mechanisms against it here.

   There is no campaign, you are paranoid.   There is no difference
between 3,4 and 5 except your imagination. In 1-4 I can just as easily
spoof. If someone is aware that 1-4 can be spoofed by anyone and they can't
extend their pea-brain to reason that (5) can also be spoofed then they
deserve the fate they get!

> In (3) and (4), the reciever *knows* that the message can be from
> *anyone*. In (5), the receiver does *not* know, and may even be
> *misled* into believing that a message is in categories (1) or (2) when
> it is in fact in fact `anonymous'. IMHO this is *very* dangerous.

   Caveat emptor. After they are pseudospoofed for the first time, they won't
be so trusting of net.con-men anymore and will demand better proof of
identification.

> This *camouflage* that various cypherpunks promote, apparently up to
> the highest levels of `leadership', is IMHO inherently subversive.
> Because no one here seems to be afraid of subversion and anarchy, and
> even embraces it, let me go further and say it is *destructive* not
> only to societies but to *any* social interaction, even interpersonal.
> IMHO It is not just a recipe for anarchy, it is a recipe for chaos and
> barbarianism, *particularly* when associated with personal mail
> (including mailing lists).

  Perhaps I'm just not that excitable, but I don't see what all the
fireworks are for. This already is the status quo. Mail fraud, con-jobs,
fake-ids, these already exist outside cyberspace. If anything, you should be
more distrusting of net.pseudonyms than the three-card monte dealer. 

> In fact, apparently not only are `some' cypherpunks in favor of `black'
> postings, they are in favor of *concealing* the very existence of the
> capability, so as to potentially manipulate and brainwash others in an
> undetected concerted conspiracy! I think I will define this as `evil blackness'. <g>

  Bogus. You just went off the deep-end. If you're so concerned about this
capability, why don't you go liberate the net.universe and tell them this
amazing fact: you can forge identities on the net. Postings, mail, accounts,
even whole domains.

-Ray

NEWSFLASH: Great Cypherpunk Conspiracy Revealed! A california based group
of cryptography fans conspire to cover up pseudoanonymous capabilities so
they can continue their reign of abuse, exploitation, psychological combat,
and the sapping of precious bodily fluids from net.novices.

p.s. all this reminds me of the great mud gender identity debates. Many
young males were extremely disturbed that the female MUD users they were
practicing cybersex with were actually other males. As a result, most
mud users are no longer as gullible. Evolution and natural selection at its
best.

p.p.s you will find that many of us aren't trying to cover pseudoanonymous
capability up -- It is just that _we don't care_ I certainly don't care, and
I don't think of myself of "the great protector of the ignorant" as you 
seem to do either. The facts are, short of demanding digital signatures or
passwords for posting to this list, there is nothing you can do to prevent
me from forging "From" lines, I could probably forge Received: lines too
if I had a well-positioned machine. One feature of my Extropian's list
software is that it only allows people who are on the list to post to it, and
a user can turn on a "password" feature that only allows his address to post
if a password is supplied.

-- Ray Cromwell        |    Engineering is the implementation of science;    --
-- EE/Math Student     |       politics is the implementation of faith.      --
-- rjc@gnu.ai.mit.edu  |                         - Zetetic Commentaries      --




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: rjc@pseudospoofer.exploit.org (Timothy C. May)
Date: Sun, 24 Oct 93 03:28:35 PDT
To: Cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: pseudoanonymous correction
Message-ID: <9310241026.AA16632@albert.gnu.ai.mit.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


rjc@gnu.ai.mit.edu writes:
> > Very serious abuses of (5) can lead to insideous deception and
> > treachery, particularly in the interplay between public and private
[opps, a paragraph got cut out somehow, oh well]
>   The same case can be made for free speech. Allowing hate speech
> mongers the protection of free speech could lead to negative public

--Tim May


--
..........................................................................
Timothy C. May         | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,
tcmay@netcom.com       | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
408-688-5409           | knowledge, reputations, information markets,
W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA  | black markets, collapse of governments.
Higher Power: 2^756839 | Public Key: PGP and MailSafe available.
Note: I put time and money into writing this posting. I hope you enjoy it.














-- Ray Cromwell        |    Engineering is the implementation of science;    --
-- EE/Math Student     |       politics is the implementation of faith.      --
-- rjc@gnu.ai.mit.edu  |                         - Zetetic Commentaries      --





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: nobody@alumni.cco.caltech.edu
Date: Sun, 24 Oct 93 07:58:35 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: pirate radio
Message-ID: <9310241451.AA12876@alumni.cco.caltech.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

There's an article on this morning's front page of the New York Times (10/24/93) about a guy in Berkeley who runs a pirate station and gives seminars on how to do likewise on the cheap. Better get judgement proof first, though - FCC is trying to fine him $20,000.

Eternal!Optimist@anon.penet.fi   (copyright 1993, Eternal Optimist [Ha Ha Ha])
 0) 0) =:()]-<                                    <na26522@anon.penet.fi>
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From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: edgar@spectrx.saigon.com (Edgar W. Swank)
Date: Mon, 25 Oct 93 11:34:37 PDT
To: Cypherpunks          <cypherpunks@toad.com>
Subject: TEMPEST Info
Message-ID: <uwLXBc10w165w@spectrx.saigon.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

I received several requests for my text file on TEMPEST, which
I offered to send to Victor Borisov.  I have sent a copy directly
to Victor; but rather than try to send copies to all who requested
it, I'm going to post it to the list.  To save bandwidth, I'll
use PGP (compressed) armored form.  So you'll know it's from me,
I'll sign it, but it won't be encrypted.

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.3a      

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QtadRkICHMg=
=nXsK
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

--
edgar@spectrx.saigon.com (Edgar W. Swank)
SPECTROX SYSTEMS +1.408.252.1005  Cupertino, Ca





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: edgar@spectrx.saigon.com (Edgar W. Swank)
Date: Mon, 25 Oct 93 11:44:13 PDT
To: Cypherpunks          <cypherpunks@toad.com>
Subject: TEMPEST File 1/2
Message-ID: <6wLXBc11w165w@spectrx.saigon.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


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--
edgar@spectrx.saigon.com (Edgar W. Swank)
SPECTROX SYSTEMS +1.408.252.1005  Cupertino, Ca





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: edgar@spectrx.saigon.com (Edgar W. Swank)
Date: Mon, 25 Oct 93 11:39:11 PDT
To: Cypherpunks          <cypherpunks@toad.com>
Subject: TEMPEST File 2/2
Message-ID: <2XLXBc12w165w@spectrx.saigon.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


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-----END PGP MESSAGE, PART 02/02-----

--
edgar@spectrx.saigon.com (Edgar W. Swank)
SPECTROX SYSTEMS +1.408.252.1005  Cupertino, Ca





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: rjc@gnu.ai.mit.edu (Ray)
Date: Sun, 24 Oct 93 05:58:34 PDT
To: catalyst@netcom.com (Scott Collins)
Subject: Re: impersonation
In-Reply-To: <9310241011.AA28640@newton.apple.com>
Message-ID: <9310241254.AA12447@churchy.gnu.ai.mit.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Scott Collins () writes:
> 
> This is not true.
[...]
> There are two major thrusts to the tech discussed on this list.
> 
>   a) anonymity, i.e., stripping communication of provable identity;
>   b) authentication, i.e., demonstrable proof of identity.
[...] 
> illicitly claim another's identity.  The technology of the latter category
> (e.g., digital signatures) is, in fact, meant to be a significant obstacle
> to this very act.
[...]
> as rape.  I'm pretty damn pleased that cryptography has provided me a
> weapon against it: a weapon advocated by cypherpunks; a weapon wielded
> frequently on this list; a weapon we are all armed with, in the bodies of
> PGP and PEM.
[...] 
> 'track covering', and conversely, less credibility.  Digital signatures, on
> the other hand, provide a simple, tested, workable protection.

  Thank you. I've been trying to drum this into people for a while, especially
Detweiler. I don't know how much more he can want, but Digital Sigs must
not be acceptable because he rejected my "private password for posting" which
is almost equivalent to a digital signature scheme except that the password
checking is done at the distribution site, not the home site (which is
preferable to some people who don't have great boxes at home)

  With MD5+digital sigs, a real moderated newsgroup could work without the
capability of someone forging control messages. Simply have the news
software reject articles which aren't signed by the moderator. The same
could go for "non-spoofing" secure groups. The technology is already here,
all it takes is a few mods to existing readers. There is no need for
a future draconet or data super-(fcc controlled and censored)-highway.


-- Ray Cromwell        |    Engineering is the implementation of science;    --
-- EE/Math Student     |       politics is the implementation of faith.      --
-- rjc@gnu.ai.mit.edu  |                         - Zetetic Commentaries      --




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Duncan Frissell <frissell@panix.com>
Date: Sun, 24 Oct 93 07:03:34 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Net Regulation
Message-ID: <199310241403.AA06468@panix.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


To: cypherpunks@toad.com
B >Duncan Frissell <frissell@panix.com> wrote:
B >:And don't tell me that we still have to live in the physical world. 
B >:If 90% of the GWP (including *almost all* the money) consists of 
B >:non-physical goods and services on the nets, government control over
B >:the remaining 10% is not statistically significant.
B >
B >All too often, people look at one thing and imagine that the
B >numbers somehow outweigh reality. It ain't like that, folks.
B >Reality is complexly, intimately, and inseparately interconnected.
B >No matter what you do with the bits, physical reality cannot be
B >discounted.

You also can't disount the physical realities confronting the state.  It 
is enormously difficult to control workers who can live anywhere on earth 
and work anywhere else.  The US government may think that it can control 
Americans but it can't control the rest of the world's population most of 
whom live in countries that don't even claim to try and tax income earned 
by their expats.  Everyone on the nets is an expat.

I believe that the percentage of GWP controlled by the world's states 
peaked at some point since WWII and has started a decline.  With the 
growth of informal markets, tax evasion, non-national economic activity 
(offshore), and the privitization of the economies of the SU and China.  
If this trend continues, the relative power of states will decline as 
their control of economic activity declines. 

B >"No matter how subtle the wizard, a knife in the back will always
B >cramp his style."

But who is more vulnerable to the knife.  Millions of "Permanent Tourists" 
living and working in cyberspace or a large nation state incapable of 
moving, hiding, or getting an honest job when markets turn against it.

B >So, please, stop with the simplistic answers!
B >
B >(What *did* happen at Panix, eh? I rest my case.)

Panix was down but my three other connections to the nets were up.  Panix 
had a security intrusion.

Duncan Frissell



--- WinQwk 2.0b#1165
                            




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Robert J. Woodhead" <trebor@foretune.co.jp>
Date: Sat, 23 Oct 93 18:38:29 PDT
To: Alexander Reynolds <chrome@jhunix.hcf.jhu.edu>
Subject: Re: Subliminal Channels
In-Reply-To: <Pine.3.05.9310231521.A9649-b100000@jhunix.hcf.jhu.edu>
Message-ID: <9310240134.AA14181@dink.foretune.co.jp>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Alexander writes:

>Read R. Key's _The Clam-Plate Orgy_ for information on how advertising
>companies (cigarette ana alcohol companies especially) add little
>airbrushed renditions of subliminally pleasing sex scenes, with intent to
>stimulate purchase of the product.  Its been done for almost 50 years now,
>and started with the tachistoscope used in movie theatres to get people to
>consume popcorn and Coca-Cola(tm) in great quantities.  Sales went up by 60%.

Alas, almost every study that has been done on "Subliminal Seduction"
has generated negative results.  The famous Movie theatre experiment, for
example, was totally uncontrolled -- and did Key mention that it was
done during a heatwave, with broken air-conditioning in the theatre?

Moreover, tests of the "embedded sex objects" hypothesis don't pan out.
It turns out that (a) people don't notice them unless they have been
predisposed to (ie:"find the penis in the photo") and (b) whether or
not there is an embed in the photo has no meaningful effect on the
viewer.

Basically, human beings are pattern recognition machines.  We _love_
patterns so much that we tend to see them even when they aren't there
For example, "The line I  am in is always the slowest."  This is because
you don't remember the times you were in a fast line, because it isn't
a big stimulus to you.  So guys like Key, who are looking for patterns,
will find them everywhere.

Deliberate embeds in advertising are almost without exception artists
jokes.  And most perceived embeds are simply random things about the
image that our minds are organizing for us.





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Robert J. Woodhead" <trebor@foretune.co.jp>
Date: Sat, 23 Oct 93 18:48:29 PDT
To: hughes@ah.com (Eric Hughes)
Subject: Re: ADMIN: proposed new policy on the mailing list
In-Reply-To: <9310232111.AA03150@ah.com>
Message-ID: <9310240145.AA14242@dink.foretune.co.jp>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


You write:

>So far I have received six comments on the proposed sign-or-delay
>system, two in public, four in private.  All have been supportive of
>concept, but there have been specific technical issues with it.

I think you are reading those replies through rose-colored glasses.
They were politely telling you "no way."

>The real goal of this plan is to change the software infrastructure so
>that crypto can easily be inserted. 

Please keep in mind that it is impolite to _impose_ your beliefs on
others, and to punish people that don't believe as you do.  That's
what certain governments that people on the list are concerned about
do.  People don't respond well when forced.  All you will do is
alienate them.

I suggest you offer an incentive for signature use rather than a
penalty for non-use.  For example, the "Quarterly Cookie Quota" (QCQ),
a pledge to send a package of cookies (good ones, too) to a signer
picked at random.  This will cost you $100 a year, less than the
time/$ cost of modifying the mail list software.

Bottom line: Use Carrots, not Sticks.  Using sticks is counterproductive,
especially when you try and use them on ornery jerks like the membership
of this list (humble correspondent included in that characterization).





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "W. Kinney" <kinney@ucsu.Colorado.EDU>
Date: Sun, 24 Oct 93 10:33:10 PDT
To: hughes@ah.com
Subject: Re: ADMIN: proposed new policy on the mailing list
Message-ID: <199310241732.AA23689@ucsu.Colorado.EDU>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----



What's the point of resorting to contrived inducements to include signatures? 
If there's a real reason to do it, people will, and if not, they won't.

Perhaps we could just all by-and-large agree to sign posts? I'll start with 
this one...

                                 -- Will




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Version: 2.3

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9WyyI02GEDk=
=xy8S
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Larry Gadallah <larry@owrlakh.wl.aecl.ca>
Date: Sun, 24 Oct 93 15:33:21 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Coffee, anyone?
Message-ID: <9310241931.AA17244@owrlakh.wl.aecl.ca>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> 

> Hello, _real_ people and cypher-crypto-pseudo-spoofs!
> 

> I almost fell out of my chair laughing at the recent post
> revealing the TRUE identities of half the people (I use that
> term guardedly these days) in the mail group. It did me a
> world of good.
> 

> Try this on for a quick reality check- this is how I view the
> issue of  anonymity, trust, reputation, validity, etc. in the
> Cypherpunk forum:   I see the list as a coffee house, buried in
> the bowels of a machine at Berkeley. People wander in and out,
> some to chat, others to listen. There is no implied social
> contract in place among the participants, really, just some
> common interests. For the price of a cup of coffee (my time
> and my connection to Internet), I can enjoy stimulating
> conversation and shoot the breeze. When people present their
> ideas, I take their  identities at face value (asking for ID's
> before making small talk seems a bit gauche). Every now and
> then, a message in a bottle comes sailing through the (open)
> door- the waiter pulls the message out and reads an anonymous
> posting. Those so motivated can put replies in the bottle and
> sling it back outside, where the anonymous poster picks it
> up. Truly obnoxious messages can be answered by Molotov
> cocktails in the same manner <grin>.
> 

> My point is this: we're in a coffee house, not a courtroom.
> If I meet someone in a coffee house and want to do serious
> business like buying a car, co-publishing a paper, or betting
> my career on a set of equations, I (we) would adjourn to a
> somewhat more formal setting and follow entirely different
> rules for establishing trust and reputation. In the same vein,
> I might listen to a chorus of voices spouting political
> agendas while sipping my coffee, but I wouldn't expect the
> applause and the catcalls to be tabulated and published as
> election results. I agree entirely with Detweiler about the
> importance of being able to validate people electronically,
> but I think it would be a shame to close the door to the
> coffee house, take attendance, and charge admission.
> ..............................................................
> .......... Philippe D. Nave, Jr.   | The person who does not
> use message encryption pdn@dwroll.dw.att.com   | will soon be
> at the mercy of those who DO... Denver, Colorado USA    | PGP
> public key: by arrangement.
> 



Hear! hear!

I really _like_ my coffee, and I'd hate to see all the interesting  
people and discussions frightened off by excessive officiousness in 

the coffee shop.

---
---------------------------------------------------------------------
Larry Gadallah                                   Amateur Radio VE4TCP
Lac Du Bonnet, Manitoba, Canada                    IP: [44.135.114.9]
SMTP: larry@owrlakh.wl.aecl.ca     AX25: VE4TCP@VE4PIN.#PIN.MB.CAN.NA
---------------------------------------------------------------------





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Eli Brandt <ebrandt@jarthur.Claremont.EDU>
Date: Sun, 24 Oct 93 15:13:26 PDT
To: cypherpunks list <cypherpunks@toad.com>
Subject: Re: ADMIN: proposed new policy on the mailing list
In-Reply-To: <9310242036.AA05082@anon.penet.fi>
Message-ID: <9310242209.AA08710@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> Here's one: How do you verify a signature for an anonymous,
> first time poster?

You don't try -- what would it mean?  You accept the provided public
key, and use it to check the continuity of the pseudonym.

> How do we prevent people from registering a key in
> someone else's name??? It's beyond me.

The list, to check signatures, has to have a trusted key from
each nym.  But there are different sorts of trust.  One might
certify that a given key belongs to a known real-world meat
machine.  Or one might certify only that it corresponds to the
legitimate user of a given net address.  In theory, one could
even certify that the key holder was not forced to hand a copy
over the the NSA, or make whatever other guarantees one chooses.
I think the trusting of keys should be left to individuals, who
may have different ideas of what it means for them to accept
a given signature.

In PGP's "web of trust" model, is there a general consensus on what
it means to sign someone's key?

> Wonderer

   Eli   ebrandt@jarthur.claremont.edu




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Eli Brandt <ebrandt@jarthur.Claremont.EDU>
Date: Sun, 24 Oct 93 15:23:16 PDT
To: cypherpunks list <cypherpunks@toad.com>
Subject: Re: the principle of least astonishment
In-Reply-To: <CFEx7J.AxE@twwells.com>
Message-ID: <9310242219.AA08866@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> From: bill@twwells.com (T. William Wells)
> For my service, given what it is for, the presumption should be
> anonymity. For the personals groups, perhaps the presumption
> should be the other way around. There is, almost certainly, no
> one right answer.

What are your thoughts on solutions which do not do either of these
alternatives?  For example, several people have discussed systems
involving two sets of addresses.  These avoid both problems
(unexpectedly failing to anonymize / unexpectedly anonymizing a
message with a sig), at the cost of some complexity.

> Either the perpetrators are so intellectually lacking that they
> do not see what they are doing or they are so intellectually
> dishonest that they do. In either case, I am utterly disgusted.

Aren't you detweiling a bit here?  I don't think the situation really
warrants "utter disgust"...

   Eli   ebrandt@jarthur.claremont.edu




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: swc@uc1.ucsu.edu (Stuart W. Card)
Date: Sun, 24 Oct 93 12:23:10 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: bye for now...
Message-ID: <9310241923.AA00527@uc1.ucsu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



The last couple of weeks have been interesting and fun
(and have provided me with useful information upoin
which I will act shortly), but I can't keep up with the
volume.  Thanks, and see you later (when I have more time).
I will remain on the -announce list and will still be
available via direct e-mail.  bye for now...
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Stuart W. Card, Consultant, Card & Associates -- Research & Development
Box 153 RR 1 Newport Rd Utica NY 13502         315-735-1717 / FAX -8469
swc@uc1.ucsu.edu or cards@top.cis.syr.edu           "Who is John Galt?"




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Robert J. Woodhead" <trebor@foretune.co.jp>
Date: Sat, 23 Oct 93 23:33:08 PDT
To: Alexander Reynolds <chrome@jhunix.hcf.jhu.edu>
Subject: Re: Subliminal Channels
In-Reply-To: <Pine.3.05.9310232101.A28131-c100000@jhunix.hcf.jhu.edu>
Message-ID: <9310240630.AA15265@dink.foretune.co.jp>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



This will be my final note on this subject, as it is inappropriate
for the list.

Alex writes in support of subliminal seduction:

Alex, there have been numerous studies on the subject, which I
summarized in my previous email (and you ignored).  Go look it
up for yourself if you don't believe me.

My degree is in psych, perceptual psych.  I know whereof I speak.
Subliminal seduction does not have a statistically significant
effect.  If you are predisposed to see penises and breasts, you
see them.  There are ice-cubes in booze ads because (surprise!)
you put ice-cubes in booze!

Artists jokes appear in work all the time.  Apple's Newton has
several of them.  Most of the anime films I subtitle have them
in them.  It is human nature, and part of the creative process,
which is why it is tolerated.

"SS" is a powerful myth, but tons of studies have shown that it
has the same validity as "Gerbilling."  I'm not saying it hasn't
been tried, it most surely has.  What I am saying is that most
people in the Ad industry know it's bullshit.

A much more powerful effect, if you're going to airbrush, would
be to correct images so they present the right cues to the
reader.  An example would be making sure that that smiling
girl is presenting Duchenne's marker (a subtle difference
typified by involuntary contraction of the pars lateralis eye
muscle that signifies a true happy smile, as opposed to a fake
or a social smile).  See SCIENCE, Vol 262, Pg 336 for a fascinating
report on this -- learning how to contract this muscle and smile
true happy smiles can actually make you feel happy!





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: XXCLARK@indst.indstate.edu
Date: Sun, 24 Oct 93 13:38:36 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: pgp inforequest
Message-ID: <9310242035.AA07381@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain




      The PGP23a DOC_2 file says:

     "Info-pgp is moderated by Hugh Miller, and you may subscribe to it
      by writing him a letter at info-pgp-request@lucpul.it.luc.edu.
      Include your name and Internet address. If you want to know where
      to get PGP, Hugh can send you a list of Internet FTP sites and BBS
      phone numbers.  Hugh may also be reached at hmiller@lucpul.it.luc.edu."

      As I presently have no newsgroup access, I attempted to mail to the
      request add above and the message bounced.

      Can anyone tell me if this address is still valid... or correct?




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: msattler@netcom.com (Michael Sattler)
Date: Sun, 24 Oct 93 17:03:24 PDT
To: Alexander Reynolds <rjc@gnu.ai.mit.edu>
Subject: Re: Subliminal Channels
Message-ID: <9310242358.AA18280@netcom.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I can barely believe *I* am saying this, given my penchant for nibbling on
topics only somewhat near crypt, but IMHO it's time for y'all to take this
elsewhere.

Since it seems to have degenerated into a "is not, is too" exchange between
chrome@jhunix.hcf.jhu.edu and rjc@gnu.ai.mit.edu, I suggest you two
continue via email.

And *no* using subliminal ascii....


-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
Michael S. Sattler         msattler@netcom.com        +1 (415) 621-2903
Digital Jungle Software    Encrypt now; ask me how.   (finger for PGP key)

               All that is required for evil to triumph is
                for {wo}men of good will to do nothing.






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: bill@twwells.com (T. William Wells)
Date: Sun, 24 Oct 93 11:58:42 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: the principle of least astonishment
Message-ID: <CFEx7J.AxE@twwells.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


For my service, given what it is for, the presumption should be
anonymity. For the personals groups, perhaps the presumption
should be the other way around. There is, almost certainly, no
one right answer.

Those who attempt to support their arguments by reference to
"least astonishment" are doing nothing more than attempting to
pretend that their subjective judgements are universal and
unarguable.

Either the perpetrators are so intellectually lacking that they
do not see what they are doing or they are so intellectually
dishonest that they do. In either case, I am utterly disgusted.





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: jamie@netcom.com (Jamie Dinkelacker)
Date: Sun, 24 Oct 93 18:08:45 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Content vanquishes PSEUDOSPOOFING
Message-ID: <9310250105.AA24314@netcom.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Members of the True Cause and Final Movement:

Someplace in all this 'pseudospoofing' bandwidth, maybe once in a while,
it's worth looking at the _content_ of a message. 

Some mail I read, some I don't; but when I do, I attend to the content. If
it's interesting, or new, or informative, or funny, or sometimes pathetic,
I pay attention. I don't care who/what wrote it. I'll make my own decisions
whether it's news or entertainment, science or fiction. To quote Whitehead,
"Ideas have consequences." (So does behavior.)
--
................................
Jamie Dinkelacker   Palo Alto CA 
Jamie@netcom.com    415.941.4782    





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Anonymous <nowhere@bsu-cs.bsu.edu>
Date: Sun, 24 Oct 93 16:18:46 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Interesting reading
Message-ID: <9310242316.AA16018@bsu-cs.bsu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



From: ld231782@LANCE.ColoState.Edu (L. Detweiler)
Subject: on the CYPHERPUNKS, PSEUDOSPOOFING, and POISON
Sender: news@yuma.ACNS.ColoState.EDU (News Account)
Message-ID: <Oct24.113641.53933@yuma.ACNS.ColoState.EDU>
Date: Sun, 24 Oct 1993 11:36:41 GMT
Nntp-Posting-Host: jenkins.lance.colostate.edu
Organization: Colorado State University, Fort Collins, CO  80523
Lines: 999


Recent extremely unpleasant personal experiences in cyberspace have given 
me, at the same time, deep scars and deep epiphanies. Following are some 
messages from the Cypherpunks mailing list generally on the subject of
`pseudospoofing' -- the possibility that some people are posting or 
emailing under *different* `identities' from multiple sites, specifically
with the intention of camouflage and deception.

I have watched the development of anonymity on the internet with a high
degree of personal interest, advocacy, and commitment. But this recent
realization of the potentials and extent of `pseudospoofing' has deeply 
disturbed me. The most shocking realization is not just that it is 
technically feasible but is possibly *widespread* in certain quarters of the 
Internet. It alarms me that some are championing pseudospoofing (and
what I have been calling `black' posts and email) as `liberating' and 
`refreshing' under the guise of `privacy' or `true/pure anonymity'.

> I suspect the
> result will be a more honest dialog, a more productive conversation
> freed from posturing and, ironically, from the concealment of threatening 
> truth.  I hope we will observe the resulting new forms of good and evil
> with Zen patience and allow this quite interesting experiment to 
> continue.

> It's interesting to see the different mental models that people hold
> of the net.  To me, this equation that one truename means one persona
> is not realistic or reasonable.  People spawn personas (-ae?) for
> many reasons, including psychological exploration, sociological
> experiments, sexual thrills, or just for practice at maintaining
> personas.  I know of several instances in which one person patted
> himself on the back circularly, or took half a dozen sides in a
> discussion -- and can surmise about others.  This sort of thing may
> well happen routinely, [...]

> [...] the privacy technology `we' espouse can only promote
> this.  There is no way to maintain this one-to-one equation when
> working with pseudonyms, when the human "dongle on the keyboard" is no
> longer a viable identifier.  I think the Usenet motto, "Live with it",
> applies.

> Perhaps "support" is better measured by how many people are motivated
> enough to go to the effort to make multiple but individually unique,
> reputable posts in favor of a proposition, rather than by 
> simple numerical polls that abstract away knowledge and
> motivation, or by how many True Names position themselves 
> with I'm-on-your-side posts. 

The idea of `spawning identities' for `psychological exploration, 
sociological experiments or sexual thrills' repulses me. It sounds to 
me like advocation of perversions and multiple personality disorders.
And much to my shock, horror and disgust it appears to be a major 
component of the Cypherpunk philosophy. (I even wonder if the 
mainstream media has been misled about the true cypherpunk agenda, 
and so far have not been comforted by anyone `real'.) And the idea
that `support' for projects be measured by `how many people are motivated 
enough to go to the effort to make multiple but individually unique, 
reputable posts in favor of a proposition' is absolutely bizarre.

I have been publicly and privately assaulted and ridiculed so thoroughly, 
searingly, and viciously in both public and private flames by so many 
apologists and moral relativists on this subject that it has encouraged 
a certain degree of personal paranoia. In fact, I cannot count a single 
strong supporter so far. The whole black affair has opened my eyes to the 
extraordinary potential for grotesque evils such as manipulation, 
treachery, conspiracies, and brainwashing possible by combining the 
openess of electronic forums and `pseudospoofing', particularly in 
private email.

I think that anyone who subscribes to this public internet mailing 
list should be warned that it may be a bizarre `experiment' in 
pseudospoofing and brainwashing on unsuspecting or unwilling 
participants. I certainly would never have subscribed if `I knew then 
what I knew now'. Its deeply upsetting that I may have been trying 
to cultivate friendships with nothing but phantoms, parasites, and
betrayers on the list and in my personal mail or that this has 
polluted my other online activities.  The bizarre perversions 
found in my personal mail far surpass everything I have posted 
here, and have quite traumatized me -- something like virginity 
violated by a rapist.

The evasive, blase, flippant, and cavalier attitude by top 
`leadership' in the group on the subject horrifies me. (One eminent
contributor to the list even suggested to me in email that a
secret `elite' list existed or was in the works, presumably free
of this reprehensible toxic waste.) Many respondents have taken
the position that prohibitions against `pseudospoofing' are
equivalent to invasion of privacy and government oppression. One
very prominent poster suggested, as an insult, that `state run 
registries of legal persons' were reminiscent of `key escrow' 
systems like Clipper! I find this quite ironic, given that such
a system already exists, called `birth certificates'!

Even more upsetting to me the possibility that this practice of
pseudospoofing may be infecting and corrupting mail lists devoted 
to serious project development of Internet technologies. I fear 
the openess and freedom of these forums is being subtly and 
insideously poisoned by increasing pseudospoofing -- perhaps a 
systematic and concerted campaign. It seems to me that resolution
of the issues of identification and authentication are absolutely
crucial for future internet development, and that some minor 
sacrifices in current `freedoms' will be the profound investments
required for a harmonious future atmosphere.

I will have more to say in various forums on the subject in the
future. This is an introduction and background. I hope that 
eminent Usenet contributors will address the multitudes of issues this
raises.  I have spent valuable reputation capital in pursuing this
matter, and have made many new enemies over the past few weeks, and
am sure I will be branded as the new premier cyberlunatic by many, 
but if I am branded a `paranoid ranter' by terrorists and criminals 
it will only upset me if they're not in jail.  I believe this issue 
of identification has paramount importance to everyone currently
involved in `cyberspace' and its future development, perhaps even 
the #1 issue that must be resolved for basic progress -- how much
authentication and identification is to be required?


Note1: see talk.politics.crypto for a `user survey' on the subject 
       and possible future postings.

Note2: these postings have been edited slightly.


===cut=here===

To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: on anonymity, identity, reputation, and spoofing
Date: Mon, 18 Oct 93 00:05:56 -0600
From: "L. Detweiler" <ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu>

H.  Finney <hfinney@shell.portal.com>
>After going to enormous efforts to create a network of anonymous remailers,
>we are hoist by our own petard, as our list receives strange, irrelevant,
>and argumentative posts through our own anonymous remailers.  (Not all
>anonymous posts are like this, but there have been quite a few in the last
>few weeks which fall into these categories.)

I've been thinking about this a lot lately. I think a large part of the
problem as you indicate is associated with reputation. How does one
build up a reputation and identity in cyberspace in general? Part of
the problem IMHO is that this list software & the internet in general
is extremely vulnerable to a lot of different kinds of spoofing.

People are very sensitive to the perception of a `consensus' -- they
are deeply influenced by what they perceive to be the `majority
opinion'. What if that `opinion' was not an accurate representation of
reality? what if a few people were creating the illusion that some
different kind of consensus existed? what if that `agenda' were
actually something inherently wicked like lawlessness or anarchy? what
if a conspiracy created the impression that some project or progress
was underway when it really wasn't? or that some person was loudly
favored or condemned by the `group'? this could be especially
problematic if any kind of intimidation were happening `behind the
scenes' in email. who would ever know? unless the dissatisfaction
reached the list, how would we find out? another problem is that, at
the same time being strongly influenced by a lot of flames, people just
delete them out of sheer distaste and they may not be around later for inspection.

what really is our assurance that all these email addresses actually
exist and represent *unique* people? there really is very little currently. 

I think newsgroups are far less vulnerable to this kind of spoofing,
but unfortunately mailing lists are *extremely* vulnerable. (Keep in
mind, there are a whole set of other benefits and detriments in *other*
categories which I'm not talking about here.) In the former we have
thousands of subscribers all checking on each other's honesty. If a
suspicious address or opinion pops up, there is some probability
someone will notice, and cases of spoofing would probably be noise
drowned out in the representative opinion. Also, distribution is
centralized, so that `message blocking' is not very feasible.

In the latter case, i.e. mailing lists such as this one, there is a
much closer knit community that is geographically isolated. Individuals
on the list are far more susceptible to spoofing. People are more
likely to see *every* message including the `spoofed' ones. There are
far fewer people to `check up' and those that are there may not have
the technical expertise. What's worse, the list is not `distributed' in
a certain sense. If someone wants to get out the message that
`something wrong is going on' it could be censored because of the
centralization of the distribution. This wouldn't work with Usenet
because the distribution of the messages (e.g. NNTP servers) is
generally cleaved from the people with strong self-interests in the
traffic (e.g. people who post to group [x]).

This cyberspace stuff can be a *very* powerful influence on many. It is
an electronic community, and peer pressure is *extremely* powerful.
Many people do not have an extremely strong internal `moral compass'
and could be influenced by this kind of corrupt magnetism associated
with a `conspiracy of spoofing'. Note that reputations are crucial in
not only persuading us to listen attentively to those we respect, but
to `tune out' the lunatics and criminals.

* * *
Spoofing

Regarding the what also gets my vote as `strangest posting of the year'
by `S. Boxx',  Philippe D. Nave, Jr. <pdn@dwroll.dw.att.com> (based on
my email, a loyal cypherpunk and fellow Denverite!) wrote:

>[...] it seems that the point of the message is that there is a lot
>of smoke coming from people who use aliases or anonymous remailer
>services to post to the cypherpunks list. Does this posting contribute
>to that problem, or have I missed something?
[...]
>What the hell ?!? I've either missed something significant (and would
>appreciate enlightenment) or this is a candidate for 'strangest post
>of the year'. If 'S. Boxx' really exists and is the author of this
>posting, I apologize- if not, then come out from behind your damn
>remailer and quit contributing to the problem. As for monitoring the
>list for traitors, go ahead- I post under my own name, and I don't
>give a shit what you do with the text. If I was concerned about lurkers
>building 'traitor files', I'd encrypt my messages and happily watch you
>choke on them.

I think I speak for many here in saying that I weigh anonymous postings
very little, but don't consider the capability a serious problem. They
have very significant purposes in e.g. `whistleblowing' `within the
system' that I've always been attracted to.

On the other hand, I think there is an implicit assumption by virtually
everyone here that addresses on public posts and private email that are
not specifically anonymous represent *unique* people. That is, if some
people were taking advantage of the loose, free, and open atmosphere
here to influence opinion or perception of reputations by posting
messages under different presumably `real' identities (defined as
anything that is not obviously tagged as anonymous), I and probably
everyone else would feel very `upset' in the least and `violated' at
the most. It would seem like a very serious breach of community trust,
and might even have the effect of derailing positive contributions to
the `cypherpunk cause' (whether algorithmic or political, the two chief
schools of thought). I recall discussions of this related to the
Extropians list, which specifically bars this practice.

* * *
List suggestions

The fact that this `uniqueness of real identities' has always been
something of an implicit assumption here bothers me. I think anything
this delicate and important should be made formal and explicit. We
should not simply assume that `everone is honest and no one would be
depraved enough to do this.' I think the following guidelines are very
reasonable, and might be part of a list charter agreed to by new members:

1) list members are allowed *one* anonymous identity if any. They are
required to associate some name with all anonymous posts via that identity.
2) *no one* is allowed multiple `real' identities and in fact any
violation of this is considered an extremely serious breach of netiquette & honesty.
3) completely anonymous posts from `outside' the list are allowed; if
no pseudoidentity is given they are assumed to come from `outside'.

and if anyone has been posting under multiple `real' identies, I think
they owe it to everyone here to `come clean'. I don't see why anyone
would go to the trouble but if someone was just unstable or obsessive
enough to equate reputation with posting traffic, s/he might go off the
deep end. The practice amounts to `spoofing' and any patriotic
cypherpunk with some integrity ought to recognize that immediately and
condemn it, technical capabilities regardless. I would equate this
practice with `lying to one's colleagues'. spoofing is probably the #1
crime against cypherpunk ideology.

* * *
Reputations

As for reputations, what can we do about this? I think that there are a
lot of solutions to be experimented with in software. One of the best
is just to have archives that are searchable by ID. But archives are
very disk-consuming. I have some various other ideas that wouldn't
require much beyond the current database maintenance of email
addresses. Suppose that along with everyone's name, the following
statistics were presented:

1) how long they have been on the list in days, 0 if none at all
2) how many postings they have posted here
3) maybe a posting/age ratio -- some people seem to be very sensitive
or tune out people with a high one.
4) another idea: tracking the number of responses a given poster has,
average, per original post, measured by `re: [x]' subject tracking.

now, look what we get with all these. They are all simple to implement.
They all can tremendously help us weigh the various opinions that are
out there. They can set up a positive feedback system whereby `good'
posters potentially really are quantitatively identified.  Regarding
(4), one way to `punish' a poster for irrelevant postings is to simply
not respond, and they will not get any `credit' in this statistic. The
problem with this is that from my experience, sometimes my most
authoritative and finely-crafted postings generate the least response.
But note the point of all these things: they don't necessarily require
any digital signatures to implement. Authentication of postings
`allowed' to the group really seems like a separate problem to me.

Another simple idea is to have a voting system in response to postings.
People's `credit' associated with their postings could be listed in
headers too. This of course is far more ambitious, and the generally
complex problem of authentication rears its ugly head.

In addition to all this, I would like to see protocols that guarantee
honesty on the part of the list maintainer. When databases like this
are maintained, a little unilateral tweaking here and there can be
extremely deleterious to community integrity, honesty, and reputations.



Date: Sun, 17 Oct 93 23:58:08 -0700
From: hughes@ah.com (Eric Hughes)
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: on anonymity, identity, reputation, and spoofing

[...]

That which can never be enforced should not be prohibited.

The claim that a person should have only one pseudonym per forum
indicates profound misunderstanding.  If someone wants to have
multiple cryptographically protected pseudonyms, they will be able to;
that is one of the main goals of cypherpunks software.

The situations you despise will occur.  This is reality.  Change your
own psychology or change your own software.  You will not be able to
change the other person.

Eric


From: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Subject: Uniqueness and "is-a-person" credentials
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Date: Mon, 18 Oct 93 10:17:35 PDT

[...]

I don't like the idea of state-run registries of "legal persons."
Better to live with the occasional vagaries of digital pseuodonyms
than to ban them.

(And multiple identies can have many uses, some good, some not.
Welcome to the future.)

Since it may touch on our "cypherpunks agenda," I plan to read up on
some of these proposals for "is-a-person" credentialling and see how
they might relate to schemes for centralized key registration or escrow.

Any suggestion besides the "Crypto" proceedings?

--Tim May

-- 
..........................................................................
Timothy C. May         | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,  
tcmay@netcom.com       | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
408-688-5409           | knowledge, reputations, information markets, 
W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA  | black markets, collapse of governments.
Higher Power: 2^756839 | Public Key: PGP and MailSafe available.
Note: I put time and money into writing this posting. I hope you enjoy it.




Subject: Re: on anonymity, identity, reputation, and spoofing
To: cypherpunks list <cypherpunks@toad.com>
Date: Mon, 18 Oct 93 3:44:35 PDT
From: Eli Brandt <ebrandt@jarthur.Claremont.EDU>

> From: "L. Detweiler" <ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
> On the other hand, I think there is an implicit assumption by virtually
> everyone here that addresses on public posts and private email that are
> not specifically anonymous represent *unique* people.
[...]
> 1) list members are allowed *one* anonymous identity if any. They are
> required to associate some name with all anonymous posts via that identity.
> 2) *no one* is allowed multiple `real' identities and in fact any
> violation of this is considered an extremely serious breach of netiquette & honesty.
[...]
> deep end. The practice amounts to `spoofing' and any patriotic
> cypherpunk with some integrity ought to recognize that immediately and
[...]
> crime against cypherpunk ideology.
[...]

It's interesting to see the different mental models that people hold
of the net.  To me, this equation that one truename means one persona
is not realistic or reasonable.  People spawn personas (-ae?) for
many reasons, including psychological exploration, sociological
experiments, sexual thrills, or just for practice at maintaining
personas.  I know of several instances in which one person patted
himself on the back circularly, or took half a dozen sides in a
discussion -- and can surmise about others.  This sort of thing may
well happen routinely, particularly in the low-rent areas of Altnet,
where participation is a kind of game.

What's more, the privacy technology `we' espouse can only promote
this.  There is no way to maintain this one-to-one equation when
working with pseudonyms, when the human "dongle on the keyboard" is no
longer a viable identifier.  I think the Usenet motto, "Live with it",
applies.

   Eli   ebrandt@jarthur.claremont.edu



From: szabo@netcom.com (Nick Szabo)
Subject: Re: on anonymity, identity, reputation, and spoofing
To: jamie@netcom.com (Jamie Dinkelacker)
Date: Mon, 18 Oct 93 3:29:08 PDT
Cc: cypherpunks@toad.com


[...]

In my limited experience creating Internet pseudonyms, I've been quite 
distracted by the continual need to avoid leaving pointers to my
True Name lying around -- excess mail to/from my True Name, shared 
files, common peculiarities (eg misspellings in written text), traceable 
logins, etc.   The penet.fi site explicitly maintains a list of pointers 
to the original address.  All kinds of security controls -- crypto, access, 
information, inference -- have to be continually on my mind when using 
pseudonymous accounts.  The hazards are everywhere.  With our current 
tools it's practically impossible to maintain an active pseudonym for a 
long period of time against a sufficiently determined opponent, and
quite a hassle to maintain even a modicum of decent security.  Pointers
to info and/or tools to enable the establishment and maintenance of a 
net.nym, beyond the standard cypherpunks PGP/remailer fare with which 
I'm now familiar, greatly appreciated.  Especially nice would be a list 
of commercial net providers that allow pseudonymous accounts.

[...]

I hope that we stick to experimenting with pure anonymity
in many venues.  I suggest we'll find out that purely anonymous
posts are not so bad, overall.  Some of the recent stuff has been weird
or rude, but so have been a lot of True Name flames that have passed 
thru this list.  We find True Name posts easier to deal with
because it's what we're used to.  Many are comforted by the thought
that as a last resort, if a flame is just too evil, the poster
can be tracked down and made to pay for his sins.   The WELL
was so threatened by the thought of anonymity that they required
all pseudonyms to be traceable to the True Name, as an explicit
policy right from the start of the system.  Pure anonymity in all 
its manifestations is a strange, threatening, fascinating beast
in our panoptic social-welfare world.  Even those of us at
the forefront of harnessing this monster shrink back in fear
when it whinnies.

[...]

Pure anonymity provide voice for a wide variety of new kinds
of expression that up until now have been suppressed.
Some kinds are good (whistleblowing), some bad
(slander).  Most are good or bad depending on the 
situation (asking embarrassing newbie questions, expressing politically 
incorrect opinions, discussing illegal activities, etc.)  I hope we 
continue experimenting with pure anonymity for a while longer, as well 
as experimenting with reputation-based pseudonymous systems.  Some of 
what comes out might look very strange, something like tapping into 
previously concealed areas of our social psyche.  I suspect the
result will be a more honest dialog, a more productive conversation
freed from posturing and, ironically, from the concealment of threatening 
truth.  I hope we will observe the resulting new forms of good and evil
with Zen patience and allow this quite interesting experiment to 
continue.

Nick Szabo				szabo@netcom.com



To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: PSEUDOSPOOFING
Date: Mon, 18 Oct 93 03:41:03 -0600
From: "L. Detweiler" <ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu>

I'm absolutely *horrified* and *nauseated* that eminent cypherpunk
leader `ZZZ' has come out in total support of what I have been
calling `spoofing' or using pseudo-real addresses to post to the list. 

(It isn't `really' spoofing in the exact sense because as I noted there
has only been an *implicit assumption* by all of us here that opinions
from unique addresses were themselves unique. so, lets call it)

PSEUDOSPOOFING

the activity of misleading people into thinking that an identity is
unique when it really isn't! i.e. posting behind `real' addresses not
specifically noted as anonymous!

I consider pseudospoofing a *detestable* and *reprehensible* activity
if it exists. Am I the only one who finds this absolutely *repulsive*
and *abhorrent*? How long has this been going on? who has been doing
it? am I the first to suspect it is happening? how many debates have
been affected? how many people have been *harassed* or *intimidated* or
*burned* to a *crisp* by pseudospoofers? is this going on in *private
email* too? how many debates have been skewed? how many people here
DON'T EXIST? Are the other founders T.C.May and J.Gilmore in favor of
this too? how much have you guys been doing this? is this really part
of the cypherpunk agenda? who here supports this, anyway? does this
have anything to do with the bizarre conspiracy theories posts of
`S.Boxx'?! is this why `everyone' is opposed to a newsgroup or other
change in the `status quo'?! Is this why *I* get *flamed* so much? is
this polluting other mailing lists?!

E.H.
>The claim that a person should have only one pseudonym per forum
>indicates profound misunderstanding.  If someone wants to have
>multiple cryptographically protected pseudonyms, they will be able to;
>that is one of the main goals of cypherpunks software.

IMHO, this itself represents a `profound misunderstanding' under what
actually constitutes an OPEN FORUM. If we are merely conducting some
depraved experiment on the psychology of pseudonymity and
pseudospoofing on unwilling participants, please say so! I for one
never saw *that* announcement when I signed up! calling
`pseudospoofing' `one of the `main goals' of cypherpunks software'
sounds *criminal* to me. Or maybe I'm missing the point! I guess this
is what anarchy really *is* all about!

* * *

speaking of OPEN FORUMS, `Jamie Dinkelacker' <Jamie@netcom.com> objects
to my other proposals for reputation tracking statistics:

>>
>>1) how long they have been on the list in days, 0 if none at all
>>2) how many postings they have posted here
>>3) maybe a posting/age ratio -- some people seem to be very sensitive
>>or tune out people with a high one.
>>4) another idea: tracking the number of responses a given poster has,
>>average, per original post, measured by `re: [x]' subject tracking.
>>
>
>Each of these suggestions call for data that may contribute to identifying
>individuals, tracking their behavior or providing information useful to
>decypher some messages. This has a very NSA feel to it. 

A very ``NSA FEEL''?! all of these statistics could be generated by
*anyone* who subscribes to the list! is this an OPEN FORUM or not?! How
could *anyone* object to anything so innocuous? 

A *true* forum would be *representative*. For example, I already have
the impression that no one here supports my suggestions whatsoever on
list modifications & protocol  from E.H.'s comments and
jamie@netcom.com. Now, humor me, and take the hypothetical situation
that these are the same person! how can this be a `forum' if an opinion
is not *representative*? what if a single person just `ganged up' on
someone they didn't like by overwhelming them with pseudospoofs? what
if there was *truly* support for some project but a pseudospoofer
ganged up on the proponents and clobbered them with flames? does this
sound anything like what has happened on this list in the past? doesn't
it throw every `conversation' on this list into spectacularly
*grotesque* doubt? wouldn't that be a lot like intimidation at best and
*extortion* at worst? would it look like a `clique'? what if this was
happening *routinely*? what if people were being *influenced* by what
they perceived was the *majority opinion* or the *views of their peers*
that were really nothing but DECEPTION AND LIES? what if it was
*thwarting progress*? I would consider this nothing but TREACHERY and
HIGH TREASON. is all this  really one of the `main goals' of the
cypherpunk agenda? if so, SIGN ME OFF.

Regardless of whether anyone believes in democracy (a `lot' of people
here said they didn't a while ago, but now I have my doubts!) the idea
of `one man one vote' is SACRED. it means in essence, one man shall not
have UNFAIR INFLUENCE. anything less is just the `Golden Rule: He who
Has the Most Gold Makes the Rules'. or, `you can be here as long as I
always have more *power* than you do and you don't complain!' it is
*anti egalitarian*. it is a recipe for anarchy, dischord and chaos. Or
perhaps I'm MISSING THE POINT?! maybe that's what somebody *wants*. is
*this* what the Cypherpunks really stand for? UNFAIR INFLUENCE. ABUSE
OF POWER. MANIPULATION. DECEIT. TREACHERY. EXPLOITATION. SECRET CONSPIRACIES.



Date: 18 Oct 93 14:18:10 EDT
From: Sandy <72114.1712@CompuServe.COM>
To: <cypherpunks@toad.com>
Subject: DETWEILER

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
  SANDY SANDFORT               Reply to:  ssandfort@attmail.com
 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Punksters,

Lance Detweiler finished his most recent rant thusly:

    . . . is *this* what the Cypherpunks really stand for?
    UNFAIR INFLUENCE. ABUSE OF POWER. MANIPULATION. DECEIT.
    TREACHERY. EXPLOITATION. SECRET CONSPIRACIES.

Lance, stop frothing at the mouth and get a life.

 S a n d y  (aka Tim May, Eric Hughes, Nick Szabo, Perry Metzger,
            Duncan Frissell, Mao Tse-tung, George Herbert Walker
            Bush and a cast of thousands)

>>>>>>    Please send e-mail to:  ssandfort@attmail.com    <<<<<<
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~


Date: Mon, 18 Oct 1993 11:55:46 -0800
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
From: lefty@apple.com (Lefty)
Subject: Re: PSEUDOSPOOFING

>what if people were being *influenced* by what
>they perceived was the *majority opinion* or the *views of their peers*
>that were really nothing but DECEPTION AND LIES? what if it was
>*thwarting progress*? I would consider this nothing but TREACHERY and
>HIGH TREASON. is all this  really one of the `main goals' of the
>cypherpunk agenda? if so, SIGN ME OFF.

Works for me.

--
Lefty (lefty@apple.com)
C:.M:.C:., D:.O:.D:.


From: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Subject: Time for me to come clean...
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Date: Mon, 18 Oct 93 12:46:40 PDT

My experiment has gone far enough.

One of you has claimed that the Net entity "tcmay" (Timothy C. May,
putatively) is actually "jamie" (Jamie Dinkelacker, putatively). This
person has at other times claimed that perhaps Eric Hughes and Jamie
are the same person, and that the Net entity "tcmay" is the "lackey of Eric
Hughes."

It is all getting so confusing! 

Allow me to clarify.

I entered this list under a variety of pseudonyms, with the intent of
compiling information on all of you. I have been posting under the
identities of Tim May (who has actually never existed....the man
behind the mask on the cover of "Wired" was a hired actor, as were the
stand-ins for the personnas of Eric Hughes and John Gilmore), Sandy
Sandfort, Jamie Dinkelacker, and many others.

I disavow any connection to the paranoid "S. Boxx," however.

In fact, I think there are only five actual biological entities on
the list. Makes for some good conspiracy theories for the paranoids.

Finally, I also write under the nym de guerre of "Dorothy Denning."
The real Dorothy Denning is too busy grading papers for her freshman
crypto class to post, so I fill in.

My real name should be apparent to you all. I knew if I used it, the
other four of you would not take me seriously. But now the secret's
out.


David
     
--
     
David Sternlight         When the mouse laughs at the cat,
                         there is a hole nearby.--Nigerian Proverb
 

From: cman@IO.COM (Douglas Barnes)
Subject: Re: PSEUDOSPOOFING (lions and tigers and bears, oh my!)
To: ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu (L. Detweiler)
Date: Mon, 18 Oct 1993 11:21:22 -40962758 (CDT)

L. Det writes:
> I for one
> never saw *that* announcement when I signed up! calling
> `pseudospoofing' `one of the `main goals' of cypherpunks software'
> sounds *criminal* to me. Or maybe I'm missing the point! I guess this
> is what anarchy really *is* all about!

It was one of the main reasons *I* signed up... we were working on
a TV show about cyberspace, and Paco Nathan explained public key
encryption, digital money, and nyms with reputations in his inimitably
cheerful and energetic fashion for our cameras.

The part he was most excited about (a part that still fascinates
me no end) is the possibility of spawning new identities that
can acquire reputations, property, prestige, ignominity, whatever,
without the need to appeal to a government bureaucracy for validation.

Furthermore, the whole notion that there is some kind of implied contract 
when you join a free mailing list completely absurd, second only to your 
notion that we are all pushing for the same political agenda (or should
be) because we put our names in the same hat at toad.com. It just ain't so,
and no amount of wishing will make it so.

And, to cap it all off, I have had more external validation of the 
physical existence of the key members of *this* data space than any 
other international data space I participate in; in addition to 
numerous pictures, I've met a number of the folks, who have, in turn,
met a number of the folks... cypherpunks is one of the meetingest
mailing lists I've ever seen or heard of.

Doug

PS: the show never got edited, because Steve and I decided to set up 
io.com. 

-- 
----------------                                             /\ 
Douglas Barnes            cman@illuminati.io.com            /  \ 
Chief Wizard         (512) 448-8950 (d), 447-7866 (v)      / () \
Illuminati Online          metaverse.io.com 7777          /______\




From: szabo@netcom.com (Nick Szabo)
Subject: SILLY FLAMES: pseudospoofing
To: ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu (L. Detweiler)
Date: Mon, 18 Oct 93 5:25:22 PDT
Cc: cypherpunks@toad.com


L. Detweiler -- shocked, simply shocked, at the realization that
multiple pseudonyms are possible on the net -- explodes:

> ....how can this be a `forum' if an opinion
> is not *representative*? 

Perhaps there are differences between a forum and a voting booth?

> what if a single person just `ganged up' on
> someone they didn't like by overwhelming them with pseudospoofs? what
> if there was *truly* support for some project but a pseudospoofer
> ganged up on the proponents and clobbered them with flames?

Perhaps "support" is better measured by how many people are motivated
enough to go to the effort to make multiple but individually unique,
reputable posts in favor of a proposition, rather than by 
simple numerical polls that abstract away knowledge and
motivation, or by how many True Names position themselves 
with I'm-on-your-side posts. 

On cypherpunks' better days, "support" is measured by what kind 
of code gets written, not by who flames whom how often under
how many names.  Of course we all know that writing code
does not constitute *true* support, since only Democracy is 
The One True Way.

> doesn't
> it throw every `conversation' on this list into spectacularly
> *grotesque* doubt? 

Welcome to the Internet, Detweiler.  Perhaps you might get
together some physical meetings in Colorado, talk to more cypherpunks 
on the phone, look at the pictures in Wired magazine (perhaps also
faked?), etc. if you are so concerned about being ganged up on by 
unknown numbers of strangers.  (Is it better to be ganged up
on by known numbers of strangers?  Why of course, that's called
Democracy).

> the idea
> of `one man one vote' is SACRED.

Hallelujah!  Praise the Lord & pass the card punch!  Let's
vote ourselves bigger paychecks & unlimited medical care.
Let's take a vote on which cypherpunks tools we will implement.
Those who vote with the minority get to do the programming
work, those in the majority get to tell the minority what to write.
I nominate L. Detweiler President of the Cypherpunks.  All in favor 
say "aye" and bow down to His Holiness of the Veiled Booth!

> it is
> *anti egaltarian*. it is a recipe for anarchy

God forbid!  Quick, Detweiler, get out your garlic, raise
up your cross and abjure these crypto-anarchists 
before we spread any further!  Next thing you know
we'll get some elitist, anti-democratic development like
untraceable digital cash.  Some people will accumulate
more digicash than others, and Detweiler won't even know
who they are.  Horrors!  Quick Detweiler,
write your electronic leveling tax protocols before 
its too late.  Better yet, get the majority to vote on
making us evil crypto-anarchists -- only a small cypherpunk
minority once our pseudonyms are unmasked, of course -- make 
us write them for you.  After all, egalitarian software
is a basic human right!

> UNFAIR INFLUENCE. ABUSE
> OF POWER. MANIPULATION. DECEIT. TREACHERY. EXPLOITATION. SECRET CONSPIRACIES.
>...

Isn't it just dreadful?


Nick Szabo				szabo@netcom.com



Date: Mon, 18 Oct 93 08:02:16 CDT
From: m5@vail.tivoli.com (Mike McNally)
To: "L. Detweiler" <ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Cc: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: PSEUDOSPOOFING


"L. Detweiler" writes:
 > I'm absolutely *horrified* and *nauseated* ...

If digicash were a reality, I'd send you some with the proviso that
you only spend it on clues.

Repeat this chant until you attain enlightenment:

	Pseudospoofing cannot be prevented
	Pseudospoofing is a reality of online existance
	No amount of fear and loathing will make it go away

If it weren't for fundamentally new concepts like the ability to
pseudospoof (that's a lousy term, by the way), the net would not be
the quantum change in human communication and human thought it is.

 > p.s. if anyone doesn't hear from me for awhile, assume I've been
 > `liquidated' and this isn't really an `open forum' ...

No, I'll assume the ELF-2 running your pseudomind blew a fuse.

--
Mike McNally



To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: pseudospoofed out
Date: Wed, 20 Oct 93 01:13:18 -0600
From: "L. Detweiler" <ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu>

Cypherpunks, I use the internet for a lot of serious activities, and it
deeply troubles me to think that I have been vicitimized by
pseudospoofers in areas outside of merely the cypherpunks list such as
in the numerous FAQs I edit (a very time consuming endeavor) or in my
other favorite mailing lists. I feel like my blood has been drained by
parasites that suck my prose and passions. Since there is absolutely no
support for any `True Names' here whatsoever, I volunteer to drop the
subject. And of course I am just another blip on this list, so my ideas
for its improvement mean nothing, and I will not *ever* make a
proposition again here regarding the subject. however,

A PERSONAL REQUEST

I humbly request that ANYONE SENDING ME PERSONAL MAIL have the decency
to do so under their `True Name' or `obviously anonymously' under the
same identity. Do not deceive me for perverted sport. Do not try to
build up trust merely so that you can betray it. Do not manipulate me
simply because you have the capability or because I am a basically
trusting person. This sentiment is equivalent to something like `if a
woman doesn't carry a gun then it's OK to rape her' and it is one of
the most alarming aspects of what I have seen promoted here and in the
general `hacker' community. `nothing is wrong if you can get away with
it.' I believe that there is no such thing as a `consequentless
action'. Please, do not drag *me* into the gutter because you like to wallow there.

If anyone has deceived me in manipulating me with multiple pseudonyms
in my personal email, please inform me *now*. I believe this is the
absolute least that *anyone* could ask on the internet.

Another point to make is that Usenet & current mailing lists are far
from the future models. I fundamentally believe that `true name'
systems are entirely socially desirable and can be erected without
invading privacy. Anyone who claims that `true names' and `privacy' are
fundamentally incompatible is simply mistaken. Does `absolute privacy'
mean that no one *ever* knows who *anyone* is?

It seems to me the ability to differentiate identities or reject their
input based on `true names' is a basic right of the listener. You do
not have a right to bludgeon me with identical opinions from an
unrepresentative arsenal of imaginary identities. I suspect some of the
people advocating `absolute privacy' are themselves currently using
powerful tools to detect pseudospoofing others do not possess. Is that
the cypherpunk Utopian ideal? A place where you can manipulate people
without them knowing it? let others drown in mud while you trample atop their backs?

Also, please do not deceive the press. T.C. May has recently
satirically suggested that some of the Wired pictures are of hired
actors. I don't find this funny. If the `cypherpunks' are really
something other than that which they claim, it will eventually and
inevitably come back to haunt the `movement,' whatever it is
(algorithms or ideology? I no longer care). History and society is far
more shrewd than that. If pseudospoofing is really the #1 cypherpunk
agenda, please make that clear. `We want to fool everyone with
brainwashing techniques so they are at the mercy of our whim.'

One of my attractions to cyberspace was the promise of making online
friends, and I have made many over many months. But the idea that some
psychopaths are sending me email just to leech my strong emotions and
play with my passions, like a cat does a captured mouse, perhaps even
with the support of a large and complex software `arsenal' designed
specifically to promote camouflage and manipulation, perhaps on a very
widespread scale involving multiple lists, I find reprehensible and
inherently evil. Please, choose another lab rat victim.

My whole `cyberspatial reality' has been cast into doubt. Who's real?
Who's fake? I used to really look forward to reading and responding to
my mail, but now I approach it with dread, horror, and nausea. I don't
even know if who I am talking to on the phone is who they say they are
anymore, or if I really have any true cyberspatial friendships, because
of all the pseudospoofing in my mailbox. There are some among you who
say `welcome to the real world'. Are you people saying that man's
natural state is confusion, desperation, and paranoia?

I am not opposed to `pseudonymity' and multiple reputations of course.
But the strong sentiments on this list that I should be kept *guessing*
I find abhorrent. What is most disturbing is the possibility of a
single entity attempting to stick someone's psyche in a vice by
systematic and concerted assaults from multiple supposedly `unique'
identities in private email. This is like dealing with a tentacled
octopus-monster. What could be more depraved? This is nothing but
vicious interrogation and brainwashing.

I'm simply in favor of truth in advertising, and I think this list has
been misrepresented as a `forum' when it's nothing but a hotbed of
pseudospoofing, possibly even aided by automatic software tools.
Someone tell me, how long have I been arguing with AI programs anyway?
Trully, I never would have subscribed if I had realized the `practice'
of pseudospoofing was epidemic. I mean, I suspected there were isolated
cases, but now it appears a large part of traffic is manufactured
flames and froth. Does anyone have any idea how much time has been
wasted wading or even arguing with opinions that were nothing but
mirages? I'm deeply disillusioned. But of course, who cares? Certainly
not the leadership or the followers.

I'm not sure that some of the `identities' I've been dealing with over
the past few months really have any basic morality. I suspect there are
some demagogues that tout `privacy' while really subtly and insideously
promoting dishonesty, sociopathism, treachery, and barbarianism.

An example: I am on another mailing list where I posted a long article
as a `gift' to the subscribers. I got some favorable comments, except
from the moderator who said that `people are shocked at what you did.'
I asked him. What people? What did they say? He backed down. But
imagine that someone slandered me with a worthless pseudonym? and, in
fact, even if they mailed *me* would I be able to tell that they didn't
care about the reputation of that pseudonym? It seems to me that there
is a basic idea of reputation and postings. To a degree, if you haven't
earned a reputation in some subject, you should be disqualified from
pontificating on it, irrelevant of your arsenal of pseudonyms. Filters
based on reputations may help make this a reality. (I would personally
like to ban my mailbox of all opinionated pseudonyms who have not read
more than 2 of my posts.)

I remember `ZZZ' once announcing to the list that J. Markoff had
unsubscribed. Who's really in favor of privacy? Is everybody here
really interested in `privacy' as an `offensive weapon'? `Privacy' as a
way of evading taxes? `privacy' as a way of manipulating or betraying
the gullible and trusting for perverted pleasure? `privacy' as
destroying social order and promoting anarchy? Really, nevermind.
please, don't send me any more blistering flames. These are rhetorical
questions. In fact, this is a rhetorical essay.


Date: Wed, 20 Oct 93 08:30:42 CDT
From: m5@vail.tivoli.com (Mike McNally)
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: pseudospoofed out


"L. Detweiler"  writes:
 > [ the funniest thing I've read on the net in years. ]

Thank you, thank you, thank you *all* for making this possible.  The
hours of cleaning crud from my INBOX are *easily* worth this kind of
entertainment.  I am literally in tears, irritating my officemate with
incessant laughter.

Mr. Detweiler (if that really *is* your name), thank you especially.
You write well, kinda, even if I utterly disagree with you.  I think
I'll print this out and paste it into my big unabridged next to
"hyperbole".

--
Mike McNally


Date: Wed, 20 Oct 93 08:22:25 CDT
From: m5@vail.tivoli.com (Mike McNally)
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: pseudospoofed out


"L. Detweiler" writes:
 > I feel like my blood has been drained by
 > parasites that suck my prose and passions.

I hereby claim this as a .signature for at least one of my
identities.

--
Mike McNally




--

ld231782@longs.LANCE.ColoState.EDU





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: plaz@netcom.com (Geoff Dale)
Date: Sun, 24 Oct 93 18:33:11 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: ADMIN: proposed new policy on the mailing list
Message-ID: <9310250133.AA26931@netcom.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


-----BEGIN UNSIGNED MESSAGE-----
>I don't think restricting participation to signed messages
>is a good idea until we have some way of verifying a 
>signature automatically before allowing it to be posted.

Actually, Eric wasn't suggesting restricting participation, just putting a
delay on it.

But you're right. This proposed policy is pointless. I would probably end
up copying and pasting a bogus signature (not bogus for somebody else's
message, but bogus for mine) into my message to avoid the delay. The
policy, as it stands is rediculously easy to circumvent. I suspect that
this would be even less effective than the national 55 mph speed limit.

>How do we prevent people from registering a key in
>someone else's name??? It's beyond me.

You can't. There is simply no way to kill pseudo-spoofing without coming
down on the whole internet with a massively intrusive security system. It
certainly isn't worth it to me, to hand the net over to big brother to
avoid people posting under various aliases.

You'd almost certainly end up losing anonymous posting as well.

PS - Eric you can take this as a vote "NO".
-----END UNSIGNED MESSAGE-----

_______________________________________________________________________
Geoff Dale    -- insert standard disclaimers here --    plaz@netcom.com
               "We are the shock troops of reality."
                - Voice of the Friends (Wild Palms)






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: bill@twwells.com (T. William Wells)
Date: Sun, 24 Oct 93 12:58:36 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Mail delivery question
In-Reply-To: <9310231851.AA25213@toad.com>
Message-ID: <CFF0qA.Bpu@twwells.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


In article <9310231851.AA25213@toad.com>,
peter honeyman <honey@citi.umich.edu> wrote:
: To: toad.com!cypherpunks
: In-Reply-To: bill's message of Thu, 21 Oct 1993 22:05:48 +0000.
:
: well, i think bill overstates the case.  but then, i'm from the
: slash/hack, no risk/no gain school of computer programming.

I believe in minimizing those risks that can be easily minimized.
RTFMing and asking for other opinions certainly fall into the
easy to do/high gain category of risk minimizing.

As an operator of an anonymous service, I'm constantly amazed at
the things that supposedly worthwhile net.citizens will do,
without even the slightest thought for the consequences. And
consequences there have been, sometimes potentially tragic ones.
Perhaps I should tell some of my horror stories.





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: an41418@anon.penet.fi (wonderer)
Date: Sun, 24 Oct 93 12:03:10 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: pseudospoofing survey
Message-ID: <9310241902.AA23167@anon.penet.fi>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I don't know the value of such a survey. I am not inclined
to answer these questions to someone who I don't really know
over a communication system that is inherently untrustworthy.

I agree that this information would be valuable could it be
collected, but I figure since I don't feel like revealing
this information, especially not under my true identity, then
others, (who may even be malicious at times) will be less
likely to.

What is your intention in posting such questions? Do you
really expect to learn anything from the responses?

Wonderer
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
To find out more about the anon service, send mail to help@anon.penet.fi.
Due to the double-blind, any mail replies to this message will be anonymized,
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From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Sameer <sameer@infinity.hip.berkeley.edu>
Date: Sun, 24 Oct 93 19:13:12 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Off-shore banking and Steve Roberts' flotilla
Message-ID: <199310250205.AA06191@infinity.hip.berkeley.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


	I could have the name wrong here. If so, my utmost apologies.

	Are people here familiar with Steve Roberts, the guy who had a
bike called "BEHEMOTH" which he rode around the country, while
connected to the networks?

	He's temporarily settled down now, and planning his next
project, a technomadic flotilla which would be a bunch of technomadic
folk who would like to live outside the boundaries of any national
jurisdiction, touring the world, and earning a living while doing it.

	One potential income for these people I think, would be an
off-shore internet bank implementing digital cash.

	It might be a good idea for some cypherpunks (Sandy? You said
you found an investor, right?) to get in touch with the flotilla-folk
and see if something could be arranged.
	(I'm sorry, I don't have any email addresses on hand.)




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: bill@twwells.com (T. William Wells)
Date: Sun, 24 Oct 93 13:08:36 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Net Regulation
In-Reply-To: <199310241403.AA06468@panix.com>
Message-ID: <CFF1Is.BzJ@twwells.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


In article <199310241403.AA06468@panix.com>,
Duncan Frissell <frissell@panix.com> wrote:
: B >Duncan Frissell <frissell@panix.com> wrote:
: B >:And don't tell me that we still have to live in the physical world.
: B >:If 90% of the GWP (including *almost all* the money) consists of
: B >:non-physical goods and services on the nets, government control over
: B >:the remaining 10% is not statistically significant.
: B >
: B >All too often, people look at one thing and imagine that the
: B >numbers somehow outweigh reality. It ain't like that, folks.
: B >Reality is complexly, intimately, and inseparately interconnected.
: B >No matter what you do with the bits, physical reality cannot be
: B >discounted.
:
: You also can't disount the physical realities confronting the state.

Oh, I don't disagree with your main thesis which, if I understand
it aright, amounts to that the state is pretty much obsolete and
is only taking its time realizing this. :-) I'm just trying to
point out that it is simply dangerous to imagine that bandying
about numbers that purport to show its insignificance will
actually make it so. Or, to put it another way, I mostly agree
with your statements and wish you wouldn't weaken them with
worthless supporting claims.

:                                                                       It
: is enormously difficult to control workers who can live anywhere on earth
: and work anywhere else.

Really? I'll tell you what: I'll give you 100% control over all
communications starting tomorrow and I'll take 100% control over
all food and water at the same time. I win. You *die*.

Simplistic and impossible, true, but the point remains. There is
always a physical reality and no matter who "insignificant" it
is, it can still kill you.

: B >"No matter how subtle the wizard, a knife in the back will always
: B >cramp his style."
:
: But who is more vulnerable to the knife.  Millions of "Permanent Tourists"
: living and working in cyberspace or a large nation state incapable of
: moving, hiding, or getting an honest job when markets turn against it.

The permanent tourists, of course. The state is, when all is
boiled down, an instrument of force and it functions most
"effectively" when it limits itself to that. I guarantee you that
if the US wanted to crack down on this stuff that it would be
gone. This year, a third of the prison population is from
drug-related "crimes"; if they got a bee in their bonnets, you
and I and a whole lot of other people could take their places.
(Not, mind you, that I think this'll happen. But it *could*.)

Yes, that could be prevented, but it won't be prevented by what
the cypherpunks are doing. Sooner or later, the bodies would have
to meet the bullets. That's the way of the world, alas.

: B >So, please, stop with the simplistic answers!
: B >
: B >(What *did* happen at Panix, eh? I rest my case.)
:
: Panix was down but my three other connections to the nets were up.  Panix
: had a security intrusion.

You missed the point. The net is embedded in the rest of reality
and that reality, in this case, *people*, had significant
deleterious effects on many others' ability to use the net. This
isn't going to change any time soon. Maybe in a couple of decades,
less if people stop pretending the real world is an irrelevancy.





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: rjc@gnu.ai.mit.edu
Date: Sun, 24 Oct 93 16:28:47 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: ADMIN: proposed new policy on the mailing list
In-Reply-To: <9310241952.AA28774@anon.penet.fi>
Message-ID: <9310242328.AA28745@kropotkin.gnu.ai.mit.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



   I think the major benefit of requiring signatures on the cypherpunks list
is not the authentication it will give, but the new software which cypherpunks
will be forced to develop to make adding signatures with mail readers 
automatic. After the user interface work has evolved enough to make signatures
ubiquitous, we can then switch to some kind of trusted-key system and
really authenticate list members if we want.

   I think the most important and needed software is yet to be developed:

   Offline mail readers which work from home over the serial port and
which incorporate PGP abilities. I know there are lots of POP readers,
but we need one which is in ANSI C, portable, and easily extendable to
serve as a base for incorporation of crypto. Preferably, it should
use curses, or an abstracted window model so it can be easily ported
to Mac, Windows, AmigaDOS, X-Windows with little change. 

-Ray



-- Ray Cromwell        |    Engineering is the implementation of science;    --
-- EE/Math Student     |       politics is the implementation of faith.      --
-- rjc@gnu.ai.mit.edu  |                         - Zetetic Commentaries      --




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: an5877@anon.penet.fi (deadbeat)
Date: Sun, 24 Oct 93 12:53:36 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: ADMIN: proposed new policy on the mailing list
Message-ID: <9310241952.AA28774@anon.penet.fi>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

I am among those "generally supportive" of E. Hughes' suggestion that
signed messages be encouraged in some way.  It wouldn't bother me a
bit if that led to a decline in CypherPunks mailing list membership;
with luck, the quality of the list would improve.  Furthermore, class
consciousness is a good thing (?), so let's create classes of CypherPunks
and try generally to elevate consciousness.

DEADBEAT <na5877@anon.penet.fi>

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Version: 2.3

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gqPOPYXPP0IXdL+J/+u3sZRNoza10MOG
=cAa8
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
To find out more about the anon service, send mail to help@anon.penet.fi.
Due to the double-blind, any mail replies to this message will be anonymized,
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From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: an5877@anon.penet.fi (deadbeat)
Date: Sun, 24 Oct 93 13:13:11 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: impersonation
Message-ID: <9310242012.AA01583@anon.penet.fi>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

Scott, I'm not sure what you mean by dissemination of information not
being ergodic -- could you please elaborate.  Well, not elaborate,
because your style is already quite elaborate, and I can't make heads
or tails out of your note.  The comparison of Email forgery to rape
("or any other invasion of privacy" -- excuse me, but forcibly shoving
your penis into my vagina is not an invasion of my privacy, it is a
violent crime on my body, for which you will pay) so enrages me, it
makes calm discussion impossible.

DEADBEAT <na5877@anon.penet.fi>

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.3

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=wh4r
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
To find out more about the anon service, send mail to help@anon.penet.fi.
Due to the double-blind, any mail replies to this message will be anonymized,
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From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: an41418@anon.penet.fi (wonderer)
Date: Sun, 24 Oct 93 13:43:14 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: ADMIN: proposed new policy on the mailing list
Message-ID: <9310242036.AA05082@anon.penet.fi>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I don't think restricting participation to signed messages
is a good idea until we have some way of verifying a 
signature automatically before allowing it to be posted.
Here's one: How do you verify a signature for an anonymous,
first time poster?

I am not opposed to the concept, just I don't think there's
a practical way of doing it. 

How about this: Require cypherpunks users to register a key
and an identity, real or pseudonymous. Then, they can
sign with the corresponding private key and nobody else
can. The software then filters out bad posts.

How do we prevent people from registering a key in
someone else's name??? It's beyond me.

Wonderer

-------------------------------------------------------------------------
To find out more about the anon service, send mail to help@anon.penet.fi.
Due to the double-blind, any mail replies to this message will be anonymized,
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From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Perry E. Metzger" <pmetzger@lehman.com>
Date: Sun, 24 Oct 93 18:58:39 PDT
To: bill@twwells.com (T. William Wells)
Subject: Re: Net Regulation
In-Reply-To: <CFF1Is.BzJ@twwells.com>
Message-ID: <9310250152.AA09786@snark.lehman.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



T. William Wells says:
> :                                                                       It
> : is enormously difficult to control workers who can live anywhere on earth
> : and work anywhere else.
> 
> Really? I'll tell you what: I'll give you 100% control over all
> communications starting tomorrow and I'll take 100% control over
> all food and water at the same time. I win. You *die*.

How will you take control? If Napoleon and Hitler couldn't manage it,
I doubt any of the mediocre dictators we have around these days could.

You can't forget that that the state can't violate the laws of physics
or economics. They can't extract more resources out of a country than
that country has, and they can't be everywhere at once.

Admittedly, if someone could put a *loyal* armed soldier over
everyone's shoulder on earth they could control everyone. How, though,
could they manage to do this?

> Simplistic and impossible, true, but the point remains. There is
> always a physical reality and no matter who "insignificant" it
> is, it can still kill you.

I think you are the one who is ignoring this. The state is just as
subject to the problems of physical reality as anyone else.

Perry




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Sandy <72114.1712@CompuServe.COM>
Date: Sun, 24 Oct 93 19:28:39 PDT
To: <cypherpunks@toad.com>
Subject: A MODEST PROPOSAL
Message-ID: <931025021235_72114.1712_FHF61-1@CompuServe.COM>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
  SANDY SANDFORT               Reply to:  ssandfort@attmail.com
 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Punksters,

I'm tired of playing with L. Detweiler's head on the Cypherpunks
list.  Let's up the ante.  I think we (in northern California, at
least) should play with his head in person!  I hereby pledge $20,
and ask for sufficient matching pledges, to buy Lance, Larry or
whatever his REAL name is, a ticket, etc.  to come to our next
meeting.  The offer, though, comes with certain . . . conditions.

To take advantage of this offer, Detweiler must agree first post
a list of Bay Area Cypherpunks he thinks are fictitious.  If we
can't produce those people with "official" IDs, we pay him $100
over his round trip air fare, we put him up in a nice hotel and
we get him laid.  If everyone is "real" we don't pay him squat,
and we get to "pants" him on the lawn in front of Cygnus.

To quote one of my many avatars, "Works for me."

Right, Tim?

>"Right, Sandy!"

Right, Nick?

>"Right you are, Sandy!"

Right, Perry!

>"You're right as rain, Sandy!"

Okay, Alvin?

 . . .

Okay, Alvin?

 . . .

ALVIN!!!!!

>"O-kaaaaaay!"


 S a n d y

>>>>>>    Please send e-mail to:  ssandfort@attmail.com    <<<<<<
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Duncan Frissell <frissell@panix.com>
Date: Sun, 24 Oct 93 19:18:39 PDT
To: CYPHERPUNKS@toad.com
Subject: Re: Net Regulation
Message-ID: <199310250215.AA03602@panix.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


B >From: bill@twwells.com (T. William Wells)

B >I mostly agree
B >with your statements and wish you wouldn't weaken them with
B >worthless supporting claims.

I'm glad.

B >The permanent tourists, of course. The state is, when all is
B >boiled down, an instrument of force and it functions most
B >"effectively" when it limits itself to that. I guarantee you that
B >if the US wanted to crack down on this stuff that it would be
B >gone. This year, a third of the prison population is from
B >drug-related "crimes"; if they got a bee in their bonnets, you
B >and I and a whole lot of other people could take their places.
B >(Not, mind you, that I think this'll happen. But it *could*.)

Permanent Tourists are outside US jurisdiction.  You could grab a very few 
but only a few.  You couldn't affect the non-US persons earning their 
dough on the nets at all.  That's the point of the nets that "foreigners" 
can be Americans and Americans can be "foreigners" without any loss of 
income.  Once developed, the ability to work from anywhere to anywhere is 
powerful.  It makes one much harder to control.  Consider, small 
cash-intensive businesses located *in* the US report less than half of 
their income to the government (according to IRS studies).  That is among 
people completely subject to US jurisdiction.  

B >Yes, that could be prevented, but it won't be prevented by what
B >the cypherpunks are doing. Sooner or later, the bodies would have
B >to meet the bullets. That's the way of the world, alas.

Actually, such problems are rare in the OECD countries.  Most enforcement 
here is indirect.  People obey because of fear not direct application of 
force.  Reduce the fear and you reduce the obedience.  The threat we 
represent is a bit to abstract to sell the government on an all-out 
campaign against us that would be difficult and expensive.  I don't think 
the Feds would "go to the mattresses" to fight us.

Duncan Frissell

If the KGB and the Stasi couldn't prevail against the winds of 
institutional "rightsizing", what chance does one aging dyke have?

--- WinQwk 2.0b#1165                                                                            




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: hfinney@shell.portal.com (Hal Finney)
Date: Sun, 24 Oct 93 22:28:40 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: A favor re Detweiler
Message-ID: <9310250526.AA08546@jobe.shell.portal.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
 
I'd like to expend some "reputation capital" here and ask people for a 
favor.  I am worried about Larry Detweiler's obvious mental anguish.  We 
tend to forget that we are dealing with real people on the net, flesh 
and blood human beings.  Larry is obviously going through genuine 
difficulties here.  As a member of our virtual community, I ask that we 
show him some compassion and consideration.
 
Larry believes that people have been communicating with him in private 
mail under multiple identities in order to confuse and mislead him.  
Specifically, he has suggested that Jamie Dinkelacker is a pseudonym 
employed by Tim May.  I gather that he has received email from both 
names.  He also suggests that others have employed these practices.
 
Since I do not live in the Bay area, I have never met Jamie Dinkelacker, 
although I had the opportunity to meet Tim once when he visited southern 
California.  So I am not in a position personally to assure Larry that 
Jamie is a real person separate from Tim.  But I know many list members 
are in northern California and I assume several of you have met both 
Jamie and Tim.  I ask those of you who can vouch for Jamie's separate 
identity to send me private email saying so, which I will forward to 
Larry.  If enough people can do this, perhaps a PGP-style "web of trust" 
can be established which will reduce Larry's concerns about this 
particular case at least.
 
(I have considered the possibility that Jamie actually is a pseudonym 
employed by Tim.  This is certainly not inherently impossible, given the 
structure of the net.  As I told Larry, I myself have occasionally 
posted under apparently-legitimate pseudonyms in other times and places, 
although never on this list.  I certainly don't attach the moral 
significance to the practice that Larry does.  Nevertheless, in this 
particular case, the situation is so obviously causing mental suffering 
that I assume that if Larry's charges were true that Tim would have 
confessed in order to spare Larry this pain.)
 
I know that it's easy to just write people off on the net, the various 
marginal or fanatical personalities whom one runs into now and then.  
That is why I am asking this as a personal favor.  If you have read and 
appreciated my essays on digital cash, or on the various legal issues 
involving crypto exports; if you have used the remailer code I worked 
on, or PGP for that matter on which I spent hundreds of hours of 
personal time, then I ask that you help me out with this request.  Do it 
as a favor to me regardless of your feelings for Larry, and I will just 
hope that my efforts will bring him some peace of mind.  Thank you.
 
Hal Finney
hfinney@shell.portal.com
 
 
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From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: mench@cs.unr.edu (Peter J Menchetti)
Date: Sun, 24 Oct 93 22:33:12 PDT
To: Cypherpunks@toad.com (Cypherpunks)
Subject: Chris Odhner?
Message-ID: <9310250532.AA19665@pyramid>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



please send me mail, chris, this is Pete, the
guy who made all those goddamn big brother insdie
stickers for you.

pete




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: greg@ideath.goldenbear.com (Greg Broiles)
Date: Sun, 24 Oct 93 23:23:12 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Apple, AOCE, and key pair security
Message-ID: <s6NyBc1w164w@ideath.goldenbear.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----


A few months ago, I posted an excerpt from a MacWeek article re AOCE
(Apple Open Collaboration Environment), a collection of services to
be integrated into the Mac OS to facilitate groupware apps.

The MacWeek article said that users would receive their public keys (to
be used for digital signatures on documents) from RSADSI, instead of
generating them themselves. Scott Collins wrote to disagree, saying that
the AOCE software he'd seen didn't work that way. I E-mailed
the author of the original article, who stood by what he wrote, saying
that "very good sources" said that the keys would be provided to users
by outside, allegedly trustworthy, sources.

According to the 11/93 Macworld, users will not, in most cases, generate
their own key pairs:

"When you receive a signed digital document, how do you know that the
signature is legitimate and that it isn't from a pretender? In many
ways, your digital signature is similar to a credit card; it is issued
by a known authority, it has an expiration date, and you can verify its
validity. To get your own digital signature from RSA, you take a form to
a notary public, who verifies your identity, notarizes the information
on the form, and then mails the form to RSA. Based on the notary
public's authority to say you are who you claim to be, you eventually
receive a disk in the mail with your personal electronic signature. Your
electronic signature has a two-year expiration date, and includes some
verification information. If someone wants to make sure your signature
is valid, he or she contacts the issuing authority listed in the
certificate. There will be issuing authorities other than RSA. For
example, Apple Computer's security department plans to issue signatures
to all Apple employees with employee badges."

"AOCE, Apple's plan for groupware", Macworld, 11/93, p. 167.


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hh07sCIsswM=
=6i+9
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

--
Greg Broiles
greg@goldenbear.com                     Baked, not fried.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Date: Sun, 24 Oct 93 22:48:41 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: ADMIN: Shall we sign?
In-Reply-To: <9310232303.AA26424@flammulated.owlnet.rice.edu>
Message-ID: <9310250546.AA02480@netcom5.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



-- 
..........................................................................
Timothy C. May         | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,  
tcmay@netcom.com       | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
408-688-5409           | knowledge, reputations, information markets, 
W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA  | black markets, collapse of governments.
Higher Power: 2^756839 | Public Key: PGP and MailSafe available.
Note: I put time and money into writing this posting. I hope you enjoy it.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "L. Detweiler" <ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Date: Sun, 24 Oct 93 21:58:48 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: on the term `signature'
Message-ID: <9310250455.AA06984@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Consider the term `signature' in the conventional connotation of a
handwritten scrawl. What are the *critical* properties of a handwritten
signature of a person [x]?

1) no person [y] can `forge' the signature of [x]
2) the signature of [x] is unique to [x]

Look closely at (2). What value would `signatures' have in our society
if they could not be traced to unique individuals? Virtually everyone
here will probably say `no problem' but this aspect is a very critical
aspect of the legal basis for signatures as a certificate of identity.
If a person cannot be traced based on their digital signatures, where
is the accountability? What if a person signs a document with a
`digital signature' and *breaks* that contract? you have no recourse
unless the identity is ultimately identifiable and you can take `that
body' to court.

This `two way street' is the crucial ingredient for the legal value of
handwritten signatures. A person can indicate they consent to an
agreement or certify something as genuine originating from themselves
(one way). But on the other hand, if the agreement is broken or there
is some question of authenticity *independent* of the signature (i.e.,
suppose someone has broken the signature security) there is recourse in
retracing the path back to the original signer (the other way).

Many here are championing that the loss of (2) with `digital
signatures' and completely untracable identities is `liberating'. But
there is a price to pay, perhaps very great. It is simply an unworkable
system anywhere serious accountability is required (such as related to
a job, etc.) Sure, if all people want to do is get into twisted debate
contests, the absence of (2) certainly encourages it (speaking from experience).

Because digital signatures alone are not really strictly analogous to
written signatures because of the lack of property (2) above, perhaps a
better term would be `identification tag'. Adding the guarantee that a
given signature can be traced back to a human entity, with the use of a
database or otherwise, makes them truly `digital signatures'.

please cc: me in any replies.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Date: Sun, 24 Oct 93 23:08:41 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: ADMIN: Shall we sign?
Message-ID: <9310250606.AA04356@netcom5.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


*********************************************************************
*******THIS MESSAGE HAS BEEN SIGNED BY "TIM'S REALLY NEAT SYSTEM"****
*********************************************************************

I see some problems, for me at least:

1. I run MacPGP home machine, and using it is a boring and
time-consuming prcess. Many of you know about this. (Ironically, it's
more secure for me to run it on my home machine, instead of on Netcom,
but it means a lot more work.)

2. I also have plain old PGP running on one of my DOS laptops, and I
sometimes use RSADSI's "MailSafe" on this, even to sign. (But not
often, that's for sure.)

3. For quick responses, where response time is more important anyway,
I cannot see jumping through all these hoops. Ironic, isn't i?

4. If the signatures are not to be verified, or even to be looked at
very closely, then the situation presented at the beginning of this
message will flourish: phony sigs to beat the delay. 

5. Eric alluded to such proliferation being a Good Thing. I think not,
as it will trivialize real sigs and will in some sense turn digital
sigs into a kind of running joke on the list. Not a good thing, in my
view.

6. The sitiuation with L. Dettweiler and S. Boxx, tragicomic as it
was, would not have been materially affected. Both would have "signed"
their messages in some way  and what would then have been
accomplished? (In some sense, both _were_ signed: Dettweiler by the
origin of his message and the hard-to-spoof 
"an12070" (or whatever) that S. Boxx used.)

While I'm not sure if the LD/S.Boxx situation, and the general claims
of "pseudospoofing" are motivating Eric's idea, I certainly don't see
a system of "weak" digital sigs (weak meaning no real checking) doing
anything.

7. Finally, I have yet to see any serious evidence that this so-called
pseudospoofing is going on, that is, that people are pretending to be
others. I know Dettweiler _thinks_ that I am using the nyms of Jamie
Dinkleacker, Nick Szabo,  and others, but this is arrant nonsense.
(And to repeat the obvious, as noted above, if I _were_ using other
identities in this way, digitally signing the messages would be
trivial and would in fact create a false sense of security, as others
have also noted.).

I've never seen anyone else claim to be me, at least not seriously,
nor have I ever suspected such pseudospoofing is actually going on.

--Tim

-- 
..........................................................................
Timothy C. May         | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,  
tcmay@netcom.com       | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
408-688-5409           | knowledge, reputations, information markets, 
W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA  | black markets, collapse of governments.
Higher Power: 2^756839 | Public Key: PGP and MailSafe available.
Note: I put time and money into writing this posting. I hope you enjoy it.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: nobody@shell.portal.com
Date: Sun, 24 Oct 93 23:38:40 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: S.Box and LD SAME???
Message-ID: <9310250638.AA13946@jobe.shell.portal.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


 Subject says it all... I think these 2 are the same person...
      bloody idiots
      sam hill
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
To find out more about the anon service, send mail to help@anon.penet.fi.
Due to the double-blind, any mail replies to this message will be anonymized,
and an anonymous id will be allocated automatically. You have been warned.
Please report any problems, inappropriate use etc. to admin@anon.penet.fi.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Eli Brandt <ebrandt@jarthur.Claremont.EDU>
Date: Sun, 24 Oct 93 23:48:41 PDT
To: cypherpunks list <cypherpunks@toad.com>
Subject: Re: ADMIN: Shall we sign?
In-Reply-To: <9310250606.AA04356@netcom5.netcom.com>
Message-ID: <9310250646.AA14091@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> While I'm not sure if the LD/S.Boxx situation, and the general claims
> of "pseudospoofing" are motivating Eric's idea, I certainly don't see
> a system of "weak" digital sigs (weak meaning no real checking) doing
> anything.
> 
> 7. Finally, I have yet to see any serious evidence that this so-called
> pseudospoofing is going on, that is, that people are pretending to be
> others.

Several people have inferred or assumed that Eric's suggestion was in
response to this "pseudospoofing" circus.  As I read his original
message, he simply hoped to provide an incentive for the use of
digital signatures, and to encourage the writing of software to make
this easier.  After all, digital signatures don't prevent the
establishment of pseudonyms -- in fact, they indirectly promote it
by preventing "claim-jumping" on an established nym.

> I've never seen anyone else claim to be me, at least not seriously,

I am you.  Seriously.

> --Tim

   Eli   ebrandt@jarthur.claremont.edu




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: jamie@netcom.com (Jamie Dinkelacker)
Date: Sun, 24 Oct 93 23:58:40 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: A favor re Detweiler (ha ha ha)
Message-ID: <9310250655.AA25136@netcom.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Hal Finney says:
> 
>Since I do not live in the Bay area, I have never met Jamie Dinkelacker, 
>although I had the opportunity to meet Tim once when he visited southern 
>California.  So I am not in a position personally to assure Larry that 
>Jamie is a real person separate from Tim.  
> 

Hello, world.

Here's a novel thought:  let's cut to the chase. 

My phone number is in my .sig block. Tim's in his. Call each of us
back-to-back and have a 3 minute conversation with each. If the caller
can't tell that we are different individuals, well ... . Do we sound the
same? Are there accents? What about our speech speed and rhythm? Word
choice? Sentence structure?

If this is an issue to Detweiler, why hasn't he put his suppositions to the
test by picking up the phone and, like a responsible adult, identifying
himself for a conversation. Instead, we get net.waste.bandwidth. The only
person to resolve this is Detweiler (unless Sniveling.Boxx takes me up on
my lunch offer and could then vouch for the distinctions between me and
Tim). If Detweiler really wanted to know the answer, he could find out for
himself. Why should others support his "learned helplessness?" 

The only reason Detweiler has not executed this test is that he avoids truth.

Is Detweiler aka Sternlight? Is that what's really being hidden? Is this
all a deception distracting us from the NSA/Straumli perversion? I don't
care about his anguish because I personally believe he's fabricated it to
toy with us and distract us. 

But, I must admit, if I'm to be associated with anybody, Tim's not a bad
choice: he's brilliant, articulate, wealthy, independent, good-looking and
has great taste in music and friends. Not bad things to be nymed with.

Hal, I invite your call. Call me mid-mornings PDT. As you know by private
email I've sent you, I truly appreciate your posts and learn from them.
Call me for a chat. Find out for yourself.

C'mon Detweiler, cut to the chase and face the truth. Sheeesh, how can we
miss you if you don't go away? ... (sigh).

 
--
................................
Jamie Dinkelacker   Palo Alto CA 
Jamie@netcom.com    415.941.4782    





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: thomas.hughes@chrysalis.org
Date: Mon, 25 Oct 93 01:03:13 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Q
Message-ID: <9310250013.A6273wk@chrysalis.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



 --> Note: Forwarded (from: DFW)
 Originally from Bryny (1:124/4109.0)
 Original dated: Oct 23 '93, 18:36
 
The EPCA applies to Common Carriers.  Thus it applies to Compuserve, MCI Mail,
etc.  It does not apply to bulletin boards unless they issue mail contracts.
 
 
----8<----
 
what are the actual legal requirements for claiming status as a Common 
Carrier??  (other than being in the USA ...)
 
signed written agreements?
 
(this is the best "place" i could think of to ask this question...)
 <thomas.hughes@chrysalis.org>





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: bill@twwells.com (T. William Wells)
Date: Sun, 24 Oct 93 18:13:11 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: the principle of least astonishment
In-Reply-To: <9310242219.AA08866@toad.com>
Message-ID: <CFFFq6.F6x@twwells.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


In article <9310242219.AA08866@toad.com>,
Eli Brandt <ebrandt@jarthur.Claremont.EDU> wrote:
: > From: bill@twwells.com (T. William Wells)
: > For my service, given what it is for, the presumption should be
: > anonymity. For the personals groups, perhaps the presumption
: > should be the other way around. There is, almost certainly, no
: > one right answer.
:
: What are your thoughts on solutions which do not do either of these
: alternatives?  For example, several people have discussed systems
: involving two sets of addresses.  These avoid both problems
: (unexpectedly failing to anonymize / unexpectedly anonymizing a
: message with a sig), at the cost of some complexity.

I haven't really given this much thought because it hasn't been
relevant to my server. There are a number of problems that I
think fall into the same category of inadvertent disclosure. All
of them are "operator error" in a sense. All of the anonymous
e-mail services are hacks added onto the existing e-mail services
and require significant attention to detail if one is to not
inadvertently give away one's real identity. It's as if you had
to type in the RFC822 headers yourself for each message; even
though they're quite simple, you're going to mess up reasonably
frequently. And just once is sufficient to destroy one's
anonymity. The multiple address thing doesn't address this at all
so I don't think it will help.

Alas, I really don't have the spare time to work up my thoughts
on where the e-mail system ought to go. All I can really say for
sure is that the whole thing should be rethought from the ground
up.

: > Either the perpetrators are so intellectually lacking that they
: > do not see what they are doing or they are so intellectually
: > dishonest that they do. In either case, I am utterly disgusted.
:
: Aren't you detweiling a bit here?

I don't think so. Detweiler and those like him simply react; they
do not examine where they are coming from nor are they willing to
do so. Their fault is not that they reach strong moral
conclusions nor that they express them but that they so lack
respect for others that they will not examine the positions of
others nor attempt to determine where the line of "it isn't my
business to tell them what to do" should be drawn.

(BTW, cypherpunks wins big when it loses Detweilers; just look at
Objectivism's reputation for why.)

:                                    I don't think the situation really
: warrants "utter disgust"...

Technical problems can often be solved by "try it and see" but
systemic people problems rarely can or should be. A wrong
solution is often just too costly; ask the folks in the ex-USSR
what they think of that "try it and see". People problems require
careful thought if the results of one's actions are not to lead
to misery and death.

When people resort to rather obviously flawed modes of reasoning,
disgust is quite appropriate, except when stronger responses are
warrented.





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: hiscdcj@lux.latrobe.edu.au  (Dwayne)
Date: Sun, 24 Oct 93 07:43:09 PDT
To: hughes@ah.com (Eric Hughes)
Subject: Re: ADMIN: proposed new policy on the mailing list
In-Reply-To: <9310231738.AA02831@ah.com>
Message-ID: <9310241441.AA22293@lux.latrobe.edu.au>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Hi,

re the proposed policy:

I read mail offline, usually. The mailer I use, an ms-dos mailer,
doesn't support signing mail. It has some allowance for a .sig file, but
I can't get it to work. I sometimes reply online, a I am doing now.
  If I reply online, I can sign messages, I think, using elm. Although I
have no idea at all how to do this, but I'm sure I can find out.
However, if I use my offline mailer, my mail will be delayed.
Normally, this wouldn't be a problem, but what if I came across
something urgent, wrote a reply, and uploaded it immediately?

Anyone else in this situation?

Dwayne.

Who is going to get in touch with the author of this mailer Real Soon
Now, he thinks....



              (Dwayne Jones-Evans  IRC: ddraig  )
     ( SCA: Cynon Yscolan ap Myrddin, Stormhold, Lochac, West)
        PGP public key available. finger me.  be gentle.
           internet---> hiscdcj@lux.latrobe.edu.au





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: nobody@shell.portal.com
Date: Mon, 25 Oct 93 00:53:12 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: LD's Latest RANT!!
Message-ID: <9310250749.AA19335@jobe.shell.portal.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


 LD is starting to sound more like the NSA AI DS all
the time...




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: pierre@shell.portal.com (Pierre Uszynski)
Date: Mon, 25 Oct 93 01:03:41 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: ADMIN: proposed new policy on the mailing list
Message-ID: <9310250802.AA19739@jobe.shell.portal.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


-----BEGIN PGP UNSIGNED MESSAGE-----


I'll vote yes to the amended policy proposal

> "make something that looks like a signature, or else".

While I tend to agree with the general argument presented in favor,
I'll also agree that there are several problems with it:

- Yes, it's too easy to circumvent the policy by cutting and pasting
something that looks like a signature (more or less :-)

- Even then, the 6 hour delay is not that much trouble when you are
actually building a discussion, and not flaming... So it would be
more like "if you want to flame, you better spoof"... hmmm :-( 

So, all in all, there is not that much incentive added to using signatures.
I think any is better than even less, so I'll still vote "yes"... at least
as an experiment...

But here are some more ideas:

1) have the mailing list relay insert disclaimers according to what it
recognized:

> remailer: This message wholly un-authenticated. The identity info
> presented in this message could have been faked by a 6 year old.
> Use digital signatures.

or,

> remailer: This message digitally signed. The pseudonymous identity
> used may have no relation with any Real Life Person.

or,

> remailer: This message digitally signed. Signature checked to match
> previous uses on this list by this pseudonym.

or,

> remailer: This message's digital signature does not match previous
> uses on this list by this pseudonym. This will be -version 2- of this
> pseudonym.

2) Campaign so that users of this list include "security disclaimers"
whenever they post or email on the net. That could be a sig or a header
line, such as "The identity info in this post could have been forged by
a six year old. Do not trust it. Use digital signatures."

3) To make it more obvious that the From: field can say just about
anything, use the "National Enquirer" headline generator that was
posted on the net to replace the incoming header:

>From: Diform Flying Saucer Throws Giant Tomato on the Pope

Maybe then, people will take that header less seriously...

Pierre (who?)
pierre@shell.portal.com

-----BEGIN PGP UNSIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.4

iQBFThIsMayHAVEBEEnarealsiGNatUre, IFi   onlYHaDEvERYthiNginPlace
toCheCKINcOmINGSigsTOO. :-)
=Bof
-----END PGP UNSIGNATURE-----





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: remailer@dis.org (remailer bogus account)
Date: Mon, 25 Oct 93 01:33:14 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Pseudonyms... and LD
Message-ID: <9310250812.AA13483@merde.dis.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


                  Anonymous Digital Kiosks

With all the talk of reputations, digital cash, anonymous
remailers/posters/DC nets, Data havens Grey Markets one quickly
comes to the the conclusion that the future is here now. 
Sufficient protective technology is currently available
to create a "greymarket" anonymous digital kiosk.
This ADK could be located literally anyplace with net-connections
in real space, and using Public Key Encryption Technology and
Cypherpunks Remailers as well as newly emergent Digital Cash systems
with say a "friendly" Lichenstein Account be able to
vend ANY kind of service and collect payments for same 
 regardless of the prevailing laws
in the real space location of the ADK.

    This indeed is what is most likely frightens the goverment,
code from projects like DOD/SBIR A90-217 "Electronic Countermeasure:
Computer Virus" and other more "black" projects could be spirited out of
projects and sold to possible clients with relatively little fear of reprisal.
Solicitation for grey market information and responses to same
are relatively safe and untraceable making  current civil intrusion
by the state impossible in the case of net.citizens choosing to employ
this technology.

And composite entities and persona will become popular such as this one...
Sam Hill is actually several people... :)(sorry about that LD)

    Sam






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: jamie@netcom.com (Jamie Dinkelacker)
Date: Mon, 25 Oct 93 02:15:13 -0600
To: "L. Detweiler" <ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Subject: Thanks for the exposure
Message-ID: <9310250815.AA29913@netcom.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Still posting my phone number, asshole? Are you really trying to pick a
fight? Do you truly want to see how I can squash a bug like thee? Better
start looking over your shoulder.

Don't forget, gutless wonder, I CONTROL YOU.

You will never forget me. You can't touch a keyboard without thinking of
me. I control you. And always will.

You no longer have any independent thought.

I lead my life of wonder; filled with friends and play. You are
insignificant, and don't cross my mind until someone tells me of your
posts. But you have no choice but to sit and think of me. I control you.

Everytime you see the word "cypherpunks" you'll know I control you. And I
always will. Everytime you hear a modem or see an ethernet cable, you'll
know I control you.

Soon, you'll be able to think of nothing but me, and then the control will
be complete.

Get a life, asshole.



------- End of Forwarded Message





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "L. Detweiler" <ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Date: Mon, 25 Oct 93 00:28:47 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: the Joy of Pseudospoofing
Message-ID: <9310250728.AA09485@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Not a single person has said they understand what I have been talking
about in describing the evils of pseudospoofing. Let me be more
specific. I hope anyone with additional comments can send me email.

First, I've been talking about `pseudospoofing' as if what it connotes
is obvious, but let me be absolutely thorough. Suppose a person created
an entire fake identity. Jim Riverman, a software engineer, working in
CA. Subscriber to the cypherpunks. Expert in number theory and NSA
arcania. Posts very authoritatively to the list, and when he does its
short and sweet, and a keeper. Even has a phone number. Has a nice
signature complete with a cute quote: `death is the ultimate form of
censorship' along with his phone number (work). Signed up on a public
access Internet system that requires no authentication of identity.
Address jr@netcom.com. Perhaps he has even described his troublesome
toils in software development projects with a large company. Cultivated
personal relationships with people in email.

But JR does not exist. He is the figment of somebody's imagination,
let's call her Medusa. The phone number reaches her. When she gets a
call on the `JR' phone she speaks in a deep voice and talks about
software development. It's rather rare that anyone calls anyway, and
she rather loathes it when it happens and does not encourage anyone to
do so. She's very guarded in phone conversations, and often takes the
offensive stance by asking questions. `What are you calling about?'
`Why should this be important?' etc. She never volunteers personal
information under the JR voice for obvious reasons.

She uses the jr@netcom.com account in a very systematic way. When she
has interesting information she is very careful about presenting it in
a way that maximizes her posting reputation under the JR pseudonym. If
the information is related to his personality, she posts it under his
identity in a characteristic way, perhaps even with consistent
mispellings and a certain style. She never posts uncharacteristically
under JR, such as talking about some other arbitrary subject she's
knowledgable on but would be a bit surprising if JR said anything about it.

Okay, let's stop and take note of this. Is any `deception' going on
here? Absolutely. Should this be permitted? I don't think so, but
perhaps others do. (Certainly many have contacted me to say so.) Many
are saying `you can't prevent this' etc. `it's harmless and her
cyberspatial right to build up her reputation under a digital pseudonym.'

So, let's go further and explore this. Suppose Medusa also has an
account snake@netcom.com. She cultivates another personality and
reputation from that address, as an authority on mail forgery, guerilla
warfare, and sabotage. Again, she is careful to never post on
`uncharacteristic' subjects, *particularly* those that would overlap
with JR, because that would cast suspicion on the uniqueness of the two
identities. Is all this still OK with everyone?

* * *

But let's now look at the interplay of postings on a mailing list. The
whole point is that a *dialogue* is in action, right? That's the draw.
The mailing list is not just a endless series of contextless messages
existing independently (quite contrary to what a lot of
`pseudothinkers' have been telling me lately). People respond to each
other, carry on conversations, quote each other, flame, criticize,
comment, contradict, rebut, reject, congratulate, even lauch private
email conversations from public postings. (And these private dialogues
can be highly rewarding, in many ways more than reading the list
itself, which tends to be `noisy'.)

And, in fact, all this feedback is actually the *basis* of the best
reputations. When someone posts something that is extremely relevant to
the conversation at hand, their reputation in the eyes of their
colleagues increases. When they rebut an argument with a stellar
comeback, their own esteem is raised in the eyes of the group just as
the victim's is lowered. When they post something that is authoritative
on a given subject, again they are admired. `posting is reputation'.

Finally, there can even be an interplay *behind the scenes* of the
mailing list. People might organize meetings or go to parties with
people they have met on the list. For some, this is sort of the holy
grail of online interaction, and gives it true meaning. The interplay
of reputations between this and a mailing list is complex. Someone's
reputation might be raised or lowered because of their `realspace' vs.
`cyberspace' personas. And the possibilities of outside project
development can be extremely important, especially if a mailing list is
designated to discuss some endeavor, say PEM software standards or whatever.

* * *

But the problem with all this is that in a regular social setting,
there are some very ancient, venerable, and sophisticated rules
involving propriety and courtesy of communication that break down
dangerously on any online `forum' when a single person has multiple
pseudonyms, and these `subversive uses' are what I will expand on.

For example, many people become annoyed when someone talks too much,
roughly analogous in cyberspace to postings that are too long or too
frequent. In fact, this repulsion may be so strong as to cause people
to reject messages simply because of it and irrespective of content
(which might nevertheless have consistently high or at least above-average quality).

Moreover, many people are highly annoyed by others who are constantly
stroking their own fragile egos. `I am great because I did this.' It's
quite nauseating at times with some! People often tune out or reject
comments like this with something like `mental filters'. Reputations
can be affected in extreme cases. `Oh, that JR is so quiet.' `Oh, that
Medusa is so vain.'

Also, some people turn out to be control freaks, and various degrees of
clever euphemisms can be used to hide their inherent dominative
tendencies. `You do this because I say so.' `That is the wrong way to
do what you want to do.' `*work* with me!' `you are being uncooperative'.

The final and most important aspect of group communication psychology
is that of *consensus* and *peer pressure*. This can be an
extraordinarily powerful force. Many people are `lurkers' and are most
influenced by what they perceive to be other's opinion on various
subjects, or the general group feelings as gauged through multiple
postings. They are unlikely to question what they read.

* * *

Now let's look at how some of these proprieties can be thwarted to the
detriment of community by use of pseudospoofing, in the case of Medusa
and JR. First, notice that a single person could get away with far more
postings if they all successfully matched the online personas. In fact,
this could become quite a problem with traffic on the list at very high
levels with everyone actually trying to *break apart* their posts into
different identities to maximize the reputations associated with each
-- a rather bizarre disincentive.

A sort of anti-respect might develop for people who take the time to
write long postings. They would look atypical in the forum. They might
even be perceived as being egotistical and simply trying to assuage
their own reputation through a lot of concerted effort under a single
identity. Have you ever met anyone who hated you the more you
accomplished and the more successful you were? This translates very
directly into the cyberspatial realm.

This leads directly into the ego case. What about people who are simply
out to assuage their own ego? Suppose Medusa wishes to do this. She
could `stage' very clever situations where jr@netcom.com says `I heard
that Medusa knows a lot about industrial sabotage, and am always
fascinated by her posts.' Medusa pops up a few messages later under
snake@netcom.com and says `Thanks Jim, I really respect your knowledge
of number theory too, and I hope you can provide some more updates on
it' and launches into an amazingly relevant post, considering what Jim asked about.

So, cypherpunks, what do you think of that? This strikes me as rather
perverted. In reality, if Jim and Medusa were different entities, this
would generate significant respect for both. But if they were the same
entity, this would just be a twisted deception. And anyone who found
out about it might feel very misled and disillusioned. Someone had
created the false impression of reputation that was nothing but a sham.

Of course, this all seems very implausible. Why would anyone go through
*so much trouble* to do this? the problem is that we can ask this
problem about a lot of `criminal' behaviors, and the situation is that
every perversion known to man has been practiced at some time or
another, *especially* when circumstances permit it. If there are
certain people who are so consumed by reverence for online reputation,
multiple personality fantasies from e.g. fiction, and getting away with
clever deceptions, they would be *drawn* to an environment where this is possible.

A person with a very fragile ego would be drawn into defending all of
`its' identities with the different online personas. If someone
attacked snake@netcom.com, a message from jr@netcom.com might pop up
saying that `Medusa is my best friend, and you're a paranoid ranter.'
This is like having `someone else' do the dirty work for you, and with
great irony that `someone else' is yourself. In very extreme cases,
suppose that Medusa has a cherished belief, for example, in the basic
propriety of multiple personality disorder. If that was ever questioned
on the list by anyone, perhaps she would be so upset as to engage
*both* jr@netcom.com and snake@netcom.com.

Let's now look at the penultimate case, where someone is a control
freak. Suppose they wished to create support for a project or inhibit
others working on a project not within their agenda. Whenever someone
pops up, they are flamed. `Medusa knows what she is talking about. I
heard that she has done all these things. Don't do anything until you
have talked to her.' `Thank you! That's quite correct! Anyone involved
with this should contact me personally, or wait until we are finished.
It's definitely in the works.'

Finally, let's look at how peer pressure can be influenced by these
pseudonymous postings of Medusa's. Obviously, she has created the
illusion of support or rejection of something that is not consistent
with reality. It is a deception. People may have lowered or raised
their opinion of something merely because they saw multiple posts
criticizing the same thing, when they all came ultimately from Medusa.
In the absolute worst case they would alter their *real space*
activities or perceptions, perhaps thinking that someone else is a jerk
and avoiding meeting them in person, or giving up work on a particular
project because someone else was apparently farther along.

By this time it should be clear that Medusa does not really have any
ethics or morality, if she is going to deceive and manipulate people
like this. She might even create imaginary `realspace' illusions to
augment her elaborate cyberspatial fantasies. She might make up
progress reports on various projects, and have various details
confirmed by JR. If someone pops up on the list saying `I haven't seen
anything going on with this' JR would pop up and say `don't worry, you
can be sure that it's happening.' These fantasies would totally pollute
and poison any trust in an online community. It could be compared to brainwashing.

* * *

Let's add some new dimensions to our little thought experiment. Suppose
that the possibility of *private* email is added to all these areas,
and that *very many* pseudonyms could be maintained with a minimum of
effort. First, again, the `talk too much' case. If someone is posting
too often, Medusa would not like that because it detracts from her own
arsenal of pseudonymous identities. She would flame from her array of
identities in public postings. If the person persists, she could
assault him with private email, especially in the one-two form `I
really admire and respect what you've done, but you've really got to be
quieter.' The first half of the sentence generates respect, and the
second half manipulates the listener. 

And if someone got this flame from *both* JR and Medusa in private
email, they might be quite intimidated. `gosh, these cypherpunk members
seem to know what they are talking about, and they say I'm out of line,
so I better cut it out.' Even if the person had never `met' these
identities before, they could be manipulated. In fact, totally
arbitrary new identities could be created and still influence some
people. `this person is responding to my public posting, so s/he
obviously is a contributing member and his opinion counts. If they are
telling me to shut up, I'd better be quiet. Especially if JR, a
software engineer who I have a great deal of personal respect for says
so.' Even if other cypherpunks would be aghast to find out there were
behind-the-scenes flames going on, they might never know. Some people,
while at the same time just deleting flames, can be very upset by them.

Note that in all these cases, if any of this was going on in `real
world meetings' it would be considered shocking depravity. In the
online realm, some are championing it all as `newly liberating freedoms
from true anonymity'. Note that if these messages were sent
*anonymously* there would not be much of a problem. People would
realize they could be coming from anyone, including the known
powermongers on the list, and dismiss them without too much value.

Now let's look again at the `ego' case. This can be *extremely*
compelling when orchestrated via multiple identities and private email.
Imagine a person criticizes Medusa on the list, and gets a barrage of
public and private flames. `You are really way out of line here. Medusa
has done all of these things for the cypherpunks.' There could be all
kinds of `damage control' where different pseudonymous entities try to
clean up the holes, each one addressing a different aspect of the
criticism. All this could be done without snake@netcom.com ever sending
*anything*! An entire illusion of respect for an entity could be
manufactured. It might look something like an `elite clique' to anyone
who didn't know there was a single entity behind the postings.

Again, the case of the control freak. Obviously the ability to create
the illusion of consensus in public postings and private mail would be
extremely dangerous but very enticing for Medusa, who has no
compunctions about deceit and treachery. A megalomaniac would be quite
drawn to the capability. They would even be interested in developing
powerful software to keep track of all the identities to prevent any
`crossings' (a leak of information that reveals a link between
identities). What's to prevent them? Certainly not a personal
conscience. With all of this, quite a barrage of misinformation could
be orchestrated, a sort of mental invasion campaign. Medusa could
systematically `break down' any resistance to her evil plans for world
domination <g> `behind the scenes' without anyone ever knowing it. If
anyone said something, they would be accused of harboring bizarre
conspiracy theories and violating the trust of personal email.

Finally, what about the idea of consensus and peer pressure under this
system? I think it has become clear that an entire *movement* could be
faked with this system. A mailing list could turn into a sort of
international brainwashing machine for Medusa's evil agenda. Combine
the possibility that there is more than one Medusa -- perhaps she has
several sisters. They are all conspiring behind the scenes to break
down resistance, confuse and obfuscate their opponent's arguments with
psychological mind-bombs, and promote it all under something like
Liberation of the Universe. An ingenous tactic would be to litter the
mailing list with pseudospoofed posts that attack irrelevant points and
obscure the original messages of real people. Who would ever know? What
would prevent it? What is our protection? After all, creating multiple
identities and pseudospoofing is a fundamental right of cyberspace,
right? With it, the liberation of the world is at hand!

Another astonishing possiblity is that Medusa is actually present on
*multiple* mailing lists and newsgroups. She could assault people in
all kinds of ways. She might see that someone she hates has posted to
some arbitrary list, and try to strike up a new conversation with them
with a unique tentacle. The person would be *wholly* unsuspecting
because of the `distance' of the body and the tentacle. He might let
strategic information slip to Medusa that compromises his protection
and privacy based on this empty trust.

Obviously, all this would be *extremely* difficult to detect,
especially if no one had the capability to trace even pseudonymous
identities to unique people. There would be various suspicious signs,
however. If `newbies' consistently popped up out of nowhere to ask
seemingly staged questions, provide setups, or comment on issues they
would presumably have little knowledge to do so (such as the general
list quality, the `movement', etc.) it would look very suspicious. 
Let's say that Medusa was extremely sensitive about `newbie flames'
because she had been accused in the past of being hostile to newcomers.
She might stage a routine where she helps out a `newbie' just to
deflect the criticism and `prove' that she is actually very gracious.
She would post to reaffirm that. `Why, I just helped out that newbie
with the book reference.' If anyone who was confronted about the
possibility of personally pseudospoofing instead deflected concern with
satire and no specific denials, it would also be suspicious.

* * *

The very final possibility of pseudospoofing I would like to describe ,
perhaps the most treacherous and evil, is the following. Suppose Medusa
not only had no ethics and morality, but was actually Satan in
disguise. Suppose that she liked to torment and `punish' people with
her `tentacles' whenever they `misbehaved', measured by their
resistance to her oppression. She could be quite unpleasant, don't you
think? She could consistently flame their arguments from different
tentacles even if the posts were intelligent, just out of spite. She
might bait them and say `I have some information for you' and when they
reply in a query, snatch it from their fingers. She might have all her
sisters try to work on the person in particular and break them down.
`You are not going to have any friends if you keep this up. Why are you
such a troublemaker, anyway? You are rude and have no manners. You need
to grow up and stop thinking that everyone is out to get you. That path
leads to madness.' Or, if the person has recognized the brainwashing
and is amidst flight, she could try to lead him back to darkness. `Oh,
I so enjoyed your posts, please reconsider.' This from a tentacle the
victim has never heard from before.

Now imagine the most fantastic possibility of all, that Medusa is so
interested in tormenting a certain (from her view) `uncooperative'
individual that she no longer even cares about converting him. Let's
call him Luke Skywalker. Even the arguments like `I am your father,
join the dark side, and together we can rule the universe' from many
other tentacles have failed.

In utter desperation she might still endeavor to build up another
situation to simply gain his trust, say, with even a respectable Jim
Riverman tentacle. `Luke -- I saw your post on lightsaber techniques,
and I'm really impressed.' She could try to cultivate the trust over a
long series of posts by responding to questions and revealing some
simple information she knows would interest him. `yes, there seems to
be some kind of clique or conspiracy going on'. Then she would slip in
things like `what do you know about it?' `what do you think of Medusa,
anyway?' Or, if she already knew that Luke thought she was evil, she
might say `Luke -- that bastard Medusa has really gotten to me too. You
should see my newbie posts she flamed me over! I don't know what to do.
What are you going to do?'

If Luke were naive, gullible, trusting, open, and honest, he might let
very serious strategic information leak, partly in the hopes that Jim
Riverman could help him personally, and together they could choke the
monster. But Luke would just be betrayed by yet another tentacle. What a pity.

* * *

But perhaps you think otherwise! Ah, the Joy of Psuedospoofing. Let
Medusa and Her head of snakes thrive in Cyberspace, and let's all bathe
in the beauty of Her radiance! Weekly virgin sacrifices on the altar of
the Death Star!

A person said to me, `I think the Usenet credo, `live with it',
applies.'  another said, `that which cannot be enforced should not be
prohibited.' another said, `if I were to prevent you from posting to
the list, that would not be censorship.' another said, `bowel
movement?' another said, `the assertion that [T.C.May] is Jamie
Dinkelacker is just too bizarre to be believed.' another said `on that
path lies madness'.

--

``Death is the ultimate form of censorship.'' (author unknown)

Jim Riverman
Software Engineer
jr@netcom.com
(415) 941-4782 [work]




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Panzer Boy <panzer@drown.slip.andrew.cmu.edu>
Date: Sun, 24 Oct 93 23:38:46 PDT
To: Cypherpunk Mailing List <cypherpunks@toad.com>
Subject: Signing Messages & Other Ramblings
Message-ID: <Pine.3.05.1.9310250122.A1164-c100000@drown.slip.andrew.cmu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

First, I would like to make sure that Eric Hughes knows that by his simple
little push he has gotten someone (me) to install some code for Emacs to
auto-sign messages.  This, with external editing capabilities of Pine,
allow me to sign all my outgoing mail extremely easily.  If anyone would
like help on this, just send me mail, and I can explain how to do it.

L Detweilers obvious disliking towards people not being who they say they
are.  This is an obvious problem with the net.  The net is based on a
model of people trusting everyone else.  Nothing that is posted or or sent
out from net machines has verification on it.  Currently this implies that
the users need to do their own verification.  Creating software that
automatically handles signatures in and out, handles the fact that every
machine but your own is not to be trusted.  Assuming that people are going
to be truthful and nice to you all the time is a nice fantasy, yet it
rarely happens.  It does happen more often on the Net than it does is
"Real-Life" though.

I have spoofed mail before, mostly as a joke among friends.  All of my
"targets" were told sooner or later about the joke.  Because this
information is not new to me, I don't expect all mail to me to be
originating from the person it says it's from.  You must judge incoming
mail, and posts, on their content.  If you have questions about the
content than demand some sort of proof of who they say they are.

People have said they feel "RAPED" when they discover they are talking to
people who aren't who they say they are.  "Raped" is a harsh word, but
chosen obviously for it's violent connotations, even if these connotations
are a bit wrong.

Being the target of "spoofed" mail is like being conned, obviously no one
likes be show that s/he is ignorant.  It hurts, but at the same time, you
shouldn't expect everyone to play by the "honor-system".

When I read mail from people I usually assume it is from the person in the
"From:" line.  But if the mail is something absurd, or controversial, then
I don't automatically assume this.  If for example there was a post from
Hal Finney about the great new digi-cash system that he had implemented
and that it had financial banking from a rich middle eastern country.  I
would probably check the signature, and then even after that I would
probably still wait and see if it was a "black-net" post.

Well, this post has gotten to the length were many people will probably
not read it, so I will stop here, and continue with some other comments
about the new anon-remailer tomorrow.

 -Matt                              | Use the normal means to extract my 
 (panzer@drown.slip.andrew.cmu.edu) | public key for proof of this message

 "That which can never be enforced should not be prohibited."



-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.3a

iQCVAgUBLMs3K+aKxB8nktcBAQHabQP/d7yhWgpGZBIoIqII8cY9nG55HYHgvtox
PkXyfYKnOlzsIjp2toust1Q5A3/n54PBKrUDN9tHVzui6XaCZmKH68fOWYYySKAz
6hanC0R3seYNhUYhoJViCcCG3Ch466q9EKUuDulTU6OLsilzmRvQJn0EJhzd4pht
sRjLQr4iVVM=
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-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: rjc@gnu.ai.mit.edu (Ray)
Date: Sun, 24 Oct 93 22:53:12 PDT
To: ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu (L. Detweiler)
Subject: Re: on the term `signature'
In-Reply-To: <9310250455.AA06984@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Message-ID: <9310250549.AA17848@churchy.gnu.ai.mit.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


L. Detweiler () writes:
> 
> Consider the term `signature' in the conventional connotation of a
> handwritten scrawl. What are the *critical* properties of a handwritten
> signature of a person [x]?
> 
> 1) no person [y] can `forge' the signature of [x]
> 2) the signature of [x] is unique to [x]

   Well (2) is untrue since I know people who can forge signatures with
great precision (even my own).

   Since we're going for an ideal Brave New Cyberspace where forging
ids is impossible, I've got some suggestions. These should make you very
happy:

 1) Phase out handwritten signatures in society and switch to finger prints,
retinal scan, and DNA codes. Whenever you sign anything, the store/business/
govt office will require a blood test (for DNA), retina scan, and finger
print. With today's technologies, these can be made painless and quick.

 2) Require everyone to have a global positioning tracker installed under the
skin so they are "accountable" at all times. This worked great in
demolition man.

 3) Mandatory caller-id, video-id for everyone. No one should be able to
make calls without the other person knowing who you really are. Payphones
should have finger print/retinal scanners for verification.

 4) all new computers should come equipped with finger print recognizing
keyboards. No more spoofed messages posted on people who leave their terminals
accidently logged in (in the computer lab)

 5) get rid of cash! we can't have unaccountable transactions taking place
in the economy. Banish the free market. Nationalize all businesses under
NSA control.

> If a person cannot be traced based on their digital signatures, where
> is the accountability? What if a person signs a document with a
> `digital signature' and *breaks* that contract? you have no recourse
> unless the identity is ultimately identifiable and you can take `that
> body' to court.

   Get a clue for god's sake. Digital signatures won't exist in a vacuum.
No one is going to accept the validity of a signature unless it is signed by
some trusted/certified authority and that authority would be liable for the
person's true name or actions.

   This is exactly how Apple's new DSA system works.

   I'm starting to think someone is pseudospoofing you because your posts
have become so idiotic it reads like a satire. Are you really the same
person who wrote the anonymity faq?
  


-- Ray Cromwell        |    Engineering is the implementation of science;    --
-- EE/Math Student     |       politics is the implementation of faith.      --
-- rjc@gnu.ai.mit.edu  |                         - Zetetic Commentaries      --




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: bart@netcom.com (Harry Bartholomew)
Date: Mon, 25 Oct 93 02:33:14 PDT
To: jamie@netcom.com (Jamie Dinkelacker)
Subject: seconded suspicion
In-Reply-To: <9310250655.AA25136@netcom.netcom.com>
Message-ID: <9310250931.AA17503@netcom5.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> 
> Is Detweiler aka Sternlight? Is that what's really being hidden? Is this
> all a deception distracting us from the NSA/Straumli perversion? I don't
> care about his anguish because I personally believe he's fabricated it to
> toy with us and distract us. 
> ................................
> Jamie Dinkelacker   Palo Alto CA 

    I was going to make this very suggestion myself when I saw
    LD's 1033 line post "Interesting Reading". He, like the 
    notorious Sternlight seems to have infinite time to spend
    on churning out text. 




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: remail@tamsun.tamu.edu
Date: Mon, 25 Oct 93 00:38:41 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: LD and Spoofing
Message-ID: <9310250733.AA24962@tamsun.tamu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I/We have been laughing so hard I/We have almost been crying,
LD has really gone and lost it...
Come on Brace up LD... you were such a fervent defender of
privacy and anonymity such a short time ago too...

     Sam




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "L. Detweiler" <ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Date: Mon, 25 Oct 93 01:38:42 PDT
To: hfinney@shell.portal.com (Hal Finney)
Subject: Re: A favor re Detweiler
In-Reply-To: <9310250526.AA08546@jobe.shell.portal.com>
Message-ID: <9310250834.AA10487@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Mr. Finney makes many references to private mail correspondence of mine
and many presumptions of my thoughts, many of which are incorrect and
none of which I have given him permission to do so.

No one would be doing me any favor by contacting me personally over the
`Dinkelacker matter'. Please do not do so. I am very shocked that Mr.
Finney would have made any such request publicly without first
consulting with me. The style of this request reminds me of Mr. May's
public letter of some time ago to M.Landry over a `safe and fun
environment', the latter individual telling me he was shocked over Mr.
May's public address on his own private matter. 

>Nevertheless, in this 
>particular case, the situation is so obviously causing mental suffering 
>that I assume that if Larry's charges were true that Tim would have 
>confessed in order to spare Larry this pain.)

The situation you describe has nothing to do with me personally. I
assume that if there were no merit to the `charges' Mr. May or Mr.
Hughes would have long ago posted a message specifically denying them
instead of obfuscating the issue with satire, evasions, and propaganda.
Mr. Hughes and Mr. May are unresponsive to my personal email. And
because of his complicity in the evasion and rather uncharacteristic
message (with many striking irregularities) I now doubt the existence of H. Finney.

I have tried in total desperation to find someone I respect to condemn
pseudospoofing for the evil it is. No one has done so. My respect for
many individuals has dropped accordingly. My respect for many black
phantoms has dropped accordingly. (I wish I could tell the difference.)
My respect for the cypherpunk group as a whole has dropped accordingly.
`Their' respect for me has dropped accordingly. (There is a lot of
`reputation capital' being transacted at the moment.)

I have resigned my role and unsubscribed from another list I have been
long committed to that is cross-pollinated (or should we say,
`contaminated', `tainted', and `poisoned') by some cypherpunks, over
the same issue of pseudospoofing. I fear I have lended valuable time
and `reputation capital' to a cause, that has become apparent to me
through many public and private letters by many people, to be devoid of
integrity. I blame certain individuals for this treacherous
misrepresentation of basic cypherpunk goals. And as for `being
assaulted in email' there is absolutely no doubt this has happened to
me. Whether by phantoms or real people, I have no idea. I find it
reprehensible that no one can give me any assurance.

I encourage any other `cypherpunks' who find this practice of
pseudospoofing reprehensible to unsubscribe from the list in protest,
and carry out further debate on the `agenda' in newsgroups.

If any systematic and concerted illusions or deceptions relating to
cypherpunks are being promoted by anyone, I will be no party to it. I
will quite to the contrary work to pierce the balloon of deceit with
the sharp needle of truth. Perhaps even from the inside of the balloon.
I suspect that `the Dinkelacker matter' is merely one square inch on
the entire black balloon.

The only service that will aid my `mental anguish' and cause me to
reconsider my involvement with this `group' is a post in the following from:


Newsgroups: talk.politics.crypto,alt.wired
From: tcmay@netcom.com
Subject: Multiple Personality Disorder

I have never posted or emailed under the account jamie@netcom.com.
Jamie Dinkelacker is a distinct human individual from myself. Eric
Hughes and I condemn the poisonous practice of pseudospoofing. It is
not a goal of the cypherpunks. We do not practice it. In fact, we are
investigating ways to prevent it on the list, starting with database of
everyone who has promised not to.

Furthermore, a rumor that actors were used in Wired article photographs
is simply false. To my knowledge anyone ever pictured in a photograph
of any `cypherpunk' group member in the mainstream media was at least a
list subscriber.


``Oh what a tangled web we weave; when first we practice to deceive.''
--``Shakespeare''




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "George A. Gleason" <gg@well.sf.ca.us>
Date: Mon, 25 Oct 93 02:49:00 PDT
To: trebor@foretune.co.jp
Subject: Re: Subliminal Channels
Message-ID: <93Oct25.024352pdt.14124-3@well.sf.ca.us>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


One last point on subliminal advertising... (yeah this is a digress but
anyway)...

Subliminal stimuli can be considered an induction procedure for an
individual behavior change.  Nondrug inductions of every kind (i.e.
meditation, hypnosis, lucid dream techniques, concentration and memory
techniques, progressive relaxation, biofeedback training, etc....) produce
variable results on a population sample; typically the results fall along a
normal curve wherein some people are strongly affected, some are moderately
affected, and some are affected very little if at all.  

The relevance to advertising is, if a technique can reach perhaps 5% of your
readership and then cause 5% of those to alter their behavior favorably
toward your product, you've got a quarter of a percent of the market who at
least try your product once.  In the world of mass marketing, that small
number adds up.  If you were an ad executive, would you voluntarily give up
a tool that can add market share...?  

Also, the heaviest users of certain categories of products, notably alcohol,
are also people who are notoriously suggestible, in the sense that they are
already over-reacting to their environment and are using large amounts of
alcohol in part to self-medicate against that.  Heavy users of any product
are usually seeking to fulfill some psychological need, a secondary need
which can be manipulated far more easily than can the simpler needs of the
average consumers.  This increases the effectiveness of any
psychologically-loaded selling technique.  

I believe Key goes overboard in his own writings, but on the other hand I've
discovered so many examples of this kind of thing that there's no denying
it's going on.  Some of these are so blatant I can show the picture to an
untrained observer and say "what do you think of this?" and s/he immediately
spots the embedded item.  On the other hand, these days there are other
techniques, some far less subtle; for instance, the ads (particularly
billboards) for beverages which show them spurting ejaculatorily from very
phallic bottles... advertisers use anything which works, and that leaves a
whole lot to choose from.  

anyway, back to our regular channel...

-gg




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: remail@tamsun.tamu.edu
Date: Mon, 25 Oct 93 00:58:41 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Multiple Digital Personnas
Message-ID: <9310250754.AA25358@tamsun.tamu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Gee LD some of us participate in Multiple Digital
Personnas by choice:
... some of these are composite consisting of several people 
... some of theses are individual and multiple by one person
... what do you find so wrong with it...


      Sam Hill( An intentional Composite Personna )
    




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: J. Michael Diehl <mdiehl@triton.unm.edu>
Date: Mon, 25 Oct 93 02:57:09 -0600
To: ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu (L. Detweiler)
Subject: Re: the Joy of Pseudospoofing
In-Reply-To: <9310250728.AA09485@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Message-ID: <9310250857.AA12299@triton.unm.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


According to L. Detweiler:
> 
> Not a single person has said they understand what I have been talking
> about in describing the evils of pseudospoofing. Let me be more
> specific. I hope anyone with additional comments can send me email.

Well, I think I know what you are talking about.  People who don't have the
balls to express their opinions without the use of a pseudonym agrivate me
also.  Now if they were saying something "dangerous," that would be another
story.  Just my thoughts on the matter.

You can quote me if the flames get to hot for you. ;^)


J. Michael Diehl   ;^)  |*The 2nd Amendment is there in case the 
mdiehl@triton.unm.edu   | Government forgets about the 1st!  <RL>
Mike.Diehl@f29.n301.z1  |*God is a good Physicist, and an even 
    .fidonet.org        | better Mathematician.  <Me>
al945@cwns9.ins.cwru.edu|*I'm just looking for the opportunity to 
 (505) 299-2282 (voice) | be Politically Incorrect! <Me>
Can we impeach him yet? |*Protected by 18 USC 2511 and 18 USC 2703. 



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "George A. Gleason" <gg@well.sf.ca.us>
Date: Mon, 25 Oct 93 02:59:16 PDT
To: ebrandt@jarthur.Claremont.EDU
Subject: Re: Subliminal Channels
Message-ID: <93Oct25.025749pdt.14124-1@well.sf.ca.us>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Okay, one last post from me on this subject....

An academic text was published in the late 70s or early 80s on this, the
title was _Subliminal Stimulation_ if I remember correctly.  Most decent
university psych libraries should have a copy.  I don't recall the author or
editor's name, though I did read it while an undergrad.  The gist of it was
that there *is* an effect but it's *fairly small* in terms of the subject
population.  As I said before, any induction procedure will work for some
segment of the population, so it's not surprising.  

I have to put myself in the middle on this arguement.  On one hand I think
Key went overboard; it would seem that what happened was he spent his
professional life doing advertising and then someone pointed out something
that was going on, and he over-reacted in the manner of anyone who suddenly
finds he's unwittingly been violating his own morals.  I would suggest that
some of the stuff he's trying to point to is valid, but a lot of it is
improbable to the point where I think a clinically trained observer might
see signs of paranoia.  Now on the other hand, I've found too many really
blatant examples of psychologically devious advertising techniques to write
this stuff off entirely.  The point isn't whether Key is a great
whistle-blower or a raving loonie; it isn't even whether there are forests
of hidden genitals growing in ad illustrations... the point is whether the
effect of saturation in psychologically-loaded high-production media aimed
toward promoting passive consumerism is healthy for a culture or for the
free will and dignity of its members.  And I would say it certainly is not.

-gg




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: J. Michael Diehl <mdiehl@triton.unm.edu>
Date: Mon, 25 Oct 93 02:03:47 PDT
To: remail@tamsun.tamu.edu
Subject: Re: New Project: Lets ALL create Multiple Digital Personalities
In-Reply-To: <9310250804.AA25552@tamsun.tamu.edu>
Message-ID: <9310250903.AA12368@triton.unm.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


According to remail@tamsun.tamu.edu:
> 
> In Honor of LD I/We propose we execute Operation MEDUSA.
> Since PseudoNyms bother LD so much, I/We propose
> that all begin to use them.

This is getting childish.  Please take this discussion to rec.talk.moronic.
Then, please grow up.  And now back your regularly scheduled program....
I hope!


J. Michael Diehl   ;^)  |*The 2nd Amendment is there in case the 
mdiehl@triton.unm.edu   | Government forgets about the 1st!  <RL>
Mike.Diehl@f29.n301.z1  |*God is a good Physicist, and an even 
    .fidonet.org        | better Mathematician.  <Me>
al945@cwns9.ins.cwru.edu|*I'm just looking for the opportunity to 
 (505) 299-2282 (voice) | be Politically Incorrect! <Me>
Can we impeach him yet? |*Protected by 18 USC 2511 and 18 USC 2703. 



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: remail@tamsun.tamu.edu
Date: Mon, 25 Oct 93 01:08:41 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: New Project: Lets ALL create Multiple Digital Personalities
Message-ID: <9310250804.AA25552@tamsun.tamu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


In Honor of LD I/We propose we execute Operation MEDUSA.
Since PseudoNyms bother LD so much, I/We propose
that all begin to use them.

     Sam




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: szabo@netcom.com (Nick Szabo)
Date: Mon, 25 Oct 93 04:24:49 PDT
To: jamie@netcom.com (Jamie Dinkelacker)
Subject: Re: A favor re Detweiler (ha ha ha)
In-Reply-To: <9310250655.AA25136@netcom.netcom.com>
Message-ID: <9310251120.AA21774@netcom5.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Jamie Dinkelacker:
>[wonders why Detweiler hasn't phoned himself or Tim May]
> The only reason Detweiler has not executed this test is that he avoids truth.

Harsh, but insightful.  Detweiler seems to have a world-view 
in which people are and should be marching morons who make up their 
minds via peer pressure, perceived majority, consensus, etc. rather 
than by listening or reading for content, thinking, or taking action for
themselves.  A phenomenon which disrupts this cherished "democratic" 
state of affairs is "utterly perverted" and "evil".  S(he) who promotes 
such a change, either specifically or as a side effect of trying to 
return a modicum of privacy to the panoptic, permanently recorded net, 
is a "traitor" who should be "thrown in jail", no less.  Detweiler's 
emotional vision of making every poster "accountable" to mob rule is the 
most convincing argument I've heard yet for privacy on the net, the stronger 
the better, the sooner the better.  I wonder how long it will take 
Detweiler's rhetoric of "perversion" to spread and color other cypherpunks
activities.  If maintaining 'nyms indicates a multiple personality
disorder, then perhaps posting anonymously suggests an inferiority
complex, having something to hide is the sign of a sociopath, etc.
If it's a new and different cultural phenomenon with nuances
that take time to learn, it might well be easier to defame it
as a psychological abnormality, and brand its practioners as 
"criminals", than to learn about it, adapt to it, and/or convert it 
locally to better suit one's own tastes. 

BTW, "Medusa" probably won't last very long after doubling up
with her other 'nym to flame people, having her 'nyms praise
each other, etc.  This isn't theoretical stuff -- a wide variety
of these kinds of things have been tried on BBS's for years. 
There's a big track record out there we can look at.  Making a mistake 
that unmasks your 'nym is very easy: between leaving these pointers 
lying around, the extreme difficulty of maintaining a distinct style 
or personality for an extensive amount of quality posted material, and the 
"treachery" of aquaintences (who can use anon remailers if need be
to umask the 'nym).

Thus, I find Detweiler's speculation of massive political
manipulation by net "pseudo-spoofers" (isn't that redundant)?
to be paranoid and fantastic.  I wonder if Detweiler is as worried 
about the small "clique" of newswrire writers,  
quoted almost verbatim by most print media, and without much more 
than stylistic changes by TV and radio news, a few dozen people
communicating anonymously and via mouthpieces like Dan Rather
to hundreds of millions of people in the English-speaking world?   
This "manipulation" of perceived consensus and majority opinion is 
something a few dozen net "pseudospoofers" on smart 
drugs posting under a thousand 'nyms could never hope to match.

The closest the net comes to political spoofing is
probably voting for Usenet newsgroups -- completely
insecure, there may have been some close votes swayed by
spoofers, but the world doesn't revolve around the results.
Mostly folks don't care enough about newsgroup voting to bother 
to spoof it.

We have two options for electronic voting -- we can make it more
secure, and we can make it less important by changing majority-driven
insitutions with market-driven institutions.   I'm all in favor
of making e-voting more secure, but I don't think it's worth
sacrificing our privacy or civil rights to do so.  I don't
find majority rule to be the only, "SACRED"
way to get important things done in cyberspace.  Right now voting
plays practically no role in cyberspace, and that's also what
the forseeable future looks like.

I've seen 'nym unmasking happen extensively both on BBS's and Usenet.
For example, there was a "Holocaust Revisionist" spoofer
who posted under a series of nyms to Usenenet, the old silly 
argument about only 1 million Jews were killed not 6 million,
the Nazis really intended to facilitate emigration of Jews to
Palestine and instead the Allied bombing trapped them en route
in the camps, ad nauseum.  Professing such opinions can make 
you "accountable" really quick, in many lasting ways.  In this case, 
the spoofer was booted off of techbook.com, the BanishedCPU BBS 
newsfeed was cut off when he signed up there, etc.  

None of this spoofer's 'nyms lasted long; the style was too similar
(consistent differences via purposeful mispelling, different usage 
of capital letters, etc., overdone regional jargon, etc. are easily 
recognized for what they are).  Perhaps it's selection effect, but I've 
never seen a 'nym actively maintained for more than a year without 
unmasking or changing over to another name to avoid that 'nym.  In
anon posts of significant length I've recognized many style 
pointers right off the bat.  Eg, many of us independtly made the 
L.Detweiler/S.Boxx link, I've readily recognized the origin of 
several of Tim May's anon posts, etc.  If we can recognize
links from just one or two posts, how much more difficult to
maintain the ongoing politically persuasive rhetoric suggested by 
Detweiler.  Not saying it's not possible, just that it would take an 
extreme amount of careful effort.  This isn't evidence of "criminality"
or "perversion", it's evidence that the "spoofer" cares enough
to go to those lengths, much as Detweiler cares enough to go
to great lengths to fill up my mailbox with name-calling and
elaborate scenarios.

Anybody know what the world record is for 'nym maintence?

Really important votes, market interactions, etc. should be
made quite a bit more secure than Usenet voting, but at least in 
the case of markets, does not require physical identity to be tied 
to 'nym.  (Cf. for example Chaum's work and per-organziation pseudonyms
and credentials that can be transferred between these 'nyms, 
the ongoing discussion of reputation-building, etc.)

Nick Szabo				szabo@netcom.com




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Jim McCoy <mccoy@ccwf.cc.utexas.edu>
Date: Mon, 25 Oct 93 02:28:57 PDT
To: ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu (L. Detweiler)
Subject: Re: A favor re Detweiler
In-Reply-To: <9310250834.AA10487@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Message-ID: <199310250926.AA20883@tramp.cc.utexas.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text


"L. Detweiler" <ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu> writes:
[...]
> 
> I have tried in total desperation to find someone I respect to condemn
> pseudospoofing for the evil it is. No one has done so. My respect for
> many individuals has dropped accordingly. My respect for many black
> phantoms has dropped accordingly. [...]

> I encourage any other `cypherpunks' who find this practice of
> pseudospoofing reprehensible to unsubscribe from the list in protest,
> and carry out further debate on the `agenda' in newsgroups.

After reading this message, along with several others you have recently
sent to the list (and broadcasted in comp.org.eff.talk) I think that I am
not alone in bringing to your attention the fact that "you just don't get
it." 

Identity as most people know it, and as you are attempting to tightly cling
to, is dead.  Gone.  History.  Stick a fork in it 'cause it's done.

It has no equivalent on the electronic frontier.  Complaining about it and
bemoaning whatever loss you may feel will do nothing to change this fact.
I know this must be difficult for some people to understand; I routinely
get strange looks from people when I reveal that some of my closest friends
are people who I have never "met" in the traditional sense, and that I
regularly play games, exchange messages, and discuss whatever is on my mind
with people from across the globe who have no more physical substance to me
than wisps of phosphor on a crt.  

This is a fundemental paradigm shift that you have not made yet.  It is one
that few have.  If anything, it is shared conceptual memes such as this
subject of identity in a world without substance that is the true
cypherpunk cause.  

> ``Oh what a tangled web we weave; when first we practice to deceive.''
> --``Shakespeare''

Sorry, by this was not written by Shakespeare.  It was penned by Sir Walter
Scott. 

jim

``In a false quarrel there is no true valour''
--Shakespeare



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: bill@twwells.com (T. William Wells)
Date: Sun, 24 Oct 93 23:08:46 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Net Regulation
In-Reply-To: <199310250215.AA03602@panix.com>
Message-ID: <CFFru9.HHH@twwells.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


In article <199310250215.AA03602@panix.com>,
Duncan Frissell <frissell@panix.com> wrote:
: Permanent Tourists are outside US jurisdiction.

I think that's where we're disagreeing.

Let me illustrate by taking myself as an example. I'm reasonably
well connected networkwise and knowledgeable. I could decide to
become one of these Permanent Tourists. But where would I go?

What will be my concerns? Obviously, money will be one of them.
But so also will be climate, people, activities I might not be
willing to do without, and on and on. Furthermore, other
governments are, almost without exception, more repressive than
the one I have.

The bottom line is that I would probably not physically move if I
were to take my economic activities out of the awareness of the US
government. And even if I were to, odds are I would be less safe
than I am now. So I think that most Permanent Tourists would
likely stay right where they are, more or less. Certainly they'd
stay in the developed world, where most governments are willing to
cooperate to some extent in the attempt to collect revenues.

It is a sad fact that governments collectively possess the means
to physically regulate all of the desirable real-estate and most
are more willing than ours to use physical force to pursue their
ends. So Permanent Tourist or not, one can't really escape them.

Sooner or later, of course, this won't matter but, as I've said,
at least for the short term, it _does_.

: B >Yes, that could be prevented, but it won't be prevented by what
: B >the cypherpunks are doing. Sooner or later, the bodies would have
: B >to meet the bullets. That's the way of the world, alas.
:
: Actually, such problems are rare in the OECD countries.  Most enforcement
: here is indirect.  People obey because of fear not direct application of
: force.  Reduce the fear and you reduce the obedience.

Actually, I don't think that's true in the relatively civilized
countries. My understanding is that most people obey out of a
recognition of the legitimacy of government. But that's another
topic and not really germane to this list....

:                                                        The threat we
: represent is a bit to abstract to sell the government on an all-out
: campaign against us that would be difficult and expensive.  I don't think
: the Feds would "go to the mattresses" to fight us.

Not this year or even the next. But what happens when the
printing-press equivalents cease to stave off bankruptcy?

Movement of a sufficient fraction of economic activities outside
their ability to tax would certainly change the equation and give
them lots of incentive to start that all-out campaign....

: If the KGB and the Stasi couldn't prevail against the winds of
: institutional "rightsizing", what chance does one aging dyke have?

Lots. Because people never do seem to learn the lessons of
history, sigh. Not, mind you, that I think they'd "win" for long.
They, too, prefer to ignore history. But while they're attempting
to prevent the working of the laws of nature, a lot of people
will suffer. *More* will suffer if we don't pay attention to this
reality.





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: bill@twwells.com (T. William Wells)
Date: Sun, 24 Oct 93 23:03:12 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Net Regulation
In-Reply-To: <9310250152.AA09786@snark.lehman.com>
Message-ID: <CFFs5I.HMs@twwells.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


In article <9310250152.AA09786@snark.lehman.com>,
Perry E. Metzger <lehman.com!pmetzger> wrote:
: [irrelevancy]

I watched you arguing with Detweiler and thought that you were an
idiot. However, I figured that Detweiler was sufficient
provocation to bring out the idiot in just about anyone so I
ignored that.

But here you have proven that you really don't understand.

This I don't intend to ignore. Welcome to my killfile. When you
figure out why, you may be worthy of being removed from it.





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: dinkelacker@cypherpunks.org (Sam Will - aka rjc - aka Tim - Hal)
Date: Mon, 25 Oct 93 03:03:24 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: TRAITORS to the CAUSE
Message-ID: <9310251002.AA19146@churchy.gnu.ai.mit.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


  The latest LD rant talks about the great cypherpunk cause, to which he has
lent his time, and how it has been "contaminated", "tainted", and "poisoned"
by EVIL TREACHEROUS individuals on this group. These individuals have
misrepresented "basic cypherpunk goals"  Finally, he demands
reparation for his "mental anguish" from Tim May to be posted to
talk.politics.crypto.  I have a sudden urge to say "Get a Life" for some
reason.

  I think Detweiler was operating under some kind of delusion when he
joined this list which is responsible for his anguish.  From my
analysis, it seems LD was under the impression that he was joining
some great social activist movement similar to all the other fringe
groups out there, and that the cypherpunks had some noble cause
of liberation/crypto-ethics.

  However, when I first subscribed to the list (roughly a few weeks after
it was set up), I was told the purpose of this group was to simply discuss
crypto, implications of it, and coordination of crypto-projects like
remailers, digicash systems, pgp, etc.

  Could it be that Lance is looking for ethics on a mailing list whose
motto is "cypherpunks write code" (with no limitations on what kind of
code that will be, including even pseudospoofing software)

[  All of LD's points are technically incorrect anyway because crypto
can be used for both authenication and privacy. (e.g. digital signatures
being "accoutable" legally to the authority which certified/signed them.
Contrary to his rants, digi-sig nyms can be as tracable as real signatures,
even more so depending on how strict you are on your trust model)]

  We've been accused of being conspirators, evil traitors, exploiters, abusers,
and who knows what else, and I'm getting annoyed by it. So I'm making
a proposal. Let's implement Detweiler's philosophy of having everyone
accountable. Using the Extropian's list software, this list could prevent
anyone who isn't voice validated from posting to the list. And as a first
step to improving S/N ratio, I recommend we use the list software's filtering
features to outright censor Detweiler, and any other idiot ranters (plus
all anonymous posters) from the list. I also recommend a list justice
code similar to the Extropian's list where anyone can be PUNISHED for
not obeying the Great and Holy Cypherpunk's cause. As a requirement of
the NEW ORDER (under the new software), all new subscribers will be
required to take a pledge of denouncing pseudospoofing in talk.politics.crypto
before their posting priveleges are turned on.

Sam Will

The Cypherpunks Pledge:
"I hereby proclaim that pseudospoofers are the most vile and disgusting
criminals on the face of the earth. As a cypherpunk, I pledge to fight for
a world where children go to sleep at night secure in the knowledge
that anyone they meet will be who they claim they are."




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: paul@poboy.b17c.ingr.com (Paul Robichaux)
Date: Mon, 25 Oct 93 06:39:06 PDT
To: rjc@gnu.ai.mit.edu (Ray)
Subject: Re: on the term `signature'
In-Reply-To: <9310250549.AA17848@churchy.gnu.ai.mit.edu>
Message-ID: <199310251322.AA08401@poboy.b17c.ingr.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

In a list message, Ray Cromwell wrote:
>    Get a clue for god's sake. Digital signatures won't exist in a vacuum.
> No one is going to accept the validity of a signature unless it is signed by
> some trusted/certified authority and that authority would be liable for the
> person's true name or actions.

>    This is exactly how Apple's new DSA system works.

Actually, not. Apple's PowerTalk environment uses persona certificates
right now, although entities may buy RSA's Safekeeper boxes
("tamperproof" titanium key generators) to generate actual warranted
keys.

All a persona certificate says is that key X belongs to person Y. No
warranty, express or implied, is granted. If I have a persona
certificate, say, from Dun & Bradstreet, all D&B is claiming is that
the key on that certificate belongs to *me*. They could potentially be
liable if the key actually belonged to someone else, but they wouldn't
be liable if I used that key to embezzle $10M from the EFF Digital
Credit Union.

- -Paul


- -- 
Paul Robichaux, KD4JZG     | Caution: cutting edge is sharp. Avoid contact.
Intergraph Federal Systems | Be a cryptography user - ask me how.
	    ** Of course I don't speak for Intergraph. **


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X8NIuOkihCz3DXbllyneUFaIxKuZ9RJdOFswypDIdQMNPvNACXysYpCv++/dQt5/
Lrn93pv66ksh4AaDo69EfvCHnMJd4CkJWMx37z11sXHfl+JvAIFp5VAKfgNNvmn5
zsY8fpg9dsI=
=ohfr
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From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: koontzd@lrcs.loral.com (David Koontz )
Date: Mon, 25 Oct 93 08:45:16 PDT
To: klbarrus@owlnet.rice.edu
Subject: Re: ADMIN: proposed new policy
Message-ID: <9310251542.AA14668@nebula.lrcs.loral.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>I like the idea of encouraging people to digitally sign messages.  I
>also decided to try out ripem to see what its signed documents look
>like.

It seems if transmissions to a list must pass through a server, then
the server should be used for authentication.  Otherwise, the entire
thing is nothing but wasted bandwidth and `visual noise`.  (Unless
it is meant as make work for a three letter agency).




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: dmandl@lehman.com (David Mandl)
Date: Mon, 25 Oct 93 06:20:05 PDT
To: hfinney@shell.portal.com
Subject: Re: A favor re Detweiler
Message-ID: <9310251306.AA13940@disvnm2.lehman.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> From: hfinney@shell.portal.com (Hal Finney)
>  
> I'd like to expend some "reputation capital" here and ask people for a 
> favor.  I am worried about Larry Detweiler's obvious mental anguish.  We 
> tend to forget that we are dealing with real people on the net, flesh 
> and blood human beings.  Larry is obviously going through genuine 
> difficulties here.  As a member of our virtual community, I ask that we 
> show him some compassion and consideration.

I agree.  I was just about to post a message saying the same thing.  At
this point, some of the anti-L.D. posts are becoming downright cruel, and
in my eyes amount to kicking a man when he's down.  Why don't you give it
(and him) a little rest?

   --Dave.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Perry E. Metzger" <pmetzger@lehman.com>
Date: Mon, 25 Oct 93 06:39:51 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Net Regulation
In-Reply-To: <CFFs5I.HMs@twwells.com>
Message-ID: <9310251326.AA14266@snark.lehman.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



T. William Wells says:
> In article <9310250152.AA09786@snark.lehman.com>,
> Perry E. Metzger <lehman.com!pmetzger> wrote:
> : [irrelevancy]
> 
> I watched you arguing with Detweiler and thought that you were an
> idiot. However, I figured that Detweiler was sufficient
> provocation to bring out the idiot in just about anyone so I
> ignored that.
> 
> But here you have proven that you really don't understand.
> 
> This I don't intend to ignore. Welcome to my killfile. When you
> figure out why, you may be worthy of being removed from it.

On the contrary -- I am honored to be in your kill file, given the
apparent criteria. I hope never to leave it.

Perry




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: nate@VIS.ColoState.EDU (CVL staff member Nate Sammons)
Date: Mon, 25 Oct 93 08:59:10 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com (Cypherpunks Mailing List)
Subject: Stupid childish crap cluttering the list
Message-ID: <9310251555.AA13635@vangogh.VIS.ColoState.EDU>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----


Hello, out there?

The list is getting really badly cluttered with all this "lets rag on
LD since he doesn't agree with us" shit.  "Operation Medusa" -- come on, 
it was a little bit funny for a while, but I think that you can find better
things to do with your time than dedicate yourself to the annoyance
of someone, based on the fact that they hold different views about certain
topics near and dear to the hearts of some subscribers.  Some of us are here
to try and change things -  remember that clipper thing that so many (I think
it damn near all of us) of us were up in arms about?  It's still out there.
LD is not the enemy, he's just one of us who holds a different view...
So what if he thinks there should be no pseudospoofing.... let's kill him?
I think not.

I think that most of the list is in agreement with the idea of _not_
requiring signatures on messages.  Fine.  There, that's it.  Done.  Some
of us, me included, try to sign mail whenever possible.  Maybe it's
to set an example, maybe it's just to verify that we are who we say we are.
I even sign some of the mail that doesn't go to the list, just to get people
to ask what the hell it is -- it's raising the public awareness.  But,
I digress.

LD has told me that he is leaving the list.  Some of you may cheer, some
(the more intelligent of you, IMHO), will mourn the loss.  LD could,
at times, rant a bit, but he was a contributing member of the list.  He
had _many_ good things to say, and he is a very dedicated to privacy
(read the "Privacy and Anonymity on the Net" FAQ?) and changing things.

It _really_ pisses me off to see the little armchair Cypherpunks all gang
up when they see someone down.  "Oooo, oooo, LD's not in good favor
with the rest of the guys, let's lick 'em"  Sounds like a bunch of fucking
Beevis and Butthead fans (pardon my french).  Maybe if you guys were 
spending more time writing code or making the public more aware of what
the problem is and who's here to fix it, you wouldn't have the time to
organize campaigns for annoyance.

For a while, everyone thought that LD was objecting to people being able
to post anonymously (wheather it be through anon.penet.fi or bounced
off of a remailer)... that was not (I believe) his point.  He objected to
people posing as other people (who had established reputations, etc).
He wanted to outlaw (in a sense) this act.  I disagree with him here, 
since I cannot think of how to absolutely outlaw it (since saying "don't
do that, it's against the law" seldom works), but I can think of how
to prevent it.  Sign messages.  Don't do it if you don't want to, and don't
complain when people spoof as you because you don't ever sign the messages.
I agree with LD on the idea that posing as someone else with intent to
confuse (LD's "evil black posts" as he calls them) is wrong.

If you are trying to pursuade someone (or confuse them), you should
be smart enough to do it by being anonymous (again, through anon.penet.fi or
through a remailer) or by being yourself.  You should not need to hide 
behind someone else's identity.

Well, there's my opinion, please get off the subject of ragging on LD,
and get back on the track of changing the world.

- -nate

- -- 
+-----------------------------------------------------------------------+
| Nate Sammons   email: nate@VIS.ColoState.Edu
|   Colorado State University Computer Visualization Laboratory
|   Finger nate@monet.VIS.ColoState.Edu for my PGP key
|   Key fingerprint =  2D CD 07 CA 7B EC A8 4A  86 7F F3 A8 1D 15 65 46
|   Title 18 USC 2511 and 18 USC 2703 Protected --> Monitoring Forbidden
+--------+ Guerrilla Cryptographer             Always remember "Brazil"



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: nate@VIS.ColoState.EDU (CVL staff member Nate Sammons)
Date: Mon, 25 Oct 93 09:34:21 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com (Cypherpunks Mailing List)
Subject: test, sorry
Message-ID: <9310251630.AA14875@vangogh.VIS.ColoState.EDU>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----


This is a test.

- -- 
+-----------------------------------------------------------------------+
| Nate Sammons   email: nate@VIS.ColoState.Edu
|   Colorado State University Computer Visualization Laboratory
|   Finger nate@monet.VIS.ColoState.Edu for my PGP key
|   Key fingerprint =  2D CD 07 CA 7B EC A8 4A  86 7F F3 A8 1D 15 65 46
|   Title 18 USC 2511 and 18 USC 2703 Protected --> Monitoring Forbidden
+--------+ Guerrilla Cryptographer             Always remember "Brazil"



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: nate@VIS.ColoState.EDU (CVL staff member Nate Sammons)
Date: Mon, 25 Oct 93 09:39:40 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com (Cypherpunks Mailing List)
Subject: testing, sorry
Message-ID: <9310251634.AA14982@vangogh.VIS.ColoState.EDU>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text


This is a test.

-- 
+-----------------------------------------------------------------------+
| Nate Sammons   email: nate@VIS.ColoState.Edu
|   Colorado State University Computer Visualization Laboratory
|   Finger nate@monet.VIS.ColoState.Edu for my PGP key
|   Key fingerprint =  2D CD 07 CA 7B EC A8 4A  86 7F F3 A8 1D 15 65 46
|   Title 18 USC 2511 and 18 USC 2703 Protected --> Monitoring Forbidden
+--------+ Guerrilla Cryptographer             Always remember "Brazil"



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Arthur Chandler <arthurc@crl.com>
Date: Mon, 25 Oct 93 10:54:07 PDT
To: CVL staff member Nate Sammons <nate@vis.colostate.edu>
Subject: Re: Stupid childish crap cluttering the list
In-Reply-To: <9310251555.AA13635@vangogh.VIS.ColoState.EDU>
Message-ID: <Pine.3.05.9310251047.A6097-a100000@nfs.crl.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



   Cheers for this note of sanity and compassion -- also proposed by Hal
Finney. Why can't we just discuss the pros and cons of the
spoofing/pseudonymity issue without flaming someone who feels very
passionately about the issue? The very vehemence of the discussion clearly
indicates that LD hit some nerves, and that fact alone should alert us to
try to consider the matter -- and post our replies -- dispassionately. Or,
if passion there must be, direct it to the issues, and not the people who
disagree with us.








From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "John M. Keaty" <keaty@vnet.IBM.COM>
Date: Mon, 25 Oct 93 08:07:48 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: how to sign on to the cypherpunks listserver
Message-ID: <9310251458.AA20483@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Can you give me instructions on how to sign on to the cypherpunks
listserver?
Thanks
John Keaty    keaty@vnet.ibm.com




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Robert J Woodhead <trebor@foretune.co.jp>
Date: Sun, 24 Oct 93 19:03:12 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Totally Anonymous Remailing
Message-ID: <9310250201.AA21182@dink.foretune.co.jp>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Just toying around with some ideas, and came up with this:

Totally Anonymous Remailing (V1.0)

An "TAR" goes active on the net at site anon.com.
It publishes a Public Key.

1) Creating an anonymous ID.

A User sends message to create-id@anon.com, encrypted with the TAR's
Public key.  The message contains four elements:

	A Public Key generated by the User.
	A Proposed Pseudonym (ie: "Artful-Dodger")
	The Proposed Pseudonym encrypted by the User's Private Key.
	
At this point, the TAR can verify that the new user isn't spoofing
by giving someone else's public key.  It does not reply to the
email message, nor does it store the source (which in any case
could be another anonymous remailer).  If the new Pseudo isn't in
use, it gets allocated.  If it is, it does not.

2) Sending mail to an anonymous ID

Works the same as sending mail to anyone else.  However, on receipt
it is immediately encrypted with the recipients Public key and
placed in a Mail queue.  It is _not_ automatically forwarded.

3) Using an anonymous ID.

The User sends a message to use-id@anon.com, encrypted with the
TAR's Public key.  The message contains the following:

	The User's Pseudonym (ie: "Artful-Dodger@anon.com")
	Command
	Command Specific Parameters

The Command and Parameters are encrypted with the User's private
Key.  This has several nice features that will become apparent
later.

If the command contains errors, or does not decrypt properly, the
anon mailer places an error message into the Pseudonym's mail
queue, but does not otherwise reply.

Commands would be typical:

	MAIL <username(s)>
	{ CC <username(s)>}
	{ BCC <username(s)>}
	{ SUBJECT <whatever>}
	<message>

		Sends <message> using psuedonym.  <messages>
		ought to be encrypted.

	POST <newsgroups(s)>
	SUBJECT <whatever>
	<message>

		Posts <message> using psuedonym.  You could
		verify your pseudo was accepted by posting
		to a worldwide test group.

	SEND <destination>

		Sends accumulated mail, in a batch, to the
		email address specified.  So you can log on
		to any account, even a guest, and get your
		mail.

and so on.  Might be nice to make it a shell on top of something
like MH, and allow you to manage your mailbox remotely and
anonymously.

BTW, none of this double-blind crap.  If someone wants to
reply anonymously, they ought to create their own pseudo.

Anon-net:

Note that use-id@ has a nice property.  Assume there is another
anon server, noname.com, which gets a message, encrypted with
it's public key, that is a command for Artful-Dodger@anon.com.
It can simply re-encrypt the message with anon.com's public key
and pass it on, never having seen the command because it is
encrypted - and only anon.com knows Artful-Dodger's public key,
because Artful only sent it to anon once, encrypted with anon's
key.  The extension - several anon sites passing mail back and
forth regularly (all encrypted batches containing several real
and fake messages) - is obvious and makes traffic analysis
more difficult (especially as the number of sites goes up).

There could also be a facility for one-shot "bounces," the
ability to use the anon site to bounce an email to a restricted
number of addresses (typically, other anon sites).  So you could
email to noname (using noname's key) and have the message bounced
to anon.  So you could have an account on anon and yet never
directly send email to anon -- it would never at any time have
any clue as to your identity.

Of course, you'd have to trust the software.  And some work needs
to be done to ensure the net stays viable even if some of the
sites have been subverted.

This is only a first draft, probably many mistakes.
Comments?





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Peter shipley <shipley@merde.dis.org>
Date: Mon, 25 Oct 93 11:34:36 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: No Subject
Message-ID: <9310251827.AA14837@merde.dis.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


------- Forwarded Message

Return-Path: tpc-rp-request@aarnet.edu.au
Return-Path: <tpc-rp-request@aarnet.edu.au>
Message-Id: <9310251638.AA17387@skigo.graphics.cornell.edu>
To: tpc-rp@aarnet.edu.au
Subject: Re: My first hole-punching! 
In-Reply-To: Your message of "Sun, 24 Oct 93 22:13:01 PDT."
             <9310250513.AA03502@antigone.com> 
Date: Mon, 25 Oct 93 12:38:23 -0400
From: Mitch Collinsworth <mkc@graphics.cornell.edu>
X-Mts: smtp
X-Ploder: dailim
Precedence: bulk


>Anonymous sending throws a new twist on the tpc guidelines which  
>allow me to lock out a sender... 

Yes, I think so.  I've been thinking about setting up a server, but I
think it would only make sense to lock out all *@anon.penet.fi and
similar sources.

- -Mitch

------- End of Forwarded Message





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: cme@ellisun.sw.stratus.com (Carl Ellison)
Date: Mon, 25 Oct 93 08:34:38 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: updated text of the MTTF paper
Message-ID: <9310251531.AA05254@ellisun.sw.stratus.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


What I sent out was dashed together last June and never polished.
Here's text after one re-write...

 - Carl

(Equations haven't changed...)

--------------------------------------------------------------------

\documentstyle[12pt]{article}

\begin{document}

\title{MTTF of Various Systems}
\author{Carl M. Ellison \thanks{Stratus Computer Inc., 55 Fairbanks Blvd.,
Marlborough MA 01752. Email address: {\tt cme@sw.stratus.com}.}}
\date{October 25, 1993}

\maketitle

\begin{abstract}
Expressions are presented for the Mean Time To Failure (MTTF) of various
redundant systems, as a function of the number of nodes in the system, N,
and the minimum number of nodes in a working system, K.  Failure of a
system is defined as having fewer than K working nodes.
\end{abstract}

\section{Expressions} 
Redundant systems are employed both to increase availability and to achieve
preservation of data.

Expressions for the availability of a redundant system are to be found in
normal probability and statistics texts.  [See for example, Kishor S.
Trivedi, "Probability and Statistics with Reliability, Queuing, and
Computer Science Applications" from Prentice-Hall, 1982.]  These assume
that once a system has recovered from total failure, it is as usable as it
was before the system failure.

Mean Time To Failure (MTTF) is concerned with the case that once a system
has achieved total failure, something is lost.  This might apply to
redundant disks, for example.

The expressions presented below are for the MTTF of various redundant
systems, as a function of the number of nodes in the system, N, and the
minimum number of nodes in a working system, K.  Failure of a system is
defined as having fewer than K working nodes.  Often, K=1 and each node has
a complete copy of each database.  However, sometimes the data can be kept
on multple nodes (as in a RAID-5 disk array) which will tolerate some
failures, down to a given threshold, K > 1.

It is assumed that as soon as a failure occurs, a repair cycle will be
started.  There is then a race to see if the repair can be completed before
enough additional nodes fail to drop the working number below K.

The expressions below were derived from custom Markov chains, each built to
model a given choice of N and K.  It is assumed that both failures and
repairs are exponentially distributed random events (so that the Markov
chains remain memoryless).  This is a reasonable model for failures but
not for repairs.  Therefore, these expressions are approximations.

The expressions also assume that all failure events are independent.  For
example, a multi-node system in which all nodes are on the same power grid
would not have completely independent failure events.

N: number of nodes in a full system

K: number of nodes in a minimally functional system

$\lambda$: rate of failures (e.g., number of node failures per year)

$\mu$: rate of node repair (in the same units as $\lambda$)

Each fraction below is the MTTF of the whole system: the mean time until a
system drops to (K-1) working nodes.

N =  2 ;  K =  1

\begin{equation}
\frac { 3\lambda + 1\mu }{ 2\lambda^2 }
\end{equation}

N =  3 ;  K =  1

\begin{equation}
\frac { 11\lambda^2 + 4\lambda\mu + 1\mu^2 }{ 6\lambda^3 }
\end{equation}

N =  3 ;  K =  2

\begin{equation}
\frac{ 5\lambda + \mu }{ 6\lambda^2 }
\end{equation}

N =  4 ;  K =  1

\begin{equation}
\frac { 50\lambda^3 + 18\lambda^2\mu + 5\lambda\mu^2 + 1\mu^3 }{ 24\lambda^4 }
\end{equation}

[etc.]

\end{document}




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: owen@autodesk.com (D. Owen Rowley)
Date: Mon, 25 Oct 93 13:44:09 PDT
To: pmetzger@lehman.com
Subject: Re: Net Regulation
Message-ID: <9310251903.AA26004@lux.YP.acad>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



 > From: "Perry E. Metzger" <pmetzger@lehman.com>
  > Admittedly, if someone could put a *loyal* armed soldier over
 > everyone's shoulder on earth they could control everyone. How, though,
 > could they manage to do this?

by getting them dependent on network connectivity for even the most basic 
communicatiosn between themselves other that face to face communications,
and then using AI agents as the soldiers.?

just athought!

LUX ./. owen




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Panzer Boy <panzer@drown.slip.andrew.cmu.edu>
Date: Mon, 25 Oct 93 09:39:41 PDT
To: Cypherpunk Mailing List <cypherpunks@toad.com>
Subject: Re: the Joy of Pseudospoofing Satan
In-Reply-To: <9310250728.AA09485@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Message-ID: <Pine.3.05.1.9310251251.B2130-b100000@drown.slip.andrew.cmu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


On Mon, 25 Oct 1993, L. Detweiler wrote:
> The very final possibility of pseudospoofing I would like to describe ,
> perhaps the most treacherous and evil, is the following. Suppose Medusa
> not only had no ethics and morality, but was actually Satan in
> disguise. Suppose that she liked to torment and `punish' people with
> her `tentacles' whenever they `misbehaved', measured by their
> resistance to her oppression.

(L Detweiler != S Boxx) Based on articulation capabilities
(L Detweiler == Satan) ???
I had to give up here.  But when "digital signatures", "rape", and "Satan"
can all come up in a single thread, things have gotten out of hand.

Ok, after finally reading most of LD's post, I've come to the conclusion
that LD doesn't like the fact that people lie.  He doesn't like the fact
that people mis-represent themselves, etc.

I do ask you L Detweiler, what you consider of this case.  In "real-life"
awhile back there was a womem who was an actor.  She didn't like the fact
that she needed an agent to get work.  So she invented a personality, an
became her own agent.  She aquired a different personality, different
voice patterns, etc, for this agent.  She made sure the agent did
everything over the phone, never meeting clients in person.  Soon after
doing this, she started being an agent for other actors also.  She
obviously spoke well of her actorself when she was in her agentself, and
she obviously kept two personalities.  Is this wrong?  Should this women
not have done this?

 -Matt                              | Please get my public key if you wish
 (panzer@drown.slip.andrew.cmu.edu) | to verify that this message is mine.

"That which can never be enforced should not be prohibited."






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: owen@autodesk.com (D. Owen Rowley)
Date: Mon, 25 Oct 93 14:43:18 PDT
To: rjc@gnu.ai.mit.edu
Subject: Re: on the term `signature'
Message-ID: <9310251918.AA26068@lux.YP.acad>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


 > From: rjc@gnu.ai.mit.edu (Ray)

 > L. Detweiler () writes:
 > > Consider the term `signature' in the conventional connotation of a
 > > handwritten scrawl. What are the *critical* properties of a handwritten
 > > signature of a person [x]?
 > > 
 > > 1) no person [y] can `forge' the signature of [x]
 > > 2) the signature of [x] is unique to [x]
 
 >    Well (2) is untrue since I know people who can forge signatures with
 > great precision (even my own).

However if they forged your name on one of your checks, you wouldn't
take such a blase attitude to it would you?

And in such a case you have an opprtunitty to prosecute them for
their criminal act of forgery should you be able tpo prove it.

Digital signature systems need to include the ability to track and
succesfully prosecute criminal
forgery, or digital signatures are worthless for transactiuons
that require reliable accountability.
IMNSHO
 
 >    Since we're going for an ideal Brave New Cyberspace where forging
 > ids is impossible, I've got some suggestions. These should make you very
 > happy:
 > 
 >  1) Phase out handwritten signatures in society and switch to finger prints,
 > retinal scan, and DNA codes. Whenever you sign anything, the store/business/
 > govt office will require a blood test (for DNA), retina scan, and finger
 > print. With today's technologies, these can be made painless and quick.
 > 
 >  2) Require everyone to have a global positioning tracker installed under the
 > skin so they are "accountable" at all times. This worked great in
 > demolition man.
 > 
 >  3) Mandatory caller-id, video-id for everyone. No one should be able to
 > make calls without the other person knowing who you really are. Payphones
 > should have finger print/retinal scanners for verification.
 > 
 >  4) all new computers should come equipped with finger print recognizing
 > keyboards. No more spoofed messages posted on people who leave their terminals
 > accidently logged in (in the computer lab)
 > 
 >  5) get rid of cash! we can't have unaccountable transactions taking place
 > in the economy. Banish the free market. Nationalize all businesses under
 > NSA control.


What makes you think that the bleak vision of the future reflected in your
satire above isn't exactly what the typical power/control-freak government
types want to impose?

 
 > > If a person cannot be traced based on their digital signatures, where
 > > is the accountability? What if a person signs a document with a
 > > `digital signature' and *breaks* that contract? you have no recourse
 > > unless the identity is ultimately identifiable and you can take `that
 > > body' to court.
 
 >    Get a clue for god's sake. Digital signatures won't exist in a vacuum.
 > No one is going to accept the validity of a signature unless it is signed by
 > some trusted/certified authority and that authority would be liable for the
 > person's true name or actions.

right, so where are the systems that certify trust and authenticity?
and who is designing them ,
and what are the design criterea,
and what happens if the government decides they don't want to,
and.....

 LUX ./. owen




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Christian D. Odhner" <cdodhner@indirect.com>
Date: Mon, 25 Oct 93 12:49:10 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: S.Box and LD SAME???
In-Reply-To: <9310250638.AA13946@jobe.shell.portal.com>
Message-ID: <199310251944.AA03198@indirect.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> 
>  Subject says it all... I think these 2 are the same person...
>       bloody idiots
>       sam hill
Without makeing any claims one way or the other, I would like to point out
that LD's posts are almost always readable, while S.Boxx's are often as
not _very_ difficult for me to understand. No, that doesn't realy mean
anything, but just because two posters send messages of approximately the
same length about approximately the same subject, doesn't mean they are
the same person.
Happy Hunting, -Chris.

______________________________________________________________________________
Christian Douglas Odhner     | "The NSA can have my secret key when they pry
cdodhner@indirect.com	     | it from my cold, dead, hands... But they shall
pgp 2.3 public key by finger | NEVER have the password it's encrypted with!"
My opinions are shareware. For a registered copy, send me 15$ in DigiCash.
  Key fingerprint =  58 62 A2 84 FD 4F 56 38  82 69 6F 08 E4 F1 79 11 





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Alexander Reynolds <chrome@jhunix.hcf.jhu.edu>
Date: Mon, 25 Oct 93 09:53:30 PDT
To: "Perry E. Metzger" <pmetzger@lehman.com>
Subject: Re: Subliminal Channels
In-Reply-To: <9310240508.AA03859@snark.lehman.com>
Message-ID: <Pine.3.05.9310251243.A5503-7100000@jhunix.hcf.jhu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> PS By the way, none of this paranoia has anything to do with cryptography.

Gee, something we do agree on.  

-Alex






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Alexander Reynolds <chrome@jhunix.hcf.jhu.edu>
Date: Mon, 25 Oct 93 10:19:08 PDT
To: habs@panix.com>
Subject: That's all, folks. <thank God>
In-Reply-To: <199310241623.AA20573@panix.com>
Message-ID: <Pine.3.05.9310251243.B5503-c100000@jhunix.hcf.jhu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


This will truly be my final remark, as this subject is hardly pertinent to the
forum but has nontheless provoked some interesting discussion.

I am repeatedly told that I am a right-wing religious paranoid, have fascist
fantasies about government, and that overall I am a moron.  While I have
difficulty refuting the third claim :), it is unfair to make accusations 1
and 2 about me without any knowledge about who I am and where I stand on
societal issues.

What has never been mentioned is the fact that none of this subliminal
stuff has seriously been studied.  People (perry, woodhead, et al.) talk
about how unscientific, absurd, etc. this topic is, all the while ignoring
their (and my) ignorance about the subject and using studies as scientific
proof, which is a contradiction unto itself, as well as unnamed first-hand
sources "inside" the industry while not identifying their position.  Whereas
they would rather let it be buried for ideological reasons, I would prefer the
subject to be explored in the open scientific community, opening it the
pressure of scientific scrutiny.  My reasons as follows: I have read books
and seen, first-hand, experiments on the nature of behavior control.  Until
you have seen people turned into automata you cannot appreciate what the
experience gives to you as a human being: perspective.  I would not want to
be controlled by _any_ power, be it government, sibling, or economy.  If
there is a chance that there are means by which I can be controlled
_without my knowledge_, I want to be aware of the methodry of such attacks.

Is that paranoid?  Quite possibly.  Cautious and intelligent?  Perhaps. 
Perhaps there are those on this forum who would prefer to let sleeping
dogs lie and let corporations run free over people instead of the
government?  

But I cannot speak for people, and I would prefer it next time I respond to a
message that the response is not a list of those "words put into my
mouth," as this discussion turned out to be.

You may call me names, you may ignore me, but the fact is the subject
remains as it is.  The matter has not been closed.

-Alex Reynolds
----------------------
Paranoid ranter supreme, eight-ball and nine-ball specialist, and
part-time anarchist and computer lab proctor.
----------------------
Chrome@jhunix,jhuvms.hcf.jhu.edu






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Johan Helsingius <julf@penet.fi>
Date: Mon, 25 Oct 93 03:55:18 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: The Anonymous service needs your help.
Message-ID: <199310251050.AA25618@mail.eunet.fi>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Sorry to interrupt the Detweiler thread, but...

As of last week, my server has been sending the following message to active
users of my anonymous service. I am turning to you, fellow cypherpunks, not for
monetary support (albeit that is of course welcome, too) but to ask for ideas
on how to arrange the payment mechanism - and to avoid taxes, currency export
problems etc. 

Maybe I should seek the help of a non-profit organisation such as EFF to
handle the transfers?

	Julf

 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 

Subject: The Anonymous service needs your help.

Hi! You have just used the anonymous server at anon.penet.fi. When I set it up,
almost a year ago, I definitely could not foresee how popular it would become.
It now has something like 45.000 registered users, wuth maybe 10.000 active
users. Thousands of mesages are handled each day.

Unfortunately, the popularity of the server might also be it's downfall. At
the start, it was easy to handle all the problems and the queries, and to
pay for the network connection. But now I spend 4-5 hours every day trying
to answer questions, fix problems and deal with abusers - but I keep getting
further and further behind on my mailbox. And the traffic is overloading the
64K international connection - I already had to cut out the binary postings.
It now costs me something close to USD 1500/month just to keep the machine
connected.

I'm afraid I can't afford the time and the money much longer. And unless
there suddenly turns up some benevolent big sponsor, the only hope for
survival for the service is contributions from individual users. If all the
10.000 active users would each contribute $5, it would pay for the costs
of running the service for a full year, as well as allowing me to employ one
or two part-time students to reply to mail queries, improve the service, and
report abuse - allowing me to concentrate on improving the software and dealing
with the abuse cases.

So I'm asking you - how much would you be willing to contribute? Use of the
server will always be free, but continuing the service needs soem funds.
At this stage, I only need to know how much you are willing to contribute -
$1, $5, $25, $100? The replies will determine the need to set up some
kind of money transfer system. Please send your replies to donations@penet.fi.

	Julf





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Duncan Frissell <frissell@panix.com>
Date: Mon, 25 Oct 93 10:29:21 PDT
To: CYPHERPUNKS@toad.com
Subject: Re: Net Regulation
Message-ID: <199310251724.AA09315@panix.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


B >Let me illustrate by taking myself as an example. I'm reasonably
B >well connected networkwise and knowledgeable. I could decide to
B >become one of these Permanent Tourists. But where would I go?
B >
B >What will be my concerns? Obviously, money will be one of them.
B >But so also will be climate, people, activities I might not be
B >willing to do without, and on and on. Furthermore, other
B >governments are, almost without exception, more repressive than
B >the one I have.

The rest of the world has as wide (or wider) a range of climates as the 
US.  The people you will be interacting with are the same people as you do 
now on the nets.  I know some people have problems with expatting (to
coining a term) themselves because of homesickness.  Harry Browne couldn't
adjust to Switzerland and so moved to Walnut Creek, CA.  Not everyone is
like that though.  And the nets means that you can take your surroundings 
with you.  Particularly once we get a VR interface.  Besides, the nets 
mean that you will be able to *virtually* expat yourself and remain
physically in the US if you like while working "overseas."

B >than I am now. So I think that most Permanent Tourists would
B >likely stay right where they are, more or less. Certainly they'd
B >stay in the developed world, where most governments are willing to
B >cooperate to some extent in the attempt to collect revenues.

Few governments tax the overseas earnings of their own expats.  Any Brit 
who expats himself physically and works via the nets would have *no* UK 
tax liability to be busted for.  If this Brit was physically remaining 
temporarily in different countries as a Permanent Tourist (even the US) 
and working on the nets, he would have *no* income tax liability.  Just as 
if I spend 6 months in France "on vacation" while I write my latest novel 
and negotiate the screen rights to my previous novels over the phone, I 
may have "earned" $2 million in France but would have *no* French tax 
liability as well as no right to work in France.  That sort of activity is 
not considered "work in France."  The nets mean that more and more people 
(musicians, surgeons, lawyers etc.) will be able to work as writers have 
always done -- from anywhere, to anywhere.  No tax consequences.  

B >It is a sad fact that governments collectively possess the means
B >to physically regulate all of the desirable real-estate and most
B >are more willing than ours to use physical force to pursue their
B >ends. So Permanent Tourist or not, one can't really escape them.

Governments are more likely to (as indeed they have already done) offer 
PTs special treatment to encourage them to hang their hat for a temporary 
basis.  This is sort of a reverse auction in which governments offer lower 
and lower taxes to snag the PTs who can go anywhere.  For example, you 
can't legally have a secret securities account or buy treasury bonds 
anonymously in the US but foreigners can.  A bank can acquire and hold 
T-Bonds for anonymous foreigners as long as it swears they are not 
Americans.  The Feds did this because they *need* anonymous foreign buyers 
for their debt instruments.  Why don't the Feds nuke any banks that try 
this.  They have the bomb after all?  Why, instead, do they explicitly 
allow this loophole by regulation?  They need the money.

B >Sooner or later, of course, this won't matter but, as I've said,
B >at least for the short term, it _does_.

There are already hundreds of thousands of American PTs living overseas.  
That was done under *old* technology.  61% of expat Americans don't file 
federal income tax forms even though they are required to do so whether or 
not they fall under the $70K exemption for overseas earned income.

B >Not this year or even the next. But what happens when the
B >printing-press equivalents cease to stave off bankruptcy?

The Government of the USSR went out of business.

B >Lots. Because people never do seem to learn the lessons of
B >history, sigh. Not, mind you, that I think they'd "win" for long.
B >They, too, prefer to ignore history. But while they're attempting
B >to prevent the working of the laws of nature, a lot of people
B >will suffer. *More* will suffer if we don't pay attention to this
B >reality.

I try and pay attention.  I just think that some over-romanticize the 
state by investing it with magic powers that it doesn't have.  Depending 
on your exact place of residence, you are more likely to be mugged by 
private parties than by the state.  

The technology doesn't strengthen the state, it weakens it.

Duncan Frissell    
--- WinQwk 2.0b#1165                                                                                                                             




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Sandy <72114.1712@CompuServe.COM>
Date: Mon, 25 Oct 93 13:29:11 PDT
To: <cypherpunks@toad.com>
Subject: NET REGULATION
Message-ID: <931025174804_72114.1712_FHF124-2@CompuServe.COM>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
  SANDY SANDFORT               Reply to:  ssandfort@attmail.com
 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Punksters,

Apparently, T. William Wells does not understood the "Permanent
Tourist" concept referenced by Duncan Frissell.  Mr. Wells wrote:

    . . . I could decide to become one of these Permanent
    Tourists. But where would I go?

    What will be my concerns?  Obviously, money will be one
    of them. But so also will be climate, people, activities
    I might not be willing to do without, and on and on.

You do not have to leave home to become a PT.  For the first time
in history, the Net provides a to work anywhere while *appearing*
to live anywhere else.

William added:

    Furthermore, other governments are, almost without
    exception, more repressive than the one I have.

For those PTs who do choose to live overseas, this simply isn't
true.  Foreigners with money to spend are almost always treated
better than the local captive audience.  Sure, there are some
repressive regimes out there, but that needn't affect the PT.

Some other material mistakes of fact by William:

    . . . in the developed world, where most governments are
    willing to cooperate to some extent in the attempt to
    collect revenues.

No they do not.  Most only give lip service to cooperating with
one another.  If Mr. PT moves to country B to avoid taxes in
country A, there is no incentive for country B to cooperate with
country A.  Why?  Because Mr. PT is spending his "ill gotten
gains" in country B.  Why screw with a good thing?

It might be argued that there are PTs from country B who are
living in country A to avoid country B's taxes.  Therefore it
would be in the best interests of both countries to cooperate.
The theory sounds great, but that's not what happens.  For
whatever reason, countries rarely cooperate in this way.

William went on:

    It is a sad fact that governments collectively possess
    the means to physically regulate all of the desirable
    real-estate and most are more willing than ours to use
    physical force to pursue their ends. So Permanent
    Tourist or not, //one can't really escape them//.
    [Emphasis added.]

It is here, William reveals himself.  I used to run into this
"you just can't win" syndrome when I was involved in libertarian
politics.  For every answer, William comes up with another
objection.  As time goes on, the objections depart further and
further from reality and reason.

There are ways to own real estate anonymously.  Force is rarely
used indiscriminately and there are ways to lower your risk. As a
practical matter, YES, YOU REALLY CAN ESCAPE THEM.

Finally, William worries about world governments focusing on us
if we become to good at taking the bread out of their mouths:

    . . . But what happens when the printing-press
    equivalents cease to stave off bankruptcy?

They go bankrupt, William.

 S a n d y

>>>>>>    Please send e-mail to:  ssandfort@attmail.com    <<<<<<
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: nobody@shell.portal.com
Date: Mon, 25 Oct 93 14:05:25 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: TEMPEST
Message-ID: <9310252100.AA20550@jobe.shell.portal.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


 Well this posting provoked another.


    ***** FOR SALE ******

   Van Eck Radiation Evesdropping Monitors
Good for All  SCAN Rates.

USES:
Evesdrop on your bosses CRT, your enemies CRT, your Lovers CRT,
Spy on the local Spies, what does your local FBI Agents
monitor say about you. Find out for sure,
with the proper antenna these monitors will repeat VDTs up to
1 KM distant.

RANGE: with proper Antennas 1 KM

 You are are responsible for checking on whether your National/Provincial/Local
laws allow the importation of this  device.

COST $8,000.00 US Dollars (Supply is Limited)

A public key and encrypted remailer block follow to allow you to place
your orders. Payment Terms will be sent to you following receipt
of a PGP encrypted order.


To reply to I/We please use the enclosed public key to
encrypt your message back to us. The anonymous remailer
encrypted return block may be used for now but if
current(known to be good) paths are needed look for the latest
in cypherpunks@toad.com.

Please encrypt ALL mail sent to us...

-----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----
Version: 2.3a

mQCNAizMFlcAAAEEALPYHDpT3OhTyO0qfEcqnbwY30pZb3ET6JUP70jfIQPiTrkA
i7WJFYnDWv0FBk3aMxfH2DpI0fauCQKLnJJrc0/WHi5AgZVJh7KTwfCyAS+Zr2xM
7xjFZlwd9Q0Ow5k3hLfO4LQpTOW8IBMATV8or1g/+Zv3m87WjLgMmjAEwDypAAUR
tDxibGluZHBpcGUgPHVzZSBjdXJyZW50IHJlbWFpbGVyIGJsb2NrIHBvc3RlZCB0
byBjeXBoZXJwdW5rcz4=
=IHVG
-----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----
--------8<--cut here-->8--------
::
Encrypted: PGP

-----BEGIN PGP MESSAGE-----
Version: 2.3a
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=WPI/
-----END PGP MESSAGE-----

<To reply, save everything below the "cut here" marks above
<into another file.  Type your reply here (below the blank 
<line three lines above!) and mail to remailer@utter.dis.org




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: jim@bilbo.suite.com (Jim Miller)
Date: Mon, 25 Oct 93 12:34:29 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Interesting reading
Message-ID: <9310251931.AA03854@bilbo.suite.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain




The following is one of the most humorous posts I've read in a long time.  It  
made my day.


-----------

From: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Subject: Time for me to come clean...
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Date: Mon, 18 Oct 93 12:46:40 PDT

My experiment has gone far enough.

One of you has claimed that the Net entity "tcmay" (Timothy C. May,
putatively) is actually "jamie" (Jamie Dinkelacker, putatively). This
person has at other times claimed that perhaps Eric Hughes and Jamie
are the same person, and that the Net entity "tcmay" is the "lackey of Eric
Hughes."

It is all getting so confusing! 


Allow me to clarify.

I entered this list under a variety of pseudonyms, with the intent of
compiling information on all of you. I have been posting under the
identities of Tim May (who has actually never existed....the man
behind the mask on the cover of "Wired" was a hired actor, as were the
stand-ins for the personnas of Eric Hughes and John Gilmore), Sandy
Sandfort, Jamie Dinkelacker, and many others.

I disavow any connection to the paranoid "S. Boxx," however.

In fact, I think there are only five actual biological entities on
the list. Makes for some good conspiracy theories for the paranoids.

Finally, I also write under the nym de guerre of "Dorothy Denning."
The real Dorothy Denning is too busy grading papers for her freshman
crypto class to post, so I fill in.

My real name should be apparent to you all. I knew if I used it, the
other four of you would not take me seriously. But now the secret's
out.


David
     

--
     

David Sternlight         When the mouse laughs at the cat,
                         there is a hole nearby.--Nigerian Proverb

--------------



Jim_Miller@suite.com





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: norm@netcom.com (Norman Hardy)
Date: Mon, 25 Oct 93 14:53:23 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Shamir Sharing
Message-ID: <9310252150.AA26406@netcom2.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


The following code may be useful in applications to share secrets a la
Shamir. Beware the warning about pseudo random numbers!

#if 0
Shamir Sharing
Warning!! We use the stock random number generator.
You must replace it if you really want to keep a secret!!

67 is prime and 67^4>2^24. We use the field of integers modulo 67.
We want to produce k<67 versions of a secret so that we may
reconstruct the message when q (0<q<k) versions of the secret are
available. ("q" for quorum)

We use polynomials of degree q-1 over the field.
If one knows values of p(x) for q distinct arguments
x_0 ... x_k then the polynomial may be determined.

To code the secret we let each byte of the message have its own
polynomial of degree q-1, but we speak here as if the secret were
just one character long. The secret character is s. We choose the
polynomial p such that p(0) = s. We choose the polymomial otherwise
to have random (mod 67) coefficients. Version j of the secret is
p(j) for 0<j<67.

Suppose for some set S of q integers we know p(i) for each i in S.
To compute s = p(0) we apply Lagrange's interpolation formula: '

p(x) = sum (i in S) (p(i) *
    (product (j in S but not i) (x - j))/
    (product (j in S but not i) (i - j)))

We use the special case where x=0.

The routines below deal in secrets < 67^4 which conveniently codes
three arbitrary bytes. Each resulting version is four bytes but
each of those bytes is < 67. Adding '0' to each version byte
results in portable ascii characters.

Program logic: "u25" is a type that gives 25 bit (or more)
unsigned integers.
Routine "void it(void)" initializes multiplication and division tables
modulo 67. mt[i][i] is i*j mod 67 if 0<=i<67 and 0<=j<67.
j*dt[i][j] is i mod 67 if 0<=i<67 and 0<j<67.

Routine "void split(u25 sec, int quor, int dis, char w[N][4])"
splits the secret (sec) into dis parts. A quorum of size quor
is necessary to recover the secret. The parts are placed in
the array w. w[0] will hold part 1, and w[quor-1] will hold
part quor. As the parts are distributed to the custodiens,
each part number must be included!

Routine "u25 join(int quor, char w[N][4], int c[N])"
takes quor parts and recomputes the secret which it returns
as a function value. w[0] thru w[quor-1] are the parts
and c[0] thru c[quor-1] are the respective part numbers.

Routine main provides a fairly general test invocation of
this code.

The following stuff is missing from <stdlib.h> and libraries
in some systems claiming to be ANSI C!

typedef struct{long quot, rem;} ldiv_t;
static ldiv_t ldiv(long a, long b)
{ldiv_t A; A.quot = a/b; A.rem = a % b; return A;}
#endif

#define N 67
#include <math.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
typedef unsigned long u25 /* 32 bits */;
static char mt[N][N], dt[N][N];
static void it(void){int i, j;
  for(i=0; i<N; ++i) for(j=0; j<N; ++j) mt[i][j] = (long)i*j % N;
  for(i=0; i<N; ++i) for(j=0; j<N; ++j) dt[mt[i][j]][j] = i;}

static char M(char a){if(a<0) return a+N; return a;}

static u25 join(int quor, char w[N][4], int c[N])
{char sx[4]; int k; for(k=0; k<4; ++k) {char q = 0;
  {int n;   for(n=0; n<quor; ++n) {char p = w[n][k];
       {int m; for(m=0; m<quor; ++m)
       if(c[n]-c[m]) p = mt[p][dt[N-c[m]][M(c[n]-c[m])]];}
      q = M(q + p - N);}}
    sx[k]=q;}
return sx[3] + N*(sx[2] + N*(sx[1] + (u25)N*sx[0]));}

static void split(u25 sec, int quor, int dis, char w[N][4])
{if(sec >= (u25)N*N*N*N) printf("Foul value\n");
 if(quor > dis || dis >= N)
   printf("Committee size must not exceed distribution and "
      "distribution must be less than N\n");
 {ldiv_t A = ldiv(sec, N), B = ldiv(A.quot, N), C = ldiv(B.quot, N);
  char a[4]; a[3] = A.rem; a[2] = B.rem; a[1] = C.rem; a[0] = C.quot;
  {int k; for(k = 0; k<4; ++k)
   {char coef[N-1]; coef[0] = a[k]; 
   {int m; for(m = 1; m<quor; ++m) coef[m] = 22/*...*/ % N;}
    {int n; for(n = 1; n<=dis; ++n) {char q = 0, m;
       for(m=quor-1; m>=0; --m)
       q = M(coef[m] + mt[q][n] - N);
       w[n-1][k] = q;}}}}}}

#define C 4
int main(){it();
if (0) {int i, j; for(i=0; i<N; ++i) for(j=0; j<N; ++j)
   if(mt[i][dt[j][i]] != j)
     printf("Ouch, %d, %d\n", i, j);}
{char dx[12][4]; split((u25)12345678, C, 8, dx);
 {int i, j; for(i=0; i<8; ++i)
   {printf("%2d ", i+1);
   for (j=0; j<4; ++j) printf("%c", '0' + dx[i][j]); printf("\n");}}
{int q[C] = {8, 3, 7, 1}; char dz[C][4]; {int i, j;
   for(i=0; i<C; ++i) for(j=0; j<4; ++j) dz[i][j] = dx[q[i]-1][j];}
 printf("%ld\n", join(C, dz, q));}}}




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: peb@PROCASE.COM (Paul Baclace)
Date: Mon, 25 Oct 93 15:09:09 PDT
To: owen@autodesk.com
Subject: Re: Net Regulation
Message-ID: <9310252204.AA05087@banff.procase.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


 
 > From: "Perry E. Metzger" <pmetzger@lehman.com>
 > Admittedly, if someone could put a *loyal* armed soldier over
 > everyone's shoulder on earth they could control everyone. How, though,
 > could they manage to do this?

By getting everyone to obey the "policeman inside" (concept due to 
Wm. Burroughs, recently quoted by Wm. Gibson in WIRED Sept/Oct).


Paul E. Baclace
peb@procase.com





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: catalyst@netcom.com (Scott Collins)
Date: Mon, 25 Oct 93 15:13:21 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Apple, AOCE, and key pair security
Message-ID: <9310252210.AA06907@newton.apple.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

- From the MacWeek article:

  >validity. To get your own digital signature from RSA, you take a form to
  >a notary public, who verifies your identity, notarizes the information
  >on the form, and then mails the form to RSA.

The form contains your name, address, etc, and a printout of your public key.


  >Based on the notary
  >public's authority to say you are who you claim to be, you eventually
  >receive a disk in the mail with your personal electronic signature.

_Not_.  The disk contains a PEM style certificate, authenticating your
public key.  On your local machine, where you generated your private key,
is a file (your private key) called a signer.  This file is your private
key + software to make it sign things, so the whole thing is a self
contained application -- but it refused to function until you bind it to a
certificate.


  >Your
  >electronic signature has a two-year expiration date, and includes some
  >verification information.

Certificate, not signature, just like RSA has been trying to sell them all
along.


  >If someone wants to make sure your signature
  >is valid, he or she contacts the issuing authority listed in the
  >certificate.

Wrong again.  Validation occurs locally because an entire chain of
certificates is provided in the signature


  >There will be issuing authorities other than RSA. For
  >example, Apple Computer's security department plans to issue signatures
  >to all Apple employees with employee badges."

Not signatures, certificates.

All key generation takes place locally.  RSA does not generate the keys. 
These articles are a woeful misrepresentation by over simplification.  I
will happily provide clarification to the authors if they call me.

If anyone wants, I will demonstrate this software at the next Bay Area
cypherpunks meeting.


Scott Collins         | "Few people realize what tremendous power there
                      |  is in one of these things."     -- Willy Wonka
......................|................................................
BUSINESS.   voice:408.862.0540  fax:974.6094   collins@newton.apple.com
Apple Computer, Inc.   5 Infinite Loop, MS 305-2B   Cupertino, CA 95014
.......................................................................
PERSONAL.   voice/fax:408.257.1746    1024:669687   catalyst@netcom.com


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Scott Collins         | "Few people realize what tremendous power there
                      |  is in one of these things."     -- Willy Wonka
......................|................................................
BUSINESS.   voice:408.862.0540  fax:974.6094   collins@newton.apple.com
Apple Computer, Inc.   5 Infinite Loop, MS 305-2B   Cupertino, CA 95014
.......................................................................
PERSONAL.   voice/fax:408.257.1746    1024:669687   catalyst@netcom.com





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Jim McCoy <mccoy@ccwf.cc.utexas.edu>
Date: Mon, 25 Oct 93 13:24:58 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Announcement: dc-nets mailing list
Message-ID: <199310252024.AA00699@tramp.cc.utexas.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

Several of us down here in Austin, as well as others on the net are working
on various schemes involving the dining cryptographers protocol.  To help
coordinate efforts to put DC networks into operation and to work out some
of the necessary practical details of such an endeavor I have set up a
mailing list for people interested in working on such projects.

If you wish to subscribe to the list, send a message to the address:

listproc@mcfeeley.cc.utexas.edu

And include the line:

subscribe dc-nets [optional Real Name]

in the BODY of the message.  For help on using the list processing software
for subscription services or to get other information send a message with
the BODY consisting of the word "help" or "info" to the listproc address.

The address of the list itself is dc-nets@mcfeeley.cc.utexas.edu

jim

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From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: craig@osh3.OSHA.GOV (Craig Nordin)
Date: Mon, 25 Oct 93 12:54:07 PDT
To: craig@uunet.UU.NET
Subject: on the CYPHERPUNKS, PSEUDOSPOOFING, and POISON
Message-ID: <9310251548.aa15879@osh3.OSHA.GOV>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



>Xref: osh3 news.admin.policy:7108 comp.org.eff.talk:15565 comp.admin.policy:3710
>Newsgroups: talk.politics.crypto,alt.privacy,alt.privacy.anon-server,news.admin.policy,comp.org.eff.talk,comp.admin.policy,alt.conspiracy
>Path: osh3!uunet!meaddata!ddsw1!library.ucla.edu!agate!ames!purdue!yuma!ld231782
>From: ld231782@LANCE.ColoState.Edu (L. Detweiler)
>Subject: on the CYPHERPUNKS, PSEUDOSPOOFING, and POISON
>Sender: news@yuma.ACNS.ColoState.EDU (News Account)
>Message-ID: <Oct24.113641.53933@yuma.ACNS.ColoState.EDU>
>Date: Sun, 24 Oct 1993 11:36:41 GMT
>Nntp-Posting-Host: jenkins.lance.colostate.edu
>Organization: Colorado State University, Fort Collins, CO  80523
>Lines: 999


Recent extremely unpleasant personal experiences in cyberspace have given 
me, at the same time, deep scars and deep epiphanies. Following are some 
messages from the Cypherpunks mailing list generally on the subject of
`pseudospoofing' -- the possibility that some people are posting or 
emailing under *different* `identities' from multiple sites, specifically
with the intention of camouflage and deception.

I have watched the development of anonymity on the internet with a high
degree of personal interest, advocacy, and commitment. But this recent
realization of the potentials and extent of `pseudospoofing' has deeply 
disturbed me. The most shocking realization is not just that it is 
technically feasible but is possibly *widespread* in certain quarters of the 
Internet. It alarms me that some are championing pseudospoofing (and
what I have been calling `black' posts and email) as `liberating' and 
`refreshing' under the guise of `privacy' or `true/pure anonymity'.

> I suspect the
> result will be a more honest dialog, a more productive conversation
> freed from posturing and, ironically, from the concealment of threatening 
> truth.  I hope we will observe the resulting new forms of good and evil
> with Zen patience and allow this quite interesting experiment to 
> continue.

> It's interesting to see the different mental models that people hold
> of the net.  To me, this equation that one truename means one persona
> is not realistic or reasonable.  People spawn personas (-ae?) for
> many reasons, including psychological exploration, sociological
> experiments, sexual thrills, or just for practice at maintaining
> personas.  I know of several instances in which one person patted
> himself on the back circularly, or took half a dozen sides in a
> discussion -- and can surmise about others.  This sort of thing may
> well happen routinely, [...]

> [...] the privacy technology `we' espouse can only promote
> this.  There is no way to maintain this one-to-one equation when
> working with pseudonyms, when the human "dongle on the keyboard" is no
> longer a viable identifier.  I think the Usenet motto, "Live with it",
> applies.

> Perhaps "support" is better measured by how many people are motivated
> enough to go to the effort to make multiple but individually unique,
> reputable posts in favor of a proposition, rather than by 
> simple numerical polls that abstract away knowledge and
> motivation, or by how many True Names position themselves 
> with I'm-on-your-side posts. 

The idea of `spawning identities' for `psychological exploration, 
sociological experiments or sexual thrills' repulses me. It sounds to 
me like advocation of perversions and multiple personality disorders.
And much to my shock, horror and disgust it appears to be a major 
component of the Cypherpunk philosophy. (I even wonder if the 
mainstream media has been misled about the true cypherpunk agenda, 
and so far have not been comforted by anyone `real'.) And the idea
that `support' for projects be measured by `how many people are motivated 
enough to go to the effort to make multiple but individually unique, 
reputable posts in favor of a proposition' is absolutely bizarre.

I have been publicly and privately assaulted and ridiculed so thoroughly, 
searingly, and viciously in both public and private flames by so many 
apologists and moral relativists on this subject that it has encouraged 
a certain degree of personal paranoia. In fact, I cannot count a single 
strong supporter so far. The whole black affair has opened my eyes to the 
extraordinary potential for grotesque evils such as manipulation, 
treachery, conspiracies, and brainwashing possible by combining the 
openess of electronic forums and `pseudospoofing', particularly in 
private email.

I think that anyone who subscribes to this public internet mailing 
list should be warned that it may be a bizarre `experiment' in 
pseudospoofing and brainwashing on unsuspecting or unwilling 
participants. I certainly would never have subscribed if `I knew then 
what I knew now'. Its deeply upsetting that I may have been trying 
to cultivate friendships with nothing but phantoms, parasites, and
betrayers on the list and in my personal mail or that this has 
polluted my other online activities.  The bizarre perversions 
found in my personal mail far surpass everything I have posted 
here, and have quite traumatized me -- something like virginity 
violated by a rapist.

The evasive, blase, flippant, and cavalier attitude by top 
`leadership' in the group on the subject horrifies me. (One eminent
contributor to the list even suggested to me in email that a
secret `elite' list existed or was in the works, presumably free
of this reprehensible toxic waste.) Many respondents have taken
the position that prohibitions against `pseudospoofing' are
equivalent to invasion of privacy and government oppression. One
very prominent poster suggested, as an insult, that `state run 
registries of legal persons' were reminiscent of `key escrow' 
systems like Clipper! I find this quite ironic, given that such
a system already exists, called `birth certificates'!

Even more upsetting to me the possibility that this practice of
pseudospoofing may be infecting and corrupting mail lists devoted 
to serious project development of Internet technologies. I fear 
the openess and freedom of these forums is being subtly and 
insideously poisoned by increasing pseudospoofing -- perhaps a 
systematic and concerted campaign. It seems to me that resolution
of the issues of identification and authentication are absolutely
crucial for future internet development, and that some minor 
sacrifices in current `freedoms' will be the profound investments
required for a harmonious future atmosphere.

I will have more to say in various forums on the subject in the
future. This is an introduction and background. I hope that 
eminent Usenet contributors will address the multitudes of issues this
raises.  I have spent valuable reputation capital in pursuing this
matter, and have made many new enemies over the past few weeks, and
am sure I will be branded as the new premier cyberlunatic by many, 
but if I am branded a `paranoid ranter' by terrorists and criminals 
it will only upset me if they're not in jail.  I believe this issue 
of identification has paramount importance to everyone currently
involved in `cyberspace' and its future development, perhaps even 
the #1 issue that must be resolved for basic progress -- how much
authentication and identification is to be required?


Note1: see talk.politics.crypto for a `user survey' on the subject 
       and possible future postings.

Note2: these postings have been edited slightly.


===cut=here===

To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: on anonymity, identity, reputation, and spoofing
Date: Mon, 18 Oct 93 00:05:56 -0600
From: "L. Detweiler" <ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu>

H.  Finney <hfinney@shell.portal.com>
>After going to enormous efforts to create a network of anonymous remailers,
>we are hoist by our own petard, as our list receives strange, irrelevant,
>and argumentative posts through our own anonymous remailers.  (Not all
>anonymous posts are like this, but there have been quite a few in the last
>few weeks which fall into these categories.)

I've been thinking about this a lot lately. I think a large part of the
problem as you indicate is associated with reputation. How does one
build up a reputation and identity in cyberspace in general? Part of
the problem IMHO is that this list software & the internet in general
is extremely vulnerable to a lot of different kinds of spoofing.

People are very sensitive to the perception of a `consensus' -- they
are deeply influenced by what they perceive to be the `majority
opinion'. What if that `opinion' was not an accurate representation of
reality? what if a few people were creating the illusion that some
different kind of consensus existed? what if that `agenda' were
actually something inherently wicked like lawlessness or anarchy? what
if a conspiracy created the impression that some project or progress
was underway when it really wasn't? or that some person was loudly
favored or condemned by the `group'? this could be especially
problematic if any kind of intimidation were happening `behind the
scenes' in email. who would ever know? unless the dissatisfaction
reached the list, how would we find out? another problem is that, at
the same time being strongly influenced by a lot of flames, people just
delete them out of sheer distaste and they may not be around later for inspection.

what really is our assurance that all these email addresses actually
exist and represent *unique* people? there really is very little currently. 

I think newsgroups are far less vulnerable to this kind of spoofing,
but unfortunately mailing lists are *extremely* vulnerable. (Keep in
mind, there are a whole set of other benefits and detriments in *other*
categories which I'm not talking about here.) In the former we have
thousands of subscribers all checking on each other's honesty. If a
suspicious address or opinion pops up, there is some probability
someone will notice, and cases of spoofing would probably be noise
drowned out in the representative opinion. Also, distribution is
centralized, so that `message blocking' is not very feasible.

In the latter case, i.e. mailing lists such as this one, there is a
much closer knit community that is geographically isolated. Individuals
on the list are far more susceptible to spoofing. People are more
likely to see *every* message including the `spoofed' ones. There are
far fewer people to `check up' and those that are there may not have
the technical expertise. What's worse, the list is not `distributed' in
a certain sense. If someone wants to get out the message that
`something wrong is going on' it could be censored because of the
centralization of the distribution. This wouldn't work with Usenet
because the distribution of the messages (e.g. NNTP servers) is
generally cleaved from the people with strong self-interests in the
traffic (e.g. people who post to group [x]).

This cyberspace stuff can be a *very* powerful influence on many. It is
an electronic community, and peer pressure is *extremely* powerful.
Many people do not have an extremely strong internal `moral compass'
and could be influenced by this kind of corrupt magnetism associated
with a `conspiracy of spoofing'. Note that reputations are crucial in
not only persuading us to listen attentively to those we respect, but
to `tune out' the lunatics and criminals.

* * *
Spoofing

Regarding the what also gets my vote as `strangest posting of the year'
by `S. Boxx',  Philippe D. Nave, Jr. <pdn@dwroll.dw.att.com> (based on
my email, a loyal cypherpunk and fellow Denverite!) wrote:

>[...] it seems that the point of the message is that there is a lot
>of smoke coming from people who use aliases or anonymous remailer
>services to post to the cypherpunks list. Does this posting contribute
>to that problem, or have I missed something?
[...]
>What the hell ?!? I've either missed something significant (and would
>appreciate enlightenment) or this is a candidate for 'strangest post
>of the year'. If 'S. Boxx' really exists and is the author of this
>posting, I apologize- if not, then come out from behind your damn
>remailer and quit contributing to the problem. As for monitoring the
>list for traitors, go ahead- I post under my own name, and I don't
>give a shit what you do with the text. If I was concerned about lurkers
>building 'traitor files', I'd encrypt my messages and happily watch you
>choke on them.

I think I speak for many here in saying that I weigh anonymous postings
very little, but don't consider the capability a serious problem. They
have very significant purposes in e.g. `whistleblowing' `within the
system' that I've always been attracted to.

On the other hand, I think there is an implicit assumption by virtually
everyone here that addresses on public posts and private email that are
not specifically anonymous represent *unique* people. That is, if some
people were taking advantage of the loose, free, and open atmosphere
here to influence opinion or perception of reputations by posting
messages under different presumably `real' identities (defined as
anything that is not obviously tagged as anonymous), I and probably
everyone else would feel very `upset' in the least and `violated' at
the most. It would seem like a very serious breach of community trust,
and might even have the effect of derailing positive contributions to
the `cypherpunk cause' (whether algorithmic or political, the two chief
schools of thought). I recall discussions of this related to the
Extropians list, which specifically bars this practice.

* * *
List suggestions

The fact that this `uniqueness of real identities' has always been
something of an implicit assumption here bothers me. I think anything
this delicate and important should be made formal and explicit. We
should not simply assume that `everone is honest and no one would be
depraved enough to do this.' I think the following guidelines are very
reasonable, and might be part of a list charter agreed to by new members:

1) list members are allowed *one* anonymous identity if any. They are
required to associate some name with all anonymous posts via that identity.
2) *no one* is allowed multiple `real' identities and in fact any
violation of this is considered an extremely serious breach of netiquette & honesty.
3) completely anonymous posts from `outside' the list are allowed; if
no pseudoidentity is given they are assumed to come from `outside'.

and if anyone has been posting under multiple `real' identies, I think
they owe it to everyone here to `come clean'. I don't see why anyone
would go to the trouble but if someone was just unstable or obsessive
enough to equate reputation with posting traffic, s/he might go off the
deep end. The practice amounts to `spoofing' and any patriotic
cypherpunk with some integrity ought to recognize that immediately and
condemn it, technical capabilities regardless. I would equate this
practice with `lying to one's colleagues'. spoofing is probably the #1
crime against cypherpunk ideology.

* * *
Reputations

As for reputations, what can we do about this? I think that there are a
lot of solutions to be experimented with in software. One of the best
is just to have archives that are searchable by ID. But archives are
very disk-consuming. I have some various other ideas that wouldn't
require much beyond the current database maintenance of email
addresses. Suppose that along with everyone's name, the following
statistics were presented:

1) how long they have been on the list in days, 0 if none at all
2) how many postings they have posted here
3) maybe a posting/age ratio -- some people seem to be very sensitive
or tune out people with a high one.
4) another idea: tracking the number of responses a given poster has,
average, per original post, measured by `re: [x]' subject tracking.

now, look what we get with all these. They are all simple to implement.
They all can tremendously help us weigh the various opinions that are
out there. They can set up a positive feedback system whereby `good'
posters potentially really are quantitatively identified.  Regarding
(4), one way to `punish' a poster for irrelevant postings is to simply
not respond, and they will not get any `credit' in this statistic. The
problem with this is that from my experience, sometimes my most
authoritative and finely-crafted postings generate the least response.
But note the point of all these things: they don't necessarily require
any digital signatures to implement. Authentication of postings
`allowed' to the group really seems like a separate problem to me.

Another simple idea is to have a voting system in response to postings.
People's `credit' associated with their postings could be listed in
headers too. This of course is far more ambitious, and the generally
complex problem of authentication rears its ugly head.

In addition to all this, I would like to see protocols that guarantee
honesty on the part of the list maintainer. When databases like this
are maintained, a little unilateral tweaking here and there can be
extremely deleterious to community integrity, honesty, and reputations.



Date: Sun, 17 Oct 93 23:58:08 -0700
From: hughes@ah.com (Eric Hughes)
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: on anonymity, identity, reputation, and spoofing

[...]

That which can never be enforced should not be prohibited.

The claim that a person should have only one pseudonym per forum
indicates profound misunderstanding.  If someone wants to have
multiple cryptographically protected pseudonyms, they will be able to;
that is one of the main goals of cypherpunks software.

The situations you despise will occur.  This is reality.  Change your
own psychology or change your own software.  You will not be able to
change the other person.

Eric


From: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Subject: Uniqueness and "is-a-person" credentials
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Date: Mon, 18 Oct 93 10:17:35 PDT

[...]

I don't like the idea of state-run registries of "legal persons."
Better to live with the occasional vagaries of digital pseuodonyms
than to ban them.

(And multiple identies can have many uses, some good, some not.
Welcome to the future.)

Since it may touch on our "cypherpunks agenda," I plan to read up on
some of these proposals for "is-a-person" credentialling and see how
they might relate to schemes for centralized key registration or escrow.

Any suggestion besides the "Crypto" proceedings?

--Tim May

-- 
..........................................................................
Timothy C. May         | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,  
tcmay@netcom.com       | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
408-688-5409           | knowledge, reputations, information markets, 
W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA  | black markets, collapse of governments.
Higher Power: 2^756839 | Public Key: PGP and MailSafe available.
Note: I put time and money into writing this posting. I hope you enjoy it.




Subject: Re: on anonymity, identity, reputation, and spoofing
To: cypherpunks list <cypherpunks@toad.com>
Date: Mon, 18 Oct 93 3:44:35 PDT
From: Eli Brandt <ebrandt@jarthur.Claremont.EDU>

> From: "L. Detweiler" <ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
> On the other hand, I think there is an implicit assumption by virtually
> everyone here that addresses on public posts and private email that are
> not specifically anonymous represent *unique* people.
[...]
> 1) list members are allowed *one* anonymous identity if any. They are
> required to associate some name with all anonymous posts via that identity.
> 2) *no one* is allowed multiple `real' identities and in fact any
> violation of this is considered an extremely serious breach of netiquette & honesty.
[...]
> deep end. The practice amounts to `spoofing' and any patriotic
> cypherpunk with some integrity ought to recognize that immediately and
[...]
> crime against cypherpunk ideology.
[...]

It's interesting to see the different mental models that people hold
of the net.  To me, this equation that one truename means one persona
is not realistic or reasonable.  People spawn personas (-ae?) for
many reasons, including psychological exploration, sociological
experiments, sexual thrills, or just for practice at maintaining
personas.  I know of several instances in which one person patted
himself on the back circularly, or took half a dozen sides in a
discussion -- and can surmise about others.  This sort of thing may
well happen routinely, particularly in the low-rent areas of Altnet,
where participation is a kind of game.

What's more, the privacy technology `we' espouse can only promote
this.  There is no way to maintain this one-to-one equation when
working with pseudonyms, when the human "dongle on the keyboard" is no
longer a viable identifier.  I think the Usenet motto, "Live with it",
applies.

   Eli   ebrandt@jarthur.claremont.edu



From: szabo@netcom.com (Nick Szabo)
Subject: Re: on anonymity, identity, reputation, and spoofing
To: jamie@netcom.com (Jamie Dinkelacker)
Date: Mon, 18 Oct 93 3:29:08 PDT
Cc: cypherpunks@toad.com


[...]

In my limited experience creating Internet pseudonyms, I've been quite 
distracted by the continual need to avoid leaving pointers to my
True Name lying around -- excess mail to/from my True Name, shared 
files, common peculiarities (eg misspellings in written text), traceable 
logins, etc.   The penet.fi site explicitly maintains a list of pointers 
to the original address.  All kinds of security controls -- crypto, access, 
information, inference -- have to be continually on my mind when using 
pseudonymous accounts.  The hazards are everywhere.  With our current 
tools it's practically impossible to maintain an active pseudonym for a 
long period of time against a sufficiently determined opponent, and
quite a hassle to maintain even a modicum of decent security.  Pointers
to info and/or tools to enable the establishment and maintenance of a 
net.nym, beyond the standard cypherpunks PGP/remailer fare with which 
I'm now familiar, greatly appreciated.  Especially nice would be a list 
of commercial net providers that allow pseudonymous accounts.

[...]

I hope that we stick to experimenting with pure anonymity
in many venues.  I suggest we'll find out that purely anonymous
posts are not so bad, overall.  Some of the recent stuff has been weird
or rude, but so have been a lot of True Name flames that have passed 
thru this list.  We find True Name posts easier to deal with
because it's what we're used to.  Many are comforted by the thought
that as a last resort, if a flame is just too evil, the poster
can be tracked down and made to pay for his sins.   The WELL
was so threatened by the thought of anonymity that they required
all pseudonyms to be traceable to the True Name, as an explicit
policy right from the start of the system.  Pure anonymity in all 
its manifestations is a strange, threatening, fascinating beast
in our panoptic social-welfare world.  Even those of us at
the forefront of harnessing this monster shrink back in fear
when it whinnies.

[...]

Pure anonymity provide voice for a wide variety of new kinds
of expression that up until now have been suppressed.
Some kinds are good (whistleblowing), some bad
(slander).  Most are good or bad depending on the 
situation (asking embarrassing newbie questions, expressing politically 
incorrect opinions, discussing illegal activities, etc.)  I hope we 
continue experimenting with pure anonymity for a while longer, as well 
as experimenting with reputation-based pseudonymous systems.  Some of 
what comes out might look very strange, something like tapping into 
previously concealed areas of our social psyche.  I suspect the
result will be a more honest dialog, a more productive conversation
freed from posturing and, ironically, from the concealment of threatening 
truth.  I hope we will observe the resulting new forms of good and evil
with Zen patience and allow this quite interesting experiment to 
continue.

Nick Szabo				szabo@netcom.com



To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: PSEUDOSPOOFING
Date: Mon, 18 Oct 93 03:41:03 -0600
From: "L. Detweiler" <ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu>

I'm absolutely *horrified* and *nauseated* that eminent cypherpunk
leader `ZZZ' has come out in total support of what I have been
calling `spoofing' or using pseudo-real addresses to post to the list. 

(It isn't `really' spoofing in the exact sense because as I noted there
has only been an *implicit assumption* by all of us here that opinions
from unique addresses were themselves unique. so, lets call it)

PSEUDOSPOOFING

the activity of misleading people into thinking that an identity is
unique when it really isn't! i.e. posting behind `real' addresses not
specifically noted as anonymous!

I consider pseudospoofing a *detestable* and *reprehensible* activity
if it exists. Am I the only one who finds this absolutely *repulsive*
and *abhorrent*? How long has this been going on? who has been doing
it? am I the first to suspect it is happening? how many debates have
been affected? how many people have been *harassed* or *intimidated* or
*burned* to a *crisp* by pseudospoofers? is this going on in *private
email* too? how many debates have been skewed? how many people here
DON'T EXIST? Are the other founders T.C.May and J.Gilmore in favor of
this too? how much have you guys been doing this? is this really part
of the cypherpunk agenda? who here supports this, anyway? does this
have anything to do with the bizarre conspiracy theories posts of
`S.Boxx'?! is this why `everyone' is opposed to a newsgroup or other
change in the `status quo'?! Is this why *I* get *flamed* so much? is
this polluting other mailing lists?!

E.H.
>The claim that a person should have only one pseudonym per forum
>indicates profound misunderstanding.  If someone wants to have
>multiple cryptographically protected pseudonyms, they will be able to;
>that is one of the main goals of cypherpunks software.

IMHO, this itself represents a `profound misunderstanding' under what
actually constitutes an OPEN FORUM. If we are merely conducting some
depraved experiment on the psychology of pseudonymity and
pseudospoofing on unwilling participants, please say so! I for one
never saw *that* announcement when I signed up! calling
`pseudospoofing' `one of the `main goals' of cypherpunks software'
sounds *criminal* to me. Or maybe I'm missing the point! I guess this
is what anarchy really *is* all about!

* * *

speaking of OPEN FORUMS, `Jamie Dinkelacker' <Jamie@netcom.com> objects
to my other proposals for reputation tracking statistics:

>>
>>1) how long they have been on the list in days, 0 if none at all
>>2) how many postings they have posted here
>>3) maybe a posting/age ratio -- some people seem to be very sensitive
>>or tune out people with a high one.
>>4) another idea: tracking the number of responses a given poster has,
>>average, per original post, measured by `re: [x]' subject tracking.
>>
>
>Each of these suggestions call for data that may contribute to identifying
>individuals, tracking their behavior or providing information useful to
>decypher some messages. This has a very NSA feel to it. 

A very ``NSA FEEL''?! all of these statistics could be generated by
*anyone* who subscribes to the list! is this an OPEN FORUM or not?! How
could *anyone* object to anything so innocuous? 

A *true* forum would be *representative*. For example, I already have
the impression that no one here supports my suggestions whatsoever on
list modifications & protocol  from E.H.'s comments and
jamie@netcom.com. Now, humor me, and take the hypothetical situation
that these are the same person! how can this be a `forum' if an opinion
is not *representative*? what if a single person just `ganged up' on
someone they didn't like by overwhelming them with pseudospoofs? what
if there was *truly* support for some project but a pseudospoofer
ganged up on the proponents and clobbered them with flames? does this
sound anything like what has happened on this list in the past? doesn't
it throw every `conversation' on this list into spectacularly
*grotesque* doubt? wouldn't that be a lot like intimidation at best and
*extortion* at worst? would it look like a `clique'? what if this was
happening *routinely*? what if people were being *influenced* by what
they perceived was the *majority opinion* or the *views of their peers*
that were really nothing but DECEPTION AND LIES? what if it was
*thwarting progress*? I would consider this nothing but TREACHERY and
HIGH TREASON. is all this  really one of the `main goals' of the
cypherpunk agenda? if so, SIGN ME OFF.

Regardless of whether anyone believes in democracy (a `lot' of people
here said they didn't a while ago, but now I have my doubts!) the idea
of `one man one vote' is SACRED. it means in essence, one man shall not
have UNFAIR INFLUENCE. anything less is just the `Golden Rule: He who
Has the Most Gold Makes the Rules'. or, `you can be here as long as I
always have more *power* than you do and you don't complain!' it is
*anti egalitarian*. it is a recipe for anarchy, dischord and chaos. Or
perhaps I'm MISSING THE POINT?! maybe that's what somebody *wants*. is
*this* what the Cypherpunks really stand for? UNFAIR INFLUENCE. ABUSE
OF POWER. MANIPULATION. DECEIT. TREACHERY. EXPLOITATION. SECRET CONSPIRACIES.



Date: 18 Oct 93 14:18:10 EDT
From: Sandy <72114.1712@CompuServe.COM>
To: <cypherpunks@toad.com>
Subject: DETWEILER

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
  SANDY SANDFORT               Reply to:  ssandfort@attmail.com
 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Punksters,

Lance Detweiler finished his most recent rant thusly:

    . . . is *this* what the Cypherpunks really stand for?
    UNFAIR INFLUENCE. ABUSE OF POWER. MANIPULATION. DECEIT.
    TREACHERY. EXPLOITATION. SECRET CONSPIRACIES.

Lance, stop frothing at the mouth and get a life.

 S a n d y  (aka Tim May, Eric Hughes, Nick Szabo, Perry Metzger,
            Duncan Frissell, Mao Tse-tung, George Herbert Walker
            Bush and a cast of thousands)

>>>>>>    Please send e-mail to:  ssandfort@attmail.com    <<<<<<
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~


Date: Mon, 18 Oct 1993 11:55:46 -0800
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
From: lefty@apple.com (Lefty)
Subject: Re: PSEUDOSPOOFING

>what if people were being *influenced* by what
>they perceived was the *majority opinion* or the *views of their peers*
>that were really nothing but DECEPTION AND LIES? what if it was
>*thwarting progress*? I would consider this nothing but TREACHERY and
>HIGH TREASON. is all this  really one of the `main goals' of the
>cypherpunk agenda? if so, SIGN ME OFF.

Works for me.

--
Lefty (lefty@apple.com)
C:.M:.C:., D:.O:.D:.


From: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Subject: Time for me to come clean...
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Date: Mon, 18 Oct 93 12:46:40 PDT

My experiment has gone far enough.

One of you has claimed that the Net entity "tcmay" (Timothy C. May,
putatively) is actually "jamie" (Jamie Dinkelacker, putatively). This
person has at other times claimed that perhaps Eric Hughes and Jamie
are the same person, and that the Net entity "tcmay" is the "lackey of Eric
Hughes."

It is all getting so confusing! 

Allow me to clarify.

I entered this list under a variety of pseudonyms, with the intent of
compiling information on all of you. I have been posting under the
identities of Tim May (who has actually never existed....the man
behind the mask on the cover of "Wired" was a hired actor, as were the
stand-ins for the personnas of Eric Hughes and John Gilmore), Sandy
Sandfort, Jamie Dinkelacker, and many others.

I disavow any connection to the paranoid "S. Boxx," however.

In fact, I think there are only five actual biological entities on
the list. Makes for some good conspiracy theories for the paranoids.

Finally, I also write under the nym de guerre of "Dorothy Denning."
The real Dorothy Denning is too busy grading papers for her freshman
crypto class to post, so I fill in.

My real name should be apparent to you all. I knew if I used it, the
other four of you would not take me seriously. But now the secret's
out.


David
     
--
     
David Sternlight         When the mouse laughs at the cat,
                         there is a hole nearby.--Nigerian Proverb
 

From: cman@IO.COM (Douglas Barnes)
Subject: Re: PSEUDOSPOOFING (lions and tigers and bears, oh my!)
To: ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu (L. Detweiler)
Date: Mon, 18 Oct 1993 11:21:22 -40962758 (CDT)

L. Det writes:
> I for one
> never saw *that* announcement when I signed up! calling
> `pseudospoofing' `one of the `main goals' of cypherpunks software'
> sounds *criminal* to me. Or maybe I'm missing the point! I guess this
> is what anarchy really *is* all about!

It was one of the main reasons *I* signed up... we were working on
a TV show about cyberspace, and Paco Nathan explained public key
encryption, digital money, and nyms with reputations in his inimitably
cheerful and energetic fashion for our cameras.

The part he was most excited about (a part that still fascinates
me no end) is the possibility of spawning new identities that
can acquire reputations, property, prestige, ignominity, whatever,
without the need to appeal to a government bureaucracy for validation.

Furthermore, the whole notion that there is some kind of implied contract 
when you join a free mailing list completely absurd, second only to your 
notion that we are all pushing for the same political agenda (or should
be) because we put our names in the same hat at toad.com. It just ain't so,
and no amount of wishing will make it so.

And, to cap it all off, I have had more external validation of the 
physical existence of the key members of *this* data space than any 
other international data space I participate in; in addition to 
numerous pictures, I've met a number of the folks, who have, in turn,
met a number of the folks... cypherpunks is one of the meetingest
mailing lists I've ever seen or heard of.

Doug

PS: the show never got edited, because Steve and I decided to set up 
io.com. 

-- 
----------------                                             /\ 
Douglas Barnes            cman@illuminati.io.com            /  \ 
Chief Wizard         (512) 448-8950 (d), 447-7866 (v)      / () \
Illuminati Online          metaverse.io.com 7777          /______\




From: szabo@netcom.com (Nick Szabo)
Subject: SILLY FLAMES: pseudospoofing
To: ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu (L. Detweiler)
Date: Mon, 18 Oct 93 5:25:22 PDT
Cc: cypherpunks@toad.com


L. Detweiler -- shocked, simply shocked, at the realization that
multiple pseudonyms are possible on the net -- explodes:

> ....how can this be a `forum' if an opinion
> is not *representative*? 

Perhaps there are differences between a forum and a voting booth?

> what if a single person just `ganged up' on
> someone they didn't like by overwhelming them with pseudospoofs? what
> if there was *truly* support for some project but a pseudospoofer
> ganged up on the proponents and clobbered them with flames?

Perhaps "support" is better measured by how many people are motivated
enough to go to the effort to make multiple but individually unique,
reputable posts in favor of a proposition, rather than by 
simple numerical polls that abstract away knowledge and
motivation, or by how many True Names position themselves 
with I'm-on-your-side posts. 

On cypherpunks' better days, "support" is measured by what kind 
of code gets written, not by who flames whom how often under
how many names.  Of course we all know that writing code
does not constitute *true* support, since only Democracy is 
The One True Way.

> doesn't
> it throw every `conversation' on this list into spectacularly
> *grotesque* doubt? 

Welcome to the Internet, Detweiler.  Perhaps you might get
together some physical meetings in Colorado, talk to more cypherpunks 
on the phone, look at the pictures in Wired magazine (perhaps also
faked?), etc. if you are so concerned about being ganged up on by 
unknown numbers of strangers.  (Is it better to be ganged up
on by known numbers of strangers?  Why of course, that's called
Democracy).

> the idea
> of `one man one vote' is SACRED.

Hallelujah!  Praise the Lord & pass the card punch!  Let's
vote ourselves bigger paychecks & unlimited medical care.
Let's take a vote on which cypherpunks tools we will implement.
Those who vote with the minority get to do the programming
work, those in the majority get to tell the minority what to write.
I nominate L. Detweiler President of the Cypherpunks.  All in favor 
say "aye" and bow down to His Holiness of the Veiled Booth!

> it is
> *anti egaltarian*. it is a recipe for anarchy

God forbid!  Quick, Detweiler, get out your garlic, raise
up your cross and abjure these crypto-anarchists 
before we spread any further!  Next thing you know
we'll get some elitist, anti-democratic development like
untraceable digital cash.  Some people will accumulate
more digicash than others, and Detweiler won't even know
who they are.  Horrors!  Quick Detweiler,
write your electronic leveling tax protocols before 
its too late.  Better yet, get the majority to vote on
making us evil crypto-anarchists -- only a small cypherpunk
minority once our pseudonyms are unmasked, of course -- make 
us write them for you.  After all, egalitarian software
is a basic human right!

> UNFAIR INFLUENCE. ABUSE
> OF POWER. MANIPULATION. DECEIT. TREACHERY. EXPLOITATION. SECRET CONSPIRACIES.
>...

Isn't it just dreadful?


Nick Szabo				szabo@netcom.com



Date: Mon, 18 Oct 93 08:02:16 CDT
From: m5@vail.tivoli.com (Mike McNally)
To: "L. Detweiler" <ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Cc: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: PSEUDOSPOOFING


"L. Detweiler" writes:
 > I'm absolutely *horrified* and *nauseated* ...

If digicash were a reality, I'd send you some with the proviso that
you only spend it on clues.

Repeat this chant until you attain enlightenment:

	Pseudospoofing cannot be prevented
	Pseudospoofing is a reality of online existance
	No amount of fear and loathing will make it go away

If it weren't for fundamentally new concepts like the ability to
pseudospoof (that's a lousy term, by the way), the net would not be
the quantum change in human communication and human thought it is.

 > p.s. if anyone doesn't hear from me for awhile, assume I've been
 > `liquidated' and this isn't really an `open forum' ...

No, I'll assume the ELF-2 running your pseudomind blew a fuse.

--
Mike McNally



To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: pseudospoofed out
Date: Wed, 20 Oct 93 01:13:18 -0600
From: "L. Detweiler" <ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu>

Cypherpunks, I use the internet for a lot of serious activities, and it
deeply troubles me to think that I have been vicitimized by
pseudospoofers in areas outside of merely the cypherpunks list such as
in the numerous FAQs I edit (a very time consuming endeavor) or in my
other favorite mailing lists. I feel like my blood has been drained by
parasites that suck my prose and passions. Since there is absolutely no
support for any `True Names' here whatsoever, I volunteer to drop the
subject. And of course I am just another blip on this list, so my ideas
for its improvement mean nothing, and I will not *ever* make a
proposition again here regarding the subject. however,

A PERSONAL REQUEST

I humbly request that ANYONE SENDING ME PERSONAL MAIL have the decency
to do so under their `True Name' or `obviously anonymously' under the
same identity. Do not deceive me for perverted sport. Do not try to
build up trust merely so that you can betray it. Do not manipulate me
simply because you have the capability or because I am a basically
trusting person. This sentiment is equivalent to something like `if a
woman doesn't carry a gun then it's OK to rape her' and it is one of
the most alarming aspects of what I have seen promoted here and in the
general `hacker' community. `nothing is wrong if you can get away with
it.' I believe that there is no such thing as a `consequentless
action'. Please, do not drag *me* into the gutter because you like to wallow there.

If anyone has deceived me in manipulating me with multiple pseudonyms
in my personal email, please inform me *now*. I believe this is the
absolute least that *anyone* could ask on the internet.

Another point to make is that Usenet & current mailing lists are far
from the future models. I fundamentally believe that `true name'
systems are entirely socially desirable and can be erected without
invading privacy. Anyone who claims that `true names' and `privacy' are
fundamentally incompatible is simply mistaken. Does `absolute privacy'
mean that no one *ever* knows who *anyone* is?

It seems to me the ability to differentiate identities or reject their
input based on `true names' is a basic right of the listener. You do
not have a right to bludgeon me with identical opinions from an
unrepresentative arsenal of imaginary identities. I suspect some of the
people advocating `absolute privacy' are themselves currently using
powerful tools to detect pseudospoofing others do not possess. Is that
the cypherpunk Utopian ideal? A place where you can manipulate people
without them knowing it? let others drown in mud while you trample atop their backs?

Also, please do not deceive the press. T.C. May has recently
satirically suggested that some of the Wired pictures are of hired
actors. I don't find this funny. If the `cypherpunks' are really
something other than that which they claim, it will eventually and
inevitably come back to haunt the `movement,' whatever it is
(algorithms or ideology? I no longer care). History and society is far
more shrewd than that. If pseudospoofing is really the #1 cypherpunk
agenda, please make that clear. `We want to fool everyone with
brainwashing techniques so they are at the mercy of our whim.'

One of my attractions to cyberspace was the promise of making online
friends, and I have made many over many months. But the idea that some
psychopaths are sending me email just to leech my strong emotions and
play with my passions, like a cat does a captured mouse, perhaps even
with the support of a large and complex software `arsenal' designed
specifically to promote camouflage and manipulation, perhaps on a very
widespread scale involving multiple lists, I find reprehensible and
inherently evil. Please, choose another lab rat victim.

My whole `cyberspatial reality' has been cast into doubt. Who's real?
Who's fake? I used to really look forward to reading and responding to
my mail, but now I approach it with dread, horror, and nausea. I don't
even know if who I am talking to on the phone is who they say they are
anymore, or if I really have any true cyberspatial friendships, because
of all the pseudospoofing in my mailbox. There are some among you who
say `welcome to the real world'. Are you people saying that man's
natural state is confusion, desperation, and paranoia?

I am not opposed to `pseudonymity' and multiple reputations of course.
But the strong sentiments on this list that I should be kept *guessing*
I find abhorrent. What is most disturbing is the possibility of a
single entity attempting to stick someone's psyche in a vice by
systematic and concerted assaults from multiple supposedly `unique'
identities in private email. This is like dealing with a tentacled
octopus-monster. What could be more depraved? This is nothing but
vicious interrogation and brainwashing.

I'm simply in favor of truth in advertising, and I think this list has
been misrepresented as a `forum' when it's nothing but a hotbed of
pseudospoofing, possibly even aided by automatic software tools.
Someone tell me, how long have I been arguing with AI programs anyway?
Trully, I never would have subscribed if I had realized the `practice'
of pseudospoofing was epidemic. I mean, I suspected there were isolated
cases, but now it appears a large part of traffic is manufactured
flames and froth. Does anyone have any idea how much time has been
wasted wading or even arguing with opinions that were nothing but
mirages? I'm deeply disillusioned. But of course, who cares? Certainly
not the leadership or the followers.

I'm not sure that some of the `identities' I've been dealing with over
the past few months really have any basic morality. I suspect there are
some demagogues that tout `privacy' while really subtly and insideously
promoting dishonesty, sociopathism, treachery, and barbarianism.

An example: I am on another mailing list where I posted a long article
as a `gift' to the subscribers. I got some favorable comments, except
from the moderator who said that `people are shocked at what you did.'
I asked him. What people? What did they say? He backed down. But
imagine that someone slandered me with a worthless pseudonym? and, in
fact, even if they mailed *me* would I be able to tell that they didn't
care about the reputation of that pseudonym? It seems to me that there
is a basic idea of reputation and postings. To a degree, if you haven't
earned a reputation in some subject, you should be disqualified from
pontificating on it, irrelevant of your arsenal of pseudonyms. Filters
based on reputations may help make this a reality. (I would personally
like to ban my mailbox of all opinionated pseudonyms who have not read
more than 2 of my posts.)

I remember `ZZZ' once announcing to the list that J. Markoff had
unsubscribed. Who's really in favor of privacy? Is everybody here
really interested in `privacy' as an `offensive weapon'? `Privacy' as a
way of evading taxes? `privacy' as a way of manipulating or betraying
the gullible and trusting for perverted pleasure? `privacy' as
destroying social order and promoting anarchy? Really, nevermind.
please, don't send me any more blistering flames. These are rhetorical
questions. In fact, this is a rhetorical essay.


Date: Wed, 20 Oct 93 08:30:42 CDT
From: m5@vail.tivoli.com (Mike McNally)
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: pseudospoofed out


"L. Detweiler"  writes:
 > [ the funniest thing I've read on the net in years. ]

Thank you, thank you, thank you *all* for making this possible.  The
hours of cleaning crud from my INBOX are *easily* worth this kind of
entertainment.  I am literally in tears, irritating my officemate with
incessant laughter.

Mr. Detweiler (if that really *is* your name), thank you especially.
You write well, kinda, even if I utterly disagree with you.  I think
I'll print this out and paste it into my big unabridged next to
"hyperbole".

--
Mike McNally


Date: Wed, 20 Oct 93 08:22:25 CDT
From: m5@vail.tivoli.com (Mike McNally)
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: pseudospoofed out


"L. Detweiler" writes:
 > I feel like my blood has been drained by
 > parasites that suck my prose and passions.

I hereby claim this as a .signature for at least one of my
identities.

--
Mike McNally




--

ld231782@longs.LANCE.ColoState.EDU




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: norm@netcom.com (Norman Hardy)
Date: Mon, 25 Oct 93 16:13:32 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Error in Shamir sharing
Message-ID: <9310252310.AA06436@netcom2.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Please substitute 'rand()' for '22'. '22' was an 
artifact of debugging!
 
Get the full copy by ftp at
netcom.com:pub/Silk/shamir.c




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: cme@ellisun.sw.stratus.com (Carl Ellison)
Date: Mon, 25 Oct 93 13:39:13 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: worked MTTF examples
Message-ID: <9310252034.AA05555@ellisun.sw.stratus.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


..for the end of the MTTF paper document --------

 - Carl

======================================================================
\pagebreak
\section{Examples}

Let $\lambda = 0.5$ failures/year, assuming a node fails on the average
once every two years.  Let $\mu = 52.0$ repairs/year, assuming a node can
be repaired in a week.  These assumptions result in the following system
MTTF values, in units of years:

\begin{tabular}{||r|r||r||} \hline
$N$ & $K$ & MTTF \\ \hline
2 & 1 & 107.00 \\
3 & 1 & 3747.67 \\
3 & 2 & 36.33 \\
4 & 1 & 98405.50 \\
4 & 2 & 955.50 \\
4 & 3 & 18.50 \\ \hline
\end{tabular}

If $\lambda = 0.5$ failures/year and $\mu = 350.0$ repairs/year (to follow
the Stratus practice) we get the following system MTTF values, in units of
years:

\begin{tabular}{||r|r||r||} \hline
$N$ & $K$ & MTTF \\ \hline
2 & 1 & 703.00 \\
3 & 1 & 164270.33 \\
3 & 2 & 235.00 \\
4 & 1 & 28788554.16 \\
4 & 2 & 41185.50 \\
4 & 3 & 117.83 \\ \hline
\end{tabular}

One could also consider the MTTF of a posting on USENET News.  $\lambda$
and $\mu$ might be the same as above, but $N$ is the number of News servers
to which the posting has propagated and $K$ is 1.  The underlying model is
different because it must take account of limited connectivity of News
servers, but it is clear that a posting's MTTF becomes effectively infinite
once it has left its home node.

\end{document}




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Lee Tien <tien@well.sf.ca.us>
Date: Mon, 25 Oct 93 17:20:20 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: FOIA lawsuit re Clipper
Message-ID: <93Oct25.171816pdt.14182-3@well.sf.ca.us>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



John Gilmore wanted me to let the list know that there will be a
hearing this Friday, Oct. 29, at the Federal Courthouse at 450
Golden Gate in SF, around 9:30 am (time is always unclear), in
his FOIA suit against the FBI/DOJ re release of documents in the
Clipper Chip matter.

Very briefly, we have received some mostly uninteresting documents
regarding Clipper so far.  We moved for an index of the withheld
documents and for expedited processing.  

The gov't response was to move for a stay of proceedings until
early 1997.  That's not a typo-- almost 4 years!

We sent them some discovery as to their FOIA processing, and
they then moved for a protective order barring discovery.

So basically, what we're going to be arguing about on Friday
is whether the case moves forward, or gets put on hold until
the FBI gets around to processing John's request.  

John encourages interested cypherpunks to attend.  He will not
be there himself.  

Feel free to e-mail me, Lee Tien, for details.  I prefer to
be reached at tien@well.sf.ca.us.

Lee Tien




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: baumbach@atmel.com (Peter Baumbach)
Date: Mon, 25 Oct 93 14:44:12 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: signed mail + steganography = ?
Message-ID: <9310252123.AA19707@bass.chp.atmel.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


What if you couldn't tell when a letter was signed unless you new the  
public key of the person signing it?  How could this be done?  Encode 
the digital signature with steganography.  Is this possible when  
steganography alters the very message you wish to sign?  I don't know. 
  
The benefit of this is signed and unsigned messages look like each other. 
People can't be lazy anymore and just assume the signature is yours.  
Your boss isn't likely going to notice you used pgp to sign your mail. 
  
Peter Baumbach
baumbach@atmel.com
 
  
 
  
 
     
 




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: cman@IO.COM (Douglas Barnes)
Date: Mon, 25 Oct 93 15:53:21 PDT
To: frissell@panix.com (Duncan Frissell)
Subject: Re: Net Regulation
In-Reply-To: <199310251724.AA09315@panix.com>
Message-ID: <9310252247.AA01128@illuminati.IO.COM>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



There are several severe limitations to how big of a movement this
could really be: 

1) Let's say, just for instance, that all computer programmers in Europe
   and the US switch places, and become Permanent Tourists. Do you think
   that anyone would notice? Do you think there might be some sort of 
   action taken at the national government level? Would it be effective?

2) Even in this highly select hypothetical group, I would say that the
   vast majority still don't even grasp or have access to the basic
   technology for using even the most simple net tools. Even if we
   eliminated all of the COBOL programmers, we'd still be looking at a 
   tough row to hoe. 

3) One of the persistent problems in solving unemployment problems in
   both the US and Europe is that folks JUST WON'T MOVE. This is more
   true in Europe than the US, but we can look at numerous examples where
   the need for particular skills (or any skills at all) will evaporate
   in one part of the country while there are shortages elsewhere. Some
   people will have sufficient gumption to load up the U-Haul and beat
   it, but most will hang around, going on welfare and engaging in 
   cargo-cult-like behavior waiting for jobs to appear from the sky.

   Most Americans are hidebound, closed-minded people who couldn't even
   find the US on an unlabelled map, much less MOVE to another COUNTRY.

4) The inability of most of our fellow citizens to process text and
   numbers is staggering; it's not clear by any means that they're 
   ready for jobs in their same CITY where they live, if it involves
   any significant reading or writing skills. How are these people going
   to fare in your scenario? Remeber, they're still citizens of an
   alleged democracy and thus have their collective finger on one of the
   largest coercive apparati in the world.

5) If folks don't move, but try to get cute with where their income
   is coming from, they will almost certainly be persecuted by the IRS,
   independent of current law, if their numbers become significant. This
   is probably true even if foreign nationals are involved, especially
   if they pose any significant load on government services. Imagine
   the resentment of, say, a local rancher, tied to physical and taxable
   goods: "Awww, he's onenna them computer-head tax evaders, think he's
   so smart. I'm a-gonna point out him out to the tax boys, and they'll 
   fix him but good."

It wouldn't take too many "examples" to force whatever tax regime the IRS
felt was necessary. The majority of taxpayers in this country are *not*
going to be to be PTs for a long, long time, or are employed in 
professions where it simply won't work (teaching, day-care, nursing, 
car repair, food service, plumbing, construction, agricultural labor,
physical plant maintenance, transportation and delivery, product assembly,
live entertainment, etc., and, of course, the government itself). 

I think that individuals like you, and the others on this list, may 
slowly leak out of the US economy over the next ten years, but it will
probably pass largely unnoticed; if it gains enough momentum, someone 
*will* notice and take steps to make it sufficiently chancy that most
folks will cough up some or all of the required taxes. 

The vast majority of folks, even the high-tech industry, are unwilling
to do anything that would take them out of their cozy home towns or 
suburban enclaves, force them to ship the enormous quantities of material 
crud that they've acquired across one ocean or another, or, god forbid, 
run afoul of the IRS. 


-- 
----------------                                             /\ 
Douglas Barnes            cman@illuminati.io.com            /  \ 
Chief Wizard         (512) 448-8950 (d), 447-7866 (v)      / () \
Illuminati Online          metaverse.io.com 7777          /______\



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Karl Lui Barrus <klbarrus@owlnet.rice.edu>
Date: Mon, 25 Oct 93 15:59:11 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Digital Signatures
Message-ID: <9310252258.AA15045@flammulated.owlnet.rice.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

Earlier, L. Detwiler posted a message which listed some desirable properties
of digital signatures.  (I won't comment on the rest of the post since I'm 
behind in list mail and haven't read up).

Signatures (real and digital) ideally have the following properties, and 
maybe others:

1) Unforgeable.  The presence of the signature shows the signer attached 
it on purpose.  Also, the signature should convince another party that the
signer signed the document (i.e. the signature can be linked to somebody
or a pseudonym or whatever satisfies the recipient).

2) Not transferable.  If the signer signs one document, it should be
impossible to transfer the signature to another document.  (Beware
signing random documents - see a previous post on the "Notary Protocol"
or Judith Moore's paper on protocol failures).  In the digital world,
transfering a signature should make it invalid.

3) Can't repudiate.  The signer can't claim he/she did not in fact sign
a document which bears the signature.

4) Can't alter.  A document which is signed can't be altered without
invalidating the signature.  I don't know if a signed contract with 
white-out, strike-outs, and various inserted edits is still valid, but a 
good digital signature should contain information (secure cryptographic
hash like md5, md4, snefru, snefru256, etc.) about the text signed.
For instance, PGP and RIPEM signatures contain an md5 hash of the message
text, so altering the document after it's signed will invalidate the
signature.

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.3a

iQCVAgUBLMxYWoOA7OpLWtYzAQHARQQAm9m28LRxWWXMeCDN9uNvTc58+4vndkpZ
+2VCAGQ5x4EMYOCWCWV81+kJ3qHS6lXZ3crpRONCcXINi58tB4+mr+XWEKsB98Ms
1C5yCS8P+jGMREq4RNiNWf+LNS4oMXtMi/66a0ytEHvNE5v8vYgOsM14FYe5fQ/u
wmorJXkuetE=
=OSlu
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: catalyst@netcom.com (Scott Collins)
Date: Mon, 25 Oct 93 18:50:41 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Apple, AOCE, and key pair security
Message-ID: <9310260144.AA15492@newton.apple.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

- From the MacWeek article:

  >validity. To get your own digital signature from RSA, you take a form to
  >a notary public, who verifies your identity, notarizes the information
  >on the form, and then mails the form to RSA.

The form contains your name, address, etc, and a printout of your public key.


  >Based on the notary
  >public's authority to say you are who you claim to be, you eventually
  >receive a disk in the mail with your personal electronic signature.

_Not_.  The disk contains a PEM style certificate, authenticating your
public key.  On your local machine, where you generated your private key,
is a file (your private key) called a signer.  This file is your private
key + software to make it sign things, so the whole thing is a self
contained application -- but it refused to function until you bind it to a
certificate.


  >Your
  >electronic signature has a two-year expiration date, and includes some
  >verification information.

Certificate, not signature, just like RSA has been trying to sell them all
along.


  >If someone wants to make sure your signature
  >is valid, he or she contacts the issuing authority listed in the
  >certificate.

Wrong again.  Validation occurs locally because an entire chain of
certificates is provided in the signature


  >There will be issuing authorities other than RSA. For
  >example, Apple Computer's security department plans to issue signatures
  >to all Apple employees with employee badges."

Not signatures, certificates.

All key generation takes place locally.  RSA does not generate the keys. 
These articles are a woeful misrepresentation by over simplification.  I
will happily provide clarification to the authors if they call me.

If anyone wants, I will demonstrate this software at the next Bay Area
cypherpunks meeting.


Scott Collins         | "Few people realize what tremendous power there
                      |  is in one of these things."     -- Willy Wonka
......................|................................................
BUSINESS.   voice:408.862.0540  fax:974.6094   collins@newton.apple.com
Apple Computer, Inc.   5 Infinite Loop, MS 305-2B   Cupertino, CA 95014
.......................................................................
PERSONAL.   voice/fax:408.257.1746    1024:669687   catalyst@netcom.com


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.3

iQCVAgUBLMw0nSmBKTQiZpaHAQFWOwQAqnD+C7cO0XDzCrbh7hxjzTSDEhbbtxZZ
B4+dXNghqSSI24c+T8FZC/gwBIhDq4Q1z0iEml2d84VcFZoHdLJL2Vi803go179E
86uwlggClAPVT+vhqE/LG7NrOC7+r8gTBk5S4gi5fX4hCkMQXdjcNOaWvgQ/slOF
XbH+g4vjhF8=
=Kn0e
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: nate@VIS.ColoState.EDU (CVL staff member Nate Sammons)
Date: Mon, 25 Oct 93 18:10:09 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com (Cypherpunks Mailing List)
Subject: Re: signed mail + steganography = ?
In-Reply-To: <9310252123.AA19707@bass.chp.atmel.com>
Message-ID: <9310260105.AA21690@vangogh.VIS.ColoState.EDU>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----


writes Peter Baumbach:
>
>What if you couldn't tell when a letter was signed unless you new the  
>public key of the person signing it?  How could this be done?  Encode 
>the digital signature with steganography.  Is this possible when  
>steganography alters the very message you wish to sign?  I don't know. 
>  
>The benefit of this is signed and unsigned messages look like each other. 
>People can't be lazy anymore and just assume the signature is yours.  
>Your boss isn't likely going to notice you used pgp to sign your mail. 
>  
>Peter Baumbach
>baumbach@atmel.com
> 
>  

What if you were to use a higher number of bits per character than 
ascii?  Then you could use the highest (or lowest) bit for a signature.

This may not be such a good idea for ascii mail, but if there is ever
a real "multi-media" (I _hate_ that term) mail, such as 'ol NeXTmail,
then I can see how it would be easy to squeeze in a signature.

- -nate

- -- 
+-----------------------------------------------------------------------+
| Nate Sammons   email: nate@VIS.ColoState.Edu
|   Colorado State University Computer Visualization Laboratory
|   Finger nate@monet.VIS.ColoState.Edu for my PGP key
|   Key fingerprint =  2D CD 07 CA 7B EC A8 4A  86 7F F3 A8 1D 15 65 46
|   Title 18 USC 2511 and 18 USC 2703 Protected --> Monitoring Forbidden
+--------+ Guerrilla Cryptographer             Always remember "Brazil"



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Dark <unicorn@access.digex.net>
Date: Mon, 25 Oct 93 16:19:13 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: help/subscribe
Message-ID: <199310252317.AA18132@access.digex.net>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


 
HELP
SUBSCRIBE
 
In the event there is a human on that end,
I was a cypherpunk recipiant before I went home (Europe) for the summer.  Please sign
 me back up!
 
 
-uni- (Dark)
 




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Eli Brandt <ebrandt@jarthur.Claremont.EDU>
Date: Mon, 25 Oct 93 19:44:49 PDT
To: cypherpunks list <cypherpunks@toad.com>
Subject: Re: Totally Anonymous Remailing
In-Reply-To: <9310250201.AA21182@dink.foretune.co.jp>
Message-ID: <9310260243.AA27775@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> From: Robert J Woodhead <trebor@foretune.co.jp>

> Just toying around with some ideas, and came up with this:
> 
> Totally Anonymous Remailing (V1.0)
[...]
> 	SEND <destination>
> 
> 		Sends accumulated mail, in a batch, to the
> 		email address specified.  So you can log on
> 		to any account, even a guest, and get your
> 		mail.

A problem here.  The SEND system eliminates the risk of database
seizure, and encrypting mail to the remailer eliminates snooping on
incoming mail, but outgoing mail is unprotected.  Anybody watching
net traffic coming out of the TAR can snoop the destination of SEND
requests, and reasonably presume that address to be the owner of the
nym.  This is of course a problem with a penet-style setup too, but
it's something to fix if you want to be "totally anonymous".  

I fairly recently posted a scheme by which a remailer could reduce
this hazard, while retaining the same front end -- which may or may
not be a wise move.  I hesitate to blat the thing to the list again,
but the plan was to use cypherpunks remailers as a back-end delivery
mechanism.  With a given key the nymserver would associate a
pseudonym and a list of delivery points, of which the first living
one would be used.  These could be either normal addresses (backward-
compatible idiot mode), or remailer addresses associated with
(encrypted!) addressing blocks to prepend.  

One thing I didn't address, which needs to be, is how best to handle
testing of the delivery chains.  I think this is a make-or-break
issue for the general usability of this thing.

   Eli   ebrandt@jarthur.claremont.edu




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: jim@bilbo.suite.com (Jim Miller)
Date: Mon, 25 Oct 93 18:19:19 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: the Joy of Pseudospoofing
Message-ID: <9310260115.AA11399@bilbo.suite.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



I just joined this mailing list a couple of days ago (you may remember my  
clue-less subscribe request that I broadcast to the list).  Anyways, I expected  
to lurk for a while, get a feel for the types of conversations that appear, and  
then occasionally post something.  However, I simply must comment on "the Joy  
of Pseudospoofing".

I'll go through it in steps.


> Not a single person has said they understand what I have
> been talking about in describing the evils of
> pseudospoofing.
> 


I understand what you're talking about and I'm just a newbie.  I would hazard a  
guess that almost everybody on the list understands what you're talking about.   
The thing is,  most people on the list probably don't find "pseudospoofing" to  
be an evil menace.

I generally don't care who authors a message.  I care about the *content* of  
the message.  If the content of the message is interesting, I save it.  It's  
boring, I delete it.  I often don't even look at who sent it.

As a member of a mailing list, I accept the fact that message headers can be  
forged or that people can use multiple nyms for nefarious purposes.  It simply  
doesn't bother me.  There will always be jerks.

I joined this list to acquire a good understanding of cryptographic technology  
and how it might affect the world.  The discussions of the technology will  
stand on their own.  The ideas will either be good ideas, bogus ideas, or  
require further study.  I don't think it is possible for people to use multiple  
nyms to somehow "corrupt" the discussion of the technology.

However, people could use multiple nyms to bias the discussions of the social  
effects of widespread cryptography.  So what.  I have long since abandoned  
using majority opinion as a tool for forming my own opinions.  I form new  
opinions based on the quality of the debates, not the quantity of posts.


> .....She never posts uncharacteristically under JR,
> such as talking about some other arbitrary subject she's
> knowledgeable on but would be a bit surprising if JR said
> anything about it.
> 

> Okay, let's stop and take note of this. Is any `deception'
> going on here? Absolutely. Should this be permitted? 


I agree that 'deception' is taking place.  Should this be permitted?  To even  
ask this question show that you haven't fully grasped the implications of the  
technology.


> But the problem with all this is that in a regular social
> setting, there are some very ancient, venerable, and
> sophisticated rules involving propriety and courtesy
> of communication that break down dangerously on any
> online `forum' when a single person has multiple
> pseudonyms, and these `subversive uses' are what I will
> expand on. 

> 


This paragraph says it all.  Many of the rules and assumptions that were  
developed for regular social settings (e.g. face-to-face) are not valid for the  
online experience.  This is something you apparently need to come to terms  
with.


> The final and most important aspect of group
> communication psychology is that of *consensus* and
> *peer pressure*. This can be an extraordinarily
> powerful force. Many people are `lurkers' and are most
> influenced by what they perceive to be other's opinion on
> various subjects, or the general group feelings as
> gauged through multiple postings. They are unlikely to
> question what they read. 

> 


What can I say?  I guess I have a higher opinion of the people lurking on this  
list than does L. Detweiler.  To me, this is his strawman:

  *People are gullible and we need to protect them!*


> This leads directly into the ego case. What about people
> who are simply out to assuage their own ego? Suppose
> Medusa wishes to do this. She could `stage' very clever
> situations where jr@netcom.com says `I heard that
> Medusa knows a lot about industrial sabotage, and am
> always fascinated by her posts.' Medusa pops up a few
> messages later under snake@netcom.com and says `Thanks
> Jim, I really respect your knowledge of number theory
> too, and I hope you can provide some more updates on it' and
> launches into an amazingly relevant post, considering
> what Jim asked about.
> 

> So, cypherpunks, what do you think of that? This strikes
> me as rather perverted. 

>

So what's wrong with being perverted?  By the way, who defines perversion these  
days anyways?  THEM, no doubt.



> Finally, let's look at how peer pressure can be
> influenced by these pseudonymous postings of Medusa's.
> Obviously, she has created the illusion of support or
> rejection of something that is not consistent with
> reality. It is a deception. People may have lowered or
> raised their opinion of something merely because they
> saw multiple posts criticizing the same thing, when they
> all came ultimately from Medusa. 

> 


Here we go again with the "multiple posts" mechanism for forming opinions.  



> These fantasies would totally pollute and poison any
> trust in an online community. It could be compared to
> brainwashing.
>

Well, perhaps trust is not something that carries over easily to the online  
community.  Ever think of that?  Why do you continue to expect online social  
settings to exactly parallel face-to-face social settings?  They are two  
different types of fruit.  They are not directly comparable.


> Note that in all these cases, if any of this was going on in
> `real world meetings' it would be considered shocking
> depravity.
> 


I don't like baseball because no one ever scores a touchdown.


> The very final possibility of pseudospoofing I would
> like to describe , perhaps the most treacherous and evil,
> is the following. Suppose Medusa not only had no ethics
> and morality, but was actually Satan in disguise.
> 


<sigh>

> ``Death is the ultimate form of censorship.'' (author unknown)
> 

> Jim Riverman
> Software Engineer
> jr@netcom.com
> (415) 941-4782 [work]
> 



Oh my god!  It's really happening!!!!!  <yawn>


Jim Miller
Software Engineer
jim@suite.com
(at work)





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Mike Godwin <mnemonic@eff.org>
Date: Mon, 25 Oct 93 17:49:43 PDT
To: thomas.hughes@chrysalis.org
Subject: Re: Q
In-Reply-To: <9310250013.A6273wk@chrysalis.org>
Message-ID: <199310260045.AA00356@eff.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


 
>  --> Note: Forwarded (from: DFW)
>  Originally from Bryny (1:124/4109.0)
>  Original dated: Oct 23 '93, 18:36
>  
> The EPCA applies to Common Carriers.  Thus it applies to Compuserve, MCI Mail,
> etc.  It does not apply to bulletin boards unless they issue mail contracts.
>  
>  
> ----8<----
>  
> what are the actual legal requirements for claiming status as a Common 
> Carrier??  (other than being in the USA ...)
>  
> signed written agreements?

Just about everything said about common carriers in these postings is
wrong. ECPA is not limited to common carriers, for example. And it *does*
apply to BBSs.

Finally, one doesn't claim common carrier status, absent a legislative or
regulatory grant of that status.

For a brief period, thanks to some partial research I'd done in the
subject, I was under the impression that there is such a thing as a
"common-law common carrier," at least potentially. I now know that this is
not the case.


--Mike







From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: rjc@gnu.ai.mit.edu
Date: Mon, 25 Oct 93 18:10:09 PDT
To: owen@autodesk.com (D. Owen Rowley)
Subject: Re: on the term `signature'
In-Reply-To: <9310251918.AA26068@lux.YP.acad>
Message-ID: <9310260106.AA03681@kropotkin.gnu.ai.mit.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


D. Owen Rowley writes:
> 
>  > From: rjc@gnu.ai.mit.edu (Ray)
> 
>  > L. Detweiler () writes:
>  > > Consider the term `signature' in the conventional connotation of a
>  > > handwritten scrawl. What are the *critical* properties of a handwritten
>  > > signature of a person [x]?
>  > > 
>  > > 1) no person [y] can `forge' the signature of [x]
>  > > 2) the signature of [x] is unique to [x]
>  
>  >    Well (2) is untrue since I know people who can forge signatures with
>  > great precision (even my own).
> 
> However if they forged your name on one of your checks, you wouldn't
> take such a blase attitude to it would you?

  First, they'd need to be able to get one of my checks, which if they were
digital, would be as hard as getting my private key. If you're going to
allow for private keys to be stolen, you may as well forget about crypto.
It's like saying "what if someone stole cash out of your wallet, how would
you find them and prosecute them." Cash is already relatively untracable so
you argument against crypto is irrelevent. (unless you also want to make
an argument against coins/dollars)

> And in such a case you have an opprtunitty to prosecute them for
> their criminal act of forgery should you be able tpo prove it.

  If someone steals one of your checks and forges a signature, how the hell
are you going to catch them anyway? Unless you knew a check was stolen
(in which case you'd notify the bank), your situation is hopeless. Likewise,
with digital signatures, if someone gets you're private key, you simply
issue a cancellation of the key and notify the digibank. The first time
someone attempts to forge a signature (on a digicheck) and cash it, the
bank nabs them. 

  I make the claim that current checks can be forged by an intelligent criminal
more easily than a digital one could.
 
> Digital signature systems need to include the ability to track and
> succesfully prosecute criminal
> forgery, or digital signatures are worthless for transactiuons
> that require reliable accountability.
> IMNSHO

  How do you forge a digital signature without having the private key of your
victim? I think you are overlooking the obvious. I'd like the hear what
your version of accountability means. Digital Cash systems protect the
honest man, and only reveal an identify if you are dishonest. Detweiler's
argument sounds like he wants an escrow-like system whereby if a forgery
is detected, you get a search warrant and the issuing authority reveals
your true name. If this is the case (identity being protected by the
trust of an ecrow, not mathemtical security), Detweiler has no right to
oppose clipper also.

> What makes you think that the bleak vision of the future reflected in your
> satire above isn't exactly what the typical power/control-freak government
> types want to impose?

  I also think it is the eventual future that "risk-fee" freaks want to
impose. In order to eliminate the possibility of pseudospoofing on
the net you need Draconian measures. I think the level accountability of
any person should depend on the type of transaction he is engaging in and
what the other person demands. In other words, it's a private matter. The
average level of accountability will arise out of the sum of all those
private transactions -- spontaneous order.

  However, unlike Detweiler, I think both accountability, privacy, and
pseudonyms are compatible. I don't see any need to bring someone's True
Name into it.

>  > > If a person cannot be traced based on their digital signatures, where
>  > > is the accountability? What if a person signs a document with a
>  > > `digital signature' and *breaks* that contract? you have no recourse
>  > > unless the identity is ultimately identifiable and you can take `that
>  > > body' to court.
>  
>  >    Get a clue for god's sake. Digital signatures won't exist in a vacuum.
>  > No one is going to accept the validity of a signature unless it is signed by
>  > some trusted/certified authority and that authority would be liable for the
>  > person's true name or actions.
> 
> right, so where are the systems that certify trust and authenticity?

  Well, for starters there is PGP. Then there's the Apple/RSA thingy which
requires notarized documents.



-- Ray Cromwell        |    Engineering is the implementation of science;    --
-- EE/Math Student     |       politics is the implementation of faith.      --
-- rjc@gnu.ai.mit.edu  |                         - Zetetic Commentaries      --




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "L. Detweiler" <ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Date: Mon, 25 Oct 93 20:09:54 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: a desperate plea
Message-ID: <9310260308.AA10040@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


please do not fill my mailbox with argument in the form `criminal
behavior [y] exists or is widespread, therefore similar practice [x] is ok'

please do not say `forgeries are hard to prevent, therefore no one
should even attempt it'

please do not say `the only systems for identity tracking amount to
government oppression'

please do not talk about some depraved person with multiple personality
disorder as a way of describing Utopia.

most of all, do not pollute the Constitution with your lies:

>The freedom to communicate in any way whatsoever, including
>"pseudospoofing", is a Constitutional guarantee and part of the
>foundation of this society.  

the Constitution specifically prohibits `high treason'. Or are we now
against the Constitution? It's hard to keep track lately.

[Pseudospoofing]
>This is a fundemental paradigm shift that you have not made yet.  It is one
>that few have.  If anything, it is shared conceptual memes such as this
>subject of identity in a world without substance that is the true
>cypherpunk cause.  

oh, what depravity and moral blackness. Evil promoted as `a fundamental
paradigm shift', a `conceptual meme'. Helleluja.

many cypherpunks have so utterly deluded themselves, they believe they
have invented a new kind of society that is completely free of
accountability, while they leech the fruits of one where that
accountability was hard-won by many sacrifices of our forefathers. I
urge you to live in your `society'. You will get the chance, I assure
you! `actions have consequences, even in cypherspace.' 

* * *

Let me ask a question of the `cypherpunks' opposed to identity tracking
in any form. A major aspect of catching vicious criminals is being able
to link up their multiple crimes. It is absolutely essential for
crimefighting. I could point to some examples using credit scams or
drug dealing or whatever, but the hard core Cypherpunks would probably
just grin with evil pleasure. So--

An excellent case is Ted Bundy. Ted Bundy would be the Cypherpunk
Poster Boy for Pseudospoofing. `Medusa' is correct in saying our new
societies allow and encourage this kind of anonymity. He slipped and
danced between cities and murdered young women in the most grisly and
heinous fashions. He lied at *every* stage of the way, perhaps even at
the end when he blamed his utter depravity on exposure to pornography.

Part of the difficulty in catching him in the end was his total mastery
of the techniques that have a striking similarity to what the
Cypherpunks promote -- hidden credit, deception, disguise,
impersonation, etc. He was a man who was so treacherous, he would truly
not `stop at anything'. I'm sure he weaved such a majestic and
convoluted `web of lies,' PRZ & the Cypherpunks would be proud. In the
end, one of the final critical incriminating pieces of evidence used in
court to convict him, and prevent further murders, was the bite marks
he had savagely embedded in the buttocks of one of his victims, which
matched his own jaw. It took something like 4 police to hold him down
to make the cast, he squirmed and writhed with such force and desperation.

Cypherpunks, look at yourselves in the mirror. See what you are
becoming and promoting. Look at the logical extent of your ideas. Could
*any* society truly function without any identity or accountability
whatsoever? The cypherpunk `agenda' has become so closely
indistinguishable with raw criminality and evil it horrifies me. Oh,
how it nauseates me. Perhaps many of you will fill my mailbox with new
letters defending Ted Bundy and asserting that the only problem was
that he didn't `spawn' a new set of teeth. Perhaps you look forward to
the day you can spawn some of your own Ted Bundys, and be so clever
you'd *never* be caught. Perhaps you already have the young lady
victims in mind. The ones that betrayed you by thinking you were too
strange too date, huh? Perhaps the only problem was that these young
ladies are just too damn *trusting*?

`that which cannot be enforced should not be prohibited'. Like murder?

* * *

Another question for all the bastard apologists and moral relativists.
Are you fundamentally opposed to me having the choice of screening
phantom identities in my personal mailbox? Many of your arguments
suggest that not only do you wish to make sure you can be anonymous,
but you wish to ensure that other people must support and sponsor your
anonymity. As for screening, very soon these capabilities will probably
exist, based on birth certificate databases etc. that are accessable
over the internet. Oh, my kingdom for this capability.

But you will infect and poison these databases with your forgeries and
lies, won't you? That is the fundamental cypherpunk agenda: wherever
accountability or identity is in place, do everything possible to
*evade* and *sabotage* it. Not only should there be *passive*
anonymity, but there should also be *active* deception. You not only
want to swing your fist, you want to batter my face -- with a phantom
bludgeon. I'll never know what hit me! Oh, what utter joy! To not only
be evil, but to get away with it! You hate Democracy and
`egalitarianism' not because they are unfair, but because they are the
closest thing to honesty and fairness we humans have ever discovered,
and in them *you* would *lose*, because the `perverted majority' of
society is *not* in favor of being murdered and raped without consequence.

And you will tear and wreck those fragile developing efforts and
schemes for identification and accountability, no matter how basic or
feeble, with the most insidious treachery. You will subscribe to the
mailing lists where the development is going on, you will infiltrate
the development groups, you will assault the honest, polite, and
courteous ladies and gentlemen with poisonous and acidic email and
posts, you will twist your knife into the baby in the crib, and you
will stick dynamite sticks up the nostrils of anyone who says, `well,
gosh, guys, just hold on a minute here!' ...

Oh, how you are thriving on the Internet. Either the parasite or the
host will die soon, of at least that I am sure. I pray to God that
Cyberspace survives.


P.S. Ask all your revered fiction authors like Gibson and Sterling
et.al. what they would think of your grotesque perversions. Be sure to
explain it in *your* terms of `true and pure anonymity.' `a fundamental
paradigm shift? sure, sounds great! right out of one of my own stories.'




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Dave Banisar <banisar@washofc.cpsr.org>
Date: Mon, 25 Oct 93 18:50:42 PDT
To: CYPHERPUNKS <CYPHERPUNKS@toad.com>
Subject: CPSR NII Paper
Message-ID: <00541.2834429212.263@washofc.cpsr.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


  CPSR NII Paper
                    FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

Contact:	
Todd Newman (CA) 415-390-1614
Eric Roberts (CA) 415-723-3642
Coralee Whitcomb (MA) 617-356-4309
Marc Rotenberg (D.C.) 202-544-9240




     COMPUTER SCIENTISTS RAISE SOCIAL AND DESIGN CONCERNS
                     ABOUT THE INFORMATION HIGHWAY



Palo Alto, Calif., October 25, 1993  --  In the wake of sudden 
corporate mergers and rapid technological developments, Computer 
Professionals for Social Responsibility (CPSR) today voiced concern 
that the planned information superhighway will not realize its full 
potential.  The public interest organization put forward specific 
guidelines for the National Information Infrastructure (NII) in a 
paper titled, "Serving the Community:  A Public-Interest Vision of 
the National Information Infrastructure."  Urging the Clinton 
Administration to move quickly to adopt these principles, CPSR 
President Eric Roberts said, "Although there is widespread agreement 
on general goals, there is no specific plan to ensure that these goals 
are met."

"It is much easier to state a vision than to achieve it, " said Dr. 
Roberts, who is also Associate Chair of the Computer Science 
department at Stanford University.  "And there are many dangers on 
the horizon that threaten to compromise the value of the NII as a 
resource for the public.  

"For example, if a small number of companies dominate the market, 
we're in danger of stifling competition and innovation on the 
network.  If those same companies control the programming, then 
open and diverse speech is limited.  If pricing structures do not cover 
universal service, the average person and the poor will be struggling 
to use the backroads of the information highway.  If privacy isn't 
protected, your TV could keep more detailed records of your finances 
than the IRS.  And, if the NII is not designed to allow everyone to 
communicate freely and to publish their own contributions, it could 
become nothing more than a medium for delivering 500-channel 
television, with interactivity limited to home-shopping and trying to 
guess the next play during sporting events."

CPSR's paper expands on these dangers and makes specific policy and 
technical recommendations for the newly formed Information 
Infrastructure Task Force.  The Task Force is expected to coordinate 
network policy for the Clinton Administration.  

"In its 'Agenda for Action' document, the Administration has set forth 
a positive vision of what the NII can be," said Dr. Roberts.  "To 
achieve that vision, however, the government must play a major role 
in the design, development, and regulation of the network."  CPSR 
recommends that the Administration adopt the following policies:

o   Promote widespread economic benefits by evaluating the NII's 
    economic success using measures that reflect its impact on the 
    society as a whole, not merely the profits of NII investors and 
    service providers.

o   Evaluate the social impact of the NII by conducting periodic 
    reviews as the NII is implemented and used to guarantee that it 
   continues to serve the public interest.

o   Guarantee equitable and universal access through an appropriate 
    mix of legislation, regulation, taxation, and direct subsidies.

o   Promote the development of a vital civic sector by ensuring 
    resources, training, and support for public spaces within the NII 
    where citizens can pursue noncommercial activities.

o   Promote a diverse and competitive marketplace in terms of the 
    content carried over the NII.

o   Provide access to government services and information over the 
    NII.

o   Encourage democratic participation by ensuring full public 
    disclosure, and actively promoting democratic decision-making 
    and public participation in all stages of the development process.

o   Actively facilitate the seamless connection of America's NII with 
    the information infrastructures of other nations by working to 
    resolve such issues as security, censorship, tariffs, and privacy.

o   Guarantee the functional integrity of the NII by establishing 
    critical technical requirements including ease of use, widespread 
    availability, full functionality, high reliability, adequate privacy 
    protection, and evolutionary expansion.

The recommendations follow from a yearlong review of the NII 
conducted by CPSR.  The process included collecting more than 1,200 
suggestions for NII policy from network users across the country, 
drafting a report, holding special chapter meetings on the NII in 
Berkeley, Boston, Seattle, and Washington, D.C., and having a 
multiple-draft review process by the membership.  Final changes 
to the report were made at the annual meeting of CPSR, where the 
report was adopted unanimously by the CPSR Board of Directors.

Dr. Roberts noted that he was very pleased by the level of 
participation in the NII report.  "The computer community knows 
that the NII is the critical technological issue facing the United States 
today.  Our members were extremely responsive when we asked 
them to participate in this project, because they understand from 
their own experience how much the NII has to offer."

CPSR also worked closely with the Telecommunications Policy 
Roundtable (TPR), a coalition of more than sixty nonprofit, consumer, 
labor and civil rights organizations based in Washington, DC.  CPSR's 
paper endorses the principles set forth by TPR.  TPR will unveil its 
founding principles in a press conference, Tuesday, October 26th at 
10:00 a.m. at the National Press Club in Washington, D.C.

CPSR is planning a conference next April in Cambridge, 
Massachusetts, on the future of the NII, The Directions and 
Implications of Advanced Computing.  The conference will 
investigate at a more specific level how to achieve the principles 
in the CPSR report.

Founded in 1981, CPSR is a national, nonprofit, public interest 
organization of computer professionals and others concerned with 
the impact of computer technology on society.  With offices in Palo 
Alto, California, and Washington D.C., and 22 chapters across the 
country, CPSR works to encourage public discussion of decisions 
involving the use of computers in systems critical to society and to 
challenge the assumption that technology alone can solve political 
and social problems. 

CPSR's NII paper is available electronically by sending email to 
listserv@cpsr.org.  In the message write the command
"GET CPSR NII_POLICY"  The paper will automatically be mailed to 
you.  You can also FTP/WAIS/Gopher cpsr.org/nii/cpsr_nii_policy.txt.

For a hard copy of the paper or for more information about CPSR, 
call 415-322-3778 or write to cpsr@cpsr.org.  For information about 
the Telecommunications Policy Roundtable, contact Jeff Chester at 
202-628-2620 or cme@access.digex.net.


                          - END -









From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "L. Detweiler" <ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Date: Mon, 25 Oct 93 20:24:55 PDT
To: root@netcom.com
Subject: Medusa's Snake Speaks
Message-ID: <9310260324.AA10369@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



------- Forwarded Message




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "L. Detweiler" <ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Date: Mon, 25 Oct 93 20:29:47 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: A Second Snake Speaks
Message-ID: <9310260327.AA10414@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



------- Forwarded Message




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "L. Detweiler" <ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Date: Mon, 25 Oct 93 21:24:03 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Another Tussle with a Tentacle
Message-ID: <9310260423.AA11740@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


"Robert J. Woodhead" <trebor@foretune.co.jp>

>I agree with him that this is an area of great potential concern.  While
>I am not opposed to the principle of maintaining multiple identities on
>the net, the rule of netiquette should be that "multiple identities should
>_NEVER_ intersect."

what, pray tell, do you define as *intersection*? the very existence of
the two pseudonyms on the same Cyberspace can be considered an `intersection'.

>So I support "L. Detweiler"s right to be "Jim," but they ought never to
>support each other.  His scenario is chillingly _possible_.

the scenario is chillingly *true*. And I do not support it. I condemn it.

>At the same time, I think such episodes will be rare.  The amount of
>effort needed to maintain multiple intersecting identities is quite high,
>and in most cases would be "uneconomic."  However, in some cases, for
>some people, the effort might be worth it, so some thought ought to
>be placed into ways to detect or discourage it.

again, more Medusa-cypherpunk brainwashing. `don't worry about this.
it's not a big deal. no one would be evil enough to do this. heaven
forbid, don't do anything rash like invent robust identity mechanisms
that would *prevent* me from continuing to exploit this weakness in the
system and inherent trust of others.'

>Which brings up the question: how can we, in the era of digital pseudonyms
>determine that two pseudos are, or are not, the same person?  One possible
>method would be careful automated analysis of the language used by
>the participants in a net discussion.

hah, hah! society has already evolved many other mechanisms that have
worked for centuries, and `you' promote obscure black magic. the
problem is, all that stuff is just to damn mundane and oppressive. it's
equivalent to Retinal Scans and a Camera on Every Corner.

cypherpunks, you have no idea how much you are being brainwashed. a
true Thought Crime if there ever was one. wipe wipe, slosh slosh, scrub
scrub. look! sparkling white! now, to pour in the blackness...




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: nobody@entropy.linet.org
Date: Mon, 25 Oct 93 22:05:54 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: LD and Contribution
Message-ID: <m0oreR4-0003EfC@entropy.linet.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


 ....
Well not ragging on about LD I/We would have to agree with and
since some of us in this disdussion are indeed
composite Personna, we tend to have issues when
someone says we dont have a right to existance.
Not every thing in the world is la
d out all black
and white as certain individuals would have it for their
comfort. For some this "brave new world" is very uncomfortable
indeed and they seek to control. For others, it is still
very uncomfortable and they seek to explore the very phenomena
that they are experiencing discomfort about.
Social and Psych experimentation are very valid tools to
explore human reaction and tolerance to this new domain.
The case of LD is particulary fascinating as from being
a proponent ofprivacy/anonymity tools/techniques he found
himself so uncomfortable about certain aspects of it
that he slipped over into the paranoid delusional phase.

Well I/We will settle at least some of the controversy,
Eric Hughes, TC May, Nick Szabo, John Gilmore, Phillip
Zimmerman are real(as well as others too numerous to
mention). David Sternlight, S Boxx, and LD I/We havent met,
does that make them any less real?

The technology of privacy and encryption ensures
that we can never goe back to what things were.
How now then do we deal with the issues around trust.
Its clear that reputations alone cant solve the issue.
Or will individuals like LD just find themselves more
and more seperate from the rest of the madding crowd?

I think that while electronic signatures are certainly possible
that the mass of the online community wont accept
the loss of privacy that comes with same.

    
                             Sam

I/WE





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Date: Mon, 25 Oct 93 22:55:51 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: We Don't Need No Steenking Digital Superhighway!!
In-Reply-To: <9310260427.AA00771@tamsun.tamu.edu>
Message-ID: <9310260550.AA13270@netcom5.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


What the Sam Hill is this?

> >   CPSR NII Paper
> >                     FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE
> >      COMPUTER SCIENTISTS RAISE SOCIAL AND DESIGN CONCERNS
> >                      ABOUT THE INFORMATION HIGHWAY
....
>   I really don't see why we need NII at all. We already have internet.
> Cable companies are rushing to provide high bandwidth networks for consumers.
> NII seems to be nothing more than WelfareNet. Which isn't surpising since
> CPSR praises systems like IGC (Econet, PeaceNet, etc) which are much more
> expensive than Netcom, Panix, Digex, and provide shoddier service.
> 
> Sam Hill

Very true! In fact, it is the EFF's talk about the "need" for such a
government effort that really worries me about the EFF (a mild kind of
worry...I haven't completely detweilered over it). I'm not clear just
how central are these issues to the EFF, currently, but I urge us all
to try to convince them that the "electronic frontier" really doesn't
need government-built channels and routes.

With a zillion forms of fiber, cable, satellites, land lines,
undersea cables, lots of competing companies, etc., there just is *no
need* for a nationalized effort to build some kind of bureacratic
dream of what the people "need."

And unlike the Interstate Highway System (actually called the National
Defense Transportation System, or somesuch, clearly an
autobahn-inspired Eisenhowwer defense project), which arguably needed
a government-level effort to obtain the land, the crossings, etc., no
such government-level effort is needed to lay more cable, put up more
satellites, etc.

In fact, the relatively anarchic growth of the Net (many nets, of
course) is a major strength and advantage.

We helped kill the Superconducting Supercollider, now we can help kill
Al Gore's TipperNet fantasy.

--Tim May


-- 
..........................................................................
Timothy C. May         | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,  
tcmay@netcom.com       | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
408-688-5409           | knowledge, reputations, information markets, 
W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA  | black markets, collapse of governments.
Higher Power: 2^756839 | Public Key: PGP and MailSafe available.
Note: I put time and money into writing this posting. I hope you enjoy it.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: plaz@netcom.com (Geoff Dale)
Date: Mon, 25 Oct 93 23:05:25 PDT
To: "L. Detweiler" <ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Subject: Re: a desperate plea
Message-ID: <9310260604.AA12241@netcom.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

You know Mr. Detweiler, I've been trying real hard to stay out of this one,
for three reasons:

        A: I think you've made positive contributions to the list.
        B: Here on cypherpunks we try NOT to argue ideologies, (but this
breaks down, unfortunately, when a person such as yourself tries to impose
his own ideology on the rest of us).
        C: Your style often makes it difficult for me to think rationally
for some time after reading them, and I hate writing irrational letters.

But I absolutely must request that you clarify this quote:

>most of all, do not pollute the Constitution with your lies:
>
>>The freedom to communicate in any way whatsoever, including
>>"pseudospoofing", is a Constitutional guarantee and part of the
>>foundation of this society.  
>
>the Constitution specifically prohibits `high treason'. Or are we now
>against the Constitution? It's hard to keep track lately.

I see no other interpretation than, "Pseudospoofing is high treason against
the government of the United States of America."

Did you honestly mean this?!?!?!?!?!?!

I mean the rest of the stuff (Ted Bundy similies and the like) is fairly
standard "worst case scenario" justifying government abridgement ordinary
peoples rights and privacies (which as you might suspect, I don't buy for a
second).

But pseudo-spoofing as high treason, in a constitutional sense? Come on
now, you must have not typed what you meant. After all, being against the
constitution ITSELF isn't even high-treason.

PS - Sorry, to all the Detweiler weary cypherpunks, but I couldn't resist.
I tried, but I couldn't.


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Version: 2.3

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PTIIblRQNMmcbUaDRUoKcYhK2zGxhtcnuvdIKFS1m5imSQ9EVAp5/diXoual5HDb
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=VP4j
-----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----

_______________________________________________________________________
Geoff Dale    -- insert standard disclaimers here --    plaz@netcom.com
               "We are the shock troops of reality."
                - Voice of the Friends (Wild Palms)






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Mike Ingle <MIKEINGLE@delphi.com>
Date: Mon, 25 Oct 93 20:49:45 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: New Crypto Tool - Beta Testers Wanted
Message-ID: <01H4JPOM66M091XK6Q@delphi.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I've been writing a new crypto tool called Secure Drive, and I need
people to help me test it. This is a program which encrypts hard
drive partitions and floppy drives, at the sector level, on the fly,
as you use them.

To use the program, you create a small partition, usually D:, big
enough to hold everything you want to keep private. Then you run
the utility CRYPTDSK to encrypt the partition using a passphrase.
Everything on the partition except the boot sector is encrypted, in
place, at the sector level. Your C: drive is not affected.

Then you load the tsr module, SECTSR, which takes only 2K of RAM.
Use LOGIN to enter your passphrase, and the D: drive becomes
accessible. All reads are decrypted on the fly, and all writes are
encrypted on the fly. When you turn off your computer, it is
automatically secure.

You can decrypt your partition at any time using CRYPTDSK.

You can also encrypt floppy disks using CRYPTDSK. You LOGIN /F and
enter the floppy password, and the floppy becomes accessible. You
can freely interchange encrypted and clear disks, as long as all of
the encrypted ones use the same passphrase. The TSR senses
encrypted disks and turns itself on and off automatically. If you
use different passphrases for different disks, you have to run
LOGIN /F again to change the passphrase in memory.

Floppies can also be decrypted. CRYPTDSK will not allow you to
decrypt with the wrong passphrase and scramble a disk.

You can have an encrypted hard drive partition and encrypted
floppies active simultaneously, using different passphrases.

The program uses Colin Plumb's very fast assembly language IDEA
code in CFB mode, and it uses MD5 to hash the passphrase. The disk
ID and sector number are used in the IV to make each sector unique.
Colin Plumb has also provided advice in writing the program.

To be a beta tester, you have to:

Live in the U.S., of course.

Agree not to export the program out of the U.S.

Please don't give out the beta version; it may be buggy. Source
code will be forthcoming as soon as I'm sure there aren't any
serious problems with the code.

Have two partitions or be willing to repartition your hard drive.
(There is supposedly a program to do this non-destructively, do you
know where to get it?)

Back up your hard drive. This program does sector-level I/O, and a
bug or interaction could easily scramble your hard drive.

Operation with DOS 6 and with two physical hard drives particularly
needs testing. I have DOS 5 and one hard drive, so I'm not sure if
it will work.

Use this program at your own risk! Back up everything.

If you want to help test the program, send me e-mail. State that
you agree not to export, and tell me if you want the files in
UUENCODE or PGP ascii armor (not encrypted) format.

There are more detailed docs with the program.

Send me all bug reports, problems, comments, suggestions, etc.

--- MikeIngle@delphi.com




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: remail@tamsun.tamu.edu
Date: Mon, 25 Oct 93 21:29:57 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: CPSR NII Paper
Message-ID: <9310260427.AA00771@tamsun.tamu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>
>   CPSR NII Paper
>                     FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE
>      COMPUTER SCIENTISTS RAISE SOCIAL AND DESIGN CONCERNS
>                      ABOUT THE INFORMATION HIGHWAY
> 
> 
> "In its 'Agenda for Action' document, the Administration has set forth 
> a positive vision of what the NII can be," said Dr. Roberts.  "To 
> achieve that vision, however, the government must play a major role 
                                    ^^^^^^^^^^             ^^^^^^^^^^
> in the design, development, and regulation of the network."  CPSR 
         ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^

  This is exactly what you don't want to happen, unless of course you
want shoddy protocols and kludges. Most of the govt services on the net
are the worst software I've ever seen including Nasa Spacelink,
Library of Congress Information System, etc

> o   Guarantee equitable and universal access through an appropriate 
>     mix of legislation, regulation, taxation, and direct subsidies.

  Translation: $25-50 billion dollars tax increase for the middle class.
FCC and Rep. Markey become King of the Net.

> o   Promote the development of a vital civic sector by ensuring 
>     resources, training, and support for public spaces within the NII 
>     where citizens can pursue noncommercial activities.

  IRC, MUDs, Usenet, E-mail. Amazingly, people find ways of developing these
things without govt input.

> o   Promote a diverse and competitive marketplace in terms of the 
>     content carried over the NII.

  Regulations on commercial speech, market quotas?
 
> o   Encourage democratic participation by ensuring full public 
>     disclosure, and actively promoting democratic decision-making 
>     and public participation in all stages of the development process.

  This is the worst part of the proposal. If this rule is followed, the
NII will never be finished in my lifetime. And you thought congressional
gridlock was bad.

> o   Guarantee the functional integrity of the NII by establishing 
>     critical technical requirements including ease of use, widespread 
>     availability, full functionality, high reliability, adequate privacy 
>     protection, and evolutionary expansion.

  Government mandated user interface? ugh.

  I really don't see why we need NII at all. We already have internet.
Cable companies are rushing to provide high bandwidth networks for consumers.
NII seems to be nothing more than WelfareNet. Which isn't surpising since
CPSR praises systems like IGC (Econet, PeaceNet, etc) which are much more
expensive than Netcom, Panix, Digex, and provide shoddier service.

Sam Hill




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: sameer@infinity.hip.berkeley.edu (Sameer)
Date: Tue, 26 Oct 93 00:09:54 PDT
To: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Subject: Re: We Don't Need No Steenking Digital Superhighway!!
In-Reply-To: <9310260550.AA13270@netcom5.netcom.com>
Message-ID: <m0oriNE-000J4wC@infinity.hip.berkeley.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> We helped kill the Superconducting Supercollider, now we can help kill
> Al Gore's TipperNet fantasy.
> 
	Eeps. And considering Tipper's penchant for detweilering (Nice
coinage) over "material-inappropriate-for-youngsters" we might have to
have "porn-filters" on every gateway.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "L. Detweiler" <ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Date: Mon, 25 Oct 93 23:20:12 PDT
To: rjc@gnu.ai.mit.edu
Subject: Re: a desperate plea
In-Reply-To: <9310260446.AA04496@kropotkin.gnu.ai.mit.edu>
Message-ID: <9310260618.AA14323@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> I assume you also support the right to keep and bear arms. Good, cause
>I'm coming over to put you out of your misery. You're like a horse with
>a brain disease, I request that you be "shot" and removed from this list, or
>prevented from posting.
 
you're really upsetting me with your references to firearms and veiled
threats. this is way uncool. please chill out.

At least you seem to understand, `death is the ultimate form of censorship.'

>Whatever Draconian measures
>you implement to achieve your dreams of absolute accountability, they
>simply WILL NOT WORK. Someone will find a way to circumvent them and commit
>crimes. You're own real life example of a killer proves it.

another argument, existence of criminal behavior [x] supports
perversion [y] or lack of total perfection implies lack of necessity. I
think I will name these Cromwell Arguments.

no YOU don't get it. `we' do NOT have to implement DRACONIAN MEASURES
to find some BENEFIT from IDENTIFICATION SYSTEMS. no system is
FOOLPROOF and many will be SABOTAGED by CRIMINALS but are ultimately
still SOCIALLY USEFUL AND DESIRABLE.

[Gibson, Sterling]
>Why should we
>revere them? (especially since they are a rip-off of Vinge. True Names
>and Fire Upon the Deep convey "internet" like sci-fi much better)

oh, so you're now criticizing them. well, why don't you ask Mr. Vinge
what he thinks of your perversions like `pseudospoofing'? I'm waiting
at the edge of my keyboard. Please quote me relevant passages. Show how
the Liberation of the Universe is attained with it. Make inferences to
current reality from Dystopian Science Fiction. Show how nothing but
systematic deception and lies will lead to any functional system other
than barbarianism!

>  I think it's time to check into a mental hospital, you're losing it.

yes, because I am willing to attack the #1 Cypherpunk cause,
PSEUDOSPOOFING IS SACRED, (which took me the better part of a year to
discover in all the obfuscation and brainwashing in black posts), I
should be consigned to an asylum for my thought crimes.

I now know what a thought crime is! And I know who has committed many!




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "W. Kinney" <kinney@ucsu.Colorado.EDU>
Date: Mon, 25 Oct 93 23:39:54 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: POISONOUS TrEaCHeRy
Message-ID: <199310260636.AA19460@ucsu.Colorado.EDU>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----


Look, everybody's right:

(1) Lying is bad.

(2) Nothing you can ever hope to do will prevent people from ignoring (1).

Jesus. Anybody who's ever had a lover should have learned this one real well
by now...


                                -- Will



-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.3

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4CQROdOHfAik29NWA5/TDq7FfM2OGAaYdvYOy7uCbjdIWVwYw/xcc4HQ4lcL4TCO
qDgZV7P2A9s=
=qV8J
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From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: rjc@gnu.ai.mit.edu
Date: Mon, 25 Oct 93 21:51:12 PDT
To: ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu (L. Detweiler)
Subject: Re: a desperate plea
In-Reply-To: <9310260308.AA10040@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Message-ID: <9310260446.AA04496@kropotkin.gnu.ai.mit.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


L. Detweiler writes:
> most of all, do not pollute the Constitution with your lies:

  I assume you also support the right to keep and bear arms. Good, cause
I'm coming over to put you out of your misery. You're like a horse with
a brain disease, I request that you be "shot" and removed from this list, or
prevented from posting.
 
> >The freedom to communicate in any way whatsoever, including
> >"pseudospoofing", is a Constitutional guarantee and part of the
> >foundation of this society.  
> 
> the Constitution specifically prohibits `high treason'. Or are we now
> against the Constitution? It's hard to keep track lately.

  No Treason sayeth Lysander Spooner.

[more idiotic ramblings of LD deleted]
> Part of the difficulty in catching him in the end was his total mastery
> of the techniques that have a striking similarity to what the
> Cypherpunks promote -- hidden credit, deception, disguise,
> impersonation, etc. He was a man who was so treacherous, he would truly
> not `stop at anything'. I'm sure he weaved such a majestic and
> convoluted `web of lies,' PRZ & the Cypherpunks would be proud. In the

   And he did it all without computers. Without cryptography. What your pea
brain fails to understand is that you can't solve social problems with
computers. It's like trying to ban guns to prevent crime, IT WON'T WORK.
Why should we all suffer because a few people will use cryptography and
anonymous remailers for evil deeds? Got that? Whatever Draconian measures
you implement to achieve your dreams of absolute accountability, they
simply WILL NOT WORK. Someone will find a way to circumvent them and commit
crimes. You're own real life example of a killer proves it.

> Another question for all the bastard apologists and moral relativists.
> Are you fundamentally opposed to me having the choice of screening

  No, get some better mail software then. Or write some damn code for
a change and stop ranting.

[more ranting deleted. I now see that my original assessment of
Detweiler after his "electronic democracy" was correct. Nothing but another
idealistic believer in the great society.]

> P.S. Ask all your revered fiction authors like Gibson and Sterling
> et.al. what they would think of your grotesque perversions. Be sure to
> explain it in *your* terms of `true and pure anonymity.' `a fundamental
> paradigm shift? sure, sounds great! right out of one of my own stories.'

  Methinks you've confused cypherpunks and CYBERPUNKS. Gibson and Sterling
couldn't rub 2-bits together if their life depended on it. Gibson
probably couldn't solve a linear algebraic equation either. Why should we
revere them? (especially since they are a rip-off of Vinge. True Names
and Fire Upon the Deep convey "internet" like sci-fi much better)


  I think it's time to check into a mental hospital, you're losing it.


-- Ray Cromwell        |    Engineering is the implementation of science;    --
-- EE/Math Student     |       politics is the implementation of faith.      --
-- rjc@gnu.ai.mit.edu  |                         - Zetetic Commentaries      --




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Eli Brandt <ebrandt@jarthur.Claremont.EDU>
Date: Tue, 26 Oct 93 01:09:59 PDT
To: cypherpunks list <cypherpunks@toad.com>
Subject: Re: We Don't Need No Steenking Digital Superhighway!!
In-Reply-To: <m0oriNE-000J4wC@infinity.hip.berkeley.edu>
Message-ID: <9310260807.AA02509@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> 	Eeps. And considering Tipper's penchant for detweilering (Nice

The Language Police say that "to detweil" is the verb, making "a
detweiler" one who detweils -- as you may have observed.  

Actually, I'm more than a little embarrassed about this particular
coinage, because it's not a flattering characterization of its
namesake, who is obviously having a hard time with all this.  I'd
like to suggest, in fact, that it be buried.

   Eli   ebrandt@jarthur.claremont.edu




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: J. Michael Diehl <mdiehl@triton.unm.edu>
Date: Tue, 26 Oct 93 00:19:53 PDT
To: rjc@gnu.ai.mit.edu
Subject: Re: a desperate plea
In-Reply-To: <9310260646.AA04776@kropotkin.gnu.ai.mit.edu>
Message-ID: <9310260714.AA17539@triton.unm.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


According to rjc@gnu.ai.mit.edu:
> 
> L. Detweiler writes:
> > you're really upsetting me with your references to firearms and veiled
> > threats. this is way uncool. please chill out.
> 
>   This is why I think you need psychological help. Either you're a 
> hypersensitive wimp, or you've got no life outside the net. Use your
> intelligence: I am sitting at a terminal a thousand miles away and
> I jokingly refer to shooting you and you become emotionally upset.
> No one else is as obsessed with pseudospoofing as you simply because 
> speech over the net doesn't have so much an impact on us as they seem
> to you.

I don't blame him at all.

>   I'm coming to kill your family tommorow with a rusty razor.

This is a bit tasteless, don't you think.  Come on, grow up.



J. Michael Diehl   ;^)  |*The 2nd Amendment is there in case the 
mdiehl@triton.unm.edu   | Government forgets about the 1st!  <RL>
Mike.Diehl@f29.n301.z1  |*God is a good Physicist, and an even 
    .fidonet.org        | better Mathematician.  <Me>
al945@cwns9.ins.cwru.edu|*I'm just looking for the opportunity to 
 (505) 299-2282 (voice) | be Politically Incorrect! <Me>
Can we impeach him yet? |*Protected by 18 USC 2511 and 18 USC 2703. 



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: jkreznar@ininx.com (John E. Kreznar)
Date: Tue, 26 Oct 93 02:34:44 PDT
To: tcmay@netcom.com
Subject: CRYPTO + REPUTATIONS = A NEW ERA
In-Reply-To: <9310211950.AA19355@netcom5.netcom.com>
Message-ID: <9310260933.AA15937@ininx>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May) wrote:

> Many of the currently "unsolved"
> problems with digital money fade away--I contend, and will discuss if
> there's interest--when the elements of reputation and reputation
> capital are included.

I'm surprised that many didn't jump on this offer.  Maybe it's their
preoccupation with Detweiler's shock at discovering that pseudospoofing can be
an effective defense against his cherished tyranny of the majority.  I for one
would value your discussion.  Please.

	John E. Kreznar		| Relations among people to be by
	jkreznar@ininx.com	| mutual consent, or not at all.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: rjc@gnu.ai.mit.edu
Date: Mon, 25 Oct 93 23:50:03 PDT
To: ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu (L. Detweiler)
Subject: Re: a desperate plea
In-Reply-To: <9310260618.AA14323@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Message-ID: <9310260646.AA04776@kropotkin.gnu.ai.mit.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


L. Detweiler writes:
> you're really upsetting me with your references to firearms and veiled
> threats. this is way uncool. please chill out.

  This is why I think you need psychological help. Either you're a 
hypersensitive wimp, or you've got no life outside the net. Use your
intelligence: I am sitting at a terminal a thousand miles away and
I jokingly refer to shooting you and you become emotionally upset.
No one else is as obsessed with pseudospoofing as you simply because 
speech over the net doesn't have so much an impact on us as they seem
to you.

  I'm coming to kill your family tommorow with a rusty razor.

> >Whatever Draconian measures
> >you implement to achieve your dreams of absolute accountability, they
> >simply WILL NOT WORK. Someone will find a way to circumvent them and commit
> >crimes. You're own real life example of a killer proves it.
> 
> another argument, existence of criminal behavior [x] supports
> perversion [y] or lack of total perfection implies lack of necessity. I
> think I will name these Cromwell Arguments.
> 
> no YOU don't get it. `we' do NOT have to implement DRACONIAN MEASURES
> to find some BENEFIT from IDENTIFICATION SYSTEMS. no system is
> FOOLPROOF and many will be SABOTAGED by CRIMINALS but are ultimately
> still SOCIALLY USEFUL AND DESIRABLE.

  So? If the majority of people will use pseudonyms honestly, why should
they be punished for the few who are malicious?

  The same arguments you make against multiple-nyms are the very same
arguments that can be made against strong crypto and for CLIPPER. Clipper
isn't Draconian either and can argubly benefit society by making it easier
for the FBI to catch criminals. What's your idealogical opposition to it
then?

  I dare you to present your "identification system" I want to see the
specifications on how it will work, and how you can oppose nyms and
reject clipper/skipjack and maintain a consistent philosophy. I don't
think you know what the hell you are talking about except for some
vague utopian ideals you have. Come on, where are those algorithms?
 
> [Gibson, Sterling]
> >Why should we
> >revere them? (especially since they are a rip-off of Vinge. True Names
> >and Fire Upon the Deep convey "internet" like sci-fi much better)
> 
> oh, so you're now criticizing them. well, why don't you ask Mr. Vinge
> what he thinks of your perversions like `pseudospoofing'? I'm waiting
> at the edge of my keyboard. Please quote me relevant passages. Show how
> the Liberation of the Universe is attained with it. Make inferences to
> current reality from Dystopian Science Fiction. Show how nothing but
> systematic deception and lies will lead to any functional system other
> than barbarianism!

  Why do you think I am concerned with the liberation of the universe?
Actually, I'm concerned with MY liberation. Why do you believe that
I care what any fiction author thinks? I make my own decisions and
my own opinions and I don't care what Vinge thinks. I like his
books, but that doesn't mean I have to agree with his real life philosophy.
You're yet another leftist wacko who thinks you can prove theories
through fictional story book worlds. Next you're be telling us that
Bladerunner is proof of why we shouldn't progress with Biotechnology.

> >  I think it's time to check into a mental hospital, you're losing it.
> yes, because I am willing to attack the #1 Cypherpunk cause,
> PSEUDOSPOOFING IS SACRED, (which took me the better part of a year to
> discover in all the obfuscation and brainwashing in black posts), I
> should be consigned to an asylum for my thought crimes.

  If it took you a year and you still got it wrong, I think you should
be consigned to elementary school. You're obviously a product of our
EVIL and TREACHEROUS public school system screwups.
 
-Ray

p.s. you're dead, I'm gunning for you now baby!


-- Ray Cromwell        |    Engineering is the implementation of science;    --
-- EE/Math Student     |       politics is the implementation of faith.      --
-- rjc@gnu.ai.mit.edu  |                         - Zetetic Commentaries      --




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: rjc@gnu.ai.mit.edu
Date: Tue, 26 Oct 93 00:43:54 PDT
To: mdiehl@triton.unm.edu (J. Michael Diehl)
Subject: Re: a desperate plea
In-Reply-To: <9310260714.AA17539@triton.unm.edu>
Message-ID: <9310260743.AA04917@kropotkin.gnu.ai.mit.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


J. Michael Diehl writes:
> According to rjc@gnu.ai.mit.edu:
> >   I'm coming to kill your family tommorow with a rusty razor.
> 
> This is a bit tasteless, don't you think.  Come on, grow up.

   That was sort of an inside joke directed at Perry. (it's the motd
of the Extropian's mail server) However, if it sapped any of LD's bodily
fluids, I'm happy. I'd have to be, since I'm an evil, treasonous
Benedict Arnold of cypherpunks who should be hung by the neck or deported
off the net.


-- Ray Cromwell        |    Engineering is the implementation of science;    --
-- EE/Math Student     |       politics is the implementation of faith.      --
-- rjc@gnu.ai.mit.edu  |                         - Zetetic Commentaries      --




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "George A. Gleason" <gg@well.sf.ca.us>
Date: Tue, 26 Oct 93 04:15:03 PDT
To: rjc@gnu.ai.mit.edu
Subject: Re: a desperate plea
Message-ID: <93Oct26.041150pdt.14145-1@well.sf.ca.us>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Ray, your little rant about Detweiler, with those "I'm going to kill you"   
things, is really getting on my nerves as well.  "wimp" and so on are       
ad-hominems of the worst kind; in Berkeley we'd take that as a homophobic   
slur similar to saying, "typical Jewish attitude" or some such.  

Please stop clogging the mailing list with this bullshit, like NOW.  If you 
have rational points to make in a spirit of good will, please do so.  If all
you have to say is along the lines of your last posting, then I'd urge you  
to get the hell off this list, and find somewhere else to play dumb games.

-gg




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: an12070@anon.penet.fi (S. Boxx)
Date: Mon, 25 Oct 93 22:31:00 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: an open offer
Message-ID: <9310260528.AA03201@anon.penet.fi>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Hello, I'm trying to build up our pool of information and inside
informants. This will be the last offer (that's why it's on the list).
If you're tired of being wracked with guilt, ready to switch over from
the Dark Side, and want to join some of your associates (or should I
say, "accomplices and coconspirators") engaged in conscience cleansing,
send some email. As stated previously, we may be able to provide some
degree of amnesty or leniency, but no promises. (Talk to me and we
might be able to work something out.)

We have information on all the basics, but need more in the following areas:


1) The capabilities of the software, especially related to preventing "crossing"

2) Some more database fragments would be useful too. (The whole thing
would really be the "Holy Grail", we've had some near misses but are
keeping our fingers crossed)

3) Names of other participants-- I think we're very close to complete,
but we have to be absolutely certain before we "make our move"

4) More on the telephony modifications, techniques, and insiders

5) The media manipulations other than those in Wired (although
expansion of the ones in there would be appreciated)

6) More of the infiltration sites. The list has become quite large, but
because of the continuous trickle we have no reason to believe it is
comprehensive yet.

7) Same with the pseudoidentities. (The "breadth" and "depth"
absolutely astonish me, but what do I know! this is really a new
experience for all of us.)

8) The credit machinations. Not much info here.

9) The "insider mailing list". Not much info here either. Working on
both of these, but as everyone knows, they're in the toughest nut to crack!

10) "somebody" said "something" about "impersonation". This is probably
the other #1 item if you have anything on it.

Of course, we can only give you leniency if you reveal your identity,
but if you just want to get something off your chest anonymously we'll
at least look at it.

(To the insiders: it will be quite awhile before we sort everything out
and file charges, so be patient.)
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
To find out more about the anon service, send mail to help@anon.penet.fi.
Due to the double-blind, any mail replies to this message will be anonymized,
and an anonymous id will be allocated automatically. You have been warned.
Please report any problems, inappropriate use etc. to admin@anon.penet.fi.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: remail@tamsun.tamu.edu
Date: Tue, 26 Oct 93 03:52:14 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Some possible projects/topics for CypherPunks
Message-ID: <9310261048.AA15347@tamsun.tamu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


  Here's some topics that I've been wanting to bring up with
the CypherPunks.  I figured it'd be best to just drop one email/post
rather than 4.

1. HARDWARE:  What about building our own machines?  This is the Vinge-ian
   crypto-anarchy theme ultimately.  We should be able to produce our own
   technology,  and not depend on the merchantile/government-mandated
   economic system/monopolies.

   I see this as being very important to the oceania/autopia/technomad
   ideas and projects of creating ocean-going free societies.

   Or is anyone interested in starting a parallel list of sorts for the
   hardware-punks?  'ware-punks?  :-)  or perhaps an even better name
   would be The Homebrew Computer Club^2.


2. STEGENOGRAPHY: Using the genome project data listings
   (bionet.molbio.genbank.updates) as a stegenographic source to 
   hide encrypted info in.  Similar to the alt.w.a.s.t.e NG,
   but more public.  Of course, it'd be bad if your ecrypted data 
   got credited with curing/causing a genetic disease.... =>


3. PUNK-NET:  (see HARDWARE above)


4. POLITICS/ANONYMITY:  I may have missed this, but has anyone
   discussed Gibson's "The Republic of Desire" idea of having a
   network based guerilla organization?  Not that we need to be
   guerilla's yet, but...

   I think the guerilla cell organization would probably lend itself
   to using the DC-net protocols, and developing webs-of-trust
   organizations.  Thoughts, comments, etc?

                                              sweetly,
                                Ducoyuh Gemugez Tokuzuham Neshotsu





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: smb@research.att.com
Date: Tue, 26 Oct 93 04:40:57 PDT
To: an45548@anon.penet.fi
Subject: Re: No subject
Message-ID: <9310261134.AA05931@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


	 Any other cypherpunks going to the ACM conference on Computer and
	 Communications Security next week?  If so, is there any interest in
	 getting a BOF together?

I'll be there -- I'm presenting a paper.  But I don't know about BOFs
with a bunch of folks wearing masks...


		--Steve Bellovin




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: m5@vail.tivoli.com (Mike McNally)
Date: Tue, 26 Oct 93 05:55:26 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: a desperate plea
In-Reply-To: <9310260618.AA14323@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Message-ID: <9310261249.AA09063@vail.tivoli.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



rjc@gnu.ai.mit.edu [ note: that's someone different from me ] writes:
 >   I'm coming to kill your family tommorow with a rusty razor.

I wonder if Mr. Godwin will consider explaining whether making
"threats" like the above, serious or not, can possibly result in a
period of less-than-pleasant interactions between the author and the
FBI.  (I'm honestly curious; I really have no idea whether the answer
is "yes" or "no".)

If Mr. Detweiler were the President, then I would advise "rjc" to
rapidly locate a lawyer...

--
Mike McNally




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: koontzd@lrcs.loral.com (David Koontz )
Date: Tue, 26 Oct 93 07:58:48 PDT
To: ld231782@lance.colostate.edu
Subject: Re: MEDUSA'S SNAKE SPEAKS
In-Reply-To: <Oct26.060317.21017@yuma.ACNS.ColoState.EDU>
Message-ID: <9310261450.AA16538@nebula.lrcs.loral.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Found in my mailbox. I've contacted root@netcom.com. Any suggestions?

(the login name has been changed to conceal the guilty, do not attempt
to use it. I added the quote at the end for effect. Do you like it?)

>Still posting my phone number, asshole? Are you really trying to pick a


Ya, change your login/get an aliases for posting, lie fallow, be succinct.

If one were to consider your stature in posting to the net as coin or
valuata, both parties to the above exchange are passing bad checks.

---
produce, consume, die.





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Peter Wayner <pcw@access.digex.net>
Date: Tue, 26 Oct 93 05:07:42 PDT
To: catalyst@netcom.com
Subject: Re: Apple, AOCE, and key pair security
Message-ID: <199310261158.AA15118@access.digex.net>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Last night, I installed my version of System 7 Pro-- the new
version of the Apple Macintosh Operating System with built in
Digital Signature capabilities. Here's the details:

1) The package contains two extra pieces of paper. One is a 
voucher that is good for one free certificate. The second
is an address and instructions for just what to do. 

2) The installation process is very simple. You click on
some icon to get the software running and then you:
 
  i) Fill in a form with your name and address.
  ii) Choose a country from a very long list.
  iii) Add in an identifying phrase. The manual says
   that you should "Type a word or phrase you can remember.
   You may have to provide this phrase if the Approval
   Authority needs to verify your identity." This may
   be used if you forget or lose something. I'm not sure.
   Perhaps it is a random number seed. Perhaps it is 
   transmitted to RSA for the same purposes as the
   "mother's maiden name" passphrase used by banks. 
   I don't know. 
  iv) Then you type in a password. This is the same
   password that you type in each time you want to 
   make a signature for a document. It seems to 
   encrypt your private key. Jim Bidzos says that
   the software is careful enough to do this work
   only in memory where it is relatively safe. 
  v) You choose a location for your signing icon. 
   At first this will be "unapproved" and it won't
   work. Eventually, when you get a disk back from 
   RSA, you'll be able to sign a document just by
   dragging it on to the signing icon. Then a dialog
   box will open up asking you for password. 
  vi) A "processing" box appears and says that it will
   need to compute for the next 1 to 10 minutes. It 
   doesn't say that it is looking for a prime, but that
   is entirely possible. Paranoids will hate this opacity.

3) Now, you get a nice print out of some random characters.
The text says that you can just send the paper if you've
a printer that is capable of 300 dpi resolution. Apparently,
they plan on using OCR to read this in. 

4) You take this paper to a Notary Public and present 3 forms
of identification. The form asks the Notary to write down
all of this and sign it. It also instructs the Notary that
this cannot be done in any other way than in person. No Agents,
Spouses etc.

5) You mail it off to a PO Box in Belmont CA and wait.

6) When it comes back, you probably get a disk that will
allow you to initialize everything. 

Some Random Observations:

*) The Certificates come with a built-in time limit. They're
only good for two years. The software comes with a renewal
mechanism so I think that people will be mailing checks in
a couple of years. 

*) I'm not sure how complicated this procedure is for large
corporate users. The book hints that you may get your signature
from a company representative. 

*) They included a sample signer so you can play with the
technology out of the box. I signed a few things and got
the software to break by trying to sign the "DigiSign Utility." 
I.e. itself. 

*) The signature verification process is very well integrated.
You simply open up the little info box that is available for
each icon. There will be a extra button with a pen. Push it
and the name and address of the signatory pops up.

*) The signature is saved as a resource in the resource fork.
The address is in the clear including several addresses for
RSA. I tried fudging with them for grins and the signature
broke. The software reported that it was tampered with. Good
show.

*) It took about 30 seconds to sign a 200k document on a IIci.

Final impressions:

Software Ease of Use: A+
Paranoia Avoidance: F (no source code or instructions on how 
  to generate your own signature)
RSA Cash Infusion: A (more checks in 2 years)
Boost to Public Crypto Usage in short term: A+
Boost to Public Crypto Usage Two Years from now when the Certificates
Run Out: INC (Who can remember to re-authorize these things?)






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: nate@VIS.ColoState.EDU (CVL staff member Nate Sammons)
Date: Tue, 26 Oct 93 07:40:55 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com (Cypherpunks Mailing List)
Subject: Re: We Don't Need No Steenking Digital Superhighway!!
In-Reply-To: <9310260807.AA02509@toad.com>
Message-ID: <9310261431.AA24330@vangogh.VIS.ColoState.EDU>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----


[I will make no mention of Detweiler's rants, or the coinage of the 
phrase "to detweil"]

I think that Tim has made a _very_ important point, and several of the
others have made posts supporting it.  If the government is to build a 
National Super-Duper Digital Highway system, they are extremely likely
to feel the "need" to monitor it.  They built the backbones of the 
Internet, and look at the NSA.... reading your email, perhaps?

I had heard that the Gov was going to shell out money, and let 
private industry build it, I don't know if it's true, or not,
but something I really HATE is the abridging of my freedom of speech
(not to mention my feelings on personal privacy)

I think that this is becoming the second large-scale battle we face,
the Clipper/SkipJack/Capstone fiasco being the first.

Lets forget about ravers [detweiler] and move on...  There's battles to 
be one, 'm boys!

- -nate

- -- 
+-----------------------------------------------------------------------+
| Nate Sammons   email: nate@VIS.ColoState.Edu
|   Colorado State University Computer Visualization Laboratory
|   Finger nate@monet.VIS.ColoState.Edu for my PGP key
|   Key fingerprint =  2D CD 07 CA 7B EC A8 4A  86 7F F3 A8 1D 15 65 46
|   Title 18 USC 2511 and 18 USC 2703 Protected --> Monitoring Forbidden
+--------+ Guerrilla Cryptographer             Always remember "Brazil"



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: nate@VIS.ColoState.EDU (CVL staff member Nate Sammons)
Date: Tue, 26 Oct 93 07:40:55 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com (Cypherpunks Mailing List)
Subject: Re: CRYPTO + REPUTATIONS = A NEW ERA
In-Reply-To: <9310260933.AA15937@ininx>
Message-ID: <9310261432.AA24364@vangogh.VIS.ColoState.EDU>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----


writes John E. Kreznar:
>
>tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May) wrote:
>
>> Many of the currently "unsolved"
>> problems with digital money fade away--I contend, and will discuss if
>> there's interest--when the elements of reputation and reputation
>> capital are included.
>
>I'm surprised that many didn't jump on this offer.  Maybe it's their
>preoccupation with Detweiler's shock at discovering that pseudospoofing can be
>an effective defense against his cherished tyranny of the majority.  I for one
>would value your discussion.  Please.
>
>	John E. Kreznar		| Relations among people to be by
>	jkreznar@ininx.com	| mutual consent, or not at all.
>

As would I.

- -- 
+-----------------------------------------------------------------------+
| Nate Sammons   email: nate@VIS.ColoState.Edu
|   Colorado State University Computer Visualization Laboratory
|   Finger nate@monet.VIS.ColoState.Edu for my PGP key
|   Key fingerprint =  2D CD 07 CA 7B EC A8 4A  86 7F F3 A8 1D 15 65 46
|   Title 18 USC 2511 and 18 USC 2703 Protected --> Monitoring Forbidden
+--------+ Guerrilla Cryptographer             Always remember "Brazil"



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: lefty@apple.com (Lefty)
Date: Tue, 26 Oct 93 10:35:42 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: a desperate plea
Message-ID: <9310261614.AA16510@internal.apple.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Ray faovrs us with
>
>J. Michael Diehl writes:
>> According to rjc@gnu.ai.mit.edu:
>> >   I'm coming to kill your family tommorow with a rusty razor.
>> 
>> This is a bit tasteless, don't you think.  Come on, grow up.
>
>   That was sort of an inside joke directed at Perry. (it's the motd
>of the Extropian's mail server) However, if it sapped any of LD's bodily
>fluids, I'm happy. I'd have to be, since I'm an evil, treasonous
>Benedict Arnold of cypherpunks who should be hung by the neck or deported
>off the net.

No, in point of fact, you're a poorly adjusted infant who finds it amusing
to stand at a safe distance and clog up the net with threats which he
surely would never dare to make face-to-face.

Ray, before you recommend psychological evaluation for others, it might be
worth considering looking into some for yourself.  You might also want to
give Jacoby and Meyers a call and ask them for a quick rundown on the
prevailing assault statutes.

Please take your cowardly bravado to private email.  You're about as
impressive as a third-grader sticking out his tongue at the playground
bully from behind the safety of his mother's skirt, a situation with which
I can't help but feel you have some personal familiarity.


--
Lefty (lefty@apple.com)
C:.M:.C:., D:.O:.D:.






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: an45548@anon.penet.fi
Date: Tue, 26 Oct 93 02:20:08 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: No subject
Message-ID: <9310260917.AA03312@anon.penet.fi>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Any other cypherpunks going to the ACM conference on Computer and
Communications Security next week?  If so, is there any interest in getting
a BOF together?
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
To find out more about the anon service, send mail to help@anon.penet.fi.
Due to the double-blind, any mail replies to this message will be anonymized,
and an anonymous id will be allocated automatically. You have been warned.
Please report any problems, inappropriate use etc. to admin@anon.penet.fi.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: dmandl@lehman.com (David Mandl)
Date: Tue, 26 Oct 93 07:14:56 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Net Regulation
Message-ID: <9310261345.AA07208@disvnm2.lehman.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> From: peb@procase.com (Paul Baclace)
>  
>  > From: "Perry E. Metzger" <pmetzger@lehman.com>
>  > Admittedly, if someone could put a *loyal* armed soldier over
>  > everyone's shoulder on earth they could control everyone. How, though,
>  > could they manage to do this?
> 
> By getting everyone to obey the "policeman inside" (concept due to 
> Wm. Burroughs, recently quoted by Wm. Gibson in WIRED Sept/Oct).

Yup, the state has been counting on this for years.  It's
hard to explain how people put up with the shit they put up with
any other way.  Wilhelm Reich talked about this many many years
ago (concept of "character armor," which is probably where WSB got
the idea.  To paraphrase WR: "The puzzling thing isn't why 2% of
people who are starving steal food, but why the other 98% *don't*."
(Forgive my anti-propertarian example, but I think you get the
idea.)

   --Dave.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: peter honeyman <honey@citi.umich.edu>
Date: Tue, 26 Oct 93 07:14:53 PDT
To: m5@vail.tivoli.com
Subject: Re: a desperate plea
Message-ID: <9310261357.AA07695@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


yeah, and maybe we need mike's opinion as to whether
mail forgery is the same as high treason.  mutter.
this saga has moved me from sympathy to amusement to
boredom.  irritation follows close on boredom's
heels.  i wish lance would just go get some prozac
or whatever modern drug cures whatever he's got.
barring that, i wish he would just go away.

	peter




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: lefty@apple.com (Lefty)
Date: Tue, 26 Oct 93 10:44:26 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: an open offer
Message-ID: <9310261700.AA17003@internal.apple.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


"S. Boxx" tries to scare us by writing:
>
>(To the insiders: it will be quite awhile before we sort everything out
>and file charges, so be patient.)

Perhaps as long as several millenia, eh?


--
Lefty (lefty@apple.com)
C:.M:.C:., D:.O:.D:.






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Duncan Frissell <frissell@panix.com>
Date: Tue, 26 Oct 93 07:40:52 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Net Regulation
Message-ID: <199310261432.AA28581@panix.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


To: cypherpunks@toad.com


P >By getting everyone to obey the "policeman inside" (concept due to 
P >Wm. Burroughs, recently quoted by Wm. Gibson in WIRED Sept/Oct).
P >
P >
P >Paul E. Baclace
P >peb@procase.com
P >
P >

If you've looked around much you will have noticed that the "policemn 
inside" is falling down on the job.  Disobedience seems to be increasing.

Duncan Frissell



--- WinQwk 2.0b#1165
                                                                                                         




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Duncan Frissell <frissell@panix.com>
Date: Tue, 26 Oct 93 07:40:55 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Net Regulation
Message-ID: <199310261432.AA28584@panix.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


To: cypherpunks@toad.com

C >Douglas Barnes (cman@illuminati.io.com) writes:

C >1) Let's say, just for instance, that all computer programmers in 
C >Europe and the US switch places, and become Permanent Tourists. Do you 
C >think that anyone would notice? 

Jobs that are ripe for virtual expatriation:

o software writing (obviously)
o all the rest of the software industry
o all other kinds of writing
o financial services
o law
o journalism
o entertainment (acting, vocals, production, VR, techs, distribution,
     sales -- the whole chain)
o telecommunications (almost all industry segments)
o marketing, design, advertising, sales of most products
o teaching (in spite of your claim to the contrary)
o medicine (large chunks including specialist consultation and
     psychology).  Slick Willie included "virtual medicine" in his AHSA'93
     propaganda for God's sake. 
o gambling
o "management"

This is just with current technology, once the VR interface gets good 
enough, we can add prostitutes and surgeons to the list.

C >3) One of the persistent problems in solving unemployment problems in
C >   both the US and Europe is that folks JUST WON'T MOVE.

Let's assume that no American moves.  What about all the people who are 
already offshore or in countries that permit easy offshore activities by 
their residents.  With a 30% to 50% tax savings, they can undercut the 
domestic competition who will have to either relocate or face declines.

C >Most Americans are hidebound, closed-minded people who couldn't 
C >even find the US on an unlabelled map, much less MOVE to another 
C >COUNTRY.

But not a problem for many of the rest of the world's population.  
Besides, as we grow a society on the nets, any residents of *that* society 
can move their bodies anywhere without leaving home.  And what are the 
political characteristics of net society?  Since coercion is difficult, 
persuasion (whether reasoned or ranting) is the primary technique.  It is 
a free society.  As long as it remains free (and try to imagine the 
technical difficulties involved in bringing it to heel), many people will 
be spending a lot of their time in a free society (even the channel 
surfers downloading their favourite vids).  They won't like having to come 
back to earth to deal with the DMV.

C >4) The inability of most of our fellow citizens to process text and
C >   numbers is staggering; it's not clear by any means that they're 
C >   ready for jobs in their same CITY where they live, if it involves
C >   any significant reading or writing skills. How are these people 

Their "point and click" muscles are well-developed.  Once the VR interface 
improves...  But seriously, they don't have to do anything to benefit from 
the technology-driven social revolution we're part of.  They benefit from 
markets or electronics whether they know anything or not.  Besides, they 
play one of the most important roles in the digital revolution -- as 
*customers*.

C >Remember, they're still citizens of an alleged democracy and thus have
C >their collective finger on one of the largest coercive apparati in the
C >world.

With no place to apply the force.  A "target lean" environment not because 
there are so few targets but because they are mixed in with so much other 
activity.  The power of the nation state was based on superior 
organization and its control of armed muscle, transportation, and 
communications.  Aside from other states, its only opponents were poorly 
organized peasants or townies "bound to the soil."  

States no longer control communications or transportation and their 
opposition is rich and mobile.  Their hierarchical organization is 
expensive, slow, and has few returns to scale in an era where I can pick 
up the phone and rent a 747 within an hour.  It can't cope with very 
nimble markets that will continue to accumulate a higher and higher 
proportion of the world's wealth.

The organized muscle deployed by states is of limited value with few open 
targets to fight.  It just costs money. 

C >5) If folks don't move, but try to get cute with where their income
C >is coming from, they will almost certainly be persecuted by the IRS,
C >independent of current law, if their numbers become significant. 

Then why haven't they done so yet with tax compliance at an all-time low 
according to official IRS studies.  10 million non-filers, 10 million 
fraudulent filers, 52% unreported income by small businesses, 61% 
non-filers among US expatriates.  

C >It wouldn't take too many "examples" to force whatever tax regime the 
C >IRS felt was necessary. 

So governments are all powerful.  They can't fail.  The May Day parade in 
Moscow will be great next year.  Tax evasion is impossible.  You can't 
win, you can't break even, you can't get out of the game.  Drugs have been 
banished from the cities; crime has disappeared; all government school 
pupils are literate, numerate, and well-groomed.

I realize that it's sometimes hard to see major institutional change while 
it is underway.  Governments face very grave institutional challenges.  
Revenue losses off the top will hurt as different factions fight for the 
remaining dough.  Don't think of virtual expatriation as a conscious 
conversion to a philosophy of self-government, a political movement, or a 
"business plan" -- think of it as changing channels. 


Duncan Frissell

And I just wanted to thank everyone for helping me write my talk for the 
First European Conference on Computers, Freedom, and Privacy (or whatever 
the order is) -- November 20th in London.
--- WinQwk 2.0b#1165                            




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Christopher Kotze <kotze1@batis.bis.und.ac.za>
Date: Tue, 26 Oct 93 01:40:05 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Join kotze1@batis.bis.und.ac.za
Message-ID: <9310260838.AA02888@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text


Hi, please Add me

Chris



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Mike Godwin <mnemonic@eff.org>
Date: Tue, 26 Oct 93 08:05:57 PDT
To: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Subject: Re: We Don't Need No Steenking Digital Superhighway!!
In-Reply-To: <9310260550.AA13270@netcom5.netcom.com>
Message-ID: <199310261458.AA06967@eff.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


 
Tim May writes:

> Very true! In fact, it is the EFF's talk about the "need" for such a
> government effort that really worries me about the EFF (a mild kind of
> worry...I haven't completely detweilered over it). I'm not clear just
> how central are these issues to the EFF, currently, but I urge us all
> to try to convince them that the "electronic frontier" really doesn't
> need government-built channels and routes.
 
EFF has been convinced of this since the beginning. The last thing EFF
wants is to have the government build the national information
infrastructure. Instead, we want to encourage both a variety of
information conduits, with a high degree of interoperability, but built by
private enterprise. The idea of the Open Platform (see our papers at
ftp.eff.org) is for private enterprise to create an environment in which
*anyone*--not just a media giant--can become an information provider, and
in which any BBS has the potential to become the WELL or CompuServe, or
whatever it likes.

Since both the telcos and the cable companies already operate under a high
degree of regulation, the issue isn't whether government should play no
role--it's already playing a pretty serious role. Instead, the issue is
how the government can reduce its regulatory role and at the same time
increase incentives for the kind of flexible, switched networks that
support the many-to-many paradigm rather than the traditional one-to-one
paradigm of the telcos or the one-to-many paradigm of the broadcasters.

The result should be a highly competitive environment with less need for
regulation, whether we're talking about local-loop telephone service or
computer-based conferencing systems.

> And unlike the Interstate Highway System (actually called the National
> Defense Transportation System, or somesuch, clearly an
> autobahn-inspired Eisenhowwer defense project), which arguably needed
> a government-level effort to obtain the land, the crossings, etc., no
> such government-level effort is needed to lay more cable, put up more
> satellites, etc.
 
EFF thinks these things will happen anyway, and is not interested in
having the government do them.

> We helped kill the Superconducting Supercollider, now we can help kill
> Al Gore's TipperNet fantasy.

The notion of government-funded information superhighways, as originally
conceived, is already dead, killed by lack of government money (just as
the supercollider was killed). EFF supports NREN, but only as a testbed
for what the NII is eventually going to look like--we can learn a lot
about how networks run by studying the controlled anarchy and the support
of information niches that exists on the Net.

It is commonly thought that EFF supports some kind of massive government
undertaking to build the information infrastructure. But those who read
our position papers at ftp.eff.org know different.


--Mike





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Perry E. Metzger" <pmetzger@lehman.com>
Date: Tue, 26 Oct 93 08:18:12 PDT
To: "L. Detweiler" <ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Subject: Re: a desperate plea
In-Reply-To: <9310260308.AA10040@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Message-ID: <9310261509.AA19858@snark.lehman.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



"L. Detweiler" says:
> please do not fill my mailbox with[...]
> please do not say [...]
> please do not say [...]
> please do not talk about[...]

Why don't you go away? You are filling OUR mailboxes with junk.

Perry




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Mike Godwin <mnemonic@eff.org>
Date: Tue, 26 Oct 93 08:18:18 PDT
To: m5@vail.tivoli.com (Mike McNally)
Subject: Re: a desperate plea
In-Reply-To: <9310261249.AA09063@vail.tivoli.com>
Message-ID: <199310261513.AA07133@eff.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


 
Mike McNally writes:

> I wonder if Mr. Godwin will consider explaining whether making
> "threats" like the above, serious or not, can possibly result in a
> period of less-than-pleasant interactions between the author and the
> FBI.  (I'm honestly curious; I really have no idea whether the answer
> is "yes" or "no".)

It's more likely that it would draw the attention of state and/or local
law enforcement: most states have laws against "terroristic threats."
Whether the comment qualifies as a genuine terroristic threat is open to
question. (Why threaten with a rusty razor? True terrorists keep their
tools sharp.)


--Mike






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Perry E. Metzger" <pmetzger@lehman.com>
Date: Tue, 26 Oct 93 08:18:14 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: an open offer
In-Reply-To: <9310260528.AA03201@anon.penet.fi>
Message-ID: <9310261513.AA19866@snark.lehman.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



S. Boxx says:
> Hello, I'm trying to build up our pool of information and inside
> informants. This will be the last offer (that's why it's on the list).

Detweiler, will you please shut up and go away?

.pm




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Robert J. Woodhead" <trebor@foretune.co.jp>
Date: Mon, 25 Oct 93 19:20:51 PDT
To: "L. Detweiler" <ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Subject: Re: the Joy of Pseudospoofing
In-Reply-To: <9310250728.AA09485@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Message-ID: <9310260214.AA06763@dink.foretune.co.jp>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


"Jim Riverman" writes about the possibilities of abuse by pseudospoofing.

I agree with him that this is an area of great potential concern.  While
I am not opposed to the principle of maintaining multiple identities on
the net, the rule of netiquette should be that "multiple identities should
_NEVER_ intersect."

So I support "L. Detweiler"s right to be "Jim," but they ought never to
support each other.  His scenario is chillingly _possible_.

At the same time, I think such episodes will be rare.  The amount of
effort needed to maintain multiple intersecting identities is quite high,
and in most cases would be "uneconomic."  However, in some cases, for
some people, the effort might be worth it, so some thought ought to
be placed into ways to detect or discourage it.

Which brings up the question: how can we, in the era of digital pseudonyms
determine that two pseudos are, or are not, the same person?  One possible
method would be careful automated analysis of the language used by
the participants in a net discussion.  As I recall, there are studies
that show that people have deep patterns in their writing that can
be detected even when they are trying to hide them.  Literary finger-
prints, if you will.

This may be an area that "Jim" ought to research.  Such an automated
monitor might be a positive contribution.






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Christopher Davis <ckd@kei.com>
Date: Tue, 26 Oct 93 08:20:00 PDT
To: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Subject: We Don't Need No Steenking Digital Superhighway!!
In-Reply-To: <9310260427.AA00771@tamsun.tamu.edu>
Message-ID: <199310261514.LAA13689@loiosh.kei.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


TCM> == Timothy C May <tcmay@netcom.com>

 TCM> In fact, it is the EFF's talk about the "need" for such a government
 TCM> effort that really worries me about the EFF (a mild kind of
 TCM> worry...I haven't completely detweilered over it). I'm not clear
 TCM> just how central are these issues to the EFF, currently, but I urge
 TCM> us all to try to convince them that the "electronic frontier" really
 TCM> doesn't need government-built channels and routes.

Have you read the article in _The New Republic_, titled "Mitch Kapor: Data
Highway Guru"?  It's been conveniently electronified and is included in
O'Reilly's _Global Network Navigator_ hyperzine, even.  (Mail info@gnn.com
for details.)

This quote's well within fair use size, given the size of the article:

   Kapor supports a nationwide fiber grid, and sees ISDN as a transitional
   step, not a substitute. Still, he does oppose big government financing
   for fiber, and this financing did seem a live prospect in January,
   after Gore's ambitious campaign rhetoric. Gore now says he was
   misinterpreted and had never envisioned a big government role. In any
   event, the interest in ISDN stoked by EFF and Markey helped end
   discussion of any such role.

I highly encourage you all to give the article a look; since GNN is free,
anyway...
-- 
Christopher Davis * <ckd@kei.com> * (was <ckd@eff.org>) * MIME * RIPEM * [CKD1]
   This netnews posting is presented in the original 80-column aspect ratio.
The black bars bordering the headers and .signature are normal for this format.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: remail@tamsun.tamu.edu
Date: Tue, 26 Oct 93 10:35:42 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: random numbers and human nature
Message-ID: <9310261621.AA03592@tamsun.tamu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


  maybe i'm just stupid, but i haven't seen this discussed yet.

  has anyone realized that there will be a lot of encrypted data
  out there when the "general public" starts using encryption
  regularly?  think about it.  people will pick passwords/phrases
  that they *think* they'll remember when they next decide to
  decrypt the file or whatever.  and these are the people that
  come out of shopping malls and have hard time finding where
  they parked car.

  how many times have you had to regen your pub/sec keys?  :)

                                                sweet & sour,
                                   Ducoyuh Tokuzuham Gemugez Neshotsu







From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Robert J. Woodhead" <trebor@foretune.co.jp>
Date: Mon, 25 Oct 93 19:44:17 PDT
To: Panzer Boy <panzer@drown.slip.andrew.cmu.edu>
Subject: Re: the Joy of Pseudospoofing Satan
In-Reply-To: <Pine.3.05.1.9310251251.B2130-b100000@drown.slip.andrew.cmu.edu>
Message-ID: <9310260239.AA07044@dink.foretune.co.jp>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Panzer Boy writes:

>I do ask you L Detweiler, what you consider of this case.  In "real-life"
>awhile back there was a womem who was an actor.  She didn't like the fact
>that she needed an agent to get w>ork.  So she invented a personality, an
>became her own agent.  She aquired a different personality, different
>voice patterns, etc, for this agent.  She made sure the agent did
>everything over the phone, never meeting clients in person.  Soon after
>doing this, she started being an agent for other actors also.  She
>obviously spoke well of her actorself when she was in her agentself, and
>she obviously kept two personalities.  Is this wrong?  Should this women
>not have done this?

Yes, she was being deceptive.  No, she was not being maliciously
deceptive, as her "agentself" was merely doing the same thing that
a seperate agent would have done, being an advocate for the actor.

The difference is that the third party _expects_ the agent to praise
the actor.  In L Detweilers example, the pseudo-spoofer was using
the _lack_ of expectation to his/her advantage.


> -Matt                              | Please get my public key if you wish
> (panzer@drown.slip.andrew.cmu.edu) | to verify that this message is mine.

>"That which can never be enforced should not be prohibited."






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Date: Wed, 27 Oct 93 00:17:49 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: My Views on the Detweiler Matter
Message-ID: <9310261923.AA29868@netcom.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Cypherpunks, 

I. too, am weary of this thread...paranoia, death threats,
"pseudospoofing," Satan's spawn, tentacles of Medusa, and on and on. I
apologize for the length of this piece, which has reached detweilerian
proportions, but I need to make some points. Sorry if many of you are fed
up with this thread. I've tried to avoid comment, but I've been getting
several rants every day from Detweiler, either posted to the List or in
private e-mail (and the rants he sends to Eric Hughes and myself are even
more tortured, as he rambles on and begs us to stop tormenting him, to call
off our devils who are attacking him, then goes back to threats and
insults....very sad). 

Several people have suggested we "lay off Detweiler," that he is clearly in
pain and is disturbed in various ways. I agree, but getting several
messages a day from him, filled with threats, taunts, insults, and
religious paranoia tends to make this "laying-off" a bit more problematic.
Especially when his posts prompt others on this List to try to defend his
points. There is always the danger that repeating the Big Lie often enough
will cause it to be accepted as the truth. In this case, apparently some
are now beginning to believe that the List is in fact controlled by a cabal
of plotters and that pseudospoofing is the tool they use to control the
mood and agenda of the List. Utter nonsense.

He has recently claimed we are a bunch of Ted Bundy's, plotting the murder
of young women, that we are spawn of Satan, trying to pull society into the
depths of Hell, that we are High Traitors which the government (his
newfound ally) must suppress, and that the High Cabal is beaming radio
waves into his brain to control his thoughts (only this last item is made
up...a taste of what is to come in the next few weeks, I suspect).

I consider the whole situation very sad, and even tragic. Lance Dettweiler
did some nice work on the "Privacy and Anonymity on the Internet FAQ."
Ironically, he now considers my helpful comments on these matters (I recall
encouraging him to go ahead and write a FAQ on these matters, sometime last
winter or so, so I may have been a prime motivator of his FAQ) to be some
kind of evil trickery designed to do whatever it is he thinks is now being
done to him.

Be that as it may, his recent points require a response from me. And the
whole Detweiler matter actually _does_ have some important connections to
the Cypherpunks area of interest, so the topic is not as off-base as some
might think. Certainly it's closer to our main themes than many of the
recent debates about subliminal advertising and using thermite bombs to
destroy safes are, to name but two topics.

Back to the Detweiler situation.

I tried to laugh it off, as my posts of last week or so showed--the one
declaring there to be only four or five actually unique individuals on the
List, with each of us using dozens of pseudonyms. Little did I suspect that
Detweiler would use my joke about the "Wired" photo using hired actors as
"proof" of our duplicity, Jeesh, that man needs a humor transplant!

His alter ego S. Boxx is still making death threats, as he himself is, and
is claiming the "evidence is being collected" for some some sort of formal
charges. Right. (That Detweiler = S. Boxx is beyond doubt. Personal mail
sent by Eric Hughes and myself to Detweiler showed up in the rants of S.
Boxx, and the styles are nearly identical. Detweiler has rather
transparently claimed that S. Boxx is "in communication" with him. Right.)

Anyway, while I have been mostly just shrugging-off Detweiler's fantastical
rants, saving them in my "Detweiler file," some of you are talking about
how Detweiler may be ranting, but how he's basically *right* about some
things. Some of you are apparently coming to believe that in fact a High
Cabal exists to purge Detweiler and to use pseudospoofing to undermine him
in public. Now I of course I can see validity in essays separate from the
underlying mental sanity of the writer (think of Nietzsche), so I don't
automatically dismiss LD's points just on the basis of his paranoid style. 

But he has presented no evidence for his assertions. I just think he's gone
off the deep end with his paranoia about the number of pseudonyms on the
List. I know for a fact that I write my stuff under my own name, that I am
not any of the more colorful "nyms" on the List....I am not "Deadbeat," "S.
Boxx," "Murdering Thug," or "Panzer Boy." (Actually, some of these may just
be BBS handles....I'm not paying too much attention to the distinction, as
I really don't care overmuch about the "actual" name of folks I haven't
met.)

To be sure, some people are using nyms, as they have for as long as the Net
has existed...and for much longer, of course. Pen names, pseudonyms,
whatever. But this is a much different thing than saying the List is
dominated by pseudonyms, by clever false identities, by Satan-inspired
demons who are adopting false identities specifically to torment good
Christians like Lance Detweiler.

His modus operandi seems to be to repeat his points over and over again and
to to accuse others of Satanic or cabalistic motivations--usually in his
inimitably florid prose style--and to claim that the "debate" is being
skewed by dozens of phony identities. If Hal Finney is not 100% behind his
latest idea, well, then obviously Hal is One of Them, a tentacle of the
Medusa, a Nym from Hell that is bent on making LD a laughingstock on the
List. 

In several cases, when Detweiler made some point and others didn't agree
with him or actions weren't taken to his liking, he simply stamped his feet
and used such effective debating tactics as "I am getting nauseatingly
disgusted and TOTALLY angered by the completely traitorous and
spectacularly cunning vipers who..." (Lance never met an adverb or
adjective he didn't like. Neither did S. Boxx.)

(When he was still soliciting my occasional advice in e-mail, which I
sometimes gave, I urged him to not try to win arguments merely by repeating
his points over and over again and then announcing what his _mental state_
was. His points would have to stand or fall on their own merits, not on his
claims that he was going to hold his breath 'til he turned blue. "Blue
Nyms"?)


THE FACTS

There's been a lot of innuendo that "pseudospoofing" is going on. Not just
anonymous mail sent to Detweiler--something I can't speak to, not having
sent him any and not having access to his incoming mail--but the use of
pseudonyms like Jamie Dinkelacker, Nick Szabo, and (as of last night,
apparently, according to Detweiler) Hal Finney to shape and slant
arguments. Detweiler has argued that these pseudospoofers are criticizing
his points and generally interfering with the democracy that would, he
thinks, otherwise produce the proper decisions. Namely, his decisions.

I've seen no situation where a "vote" of posters was taken, where these
alleged pseudospoofers shaped an outcome. In fact, the Cypherpunks list is
largely a "market anarchy," with very few real decisions *ever* being
made...the several dozen active posters say their points, announce their
projects and their progress on same, and generally follow the "coffee shop"
model someone (sorry) eloquently described a week or so ago.

Positive reputations matter. I've never met Doug Barnes or Karl Barrus
before, and they may even be pseudonyms. But I value their comments,
regardless. Even some of the recent obvious nyms, like "Sam Hill," I'm
valuing more and more. To each their own. Use filters if you don't like
nyms.


I know for a fact that I haven't been sending Detweiler anonymous mail. And
not much mail at all, in fact. About 5 or 6 weeks ago, after he went
ballistic and called me a "traitor" and a "lackey of Eric Hughes" over my
relatively mild defense of the EFF/Shari Steele advisory, I told him in
e-mail I would no longer correspond with him. (My message to him was later
quoted in its entirety in one of his rants.) Frankly, I was tired of his
hot-and-cold mood swings, with death threats and floridly-written insults
interspersed with requests for help in some area (pretty nervy!)....I just
got fed up with his obvious lack of social skills and his descent into
paranoid schizophrenia. He is, as a former girlfriend would diagnose his
condition, a "borderline personality."

I've used remailers, though never for mail to him.

Detweiler made a big thing about my open admission to him that I have in
fact used anonymous mailers at times to post to the List. This is hardly a
surprising announcement, as nearly all of you should know that in several
instances I have used remailers to make a point, to demonstrate some
capability. The three main examples that come to mind are:

1. "Information Liberation Front" (ILF). To illustrate the possibilities,
and to also post some articles I had scanned, I began using this "nym"
about a year ago. Others have since used it as well (anyone can...no sigs
are involved), as I hoped. In no cases can you find the "ILF" doing the
kind of "pseuodospoofing" Detweiler rails about.

2. The "A Patriot" (I think that was the name I used) posting supposedly
blowing the whistle on F-117 Nighthawk (Stealth) fighter cost overruns. I
posted material anonymously, got a bunch of "you are a traitor" messages
(not from Detweiler, that I can recall), and then several days later I
announced that I was the author and that the material came from widely
available public articles. My point was not to make people look like
fools--though at least one person did--but to provide a "trial run" for the
Real Thing, when actual defense secrets get out on whistleblowers-type
networks. It's gonna happen, and we need to think about this in advance.

(This posting was made about 6 months ago, and it was hardly a secret that
I was the author.)

3. "BlackNet." Ironically, someone else took my announcement of this from
somewhere--perhaps from a nanotech meeting, where I used it to illustrate
the difficulties in controlling nanotech developments--and forwarded it
through a remailer to the Cypherpunks list. But I was of course the author.
I've been using "BlackNet" as my generic example of a crypto-anarchic
entity since late 1987, as I have already explained in an earlier posting.

(The recent announcement that a Van Eyck radiation kit is available via a
BlackNet-style "cutout" was not my doing, I hasten to add. I welcome such
developments, though I doubt this one is completely serious.)

In these three cases, which are my *only* uses of anonymity/pseudonyms that
I can recall (I won't say there's never been another example, but I
honestly can't recollect any other uses....), these were essentially "open
secrets." I discussed all of them either on the List (as with the F-117 and
BlackNet material) or it was a standing joke amongst physical meeting
attendees that I was behind the ILF. 

I am not any of the pseudonyms you see on the List regularly. I guess I
have too much ego and too little to fear (being retired, I have no fears
about my "reputation" as a crypto-anarchist hurting me) to hide my views
under a pseudonym.

Enough on this, though.

Robert Woodhead made some comments in Detweiler's behalf, and was promptly
flamed for it, referred to as "another snake" or somesuch. Here are my
comments on Robert's points:

He writes:

>Personally, I am getting a little tired of your ranting.  I agreed with
>most of your position and got flamed for it.  Thanks a lot.  It's chillingly
>obvious you've read "How to Win Friends and Influence People."
>
>If you are willing to do the research and provide solid, verifyable
>evidence of such nastiness as you are convinced is happening, then
>do it.  If you are willing to discuss the implications of dishonesty
>in a universe of anonymity, then  that is a topic of interest.  If
>all you are willing to do is rant about the boogieman under the
>bed, then please do your mumbling somewhere else in cyberspace.
>
>I _still_ think the issue that concerns you is an important one.  I
>also think you are doing a very good job of ensuring that people
>don't give it critical thought. 

Robert, 

Something you might want to think about is this:

* I have never sent Detweiler--or S, Boxx, either--a message anonymously or
pseudoanonymously. That is, *all* mail I have sent him (and that hasn't
been much) has been from my one and only e-mail account, tcmay@netcom.com.

(Obviously not counting any of the anonymous mail that appeared on the List
as a whole, the aforementioned ILF, F-117, and BlackNet material.)

* Somehow he became deluded--and that is literally his condition--that
other List members, such as Jamie Dinkelacker and Nick Szabo--were
pseudonyms of *me*. He ranted at me in e-mail, interspersed with "you sly
devil!" congratulations for pulling off such a feat. He claimed I wrote the
short story, "Master Key" (about 4-6 weeks ago), which I did not....I don't
know who did. The political essays which have appeared under pseudonyms
were definitely *not* written by me...some of them I'd like to claim credit
for, but I just can't. 

* After many of these strange messages, I broke my silence with him and
sent him a message setting him straight: that I was not Jamie or Nick, that
I had not sent him any messages, and that I did not write any of the
anonymous pieces he claimed I had. (Detweiler called me a liar for
disavowing to him in e-mail that I had written these. He just won't take no
for an answer. Denials are taken as further proof of a Grand Conspiracy to
Confuse Him.)

* This knocked him further over the edge, and he began sending me death
threats (along the charming lines of "traitors like you will be hung by the
neck until DEAD and then sent to HELL") and other weird messages.

* What more can be said? He has taken his personal demon, "pseudospoofing,"
and blown it out of proportion. When Hal Finney tried to help (a misguided
idea, in my opinion, as we are not psychotherapists), he is called another
"tentacle of the Medusa" and LD says he now realizes "Hal" is just a
pseudonym of his tormenters! When Phil Zimmermann gets fed up with LD's
paranoia, he is deemed to be part of the conspiracy! 

It seems tragicomic that Detweiler has now gone almost completely over to
the side long-expressed by David Sternlight (no, I am not making any
paranoid assertions) that law enforcement needs require restrictions on
anonymity tools, that registries of True Names and identities are needed,
and that the Cypherpunks goals are dangerous. He even mixes in
fundatmentalist religious paranoia, talking about Satan-inspired
Cypherpunks and "black poison" from the depths of Hell. 

One has to wonder how Detweiler could so demonize Dorothy Denning and David
Sternlight and now have so thoroughly taken an even more extreme position
on their side of the issues.

As someone said to me recently, Detweiler should be regarded as one of the
casualties.

It's sad.

--Tim May. whose identity is all-too-public and can be easily confirmed by
looking at photos in past issues of journals like "Transactions on Electron
Devices" (January, 1979, paper on "Alpha Particle-Induced Soft Errors in
Dynamic Memories") and so forth. I am also known to about 40-60 of you, by
my rough estimate. It's sad that Detweiler will not trust the evidence of
his senses, and contacts with others, and instead has plunged head-long
into paranoid schizophrenia.


--
Timothy C. May         | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,  
tcmay@netcom.com       | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
408-688-5409           | knowledge, reputations, information markets, 
W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA  | black markets, collapse of governments.
Higher Power: 2^756839 | Public Key: by arrangement
Note: I put time and money into writing this posting. I hope you enjoy it.      








From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Duncan Frissell <frissell@panix.com>
Date: Tue, 26 Oct 93 10:40:48 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: CPSR NII Paper
Message-ID: <199310261634.AA20020@panix.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


To: cypherpunks@toad.com

B>     COMPUTER SCIENTISTS RAISE SOCIAL AND DESIGN CONCERNS
B>                     ABOUT THE INFORMATION HIGHWAY


B>many dangers on the horizon
B>small number of companies dominate the market
B>companies control the programming
B>pricing structures do not cover universal service
B>privacy isn't protected
B>not designed to allow everyone to communicate freely

B>"To achieve that vision, however, the government must play a major role 
B>in the design, development, and regulation of the network."

Commies -- Ya gotta love 'em.

Are there any "designs" for the NII that don't include telephones, email, 
and internetworking connections?  Given those, the rest is irrelevent.  
Anyone who wants to can build their own virtual networks no matter what 
the "service providers" do.

Are these people stupid or just power mad?  Networking is and will 
continue to be nearly free.  Who has better network connections with 
"universal access" Europeans or Amricans?  

Duncan Frissell

"Skim the Cream" "Skim the Cream" "Skim the Cream" -- the next commie that 
says that to me is sure going to get his cream skimmed.

--- WinQwk 2.0b#1165
                                                                                                                      




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Duncan Frissell <frissell@panix.com>
Date: Tue, 26 Oct 93 10:40:43 PDT
To: CYPHERPUNKS@toad.com
Subject: a desperate plea
Message-ID: <199310261634.AA20026@panix.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


L.>the Constitution specifically prohibits `high treason'. Or are we now
L.>against the Constitution? It's hard to keep track lately.

Little hint for you traitors out there.  Only citizens can be convicted of 
treason.  If you renounce your citizenship prior to your treasonous acts, 
you're home free.

L.>The cypherpunk `agenda' has become so closely indistinguishable with
L.>raw criminality and evil it horrifies me. [Ted Bundy, etc.]

People whose identities are known have murdered more people than people 
whose identities are unknown.  Janet Reno murdered many more people than 
Ted.

Lot of good arguments against democracy in this post.  We can use the 
moral support.

Duncan Frissell



--- WinQwk 2.0b#1165
                                               




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Duncan Frissell <frissell@panix.com>
Date: Tue, 26 Oct 93 10:35:50 PDT
To: CYPHERPUNKS@toad.com
Subject: an open offer
Message-ID: <199310261634.AA20031@panix.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


A >(To the insiders: it will be quite awhile before we sort everything 
A >out and file charges, so be patient.)

Don't wait too long.  We might be out of the jurisdiction.

DCF

Say, is there any way we could knock cypherpunks off the nets for four 
days?  Did the s/n ratio on extropians a world of good.  Maybe the 
extropian list software could incorporate random outages throughout the 
year.  Just a thought...

--- WinQwk 2.0b#1165
                                                                         




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: owner-cypherpunks
Date: Tue, 26 Oct 93 12:46:30 PDT
Subject: No Subject
Message-ID: <9310261946.AA01746@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Anonymous
Date: Tue Sep 07 12:40:11 1999
Subject: No Subject
Message-ID: <d41d8cd98f00b204e9800998ecf8427e@NO-ID-FOUND.mhonarc.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


"S. Boxx" tries to scare us by writing:
>
>(To the insiders: it will be quite awhile before we sort everything out
>and file charges, so be patient.)

Perhaps as long as several millenia, eh?


--
Lefty (lefty@apple.com)
C:.M:.C:., D:.O:.D:.






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: lefty@apple.com (Lefty)
Date: Tue, 26 Oct 93 13:21:25 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Anonymous Geeks With Killfiles
Message-ID: <9310262010.AA20816@internal.apple.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Some anonymous geek writes:
>
>In article <931025174804_72114.1712_FHF124-2@compuserve.com>,
>Sandy <72114.1712@CompuServe.COM> wrote:
>: [who cares?]
>
>You are a rude and obnoxious individual who believes that an
>argument can be answered with ad hominem.

What, you mean like calling 'em "rude and obnoxious"?

>If you had anything
>worth paying attention to, you sabotaged any possibility of my
>paying attention to it by your actions.
>
>Welcome to my killfile.

I can imagine the extreme degree of concern that Sandy must be feeling over
being placed in the killfile of an unidentified non-entity.


--
Lefty (lefty@apple.com)
C:.M:.C:., D:.O:.D:.






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: bill@twwells.com (T. William Wells)
Date: Tue, 26 Oct 93 10:35:42 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: anti-social behavior
In-Reply-To: <9310260646.AA04776@kropotkin.gnu.ai.mit.edu>
Message-ID: <CFICE5.530@twwells.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Over on ASAR, we give warning for anger. Consider yourself warned.

















In article <9310260646.AA04776@kropotkin.gnu.ai.mit.edu>,
 <rjc@gnu.ai.mit.edu> wrote:
:   I'm coming to kill your family tommorow with a rusty razor.

I despise Detweiler. I also think he ought to be in a mental
hospital. However, this is evil, anti-social behavior. It is
abusive beyond any possibility of shrugging it off.

Stop it. Don't make excuses. I don't *care* if you think this
sort of think is "just a joke". It isn't. OK, you don't
understand. That's irrelevant. Just take it from older and wiser
heads that it is unacceptable. STOP IT.

No, I'll make it stronger. Either you apologize to me, to
Detweiler, and to the list, or the list owner removes you from
the list, or I go. I will not be associated with a group that
tolerates this sort of behavior.

(Does anyone want to know why I'm so incensed. Check out ASAR for
awhile. Understand that this person's behavior, and excuse
making, is indistinguishable from the abuse that makes that
newsgroup necessary.)





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Arthur Chandler <arthurc@crl.com>
Date: Tue, 26 Oct 93 15:12:45 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: : a desperate please
In-Reply-To: <9310261357.AA07695@toad.com>
Message-ID: <Pine.3.87.9310261117.A18829-0100000@crl.crl.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



  Can't we be a little nicer, and talk about the ISSUES instead of the 
posters? 
  Let's agree that spoofing/anonymity is no good if (1) you post as 
William Gibson and you're NOT William Gibson, or (2) you post as LD, TM, 
AC, EH, or anyone else on this list if you are not that person. (1) and 
(2) aren't instances of spoofing: they're instances of impersonation and 
fraud.
   Anyone got a problem with all that?
   OK, on to the next issue:
   Why would you want to build up a pseudonymous reputation?  
   I ask this question not in a contentious manner, but out of a real 
desire to turn the discussion into a thread where encryption, privacy, 
alternate identities, etc. can be talked about in a lively, but not 
angry fashion.
   (Hmmm, that sounded kinda pompous; but bear with me!)
   Isn't it tough enough to build up a rep under our real names? What is 
the point to using a pseudonym? I can think of some bad reasons; but I 
can't come up with any good ones, except for "fun" and "just to see what 
it feels like to put out opinions not my own."  I'm sure I'm missing the 
point; so, before you jump on me as a Clueless Newbie, can you run by 
the reasons why you want to have alternate personas on the NET?
   A story to lighten up the atmosphere:
   On MediaMOO, I have a virtual puppet. I've coded the puppet -- named 
Apprentice Dragon -- to follow me around; and I can speak or emote through 
him too. Regulars on MediaMOO know he's my puppet; newbies are amazed at 
first, but soon learn to identify the puppet with its owner. Now, a 
couple of weeks ago I was in the middle of a heavy Real Time discussion 
at MediaMOO. I offered an opinion; then, just for the heck of it, I had 
the Apprentice Dragon contradict me. And danged if everyone didn't agree 
with the dragon! 
   Maybe this is a lesson I should apply to pseudonymous identities.
   Or maybe not.
   So why try for a pseudonymous rep? All replies cheerfully considered.






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: peb@PROCASE.COM (Paul Baclace)
Date: Tue, 26 Oct 93 15:12:38 PDT
To: unicorn@access.digex.net
Subject: Re: help/subscribe
Message-ID: <9310262207.AA05658@banff.procase.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



>It seems I perpetrated a vile and offensive error in sending a subscribe
>request directly to the list.

I don't get offended, I just save the subscribe/unsubscribe message
in a special folder that I will use to train a learning algorithm
to recognize these kinds of requests.  Then, I will create a program
that detects these so that mailing lists everywhere can automatically
bounce messages back to the sender with specific message like "please
send un/subscribe messages to fubar-request@node.com".

In other words, thanks for your example.  

Anyone who sends me examples will benefit this project.  (But don't send
examples from cypherpunks--I already get them.)

If anyone has suggestions for implementation that maximizes applicability
(e.g., I could write a C program that reads stdin or a named file and 
returns a status code), please let me know.


Paul E. Baclace
peb@procase.com





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Philippe_D_Nave" <pdn@dwroll.dw.att.com>
Date: Tue, 26 Oct 93 14:32:39 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Enough!
Message-ID: <9310262132.AA03113@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Hello, all!
 
The Detweiler-flaming is getting out of hand, folks.
 
Some of you have individual gripes with him, and I recognize your right to
carry on conversations via e-mail, but I (for one) am thoroughly sick of
looking at this latest wave of gratuitous harassment. There are plenty
of arenas that provide this sort of entertainment; if the best you can do
with your Internet access is send 'nyah-nyah-nyah' messages, I suggest
that you log into some local PC bulletin boards and flame away. (Those 
of you with multiple personalities and/or avatars can flame yourselves;
you'll get better response time that way anyway. <grin>). The death threats
are particularly infantile, regardless of whether or not they were meant
as some sort of obscure joke.
 
The reason coffee houses don't normally have bouncers is that they normally
don't _need_ them; in our case, I hope we can move past this disruptive 
behavior and keep the coffee house crowd from permanently polarizing into
opposing camps. If that happens, I think we'll lose whatever benefit there
is to be had from this sort of forum.

I appeal to all of us to reconsider the motives that led us to the 'punks
to start with - are we 'cypherpunks' who 'write code' and 'have fun,' or
are we just 'punks' who try to impress one another with how vicious we can
be? There is a big difference.

Newbies : If you think that there is stature to be gained by joining in 
this sorry spectacle, think again. The only place you can gain respect by
abusing someone else is a street gang (or the U.S. Congress, perhaps).

........................................................................
Philippe D. Nave, Jr.   | The person who does not use message encryption
pdn@dwroll.dw.att.com   | will soon be at the mercy of those who DO...
Denver, Colorado USA    | PGP public key: by arrangement.



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: pierre@shell.portal.com (Pierre Uszynski)
Date: Tue, 26 Oct 93 15:37:46 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: DC-nets, up from the basic concept
Message-ID: <9310262234.AA05579@jobe.shell.portal.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


A few pseudonymous questions went astray and landed in
my mail box among a few others (without much of a return
address too... the problems of anonymity)

So I'll volunteer some possible answers, and while doing
so will generate more questions :-). Others feel free to
elaborate (especially thoses who HAVE read the papers)

Still, no mention of detweil(er)ing will be made :-)
although I will mention spoofing...

1) "PHYSICAL LAYER"
===================

Q: How do you implement the idea that I can see my coin
and the coin on the left, but no others?

A: You use public key cryptography. You join a "table"
by contacting one of the persons already at the "table".
He hands you address and public key of (say) his
right neighbor, and you hand him your address and your
public key. Each time you "toss a coin" you encrypt it and
send it to his ex right neighbor (now your right
neighbor). You use the same public key protocols to
send out to everybody your "different/same" vote, and
collect and count everybody elses.

It's easy to add and remove individuals, and you can be
part of as many "tables" as you want.

2) MORE SPOOFING
================

New question: how do you make sure you are not spoofed
to death, and (mis)led to join a "table" of, say, 126
personae of the same three letter entity, and Yourself.
In which case, your messages are not very untraceable
anymore?

Not very satisfying answer: you meet in person your
left AND right neighbor at least once to exchange
address and keys... Any better answer?

3) GROUP RESPONSIBILITY AND HIGHER LAYERS
=========================================

Q: couldn't every member of the group be
implicated because they must all participate to produce
the bit of information?

A: No, when a "table" is established, what you have is
a CSMA/CD network in the classical sense (CSMA/CD = Carrier
Sense Multiple Access/ Collision Detection) just like
Ethernet is one.  Your "DC-net physical layer" is now
very complicated, and multi-layered itself, but that
only affects speed, not much else.

You could (maaaybe :-( establish the layering:

Coaxial - Ethernet - IP - TCP / Telnet - RFC822 email -
PEM - DC-net - IP - TCP / Telnet - RFC822 email - PEM

Except that now, your second layer of TCP/IP is
untraceable. By the same token (sorry :-), once you
have these protocols established for one "table", you can
internetwork many "tables" at will. Poof! Inter-DC-net!

But, boy, would the above implementations be slow :-)

In any case, even though the participants of any network
must cooperate for any message to go through (especially
true in the case of Usenet, or FIDO, for example), it is
hard to hold all the participants responsible for every
message just for being part of the infrastructure.

It would be different (even with todays networks), if
a large proportion of the messages were CLEARLY illegal.
Still, even now, it is impossible to tell whether an encrypted
message's content is illegal or not (see the previous
netnews discussion with respect to FIDO, mail privacy and
encryption), and peeking in un-encrypted email is
illegal, depending on caller contract.

So I would, until contradicted by the legal types
among us, consider a DC-net or Inter-DC-net no different
legally, than any other cooperative network out there
(Usenet, FIDO, internet...), until specifically
regulated.

Disclaimer: Of course, this is only a technical opinion,
legal decisions may or may not consider the technical
precedents :-) Reasonable technical arguments have as
much weight legally as unreasonable ones (or so it seems
at times) (meaning: of course, I'm not a lawuer)

Pierre.
pierre@shell.portal.com




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Martin Janzen <janzen@idacom.hp.com>
Date: Tue, 26 Oct 93 14:37:47 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Canon copiers
In-Reply-To: <9310221617.AA00624@jobe.shell.portal.com>
Message-ID: <9310262136.AA04460@loki.idacom.hp.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Hal Finney writes:
>The thing that makes me skeptical about this copier story is this:  the
>money could have any orientation and position on the page.  [...]

Yes.  But the thing that makes _me_ skeptical is that there are many kinds
of currency in the world besides the US dollar.  A counterfeiter could simply
copy a stack of bills that aren't in the copier's database (eg. one of the
new currencies issued by countries that were part of the former Soviet
Union), then head on down to the nearest foreign exchange office.

>However, there is another possibility, which is to look at hte color of
>the bills.

This wouldn't do the job either.  Our Canadian bills, for instance, come
in a different color for each denomination.  Bills from New Zealand and
Thailand, among others, come in a range of colors _and_ sizes.  So your
copier would have to have quite the database...

And what about changes?  The Canadian mint has been altering a number of
bills to add better security features.  Any color copier owners out there
receive mysterious, unsolicited "preventative maintenance" visits lately?

>In short, I'm pretty sure that there is a lot of disinformation going around
>designed to scare people away from trying it.

Agreed.  I think we can put an end to _this_ thread, at least!

-- 
Martin Janzen           janzen@idacom.hp.com




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: pierre@shell.portal.com (Pierre Uszynski)
Date: Tue, 26 Oct 93 15:52:45 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re:  DC-nets, up from the basic concept
Message-ID: <9310262252.AA06685@jobe.shell.portal.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> You could (maaaybe :-( establish the layering:
> 
> Coaxial - Ethernet - IP - TCP / Telnet - RFC822 email -
> PEM - DC-net - IP - TCP / Telnet - RFC822 email - PEM

Before somebody takes the above tooooo seriously, I'll add
that it would take major work to modify TCP/IP to function
as the second "TCP/IP" layer in the example above. This is
because TCP/IP relies on dialogs between machines/nets
instead of broadcasts (at least at the internetwork level),
so messages should be traceable back to an inter-DC-net
"table", but could not be traced back to a specific host. 


Pierre
pierre@shell.portal.com




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: fnerd@smds.com (FutureNerd Steve Witham)
Date: Tue, 26 Oct 93 13:16:25 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: ADMIN: proposed new policy on the mailing list
Message-ID: <9310262009.AA19841@smds.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



I want to publicly support the proposal to delay unsigned messages.
Of course, it's easy to fake a signature, so the sigs would have to
be verified against some list of public keys--perhaps automatically
updatable.

This is despite the fact that signing securely would be very tough
for people like me.

-fnerd@smds.com




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Dark <unicorn@access.digex.net>
Date: Tue, 26 Oct 93 13:16:25 PDT
To: warlord@MIT.EDU
Subject: Re: help/subscribe
Message-ID: <199310262010.AA09195@access.digex.net>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Re:  Subscription requests and Bandwidth

It seems I perpetrated a vile and offensive error in sending a subscribe
request directly to the list.

My request of course generated a multitude of angry cypherpunks (Not the
type of people you want angry with you I might add) to reply and tell me
where to look and where to stick my request (in the most polite possible
ways I assure you....)

Now allow me to waste more bandwidth and apoligize :)

On another note:

Has anyone noticed the post regarding U Chicago's computer policy and it's
omnious overtones against psuedo and anonymous postings?  I believe it
was floating around alt.privacy and I was wondering if anyone had any
more idea about where it might go from there.

Despite the fact that I believe the policy to just be lacking in general
and its limitation on privacy in general an oversite, I wonder how much
intent was involved.  Shall I provide a copy of the offending policy or
has it circulated yet...?


-uni- (Dark)




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Stanton McCandlish <mech@eff.org>
Date: Tue, 26 Oct 93 13:31:26 PDT
To: ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu (L. Detweiler)
Subject: Re: pseudospoofing survey
In-Reply-To: <9310240835.AA08908@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Message-ID: <199310262026.AA14561@eff.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> 1. `True Name' -- for our purposes let this be defined as the name on
> your birth certificate, your legal identity.

That's a bad definintion.  The name on *my* b.c. is NOT my legal identity.

[2. name one goes by all the time on the net, 3. anonymous]

> 4. `pseudonymous' -- a variation of (3) where arbitrary identification
> is used to build up a reputation under a presumed name, but
> characteristics of the message make clear that the identity is an
> *alias* for someone's *unique* identities under (1) or (2). The
> nicknames associated with the Helsingius server ID's would be an example.
> 
> 5. `pseudoanonymous' or `pseudospoofed' -- the message could either be
> someone's `true name' or an invented alias, but *no* characteristics of
> the message (including the message by the author) can discriminate
> exactly *which*. 

I fail to see how, under this definition, it differs from category 2.  If
I'd ALWAYS posted under the name George P. Schrader, then that is the
identity that would be ascribed to me.  No one can tell if "Stanton
McCandlish" is my true name either.  None of you actually know that.  I
could be a persona of Shari Steele for all anyone really knows.

> Very serious abuses of (5) can lead to insideous deception and
> treachery, particularly in the interplay between public and private
> messages, and I'm absolutely aghast to see the capability for (5)
> championed as `privacy' here and in my mailbox by many people (or
> phantoms, I'm in total confusion) I used to respect. But this is all another essay.

I think you are missing a major point, namely that in the future world of
the net, ANYONE can do this.  The entire meaning of "identity" is going to
change, and the meaning of "person" and "you" and "me", even as it is
ALREADY changing.  Read up in Hackers Dictionary, as a small example, of
how Guy L. Steele still is known as gls (his login ID from 15 years ago)
EVEN BY HIS WIFE, in day to day conversation.  People become their online
personae.  If people happen to have more than one, SO WHAT?  It is in
human nature to have multifaceted personalities, and I for one don't see
any real difference between wearing black and being glum one day while
wearing colours and being cheerful the next, and using 2 different online
pseudos.  It may not be CONVENIENT for the reader, but is it really
anyone's business if I am who I say I am, and if someone else that they've
been conversing with is also me?  It is unusual, but it's not evil.  It's
really no more strange that halloween or a masquerade ball.

In the case of forged identities stolen from someone else, yes that could
be a problem, but the problem is not the technology that allows it, but
the ATTITUDE that allows it.  Guns don't kill people, people do.

> In (3) and (4), the reciever *knows* that the message can be from
> *anyone*. In (5), the receiver does *not* know, and may even be
> *misled* into believing that a message is in categories (1) or (2) when
> it is in fact in fact `anonymous'. IMHO this is *very* dangerous.

This is patently false.  I say this on the grounds that in ALL cases of
ALL email, people know that the message can be from anyone.  Period.  End
of story.  If you do not authenticate the message w/a digital sig, and if
the recipient does not verify it, that is NOT the fault of the
technology that makes "pseudospoofing" possible, it is the fault of the
users, if they believe that mail that says it's from X must perforce
necessarily be from X.  If people do NOT know this, it is again not the
fault of the net or of anonymous services, it is the fault of the
clueless.  What you advocate seems strikingly like suggesting that we
eradicate emacs, because someone somewhere might not RTFM and might cry
and whine about not being able to use it right. 

> To further emphasize this distinction, in some sense categories (1) -
> (2) are *attributable* to *unique* identities. When I see messages in
> categories (1) or (2) on a mailing list, in my mailbox, or in Usenet
> postings, FTP articles, whatever, I can attribute them to unique people
> by definition. We also might call (1) `accountable', and if an online
> account under (2) can be traced to a legal identity, it would be also.

You most assuredly cannot confidently attribute any non-signed (and
unverified-by-you) message to any unique person, by the definition of what
email consists of and how it is produced.  Simply the existence of
"pseudospoofing" makes this so.

> Categories (3) and (4) are *not* attributable to unique identities. A
> single person could post anonymously multiple times or pseudonymously
> under multiple identities. If a person has only one pseudonym, let's
> say that's `quasi- or semi- accountable'.

This also makes no sense to me.  How can one be said to be
"quasi-accountable", particularly since there is no way for you to
acertain that they DO only have one pseudo?  To be accountable, someone or
something must make you account.
 
> But not only is (5) *not* attributable to *identities*, it is not
> `attributable' to any of the previous *categories*! Hence, let's call
> messages in the categories (1) - (2) `attributable', (3) - (4)
> `nonattributable', (1) - (4) `uncamouflaged', `white', `open' or
> `unsurreptitious', and (5) `nonattributable' and `camouflaged',
> `black', or `surreptitious'. (I leave it to subsequent debate to
> stabilize on the most descriptive and memorable terms.)

Not to mention the rather stale (and, someone would say sooner or later,
racist) psychology at work here.  I don't argue from the "PC" side of
things, but "black and white"?  Come now.  The real world, whether virtual
or otherwise is a very very grey place.  This Tolkienism is simply
impractical.  

> This *camouflage* that various cypherpunks promote, apparently up to
> the highest levels of `leadership', is IMHO inherently subversive.
> Because no one here seems to be afraid of subversion and anarchy, and
> even embraces it, let me go further and say it is *destructive* not
> only to societies but to *any* social interaction, even interpersonal.
> IMHO It is not just a recipe for anarchy, it is a recipe for chaos and
> barbarianism, *particularly* when associated with personal mail
> (including mailing lists).

How is this destructive?  If I see a man on the street, and later that
night go out to a local concert, and am entertained by a "woman" singer that
is actually the man I passed that morning, in drag, what damage has been
done?  Has my life suddenly been shattered, the fabric of society ripped
apart, because I've see the same physical person in 2 outfits, and was
none the wiser?  If I "meet" 2 "individuals" virtually on the net, and
they are the same person, how have I, or the net, been harmed?  Provided
no one is trying to defraud me, what have I lost?  What have you lost? 
And whoever it is behind the multiple idents may actually GAIN, if they
are the sort of person that cannot fully express themselves without
playing a role (which is a signifcant proportion of the people in the world).
Who are YOU to take that away from them?
 
This whole line of argument strongly reminds me of the the one that goes
like this: online communication is a bad thing, because people don't
behave like their true selves, and misrepresent themselves.  We should ban
computer mediated communcation, because it is a heartless sham, a cold
fraudulent falsehood, and will be misused by the schizoprenic and the
sociopathic.

> In fact, apparently not only are `some' cypherpunks in favor of `black'
> postings, they are in favor of *concealing* the very existence of the
> capability, so as to potentially manipulate and brainwash others in an
> undetected concerted conspiracy! I think I will define this as `evil blackness'. <g>

Puh-leeeeze.  I discard this conspiracy theory on the basis that you
accuse them of what you would yourself do: keep people from using the
capability [whether it's true or not is irrelevant].

> now, I just want to make the distinctions clear for the survey, which
> follows. The survey will help me determine the extent of `blackness'
> and `evil blackness'. 

I take that back, this isn't Tolkienish, it's Lovecraftian.  I would like
to remind you that "evil" is a term from "morals", which are baseless and
have no universality outside the closed group.  If you wish to discuss
whether using pseudonymy in this manner is *ethical* or not, then by all
means please do so.

> 1. What is your `true name'?

Stanton McCandlish
> 
> 2. Do you have a unique online identity other than your true name?

Yes.

> 3. How long have you been on the internet?

a few years (depends on how you wish to define "the internet".

> 4. How many mailing lists are you on?

At my peak, which I am reaching again, about 25 or more; counting
newsgroups, Fido echos, and the like, I follow several 100 online
conferences, again at peak. 

> 5. Are `black' / `camouflaged' identities feasible or possible on the
> internet today? If so, how in particular? Comment on public access and
> UUCP sites if possible.

Certainly.  Sign up with Netcom as "John Bigboote" and presto.
With UUCP, Fido <-> UUCP gating, or pure Fido or QWK mail, I can generate
as many personae as I wish. 

> 6. To what extent do you think `camouflaged' identities exist on the
> internet currently?

To a large extent, and growing, though probably less than 1% of personae
on the net are fake.

> Where are they used? 

Where are they NOT used?  

>What mailing lists or
> newsgroups are particularly dense with `black' postings?

soc.culture.african, soc.culture.african.american, bit.tech.africana,
rec.music.afro-latin.

> Have you ever
> received any in email?

To be serious again, who knows?  I think it highly likely.

> 7. Have you ever posted under a `camouflaged' identity? if so, where? How often?

Certainly.  Not that often, but it comes in handy.

> 8. Are you aware of any potential `abuses' of `black' messages? Has it
> turned into a big problem anywhere? Do you have any horror stories? Are
> there any `cabals' or `silent conspiracies'? have any debates or
> projects been `poisoned' or `sabotaged'?

No this is silly.  For one thing, all it takes to veryify in the case of
fraudulent use of another's name or reputation (i.e. posing a non-existent
big-wig at IBM) is a phone call.

> 9. Are you neutral on the capability of `black'/`camouflaged' messages,
> or do you strongly promote/support or condemn it? Is it harmless or dangerous?

I am neutral on it, just as I am neutral on the issue of what anyone does
with any tool or capablility.  When it is attacked however, I am in
support if of (the tool, not the attack).

> 10. Is society aware of `black messages'? if not, what would `they'
> think in general? if so, what is the consensus on the practice?

I think so.  I think it is immediately apparent to anyone that uses this
medium more than casually and for a short time that all is not as it seems
and that forgery of postings is not particularly surprising.

> 11. Is it fundamentally technically impossible to prevent *widespread*
> black messages if there was an incentive or consensus to do so? Or is
> it feasible with technology?

Anything is feasible.  The question is what price will you pay to remove
this capability from the system? (incl. human costs, not just monetary ones.)
No one needs you to protect us from ourselves or eachother.

> 12. What are internet policies in general on `black' messages? What
> should they be? Should they be restricted and prevented? allowed? Keep
> in mind the distinctions of posts to mailing lists, Usenet posts, and personal mail.

What is an "internet policy in general"?  I have yet to see such a thing. 
There would appear to be no RFCs on the subject if that is what you mean,
and netiquette doesn't seem to mind, it THAT's what you mean.  I'm not
sure the next questions under section 12 have any relevancy to anything. 
Please define "should".  Who get's to decide what "should" be done?  It
might be better to ask "what is feasible" and "is there any reason NOT to
allow psuedonymity in whatever form it takes, provided one does not step
on the rights of others?"  Thing is I don't think you could stop it,
unless you completely restructured the net, at all levels from the
mail software to the societal structure.

> 13. Please list any resources on this subject: email addresses of
> specialists, pointers to papers, etc.

Have none for you, probably because it's a non-issue.

Sorry to seem like I'm going off on you, but I just don't see the reason
in this entire line of rambling and fingerpointing.  There are certainly
more important things to get excited and active about.

-- 
-=> mech@eff.org <=-
Stanton McCandlish     Electronic Frontier Foundation Online Activist & SysOp
"A nation that is afraid to let its people judge the truth and falsehood of
ideas in an open market is a nation that is afraid of its people." -JFK
NitV-DC BBS 202-232-2715, Fido 1:109/? IndraNet 369:111/1, 14.4V32b 16.8ZyX




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Eli Brandt <ebrandt@jarthur.Claremont.EDU>
Date: Tue, 26 Oct 93 16:47:47 PDT
To: cypherpunks list <cypherpunks@toad.com>
Subject: why pseudonyms?
In-Reply-To: <Pine.3.87.9310261117.A18829-0100000@crl.crl.com>
Message-ID: <9310262347.AA04346@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> From: Arthur Chandler <arthurc@crl.crl.com>
>    Isn't it tough enough to build up a rep under our real names? What is 
> the point to using a pseudonym? I can think of some bad reasons; but I 
> can't come up with any good ones, except for "fun" and "just to see what 
> it feels like to put out opinions not my own."

An obvious reason would be that you don't want what you say to be
associated with your truename.  You might be discussing past sexual
abuse, the nefarious behavior of your employer, your relationship
problems, or the finer points of heroin use.  You may say, "Well,
that's just anonymity".  It could work that way, but it may be more
valuable to be able to carry on a discussion under a fixed pseudonym.
Context and continuity are lost if all messages are totally
anonymous.

It might be wise to conduct even relatively innocuous behavior under
a pseudonym, if you're concerned about personal privacy versus a
"dossier society".  Archives of Usenet news will make a great
marketing database some day.

   Eli   ebrandt@jarthur.claremont.edu




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: an41418@anon.penet.fi (wonderer)
Date: Tue, 26 Oct 93 10:40:42 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: No subject
Message-ID: <9310261646.AA04673@anon.penet.fi>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I'll be there, but I probably won't identify myself without
my mask.
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
To find out more about the anon service, send mail to help@anon.penet.fi.
Due to the double-blind, any mail replies to this message will be anonymized,
and an anonymous id will be allocated automatically. You have been warned.
Please report any problems, inappropriate use etc. to admin@anon.penet.fi.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: cman@IO.COM (Douglas Barnes)
Date: Tue, 26 Oct 93 15:07:47 PDT
To: frissell@panix.com (Duncan Frissell)
Subject: Re: Net Regulation
In-Reply-To: <199310261432.AA28584@panix.com>
Message-ID: <9310262201.AA17193@illuminati.IO.COM>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Basically, Duncan, I agree with you as to the *desirability* of the
outcome you describe, I'm just not as sure of its feasability.

Re: Cheating in place

Yes, folks cheat on their taxes, especially self-employed ones. But
this is widely resented, and brings cries from the vast majority to
sock it to those who fail to comply. Look at the blase acceptance
by the populace of the draconian measures taken in the War on Drugs.
Will similar measures be condoned in the War on Electronic Tax Cheats?

We've seen how little is required for a chilling effect to take place
vis-a-vis PGP, and how it's undercut its acceptance as a standard; if
the FIDO-net folks can't be persuaded to take PGP messages, how are
you going to persuade a substantial fraction of information workers to
face much more serious criminal penalties? You're much more likely to
end up with a sub-critical mass of folks who are periodically victimized
by no-knock raids, property confiscation, etc.

Re: Moving to cheat

Certainly at present information entrepreneurs can slip through the 
tax laws as they apply to the notion of residence in a foreign country. 
It's fun, it's legal, and I've done it; I don't see it ever becoming a 
big trend for all but one or two percent of the population. Maybe big
enough to get some governments to collude on grabbing folks and making 
them cough up taxes, maybe not.

Will information technology bring down the government? I'd like to think 
so, but I don't see it happening in the next 10-20 years. I'm actually more
concerned that, misused, it could re-empower the government to stick its 
nose in places where it doesn't belong.

(Note: I use the word 'cheat' despite the fact that I take an extremely
dim view of most government activites and taxes, simply because that's
how it's going to be reported in the media if it ever becomes significant.
It's how the hypothetical 'man on the street' who, say, fixes appliances
for a living and has only the vaguest notion of your underlying philosophy,
will view your activities.)

-- 
----------------                                             /\ 
Douglas Barnes            cman@illuminati.io.com            /  \ 
Chief Wizard         (512) 448-8950 (d), 447-7866 (v)      / () \
Illuminati Online          metaverse.io.com 7777          /______\



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Perry E. Metzger" <pmetzger@lehman.com>
Date: Tue, 26 Oct 93 14:47:46 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: anti-social behavior
In-Reply-To: <CFItJ2.9Gv@twwells.com>
Message-ID: <9310262143.AA20264@snark.lehman.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



T. William Wells says:
> : (Does anyone want to know why I'm so incensed. Check out ASAR for
> : awhile. Understand that this person's behavior, and excuse
> : making, is indistinguishable from the abuse that makes that
> : newsgroup necessary.)
> 
> ASAR stands for "alt.sexual.abuse.recovery", a newsgroup I run an
> anonymous server for. This group actually has survivors of all
> sorts of abuse, including the verbal abuse that rjc perpetrated.

Ray was being silly and I don't think his message was productive, but
anyone who cannot deal with someone making a silly and obviously
not-to-be-acted-upon threat is likely to crumple the first time a car
honks at them. I would suggest that such individuals are not the ones
we build society around -- were we to try to do so, almost all human
activity would have to cease. Out in the world there exist people who
are so damaged that the sight of a knife makes them go into a fit.
(The technical name for this condition is balenophobia I belive,
although I am almost sure I have the spelling wrong). We have not as a
society decided to eat with chopsticks to keep such people from being
confronted with things that scare them.


Perry




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: jim@bilbo.suite.com (Jim Miller)
Date: Tue, 26 Oct 93 16:27:45 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Enough!
Message-ID: <9310262303.AA00802@bilbo.suite.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



"Philippe_D_Nave" writes...

> Newbies : If you think that there is stature to be gained by
> joining in  this sorry spectacle, think again. The only
> place you can gain respect by abusing someone else is a
> street gang (or the U.S. Congress, perhaps). 

> 


Pretty presumptuous of you to attach a motive to my post.  I don't think my  
post was abusive, and I didn't post it in an attempt to "gain stature".

Jim_Miller@suite.com




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Stanton McCandlish <mech@eff.org>
Date: Tue, 26 Oct 93 15:02:37 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: TELECOMMUNICATIONS POLICY ROUNDTABLE -- a cast of billions (fwd)
Message-ID: <199310262200.AA16091@eff.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



         TELECOMMUNICATIONS POLICY ROUNDTABLE


FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE                CONTACT:  Jeff Chester
OCTOBER 26, 1993                               (202) 628-2620


     New Coalition Unveils Public Interest Blueprint
   for America's 21st Century Telecommunications Highway

Washington, DC -- A new coalition, the Telecommunications
Policy Roundtable, is calling on Americans to make their
voices heard on seven vital issues of communications
policy.   The coalition's goal is the creation of new
approaches to building our nation's emerging information
infrastructure.
        The Telecommunications Policy Roundtable is a
public interest coalition of more than seventy
organizations.  Its statement of principles comes less
than a month after the Clinton administration released
its own blueprint:  "National Information Infrastructure:
Agenda for Action."  The Clinton program envisions a
national network linking computer, telephone and
television technologies.
        The statement also follows dramatic developments in
the telecommunications industry, including the planned
merger of Bell Atlantic and Tele-Communications
Incorporated (TCI).
        The statement, entitled "Renewing the Commitment to
a Public Interest Telecommunications Policy," outlines a
series of  principles, and introduces them with this
credo: "We believe that the following principles must
guide policymaking in order to ensure that future
generations inherit an information infrastructure which
enhances the quality of life for everyone."

The seven principles are:

o       Universal access -- In our information age,
everyone has a right to affordable news, education
and government information.  Information that is
essential to the functioning of citizens in a
democracy should be free.

o       Freedom to Communicate -- Information is a two way
street.  The design of the new networks should aid
two-way audio and video communication from anyone
to any individual, group or network.

o       Vital civic sector -- The new networks should allow
all groups and individuals to freely express their
ideas and opinions.  The new networks should
include a way for us to build communities.

o       Diverse and competitive marketplace --  No one
should ever control both the wire or wires into our
home and the content of the programs that go over
those wires.

o       Equitable workplace -- workers must be valued and
protected in the new electronic workplace.
Nondiscriminatory practices must form the core of
the new information marketplace.

o       Privacy protection -- Privacy should be carefully
protected and extended.

o       Democratic policy making -- Every American deserves
to be heard on this complex set of issues.

        The coalition meets monthly in Washington, DC.  A
complete list of member organizations is attached.

        TELECOMMUNICATIONS POLICY ROUNDTABLE

              Member Organizations

List Current Through October 26, 1993

Alliance for Community Media
Alliance for Public Technology
American Arts Alliance
American Association of Law Libraries
American Civil Liberties Union
American Council of the Blind
American Library Association
Arts Wire
American Speech-Language-Hearing Association
Association of America's Public Television Stations
Association of Research Libraries
The Benton Foundation
Boston Computer Society, Public Service Committee
Center for Civic Networking
Center for Excellence in Education/Advanced Engineering Research &
        Associates
Center for Media Education
Center for Policy Alternatives
Computer Professionals for Social Responsibility
Computer Researching Association
Consortium for Citizens with Disabilities
Consortium of Social Science Associations
Consumer Federation of America
Coalition for Networked Information
Electronic Frontier Foundation
Gallaudet University
Government Accountability Project
High Performance, an arts magazine
The Information Trust
Institute for Public Representation
Institute for Alternative Journalism
Iris Network for Teachers, an on-line system on the MetaNetwork
The Legacy Project
Libraries for the Future
Lowenstein and Associates
Media Access Project
Medical Library Association
Minority Legislative Education Program
National Alliance of Media Arts and Culture
National Association for the Deaf
National Association of Artists Organizations
National Capitol Area Public Access Network (CapAccess)
National Center for Law and Deafness
National Citizens Communications Lobby
National Coalition on Black Voter Participation
National Coordinating Committee for the Promotion of History
National Federation of Community Broadcasters
National Learning Foundation
National Security Archive
National Writers Union (Local 1981 UAW)
New York Foundation for the Arts
OMB Watch
People for the American Way
Public Citizen
Public Service Telecommunications Corporation
Seattle Community Network
Self Help for Hard of Hearing People, Inc.
SLONET
Special Libraries Association
Sports Fans United
Taxpayer Assets Project
The Technology Education Council of Somerville (Massachusetts)
Telecommunications for the Deaf, Inc.
Telecommunications Committee, National Association for the Deaf
Telecommunications Section of the Community Development Society
TVFA,  Television for All
Telluride Institute/InfoZone
Unison Institute
United Cerebral Palsy Associations, Inc.
U.S. Public Policy Committee of the Association for Computing Machinery
World Institute on Disability
Writers Guild of America, East, Inc.

~*~*~*~*~*~*~*~*~*~*~*~*~*~*~*~*~*~*~*~*~*~*~*~*~*~*~*~*~*~*~*~*~

For more information about the Telecommunications Policy Roundtable, please
contact Jeff Chester at the below address.

        C E N T E R  F O R  M E D I A  E D U C A T I O N
              1511 K Street, NW, Suite 518
                Washington, DC  20005
             Telephone: (202) 628-2620
                Fax: (202) 628-2554
             Internet: cme@access.digex.net





-- 
-=> mech@eff.org <=-
Stanton McCandlish     Electronic Frontier Foundation Online Activist & SysOp
"A nation that is afraid to let its people judge the truth and falsehood of
ideas in an open market is a nation that is afraid of its people." -JFK
NitV-DC BBS 202-232-2715, Fido 1:109/? IndraNet 369:111/1, 14.4V32b 16.8ZyX



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: frc%bwnmr4@harvard.harvard.edu (Fred Cooper)
Date: Tue, 26 Oct 93 15:22:38 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com (Cypherpunks)
Subject: LD
Message-ID: <9310262220.AA24358@bwnmr4.harvard.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

Len,
	Do you want to me start taking you seriously again? (I used to.
You posted some great stuff.) 

	Try signing your posts. Prove your identity.

	Then maybe I'll start believing that the same guy who wrote the
anonymity faq is losing his marbles over spoofs.

FRC
 -- 

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.3a

iQCVAgUBLM2ikbbAlE4AqlTZAQFV5gP+IZE8VupNW6iJxinLlQreJAV8HWXwXyAz
sUOsqLUAcN6T75iFjM+X8fprUVhQFci5Nq1IfpPLWZpOmL9TVdoBmtlSX3EFOpdB
nX7aaq3FN2b0v5Rd5PAJlvY3fbSDDWRdEx6n4zI6l7Adc8+8iHeJqdpHUSjy8uak
TjNJpZSNYHQ=
=npG/
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Robert J. Woodhead" <trebor@foretune.co.jp>
Date: Tue, 26 Oct 93 02:34:51 PDT
To: Eli Brandt <ebrandt@jarthur.Claremont.EDU>
Subject: Re: Totally Anonymous Remailing
In-Reply-To: <9310260243.AA27775@toad.com>
Message-ID: <9310260929.AA13959@dink.foretune.co.jp>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Eli writes regarding my Totally Anonymous Mailing scheme:
>A problem here.  The SEND system eliminates the risk of database
>seizure, and encrypting mail to the remailer eliminates snooping on
>incoming mail, but outgoing mail is unprotected.  Anybody watching
>net traffic coming out of the TAR can snoop the destination of SEND
>requests, and reasonably presume that address to be the owner of the
>nym.  This is of course a problem with a penet-style setup too, but
>it's something to fix if you want to be "totally anonymous".  

I don't think this is a problem.  The send command is received by
the mailing system encrypted by the mailer's public key.  An outside
observer can't decode the message.  When it gets the message, the
mailer decrypts the envelope, and gets the sender's pseudonym and
an encrypted command (encrypted with the sender's private key).
The mailer knows the pseudo's public key, so it can decrypt the
command.  If it is a spoofed command, the mailer gets junk, and
merely sends email into the psuedo's account giving details of
the intrusion attempt (which might just be an error on the
owner's part).

The outgoing mail packet(s) would be encrypted by the pseudo owner's
public key, so only he could read them.

Some mechanism might have to be added to prevent an irritating "spoof"
attack where the attacker records an incoming message and merely
duplicates it.  This might involve having the server remember the last
couple of weeks of command transactions, reject duplicates, and
reject any messages more than a week "old."  This would require a
timestamp in the encrypted part of the message.

The part of the proposal that really needs work is methods to make
traffic analysis prohibitive.  I suspect that a net of cooperative
mailers, along with the ability to delay the relay of outgoing mail,
might help in that regard.





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: jpp@markv.com
Date: Tue, 26 Oct 93 18:37:47 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: ADMIN: proposed new policy on the mailing list
In-Reply-To: <199310241732.AA23689@ucsu.Colorado.EDU>
Message-ID: <9310261837.aa19521@hermix.markv.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I personaly like this non-standard way to sign posts, cut out the
lines in the header, wrap them with the apropriate PGP gubbish, and
check it as a detached signature.
j'
--
                O I am Jay Prime Positive jpp@markv.com 
1250 bit key fingerprint =  B8 95 E0 AF 9A A2 CD A5  89 C9 F0 FE B4 3A 2C 3F
 524 bit key fingerprint =  8A 7C B9 F2 D5 46 4D ED  66 23 F1 71 DE FF 51 48
Public keys by `finger jpp@markv.com' or mail to pgp-public-keys@pgp.mit.edu
Your feedback is welcome, directly or via symbol JPP on hex@sea.east.sun.com




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Robert J. Woodhead" <trebor@foretune.co.jp>
Date: Tue, 26 Oct 93 02:50:56 PDT
To: "L. Detweiler" <ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Subject: Re: Another Tussle with a Tentacle
In-Reply-To: <9310260423.AA11740@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Message-ID: <9310260944.AA14154@dink.foretune.co.jp>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Mr. Detweilers writes:

>what, pray tell, do you define as *intersection*? the very existence of
>the two pseudonyms on the same Cyberspace can be considered an `intersection'.

Pseudo's intersect when they interact.  You could have several psuedos
here on the list, but so long as they didn't engage in the nasty
behavior you abhor, fine by me.  You could be the paranoid L. Detweiler
and the arch-codemeister "Larry Goodhack" for all I care.

Personally, I am getting a little tired of your ranting.  I agreed with
most of your position and got flamed for it.  Thanks a lot.  It's chillingly
obvious you've read "How to Win Friends and Influence People."

If you are willing to do the research and provide solid, verifyable
evidence of such nastiness as you are convinced is happening, then
do it.  If you are willing to discuss the implications of dishonesty
in a universe of anonymity, then  that is a topic of interest.  If
all you are willing to do is rant about the boogieman under the
bed, then please do your mumbling somewhere else in cyberspace.

I _still_ think the issue that concerns you is an important one.  I
also think you are doing a very good job of ensuring that people
don't give it critical thought. 

Who knows.  Maybe that's your goal.  Think about that, 'punks.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: fnerd@smds.com (FutureNerd Steve Witham)
Date: Tue, 26 Oct 93 16:20:26 PDT
To: sw@smds.com
Subject: h
Message-ID: <9310262311.AA20812@smds.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


------BEGIN PGP SIGNED MASSAGE------

Cpunx--

Sorry for the premature post on signatures in Mush.
I looked at the sources to figure out how to use it.
If you want to append a multiline signature to your
messages without adding the gratuitous "\n--\n", do 
something like this in your .mushrc:

set autosign='\-fnerd\n\
quote me'

I'll pass on any other relevant tidbits I receive
by email.

And thanks to Eric Hughes for getting me off my 
butt for a bit.

-fnerd
quote me
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.3a

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ySKAzPkXyfYKnOlzsIjp2toust1Q5A3/n54PBKrUDN9tHVz
3Ch466q9EKUuDulTU6OLsilzmRvQJn0EJhzd4pht6hanC0R3seYNhUYhoJViCcCG
sRjLQs4iVVM=
=9wqs
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Matt Harrop <crypt@io.org>
Date: Tue, 26 Oct 93 16:32:38 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: How do I unsub
Message-ID: <Pine.3.87.9310261925.A3126-0100000@r-node.io.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Could some kind person tell me how to get myself off this list.  The 
signal-to-noise ratio has become far to high.





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Philippe_D_Nave" <pdn@dwroll.dw.att.com>
Date: Tue, 26 Oct 93 18:52:39 PDT
To: Jim_Miller@suite.com
Subject: Re: Enough!
In-Reply-To: <9310262303.AA00802@bilbo.suite.com>
Message-ID: <9310270151.AA06428@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> 
> 
> "Philippe_D_Nave" writes...
> 
> > Newbies : If you think that there is stature to be gained by
> > joining in  this sorry spectacle, think again. The only
> > place you can gain respect by abusing someone else is a
> > street gang (or the U.S. Congress, perhaps). 
> 
> Pretty presumptuous of you to attach a motive to my post.  I don't think my  
> post was abusive, and I didn't post it in an attempt to "gain stature".
> 
> Jim_Miller@suite.com
> 
I have replied to several 'please subscribe me' posts over the last few
days, explaining how to contact Eric and get on the list. Looking over
the free-for-all of the past several days, I could see where newcomers
to the list would think this is the norm, rather than (hopefully) a 
passing phase. 

Did I attach a motive to your post? No.
Did I make any comment about your motives? No.
Did I hit a nerve? Looks like it.

The 'Enough!' post was intended to point out how inappropriate this latest
round of character assassination has become. I should not have included
the specific instance of the knife/gun message without also mentioning
the use of the term 'detweilering', which is another example of the same
phenomenon. For that, I apologize. Quoting that specific case makes it
look like I'm hammering that particular author, and that was not my intent.
(I've forgotten who posted that one anyway- unlike the legendary S. Boxx,
I haven't got the file space to keep my mail forever).
 
At any rate, be assured that I did not intend to single you out.

........................................................................
Philippe D. Nave, Jr.   | The person who does not use message encryption
pdn@dwroll.dw.att.com   | will soon be at the mercy of those who DO...
Denver, Colorado USA    | PGP public key: by arrangement.



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: bill@twwells.com (T. William Wells)
Date: Tue, 26 Oct 93 14:07:47 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: anti-social behavior
In-Reply-To: <9310260646.AA04776@kropotkin.gnu.ai.mit.edu>
Message-ID: <CFItJ2.9Gv@twwells.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


: (Does anyone want to know why I'm so incensed. Check out ASAR for
: awhile. Understand that this person's behavior, and excuse
: making, is indistinguishable from the abuse that makes that
: newsgroup necessary.)

ASAR stands for "alt.sexual.abuse.recovery", a newsgroup I run an
anonymous server for. This group actually has survivors of all
sorts of abuse, including the verbal abuse that rjc perpetrated.





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Alexander Reynolds <chrome@jhunix.hcf.jhu.edu>
Date: Tue, 26 Oct 93 17:32:44 PDT
To: nick <nick@mit.edu>
Subject: sure...
Message-ID: <Pine.3.05.9310262007.A1583-a100000@jhunix.hcf.jhu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


..I'll do my best to provide you with some literature on behavior
control.  I've got midterms this and next week, so a more complete
bibliography will have to wait for a few.  
	One book which I can say is a good intro to the topic is B. F. Skinner's
_Beyond Freedom and Dignity_.  It isn't as scientifically rigorous as most
psych texts I've seen, but it's a good start if you want to really pursue
the topic.  Hannah Arendt's _Totalitarianism_ looks a bit into the nature
of behavior control from a poli sci view.

	There are more, and I'll create a list ASAP.

	Later,

	Alex






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: DON_HENSON@delphi.com
Date: Tue, 26 Oct 93 17:37:47 PDT
To: 76467.2610@compuserve.com
Subject: CyberDesk
Message-ID: <01H4KXYVPWFS90NUPM@delphi.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


A recent article in CompuServe Magazine concerning encryption made 
passing mention of a Nan Atwell of CyberCorp and a product called 
'CyberDesk' which gives users a single windows interface to multiple e-
mail and public information systems and has a seamless hook to third-
party encryption programs of the users choice.  Unfortunately, the 
article failed to include any contact info.  Does anyone know how I can 
contact Nan Atwell or CyberCorp?  An email address would be ideal but a 
vox phone number, a USnail address, or even a (Yuck!) fax number would 
be sincerely appreciated.  Please respond via private email 
(Don_Henson@delphi.com) if you can help me.

Don Henson
PGP key avail on server or on request





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: remail@tamsun.tamu.edu
Date: Tue, 26 Oct 93 19:32:47 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: blacknet international offers DOSSIERS for SALE
Message-ID: <9310270231.AA02958@tamsun.tamu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


blacknet international is pleased to offer the following materials for sale:

DOSSIERS: on the current participants in the Cypherpunks Mailing List Flame war

PRICES: Prices and delivery terms upon request via encrypted anonymous return
address.

SUBJECTS:
Perry Metzger <pmetzger@lehman.com> 
Duncan Frissell <frissell@panix.com>   
S. Boxx <an12070@anon.penet.fi>  
L. Detweiler<ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu> 
Timothy C. May <tcmay@netcom.com>  
Ray Cromwell  <rjc@gnu.ai.mit.edu>  
David Sternlight	<strnlght@netcom.com>

These are available now via PGP encrypted return anonymous mail.

To reply to I/We please use the enclosed public key to
encrypt your message back to us. The anonymous remailer
encrypted return block may be used for now but if
current(known to be good) paths are needed look for the latest
in cypherpunks@toad.com.

Please encrypt ALL mail sent to us...

-----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----
Version: 2.3a

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7xjFZlwd9Q0Ow5k3hLfO4LQpTOW8IBMATV8or1g/+Zv3m87WjLgMmjAEwDypAAUR
tDxibGluZHBpcGUgPHVzZSBjdXJyZW50IHJlbWFpbGVyIGJsb2NrIHBvc3RlZCB0
byBjeXBoZXJwdW5rcz4=
=IHVG
-----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----
--------8<--cut here-->8--------
::
Encrypted: PGP

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Version: 2.3a

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nqEg42KQkjAWotu85dBuXFjgLyShkACvah/VBXYcKHMsgfO41tCbCQiWVkg022/F
TheZmlX5mPj0pgLFlpd+nYYIsGcH2memKLXWuhaY4yThRPYCu5OEYBlQEE1TtQTs
glC6926Nu1RHvs4ivD3OabzeLdl2Kh2wZI2IcznUKOIKhH3nsXgI9ZvuHVkrKkmw
5ABXnhj2rgWW6/SxOT6XejUKH6WHu82HBjnEi6dDviB5pnGL8D2ayxw+ySwjNZ94
lJyrGVeq40XVG4HywxUbmrSbM/a6OOvH2f5zmXQAccoj2iwWa0khPJ0kjlndV/I9
FSLeIP8BZZSHU1tA9/genoDd3auQDAregfuzA10KjVr96+TcLdlh/7eM9TfQDaPz
VtCrLR+X/n2J083WtmyzbZhpeI2qzjL7YqPXNlRsofenVucl3E1k0A==
=WPI/
-----END PGP MESSAGE-----

<To reply, save everything below the "cut here" marks above
<into another file.  Type your reply here (below the blank 
<line three lines above!) and mail to remailer@utter.dis.org
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
To find out more about the anon service, send mail to help@anon.penet.fi.
Due to the double-blind, any mail replies to this message will be anonymized,
and an anonymous id will be allocated automatically. You have been warned.
Please report any problems, inappropriate use etc. to admin@anon.penet.fi.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Dave Banisar <banisar@washofc.cpsr.org>
Date: Tue, 26 Oct 93 19:12:44 PDT
To: CYPHERPUNKS <CYPHERPUNKS@toad.com>
Subject: CPSR Crypto Resolution
Message-ID: <00541.2834516628.335@washofc.cpsr.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


  CPSR Crypto Resolution
CPSR Cryptography Resolution

Adopted by the CPSR Board of Directors, San Francisco, CA October 18,
1993

WHEREAS,

Digital communications technology is becoming an increasingly
significant component of our lives, affecting our educational,
financial, political and social interaction; and

The National Information Infrastructure requires high assurances of
privacy to be useful; and

Encryption technology provides the most effective technical means of
ensuring the privacy and security of digital communications; and

Restrictions on cryptography are likely to impose significant costs on
scientific freedom, government accountability, and economic
development; and

The right of individuals to freely use encryption technology is
consistent with the principles embodied in the Constitution of the
United States; and

The privacy and security of digital communications is essential to the
preservation of a democratic society in our information age; and

CPSR has played a leading role in many efforts to promote privacy
protection for new communications technologies:

BE IT RESOLVED THAT

Computer Professionals for Social Responsibility supports the right of
all individuals to design, distribute, obtain and use encryption
technology and opposes any government attempt to interfere with the
exercise of that right; and

CPSR opposes the development of classified technical standards for the
National Information Infrastructure.






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: nobody@cicada.berkeley.edu
Date: Tue, 26 Oct 93 22:12:37 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: shut up, assmunch
Message-ID: <9310270503.AA15186@cicada.berkeley.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


don't make me slap you again, detwiler.





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: msattler@netcom.com (Michael Sattler)
Date: Tue, 26 Oct 93 22:52:36 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Shocked at my reaction
Message-ID: <9310270517.AA22598@netcom.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


The following has nothing to do with writing code, but hopefully posting
this will get me back on track....  I wrote this several weeks ago and have
been sitting on it ever since.

L. Detweiler's contributions of late have made me re-examine my feelings on
a variety of email- and cyberspace-related issues.

I very strongly believe that everyone has an inaliable right to express
themselves, as long as that expression doesn't harm others or impede their
ability to express *themselves*.

Up to now the amount of trash-mail (as I determine it) has been less than
ten percent of my mail, an amount I equate with the real-world equivalent
of billboards and junk-mail.  L. Detweiler's uncanny ability to craft
flame-bait and get the CypherPunks to respond has increased the trash-mail
percentage to the point where it's entered my awareness.

Torn between respect for someone who has a reputation for having made
contributions, worry about someone who seems to have a slim grasp on the
reality I'm experiencing, and annoyance at getting scores of ranting
incoherent messages, I've made a decision that I've never made before: to
put someone (L. Detweiler) into my kill-file.  This bothers me a great
deal.

But there it is.

----------------
To L. Detweiler:  I'm sorry, but your style, content, and quantity values
have gotten to the point where it seems unrewarding to deal with you.  The
decision to banish you bothers me a great deal, but not as much as reading
your mail does.  If you're sincere about the biblical amount of pain you
are in, I gently suggest (in my capacity as an EMT with some
crisis-intervention experience) that you talk about your pain to a
qualified person, perhaps an MFCC.  If you're doing all this to get a
reaction (for maybe a book) like Don Novello's Lazlo character of the last
three decades (and several books), then congratulations.


-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
Michael S. Sattler         msattler@netcom.com        +1 (415) 621-2903
Digital Jungle Software    Encrypt now; ask me how.   (finger for PGP key)

               All that is required for evil to triumph is
                for {wo}men of good will to do nothing.






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Jim McCoy <mccoy@ccwf.cc.utexas.edu>
Date: Tue, 26 Oct 93 20:42:37 PDT
To: pierre@shell.portal.com (Pierre Uszynski)
Subject: Re: DC-nets, up from the basic concept
In-Reply-To: <9310262234.AA05579@jobe.shell.portal.com>
Message-ID: <199310270336.AA03949@tramp.cc.utexas.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text



-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

pierre@shell.portal.com (Pierre Uszynski) writes:
[regarding DC nets...]
> 
> Q: How do you implement the idea that I can see my coin
> and the coin on the left, but no others?
> 
> A: You use public key cryptography. You join a "table"
> by contacting one of the persons already at the "table".
> He hands you address and public key of (say) his
> right neighbor, and you hand him your address and your
> public key.

Danger Will Robinson!

The only danger you really face in being revealed through a DC net is when
you are isolated by colluders on the graph.  I know who the people to my
left and right are.  If I am colluding with either one of them and you ask
to join the network I am on I will say "sure...you talk to person X" (my
colluder) and you are now completely screwed.

There are other options for network formation and joining, and I would
recommend against this one...


[regarding responsibility for messages and implication...]
> 
> It would be different (even with todays networks), if
> a large proportion of the messages were CLEARLY illegal.

Remember that on the net "legality" is often a _local_ thing.  With a DC
network consisting of participants from several different countries things
might get very interesting, because it would be imposible to determine who
a message came from and therefore who has jursidiction or even if any law
was broken...

jim

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From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: hfinney@shell.portal.com
Date: Tue, 26 Oct 93 22:42:36 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: True Names and nyms
Message-ID: <9310270537.AA00202@jobe.shell.portal.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

Some people have argued that there is no way to prevent the use of
multiple pseudonyms on the net, that it is possible today and that the
new crypto technologies will provide even easier techniques tomorrow.

This is an oversimplification, as Tim pointed out.  "Is-a-person" credentials
can be used to determine whether someone is a "True Name" or not,
which is really what Larry wanted to know.  Here is one way they might
work.

(To make this clearer, it is best to think in terms of the equation,
pseudonym == public key.  A pseudonym is a public key.  We think of
pseudonyms as being names, like "wonderer" or "sam hill", or perhaps
as email addresses, like "hacker@univ.edu".  But from the point of view
of cryptography, these are just frills.  The important thing is the key.
With a public key, a pseudonym can sign his messages, so that nobody
else can successfully pretend to be him.  He can read messages sent to
him, messages which no one else can read.  If he has to switch email
addresses he can do so and still maintain his identity by continuing
to use the same key.  It is his key which is his real identity on the
net.  OK, back to the is-a-person credential:)

An is-a-person credential could be structured identically to the digital
coins used in Chaum's simple digital cash proposal.  You would go to the
credentialling agency and provide some unique form of identification,
something that no one else could forge.  Today this might be a thumbprint,
or in the future it could perhaps be a DNA scan.  However, you do not have
to identify yourself by name.  They don't need to know who you are; they only
know that you are a living, breathing human being, one whom they have not
seen before.  (There could be more than one credentialling agency, but they
would all share a database of thumbprints or whatever.)

You choose a special public key which you will use for all of your True
Name activities on the net.  This public key will be used to sign messages
which you want to prove are from a real person.  Any message sent with
that signature is known to be from a True Name and not from a nym.  Only
one True Name exists per person.

Note that this True Name doesn't have to be your real name.  If you want
to always post under John Q. Public and use this special key for that
purposes, you can do so.  But you won't be able to post under any other
name, including your own, as a True Name, not unless you use that same
key.  And of course if you do, people will be able to know that you are
the same as John Q. Public since you are using the same signature key.

The way this is established is that you take your True Name key, which
we'll call TN, and do as was done for Chaum's cash: pass it through
a one-way function f, and blind with a random number r^3: f(TN)*r^3.
You give this to the credentiallying agency when you come in with your
thumbprint, and they sign it by taking the cube root.  This is
f(TN)^(1/3) * r.  Back home, you divide by r, getting f(TN)^(1/3).

This is your True Name certificate.  You can submit it to a public key
registry along with TN; anyone can calculate f(TN) and verify the
credentialling agency's signature.  People will therefore know that this
key is the only one belonging to some real person which is signed in
this way.  Only one such key can exist for each person.

So, if people claim to be posting under True Names, they can prove it
very easily, by using their True Name key, signed by a credentialling
agency.  People can still post under as many nyms as they want, but only
one gets to call itself True.

Note that this solution doesn't reveal very much about the person.
Because the certificates are blinded by r^3 when they are signed, even
the credentialling agency has no way of knowing which thumbprints are
associated with which True Name.  (So, actually, it wouldn't be a problem
if the agency got your name and address when you came in - this still
couldn't be linked with your postings if you didn't want it to be.)
Nobody is forced to even use a True Name when they post; they could use
nothing but nyms.  On the other hand, if people want to reserve certain
conferences for True Names only, they can.  There is tremendous flexibility
to have as much or as little use of nyms as people want.

So, people should not be so quick to claim that crypto can only be used
to increase anonymity.  It is a powerful technology that can be used to
increase our control over information in many ways.  Chaum's papers
continue to amaze me with what is possible.

Hal Finney
hfinney@shell.portal.com

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From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Duncan Frissell <frissell@panix.com>
Date: Tue, 26 Oct 93 19:42:39 PDT
To: CYPHERPUNKS@toad.com
Subject: Re: anti-social behavior
Message-ID: <199310270240.AA20351@panix.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


B >ASAR stands for "alt.sexual.abuse.recovery", a newsgroup I run an
B >anonymous server for. This group actually has survivors of all
B >sorts of abuse, including the verbal abuse that rjc perpetrated.

"Sticks and stones" etc.

--- WinQwk 2.0b#1165
     




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Duncan Frissell <frissell@panix.com>
Date: Tue, 26 Oct 93 19:42:47 PDT
To: CYPHERPUNKS@toad.com
Subject: : a desperate please
Message-ID: <199310270240.AA20354@panix.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


A >I can't come up with any good ones, except for "fun" and "just to see 
A >what it feels like to put out opinions not my own."  

Virago is a "feminist" publisher in the UK.  A few years ago, they brought 
out (to wide critical praise) a collection of short stories about 
immigrant life in the UK by a new Asian (means from the Indian 
subcontinent in the UK) woman.  They had never met her and were very 
embarrassed when "she" turned out to be a retired, male vicar.  Seems like 
a good idea to use a pseudonym in this case.  I guess that is the use you 
meant about "putting out opinions not my own."

Whenever I want to do that I just switch to lawyer mode.

Duncan Frissell


--- WinQwk 2.0b#1165                                                                




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: rjc@gnu.ai.mit.edu
Date: Tue, 26 Oct 93 20:17:49 PDT
To: lefty@apple.com (Lefty)
Subject: Re: a desperate plea
In-Reply-To: <9310261614.AA16510@internal.apple.com>
Message-ID: <9310270312.AA08185@kropotkin.gnu.ai.mit.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Lefty, resident net judge, rants:
> No, in point of fact, you're a poorly adjusted infant who finds it amusing
> to stand at a safe distance and clog up the net with threats which he
> surely would never dare to make face-to-face.

  Lefty, go stuff yourself. You have all the credibility of Blackwell.
The only time you ever post a message is to ad hominem someone else. You've
been doing this for 2+ years on the Extropians list -- lurking 99% of the
time and only posting when you have a snide comment.  (just look
at your last message against wondered)

  If you can't recognize the difference between a silly comment and a real
murder threat, it's time for you to have a medical check up. You nicely
illustrate my point anyway. I would never make a murder threat face-to-face
particulary because I have no intention of physically damaging anyone. It is
this fact alone which Detweiler, and you need to realize.

  Threats made over the net are vapor.

Buddha

-- Ray Cromwell        |    Engineering is the implementation of science;    --
-- EE/Math Student     |       politics is the implementation of faith.      --
-- rjc@gnu.ai.mit.edu  |                         - Zetetic Commentaries      --




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: nobody@rosebud.ee.uh.edu
Date: Tue, 26 Oct 93 21:27:48 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: why a nym?
Message-ID: <9310270426.AA09186@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Arthur Chandler asks why run a nym --

>    Isn't it tough enough to build up a rep under our real names? What is
> the point to using a pseudonym? I can think of some bad reasons; but I
> can't come up with any good ones, except for "fun" and "just to see what
> it feels like to put out opinions not my own."  I'm sure I'm missing the
> point; so, before you jump on me as a Clueless Newbie, can you run by
> the reasons why you want to have alternate personas on the NET?

I had a nice long message composed in response, explaining my own
circumstances, but on review, it's clear that I can't explain
without revealing personal information, threatening exposure.
Sorry.

But use your imagination.  There are plenty of uses, such as speaking
out and whistle blowing, and cypherpunks are interested in anonymous
digital economies, so running a nym is good for practice.  If you
listen to some cypherpunks, there are research questions, too.

Anonymous




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: J. Michael Diehl <mdiehl@triton.unm.edu>
Date: Tue, 26 Oct 93 23:02:37 PDT
To: rjc@gnu.ai.mit.edu
Subject: Re: a desperate plea
In-Reply-To: <9310270312.AA08185@kropotkin.gnu.ai.mit.edu>
Message-ID: <9310270558.AA16570@triton.unm.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Well, lets see how many Personal Attacks we can find in this post...

According to rjc@gnu.ai.mit.edu:
> 
> Lefty, go stuff yourself. 
> You have all the credibility of Blackwell.
> The only time you ever post a message is to ad hominem someone else. 
> You've been doing this for 2+ years on the Extropians list
> -- lurking 99% of the time and only posting when you have a snide comment.  

Well, that makes 5 out of 5 so far.  Lets see if we can find more!

(just look  at your last message against wondered)

Wow!  We are 5 for 6.  Not bad..... *NOT*

> If you can't recognize the difference between a silly comment and a real
> murder threat, it's time for you to have a medical check up. 

> You nicely illustrate my point anyway. 

Well, that's two more!

> I would never make a murder threat face-to-face
> particulary because I have no intention of physically damaging anyone. 

And of course I won't even touch this one!

> It is this fact alone which Detweiler, and you need to realize.
>   Threats made over the net are vapor.

And were these even valid comments?  You be the judge.
> 
> Buddha

Ya, right.

Final score: 7 out of the 11 sentences in this post were personal attacks.
This means that 63.6% everything you had to say wrt the orignal post was the
same kind of personal attacks you were complaining about..



J. Michael Diehl   ;^)  |*The 2nd Amendment is there in case the 
mdiehl@triton.unm.edu   | Government forgets about the 1st!  <RL>
Mike.Diehl@f29.n301.z1  |*God is a good Physicist, and an even 
    .fidonet.org        | better Mathematician.  <Me>
al945@cwns9.ins.cwru.edu|*I'm just looking for the opportunity to 
 (505) 299-2282 (voice) | be Politically Incorrect! <Me>
Can we impeach him yet? |*Protected by 18 USC 2511 and 18 USC 2703. 



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Perry E. Metzger" <pmetzger@lehman.com>
Date: Tue, 26 Oct 93 21:02:39 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: blacknet international offers DOSSIERS for SALE
In-Reply-To: <9310270231.AA02958@tamsun.tamu.edu>
Message-ID: <9310270358.AA21289@snark.lehman.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



remail@tamsun.tamu.edu says:
> blacknet international is pleased to offer the following materials for sale:
> DOSSIERS: on the current participants in the Cypherpunks Mailing
> List Flame war
> PRICES: Prices and delivery terms upon request via encrypted anonymous return
> address.
> SUBJECTS:
> Perry Metzger <pmetzger@lehman.com> 

Trust me, its worth it just for the nude photographys of me with an
ostrich. (How they got a camera into that vault, I'll never know.)

Perry




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: rjc@gnu.ai.mit.edu
Date: Tue, 26 Oct 93 21:02:48 PDT
To: bill@twwells.com (T. William Wells)
Subject: Re: anti-social behavior
In-Reply-To: <CFICE5.530@twwells.com>
Message-ID: <9310270359.AA08275@kropotkin.gnu.ai.mit.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


T. William Wells writes:
> 
> Over on ASAR, we give warning for anger. Consider yourself warned.
   Vapor. Or else?

> In article <9310260646.AA04776@kropotkin.gnu.ai.mit.edu>,
>  <rjc@gnu.ai.mit.edu> wrote:
> :   I'm coming to kill your family tommorow with a rusty razor.
> 
> I despise Detweiler. I also think he ought to be in a mental
> hospital. However, this is evil, anti-social behavior. It is
> abusive beyond any possibility of shrugging it off.

   In context it was obviously a joke, lighten up. I think LD/Sboxx
deserve what they get for coming onto a forum about cryptography
and accusing people of high treason, evil, poison, etc in an almost
religious fervor.

> No, I'll make it stronger. Either you apologize to me, to
> Detweiler, and to the list, or the list owner removes you from
> the list, or I go. I will not be associated with a group that
> tolerates this sort of behavior.

   I guess I will have to be kicked off the list then, or you will have
to unsubscribe because I have no intention of apologizing to you or Detweiler.
I don't apologize for the "evil, anti-social" joke I made either, but I
do apologize for wasting bandwidth on the list if that's any consolation.
I'm getting to the point where I can't keep put with the amount of mail
in my box anyway. The ball's in your court.

> (Does anyone want to know why I'm so incensed. Check out ASAR for
> awhile. Understand that this person's behavior, and excuse
> making, is indistinguishable from the abuse that makes that
> newsgroup necessary.)

  That's the funniest thing I've heard all week. Comparing a joke, "I'm gonna
kill your family with a rusty razor", made over the net, with rape? Even
it they were equivalent, I'm not about to walk on eggshells because some
people on the internet can't differentiate between a virtual joke and a
real life threat. Perhaps that's the biggest problem in the world today, just
last week a bunch of jocks repeated a scene from _The Program_ and laid
down in the middle of the high way. 

  If you want to prevent net.abuse, I suggest you take a look at alt.flame
or alt.tasteless and issue a couple thousand of your "warnings."

-- Ray Cromwell        |    Engineering is the implementation of science;    --
-- EE/Math Student     |       politics is the implementation of faith.      --
-- rjc@gnu.ai.mit.edu  |                         - Zetetic Commentaries      --




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: hugh@ecotone.toad.com (Hugh Daniel)
Date: Wed, 27 Oct 93 01:22:36 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: ADMIN: toad.com's mail hicups Tuesday morning...
Message-ID: <9310270814.AA20223@ ecotone.toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


  The list mailhost, toad.com, had massive problems today with
sendmail queues, resulting in load averages over 90 (on a machine
where 6 is high) and other unfun problems for me to chase.
  To my knowledge no mail was droped on the floor, but some mail did
come out of the machine with headders missing.  I have no idea what
the mail software thought it was doing by droping headers, but I think
we will live even so.
  I am looking at installing some newer software to deal with the
problems of today, though the root causes are solved for now, better
software (sendmail) is called for.
  On the other hand better software is ALLWAYS called for... Guess I
had better get back to doing that sort of work...

		||ugh Daniel
		Sysadmin of the month
		hugh@toad.com




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: 1@eternity.demon.co.uk (Russell Earl Whitaker)
Date: Tue, 26 Oct 93 18:52:46 PDT
To: xtropy-l@ubvm.bitnet
Subject: MEETING: UK Cryptoprivacy Association
Message-ID: <20804@eternity.demon.co.uk>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

UK Cryptoprivacy Association meeting

Date:  Sunday, 31 October 1993
Time:  1430

At the offices of:

   FOREST
   4th floor
   2 Grosvenor Gardens
   London   SW1W 0DH

[ FOREST is located at the corner of Grosvenor Gardens and Hobart
  Place, a couple of blocks west of Victoria Station. There is a 
  taxi shelter across the street from the office. Those who have 
  trouble finding this location can page Russell Whitaker on  
  081-812-2661, and stand by the payphone or cellphone for a callback. ]

The UK Cryptoprivacy Association has its roots in the U.S. cypherpunk 
advocacy of strong personal cryptography.  The next UKCA meeting, to be 
held at the offices of FOREST (see the above), will feature roundtable 
discussion on such issues as:

    - The recent well-publicised discovery of a larger number of U.S. 
        National Security Agency (NSA) electronic listening posts 
        than had been previously suspected;
    - Further news on the spread of freely-available public key 
        cryptography software in Eastern Europe, Russia, and the 
        Transcaucasian states;
    - The status of the various UK and Moscow PGP public key servers and 
        software archive sites, with input from a couple of maintainers 
        of these services in the UK;
    - The implications of the legal controversy surrounding the 
        development and distribution of PGP encryption software in the 
        U.S., with further discussion on the possibility of volunteer 
        contributions to Phil Zimmermann's legal defence fund;
    - Introduction to public key cryptography for novices

Attendees are encouraged to bring and exchange diskettes with their 
PGP public keys.  A few of us will bring along our MS-DOS laptops, to 
sign public keys on site.  In the interest of speeding things along, it is 
recommended that all keys signed at the meeting be submitted later, with 
their newly appended signatures, to the PGP Key Server at Demon 
Internet Services.  Send a message with the subject line "help" to 
pgp-public-keys@demon.co.uk, for more information.  PGP (Phil 
Zimmermann's "Pretty Good Privacy") public key encryption software can 
be obtained by ftp from, among other places, ftp.demon.co.uk in the 
directory /pub/pgp.  Versions include, but are not limited to, Unix, 
MS-DOS, Archimedes, and MacOS.  Full source code is available.

This meeting will also feature discussion on the upcoming First European 
Conference on Computers, Freedom and Privacy (ECFP '93) to be held on 
20 November 1993, which will feature speakers including John Gilmore, 
David Chaum, and Duncan Frissell, as well as a representative of the 
UK's Data Protection Registry.

Russell Earl Whitaker
ECFP Ventures Ltd

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Russell Earl Whitaker                   whitaker@eternity.demon.co.uk
Communications Editor                                 AMiX: RWhitaker
EXTROPY: The Journal of Transhumanist Thought
Board member, Extropy Institute (ExI)
    Co-organizer, 1st European Conference on Computers, Freedom and
    Privacy, London, 20 November 1993








From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: 1@eternity.demon.co.uk (Russell Earl Whitaker)
Date: Tue, 26 Oct 93 18:56:02 PDT
To: xtropy-l@ubvm.bitnet
Subject: CONFERENCE: European Computers, Freedom & Privacy (ECFP)
Message-ID: <20808@eternity.demon.co.uk>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


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ECFP '93:
The First European Conference on Computers, Freedom and Privacy

The New Cavendish Club
London, England

20th November 1993


Organised by ECFP Ventures Limited

Co-operating organisations :
  The Libertarian Alliance
  Privacy International, UK
  UK Cryptoprivacy Association


SCOPE
- ----------------------------------

The widespread use of computers and 
communication systems has brought considerable 
benefits to our business and personal lives and will 
continue to change and shape the way in which we 
live. However, with those benefits come unprecedented 
threats to our personal privacy and potential for abuse.

A variety of different models for protection of 
individual privacy in the electronic age have been 
suggested, ranging from state regulation to individual 
action through the use of strong cryptography. 
However, these solutions bring with them their own 
class of problems, including excessive state 
involvement in private matters and the frustration of 
law enforcement and national security objectives.

The First European Conference on Computers, 
Freedom and Privacy will both provide an introduction 
to these issues and the technological developments 
that drive them, and examine different ways in which 
individual rights can be guaranteed. These questions
are central to the preservation of a free society in the 
Information Age.

John M. Brimacombe
Conference Chair


KEYNOTE SPEAKER
- ----------------------------------

John Gilmore
Email: gnu@cygnus.com

JOHN GILMORE is Chairman of the Board of Cygnus
Support, who provide commercial support for free 
software. As founder and board member of the 
Electronic Frontier Foundation and the Cypherpunks, 
he has campaigned extensively for electronic privacy. 
John will speak on building a society in which 
personal privacy is guaranteed through the use of 
strong cryptography.



OTHER SPEAKERS
- ----------------------------------

John Brimacombe (Chairman)
Email: john@mantis.co.uk

JOHN BRIMACOMBE is the Managing Director of Jobstream Group
plc, developers of business software. A graduate in 
both law and computer science, he was an advisor to 
CFP '93 in San Francisco.  John will serve as conference
moderator.


Simon Davies
Email: davies@privint.demon.co.uk

SIMON DAVIES is Director General of Privacy International and
a member of the School of Law at the University of 
New South Wales.  He will be looking at new developments
in surveillance and ways of combating them.


Tom Burroughes
Email: tom@reptile.demon.co.uk (after 10 October 1993)

TOM BURROUGHES is Deputy Chief Reporter with the East Anglian Daily
Times in Ipswich, England. He will be giving a journalist's point
of view on privacy issues, including recent incidents involving
eavesdropping on cellular telephones, and the roles of various
corporate and government bodies in the recent adoption of
cellphone signal encryption standards in the UK.


David Chaum
Email: chaum@digicash.nl

DAVID CHAUM is head of the Cryptography Group at the Center for
Mathematics and Computer Science (CWI) in Amsterdam, and
founder of DigiCash, which develops electronic payments systems.
Dr. Chaum received his Ph.D. in computer science from the University of
California, Berkeley, in 1982, and joined CWI in 1984. He helped to
found the International Association for Cryptologic Research and
remains active on its board.  David also consults internationally on
cryptology.


Duncan Frissell
Email: frissell@panix.com

DUNCAN FRISSELL is an attorney, technical author and consultant
on matters of personal and financial privacy. Duncan will speak on
"Traditional Privacy in the Electronic Age".


Elaine Fletcher

ELAINE FLETCHER is Assistant Solicitor for Eric James Howe,
Data Protection Registrar (UK). Elaine will
speak on issues arising from the Data Protection 
regime established under the 1984 Data Protection Act.


Chris Tame

CHRIS TAME is the Director of the Libertarian Alliance
and Director of the smokers rights group FOREST, as well as UK
representative of the Libertarian International.  He
has written extensively for such academic journals as /Science
and Public Policy/, /Economic Affairs/, and /The Jewish Journal
of Sociology/, and such books as *The Case For Private
Enterprise* and *The Politics of Crime Control*. He appears
regularly on radio and television in the UK.  Chris will speak on the
libertarian views of data protection and privacy.


Russell Whitaker
Email: whitaker@eternity.demon.co.uk

RUSSELL WHITAKER, conference co-organiser, is a consultant
on electronic communications, a director of ECFP Ventures Ltd and
communications editor of Extropy magazine.  Russell will
speak on the composition of, and influences upon, the electronic
community in Britain today, and how public policy affects those
on computer bulletin boards and online services.



PROGRAMME
- ---------------------------------

Registration       9.30 - 10.00 am

First session     10.00 - 11.30 am
  BREAK           11.30 - 11.50 am

Second session    11.50 am - 1.20 pm
  BREAK            1.20 - 2.20 pm

Third session      2.20 - 3.50 pm
  BREAK            3.50 - 4.10 pm

Fourth session     4.10 - 5.40 pm

PANEL SESSION      5.40 - 6.20 pm
Closing remarks    6.20 - 6.30 pm


Lunchtime is the break after the second session, and lunch
itself is not included in the price of the conference.  There
are pubs and restaurants in the immediate vicinity.

Coffee, tea and biscuits will be on sale through the day, however.


Registration form:
- ---------------------------------

NAME                _____________________________________

JOB TITLE           _____________________________________

ORGANISATION/AFFILIATION        _________________________

              ___________________________________________


MAILING ADDRESS     _____________________________________

     ____________________________________________________

     ____________________________________________________

     ____________________________________________________


TELEPHONE     ___________________________________________

FAX           ___________________________________________

E-MAIL        ___________________________________________


IMPORTANT NOTE: only *fully* completed forms with full telephonic
details will be accepted, to be used in the event of any
emergency changes, such as change of venue.

This is not optional.


CLASS OF REGISTRATION :
[Prices are Pounds Sterling]

   Student                         10.00  ($16.00 U.S.)
   Normal                          17.50  ($28.00 U.S.)
     Normal before 1 Nov 93:       15.00  ($24.00 U.S.)
   Press                           (Contact for arrangements)

MEANS OF PAYMENT:

   - U.S. cheques/cash
   - U.K. cheques/cash
   - EuroCheques (tm)

Unfortunately, due to bank conversion charges, we are unable to
accept cheques drawn on other overseas accounts, for payment of
this year's attendance fees.


PROCEEDINGS AND AUDIO/VIDEOGRAPHY
- -------------------------------------------

You may pre-order copies of transcripts of the proceedings,
which will be shipped within 90 days after the conference:

    "Please send me ____ copies of the conference
     proceedings at 20 pounds each."

Video and audio recordings will be made of the conference, in
its entirety.  No pre-sales will be made; tapes go on sale in
December 93/January 94.


Cheques, made payable to "ECFP Ventures Limited",
should be sent with this form to :
   16 Circus Road
   MM Box 8593
   London  NW8 6PG
   England

Please direct any further enquiries to the above address, or:
   ecfp-1st@eternity.demon.co.uk  (Email)
   +44 81-812-2661  (Manned message service; quick response)


HOW TO FIND THE NEW CAVENDISH CLUB :
- ----------------------------------------------

The New Cavendish Club is 2 minutes walk from Marble Arch
Underground station.  Immediately turn right as you exit from
the station onto Oxford Street.  Then take the first turning on
the right, i.e. Great Cumberland Street.  The New Cavendish Club
is 3 blocks north on the northeast corner of the intersection
of Great Cumberland Street with Upper Berkeley Street.
 
Address:
  New Cavendish Club
  44 Great Cumberland Place
  London W1H 8BS


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Russell Earl Whitaker                   whitaker@eternity.demon.co.uk
Communications Editor                                 AMiX: RWhitaker
EXTROPY: The Journal of Transhumanist Thought
Board member, Extropy Institute (ExI)
    Co-organizer, 1st European Conference on Computers, Freedom and
    Privacy, London, 20 November 1993








From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: 1@eternity.demon.co.uk (Russell Earl Whitaker)
Date: Tue, 26 Oct 93 18:55:51 PDT
To: xtropy-l@ubvm.bitnet
Subject: CONFERENCE: The Security Services: Are They a Threat to Freedom?
Message-ID: <20812@eternity.demon.co.uk>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


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Libertarian Alliance

One Day Conference

THE SECURITY SERVICES: ARE THEY A THREAT TO FREEDOM?

Date: Sunday, 14 November, 1993

(PLEASE NOTE THAT THIS CONFERENCE IS ON A SUNDAY, 
 AND NOT A SATURDAY AS IS OUR NORMAL PRACTICE)

Admission: 5.00 pounds UK per person.   By ticket only.

Venue: The Jubilee Room 
       The New Cavendish Club 
       44 Great Cumberland Place 
            (entrance in Upper Berkeley Street)
            London  W1H 8BS 
       (Nearest tube: Marble Arch)

10.30am - 11.00am   Arrival - Tea and Coffee will be served
                    Introduction by Simon McIlwaine, 
                    Conference Chairman

11.00am - 12.00pm   Brian Crozier  
         "The Security Services and Their Role in A Free Society"

12.00 Noon - 12.30pm  Discussion

Brian Crozier is one of Britain's leading thinkers and writers 
on foreign policy and defence issues.   His books include 
Strategy of Survival, The Rebels, A Theory of Conflict, Neo-
Colonialism, The Future of Communist Power, The Minimal State 
and The Struggle for the Third World.  His autobiography, Free Agent, 
was published this year and extracts were serialised in The Times. 


12.30pm - 1.30 pm  Lunch Break


1.30pm - 2.30pm    Robin Ramsay  
        "Unsupervised and Uncontrolled: The Problem of Security 
         Services in a Free Society" 

2.30pm - 3.00pm    Discussion

Robin Ramsay is editor of Lobster, Britain's premier, and 
highly respected journal on  parapolitics, "conspiracy" and the 
"secret state".   He is co-author of Smear: Wilson and the Secret 
State and has contributed to a wide range of publications, 
including Tribune, Open Eye, and The Times Higher Education Supplement.


3.00pm - 3.15pm    Tea Break


3.15pm - 4.15pm    Larry O'Hara    
        "Searchlight Magazine: A Case Study in Secret 
         State Media Manipulation" 

4.15pm - 4.45pm  Discussion

Larry O'Hara is an independent researcher into fascism and 
the "secret state".  He is currently completing his Ph.d on 
"The National Front, 1986-1990" at Birckbeck College.   His articles 
include "Notes From the Underground: British Fascism 1974-1992" 
in Lobster and "British Fascism: The Persistence of Anti-Semitism" 
in Return.


4.45pm - 5.45pm   Brian Micklethwait 
        "What Should Libertarians Do About the Spies?"

5.45pm - 6.15pm  Discussion

Brian Micklethwait is Editorial Director of the Libertarian 
Alliance.   He appears regularly on British television and radio 
on behalf of the LA as well as speaking widely at universities and 
political meetings.   As well as his writing for the LA, he has 
contributed to such publications as Economic Affairs, Gay News 
and Ideer Om Frihet.

6.15pm  Close of Conference

- ---------------------------------------------------------------------
Please send me ... ticket(s) for the LA Conference 
          "The Security Services: Are They a Threat to Freedom?" 
           on Sunday, 14 November, at 5.00 pounds UK each.

I enclose a cheque/postal order/cash payable to the 
Libertarian Alliance, for ......

Name:    ....................................................

Address: .................................................

         .................................................

         ............................. 
         
Tel:     ..............
(Useful if we have to notify you of any last minute changes)
_____________________________________________________________________
Please Return by First Class Mail to: 
    
    Chris R. Tame 
    Director 
    Libertarian Alliance 
    25 Chapter Chambers 
    Esterbrooke Street 
    London  SW1P 4NN

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Russell Earl Whitaker                   whitaker@eternity.demon.co.uk
Communications Editor                                 AMiX: RWhitaker
EXTROPY: The Journal of Transhumanist Thought
Board member, Extropy Institute (ExI)
    Co-organizer, 1st European Conference on Computers, Freedom and
    Privacy, London, 20 November 1993








From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: rjc@gnu.ai.mit.edu
Date: Tue, 26 Oct 93 23:17:49 PDT
To: mdiehl@triton.unm.edu (J. Michael Diehl)
Subject: Re: a desperate plea
In-Reply-To: <9310270558.AA16570@triton.unm.edu>
Message-ID: <9310270614.AA08644@kropotkin.gnu.ai.mit.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


J. Michael Diehl writes:
> Final score: 7 out of the 11 sentences in this post were personal attacks.
> This means that 63.6% everything you had to say wrt the orignal post was the
> same kind of personal attacks you were complaining about..

  No, I wasn't complaining about his personal attacks per se but his long term 
behavior on this list and Extropians which is mainly "hit-and-run"
attack posts about once a month which usually generate massive flame wars.
(the last of which ended up with Tim May leaving the extropians list)

  Perhaps you don't like me, but I can atleast lay claim to have participated
in non-flamefest threads and contributed help and software when I was asked.
Many people have simply sent me private e-mail politely requesting that I stop
the Detweiler flame. All Lefty's message did was add fuel to the fire and
was just as unproductive as my original joke-threat against Lance. I
would like to end this thread and get back to rationally discussing
pseudonyms, but its not going to happen if I keep getting messages like
yours in my mailbox.


-- Ray Cromwell        |    Engineering is the implementation of science;    --
-- rjc@gnu.ai.mit.edu  |       politics is the implementation of faith.      --




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: cman@IO.COM (Douglas Barnes)
Date: Wed, 27 Oct 93 01:12:36 PDT
To: pmetzger@lehman.com
Subject: Re: blacknet international offers DOSSIERS for SALE
In-Reply-To: <9310270358.AA21289@snark.lehman.com>
Message-ID: <9310270808.AA21862@illuminati.IO.COM>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> 
> Trust me, its worth it just for the nude photographys of me with an
> ostrich. (How they got a camera into that vault, I'll never know.)
> 

Yeah? You're probably getting a cut. Heck, you could *be* blacknet :-).

-- 
----------------                                             /\ 
Douglas Barnes            cman@illuminati.io.com            /  \ 
Chief Wizard         (512) 448-8950 (d), 447-7866 (v)      / () \
Illuminati Online          metaverse.io.com 7777          /______\



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: kwaldman <kwaldman@BBN.COM>
Date: Wed, 27 Oct 93 04:22:39 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Net Requlation
Message-ID: <9310271119.AA16228@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


	Say the best way to go is to become a perpetual tourist. That is
you don't have US citzenship and thus are not subject to it's taxes and
other nosy laws. [Not that other government's don't have nosier laws]. 
Anyway

	1. If you don't have US citzenship, how do you get a passport? (Buy
it on sale from the Czech republic or what?)

	2.  Where do you live?  I mean I love to travel but after 3 or 4 weeks
of it I'm ready to settle down and hibernate for a long while. [Especially now
with a wife and 2 sons, I'd last about 2 days traveling :-)]  Somewhere
were I don't have to get thrown in jail for thinking the wrong thoughts. 
[Which given the nature of this list most of us do, except of course our
NSA monitors :-)]

	3.  Are the TELECOM connections there yet?  I saw this weeks
Economist and it looks promising but last time I was in Europe some of  
my phone connections were less than perfect. [Even parts of the US leave 
something to be desired].  I personally need a good phone line 
(especially if I'm hundreds of miles from my customer), and a minimum of 
56kbaud link for my computer. 

	4.  Customer interaction.  This is a problem, if you work on computer
systems that are unique or program custom software for these systems,
customer interaction is very important ( and in other areas I'm sure).  
Yes email, video conferencing (expensive!) help but you either need to
be  there or have very good VR (which I have yet to see, this doesn't
mean much  as I haven't seen bad VR yet either).


	The one plus is that I believe there is still time (5-10) years
before the costs outweigh the benifits of living in the US and thus
there is time to plan things like what country to live in, which bank
to use in the channel isles and let technological advance solve some
of the bandwidth problems.

		Karl Waldman

BTW The above shouldn't imply I disagree with Ducan's premise.  In fact I
have enjoyed his posts and agree with most of what he says, so I guess I should
shut up and buy some DUCAN (or whatever) on HEX.

P.S. Ducan please post your talk after you get back from London.  I will
transfer 1000 thornes  to your HEX account (if you have one)




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: lefty@apple.com (Lefty)
Date: Wed, 27 Oct 93 09:07:53 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: a desperate plea
Message-ID: <9310271600.AA01920@internal.apple.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>  No, I wasn't complaining about his personal attacks per se but his long term 
>behavior on this list and Extropians which is mainly "hit-and-run"
>attack posts about once a month which usually generate massive flame wars.
>(the last of which ended up with Tim May leaving the extropians list)

Let me make sure I understand this: are you claiming that _I_ caused Tim to
leave the Extropians list?


--
Lefty (lefty@apple.com)
C:.M:.C:., D:.O:.D:.






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Ian Turton <ian@geography.leeds.ac.uk>
Date: Wed, 27 Oct 93 02:27:52 PDT
To: Arthur Chandler <arthurc@crl.crl.com>
Subject: No Subject
Message-ID: <23551.9310270926@geography.leeds.ac.uk>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Authur Chandler writes:
> 
>    Isn't it tough enough to build up a rep under our real names? What is 
> the point to using a pseudonym? I can think of some bad reasons; but I 
> can't come up with any good ones, except for "fun" and "just to see what 
> it feels like to put out opinions not my own."  I'm sure I'm missing the 
> point; so, before you jump on me as a Clueless Newbie, can you run by 
> the reasons why you want to have alternate personas on the NET?

Well the one case that comes to mind for me is a friend I knew at a
previous university where I worked. There was a member of the support staff
who was responsible for introducing the net/email to new users (amongst
other things). He had two personas one for dealing with official things and
the other obvoiusly an alias (FoFP) for ranting about the government etc.
However new users still regualarly reported this alias to Mike (in his
official role) for bringing the university in to disrepute. I'm fairly sure
he owned up to them at this point :-).  However I'd contend that it was
important for him to distinguish official posts from unofficial posts more
strongly than just by sticking a disclaimer on the end of unoficial
messages - since who really reads them anyway.


> 
Ian Turton - School of Geography, Leeds University
	     0532 -333309




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Perry E. Metzger" <pmetzger@lehman.com>
Date: Wed, 27 Oct 93 06:42:39 PDT
To: cman@io.com (Douglas Barnes)
Subject: Re: blacknet international offers DOSSIERS for SALE
In-Reply-To: <9310270808.AA21862@illuminati.IO.COM>
Message-ID: <9310271342.AA26353@snark.lehman.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Douglas Barnes says:
> Yeah? You're probably getting a cut. Heck, you could *be* blacknet

Shh.... you'll give it away...

.pm




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Perry E. Metzger" <pmetzger@lehman.com>
Date: Wed, 27 Oct 93 07:07:55 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: anti-social behavior
In-Reply-To: <CFK01t.68F@twwells.com>
Message-ID: <9310271403.AA26452@snark.lehman.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



T. William Wells says:
>  <rjc@gnu.ai.mit.edu> wrote:
> :    In context it was obviously a joke, lighten up.
> 
> You are lying. You wrote that for the explicit purpose of causing
> pain. Your *obvious* intent was to say something upsetting and
> angering. So don't give me any of this nonsense about a joke. You
> are nothing but an insensitive, immature bully and you do not
> deserve to be among this group.

So he intended to cause pain? Big deal. I'm beginning to believe the
book "I'm Disfunctional, You're Disfunctional": it concludes that
people involved in the recovery movement are generally doing the
opposite.

I'm the sort of guy who gets flamed constantly. I've been called the
worst possible things. Hasn't hurt me or crippled me. Calling people
names is stupid, but individuals who can't take being called names are
emotional cripples.

Perry





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Pat Farrell" <pfarrell@netcom.com>
Date: Wed, 27 Oct 93 07:10:47 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: help writing code
Message-ID: <36383.pfarrell@netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I've spent the summer working on a SMTP/POP client that runs under
MS-Windows.  There are two ideas behind it. First, widespread acceptance of
global communication will require that mass market user don't have to learn
vi/emacs/... and Second, once the email composing and reading is done on a
local, controlled PC, we can trivially pipe messages in and out of PGP,
RIPEM, or your favorite encryption algorithm. This second part will allow
folks to send all their mail encrypted, which will not only spread the
word, but hurt traffic analysis.

But, I need help. I've got all the front-end stuff working, and can handle
the SMTP/POP protocols. But I can't get Windows to talk reliably with a
raw async link. (I don't want to require SLIP or PPP, as lots of sites
are too clueless to offer it.)

I need a robust communications library. It has to do as well as possible
given an inherantly inreliable link. I've bought three commercial sibraries,
and none work.

Cypherpunks write code. I've been trying. If someone wants to help,
please reply, and we can work out detailed specs of the API I have in mind.

Pat

Pat Farrell      Grad Student                 pfarrell@netcom.com
Department of Computer Science    George Mason University, Fairfax, VA
Public key availble via finger          #include <standard.disclaimer>




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Perry E. Metzger" <pmetzger@lehman.com>
Date: Wed, 27 Oct 93 07:12:40 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: anti-social behavior
In-Reply-To: <CFK2JK.6rG@twwells.com>
Message-ID: <9310271409.AA26463@snark.lehman.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



T. William Wells says:
> The old saw about sticks and stones is absolutely false and
> typically is used (I'm not presuming this of you) as a cover for
> behavior that is intended to cause harm.

So the person intends harm? Words cannot cause physical damage. They
can always be ignored.

> The vast majority of abusive behavior, defined in terms of the harm
> it causes its victims, is done with words, not by direct physical
> action.

Bill has spent too much time in the recovery movement, and has dealt
with people who are nearly completely deranged so long that he no
longer understands what is expected of normal people.

> Without getting into a long discussion, the thing is that
> emotional responses are not chosen, they are automatic. One can
> no more avoid responding with emotional pain, which is just as
> real as physical pain, to a hurtful word, than one can avoid
> responding with physical pain to a punch in the face.

Thats false. Everyone has the capacity to decide whether or not to pay
attention to words. Force, on the other hand, provokes a physical
reaction (such as bleeding, or perhaps dropping dead) that you can't
help.

Read Thomas Szasz's (sp?) "The Myth of Mental Illness" for a critique
of modern excuses like "he couldn't help it". Also read "I'm
disfunctional, you're disfunctional" to learn about the sort of cult
the recovery movement has turned into.

Perry




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: mpjohnso@nyx.cs.du.edu (Michael Johnson)
Date: Wed, 27 Oct 93 09:12:54 PDT
To: pfarrell@netcom.com
Subject: Re: help writing code
In-Reply-To: <36383.pfarrell@netcom.com>
Message-ID: <9310271610.AA23350@nyx.cs.du.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


...
> the SMTP/POP protocols. But I can't get Windows to talk reliably with a
> raw async link. (I don't want to require SLIP or PPP, as lots of sites
> are too clueless to offer it.)
> 
> I need a robust communications library. It has to do as well as possible
> given an inherantly inreliable link. I've bought three commercial sibraries,
> and none work.
...
The only way to communicate reliably over the serial port in Windows is 
to upgrade the UART in your serial port to a 16550AFN or equivalent. The 
standard UART (16450 in AT class machines) has no buffer and suffers from 
frequent dropouts due to data overwrite on receive. If you can't do that, 
then an error correcting protocol such as SLIP or PPP is required.

                                   Mike Johnson
                                   mpj@csn.org




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Timothy Newsham <newsham@wiliki.eng.hawaii.edu>
Date: Wed, 27 Oct 93 13:22:57 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Privacy/pseudonyms/etc..
Message-ID: <9310272020.AA24628@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Hi,
  I have been on this list lately.  I have seen all sorts of diversions
from "normal" cypherpunk discussion.  None has been as big as this 
discussion on psuedonyms and "pseudospoofing".  I always thought that
this list was made up of people who already believed that privacy was
a good thing and that it should be persued by writing cryptographic
software that enforced that privacy.  There are newsgroups for debating
various features of privacy,  I think one of them is called alt.privacy
or something equally obvious.  I know the discussions are pretinent to
the code that we write but I dont believe they belong on this list.  If
I wanted to discuss the ups and downs of giving everybody privacy I would
read the appropriate lists.

                                   Tim N.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Karl Lui Barrus <klbarrus@owlnet.rice.edu>
Date: Wed, 27 Oct 93 08:17:53 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: ANON: why pseudonyms
In-Reply-To: <Pine.3.87.9310261117.A18829-0100000@crl.crl.com>
Message-ID: <9310271516.AA16178@elf.owlnet.rice.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Arthur Chandler wrote:

>   Isn't it tough enough to build up a rep under our real names? What is 
>the point to using a pseudonym? I can think of some bad reasons; but I 
>can't come up with any good ones, except for "fun" and "just to see what 
>it feels like to put out opinions not my own."  I'm sure I'm missing the 
>point; so, before you jump on me as a Clueless Newbie, can you run by 
>the reasons why you want to have alternate personas on the NET?

It's not a dumb questions, and it comes up from time to time.  In
fact, this was the subject of a lengthy war on news.admin.policy a
while ago.

You could use a pseudonym anytime you don't want to be linked to an
opinion.  Maybe you don't want to be known as the author of a post to
alt.sex about whether you shower with your spouse; maybe you feel less
embarrassed asking questions like Wonderer; perhaps you want to engage
in a serious debate over touchy political issues; etc.  In these
examples, you would be putting out opinions that are your own - you
just want the freedom of speaking without fearing retribution or
ridicule.

After all, you may irritate someone who decides to cause you harm.
This won't ever happen, you say?  Maybe, but here's an example: Salmon
Rushdie, author of the "Satanic Verses" is still living in fear of his
life.

You can whistle-blow.  Some months ago a local paper ran a series of
articles on people who had the careers and lives destroyed by the
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, because they reported various unsafe
practices and violations at their workplace.

Small examples of anonymity are in our life already: most radio shows
don't broadcast your last name, papers will withhold names from
editorial pieces sent them, police departments take anonymous tips.
The protection a pseudonym affords is more powerful.

-- 
Karl L. Barrus: klbarrus@owlnet.rice.edu         
keyID: 5AD633 hash: D1 59 9D 48 72 E9 19 D5  3D F3 93 7E 81 B5 CC 32 

"One man's mnemonic is another man's cryptography" 
  - my compilers prof discussing file naming in public directories



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: jamie@netcom.com (Jamie Dinkelacker)
Date: Wed, 27 Oct 93 11:02:40 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: My Views on the Detweiler Matter
Message-ID: <9310271717.AA00817@netcom.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Cypheroids and Cypherettes,

The eventual recognition that names are symbol strings and not their
referents is akin to the realization that the map not being the terrrtory.
Yep, sometimes we just keep learning the same old lesson.

The Detweiler/Boxx rants have the flavor of a reformed alcoholic
distrupting the champagne toast at a wedding, selfishly driven by their
world view and utterly unaware of the social dynamics around them. But
aside from the rantings, pleas for TrueNameUtopia in CypherSociety, and
threats, I sense something else. Take your pick of remark -- "thou doth
protesteth too much," or "where there's smoke there's fire," or ... . Seems
to me that the essential raison d'etre of L.Detweiler and S.Boxx (and even
sometimes The SternLight himself) is purposive to distract c'punks from
"writing code" or essays or having fun. This is basic motivated deception
used in sports, business and the military ... get the opponent to do
something else ...

Here's one interpretation: if c'punks weren't pushing the envelope in
creating both tools and understanding for things like cryptography,
anonymous remailers and digital cash, nor pushing the social bounds through
BlackNet, Nyms, Sam Hill, and May's CryptoAnarchy, the Detweiler nonsense
wouldn't have emerged. A nerve has been struck; and this seems, in the big
picture, to be A Good Thing.

I've no doubt that to the true statists, fascists and communists, we are
their vision of hell. On the other side of this, they will no longer be the
only ones to hide behind anomynity, pull their secret strings, and
pronounce agents of change as Evil Incarnate. 

We stand at the threshold of a new world, in large part to be enabled by
cryptography. As "The Net" expands, dark fiber becomes illuminated, online
markets flourish and the like, cryptography will be key for economic
survival, and it will be in the hands (or machines) of The People, not The
State.

If such great progress wasn't being made toward providing for personal
privacy, the L.Detweiler-Boxxs of the Net would be ranting about something
else. So each rant underscores how significant the progress in cryptography
is becoming; and it will become more so.  In a nutshell, three cheers for
c'punks. 
--
................................
Jamie Dinkelacker   Palo Alto CA 
Jamie@netcom.com    415.941.4782    





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Karl Lui Barrus <klbarrus@owlnet.rice.edu>
Date: Wed, 27 Oct 93 08:57:54 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: CASH: crosspost
Message-ID: <9310271553.AA18040@elf.owlnet.rice.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


At risk of irritating some folks who already saw this, a crosspost:

> Medvinsky, Gennady and B. Clifford Neuman. "NetCash: A Design
> for Practical Electronic Currency on the Internet" Proceedings
> of the First ACM Conference on Computer Communications Security
> (November 1993) [available via anonymous FTP,
> <URL=ftp://prospero.isi.edu/pub/papers/security/netcash-cccs93.ps.Z>].
> Addressing the pressing problem of how to conduct fiduciary
> business on the Internet, Medvinsky and Neuman describe a
> system that allows clients, merchants, and currency servers to
> interact in a secure fashion over an insecure medium.  The
> framework presented here addresses, to varying degrees, the
> following issues: security, anonymity, scalability,
> acceptability, off-line operation, transferability, and
> hardware independence.  The authors readily admit that this
> scheme does not solve all of these problems perfectly, but it
> does allow for the integration of other protocols when utmost
> anonymity and offline capabilities are required. - DR





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: dmandl@lehman.com (David Mandl)
Date: Wed, 27 Oct 93 08:52:41 PDT
To: jrk@sys.uea.ac.uk
Subject: Re: Security of PGP private keys
Message-ID: <9310271518.AA03375@disvnm2.lehman.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> From: jrk@sys.uea.ac.uk (Richard Kennaway)
> 
> PGP secret keys are protected by a password.  Yet people have said that one
> should not keep one's secret keyring on an insecure machine.  Why?
> 
> --                                  ____
> Richard Kennaway                  __\_ /    School of Information Systems
> Internet:  jrk@sys.uea.ac.uk      \  X/     University of East Anglia
> uucp:  ...mcsun!ukc!uea-sys!jrk    \/       Norwich NR4 7TJ, U.K.


1. Why take chances?  Once the evil intruder has the file, she can throw
test passwords at it from now till doomsday and might be able to crack it.

2. On shared machines, there are ways for users with the appropriate access
to read your keystrokes (like, for example, when you type in your pass phrase).
Anyone with that access should also be able to grab your secring.pgp with no
problem, and that's that.

   --Dave.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: bill@twwells.com (T. William Wells)
Date: Wed, 27 Oct 93 06:02:41 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: anti-social behavior
In-Reply-To: <9310270359.AA08275@kropotkin.gnu.ai.mit.edu>
Message-ID: <CFK01t.68F@twwells.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Sigh. This is totally off topic. Or is it? Cyberspace is going to
*have* to deal with those entities that are biologically of the
human race but who are mentally of less value than a laboratory
rat.....so, folks, are we going to deal with this or are we going
to just have a nice slanging match with no valuable outcome?

In article <9310270359.AA08275@kropotkin.gnu.ai.mit.edu>,
 <rjc@gnu.ai.mit.edu> wrote:
:    In context it was obviously a joke, lighten up.

You are lying. You wrote that for the explicit purpose of causing
pain. Your *obvious* intent was to say something upsetting and
angering. So don't give me any of this nonsense about a joke. You
are nothing but an insensitive, immature bully and you do not
deserve to be among this group.





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Perry E. Metzger" <pmetzger@lehman.com>
Date: Wed, 27 Oct 93 08:47:54 PDT
To: jrk@sys.uea.ac.uk (Richard Kennaway)
Subject: Re: Security of PGP private keys
In-Reply-To: <15013.9310271454@s5.sys.uea.ac.uk>
Message-ID: <9310271542.AA26513@snark.lehman.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Richard Kennaway says:
> PGP secret keys are protected by a password.  Yet people have said that one
> should not keep one's secret keyring on an insecure machine.  Why?

Because people can capture your keystrokes when you enter in the
password. They then have your secret key.

Perry




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: cman@IO.COM (Douglas Barnes)
Date: Wed, 27 Oct 93 09:52:41 PDT
To: kwaldman@BBN.COM (kwaldman)
Subject: Re: Net Requlation
In-Reply-To: <9310271119.AA16228@toad.com>
Message-ID: <9310271643.AA25580@illuminati.IO.COM>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



> 
> 	Say the best way to go is to become a perpetual tourist. That is
> you don't have US citzenship and thus are not subject to it's taxes and
> other nosy laws. [Not that other government's don't have nosier laws]. 
> Anyway
> 
> 	1. If you don't have US citzenship, how do you get a passport? (Buy
> it on sale from the Czech republic or what?)

This is unnecessary. Hang on to that US Passport! You may want a backup
for some countries (a Canadian one is a good compliment and doesn't stretch
linguistic plausibility; just say 'eh' a lot at the end of sentences. 
They're real good in a number of sticky situations where one might wish to 
put their US passport in a blender.)

The US tax laws are quite lenient both legally and in terms of enforcement
vis-a-vis US citizens living abroad. Consult a tax specialist or attorney
for specific advice, but while living in Taiwan I knew *very* few Americans
who felt they needed to file.

> 
> 	2.  Where do you live?  I mean I love to travel but after 3 or 4 weeks
> of it I'm ready to settle down and hibernate for a long while. [Especially now
> with a wife and 2 sons, I'd last about 2 days traveling :-)]  Somewhere
> were I don't have to get thrown in jail for thinking the wrong thoughts. 
> [Which given the nature of this list most of us do, except of course our
> NSA monitors :-)]

The Permanent Tourist idea isn't that you keep moving around, but that you 
settle down in a foreign country without becoming a permanent resident there
(and subject to THEIR tax laws). You perform work that is paid for outside
of that country, and have the funds remitted into your host country. For
all intents and purposes you are a tourist drawing funds from abroad. 

Note that since you are, in fact, earning the money (despite your tourist
visa) in your host country, you may be violating both immigration and
tax laws in that country, but it's unlikely they'll do or say anything;
note, however, I was deported from Taiwan because I made the mistake of
working physically in a law firm there (not very common but I was turned
in by an angry ex-girlfriend).

Also note that it could well be within the scope of US legislation to 
remove existing protection for funds apparently earned from within the
US, particularly if they are received from US entities. This is currently
beyond the pale of cost-benefit for the IRS, because even 'hundreds of 
thousands' of difficult-to-enforce hard cases aren't worth the trouble.
Yet.

> 
> 	3.  Are the TELECOM connections there yet?  I saw this weeks
> Economist and it looks promising but last time I was in Europe some of  
> my phone connections were less than perfect. [Even parts of the US leave 
> something to be desired].  I personally need a good phone line 
> (especially if I'm hundreds of miles from my customer), and a minimum of 
> 56kbaud link for my computer. 

It depends. In Europe, I've heard moderately good things about EUnet. Even
in rapidly industrializing Asia, good luck getting a phone in a reasonable
period of time. In Taiwan it took three months, cost about $800 for the setup
and the connection was poor. One of my clients was the Siemen's subsidiary
there, the government was rapidly moving to digital switches purchased from
them.

As far as the net goes, good luck. In a great number of otherwise moderately
pleasant countries for the PT, the telecom situation is horrendous (but
often rapidly improving.) In Australia for instance, I hear tell that it 
is profoundly difficult in most places to get a non-government net connection. 
Just got a tip for one in Brisbane, but the situation remains pretty grim. 
In the rapidly industrializing Asian countries, if you can't lay a little 
guanxi or maybe a hong bao on the right folks, bag it. (Relationship or a 
bribe). I'm curious what the situation is in Japan these days, Mr. Woodhead?

> 
> 	4.  Customer interaction.  This is a problem, if you work on computer
> systems that are unique or program custom software for these systems,
> customer interaction is very important ( and in other areas I'm sure).  
> Yes email, video conferencing (expensive!) help but you either need to
> be  there or have very good VR (which I have yet to see, this doesn't
> mean much  as I haven't seen bad VR yet either).

While working with various trading companies in Asia, I learned the joy
of sleeplessnes, working to shift my schedule to match my target customers
(for a while, mostly in South America). And this was just to sell a
highly desirable *product* requiring no technical support other than a
call to the neighborhood 14-year-old (Nintendo knock-offs, if you must
know.)

Also, while working on the AIX 3.1, I recall one series of days when I 
was coordinating closely with a programmer in Japan; after despairing of
the phone tag, I just mapped my schedule to his so we could interact as
necessary.

> 
> 
> 	The one plus is that I believe there is still time (5-10) years
> before the costs outweigh the benifits of living in the US and thus
> there is time to plan things like what country to live in, which bank
> to use in the channel isles and let technological advance solve some
> of the bandwidth problems.
> 
> 		Karl Waldman
> 
> BTW The above shouldn't imply I disagree with Ducan's premise.  In fact I

Again, as a former attempted PT myself, I don't disagree with the overall
desirability of Duncan's proposal, I just doubt it's going to take the
government by storm.

As I side note, I was talking to a friend of mine who just got a PhD from
the same linguistics program I was involved with (UT), and he's having
a rough time looking for work -- America and Americans, in general, are 
looking inward more than ever, and linguistics departments are shutting
down all over the country. I think this bodes poorly for a mass-action PT
movement.

> have enjoyed his posts and agree with most of what he says, so I guess I should
> shut up and buy some DUCAN (or whatever) on HEX.
> 
> P.S. Ducan please post your talk after you get back from London.  I will
> transfer 1000 thornes  to your HEX account (if you have one)
> 

I'm curious what the heck you're talking about here. This is probably some
Extropians thing, right?

-- 
----------------                                             /\ 
Douglas Barnes            cman@illuminati.io.com            /  \ 
Chief Wizard         (512) 448-8950 (d), 447-7866 (v)      / () \
Illuminati Online          metaverse.io.com 7777          /______\



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Panzer Boy <panzer@drown.slip.andrew.cmu.edu>
Date: Wed, 27 Oct 93 09:17:01 PDT
To: Cypherpunk Mailing List <cypherpunks@toad.com>
Subject: Re: the Joy of Pseudospoofing Satan
In-Reply-To: <9310260239.AA07044@dink.foretune.co.jp>
Message-ID: <Pine.3.05.1.9310271228.A4394-b100000@drown.slip.andrew.cmu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

On Tue, 26 Oct 1993, Robert J. Woodhead wrote:
[Stuff I, panzer@drown.slip.andrew.cmu.edu, wrote about actor also being her
own Agent]
> Yes, she was being deceptive.  No, she was not being maliciously
> deceptive, as her "agentself" was merely doing the same thing that
> a seperate agent would have done, being an advocate for the actor.
> 
> The difference is that the third party _expects_ the agent to praise
> the actor.  In L Detweilers example, the pseudo-spoofer was using
> the _lack_ of expectation to his/her advantage.

Disclaimer:  I have aprox 100 Cypherpunk messages to read following this one.

My point was that the women still pretended to be someone else, and had a
completely different personality for this Agent.  She did it to be
deceptive.  All of L Detweiler's post have stated that he doesn't like
people's abilities to pretend to be someone else.  My point was that
people do this all the time.  Even to the extent that people act
differently around others.  When you talk on cypherpunks do you have the
same "Personality" as when you talk to others who don't own computers?

 -Matt                              | Please get my public key if you wish
 (panzer@drown.slip.andrew.cmu.edu) | to verify that this message is mine.

 "That which can never be enforced should not be prohibited."




-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.3a

iQCVAgUBLM5lxeaKxB8nktcBAQGbswQAhwHeJ7GZVDpTLkbMn8xcBhSw9SmhrwyY
Iy82QIWE8rrBgTBFoLuRcPMEQYZaIwQhWDmV3yHySLYuTwnVwmAhA7Svhue8x8mX
EkqsEN5AAd+Wbi8M8WnG6MWEqe12jFerKoXIHzdEx8Xd4A+jRoRQ8ieFq1EM/5cy
7zARfJXHz+w=
=hBJI
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Pat Farrell" <pfarrell@netcom.com>
Date: Wed, 27 Oct 93 09:12:41 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Help writing code
Message-ID: <43914.pfarrell@netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Let me quickly try to clear up some confusion. I've gotten several replies
(real quick response) that are answering a different question.

I'm not trying to reimplement TCP/IP. I'm trying to provide a Windows
version of NUpop, which is a DOS program that works fine over a
simple serial line. Most folks automatically associate SMTP/POP with
TCP/IP, but there is no connection. Admittedly they work better with
a robust, end to end protocol. But I've been using NUpop for a year
over a non-TCP/IP line. I get hundreds of messages a day. It works.
But there are no sources available to NUpop, it is a DOS program,
and it doesn't support piping messages thru PGP/RIPEM/...


I have lots of DOS libraries that do exactly the simple things I need. I
don't want to use DOS, I want native Windows code.

Pat

Pat Farrell      Grad Student                 pfarrell@netcom.com
Department of Computer Science    George Mason University, Fairfax, VA
Public key availble via finger          #include <standard.disclaimer>




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: bill@twwells.com (T. William Wells)
Date: Wed, 27 Oct 93 06:22:38 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: anti-social behavior
In-Reply-To: <199310270240.AA20351@panix.com>
Message-ID: <CFK2JK.6rG@twwells.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


In article <199310270240.AA20351@panix.com>,
Duncan Frissell <frissell@panix.com> wrote:
: B >ASAR stands for "alt.sexual.abuse.recovery", a newsgroup I run an
: B >anonymous server for. This group actually has survivors of all
: B >sorts of abuse, including the verbal abuse that rjc perpetrated.
:
: "Sticks and stones" etc.

The old saw about sticks and stones is absolutely false and
typically is used (I'm not presuming this of you) as a cover for
behavior that is intended to cause harm. The vast majority of
abusive behavior, defined in terms of the harm it causes its
victims, is done with words, not by direct physical action.

Without getting into a long discussion, the thing is that
emotional responses are not chosen, they are automatic. One can
no more avoid responding with emotional pain, which is just as
real as physical pain, to a hurtful word, than one can avoid
responding with physical pain to a punch in the face.

True, what will cause pain to one person will not necessarily
cause pain to another. Also true, between adults there is no
absolute requirement to avoid causing one another pain.

Nonetheless, respect for one another implies that one avoids
doing so whenever one can, within limits. The other side of this
is that one should have a good reason to cause another pain, even
the emotional pain caused by words.

Rjc's sin is not failure of respect, though he has certainly has
shown that, but the intentional causing of harm to another. He
has claimed that "it was only a joke". "It was only a joke",
except in rare and limited circumstances (which this is not one
of), translates directly to "I knew it was going to hurt and
that's why I did it".

He might claim otherwise. But such a claim would only have been
taken seriously if it had been accompanied by evidence that he
was aware of what he did. If he'd said "It was only a joke and
I'm sorry that I didn't consider that it would hurt Detweiler",
that would have been one thing. But he said "It was only a joke
therefore it was OK". That was only a disclaimer of responsibility
and a bald assertion that he would do the same again.





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Pat Farrell" <pfarrell@netcom.com>
Date: Wed, 27 Oct 93 09:37:54 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: help writing code
Message-ID: <45331.pfarrell@netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


In message Wed, 27 Oct 1993 10:10:04 -0600 (MDT),
  mpjohnso@nyx.cs.du.edu (Michael Johnson)  writes:

> The only way to communicate reliably over the serial port in Windows is
> to upgrade the UART in your serial port to a 16550AFN or equivalent. The
> standard UART (16450 in AT class machines) has no buffer and suffers from
> frequent dropouts due to data overwrite on receive. If you can't do that,
> then an error correcting protocol such as SLIP or PPP is required.

A 16550 is clearly a big help, but Microsoft admits that their
comm.drv fails often when you are using speeds greater than 4800. I have
16550's in my PC. A step in the right direction is TurboComm, a replacement
driver, but that is expensive. A hardware solution is to use an intellegent
serial card, like Hayes ESP or Telcor's T/Port. An O/S solution is to use a
real operating system, :-)  I want a no cost, MS-Windows solution.

But I think folks read too much into my use of "robust"
NUpop works fine as a DOS program without end-to-end.
I simply want that functionality in a Windows program. No more, no less.

I'm aiming low end, the mass market with a 386sx and a 2400 modem. Folks
like me with a network of PCs in their house and even cypherpunks are not
my market. The English majors, history and art majors are the folks I
envision when I see a "user"

Pat

Pat Farrell      Grad Student                 pfarrell@netcom.com
Department of Computer Science    George Mason University, Fairfax, VA
Public key availble via finger          #include <standard.disclaimer>




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: kwaldman <kwaldman@BBN.COM>
Date: Wed, 27 Oct 93 09:47:54 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Net Regs.
Message-ID: <9310271646.AA21161@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


		In response to my reply to Duncan's *"Net Regulation"
Perry wrote:


>To: kwaldman <kwaldman@BBN.COM>   
>Subject: Re: Net Requlation     
>Date: Wed, 27 Oct 1993 09:53:47 -0400    
>From: "Perry E. Metzger" <pmetzger@lehman.com>


>You do realize that cypherpunks is not extropians...

>kwaldman says: 
>> 	Say the best way to go is to become a perpetual tourist. That is 
>> you don't have US citzenship and thus are not subject to it's taxes and
>> other nosy laws. [Not that other government's don't have nosier laws]. 
>> Anyway


	Yes I realize it, and perhaps Perry's right we should move this
to extropians.


		Karl

* BTW I spelled Duncan's name wrong twice in 1 paragraph in my last
post. Sorry.

	




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: jc138696@longs.lance.colostate.edu
Date: Wed, 27 Oct 93 11:47:56 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: subscribe
Message-ID: <9310271844.AA08760@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


How do I subscribe?

thank you.





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: owen@autodesk.com (D. Owen Rowley)
Date: Wed, 27 Oct 93 13:37:57 PDT
To: tcmay@netcom.netcom.com
Subject: Re: My Views on the Detweiler Matter
Message-ID: <9310271952.AA04862@lux.YP.acad>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



>From: tcmay@netcom.netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
>
>It's sad.

I told you so.

By the way, my analysis of this turn of events is that this is 
a huge guerilla ontology experiment, that was spurred on by my original
postings regarding the issue of psychopathic personalitys, and the 
parameters of pathological aspects of privacy.

Good job guys.


:-)

LUX ./. owen
( A legend in his own mind)






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: bill@twwells.com (T. William Wells)
Date: Wed, 27 Oct 93 07:02:39 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: My Views on the Detweiler Matter
In-Reply-To: <9310261923.AA29868@netcom.netcom.com>
Message-ID: <CFK3u8.70q@twwells.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


In article <9310261923.AA29868@netcom.netcom.com>,
Timothy C. May <tcmay@netcom.com> wrote:
: got fed up with his obvious lack of social skills and his descent into
: paranoid schizophrenia. He is, as a former girlfriend would diagnose his
: condition, a "borderline personality."

There's always a danger in diagnosing when one isn't an expert
(especially when the experts tend to confuse *themselves*) but I
think of myself as a well informed layman and, as such am going to
comment on this.

Detweiler is not likely schizophrenic anything. That's a rather
different thing than he's appeared. Nor is he a borderline
personality, which is also a specific diagnosis. On the evidence
he is a paranoid personality or paranoid psychotic.

The reason I'm writing is to point out two things: paranoids are
rarely cured, only controlled, and they can be physically
dangerous. It is entirely possible that he means those death
threats.





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Lazlo Nibble <lazlo@triton.unm.edu>
Date: Wed, 27 Oct 93 11:59:22 PDT
To: gtoal@an-teallach.com
Subject: Re: blacknet international offers DOSSIERS for SALE
In-Reply-To: <3776@an-teallach.com>
Message-ID: <9310271854.AA27425@triton.unm.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> What's not so funny is that the moderator of comp.dcom.telecom appears to
> have taken the BlackNet joke idea for his very own, and *is* selling
> dossiers on people for the purposes of doing nasty things to them...

While I'm sure he enjoys the extra income, Townson's made it clear that a
large part of his motivation in setting up the Digital Detective thing is
to shove it in peoples' faces just how easy it is to get that kind of
information.

Surely this old news.

--
Lazlo (lazlo@unm.edu)



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Harry Shapiro <habs@panix.com>
Date: Wed, 27 Oct 93 10:32:40 PDT
To: pmetzger@lehman.com
Subject: Re: anti-social behavior
In-Reply-To: <9310271403.AA26452@snark.lehman.com>
Message-ID: <199310271731.AA16748@panix.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


a conscious being, Perry E. Metzger wrote:
> 
> 
> T. William Wells says:
> >  <rjc@gnu.ai.mit.edu> wrote:
> > :    In context it was obviously a joke, lighten up.
> > 
> > You are lying. You wrote that for the explicit purpose of causing
> > pain. Your *obvious* intent was to say something upsetting and

> So he intended to cause pain? Big deal. I'm beginning to believe the
> book "I'm Disfunctional, You're Disfunctional": it concludes that
> people involved in the recovery movement are generally doing the
> opposite.
> 
> I'm the sort of guy who gets flamed constantly. I've been called the
> worst possible things. Hasn't hurt me or crippled me. Calling people
> names is stupid, but individuals who can't take being called names are
> emotional cripples.

Perry is very right here, imho. If Ray was your wife or a co-worker,
or in someway had a formal relationship with you it might be an
issue. 1) I think it was a joke, but 2) Even if it wasn't you are
letting him push your "buttons." 


-- 
Harry S. Hawk  				      habs@extropy.org
Electronic Communications Officer, Extropy Institute Inc. 
    	    The Extropians Mailing List, Since 1991
EXTROPY -- A measure of intelligence, information, energy, vitality,
experience, diversity, opportunity, and growth.  EXTROPIANISM -- The
philosophy that seeks to increase extropy.          



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Christopher Kotze <kotze1@batis.bis.und.ac.za>
Date: Wed, 27 Oct 93 05:07:54 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: RSA encryption
Message-ID: <9310271207.AA17133@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text


Does anyone know anything about RSA encryption, if so, please tell me about
it !
 
cheers,
chris



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Duncan Frissell <frissell@panix.com>
Date: Wed, 27 Oct 93 11:17:55 PDT
To: CYPHERPUNKS@toad.com
Subject: Re: Net Regs.
Message-ID: <199310271815.AA27525@panix.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


K >	Yes I realize it, and perhaps Perry's right we should move this
K >to extropians.

No one has complained to *me* yet.  I thought this a cpherpunks issue 
because it deals with the *Physical* Layer which is just as important a 
part of the ISO reference model as any other.  We have to deal with 
questions of the interface between some of our technology and the world.

Duncan Frissell


Free Reference Model mnemonic.  Read from the bottom up:

Anarchists
Communists or
Socialists            <--- I know they've renamed this but that's the way
Trust                      I first saw it.
Never
Departments
Police

Applications
Communications
System
Transport
Network
Data Link
Physical

--- WinQwk 2.0b#1165
                                                        




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: hugh@ecotone.toad.com (Hugh Daniel)
Date: Wed, 27 Oct 93 14:42:40 PDT
To: an41418@anon.penet.fi
Subject: My key
In-Reply-To: <9310271725.AA18537@anon.penet.fi>
Message-ID: <9310272135.AA24409@ ecotone.toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


  I think you miss the point of Public Key Crypto.  The idea is that
you CAN publish your public key, to one and all.  Then when you sign a
post with your private  key (and do work hard to keep that key
private!), then anyone can verify that _you_ (in the guies of your
public/private key pair) wrote the message. No one else can sign a
message such that _your_ public key will decrypt the sig in a valid
way, unless you have let your private key leek out.
  This is the whole wonderful idea that make Public Key crypto so
wonderful.  
  You are createing a strong and valued Psudonym, and signing your
messages will only make it stronger!  Then there is no way to really
spoof a message from 'Wonderer', as you will be ('Wonderer'*KEY) and a
solid nym-citizen.
  Make sence?

		||ugh Daniel
		hugh@toad.com




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: jrk@sys.uea.ac.uk (Richard Kennaway)
Date: Wed, 27 Oct 93 07:52:41 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Security of PGP private keys
Message-ID: <15013.9310271454@s5.sys.uea.ac.uk>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


PGP secret keys are protected by a password.  Yet people have said that one
should not keep one's secret keyring on an insecure machine.  Why?

--                                  ____
Richard Kennaway                  __\_ /    School of Information Systems
Internet:  jrk@sys.uea.ac.uk      \  X/     University of East Anglia
uucp:  ...mcsun!ukc!uea-sys!jrk    \/       Norwich NR4 7TJ, U.K.






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: J. Michael Diehl <mdiehl@triton.unm.edu>
Date: Wed, 27 Oct 93 14:32:41 PDT
To: frissell@panix.com (Duncan Frissell)
Subject: Re: Net Regs.
In-Reply-To: <199310271815.AA27525@panix.com>
Message-ID: <9310272124.AA07553@triton.unm.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


According to Duncan Frissell:
> 
> K >	Yes I realize it, and perhaps Perry's right we should move this
> K >to extropians.

Well, I'm just beginning to get interested in this thread.  Please keep it here
at least for a while.  Thanx.


J. Michael Diehl   ;^)  |*The 2nd Amendment is there in case the 
mdiehl@triton.unm.edu   | Government forgets about the 1st!  <RL>
Mike.Diehl@f29.n301.z1  |*God is a good Physicist, and an even 
    .fidonet.org        | better Mathematician.  <Me>
al945@cwns9.ins.cwru.edu|*I'm just looking for the opportunity to 
 (505) 299-2282 (voice) | be Politically Incorrect! <Me>
Can we impeach him yet? |*Protected by 18 USC 2511 and 18 USC 2703. 



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: jdblair@nextsrv.cas.muohio.EDU
Date: Wed, 27 Oct 93 12:17:56 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: my sad observations...
Message-ID: <9310271936.AA04768@ nextsrv.cas.muohio.EDU >
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I have followed the cypherpunk list for about 9 months now, and I have learned
A LOT directly from it.  I have rarely posted, just read the material as it
appeared, learning from what I was able to without getting lost in equations.

There is always a certain amount of noise to useful signal from any information
source, although over the past month the signal to noise ratio on Cypherpunks
has become almost intolerable.  I now read few of the messages, just sifting
out what I hope will be useful to me from the subject headings.  If any of
you are able to read ALL of the posts, and keep up the rest of your work, I
commend you.

Perhaps the current state is a symptom of growing popularity.  Since it has
always appeared to me that the point of the list was to disseminate information
on cryptography, and provide a discussion point for those interested in
spreading the use of cryptography, growing popularity would seem to be a
signal of success.

However, I miss the state of the list last April, when every time I checked it
I felt like I learned something new about cryptography.  Perhaps those with
little to say, that seem to be posting just to cause trouble or to be heard,
would better serve the group if they faded out for a while now, and just
watched until they were ready to say something useful.

I do not wish to flame anyone in particular, or to start a flame war, just
point out (probably for the nth time) what is a growing problem.

If any new listeners are interested, I have an archive of the postings which
I found interesting, or seemed like they would be useful.  I do not pretend
that it is the definitive cypherpunk archive, especially since there is a 2.5
month gap for the summer when I was living out of my pack in the Sangre De
Christo Mtns.  If you want a copy, e-mail me.  Please put "archive request"
in the subject header.  

For intro. information, the Cryptography FAQ, posted on sci.crypt
was very helpful for me.

This posting has now gotten too large, and is perhaps guilty of the problem I
am addressing.  For this, I apoligize.

code on, -john.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
John Blair                      |Fertilize your garden with dirt, compost,
jdblair@nextsrv.cas.muohio.edu  |old magazines, Apple II logic boards, obsolete
PGP Key available upon request  |software, forgotten video images, rusty cans,
                                |canceled stamps, love, hate, and desire.
                                |Wait untill spring, and see what comes up.



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Duncan Frissell <frissell@panix.com>
Date: Wed, 27 Oct 93 13:22:41 PDT
To: CYPHERPUNKS@toad.com
Subject: Re: Net Regs.
In-Reply-To: <199310271815.AA27525@panix.com>
Message-ID: <Pine.3.05.9310271547.A12159-9100000@panix.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


	
On Wed, 27 Oct 1993, Duncan Frissell wrote:

> Applications
> Communications
> System               <---- Or is that the Session layer?  Oh well no 
> Transport                  mnemonic is better than the brain that uses it.
> Network
> Data Link
> Physical
> 

DCF






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Brad Huntting <huntting@glarp.com>
Date: Wed, 27 Oct 93 16:02:42 PDT
To: jrk@sys.uea.ac.uk (Richard Kennaway)
Subject: Re: Security of PGP private keys
In-Reply-To: <15013.9310271454@s5.sys.uea.ac.uk>
Message-ID: <199310272223.AA02694@misc.glarp.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



> PGP secret keys are protected by a password.  Yet people have said that one
> should not keep one's secret keyring on an insecure machine.  Why?

Passwords are often guessable.


brad




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Duncan Frissell <frissell@panix.com>
Date: Wed, 27 Oct 93 13:32:57 PDT
To: CYPHERPUNKS@toad.com
Subject: Re: Net Requlation
Message-ID: <199310272030.AA17905@panix.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


K >1. If you don't have US citizenship, how do you get a passport? (Buy
K >it on sale from the Czech republic or what?)

Actually, the Dominican Republic is better.  You don't really need to 
change citizenship unless you are from a country that restricts foreign 
travel by citizens.  Picking up a *second* passport is always a good idea, 
however, and the US has recently changed its regs to permit its nationals 
to seek naturalisation in other countries without renouncing US 
citizenship.

K >2.  Where do you live?  I mean I love to travel but after 3 or 4 
K >weeks of it I'm ready to settle down and hibernate for a long while. 
K >[Especially now with a wife and 2 sons, I'd last about 2 days traveling
K > :-)] Somewhere

As someone pointed out, you need not travel much just be in a country 
where you are not a citizen.

K >3.  Are the TELECOM connections there yet?

Slowly but surely.  Switzerland is good these days.  Expense is the main 
problem.  If the Anglo-Saxon conspiracy wins the battle of network 
non-design (as it seems sure to do) everyone in the OECD will soon have 
cheap telcoms.

K >4.  Customer interaction.  This is a problem, if you work on computer
K >systems that are unique or program custom software for these systems,
K >customer interaction is very important

If you have the customer in the first place, you can make visits without 
too much problem.  Marketing is more difficult.  Slow-scan video for 
everyone over the nets is close.

Things to keep in mind...

I don't expect that very many people will use cryptography, anonymous 
remailers, DC nets, etc to become PTs or virtual expatriates but these 
tools will have a marginal (meaning "edge" not "small") effect on the 
process of institutional transformation.  The nets themselves are the 
critical device for weakening national controls.  They will sweep aside 
labor regulations, financial regulations and a host of restraints that 
keep people poorer than they need be.

Oops!  Sorry about that.  Too much time spent on alt.politics.economics... 
  

Duncan Frissell


--- WinQwk 2.0b#1165
                                                                                   




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Perry E. Metzger" <pmetzger@lehman.com>
Date: Wed, 27 Oct 93 13:32:40 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Electronic fraud/and creditors abay.
In-Reply-To: <26024.9310271951@csmail.brookes.ac.uk>
Message-ID: <9310272032.AA26860@snark.lehman.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



It appears another perversion has been released in the high beyond.
Remain calm.


carugo o says:
> Yes
> Firstly hallo fellow punks.
>  
>  
> Yes you tell me about electronic fraud and Iw ould like to know are there any
> of you out there how are good at keeping creditors at bay, eg phone companies
> etc.   Trump can you hear me?
>  
> Bye
>  
> Mephisto
> e0004353@brookes.uk.ac




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Sameer <sameer@uclink.berkeley.edu>
Date: Wed, 27 Oct 93 16:58:03 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Detweiler and his digital signature
Message-ID: <m0osKcF-000J4wC@infinity.hip.berkeley.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


	Has anyone seen L. Detweiler post a *SIGNED* message, using a
*TRUSTED* public key, on this psuedospoofing matter?

	While I don't know L. Detweiler, I feel that there's reason to
believe that L. Detweiler might be undergoing an attack of a
spoofer/account-breakin who wants to discredit him.

	I can't see how someone who wrote an anonymity/privacy FAQ (I
haven't read that FAQ, so I can't say whether its a *good* FAQ or not)
could turn so irrational and paranoid. It's possible, but until it's
proven to me, with a trusted key, that *L. Detweiler* has been saying
these things, I'm going to assume that he hasn't, and ignore further
posts by an unsigned L. Detweiler.



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: an41418@anon.penet.fi (wonderer)
Date: Wed, 27 Oct 93 10:27:55 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: My key
Message-ID: <9310271725.AA18537@anon.penet.fi>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


As Hal Finney suggests, a pseudonym is a key. Others have
also inquired about my key, so I made one. However,
posting it to the group makes no sense because if this
message were a forgery, then someone could pose as
me. Strange, the idea of someone posing as someone
else's pseudonym.

Anyway, send me e-mail if you want my public key, and I'll
send it to you. 

Wonderer

P.S. Silly pgp question: When I type pgp -sa file -u wonderer
I produce an entire pgp message. How do I make a shorter
signature that is a hash of my message?
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
To find out more about the anon service, send mail to help@anon.penet.fi.
Due to the double-blind, any mail replies to this message will be anonymized,
and an anonymous id will be allocated automatically. You have been warned.
Please report any problems, inappropriate use etc. to admin@anon.penet.fi.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Andy Wilson <ajw@Think.COM>
Date: Wed, 27 Oct 93 14:38:01 PDT
To: arthurc@crl.crl.com
Subject: : a desperate please
In-Reply-To: <Pine.3.87.9310261117.A18829-0100000@crl.crl.com>
Message-ID: <9310272133.AA08185@custard.think.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


   Date: Tue, 26 Oct 1993 14:46:56 -0700 (PDT)
   From: Arthur Chandler <arthurc@crl.crl.com>

   [...]

      Isn't it tough enough to build up a rep under our real names? What is 
   the point to using a pseudonym? I can think of some bad reasons; but I 
   can't come up with any good ones, except for "fun" and "just to see what 
   it feels like to put out opinions not my own."  I'm sure I'm missing the 
   point; so, before you jump on me as a Clueless Newbie, can you run by 
   the reasons why you want to have alternate personas on the NET?

Here's an example:  you're a rock star,  but your rock star identity is
a pseudonymous one,  so you can function as a normal person in your true
name identity.  When you are a celebrity your life becomes limited because
of people's reactions.  There will certainly be cyberspatial equivalents
of celebrities.

Another scenario:  if you develop some notoriety in a certain field,  it
may affect how your work in another field is received.  Say, for example
you are a dominatrix and a composer of church music,  and you love to do
both.  So you have separate identities for each.

It could also be instructive to have a cyberspatial pseudonymous identity
that is of a different gender, race, species, etc.

Andy




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: bill@twwells.com (T. William Wells)
Date: Wed, 27 Oct 93 12:12:41 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: I'm leaving cypherpunks
Message-ID: <CFKGsz.A77@twwells.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


A few things before I go. If you have any replies you want me to
see, you'll have to send them via private mail, since I no longer
get the list. This includes replies to my recent set of posts.

I was asked how to participate in the sexual abuse newsgroup.
That newsgroup is a standard Usenet-style newsgroup in the
altnet. You may not have it at your server because it has the
dreaded s-- infix. Explaining to your admin that the group is not
a porno group might get the group. If you want the group but, for
one reason or another don't care to ask your admin, you can write
me and I'll ask (without mentioning your name).

Alternately, I can send it to you via e-mail; it's fairly high
volume, though, running perhaps 50-60 messages a day. You can
post through one of the anonymous servers. Send to
anon-help@twwells.com for info on how to use mine.

Some of you may wonder why I'm leaving cypherpunks. Rjc seems
like a minor provocation, in comparison to Detweiler and some of
the lesser lights here. That's true and rjc is not why I'm
leaving.

I'm a firm believer in the right to privacy. And to the right to
possess and appropriately use the tools needed to secure it. That
much, I support the cypherpunks goal. However, I also believe
that this Brave New World of ours can go in more than one way. It
may become a dystopia in which people like rjc, and their more
powerful brethren, set the terms and tone, or it may approach a
utopia that enables its participants to make the most of what
they have.

We here at the beginning will make that choice. We'll do it *by*
*our* *actions*. Either we will choose to form a true _society_ of
privacy or we will permit cyberspace to descend into a war of all
against all. *We* choose.

We choose with each of our actions. Is this action based on a
fundamental respect for others or is it based on a desire for
self-aggrandizement? Does it further the end of healthy, human
interaction or is it destructive in nature and intent?

But as important as these individual contributions are, more
important is the attitude that is taken towards them. Are acts
such as rjc's considered acceptable behavior, to be tolerated
with all other sorts of behavior, or are they to be censured and,
where appropriate, censored?

In an uncontrolled environment, there is little that can be done
to further an appropriate attitude. One can reinforce the good
and censure the bad. And hope.

In a controlled environment, such as cypherpunks, those who
control the list have the final say. The excess of noise on this
can be *directly* traced to the list owner's choice to not
control its content. Rjc's ability to abuse another *and to
continue the abuse* is a direct consequence of the owner's
policies. These facts are, by themselves, offensive but would be,
barely, tolerable.

However, their consequences are not. Their consequences are a
furthering of the ends of people like rjc, a society in which
might makes right, and in which the potentials of others are
stifled by the hostility of those who prefer to rule rather than
grow.

And this I cannot support. Nor do I care to be associated with a
group that, intentionally or not, supports this. *This* is why
I'm leaving cypherpunks.

Privacy is a *social* phenomenon, not a technical one. There is
no sense in creating tools for privacy unless one also works for
a society in which the deployment of these tools makes sense.

One final thing before I go. I could set up a list on my machine
(not on the Internet but I connect fairly frequently because of
my server) with policies that address these issues, with the side
effect of dramatically improving the signal-to-noise ratio. If
this is of potential interest to you, let me know. If there is
sufficient interest I'll draw up a formal policy. If enough
people then say they'll sign up, I'll create the list.





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Alexander Reynolds <chrome@jhunix.hcf.jhu.edu>
Date: Wed, 27 Oct 93 14:52:40 PDT
To: cypher <cypherpunks@toad.com>
Subject: Goodbye
Message-ID: <Pine.3.05.9310271749.C474-a100000@jhunix.hcf.jhu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



	I'm outta here.  One last note, I learned a bit of crypt from this
forum, and to those who posted crypt stuff: thanks a lot. 
	Naturally I'm not so appreciative of the flames.  Some people on this
forum could use a maturity change from diapers to underwear, seriously. 
What is the attitude problem here?  The members of this forum should look
at the elitism which spews out only all too frequently.  It could place the
general ideal of anonymous crypt out of business with all the pointless
bickering.

	Rjc: you wanted to debate, and called me a coward if I didn't.  I
am still waiting...
	Perry: dude, I'm speechless.

	Ok, see you all.  Thanks for everything.

	Alex Reynolds

   





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: gtoal@an-teallach.com (Graham Toal)
Date: Wed, 27 Oct 93 10:02:41 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: blacknet international offers DOSSIERS for SALE
Message-ID: <3776@an-teallach.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


In article <9310270231.AA02958@tamsun.tamu.edu> remail@tamsun.tamu.edu writes:
 > blacknet international is pleased to offer the following materials for sale:
 > 
 > DOSSIERS: on the current participants in the Cypherpunks Mailing List Flame war
 > 
 > PRICES: Prices and delivery terms upon request via encrypted anonymous return
 > address.
 > 
 > SUBJECTS:
 > Perry Metzger <pmetzger@lehman.com> 
 > Duncan Frissell <frissell@panix.com>   
 > S. Boxx <an12070@anon.penet.fi>  
 > L. Detweiler<ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu> 
 > Timothy C. May <tcmay@netcom.com>  
 > Ray Cromwell  <rjc@gnu.ai.mit.edu>  
 > David Sternlight        <strnlght@netcom.com>
 > 
 > These are available now via PGP encrypted return anonymous mail.

Yes yes, very droll.  What's not so funny is that the moderator
of comp.dcom.telecom appears to have taken the BlackNet joke idea
for his very own, and *is* selling dossiers on people for the purposes
of doing nasty things to them (as he says himself in a footnote some
way down this post)

Of course, I'd like to discuss this in comp.dcom.telecom, but I'm
persona non grata there nowadays...




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "W. Kinney" <kinney@ucsu.Colorado.EDU>
Date: Wed, 27 Oct 93 18:22:41 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: I'm leaving cypherpunks
Message-ID: <199310280013.AA29113@ucsu.Colorado.EDU>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----


I know I'm just a silly lurker, but I couldn't help but comment on this
one...

T. William Wells writes:

> Privacy is a *social* phenomenon, not a technical one. There is
> no sense in creating tools for privacy unless one also works for
> a society in which the deployment of these tools makes sense.

I don't agree with everything that Bill said, but this here really hits
the mark. And the place where the social agenda of the cypherpunks is
most truly reflected is in how people interact with each other on the list.

I find it incredibly ironic that Bill Wells, not too long ago, got
roundly pasted by Detweiler over his practice of keeping track of True
Names on ASAR, and wrote convincinly in defense of his policies to the
'punks.

I dropped him some e-mail at the time to tell him that there were actually
quite a few level heads around here, and that it seemed to me that the
'punks and ASAR were natural allies. Here is this guy running an anon
service on the net that actually means something vital to a lot of people
who don't have much in their lives that they feel they CAN count on, and
running it well. Here's a place where all this lovely talk could be
put to use where it counts. 

I don't have the expertise to do the kind of things this guy needs, but I've
been reading ASAR frequently of late -- all of you should be too, and
thinking about what anonymity is doing for the people who post there.

He got absolutely zip out of his association with the cypherpunks. And
we all passed up a terrific opportunity to be of real use to the world. Or
hasn't that occurred to anyone but me? 

Good job, folks. And Bill, sorry to see you go.


                                -- Will





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From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Martin Janzen <janzen@idacom.hp.com>
Date: Wed, 27 Oct 93 17:18:02 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: help/subscribe
In-Reply-To: <9310262207.AA05658@banff.procase.com>
Message-ID: <9310280017.AA06037@loki.idacom.hp.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Paul Baclace writes:
>>It seems I perpetrated a vile and offensive error in sending a subscribe
>>request directly to the list.
>
>I don't get offended, I just save the subscribe/unsubscribe message
>in a special folder that I will use to train a learning algorithm
>to recognize these kinds of requests. [...]
>If anyone has suggestions for implementation that maximizes applicability
>(e.g., I could write a C program that reads stdin or a named file and 
>returns a status code), please let me know.

Since you mention stdin, I assume you're running UNIX.  In that case, it's
very easy to do this using awk; no C programming required.

To try this out, create a small awk program called subscribe.awk, which
contains one regular expression per "flavor" of subscribe request.  The
command in braces is executed if a match for that regexp is found:

  /[Pp]lease subscribe me/ {exit 1}
  /[Aa]d me to the/        {exit 1}
  /How .* subscribe/       {exit 1}
  [etc.]

Create or capture a suitable example message.  To test it:

  % awk -f subscribe.awk subscribe_message; echo $status
  1
  % awk -f subscribe.awk other_message; echo $status
  0

Or, you can use awk as a filter:

  % cat subscribe_message | awk -f subscribe.awk ; echo $status
  1
  % cat other_message | awk -f subscribe.awk ; echo $status
  0

Now, just wrap it in a shell script which responds with an appropriate
message (you can of course have subscribe.awk return a different exit
code depending on which regular expression is matched), and call the
shell script from your $HOME/.forward file, mail filter, or whatever.

-- 
Martin Janzen           janzen@idacom.hp.com




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Dark <unicorn@access.digex.net>
Date: Wed, 27 Oct 93 15:22:40 PDT
To: kwaldman@BBN.COM
Subject: Re: Net Requlation
Message-ID: <199310272219.AA09423@access.digex.net>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


->  kwaldman@bbn.con says:

        Say the best way to go is to become a perpetual tourist. That is
you don't have US citzenship and thus are not subject to it's taxes and
other nosy laws. [Not that other government's don't have nosier laws].
Anyway
 
        1. If you don't have US citzenship, how do you get a passport? (Buy
it on sale from the Czech republic or what?)

Passports from many nations are available for real basic requirements.
By your use of the language "Perpetual Traveler" I assume you're talking
about the SCOPE international (i.e. Dr. W. G. Hill) materials.

The concept is this:  States like Liechtenstein (My home country) Thailand,
Lebaon, Luxembourg, Italy (the list goes on) are fairly easy to obtain
passports from.  Many countries issue "passports" that are seperate from
actual citizenship.  If you thus hold several passports, and maintain
residence for (say 6 months) a period of time, you are a perpetual
traveller, and not subject to taxation, military service, prosecution, death
....  All the usual.  Snake oil, it cures what ails ya.

The problem is that is doesn't quite work this way.  What ole DOC Hill is
saying isn't exactally unture, but it is misleading.

->  kwaldman@bbn.com :

        1. If you don't have US citzenship, how do you get a passport? (Buy
it on sale from the Czech republic or what?)

<-

Well, in many countries, Liechtenstein a prime example, a sizeable investment
employing a certain amount of citizens is enough to "buy" you a passport.
Other channels (less up front) exist.  A sizeable account in (the prince's
bank) can get you a passport as well.

-> kwaldman :

        2.  Where do you live?  I mean I love to travel but after 3 or 4 weeks
of it I'm ready to settle down and hibernate for a long while. [Especially now
with a wife and 2 sons, I'd last about 2 days traveling :-)]  Somewhere
were I don't have to get thrown in jail for thinking the wrong thoughts.
[Which given the nature of this list most of us do, except of course our
NSA monitors :-)]

<-

The concept is that you maintain several residences and spend time in each.
Expense is obviously a problem.

-> kwaldmaan :

        3.  Are the TELECOM connections there yet?  I saw this weeks
Economist and it looks promising but last time I was in Europe some of
my phone connections were less than perfect. [Even parts of the US leave
something to be desired].  I personally need a good phone line
(especially if I'm hundreds of miles from my customer), and a minimum of
56kbaud link for my computer.

<-

This is a case by case basis.  Germany is pretty good, but on the whole
things are worse than the U.S.

->  kwaldman :

        4.  Customer interaction.  This is a problem, if you work on computer
systems that are unique or program custom software for these systems,
customer interaction is very important ( and in other areas I'm sure).
Yes email, video conferencing (expensive!) help but you either need to
be  there or have very good VR (which I have yet to see, this doesn't
mean much  as I haven't seen bad VR yet either).

<-

Expense is going to be the key problem in general in any kind of tax exile
situation.  You're going to need to have the kind of business that can\
be run from anywhere without much need for local.  This is difficult in
Europe in general, but obviously it depends on your exact location and the
nature of your business.  Some might argue that the proximity of nations
makes for less travel expense in general and nullfies the cost of video
conferencing etc.... Again, specifics and your mileage may vary.

-> kwaldman :
        The one plus is that I believe there is still time (5-10) years
before the costs outweigh the benifits of living in the US and thus
there is time to plan things like what country to live in, which bank
to use in the channel isles and let technological advance solve some
of the bandwidth problems.
 
                Karl Waldman
<-

I tend to agree with your assesment here.  If the current trend to centralized
power continues, I'm going to head home myself.  It's much nicer to be a
powerholder in a partially socialized nation than a power seeker.

The biggest problem is much as you put it.  The international data concerns
are much greater in Europe, and it is expensive to estlablish an alternative
residence and citizenship.

General comments:

When you refer to not having U.S. citizenship, and being a perpetual tourist,
are you refering to not holding ANY citizenship? or just one other than U.S.?

There is a distinct difference between being stateless and a perpetual tourist.
You might consider that the U.S. has a fairly low taxation rate compared to
other nations, especially the European nations that provide extensive social
programs.

Many nations will not allow you to dissove your nationality without consent.
See Generally, Convention on Certain Questions Relating to Conflict of 
Nationality Laws (1930).  See Also, Esphahanian v. Bank Tejarat, AWD
31-157-2 (1983), 77 AJIL 646 (1983).

Some nationalities are not often recognized when they are percieved to be
for tax purposes (Liechtenstein has had this problem with the U.S. for years)

Cypherpunk hitch:  When indeed crypto is regulated, and if privacy degrades
to the point in the U.S. where it's not worth staying here anymore, where
will you go and how?  Personally I love the fact that I hold two passports
and money abroad.  Privacy is a lot easier to maintain as such.


-uni- (Dark)




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: carugo o <e0004353@oxford-brookes.ac.uk>
Date: Wed, 27 Oct 93 12:00:59 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: New arrival.
Message-ID: <24895.9310271843@csmail.brookes.ac.uk>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Yes, Ia m here weird, strong, and full willingness to learn.
If you want to know what I am like think of a rhino with his turbo charged
bulldozer flatening the field of complacent cows.
 Yes that his me captain spineless- people- crusher.
 
Is there any recommended literature as regards the cypherpunks
dark and dangerous world.  I love high electronic finance.
I have been looking at the takeover battle for paramount..
 
What these bloody harvard mba managers don't seem to realise is that if all
internet factions got together we could outbid any takover offer..
Now that is corporate bucks!!!  Does anybody write to vice president gore or
cher clinton.
 
 
BTW who is your local net.god?  I am very serious on one hand buit sucha good
sport on the other.  I am also logged onto bras-net and I must say these Phd
Brasilians are something else. It is a big fight on how corruption money should
be distributed to them and god is there or not, I was thought he abandoned
human king=d the day he saw how bloody ugly eve was and went on to better world
with full of social security, plenty of computer wizz kids and other such
lovely mechanical inventions.
I would love to get onto angel@heaven.sky
 
Wacky or what!!  are there any invesment bankers on line ?
I hope so, since I have become an old hand in Latin american
investment. I get calls from investors at all times in my dreams.
well, I am still here writing....
 
I am doing my personal research on the future of commerce on the internet?!
 
Opinions. Would you want adverts being pourred down your screen all day??
 
I have to go for now.  I will hate and love this club.
 
 
Bye form the wacky man!!!




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: carugo o <e0004353@oxford-brookes.ac.uk>
Date: Wed, 27 Oct 93 11:57:56 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Watch out for carl@com.malamud.t
Message-ID: <25106.9310271855@csmail.brookes.ac.uk>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


He is a neg!!!
 
e0004353@brookes.uk.ac
 
ps i wrote the introductory piece on myself!!




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: J. Michael Diehl <mdiehl@triton.unm.edu>
Date: Wed, 27 Oct 93 18:32:41 PDT
To: janzen@idacom.hp.com (Martin Janzen)
Subject: Re: help/subscribe
In-Reply-To: <9310280017.AA06037@loki.idacom.hp.com>
Message-ID: <9310280131.AA22048@triton.unm.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


According to Martin Janzen:
> 
> Since you mention stdin, I assume you're running UNIX.  In that case, it's
> very easy to do this using awk; no C programming required.
> 
> 
> Now, just wrap it in a shell script which responds with an appropriate
> message (you can of course have subscribe.awk return a different exit
> code depending on which regular expression is matched), and call the
> shell script from your $HOME/.forward file, mail filter, or whatever.

Gak!  Use procmail!  I'm working on such a beast now.  You can use regular
expressions and it gets executed when you get the email.  Even better, you
never have to see the incoming message if you don't want to.

my $.02


J. Michael Diehl   ;^)  |*The 2nd Amendment is there in case the 
mdiehl@triton.unm.edu   | Government forgets about the 1st!  <RL>
Mike.Diehl@f29.n301.z1  |*God is a good Physicist, and an even 
    .fidonet.org        | better Mathematician.  <Me>
al945@cwns9.ins.cwru.edu|*I'm just looking for the opportunity to 
 (505) 299-2282 (voice) | be Politically Incorrect! <Me>
Can we impeach him yet? |*Protected by 18 USC 2511 and 18 USC 2703. 



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: carugo o <e0004353@oxford-brookes.ac.uk>
Date: Wed, 27 Oct 93 12:52:40 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Electronic fraud/and creditors abay.
Message-ID: <26024.9310271951@csmail.brookes.ac.uk>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Yes
Firstly hallo fellow punks.
 
 
Yes you tell me about electronic fraud and Iw ould like to know are there any
of you out there how are good at keeping creditors at bay, eg phone companies
etc.   Trump can you hear me?
 
Bye
 
Mephisto
e0004353@brookes.uk.ac




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: msattler@netcom.com (Michael Sattler)
Date: Wed, 27 Oct 93 20:58:04 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: blacknet international offers DOSSIERS for SALE
Message-ID: <9310280355.AA18327@netcom.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>...and *is* selling dossiers on people...

I just don't get what the big deal is, he seems to be providing info that's
publically available but not trivial to get.  I'm a computer consultant;
that's exactly what *I* do to pay the bills.


-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
Michael S. Sattler         msattler@netcom.com        +1 (415) 621-2903
Digital Jungle Software    Encrypt now; ask me how.   (finger for PGP key)

               All that is required for evil to triumph is
                for {wo}men of good will to do nothing.






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: peter honeyman <honey@citi.umich.edu>
Date: Wed, 27 Oct 93 19:18:04 PDT
To: bill@twwells.com (T. William Wells)
Subject: Re: I'm leaving cypherpunks
Message-ID: <9310280214.AA00552@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


t.w., i guess you're unfamiliar with sturgeon's law.

as for your new, improved cpunx list, count me out.
i like cpunx the way it is: uncontrolled.

	peter




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Sameer <sameer@uclink.berkeley.edu>
Date: Wed, 27 Oct 93 22:42:41 PDT
To: hiscdcj@lux.latrobe.edu.au (Dwayne)
Subject: Re: Off-shore banking and Steve Roberts' flotilla
In-Reply-To: <9310280306.AA19298@lux.latrobe.edu.au>
Message-ID: <m0osQ2M-000J4sC@infinity.hip.berkeley.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> 
> Cool. Do you have an email address for more info?
> 
	Found it.

	technomads-request@ucsd.edu






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: ferguson@icm1.icp.net (Paul Ferguson x2044)
Date: Wed, 27 Oct 93 19:38:05 PDT
To: honey@citi.umich.edu (peter honeyman)
Subject: Chaos - A noun we can live with
In-Reply-To: <9310280214.AA00552@toad.com>
Message-ID: <9310280336.AA03422@icm1.icp.net>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text



> i like cpunx the way it is: uncontrolled.

Ditto.





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: msattler@netcom.com (Michael Sattler)
Date: Wed, 27 Oct 93 22:38:04 PDT
To: lhurder@arrl.org (Luck Hurder KY1T)
Subject: Codes, ciphers, and ham radio
Message-ID: <9310280538.AA01217@netcom.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


And now for something different regarding crypto:

In studying for my FCC Technician's license I ran across FCC 97.113
(Sub-part 113 of Part 97 of Title 47 Code of Federal Regulations), which
prohibits the use of codes or ciphers to obscure the meaning of a message.

Besides preventing me from using Pig Latin in voice communications, this
*seems* to prohibit the use of any deliberate encryption (as opposed to
compression) of data transmitted via radio, such as the computer packet ->
radio -> Internet gateways.

The data highway may be encryption-tolerant today, but the off-ramps are murder.

:-) M


-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
Michael S. Sattler         msattler@netcom.com        +1 (415) 621-2903
Digital Jungle Software    Encrypt now; ask me how.   (finger for PGP key)

               All that is required for evil to triumph is
                for {wo}men of good will to do nothing.






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: fnerd@smds.com (FutureNerd Steve Witham)
Date: Wed, 27 Oct 93 22:39:39 PDT
To: T. William Wells <bill@twwells.com>
Subject: Re: I'm leaving cypherpunks
Message-ID: <9310280251.AA26446@smds.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


------BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE------

Mr. Wells--

Goodbye, best wishes.  I'm guessing, but I think you're making 
a mistake in leaving, both for yourself and about us.

We are not being irresponsible.  We have a
different, serious, view of how the world should be made into 
a good place.  We can only "set the tone," as you say, if what we 
are saying is founded in truth and competence.  The personal part 
of this letter continues after the philosophy.

- -----BEGIN PHILOSOPHY------

There are tools available to protect privacy, and protect ourselves,
that don't require much cooperation of others.  People should adopt
these tools, and also methods, habits, knowledge and attitudes.
One good attitude is a basic awareness and self-responsibility.  
One is that insults and taunts are only words.

Yes, on a personal level, in a group of friends, in a society that
is still basically functioning, there are many important issues of
how people should treat each other, and how a good environment 
should be established.  But cypherpunks is addressing, and 
experimenting with, a more basic, raw level of things.  The 
technical and nasty issues are every bit as urgent as the personal 
and ideal ones, and we constantly need to (and try to) relate them.

It's bad to ask social conventions of niceness to take over jobs
that people should--have to--take care of consciously for 
themselves.  It distributes responsibilities and burdons unfairly.
It is unwise in that it won't work.  It seems to give play to
a kind of self-delusion.  And to recommend it as a course to 
others is to send the sheep to feed the wolves.  It's to hang on 
to a picture of society with a false happy-face front that's 
crumpling behind--for all of us.

There's a basic level of self-protection that people have to take
care of for themselves, or higher-level social goals don't have
a chance.  People not protecting themselves actually increase
harmful activities--besides small criminals there are whole 
industries of parasitism--*because* people feed them in sheepish 
trust.

We're not talking guns or martial arts here, just purely protective
things like crypto and a little dose of reality.  A realistic
sense of what neighborhood one is walking in, for instance.

Like the cypherpunks neighborhood.  Here we're trying to 
experiment, get a sense of the worst of what could happen,
imagine ways of dealing with it.  And we've been openly like this
since we started.

Here is how I see the situation with Detweiler: I sympathize with 
his pain (to the extent I can follow it).  I try to be friendly to
him.  There have been others offering support who he could have
talked with instead of the people he picked fights with.  Some 
people shouldn't have been so nasty to him.  But he should have 
gotten a reality check a long time ago about how rough we play 
here--it's not very rough!!  There's no way we could have been 
expected to know that he wouldn't, and it is not our 
responsibility to police each other into treating him
supportively.

That doesn't mean we are building an unsupportive, hostile world.
We are playing worst-case-scenario with each other just so that
we can have a world that is not like that.

You construe the list owners' *allowing* rjc to continue posting
to be *condoning* it.  That's a bad thought path.  To suggest 
that they step in, in the kind of matter we're talking about, is 
not a good model for how a world should be run, and it's 
egregious in terms of the atmosphere we want in our own group.

> In an uncontrolled environment, there is little that can be done
> to further an appropriate attitude. One can reinforce the good
> and censure the bad. And hope.

(And give people tools, knowledge, and ideas to protect 
themselves.  And develop methods that actively shrink the 
opportunities for bad behavior.)

Cypherpunks is purposely a model of an uncontrolled environment,
including its worst aspects.

> Privacy is a *social* phenomenon, not a technical one. 

The convention of respect for privacy is social.  It's based on
a more primitive and basic ability of people to *get* privacy if
they need it.  The latter is breaking down, making the former
increasingly a charade behind which things can get worse.  But 
in the process of fixing things, the ground rules--in terms of 
which new social conventions will have to grow--will change.  
Things will seem rude to people stuck in old ways of looking at 
them.

> There is
> no sense in creating tools for privacy unless one also works for
> a society in which the deployment of these tools makes sense.

Although I can't imagine a situation where deploying privacy
tools doesn't make sense, I agree that we should keep our social
goals and issues in mind.  I'm surprised you imply that we aren't
doing that.  But society has to be built on good foundations.

- -----END PHILOSOPHY------

I think some of the things you suggest we do, amount to hiding 
from the important problems.  I hope (mostly for our sake) 
that you aren't doing that yourself.

I guess this list can seem very rough without a sense that the
people are ethical and serious, and that the roughness is there 
for a purpose.  I hope you can come around to believe that of
some of us and tolerate the rest.  We need people who can help
think about what we're aiming for, and what it will be like for 
humans in the worlds we propose.  Once in a while it helps to
have someone to protest a thoughtless post.

bye,
-fnerd@smds.com (FutureNerd Steve Witham)
quote me
ps i restrained myself from all the twelve step phrases i thot

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From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: msattler@netcom.com (Michael Sattler)
Date: Wed, 27 Oct 93 23:22:42 PDT
To: bill@twwells.com (T. William Wells)
Subject: Re: I'm leaving cypherpunks
Message-ID: <9310280620.AA06357@netcom.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


At 17:34 10/27/93 +0000, T. William Wells wrote:

>In a controlled environment, such as cypherpunks, those who
>control the list have the final say. The excess of noise on this
>can be *directly* traced to the list owner's choice to not
>control its content. Rjc's ability to abuse another *and to
>continue the abuse* is a direct consequence of the owner's
>policies. These facts are, by themselves, offensive but would be,
>barely, tolerable.

I'm very sorry to see you go.  I certainly agree that the list has been
annoying of late, but I disagree that cpunx is a controlled environment,
nor should it be.  I believe that leaving is no solution, but making
heart-felt comments and contributions on one hand and ignoring and
kill-filing obnoxious posters on the other hand is IMHO the most direct
path to a future we are comfortable in.

Again, I'm sorry to see you go.  It feels like a victory for the dark side.


-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
Michael S. Sattler         msattler@netcom.com        +1 (415) 621-2903
Digital Jungle Software    Encrypt now; ask me how.   (finger for PGP key)

               All that is required for evil to triumph is
                for {wo}men of good will to do nothing.






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: J. Michael Diehl <mdiehl@triton.unm.edu>
Date: Wed, 27 Oct 93 23:38:05 PDT
To: zeek@io.com
Subject: Re: Security of PGP private keys
In-Reply-To: <9310280613.AA09120@actlab.rtf.utexas.edu>
Message-ID: <9310280634.AA04635@triton.unm.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


According to zeek@io.com:
> 
> 
> 
> *> > PGP secret keys are protected by a password.  Yet people have said that one
> *> > should not keep one's secret keyring on an insecure machine.  Why?
> *> 
> *> Passwords are often guessable.
> 
> Passwords may also be picked up over telephone lines.  It is good to keep
> them short, wacko, and in human memory.  
> 
> #$%Osd(@ is a good one.  
> 

Ya right, about as good as qwerty, which is in many wordlists these days.


J. Michael Diehl   ;^)  |*The 2nd Amendment is there in case the 
mdiehl@triton.unm.edu   | Government forgets about the 1st!  <RL>
Mike.Diehl@f29.n301.z1  |*God is a good Physicist, and an even 
    .fidonet.org        | better Mathematician.  <Me>
al945@cwns9.ins.cwru.edu|*I'm just looking for the opportunity to 
 (505) 299-2282 (voice) | be Politically Incorrect! <Me>
Can we impeach him yet? |*Protected by 18 USC 2511 and 18 USC 2703. 



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: J. Michael Diehl <mdiehl@triton.unm.edu>
Date: Wed, 27 Oct 93 23:42:42 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Bad Ascii armour?
Message-ID: <9310280638.AA04749@triton.unm.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Why is it that when I send this message to pgp, i get an error?  This was 
posted recently.  Is it a fraud?  I donno and don't want to start another
flamefest.


------BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE------

Mr. Wells--

Goodbye, best wishes.  I'm guessing, but I think you're making 
a mistake in leaving, both for yourself and about us.

We are not being irresponsible.  We have a
different, serious, view of how the world should be made into 
a good place.  We can only "set the tone," as you say, if what we 
are saying is founded in truth and competence.  The personal part 
of this letter continues after the philosophy.

- -----BEGIN PHILOSOPHY------

There are tools available to protect privacy, and protect ourselves,
that don't require much cooperation of others.  People should adopt
these tools, and also methods, habits, knowledge and attitudes.
One good attitude is a basic awareness and self-responsibility.  
One is that insults and taunts are only words.

Yes, on a personal level, in a group of friends, in a society that
is still basically functioning, there are many important issues of
how people should treat each other, and how a good environment 
should be established.  But cypherpunks is addressing, and 
experimenting with, a more basic, raw level of things.  The 
technical and nasty issues are every bit as urgent as the personal 
and ideal ones, and we constantly need to (and try to) relate them.

It's bad to ask social conventions of niceness to take over jobs
that people should--have to--take care of consciously for 
themselves.  It distributes responsibilities and burdons unfairly.
It is unwise in that it won't work.  It seems to give play to
a kind of self-delusion.  And to recommend it as a course to 
others is to send the sheep to feed the wolves.  It's to hang on 
to a picture of society with a false happy-face front that's 
crumpling behind--for all of us.

There's a basic level of self-protection that people have to take
care of for themselves, or higher-level social goals don't have
a chance.  People not protecting themselves actually increase
harmful activities--besides small criminals there are whole 
industries of parasitism--*because* people feed them in sheepish 
trust.

We're not talking guns or martial arts here, just purely protective
things like crypto and a little dose of reality.  A realistic
sense of what neighborhood one is walking in, for instance.

Like the cypherpunks neighborhood.  Here we're trying to 
experiment, get a sense of the worst of what could happen,
imagine ways of dealing with it.  And we've been openly like this
since we started.

Here is how I see the situation with Detweiler: I sympathize with 
his pain (to the extent I can follow it).  I try to be friendly to
him.  There have been others offering support who he could have
talked with instead of the people he picked fights with.  Some 
people shouldn't have been so nasty to him.  But he should have 
gotten a reality check a long time ago about how rough we play 
here--it's not very rough!!  There's no way we could have been 
expected to know that he wouldn't, and it is not our 
responsibility to police each other into treating him
supportively.

That doesn't mean we are building an unsupportive, hostile world.
We are playing worst-case-scenario with each other just so that
we can have a world that is not like that.

You construe the list owners' *allowing* rjc to continue posting
to be *condoning* it.  That's a bad thought path.  To suggest 
that they step in, in the kind of matter we're talking about, is 
not a good model for how a world should be run, and it's 
egregious in terms of the atmosphere we want in our own group.

> In an uncontrolled environment, there is little that can be done
> to further an appropriate attitude. One can reinforce the good
> and censure the bad. And hope.

(And give people tools, knowledge, and ideas to protect 
themselves.  And develop methods that actively shrink the 
opportunities for bad behavior.)

Cypherpunks is purposely a model of an uncontrolled environment,
including its worst aspects.

> Privacy is a *social* phenomenon, not a technical one. 

The convention of respect for privacy is social.  It's based on
a more primitive and basic ability of people to *get* privacy if
they need it.  The latter is breaking down, making the former
increasingly a charade behind which things can get worse.  But 
in the process of fixing things, the ground rules--in terms of 
which new social conventions will have to grow--will change.  
Things will seem rude to people stuck in old ways of looking at 
them.

> There is
> no sense in creating tools for privacy unless one also works for
> a society in which the deployment of these tools makes sense.

Although I can't imagine a situation where deploying privacy
tools doesn't make sense, I agree that we should keep our social
goals and issues in mind.  I'm surprised you imply that we aren't
doing that.  But society has to be built on good foundations.

- -----END PHILOSOPHY------

I think some of the things you suggest we do, amount to hiding 
from the important problems.  I hope (mostly for our sake) 
that you aren't doing that yourself.

I guess this list can seem very rough without a sense that the
people are ethical and serious, and that the roughness is there 
for a purpose.  I hope you can come around to believe that of
some of us and tolerate the rest.  We need people who can help
think about what we're aiming for, and what it will be like for 
humans in the worlds we propose.  Once in a while it helps to
have someone to protest a thoughtless post.

bye,
-fnerd@smds.com (FutureNerd Steve Witham)
quote me
ps i restrained myself from all the twelve step phrases i thot

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.3a

aKxB8nktcBAeQHabQP/d7yhWgpGZBIoIqII8cY9nG55HYHgvtoxiQCVAgUBLMs3K
ui6XaCZmKH68fOWYYySKAzPkXyfYKnOlzsIjp2toust1Q5A3/n54PBKrUDN9tHVz
3Ch466q9EKUuDulTU6OLsilzmRvQJn0EJhzd4pht6hanC0R3seYNhUYhoJViCcCG
sRjLQs4iVVM=
=9wqs
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Robert J. Woodhead" <trebor@foretune.co.jp>
Date: Wed, 27 Oct 93 09:09:23 PDT
To: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Subject: Tim May, Detweiler and Me.
In-Reply-To: <9310261923.AA29868@netcom.netcom.com>
Message-ID: <9310271602.AA04945@dink.foretune.co.jp>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Tim writes at length and with some eloquence regarding the
recent conflagration, and then quotes me replying to Mr. Detweiler.

>>Personally, I am getting a little tired of your ranting.  I agreed with
>>most of your position and got flamed for it.  Thanks a lot.  It's chillingly
>>obvious you've read "How to Win Friends and Influence People."
>>
>>If you are willing to do the research and provide solid, verifyable
>>evidence of such nastiness as you are convinced is happening, then
>>do it.  If you are willing to discuss the implications of dishonesty
>>in a universe of anonymity, then  that is a topic of interest.  If
>>all you are willing to do is rant about the boogieman under the
>>bed, then please do your mumbling somewhere else in cyberspace.
>>
>>I _still_ think the issue that concerns you is an important one.  I
>>also thi>nk you are doing a very good job of ensuring that people
>>don't give it critical thought. 

He then asks me to think about certain points, but after doing so, I
think he has misunderstood _my_ point.  My point in the above is
"Do not judge the message by the messenger."  Regardless of whether
or not his scenario is in play on the group (I don't think it is),
it is something to think about, and it is inevitable that people will
attempt to maliciously pseudospoof, and some will succeed.

Granted, Mr. Detweiler has been a royal twit.  But then, so have many
others on the list in reply to him.  Shame on the lot of you.

One of the central aspects of human society is negotiation and the
attempt to reach consensus.  In the past, while sitting around the
campfire or negotiating table, one could see the other parties to
the negotiation and be reasonably sure of their identity.

Sure, groups could collude to your detriment -- and sometimes did,
for it is a powerful technique (ask any poker player for examples),
but at least you knew that it took cooperation between individuals
and groups, and it was easier to track.  You at least had a scorecard
of the players, so to speak.

One of the effects of the digital revolution is that now, a single
person can be multiple people at the campfire with _much_ less
effort than before.  This reduces the cost of collusion, and makes
it more likely.

I believe this is an issue that needs to be addressed, if for no
other reason than to make people aware of the possibility that
it might be going on.  Hal Finney's recent posting on "True Names"
is a valuable contribution in that it proposes a way to deal
with the problem.

To quote Mr. D Vader, "Do not be so proud of this technological
terror you have created."  The cryptographic techniques being
developed today are immensely powerful.  Let us hope that we are
wise enough to learn how to use them well.  Let us take it as read
that there will be others who will foolishly use them for base ends,
and spend a little extra time to ensure that it isn't so easy.





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: zeek@io.com
Date: Wed, 27 Oct 93 23:18:05 PDT
To: huntting@glarp.com (Brad Huntting)
Subject: Re: Security of PGP private keys
In-Reply-To: <199310272223.AA02694@misc.glarp.com>
Message-ID: <9310280613.AA09120@actlab.rtf.utexas.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain




*> > PGP secret keys are protected by a password.  Yet people have said that one
*> > should not keep one's secret keyring on an insecure machine.  Why?
*> 
*> Passwords are often guessable.

Passwords may also be picked up over telephone lines.  It is good to keep
them short, wacko, and in human memory.  

#$%Osd(@ is a good one.  

-z





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: rjc@gnu.ai.mit.edu (Ray)
Date: Thu, 28 Oct 93 01:38:05 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Last words, perhaps...
In-Reply-To: <CFFs5I.HMs@twwells.com>
Message-ID: <9310280836.AA14741@churchy.gnu.ai.mit.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



  In his final message, Mr. Wells accuses me of wanting to control, rule,
and abuse despite the fact that I've been on the list since it's
beginning and have participated in a grand total of 2 flames. He says our
actions should be based on a fundamental respect for others. He's already
abused my character far more than I did to Detweiler. While weeding out
my mailbox, I ran across the following:

T. William Wells writes:
> 
> In article <9310250152.AA09786@snark.lehman.com>,
> Perry E. Metzger <lehman.com!pmetzger> wrote:
> : [irrelevancy]
> 
> I watched you arguing with Detweiler and thought that you were an
> idiot. However, I figured that Detweiler was sufficient
> provocation to bring out the idiot in just about anyone so I
> ignored that.
> 
> But here you have proven that you really don't understand.
> 
> This I don't intend to ignore. Welcome to my killfile. When you
> figure out why, you may be worthy of being removed from it.

  Not the words of an "understanding" and "sensitive" person.

  Everyone else seems to be getting in their last word. That's mine.
I've temporarily unsubscribed the list for an unspecified period. I can't
keep up with this war, my classes, and my work on the Extropians list
software.

 
-- Ray Cromwell        |    Engineering is the implementation of science;    --
-- rjc@gnu.ai.mit.edu  |       politics is the implementation of faith.      --
--                   Founding Member of the Dark Side                        --




















From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: AFCO73%IRMFAO01.BITNET@vm.cnuce.cnr.it
Date: Thu, 28 Oct 93 00:58:05 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: How do I unsubsrcibe
Message-ID: <931028.085609.ITA.AFCO73@IRMFAO01>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Good day, would someone please advise me how I could unsubscribe from this
list?

Thanks for your help.

Johnny Hua at FAO of the UN, Italy




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: carugo o <e0004353@oxford-brookes.ac.uk>
Date: Thu, 28 Oct 93 02:42:42 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: APOLOGY!!!!
Message-ID: <645.9310280937@csmail.brookes.ac.uk>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Yes,
 
 
I want to make a public apology on behalf of my obnoscious brother
he is the only neg I know.
 
More relevant information will come from me.
 
u.r.carugo e0004353@brookes.uk.ac




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: an31122@anon.penet.fi
Date: Thu, 28 Oct 93 03:18:07 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Words, words, words
Message-ID: <9310281013.AA23863@anon.penet.fi>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Fellow cpunks, 
	I'm a little ashamed to admit it, but I enjoy a bit of flame
war.  I genuinely do not care what happens to Mr. BatGuano ("if that
IS your name"), so a clever insult once in a while is fun to read.  If
Detweiler really IS Boxx, so what?  If he says that you're a moron, so
what?  If someone creates a second name to use when they're mad and
want to flame, that's their business.  What's important is the ideas
in someones head, not the name they use.  While I'm interested in
dining cryptographers, I also find it enlightening to listen to Tim
May or Duncan Frissell talk politics.  I don't see any reason to limit
this list to discussions of random number generators.  It would be a
terrible waste to ignore the collected wisdom and experience of the
group because it was marginally off topic.  If people would have
simply ignored Detweiler rather than answering his tomes, he would
have gone away sooner.
	It only takes a few lines to see whether a post will be
interesting or not.  If not, DON'T READ IT.  Forget it, trash it,
delete it.  Most importantly, don't get upset about it.  It's just
words; they can't hurt you.  I give Detweiler a paragraph or two.  We
all know who is worth listening to and who isn't.  Once you've figured
out what Detweiler, rjc, or Boxx have to say, don't bother reading
them anymore.  That's all there is to it.
	My point, I guess, is that net.talk isn't all that different
from real.talk.  There are real people on the other end of the line,
regardless of the names that they use.  Some are worth listening to,
some are not.  It's not hard to tell them apart, and not hard to
ignore the wierdos.  Talk of censoring people, charging for posts, or
sharply defining the scope of the group all seem to make things worse
rather than better.  It's silly to talk of the way that things "should
be".  It's far more productive (and easier!) to figure out how to get
what you want from the way that they already are.

				See you in the Zone,
				Tyrone Slothrop (RocketMan)
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
To find out more about the anon service, send mail to help@anon.penet.fi.
Due to the double-blind, any mail replies to this message will be anonymized,
and an anonymous id will be allocated automatically. You have been warned.
Please report any problems, inappropriate use etc. to admin@anon.penet.fi.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: hughes@ah.com (Eric Hughes)
Date: Thu, 28 Oct 93 11:18:08 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Signing our keys
In-Reply-To: <9310281731.AA24284@anon.penet.fi>
Message-ID: <9310281812.AA02472@ah.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>If we are willing to sign a key based on an
>entity that we KNOW does not really exist, then what
>does a signature mean? 

The key is the identity, period.  Let's get that straight up front.
Signing a key does not change the identity.

Signatures on keys are attestations that the key belongs to some
person or email address.  Signing a key attests that an identity has a
name.

I've developed a criterion for signing pseudonym keys.  The only party
(other than the holder) who can gain any certain knowledge that an
e-mail address maps to the holder of a given key is the provider of
the e-mail address.  In other words, Julf's server should sign
wonderer's key.  

The following applies to any system providing pseudonyms, i.e. mail
addresses.  The mail server should have a public key.  The public key
of a user would be encrypted with the server's public key and
forwarded to the server.  The server would accept as authentication of
this public key the same authentication that it accepts for everything
else.  Once it has the key, it can sign it and return it to the
individual, who can then publish it.

>Something strange is going on in the word when nym's
>are signing each other's keys...

The one pseudonym is attesting that they reach the same individual
each time they send mail to the other pseudonym encrypted with the
public key claimed by that other pseudonym.  This attestation is not
as strong as person-to-person contact, but as long as the signer
reasonably believes that mail delivery system functions as it claims
to, i.e. no interposers, the signature does actually mean something.

Eric




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: pierre@shell.portal.com (Pierre Uszynski)
Date: Thu, 28 Oct 93 11:21:34 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: My Key
Message-ID: <9310281814.AA19779@jobe.shell.portal.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> From: an41418@anon.penet.fi (wonderer)
> 
> say someone wants to become Wonderer (I mean, it's
> great being me, who wouldn't want to?), they could forge
> a message as coming from me and include a public key.
[...]
> The problem I have with public key cryptography is that
> it is easy for an imposter to publish a public key and  
> get people to believe that it is valid.

As long as no certification agency is involved, a public
key only stands for itself. It only weakly associates a key
with a name. It does NOT associate a key with a person, or
an email address. And this association is not even unique,
you could have several names with the same public key, and
the same name with several public keys. In other words,
the only thing that authenticates the messages is the key
itself, the key is now the only significant name. The name
is merely a poor mnemonic to the key (more or less).

No matter what, any "John Smith" out there has an arguable
right to call himself "John Smith". The situation does not
improve as communication infrastructures become more global.

So, even though you were the first on this list to use
the name "wonderer", as long as you don't post a public key
for it, somebody else can pre-empt you and claim that name
and post a key, and that would not prevent you from posting
a key for the same name yourself in the future. (is that
confused enough?) The only way to distinguish same names
for different keys is if people automatically collect
key-name pairs and their mail readers shows key-names as
author, not just name (and that's not a reliable or likely way
to go. Assuming here there is only email and posting to
distribute keys.) You say somebody would forge a mail from
your address to "claim" your name... They wouldn't need to:
How many of us check your email address in the header when
we see "wonderer". We don't remember your email address,
just "wonderer". We wouldn't remember your key either,
just "wonderer" again. Only a fancy mail reader would tie
together all the different messages you posted under the same
key.

So, does it matter and what can we do?  Well as long as
the only key propagation mechanisms are email and posting,
we can't do much.

If you start talking as "Some Name" with or without a posted
public key, and somebody else posts one as the same name:

- you can counter with a key for "Some Name" yourself.
- you can sue if "Some Name" is sufficiently associated
with you (first and last name, trademark...), and
insufficiently with the other (not his name or less valid
trademark), and if the other is in a jurisdiction where
you have a recourse.
- you can start an online war between the two that
essentially will make the name impossible to use for
anybody (quasi-universally kill-filed... for a while)
- you can claim a Better Name "The One True Some Name", and
post your same public key for it. Until he does the same.
- you can wait for, or better yet :-), write mail readers
or list software  that tend to prefer keys and signatures
over names and mail addresses.

The possibilities for fun, forgery, spoofing, and flaming
are endless... Until the list software starts associating
keys with names on a first come first serve basis (or by
chains of certificates and in-person meetings, as a way
to settle disputes).


Pierre.
pierre@shell.portal.com




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: hughes@ah.com (Eric Hughes)
Date: Thu, 28 Oct 93 11:48:08 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Signing our keys
In-Reply-To: <199310281806.AA13209@poboy.b17c.ingr.com>
Message-ID: <9310281841.AA02550@ah.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>A PEM key is bound to a particular identity by a
>certificate. Right now, you can only get these certificates from
>entities that want some concrete evidence of your True Name

RSA is running a persona certificate server for PEM keys.  They don't
ask for anything.  Their latest brochure diagrams these as "anonymous
internet users."  I don't know the address, but I do know that six
months ago it was running and being tested.

It would be interesting to know if such certificates worked in the new
Apple system 7.  If so, there may soon be a whole flood of Mac-owning
pseudonyms using PEM.

Eric




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Date: Thu, 28 Oct 93 12:02:42 PDT
To: perobich@ingr.com
Subject: Back to the Basics in Crypto
In-Reply-To: <199310281750.AA13134@poboy.b17c.ingr.com>
Message-ID: <9310281859.AA05499@netcom5.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Paul Robichaux makes some good points: (which I'll only quote briefly)

> An unsolicited opinion: one of the best things about cypherpunks'
> early days is that the list members (spurred on by the examples set by
> a few folks) generally posted informative and incisive material to the
> list and kept the flames, potentially-silly questions, and other
> detritus in private e-mail.

Yes, many people have commented on the greater information content of
the "early days." (Interestingly, I sense that the "early days" for
each member are of course that person's early days on the List!)

We each have our favorite interests, even our areas of expertise. So,
in our early days on the List (which for me was a year ago) we
naturally tend to write a lot of essays, raise new points, and
generally act in an enthusiastic, excited way (by excited I don't mean
flaming). After a few months of this, most folks drop their level of
enthusiasm. Very natural and expected...after all, the material is no
longer new.

One just can't keep writing essays about the same material, though
occasionally we see "golden oldies" reposted to the List (as I
recently did with a year-old essay on "Dining Cryptographers").

So, if newcomers want to see new material, and not just reactive
comments, it is largely up to them to find some areas of interest,
gain some relative expertise, and then to write essays or pieces on
these topics.

There's just a huge amount of stuff out there, stuff on "zero
knowledge proof systems," on the existence (or not) of digital coins,
on the nature of data havens and offshore black markets, on
alternatives to RSA, and on and on. Reading and absorbing this stuff
will take any person I know at least a few days of very intensive
reading and thinking (I spent at least six or eight hours in 1989
reading and rereading Chaum's DC-Net paper before it really made sense
to me....no summary on the Net could possibly do it justice or obviate
the need to pore over the paper, preferably in printed form).

My point? If the List gets to be too much for you, what with the
occasional outbreaks of flames and the "trivial" (to some) debates
about foo and bar, then go off and do some very intensive reading of
the cryptographic, banking, and information theory literature,

For example, I just received yesterday a spectacular new book in the
mail: "An Introduction to Kolmogorov Complexity Theory and its
Applications," by Ming Li and Paul Vitanyi (Springer-Verlag, $59, call
800-SPRINGE to order, or find it eventually in your local university
library--maybe). Kolmogorov and Chaitin (and a few others, like
Martin-Lof and Solomonoff...a lot of "loffs" in their!) developed what
is also called "algorithmic information theory (AIT)," which is interested
in issues of randomness, descriptive complexity, etc.

This is currently my main interest, and we had a "virtual seminar"
over on Extropians several months ago on AIT. Nick Szabo, Hal Finney,
and Derek Zahn, all now on the Cypherpunks list as well, were
participants with me in this virtual seminar. Folks actually read some
of the key papers, thought about the issues, and came up with
interesting conclusions about the connections between AIT,
cryptography, neural nets, evolution, and several other things. Very
stimulating!

So, if things are "dragging" here, it's maybe time for folks to go off
and recharge, to "Use the Force, Read the Source." The Net is great,
but it can't possibly convey the sheer depth of information present in
books, formal papers, graphs, equations, etc. The Net is typically a
chat forum, like the coffee house someone remarked on.

But even if coffee houses, folks have to bring something exciting to
talk about.

I'm not chastising anyone....we all have other projects, work, our
private lives, and so on. Not everyone wants to become an expert in
some area, not everyone has the backround. And many of you are
_already_ world-class experts in important areas (inventor of public
key itself reads the list, experts in Unix security do, and on and on).

These experts in most cases did in fact write wonderful essays on some
aspect of what they're interested in, be it spread spectrum
communications, e-mail standards, digital money, steganography,
capability-based systems, whatever. It's understandable that they
don't keep writing the same essays.

("Why not archives?" I hear some of you saying---unless I'm just
hearing voices in my head, of course. Well, the toad.com machine does
have the archives, and hugh Daniel tells me they may someday be
accessible. Also, the List has in some cases been gatewaayed into
local Usenet form, so some sites may already have archives. However,
my experience with archives is that newcomers will perhaps
understandably not wade through several dozen megabytes of archived
postings, and prefer to see currently-written essays instead. A
dilemma we're not likely to solve.)

My biggest conclusion: If the List is not what you want it to be, _make_
it what you want it to be! Stop reading the List for a few days and
instead use the time saved to dig up the "Crypto" Proceedings and the
other crypto materials. You may find some articles that excite you
enough to summarize them for the List or even to prompt you to go off
and try to implement the ideas yourself.

Happy hunting!

--Tim May

-- 
..........................................................................
Timothy C. May         | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,  
tcmay@netcom.com       | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
408-688-5409           | knowledge, reputations, information markets, 
W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA  | black markets, collapse of governments.
Higher Power: 2^756839 | Public Key: PGP and MailSafe available.
Note: I put time and money into writing this posting. I hope you enjoy it.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: J. Michael Diehl <mdiehl@triton.unm.edu>
Date: Thu, 28 Oct 93 11:12:42 PDT
Subject: Re: Words, words, words
Message-ID: <9310281811.AA24925@triton.unm.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


According to wonderer:
> 
> Some words that can hurt you:
>  - death threats
>  - "You're fired"
>  - "I don't want to see you ever again."
>  - "You're ideas are stupid; take them somewhere else."
>  - "We see no option but to declare war!"
> you get the idea.

You forgot:

Bitch, nigger, queer, spick, Nazi, dumbfuck, chink, wop, etc.
Simply a call for people to try to be a bit more polite to each other.


J. Michael Diehl   ;^)  |*The 2nd Amendment is there in case the 
mdiehl@triton.unm.edu   | Government forgets about the 1st!  <RL>
Mike.Diehl@f29.n301.z1  |*God is a good Physicist, and an even 
    .fidonet.org        | better Mathematician.  <Me>
al945@cwns9.ins.cwru.edu|*I'm just looking for the opportunity to 
 (505) 299-2282 (voice) | be Politically Incorrect! <Me>
Can we impeach him yet? |*Protected by 18 USC 2511 and 18 USC 2703. 



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Date: Thu, 28 Oct 93 12:43:08 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Hackers 9.0 Crypto Panel, the Semi-Final Agenda
Message-ID: <9310281941.AA10002@netcom5.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Many of you will be attending Hackers 9.0 beginning next Friday at
Lake Tahoe. This message is for you.

The Hackers Conference panel on crypto has come together nicely. Glenn
Tenney has asked us to move it from Saturday afternoon to Friday
night, 9:30 to 11, and I've agreed. I don't think this should conflict
with any other sessions, as this is a one-track section too. If there
are conflicts, let me know and we can arrange substitutes or somesuch.

A few weeks ago I solicited your advice on topics and asked for any
volunteers. This is what came out of this process:

* a panel discussion, as opposed to the short speeches of last year.

* a discussion of whatever is of main interest after the panel makes
their initial points.

* panelists:

- Phil Karn, on Internet encryption
- Peter Honeyman, on issues of anonymity and trust
- John Draper, on the spread of PGP 
- Eric Hughes, on digital money and banking
- Mike Godwin, on legal issues surrounding crypto

If any of you has changed your mind, let me know as soon as you can.
And if anyone else has some topics they really want to talk about, let
me know...maybe you can be added or be a sub for anyone who drops out.

I'll try to moderate this thing and keep any one topic from sucking up
all available time. Clipper and the legal issues surrounding PGP are
two of the obvious things that the audience could "demand" more
attention be given to. I think we of course _should_ talk about these
issues, but we also want to bring up new material and not just today's
"headlines." (For example, a year ago the "key escrow" stuff was
relatvely obscure next to the Steve Jackson Games issue....then key
escrow blossomed into "Clipper" just six months later and is now the
Really Hot Topic. The use of anonymous remailers in the breaking of
the Verilog encryption system is similarly a portent of things to come.)

These topics will likely come up many times in the audience
participation phase.

And if Phil Zimmermann attends, which I've not been able to confirm, I
expect he will be on the panel, or will participate centrally in the
"BOF" (birds of a feather) session which I expect will start after our
panel).

(In fact, if he attends, it might be good to just let him speak for as
long as he wants at a BOF. I remember Cliff Stoll speaking until
nearly 4 in the morning a couple of years ago.)

See you there!

-Tim May


-- 
..........................................................................
Timothy C. May         | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,  
tcmay@netcom.com       | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
408-688-5409           | knowledge, reputations, information markets, 
W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA  | black markets, collapse of governments.
Higher Power: 2^756839 | Public Key: PGP and MailSafe available.
Note: I put time and money into writing this posting. I hope you enjoy it.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: paul@poboy.b17c.ingr.com (Paul Robichaux)
Date: Thu, 28 Oct 93 10:52:42 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Chaos - A noun we can live with
In-Reply-To: <9310281712.AA21098@anon.penet.fi>
Message-ID: <199310281750.AA13134@poboy.b17c.ingr.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

An unsolicited opinion: one of the best things about cypherpunks'
early days is that the list members (spurred on by the examples set by
a few folks) generally posted informative and incisive material to the
list and kept the flames, potentially-silly questions, and other
detritus in private e-mail.

The recent Detwiler melee is a case of the USENET-ization of this
list. I'm sorry that some valuable contributors- *including Detwiler*,
who often had a steely point buried under the Moby Adjectives- will no
longer be sharing with us.

A bad s/n ratio is usually transient, and people who tune out due to
the traffic will often come back. Unfortunately, the kind of
acrimony we've been favored with here tends to force out many people
whose contributions enrich us all.

I'd like to ask each of the remaining members to think about your own
reasons for reading the list. If you're here to learn, teach, and
share, that's great. If you're here to act like an alt.flame regular,
not so great. 

I'd hate to see any more people driven off because the coffee in our
coffee house is too bitter. So, to summarize: you don't have to always
be nice, but if you feel the need to flame, keep it in e-mail.

- -Paul


- -- 
Paul Robichaux, KD4JZG     | Caution: cutting edge is sharp. Avoid contact.
Intergraph Federal Systems | Be a cryptography user - ask me how.
	    ** Of course I don't speak for Intergraph. **


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.3a

iQCVAgUBLNAGUiA78To+806NAQEkVQQAxS7WOinmWY2JMs39ZhL1rsV2hrGxvRnl
ACZv3GmNIRWiwJTPco7C7ykbfZkvquK7lqOJcl3voTQzE/AlyUuv0IoeTVANy5ZG
UrxviB9yzxozuwL2QQnCYYnUH7EWBbFDwkc+txo67ilv2vInrZWIae1VLSBygKaB
+Uiw5gkayyU=
=GnYl
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: paul@poboy.b17c.ingr.com (Paul Robichaux)
Date: Thu, 28 Oct 93 11:08:08 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re:  Signing our keys
Message-ID: <199310281806.AA13209@poboy.b17c.ingr.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

In an interesting list message, Wonderer wrote:
>It seems to me that we have an interesting dilemma
>here. If we are willing to sign a key based on an
>entity that we KNOW does not really exist, then what
>does a signature mean? 

Here's a terrific example of one of the interesting differences
between the PEM-style key hierarchy and the PGP web.

Consider that any entity (real or spoofed) can own a key pair in
either model. A PEM key is bound to a particular identity by a
certificate. Right now, you can only get these certificates from
entities that want some concrete evidence of your True Name; this
makes sense, since the certificate establishes that key X belongs to
True Name Y.

PGP, OTOH, doesn't have any direct equivalent of a certificate. If I
get Wonderer's key with no signatures, I can't guarantee anything
about the association between that entity and the key I get. 

If I get that same PGP key with signatures from Phil Karn and L. Detwiler,
I know that they're willing to certify the assocation. Does that mean
anything? Well, it depends on who the signers are :)

A set of PGP signatures can be equivalent to a PEM-style certificate;
that is, the set of signatures on a key, establishing that a
particular key belongs to a particular entity, can potentially be as
trustworthy as a certificate from Dun & Bradstreet or RSA.

The PGP feature that a key doesn't have to belong to the True Name of
an entity is a big plus in my book; otherwise, we'd have no Wonderer,
no deadbeat, and no S. Boxx.

- -Paul


- -- 
Paul Robichaux, KD4JZG     | Caution: cutting edge is sharp. Avoid contact.
Intergraph Federal Systems | Be a cryptography user - ask me how.
	    ** Of course I don't speak for Intergraph. **


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.3a

iQCVAgUBLNAJ2yA78To+806NAQF/DAQApsjQgIjW26GPvL2kINfCzTGyxn6zXJr9
OZVdLjPRe/J7eudxXfe5q7MlENxyomXgXqnUr5AxmTEjPzWCj63D1Yq2qr2Gcjq+
i7YTg8d9P+L+yTsTVUBk+ZIbBv+AFnD35yCEQnIC5nCE0kK644cpwa1FjDyLla01
2m4fvPNTOnM=
=ZF43
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: nobody@rosebud.ee.uh.edu
Date: Thu, 28 Oct 93 11:32:42 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Tim May, Detweiler and Me.
Message-ID: <9310281829.AA11138@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> Granted, Mr. Detweiler has been a royal twit.  But then, so have many
> others on the list in reply to him.  Shame on the lot of you.

Oh, fuck off.  Take your preaching and moralizing to the net.
In fact, all of y'all interested in reforming our black hearts:
get fucking lost.  I want to hear Hal Finney's description of
DC-nets, and you are just plain in the way.        Nowhere, Man




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: holland@CS.ColoState.EDU (douglas craig holland)
Date: Thu, 28 Oct 93 12:42:42 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: PGP automation
Message-ID: <9310281940.AA28085@beethoven>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text


Right now, it is a complete pain in the ass for me to encrypt or sign
messages using PGP.  The reason is because I have my email account on
one of CSU's unix machines, so I have to do my posting there, while
my PGP stuff lives on my PC in my apartment.  Usually, I check my mail
and read news by calling CSUNet over my modem, but if I want to encrypt,
decrypt, sign or check the signature of a message, I have to zmodem the
message to my machine, log off, decrypt or check the message while
offline (or at least shelled into DOS), type up a reply, manually encrypt
it and finally get back into my term program and zmodem the reply back
up to CSUNet and mail it.  I don't really want to run PGP on CSUNet, since
I don't trust their machines like I trust mine, but I am thinking about
doing that and generating a key which I would be wiling to use for less
secure stuff.  Anyone here have any other suggestions on making encryption
less of a pain?

Doug

|  Doug Holland                       | Proud member of:
|  holland@beethoven.cs.colostate.edu | Mathematicians Against Drunk Deriving
|  Finger for PGP 2.2 key             | 



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: jim@nimrod.suite.com
Date: Thu, 28 Oct 93 13:32:42 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com@bilbo.suite.com
Subject: Re: Signing our keys
Message-ID: <9310281913.AA02459@nimrod.suite.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



"Eric Hughes" writes...

> RSA is running a persona certificate server for PEM keys. 

> They don't ask for anything.  Their latest brochure
> diagrams these as "anonymous internet users."  I don't
> know the address, but I do know that six months ago it was
> running and being tested. 

> 


Here's an extract from the latest RSA Newsletter:

------------

_RSA Certificate Services Center Opens for Business_

Last month, the RSA Certificate Services Center (CSC) officially opened for  
business.  Right now, today, you can obtain real certificates with your name,  
public key, and organizational affiliation safely embedded in a  
cryptographically tamper-proof digital document.

[stuff deleted]

GETTING A CERTIFICATE

There are two primary types of certificates that are supported by the RSA  
Certificate Service Center: affiliated and unaffiliated.

[stuff deleted]

There are three ways to get a certificate:

[stuff deleted]

3. You can purchase individual unaffiliated certificates directly from the CSC.

[stuff deleted]

For more information contact George Parsons, CSC Manager, at 415/595-8782.

------------

Jim_Miller@suite.com





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: smb@research.att.com
Date: Thu, 28 Oct 93 11:28:08 PDT
To: perobich@ingr.com
Subject: Re: Signing our keys
Message-ID: <9310281827.AA11123@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


	 The PGP feature that a key doesn't have to belong to the True Name of
	 an entity is a big plus in my book; otherwise, we'd have no Wonderer,
	 no deadbeat, and no S. Boxx.

It is, of course, worth noting that the PEM specs make explicit
provisions for aliases; it's just up to some issuing agency to
decide to issue them.  And if no one wants to -- well, no one has
to sign an anXXXX address's key, either.


		--Steve Bellovin




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: khijol!erc (Ed Carp)
Date: Thu, 28 Oct 93 15:08:10 PDT
To: ajw@Think.COM (Andy Wilson)
Subject: Re: Tim May, Detweiler and Me.
In-Reply-To: <9310282142.AA07808@custard.think.com>
Message-ID: <m0osfNd-000HWUC@khijol>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text


>    Date: Thu, 28 Oct 93 13:34:35 -0500
>    From: nobody@rosebud.ee.uh.edu
> 
>    > Granted, Mr. Detweiler has been a royal twit.  But then, so have many
>    > others on the list in reply to him.  Shame on the lot of you.
> 
>    Oh, fuck off.  Take your preaching and moralizing to the net.
>    In fact, all of y'all interested in reforming our black hearts:
>    get fucking lost.  I want to hear Hal Finney's description of
>    DC-nets, and you are just plain in the way.        Nowhere, Man
> 
> Yo Nowhere Boy,
> 
> Come out from behind that there anonymous re-mailer,  you no-account, 
> penny-ante, douche-swillin', hound-dog-be-hind-sniffin', cake-bakin', 
> cant-chantin', underwear-chewin', varmint-humpin', slack-jawed,
> cripple-beatin', velveeta-meltin', glue-sniffin', shit-eatin',
> beady-eyed, rubber-armed, dried-drool-encrusted, paper-bag-foldin',
> mind-numbin', politician-listenin', professional-help-needin',
> lawyer-trustin', TV-watchin', toilet-bowl-kissin', propaganda-believin', 
> both over- and under-edumacated, bocce-playin', reality-distortin', 
> space-warpin', card-countin', sassafrass-sippin', channel-surfin',
> ill-behaved, fume-breathin', waste-spewin', paste-tastin', goofy-lookin',
> turkey-bastin', KMART-wit-implanted, coupon-clippin', rhino-horn-ridin',
> Bart-Simpson-veneratin', tired-old-idea-recyclin', seaweed-smellin',
> floppy-eared, donut-chompin', kudzu-entwined, se-mantically-challenged,
> not-at-all-anywheres-near-tolerable purple-assed wimp!
> 
> If you're going to flame somebody, at least stand up for your 
> own words with your own name,  or a reputable pseudonym.  Or
> better yet use PRIVATE EMAIL FER YER FLAME PICNICS!  Y'stoops!
> 
> Dammit.
> 
> Andy, being a nanosmidgin hypocritical today on accounta life bein' grand!

I've kept clear of this latest vitrolic drivel-throwing contest, but I have to
say that Andy get the prize for the most inventive.  Very creative! :)

Made me smile... :)
-- 
Ed Carp, N7EKG			erc@apple.com			510/659-9560
                   an38299@anon.penet.fi, anon-1157@twwells.com
If you want magic, let go of your armor.  Magic is so much stronger than
steel!        -- Richard Bach, "The Bridge Across Forever"



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Arthur Chandler <arthurc@crl.com>
Date: Thu, 28 Oct 93 16:02:42 PDT
To: erc@apple.com
Subject: CypherPunk Paintball
In-Reply-To: <m0osfNd-000HWUC@khijol>
Message-ID: <Pine.3.87.9310281555.A27871-0100000@crl.crl.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



  Ed's appreciative note on andy's gatling-gun invective inspires me to 
suggest, as a solution to the flames and counterflames:
  Why not just designate an area of cypherpunks -- designation by Subject 
Header -- the Verbal Paintball Area. If you want to attack someone for 
being a paranoid, a sumbitch, a brainfried Nazi, a... well, you get the 
idea -- then you post the the Cypherpunk Paintball Area. Extra points 
awarded if you can spoof or encrypt your insults so that no one can 
figure out who said what to whom.
  :<)





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: hortonb@source.asset.com (Bruce Kelley Horton)
Date: Thu, 28 Oct 93 13:18:08 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: pgp versions
Message-ID: <9310282009.AA18893@source.asset.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text



  I would like to use PGP on multiple platforms, and am unsure
of which version I should use to maximize my interoperability with
other PGP users.  

  In the PGP documentation, "hmiller@lucpul.it.luc.edu" is listed 
as a source of info regarding the availability of PGP for various 
computer platforms.  I EMailed Mr. Miller but recieving no response.
Finger indicates he hasn't used that account in over a month.
John Draper suggested I contact you. 

  I am unable to read PGP2.23 files created under DOS on the Macintosh
running MACPGP2.2.  I saw nothing in the "newfor23" file to indicated 
that the PGP file format had been changed so as to be incompatible.  Are 
you familiar with this problem?  Is there a MACPGP2.23 in the works?


-bh




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: an41418@anon.penet.fi (wonderer)
Date: Thu, 28 Oct 93 09:48:07 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: My Key
Message-ID: <9310281643.AA16638@anon.penet.fi>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Hugh,

I agree with most of what you say. However, my point was,
that say someone wants to become Wonderer (I mean, it's
great being me, who wouldn't want to?), they could forge
a message as coming from me and include a public key. From
them on, they would be wonderer, and it would be more
believable than if I sent the messages myself. They could
prove they were me better than I could.

My point was that if someone sent me private mail, and I
responded with my public key, that would be much less
likely to be a forgery.

However, I will concede. Here's my public key, and after
this one, I'll sign my messages. If anyone wants confirmation
of my public key, or wants to sign it for me let me know.
However, since there is no certificate, I probably wouldn't
sign your key under the same circumstances, so it's up to
you.

The problem I have with public key cryptography is that
it is easy for an imposter to publish a public key and  
get people to believe that it is valid.

Wonderer

-----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----
Version: 2.3

mQBNAizOm20AAAECAMfolwrccyUip9pUcpLQjLSw0BWgmIhW2v1YjGOxTqJdU8+v
Nh9eXckudk6h6LCcs7KIn++PSl04HWRMm6ugMP0ABRG0CHdvbmRlcmVy
=foLb
-----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
To find out more about the anon service, send mail to help@anon.penet.fi.
Due to the double-blind, any mail replies to this message will be anonymized,
and an anonymous id will be allocated automatically. You have been warned.
Please report any problems, inappropriate use etc. to admin@anon.penet.fi.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: an41418@anon.penet.fi (wonderer)
Date: Thu, 28 Oct 93 10:13:07 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Chaos - A noun we can live with
Message-ID: <9310281712.AA21098@anon.penet.fi>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> i like cpunx the way it is: uncontrolled.

I too agree with this statement up to a point. I don't
believe there should be any control by the list management.
However, I see no problem with the democratic process
of participants on the mailing list saying whatever they
can to quiet those who are disrupting the intelligent
discussions that are taking place with useless banter
and silly flames. Personally, I always found flaming
to be an unproductive way of expressing one's self.
Constructive criticism is always better in my view.

Wonderer

p.s. something's wrong with my pgp, I'll start signing
soon. Sorry.
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
To find out more about the anon service, send mail to help@anon.penet.fi.
Due to the double-blind, any mail replies to this message will be anonymized,
and an anonymous id will be allocated automatically. You have been warned.
Please report any problems, inappropriate use etc. to admin@anon.penet.fi.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: an41418@anon.penet.fi (wonderer)
Date: Thu, 28 Oct 93 10:32:42 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Signing our keys
Message-ID: <9310281731.AA24284@anon.penet.fi>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Well, it is true that you have built up a reputation
on the list. I am trying to do the same. Quite an
interesting experience. 

It seems to me that we have an interesting dilemma
here. If we are willing to sign a key based on an
entity that we KNOW does not really exist, then what
does a signature mean? You have been an active and
productive participant on cypherpunks for quite some
time now, so if that's what I'm saying by signing
your key, then I would be willing to. Off line methods
wouldn't work in this case because we aren't real.

Something strange is going on in the word when nym's
are signing each other's keys...

I am going to register my public key as you suggested.
If you send me a signed copy, I will add it to my
keyring. Please send me your public key, and I will
sign it for you. 

The world is becoming a more interesting place.

Wonderer

p.s. I believe something may be wrong with my pgp
here at my oranization. I type:
pgp -sat file -u wonderer +cleartext=on
as someone on the list suggested, and this does not
work. What command do you use to sign your messages?
I will include a detached signature of this message
below.
-----BEGIN PGP MESSAGE-----
Version: 2.3

iQBVAgUALM/wPh1kTJuroDD9AQEq5AH+Nxou8vx4F3JsDhSDvUpy6P0yvXz2Be/F
Q32ZwM+AiBD/Sijb/XX3Z2jixDTWP/xs/lr2Iw1tmbK8RBWS4iZDLQ==
=rjX8
-----END PGP MESSAGE-----

-------------------------------------------------------------------------
To find out more about the anon service, send mail to help@anon.penet.fi.
Due to the double-blind, any mail replies to this message will be anonymized,
and an anonymous id will be allocated automatically. You have been warned.
Please report any problems, inappropriate use etc. to admin@anon.penet.fi.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: jpp@markv.com
Date: Thu, 28 Oct 93 17:43:11 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: PGP automation
In-Reply-To: <9310281940.AA28085@beethoven>
Message-ID: <9310281737.aa24269@hermix.markv.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> From: douglas craig holland <holland@CS.ColoState.EDU>
> [...]  I don't really want to run PGP on CSUNet, since I don't trust
> their machines like I trust mine, but I am thinking about doing that
> and generating a key which I would be wiling to use for less secure
> stuff.  Anyone here have any other suggestions on making encryption
> less of a pain?

  In short, I sugest doing what you are thinking about: use two keys,
a high security key, and a low security key signed by the high one.

  Use a low security key signed by a high security one.  Change the
low security key every so often.  Keep the low security key under a
pass phrase unrelated to the one you use for the high security key,
and don't ever even store the high security key on the multi-user
system.  Then use some package (like my pgpmail.el) which connects
your multi-user system's mail program to pgp.  Sign your posts and
casual mail with the low security key, and if/when it is compromised
you will be able to issue convincing key change notices using the high
security key.  Naturally you should get other folks to sign your high
security key, not the low one.

  That's what I do.

j'
--
                O I am Jay Prime Positive jpp@markv.com 
1250 bit key fingerprint =  B8 95 E0 AF 9A A2 CD A5  89 C9 F0 FE B4 3A 2C 3F
 524 bit key fingerprint =  8A 7C B9 F2 D5 46 4D ED  66 23 F1 71 DE FF 51 48
Public keys by `finger jpp@markv.com' or mail to pgp-public-keys@pgp.mit.edu
Your feedback is welcome, directly or via symbol JPP on hex@sea.east.sun.com




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: J. Michael Diehl <mdiehl@triton.unm.edu>
Date: Thu, 28 Oct 93 16:42:43 PDT
To: holland@cs.colostate.edu (douglas craig holland)
Subject: Re: PGP automation
In-Reply-To: <9310281940.AA28085@beethoven>
Message-ID: <9310282340.AA17393@triton.unm.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


According to douglas craig holland:
> 
> Right now, it is a complete pain in the ass for me to encrypt or sign
> messages using PGP.  The reason is because I have my email account on
> one of CSU's unix machines, so I have to do my posting there, while
> my PGP stuff lives on my PC in my apartment.  Usually, I check my mail
> and read news by calling CSUNet over my modem, but if I want to encrypt,
> decrypt, sign or check the signature of a message, I have to zmodem the
> message to my machine, log off, decrypt or check the message while
> offline (or at least shelled into DOS), type up a reply, manually encrypt
> it and finally get back into my term program and zmodem the reply back
> up to CSUNet and mail it.  I don't really want to run PGP on CSUNet, since
> I don't trust their machines like I trust mine, but I am thinking about
> doing that and generating a key which I would be wiling to use for less
> secure stuff.  Anyone here have any other suggestions on making encryption
> less of a pain?

If you happen to use 4dos and telix on your pc at home, I have some (imho) nice
tools which make it easy to encrypt...  For a taste of what I mean, try my 
menu.btm menu program for pgp under 4dos.  If you like it, you can look at my
(as yet unreleased) mail program.  Lagers.


J. Michael Diehl   ;^)  |*The 2nd Amendment is there in case the 
mdiehl@triton.unm.edu   | Government forgets about the 1st!  <RL>
Mike.Diehl@f29.n301.z1  |*God is a good Physicist, and an even 
    .fidonet.org        | better Mathematician.  <Me>
al945@cwns9.ins.cwru.edu|*I'm just looking for the opportunity to 
 (505) 299-2282 (voice) | be Politically Incorrect! <Me>
Can we impeach him yet? |*Protected by 18 USC 2511 and 18 USC 2703. 



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Andy Wilson <ajw@Think.COM>
Date: Thu, 28 Oct 93 14:43:09 PDT
To: nobody@rosebud.ee.uh.edu
Subject: Tim May, Detweiler and Me.
In-Reply-To: <9310281829.AA11138@toad.com>
Message-ID: <9310282142.AA07808@custard.think.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


   Date: Thu, 28 Oct 93 13:34:35 -0500
   From: nobody@rosebud.ee.uh.edu

   > Granted, Mr. Detweiler has been a royal twit.  But then, so have many
   > others on the list in reply to him.  Shame on the lot of you.

   Oh, fuck off.  Take your preaching and moralizing to the net.
   In fact, all of y'all interested in reforming our black hearts:
   get fucking lost.  I want to hear Hal Finney's description of
   DC-nets, and you are just plain in the way.        Nowhere, Man

Yo Nowhere Boy,

Come out from behind that there anonymous re-mailer,  you no-account, 
penny-ante, douche-swillin', hound-dog-be-hind-sniffin', cake-bakin', 
cant-chantin', underwear-chewin', varmint-humpin', slack-jawed,
cripple-beatin', velveeta-meltin', glue-sniffin', shit-eatin',
beady-eyed, rubber-armed, dried-drool-encrusted, paper-bag-foldin',
mind-numbin', politician-listenin', professional-help-needin',
lawyer-trustin', TV-watchin', toilet-bowl-kissin', propaganda-believin', 
both over- and under-edumacated, bocce-playin', reality-distortin', 
space-warpin', card-countin', sassafrass-sippin', channel-surfin',
ill-behaved, fume-breathin', waste-spewin', paste-tastin', goofy-lookin',
turkey-bastin', KMART-wit-implanted, coupon-clippin', rhino-horn-ridin',
Bart-Simpson-veneratin', tired-old-idea-recyclin', seaweed-smellin',
floppy-eared, donut-chompin', kudzu-entwined, se-mantically-challenged,
not-at-all-anywheres-near-tolerable purple-assed wimp!

If you're going to flame somebody, at least stand up for your 
own words with your own name,  or a reputable pseudonym.  Or
better yet use PRIVATE EMAIL FER YER FLAME PICNICS!  Y'stoops!

Dammit.

Andy, being a nanosmidgin hypocritical today on accounta life bein' grand!




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: an41418@anon.penet.fi (wonderer)
Date: Thu, 28 Oct 93 10:48:07 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Words, words, words
Message-ID: <9310281746.AA26763@anon.penet.fi>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Tyrone Slothrop (RocketMan), you say:

> It's just words; they can't hurt you.

I think many people, nations, reputations, organization,
etc. have been destroyed by "just words." Somewhere I
heard the phrase: "The pen is mightier than the sword."
Words can and do hurt. I believe the practive of flaming
has probably hindered many people's participation and
contribution to discussions on the net. 

Some words that can hurt you:
 - death threats
 - "You're fired"
 - "I don't want to see you ever again."
 - "You're ideas are stupid; take them somewhere else."
 - "We see no option but to declare war!"
you get the idea.

Flaming is unproductive.

Wonderer

p.s. I am ashamed; messages will be signed soon. Here's
a detached signature of this message.
-----BEGIN PGP MESSAGE-----
Version: 2.3

iQBVAgUALM/zPR1kTJuroDD9AQGpVAH/Y7rQ86YcC91Fi19UfyVv607NSwQu063K
c++LRh5Y7D/CrZZNkPkmiE1melwNvXruoLx3dP8w38HacT090/Jx+w==
=aJVa
-----END PGP MESSAGE-----
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
To find out more about the anon service, send mail to help@anon.penet.fi.
Due to the double-blind, any mail replies to this message will be anonymized,
and an anonymous id will be allocated automatically. You have been warned.
Please report any problems, inappropriate use etc. to admin@anon.penet.fi.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: jrk@sys.uea.ac.uk (Richard Kennaway)
Date: Thu, 28 Oct 93 11:19:58 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Signing our keys
Message-ID: <4812.9310281817@s5.sys.uea.ac.uk>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


an41418@fi.penet.anon (wonderer) writes:
>It seems to me that we have an interesting dilemma
>here. If we are willing to sign a key based on an
>entity that we KNOW does not really exist, then what
>does a signature mean? You have been an active and
>productive participant on cypherpunks for quite some
>time now, so if that's what I'm saying by signing
>your key, then I would be willing to. Off line methods
>wouldn't work in this case because we aren't real.

Certification establishes a relationship between a public key and a True
Name.  When there is no True Name, or the True Name is not to be revealed,
certification is irrelevant.  For a nym to prevent anyone else for
masquerading as itself, it should announce a public key in its first
appearance on the net, and thereafter sign every message with its private
key.  This guarantees that all such messages emanate from those with access
to the private key.  Certification is irrelevant.

What does become difficult for a nym is key revokation.  If the nym's
private key is compromised, anyone with access to it can send a message
purporting to revoke the key and announcing a new one.  Such a revokation
cannot be certified unless its issuer not only reveals their True Name but
somehow establishes to the satisfaction of whoever is certifying it that
they are the True Name of the nym.

Or as someone put it more succinctly, keys *are* the identities of the
future net.

--                                  ____
Richard Kennaway                  __\_ /    School of Information Systems
Internet:  jrk@sys.uea.ac.uk      \  X/     University of East Anglia
uucp:  ...mcsun!ukc!uea-sys!jrk    \/       Norwich NR4 7TJ, U.K.






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Marc Horowitz <marc@security.ov.com>
Date: Thu, 28 Oct 93 16:12:43 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: ["Tom Jones": ViaCrypt PGP for MS-DOS Now Shipping]
Message-ID: <9310282309.AA04052@dun-dun-noodles.aktis.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



------- Forwarded Message

Date: Thu, 28 Oct 93 15:58:57 -0700
To: marc@gza.com
From: "Tom Jones" <wk01965@worldlink.com>
Organization: ViaCrypt div Lemcom Systems
Subject: ViaCrypt PGP for MS-DOS Now Shipping

You recently contacted ViaCrypt and asked for information about
ViaCrypt PGP, and that it be sent to you electronically.
    
ViaCrypt PGP Version 2.4 for MS-DOS is now available for shipment. 
Appearing below is information from our literature, along with
details about ordering ViaCrypt PGP.


        ViaCrypt Introduces...          ViaCrypt(tm) PGP(tm)
                                        Pretty Good Privacy(tm)

        Protect The Privacy Of Your Files And E-Mail Messages
        =====================================================

Your files and messages.  They're personal.  They're private.  And
no one's business but yours.  You may be planning a political
campaign, preparing your taxes, or negotiating a contract. 
Whatever it is, you don't want your private electronic mail
(e-mail) or confidential documents read by anyone without your
permission.

ViaCrypt PGP is the perfect tool for individuals, small businesses,
large corporations, or anyone who values the privacy of their
proprietary or sensitive information. 

A software program that combines powerful cryptography with
ease-of-use, ViaCrypt PGP provides the ability to encrypt files and
messages.  Using Digital Signatures, it also provides a facility
for message authentication.


               You Control The Keys To Your Privacy
               ------------------------------------

With ViaCrypt PGP, you are in complete control of your privacy. YOU
create your keys.  YOU decide how long they are valid. YOU decide
who to trust. 

Other systems require you to place your trust in a disinterested
third party, or worse yet, a chain of faceless people you've never
met.  ViaCrypt PGP allows you to do so too, but never requires it. 
YOU are always in control.

ViaCrypt PGP is for people who don't want to surrender control of
their privacy.


                         Strong Cryptography
                         -------------------

ViaCrypt PGP combines the respected RSA system for Public Key
Cryptography with state-of-the-art IDEA(TM) encryption to protect
your files and electronic mail, and to let you communicate securely
with people you have never met.
                              Features
                              --------

    * Protects the privacy of your files and e-mail messages.

    * Digitally signs files and e-mail messages to protect them
      from tampering and to authenticate the sender.

    * Sophisticated key management

    * RSA/IDEA hybrid encryption scheme

    * Message digests for digital signatures

    * Data compression before encryption

    * Simple, command-line interface for ease of use

    * Easy-to-understand documentation


                            How It Works
                            ------------

ViaCrypt PGP combines the best features of conventional and public
key cryptography.  Using conventional secret key cryptography, a
file can be encrypted using a key, then sent to the recipient. The
recipient decrypts the file using the same key. Conventional
cryptography is very fast, but it is difficult to provide the
recipient with the key in a secure manner.

Public key cryptography eliminates the problems associated with
distributing keys. Using public key cryptography, the key is split
into two halves: A private key that you never reveal, and a public
key that you can freely distribute. The public key and private key
are mathematically related such that anything encrypted using the
public key can be decrypted only using the matching private key.

In a process invisible to the user, ViaCrypt PGP creates a
temporary one-time key, called a session key, to encrypt the file
using fast conventional cryptography. Then the recipient's public
key is used to encrypt the session key. The encrypted session key
is sent along with the encrypted file to the recipient.  Once the
file is encrypted, only the intended recipient(s) can read it.

Using a single ViaCrypt PGP command, the recipient uses her own
private key to recover the session key, then uses that key to
quickly decrypt the file.

Message authentication is also provided. The sender's own private
key can be used to encrypt a 'fingerprint' or message digest of the
file or message. This creates a digital signature of the file or
message, which the recipient can check by using the sender's public
key to decrypt and compare with the original. The digital signature
proves that the sender was the true originator, and the file or
message has not been altered by anyone else.


                      ViaCrypt PGP Enables You To:
                      ----------------------------

    * Encrypt files or messages, sign them, or both

    * Decrypt previously encrypted files or messages

    * Check previously generated digital signatures

    * Encrypt messages to multiple recipients

    * Encrypt files or messages using just conventional
      cryptography

    * Generate your own keys

    * Easily add and remove other people's public keys to your 'key
      ring'

    * View the keys on your key ring

    * Revoke your keys

    * Re-format encrypted files so they can be sent through e-mail
      channels

    * Sign and certify other people's public keys

    * Specify 'trust parameters' for various keys


                               Requirements
                               ------------

    * IBM Compatible PC
    
    * MS-DOS Version 3.3 or later

    * 640K RAM
    
    * 3-1/2 or 5-1/4 inch floppy disk drive

=================================================================

                               What You Get

    * ViaCrypt PGP on both 3-1/2 and 5-1/4 inch diskettes
    
    * User Manual
    
    * License Agreement
    
    * Software registration card
    
=================================================================
    
                                 Pricing
                (Licensed for sale in USA and Canada only)
    
    ViaCrypt PGP Version 2.4 for MS-DOS (Single User)   $ 199.95
    (Promotional price good thru December 31, 1993:    ($  99.98)

    ViaCrypt PGP Version 2.4 for MS-DOS (Five User)     $ 599.95
    (Promotional price good thru December 31, 1993:    ($ 299.98)

    ViaCrypt PGP Version 2.4 for MS-DOS (Twenty User)   $1649.95
    (Promotional price good thru December 31, 1993:    ($ 824.98)
    
    Please add $8.00 shipping and handling per order

    If you live in AZ, CA, IL, TX, WA, NY, NJ, or GA please
    add appropriate sales tax.
    
=================================================================

                               How To Order    
    
    Four ways to order:

    1. Via telephone at 1-800-536-2664 (orders only) 8 a.m. to
       5 p.m. MST Monday - Friday.  We accept American Express,
       Discover, MasterCard, or VISA.
    
    2. Via FAX at (602) 943-2601.  We can FAX you a pre-printed
       order form that you can fill in and FAX back to us.
    
    3. Via Mail.  Send your Check or Money Order to:
    
           ViaCrypt
           ViaCrypt Order Desk
           2104 W. Peoria Ave.
           Phoenix, AZ  85029
    
    4. Via company purchase order, providing you have been
       pre-approved for credit.  Please contact ViaCrypt for terms,
       conditions, and credit information.

=================================================================
    For more information, contact ViaCrypt at (602) 944-0773.
    

U.S. Patent No. 5,214,703 licensed by Ascom Tech, AG.

U.S. Patent Nos. 4,200,770, 4,218,582, 4,405,829, and 4,424,414
Licensed Exclusively by Public Key Partners




------- End of Forwarded Message





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: m-sh8481@SPARKY.CS.NYU.EDU (Singh Hardayal)
Date: Thu, 28 Oct 93 17:03:10 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: No Subject
Message-ID: <9310282355.AA00978@SPARKY.CS.NYU.EDU>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Dear friends,

      I am new to this group but interested in cryption and encryption
     and also about Public keys and Private keys. 

     The only thing I know about them is that I have read their man pages
     on the Sparc stations. But I donot still know where to look in for
     the Public and the Private keys and how to change them etc.
  
     Could someone be kind enough to give me a little
    i/p that how should I proceed on to become a cypherpunk on this 
    mailing list.

    I know it might be awkward for many of you. But I guess I have to start
    somewhere.

                                  ----Thanking in advance

                                      Hardayal Singh
      




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: an41418@anon.penet.fi (wonderer)
Date: Thu, 28 Oct 93 13:12:42 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re:  Signing our keys
Message-ID: <9310282009.AA21887@anon.penet.fi>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

Well, Paul Robichaux, actually, that message was not intended
for the list, as you seem to realize. However, given your
message, and the thoughts that it sparked, I guess it wasn't
such a bad thing after all that my lack of sleep caused me
to be careless.

I'd like to know how many people check the signatures at the
end of messages. Maybe whenever there's a questionable one,
or if someone claims that a message seemingly from them
is a spoof.

So, my question is: how do I get people to agree to sign
my key when I don't really exist? Is my net reputation
enough for you?

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.3

iQBVAgUBLNARpB1kTJuroDD9AQEiEAH/etWoc0WA89+Rb9ojM4jRQflZQNjVrnYx
r8YSYpq1k+G2W6eDPA+m0mQnWqaKGizKwPJecXkpQGfW5YawWSOg6w==
=kZgv
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
To find out more about the anon service, send mail to help@anon.penet.fi.
Due to the double-blind, any mail replies to this message will be anonymized,
and an anonymous id will be allocated automatically. You have been warned.
Please report any problems, inappropriate use etc. to admin@anon.penet.fi.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: J. Michael Diehl <mdiehl@triton.unm.edu>
Date: Thu, 28 Oct 93 20:02:43 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: pgp request?
Message-ID: <9310290300.AA27325@triton.unm.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Hi all.

I'm playing with procmail and trying to get it to automate many of the pgp-
related email operations.  I have it set up now, so that it validates all pgp-
signed email that I receive.  It will also automatically add any pgp keys which
are in an incoming message.  My problem, though, seems to that of philosophy.

I also have the capability to check each message to see if pgp was used at all.
If it was not, I could send the sender a one-time-only "advertisement" for pgp.

Also, I could send a one-time-only "thank you" to people who send me email that
is signed/encrypted.

I'm really having difficulty deciding if this is something I want to do.  Please
send me your comments.  Thanx in advance.


J. Michael Diehl   ;^)  |*The 2nd Amendment is there in case the 
mdiehl@triton.unm.edu   | Government forgets about the 1st!  <RL>
Mike.Diehl@f29.n301.z1  |*God is a good Physicist, and an even 
    .fidonet.org        | better Mathematician.  <Me>
al945@cwns9.ins.cwru.edu|*I'm just looking for the opportunity to 
 (505) 299-2282 (voice) | be Politically Incorrect! <Me>
Can we impeach him yet? |*Protected by 18 USC 2511 and 18 USC 2703. 



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: norm@netcom.com (Norman Hardy)
Date: Thu, 28 Oct 93 22:08:17 PDT
To: wk01965@worldlink.com
Subject: ViaCrypt PGP
Message-ID: <9310290505.AA17113@netcom2.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Congratulations and good luck. I have a Mac and will not be buying
you PC version. I might well buy a Mac version especially at the $99
introductory price. I hope you send me e-mail when you have a Mac
version.
 
I am impressed with PGP and would be willing to pay for a "legal"
version. I have no important secrets but may still buy the program as
a matter of principle.
 
I have a couple of (free) ideas you may be interested in.
(Consider this a customer request if there are any lawyers about.)
As I understand PGP, it generates random numbers by timing keystrokes
for at least two purposes, first to avoid known plain text and second
to choose large primes for the RSA key. If there were an option to
generate those random numbers by a published mapping from input
text then the following benefits would accrue:
 
The paranoid could compare the output of your program with others written
to the same spec to gain assurance that programs operated to spec. This
is especially critical in key generation. I would propose that the spec
would be to choose the prime from among an arithmetic sequence A+Bn
where A and B are derived from the input text.
 
The paranoid would know that the cipher text contained no covert or subliminal
information.
 
Both of these benefits would accrue without having to read the code for either
of the systems compared. It would need to assume no collusion to achieve this
assurance.
 
Some paranoids would see the threat of exposure as sufficientreason to
trust the program.
 
Another advantage is that I could run your PC version on my Mac using SoftPC.
I understand that PGP does not get random keystroke timing under SoftPC.
 
Yet another advantage would be to those who wish to keep their private key
in their head. This would require remembering and correctly typing about
1000 characters at each computer sesion. An optional text checksum would thus
be strategic and not compromise security.
 
I understand that the quality of keyed data may be poor. Shannon estimated
that such data could provide about one bit of information per character.
It might be difficult to provide a sufficient warning to users unfamilliar
with information theory on the dangers of known or guessed sayings as input
text. Unlike some cryptographic applications weekness in the random
numbers does not induce sudeen failure. The effort in breaking a public
key declines slowly with declining quality in the random numbers.
Keystroke timing may well be the best default however.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: major@dcd.wa.gov.au
Date: Thu, 28 Oct 93 08:52:42 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: blacknet international offers DOSSIERS for SALE
Message-ID: <199310281459.AA03577@belfast.>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



cman@IO.COM (Douglas Barnes) writes:

> > Trust me, its worth it just for the nude photographys of me with an
> > ostrich. (How they got a camera into that vault, I'll never know.)
> 
> Yeah? You're probably getting a cut. Heck, you could *be* blacknet :-).


I'm sure Perry is shocked, simply shocked that anyone would suggest
that.

Major



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: nobody@Menudo.UH.EDU
Date: Thu, 28 Oct 93 22:02:43 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Paranoid
Message-ID: <199310290500.AA09296@Menudo.UH.EDU>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Does PGP compress the text before it is encoded?

Does this allow a cracker to search for the compression's signature after every
attempt?

Is there a checksum that a cracker could use to test for success after
every attempt?

Would using UUENCODE on the text and deleting the "begin/end" lines before
encrypting it have a synergistic effect on the difficulty of cracking a secret
key from that particular message?

Is there an easy way to generate keys larger than 1024 bits?






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: jdblair@nextsrv.cas.muohio.EDU
Date: Thu, 28 Oct 93 20:52:44 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: archive request bounce
Message-ID: <9310290412.AA13325@ nextsrv.cas.muohio.EDU >
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I mailed off the posting archive to everyone that requested one (I think).
However, something bounced.  If you wanted one and didn't get one, e-mail
me back.

caffienated...
-john.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: hiscdcj@lux.latrobe.edu.au  (Dwayne)
Date: Thu, 28 Oct 93 07:18:09 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: hardware projects and stuph
Message-ID: <9310281413.AA29332@lux.latrobe.edu.au>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


: >  Here's some topics that I've been wanting to bring up with
: >the CypherPunks.  I figured it'd be best to just drop one email/post
: >rather than 4.
: 
: >   Or is anyone interested in starting a parallel list of sorts for the
: >   hardware-punks?  'ware-punks?  :-)  or perhaps an even better name
: >   would be The Homebrew Computer Club^2.
: 
: >3. PUNK-NET:  (see HARDWARE above)
: 
: I may be able to get a mailing list for punk net going. If people
: don't mind discussing hardware in that, that's cool.
: 
: However: I'm not big on unix (at all, actually), so I can subscribe people
: and stuff like that, but if it crashes it may take a while to get going
: again.
:   Can anyone tell me how much diskspace a listserver will take up?
: I have about 15 meg to play with, that should be more than enough
: ( he says, innocently )
: 
: Dwayne.
: 


              (Dwayne Jones-Evans  IRC: ddraig  )
     ( SCA: Cynon Yscolan ap Myrddin, Stormhold, Lochac, West)
        PGP public key available. finger me.  be gentle.
           internet---> hiscdcj@lux.latrobe.edu.au





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Derek Atkins <warlord@MIT.EDU>
Date: Thu, 28 Oct 93 22:22:43 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Paranoid
In-Reply-To: <199310290500.AA09296@Menudo.UH.EDU>
Message-ID: <9310290522.AA11750@toxicwaste.MEDIA.MIT.EDU>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> Does PGP compress the text before it is encoded?

Yes.  It uses the zip algorithm (I think) as its compression engine.

> Does this allow a cracker to search for the compression's signature
> after every attempt?

Every attempt?  You mean every attempt at encryption?  Well, yes and
no.  Yes, there is a semi-known plaintext inside the encrypted data.
It is unknown if this can help an attacker.

> Is there a checksum that a cracker could use to test for success after
> every attempt?

The only checksums are the ASCII-armor checksums, and the MD5 hash
which is inside the RSA signature.  Other than these, there are no
checksums.  Neither of these can be used to aid an attacker.

> Would using UUENCODE on the text and deleting the "begin/end" lines
> before encrypting it have a synergistic effect on the difficulty of
> cracking a secret key from that particular message?

This would give an attacker even MORE of a plaintext attack, since
this will create lines of 64 characters, starting with an "M", which
gives a regular pattern to the plaintext.

> Is there an easy way to generate keys larger than 1024 bits?

No.  However given current technology and assuming no significant
breakthroughs in factoring algorithms, a 1024 bit key wont be broken
for over a million year (significantly more, if I recall).

Hope this helps.

-derek





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: J. Michael Diehl <mdiehl@triton.unm.edu>
Date: Fri, 29 Oct 93 01:18:18 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: RE: pgp and procmail
Message-ID: <9310290814.AA05936@triton.unm.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
 
Hi again!
 
     I've gotten some real good replies to my question regarding whether I
should use procmail to send pgp advertisements.  The overwhelming response has
been that I shouldn't.  I will instead, as was suggested, put my advertisement
in my heading, like my pgp key info.  Any suggestions as to what to put there?
 
     I have also been asked if I intend to post my procmail rc file.  Yes, I do. 
As soon as I have tested it and feel finished, I will post it to the list.  I've
only been using procmail for ~4 days.
 
     By the end of the week-end, I will have procmail preprocessing my incoming
encrypted email, a non-secure key on the mainframe to sign quick letters with,
and a secure message-signing and transport system on my pc at home.  I intend
to run the link program from within Telix and Use Mike Ingle's encrypted disk
driver.  Short of burying my computer under 500 feet of concrete, what else can
I do to build a reasonably secure system at home?  Just for the Hell of it. ;^)
 
 
 
 
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.2
 
iQCVAgUBLMsjE1WjzUwifAbxAQG2fAQArUMrQBKa0o2n3HieGO/aUCZX1CsHgpXY
QluVsGK1I8JPqxVdo6hPwl4M8gE6VSNimUjo7Sp/a/UzonjdS7BkOYX+V2/1oIv3
iHi6Y0ms0FmXBP/m7/ZZq2t2BQGCmLXiJ9M4r57nnZsqagsVUXStr0vMzWN/V+fd
R3qdl3Iopps=
=VDMU
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: jpinson@fcdarwin.org.ec
Date: Fri, 29 Oct 93 09:18:24 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: ID of anonymous posters via word analysis?
Message-ID: <9310290952.aa20334@pay.ecua.net.ec>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


All the talk recently about multiple fake identities reminded me
of a research project I read about a few years ago.   A team set
out to ascertain if Shakespeare was really one person, or actually
several people.

The researchers analyzed the frequency distribution of words
found in the works of Shakespeare, and compared them to the other
writers of the day.     I don't recall the results of the
project, but that kind of research would have implications for
anonymous postings.

It is not too difficult to see how certain spelling errors, word
frequency (how often do you say 'I':-) choice of wording, and the
working vocabulary of an individual could  allow you to
identify an anonymous poster.  This would be particularly easy if the
individual also posted under their real name.

I suspect that the government has done research on this topic. It
would be useful to identify which terrorist made which (written)
threat.

This brings up the subject of how one can post without
leaving an "ASCII fingerprint".  I suspect the use of a spelling
checker and grammatical checker would help.    Perhaps running
your text through a language converter, (say English to French)
then back would remove many identifying characteristics.



Jim Pinson                     Galapagos Islands
PGP key available by finger    jpinson@fcdarwin.org.ec





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Arthur Chandler <arthurc@crl.com>
Date: Fri, 29 Oct 93 10:28:24 PDT
To: jpinson@fcdarwin.org.ec
Subject: Re: ID of anonymous posters via word analysis?
In-Reply-To: <9310290952.aa20334@pay.ecua.net.ec>
Message-ID: <Pine.3.87.9310291032.A24998-0100000@crl.crl.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



  I remember reading some time ago that the Nazis had a method of 
trapping communists that went like this:
  They'd put the suspect in  room and carry on a conversation with him 
(all males, as I remember). Then, after several hours of conversation 
about any and all kinds of subjects, they would tote up the number of 
times that the suspect used the word "concrete" -- evidently a favorite 
left-wing buzzword in the '30s. If the "concrete" cropped up frequently 
.... off to camp went the suspect.
  I think that identification by buzzwords, habitual misspellings, etc. 
could be used to identify anonymous posters. Sentence structure is also 
revealing. Le style, c'est l'homme, said Voltaire.  Of course, it all 
comes down to how much time and effort you want to put into proving, say, 
that SBoxx=LDetweiler.
  And the method is fallible. I've seen some pretty wacky schemes 
"proving," by word or grammatical analysis, that Shakespeare's works were 
written by Francis Bacon, Chris Marlowe, Queen Elizabeth, etc. It's very 
easy to be misled by your desire to prove something you're already 
convinced of for other reasons.





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: nobody@Menudo.UH.EDU
Date: Fri, 29 Oct 93 08:18:23 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: ANON: message padding
Message-ID: <199310291517.AA20642@Menudo.UH.EDU>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

The remailer at elee9sf@menudo.uh.edu now pads messages.

So as not to be too annoying, messages under 1K are padded to 1K;
larger messages are untouched.  Padding is calculated by the size of
the message body as it goes to sendmail - the header doesn't enter in
the calculation.

This remailer also caches messages until midnight; this is being
mailed out early because I forced it.

This message is shorter than 1K, so there will be some padding below
(after the signature block).

Coming soon: explanation of what I'm doing :-)

Karl Barrus
<klbarrus@owlnet.rice.edu>

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.3a

iQCVAgUBLNEygIOA7OpLWtYzAQFTggP/ZNq3NbDzKAAwflRxtFBQ9XBohHnlnYWz
gPY35v4tyLyalxMFLrjg2RXqRCZwwsMVKeXdq8x4m7m8LETV2cQyBJpHZUFJNRk6
9it59a47Uvk4MxSLWwsNE7NeBagjT4XluYjYBQqMxXc7Cu641IGUvPNpkwtBfEKy
IklE0fm7Z0A=
=eNuW
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----


FktH6kRoEhfyrw8HVOVWZjMtv4
GyLW511PVKywmZzC8hn7TzWU7btUpKc7tdB4JhJpEoDz2AwxcjGRgyVpvoss3cO




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: peter honeyman <honey@citi.umich.edu>
Date: Fri, 29 Oct 93 08:02:46 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Formal Methods for the Analysis of Authentication Protocols
Message-ID: <9310291501.AA23581@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


avi rubin and i recently completed a survey paper that may be of interest
to cpunx.  it is available via anonymous ftp from citi.umich.edu:

/afs/umich.edu/group/itd/citi/public/techreports/PS.Z/citi-tr-93-7.ps.Z

i have attached the abstract to this message.

	peter

=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=

Formal Methods for the Analysis of Authentication Protocols

A D. Rubin
P. Honeyman

Center for Information Technology Integration
University of Michigan
Ann Arbor


In this paper, we examine current approaches and the state of the art
in the application of formal methods to the analysis of cryptographic
protocols.  We use Meadows' classification of analysis techniques into
four types.

The Type I approach models and verifies a protocol using specification
languages and verification tools not specifically developed for the
analysis of cryptographic protocols.  In the Type II approach, a
protocol designer develops expert systems to create and examine
different scenarios, from which she may draw conclusions about the
security of the protocols being studied.  The Type III approach models
the requirements of a protocol family using logics developed
specifically for the analysis of knowledge and belief.  Finally, the
Type IV approach develops a formal model based on the algebraic
term-rewriting properties of cryptographic systems.

The majority of research and the most interesting results are in the
Type III approach, including reasoning systems such as the BAN logic;
we present these systems and compare their relative merits.  While each
approach has its benefits, no current method is able to provide a
rigorous proof that a protocol is secure.





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: pckizer@tamu.edu (Philip Kizer)
Date: Fri, 29 Oct 93 09:12:46 PDT
To: jpp@markv.com
Subject: Re: PGP automation
In-Reply-To: <9310281737.aa24269@hermix.markv.com>
Message-ID: <9310291608.AA04304@gonzo.tamu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

>   In short, I sugest doing what you are thinking about: use two keys,
> a high security key, and a low security key signed by the high one.

[ explaination of method deleted ]

>   That's what I do.
> 
> j'
> --
>                 O I am Jay Prime Positive jpp@markv.com 
> 1250 bit key fingerprint =  B8 95 E0 AF 9A A2 CD A5  89 C9 F0 FE B4 3A 2C 3F
>  524 bit key fingerprint =  8A 7C B9 F2 D5 46 4D ED  66 23 F1 71 DE FF 51 48
> Public keys by `finger jpp@markv.com' or mail to pgp-public-keys@pgp.mit.edu
> Your feedback is welcome, directly or via symbol JPP on hex@sea.east.sun.com


I like this method you mentioned of
using two keys, on one on the public machine, and one more secure at home
or whatever.

I meant to comment on this before...I'm not sure about the "detached"
signature, though.  What if someone created a detached signature, adds it
to their header, and the last thing that happens is that their mailer
appends their .signature to the end of the message.  The only way seems to
be to say, "Encorporate the detached signature mechanism into whatever
program you're using so that it's the last thing that happens.  This
includes things like mailx, elm, and inews."  Not everyone could probably
comply with this (especially some who work for corporations that add a
corporate signature to messages after it's left the user's hands).

- -pc

____________________________________________________________ Philip Kizer ___
Texas A&M CIS Operating Systems Group, Unix      fnord       pckizer@tamu.edu

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.3a

iQCVAgUBLNE/87ZspOMRmJBhAQG1iQP/bAdjFL+OYzYJCNgvjB/0+eW+yA5ym/NY
6JrJkGjOKgjYMJ+fZFItcxgfiRUlFs+1X+N5j51P5r78XOVK20v5La2BP5CftOmj
bLsb8Lg0hjCLtPbZWcywvPjAmA03fp3/gtFGr1rygTWGTy8cUlbRJS6FGcc0/uqZ
o35s9zrul10=
=X9yf
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: James Still <still@kailua.colorado.edu>
Date: Fri, 29 Oct 93 11:33:25 PDT
To: 'Cypherpunks List' <cypherpunks@toad.com>
Subject: Re: ID of anonymous posters via word analysis?
Message-ID: <2CD16F67@kailua.colorado.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



>  I remember reading some time ago that the Nazis had a method of
>trapping communists that went like this:
>  They'd put the suspect in  room and carry on a conversation with him
>(all males, as I remember). Then, after several hours of conversation
>about any and all kinds of subjects, they would tote up the number of
>times that the suspect used the word "concrete" -- evidently a favorite
>left-wing buzzword in the '30s. If the "concrete" cropped up frequently
>.... off to camp went the suspect.


This practice is, IMHO, extremely unethical and dubious at best!

If the world's experiences are a metaphorical "object" bundled up in
a <.lib> somewhere in the cosmos, then *anything* that the Nazi's
did should be considered completely bugged code.  Why do we want to
inherit their flawed algorithm's?

The whole point of the cypherpunk cause is to compile code from the
ground up--considering the ethics involved with decisions such as
rooting out 'nyms.  Have we decided that it is now imperative to know
the identities of those on 'our' side (further fueling this
polarization of 'us' versus 'them')?

Let's leave behind this obsession with determining who's who; it
has taken us too close to the kluged code of Nazi history!  My eye
is on the prize...  ;)


 --- still@kailua.colorado.edu ------------------------------------




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Stanton McCandlish <mech@eff.org>
Date: Fri, 29 Oct 93 10:12:47 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: ON THE ROAD TO NOSINESS? THE SAME GEAR THAT WOULD SMOOTH OUT TRAFFIC JAMS
Message-ID: <199310291710.AA04040@eff.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Forwarded message:

Date: Thu, 28 Oct 1993 16:44:11 -0400 (EDT)
From: Dan Gillmor <dgillmor@det-freepress.com

 DETROIT FREE PRESS
 DATE: MONDAY October 18, 1993
 ED: METRO FINAL
 PAGE: 10F                    SECTION: BIZ     LENGTH: MEDIUM
 ILLUST:  Photo
 BYLINE:  DAN*GILLMOR*
 DATELINE:
 MEMO:  BUSINESS MONDAY: TECHNOLOGY


                      ON THE ROAD TO NOSINESS?
                THE SAME GEAR THAT WOULD SMOOTH OUT
             TRAFFIC JAMS COULD BE USED TO SNOOP ON YOU

     The next time you're stuck in stop-and-go traffic, steaming
 because you're late, consider the promise of smarter cars and
 highways. Then consider the possible impact on your privacy.

     The idea  behind intelligent vehicle highway systems
 --IVHS, the in-crowd acronym for smart cars and highways -- is
 alluring. By using computers and other electronic gear, we
 could squeeze many more cars, trucks  and buses onto existing
 highways and help everyone get where he or she is going more
 quickly and reliably.

     IVHS is just one of the advances in communications and
 information technology that are  transforming our lives. But it
 also could let government and private snoops peer into our
 lives in new and scary ways.

     "There is a lot of good that can come from IVHS if it's
 done right, but there's  also a need to assure that privacy and
 individual rights are maintained," says U.S. Rep. Bob Carr, D-
 Mich., a strong advocate of IVHS.

     IVHS isn't a single technology. It's an expanding grab-bag
 of gadgets, computers and brains. Among them:

 * An experiment now under way in Oakland County. Cameras keep
 track of traffic on  major streets. They relay information to a
 computer that tells the traffic  lights when to turn green,
 yellow and red. The result, according to road officials, is
 smoother-flowing traffic.

 * Projects in Europe and Japan. One is Prometheus, a European
 system designed to help  cars avoid collisions, plus in-car
 computers that give information on how to steer around
 congestion.

 * Pathfinder, a California-based car-to-computer communication
 system that includes dashboard displays  about upcoming traffic
 jams.

 * Proposals for electronic tolls -- which economists and
 traffic planners generally agree would be an  efficient way to
 reduce congestion and pay for upkeep. The reasoning,  which
 makes sense, is that you should pay more to use the highway at
 rush hour than at 2 a.m. How would that be done? Highway and
 vehicle sensors, which wouldn't slow traffic like old-fashioned
 toll  booths, would know when you use  the road and bill you
 accordingly.

     Those and other emerging IVHS technologies hold out the
 long-range promise of fully automatic highways and cars: You'd
 get into  your car, tell it where you're going, and the car and
 the roads would do the rest.

     Backers of IVHS include the Big Three automakers,
 Michigan's state government and  its major universities. They
 see a potential mother lode -- much of it likely to be mined
 from taxpayer's pocketbooks -- as well as public benefits.

     Let's think about this.

     Assume for the moment that IVHS actually will  work and be
 affordable.

     What worries me, and ought to worry you, is how IVHS could
 be used to pry into your life. A rule of thumb: The smarter the
 system, the more Big-Brotherish it could be.

     Specifically, the smarter the system, the more easily it'll
 be able to track your every move.

     Oakland County's relatively primitive traffic-control
 system uses cameras, but officials with the  county road
 commission say the cameras only sense motion. They don't
 monitor license plate numbers or take pictures of drivers.

     Spy on motorists? "We're opposed to it and have no
 intention of getting  into it," insists Brent Bair, managing
 director of the Road Commission for Oakland County. "We can't
 afford to get involved in stuff like that."

     I believe him. But questions I'm raising aren't about
 what's here today, but what's coming tomorrow.

     Bair thinks I'm being alarmist. I hope he's right. But
 suppose some future road officials decide to install new
 cameras and higher-capacity transmission  lines, allowing the
 system to scan locations, license-plate numbers and drivers'
 faces into the computer.

     And what about other IVHS systems that include
 communications devices in vehicles that talk  with a central
 computer and get instructions on the best route.  Will the
 computer keep records of where the car has been, and when?

     These concerns apply to electronic tolls and just about all
 other  IVHS technologies. Will the information be used solely
 for traffic control and billing? If not, who should have access
 to it, and for what purposes? We need to answer all of these
 questions now, not  after the fact.

     "Most people are honest and wouldn't misuse the
 information, but we do need protections, just in case," says
 Dale Rubin, professor of law at Willamette College of Law in
 Salem, Ore.,  and the author of several papers on IVHS issues.

     I'm no Luddite who fears anything new; IVHS undoubtedly can
 make our lives better. Still, before we spend a few bazillion
 dollars on this brave new  world of transportation, we should
 consider just how much liberty we're willing to trade for
 mobility and convenience.

                           ******

Dan Gillmor                       Internet: dgillmor@det-freepress.com
Detroit Free Press                CompuServe: 73240,334
306 S. Washington                 313-691-2400 Voice
Royal Oak, MI 48067               313-691-2420 Fax
(Standard disclaimer: Neither the Free Press nor I speaks for the other.)






-- 
-=> mech@eff.org <=-
Stanton McCandlish     Electronic Frontier Foundation Online Activist & SysOp
"A nation that is afraid to let its people judge the truth and falsehood of
ideas in an open market is a nation that is afraid of its people." -JFK
NitV-DC BBS 202-232-2715, Fido 1:109/? IndraNet 369:111/1, 14.4V32b 16.8ZyX
Join EFF!  For more information about membership, send mail to eff@eff.org



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: holland@CS.ColoState.EDU (douglas craig holland)
Date: Fri, 29 Oct 93 12:24:04 PDT
To: mdiehl@triton.unm.edu (J. Michael Diehl)
Subject: Re: PGP automation
In-Reply-To: <9310282340.AA17393@triton.unm.edu>
Message-ID: <9310291923.AA03760@beethoven>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text


> 
> If you happen to use 4dos and telix on your pc at home, I have some (imho) nice
> tools which make it easy to encrypt...  For a taste of what I mean, try my 
> menu.btm menu program for pgp under 4dos.  If you like it, you can look at my
> (as yet unreleased) mail program.  Lagers.
> 
> J. Michael Diehl   ;^)  |*The 2nd Amendment is there in case the 
> mdiehl@triton.unm.edu   | Government forgets about the 1st!  <RL>
> Mike.Diehl@f29.n301.z1  |*God is a good Physicist, and an even 
>     .fidonet.org        | better Mathematician.  <Me>
> al945@cwns9.ins.cwru.edu|*I'm just looking for the opportunity to 
>  (505) 299-2282 (voice) | be Politically Incorrect! <Me>
> Can we impeach him yet? |*Protected by 18 USC 2511 and 18 USC 2703. 
> 
I wouldn't mind seeing some script files and the like.  You just gave me an
idea, that is if I could figure out the script languages for Emacs, Elm, as
well as Qmodem.  It would be nice if I could automate the encryption/decryp-
tion/signature process.

Doug

|  Doug Holland                       | Proud member of:
|  holland@beethoven.cs.colostate.edu | Mathematicians Against Drunk Deriving
|  Finger for PGP 2.2 key             | 



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: jon@balder.us.dell.com (Jon Boede)
Date: Fri, 29 Oct 93 11:28:24 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: ID of anonymous posters via word analysis?
Message-ID: <9310291825.AA21833@balder.us.dell.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


People interested in fingerprinting anonymous posters might be interested in a
Markov tuple analysis program that was posted to the net eons ago.  It should
be in the '85 or '86 comp.sources under the name markov3.  I recall that this
was a program that fed enough posts from a given poster would create another
post in their "style"; it was kinda fun.

Jon

-- 
                     ,,,
                    (o o)
Jon Boede    ----ooO-(_)-Ooo----         jon@dell.com           +1 512 728-4802
Engineering, Dell Computer Corp.    Server OS Development          Austin, TX
  "The problem is that _they_ see us as *them*." -- John Gilmore, Cypherpunk




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Robert J. Woodhead" <trebor@foretune.co.jp>
Date: Thu, 28 Oct 93 21:58:17 PDT
To: nobody@rosebud.ee.uh.edu
Subject: Re: Tim May, Detweiler and Me.
In-Reply-To: <9310281829.AA11138@toad.com>
Message-ID: <9310290452.AA29249@dink.foretune.co.jp>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Nobody flames:

>Oh, fuck off.  Take your preaching and moralizing to the net.

You've made my day.  I've always wanted to be flamed by nobody,
in particular.

Seriously, I suggest you take a long hard look at the dictionary.
Apart from learning many more highly useful expletives, you might
also chance apon such words as "courtesy" and "etiquette."





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: jdblair@nextsrv.cas.muohio.EDU
Date: Fri, 29 Oct 93 11:22:47 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: signing messages
Message-ID: <9310291845.AA16281@ nextsrv.cas.muohio.EDU >
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


How does one sign a message w/ PGP when one doesn't have the public key of a
recipient?  Example: when a key is signed to authenticate it, or when the
source code for PGP is signed to authenticate it.

Forgive me if this is a stupid question.
-john.



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: dmandl@lehman.com (David Mandl)
Date: Fri, 29 Oct 93 12:04:04 PDT
To: jdblair@nextsrv.cas.muohio.edu
Subject: Re: signing messages
Message-ID: <9310291859.AA09570@disvnm2.lehman.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> How does one sign a message w/ PGP when one doesn't have the public key of a
> recipient?  Example: when a key is signed to authenticate it, or when the
> source code for PGP is signed to authenticate it.
> 
> Forgive me if this is a stupid question.
> -john.

There are no recipients necessarily involved.  A signature with your
secret key is proof that the message (or file) came from you.  Anyone
with your public key can confirm its authenticity.  If you want to
sign someone's public key, you obviously need their key, but otherwise,
signing something involves only you and no one else.  (Many people's
public keys are on the public key servers, so that's a good place to
look if you need to find someone's key.  See the document <keyserv.doc>
in the PGP package for more information about the servers.)

If you want to sign a message intended for one person only, you sign
it and then encrypt with their public key.

   --Dave.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: J. Michael Diehl <mdiehl@triton.unm.edu>
Date: Fri, 29 Oct 93 15:25:23 PDT
To: jon@balder.us.dell.com (Jon Boede)
Subject: Re: ID of anonymous posters via word analysis?
In-Reply-To: <9310291825.AA21833@balder.us.dell.com>
Message-ID: <9310292223.AA13784@triton.unm.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


According to Jon Boede:
> 
> People interested in fingerprinting anonymous posters might be interested in a
> Markov tuple analysis program that was posted to the net eons ago.  It should
> be in the '85 or '86 comp.sources under the name markov3.  I recall that this
> was a program that fed enough posts from a given poster would create another
> post in their "style"; it was kinda fun.

Has anyone found this program?  I'd sure like a copy of it.  Thanx in advance.


J. Michael Diehl   ;^)  |*The 2nd Amendment is there in case the 
mdiehl@triton.unm.edu   | Government forgets about the 1st!  <RL>
Mike.Diehl@f29.n301.z1  |*God is a good Physicist, and an even 
    .fidonet.org        | better Mathematician.  <Me>
al945@cwns9.ins.cwru.edu|*I'm just looking for the opportunity to 
 (505) 299-2282 (voice) | be Politically Incorrect! <Me>
Can we impeach him yet? |*Protected by 18 USC 2511 and 18 USC 2703. 



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: major@dcd.wa.gov.au
Date: Fri, 29 Oct 93 03:43:21 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Paranoid
Message-ID: <199310290918.AA06485@belfast.>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



A nym of no particular repute <nobody@Menudo.UH.EDU> writes:

> Does PGP compress the text before it is encoded?

yes

> Does this allow a cracker to search for the compression's signature
> after every attempt?

There is no "signature". Unix compress(1) leaves a signature but there
is nothing in the math of compression which forces a compression
algorithm to do so.

Major



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Edward J OConnell <ejo@world.std.com>
Date: Fri, 29 Oct 93 14:39:07 PDT
To: Graham Toal <gtoal@an-teallach.com>
Subject: Re: ID of anonymous posters via word analysis?
In-Reply-To: <4477@an-teallach.com>
Message-ID: <Pine.3.87.9310291722.A1566-0100000@world.std.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


One could also imagine a 'symantic scrambler' analogous to the word 
analysis program, but designed to defeat it, by randomly altering the 
syntax of a post. The output might have to be tweaked afterwards, in 
order to restore some sense to it, but it would be a sort of ascii 
version of the cutting the words out of magazines style of ransom note.

It might just be a huge lookup table of canned phrases that get swapped 
in to replace your 'unique,' identifiable sentences. It seems like a 
dedicated global search and replace, combined with some sort of die throw 
to dictate sentence structure might be enough to screw up word analysis, 
actually...

Actually, the scrambler wouldn't have to be random--it could always 
produce output with the same word analysis signature. As long as a bunch 
of people were using it, or had access to it, you'd have deniability.


E. Jay O'Connell____________________________________________________
"God does not play dice with the Universe"--A Einstein
"No, she plays SuperScratch-Card Wingo (TM)"--Me.
____________________________________________________________________
Information Wants to Be Free      PGP Public Key available by Finger







From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: J. Michael Diehl <mdiehl@triton.unm.edu>
Date: Fri, 29 Oct 93 16:34:40 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: pgp and procmail
Message-ID: <9310292330.AA17022@triton.unm.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Well, I've had a lot of people asking me where to get procmail from.  I'm 
including several addreses at the end of this list.  At the momeent, I am 
testing my procmail recipes for pgp.  I suspect I have a file locking problem,
which, while it hasn't manifested itself yet, could cause problems later.  I am
working on fixing this before I release my recipes.  So that I may test my 
recipes, I would appreciate it if you would send me, first, a copy of your
public key, then a message signed with it.  Also, I would like you to try to
spoof it.  To make this easier for you, I will send you back your message as it
appears in my mailbox.  Thanx in advance.



Host ftp.cs.widener.edu    (147.31.254.132)
Location: /pub/src/mail
FILE    -r--rw-r--  118657 bytes  00:00  1 Jul 1992  procmail.tar.Z

Host ftp.sunet.se    (130.238.127.3)
Location: /pub/unix/mail
FILE    -rw-rw-r--  111459 bytes  22:00 15 May 1992  procmail.tar.Z

Host ftp.edvz.univie.ac.at    (131.130.1.4)
Location: /unix/systems/linux/util/mail
FILE    -rw-r--r--  221413 bytes  02:08 25 Jun 1993  procmail.tar.Z

Host alf.uib.no    (129.177.30.3)
Location: /pub/Linux/util/mail
FILE    -rwxr-xr-x  221413 bytes  03:18 26 Jun 1993  procmail.tar.Z

Host keos.helsinki.fi    (128.214.4.83)
Location: /pub/archives/comp.sources.misc
DIRECTORY    drwxrwxr-x     512 bytes  00:00 12 Feb 1993  procmail




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: J. Michael Diehl <mdiehl@triton.unm.edu>
Date: Fri, 29 Oct 93 16:34:07 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Duplicate key in keyring?
Message-ID: <9310292333.AA17127@triton.unm.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Lately, when I use pgp -ka, I get the following message:

warning: duplicate key in keyring '/usr/tmp/1730s/pubring.pgp'
warning: duplicate key in keyring '/usr/tmp/1730s/pubring.pgp'
warning: duplicate key in keyring '/usr/tmp/1730s/pubring.pgp'
warning: duplicate key in keyring '/usr/tmp/1730s/pubring.pgp'

I'm using the keyring from the key-server.  This really annoys me.  Is there 
any way to fix this?  Thanx in advance.


J. Michael Diehl   ;^)  |*The 2nd Amendment is there in case the 
mdiehl@triton.unm.edu   | Government forgets about the 1st!  <RL>
Mike.Diehl@f29.n301.z1  |*God is a good Physicist, and an even 
    .fidonet.org        | better Mathematician.  <Me>
al945@cwns9.ins.cwru.edu|*I'm just looking for the opportunity to 
 (505) 299-2282 (voice) | be Politically Incorrect! <Me>
Can we impeach him yet? |*Protected by 18 USC 2511 and 18 USC 2703. 



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: jim@bilbo.suite.com (Jim Miller)
Date: Fri, 29 Oct 93 15:53:30 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: ViaCrypt PGP on its way
Message-ID: <9310292251.AA03568@bilbo.suite.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain




I ordered ViaCrypt PGP today.  They said I should get it by next friday.  I'll  
post comments about it as I learn to use it.  I haven't used "classic" PGP so I  
wont be able to make any commparisons.

Jim_Miller@suite.com  (camping on the mailbox)




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Dark <unicorn@access.digex.net>
Date: Fri, 29 Oct 93 14:43:26 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Nazis/Privacy/Cypherpunks
Message-ID: <199310292140.AA20797@access.digex.net>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
 
 
- -> Observe the following exchange
 
>  I remember reading some time ago that the Nazis had a method of
>trapping communists that went like this:
>  They'd put the suspect in  room and carry on a conversation with him
>(all males, as I remember). 
 
[Stuff deleted, no value judgment implied.]
 
This practice is, IMHO, extremely unethical and dubious at best!
 
If the world's experiences are a metaphorical "object" bundled up in
a <.lib> somewhere in the cosmos, then *anything* that the Nazi's
did should be considered completely bugged code.  Why do we want to
inherit their flawed algorithm's?
 
[See note 1]
 
The whole point of the cypherpunk cause is to compile code from the
ground up--considering the ethics involved with decisions such as
rooting out 'nyms.
 
[See note 2]
 
Have we decided that it is now imperative to know the identities
of those on 'our' side (further fueling this polarization of 'us'
versus 'them')?
 
Let's leave behind this obsession with determining who's who; it
has taken us too close to the kluged code of Nazi history!  My eye
is on the prize...  ;)
 
[See note 3]
 
 --- still@kailua.colorado.edu ------------------------------------
 
 
 
- -> so...
 
[Note 1]
Personally, I don't rule out examination of Nazi tactics as a
worst case scenario model.  Let's face it, as ugly and dark as
Nazi rule was, they did some things quite efficiently indeed.
 
Take state security.  The Nazi's had so perfected the process of
identifying dissidents and quashing opposition that aside from
the high ranking traitors, war time and early pre-war Nazi
Germany was probably the most stable dictatorship in history.
(From an internal and counter intelligence perspective anyhow
[See Barry Posen for more.])  The price, of course, was the death
of many, many innocents who were just perceived as threats
(camps aside.)
 
To rule out Nazi approaches, especially when dealing with
intelligence and counter-intelligence issues (which IMHO is
basically what cypherpunks is all about on some level or
another...) is plain silly. Current intelligence practices are
based a great deal on what was learned in WWII (OSS being
the basis for today's CIA etc...) I'll begin to differ when you start
talking about medical issues.
 
[Note 2]
No one writes code from "the bottom up" in the manner that you
suggest.  If that were the case we'd see the wheel invented time
and time again.  One of the reasons this mailing list exists is to
accomplish exactly the opposite.  That being to incorporate common
or even fringe ideas into the development of code for the common
purpose (The Prize as you adeptly put it.) so we don't HAVE to
build from the ground up every time.
 
[Note 3]
One of the ways we learn is through trial and error amongst
ourselves. It's funny that the list is beginning to lose some of
the major personas that were here when I first joined last fall
(winter?) Cypherpunks was a collection of experts, and newbies
all feeding off each other to push the technologies farther and
make a social impact encouraging privacy in the process.
Where better to defeat anonymous posting and improve the art
than among ourselves?
 
This brings up a side issue for me, and incidentally the reason I
rejoined cypherpunks (aside from my brief loss of net access
when I went back to Liechtenstein this summer).  More and more,
where I look, I see privacy in this country eroded.  It has gotten
to the point where I can see no other direction now than the
centralization of government in an age where technology makes
it a joke to keep track of individuals from what they buy, to which
toll booths they drive through, to which bank tellers they use, to
what they "Publish" on the net.
I feel that a hands on approach for government becomes more
and more dangerous the farther technology progresses.  Information technology is like nuclear technology in this way, you just can't tell
how it will be applied, to liberate, or to oppress.  Either is possible.
Will something not have to give if we are to be reasonably secure
in the belief that a brutal and powerful dictatorship will not
succeed in this country?
I will be the first to admit that the U.S. is not likely to fall to
such a fate in the next (insert number appropriate to your ideology
here) years, but if it does, it will be a dictatorship/authoritarian/
centralized power the likes of which no one has ever seen.
The tools exist to make freedom meaningless.  Personally I'm
not secure enough relying on the balance of powers as the
only safeguard.  The omnipotence that any authoritarian power
would have in this country, a country where the pizza delivery
man punches up your usual order and doesn't have to ask for your
address or credit card number when you call (In 2 years will they
have to answer the phone at all?), is staggering in its scope.
 
If the Nazi's took power in such an environment... phew.
 
Personally (yet again) with the prospect of national health care,
the card to be issued at birth, and the adjoining files to be collected
on anyone who claims anything under it, I am that much more
sure that everyone should establish three or four identities complete
with documentation before acquiring such documentation becomes impossible anymore.
(Speaking of which, does anyone know if the Social Security act of
1974 which limited the use of Social Security numbers and tried to
form some basic (albeit limited) privacy to card holders has any
counterpart in the health card?)
 
There is great safety in anonymity.  I intend to keep it.
 
- -uni- (Dark)
 
 
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.3
 
iQCVAgUBLNGb1xibHbaiMfO5AQH2QgP+KkvBHohXgFMEhotPPSwFgqWta5E+KTuk
tfSSFLO0EyoERFUz6mZPU6cKFpxAgpX5aHNeHsfAwLs0WRQs+T4ZE7cJDgDS215F
gmhUaHKpBfgwQz5aoT1EHnGcLRZCQl9h2uAXubpnHUUb1d+sBWUNRnFJKkKmBIZ+
eODsv0JZHEc=
=yXrJ
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Dark <unicorn@access.digex.net>
Date: Fri, 29 Oct 93 14:44:07 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Style Analysis
Message-ID: <199310292142.AA22002@access.digex.net>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
 
- -> Back when jpinson@fcdarwin.org.ec said....
 
[Stuff deleted, no value judgment implied]
 
The researchers analyzed the frequency distribution of words
found in the works of Shakespeare, and compared them to the other
writers of the day.     I don't recall the results of the
project, but that kind of research would have implications for
anonymous postings.
 
It is not too difficult to see how certain spelling errors, word
frequency (how often do you say 'I':-) choice of wording, and the
working vocabulary of an individual could  allow you to
identify an anonymous poster.  This would be particularly easy if the
individual also posted under their real name.
 
[Stuff deleted, no value judgment implied]
 
This brings up the subject of how one can post without
leaving an "ASCII fingerprint".  I suspect the use of a spelling
checker and grammatical checker would help.    Perhaps running
your text through a language converter, (say English to French)
then back would remove many identifying characteristics.
 
 
Jim Pinson                     Galapagos Islands
PGP key available by finger    jpinson@fcdarwin.org.ec
 
 
- -> to which I reply:
 
It seems to me that the software to "filter" a message through and
remove anomalies, standardize punctuations and replace words
over 5 letters with more standard words.. etc.. has a kind of
utility.  I particularly like the two sweep translation program
idea.  If enough people used this software it would become
meaningless to attempt this kind of analysis, which looks to
be straightforward enough to give even the persistent
investigator a "gut feel" for the identity of an otherwise
anonymous poster.
It seems that the most solid basis for this kind of message
analysis is non-standard use of grammar, spelling, and
punctuation. I, for example, use too many commas.
Anyone have any information on what factors identify
posters?  Is it just word frequency analysis or...?  It would
be easy enough to correct that.
 
- -uni- (Dark)
 
 
 
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.3
 
iQCVAgUBLNGcxxibHbaiMfO5AQFVIwP+JsuNvRmE1WlFZ7wxvIybg1bTa0FO5/N7
4XrHQ0On1avtoFDjPAmA7dqgrHHscz8LiwYEx1eXx/exOPmZkA2sCg5/AVo61zv6
iBjsqd3o5IgV9L+uXmzl2+OBJ0zpdTyNxiV7VzrKjJqKVlzZgCqbYCB8tN5cOpFj
M3FnGQZfSsg=
=a1Hf
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Matthew J Ghio <mg5n+@andrew.cmu.edu>
Date: Fri, 29 Oct 93 16:29:07 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: ID of anonymous posters via word analysis?
In-Reply-To: <Pine.3.87.9310291722.A1566-0100000@world.std.com>
Message-ID: <ggoOPMG00awJE=M1Ad@andrew.cmu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


E. Jay O'Connell <ejo@world.std.com> wrote:

> It might just be a huge lookup table of canned phrases that get
> swapped in to replace your 'unique,' identifiable sentences. It seems
> like a dedicated global search and replace, combined with some sort
> of die throw to dictate sentence structure might be enough to screw
> up word analysis, actually...
>
> Actually, the scrambler wouldn't have to be random--it could
> always produce output with the same word analysis signature. As
> long as a bunch of people were using it, or had access to it, you'd
> have deniability.

I've seen a few programs which do this, but they were mostly for humor
value.  The program would pick out certain words or phrases and swap the
with other words of phrases in its database, mostly cliches and other
strange word usage.  (such as "Like, wow, gag me with a spoon" etc...)  
The output was rather humorus, but most of the meaning was still
preserved.  I saw several of them used awhile ago during the Jon Fether
fiasco on the usenet (If any of you saw that - a little 14-year old got
daddy's modem and found a free internet site, and then started flamewars
on several usenet groups.  A few people took his flame posts and ran
then thru their "filters" and then re-posted them.)

Anyway, it probably wouldn't be too hard to just swap words with
synonyms or reorder or replace certain prepositional phrases.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Anonymous <nowhere@bsu-cs.bsu.edu>
Date: Fri, 29 Oct 93 17:33:25 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Sternlight with the news...
Message-ID: <9310300031.AA21054@bsu-cs.bsu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Newsgroups: sci.crypt,talk.politics.crypto,alt.security.pgp,alt.security.ripem,comp.org.eff.talk
From: strnlght@netcom.com (David Sternlight)
Subject: News from the cipher front
Message-ID: <strnlghtCFKJoH.IHu@netcom.com>
Organization: DSI/USCRPAC
Date: Wed, 27 Oct 1993 18:36:16 GMT
Lines: 143

Ciphertext, the RSA newsletter (v1 n1, Fall 1993) showed up in my mailbox
this week. It contains much useful and interesting information, as well as
an announcement of RSA's 1994 conference on January 12-14. What follows are
some digested excerpts, posted with permission.

On the Clipper front there is a very useful and non-polemical summary of the
technical aspects of Clipper by Paul Fahn, and an article by Martin Hellman.
Hellman is a Distinguished Associate of RSA Laboratories, one of the
inventors of Public Key technology, and a Professor of Electrical
Engineering at Stanford. He's not happy with Clipper as presently proposed,
and says why.  Since the article is based on his NIST testimony, the latter
can be obtained by anonymous ftp at isl.stanford.edu in
/pubs/hellman/nist.clipper.text.

The third annual RSA Data Security Conference is at Redwood Shores, CA. It
costs $245 per person. There is no Onsite registration. Deadline is Friday
12/17/93. For details contact RSA. Registration is limited to 400 and
includes the conference, tutorials, and hardcopy conference proceedings, as
well as a cocktail reception, and breakfast and lunch on all three days.

Apple Ships RSA Digital Signature in Long-Awaited System 7 Pro. On October
4th, Apple Computer introduced millions of new users to the RSA Digital
Signature. The producs are called PowerTalk and PowerShare and are part of
System 7 Pro, a new version of the Mac operating system. They include five
components, integrated into the operating system--Messaging, Electronic Mail
Directories, Privacy and Authentication, and Digital Signatures. They also
include RSA's RC4 symmetric stream cipher for server-to-server link
encryption. Powertalk is compliant with the Public Key Cryptography
Standards, and users will receive a voucher for a free unaffiliated
"residential digital certificate, good for use with any secure PKCS or
Internet PEM-compliant application.

The Apple System 7 Pro implementation is PEM-certificate compatible, and the
messages are as well.  (For those who want privacy, RIPEM Mac operates with
the key pair generated by the Mac.) There is an API to the sign/verify
functions of the MacOS so that any app developer can use the features
without needing to license from RSA. Of course, the MacOS with RSA Digital
Signatures is fully exportable. RSA has a free signer utility for
Windows that is compatible with the Mac sigs.

Internet Privacy Enhanced Mail Arrives. Several commercial and freeware
versions are available right now:

TechMail, written at MIT, is a complete mail reading program for Macintosh
and (soon) Windows. It includes full implementation of the Internet PEM
RFCs, using RSA's TIPEM toolkit as its security engine. It is a client of
the Internet Post Office Protocol. Techmail for the Mac is available from
net.dist.mit.edu in pub/TechMail. It runs on SLIP or non-SLIP. (Poster's
note: The SLIP version incudes PEM and works fine. I haven't tested the
non-slip version and am not sure if it yet includes PEM.)

TIS/PEM and T-Mail are non-commercial freeware and commercial supported
versions, respectively, of Trusted Information Systems implementations of
Internet PEM. The former was developed under contract with ARPA and
agreement with RSADSI and is available in source code for academic research
or exploratory use by corportions or individuals on the Internet. For more
information send e-mail to tispem-support@tis.com.

TIPEM 1.1 is the latest release of RSA's Toolkit for Interoperable
Privacy-Enhanced Messaging. It permits creating applications that comply
with the Internet PEM standards as well as the commercial Public Key
Cryptography Standards (PKCS) established by vendors including Lotus, Apple,
Novell, and Microsoft. The toolkit was used for Apple's Powertalk. It is
available directly from RSA Data Security Inc.

RIPEM is another freeware public key encryption program designed for
Internet PEM. It implements a subset of PEM as described in RFC's 1421-1424
The internet host ripem.msu.edu acts as a RIPEM key server for users who
choose to register their keys. It is available via anonymous ftp from
rsa.com and non-anonymous ftp from ripem.msu.edu.

RSA Certificate Services Center Opens for Business. This article describes
the center RSA has established to get ral certificates with your name,
public key, and organizational affiliation safely embedded in a
cryptographically tamper-proof digital document. This provides the digital
ID for Apple Powertalk, Internet Privacy-Enhanced Mail, or any X.509
certificate-based secure application.

The center allows you to issue your own affiliated certificates using RSA's
Certificate Issuing System; or the Certificate Services Center can issue
affiliated certificates for you, or you can purchase individual unaffiliated
certificates directly from the CSC. Revocation services are also provided,
as are certificate verification services. Users of Apple's System 7 PRO may
get their first certificate free. (Poster's note--as I understand it,
subsequent individual certificates are $25.) For more information contact
George Parsons, CSC Manager at 415-595-8782.

RSA Licensee Update: 

This piece is a partial list of products using RSA Technology available now
or coming soon. They include products from Novell, Apple, Microsoft, Trusted
Information Systems, Motorola, AT&T, Lotus, Word Perfect, Racal, IBM,
Northern Telecom, Hughes, etc. in categories of Security in the OS, Secure
E-mail, Secure Telephone and Fax, Secure Workgroup, Secure Electronic Forms,
Link and Node Encryption, and Secure Remote Access.

Hilgraeve Licenses RSA for Best-Selling Asynch Package. Hilgraeve, Inc. is
about to release the very first mass-market asynchronous communications
package with RSA encryptoin capabilities built in. The current release of
that software, HyperACCESS/5 is already a market leader, for DOS, OS/2, and
Windows. It has received PC Magazine's Editors' Choice Award three out of
the past five years for its quality, performance, and ease of use. For more
information, contact Matt Gray at 313/243-0576.

DataMedia's SECURExchange can "secure virtually any existing DOS, Windows,
or Macintosh E-mail system. It uses RSA Digital Envelopes, RSA Digital
Signatures, and RSA Digital Certificates. It has been fully tested with
cc:Mail, Microsoft Mail, DaVinci Mail, Beyond Mail, Internet, Compuserve,
MCI Mail, AT&T EasyLink, and other systems. For more info call 603/886-1570.

Dr. Ron Rivest has a piece on the Difficulty of Factoring--a reprint of a
"classic paper."

The RSA Factoring Challenge is a list of very long numbers posted on
rsa.com. There are cash prizes for the most successful factorers. Prizes
vary from the tens to the thousands of dollars, and unrewarded prize money
rolls over into a kitty from month to month.

SmartDisk is a smartcard that fits in a standard 3-1/2 inch diskette slot
and interfaces with the disk read heads. It's a high-performace smart card
that doesn't need a reader. It has its own embedded OS firmware. the firt
application available is SafeBoot, a complete PC access control package
which is "virtually unhackable. The encryption algorithm and key are stored
on the SmartDisk to protect them. For further info call Gene Wagner or Jon
Kaplan at Fischer International, 813/643-1500.

The above excerpts are only partial summaries of the material in the
newsletter.

RSA Data Security Inc. is at 100 Marine Parkway, Suite 500, Redwood City, CA
94065-1031.

Disclaimer: The poster of this summary has no connection with any of the
companies mentioned herein, except as an occasional beta tester for some,
and an interested observer.

David



-- 
David Sternlight         When the mouse laughs at the cat,
                         there is a hole nearby.--Nigerian Proverb





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Derek Atkins <warlord@MIT.EDU>
Date: Fri, 29 Oct 93 16:59:07 PDT
To: J. Michael Diehl <mdiehl@triton.unm.edu>
Subject: Re: Duplicate key in keyring?
In-Reply-To: <9310292333.AA17127@triton.unm.edu>
Message-ID: <9310292356.AA14828@toxicwaste.MEDIA.MIT.EDU>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> Lately, when I use pgp -ka, I get the following message:
[stuff deleted]

1) You never say what version of PGP you are using.

2) You didn't say which key-server you got the keyring from (granted,
this shouldn't make a difference, but you never know).

3) You didn't say what kind of machine you are on.

-derek





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: an41418@anon.penet.fi (wonderer)
Date: Fri, 29 Oct 93 14:13:28 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: ON THE ROAD TO NOSINESS? THE SAME GEAR THAT WOULD SMOOTH OUT TRAFFIC JAMS
Message-ID: <9310292110.AA04186@anon.penet.fi>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

My understanding is that IVHS systems are voluntary. Here are
some examples of systems that invade your privacy, and yet
are considered acceptable:

 - phone bill
    an itemized list of every number you called.
 - credit card bill
    Where and how much you spent
 - school records
 - criminal record

All this information is easily obtainable. Do you think that
people will reject a system that saves them a significant portion
of their trip to work each day so that there is no record of
where they drove?

Also, I believe most toll collection systems being built
are on a pre-paid basis, and anonymity is retained unless
there is a violation. In that case, a photograph is taken
of the plate. In Europe, I believe that there are highways
that you can speed on, and then receive a ticket in the mail
when the camera photographs your plate.

Okay, that's the devil's advocate point of view. The argument
of the IVHS proponents. Personally, I believe that IVHS is
receiving enough government funding that it will happen.
Nothing is inevitable, but money talks. To combat the privacy-invading
aspects of IVHS will take a substancial political battle.

Isn't Clinton's proposed Health card a bigger threat than IVHS?

I believe we should concentrate on privacy issues as they
relate to computer systems and cryptography. We are cypherpunks,
not just punks. Those issues are also important, but probably
more related to alt.privacy or some such group.

Wonderer

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.3

iQBVAgUBLNGBlR1kTJuroDD9AQEXwwIAlu3Nq9XAxN5z6GgSETxa1/yhL/UI0dIf
CcLietZRDnknSz4m9j8WcgGqezmkzCoWUx4mSz634mdo7BNIJ+TC6Q==
=ivnS
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
To find out more about the anon service, send mail to help@anon.penet.fi.
Due to the double-blind, any mail replies to this message will be anonymized,
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From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Jim McCoy <mccoy@ccwf.cc.utexas.edu>
Date: Fri, 29 Oct 93 19:33:25 PDT
To: mdiehl@triton.unm.edu (J. Michael Diehl)
Subject: Re: ID of anonymous posters via word analysis?
In-Reply-To: <9310292223.AA13784@triton.unm.edu>
Message-ID: <199310300232.AA05517@tramp.cc.utexas.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text


> From owner-cypherpunks@toad.com Fri Oct 29 18:11:38 1993
> Received: from relay2.UU.NET by ccwf.cc.utexas.edu with SMTP id AA01696
>   (5.65c/IDA-1.4.4 for <mccoy@ccwf.cc.utexas.edu>); Fri, 29 Oct 1993 17:39:18 -0500
> Received: from toad.com by relay2.UU.NET with SMTP 
> 	(5.61/UUNET-internet-primary) id AA20384; Fri, 29 Oct 93 18:38:51 -0400
> Received: by toad.com id AA27077; Fri, 29 Oct 93 15:25:23 PDT
> Received: by toad.com id AA27054; Fri, 29 Oct 93 15:23:54 PDT
> Return-Path: <mdiehl@triton.unm.edu>
> Received: from triton.unm.edu ([129.24.8.235]) by toad.com id AA27050; Fri, 29 Oct 93 15:23:50 PDT
> Received: by triton.unm.edu (5.65/0.1)
> 	id <AA13784>; Fri, 29 Oct 1993 16:23:35 -0600
J. Michael Diehl asks:
> According to Jon Boede:
> > 
> > People interested in fingerprinting anonymous posters might be
> > interested in a Markov tuple analysis program that was posted to the
> > net eons ago.
>
> Has anyone found this program?  I'd sure like a copy of it.  Thanx in
> advance. 

I found it in a net.sources archive (which should give a trip through the
wayback machine for some old-timers...)  You can now get it via anonymous
ftp in ftp.cc.utexas.edu:/pub/cypherpunks/utils/markov.shar.gz

jim



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Graham Toal <gtoal@an-teallach.com>
Date: Fri, 29 Oct 93 14:01:48 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: PGP automation
Message-ID: <4476@an-teallach.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


In article <9310281940.AA28085@beethoven> holland@cs.colostate.edu writes:
 > Right now, it is a complete pain in the ass for me to encrypt or sign
 > messages using PGP.  The reason is because I have my email account on
 > one of CSU's unix machines, so I have to do my posting there, while
 > my PGP stuff lives on my PC in my apartment.  Usually, I check my mail
 > and read news by calling CSUNet over my modem, but if I want to encrypt,
 > decrypt, sign or check the signature of a message, I have to zmodem the
 > message to my machine, log off, decrypt or check the message while
 > offline (or at least shelled into DOS), type up a reply, manually encrypt
 > it and finally get back into my term program and zmodem the reply back
 > up to CSUNet and mail it.  I don't really want to run PGP on CSUNet, since
 > I don't trust their machines like I trust mine, but I am thinking about
 > doing that and generating a key which I would be wiling to use for less
 > secure stuff.  Anyone here have any other suggestions on making encryption
 > less of a pain?

This may seem a little excessive, but the only sensible way to use
pgp in environments like yours or prz's (heh heh) is to set yourself
up with your own site at home, either with a dialup SLIP/PPP feed or
a plain and cheap uucp feed.  Both of those options are becoming much
cheaper than they used to be, and you can run suitable software on all
sorts of computers - whatever you're using to dial in to your timeshare
service at the moment would probably do, as long as its not just a dumb
terminal.  DOS, a free unix or linux, Amiga, Atari - they can all handle
at least uucp if not tcp/ip too.  If you don't have suitable hardware,
you can surelu find a 286 dos box with an old 20Mb drive and plain text-
only display secondhand somewhere for $200 or less...  that'll run UUPC
or even KA9Q.

If you care about privacy in your email, you *have* to run it all the
way into your own machine.

G





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: gtoal@an-teallach.com (Graham Toal)
Date: Fri, 29 Oct 93 13:59:08 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: ID of anonymous posters via word analysis?
Message-ID: <4477@an-teallach.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


In article <Pine.3.87.9310291032.A24998-0100000@crl.crl.com> arthurc@crl.crl.com writes:
 >   I think that identification by buzzwords, habitual misspellings, etc. 
 > could be used to identify anonymous posters. Sentence structure is also 
 > revealing. Le style, c'est l'homme, said Voltaire.  Of course, it all 
 > comes down to how much time and effort you want to put into proving, say, 
 > that SBoxx=LDetweiler.

I had a go at this just for fun when an8785 was doing his thing.  I'm
pretty sure I identified him correctly in the end.  (The guy I thought
it was, when I asked him, said 'If I were I wouldn't tell you', whereas
all the other people I suspected but not as strongly all denied it
violently, heh heh heh)

I think this sort of analysis could be automated to a reasonable
extent, to cut out the TypeI errors that the guys who did Shakespeare/Bacon
analysis made.  It's very easy to fool yourself if you don't have predefined
criteria of comparison and a rigid marking scheme.

I'm fairly sure that a sufficiently detailed analysis looking at enough
different points of style would still catch someone's fingerprint even if
they went out of their way to disguise their postings.  The only approach
I can think of that would be successful in hiding individual style is for
person A to write something, person B reads it quickly, then attempts to
write something with the same semantic content, but of course it will
have B's grammar and phraseology and punctuation idiosyncracies.  (And
this only works if B is not a net poster, otherwise you recognise B and
work out who his friends are :-) )

G
-- 
Personal mail to gtoal@gtoal.com (I read it in the evenings)
Business mail to gtoal@an-teallach.com (Be careful with the spelling!)
Faxes to An Teallach Limited: +44 31 662 4678  Voice: +44 31 668 1550 x212





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: an41418@anon.penet.fi (wonderer)
Date: Fri, 29 Oct 93 16:09:07 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: ID of anonymous posters via word analysis?
Message-ID: <9310292305.AA22193@anon.penet.fi>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

I don't see anything wrong or unethical about using software.
It is true that the Nazis used gas against the Jews in
WW II, so are you not going to use gas? I hope this doesn't
sound insensitive, but part of studying anonymity and
the pseudonymous experience is finding out what sort of
techniques can be used to discover someone's nym. I pointed
one out earlier - watching for double postings, one by nym,
the other by actual identity.

If studying writing patterns is a viable method for
discovering the true identity of a nym, then by all means
try it. If someone were to discover my identity, I would
use it as a learning experience. I'm going to be as
careful as possible, but I would not advocate ignoring
software if it exists, no matter what its historical
significance.

Wonderer

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.3

iQBVAgUBLNF+hh1kTJuroDD9AQG96QIAo5JEYTSOAwaAdFDs9AOEbbq27Uho3b8r
T1corhWKdZVmESMYLKTCaIcxlkABUcCcZfyCS8bLlud7P4HlCSq3dw==
=RKfn
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
To find out more about the anon service, send mail to help@anon.penet.fi.
Due to the double-blind, any mail replies to this message will be anonymized,
and an anonymous id will be allocated automatically. You have been warned.
Please report any problems, inappropriate use etc. to admin@anon.penet.fi.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: mikeingl@news.delphi.com (MIKEINGLE@DELPHI.COM)
Date: Fri, 29 Oct 93 20:59:10 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Get this (from alt.security.pgp)...
Message-ID: <9310300355.AA11168@news.delphi.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



>Newsgroups: alt.security.pgp,talk.politics.crypto,comp.org.eff.talk
>Path: news.delphi.com!noc.near.net!howland.reston.ans.net!spool.mu.edu!sgiblab!rtech!amdahl!netcomsv!netcom.com!strnlght
>From: strnlght@netcom.com (David Sternlight)
>Subject: L'Envoi
>Message-ID: <strnlghtCFoIwF.IqG@netcom.com>
>Followup-To: poster
>Organization: DSI/USCRPAC
>Date: Fri, 29 Oct 1993 22:09:50 GMT
>Lines: 60
>Xref: news.delphi.com alt.security.pgp:5751 talk.politics.crypto:1071 comp.org.eff.talk:20845

When I began participating in cryto discussions here, there were several
issues of interest to me. One was to encourage RSADSI to permit a
"U.S.-legal" version of PGP. I have worked behind the scenes with RSA to
encourage that, and it now appears that with ViaCrypt that goal has been
reached for DOS, and one assumes soon for Unix and the Mac.

Another was to make it clear that I thought both that pgp 1.x and 2.x
were infringements of PKP's patents in the U.S. and those who encouraged
or supported that were acting in a counterproductive way to RSA's
permitting a licensed version. I've made my views very clear on this,
and now that ViaCrypt is out, the issue is somewhat stale.

A third was my concern that PGP2.x was the result of violating U.S. law.
Since a Grand Jury is now investigating this matter, I am happy to leave
it, whatever the outcome, in the hands of the professionals.

I claim no personal credit for any of the above developments.

Along the way I electronically met many colleages who vigorously but
civilly disagreed with some of my views and advocacies. They have earned
my undying respect and admiration.

I also met some who were, not to put too fine a point on it, badly in
need of having their mouths washed out with soap. They will remain in
memory for who they have shown themselves to be.

My biggest single disappointment was with Mike Godwin and EFF. I had
considered them to be professionals working on issues I supported. I now
believe they are petty special pleaders riding a particular hobby horse,
and to some extent a toy of their major funders. They have, again in my
view, shown themselves not above both inaccurate propaganda statements,
and a complete inability to acknowledge and correct such errors when they
arise.

Thanks to the many who sent me e-mails of support during this whole
experience. Thanks also also to the few who had genuine disagreements
and expressed them civilly in e-mail.

Since the main issues of concern to me now seem to be well in train, it's
time to use my energies in other ways. Thus I am removing
talk.politics.crypto and alt.security.pgp from my reading lists. I am
always available via e-mail, and would welcome news from colleagues who
wish to take the trouble to write me on how Phil Zimmerman is doing, how
the Grand Jury proceedings are coming along and with what result, and
when "U.S.-legal" Mac and Unix versions of PGP become available.

For those who are curious, when I need encryption my current tools of
choice are TechMail for correspondence flowing via POP Mail servers, and
MacRipem for point-to-point traffic to other Macs. I am also
experimenting with the new Mac System 7 Pro and an illustrative
application Apple sent to developers that handles internet mail within
it. I understand Ripem Mac will fit into this model and accept the
System 7 Pro signer keys for encryption, and I'm going to work with that
as well.

David

-- 
David Sternlight         When the mouse laughs at the cat,
                         there is a hole nearby.--Nigerian Proverb




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: nobody@Menudo.UH.EDU
Date: Fri, 29 Oct 93 22:03:25 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Paranoid
Message-ID: <199310300500.AA06657@Menudo.UH.EDU>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>>> Does this allow a cracker to search for the compression's signature
>>> after every attempt?
 
>Every attempt?  You mean every attempt at encryption?  Well, yes and
>no.  Yes, there is a semi-known plaintext inside the encrypted data.
>It is unknown if this can help an attacker.
 
"unknown" doesn't provide anyone with very much reassurance.
 
 
>>> Would using UUENCODE on the text and deleting the "begin/end" lines
>>> before encrypting it have a synergistic effect on the difficulty of
>>> cracking a secret key from that particular message?
 
>This would give an attacker even MORE of a plaintext attack, since
>this will create lines of 64 characters, starting with an "M", which
>gives a regular pattern to the plaintext.
 
Not all versions of UUENCODE start each line with an "M" and there are
other programs similar to UUENCODE that can be used. The synergistic effect
would also be due to the fact that the cracker would be clueless to the fact
that UUENCODE was being used, but only if there is no type of checksum or
compression signature that was being used instead of a spell checker.
 
A spell checker?? This is insane. There has got to be some type of checksum
code that verifies if the text was decrypted properly or not. Crackers can't
possibly be trying keys and word searching for "the" or "and". Where have all
the code writters vanished to?
 
Doesn't the recursive use of DES have a synergistic effect?
 
 
>>> Is there an easy way to generate keys larger than 1024 bits?
 
>No.  However given current technology and assuming no significant
>breakthroughs in factoring algorithms, a 1024 bit key wont be broken
>for over a million year (significantly more, if I recall).
 
My opinion ---> What TotalFuckingBullshit(tm) <---
 
Technology is growing exponentially. Try: "for over 10 year[sic]"
 
Any decent "personal computer" can crack mediocre DES encryptions in a semi
reasonable amount of time. 10 years ago how many people do you think thought
that this would be possible?
 
Is there some type of design flaw that limits RSA keys to 1024 bits??







From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: an15489@anon.penet.fi (Jack Daniels)
Date: Fri, 29 Oct 93 17:23:25 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: ON THE ROAD TO NOSINESS...
Message-ID: <9310300019.AA04372@anon.penet.fi>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain




>In Europe, I believe that there are highways
>that you can speed on, and then receive a ticket in the mail
>when the camera photographs your plate.

This happens here in the United States.  In Campbell, California
the police have a small van which they set up on major streets.
If the radar thinks you're speeding, it photographs you and mails
you a ticket.

Jack

-------------------------------------------------------------------------
To find out more about the anon service, send mail to help@anon.penet.fi.
Due to the double-blind, any mail replies to this message will be anonymized,
and an anonymous id will be allocated automatically. You have been warned.
Please report any problems, inappropriate use etc. to admin@anon.penet.fi.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: remail@tamsun.tamu.edu
Date: Fri, 29 Oct 93 23:03:25 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: ANON: anonymous mail
Message-ID: <9310300600.AA03570@tamsun.tamu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

The remailer at elee9sf@menudo.uh.edu now pads messages.

So as not to be too annoying, messages under 1K are padded to 1K;
larger messages are untouched.  Padding is calculated by the size of
the message body as it goes to sendmail - the header doesn't enter in
the calculation.

This remailer also caches messages until midnight; this is being
mailed out early because I forced it.

This message is shorter than 1K, so there will be some padding below
(after the signature block).

Coming soon: explanation of what I'm doing :-)

Karl Barrus
<klbarrus@owlnet.rice.edu>

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.3a

iQCVAgUBLNEygIOA7OpLWtYzAQFTggP/ZNq3NbDzKAAwflRxtFBQ9XBohHnlnYWz
gPY35v4tyLyalxMFLrjg2RXqRCZwwsMVKeXdq8x4m7m8LETV2cQyBJpHZUFJNRk6
9it59a47Uvk4MxSLWwsNE7NeBagjT4XluYjYBQqMxXc7Cu641IGUvPNpkwtBfEKy
IklE0fm7Z0A=
=eNuW
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Mike Godwin <mnemonic@eff.org>
Date: Fri, 29 Oct 93 22:23:25 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Question about Proper Names of Crypto Companies
Message-ID: <199310300520.AA10998@eff.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


A journalist friend asks me the following:

> what is the proper (as in inc., corp. co., etc)
> name + location of viacrypt + austin code works?

I know where Austin Code Works is, of course, but couldn't be 
authoritative on the other matters. Could someone fill me in?


--Mike, not afraid to express uncertainty






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Derek Atkins <warlord@MIT.EDU>
Date: Fri, 29 Oct 93 23:23:26 PDT
To: nobody@Menudo.UH.EDU
Subject: Re: Paranoid
In-Reply-To: <199310300500.AA06657@Menudo.UH.EDU>
Message-ID: <9310300622.AA04325@binkley.MIT.EDU>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> "unknown" doesn't provide anyone with very much reassurance.

Well, sorry.  But if you think about it, Shamir figured out a way to
crack a DES key given 2^53 plaintexts (I think this is the right order
of magnitude).  This is with DES, which has 56-bit keys.  PGP uses
IDEA, which is 128-bit keys.  However, the IDEA algorithm is
relatively new, and has not been as throroughly tested.  With DES, it
is fairly easy to say that "knowing the plaintext and cyphertext does
not allow you to easily find the key used".  Is this statement also
true with IDEA?  I don't know.  Also, this is knowing a full block of
plaintext, or the WHOLE plaintext.  Partial plaintext helps even less.

> Not all versions of UUENCODE start each line with an "M" and there are
> other programs similar to UUENCODE that can be used. The synergistic effect
> would also be due to the fact that the cracker would be clueless to the fact
> that UUENCODE was being used, but only if there is no type of checksum or
> compression signature that was being used instead of a spell checker.

Wait a second, *why* do you want to use UUENCODE?  The reason
compression is used is to 1) reduce the size of the message, and 2) to
reduce the amount of redundancy in the message.  The redundancy can
help an attacker break it.  (If you know that it is ASCII text, it is
easier to try to break it than if its compressed ASCII text, since the
compressed ASCII text is now binary text!).  Why UUENCODE?  Now you
again reduce the problem to fixed-format, fixed line length ASCII
text!  This doesn't help you.  This helps the attacker.  You want to
remove as much redundancy from the plaintext as possible before it is
encrypted.

> A spell checker?? This is insane. There has got to be some type of checksum
> code that verifies if the text was decrypted properly or not. Crackers can't
> possibly be trying keys and word searching for "the" or "and". Where have all
> the code writters vanished to?

There is.  There is a header *byte* that lets you know that the block
was decrypted.  Read my statements about partial plain-text.  A good
encryption algorithm will not give you any information about a key
given access to both the plain text and cyphertext.

> My opinion ---> What TotalFuckingBullshit(tm) <---
[stuff deleted]
> Is there some type of design flaw that limits RSA keys to 1024 bits??

You asked "Is there an easy way to generate keys larger than 1024
bits?"  I answered No.  This is true, there is no way, currently, in
PGP, to generate keys larger than 1024 bits.  Is there a design flaw?
No.  It was an implementation decision.  It does not mean that the key
size will not be increased in a future release.

There is one flaw limiting to 1024-bit keys.  RSAREF.  It currently
has a limit of 1024 bit keys.  If there is ever to be a PGP that uses
RSAREF, then either RSAREF needs to be capable of larger keys, or PGP
is going to have to keep itself limited to 1024-bit keys.

> Technology is growing exponentially. Try: "for over 10 year[sic]"

Technology is not growing exponentially, it is growing geometrically.
And there is a finite limit to the amount it can grow.  It is called
quantum physics!  If you assume that no significant improvements are
made to the factoring problem, algorithmically, then all you can do is
apply more computer power towards the problem.

As a concrete example, there is currently a project to try to factor
RSA129, a 129 digit RSA modulus.  This is equivalent to approximately
425 bits.  The estimated time for completion of this problem is about
6000-10000 MIP-years.  That means it would take 10000 1-MIP machines
one full year to factor the number.  From personal experience in this
project, I can tell you *there is no damn way you are going to factor
a 1024-bit number in 10 years*.  Not until every person on this planet
has hundreds of computers at their disposal that are many orders of
magnitude more powerful than today's most powerful machines, and you
devote every single one of them to the problem for those 10 years,
basically shutting down the planet for 10 years.

Remember, factoring is an exponential problem.  I don't remember the
exact formula for the complexity, offhand, however the number of
MIP-years for a 1024-bit key was somewhere around 10^20 MIP-years.
Don't compare factoring to breaking DES, they are totally different
problems.

> Any decent "personal computer" can crack mediocre DES encryptions in a semi
> reasonable amount of time. 10 years ago how many people do you think thought
> that this would be possible?

Define a reasonable about of time?  Currently, the best we have
currently is the $1M machine that can crack DES in 3.5 hours, on
average.  You consider that a "decent personal computer"?  Or do you
consider "semi reasonable amount of time" to be 10 years?

Clearly, you have a lot to learn about orders of magnitude!

-derek

         Derek Atkins, SB '93 MIT EE, G MIT Media Laboratory
     Secretary, MIT Student Information Processing Board (SIPB)
         PGP key available from pgp-public-keys@pgp.mit.edu
            warlord@MIT.EDU       PP-ASEL        N1NWH




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Mike Ingle <MIKEINGLE@delphi.com>
Date: Sat, 30 Oct 93 00:19:10 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Paranoid
Message-ID: <01H4PIVP2EUA91X82R@delphi.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Warlord wrote:

>You asked "Is there an easy way to generate keys larger than 1024
>bits?"  I answered No.  This is true, there is no way, currently, in
>PGP, to generate keys larger than 1024 bits.  Is there a design flaw?
>No.  It was an implementation decision.  It does not mean that the key
>size will not be increased in a future release.

PGP23a for DOS will create a 1264 bit key if you enter the key
size manually at the prompt. Key generation will take a long time,
and secret key operations (decryption and signing) will be slow.
Not that anyone actually needs a 1264 bit key, but it is possible.
 




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: hiscdcj@lux.latrobe.edu.au  (Dwayne)
Date: Fri, 29 Oct 93 11:49:04 PDT
To: futurec@uafsysb.uark.edu (futureculture mailing list)
Subject: My PGP pubkey has been changed...
Message-ID: <9310291843.AA17560@lux.latrobe.edu.au>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Hi,

   I've changed my public key. Anyone who has a copy of my old one and
needs to use it, I can still decrypt stuff using that, but my fingerable
public key, and the one in the keypair I will be encrypting stuff with,
has changed.  So there.

Dwayne.

              (Dwayne Jones-Evans  IRC: ddraig  )
     ( SCA: Cynon Yscolan ap Myrddin, Stormhold, Lochac, West)
        PGP public key available. finger me.  be gentle.
           internet---> hiscdcj@lux.latrobe.edu.au





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: nobody@indirect.com
Date: Sat, 30 Oct 93 08:20:51 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: ANON: anonymous mail
Message-ID: <199310301519.AA08057@indirect.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

I thought I'd describe why you would want to pad anonymous mail.

Currently, the destination and contents of email you send isn't private.  It
is possible for any number of people to snoop your mail as it travels to its
destination.

For privacy, you can encrypt your mail.  Suppose Alice has an email account
as learns that email is about as private as a postcard.  She decides to
encrypt all of her email, and all of her correspondents agree to do the 
same.  So now, nobody can read her mail.

But, who she communicates with still yeilds information.  This is called 
traffic analysis, and I won't go into it here.  

So, enter anonymous remailers (see Chaum's "Untraceable Electronic Mail").
Currently several people on this list are experimenting with and running
anonymous remailers.  The remailers accept instructions (optionally 
encrypted) and resend messages, making it look as though the mail originates
from the remailer.

Now Alice sends and receives all her encrypted mail from an anonymous
remailer.  Somebody snooping Alice won't learn the contents of her mail,
or even with whom she communicates.  (She could even keep private what
USENET news she reads by borrowing a trick from Mr. Slippery in "True Names"
 - just download everything and read what you want at home.)

Another security enhancement is chaining the anonymous remailers, 
instructing one to mail to another, and so on, eventually delivering mail. 
Alice and her friends do the same, and they continue to privately 
communicate, keeping their various identities secret.  If the snooper just 
watches the first remailer, he will learn that her mail goes to another 
remailer, etc.  Now the snooper would need to watch more remailers to figure
out who Alice is talking to.

- From time to time, people suggest a probabalistic remailer, either 
forwarding mail to another remailer, or delivering it immediately.  This
actually reveals the final destination to more remailers than before.  For
example, if Alice chains mail A-B-C-final, then only the C remailer knows
the final destination.  But if the remailers implemented some probabalistic
scheme, then each one will have to be given the final destination.

To make it harder for a snooper, the remailers decide to cache their
remailing requests, sending them out periodically instead of immediately.
Now, a snooper would see a steady stream of mail into the remailer, and
nothing coming out until suddenly, the remailer sends out all of its queued
messages.  If a large number of messages are stored to be remailed later, 
the snooper isn't able to easily match up incoming and outgoing messages.

Now we come to message padding.  If a snooper watches the incoming and
outgoing mail, perhaps the size of the mail will provide enough information
to link sender to destination, even if it is cached and remailed along with
several other messages.  So, to defeat this, the remailer can pad all 
messages to be a certain length.

The best way for this to work is if a snooper can't figure out what is
padding and what isn't.  For plaintext and digitally signed (only)
documents, this is not too difficult.  But, for encrypted messages, if the
remailer could insert padding into the encrypted text itself, or add in 
padding which would be ignored upon decryption, then it would be very 
difficult, if not impossible, for a snooper to determine what is and what
isn't padding.

The system implemented at the elee9sf@menudo.uh.edu remailer is a simple
type - it pads the message body to a certain length.  But it is pretty
obvious what is padding and what isn't - so if a snooper is in a position
to determine the length of a message (say they are trying to match up
source and destination), they probably will be able to read the message
and throw the padding out on their own.

A better system would be one that pads inside encrypted text.  This can be 
done with a pgp encrypted message by padding the end of ascii encrypted text
and adjusting a few bytes (length fields, etc.).  The message can still be 
decrypted, and the excess padding bytes will be ignored.  Such a system is 
in the works... and it is reasonable to pad encrypted messages since it is 
much harder to detect and you will probably encrypt text sent through an 
anonymous remailer to get the maximum benefit.  (If you don't mind everyone
reading what you wrote you could use a dc-net and generate plaintext :-)

Another useful technique is an anonymous pool, where everybody in the pool
gets every message.  Since everybody subscribing to the list receives
every message, it would be extremely difficult for a snooper to determine
to whom such a message is really intended for.  You could use a newsgroup 
for the same purpose - post encrypted text to some group and your friend 
would read the group and retreive the message.  

Also, from time to time people wonder about errors and whether failed mail
can be bounced back or whatever.  The difficulty here is that the anonymous
remailers try to keep information about source and destination to a minimum.
For instance, a message may be routed through several remailers; the 
previous hop may be another remailer, so it wouldn't be useful to bounce the
message back.  Some remailers drop bounced mail, others wind up appending to
a log file.  A good solution currently implemented at extropia.wimsey.com is
to use an anonymous pool for error reporting.

Karl Barrus
<klbarrus@owlnet.rice.edu>

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OFkNxCrdqYY=
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-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Brad Huntting <huntting@glarp.com>
Date: Sat, 30 Oct 93 08:19:14 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: ON THE ROAD TO NOSINESS...
In-Reply-To: <9310300019.AA04372@anon.penet.fi>
Message-ID: <199310301517.AA03406@misc.glarp.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



>>In Europe, I believe that there are highways
>>that you can speed on, and then receive a ticket in the mail
>>when the camera photographs your plate.

> This happens here in the United States.  In Campbell, California
> the police have a small van which they set up on major streets.
> If the radar thinks you're speeding, it photographs you and mails
> you a ticket.

Apparently this caused a bit of embarrassment for some English
philanderer a while back.  When the ticket came in the mail complete
with a photo of the license plate and occupants, his wife wanted
on knowing who the woman in the passenger seat was.

Then again, this could be urban legend.


brad




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: felix@hu.se (Felix Ungman)
Date: Sat, 30 Oct 93 05:39:14 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: ID of anonymous posters via word analysis?
Message-ID: <199310301238.AA27634@mail.swip.net>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>Edward J OConnell writes:
>One could also imagine a 'symantic scrambler' analogous to the word 
>analysis program, but designed to defeat it, by randomly altering the 
>syntax of a post. 

It doesn't have to be random. You could have a neural network style
translation of sentences. You would train the network by having a known
pre-written sentence as output, and a sentence with the same meaning, but
with your personal syntactic style. It would also be possible to do lexical
or paragraphical translation.

With this scheme, you can have as many writing styles as you want (e.g. one
for each poster). If you want to look like Shakespeare, just train the
network with a couple of (pair of) sentences of Hamlet.

----------------------------------------------------------------------
True Name: Felix Ungman               "Gen is god and your God is not"





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Karl Lui Barrus <klbarrus@owlnet.rice.edu>
Date: Sat, 30 Oct 93 08:53:27 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Paranoid
Message-ID: <9310301553.AA00702@elf.owlnet.rice.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

I'm not exactly sure what this thread is about :-) but I do have some
numbers:

Differential cryptanalysis of DES requires 2^47 = 140737488355328 =
1.4 10^14 known plaintexts.

The complexity of a brute force DES attack (keysearch) is 2^56 =
72057594037927936 = 7.2 10^16, or 2^55 = 36028797018963968 = 3.6 10^16
if you are efficient.

Similary, brute forcing IDEA is 2^128 =
340282366920938463463374607431768211456 = 3.4 10^38

The best factoring algorithm (gopher plug: check in Misc/ for
a recent "bits and difficulty factoring post") for a 1024 bit key is 
a complexity of 4.42 10^29.

Somewhere around 1600 bits comes a point where it is "easier" to
attack IDEA than factor the resulting number.

Karl Barrus
<klbarrus@owlnet.rice.edu>

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-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Christian D. Odhner" <cdodhner@indirect.com>
Date: Sat, 30 Oct 93 12:49:14 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: pgp bug/feature
Message-ID: <199310301948.AA25659@indirect.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Found a new 'undocumented feature' of pgp just now. in a recent message
apparently from Future Nerd Steve W., the message begins with the usual 
-----------Begin pgp signed message--------- Header.
Then later in the message, as sortof a joke I think, he he put:
- ---------Begin philosophy------------- and then later an end philosophy
and a begin pgp sig. So when I tried to verify the signature, pgp gave me
a 'Failure striping ascii armor' error and said 'ascii armor error in
signed file' or something like that. So I guess that use of anything that
looks like a pgp header to pgp within the message invalidates any pgp sig.

Happy Hunting, -Chris.

______________________________________________________________________________
Christian Douglas Odhner     | "The NSA can have my secret key when they pry
cdodhner@indirect.com	     | it from my cold, dead, hands... But they shall
pgp 2.3 public key by finger | NEVER have the password it's encrypted with!"
My opinions are shareware. For a registered copy, send me 15$ in DigiCash.
  Key fingerprint =  58 62 A2 84 FD 4F 56 38  82 69 6F 08 E4 F1 79 11 





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: jdblair@nextsrv.cas.muohio.EDU
Date: Sat, 30 Oct 93 09:43:28 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: thanks...
Message-ID: <9310301703.AA19974@ nextsrv.cas.muohio.EDU >
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Thanks to all of the people who answered my question on message signing.

-john.



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: zeek@actlab.rtf.utexas.edu (Kevin T. Kruzich)
Date: Sat, 30 Oct 93 11:13:29 PDT
To: mnemonic@eff.org (Mike Godwin)
Subject: Re: Question about Proper Names of Crypto Companies
In-Reply-To: <199310300520.AA10998@eff.org>
Message-ID: <9310301813.AA07272@actlab.rtf.utexas.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


*> A journalist friend asks me the following:
*> 
*> > what is the proper (as in inc., corp. co., etc)
*> > name + location of viacrypt + austin code works?
*> 
*> I know where Austin Code Works is, of course, but couldn't be 
*> authoritative on the other matters. Could someone fill me in?

The telephone for Austin Code Works is (512) 258.0785, but does not answer
this Saturday.  

-z




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: trestrab@GVSU.EDU (BETH TRESTRAIL)
Date: Sat, 30 Oct 93 10:23:29 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Has anyone seen "Applied Cryptography" yet ?
Message-ID: <9309307520.AA752012317@GVSU.EDU>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


If anyone has seen Bruce Schneir's new book, "Applied Cryptography",
please post a short review to the list so that others can know whether
to special order it. Thanks.

          Jeff




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: jdblair@nextsrv.cas.muohio.EDU
Date: Sat, 30 Oct 93 10:09:13 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Macintosh PGP CDEV Idea
Message-ID: <9310301731.AA20087@ nextsrv.cas.muohio.EDU >
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

I have a proposal for a piece of code I'd like to try and put togethor over
Xmas break, and I want to bounce it off of the group to make sure that I'm
not duplicating anyone else's work.

I work mostly on the Macintosh, and this program would be for the mac.  It
would be a CDEV (good 'ol desk accessory) which would contain a smaller
version of PGP.  By smaller, I don't mean less secure, I mean a little
less functionality.  All it would do would sign, encrypt, or decrypt
text files.  By being a desk accessory, it would allow a message that's been
downloaded by whatever means (MS Mail, FTP, Kermit, etc.) to be quickly
decrypted, or to encrypt files for uploading.  The idea is to have a simple,
easy graphical interface on a small floating pallete type window.  Since it
would be a CDEV, it could be used simultaneously with a communications program
even if the machine was running 6.0 w/ the unary finder.  Keys would still be
generated in the full fledged version, but these keys would be accessible by
the CDEV.  A possible later version could also take advantage of Apple Events,
thus becoming a module which other programs could send files to to become
decrypted, or encrypted without worrying about the process themselves.

I've begun poreing through the source code to see how easy or difficult this
is going to be, but first I'd like to make sure that their aren't already
projects like this in development, or if there is any body who would like
to help with the development process.

It must be made clear that I am a beginning C programmer and a beginning
developer of hard-coded Macintosh applications.  I've started to consider
tackling this project as something that will force me to learn both.

Anybody have any ideas, comments, proposals?  E-mail me directly, unless you
think its a discussion that should be posted to the group as a whole.

later,
- -john.

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=car+
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: zeek@IO.COM (zeek)
Date: Sat, 30 Oct 93 12:23:29 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: LATEST PGP INFO FILE?
Message-ID: <9310301918.AA21155@illuminati.IO.COM>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----



Could somebody please direct me to either an address or ftp site where I
can get the latest pgp-info file?  

I have one from a few months ago.  Just wondering if there have been any
updates.  

The info file I have can be found by "finger zeek@io.com"  

Any help is appreciated.

Thank you,

- -z



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P9xJlAX48Uk=
=lwjm
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: hfinney@shell.portal.com
Date: Sat, 30 Oct 93 18:13:35 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Signing keys for nyms
Message-ID: <9310310111.AA04227@jobe.shell.portal.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

The big weakness with public-key cryptography is making sure you have a
valid key for the person you are communicating with.  If you just get
a key off a key server, it's possible that the key has been faked and
does not actually belong to the person it claims to.  Key signatures
from trusted individuals testify that the key actually is associated
with the given userid.  Without a trusted signature, it's possible that
your messages could be read en route and then re-encrypted with the true
key of the recipient, who receives a properly encrypted message and
doesn't suspect anything.

In practice, this attack would normally be difficult to mount, as it
would imply some way of intercepting and altering the messages you are
sending.  But anonymous communicants are perhaps more vulnerable to these
attacks since their mail generally must go through a server system.  They
have to trust these servers not to reveal their true identity (at least,
with the penet.fi server), but there is also the danger that the server
could alter their messages as they pass through the server, possibly
posting false public keys for them.

If Wonderer, for example, communicated mostly through the penet server,
there could be many kinds of changes being made to his messages, and
he might not notice.  His key could have been changed, then when his
posted Cypherpunks message came back to him, it could have been changed
back to what he sent.  Encrypted mail to him could be read by the penet
operator and then re-encrypted with his real key.

(Naturally, I'm not suggesting the Julf would do something like this,
but the attack is possible in principle.)

Obviously this kind of attack could be defeated in many ways, such as
if Wonderer could check his postings through some other path than penet.fi.
But this might require him to expose himself in some ways (such as by
signing up to the CP list under his True Name) that he would prefer not
to.  Ideally, a nym should be able to explore interests completely
separate from any connection with his True Name.

In general, it seems to me that anonymity server operators are the ones
in the best position to create fake keys for nyms.  Eric's suggestion
that operators should sign the keys doesn't help much in this situation.
I'd say that other methods are needed to confirm that encrypted messages
to nyms are not being read en route.

Hal

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ORHMk+JowQw=
=Y8Uf
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: hfinney@shell.portal.com
Date: Sat, 30 Oct 93 18:14:21 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Chaum's credentials (technical question)
Message-ID: <9310310111.AA04231@jobe.shell.portal.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

In response to the recent discussions about identity, pseudonyms,
"is-a-person" credentials, etc., I've been studying Chaum's paper from
Auscrypt 90, "Showing Credentials without Identification; Transferring
Signatures between Unconditionally Unlinkable Pseudonyms."  This is quite
a dense and rather cryptic paper which requires careful reading.  It
doesn't help that the references got left off when the paper was printed.
There are also quite a few obvious misprints in some of the printed
formulas.

I am trying to understand one particular passage, on page 258.  Chaum
uses the idea of a credential as an RSA signature on a pseudonym, where
the pseudonym is a number Px.  The RSA modulus has, in this case, two
exponents e1 and e2 which mean different things.  (Say, e1 means "good
credit risk" and e2 means "good driving record".)  The corresponding
private exponents are d1 and d2.  If a person has these two credentials
that means that he has the two numbers Px^d1 and Px^d2, from the
credentialling organization.  These RSA signatures prove that he actually
has the characteristics described in the credential.

Now, I am having a problem with Chaum's math.  This is a little technical
but I know we have some people on the list who know some number theory.
Here is what Chaum says:

   "Suppose an organization X were to require that you have each of two
   credentials, say both that with public exponents e1 and e2.  You could
   send X separatley Px^d1 and Px^d2.  It is also possible for you to use
   the two credentials to form the single credential Px^(d1*d2), which
   will be called their AND....  To create the AND, you: set g to the
   multiplicative inverse of d1 modulo d2; set h to the remainder after
   dividing g*d1-1 by d2; and computing
   (Px^d1)^g * (Px^d2)^(-h) = Px^(d1*d2)."

It would be really nice if this AND credential could be created like this,
because it might be applicable to digital cash.  Instead of having to go
through the complicated spending transaction for each piece of cash, you
might be able to combine all the pieces of cash into one, and just spend
that.  It would be more compact.

But Chaum's math doesn't work.  First of all, he says "you" should set g
to the inverse of d1 modulo d2.  But this seems to presume knowledge of
d1 and d2.  Yet "you" don't know these things; these are the secret
exponents of the signing agency.  So is Chaum actually talking here about
something the signing agency does?  It didn't sound that way from the
context.

If the signing agency wants to compute Px^(d1*d2), given Px^d1 and Px^d2,
it can do so easily enough; simply take Px^d1 to the d2 power.  You don't
need to go through this rigamarole with g and h.  So that interpretation
doesn't make much sense either.

The other possibility I thought of is that he meant that the signing
agency would make g and h, as he defined them, public.  With g and h
then users could combine their credentials as he said.  But even that
doesn't work; his whole formula doesn't make sense.  g is the inverse
of d1 mod d2; this means that g*d1 = 1 mod d2, or in other words
g*d1 - 1 = k*d2 for some k.  That's the definition of the multiplicative
inverse.  Okay, but then he says h is the remainder when g*d1-1 is divided
by d2.  But look: g*d1-1 is a MULTIPLE of g2!  The remainder will always
be zero.  So that doesn't make any sense either.

So I thought, perhaps he really meant that h should be the quotient
rather than the remainder; it would be "k" in the equation I just wrote.
Then we'd have g*d1 - 1 = h*d2, which is somewhat encouraging because
it resembles his formula.  But his formula is (Px^d1)^g * (Px^d2)^(-h),
which is Px^(g*d1 - h*d2).  Rearranging the equation two lines above,
we see that g*d1 - h*d2 = 1.  So we end up with just Px, not Px^(d1*d2).
So this isn't right, either.

In fact, the notion that you can calculate Px^(d1*d2) from Px^d1 and
Px^d2 is pretty questionable, since the impossibility of doing this is
the basis of Diffie-Hellman key exchange!

In short, I haven't found any interpretation of Chaum's math that makes
sense.  Can anyone shed any light on this?  Was this just a mistake in
a paper which was, after all, just intended for conference proceedings,
not a refereed journal?  Thanks -

Hal

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From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: hughes@ah.com (Eric Hughes)
Date: Sat, 30 Oct 93 19:29:22 PDT
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Signing keys for nyms
In-Reply-To: <9310310111.AA04227@jobe.shell.portal.com>
Message-ID: <9310310224.AA00840@ah.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>In general, it seems to me that anonymity server operators are the ones
>in the best position to create fake keys for nyms.  

They are certainly in the best position for good or for ill.

>Eric's suggestion that operators should sign the keys doesn't help
>much in this situation.  

If the servers, however, don't sign keys, I don't think the pseudonym
can prove to a third party that alteration has taken place.  See the
protocol below, which detects signatures on false keys.

>I'd say that other methods are needed to
>confirm that encrypted messages to nyms are not being read en route.

Here is such an "other method."

If a provider of any sort is the sole means of access to a series of
communications, there will be the possibility of tampering.  If some
public key must issue forth through this channel only, it is possible
to alter the pseudonym's public key each time it is passed throught
that channel.  Since every protocol which uses communications only
through the server won't work, every solution needs another channel.

Let us assume that the server is signing pseudonym keys.  We want a
protocol to detect key alteration.  If keys are being spoofed, the
pseudonym will have to be provided with a certificate which signs the
true key, but which the provider has transmitted only to the
pseudonym; everyone else sees the provider's false key.

Assume a third party cooperating with the pseudonym.  The pseudonym
sends their own public key as signed by the server--i.e. the
certificate the pseudonym has--to the third party both both through
the provider's pseudonym server and through an anonymous remailer.  If
the server is spoofing keys, the key that passes through the server
will be altered.  The message contains a random number used as an ID
to match up the two messages.  The third party encrypts the message
received from the server with the public key received anonymously and
sends it back to the pseudonym, again through the server.  The server
cannot decrypt this message, since it is encrypted with the true
pseudonym public key, not the false one.  The pseudonym then checks
that the certificates match.

The key to this protocol (and there are plenty similar) is that the
public pseudonym key is transmitted to the outside world by a
different channel than the server.  That's a necessary part of any
solution.

Note that this protocol can be completely automated.  The third party
could be another server which pairs up messages and sends them back.

Why not just send the pseudonym's certificate with an anonymous
remailer?  The reason is that, assuming that all communications to the
pseudonym do pass through the server, the pseudonym might never find
out that their own key had been compromised.  The protocol above,
while more complicated, notifies the pseudonym first of any
alteration.

Eric




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: m5@vail.tivoli.com (Mike McNally)
Date: Fri, 17 Dec 93 08:36:18 PST
To: "Alan (Miburi-san) Wexelblat" <wex@media.mit.edu>
Subject: Bobby Inman
In-Reply-To: <199312170745.XAA10422@jobe.shell.portal.com>
Message-ID: <9310310702.AA12928@vail.tivoli.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Damn it, I'll *brew* you several gallons of beer!  Tell us! Tell us!

--
Mike McNally : m5@tivoli.com : Day Laborer : Tivoli Systems : Austin, TX
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Remember that all experimentation does not produce extrapolated results.
                                                           - k. pisichko




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: edgar@spectrx.saigon.com (Edgar W. Swank)
Date: Sun, 31 Oct 93 02:09:28 PST
To: Cypherpunks          <cypherpunks@toad.com>
Subject: Re: Mail delivery question
Message-ID: <uL60Bc16w165w@spectrx.saigon.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

T. William Wells posted here on Oct 24:

    As an operator of an anonymous service, I'm constantly amazed at
    the things that supposedly worthwhile net.citizens will do,
    without even the slightest thought for the consequences.  And
    consequences there have been, sometimes potentially tragic ones.
    Perhaps I should tell some of my horror stories.

Yes! Yes!  Please tell us all the gory details!

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.3a      

iQCVAgUBLNLzXd4nNf3ah8DHAQGAowP/fkWAwK8cuHKf8+LNY6+u8bP3T7avsf6d
GpDLUIpgD/PKhHVTChHMGjm5Ga51mFlB60dY3CxF/qyrybr2071HwAb4CkhCiDdy
guz8UU3n2iz00+HjlG4Rjqlpnejkm9AJE1Hm5Jm3a0i0bPNUtBfsD0xBhYoaVZ8K
SKAJIapQ7nU=
=Wr1L
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

--
edgar@spectrx.saigon.com (Edgar W. Swank)
SPECTROX SYSTEMS +1.408.252.1005  Cupertino, Ca





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: ferguson@icm1.icp.net (Paul Ferguson x2044)
Date: Sun, 31 Oct 93 08:53:40 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: (fwd) Getting a Copy of APPLIED CRYPTOGRAPHY
Message-ID: <9310311650.AA16870@icm1.icp.net>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text


I thought some of you folks might find this of interest. 

Forwarded message:

> Newsgroups: sci.crypt,comp.security.misc,alt.security
> From: schneier@chinet.chinet.com (Bruce Schneier)
> Subject: Getting a Copy of APPLIED CRYPTOGRAPHY
> Message-ID: <CFn0Jz.LEn@chinet.chinet.com>
> Summary: I'll send you my book if you want it.
> Keywords: Cryptography, Book
> Organization: Chinet - Public Access UNIX
> Date: Fri, 29 Oct 1993 02:35:59 GMT
> Lines: 19
> 
> If anyone has trouble getting a copy of my book, I would be happy to mail it
> to them for $45 plus postage.  (Postage can very from 4th Class Book Rate to
> Federal Express, and depends on what country you are in.)
> 
> If you prefer, you can order it from your bookstore.  (I've been getting
> enough questions about this to post this info for all.)  All you need is the
> ISBN, but here's the rest of the information:
> 
> 	APPLIED CRYPTOGRAPHY: PROTOCOLS, ALGORITHMS, AND SOURCE CODE IN C
> 	Bruce Schneier
> 	John Wiley & Sons, 1994
> 	ISBN: 0-471-59756-2
> 	$44.95
> 
> I am currently attempting to get permission to put the index on line.
> 
> Bruce

_____________________________________________________________________________
Paul Ferguson                                                               
Mindbank Consulting Group                                    fergp@sytex.com   
Fairfax, Virginia  USA                                       ferguson@icp.net



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Anonymous <nowhere@bsu-cs.bsu.edu>
Date: Sun, 31 Oct 93 09:23:40 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: The lighter side of computing...
Message-ID: <9310311722.AA00610@bsu-cs.bsu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Although this cross-post is off-topic, I thought perhaps many
of you would find it as humorous as I did. If not,
sorry for the bandwidth.


From: mnemonic@eff.org (Mike Godwin)
Newsgroups: comp.org.eff.talk,talk.politics.crypto,misc.legal,alt.security.pgp
Subject: Re: "Honest argumentation"
Date: 30 Oct 1993 09:14:45 -0400
Organization: Electronic Frontier Foundation
Lines: 55
Message-ID: <2atpc5$cds@eff.org>
References: <strnlghtCFKFLy.DtC@netcom.com> <CFo1Gs.AyH@cs.uiuc.edu> <strnlghtCFo7uo.BGx@netcom.com> <2atp3u$cca@eff.org>
NNTP-Posting-Host: eff.org

In article <strnlghtCFo7uo.BGx@netcom.com>,
David Sternlight <david@sternlight.com> wrote:

>Courts have discussed this point in the past. There was a famous case in
>which a distinction was made between "the sound seemed to wander" and "the
>sound wandered." (Bose vs. Consumers Union). One cannot assume that Mike's
>usage (particularly since he is an attorney) meant "seemed" unless he said
>so. He did not. He said "is".

Interesting that you should apply a product libel case to your own
situation. Are you a product, David? Which manufacturer produced you?

A better precedent, of course, is Gertz v. Robert Welch Inc. David
Sternlight, after having thrust himself into the vortex of public opinion,
will find it hard to avail himself of the protections against reputational
damage that a private citizen has.

My statement falls so clearly within the area of non-actionable speech
that your case would lose on summary judgment. I'd move for sanctions, of
course, since Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, as well as
comparable state rules, sanction the initiation of frivolous lawsuits.
Ask your attorneys how they like Rule 11 sanctions, David. Whoever those
attorneys are, that is.

>Since it is a remark that goes to a matter of fact and is false, and more
>than that, Mike has no knowledge of my study of the history of press freedom
>in this country, and finally, since he is an attorney, this is considerably
>more than some layman's ad hominem.

First, it's not false.

Second, libel law doesn't distinguish between lawyer statements of fact
and non-lawyer statements of fact.

Third, it's not an ad hominem, as that term is used precisely.

>It is quite material to my view of EFF that one of their attorneys should
>post, over their name, a message that I am advised is defamatory.

Please, please don't dig yourself any deeper. If you like, I can give you
some examples of truly defamatory and non-defamatory statements, so you
can learn the distinction. 

In the meantime, I await the letter from your "attorneys." Nothing would
give me more pleasure than to slamdunk a frivolous libel suit.


--Mike


-- 
Mike Godwin, (202) 347-5400 |"In our sleep, pain which cannot forget
mnemonic@eff.org            | falls drop by drop upon the heart until, 
Electronic Frontier         | in our own despair, against our will, comes
Foundation                  | wisdom through the awful grace of God."

-------end forwarded article----------





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: a2@ah.com (Arthur Abraham)
Date: Sun, 31 Oct 93 15:23:44 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: NSA Security
Message-ID: <9310312317.AA00275@ah.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text


Seymour M. Hersh, writing in the November 1, 1993 _New Yorker_, comments:

"...current and former high-ranking officials with access to intelligence,
whose information has been extremely reliable in the past, specifically
told me that the National Security Agency, which is responsible for 
electronic intelligence, had produced no significant high-level intercepts
from Iraq in years.  American intellignece experts have concluded that
the Reagan Adminstration's policy of providing satellite and communications
intelligence to Iraq in the mid-nineteen-eighties had an unwelcome side
effect: the Iraqi intelligence service learned how to hide its important
communications from the N.S.A.'s many sensors."

I am posting this to help provide an insight into some of NSA's motivations.

If you think this is disinformation, consider the motives for creating it --
the insights are similar.


-a2



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: mikeingl@news.delphi.com (MIKEINGLE@DELPHI.COM)
Date: Sun, 31 Oct 93 13:43:45 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Secure Phone Progress (fwd)
Message-ID: <9310312142.AA28209@news.delphi.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



>Path: news.delphi.com!noc.near.net!howland.reston.ans.net!math.ohio-state.edu!caen!usenet.cis.ufl.edu!usenet.ufl.edu!travis.csd.harris.com!amber!tom
>From: tom@ssd.csd.harris.com (Tom Horsley)
>Newsgroups: sci.crypt,talk.politics.crypto
>Subject: New IBM soundcard and secure phones
>Date: 28 Oct 1993 11:55:54 GMT
>Organization: Harris Computer Systems Division
>Lines: 24
>Message-ID: <TOM.93Oct28075554@amber.ssd.csd.harris.com>
>NNTP-Posting-Host: amber.ssd.csd.harris.com
>Xref: news.delphi.com sci.crypt:13815 talk.politics.crypto:983

Over in the comp.sys.ibm.pc.soundcard group there have been a couple of
brief mentions of the new "Windsurfer" card from IBM. It apparently
incorporates a couple of DSP chips, a 14.4K modem, a soundblaster emulator,
general midi, kitchen sink, etc :-).

I don't know if these DSP chips will be user programmable or not, but if so,
this sounds like the one board you need to build your very own secure
phone. The 14.4K modem for sending the data, the DSP chips for audio
compression, and the sound board for digitizing speach and playing it
back. Throw in a little private key exchange via RSA or equivalent at the
start of the connection, and use triple DES or IDEA on the data (of course,
the person at the other end needs the same setup).

Does anyone have any more details on this board (like, will it be user
programmable, and will the specs be available for less than your firstborn
child :-)?
--
======================================================================
domain: tahorsley@csd.harris.com       USMail: Tom Horsley
+=============================================+511 Kingbird Circle
Don't have awk? Use this simple sh emulation: |Delray Beach, FL  33444
#!/bin/sh                                     +======================+
echo 'Awk bailing out!'
exit 2




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Michael J Kirwin <mkirwin@magnus.acs.ohio-state.edu>
Date: Sun, 31 Oct 93 16:33:46 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Hardware encryption device...
Message-ID: <9311010029.AA22649@bottom.magnus.acs.ohio-state.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


     Hey 'Punks!  I found a kit to build a hardware encryption device.  The 
whole kit costs less than $120 and both partys need one.  There rather slow 
however, the top speed is only 1200 baud.  I found the article on it BYTE 
September '86.  Here's the address of the place that sells the kit
     CCI
     P.O. Box 428
     Tolland, CT 06084

     If anybody does get this kit and trys it out I would be interested in how 
it turns out.  Drop me a line.  Thanks, Michael
          mkirwin@acs.ohio-state.edu




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: jim@Tadpole.COM (Jim Thompson)
Date: Sun, 31 Oct 93 19:29:39 PST
To: mg5n+@andrew.cmu.edu
Subject: Re: Secure Phone Progress (fwd)
Message-ID: <9311010328.AA04235@tadpole.Tadpole.COM>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Most (US-based) phone equipment can't deal with clear channels, (ok,
long strings of zero data) thus, a DS0 (the cannonical single voice
call) operates with one bit always set 'on', so your 64kbps channel is now
a 56kbps channel.  4:1 compression would get you to (just) inside the magic
'14400' bps limit of v.32bis signaling.  Such algorithms exist, though their
performance on data with characteristics like 'voice' is poor at worst.

CLEP is a speech encoding algorithm (compressor) that can work well inside
a 4800bps channel.  It is, however, quite expensive in terms of CPU power.
A DSP would help here.  :-)  CLEP also tends to diminish the dynamic range of
its input, with a resulting loss of 'quality'.

Writing things in assembly is not a magic bullet, making the algorithm go faster
just as a consequence of it being hand-rolled.

The v.fast (28000 bps) modes may, or may not work at 28000 bps between any two
endpoints. (subscribers).

Jim





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Matthew J Ghio <mg5n+@andrew.cmu.edu>
Date: Sun, 31 Oct 93 18:39:39 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Secure Phone Progress (fwd)
In-Reply-To: <9310312142.AA28209@news.delphi.com>
Message-ID: <0gp7NE600awUQ5lkYP@andrew.cmu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


mikeingl@news.delphi.com (MIKEINGLE@DELPHI.COM) wrote:

> Over in the comp.sys.ibm.pc.soundcard group there have been a couple of
> brief mentions of the new "Windsurfer" card from IBM. It apparently
> incorporates a couple of DSP chips, a 14.4K modem, a soundblaster
> emulator, general midi, kitchen sink, etc :-).
>
> I don't know if these DSP chips will be user programmable or not, but
> if so, this sounds like the one board you need to build your very
> own secure phone. The 14.4K modem for sending the data, the DSP
> chips for audio compression, and the sound board for digitizing speach
> and playing it back. Throw in a little private key exchange via RSA
> or equivalent at the start of the connection, and use triple DES or IDEA
> on the data (of course, the person at the other end needs the same setup).

Um...  Well, you should be able to do that with an ordinary sound
board/digitizer and a modem.  However, 14400 bps (without compression)
isn't enough to transmit sound waves at normal frequencies.  Since the
range of human hearing is up to about 20000 hz, you need a sampling rate
of 40000hz to get at least a crude sample of all possible frequencies. 
(Most telecom equipment uses 64000 bps to transmit voice conversations.)
 But that's where compression comes in.  You could probably do without
the DSPs and just use the main CPU to do it.  Since sound data would be
coming in at 40000-60000 bytes/sec (or bits/sec or...?) and output would
be going out at 1440 bytes/sec and your cpu can do several million
instructions per second, you have several hundred to several thousand
cycles to process the data, which should be sufficient time.  (I assume
you would write this in assembly.)  The only real problem is to design a
compression technique which can squeeze that much data into a 14400bps
connection without losing too much sound quality, which would have to be
a pretty good compression technique.  It would probably be easier if you
had one of those 28800 bps modems that are supposed to be out soon...

As for the encryption part of it, If CPU load became a problem, you
wouldn't really need to use Triple-DES or IDEA, you could use something
simpler.  Remember that breaking a cypher requires they you have some
idea as to what your looking for so you know you've cracked it. 
Compressing the data would remove such identifing data and make breaking
the code more difficult.  Also, if you had the system reset itself
during dead time (no sound) or whenever it encountered line noise or
whatever by generating a new encryption key and doing a key exchange
with RSA, then even if someone broke the code, they wouldn't get much of
a prize - just a few seconds of your conversation, which would likely
tell them very little.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: karn@qualcomm.com (Phil Karn)
Date: Sun, 31 Oct 93 20:59:42 PST
To: Matthew J Ghio <cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Secure Phone Progress (fwd)
Message-ID: <9311010457.AA13960@servo>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



>Um...  Well, you should be able to do that with an ordinary sound
>board/digitizer and a modem.  However, 14400 bps (without compression)
>isn't enough to transmit sound waves at normal frequencies.
[...]

There are a few minor misstatements in this note. Standard telephony
samples 8000 times per second, with 8 bits per sample. You can
easily sample fast enough to get all important speech frequencies into
14400 bps -- at the expense of reducing the resolution of each sample.
The resulting speech would be understandable, but highly distorted.

There are many other speech coding methods that work somewhat better,
including various forms of delta modulation (sending just the differences
between adjacent samples). These are probably the best in the bang-for-buck
department (Motorola's CVSD is already widely used in secure voice radios
operating at 16 kb/s or so). 

But if you really want high quality at low data rates, you pretty much have
to use a vocoder. All of the methods mentioned above try to reproduce the
(important parts of) the speech waveform.  Vocoders work by modeling
the human vocal tract and sending the parameters that describe it at any
particular moment, instead of attempting to encode the actual waveform.
Since these parameters correspond to things that move relatively slowly
in the modeled system (e.g., the muscles of the tongue, jaw, lips, etc)
they consume much less bandwidth than the actual sound that's produced.

What makes CELP so computationally expensive is the "C" part. CELP
stands for Codebook Excited Linear Prediction. The modeling scheme I
just mentioned is the Linear Prediction part; the Codebook Excitation
part is used to drive it. It corresponds to the vocal cords in the vocal tract.
As I understand it, the analyzer picks an entry in a predefined "codebook"
that produces the best results, i.e., synthesized speech that most closely
matches the original sound. This is a fairly brute-force process; we're talking
tens of DSP MIPS to do this in real time.  I don't  know anyone who has
done it in assembler on a widely available general purpose CPU, but I
would be ecstatic to be proven wrong.

Phil




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: nobody@alumni.cco.caltech.edu
Date: Sun, 31 Oct 93 22:33:47 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: ANON: remailer list
Message-ID: <9311010626.AA11320@alumni.cco.caltech.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

Cypherpunk anonymous remailers, 11/1/93

Q1: What are the anonymous remailers?

A1:

 1: remailer%chaos@bsu.edu
 2: nowhere@bsu-cs.bsu.edu
 3: hh@cicada.berkeley.edu
 4: hh@pmantis.berkeley.edu
 5: hh@soda.berkeley.edu
 6: 00x@uclink.berkeley.edu
 7: cdodhner@indirect.com
 8: hal@alumni.caltech.edu
 9: cs60a-qu@cory.eecs.berkeley.edu
10: ebrandt@jarthur.claremont.edu
11: catalyst@netcom.com
12: sameer@netcom.com
13: remailer@rebma.mn.org
14: elee6ue@rosebud.ee.uh.edu
15: elee7h5@rosebud.ee.uh.edu
16: hfinney@shell.portal.com
17: sameer@soda.berkeley.edu
18: remail@tamsun.tamu.edu
19: remail@tamaix.tamu.edu
20: remailer@utter.dis.org
21: remailer@entropy.linet.org
22: elee9sf@menudo.uh.edu
23: remail@extropia.wimsey.com

NOTES: 

1-7		no encryption of remailing requests
8-22		support encrypted remailing requests
23		special - header and message must be encrypted together
13,20,21,23	introduce larger than average delay (not direct connect)
13,20,23	running on privately owned machines
14		requires "cash" payment for remailing
22		supports RIPEM encryption, caches remailing requests

======================================================================

Q2: What help is available?

A2:

Check out the pub/cypherpunks/remailer directory at soda.berkeley.edu
(128.32.149.19).  

chain.zip             - program that helps with using remailers
dosbat.zip            - MSDOS batch files that help with using remailers
hal's.instructions.gz - in depth instruction on how to use
hal's.remailer.gz     - remailer code
pubkeys.tar.gz        - public keys of remailers which support encryption
pubkeys.zip           - MSDOS zip file of public keys
scripts.tar.gz        - scripts that help with using remailers

For MAC's, at 129.82.156.104 in /pub/pgpc/ are two files:
pgpc22.tar.gz, pgpc22.tar.Z which assist in using the anonymous
remailers, including anon.penet.fi.

Mail to me (klbarrus@owlnet.rice.edu) for further help and/or questions.

======================================================================

Q3.  Email-to-Usenet gateways?

A3.

 1: group-name@cs.utexas.edu
 2: group.name.usenet@decwrl.dec.com
 3: group.name@news.demon.co.uk
 4: group.name@news.cs.indiana.edu
 5: group-name@pws.bull.com
 6: group-name@ucbvax.berkeley.edu

NOTES:

*  This does not include ones that work for single groups, like twwells.com.
#6 blocks from non-berkeley sites (so use the berkeley remailers :-)

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From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Perry E. Metzger" <pmetzger@lehman.com>
Date: Sun, 31 Oct 93 19:44:39 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Secure Phone Progress (fwd)
In-Reply-To: <9311010328.AA04235@tadpole.Tadpole.COM>
Message-ID: <9311010343.AA24968@snark.lehman.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Jim Thompson says:
> CLEP is a speech encoding algorithm (compressor) that can work well inside

That "CELP". I thought it was a misprint, but you wrote it more than
once that way. 

.pm




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Derek Atkins <warlord@MIT.EDU>
Date: Sun, 31 Oct 93 19:53:47 PST
To: Matthew J Ghio <mg5n+@andrew.cmu.edu>
Subject: Re: Secure Phone Progress (fwd)
In-Reply-To: <0gp7NE600awUQ5lkYP@andrew.cmu.edu>
Message-ID: <9311010351.AA03794@hodge.MIT.EDU>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Matt, 

There are a few flaws in your statements.  You are correct that human
hearing is up to 20 kHz, and again with the 40 kHz sampling (this is
why CD is 44.1 kHz, to be able to fully obtain a 40 kHz sample with
non-ideal filters).

However, we are talking about Secure Phones.  Phones have a dynamic
range of 3.6 kHz, with a sampling of 8000 samples/sec!  Also, the
phone uses 8-bit mu-law data, for the 64000 bits/sec that you commonly
hear.

So, without compression, you need a 64 Kbps link to transmit
phone-quality audio.  The problem with a Secure Phone is getting the
data compression to reduce the data to below 14.4 Kbps, in order to
use a 14.4 Kbps modem.  You need a real-time compression to do this,
which is where the DSP chips come in!  The encryption isn't a problem,
as most encryption algorithms can easily do 64 Kbps!

-derek

         Derek Atkins, SB '93 MIT EE, G MIT Media Laboratory
     Secretary, MIT Student Information Processing Board (SIPB)
         PGP key available from pgp-public-keys@pgp.mit.edu
            warlord@MIT.EDU       PP-ASEL        N1NWH





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Alan Ruttenberg <alanr@media.mit.edu>
Date: Sun, 31 Oct 93 20:29:40 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Anonymous remailer with encryption (query)
Message-ID: <9311010426.AA21623@media.mit.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Is there a stable anonymous remailer which can encrypt any mail that
it sends to me? 




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: russell@eternity.demon.co.uk (Russell Earl Whitaker)
Date: Sun, 31 Oct 93 18:19:39 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: MEDIA: PGP in CompuServe Magazine
Message-ID: <21504@eternity.demon.co.uk>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

1 Nov 93

Yesterday, 31 Oct 93, in London, some of us privacy
advocates held another meeting of the UK Cryptoprivacy Association.

One of our regulars brought in the latest CompuServe Magazine,
the issue of November 1993.  I was delighted to read an article
(pp 19-25), "The Digital Deadbolt", strongly advocating the use
of secure cryptography, including PGP 2.3.

The article, written by Christopher J. Galvin, an associate
editor of the publication, was truly an advocacy piece.
For those on CompuServe (CIS) who were unfamiliar with the issues,
cogent and useful reasons for using encryption were given, with
pointers for finding the relevant software.  I quote:

   ZIFFNET PUBLIC BRAND SOFTWARE
   APPLICATION FORUM (GO PBSFORUM)

   Pretty Good Privacy 2.3 - The controversial
      program PGP combines the convenience of
      the RSA public-key cryptosystem with the
      speed of conventional cryptography to protect
      e-mail and data files.  Includes digital
      signatures, data compression before encryption
      and sophisticated key management.
      Manual included.  Freeware.  Library 1, "Hot
      Off the Presses," PGPRIV.ZIP (232,895 bytes).

Further file references included text in the CYBER FORUM (GO
CYBERFORUM) on anonymous remailers (Library 13, "MONDO 2000,"
PRIVAC (7,078 bytes)), and a NIST publication on public-key
cryptology in ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FORUM (GO EFFSIG), (Library 3,
"The Frontier Files," PUB_KE.EXE (125,472 bytes)).

CompuServe claims a worldwide subscriber base of around 1
million accounts.  Every account holder is sent a monthly copy
of CompuServe Magazine.  Based on this circulation alone, the
article is a notable achievement in public access to strong
encryption.

What makes it even more notable is the bald admission in the
article that

     "... PGP and RIPEM aren't circulating as far as they might.
      They've been removed from various CompuServe forum
      libraries and some university Internet sites by sysops and
      administrators concerned that export laws might be
      violated by online availability."

Those who are puzzled as to why, then, PGP is listed in the same
article as being available _through_ CompuServe should take note
that it is not available _on_ CompuServe.  Having had some
CompuServe experience myself, I was struck by what I think might
be the case here: Ziffnet is a separate service from CompuServe
(CIS), with CIS acting solely as a gateway.  Ziff-Davis is a
very large publishing house.  Anyone who's been to trade shows
around the world has run across the Ziff-Davis booth, where
various of its magazines - the biggest names in the business -
are given away as samples.

It may be an ill-informed hunch on my part, but I suspect that
Ziff-Davis is drawing on its statutory rights as a _publisher_
to make PGP available through one or more gateway services.  If
this is the case, I applaud them.

And I congratulate CompuServe for having run Mr. Galvin's
article.  Christopher Galvin can be reached at
70003.5571@compuserve.com.


Russell Earl Whitaker                   whitaker@eternity.demon.co.uk
Communications Editor                                 AMiX: RWhitaker
EXTROPY: The Journal of Transhumanist Thought
Board member, Extropy Institute (ExI)
    Co-organizer, 1st European Conference on Computers, Freedom and
    Privacy, London, 20 November 1993




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Version: 2.3

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TtHkdhLRjvDLeWOEbG5LKY1VsVovU5YY1ru8h1xjrMqLiWvv4LQJanhg7I+D3Cpr
J5xhM0IZSMotYKmCdY20SRdw918VA8JlNck+r1n40ozgdY8yOsAO6qdjOsolyquA
OXShI0Gkzf8=
=U0GH
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-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: szabo@netcom.com (Nick Szabo)
Date: Mon, 1 Nov 93 02:43:49 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Increasing subscriber base (fwd)
Message-ID: <9311011041.AA27784@netcom6.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Cypherpunks,

Enclosed below is a call for help.  imp-interest deals with
Internet commercial protocols, with special interest in secure
billing.  The future of cypherpunks' goals, most obviously digital
cash but also much of the rest of our varied agenda, ranging from
privacy to freedom on the net, is deeply tied in with what direction 
the emerging world of Internet commerce chooses to pursue.  Will these 
businesses move us towards a world of freedom and privacy on the net, 
or a world in which our credit card numbers and IDs will be tracked to 
"ensure accountability", and our every purchase and data access on the 
commercial Net tied to our True Names to build lucrative marketing 
databases and fodder for future snoops?  Contrariwise, what
insights can those pursuing the everyday practicum of net.business
contribute to the cypherpunks vision?

It would be a tremendous advance, I daresay more important than
stopping Clipper (important as that task is), to get Internet commerce 
on board with the commercial privacy-enhancing protocols of Chaum et. 
al. -- digital cash, DC-nets, per-organization pseudonyms with transferable
credentials, etc.  And contrariwise, to invigorate those protocols
with doses of practical, real-world business considerations.
Those of us with an interest in promoting free and private Internet 
commerce, and motivation to pursue this, I urge you to get deeply 
involved in the "imp" movement.

Nick Szabo				szabo@netcom.com

Forwarded message:
Date: Sun, 31 Oct 93 22:00:54 PST
From: ptrubey@shl.com (Phil Trubey)
Message-Id: <9311010600.AA25672@technet1.shl.com>
Subject: Increasing subscriber base

No offence meant to anyone subscribed to this mailing list, but this
mailing list does not seem to have enough of a critcal mass of
interested people to ensure a good level of dicussion and the ability
for collaborative work.  I am suggesting that we advertise the
existence of this list to a selected few other mailing lists and
newsgroups to increase awareness and participation.  If there are no
violent objections I can send out a short note to cypherpunks,
com-priv, the Internet List of Lists.
....

Phil Trubey                   | Internet: ptrubey@shl.com
Systemhouse Inc.              | Voice:    310-809-5491
                              | Fax:      310-860-9668





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Cum catapultae proscriptae erunt tum soli proscripti catapultas habebunt  01-Nov-1993 1019 <yerazunis@aidev.enet.dec.com>
Date: Mon, 1 Nov 93 07:19:46 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: unsubscribe
Message-ID: <9311011516.AA07656@us3rmc.bb.dec.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


unsubscribe





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: koontzd@lrcs.loral.com (David Koontz )
Date: Mon, 1 Nov 93 11:34:47 PST
To: mg5n+@andrew.cmu.edu
Subject: Re: Secure Phone Progress (fwd)
Message-ID: <9311011627.AA02085@io.lrcs.loral.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>From: jim@Tadpole.COM (Jim Thompson)

(lets see if I can do this without screwing up the spelling)

>CLEP is a speech encoding algorithm (compressor) that can work well inside
>a 4800bps channel.  It is, however, quite expensive in terms of CPU power.
>A DSP would help here.  :-)  CLEP also tends to diminish the dynamic range of
>its input, with a resulting loss of 'quality'.

Thats CELP - Codebook Excited Linear Predictive coder.

The reason everyone targets 4800 baud is to allow operation over analog
cellular phones, which won't support faster transmissions.  The government
extensively uses secure voice systems over cellular phones.  The market
place for secure voice follows the government.  CELP can be a single chip
solution (QUALCOMM, $70 in 10K, (QCELP)).  

I'm not sure AT&T Surety Communications devices use a single chip solution,
they're guaranteed to use AT&T DSP chips.  A proprietary vocoder (ACELP)
is used, which is supposed to work better with female voices.

A large part of insuring the quality of compressed voice falls under the
heading of signal conditioning.  AGC for dynamic range, pre-emphassis or
otherwise filtering to match the frequency response of the input (mic and
preamps).

AT&T sells 5 plug-in modules to their 3700 unit which are considered 
adequate to interface to all the phones out there.  I recall there was
one for a 500 series phone, and one for NEC phones.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: James Still <still@kailua.colorado.edu>
Date: Mon, 1 Nov 93 07:09:46 PST
To: 'Cypherpunks List' <cypherpunks@toad.com>
Subject: RE: Nazis/Privacy/Cypherpunks
Message-ID: <2CD5431A@kailua.colorado.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



>Personally, I don't rule out examination of Nazi tactics as a
>worst case scenario model.  Let's face it, as ugly and dark as
>Nazi rule was, they did some things quite efficiently indeed.
>
> [...]
>
>To rule out Nazi approaches, especially when dealing with
>intelligence and counter-intelligence issues (which IMHO is
>basically what cypherpunks is all about on some level or
>another...) is plain silly. Current intelligence practices are

If I understand your basic point to be:  "consider the worst
possible scenario in order to better prepare for it" then I
agree completely.  However I have serious reservations with
emulating or (gadzooks!) *admiring* those Nazi tactics that
seemed to "work" because I would disagree that, first they
actually did work, and more importantly, that their ends
justified the means.  Which brings me to your second point:


>[Note 2]
>No one writes code from "the bottom up" in the manner that you
>suggest.  If that were the case we'd see the wheel invented time
>and time again.  One of the reasons this mailing list exists is to
>accomplish exactly the opposite.  That being to incorporate common
>or even fringe ideas into the development of code for the common
>purpose (The Prize as you adeptly put it.) so we don't HAVE to
>build from the ground up every time.

I disagree.  (Semantics check:  I'm not talking about a mouse driver
or a basic windowing interface here.  Obviously, there's no need to
hammer out that wheel again.)

I am talking about what I see as a basic cypherpunk mission, that
being, "the constant reevaluation of the approach towards privacy."
We have the ability to constantly rip apart our own ideas, like
children's ABC blocks, and see if they fit back together again
in a better way.  I would prefer to see constant rewrite's of a
"given" (like PGP for instance) than to stagnate and rely on the
one idea, concept, or proof just because we've always done it
that way.  Our code should be like our ethics: constantly re-
evaluated, questioned, and tested for validity.

 --- still@kailua.colorado.edu --------------------------------








From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Mike Godwin <mnemonic@eff.org>
Date: Mon, 1 Nov 93 15:04:53 PST
To: still@kailua.colorado.edu (James Still)
Subject: Re: Nazis/Privacy/Cypherpunks
In-Reply-To: <2CD5431A@kailua.colorado.edu>
Message-ID: <199311011604.AA29446@eff.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



This seems as good a time as any to remind folks of Godwin's Law, which
represents one of my earliest net.meme.hacks:

-----
Godwin's Law of Nazi Analogies: As an online discussion grows longer, the
probability of a comparison involving Nazis or Hitler approaches one.
----


--Mike


P.S. You may also be interested in the corollaries, which shed some useful
light on the dynamics of online discussions:

Gordon's Restatement of Newman's Corollary to Godwin's Law:
   Libertarianism (pro, con, and internal faction fights) is *the*
primordial netnews discussion topic.  Anytime the debate shifts
somewhere else, it must eventually return to this fuel source.

Morgan's Corollary to Godwin's Law: 
	As soon as such a comparison occurs, someone will start a
	Nazi-discussion spinoff thread on alt.censorship.

Sircar's Corollary:  If the USENET discussion touches on homosexuality
or Heinlein, Nazis or Hitler are mentioned within three days.





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: walter kehowski <wak@next11.math.pitt.edu>
Date: Mon, 1 Nov 93 11:33:48 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: BOOK: Learning Perl
Message-ID: <9311011643.AA03242@next11.math.pitt.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Extropians and Cypherpunks:

 O'Reilly&Assoc. has a new book out, "Learning Perl" (ISBN  
1-56592-042-2, price $24.95). I have back-ordered it.   
O'Reilly&Assoc. can be contacted at:

PHONE: 800-998-9938
FAX: 707-829-0104
MAILING ADDRESS: O'Reilly&Assoc., 103 Morris St., Suite A,  
Sebastopol, CA, 95472

Walter, wak@next0.math.pitt.edu




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Alan (Gesture Man) Wexelblat" <wex@media.mit.edu>
Date: Mon, 1 Nov 93 11:43:49 PST
To: mg5n+@andrew.cmu.edu
Subject: Secure Phone Progress (fwd)
In-Reply-To: <0gp7NE600awUQ5lkYP@andrew.cmu.edu>
Message-ID: <9311011654.AA23855@media.mit.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Well, keep in mind that the phone doesn't transmit nearly all of the
spectrum of hearing.  In fact it doesn't transmit anything above about
3.5KHz, so you don't have to have enough bandwidth for the human 20Khz
hearing range if all you're doing is emulating today's voice phone
technology.

This, btw, is why it's hard to identify speakers over the phone even in a
noise-free transmission -- the acoustical signal is just plain impoverished.

--Alan Wexelblat, Reality Hacker, Author, and Cyberspace Bard
Media Lab - Advanced Human Interface Group	wex@media.mit.edu
Voice: 617-258-9168, Pager: 617-945-1842	PUBLIC KEY available by request
Try not to have a good time ... This is supposed to be educational.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: GRABOW_GEOFFREY@tandem.com
Date: Mon, 1 Nov 93 13:43:49 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: ON THE ROAD TO NOSINESS...
Message-ID: <199311011343.AA2361@comm.Tandem.COM>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> There is a similar system in Paris, if I remember correctly.

> Yes, and Germany.  There may be others.

Yes, there are others.  Six of these camera systems were installed in
Manhattan, and they have been rumored to have issued more than 250 tickets
per week each!!!  I guess that this means that cops will now have more time
to do other things. (Nab bad guys, eat donuts, etc...)




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Eric Blossom <eb@srlr14.sr.hp.com>
Date: Mon, 1 Nov 93 14:19:51 PST
To: GRABOW_GEOFFREY@tandem.com
Subject: ON THE ROAD TO NOSINESS...
In-Reply-To: <199311011343.AA2361@comm.Tandem.COM>
Message-ID: <9311012215.AA08514@srlr14.sr.hp.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> Yes, there are others.  Six of these camera systems were installed in
> Manhattan, and they have been rumored to have issued more than 250 tickets
> per week each!!!  I guess that this means that cops will now have more time
> to do other things. (Nab bad guys, eat donuts, etc...)

My understanding of the one in Campbell was that the company that
owned the van / built the gizmo got a cut of the action.  I also
understand that they discontinued it, because you had to post a cop
next to the thing so that people wouldn't just take a hammer to it.





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: jim@chiba.Tadpole.COM (Jim Thompson)
Date: Mon, 1 Nov 93 12:53:49 PST
To: an15489@anon.penet.fi
Subject: Re: ON THE ROAD TO NOSINESS...
Message-ID: <9311012046.AA00537@chiba.tadpole.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> There is a similar system in Paris, if I remember correctly.

Yes, and Germany.  There may be others.

They (the big 'they') tried this in Nevada several years ago, but stopped
after about 6 months.  It seems that the last picture a number of these
units took was of a pickup truck, license plate masked off, both driver
and passenger wearing ski masks, with the passenger weilding a baseball bat.

I guess it was pretty expensive.  ;-)

The ACLU was, at some point, challenging the practice of un-manned
units beaming radar at every car on the road, taking pictures of those
that were 'speeding'.

Jim

(who stands corrected, its 'CELP'.)




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Andy Wilson <ajw@Think.COM>
Date: Mon, 1 Nov 93 11:53:49 PST
To: an15489@anon.penet.fi
Subject: ON THE ROAD TO NOSINESS...
In-Reply-To: <9310300019.AA04372@anon.penet.fi>
Message-ID: <9311011950.AA27966@custard.think.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


   From: an15489@anon.penet.fi (Jack Daniels)
   Date: Sat, 30 Oct 1993 00:19:10 UTC



   >In Europe, I believe that there are highways
   >that you can speed on, and then receive a ticket in the mail
   >when the camera photographs your plate.

   This happens here in the United States.  In Campbell, California
   the police have a small van which they set up on major streets.
   If the radar thinks you're speeding, it photographs you and mails
   you a ticket.

There is a similar system in Paris, if I remember correctly.

Andy

   Jack

   -------------------------------------------------------------------------
   To find out more about the anon service, send mail to help@anon.penet.fi.
   Due to the double-blind, any mail replies to this message will be anonymized,
   and an anonymous id will be allocated automatically. You have been warned.
   Please report any problems, inappropriate use etc. to admin@anon.penet.fi.





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: kovar@NDA.COM (David Kovar)
Date: Mon, 1 Nov 93 12:39:47 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Anonymous vs false IDs
Message-ID: <9311012037.AA03787@NDA.COM>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


  There is a lot of effort being put into creating tools to mask identities.
I'm curious why people don't go a different route - creating a false
electronic identity? If you have control over your own system, it is easy
enough to create an account. Lacking that, there are a lot of companies
out there offering low cost accounts on Unix systems with full Internet
access. Why not get an account in a different name rather than using
anonymous remailers?

  I can see some reasons for going both routes, I'm just curious as to
other people's reasons.

-David



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Arthur Chandler <arthurc@crl.com>
Date: Mon, 1 Nov 93 16:22:40 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Your mother's maiden name
In-Reply-To: <UgpMbJO00VomMPJkcJ@andrew.cmu.edu>
Message-ID: <Pine.3.87.9311011635.A18061-0100000@crl.crl.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



 At least three places/organizations I do business with ask for this bit 
of info as a "security check." The idea being, I think that you mother's 
maiden name is something that only those intimately familiar with your 
family would know, and therefore is an easy, universally applicable kind 
of "password" to be used before handing out sensitive info.
 But I've always wondered just how secure this "password" is. Recalling 
Eric Hughes statement that "cryptography is all economics," and 
realizing that someone with an unlimited budget could probably scrounge 
that info after some effort -- just how much effort would it take? And 
how secure is "mom's maiden name" as a password for obtaining sensitive 
information over the phone?





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: dmandl@lehman.com (David Mandl)
Date: Mon, 1 Nov 93 13:19:49 PST
To: kovar@nda.com
Subject: Re: Anonymous vs false IDs
Message-ID: <9311012116.AA21226@disvnm2.lehman.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> From: kovar@nda.com (David Kovar)
> 
>   There is a lot of effort being put into creating tools to mask identities.
> I'm curious why people don't go a different route - creating a false
> electronic identity? If you have control over your own system, it is easy
> enough to create an account. Lacking that, there are a lot of companies
> out there offering low cost accounts on Unix systems with full Internet
> access. Why not get an account in a different name rather than using
> anonymous remailers?

If you use five different identities, why waste your money paying for five
accounts, especially if some of them are used only infrequently?

Why have a full UNIX account (like my account on PANIX, say) for an
identity that won't need to do anything but send out a couple of email
messages now and then?

What if you create and kill off personas relatively frequently?

Having everything centralized seems like the most logical way to go--don't
forget, separate accounts would mean setting up separate .profile files,
copying code from one place to another all the time, keeping duplicate
copies of things, etc., etc.  The exception would be when you have
identities or "lives" that are truly separate, with little overlap, but
even then I'd prefer having full access to all my files and robots in one
place all the time.

If I had an Internet connection on my own box at home, sure, it might be
more convenient to segregate things in separate accounts, but most people
don't have that luxury yet.

   --Dave.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: bart@netcom.com (Harry Bartholomew)
Date: Mon, 1 Nov 93 16:19:52 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: privacy, packwood, & pgp
Message-ID: <9311020019.AA00687@netcom5.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


    I'm not really sure what point I wish to make. Packwood on 
    McNeill-Lehrerer seemed to deserve consideration. The question
    of what one may expect to be private seems paramount. Just now
    the whole country is paying attention to the issue, so if you 
    can figure a way to attract their attention, major leverage may be 
    obtained.

    What would Packwood have gained if he had used PGP or DES ?
   




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: lefty@apple.com (Lefty)
Date: Mon, 1 Nov 93 16:53:49 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: privacy, packwood, & pgp
Message-ID: <9311020042.AA16247@internal.apple.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>    What would Packwood have gained if he had used PGP or DES ?

Nothing but increased notoriety, and the immediate presumption of guilt in
the minds of many.  "Well, if you don't have anything to hide, then why are
you hiding it, huh?"  Sadly, many people subscribe, consciously or
unconsciously to the sort of thinking that Ed Meese liked to promulgate:
"If they weren't guilty, then they wouldn't be suspects."

Note that nobody is, as far as I know, trying to extract Packwood's diary
by sheer force of arms.


--
Lefty (lefty@apple.com)
C:.M:.C:., D:.O:.D:.






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Matthew J Ghio <mg5n+@andrew.cmu.edu>
Date: Mon, 1 Nov 93 14:14:51 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Anonymous vs false IDs
In-Reply-To: <9311012116.AA21226@disvnm2.lehman.com>
Message-ID: <UgpMbJO00VomMPJkcJ@andrew.cmu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


David Mandl <dmandl@lehman.com> wrote:

> If you use five different identities, why waste your money paying for
> five accounts, especially if some of them are used only infrequently?
>
> Why have a full UNIX account (like my account on PANIX, say) for
> an identity that won't need to do anything but send out a couple of
> email messages now and then?

Perhaps it would be better to set up a remailer where people could
create a pseudonymous accounts on it.  If the remailer didn't have an
obvious "anon" name, most people probably wouldn't realize that it was a
remailer, and might think that it was a real site with real users.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: nobody@cicada.berkeley.edu
Date: Mon, 1 Nov 93 18:03:49 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: PGP automation
Message-ID: <9311020155.AA18104@cicada.berkeley.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> > secure stuff.  Anyone here have any other suggestions on making encryption
> > less of a pain?
>
>This may seem a little excessive, but the only sensible way to use
>pgp in environments like yours or prz's (heh heh) is to set yourself
>up with your own site at home, either with a dialup SLIP/PPP feed or
>a plain and cheap uucp feed.  Both of those options are becoming much
>cheaper than they used to be, and you can run suitable software on all
>sorts of computers - whatever you're using to dial in to your timeshare
>service at the moment would probably do, as long as its not just a dumb
>terminal.  DOS, a free unix or linux, Amiga, Atari - they can all handle
>at least uucp if not tcp/ip too.  If you don't have suitable hardware,
>you can surelu find a 286 dos box with an old 20Mb drive and plain text-
>only display secondhand somewhere for $200 or less...  that'll run UUPC
>or even KA9Q.

Why not just get Nupop, a freeware mail downloader, off Simtel? No good for
reading newsgroups, but mail, no problem.
>
>If you care about privacy in your email, you *have* to run it all the
>way into your own machine.

Agreed.







From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Stanton McCandlish <mech@eff.org>
Date: Mon, 1 Nov 93 15:03:50 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Reposting to FidoNews
Message-ID: <199311012300.AA10920@eff.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Not a good idea.  The material from Mike was pretty good, but whoever did
that also forwarded some solidly afactual material from P.Metzger
pretending to be a telecom lawyer.  There's no telling how many sysops
are going around thinking they are common carriers now, and who are
utterly mistaken.  This may take quite a bit of doing to clean up.   
A better tactic would be to write an article, then pass it on to people
that know what they are talking about for some editorial review, THEN send
it to the Snooze.
<No offense meant to Perry; he knows plenty about some things, but an
attorney he ain't. :> 

--  
-=> mech@eff.org <=-
Stanton McCandlish     Electronic Frontier Foundation Online Activist & SysOp
"A nation that is afraid to let its people judge the truth and falsehood of
ideas in an open market is a nation that is afraid of its people." -JFK
NitV-DC BBS 202-232-2715, Fido 1:109/? IndraNet 369:111/1, 14.4V32b 16.8ZyX
Join EFF!  For more information about membership, send mail to eff@eff.org



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Steven Hodas <hhll@u.washington.edu>
Date: Mon, 1 Nov 93 18:33:50 PST
To: Arthur Chandler <arthurc@crl.com>
Subject: Re: Your mother's maiden name
In-Reply-To: <Pine.3.87.9311011635.A18061-0100000@crl.crl.com>
Message-ID: <Pine.3.87.9311011842.H12407-0100000@stein2.u.washington.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



About a year ago my wife got a phone call from a stranger claiming to believe
he had gone to high school with her, but he wasn't really sure.  After
a whole song and dance he finally said, nonchalantly, "Well, gee, what was 
your mother's maiden name?"

Since her mother's maiden name was not, "Fuck you, asshole", I gathered 
from those words that she had figured out his scam. 

Who knows who he was. We immediatley changed all maiden-name passwords to
something more obscure and less socially-engineerable.
 

Steven

    ______________________________________________________
   |                                                      |
   |    HORSE HORSE LION LION, A Consulting Cooperative   | 
   |              "Information into Culture"              | 
   |                                                      | 
   |      Steven Hodas/Catherine Holland, Principals      |
   |                                                      | 
   |    hhll@u.washington.edu   VOICE/FAX 206.285.5975    |
   |______________________________________________________|


On Mon, 1 Nov 1993, Arthur Chandler wrote:

> 
>  At least three places/organizations I do business with ask for this bit 
> of info as a "security check." The idea being, I think that you mother's 
> maiden name is something that only those intimately familiar with your 
> family would know, and therefore is an easy, universally applicable kind 
> of "password" to be used before handing out sensitive info.
>  But I've always wondered just how secure this "password" is. Recalling 
> Eric Hughes statement that "cryptography is all economics," and 
> realizing that someone with an unlimited budget could probably scrounge 
> that info after some effort -- just how much effort would it take? And 
> how secure is "mom's maiden name" as a password for obtaining sensitive 
> information over the phone?
> 
> 





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Alan Ruttenberg <alanr@media.mit.edu>
Date: Mon, 1 Nov 93 16:24:51 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: anonymity and privacy in email
Message-ID: <9311012346.AA06090@media.mit.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



I've looked over the instructions for the anonymous remailer and hals'
instructions, and I have a few thoughts concerning the attempted
guarantee of anonymity and privacy.

In all cases, privacy is guaranteed only if you trust the remailer.
I'll take as a given that this is the case.

But suppose that a response is mailed in plaintext using an encrypted
return address method. The privacy of that message can be violated by
someone who had enough power and interest to monitor incoming mail to
the destination site, since mail and message are unencrypted as the
response enters its destination's mail queue. This is not very much
power to have. The sysop the destination can do this, as can a person
at any gateway between the final remailer and you.

That much can be prevented if you trust the originater of the message
and you have them encrypt their reply using your public key. But
suppose that you have a malicious respondant who wishes to expose your
identity, and has a good guess as to where you might be. Then the
responder needs to send a tagged message and their accomplice needs to
monitor incoming mail looking for that tag. The only way around this
that I see is to have a trusted remailer to which you have given a
public key to use when remailing mail addressed to you.

A second problem concerns the time ordering of incoming and outgoing
messages from a remailer. Consider the one remailer case, as I believe
that the argument holds for chained remailings as well. Suppose that
you are able to monitor the incoming and outgoing feeds of the
remailer. Further, you can identify mail which goes to the remailer
(as opposed to other persons at that site) by reading the to: header.
Suppose that you have a method to identify outgoing mail from the
remailer (from some header) such as "From: nobody@alumni.cco.caltech.edu".

If messages are processed by the remailer in a fifo manner, then you
can identify the recipient of any incoming message assuming that you
get synchronized at some point.  One can to get around this, I think,
is by deliberately scrambling the message processing order, and
perhaps inserting enough fake messages that the monitoring agent can
no longer reliably synchronize.

I'm new to the list, and apologize if I'm repeating previous
commentary. 

-alan





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: J. Michael Diehl <mdiehl@triton.unm.edu>
Date: Mon, 1 Nov 93 20:34:50 PST
To: arthurc@crl.com (Arthur Chandler)
Subject: Re: Your mother's maiden name
In-Reply-To: <Pine.3.87.9311011635.A18061-0100000@crl.crl.com>
Message-ID: <9311020433.AA01264@triton.unm.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


According to Arthur Chandler:
> 
>  But I've always wondered just how secure this "password" is. Recalling 
> Eric Hughes statement that "cryptography is all economics," and 
> realizing that someone with an unlimited budget could probably scrounge 
> that info after some effort -- just how much effort would it take? And 
> how secure is "mom's maiden name" as a password for obtaining sensitive 
> information over the phone?

You mean you told them your mother's REAL maiden name?  Bummer. ;^)

J. Michael Diehl   ;^)  |*The 2nd Amendment is there in case the 
mdiehl@triton.unm.edu   | Government forgets about the 1st!  <RL>
Mike.Diehl@f29.n301.z1  |*God is a good Physicist, and an even 
    .fidonet.org        | better Mathematician.  <Me>
al945@cwns9.ins.cwru.edu|*I'm just looking for the opportunity to 
 (505) 299-2282 (voice) | be Politically Incorrect! <Me>
Can we impeach him yet? |*Protected by 18 USC 2511 and 18 USC 2703. 



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: J. Michael Diehl <mdiehl@triton.unm.edu>
Date: Mon, 1 Nov 93 20:39:50 PST
To: lefty@apple.com (Lefty)
Subject: Re: privacy, packwood, & pgp
In-Reply-To: <9311020042.AA16247@internal.apple.com>
Message-ID: <9311020436.AA01358@triton.unm.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


According to Lefty:
> 
> Note that nobody is, as far as I know, trying to extract Packwood's diary
> by sheer force of arms.

Well what do you think a supeona is?  It most certainly is backed by "sheer
force of arms..."  the long arm of the law, if you will.


J. Michael Diehl   ;^)  |*The 2nd Amendment is there in case the 
mdiehl@triton.unm.edu   | Government forgets about the 1st!  <RL>
Mike.Diehl@f29.n301.z1  |*God is a good Physicist, and an even 
    .fidonet.org        | better Mathematician.  <Me>
al945@cwns9.ins.cwru.edu|*I'm just looking for the opportunity to 
 (505) 299-2282 (voice) | be Politically Incorrect! <Me>
Can we impeach him yet? |*Protected by 18 USC 2511 and 18 USC 2703. 



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: gtoal@an-teallach.com (Graham Toal)
Date: Mon, 1 Nov 93 15:07:11 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: ID of anonymous posters via word analysis?
Message-ID: <4963@an-teallach.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


In article <9310292305.AA22193@anon.penet.fi> an41418@anon.penet.fi writes:
 > If studying writing patterns is a viable method for
 > discovering the true identity of a nym, then by all means
 > try it. If someone were to discover my identity, I would

Much can be hidden by some mechanical process of canonizing ones
text, but I'm fairly sure a lot of personal traits will remain; especially
ones to which the writer is unconscious, such as the use of particular
bits of vocabulary.  Take this pretentious word 'nym', for instance,
that some of the cypherpunks are so fond of.  Do you realise only *FOUR*
non-anonymous people on the whole of this list have used it in the last
month or so? - Tim May, Jamie Dinkelacker, Hal Finney and Richard 
Kennaway.  (There was also a remailed anonymous poster, and the cryptically
named major@dcd.wa.gov.au who interestingly posts from a .au address but
uses US English; and whose finger demon says 'no such user')

If one were slightly paranoid in the Detweiler mould, one might look
more closely at an41418's postings and the postings of the above, for
other similarities.  For instance, only Tim May and Jamie Dinkelacker
have ever used the word "essay"... (one I chose to look up at random);
or one could watch for idiosyncracies such as a misspelling like
'revokation' (Richard Kennaway alone, consistently), or "somesuch"
(Tim May, consistently) which they're probably not aware of and would
be hard pushed to suppress if they were adopting other personae.

Other things to look at are punctuation - do they consistently put
a comma before the last element of a list preceding an 'and', or do
they miss it out (as in the old style).  Things like that are a lot
harder to consciously suppress than using...ellipses for instance---instead
of dashes, in an attempt to disguise your most obvious writing traits.

Just FYI, I don't think any of the people mentioned here are each other,
unless they do a much better job of hiding their identities than I have
a right to expect - for instance Jamie Linkelackers appalling solecisms
- "thou doth protesteth too much" and "is purposive to" seem too archetypal
to me to be deliberate mistakes, and none of the other posters come close
to that kind of mistake. 

G
-- 
Personal mail to gtoal@gtoal.com (I read it in the evenings)
Business mail to gtoal@an-teallach.com (Be careful with the spelling!)
Faxes to An Teallach Limited: +44 31 662 4678  Voice: +44 31 668 1550 x212





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Alan Barrett <barrett@daisy.ee.und.ac.za>
Date: Mon, 1 Nov 93 14:09:50 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: ON THE ROAD TO NOSINESS...
In-Reply-To: <199311011343.AA2361@comm.Tandem.COM>
Message-ID: <Pine.3.03.9311020033.W459-9100000@daisy.ee.und.ac.za>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Here in South Africa, we have had unmanned speed traps with cameras since
about the mid 1970's, I think, and the unmanned cameras at intersections
to catch folk driving through on a red light have been around since the
early 1980's.  Are such devices uncommon in other countries?

--apb (Alan Barrett)








From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: hughes@ah.com (Eric Hughes)
Date: Tue, 2 Nov 93 01:31:20 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Your mother's maiden name
In-Reply-To: <Pine.3.87.9311011635.A18061-0100000@crl.crl.com>
Message-ID: <9311020923.AA01212@ah.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


re: cost of obtaining mother's maiden name.

>And how secure is "mom's maiden name" as a password for obtaining
>sensitive information over the phone?

Not very.  Birth records and marriage records tend to be public
record.  Organizations that do genealogical research tend to have this
data around, although they don't always make it easy to get data on
the living.

On the other hand, most organizations I've dealt with that use it just
use it as a password field.  You can just pretend that the person on
the other end of the line is asking "What is your password?" rather
than the standard question.

Eric




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "George A. Gleason" <gg@well.sf.ca.us>
Date: Tue, 2 Nov 93 01:29:52 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: on the road...
Message-ID: <199311020929.BAA22765@well.sf.ca.us>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



...and in Berkeley the PD has a little trailer they set up all by itself,
which has a radar system in it and a display in large red numerals.  There
is a place to hang some large printed numbers representing the speed limit.
There is a large sign on the back which says, "Speed limit (printed
numbers); your speed: (red display numbers), drive safely!"  No tickets
dispensed, but pretty effective at getting people to slow down.  




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Mike Ingle <MIKEINGLE@delphi.com>
Date: Mon, 1 Nov 93 22:39:52 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Hole in MD5
Message-ID: <01H4TM7X9M2A91WCV4@delphi.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Recently there was a message here about MD5 having a hole in it.
Maybe this is what the person was talking about...

From msuinfo!uwm.edu!cs.utexas.edu!uunet!ddsw1!chinet!schneier Tue Mar 23
10:36:50 1993
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
Path: msuinfo!uwm.edu!cs.utexas.edu!uunet!ddsw1!chinet!schneier
From: schneier@chinet.chi.il.us (Bruce Schneier)
Subject: Successful Cryptanalysis of MD5
Message-ID: <C42Gr3.M3w@chinet.chi.il.us>
Organization: Chinet - Public Access UNIX
Date: Thu, 18 Mar 1993 04:06:39 GMT
Lines: 25

This is from Bart Preneel's Ph.D. thesis, "Analysis and Design of
Cryptographic Hash Functions," Jan 1993, p. 191.  It is about the
cryptanalysis of MD5:

    B. den Boer noted that an approximate relation exists between
    any four consecutive additive constants.  Moreover, together
    with A. Bosselaers he developed an attack that produces
    pseudo-collisions, more specifically they can construct two
    chaining variables (that only differ in the most significant
    bit of every word) and a single message block that yield the
    same hashcode.  The attack takes a few minutes on a PC.  This
    means that one of the design principles behind MD4 (and MD5),
    namely to design a collision resistant function is not satisfied.

I have not seen the actual paper yet, which will be presented at
Eurocrypt.  Both PEM and PGP rely on MD5 for a secure one-way hash
function.  This is troublesome, to say the least.

Bruce

**************************************************************************
* Bruce Schneier
* Counterpane Systems         For a good prime, call 391581 * 2^216193 - 1
* schneier@chinet.chi.il.us
**************************************************************************

From: burt@chirality.rsa.com (Burt Kaliski)
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
Subject: Pseudocollisions in MD5
Message-ID: <BURT.93Apr23171338@chirality.rsa.com>
Date: 23 Apr 93 21:13:38 GMT
Distribution: sci
Organization: RSA Data Security, Inc.
Lines: 89
NNTP-Posting-Host: chirality.rsa.com

Following is a short note commenting on den Boer and Bosselaers'
recent work on the MD5 message-digest algorithm. Feel free to email
questions or further comments.

-- Burt Kaliski
RSA Laboratories
----------------------------------------------------------------------
\documentstyle[12pt]{article}
\begin{document}

\title{On ``Pseudocollisions'' in the MD5 Message-Digest Algorithm}
\author{Burton S. Kaliski Jr. \\
{\tt burt@rsa.com} \and
Matthew J.B. Robshaw \\
{\tt matt@rsa.com} \and
RSA Laboratories \\
100 Marine Parkway \\
Redwood City, CA  94065}
\date{April 23, 1993}

\maketitle

A message-digest algorithm maps a message of arbitrary length to a
``digest'' of fixed length, and has three properties: Computing the
digest is easy, finding a message with a given
digest---``inversion''---is hard, and finding two messages with the
same digest---``collision''---is also hard. Message-digest algorithms
have many applications, including digital signatures and message
authentication.

RSA Data Security's MD5 message-digest algorithm, developed by Ron
Rivest \cite{rfc-md5}, maps a message to a 128-bit message digest.
Computing the digest of a one-megabyte message takes as little as a
second.  While no message-digest algorithm can yet be {\em proved}
secure, MD5 is believed to be at least as good as any other that maps
to a 128-bit digest.  Inversion should take about $2^{128}$
operations, and collision should take about $2^{64}$ operations.  No
one has found a faster approach to inversion or collision.

Recent work by den Boer and Bosselaers \cite{den-boer-md5} presents
a special kind of ``pseudocollision'' in MD5's
internal compression function, which maps
a 512-bit message block $x$ and a
128-bit input state $s$ to a 128-bit output
state. They show how to find a message block $x$
and two related input states $s_1$ and $s_2$ that yield the same
output state: $f(x,s_1)$ = $f(x,s_2)$. Their well-thought approach
exploits structural properties of the collision function to find 
a pseudocollision in about $2^{16}$ operations, much less than one
would expect.

Practical implications of this pseudocollision work to the security of
MD5 are not evident. While a real collision in MD5 implies a
pseudocollision (or a ``pseudo-inversion''), a
pseudocollision need not imply a real collision. Indeed, a real
collision, since it involves two different messages, would almost
always involve {\em different} message blocks $x_1$ and $x_2$ such that
$f(x_1,s_1) = f(x_2,s_2)$, but the pseudocollisions have the same
message blocks. Moreover, the input states $s_1$ and $s_2$ would
generally be unrelated, but the pseudocollisions' input states are
the same except for four bits.  There does not seem to be any way to
extend den Boer and Bosselaers' approach to anything beyond the
special pseudocollisions, a limitation they readily admit.

It is reasonable, therefore, to believe that MD5 remains secure. While den
Boer and Bosselaers have found interesting structural properties in
MD5, the properties seem only to lead to special pseudocollisions
and not anything approaching real collisions. Further research, of
course, will give a better understanding of the strengths of MD5 and
other message-digest algorithms, with the eventual hope that
such algorithms can, in some sense, be proved secure.

\bibliographystyle{plain}
\begin{thebibliography}{1}

\bibitem{den-boer-md5}
Bert den~Boer and Antoon Bosselaers.
\newblock Collisions for the compression function of {MD5}.
\newblock In {\it Advances in Cryptology --- Eurocrypt '93}, 1993.
\newblock Preprint.

\bibitem{rfc-md5}
R.L. Rivest.
\newblock {\it {RFC} 1321: The {MD5 Message-Digest Algorithm}}.
\newblock Internet Activities Board, April 1992.

\end{thebibliography}

\end{document}





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: collins@newton.apple.com (Scott Collins)
Date: Tue, 2 Nov 93 01:34:52 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Hole in MD5
Message-ID: <9311020930.AA05211@newton.apple.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Kaliski's response (re: den Boer and Bosselaers' recent work) sounds
reasonable when applied to real life 'human readable' messages typically
comprising many blocks.  I wonder, though, if this technique admits a
reasonable attack on single-block, offline hashing schemes like Bellcore's
timestamping system.

I am a little unsure of the details of their system, but I think I
correctly present the gist of it in the following.

Bellcore's timestamping system is 'offline' in that all the information a
verifier gets is from the prover (except, perhaps, double-checking the root
hash with some public archive).  Most of the important information is
already gone: the maximum depth of that day's hash-tree; the hash-tree
itself; the actual depth of any given timestamp; et al.

Eve has a document, allegedly timestamped with the Bellcore system.  To
prove it to me, she gives me the document (doc), a date/time, and a list of
N hashes, h_1..h_N, where h_N is the root hash for that date (verifable
from some widely published event on that date).  I call Bellcore, or look
in some archives to get the published root hash (root) for that date/time.

        h <- MD5(doc)
        For i<-1..N-1
          h<-MD5(h concatenated with h_i)

When I'm done, if h = h_N, then the timestamp is valid.

Since I don't know the actual depth of Eve's timestamp, her hash sequence
can have any number of elements.  If Eve can produce a collision for
digests the size of the internal nodes in the daily timestamp hash-tree,
even if she can't do it with a single direct collision, she can spoof me. 
(Of course, if she gives me some number of hashes such that 2 to that power
<the number of documents stamped that day> is greater than the number of
people in the U.S., I might smell a rat.)  I haven't yet seen the paper, so
this may be an unreasonable conclusion.

I gathered from Bellcore's presentation at the last RSA conference that
they don't sign the timestamps because "you could always bribe the
timestamper".  They rely completely on the security of the chosen hash
function, and the idea of a 'widely published event'.

If anybody has better/more specific info on Bellcore's system, or den Boer
and Bosselaers work, or Preneel's paper, I would be interested.


Scott Collins         | "Few people realize what tremendous power there
                      |  is in one of these things."     -- Willy Wonka
......................|................................................
BUSINESS.   voice:408.862.0540  fax:974.6094   collins@newton.apple.com
Apple Computer, Inc.   5 Infinite Loop, MS 305-2B   Cupertino, CA 95014
.......................................................................
PERSONAL.   voice/fax:408.257.1746    1024:669687   catalyst@netcom.com





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: hughes@ah.com (Eric Hughes)
Date: Tue, 2 Nov 93 03:19:54 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Chaum's credentials (technical question)
In-Reply-To: <9310310111.AA04231@jobe.shell.portal.com>
Message-ID: <9311021112.AA01396@ah.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Hal Finney writes about a paper of Chaum's, and near the end asks:

>In short, I haven't found any interpretation of Chaum's math that makes
>sense.  Can anyone shed any light on this?  

I think you're correct, Hal.  From everything I can tell, Chaum's
confused product and greatest common divisor.

First, though, there's a basic fact about the arithmetic of integers
which everyone who wants to learn more algebra should know.  Z is the
set of integers.

    For every m,n in Z, there is a,b in Z such that a*m + b*n = gcd(m,n).

One calculates the gcd by means of the Euclidean algorithm, and the
coefficients a and b by an extension of that algorithm.  Lots of basic
algorithm books contain descriptions.

From an abstract point of view, this is a simple consequence that Z is
a principal ideal domain.  The ideal (m,n) is composed of the linear
span of m and n.  Since this ideal is principal, by definition there
is a c such that (m,n) = (c).  Clearly c is in the linear span of m
and n, hence coefficients exist.

Note that reducing mod n gives a*m = gcd(m,n) (mod n).  If m and n are
relatively prime (means gcd = 1), the a is m inverse mod n.  Likewise
b is n inverse mod m.  This is a standard algorithm for calculating
modular inverses.

Here's the relevant passage, again:

>   "Suppose an organization X were to require that you have each of two
>   credentials, say both that with public exponents e1 and e2.  You could
>   send X separatley Px^d1 and Px^d2.  It is also possible for you to use
>   the two credentials to form the single credential Px^(d1*d2), which
>   will be called their AND....  To create the AND, you: set g to the
>   multiplicative inverse of d1 modulo d2; set h to the remainder after
>   dividing g*d1-1 by d2; and computing
>   (Px^d1)^g * (Px^d2)^(-h) = Px^(d1*d2)."

I believe that Hal is correct when he points out that h is not a
remainder (which would be zero, as he points out) but the quotient.  I
originally misread this as quotient because I recognized the context.

First, the multiplicative inverse of d1 (mod d2) exists only if the
two are relatively prime.  Hal did not quote the whole article, so I
don't know if this criterion is stated elsewhere.  Let us assume the
d's have this property, since the d's can be so chosen.

The calculation of d1 (mod d2) is exactly the calculation of the
coefficients in the extended Euclidean algorithm above.  Consider a*d1
+ b*d2 = 1.  Reducing mod d2, we have a*d1 = 1 (mod d2).  That means
that a is d1^(-1) (mod d2).  Likewise (a*d1 - 1) / d2 = -b.  Chaum's
description exactly fits the gcd context.

>The other possibility I thought of is that he meant that the signing
>agency would make g and h, as he defined them, public.  

That's my interpretation as well.  After the calculation, as Hal
observes, you just end up with Px, not Px^(d1*d2).  That's totally
useless, since you already knew Px.

It is certainly possible to create coefficients for combining
credentials such that you end up with a product in the exponent.  For
example, the pairs <d2,0> and <0,d1> both work nicely, with the bad
side effect that you've given away a private key.  Let's try blinding
them.

Suppose you have coefficients a and b such that a*d1+b*d2=0; the pair
<d2,-d1> works here.  Then every such pair of product-combining
coefficients can be represented as <d2,0> + r*<a,b>.  Since the
exponents are mod phi(N), we can suppose that the pair <d2+r*a,r*b>
doesn't _directly_ reveal the private keys.  But it's unclear to me
that this pair of coefficients doesn't reveal d1 and d2.  One doesn't
know phi(N), but one may not need to.

Eric




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: an5877@anon.penet.fi (deadbeat)
Date: Mon, 1 Nov 93 19:24:50 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Online Cash Checks
Message-ID: <9311020323.AB07789@anon.penet.fi>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



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Online Cash Checks

David Chaum

Centre for Mathematics and Computer Science
Kruislaan 413 1098SJ Amsterdam

INTRODUCTION
Savings of roughly an order of magnitude in space, storage, and bandwidth
over previously published online electronic cash protocols are achieved by
the techniques introduced here. In addition, these techniques can increase
convenience, make more efficient use of funds, and improve privacy.

"Offline" electronic money [CFN 88] is suitable for low value
transactions where "accountability after the fact" is sufficient to deter
abuse; online payment [C 89], however, remains necessary for transactions
that require "prior restraint" against persons spending beyond their
available funds.

Three online schemes are presented here. Each relies on the same
techniques for encoding denominations in signatures and for "devaluing"
signatures to the exact amount chosen at the time of payment. They differ
in how the unspent value is returned to the payer. In the first, all change is
accumulated by the payer in a single "cookie jar," which might be
deposited at the bank during the next withdrawal transaction. The second
and third schemes allow change to be distributed among unspent notes,
which can themselves later be spent. The second scheme reveals to the
shop and bank the maximum amount for which a note can be spent; the
third does not disclose this information.

DENOMINATIONS AND DEVALUING
For simplicity and concreteness, but without loss of generality, a
particular denomination scheme will be used here. It assigns the value of 1
cent to public exponent 3 in an RSA system, the value of 2 cents to
exponent 5, 4 cents to exponent 7, and so on; each successive power-of-two
value is represented by the corresponding odd prime public exponent, all
with the same modulus. Much as in [C 89], a third root of an image under
the one-way function f (together with the pre-image modulo the bank's
RSA composite) is worth 1 cent, a 7th root is worth 4 cents, and a 21st root
5 cents. In other words, a distinct public prime exponent is associated with
each digit of the binary integer representation of an amount of payment;
for a particular amount of payment, the product of all those prime
exponents corresponding to 1 's in the binary representation of the amount
is the public exponent of the signature.

A signature on an image under f is "devalued" by raising it to the
public powers corresponding to the coin values that should be removed.
For instance, a note having a 21st root could be devalued from its 5 cent
value, to 1 cent, simply by raising it to the 7th power.

In earlier online payment systems [C 89], the number of separate
signatures needed for a payment was in general the Hamming weight of the
binary representation of the amount. Since online systems would be used
for higher-value payments (as mentioned above), and extra resolution may
be desired to provide interest for unspent funds [C 89], an average of
roughly an order of magnitude is saved here.

COOKIE JAR

In this first scheme the payer periodically withdraws a supply of notes
from the bank, each with the system-wide maximum value. Consider an
example, shown in Figure 1.1, in which two notes are withdrawn. The n
and ri are random. The ri "blind" (from the bank) the images under the
public, one-way function f. The bank's signature corresponds to taking the
h-th root, where h = 3*5*7*11. As in all the figures, the payer sends
messages from the left and the bank sends from the right.

                    h             h
          f(n1) * r1 ,  f(n2) * r2 
     ----------------------------------------->
PAYER                                        BANK
     <------------------------------------------
               1/h            1/h 
          f(n1)    * r1, f(n2)    * r2

           Fig. 1.1. Cookie-jar withdrawal

In preparing the first payment, the payer divides r1 out. The signature
is then raised to the 55th power to devalue it from 15 cents to 5 cents.
Figure 1.2 shows this first payment. Of course the shop is an intermediary
between the payer (left) and the bank (right) in every online payment, but
this is not indicated explicitly. Also not shown in the figures are messages
used to agree on the amounts of payment.

                   1/(3*7)           5*11 
          n1, f(n1)       , f(j) * s1
     ----------------------------------------->
PAYER                                        BANK
     <------------------------------------------
              1/(5*11)
          f(j)         * s1

           Fig. 1.2. First cookie-jar payment

The first two residues sent in paying, n1 and its signed image under f,
are easily verified by the bank to be worth 5 cents. The third residue is a
blinded "cookie jar," a blinded image under f of a randomly chosen value
j. This cookie jar is modulo a second RSA composite that is only used for
cookie jars. Once the bank verifies the funds received, and that n1 has not
been spent previously, it signs and returns the blinded cookie jar (under
the cookie jar modulus) with public exponents corresponding to the
change due.

The second payment, shown in figure 1.3, is essentially the same as the
first, except that the amount is 3 cents and the cookie jar now has some
roots already on it. If more payments were to be made using the same
cookie jar, all resulting signatures for change would accumulate.

                   1/(3*5)      1/(5*11)    7*11 
          n2, f(n2)       , f(j)        * s2
     ----------------------------------------->
PAYER                                        BANK
     <------------------------------------------
              1/(5*11*7*11)
          f(j)              * s2

           Fig. 1.3. Second cookie-jar payment

The cookie jar might conveniently be deposited, as shown in figure
1.4, during the withdrawal of the next batch of notes. It is verified by the
bank much as a payment note would be: the roots must be present in the
claimed multiplicity and the pre-image under f must not have been
deposited before.


                 1/(5*7*11*11)
          j, f(j)
     ----------------------------------------->
PAYER                                        BANK

           Fig. 1.4. Cookie-jar deposit

The cookie jar approach gives the effect of an online form of "offline
checks" [C 89], in that notes of a fixed value are withdrawn and the unspent
parts later credited to the payer during a refund transaction.

DECLARED NOTE VALUE

Figure 2 depicts a somewhat different scheme, which allows change to be
spent without an intervening withdrawal transaction.  Withdrawals can be
just as in the cookie-jar scheme, but here a single modulus is used for
everything in the system. The products of public exponents representing
the various amounts are as follows: d is the amount paid, g is the note
value, the "change" c is g/d, and h is again the maximal amount, where d | g
| h. A payment (still to the bank through a shop) includes first and second
components that are the same as in the cookie-jar scheme. The third
component is the amount of change c the payer claims should be returned.
The fourth is a (blinded) number m, which could be an image under f used
in a later payment just as n is used in this one.

                 1/d        c
          n, f(n)   , c, m*s
     ----------------------------------------->
PAYER                                        BANK
     <------------------------------------------
                     +------------+
           1/c       |       1/c  | (Graphic padlock)
          m    * s * | f(f(n)   ) |
                     +------------+

           Fig. 2. Declared note value payment

The signature returned contains a "protection" factor (shown inside
the padlock). This factor ensures that the payer actually has the c-th root of
f(n), by requiring that the payer apply f to it before dividing the result out
of the signature. Without such protection, a payer could get the system-
wide maximum change, regardless of how much change is actually due;
with it, the change claimed can only be recovered if the corresponding
roots on n are in fact known to the payer.

DISTRIBUTING CHANGE
The change returned in a payment can be divided into parts that fill in
missing denominations in notes not yet spent. Suppose, for example, that
the last payment is spent with d = 5*11, c = 3*7, and that m is formed by
the payer as shown in the first line of Figure 3.1. Then unblinding after
the payment yields the a shown in the second line.

(Use === for "is equivalent to")

                         3        7
              m === f(n1)  * f(n2)

                     1/21
              a === m

           Fig. 3.1. Form of change returned

- From a, the two roots shown in the last two lines of Figure 3.2 are
readily computed. (This technique is easily extended to include any
number of separate roots.) Thus the values unused in the last payment fill
in roots missing in notes n1 and n2.
                   -1
              u = 3   mod 7

              v = 3u div 7

          1/7       3        -1  u        -v
     f(n1)    === (a  * f(n2)   )  * f(n1)

          1/3              -1/7
     f(n2)    === a * f(n1)

           Fig. 3.2. Distributing the change

Because overpayment allows change to be returned in any chosen
denominations (not shown), the payer has extra flexibility and is able to
use all funds held. This also increases convenience by reducing the need
for withdrawals.

HIDDEN NOTE VALUE
Although the combination of the previous two subsections is quite
workable, it may be desirable for the payer not to have to reveal c to the
shop or the bank. Figure 4 shows a system allowing this. The payment
message is just as in the declared note value protocol above, except that c is
not sent. The protection factor (shown again in a lock) is also placed under
the signature, but it is missing the extra f and is raised to a random power z
chosen by the bank

                 1/d     c
          n, f(n)   , m*s
     ----------------------------------------->
PAYER                                        BANK
     <------------------------------------------
                        +----------+
           d/h    g/h   |     zd/h |
          m    * s    * | f(n)     |, z
                        +----------+

           Fig. 4. Hidden note value payment

If z were known to the payer before payment, then the payer could
                       -z
cheat by including f(n)   in the third component; this would yield the payer
the system-wide maximum change, even if none were due. Consider a
single change exponent q. If z mod q is guessed correctly by a cheating
payer, then the payer improperly gets the corresponding coin value. Thus
the chance of successful cheating is 1/q. If, however, the divisors of h are
chosen sufficiently large, quite practical security can be achieved. When
the possibilities of distributing change and refunding are included, this
scheme's privacy surpasses that of a coin system.

CONCLUSION
Combining online coins improves efficiency, use of funds, convenience,
and privacy.

REFERENCES

Chaum, D., "Privacy Protected Payments: Unconditional Payer and/or
Payee Anonymity," in Smart Card 2000, North-Holland, 1989, pp. 69-92.

Chaum, D., A. Fiat, & M. Naor, "Offline Electronic Cash," Proceedings
of Crypto '88.

Brought to you by the Information Liberation Front, and

DEADBEAT <na5877@anon.penet.fi>

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From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: mlshew@netcom.com (Mark Shewmaker)
Date: Tue, 2 Nov 93 04:09:56 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: 700 Club Report on the Clipper Chip on Wednesday, October 20, 1993
Message-ID: <9311021208.AA26528@netcom6.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


On October 20, 1993, the 700 Club gave a report on the Clipper chip.
The report was fantastic.  If you want to convince people why the
chip is so very dangerous, and why cryptographic freedoms are so
important, I recommend that you take a good look at this.

Most people don't take to overly technical explanations of things,
at least for the first round of explanations.  This is an excellent
model of starter explanation for such people.

I've included a transcript of the show's Clipper segments.

Notice one important thing:  The report is not overtly religious in
tone.  It does not need to be.  Encryption and privacy issues cut
across many political and religious lines.  There is no need to
alienate the people you are trying to convince by insulting their
group affiliations.

Notes on the transcript:  It includes only the Clipper-chip segments.
The transcript is in three sections.  The first is from the intro to
the show where they show clips of future segments of that days show,
the second is the pre-commercial "Next: The Clipper chip, here on the
700 Club", and the last is the actual report.

All typos and inaccuracies are mine.  The editing I did to the report
is: (1) remove "uh"'s (2) try to add returns in order to put the speech's
format into some semblance of paragraph form for easier reading, and
(3) change one case of two people talking simultaneously (at the end)
to one person saying a few words, followed by the other saying a few words.

People in the report:  Ben Kinchlow and Terry Meeuwsen are the hosts,
who talk about the stories between themselves, and Julia Zaher is the
reporter for the story.  She speaks both in a voiceover to the report,
and in the report, interviewing Jerry Berman, Lynn McNulty, Lance Hoffman,
and of course Dorothy Denning.

By the way, they showed the Clipper chip itself!  Or, at least they
showed something they claimed to be the Clipper chip.  Unfortunately,
there was no close-up, just the chip in someone's hand, with the chip
taking about a sixteenth of the screen.  It looked like a 28 pin PLCC
package, with the cheaper tin plated leads.  Odd that there are so few pins.


Here's the transcript:

[The following was clipped from the intros to the that day's topics]

Ben Kinchlow:
               We've also got a word of caution for you because
               very soon, if you're familiar with this song:
               _Every_Move_You_Make,_Every_ _Step_You_Take:  The
               federal government could be watching you!

Jerry Berrman:
                We are going to conduct our lives in electronic
                media:  Order our movies, order our television
                shows, decide what schools we send our children
                to, what programs we want to, what products we
                want to buy, what magazines we want downloaded
                into our homes.

Ben Kinchlow:
               And if you're a big fan of large government, this
               tiny computer chip could now give the government,
               Big Brother, instant access to every detail of your
               private life.

               And we'll have details of that still to come.

               Terry?

Terry Meeuwsen:
                 Right...Scary.

---
[The following is the pre-commercial message.]
---

Ben Kinchlow:
               Well coming up next... The clipper computer chip.

               It could be a key to invading your privacy.

               We'll have that for you as the 700 club continues.

---
[The following is the actual report.]
---

Terry Meeuwsen: The famous line from the book _1984_ was
                "Big Brother is watching you", and in the future,
                that could prove to be true.

                How would Big Brother watch you?

                What method would he use?

                Some privacy experts fear the means could be--
                a computer chip.  CBN News correspondent
                Julia Zaher brings us the story from Washington.

Julia Zaher:
(voiceover)
            The way we communicate is changing rapidly.  It won't
            be long before our telephone, our computer, and
            perhaps even our television will all be one device.

            Jerry Berman of the Electronic Frontier Foundation
            says we'll use that device to conduct most of our
            daily business, our personal business; and for some of
            us, our professional business.

Jerry Berrman:

                We are going to conduct our lives in electronic
                media:  Order our movies, order our television
                shows, decide what schools we send our children
                to, what programs we want, what products we want
                to buy, what magazines we want downloaded into our
                homes.

Julia Zaher:
(voiceover)
              Berman and others in the communications and computer
              industries welcome the innovative technology, but
              they also worry that a new danger is threatening the
              privacy of every American. The danger is that a
              computerized record of nearly all of our activities
              will be constantly accumulating.  That record could
              show virtually every move we make, from what we buy,
              to how much money we make, to what political causes
              we support.

              To protect our privacy, Berman and others believes,
              more people will start doing what the government and
              the military have done for decades:  Add scrambling
              devices to telephones and computers, to keep
              outsiders from tapping into important information
              and conversations.  That process of coding and
              decoding information is called encryption.

Jerry Berrman:
                Today we don't think of encrypting our
                communications, but it will be done with a flick
                of a button.

Julia Zaher:
(voiceover)
              Already, AT&T makes a scrambling device for
              telephones.  Many businesses, especially those with
              overseas offices, use these scrambling devices
              routinely.

              They also take advantage of the almost 300 computer
              software programs available to code and decode
              computer programs and electronic mail.

              The Clinton administration has taken a great
              interest in this information revolution, and the
              government has invented its own scrambling device.

Lynn McNulty:
               This is one of the clipper chips.  The chip itself
               costs about twenty-five dollars.

Julia Zaher:
(voiceover)
              The new invention is known as the Clipper chip.  The
              chip is supposed to provide the strongest possible
              method of coding phone, FAX, and computer
              transmissions to prevent unwanted eavesdropping.

              The chip is supposed to be on the market soon.

              Lynn McNulty is with the National Institute of
              Standards and Technology, known as NIST for short.

              President Clinton has commissioned NIST to help make
              the Clipper chip the highest standard for scrambling
              information.  The White House wants to see more
              businesses and individuals use the Clipper chip to
              protect their communications once it's on the market.

              The reportedly unbreakable scrambling code in the
              chip would be a big plus in the fight to keep
              information private.

              But there's a catch.

Lynn McNulty:
               A good part of the technical details of the, that
               underlie the standard will not be made public,
               which is a departure from the way we've done
               business in the past.

Julia Zaher:
(voiceover)
              The details of how Clipper works and the keys that
              can break the code are all being kept secret by the
              government.

              That has nearly everyone in the computer and
              communications industries alarmed.

              Lance Hoffman is a computer science and encryption
              coding and decoding expert.

Lance Hoffman:
                The administration wants to control the whole
                process, and wants the government to control all
                the keys, is what it boils down to--that's the
                real problem.

Julia Zaher:
(voiceover)
              The government says it alone must hold the keys that
              can break Clipper's private scrambling code.  That
              would mean that only government agencies could
              eavesdrop on computer and telephone transmissions.
              Private agencies, or individuals like private
              detectives couldn't do it.

              The FBI and other law enforcement agencies say,
              instead of getting court orders for wiretaps, in the
              future they'll be routinely requesting codes that
              are scrambling computers and telephones.

              Dorothy Denning is one of the five outside computer
              experts who had the chance to examine the Clipper
              chip and try to break its code.

Julia Zaher:
              And what happened?

Dorothy Denning:
                  I failed.  I didn't break it.

Julia Zaher:
              There was no way you could break it?

Dorothy Denning:
                  There was no way I could break it.

Julia Zaher:
(voiceover)
              Denning is one of the very few people in the
              computer science field who sees no danger in the
              government holding the only keys that can break
              Clipper's code.

Dorothy Denning:
                  ...And this initiative does not in any way to
                  expand the government's authority to intercept
                  communications.

Julia Zaher:
(voiceover)
              Denning also says Clipper's unbreakable code would
              make it more difficult for police or the FBI to do
              illegal wiretaps.

              But Hoffman and many others disagree.  They say that
              all of the secrecy about how clipper works, combined
              with the government alone holding the keys to break
              the code, would put the privacy of everyone using
              clipper in jeopardy.

              Hoffman says that while the chip is just one of many
              scrambling devices now, the government could
              eventually argue that everyone coding their
              information must use clipper

Lance Hoffman:
                There's no reason they couldn't change their mind
                at a later point and say "well we tried it
                voluntari..." "We tried it as a voluntary measure,
                it doesn't work, so now it's going to be
                mandatory."

Julia Zaher:
(voiceover)
              Privacy advocates like Jerry Berman point out the
              government has been known to spy on citizens when it
              believes they hold dangerous political opinions.

Jerry Berrman:
                There are good governments, there are bad
                governments.  We've gone through abusive periods
                where we've had intelligence agencies chasing
                different political dissidents from the right and
                left around.

                We worry about these things.

Julia Zaher:
(reporting)
              Computer coding and decoding standards may all seem
              irrelevant at this point, but they'll be important
              in the future to protect your privacy.

              The government's Clipper chip is the most powerful
              coding and decoding device developed so far.

              It hasn't been decided yet if Clipper will be the one
              national standard used to protect electronic
              privacy, but if it is, it could also pose the
              greatest threat, if those decoding keys, held by the
              government, fall into the wrong hands.

              Julia Zaire, CBN News, Washington.

Ben Kinchlow:
               And some of us would say that the wrong hands for
               them to fall into is the government!  You know.

               What your talking about here, essentially, is a
               giant superhighway.  This is what the President,
               Vice-President Gore is recommending--that we have
               this super-highway, which on the surface is
               wonderful.  It enables us all across the world to hook up and,
               you know, exchange information and communications
               with people, and that's a wonderful idea, and we
               need to take full advantage of what's going on in
               technology today:  Marvelous things.

               Like one of our cameramen is hooked up to something
               called Internet, where you can pull out files from
               the university of Tokyo, if you will.

               I mean, it's a wonderful idea.

               The problem is, when the government comes in and
               starts saying, "The only" I mean, everybody has
               this scrambling device, but the only people who
               can unscramble this device is the government.

               But the government says that "we must have this"
               in order to track down criminals and terrorists.

               The problem is, "criminals and terrorists"
               eventually become who the government says
               "criminals and terrorists" are.

               And it will not be long before anybody who
               disagrees with the government, then, can become a
               criminal, and his whole activities can be tracked
               down.

               And indeed what Orwell said about 1984 becomes a
               reality.

               The Big Brother has the capacity to watch you,
               track you.

               And by the way, interestingly enough, they do
               have, and have developed, a small uh

Terry Meeuwsen:
                 Oh, I don't want to know this

Ben Kinchlow:
               tracking device that goes under

Terry Meeuwsen:
                 Under the skin?

Ben Kinchlow:
               under your skin.  In fact, they used some of it,
               according to one report I read, over in the war
               that just took place in the middle east, so they
               could track our men by satellite.

Terry Meeuwsen:
                 Well, you know [sigh], the bottom line is that
                 it's the same thing we've been hearing day after
                 day after day: More government control, more
                 government control. So, we need to hear that...

Ben Kinchlow:
               The operative word here being 'control.'

Terry Meeuwsen:
                 Yeah.

Ben Kinchlow:
                Watch it.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: mlshew@netcom.com (Mark Shewmaker)
Date: Tue, 2 Nov 93 06:23:54 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: 700 Club Report on the Clipper Chip on Wednesday, October 20, 1993
Message-ID: <9311021420.AA08854@netcom6.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I have an error in my spelling.  I spelled Jerry Berman's name
wrongly as Jerry Berrman.

Major apologies.  And after mentioning him as just 'an eff guy'
in the first message.  <sigh>

I'm sorry to have misspelled your name, Mr. Berman.

***
Everyone, please do a search and replace of Berrman->Berman before
distributing the document any further.
***




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: thomas.hughes@chrysalis.org
Date: Tue, 2 Nov 93 11:33:54 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Z
Message-ID: <9311021301.A4036wk@chrysalis.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



wild and crazy ideas for the remailers:
 
 
o  some fabulous code writer needs to hack up a copy of PGP so that it will
   allow/force a batch-mode operation and not stop and wait for input from
   the "user" if the message fed into it uses an unknown key or something
   else happens that causes PGP to pause/stop/halt/quit/die.
 
       " ::            "
   the " PGP-ENCRYPTED "  line could be done away with all together.
   if the message fed through the PGP.batch.version returns a plaintext,
   use the plaintext; if not, try to process the original message.
 
 
o  i looked at the code for hal-the-remailer for about 5 seconds and can't
   remember even a line of what it looked like, but how difficult would it
   be to rig up the remailers to delay untill midnight and then process
   each message stacked in the remailer que _randomly_?
 
   1 out of 3 it is sent out
   1 out of 3 it is skipped entirely (until the next remailing-event/time)
   1 out of 3 it is forwarded automagicly through a "friendly" remailer.
 
   you set the remailer to NOT skip a message that is in the first "n"
   messages on the stack to be remailed. (to prevent a message from getting
   "stuck" inside the remailer for an extended period of time...)
 
   obviously whomever is running the remailer can tinker with the ratios
   and the number of times per day messages are processed ...
 
 
o  the more remailers the message goes through, the harder it is to
   track down the original sender. why force the sender to manually
   send messages through multiple remailers when some clever script
   can do it from inside the "remailer network" automaticly?
 
   messages go into one remailer, and are forwarded in a random order
   once/twice/? a day through a second remailer. encryption, compression,
   padding, etc would add to the effect as well.
 
 
o  how about checking for " ::      "
                          " Respond "
 
   and bouncing back: " Message received. "
                      " ReMailer active.  "
 
   or perhaps the remailer's public key, or even a description of the
   location of the system the remailer is running on, how to get a copy
   of the software, what the author's favorite color is, etc ...
 
   anyone that wants the remailer to bounce back a response can stick
   "::RESPONDDAMNIT!" in their messages, and the people who don't want
   the remailers to respond at all, won't hafta worry about it.
 
 
o  i suggest adding an "ignore list" of sites.
   this would provide a simple somewhat effective way to cut down on
   abuse with a minimum effort. if a problem-abuser pops up, just lock
   that site out for a while and maybe the problem will go away.
 
   the amount of annoyance/difficulty the abuser is caused is much
   greater than the effort needed to add the site's name to the ignore
   list. sure the abuser will just find another site to send from or
   another remailer to abuse, but mr abuser will wear himself out while
   the remailers won't even break a sweat.
 
 
o  an overiding "OK-to-respond" list would be nice too.
   (to allow remailers to accept messages from certain systems, users,
    and remailers regardless of any locked out sites.)





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: szabo@netcom.com (Nick Szabo)
Date: Tue, 2 Nov 93 13:13:54 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Commerce Models (fwd)
Message-ID: <9311022112.AA10177@netcom5.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Addendum my to previous post: the Internet commerce list is
at imp-interest@thumper.bellcore.com, presumably you can
subscribe via imp-interest-request@thumper.bellcore.com.
Great articles on electronic cash, "digital pennies",
Internet Billing Service, etc. from people intending to 
implement and use this stuff, soon.

Nick Szabo					szabo@netcom.com			




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Phil Taylor <ptaylor@panix.com>
Date: Tue, 2 Nov 93 12:10:01 PST
To: Dark <unicorn@access.digex.net>
Subject: Re: Style Analysis
In-Reply-To: <199310292142.AA22002@access.digex.net>
Message-ID: <Pine.3.05.9311021455.A12868-a100000@panix.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain




On Fri, 29 Oct 1993, Dark wrote:

> It seems to me that the software to "filter" a message through and
> remove anomalies, standardize punctuations and replace words
> over 5 letters with more standard words.. etc.. has a kind of
> utility.

I remember a sf suggestion a while ago that went like this:
a. A mail reader that intelligently filters incoming messages to extract
only the factual content.
b. A mail sender that intelligntly "stylizes" a factual message with
appropriate "fluff".
That way I can send you a one line message "watch out for the MDS!", but
our computers will communicate with as much polite waffling as possible.

The suggestion was a joke but maybe it has applicability :-)


PJT - A new poster but a longtime reader.







From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Karl Lui Barrus <klbarrus@owlnet.rice.edu>
Date: Tue, 2 Nov 93 13:30:01 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: ANON: mail concerns
Message-ID: <9311022125.AA05859@elf.owlnet.rice.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

Hm.. there have been some concerns over anonymous mail recently...
both Alan and Thomas have noted that it is easy to match up sender and
destination for a remailer which processes each message as it arrives.

Solution: cache all messages and process them later (once a day, once
a week, etc.).  For example, the remailer at elee9sf@menudo.uh.edu
caches all incoming requests, and processes them (randomly) at
midnight.

I didn't even have to modify the remailer scripts to do this; rather,
I wrote some extra ones.  The process seems stable.  The trickiest
part is scheduling the remailing: I have to use the 'at' command since
I can't have my own crontab.

Also, Thomas mentioned what seems to be 'random remailing'.  As I
mentioned in a previous message ("ANON: anonymous mail"), forcing mail
to progress through a network randomly also forces the final
destination to be known to everybody, where before only one site knows
the final destination.

Also, instead of building the necessay headers to hop mail you may be
able to use one of several scripts and programs available at
soda.berkeley.edu

Karl Barrus
<klbarrus@owlnet.rice.edu>

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.3a

iQCVAgUBLNbQEoOA7OpLWtYzAQEe0QP+KaDWOyep8+wSfEMtUjBOj8OGJMrdSCkO
jAfS3zW/uASpOfZ8zgaGBhl8kFPzF9ZyEJyKV/tydIHJdQUEI9K3FU0AE4vB2Fei
xcGcM16dZlSSOW/E+CkRR/3UstlRwUuHCccFACTh5SIPIG3mSSVvNMEp7Cz+SIss
j5Mkq9KqJc0=
=tWzv
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: kwaldman <kwaldman@BBN.COM>
Date: Tue, 2 Nov 93 13:10:01 PST
To: thomas.hughes@chrysalis.org
Subject: Re: Z
In-Reply-To: <9311021301.A4036wk@chrysalis.org>
Message-ID: <9311022108.AA26311@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>From: thomas.hughes@chrysalis.org
>Date: Tue, 02 Nov 93 13:01:08 
>Subject: Z
>To: cypherpunks@toad.com
>
>
>wild and crazy ideas for the remailers:
> 
> 
>o  some fabulous code writer needs to hack up a copy of PGP so that it will
>   allow/force a batch-mode operation and not stop and wait for input from
>   the "user" if the message fed into it uses an unknown key or something
>   else happens that causes PGP to pause/stop/halt/quit/die.
> 
>       " ::            "
>   the " PGP-ENCRYPTED "  line could be done away with all together.
>   if the message fed through the PGP.batch.version returns a plaintext,
>   use the plaintext; if not, try to process the original message.
> 
> 
	At least on version 2.2 you could set BATCHMODE=TRUE in pgp.c


		Karl

--------
Karl M. Waldman              kwaldman@bbn.com  
BBN Systems and Technologies




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Christian D. Odhner" <cdodhner@indirect.com>
Date: Tue, 2 Nov 93 15:47:14 PST
To: Karl Lui Barrus <klbarrus@owlnet.rice.edu>
Subject: Re: ANON: mail concerns
In-Reply-To: <9311022125.AA05859@elf.owlnet.rice.edu>
Message-ID: <Pine.3.07.9311021608.A12794-b100000@indirect.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I recently bought a copy of oracom's "Programing Perl" (which btw has a
GREAT quickreference guide) and have been working on a remailer mod with
little succsess. My thought goes like this:
New remailer command...
::
Induce-Delay: X

Where X is any number between 0 and 9999, or the word 'Random'. This would
delay the remailing of the message by X minutes through a simple perl
sleep command. 

QUESTION: Would new mail be kept waiting by the old mail? Or would Unix
spawn a new incarnation of the remailer process to take care of each
subsequent message?

::
Mail-At-Time: X
Mail-On-Date: X

Again both of these would use a sleep command to avoid the cron and at
commands.

::
Request-Encryption-To: X

If user ID X is on the remailer's pubkey ring, the outgoing message is
encrypted to X. This could be usefull for anonymous return-address blocks.

I think these are all pretty good ideas, however I'm not very good at perl
(in fact, at this point I suck) and things keep on bombing.

Well, Happy Hunting to all, -Chris.

Christian Douglas Odhner     | "The NSA can have my secret key when they pry
cdodhner@indirect.com	     | it from my cold, dead, hands... But they shall
pgp 2.3 public key by finger | NEVER have the password it's encrypted with!"
My opinions are shareware. To register your copy, send me 15$ in DigiCash.
  Key fingerprint =  58 62 A2 84 FD 4F 56 38  82 69 6F 08 E4 F1 79 11 






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: khijol!erc (Ed Carp)
Date: Tue, 2 Nov 93 17:22:16 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: anonymous remailing/posting software
Message-ID: <m0ouWt4-000HWiC@khijol>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text


Ah, yes.  Once again, it's time to upgrade the APS software here at khijol.
For those who don't know, I run an anonymous posting site which posts to only
a select set of newsgroups (to prevent abuse).  Now that the machine is
sitting on the Internet, it's time to revamp the software, and I have thought
that it might be easier to hack someone else's than to redo my own (which
was one of those all-day hack sessions).

Double blind remailing and unique ID services are essential,  with the 'nice
to have' services like automatic pinging of posts, checksum verifications of
posts, automatic encryption/decryption of posts, etc. would be ideal.

Any ideas on where I could obtain such software?  Shell scripts are OK, C
is better.  Perl is not desirable unless I really have to. :(

Thanks!
-- 
Ed Carp, N7EKG			erc@apple.com			510/659-9560
                   an38299@anon.penet.fi, anon-1157@twwells.com
If you want magic, let go of your armor.  Magic is so much stronger than
steel!        -- Richard Bach, "The Bridge Across Forever"



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: D Nicoll <ejuv19@festival.edinburgh.ac.uk>
Date: Tue, 2 Nov 93 10:33:54 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: unsubscribe
Message-ID: <9311021828.aa13590@uk.ac.ed.festival>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


unsubscribe please

thanks




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Matthew J Ghio <mg5n+@andrew.cmu.edu>
Date: Tue, 2 Nov 93 16:42:17 PST
To: jon@werple.apana.org.au
Subject: Re: Some possible projects/topics for CypherPunks
In-Reply-To: <9311021416.AA13358@lux.latrobe.edu.au>
Message-ID: <0gpjpDm00awINIlkpF@andrew.cmu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


: > 1. HARDWARE:  What about building our own machines?  This is the Vinge-ian
: >    crypto-anarchy theme ultimately.  We should be able to produce our own
: >    technology,  and not depend on the merchantile/government-mandated
: >    economic system/monopolies.
: > 
: >    I see this as being very important to the oceania/autopia/technomad
: >    ideas and projects of creating ocean-going free societies.

I agree.  Altho we'd probably want to build our own boards, we'd have to
rely on commercially availiable integrated circuits and other
components.  The components we'd need are fairly easy to obtain, and I
don't see any reason to believe that we will have difficulty obtaining
computer components to build a secret network in the future.  Oceania
will probably become a major source of electronic privacy technologies,
but that's still several years in the future.

: >    Or is anyone interested in starting a parallel list of sorts for the
: >    hardware-punks?  'ware-punks?  :-)  or perhaps an even better name

Yes.  Who can host the mailing list?




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: A1 ray arachelian (library)  <rarachel@ishara.poly.edu>
Date: Tue, 2 Nov 93 21:42:17 PST
To: ptaylor@panix.com (Phil Taylor)
Subject: Re: Style Analysis
In-Reply-To: <Pine.3.05.9311021455.A12868-a100000@panix.com>
Message-ID: <9311030137.AA11763@ishara.poly.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> I remember a sf suggestion a while ago that went like this:
> a. A mail reader that intelligently filters incoming messages to extract
> only the factual content.
> b. A mail sender that intelligntly "stylizes" a factual message with
> appropriate "fluff".
> That way I can send you a one line message "watch out for the MDS!", but
> our computers will communicate with as much polite waffling as possible.
> 
> The suggestion was a joke but maybe it has applicability :-)

Yes, however, this isn't too feasable.  There's a great quote somewhere in
Don Lancaster's Secret Money Machine II that goes along the lines of a
bit of text being translated to Russian and back which illustrates just how
(in)effective these things can be:

IN: The spirit is willing, but the flesh is weak.
OUT:The vodka was great, but the mean is rotten.





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: jet@netcom.com (J. Eric Townsend)
Date: Tue, 2 Nov 93 13:40:04 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: 700 Club Report on the Clipper Chip on Wednesday, October 20, 1993
In-Reply-To: <9311021208.AA26528@netcom6.netcom.com>
Message-ID: <9311022136.AA22619@netcom7.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Mark Shewmaker writes:
 > Notice one important thing:  The report is not overtly religious in
 > tone.  It does not need to be.  Encryption and privacy issues cut

As a regular and long-time 700 Club viewer :-), I'd like to point out
that they've taken great pains to be non-religous in their coverage of
issues.  They're really trying to appeal to people who don't already
'believe'.  Also, I suspect they're trying to snare channel-surfers.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Sameer <sameer@uclink.berkeley.edu>
Date: Tue, 2 Nov 93 22:22:15 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: My PGP key
Message-ID: <m0oubWI-000J5lC@infinity.hip.berkeley.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


	I finally got linux/a secure place for PGP set up-- here's my key.

-----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----
Version: 2.3a
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=Rgag
-----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: thomas.hughes@chrysalis.org
Date: Wed, 3 Nov 93 00:17:18 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: MORE Z
Message-ID: <9311022222.A6296wk@chrysalis.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



some seriously moronic dribling idiot wrote:
 
>> o  i suggest adding an "ignore list" of sites.
 
fine. it was late. i wasn't thinking clearly. shut up. i don't wanna hear it.
 
this idea would work fine if you happen to have a clue where the hell the
abusive/annoying messages are comming from ...
 
how about just switching that around to be a "lock out these sites" list
and ignore all messages that ask to be remailed to those sites.
 
and be sure to stick "willy@whitehouse.gov" on the top of the list.





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Alan Ruttenberg <alanr@media.mit.edu>
Date: Tue, 2 Nov 93 20:12:15 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: trivia question
Message-ID: <9311030407.AA16095@media.mit.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



A friend, (who wished to remain anonymous :) asks:

Perhaps you can forward for me a trivia question I've been trying to
get answered.

I'm pretty sure the phreak magazine "2600" is named after 2.6KHz,
which I think was a tone used for some phone billing system that
got cracked (perhaps Cap'n Crunch's whistle frequency?)

The trivia question is this: can anyone point me to a definitive
reference for what 2600 really was? An ACM article or the particular
phone system or the cracker who exploited it would suffice.

thanks!






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Dark <unicorn@access.digex.net>
Date: Tue, 2 Nov 93 20:42:15 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Nazis/probability of their mention and/or use to discredit
Message-ID: <199311030439.AA27770@access.digex.net>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
 
Message 53:
- From owner-cypherpunks@toad.com Mon Nov  1 10:35:58 1993
From: James Still <still@kailua.colorado.edu>
To: 'Cypherpunks List' <cypherpunks@toad.com>
Subject: RE: Nazis/Privacy/Cypherpunks
Date: Mon, 01 Nov 93 09:08:00 PST
 
 
>Personally, I don't rule out examination of Nazi tactics as a
>worst case scenario model.  Let's face it, as ugly and dark as
>Nazi rule was, they did some things quite efficiently indeed.
 
[Stuff Deleted]
 
If I understand your basic point to be:  "consider the worst
possible scenario in order to better prepare for it" then I
agree completely.  However I have serious reservations with
emulating or (gadzooks!) *admiring* those Nazi tactics that
seemed to "work" because I would disagree that, first they
actually did work, and more importantly, that their ends
justified the means.  Which brings me to your second point:
 
- ->
Let me make clear that I do not (gadzooks appropiate here)
condone any Nazi security measures.  My point was more
to provoke thought about how Nazi security techniques
would pan out in the information age.
 
Again, the question, did they work, is debateable.
<-
 
>[Note 2]
>No one writes code from "the bottom up" in the manner that you
>suggest.  If that were the case we'd see the wheel invented time
>and time again.
 
I disagree.  (Semantics check:  I'm not talking about a mouse driver
or a basic windowing interface here.  Obviously, there's no need to
hammer out that wheel again.)
 
I am talking about what I see as a basic cypherpunk mission, that
being, "the constant reevaluation of the approach towards privacy."
We have the ability to constantly rip apart our own ideas, like
children's ABC blocks, and see if they fit back together again
in a better way.  I would prefer to see constant rewrite's of a
"given" (like PGP for instance) than to stagnate and rely on the
one idea, concept, or proof just because we've always done it
that way.  Our code should be like our ethics: constantly re-
evaluated, questioned, and tested for validity.
 
- ->
I interpreted your ground up analogy incorrectly.
 
I do believe that ideas should be examined and reassembled.
I just think it's silly to rule out anything that might have
merit.  (I guess I'm just determined to be flamed here on
the merit of anything Nazi)
<-
 
- -uni- (Dark)
 
 --- still@kailua.colorado.edu --------------------------------
 
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.3
 
iQCVAgUBLNc0/BibHbaiMfO5AQFrXwQAoxfek4YivmYGsAc21mS6LrRLqTkDXrB1
62o+te0Fge3k2drHiC9oKPEXGa3Aid6/Td3HjDb7IjFsXvAlyD6P/x4IXtVw1W2J
Tb2CnwoNl0mz171iLIjHIHAWcfDqwzU5mYgPb1T5XyntgFJTJ966tvEIYhhfkvcH
nU5EVDMsdyo=
=nSBc
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Alan Ruttenberg <alanr@media.mit.edu>
Date: Tue, 2 Nov 93 21:42:15 PST
To: hughes@ah.com (Eric Hughes)
Subject: Re: trivia question
In-Reply-To: <9311030448.AA02487@ah.com>
Message-ID: <9311030539.AA20710@media.mit.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


	This topic is inappropriate for cypherpunks.  At the least next time
	please acknowledge this and ask for replies in private email.
	
	Eric

My apologies. I've only joined the list recently and was just passing on
a question which someone else thought might be answered in this forum.
Please direct any further responses to my email address. 

Thanks

-alan




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: J. Michael Diehl <mdiehl@triton.unm.edu>
Date: Tue, 2 Nov 93 23:47:18 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Procmail update.
Message-ID: <9311030743.AA21191@triton.unm.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Hi all!  Just a quick update on my procmail mail processor rc file.  I have most
of the functionality implemented.  I'm working on speeding up mail delivery and
making sure I don't have a file locking problem.  So far, my system will:
 
1    Accept incoming mail and determine if it contains a pgp message, key,
     or signature.
 
2    If it contains a message, it determines who can read it.
 
3    If it contains a key, it is added to your pubring.pgp
 
4    If it contains a signed message, the signature is validated.
 
5    An informative subset of pgp's output is tacked onto the head of the
     message, surrounded by user-defined lines to prevent spoofing of the
     validation info.
 
6    Finally, the subject of the mail is prefixed with either (key),
     (sig), (prv) to indicate that the message contains a key, signed
     message, or encrypted (private) message.
 
I also have the capability to use procmail as a pgp-info server.  You could send
me mail with the subject: send pgp-help and my machine would send you a file
which contains help for pgp.  This could lead to lots of uses....
 
Any comments are welcome.  I should be releasing my procmailrc file within the
week.  Take care, all
 
Lagers,
 
 
J. Michael Diehl   ;^)  |*The 2nd Amendment is there in case the 
mdiehl@triton.unm.edu   | Government forgets about the 1st!  <RL>
Mike.Diehl@f29.n301.z1  |*God is a good Physicist, and an even 
    .fidonet.org        | better Mathematician.  <Me>
al945@cwns9.ins.cwru.edu|*I'm just looking for the opportunity to 
 (505) 299-2282 (voice) | be Politicly Incorrect! <Me>
Can we impeach him yet? |*Protected by 18 USC 2511 and 18 USC 2703. 
PGP Key = 7C06F1 = A6 27 E1 1D 5F B2 F2 F1  12 E7 53 2D 85 A2 10 5D




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: hiscdcj@lux.latrobe.edu.au  (Dwayne)
Date: Tue, 2 Nov 93 06:19:56 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com (cypherpunks mailing list)
Subject: Re: Some possible projects/topics for CypherPunks
Message-ID: <9311021416.AA13358@lux.latrobe.edu.au>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


This is from the guy who thought up the punk net idea. He has a smallish
mbox, so asked me to passs this on. Feel free to mail him directly..

Dwayne.

: From jon@werple.apana.org.au Tue Nov  2 17:26:48 1993
: Date: Tue, 02 Nov 1993 17:26:23 +1100 (EST)
: From: Jon Holdsworth <jon@werple.apana.org.au>
: Subject: Re: Some possible projects/topics for CypherPunks
: To: hiscdcj@lux.latrobe.edu.au (Dwayne)
: Message-Id: <199311020626.RAA00708@werple.apana.org.au>
: 
: > 1. HARDWARE:  What about building our own machines?  This is the Vinge-ian
: >    crypto-anarchy theme ultimately.  We should be able to produce our own
: >    technology,  and not depend on the merchantile/government-mandated
: >    economic system/monopolies.
: > 
: >    I see this as being very important to the oceania/autopia/technomad
: >    ideas and projects of creating ocean-going free societies.
: > 
 This is all good encouraging stuff!  Of course you realize that half the
 issue is that PunkNet and some other things HAVE to be *Illegal*.  Why?
 Because they have no point in existing if they can be regulated, taxed,
 interferred with or "policed" (an abstract) by any govt or comm agency
 
: 
: >    Or is anyone interested in starting a parallel list of sorts for the
: >    hardware-punks?  'ware-punks?  :-)  or perhaps an even better name
 This is an excellent idea.  Get the HAM crowd into it (The ULTRAnerds)
: 
: >    would be The Homebrew Computer Club^2.
 No that would be a fucking shithouse name
: 
: > 2. STEGENOGRAPHY: Using the genome project data listings
: >    (bionet.molbio.genbank.updates) as a stegenographic source to 
: >    hide encrypted info in.  Similar to the alt.w.a.s.t.e NG,
: >    but more public.  Of course, it'd be bad if your ecrypted data 
: >    got credited with curing/causing a genetic disease.... =>
: >
 Mad.  I like it
:  
: > 3. PUNK-NET:  (see HARDWARE above)
 Wheeeeeee!!!!
: 
: > 4. POLITICS/ANONYMITY:  I may have missed this, but has anyone
: >    discussed Gibson's "The Republic of Desire" idea of having a
: >    network based guerilla organization?  Not that we need to be
: >    guerilla's yet, but...
: > 
 In MUDS (eg. Graphical muds!!) I think it would become easier than ever to
 assemble cell-structure type (eg. IRA style) orgs
 Encyphered PunkNet too
: 
: 
: >    I think the guerilla cell organization would probably lend itself
: >    to using the DC-net protocols, and developing webs-of-trust
 Whats DC-net?

{Dwayne's note:  I'll pass on the DC-NET thing that was posted here a
while ago. I've saved it. Somewhere  :-/  }


              (Dwayne Jones-Evans  IRC, MediaMOO: ddraig  )
     ( SCA: Cynon Yscolan ap Myrddin, Stormhold, Lochac, West)
        PGP public key available. finger me.  be gentle.
           internet---> hiscdcj@lux.latrobe.edu.au





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: thomas.hughes@chrysalis.org
Date: Wed, 3 Nov 93 01:07:18 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: RE-RE-RE-RE: ZEE
Message-ID: <9311030207.A6385wk@chrysalis.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



>>Random mailing routes actually make it easier to track down the
>>original sender.

>>Perhaps you missed an earlier message I sent to the list ("Anonymous
>>Mail").  If the message proceeds randomly through the remailers, then
>>every single site must somehow be told the final address.  Therefore,
>>instead of just one site knowing the final destination, every site
>>must know the final destination.

if every single site knows the final address, so what?
 how is this going to help them track down the original sender??

anyone at the final destination who wants to track down the original sender
would need to hop-scotch backwards through the numerous sites and try to
track down the path the message took. this is of course, IF someone really
wants to go to this much trouble and if they think they can talk a slew
of administrators into helping them with the witchhunt.

1 out of 5 odds that a "special processing script" is executed on the
message and it is forwarded through a remailer or two using encryption.
 just set up 20 different scripts that route the message in encrypted form
through various/random/secret/obscure remailer-paths.






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: remail@tamsun.tamu.edu
Date: Wed, 3 Nov 93 02:47:22 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: TRW PhonePrint (fwd)
Message-ID: <9311031045.AA09792@tamsun.tamu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


FACT SHEET

What is TRW PhonePrintTM ?

TRW PhonePrintTM  is a system designed to block illegal access to cellular 
networks by cellular "counterfeiters" who use stolen telephone identification 
numbers.

How Does It Work?

Each cellular telephone emits unique signal transmission characteristics - an 
electronic version of a human fingerprint - which cannot be duplicated.  These 
characteristics are matched with the mobile identification number (MIN) and the

electronic serial number (ENS) of the phone to develop a unique pattern for 
each legitimate customer, TRW PhonePrintTM  uses sophisticated signal analysis 
hardware and software to analyze and file the patterns belonging to legitimate 
customers.  When a caller attempts to access the network, the system compares 
incoming patterns to those on file.  If the patterns do not match the call is 
immediately terminated.

Who Benefits?

Cellular telephone fraud costs the industry up to $300 million annually.  TRW 
PhonePrintTM  benefits cellular operators and customers by:

	o Terminating fraudulent calls before they can access the system
	o Eliminating the need for legitimate users to change phone numbers or 	  
	  codes.
	o Increasing the capacity of the network by eliminating the flow of illegal
traffic.
	o Building customer confidence in the security of the cellular network.

When Will It Be Available?

TRW PhonePrintTM  is currently being tested by PacTel Cellular, Los Angeles. 
Testing 
is expected to be completed in early 1994, and the system will be made
available to 
cellular carriers nationwide.

The Company

TRW, headquartered in Cleveland, Ohio, is strategically focused on providing
products 
and services with a high technology or engineering content.  






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: koontzd@lrcs.loral.com (David Koontz )
Date: Wed, 3 Nov 93 07:52:25 PST
To: remail@tamsun.tamu.edu
Subject: Re:  TRW PhonePrint (fwd)
Message-ID: <9311031547.AA00321@io.lrcs.loral.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>Each cellular telephone emits unique signal transmission characteristics - an
>electronic version of a human fingerprint - which cannot be duplicated.  These
>characteristics are matched with the mobile identification number (MIN) and the
>electronic serial number (ENS) of the phone to develop a unique pattern for
>each legitimate customer

I would take it that this would have to operate at the cell level?




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Brian D Williams <talon57@well.sf.ca.us>
Date: Wed, 3 Nov 93 07:52:26 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: INFO: Word Cracking program
Message-ID: <199311031550.HAA00208@well.sf.ca.us>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



 I saw several requests for a program that can break the encryption on Word
for Windows ans Word for Dos files....I have just uploaded WORDPWD>ZIP to
(thats wordpwd.zip) to soda.berkeley.edu cd pub/cypherpunks/incoming.

 I think the author put it best;

        HELLO MICROSOFT:
        If any of you are listening; it would be very nice if future
        versions of Winword had competent encryption that can't be
        broken by any kid who understands his Spiderman Secret Decoder
        Ring. A false sense of security is much worse than none at
        all. It misleads people into thinking that they have assured
        the confidentiality of their documents when they have in fact
        not, and should have used another method to do so. The best
        approach is to have winword call an external program to do the
        encryption. This would let us plug in our favourite
        cryptengine and save you a lot of hassle vis-a-vis export
        controls on useful crypto technology.

---
 Marc Thibault        |  Automation Architect        |  All we are saying
 marc@tanda.isis.org  |  R.R.1, Oxford Mills,        |  is give global
 CIS:71441,2226       |  Ontario, Canada  K0G 1S0    |  warming a chance.
 NC FreeNet: aa185    |                              |

-----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----
Version: 2.0

mQBNAiqxYTkAAAECALfeHYp0yC80s1ScFvJSpj5eSCAO+hihtneFrrn+vuEcSavh
AAUwpIUGyV2N8n+lFTPnnLc42Ms+c8PJUPYKVI8ABRG0I01hcmMgVGhpYmF1bHQg
PG1hcmNAdGFuZGEuaXNpcy5vcmc+
=HLnv
-----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----



enjoy...

Brian D Williams
Extropian
Cypherpatriot




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: lefty@apple.com (Lefty)
Date: Wed, 3 Nov 93 10:42:21 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Style Analysis
Message-ID: <9311031756.AA18695@internal.apple.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>IN: The spirit is willing, but the flesh is weak.
>OUT:The vodka was great, but the mean is rotten.

IN: Out of sight, out of mind.
OUT: Blind lunatic.


--
Lefty (lefty@apple.com)
C:.M:.C:., D:.O:.D:.






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Mike Godwin <mnemonic@well.sf.ca.us>
Date: Wed, 3 Nov 93 11:37:26 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: EFF statement on Bell Atlantic/TCI deal
Message-ID: <199311031935.LAA24250@well.sf.ca.us>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text



The following is an offical EFF statement with regard to the Bell
Atlantic/TCI deal.


--Mike


======

The recent spate of telecommunications mergers -- Bell Atlantic/TCI, US
West/Time-Warner, AT&T/McCaw, plus numerous others in the works -- raise
the stakes for information policy makers and those of us who are concerned
about the development of an open, accessible information infrastructure.  

EFF has just released a major new statement on our Open Platform Campaign,
which explains EFF's approach to infrastructure policy.  Our big concern is
encourage Congess and the Administration to do the right thing and set out
a new, positive communications policy that is ready for the information
age.  We believe that this policy must achieve the following goals:

+    Diversity of Information Sources:  Promote a fully interactive
infrastructure in which the First Amendment flourishes, allowing the
greatest possible diversity of view points;

+    Universal Service:  Ensure a minimum level of affordable
information and communication service for all Americans;

+    Free Speech and Common Carriage:  Guarantee infrastructure access
regardless of the content of the message that the user is sending;

+    Privacy:  Protect the security and privacy of all communications
carried over the infrastructure, and safeguard the Fourth and Fifth
Amendment rights of all who use the information infrastructure;

+    Development of Public Interest Applications and Services:  Ensure
that public interest applications and services which are not produced by
the commercial market are widely available and affordable.

Our policy proposal, available by anonymous ftp on ftp.eff.org in
/pub/eff/papers/op2.0, contains a discussion of these principles and
concrete legislative recommendations on how to accomplish many of these
goals.  Here are a few selected paragraphs from the main paper to give a
flavor of our positions, but we hope you'll read the whole thing.

     "Regulatory changes should be made, and mergers approved or barred
based on specific, enforceable commitments that the electronic
superhighways will meet public goals and realize the potential of digital
technology.  That potential arises from the extraordinary spaciousness of
the broadband information highway, contrasted with the scarcity of
broadcast spectrum and the limited number of cable channels that defined
the mass media era.  Properly constructed and administered, the information
highway has enough capacity to permit passage not only for a band of
channels controlled by the network operator, but also for a common carriage
connection that is open to all who wish to speak, publish, and communicate
on the digital information highway.  For the first time, electronic media
can have the diversity of information we associate only with the print
media."

But we can't rely on the promises of industry or the wonders of the
competitive marketplace alone to create this infrastructure.  We need
legislative benchmarks to ensure that all citizens have access to advanced
information infrastructure.  We will achieve this goal not by having
government build the whole thing, but by finding a new communications
policy framework that works for the market and brings benefits to
consumers.

We've expanded the concept of "Open Platform Services" from just narrowband
ISDN, to include any switched, digital service, offered on a common
carriage basis, by any provider.

     "To achieve the full potential of new digital media, we need to
make available what we call Open Platform services, which reach all
American homes, businesses, schools, libraries, and government
institutions.  Open Platform service will enable children at home to tie
into their school library (or libraries all around the world) to do their
homework.  It will make it possible for a parent who makes a video of the
local elementary school soccer game to share it with parents and students
throughout the community.  Open Platform will make it as easy to be an
information provider as it is to be an information consumer."

     "Open Platform services provide basic information access
connections, just as today's telephone line allows your to connect to an
information service or the coaxial cable running into your home connects
you to cable television programming.   This is not a replacement for
current online services such as America Online or Compuserve, but rather is
the basic transport capacity that one needs to access the multimedia
version of these information services.

     "Specifically, Open Platform service must meet the following criteria:

+    widely available, switched digital connections;
+    affordable prices;
+    open access to all without discrimination as the content of the message;
+    sufficient "up-stream" capacity to enable users to originate, as
well as receive, good quality video, multimedia services.

"Open Platform service itself will be provided by a variety of providers
over interconnected networks, using a variety of wires, fiber optics, coax
cable, and wireless transmission services.  But however it is provided, if
it is affordable and widely available, it will be the on-ramp for the
nation's growing information superhighway."

Rather than a narrow focus on stopping or delaying the proposed mergers,
policy makers should use the leverage of the moment to create a new
Communications Act that serves the public interest.

     "The Administration and Congress can create an prompt the
deployment of open platforms by using the political leverage at its
disposal.  Bell Atlantic, TCI, Time Warner, US West and others involved in
recent mergers are all promising to build open platforms. 
Telecommunications giants are asking policymakers for permission to enter
new markets or to form new, merged entities.  Rather than per se opposition
to current mergers, or mere reliance on competition to build the data
highways, make the mergers and other accommodations conditional on
providing affordable open platform services.  The terms of this new social
contract should be written into a new Communications Act, revised for the
information age.  With a real "social contract" in hand, we just might
realize the Jeffersonian potential of the data superhighways. "

     "Together with a coalition of public interest groups and private
industry, the Electronic Frontier Foundation is working to establish Open
Platform objectives in concrete legislation.  Open Platform provisions,
which would cause near term deployment of Open Platform services, are
present in both the recent Senate infrastructure bill and the latest draft
of House telecommunications legislation, soon to be introduced.  We are
also working with the Administration to have Open Platform policies
included in the recommendations of the Information Infrastructure Task
Force.  In addition to federal policy, critical decisions about the shape
of the information infrastructure will be made at state and local levels. 
Since 1991, EFF has been working with a number state legislatures and
public utility commissions to have affordable, digital services offered at
a local level.  As cable and telephone infrastructures converge, we will
also work with local cable television franchising authorities.  We invite
all who are concerned about these issues to join with us in these public
policy efforts."


We hope that everyone will have a look at our new proposal, and join in to
help us.  


===================================================================
FOR MORE INFORMATION ABOUT THE OPEN PLATFORM CAMPAIGN CONTACT:

Daniel J. Weitzner, Senior Staff Counsel, <djw@eff.org>


MEMBERSHIP:

Sarah Simpson, Membership Coordinator, <ssimpson@eff.org>


ONLINE RESOURCES AND INFORMATION:

Stanton McCandlish, Online Activist, <mech@eff.org>

EFF DOCUMENTS ON THE SUBJECT (in ftp.eff.org):

Open Platform Campaign: Public Policy for the Information Age
/pub/eff/papers/op2.0

Senate Telecommunications Infrastructure Act of 1993 (S. 1086)
/pub/eff/legislation/infra-act-s1086
/pub/eff/legislation/infra-act-s1086-summary

EFF Testimony on Senate Infrastructure Bill
/pub/eff/legislation/kapor-on-s1086





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Alan (Gesture Man) Wexelblat" <wex@media.mit.edu>
Date: Wed, 3 Nov 93 08:52:25 PST
To: remail@tamsun.tamu.edu
Subject: TRW PhonePrint (fwd)
In-Reply-To: <9311031045.AA09792@tamsun.tamu.edu>
Message-ID: <9311031647.AA17745@media.mit.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


This sounds like they're matching access codes to physical devices.  Does
that mean I can't use someone else's cellphone?

If this "fingerprint" signal is transmitted continuously, does this mean
that it's now easier to track cellphone users?

How long before someone makes a black box to spoof these signals?

--Alan Wexelblat, Reality Hacker, Author, and Cyberspace Bard
Media Lab - Advanced Human Interface Group	wex@media.mit.edu
Voice: 617-258-9168, Pager: 617-945-1842	PUBLIC KEY available by request
Try not to have a good time ... This is supposed to be educational.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: jim@bilbo.suite.com (Jim Miller)
Date: Wed, 3 Nov 93 12:47:26 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: WARNING: direct-marketing email address list
Message-ID: <9311032045.AA07624@bilbo.suite.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



> According to the Internet Business Report 1.3 (page 4), J.S. McBride and
> Company are selling access to a database of Internet addresses, including
> demographic information.  They claim over one million entries.  The net
> 


I receive an unsolicited e-mail from these people just the other day.  It said  
something to effect of

"I have heard that you may be interested in implementing UNIX/Mac/PC  
software...I have a database of contact addresses that may interest you...I am  
NOT selling anything...If I have mis-read your intentions, I apologize.   
However, could you forward this letter to someone would may be interested."

I deleted it.

Jim_Miller@suite.com




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Stanton McCandlish <mech@eff.org>
Date: Wed, 3 Nov 93 11:57:26 PST
Subject: WARNING: direct-marketing email address list
Message-ID: <199311031956.AA10135@eff.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


FYI...

____ begin forward ____________________________________________

Date: Mon, 1 Nov 93 10:11:21 xST
From: [Anonymous]
Subject: Direct E-Mail: J.S. McBride & Co.

According to the Internet Business Report 1.3 (page 4), J.S. McBride and
Company are selling access to a database of Internet addresses, including
demographic information.  They claim over one million entries.  The net
address is jim_mcbride@netmail.com, and I am sure they would enjoy hearing
from anybody who would like to be removed from the list.

    [Equifax revisited?  PGN]

____ end forward ______________________________________________









From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Stanton McCandlish <mech@eff.org>
Date: Wed, 3 Nov 93 12:07:27 PST
To: thesegroups@tic.com
Subject: New EFF Infrastructure Policy Statement
Message-ID: <199311032002.AA10225@eff.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


                New EFF Open Platform Statement Online

The recent spate of telecommunications mergers -- Bell Atlantic/TCI, US
West/Time-Warner, AT&T/McCaw, plus numerous others in the works -- raise
the stakes for information policy makers and those of us who are concerned
about the development of an open, accessible information infrastructure.  

EFF has just released a major new statement on our Open Platform Campaign,
which explains EFF's approach to infrastructure policy.  Our big concern is
encourage Congess and the Administration to do the right thing and set out
a new, positive communications policy that is ready for the information
age.  We believe that this policy must achieve the following goals:

*       Diversity of Information Sources:  Promote a fully interactive
        infrastructure in which the First Amendment flourishes,
        allowing the greatest possible diversity of view points;

*       Universal Service:  Ensure a minimum level of affordable
        information and communication service for all Americans;

*       Free Speech and Common Carriage:  Guarantee infrastructure
        access regardless of the content of the message that the
        user is sending;

*       Privacy:  Protect the security and privacy of all
        communications carried over the infrastructure, and
        safeguard the Fourth and Fifth Amendment rights of all
        who use the information infrastructure;

*       Development of Public Interest Applications and Services:
        Ensure that public interest applications and services
        which are not produced by the commercial market are
        widely available and affordable.

Our policy proposal, available by anonymous ftp on ftp.eff.org in
/pub/eff/papers/op2.0, contains a discussion of these principles and
concrete legislative recommendations on how to accomplish many of these
goals.  Here are a few selected paragraphs from the main paper to give a
flavor of our positions, but we hope you'll read the whole thing.

        "Regulatory changes should be made, and mergers approved or barred
based on specific, enforceable commitments that the electronic
superhighways will meet public goals and realize the potential of digital
technology.  That potential arises from the extraordinary spaciousness of
the broadband information highway, contrasted with the scarcity of
broadcast spectrum and the limited number of cable channels that defined
the mass media era.  Properly constructed and administered, the information
highway has enough capacity to permit passage not only for a band of
channels controlled by the network operator, but also for a common carriage
connection that is open to all who wish to speak, publish, and communicate
on the digital information highway.  For the first time, electronic media
can have the diversity of information we associate only with the print
media."

But we can't rely on the promises of industry or the wonders of the
competitive marketplace alone to create this infrastructure.  We need
legislative benchmarks to ensure that all citizens have access to advanced
information infrastructure.  We will achieve this goal not by having
government build the whole thing, but by finding a new communications
policy framework that works for the market and brings benefits to
consumers.

We've expanded the concept of "Open Platform Services" from just narrowband
ISDN, to include any switched, digital service, offered on a common
carriage basis, by any provider.

        "To achieve the full potential of new digital media, we need to
make available what we call Open Platform services, which reach all
American homes, businesses, schools, libraries, and government
institutions.  Open Platform service will enable children at home to tie
into their school library (or libraries all around the world) to do their
homework.  It will make it possible for a parent who makes a video of the
local elementary school soccer game to share it with parents and students
throughout the community.  Open Platform will make it as easy to be an
information provider as it is to be an information consumer."

        "Open Platform services provide basic information access
connections, just as today's telephone line allows your to connect to an
information service or the coaxial cable running into your home connects
you to cable television programming.   This is not a replacement for
current online services such as America Online or Compuserve, but rather is
the basic transport capacity that one needs to access the multimedia
version of these information services.

        "Specifically, Open Platform service must meet the following criteria:

*       widely available, switched digital connections;
*       affordable prices;
*       open access to all without discrimination as the content
        of the message;
*       sufficient "up-stream" capacity to enable users to
        originate, as well as receive, good quality video,
        multimedia services.

"Open Platform service itself will be provided by a variety of providers
over interconnected networks, using a variety of wires, fiber optics, coax
cable, and wireless transmission services.  But however it is provided, if
it is affordable and widely available, it will be the on-ramp for the
nation's growing information superhighway."

Rather than a narrow focus on stopping or delaying the proposed mergers,
policy makers should use the leverage of the moment to create a new
Communications Act that serves the public interest.

        "The Administration and Congress can create an prompt the
deployment of open platforms by using the political leverage at its
disposal.  Bell Atlantic, TCI, Time Warner, US West and others involved in
recent mergers are all promising to build open platforms. 
Telecommunications giants are asking policymakers for permission to enter
new markets or to form new, merged entities.  Rather than per se opposition
to current mergers, or mere reliance on competition to build the data
highways, make the mergers and other accommodations conditional on
providing affordable open platform services.  The terms of this new social
contract should be written into a new Communications Act, revised for the
information age.  With a real "social contract" in hand, we just might
realize the Jeffersonian potential of the data superhighways. "

        "Together with a coalition of public interest groups and private
industry, the Electronic Frontier Foundation is working to establish Open
Platform objectives in concrete legislation.  Open Platform provisions,
which would cause near term deployment of Open Platform services, are
present in both the recent Senate infrastructure bill and the latest draft
of House telecommunications legislation, soon to be introduced.  We are
also working with the Administration to have Open Platform policies
included in the recommendations of the Information Infrastructure Task
Force.  In addition to federal policy, critical decisions about the shape
of the information infrastructure will be made at state and local levels. 
Since 1991, EFF has been working with a number state legislatures and
public utility commissions to have affordable, digital services offered at
a local level.  As cable and telephone infrastructures converge, we will
also work with local cable television franchising authorities.  We invite
all who are concerned about these issues to join with us in these public
policy efforts."


We hope that everyone will have a look at our new proposal, and join in to
help us.  


===================================================================
FOR MORE INFORMATION ABOUT THE OPEN PLATFORM CAMPAIGN CONTACT:

Daniel J. Weitzner, Senior Staff Counsel, <djw@eff.org>


MEMBERSHIP:

Sarah Simpson, Membership Coordinator, <ssimpson@eff.org>


ONLINE RESOURCES AND INFORMATION:

Stanton McCandlish, Online Activist, <mech@eff.org>

EFF DOCUMENTS ON THE SUBJECT (in ftp.eff.org):

Open Platform Campaign: Public Policy for the Information Age
/pub/eff/papers/op2.0

Senate Telecommunications Infrastructure Act of 1993 (S. 1086)
/pub/eff/legislation/infra-act-s1086
/pub/eff/legislation/infra-act-s1086-summary

EFF Testimony on Senate Infrastructure Bill
/pub/eff/legislation/kapor-on-s1086



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: m5@vail.tivoli.com (Mike McNally)
Date: Wed, 3 Nov 93 13:12:21 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: re: Internet "mailing list"
Message-ID: <9311032108.AA20464@vail.tivoli.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



(Hoping I don't get yelled at (TYPED at?) for something not suitably
cypherpunkish...) 

I wonder if the Internet mailing list people have "ringers" in the
list?  They could set up accounts on netcom and other services, I
suppose, and just keep a .forward file there.  Of course, if one stole
the list (or bought 1 use and decided to keep using it) but sent all
mail through an anonymous remailer, that wouldn't do them much good
(not that mailing through an anonymous remailer could do much good to
a business abusing the list in an attempt to make a profit.)

I wonder whether any well-used anonymous addresses are in it?  One
could, in principle, compile quite useful demographic information
about a nym.  And what if (gasp! shudder!  my fluids!) several names
in the list map to one real user?  Could the purchaser of the list
demand a partial refund?

--
Mike McNally




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: jim@bilbo.suite.com (Jim Miller)
Date: Wed, 3 Nov 93 13:32:21 PST
To: mg5n+@andrew.cmu.edu
Subject: Re: WARNING: direct-marketing email address list
Message-ID: <9311032125.AA08247@bilbo.suite.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



>> I receive an unsolicited e-mail from these people just the other day. 

>> It said something to effect of
>
> You should have posted it and their address so we could all email them
> and tell them how pleased we were to receive their crapola. :)
> 


Their address is the one mentioned in Stanton McCandlish's "WARNING:  
direct-marketing email address list" post:   jim_mcbride@netmail.com


Jim_Miller@suite.com





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Alan (Gesture Man) Wexelblat" <wex@media.mit.edu>
Date: Wed, 3 Nov 93 13:42:22 PST
To: Jim_Miller@suite.com
Subject: WARNING: direct-marketing email address list
In-Reply-To: <9311032045.AA07624@bilbo.suite.com>
Message-ID: <9311032136.AA14423@media.mit.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


As I've pointed out several times in other places, the Internet as it's
currently set up makes junk mail remarkably easy to deter.  Kill files can
remove it before you see it or if the offender persists, a cron job mailing
him core files can be a remarkable deterrent.

--Alan Wexelblat, Reality Hacker, Author, and Cyberspace Bard
Media Lab - Advanced Human Interface Group	wex@media.mit.edu
Voice: 617-258-9168, Pager: 617-945-1842	PUBLIC KEY available by request
Try not to have a good time ... This is supposed to be educational.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Philippe Nave" <pdn@dwroll.dw.att.com>
Date: Wed, 3 Nov 93 15:47:31 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Looking for WORDPWD.ZIP
Message-ID: <9311032345.AA16996@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I used anonymous ftp to connect to soda.berkeley.edu and wandered through
the directory structures in search of WORDPWD.ZIP, but to no avail. Has
anybody else picked this software up from there?

I get a giggle out of demonstrating just how 'secure' the encryption 
schemes in popular PC packages really are...

........................................................................
Philippe D. Nave, Jr.   | The person who does not use message encryption
pdn@dwroll.dw.att.com   | will soon be at the mercy of those who DO...
Denver, Colorado USA    | PGP public key: by arrangement.



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Stanton McCandlish <mech@eff.org>
Date: Wed, 3 Nov 93 15:17:30 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: oops
Message-ID: <199311032313.AA13012@eff.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Please pardon the double posting of the Open Platform info.  We'll try not
to let that happen again. 

-- 
-=> mech@eff.org <=-
Stanton McCandlish     Electronic Frontier Foundation Online Activist & SysOp
"A nation that is afraid to let its people judge the truth and falsehood of
ideas in an open market is a nation that is afraid of its people." -JFK
NitV-DC BBS 202-232-2715, Fido 1:109/? IndraNet 369:111/1, 14.4V32b 16.8ZyX
Join EFF!  For more information about membership, send mail to eff@eff.org



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: nobody@alumni.cco.caltech.eduEternal Optimist <na26436@anon.penet.fi>
Date: Wed, 3 Nov 93 18:57:31 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: ANON: mail concerns
Message-ID: <9311040252.AA20137@alumni.cco.caltech.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

>::
>Request-Encryption-To: X
>
>If user ID X is on the remailer's pubkey ring, the outgoing message is
>encrypted to X. This could be usefull for anonymous return-address blocks.

Encryption should be the default. Err on the side of caution.

Eternal!Optimist@anon.penet.fi   (copyright 1993, Eternal Optimist [Ha Ha Ha])
 0) 0) =:()]-<                                                                <na26436@anon.penet.fi>
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.3

iQCVAgUBLNgXzIjvfLxJbYYtAQEK4AP9HrSaMSOnlsxzEjgLbAgvsCSw3vMxLJ4u
856ZbKI2cZTNLoPzyWLNW68gZ7kcNeaF7MHKzWbI9tLEDePpWN34sB11wBlpfzcf
WzcYVLI6JBLVERq2seyKU3cqAhWuxldSDeAlsKkMsrzI0tGgOaLkxCxhxn9weZf8
58mZeANd3sg=
=8F9u
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Date: Wed, 3 Nov 93 20:22:21 PST
To: Jim_Miller@suite.com
Subject: Re: message depots
In-Reply-To: <9311040308.AA14472@bilbo.suite.com>
Message-ID: <9311040418.AA21327@netcom5.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Jim Miller writes:

> One of the main unsolved problems with anonymous remailer networks is that,  
> somewhere, there has to be a remailer that knows the mapping from your  
> anonymous identity to your real identity (or at least your real e-mail  
> address).  This means that you will have to trust the person running the  
> remailer.

This is not so, and we have discussed this many, many times. Chaum's
1981 CACM paper, referred to again by Hal Finney recently, describes
how a series of remailers (or mixes, in his terminology) can prevent
this mapping from "real identity" to "anonymous identity."

This mapping is currently known to remailer in "Julf-style" remailers,
such as the one S. Boxx used. But what if, to pick a simple example,
someone first used an encrypted Cyperpunks remailer to mail to the Julf site?
Unless Julf and the Cypherpunks remailer owner get together (collude),
neither of them can construct the mapping.

With N remailers and use of encryption at each node, all any of the N
nodes can deduce is the mapping between inputs and outputs, neither of
which are necessariy either the "real name" or the "anonymous name."

Jim goes on to describe his ideas for a "message depot" system, which
bears close resemblance to Chaum's mixes, the basis for our existing
encrypted remailers, and Myron Cuperman's "pool" idea, first deployed
about a year ago. My own "BlackNet" example of a month or so ago (and
developed in 1988, conceptually) used both encryption and pools: the
messages I picked up and decrypted, using the BlackNet private key,
were readable only by me, and neither I nor the senders had any way of
knowing who the other person was.

I know some will call me an old fogey, or an old-timer who won't help
newcomers, or even a parasitic nym (or somesuch, says G. Toal :-})
intent on devouring the initiative of the creative talents here, but I
have to call 'em as I see 'em.

--Tim May


-- 
..........................................................................
Timothy C. May         | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,  
tcmay@netcom.com       | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
408-688-5409           | knowledge, reputations, information markets, 
W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA  | black markets, collapse of governments.
Higher Power: 2^756839 | Public Key: PGP and MailSafe available.
Note: I put time and money into writing this posting. I hope you enjoy it.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: doug@netcom.com (Doug Merritt)
Date: Wed, 3 Nov 93 20:37:34 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: trusting software
Message-ID: <9311040435.AA23042@netcom5.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


How does one know that one can trust the software that one is using
on one's own machine for encryption, mailing, etc, or worse yet, how
can one know whether to trust the software doing anonymous or other
remailing on other machines? Web-of-trust schemes are only statistically
reliable due to these concerns.

These are rhetorical questions; the point is, I just realized that I
didn't explain myself last month when I talked about an algorithm for
verifying *intentions*. A number of people emailed me to complain that
authentication should be a matter of establishing a person's *real*
identity -- a valid issue, but I was off on a tangent and neglected
to explain my actual point:

Imagine you have a single piece of software which runs a dcnet over
the internet by being instantiated on many nodes. Imagine that you're
concerned that the NSA or someone will spoof a whole bunch of nodes,
pretend to be the Real Software (which ordinarily helps guarantee
anonymity, defeat traffic analysis, etc), but actually works to defeat
the Real Software and the people who use it.

One would like to somehow guarantee that when one talks to remote software
as part of a web of trust scheme, that the software really is the One and
Only True Software, and not some deceitful counterfeit.

It is in *this* connection that one might wish to authenticate the
unique identity of multiply instantiated *software* by a hypothetical
process which ascertains the *intentions* of that software instantiation.

I previously phrased this as if it were a person that the hypothetical
algorithm was authenticating, leading to understandable objections. Apologies;
I had gotten into a digressive train of thought about using it with people
before I posted, and it's taken me this long to realize that I never
communicated clearly.

I still haven't described the algorithm ("this margin is too narrow" :-),
but I hope it's more clear that such an algorithm is potentially more
realizable for software than it would be for people.
        Doug




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: jdblair@nextsrv.cas.muohio.EDU
Date: Wed, 3 Nov 93 17:27:30 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: punk hardware list possibilities
Message-ID: <9311040148.AA08057@ nextsrv.cas.muohio.EDU >
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Relating to the discussion of setting up a cypherpunk hardware related list...

I would be able to host a list on the machine here, most likely-- its a
little used (relatively) and a pretty open system.

Let me know if anybody is interested.

-john




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: jim@bilbo.suite.com (Jim Miller)
Date: Wed, 3 Nov 93 19:12:21 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: message depots
Message-ID: <9311040308.AA14472@bilbo.suite.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



The mailing list has been pretty quite today.  How about a new(?) idea to kick  
around...


One of the main unsolved problems with anonymous remailer networks is that,  
somewhere, there has to be a remailer that knows the mapping from your  
anonymous identity to your real identity (or at least your real e-mail  
address).  This means that you will have to trust the person running the  
remailer.

It seems to me that as long as remailers use a message *delivery* paradigm,  
this problem is unsolvable.  However, there is another paradigm that can be  
used which can solve this problem.  I call it the "message depot" paradigm.

It wastes a lot of bandwidth and cpu cycles.  However, I believe that in the  
not too distant future we'll have more bandwidth than we know what to do with  
(Telecosm).  Perhaps someday we'll also have more cpu cycles than we'll know  
what to do with (cray on a chip).  When that day arrives, this idea will become  
practical.  Until then, it will probably just be a toy.  Still...


Here how I see it working...


Simplest case:  One message depot

Not too different from a message-only BBS where all messages are encrypted.

If Bob wants to send a secure message to Alice and defeat traffic analysis, he  
will encrypt the message with Alice's public key and send it to the message  
depot.  Alice (and everyone else) periodically grabs *all* new messages from  
the message depot and attempts to decrypt them.  Alice finds that she can  
decrypt one of them; the one from Bob.  If Bob signed the message before  
encrypting it, and Alice has Bob's public key, she can verify the signature.   
Of course, this doesn't means she knows who "Bob" is, just that "Bob" sent the  
message.  Replace "Bob" with you favorite 'nym.

Since everybody is periodically downloading all new messages, the message depot    
doesn't know which message goes to which person.  Also, since the only clue to  
the sender's identity is the message signature, the message recipient may not  
know the identity of the sender.  (It would depend on how the recipient got the  
sender's public key.)


Scaling Up a Step:  Multiple message depots

Place a dozen message depots in the picture.  They each publish a unique public  
key, which means that people can send encrypted messages to the depots as end  
points.  The depots would poll each other for new messages to see if there is a  
message encrypted with their public keys.

Example: Depot A polls depot B for new messages.  Depot A attempts to decrypt  
the new messages.  It finds one that it can decrypt.  Upon decrypting the  
message, the depot sees a depot command and more message.  The one and only  
depot command will be: "PUT THE REMAINDER OF THE MESSAGE IN YOUR MESSAGE POOL  
AS A NEW MESSAGE".  Any message the depot cannot decrypt will be discarded.

How is this useful?  Well, by nesting a message in layers of digital envelopes,  
a sender can effectively move the message around the set of message depots  
until it reaches a depot that the final recipient polls.

Lets say that Bob knows that Alice polls Depot E, yet, for some reason, Bob  
doesn't want to send the message directly to Depot E.  What does he do?  He  
first signs the message with his private key (if he wants to), then encrypts it  
with Alice's public key, appends the depot command and encrypts everything with  
Depot E's public key, appends another depot command and encrypts everything  
with Depot B's public key.  He then sends the result to Depot B.

Depot B decrypts the message, sees the depot command, strips it off and places  
the remainder in its message pool as a new message.  Some time later, Depot E  
polls Depot B for new messages.  Depot B obliges.  Depot E attempts to decrypt  
the messages, finds that it can decrypt one of them.  It sees the depot  
command, strips and posts the remainder of the message to its message pool.   
Eventually, Alice polls Depot E for new messages.  And you can guess the rest.

If Bob doesn't know which message depot Alice polls, he can send copies to a  
number of different depots and hope that Alice will find it.  If he sent it to  
*all* depots, Alice will eventually get the message (unless she stops polling  
altogether).

Messages depots will delete messages after a configurable amount of time.   
Also, the depots will not keep track of who has sucked down which set of "new"  
messages.  This implies that the people polling the depots will have to tell  
the depot they want all messages since a given time.  The client-side polling  
software can easily keep track of this for the user.



Interfacing to the rest of the world:

To support sending messages to specific e-mail addresses or news groups,  
somebody will have to run a remailer that polls the message depots.  A sender  
will encrypt a remailer command and a message using the remailer's public key  
and direct it to the depot that the remailer polls.  The remailer will find the  
message and interpret the remailer command.  The command could be "SEND THIS TO  
<an Internet address>", or "POST THIS TO <a newsgroup>", or whatever.

Replies would have to travel back through the depot net.  The body of the  
message can indicate a message depot to "reply" to.


I believe most of this message depot idea can be automated.


As you can see, this mechanism consumes lots of bandwidth and lots of cpu.  But  
it does not require that you trust any part of the system except the part that  
sits in front of you.  I also believe that it successfully defeats traffic  
analysis.


"All the smarts will be at the fringes of the network." 


	- the guy who is writing Telecosm (and whose name escapes me).


Jim_Miller@suite.com






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: jazz@hal.com (Jason Zions)
Date: Wed, 3 Nov 93 19:47:34 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: ID of anonymous posters via word analysis?
Message-ID: <9311040344.AA02307@jazz.hal.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


   This brings up the subject of how one can post without
   leaving an "ASCII fingerprint".  I suspect the use of a spelling
   checker and grammatical checker would help.    Perhaps running
   your text through a language converter, (say English to French)
   then back would remove many identifying characteristics.

Two words:  "jive"; "valspeak".

Okay, two more:  "swedish chef".

Sure, it makes it a little harder to extract semantics from a message, and
it can be hard to keep from giggling at the results, but those lex-based
filters would work much better than some English->French->English translator
program. You'd want to run the results through a reading-level checking
program to make sure you knocked out the 64-dollar words; the size of ones
vocabulary is one of those "identifying characteristics."

Jazz




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: henry strickland <strick@osc.versant.com>
Date: Wed, 3 Nov 93 22:07:34 PST
To: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Subject: message depots, packet routing?
In-Reply-To: <9311040418.AA21327@netcom5.netcom.com>
Message-ID: <9311040605.AA00344@osc.versant.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


# Jim goes on to describe his ideas for a "message depot" system, which
# bears close resemblance to Chaum's mixes, the basis for our existing
# encrypted remailers, and Myron Cuperman's "pool" idea, first deployed
# about a year ago. 

If these papers address how to do naming/routing services in DCNets,
I'd like to get references/copies.

The idea of using well known names and well known hierarchies and
fairly static connectivity with long TTLs (like DNS does) in order to
get addressing and routing information does not seem as desirable in a
DCNet.

Sometimes it seems better to have static topology: if a couple of nodes
I trust are in my dining ring and each ring connected to mine, I feel
fairly confident doing business.  I can take the time to get the right
people around me.  But static topologies allow more time for third
parties to form alliances and collude.

So perhaps every few seconds we should all get up, run around the room,
grab hands with different partners, and start new rings.  But then you
don't have time to check out the reputations of your new neighbors.

I can imagine a world of dining cryptographers in which 95% of the
participants all work for the same highly-funded branch of the
government and are in collusion ...

					paranoid, strick





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: jim_mcbr@netmail.com
Date: Thu, 4 Nov 1993 15:38:43 -0500
To: mech@eff.org
Subject: Auto Reply
Message-ID: <2cd89d75.jmcbride@netmail.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Thank you for your mail to Jim McBride at JS McBride & Company. Due to the
volume of mail be handled by this account, this is an automatic reply.

PLEASE READ CAREFULLY!!

1. JS McBride is NOT collecting demographic information on email addresses.
   Due to the controversy surrounding this practice, we have discarded
   the product demographics we collected. We are however still collecting
   email addresses and user names. 

2. The information collected (name and email address) will be offered in
   a printed white pages directory and in a white pages server on the net.

3. You DO NOT need to ask to have your name removed. BEFORE your name is
   used in the directory, you will receive mail asking for your permission. 
   If you reply to the inquiry, your information will be used. If you do
   not reply, your name will NOT be used.

4. Comments regarding the white pages should be sent to Tom Manning at 
   JS McBride & Company. <tmanning@netmail.com>

5. Mail to Jim McBride should be sent to <jimm@netmail.com>

6. Information regarding the purchase of the white pages directory should
   be sent to <listinfo@netmail.com> or telephone us at 415-949-4295


   Thank you for your time,
   Jim McBride
   

___________ end forward __________







From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: csm2747@NebrWesleyan.edu (Chad S. Mawson)
Date: Wed, 3 Nov 93 20:52:22 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Remailers...
Message-ID: <9311040450.AA09291@NebrWesleyan.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Ok, Ok, I'll admit I'm a newbie to encryption and the like.  This idea
of remailers seems excellent.  My only question how do I use them?
Also where could I get more info about all this?  The ftp at
soda.berkeley looks like a good place to start...any suggestions on
specific files or programs, beside PGP.  Thanks.

+-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-+
| Chad Mawson   *-* Nebraska Weseleyan University  <>  Lincoln, Nebraska *-*  |
+-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-+
csm2747@hobbes.nebrwesleyan.edu




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "L. Detweiler" <ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Date: Wed, 3 Nov 93 23:22:22 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: pseudospoofing SF
Message-ID: <9311040718.AA07685@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


cypherpunks interested in identity mutations, perversions, and crimes
like MPD, impersonation, pseudospoofing, etc., and developing a
legendary anecdotes and a complex mythology regarding it all with e.g.
compiled science fiction references, (who comprise the majority of the
members, based on my mail and enemies) may be delighted by the
masterpiece novella `Mefisto in Onyx' by Harlan Ellison in the Oct.
1993 Omni magazine.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: hiscdcj@lux.latrobe.edu.au  (Dwayne)
Date: Wed, 3 Nov 93 14:12:34 PST
To: mg5n+@andrew.cmu.edu (Matthew J Ghio)
Subject: Re: Some possible projects/topics for CypherPunks
In-Reply-To: <0gpjpDm00awINIlkpF@andrew.cmu.edu>
Message-ID: <9311031422.AA19696@lux.latrobe.edu.au>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Matthew J Ghio blew a bubble, which danced and sang:
: 
: I agree.  Altho we'd probably want to build our own boards, we'd have to
: rely on commercially availiable integrated circuits and other
: components.  The components we'd need are fairly easy to obtain, and I
: don't see any reason to believe that we will have difficulty obtaining
: computer components to build a secret network in the future.  Oceania
: will probably become a major source of electronic privacy technologies,
: but that's still several years in the future.

Oceania is, but we may be able to set up the network soon, with a bit of
effort. Or maybe not, it depends on enthusiasm, I suppose.

: : >    Or is anyone interested in starting a parallel list of sorts for the
: : >    hardware-punks?  'ware-punks?  :-)  or perhaps an even better name
: 
: Yes.  Who can host the mailing list?

I may be able to. As in, I have a TCP/IP access and a very large
account. Is listserv large? Will I get shot if I install it, I wonder.
I've been told that any software I want to run I can install it myself,
so I _guess_ this means I could run a mailing list......

I'll talk it over with sysadmin, I think.   :-/

Dwayne
FAQ stolen by dream bandits


              (Dwayne Jones-Evans  IRC, MediaMOO: ddraig  )
     ( SCA: Cynon Yscolan ap Myrddin, Stormhold, Lochac, West)
        PGP public key available. finger me.  be gentle.
           internet---> hiscdcj@lux.latrobe.edu.au





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Lloyd Cowling"  <cowlingl@cs.WNMU.EDU>
Date: Thu, 4 Nov 93 08:07:36 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: ciphers and such
Message-ID: <9311041607.AA01018@CS.WNMU.EDU>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Cipherpunks:

I have a long running interest in ciphers. Could you put me on to your modis 
operundi and FAQ's, etc. Where I might find out more about you and what you do?

Thx - Lloyd








From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: hughes@ah.com (Eric Hughes)
Date: Thu, 4 Nov 93 09:22:23 PST
To: julf@penet.fi
Subject: Er?
In-Reply-To: <199311041453.AA24861@mail.eunet.fi>
Message-ID: <9311041716.AA04672@ah.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


It appears that last few fields in the returned header are responsible
for the problems.  Julf's mail also indicates why cypherpunks has had
a couple of duplicate posts recently.

The offending headers are "Return-Receipt-To" and "Errors-To".  The
"Return-Receipt-To" field is triggering a reaction in some other
mailers to bounce back acknowledgement of the mail.  Now
cypherpunks@toad.com was in the "To" list, and it appears that
acknowldegement mail was sent out to cypherpunks again.  All this time
the "Received" fields are increasing.  When there are too many of
them--the number is mailer dependent, but is typically 17-20, some
mailer along the chain bounces the message.  It sees the "Errors-To"
line and sends back the bounce to penet.  My guess is that a
significant fraction of the cypherpunks list is sending anon.penet.fi
back one message each per "Return-Receipt-To".

Not all that many mailers honor return receipts, but all mailers
bounce mail with too many Received fields.  Hence the first return
receipts sent didn't generate nearly so many errors as all the bounces
from the second time the message went out to the list.

How we solve this?  Well, let's list the mailers involved in the
particular message you sent.  The first one was the anonymous remailer
at caltech.  The message from there was directed to cypherpunks, so
that's toad.com.  From there it travelled through uunet (toad.com's
mail gateway for a large amount of traffic) to somewhere in the
gza/aktis/ov group of machines.  Somewhere in there the return receipt
was generated; note the "Return-Path: <jik@security.ov.com>" field.
This mailer generated a message back to cypherpunks (toad.com) again.
One copy of this went to a machine in uci.edu, which bounced it to
penet.

I'd say that the mailer which generated the return-receipt back to
cypherpunks (assuming that happened) is the most proximate cause.
Cypherpunks was in the To: field, not the From: field, and even though
your standard reply might go to both parties (assuming the To: field
is larger than just you), a return receipt should only be propagated
to the original sender.

toad.com is a secondary cause, since the Return-Receipt-To: field
should probably not be propagated out to a mailing list, but rather
acknowledged or discarded before mailing list expansion.  Also, since
toad.com is not running reasonable mailing list software (which we
don't have), it's not detecting duplicate messages sent back to the
list and discarding them.

Eric





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: crunch@netcom.com (John Draper)
Date: Thu, 4 Nov 93 10:47:38 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Next Step show
Message-ID: <9311041847.AA05706@netcom.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Saw Eric Hughes on the Next Step science show on the Discovery Channel
last Tuesday.    Good job Eric...!!   Wish they would have mentioned
PGP and how easy it was to get it...

Cheers
CC




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Karl Lui Barrus <klbarrus@owlnet.rice.edu>
Date: Thu, 4 Nov 93 09:02:23 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: ANON: random remailing...
Message-ID: <9311041659.AA13439@arcadien.owlnet.rice.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

>if every single site knows the final address, so what?
>how is this going to help them track down the original sender??

>anyone at the final destination who wants to track down the original sender
>would need to hop-scotch backwards through the numerous sites and try to
>track down the path the message took. this is of course, IF someone really

Yes, this is true, but the key point in the anonymous remailers is
they can be used for two-way communication.  Presumably, both you and
your friend intend to email each other.  

If mail proceeds randomly throughout the network, then the final
destination must be available to every remailer.  This may be fine if
A only sends to B (announces to every remailer B's address), but when
B responds to A, A's address is similarly announced to every remailer.
Now it is simple to figure out A and B are communicating.

If all you want is one-way communication (i.e. you just want to send
and don't expect any replies), you may be better off faking mail with
telnet, or using a newsgroup.

Karl Barrus
<klbarrus@owlnet.rice.edu>

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.3a

iQCVAgUBLNk0qoOA7OpLWtYzAQF17wP/eittrsJRkRuKSXH0V1bSiEEc1+ZAYGj9
4+aTctisX0QG2LholGDHqxti02SyEH+iQO8qjAkY5vyHNDVM6pH4tr2xzF2W9prx
1A91KNXHdiZPAvsUWgv32+B5IJYZqarRVmLjuI7PnydTiKX9/24bffl8TUtoidln
syJ3O/cVoyA=
=iz1j
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Karl Lui Barrus <klbarrus@owlnet.rice.edu>
Date: Thu, 4 Nov 93 09:12:25 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: ANON: pools
Message-ID: <9311041709.AA13687@arcadien.owlnet.rice.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

>address).  This means that you will have to trust the person running the  
>remailer.

Well, you can always run your own remailer or two... :-)

>used which can solve this problem.  I call it the "message depot" paradigm.

Actually, this is quite similar (identical to?) anonymous pools.  The
stuff about interfacing different pools sounds good.  Miron is running
one at extropia.wimsey.com (mail to pool0-request or pool0-help).
Basically, it is a mailing list with several subscribers.  If you want
to send a message to one person, encrypt it and send it to the pool.
Everybody gets the message, but only one person can decrypt it.


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.3a

iQCVAgUBLNk3FoOA7OpLWtYzAQENwgQAoYV+LeTQ2XguY5OtXgiW1pkMuZYxwifl
pmmoHvUiFN5JdOBnyII4JgFjWpU1vqzAuUaZxR7yG1/c6Uaq+IluADGsu9NdSUVX
NM7UGKffDMmE0bdlfzmlZJtP7+bbUK5kNE7gJkseyZ6q8cU9qjftUlFgASNrUCH9
w75nM8tMM68=
=x9BH
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: jim@bilbo.suite.com (Jim Miller)
Date: Thu, 4 Nov 93 09:57:38 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: message depots
Message-ID: <9311041755.AA27473@bilbo.suite.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



It seems the message depot idea is not terribly original.  Oh well, I'm not too  
surprised.  I suspected this and that's why I put "new(?) idea" in my post.  I  
can at least pat my self on the back for reinventing it a few years late. :-)


Jim_Miller@suite.com




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Jonathan I. Kamens" <jik@security.ov.com>
Date: Thu, 4 Nov 93 09:57:44 PST
To: hughes@ah.com
Subject: Re: Er?
In-Reply-To: <9311041716.AA04672@ah.com>
Message-ID: <199311041755.MAA29355@gza-client1.aktis.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


ACK!  I'm not responsible for the "Return-Receipt-To" in that message.
However, I am responsible for resending the message to the mailing
list.  Our mail2news gateway (we gateway cypherpunks into a local
newsgroup) bounced it because of a duplicate From line, and when I
resent it to the gateway alias, I screwed up and sent it to the list
as well.

I'm sorry for the extra traffic on the list.  I'll be more careful in
the future.

Jonathan Kamens | OpenVision Technologies, Inc. | jik@security.ov.com




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Matthew J Ghio <mg5n+@andrew.cmu.edu>
Date: Thu, 4 Nov 93 10:12:24 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: ANON: random remailing...
In-Reply-To: <9311041659.AA13439@arcadien.owlnet.rice.edu>
Message-ID: <sgqIHyC00VopRd5VdQ@andrew.cmu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> If all you want is one-way communication (i.e. you just want to
> send and don't expect any replies), you may be better off faking
> mail with telnet, or using a newsgroup.

Exacltly how do you fake mail with telnet or use a newsgroup for one-way
anonymous email?  Care to elaborate?




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Anonymous <nowhere@bsu-cs.bsu.edu>
Date: Thu, 4 Nov 93 11:57:38 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Jim McBride
Message-ID: <9311041958.AA25172@bsu-cs.bsu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Got this in the mail today:

-- cut --

Date:     Wed, 03 Nov 1993 22:11:07
From: jim_mcbr@netmail.com
Subject: Auto Reply
To: <me>

Thank you for your mail to Jim McBride at JS McBride & Company. Due to the
volume of mail be handled by this account, this is an automatic reply.

PLEASE READ CAREFULLY!!

1. JS McBride is NOT collecting demographic information on email addresses.
   Due to the controversy surrounding this practice, we have discarded
   the product demographics we collected. We are however still collecting
   email addresses and user names. 

2. The information collected (name and email address) will be offered in
   a printed white pages directory and in a white pages server on the net.

3. You DO NOT need to ask to have your name removed. BEFORE your name is
   used in the directory, you will receive mail asking for your permission. 
   If you reply to the inquiry, your information will be used. If you do
   not reply, your name will NOT be used.

4. Comments regarding the white pages should be sent to Tom Manning at 
   JS McBride & Company. <tmanning@netmail.com>

5. Mail to Jim McBride should be sent to <jimm@netmail.com>

6. Information regarding the purchase of the white pages directory should
   be sent to <listinfo@netmail.com> or telephone us at 415-949-4295


   Thank you for your time,
   Jim McBride
   

-- 
David Sward     sward+@cmu.edu     Finger or email for PGP public key 3D567F
Encryption is an envelope for your email; read alt.security.pgp for details.
 GCS: -d+ -p+(---) c++(++++) l+ u+ e+ m+()@ s+/++ n+@ h+ f !g w+@ t+@ r+ y?




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Wizard@falcon.lhup.edu (The Wizard)
Date: Thu, 4 Nov 93 12:52:38 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: PC Magizine.....
Message-ID: <9311042049.AA36322@falcon.lhup.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


...just to let all know, the November issue of PC Magazine mentions 
PGP in the Trends section.  (pg 29)

'....in fact, cryptography is included on the State Departments' list of
 weapons that could compromise the country's security.'
 
'..Despite attemps to keep the technology stateside, 84 products that 
employ Digital Encryption Standard (DES) are available overseas, says
the Software Publishers Association.  But the regulation has succeeded
in keeping U.S. companies out of the globabl marketplace.  And recently,
the makers of a software encryption program called Pretty Good Privacey(PGP)
have been investigated for possible export violations. (Both DES and PGP
are available on the Internet.)'

The article also talks some about Clipper, but nothing new to my ears.  
The Skip-Jack algorithm is mentioned, and the fact that the NSA is keeping
mum on how it works.

Sean
wizard@falcon.lhup.edu




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Stanton McCandlish <mech@eff.org>
Date: Thu, 4 Nov 93 12:47:38 PST
Subject: Re: UPDATE: direct-marketing email address list
In-Reply-To: <2b92da$9sc@eff.org>
Message-ID: <199311042046.AA10416@eff.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Here's what you get if you send mail to J.S. McBride's posted address to
query about the direct-marketing email address list:

______ begin forward ______




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: edgar@spectrx.saigon.com (Edgar W. Swank)
Date: Thu, 4 Nov 93 16:37:41 PST
To: Cypherpunks          <cypherpunks@toad.com>
Subject: Re: Allegations of PGP Weaknesses
Message-ID: <66Licc4w165w@spectrx.saigon.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

A few days ago, Victor Borisov posted here the following allegations
or rumors about "weaknesses" in PGP.

    >He made same program (LanCrypto).  That why, I hear only bad
    >words from he.  :)  You can read about this program in
    >cypherpunks.  >From other KGB-men, I hear, that prophesor
    >Sidelnicov (the well known cryptoanalisist from Russia) saw,
    >that PGP has some weak places:

    > - random number is`t "good" random number.
    > - md5 has hole (but here man lapse into salence:( ).
    > - PGP for DOS don`t have any anti-overloking tools.
    >
    >BTW:  LanCrypto play on last weakness:  thay wrote litle
    >resident DOS program.  This program crack PGP and than pgp
    >sign (and check) only part of message.  LanCrypto public
    >this resalt in buziness newspaper and show program on the
    >big computer-show.  I think this is rough market, but it
    >work well (as all, that KGB made:))!!!

Since then, I have checked with other members of the PGP development
team and here is a summary of what they (and I) say:

    The random number handling in PGP was beefed up in the 2.2
    release.  We don't know if there were any real weaknesses before
    that, but the improvements were added anyway.  We suspect that if
    there were any problems, they are gone now.  The guy who
    complained about it, Dr.  Sidelnikov, never cooperated with
    requests for details on what he found wrong with PGP.  In fact, he
    was pointedly uncooperative when contacted with questions asking
    him for details.

    If MD5 has a hole, we'd like to know about it.  It would be
    publishable in any crypto journal.  At Eurocrypt93, someone did
    find some slight weakness in MD5, but in realistic situations,
    this would not be a significant weakness.  Future versions of PGP
    may use the SHA hash algorithm, instead of MD5.  MD5 should be
    kept around for backwards compatibility.  MD5 is still a good hash
    function, and the weaknesses found were not applicable to any
    real-world uses of it.

    An old version of PGP did not detect if material was appended to a
    signed message.  This was a bug that was fixed, around version
    2.2, or maybe 2.1, I'm not sure which.

    We're not quite sure what "anti-overlooking" tools are, but based
    on Boris' example, we guess it would be code added 1) to insure
    that the code is unmodified and 2) make analysis of the code (e.g.
    with debugging tools & disassemblers) difficult.

    Since PGP is distributed with source code, it's obviously open to
    analysis and modification by anyone even moderately skilled in
    programming.  "Overlooking" attacks are easily countered by 1)
    making sure you have a "clean" PGP.EXE by checking it against the
    detached signature packed with it.  2)Running PGP with a freshly
    booted MSDOS from a factory diskette.  This is especially true if
    you run into "suspicious" actions when running PGP in your normal
    configuration. (Like you get back a copy of something you signed
    which seems to have text added you don't remember).

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.3a      

iQCVAgUBLNeRXt4nNf3ah8DHAQE+0QP/csLY4hw6AHGTdkoZu2koETv2q/ohnVl8
yGDwR65VVeuuiSANHjSmhUbA2w7DcbOaIxamzi1PSY6OHosB1ve4d2hOHKzdMrv1
m38x0iQLPZdGuuX0mCxRqvIJ47W8xKj49CxXIB+Khrva0nn+pAmQF6+IYonPGSAE
7uRREQnIzCU=
=7ogP
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

--
edgar@spectrx.saigon.com (Edgar W. Swank)
SPECTROX SYSTEMS +1.408.252.1005  Cupertino, Ca





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: David Reeve Sward <sward+@CMU.EDU>
Date: Thu, 4 Nov 93 13:27:38 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Jim McBride
In-Reply-To: <9311041958.AA25172@bsu-cs.bsu.edu>
Message-ID: <MgqL=1e00WBMQ=C2kL@andrew.cmu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Excerpts from internet.cypherpunks: 4-Nov-93 Jim McBride by
Anonymous@bsu-cs.bsu.edu 
> David Sward     sward+@cmu.edu     Finger or email for PGP public key 3D567F
> Encryption is an envelope for your email; read alt.security.pgp for details.
>  GCS: -d+ -p+(---) c++(++++) l+ u+ e+ m+()@ s+/++ n+@ h+ f !g w+@ t+@ r+ y?

Whoops :)
-- 
David Sward     sward+@cmu.edu     Finger or email for PGP public key 3D567F
Encryption is an envelope for your email; read alt.security.pgp for details.
 GCS: -d+ -p+(---) c++(++++) l+ u+ e+ m+()@ s+/++ n+@ h+ f !g w+@ t+@ r+ y?




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Johan Helsingius <julf@penet.fi>
Date: Thu, 4 Nov 93 06:57:36 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Er?
Message-ID: <199311041453.AA24861@mail.eunet.fi>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Anyone have any idea what this is about? Anon.penet.fi is being bombarded by
an endless flow of these...

	Julf

------- Forwarded Message

X-Envelope-To: na26436
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From: Mail Delivery Subsystem <MAILER-DAEMON@hydra.acs.uci.edu>
Message-Id: <199311041347.AA24199@hydra.acs.uci.edu>
To: na26436@anon.penet.fi
Subject: Returned mail: Return receipt

   ----- Transcript of session follows -----

  ----- Message header follows -----
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Message-Id: <9311040252.AA20137@alumni.cco.caltech.edu>
To: XXXXXXXXXXXXXXX, cypherpunks@toad.com
X-Mail-Duplicate-From: nobody@alumni.cco.caltech.edu
Comments: This message is NOT from the person listed in the From
 line.  It is from an automated software remailing service operating at
 that address.  Please report problem mail to <hal@alumni.caltech.edu>.
Subject: Re: ANON: mail concerns
From: Eternal Optimist <na26436@anon.penet.fi>
Return-Receipt-To: na26436@anon.penet.fi
Reply-To: na26436@anon.penet.fi
Errors-To: na26436@anon.penet.fi

------- End of Forwarded Message





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: jim@bilbo.suite.com (Jim Miller)
Date: Thu, 4 Nov 93 15:47:40 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: ViaCrypt PGP has arrived
Message-ID: <9311042344.AA04365@bilbo.suite.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



My copy of ViaCrypt PGP arrived yesterday (Nov 3).  Since I worked late, I  
haven't had a chance to play with it yet.  I looked through the manual.  The  
commands look similar (if not identical) to "classic" PGP's, as far as I could  
tell at a glance.

The bulk of the text for the manual was taken from the documentation that comes  
with PGP, except all occurances of "PGP" where replaced with "ViaCrypt PGP".

The box looks pretty good. :-)  Looks like they hired a real graphics designer.

I suppose some of you are wondering why I'd fork over 100 bucks for something I  
could get for free.  First of all, I can afford it.  Second of all, I simply  
feel more comfortable using a licensed shinkwrapped software product than a  
quasi-legal freeware one.  Call me a coward.

I realize that by not compiling the code myself on my own machine I basically  
have to trust the ViaCrypt PGP implementation.  So be it.  If there is  
something wrong with ViaCrypt PGP I believe it will eventually be discovered.   
Somebody will no doubt disassemble it and look for backdoors.  If someone finds  
one, ViaCrypt's reputation will be worthless.  It's in ViaCrypts best interest  
not to put in any backdoors.


Jim_"Rebel without a spine"_Miller@suite.com




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Christian D. Odhner" <cdodhner@indirect.com>
Date: Thu, 4 Nov 93 18:17:50 PST
To: na26436@anon.penet.fi
Subject: Re: ANON: mail concerns
In-Reply-To: <9311040252.AA20137@alumni.cco.caltech.edu>
Message-ID: <Pine.3.07.9311041952.A26707-b100000@indirect.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


On Wed, 3 Nov 1993 nobody@alumni.cco.caltech.edu wrote:

> >::
> >Request-Encryption-To: X
> >
> >If user ID X is on the remailer's pubkey ring, the outgoing message is
> >encrypted to X. This could be usefull for anonymous return-address blocks.
> 
> Encryption should be the default. Err on the side of caution.
> 
What if the "To" address has more than one key associated with it? Maybe
even more than one entity? Another (not publicized) remailer?

Maybe this wouldn't be a problem. Hmmm.....

Happy Hunting, -Chris

Christian Douglas Odhner     | "The NSA can have my secret key when they pry
cdodhner@indirect.com	     | it from my cold, dead, hands... But they shall
pgp 2.3 public key by finger | NEVER have the password it's encrypted with!"
My opinions are shareware. To register your copy, send me 15$ in DigiCash.
  Key fingerprint =  58 62 A2 84 FD 4F 56 38  82 69 6F 08 E4 F1 79 11 


> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
> Version: 2.3
> 
> iQCVAgUBLNgXzIjvfLxJbYYtAQEK4AP9HrSaMSOnlsxzEjgLbAgvsCSw3vMxLJ4u
> 856ZbKI2cZTNLoPzyWLNW68gZ7kcNeaF7MHKzWbI9tLEDePpWN34sB11wBlpfzcf
> WzcYVLI6JBLVERq2seyKU3cqAhWuxldSDeAlsKkMsrzI0tGgOaLkxCxhxn9weZf8
> 58mZeANd3sg=
> =8F9u
> -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----







From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: crypto@fizbin.fredd.com (Red Rover)
Date: Thu, 4 Nov 93 18:17:41 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: unsubscribe
Message-ID: <9311042032.D4339xz@fizbin.fredd.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Please unsubscribe me.  Thanks!

--
Red Rover                                                crypto@nowhere.com





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: nobody@alumni.cco.caltech.eduEternal Optimist <na26436@anon.penet.fi>
Date: Thu, 4 Nov 93 20:42:27 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: PGP BUG/FEATURE: multi-platform keys
Message-ID: <9311050434.AA19322@alumni.cco.caltech.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

Recently I have received two keys that were unusable without modification (from wonderer and Sameer) because they were not prepared using canonical text. I had to replace all the carriage returns by hand (this is the workaround for mac users who receive PC keys). Why is non-canonical text even an option in pgp? Who would use it except by mistake?

As long as I'm at it, here are some more macPGP2.3 bugs, for those who care. Trying to decrypt a message signed by a key I don't have causes a serious crash requiring reboot. Trying to select cancel in a signature dialogue just raises the same dialogue box instead of cancelling. I'm running on a powerbook 145 under system 7.0.1.

Eternal!Optimist@anon.penet.fi   (copyright 1993, Eternal Optimist [Ha Ha Ha])
 0) 0) =:()]-<                                    <na26436@anon.penet.fi>
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.3

iQCVAgUBLNe7R4jvfLxJbYYtAQFFHQP7BCqn1JKaI09wBrWnjOF73CPz7GetaC/y
XL8zqhmzDdrGdLbWB/vBDgXW7z+2EJHazbvqaUhq1GQw8bq+opC2fe4mXcw2x3Y+
wliLy1CWDtfl24L8ah//nLQMtttfG4kXjiB8JqUnS7US+W3vvH3AXxi+wZb5W2qi
7gPXMErUCUA=
=Ew/6
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: hfinney@shell.portal.com
Date: Thu, 4 Nov 93 21:47:41 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Signing keys for nyms
Message-ID: <9311050543.AA26998@jobe.shell.portal.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

Eric Hughes writes, regarding the problem of determining whether the
key of a "nym" is valid:

> If a provider of any sort is the sole means of access to a series of
> communications, there will be the possibility of tampering.  If some
> public key must issue forth through this channel only, it is possible
> to alter the pseudonym's public key each time it is passed throught
> that channel.  Since every protocol which uses communications only
> through the server won't work, every solution needs another channel.

Eric goes on to describe a solution based on sending the key through
two different channels, with a return message via the pseudonym server
channel.  I think this is a good solution, but there is the possibility
that the evil pseudonym server could corrupt the return message so that
the nym did not find out that his key was being mangled (although other
people would find out, which may be good enough).

A more general solution is to use more than one pseudonym server.
Assuming they aren't both colluding, you can send your nym1 key to nym2,
and vice versa.  By providing two or more channels back to you as well
as out from you, you are able to detect corruption of your messages.

Eric suggested that if the pseudonym server signed the user's key, then
corruption of the key could be proven to third parties.  I'm not sure this
is the case, because it would seem that a user could falsely incriminate
a pseudonym server by claiming that he had never created the key which the
pseudonym server signed, that it was a bogus key.  I suppose reputations
would have to play a role then, in weighing the credibility of the pseudonym
server against that of the nym.

Hal
hfinney@shell.portal.com

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.3a

iQCVAgUBLNm4NagTA69YIUw3AQFGOwQApSwLHzBfQKStZd6g/17dsL3WUtgCvy6D
OyQjFQ3dRd6VRGrEaQ7aRbnae9If0NqF2qbaxeHAKNP/Uiyo/cGBWvFjAxWeVyY0
hddLRBygxIyqjkDkxAEBGaYRruly8TC4TEU45ChwSUz2Smh0rDm8S2GINgXe340P
a1peTNDPSlI=
=Ywbw
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: hfinney@shell.portal.com
Date: Thu, 4 Nov 93 22:37:41 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: ANON: pools
Message-ID: <9311050634.AA00945@jobe.shell.portal.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

>address).  This means that you will have to trust the person running the  
>remailer.

One point is being missed here - a chain of remailers is as strong as
its STRONGEST link.  As long as even ONE remailer in the chain is
trustworthy, hiding the connection between incoming and outgoing messages,
your anonymity is preserved.

The suggestion that remailers themselves choose the routing path means
that you have to trust the remailer that chooses the path.  If it is
corrupt, it can defeat the effect of the path.  To protect yourself,
you want to use many remailers in the chain, and use a system which
does not require you to trust any one remailer.  Having the remailers
choose the path does not really help.

Hal Finney
hfinney@shell.portal.com

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.3a

iQCVAgUBLNnDFKgTA69YIUw3AQFDWQP/fCdoob+6zBSTFIlvnWLmXEL5+KPzMOgf
AOImZJlFDOSAbAL2GK/+Pm/tsOiLEQ0MD7yEvUjafpM0D2qEtsxzz7FJvJl09+gd
GFoGrMmbkCavFqajYGK89aq+8ESGIc4Gefyob4izeAOOWXIhZpS2CjX16CQ2s0DZ
U2xTGaO67/Q=
=0MVk
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: hfinney@shell.portal.com
Date: Thu, 4 Nov 93 22:37:51 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: message depots, packet routing?
Message-ID: <9311050634.AA00949@jobe.shell.portal.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

A few discussions of DC-Nets here show a small misconception.  The
network topology does not have to be the same as the DC-Net topology.

What I mean is this: the communication in the network may be a ring
or any other topology.  But that does not mean that you only share
random numbers with your neighbors on the ring.  You can share random
numbers (on a pairwise basis) with every other participant in the network,
in the most extreme case.

Look at this diagram, showing four people communicating in a DC-Net.
The lines represent shared random number one-time pads.

		A---------B
		| \     / |
		|   \ /   |
		|   / \   |
		| /     \ |
		C---------D

Each person shares random numbers individually with every other person
in the network, in this example.  A and B share their own random numbers,
A and C share a different set, A and D have their own, B and C do,
and so on.  But that does not mean that the network communication
topology has to be all to all.  Instead, a ring topology could be used,
with packets passing around the network A-B-D-C-A-B-D-C-....  At each
step, A would xor in the next random number from each of the three pads
that he is using, then xor in his message bits if he has anything.  Then
he would pass it on to B.  After the packet has gone all the way around,
the message (if any) would be revealed.

And in this case it doesn't matter who your "neighbors" are in the
communication network.  B and C colluding can't distinguish whether messages
come from A and D despite the fact that they separate them in the comm
network.

So this concern about "knowing your neighbors" in the DC-Net is not as
serious as it sounds.  If truly paranoid people want to participate in
a DC-Net (and who else would?) then they can use a DC-Net topology
which does not allow partitioning.  This adds overhead and inconvenience
of distributing shared random numbers, but it does not require the
communication pattern to change.

BTW, I like the name someone proposed for a DC-Net: "Ouija Net".  The idea
is that messages appear in a DC-Net somewhat like messages appearing on
a Ouija board.  The true source of most Ouija board messages, IMO, is people
pushing the indicator around.  But because everyone is touching it, each
person has plausible denial.  You know that SOMEONE is moving it, but
there is no way to tell who.  This is similar to DC-Net messaging.

Hal
hfinney@shell.portal.com

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.3a

iQCVAgUBLNnG0qgTA69YIUw3AQFigQP+LDMO6S7HkS4YkLdctLus4GamIvb/BxSX
uG8VcZ/0eujQt8ZEIlNEzwNZvBR3Sio8gKko2jjvmWDGyobibSpctfqcr5Qf42xz
42TWVzYCjg+tka6FttosZ0phwGP1m7Dy+sC/zE0YmEQagS6jDSn/RiqR2PDMSJZn
FEo2lfh8tmQ=
=ZUfW
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Dark <unicorn@access.digex.net>
Date: Thu, 4 Nov 93 20:27:41 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re:  ViaCrypt PGP has arrived
Message-ID: <199311050423.AA21464@access.digex.net>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I was with you all the way until you said:

->
I realize that by not compiling the code myself on my own machine I basically
have to trust the ViaCrypt PGP implementation.  So be it.  If there is
something wrong with ViaCrypt PGP I believe it will eventually be discovered.   Someb
ody will no doubt disassemble it and look for backdoors.  If someone finds
one, ViaCrypt's reputation will be worthless.  It's in ViaCrypts best interest  not t
o put in any backdoors.

<-

Call me paranoid:

I'd never take what it's in someone's "best interest" as a 
major factor in predicting actions.  Look at the crime
section of the local paper or that bit called "news of
the wierd"

I happen to agree with you this time, though it would be nice
if ViaCrypt had included the code and a compling mechanism.
I suppose this is outside the realm of marketing possibility though.


-uni- (Dark)




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: hughes@ah.com (Eric Hughes)
Date: Thu, 4 Nov 93 23:57:42 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Signing keys for nyms
In-Reply-To: <9311050543.AA26998@jobe.shell.portal.com>
Message-ID: <9311050750.AA05585@ah.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


re: my protocol for determining whether your pseudonym server is
spoofing your public key distribution.

>Eric goes on to describe a solution based on sending the key through
>two different channels, with a return message via the pseudonym server
>channel.  I think this is a good solution, but there is the possibility
>that the evil pseudonym server could corrupt the return message so that
>the nym did not find out that his key was being mangled (although other
>people would find out, which may be good enough).

The pseudonym server may deny service, that is either refuse to pass
the email at all or corrupt the container (a piece of email) so that
no message is sent.  As the owner of the pseudonym tries the protocol
multiple times and never gets a response, alteration at the server
become more plausible.

What the pseudonym server cannot do is read the contents of the
incoming message.  If this message contains a bit of data that was not
passed through the server, either a signature made by the
match-and-remail server or by an arbitrary number passed through the
anonymous channel, then the pseudonym server cannot make a valid
message to substitute for the return message.  The pseudonym server
can substitute any arbitrary message it cares to, since it does have
the pseudonym's true public key, but it cannot know what to put in
such a message, either because it does not hold the private key of the
M&R server or because it has never seen the arbitrary number passed
out of the other channel.

>Eric suggested that if the pseudonym server signed the user's key, then
>corruption of the key could be proven to third parties.  

If the pseudonym server is signing keys, it will have to send one
certificate on the true key to the owner of the pseudonym and one
certificate on the false key.  The certificates have different keys
and the same identifier.  This pair of certificates, exhibited side by
side, is prima facie evidence of alteration of keys.  This is the
situation that I was speaking of.

>I'm not sure this
>is the case, because it would seem that a user could falsely incriminate
>a pseudonym server by claiming that he had never created the key which the
>pseudonym server signed, that it was a bogus key.  

The certificate that a pseudonym provider signs asserts the following:
"I certify that this key K is a key of name N who can be reached at
address A for which I provide final delivery."  Let us assume that the
pseudonym server is propagating a false key; we may also assume that
the false key has a certificate as above.  

If the pseudonym owner is not using a public key, they're screwed.
The identity is the public key, not the email address, which is only a
form of delivery.  The server is asserting that a cryptographic
identity is reachable at that address, but the pseudonym owner thinks
that mail delivery is sufficient to prove identity.  In fact, a
cryptographic identity _is_ reachable at that address, it's just that
that identity is not the one whose mailbox it is.

In Hal's situation, the pseudonym owner claims that the server is
distributing a false key.  Immediately after such an claim, the first
question will be "Well, where is your public key and the certificate
made by the server?"  Unless the pseudonym owner can exhibit these,
the accusation holds no weight.

Eric





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: ateel@nyx10.cs.du.edu (A. J. Teel - Sui Juris)
Date: Fri, 5 Nov 93 00:27:42 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: bouncing mail?
Message-ID: <9311050824.AA26688@nyx10.cs.du.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Dear cypherpunks@toad.com:

	I read the following message and then followed itss
instructions and the messages after it were the result. Any ideas?
	BTW: What is cypherpunks?

+---------------------------------------------------------+
| With Explicit Reservation of All Rights (U.C.C. 1-207), |
| Regards, -A. J. Teel-, Sui Juris (ateel@nyx.cs.du.edu). |
| Call (303) 687-4935 anytime! Finger for PGP PUBLIC KEY. |
| Please use "ateel@nyx.cs.du.edu" NOT ".@nyx10." Thanks. |
+---------------------------------------------------------+

--------------------- Msg 1 ---------------------
Date: Tue, 2 Mar 93 00:09:27 CST
From: dclunie@pax.tpa.com.au (David Clunie)
Message-Id: <9303011339.AA15227@britt>
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Mail server for PGP sources

I gather some people have had trouble obtaining sources for PGP. I
have accumulated those I can and they are available from my mail
server. If you can get these somewhere closer then great, but
if desperate feel free to get them from here (as long as the load
doesn't get out of hand I will keep it going).

The address is "mail-server@pax.tpa.com.au".

Help is available by sending in the message body:

  send help
  end

An index of PGP files is available by sending in the message body:

  index pgp
  end

And results in something like the following ...

     Date       Size  Index: pgp
  ----------  ------  ----------------------------
  1992/12/25    216K  security/pgp/macpgp2.0.sit.hqx
  1992/12/25    160K  security/pgp/msiguide.zip
  1992/12/25     33K  security/pgp/ngclon11.zip
  1992/12/25    168K  security/pgp/pgp-ng.zip
  1992/09/13    184K  security/pgp/pgp20.zip
  1992/09/13    376K  security/pgp/pgp20src.zip
  1992/12/25    536K  security/pgp/pgp21.tar.Z
  1992/12/25    192K  security/pgp/pgp21.zip
  1992/12/25    656K  security/pgp/pgp21ami.lha
  1992/12/25    240K  security/pgp/pgp21os2.zip
  1992/12/25    440K  security/pgp/pgp21src.zip
  1992/12/25    224K  security/pgp/pgp21_next.tar.Z
  1992/12/25    256K  security/pgp/pgp21_sparc.tar.Z
  1992/09/13    464K  security/pgp/unix_pgp20.tar.Z

Probably pgp21.tar.Z or pgp21.zip are what you want for unix or pcdos
respectively.

If anyone has a more recent mac version I will put that up too.

david


--------------------- Msg 2 -----------------



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Mail Delivery Subsystem <MAILER-DAEMON@mordor.cs.du.edu>
Date: Fri, 5 Nov 93 01:17:17 MST
To: ateel@nyx10.cs.du.edu
Subject: Returned mail: Host unknown
Message-ID: <199311050816.AA26761@mordor.cs.du.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


   ----- Transcript of session follows -----
550 pax.tpa.com.au (TCP)... 550 Host unknown
554 <mail-server@pax.tpa.com.au>... 550 Host unknown (Authoritative answer from name server)

   ----- Unsent message follows -----
Received: from nyx10.cs.du.edu by mordor.cs.du.edu with SMTP id AA26759
  (5.65c/IDA-1.4.4 for <mail-server@pax.tpa.com.au>); Fri, 5 Nov 1993 01:16:46 -0700
Received: by nyx10.cs.du.edu (4.1/SMI-4.1)
	id AA26298; Fri, 5 Nov 93 01:17:11 MST
Date: Fri, 5 Nov 93 01:17:11 MST
From: ateel@nyx10.cs.du.edu (A. J. Teel - Sui Juris)
Message-Id: <9311050817.AA26298@nyx10.cs.du.edu>
X-Disclaimer: Nyx is a public access Unix system run by the University
	of Denver.  The University has neither control over nor
	responsibility for the opinions or correct identity of users.
To: mail-server@pax.tpa.com.au
Subject: ...

index pgp
end

---------------------- Msg 3 ----------------------



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Mail Delivery Subsystem <MAILER-DAEMON@mordor.cs.du.edu>
Date: Fri, 5 Nov 93 01:16:55 MST
To: ateel@nyx10.cs.du.edu
Subject: Returned mail: Host unknown
Message-ID: <199311050816.AA26755@mordor.cs.du.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


   ----- Transcript of session follows -----
550 pax.tpa.com.au (TCP)... 550 Host unknown
554 <mail-server@pax.tpa.com.au>... 550 Host unknown (Authoritative answer from name server)

   ----- Unsent message follows -----
Received: from nyx10.cs.du.edu by mordor.cs.du.edu with SMTP id AA26753
  (5.65c/IDA-1.4.4 for <mail-server@pax.tpa.com.au>); Fri, 5 Nov 1993 01:16:14 -0700
Received: by nyx10.cs.du.edu (4.1/SMI-4.1)
	id AA26238; Fri, 5 Nov 93 01:16:38 MST
Date: Fri, 5 Nov 93 01:16:38 MST
From: ateel@nyx10.cs.du.edu (A. J. Teel - Sui Juris)
Message-Id: <9311050816.AA26238@nyx10.cs.du.edu>
X-Disclaimer: Nyx is a public access Unix system run by the University
	of Denver.  The University has neither control over nor
	responsibility for the opinions or correct identity of users.
To: mail-server@pax.tpa.com.au
Subject: ...

send help
end
------------------------------------------------




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: szabo@netcom.com (Nick Szabo)
Date: Fri, 5 Nov 93 01:52:28 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Commerce models
Message-ID: <9311050950.AA06937@netcom.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Here's a copy of a post I made to imp-interest@thumper.bellcore.com
(among other reasons to refute Detweiler, who is on imp now promoting 
his "tag the criminals" agenda).  I hope I've given a fair overview 
of some of the things we're interested in, but from a "pro-commerce" 
rather than "pro-cypherpunks" point of view.  (I find the ends and
means to be very similar, but the point of view is 
different.  imp-interest is interested in pushing Internet commerce,
not ideological agendas).

-----------------------

> 1. Can anyone else come up with some other Internet commerce models?

You mentioned one of the original digital cash shemes.
There are wide variety of offline (2-party transactions) and online 
(realtime connection of buyer & seller with bank) digital cash proposals,
many by David Chaum, his students, and colleagues (cf. Eurocrypt and 
Crypto proceedings).  Some of these can be implemented securely in
software, without the need for smart cards or other kinds of
physical security.  (For example, one's own digital cash can
be encrypted with one's own private key & passphrase, making
it as difficult to rip off as any other form of electronic
money).  Also, Chaum has an interesting per-organization 
pseudonym/transferrable credentials system that could allow checking 
credit ratings without revealing identity.  

Another, much simpler concept, is "digital postage", where
tokens would be sold per service provider, perhaps from physical
stores or vending machines, or online in exhange for other
tokens, or by a non-private means like credit card as long as there is
a fluid market for such tokens.  These would be much like the token 
cards used now in subways, copy machines, etc.  Although this is not 
as general as digital cash, client software might allow a wide variety 
of tokens to be maintained and used automatically, and the basic
software would be less complicated (the underlying security
protocols easier to understand and implement purely in
software).

> 2. Do you think that the IBS model is good?

(Forgive me if I'm misunderstanding the nature of Internet
Billing Service; I'm basing my comments on your comparison of it to 
credit card billing).

I'm very concerned that IBS and on-line checks would, like credit cards,
lack privacy, allowing dossiers to be easily collected on customer buying 
patterns.  Under such systems there would be incentive for those 
seeking privacy to spoof (eg by creating false credentials and/or
credentialling agencies), as well as for those seeking to defraud
to spoof.  A good net commerce model should be able 
to deal with the fact that many Internet users can easily create
pseudonyms, and credentials (digital signatures, etc.) for those
pseudonyms, without demanding expensive, privacy-endangering
"true ID" enforcement.  Given the extremely messy legal environment with 
thousands of jurisdictions criss-crossed by the Internet, a basic principle 
of Internet commerce should be to minimize the need for legal
intervention.

Also I'm concerned about the vulnerabity of the IBS 
organization(s) themselves to corruption, which could sap or destroy 
an economy centered on such an agency.  A good commercial model
should be decentralized so that any such corruption can be quickly routed 
around, much like the Internet is built to route around node failures.  
With the efficiency of on-line software customers can "ping" 
banks, billing services, etc. by depositing money in a very
fine-grained manner at a wide variety of such service providers,
to determine which services are the most trustworthy.  Extensive
reputation records for these services can be accumulated,
searchable on-line Consumer Reports.

Thus I hope a wide variety of decentralized means of Internet commerce
can be tolerated.  Of the possible means, digital cash and/or pseudonyms 
with transferrable credentials seem the most attractive.  They are 
complicated in raw protocol and software, but could present a simple 
conceptual interface for most users, and they don't demand that third
parties, ie net culture, net user's software, and world politics be 
changed in in fundamental ways.  Some sorts of changes might happen, but 
the goal of Internet commerce is not to predict them or bring them about or 
prevent them (we can't do those things any better than anybody 
else), but to set up Internet commerce without having to rely 
on major help or change on the part of third parties.

Nick Szabo				szabo@netcom.com




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: miron@extropia.wimsey.com (Miron Cuperman)
Date: Thu, 4 Nov 93 23:27:41 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: ANON: pools
In-Reply-To: <9311041709.AA13687@arcadien.owlnet.rice.edu>
Message-ID: <1993Nov5.064715.7230@extropia.wimsey.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

klbarrus@owlnet.rice.edu (Karl Lui Barrus) writes:

>stuff about interfacing different pools sounds good.  Miron is running
>one at extropia.wimsey.com (mail to pool0-request or pool0-help).

Err...  The correct procedure is to send 'help' on the subject line
to pool0-request.

>Basically, it is a mailing list with several subscribers.  If you want
>to send a message to one person, encrypt it and send it to the pool.
>Everybody gets the message, but only one person can decrypt it.

That's a good description as any.

	Miron
- -- 
        Miron Cuperman <miron@extropia.wimsey.com> | NeXTmail/Mime ok
        Unix/C++/DSP,  consulting/contracting      | Public key avail
        AMIX: MCuperman                            |

What we seek is not the overthrow of the government but a situation in 
which it gets lost in the shuffle. anon.



-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.3

iQCVAgUBLNn215NxvvA36ONDAQGqiQP9GG8hVqK7/hkBjM0q/P3Hnos9fTFapDsZ
0ft4QEH2VIVVo5eXnEwbbmKCESimuk0Rt0AUSF6jFObbT1hbqLkNdVHSom59wheo
wfGcF8H6+9BBCQjKIhoRILdkanZSRCHLQMRonl3ggZofIUBxKs4JeUEmwUWWxZ2Z
ULUef3Khz+Y=
=4467
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: pierre@shell.portal.com (Pierre Uszynski)
Date: Fri, 5 Nov 93 07:57:46 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re:  ViaCrypt PGP has arrived
Message-ID: <9311051556.AA16560@jobe.shell.portal.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> From: jim@bilbo.suite.com (Jim Miller)
[...]
> I realize that by not compiling the code myself on my own machine I basically  
> have to trust the ViaCrypt PGP implementation.  So be it.  If there is  
> something wrong with ViaCrypt PGP I believe it will eventually be discovered.   
> Somebody will no doubt disassemble it and look for backdoors.  If someone finds  
> one, ViaCrypt's reputation will be worthless.  It's in ViaCrypts best interest  
> not to put in any backdoors.

Unfortunately, backdoors have not been the main security problem in
commercial system software, bugs and "honest mistakes" have been.
Unfortunately too, there has been very little pressure by customers
to hold companies accountable for the software they ship. Usually
somebody uncovers a bug, uses it for a while, is detected, and that causes
(in the best case) the software company to issue a new patch. Some
distribute the patches for free, some make you pay big bucks for it.

But never is the company really harmed by the fact that it claimed
some level of security (or functionality), and was not providing it.

If, in the future, ViaCrypt says "ooops, there was a debugging switch
left on when we compiled, here is a free patch." would you discard your
ViaCrypt PGP, buy the competitor's version (there is none), and sue them?
Did they include any disclaimer in the license?

Call me cynical,
Pierre.
pierre@shell.portal.com




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: doug@netcom.com (Doug Merritt)
Date: Fri, 5 Nov 93 08:57:45 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: trusting software
Message-ID: <199311051657.IAA20001@mail.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


ogr@wyvern.wyvern.com (Jason Plank) said:
>	Phil Zimmerman solved this problem by supplying the source code for
>his product.  You can see for yourself that there are no backdoors.

This helps, but is imperfect. How many people will read their particular
copy in sufficient detail to ascertain that there aren't any obvious
backdoors added by e.g. a sneaky archive site maintainer, or some sneaky
cracker who found a way to modify the archived copy?

Furthermore, even close reading won't absolutely *guarantee* the lack of
backdoors in all cases, even if the reader is an expert on relevant
subjects.

We'll all continue to use software despite lack of absolute assurances,
but it's worth keeping in mind what the situation is.
	Doug




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: doug@netcom.com (Doug Merritt)
Date: Fri, 5 Nov 93 09:17:45 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: trusting software
Message-ID: <199311051714.JAA21715@mail.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


greg@ideath.goldenbear.com (Greg Broiles) said:
>It's not clear to me how you can trust systems not under your control to 
>report on themselves or local conditions accurately. As your program gets 
>more complex, aren't you going to run into an analog of the Turing 
>machine/halting problem?

The idea is to encode the important-to-be-trusted features of the software
and the inter-machine protocol handshake together into the equivalent
of a Goedel number which acts as a public key during the protocol handshake,
so that any change to that core encoding of the functionality would have
the side effect that it was no longer able to communicate.

>It's an intriguing idea, but it's still very unclear to me how it might 
>work on software of any real complexity.

Yeah...I'm having strong difficulties with doing it in a way that is
computationally feasible as well as theoretically sound. Several times
I thought I'd found the right approach but then found holes in it. So
I lied in implying that I really did have a final algorithm....I *thought*
I did, but I was wrong.
	Doug




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: zeek@IO.COM (zeek)
Date: Fri, 5 Nov 93 07:47:47 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Remailer Abuse?
Message-ID: <9311051540.AA27805@illuminati.IO.COM>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----



What constitutes remailer abuse is my question.  I'm aware of the obvious
reasons, but unclear about the details.  

I suppose this question could be asked another way; what constitutes
the *proper* use of a remailer?  Or; have clear guidelines been drawn for
them?  


- -z

- -- 

ThesearelessonswhichIlearnedinpartwalikingwithmydogsandwonderinghowtheworld
lookswithoutafoveaandveryfewretinalcellsforcolourvisionbutwithahugeneural
processingandsensoryareaforsmellsTheeyesmadeavailableinmoderntechnological
sciencesshatteranyideaofpassivevision-donnaharraway.


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Kr8khtZdZusZUqgAttZ+gHC1uQdkM1fcCqabAz2+9689kPfhnlcYfGoito1o/xfz
cUoN/LIuZCI=
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From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: felix@hu.se (Felix Ungman)
Date: Fri, 5 Nov 93 02:32:28 PST
To: jdblair@nextsrv.cas.muohio.EDU
Subject: Re: Macintosh PGP CDEV Idea
Message-ID: <199311051029.AA15275@mail.swip.net>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I have some ideas I've been working on (a modular approach). To be
sucessfull, a cryptographic utility for the Mac has to fit nicely into the
system.

Here's my proposal (divided into five layers):

1 - CryptoModules
To do encryption we need cryptographic algorithms. These are written as
small modules (code resources) and are put into the Extensions folder. They
contain algorithms but no user interaction. 
It's easy for the user to install and upgrade CryptoModules. It's also easy
to write new modules, as you don't need to worry about user interfacing,
and can concentrate on the algorithms.

2 - CryptoAccess
This module is the interface to the CryptoModules. It provides c/pascal
routine interface and scripting abilities (AppleEvents). Contains no user
interaction, and is key oriented (it looks up the right algorithm for a
given key).

3 - CryptoAPI
This module handles the user interaction. Provides the dialogs and menus
neccesarry for encrypting/signing data. Accessed by c/pascal routines or
AppleEvents.

4 - Applications/Utilities
With the CryptoAPI it's easy to write encryption capable programs. Very
little code has to be added to existing applications. A nice utility would
be encryption of text in TextEdit.

5 - Integration with System 7 Pro
Patching the Digital Signature Manager will extend the system in a
consistent way. All neat features (like signing in the Finder, etc) will
also work with PGP.

Unfortunately, I haven't enough spare time to do all this myself. The layer
model makes it possible to divide the work that has to be done.

----------------------------------------------------------------------
True Name: Felix Ungman               "Gen is god and your God is not"





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: dmandl@lehman.com (David Mandl)
Date: Fri, 5 Nov 93 08:12:30 PST
To: na26436@anon.penet.fi
Subject: Re: PGP BUG/FEATURE: multi-platform keys
Message-ID: <9311051606.AA04336@disvnm2.lehman.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> As long as I'm at it, here are some more macPGP2.3 bugs, for those who care. Trying to decrypt a message signed by a key I don't have causes a serious crash requiring reboot. Trying to select cancel in a signature dialogue just raises the same dialogue box instead of cancelling. I'm running on a powerbook 145 under system 7.0.1.
> 
> Eternal!Optimist@anon.penet.fi   (copyright 1993, Eternal Optimist [Ha Ha Ha])
>  0) 0) =:()]-<                                    <na26436@anon.penet.fi>

It's been a while since I beta-tested MacPGP 2.3, but I think that...

The problem with quitting out of the pass phrase prompt was a "feature."
When you pressed CANCEL, the interface told the pgp engine that you had
typed in a bad pass phrase.  I guess this was an easy quick and dirty way
to handle it.  The problem was, when you typed in a bad pass phrase, you
were given two more chances to get it right.  Therefore, when you pressed
CANCEL, you were also prompted two more times.  So, you had to press CANCEL
three times to quit from that prompt.  This was fixed in 2.3a, a beta version
of which I've got.  I guess the official 2.3a has been released by now, but
I haven't checked.

   --Dave.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: collins@newton.apple.com (Scott Collins)
Date: Fri, 5 Nov 93 11:27:47 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Hole in MD5 (Not)
Message-ID: <9311051919.AA10041@newton.apple.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


What follows is a private e-mail exchange with Burt Kaliski (posted with
his permission), where he clarifies the 'hole in MD5' and shows that it
does not afford the attack I described previously.

Mike Ingle:
  >Recently there was a message here about MD5 having a hole in it.
  >Maybe this is what the person was talking about...

Bruce Schneier:
  [ describes Bart Preneel's Ph.D. thesis, which cites the work of
  den Boer and Bosselaer ]

Burt Kaliski:
  [ a LaTeX document noting the implications, or lack thereof, of den Boer
  and Bosselaers' work ]

Scott Collins:
  [ describes an attack on (e.g.) Bellcore's timestamp system; wonders
  if den Boer and Bosselaers' work makes this attack possible ]

Burt Kaliski (private response):
  >When operating on single blocks, MD5 computes a function z = f(x,y0), 
  >where x is the 512-bit message block, y0 is a fixed 128-bit value, and 
  >z is the 128-bit message digest.
  >
  >den Boer and Bosselaers found a way to construct a triple (x,y1,y2) 
  >such that f(x,y1) = f(x,y2). The y1 and y2 values are not the same as 
  >the fixed y0, so clearly this is different than an MD5 collision, 
  >which would have different message blocks.
  >
  >I'm not sure how this relates to the attack you have in mind, although 
  >I'd be interested in more details. Also, the attack you describe is 
  >"after-the-fact" in the sense that the target value h_N is already 
  >published. To forge a time-stamp at that point, what I need is not a 
  >collision, but an inversion. (I have to find something that hashes to 
  >h_N.) Collisions play a greater role "before-the-fact," where I might 
  >give Eve something to sign, where I happen to know another message 
  >with the same digest.
  >
  >-- Burt Kaliski
  >RSA Laboratories

Scott Collins:
  > [ ... ]
  >
  >Ahh. This is not (even close to) a big enough foothold to support my 
  >attack.  :-)
  >
  > [ ... ]
  >
  >The attack does, in fact, require inversion.  Since the verifier can't 
  >compare the depth of the alleged hash tree to the actual one, the attack is 
  >still possible even when only _some_ inversions are possible, as long as 
  >the attacker can find one along the actual path to the root (the degenerate 
  >case being when the attacker can find an inversion for the root itself).
  >
  >The attack only came to mind because the the depth cannot be verified, and 
  >so the attacker is not limited in the number of steps (in case she can only 
  >find inversions of a special form); the intermediate hash values are all of 
  >minimal size; the intermediate hash values are expected to be 'random', and 
  >so there is no constraint requiring human-readable inversions.  Thus, it 
  >seemed that if an the hash could be usefully inverted, this would be the 
  >situation that allowed it.
  >
  >Thanks for the clarification.  May I repost your answer, or at least _this_ 
  >message which quotes it, to the original distribution list of my question?

Permission was granted.


Scott Collins         | "Few people realize what tremendous power there
                      |  is in one of these things."     -- Willy Wonka
......................|................................................
BUSINESS.   voice:408.862.0540  fax:974.6094   collins@newton.apple.com
Apple Computer, Inc.   5 Infinite Loop, MS 305-2B   Cupertino, CA 95014
.......................................................................
PERSONAL.   voice/fax:408.257.1746    1024:669687   catalyst@netcom.com





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Carl Ellison <cme@sw.stratus.com>
Date: Fri, 5 Nov 93 08:37:45 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Sternlight
Message-ID: <199311051636.LAA02859@ellisun.sw.stratus.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I don't know who wanted to start reposting Sternlight posts to this list,
but I have a good way in my news reader to avoid mail from him or in 
reply to him or talking about him -- but lack such facilities in my 
mail reader.  Could any message mentioning Sternlight or reacting to
something he said (however indirectly) include his name in the subject line
so that I can kill it without reading?

Thank you.

 - Carl




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Eli Brandt <ebrandt@jarthur.Claremont.EDU>
Date: Fri, 5 Nov 93 12:47:47 PST
To: cypherpunks list <cypherpunks@toad.com>
Subject: Re: trusting software
In-Reply-To: <199311051657.IAA20001@mail.netcom.com>
Message-ID: <9311052045.AA11880@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> From: doug@netcom.com (Doug Merritt)
> Furthermore, even close reading won't absolutely *guarantee* the lack of
> backdoors in all cases, even if the reader is an expert on relevant
> subjects.

Case in point: sendmail.  The sendmail code is something like a nucleon,
in that one can apparently obtain an arbitrary number of bugs by putting
sufficient energy in.

ViaCrypt's market is people who want unquestioned legality as well
as decent security.  The best way to get this is to use PGP 2.3a,
with source, while holding a license to a product producing
identical output.  Conveniently, editing the "2.3a" to "2.4" in a
PGP-encrypted file causes no apparent problems.

   Eli   ebrandt@jarthur.claremont.edu




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: jdblair@nextsrv.cas.muohio.EDU
Date: Fri, 5 Nov 93 09:57:46 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: punk-net mailing list
Message-ID: <9311051817.AA16654@ nextsrv.cas.muohio.EDU >
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


To those interested in participating in a hardware specific cypherpunks list,
(punk-net, net underground, whatever) e-mail me.  My sysadmin is cool with
the idea of setting the list up here, so if a decent number of people respond
over the next week, I'll set it up.

So, hardware fiends... time to bring a whiff of burnt flux and overheated
resistors to the world of underground cryptography.

-john.
jdblair@nextsrv.cas.muohio.edu



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Matthew J Miszewski <MJMISKI@macc.wisc.edu>
Date: Fri, 5 Nov 93 13:12:30 PST
To: CYPHERPUNKS@toad.com
Subject: dcnets and tcmay cartoon
Message-ID: <23110515071891@vms2.macc.wisc.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I have just been reading d. Chaum's _Security without identification:
Card Computers to make Big Brother Obsolete_ and have some questions.
But Ill ask the serious ones in another post.  For this one, and to
satisfy the comparable conspiracy buffs on the list, look
first at the Cypherpunks Wired issue.  Now look at the comic
in Chaum's paper.  I guess that bearded guy with the longer
hair could be....hmm....Jamie...no...Nick...no ITS TIM MAY!
 
--Matt
______________________________________________________________________________
In defense of liberty, encrypt for all purposes, civil and professional.
In defense of privacy, encrypt all correspondence, personal and professional.
In defense of sanity, do not encrypt your dry cleaning invoice!
 
       ++++++++--------mjmiski@macc.wisc.edu                          (c)1993




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Karl Lui Barrus <klbarrus@owlnet.rice.edu>
Date: Fri, 5 Nov 93 15:52:35 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: ANON: random remailing
Message-ID: <9311052351.AA14311@elf.owlnet.rice.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

>Exacltly how do you fake mail with telnet or use a newsgroup for
>one-way anonymous email?  Care to elaborate?

Whoops, I think I was vague in my earlier response.

In mail, either you know whoever your mailing to or you don't.  If A
wants to mail B and doesn't need a response:

If A doesn't know B, A could use telnet to fake mail to B.  This
leaves more of a trail than an anonymous remailer, narrows down where
the message could have come from, but obscures who actually sent it
(I'm sure some logging facilities invalidate this).

If A knows B, they could agree to use a newsgroup as an anonymous pool
(sort of).  A posts a message, B reads it.

- From time to time, random remailing is suggested.  I think I'll go
re-read Chaum's paper and think about it more, but I'm nearly positive
that this makes it easier to pair up sender and destination.

Suppose remailers used random routing.  Assuming one remailer can be
trusted (the first hop) so linking A and mail sent to the trusted
remailer is not possible, A could send to B via the trusted remailer.
B's address will be made available to every remailer.  Now when B
replies, A's address is made available.  Caching and padding messages
may help, but all an eavesdropper has to do is monitor mail from B, a
known address, and when mail hits any remailer, A's address is known.

So is it reasonable to assume an eavesdropper can monitor a remailer
(all remailers except the trusted remailer), they can also monitor an
arbitrary address (B's)?

Hm...


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/BftSwec4ZGtJ/L14EB1fwP6j31m365VflUMzckJk0kViLcS3pMT85dCEK5pIduu
kzzdhBGS/MRYaj2uHlSMdz2dtyzwtjYc7hLyAriPLCKcwLrCcc440G81Z0BSWOhj
5ECgPYSNsIM=
=VKgV
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: gtoal@an-teallach.com (Graham Toal)
Date: Fri, 5 Nov 93 11:32:30 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Sarah's Bio
Message-ID: <5816@an-teallach.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


In article <199311051657.IAA20001@mail.netcom.com> doug@netcom.com writes:
 > ogr@wyvern.wyvern.com (Jason Plank) said:
 > >       Phil Zimmerman solved this problem by supplying the source code for
 > >his product.  You can see for yourself that there are no backdoors.
 > 
 > This helps, but is imperfect. How many people will read their particular
 > copy in sufficient detail to ascertain that there aren't any obvious
 > backdoors added by e.g. a sneaky archive site maintainer, or some sneaky
 > cracker who found a way to modify the archived copy?

Well, I did for one.  Some of you may remember me posting to sci.crypt
quite some time ago, because the one thing I wasn't happy about was the
use of a probabilistic primality tester when there were completely
certain primality tests available (albeit a bit more expensive in cpu).
(especially since I didn't understand how the probabilistic one worked)

I see from a posting on sci.crypt today that the probabilistic tests
have been show to be possibly mildly weak in some infrequent cases.
Probably not worth worrying about, but still, it's a sobering thought.

The rest of the code I understood well enough to trust it, mostly :)

G
--
Personal mail to gtoal@gtoal.com (I read it in the evenings)
Business mail to gtoal@an-teallach.com (Be careful with the spelling!)
Faxes to An Teallach Limited: +44 31 662 4678  Voice: +44 31 668 1550 x212





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: nobody@cicada.berkeley.edu
Date: Fri, 5 Nov 93 20:17:52 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: information meter
Message-ID: <9311060416.AA07749@cicada.berkeley.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


From Bits and Bytes Online v1 #14:

>=> INFO METER. The "information meter" chip developed by Wave Systems
>can be installed in any computer and used to bill users for the amount
>of software and/or data they actually make use of. The chip costs
>less than $30. (Forbes 10/18 93, EDUPAGE 10/19/93)

Little brother is watching your computer!






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: hh@cicada.berkeley.edu
Date: Fri, 5 Nov 93 20:37:52 PST
To: zeek@io.com (zeek)
Subject: Re: Remailer Abuse?
In-Reply-To: <9311051540.AA27805@illuminati.IO.COM>
Message-ID: <9311060434.AA19801@cicada.berkeley.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


In message <9311051540.AA27805@illuminati.IO.COM>, zeek writes:
>What constitutes remailer abuse is my question.  I'm aware of the obvious
>reasons, but unclear about the details.  

Harassing other users is considered abuse, and sending chain letters is a
form of harassing other users.  However, it's not a very serious form of
abuse.  If I found conclusive evidence that someone were sending something
like childporn through my remailer, I would take some pretty drastic
actions.  Chainletters are just an annoyance.

>I suppose this question could be asked another way; what constitutes
>the *proper* use of a remailer?  Or; have clear guidelines been drawn for
>them?  

Well, there aren't any guidelines for the proper use.  The only things which
are improper uses are uses designed to make the Net a less friendly place by
harassing other users, and uses which I find morally unbearable, like
childporn or something like that.

Note that the only way I found out that you had sent that through my
remailer was because the mail bounced.  The only way I am aware of stuff
going through my remailer is stuff that bounces or when recipients of mail
complain.  I don't read logs; I wouldn't have time to do that if I had 30
hour days, and besides, most of it is encrypted anyway.

e




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: John Alden <72461.2150@CompuServe.COM>
Date: Fri, 5 Nov 93 19:12:36 PST
To: Cypherpunks <cypherpunks@toad.com>
Subject: Newsletter?
Message-ID: <931106030757_72461.2150_CHU53-1@CompuServe.COM>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Hi,

I heard you publish a newsletter - how can I get a copy?

TIA,

John Alden
PO 1492
Mercer Island, WA  98040





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: abootch@sfsuvax1.sfsu.edu (Bokum Bop Till You Drop)
Date: Fri, 5 Nov 93 23:47:54 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com (cypher)
Subject: pgp in the weirdest places!
Message-ID: <9311060745.AA13909@sfsuvax1.sfsu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Hello out there - 

A friend of mine recently bought a computer and I've spent the past
couple days with him setting it up and stuff. Anyways, I've come across
some interesting stuff in his fax/modem software. In converting a
word processing text into a format the fax recognizes, I got a weird
file that seemed to be encrypted in pgp or something - I'm not sure
since I haven't seen pgp run on dos. That was no big deal but when I
scanned through the converted text I found various messages about pgp.
Some of it was obviously from the readme files but there was some other
stuff about some other Hughes guy (btw, I'm a newbie, so...) that wasn't
Eric. I'm not that familiar with pc so I couldn't really help him so 
I'm calling on you guys. The software is called "Quick Link II" It
claims to be the "Next Generation in Communication Software" and 
seemingly so. Its from Smith Micro Software Inc. and its being run
on yer average 486 sx20. I'll post the converted texts if there's
interest but in the meanwhile I am highly confused!
-- 




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Eli Brandt <ebrandt@jarthur.Claremont.EDU>
Date: Sat, 6 Nov 93 01:52:37 PST
To: cypherpunks list <cypherpunks@toad.com>
Subject: Re: pseudospoofing ad nauseam
In-Reply-To: <9311060906.AA07563@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Message-ID: <9311060951.AA20006@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> there are these cypherpunks who have created an entire *religion* out
> of *defying* and *sabotaging* whatever identification scheme is
> invented.

Amen, brother L.

> do you think your bank, associates, or the government doesn't have
> a right to know who you are?

Nope.  They can have my unforgeable credentials, though.

   Eli   ebrandt@jarthur.claremont.edu




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "L. Detweiler" <ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Date: Sat, 6 Nov 93 01:07:54 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: pseudospoofing ad nauseam
Message-ID: <9311060906.AA07563@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



- another Mailing List
- the Fires in my Mailbox
- on the Unequivocal Distinction of Pseudoanonymity
- my Position and a Modest Proposal Crystallized
- an Open Letter to Criminals and Terrorists
- the Story of the Cyberspatial Lynch Mob
- on Pseudospoofing by the Eminent Leaders
- L. Detweiler's Complete Confession


another Mailing List
==

I would like to hear from any cypherpunks interested in starting
another mailing list. I unfortunately lack the resources to start one.
It seems to me there would be a strong interest in the following agenda:

- in favor of Democracy and experimenting with voting systems
- in favor of some form of Government, and some form of law enforcement
- in favor of experimenting with reputation schemes
- in favor of some identification systems, esp. to catch criminals
- in favor of a `movement' that includes political aspects
- in favor of a totally open, honest, representative, polite,
respectful, egalitarian dialogue
- in favor of systematic development and progress reports to others
- in favor of presenting a professional appearance to the public and media
- in favor of `some' restrictions on communications to limit criminality
- in favor of putting together protocols, RFCs, and FAQs for the world

- against Clipper or any involuntary encryption scheme
- against behind-the-scenes machinations (`conspiracies') or elitism
- against tax evasion
- against black marketeering
- against pseudospoofing and pseudoanonymity
- against other criminal behaviors like impersonation and forgery
- against routine hostility, secrecy, and flames
- against manipulating the media or individual ego-assuagement
- against people only interested in tedious debates or popularity contests

Above all, in favor of `using technology, especially cryptographic
techniques, to accomplish promote all of the above.'

I don't really know how many current cypherpunks would be interested in
this agenda. Judging by my mail, NONE! <g> But seriously, I think there
are some more `moderate' cypherpunks out there who would really love
this agenda, and their existence has long caused a lot of tension on
this list over the above points, when what is really happening is that
there is a tension in fundamentally incompatible goals and views
underneath it all, such that we could all be better served by better
`organization' (or perhaps `segragation' or `sequestration' <g>).

Regarding the above agenda: we should recognize that all great
technologies can be used for different purposes. The internet can be
used for honest communication between strangers, or it can be used to
manipulate people who naturally trust each other. We can develop
digital cash schemes that encourage tax evasion and black marketeering,
or they can enforce some taxation and discourage criminal behavior for
overall social harmony (quite like the system we currently live under).
Nothing is inevitable with passivity, everything is possible with activity!

As I recall, a long time ago, in a very hot flame war over the
Cypherpunks name involving all the great luminaries (E.Hughes, T.C.May,
P.Metzger, etc.) T.C.May ended up posting a message near the dying
embers of the flames that indicated some of the other names that he and
E.Hughes had tossed around. Does anyone have that message? Could you
send it to me? I thought there were some interesting names in there, as
I recall. I wouldn't want to take anyway from the existing cypherpunk
agenda in promoting something that was entirely incompatible with it
under the same name. The public and the media would certainly be
confused (as if they aren't already)! I was thinking -- maybe the
`cypherwonks'. (Ever hear about Bill Clinton being a `policy wonk'?) 

As for the mailing list, if anyone starts one I promise you my personal
cyberspatial allegiance as long as it sticks to this above agenda, and
humbly offer you all the things I have done on this list over about 10
months or so, like forwarding articles, summarizing views, `cypherwonk
awards', mini-newsletters, hot controversy, analysis of press reports,
Clipper & NSA flames, D.Denning ridicule <g>, etc. if you provide a
highly literate, polite, and professional audience.

Just imagine, all of you in the L. Detweiler Hate Society (the
membership has quite grown lately!) -- you could be freed of all the
flames here over everything I stand for! I'm *sure* you will appreciate that. <g>


the Fires in my Mailbox
==

yes, the flames in my mailbox have really died down. It's gone from

>I'm going to come and kill your family with a rusty razor blade.

to

>It would seem that, as you are a victim of such TERRIBLE CRIMES, your "RIGHT"
>has BEEN alienated someWHAT.

ah, I have to settle for what I can get, even if it is sarcastic.


on the Unequivocal Distinction of Pseudoanonymity
==

(So, because I am insane, I am writing more on the subject of
pseudospoofing, as more carrion for the amusement of vultures.)

It really astounds me how many people continue to write me email
obfuscating the distinction between anonymous/pseudonymous mail vs. pseudoanonymous.

In the former category, the identification in the message says or
implies, `this could be from *anyone*.' `passive concealment'.

In the latter, the identification implies, `this is from a real person
named [x], distinct from any other real people named [y].'

Also,  many continue to ignore the sheer dangers of this practice. If
anyone does not understand and has not seen my essay `The Joy of
Pseudospoofing', please email me and I will send it to you. (If you
have seen it, and continue to miss the point, well, I can't help you.
As Ann Landers says, seek professional counseling.)


my Position and a Modest Proposal Crystallized
==

I fear my position has been accidentally misrepresented on this list by
people who wish to understand pseudospoofing, or intentionally
obfuscated phantoms who wish to demonize me. (Once, a long time ago, I
flamed D.Denning with such searing ire on this list. T.C.May suggested
that `demonizing' anyone was counterproductive and impolite. Point well
taken! What goes around comes around!)

Here is what I propose for the Internet.

1) a *voluntary* system whereby people who want to `authenticate' their
identities can do so by registering with some form of identification.
2) identification servers could be formed that would service requests
in the form, `is identity [x] a real person?'
3) hence, people who choice to screen pseudospoofed identities from
their mailboxes have the choice of subscribing to a system that allows
them this freedom of choice.

Such a system, in my view, is NOT Draconian, NOT Orwellian, NOT against
the grain of the Internet, and actually feasible in practice. And, in
fact I think some form of this is *inevitable*. (and, believe it or
not, contrary to the brainwashing, this is *not* incompatible with
`true' or `pure' anonymity, which is quite another issue entirely.) Mr.
Finney suggested this scheme for `is a person' certificates many
messages ago. I fervently believe this system is going to be inevitable
because of its high social usefulness and desirability. I'll bet anyone
$1 in digital cash the most popular version of Cyberspace is going to
have at *least* this much.


an Open Letter to Criminals and Terrorists
==

Many people have been using all kinds of euphemisms for condoning
brutality in referring to pseudospoofing etc. `anyone who doesn't know
how the internet works deserves to learn the hard way.' `anyone who is
stupid enough not to recognize that pseudospoofing is a fact of life
should go somewhere else with padded walls and handholding, like Prodigy.' (etc.)

But all you vicious cypherpunks, recognize: the world is not as
unrefined and raw as you yourselves are, as much as you say it is and
wish it were. The greatest and most omnipresent technology is that
which is simple and incorruptable. The widespread public can be
frightened very easily! and will gravitate toward a system that
promotes trust and honesty, because they themselves crave trust and
honesty. it is a total fantasy if you think you are going to get away
with your imaginary identity arsenals in the future civilized
cyberspace. yes, there may be some bloody battles, but you are going to
lose. Or, at least, as I was telling an eminent member of EFF, if you
do not lose, and I have not died in the battle, I think I will commit suicide.

Inevitably, some of you are going to want to sabotage a system that
prevents pseudospoofing -- `because its there' -- even if doing so is
against the law. I am absolutely AGHAST how much raw criminality is
being disguised here in `the cryptographic revolution' and `privacy for
the masses' brainwashing. From my mail, a very strong representation of
cypherpunks are in favor of, perhaps routinely, FORGING things like
birth certificates etc. in the name of PRIVACY. this they disguise
under views like, `those damned Big Corporations and Government are
Evil, and we have to do everything we can to stop their oppression.'
uh, how exactly are you being oppressed? you look at the bountiful
fruits of our society and think you are being deprived? `whatever
system you will invent, someone will break it.'  well, yes, this is
like saying, `criminals exist.'

there are these cypherpunks who have created an entire *religion* out
of *defying* and *sabotaging* whatever identification scheme is
invented. Let it be signatures, checks, birth certificiates, drivers
licenses, social security, etc. How many cypherpunks are reincarnated
thieves, anyway? What society do you people live in, anyway? do you
think that checks with your True Name invade your privacy? do you think
your bank, associates, or the government doesn't have a right to know
who you are? (Uh, rhetorical question. I know the answer.)

I hold this as an AXIOM, an Inalienable Human Right: you do NOT have
the right to guarantee that another particular individual will read
your pseudospoofed postings. If they choose to develop a system that
filters it and do all their communication within it, I think you're out
of luck (yes, the technique of pseudoanonymity will always be possible
in frivolous amusement parks and other various quarantined playpens.)
If you think otherwise, well, I guess those bloody battles have already
started, haven't they?

Frankly, I think quite a few cypherpunks have seriously deluded
themselves about the basic nature of the Internet and the ultimate
desirability and likelihood of certain protocols (and their own
influence in manipulating them). The mail I have been getting is just
so far beyond reality, I can barely even respond to it. As (I think)
Linus Pauling once said after coming out of a talk, after prompted by a
student, `It wasn't even wrong'. This would not be a problem, but in my
view you cypherpunks, with your pseudospoofing, forgeries, and
sabotage, are really poisoning Cyberspace. Excuse me, I live here too,
and it is all choking me.


the Story of the Cyberspatial Lynch Mob
==

Here is one aspect of pseudospoofing I haven't really addressed yet publicly.

`As for people being tricked into seeing a consensus when one does not
exist, who cares?'

The person who asked me this was referring to a scenario like this.
Imagine that Medusa has grown quite a few snakes in cyberspace, and
uses them all in a single disinformation campaign. `who cares?'

To answer this, consider the psychology and anatomy of a lynch mob. In
frontier days, this was the notion of `criminal justice' -- a mob of
people would catch a criminal, supposedly the perpetrator of heinous
crimes. I suspect pseudo-trials went on even in these `mob societies'.
you see, a mob is often comprised of people with a slight glimmer of
conscience individually. A leader will often arise who manipulates that
doubt so that it is turned into vicious hatred, almost animal
brutality, to serve the aims of the public lynching.

`What did this man do?' the leader might ask, somewhat rhetorically.

`He stole my gold!' says one.

`He raped my wife!' says another.

`He murdered my brother!' says the other.

At this point, as you can imagine, the rest of the mob needs no further
motivation. If they are too impatient to watch the `criminal's' eyes
bulge out from the asphyxiating rope, or are in a particularly
vindictive mood, they might even rip or bludgeon the `criminal' to
oozing brains and blood, meat strips, and poking bones with their bare
hands, all with the barest encouragement like `what are we going to DO
ABOUT IT?' from the Leader.

Ah -- Justice is Served --

but what if the `Leader' is Medusa? And `one' is Snake #1, `another' is
Snake #2, and `the other' is Snake #3?


on Pseudospoofing by the Eminent Leaders
==

By the way, some people have said to me in email that E.Hughes and
T.C.May have publicly condemned pseudospoofing, or at least indicated
they have not ever practiced it, or at least they are not doing it
routinely,  or at least that they are not doing it at the moment, or at
least they hate the term `pseudospoof', or whatever. <g>

If so, please send me those messages. I missed them. (I have asked them
to post on the subject, but these letters invariably go unanswered.
They are exceedingly evasive in my private email. In fact, Mr. May said
that he was quite tired of my enthusiams, and I have so upset Mr.
Hughes that he has given me the great honor of putting me, alone, in
solitary confinement, into his kill file. `plonk!') The only statements
I have are the following:

``That which can never be enforced should not be prohibited. The claim
that a person should have only one pseudonym per forum indicates
profound misunderstanding.  If someone wants to have multiple ...
pseudonyms, they will be able to; that is one of the main goals of
cypherpunks software.  The situations you despise will occur.  This is
reality.  Change your own psychology or change your own software.  You
will not be able to change the other person.''
--E.Hughes, cofounder, Cypherpunks

``Better to live with the occasional vagaries of digital pseudonyms
than to ban them.''
--T.C.May, cofounder, Cypherpunks


L. Detweiler's Complete Confession
==

By the way, just to encourage others to come clean, express my good
will and sense of ethics to all the cypherpunks on this list, and
whiten my own conscience, following is my public posting of the list of
all the pseudoanonymous identities I have ever posted or emailed under:





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Cdt Pvt Dan Doughty <DOUGHTYD@Citadel.edu>
Date: Sat, 6 Nov 93 00:02:36 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: unsub
Message-ID: <01H4ZAE1IMYM8WW39Z@Citadel.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I've tried to normal unsub.  It didn't work.  Can someone please take me
off?  Thanks and sorry this had to go out.





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "L. Detweiler" <ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Date: Sat, 6 Nov 93 02:07:57 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: `the Dinkelacker matter'
Message-ID: <9311061004.AA08136@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Many people appear to have me confused with `S.Boxx'. I assure you, we
are two unique identities. Anyway, this all appears to have resulted
partly from H.Finney's posting a while back asking for help in
relieving me of my `mental anguish' and `mental suffering' as a
`personal favor' to bring me `piece of mind.'

>Larry believes that people have been communicating with him in private
>mail under multiple identities in order to confuse and mislead him.
>Specifically, he has suggested that Jamie Dinkelacker is a pseudonym
>employed by Tim May.  I gather that he has received email from both
>names.  He also suggests that others have employed these practices.

I'm not really sure where Mr. Finney got this impression -- perhaps
from private mail we traded. I definitely had some doubts about the
`Dinkelacker matter', partly in consideration of the (admittedly
bizarre) `S.Boxx' postings, as I stated publicly in response to his
post. But I (L. Detweiler!) haven't ever publicly accused Mr.
Dinkelacker of being anyone other than Mr. Dinkelacker, that I remember!

Anyway, an eminent cypherpunk was kind enough to clear up this
misunderstanding to me in email. I asked him to post to the list or to
sci.crypt, but to my knowledge it has not made it to either place so
far. Since this is an important matter and may have caused some other
cypherpunks some confusion, here is the *unequivocal* assurance that
Dinkelacker exists independent of T.C.May, and that the latter has
never posted under the identity of the former! (esp. given the eminent
reputation of this kind soul who has reassured me.)

I really appreciate this effort to help me in my own doubts, but also
let me assure everyone that (contrary to the person's suggestions) I am
not `clinging to a paranoid fantasy, adding layers of elaboration, and
as more evidence comes forward just adding layers upon layers,' `afraid
of the truth', `afraid to face the possibility you are wrong'

As far as all this pseudospoofing, it is something I would rather not
worry about, and I'm very hopeful that J. Helsingius will start a new
list where it is at least discouraged. I would like to see a new taboo
against it arise with the strength of those currently against network
censorship. In some quarters of the internet, the taboo against
pseudospoofing is actually there. Unfortunately, quite the opposite is
the case here, and it has indeed caused me some unpleasant and
unsettling doubts I would not even wish on my enemies. A new list would
certainly solve a lot of problems!

>I have to say that it's sad
>to see you screwing yourself up like this.  I hope you can get straight.

I really appreciate this person's concern and compassion, but even if
Mr. Dinkelacker was a snake of Medusa or a tentacle of a monster, I
certainly would not waste much time in `screwing myself up' over it. As
for my `reluctance to call Mr. May or Mr. Dinkelacker yourself' is not
due less to blind obstinacy than blase disinterist! (Although I'm not
sure how this person knew I hadn't called either -- but that's just my
paranoia speaking! <g>) Actually, Mr. May sent me mail stating that the
assertion that he had ever posted under J. Dinkelacker,
jamie@netcom.com, was `too bizarre to be believed', and I believe him.
I wasn't quite sure what he meant about his actual pseudospoofing
experience, though, and that's not really my business to comment on (I
asked him to post an unequivocal statement to the list, beyond his
initial satire, given the importance of the matter, which I have apparently missed).

(following slightly edited to preserve anonymity)

===cut=here===

Date: Tue, 26 Oct 93 09:49:42 PDT
From: [...]
To: ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu
Subject: Dinkelacker

Lance - For what it's worth, I called Jamie Dinkelacker on the phone yesterday.
He seemed to be a real person.  I had met Tim May a year or two ago (and
BTW, Tim looks just like his picture in Wired), and Dinkelacker 's  voice
seemed different from Tim's.  Tim had a deep voice (he's a big guy) while
Dinkelacker's was higher pitched.

We talked for about twenty minutes, and I was convinced that he was who he
claimed.  He is the former VP of Marketing for AMix, the American Information
Exchange, a spin-off from Autodesk (the CAD company) which I think went
out of business last year (maybe they're still around).  You might be able
to find some articles about AMiX from last year or the year before and they
might mention him.

Dinkelacker is active in nanotechnology circles there in the Bay area.  That
is how he met Tim.  He has never been to a CP meeting.  He mentioned a
couple of people who knew them both: Nick Szabo, who confirmed this to me
in email, and also Max More, whom I know personally.  Max is a grad student
at USC, where my [...] goes to school.  He is the founder of thee Extropian
movement, and publishes a twice-yearly journal called Extropy.  Max is a
really nice guy, soft-spoken and friendly.  He is originally from Ireland.
If you'd like his phone number, let me know.

This is about all I can offer you in terms of evidence for Dinkelacker's
independent existence.  It's up to you now.  You can cling to this paranoid
fantasy, adding layers of elaboration, saying that I must be a false identity,
Nick must be, this Max More must be (but then, who publishes Extropy?  You
can get back issues going back three years!), and as more evidence comes
forward you just add layers upon layers.

Or you can say to yourself, do I really have any basis for believing that
people are trying to mislead me in this way?  Who is my best candidate for
being a fake persona?  Let's investigate that one in detail.  Let's face
the truth.

If you're afraid of the truth, you're never going to find your way out of
fantasy.  Your reluctance to call Tim May and Jamie Dinkelacker directly
suggests to me that you don't really want to face the possibility that you
are wrong.  That's your decision to make, but I have to say that it's sad
to see you screwing yourself up like this.  I hope you can get straight.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Matthew J Ghio <mg5n+@andrew.cmu.edu>
Date: Sat, 6 Nov 93 07:57:58 PST
To: DOUGHTYD@Citadel.edu>
Subject: Re: unsub
In-Reply-To: <01H4ZAE1IMYM8WW39Z@Citadel.edu>
Message-ID: <UgqwVku00awJMJEUlf@andrew.cmu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


In "unsub", Cdt Pvt Dan Doughty <DOUGHTYD@Citadel.edu> wrote:

> I've tried to normal unsub.  It didn't work.  Can someone please
> take me off?  Thanks and sorry this had to go out.

When sending mail to cypherpunks-request, Eric has to read them and
alter the subscription requests himself, and sometimes he gets a few
days behind.  A little patience will save you from having to announce
your intent to depart to the entire list.  Thank you.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Carl Ellison <cme@sw.stratus.com>
Date: Sat, 6 Nov 93 08:07:58 PST
To: bontchev@fbihh.informatik.uni-hamburg.de
Subject: Re: Warning for PGP Users!
Message-ID: <199311061605.LAA05613@ellisun.sw.stratus.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>Each new
>version of PGP should contain a file with MD5 hashes of each of the
>source files, and the whole file with MD5 hash should be clearsigned
>by one of the developers (Branko, I think).

I checked the .tar file at soda.berkeley.edu and the sources have
several mismatching MD5s.  Is anyone looking at this?

 - Carl




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Johan Helsingius <julf@penet.fi>
Date: Sat, 6 Nov 93 01:32:37 PST
To: "L. Detweiler" <ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Subject: Re: pseudospoofing ad nauseam (actually: new list)
In-Reply-To: <9311060906.AA07563@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Message-ID: <199311060930.AA07312@mail.eunet.fi>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



> I would like to hear from any cypherpunks interested in starting
> another mailing list. I unfortunately lack the resources to start one.

If there is enough interest, I am willing to host it (using an automatic
listserver such as Majordomo - I already have it set up anyway...).

I do feel there is a need for a split, as the current list just keeps
oscillating between wildly different subtopics. But I am not sure about
what the right split would be...

	Julf (occasionally masquerading as an0@anon.penet.fi)





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Sandy <72114.1712@CompuServe.COM>
Date: Sat, 6 Nov 93 10:17:59 PST
To: <cypherpunks@toad.com>
Subject: HE'S BACK!
Message-ID: <931106181157_72114.1712_FHF107-1@CompuServe.COM>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
  SANDY SANDFORT               Reply to:  ssandfort@attmail.com
 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Punksters,

It's nice to see that Detweiler is back on his medications.
Let's hope he stays with the program.  I have no doubt he is
telling the truth when he says he and S.Boxx "are two unique
identities."  Yes Lance, but are they the same person?

I don't think any Cypherpunk will have any objections to his
voluntary name certification schemes.  On the other hand, most
Cypherpunks would probably consider it their *civic duty* to
attempt to discover the weaknesses in such protocols.  This is
called "destructive testing" in industry, and is a time honored
technique.

Lance, you will be a better writer, and will be taken much more
seriously if you, (a) tone down the purple prose, and (b) learn
some verbal economy.  You write far too much, and say far too
little.  Repetition is not a substitute for argumentation.

 S a n d y  (who is really just himself)  S a n d f o r t

>>>>>>    Please send e-mail to:  ssandfort@attmail.com    <<<<<<
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: jim@bilbo.suite.com (Jim Miller)
Date: Sat, 6 Nov 93 13:32:45 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: some newbie DC-net questions
Message-ID: <9311062129.AA16194@bilbo.suite.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



I'm a newcommer to DC-nets, so the following questions may sound funny to  
somebody that actually knows DC-nets...


1) What is happening on a DC-net when nobody is sending a message?  Is it  
simply issuing a stream of zeros?  Are "coins" being continuously flipped, even  
when no messages are being sent?

2) What does it look like (from a traffic flow perspective) when the DC-net  
transitions from no messages being sent to a message being sent?  The stream of  
zeros becomes and bunch of ones-and-zeros?

3) What happens when two members of a "table" attempt to transmit at the same  
time?  How is this case handled?

4) Are there any DC-net papers available for downloading via FTP?


Thanks,

Jim_Miller@suite.com




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: ferguson@icm1.icp.net (Paul Ferguson x2044)
Date: Sat, 6 Nov 93 12:47:59 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: (fwd) ViaCrypt PGP ships today
Message-ID: <9311062047.AA09612@icm1.icp.net>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text



I realize that this is a few days old, but I've been up to my 
eye-teeth with other network problems and using this dreary
Saturday afternoon to catch up on Net News.

Cheers.

Forwarded message:

> Newsgroups: alt.security
> From: hugh@gargoyle.uchicago.edu (Hugh Miller)
> Subject: ViaCrypt PGP ships today
> Message-ID: <hugh.752165605@gargoyle>
> Sender: news@uchinews.uchicago.edu (News System)
> Organization: University of Chicago -- Academic & Public Computing
> Date: Mon, 1 Nov 1993 14:53:25 GMT
> Lines: 61
> 
>     ViaCrypt, Inc., will begin shipping ViaCrypt PGP today, 1 November
> 1993.  ViaCrypt PGP is a commercial public-key encryption package which is 
> based on, and virtually identical with, the freeware program known as PGP, 
> or `Pretty Good Privacy.' (The source code is in fact identical to that of 
> the freeware version 2.3a of PGP, with the exception of the RSA encryption 
> module, which is one ViaCrypt developed in-house after acquiring a license 
> for the algorithm from PKPartners.  In addition, ViaCrypt incorporates a 
> few bug fixes.  The private-key crypto algorithm is IDEA, as in freeware 
> PGP, for which ViaCrypt has obtained a license from Ascom-Tech AG of Zurich.)  
> ViaCrypt bought its RSA license from PKP before either PKP or ViaCrypt knew
> that ViaCrypt would someday use it to sell PGP.  ViaCrypt later acquired 
> the rights to sell PGP from Phil Zimmermann.  I don't know what PKP thinks 
> of this state of affairs, but ViaCrypt's PKP license clearly allows them
> to sell PGP.
> 
>     Output is byte-for-byte identical with that of freeware PGP 2.3a, except 
> that the `Version' header atop the message body reads "Version: 2.4" 
> instead of "Version: 2.3a".  Keys, signature certificates, binary or 
> ASCII-armored ciphertexts, produced by one program will be identical to, 
> and transparently handled by, the other.  ViaCrypt PGP will (for now) be 
> available in the US and Canada only, pending any future relaxation of the 
> ITAR export control laws.  Phil Zimmermann says no compromises in the 
> cryptographic strength of PGP were made for ViaCrypt's version of PGP.
> 
>     The ViaCrypt PGP package include program disks (executables only, no 
> source code), user manual, and individual user license.  The current release 
> will be for MS-DOS only; ViaCrypt plans to ship a UNIX version soon. 
> Introductory price of a single user package is US$100.  (For purchases 
> of 20 units or more, a substantial discount -- price drops to about US$41 
> per user -- is available.)
> 
>     To purchase ViaCrypt PGP or to find out more about it, you can contact
> them as follows:
> 
>     ViaCrypt
>     2104 W. Peoria Ave.
>     Phoenix, AZ 85029 USA
>     602-944-0773 (Voice)
>     602-943-2601 (FAX)
>     70304.41@compuserve.com (Netmail)
> 
>     I have no connection with ViaCrypt, commercial or otherwise.  Indeed, I
> disagree in principle with the concept of algorithm patents.  I think, 
> though, that the net, and particularly users and admirers of the freeware 
> PGP deserve to hear about this.  Because ViaCrypt paid PKP for a 
> license, users of ViaCrypt can now utilize PGP with absolutely no fear of 
> lawsuit for patent infringement.  Since ViaCrypt will ship only in 
> USA/Canada, ITAR violations are not at issue.  This will enable the 
> PGP approach, with its decentralized distributed-trust key management, 
> to achieve crucial penetration into the corporate marketplace.  
> This will speed its acceptance as the de facto email crypto standard, 
> as opposed to other centralized or key-escrow schemes, like PEM or Clipper.  
> And ViaCrypt PGP will enable U.S. users to communicate completely legally 
> with non-U.S. users of PGP 2.3a.
> 
> -- 
> 
> Hugh Miller       | Asst. Prof. of Philosophy |  Loyola University Chicago
> FAX: 312-508-2292 |    Voice: 312-508-2727    |  hmiller@lucpul.it.luc.edu
> PGP 2.3A Key fingerprint: FF 67 57 CC 0C 91 12 7D  89 21 C7 12 F7 CF C5 7E
> 
> 

_____________________________________________________________________________
Paul Ferguson                                                               
Mindbank Consulting Group                                    fergp@sytex.com   
Fairfax, Virginia  USA                                       ferguson@icp.net



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Dark <unicorn@access.digex.net>
Date: Sat, 6 Nov 93 13:18:02 PST
To: ferguson@icm1.icp.net
Subject: Re:  (fwd) ViaCrypt PGP ships today
Message-ID: <199311062117.AA05991@access.digex.net>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



For some reason it occured to me that were CiaCrypt (oops, slip... sorry)
to want to provide an unsecure product to the general cryptography
public, the best way to do it would be to attack the security of the
secret key password.
To me, the fact that Phil Z. has vouched for the program is enough
for the moment.
If the key password were attacked, output would not be affected.

I'm sure this is no revelation to most of you.  As for the rest,
See how smart I am?

:)


-uni- (Dark)




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: ferguson@icm1.icp.net (Paul Ferguson x2044)
Date: Sat, 6 Nov 93 13:22:45 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Mark Abene (Phiber Optik) sentenced
Message-ID: <9311062120.AA09817@icm1.icp.net>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


forwarded message follows:


8<--------- cut here ------------

From: risks@csl.sri.com (RISKS Forum)
Newsgroups: comp.risks
Subject: RISKS DIGEST 15.22
Date: 6 Nov 93 01:57:47 GMT
Sender: daemon@ucbvax.BERKELEY.EDU
Reply-To: risks@csl.sri.com
 
 
Date: 04 Nov 93 17:37:14 EST
From: "Mich Kabay / JINBU Corp." <75300.3232@compuserve.com>
Subject:  Master of Disaster Phiber Optik sentenced
 
  Mark Abene, 21, widely known as Phiber Optik, was sentenced to a year and a
  day in prison.  He will serve 600 hours of community service.  He pleaded
  guilty last July to conspiracy, wire fraud and other federal charges
  relating to his activities as one of five Masters of Disaster indicted for
  breaking into telephone, educational, and commercial computer systems.
  [Perhaps in a few years more, they will be Doctors of Disaster?]  [PGN
  Excerpting Service, drawn from the Associated Press and Reuters, both on 3
  November 1993]
 
The Reuter article give background information, including
 
o the charges against MoD marked the first use of wiretaps to record both
  conversations and datacomm by accused hackers.
 
o the hackers attacked phone switching computers belonging to Southwestern
  Bell, New York Telephone, Pacific Bell, U.S. West and Martin Marietta
  Electronics Information and Missile Group.
 
o they broke into credit-status reporting companies including TRW, Trans
  Union and Information America, stealing at least 176 TRW credit reports.
 
o the young men were apparently competing with each other and other
  hacker groups for "rep" (reputation) and were also interested in
  harassing people they didn't like.
 
o the Reuter article mentions that "they wiped out almost all of the
  information contained on a system operated by the Public Broadcasting
  System affiliate in New York, WNET, that provided educational
  materials to schools in New York, New Jersey and Connecticut" and
  left the message, ""Happy Thanksgiving you turkeys, from all of us at MOD."
 
Michel E. Kabay, Ph.D., Director of Education, National Computer Security Assn
 

8<---------- cut here ---------

Cheers.
_____________________________________________________________________________
Paul Ferguson                                                               
Mindbank Consulting Group                                    fergp@sytex.com   
Fairfax, Virginia  USA                                       ferguson@icp.net




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Jim McCoy <mccoy@ccwf.cc.utexas.edu>
Date: Sat, 6 Nov 93 14:58:02 PST
To: Jim_Miller@suite.com
Subject: Re: some newbie DC-net questions
In-Reply-To: <9311062129.AA16194@bilbo.suite.com>
Message-ID: <199311062256.AA00524@tramp.cc.utexas.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text


> 1) What is happening on a DC-net when nobody is sending a message?  Is it  
> simply issuing a stream of zeros?  Are "coins" being continuously
> flipped, even when no messages are being sent?

Yes.  Lots of zeros.  Generally one would probably have a low traffic
"carrier" of zeros and then once traffic starts the system would ramp up to
a higher traffic/fast throughput system.

> 2) What does it look like (from a traffic flow perspective) when the DC-net  
> transitions from no messages being sent to a message being sent?  The
> stream of zeros becomes and bunch of ones-and-zeros?

Generally one would have a signal that when boradcast by someone indicates
that they have the token for speaking and things progress from there.  It
is basically a distributed ring network (because of the lack of true
broadcasting over any distance) and so it will follow the standard methods
and protocols for networks of that type.

> 3) What happens when two members of a "table" attempt to transmit at the
> same time?  How is this case handled?

They will get a collision.  If an even number of members transmit at once
then the bit will be the opposite of what each expects to see, if an odd
number then it will be an undetected collision.  There are fairly standard
protocols for backdown on distributed broadcast networks.


> 4) Are there any DC-net papers available for downloading via FTP?

ftp.cc.utexas.edu:/pub/cypherpunks/dc-nets  there is the chaum paper and
tim mays general outline; both were posted to the list a while back.  Once i
get motivated i will write up an outline of a proposed implementation for
mail passing I am going to try to get running to use to test the concept
and hack out any bugs...

jim



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: jdblair@nextsrv.cas.muohio.EDU
Date: Sat, 6 Nov 93 13:58:04 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: name for hardware list...
Message-ID: <9311062216.AA20823@ nextsrv.cas.muohio.EDU >
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

Hey, y'all...

The response to the proposal for the punk hardware list was overwhelming (or
at least far beyond expectations).  I will get it set up hopefully on Monday,
or Tuesday at the latest of next week.  I just have to get my sysadmin to
get moving and set of the list on the ListProcessor.

There is a minor problem, which I want to spend very little time worrying about,
concerning the name of the list.

All I've come up with is the boring "punk hardware" or "punkware", or the
cryptic "punk-net."  The punk-net name derives from the discussion of an
underground, wireless net (which got me interested in forming the list) but I
think that discussion about that net will probably be a minor part of the list.

Perhaps we should get away from the "punk*" naming scheme-- I don't know.

Let me know what you think it should be called... I'll determine the name by
a psuedo-democratic process (I'll use the name that's proposed the most, unless
 I think there's a better one.).

So, let me know what you think it should be called, but let me know soon-- when 
it's on-line I'll post info on how to subscribe.

rave on,
- -john.

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/fpawVKB/gsa1s3EMbXbL73XYH5u4chuNav84ZLobpqLJjfECO38FA==
=JrAe
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From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: plaz@netcom.com (Geoff Dale)
Date: Sat, 6 Nov 93 17:12:50 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Blacknet in WIRED
Message-ID: <199311070112.RAA23954@mail.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Did everyone catch the Blacknet reference in WIRED 1.5? P.32 in the central
item. Check it out!

_______________________________________________________________________
Geoff Dale    -- insert standard disclaimers here --    plaz@netcom.com
               "We are the shock troops of reality."
                - Voice of the Friends (Wild Palms)






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Mark W. Eichin" <eichin@paycheck.cygnus.com>
Date: Sun, 7 Nov 93 18:48:14 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: tapping hardware? (was re: Mark Abene (Phiber Optik) sentenced)
In-Reply-To: <9311062120.AA09817@icm1.icp.net>
Message-ID: <9311062339.AA18639@paycheck.cygnus.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



>> o the charges against MoD marked the first use of wiretaps to record both
>>   conversations and datacomm by accused hackers.
	This I find quite interesting... As a guess, if I were to
attempt such monitoring, I would start with a pair of off-the-shelf
modems, but I don't know the details of modern compression (v.42) or
wire encodings to know how easy that would be to make work...
	Anyone have more details on how the tap was accomplished?

				_Mark_ <eichin@paycheck.cygnus.com>
				... just me at home ...





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: pierre@shell.portal.com (Pierre Uszynski)
Date: Sat, 6 Nov 93 20:12:48 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: some newbie DC-net questions
Message-ID: <9311070412.AA14773@jobe.shell.portal.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> From: Jim McCoy <mccoy@ccwf.cc.utexas.edu>
> 
> > 3) What happens when two members of a "table" attempt to transmit at the
> > same time?  How is this case handled?
> 
> They will get a collision.  If an even number of members transmit at once
> then the bit will be the opposite of what each expects to see, if an odd
> number then it will be an undetected collision.  There are fairly standard
> protocols for backdown on distributed broadcast networks.
> 

Actually, it seems to me undetected collisions are not as likely as this
makes it appear: Every person trying to transmit is monitoring
at the same time to make sure the message they transmit does appear in
the "sum of differences". If you tried to transmit and any bit comes out
wrong, it's that there was a collision. Only an odd number of completely
identical messages transmitted at the same time would appear as one
un-collided message. Of course, if you are only considering very short
messages (like 1 bit answers to questions) you are looking for trouble...
but if you are sending around longer messages similar to email, then
un-noticed collisions are unlikely because messages include signatures
and such.

When you detected that your message collided, typically, you stop
transmitting. You then decide on a random time delay, wait for that
duration and try again if the way is clear (all zeroes carrier).

Pierre.
pierre@shell.portal.com




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: an41418@anon.penet.fi (wonderer)
Date: Sat, 6 Nov 93 14:02:47 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: some newbie DC-net questions
Message-ID: <9311062158.AA07250@anon.penet.fi>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

Thank you Jim. I have been wondering about these questions
myself. Especially #4. Anybody?


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=Zb+C
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-------------------------------------------------------------------------
To find out more about the anon service, send mail to help@anon.penet.fi.
Due to the double-blind, any mail replies to this message will be anonymized,
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From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Matthew J Ghio <mg5n+@andrew.cmu.edu>
Date: Sat, 6 Nov 93 19:18:05 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: (fwd) ViaCrypt PGP ships today
In-Reply-To: <199311062117.AA05991@access.digex.net>
Message-ID: <Qgr6VSm00awKE5EUZK@andrew.cmu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> For some reason it occured to me that were CiaCrypt (oops, slip... sorry)
> to want to provide an unsecure product to the general cryptography
> public, the best way to do it would be to attack the security of the
> secret key password.
> To me, the fact that Phil Z. has vouched for the program is enough
> for the moment.
> If the key password were attacked, output would not be affected.

I don't see how this would be of much help tho.  Putting a weakness in
the secret key password wouldn't help them much since they don't have
your secret key.  Furthermore, they couldn't easily change it without
making it incompatible with previous keys.  If I wanted to subtly weaken
PGP, I'd do it by weakening the randomness of the IDEA cipher key,
making it significantly easier to guess, by choosing a "random" key
based on something known, such as the legnth of the message or the date
it was encrypted, which would provide seemingly random encryption, but
actually make it easy to break if you knew the pattern.  I'm not saying
that anyone did that, but that's where I would start if I wanted to
sabotage it...




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: an41418@anon.penet.fi (wonderer)
Date: Sat, 6 Nov 93 15:42:47 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: some newbie DC-net questions
Message-ID: <9311062341.AA17127@anon.penet.fi>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


How do you implement people seeing their neighbors
coin, but nobody else seeing it? Does it require
a secure channel between every adjacent person?

Wonderer
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
To find out more about the anon service, send mail to help@anon.penet.fi.
Due to the double-blind, any mail replies to this message will be anonymized,
and an anonymous id will be allocated automatically. You have been warned.
Please report any problems, inappropriate use etc. to admin@anon.penet.fi.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Mike Ingle <MIKEINGLE@delphi.com>
Date: Sat, 6 Nov 93 22:58:05 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Real-world digicash
Message-ID: <01H50ID1IWXU9AN48T@delphi.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I've been reading digicash papers lately, and it appears there are three
approaches to preventing double-spending:

1) Catch the cheater after the fact, by matching up two copies of the
   same coin in such a way as to reveal his identity. This requires a
   challenge-response sequence between the user and the shop.

2) Combine (1) with an observer, a piece of secure hardware which
   signs transfers and prevents double spending.

3) Use an online server which checks off coins as they are spent.

After-the-fact detection probably won't fly, because organized multiple
spending could kill it. There are people who are dumb enough to write
their PIN numbers on their ATM cards. Such people will also be careless
with their digicash and any secret keys used to protect it. A thief could
compromise a few coins belonging to such careless people, distribute
them to a network of many thieves, and spend them hundreds of times before
being detected. This would make the shops either abandon digicash or
refuse to deliver merchandise until the coins cleared the bank, making it
effectively an online system. Using this type of digicash over the net
would be particularly troublesome. A person receiving a double-spent coin
would be in the same situation as a person receiving a bad check from
another state. Legally, he has all kinds of rights. Practically, he is
flat out of luck. It will cost him more to take action than the amount
of the coin or check.
 
Observer-based protocols can protect privacy. All data going to and from
the observer is blinded by the user's software so the observer cannot
learn anything about the user. The design of the observer can be public;
the only secret in the observer is a key. Observer-based protocols also
include the after-the-fact detection, so anyone who cracked his observer
(i.e. extracted the secret key) would still be caught later. To cheat,
you would have to steal someone else's observer, extract the key, and use
it. If the time required to crack an observer was longer than what it
would take a person to notice and report his stolen observer, fraud would
be uncommon. Because the observer is hard to crack, it would be much like
counterfeiting paper money: possible, but requiring a large organization
to be profitable. Such an organization would be susceptible to traditional
methods of law enforcement.

Since observers require hardware, this method cannot easily be used on a
guerrilla basis. The banking industry could do it, but since people are
willing to use credit cards, which are online, insecure, and a
dossier-builder's dream, there is no particular motive for the banks
to create such a system. Most people, if surveyed, will say that they
are concerned about their privacy. But when made to choose between
privacy and convenience, they choose convenience.

That leaves online digicash as the most practical system for use on the
net right now. Online digicash will probably be the only system
trustworthy enough for large transactions in any case. Are there any
published online systems which include strong privacy and which allow
multiple banks/servers? NetCash does not provide strong anonymity;
the user has to trust the coin issuer not to record who gets which coins.
An investigator could go to the coin issuer and demand that the issuer
track a particular user's coins.

--- MikeIngle@delphi.com
  




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "George A. Gleason" <gg@well.sf.ca.us>
Date: Sun, 7 Nov 93 02:02:50 PST
To: jazz@hal.com
Subject: Re:  ID of anonymous posters via word analysis?
Message-ID: <199311070959.BAA13037@well.sf.ca.us>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I'm not so sure about translation software... apparently there is a story
about the first time this was attempted; an NSA implementation for use on
the US-USSR hot line, to speed things along in the event of a crisis.

When they opened the thing up for test, there was a diplomat at each end,
and a top military official as well.  At the US end, they typed in, "The
spirit is willing but the flesh is weak."  Then it popped out in Russian,
and was typed back in again in Russian.  What popped back out in Washington
in English was, "The ghost is ready but the meat is raw."  Back to the
proverbial drawing board.  

Presumably things have improved a bit since then, eh...?

-g




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: szabo@netcom.com (Nick Szabo)
Date: Sun, 7 Nov 93 02:03:05 PST
To: MIKEINGLE@delphi.com (Mike Ingle)
Subject: Mostly Offline Digicash
In-Reply-To: <01H50ID1IWXU9AN48T@delphi.com>
Message-ID: <199311071002.CAA13037@mail.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Mike Ingle:
> After-the-fact detection probably won't fly, because organized multiple
> spending could kill it. There are people who are dumb enough to write
> their PIN numbers on their ATM cards.

Nevertheless, millions use ATM cards, with substantially less loss to
fraud than with credit cards.  Improvement in privacy and reduction
of incidence of fraud over credit cards are sufficient goals for a 
digital cash system.

For Pretty Good Digicash, which would probably far exceed those
goals, how about a "mostly offline" system as follows:

* Modify offline cash to be "stochastically online", so that
1 out of every N coin transactions are checked for double spending 
online, and the remainder of the coins are kept offline.  The chances 
of getting away with K+1-spending a coin are (1-1/N)^K.  The chances of 
getting away with K+1-spending each of M different coins are (1-1/N)^MK.
In general, with a fixed upper limit on coin denominations, the chances of
getting caught at the scene of double-spending increase exponentially
with the amount double-spent.  This means penny-ante fraud will
be easy to get away with (at the scene), but large scale fraud
quickly becomes impractical.  This also means that most 
low-value transactions will be offline and most high-value
transactions online.   Note that above formulae are the odds
of getting the goods before being caught.  Even if by chance all
coins are kept offline during the fraudulent transactions, the odds
of two making it back to the bank increase exponentially
with the number of times they change hands.  Thus even penny-ante
double-spenders will soon be caught, with odds quickly approaching 
certainty, after the fact.  The double-spender's 'nym is then 
revealed, and its reputation damaged or destroyed.

* N is the credit rating of the customer. 'Nyms with good,
solid credentials and/or long-standing reputations can be trusted 
to spend large amounts of digital cash per online check.
New 'nyms, 'nyms with bad credit ratings, and anonymous spenders 
have lower N and are thus checked more often.  Attempting
to defraud via rapid turnover of penny-ante double-spending
'nyms won't pay, because the odds of a new 'nym getting caught
online can be placed as high as needed to make this strategy a loser.

At the first sign of double-spending, or if other signs of
bad credit accumulate, credit rating N is lowered for the customer.  
N should be set by credit rating agencies so that
(Max coin denomination)*MK*(1-1/N)^MK is less than the 'nym's
accumulated "reputation capital", so that it does not pay to build a 
reputation and then "cash in the reputation chips" with a spectacular 
act of digicash fraud.  Since the reputation capital of most customers
will dwarf the average size of their purchases, in practice
the vast majority of purchases will be offline, with only
a few (mostly large) purchases held up for online verification
(which need not take any longer than online verification of
credit cards today).

I envision a decentralized credit-rating system, so that the
integrity of ratings cannot be jeopardized by corrupting one or a 
related few credit rating agencies with false information.  (The IP 
paradigm: an economy should be able to route around node failures).

Nick Szabo				szabo@netcom.com
HEx symbol: N  :-)




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Dark <unicorn@access.digex.net>
Date: Sat, 6 Nov 93 23:38:05 PST
To: mg5n+@andrew.cmu.edu
Subject: Re: (fwd) ViaCrypt PGP ships today
Message-ID: <199311070733.AA12593@access.digex.net>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



->

I don't see how this would be of much help tho.  Putting a weakness in
the secret key password wouldn't help them much since they don't have
your secret key.  Furthermore, they couldn't easily change it without
making it incompatible with previous keys.  If I wanted to subtly weaken

<--

oh,  yeah.

I knew that.


-uni- (Dark)




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Mike Godwin <mnemonic@eff.org>
Date: Sun, 7 Nov 93 07:03:11 PST
To: ferguson@icm1.icp.net (Paul Ferguson x2044)
Subject: Re: Mark Abene (Phiber Optik) sentenced
In-Reply-To: <9311062120.AA09817@icm1.icp.net>
Message-ID: <199311071502.AA00947@eff.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


 
Paul Ferguson reports on the MOD case:

> The Reuter article give background information, including
<text deleted>
>  
> o the young men were apparently competing with each other and other
>   hacker groups for "rep" (reputation) and were also interested in
>   harassing people they didn't like.
  
Reuters doesn't mention, for some reason, that these defendants,
and Mark Abene in particular, were primarily motivated by the desire to
learn about the systems they were using.

> o the Reuter article mentions that "they wiped out almost all of the
>   information contained on a system operated by the Public Broadcasting
>   System affiliate in New York, WNET, that provided educational
>   materials to schools in New York, New Jersey and Connecticut" and
>   left the message, ""Happy Thanksgiving you turkeys, from all of us at MOD."

No MOD defendant has admitted to doing this. In fact, it seems certain
that this particular act was committed by a rival who wanted to frame the
MOD members.


--Mike






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: hfinney@shell.portal.com
Date: Sun, 7 Nov 93 11:12:53 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Real-world digicash
Message-ID: <9311071909.AA04142@jobe.shell.portal.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

I agree with Mike Ingle's points re NetCash.  I had some pretty strong
criticisms of their proposal when it first came out.  They didn't seem
too familiar with the literature on digital cash.  Their system was more
like cashier's checks than cash.  The anonymity was not strong.

Nick has some interesting ideas re the use of "reputation capital" to
discourage double-spending of dcash.  You wouldn't want to destroy your
reputation by cheating on a small sum of money, not if the reputation
was one which you had built up over a period of time.

In considering these ideas, there are a lot of questions about the
whole infrastructure in which the dcash is being used.  Is this something
which we would see occuring in the near future, the next couple of years,
in which case current systems of electronic communication would be used?
In that case, we might imagine people purchasing items via the more
progressive on-line services, like the new MUD-based systems people
are working on (metaverse, virtual city, ...).  Or companies might simply
advertise items for sale on the internet and accept orders by email or
perhaps TCP connection.

One technical detail is that dcash systems require a multi-step protocol
for spending and withdrawal.  This would make email orders more difficult
to deal with since mail would have to bounce back and forth.  Actually,
Chaum's simplest dcash scheme has a one-step protocol for spending (just
send the cash), but that requires on-line verification.  TCP connections
can handle the back-and-forth very quickly so that may be a preferred
communications method.

Today, most credit card transactions do an on-line check, so I don't think
that on-line systems should be ruled out, although eventually a dedicated
network separate from the internet would probably be needed.  The total
data transfer per transaction is not large, a few hundred bytes.

One question in considering whether double-spending is likely to be a
problem is whether bank accounts are anonymous.  One possible system
is for bank accounts to be non-anonymous, but for transactions to be
untraceable.  Then if someone double-spends the cheating is traced, not
to a "nym", but to a real person.  (There is still the possibility Mike
raised of stealing someone's cash, similar to how you might steal someone's
PGP secret key today, but perhaps this will not occur often enough to
be a problem.)

In this case you don't have to have an infrastructure of reputations and
credit ratings in order to use the cash.  Nick's idea sounds like it would
take some time to develop.  Our hundreds of years of experience in giving
credit will require some readjustement to a world in which "nyms" can
disappear much more easily than physical people can.

Another technical detail with the two forms of digital cash that I am
more familiar with, Chaum's on-line and off-line systems from his Crypto
88 paper, is that even the off-line system requires the vendor to communicate
with the bank for every transaction.  He has to send in the spent cash, as
well as the results of his protocol with the customer, for every piece of
cash he gets.  The difference is that he doesn't have to do it right away.
So this off-line system will actually require more bandwidth for communication
with the bank than Chaum's on-line system would (because of the extra
transaction information that has to be sent).

It seems that on-line and off-line cash systems both have pros and cons.
Initially my feeling is that an on-line system might be preferable because
there is less need for trust between the parties involved.  Each person
checks at each stage to make sure he is not being cheated.  There is no
need for a legal system to prove double-spending and force cheaters to make
good.  The protocols are much simpler and easier to understand.  And the
bandwidth requirements are less.  The main disadvantage is the need for
enough redundancy in the bank to allow continual accessibility, although
even this would not be an issue for purchases which are delivered after
a delay, typical of electronic purchases today.

Hal Finney
hfinney@shell.portal.com

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From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Perry E. Metzger" <pmetzger@lehman.com>
Date: Sun, 7 Nov 93 08:48:10 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: ID of anonymous posters via word analysis?
In-Reply-To: <199311070959.BAA13037@well.sf.ca.us>
Message-ID: <9311071646.AA04416@snark.lehman.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Astonishing how far urban legends go. This keeps getting distorted
further and further. I've heard this go further and further and
further from the version I first heard. I wonder if there ever was a
real story to begin with.

Perry

"George A. Gleason" says:
> I'm not so sure about translation software... apparently there is a story
> about the first time this was attempted; an NSA implementation for use on
> the US-USSR hot line, to speed things along in the event of a crisis.
> 
> When they opened the thing up for test, there was a diplomat at each end,
> and a top military official as well.  At the US end, they typed in, "The
> spirit is willing but the flesh is weak."  Then it popped out in Russian,
> and was typed back in again in Russian.  What popped back out in Washington
> in English was, "The ghost is ready but the meat is raw."  Back to the
> proverbial drawing board.  
> 
> Presumably things have improved a bit since then, eh...?
> 
> -g




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Alan Barrett <barrett@daisy.ee.und.ac.za>
Date: Sun, 7 Nov 93 02:33:27 PST
To: Carl Ellison <cme@sw.stratus.com>
Subject: Re: Warning for PGP Users!
In-Reply-To: <199311061605.LAA05613@ellisun.sw.stratus.com>
Message-ID: <Pine.3.03.9311071239.m459-a100000@daisy.ee.und.ac.za>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> I checked the .tar file at soda.berkeley.edu and the sources have
> several mismatching MD5s.  Is anyone looking at this?

Yes, the PGP 2.3A distribution has incorrect MD5 values in
contrib/md5sum/pgp23.md5. I think that they were not updated to acount for
the changes between versions 2.3 and 2.3A. 

Nevertheless, the file pgp23sigA.asc (which is distributed separately from
the .tar.Z and .zip files) contains good detached signatures from Colin
Plumb, covering the various .zip and .tar.Z files for PGP 2.3A.  

--apb (Alan Barrett)







From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: szabo@netcom.com (Nick Szabo)
Date: Sun, 7 Nov 93 13:38:12 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Commercial aspects of digital cash
Message-ID: <199311072137.NAA27470@mail.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Here's my attempt to explain the practical commercial aspects of 
digital cash on imp-interest@thumper.bellcore.com:


Rob Raisch questions digital cash by pointing out the many problems
with issuing credit over the net.  What's missing is that digital 
cash is not credit.  It is cash, unforgeable, signed by a reputable
bank.  The customer cannot obtain such cash without presenting
whatever credentials are necessary to join the bank, and the bank 
takes any risk involved in trusting those credentials.  Cf. Chaum & 
colleague papers for the protocols.  Thus, no physical identity is 
needed by the vendor, just as none is needed for physical cash
purchases.

Thus, 

> 	- Monetary transactions require hard identity to cover risk.

True for credit transactions, untrue for cash.  For customers
without physical identity, the the cash's integrity is verified with 
real-time connection to the issuing bank before the goods are 
delivered (much like credit cards are verified today, except 
that we're checking the signature of the bank that issued the cash,
not the ID of the customer).

> 	- Risk can be offset by charging a fee for each transaction.

The risk of digital cash fraud is much lower than for credit cards, 
ATMs, and even physical cash (which can be forged and stolen much 
more easily than digital cash).

> 	- On the Internet, there is no hard physical identity.

Quite true, and it is also quite impractical to insist, as Mr.
Detweiler does, that the Internet be radically changed to facilitate it.  

It is possible to build up a system of reputation for "soft" identities,
so that digital signatures with unforgeable credentials and/or well
developed credit ratings can be extended limited amounts of
credit, but such a system will take time to develop and get used
to.  I've described a combination offline cash/reputation system which 
gives extremely low rates of fraud, which I can post if there's 
interest, but it's probably better to start off with the online digital 
cash system which also gives very low rates of fraud, is simpler and 
doesn't require any credit ratings for digital signatures.

> 	- Data cannot be protected because it lacks a physical identity.

Not at all true.  Encryption, digital signatures, and variations
of these can be used to protect data in a wide variety of ways,
typically superior to protecting the integrity of physical objects
(photo IDs, cash, etc.).  The difference is that on the net, 
the signature itself becomes an identity with its own reputation.
This requires a change in the way we view commercial credit risk
as we become more at home in the net,  but it is not inherently less 
trustworthy or "subversive" (love ya, Mr. Detweiler) than physical
identity (which is also just based on information, the imperfect
information of our senses, which can be spoofed in various ways).

Keeping mind it is not necessary to trust such signatures
for online digital cash: the customer's identity doesn't matter,
and the bank's signature can be checked online.

Conclusion: Issuing credit over the net is, for the near future, a can 
of worms.  Even just verifying credit entails the high fraud, lack of 
ubiquity, and lack of privacy of credit cards.  Lack of hard identitity, 
thousands of legal jurisdictions criss-crossed by the net, etc. make net 
credit very risky.  Take the trouble to implement digital cash.  With
significant volume it will soon pay for itself in much lower, even very
close to zero, rates of fraud.

Nick Szabo				szabo@netcom.com




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Anonymous <nowhere@bsu-cs.bsu.edu>
Date: Sun, 7 Nov 93 12:52:54 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Mirrorshades & Prosody
Message-ID: <9311072050.AA04405@bsu-cs.bsu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



ABOUT MIRRORSHADES & PROSODY
************************************************************************
by Keith Eluard
 
FAQs with a bit of Technical Info buried inside...
 
1.	What are Mirrorshades & Prosody? and Why?
 
	Mirrorshades and Prosody are my babies - a pair of text
	generation/revision programs that I developed to suit my needs
	as a creative pump to force me to use more vibrant and evocative
	images in my writings. They originally started as a
	semi-intelligent thesaurus on my Commodore 64 (which I still use
	...as a printer controller). If I were to enter the word "bird",
	I would have spat back at me a few dozen choices such as "black
	bird" or "the blue bird of happiness that flew up my left nostril".
	Anyway, I kept messing with it and eventually ported it out onto
	a NeXT, where I also was using a wonderful language known as
	cmusic to generate musical sequences and sounds.
 
	Then an evil idea occurred to me. If language is related to music,
	then a music tool could be used to create a language tool of a
	similar nature...Why Not!
	
	The first program was what would later become Mirrorshades. It
	wrote haiku.
	
	nothing but haiku
	
	lots of haiku
	
	1,768,669 haiku, to be exact.
	
	Then it ran out of possible word combinations that fit its
	algorithms (more later)
	
	That bit o' code was called "basher" (in dadaist mockery of
	Basho) and was slapped onto indyvax.iupui.edu by a few friends
	(a copy might be around there still...). It had quite a few
	things in it I didn't like, so I revised it to fix its problems
	and what I thought were problems...
	
	Then a lovely group of people sent me a note called SUNDEVIL...
	((I'm still paying for that Mac... <contributions welcome>))
	
	It was at that time I decided that encryption is A GOOD THING and
	bought into PGP. Not a bad cypher, but it could be better...
	
	That's where Prosody came from - a bulletproof adaptation of PGP
	into an encryption that I DARE ANYONE to decode (& if you do,
	may I please drool over your machine, pretty please...). It revises
	an existing text to a degree specified by the user. If the word
	"bird" is entered, it might spit back "black bird" or it might
	spit back "a silly gesture" depending on its settings. The
	original text is preserved electronically in its original form,
	but encoded using a strange attractor. So if you see the text
	block:
 
		it snores in the simple tank. its pipe pesters the mud.
		its hot glove is full of meaning.
 
	you have to decide if I'm being weird or using Prosody to send
	an encrypted post. And it can't be decoded except by using
	Prosody to revise the received message at the appropriate setting
	or else you get weirdness of a similar nature back at you.
	Combine this with traditional encryption and viola! Privacy at
	its finest and easiest.
 
	But Mirrorshades uses the same algorithms to search a database of
	words (the text pool) and generate a surreal style all its own:
 
		rubbing her sable with long thoughtful fingers. skimming
		the curdles of the dream. his eyes, dull and tired, like
		grape seeds. gravy stains from the previous tenant.
		motific clouds. a summer shaped like a hot dog, and its
		rungs of sunlight. nails--no two bent the same way.
 
 
2.	How exactly does it work?
 
	Both programs use iterative mathematics to search databases of
	words classified by 1)part of speech, 2)connotative meaning,
	3)association to other words, 4)metrical value & common
	pronunciation, and 5)established user preferences (it can be
	taught to write really messed up love poems, if you'd like).
	In Prosody, most of the algorithms are strange or chaotic
	attractors with a few Julia curves thrown in for good measure
	driving a probability engine in the form of a set of distribution
	curves set up in a way reminiscent of cmusic algorithmic
	composition programs. As a result, it flows very well when
	spoken aloud (wink, wink, nudge, nudge, you voice synthesis
	developers <especially those involved with singing simulation>...).
	
	Mirrorshades does somewhat of the same thing, except that it
	uses the intersections of strange attractors, distributed
	pseudo-random number generators, various fractal curves, and
	formal rules to create semi-surreal, lucid dreaming images
	(I was inspired by Wm Gibson's work in _Mirrorshades_,
	an anthology of first wave cyberpunk authors ed. by Bruce Sterling)
	that fit a series of preferences that could be called poems.
	That is, if you want a sonnet you can get a sonnet. If you want
	a really f8nky paragraph on gravity to lead off a chapter in a
	physics textbook you're working on, you could get that too.
	
	In short, I was setting out to create the most flexible writing
	tool I could. I think I've come close.
 
3.	Is it commercial?
 
	What do you think!!! No, actually it's shareware with a pricing
	structure like this: if you request a copy as an *.edu user from
	now until 1 December, it's free. After that, it's available at
	the *.com user price of $10 to receive the code key to unlock a
	copy. I'm still not sure if I want to let any *.gov types have it
	yet, but if they're nice to me...we'll see. Hacked copies are
	worthless - it comes out as a really screwed up epic poem (when
	I tried hacking it, it was about an umbrella and a sewing machine
	--I heard great grandpa Eluard rolling in his grave). You have to
	use the appropriate code key for that copy of the program or my
	shipping backdoor (no, it won't open messages created with it,
	just the copy I give you...).
	
	I think it's a reasonable pricing structure. If you don't, please
	tell me through keithwriters @ delphi.com.
 
4.	When will these programs be available?
 
	That depends on your function in the universe. If you are a sysop at
	a university with a respected Creative Writing program, advance
	copies for your Net will be made available. The same with industry
	magazines (computer science, cyberculture, artificial intelligence,
	iterative math, etc... but not $5/issue advertisements like @(*# or
	&@ (##% posing as "true sources of NEW information" on computers
	when they're actually rehashing stuff thought of and started in
	the '50s...yes, it's a torchy kind of thing for me...). User copies
	will be sent via e-mail or to designated FTP sites for downloading
	by 1 December. Pre-release registration materials will be sent to
	requestors around Thanksgiving. Physical (diskette) copies will be
	available also (give KEITHWRITERS@DELPHI.COM a physical address for
	you and everyone will be happy).
 
5.	Has anyone used this stuff before?
 
	Yes. Me. I have 4 books of poetry out and available that are direct
	output from Mirrorshades and/or Prosody: _Naked_City_, "Black Sun"
	(actually the libretto to an opera in development of the same name),
	_A_Dream_of_a_Shadow_of_Smoke_, and _Hieroglyphs_of_Desire_. Copies
	of all are available by e-mail and asking nicely for the book(s) you
	want and providing a physical address. They will be sent COD (or
	free to reviewers).
 
6.	Is it AI (artificial intelligence)?
 
	Maybe. I'm not completely sure. They use a cut-down version of a
	neural net and intuitive search processes based on past accepted
	outputs (it can figure out what you want from that session, but
	not between sessions). They have passed some informal Turing tests
	among some poets & writers of international caliber with some
	interesting results. However, none were computer experts and so I
	am interested in that side of testing. Any volunteers?
 
7.	Where can I find out more?
 
	Prowl the sci.ai.nat-lang for some nifty academic resources. I have
	brewed my notes from my development stage into a text file I could
	send to any interested persons, but it's mostly on strange
	attractors and fractals. Most GOPHERs will have something there
	under computer science, artificial intelligence, fractals, chaos
	theory, or related topics.
 
Thanx for your time and patience. Please direct replies/correspondence to
 
KEITHWRITERS@DELPHI.COM
 
mark it: "ATTN: K Eluard" in the subject line so that it doesn't wind up
on Keith Boyle's desk here at the Writers' Center of Indianapolis.
or snail mail us at Technosys:
 
Keith Eluard, software development
Technosys
3025 North Meridian Street #202
Indianapolis Indiana 46208





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Lyle_Seaman@transarc.com
Date: Sun, 7 Nov 93 13:48:12 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Real-world digicash
In-Reply-To: <9311071909.AA04142@jobe.shell.portal.com>
Message-ID: <AgrKlkuSMUw8Q6Tsk6@transarc.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


hfinney@shell.portal.com writes:
re NetCash:
> The anonymity was not strong.

Hmph.  You can say that again. There is no real anonymity in NetCash
(v1).  What they describe is something like an online (non-anonymous)
system with the suggestion that people may achieve anonymity by
trafficking in coins without verifying their validity.  If they
receive an invalid coin, T.S.  In such an environment, you can bet
that everyone would keep records of all off-line transactions so they
could recover their losses if they were passed an invalid (spent)
coin.  The suggestion that a (non-anonymous) Currency Server might
simply avoid tracking coins is poppycock.  That would work for epsilon
months, until the CS was strongarmed into keeping logs.
One valid point that the NetCash paper raised was that a framework
must be devised in which currency exchange can occur, without forcing
an intermediate transfer into paper. 

I like Nick's suggestions regarding mostly-offline digicash.

A couple of issues which it seems must be pointed out:

1.  Any digicash scheme is going to require some hardware.  You just
can't do this with pencil and paper.  They don't all require
special-purpose, tamperproof hardware, but very few people are going
to be willing to keep long lists of numbers and do complex arithmetic
in their head...

Hal sez:
> Today, most credit card transactions do an on-line check, so I don't think
> that on-line systems should be ruled out, although eventually a dedicated
> network separate from the internet would probably be needed.  The total
> data transfer per transaction is not large, a few hundred bytes.

The credit-card infrastructure is funded by the 3%-7% cut that the
credit company gets from each purchase.  Who is going to fund such an
infrastructure (potentially much much much larger) for cash
transactions?  Presumably, it would be someone who stands to make a
profit from these transactions, but how will that profit be realized?
Maybe the digicash vendor will charge for on-line verification.  I
guess that works.  It lets the dcash recipient decide whether to trade
off risks against known costs, which I like.

> to a "nym", but to a real person.  (There is still the possibility Mike
> raised of stealing someone's cash, similar to how you might steal someone's
> PGP secret key today, but perhaps this will not occur often enough to
> be a problem.)

A widely-used digicash scheme will certainly include small computers
for performing the transactions.  Such a computer should be guarded as
well as one's wallet, or one's home safe.

> So this off-line system will actually require more bandwidth for communication
> with the bank than Chaum's on-line system would (because of the extra
> transaction information that has to be sent).

Requiring more bandwidth isn't really a problem.  The available
bandwidth of any network is practically infinite, if you don't care
about delay. For all practical purposes, the off-line systems don't care
about delay.  (to forestall flames, I will admit that the delay
must be small enough to reduce the temptation to double-spend, and
that it must be small enough to prevent the holder of cash from losing
value due to inflation.  Delays on the order of days are not
unreasonable.  Given current technology (ie, without purchasing any
new hardware), the workstation on my desk can handle 10 times the
bandwidth that it now does, if I will accept delays on the order 
of several days.) 

I forgot what else I was going to say.  I think my 'nym is stealing my
thoughts. 

Lyle		Transarc		707 Grant Street
412 338 4474	The Gulf Tower		Pittsburgh 15219





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Mike Ingle <MIKEINGLE@delphi.com>
Date: Sun, 7 Nov 93 14:08:15 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Mostly offline digicash
Message-ID: <01H51I6RG58296WT1B@delphi.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>>After-the-fact detection probably won't fly, because organized multiple
>>spending could kill it. There are people who are dumb enough to write
>>their PIN numbers on their ATM cards.

>Nevertheless, millions use ATM cards, with substantially less loss to
>fraud than with credit cards.  Improvement in privacy and reduction
>of incidence of fraud over credit cards are sufficient goals for a 
>digital cash system.

True, but if someone swipes your ATM card and PIN, they can only get
what's in your account, and only $300 or $500 a day. If someone swipes
your digi-coins, they can spend them hundreds of times, obtaining
merchandise worth much more than the coins, before being detected.
That's the hazard I'm worried about. A few such heists could make
people back away from digicash.

The problem with credit cards (and cellular phones) is the "replay
attack." Some kind of authentication is needed. As I understand it,
ATM's use DES with the PIN being used as part of the DES key, correct?
 
>For Pretty Good Digicash, which would probably far exceed those
>goals, how about a "mostly offline" system as follows:

I like this approach. It does require the "online infrastructure" to
be present at every shop, but it would generate less bandwidth than
fully online systems. Offline processing could be done at night when
the system is otherwise idle. The Russian-roulette aspect of trying to
cheat would certainly discourage it. 

>I envision a decentralized credit-rating system, so that the
>integrity of ratings cannot be jeopardized by corrupting one or a 
>related few credit rating agencies with false information.  (The IP 
>paradigm: an economy should be able to route around node failures).

Definitely. The goal of digicash, at least in my opinion, is to
destroy centralized power. An online system should have multiple
servers, and an observer-based system should have multiple suppliers
of observers. The only secret in the observer should be the key.

--- MikeIngle@delphi.com





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Jim McCoy <mccoy@ccwf.cc.utexas.edu>
Date: Sun, 7 Nov 93 15:08:13 PST
To: an41418@anon.penet.fi
Subject: Re: some newbie DC-net questions
In-Reply-To: <9311062341.AA17127@anon.penet.fi>
Message-ID: <199311072306.AA05258@flubber.cc.utexas.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text


an41418@anon.penet.fi (wonderer) writes:
> 
> How do you implement people seeing their neighbors
> coin, but nobody else seeing it? Does it require
> a secure channel between every adjacent person?

Yes.  There are a couple of methods you could use to perform this.  One is
to burn a ton of random noise into a CD-ROM and mail it to your neighbor.
Another is to use public-key encryption to pass a large chunk of data over
the net (you know who your neighbors are, so it is relatively easy for them
to publish a key along with thier address when the net is forming) or you
could all agree to use the same PRNG and then you just pass seed values to
the person you share data with and let them expand it out as needed (if
bandwidth is limited, for example.)

Either way, if one transmission is compromised you are not necessarily left
visible to an evesdropper; they also need to know the random numbers that
are being compared to the data you exchange...

jim



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Jim McCoy <mccoy@ccwf.cc.utexas.edu>
Date: Sun, 7 Nov 93 15:18:13 PST
To: pierre@shell.portal.com (Pierre Uszynski)
Subject: Re: some newbie DC-net questions
In-Reply-To: <9311070412.AA14773@jobe.shell.portal.com>
Message-ID: <199311072317.AA05272@flubber.cc.utexas.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text


pierre@shell.portal.com (Pierre Uszynski) writes:
> > From: Jim McCoy <mccoy@ccwf.cc.utexas.edu>
> > [regarding collisions on a dc-net and detection of them]
> 
> Actually, it seems to me undetected collisions are not as likely as this
> makes it appear: Every person trying to transmit is monitoring
> at the same time to make sure the message they transmit does appear in
> the "sum of differences".

Yes and no.  In theory undetected collisions are unlikely.  In practice you
need to design against them in certain areas because unless you are talking
to someone on a true broadcast medium (ethernet, etc but not any internet
protocols above the datalink layer...) you are going to have to fake the
broadcast and depending on how you do this you could waste a significant
chunk of time and bandwidth passing a "token" around until the collision is
detected.  There will always be a delay in the time between broadcast and
reception so certain operations (like defining your channel in a
multiplexed broadcast network or getting any token or other identifier
necesary to let others know that someone is talking and they should not try
to transmit, etc) need to include steps to make sure that collisions are
detected early before significant effort and bandwidth is involved, where a
collision could make an entire round of messages need to be repeated...

> When you detected that your message collided, typically, you stop
> transmitting. You then decide on a random time delay, wait for that
> duration and try again if the way is clear (all zeroes carrier).

And make sure that your backdown includes a bit of random wait added on or
else two colliding speakers will constantly run into each other.  A good
example of how to deisgn and layout such a system can be found in CSMA/CD
networks like enet (IEEE 802.3 i think...) or the satellite broadcasting
networks, etc.  The methods necessary to make such a system work most
efficiently have already been designed by others for networks that share
many common characteristics with a dc network, makes sense to use them, no?
:)


jim



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: szabo@netcom.com (Nick Szabo)
Date: Sun, 7 Nov 93 20:58:14 PST
To: MIKEINGLE@delphi.com (Mike Ingle)
Subject: Re: Mostly offline digicash
In-Reply-To: <01H51I6RG58296WT1B@delphi.com>
Message-ID: <199311080455.UAA20560@mail.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Mike Ingle:
> If someone swipes
> your digi-coins, they can spend them hundreds of times

For both the online and the mostly-offline system, only one
one or a small number of fraudulent coins can be spent without 
online detection.  Furthermore, digicash is much easier to lock 
up than cash; encrypt it with your secret key, following the normal 
procedure of keeping the secret key on a closely held floppy or 
smart card. 

> A few such heists could make
> people back away from digicash.

Why haven't people backed away from credit cards despite
$10's of billions in fraud?  Digital cash, implemented
reasonably well, is probably going to lose orders of
magnitude less to fraud per transaction than credit
cards.  The transaction costs may be much less than
the 3-7% cut taken by credit card companies.  One practical
task will be thorough debugging before implemented on large
scale, as there are plenty of people with  (a) an ideological
prejudice against cash that or (b) uncomfortable with their
lack of understanding of the protocols, who will jump on the 
opportunity to flame it.  (cf. current discussion on imp-interest 
with Detweiler & Co., for example).

Nick Szabo				szabo@netcom.com




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Timothy Newsham <newsham@wiliki.eng.hawaii.edu>
Date: Sun, 7 Nov 93 23:08:17 PST
To: kovar@nda.com (David Kovar)
Subject: Re: tapping hardware? (was re: Mark Abene (Phiber Optik) sentenced)
In-Reply-To: <199311080426.XAA29294@nda.nda.com>
Message-ID: <9311080705.AA15339@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> 
>   I'd just copy everything to tape as I'd been doing for years. You don't
> need anything new to tap the phone line to pick up the data. After that,
> you just need to figure out the baud rate, parity, and data compression
> (which could be done by trial and error pretty quickly) and then just
> play the tape into a modem that was set up correctly. 
> 
>   Unless I'm missing something, it seems pretty simple.

I have heard that tapping high speed modems can be a little tricky
because of the adaptive filtering done.  The modems both have
adaptive filters that adjust to the line as they see it.  If you
are tapping at some other point the filtering will not be optimimal
for your case.  I believe these filters take care of smearing and
echos and things of that nature.

Maybe someone in the know can elaborate and clear up all the
bad data I probably just spewed :)   

Phil?

> -David




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: doug@netcom.com (Doug Merritt)
Date: Sun, 7 Nov 93 22:43:00 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: trusting software
Message-ID: <199311080642.WAA02946@mail.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


ogr@wyvern.wyvern.com (Jason Plank) said:
>Penned by Doug Merritt:
>> Furthermore, even close reading won't absolutely *guarantee* the lack of
>> backdoors in all cases, even if the reader is an expert on relevant
>> subjects.
>
>	Why not?  Read *every* line of code and the spaces in between two or
>three times.

Surely. A certain percentage of people will. A certain percentage of
people lack the expertise to do so. That was my primary point.

My secondary point is that even those who *do* may not detect the presence
of a backdoor. The decade-and-a-half controversy over whether DES has
a backdoor, despite the fact that the alogorithm is public, is an example
of this. The eventual answer to the question is less important than the
period of debate...think about it.

Reading source code is never a guarantee; it is only a *statistically* safe
measure. Worse yet, the statistical issues tend to be hard to analyze,
and in no case does one attain a 100% confidence.

This is a limited response to a limited question; I'm aware that there
are a million other issues as well.
	Doug




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Cdt Pvt Dan Doughty <DOUGHTYD@Citadel.edu>
Date: Sun, 7 Nov 93 20:28:14 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: to mark re: MoD tapping
Message-ID: <01H51VAQ02MS8Y4ZAC@Citadel.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


well from what I have read, an observer watched as one of the members
loaded a program, called a local telephone system, (the utility was a phone
utility produced by the phone company) and then whala he could hear the 
people voices or if data he could watch it scroll down his menu.  I was
amazed when I heard this.  No tech available but I thought I should
mention that it was a hardware utility available through the modem.
			Dan 





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: David Kovar <kovar@nda.com>
Date: Sun, 7 Nov 93 21:08:14 PST
To: eichin@paycheck.cygnus.com (Mark W. Eichin)
Subject: Re: tapping hardware? (was re: Mark Abene (Phiber Optik) sentenced)
In-Reply-To: <9311062339.AA18639@paycheck.cygnus.com>
Message-ID: <199311080426.XAA29294@nda.nda.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> >> o the charges against MoD marked the first use of wiretaps to record both
> >>   conversations and datacomm by accused hackers.
> 	This I find quite interesting... As a guess, if I were to
> attempt such monitoring, I would start with a pair of off-the-shelf
> modems, but I don't know the details of modern compression (v.42) or
> wire encodings to know how easy that would be to make work...
> 	Anyone have more details on how the tap was accomplished?

  I'd just copy everything to tape as I'd been doing for years. You don't
need anything new to tap the phone line to pick up the data. After that,
you just need to figure out the baud rate, parity, and data compression
(which could be done by trial and error pretty quickly) and then just
play the tape into a modem that was set up correctly. 

  Unless I'm missing something, it seems pretty simple.

-David






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: kelly@netcom.com (Kelly Goen)
Date: Mon, 8 Nov 93 02:13:36 PST
To: eichin@paycheck.cygnus.com (Mark W. Eichin)
Subject: Re: tapping hardware? (was re: Mark Abene (Phiber Optik) sentenced)
In-Reply-To: <9311062339.AA18639@paycheck.cygnus.com>
Message-ID: <199311081013.CAA25398@mail.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


 ...


 NOTE when Tapping and recording FAX or Hi-Speed MODEMS...
A ANALOG recorder simply doesnt work....


 BUT A modern SONY DAT works beautifully...


 the analog recorders have too much flutter and wow to reproduce the signal
 faithfully

     cheers
     kelly...
-- 




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: nobody@cicada.berkeley.edu
Date: Mon, 8 Nov 93 06:53:02 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Remailer Abuse?
Message-ID: <9311081451.AA11051@cicada.berkeley.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


hh@cicada.berkeley.edu says:

> Harassing other users is considered abuse, and sending chain letters is a
> form of harassing other users.  However, it's not a very serious form of
> abuse.  If I found conclusive evidence that someone were sending something
> like childporn through my remailer, I would take some pretty drastic
> actions.

Interesting.  I wonder what those drastic actions would be? 

People sending serious death threats and the like through anon remailers
should be aware that those actions are considered seriously anti-social
and may cause them some problems.  But I don't view "kiddie porn" the same
way.  Its very definition is VERY ill-defined, and there is widespread
disagreement on how much of an evil threat to truth, justice, and the
American Way it really poses.  This makes me start to think that borderline
policies like this should be well publicized by the operator of the remailer.

I don't support the kiddie porn witch hunt going on in the U.S. currently,
and would not have assumed that posting what many people consider to be
harmless photos of kids under 18 would get someone automatically turned in
to the cops.  (Again, keep in mind that the definition is very fuzzy.  Some
people who have been busted as kiddie pornographers have been busted for
extremely mild and un-pornographic material that no reasonable person would
consider harmful.) 

.....Cindy




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Lyle_Seaman@transarc.com
Date: Mon, 8 Nov 93 06:23:00 PST
To: outnews+netnews.talk.politics.crypto@andrew.cmu.edu>
Subject: Article in biz.clarinet.sample
In-Reply-To: <biz-computerUR971_3N1@clarinet.com>
Message-ID: <cgrZHQ2SMUw886ToN2@transarc.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I don't know whether forwarding Clari articles posted to ...sample is
permitted or not, so I am posting just a pointer.   Trot on over to
biz.clarinet.sample, and check out this article:

> Subject: Software you can buy but can't sell
> Message-ID: <biz-computerUR971_3N1@clarinet.com>
> Date: Sat, 6 Nov 93 18:08:02 PST

>	In mid-October, the House Subcommittee on Economic Policy, Trade and
> Environment began a round of hearings on legislation to reauthorize the
> Export Administration Act, which sets export control policy for the
> United States.

There's not a lot of information, but it's a favorable article.


Peeve:  I wish tech editors wouldn't insist on spelling out acronyms
that nobody ever (ever! Well, except tech writers/editors) uses in
their spelled out form.  If they must spell them out, do it in parens,
and bury it.  I *hate* having to try to figure out what "the
Transmission Control Protocol / Internet Protocol suite" is (eg).  

>	It wasn't that Iraq's dictator had hired the world's best technical
> wizards to work for him. It was because the technical minds which were
> already in Iraq recognized the fact that standard Internet Protocol
> routers were designed well. Knock one out and another takes over,
> invisibly. The computer network keeps running.






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: doug@netcom.com (Doug Merritt)
Date: Mon, 8 Nov 93 09:33:00 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: ID of anonymous posters via word analysis?
In-Reply-To: <pmetzger@lehman.com>
Message-ID: <199311081729.JAA16934@mail.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


"Perry E. Metzger" <pmetzger@lehman.com> said:
>Astonishing how far urban legends go. This keeps getting distorted
>further and further. I've heard this go further and further and
>further from the version I first heard. I wonder if there ever was a
>real story to begin with.

Good question. I just checked a terse history of machine translation,
and it didn't mention any version of this. I suspect that its origin
was as a hypothetical example of the kinds of problems that can arise,
and that it didn't actually happen in any real life situation. Examples
like that have always been common in linguistics papers on such subjects.
	Doug




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Arthur Chandler <arthurc@crl.com>
Date: Mon, 8 Nov 93 09:48:23 PST
To: "Patrick E. Hykkonen" <pat@tstc.edu>
Subject: Private and Public
In-Reply-To: <9311081550.AA00789@tstc.edu>
Message-ID: <Pine.3.87.9311080920.A8020-0100000@crl.crl.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



  I'm sure that few folks want to unsheathe the pro- and con- spoofing 
arguments again. But Patrick's last post got me thinking:
  Does the government have the right to know how much money I make, and 
from what sources? The IRS says yes, absolutely. But Eric Hughes, in a 
talk given at San Francisco State University, said, in response to a 
question from an audience, that international digital banking will make 
it very difficult for a national government to track monetary exchanges, 
and thereby tax them. Furthermore, I deduced from the gleam in his eye 
that Eric thought that this was a Good Thing (correct me if I 
misconstrued you, Eric). 
  Right now, there seems to be a kind of social contract between us and 
the government: it protects us, provides free schools, etc etc, in 
exchange for which we have to pony up a fair share of our earnings. It 
follows, doesn't it, that the government has a right to enforce its laws 
saying that everyone must pay that fair share of taxes? To enforce that 
rule, it has a right, under certain conditions, to rummage around in our 
records to see if we have hidden any income source from them.
  This may or may not be Big Brother. But it does seem to be the modus 
operandi of every government that ever was.
  The point: concerns of privacy often come in conflict with the larger 
obligations of public good. We can't say categorically that one must 
always predominate. 
  What do you think?





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: System Operator <anagld!decode!system@uunet.UU.NET>
Date: Mon, 8 Nov 93 17:03:08 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: LAW: Wireless interception
Message-ID: <7FaPcc1w165w@decode.UUCP>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Fellow Cypherpunks,

Here's a couple excerpts from this month's _Search and Seizure Bulletin_,
relating to interception of telephone calls.  The first reiterates
that ECPA covers interception of cellular telephone calls, whether
intentional or not, even by the authorities.  The second repeats that
there is no expectation of privacy with cordless telephones.
Interesting reasoning here: "the reasonableness of a cordless telephone
user's expectation of privacy depends on the specific technology
involved."

By that reasoning, does the use of the new 900 MHz digital telephones
(i.e. the VTech Tropez, etc.) infer a greater expectation of privacy,
even though they are still cordless telephones?

Anyway, here they are:

=======================================================================

Interception of Call to Seized Cellular Telephone-- Language Barrier
(Hawaii)

United States v. Kim, 803 F.Supp. 352 (1992)

Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) agents questioned
two men who had bought one-way plane tickets with
cash. One of the men was Kim, a man agents had caught
with more than eight grams of methamphetamine a month
earlier. During the first encounter Kim had cooperated with
the police and signed a statement containing a "boiler plate"
paragraph. The paragraph stated Kim had read and initialed
the statement and agreed all corrections had been made and
the statement was true and correct.

During the second incident, Kim gave officers permission to a search him.
Police found a cellular telephone and
a large amount of cash. At this point, Kim was transferred
to federal custody. Kim again gave a statement and a written
summary, containing the same boiler plate paragraph, and
was released.

The DEA seized the cellular telephone under a statute
which allowed forfeiture of equipment used to carry out drug
deals. Two days after the telephone had been seized, an agent
activated it to learn the number. Within the space of a few
hours, two calls came in. The agent learned from the second
caller a "deliveryman'' was arriving that day and needed
to know which hotel to go to.

The agents knew Kim was staying at the Outrigger Phoenix
Hotel. Agents went to the hotel room, knocked on the door,
identified themselves, and threatened to "bust it down."
Kim was ill and sleeping inside. Menchavez was staying
with him. She tried to wake Kim when the police knocked,
but was barely able to rouse him. She opened the door and,
confronted by four agents with guns drawn, stepped back
to allow them in.

The agents lifted the naked Kim out of bed, slapped him,
slammed him against the wall, and shouted at him. A search
of the immediate area revealed $85,000 in cash. After the
cash was discovered, Kim was given a consent to search form,
which he signed. A further search uncovered 348 grams of
methamphetamine. Kim was arrested and signed a third state-
ment the following day.

Kim asked the court to suppress his written statements,
evidence seized during his initial encounter with the DEA
and from his car, and all evidence seized as a result of the
intercepted cellular telephone call.

DECISION: The three statements and all evidence obtained
as a result of the telephone call interception were suppressed.
Drugs seized during first encounter were admissible.
         
The court said cellular telephone calls are protected under
the Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, just as
standard telephone calls are, and cannot be intercepted with-
out a warrant. Accordingly, the DEA agent's interception of
the call to Kim -- although unplanned-- was illegal and
all evidence seized as a result of the interception remained
inadmissible.

Even if the interception had been legal, the evidence would
have been suppressed because 1) Menchavez did not give
the agents permission to enter the hotel room--she stepped
back from the door because agents had threaten to push it
down and had weapons drawn; and 2) Kim, being sick, naked,
and abused, did not voluntarily consent to a search of the
hotel room. Because the entry and search were illegal, Kim's
statement made the following day was inadmissible against
him.

Kim's first two written statements were suppressed. Given
Kim's first language was Korean and evidence showed he
had a limited understanding of the boiler plate paragraph,
it could not be proved the statements were accurate.
The methamphetamine taken from Kim during the DEA's
first encounter with Kim was admissible. Kim consented to
the search of his pockets.

United States v. Gallo, 659 F.2d 110 (1981).
         
=============================================================

Expectation of Privacy
         
Cordless Telephone Conversations Monitored Without Warrant
(Texas)

United States v. Smith, 978 F.2d 171 (1992)

Varing believed his next door neighbor, Smith, had burglarized
his house. Varing used a scanner to monitor Smith's
cordless telephone conversations. When Varing overheard
Smith discussing drug deals, Varing contacted police. The
police asked Varing to tape the conversations, provided cas-
sette tapes, and were present during some of the monitoring.
No warrant was obtained.

As a result of the monitoring, Smith was arrested and
charged with narcotics offenses. Smith argued the warrantless
monitoring and recording of his telephone conversations vio-
lated his Fourth Amendment rights and the Omnibus Crime
and Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 (Wire Statute). He
was convicted and appealed.

DECISION: Affirmed.

Smith failed to produce evidence he reasonably expected
his cordless telephone conversations would remain private.
A violation of the Fourth Amendment occurs when government
activity significantly intrudes on a person's reasonable
expectation of privacy. Depending on the particular
technology involved, it may or may not be reasonable for
a cordless telephone user to expect his or her conversation
will remain private. Early cordless telephones transmitted to
commercial radio frequencies and conversations could be
overheard inadvertently; some new cordless telephones cannot
be monitored without very sophisticated equipment. Accordingly,
the reasonableness of a cordless telephone user's expectation
of privacy depends on the specific technology involved.
Smith failed to offer any evidence that his belief his conversations
would remain private was reasonable.

The Wire Statute explicitly excludes cordless telephones
from its scope.

=====================================================================

_Search and Seizure Bulletin_ is published monthly by Quinlan Publishing
Company, 23 Drydock Avenue, Boston, MA, 02210-2387.  ISSN 0037-0193.

I am operating under the assumption that relating these excerpts
is covered under the fair use doctrine.  Also, I have no connection
with Quinlan Publishing Company other than as a satisfied customer.


Dan


--
system@decode.UUCP (System Operator)
Cryptography, Security, Privacy BBS  +1 410 730 6734   Data/FAX




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: pat@tstc.edu (Patrick E. Hykkonen)
Date: Mon, 8 Nov 93 07:53:00 PST
To: ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu (L. Detweiler)
Subject: Re: pseudospoofing ad nauseam
In-Reply-To: <9311060906.AA07563@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Message-ID: <9311081550.AA00789@tstc.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> there are these cypherpunks who have created an entire *religion* out
> of *defying* and *sabotaging* whatever identification scheme is
> invented. Let it be signatures, checks, birth certificiates, drivers
> licenses, social security, etc. How many cypherpunks are reincarnated
> thieves, anyway? What society do you people live in, anyway? do you
> think that checks with your True Name invade your privacy? do you think
> your bank, associates, or the government doesn't have a right to know
> who you are? (Uh, rhetorical question. I know the answer.)

Actually, I still do not think he knows the answer.

However, the second part of the question is more relevant.  No, the
bank, my associates, or the government does not have the right to know
who I am simply because I exist and do business with them.  Those
entities should only know what I tell them, nothing more.  The current
trend towards Big Brotherism in the *real* world is why I'm a
cypherpunk.  I wish to control my own information, not some faceless
bank, credit beaurau, or other possibly wrong information provider.

-- 
Pat Hykkonen ** N5NPL ** pat@tstc.edu ** CNSA -- (817) 867-4831
Disclaimer:  This product may cause irritability in some users.  In cases of
allergic reaction, delete and consult a physician immediately.





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Blanc Weber <blancw@microsoft.com>
Date: Mon, 8 Nov 93 11:08:23 PST
To: arthurc@crl.com
Subject: RE: Private and Public
Message-ID: <9311081907.AB19513@netmail.microsoft.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


But of COURSE the government has a right to know how much money you 
make -    It OWNS you;
why else would it protect you and educate you?

(Up Ahead -   be prepared . . . you have now crossed into the Twilight Zone).

Blanc
----------
From: Arthur Chandler
Subject: Private and Public
Date: Monday, November 08, 1993 9:31AM


  I'm sure that few folks want to unsheathe the pro- and con- spoofing
arguments again. But Patrick's last post got me thinking:
  Does the government have the right to know how much money I make, and
from what sources? The IRS says yes, absolutely. But Eric Hughes, in a
talk given at San Francisco State University, said, in response to a
question from an audience, that international digital banking will make
it very difficult for a national government to track monetary exchanges,
and thereby tax them. Furthermore, I deduced from the gleam in his eye
that Eric thought that this was a Good Thing (correct me if I
misconstrued you, Eric).
  Right now, there seems to be a kind of social contract between us and
the government: it protects us, provides free schools, etc etc, in
exchange for which we have to pony up a fair share of our earnings. It
follows, doesn't it, that the government has a right to enforce its laws
saying that everyone must pay that fair share of taxes? To enforce that
rule, it has a right, under certain conditions, to rummage around in our
records to see if we have hidden any income source from them.
  This may or may not be Big Brother. But it does seem to be the modus
operandi of every government that ever was.
  The point: concerns of privacy often come in conflict with the larger
obligations of public good. We can't say categorically that one must
always predominate.
  What do you think?





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: blaster@rd.relcom.msk.su (Victor A. Borisov)
Date: Mon, 8 Nov 93 00:23:00 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: TV scremblers.
Message-ID: <AAl_Vtimi7@rd.relcom.msk.su>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Hi!
     How can I receive any  information about TV  scremblers
(and hacking of one)?

--- 
Victor A. Borisov aka blaster;	Relcom R&D;
Email: blaster@rd.relcom.msk.su;
Phone: +7(095)-943-4735; +7(095)-198-9510;
	=== Don`t panic! ===




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: hughes@ah.com (Eric Hughes)
Date: Mon, 8 Nov 93 11:23:03 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Private and Public
In-Reply-To: <Pine.3.87.9311080920.A8020-0100000@crl.crl.com>
Message-ID: <9311081918.AA09930@ah.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>international digital banking will make 
>it very difficult for a national government to track monetary exchanges, 
>and thereby tax them. Furthermore, I deduced from the gleam in his eye 
>that Eric thought that this was a Good Thing

I think that increasing the ability of parties to transact in private,
such that neither the contents nor the existence of a transaction is
revealed, is a Very Good Thing.

I do not believe that it is prudent for governments to continue to
fund themselves on transaction taxes, such as income tax.  Government
exists primarily because of the facts of geography, properties of
territory and boundary.  The digital world is not a geographic one,
and the geographic model of government is not appropriate for it.

Please respond to my personal email address.

Eric




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Eli Brandt <ebrandt@jarthur.Claremont.EDU>
Date: Mon, 8 Nov 93 11:33:03 PST
To: cypherpunks list <cypherpunks@toad.com>
Subject: Re: ID of anonymous posters via word analysis?
In-Reply-To: <199311081729.JAA16934@mail.netcom.com>
Message-ID: <9311081931.AA26917@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> Good question. I just checked a terse history of machine translation,
> and it didn't mention any version of this.

And in the alt.folklore.urban FAQ we find:
F. Russian/Chinese mechanical translator translates "out of sight, out of mind"
   into "blind and insane".  Also "Spirit is willing, but the flesh is weak" 
   as "the drink is good but the meat is rotten."

(The "F" means "known to be false")

   Eli   ebrandt@jarthur.claremont.edu




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Stanton McCandlish <mech@eff.org>
Date: Mon, 8 Nov 93 08:38:23 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Bits-n-Bytes Online
Message-ID: <199311081635.AA09758@eff.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Anyone have the address of Bits-n-Bytes Online newsletter?  I think Jay
Machado is putting that out, but I don't recall... 

-- 
-=> mech@eff.org <=-
Stanton McCandlish     Electronic Frontier Foundation Online Activist & SysOp
"A nation that is afraid to let its people judge the truth and falsehood of
ideas in an open market is a nation that is afraid of its people." -JFK
NitV-DC BBS 202-232-2715 Fido 1:109/1103 IndraNet 369:111/1, 14.4V32b 16.8ZyX
Join EFF!  For more information about membership, send mail to eff@eff.org



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: A1 ray arachelian (library)  <rarachel@ishara.poly.edu>
Date: Mon, 8 Nov 93 13:08:47 PST
To: mg5n+@andrew.cmu.edu (Matthew J Ghio)
Subject: Re: Tapping modem transmissions
In-Reply-To: <Ugrec5600awK8D9Uch@andrew.cmu.edu>
Message-ID: <9311081659.AA03819@ishara.poly.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> 
> It's not too technically difficult to tap modem connections at low
> speed, I played around with it a few years back, and I was able to add a
> third modem onto a 300 or 1200 baud connection and view what was being
> transmitted.  Using the modem as a dumb interpreter of the signal works
> well to analyze the raw data being transmitted at low speeds, but when
> you use v.42 and LAPM, things get a bit more complicated.  You need
> special hardware/software to interpret and decode the compressed &
> checksummed data packets.
> 

Actually, there's another way if you can tap into the RS-232 pipeline
itself.  I've seen a box in a catalog that offers a three way RS-232
split.  What I would do with it is to actually build something like that
myself and take the send/receive lines and hook them up to another machine
to capture the transfer of info between them.  I could then capture any
data coming through the lines.

Uses for this: if you suspect someone is breaking into your machine
or some other machine via a dial up line and want to capture some
proof of it.  (Cliff Stoll did this with a printer.)

You can't actually tap into the phone line with this of course.. :-) But
there are better things to do.  For one, you can buy a portable DAT
walkman and a large capacity DAT tape, and dump everything to the tape,
then have your modem decode the conversation, but you have to filter out
one side or the other.  While this may be hard for Joe Hacker, it wouldn't
be hard for Joe Rockwell who works in a modem factory and can build a special
box based on the Rockwell (or other) chipset to spy on the modem conversation.

A long long time ago, when a friend of mine was running a BBS (at 300bps)
and his machine was down, he put a 300bps recording of his modem writing
"Sorry the BBS is down" on an answering machine.  The timing was a bit
screwey, but the message got through most of the time. :-)





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Arthur Chandler <arthurc@crl.com>
Date: Mon, 8 Nov 93 12:13:03 PST
To: nick@mit.edu
Subject: Re: Private and Public
In-Reply-To: <199311081917.AA15324@crl.crl.com>
Message-ID: <Pine.3.87.9311081157.A17620-0100000@crl.crl.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain




     Hmmm... my post may well ignite some flames; but I can't go along with
the notion that this list is for purely tech discussion. Encryption is a
social and political issue as well as a technical one, isn't it?  I would
think that it's more dangerous to ignore the social and political
ramifications than to have them out publically.
    It seems to me that encryption poses LOTS of dilemmas for any 
government. I chose just one -- taxes -- for my post. And looks like 
there are quite a few viewpoints on that one, with regards to the 
government's right to examine your income sources. The fact the encryption 
schemes are classified as military  (or military-type) material and so 
are subject to comparable controls by  the State Department should alert 
us to this fact. So to insist that we  stick to Greatest Primes and 
Modulo seems... unrealistic.
    Of course, if the discussion seems pointless or irrelevant to you... 
there's always the delete key.
    My :9&53xS+ (= digital $.02) worth.


On Mon, 8 Nov 1993, Nick Papadakis wrote:

> 
> >   What do you think?
> 
> 	I think you are inviting a political flame war on what is
> supposed to be a technical list.  Please take it to alt.privacy.
> 
> 	- nick
> 







From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: A1 ray arachelian (library)  <rarachel@ishara.poly.edu>
Date: Mon, 8 Nov 93 13:08:23 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: If you've seen any of my posts
Message-ID: <9311081702.AA03864@ishara.poly.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Guys, I'd like to ask you if you've seen any of my posts since Thursday
night.  If you have, they weren't from me, as I've been unable to log in
to my account since then.  Please forward them to me in email.

One of two things has happened.  a) I goofed and changed my password to
something I forgot, or b) someone got into my account somehow.  b) may
be possible since I found the data on one of my directories has changed
and I'm not sure if it's just the system`s time that`s wrong...

Anyhow, I've had the sysadmin set me a new password so here I am again.





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: cman@IO.COM (Douglas Barnes)
Date: Mon, 8 Nov 93 10:28:23 PST
To: arthurc@crl.com (Arthur Chandler)
Subject: Re: Private and Public
In-Reply-To: <Pine.3.87.9311080920.A8020-0100000@crl.crl.com>
Message-ID: <9311081822.AA15679@illuminati.IO.COM>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>   This may or may not be Big Brother. But it does seem to be the modus 
> operandi of every government that ever was.
> 

Alas for the large nation-states, this is not the case. There are many 
small governments that don't have this notion, and in exchange for various
considerations (primarily patronizing the financial services of their
country), are more than willing to pay little or no attention to issues
of how much money one makes, or where the it came from.

The boon of secure, anonymous digital transactions is that it's not real
clear exactly *where* they happen, and if the digital money to real world
money interface takes place in one of these financial ports of convenience,
it bodes ill for the taxability of these transactions.

While I believe that it is A Good Thing, I also agree with you that the 
nation-states will not go down without a pretty good fight, and that this
will have the effect in the near term of limiting the extent of this 
practice. Others believe that existing governments are sufficiently rotten
and spent that they will just keel over under the weight of these activities;
I'm not so sure.

-- 
----------------                                             /\ 
Douglas Barnes            cman@illuminati.io.com            /  \ 
Chief Wizard         (512) 448-8950 (d), 447-7866 (v)      / () \
Illuminati Online          metaverse.io.com 7777          /______\



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Timothy Newsham <newsham@wiliki.eng.hawaii.edu>
Date: Mon, 8 Nov 93 14:38:44 PST
To: arthurc@crl.com
Subject: Re: Private and Public
In-Reply-To: <Pine.3.87.9311081157.A17620-0100000@crl.crl.com>
Message-ID: <9311082238.AA29867@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> 
>      Hmmm... my post may well ignite some flames; but I can't go along with
> the notion that this list is for purely tech discussion. Encryption is a
> social and political issue as well as a technical one, isn't it?  I would
> think that it's more dangerous to ignore the social and political
> ramifications than to have them out publically.

Encryption is a social a political issue.  This list however is a
collection of people interested in the technical aspects of using
encryption to increase privacy (crypto-privacy).  Some of the people
on this list may be interested in discussing the social and political issues,
some of the people on this list may not be interested in discussing the
political and social issues.  The *one* thing that all subscribers
to this list have in common is an interest in the technical aspects
of crypto-privacy.  Lets keep on topic.  Like someone has said to
the list before we are a collection of people with different goals
and views, lets work together as long as we have to and no longer.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Date: Mon, 8 Nov 93 12:43:42 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: The "Nymalizer" and Shannon's Information Theory
In-Reply-To: <9311081958.AA00500@ciis.mitre.org>
Message-ID: <199311082043.MAA00486@mail.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Curtis Frye and many others have written about the ways anonymous or
pseuodonymous posts can be identified. Graham Toal's comments were
especially cogent (even if he tweaked my for some of my characteristic
writing patterns and whatnot (hint: I use "whatnot" more than most
people here).

I want to briefly mention another way of looking at this issue, and
will use Curtis' comments to start:

> For the past few years I've looked at this issue (author identification
> through text content analysis) a bit from a psycholinguistic point of view.
...
> A 1983 paper (which I also do not have the cite handy for) by Dr. Murray
> Miron of Syracuse University gave his equations for analyzing two texts (of
> roughly similar lengths) and establishing a probability that the two
> writings were produced by the same individual.  In his paper, Dr. Miron
...
> The same idea applies here - for CUSUM or similar analysis to be valid, an
> analyst needs large volumes of messages where one of the authors is known

One can view this problem in terms of Shannon's theorem about the
transmission of a message in the presence of noise:

* Signal -- the identity of the poster (true name, pseudonym,
whatever)
- characteristic usage of words, of punctuation, and whatnot (see)
- even the ideologies expressed (which LD incorrectly used to
conclude Jamie Dinkelacker and I "must" be the same person)

* Noise -- variations in spelling, usage, etc.
- many people use similar constructions and whatnot (like this)

Now Shannon's theorem, which can be applied here if some care is taken
(that is, don't apply it too simplistically or too mechanistically),
says that no matter how much noise is present, one can extract the
signal if one samples enough.

(Caveats: for a stationary sequence, etc., whereas one's writings may
change with time, with the topic at hand, etc.)

This means that one can "communicate" the "message"--which in this
case is the message "I am Tim May" or "Jamie and Tim are distinct
posters" and so forth--if enough messages are analyzed.

But to Shannon's basic view one must also add _intereference_, whether
deliberate (spoofing) or not. If I try to emulate the style of S.
Boxx, for example, by writing in the form "I am becoming INCREASINGLY
DISGUSTED by the blatant disregard for the Cypherpunks CAUSE and ...",
then this "intereference" could greatly complicate the signal
extraction.

In fact, more obscure correlations would have to be looked at, ones
which might require many more messages to analyze...possibly more
message samples than exist.

Text analysis tools have presumably gotten a lot more powerful than
they were 30 years ago when the "Did Marlowe writes Shakespeare's
plays?" question was being computer-analyzed.

Anyway, like others have said, there are several programs available
which do this kind of analysis, and I don't think it's paranoid to say
that the CIA and the NSA must have extremely sophisticated tools for
such analysis.

An interesting area. Anybody else interested in building a "nymalizer"
which sorts posts into likely bins?

--Tim May


-- 
..........................................................................
Timothy C. May         | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,  
tcmay@netcom.com       | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
408-688-5409           | knowledge, reputations, information markets, 
W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA  | black markets, collapse of governments.
Higher Power: 2^756839 | Public Key: PGP and MailSafe available.
Note: I put time and money into writing this posting. I hope you enjoy it.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: GRABOW_GEOFFREY@tandem.com
Date: Mon, 8 Nov 93 12:48:23 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Public and private.
Message-ID: <199311081251.AA26937@localhost>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


ARTHURC@CRL.COM writes:
> But of COURSE the government has a right to know how much money you
> make -    It OWNS you;

I prefer to think of myself as a shareholder in our government.  Not that it
is an entity unto itself and that I am "owned" by it.  This may be a little
self-deluding, but it lets me sleep nights.

As to the gov't tracking every penny that I earn, the only alternative to an
income tax is an extremly high sales tax.  This is extremely unfair to those
on the lower end of the wage scale.

                                              G.C.G.















From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Brad Huntting <huntting@glarp.com>
Date: Mon, 8 Nov 93 11:48:23 PST
To: Timothy Newsham <newsham@wiliki.eng.hawaii.edu>
Subject: Re: tapping hardware? (was re: Mark Abene (Phiber Optik) sentenced)
In-Reply-To: <9311080705.AA15339@toad.com>
Message-ID: <199311081947.AA09591@misc.glarp.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



> I have heard that tapping high speed modems can be a little tricky
> because of the adaptive filtering done.  The modems both have
> adaptive filters that adjust to the line as they see it.  If you
> are tapping at some other point the filtering will not be optimimal
> for your case.  I believe these filters take care of smearing and
> echos and things of that nature.

Hmm...  As part of the tap, introduce just enough distortion or
noise to cause the modems to fallback to a slower bit rate.  This
is somewhat intrusive of course and so it might be noticed, but it
could make taping a line much cheaper.


brad




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Timothy Newsham <newsham@wiliki.eng.hawaii.edu>
Date: Mon, 8 Nov 93 15:13:05 PST
To: pdn@dwroll.dw.att.com (Philippe Nave)
Subject: Re: Modem taps/Caller ID
In-Reply-To: <9311082230.AA29752@toad.com>
Message-ID: <9311082312.AA00818@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> 
> The recent discussions of tapping modem transmissions reminds me of
> a scrap of data I saw about Caller ID [the service provided by the 
> phone company that displays the caller's phone number whenever your
> phone rings]. Supposedly, the phone company transmits the caller's 
> number as a burst of 1200 or 2400 baud ASCII between the first and
> second rings; if your modem is set up 'just right,' you can capture
> the number with a PC.

The number is transmitted in ascii at 1200 bits per second.  The
standard used to transmit the data is not the "normal" 1200 bps
mode of your modem.  Normally 1200 bps is accomplished by sending
300 symbols per second where each symbol conveys 4 bits of information.
The caller ID info is transmitted at 1200 bps by sending 1200 symbols
per second where one symbol conveys 1 bit of information.  The method
used is FSK,  one frequency is sent for a 1 bit, and another for
a zero bit.  I dont have the frequencies on me, but if you are 
really interested I can get them to you later.

I have no idea how you would get your modem to go into the right
mode (and how it would react to data on the line before it goes
off hook). 

> Philippe D. Nave, Jr.   | The person who does not use message encryption
> pdn@dwroll.dw.att.com   | will soon be at the mercy of those who DO...
> Denver, Colorado USA    | PGP public key: by arrangement.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Date: Mon, 8 Nov 93 13:08:41 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: IRS records, FINCEN, etc.
In-Reply-To: <9311082033.AA07090@media.mit.edu>
Message-ID: <199311082107.NAA02595@mail.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


..
> right to know how much money you make.  That's why the IRS was set up
> separately from the rest of the gov't, why it's supposed to not share data
> with the rest of the gov't (yeah, right), and why the income tax was ruled
> unconstitutional by the Supreme Ct...
> 
> Of course, that's all dark history today that no one studies or takes
> seriously.  Sigh.
> 
> --Alan

The latest "Wired," 1.6, has an article entitled "Big Brother Wants to
Look Into Your Bank Account (any time it pleases)." 

It describes how FinCEN, the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network,
cross-refererence IRS records.

(I've been curious about FinCEN since around early 1990, when I first
heard about its formation--as a joint task force of Treasury, State,
NSA, FBI, etc.--and this article in "Wired" has filled in a lot of
gaps. Suffice it to say that FinCEN is likely _very_ interested in our
schemes for money-laundering, tax evasion, black markets, and collapse
of the U.S. and other governments.)

By the way, I generally avoid here the well-trodden ground of
libertarian politics, anarcho-capitalism, the "duties" one putatively
owes the State, and so on.

One should not take my unwillingness to "debate the basics" to mean
assent for the views others express here.

--Tim May


-- 
..........................................................................
Timothy C. May         | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,  
tcmay@netcom.com       | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
408-688-5409           | knowledge, reputations, information markets, 
W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA  | black markets, collapse of governments.
Higher Power: 2^756839 | Public Key: PGP and MailSafe available.
Note: I put time and money into writing this posting. I hope you enjoy it.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Perry E. Metzger" <pmetzger@lehman.com>
Date: Mon, 8 Nov 93 10:18:23 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Private and Public
In-Reply-To: <Pine.3.87.9311080920.A8020-0100000@crl.crl.com>
Message-ID: <9311081816.AA10013@snark.lehman.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Arthur Chandler says:
>   Right now, there seems to be a kind of social contract between us and 
> the government: it protects us, provides free schools, etc etc, in 
> exchange for which we have to pony up a fair share of our earnings. It 
> follows, doesn't it, that the government has a right to enforce its laws 
> saying that everyone must pay that fair share of taxes?

You are asking a political, not a technical, question. Personally, I
don't believe there is such a thing as a social contract -- I never
signed anything, and from what I can tell the terms on the social
contract are ones I would never have accepted. I would be happy to
purchase what the goverment give me on the open market -- I see no
need for government to be involved in mail delivery or garbage
collection or schools or any of the other things it runs -- from what
I can tell all it touches turns to crap.

However, this entire topic belongs on places like talk.politics.misc,
not cypherpunks. I would suggest that it be conducted elsewhere.

Perry




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Alan (Gesture Man) Wexelblat" <wex@media.mit.edu>
Date: Mon, 8 Nov 93 11:18:41 PST
To: szabo@netcom.com
Subject: Mostly offline digicash
In-Reply-To: <199311080455.UAA20560@mail.netcom.com>
Message-ID: <9311081918.AA27998@media.mit.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Nick asks:
> Why haven't people backed away from credit cards despite $10's of billions
> in fraud? 

A very good question.  The reason is largely because it's a very profitable
business *for the card merchants* (banks, mostly).  They get their
percentage no matter what, and losses don't eat into it all that much.

I agree with much of what Nick says, but I think we have to consider ways to
help make digicash pay for its own implementation and enforcement, or it
will not take hold.

--Alan Wexelblat, Reality Hacker, Author, and Cyberspace Bard
Media Lab - Advanced Human Interface Group	wex@media.mit.edu
Voice: 617-258-9168, Pager: 617-945-1842	PUBLIC KEY available by request
Try not to have a good time ... This is supposed to be educational.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: hughes@ah.com (Eric Hughes)
Date: Mon, 8 Nov 93 14:58:24 PST
To: an41418@anon.penet.fi
Subject: Private and Public
In-Reply-To: <9311082141.AA13758@anon.penet.fi>
Message-ID: <9311082252.AA10214@ah.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I specifically asked for responses to my morning's short note on tax
to be directed to my own mailbox.  I do not intend to discuss it in
this forum.  

I post this message here to repeat my request.

Eric





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Joe Thomas <jthomas@pawpaw.mitre.org>
Date: Mon, 8 Nov 93 11:58:23 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Mostly offline digicash
Message-ID: <9311081957.AA26361@pawpaw.mitre.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Alan (Gesture Man) Wexelblat <wex@media.mit.edu> writes"
> Nick asks:
> > Why haven't people backed away from credit cards despite $10's of  
billions
> > in fraud? 

> 

>  A very good question.  The reason is largely
> because it's a very profitable business *for the
> card merchants* (banks, mostly).  They get their
> percentage no matter what, and losses don't eat
> into it all that much.
> 

> I agree with much of what Nick says, but I think
> we have to consider ways to help make digicash pay
> for its own implementation and enforcement, or it
> will not take hold.

Hmmm.  Couldn't digicash issuers simply charge up front
for their digicash notes, adding a percentage on top
like travellers checks?  Let the people who want the
convenience and anonymity of digital cash pay for it;
let the merchants redeem it for free.  Sound okay?

Joe




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: gtoal@an-teallach.com (Graham Toal)
Date: Mon, 8 Nov 93 07:03:01 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Mark Abene (Phiber Optik) sentenced
Message-ID: <6230@an-teallach.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


In article <9311080705.AA15339@toad.com> newsham@wiliki.eng.hawaii.edu writes:
 > I have heard that tapping high speed modems can be a little tricky
 > because of the adaptive filtering done.  The modems both have
 > adaptive filters that adjust to the line as they see it.  If you
 > are tapping at some other point the filtering will not be optimimal
 > for your case.  I believe these filters take care of smearing and
 > echos and things of that nature.
 > 
 > Maybe someone in the know can elaborate and clear up all the
 > bad data I probably just spewed :)   

Dunno if this is how they did it, but you get *perfect* data tapping
if you record digitally off the exchange trunks...

G
-- 
Personal mail to gtoal@gtoal.com (I read it in the evenings)
Business mail to gtoal@an-teallach.com (Be careful with the spelling!)
Faxes to An Teallach Limited: +44 31 662 4678  Voice: +44 31 668 1550 x212





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: cfrye@ciis.mitre.org (Curtis D. Frye)
Date: Mon, 8 Nov 93 11:53:04 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: ID of anonymous posters via word analysis?
Message-ID: <9311081958.AA00500@ciis.mitre.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


For the past few years I've looked at this issue (author identification
through text content analysis) a bit from a psycholinguistic point of view.
 According to an occasional electronic digest coordinated by a woman from
the UK named Blackwell (I apologize that I don't remember her name or have
her email address handy), a technique that sums the probabilities of
various word occurrences (CUSUM) has come under fire recently and, if I
remember correctly, is not accepted in UK courts.

A 1983 paper (which I also do not have the cite handy for) by Dr. Murray
Miron of Syracuse University gave his equations for analyzing two texts (of
roughly similar lengths) and establishing a probability that the two
writings were produced by the same individual.  In his paper, Dr. Miron
related the story of a trial where he was summoned as an expert witness and
was not allowed to testify as to whether an extortion note was authored by
the defendant based on analysis of the note vis a vis a known letter from
the defendant.  However, the jury ended up finding the defendant guilty
based on identical misspellings of a word in each message.  Dr. Miron noted
that the jury's decision agreed with the overall findings of the computer
analysis; however, the jury returned a guilty verdict based on a single
coincident misspelling that could happen (with relatively high probability)
in any two random messages.

The same idea applies here - for CUSUM or similar analysis to be valid, an
analyst needs large volumes of messages where one of the authors is known
(an anonymous id counts) and the documents compared are of similar lengths.
 One note a while back indicated that matching anonymous id's could be done
through tracing misspellings and uncommon word usage.  Definitely not true
without a large base of known messages from both id's and a high score on
an evaluation function as described in the literature.


Curtis D. Frye
cfrye@ciis.mitre.org
"If you think I speak for MITRE, I'll tell you how much they
 pay me and make you feel foolish."






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Matthew J Ghio <mg5n+@andrew.cmu.edu>
Date: Mon, 8 Nov 93 12:23:03 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Tapping modem transmissions
In-Reply-To: <9311080705.AA15339@toad.com>
Message-ID: <Ugrec5600awK8D9Uch@andrew.cmu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


It's not too technically difficult to tap modem connections at low
speed, I played around with it a few years back, and I was able to add a
third modem onto a 300 or 1200 baud connection and view what was being
transmitted.  Using the modem as a dumb interpreter of the signal works
well to analyze the raw data being transmitted at low speeds, but when
you use v.42 and LAPM, things get a bit more complicated.  You need
special hardware/software to interpret and decode the compressed &
checksummed data packets.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Stanton McCandlish <mech@eff.org>
Date: Mon, 8 Nov 93 12:23:23 PST
Subject: UPDATE: Internet "whitepages" database of addresses
Message-ID: <199311082022.AA14164@eff.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



_____ Begin forward ______________________________
Date:      Wed, 03 Nov 1993 09:56:28 pst
From: "JS McBride & Co. PostMaster" <jim_mcbride@netmail.com>
Subject:   InterNet Mailing List

Here is the CORRECT info on the InterNet Mailing List.

Addresses are extracted from news feeds, list servers, and other sources. NO
personal information is collected. The following is the ONLY information we
collect.

    1. Electronic mail address
    2. User name
    3. Search keywords
    4. Date info was collected

The search keywords are limited to products.

Example: xwindows,unix,dos,ms-windows,emacs

To have your name removed from the list, send a message to DELETE@NETMAIL.COM
Please place ANY addresses that you wanted removed from the list in the body
of the message.

To get more info on how and why we are building the list, send a message to
LISTINFO@NETMAIL.COM .   [Just see next message.  PGN]

Comments should be sent to TMANNING@NETMAIL.COM

Thank You, James McBride, NetMail, 415-949-4295


Date:     Wed, 03 Nov 1993 22:11:07
From: "JS McBride & Co. PostMaster" <jim_mcbride@netmail.com>
Subject: Auto Reply [What you get from LISTINFO.  PGN]

Thank you for your mail to Jim McBride at JS McBride & Company. Due to the
volume of mail be handled by this account, this is an automatic reply.

PLEASE READ CAREFULLY!!

1. JS McBride is NOT collecting demographic information on email addresses.
   Due to the controversy surrounding this practice, we have discarded
   the product demographics we collected. We are however still collecting
   email addresses and user names.

2. The information collected (name and email address) will be offered in
   a printed white pages directory and in a white pages server on the net.

3. You DO NOT need to ask to have your name removed. BEFORE your name is
   used in the directory, you will receive mail asking for your permission.
   If you reply to the inquiry, your information will be used. If you do

   not reply, your name will NOT be used.

4. Comments regarding the white pages should be sent to Tom Manning at
   JS McBride & Company. <tmanning@netmail.com>

5. Mail to Jim McBride should be sent to <jimm@netmail.com>

6. Information regarding the purchase of the white pages directory should
   be sent to <listinfo@netmail.com> or telephone us at 415-949-4295

   Thank you for your time,
   Jim McBride

Thanks to all of you (too many to note) who forwarded this to RISKS.  PGN]

------------------------------









From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: ljenkins@mv.us.adobe.com (Luis Jenkins)
Date: Mon, 8 Nov 93 15:28:26 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Taxes
Message-ID: <9311082328.AA09541@albertus.mv.us.adobe.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



> I disagree that income tax is a bad thing. What other way
> does the government have of maintaining fairness across

I am a relative novice in taxation policies, and among other
things, I would like to hear recommendations from people
in this list about books and/or articles to read, but the
bad thing about income taxes is that it "gives" the government
the "right" to snoop into all your affairs because they have to
know what your income is. 

Having grown up in another country and lived in other countries,
(that also have income taxes), but don't intrude so much into your 
private life, I must say that I was shocked the first time that I had 
to file an income tax declaration in the USA! Of all the countries where 
I have lived (four or five), this is the only place where *individuals*
need to keep ridiculously detailed records of everything! And the only 
country I know where individuals routinely have to hire an accountant to
be able to file a tax return ...

Is moving to a consuption-based tax system part of the solution or not?

	Luis

PS: I realize that this is not exactly a cypher issue, so is there
a better place to discuss it?





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Philippe Nave" <pdn@dwroll.dw.att.com>
Date: Mon, 8 Nov 93 14:33:03 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Modem taps/Caller ID
Message-ID: <9311082230.AA29752@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


The recent discussions of tapping modem transmissions reminds me of
a scrap of data I saw about Caller ID [the service provided by the 
phone company that displays the caller's phone number whenever your
phone rings]. Supposedly, the phone company transmits the caller's 
number as a burst of 1200 or 2400 baud ASCII between the first and
second rings; if your modem is set up 'just right,' you can capture
the number with a PC.

[Sorry there is so little data to go on; this tidbit appeared on a 
PC bulletin board and there was no follow-up discussion.]

Does anyone here know more about this? I would dearly love to set up a
program on the PC in my basement that could capture Caller ID data and
log it in a database. Obnoxious callers (Olan Mills, local telemarketers,
etc.) could be identified easily, and I could program the modem to pick
up / hang up on those calls. Then, I could ignore the phone until the
third ring; my PC would automatically dispose of nuisance callers as soon
as the Caller ID data was processed. Also, I'd build up a database of 
names and phone numbers important to me - maybe I'd spend less time 
scrounging my pile of Post-It notes looking for phone numbers.

........................................................................
Philippe D. Nave, Jr.   | The person who does not use message encryption
pdn@dwroll.dw.att.com   | will soon be at the mercy of those who DO...
Denver, Colorado USA    | PGP public key: by arrangement.



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: ljenkins@mv.us.adobe.com (Luis Jenkins)
Date: Mon, 8 Nov 93 15:28:45 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re:  Modem taps/Caller ID
Message-ID: <9311082332.AA09544@albertus.mv.us.adobe.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



> Does anyone here know more about this? I would dearly love to set up a
> program on the PC in my basement that could capture Caller ID data and

There is a number of modems that will do this for you automatically.
The Supra comes to mind, and I believe the Zyxel also does it.

I do have the specs for CID somewhere, but off the top of my head I
don't recall how it is transmitted.

There was an intersting thread in comp.dcom.telecom about something
called the "Presto Chango!" box, that transmits bogus CID information
after the call is answered, so you can easily confuse most CID boxes
in the market.

	Luis




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Alan (Gesture Man) Wexelblat" <wex@media.mit.edu>
Date: Mon, 8 Nov 93 12:38:23 PST
To: arthurc@crl.com
Subject: Private and Public
In-Reply-To: <Pine.3.87.9311080920.A8020-0100000@crl.crl.com>
Message-ID: <9311082033.AA07090@media.mit.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Boy I hope we don't start a Libertarian/Liberal flame war about taxes, the
gov't, and the social contract (or lack thereof).  I will just point out
that it was the *founders* of the IRS who thought that the gov't had no
right to know how much money you make.  That's why the IRS was set up
separately from the rest of the gov't, why it's supposed to not share data
with the rest of the gov't (yeah, right), and why the income tax was ruled
unconstitutional by the Supreme Ct...

Of course, that's all dark history today that no one studies or takes
seriously.  Sigh.

--Alan





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Perry E. Metzger" <pmetzger@lehman.com>
Date: Mon, 8 Nov 93 12:43:03 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Private and Public
In-Reply-To: <Pine.3.87.9311081157.A17620-0100000@crl.crl.com>
Message-ID: <9311082039.AA10125@snark.lehman.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain




Arthur Chandler says:
>      Hmmm... my post may well ignite some flames; but I can't go along with
> the notion that this list is for purely tech discussion.

I'm sorry that "you can't go along" with that, but I'm afraid that you
don't have much choice: it isn't your list. Many of us have gotten
burned out from a number of very long arguments on this list, and
politics was not part of the charter to begin with. If you insist on
discussing it, might I suggest that there are many places where the
discussion would be appropriate, like talk.politics.crypto,
alt.privacy, talk.politics.misc, or many other places?

.pm




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Nick Papadakis <nick@martigny.ai.mit.edu>
Date: Mon, 8 Nov 93 12:43:23 PST
To: arthurc@crl.com
Subject: Private and Public -- and Quiet!
In-Reply-To: <Pine.3.87.9311081157.A17620-0100000@crl.crl.com>
Message-ID: <9311082039.AA27786@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



> Encryption is a
> social and political issue as well as a technical one, isn't it?

	It is, and I think that aspect merits discussion.  I'd simply
like to see it occur in some other venue, where I can avoid it more
easily.

	I just nearly signed off cypherpunks (and many good people
did) because the list was clogged with pointless flaming.  I don't
want to see it happen again, and trying a bit of restriction based on
technical content is one way to do that.

	Look at it this way: there are n places (alt.privacy,
alt.security, extropians, sci.crypt) where you political types can
flame merrily away.  Where can I go for a rest from the flames?  Let
cypherpunks be that place.  I'd like to see only high-quality
technical posts, and occasional well-thought out commentary and
pointers to the political developments elsewhere.

	I'm tired of the terrible tyranny of the voluble, where the
debate becomes controlled by those with nothing better to do than type
first and think later (if ever).  Not that I mean to imply that's what
your doing -- I'm just gun-shy.


	Cheers,


		- nick


P.s.	Some people get very upset if you quote private email
publically without permission.  I'm not one of those people, but I
thought I'd let you know before you actually meet one.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Jim McCoy <mccoy@ccwf.cc.utexas.edu>
Date: Mon, 8 Nov 93 14:48:24 PST
To: na41418@anon.penet.fi
Subject: Re: Private and Public
In-Reply-To: <9311082141.AA13758@anon.penet.fi>
Message-ID: <199311082243.AA02986@tramp.cc.utexas.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text


Apologies for the political nature of this message.  To compensate, here is
a little ObTechincal:

	So far the Blum-Blum-Shub PRNG has been pointed out to me as one of
	the better ones availble.  I have a copy of a version for bc and am
	considering recoding it in C.  Has anyone already done so or is
	there something better I should consider?  The goal of this is to
	generate random one time pads for a DC network (and the output rate
	of the BBS generator worries me a little, but I want to start with
	"secure" and work to "fast" in later versions.

And now the political:

an41418@anon.penet.fi (wonderer) writes:
> 
> I disagree that income tax is a bad thing. What other way
> does the government have of maintaining fairness across
> income tax levels. Someone who only makes 15k a year should
> not be expected to pay as much as someone who makes 200k.

Wny not?  Are they consuming different amounts of government 
services?  There are really two kinds of taxes, those that seek 
to tax people based upon thier use of certain items and services
(which is fairly constant among all members of a society) and
those that seek to tax people so that the governement can 
redistribute part of thier earnings to those who did not earn as 
much.  

The idea of "fairness" you cite is a very relative term.  Life is
not fair, so why should we try to pretend it is?  The truth is, the
people who really get screwed are those in the middle.  The poor pay
little in taxes, and the rich are either powerful enough (to get tax
loopholes put into laws) or smart enough (or can hire someoen smart
enough...) that they pay very little in taxes.  That leaves the people
in the middle to shoulder the burden.

> Income tax generates too much revenue to be that easily
> dispensed with. Given the financial trouble our country
> is already in, I hate to think of the consequences to
> the budget if income tax disappeared. 

Maybe the government would collapse and disappear.  Not a pretty
thought, but considering how much financial trouble to this 
country has been _cuased_ by a bloated government, maybe something
to consider... :)

> Note: I do not enjoy paying this tax, but I'm glad to know
> that the people making a lot more than I am are contributing
> more.

Why?  Are you jealous of thier wealth?  Do you seek to vindicate
some perceived wrong?  Do you think they consume more services 
from the government than they would otherwise pay for through
usage taxes?  Just curious...

jim






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: cfrye@ciis.mitre.org (Curtis D. Frye)
Date: Mon, 8 Nov 93 13:58:24 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: The "Nymalizer" and Shannon's Information Theory
Message-ID: <9311082202.AA01748@ciis.mitre.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Extending off Tim's comments:

>I want to briefly mention another way of looking at this issue, and
>will use Curtis' comments to start:
>
>> For the past few years I've looked at this issue (author identification
>> through text content analysis) a bit from a psycholinguistic point of view.
>...
>> A 1983 paper (which I also do not have the cite handy for) by Dr. Murray
>> Miron of Syracuse University gave his equations for analyzing two texts (of
>> roughly similar lengths) and establishing a probability that the two
>> writings were produced by the same individual.  In his paper, Dr. Miron
>...
>> The same idea applies here - for CUSUM or similar analysis to be valid, an
>> analyst needs large volumes of messages where one of the authors is known
>
>One can view this problem in terms of Shannon's theorem about the
>transmission of a message in the presence of noise:
>
>* Signal -- the identity of the poster (true name, pseudonym,
>whatever)
>- characteristic usage of words, of punctuation, and whatnot (see)

Absolutely true, though the question is whether or not this analysis
provides a *unique* style signature for a given individual.  Note how
quickly jargon is passed around and how quickly you, in conversation,
acquire new phrases from your surroundings.

>- even the ideologies expressed (which LD incorrectly used to
>conclude Jamie Dinkelacker and I "must" be the same person)

This is where I begin to disagree.  Suppose one or two individuals wanted
to conduct a debate on a subject and steer the discussion to a
predetermined issue space.  By creating multiple identities (as Peter and
Val did in _Ender's Game_ by Orson Scott Card, *shameless plug:  GREAT
BOOK*), one could achieve this or another goal by varying the ideologies
expressed in the writing and foil this style of analysis.  Also, there is a
question about the reliability of context-sensitive text analysis engines. 
If the engine is knowledge base-driven, it is unreliable outside its realm
of expertise; if it's a neural net-based package, the training collection
is very important.
>
>* Noise -- variations in spelling, usage, etc.

The Net doesn't place a lot of emphasis on spelling and most posts/messages
aren't spell-checked, increasing the noise in the system.

>- many people use similar constructions and whatnot (like this)

Again, the "unique signature" problem.  Perhaps one could determine
regional background (New England, Deep South of the US etc.) from this
reliably, though I'm not sure how much farther the analysis could be
extended.

>
>Now Shannon's theorem, which can be applied here if some care is taken
>(that is, don't apply it too simplistically or too mechanistically),
>says that no matter how much noise is present, one can extract the
>signal if one samples enough.
>
>(Caveats: for a stationary sequence, etc., whereas one's writings may
>change with time, with the topic at hand, etc.)

I would believe that these caveats are a significant barrier to establishng
a unique signature.

>
>But to Shannon's basic view one must also add _intereference_, whether
>deliberate (spoofing) or not. If I try to emulate the style of S.
>Boxx, for example, by writing in the form "I am becoming INCREASINGLY
>DISGUSTED by the blatant disregard for the Cypherpunks CAUSE and ...",
>then this "intereference" could greatly complicate the signal
>extraction.
>
>In fact, more obscure correlations would have to be looked at, ones
>which might require many more messages to analyze...possibly more
>message samples than exist.

There is also the question of whether or not current text analysis programs
are capable of making these distinctions/correlations and whether or not
these distinctions can be communicated to the program overseers once they
are established.  

My basic position is that text analysis packages are probably not advanced
enough to reliably analyze more or less extemporaneous utterances
transmitted in the form of email or posts.  However, I second Tim's call
for a text analysis on various messages, beginning with those of single
authors to check the reliability of the system.  I'm just an amateur and of
no real help technically, but there's bound to be someone in one of the
CS/AI departments around the world that could provide us with a reasonable
text analysis engine.


Curtis D. Frye
cfrye@ciis.mitre.org
"If you think I speak for MITRE, I'll tell you how much they
 pay me and make you feel foolish."






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: jon@balder.us.dell.com (Jon Boede)
Date: Mon, 8 Nov 93 15:28:54 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Modem taps/Caller ID
Message-ID: <9311082326.AA20402@balder.us.dell.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> The recent discussions of tapping modem transmissions reminds me of
> a scrap of data I saw about Caller ID [the service provided by the 
> phone company that displays the caller's phone number whenever your
> phone rings]. Supposedly, the phone company transmits the caller's 
> number as a burst of 1200 or 2400 baud ASCII between the first and
> second rings; if your modem is set up 'just right,' you can capture
> the number with a PC.

I don't know if this is particularly true but you can purchase modems
that recognize caller-id and distinctive ring data.  The caller-id
information is printed between the RING and CONNECT strings.  In
particular, I have re-written the UNIX getty program in order to take
these strings and put them in an environment variable before calling
login.  Since the getty actually uses ATA to answer the phone rather
than setting S0=1, we have considered building a database of known
troublemakers' phone numbers and then have getty let the phone ring
away to NO CARRIER when said tarbs call.  ZyXEL makes such a modem.

Jon




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: jon@balder.us.dell.com (Jon Boede)
Date: Mon, 8 Nov 93 15:33:06 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: PC random number hardware
Message-ID: <9311082331.AA20436@balder.us.dell.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Does anyone know of a commerical source (or schematics) for a good random
bitstream generator -- something that you hang off of COM1 and read random
bytes from?

Can anyone refute the claim that you can only generate truly random numbers
using hardware?  I recall seeing a proof that totally random numbers could
only be generated by an infinitely large program.

Jon




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Alan (Gesture Man) Wexelblat" <wex@media.mit.edu>
Date: Mon, 8 Nov 93 14:43:03 PST
To: jthomas@pawpaw.mitre.org
Subject: Mostly offline digicash
In-Reply-To: <9311081957.AA26361@pawpaw.mitre.org>
Message-ID: <9311082241.AA21513@media.mit.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Joe Thomas' proposal to have the digicash issuers charge for it up front
sounds fine to me.  My point was not that we needed a specific theory, but
that we needed a coherent theory to present when we propose digicash in the
first place.

--Alan




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: jim@bilbo.suite.com (Jim Miller)
Date: Mon, 8 Nov 93 15:48:26 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Modem taps/Caller ID
Message-ID: <9311082345.AA29747@bilbo.suite.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain




Practical Peripherals sells a modem that also captures Caller ID info and makes  
it available to your comm program.  I've also seen devices that do this for  
sale in the back of BBS magazines.

Jim_Miller@suite.com





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Perry E. Metzger" <pmetzger@lehman.com>
Date: Mon, 8 Nov 93 15:23:06 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Private and Public
In-Reply-To: <9311082141.AA13758@anon.penet.fi>
Message-ID: <9311082322.AA10161@snark.lehman.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



wonderer says:
> In response to Eric Hughs:
> 
> I disagree that income tax is a bad thing. What other way
> does the government have of maintaining fairness across
> income tax levels.

Why should anyone have taxes at all? Anyway, this is politics, not
crypto. Lets take it off this list.

Perry




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Matthew J Ghio <mg5n+@andrew.cmu.edu>
Date: Mon, 8 Nov 93 15:33:45 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: ID of anonymous posters via word analysis?
Message-ID: <UgrhHYO00awHE1oVdw@andrew.cmu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Just reading this list I'm sure it would be fairly clear that word
analysis could be used to identify posters.  Reread a few posts on the
cypherpunks list.  Note who spells out "government" and who abbreviates
to "gov't".  Some people consistently use one or the other.  Count who
uses "though" and who uses "tho".  Also look at who refers to "anonymous
posters" and who talks about "nyms".  I think you will notice some
definent patterns.  Other possible word favoritisms:
cypherpunks/c-punks
cryptography/crypto
cipher/encryption
America/USA
England/UK
baud/bps
DigiCash/digital cash
Internet/"the net"
information/info
Mail/E-mail/Net-mail

Just looking at the above list I'm sure some of you will realize how
much you favor using certain terms, others probably without noticing it.
 Sorting by subject is possible too.  Notice that there is only a
certain group of users who consistently discuss DCnets.  Another group
consistently mentions the IRS, and taxes.  A different group typically
discusses anonymnity and anonymous postings.  Others tend to avoid
certain topics.  Think about your own postings and realize what topics
interest you most.  

I don't think it would be too hard to establish a "text fingerprint" of
people based on what words they use.  Maybe when I have some time I'll
write a program to do it and see how many different patterns/styles I
can identify.

P.S. Also note the variations in text markings to express emphasis. 
Note who CAPITALIZES, *stars* _underscores_ or Capitalizes The First
Letters.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Matthew J Ghio <mg5n+@andrew.cmu.edu>
Date: Mon, 8 Nov 93 15:33:26 PST
To: pdn@dwroll.dw.att.com>
Subject: Re: Modem taps/Caller ID
In-Reply-To: <9311082230.AA29752@toad.com>
Message-ID: <kgrhOQS00awHE1oWBr@andrew.cmu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Philippe Nave" <pdn@dwroll.dw.att.com> asked:

> Does anyone here know more about this? I would dearly love to set up a
> program on the PC in my basement that could capture Caller ID data and
> log it in a database. Obnoxious callers (Olan Mills, local telemarketers,
> etc.) could be identified easily, and I could program the modem to pick
> up / hang up on those calls.

Supra offers CallerID as an option on their high speed modems.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Date: Mon, 8 Nov 93 18:43:07 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Wired 1.6 is not yet publically available
Message-ID: <199311090242.SAA11545@mail.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Cyphertentacles,

A couple of you have asked about "Wired" and the availability of the
new issue, 1.6. Especially as the first "monthly" issue, 1.5, has only
been out a few weeks. (And it mentions a strange thing called
"BlackNet" on page 32, as sharp observers have noted.)

I've been told by Sandy Sandfort that the issue is not yet on the
newstands, and may not even be sent out to contributor and subscribers
for a couple more weeks....so no point in looking for it now. How'd I
get one, then?

Well, we found hundred of copies of 1.6 on our dinner tables Friday
night at the Hackers Conference. The FinCEN article that I mentioned
was thus a fine preparation for the Crypto panel later that evening.

Speaking of which, it went quite well. Personally, I liked the panels
on "agents and agoric computing," the talk on "algorithmic investing,"
and the demoes of some truly impressive virtual reality work at Sun.
Maybe the crypto stuff is old hat to me. 

But lots of folks were extremely interested, many even claiming it was
their favorite panel. 

The panelists were Peter Honeyman, Phil Karn, Eric Hughes, Mike
Godwin, and John Draper, with me nominally as the moderator.

A "BOF" ("birds of a feather," a SIG by another name) session was held
in the early hours of Saturday, with even more interest. We may get
another wave of new members on the list.



-- 
..........................................................................
Timothy C. May         | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,  
tcmay@netcom.com       | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
408-688-5409           | knowledge, reputations, information markets, 
W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA  | black markets, collapse of governments.
Higher Power: 2^756839 | Public Key: PGP and MailSafe available.
Note: I put time and money into writing this posting. I hope you enjoy it.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: nobody@shell.portal.com
Date: Mon, 8 Nov 93 19:09:02 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: No Subject
Message-ID: <9311090306.AA18162@jobe.shell.portal.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


i've heard rumors that one or more pgp key servers have been shut down
due to lawyers letters from bidzos and/or pkp.

anyone have any facts?




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: ski_man@mindvox.phantom.com (Christopher M. Wisnos)
Date: Mon, 8 Nov 93 16:28:45 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Need Info
Message-ID: <2J2Pcc1w165w@mindvox.phantom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Hi all,
        I'm brand spanking new to this list but I need to ask a favor
I am doing an independent study on Public Encryption next semester and 
need some background info for my prof before the school will ok the 
class.  Thuss I need some anon ftp sites and the such to gather some 
info, any help will be greatly appreciated
                                        Thanx
                                     ski_man@mindvox.phantom.com
                                      ( Chris Wisnoski)
p.s.
   you can also e-nail me any 
   info you have




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Date: Mon, 8 Nov 93 19:33:07 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: TEMPEST, Van Eyck Radiation, and Eavesdropping
Message-ID: <199311090331.TAA18597@mail.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


TEMPESTpunks, 

The theme of TEMPEST/RF/eavesdroping/Faraday cages/Van Eyck
Radiation/etc. comes up on this list every month or so, nearly as
often as the threads about generating random numbers in hardware.

(If you don't know about eavesdropping on computer sessions by
monitoring and decoding RF emissions by the computers, keep reading
this list and the topic will pop up, as it just has!)

Anyway, I found this item interesting. I'm not yet sure we need to
become "Faraday-Cage-punks quite yet, but the articles and laws
mentioned in this report might be useful for someone.


From: mitchell@ncsa.uiuc.edu (myself)
Newsgroups: talk.politics.crypto
Subject: Re: illegal taps
Date: 8 Nov 1993 22:39:54 GMT
Distribution: world
Reply-To: mitchell@ncsa.uiuc.edu (myself)


In article <2bjdvm$6gh@vixen.cso.uiuc.edu>, trh42502@uxa.cso.uiuc.edu
(Dream Weaver) writes:
|> I suggest that this be the last post here, as the topic is going well
|> out of the groups charter. Please redirect, somewhere else.

|> 
|> This officer was in the same way. He freely admited that he was monitoring
|> cellular freqs. My reading of the posting as that he had no idea that
this was 
|> illegal. BAD training, and/or lack of understanding of technology
based laws!
|> It needs to be emphasized to police that just because something is 
|> transmitted in the air does not mean they can listen to it! Ordinary
|> telephone lines transmit, microwave repeaters for long distance & etc.
|> Does anyone know if Tempest or any other non-visual surveillance is
|> legal without a warrant?
|> 

There is a file available from NIST discussing TEMPEST tech, and its
legal status.  It is quite an interesting read.

Anonymous ftp to csrc.ncsl.nist.gov
file /pub/secpubs/tempest.txt

It summarizes the legal status of TEMPEST as follows:

The use of TEMPEST is not illegal  under  the  laws  of  the
United  States3,  or  England.    Canada has  specific  laws
criminalizing TEMPEST eavesdropping but the  laws do more to
hinder surveillance countermeasures than  to prevent TEMPEST
surveillance.  In  the United  States it is  illegal for  an
individual  to  take   effective  counter-measures   against
TEMPEST surveillance.   This leads to the  conundrum that it
is legal  for individuals and  the government to  invade the
privacy of others but illegal for individuals to  take steps
to protect their privacy.

<quote.off> The reason for the preventive equipment being illegal
is that it is classified. (Shocker!)  The eavesdropping is legal
due to the fact that the radiation emitted in not considered to
be a 'communication', and hence is not covered by ECPA, etc.

I am leaving this followup in talk.politics.crypto due to the fact
the as crypto gets better, the best way to 'crack' it will be
through techniques such as TEMPEST.  Even a one-time pad doesn't
help if your opponent can read monitor from a half-mile away!

Anyway, I highly recommend that everyone interested in this thread
get a copy of the file.  Curious that it should show up on an NIST
server.  Looks more like something EFF would be distributing.

-David Mitchell

|> Tom
|> 
|>
______________________________________________________________________________
|> Tom Hilquist                                     
Internet:t-hilquist@uiuc.edu
|> Disclamer: I didn't write this!                   Email for PGP Public Key
|> PGP 2.3a Key fingerprint = 20 FF CA 46 1D B8 CD 55  F7 9D 71 B0 BD B7 B3 B5 






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Date: Mon, 8 Nov 93 19:48:29 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: (fwd) Clipper and Tipper on Route 666
Message-ID: <199311090345.TAA20358@mail.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I was able to "christen" a brand new newsgroup,
"alt.politics.datahighway," with this posting. For those of you who
have announced that you do not like to see political points raised in
the Cypherpunks group, that only serious discussion of the XJ9 e-mail
protocols and their MIME compliance is a worthy topic, I say that a
bit of politics is always appropriate.

In any case, Cyperpunks believe in kill files, I hope.

-Tim

Newsgroups: alt.politics.datahighway
From: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Subject: Clipper and Tipper on Route 666
Date: Tue, 9 Nov 1993 03:11:10 GMT


The Clipper chip, introduced by the Clinton Administration to ensure
that they can easily listen in on our phone conversations, is closely
related to Albert Gore's "National Information Infrastructure."

To ensure that the Net of the Future is safe for K-12 outings and
field trips and that perverts and dissidents are kept off this
national resource, a special chip has been developed which censors
obscene speech, rock music lyrics, and non-Baptist religious speech.

This chip is known as the "Tipper" chip.

(Many other chips exist in this family of "X-ippper" chips, including
the Navy's Flipper chip, RCA's Nipper chip, DEC's Pipper chip, and so
on.)

Perhaps we can encourage the "700 Club," which did an excellent attack
piece on Clipper (yes, seriously, they did), to attack the ClintonNet
"data superhighway." I suggest they call it "Route 666."

As you may be able to tell from my satire here, I consider the Data
Superhighway a boondoggle at best and a dangerous move toward
centralilzed computing at worst.

A few days ago, at the Hackers Conference, I expressed this view to
Tom Kalil, of the White House. He apparently is one of the charmingly
named "policy wonks" responsible for planning our digital future. A
pleasant enough guy, but I don't want him or any other policy wonk
planning the future of the networks.

The free market has produced--and is continuing to produce at a
breakneck speed--a diverse, vigorous international network. From local
LANs to fiber to satellites to a variety of even faster links, there
is no lack of alternatives. 

And unlike the National Interstate Highway System, to which the NII is
often compared (perhaps wrongly...), there is absolutely no need for
the government to get involved. No land is needed (as was the case in
the 1950s when the Interstates were being built), and no centralized
planning is needed.

Do we want networks built and run by the equivalent of the Postal
Service--or by the equivalent of FedEx and Airborne?

A government effort will likely skew normal market forces, lay
network lines in places they are not needed, be built by the pork
barrel procurement policies that have given us so many other
boondoggles, and will turn engineers into proposal-writing pigs at the
public trough.

I say we kill the Data Superhighway the way we killed the
Supercollider. Except, this time let's do it before we spend a few
billion bucks we don't have.

--Tim May

-- 
..........................................................................
Timothy C. May         | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,  
tcmay@netcom.com       | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
408-688-5409           | knowledge, reputations, information markets, 
W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA  | black markets, collapse of governments.
Higher Power: 2^756839 | Public Key: PGP and MailSafe available.
Note: I put time and money into writing this posting. I hope you enjoy it.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Wabasha-Kellogg High School <0811wksh@ties.k12.mn.us>
Date: Mon, 8 Nov 93 19:08:45 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Caller ID
Message-ID: <Pine.3.05.9311082016.D26586-9100000@tiesnet.ties.k12.mn.us>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I believe the frequencies used for Caller ID are per Bell 202, a straight
FSK data standard.  I have a copy around here somewhere & will post the
appropriate numbers unless someone tells me it's NOT 202 before I find the
spec ..... ... .. 

/s/ Bill







From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Wabasha-Kellogg High School <0811wksh@ties.k12.mn.us>
Date: Mon, 8 Nov 93 19:08:28 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Tropez phones
Message-ID: <Pine.3.05.9311082142.E26586-7100000@tiesnet.ties.k12.mn.us>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I'm new.  Has anyone dissected one of the beasties yet & posted protocol,
internals, etc?  







From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: doug@netcom.com (Doug Merritt)
Date: Mon, 8 Nov 93 21:03:07 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Mark Abene (Phiber Optik) sentenced
Message-ID: <199311090503.VAA01852@mail.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


gtoal@an-teallach.com (Graham Toal)
>Dunno if this is how they did it, but you get *perfect* data tapping
>if you record digitally off the exchange trunks...

"Perfect" reproduction of an analog signal that may be noisy and smeared,
you mean. The original critique holds. Your argument applies if and only
if the entire transmission is digital from one end to the other.
	Doug




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Matthew J Ghio <mg5n+@andrew.cmu.edu>
Date: Mon, 8 Nov 93 18:08:28 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Taxes
In-Reply-To: <9311082328.AA09541@albertus.mv.us.adobe.com>
Message-ID: <kgrjf_O00awN8Ab189@andrew.cmu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


ljenkins@mv.us.adobe.com (Luis Jenkins) wrote:

> PS: I realize that this is not exactly a cypher issue,
> so is there a better place to discuss it?

If you're in favor of reducing or eliminating taxes, you might want to
bring up the subject on libernet-d (libernet-d-request@dartmouth.edu),
otherwise take it to one of the alt.politics groups.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: doug@netcom.com (Doug Merritt)
Date: Mon, 8 Nov 93 21:23:32 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Private and Public
In-Reply-To: <arthurc@crl.com>
Message-ID: <199311090524.VAA05639@mail.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Arthur Chandler <arthurc@crl.com> said:
>  Does the government have the right to know how much money I make, and 
>from what sources? The IRS says yes, absolutely. [...]
>  Right now, there seems to be a kind of social contract between us and 
>the government: it protects us, provides free schools, etc etc, in 
>exchange for which we have to pony up a fair share of our earnings. It 
>follows, doesn't it, that the government has a right to enforce its laws 
>saying that everyone must pay that fair share of taxes?
> [...]  What do you think?

I'm a non-standard brand hybrid Libertarian plus other noncategorizable
views, and I agree with the notion of the social contract, but I have
critiques that fall outside anything you said, which cause me to view
with pleasure the possibility of short-circuiting the previous government
taxation schemes.

I think that government supported infrastructure can be a good thing;
I approve of having fire services which are not profit centers, for instance.
On the other hand, I'm in favor of minimizing such things, whereas
governments tend to maximize the number of "services" and therefore also
taxes to support them.

Governments and their bureaucracies and services and laws etc. appear to
inescapably grow ever-larger over time, regardless of the impact of that
bloating.

I see online crypto-banking and related technologies/services as a trend that
will force governments to downsize back to their appropriate role of
providing only the most necessary of infrastructure.

The precise nature of "most necessary" is highly controversial. But if they
can only collect as much taxes as people are willing to pay in order to
maintain minimum infrastructure, then it becomes a system that continues
to stay in equilibrium rather than growing out of control.

In other words, avoid the tyranny of the majority and of self-serving
representative democracy, and create a world in which we get only that which
we are willing to pay for. People will pay a lot for that which is truly
valuable. At the moment we are a long way from getting what we pay for.
	Doug
--
Doug Merritt				doug@netcom.com
Professional Wild-eyed Visionary	Member, Crusaders for a Better Tomorrow

Unicode Novis Cypherpunks Gutenberg Wavelets Conlang Logli Alife HC_III
Computational linguistics Fundamental physics Cogsci SF GA VR CASE TLAs




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: doug@netcom.com (Doug Merritt)
Date: Mon, 8 Nov 93 21:38:32 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Private and Public
In-Reply-To: <pmetzger@lehman.com>
Message-ID: <199311090536.VAA08446@mail.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


"Perry E. Metzger" <pmetzger@lehman.com> said:
>However, this entire topic belongs on places like talk.politics.misc,
>not cypherpunks. I would suggest that it be conducted elsewhere.

I very strongly disagree. The social, political, and economic impact
of cryptographic techniques is at least as important as the technology
itself. Pure algorithms can be discussed in sci.crypt, after all.
Cypherpunks do not have a common agenda, but we do share an interest
in how the future world will be shaped by cryptographic technology.

>Personally, I don't believe there is such a thing as a social contract --
>I never signed anything, and from what I can tell the terms on the social
>contract are ones I would never have accepted.

Incorrect. You have complete freedom as to your citizenship. Any time that
you choose, you are free to renounce your citizenship, and thereby
reject the contract that citizenship gives you. Naturalized citizens
of a country/government *very* explicitly enter into the contract; those
of you born into citizenship tend to not to think about the subject very
deeply, but basically you are simply being granted the privilege of
skipping the formalisms, on the assumption that you either accept the
contract, or will explicitly opt out.

If you continue to accept the freely-granted citizenship you were born
into, then you are also accepting the entire contract, like it or not.

If you truly reject the contract that U.S. citizenship obligates you to,
with all its positive and negative points, then go ahead and give it up.
Put your money where your mouth is.

Otherwise, accept that citizenship is a two-way street, and work within
that system to change it to your tastes, rather than denying that the
contract even exists.

>I would be happy to
>purchase what the goverment give me on the open market -- I see no
>need for government to be involved in mail delivery or garbage
>collection or schools or any of the other things it runs -- from what
>I can tell all it touches turns to crap.

I completely agree. But this is quite a different subject.
	Doug
--
Doug Merritt				doug@netcom.com
Professional Wild-eyed Visionary	Member, Crusaders for a Better Tomorrow

Unicode Novis Cypherpunks Gutenberg Wavelets Conlang Logli Alife HC_III
Computational linguistics Fundamental physics Cogsci SF GA VR CASE TLAs




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: an41418@anon.penet.fi (wonderer)
Date: Mon, 8 Nov 93 13:43:04 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Private and Public
Message-ID: <9311082141.AA13758@anon.penet.fi>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


In response to Eric Hughs:

I disagree that income tax is a bad thing. What other way
does the government have of maintaining fairness across
income tax levels. Someone who only makes 15k a year should
not be expected to pay as much as someone who makes 200k.

Income tax generates too much revenue to be that easily
dispensed with. Given the financial trouble our country
is already in, I hate to think of the consequences to
the budget if income tax disappeared. 

Note: I do not enjoy paying this tax, but I'm glad to know
that the people making a lot more than I am are contributing
more.

Wonderer
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
To find out more about the anon service, send mail to help@anon.penet.fi.
Due to the double-blind, any mail replies to this message will be anonymized,
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Please report any problems, inappropriate use etc. to admin@anon.penet.fi.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: doug@netcom.com (Doug Merritt)
Date: Mon, 8 Nov 93 21:48:34 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: ID of anonymous posters via word analysis?
In-Reply-To: <ebrandt@jarthur.Claremont.EDU>
Message-ID: <199311090544.VAA09471@mail.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Eli Brandt <ebrandt@jarthur.Claremont.EDU> said
>And in the alt.folklore.urban FAQ we find:
>F. Russian/Chinese mechanical translator translates "out of sight, out of mind"
>   into "blind and insane".  Also "Spirit is willing, but the flesh is weak" 
>   as "the drink is good but the meat is rotten."
>
>(The "F" means "known to be false")

I think we were already agreeing that the folklore is false. The
remaining question is 'where did it originate'? My hypothesis was
that it came out of a linguistic research paper giving an example.
	Doug




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: doug@netcom.com (Doug Merritt)
Date: Mon, 8 Nov 93 21:53:12 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Private and Public
In-Reply-To: <pmetzger@lehman.com>
Message-ID: <199311090553.VAA10667@mail.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Arthur Chandler says:
>      Hmmm... my post may well ignite some flames; but I can't go along with
> the notion that this list is for purely tech discussion.

"Perry E. Metzger" <pmetzger@lehman.com> said:
>I'm sorry that "you can't go along" with that, but I'm afraid that you
>don't have much choice: it isn't your list.

Gee, Perry, too bad for you, but it isn't *your* list, either. You
are assuming you speak for the list in your response. You're no spokesman.
This list is as unmoderated as any newsgroup. Your tastes have no
enforcement power.

Arthur can and will post about whatever he likes.

>Many of us have gotten
>burned out from a number of very long arguments on this list, and
>politics was not part of the charter to begin with.

Tell you what...for the sake of all of us newcomers, why not quote the
initial charter? Perhaps it would help us all focus. That could be
a good thing.

If no one does so, then you can expect people to continue posting about
their own personal interests, whether or not it matches your view
of appropriateness.
	Doug




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: doug@netcom.com (Doug Merritt)
Date: Mon, 8 Nov 93 22:03:11 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Public and private.
Message-ID: <199311090600.WAA11575@mail.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


GRABOW_GEOFFREY@tandem.com said:
>As to the gov't tracking every penny that I earn, the only alternative to an
>income tax is an extremly high sales tax.  This is extremely unfair to those
>on the lower end of the wage scale.

This can be avoided simply by exempting subsistence items, just as
current food stamps pretend to do.

This is *almost* a digression from the topics of the list, but not quite.
The connection is that consequences like this and strategies to handle
them are very much an issue when we talk about deploying new technologies.
Crypto-technology will change the world, will he nil he; we can either
shrug off the consequences, or we can plan for them.
	Doug




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: doug@netcom.com (Doug Merritt)
Date: Mon, 8 Nov 93 22:18:33 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: PC random number hardware
Message-ID: <199311090616.WAA14018@mail.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


jon@balder.us.dell.com (Jon Boede) said:
>Can anyone refute the claim that you can only generate truly random numbers
>using hardware?  I recall seeing a proof that totally random numbers could
>only be generated by an infinitely large program.

Assuming a bit of leeway in interpretation, this is trivially true
mathematically. There's a great von Neumann quote that goes something
like "anyone who uses finite state machines to generate supposedly
random numbers is, of course, living in a state of sin."

Use of hardware random number generation does not automatically confer
a state of grace, however. Such processes sample through an aperture
and are subject to the Nyquist limit, the General Uncertainty Principle,
and frequently the Central Limit Theorem as well, which is to say that
you still have to mind your p's and q's quite carefully.
	Doug




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: nobody@shell.portal.com
Date: Mon, 8 Nov 93 22:33:11 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: TEMPEST Defenses and average Van Eck Gear...
Message-ID: <9311090632.AA27475@jobe.shell.portal.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Hi All....

    #1 using personal countermeasures against emanation
eavesdropping IS defnitely NOT illegal.
    #2 So few people have actual experience with Van Eck gear either
the ConsumerTronics Model or the Pk Electronics German Device or
the version made by a firm in england. 
First of all Van Eck Monitor Eavesdropping seems to be a deeply shrouded
subject even for most engineers and for most c-punks.

Its basically a system for reconstruction of the sync signal for
monitor radiation received with a standard tuning mechanism...
It is VERY similar to various Pay TV Decode Schemes mentioned and
detailed in Radio Electronics over the past several years combined with a 
Monitor and a high gain amplified antenna... VERY specific
plans are available from consumertronics for 25.00.

And protecting against Van Eck can be extensive as a faraday cage or
a subtle as conductive Wallpaper. floors, doors and windows...
it really depends on the economic resources of your adversary and
how much of a bother you are...

      Sam Hill
p.s. Careful monitor placement if you have A LOT(at least 50) computers/
monitors can use noise data displayed on non-critical monitors to
mask emanations of a single monitor where critical data IS handled..
$3-25k spent by a firm on acquiring the technology for internal
survey can save LOTS of money from having to Faraday Cage an Entire Data
Center...

As for eavesdropping on bus/circuit emanation we will take that up
at another time




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: greg@ideath.goldenbear.com (Greg Broiles)
Date: Mon, 8 Nov 93 23:08:34 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Nymalizer, politics on the list
Message-ID: <HZJqcc2w164w@ideath.goldenbear.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Will an input-oriented (recognition mode) Nymalizer be able to differentiate 
between the outputs of "actual people" (ha) and actual people as filtered 
through output-oriented (generation mode) Nymalizers? After all, once we 
discover that username 'x' posts using LOTS of CAPITALIZED words and phunny 
SPELLINGS and so forth, it doesn't seem so hard to turn a Nymalizer into a 
filter which would create (or at least describe to a human creator) text 
which would fit that pattern ..

I'm pleased to see that Perry now supports moving politics off the list; his 
posts do make me wonder if he's being spoofed, as he cheerfully participated 
in the econ-flames of a month ago. Still, I wholeheartedly support either 
him or the spoofer in their call to take the politics somewhere else.


--
Greg Broiles
greg@goldenbear.com                     Baked, not fried.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: rustman@netcom.com (Rusty Hodge)
Date: Mon, 8 Nov 93 23:03:11 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: TEMPEST, Van Eyck Radiation, and Eavesdropping
Message-ID: <199311090703.XAA25150@mail.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


As FCC regulations become tighter, the issue of Van Eyck Radiation
will go down some.  In 1974, when we had a Motorola Exorbus 6800
development system; the neighbors could tell what we were doing on it
by the RFI to their TV sets.  My 1993 Quadra doesn't even totally
wipe out a receiver sitting next to it.

> First of all Van Eck Monitor Eavesdropping seems to be a deeply
shrouded
> subject even for most engineers and for most c-punks.
>
> Its basically a system for reconstruction of the sync signal for
> monitor radiation received with a standard tuning mechanism...

More reason to use a LCD panel or EL display.  None of this messy
sync radiation.

> And protecting against Van Eck can be extensive as a faraday cage or
> a subtle as conductive Wallpaper. floors, doors and windows...

If you can still receive the AM broadcast band inside your conductive
wallpapered room, I would not feel comfortable about attenuation
being provided. ;->

-- 
Rusty H. Hodge  <rustman@netcom.com>  A+Plus Technology & Design (714) 639-4949
1407 North Batavia Street, Suite 107, Orange, CA 92667       FAX (714) 639-3311



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: warlord@MIT.EDU
Date: Mon, 8 Nov 93 20:38:32 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: [alt.security.pgp] pgp.iastate.edu service discontinued
Message-ID: <9311090437.AA11307@podge.MIT.EDU>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


This was sent over the net, and should answer your question about 
KeyServers.  The other keyservers are all operational.

-derek

------- Start of forwarded message -------
Newsgroups: alt.security.pgp
From: explorer@iastate.edu (Michael Graff)
Subject: pgp.iastate.edu service discontinued
Organization: Iowa State University, Ames IA
Date: Fri, 5 Nov 1993 21:08:12 GMT

Due to circumstances I cannot control, I can no longer support a public key
server on pgp.iastate.edu.

Please use one of the other server sites for key exchanges.

--Michael

-- 
Michael Graff                 <explorer@iastate.edu>   Speaking for myself, not
Project Vincent               Voice: (515)294-4994     for ISU or the ISUCC
Iowa State Univ Comp Center   Fax:   (515)294-1717
Ames, IA  50011          -=*> PGP key on pgp-public-keys@pgp.iastate.edu <*=-
------- End of forwarded message -------




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: nobody@shell.portal.com
Date: Tue, 9 Nov 93 01:03:32 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: No Subject
Message-ID: <9311090903.AA10563@jobe.shell.portal.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Re the Phiber Optik case. I understand that only vanilla, split-band
modems (1200, 2400 baud) were tapped, on the analog loop. They were,
and still are, common in the mundane telco world.  Throw a bandpass
filter on the upper half of the audio band, get the answer data. Throw
a filter on the lower half, get the originate data. Much MUCH easier
than tapping modern full-duplex full-band modems with echo
cancellation and compression. I know some of the datacops involved,
and I seriously doubt they have a clue about how to handle V.32
without help from the NSA, which DOES know how to intercept them.

Of course, even if the modems had NSA-proof encryption built in, the
victim could always intercept the decrypted data on the DTE
connector...  cracking is and will remain a risky and stupid thing to
do...





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: szabo@netcom.com (Nick Szabo)
Date: Tue, 9 Nov 93 01:48:33 PST
To: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Subject: Re: (fwd) Clipper and Tipper on Route 666
In-Reply-To: <199311090345.TAA20358@mail.netcom.com>
Message-ID: <199311090948.BAA19140@mail.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Tim May suggests we called the "Data Superhighway"

>  "Route 666."

In Unix file permissions 666 means the file is readable by 
world.  Apropos for a panoptic net where encryption is banned
or "Clipped".

Nick Szabo				szabo@netcom.com




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "L. Detweiler" <ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Date: Tue, 9 Nov 93 01:13:10 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Real Identity: valid or worthless?
Message-ID: <9311090910.AA05504@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Many have sent me mail along the lines, `the concept of real identity
is fading away completely. It no longer has any meaning. You simply
don't get it. There are no distinctions between imaginary and real identities.'

But that is not my complaint, that you have an arsenal of imaginary
identities to play with. It is when you wish to pretend that they are
*real* that I object.

Society actually tolerates anonymity and pseudonymity. They say, `if
you are not willing to affix your name to your opinions, they WEIGH
LESS than if you do.' (some may say they are `worthless' -- but that is
their opinion, and they are entitled to it!) We cannot ever change
that. That is a Universal Law. If I volunteer to be responsible for
everything I write, that automatically carries far more intrinsic
weight and `reputation capital' than any monster's tentacle or Medusa's
snake. Identity, reputation, and value are interchangable! And the
choice of whether I am responsible for my writing and actions *can* be
made, recorded, and enforced!

It is not allowable that anonymous opinions be *globally* censored, but
it is entirely acceptable, and necessary, there be the capability for
individual, *local* filtering.

Many cypherpunks denigrating the value of *real* identity and blurring
the distinction of real and imaginary identities are casting out
wretched lies. They intrinisically recognize the implicit existence of
the fundamental distinction between real and imaginary identities, and
the extreme value of *real* identity between the two, while at the same
time denying it all. 

The PSYCHOPUNKS seek to STEAL REAL REPUTATION with PSEUDOSPOOFING of
IMAGINARY IDENTITIES. they would gain no profit if no one trusted any
identity (the philosophy they simultaneously advocate and defame)! they
only gain so long as the system of trust they rob from is in place! If
no one trusted the system (as they exalt and defame, again, as the
context suits them), they would no longer be able to rob from it! In
their deceptive sham and confidence game, they *lie* that they are
accountable for their opinions! And defraud all the investors who believe it!

They understand: the distinction of real and imaginary identities is a
an extremely powerful mechanism that involves intense levels of trust.
And wherever there is value and trust, the criminals zoom in on! ``we
can steal real reputation with imaginary identities by corrupting any
system that distinguishes between real and imaginary identities.''
Nothing but the ancient criminal refrain, ``we can steal money from
honest people with criminal means by corrupting any system that
protects honest people's money.'' Or, in the root form, ``we can steal
money by tricking honest people.''

pseudospoofers are nothing but REPUTATION THIEVES. of course they exalt
the system they rob from! and deny that there is any way to embezzle
gold from the treasury! they even deny the gold has any value! why,
they are providing a valuable public service by relieving everyone of
their gold who is too ignorant to realize it can be stolen!

What utter, shameful, poisonous hypocrisy. I hope you all choke on your
own poison. I have news for you, psychopunks, THE TREASURY IS BARE.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Duncan Frissell <frissell@panix.com>
Date: Tue, 9 Nov 93 03:38:36 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Private and Public
Message-ID: <199311091138.AA22014@panix.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


To: cypherpunks@toad.com

A >the government: it protects us, provides free schools, etc etc, in 
A >exchange for which we have to pony up a fair share of our earnings. 

You should know that there are people out there who would use deadly force 
to resist government attempts to provide *their* children with free 
schools.

To avoid a political argument which some may feel would be inappropriate 
for cypherpunks -- you should consider that social systems are dependent 
on the power relationships among individuals and groups in society.  As 
technology changes, this balance of power changes.  Social systems which 
depend upon the people being weak and the government strong, cannot 
survive an increase in the physical powers possessed by the people.  This 
is a technological phenomenon.

One of the public services that groups like cypherpunks can perform is to 
give both the rulers and the ruled some advance warning of the 
transformations that are on the horizon so that both groups can adjust 
their plans.

Rather than debating whether or not the people owe the government 
information about themselves, you should argue about whether or not the 
government has the technological capability to discover information about 
people.  In the absence of such capability, government "rights" to have 
the information are merely rhetoric.

Duncan Frissell
--- WinQwk 2.0b#1165                         




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: m5@vail.tivoli.com (Mike McNally)
Date: Tue, 9 Nov 93 06:38:39 PST
To: Matthew J Ghio <mg5n+@andrew.cmu.edu>
Subject: Re: ID of anonymous posters via word analysis?
In-Reply-To: <UgrhHYO00awHE1oVdw@andrew.cmu.edu>
Message-ID: <9311091431.AA17374@vail.tivoli.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Matthew J Ghio writes:
 > Just reading this list I'm sure it would be fairly clear that word
 > analysis could be used to identify posters.

Though I agree with some other contributors that iron-clad
identification may require substantial amounts of material, I think
Mr. Ghio's point is correct to the extent that a party can satisfy
itself informally that a particular anonymous post is from some
well-known identity.  Though the evidence may be useless in a legal
sense, that's not a problem in some contexts.

For example, if Bob Scum is posting anonymously some risky notes to
a particular mailing list or newsgroup, it may be quite unfortunate
for Bob if mere suspicion arises that the notes are from him.  That
suspicion need not be based on admissable-in-court evidence; if it's
noted by someone that both Bob and the anonymous author routinely use
the word "copacetic", things could heat up for poor Bob.  If the risky
notes involve some socially unacceptable topics like drug use or
pornography, the fact that Bob can't actually be convicted is
unimportant. 

--
Mike McNally




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Jef Poskanzer <jef@ee.lbl.gov>
Date: Tue, 9 Nov 93 09:33:11 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: CRYPTO DATA warning sign
Message-ID: <9311091730.AA09623@ace.ee.lbl.gov>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I posted this to alt.hackers last Thursday, and I just joined cypherpunks
yesterday, so I don't know whether someone copied it to the list in the
intervening days.  If so, sorry for the duplication.  If not...

This is a warning sign in the style of the diamond-shaped ones that the
Department of Transportation requires on the back of vehicles carrying
hazardous loads.  It will look pretty butch on your read bumper.  I suggest
printing it onto sticker paper and then overspraying with clear acrylic
or polyurethane for weatherproofing.
---
Jef

%! dot_crypto.ps - draw a DOT cryptographic data warning symbol
%
% Copyright (C) 1989, 1993 by Jef Poskanzer <jef@netcom.com>.
%
% Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software and its
% documentation for any purpose and without fee is hereby granted, provided
% that the above copyright notice appear in all copies and that both that
% copyright notice and this permission notice appear in supporting
% documentation.  This software is provided "as is" without express or
% implied warranty.

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/DOT_lw  0.01  def			% line width
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/DOT_bits_xspacing  0.012  def
/DOT_bits_yspacing  0.020  def
/DOT_bits_size  0.75  def
/DOT_bits_xsize  DOT_bits_xspacing DOT_bits_size mul  def
/DOT_bits_ysize  DOT_bits_yspacing DOT_bits_size mul  def
/DOT_bits_nx  1 DOT_bits_xspacing div  def
/DOT_bits_ny  1 DOT_bits_yspacing div  def
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/DOT_bits_yso2  DOT_bits_ysize 2 div  def

/DOT_diskoffset  0.19  def		% y-position of disk
/DOT_diskscale  0.28 3.5 in div  def	% scale of disk
/DOT_fontsize  0.09  def		% size of lettering
/DOT_wordoffset  -0.06  def		% y-position of "CRYPTO DATA"
/DOT_numoffset  -0.34  def		% y-position of "10"

/DOT_inner_outline {
    newpath
	-0.5 DOT_inset add  0  moveto
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	0.5 DOT_inset sub  0  lineto
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/DOT_bits_0 {
    gsave
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/DOT_bits_1 {
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    0 setlinewidth
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	    DOT_bits_ny DOT_bits_yspacing mul 2 div neg  translate
	0 1 DOT_bits_ny {
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		0  exch DOT_bits_yspacing mul  translate
		0 1 DOT_bits_nx {
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			    DOT_bits_1
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} ifelse

gsave
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showpage




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "W. Kinney" <kinney@ucsu.Colorado.EDU>
Date: Tue, 9 Nov 93 08:44:11 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Cyphergurus: Advice needed
Message-ID: <199311091643.AA11260@ucsu.Colorado.EDU>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----


I'm writing a Macintosh encryption application (nearing completion), which,
when it encrypts a file, changes its file type and creator so that the 
encryption program will be launch when the file is double-clicked. I have to 
save four pieces of information about the original plaintext: file type, 
creator, data fork length, and resource fork length. These are placed in a 
resource in the encrypted file. 

What I'd like to get opinions on is _should I encrypt this header information_, 
since its format will be known to an attacker and, in many cases, its contents 
easy to guess? My inclination is to leave it plaintext, since the worst that 
can happen if a file type is known is the same type of attack that would 
_always_ be possible with an encrypted header.

Thanks to all with thoughts on the subject.

                                  -- Will



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From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: jamie@netcom.com (Jamie Dinkelacker)
Date: Tue, 9 Nov 93 09:58:39 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Nymalizer, politics on the list
Message-ID: <199311091756.JAA11525@mail.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


greg@ideath.goldenbear.com (Greg Broiles)

> I wholeheartedly support either 
>him or the spoofer in their call to take the politics somewhere else.
>

Try the Extropians list. Y'all come!

--
................................
Jamie Dinkelacker   Palo Alto CA 
Jamie@netcom.com    415.941.4782 
................................






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Wabasha-Kellogg High School <0811wksh@ties.k12.mn.us>
Date: Tue, 9 Nov 93 08:43:11 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: "Philosophical" politics in technical groups
Message-ID: <Pine.3.05.9311091018.B2921-9100000@tiesnet.ties.k12.mn.us>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


It seems to me the reason some "techies" insist on posting soft political
discourse in thecnical groups is that no one will listen to them in the
groups designed for soft politics, or flames them when they bring up "nuts
& bolts" issues.

Maybe we need a new news thread for people who want to argue soft politics
only with technically oriented people so they don't have to put up with
all those other people who disagree with them for no reason.







From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Date: Tue, 9 Nov 93 10:58:39 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Is Clipper Almost Dead? (was: Clipper and Tipper on Route 666)
In-Reply-To: <9311091636.AA10566@metal.psu.edu>
Message-ID: <199311091856.KAA29306@mail.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Clark Reynard writes:

> I must say I had never considered the possibility that
> the Data Superhighway itself might be a scam; but it's
> an interesting possibility.  

I don't think it's a deliberate scam, just a Bad Idea. On the other
hand, once the idea got rolling (Al Gore campaigned on the idea of the
Data Superhighway), I'm sure the various government agencies made
their comments and meshed their plans for Clipper, Skipjack, Capstone
(data encryption, not just voice), and so forth, with the emerging
ideas about subsidizing the Net to meet "national goals."

By the way, the White House guy I mentioned, Tom Kalil, made much of
the plans to tie the "single payer" health insurance system into his
discussion, describing how one's "HealthCard" would be used to
transfer medical records across the Nets to other hospitals and
insurance company computers, how the NII would be used to "cut costs"
by computerizing all records, etc. Very scary.

(Duncan Frissell, over on Extropians wrote some great stuff on how one
might avoid being issued one of these HealthCards...my favorite: "I
thought I might be an illegal alien.")

> Perhaps the spooks have, as we all know, been buying
> CD-ROMS and grepping 'em.  It could be a conspiracy

Oh, can there be any doubt about this? The "Open Sources" plan just
makes this official policy.

> "Route 666."  I like that.  How does one get
> hold of Pat Robertson's people?  And get him
> to think we're good Christian boys, so they'll
> do it?  I think Pat's _already_ pissed about
> this Clipper thing, and he'd be happy to talk
> about evil liberal perfidy in the White House.

Thanks. My reference was of course to the well-known paranoia the
Christian Right has to "the mark of the Beast" and the growing concern
that an electronified Orwellian world would be the realization of this
fear.

Phil Karn brought a tape of the "700 Club" Clipper piece with him to
Hackers. It was really amazing, honest. The news anchor, a black named
Ben Kinchlow (sp?), was very well informed (contrast him with Dan
Rather or the like) and was very agitated about the Clipper plans.

Granted, the Christian Right does not subscribe to most of our views
about other freedoms in society. I won't get into these topics here.

But we may as well find allies where we can. The same goes for them
RU-486-usin', pot-smokin' lesbos in Baghdad-by-the-Bay. That is, get
folks on the Left _and_ the Right to fear what an Orwellian
surveillance society would really mean for anyone not in power at the
time and thus get them to side against the survelliance society
planning per se.

If you've read this far, here's a bonus news item (a reward for those
who actually read my articles!): John Markoff, the reporter for the
"New York Times" who has written many outstanding articles on crypto
and computers, told me at Hackers that the Clipper debacle is
unraveling:

- that AT&T is pissed-off at the bad publicity they're getting, and at
the confusion and delays in delivering the final version of the chips
(sounds contradictory, but I think you can see how they'd be pissed
that they're catching hell---and for nothing on their bottom line so
far).

- that heads may roll in the NSA/NIST world, with Clint Brooks, the
point man on Clipper, being moved sideways or down to another job.
Sounds like damage control is starting.

- that Dorothy Denning is now almost isolated from her former
colleagues, at least in terms of her reputation, and that she herself
is trying to do some damage control (but several of us think she'll
mainly be the "outside consultant" for the Feds for years to
come...that is, she's cast her lot with the Feds).

So, the efforts of the EFF, various corporate policy groups, security
activists, and even our own group, seem to have paid off.
Clipper/Capstone seems to be in a state of confusion.

We may not have to push too much harder.

I say we increase our attention on the Data Superhighway and try to
kill it as well.

--Tim May


-- 
..........................................................................
Timothy C. May         | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,  
tcmay@netcom.com       | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
408-688-5409           | knowledge, reputations, information markets, 
W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA  | black markets, collapse of governments.
Higher Power: 2^756839 | Public Key: PGP and MailSafe available.
Note: I put time and money into writing this posting. I hope you enjoy it.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: cfrye@ciis.mitre.org (Curtis D. Frye)
Date: Tue, 9 Nov 93 07:53:12 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: ID of anonymous posters via word analysis?
Message-ID: <9311091556.AA06521@ciis.mitre.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Mike McNally writes:
>Though I agree with some other contributors that iron-clad
>identification may require substantial amounts of material, I think
>Mr. Ghio's point is correct to the extent that a party can satisfy
>itself informally that a particular anonymous post is from some
>well-known identity.  Though the evidence may be useless in a legal
>sense, that's not a problem in some contexts.
>
>For example, if Bob Scum is posting anonymously some risky notes to
>a particular mailing list or newsgroup, it may be quite unfortunate
>for Bob if mere suspicion arises that the notes are from him.  That
>suspicion need not be based on admissable-in-court evidence; if it's
>noted by someone that both Bob and the anonymous author routinely use
>the word "copacetic", things could heat up for poor Bob.  If the risky
>notes involve some socially unacceptable topics like drug use or
>pornography, the fact that Bob can't actually be convicted is
>unimportant. 

True, though the probability that two individuals would (over)use a
particular word or phrase is high enough where "heating things up" would be
unjustified, especially if spoofing were involved.  Consider the reverse of
the analytical process -- I want everyone to believe I'm Joe X, so I do a
text analysis of his messages, write my own, analyze my message in
comparison with Joe's, and modify it until the (or an) engine's algorithms
spit out a score indicating that I'm Joe.  Spoofing deluxe!

I don't mean to say that informal analysis doesn't have its place, but we
need to be careful about jumping to conclusions and potentially "heating
things up" for innocent individuals or "convicting" them in the Court of
Net.Opinion absent sufficient proof.  I would agree that these analyses
might form the basis for a reasonable suspicion that a particular
individual is resposnible for bothersome anonymous posts, providing grounds
for sysadmin notification.


Curtis D. Frye
cfrye@ciis.mitre.org
"If you think I speak for MITRE, I'll tell you how much they
 pay me and make you feel foolish."






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Clark Reynard <clark@metal.psu.edu>
Date: Tue, 9 Nov 93 08:28:39 PST
To: tcmay@netcom.com
Subject: Re: (fwd) Clipper and Tipper on Route 666
Message-ID: <9311091636.AA10566@metal.psu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I must say I had never considered the possibility that
the Data Superhighway itself might be a scam; but it's
an interesting possibility.  

With all the hideous legislative work they cribbed from
the Bush clan, a former CIA chief; how surprised would
you be to find that the Data Superhighway AND Clipper
Chip proposals were intended to be enacted almost simultaneously;
to rein in the Internet.

Perhaps the spooks have, as we all know, been buying
CD-ROMS and grepping 'em.  It could be a conspiracy
to establish complete government surveillance of
all computer equipment.

I may simply be being paranoid, here, but in political
situations which smack of unlikely coincidence; one
must occasionally ask the rhetorical question _Cui bono_?

In this case, a number of people stand to benefit;
and, oddly, the people seem to be predominantly in
the government.

I'm not entirely serious about this theory, and
I do present it semi-satirically, as a perspicacious
few may have noted; but perhaps the topic shall
stir up a bit of debate.

"Route 666."  I like that.  How does one get
hold of Pat Robertson's people?  And get him
to think we're good Christian boys, so they'll
do it?  I think Pat's _already_ pissed about
this Clipper thing, and he'd be happy to talk
about evil liberal perfidy in the White House.

Anyone have their FAX numbers and addresses?
----
Robert W. F. Clark                        PGP Key Available Upon Request
rclark@nyx.cs.du.edu
clark@metal.psu.edu




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Date: Tue, 9 Nov 93 11:48:39 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Info on Clipper chip and fabrication of it
Message-ID: <199311091947.LAA03093@mail.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Clipperpunks (Not!),

Someone in the know passed on some information to me about the
Clipper/Skipjack stuff. Here it is:

***begin quote***

An ARM processor will be used as a controller inside the Skipjack & ??
chips (don't think it's currently used in Clipper).

VLSI progammable logic (EEprom based?) is used to both
store the keys, and provide some other logic functions, so you can't read
anything if you take the chip apart. I don't think any other exotic
technologies are used. Mykotronix designs the mask- they're fabricated at
VLSI.

***end quote***

We knew all of this, except for the part about the ARM processor
(formerly the "Acorn Risc Machine") being used in the core. The ARM is
a high MIPS-per-watt processor that is being used in the Apple Newton
and the 3DO game machine.

(I'll leave it to you all to construct some theories about what this
might mean--but probably doesn't--for Newtons and 3DO containing
Skipkjack features.)

--Tim May





-- 
..........................................................................
Timothy C. May         | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,  
tcmay@netcom.com       | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
408-688-5409           | knowledge, reputations, information markets, 
W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA  | black markets, collapse of governments.
Higher Power: 2^756839 | Public Key: PGP and MailSafe available.
Note: I put time and money into writing this posting. I hope you enjoy it.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Perry E. Metzger" <pmetzger@lehman.com>
Date: Tue, 9 Nov 93 09:03:39 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Private and Public
In-Reply-To: <199311090536.VAA08446@mail.netcom.com>
Message-ID: <9311091703.AA15735@snark.lehman.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Since Mr. Merritt has insisted, I will take a foray into this issue. I
would suggest, however, that this is not the forum for this discussion.

Doug Merritt says:
> Incorrect. You have complete freedom as to your citizenship. Any time that
> you choose, you are free to renounce your citizenship, and thereby
> reject the contract that citizenship gives you.

Mr. Merritt, this discussion is much like that of a Catholic peasant
in 1500 trying to understand an atheist, with me in the role of the
atheist. I don't believe that government has any legitimacy. Imagine
an armed gang comes up to you and says "We are your government. You
are a citizen of our government. We will now take half of all your
money and protect you with it." How is this in any fundamental sense
different from what the goverment does? They have a piece of paper
called a "constitution". Fine. I can write a similar pretty piece of
paper called a "constitution" if I want. They have a lot of nice
marble buildings. I could buy some nice marble buildings. They have
periodic "elections" in which they allow an arbitrary set of people they
have selected to "vote". I could similarly hold periodic "elections".
They say they are the legitimate rulers of the U.S. -- I could
similarly simply claim to be the legitimate ruler of the U.S.

Government controls because of a large collective delusion. To the
peasant in 13th century Italy, disobeying a priest would be
unthinkable -- he was delivering the word of God, after all. The
notion that God does not exist didn't even occur to him. The power of
the Catholic Church of the day was awesome because most people held
the irrational belief system that said the Church spoke the word of a
mythical "God". A peasant of that day could not have conceived of the
notion that a man could live his life without any religion or a church
to belong to.  Similarly, the bulk of the people in our country
believe in the legitimacy of the Government, largely because they
believe it is somehow a legitimate entity that they require. People
believe that they need the government the way that 13th century
peasants believed that they needed God. 

Well, millions of people now understand that they can live happy
comfortable lives without a church, and someday most people will
understand that they can lead happy comfortable lives without the
government.

You claim that I've entered into a "social contract". I have never
seen such a contract. I have no idea what it might say. You claim that
I am free to renounce my citizenship -- but non-citizens resident in
this country are also apparently members of this mythical "contract"
because they too are forced to pay tribute to this gang calling itself
the government. You claim that my staying in the land in which I was
born is implicit acceptance of this "contract", but in what way is
this different from a mafiosi claiming that because I continue to live
in the neighborhood which he controls I must pay him protection money?

> If you continue to accept the freely-granted citizenship you were born
> into, then you are also accepting the entire contract, like it or not.

As for your quaint theory that there is in fact a social contract, I
suggest reading Lysander Spooner's "No Treason: The Constitution of No
Authority", which you can FTP from think.com in the libernet directory
tree. Spooner was a 19th century anarchist and legal scholar. Among
his other accomplishments was demonstrating that the U.S. Postal
monopoly was unnecessary by starting the American Letter Mail Company,
which nearly drove the U.S. Postal Service out of any use by anyone
before his company was banned by the Private Express Acts which were
specifically targetted at him. Spooner had many other fascinating
adventures, as an abolitionist and as a promoter of private monetary
systems -- which were also banned, incidently.

Perry




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Matthew J Ghio <mg5n+@andrew.cmu.edu>
Date: Tue, 9 Nov 93 09:28:39 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re:
In-Reply-To: <9311090903.AA10563@jobe.shell.portal.com>
Message-ID: <Mgrx8p600awIE6nVN_@andrew.cmu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


An anonymous poster said:

> Of course, even if the modems had NSA-proof encryption built
> in, the victim could always intercept the decrypted data on the
> DTE connector...  cracking is and will remain a risky and
> stupid thing to do...

Most likely the DTE will be doing the encryption/decryption.  Who would
buy an expensive hardware encryption device when you can write terminal
software to do it?

Yeah, tapping 1200 and 2400 bps modems is prety easy to do.  Actually
you probably wouldn't even need to build filters or anything, just
record the signal and connect it to a stock 2400 modem, then set the
modem to originate or answer.  The modem already has filters to decode
the data, of course.  You have to do it twice if you want to get both
sides of the transmission tho.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Matthew J Ghio <mg5n+@andrew.cmu.edu>
Date: Tue, 9 Nov 93 09:38:39 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: ID of anonymous posters via word analysis?
In-Reply-To: <9311091556.AA06521@ciis.mitre.org>
Message-ID: <EgrxIrO00awIM6nVt=@andrew.cmu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Curtis D. Frye <cfrye@ciis.mitre.org> wrote:

> True, though the probability that two individuals would (over)use a
> particular word or phrase is high enough where "heating things up"
> would be unjustified, especially if spoofing were involved.  Consider
> the reverse of the analytical process -- I want everyone to believe I'm
> Joe X, so I do a text analysis of his messages, write my own, analyze
> my message in comparison with Joe's, and modify it until the (or an)
> engine's algorithms spit out a score indicating that I'm Joe.  Spoofing
> deluxe!
>
> I don't mean to say that informal analysis doesn't have its place, but
> we need to be careful about jumping to conclusions and potentially
> "heating things up" for innocent individuals or "convicting" them in
> the Court of Net.Opinion absent sufficient proof.  I would agree that
> these analyses might form the basis for a reasonable suspicion that a
> particular individual is resposnible for bothersome anonymous posts,
> providing grounds for sysadmin notification.

You can use electronic equipment to disguise your voice on the phone
too, it's just not particularily easy or convienient to do.  Nobody's
saying that this would be convicting evidence, it's like testifying that
you recognized the voice of a caller on the phone.  (Altho electronic
analysis of anonymous callers voices have been used as evidence in
court.)




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Date: Tue, 9 Nov 93 12:38:39 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Are we gatewayed to Usenet?
Message-ID: <199311092038.MAA06532@mail.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Last night when I entered the newsgroups of my system (Netcom) I was
given the choice of subscribing to a new newsgroup,
"cypherpunks.list". I did with alacrity, to discover what was going
on.

Here's a sample of what's appeared so far (a screen in "tin"):

...
21    1  PC random number hardware                      Jon Boede
22       Need Info                                      Christopher M. Wis
23       Wired 1.6 is not yet publically available      Timothy C.Ma y    
24       Caller ID                                      Wabasha-Kellogg Hi
25       Tropez phones                                  Wabasha-Kellogg Hi 
26    1  TEMPEST, Van Eyck Radiation, and Eavesdroppin  Timothy C. May    
27       (fwd) Clipper and Tipper on Route 666          Timothy C. May     
28       [alt.security.pgp] pgp.iastate.edu service di  warlord@MIT.EDU   
29       Mark Abene (Phiber Optik) sentenced            Doug Merritt
30       TEMPEST Defenses and average Van Eck Gear...   nobody@shell.porta 
31       Nymalizer, politics on the list                Greg Broiles
32       Test of this list...                           Timothy C. May    
 

I believe someone has gatewayed the list onto Netcom, which is
available to many thousands of subscribers, including local POPs
(points of presence) in Washington, D.C., Boston, Atlanta, Austin, and
of course all up and down the West Coast.

Is this such a good idea? And should it be unilaterally done? If there
was discussion of this, I must've missed it somehow (which I doubt).

It does look like it may've been a one-shot affair, as the recent
messages to the List proper have not appeared in the newsgroup. Also,
I posted a test message to the group, which appears above as item #32,
but which appeared only in the newsgroup and not on the List proper
(two hours have passed, so it may eventually appear).

Certainly our List is not a deep, dark secret, and certainly we know
the list is gatewayed into some local networks, but I really worry
about everything we say hear being readable by anyone with a newsfeed.

It also opens us up to more disruptive flaming and puerile
argumentation.

--Tim May

-- 
..........................................................................
Timothy C. May         | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,  
tcmay@netcom.com       | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
408-688-5409           | knowledge, reputations, information markets, 
W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA  | black markets, collapse of governments.
Higher Power: 2^756839 | Public Key: PGP and MailSafe available.
Note: I put time and money into writing this posting. I hope you enjoy it.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: pmetzger@lehman.com (Perry E. Metzger)
Date: Tue, 9 Nov 93 10:44:17 -0700
To: "L. Detweiler" <ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Subject: Go away.
Message-ID: <9311091744.AA10163@kublai.lehman.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Go away and leave us alone.






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: ljenkins@mv.us.adobe.com (Luis Jenkins)
Date: Tue, 9 Nov 93 13:03:13 PST
To: tcmay@netcom.com
Subject: Re:  Are we gatewayed to Usenet?
Message-ID: <9311092102.AA11184@albertus.mv.us.adobe.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> Is this such a good idea? And should it be unilaterally done? If there
> was discussion of this, I must've missed it somehow (which I doubt).

I think it is an spectacularly bad idea... 

	Luis




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Date: Tue, 9 Nov 93 13:04:13 PST
To: mnemonic@eff.org (Mike Godwin)
Subject: Should we oppose the Data Superhighway/NII?
In-Reply-To: <199311092042.AA01584@eff.org>
Message-ID: <199311092104.NAA08980@mail.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Mike Godwin writes:

> Before this goes much further, it would be nice if Tim and Robert
> could explain which project, precisely, they want to kill. I am very hazy
> as to what you're talking about.

Speaking for myself, natch, I object to nearly every aspect of the NII
as I have seen it described in the EFF info, the "Whole Earth Review"
article, the discussions with Kalil and Steele at Hackers, and the
material that has appeared in the EFF newsgroups and the new group
devoted to the Superhighway.

My objections are philosophical and broad, not just targeted at
specific proposals (e.g, the "equal access" provisions, the
subsidizing of bandwidth, the support of various special interest
groups).

There is of course no real "Cypherpunks agenda," per se, so my
comments that we should turn our attention toward killing the
Clinton/Gore proposal are rhetorical.

The various Nets, including "_the_ Net," should be further libertated
from government control, not made part of a plan for a National
Information Infrastructure.

There are some parts of the proposal I could support, such as making
it explicit that networks are common carriers and are not responsbile
for content (Kalil mentioned this in passing, and Jim Warren
enthusiastically agreed, as we all did). But this is more a matter of
legal interpretation (court rulings), I would guess.

Similarly, making government documents and such (laws, regulations,
Congressional Record, etc.)  available by ftp, gopher, WWW, etc.,
seems to be a Good Thing, and this could be done starting _today_.

But most other parts I cannot support, especially the underpinning
idea that the government needs to be involved in planning networks,
and that various groups in society need "fair access" to such
networks. And the idea that the government should set the specs for
a network to tie in with the National Health Insurance Plan--a point
repeatedly raised by Tom Kalil of the White House--is odious.

Since many folks here on this List dislike political talk--Clipper was
seen as an exception, I guess--perhaps this discussion should take
place on the new group devoted to the "datahighway"?

--Tim May


-- 
..........................................................................
Timothy C. May         | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,  
tcmay@netcom.com       | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
408-688-5409           | knowledge, reputations, information markets, 
W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA  | black markets, collapse of governments.
Higher Power: 2^756839 | Public Key: PGP and MailSafe available.
Note: I put time and money into writing this posting. I hope you enjoy it.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: nate@VIS.ColoState.EDU (CVL staff member Nate Sammons)
Date: Tue, 9 Nov 93 12:13:39 PST
To: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Subject: Re: Info on Clipper chip and fabrication of it
In-Reply-To: <199311091947.LAA03093@mail.netcom.com>
Message-ID: <9311092013.AA09822@vangogh.VIS.ColoState.EDU>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----


writes Timothy C. May:
>
>We knew all of this, except for the part about the ARM processor
>(formerly the "Acorn Risc Machine") being used in the core. The ARM is
>a high MIPS-per-watt processor that is being used in the Apple Newton
>and the 3DO game machine.
>

Last I heard, hte model of the ARM series used in the Newton (the 
ARM 610 processor) cranked out about 30,000 Drystones and used 
_very_ little power.

- -nate

- -- 
+-----------------------------------------------------------------------+
| Nate Sammons  nate@VIS.ColoState.Edu  (303) 491-1578                  |
|   Colorado State University -- Computer Visualization Laboratory      |
+-----------------------------------------------------------------------+



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: nate@VIS.ColoState.EDU (CVL staff member Nate Sammons)
Date: Tue, 9 Nov 93 12:29:02 PST
To: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Subject: Re: Is Clipper Almost Dead? (was: Clipper and Tipper on Route 666)
In-Reply-To: <199311091856.KAA29306@mail.netcom.com>
Message-ID: <9311092025.AA09863@vangogh.VIS.ColoState.EDU>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----


writes Timothy C. May:
>
>- that AT&T is pissed-off at the bad publicity they're getting, and at
>the confusion and delays in delivering the final version of the chips
>(sounds contradictory, but I think you can see how they'd be pissed
>that they're catching hell---and for nothing on their bottom line so
>far).
>
>- that heads may roll in the NSA/NIST world, with Clint Brooks, the
>point man on Clipper, being moved sideways or down to another job.
>Sounds like damage control is starting.
>
>- that Dorothy Denning is now almost isolated from her former
>colleagues, at least in terms of her reputation, and that she herself
>is trying to do some damage control (but several of us think she'll
>mainly be the "outside consultant" for the Feds for years to
>come...that is, she's cast her lot with the Feds).
>
>So, the efforts of the EFF, various corporate policy groups, security
>activists, and even our own group, seem to have paid off.
>Clipper/Capstone seems to be in a state of confusion.
>

This is welcome news, indeed.  I can see why AT&T would be pissed -- if
it gets out that the Clipper/SkipJack/Capstone combo is a major step
towards Big Brotherism, then their whole "You Will" commertial series
will not be accepted as well as I think it has so-far.

>
>We may not have to push too much harder.
>

Maybe not, but we should not just say "Well, there... we've done it." and
stop pushing all together.

>
>I say we increase our attention on the Data Superhighway and try to
>kill it as well.
>

Agreed.

>
>--Tim May
>

- -nate sammons

- -- 
+-----------------------------------------------------------------------+
| Nate Sammons  nate@VIS.ColoState.Edu  (303) 491-1578                  |
|   Colorado State University -- Computer Visualization Laboratory      |
+-----------------------------------------------------------------------+



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: hughes@ah.com (Eric Hughes)
Date: Tue, 9 Nov 93 13:48:40 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: ADMIN: Are we gatewayed to Usenet?
In-Reply-To: <199311092038.MAA06532@mail.netcom.com>
Message-ID: <9311092143.AA11837@ah.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Gateways to local usenet groups are fairly common for the list.  CMU
is behind one, and there are several others.  The most frequent reason
given is that it is easier to read a large list with news software
rather than mail software.  (I am just passing this own; don't quibble
with me over it.)

What I find most interesting is that I cannot identify where netcom is
getting their feed from.  None of the netcom addresses on the
distribution list appear to be gateway addresses, nor have I heard
from any netcom administrator about making such a gateway.

There are 34 netcom accounts on the list.  Perhaps if enough of you
asked where this distribution came from the answer would appear.

Eric





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Stanton McCandlish <mech@eff.org>
Date: Tue, 9 Nov 93 11:03:11 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Suggested mod to PGP
Message-ID: <199311091901.AA28675@eff.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


An interesting suggestion was passed to me from a FidoNet node, suggesting
a way that might get PGP accepted in BBS-based networks a little easier:

A new commandline switch that will cause PGP to produce it's clearsigning
info, digital signature, etc, as part of a FTSC kluge line, most of which
are "invisible" unless you really try to get at them (in much the same
way that elm will filter out most of the headers, and you have to hit "h"
to see them all).  This would assuage fears of Fidomail becoming
cluttered and unreadable with PGP output.

This reminds me strongly of another recent proposal to have PGP use the
headers, rather than the body of messages, for PG information in
Internet/Usenet messages.  Considering that these 2 similar ideas came
from totally independent sources, this may be a good idea for developers
to look at, since it seems to occur to a lot of people. 

--  
-=> mech@eff.org <=-
Stanton McCandlish     Electronic Frontier Foundation Online Activist & SysOp
"A nation that is afraid to let its people judge the truth and falsehood of
ideas in an open market is a nation that is afraid of its people." -JFK
NitV-DC BBS 202-232-2715 Fido 1:109/1103 IndraNet 369:111/1, 14.4V32b 16.8ZyX
Join EFF!  For more information about membership, send mail to eff@eff.org



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Date: Tue, 9 Nov 93 14:08:41 PST
To: mnemonic@eff.org (Mike Godwin)
Subject: Re: Should we oppose the Data Superhighway/NII?
In-Reply-To: <199311092123.AA02417@eff.org>
Message-ID: <199311092206.OAA14884@mail.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Mike Godwin makes his usual cogent points, even if one disagrees with
him:

> First of all, EFF's Open Platform says outright that the government is not
> going to build the data superhighway. Check again if you don't believe me.

For sure. I have "OP2.0" and have read it.

But it is important that we not think that EFF's plan is identical to
that of the White House. I have not called for us to kill the EFF
plan.

Rather, the "data superhighway" as it is being discussed all over
town, and as White House spokeswonks are representing it.

(Just one example: the need, expressed by Kalil, to ensure that K-12
students have "free access" to the Net. I brought up the fact that
when a "K-12" group ("k12.chat.senior") appeared at my site, I dipped
into to see what it was about. When I made some anti-D.A.R.E.
comments, debunking some of the brainwashing about drugs, I was
contacted by a site administrator who announced to me that my
presence, as an adult, in "their" forum was unwelcome (fine) and could
be construed (by whom?) as some form of harassment (or worse) of
children. I told him to fuck off. This trend is what has me worried.)

> Second, I think it's possible that you may be conflating discussions of one
> kind of superhighway--a government-funded and -operated one--with discussions
> of what kind of superhighway we might ultimately have if private
> enterprise builds it. EFF does not the establishment of a big government
> operation--instead, it wants the government, since it's spending money on
> connectivity and bandwidth for its own purposes, to spend the money in a
> way that promotes an infrastructure that everyone can use.
> 
> Since the money is going to be spent by government no matter what, why not
> get them to spend it in the right way?

Why not work to change the first part of your statement, the "the
money is going to be spent by government no matter what" part? I don't
mean in the sense of completely eliminating government, but in the
sense of just not spending significant amounts of money in the NII?

In fact, the Net is already more privately subsidized than many of us
realize (I don't have exact numbers). The NSF funding could vanish
completely and I susepct the Net would become healthier.

> Furthermore, EFF wants a world of less regulation of communications
> providers, not more. But since we live in a highly regulated world
> now (witness telephone service and cable), the issue is how to get to a
> world with the least possible regulation and the most competition among
> private-enterprise providers, and yet keep the benefits of Universal 
> Service and an open communications system. For EFF, the way to do that is to

Well, I don't support the notion of "Universal Service." I don't
expect Federal Express or Airborne to provide universal service, just
ordinary for-profit service. (I won't belabor the point by listing a
bunch of things people buy and sell--like cars, computers, stereos,
food--and which could plausibly, using the NII reasoning, be provided
as part of "universal service."

These are the philosophical underpinnings of NII I cannot support.
Others may support the NII or Open Platform in some way. I cannot.


> But don't think that, in the absence of EFF-supported policy, you don't
> get data superhighways. Tim, you're going to get those no matter what.
> The only question is whether you get something like what the interactive
> cable companies promoted at Hackers--just an enhanced version of the Home
> Shopping Network--or whether you get something like the current public
> switched network, in which individuals can use a phone line for whatever
> they like.

On the specific point of cable franchises, I agree that the current
situation of forcing all households in a given area to have whatever
the "franchise winner" provides is a disaster. I can think of several
solutions:

- throw out the very idea of cable and telephone franchises; fiber
optic cables are so small and cheap that entire neighborhoods could be
wired with N lines, with auctioned access to the head-end fiber
distribution point. Or, stringing a fiber directly to one's home from
the next branch up on the distribution tree is becoming feasible.

- satellite dishes are coming (from two companies) which will further
increase the selection; UseNet feeds are already available, with
feedback via dial-up lines (one generally needs much less bandwidth in
the reverse direction, naturally).

- ISDN is coming, giving high bandwidth to other services (not enough
for video).

Things seem to be moving rather well. I'm not overly worred about the
TCI-Atlantic Bell types of mergers, as they won't have any effect so
far as I can see in accessing the services I now have and expect to
have.

In short, if it ain't broke, don't fix it.

The OP2.0 stuff I fully support has to do with making sure there are
no laws telling me I can't send encrypted files, can't receive them,
etc. Beyond that, I don't want guaranteed access to other services,
just as I would NOT want others to have guaranteed access to services
(networks, bulletin boards, ftp sites, etc.) that I might provide.

Freedom to associate, to pick one's friends and customers, and all
that.

Yes, I even support the radical idea that stores can refuse service to
purple Martians, to Lesbian cats, to homeless bums, to blacks,
whatever. We may not like it, but freedom to pick one's associates is
as fundamental a right as one can imagine.

Crypto anarchy will of course allow this in various ways. Though it
may not be often used.

As a a wonderful cartoon in "The New Yorker" so cogently put it: Two
dogs. One dog says to the other, "The great thing about the Internet
is that nobody knows you're a dog."

--Tim


-- 
..........................................................................
Timothy C. May         | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,  
tcmay@netcom.com       | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
408-688-5409           | knowledge, reputations, information markets, 
W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA  | black markets, collapse of governments.
Higher Power: 2^756839 | Public Key: PGP and MailSafe available.
Note: I put time and money into writing this posting. I hope you enjoy it.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Date: Tue, 9 Nov 93 14:28:43 PST
To: jdblair@nextsrv.cas.muohio.EDU
Subject: Re: Should we oppose the Data Superhighway/NII?
In-Reply-To: <9311092213.AA03580@ nextsrv.cas.muohio.EDU >
Message-ID: <199311092227.OAA16955@mail.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


John Blair (I think) writes:

> I'm not sure what you mean by "various groups," but I do think that a very
> basic net connection, with minimal services (access to government records,
> public domain postings, and similar information) should be provided either free
> or at a very minimal cost.  It is not difficult for me to envision a day when
> paper based sources of info (newspapers, magazines, etc.) may be impossible
> to recieve in paper format, and when participation in our political system
> will depend on having access just as much as it depends, for all practical
> purposes, on having a stable residence.  Groups which cannot afford net
> connection in the future may very likely become a politically excluded group.
> Its important that we set the precedent now that these basic services not be
> dependant on a certain minimum economic standing.  This is what I understand
> "fair access" to mean.

But how is this any different from providing subsidized or free
newspapers or news channels to the population?

How is a Net connection any more usable than a free CNN channel? Or
C-SPAN, which is in fact subsidized by the cable companies?

If we decide that the government needs a subsidized channel or network
to make avaiable its laws, its debate, its position, then we have just
created a publically-funded propaganda channel for them.

(Earlier, I took a position that making government docs available by
ftp, gopher, WWW, etc., would be a good thing. I still do, but I worry
that the channels would just be platforms for government bureaucrats
to pitch their policies and plans. I have no doubt that when the
commercial networks are reluctant to carry speeches and press
conferences by Clinton, that he'd really like to have subsidized
channels that _had_ to carry him. Of course, few would watch, but
that's another topic.)

So, if we need a National Information Infractructure, why not the same
thing for newspapers, television, radio, etc.? Why not guarantee
everyone a daily newspaper? After all, they need to be informed.

(I don't want to drift into sarcasm about this, as I think Mike Godwin
and others are making serious points. But bear in mind that the
purported needs for communicating with the public are often the
justification for "State Radio" and for the UNESCO-sponsored proposals
to restrict the "private press" in many countries. Put it this way, do
you really want President Robertson or President Perot to have his won
subsidized channels of communication? Perot can of course _buy_ a
couple of networks, but that's not the same as an official network.)

CNN, the Clinton News Network.

--Tim May

P.S. I cancelled my entire cable t.v. subscription several weeks back.
Too much shit, too little quality, too confusing a monthly bill. I
have a sneaking feeling we're going to have about 500 channels soon,
with a couple of hundred of them available cheaply enough. 


-- 
..........................................................................
Timothy C. May         | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,  
tcmay@netcom.com       | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
408-688-5409           | knowledge, reputations, information markets, 
W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA  | black markets, collapse of governments.
Higher Power: 2^756839 | Public Key: PGP and MailSafe available.
Note: I put time and money into writing this posting. I hope you enjoy it.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Dark <unicorn@access.digex.net>
Date: Tue, 9 Nov 93 11:58:39 PST
To: ljenkins@mv.us.adobe.com
Subject: Re:  Modem taps/Caller ID
Message-ID: <199311091956.AA09885@access.digex.net>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


->

 
There was an intersting thread in comp.dcom.telecom about something
called the "Presto Chango!" box, that transmits bogus CID information
after the call is answered, so you can easily confuse most CID boxes
in the market.
 
        Luis

<-

anyone have more info?


-uni- (Dark)




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Paul Goggin <chaos@aql.gatech.edu>
Date: Tue, 9 Nov 93 12:13:13 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com (Cryptoanarchists are Us)
Subject: Re: ISS location
Message-ID: <9311092011.AA19053@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

Bilbo Baggins (an6077@anon.penet.fi) queries:

>As the subject says, has anyone located the ISS (Internet Security
>Scan) on a ftp-site. I have seen the discussion about it, but not any
>sites mentioned. (I have tried archie to!)


As I have posted before and yet again....
Try aql.gatech.edu
/pub/security/iss
 
- --
R  O    All Comments Copyright by  | Technofetishist
 A  N     Paul S. Goggin (1993)    | Cypher, Cyber, Chaos              
  V        Information Broker      | Ergoflux, Interzone
   E      chaos@aql.gatech.edu     | Carpe Diem: Stop the Clipper wiretap chip 
Finger account for latest _Phrack_ | Public Key: PGP and RIPEM available
      For anonymous communication:---> anon32940@anon.penet.fi
- ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Title 18 USC 2511 and 18 USC 2703 Protected -- Monitoring Absolutely Forbidden

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.2

iQCVAgUBLN/44Mjh5TPwiWbBAQHLzwP/Xnke5vfiD8C0GWw6MzfXPdSIQRvr+yUm
mOIsx7FZbeEu78lI55jcgrDZ2Kz4mgROeHVfY3aEG3WnOfisDqH0bsKB6ddvdaW+
cmqRSazNAQkXtIbUYOLeAM+Sa5ziu1rKaBViBfFHWtcu7fHTfzatIxvDtkI1TZ/B
XyavzNIz8Zk=
=9cgw
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: smb@research.att.com
Date: Tue, 9 Nov 93 12:28:39 PST
To: an6077@anon.penet.fi
Subject: Re: Q: Can anyone locate the ISS
Message-ID: <9311092027.AA19328@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


	 
	 As the subject says, has anyone located the ISS (Internet Security 
	 Scan) on a ftp-site. I have seen the discussion about it, but not any 
	 sites mentioned. (I have tried archie to!)

ftp.uu.net:/usenet/comp.sources.misc/volume39/iss




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Lee Tien <tien@well.sf.ca.us>
Date: Wed, 10 Nov 93 09:03:57 PST
To: cypherpunks-announce, cypherpunks
Subject: hearing on Nov. 15 at 10 am in Gilmore v. NSA case
Message-ID: <9311101702.AA08712@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Many of you know of John Gilmore's Freedom of Information Act lawsuit
against NSA, which was written up in WIRED.

In September, Judge Henderson dismissed the case, ruling that there
was no claim for an injunction against NSA for its regular, routine
failure to respond to FOIA requests within the time limits provided
by the law.  

John has moved for reconsideration of the dismissal on a variety of
legal grounds.  The hearing on Monday 11/15 10 a.m. is in Courtroom
12, on the 19th floor of the U.S. Courthouse, 450 Golden Gate Ave.,
San Francisco.  

Lee Tien





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Philippe Nave" <pdn@dwroll.dw.att.com>
Date: Tue, 9 Nov 93 14:33:15 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Usenet: 'Resistance Is Futile'
Message-ID: <9311092231.AA21883@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Regarding the recent question of whether the cypherpunks list is being
gatewayed to Usenet:

1) So what? I have always assumed that anything distributed to a group
   of _any_ kind may wind up scattered all over the globe and may turn
   up in unusual places. If the data is sensitive, encrypt it!

2) [Disclaimer: I know just enough Unix to get in trouble..] From what
   I understand so far, all it takes is one cypherpunk and some magic
   mail routing code to bounce cypherpunks list postings anywhere else
   on the planet. If this cypherpunk bounced the traffic off an anonymous
   remailer, you would never even be able to tell who was feeding the 
   other system. Unless I'm missing something, there seems to be no
   defense possible against this activity.

3) I agree with the concern expressed by Tim May that we may be opened
   up to 'disruptive flaming and puerile argumentation.' The only way
   to avoid this problem [as far as I can tell] is to limit postings
   to members of the mailing list. That's a tough one. Let us hope that
   our coffee shop is not overrun by screaming children...

........................................................................
Philippe D. Nave, Jr.   | The person who does not use message encryption
pdn@dwroll.dw.att.com   | will soon be at the mercy of those who DO...
Denver, Colorado USA    | PGP public key: by arrangement.



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Clark Reynard <clark@metal.psu.edu>
Date: Tue, 9 Nov 93 12:23:13 PST
To: tcmay@netcom.com
Subject: Re: Is Clipper Almost Dead? (was: Clipper and Tipper on Route 666)
Message-ID: <9311092033.AA11285@metal.psu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May) writes:

>I say we increase our attention on the Data Superhighway and try
>to kill it as well.

Does anyone wish to second the notion?

I do.  

I think it would be very important if we could attempt to
sway the Christian right into this; it is certain we
probably don't agree on many issues, and the "700 Club"
anti-Clipper piece was very effective, good video.

If you don't believe me, watch it.  They almost seem
to agree with us entirely on the issue of cryptography.
Perhaps it's time for a _new_ group; the cyphermonks.

I nominate St. John the Divine as a patron saint.

----
Robert W. F. Clark                 PGP Key Available Upon Request
rclark@nyx.cs.du.edu
clark@metal.psu.edu




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Mike Godwin <mnemonic@eff.org>
Date: Tue, 9 Nov 93 12:43:13 PST
To: clark@metal.psu.edu (Clark Reynard)
Subject: Re: Is Clipper Almost Dead? (was: Clipper and Tipper on Route 666)
In-Reply-To: <9311092033.AA11285@metal.psu.edu>
Message-ID: <199311092042.AA01584@eff.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Robert Clark writes:
 
> tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May) writes:
> 
> >I say we increase our attention on the Data Superhighway and try
> >to kill it as well.
> 
> Does anyone wish to second the notion?
> 
> I do.  

Before this goes much further, it would be nice if Tim and Robert
could explain which project, precisely, they want to kill. I am very hazy
as to what you're talking about.


--Mike






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Matthew J Ghio <mg5n+@andrew.cmu.edu>
Date: Tue, 9 Nov 93 12:53:13 PST
To: kinney@ucsu.Colorado.EDU>
Subject: Re: Cyphergurus: Advice needed
In-Reply-To: <199311091643.AA11260@ucsu.Colorado.EDU>
Message-ID: <cgs09Ly00awQE_d0gh@andrew.cmu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Will Kinney <kinney@ucsu.Colorado.EDU> asked for advice on the following:

> I'm writing a Macintosh encryption application (nearing completion),
> which, when it encrypts a file, changes its file type and creator so
> that the encryption program will be launch when the file is
> double-clicked. I have to save four pieces of information about the
> original plaintext: file type, creator, data fork length, and resource
> fork length. These are placed in a resource in the encrypted file. 
>
> What I'd like to get opinions on is _should I encrypt this header
> information_, since its format will be known to an attacker and, in
> many cases, its contents easy to guess? My inclination is to leave it
> plaintext, since the worst that can happen if a file type is known is
> the same type of attack that would _always_ be possible with an
> encrypted header.

So what you're saying is that you don't want to encrypt the header
because it has a known format which would allow a cracker to surmize
certain info about the plaintext which would facilitate decryption, but
you don't want to leave the header in plaintext because it would convey
information about the file format which would facilitate breaking the
code.

Solution: Perform a one-way hash of the data file and use the result of
the hash to encrypt the header.  Then encrypt the file.  This means that
the file would have to be decrypted before the header could be decoded. 
Breaking the code would therefore be more difficult because the file
format would not be known.

By the way, what encryption algorythm are you using?




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Joe Thomas <jthomas@pawpaw.mitre.org>
Date: Tue, 9 Nov 93 13:14:01 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Are we gatewayed to Usenet?
Message-ID: <9311092115.AA29343@pawpaw.mitre.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Tim May wrote:

> I believe someone has gatewayed the list onto
> Netcom, which is available to many thousands of
> subscribers, including local POPs (points of
> presence) in Washington, D.C., Boston, Atlanta,
> Austin, and of course all up and down the West
> Coast.
> 

> . . .
> 

> It also opens us up to more disruptive flaming
> and puerile argumentation.

Chilling thought:  strnlght@netcom.com

A subscriber to Washington-based Digital Express recently asked on  
the digex.general group that the cypherpunks list be gatewayed to a  
newsgroup there, too.  It hasn't shown up there, and I hope it  
doesn't.  Mailing lists just "feel" a little more private, and their  
central administration makes possible some control over abusers.

Has anyone sent mail to postmaster or news@netcom to ask them what  
they're doing?  I'd feel a little funny doing so myself, since I'm  
not a subscriber.  I have asked Digex not to gateway the list,  
though.

Joe





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Matthew J Ghio <mg5n+@andrew.cmu.edu>
Date: Tue, 9 Nov 93 13:18:40 PST
To: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Subject: Re: Are we gatewayed to Usenet?
In-Reply-To: <199311092038.MAA06532@mail.netcom.com>
Message-ID: <Ugs0Vdm00awQ0_d1Bh@andrew.cmu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May) wrote:

> Last night when I entered the newsgroups of my system (Netcom)
> I was given the choice of subscribing to a new newsgroup,
> "cypherpunks.list". I did with alacrity, to discover what was
> going on.
...

> I believe someone has gatewayed the list onto Netcom, which is
> available to many thousands of subscribers, including local POPs
> (points of presence) in Washington, D.C., Boston, Atlanta,
> Austin, and of course all up and down the West Coast.

Well, I read the list here as a local newsgroup on cmu.edu, it's not
uncommon at some sites to do this, as it cuts down on incoming mail.  If
it becomes a problem, we could restrict posting access to "registered"
users, as is done on extropians, but I think it might be a bit premature
or possibly counterproductive to take such a step on this list.  I
prefer reading it a local newsfeed, since there is no digest version
availiable, and because it allows me to keep my personal mail seperate
from the list.  I would reccommend that if certain sites become a
problem by attracting flamers, communists, liberals, or government
authoritarian types, that we could remove them on a case-by-case basis.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Mike Godwin <mnemonic@eff.org>
Date: Tue, 9 Nov 93 13:24:13 PST
To: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Subject: Re: Should we oppose the Data Superhighway/NII?
In-Reply-To: <199311092104.NAA08980@mail.netcom.com>
Message-ID: <199311092123.AA02417@eff.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


 
Tim May writes:

> Speaking for myself, natch, I object to nearly every aspect of the NII
> as I have seen it described in the EFF info, the "Whole Earth Review"
> article, the discussions with Kalil and Steele at Hackers, and the
> material that has appeared in the EFF newsgroups and the new group
> devoted to the Superhighway.

First of all, EFF's Open Platform says outright that the government is not
going to build the data superhighway. Check again if you don't believe me.

Second, I think it's possible that you may be conflating discussions of one
kind of superhighway--a government-funded and -operated one--with discussions
of what kind of superhighway we might ultimately have if private
enterprise builds it. EFF does not the establishment of a big government
operation--instead, it wants the government, since it's spending money on
connectivity and bandwidth for its own purposes, to spend the money in a
way that promotes an infrastructure that everyone can use.

Since the money is going to be spent by government no matter what, why not
get them to spend it in the right way?

Furthermore, EFF wants a world of less regulation of communications
providers, not more. But since we live in a highly regulated world
now (witness telephone service and cable), the issue is how to get to a
world with the least possible regulation and the most competition among
private-enterprise providers, and yet keep the benefits of Universal 
Service and an open communications system. For EFF, the way to do that is to
give communications conduit providers (who also will be content providers)
incentives to keep the channels as open as the public highways are.
This doesn't involve big, expensive government projects; what it requires
is policies with a vision of an open market, built on an open
infrastructure, in the 21st century.

But don't think that, in the absence of EFF-supported policy, you don't
get data superhighways. Tim, you're going to get those no matter what.
The only question is whether you get something like what the interactive
cable companies promoted at Hackers--just an enhanced version of the Home
Shopping Network--or whether you get something like the current public
switched network, in which individuals can use a phone line for whatever
they like.



--Mike






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Sandy <72114.1712@CompuServe.COM>
Date: Tue, 9 Nov 93 14:53:15 PST
To: <cypherpunks@toad.com>
Subject: ROUTE 666
Message-ID: <931109214231_72114.1712_FHF12-1@CompuServe.COM>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
  SANDY SANDFORT               Reply to:  ssandfort@attmail.com
 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Punksters,

Tim May wrote:

    I say we increase our attention on the Data Superhighway
    and try to kill it as well.

Sounds good to me, but if we succeed, would that be road kill?

(I'm so ashamed),

 S a n d y

>>>>>>    Please send e-mail to:  ssandfort@attmail.com    <<<<<<
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Pat Farrell" <pfarrell@netcom.com>
Date: Tue, 9 Nov 93 13:53:13 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: RE: Are we gatewayed to Usenet?
Message-ID: <60874.pfarrell@netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


In message Tue, 9 Nov 93 12:38:52 PST,  tcmay (Timothy C. May)  writes:

> I believe someone has gatewayed the list onto Netcom, which is
> available to many thousands of subscribers, including local POPs
> (points of presence) in Washington, D.C., Boston, Atlanta, Austin, and
> of course all up and down the West Coast.
>
> Is this such a good idea? And should it be unilaterally done? If there
> was discussion of this, I must've missed it somehow (which I doubt).

I think this is a terrible idea. Yes, the list is not secret, and
I expect that half the nyms on it are TLA employees, but
converting the list to a feed on a commercial service such as netcom,
delphi, or digex, is not what I want to see. IMHO, of course, but a bad
idea.

Since I'm a netcom user too, i'll fire up rn from the east coast.

Pat

Pat Farrell      Grad Student                 pfarrell@netcom.com
Department of Computer Science    George Mason University, Fairfax, VA
Public key availble via finger          #include <standard.disclaimer>




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: jdblair@nextsrv.cas.muohio.EDU
Date: Tue, 9 Nov 93 13:53:41 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Should we oppose the Data Superhighway/NII?
In-Reply-To: <199311092104.NAA08980@mail.netcom.com>
Message-ID: <9311092213.AA03580@ nextsrv.cas.muohio.EDU >
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Timothy May writes (in part of his posting),

> But most other parts I cannot support, especially the underpinning
> idea that the government needs to be involved in planning networks,
> and that various groups in society need "fair access" to such
> networks. And the idea that the government should set the specs for
> a network to tie in with the National Health Insurance Plan--a point
> repeatedly raised by Tom Kalil of the White House--is odious.

I'm not sure what you mean by "various groups," but I do think that a very
basic net connection, with minimal services (access to government records,
public domain postings, and similar information) should be provided either free
or at a very minimal cost.  It is not difficult for me to envision a day when
paper based sources of info (newspapers, magazines, etc.) may be impossible
to recieve in paper format, and when participation in our political system
will depend on having access just as much as it depends, for all practical
purposes, on having a stable residence.  Groups which cannot afford net
connection in the future may very likely become a politically excluded group.
Its important that we set the precedent now that these basic services not be
dependant on a certain minimum economic standing.  This is what I understand
"fair access" to mean.

-john.



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Perry E. Metzger" <pmetzger@lehman.com>
Date: Tue, 9 Nov 93 14:33:42 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Should we oppose the Data Superhighway/NII?
In-Reply-To: <9311092213.AA03580@ nextsrv.cas.muohio.EDU >
Message-ID: <9311092229.AA16015@snark.lehman.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



jdblair@nextsrv.cas.muohio.edu says:
> I'm not sure what you mean by "various groups," but I do think that
> a very basic net connection, with minimal services (access to
> government records, public domain postings, and similar information)
> should be provided either free or at a very minimal cost.

In New York City, the effective variable cost of an internet mail/news
connection is $27 a month -- less than you can panhandle in about
threen hours during rush hour, and I'm assuming you never use the
phone for anything else and call a couple times a day. The cost is
still dropping, and will doubtless be nearly invisible even without
any government intervention within a few years. My poorest unemployed
friend living in Hell's Kitchen in a fifth floor walkup apartment in
roach-infested tenement (no joke) has an internet connection via
Panix.

I therefore see no reason for government guarantees of net access --
it is obvious that anyone with even minimal initiative can get one
already, or will be able to within a few years. The cost of a net
connection is far less than the cost of, say, smoking, and there are
homeless people who still manage to smoke.

Perry





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Alan Ruttenberg <alanr@media.mit.edu>
Date: Tue, 9 Nov 93 15:03:17 PST
To: "W. Kinney" <kinney@ucsu.Colorado.EDU>
Subject: Re: Cyphergurus: Advice needed
In-Reply-To: <199311091643.AA11260@ucsu.Colorado.EDU>
Message-ID: <9311092301.AA22739@media.mit.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


   What I'd like to get opinions on is _should I encrypt this header information_, 
   since its format will be known to an attacker and, in many cases, its contents 
   easy to guess? My inclination is to leave it plaintext, since the worst that 
   can happen if a file type is known is the same type of attack that would 
   _always_ be possible with an encrypted header.
   
   Thanks to all with thoughts on the subject.
   
                                     -- Will

I do think that you should encrypt this information.

What if you embed the header at some random point in the file, with
the last bytes of the file being a pointer to where the header is? You
can then splice the header information out of the decrypted stream.

Cryptoexperts: Does this make it harder to use the header information
to decrypt the file? What if you embed a series of pointers: ie.
Pointer to pointer to pointer to header, all of which get spliced out
in the end.

Or how about embedding the header in an out of band stream which is
part of the file - Escape signals an out of band message and
Escape-Escape the old Escape character. Then you could also place the
header at a random point in the file. I suppose that you get
information about the frequency of the escape character (since the
file grows) but that can be masked by appending a random amount of
extraneous data in all files).


-alan




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Perry E. Metzger" <pmetzger@lehman.com>
Date: Tue, 9 Nov 93 15:09:15 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Should we oppose the Data Superhighway/NII?
In-Reply-To: <9311092229.AA16015@snark.lehman.com>
Message-ID: <9311092308.AA16051@snark.lehman.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



"Perry E. Metzger" says:
> 
> In New York City, the effective variable cost of an internet mail/news
> connection is $27 a month -- less than you can panhandle in about
> threen hours during rush hour,

Thats "three hours". My assumption is based on the panhandling rates
I've seen from homeless people on the subways.

Perry




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Mike Godwin <mnemonic@eff.org>
Date: Tue, 9 Nov 93 15:28:43 PST
To: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Subject: Re: Should we oppose the Data Superhighway/NII?
In-Reply-To: <199311092227.OAA16955@mail.netcom.com>
Message-ID: <199311092324.AA04888@eff.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Tim May writes:

> How is a Net connection any more usable than a free CNN channel?

For one thing, I get cypherpunks here.

> So, if we need a National Information Infractructure, why not the same
> thing for newspapers, television, radio, etc.? Why not guarantee
> everyone a daily newspaper? After all, they need to be informed.
 
I note that those who produce newspapers, television, radio, etc., also
use the same highways and the same phone system. Good infrastructure
design unleashes free markets.

> (I don't want to drift into sarcasm about this, as I think Mike Godwin
> and others are making serious points. But bear in mind that the
> purported needs for communicating with the public are often the
> justification for "State Radio" and for the UNESCO-sponsored proposals
> to restrict the "private press" in many countries.

Tim, I think one has to distinguish between "guaranteed access" along the
Local Access Cable model and access along the "universal service" model.
Local Access Cable is next to useless as a democratic medium, and EFF
would not support any guarantee of access along those lines. But
universal service, along the Theodore Vail model, is different.

Remember, we have universal service now, but people still have to pay
their phone bills. And when we get competition in the local loop (a
competition that will require changes in the infrastructure), people's
residential phone payments will, in general, pay for the cost of operation
of their service.

Ithiel de Sola Pool's discussions of how to get government-supported
and -regulated monopolies to move to free-market models are extremely
helpful here. Just sticking with the status quo is not enough.


--Mike




u 

 Put it this way, do
> you really want President Robertson or President Perot to have his won
> subsidized channels of communication? Perot can of course _buy_ a
> couple of networks, but that's not the same as an official network.)
> 
> CNN, the Clinton News Network.
> 
> --Tim May
> 
> P.S. I cancelled my entire cable t.v. subscription several weeks back.
> Too much shit, too little quality, too confusing a monthly bill. I
> have a sneaking feeling we're going to have about 500 channels soon,
> with a couple of hundred of them available cheaply enough. 
> 
> 
> -- 
> ..........................................................................
> Timothy C. May         | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,  
> tcmay@netcom.com       | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
> 408-688-5409           | knowledge, reputations, information markets, 
> W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA  | black markets, collapse of governments.
> Higher Power: 2^756839 | Public Key: PGP and MailSafe available.
> Note: I put time and money into writing this posting. I hope you enjoy it.
> 




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "W. Kinney" <kinney@ucsu.Colorado.EDU>
Date: Tue, 9 Nov 93 17:28:44 PST
To: mg5n+@andrew.cmu.edu (Matthew J Ghio)
Subject: Thanks, cyphergurus
In-Reply-To: <cgs09Ly00awQE_d0gh@andrew.cmu.edu>
Message-ID: <199311100126.AA29302@ucsu.Colorado.EDU>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Thanks to all for the ideas.

Matthew J Ghio writes in response to my question on Mac encryption:

> Solution: Perform a one-way hash of the data file and use the result of
> the hash to encrypt the header.  Then encrypt the file.  This means that
> the file would have to be decrypted before the header could be decoded. 
> Breaking the code would therefore be more difficult because the file
> format would not be known.

Now THIS I like. There have been a couple of suggestions to use random
numbers in one way or another, but one thing I've been trying to avoid
is having to depend on a PRNG in any way (the same plaintext will always
create the same ciphertext, then, but there seems to be nothing particularly
weak about that -- correct me if I'm wrong). I don't trust the damn
things, and REAL random numbers are just too hard to come by.

As a matter of fact, I'm ALREADY MD5 hashing the plaintext to use as a key
verification block (I posted about this a while ago). The first 4K of the
plaintext is hashed and encrypted with the same key as the plaintext. That
way, when the file is decrypted, it can be hashed again and the new hash
compared to the old hash. If the hashes match, the key is good.

So I guess I'm modifying my request to ask for critiques of this scheme:

Encryption:
(1) Prompt for a pass phrase (I allow 255 characters)
(2) MD5 hash the pass phrase to get an IDEA encryption key
(3) MD5 hash the plaintext to make a key verification block
(4) Encrypt the header info (type, creator, fork lengths) with the
    key verification block.
(5) Encrypt the plaintext and the key verification block with the IDEA key

Decryption:
(1) Get pass phrase as above and hash to an IDEA key
(2) Decrypt the ciphertext with the IDEA key
(3) MD5 hash the new plaintext to make a key test block
(4) Decrypt the key verification block produced in (3) above with the IDEA
    key.
(5) Compare the key test block with the key verification block -- if they
    match, the key is good.
(6) Decrypt the header with the key verification block.

Note that in practice, I'm encrypting the file 4K at a time, and only 
hashing the first 4K block to make the key verification block. The
header info and the key verification block are stored in a RESOURCE.
This is for local, symmetric encryption on a Mac, and there's no point
in not using the tools available. You wanna talk to a DOS machine, use
PGP -- that's what it's for.

> 
> By the way, what encryption algorythm are you using?

IDEA CBC, natch. The application is fully Mac (dialogs, alerts, whatnot),
drag-and-drop, AppleEvent aware. Should be pretty easy to make an Alpha
TCL module to call it.  It does recursive encryption of directories or
entire volumes, properly resolves aliases, and knows enough to keep you
from encrypting your own system file.  I've also got most of the work 
done on a compatible text editor which allows you to edit encrypted files 
without ever decrypting them to disk. All System 7 only. The only glaring
omission in the initial version will be no data compression, but I'd
rather get the thing out and add that later.

Expect aroud a month, maybe two before it's ready for beta. It will be
freeware, and come with source. I plan to post later to discuss establishing
a PGP key for my "software company" pseudonym, for source/executable 
verification.

Comments are solicited -- I'd be willing to modify or add things in response 
to cool flames...


                                 -- Will


(Sorry -- no signature on this one...)



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Date: Tue, 9 Nov 93 18:49:08 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Gatewaying to Netcom fixed....
Message-ID: <199311100249.SAA10459@mail.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


The gatewaying of the List to Netcom has apparently been fixed, or
soon will be. The message below describes what happened.

This still does not explain the similar situations which others
reported (unless they were just reporting purely local gatewaying).

-Tim


> Newsgroups: cypherpunks.list
> Path: netcom.com!netnews
> From: netnews@netcom.com (USENET Administration)
> Subject: Re: Test of this list...
> Message-ID: <netnewsCG97IJ.524@netcom.com>
> Organization: Netcom Online Communications Services (408-241-9760 login: guest)
> References: <tcmayCG8oBv.uq@netcom.com>
> Date: Wed, 10 Nov 1993 02:13:30 GMT
> Lines: 36
> 
> In article <tcmayCG8oBv.uq@netcom.com> tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May) writes:
> >
> >I'm writing this as a _post" to a new newsgroup that appeared on
> >Netcom yesterday, "cypherpunks.list."
> >
> >Who created this newsgroup? Do postings here appear on the e-mail list
> >itself? (Hence this test.)
> >
> >I'm not sure that gatewaying our semi-private mailing list, containing
> >candid remarks about smashing governments with strong crypto (as just
> >one example), is such a great idea. It just makes it easier for "Them"
> >to monitor us and for flamers to disrupt the group.
> >
> >Oh well.
> >
> 
> It was newgrouped at Netcom because it was showing up as one of the
> top ten non-existent groups that were were nevertheless receiving
> articles for.
> 
> I just checked with the admin of the site that we were receiving
> the articles from.  It turns out that someone downstream of him
> had gatewayed the mailing list into a newsgroup, but it was
> supposed to stay local to that site!  A minor configuration error
> let the articles leak back upstream until they reached Netcom.
> 
> The admin of the site gating the list to the newsgroup will be
> patching the leak ASAP, so the list activity should dry up
> in a day or two.  At the end of the week, I'll close the group
> down and that should be the end of it.
> 
> Dont'cha just LOVE those funny leetle config files?  ;-)
> 
> 
> -- 
> Netcom Newsfeed Support -- (408) 554-8717 -- netnews@netcom.com
> 




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: ferguson@icm1.icp.net (Paul Ferguson x2044)
Date: Tue, 9 Nov 93 16:09:07 PST
To: mnemonic@eff.org (Mike Godwin)
Subject: Let "Common Sense" (tm) dictate the in-roads for NII
In-Reply-To: <199311092324.AA04888@eff.org>
Message-ID: <9311100004.AA21899@icm1.icp.net>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text


Mike Godwin writes:
> 
> Tim May writes:
> 
> > How is a Net connection any more usable than a free CNN channel?
> 
> For one thing, I get cypherpunks here.

Good point.

> 
> > So, if we need a National Information Infractructure, why not the same
> > thing for newspapers, television, radio, etc.? Why not guarantee
> > everyone a daily newspaper? After all, they need to be informed.
>  
> I note that those who produce newspapers, television, radio, etc., also
> use the same highways and the same phone system. Good infrastructure
> design unleashes free markets.
>

Another good point to bear in mind is that networking technologies are
"empowering" people to voice their opinions in a fashion previously
unknown. Once the "empowerment" issue is _really_ discovered by "the
masses" (tm), the need and desire for networking services will virtually
be driven by this simple factor. The cart and the horse.

Cheers,

_____________________________________________________________________________
Paul Ferguson                                                               
Mindbank Consulting Group                                    fergp@sytex.com   
Fairfax, Virginia  USA                                       ferguson@icp.net



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Grendel Grettisson <mimir@u.washington.edu>
Date: Tue, 9 Nov 93 19:23:14 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Is Clipper Almost Dead? (was: Clipper and Tipper on Route 666)
In-Reply-To: <9311092033.AA11285@metal.psu.edu>
Message-ID: <Pine.3.87.9311091930.A11787-0100000@goren1.u.washington.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



On Tue, 9 Nov 1993, Clark Reynard wrote:

> I think it would be very important if we could attempt to
> sway the Christian right into this; it is certain we
> probably don't agree on many issues, and the "700 Club"
> anti-Clipper piece was very effective, good video.

For those that watch the 700 Club. Personally, I'm opposed to anything 
that gives the Christian Right more power or puts them in the public eye 
more given their past track record.

> If you don't believe me, watch it.  They almost seem
> to agree with us entirely on the issue of cryptography.
> Perhaps it's time for a _new_ group; the cyphermonks.
> 
> I nominate St. John the Divine as a patron saint.

I thought the Christian Right didn't like Catholics or Saints either. It 
is a Protestant movement.

Wassail,
Al Billings

(*)(*)(*)(*)(*)(*)(*)(*)(*)(*)(*)(*)(*)(*)(*)(*)(*)(*)(*)(*)(*)(*)(*)(*)(*)(*)
| Al Billings aka Grendel Grettisson        | "You are, each one, a priest,  |
|                 mimir@u.washington.edu    |      Just for yourself."       |
| Sysop of The Sacred Grove (206)322-5450   |                                |
| Admin for Troth-L, The Asatru E-Mail List |             -Noble Drew Ali-   |
(*)(*)(*)(*)(*)(*)(*)(*)(*)(*)(*)(*)(*)(*)(*)(*)(*)(*)(*)(*)(*)(*)(*)(*)(*)(*)








From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "L. Detweiler" <ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Date: Tue, 9 Nov 93 18:23:14 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: the Amusements of Cypherpunks
Message-ID: <9311100223.AA03194@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Mr. Metzger, premier cypherpunk, undoubtedly derived great ecstasy from
mailing me 16 copies of the following letter, apparently in response to
my complimenting & commending him on his recently released RSA toolkit...

Who was it that said something about `striking a nerve'? Was that J.
Dinkelacker? I forget.

===cut=here===




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Tony A Rippy <tr2n+@andrew.cmu.edu>
Date: Tue, 9 Nov 93 16:43:14 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Usenet: 'Resistance Is Futile'
In-Reply-To: <9311092231.AA21883@toad.com>
Message-ID: <Mgs3Wvm00WB2FoqzMY@andrew.cmu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Dear All,
    A little quote from Mr. Nave: "Let us hope that our coffee shop is
not overrun by screaming children..." 
    Excuse me if I get a tad bit offended by this. I am a computer
science student at Carnegie-Mellon University and I read several
internet b-boards. Most of the time I don't enter in arguments, or
"petty bickering" as it has been called. I just like to read other
people's ideas and see what's going on. I can see you guys getting
frustrated with thousands of repetative messages and postings, but do
you want to sanction of the rest of the world? I always thought (correct
me if I'm wrong) that you guys advocated the open exchange of
information and ideas via computer. Now you guys want to discuss the
advantages of free computer forums while excluding anyone else from your
little discussion? Sounds slightly hypocritical. 

                                    A Screaming Child,
                                                Tony Rippy
                                                tr2n+@andrew.cmu.edu




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Wabasha-Kellogg High School <0811wksh@ties.k12.mn.us>
Date: Tue, 9 Nov 93 17:49:07 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Cost of Internet (was: Should we oppose ... Superhighway)
Message-ID: <Pine.3.05.9311091903.C3662-b100000@tiesnet.ties.k12.mn.us>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Please don't confuse New York with the vast reaches of Rural America.  ALL
Internet access is a long distance call from many many location in the
world, including here.

I would *love to have a free national net available, 'cause I think I know
how to use it.  Others might abuse it, but I woul work the heck out of it.



---------- Forwarded message ----------
Date: Tue, 09 Nov 1993 17:29:18 -0500
From: "Perry E. Metzger" <pmetzger@lehman.com>
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Should we oppose the Data Superhighway/NII? 


jdblair@nextsrv.cas.muohio.edu says:
> I'm not sure what you mean by "various groups," but I do think that
> a very basic net connection, with minimal services (access to
> government records, public domain postings, and similar information)
> should be provided either free or at a very minimal cost.

In New York City, the effective variable cost of an internet mail/news
connection is $27 a month -- less than you can panhandle in about
threen hours during rush hour, and I'm assuming you never use the
phone for anything else and call a couple times a day. The cost is
still dropping, and will doubtless be nearly invisible even without
any government intervention within a few years. My poorest unemployed
friend living in Hell's Kitchen in a fifth floor walkup apartment in
roach-infested tenement (no joke) has an internet connection via
Panix.

I therefore see no reason for government guarantees of net access --
it is obvious that anyone with even minimal initiative can get one
already, or will be able to within a few years. The cost of a net
connection is far less than the cost of, say, smoking, and there are
homeless people who still manage to smoke.

Perry







From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: an6077@anon.penet.fi (Bilbo Baggins)
Date: Tue, 9 Nov 93 11:44:13 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Q: Can anyone locate the ISS
Message-ID: <9311091943.AA27913@anon.penet.fi>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



As the subject says, has anyone located the ISS (Internet Security 
Scan) on a ftp-site. I have seen the discussion about it, but not any 
sites mentioned. (I have tried archie to!)

Thanks in advance.

-------------------------------------------------------------------------
To find out more about the anon service, send mail to help@anon.penet.fi.
Due to the double-blind, any mail replies to this message will be anonymized,
and an anonymous id will be allocated automatically. You have been warned.
Please report any problems, inappropriate use etc. to admin@anon.penet.fi.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: doug@netcom.com (Doug Merritt)
Date: Tue, 9 Nov 93 20:03:14 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Private and Public
In-Reply-To: <pmetzger@lehman.com>
Message-ID: <199311100400.UAA06914@mail.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


--- Forwarded mail from pmetzger@lehman.com

>From owner-cypherpunks@toad.com Tue Nov  9 09:15:40 1993
Return-Path: <owner-cypherpunks@toad.com>
Received: from relay2.UU.NET by mail.netcom.com (8.6.4/SMI-4.1/Netcom)
	id JAA12727; Tue, 9 Nov 1993 09:15:36 -0800
Received: from toad.com by relay2.UU.NET with SMTP 
	(5.61/UUNET-internet-primary) id AA04858; Tue, 9 Nov 93 12:13:54 -0500
Received: by toad.com id AA17446; Tue, 9 Nov 93 09:03:39 PST
Received: by toad.com id AA17443; Tue, 9 Nov 93 09:03:11 PST
Received: from lehman.com ([192.147.66.1]) by toad.com id AA17438; Tue, 9 Nov 93 09:03:06 PST
"Perry E. Metzger" <pmetzger@lehman.com> said:
>Since Mr. Merritt has insisted, I will take a foray into this issue. I
>would suggest, however, that this is not the forum for this discussion.

Ok...I'll desist after a brief comment: I actually don't disagree with
any of the major points you make when you put it that way -- although
some of the other things I call minor points you might call major points :-)

I think I do have some quibbles which would probably turn *into* serious
disagreement, but even I would say that raising those things would take us
far afield, so I'll leave it at that.

P.S. This is ad hominem...tsk, tsk:

>Mr. Merritt, this discussion is much like that of a Catholic peasant
>in 1500 trying to understand an atheist, with me in the role of the
>atheist.
	Doug




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: jim@bilbo.suite.com (Jim Miller)
Date: Tue, 9 Nov 93 18:08:45 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: sarcastic quote
Message-ID: <9311100205.AA23361@bilbo.suite.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain





There is much to be said in favor of modern journalism.  By giving us the  
opinions of the uneducated, it keeps us in touch with the ignorance of the  
community.

	- Oscar Wilde


Seems an appropriate quote for today.


ObRhetoricalClipper:

How do the key escrow agencies confirm that the LEAF presented with a warrant  
is from a line that was legally tapped?


Jim_Miller@suite.com





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: doug@netcom.com (Doug Merritt)
Date: Tue, 9 Nov 93 20:08:45 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Info on Clipper chip and fabrication of it
Message-ID: <199311100408.UAA07785@mail.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May) quoted someone else saying:
>VLSI progammable logic (EEprom based?) is used to both
>store the keys, and provide some other logic functions, so you can't read
>anything if you take the chip apart. I don't think any other exotic
>technologies are used. Mykotronix designs the mask- they're fabricated at
>VLSI.

What about triple layer metal interconnect? If they're serious about
making it reverse-engineering-resistant, they'd do that even if it
weren't functionally needed, simply to make it STM-opaque. I think (but
am not sure) that VLSI has that technology in their current fab lines.

I suppose that it's not quite "exotic" by now; maybe that's just assumed
as obvious?
	Doug




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: doug@netcom.com (Doug Merritt)
Date: Tue, 9 Nov 93 20:18:44 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Are we gatewayed to Usenet?
Message-ID: <199311100415.UAA08381@mail.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May) said:
>Certainly our List is not a deep, dark secret, and certainly we know
>the list is gatewayed into some local networks, but I really worry
>about everything we say hear being readable by anyone with a newsfeed.
>
>It also opens us up to more disruptive flaming and puerile
>argumentation.

Agreed. There are a fair number of topics that I don't care to
discuss in a newsgroup where J. Random Luser might briefly drop in, but that
I'm willing to talk about in a mail list, where there is a psychological
barrier plus time delay and general perceived effort etc to join.
	Doug




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: doug@netcom.com (Doug Merritt)
Date: Tue, 9 Nov 93 20:33:15 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Should we oppose the Data Superhighway/NII?
In-Reply-To: <mnemonic@eff.org>
Message-ID: <199311100431.UAA10101@mail.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Mike Godwin <mnemonic@eff.org> said:
>First of all, EFF's Open Platform says outright that the government is not
>going to build the data superhighway. Check again if you don't believe me.

Ah...do you mean "should not build", or do you really mean that it contains
a discussion outlining the logic behind predicting that they *won't*
build?

>The only question is whether you get something like what the interactive
>cable companies promoted at Hackers--just an enhanced version of the Home
>Shopping Network--or whether you get something like the current public
>switched network, in which individuals can use a phone line for whatever
>they like.

<shudder> I skipped that session because I was already bored to tears with
the prospect of "playing football from home while watching it on tv"
and by that of 500 pay-per-view-channels. Were they really boosting
HSN-type stuff? How completely evil!

I'm still dismayed by the recent FCC decision that HSN channels are included
in the category of (paraphrased) "for the public good". Was this due to
corruption, or merely a sharp drop in collective FCC IQ?
	Doug




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Date: Tue, 9 Nov 93 20:48:47 PST
To: unicorn@access.digex.net (Dark)
Subject: Re: Are we gatewayed to Usenet?
In-Reply-To: <199311100437.AA05249@access.digex.net>
Message-ID: <199311100447.UAA18671@mail.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Some Dark thoughts:

> Even today, what recourse do we have to keep the circulation
> of the list minimal, and (egads) filter the readers such
> to keep bandwidth low and flame / agitator disruption to a min.?
> 
> Doesn't this smack of censorship, and if so where's the line
> between censorship and exclusivity, and is cypherpunks
> even really exclusive?  It was nice before the summer when
> the list was a little less well known and it had that
> "private feel" that I think T. May was talking about.
> 
> Is there a basic conflict between impact power of the list
> as a political sway force and that personal feel?

Some very good points.

Eric reports that there are more than 550 subscribers. No doubt many
will drop off, for a variety of reasons, but the number seems to be
consistently edging higher.

We can think of conflicting goals for the membership:

* as many people as possible, to help spread the word, to get local
groups formed, etc.

* more selective, more elitist.

Which is preferable? At what point does a group like ours get so
extended, so large, that all sense of community is lost and we're just
each doing our own thing?

Hard questions to answer, so we'll probably just continue on as we
are. 

--Tim May


-- 
..........................................................................
Timothy C. May         | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,  
tcmay@netcom.com       | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
408-688-5409           | knowledge, reputations, information markets, 
W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA  | black markets, collapse of governments.
Higher Power: 2^756839 | Public Key: PGP and MailSafe available.
Note: I put time and money into writing this posting. I hope you enjoy it.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: doug@netcom.com (Doug Merritt)
Date: Tue, 9 Nov 93 20:53:17 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Should we oppose the Data Superhighway/NII?v
Message-ID: <199311100450.UAA11942@mail.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
>Freedom to associate, to pick one's friends and customers, and all
>that.
>
>Yes, I even support the radical idea that stores can refuse service to
>purple Martians, to Lesbian cats, to homeless bums, to blacks,
>whatever. We may not like it, but freedom to pick one's associates is
>as fundamental a right as one can imagine.

On that subject: my company receives substantial money from a government
agency (that prefers that we call it "DARPA" in public), to develop
technologies that are up our alley but not otherwise commercially viable.
That is, they're paying us to adapt our commercial technology to
applications that don't pay off in the market place, because they want
those non-viable applications for their own use.

As a result of this, it turns out that the government requires all
contractors and subcontractors to undergo not just financial audits,
but also Equal Opportunity Employment audits.

In preparing for an audit of that sort, we discovered that, not only
is it a Bad Thing to discriminate on the basis of race, sex, etc, etc,
which we all know by now, but it is also a Bad Thing to discriminate
on the basis of *personality*. To turn away an interviewee because they
would not fit into the existing group personality-wise apparently is
a Very Bad Thing Indeed.

I was flabbergasted. I had no idea that political correctness of this
extreme had been enshrined into federal policy.

On the flip side of the issue, I admit that I can see the point that
even...ah...personality-challenged people need to work so they can eat.
But still...yikes!

There go your "fundamental rights". Granted this (as far as I know) only
applies to government contractors at the moment. But what do you want to
bet but that this will soon apply to all businesses?
	Doug




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Philippe Nave" <pdn@dwroll.dw.att.com>
Date: Tue, 9 Nov 93 19:58:44 PST
To: tr2n+@andrew.cmu.edu (Tony A Rippy)
Subject: Re: 'Resistance Is Futile'
In-Reply-To: <Mgs3Wvm00WB2FoqzMY@andrew.cmu.edu>
Message-ID: <9311100357.AA27911@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> 
> Dear All,
>     A little quote from Mr. Nave: "Let us hope that our coffee shop is
> not overrun by screaming children..." 
>     Excuse me if I get a tad bit offended by this. I am a computer
> science student at Carnegie-Mellon University and I read several
> internet b-boards. Most of the time I don't enter in arguments, or
> "petty bickering" as it has been called. I just like to read other
> people's ideas and see what's going on. I can see you guys getting
> frustrated with thousands of repetative messages and postings, but do
> you want to sanction of the rest of the world? I always thought (correct
> me if I'm wrong) that you guys advocated the open exchange of
> information and ideas via computer. Now you guys want to discuss the
> advantages of free computer forums while excluding anyone else from your
> little discussion? Sounds slightly hypocritical. 
> 
>                                     A Screaming Child,
>                                                 Tony Rippy
>                                                 tr2n+@andrew.cmu.edu
> 

You're right. That _was_ a particularly stupid remark. I apologize.

........................................................................
Philippe D. Nave, Jr.   | The person who does not use message encryption
pdn@dwroll.dw.att.com   | will soon be at the mercy of those who DO...
Denver, Colorado USA    | PGP public key: by arrangement.



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Perry E. Metzger" <pmetzger@lehman.com>
Date: Tue, 9 Nov 93 18:03:14 PST
To: Wabasha-Kellogg High School <0811wksh@ties.k12.mn.us>
Subject: Re: Cost of Internet (was: Should we oppose ... Superhighway)
In-Reply-To: <Pine.3.05.9311091903.C3662-b100000@tiesnet.ties.k12.mn.us>
Message-ID: <9311100202.AA16445@snark.lehman.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Wabasha-Kellogg High School says:
> Please don't confuse New York with the vast reaches of Rural America.  ALL
> Internet access is a long distance call from many many location in the
> world, including here.

It won't be long distance in five years (probably not even in two
years), and thats without any government help at all.

Perry




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: hughes@ah.com (Eric Hughes)
Date: Tue, 9 Nov 93 23:23:29 -0700
To: ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu
Subject: the Amusements of Cypherpunks
Message-ID: <9311100622.AA12657@ah.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Posting private mail you have received, however rude, onto the
cypherpunks list is unwelcome and annoying behavior.  Please do not
continue to do this and other disruptive behavior.

Eric






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: hughes@ah.com (Eric Hughes)
Date: Tue, 9 Nov 93 22:53:47 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: How long before Mr. Hughes CENSORS me?
In-Reply-To: <9311100629.AA08037@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Message-ID: <9311100652.AA12723@ah.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I have forwarded the recent ld231782 posting to the relevant
postmaster.  There is no need for others to do likewise, although at
this point I definitely think other complaints are in order.

Eric




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "L. Detweiler" <ld231782>
Date: Tue, 9 Nov 93 23:27:32 -0700
To: hughes@ah.com (Eric Hughes)
Subject: Re: the Amusements of Cypherpunks
In-Reply-To: <9311100622.AA12657@ah.com>
Message-ID: <9311100627.AA07964@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Mr. Hughes, I was myself subject to `rude and unwelcome and annoying
behavior' -- a mini mail bomb, which I attempted to shame the sender
into refraining from in reporting it to the mailing list as a whole.
You explicitly condone such atrocious behavior in your outrageous
response to myself and my postmaster.





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "L. Detweiler" <ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Date: Tue, 9 Nov 93 22:33:16 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: How long before Mr. Hughes CENSORS me?
Message-ID: <9311100629.AA08037@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Dark <unicorn@access.digex.net>
Date: Tue, 9 Nov 93 20:38:47 PST
To: tcmay@netcom.com
Subject: Re: Are we gatewayed to Usenet?
Message-ID: <199311100437.AA05249@access.digex.net>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


This brings up the question,

In the event _the net_ were centralized, and not a disperate
entity, how might selective distrubution be affected?

->
I would reccommend that if certain sites become a
problem by attracting flamers, communists, liberals, or government
authoritarian types, that we could remove them on a case-by-case basis.
<-

In the event this became a problem, how might a theoretically
"private" or "psuedo-private" (constructively private?)
newsletter/mailing list be restricted.

Even today, what recourse do we have to keep the circulation
of the list minimal, and (egads) filter the readers such
to keep bandwidth low and flame / agitator disruption to a min.?

Doesn't this smack of censorship, and if so where's the line
between censorship and exclusivity, and is cypherpunks
even really exclusive?  It was nice before the summer when
the list was a little less well known and it had that
"private feel" that I think T. May was talking about.

Is there a basic conflict between impact power of the list
as a political sway force and that personal feel?




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: szabo@netcom.com (Nick Szabo)
Date: Tue, 9 Nov 93 23:54:12 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Welcome to the Data Highway
In-Reply-To: <199311091856.KAA29306@mail.netcom.com>
Message-ID: <199311100754.XAA06086@mail.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Welcome to the Information Highway.  Please obey the posted
opinion limits.  Our Internet Fairness Doctrine ensures that
both sides of an argument will be heard.  Our poster's licensing
system ensures that the undemocratic practice of "pseudospoofing" is
eliminated from the data highways, just as driver's licensing
ensures maximimum safety and minimum pollution of our vehicular
highways.  Remember, posting on the Highway is a privilege, not a 
right.

Gore/Detweiler in '00,
-- 
Nick Szabo					 szabo@netcom.com




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Dark <unicorn@access.digex.net>
Date: Tue, 9 Nov 93 20:58:48 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Clipper/  Dead?
Message-ID: <199311100455.AA09340@access.digex.net>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



From: nate@vis.colostate.edu (CVL staff member Nate Sammons)
->

 
This is welcome news, indeed.  I can see why AT&T would be pissed -- if
it gets out that the Clipper/SkipJack/Capstone combo is a major step
towards Big Brotherism, then their whole "You Will" commertial series
will not be accepted as well as I think it has so-far.
 
<-

Time to pat myself on the back.
:)

Way back just before Clipper was announced loudly, AT&T (who knew
very well at the time that they were going to actively back
Clipper) was running the individual plan ads.  You know the ones,
with Aretha Franklin chanting out "Freedom....Freedom...FREEDOM."

Individual plan?
Freedom?
You Will?

AT&T knew all along it might be a damage control project.
Same way Dow Chemical began running ads before their
new project on Binary weapons was outed.

What you have here is a company that is trying to portray itself
as a maverick in liberating technology that talks out of both
sides of its corporate mouth.

I mentioned it at the time too here.
(You heard it here first.)

:)


-uni- (Dark)




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "L. Detweiler" <ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Date: Tue, 9 Nov 93 23:03:17 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: put me in your kill file
Message-ID: <9311100701.AA08606@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Earlier I suggested that Mr. Hughes had put me in his kill file. I
actually had misinterpreted another message from another eminent
cypherpunk (involved in MacPGP developement) who quoted Mr. Hughes and
then his own indication that he was putting me in his kill file in my
mail. Sorry for the confusion. Quite to the contrary, as recent events
demonstrate, Mr. Hughes has had the great courtesy and kindness to
continue to listen to my posts, even though I'm obviously very
personally rattled and these postings obviously upset him a great deal.
A true model of humanity and compassion to a troubled soul. My personal
and humble thanks, Mr. Hughes. You've been a guiding light and an
inspiration to me these last few weeks.

For everyone else who can't stand me, let me suggest that putting me in
your kill files will save you lots of exasperation. I certainly believe
it is a far more mature and sensible approach than a puerile stunt like
mini-mailbombing me. I fear that others are escalating a sensitive but
frivolous situation to rather extreme and inappropriate levels, with a
lot of intense emotionalism.

BTW, there is no need to inform me that I am in your kill file. That
would be rather pointless and defeat the purpose of defeating communication!

===cut=here===

---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The following has nothing to do with writing code, but hopefully posting
this will get me back on track....  I wrote this several weeks ago and have
been sitting on it ever since.

L. Detweiler's contributions of late have made me re-examine my feelings on
a variety of email- and cyberspace-related issues.

I very strongly believe that everyone has an inaliable right to express
themselves, as long as that expression doesn't harm others or impede their
ability to express *themselves*.

Up to now the amount of trash-mail (as I determine it) has been less than
ten percent of my mail, an amount I equate with the real-world equivalent
of billboards and junk-mail.  L. Detweiler's uncanny ability to craft
flame-bait and get the CypherPunks to respond has increased the trash-mail
percentage to the point where it's entered my awareness.

Torn between respect for someone who has a reputation for having made
contributions, worry about someone who seems to have a slim grasp on the
reality I'm experiencing, and annoyance at getting scores of ranting
incoherent messages, I've made a decision that I've never made before: to
put someone (L. Detweiler) into my kill-file.  This bothers me a great
deal.

But there it is.

----------------
To L. Detweiler:  I'm sorry, but your style, content, and quantity values
have gotten to the point where it seems unrewarding to deal with you.  The
decision to banish you bothers me a great deal, but not as much as reading
your mail does.  If you're sincere about the biblical amount of pain you
are in, I gently suggest (in my capacity as an EMT with some
crisis-intervention experience) that you talk about your pain to a
qualified person, perhaps an MFCC.  If you're doing all this to get a
reaction (for maybe a book) like Don Novello's Lazlo character of the last
three decades (and several books), then congratulations.





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: jrk@sys.uea.ac.uk
Date: Tue, 9 Nov 93 16:08:44 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re:  Are we gatewayed to Usenet?
Message-ID: <26944.9311100009@zen.sys.uea.ac.uk>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I also noticed the cypherpunks list show up at nyx.cs.du.edu as a Usenet
newsgroup called mail.cypherpunks.

--                                  ____
Richard Kennaway                  __\_ /    School of Information Systems
Internet:  jrk@sys.uea.ac.uk      \  X/     University of East Anglia
uucp:  ...mcsun!ukc!uea-sys!jrk    \/       Norwich NR4 7TJ, U.K.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Mike Godwin <mnemonic@eff.org>
Date: Tue, 9 Nov 93 21:13:47 PST
To: doug@netcom.com (Doug Merritt)
Subject: Re: Should we oppose the Data Superhighway/NII?
In-Reply-To: <199311100431.UAA10101@mail.netcom.com>
Message-ID: <199311100513.AA13045@eff.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


 
Doug writes:

> Mike Godwin <mnemonic@eff.org> said:
> >First of all, EFF's Open Platform says outright that the government is not
> >going to build the data superhighway. Check again if you don't believe me.
> 
> Ah...do you mean "should not build", or do you really mean that it contains
> a discussion outlining the logic behind predicting that they *won't*
> build?

Nobody seriously thinks the government's going to build a Data
Superhighway. EFF's interested in seeing the private sector do it.

> <shudder> I skipped that session because I was already bored to tears with
> the prospect of "playing football from home while watching it on tv"
> and by that of 500 pay-per-view-channels. Were they really boosting
> HSN-type stuff? How completely evil!

Well, you should have stayed to watch me rabble-rouse.



--Mike






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Bill <sesquive@mailbox.syr.edu>
Date: Tue, 9 Nov 93 23:13:16 PST
To: cypherpunks-request@toad.com
Subject: UN-subscribe
Message-ID: <Pine.3.05.9311100250.A26127-8100000@rodan.syr.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Please Unsubscribe me  tanx


******************************************************************************
Bill Sulouff
sesquive@mailbox.syr.edu
__________________________________/-----------\______________________________







From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Dark <unicorn@access.digex.net>
Date: Wed, 10 Nov 93 02:13:17 PST
To: ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu
Subject: Re:  put me in your kill file
Message-ID: <199311101010.AA04957@access.digex.net>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


ld231782 ->

BTW, there is no need to inform me that I am in your kill file. That
would be rather pointless and defeat the purpose of defeating communication!
 
<-

Pointless is this entire endevor.

And people wonder why cypherpunks has deteriorated.


-uni- (Dark)




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: paul@poboy.b17c.ingr.com (Paul Robichaux)
Date: Wed, 10 Nov 93 06:18:57 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: 'Resistance Is Futile'
Message-ID: <199311101415.AA07199@poboy.b17c.ingr.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

Philippe makes another in a series of good points about our crypto
coffee shop: it is vulnerable to disruption by "screaming children."

Of course, not all usenet readers are screaming children; Tony Rippy,
in a cogent post, proves that he belongs in that happy group. However,
I present as counterexamples David Sternlight, John De Armond, and
John Palmer.

Those who have an interest in this subject will find the list, and we
should welcome them here. USENET gatewaying makes it waaay too easy
for the casual flamers and empty-headed arguers to drop in to visit
us.

Enjoy your coffee,
- -Paul

- -- 
Paul Robichaux, KD4JZG     | Caution: cutting edge is sharp. Avoid contact.
Intergraph Federal Systems | Be a cryptography user - ask me how.
	    ** Of course I don't speak for Intergraph. **


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From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: cdmorgan@mosaic.uncc.edu (Charles D Morgan)
Date: Wed, 10 Nov 93 05:33:21 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: unsubscribe
Message-ID: <9311101331.AA09761@mosaic.uncc.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


please unsubscribe me
cdmorgan@unccsun.uncc.edu




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: doug@netcom.com (Doug Merritt)
Date: Wed, 10 Nov 93 08:48:58 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Personality BS (was: Should we oppose the Data Superhighway/NII?)
In-Reply-To: <wex@media.mit.edu>
Message-ID: <199311101649.IAA15443@mail.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


"Alan (Gesture Man) Wexelblat" <wex@media.mit.edu> said:
>Hunh.  Doug, I'm sorry to oppose you on this, but I think that the sort of
>bullshit pry-into-your-personal-life stuff that companies are resorting [...]
>[The questions have to do with all kinds of shit like "Have you ever had a
>homosexual experience?" and "Have you ever shoplifted anything?" and "How
>do you feel about XXX?".  Totally unrelated to my job skills.]

We're not in opposition, I very strongly agree. It's just that we're
talking about slightly but importantly different things. The thing you're
referring to is indeed outrageous. So are the presumption-of-guilt drug tests
that I understand that 80% of all Fortune 1000 companies now require. (The
latter is particular heinous, since all tests have a non-zero false-positive
rate, for one thing.)

But what I was referring to was the common interviewing strategy of trying
to figure out whether someone will get along with the existing group,
not by prying into their personal life or giving them personality tests,
but just by the age-old method of discussing everyone's impressions of
the candidate. This all by itself is what we were told is unacceptable
discrimination (against the personality-challenged, presumably. :-)

>It's a total load of crap and should be illegal.  I, for one, am glad the
>gov't is telling its contractors NOT to do that.

Sorry, but I am pretty sure that giving personality tests is quite ok,
so long as they are one of those bullshit Supposedly Scientific things based
on Meyers Briggs or the Minnesota Multiphasic Aptitude Test or some such,
and as long as they are uniformly given to all candidates.

So they're outlawing the reasonable and allowing the unreasonable, the
worst of both worlds.
	Doug




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Perry E. Metzger" <pmetzger@lehman.com>
Date: Wed, 10 Nov 93 06:23:20 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: the Amusements of Cypherpunks
In-Reply-To: <9311100223.AA03194@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Message-ID: <9311101417.AA21809@snark.lehman.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



I'm sending him fourty copies of the next one. Four hundred of the one
after that. Its no secret. I dont like getting crap mailed to me by
imbeciles. If he doesn't want me to to reply to him, he can stop
sending me personal mail.

Perry

"L. Detweiler" says:
> Mr. Metzger, premier cypherpunk, undoubtedly derived great ecstasy from
> mailing me 16 copies of the following letter, apparently in response to
> my complimenting & commending him on his recently released RSA toolkit...
> 
> Who was it that said something about `striking a nerve'? Was that J.
> Dinkelacker? I forget.
> 
> ===cut=here===
> 
> >From pmetzger@lehman.com Tue Nov  9 10:44:21 1993
> Return-Path: <pmetzger@lehman.com>
> Received: from Lehman.COM by longs.lance.colostate.edu (5.65/lance.1.5)
> 	id AA16044; Tue, 9 Nov 93 10:44:17 -0700
> Received: from relay.lehman.com by lehman.com (8.6.4/LB 0.1)
> 	id MAA02706; Tue, 9 Nov 1993 12:44:11 -0500
> Received: from kublai.lehman.com by relay.lehman.com (4.1/LB-0.6)
> 	id AA16204; Tue, 9 Nov 93 12:44:09 EST
> Received: from snark.lehman.com by kublai.lehman.com (4.1/SMI-4.1)
> 	id AA10163; Tue, 9 Nov 93 12:44:08 EST
> Date: Tue, 9 Nov 93 12:44:08 EST
> From: pmetzger@lehman.com (Perry E. Metzger)
> Message-Id: <9311091744.AA10163@kublai.lehman.com>
> Received: by snark.lehman.com (4.1/SMI-4.1)
> 	id AA15756; Tue, 9 Nov 93 12:44:08 EST
> To: "L. Detweiler" <ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
> Subject: Go away.
> Reply-To: pmetzger@lehman.com
> X-Reposting-Policy: redistribute only with permission
> 
> Go away and leave us alone.
> 
> 




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: jon@balder.us.dell.com (Jon Boede)
Date: Wed, 10 Nov 93 07:38:58 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Should we oppose the Data Superhighway/NII?
Message-ID: <9311101535.AA04293@balder.us.dell.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Mike writes:
> Doug writes:
>> Mike Godwin <mnemonic@eff.org> said:
>> >First of all, EFF's Open Platform says outright that the government is not
>> >going to build the data superhighway. Check again if you don't believe me.
>> 
>> Ah...do you mean "should not build", or do you really mean that it contains
>> a discussion outlining the logic behind predicting that they *won't*
>> build?
> 
> Nobody seriously thinks the government's going to build a Data
> Superhighway. EFF's interested in seeing the private sector do it.

I thought we already had a data superhighway and what congress (et Al) is
really talking about is a national system of on-ramps and off-ramps?

Jon

-- 
                     ,,,
                    (o o)
Jon Boede    ----ooO-(_)-Ooo----         jon@dell.com           +1 512 728-4802
Engineering, Dell Computer Corp.    Server OS Development          Austin, TX
 "When I was 10, mean old man Miller's house burned down.  We put home plate
  where his toilet once stood -- his garden became our center field... and in
  these ways, the laws of karma were revealed."




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: cdmorgan@mosaic.uncc.edu (Charles D Morgan)
Date: Wed, 10 Nov 93 06:44:17 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: unsubscribe
Message-ID: <9311101443.AA13114@mosaic.uncc.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


unsubscribe me please
Thank you




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Oliver Seiler <oseiler@unixg.ubc.ca>
Date: Wed, 10 Nov 93 10:14:29 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Cost of Internet (was: Should we oppose ... Superhighway)
In-Reply-To: <Pine.3.05.9311091903.C3662-b100000@tiesnet.ties.k12.mn.us>
Message-ID: <Pine.3.05.9311101046.B22015-b100000@unixg.ubc.ca>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



> Please don't confuse New York with the vast reaches of Rural America.  ALL
> Internet access is a long distance call from many many location in the
> world, including here.
> 
> I would *love to have a free national net available, 'cause I think I know
> how to use it.  Others might abuse it, but I woul work the heck out of it.
> 

I think the question should be:

 Do I want my taxes to pay for somebody elses Internet connection?

I would answer no... (a moot point though, since for one, I'm Canadian,
and for another, the government would probably do it anyway, whether you
want it or not...)

This attitude tends to put me on the opposition for government supplied
networks. Hell, I currently have 5 unix accounts scattered here and there
in cyberspace... I think the main problem is that most people *don't* see
the benefits they would get (I think e-mail probably being the biggest)
since most people are fairly computer illiterate, and even many of the
ones who can handle themselves quite well on a computer don't know the
first thing about the benefits of a network...

(These attitudes were gleaned from working about a year and a half in a
computer store... Wonderful places to meet all sorts of redundant people :)

-Oliver

| Oliver Seiler          + Erisian Development Group +  Amiga Developer  +
| oseiler@unixg.ubc.ca   +-------------Reality by the Slice--------------+
| oseiler@nyx.cs.du.edu  |           	  (604) 683-5364                 |
| ollie@BIX.com          | POB 3547, MPO, Vancouver, BC, CANADA  V6B 3Y6 |






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: paul@poboy.b17c.ingr.com (Paul Robichaux)
Date: Wed, 10 Nov 93 08:08:57 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Ever buy encryption software? YOU WILL!
Message-ID: <199311101608.AA07903@poboy.b17c.ingr.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

I found this on comp.dcom.telecom and have elided some marketing
material. My editorial comments are enclosed in brackets.

Amazing. _AT&T_, the same folks that were trying to bring us Clipper,
are going to sell DES over-the-counter. I'd be happier with
triple-DES, but this blows my tiny little mind.

I have a call in to Dave Arneke, who's listed as the contact person
for this release. When I can extract some details from him, I'll post
them.

Some key points:
  - products include DES (single or triple?) and SHA, an encrypting
    version of ZMODEM, and unnamed RSA-based products
  - the products have been available in the gov't market for > 1 year
  - AT&T is marketing them; they were developed by another company.

X-Submissions-To: telecom@eecs.nwu.edu
X-Administrivia-To: telecom-request@eecs.nwu.edu
X-Telecom-Digest: Volume 13, Issue 745, Message 1 of 10

...

We'll be demonstrating these and other data security products at
COMDEX next week (we're in the NCR booth).

We have a variety of secure communications products in our line,
hardware and software, voice, data, fax, video and wireless.  I'll
keep the information coming as we put it out.

Thanks again.

Sincerely,

David Arneke   Media Relations Manager, 
AT&T Secure Communications Systems
919 279-7680   david.arneke@att.com

AT&T INTRODUCES SECURITY SOFTWARE TO PROTECT PC, WORKSTATION DATA AND
COMMUNICATIONS

     GREENSBORO, North Carolina -- AT&T is introducing software
programs that protect a variety of laptop, PC and workstation
applications.

     The shrink-wrapped programs, announced today, provide data
privacy, digital signatures and secure data transmission.  They are
the first in a series that will provide end-users with public key
cryptography capabilities.

     AT&T Secure Communications Systems has previously developed a
multilevel secure UNIX software package.  The products announced today
are its first security-related offerings in the DOS/Windows and
Macintosh markets.

[ ... marketing talk from Bill Franklin, business development manager
for AT&T Secure Communications Systems, deleted ]

     The first programs in the series are:

     -- AT&T SecretAgent (R), which implements the Digital Encryption
Standard for privacy and the Digital Signature Algorithm and Secure
Hash Standard to protect the integrity of files stored on or
transmitted from personal computers.  It operates transparently to
e-mail systems.

     -- AT&T dsaSIGN (TM), which provides authentication and data
integrity assurance for electronic documents through use of the
Digital Signature Algorithm and Secure Hash Standard.

     -- AT&T SecureZMODEM (TM), which encrypts data on the fly as it
is transmitted using the ZMODEM communications protocol.

     Additional software products based on RSA public-key technology
are also available.

     "We will also introduce access control products, com- patible
with the products we're announcing today, for PCs, workstations and
networks in the coming months," Franklin said.

     All three programs were developed for AT&T by Information
Security Corporation of Deerfield, Illinois.  They are available
exclusively from AT&T and its distributors.

     ISC will be AT&T's primary representative in the government
market for these and related products.

     The programs use proven technology that has been available in the
government market for more than a year.

     "All three have gained strong acceptance among government
computer users," said Tom Venn, president of Information Security
Corporation.

     The single-copy price for AT&T SecretAgent is $329.95; for AT&T
dsaSIGN, $149.95; and for AT&T SecureZMODEM, $99.95.  Site and
enterprise licenses and volume discounts are available.

     All programs are available now directly from AT&T Secure
Communications Systems and its distributors.

     Customers can get more information on AT&T software security
programs by calling 1 800 203-5563.

     For media inquiries, call David Arneke at AT&T Secure
Communications Systems, 919 279-7680.

- -Paul

- -- 
Paul Robichaux, KD4JZG     | Caution: cutting edge is sharp. Avoid contact.
Intergraph Federal Systems | Be a cryptography user - ask me how.
	    ** Of course I don't speak for Intergraph. **

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.3a

iQCVAgUBLOERoyA78To+806NAQHlLQQArzWzEqpqO+EoYEqShkQJmqAI3y1O9sBD
yBbBElXylpmJ+yf6WofUWXCci2sEDw0JSE8RSYoTSe0HGtx16pAjh1fkK6UA+8XW
2ZsyzHiuPm1OYMM63iFDRMHTnIYLowmc5GPIXRGnweyCuiWgVNTkHxClnbNo2vGb
uaDI2O5X9dI=
=FTwT
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Dave Hart <davehart@microsoft.com>
Date: Wed, 10 Nov 93 13:04:18 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Dr. Dobb's editorial on PGP
Message-ID: <9311102104.AC08031@netmail.microsoft.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


The December Dr. Dobb's Journal has an editorial on the current PGP 
legal wrangling.  I'll quote the last sentence:

    More importantly, the First Amendment guarantees us the right
    to speak in an encrypted way and insidious attempts to douse
    public access to cryptography, cloaked under the guise of
    software-export investigations, appear to stifle these rights.


--------------------------------------   DaveHart@microsoft.com
The opinions expressed are personal and do not necessarily agree
with the opinions of Microsoft Corporation.  Microsoft has its own
opinions, one of which is "disclaimers are a good thing".




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Brian D Williams <talon57@well.sf.ca.us>
Date: Wed, 10 Nov 93 10:39:28 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: re: Should we build the Data Superhighway/NII
Message-ID: <199311101839.KAA19331@well.sf.ca.us>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



DISCLAIMER; This is for the private reading of the members of the
Cypherpunks list, and may not be redistributed without permission.
The opinions expressed are strictly my own and do not necessarily
reflect the views of Ameritech or it's alliance partners.   


My two bits on the data highway;

 - on universal access
  
   Ameritech, the consortium of the five regional midwest RBOC's
filed a plan for complete deregulation and access to the local loop
the first week in March under the title of "Advanced Universal
Access" The gist of it? If you remove the regulations against us
competeing in everyone elses markets, we will allow and provide
complete unbundled access to the local loop. Number plan the whole
bit, right to the copper pair if you want.

 My two bits? we don't have any problem with any and all forms of
competition. Do you want "Universal Access"? Then all participants
have to share the costs involved.

 In Illinois alone there are more than 30 companies providing local
loop service, each functions as a "Monopoly" within it's geographic
area. Sprint the long distance company owns and is a "Local Loop
Monopoly" in about 8 areas that I recall,(This was the result of
there purchase of Centel) GTE, all the big boys are here. Large
corporate customers are directly connected with long distance
carriers without touching the local loop.

-  Bell Atlantic and TCI merger? couldn't care less, bring them on!

  I am involved with a number of projects that pertain to the "Data
Highway" concept. 

  - The Extended classroom, part of the "Superschools" project.
This will provide E-mail services and basic info services to K-12
students. The next stage calls for Internet/Usenet Access and
interactive MultiMedia (Hyperlearning) access.

  - Health services network, this is already providing shared info
between various medical agencies and hospitals, it is limited right
now by regulatory restrictions.

  - Announced just this morning....Ameritech has announced an
alliance with Citibank to provide for "Display Telephone" access to
Citibank financial services, this will also provide access to
directory services and advanced telephone services. This is
basically a variation of the French "Minitel" system from the look
of it. I intend on pushing for Internet/Usenet access as well. Of
course this is only the start, got an idea for a service? give us
a call. All are welcome, I expect to see numerous "Garage" startups
providing content of all sorts.

- Video Dialtone, basically a piece of cake if you have the
bandwidth, currently works well down to T-1 speeds (1.54 MPS)

 The Battle to build the "Superhighway" has been called the battle
of 250 million trenches. This refers to the notion that 250 million
sections of local loop will have to be replaced with fiber
eventually. It's true that ISDN can play a part and ADSL
(Asymetrical digital subscriber loop) which has been successfully
tested at 3MPS over UTP and should clear 6MPS in the next 6 months
will help fill the gaps. Some Cable companies will have their own
offerings, as will various "Telecosm" pioneers we've yet to see.

 The cost of building the initial "Fibersphere" has been estimated
at 250 billion dollars. Who's going to foot the bill? The existing
cable plant is more than sufficient for the services the telco's
are currently permitted to offer. We've made our point clear ( see
the FCC filing "Advanced Universal Access") Turn us loose, and
we'll build it, or at least contribute to it,  ;) and equal access
will be provided to all competitors.

 We're going to build it anyway, " Are you with me men!"

Brian Williams
Cypherpatriot
Extropian

* Telecosm and Fibersphere are from the works of futurist George
Gilder, his work is highly recommended.

* Hyperlearning is from the work of Lewis J. Perelman particularly
"Schools Out, Hyperlearning, the new technology, and the end of
education." Also highly recommended.   





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Philippe Nave" <pdn@dwroll.dw.att.com>
Date: Wed, 10 Nov 93 11:03:22 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: AT&T encryption software
Message-ID: <9311101901.AA10042@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Well, well, well.

I should have guessed that we [AT&T] would scramble onto the encryption
software bandwagon sooner or later. Buried in the bowels of the PBX 
business, I haven't heard anything about the product yet, but that's about
par for the course. 

I would like to strongly encourage anybody who can get a copy of this
product to examine it thoroughly; my gut feel is *bad*, but I'll need
some concrete facts if I am to present a dissenting view. Sooner or 
later, the PC lab guys will probably be installing this thing on our
PCs and we'll be the 'vanguard of the future' (again!). I am particularly
interested in whether this package is interoperable with PGP- for some
reason, I tend to doubt it <tired grin>.

[If any of you were wondering whether or not I 'speak for AT&T', this 
posting should remove all doubt..]

........................................................................
Philippe D. Nave, Jr.   | The person who does not use message encryption
pdn@dwroll.dw.att.com   | will soon be at the mercy of those who DO...
Denver, Colorado USA    | PGP public key: by arrangement.



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Date: Wed, 10 Nov 93 10:59:28 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Big Mother can't protect our privacy
In-Reply-To: <9311101620.AA19827@media.mit.edu>
Message-ID: <199311101900.LAA22288@mail.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Alan Wexelblat writes:

> Hunh.  Doug, I'm sorry to oppose you on this, but I think that the sort of
> bullshit pry-into-your-personal-life stuff that companies are resorting to
> these days is *exactly* the sort of stuff that cypherpunks would want
> stopped!
> 
> Have you ever had to take one of these tests?  Have you seen the questions
> they ask?  I have been handed a test (in an all-too-recent interview) and
> after looking at the test I told them flat-out I would not take the test and
> if they hired people based on it then I wouldn't work at their company.
> 
> [The questions have to do with all kinds of shit like "Have you ever had a
> homosexual experience?" and "Have you ever shoplifted anything?" and "How
> do you feel about XXX?".  Totally unrelated to my job skills.]

Simple solution: If you don't want to take the MMPI test (*), don't
work for that company. 

(* MMPI is the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Index test, which
sounds like the test described here. It has a couple of thousand of
these questions. Without defending the analytical powers of this test,
let me say that the intent is psychological, not political. The
famoous questions about believing in God, having homosexual
experiences, washing one's hands, and so on, are devised by shrinks,
not designed to ferret out atheists and homos. The MMPI has been in
wide use since the 1950s, though it's use is declining as people file
lawsuits over it.)

> It's a total load of crap and should be illegal.  I, for one, am glad the
> gov't is telling its contractors NOT to do that.
> 
> Sorry this is so strident, but I see cryptography and privacy-enhancement as
> technological branches of the same tree as this stuff.  Appropriate data in
> appropriate places, and nothing more.

I can understand Alan's stridency, but if for whatever reason I ask a
potential employee to take a test--call it Tim's Multiphasic
Personality Index, the TMPI--does he really want me thrown in jail?

That's what saying that this "should be illegal" generally implies.

Most Cypherpunks I know would rather just demonstrate their competency
and tell the potential employer to screw themselves. Not surprisingly,
most employers will then get the message and drop such tests.

(The MMPI, designed in the conformist 50s and only occasionally
updated since, is a pretty crummy test of talent or ambition, in my
unprofessional opinion. A girlfriend who was an MFCC (Marriage,
Family, and Child Counselor, a shrink) agree it was flawed.)

All I'm saying is that interfering with my practices or with those of
others, to make certain things illegal, is not what most Cypherpunks
are after. 

Sorry if this is political, but Cypherpunks should not be looking for
laws and regulations to protect someone's idea of privacy.

In Britain, in case there are some of you out there who haven't heard
about this, they got concerned about corporations compiling records on
people. Sounds like a valid concern, right? Well, the result was the
Data Privacy Act (or somesuch), which outlaws such records unless the
compiler notifies _all_ of the targets _and the government_.

The result is that anyone who saves computer files--like this list,
which of course contains e-mail addresses of hundreds of people--is
technically in violation of the law. Companies are finding it tough to
go about their business. And so on.

Cypherpunks protect their own privacy, they don't depend on Big Mother
to do it for them.

--Tim

-- 
..........................................................................
Timothy C. May         | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,  
tcmay@netcom.com       | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
408-688-5409           | knowledge, reputations, information markets, 
W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA  | black markets, collapse of governments.
Higher Power: 2^756839 | Public Key: PGP and MailSafe available.
Note: I put time and money into writing this posting. I hope you enjoy it.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "mycal" <mike@NetAcsys.com>
Date: Wed, 10 Nov 93 12:33:21 PST
To: "Timothy Newsham" <newsham@wiliki.eng.hawaii.edu>
Subject: Re: Modem taps/Caller ID
Message-ID: <2ce13a75.acsys@NetAcsys.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


On Mon, 8 Nov 1993 13:05:58 -1000 (HST), "Timothy Newsham" <newsham@wiliki.eng.hawaii.edu> wrote:
> The number is transmitted in ascii at 1200 bits per second.  The
> standard used to transmit the data is not the "normal" 1200 bps
> mode of your modem.  Normally 1200 bps is accomplished by sending
>
> I have no idea how you would get your modem to go into the right
> mode (and how it would react to data on the line before it goes
> off hook). 
>
The 1200 bps it uses is called bell 202, kinda reminds me of the old days
with an apple, an apple cat modem, and first disfer then catsend and catfer...

Hmmm maybe I can dust off that apple cat modem and use it for caller ID :)

The apple cat modem is the only modem I know of that supported this
flavor of 1200bps, which was great for short bursts of data with little
syncronization neccary.

mycal







From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Alan (Gesture Man) Wexelblat" <wex@media.mit.edu>
Date: Wed, 10 Nov 93 08:23:57 PST
To: doug@netcom.com
Subject: Personality BS (was: Should we oppose the Data Superhighway/NII?)
In-Reply-To: <199311100450.UAA11942@mail.netcom.com>
Message-ID: <9311101620.AA19827@media.mit.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Hunh.  Doug, I'm sorry to oppose you on this, but I think that the sort of
bullshit pry-into-your-personal-life stuff that companies are resorting to
these days is *exactly* the sort of stuff that cypherpunks would want
stopped!

Have you ever had to take one of these tests?  Have you seen the questions
they ask?  I have been handed a test (in an all-too-recent interview) and
after looking at the test I told them flat-out I would not take the test and
if they hired people based on it then I wouldn't work at their company.

[The questions have to do with all kinds of shit like "Have you ever had a
homosexual experience?" and "Have you ever shoplifted anything?" and "How
do you feel about XXX?".  Totally unrelated to my job skills.]

Of course, they reacted with the same sort of shock and surprise that I got
from Texas Instruments when I told *them* I wouldn't piss into their cup on
demand and that they could shove *that* job.  No one had ever even objected
to taking the test before, let alone to the fact that the company keeps the
database of all the answers of all the applicants ever.  (Unencrypted, on a
PC in the president's office, as it happened.)

It's a total load of crap and should be illegal.  I, for one, am glad the
gov't is telling its contractors NOT to do that.

Sorry this is so strident, but I see cryptography and privacy-enhancement as
technological branches of the same tree as this stuff.  Appropriate data in
appropriate places, and nothing more.

--Alan Wexelblat, Reality Hacker, Author, and Cyberspace Bard
Media Lab - Advanced Human Interface Group	wex@media.mit.edu
Voice: 617-258-9168, Pager: 617-945-1842	PUBLIC KEY available by request
Try not to have a good time ... This is supposed to be educational.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Pat Farrell" <pfarrell@netcom.com>
Date: Wed, 10 Nov 93 08:23:19 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Should we oppose the Data Superhighway/NII?
Message-ID: <40905.pfarrell@netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Tim May asks if we cypherpunks should oppose the NII.
I think we probably should, but not on cypherpunks.
A suitable list for discussing this topic is
'com-priv@psi.com' which addresses the political and economic issues
of the commercialization of the pure and pristine Internet.

The US Federal government already has a huge infrastructure of networking.
For example, the VA has two independant nationwide networks. On connects
the administrative folks that handle VA loans, college benefits, etc. and
the other connects the VA hospitals. The DOT has a huge net for air traffic
control. The Federal Courts have their own network. Interior, thru USGS has
a huge network, with BLM and other agencies trying to make it bigger.
Social Secutrity has a net, Agriculture has a net and a large payroll
center in New Orleans. I think 'punks are smart enuff to see a pattern here.

Followups via email are fine. Otherwise I'm moving this to com-priv.

Pat
-- former consultant to VA, DOT, SSN, Treasury, Interior, Courts, etc.

Pat Farrell      Grad Student                 pfarrell@netcom.com
Department of Computer Science    George Mason University, Fairfax, VA
Public key availble via finger          #include <standard.disclaimer>




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Date: Wed, 10 Nov 93 11:23:21 PST
To: mnemonic@eff.org (Mike Godwin)
Subject: NII and the Need for XXX-rated Porn
In-Reply-To: <199311101637.AA18473@eff.org>
Message-ID: <199311101923.LAA24616@mail.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Now that I have your attention...

(Warning: This post discusses hard-core XXX-rated material of no
socially redeeming value. Transmission on the National Information
Infratructure is thus forbidden. Do so at the risk of asset forfeiture.)

Mike Godwin writes:

> You know, I was just thinking of Tim's comment about how he punted his
> cable service. One of the reasons that cable is just "a vaster wasteland"
> is that it follows the old cable/broadcaster paradigm--get a
> government-supported, government-regulated monopoly in place, and let a
> single provider (or a small set of providers) funnel their product into
> the home.
> 
> But cable service would be far more valuable to me (and I'd pay more for
> it) if I could, say, upload a video of my little girl taking her first
> steps and send it to Tim. (Not that he'd necessarily pay for that
> privilege, but you get the idea.)

I might, if there was a market in alt.binaries.pictures.....

Just kidding, Mike!

Seriously, Mike's comments about cable being a "vaster wasteland" (a
nice EFF paraphrase of the famous FCC Commissioner's comments in the
60s), is important.

I dropped my cable because paying $55 a month for a bunch of crap was
getting to be too much. 

Let me be very blunt: I would certainly resume my cable if certain
"interesting" channels could be provided. X-rated, as just one
example. 

A telling situation: Why are X-rated movies (I mean X-rated, as you
find in video rental places, not the soft-core stuff that "Playboy"
and "Spice" offer) not offered? A combination of FCC rules (for
broadcast throught the air and--maybe--for cablecast, but I'm not sure
what sway the FCC has over cable) and various lawsuits.

A couple of years ago the _satellite_ channel, "American XXXcstacy,"
or somesuch (I never got it and only read about the cases), was knocked
off the air by prosecutions or threats of prosecutions in certain
Bible Belt areas. (There are many issues we could discuss here: "forum
shopping," selective prosecution, RICO laws, etc.)

Does anyone expect the NII will offer hard-core porn on its networks? 

Just one example.

I don't know what the solution is, except that I'm naturally skeptical
about the government having _anything_ to do with it. (I've read the
CPSR pitch on NII and it scares the crap out of me. I've read the NII
articles in "Whole Earth Review" and elsewhere and I have the same
reaction. I've read the Open Platform proposal from EFF and find it
better, but still overly oriented toward government solutions.
Finally, I'm still trying to dig out the NII docs themselves, the ones
Tom Kalil has pointed us to.)

The link to Cypherpunks is clear: most of us are opposed to Big Mother
choosing what we read, watch, or talk about. Strong crypto makes this
bypassing of Big Mother and Big Brother possible.

Strong crypto fundamentally collides with many of the stated public
policy goals surrounding the National Information Infrastructure.

Which do we want to win?

--Tim May


-- 
..........................................................................
Timothy C. May         | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,  
tcmay@netcom.com       | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
408-688-5409           | knowledge, reputations, information markets, 
W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA  | black markets, collapse of governments.
Higher Power: 2^756839 | Public Key: PGP and MailSafe available.
Note: I put time and money into writing this posting. I hope you enjoy it.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Postmaster@cproject.com (Andrew Hammer)
Date: Wed, 10 Nov 93 10:38:58 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Fwd: [gtoal@an-teallach.com (Graham Toal)]Info on Clipper chip and fabrication of it
Message-ID: <0E062001.gd0de3@cproject.cproject.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


In article <9311092013.AA09822@vangogh.VIS.ColoState.EDU> nate@vis.colostate.edu writes:
 > Last I heard, hte model of the ARM series used in the Newton (the 
 > ARM 610 processor) cranked out about 30,000 Drystones and used 
 > _very_ little power.

Oh boy, wait till the guys on comp.sys.acorn hear about this!

I can tell why the arm was chosen: it comes as a drop-in circuit that
manufacturers can use in their own designs.  Not many of the other
low-power fast CPUs are available like this.  And its very small,
and blindingly fast.

G
-- 
Personal mail to gtoal@gtoal.com (I read it in the evenings)
Business mail to gtoal@an-teallach.com (Be careful with the spelling!)
Faxes to An Teallach Limited: +44 31 662 4678  Voice: +44 31 668 1550 x212




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Mike Godwin <mnemonic@eff.org>
Date: Wed, 10 Nov 93 08:38:57 PST
To: jon@balder.us.dell.com (Jon Boede)
Subject: Re: Should we oppose the Data Superhighway/NII?
In-Reply-To: <9311101535.AA04293@balder.us.dell.com>
Message-ID: <199311101637.AA18473@eff.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


 
Jon writes:

> I thought we already had a data superhighway and what congress (et Al) is
> really talking about is a national system of on-ramps and off-ramps?

Not exactly. Not everyone recognizes the need and value of on and off
ramps.

More importantly, the NII is not about building more trunk lines so much
as it is about ensuring that the resulting infrastructure allows everyone
to be an information provider as well as consumer. There's money to be
made here, and lots of entrepreneurial opportunities, if the thing is 
done right.

You know, I was just thinking of Tim's comment about how he punted his
cable service. One of the reasons that cable is just "a vaster wasteland"
is that it follows the old cable/broadcaster paradigm--get a
government-supported, government-regulated monopoly in place, and let a
single provider (or a small set of providers) funnel their product into
the home.

But cable service would be far more valuable to me (and I'd pay more for
it) if I could, say, upload a video of my little girl taking her first
steps and send it to Tim. (Not that he'd necessarily pay for that
privilege, but you get the idea.)


--Mike






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: smb@research.att.com
Date: Wed, 10 Nov 93 08:53:57 PST
To: perobich@ingr.com
Subject: Re: Ever buy encryption software? YOU WILL!
Message-ID: <9311101653.AA08623@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


	 -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

	 I found this on comp.dcom.telecom and have elided some marketing
	 material. My editorial comments are enclosed in brackets.

	 Amazing. _AT&T_, the same folks that were trying to bring us Clipper,
	 are going to sell DES over-the-counter. I'd be happier with
	 triple-DES, but this blows my tiny little mind.

Disclaimer:  I'm speaking for myself, not AT&T.

I've said this before, but it's worth repeating.  For the most part,
corporations exist to make money.  They don't take moral stances.
(Aside:  I'm not saying that this is good or bad; rather, I'm saying
that it just is.)  If you offer a company a way to make money, it
will probably do it.  Unified visions, of the sort you're implying
AT&T had on encryption, are generally seen as long-term ways to make
money, i.e., if the company picks some standard, it will be easier or
cheaper to make or sell some future set of products.

In the case of Clipper, there was a clear market:  the government wanted
to buy Clipperphones.  AT&T already sells secure phones (STU-III's) to
the government; the question here (and I wasn't privy to any of the
discussions) was whether or not it would cost more to develop the phone
than the potential profits.

But Clipper isn't, and can't be, the be-all for encryption, even apart
from the moral questions.  See if you can dig up AT&T's response to the
proposed key escrow FIPS.  I suspect you'd be surprised.  I don't think
I have it handy, but it points out things like the unsuitability of
key escrow for software implementations -- and the products you describe
are exactly that.  Yes, AT&T as a company thinks that there is a market
for privacy devices.  (And it's no secret that the defense market is
drying up, due to budget cuts.)  Clipper can't fill certain market niches.
DES -- or triple DES, or IDEA, or RC2, or whatever -- can.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: hughes@ah.com (Eric Hughes)
Date: Wed, 10 Nov 93 12:03:21 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Applications of cryptography
In-Reply-To: <9311101851.AA00120@anon.penet.fi>
Message-ID: <9311101959.AA17774@ah.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>I am trying to compile information about the different
>applications of cryptography. 

There's no need.  Go out and buy Bruce Schneier's new crypto book
whose title I forget.  I has exactly the selection of articles you
want and comes with source code.

Cody's here in Berkeley has four copies on order; I'll bet they sell
out in a week once they arrive.  Bruce was offering to send people
copies in exchange for a check; details were on sci.crypt.

I'm sure there are interesting topics in there that you'd want
covered, but there's no need to duplicate the effort of a fellow who's
worked on this for a couple of years.

Eric




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Mike Godwin <mnemonic@eff.org>
Date: Wed, 10 Nov 93 09:08:57 PST
To: pmetzger@lehman.com
Subject: Re: Should we oppose the Data Superhighway/NII?
In-Reply-To: <9311101654.AA21967@snark.lehman.com>
Message-ID: <199311101705.AA18927@eff.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Perry writes:
 
> Mike Godwin says:
> > But cable service would be far more valuable to me (and I'd pay more for
> > it) if I could, say, upload a video of my little girl taking her first
> > steps and send it to Tim. (Not that he'd necessarily pay for that
> > privilege, but you get the idea.)
> 
> Why do we need government for this?

We don't. We need private providers for this.

> Seems to me that bandwidth is
> going to be nearly free in both directions in a few years whether
> government intervenes or not.

I agree about the potential for it to be free, but, I gotta tell you, the
monopolists running the cable systems in this country have no inclination
to share that nearly free bandwidth with you, even if you're willing to
pay for access to it.

In order to get to a world in which free markets can meet our demand for
high-bandwidth connectivity, we have to dig ourselves out from the 
market-failure position we're in now. And because government is part of
the problem, changing government policy is part of the solution. So,
that's one of the major thrusts of EFF's NII policy. 


--Mike






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Perry E. Metzger" <pmetzger@lehman.com>
Date: Wed, 10 Nov 93 09:14:18 PST
To: Mike Godwin <mnemonic@eff.org>
Subject: Re: Should we oppose the Data Superhighway/NII?
In-Reply-To: <199311101705.AA18927@eff.org>
Message-ID: <9311101712.AA21990@snark.lehman.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Mike Godwin says:
> I agree about the potential for it to be free, but, I gotta tell you, the
> monopolists running the cable systems in this country have no inclination
> to share that nearly free bandwidth with you, even if you're willing to
> pay for access to it.

Wouldn't the solution then be to eliminate the capacity of local
municipalities to grant cable monopolies? Fiber is compact -- five or
even twenty cable companies could coexist happily in New York (where I
live) if the city didn't grant "franchises", which it charges
exhorbitantly for. With large scale competition between cable
companies, monopolies would no longer be a problem.

> In order to get to a world in which free markets can meet our demand for
> high-bandwidth connectivity, we have to dig ourselves out from the 
> market-failure position we're in now.

Isn't the problem in question the result of government granted,
rather than natural, monopolies? Isn't it thus wrong to call it a
"market failure"? Seems more like yet another government failure.

Perry




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: owen@autodesk.com (D. Owen Rowley)
Date: Wed, 10 Nov 93 12:58:59 PST
To: szabo@netcom.netcom.com
Subject: Re: (fwd) Clipper and Tipper on Route 666
Message-ID: <9311102050.AA00348@lux.YP.acad>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


 > To: tcmay@netcom.netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
 > Tim May suggests we called the "Data Superhighway"
 > 
 > >  "Route 666."
 > 
 > In Unix file permissions 666 means the file is readable by 
 > world.  Apropos for a panoptic net where encryption is banned
 > or "Clipped".
 

There is an actual route 666, its in New Mexico or Arizona.

A t shirt manufacturer here in SF prints up a version
of the sign on a black shirt.

one of my favorite *cruising* shirts BTW :-)

LUX ./. owen




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: owen@autodesk.com (D. Owen Rowley)
Date: Wed, 10 Nov 93 15:13:28 PST
To: clark@metal.psu.edu
Subject: Re: Is Clipper Almost Dead? (was: Clipper and Tipper on Route 666)
Message-ID: <9311102113.AA00419@lux.YP.acad>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



  > From: Clark Reynard <clark@metal.psu.edu>
  > I think it would be very important if we could attempt to
 > sway the Christian right into this; it is certain we
 > probably don't agree on many issues, and the "700 Club"
 > anti-Clipper piece was very effective, good video.
 > 
 > If you don't believe me, watch it.  They almost seem
 > to agree with us entirely on the issue of cryptography.
 > Perhaps it's time for a _new_ group; the cyphermonks.
 > 
 > I nominate St. John the Divine as a patron saint.
 
Don Corleone taught his son Michael to *keep his friends close, and his
enemys closer*.

meanwhile, don't forget for a second that the christian right
*will* toss your anarchic ass on the pyre where they *will* roast
pagan faggots like myself after they've squeezed you for your
support.

Religion has it's protection clearly enumerated in the constitution,
and a clear agenda to keep everyone elses freedom from being similary
enumerated.
Caveat emptor, and carry a loaded flamethrower, because the first
chance they get to cut you out of the deal you will need it.


Me, I plan to be long gone into the "Inner Zone (TM)".


LUX ./. owen





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Mike Godwin <mnemonic@eff.org>
Date: Wed, 10 Nov 93 10:28:59 PST
To: pmetzger@lehman.com
Subject: Re: Should we oppose the Data Superhighway/NII?
In-Reply-To: <9311101712.AA21990@snark.lehman.com>
Message-ID: <199311101826.AA19786@eff.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


 
> Wouldn't the solution then be to eliminate the capacity of local
> municipalities to grant cable monopolies?

That might be one solution. It certainly will be part of the ultimate
solution.

> Fiber is compact -- five or
> even twenty cable companies could coexist happily in New York (where I
> live) if the city didn't grant "franchises", which it charges
> exhorbitantly for. With large scale competition between cable
> companies, monopolies would no longer be a problem.
 
Which cable company has to eat the cost of digging the original
groundwork? Or are you saying that every new cable entity will have 
to lay its own infrastructure? The capital costs of that create an
immense barrier to market entry, and ease of market entry is a
pre-requisite for free-market competition.

The only reason the first cable companies even invested in laying cable is
that they were guaranteed a local monopoly. Since government, in effect,
participated in the creation of that part of the infrastructure, there are
serious issues as to whether the first cable provider in a local area
should continue to profit from a government-granted incentive while new
potential providers are left high and dry.

These are the kinds of issues that need to be addressed as we move from
monopoly to free-market competition--how do we correct for the distortions
caused by the initial government intervention in the market?

> Isn't the problem in question the result of government granted,
> rather than natural, monopolies? Isn't it thus wrong to call it a
> "market failure"? Seems more like yet another government failure.

"Market failure" is a term of art. It refers to a condition, which
may in fact be caused by government, in which market mechanisms have been
prevented from ensuring competition.


--Mike






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: gtoal@an-teallach.com (Graham Toal)
Date: Wed, 10 Nov 93 05:33:56 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Info on Clipper chip and fabrication of it
Message-ID: <6864@an-teallach.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


In article <9311092013.AA09822@vangogh.VIS.ColoState.EDU> nate@vis.colostate.edu writes:
 > Last I heard, hte model of the ARM series used in the Newton (the 
 > ARM 610 processor) cranked out about 30,000 Drystones and used 
 > _very_ little power.

Oh boy, wait till the guys on comp.sys.acorn hear about this!

I can tell why the arm was chosen: it comes as a drop-in circuit that
manufacturers can use in their own designs.  Not many of the other
low-power fast CPUs are available like this.  And its very small,
and blindingly fast.

G
-- 
Personal mail to gtoal@gtoal.com (I read it in the evenings)
Business mail to gtoal@an-teallach.com (Be careful with the spelling!)
Faxes to An Teallach Limited: +44 31 662 4678  Voice: +44 31 668 1550 x212





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Carl Ellison <cme@sw.stratus.com>
Date: Wed, 10 Nov 93 10:49:19 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re:  Are we gatewayed to Usenet?
Message-ID: <199311101848.NAA16511@ellisun.sw.stratus.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I think there's a difference between a gateway into USENET and a
gateway from USENET.

The latter would give us a feed from Sternlight, Pope, et al.

 - Carl




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Carl Ellison <cme@sw.stratus.com>
Date: Wed, 10 Nov 93 10:54:17 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: oops
Message-ID: <199311101853.NAA16531@ellisun.sw.stratus.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


please ignore the previous message (I must be tired).
Access from the net to cpunx is already trivial.
so much for that.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Perry E. Metzger" <pmetzger@lehman.com>
Date: Wed, 10 Nov 93 11:03:59 PST
To: Mike Godwin <mnemonic@eff.org>
Subject: Re: Should we oppose the Data Superhighway/NII?
In-Reply-To: <199311101826.AA19786@eff.org>
Message-ID: <9311101859.AA22080@snark.lehman.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Mike Godwin says:
> > Fiber is compact -- five or
> > even twenty cable companies could coexist happily in New York (where I
> > live) if the city didn't grant "franchises", which it charges
> > exhorbitantly for. With large scale competition between cable
> > companies, monopolies would no longer be a problem.
>  
> Which cable company has to eat the cost of digging the original
> groundwork? Or are you saying that every new cable entity will have 
> to lay its own infrastructure?

Well, in NYC, the utility tunnels are municipal, so its a question of
leasing a slot from the city. (Frankly I wish the tunnels were
privately held, but thats another story.) In most rural and suburban
areas in the US utility poles are still used and its a question of
leasing slots from the owners of those (which is easy since fiber is
quite lightweight, is typically strong when kevlar reinforced, and
presents little or no lightning hazard.) In some areas it might mean
digging new infrastructure -- modern cable laying equipment has
dramatically reduced the cost of this, especially for buried fiber
optics.

In practice, none of this is a real problem. Many areas DO have two or
more cable companies because there is no local prohibition on
competition, and a few areas even have multiple electric companies
because there are enlightened governments that permit such heretical
violation of the "natural" (read, government granted) monopoly thesis.

> The capital costs of that create an immense barrier to market entry,
> and ease of market entry is a pre-requisite for free-market
> competition.

Its not a real barrier. Capital costs for such structures are
typically sunk via mortgage bonds -- its possible for most utilities
to raise vast amounts of money in the debt markets. If you wish, I can
direct you to people at the Cato Institute who can give you plenty of
good data on why there is no legitimate reason why two or more phone,
cable, electrical, or even gas and water companies couldn't operate in
most areas -- I mean hard data down to the costs involved and
potential profits and the way that competitive utilities have
functioned in areas permitting them. The reasonable conclusion the
data leads to is that the only reason such things don't happen much in
the U.S. is that in most places competition is prohibited by law.

> The only reason the first cable companies even invested in laying cable is
> that they were guaranteed a local monopoly.

Well, the fact that multiple cable companies do in fact exist in many
places gives lie to this premise. The fact that multiple phone
companies used to operate in the early days of the century before the
government put a legal end to that also tends to discount this thesis.

I've heard the argument given time and again about dozens of
industries that "The X industry requires a government monopoly to
operate" or "The Y industry needs subsidies or we would be left
without a Y industry" and the like. I've checked up on many such
claims, and have yet to see one where the numbers or the facts
actually backed up the claim. The practice of granting monopolies was
started in England under the Tudors as a way of earning money for the
crown (which it still is in many states if you look at franchise fees
and utility tax structures). There was initially no pretense about the
practice being needed to preserve certain businesses -- that, of
course, eventually arose as an excuse and is perpetually the
monopolists argument for why competition should not be permitted.

Ultimately, one must ask the hard question of the monopolists. "If
competition is impossible in this industry, or if competitors could
not raise money for infrastructure, why do you need legal protection
from competition? If competition it would render the business
unprofitable, why would people seek to compete with you?"

> These are the kinds of issues that need to be addressed as we move from
> monopoly to free-market competition--how do we correct for the distortions
> caused by the initial government intervention in the market?

Eliminate the intervention by stopping the monopoly?

Perry




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: abootch@sfsuvax1.sfsu.edu (Bokum Bop Till You Drop)
Date: Wed, 10 Nov 93 14:19:01 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Hardware for Sale
Message-ID: <9311102215.AA11909@sfsuvax1.sfsu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


FYI --

Noticed in new ish of 2600 an ad for Consumertronics in NM selling
Tempest, Van Eck systems, KX Radar Emitter -- and more (of course). No
free catalog, tho'. 

-- 
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Version: 2.3a

mQBNAizdNhgAAAECAKYlJfK4YQoaRYtiywdgR7OQmsS23oRFr3QYZf4mE1pQTvPg
DGB7xVx2mfRjsqUdQsar4vdWyNZmXLMmHNdez9UABRG0K0FuZHkgSS4gTWF0aW5v
ZyA8YWJvb3RjaEBzZnN1dmF4MS5zZnN1LmVkdT4=
=KJFP
-----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: 9307905p@ntx.city.unisa.edu.au (CaHoS)
Date: Tue, 9 Nov 93 19:48:45 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: unsubscribe 9307905p@ntx.city.unisa.edu.au
Message-ID: <9311100346.AA12744@ntx.city.unisa.edu.au>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text


ARRRRRRGGH....
        Unsubscribe me.  Im drowning.....


9307905p@ntx.city.unisa.edu.au --- F.R.J. Cichy
                                   B.CS U of SA, Australia



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Mike Godwin <mnemonic@eff.org>
Date: Wed, 10 Nov 93 11:28:59 PST
To: pmetzger@lehman.com
Subject: Re: Should we oppose the Data Superhighway/NII?
In-Reply-To: <9311101859.AA22080@snark.lehman.com>
Message-ID: <199311101926.AA20523@eff.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


 
> Well, in NYC, the utility tunnels are municipal, so its a question of
> leasing a slot from the city.

Is that true? How many slots are there? Is access to the slot unregulated?

> In some areas it might mean
> digging new infrastructure -- modern cable laying equipment has
> dramatically reduced the cost of this, especially for buried fiber
> optics.
 
The question is less one of creating new conduits than of seeing that the
conduits already in place (invariably under a government regulatory
regime, if not an outright monopoly) get used to their fullest potential.
Perry, you think that just letting things happen alone means that
someone's going to give you purchasable video uplink. I'm glad to hear it,
but I don't share you belief. Where we do agree, of course, is that access
to the cable part of the infrastructure (whether by building new conduits
or allocating sections of existing ones) shouldn't be subsidized by
government money, except of course to the extent that the government is
buying such services for itself.

> In practice, none of this is a real problem. Many areas DO have two or
> more cable companies because there is no local prohibition on
> competition ....

I wouldn't say this is accurate. Even in multiple-cable areas, I
understand, the cable companies have government licenses and operate under
government regulation.

In the Boston area, there are multiple cable companies, but you can't
choose which one your particular home will use if you subscribe to cable.

>, and a few areas even have multiple electric companies
> because there are enlightened governments that permit such heretical
> violation of the "natural" (read, government granted) monopoly thesis.

Do those electric companies each have different wires? So that if 
I move into the house where you used to live, and you bought power from
company X, I can call up company Y and say "You're supplying power here
now"? How is this implemented.

I don't think discussion of "natural monopolies" is relevant here, because
it doesn't matter whether the monopolies that exist are natural or not.
They're here in any case.

> > The capital costs of that create an immense barrier to market entry,
> > and ease of market entry is a pre-requisite for free-market
> > competition.
> 
> Its not a real barrier. Capital costs for such structures are
> typically sunk via mortgage bonds -- its possible for most utilities
> to raise vast amounts of money in the debt markets.

I disagree that it's possible for all cable utilities to do this. If
you're the second cable system in a duopoly, maybe. But I don't know of a
debt market that will buy the bonds of the tenth cable company to lay
cable in a certain area. If you know of one, let's start it together--lots
of money to be made in cable!

> If you wish, I can
> direct you to people at the Cato Institute who can give you plenty of
> good data on why there is no legitimate reason why two or more phone,
> cable, electrical, or even gas and water companies couldn't operate in
> most areas -- I mean hard data down to the costs involved and
> potential profits and the way that competitive utilities have
> functioned in areas permitting them.

I regularly read Cato Institute publications and white papers.

> > The only reason the first cable companies even invested in laying cable is
> > that they were guaranteed a local monopoly.
> 
> Well, the fact that multiple cable companies do in fact exist in many
> places gives lie to this premise.

I overgeneralized. But the scenario I mention here is the most common
one.

> The fact that multiple phone
> companies used to operate in the early days of the century before the
> government put a legal end to that also tends to discount this thesis.

They used the same wires, Perry.

> I've heard the argument given time and again about dozens of
> industries that "The X industry requires a government monopoly to
> operate" or "The Y industry needs subsidies or we would be left
> without a Y industry" and the like.

This seems to be a digression. No one around here is arguing for
government monopolies. At least not so far as I can tell.


--Mike








From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Jim McCoy <mccoy@ccwf.cc.utexas.edu>
Date: Wed, 10 Nov 93 12:49:18 PST
To: hughes@ah.com (Eric Hughes)
Subject: Re: Applications of cryptography
In-Reply-To: <9311101959.AA17774@ah.com>
Message-ID: <199311102048.AA10536@flubber.cc.utexas.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text


hughes@ah.com (Eric Hughes) writes:
> 
> >I am trying to compile information about the different
> >applications of cryptography. 
> 
> There's no need.  Go out and buy Bruce Schneier's new crypto book
> whose title I forget.  I has exactly the selection of articles you
> want and comes with source code.

The title is:

Applied Cryptography: Protocols, Algorithms, and Source Code in C

Author: Bruce Schneier
Publisher: J. Willey and Sons
ISBN 0-471-59756-2


I got mine on Monday :)


jim



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Mike Godwin <mnemonic@eff.org>
Date: Wed, 10 Nov 93 11:53:21 PST
To: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Subject: Re: NII and the Need for XXX-rated Porn
In-Reply-To: <199311101923.LAA24616@mail.netcom.com>
Message-ID: <199311101950.AA20732@eff.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


 
Tim May writes:

> Seriously, Mike's comments about cable being a "vaster wasteland" (a
> nice EFF paraphrase of the famous FCC Commissioner's comments in the
> 60s), is important.
 
I proudly take credit for "a vaster wasteland"--a phrase that occurred to
me in a flash of insight as I was doing a revision of the Open Platform
paper. I hope that if I repeat it a lot, it will become a
self-perpetuating meme.

> Does anyone expect the NII will offer hard-core porn on its networks? 
 
In the long run, I expect it will, yes. On a properly designed NII, it
would be impossible to prevent, although of course anyone could bar it at
his or her home.

> I don't know what the solution is, except that I'm naturally skeptical
> about the government having _anything_ to do with it. (I've read the
> CPSR pitch on NII and it scares the crap out of me. I've read the NII
> articles in "Whole Earth Review" and elsewhere and I have the same
> reaction. I've read the Open Platform proposal from EFF and find it
> better, but still overly oriented toward government solutions.

Well, we knew we weren't going to please the purest Libertarians, but we
did try to make it palatable to them--after all, we have genuine
entrepreneurs on our Board of Directors, and they *do* believe in free
markets. Open Platform is our way of getting there from here.

> Finally, I'm still trying to dig out the NII docs themselves, the ones
> Tom Kalil has pointed us to.)
 
Did he say they were online? If this has been discussed before, I missed
it.

> Strong crypto fundamentally collides with many of the stated public
> policy goals surrounding the National Information Infrastructure.

I don't think it collides with EFF's public policy goals, although it may
collide with Tom Kalil's.


--Mike






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: cfrye@ciis.mitre.org (Curtis D. Frye)
Date: Wed, 10 Nov 93 11:54:00 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Big Mother can't protect our privacy
Message-ID: <9311101959.AA19156@ciis.mitre.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Tim writes:
>
>(* MMPI is the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Index test, which
>sounds like the test described here. It has a couple of thousand of
>these questions. Without defending the analytical powers of this test,
>let me say that the intent is psychological, not political. The
>famoous questions about believing in God, having homosexual
>experiences, washing one's hands, and so on, are devised by shrinks,
>not designed to ferret out atheists and homos. The MMPI has been in
>wide use since the 1950s, though it's use is declining as people file
>lawsuits over it.)
>

It should also be noted that the MMPI is designed to diagnose abnormal
personalities, while the California Personality Inventory (CPI) is designed
to diagnose more or less normal personality traits.  It seems that
companies indiscriminately giving the MMPI to individuals without suspision
of neurotic/ psychotic tendencies would open themselves up for a solid
thumping in court.

P.S. - I noticed a book on the statistical basis of the MMPI in the
psychology section of Border's Bookstore in Tysons Corner, VA, a few months
ago.  If there's interest, I could look for a citation on my next trip
there.


Curtis D. Frye
cfrye@ciis.mitre.org
"If you think I speak for MITRE, I'll tell you how much they
 pay me and make you feel foolish."






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Perry E. Metzger" <pmetzger@lehman.com>
Date: Wed, 10 Nov 93 12:13:28 PST
To: Mike Godwin <mnemonic@eff.org>
Subject: Re: Should we oppose the Data Superhighway/NII?
In-Reply-To: <199311101926.AA20523@eff.org>
Message-ID: <9311102009.AA22170@snark.lehman.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Mike Godwin says:
> > Well, in NYC, the utility tunnels are municipal, so its a question of
> > leasing a slot from the city.
> 
> Is that true? How many slots are there? Is access to the slot unregulated?

Well "slots" is a misnomer. There is space in the tunnels. They were
designed for holding lots of phone cable, much of which has dried up
since the copper has started to be replaced with fiber. Fiber takes up
extraordinarily little space, so unless hundreds of companies wanted
to use the same space there wouldn't be real trouble. The space is
both directly and indirectly owned by the city -- some of it is in the
form of subway tunnels and subway access tunnels that are officially
controlled by the MTA, but are de facto controlled by the city.

And no, they have to like you to let you use them.

> > In some areas it might mean
> > digging new infrastructure -- modern cable laying equipment has
> > dramatically reduced the cost of this, especially for buried fiber
> > optics.
>  
> The question is less one of creating new conduits than of seeing that the
> conduits already in place (invariably under a government regulatory
> regime, if not an outright monopoly) get used to their fullest potential.
> Perry, you think that just letting things happen alone means that
> someone's going to give you purchasable video uplink. I'm glad to hear it,
> but I don't share you belief.

I can buy one now. It expensive, but the price is falling. Lehman can
purchase lines from Nynex, Teleport, Metrofiber, and several other
vendors. Vendors WANT to be in the business -- it makes them money,
after all. Car companies don't conspire to avoid selling people cars,
and I doubt deregulated carriers would spend their days trying to find
ways looking for methods to avoid selling people services. What IS a
problem is that many of these carriers can't yet gain access to
customers because of regulations. Manhattan Cable has fiber to every
block in the city -- but was forbidden by the city from competing with
the phone companies for data transmission services.

Indeed, the only companies I ever see looking for ways to avoid having
to provide services are regulated monopolies.

> Where we do agree, of course, is that access to the cable part of
> the infrastructure (whether by building new conduits or allocating
> sections of existing ones) shouldn't be subsidized by government
> money, except of course to the extent that the government is buying
> such services for itself.

Yes.

> > In practice, none of this is a real problem. Many areas DO have two or
> > more cable companies because there is no local prohibition on
> > competition ....
> 
> I wouldn't say this is accurate. Even in multiple-cable areas, I
> understand, the cable companies have government licenses and operate under
> government regulation.
> 
> In the Boston area, there are multiple cable companies, but you can't
> choose which one your particular home will use if you subscribe to
> cable.

The same is true in New York, where there are multiple companies
serving distinct areas of the city.

This is not universally true, however. There are some areas where
multiple cable companies provide overlapping service areas.

> >, and a few areas even have multiple electric companies
> > because there are enlightened governments that permit such heretical
> > violation of the "natural" (read, government granted) monopoly thesis.
> 
> Do those electric companies each have different wires?

I believe so, since it would otherwise be difficult to meter the power
usage. If both companies shared a customer grid, how could you know
who's power was being used? (Power companies do have a grid for
transfering power between their generators, but thats another story.)

> So that if I move into the house where you used to live, and you
> bought power from company X, I can call up company Y and say "You're
> supplying power here now"?

Apparently.

> How is this implemented.

I imagine its much like the way one switches heating from oil to gas
-- someone comes to your house and does a bit of physical work,
usually leaving the old infrastructure in place.

> I don't think discussion of "natural monopolies" is relevant here, because
> it doesn't matter whether the monopolies that exist are natural or not.
> They're here in any case.

Ah, but it is important. If a monopoly is an artificial creature of
government, and not natural, that means that prices are being
artificially kept high BY THE GOVERNMENT. That also means that your
dream of universal access is being blocked.

> > > The capital costs of that create an immense barrier to market entry,
> > > and ease of market entry is a pre-requisite for free-market
> > > competition.
> > 
> > Its not a real barrier. Capital costs for such structures are
> > typically sunk via mortgage bonds -- its possible for most utilities
> > to raise vast amounts of money in the debt markets.
> 
> I disagree that it's possible for all cable utilities to do this. If
> you're the second cable system in a duopoly, maybe. But I don't know of a
> debt market that will buy the bonds of the tenth cable company to lay
> cable in a certain area.

You are certainly correct -- but thats part of the way the free market
works. When you can't get financing for your project it probably means
people don't believe there is a market any more. The first five cable
companies get business, and profits shrink as price wars occur, and
then few new players enter the market. I suspect the first several
players will get money, and thats all you need.

Hell, nothing is more expensive in capital costs than starting an
airline -- and yet people get financing for airlines all the time.

I'd leave the worries about how to finance these things to the
investors, who are after all the people who's money is at risk.

> > If you wish, I can
> > direct you to people at the Cato Institute who can give you plenty of
> > good data on why there is no legitimate reason why two or more phone,
> > cable, electrical, or even gas and water companies couldn't operate in
> > most areas -- I mean hard data down to the costs involved and
> > potential profits and the way that competitive utilities have
> > functioned in areas permitting them.
> 
> I regularly read Cato Institute publications and white papers.

Then I would suggest calling them up and asking them for something on
utility regulation.

> > The fact that multiple phone
> > companies used to operate in the early days of the century before the
> > government put a legal end to that also tends to discount this thesis.
> 
> They used the same wires, Perry.

Nope, they didn't. If necessary, we can dig up references.

> 
> > I've heard the argument given time and again about dozens of
> > industries that "The X industry requires a government monopoly to
> > operate" or "The Y industry needs subsidies or we would be left
> > without a Y industry" and the like.
> 
> This seems to be a digression. No one around here is arguing for
> government monopolies. At least not so far as I can tell.

Ah, but you have been arguing against the elimination of state granted
cable monopolies, haven't you? If not, please let me know because then
there is no reason for me to argue.

Perry




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: jdblair@lust.cas.muohio.EDU (John Blair)
Date: Wed, 10 Nov 93 12:28:59 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: cypherpunks hardware list
Message-ID: <9311102034.AA13898@ lust >
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


To all of those interested in the cypherpunks hardware list:

I apoligize for the delay- I expected to have it on-line by now.  It is
really close to running, I'm just getting some errors from the ListProc
software that my SysAdmin is ironing out right now.

It should be running within 24 hours.

later,
-john.



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Mike Godwin <mnemonic@eff.org>
Date: Wed, 10 Nov 93 12:43:21 PST
To: pmetzger@lehman.com
Subject: Re: Should we oppose the Data Superhighway/NII?
In-Reply-To: <9311102009.AA22170@snark.lehman.com>
Message-ID: <199311102040.AA21328@eff.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Perry Metzger writes:
 
> I imagine its much like the way one switches heating from oil to gas
> -- someone comes to your house and does a bit of physical work,
> usually leaving the old infrastructure in place.
 
This doesn't sound like a true free market to me--there are barriers other
than mere price to switching among power providers. It will be cheaper in
terms of opportunity costs to stay with the same provider.

Contrast this with long-distance services, where competition forces
providers to give you incentives to switch.

> Ah, but it is important. If a monopoly is an artificial creature of
> government, and not natural, that means that prices are being
> artificially kept high BY THE GOVERNMENT. That also means that your
> dream of universal access is being blocked.
 
I just don't see how whether we agree on the existence of natural
monopolies or not has to do with this discussion. We both think the
monopolies and government subsidies should end.

> > I disagree that it's possible for all cable utilities to do this. If
> > you're the second cable system in a duopoly, maybe. But I don't know of a
> > debt market that will buy the bonds of the tenth cable company to lay
> > cable in a certain area.
> 
> You are certainly correct -- but thats part of the way the free market
> works. When you can't get financing for your project it probably means
> people don't believe there is a market any more.

Okay, now let's look at Tim May's hypothetical case. Tim wants X-rated
cable. But the first nine cable companies don't want to provide it. And
the Metzger-Godwin Cable operation, which would provide it, can't get
financing. There's a market for it, but there's also a barrier to entry.
If the only way to reach that market is to invest independently in one's
own infrastructure, then that market simply goes unsatisfied--no
reasonable entrepreneur would bother.

I leave to your imagination what happens in the event that we *do* 
start the P-G Cable company, but content providers won't sell other
programming to us so Tim is forced to choose between only X-rated
cable--us--and cable services that provide other kinds of programming.
(Tim may have no problem with this, but lots of other people in our market
will want to watch CNN as well as X-rated videos.) 

And don't forget that the cable infrastructure we're talking about
duplicating here includes coax to the individual home. So, when Tim
decides to switch over to P-G, we've got to go out to his house and
install a brand-new cable and yank out the old one--we can't just
turn on the existing cable. This is the consequence of duplicating cable
infrastructure.

My understanding, by the way, is that cable in multi-provider areas is not
duplicated--that when a municipality awards a contract to a new cable
bidder, they don't yank out the old cable or add a whole new cable
infrasture. Instead, they turn the existing infrastructure over to a new
provider. 

> The first five cable
> companies get business, and profits shrink as price wars occur, and
> then few new players enter the market.

So, what happens when, in a system in which the only way one can enter as
a competitor is to invest in a whole new infrasture, and nobody will fund
it, and the existing cable companies won't carry your service? How does
the market, in a world that treats cable in the ground as somebody's
private conduit rather than as true infrastructure, provide Tim his
X-rated cable service?

Wouldn't it be better to live in a world in which the cable
infrastructure, like the telephone infrastructure, could be serviced by
competing providers, and at the individual level? We already have this
with long-distance--if I want, I can have Sprint, MCI, *and* AT&T accounts
and use them all from the same phone. Ultimately we'll have it in the
local loop.

In this world, Tim could contract with Warner Cable to get some of their
programming, and with P-G Cable to get that little something Xtra that
helps him get through the day. 

> Hell, nothing is more expensive in capital costs than starting an
> airline -- and yet people get financing for airlines all the time.
 
All this illustrates is the inadequacy of comparing air providers to
infrasture providers.

> > I regularly read Cato Institute publications and white papers.
> 
> Then I would suggest calling them up and asking them for something on
> utility regulation.
 
Why? I've already read their stuff. Reading is not the same thing as
agreeing.

> > > The fact that multiple phone
> > > companies used to operate in the early days of the century before the
> > > government put a legal end to that also tends to discount this thesis.
> > 
> > They used the same wires, Perry.
> 
> Nope, they didn't. If necessary, we can dig up references.
 
Oh, you're saying that one couldn't make a phone call from one local phone
company to another?

> > This seems to be a digression. No one around here is arguing for
> > government monopolies. At least not so far as I can tell.
> 
> Ah, but you have been arguing against the elimination of state granted
> cable monopolies, haven't you? If not, please let me know because then
> there is no reason for me to argue.

I'm not. I think they should be eliminated.


--Mike






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: fnerd@smds.com (FutureNerd Steve Witham)
Date: Wed, 10 Nov 93 13:48:59 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Deconstructing DH/NII (was: Should we oppose...?)
Message-ID: <9311102133.AA07425@smds.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Mike Godwin asks what Tim May is against when he says he's against the
NII ("National Information Infrastructure"), or DH ("Data Superhigh-
way.")  Mike also points out that EFF is not into government funding or
regulation, but (I paraphrase) as long as the govt is going to be 
involved, why not try to convince them to be involved in the right
way?  One way he mentions is providing incentives to steer the 
industry in good directions since we're going to [future tense] 
have *some* kind of data superhighway anyway.  Mike is certainly 
right that there are directions it would be nice to steer the 
government in in these issues, and I'm sure grateful for his (and 
EFF's) efforts on that front.

I think this "that's not what we meant...but why not..." situation 
that Mike finds himself in is due to the nature of "initiatives" like 
NII.  We are afloat in connotations, suggestions and perverse pep.

The phrases "National Information Infrastructure" and "Data Super-
highway" do not conjure an anarchist vision.  They do not suggest 
companies and people working independently in parallel, free from 
centralized interference.  They do not convey the idea that the net
is what you make of it, what your exploring and connecting bring 
together for you, out of a hodgepodge of methods, links, databases
and groups of friends.  The fact that NII and DH are new terms, and 
that they are talked about as future goals, does not convey the fact 
that the data superhighway is here today. 

I'm understating, of course.  These terms connote all the opposite
things.  Centralization, government funding, premature standar-
dization, regulation--and finally a decent data network as a result.
I'm not being unfair.  These connotations are there because that's 
exactly what many of the people using these terms mean.  They want 
all the wrong things, and all the wrong ideas attach themselves to
national project proposals like this.

There's an additional misleading connotation, that there is some
watershed mark that we're all talking about, some point--in the
future--when we'll finally have "enough" or the "right" communi-
cations underpinning*.  This is partly just boosterism--Clinton and 
Gore wanting to be JFK going to the moon--but also there's the
hint that once the big guys implement the right way to do things,
we consumers shouldn't complain.  I mean there's an implication
in terms like "infrastructure" of experts knowing what is needed.
And of course this discounts the efforts of the people who have
brought us to where we are.  There's a hint that what we've got is
fine for hackers, but it's not, well, *organized* enough to be
suitable for the real world.  (Partly true but still an insult
and a backhanded dismissal of the purposefulness of our anarchy.)

(*There is no watershed.  You can get a T1 line now.  Prices will go 
down, bandwith up, ubiquity and commonness up, standardization and 
ease of use up, complication down, I hope--continuously for the 
forseeable future as they have been doing so far.)

Still it's all only connotations and impressions, and anyone
in particular may not mean this or that.  But given that there
are lots of people who really *do* intend the bad ideas, I 
wish people who come from a whole different point of view would
make that really really clear.  Starting by not using the same
slogans.  So, we need some alternatives.

Slogans for how the real network is:
Hmm, the anarchic data backroad (adb--nope, taken)...
Or, "The Network's Fine" (as in, "Come on in...")--TNF.
You Are Here---YAH...

Or we can invent slogans for what the DH/NII really mean:
Or, "Drag The Government Kicking and Screaming Into The Eighties"
(or do I mean the seventies, a la ethernet and UUCP?)--DG8.
The Federal Technical Catchup (FTC--oops, another one taken)...
No, I know--the Federal Communications Catchup...
Big Brother with a Human Face...

Work with me on this, folks.

-fnerd@smds.com
quote me

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3Ch466q9EKUuDulTU6OLsilzmRvQJn0EJhzd4pht6hanC0R3seYNhUYhoJViCcCG
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From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: mpjohnso@nyx10.cs.du.edu (Michael Johnson)
Date: Wed, 10 Nov 93 15:59:00 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: MPJ2 Encryption Algorithm
Message-ID: <9311102355.AA06521@nyx10.cs.du.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


For a sneak preview of the MPJ2 Encryption Algorithm article I just submitted
to the IEEE Transactions on Information Theory, anonymous ftp to csn.org and
look in the mpj directory or call my BBS at 303-938-9654.  I used the 
same mechanism used by rsa.com to isolate the nonexportable stuff (source 
code, programs) from the Constitutionally protected publication (article 
describing the algorithm).  Seems strange to me, but if it works for the 
Department of State and rsa.com thinks it won't get them in trouble, then 
I guess I'm not sticking my neck out too far.

Any technical types among you want to take a look at the algorithm and 
tell me what you think about its security?  I've been trying to break it for
several years, but I'm just an amateur who reads a lot.

Why MPJ2 and not just IDEA or 3DES?  Never put all your crypto eggs in 
one basket.  Besides, MPJ2 is royalty-free.  Go build some useful code or 
hardware.  (MPJ2 is faster and simpler in hardware, once the key is set up).

                                      Mike Johnson
                                      mpj@csn.org
                                      (aka mpjohnso@nyx.cs.du.edu)

Never thumb your nose at a giant, but don't let the giant intimidate the life
out of you. -- Jack's Goose.





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Alan (Gesture Man) Wexelblat" <wex@media.mit.edu>
Date: Wed, 10 Nov 93 14:08:59 PST
To: talon57@well.sf.ca.us
Subject: Should we build the Data Superhighway/NII
In-Reply-To: <199311101839.KAA19331@well.sf.ca.us>
Message-ID: <9311102207.AA22836@media.mit.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


The business about replacing copper with optical fibre and who's going to
pay for it is a total red herring.  Currently, it's much cheaper for the
RBOCs to lay fiber than copper.  Over the whole nation, about 5% of the
wiring is replaced annually.  For at least the last two years, that
replacement has been 100% fiber and (IMNVHO) that trend will continue.  In
~20(*) years the whole country will be fiber without anyone doing anything
out of the ordinary.

(*) It's a little more than 20 years because there is some overlap in the
areas that get replaces; I.e. it's not a new 5% each year, but the overlap
is well under 1%.

--Alan Wexelblat, Reality Hacker, Author, and Cyberspace Bard
Media Lab - Advanced Human Interface Group	wex@media.mit.edu
Voice: 617-258-9168, Pager: 617-945-1842	PUBLIC KEY available by request
Try not to have a good time ... This is supposed to be educational.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: hatzm@bigbird.cso.gtegsc.com (Mike Hatz)
Date: Wed, 10 Nov 93 16:13:26 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Elm Filtering on CC???
Message-ID: <9311110020.AA17743@bigbird.cso.gtegsc.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text


Is it possible to get Elm's filter to pick out messages that are cc'd to 
the cypherpunks list?  I would like to keep all the cypherpunk mail in 
one place and have no trouble getting it properly copied when the message 
is "to" the cypherpunks list.  I'm just not sure how to work on the CC part.

Thanks!

Mike



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Dark <unicorn@access.digex.net>
Date: Wed, 10 Nov 93 15:19:00 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Privacy, Property, Cryptography (long)
Message-ID: <199311102317.AA19232@access.digex.net>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
 
I guess this is particularly political, but I thought it 
interesting enough to attach to cypherpunks.
 
 
Subject matter appropriateness flames by E-Mail please.
 
 
Questions of Privacy and Property:
How Encryption narrows the focus.
 
- ->
 
There is no right to privacy in this country.
 
	The much touted "Right to privacy" is a common law 
conception and invention that, for the most part, has little 
foundation.  There are constitutional provisions that _suggest_ 
privacy, but none that "assure" it.  To enforce a right to 
privacy in court, judges have to do a lot of reaching.
 
	I can't recall who it was, but some cypherpunk mentioned 
that they had not consented to the "social contract" or 
"convention" that gave the government the right to "violate" 
their "privacy" or collect data on them.  I agree with you on 
principal (oh, unnamed privacy patron) but unfortunately 
logically I can't.
	Your natural rights approach to the rights of privacy is 
limited in that, unlike other rights founded in a Natural Rights 
/ Victorian legal thought fashion, privacy has no logical 
precedent in the state of nature.
	When you see assertions of Natural Rights concepts, they 
tend to work down from grand principals.  In the past, these 
principals have their root in a concept of the "State of Nature" 
or the Creation myth.  e.g., Property exists and is enforceable 
because God created the Earth for common use, and what you take, 
and can reasonably put to use, becomes yours by means of the 
labor you put into it (Locke).
	How to find these precedents with regards to privacy is 
quite beyond me.  It seems almost ingrained in the culture of 
Natural Rights that the Divine was all knowing.  It leaves little 
basis to find a protection for privacy in Natural Rights theory.
	So move to the more progressive social convention theories.  
These are almost always more empowering to the judicial system, 
with a concept that the judge was not just a tool to enforce law, 
but to shape it as well.  In the 1920's-30's we begin to see more 
and more frequent legal applications of nebulous "balancing 
tests" to replace the bright line rules as a result.  
Unfortunately the departure of the formalist approach takes with 
it the notion of the public and private spheres distinction.  The 
progressive movement began to blend the spheres, and what 
distinction was left between them was gelded by the notion that 
the public sphere was the larger and more important of the two.  
Farewell individual rights, hello good of the collective.
	I think this is much of the reason that the appeal to the 
absolute right of privacy gets little attention today.  Instead 
we see privacy taking a back seat to public elements like the war 
on drugs and national security.  Avoiding for a moment the basic 
conflict between security and liberty, so long as the 
"establishment" can assert that a particular action is for the 
good of the public, it will justify the removal of any right or 
privilege.
	Turn for a second to the nature of right and privilege.  
Privacy is really not a right to begin with but a privilege.  
Before you get up in arms, and make analogies to driver's 
licenses, consider the following, courtesy of Hohfield.  Every 
entitlement is either a right or a privilege.  All rights have 
corresponding duties, (by definition in Hohfield's explanation) 
privileges by contrast are met on the other side by the existence 
of a no-right.  For example:  If I verbally assault Tom on the 
street, he has no legal recourse.  I have the privilege of verbal 
assault, and Tom has a no-right relationship with my privilege.  
He has no right to redress.  If I burn down Tom's house, Tom has 
had his right (to use and enjoyment of land) violated, and as a 
result, I have a duty not to infringe on that right.
	Privacy in the past has fit nicely into the privilege hole.  
It wasn't that you had a right to privacy, but rather that 
everyone else had no-right to pry.  Privacy was in a Hohfieldian 
manner, a privilege.  Today this changes.  Privacy, or more 
accurately LACK OF PRIVACY, is now a duty.  The social security 
administration has a RIGHT to assign you a number.  The IRS has a 
RIGHT to poke around.  The FBI has a RIGHT to tap your phone 
(with cause, [or not]).  We have gone from a privilege to the 
opposite side of a right, a duty in effect.
	Enter cryptography.  Now we have the means to protect our 
information.  Technology makes it easier to avoid the "duty" of 
disclosure.  One way or another, something will give.  Privacy is 
on the fence right now with a movement to a government 
entitlement against it.  Cryptography will either force the hand, 
or force a backdown.  Which one is a matter of conjecture.
	Personally I would like to see the elements of privacy 
become guarded by right to privacy, with the typical bundle of 
property rights that follows such a designation.  Right to use, 
right to exclude, right to transfer the property of information, 
personal or proprietary.  This opens the door for more radical 
injunctive and money damage relief for the violation of these 
rights than is currently available.  It is with this goal in mind 
that I approach my support of cypherpunks and cryptography.
	No one in my mind has a right to intrude and it is entirely 
counterintuitive to expect citizens to submit to a duty of 
disclosure as is the current practice and direction.  Even with 
respect to business and banking, the only reason identity has 
become important is with the rise of the credit transaction.  
There is simply no need for identity disclosure with cash 
transactions.  Numbered bank accounts and even lines of credit 
exist and will continue to prosper.
 
Thank you for your time and attention.
:)
 
- -uni- (Dark)
 
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X/P2AF5oX3WTV0zGNsMFX88uUeJUTx83yCt24o+ZgX+FxM5aNDuNME1LDH2voatP
mFdiGatQhS4=
=7SjQ
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: trestrab@GVSU.EDU (BETH TRESTRAIL)
Date: Wed, 10 Nov 93 15:33:26 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Wired 1.6 is not yet publically available
Message-ID: <9310107529.AA752984927@GVSU.EDU>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


 Tim May (tcmay@netcom.com) wrote:

>A couple of you have asked about "Wired" and the availability of the
>new issue, 1.6. Especially as the first "monthly" issue, 1.5, has
>only been out a few weeks. (And it mentions a strange thing
>called "BlackNet" on page 32, as sharp observers have
>noted.)

>I've been told by Sandy Sandfort that the issue is not yet on the
>newstands, and may not even be sent out to contributor and
>subscribers for a couple more weeks....so no point in
>looking for it now. How'd I get one, then?

"Wired" 1.6 was on the newstands in West. Michigan today.

          Jeff




















-- 
..........................................................................
Timothy C. May         | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,  
tcmay@netcom.com       | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
408-688-5409           | knowledge, reputations, information markets, 
W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA  | black markets, collapse of governments.
Higher Power: 2^756839 | Public Key: PGP and MailSafe available.
Note: I put time and money into writing this posting. I hope you enjoy it.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Bill Stewart <stewab@us0750tb.oakland.NCR.COM>
Date: Wed, 10 Nov 93 19:13:27 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: AT&T Encryption Product
Message-ID: <9311102212.ag09356@ncrhub1.NCR.COM>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


           NCR - An AT&T Company
           ____________________________________INTRA CORPORATION

    From:  Bill Stewart <bill.stewart@pleasantonca.ncr.com>
Location:  Pleasanton District

      To:  cypherpunks@toad.com
Location:  The Real World,or at least Cyberspace

 Subject:  AT&T Encryption Product

Well, it was interesting to see Philippe Nave's posting about an AT&T 
encryption software product (using the government's digital signature
and secure hash standards instead of RSA and MD-5, so it won't be PGP-
or PEM-compatible).  Prices seemed a bit high, though not bad for AT&T,
who are cutting some new market turf as well as typically pricey,
and the encrypted Zmodem software may be useful.  Does anybody know
if there are any other SHA / government-signature products out?
(I'm assuming there won't be much freeware because of the patent
issue; people who don't mind violating RSA's patent generally use PGP.)

		Bill




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Carl Ellison <cme@sw.stratus.com>
Date: Wed, 10 Nov 93 15:44:00 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: random dot stereo code
Message-ID: <199311102343.SAA17966@ellisun.sw.stratus.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I have just uploaded to soda a file of code for generating random dot
stereograms, as well as the following short description file.
This is the code to which I referred a month ago or so.
I'm going to play with the code myself as soon as I have time, but
because of the expressed interest, I thought I'd give the rest of the
list a crack at it as soon as I got permission.

 - cme

====================================================================
The file stereo.tar.gz holds code for generating random dot stereograms
which I discussed earlier on the list.

This code is not mine.  I received it from a friend of the man who wrote it.
She assures me that he doesn't care who uses the code or for what.
I haven't run this code myself.

 - Carl

cme@sw.stratus.com





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Bill Stewart <stewab@us0750tb.oakland.NCR.COM>
Date: Wed, 10 Nov 93 19:14:03 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Newsgroups, Sternlight-bashing and screaming children
Message-ID: <9311102212.ah09356@ncrhub1.NCR.COM>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


           NCR - An AT&T Company
           ____________________________________INTRA CORPORATION

    From:  Bill Stewart <bill.stewart@pleasantonca.ncr.com>
Location:  Pleasanton District

      To:  cypherpunks@toad.com
Location:  cyberspace

 Subject:  Newsgroups, Sternlight-bashing and screaming children

I consider the Sternlight-bashing suggestions to be unreasonable;
Sternlight may rave from a warped, pro-government viewpoint,
but he is capable of carrying on civilized conversations, even when
he's (continually) grinding the same axe.  The coffee-house analogy
is a very good one, and there *is* occasionally a screaming-children
problem on usenet; I assumed the original poster was referring more to
the perpetual-newbie types rather than to the newly arrived,
chronologically-deficient college students, most of whom are either
quiet, productive, or both (though a college student and the author 
apparently felt otherwise :-)
  
I still prefer having this as a mailing
list, in spite of the volume; I can read sci.crypt when I want to,
though I'll probably have to get a netcom account rather than
keep telnetting into my old system now that I've moved.

	Thanks;  Bill





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: an41418@anon.penet.fi (wonderer)
Date: Wed, 10 Nov 93 10:53:21 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Applications of cryptography
Message-ID: <9311101851.AA00120@anon.penet.fi>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


My apologies for getting caught up in the political
momentum of the Private vs. Public debate on income
tax. It was too tempting...

Anyway, back to wondering.

I am trying to compile information about the different
applications of cryptography. I would like to create
something like the handbook of cryptography. Some
examples that come to mind are: digital cash, DC nets,
coin flipping, mental poker, digital signatures,
secure communication, encrypted file systems, etc.
Any help will be appreciated. 

If people respond to me directly, I will post a summary
to the list, and maybe distribute the handbook if it is
a successful project in a few months.

Thanks,
Wonderer
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
To find out more about the anon service, send mail to help@anon.penet.fi.
Due to the double-blind, any mail replies to this message will be anonymized,
and an anonymous id will be allocated automatically. You have been warned.
Please report any problems, inappropriate use etc. to admin@anon.penet.fi.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Martin.Greifer@f28.n125.z1.FIDONET.ORG (Martin Greifer)
Date: Thu, 11 Nov 93 08:33:31 PST
To: Cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: modem taps/caller id
Message-ID: <4110.2CE1DFEC@shelter.FIDONET.ORG>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



> From  kumr!toad.com!owner-cypherpunks

> Practical Peripherals sells a modem that also captures Caller ID info
> and makes   it available to your comm program.  I've also seen devices
> that do this for   sale in the back of BBS magazines.

The question is, how does a caller block this feature?
___ Blue Wave/QWK v2.12
--  
Martin Greifer - via FidoNet node 1:125/1
UUCP: ...!uunet!kumr!shelter!28!Martin.Greifer
INTERNET: Martin.Greifer@f28.n125.z1.FIDONET.ORG




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: fnerd@smds.com (FutureNerd Steve Witham)
Date: Wed, 10 Nov 93 17:59:35 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Should we oppose the Data Superhighway/NII?
Message-ID: <9311110120.AA08393@smds.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Mike Godwin sez

> In order to get to a world in which free markets can meet our demand for
> high-bandwidth connectivity, we have to dig ourselves out from the 
> market-failure position we're in now. And because government is part of
> the problem, changing government policy is part of the solution. So,
> that's one of the major thrusts of EFF's NII policy. 

As I understand it, for both telephones and cable TV, it is still common
for local governments to "grant" "franchises" to single companies for
phone and cable wires.  If there were one thing to change, that would be
it.

In other words, the "market failure" you're talking about is in a 
situation where the law forbids a market.  And the change required is 
that the government not be involved.  It would be nice if that were
how EFF stated its NII policy: Yankee Go Home.

Also, isn't the FCC is somehow involved in defining 
cable and telephone services, and what combinations of services 
companies are allowed to offer?  Or am I thinking of "information
providers" vs....something?  Here again, the limitation is merely in
what's legal.

-fnerd@smds.com
quote me
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3Ch466q9EKUuDulTU6OLsilzmRvQJn0EJhzd4pht6hanC0R3seYNhUYhoJViCcCG
sRjLQs4iVVM=
=9wqs
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From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Eli Brandt <ebrandt@jarthur.Claremont.EDU>
Date: Wed, 10 Nov 93 20:29:24 PST
To: cypherpunks list <cypherpunks@toad.com>
Subject: rant pointer
Message-ID: <9311110429.AA18475@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


L. Detweiler has a rather hefty essay in the latest Risks on the
subject of `pseudospoofing', social parasites, "a criminal group
called the CryptoAnarchists" (with members such as "Eric May" and
"T.C. Hughes"), and such matters.  I will not forward it to the
list, unh unh, no way.

	 PGP 2 key by finger or e-mail
   Eli   ebrandt@jarthur.claremont.edu




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "L. Detweiler" <ld231782>
Date: Wed, 10 Nov 93 20:53:33 -0700
To: pmetzger@lehman.com
Subject: Re: the Amusements of Cypherpunks
In-Reply-To: <9311101417.AA21809@snark.lehman.com>
Message-ID: <9311110353.AA09938@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


apparently you are so clueless as to never have heard of a kill file.
or are too insane to implement one yourself if your software doesn't have one.

please, join the rest of society. don't be such an incredible jerk. it
wouldn't be so bad if you just left me alone, but the whole point of
your venemous rudeness is that you ASSAULT PEOPLE.

I really do feel sorry for you.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "L. Detweiler" <ld231782>
Date: Wed, 10 Nov 93 20:54:48 -0700
To: postmaster@lehman.com
Subject: P. Metzger
Message-ID: <9311110354.AA09957@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Assuming you are not P. Metzger, please help him to understand how to
implement a kill file rather than assaulting me with mailbombs.

===cut=here===

[insert minimailbomb here]





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Duncan Frissell <frissell@panix.com>
Date: Wed, 10 Nov 93 18:44:37 PST
To: CYPHERPUNKS@toad.com
Subject: New Cash Card Announced
Message-ID: <199311110244.AA14107@panix.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Today's WSJ reports that VISA USA intends to launch a "prepaid" travel 
card for use in ATMs and POS terminals.  The card, meant as an electronic 
travelers check, would be yet another form of cash substitute.

This would, in reality, be a Visa card you could purchase for cash.  
Presumably US sales of these cards would be subject to cash transaction 
reporting rules but not those in other countries.

Interesting scenario.  I buy one of these babies for $100,000 in 
Switzerland.  I arrange to have it not yet "turned on."  (Many of the new 
prepaid phone cards must be activated before they can be used.) I enter 
the US carrying a card worth $0.  I order it activated.  Suddenly I have a 
$100,000 cash card in the US without having imported $100,000 into the US.

The nice thing about the explosion of payment forms that is going on right 
now is that the regulators tend to get swamped.  It is hard to regulate 
things with 10 different payment forms (cash, checks, money orders, 
travelers checks, credit cards, ATM cards, debit cards, bank wires, 
consumer electronic money transfers, and bill payment services).  When 
these new cards hit and all of the new electronic banking payment systems 
are up and running, the Feds will be hard pressed to even keep up with the 
bare outline of the payments system much less regulate it closely.

Duncan Frissell

"Dowd's the name, Elwood P.  Here, let me give you one of my cards.  
Don't use that phone number it's the old one use the other number.  I'd
like you to meet a friend of mine.  His name's Harvey.  He's a Pooka." 

--- WinQwk 2.0b#1165                                                               




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: jkreznar@ininx.com (John E. Kreznar)
Date: Wed, 10 Nov 93 22:29:02 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Privacy, Property, Cryptography (long)
In-Reply-To: <199311102317.AA19232@access.digex.net>
Message-ID: <9311110628.AA17830@ininx>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



> 	No one in my mind has a right to intrude and it is entirely 
> counterintuitive to expect citizens to submit to a duty of 
> disclosure as is the current practice and direction.

And this intuition of yours seems to be reflected in law and statute to a
greater degree than you're allowing elsewhere in your essay.  For example, U.S.
Supreme Court Justice Louis Brandeis said that the "right to be left alone is
the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized men."[1]
Yet your opening lines are

> There is no right to privacy in this country.

> 	The much touted "Right to privacy" is a common law 
> conception and invention that, for the most part, has little 
> foundation.  There are constitutional provisions that _suggest_ 
> privacy, but none that "assure" it.  To enforce a right to 
> privacy in court, judges have to do a lot of reaching.

It's hard to believe that support for privacy is _this_ lacking in law or
statute.

(Of course, the foregoing notwithstanding, I embrace the cypherpunks position
that securing privacy is one's own responsibility.)

Elsewhere you state

> Privacy was in a Hohfieldian manner, a privilege.

Hohfield sounds like an interesting read.  Can you give a reference?

[1] Quoted in ACLU Briefing Paper Number 5, "Drug Testing in the Workplace",
published by the Department of Public Education, American Civil Liberties Union,
132 West 43rd Street, New York, NY 10036, (212) 944-9800.

	John E. Kreznar		| Relations among people to be by
	jkreznar@ininx.com	| mutual consent, or not at all.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: hughes@ah.com (Eric Hughes)
Date: Wed, 10 Nov 93 22:39:02 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: L. Detweiler's latest rant on comp.risks
Message-ID: <9311110637.AA19911@ah.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I would suggest that everyone with any interest at all in the latest
L. Detweiler rant, which appears on comp.risks, to send a short
message to RISKS attesting to the separate existence of the following
individuals, as listed by LD at the end:

>I thank the following eminent Cypherpunks for ideas in this article,
>although it should not be construed to be representative of their
>opinions, and neither can I provide any guarantee they represent
>unique people:

>G.Broiles, A.Chandler, J.Dinkelacker, H.Finney, E.Hughes, M.Landry,
>T.C.May, N.Szabo

In particular, I'd like to see short messages from each of the above
people to RISKS attesting to their own individuality.  Also, if LD has
accused you in public or private of not existing, please send a
message stating this.

The address is

	risks@csl.sri.com

Keep your comments short and polite, and mention "L. Detweiler" in
each of them.  We need everyone who has been involved to send a
message.

Please speak out.

Thanks.

Eric





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: lear35!mdbomber@nebula.acs.uci.edu (Matt Bartley)
Date: Thu, 11 Nov 93 03:13:29 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Elm & PGP
Message-ID: <9311110647.AA19765@lear35.vlpa.ca.us>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----


I'm having some trouble using the morepgp filter program that's in the
contrib/elm_nn directory of the PGP distribution.  It works nicely in
most respects.  However, I haven't been able to choose a good pager
program for morepgp to send its output to.

If I tell morepgp to use the 'more' program, it will page through the
mail message until it gets to the end.  When that happens, elm
suddenly retakes control and clears the screen.  The last screenful of
the message is therefore on the screen only an instant.  This is
unacceptable.

A lesser problem is when the mail message has a PGP signature.  As pgp
works on it, it will say something to the effect of
	good signature from <user> at <timestamp>
However, it immediately passes control to more, which doesn't pause the
screen until the "good signature" message has already scrolled off the
screen.  At least in an xterm window I can scroll back.

Speaking of less, that's the default pager for morepgp, but it has
problems also.  It has the same problem as more where the pgp
signature information scrolls off the screen before it can be read.
However, since less clears the screen between each screenful, there is
no way to scroll back using the scroll bars of an xterm window.  Thus
I only get a few miliseconds to read whether whose signature was on
that mail message I just read...  I haven't found any command line options
for less that disable the screen clears.

Does anyone have any solutions to this problem?


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.3a

iQBVAgUBLOHgEjSSmvXojb+5AQH1/wH6A7j1dZalFHIIZXLxl0OW4K/CgA/hAZ0G
SV2RAe5k5fDIY52JCJoFgtwL7fam0YQ+eifveIoCkkLV2EOP4ZXtUg==
=4ctR
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: doug@netcom.com (Doug Merritt)
Date: Wed, 10 Nov 93 23:09:02 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Should we oppose the Data Superhighway/NII?
In-Reply-To: <mnemonic@eff.org>
Message-ID: <199311110705.XAA04155@mail.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Mike Godwin <mnemonic@eff.org> said:
>Perry writes:
>> Seems to me that bandwidth is
>> going to be nearly free in both directions in a few years whether
>> government intervenes or not.
>
>I agree about the potential for it to be free, but, I gotta tell you, the
>monopolists running the cable systems in this country have no inclination
>to share that nearly free bandwidth with you, even if you're willing to
>pay for access to it.

I hate to disagree, considering that I prefer to agree with the philosophy
here, but it *can't* work that way, regardless of what we wish.

The problem is that bandwidth is a highly limited resource, just like
real estate is a limited resource. Eventually we will complete saturate
network bandwidth no matter what technology is used. This has been discussed
in various forums for many years. Once optical fiber optic bandwidth
peaks, you have to move to ultraviolet for greater channel capacity.
Then that is exhausted, and we will continue pushing...gamma ray bandwidth
fiber optic (or line of sight transmission) will eventually be a target,
despite its extreme difficulties even in theory.

At the same time we will be laying fiber and raising dishes to beat the
band. But no matter how well all that goes, we will *very* quickly reach
a saturation point of facilities as each new technology is introduced.

These days it's easy to be optimistic, because bandwidth is growing
geometrically. The problem is that there is no way in hell that that
trend can continue indefinitely. One or two decades hence we will saturate
theoretical limits.

Bandwidth is and will always remain a scarce and precious resource.

On the other hand, if you mean "slow channels by comparison with state of
the art channels," then yeah, *that* may as well be free at any given
point. Right this instant one could make an argument for 110 baud
channels being free.

>In order to get to a world in which free markets can meet our demand for
>high-bandwidth connectivity, we have to dig ourselves out from the 
>market-failure position we're in now. And because government is part of
>the problem, changing government policy is part of the solution. So,
>that's one of the major thrusts of EFF's NII policy. 

I agree, but this seems to be a subject change.
	Doug




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: hughes@ah.com (Eric Hughes)
Date: Wed, 10 Nov 93 23:19:02 PST
To: risks@csl.sri.com
Subject: A short response to L. Detweiler: 'I exist as myself.'
Message-ID: <9311110714.AA19967@ah.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


L. Detweiler's recent article on the RISKS of confusing an online
identity with a potentially knowable physical one are quite
interesting, if hypothetical.

I would be interested in hearing of situations where this practice
has actually occurred.  If any RISKS members know of any such
incidents from first-hand experience, please share them with the
readership.

Unfortunately, I think he really believes that the cypherpunks mailing
list has been dominated by a small cabal who have been using multiple
identities who talk with each other on the list in order to enforce
concensus and to suppress disagreeing positions, namely his.

It just ain't so.  

Therefore, to set the record straight I feel I ought to make the
following public statement:

I, Eric Hughes, have never posted or communicated in any name other
than my own.  I can personally testify that I am not the same as any
of the other people listed at the end of L. Detweiler's post, and I
can testify from personal experience that Arthur Chandler, Hal Finney,
Tim C. May, and Nick Szabo are all different people.

I also decline to answer, point by point, the numerous defamatory
innuendos made by L. Detweiler against the members of the cypherpunks
mailing list.  Might I also observe that none of the statements are
specific enough to actually count as accusation, but merely as general
slander?

Eric




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "L. Detweiler" <ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Date: Wed, 10 Nov 93 22:23:27 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: The Depravities of Cypherpunks
Message-ID: <9311110619.AA12976@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I did not understand Mr. Metzger at first. When he sent me messages in
the form `go away and leave us alone' I thought he was suggesting I be
censored from the cypherpunks mailing list. Apparently he is only
objecting to personal email from me. Well, after receiving 40 messages
with the concatenated contents of other messages from him and myself
over the matter, in response to the following two, I certainly will not do so.

Mr. Metzger did say it was OK for me to post to the Cypherpunks list,
for which I wish to express my heartfelt gratitude in his allowing me
his permission. He threatened to send me 400 letters the next time I
sent him personal mail however, and of course he is certainly capable of it.

I mailed postmaster@lehman.com, asking him to encourage Mr. Metzger to
learn how to use a kill file instead of sending me mailbombs in
response to his obvious intense mental anguish at seeing my name <g>,
but unfortunately Mr. Metzger is the postmaster at his site.

Mr. Hughes is quite perplexed at my sheer rage at Mr. Metzger's
unsurpassed childishness. He didn't approve of me attempting to shame
Mr. Metzger (a close personal friend, I suppose) into refraining from
sending me mailbombs and dealing with his own insanity in a more
proactive manner -- like figuring out how to implement a kill file in
his mail -- by informing the cypherpunk world of his puerile prank. I
told Mr. Hughes that it was likely that Mr. Metzger was his own site
administrator (I was not positive at this point, alas). Mr. Hughes has
not responded to that letter.

Mr. Hughes is also quite puzzled why I should violate Mr. Metzger's
privacy in revealing his `private' mailbomb to other members of the
community he (supposedly) resides in. I guess he believes that
mailbombs, like everything else, are a private matter. My apologies,
Mr. Hughes, for what you consider an inappropriate use of your mailing
list. My personal opinion is that I had essentially no other recourse,
and even the `recourse' I chose was obviously ineffective! I asked Mr.
Hughes to condemn Mr. Metzger's behavior. So far his only comment is
that it was `rude'. Maybe he will have another opinion upon learning of
Mr. Metzgers 40 letter bomb just received, or his 400 letter threat. Or
maybe he thinks that Mr. Metzger is just another patriotic cypherpunk,
perhaps even deserving of a medal!

Also, I have mail from Mr. Jason Zions (jazz@hal.com) also complaining
that I violated Mr. Metzger's privacy in revealing his mailbomb to me
to the list as a whole. This strange code of cypherpunk chivalry I am
not familar with. I am quite bewildered! Perhaps someone can point me
to an FTP site housing the Cypherpunk Code of Chivalry. I looked on
soda.berkeley.com and found the Cypherpunk Charter (By E.Hughes)
talking a lot about things like privacy and software, but it didn't
really seem to address the issue of mailbombing. Maybe the basic idea
is just privacy *everywhere*, even with cyberspacial assault and
societal criminals. I guess I did miss the point. If all the other
cypherpunks condone or applaud Mr. Metzger's behavior, please let me
know. I'm not really sure what the consensus is on this. (Of course,
here, no one can really be sure of the consensus on *anything*! <g>) I
certainly haven't heard from anyone I respect yet, assuming these
people are still on the list.

BTW -- I do get the impression that the list membership is down.
Perhaps Mr. Hughes can reveal that directly. Some people have been
blaming me for the `deterioration of the list' lately. Another person
told me that the list had `quite improved since I stopped posting'. I'm
not sure what to make of all this -- unless both were tentacles, I
suppose that might explain it all. Frankly, I have been posting very
little lately compared to my Golden Cypherpunk Days. (ah, the carefree
and naive life of youth.) Also, Mr. Hughes has always advocated
software solutions like kill files, and if anyone objects to my
presence, please put me in yours. It is silly to continually be
offended by me! The people who are interested in listening will not
plonk me, and those that are inflamed by my postings *will* -- what
could be simpler? That certainly couldn't be a problem for anyone,
could it? I mean, if what I am saying has no merit, people will
immediately recognize that, right? To paraphrase somebody else, `There
is only a message'.

* * *

P.M., after the 40 letter mailbomb
>If you insist on 400 detweiler, I'll send them to you. Last warning.

Mr. Metzger, I assure you an apocalypse in cyberspace will happen
before I will ever send a message to the address pmetzger@lehman.com.
In fact, perhaps you could tell me all your other addresses, so I do
not inadvertently send mail to them. For example, I had a glimmer of
hope that postmaster@lehman.com was not you, and paid dearly for it
with your 40 letter mailbomb. 

Mr. Metzger, Do you pseudospoof? This could be a problem. What if I
inadvertently send something to one of your tentacles? Does that count?
Will you mailbomb me in that case, or just forgive me for my stark
ignorance? I have to ask a favor, if you don't--perhaps you could give
me a list of all the addresses you post from. I mean, that would
compromise the pseudoanonymous security of your identities, but on the
other hand I have absolutely no desire to be subject to another
explosion in my mailbox when I open my mail! I guess in this case, you
might have to decide which is worth more, your hatred for me and insane
desire that you not see any communication from me in any form, or your
passionate goal of further undetected, secret pseudospoofing.

You have to forgive me for my instinct of replying to the letters in my
mailbox. It has served me well until now. I assure you I will now make
an exception in your case! For example, my response to your last
letterbomb threat might have been `please don't do it!' but I now
realize that would have gotten me `nowhere' (or wherever it is that
bomb victims go) thanks to the previous two mailbombs! Thanks for the
valuable education in cyberspacial netiquette! (All my habits and
perceptions in cyberspace have been radically altered lately in
response to changing circumstances, and your mailbombing is just the
latest incarnation, so I certainly shouldn't be complaining!)

HOWEVER -- I will continue to post to the cypherpunks list, since you,
Mr. Metzger, have so kindly given me permission and I am still not
being censored yet. Please, please, please Mr. Metzger, do not
interpret this as sending you private mail! I certainly have NO DESIRE
WHATSOEVER to be subject to your 400 LETTER MAILBOMB. Perhaps some
other cypherpunks, who have no objections to your behavior so far, and
criticize me for taking a stand by condemning it publicly, would like
to VOLUNTEER IN MY PLACE.

So, here is what bought me the 40 letter mailbomb:

===cut=here===




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: hughes@ah.com (Eric Hughes)
Date: Wed, 10 Nov 93 23:29:37 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Meeting Saturday 13 Nov 93
Message-ID: <9311110725.AA19994@ah.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Bay Area Cypherpunks Meeting

Date: Saturday, 13 Nov 93, the second Saturday of the month as always
Time: 12:00 noon - 6:00 p.m.
Where: Cygnus Support Offices, Mt. View, CA

This month we have planned so far the following:

-- Scott Collins on the Newton.  Scott is bringing some fellow Apple
folk down to talk about the development environment.  Since the Newton
might be a good platform for a private key holder, we'll examine it.

-- The new Schneier book has just hit the bookstores.  I just got a
copy and will be talking about it.

-- The usual announcements and topics from the floor.

Eric


[Directions to Cygnus provided by John Gilmore. -- EH]

	Cygnus Support
	1937 Landings Drive
	Mt. View, CA  94043
	+1 415 903 1400   switchboard
	+1 415 903 1418   John Gilmore

Take US 101 toward Mt. View.  From San Francisco, it's about a
40-minute drive.  Get off at the Rengstorff Ave/Amphitheatre Parkway
exit.  If you were heading south on 101, you curve around to the
right, cross over the freeway, and get to a stoplight.  If you were
heading north on 101, you just come right off the exit to the
stoplight.  The light is the intersection of Amphitheatre and
Charleston Rd.  Take a right on Charleston; there's a right-turn-only
lane.

Follow Charleston for a short distance.  You'll pass the
Metaphor/Kaleida buildings on the right.  At a clump of palm trees and
a "Landmark Deli" sign, take a right into Landings Drive.  At the end
of the road, turn left into the complex with the big concrete
"Landmark" sign.  Follow the road past the deli til you are in front
of the clock tower that rises out of one of the buildings, facing you.
Enter through the doors immediately under the clock tower.  They'll be
open between noon and 1PM at least.  (See below if you're late.)

Once inside, take the stairs up, immediately to your right.  At the top
of the stairs, turn right past the treetops, and we'll be in 1937 on 
your left.  The door is marked "Cygnus".

If you are late and the door under the clock tower is locked, you can
walk to the deli (which will be around the building on your left, as
you face the door).  Go through the gate in the fence to the right of
the deli, and into the back lawns between the complex and the farm
behind it.  Walk forward and right around the buildings until you see
a satellite dish in the lawn.  Go up the stairs next to the dish,
which are the back stairs into the Cygnus office space.  We'll prop
the door (or you can bang on it if we forget).

Or, you can find the guard who's wandering around the complex, who
knows there's a meeting happening and will let you in.  They can be
beeped at 965 5250, though you'll have trouble finding a phone.

Don't forget to eat first, or bring food at noon!  I recommend hitting
the burrito place on Rengstorff (La Costen~a) at about 11:45.  To get
there, when you get off 101, take Rengstorff (toward the hills) rather
than Amphitheatre (toward the bay).  Follow it about ten blocks until
the major intersection at Middlefield Road.  La Costen~a is the store
on your left at the corner.  You can turn left into the narrow lane
behind the store, which leads to a parking lot, and enter by the front
door, which faces the intersection.  To get to the meeting from there,
just retrace your route on Rengstorff, go straight over the freeway,
and turn right at the stoplight onto Charleston; see above.

See you there!

	John Gilmore







From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: doug@netcom.com (Doug Merritt)
Date: Wed, 10 Nov 93 23:29:24 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Personality BS (was: Should we oppose the Data Superhighway/NII?)
Message-ID: <199311110725.XAA07571@mail.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


arromdee@blaze.cs.jhu.edu said:
>One problem is that if you just sit around and discuss everyone's impressions
>of the candidate, you've probably got some people who automatically get
>negative impressions of all candidates who are black, or Asian, or Jewish, or
>gay, or in the wrong political party.

True. And even aside from extreme examples like that, it is notoriously
hard to judge such things, even given people who are reasonable and operating
on the basis of good will.

On the flip side, ideally one would not have hired bigots in the first
place, so there wouldn't be such people making such judgements. (I haven't
stopped to do a head count, but as a white male I may actually be in the
minority in my group. Our V.P. is female and Jewish, as one example of
that. We're probably atypical. ;-)

And lastly, every method of interviewing anyone has ever conceived of
has its bad side. Nothing's perfect. Therefore this particular interchange
of ours is really merely a digression.
	Doug




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: hughes@ah.com (Eric Hughes)
Date: Wed, 10 Nov 93 23:29:02 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: On my recent Bcc: to cypherpunks
Message-ID: <9311110727.AA20008@ah.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I just forwarded my own contribution to the RISKS digest.

Please, do not reply to the risks@csl.sri.com address unless you are
submitting something for publication!

I realized too lat what a blind carbon copy would do to repliers on
the mailing list.  Aack.

Eric




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "L. Detweiler" <ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Date: Wed, 10 Nov 93 22:53:27 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Waving the White Flag
Message-ID: <9311110652.AA13691@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Gosh, it has been very unpleasant lately. I have never been subject to
mailbombs, and my postmaster has never been harassed over my postings
anywhere (by an Eminent Cypherpunk Leader, no less), before yesterday
and today. Yes, I really thank all the cypherpunks for their valuable
lessons on the internet and cyberspace. Now we really *can* believe
that pseudospoofing inherently promotes a sense of community trust and
harmony! All this time, and all the rancor on the list, all our stellar
successes in media penetration and identity-subversion protocols can be
chalked up to the Joy of Pseudospoofing. I really am grateful for you
all in showing me your vision of cyberspace, and how it is superior to
all those Orwellian and `Dossier Society' schemes that involve those
oppressive identification protocols.

shew.

Anyway, this letter is an attempt to find a topic that someone will not
flame me about, and is relevant to the cypherpunk list as I understand it!

Phiber Optik
--

I have been watching the trial of Mark Abene, aka Phiber Optik,
closely, and I think I even fowarded articles on it to the cypherpunks
once. This is a very fascinating trial. We learn, for example, of the
first use of wiretaps for digital data (modem communications) for a
successful prosecution. Also, we learned about how LOD (Legion of Doom)
-- or was it MOD, Masters of Deception, I get all these criminal
organizations mixed up! -- infiltrated phone systems. I think I even
heard in one news report that some in the group performed illicit wiretaps.

I find this *fascinating*. Can anyone elaborate to me the wiretapping
that was going on? who did they wiretap? how did they do it? how did
they avoid detection? more importantly, have the phone systems been
upgraded or modified to be protected from this kind of extremely insidious crime?

I read in `Cyberpunk' by K.Hafner and J.Markoff (the latter my favorite
cyberspatial writer) that K. Mitnick in California also had this
capability of wiretapping, and used it in an extremely sophisticated
way. Apparently he actually tapped the lines of police stations and
knew when they were coming, or knew when they had detected or `sniffed'
his own illegal wiretapping.

Did this happen? or is all of this rumor?

I remember Phiber Optik posting to *this list* on the subject of phone
wiretapping. I think he might have been a bit too knowledgeable for his
own good, eh? What ever happened to K. Mitnick, anyway? He did serve
federal time, I know that. I remember reading that story and thinking
-- here is someone we should keep our eyes on, even after he is out of
prison, *especially* when he is out!

Conspiracy Charges
--

Another question. I understand that Mr. Abene was charged with
`conspiracy' or at least that was one of the charges involved in the
whole affair, perhaps against others. My question: what is the legal
criterion for a `conspiracy'? what are the penalties? did Abene
actually get successfully prosecuted for `conspiring'? what was the
conspiracy? Did it have anything to do with the wiretapping?what are
famous conspiracy cases?  I'm sure that some cypherpunks may be
knowledgeable on these subjects. I sincerely hope I haven't offended
anyone in asking. Mr. Finney posted some outstanding analyses of the
ITAR (which I subsequently incorporated into a RISKS article), for
example, so there is definitely some strong legal background here.

please cc: your replies to me or I may not see them.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Dark <unicorn@access.digex.net>
Date: Wed, 10 Nov 93 21:23:26 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: smuggling currency
Message-ID: <199311110522.AA14630@access.digex.net>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
 
 
- ->
Interesting scenario.  I buy one of these babies for $100,000 in
Switzerland.  I arrange to have it not yet "turned on."  (Many of the 
new
prepaid phone cards must be activated before they can be used.) I 
enter
the US carrying a card worth $0.  I order it activated.  Suddenly I have a
$100,000 cash card in the US without having imported $100,000 into the 
US.
<-
 
I wish it were so,
 
Looks to me like this violates the following:
 
18 USCS 1001
18 USCS 1956
31 USCS 5316
 
The basic thrust is this:
You can't transport a monetary instrument worth more
than $ 10,000 without filling out the appropriate customs
report.  The real killer here is the title 31 code.  Which reads
liberally enough to bite you.  Specific language reads something
like "...shall not construct a transaction to evade reporting
requirements...."  The fine provision allows for $500,000 or twice
the value of the monetary instrument.  Hefty indeed.  I think they
take this seriously.  If you bring the money in with the intent to
avoid taxes, you have a second count, and could be in it for up to
four times the amount you smuggled.
 
I like the thinking, the court is less likely to.
All your transaction does (unfortunately) is delay the importation
of the "currency" until after the plane trip.  You're still required
to report the transaction, the card just makes it easier to get
away with it.
 
- -uni- (Dark)
 
 
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.3
 
iQCVAgUBLOHKfhibHbaiMfO5AQFlBwQAvubWG5DkEdILWMae3JGD4NG+fQaxcIpz
T6GALRxZLRBxKGVpSYPLNH9j/4ys3c5Q/2mIc7RIa4ew4hb7Tlv9mKEnoi+7fMcs
ihc6umAtJs+nMNTuL1qguw9hwtwslDt/jrPc+UefBw09ZIcsTiQ1WGOeRripwxw5
7tHsWSR9swY=
=HYhE
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "L. Detweiler" <ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Date: Wed, 10 Nov 93 23:32:55 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: the Tragedies of Pseudospoofing
Message-ID: <9311110726.AA14246@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I wrote another essay, `the Joy of Pseudospoofing', which I have been
refining and evolving, and will be glad to email it to anyone who is
interested. For now, I would like to address briefly the issue, `The
Tragedies of Pseudospoofing.'

Knowledge & Friendship
--

Consider the basis of friendship. In many ways, knowledge is
friendship. The more you know about someone, the closer you feel. And
in fact if you don't know certain things, about someone you consider a
close friend, you might be surprised or upset. `I never knew that! why
didn't you tell me?' or `you've been holding out on me! I'm upset!'
Also, many of our metaphors about friendship involve its basis in
knowledge, like thses. The whole idea of sharing knowledge is inherent
to the idea of trust that is so critical in true friendship. We trust
our friends not to betray us with sensitive information about ourselves
to our enemies. There are plenty of classic situations about this.

One really hilarious example, I recall, is that told in one Seinfeld
story, where Jerry (is that right?), in the middle of some `hot and
heavy' activity <g> tries to talk dirty to a girlfriend that was
Elayne's (his close personal friend) secretary. It backfires, the
girlfriend/secretary is incredibly upset and offended. Jerry, in total
desperation, as a last ditch effort, says, `now, of course, beyond
everything else, this is just between you and me.' The girlfriend
storms out the room.

Later, Jerry hears that Elayne promoted the secretary, or the secretary
was leaving her office. He drops all kinds of hints. `Was that *all*
she said?' He didn't want to be embarrassed by a frivolous girlfriend
in front of his true friend. Elayne shows no sign that she heard of
anything embarassing. But, later after she was walking out the door,
she snidely quotes the exact lines of Jerry's backfired dirty talk!
Jerry was betrayed by *both* the girlfriend and Elayne. And Elayne in
an extremely callously, manipulative way! She dangled the knowledge
above him, like someone teases and tortures an animal.

So, the point of all this is that `information control' is one of the
most crucial aspects of friendship.

Pseudospoofing & Friendship
--

Now, consider the ingredient of pseudospoofing, and how it completely
destroys all this trust. First, suppose that no one knows I am posting
under Jim Riverman. They would be really aghast to find out later, even
if everything said under Jim Riverman was wholly respectable (or
perhaps, especially in that case!). That is part of friendship:
exploring all the nooks and crannies of each other's personalities. Its
because of friendship that people say, `I want to get to *know* you' or
`you think you *know* someone...'When we come upon locked boxes, the
trust evaporates.

Also, consider that I write a lot of outstanding material on software
engineering under Jim Riverman. Everyone might get the impression that
L. Detweiler doesn't know squat about software engineering. And L.
Detweiler might even go to a job interview, where the interviewer was
also on the Software Engineering mailing list. `I'm sorry Mr.
Detweiler, your experience as I've seen on the list just doesn't cut
it. On the other hand, that Jim Riverman really knows what he is
talking about, but all he could do was recommend that you come. I
really am disappointed. Please have him come himself.'

In fact, if Jim Riverman did all the posting, people might think that
L. Detweiler didn't know squat about *anything*, when in fact L.
Detweiler was posting his brains out under another identity (so to
speak!). They might become alienated. `What has that L. Detweiler done
for the Software Engineering Mailing List, anyway?'

To bring this home, consider the following. Suppose that E.Hughes was
actually posting as H.Finney (my apologies to both of you, please just
grin and bear this, I need the effect). We would be startled to find
out that E.Hughes had such extensive legal experience with the ITAR or
capability in presenting outstanding articles and tutorials to
newcomers. In fact, people might even become disillusioned with, or
criticize, E.Hughes because they don't see the `leadership' posting
anything that helps newcomers, when in fact they are `posting their
brains out' (so to speak!).

Yet More Tragedies
--

Another problem with pseudospoofing is that of publishing. Suppose that
E.Hughes now wished to write a big article for RISKS about the ITAR. He
could not do so except under H. Finney without potentially compromising
a `crossing' (where someone discovers the correlation). So he would
have to post as H.Finney. But this would be a problem, because people
might send mail to H.Finney after seeing the great RISKS posting.
`Please come give a talk to our university for $10K'. H. Finney, if he
had the audacity to respond, might say, `I'm sorry, I can't make it,
but my friend E.Hughes can. I taught him everything I know.' If the
university even responds, it might be something in the form `why can't
*you* do it?' or `sorry, we're not interested.' H.Finney at the same
time craves reputation, but abhors recognition. A hellish life indeed.

Also, consider the problem of phone numbers. People like to maintain
relationships over the phone.  Cyberspace just seems too impersonal at
times. What happens when someone asks for the phone number of a
tentacle? Does Medusa say, `gee, my phone service is really bad, and if
you are looking for ways of getting in touch with me, the phone is the
worst of all. please send me a fax instead.' If the person trying to
maintain a friendship didn't go away right then, they'd be *un*lucky.
But in any case, they would feel quite upset and alienated. Any way you
look at it, they have been betrayed. The only question is, to what extent?

I think that this `cyberspace thing' is not about building
*reputations*, but about building *friendships*. A reputation is
nothing but condensed admiration that is synonymous with friendship.
And looking over the idea of pseudospoofing, I can't see how anyone who
practices it could conceivably have *any* friends, because of all the
details they have to hide from others. (Does a person with Multiple
Personality Disorder or a pathological liar have any friends?) But, at
the same time, I'm sure I will hear from many snakes and claiming it
*is* possible, and that *they* have friends. Maybe they are referring
to all their `friends' as the other tentacles around them!

What a pity. Like I was telling someone recently, `I really feel sorry for you.'




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Jim McCoy <mccoy@ccwf.cc.utexas.edu>
Date: Thu, 11 Nov 93 01:04:02 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Austin Cypherpunks Meeting
Message-ID: <199311110903.AA08348@tramp.cc.utexas.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text


		 Digital Freedom: By any means necessary.


		    Austin Cypherpunks November Meeting
			 November 13, 1993 3:00 pm
		      4th Floor Austin Public Library
			    (800 Guadalupe St.)

The Austin Cypherpunks chapter will be holding its November meeting on
Saturday the 13th of November from 3 to 5 pm in a meeting room on the 4th
floor of the downtown branch of the Austin Public Library.  I have been
told the room we will be using is "the first thing you see when you get off
the elevator..."

The theme of this meeting will be an introduction to PGP and public key
cryptography in general.  We will be explaining how PGP and other
public-key cryptography systems work, and will go over some basic details
regaring getting such software packages and how to properly use them.
Bring your public-key on a disk of you have one, if not we will try to have
a machine available for you to use to generate your own public-key.

Additonal agenda items for this meeting include

	-Education/Information Disks
		The HoHoCon will be held in December in Austin and this
		should prove to be a good place for us to spread crypto
		technology and information about encryption in general.  To
		this end we will be discussing possible files, programs,
		and news clippings to include in a disk of CryptoInfo and
		one of CryptoPrograms that we can distribute at conferences
		such as this.  

	-TCP/IP Protocols and Encryption
		One possible project for us to consider is that of adding
		encryption to some of the most commonly used TCP/IP
		protocols (particularly those that otherwise broadcast
		account names and passwords in cleartext...)  We will toss
		around a few ideas and see if this is something to try.

 	-Digital Credit Union Project
		We will get up to date on this project and brainstorm some
		possible membership questions/ideas that we did not get
		around to at the last meeting.


To subscribe to our full mailing list or our announcement-only mailing
list, send mail to:  
     listproc@mcfeeley.cc.utexas.edu

Put the line "subscribe austin-cypherpunks [real name or nym]" in the
BODY of the message to subscribe to the full list and "subscribe
austin-cypherpunks-announce [real name or nym]" in the body of the
message to subscirbe to the announcements list.

Our file archives are available in /pub/cypherpunks via anonymous
ftp at: ftp.cc.utexas.edu

Cypherpunks:  There is safety in numbers... large primes.

Local contacts for your questions...:

	Jim McCoy	<mccoy@bongo.cc.utexas.edu>
	Doug Barnes	<cman@io.com>








From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Andrew Loewenstern <andrew@cubetech.com>
Date: Thu, 11 Nov 93 01:53:27 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: whisper for NeXTSTEP
Message-ID: <9311110950.AA24198@valinor.cubetech.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Hi!  If there are any cypherpunks with access to a NeXTSTEP box on  
the net who want to help me test out a little chatter app, please let  
me know.

The app lets multiple people chat securely over the net using  
DistributedObjects and the IDEA cipher from PGP.  It has no whizbang  
features like trading unique session keys with RSA (just distribute a  
pass-phrase through e-mail with PGP) or rich-text support, although  
these could be added if there was demand...

I really want to find out if it works ok between NS/i and black  
hardware...


thanks,
andrew




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Dark <unicorn@access.digex.net>
Date: Thu, 11 Nov 93 02:29:04 PST
To: ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu
Subject: Re:  The Depravities of Cypherpunks
Message-ID: <199311111028.AA21417@access.digex.net>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Look,

I have sympathy,
Really I do.

But we are all really tired of hearing about it.

Take it somewhere else.

I shouldn't HAVE to use my killfile on a mailing list.
Christ.


-uni- (Dark)




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Dark <unicorn@access.digex.net>
Date: Thu, 11 Nov 93 02:34:04 PST
To: jkreznar@ininx.com
Subject: Re: Privacy, Property, Cryptography (long)
Message-ID: <199311111033.AA21654@access.digex.net>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


->
And this intuition of yours seems to be reflected in law and statute to a
greater degree than you're allowing elsewhere in your essay.  For example, U.S.
Supreme Court Justice Louis Brandeis said that the "right to be left alone is
the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized men."[1]Yet y
our opening lines are
<-

The only statues giving any kind of "Right to privacy" that have
any weight at all are full of holes.  For the most part a right
to privacy has been EXTRACTED from them, usually without much basis.

Even Brandeis has his reservations (International News Service v.
Associated Press)  Again, the right to privacy is not constitutionally
reserved, and is almost entirely a construction of common law.

> Privacy was in a Hohfieldian manner, a privilege.
 
Hohfield sounds like an interesting read.  Can you give a reference?
<-

Let me dig up the bio on him and drop it here.


-uni- (Dark)




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Duncan Frissell <frissell@panix.com>
Date: Thu, 11 Nov 93 03:19:04 PST
To: CYPHERPUNKS@toad.com
Subject: The Depravities of Cypher
Message-ID: <199311111115.AA03337@panix.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


L.>Mr. Hughes is quite perplexed at my sheer rage at Mr. Metzger's
L.>unsurpassed childishness. He didn't approve of me attempting to shame
L.>Mr. Metzger (a close personal friend, I suppose) 

This is a joke -- right?  <G>

DCF

--- WinQwk 2.0b#1165
     




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Duncan Frissell <frissell@panix.com>
Date: Thu, 11 Nov 93 03:19:28 PST
To: CYPHERPUNKS@toad.com
Subject: Re: Should we oppose the
Message-ID: <199311111115.AA03340@panix.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


D >The problem is that bandwidth is a highly limited resource, just like
D >real estate is a limited resource. Eventually we will complete 
D >saturate network bandwidth no matter what technology is used. This has
D >been discussed in various forums for many years. 

Then why have telecoms prices been declining for years?  A three minute 
phone call from the US to England cost $25 in 1955 (in 1955 dollars).  
Where in the current comms spectrum do you see saturation and rising 
prices?

It seems to me that in most resources we get predictions of shortages for 
centuries but those shortages never appear because the market eliminates 
or dodges them.

DCF



--- WinQwk 2.0b#1165
                                                                                  




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: ME <root@decvax.dec.com>
Date: Thu, 11 Nov 93 08:29:11 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: OMNI CARD
Message-ID: <199311111121.AA00503@visgraph.uucp>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I just got this from last night's edition of "BEYOND 2000" on the
discovery channel....

A Eurpoean banking system is experimenting and using a new card they
call the OMNI CARD.  What this does is provides some form of
authentication aside from the PIN number.  

The procedure:

1)  You place your phone call to the bank and make your request.
2)  You type in your PIN number into the OMNI card (sort of a hacked
	calculator card, I suppose)
3)  The OMNI card generates a number from this which you verbally
	read to the bank.
4)  The bank clerk responds with a "Challenge Number" which you type
	into the OMNI card.
5)  The OMNI card generates a result from this number which you verbally
	read to the bank clerk.  If all is in check, this is proper 
	authentication of who you are.

The purpose is to avoid having to read your actual PIN number aloud,
or type it in where someone can see you.

The OMNI card uses a random formula to calculate its numbers in conjunction
with the challenge number; supposedly this is different for each transaction.

A sample number which was displayed was:

Challenge Number:  28385180
Result          :  572738

The technology was sold to "two major US computer companies" recently.

I suppose this is some metamorphicly generated checksum.  Until someone
gets ahold of one of these OMNI cards and takes it apart...

Just FYI...



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Duncan Frissell <frissell@panix.com>
Date: Thu, 11 Nov 93 04:43:31 PST
To: CYPHERPUNKS@toad.com
Subject: smuggling currency
Message-ID: <199311111240.AA08117@panix.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


U>The basic thrust is this: You can't transport a monetary instrument
U>worth more than $ 10,000 without filling out the appropriate customs
U>report.  

Of course they have to be able to prove that you did so.  Cash cards raise 
real proof problems.

U>If you bring the money in with the intent to avoid taxes, you have a 
U>second count, 

There are no tax consequences to cash per se.  The issue is whether the 
cash constitutes unreported income or not.  A separate issue.

U>All your transaction does (unfortunately) is delay the importation
U>of the "currency" until after the plane trip.  You're still required
U>to report the transaction, the card just makes it easier to get
U>away with it.

However, by spreading the "importation" out over time, cash cards reduce 
the chances that a "structuring" count could be proved against you.  The 
whole cash card thing really mixes up the exact location of the money.  
What if you are overseas and buy a VISA USA cash card and then bring it 
into the US.  Is this a reportable transaction?  Presumably the payment 
for the card was wired by your overseas institution to VISA USA, a bank 
wire is not reportable.  In any case, the overseas institution may not 
link you with its purchase of a VISA Cash Card from the US.

Complications.

DCF



--- WinQwk 2.0b#1165
                                                                                          




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: djw@eff.org (Daniel J. Weitzner)
Date: Thu, 11 Nov 93 05:13:31 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Government Accounting Office Report on Communications Privacy
Message-ID: <199311111310.AA29819@eff.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


A few days ago, the Government Accounting Office (GAO) -- a pretty sharp
internal gov't investigative organization that's about a lot more than
accounting -- issued a report on communications privacy.  (Much of what's
in the report will probably raise of big "duh, we've been saying this for a
decade," from cypherpunks and other digerati, but it's still very important
to have the GAO saying this stuff.)

The report makes four very important findings:

1. Privacy-protecting technology (crytopgraphy) is increasingly important
for protecting the security of business communications and personal
information.  But federal policy is getting in the way of this technology.

"Increased use of computer and communications networks, computer literacy,
and dependence on information technology heighten US industries risk of
losing proprietary information to economic espionage.  In part to reduce
the risk, industry is more frequently using hardware and software with
encryption capabilities.  However, federal policies and actions stemming
from national security and law enforcement concerns hinder the use and the
export of U.S. commercial encryption technology and may hinder its
development."

2. The NSA's role in this area is has been extensive, and possibly beyond
the spirit of the Computer Security Act. 

"Although the Computer Security Act of 1987 reaffirmed NIST's reponsibility
for developing federal information-processing standards for security of
sensitive, unclassified information, NIST follows NSA's lead in developing
certain cryptographic standards"

3. Opportunity for public input in the standards process has been
insufficient, leading to proposals like Clipper which lack public support.

"These policy issues are formulated and announced to the public, however,
with very little input from directly affected business interests, academia,
and others."

The report draws no specific policy conclusions, but provides excellent
ammunition for those of us who are trying to open up the standards process
and get export controls lifted.

Full text of the report (GAO/OSI-94-2 Communications Privacy: Federal
Policy and Actions) is supposed to be made available by ftp from GAO.  As
soon as it is, I'll let people know where it is.



......................................................................
Daniel J. Weitzner, Senior Staff Counsel              <djw@eff.org>
Electronic Frontier Foundation                        202-347-5400 (v) 
1001 G St, NW  Suite 950 East                         202-393-5509 (f)
Washington, DC 20001

*** Join EFF!!!  Send mail to membership@eff.org for information ***






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Mike Godwin <mnemonic@eff.org>
Date: Thu, 11 Nov 93 05:33:32 PST
To: jkreznar@ininx.com (John E. Kreznar)
Subject: Re: Privacy, Property, Cryptography (long)
In-Reply-To: <9311110628.AA17830@ininx>
Message-ID: <199311111329.AA29910@eff.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


 
John Kreznar writes:

> Supreme Court Justice Louis Brandeis said that the "right to be left alone is
> the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized men."[1]
> 
> [1] Quoted in ACLU Briefing Paper Number 5, "Drug Testing in the Workplace",
> published by the Department of Public Education, American Civil Liberties Union,
> 132 West 43rd Street, New York, NY 10036, (212) 944-9800.

This quotation needs to be debugged a little bit. The actual quotation
reads as follows: 

"They [the framers of the Constitution and the Bill of Rights] conferred,
as against the government, the right to be let alone--the most
comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized men."

Olmstead v. United States, 227 U.S. 438, 478 (1928).

(Note in particular that it's "let," not "left.")



--Mike






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Mike Godwin <mnemonic@eff.org>
Date: Thu, 11 Nov 93 05:39:31 PST
To: doug@netcom.com (Doug Merritt)
Subject: Re: Should we oppose the Data Superhighway/NII?
In-Reply-To: <199311110705.XAA04155@mail.netcom.com>
Message-ID: <199311111337.AA29933@eff.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


 
Doug Merritt writes:

> Mike Godwin <mnemonic@eff.org> said:
> >Perry writes:
> >> Seems to me that bandwidth is
> >> going to be nearly free in both directions in a few years whether
> >> government intervenes or not.
> >
> >I agree about the potential for it to be free, but, I gotta tell you, the
> >monopolists running the cable systems in this country have no inclination
> >to share that nearly free bandwidth with you, even if you're willing to
> >pay for access to it.
> 
> I hate to disagree, considering that I prefer to agree with the philosophy
> here, but it *can't* work that way, regardless of what we wish.
> 
> The problem is that bandwidth is a highly limited resource, just like
> real estate is a limited resource.

Doug, I think you may be under the impression that we're talking about a
single fiber-optic or coax cable. You can have a single (or double or
triple) infrastructural network, but add bandwidth to each one. I think
the notion of "scarcity" doesn't apply to cable any more than it applies
to personal computers.

> Eventually we will complete saturate
> network bandwidth no matter what technology is used. This has been discussed
> in various forums for many years. Once optical fiber optic bandwidth
> peaks, you have to move to ultraviolet for greater channel capacity.

Or you add a new cable. Not hard. Nothing I have ever read has suggested
that "scarcity," as that term is normally used in reference to a resource,
applies in any meaningful way to cable. I believe that Perry's prediction
is closer to the truth than yours.


--Mike






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: ferguson@icm1.icp.net (Paul Ferguson x2044)
Date: Thu, 11 Nov 93 05:39:08 PST
To: djw@eff.org (Daniel J. Weitzner)
Subject: Re: Government Accounting Office Report on Communications Privacy
In-Reply-To: <199311111310.AA29819@eff.org>
Message-ID: <9311111338.AA01658@icm1.icp.net>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text



> 
> A few days ago, the Government Accounting Office (GAO) -- a pretty sharp

[...]


Not to pick nits, but the GAO is the General Accounting Office, not
"Government" Accounting Office.

Cheers,

____________________________________________________________________________
Paul Ferguson                         
Sprint Managed Router Network Engineering              tel: 703.904.2437 
Herndon, Virginia  USA                              e-mail: ferguson@icp.net



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Mike Godwin <mnemonic@eff.org>
Date: Thu, 11 Nov 93 05:43:30 PST
To: unicorn@access.digex.net (Dark)
Subject: Re: Privacy, Property, Cryptography (long)
In-Reply-To: <199311111033.AA21654@access.digex.net>
Message-ID: <199311111342.AA29975@eff.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


 
Dark writes:

> The only statues giving any kind of "Right to privacy" that have
> any weight at all are full of holes.  For the most part a right
> to privacy has been EXTRACTED from them, usually without much basis.
> 
> Even Brandeis has his reservations (International News Service v.
> Associated Press)  Again, the right to privacy is not constitutionally
> reserved, and is almost entirely a construction of common law.

As I recall, Dark, INS v. AP is copyright/First Amendment case, not a
privacy case. (International News Service was cribbing from AP stories.)
What does Brandeis say in this case that seems to be a reservation about
privacy rights?


--Mike






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Perry E. Metzger" <pmetzger@lehman.com>
Date: Thu, 11 Nov 93 06:33:32 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Should we oppose the Data Superhighway/NII?
In-Reply-To: <199311110705.XAA04155@mail.netcom.com>
Message-ID: <9311111430.AA28017@snark.lehman.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Doug Merritt says:
> I hate to disagree, considering that I prefer to agree with the philosophy
> here, but it *can't* work that way, regardless of what we wish.
> 
> The problem is that bandwidth is a highly limited resource, just like
> real estate is a limited resource. Eventually we will complete saturate
> network bandwidth no matter what technology is used.

Lets see whether this is reasonable.

A single fiber optic strand has enough capacity in theory to carry the
equivalent of every call made in the U.S. during the peak capacity
utilization period on Mother's Day. A single fiber can carry more data
than can be transmitted by the entire radio spectrum from low
frequency AM to Ku band satelite. Thats bandwidth for literally
thousands of simultaneous video signals.

Using switching technology rather than shared access LAN style
technology, every person in the world could concievably be sending and
receiving that much at once.

I don't know about you, but I personally can't produce more than 750
simultaneous videos at once for network distribution, so I suppose I'm
uninteresting, but even the people who can do more than that are
likely going to be fine. If they aren't, well, I suppose they could
get TWO fibers coming into their home, or maybe even TEN or ONE
HUNDRED if necessary.

> These days it's easy to be optimistic, because bandwidth is growing
> geometrically. The problem is that there is no way in hell that that
> trend can continue indefinitely. One or two decades hence we will saturate
> theoretical limits.

I suspect that we have a wee bit longer to go than that. When people
start faxing themselves regularly we may have to go to slightly more
exotic technologies.

Perry




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Date: Thu, 11 Nov 93 10:19:11 PST
To: extropians@extropy.org
Subject: (fwd) Netcom adds access in Denver area
Message-ID: <199311111815.KAA05545@mail.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Cyphertentacles and Extropiates,

Here's a convenient list of the latest Netcom sites, which span the U.S.

I've been happily using it (well, they changed to a new emacs
yesterday and now my autowrap doesn't work....I hate having to spend a
couple of hours on such a trivial matter) for a year and a half and I
conservatively estimate I've influenced at least 30 people to sign up
for it....too bad I don't get any usage credits for it.

The best things about it: flat monthly fee ($17.50), unlimited connect
time, full range of services (much better than most universities have,
folks tell me), and--best of all--your Netcom account won't change
when you change jobs! And posting with Netcom presumably won't run the
risk of angering your employer.

I'm thrilled that Netcom is expanding so rapidly. 

--Tim



Newsgroups: netcom.general,co.general,ba.internet,alt.internet.access.wanted
From: glee@netcom.com (Glee Harrah Cady)
Subject: Netcom adds access in Denver area
Distribution: netcom,usa
Date: Thu, 11 Nov 1993 17:22:36 GMT



NETCOM On-line Communication Services, Incorporated is pleased to announce
the expansion of the NETCOM backbone into the Denver, CO metropolitan
area.  To reach the service, using a VT100 terminal emulator dial
303-758-0101 with your modem set to 8,1,N, and hardware flow control. 
Denver's new Point of Presence (POP) joins our nationwide backbone in
supporting a full range of network services including: 


      o  Internet Connections (T1 & 56kb, dedicated and dialup) 
      o  News/Mail feeds with Domain service
      o  Business Dial-up access (news / mail / ftp / telnet / shell)
      o  Host dial access (International and National News, news / mail / ftp / telnet / shell)
      o  Personal Network (SLIP or PPP) Connections (PNC) 
      o  FrameConnect Internet Services

NETCOM can be your gateway to economical global communications.  A
connection to the NETCOM state-of-the-art network will deliver
connectivity at very affordable prices.  NETCOM offers Internet
connections, news feeds, electronic mail, local access points throughout
the United States, source archives, telecommunications consulting,
discounts on purchases of communication equipment, and other services. 
 
NETCOM offers a guest account to provide more information about its
services. To access the guest account via your modem and personal
computer, dial a local access number from the list below.  After you
connect, at the Login: prompt, type "guest".  You need not type in a
password.  Remember, you must use lower case letters. If you prefer, you
can also log in via telnet to netcom.netcom.com or to the IP address of
192.100.81.100.  Here are a few of the local access 1200/2400/9600
V.32/V.42 numbers: 

	206-547-5992		Seattle 

	214-753-0044		Dallas

	310-842-8835		Los Angeles 

	303-758-0101		Denver		

	404-303-9765		Atlanta      

	408-241-9760		San Jose     

	408-459-9851		Santa Cruz  

	415-328-9940		Palo Alto 

	415-985-5650		San Francisco     

	503-626-6833		Portland         

	510-426-6610		Pleasanton       

	510-865-9004		Alameda          

	617-237-8600		Boston           

	619-234-0524		San Diego        

	703-255-5951		Washington DC   

	714-708-3800		Irvine          

	818-585-3400		Pasadena         

	916-965-1371		Sacramento  
 


                 VOICE:        (408) 554-8649
                   FAX:        (408) 241-9145
  Local Access Numbers:        (800) 488-2558

_____________________________________________________________________________
- info@netcom.com (408) 554-8649  NETCOM On-line Communication Services, Inc.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Brendan Kehoe <brendan@lisa.cygnus.com>
Date: Thu, 11 Nov 93 10:34:11 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: meetings at Cygnus
Message-ID: <4653.753042932@lisa.cygnus.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


On behalf of a bunch of people at Cygnus, I've a small request to make
of the Cypherpunks.  When you bring chairs into the conference room
for your meeting, *please* remember where you got them.  That way, at
the end of the meeting, they can go back where they came from, and we
don't have to spend Monday morning trying to find our chairs around
the office.

Thanks,
Brendan

--
Brendan Kehoe                                               brendan@cygnus.com
Cygnus Support, Mountain View, CA                              +1 415 903 1400



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Mike Godwin <mnemonic@eff.org>
Date: Thu, 11 Nov 93 07:39:11 PST
To: fnerd@smds.com (FutureNerd Steve Witham)
Subject: Re: Should we oppose the Data Superhighway/NII?
In-Reply-To: <9311110120.AA08393@smds.com>
Message-ID: <199311111535.AA02116@eff.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


 
Steve Witham writes:

> As I understand it, for both telephones and cable TV, it is still common
> for local governments to "grant" "franchises" to single companies for
> phone and cable wires.  If there were one thing to change, that would be
> it.
> 
> In other words, the "market failure" you're talking about is in a 
> situation where the law forbids a market.  And the change required is 
> that the government not be involved.  It would be nice if that were
> how EFF stated its NII policy: Yankee Go Home.

It's not that simple, unfortunately. Once monopolies have been created
with government support, removing government intervention doesn't 
automatically make competition happen.

Compare it to strip-mining: once a strip mine has dug up the landscape,
the mere decision to stop mining doesn't automatically restore the land to
the status quo ante, or even to an environment in which any kind of
ecosystem can flourish.


--Mike





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: lefty@apple.com (Lefty)
Date: Thu, 11 Nov 93 10:43:32 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: OMNI CARD
Message-ID: <9311111839.AA14681@internal.apple.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>I suppose this is some metamorphicly generated checksum.  Until someone
>gets ahold of one of these OMNI cards and takes it apart...

We use SecurID cards, which sound very similar, as a security measure on
some of our remote access connections.

BTW, you can't take the cards apart.  They fry themselves if you try.


--
Lefty (lefty@apple.com)
C:.M:.C:., D:.O:.D:.






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: djw@eff.org (Daniel J. Weitzner)
Date: Thu, 11 Nov 93 08:09:11 PST
To: ferguson@icm1.icp.net (Paul Ferguson x2044)
Subject: Re: Government Accounting Office Report on Communications Privacy
Message-ID: <199311111605.AA03469@eff.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


At  8:38 AM 11/11/93 -0500, Paul Ferguson x2044 wrote:
>> 
>> A few days ago, the Government Accounting Office (GAO) -- a pretty sharp
>
>[...]
>
>
>Not to pick nits, but the GAO is the General Accounting Office, not
>"Government" Accounting Office.
>

Thanks for the correction.  That's what happens when I  post too early in
the morning.


......................................................................
Daniel J. Weitzner, Senior Staff Counsel              <djw@eff.org>
Electronic Frontier Foundation                        202-347-5400 (v) 
1001 G St, NW  Suite 950 East                         202-393-5509 (f)
Washington, DC 20001

*** Join EFF!!!  Send mail to membership@eff.org for information ***






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Perry E. Metzger" <pmetzger@lehman.com>
Date: Thu, 11 Nov 93 08:24:11 PST
To: Mike Godwin <mnemonic@eff.org>
Subject: Re: Should we oppose the Data Superhighway/NII?
In-Reply-To: <199311111535.AA02116@eff.org>
Message-ID: <9311111622.AA28106@snark.lehman.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Mike Godwin says:
> It's not that simple, unfortunately. Once monopolies have been created
> with government support, removing government intervention doesn't 
> automatically make competition happen.
> 
> Compare it to strip-mining: once a strip mine has dug up the landscape,
> the mere decision to stop mining doesn't automatically restore the land to
> the status quo ante, or even to an environment in which any kind of
> ecosystem can flourish.

However, its not like strip mining. So long as regulations are in
place, the market is not functioning in a maximally efficient manner,
and further distortions are occuring.

Many modern economists, from Public Choice school to Austrian school,
would hold that any attempt by the government to "fix" what it has
done axiomatically are further distortions of the market, and that the
market will settle most rapidly into a properly functioning state if
government control is removed as quickly and thoroughly as possible.

Theory in fact matches practice. Observe, for example, the difference
between places like Hungary (we will be kind and not use Russia as an
example) in which gradualist government guided conversions to the
market are practiced, versus Poland, where a radical "shock therapy"
liberalization occured. Poland was the only nation in Eastern Europe
to experience economic growth following the inception of its program,
its inflation rate is down to acceptable levels, and over half the
country's workers are now in the private sector.

I understand the impulse to use metaphors like strip-mining, but
metaphors are a way of explaining theory, not a way to reason. I
could, for example, analogise the infrastructure to a car, which is
zooming along fine now but might run out of gas without fueling.
However, this metaphor is inapplicable -- it has nothing to do with the
situation.

Concretely observed, there is no obstacle to the sort of national
network we want other than the government. In spite of the belief that
"monopolists" will take over, there is no evidence that competition is
slowing down (in fact, it is speeding up as fast as the government
will allow it to) and in spite of the belief that the network will
"control programming and work only one way" the truth seems to be that
the cable companies and everyone else want to get into digital two-way
services as soon as possible and that the government is all that is
standing in the way.

Perry




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: jim@bilbo.suite.com (Jim Miller)
Date: Thu, 11 Nov 93 09:39:11 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: cypherplonks mailing list
Message-ID: <9311111736.AA28612@bilbo.suite.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



A couple of weeks ago someone jokingly proposed creating a parallel mailing  
list for flames, rants, and other non-crypto posts.  If that ever happens, I  
propose calling it the "cypherplonks" mailing list.


Jim_Miller@suite.com





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: paul@poboy.b17c.ingr.com (Paul Robichaux)
Date: Thu, 11 Nov 93 09:39:32 PST
To: stewab@us0750tb.oakland.ncr.com
Subject: Re: AT&T Encryption Product
In-Reply-To: <9311102212.ag09356@ncrhub1.NCR.COM>
Message-ID: <199311111737.AA01959@poboy.b17c.ingr.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

> Well, it was interesting to see Philippe Nave's posting about an AT&T 
> encryption software product (using the government's digital signature
> and secure hash standards instead of RSA and MD-5, so it won't be PGP-
> or PEM-compatible).

I got a call from David Arneke of AT&T yesterday. He was able to
answer a few questions for me: namely, that the reason no RSA-based
products are available is that they aren't finished yet!

AT&T Secure Systems put on a big push to have products ready to show
at COMDEX, and the DES/SHA/DSS-based products were ready first. Arneke
did say that they will be forthcoming.

- -Paul

- -- 
Paul Robichaux, KD4JZG     | Caution: cutting edge is sharp. Avoid contact.
Intergraph Federal Systems | Be a cryptography user - ask me how.
	    ** Of course I don't speak for Intergraph. **

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.3a

iQCVAgUBLOJ4NSA78To+806NAQGT8gQAjCpcoS1fXuVWpl1blQbmWMab4dogq8XR
Vdp3CXbhBiouXFQdlgW/CwqNzuZj0ghYQYFwuQUB2/NklAkPepP8kUi4fxqtkn/F
BoOzHofmpHFILWG6xhLLUlW8pX/GtFPaRkJsB2gKL5r+NrzLg5xCPN8xAHVDvdpw
/yNWT3ituHc=
=2+dY
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: GRABOW_GEOFFREY@tandem.com
Date: Thu, 11 Nov 93 12:19:12 PST
To: frac-l%gitvm1.bitnet@uga.cc.uga.edu
Subject: Fractal cryptography?
Message-ID: <199311111223.AA16697@localhost>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Greetings all,
    I've come up with an idea that uses the chaotic nature of fractals to
perform some very secure encryption.  Does anybody know if this has already
been done?  The programs I've already written seem to be very secure.

                                          Any info is appreciated,
                                                               G.C.G.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Mike Godwin <mnemonic@eff.org>
Date: Thu, 11 Nov 93 09:34:11 PST
To: pmetzger@lehman.com
Subject: Re: Should we oppose the Data Superhighway/NII?
In-Reply-To: <9311111622.AA28106@snark.lehman.com>
Message-ID: <199311111733.AA04581@eff.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


 
Perry writes:

> However, its not like strip mining. So long as regulations are in
> place, the market is not functioning in a maximally efficient manner,
> and further distortions are occuring.
 
It's like strip mining in this sense: stopping the intervention doesn't
restore the healthy previous condition automatically. Merely ending
regulation doesn't make the distortions go away.

> I understand the impulse to use metaphors like strip-mining, but
> metaphors are a way of explaining theory, not a way to reason.

Just so. If you really believe that merely stopping regulation, *without
anything else*, would restore competition to a market that's been
dominated by a government-supported monopoly or duopoly, then we simply
must agree to disagree.

> Concretely observed, there is no obstacle to the sort of national
> network we want other than the government.

Untrue. The cable providers often are putting up obstacles of their own, as
are telco providers. The impossibility of Tim May's X-rated cable channel
illustrates this point. The market can't function--Tim and those like him
who want a certain type and variety of programming--unless there is access
to the information infrastructure. Telling every would-be X-rated cable
viewer to build his own cable system is not a solution.

According to standard free-market theory, the existence of demand
(Tim and friends) for an affordable product ought to stimulate a supplier
for that product. But that will never happen if all we do is say to the
cable and telco providers "Well, we've given you these markets and allows
you to profit enormously and to have absolute ability to use nonmarket
mechanisms to squash any hint of serious competition, and now we're going
to just dust off our hands and walk away."


--Mike








From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: lex@mindvox.phantom.com (Lex Luthor)
Date: Thu, 11 Nov 93 10:09:11 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Phiber, The MOD, and The LOD.
Message-ID: <qL4ucc2w165w@mindvox.phantom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



"L. Detweiler" <ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu> writes:

>
>Anyway, this letter is an attempt to find a topic that someone will not
>flame me about, and is relevant to the cypherpunk list as I understand it!
>
>Phiber Optik
>--
>
>I have been watching the trial of Mark Abene, aka Phiber Optik,
>closely, and I think I even fowarded articles on it to the cypherpunks
>once. This is a very fascinating trial. We learn, for example, of the
>first use of wiretaps for digital data (modem communications) for a                 
>successful prosecution. Also, we learned about how LOD (Legion of Doom)
>-- or was it MOD, Masters of Deception, I get all these criminal
>organizations mixed up! -- infiltrated phone systems. I think I even
>heard in one news report that some in the group performed illicit wiretaps.


Although some people on this list could care less about the details,
since you confused the two ex-hacking groups, I feel the need to set
the record straight.
 
It was MOD *not* LOD that phiber has been recently affiliated with. MOD was
in my opinion a malicious group of hackers who used their
knowlege and abilities to relentlessly harass people, wreak havoc on computer
systems and networks by shirking the 'hacker ethic' of not causing damage,
and allegedly to perpetrate various forms of fraud and theft. Please note that
Phiber Optik was probably the most mellow one of the MOD and having spoke with
him a number of times, it seems that he is not a malicious type. IMHO his
mistake was teaching his 'friends' in the group how to do certain things
without regard to what they intended to do with that knowlege.

LOD was a whole different type of group. If you want to classify us as a
criminal organization due to gaining unauthorized access into various computers
and networks over the years, fine. But the LOD maintained a high standard of
ethical behavior in the way of not intentionally causing damage to computer
system, not violating people's privacy for the sole purpose of harassment or
fraud, and the overall mentality of spreading knowlege and information to
those who were interested. Obviously those ethics were warped as none of
the ex-members that I am in contact with (erik bloodaxe - editor of Phrack, 
the marauder, Lord Digital and Deal Lord - Mindvox owners, etc.) believe that
unauthorized access to computers is/was right nor legal. I am not defending
what we did all those years ago, but just clarifying the degree to which we
were involved. To make this clear, gaining unauthorized access to computer
systems is illegal and wrong under just about any circumstance. Violating
a person or company's privacy is wrong also, even if it was done out of
curiousity or a thirst for knowlege.

One other thing, it was reported in the press a number of times that there
was some sort of war between hacker groups. I think this is silly and 
although I had 'retired' by 1989 which was about the time a lot of the
alleged MOD activity took place, my version is that there was no 'war'. There
are always personality conflicts between people and arguements between erikb
and phiber appears to have been blown way out of proportion as usually happens
when things get reported by the press.

>I find this *fascinating*. Can anyone elaborate to me the wiretapping
>that was going on? who did they wiretap? how did they do it? how did
>they avoid detection? more importantly, have the phone systems been
>upgraded or modified to be protected from this kind of extremely insidious
>crime?

One of the things some MOD members allegedly did was gain access to certain
key computer systems that controlled various functions of BT's Tymnet packet
switching network. There are some systems that allow a privileged user to
monitor network traffic (XRAY for example), by gaining access to these systems
and knowing the correct commands, one can 'wiretap'.

It should be noted, if you read through the old hacker BBS message bases (which
you can do if you contact lod communications who is compiling messages from
the very first phreak boards such as Modem Over Manhattan and 8BBS circa 1980
up through boards such as the Phoenix Project circa 1989/1990, see the review
of the project in Autumn 1993 issue of 2600 or CuD #5.39 for more details or
email lodcom@mindvox.phantom.com) that the LOD had access to those same systems
years before MOD was around, and no one was the wiser simply because it was
more of an exploration of the systems as opposed to an exploitation of the 
systems. I for one operated on the premise that if I didn't know what a certain
command did, I did not type it in. That kind of caution allows you to explore
and learn as safely as possible by helping to avoid accidental damage.

As for tapping phone lines, most any reader of the cypherpunks list can do
this physically. What the MOD *may* have done (or use the word allegedly if
you like), is to gain access to certain phone company systems, such as LMOS
(Loop Maintenance Operating System) which allow a person who has a privileged
account and the correct commands and syntax, to REMOTELY monitor phone lines.
The phone company does this for repair and maintenance reasons and not to spy
on subscribers. As we all know, most technologies can be used for reasons other
than for what they were originally intended, this being a classic example.

As for avoiding detection, if one had access to the Switching Control systems,
they would be able to do a whole host of other things from putting traces on
subscribers served by the particular switch to seeing if there were any
'traces' on their lines. In addition, putting call forwarding onto a network
access port number and then forwarding calls to their computer, would allow
the perpetrator to gain untold amounts of usernames/passwords for systems on
whichever network they forwarded the calls from.


>I read in `Cyberpunk' by K.Hafner and J.Markoff (the latter my favorite
>cyberspatial writer) that K. Mitnick in California also had this
>capability of wiretapping, and used it in an extremely sophisticated
>way. Apparently he actually tapped the lines of police stations and
>knew when they were coming, or knew when they had detected or `sniffed'
>his own illegal wiretapping.
>Did this happen? or is all of this rumor?

 
Back in 1984 or so, a fellow lod member, The Blue Archer, dealt a lot with
Mitnick (using the handle The Condor if I remember correctly). I specifically
recall speaking with Blue Archer when he told me to not discuss certain things
for fear that Condor was listening to his line remotely. Not only this, but
Condor gave Blue Archer a phone number in California that forwarded to his
real phone number which was located 1000 miles east. This number lasted for
a long time and somehow there was never any billing associated with this
long distance forwarding situation.

Therefore, I believe the above happened and was not rumor. What is interesting
is that he was capable of this type of technology manipulation nearly a decade
ago. Condor/Mitnick was one of the 'best' there ever was, but it appears that
he used his knowlege and abilities in ways that he probably should not have.


>I remember Phiber Optik posting to *this list* on the subject of phone
>wiretapping. I think he might have been a bit too knowledgeable for his                 
>own good, eh? What ever happened to K. Mitnick, anyway? He did serve
>federal time, I know that. I remember reading that story and thinking
>-- here is someone we should keep our eyes on, even after he is out of
>prison, *especially* when he is out!
>
>Conspiracy Charges
>--
>
>Another question. I understand that Mr. Abene was charged with
>`conspiracy' or at least that was one of the charges involved in the
>whole affair, perhaps against others. My question: what is the legal
>criterion for a `conspiracy'? what are the penalties? did Abene
>actually get successfully prosecuted for `conspiring'? what was the
>conspiracy? Did it have anything to do with the wiretapping?what are
>famous conspiracy cases?  I'm sure that some cypherpunks may be
>knowledgeable on these subjects. I sincerely hope I haven't offended
>anyone in asking. Mr. Finney posted some outstanding analyses of the
>ITAR (which I subsequently incorporated into a RISKS article), for
>example, so there is definitely some strong legal background here.
>
>please cc: your replies to me or I may not see them.
>

Reply was cc'd to you. 

Lex





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: J. Michael Diehl <mdiehl@triton.unm.edu>
Date: Thu, 11 Nov 93 12:39:12 PST
To: huggins@eecs.umich.edu (Jim Huggins)
Subject: Re: Clipper and the "Christian Right"
In-Reply-To: <199311111959.AA04683@quip.eecs.umich.edu>
Message-ID: <9311112035.AA25997@triton.unm.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


According to Jim Huggins:
> 
> Clark Reynard has rightly pointed out that some in the Christian Right
> agree with the cypherpunks on the need for legal cryptography and that they
> might be able to help in the fight against things like Clipper.  
> Why that should bring out deep-seeded hatred against the Christian Right
> for unrelated offenses or differences of opinion is beyond me.  Isn't
> it enough that we could agree on this one issue?

I might add that I'm a "member" of the Christian Right.  I also like to think
that I've contributed to the "Cypherpunk Cause."  I believe that encryption is
a right, and I believe that government should stay out of most things I'm 
involved with.

Just my $.02

Lagers,


J. Michael Diehl   ;^)  |*The 2nd Amendment is there in case the 
mdiehl@triton.unm.edu   | Government forgets about the 1st!  <RL>
Mike.Diehl@f29.n301.z1  |*God is a good Physicist, and an even 
    .fidonet.org        | better Mathematician.  <Me>
al945@cwns9.ins.cwru.edu|*I'm just looking for the opportunity to 
 (505) 299-2282 (voice) | be Politically Incorrect! <Me>
Can we impeach him yet? |*Protected by 18 USC 2511 and 18 USC 2703. 



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Duncan Frissell <frissell@panix.com>
Date: Thu, 11 Nov 93 10:44:11 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Should we oppose the
Message-ID: <199311111839.AA10010@panix.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


To: cypherpunks@toad.com

M >Just so. If you really believe that merely stopping regulation, 
M >*without anything else*, would restore competition to a market that's
M >been dominated by a government-supported monopoly or duopoly, then we 
M >simply must agree to disagree.

You mean to tell me that if the Feds just said -- the Local Loop monopoly 
no longer exists, we'll auction all the frequencies and get out of the 
business of regulating telecoms, no market would spring up.  Right now, 
there are 6 count them 6 possible suppliers for the Local Loop:

1) TPC
2) Cable
3) The Electric Company (yes the Electric Company)
4) Cellular
5) PCS
6) Digital Mobile Radio (you all saw the stories about Nextel?)

There are probably others I haven't heard of.  Looks like tons of 
suppliers to me.

M >Untrue. The cable providers often are putting up obstacles of their 
M >own, as are telco providers. The impossibility of Tim May's X-rated
M >cable channel illustrates this point. The market can't function

It seems to me that many of the alt.sex.whatever subscribers are using the 
PSTN to satisfy their desires.  As long as we have a switched network to 
the home or office, we can switch whatever we like over it.  How can a 
provider stop a porno enterprise network from supplying encrypted signal 
to subscribers.  It won't even be able to tell it's going on.

M >Telling every would-be X-rated cable viewer to build his own cable
M >system is not a solution.

That's just what we do every day on the PSTN or Internet.

DCF

--- WinQwk 2.0b#1165
                                                                                                                




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Matthew J Miszewski <MJMISKI@macc.wisc.edu>
Date: Thu, 11 Nov 93 13:24:46 PST
To: CYPHERPUNKS@toad.com
Subject: OMNI CARD
Message-ID: <23111113581263@vms2.macc.wisc.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


With re to Root's comments:
 
  The OMNI Card appears to be the incarnation of D. Chaum's SmartCardComputers.
If its what it sounds like it is a public key encryption/digital signature
computing device.  DigiCash...er...Digital Cash (Im not good at avoiding a
pseudospoof) is on its way boyz.
 
--Matt
______________________________________________________________________________
In defense of liberty, encrypt for all purposes, civil and professional.
In defense of privacy, encrypt all correspondence, personal and professional.
In defense of sanity, do not encrypt your dry cleaning invoice!
 
       ++++++++--------mjmiski@macc.wisc.edu                          (c)1993




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Mike Godwin <mnemonic@eff.org>
Date: Thu, 11 Nov 93 11:29:12 PST
To: frissell@panix.com (Duncan Frissell)
Subject: Re: Should we oppose the
In-Reply-To: <199311111839.AA10010@panix.com>
Message-ID: <199311111927.AA06278@eff.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


 
frissell writes:

> M >Just so. If you really believe that merely stopping regulation, 
> M >*without anything else*, would restore competition to a market that's
> M >been dominated by a government-supported monopoly or duopoly, then we 
> M >simply must agree to disagree.
> 
> You mean to tell me that if the Feds just said -- the Local Loop monopoly 
> no longer exists, we'll auction all the frequencies and get out of the 
> business of regulating telecoms, no market would spring up.  Right now, 
> there are 6 count them 6 possible suppliers for the Local Loop:
 
First, I wasn't talking about the local-loop competition. I was talking about
cable. I don't doubt that in *some* monopoly situations, mere reduction or
elimination of regulation can allow markets to spring up. I just don't
think this is true with regard to telcos and cable.

Secondly, and as I mentioned, there are non-market tactics that a supplier
can use to prevent competition from arising. For example, why should a local
telco decide on its own to be interoperable with, say, the Electric
Company? What market share can a monopoly gain by giving access to
competition? None. It can only *lose* market share.

> 1) TPC
> 2) Cable
> 3) The Electric Company (yes the Electric Company)
> 4) Cellular
> 5) PCS
> 6) Digital Mobile Radio (you all saw the stories about Nextel?)

It's always a mistake to confuse technical feasibility for competition.
What's to prevent the dominant one or two providers (TPC and Cellular,
let's say) from closing out the others by refusing to be interoperable?


--Mike







From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Perry E. Metzger" <pmetzger@lehman.com>
Date: Thu, 11 Nov 93 11:39:32 PST
To: Mike Godwin <mnemonic@eff.org>
Subject: Re: Should we oppose the Data Superhighway/NII?
In-Reply-To: <199311111733.AA04581@eff.org>
Message-ID: <9311111937.AA28165@snark.lehman.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Mike Godwin says:
> > Concretely observed, there is no obstacle to the sort of national
> > network we want other than the government.
> 
> Untrue. The cable providers often are putting up obstacles of their own, as
> are telco providers. The impossibility of Tim May's X-rated cable channel
> illustrates this point. The market can't function--Tim and those like him
> who want a certain type and variety of programming--unless there is access
> to the information infrastructure. Telling every would-be X-rated cable
> viewer to build his own cable system is not a solution.

X-Rated movies are a huge business. I suspect cable companies would
love to broadcast them. However, there are government impediments to
transmitting them -- fears of lawsuits, FCC intervention, and criminal
charges being among them.

Of course, this is comparing apples and oranges -- when TV channels
per se cease to exist, which is inevitable, it will be difficult if
not impossible for bluenoses to detect when such services are in use.

> According to standard free-market theory, the existence of demand
> (Tim and friends) for an affordable product ought to stimulate a supplier
> for that product.

Of course it would, BARRING LEGAL OBSTACLES. Again, as before, the
market is not currently free -- the obstacles are government created.

Perry




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: gtoal@an-teallach.com (Graham Toal)
Date: Thu, 11 Nov 93 06:49:10 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Big Mother can't protect our privacy
Message-ID: <7110@an-teallach.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


In article <199311101900.LAA22288@mail.netcom.com> tcmay@netcom.com writes:
 > let me say that the intent is psychological, not political. The
 > famoous questions about believing in God, having homosexual
 > experiences, washing one's hands, and so on, are devised by shrinks,
 > not designed to ferret out atheists and homos. The MMPI has been in
 > wide use since the 1950s, though it's use is declining as people file
 > lawsuits over it.)
 
Read 'The straight dope' on how these questions are scored.  Anyone who 
doesn't believe in God, for example, comes off very badly.  There are
many very nasty assumptions all through it that reflect the prejudices
of the shrinks you refer to.  It might as well have been written by
god-freaks and gay-bashers.  (Usually the same thing in my experience)

 > In Britain, in case there are some of you out there who haven't heard
 > about this, they got concerned about corporations compiling records on
 > people. Sounds like a valid concern, right? Well, the result was the
 > Data Privacy Act (or somesuch), which outlaws such records unless the
 > compiler notifies _all_ of the targets _and the government_.
 
Close but your wording is misleading.  People compiling lists in this 
country do *not* notify the people on the lists.  The latter have to
know who is compiling data on them, then put in a request (like a FOIA
request) asking to be told what that data is.  The public register just
says 'company X keeps data' - it doesn't say on whom.  In order to find
out who is holding data on you, you would have to request it off every
company registered with the DPA - and at about 10 pounds per request,
that's a good way to go broke fast.

The Data Protection Act would be better renamed the Data Secrecy Act -
it primarily protects the large list of exempt bodies who not only
do not register but are also immune from seaches; and any searches by
other means are illegal.  For instance, town councils, the police,
banks, ... - just about anyone you would actually want to find out what
they have on you.
 
 > The result is that anyone who saves computer files--like this list,
 > which of course contains e-mail addresses of hundreds of people--is
 > technically in violation of the law. Companies are finding it tough to
 > go about their business. And so on.

This may well be true; it's been posited that anyone with a usenet feed
should be registered since people post personal details in .sigs, and
the data can be searched automatically in the mail spool.  No-one to my
knowlege has done so though, and no-one is asking them to.  It's a big
bone of contention at the moment whether BBSes should register - some
see it as a way of squeezing them out of the BBS game.  Again, most
of them don't, and no-one complains.  However it's always at the back
of peoples' minds that the DPA could be used against them as an excuse
if they were ever targeted for other reasons (such as unpopular political
speech).
                                                          
G
-- 
Personal mail to gtoal@gtoal.com (I read it in the evenings)
Business mail to gtoal@an-teallach.com (Be careful with the spelling!)
Faxes to An Teallach Limited: +44 31 662 4678  Voice: +44 31 668 1550 x212





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: gtoal@an-teallach.com (Graham Toal)
Date: Thu, 11 Nov 93 06:53:33 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: L. Detweiler's latest rant on comp.risks
Message-ID: <7111@an-teallach.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


In article <9311110637.AA19911@ah.com> hughes@ah.com writes:
 > >G.Broiles, A.Chandler, J.Dinkelacker, H.Finney, E.Hughes, M.Landry,
 > >T.C.May, N.Szabo

Hey, can't I be somebody too, pretty please?!!!

G (aka Sy Verpunc, until he installed procmail)
-- 
Personal mail to gtoal@gtoal.com (I read it in the evenings)
Business mail to gtoal@an-teallach.com (Be careful with the spelling!)
Faxes to An Teallach Limited: +44 31 662 4678  Voice: +44 31 668 1550 x212





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Mike Godwin <mnemonic@eff.org>
Date: Thu, 11 Nov 93 11:49:12 PST
To: pmetzger@lehman.com
Subject: Re: Should we oppose the Data Superhighway/NII?
In-Reply-To: <9311111937.AA28165@snark.lehman.com>
Message-ID: <199311111947.AA06606@eff.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


 
Perry writes:

> X-Rated movies are a huge business. I suspect cable companies would
> love to broadcast them.

Right. And the telcos would love to carry phone-sex services. 

Your suspicion would be incorrect. Current providers tend not to want to
carry sexually explicit services because it hurts their image. For
example, the telcos didn't want to support 900-number phone-sex services,
in spite of the fact that there is a very clear market for them, because
they didn't want to do any business for and with the phone-sex companies.
See, e.g., Sable Communications v. FCC.

If your characterization were correct, the phone companies would be dying
to carry phone-sex services. In real life, however, they keep petitioning
regulatory bodies to allow them not to carry them.

> Of course it would, BARRING LEGAL OBSTACLES. Again, as before, the
> market is not currently free -- the obstacles are government created.

Thanks for the capital letters--I am getting a little nearsighted in my
old age.

But your analysis hear assumes that, given a clear and profitable market,
any rational provider would cater to it. Even in the absence of legal
sanctions, this isn't true, as Sable Communications and other cases
clearly show.


--Mike






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Derek Atkins <warlord@MIT.EDU>
Date: Thu, 11 Nov 93 11:53:31 PST
To: cypherpunks-east@MIT.EDU
Subject: ANNOUNCE: Boston Area Cypherpunks Meeting
Message-ID: <9311111950.AA04886@toxicwaste.media.mit.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


This is to inform you about the November Boston Area Cypherpunks
Meeting.  This meeting will be held in MIT room 1-115 on Saturday,
November 13, from 12 - 6PM.

Topics will range from PGP tutorial and informatioon, key signing,
mathematical explanations, digital cash, and other topics from the
attendees.

If you have any questions, please mail me personally.  All further
information will be sent to "cypherpunks-east@MIT.EDU".  To get on
this list, send mail to "cypherpunks-east-request@MIT.EDU"

See you Saturday.

-derek

PS: It has been suggested that we attempt an audio feed to California.
My response is that if we can obtain the hardware here we can attempt
it, but I'm not sure how well it will help the meeting move along.

Directions: 

T: Red line to Kendall Sq. Walk away from the Marriott (across the
street). Walk down the road until the next road, Amhurst, and take a
right.  There keep walking.  You will cross Ames St.  Keep walking
forward until you pass the "Great Sail", then bear right.  Walk up the
steps and then keep walking straight.  Follow the signs for 1-115

Bus: #1 to 77 Mass Ave.  Walk up the stairs and follow the signs.

Car: Get to Cambridge.  Find somewhere to park around Mass Ave between
Memorial Drive and Vassar St.  You may want to try an MIT parking lot.
Enter MIT at 77 Mass Ave and follow the signs.





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: gtoal@an-teallach.com (Graham Toal)
Date: Thu, 11 Nov 93 06:59:11 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: A short response to L. Detweiler: 'I exist as myself.'
Message-ID: <7112@an-teallach.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


In article <9311110714.AA19967@ah.com> hughes@ah.com writes:
 > L. Detweiler's recent article on the RISKS of confusing an online
 > identity with a potentially knowable physical one are quite
 > interesting, if hypothetical.
 > 
 > I would be interested in hearing of situations where this practice
 > has actually occurred.  If any RISKS members know of any such
 > incidents from first-hand experience, please share them with the
 > readership.

I can tell a fascinating tale about spoofed identities that happened
on a mailing list I was on a couple of years ago; but it's a *very*
long story and I haven't the time.  Maybe if I'm idle over the
christmas holidays I'll pull up a log, sit down, and tell the story
(if I'm bribed with enough drinks first :-) )

G
(For anyone else here who's on that list, it's the story of Mahalingam
et al...)
PS Also I'm aware of quite a culture of 'she-males' in certain groups
and IRC where men pose as women - usually lesbians - usually to get other
real lesbians to confide in them (for the purposes of their own arousal...)
-- 
Personal mail to gtoal@gtoal.com (I read it in the evenings)
Business mail to gtoal@an-teallach.com (Be careful with the spelling!)
Faxes to An Teallach Limited: +44 31 662 4678  Voice: +44 31 668 1550 x212





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Perry E. Metzger" <pmetzger@lehman.com>
Date: Thu, 11 Nov 93 11:59:12 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Should we oppose the
In-Reply-To: <199311111927.AA06278@eff.org>
Message-ID: <9311111954.AA28183@snark.lehman.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Mike Godwin says:
> It's always a mistake to confuse technical feasibility for competition.
> What's to prevent the dominant one or two providers (TPC and Cellular,
> let's say) from closing out the others by refusing to be interoperable?

Why did virtually all the railroads in the northern U.S. use the same
rail gauge BEFORE regulation of the railroads?

Why do most of the commercial internet providers (except for the
government subsidized ANS) agree to exchange packets with each other
freely?

Why do open standards do better in the market than closed standards?

The answer is "its in their interest to cooperate, thats why."

There was actually a really nice article in Forbes recently on game
theory and competition vs. cooperation...

Perry




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Jim Huggins <huggins@eecs.umich.edu>
Date: Thu, 11 Nov 93 11:59:32 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Clipper and the "Christian Right"
Message-ID: <199311111959.AA04662@quip.eecs.umich.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Grendel Grettisson <mimir@u.washington.edu> writes:
> On Tue, 9 Nov 1993, Clark Reynard wrote:
> > I think it would be very important if we could attempt to
> > sway the Christian right into this; it is certain we
> > probably don't agree on many issues, and the "700 Club"
> > anti-Clipper piece was very effective, good video.

> For those that watch the 700 Club. Personally, I'm opposed to anything 
> that gives the Christian Right more power or puts them in the public eye 
> more given their past track record.

You mean "their past track record that I don't agree with."  Sure, 
many excesses have been committed in the name of the "Christian Right"
(whatever that is ... I'm supposedly a part of it and I've never seen
a coherent definition of what it is).  But the "Agnostic Left" has
probably committed a few excesses in its day, too.  

Frankly, a coalition with people from a wide variety of political backgrounds
can only help to make the anti-Clipper cause seem more respectible.  
Otherwise, the anti-Clipper folks might end up sounding like just another
liberal protest group, and be treated just like any other lobbying group.

> > If you don't believe me, watch it.  They almost seem
> > to agree with us entirely on the issue of cryptography.
> > Perhaps it's time for a _new_ group; the cyphermonks.
> > I nominate St. John the Divine as a patron saint.

> I thought the Christian Right didn't like Catholics or Saints either. It 
> is a Protestant movement.

Not really.  From my experience, the "Christian Right" is composed of
conservative Christians -- both Protestant and Catholic.  It's only in
certain parts of the country where conservative Protestants and
Catholics are unfriendly ...

--Jim Huggins



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Jim Huggins <huggins@eecs.umich.edu>
Date: Thu, 11 Nov 93 12:03:32 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Clipper and the "Christian Right"
Message-ID: <199311111959.AA04683@quip.eecs.umich.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Owen Rowley <owen@autodesk.com) writes:
> > From: Clark Reynard <clark@metal.psu.edu>
> > I think it would be very important if we could attempt to
> > sway the Christian right into this; it is certain we
> > probably don't agree on many issues, and the "700 Club"
> > anti-Clipper piece was very effective, good video.
 
> meanwhile, don't forget for a second that the christian right
> *will* toss your anarchic ass on the pyre where they *will* roast
> pagan faggots like myself after they've squeezed you for your
> support.

> Religion has it's protection clearly enumerated in the constitution,
> and a clear agenda to keep everyone elses freedom from being similary
> enumerated.
> Caveat emptor, and carry a loaded flamethrower, because the first
> chance they get to cut you out of the deal you will need it.

Oh, come on now.  You give the "Christian Right" (and I still don't know
what that means) far more power than they have.    There is this popular
notion that the "Christian Right" has some master agenda that all 
conservative Christians buy into blindly.  That simply ain't so ...
just as there isn't a single master cypherpunks agenda agreed on in this list
(complaints by Mr. Detweiler notwithstanding).  

Clark Reynard has rightly pointed out that some in the Christian Right
agree with the cypherpunks on the need for legal cryptography and that they
might be able to help in the fight against things like Clipper.  
Why that should bring out deep-seeded hatred against the Christian Right
for unrelated offenses or differences of opinion is beyond me.  Isn't
it enough that we could agree on this one issue?

Let's try to make this issue non-partisan, OK?

--Jim Huggins



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: abootch@sfsuvax1.sfsu.edu (Bokum Bop Till You Drop)
Date: Thu, 11 Nov 93 15:03:35 PST
To: Martin.Greifer@f28.n125.z1.fidonet.org (Martin Greifer)
Subject: Re: modem taps/caller id
In-Reply-To: <4110.2CE1DFEC@shelter.FIDONET.ORG>
Message-ID: <9311112303.AA19607@sfsuvax1.sfsu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> > Practical Peripherals sells a modem that also captures Caller ID info
> > and makes   it available to your comm program.  I've also seen devices
> > that do this for   sale in the back of BBS magazines.
> 
> The question is, how does a caller block this feature?
> ___ Blue Wave/QWK v2.12
> --  

You can press *67 (or *69? in some places) to keep the receiver from
getting your phone number but your phone number is still sent - just not
displayed - more info in current ish of 2600.

-- 

-----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----
Version: 2.3a

mQBNAizdNhgAAAECAKYlJfK4YQoaRYtiywdgR7OQmsS23oRFr3QYZf4mE1pQTvPg
DGB7xVx2mfRjsqUdQsar4vdWyNZmXLMmHNdez9UABRG0K0FuZHkgSS4gTWF0aW5v
ZyA8YWJvb3RjaEBzZnN1dmF4MS5zZnN1LmVkdT4=
=KJFP
-----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: abootch@sfsuvax1.sfsu.edu (Bokum Bop Till You Drop)
Date: Thu, 11 Nov 93 15:13:35 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com (Cypherpunks)
Subject: tel news
Message-ID: <9311112312.AA21315@sfsuvax1.sfsu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


FYI ----
(sorry if this is re-hash)

Today's SF CHRON reports:

Pac's Baby Bell will spend 15 billion installing fiber optics throughout
California. ATT will supply ATM switchers to convert the video
signals...

And PacTel Cellular will offer Bay Area cell users CDPD - faster and
more efficient cell data transmittion - it transmits the data in packets
during "the idle milliseconds of voice conversations carried on cell.
phone systems". So its compressed and....

-- 

-----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----
Version: 2.3a

mQBNAizdNhgAAAECAKYlJfK4YQoaRYtiywdgR7OQmsS23oRFr3QYZf4mE1pQTvPg
DGB7xVx2mfRjsqUdQsar4vdWyNZmXLMmHNdez9UABRG0K0FuZHkgSS4gTWF0aW5v
ZyA8YWJvb3RjaEBzZnN1dmF4MS5zZnN1LmVkdT4=
=KJFP
-----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: jim@bilbo.suite.com (Jim Miller)
Date: Thu, 11 Nov 93 13:34:12 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: CUD 5.84
Message-ID: <9311112133.AA01867@bilbo.suite.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



The following was recently posted to sci.crypt.  I would like to get a copy of  
the referenced issue of CUD and check out the "DES: Broken!" article.  I looked  
in the EFF ftp site, but they only have CUD up to issue 5.76.

Anybody know where I can get CUD 5.84?

Thanks,

Jim_Miller@suite.com


-------------

From: pwilk@reed.edu (The Cannibal)
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
Subject: Computer underground Digest    Sun  Nov 7 1993   Volume 5 : Issue 84
Message-ID: <2bn1u8$gt0@scratchy.reed.edu>
Date: 9 Nov 93 03:14:16 GMT
Organization: Reed College,  Portland, Oregon
Lines: 29

Thought you might like to know:

Computer underground Digest    Sun  Nov 7 1993   Volume 5 : Issue 84
                           ISSN  1004-042X

       Editors: Jim Thomas and Gordon Meyer (TK0JUT2@NIU.BITNET)
       Archivist: Brendan Kehoe
       Shadow-Archivists: Dan Carosone / Paul Southworth
                          Ralph Sims / Jyrki Kuoppala
                          Ian Dickinson
    Copy Eatitor: Etaoin Shrdlu, III

CONTENTS, #5.84 (Nov 7 1993)
File 1--Computers, Freedom, and Privacy '94 Conference
File 2--CFP '94 Scholarship Announcements
File 3--Korea 94: Call for Papers
File 4--CPSR NII Paper
File 5--DES: Broken! <-----------------------------
File 6--NAFTA mandates software patents (fwd)
File 7--Phiber Optik Sentenced to One Year in Prison


read it.  check it out.

--
The      _O_ "Darkness may cover me:  midnight may steal along my living veins;
Cannibal  |   yea and the ultimate futility, the ghastly nothing on which all
              things play may break ice-thin crust and freeze my soul"
pwilk@reed.edu   -=public key available on finger=-   - John Cowper Powys




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Mike Godwin <mnemonic@eff.org>
Date: Thu, 11 Nov 93 12:59:12 PST
To: pmetzger@lehman.com
Subject: Re: Should we oppose the
In-Reply-To: <9311111954.AA28183@snark.lehman.com>
Message-ID: <199311112058.AA07980@eff.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


 
Perry writes:

> Why did virtually all the railroads in the northern U.S. use the same
> rail gauge BEFORE regulation of the railroads?
 
Partly because there was no pre-existing railroad monopoly that was
blocking them from the market.

Of course, railroad interoperability is trivial, and can't easily be
altered to block entry. But it should be noted that "using the same rail
gauge" is only part of interoperability. I leave it to you to guess what
the other part is, and how a railroad monopoly can prevent entry of new
competition.

> Why do most of the commercial internet providers (except for the
> government subsidized ANS) agree to exchange packets with each other
> freely?
> 
> Why do open standards do better in the market than closed standards?
> 
> The answer is "its in their interest to cooperate, thats why."
 
Please explain, specifically, how it's in a local telco's interest to
cooperate with an upstart Electric Company telco provider.

> There was actually a really nice article in Forbes recently on game
> theory and competition vs. cooperation...

That's nice. But don't assume I'm not knowledgeable on these subjects.  


--Mike






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: smb@research.att.com
Date: Thu, 11 Nov 93 13:03:32 PST
To: pmetzger@lehman.com
Subject: Re: Should we oppose the
Message-ID: <9311112100.AA01913@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


	 Why did virtually all the railroads in the northern U.S. use the same
	 rail gauge BEFORE regulation of the railroads?

Ah -- you specify the ``northern'' U.S.  The situation in the south
was very different.  And even in the north, the Pennsylvania Railroad
was so large (they're the ones who billed themselves as ``the standard
railroad of the world) that other folks had to follow if they came near
the PRR.  It was near-monopoly that created that situation, not any
desire for co-operation.

In Europe, there are still a variety of different gauges, electrical
standards, loading gauges, etc.  (Actually, the latter two are problems
in the U.S. as well.)




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Perry E. Metzger" <pmetzger@lehman.com>
Date: Thu, 11 Nov 93 13:09:12 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Should we oppose the
In-Reply-To: <199311112058.AA07980@eff.org>
Message-ID: <9311112106.AA28293@snark.lehman.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Since the discussion is endless, I'm going to take my latest arguments
to private mail with Mike.

Perry




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Perry E. Metzger" <pmetzger@lehman.com>
Date: Thu, 11 Nov 93 13:19:12 PST
To: smb@research.att.com
Subject: Re: Should we oppose the
In-Reply-To: <199311112100.QAA24989@lehman.com>
Message-ID: <9311112114.AA28312@snark.lehman.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



This has gone on too long -- I'm writing a last reply here in public
and then I would ask that we take this to private mail.

smb@research.att.com says:
> 	 Why did virtually all the railroads in the northern U.S. use the same
> 	 rail gauge BEFORE regulation of the railroads?
> 
> Ah -- you specify the ``northern'' U.S.  The situation in the south
> was very different.

Yes, the south had fewer railroads and they followed a different gauge
-- this is to be expected in such situations.

> And even in the north, the Pennsylvania Railroad
> was so large (they're the ones who billed themselves as ``the standard
> railroad of the world) that other folks had to follow if they came near
> the PRR.  It was near-monopoly that created that situation, not any
> desire for co-operation.

I once read a wonderful account of how enraged J.P. Morgan was one day
when, while relaxing at his country home on the Hudson in upstate New
York, he heard the sounds of a railroad construction gang driving
through a railroad competing with the Penn Central line which he
effectively controlled via the Vanderbilts. No attempt to set up a
railroad cartel or monopoly worked until the ICC was formed, you know
-- a government agency created largely so monopolists would have a
legal way of enforcing rate fixing.

> In Europe, there are still a variety of different gauges, electrical
> standards, loading gauges, etc.

Yes. Such things typically occur for a while when people aren't
geographically proximate and don't interact much -- the north and
south were such an example. However, in regions where people do
interact standards quickly enforce themselves. Look around you at the
computer industry for example.

Perry




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: strick -- henry strickland <strick@versant.com>
Date: Thu, 11 Nov 93 16:43:35 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: MATH: new number
Message-ID: <9311120044.AA23664@versant.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


And now for something completely relevant:

  Newsgroups: rec.arts.sf.written
  From: daveb@harlqn.co.uk (Dave Berry)
  Organization: Harlequin Ltd, Cambridge, UK
  Date: Thu, 4 Nov 1993 19:15:59 GMT
  
  >   It was mentioned on CNN that the new prime number discovered
  >   recently is four times bigger then the previous record.
  >                               -- John Blasik
  
     Mathematicians at Cambridge University announced today that they have
     discovered a new whole number between 27 and 28.  "We don't know much
     about its properties", said a spokesman, "but it is causing lots of
     bother in equations.  However, we do know that it's divisible by 6 -
     but only once".
                                  -- "On the hour", BBC Radio.






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: gtoal@an-teallach.com (Graham Toal)
Date: Thu, 11 Nov 93 09:53:33 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Are we gatewayed to Usenet?
Message-ID: <7161@an-teallach.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


In article <199311092038.MAA06532@mail.netcom.com> tcmay@netcom.com writes:
 > I believe someone has gatewayed the list onto Netcom, which is
 > available to many thousands of subscribers, including local POPs
 > (points of presence) in Washington, D.C., Boston, Atlanta, Austin, and
 > of course all up and down the West Coast.
 > 
 > Is this such a good idea? And should it be unilaterally done? If there
 > was discussion of this, I must've missed it somehow (which I doubt).

There is absolutely nothing wrong with a local redistribution of a
mailing list.  It probably isn't bidirectional, but even if it is,
so what?  What you're really saying is you don't want too many people
reading who you can't keep tabs on, isn't it?  Or are you really just
rankled that *Sternlight* can read cypherpunks and you won't know
about it?  I guess that must be it because we've *lots* of local
redistributions signed up for this list. (Anyone who wants to see
the complete direct membership list merely has to telnet to toad.com's
smtp port and EXPN the real list name)

I have a great deal of sympathy about 'private space', but if you want
to make this list in some way semi-private, then you *must* issue a
policy notice when anyone signs on the list, saying what the conditions
are, eg that it is not to be quoted in other forums or reposted to
local lists etc.  Otherwise people (unethical people, I mean) can do
what they like with our posts whether we approve or not.  I could show
you some of the warnings I've seen elsewhere, except I'd be in breach
of those lists rules by reposting them :)  [no, really, I just don't
have one handy...]

In fact, the truly paranoid would make list membership a two-stage
process where you first sent out the rules, then waited for a mail
accepting them...

I *don't* advicate this course by the way.  I'm happy with things
as they are, until DS turns up :-)

Graham




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: opus@xstablu.com (Opus Outland)
Date: Thu, 11 Nov 93 18:33:34 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Cancel me.
Message-ID: <m0oxo4n-00029ZC@xstablu.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Please cancel my subscription.  Thanks.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Sameer <sameer@uclink.berkeley.edu>
Date: Thu, 11 Nov 93 18:24:17 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Mounting a "Secure" filesystem in UNIX
Message-ID: <m0oxo8a-000J5iC@infinity.hip.berkeley.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


	Right now I'm running Linux with SLIP at home, and with
telnetd disabled, I feel very secure keeping my PGP secret key on the
system. The drawback inherent in this system, however, of course, is
that I can't connect to my home system and collect mail/do work/etc.
remotely.
	(That's why I have all mail going to uclink, from which point
it goes both to my home machine and netcom.)

	I was wondering if it was possible to mount a "secure"
filesystem/partition using Linux or some other free version of UNIX,
so that it's inaccessible if logged in remotely, but accessibly when
logged in locally.
	That way I can store my PGP secret key on the "secure"
filesystem, and keep telnetd enabled.

	Any thoughts?

Thanks,
	Sameer

	



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Sameer <sameer@uclink.berkeley.edu>
Date: Thu, 11 Nov 93 18:39:51 PST
To: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Subject: Re: (fwd) Netcom adds access in Denver area
In-Reply-To: <199311111815.KAA05545@mail.netcom.com>
Message-ID: <m0oxoNK-000J5iC@infinity.hip.berkeley.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> 
> Cyphertentacles and Extropiates,
> 
> Here's a convenient list of the latest Netcom sites, which span the U.S.
> 
> I've been happily using it (well, they changed to a new emacs
> yesterday and now my autowrap doesn't work....I hate having to spend a
> couple of hours on such a trivial matter) for a year and a half and I
> conservatively estimate I've influenced at least 30 people to sign up
> for it....too bad I don't get any usage credits for it.
> 
> The best things about it: flat monthly fee ($17.50), unlimited connect
> time, full range of services (much better than most universities have,
> folks tell me), and--best of all--your Netcom account won't change
> when you change jobs! And posting with Netcom presumably won't run the
> risk of angering your employer.
> 
> I'm thrilled that Netcom is expanding so rapidly. 
> 
	I don't want to bash netcom here.. I have an account and I'm
*quite* happy with it. (The accounts I have at my university are very
nice, but when 20 people have root, there's *no* security.)

	I have doubts, however, about how good a thing it is to have
*one* public access provider with such a wide net. It *is* a great
thing that now a netcom account doesn't mean that much about where I'm
located, so further privacy is available through that indirection. (Of
course, where I'm located is available via finger, but I provide that
information myself.)

	The problem I fear is a centralization of the net. If netcom
is the major provider for the entire country, then there's much more
risk of "network-disaster" if netcom dies for some reason. (Not
Imminent Death of the Net, but if, say, 20% of all users of the
internet who use a commercial provider use netcom, then a death of
netcom would be a serious blow to the net-population.)

	There's some aesthetic beauty, I think, in localized network
providers, but I can't root out a rational basis for that one.

	The fact, however, that I can be in any major city and *still*
have access to my netcom account with a local (or rather cheap) phone
call, is a *very* good thing, however. I *have* heard, though, that
the POPs outside the bay area only have 56K connections to the netcom
computers.. (From ping times to these sites, a friend of mine who runs
an *excellent* public access network site in Chicago, estimated these
things.) Has anyone who used both the Bay Area POPs and long-distance
POPs noticed a difference? File transfers?

	(Those in Chicago looking for network access, should look into
MCSNet-- Personally I prefer the level of service there to netcom, but
I've been with the guy for multiple years, so there's a level of bias
in there. [And I *think* there's a reference credit on MCSnet.. for
every person I get to subscribe for 3 months I think I get 2 weeks or
something like that.] 312-248-0900.. He will soon have a T1 and T1
POPs all over the Chicago area.)




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Duncan Frissell <frissell@panix.com>
Date: Thu, 11 Nov 93 15:39:17 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Should we oppose the
Message-ID: <199311112337.AA10372@panix.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


To: cypherpunks@toad.com

M >First, I wasn't talking about the local-loop competition. I was 
M >talking about cable. I don't doubt that in *some* monopoly situations,
M >mere reduction or elimination of regulation can allow markets to spring
M >up. I just don't think this is true with regard to telcos and cable.

Hasn't it occurred to everyone that the local loop is cable and cable is 
the local loop.  There's no difference.  Any way of squishing gobs of 
zeros and ones down a channel to you is the Local Loop and the Trunk and 
the Cable and everything.

M >Secondly, and as I mentioned, there are non-market tactics that a 
M >supplier can use to prevent competition from arising. For example, why
M >should a local telco decide on its own to be interoperable with, say,
M >the Electric Company?

In this Age of Open Systems?  Anyway if they won't connect each other, I 
will with my own switch just like International Discount 
Telecommunications and the other companies are smashing the ITU monopoly 
pricing of international phone calls.

M >It's always a mistake to confuse technical feasibility for 
M >competition.  What's to prevent the dominant one or two providers (TPC
M >and Cellular, let's say) from closing out the others by refusing to be 
M >interoperable?

M >--Mike

Sweden approved 5 national cellular franchises by far the most of any 
country.  Sweden has the most market penetration of cellular by any 
country.  No coincidence.

Duncan Frissell
--- WinQwk 2.0b#1165                                         




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Arthur Chandler <arthurc@crl.com>
Date: Thu, 11 Nov 93 19:19:18 PST
To: Sameer <sameer@uclink.berkeley.edu>
Subject: Re: (fwd) Netcom adds access in Denver area
In-Reply-To: <m0oxoNK-000J5iC@infinity.hip.berkeley.edu>
Message-ID: <Pine.3.87.9311111946.A17194-0100000@crl.crl.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



  As someone who has gotten some pretty crusty mail for posting 
issues related to the social and cultural aspects of encryption  -- "stay 
on the subject! this place is about encryption, not politics!" -- may I 
ask -- very politely, of course  -- what these plugs for netcom are 
doing here? I'm using a different provider, and am very happy with them. 
But should I be plugging them (or dinging them) on this list? 





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Date: Thu, 11 Nov 93 20:23:34 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Politics on the List?
In-Reply-To: <Pine.3.87.9311111946.A17194-0100000@crl.crl.com>
Message-ID: <199311120422.UAA28483@mail.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Arthur Chandler writes:

>   As someone who has gotten some pretty crusty mail for posting 
> issues related to the social and cultural aspects of encryption  -- "stay 
> on the subject! this place is about encryption, not politics!" -- may I 
> ask -- very politely, of course  -- what these plugs for netcom are 
> doing here? I'm using a different provider, and am very happy with them. 
> But should I be plugging them (or dinging them) on this list? 

As you all may have noticed, I discuss political issues here on the
List when I think the topic is appropriate. I notice others do as
well.

Yes, some folks complain when non-technical stuff comes up, when the
discussion moves away from Mersenne primes and thermite bombs. Yes,
the mantra of "Cypherpunks write code" is oft-repeated.

Of course, I notice that very few of us are writing any code these
days. Some of the remailer wizards are still revising their code, and
a few C-punks are trying to implement DC-Nets in code. But the vast
majority of the 500+ folks on this List are either not writing crypto
code, or are keeping silent about it.

The intent of the "Cypherpunks write code" line, if I can venture a
motivation (it was of course Eric's line), is that we are more
interested in seeing the Brave New Crypto World happen than in just
jawboning about export laws, the Zimmmermann case, and whether
libertarians are right and socialists are wrong.

Some of us are socialists, some are anarcho-capitalists, some of us
are Trotskyites, and so on. So what else is new?

The kind of political rancor we have largely been successful in
avoiding is the traditional libertarian vs. everyone else debate that
afflicts so many other groups. I am pleasantly surprised by this.

Crypto has massive implications, for so many areas: privacy, taxation,
national borders, data havens, export laws, redistribution of income,
and on and on.

Cypherpunks should write code, if they can, but in any case they ought
to have some idea of where they're going.

--Tim May


-- 
..........................................................................
Timothy C. May         | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,  
tcmay@netcom.com       | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
408-688-5409           | knowledge, reputations, information markets, 
W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA  | black markets, collapse of governments.
Higher Power: 2^756839 | Public Key: PGP and MailSafe available.
Note: I put time and money into writing this posting. I hope you enjoy it.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: jim@bilbo.suite.com (Jim Miller)
Date: Thu, 11 Nov 93 18:34:17 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Brady Bill and Instant Check system
Message-ID: <9311120231.AA06445@bilbo.suite.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain




I think I heard on CNN last night the the Brady Bill passed the House and is on  
its way to the Senate.  I think part of the Brady Bill calls for the  
development within 5 years of a nationwide computer system for performing  
"instant" checks on people attempting to purchase handguns.

Without getting into a discussion on the issues of gun ownership (I'm *very* in  
favour of it), how do you suppose this Instant Check system will work?  How  
will they index into the database? SSN?  Health Security ID number?  


Fingerprints?

I know TRW has developed a pilot fingerprint identification system for the San  
Jose Police Department.  It's called C.O.N.F.I.R.M.  (COunty-wide Networked  
Fingerprint Identification Remote Match.

I'm not suggesting that CONFIRM was designed for the Instant Check system, just  
that the technology to create a nationwide fingerprints database exists, if the  
Gov'mnt were to decide that was a good thing.

What can be done to insure that this Instant Check database idea doesn't get  
out of hand?  (If it's not already too late.)

Can personal cryptography prevent the accumulation of information on people who  
are arrested (regardless of whether or not they are convicted)?  I doubt it.   
Only the elimination of the function of a police force would achieve that!

A related, and more philosophical question is:  Is there any room in  
Cypher-topia for databases containing information that can be used to identify  
convicted "rights-violators"?

Jim_Miller@suite.com


P.S. let me know if none of this is appropriate for the Cypherpunks list.  I'm  
still new to this list.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: mlinksva@netcom.com (Michael R Linksvayer)
Date: Thu, 11 Nov 93 20:59:22 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: New magazine: Meta
Message-ID: <199311120457.UAA03092@mail.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Dear cypherpunks,
	The premier issue of Meta, a monthly for-profit electronic magazine,
is now available in PostScript and Replica formats.  This issue contains
some crypto news and commentary (none of which will be new to someone on
this list), and subsequent issues will have more.

Generic info follows:

Meta is a monthly electronic magazine that covers issues of particular
interest to the net community, including, but not limited to: cryptography,
electronic publishing, free software development, intellectual property, 
internet commercialization, privacy and virtual communities.

Meta is available via email and ftp, and is freely redistributable.

ftp:	ftp.netcom.com:/pub/mlinksva
		meta1193.ps (PostScript)
		meta1193.ps.gz (gzip'd PS)
		meta1193.rpl (Replica - requires MS-Windows and Replica viewer)
		meta1193.exe (Replica with embedded Replica viewer)

mail:	send mail to mlinksva@netcom.com with a subject of:
		send1193ps
		send1193rpl
		send1193exe
	to obtain the PS, Replica and embedded Replica versions respectively.
--
Mike Linksvayer   mlinksva@netcom.com   +1 415 431 0775 voice
Publisher, Meta                         +1 415 327 7629 fax




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Paul Goggin <chaos@aql.gatech.edu>
Date: Thu, 11 Nov 93 18:13:34 PST
To: Jim_Miller@suite.com
Subject: Re: CUD 5.84
In-Reply-To: <9311112133.AA01867@bilbo.suite.com>
Message-ID: <9311120212.AA07613@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>Anybody know where I can get CUD 5.84?

It is available from aql.gatech.edu
/pub/eff/cud/cud

>File 5--DES: Broken! <-----------------------------

This is old news though, it has appeared on the cypherpunks list about
4-6 weeks ago (if memory serves).

--
R  O    All Comments Copyright by  | Technofetishist
 A  N     Paul S. Goggin (1993)    | Cypher, Cyber, Chaos              
  V        Information Broker      | Ergoflux, Interzone
   E      chaos@aql.gatech.edu     | Carpe Diem: Stop the Clipper wiretap chip 
Finger account for latest _Phrack_ | Public Key: PGP and RIPEM available
      For anonymous communication:---> anon32940@anon.penet.fi
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Title 18 USC 2511 and 18 USC 2703 Protected -- Monitoring Absolutely Forbidden




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: doug@netcom.com (Doug Merritt)
Date: Thu, 11 Nov 93 22:43:37 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Should we oppose the Data Superhighway/NII?
In-Reply-To: <mnemonic@eff.org>
Message-ID: <199311120641.WAA15638@mail.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Mike Godwin <mnemonic@eff.org> said:
>Doug, I think you may be under the impression that we're talking about a
>single fiber-optic or coax cable. You can have a single (or double or
>triple) infrastructural network, but add bandwidth to each one. I think
>the notion of "scarcity" doesn't apply to cable any more than it applies
>to personal computers.

I understand. I think that we're looking at different sides of the same
coin. I'm taking the long view, where you're taking the short view. For
the next several years, I agree that bandwidth will continue to increase
even as cost-per-bit-per-second continues to fall.

My previous comments were directed at the long term view, which may
be inappropriate to discuss at the moment, since naturally the long term
has no immediate pragmatic import.

Just keep those comments in mind 5 or 10 years from now. ;-)
	Doug




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: doug@netcom.com (Doug Merritt)
Date: Thu, 11 Nov 93 22:44:22 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Privacy, Property, Cryptography (long)
In-Reply-To: <mnemonic@eff.org>
Message-ID: <199311120644.WAA16116@mail.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Mike Godwin <mnemonic@eff.org> said:
>This quotation needs to be debugged a little bit. The actual quotation [...]
>as against the government, the right to be let alone--the most [...]
>(Note in particular that it's "let," not "left.")

It's always nice to get quotations down correctly, but surely the
original "let" translates in today's speech to "left"? If not, I'd
like to hear about the difference.
	Doug




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: doug@netcom.com (Doug Merritt)
Date: Thu, 11 Nov 93 22:59:23 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Should we oppose the Data Superhighway/NII?
In-Reply-To: <pmetzger@lehman.com>
Message-ID: <199311120659.WAA17915@mail.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


"Perry E. Metzger" <pmetzger@lehman.com> said:
>A single fiber optic strand has enough capacity in theory to carry the
>equivalent of every call made in the U.S. during the peak capacity
>utilization period on Mother's Day.

This is a nice reduction to theory; the current optical modulation rates
fall vastly short of the theoretical limits, but yes, at their maximum
it would be something on that order.

>I don't know about you, but I personally can't produce more than 750
>simultaneous videos at once for network distribution, so I suppose I'm
>uninteresting, but even the people who can do more than that are
>likely going to be fine. If they aren't, well, I suppose they could
>get TWO fibers coming into their home, or maybe even TEN or ONE
>HUNDRED if necessary.

Heh. Well. By today's standards, theoretical-capacity fiber optic will
be indeed be overkill; there would be plenty left over.

Keeping in mind that we're talking about the medium to long term future
rather than the immediate future, though: needs tend to grow easily
as fast as does capacity to meet needs. In the past one can point to
1950's quotes about how many computers would ever be needed worldwide,
or to 1970's arguments about why GUI interfaces would never be realistic,
or even to Bill Joy's late 1980's Nanotech Conf. talk when he coined the unit
of VAX-MIPS-Millenia, which he thought would be useless even if available.

Counterexamples to Joy's thesis are trivially found in cryptography,
and less obviously in things like computer generated holography. The latter
might easily become a GUI standard of the future, and will indeed require
VAX-MIPS-millenia of computation to compute in real time.

They would also require similarly astronomical amounts of bandwidth to
transmit. By today's standards, that's ridiculous to assume. But by the
standards of 10 years hence, two dimensional video may well appear as
primitive as 110 baud text transmission does to us today.

Judging the future by today's standards tends to leave one's predictions
high and dry.
	Doug




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: doug@netcom.com (Doug Merritt)
Date: Thu, 11 Nov 93 23:14:52 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Should we oppose the Data Superhighway/NII?
Message-ID: <199311120715.XAA20441@mail.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Lyle_Seaman@transarc.com said:
>I think Doug believes that demand for bandwidth due to new
>technologies (image, higher definition audio, etc etc) will grow
>faster than the ability to provide more bandwidth.  Perhaps, but I
>don't envision running out of aggregate bandwidth in my lifetime. You
>can put a lot of optical fibers in a very small space.

I only ask that you remember my bizarre prediction over the next decade.

I believe that history will vindicate me. The problem is that history
has vindicated me a number of times in the last 15 years, but no one
remembers by the time that the future rolls around.

Clearly I'm not taking the right approach even now, given that.
I'll keep working on it.
	Doug




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: hfinney@shell.portal.com (Hal Finney)
Date: Thu, 11 Nov 93 23:49:23 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Fractal cryptography
Message-ID: <9311120740.AA19589@jobe.shell.portal.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


There have been some discussions on sci.crypt within the past few months
on nonlinear/chaotic algorithms and their use in cryptography.  Fractal
cryptography sounds like it might be related.  The problem is that unless
an algorithm was SPECIFICALLY DESIGNED to prevent an intelligent adversary
from defeating it, the chances of it being an effective cryptosystem are
limited.  Just because nonlinear systems produce complex-looking results
does not mean that these results are unpredictable given enough data.

Now, maybe this particular fractal cryptosystem idea will actually work
well.  I don't know; I haven't seen it.  But the point is that these
complex types of systems have not provided a good foundation for crypto-
graphy in the past.

sci.crypt messages are available on (at least) ripem.msu.edu, in
/pub/crypt/sci.crypt.  In that directory there is a file "subjects",
which lists all the subject lines by message number, as well as a collection
of files each of which holds a couple of months' worth of messages.  You
can grep the subjects file to find those messages which might be i{terested.
The archives appear to go back a couple of years.

Hal




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: kone@COURIER1.SHA.CORNELL.EDU
Date: Thu, 11 Nov 93 20:29:20 PST
To: <cypherpunks@toad.com>
Subject: Instant check system
Message-ID: <2CE33AED@COURIER1.SHA.CORNELL.EDU>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Jim Miller asked about the "Brady Bill" instant check system.  In the House
version no deadline is set for the nation wide system.  As for fingerprints,
it is one of the ways the bill authorizes to check back grounds.
 
My over payed earrend boy, Congressman Hinchy, got a copy of the bill for me
and two of my Cornell pre-law friends looked it over.  We still don't know
what they want in the end. (not counting the total ban.)  The bill did refer
to an "individual number" a lot.  It is not clear if the "individual number"
is your SS number or the serial number of the weapon.
 
I personly like the idea of instant check, if my privacy can be preserved.
The last thing I want is either a convicted "rights-violator" with a weapon or
someone keeping track on what I buy or don't buy.  I have been trying to keep
my life out of as many records as possable, and am a bit worried by the vage
instant check program. (is visiting a srink for depresion a sign of mental
instablity?)
 
Ther should be a way for individuals to check on their own record, as often as
they want, yet not alowing for others to check.  i.e. the sellor types in your
number (public key) and the confuser says OK or NOT OK.  You type in your
private key and see your arest record and such.
 
One final item, I do agree that weapon ownership is not the issue we should
talk to, but how can we protect our privacy yet keep "rights-violators" from
open access to weapons.
 
William Kone
"I have trained over a thousand young men to eat, sleep, and shoot with their
weapon.  But, I still get worried the first time I give them the rifels."




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Dark <unicorn@access.digex.net>
Date: Thu, 11 Nov 93 23:59:23 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: privacy/property
Message-ID: <199311120757.AA23496@access.digex.net>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
 
- ->
As I recall, Dark, INS v. AP is copyright/First Amendment case, 
not a privacy case. (International News Service was cribbing from 
AP stories.)  What does Brandeis say in this case that seems to 
be a reservation about  privacy rights?
<-
 
Although the basis for the case was superficially a copyright 
case, because it involved injunctive relief, the Justices had to 
reach for a protection of property rights to uphold the 
injunction.  This was my point, that privacy should be linked to 
property rights so as to open the way for more than simple forced 
transactions by entitlement and monetary damages in relief.
Consider Justice Brandeis' comments at the beginning of his 
dissent:
 
   No question of statutory copyright is involved.  The sole 
question for our consideration is this: Was the International 
News Service properly enjoined from using, or causing to be used 
gainfully, news of which it acquired knowledge by lawful means 
[...]  _International News Service v. The Associated Press_, 248 
U.S. 215, at 249 (Brandeis, J., Dissenting).
 
 
As for the hook in on property and privacy, consider:
 
The general rule of law is, that the noblest of human productions 
- - knowledge, truths ascertained, conceptions, and ideas - become, 
after voluntary communication to others, free as the air to 
common use.  Upon these incorporeal productions the attribute of 
property is continued after such communication only in certain 
classes of cases where public policy has seemed to demand it.  
_International News Service_, 248 U.S. 215 at 250 (Brandeis, J., 
Dissenting).
 
This is just in 1918.  Even here we see the public sphere taking 
the lead role.  Enter the progressives of the 20's.  This was a 
touch beyond my point, however.  My focus was more that even back 
then there was a recognition that intellectual production had to 
be guarded with property rights.  Applying the law of capture to 
intellectual pursuits like the news?  If privacy rights existed, 
why go so far?  Business and proprietary news protected by a long 
stretch of property rights?  To me this is just a bridge to jump 
the missing privacy rights gap.  Granted this is not an ideal 
case, but it illustrates the attitude (and it was the only 
Brandeis case that jumped to mind when replying quickly to your 
note :)  )
 
- -uni- (Dark)
 
 
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.3
 
iQCVAgUBLONAHRibHbaiMfO5AQFiGAP/Ud06AWsAgqXQSYX5P3DNxtTgqv7HO+OJ
QZnj93GuzQSETJmWNBaVCEbD/5xPQC3MKt1h9gbPY9Fai9rx+8djiocWKWF1UXFH
i/4tkKEUN4YwcOJWPoO6EFS/ykgLo25NRiJkLEbhxm4ge/34VX3CxQ5FfNSdRI3o
m5Be07dvFJk=
=fsg8
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: an41418@anon.penet.fi (wonderer)
Date: Thu, 11 Nov 93 19:23:35 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Fractal cryptography?
Message-ID: <9311120321.AA06790@anon.penet.fi>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

I would be interested in more information on this!

Wonderer


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.3

iQBVAgUBLOKnzR1kTJuroDD9AQEnJAH/cpHuXA/+xdhHZtSxiD7iawDQMwgQTHDw
8t4oFRF/o98lWztuoiq0Dl3aDYEtcFcJI4NV6qAOjMVsQoDIOgVemQ==
=saSN
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
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Due to the double-blind, any mail replies to this message will be anonymized,
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From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "George A. Gleason" <gg@well.sf.ca.us>
Date: Fri, 12 Nov 93 05:29:30 PST
To: tcmay@netcom.com
Subject: Re:  Should we oppose the Data Superhighway/NII?
Message-ID: <199311121328.FAA25705@well.sf.ca.us>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


RE "killing route 666," my primary objection is that there seems to be very
little emphasis on increasing access at the grassroots level; the way things
are going it will be 500 channels of commercial TV with "interactive"
limited to Home Shopping and other trivial bullshit.  I'm all in favor of
common carrier status, guaranteed access for all, etc; but the current
govt and private proposals & general moves like Bell/TCI, seem to miss the
mark widely.  

-gg




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: geoffw@nexsys.net (Geoff White)
Date: Fri, 12 Nov 93 07:03:43 PST
To: gtoal@an-teallach.com
Subject: Re: (fwd) Netcom adds access in Denver area
Message-ID: <9311121455.AA09451@nexsys.nexsys.net>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>  I'd be more thrilled if they were doing what demon do and putting
>  people's own sites on the net under SLIP for a flat rate (with demon
>  it's 10 pounds per month - call it 15 bucks) and just ordinary phone-
>  call costs on top.  [If netcom now does this, apologies - it's been
>  some time since I looked into the US slip culture]

Well InterNex is hooking people up via ISDN using PPP.  This is a full
56 kbps link with domain name registration, and nntp feed for $150/month
(plus your ISDN bill which will run $28/month + $.01 per minute)
I have this installed in my house (nexsys.net) and it's great, there's
never any need to leave my Sun at home, except for meetings and such,
if your interested you can ftp their stuff from ftp.internex.net.







From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Clark Reynard <clark@metal.psu.edu>
Date: Fri, 12 Nov 93 05:24:46 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Bandwidth limitations
Message-ID: <9311121335.AA15471@metal.psu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


pmetzger@lehman.com (Perry Metzger) writes:

>Doug Merritt says:

>> I hate to disagree, considering that I prefer to agree with the philosophy
>> here, but it *can't* work that way, regardless of what we wish.
>> 
>> The problem is that bandwidth is a highly limited resource, just like
>> real estate is a limited resource. Eventually we will complete saturate
>> network bandwidth no matter what technology is used.

>I don't know about you, but I personally can't produce more than 750
>simultaneous videos at once for network distribution, so I suppose I'm
>uninteresting, but even the people who can do more than that are
>likely going to be fine. If they aren't, well, I suppose they could
>get TWO fibers coming into their home, or maybe even TEN or ONE
>HUNDRED if necessary.

>I suspect that we have a wee bit longer to go than that. When people
>start faxing themselves regularly we may have to go to slightly more
>exotic technologies.

Apparently, information-theoretically, there is a limit to the
bandwidth available in any given area of space before overlapping
of signal occurs.  

While I don't agree that it is likely to occur soon, eventually
we will hit an information bottleneck; probably somewhere after
we manage to use subquantal particles as signal-carriers.

Our current system would, indeed, allow people to fax themselves
regularly; in fact, I occasionally fax things to myself already.
However, when people start doing genuinely exotic things, such
as emailing their entire genome to their doctor; or emailing
vast files on self-administered MRI tests to the hospital;
or transmitting graphical images of components for something
as simple as factory work; then we'll seriously have to think
about theoretical bandwidth limitations.

However, with any luck we'll be off the planet, and will have
the infinite bandwidth we need by the time we need it.
----
Robert W. F. Clark                   PGP Key Available Upon Request
rclark@nyx.cs.du.edu
clark@metal.psu.edu




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Date: Fri, 12 Nov 93 08:39:32 PST
To: gtoal@an-teallach.com
Subject: Re: Politics on the List?
In-Reply-To: <7323@an-teallach.com>
Message-ID: <199311121636.IAA08573@mail.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Graham Toals writes:

>  (What I'm really saying is that this list clearly serves a purpose,
>  and it is evolving into its own character, whatever that may be, despite
>  the efforts of the early founder members to keep it on some tightly
>  defined track that they once conceived it as.  I don't see this
>  evolution as being a problem, and I'm slightly (though not to
>  Detweilerian proportions) annoyed whenever people like Tim or Perry
>  pull rank and try to limit the topics of discussion, when on closer
>  inspection they're just as bad as the rest of us at drifting 'off topic'.)

The point of my last article was exactly this, that I drift "off
topic" all the time. Far from "pulling rank" and limiting the topics
(how could this be done? Eric has only twice, that I recall, called
for a halt in some especially unproductive topic, one that Perry and I
were involved in, ironically).

It is true that we see messages of the form "Let's not waste time on
topic foo, let's stick to our charter bar. Cypherpunks write code."

I try to avoid this form, as my interests are all over the map. The
political, legal, and economic issues surrounding crypto seem to me to
be fair game for this list. More basic debates about the validity of
taxation, the abortion/antiabortion debate, and religious arguments
about Christians vs. pagans (or whatever) seem generally unfruitful
and probably would be a waste of list bandwidth.

(Which doesn't mean, I think, that they shouldn't come up now and
again. It's just that back-and-forth arguments that are nothing more
than restatements of initial postions are pointless.)

On a more recent topic, the NII, I have several things to say that
connect with this thread.

First, I dropped out of the debate with Godwin and Perry and others
when it seemed to reach a point of repeating initial positions.

Second, I now have all three major NII position papers (Kalil's NII
docs, the EFF Open Platform paper, and the CPSR position paper) and am
rereading them with a more analytical eye, trying to figure out what
the _real datahighway_ is intended to be....it's not at all clear.

Third, the NII could have profound implications for crypto. For
example, suppose the various law enforcement and business regulation
goals (NII will be a business infrastructure, too) are used to limit
strong crypto? Perhaps data packets will have to be tagged,
analogously to license plates and to business licenses (have to be
able to trace packets to ensure NII laws are complied with, that the
originator has hired sufficient numbers of persons of color, and so
on).

(I can construct many plausible worries, and will do so in a longer
piece.)

So, I don't use the "Cypherpunks write code" mantra as anything more
than a kind of ideal goal. 

Let a thousand flowers bloom.

--Tim May


-- 
..........................................................................
Timothy C. May         | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,  
tcmay@netcom.com       | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
408-688-5409           | knowledge, reputations, information markets, 
W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA  | black markets, collapse of governments.
Higher Power: 2^756839 | Public Key: PGP and MailSafe available.
Note: I put time and money into writing this posting. I hope you enjoy it.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Clark Reynard <clark@metal.psu.edu>
Date: Fri, 12 Nov 93 05:43:43 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Are we gatewayed to Usenet
Message-ID: <9311121351.AA15525@metal.psu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Never.  I don't _ever_ want to see this made into a
'semi-private' mailing list.  Extropians, for example,
does this, and it's ended up being an incestuous,
closed group, with extremely low signal-to-noise
ratio; as the same groups of people chatter and 
blather about the same subjects to no end.

I'd rather have the list the way it is.  At least
the noise is usually _new_ noise; and new signal
comes in constantly.

I even prefer it with L. Detweiler; perhaps he'll
cease his rather garbled rants and return
to being a constructive poster.

In any case, if this sort of thing were ever to be put to
a vote, I'd be emailing everyone I knew not to have anything
to do with such a giddy, doomed proposal.
----
Robert W. F. Clark                   PGP Key Available Upon Request
rclark@nyx.cs.du.edu
clark@metal.psu.edu




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: hfinney@shell.portal.com (Hal Finney)
Date: Fri, 12 Nov 93 08:54:48 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: (fwd) Netcom adds access in Denver area
Message-ID: <9311121654.AA07885@jobe.shell.portal.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Unfortunately, netcom's nearest point-of-presence is a $.10/minute nighttime
long distance call away from me.  So this "free" service would cost me about
$6/hour.  There are several services which provide access via packet-switching
networks which have hundreds of POP's, including some local to me.  Two of
these networks are Sprintnet and Compuserve's network (which is separate from
the Compuserve service itself).  These networks charge $2-$3/hour off-prime,
so they are a better deal.  But the carrying capacity of these networks seems
somewhat limited, and you don't get the full throughput of your baud rate.

There are resources available on the net, the "pdial" and "nixpub" lists,
which provide lists of service providers for Internet access.  I don't have
access information handy....  Well, I just grabbed some info.  Here
is an excerpt from alt.internet.services FAQ:

> *** 3.1: WHERE CAN I GET INTERNET ACCESS IN MY AREA? 
> Check out PDIAL, a list of public access service providers offering 
> dialup access to Internet connections. PDIAL lists both free and pay 
> services all around the world. The PDIAL list is posted semi-regularly 
> to alt.internet.access.wanted, alt.bbs.lists, ba.internet, and 
> news.answers.
> 
> To receive PDIAL via e-mail, send mail with a subject line of
> "Send PDIAL" to "info-deli-server@netcom.com". To receive future 
> editions as they are published, send email with the subject
> "Subscribe PDIAL" to the same address. The most recent PDIAL is also 
> available by sending mail with a message body of 
> "send usenet/news.answers/pdial" to "mail-server@rtfm.mit.edu". To get 
> PDIAL via FTP:
> ftp.netcom.com:/pub/info-deli/public-access/pdial
> rtfm.mit.edu:/pub/usenet/alt.internet.access.wanted/P_D_I_A_L_(P)
> 
> For more information about service providers and getting on the 
> Internet, read "FYI: Searching for Treasure" (FTP info at the end of 
> this document.)
> 
> Another list of service providers, and tips on getting Internet access, 
> is provided in the "alt.bbs.internet" FAQ, available via FTP as 
> rtfm.mit.edu:/pub/usenet/news.answers/inet-bbs-faq.Z
> 
> Access provider information from the book "Internet: Getting Started," 
> (detailed in the final section of this document) is available via 
> anonymous FTP as
> ftp.nisc.sri.com:/netinfo/internet-access-providers-us.txt
> ftp.nisc.sri.com:/netinfo/internet-access-providers-non-us.txt
> 
> If you are a college student or faculty, check with your campus computer 
> center to learn about the online facilities available to you. Many 
> schools offer free accounts to students and staff.
> 
> Next, turn to the Usenet community for assistance. Find out if there is 
> a local newsgroup for your area or state. For instance, Columbus, Ohio 
> users can check on the "oh.general" and "cmh.general" newsgroups. Many 
> other areas have regional newsgroups. Ask the locals questions about the 
> area - who better to know the answers?
> 
> If all else fails, post your plea on the Usenet newsgroup 
> "alt.internet.access.wanted". Note that such requests aren't looked 
> kindly upon if posted elsewhere.
> 
> *** 3.2: I NEED A BBS (ON THE INTERNET OR IN MY AREA)!
> This is covered extensively in the "alt.bbs.internet" FAQ, available on 
> the Usenet group "alt.bbs.internet" or via FTP as
> rtfm.mit.edu:/pub/usenet/news.answers/inet-bbs-faq.Z
> 
> Also look for information on the Usenet newsgroups 
> "alt.internet.access.wanted" and "alt.internet.services". Get the PDIAL 
> list, mentioned at the end of this document. 
> 
> Also available is NIXPUB, a listing of over 100 free and pay-for-play 
> accessible systems. It is posted regularly to the Usenet newsgroups 
> "comp.misc", "comp.bbs.misc", and "alt.bbs". Retrieval information near 
> the end of this document.
> 
> Also, for BBS information for your area code or specific interest, FTP 
> to:
> wuarchive.wustl.edu:/mirrors/msdos/bbslists
> 
I check these lists every so often, hoping to find cheaper access, but
still no luck.

But I agree with Graham Toal that a much better setup would be smarter
software on my home PC, with an intelligent protocol for communication with
the net service provider.  I wouldn't care if it was UUCP, POP, SLIP, or
whatever, at this point; it's probably better than semi-automated ZMODEM.
I hope that these facilities become more widely available at a price of
around $20-$30 a month or less.  Paying hundreds of dollars a month for
these capabilities is far beyond my budget.  I can't understand why England
is so far ahead of the U.S. in this regard.  No offense intended, but I
always thought of their telecommunications and computing infrastructure as
being several years behind the U.S.

Hal





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Clark Reynard <clark@metal.psu.edu>
Date: Fri, 12 Nov 93 05:53:41 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Phiber Optik, and miscellaneous ramblings
Message-ID: <9311121404.AA15560@metal.psu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


lex@mindvox.com (Lex Luthor) writes:

>Please note that
>Phiber Optik was probably the most mellow one of the MOD and having spoke with
>him a number of times, it seems that he is not a malicious type. IMHO his
>mistake was teaching his 'friends' in the group how to do certain things
>without regard to what they intended to do with that knowlege.

True; after reading a number of the charges against him,
it appears they just threw whatever they could at him,
in the hopes that something would stick.

I find it oddly revolting that if a gang of teenage hoodlums
were to enter a school and vandalize it, physically destroying
the computers with hammers and spray paint, they would be
considered harmless 'wild boys' and probably get a fine.
Reform school at most.

This is fine by me, however; if a fucking _smart_ kid just _accesses_
the piece of shit PCs that schools use, and alters his grade, then,
in most states, that is considered a hideous crime worthy of
federal crime.

Granted, Phiber did a good deal more than that, but was he a _serious_ criminal?

Did he make huge wads of cash?  Is he living in some kind of
fucking mansion from his vast profits?

In my case, I'm disgusted by the data cops making more-or-less
harmless rich kids with high-tech and inventive curiosity;
perhaps a streak of malice; and too much time, into some
kind of demonic threat to the nation.

No wonder our smart kids are practically last in the civilized
world, when we punish kids for being too smart and throw them
in jail for being too dumb, while slashing education budgets.

[As the astute reader may have gathered, the Author of this
article has, himself, been busted for thoughtcrime; however,
he's doing fine now, so don't worry.]

Thanks for clearing the issue up, Lex; and consider me in wholehearted
agreement.
----
Robert W. F. Clark            PGP Key Available Upon Request
rclark@nyx.cs.du.edu
clark@metal.psu.edu




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Dave Hart <davehart@microsoft.com>
Date: Fri, 12 Nov 93 10:19:32 PST
To: sameer@uclink.berkeley.edu
Subject: RE: Mounting a "Secure" filesystem in UNIX
Message-ID: <9311121819.AA25880@netmail.microsoft.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

| From: Sameer  <netmail!sameer@uclink.berkeley.edu>
|
| 	I was wondering if it was possible to mount a "secure"
| filesystem/partition using Linux or some other free version of UNIX,
| so that it's inaccessible if logged in remotely, but accessibly when
| logged in locally.

I know you want to do this with UNIX, but Windows NT allows you do this 
quite nicely.  One of the "groups" of users is INTERACTIVE, another is 
NETWORK.  You can specifically prohibit network users from accessing a 
file by adding "NETWORK - No Access" to the p
ermissions list in File Manager.  I do this with secring.pgp and 
secring.bak, on top of the restriction which allows only me to access 
the file.  So even if someone guesses my password, they can't snoop on 
my private key except by physically being at my machi
ne.

== DaveHart@microsoft.com == Opinions are mine, not Microsoft's. ==

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.3a

iQCVAgUBLOPOM+mFbAJWprWtAQFihAQAoHfErGrFffPkJHeSdStjH8y+zHUAPv8I
b9QP85l/jN545PKDB9iRBpqc6708DeXoR7Brm6vydElYDlvShzfpotcUxHtOO9bH
vCGXd/lFKyF3d81Rhckn2DGqH9ab1yw587ofXfAKKzdt3tLpYDCLUdz8eMGLIZCD
ILPaiKYryPI=
=Nnzg
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Date: Fri, 12 Nov 93 10:13:45 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Invention and Digital Timestamping
In-Reply-To: <199311121712.AA07012@eff.org>
Message-ID: <199311121811.KAA17531@mail.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Mike Godwin writes:

> Doug Merritt writes:
>  
> > I believe that history will vindicate me. The problem is that history
> > has vindicated me a number of times in the last 15 years, but no one
> > remembers by the time that the future rolls around.
> 
> Solution: digital timestamping.

As it now set up (cf. Haber and Stornetta), only a partial solution.
The costs of digital timestamping are so low as to allow many
variations of a hypothetical invention to be digitally timestamped.

Thus, an inventor can later selectively disclose only the variations
on an idea which turn out out to work. The "brilliant penny" scam in
investments (which is: claim a penny can predict the stock market up
or down for the next 10 days...store the 1024 "predictions" and then
only open the envelope or whatever for the "winner." Then sell the
brilliant penny to a gullible fool.).

Certainly cheap digital timestamping is good for many applications.

But for others, one can imagine higher prices, such as $5 to register
an idea. This heads off certain kinds of "flooding."

(Same solution, by the way, for the problem often raised of people
trying to "guess" passwords or keys: charge a nominal fee and this is
no barrier to the actual owner but a huge barrier to random guessers.)

The timestamping service can still "collude" in a way by offering
discounts to its friends.

Scott Stornetta, currently of Bellcore, and co-inventor of the
timestamping protocol discussed here, is spinning-off the ideas into a
company. To be located in the Bay Area, not New Jersey.

Crypto-savvy Cypherpunks in the Bay Area who want to work in this area
might keep this in mind.

--Tim May


-- 
..........................................................................
Timothy C. May         | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,  
tcmay@netcom.com       | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
408-688-5409           | knowledge, reputations, information markets, 
W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA  | black markets, collapse of governments.
Higher Power: 2^756839 | Public Key: PGP and MailSafe available.
Note: I put time and money into writing this posting. I hope you enjoy it.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Patrick M. Fitzgerald" <pmfitzge@fitz.b30.ingr.com>
Date: Fri, 12 Nov 93 08:24:47 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Instant check system
In-Reply-To: <2CE33AED@COURIER1.SHA.CORNELL.EDU>
Message-ID: <199311121624.AA15772@fitz.b30.ingr.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


kone@COURIER1.SHA.CORNELL.EDU writes:
> 
> Jim Miller asked about the "Brady Bill" instant check system.  In
> the House version no deadline is set for the nation wide system.

An amendment was passed before voting that sunsets the Brady Bill to
five years.  So, effectively, there is a five-year deadline in the
House version.  This ignores the fact that the Feds have admitted that
they cannot *force* states to perform the instant check.  The Brady
Bill only *suggests* that states implement an instant check.

> I personly like the idea of instant check, if my privacy can be
> preserved.  The last thing I want is either a convicted
> "rights-violator" with a weapon [...]

Instant check will initially have some effect on criminals getting
guns, but certainly won't stop them.  From memory, I think the FBI
estimates that over 80% of criminals get their guns from places other
than gun shops (for example, from theft, private sale).  And as the
instant check is implemented, I imagine that the black market will
grow further.  But this doesn't belong on cypherpunks, so I'll shut
up.

> There should be a way for individuals to check on their own record,
> as often as they want, yet not alowing for others to check. [...]

I agree, this is important.  In the Virginia instant-check system,
which is a de-facto registration (since they also have a stupid
"one gun a month" law), you cannot check your status unless you
actually try to buy a gun.

Recently, a law-abiding citizen mistakenly tried to purchase a gun
after only 28 days.  He failed the instant check.  After a couple
weeks, troopers showed up at his house and tried to arrest him.  Seems
that he had "made a false statement" on his paperwork, which is a
felony.  Luckily, he did some fast talking and they later decided to
drop all charges.

This whole business make me sick.
--
Patrick M. Fitzgerald, pmfitzge@ingr.com             ______
                                                    / ___  )
  [The United States] can't be so fixed on our     / __)/ /__
  desire to preserve the rights of ordinary       (_/it(_____)
  Americans ...  - President William Clinton,
  March 1, 1993, during a press  conference in Piscataway, NJ, as
  reported by "The Boston  Globe", 3/2/93, pg 3




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: peb@PROCASE.COM (Paul Baclace)
Date: Fri, 12 Nov 93 11:04:33 PST
To: mnemonic@eff.org
Subject: digital timestamping
Message-ID: <9311121903.AA20106@ada.procase.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain




I seem to have lost all information about how to use the Bellcore
timestamper.  Neither could I find their hash code in the Sunday
NYT, last I looked (perhaps that was a slow week).

Please post information on this, if you have it.


Paul E. Baclace
peb@procase.com





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: sommerfeld@orchard.medford.ma.us (Bill Sommerfeld)
Date: Fri, 12 Nov 93 08:23:42 PST
To: lefty@apple.com
Subject: Re: OMNI CARD
In-Reply-To: <9311111839.AA14681@internal.apple.com>
Message-ID: <199311121608.LAA00480@orchard.medford.ma.us>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


   BTW, you can't take the cards apart.  They fry themselves if you try.

Uhh.  Well, not exactly.  The cards don't fry, but presumably the
*key* inside them does.

I've seen a SecurID card which had been pried apart; when you put the
two halves back together, the LED went on again, apparantly into some
"initialization mode".

One assumes that the internal key had apparantly been fried; it was,
however, apparantly possible to reinitialize the card with a new key.

This may not defeat their security, but it may make it possible to
recycle their old cards instead of buying new ones..

				 	- Bill




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Perry E. Metzger" <pmetzger@lehman.com>
Date: Fri, 12 Nov 93 08:19:32 PST
To: doug@netcom.com (Doug Merritt)
Subject: Re: Should we oppose the Data Superhighway/NII?
In-Reply-To: <199311120641.WAA15638@mail.netcom.com>
Message-ID: <9311121616.AA03341@snark.lehman.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Doug Merritt says:
> I understand. I think that we're looking at different sides of the same
> coin. I'm taking the long view, where you're taking the short view. For
> the next several years, I agree that bandwidth will continue to increase
> even as cost-per-bit-per-second continues to fall.
> 
> My previous comments were directed at the long term view, which may
> be inappropriate to discuss at the moment, since naturally the long term
> has no immediate pragmatic import.
> 
> Just keep those comments in mind 5 or 10 years from now. ;-)

Just one question, Doug -- in what sort of "Long Term" do you envision
individuals needing to be able to send MORE than several thousand
video signals worth of data simultaneously? Even if you put a camera
facing every corner of every nook of your house, transmitted high
quality audio from every square meter, wired every square inch with
strain gauges and other sensors and was simultaneously transfering the
entire contents of the library of congress over and over and over, you
couldn't exhaust the potential bandwidth of a single fiber. If you
need a bit more, you get two fibers. What applications do you envision
that would require more bandwidth than this, even in twenty or thirty
years?

This is not to say that I don't believe that we won't eventually need
something better -- if humans upload into computers and start
operating billions of times faster such links will seem slow -- but at
that point you aren't really talking about humans any more. What I
want to know is what sort of applications do you envision that HUMANS
might want more bandwidth for.

Perry





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: sommerfeld@orchard.medford.ma.us (Bill Sommerfeld)
Date: Fri, 12 Nov 93 08:24:32 PST
To: tcmay@netcom.com
Subject: Re: Politics on the List?
In-Reply-To: <199311120422.UAA28483@mail.netcom.com>
Message-ID: <199311121616.LAA00496@orchard.medford.ma.us>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


   But the vast majority of the 500+ folks on this List are either not
   writing crypto code, or are keeping silent about it.

There are undoubtedly a fair number of the latter; probably better
than 50% of the cypherpunks subscribers I know around here (including
myself) get paid to (among other things) work on software related to
network security through cryptography.

Random Rant (preaching to the choir, but..):

The same day that I spent far too many hours attempting to get our
DES-using products in synch with what we believe is a correct
interpretation of the export regulations, I saw a post in sci.crypt
from someone in Italy announcing that he had a copy of my HP48SX DES
implementation (which is available for anonymous FTP from
soda.berkeley.edu; disclaimer: it does ECB encrypt mode only, that's
all I needed).

					- Bill




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Perry E. Metzger" <pmetzger@lehman.com>
Date: Fri, 12 Nov 93 08:29:32 PST
To: doug@netcom.com (Doug Merritt)
Subject: Re: Should we oppose the Data Superhighway/NII?
In-Reply-To: <199311120659.WAA17915@mail.netcom.com>
Message-ID: <9311121626.AA03349@snark.lehman.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Doug Merritt says:
> Counterexamples to Joy's thesis are trivially found in cryptography,
> and less obviously in things like computer generated holography. The latter
> might easily become a GUI standard of the future, and will indeed require
> VAX-MIPS-millenia of computation to compute in real time.
> 
> They would also require similarly astronomical amounts of bandwidth to
> transmit. By today's standards, that's ridiculous to assume. But by the
> standards of 10 years hence, two dimensional video may well appear as
> primitive as 110 baud text transmission does to us today.
> 
> Judging the future by today's standards tends to leave one's predictions
> high and dry.

Three dimensional video would not require bandwidths that would make
fiber optics wince -- even at the limits of human perceptional
capacities. (Holography encapsulates the three dimensional image in a
very high resolution piece of two-dimensional film. A digital analog
would only require a large boost in resolution -- large by our
standards, but not large by the standards of the bandwidth of fiber
optic cable.) Given that even your best scenario for "expensive big
application" comes up short, I don't see what the problem will be.

I can easily envision what I would do with a computer ten thousand
times more powerful than the one I have now. I can't see what I could
do with a communication channel ten thousand times wider than what a
bunch of fiber optics can in theory give me.

Perry





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Perry E. Metzger" <pmetzger@lehman.com>
Date: Fri, 12 Nov 93 08:49:32 PST
To: gtoal@an-teallach.com (Graham Toal)
Subject: Re: Should we oppose the Data Superhighway/NII?
In-Reply-To: <753109212snz@an-teallach.com>
Message-ID: <9311121645.AA03366@snark.lehman.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Graham Toal says:
> In article <9311111430.AA28017@snark.lehman.com> pmetzger@lehman.com writes:
> >A single fiber optic strand has enough capacity in theory to carry the
> >equivalent of every call made in the U.S. during the peak capacity
> >utilization period on Mother's Day. A single fiber can carry more data
> >than can be transmitted by the entire radio spectrum from low
> >frequency AM to Ku band satelite. Thats bandwidth for literally
> >thousands of simultaneous video signals.
> 
> "All the world's comms needs can be met with a single fibre"
> 
> contrast this with a famous quotation from history...
> 
> "All the country's computing needs can be met with a single computer"

You didn't understand the point. Not a SINGLE fiber. Each person would
have their own fiber into a switched fabric the way everyone has their
own phone line into a switched fabric. Each person would have all that
capacity TO HIMSELF. If he needed more, he could get two, or even ten,
not that he'll need more than one.

Perry




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Perry E. Metzger" <pmetzger@lehman.com>
Date: Fri, 12 Nov 93 08:54:32 PST
To: Clark Reynard <clark@metal.psu.edu>
Subject: Re: Bandwidth limitations
In-Reply-To: <9311121335.AA15471@metal.psu.edu>
Message-ID: <9311121650.AA03375@snark.lehman.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Clark Reynard says:
> However, when people start doing genuinely exotic things, such
> as emailing their entire genome to their doctor;

The human genome fits nicely in 1GB. Mere Gigabit networks could allow
you to send your whole genome in seconds -- and fiber can do many
orders of magnitude better than that.

> or emailing
> vast files on self-administered MRI tests to the hospital;

A complete MRI scan can be sent on a gigabit network in mere moments,
too, and again, fiber can do far better than that.

> or transmitting graphical images of components for something
> as simple as factory work;

If you can send a thousand video signals down your fiber at once,
sending complete plans for a factory to build Fords, and the complete
plans for the cars, will likely take a wink of an eye.


Perry




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Perry E. Metzger" <pmetzger@lehman.com>
Date: Fri, 12 Nov 93 08:53:41 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Are we gatewayed to Usenet
In-Reply-To: <9311121351.AA15525@metal.psu.edu>
Message-ID: <9311121652.AA03383@snark.lehman.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Clark Reynard says:
> Never.  I don't _ever_ want to see this made into a
> 'semi-private' mailing list.  Extropians, for example,
> does this, and it's ended up being an incestuous,
> closed group, with extremely low signal-to-noise
> ratio; as the same groups of people chatter and 
> blather about the same subjects to no end.

The participants would say that they have a very high signal to noise
ratio. The fact that you didn't like the signals and would prefer
different ones means you were not suited to the interests discussed on
that list, not that the experiment has not been a success.

Perry




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Carl Ellison <cme@sw.stratus.com>
Date: Fri, 12 Nov 93 09:03:41 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re:  OMNI CARD
Message-ID: <199311121700.MAA21161@ellisun.sw.stratus.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


This sounds almost identical to the Racal-Guardata Watchword.  It's old
technology (although making the unit small might be new).  I have a
Watchword on my desk as I write this.

It's a calculator with authentication built in.

There's my own DES key inside.  To get to it, I enter 1 of 2 PINs.  (the
second is a "duress PIN" -- works but sounds a warning in the security
office, saying that I have a gun to my head, if I use it for a
challenge/resp).

The system authenticating me gives me a 7-digit challenge number.  I enter
it and my Watchword gives me a 7-digit response number back.  I then give
that number to the system -- typed as a password or over the phone to a
person.


-------

The SecureID (which I carry in my wallet, against directions from the vendor)
has my encryption key buried inside along with a calendar clock.

Every minute, it encrypts the date and time with my key and displays 6 digits
of the result.  It has a keypad for entering a PIN which is then added (without
carry) to the 6-digit result and that is displayed instead, if I've entered
the PIN, for the next 5 minutes.

This saves half the protocol (by sync of calendar clocks).

 - Carl




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: dmandl@lehman.com (David Mandl)
Date: Fri, 12 Nov 93 09:09:33 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Politics on the List?
Message-ID: <9311121708.AA12887@disvnm2.lehman.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> From: sommerfeld@orchard.medford.ma.us (Bill Sommerfeld)
> 
>    But the vast majority of the 500+ folks on this List are either not
>    writing crypto code, or are keeping silent about it.
> 
> There are undoubtedly a fair number of the latter; probably better
> than 50% of the cypherpunks subscribers I know around here (including
> myself) get paid to (among other things) work on software related to
> network security through cryptography.

I've always had problems with the slogan "Cypherpunks write code."
It's a cute pun (if it was intended that way), but I think too many
cypherpunks are techie-snobs.  Writing code is all well and good,
even crucial, but there are plenty of other things that can and should
be done to further cypherpunk goals.  Many many people have found out
about cypherpunk developments through sympathetic articles in Wired,
the Village Voice, etc.  I've done long interviews with Tim May and
Phil Zimmerman on my radio show.  (And Perry Metzger and I are going
to be giving a talk on crypto anarchy here in NYC in January.  This
is being sponsored by a local anarchist group.  More details on this
later.)

Everything helps.  I was moved to invite Tim May to be on my show
last year not because of any beautiful code he'd written, but because
I was inspired by some of his political/theoretical writing.  You
don't have to write cypherpunk code to be a cypherpunk.  You don't even
have to write code at all.  There are plenty of other things to do that
are just as important and just as exciting.

P.S.: I'm not being defensive.  I write code for a living, just not
cypherpunk code (yet).

   --Dave.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: cvoid@albemuth.tatertot.com (Christian Void)
Date: Fri, 12 Nov 93 17:59:42 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Are we gatewayed into USENET?
Message-ID: <Ti5wcc5w165w@albemuth.tatertot.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


For a moment there, yes. But alas, I have the problem fixed. You see,
I was gating the list into a local group for my own purposes, and was not 
aware my machine (albemuth) was batching the list outgoing. My smarthost 
asked about this as it was being junked on his end. Well evidently, the
junking stopped and alas <cypherpunks.list> starting showing up on 
Netcom. 

The problem is corrected. Sorry if anyone is upset, but alas, shit 
happens. ;)


Christian Void /T71 | "I don't like it, and I'm sorry I | VMResearch, Inc.
cvoid@netcom.COM    | ever had anything to do with it." | P.O. Box 170213
Tel. 1+415-807-5491 |  -Erwin Schrodinger  (1887-1961)  | SF, CA  94117
                * PGP v2.3a Public Key Available Via Finger *




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Mike Godwin <mnemonic@eff.org>
Date: Fri, 12 Nov 93 09:14:33 PST
To: doug@netcom.com (Doug Merritt)
Subject: Re: Privacy, Property, Cryptography (long)
In-Reply-To: <199311120644.WAA16116@mail.netcom.com>
Message-ID: <199311121711.AA06984@eff.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Doug writes:
 
> Mike Godwin <mnemonic@eff.org> said:
> >This quotation needs to be debugged a little bit. The actual quotation [...]
> >as against the government, the right to be let alone--the most [...]
> >(Note in particular that it's "let," not "left.")
> 
> It's always nice to get quotations down correctly, but surely the
> original "let" translates in today's speech to "left"? If not, I'd
> like to hear about the difference.

Oh, it means almost the same thing--there's only a slight connotative 
difference. But the issue for me is the precise accuracy of the
quotation, not the nuance. I spotlighted that difference
because otherwise it would likely be overlooked.

If one prefers to "translate" rather than to quote, one shouldn't use
quotation marks, IMHO. Besides, Brandeis's comment is perfectly good
20th-century speech--only six or seven decades old. 


--Mike






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Mike Godwin <mnemonic@eff.org>
Date: Fri, 12 Nov 93 09:13:43 PST
To: doug@netcom.com (Doug Merritt)
Subject: Re: Should we oppose the Data Superhighway/NII?
In-Reply-To: <199311120715.XAA20441@mail.netcom.com>
Message-ID: <199311121712.AA07012@eff.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Doug Merritt writes:
 
> I believe that history will vindicate me. The problem is that history
> has vindicated me a number of times in the last 15 years, but no one
> remembers by the time that the future rolls around.

Solution: digital timestamping.


--Mike






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Mike Godwin <mnemonic@eff.org>
Date: Fri, 12 Nov 93 09:19:32 PST
To: unicorn@access.digex.net (Dark)
Subject: Re: privacy/property
In-Reply-To: <199311120757.AA23496@access.digex.net>
Message-ID: <199311121718.AA07076@eff.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


 
Dark writes:

>    No question of statutory copyright is involved.  The sole 
> question for our consideration is this: Was the International 
> News Service properly enjoined from using, or causing to be used 
> gainfully, news of which it acquired knowledge by lawful means 
> [...]  _International News Service v. The Associated Press_, 248 
> U.S. 215, at 249 (Brandeis, J., Dissenting).
  
I note that the ruling against INS would probably not occur today in the
post-Feist world.

> As for the hook in on property and privacy, consider:
>  
> The general rule of law is, that the noblest of human productions 
> - - knowledge, truths ascertained, conceptions, and ideas - become, 
> after voluntary communication to others, free as the air to 
> common use.  Upon these incorporeal productions the attribute of 
> property is continued after such communication only in certain 
> classes of cases where public policy has seemed to demand it.  
> _International News Service_, 248 U.S. 215 at 250 (Brandeis, J., 
> Dissenting).
  
I don't see how this reads as Brandeis's having a reservation about
privacy. Perhaps the premier legal theorist about privacy issues in the
last 100 years, Brandeis is simply noting that privacy isn't a given--one
must actively work if one is to preserve it. This is perfectly consistent
with cypherpunk philosophy, IMHO.


--Mike






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Clark Reynard <clark@metal.psu.edu>
Date: Fri, 12 Nov 93 09:14:48 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Bandwidth limitations
Message-ID: <9311121723.AA16930@metal.psu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Perry writes:

[Elegant refutation of all examples I give in original article.]

Point taken.  

Obviously, I took a few elementary examples, which are quite
achievable even today.

Perhaps some true bandwidth stretchers:

Complete maps of all the known universe, with spectrographic assays,
gravitational information, particle densities, motion/vector analysis
of areas of high matter concentration, spin and orbital velocity
graphs, etc. being zipped back and forth between relay satellites,
earthbound observatories, and individuals needing such information.

Complete records of all genomes of all humans born after this
becomes standard.  Copyright information, and rights transfers
for all living humans; what portions of the genome are for
sale, or if replication is prohibited.

Perhaps black market genes will be hid, steganographically,
in horrendously large files which appear to be garden
variety vr porn.

Voiceprints and retina scans for all living and dead human
beings.

Increasingly-detailed weather maps, down to the molecular level.

Of course, what actually will happen will probably be stranger.

When we had parchment, we had very narrow bandwidth, with
very little to transmit..

Today, we have wide bandwidth, but a lot more ways to use it.
I'm sure someone will find a way to use vast chunks of
it; until we need come to a new standard.
----
Robert W. F. Clark                      PGP Key Available Upon Request
rclark@nyx.cs.du.edu
clark@metal.psu.edu




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: gtoal@an-teallach.com (Graham Toal)
Date: Fri, 12 Nov 93 04:39:28 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: (fwd) Netcom adds access in Denver area
Message-ID: <7321@an-teallach.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


In article <199311111815.KAA05545@mail.netcom.com> tcmay@netcom.com writes:
 > The best things about it: flat monthly fee ($17.50), unlimited connect
 > time, full range of services (much better than most universities have,
 > folks tell me), and--best of all--your Netcom account won't change
 > when you change jobs! And posting with Netcom presumably won't run the
 > risk of angering your employer.
 
 Unfortunately, your netcom account also won't change when you change
 internet vendors.  What everyone should have is their own domain name;
 netcom offers this service (a la david@sternlight.com) for, I think,
 $45/month.

 Anyone who's interested in a better deal might like to check out
 internet.com who offer your own domain (and a single user id) for
 $75/year.  You get your mail rewritten by them to your ordinary
 account elsewhere (eg tcmay@netcom.com) and can move the domain with
 you should you ever be dissatisfied with internet.com's service.
 
 Apologies, btw, for not talking about code, but I guess if Perry
 hasn't flamed Tim yet he's not going to flame me for posting this
 either :)

 > I'm thrilled that Netcom is expanding so rapidly. 

 I'd be more thrilled if they were doing what demon do and putting
 people's own sites on the net under SLIP for a flat rate (with demon
 it's 10 pounds per month - call it 15 bucks) and just ordinary phone-
 call costs on top.  [If netcom now does this, apologies - it's been
 some time since I looked into the US slip culture]

 This *is* a cypherpunks related goal IMHO, because everyone having
 their own site at home rather than just using their PCs as terminals
 to systems like netcom means they can *much* more easily integrate
 pgp into their routine mailing life.  (Uploading and downloading
 pgp mail is such a hassle for some people - like prz himself - that
 they just don't do it...)

G





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: gtoal@an-teallach.com (Graham Toal)
Date: Fri, 12 Nov 93 04:49:31 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Mounting a "Secure" filesystem in UNIX
Message-ID: <7322@an-teallach.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


In article <m0oxo8a-000J5iC@infinity.hip.berkeley.edu> sameer@uclink.berkeley.edu writes:
 >         I was wondering if it was possible to mount a "secure"
 > filesystem/partition using Linux or some other free version of UNIX,
 > so that it's inaccessible if logged in remotely, but accessibly when
 > logged in locally.
 >         That way I can store my PGP secret key on the "secure"
 > filesystem, and keep telnetd enabled.
 > 
 >         Any thoughts?

I think the best you can do is to create a secure chroot subshell which
anyone logging in anywhere but from the console gets put into.

[When I wrote such a shell as an experiment, I found it very difficult
to do properly when the system had multiple partitions - I could only
get it to work on a machine that had a single pack.  So if you're starting
from scratch, my suggestion is to use netbsd and start off with your
entire disk on a single partition - don't have the traditional small
root partition.  If you get that far I have some code I can mail you.]

G
-- 
Personal mail to gtoal@gtoal.com (I read it in the evenings)
Business mail to gtoal@an-teallach.com (Be careful with the spelling!)
Faxes to An Teallach Limited: +44 31 662 4678  Voice: +44 31 668 1550 x212





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: gtoal@an-teallach.com (Graham Toal)
Date: Fri, 12 Nov 93 04:59:33 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Politics on the List?
Message-ID: <7323@an-teallach.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


In article <199311120422.UAA28483@mail.netcom.com> tcmay@netcom.com writes:
 > Of course, I notice that very few of us are writing any code these
 > days. Some of the remailer wizards are still revising their code, and
 > a few C-punks are trying to implement DC-Nets in code. But the vast
 > majority of the 500+ folks on this List are either not writing crypto
 > code, or are keeping silent about it.
 
 Just FYI, I'm working on integrating pgp to the mailer
 that comes with 386bsd.  I hacked it first a long time
 ago, and never gave it out because it had a lot of loose
 ends - now I'm tidying them up so that I can give it out
 and people won't have to be careful what they type to avoid
 some of the misfeatures...
 
 > The intent of the "Cypherpunks write code" line, if I can venture a
 > motivation (it was of course Eric's line), is that we are more
 > interested in seeing the Brave New Crypto World happen than in just
 > jawboning about export laws, the Zimmmermann case, and whether
 > libertarians are right and socialists are wrong.

 The intent of 'Cypherpunks write code' is that Perry can dump on
 people talking about anything other than code ;-)  (When we *do* talk
 about practical stuff he tells us its impractical or been done
 before or pointless, or that we should stop *talk*ing about it
 and go away and do it...)  I'm surprised we bother running a list
 at all actually.  We should all be locked away in our garrets
 hacking I guess.

 (What I'm really saying is that this list clearly serves a purpose,
 and it is evolving into its own character, whatever that may be, despite
 the efforts of the early founder members to keep it on some tightly
 defined track that they once conceived it as.  I don't see this
 evolution as being a problem, and I'm slightly (though not to
 Detweilerian proportions) annoyed whenever people like Tim or Perry
 pull rank and try to limit the topics of discussion, when on closer
 inspection they're just as bad as the rest of us at drifting 'off topic'.)

G





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: szabo@netcom.com (Nick Szabo)
Date: Fri, 12 Nov 93 12:59:36 PST
To: banisar@washofc.cpsr.org (Dave Banisar)
Subject: Re: CPSR Alert 2.05
In-Reply-To: <00541.2835954991.594@washofc.cpsr.org>
Message-ID: <199311122058.MAA04465@mail.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



In the latest CPSR update:
>      "Each FBI Special Agent in Charge's contacting key law
>      enforcement and prosecutorial officials in his/her territory
>      to stress the urgency of Congress's being sensitized to this
>      critical issue;

Isn't this a violation of the Hatch Act?  Either on the part
of the agents, or on the part of the "key" officials directly
"sensitizing" Congress, or both.

>      An agent from the Newark office of the Internal Revenue
>      Service "advised that since the last time he was contacted,
>      his unit has not had any problems with advanced telephony
>      matters."

Does the IRS conduct wiretaps?  Does it need to obtain court
order to do so?

Nick Szabo					szabo@netcom.com




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: jim@Tadpole.COM (Jim Thompson)
Date: Fri, 12 Nov 93 11:03:45 PST
To: sameer@uclink.berkeley.edu
Subject: RE: Mounting a "Secure" filesystem in UNIX
Message-ID: <9311121859.AA26978@tadpole.Tadpole.COM>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I can't even begin to imagine the kinds of calls that Microsoft
support will get with this 'feature' in place.  "But it worked
yesterday, and I haven't changed ANYTHING!"

Jim




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: gtoal@an-teallach.com (Graham Toal)
Date: Fri, 12 Nov 93 05:09:32 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Should we oppose the Data Superhighway/NII?
In-Reply-To: <9311111430.AA28017@snark.lehman.com>
Message-ID: <753109212snz@an-teallach.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


In article <9311111430.AA28017@snark.lehman.com> pmetzger@lehman.com writes:
>A single fiber optic strand has enough capacity in theory to carry the
>equivalent of every call made in the U.S. during the peak capacity
>utilization period on Mother's Day. A single fiber can carry more data
>than can be transmitted by the entire radio spectrum from low
>frequency AM to Ku band satelite. Thats bandwidth for literally
>thousands of simultaneous video signals.

"All the world's comms needs can be met with a single fibre"

contrast this with a famous quotation from history...

"All the country's computing needs can be met with a single computer"

:-)

G
(It'll be a nice one to quote to my grandchildren in years to come...)





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: an12070@anon.penet.fi (S. Boxx)
Date: Fri, 12 Nov 93 05:03:44 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Dinkelacker II
Message-ID: <9311121302.AA07765@anon.penet.fi>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


WHO is ARTHUR CHANDLER?!

<g>
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
To find out more about the anon service, send mail to help@anon.penet.fi.
Due to the double-blind, any mail replies to this message will be anonymized,
and an anonymous id will be allocated automatically. You have been warned.
Please report any problems, inappropriate use etc. to admin@anon.penet.fi.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Dave Banisar <banisar@washofc.cpsr.org>
Date: Fri, 12 Nov 93 11:08:01 PST
To: CYPHERPUNKS <CYPHERPUNKS@toad.com>
Subject: CPSR Alert 2.05
Message-ID: <00541.2835954991.594@washofc.cpsr.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


  CPSR Alert 2.05
     ==============================================================
  
       @@@@  @@@@   @@@   @@@@        @    @     @@@@  @@@@ @@@@@@
       @     @  @  @      @  @       @ @   @     @     @  @    @
       @     @@@     @    @@@       @@@@@  @     @@@   @@@     @
       @     @        @   @  @      @   @  @     @     @  @    @
       @@@@  @     @@@    @   @     @   @  @@@@  @@@@  @   @   @
  
     =============================================================
     Volume  2.05                                November 12, 1993
     -------------------------------------------------------------
  
                             Published by
             Computer Professionals for Social Responsibility
                           Washington Office
                       (Alert@washofc.cpsr.org)                        
      
     -------------------------------------------------------------
  
Contents
  
        [1] Operation "Root Canal" Documents Released:
		  Questions Raised about FBI's Digital
            Telephony Initiative
        [2] GAO Report Criticizes Gov't Crypto Policy
        [3] Health Care Plan Raises Privacy Questions
        [4] Hacker Sentenced to One Year Imprisonment
        [5] Matching grant for CPSR FOIA Work Offered
        [6] New Documents in the CPSR Internet Library
        [7] Upcoming Conferences and Events
  
     -------------------------------------------------------------
  
[1]  FBI's Operation "Root Canal" Documents Disclosed

In response to a CPSR Freedom of Information Act lawsuit, the FBI this
week released 185 pages of documents concerning the Bureau's Digital
Telephony Initiative,  code-named Operation "Root Canal." The newly
disclosed material raises serious doubts as to the accuracy of the
FBI's claim that advances in telecommunications technology have
hampered law enforcement efforts to execute court-authorized wiretaps.

The FBI documents reveal that the Bureau initiated a well- orchestrated
public relations campaign in support of "proposed legislation to compel
telecommunications industry cooperation in assuring our digital
telephony intercept requirements are met."  A May 26, 1992, memorandum
from the Director of the FBI to the Attorney General lays out a
"strategy ... for gaining support for the bill once it reaches
Congress," including the following:

     "Each FBI Special Agent in Charge's contacting key law
     enforcement and prosecutorial officials in his/her territory
     to stress the urgency of Congress's being sensitized to this
     critical issue;

     Field Office media representatives educating their contacts
     by explaining and documenting, in both local and national
     dimensions, the crisis facing law enforcement and the need
     for legislation; and

     Gaining the support of the professional associations
     representing law enforcement and prosecutors."

However, despite efforts to obtain documentation from the field in
support of Bureau claims of a "crisis facing law enforcement," the
response from FBI Field Offices was that they experienced *no*
difficulty in conducting electronic surveillance.  For example, a
December 3, 1992, memorandum from Newark reported the following:

     The Newark office of the Drug Enforcement Administration
     "advised that as of this date, the DEA has not had any
     technical problems with advanced telephone technology."

     The New Jersey Attorney General's Office "has not experienced
     any problems with the telephone company since the last
     contact."

     An agent from the Newark office of the Internal Revenue
     Service "advised that since the last time he was contacted,
     his unit has not had any problems with advanced telephony
     matters."

     An official of the New Jersey State Police "advised that
     as of this date he has had no problems with the present
     technology hindering his investigations."

Likewise, a memorandum from the Philadelphia Field Office reported that
the local offices of the IRS, Customs Service and the Secret Service
were contacted and "experienced no difficulties with new technologies."
Indeed, the newly-released documents contain no reports of *any*
technical problems in the field.

The documents also reveal the FBI's critical role in the development of
the Digital Signature Standard (DSS), a cryptographic means of
authenticating electronic communications that the National Institute of
Standards and Technology was expected to develop.  The DSS was proposed
in August 1991 by the National Institute of Standards and Technology.
NIST later acknowledged that the National Security Agency developed the
standard.  The newly disclosed documents appear to confirm speculation
that the  FBI and the NSA worked to undermine the legal authority of
the NIST to develop standards for the nation's communications
infrastructure.

CPSR intends to pursue further FOIA litigation to establish the extent
of the FBI involvement in the development of the DSS and also to obtain
a "cost-benefit" study discussed in one of the FBI Director's memos and
other documents the Bureau continues to withhold.

       -------------------------------------------------------------
  
[2] GAO Report Criticizes Gov't Crypto Policy

A Government Accounting Office report has found that government
policies are hindering the development of encryption technology at the
same time the industry is threatened by economic espionage because of
computer networks lacking adequate security.  The report was requested
by House Judiciary Chair Jack Brooks.

The report _Communications Privacy: Federal Policy and Actions_
(GAO/OSI-94-2) also found that NIST followed the NSA's lead in
developing cryptographic standards for communications privacy and that
there has been little public input in this process. NIST terminated a
project in 1982 to develop a public key encryption system at the
request of NSA and in 1991 introduced a NSA developed standard for
digital signatures. In addition, no public input was solicited for the
Clipper Chip proposal until 1993, over three years after the initiation
of its development.

The report also noted the wide range of software and hardware available
outside the US and that the continued export controls are apparently
more stringent than those in other countries. This is apparently
hurting sales of U.S. software and hardware products worldwide.

Congressman Brooks said that "[I]t is deeply disturbing to find that
some U.S. government agencies are undermining American corporations
efforts to protect themselves from state-sponsored theft of trade
secrets and other propriety information." Brooks also stated that "The
plain truth is that encryption devices and software are available
around the world. The barn door is open; the horses are out. It is high
time for the government to accept this fact of life and stop hog-tying
U.S. industry with overly restrictive export controls that damage this
country's effort to compete in the global marketplace."

The GAO report is available at the CPSR Internet Library (see below).

 A paper copy is available from the GAO by calling 202-512-6000.
  
       -------------------------------------------------------------

[3] Health Care Reform Plan Released Amidst Growing Concern About
Medical Privacy

The Clinton health care reform plan was released the same week that a
new Lou Harris poll found high levels of concern about privacy among
the American public. The health care reform proposal includes important
privacy safeguards, but the measures may not go far enough to address
public concerns.

The Harris poll reveals that Americans are very much concerned about
medical record privacy.  The poll conducted by Prof. Alan Westin found
that 49 percent of all Americans are very concerned and 30 percent are
somewhat concerned by the threats to their personal privacy. An
additional 56 percent believe that strong federal protection of medical
records is necessary to accomplish health care reform.

The health care reform proposal includes a strong code of fair
information practices, and an explicit prohibitions on the use of
medical record information for employment purposes.  But the plan
leaves open the question of whether the Social Security Number might be
used as a patient identifier and also allows more than three years
before full legislative safeguards are established.

At a conference organized by the US Office of Consumer Affairs, CPSR
Washington Office Director Marc Rotenberg and ACLU Privacy and
Technology Project Director Janlori Goldman said that the health care
reform plan raises far-reaching privacy concerns that must be addressed
at the outset.

The Office of Technology Assessment released a new report on medical
records and  privacy at a Congressional hearing held by Rep. Gary
Condit (D-CA). "Protecting Privacy in Computerized Medical Information"
explores the implications of the  automation of health care information
and recommends federal legislation to  address patient confidentiality
and privacy.

An electronic copy  is  available at the CPSR Internet Library. (see
below for location details).

Senator Patrick Leahy (D-VT) recently held a hearing to explore the
privacy implications of medical smart cards.  The Senator plans to hold
a second hearing on medical record privacy later this year.
  
       -------------------------------------------------------------
  
[4] Hacker Sentenced to One Year Imprisonment

Mark Abene (a.k.a. Phiber Optik) was sentenced by U.S. District Court
Judge Louis Stanton (E.D. N.Y.) to one year and one day for two counts
of computer crime. He will serve a minimum ten months before he is
eligible for release. He is also required to serve three years
probation and to do 600 hours of community service.

Abene pled guilty to two counts of computer intrusion in July relating
to incidents of break-ins at a NY television station and a Southwestern
Bell computer. He will begin his sentence on January 7, 1994.

       -------------------------------------------------------------
  
[5] CPSR Seeking Donors for Matching FOIA Grant

A CPSR member who wishes to remain anonymous has offered a $500
matching grant to support CPSR's Freedom of Information Act litigation.
If you are interested in supporting CPSR's FOIA work, please send a
message to rotenberg@washofc.cpsr.org

       -------------------------------------------------------------

[6]  The CPSR Internet Library
  
The Congressional Office of Technology Assessment report "Protecting
Privacy in Computerized Medical Information"

/cpsr/medical/1993_ota_medical_privacy_report.txt

The Clinton health care reform bill and overview (almost 8 megs)
/cpsr/medical/clinton_health_care_reform/ (folder).

The GAO report is available as
1993_gao_communications_privacy_report.txt in folder cpsr/crypto.
  
The CPSR Internet Library is available via FTP/WAIS/Gopher from
cpsr.org /cpsr. Materials from Privacy International, the Taxpayers
Assets Project and the Cypherpunks are also archived. For more
information, contact Al Whaley (al@sunnyside.com)
  
       -------------------------------------------------------------
  
[7] Upcoming Conferences and Events

"Cyberculture Houston 93." Houston, Tx. December 10-12,  Contact:
cyber@fisher.psych.uh.edu.

Worldwide Electronic Commerce: Law, Policy and Controls Conference.
MultiCorp, Inc and American Bar Association.  Waldorf Astoria Hotel,
New York City. January 17 - 18, 1994.  Contact: Fred Sammet
(76520.3713@CompuServe.COM), Phone (214) 516-4900, fax at (214)
475-5917.

"Highways and Toll Roads: Electronic Access in the 21st Century" Panel
Discussion. 1994 AAAS Annual Meeting. San Francisco, CA. Feb. 21, 1994
2:30 - 5:30pm. Sponsored by the Association for Computing Machinery
(ACM). Contact: Barbara Simons (simons@vnet.ibm.com)

"Computers, Freedom and Privacy 94." Chicago, Il. March 23-26.
Sponsored by ACM and The John Marshall Law School. Contact: George
Trubow, 312-987-1445 (CFP94@jmls.edu).

CPSR DIAC-94 "Developing an Effective, Equitable, and Enlightened
Information Infrastructure." MIT Media Lab, Cambridge, MA. April 1994
(tentative). Contact: Doug Schuler (doug.schuler@cpsr.org).

5th Conference On Women Work And Computerization "Breaking Old
Boundaries: Building New Forms." UMIST, Manchester, UK. July 2-5. 94
Abstracts by 10/1/93. Contact: Andrew Clement (clement@vax.ox.ac.uk)
  
         (Send calendar submissions to Alert@washofc.cpsr.org)
  
=======================================================================
  
To subscribe to the Alert, send the message:

"subscribe cpsr <your name>" (without quotes or brackets)
to listserv@gwuvm.gwu.edu.  Back issues of the Alert are available at
the CPSR Internet Library FTP/WAIS/Gopher cpsr.org /cpsr/alert

Computer Professionals for Social Responsibility is a national,
non-partisan, public-interest organization dedicated to understanding
and directing the impact of computers on society. Founded in 1981, CPSR
has 2000 members from all over the world and 22 chapters across the
country. Our National Advisory Board includes a Nobel laureate and
three winners of the Turing Award, the highest honor in computer
science. Membership is open to everyone.

For more information, please contact: cpsr@cpsr.org or visit the CPSR
discussion conferences on The Well (well.sf.ca.us) or Mindvox
(phantom.com).

=======================================================================

CPSR MEMBERSHIP FORM

Name ______________________________________________________________

Address ___________________________________________________________

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  CPSR Membership Categories
  
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    Additional tax-deductible contribution to support CPSR projects:
  
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     Total Enclosed:  $ ________
  
     Make check out to CPSR and mail to:
           CPSR
           P.O. Box 717
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  ------------------------ END CPSR Alert 2.05-----------------------
 






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: paul@poboy.b17c.ingr.com (Paul Robichaux)
Date: Fri, 12 Nov 93 11:23:45 PST
To: pmetzger@lehman.com
Subject: Re: Mounting a "Secure" filesystem in UNIX
In-Reply-To: <9311121848.AA03516@snark.lehman.com>
Message-ID: <199311121921.AA09914@poboy.b17c.ingr.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

Not that I'm a Windows/NT fan- quite the contrary; although my
employer is the largest NT developer in the world behind Microsoft, I
personally want no part of NT.

> The security properties of Windows/NT are currently unknown since it
> has seen little real torture testing. 

NT is presently being evaluated by the NCSC for C2 status.

> The NT security mechanisms are also more complicated,
> which in my opinion means there are more potential bugs. 

Absolutely correct. However, I take some comfort from the fact that
Dave Cutler, of VMS fame, was the principal engineer on NT. For all
its (myriad) other faults, VMS is fairly secure out of the box.

> NT is a closed system, and there is no way to personally verify that
> code does what you think it should. I think its best to depend only on
> source available systems for security if possible.

NT doesn't have source available. Neither does SunOS. Both support the
same set of "open computing" protocols, so saying NT is closed is
specious at best.

Like the theoretical capacity of an optical fiber, using
source-available OSs as the bedrock for your own secure system is
wonderful in theory but extremely limiting in practice.

- -Paul

- -- 
Paul Robichaux, KD4JZG     | Caution: cutting edge is sharp. Avoid contact.
Intergraph Federal Systems | Be a cryptography user - ask me how.
	    ** Of course I don't speak for Intergraph. **


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-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Perry E. Metzger" <pmetzger@lehman.com>
Date: Fri, 12 Nov 93 10:49:49 PST
To: Dave Hart <davehart@microsoft.com>
Subject: Re: Mounting a "Secure" filesystem in UNIX
In-Reply-To: <9311121819.AA25880@netmail.microsoft.com>
Message-ID: <9311121848.AA03516@snark.lehman.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Dave Hart says:
> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
> 
> | From: Sameer  <netmail!sameer@uclink.berkeley.edu>
> |
> | 	I was wondering if it was possible to mount a "secure"
> | filesystem/partition using Linux or some other free version of UNIX,
> | so that it's inaccessible if logged in remotely, but accessibly when
> | logged in locally.
> 
> I know you want to do this with UNIX, but Windows NT allows you do this 
> quite nicely.

The security properties of Windows/NT are currently unknown since it
has seen little real torture testing. I know that people have tried to
attack my firewall, and savagely. How many NT boxes have withstood
such treatment? The NT security mechanisms are also more complicated,
which in my opinion means there are more potential bugs. Lastly,
Sameer has full source code to Linux (as does anyone who wants it). NT
is a closed system, and there is no way to personally verify that code
does what you think it should. I think its best to depend only on
source available systems for security if possible.

Perry




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: baldwin@LAT.COM (Bob Baldwin)
Date: Fri, 12 Nov 93 14:29:42 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: VMS Password security
Message-ID: <9311122148.AA01051@LAT.COM>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


	One of the barn-door sized holes in VMS was (still is?) that
VMS used the Purdy Password hashing function.  I considered using it
for the Oracle RDBMS password function, but dropped the idea when I
realized that it is possible to invert the hash function.  I don't have
my notes, but I recall that it only took me a couple days to work it out.
The problem is that many passwords hash to the same value.  It is actually
hard to find out the true password that someone else chose, but easy to
find another password that will hash to the same value.  The hard part is
finding a printable password that maps to the desired value.
		--Bob Baldwin





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: jdblair@nextsrv.cas.muohio.EDU
Date: Fri, 12 Nov 93 11:05:07 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: HARDWARE MAILING LIST ON-LINE
Message-ID: <9311121924.AA17669@ nextsrv.cas.muohio.EDU >
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


The hardware off-shoot of this list is finally on-line!

You can subscribe to the list by sending a subscribe request of the form:
SUBSCRIBE cp-hardware <name>
to listproc@nextsrv.cas.muohio.edu

I have decided to call the list 'cp-hardware'.  While perhaps this is
somewhat more boreing of a name than punk-net, or the like, it is more
descriptive of the list as a whole.  Thanks to all of the people who sent
me mail requesting to be on the list- your're requests are why I've set
the list up.  However, I decided it will be simpler for people who are
interested to send the subscribe request themselves.  This should
eliminate, or rather minimize errors.  So, if you sent me a request
previously, you still need to send a request listproc.

The intention is that the list will be a forum for discussion of hardware
issues related to computer privacy, as well as dicussion, design, and
hopefully construction of several projects.  If the list gets going
sufficiently well, I'll set up an anonymous ftp site for the storage of
archive, schematics, and anything else that is related.

When you subscribe, you will get a welcome message which describes what I
see the list could be.  Your feedback is appreciated.  A short (very
short) informational file can be requested by mailing

INFO cp-hardware

To listproc@nextsrv.cas.muohio.edu, although the welcome message is I
think more descriptive of the list at this point.

so, punks, why stop at writing code?  Let's build hardware!
-john




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Dark <unicorn@access.digex.net>
Date: Fri, 12 Nov 93 11:29:33 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Privacy/Property
Message-ID: <199311121927.AA08988@access.digex.net>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
 
Mr. Godwin
- ->
 
I note that the ruling against INS would probably not occur today 
in the post-Feist world.
 
<-
 
Conceeded.
 
 
Mr. Godwin
- ->
 
 
I don't see how this reads as Brandeis's having a reservation 
about privacy. Perhaps the premier legal theorist about privacy 
issues in the last 100 years, Brandeis is simply noting that 
privacy isn't a given--one must actively work if one is to 
preserve it. This is perfectly consistent with cypherpunk 
philosophy, IMHO.
 
<-
 
I concur, and add that this is a long cry from reading any
"Right to Privacy" into the law.  If indeed Brandeis is asserting 
that privacy isn't just "given" (Your assessment with which I 
agree) then isn't this a reservation about a existing "right to 
privacy"?  It's possible, Mr. Godwin that the only level we 
differ on is semantics and definitional?
 
I like the cypherpunk approach, very much.  Self empowerment is a 
rewarding and self regulating regime.  I would like to see 
broader remedies available for privacy enforcement.  You can't 
sit on your porch with a shotgun all day and keep trespassers 
off.  It's a well accepted premise that a determined attacker 
will always prevail, given enough resource.  Or at least cause 
lots of problems trying.  It would be nice if this were an 
option, but not the ONLY manner of protection.  No?
 
Cypherpunks is about change of attitude as well not so?
 
- -uni- (Dark)
 
 
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From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Carl Ellison <cme@sw.stratus.com>
Date: Fri, 12 Nov 93 11:39:33 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Watchword
Message-ID: <199311121934.OAA21468@ellisun.sw.stratus.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


One reader asked:
>Will you please send me some additional information on Racal - Guardata
>Watchword technology? I would appreciate any addresses you might have of
>sellers, resellers, and the company itself also.


Racal-Guardata is a British company, I believe, but they have a US office:

Racal-Guardata
480 Spring Park Place
Herndon VA 22070
1-800-521-6261
in VA: 703-471-0892
FAX: 703-437-9333

They make both authorization and encryption devices (all DES based, I
believe).

The WatchWord I have is a small 4-fcn calculator with an 8 digit display,
4 1/8" x 2 1/4" x 3/8" in its own vinal case.

It has the normal buttons, including M+, RM, CM ....

It also has an unlabeled red button.

You press it and the fine print says "AUTH  \n  ENTER PIN".
You enter your PIN and press "=" and it changes to "ENTER CHALL"
You enter your 7-digit challenge number and press "=" and it shows
you the 7-digit reply.  (DES of the challenge number, using your key as
selected (probably merely modified) by the PIN.) labeled "RESP".

You clear that by turning the calculator off.

Each unit can be programmed with a key of your choice.  You don't have
to use a key provided by your employer.

(Note: if you use your own keys and have a good source of rannos, this is a
hand-held DES encryption device.  The operating rate is slow but the
security should be full DES.  (Alice generates a ranno and tells Bob in the
clear, Bob encrypts ranno and adds in a 7 digit message fragment, tells
that back to Alice who also encrypted the ranno.)

It can hold two different keys, for two different services (machines,
people, ...).

The last I heard, a new model was coming out (I'm holding the old one -- from
a year ago or more) which is more like a credit card in size but has all the
same functionality.  That one should be out by now and it was predicted to
cost around $50.  You need to ask Racal about it, if you're interested.

 - Carl




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Perry E. Metzger" <pmetzger@lehman.com>
Date: Fri, 12 Nov 93 12:49:36 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Mounting a "Secure" filesystem in UNIX
In-Reply-To: <199311121921.AA09914@poboy.b17c.ingr.com>
Message-ID: <9311121957.AA03589@snark.lehman.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Paul Robichaux says:
> > The NT security mechanisms are also more complicated,
> > which in my opinion means there are more potential bugs. 
> 
> Absolutely correct. However, I take some comfort from the fact that
> Dave Cutler, of VMS fame, was the principal engineer on NT. For all
> its (myriad) other faults, VMS is fairly secure out of the box.

And the check is in the mail.

At the last site I was at that used VMS, the security patches came in
virtually weekly. The thing is more full of holes than swiss cheese.
VMS stands for Virtually Missing Security.

> > NT is a closed system, and there is no way to personally verify that
> > code does what you think it should. I think its best to depend only on
> > source available systems for security if possible.
> 
> NT doesn't have source available. Neither does SunOS.

SunOS does have source available. Large companies can buy sources
because they feel they need them. Small users can use systems like
Linux. How do I get sources to NT?

I can get drop in replacements for virtually all the programs on
SunOS, from "login" to inetd, and I can hack on them, for free. (BSD
utilities work right out of the box most of the time.) How can I do
that with NT?


Perry




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: VACCINIA@UNCVX1.OIT.UNC.EDU
Date: Fri, 12 Nov 93 12:23:44 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re:Bandwidth limitations
Message-ID: <01H58E3K6E4I0028OU@UNCVX1.OIT.UNC.EDU>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

Perry writes:
>The human genome fits nicely in 1 GB. Mere Gigabit networks could allow you
>to send your whole genome in seconds -- and fiber can do many orders of 
>magnitude better than that.

The human genome has approximately 3 x 10^9 base pairs. Each base is 
represented as the following binary code: G=1000, A=0100, T=0010, C=0001. 
Thus the human genome represents about 3 gigabytes of info (uncompressed),
as Perry said easily transmitable by fiber optics.

When you all do finally get your genome sequenced, the last thing you should 
do is let anyone see it (perhaps only small segments of it). I can think of 
no better use for cryptography than to keep citizens genomes to themselves. 
Would you give anybody a crystal ball which tells of your past, present and 
future? 

Some of us write genetic code and, IMHO, one's own genetics are a source code 
which should not be freely distributed.

Scott G. Morham            !The First,
VACCINIA@uncvx1.oit.unc.edu!          Second  
PGP Public Keys by Request !                and Third Levels 
                           !      of Information Storage and Retrieval
                           !DNA,
                           !    Biological Neural Nets,
                           !                           Cyberspace


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From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Andy Wilson <ajw@Think.COM>
Date: Fri, 12 Nov 93 12:29:36 PST
To: kone@COURIER1.SHA.CORNELL.EDU
Subject: Instant check system
In-Reply-To: <2CE33AED@COURIER1.SHA.CORNELL.EDU>
Message-ID: <9311122028.AA00561@custard.think.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


   From: kone@COURIER1.SHA.CORNELL.EDU
   Date: Fri, 12 Nov 1993 02:27:00 -0500

   [...]

   One final item, I do agree that weapon ownership is not the issue we should
   talk to, but how can we protect our privacy yet keep "rights-violators" from
   open access to weapons.

   William Kone
   "I have trained over a thousand young men to eat, sleep, and shoot with their
   weapon.  But, I still get worried the first time I give them the rifels."

I disagree with your premise that there is any need to keep "rights-violators"  
from open access to weapons.

The Brady Bill will have no effect on crime.  It is a pathetic band-aid
solution that does nothing to address the real causes of crime.  It will
only result in more potential abuses of the rights of law-abiding citizens.

1. Criminals don't always buy weapons from liscensed dealers, and
   after the bill passes and the system is in place, they won't at all.
   But this will not keep even one criminal from getting a weapon.  You
   can get weapons easily and cheaply on the street.

2. The waiting period will have no effect other than deny law-abiding
   citizens in imminent danger the right to defend themselves.  When
   someone threatens to kill you,  they are not going to wait seven
   days before they do it.  This is especially urgent for people who
   are being stalked.  The waiting period will not keep even one 
   potential murderer from getting a weapon,  but will result in anyone
   who is in danger being a sitting duck for seven days.

3. Any reason other than prior convictions as grounds for denial would
   be unconstitutional.  Alleging mental illness in order to deny civil
   rights was a favorite tactic of the former Soviet Union,  and has
   been used in this country not so long ago to deny civil rights to
   homosexuals.  People with behavior patterns that don't fit the white
   bread norm do not forfeit their right to self defense.  c.f. Szasz, 
   "The Myth of Mental Illness".

4. Convicted murderers belong in jail.  If we didn't let them out,
   we wouldn't need to check their backgrounds.  The way to keep
   "rights-violators" from open access to weapons is to keep them
   in jail.  In order for this to happen prisons need to be privately
   held profit-making entities.

I don't think there is any need for either a backround check or a waiting
period.

Curiously, a police officer in Cambridge told me recently that there is a 
law still on the books in Massachussetts that it is unlawful for a head
of household to be in public *without* a firearm on Sundays,  the rationale
being that the head of household is responsible for the defense of the
family.  I wonder if he is correct.

Andy







From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: m5@vail.tivoli.com (Mike McNally)
Date: Fri, 12 Nov 93 13:49:37 PST
To: Andy Wilson <ajw@Think.COM>
Subject: Instant check system
In-Reply-To: <2CE33AED@COURIER1.SHA.CORNELL.EDU>
Message-ID: <9311122140.AA15043@vail.tivoli.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Andy Wilson writes:
 > ...open access to weapons...The Brady Bill...

Let me just accelerate things here:

	The Brady Bill is just a gun-grabber Creationist plot to foil
Nazi Abortionists who don't realize that Libertarinaism is the only
true way to distinguish saffron from turmeric.  And the new Star Trek
*is* better than the old one.  Nyaaa.

--
Mike McNally




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Stanton McCandlish <mech@eff.org>
Date: Fri, 12 Nov 93 13:13:44 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: NEED STATISTICS ON LOST CRYPTO SALES
Message-ID: <199311122112.AA12311@eff.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Something of import, and something you can DO.  Please see note at end.
Pardon the crosspostings, but this needs to get around.

_______ begin forward ____________________

NEED STATISTICS ON LOST CRYPTO SALES

The Software Publishers Association (SPA) has been working to bring
about the liberalization of export controls on mass market software
with encryption capabilities.  SPA's much-publicized study of the
foreign availability of cryptographic products has clearly
demonstrated the widespread and easy availability of encryption
that is stronger than what U. S. firms have been able to export.
However, NSA claims that software companies have not demonstrated
sufficiently the economic harm they have suffered from export
controls.  Congress has told us that without better economic harm
statistics, our chances of liberalizing the export laws are slim.
Therefore, WE NEED YOUR HELP.

If you or your firm has lost business because you have not been
able to export your encryption product, please let us know.  Be as
specific as possible.  It is the cumulative effect of this
information that will be most compelling.

Please pass this on to those in your firm who might know about
these matters or might also be able to respond.

Please send replies to i.rosenthal@applelink.apple.com or to

Ilene Rosenthal, General Counsel
Software Publishers Association
1730 M St. NW, Suite 700
Washington DC 20036
(202) 452-1600 ext. 318

or to

Douglas Miller
(same address)
(202) 452-1600 ext. 342

________ end forward _______________

Please also send this info to eff@eff.org!  We're all in this one together!






-- 
-=> mech@eff.org <=-
Stanton McCandlish     Electronic Frontier Foundation Online Activist & SysOp
"A nation that is afraid to let its people judge the truth and falsehood of
ideas in an open market is a nation that is afraid of its people." -JFK
NitV-DC BBS 202-232-2715 Fido 1:109/1103 IndraNet 369:111/1, 14.4V32b 16.8ZyX
Join EFF!  For more information about membership, send mail to eff@eff.org



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: David Sobel <dsobel@washofc.cpsr.org>
Date: Fri, 12 Nov 93 13:43:44 PST
To: Cypherpunks <cypherpunks@toad.com>
Subject: "Root Canal" questions
Message-ID: <00541.2835966052.614@washofc.cpsr.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


  "Root Canal" questions

>In the latest CPSR update:
>>      "Each FBI Special Agent in Charge's contacting key law
>>      enforcement and prosecutorial officials in his/her territory
>>      to stress the urgency of Congress's being sensitized to this
>>      critical issue;
>
>Isn't this a violation of the Hatch Act?  Either on the part
>of the agents, or on the part of the "key" officials directly
>"sensitizing" Congress, or both.

The Hatch Act applies only to "partisan" activity (i.e., electoral).
There is, however, a very real question as to whether or not the
activity we've uncovered might violate 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1913, which
prohibits the use of "appropriated funds" for lobbying purposes.
I'm in the process of looking into that.  There's no way to read this
material without concluding that the Bureau was undertaking an
orchestrated, agency-wide lobbying campaign in support of the
"Root Canal" initiative.

BTW, anyone have ideas about that name!?

David Sobel
CPSR Legal Counsel








From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: jim@bilbo.suite.com (Jim Miller)
Date: Fri, 12 Nov 93 14:19:39 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Instant check system
Message-ID: <9311122217.AA24118@bilbo.suite.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Mike McNally writes:

> 	The Brady Bill is just a gun-grabber Creationist plot to foil
> Nazi Abortionists who don't realize that Libertarinaism is the only
> true way to distinguish saffron from turmeric.

What about the Nazi Abortionists who *do* realize that Libertarinaism is the  
only true way to distinguish saffron from turmeric?  Will we still be able to  
get guns?  :-)


I'm beginning to regret my 'Brady Bill and Instant Check system' post...

Jim_Miller@suite.com





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Date: Fri, 12 Nov 93 16:34:41 PST
To: pdn@dwroll.dw.att.com (Philippe Nave)
Subject: Re: CPSR cypherpunks archive
In-Reply-To: <9311130010.AA26436@toad.com>
Message-ID: <199311130034.QAA06115@mail.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


.....
> > The CPSR Internet Library is available via FTP/WAIS/Gopher from
> > cpsr.org /cpsr. Materials from Privacy International, the Taxpayers
> > Assets Project and the Cypherpunks are also archived. For more
>                  ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ 
> This caught my eye, especially in light of the recent postings about
> whether or not the cypherpunks postings should/should not be provided
> to Usenet.
> 
> ........................................................................
> Philippe D. Nave, Jr.   | The person who does not use message encryption

That _appears_ to just be a mirror of the soda.berkeley.edu site, that
is, a buch of files, programs, rants, intros, etc.

I could find no evidence of posts to the list being archived there.

Again, the issue is not that the List be hidden, or secret....it
obviously is fairly well-known by now.

The issue is that of mailing list vs. newsgroup. Local gateways into a
newsgroup format are much different than, say, "alt.cypherpunks"
appearing around the world. Some would like this, some would not, but
no one can say things would be the same if this came to pass.

--Tim May


-- 
..........................................................................
Timothy C. May         | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,  
tcmay@netcom.com       | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
408-688-5409           | knowledge, reputations, information markets, 
W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA  | black markets, collapse of governments.
Higher Power: 2^756839 | Public Key: PGP and MailSafe available.
Note: I put time and money into writing this posting. I hope you enjoy it.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Philippe Nave" <pdn@dwroll.dw.att.com>
Date: Fri, 12 Nov 93 15:49:41 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Caller ID: belated thanks
Message-ID: <9311122349.AA25999@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Many thanks to all the people who posted responses to the Caller ID
question! I appreciate your time, thought, and responses. 

........................................................................
Philippe D. Nave, Jr.   | The person who does not use message encryption
pdn@dwroll.dw.att.com   | will soon be at the mercy of those who DO...
Denver, Colorado USA    | PGP public key: by arrangement.



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Matthew J Ghio <mg5n+@andrew.cmu.edu>
Date: Fri, 12 Nov 93 13:53:44 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re:Bandwidth limitations
In-Reply-To: <01H58E3K6E4I0028OU@UNCVX1.OIT.UNC.EDU>
Message-ID: <4gt0JMi00Vp=N1TF8u@andrew.cmu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


VACCINIA@UNCVX1.OIT.UNC.EDU wrote:

> The human genome has approximately 3 x 10^9 base pairs. Each base is 
> represented as the following binary code: G=1000, A=0100, T=0010, C=0001. 
> Thus the human genome represents about 3 gigabytes of info (uncompressed),
> as Perry said easily transmitable by fiber optics.

Um, minor correction: There are four base pair combinations, and each
can be represented by two bits.

> When you all do finally get your genome sequenced, the last thing
> you should do is let anyone see it (perhaps only small segments of it).
> I can think of no better use for cryptography than to keep citizens
> genomes to themselves.  Would you give anybody a crystal ball
> which tells of your past, present and future? 

Frankly, if I had the kind of technology to easily sequence my entire
geneome, I doubt I'd be content to just look at it.  I'd probably be
saying, "Hmm.. I don't like that gene, it might give me heart desease,
I'll just use a modified retrovirus to substitute a better one..." :)
Maybe one day genetic identification tests won't be so accurate as they
are today.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: jazz@hal.com (Jason Zions)
Date: Fri, 12 Nov 93 15:04:39 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Should we oppose the Data Superhighway/NII?
Message-ID: <9311122303.AA15768@jazz.hal.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


   Okay, now let's look at Tim May's hypothetical case. Tim wants X-rated
   cable. But the first nine cable companies don't want to provide it. And
   the Metzger-Godwin Cable operation, which would provide it, can't get
   financing. There's a market for it, but there's also a barrier to entry.

If there's a market for it, investors will poney up the money; that's just
the way it works, Mike.

   I leave to your imagination what happens in the event that we *do* 
   start the P-G Cable company, but content providers won't sell other
   programming to us so Tim is forced to choose between only X-rated
   cable--us--and cable services that provide other kinds of programming.
   (Tim may have no problem with this, but lots of other people in our market
   will want to watch CNN as well as X-rated videos.)

Cable, like many other utilities, doesn't restrict you to a single provider.
I can imagine having phone lines from two local loop providers to maximize
redundancy; similar for an information utility, where the information
provided will likely differ from one provider to another. In the cable
business, two companies will not want to compete on price; they'll try to
compete on content instead, each having exclusive material. The ideal
situation from the cable companies' perspective is for customers to *want*
to subscribe to more than one. The infrastructure will grow to allow it.

   Wouldn't it be better to live in a world in which the cable
   infrastructure, like the telephone infrastructure, could be serviced by
   competing providers, and at the individual level? We already have this
   with long-distance--if I want, I can have Sprint, MCI, *and* AT&T accounts
   and use them all from the same phone. Ultimately we'll have it in the
   local loop.

If you have competition in the local loop on shared infrastructure - who
owns that infrastructure, who maintains it, who allocates costs? Probably
some neutral 3rd party, possibly regulated. Square one.

   > > They used the same wires, Perry.
   > 
   > Nope, they didn't. If necessary, we can dig up references.

   Oh, you're saying that one couldn't make a phone call from one local phone
   company to another?

Exactly correct; you had to know which company provided service to your
party and use their equipment. Much like dialing 1-800 numbers from
overseas; you have to contact the US operator for the company that provides
800 service and ask them to hook you up. Perhaps 800 number portability will
solve that, though; are you suggesting something like the infrastructure
that supports 800-number portability will appear at the local-loop level as
well? Not any time soon; they can barely get the 800 number stuff to work
right, and local loop is three orders of magnitude larger.

Jason Zions




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Philippe Nave" <pdn@dwroll.dw.att.com>
Date: Fri, 12 Nov 93 16:13:45 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: CPSR cypherpunks archive
Message-ID: <9311130010.AA26436@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Dave Banisar sent us the November 12 CPSR alert [thanks, by the way!]
which contained, among other things:

> The CPSR Internet Library is available via FTP/WAIS/Gopher from
> cpsr.org /cpsr. Materials from Privacy International, the Taxpayers
> Assets Project and the Cypherpunks are also archived. For more
                 ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ 
This caught my eye, especially in light of the recent postings about
whether or not the cypherpunks postings should/should not be provided
to Usenet.

........................................................................
Philippe D. Nave, Jr.   | The person who does not use message encryption
pdn@dwroll.dw.att.com   | will soon be at the mercy of those who DO...
Denver, Colorado USA    | PGP public key: by arrangement.



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: jazz@hal.com (Jason Zions)
Date: Fri, 12 Nov 93 15:19:40 PST
To: "L. Detweiler" <ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Subject: The Depravities of Cypherpunks
Message-ID: <9311122319.AA15772@jazz.hal.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>Also, I have mail from Mr. Jason Zions (jazz@hal.com) also complaining
>that I violated Mr. Metzger's privacy in revealing his mailbomb to me
>to the list as a whole. This strange code of cypherpunk chivalry I am
>not familar with.

It's not chivalry; it's copyright law. The creator of a message owns the
copyright to that intellectual property; the recipient owns the copy of the
message, much like one who buys a recorded album owns the copy of the work.
The message you quoted contained the statement "Do not forward/reproduce
this message" or words to that effect. That is a clear statement by the
copyright holder which limits any redistribution rights that might have
otherwise become yours upon receipt of the message.

Given the nature of the communication (i.e. mention of potential email
bombing), I believe you'd be within your rights to share the threatening
content of the message with upstream mail host admins who might play a role
in preventing such an occurance; but no further.

It's also common courtesy. You can have significant disagreements with a
person, yet still honor their simple requests.

Jason




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: jazz@hal.com (Jason Zions)
Date: Fri, 12 Nov 93 15:39:41 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: (fwd) Netcom adds access in Denver area
Message-ID: <9311122336.AA15810@jazz.hal.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Gee, it'd sure be nice if they showed up in Austin. Hint, hint.

Jason




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: karn@qualcomm.com (Phil Karn)
Date: Fri, 12 Nov 93 17:53:45 PST
To: 0811wksh@ties.k12.mn.us
Subject: Caller ID
In-Reply-To: <Pine.3.05.9311082016.D26586-9100000@tiesnet.ties.k12.mn.us>
Message-ID: <9311130152.AA29949@servo>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>I believe the frequencies used for Caller ID are per Bell 202, a straight
>FSK data standard.

This is correct. Before Caller ID came along, about the only group
backward enough to still be using Bell 202 are the amateur packet
radio folks. So if you happen to be a ham with a packet TNC and a lot
of spare time, you could consider reprogramming one to decode caller
ID. Of course, you still have to sign up for the service before the CO
will send you the data.

And if your time is worth anything to you, it'd be better to just buy one
of the modems that already has caller-ID built in.

Phil




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Brad Huntting <huntting@glarp.com>
Date: Fri, 12 Nov 93 17:25:13 PST
To: perobich@ingr.com
Subject: Re: Mounting a "Secure" filesystem in UNIX
In-Reply-To: <199311121921.AA09914@poboy.b17c.ingr.com>
Message-ID: <199311130124.AA01765@misc.glarp.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



>> The NT security mechanisms are also more complicated,
>> which in my opinion means there are more potential bugs. 

> Absolutely correct. However, I take some comfort from the fact that
> Dave Cutler, of VMS fame, was the principal engineer on NT. For all
> its (myriad) other faults, VMS is fairly secure out of the box.

I suppose "out of the box" means no DECNET then?




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: P.V.McMahon@rea0803.wins.icl.co.uk
Date: Fri, 12 Nov 93 11:04:50 PST
To: " (Hal Finney)" <hfinney@shell.portal.com>
Subject: RE*2: (fwd) Netcom adds access in Denver area
Message-ID: <"7702*/I=PV/S=McMahon/OU=rea0803/O=icl/PRMD=icl/ADMD=gold 400/C=GB/"@MHS>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain








> these capabilities is far beyond my budget.  I can't understand why England
> is so far ahead of the U.S. in this regard.

Do you refer here to its inexpensive private Internet access services
(like demon)?

Apologies if there was an antecedent in previous mail under this subject,
but I have now deleted it.


>                                             No offense intended, but I
> always thought of their telecommunications and computing infrastructure as
> being several years behind the U.S.

What aspect of the UK infrastructure did you perceive as lagging
the US ?


pvm


Ps. I believe that the natural home for this thread isn't on this list.





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: anonymous@extropia.wimsey.com
Date: Fri, 12 Nov 93 19:29:41 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Dr. Dobb's Editorial
Message-ID: <199311130306.AA20780@xtropia>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


As mentioned, the December, 1993 issue of Dr. Dobb's Journal has an
excellent editorial about the government investigation of PGP export
and the general crackdown on cryptography.  This issue also includes
an article by Bruce Schneier describing the IDEA encryption algorithm.
As usual with DDJ, source code is included: IDEA.C, apparently based
on PGP source.

Dr. Dobb's has published encryption source before.  A few months ago
there was an article by Burt Kaliski of RSADSI on using Montgomery
multiplication to speed up an RSA implementation.  Earlier there was
an article on the (patented) Lucas public-key system.  Both articles
had source.  No doubt there have been others as well.

Here is the text of the editorial:

    Cryptography is like one of those West Virginia subterranean fires
    that smolder along coal seams for months before flaring up above
    ground.  The current flame along the encryption firing line involves
    a pair of Federal grand jury subpoenas handed out to distributors of
    Phil Zimmermann's PGP ("Pretty Good Privacy") message signature and
    privacy software.

    Earlier this fall, the Austin Code Works (a Texas software distributor)
    and ViaCrypt (a Phoenix cryptography-tool developer) were slapped with
    demands to produce contracts, payments, correspondence, and related
    information concerning their international distribution of PGP and
    RSA cryptography source code.  Neither company was told why they must
    turn over this information, nor were they given any indication of when
    or what the next shoe to drop might be.

    For the past year Code Works has been selling Grady Ward's Moby Crypto,
    a collection of crypto software that includes PGP, RSA, MD4, DES, and
    the like.  Although not mentioned in the subpoena, Code Works has also
    been separately selling a DES encryption and decryption software
    package.  For the time being, both have been removed from Code Works'
    shelves.  ViaCrypt, on the other hand, licensed PGP from Zimmermann,
    combined it with ViaCrypt's DigiSig+ cryptographic engine, and released
    a toolkit called "ViaCrypt PGP," the first commercial PGP-based package.
    Interestingly, ViaCrypt is also a sublicensee of RSA public-key
    encryption from Public Key Partners, holder of the RSA patent and a
    big-time competitor and long-time critic of PGP.

    Ostensibly, the subpoenas are part of a U.S. Customs investigation into
    the export of PGP.  (A letter the State Department's Enforcement Branch
    fired off to the Code Works begins with, "It has come to the attention
    of this office that your company is making cryptographic source code...
    available for commercial export....")  State Department regulations
    lump cryptographic software with munitions and weapons, making it
    subject to export licenses as per International Traffic in Arms
    Regulation guidelines.  However, Code Works' current advertisements
    clearly state that both Moby Crypto and DES Encryption are "not for
    export," and ViaCrypt says sales are made "export regulations permitting."
    In short, there's no indication that either company has exported crypto
    software, leading you to believe that the investigation is really nothing
    more than a fishing expedition.

    The timing is curious, considering that the Clinton administration views
    many high-tech export rules as antiquated Cold War laws that hinder
    U.S. trade.  Consequently, the administration is rethinking export laws
    so that U.S. manufacturers can more easily export communications and
    other high-tech equipment - what's protected today may be fair game in
    a few months.  Of course, the government also wants to make it harder
    to sell high-tech military equipment to renegade countries.  Unfortunately,
    cryptography has a foot in both military and civilian communications camps.

    Neither the Code Works nor ViaCrypt had anything to do with developing
    PGP.  You could even argue that Zimmermann really isn't the "author" of
    the software.  True, he did write Version 1.0, but subsequent editions
    (2.3 is the current release) are the contributed efforts of U.S. and
    non-U.S. programmers who've created what's been described as the
    strongest, easiest-to-use encryption utility available to the public in
    source form.  There's no question that PGP was exported, but neither is
    there a hint that Zimmermann shipped it overseas.  He assiduously
    avoided the chance of _his_ exporting PGP, to the point of having other
    people upload the software to the nets.  The bottom line is that PGP
    was legally on the net and anyone with a PC and a modem could have
    moved it across international borders - just as with DES, which has
    been on the nets and authorized by the government for more than a decade.

    Still, you have to wonder why the government is taking action now.  PGP
    has been around for a couple of years.  Maybe the Feds are upset that
    Zimmermann's encryption scheme is good - PGP is thought to be stronger
    than DES, the NSA and FBI reportedly can't crack it, and the thought of
    publicly available cryptography scares the dickens out of them.  Or
    maybe the announcement of a commercial PGP-based application finally
    hitting the shelves prompted PGP's competitors to lean on the government.
    We just don't know, and the Feds aren't talking.

    The government is struggling to cope with a changing world, one in which
    technology has altered many of the old rules.  Regulations, written for
    a paper-based society, aren't adapting well to digital reality.
    International electronic networks make it hard to control software
    distribution and information dissemination.  Like wildfire, bank transfers
    and e-mail are circling the globe unfettered - and encryption is keeping
    secret the contents of these communications.  But the means by which
    Washington is attempting to maintain control over cryptography is, in
    the long run, injurious to us all.  From a business perspective, these
    tactics hobble U.S. companies from competing internationally.  More
    importantly, the First Amendment guarantees us the right to speak in
    an encrypted way and insidious attempts to douse public access to
    cryptography, cloaked under the guise of software-export investigations,
    appear to stifle those rights.

    Jonathan Erickson
    editor-in-chief





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "mycal" <mike@NetAcsys.com>
Date: Fri, 12 Nov 93 20:19:41 PST
To: pmetzger@lehman.com
Subject: Re: Fractal cryptography
Message-ID: <2ce44fb5.acsys@NetAcsys.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


On Fri, 12 Nov 1993 19:31:09 -0500, "Perry E. Metzger" <pmetzger@lehman.com> wrote:
> 
> Amateurs regularly develop systems and claim fantastic things for
> them. They then turn out to be trivial to break. This has made people

Just to add a data point, chaos seems to be worth a look.  MIT's
Research Lab have created new signal-processors designs based on chaos
theroy for use in secure communication.

They are based on a recent descovery called synchronized chaos, where
a transmitter and receiver synchronize with each other.

I have a photo copy of an article in front of me but (blush) it has
no identifying elements to it.  I will look monday for the original
and post the source.

mycal






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Matthew J Ghio <mg5n+@andrew.cmu.edu>
Date: Fri, 12 Nov 93 16:19:42 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Fractal cryptography
In-Reply-To: <9311120740.AA19589@jobe.shell.portal.com>
Message-ID: <ggt2OaK00awKAjSUYi@andrew.cmu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


hfinney@shell.portal.com (Hal Finney) wrote:

> There have been some discussions on sci.crypt within the past few months
> on nonlinear/chaotic algorithms and their use in cryptography.  Fractal
> cryptography sounds like it might be related.  The problem is that unless
> an algorithm was SPECIFICALLY DESIGNED to prevent an intelligent
> adversary from defeating it, the chances of it being an effective
> cryptosystem are limited.  Just because nonlinear systems produce
> complex-looking results does not mean that these results are unpredictable
> given enough data.

Yeah, but how much data?  Just because something can be solved given
enough data doesn't help me break it if I need 10^37643254 bytes of data
to do it.

> Now, maybe this particular fractal cryptosystem idea will actually work
> well.  I don't know; I haven't seen it.  But the point is that these
> complex types of systems have not provided a good foundation for crypto-
> graphy in the past.

Well, here's a little test.  The following numbers were generated using
a chaotic function:

568139551155097445567935056793172821494566808655678121156334445567812121480659

Do you see a pattern?  What function did I use to generate it?  :)

(Actually, assuming you knew what function I used, you could probably
solve for the key if you had enuf raw output from the PRNG, so it's
probably not completely impossible to solve the above, but that wouldn't
necessarily help you decrypt a file which had been encoded with such a
pad, unless you knew a lot about the format of the file.)




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: karn@qualcomm.com (Phil Karn)
Date: Fri, 12 Nov 93 19:19:42 PST
To: anagld!decode!system@uunet.uu.net
Subject: LAW: Wireless interception
In-Reply-To: <7FaPcc1w165w@decode.UUCP>
Message-ID: <9311130316.AA00717@servo>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>Interesting reasoning here: "the reasonableness of a cordless telephone
>user's expectation of privacy depends on the specific technology
>involved."

Considering that analog cell phones and cordless phones use the very
same modulation method (FM), albeit at higher power for the cell
phones (making them much easier to intercept than cordless phones at a
distance), it would be much more accurate to say "...depends on
whether the specific technology involved has a large US industrial
base lobbying for it".

Cellular is protected under ECPA because it's big bucks for some
powerful US businesses. Cordless phones don't use a large domestic
infrastructure that charges for airtime. The only money in cordless
phones are in the phones themselves, which are invariably made
overseas.  And Japanese, Chinese and Korean businessmen can't vote in
US elections.

Phil




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Perry E. Metzger" <pmetzger@lehman.com>
Date: Fri, 12 Nov 93 16:33:45 PST
To: Matthew J Ghio <mg5n+@andrew.cmu.edu>
Subject: Re: Fractal cryptography
In-Reply-To: <ggt2OaK00awKAjSUYi@andrew.cmu.edu>
Message-ID: <9311130031.AA03966@snark.lehman.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Matthew J Ghio says:
> hfinney@shell.portal.com (Hal Finney) wrote:
> 
> > There have been some discussions on sci.crypt within the past few months
> > on nonlinear/chaotic algorithms and their use in cryptography.  Fractal
> > cryptography sounds like it might be related.  The problem is that unless
> > an algorithm was SPECIFICALLY DESIGNED to prevent an intelligent
> > adversary from defeating it, the chances of it being an effective
> > cryptosystem are limited.  Just because nonlinear systems produce
> > complex-looking results does not mean that these results are unpredictable
> > given enough data.
> 
> Yeah, but how much data?  Just because something can be solved given
> enough data doesn't help me break it if I need 10^37643254 bytes of data
> to do it.

Amateurs regularly develop systems and claim fantastic things for
them. They then turn out to be trivial to break. This has made people
who are even semi-pro like some of the folks on this list shake their
heads and say "oh no, not another one" every time someone who hasn't
read the literature claims to have come up with "the new great
cryptosystem". This is the reason that people tend to be so skeptical
of the constant stream of new proposals from such individuals. Its
nothing personal -- its just the sort of jaded attitude you get when
this sort of thing happens repeatedly.

Perry




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: gtoal@an-teallach.com (Graham Toal)
Date: Fri, 12 Nov 93 12:13:44 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Dinkelacker II
Message-ID: <7471@an-teallach.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


In article <9311121302.AA07765@anon.penet.fi> an12070@anon.penet.fi writes:
 > WHO is ARTHUR CHANDLER?!

Dunno, but if I'd remembered your ID about it three days ago I could
have told you who S.Boxx was :-) ... I found a nasty bug in penet.fi
whereby putting a return-receipt-to line in mail to an na01234-style
ID caused that person's mailer to tell you who they were :-) 

(I did of course tell Julf within 24 hours, and it's now fixed.  He
wasn't too amused at being woken up by a phone call at 1am Finland time ;-) )

However, this isn't to brag; it's to warn anyone with an anon ID to
look through all the mail they've received on their anon accounts (if
they've kept it) and see if any of it has a Return-receipt-to field
in it.  If it does, your ID will have been compromised.  I know a
lot of Mac mailers put these in automatically, so a lot of you might
already have been compromised by accident.

G
-- 
Personal mail to gtoal@gtoal.com (I read it in the evenings)
Business mail to gtoal@an-teallach.com (Be careful with the spelling!)
Faxes to An Teallach Limited: +44 31 662 4678  Voice: +44 31 668 1550 x212





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: gtoal@an-teallach.com (Graham Toal)
Date: Fri, 12 Nov 93 12:24:49 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Bandwidth limitations
Message-ID: <7472@an-teallach.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


In article <9311121650.AA03375@snark.lehman.com> pmetzger@lehman.com writes:
 > The human genome fits nicely in 1GB. Mere Gigabit networks could allow
 > you to send your whole genome in seconds -- and fiber can do many
 > orders of magnitude better than that.
 > 
 > A complete MRI scan can be sent on a gigabit network in mere moments,
 > too, and again, fiber can do far better than that.
 > 
 > If you can send a thousand video signals down your fiber at once,
 > sending complete plans for a factory to build Fords, and the complete
 > plans for the cars, will likely take a wink of an eye.

Perry, I did understand your remark; I don't think you got the point
of mine; give me a fiber and a computer fast enough to use it and
sufficient disk space, and trust me, I'll find something to fill it
with.  Capacity increases to fill the available bandwidth/disk space/
whatever.  Just because you don't have the imagination to think of
how we'll use an essentially new medium in the future, don't write
it off already.

Here's one suggestion that is quite sensible given vast resources: 
instead of linear TV, we have parallel TV.  I don't mean dial-on-demand
download a program - I mean every single program ever made and every
single movie ever made are broadcast down fiber simultaneously; - you
want to see the 59th episode of Star Trek, you switch to the 59th
episode of Star Trek channel, where it's going round and round as
fast as it can be transmitted.

Now, you do the sums.  How much fiber does *that* need?  (When you've
done that one, add on the volume of transmitting a high-res scan of
every page of every book in the world...)

This may seem like an outrageous or stupid application *at the moment*,
but I guess the guy at Manchester in the 50's who thought his computer
would be enough to satisfy the needs of all our Universities over here
would have thought that using the entire resources of his 64K giant machine
to play Pacman on was totally insane, yet only 30 years later the same
power was available in hand-held toys costing $20.

G
-- 
Personal mail to gtoal@gtoal.com (I read it in the evenings)
Business mail to gtoal@an-teallach.com (Be careful with the spelling!)
Faxes to An Teallach Limited: +44 31 662 4678  Voice: +44 31 668 1550 x212





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: karn@qualcomm.com (Phil Karn)
Date: Fri, 12 Nov 93 20:40:15 PST
To: tcmay@netcom.com
Subject: TEMPEST, Van Eyck Radiation, and Eavesdropping
In-Reply-To: <199311090331.TAA18597@mail.netcom.com>
Message-ID: <9311130439.AA01290@servo>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>surveillance.  In  the United  States it is  illegal for  an
>individual  to  take   effective  counter-measures   against
>TEMPEST surveillance.   This leads to the  conundrum that it

I really DO wish this particular bit of misinformation would go away!
It is most definitely NOT illegal to shield one's computers against
TEMPEST surveillance. In fact, the FCC requires that manufacturers
limit the same spurious radiations that TEMPEST exploits to minimize
interference to nearby radio and TV receivers. The details appear in
Part 15 of the FCC rules.  They are more stringent ("Class B") for
devices intended for home use, since receivers are much more likely to
be nearby than for devices intended solely for office use ("Class A").

The Part 15 interference rules for computers came into being in the
mid 1980s, so anything you may read about the ease of intercepting
computer emissions that was written before that time is somewhat
suspect.  Thanks to the rules, modern computers are FAR quieter than
those sold in the 1970s and early 1980s, though they're still not
completely silent.

Phil





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Matthew J Ghio <mg5n+@andrew.cmu.edu>
Date: Fri, 12 Nov 93 18:39:42 PST
To: pmetzger@lehman.com
Subject: Re: Fractal cryptography
In-Reply-To: <9311130031.AA03966@snark.lehman.com>
Message-ID: <cgt4T_G00awS0WfEhN@andrew.cmu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


"Perry E. Metzger" <pmetzger@lehman.com> wrote:

> Amateurs regularly develop systems and claim fantastic things for
> them. They then turn out to be trivial to break. This has made people
> who are even semi-pro like some of the folks on this list shake their
> heads and say "oh no, not another one" every time someone who hasn't
> read the literature claims to have come up with "the new great
> cryptosystem". This is the reason that people tend to be so skeptical
> of the constant stream of new proposals from such individuals. Its
> nothing personal -- its just the sort of jaded attitude you get when
> this sort of thing happens repeatedly.

This is true.  If you were specifically referring to the example I
posted, it could probably be broken from the data presented if you
really put your mind to it.  However it is a fairly clever PRNG, and it
takes quite a bit of data to get the exact pattern.

It might not be feasible to create a cryptosystem using fractals and
chaos functions, but I think the possibility could be explored a bit
further...




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: VACCINIA@UNCVX1.OIT.UNC.EDU
Date: Fri, 12 Nov 93 18:33:44 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re:Bandwidth limitations, DNA binary coding
Message-ID: <01H58QZWMFG2002CL4@UNCVX1.OIT.UNC.EDU>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----


Matthew J Ghio writes:
>Um, minor correction: There are four base pair combinations, and each can be
>represented by two bits.

        There are four base pair combinations, but HUGO (Human Genome 
Organization) has elected to use 15 letter symbols in it's representation
of the genome coding sequence (X is any base, for instance). 15 symbols, 
1 byte.

>Frankly, if I had the kind of technology to easily sequence my entire genome,
>I doubt I'd be content to just look at it. I'd probably be saying, "Hmm.. I
>don't like that gene, it might give me heart disease, I'll just use a 
>modified retrovirus to substitute a better one..." :)

Lee Hood is working on the technology (PCR, for which Kary Mullins just won a 
Nobel Prize will help) for sequencing large amounts of DNA code, granted it's
15 years away at least, but just wait. Also, Have you been reading French 
Anderson in the New York Times? As one of the people who helped design the 
"modified retrovirus" of which you speak (Retroviral Expression Vector, N2), 
I can tell you that they work great in cells that live in a dish and lousy
in a whole organisms, don't trust your heart to them. We can, however, 
engineer you in other ways.

Scott G. Morham              ! The First, 
Vaccinia@uncvx1.oit.unc.edu  !           Second
PGP Public Key by Request    !                  and Third Levels
                             !        of Information Storage and Retrieval
                             ! DNA,                       
                             !     Biological Neural Nets,
                             !                            Cyberspace

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.3a

iQCVAgUBLOMCRz2paOMjHHAhAQG62wQAg2fHDYdhJADiz5KdEMTDCLg74IZ9onBQ
TCrQcuFdiWBlB+Wt970a8zmur8Js5NdskpKYMiDCz6BKqEP1t17ZWPCL1lliTsPF
gtikx9dTsCRiWbWKUzPPfiEDXDGO/GovuLVbC98dOyJrTVBjrBHsJtuXL21S/R+n
74C/S2k4o74=
=jI3W
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Mark W. Eichin" <eichin@paycheck.cygnus.com>
Date: Sun, 14 Nov 93 00:19:58 PST
To: sommerfeld@orchard.medford.ma.us
Subject: OMNI CARD
In-Reply-To: <199311121608.LAA00480@orchard.medford.ma.us>
Message-ID: <9311130243.AA03120@paycheck.cygnus.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



lefty@apple.com might have said:
>>   BTW, you can't take the cards apart.  They fry themselves if you try.

sommerfeld@orchard.medford.ma.us might have replied:
>I've seen a SecurID card which had been pried apart; when you put the
>two halves back together, the LED went on again, apparantly into some
>"initialization mode".

If you looked inside, perhaps you saw where the switches are?

I've been told that the SecurId cards have two membrane-style switches
on the face (not actually marked though.) The initial key is
programmed by keying it in through those switches; the "protocol" ends
with a command to "ignore any further input from these switches"...

Early ones were hand-keyed, they then went to a robot mechanism, and
now apparently there is a device which takes a hopper full of cards
and keys them in in parallel batches (something like 20 at a time for
the machine I heard about a year ago.)

This is all stories I heard (as far as I know, second hand from
SecurID people) but it would be interesting to confirm the existance
of the switches...


				_Mark_ <eichin@paycheck.cygnus.com>
				... or at least I might be...





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Perry E. Metzger" <pmetzger@lehman.com>
Date: Fri, 12 Nov 93 18:49:56 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Bandwidth limitations, DNA binary coding
In-Reply-To: <01H58QZWMFG2002CL4@UNCVX1.OIT.UNC.EDU>
Message-ID: <9311130249.AA04254@snark.lehman.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



VACCINIA@uncvx1.oit.unc.edu says:
>         There are four base pair combinations, but HUGO (Human Genome 
> Organization) has elected to use 15 letter symbols in it's representation
> of the genome coding sequence (X is any base, for instance). 15 symbols, 
> 1 byte.

15 symbols, HALF a byte (actually a touch less.) One nybble can
express 16 possible symbols (or one Hex digit, or whatever.) 

Plus, of course, the genome is highly compressable -- lots of repeated
sequences, especially in interons.

Perry




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: an7822@anon.penet.fi (Archimboldo)
Date: Fri, 12 Nov 93 15:33:46 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Key Sharing Protocols
Message-ID: <9311122332.AA17912@anon.penet.fi>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I'm working on an internal protocol for securing company records
and I'd like to solicit some net.wisdom.

One of my requirements is to ensure that no data is lost if an
employee quits, is fired, dies, etc. At the same time, I don't
want to have a security officer with the "keys to the castle" for
every user.

I've had these ideas, so far.

*  Use PGP for all encryption, for both E-mail and personal files
   on disk.

*  For personal files, encrypt with your own public key.

This allows all files and communications to be encrypted while
using one passphrase, which may be changed without having to re-
encrypt files.

To allow for loss of a passphrase, for whatever reason, use a
secret sharing protocol to split the secret key of the user into
several pieces, held by designated security officers.
Reconstruction of the key will require cooperation by "n"
security officers. I have some problems with this.

*   While I can extract the secret key from the user's private
    keyring, it is still encrypted by the user's passphrase. Is
    there any method for extracting an unencrypted key?

*   If there is no way to produce an unencrypted key, I could
    have the user extract her key after setting her passphrase to
    some standard value, and then change it again after
    extraction.

*   How can I ensure, without reconstructing the key from my
    secret sharers, that the key and passphrase I have been given
    are, in fact, correct. If I could produce an unencrypted key,
    I would just have to verify that this was the correct private
    RSA key. If the private key can only be extracted encrypted,
    I have to verify both the standard passphrase and the private
    RSA key.

I would be interested in comments and suggestions on this
proposed protocol and the unresolved issues. My intent is that a
user be able to generate a key pair, run a job to split the key
into n segments for the sharers and have the sharers able to
verify that they have the correct key, without having to
reassemble the key.

Has anyone implemented code for any of the secret sharing
protocols, or am I going to have to reinvent this particular
wheel?
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
To find out more about the anon service, send mail to help@anon.penet.fi.
Due to the double-blind, any mail replies to this message will be anonymized,
and an anonymous id will be allocated automatically. You have been warned.
Please report any problems, inappropriate use etc. to admin@anon.penet.fi.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: pierre@shell.portal.com (Pierre Uszynski)
Date: Sat, 13 Nov 93 01:03:44 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re:  The Depravities of Cypherpunks
Message-ID: <9311130803.AA11910@jobe.shell.portal.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Jason Zions thus emailed:

> >Also, I have mail from Mr. Jason Zions (jazz@hal.com) also complaining
> >that I violated Mr. Metzger's privacy in revealing his mailbomb to me
> >to the list as a whole. This strange code of cypherpunk chivalry I am
> >not familar with.
> 
> It's not chivalry; it's copyright law. The creator of a message owns the
> copyright to that intellectual property;

Apart from the ridicule of this whole thing, there at least two different
and independent issues here: Privacy issues and copyright issues.

And I'm still not fully clear on the legal side of some of their
subtelties (help from our legal types would be appreciated).

In the case of private mail from one person to an other. I'm under the
impression that the sender retains copyright ownership on the message,
but that the receiver has the right to make the content public (as in
disclosing what it is about, and that the communication occured).
(This impression gleaned from -Syslaw, Lance Rose, Jonathan Wallace, 1992-
in particular)

How far the recipient can go in disclosing is not clear: posting the whole
or part of the message seems to go against the ownership rule. Header
notices like "Do not forward" or "reposting with permission only" do not
change much the ownership issue, but do they alter the privacy issue? What
is the origin of any right of the recipient to disclose the message to
third party? For that matter, is there sufficient "intellectual input"
in a short mail bomb / threat like the one that was used (if I remember)
to cause significant copyright ownership?

Apologies for nitpicking. It's just that the ownership/privacy issue is
very important for the Future Net, and that I'm interested in THAT aspect
of the war.

> Given the nature of the communication (i.e. mention of potential email
> bombing), I believe you'd be within your rights to share the threatening
> content of the message with upstream mail host admins who might play a role
> in preventing such an occurance; but no further.

Given the nature of the communication, I believe it's clearly his rights
to make the threats public... especially in the case where
the threatener is his own sysadmin, and especially on this list where
we can all (ahem... :-) benefit from knowing how things evolve (nobody
forces anybody to read any of the longish drivel, mine included).

> It's also common courtesy. You can have significant disagreements with a
> person, yet still honor their simple requests.

LOL

This really cracks me up. I mean, that some bystanders still use the words
"common courtesy", "disagreements" and "simple requests" when talking
about this war. Remember both/either sides could have started using
mail filters ages ago, instead they are now proudly mail bombing and
reputation bombing.

Just a bystander... maybe standing a bit in the middle...
Pierre.
pierre@shell.portal.com




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: jdwilson@gold.chem.hawaii.edu (Jim Wilson (VA))
Date: Sat, 13 Nov 93 03:43:49 PST
To: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Subject: Re: Big Mother can't protect our privacy
In-Reply-To: <199311101900.LAA22288@mail.netcom.com>
Message-ID: <9311131141.AA24839@gold.chem.hawaii.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> 
> Alan Wexelblat writes:
> 
> > Hunh.  Doug, I'm sorry to oppose you on this, but I think that the sort of
> > bullshit pry-into-your-personal-life stuff that companies are resorting to
> > these days is *exactly* the sort of stuff that cypherpunks would want
> > stopped!
> > 
> > Have you ever had to take one of these tests?  Have you seen the questions
> > they ask?  I have been handed a test (in an all-too-recent interview) and
> > after looking at the test I told them flat-out I would not take the test and
> > if they hired people based on it then I wouldn't work at their company.
> > 
> > [The questions have to do with all kinds of shit like "Have you ever had a
> > homosexual experience?" and "Have you ever shoplifted anything?" and "How
> > do you feel about XXX?".  Totally unrelated to my job skills.]
> 
> Simple solution: If you don't want to take the MMPI test (*), don't
> work for that company. 
> 
> (* MMPI is the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Index test, which
> sounds like the test described here. It has a couple of thousand of
> these questions. Without defending the analytical powers of this test,

Tim:  the MMPI has 600 questions, with approx 4x redundancy for indicators of
deception, and *can* be manipulated to read whatever indicators (or non-
indicators) you choose.  All you need to do is visit your local medical library
and do a little homework...

 -Jim





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "L. Detweiler" <ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Date: Sat, 13 Nov 93 00:49:45 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: The Courtesies of Cypherpunks
Message-ID: <9311130846.AA19291@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


 From: jazz@hal.com (Jason Zions)
>It's also common courtesy. You can have significant disagreements with a
>person, yet still honor their simple requests.

I owe no courtesy to someone who forfeits any respect in their
atrocious misbehavior. This is as simple as the maxim, if you are a
criminal your rights are diminished. If you mailbomb me, you have
forfeited your `right to privacy'. If you email my postmaster a
complaint about me before contacting me, you have forfeited your `right
to privacy'. If you lie to me, you have forfeited your `right to
privacy'. If you fail to adequately respond to my personal accusations
of impropriety or criminality, especially meeting them with evasion or
stonewalling, you have forfeited your `right to privacy'. If you have
ever sent me mail as a Snake of Medusa or a Tentacle of a Monster, you
have forfeited your `right to privacy' -- under ALL your pseudonyms and
identities. If you ridiculously condone and endorse any such
reprehensible behaviors under such patent idiocy as `respecting
copyright' or `common courtesy', you have forfeited your `right to
privacy'. If you have done any of the above to *anyone*, you have
forfeited your `right to privacy' with respect to EVERYONE in your society!

I also think you have forfeited your right to speak in that society as
well -- maybe only temporarly -- but in situations where these kinds of
outrageous behaviors are condoned by a corrupt moderator, no recourse
except leaving or starting a new list is possible.

In particularly obnoxious cases of criminal abuse, I will attempt to
shame you into repentance by ridiculing you in front of people who
appear to be your friends and community (presuming you actually have
any), if all other measures have failed. (Even this may be ineffective,
but if you have no shame, you have no humanity.) 

That is the Detweiler Code of Cyberspatial Ethics and Privacy. If it is
incompatible with the Cypherpunk Code of Chivalry, my heartfelt
condolences go out to you. Perhaps you would like to elucidate me as to
which of the above practices require my RESPECT.

As I was saying, psychopunks have elevated their religion of `privacy'
and `pseudospoofing' to perverse extremes. ``The cypherpunk agenda is
becoming indistinguishable from raw criminality.'' May you choke on
your own poisons. Already, you wallow and drown in them and defile the
naive, trusting, honest, and innocent daily on your list. Frankly, I
can barely stand to be in the same Cyberspace with you. The `psychopunk
core' of the cypherpunks is nothing but a fanatic, brainwashed
religious cult. No wonder you guys identify with David Koresh. I assure
you, future Cyberspace will not be big enough for the both of us.

Go ahead, CENSOR me! For the crime of writing `FLAMEBAIT' or,
equivalently, YELLING THE TRUTH.

What depraved hypocrisy, that some psychopunks attempt to CENSOR ME
indirectly by mailing my postmaster (who could care less about your
sniveling whinings).

You guys really do have *some* ethics, don't you? ``Don't ever DIRECTLY
CENSOR ANYTHING!'' ``NEVER GET CAUGHT or be PERSONALLY ACCOUNTABLE or
RESPONSIBLE for ANYTHING!''




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Carl Ellison <cme@sw.stratus.com>
Date: Fri, 12 Nov 93 22:49:42 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: random dot stereo benefactor
Message-ID: <199311130649.BAA24349@ellisun.sw.stratus.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


For those who are interested, my source for the random dot stereo code was
Tony Marotto: marotto@camb.com

(Sorry, I still haven't tested it.)





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Sameer <sameer@uclink.berkeley.edu>
Date: Sat, 13 Nov 93 02:09:45 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: REMAIL: Cypherpunks Anonymous Remailer Installation
Message-ID: <m0oyHrR-000J5iC@infinity.hip.berkeley.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

	Finally, after a few months of slacking off, I've finally
gotten this remailer installation thing cleaned up to release it.

	I'll be throwing this in /pub/cypherpunks/incoming on
soda.berkeley.edu.

	   The Cypherpunks Anonymous Remailer Installation
			     Version 1.0
		       Installer: Sameer Parekh
Remailer: Eric Hughes & Hal Finney, with minor modifications by Sameer Parekh
- -----------------------------------------------------------------------------

	This is the Cypherpunks Anonymous Remailer Installation Suite
Version 1.0. By simply running the script "install_remail" included in
the archive, you can very easily install a cypherpunks anonymous
remailer service in almost any UNIX account.

	The anonymous remailer uses the .forward file to pipe all mail
to the remailer system. If mail to the remailer account is not acted
upon by the remailer software, it lands in the standard mailbox of the
account.
	First on the TODO list is to make it so that non-remailer mail
is acted upon in a fashion which allows an alternate .forward file
operation.

	To install: gunzip and untar the archive:

% gunzip RemailInstall.tar.gz
% tar xfv RemailInstall.tar

	execute the remail_install program:

% remail_install

	answer all the questions.

	The program automatically self-tests, and mails me a notice
saying that the remailer is in operation. I plan on writing a system
which will wait one week after receiving the notice, after which your
remailer will be pinged. If the ping is received, your remailer will
be added to my list of active remailers, updated and posted weekly to
the cypherpunks list. (Not yet operable, but the installation script
still sends a notice.)

	Remember that running a remailer is a sensitive issue on the
net. If you choose to run a remailer, keep in mind that some powerful
net-personalities object to anonymous remailers, endangering your
access to the internet.

	Stay free,
Sameer
sameer@uclink.berkeley.edu







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From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "George A. Gleason" <gg@well.sf.ca.us>
Date: Sat, 13 Nov 93 03:10:01 PST
To: frissell@panix.com
Subject: Re: Should we oppose the
Message-ID: <199311131105.DAA01673@well.sf.ca.us>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


You ask, "why have telecoms prices been declining for years?" and cite
overseas calls as an example.  In fact, the actual cost of local service has
gone up over 240% since deregulation, according to a detailed research
report a friend of mine is about to publish.  




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "L. Detweiler" <ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Date: Sat, 13 Nov 93 02:44:46 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: The Religion of the Cypherpunks
Message-ID: <9311131044.AA20370@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


- EH & TCM statements on pseudospoofing
- hypocrisies and the religion of pseudospoofing
- the second pseudospoofing survey
- a tale of two `cypherpunks' (Or: The Postmaster, The Magicians, and the Critic)


EH & TCM statements on pseudospoofing
--

From `someone':

>There is no conspiracy.  EH and TCM have publicly stated several times
>that they have never "pseudospoofed."  Why would they go to such lengths
>just to create an elaborate hoax and attempt to drive you crazy?  There's
>no conceivable reason.  It's easily confirmed that there are hundreds of
>real, unique individual people on the cypherpunks list.  You see their
>email addresses.  This is crazy.  I just don't see your point.  You are
>exhibiting MAJOR paranoia symptoms.  Why do this to yourself?

I missed the public statements by EH and TCM that `they have never
`pseudospoofed'', despite my various requests, both public and private,
over the past few weeks -- could someone email those to me? Mr. May
told me he `had experimented' with the technique (I only say this
because I think it is public knowledge at this point). I have seen some
circuitous statements (quoted in the RISKS article) that pseudonyms are
a fact of life in cyberspace, and `the situations you despise will
occur.' None of these are very authoritative, IMHO. All the statements
I have seen are far from conclusive, and they have consistently
stonewalled and evaded me in private mail. (That is the *only* reason I
have continued to escalate my rhetoric.) If they answered my simple
questions, and been straightforward about their practices, I would have
no objections, and I would have `gone away' a long time ago.


hypocrisies and the religion of pseudospoofing
--

One of the things I don't understand about this pseudospoofing religion
thing -- if it is the cypherpunk religion, as hundreds of email
messages have convinced me it is, why are so many cypherpunks so
resistant to revealing their personal involvement? Isn't religion
supposed to uplifting, something you can be proud of, something you can
announce to the world? Why is there so much secrecy? You don't think
there's anything wrong or criminal or shameful about what you're doing, do you?

I suppose all the secrecy would be useful in promoting a *conspiracy*,
but what's the use in that? Isn't the whole idea that you are trying to
promote all these neat techniques to the whole world, so that everyone
can use them? (Oh, that's that annoying egalitarian idea-- sorry, of
course you have flamed that searingly.)  I always thought that
cypherpunks were against things like secret conspiracies and
corruption. Or maybe they only are against it when a *government* is
engaged in it. Private practice, so to speak, is entirely wholesome,
commendable, useful, and desirable? 

I suppose that the more that people knew about widespead
pseudospoofing, the less susceptible to it they would become, so the
usefulness of the technique would be diminished. (the `robbing the
treasury' principle I wrote about earlier --eventually it becomes
bare!). Or, some people have these nagging taboos against it. For
example, a net legend John Palmer supposedly is famous for it. Also,
some people might just leave anywhere where the pseudospoofing was
really prevalent. That would be unpleasant for anyone who wanted to
practice it routinely on unsuspecting and unwilling participants.

I suppose this secret conspiracy approach does fit in with some of the
Extropian and cryptoanarchist ideas also, about elevating the idea of
private companies, tax evasion, and black marketeering to the point of
the complete dissolution of governments, etc. I asked a top Extropian
leader about their official opinion on pseudospoofing -- neutral, pro,
con, or undecided. He was quite upset by my question and refused to
answer it, and cc:ed his response to all the other prominent leaders in
the group. (I guess this could tie in with a letter by H.Finney to me
saying that one of the Extropian leaders could help verify the
independent existence of J.Dinkelacker.)

I appreciate all the cypherpunks outlining their philosophies in so
many forums. It helps me to understand what you all are about. For
example, I just started posting to a list on Internet Mercantile
Protocols, and was quite surprised to find a group of cypherpunks
already there, strongly promoting things like completely untraceable
cash and total anonymity (and criticizing all alternatives as
Orwellian). In fact, one of them had written one of the most
*beautiful* classic cypherpunk essays in favor of the Joy of
Pseudospoofing (`tapping into new areas of the human psyche' or a
`truer, more free debate', or something like that.)

If anyone else knows of other cypherpunks posting to various Internet
development project lists, esp. those related to digital cash or
identification protocols, I would be interested in hearing from you.
Have they generally been polite? Do they look at all sides of the
issues? What do they have to say about identity protocols?

Really, though, the bottom line is that anyone doesn't like to talk
about their religion of pseudospoofing is nothing but a hypocrite. If
pseudospoofing is OK, then why hide it? If you are hiding it, does that
mean it is not OK?


the second pseudospoofing survey
--

As an example of this idea of disclosure, I asked two prominent
cypherpunk `leaders' (who object to the term, and will remain nameless
to protect their `privacy') to answer the following questions, which
would obviously unequivocally resolve their own involvement in the
practice of `pseudospoofing':

> I will stop harassing you two personally over the issue of
> pseudospoofing if you post the following, and cc: me:
> 
> 1) how many identities each of you is currently maintaining
> 2) how many U.S. states they span
> 3) how many countries they span
> 4) how many independent phone numbers you have established
> 5) what mailing lists you are using them in, past & present
> 6) what newsgroups you are using them in, past & present
> 7) the people you have privately emailed under them
> 8) how many other people you know in Cypherpunks who are routinely pseudospoofing
> 9) their own responses to these questions
> 10) your software capabilities in promoting the pseudospoofing agenda
> 11) the number of hours per day you spend on pseudospoofing
> 12) your future intentions in promoting the capability
> 
> Note that I am not requesting that you actually disclose any of the
> identities (or even close geographical information). Since you find
> pseudospoofing entirely ethical, I see no reason you would object to
> answering any of the above.
> 
> Otherwise, `the beatings will continue until morale improves'
> 
> p.s. what do you think of the RISKS article? I think it turned out
> great. Hope to hear from you. <g> 
> 
> If you wish to make your own demands, I'm negotiable.
> 

I asked these questions because I was disapointed by the results of my
survey I posted to talk.politics.crypto. While I received many
responses, few were from the cypherpunks who had openly advocated
pseudospoofing on this list. And the `core cypherpunk leadership' was
completely unrepresented. I was laboring under the impression that
everyone that passionately pursued pseudospoofing was also passionately
interested in explaining their brilliant techniques! But it appears
they are very reluctant to talk about their obviously highly refined
culture of science, religion, and art of pseudospoofing. I greatly
despaired that the cypherpunks were so unrepresented officially,
especially given their strong advocation of pseudospoofing. Surely,
they would want to let the world know about their religion! If they
didn't, it might look like they were not holy saints but just lowly
conspirators! Also, this could be the comprehensive official cypherpunk
statement crafted by EH and TCM (revered cypherpunk leaders) on
pseudospoofing that has so far eluded me.


A Tale of Two `Cypherpunks' (Or: The Postmaster, The Magicians, and the Critic)
--

So I devised this new variation of my previous survey, designed to be
completely free of `invasions of privacy', and targeted at the core
cypherpunk leadership. Sort of like a direct mailing approach. Anyway,
in response to my questions, one of the two eminent cypherpunks was
very terse, as he has a habit of being, and called my questions
`inquisitional'. I guess he was referring to the Spanish Inquisition,
where all kinds of grisly torture devices were used to extract
`confessions' from supposed criminals (often completely innocent). I'm
not clear of the connection. Perhaps someone could elaborate on this metaphor.

The second cypherpunk was more grandiose and verbose in his rhetoric.
He acknowledged that `I have resisted until now responding to your
recent rants'. For those not currently familar with the unique language
of the Pseudospoofing Religion, he was saying here that he has not
answered any of my questions directly so far because, likely, the
answers would be embarrassing, incriminating, humiliating or all of the above.

He was so compassionate as to remark on my recent apparent strain over
the topic of pseudospoofing, suggesting that I seek counseling or take
a long vacation from the Net (thanks so much for your concern). Then he
talked about how my `threats' especially the `violent ones' could not
be `idly dismissed'. This cypherpunk has an extremely active
imagination (this is evidenced in his love for great works of science
fiction, especially those that refer to the blurring of identities).
I'm not sure where he got the idea about `violence'. The only violence
that has ever been involved is entirely metaphorical, happening on the
plane of reputations and credibility. (I assure you that lately I am
bloody myself!) Maybe he took the obviously satirical line about
`continued beatings' literally. Ah, he is quite suggestible. I guess
the only thing I can remember on this subject was Dinkelacker's letter
to me, `you better start looking over your shoulder'. That was
*definitely* unpleasant! Oh, and there was what's-his-name's comment,
`I'm going to come over and kill your family with a rusty razor blade'.

This cypherpunk goes on to say that I have turned myself into the
`laughingstock of the Net [...]' from `your latest paranoid descent
into fantasy in RISKS, and your email harassment of many of us.' As for
`paranoid descent into fantasy', I think everyone understood this was a
hypothetical scenario. Maybe Mr. Cypherpunk has information that
suggests otherwise. If so, I would love to see it, as I'm sure everyone
else here would too. Actually, it's all I've been aiming for over about
a dozen posts and articles now.

I'm not sure what he is referring to as `harassment'. I think some of
the questions I have raised in my writings on pseudospoofing, and
perhaps the questions above, he considers `harassing'. I'm quite at a
loss as to why. The questions I included above are very innocuous. I
would think that someone proud of themselves and their beliefs would
humor me immediately in answering them, recognizing that I will not go
away until they do so (and answering a simple question, of course, is
just common courtesy). Certainly, I would fill out the questions
myself, and am sure many other honest cypherpunks would see no invasion
of privacy in doing so either (they are vague enough to protect
privacy, IMHO, as designed to do, but of course I'm biased!).

This cypherpunk closes by stating that `I have a strong feeling that
you're going to have a very hard time getting a job in the computer
industry after this spectacular series of rants.' Thanks, again, for
your concern! Actually, I have made some very valuable contacts from
professionals from the RISKS article, who are as concerned about these
issues as I am. My mailbox has been quite deep with requests for the
`Joy of Pseudospoofing' essay, first posted here! (Again, if anyone has
not seen it, please email me.) I'm quite glad I managed to get in this
prestigious journal, because now others can be aware of the potential
abuses of widespread, systematic, routine pseudospoofing. The
cypherpunks have been largely uninterested or critical in my writings
on the subject, so it's very refreshing to find someone else in
Cyberspace who can discuss something as important as pseudospoofing
dispassionately, knowledgeably, and honestly.

The `terse' cypherpunk had earlier notified my postmaster about my
public posting here revealing Mr. Metzger's (prominent cypherpunk and
close friend of the core leadership) mailbombing me and further
mailbomb threats. He didn't find it necessary to notify my postmaster
this time about my `inquisitional' questions. I guess he understood
when my postmaster and I both sent him mail explaining why this was an
inappropriate tactic.

The second cypherpunk had not previously mailed my postmaster, but

>I am taking the step I have never before considered doing, in more
>than five years of active participation in the Net, of copying your
>postmaster on this note. Maybe he can talk some sense to you.

I guess the `terse' cypherpunk had not informed him that my postmaster
was uninterested in his personal problems. (This is surprising, given
their obviously strong affinity for each other.) But my postmaster did
send him a note later explaining why he `didn't have time for this
nonsense'. There do not appear to be any new developments along this
line. I am crossing my fingers that my postmaster will not be further
harassed by other cypherpunks. Anyway, I think he has already decided I
have just offended a particularly vocal group of raving religious
fanatics. (Some other people have gotten this impression from the RISKS
article. Maybe the clarifications on pseudospoofing by the top
leadership will help resolve all this.)

I generally regard all these lamentations and supplications to my
postmaster as extremely desperate attempts to censor me where all other
efforts at silencing me have failed. Also, I think they are definitely
invasions of my privacy. How many other people out there would like to
have your postmaster bothered just because you offended some
particularly sensitive people? Again, if you object to what I write,
just stick me in your kill file. You will certainly save us both a lot
of trouble! Mr. Hughes, our eminent and esteemed moderator, has
recommended this numerous times in other contexts. I'm absolutely
aghast and amazed at how many cypherpunks think that the most effective
way of getting me to be quiet is to send me mail. It is quite a curious
and perplexing approach. (Even more baffling was Mr. Metzger's
procedure of sending me mail, saying essentially `do not reply to this
or I will mailbomb you with 400 messages.' I respond to virtually all
personal mail, but as I noted I have made a worthy exception for His
Royal Eminence, as learned the hard way.)

(I would like to thank those who have the power to censor me and have
refrained. It shows you have a strong and admirable sense of morality.
At one point someone told me `If I did not allow you to post, that
would not be censorship'. I never understood the reasoning. But so far,
it appears that the cypherpunks are generally opposed to direct
censorship, although the indirect route is not taboo.)

The bottom line is that my efforts at enlightenment, now spanning many
weeks, have so far have gone `unrequited'. The top cypherpunks do not
wish to reveal the extent their amazing feats of pseudospoofing. We can
only continue to speculate on their sheer prowess and fantastic span!
(I'm currently investigating the opportunity to do so in reputable
publications -- email me and I will toss your offer into the current
batch under consideration).

I guess the Tantalizing Two feel that `a magician never reveals his
secrets'. And what amazing feats of deception we have witnessed! Dozens
of Rabbits emanating from a Single Hat, all while the magician says,
`nothing up my sleeves!' Are there any stagehands or informed audience
members that would like to comment on their masters' remarkable skill?
So far, it is a remarkably unified front. But I am continuing to `cram'
wedges into the cracks...

Ah, the pity of it all. The tension, anxiety, and anticipation is
driving me crazy! I wish to consummate this affair, so to speak! The
spotlight continues to burn down hotly! When will the show be over?
When can I go home? Tell my friends what happened in the end and write
my review? When will the fat lady sing?

p.s. anyone in Colorado, PRZ is giving a talk in Boulder on Sunday I
think. if you email me I might be able to scrounge up the details
somewhere in my piles of slobbering hate mail. <g>




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: an7822@anon.penet.fi (Archimboldo)
Date: Fri, 12 Nov 93 23:33:45 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Key Sharing Protocols
Message-ID: <9311130732.AA07592@anon.penet.fi>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> 
> I'm working on an internal protocol for securing company records
> and I'd like to solicit some net.wisdom.
> (...)
> 
> To allow for loss of a passphrase, for whatever reason, use a
> secret sharing protocol to split the secret key of the user into
> several pieces, held by designated security officers.
> Reconstruction of the key will require cooperation by "n"
> security officers. I have some problems with this.
> 

Sorry, I should have done some more reading before I posted. What I'm
after is a "Fair Cryptosystem". I'm not happy with the whole idea of
escrowed keys, but in this case, it's the best solution which will be
accepted by this organization.

Micali describes how the user can generate their own key and create
verifiable pieces for the escrow agents. Does anyone know of code which
implements this scheme?


-------------------------------------------------------------------------
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From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Sameer <sameer@uclink.berkeley.edu>
Date: Sat, 13 Nov 93 09:49:52 PST
To: hughes@soda.berkeley.edu
Subject: REMAIL: installer script not working
Message-ID: <m0oyP1r-000J6ZC@infinity.hip.berkeley.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

	I jumped the gun, and posted before I was ready. Oops.

	The installation script isn't working perfectly yet. Hopefully
I won't wait two months before fixing these problems like I did last
time.

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.3a

iQCVAgUBLOUdEni7eNFdXppdAQG6AwQAkJAoiz3KE7nYhS2JPmtP6u0VokIaJ1Dl
TfgYEgNxqQhb3M1VBvM0vIaxtGk6K956+ji3W7WhpkJk65IBvmyVMm/O3b6ZFG1h
kGQ9wjmUTOGageXag3fXCOGo3NFXi2WIhLyzix1u02Q+iw7Bwf2pSTztp60Mw32g
ePTbENC128E=
=8jWg
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: cman@IO.COM (Douglas Barnes)
Date: Sat, 13 Nov 93 09:00:23 PST
To: ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu (L. Detweiler)
Subject: Re: The Religion of the Cypherpunks
In-Reply-To: <9311131044.AA20370@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Message-ID: <9311131656.AA10352@illuminati.IO.COM>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Go away and leave us alone, Mr. Detweiler. I am losing my patience.
I use to think you had something to contribute; I used to think that it
was cool that someone from my hometown was on the list; I used to
think you were kind of funny. This stopped about the time you (quite
seriously, and in some detail) compared me to Darth Vader... I convinced
you I wasn't the "Hydra", so I was just a seducing minion.

You have become major pest, you have done more than anyone else to 
disrupt this list and make it next to impossible for real work to get 
done on it (including work that would help mitigate problems of the 
kind you believe your "enemies" are perpetrating on you.) 

You persist in baiting the less-restrained members of the list with your 
antaigonistic, paranoid, policial/social rants, which have accomplished 
nothing producive, except to sap the energy of people who would otherwise
be writing code, engaging in PR for our cause, educating one another, and
working towards a consensus or at least an honest delineation of where
we disagree as mature individuals (rather than characterizing folks as evil 
spawn of darkness).

Note that your postmaster, when I contacted him, made it clear that he
had instructed you to stop doing whatever it was you were doing that
was upsetting people so much. If anything, you have gotten worse; you
have turned this thing into a nonsensical, paranoid, one-man jihad against 
cypherpunks on a variety of *other* lists, while continuing your activities 
on this one.

I intend to go beyond your postmaster on the next try, to various former
classmates and old friends of mine who are computation center employees,
faculty, and administration members at CSU now.  Unless, of course, you 
cut this shit out and leave us alone, or at least go back on whatever 
medication you were taking before you went from a mildly annoying over-
eager wannabe to a full-fledged psychopath.

Doug


-- 
----------------                                             /\ 
Douglas Barnes            cman@illuminati.io.com            /  \ 
Chief Wizard         (512) 448-8950 (d), 447-7866 (v)      / () \
Illuminati Online          metaverse.io.com 7777          /______\



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: lear35!mdbomber@nebula.acs.uci.edu (Matt Bartley)
Date: Sat, 13 Nov 93 11:13:47 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: key servers
Message-ID: <9311131901.AA23353@lear35.vlpa.ca.us>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----


Could someone tell me where to find a list of PGP keyservers and how
to use them?  I haven't been able to find such a thing on
soda.berkeley.edu or on toxicwaste.mit.edu (the 2 relevant sites I can
remember).


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.3a

iQBVAgUBLOUvDTSSmvXojb+5AQGt0gH/T1ikHaWU/W7GR2VAGcx5fncjw9bDbmn3
CPfzPu28j4ejq3OlUJKRt3yz3wYryhYM/xT+OftOFfONpgqPjIS+TA==
=U7Q0
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Brad Huntting <huntting@glarp.com>
Date: Sat, 13 Nov 93 10:09:52 PST
To: CYPHERPUNKS@toad.com
Subject: Re: Should we oppose the
In-Reply-To: <199311111115.AA03340@panix.com>
Message-ID: <199311131806.AA01210@misc.glarp.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



>The problem is that bandwidth is a highly limited resource, just like
>real estate is a limited resource. Eventually we will complete 
>saturate network bandwidth no matter what technology is used. This has
>been discussed in various forums for many years. 

Eventually yes.  Some media are already saturated (short wave),
but in general, the terestrial bandwidth will not approach it's
upper limit in our lifetimes.

Terrestrial networks are limited only by the cost of putting down
the infrastructure (fiber these days) and maintaining the equipment
to drive it.  A single fiber will of course have limited band width
that will no doubt be reached in our lifetimes, but when that runs
out, there's always more room in the trenches, and if there's a
will, there's room for a new trench.

As the existing infrastructure is paid off, and the monopolies
which were granted for it's initial construction break up, the
price of terrestrial bandwidth drops.

There is no shortage of intra-continental bandwidth (at least not
in populated wealthy areas such as north america, Singapore, etc).
There may be a shortage of inter-continental bandwidth.  The cost
of laying undersea fiber makes it difficult for new competition to
get a foothold and hence the market lends itself to de facto
monopolies.


brad




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Brad Huntting <huntting@glarp.com>
Date: Sat, 13 Nov 93 10:23:48 PST
To: Mike Godwin <mnemonic@eff.org>
Subject: Re: Should we oppose the Data Superhighway/NII?
In-Reply-To: <199311111535.AA02116@eff.org>
Message-ID: <199311131820.AA01281@misc.glarp.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



> It's not that simple, unfortunately. Once monopolies have been created
> with government support, removing government intervention doesn't 
> automatically make competition happen.

True...  AT&T (and the RBOC's) have paied of most if not all of
their infrastructure.  This means that when upstarts like Wiltel
or MCI come around and think about laying their own fiber, they
have to be prepaired for the ex-monopoly to start price gauging.


brad




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Matthew J Ghio <mg5n+@andrew.cmu.edu>
Date: Sat, 13 Nov 93 08:49:51 PST
To: gg@well.sf.ca.us>
Subject: Re: Telecom deregulation
In-Reply-To: <199311131105.DAA01673@well.sf.ca.us>
Message-ID: <AgtExZ200awQ4vI0gZ@andrew.cmu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


"George A. Gleason" <gg@well.sf.ca.us> wrote:

> You ask, "why have telecoms prices been declining for years?" and cite
> overseas calls as an example.  In fact, the actual cost of local service has
> gone up over 240% since deregulation, according to a detailed research
> report a friend of mine is about to publish.  

Please tell me you're not that stupid.  The local companies haven't been
deregulated.  Only the long distance has been somewhat deregulated,
while the local companies still enjoy a monopoly.  Think about
it...sheez...




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Matthew J Ghio <mg5n+@andrew.cmu.edu>
Date: Sat, 13 Nov 93 08:54:51 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: fractal crypto
In-Reply-To: <9311130543.AA26841@tamsun.tamu.edu>
Message-ID: <ggtF2hm00awQ4vI1BR@andrew.cmu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> give a hint about the chaotic function you used... like what it
> was x(1-x) or something else
>
> that would just leave the "key" to be determined... a reasonable test!

hehe...  I did something involving the trigonometric tangent function.

The actual "key" isn't too complex actually...




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: doug@netcom.com (Doug Merritt)
Date: Sat, 13 Nov 93 12:13:51 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Should we oppose the Data Superhighway/NII?
In-Reply-To: <pmetzger@lehman.com>
Message-ID: <199311132012.MAA21160@mail.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


"Perry E. Metzger" <pmetzger@lehman.com> said:
>Just one question, Doug -- in what sort of "Long Term" do you envision
>individuals needing to be able to send MORE than several thousand
>video signals worth of data simultaneously? Even if you put a camera
>facing every corner of every nook of your house, [...]
>you couldn't exhaust the potential bandwidth of a single fiber.

This is highly misleading. Consider this. The Nyquist limit puts a
fundamental limit on bandwidth; you cannot transmit more information
over a channel than (roughly) the cycles-per-second rate of the carrier.
If a fiber uses optical wavelengths, then that fiber cannot carry more
than a single fully quality analog optical *pixel*. We get a lot more
out of them than that by reducing the quality of the image being sent,
e.g. by sending only 60 frame-samples per second, where each frame-sample
is itself carved up into X * Y discrete pixels, and each pixel has a reduced
dynamic range etc.

My point in saying this is that you're speaking as if current day video
standards are some kind of ultimate load on information transmission,
whereas actually it's just something we've settled for. HDTV will vastly
improve the quality of what we transmit without increasing bandwidth
much, but it is still a far cry from what can be desirable.

60 frames per second makes it impossible to transmit adequate information
about objects moving quickly across the frame of view that are easy to
perceive in person. 1000 frames per second is desirable. 2D images
are less desirable than 3D images. A minimum of about 300 horizontal
views by perhaps 100 vertical views is desirable for 3D viewing. Assume
compression of that 300 * 100 down to a simple factor of 300. Now notice
that depth of field information is desirable for realism (without this
everything is always in focus, good for some things, bad for others).
Let's give that a simple factor of 10.

I'll leave out arguments for increasing e.g. the dynamic range of contrast
and color information, even though they are currently several orders of
magnitude worse than the human eye can perceive.

That all gives us roughly 10 * 300 * 10 = 30,000 times more information
in a single *really* high quality "video" signal than we are currently
accustomed to.

Ultra high quality image transmission like this won't begin to become
significantly widely used for quite a while. But it will happen eventually,
because we'll be able to, and will perceive differences, etc.

> What applications do you envision
>that would require more bandwidth than this, even in twenty or thirty
>years?

Truly high quality video is one answer, even without taking into account
the problems carriers would have in supporting the full bandwidth of
a single fiber in switched networks (combinatorial explosion means that
they can never support every possible connection simultaneously, therefore
switching and multiplexing is here to stay).

The more general answer is to just keep in mind that demand for uses of
technology *always* outstrips the capacity of technology, if it is
affordable. Demand is limited only because of economic issues.
	Doug




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Ken McGlothlen <mcglk@cpac.washington.edu>
Date: Sat, 13 Nov 93 12:14:53 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: The Courtesies of Cypherpunks
In-Reply-To: <9311130846.AA19291@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Message-ID: <9311132017.AA17747@yang.cpac.washington.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu ("L. Detweiler") writes:

| I owe no courtesy to someone who forfeits any respect in their atrocious
| misbehavior.

But wouldn't you say that *any* mailbombing is atrocious behavior?  So why
should you garner further respect?

| [...]  If you mailbomb me, you have forfeited your `right to privacy'.  If
| you email my postmaster a complaint about me before contacting me, you have
| forfeited your `right to privacy'. If you lie to me, you have forfeited your
| `right to privacy'. If you fail to adequately respond to my personal
| accusations of impropriety or criminality, especially meeting them with
| evasion or stonewalling, you have forfeited your `right to privacy'.

The first one has the most credibility as far as forfeiting one's right to
privacy.  But then, I think that mailbombing someone, and then threatening more
mailbombs, might well lead to getting some help from the site administrator, or
even the subnet administrator if need be, because that sort of juvenile,
puerile action isn't warranted at any time.  The last one is the . . . well,
stupidest, because if that held to *everyone*, then nobody would have any right
to privacy.  Anyone could accuse anyone, without basis, of impropriety or
criminality.  Hey, Detweiler, where were you on the night of February 4, 1989?
Someone was breaking into my system from colostate.edu. . . .  Unless it was a
special event, you'd probably have a tough time remembering what happened to
you on that day, much less rounding up witnesses.  So how can you make an
"adequate response"?  Whose definition of "adequate response" do you use?

I just don't think that your rather arbitrary, personal criteria justify
forfeiting one's "right to privacy"---and whose definition do you use for that?

| If you have ever sent me mail as a Snake of Medusa or a Tentacle of a
| Monster, you have forfeited your `right to privacy' -- under ALL your
| pseudonyms and identities.

Pardon?  Meaning that if I'd sent you mail---*any* mail---via anon.penet.fi,
that I forfeit my "right to privacy"?  That's ludicrous.  Inane, even.

| If you have done any of the above to *anyone*, you have forfeited your `right
| to privacy' with respect to EVERYONE in your society!

Again, whose definitions do we use?  I'd really hesitate to use yours as
written above.  Why not my definitions?  Because I think mailbombs at *any*
time are odious, because they not only affect the users involved, but every
site that message goes through.  So have you forfeited your right to privacy?
If not, why?  Who says?

| I also think you have forfeited your right to speak in that society as well
| -- maybe only temporarly -- but in situations where these kinds of outrageous
| behaviors are condoned by a corrupt moderator, no recourse except leaving or
| starting a new list is possible.

Well, who decides?  You or the moderator?  Maybe the moderator prefers his
definitions.

| That is the Detweiler Code of Cyberspatial Ethics and Privacy.

Fortunately, there has been no move to adopt this sort of "code of ethics" on a
general basis.  It's not so much a "code of ethics" as much as it is a "code of
Detweiler uber alles."  It's just too arbitrary and Detweiler-centric, and the
results of violating your code of ethics seems to be swamping people with
mailbombs, so. . . .

| No wonder you guys identify with David Koresh. I assure you, future
| Cyberspace will not be big enough for the both of us.

More ludicrousness.  Cypherpunks is not made of a uniform hive of like-minded
hackers (traditional sense).

| Go ahead, CENSOR me! For the crime of writing `FLAMEBAIT' or, equivalently,
| YELLING THE TRUTH.

What truth?  You haven't really said anything useful here, you've just tried to
dictate what your "code of ethics" is, which boils down to "if you do something
I don't like, at any point, you lose your right to privacy as far as I'm
concerned."  It's arbitrary and capricious; not all that useful to the rest of
us, and hardly appropriate to this list.

| You guys really do have *some* ethics, don't you? ``Don't ever DIRECTLY
| CENSOR ANYTHING!'' ``NEVER GET CAUGHT or be PERSONALLY ACCOUNTABLE or
| RESPONSIBLE for ANYTHING!''

And as for that point, you are guilty of lumping all of us together again,
aren't you?

				---Ken McGlothlen
				   mcglk@cpac.washington.edu
				   mcglk@cpac.bitnet




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: VACCINIA@UNCVX1.OIT.UNC.EDU
Date: Sat, 13 Nov 93 09:19:53 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re:Bandwidth limitations, DNA binary coding
Message-ID: <01H59LQZ0IG20028BH@UNCVX1.OIT.UNC.EDU>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

Perry writes:
>15 symbols, HALF a byte (actually a touch less.) One nybble can express 16
>possible symbols (or one Hex digit, or whatever.)

Oops, I stand corrected, 15 symbols half a byte. What I was trying to convey 
is that GenBank (the repository for genomic sequence data) has a specific 
format for binary representation of DNA sequence data. Most genomic analysis 
programs use GenBank sequence format now (some use EMBL which is similar) and 
probably will in the future. Thus, the half byte per GATC symbol is defined as 
convention, not by the fewest binary digits neccesary for encoding them. It 
may waste bandwidth but that's no problem for fiber optics. Which is how this 
thread started.

>plus, of course, the genome is highly compressable -- lots of repeated
>sequences, especially in interons.

This brings up an interesting topic. There are four classes of DNA: Foldback 
DNA, highly repetitive DNA, middle-repetitive DNA and single-copy DNA. 
Foldback DNA consists of palindromic sequences which form hairpin like 
structures. Highly repetitive DNA is made up of short sequences from several 
to hundreds of bases long (repeated around 5 x 10^5 times). Middle repetitive 
DNA consists of longer sequences, hundreds or thousands of bases long (these 
appear hundreds of times in the genome). Single-copy DNA sequences are usually 
genes themselves, of which (in humans) it is estimated that there are around 
1 x 10^5.

Since the genome is highly redundant (in mammals up to 60% of the genome is 
repetitive sequence), you could probably compress alot of it just by 
designating symbols for specific repetitive elements. Most of the repetitive 
nature of the genome is found as highly repetitive sequence localized as
tandem arrays (not in introns). However, a second class of element known as 
SINEs and LINEs are found in introns, gene flanking regions and intergenic 
regions. The most widely characterized SINE is the Alu sequence, which is 
approximately 300 bases long and scattered throughout the genome over 
5 x 10^5 times. This constitutes 5-6% of the genome! That's a lot of 
compressability.

I often wonder if the redundancy is a way to encrypt a species genome, thus 
keeping different species from genetic communication. The "key" being millions 
of random base pairings which allow like species to decrypt their own genetic 
code and successfully have progeny. Pairings between species that are too
dissimilar would be a refractory event because the key is not homologous. 
By the way, genes are made up of exons and introns.

Scott G. Morham              ! The First, 
Vaccinia@uncvx1.oit.unc.edu  !           Second
PGP Public Key by Request    !                  and Third Levels
                             !        of Information Storage and Retrieval
                             ! DNA,                       
                             !     Biological Neural Nets,
                             !                            Cyberspace

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Version: 2.3a

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YmHv5hPpusiXx6jt2tVGPnPyH0TVtdFb5Cy1YVnvLydgU4FPblJAO7chWuc5EPXn
7/SQ29AuGrDnWu9gEGaQiqEUgn40idPgvDVVQPikAX8tn5OmWo8vygMwIYgicQUh
Po8BHvPSLfg=
=ek9F
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From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Karl Lui Barrus <klbarrus@owlnet.rice.edu>
Date: Sat, 13 Nov 93 10:24:53 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: REMAIL: scan, folders scripts
Message-ID: <9311131821.AA15215@arcadien.owlnet.rice.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Well, I put two PERL scripts I wrote at the ftp site (named
misc.elm.scripts.tar.gz); here is the README file:

scan is the script which prints out signature information of pgp
signed messages (instead of where the message came from).  Thus, if
pgp signed mail is sent through an anonymous remailer, you see who
signed the message instead of where it came from.  The inner loop is
ugly and needs major reworking; I've noted this below and in a comment
in the code :-)

It would be easy to include this in the mh 'folder' command, but I
don't have mh anymore here on owlnet :(  Integration into elm itself
would be great.

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

These are two experimental PERL scripts I wrote which report
information about elm mail folders.

folders prints a summary of mail in your ~/Mail directory.  It prints
out how many letters are in each folders, and how many files are in
each directory.

~> folders
Folder     austin         :    4 messages
Folder     cypher         :   20 messages
Folder     educom         :    1 message
Folder     inc            :   17 messages
Directory  misc           :   12 messages
Folder     store          :   26 messages
Folder     ysn            :    0 messages

- --------------------

scan prints out a more detailed summary of a folder in the ~/Mail
directory.  It prints message number, who the message is from, and the
subject.

~>scan cypher
   1  hfinney@shell.portal.com   Chaum's credentials (technical question)
   2  hughes@ah.com              Chaum's credentials (technical question)
   3  hfinney@shell.portal.com   Signing keys for nyms
   4  hfinney@shell.portal.com   message depots, packet routing?
   5  hughes@ah.com              Signing keys for nyms
   6  szabo@netcom.com           Commerce models

scan also takes an optional argument: -p
this will make scan look for pgp signed messages, and attempt to
verify them.  An asterisk is printed at each signed message, and the
signer's address is printed instead.

~>scan -p cypher
   1* Hal Finney <74076.1041@com Chaum's credentials (technical question)
   2  hughes@ah.com              Chaum's credentials (technical question)
   3* Hal Finney <74076.1041@com Signing keys for nyms
   4* Hal Finney <74076.1041@com message depots, packet routing?
   5  hughes@ah.com              Signing keys for nyms
   6  szabo@netcom.com           Commerce models

Here, we see three messages are signed, and the signer's address is
printed instead.  This distinction is important if a message is sent
via and anonymous remailer, for example.  In this case, instead of
printing the anonymous remailer as who sent the message, you will see
who signed the message (which may in turn be a pseudonym, etc.)

BUGS: 

folders counts the number of message by looking for 'From' at the
beginning of a line.  This causes problems if the text of a message
contains 'From' at the left, or if a message contains a forwarded
message, or somehow pastes in another message's header.  In these
cases, the message count will be off.

scan probably also makes this mistake.  In fact, you will find the
inner loop of scan to be pretty ugly.  I will clean it up eventually.

scan winds up piping message to PGP to check signatures.  This
degrades performance.

scan is not able to deal with pathological files: pgp messages that
don't have an end delimiter, etc.

One of these days I will read RFC-822 and other relevant documents and
make the message count accurate.

Comments, bug fixes, enhancements :-) are all welcome at
klbarrus@owlnet.rice.edu 

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.3a

iQCVAgUBLOUhEoOA7OpLWtYzAQG4PAP/eTw/EWw0wlQ4QVpHfUP6OI3sWdKOltwN
3pgB41JxK1sY/GCnP8rCP9HDEkY/OePTBZDsu9CGJG1fneTsZIlCXrXpKSGzQpvC
94819bdF/+OFe5DcMUcaTcsG/KN3asw3TO0ed4KyOXqTE/SrAIyHsChgKRtHO70u
3uuLWrp0nR8=
=vVg8
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: doug@netcom.com (Doug Merritt)
Date: Sat, 13 Nov 93 12:44:53 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Bandwidth limitations
In-Reply-To: <clark@metal.psu.edu>
Message-ID: <199311132045.MAA24370@mail.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>Clark Reynard <clark@metal.psu.edu> said:
>Perry writes:
>
>[Elegant refutation of all examples I give in original article.]
>
>Perhaps some true bandwidth stretchers:
>
>Complete maps of all the known universe, with spectrographic assays,

It occurs to me that Perry will refute my attempted refutation of his
refutation by pointing out that even a factor of 30,000 in video
won't saturate theoretical fiber limits, and that he may consider
your examples too fanciful.

But part of what we're talking about is just timing, even Perry said so.
We cannot yet modulate fiber at its theoretical limits. To do that we'll
need optical frequency sub-band frequency modulation, and that hasn't
even been achieved in the lab yet. (FM tuneable dye can't be modulated
at optical rates. Semiconductor "variable frequency" modulated lasers
can only switch between discrete frequencies.)

Some think it will take twenty years to achieve this. But I'm optimistic
and hoping for 5 to 10 years. (Unsure about commercial deployment, but
let's say it is fast and can use existing fibers, if not trunk equipment.)

So if you're "realistic" about when we'll be able to achieve fiber
saturation modulation, we're also far enough into the future that it
gets easier to see that we may have completely novel demands on information
transmission by then, and that existing demands will continue to cause
problems for existing fiber technology.

Conversely if one is optimistic about achieving theoretical limits on
fiber, then the fine points of the argument begin to be relevant. That
factor of 30,000 for video won't be enough to fill the fiber. Receiving
every global TV and Internet (ultra high quality) video transmission
simultaneously (to record and allow later channel switching) might do
it, but I have to admit that it seems chancy.

So it all comes down to the time frame in which the theoretical limits
are achieved.

Unless one gets speculative...for instance, nanotechonology scan-transmit-
and-rebuild could easily more than saturate even a large number of fibers.

Or slightly less blue sky: if your computer is an array of 10,000 optical
computers each operating at 100 gigahertz, and doing a distributed computation
with other systems over the net. (In this case networks are *always*
the bottleneck.)

Anyway the whole subject seems debatable and a matter of which numbers
one cares to predict for which future year. But we all agree that it's
merely a question of *when* fiber runs out of steam, not whether.
	Doug




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Derek Atkins <warlord@MIT.EDU>
Date: Sat, 13 Nov 93 11:29:53 PST
To: lear35!mdbomber@nebula.acs.uci.edu (Matt Bartley)
Subject: Re: key servers
In-Reply-To: <9311131901.AA23353@lear35.vlpa.ca.us>
Message-ID: <9311131926.AA01059@m1-115-1.MIT.EDU>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


send a message with a subject of "help" to any of the keyservers.

For example, send this message:

	To: pgp-public-keys@pgp.mit.edu
	From: <your address>
	Subject: help

Hope this helps.

-derek




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "L. Detweiler" <ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Date: Sat, 13 Nov 93 23:05:32 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Soothing Sayings
In-Reply-To: <9311131656.AA10352@illuminati.IO.COM>
Message-ID: <9311140705.AA05139@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Mr. Barnes, obviously deeply upset, emotionally objects to my simple
questions, but not ever directly, but implicitly buried and obscured in
the most spectacular set of ad hominem attacks I have ever been
privileged to find in my mailbox, outside of His Royal Eminence.

Mr. Barnes, I would be interested in your own responses to that set of
questions, or your reasons for why you should not have to answer them.
Do you think they represent a `witchhunt'? perhaps an `inquisition'?
Would you like me to show you my own responses, to help you figure out
how to understand them? are they too complicated for you? are they an
invasion of your privacy? would you be embarassed by the answers? would
you have to lie to evade incrimination? do you wish to deceive others
of your pseudospoofing?

>I used to
>think you were kind of funny. This stopped about the time you (quite
>seriously, and in some detail) compared me to Darth Vader... I convinced
>you I wasn't the "Hydra", so I was just a seducing minion.

Mr. Barnes, you tried to convince me of the Joy of Pseudospoofing, for
which I suggested you were trying to convert me to the  Dark Side
(actually, I am indebtedly grateful for that beautiful inspiration for
my essay). You told me that E.Hughes' lectures on the subject of
pseudospoofing were what drew you to it in the first place! But this is
buried very deep in my comprehensive archives, from many weeks ago. (I
encourage all other cypherpunks to keep very good archives, because
some day we will be able to separate all the pseudospoofed identities
from real ones, and it will be quite shocking, I assure you. Some
prominent cypherpunks are extremely terrified and staunchly opposed to
archives, for obvious reasons.)

>you have done more than anyone else to 
>disrupt this list and make it next to impossible for real work to get 
>done on it (including work that would help mitigate problems of the 
>kind you believe your "enemies" are perpetrating on you.) 

No one is interested in preventing pseudospoofing here, quite to the
contrary they are interested in secretly pursing it at the expense of
others, including their own associates in this group,it is the NUMBER
ONE PRIORITY, and I am quite repulsed by your baldfaced lie in the face
of reality and my oceans of fanatic hate mail (which yours is only the
latest on the pile). I asked many weeks ago that E.Hughes and T.C.May
condemn pseudospoofing. They had problems doing so, for obvious
reasons! I asked that they prohibit it from this list, or ask promises
to refrain from it. Again, an outrageous demand, apparently, based on
the response. I asked that they reveal their own practice! I have been
continually whittling down my demands, and have every time been
rebuffed. Honest cypherpunks, why is that? do you care if other people
are systematically deceiving you? When will you be free of the jaws of
this delusion? I am even offering to GO AWAY COMPLETELY if some SIMPLE
QUESTIONS are ANSWERED HONESTLY.

As for disruptions in the list, it is a fantasy that *I* have caused
any over its lifetime. It is the evasions and the stonewalling that
have caused all the *recent* commotion! it is the rampant
pseudospoofing that has poisoned `real work', and you make me your
scapegoat and martyr for its evils and your own depravity and perversions.

>You persist in baiting the less-restrained members of the list with your 
>antaigonistic, paranoid, policial/social rants, which have accomplished 
>nothing producive, except to sap the energy of people who would otherwise
>be writing code, engaging in PR for our cause, educating one another, and
>working towards a consensus or at least an honest delineation of where
>we disagree as mature individuals (rather than characterizing folks as evil 
>spawn of darkness).

Nothing but stark and utter lies. You blame the `movements'
shortcomings on myself, one person who has had the audacity to
challenge those who wish to promote their secret conspiracies of
pseudospoofing. PSEUDOSPOOFING IS THE ONLY ISSUE. I have done
everything productive to sap the energy of those writing code solely to
promote their pseudospoofing, engaging in false PR for the cause of
`Privacy for the Masses' or the `Cryptographic Revolution' when in fact
it is all nothing but deception and lies in favor of pseudospoofing,
and conspiring between one another--And I have been flamed into
oblivion by snakes and tentacles who urinate on Democracy and Consensus
and anything Egalitarian, so do not assault me with your hypocrisies
about `working towards a consensus' or `an honest delineation of where
we disagree as mature individuals', because there is nothing here but
PUERILE PSEUDOSPOOFING FANTASIES.

>Note that your postmaster, when I contacted him, made it clear that he
>had instructed you to stop doing whatever it was you were doing that
>was upsetting people so much.

I wonder how your postmaster would feel about pseudospoofing. Or are
you your own postmaster? Or does E.Hughes help maintain your site?
Those who mail my postmaster are nothing but vile and shameful cowards
with machine gun arsenals assaulting a man who has attempted to expose
frauds, poseurs, and hypocrites with nothing but his bare hands and the
Truth. You are such a slimy hypocrite, to have never have even used the
word `pseudospoofing' once in your little rant, only to say that I am
`upsetting people so much'.

>you
>have turned this thing into a nonsensical, paranoid, one-man jihad against 
>cypherpunks on a variety of *other* lists, while continuing your activities 
>on this one.

`jihad'? well, yes, I would call your pseudoreligion precisely that.
very curious how many lists they have invaded and infiltrated and
littered with their eloquent prose for Glorious Privacy, True
Anonymity, Liberating Cash, and No Oppresive Identification, yourself
included. Perhaps you would like to indicate what lists that other
cypherpunks are on, and what they have said there? (Reminds me of my
essay in RISKS -- have you seen that, by chance?) What is your own
knowledge on the the subject, hm? Can I ask without you going into
seizures or convulsions?

>I intend to go beyond your postmaster on the next try, to various former
>classmates and old friends of mine who are computation center employees,
>faculty, and administration members at CSU now.

Anyone I respect will not ask me to compromise my ethics.
Unfortunately, you do not meet this criteria.

>Unless, of course, you 
>cut this shit out and leave us alone, or at least go back on whatever 
>medication you were taking before you went from a mildly annoying over-
>eager wannabe to a full-fledged psychopath.

it is the pseudospoofing psychopunks who are the full-fledged
psychopaths. I will leave when the so-called `leadership' answers some
simple questions truthfully. Look, honest cypherpunks, OPEN YOUR EYES,
see to what extreme lengths that they have gone to, to deceive you of
their pseudospoofing, and EVADE AND STONEWALL. Reminds me of someone
talking about `betrayal, treachery, and high treason'!

You can have your secret conspiracies, xor your public credibility, for
the moment. some day, you will have neither. I suppose you could censor
me, too. Maybe E.Hughes could conduct a little poll, and state that the
majority decided to censor me. Oh, wait, you guys don't believe in
polls and voting and the majority. The Majority is Always Wrong. Well,
let's see, I guess Mr. Hughes could decide to unilaterally censor me.
But that wouldn't seem to be compatible with the cypherpunk charter. I
was looking at it recently!
(soda.berkeley.edu:/pub/cypherpunks/brainwashing). it said that
`cypherpunks do not seek to prevent others from speaking' or something like that. 

Maybe E.Hughes will change the charter and throw me out. You guys in
California could do that at your next monthly `conspiracy'. BTW, when
is it?  What do you do at those great meetings, anyway, Mr. Barnes? I
asked that someone provide minutes, so that everyone on the list may
share in the lovely `movement', but there was a lot of hostility to
that idea. Why could that be? 

Mr. Barnes, please let me know how the CA group decides to persecute me
further, beyond all the depravities I have been subject to so far.   I
do appreciate your indicating that you are going to attempt to
blackmail me through close associates, it's a fair warning. Clearly,
`they' are desperate. The facade is crumbling.

Imagine, all this fantastic hostility directed solely at me, for asking
some wholly innocuous questions. Cypherpunks, why is everyone so upset?
It makes me wonder if there is a core group hiding something or
covering something up. a `conspiracy'? (hee, hee, love that word).
Maybe I would have to move to CA to find out, eh?

Once again, I volunteer to leave if they are answered truthfully and
publicly revealed!




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Mark W. Eichin" <eichin@paycheck.cygnus.com>
Date: Mon, 15 Nov 93 01:30:20 PST
To: ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu
Subject: Key Servers
In-Reply-To: <9311150432.AA21999@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Message-ID: <9311140602.AA03621@paycheck.cygnus.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Executive summary: if you care about true people, sign their keys, or
create an authority that you trust to sign them, and the keyservers
will automatically take care of the rest.

This is really a misunderstanding. (When people start using all
uppercase letters, it usually is.) I don't like to see people I work
closely with (Hi Derek!) the object of such wrath...

>> false. There could be a network of `true identity' key servers just as
>> easily as there is a network of PSEUDOSPOOFED LIES.

Take it easy for a bit here... the key servers (by which I mean the
PGP keyservers such as are run on toxicwaste.mit.edu and elsewhere)
*don't provide any authentication*... all they provide is keys. If you
trust a key because you got it from a key server, then you have
perhaps misunderstood the concept of digital signatures -- you should
be able to "validate" the key based on what's in it, not where you got
it from.

That said, if you or someone of similar interests wanted to provide a
"true identity" key service, you'd simply have to create a key for
that service, advertise it, convince people to belive that you really
were doing a "true identity" service (this is the social side, not the
technical side -- you can't convince them in purely electronic means
any more than you can convince them you even *exist* in purely
electronic means... but you can find some way of building *real world*
trust that suffices...) and then start signing the keys of those you
assert are "true people".

And guess what -- Derek's key server, *and all the others*, would
start carrying your signatures and keys. They wouldn't filter them out
- it wouldn't be worth the trouble :-) and it would be against their
mission which is to provide *keys* not *judgements*...
	
>> so, Mr. Keyserver, considering that this (your?) software could be used
>> TODAY to help build up a true identity system, why do you oppose using

Please, sir, do not defame the people who are making your desires
possible. Derek has *not* opposed letting *you* sign and publish lists
of true-person keys. He's just brought up the practical point that he
doesn't have time to do it (nor, perhaps, interest) as well as the
technical point that keyservice has *nothing to do* with validity of
keys. He's being generous and done everything you need for
infrastructure -- all you have to do is identify real people and sign
for them (or convince someone *you trust* to do so.)

I hope this clears things up a bit. Noone is preventing this from
happenning. (If I thought I could make money at it, enough to
compensate for the hassle, I'd consider doing it myself... but it
probably wouldn't be competitive with the RSA PCA's, as it usually
takes a *lot* of money to convince me something is worth the
hassle :-)

				_Mark_ <eichin@paycheck.cygnus.com>
				... or at least I might be...





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: an12070@anon.penet.fi (S. Boxx)
Date: Sat, 13 Nov 93 23:19:58 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: RAMPANT CONSPIRACIES and MASSIVE COVERUP
Message-ID: <9311140716.AA22214@anon.penet.fi>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


As David Letterman says, I don't have a joke here, I just like saying ...

<g>
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
To find out more about the anon service, send mail to help@anon.penet.fi.
Due to the double-blind, any mail replies to this message will be anonymized,
and an anonymous id will be allocated automatically. You have been warned.
Please report any problems, inappropriate use etc. to admin@anon.penet.fi.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: nobody@pmantis.berkeley.edu
Date: Sun, 14 Nov 93 09:23:56 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: CIA admits Timothy May Surveillance: PHOTOS!
Message-ID: <9311141724.AA20420@pmantis.berkeley.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


***********************************************************************
       ________________
      /                \
     / /          \ \   \
     |                  |
    /                  /
   |      ___\ \| | / /
   |      /           |
   |      |     __    |
  /       |       \   |
  |       |        \  |              "HEH HEH HEH !!!!!"
  |       |       __  |             L. Detweiler can eat my
  |      __\     (_o) |               shorts!  Am I Beavis
  |     |             |          /       or am I tcmay?
   \    ||             \        /      PSEUDOSPOOF THIS!
    |   |__             \
    |   |           (*___\
    |   |       _     |
    |   |    //_______|
    |  /       |_|_|_|___/\
     \|       \ -         |
      |       _----_______/
      |      /
      |_____/
***********************************************************************




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: sommerfeld@orchard.medford.ma.us (Bill Sommerfeld)
Date: Sun, 14 Nov 93 09:03:56 PST
To: eichin@paycheck.cygnus.com
Subject: Re: OMNI CARD
In-Reply-To: <9311130243.AA03120@paycheck.cygnus.com>
Message-ID: <199311141647.LAA00315@orchard.medford.ma.us>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


There were apparantly more than two switches; more like 10 or so.

I think there may be two different models of securid cards, one with
and one without switches; the only difference may be in the faceplate
and the factory programming.

					- Bill





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: jel@sutro.SFSU.EDU (John E. Levine)
Date: Sun, 14 Nov 93 15:03:57 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: "Applied Cryptography" at Cody's
Message-ID: <9311142258.AA29711@sutro.SFSU.EDU>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


As of 14:30 today, Cody's in Berkeley has 4-1=3 copys of
"Applied Cryptography" by Schneier.





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Perry E. Metzger" <pmetzger@lehman.com>
Date: Sun, 14 Nov 93 13:00:11 PST
To: "mycal" <mike@netacsys.com>
Subject: Re: Fractal cryptography
In-Reply-To: <2ce44fb5.acsys@NetAcsys.com>
Message-ID: <9311142057.AA07089@snark.lehman.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



"mycal" says:
> On Fri, 12 Nov 1993 19:31:09 -0500, "Perry E. Metzger" <pmetzger@lehman.com> 
wrote:
> > 
> > Amateurs regularly develop systems and claim fantastic things for
> > them. They then turn out to be trivial to break. This has made people
> 
> Just to add a data point, chaos seems to be worth a look.  MIT's
> Research Lab have created new signal-processors designs based on chaos
> theroy for use in secure communication.

I've heard of them. They aren't secure. Just another example of the
same phenomenon.

Perry




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Perry E. Metzger" <pmetzger@lehman.com>
Date: Sun, 14 Nov 93 14:53:58 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: The Courtesies of Cypherpunks
In-Reply-To: <9311130846.AA19291@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Message-ID: <9311142115.AA07098@snark.lehman.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Look, everyone --

Detweiler is a seriously disturbed individual. Sending him mail saying
"what the hell are you doing -- you're nuts" isn't going to do any
good. Crazy people don't think they are crazy. Ignoring is rantings
works a whole lot better than any other strategy.

I only mailbombed him because he was sending me unsolicited personal
mail and wouldn't stop. Otherwise I ignore him, and I advise others to
do the same.

Perry




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Perry E. Metzger" <pmetzger@lehman.com>
Date: Sun, 14 Nov 93 14:33:59 PST
To: "George A. Gleason" <gg@well.sf.ca.us>
Subject: Re: Should we oppose the
In-Reply-To: <199311131105.DAA01673@well.sf.ca.us>
Message-ID: <9311142128.AA07122@snark.lehman.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



"George A. Gleason" says:
> You ask, "why have telecoms prices been declining for years?" and cite
> overseas calls as an example.  In fact, the actual cost of local service has
> gone up over 240% since deregulation, according to a detailed research
> report a friend of mine is about to publish.  

What has happened is that the price the consumer sees has gone up.
AT&T used to subsidize local service with long distance service --
this cross subsidy has ended. Local service is not deregulated
anywhere in the U.S., so your friend's study is meaningless.

Long distance prices have dropped dramatically, even taking subsidy
elimination into account. Competition works, George. Fabian socialism
is what doesn't.

Perry





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "L. Detweiler" <ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Date: Sun, 14 Nov 93 15:50:14 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: The Contortions of Cypherpunks
Message-ID: <9311142347.AA17045@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


N.Szabo <szabo@netcom.com> in RISKS

>I'd like to assure the readers of RISKS that I am in fact a unique person,
>distinct from the other names L. Detweiler listed.  Of the people on his list
>I know from personal contact, all are distinct people in Real Life(tm).  

Give specific evidence to support your claim or retract it. Who do you
know from personal contact? What do you mean that you are `distinct
from other names'?

>Well
>before his post to RISKS, L. Detweiler was provided means of personally
>verifying that many of the names he listed are distinct True Names (eg phone
>numbers he can call), but it doesn't seem to help.

You appear to be referring to my private mail among many different
people. Please elaborate on your claim, or retract it.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Perry E. Metzger" <pmetzger@lehman.com>
Date: Sun, 14 Nov 93 15:33:57 PST
To: doug@netcom.com (Doug Merritt)
Subject: Re: Should we oppose the Data Superhighway/NII?
In-Reply-To: <199311132012.MAA21160@mail.netcom.com>
Message-ID: <9311142218.AA07162@snark.lehman.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Doug Merritt says:
> My point in saying this is that you're speaking as if current day video
> standards are some kind of ultimate load on information transmission,

No, not at all (although limits to quality are in striking range -- CD
audio is as good as human ears can hear, and 24 bits of color is
actually overkill for the discrimination capacity of the human eye). I
merely mention "thousands of video channels" because people are used
to the bandwidth requirements of conventional video so it gives them a
sense of scale.

Perry




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "L. Detweiler" <ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Date: Sun, 14 Nov 93 17:13:59 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: K. Mitnick
Message-ID: <9311150028.AA17481@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Thanks for all the info on K.Mitnick, the `dark side hacker'. Some have
mailed me saying he changed his name and is living, got a job in
security consulting or something like that (!), and is living in `2.5 kids land'

Another few questions. I heard that the judge barred him from using a
modem for life, or something like that. What was the sentence? How is
it being enforced?

Also, I assume that Mr. Mitnick changed his name legally (hee, hee).
Anyway, I would like to email him, if anyone knows his address. 




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "L. Detweiler" <ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Date: Sun, 14 Nov 93 19:20:27 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Key Servers
Message-ID: <9311150320.AA20102@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I wonder if anyone would want to start a PGP key server dedicated only
to *real* identities. Obviously, there is no such demand with the current ones.

And please don't start with the `that would be impossible' arguments. A
key server that had the official policy `if you register here, on your
honor your legal name is what you give, under penalty of public
exposure if you are caught' would be enough for me.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "L. Detweiler" <ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Date: Sun, 14 Nov 93 19:33:58 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: pseudospoofing, copyrights, and ECPA
Message-ID: <9311150332.AA20559@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Some losers are still assaulting me with claims that I failed to
respect His Royal Eminence's privacy by revealing his mailbomb to the
list, saying I was not polite or courteous. Please, hypocrites, go
away. Where does this bizarre philosophy originate? Where do you guys
get your `ethics', anyway? At least have the decency to codify them,
sign your names to them, and stick them on an FTP site if you are going
to spout this bizarre depravity.

Next: Mr. Zions, while one of the `protect the mailbombers privacy'
advocates, brought up some interesting points.

Does the ECPA (the law regulating communications privacy) or the
copyright laws apply to material that was written under a
*pseudonymous* identity? I would consider this a grey area. A court
test would be extremely fascinating. What if work was redistributed if
printed under imaginary identities? the whole aspect of both of the
laws involves *ownership* and *identity*.

If ECPA or copyright laws are interpreted to protect pseudonymous
identities, I propose they be amended and revised to afford no
protection. (Legitimate variations like pseudonymity and anonymity
should be protected in any case.)

One man's opinion. Feel free to stone me some more. Have you figured
out who my personal friends are yet? Have you found any nifty blackmail
on me? I can't wait for the next sordid perversion.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "L. Detweiler" <ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Date: Sun, 14 Nov 93 19:43:59 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: pseudopools
Message-ID: <9311150343.AA20782@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


One application of pseudospoofing, a particularly insideous and
treacherous form, would be to create a `pool' of different accounts.
Everyone in the group can negotiate with each other `behind the scenes'
when to post from different accounts. This would be even more difficult
to detect than regular pseudospoofing (and, IMHO, even that much more
of a perversion) because all traces of consistency of identity are
subverted and lost.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: J. Michael Diehl <mdiehl@triton.unm.edu>
Date: Sun, 14 Nov 93 20:15:16 PST
To: MIKEINGLE@delphi.com (Mike Ingle)
Subject: Re: True Name Keyservers
In-Reply-To: <01H5BMFCSV829D59GI@delphi.com>
Message-ID: <9311150414.AA27814@triton.unm.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


According to Mike Ingle:
> 
> Another approach would be to have some people who certify keys as
> being True Name keys, using special signer keys which are labeled
> "True Name certifier key" or something similar. These certifiers
> would be risking their own credibility if they were tricked, so
> they would have a motive to be careful. If this was a for-profit
> undertaking (i.e. "send me ten bucks and a copy of your birth
> certificate, driver's license, and a third form of ID") then it could
> be fairly effective. Any of you capitalists out there...? 

I'd be willing to do it for free as soon as I develope the s/w tools I'd want
to use to automate as much as I can.  Give me a couple of weeks; I'll make some
kind of announcement.

J. Michael Diehl   ;^)  |*The 2nd Amendment is there in case the 
mdiehl@triton.unm.edu   | Government forgets about the 1st!  <RL>
Mike.Diehl@f29.n301.z1  |*God is a good Physicist, and an even 
    .fidonet.org        | better Mathematician.  <Me>
al945@cwns9.ins.cwru.edu|*I'm just looking for the opportunity to 
 (505) 299-2282 (voice) | be Politically Incorrect! <Me>
Can we impeach him yet? |*Protected by 18 USC 2511 and 18 USC 2703. 



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: nobody@eli-remailerEternal Optimist <na26436@anon.penet.fi>
Date: Sun, 14 Nov 93 21:20:19 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Hazard of encrypt to self?
Message-ID: <9311150518.AA06287@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

I always encrypt stuff when I send it to the remailers. I always encrypt to myself along with the remailer, in case I need to look at the message again. But since trying to decrypt a message reveals the id's of the keys that can decrypt it, this reveals information about the sender of the message that wouldn't be available if I only encrypted to the remailer.

A partial solution - I generated a new key pair to use for the encrypt-to-self function (a nice short one). I put some meaningless nonsense in the id, so anyone who observes my message on its way to the remailer will no know it is from

Eternal!Optimist@anon.penet.fi   (copyright 1993, Eternal Optimist [Ha Ha Ha])
 0) 0) =:()]-<                                    <na26436@anon.penet.fi>
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.3

iQCVAgUBLObHdojvfLxJbYYtAQEZAgP8Db7qpgqy17wmP91/zl5ZioF/53IIugpW
eFjJVtT/UC0wEB/wdvQSBuG2xoXFPWxwWraEtWUCvsAP580juKiGSvmpZARxnm30
yfHVuqv+cfo8FYm7KJpWGdSIFmoqvG8h/a4wiGWMg/Dnai5wOZtRt0mWDyftj+gt
EzgFJSwTtIc=
=xEZA
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "L. Detweiler" <ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Date: Sun, 14 Nov 93 20:33:58 PST
To: Derek Atkins <warlord@MIT.EDU>
Subject: Re: Key Servers
In-Reply-To: <9311150425.AA19297@oliver.MIT.EDU>
Message-ID: <9311150432.AA21999@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>> I wonder if anyone would want to start a PGP key server dedicated only
>> to *real* identities. Obviously, there is no such demand with the current ones.
>
>This defeats the purpose for which the PGP Keyservers were created.
>The Keyservers were created to give a *SINGLE* place where you could
>go to request a PGP key for some name (and it doesn't matter whether
>that name is real or not).

<sigh> nobody is interested in preventing pseudospoofing here. the
people who have most maneuvered themselves into a position to aid
future cyberspace are instead constraining it. that's the point, isn't
it? gosh, how could I have been so blind...

>Having a keyserver "dedicated only to real identities" would violate
>the basis for which the Keyservers were originally created.

as YOU conceive them.

>By proposing a split in the Keyserver service, you propose breaking
>the initial assumption under which the keyservers were created:
>Everyone has access to the whole public keyring from any server.

false. There could be a network of `true identity' key servers just as
easily as there is a network of PSEUDOSPOOFED LIES.

> > And please don't start with the `that would be impossible' arguments. A
>> key server that had the official policy `if you register here, on your
>> honor your legal name is what you give, under penalty of public
>> exposure if you are caught' would be enough for me.
>
>It is,
>however, unlikely that anyone will, and I personally will oppose any
>such move to provide a service such as this.

the real question, cypherpunks, is what you would do to THWART,
SABOTAGE, and DESTROY any such system or attempt ... (that is, beyond
your current impressive resume)

>However it is not the job of the Keyserver to provide any sort of
>policy as to the keys it provides.  As I've said, the Keyserver is for
>key distribution, not for any sort of key validation.  

so, Mr. Keyserver, considering that this (your?) software could be used
TODAY to help build up a true identity system, why do you oppose using
it in that fashion? I mean, besides that you are a Cypherpunk.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: jim@bilbo.suite.com (Jim Miller)
Date: Sun, 14 Nov 93 19:45:27 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Key Servers
Message-ID: <9311150344.AA09795@bilbo.suite.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



L. Detweiler writes:

> I wonder if anyone would want to start a PGP key server
> dedicated only to *real* identities. Obviously, there
> is no such demand with the current ones.
> 

> And please don't start with the `that would be
> impossible' arguments. A key server that had the
> official policy `if you register here, on your honor your
> legal name is what you give, under penalty of public
> exposure if you are caught' would be enough for me. 

> 


It's not PGP, but RSA, Inc. and others (Internet Policy Registration Authority)  
are already setting up a system for registering pubilc-keys that are "proven"  
to belong to actual humans.  You can read about it in RSA's newletter available  
at their ftp site (rsa.com).  The newsletter is called "Ciphertext - The RSA  
newsletter".

Of course, their system for "proving" the identity of a human is not perfect.   
If you can obtain some fake IDs, you can defeat their public-key registration  
system.  This is probably true for any non-biometric identification system.


Jim_Miller@suite.com





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Jef Poskanzer <jef@ee.lbl.gov>
Date: Sun, 14 Nov 93 21:50:18 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: "Applied Cryptography" at Cody's
Message-ID: <9311150547.AA18982@ace.ee.lbl.gov>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>As of 14:30 today, Cody's in Berkeley has 4-1=3 copys of
>"Applied Cryptography" by Schneier.

One fewer as of 16:30.  They had it hidden in the back room upstairs, but
I made them file the rest in the math section.  I'm about halfway through
it now.  It's pretty nifty!
---
Jef




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: karn@qualcomm.com (Phil Karn)
Date: Sun, 14 Nov 93 22:00:18 PST
To: mnemonic@eff.org
Subject: Re: LAW: Wireless interception
Message-ID: <9311150557.AA04875@servo>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Mike is correct that early models of cordless phones could often be
picked up on broadcast radios. Their base stations transmitted just
above the AM broadcast band (in the 1.7 Mhz region). Since then, all
new cordless phones operate on the 46 and 49 Mhz bands, which
generally require a scanner to receive.

However, cell phones still operate in what used to be UHF TV channels
70-83, and it is still possible in some cases to intercept cell phone
calls on a UHF TV set. So much for *that* theory. :-)

I still think my original explanation for the ECPA's distinction
between cordless and cellular phones is the dominant one.

Phil




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Jef Poskanzer <jef@ee.lbl.gov>
Date: Sun, 14 Nov 93 22:34:00 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: *hot* pseudospoofing ideas!
Message-ID: <9311150631.AA19034@ace.ee.lbl.gov>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>here's an interesting idea. Suppose that whenever cypherpunks in favor
>of pseudospoofing emailed me, I put all their posts into a big pot....

Say....  Does anyone have an archive of Detweiler's messages handy?
There's this nifty program called "travesty" that I suddenly have
an urge to play with.
---
Jef




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "L. Detweiler" <ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Date: Sun, 14 Nov 93 21:40:18 PST
To: Derek Atkins <warlord@MIT.EDU>
Subject: Re: Key Servers
In-Reply-To: <9311150457.AA15079@oliver.MIT.EDU>
Message-ID: <9311150536.AA23117@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>I think its because we don't see pseudospoofing as a "danger" like you
>do.  Personally, I consider it a necessity.  I like being able to hide
>behind an anonymous identity (not that I do, mind you).  I don't see
>pseudospoofing as "constraining".  On the contrary, I see it as
>freeing us.

DAMNIT! will you CYPHERPUNKS stop CONFLATING 

1) pseudonymity
2) anonymity
3) pseudoanonymity

you jerks CONTINUE to claim that (1) (2) and (3) are EQUIVALENT

>No the software isn't mine, but I consider myself it's God Father.
>Mike Graff (explorer@iastate.edu) and I were talking about this a long
>time, and he just beat me to learning enough PERL to write the thing.
>But I'd like to think that the two of us did most all of the design of
>it.  So, in a way, it is my software.

Oh. I see. And you would regulate its use on the Internet. Gosh, that
sounds kind of like one of those fascist oppressive restrictions by an
outside authority. Something to bludgeon.

>And, as I said, it is not the job of the Keyserver to provide any sort
>of policy.  The job of the Keyserver is to distribute keys.  Nothing
>more.  Nothing less.  The job of identifying True Names is solely a
>job for Digital Signatures, not a job for the Keyserver.  

Call it a Keyserver, or a Digital Signature Server or a Toxic Waste
Dump, frankly, I don't care what you call it.

>I am a cypherpunk.  I don't believe in trusting something on faith
>alone, but you seem to be asking for that.

you `cypherpunks' have no idea what a true society constitutes. trust
is inherent to one. you guys all subscribe to the idea, `nothing is bad
if you can get away with it.' `if you can get away with it, you should try it.'

we'll see who has the last laugh.

HA, HA.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "L. Detweiler" <ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Date: Sun, 14 Nov 93 21:50:51 PST
To: cman@IO.COM (Douglas Barnes)
Subject: Re: Key Servers
In-Reply-To: <9311150500.AA10063@illuminati.IO.COM>
Message-ID: <9311150550.AA23351@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Mr. Barnes somehow found it possible to write me without assaulting me
with vicious ad hominem attacks, vilifications, obfuscations,
misrepresentations, all approaching blatant lies, completely tangential
points to my posts, and cc:ing my postmaster this time. My postmaster
and I thank you. It is free, too, of a subtle hint of censoring or
blackmailing me by going to `various former classmates and old friends
of mine who are computation center employees, faculty, and
administration members at CSU now.' No tarring me as a `overeager
wannabe' (well, I don't wannabe a pseudospoofer) and a `full fledged
psychopath' on `medication'...

>Why don't you just do the following, which would serve everyone's 
>interests, and would be well within the spirit of the movement:

`movement'? I thought there was no cypherpunk movement. There is only software.

[identity database]
>1) Encourage the existing plan to have *all* PGP keys served.

I dunno. This is a big step. The choice at this point could really
affect future cyberspace, eh? Frankly, I think serious professional
uses of the internet are fundamentally incompatible with
pseudospoofing, and will make design decisions based on that
incontrovertable premise. Like quarantining databases from existing
toxic waste dumps.

>4) (optionally) provide a service mapping from keys -> Real Names,
>   for the ultra-paranoid.

you have just classified 99.9 % of the population as `ultra paranoid'.
But that .1% of the degenerates have never understood the idea of civility anyway.

>People who share your concerns about pseudospoofing would make you
>their most trusted (or only trusted) signer of keys. Presto. Those
>who care, can believe only those keys signed by you are real. Those
>who don't give a damn, believe what they want.

hee, hee. or believe in elaborate, complex fantasies straight from SF...

As an example, look at Ender's Game, where Ender's brother and sister
get on the net under pseudonyms, and get treated just like everyone
else.  There is no biases.  People are judged on their actions and
words, not by who they are, how old they are, what they look like, or
anything like that.  Maybe you are blind, I don't know.  I've never
met you.

who wrote that? I forget <g>

>Mike Graff (explorer@iastate.edu) and I were talking about this a long
>time, and he just beat me to learning enough PERL to write the thing.
>But I'd like to think that the two of us did most all of the design of
>it.  So, in a way, it is my software.

I wonder if Mr. Graff would like to weigh in in this little discussion.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Mike Ingle <MIKEINGLE@delphi.com>
Date: Sun, 14 Nov 93 20:00:16 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: True Name Keyservers
Message-ID: <01H5BMFCSV829D59GI@delphi.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>"ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu"  "L. Detweiler" wrote:
>Subject: Key Servers

>I wonder if anyone would want to start a PGP key server dedicated only
>to *real* identities. Obviously, there is no such demand with the current
>ones.

>And please don't start with the `that would be impossible' arguments. A
>key server that had the official policy `if you register here, on your
>honor your legal name is what you give, under penalty of public
>exposure if you are caught' would be enough for me.

That might be somewhat effective if there was a way to expose the
person's True Name if they were caught using a nym. If the only thing
to be exposed was the falsity of the nym, the person could just create
a new nym, with no penalty for lying except a bit of inconvenience.

Another approach would be to have some people who certify keys as
being True Name keys, using special signer keys which are labeled
"True Name certifier key" or something similar. These certifiers
would be risking their own credibility if they were tricked, so
they would have a motive to be careful. If this was a for-profit
undertaking (i.e. "send me ten bucks and a copy of your birth
certificate, driver's license, and a third form of ID") then it could
be fairly effective. Any of you capitalists out there...? 

Somewhere I read about "is-a-person" certificates, which, if I remember
correctly, allow you to prove your identity is unique without giving out
your True Name. How do these work? Is this a blind signature of your key?

Whatever is done involving True Names, nyms should have a right to
exist as well.

--- MikeIngle@delphi.com




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: cman@IO.COM (Douglas Barnes)
Date: Sun, 14 Nov 93 21:03:58 PST
To: ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu (L. Detweiler)
Subject: Re: Key Servers
In-Reply-To: <9311150432.AA21999@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Message-ID: <9311150500.AA10063@illuminati.IO.COM>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> false. There could be a network of `true identity' key servers just as
> easily as there is a network of PSEUDOSPOOFED LIES.
> 

Why don't you just do the following, which would serve everyone's 
interests, and would be well within the spirit of the movement:

1) Encourage the existing plan to have *all* PGP keys served.

2) Provide a service (possibly for a small fee) wherein people could 
   send you copies of their PGP key along with a notarized statement.

3) Sign those keys with your key, or a key you generate for this
   purpose. 

4) (optionally) provide a service mapping from keys -> Real Names,
   for the ultra-paranoid.

People who share your concerns about pseudospoofing would make you
their most trusted (or only trusted) signer of keys. Presto. Those
who care, can believe only those keys signed by you are real. Those
who don't give a damn, believe what they want.

-- 
----------------                                             /\ 
Douglas Barnes            cman@illuminati.io.com            /  \ 
Chief Wizard         (512) 448-8950 (d), 447-7866 (v)      / () \
Illuminati Online          metaverse.io.com 7777          /______\



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "L. Detweiler" <ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Date: Sun, 14 Nov 93 22:05:18 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: D. Barnes
Message-ID: <9311150604.AA23587@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>You have become major pest, you have done more than anyone else to
>disrupt this list and make it next to impossible for real work to get
>done on it (including work that would help mitigate problems of the
>kind you believe your "enemies" are perpetrating on you.)

please, characterize this `work' and your own involvement in it.

>we don't see pseudospoofing as a "danger" like you
>do.  Personally, I consider it a necessity.  I like being able to hide
>behind an anonymous identity (not that I do, mind you).  I don't see
>pseudospoofing as "constraining".  On the contrary, I see it as
>freeing us.

oh.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "L. Detweiler" <ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Date: Sun, 14 Nov 93 22:13:59 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: *hot* pseudospoofing ideas!
Message-ID: <9311150612.AA23683@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


here's an interesting idea. Suppose that whenever cypherpunks in favor
of pseudospoofing emailed me, I put all their posts into a big pot.
Since they all advocate the same ideas, I would just file all the
different paragraphs in favor of pseudanonymity, against democracy, in
favor of anarchy, in favor of tax evasion etc. in different folders.
Then, whenever one of the cypherpunks sends me mail, I just pick a
paragraph at random from the folders that match his idea. 

I could do this with public postings too. I have been filling out very
many form letters lately anyway on the same old tired, depraved ideas.
And I might even have a lot of fun with misattributing people's
writing. That would be quite clever! I'm sure the cypherpunks would get
a great kick out of that. The blurring of identities is perfect. No one
would know who said what! Why, I might even put together software that
promotes all this, and turn it loose on the Cypherpunks list (but of
course, not tell anyone--that would take all the fun of it, and
besides, if they knew they might leave).

There's nothing unethical about it, because I *can* do it. It would be
like those scenarios right out of that great science fiction, like
Enders Game. I could pretend that different cypherpunks existed. No one
would care. The effect would be the same. They are all interchangeable
anyway. there is only a message.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: J. Michael Diehl <mdiehl@triton.unm.edu>
Date: Sun, 14 Nov 93 22:25:18 PST
To: MIKEINGLE@delphi.com (Mike Ingle)
Subject: Re: True Name keys
In-Reply-To: <01H5BPPICLNM9EEVDF@delphi.com>
Message-ID: <9311150624.AA01761@triton.unm.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


According to Mike Ingle:
> 
> JMDiehl: your service would be more widely trusted, and potentially
> profitable, if you bought a copy of ViaCrypt PGP for legality and
> charged a small fee for your services. If there is money and your
> reputation at stake, people will assume you are going to be more
> careful in checking keys, and they will trust your service more.
> You don't want any kind of automation; you want to verify each one
> before signing it.

I wouldn't want to charge for these services since that would introduce a 
conflict of interest, profit.  I want to be trusted based on my stated policy.
The suggestion of purchasing a ViaCrypt copy of pgp is valid.  

As for automation, it would not be all that "automatic."  It would simply 
comprise tools to issue "Certificates" so that people can show other people to
indicate that my signature on their key is trustworthy.

Comments are welcome.


J. Michael Diehl   ;^)  |*The 2nd Amendment is there in case the 
mdiehl@triton.unm.edu   | Government forgets about the 1st!  <RL>
Mike.Diehl@f29.n301.z1  |*God is a good Physicist, and an even 
    .fidonet.org        | better Mathematician.  <Me>
al945@cwns9.ins.cwru.edu|*I'm just looking for the opportunity to 
 (505) 299-2282 (voice) | be Politically Incorrect! <Me>
Can we impeach him yet? |*Protected by 18 USC 2511 and 18 USC 2703. 



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Derek Atkins <warlord@MIT.EDU>
Date: Sun, 14 Nov 93 20:25:52 PST
To: "L. Detweiler" <ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Subject: Re: Key Servers
In-Reply-To: <9311150320.AA20102@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Message-ID: <9311150425.AA19297@oliver.MIT.EDU>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> I wonder if anyone would want to start a PGP key server dedicated only
> to *real* identities. Obviously, there is no such demand with the current ones.

This defeats the purpose for which the PGP Keyservers were created.
The Keyservers were created to give a *SINGLE* place where you could
go to request a PGP key for some name (and it doesn't matter whether
that name is real or not).

Having a keyserver "dedicated only to real identities" would violate
the basis for which the Keyservers were originally created.  Also,
quite recently, the keyserver administrators were discussing new
Keyserver sites, and we all agreed that ALL Keyserver sites would be
interconnected, to make sure that anyone could get any key from any
Keyserver site, no matter which server they use.

By proposing a split in the Keyserver service, you propose breaking
the initial assumption under which the keyservers were created:
Everyone has access to the whole public keyring from any server.

> And please don't start with the `that would be impossible' arguments. A
> key server that had the official policy `if you register here, on your
> honor your legal name is what you give, under penalty of public
> exposure if you are caught' would be enough for me.

Oh, I'm not saying that this is impossible.  It is possible.  It is,
however, unlikely that anyone will, and I personally will oppose any
such move to provide a service such as this.  It is not the job of the
Keyserver to decide whether a key blongs to a real person or not.  The
job of the Keyserver is to provide keys.  All keys.  Any keys.  No
matter who claims to own the key.

The job to decide if a key was a True Name as its owner is a matter
for signators.  Thats what Public Key Signatures are all about!  If
you create some kind of Notary Hierarchy to require two pieces of
picture identification, two major credit cards, and a note from your
mother, then you can guarantee that that is a True Name (assuming you
believe in that hierarchy).

However it is not the job of the Keyserver to provide any sort of
policy as to the keys it provides.  As I've said, the Keyserver is for
key distribution, not for any sort of key validation.  

Thanks,

-derek




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "L. Detweiler" <ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Date: Sun, 14 Nov 93 22:35:18 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: A Glimmer of Light
Message-ID: <9311150632.AA24172@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Some miscellaneous psychopunk (I forget who, they are all interchangeable) said

>> <sigh> nobody is interested in preventing pseudospoofing here. the
>> people who have most maneuvered themselves into a position to aid
>> future cyberspace are instead constraining it. that's the point, isn't
>> it? gosh, how could I have been so blind...
>
>I think its because we don't see pseudospoofing as a "danger" like you
>do.  Personally, I consider it a necessity.  I like being able to hide
>behind an anonymous identity (not that I do, mind you).  I don't see
>pseudospoofing as "constraining".  On the contrary, I see it as
>freeing us.

wow! a break in the clouds! a breath of fresh air! who is `we'? please
elaborate! This miscellaneous psychopunk is posting from MIT. Do you
think his burdensome flesh-cucoon is in Boston? or California?

AT LAST! HONESTY! (even if it is criminal or perverted)

Psychopunks, I'm most impressed with this new atmosphere of open
advocation of pseudoanonymity instead of all the black disinformation
snippets about `true anonymity' and all the other nonsense about it not
being widespread, no cypherpunks being personally involved, etc. for
the dreary 10 months or so I've been here. What trouble and heartache
for all of us you have caused me in pretending it isn't! Finally, they
Come Out of the Closet. Imagine -- having to hide in your own
neighborhood for so long. Really, it's all right. There, there.

When will the articles on Pseudospoofing come out in Wired and NYT? Oh,
let's see, there's Newsweek and all those other places too. Please,
tell me, I'm really in a tizzy. I'll have to call Mr. Kelly and Mr.
Markoff and tell them of your new openness. I'm sure they will be quite interested!

So, I would like to collect a list of all the Psychopunks who are
PSEUDOSPOOFERS and PROUD OF IT. Please, describe your lovely
techniques, all the pain and victimization you have gone through from
your tormenters (like me), and how you are going to Change the World so
that Pseudospoofers can Live without Harassment. `Live and Let Live'.
Sort of like Gay Pride. When are you going to stick it in your charter,
anyway? How pseudospoofing == privacy == anonymity == pseudoanonymity
== pseudonymity == holy liberation == bliss? What a delicious mystery.
Life a SF book by Card. What a Card.

Also, I'm still waiting for some kind of comment from those *fabulous*
leaders of yours. They're so coy with me. They've been flirting with me
since I've been on the list. It's really sexy and erotic, actually, the
way they strut around. You can look, but you can't touch! They're real
masters at the dance. Ooooooh... just FABULOUTHS.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "L. Detweiler" <ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Date: Sun, 14 Nov 93 22:45:18 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: some pseudopool FUN
Message-ID: <9311150645.AA24431@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


S.Boxx:
> <sigh> nobody is interested in preventing pseudospoofing here. the
> people who have most maneuvered themselves into a position to aid
> future cyberspace are instead constraining it. that's the point, isn't
> it? gosh, how could I have been so blind...

T.C.May:
>I think its because we don't see pseudospoofing as a "danger" like you
>do.  Personally, I consider it a necessity.  I like being able to hide
>behind an anonymous identity (not that I do, mind you).  I don't see
>pseudospoofing as "constraining".  On the contrary, I see it as
>freeing us.

E.Hughes, on Pseudospoofing software
>No the software isn't mine, but I consider myself it's God Father.
>Tim May and I were talking about this a long
>time, and he just beat me to learning enough PERL to write the thing.
>But I'd like to think that the two of us did most all of the design of
>it.  So, in a way, it is my software.

Nick Szabo:
>As an example, look at Ender's Game, where Ender's brother and sister
>get on the net under pseudonyms, and get treated just like everyone
>else.  There is no biases.  People are judged on their actions and
>words, not by who they are, how old they are, what they look like, or
>anything like that.  Maybe you are blind, I don't know.  I've never
>met you.

Arthur Chandler:
>And, as I said, it is not the job of the Keyserver to provide any sort
>of policy.  The job of the Keyserver is to distribute keys.  Nothing
>more.  Nothing less.  The job of identifying True Names is solely a
>job for Digital Signatures, not a job for the Keyserver.  

Jamie Dinkelacker:
>I oppose using it in a bogus fashion because the software is not
>designed for such a use, there is absolutely no protection for it (any
>key can be added), because I, and all the other Keyserver admins,
>believe that all the keyservers should be interconnected, and because
>I feel the job for determining a True Name on a key is a job for
>Digital Signatures, not for the Keyserver.  

Perry Metzger:
>I am a cypherpunk.  I don't believe in trusting something on faith
>alone, but you seem to be asking for that.  There is no way to protect
>such a reckless use of the Keyserver.  The only way to provide a
>secure way for True Names is to Cryptographically identify them.

Hal Finney:
>So, Mr. Detweiler, why do you oppose using Digital Signatures to
>verify True Names?  I mean, besides that you consider yourself a
>Cypherpunk? ;-)





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: an12070@anon.penet.fi (S. Boxx)
Date: Sun, 14 Nov 93 15:50:25 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: the Zen of Cyberspace
Message-ID: <9311142347.AA18381@anon.penet.fi>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain




Yang said to Yin, ``why are you so weird? why can't you be more like me?''

``because you are Yang, and I am Yin,'' said Yin.

* * *

I was walking along a path in a foreign city, and came upon a group of
men carrying their king on their shoulders on a massive platform and
weighty throne. They were struggling and sweating from the oppressive
weight in the hot sun.

``Long live the Royal King'' they called out to me as I was about to
pass. The king had haughty expression, and looked down on me sullenly
and, I thought, somewhat belligerently.

``What do you think of my kingdom, traveller?'' he called out.

I answered, ``Kind sir, I have been treated most generously by your
gracious citizens. They have offered kind hospitality to a weary
traveller. Truly, it is an oasis in the desert.''

``Long live the Holy King!'' they called out. The king waved me away,
and I bowed. But I was curious and followed the procession. The king
made many strange contacts along the way, but that is another story.
After a time he became bored, yawned, and fell asleep. The carriers
continued to struggle with the sheer weight of his burden.

``How long have you been carrying the king?'' I whispered to one.

``Many years, traveller. Many years the people of this country have
beared the weight of this tyrant.''

Of course, I was shocked at this. But other men echoed out upon hearing
us, but whispered and were careful not to wake the slumbering king, who
now had a steady stream of drool running down his chin and was snoring
quite noisily.

They told me horrible tales of his tyranny and crimes against the
people. But they also told me of their great fear in challenging him. I
was quite surprised -- It seems that each of the carriers shared a
common vice with the king, and they were bound by the chain of their
depravity. They were all greedy, and thirsted after the gold that he
taunted them with every night in secret meetings in the palace chamber
halls. Much of the populace saw many signs of the corruption but
``looked the other way''. Some had been executed for their dark discoveries.


Many years later, I passed through the country again. I came upon the
same sight -- the weary and toiling men carrying the heavy king upon
their backs. By this time His Highness was quite fat and ugly from his
vice and excess, and the carriers had great despair, desperation, and
resignation etched in their faces. But they trudged on.

That time, the king was apparently asleep when I found them. This time,
he was quite inert and lifeless.

``How long have you been carrying the king?'' I said.

``Many years. Too numerous to remember. You get used to it after awhile.''

I talked to the men quietly. They still beared their great burden,
prodded by their intense hunger for the gold of the king, which he had
teased them with for many years. The king had tremendous power over
people. Nevertheless, they began to laugh loudly at their king's
stupidity and ignorance of their embezzlements. I wondered if the king
was in turn embezzling from them. Suddenly, I realized the whole
royalty was corrupt.

The men laughed some more, oblivious to my epiphany, and one man jabbed
the king accidentally with his flailing arms in the midst of his
ridicule and mockery. The man was horrified. But the king did not stir.

The other carriers were puzzled. They apparently had not looked at the
king for some time, and suddenly realized that their highness had a
pale pallor. The carrier who had jabbed him thought his body felt
rather stiff. Suddenly, the night grew utterly cold.

The king was dead. They were flabbergasted.

``How long has the king been dead?'' I asked.

They did not know.

With this, they suddenly dropped the massive platform in terror, and it
broke and shattered with an ugly, ear-splitting noise. The king was
lost within the rubble. I was injured by some fragments. Some of the
carriers were crushed. Some cursed me. Some claimed that I was an evil
omen that triggered the death of the king! Others fled. Many headed for
the Castle, to steal whatever was left of the unguarded gold. They were
astonished to find it was all counterfeited, and worthless.

After many weeks, the entire populace finally realized they had been
sustaining a black lie, and the country plunged into chaos. I was lucky
to escape alive.

* * *

Yin said to Yang, ``why are you so weird? why can't you be more like me?''

``because you are Yin, and I am Yang,'' said Yang.

-------------------------------------------------------------------------
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From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: bart@netcom.com (Harry Bartholomew)
Date: Sun, 14 Nov 93 23:50:18 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: The unmentionable word
Message-ID: <199311150750.XAA09779@mail.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


    I'm kind of glad not to have just used filter to remove all
    of his posts sight unseen. Better to see, and note their 
    frequency. Sadly when I instantly hit delete for them and their
    replies, there is very little left on the list.

    It's hard to maintain a coherent conversation in the presence
    of his raving.

    Won't he ever run down?

    Sigh

    Bart




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Derek Atkins <warlord@MIT.EDU>
Date: Sun, 14 Nov 93 21:00:17 PST
To: "L. Detweiler" <ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Subject: Re: Key Servers
In-Reply-To: <9311150432.AA21999@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Message-ID: <9311150457.AA15079@oliver.MIT.EDU>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> <sigh> nobody is interested in preventing pseudospoofing here. the
> people who have most maneuvered themselves into a position to aid
> future cyberspace are instead constraining it. that's the point, isn't
> it? gosh, how could I have been so blind...

I think its because we don't see pseudospoofing as a "danger" like you
do.  Personally, I consider it a necessity.  I like being able to hide
behind an anonymous identity (not that I do, mind you).  I don't see
pseudospoofing as "constraining".  On the contrary, I see it as
freeing us.

As an example, look at Ender's Game, where Ender's brother and sister
get on the net under pseudonyms, and get treated just like everyone
else.  There is no biases.  People are judged on their actions and
words, not by who they are, how old they are, what they look like, or
anything like that.  Maybe you are blind, I don't know.  I've never
met you.

> so, Mr. Keyserver, considering that this (your?) software could be used
> TODAY to help build up a true identity system, why do you oppose using
> it in that fashion? I mean, besides that you are a Cypherpunk.

No the software isn't mine, but I consider myself it's God Father.
Mike Graff (explorer@iastate.edu) and I were talking about this a long
time, and he just beat me to learning enough PERL to write the thing.
But I'd like to think that the two of us did most all of the design of
it.  So, in a way, it is my software.

And, as I said, it is not the job of the Keyserver to provide any sort
of policy.  The job of the Keyserver is to distribute keys.  Nothing
more.  Nothing less.  The job of identifying True Names is solely a
job for Digital Signatures, not a job for the Keyserver.  

I oppose using it in a bogus fashion because the software is not
designed for such a use, there is absolutely no protection for it (any
key can be added), because I, and all the other Keyserver admins,
believe that all the keyservers should be interconnected, and because
I feel the job for determining a True Name on a key is a job for
Digital Signatures, not for the Keyserver.  

I am a cypherpunk.  I don't believe in trusting something on faith
alone, but you seem to be asking for that.  There is no way to protect
such a reckless use of the Keyserver.  The only way to provide a
secure way for True Names is to Cryptographically identify them.

So, Mr. Detweiler, why do you oppose using Digital Signatures to
verify True Names?  I mean, besides that you consider yourself a
Cypherpunk? ;-)

-derek




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: J. Michael Diehl <mdiehl@triton.unm.edu>
Date: Sun, 14 Nov 93 23:10:19 PST
To: cman@IO.COM (Douglas Barnes)
Subject: Re: True Name keys
In-Reply-To: <9311150654.AA11738@illuminati.IO.COM>
Message-ID: <9311150706.AA03132@triton.unm.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


According to Douglas Barnes:
> 
> 
> You mention that you feel there is a conflict of interest if you
> were to charge money to sign keys.
> Actually, by charging money, I think you would greatly enhance
> the weight that people gave to your certification, and by leading
> out with a fee/service arrangement, you would be able to avoid
> the kind of overload that, say, Julf has run into with penet.

These are very good points.  After I get this whole thing put together, I may
have an introductory special.... ;^)

> If you were to get enough business, you could then just farm the
> whole thing out to a local notary/clerk type who would probably
> have more experience with identity documents, the work of other
> notaries, etc. 

And you would be force to trust him, also...and anyone else I may farm this out
to.  Not this kid. ;^)

> Another thought: offer various levels of certification, based
> on the level of documentation. E.g., one level for xeroxes of
> id documents (you may just want to rule this out), another level 
> for notarized copy of driver's licence, another for notarized
> copy of d.l. and birth certificate, etc. etc.

I was thinking of issuing a signed certificate to the customer indicating 
exactly why I signed his key.  This could be presented to other people who 
question my signature.  As per my policy, which can be gotten via finger, I will
sign a key iff any of the following is true:

1. I watched him generate his key.
2. I know the person by sight, and can verify his key.
3. He proves, with picture id, in person, that the public key is his.
4. He sends me a photocopy of his picture id and a signed statement   
     containing the pgp footprint of his key.
5. His key is signed by someone whom I trust to sign keys.

Note that #5 implies that the other signer has the same policy.  My policy will
be stated in my certificate.  Comments?


J. Michael Diehl   ;^)  |*The 2nd Amendment is there in case the 
mdiehl@triton.unm.edu   | Government forgets about the 1st!  <RL>
Mike.Diehl@f29.n301.z1  |*God is a good Physicist, and an even 
    .fidonet.org        | better Mathematician.  <Me>
al945@cwns9.ins.cwru.edu|*I'm just looking for the opportunity to 
 (505) 299-2282 (voice) | be Politically Incorrect! <Me>
Can we impeach him yet? |*Protected by 18 USC 2511 and 18 USC 2703. 



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Mike Godwin <mnemonic@eff.org>
Date: Sun, 14 Nov 93 21:15:18 PST
To: karn@qualcomm.com (Phil Karn)
Subject: Re: LAW: Wireless interception
In-Reply-To: <9311130316.AA00717@servo>
Message-ID: <199311150514.AA29541@eff.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Phil Karn writes: 
 
> Cellular is protected under ECPA because it's big bucks for some
> powerful US businesses. Cordless phones don't use a large domestic
> infrastructure that charges for airtime.

Without disputing anything Phil says here, I have it on good authority
that the exemption of cordless phones from ECPA had to do with the fact
that early models of cordless phones often generated signals that could
be picked up by normal radios. The concern was that the owners of normal
radios (as distinct from scanners) might be turned into felons for
overhearing a cordless-phone conversation.


--Mike






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "L. Detweiler" <ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Date: Sun, 14 Nov 93 23:20:29 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: the Pseudospoofer Game
Message-ID: <9311150720.AA24779@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Hey guys, you are so clever with the cyberspatial software tricks.
Here's something I think you should come up with. 

THE PSEUDOSPOOFING GAME

I haven't got all the details of this worked out yet, but bear with me.
The scenario is that this would be a game you play on a machine that is
a lot like a mail server, except that it is dedicated to the game and
everyone knows it (I know you guys won't like that idea, but bear with
me.) The object of the game is to uncover each other's true identities.
When you start the game, there are a certain number of other real
people out there. They all get a fixed number of `pseudoanonyms' (of
course, names that look real but aren't).

There would be both public and private postings. You have to try to
determine who everyone is by analyzing their style and subjects (and of
course, evade detection with ingenious cypherpunk techniques). You
could use any of your tentacles in any way, public or private, just
like on this list (which is a great inspiration for the game, BTW).

Every once in awhile, you might make accusations on true reputations,
after you have built up enough certainty. The points of the game would
depend on how correct you are. You might `bet' different points on
various identities. You might be able to bargain with others to collude
with you by trading points or something. Maybe there is some kind of
mechanisms whereby tentacles are weakened after a lot of accusations or
something. Obviously, the possibilities are really endless. All the
agent provacateur, double agent, etc. gimmicks you inflicted on me
(your white lab rat) could be used there.

Maybe `credit' could be synonymous with `reputation' -- when you flame
someone successfully others can transfer points between the two, rate
your reputations explicitly. You could always rate other people at any
time. There might be `public ratings' that are the averages of all the
private ratings that everyone knows about. These ratings might tend to
fluctuate based on behavior. For example, when somebody lies their
rating would go down if other's suspected it. If someone was a
hypocrite, it would come back to haunt them in the `bottom line'.

The more confused and insane you drive someone with disinformation and
lies (dishonesty is the name of the game, after all!) the better. Who
knows, you might be able to *really* upset someone over nothing but
meaningless ASCII text! Nothing but messages. That would be their own
fault for taking it seriously. These `pseudospoofed virgins' should be
raped for great sport and satisfaction. You could get together
afterwards and drink a few beers and brag about your scores and
conquests, and how they wailed or cried at the end. I suppose you could
even figure out how to have imaginary postmasters that can censor
various real identities if their reputations drop too low, or some
other capricious criteria. Maybe you could even design in mail bombs.

I'm sure you guys could bang this whole thing together pretty fast,
with all your skill, ambition, and practice. But you might have
difficulty attracting players if you want to keep it secret and all to
yourselves. Another thing, is that everyone would learn about
pseudospoofing. That is what you want, right? Since it's their
stupidity if they fall for this kind of puerile fantasy, it's an ideal
situation if *everyone* knows about it. The Cypherpunk Way.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Mike Ingle <MIKEINGLE@delphi.com>
Date: Sun, 14 Nov 93 21:30:52 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: True Name keys
Message-ID: <01H5BPPICLNM9EEVDF@delphi.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


"ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu"  "L. Detweiler" complains:

><sigh> nobody is interested in preventing pseudospoofing here. the
>people who have most maneuvered themselves into a position to aid
>future cyberspace are instead constraining it. that's the point, isn't
>it? gosh, how could I have been so blind...

Not true at all. I proposed a more secure method, signing of keys by
trusted certifiers, and JMDiehl said he'd look into implementing it.
Warlord said that he didn't like the idea of having a separate
network of keyservers for True Names, but that keys could be certified
as True Name keys. Nobody said that they opposed the idea of True Name
keys. Such certifications, especially if from multiple parties, would
be much more secure than a network of keyservers. Remember that these
exchange keys, and if you could hack one, you could put a phony key
into the loop.

JMDiehl: your service would be more widely trusted, and potentially
profitable, if you bought a copy of ViaCrypt PGP for legality and
charged a small fee for your services. If there is money and your
reputation at stake, people will assume you are going to be more
careful in checking keys, and they will trust your service more.
You don't want any kind of automation; you want to verify each one
before signing it.

Warlord: Is there any way to clean out old keys from the keyservers?
How about keeping track of when a key was uploaded, and killing them
after a year or so. If a person wants to keep a key active, he can
mail it to the keyserver again before the year runs out. The keyservers
are full of old, dead, and revoked keys, and the number will continue
to grow as more people use PGP. Present keys could be killed a year
from now, or whenever.

Detweiler: why don't you do it? You could advance your crusade and
make some money in the process. Start a service to certify keys.
If a key were certified by several services, you could be pretty
sure of its authenticity.

Everyone: is it possible to translate RIPEM keys into PGP keys?
Can the signature be kept intact? Is it possible to use Mac signer
keys for encryption as well as signing? Doesn't it seem just a bit
political that the Mac system has RSA for signatures and a symmetric
cryptosystem, but no public-key encryption? Maybe something could
be done about this, but I don't have a Mac to try it.

--- MikeIngle@delphi.com





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: gnu (John Gilmore)
Date: Mon, 15 Nov 93 00:50:52 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Great quote from public NIST comments on Clipper
Message-ID: <9311150850.AA10306@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


EFF has made available the full file of public comments that were
submitted to NIST through the "cryptnow@eff.org" service.  I found this
great quote in there:

  However, if this standard is adopted, we at least have the opportunity to
  reduce our dependence on imported oil substantially. All we need do is
  hook up generators to the bones of the authors of the Constitution and
  the Bill of Rights. I estimate their rotational speed at 2000 RPM now and
  rising rapidly.

  Sincerely yours,
  
  Richard B. Mott
  Ringoes, New Jersey

The comments are in ftp.eff.org:/pub/crypto/EES_FIPS_Comments.txt .
--
John Gilmore                gnu@toad.com  --  gnu@cygnus.com  --  gnu@eff.org
  ``This committee has not tried to determine whether the National Security
  Agency tendency to advance exaggerated claims of authority ... stems from
  conscious policy or the actions of individual NSA employees.''
The Government's Classification of Private Ideas, House Report 96-1540, p. 67




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: cman@IO.COM (Douglas Barnes)
Date: Sun, 14 Nov 93 23:00:18 PST
To: mdiehl@triton.unm.edu (J. Michael Diehl)
Subject: Re: True Name keys
In-Reply-To: <9311150624.AA01761@triton.unm.edu>
Message-ID: <9311150654.AA11738@illuminati.IO.COM>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



You mention that you feel there is a conflict of interest if you
were to charge money to sign keys.

Actually, by charging money, I think you would greatly enhance
the weight that people gave to your certification, and by leading
out with a fee/service arrangement, you would be able to avoid
the kind of overload that, say, Julf has run into with penet.

If you were to get enough business, you could then just farm the
whole thing out to a local notary/clerk type who would probably
have more experience with identity documents, the work of other
notaries, etc. 

Another thought: offer various levels of certification, based
on the level of documentation. E.g., one level for xeroxes of
id documents (you may just want to rule this out), another level 
for notarized copy of driver's licence, another for notarized
copy of d.l. and birth certificate, etc. etc.

-- 
----------------                                             /\ 
Douglas Barnes            cman@illuminati.io.com            /  \ 
Chief Wizard         (512) 448-8950 (d), 447-7866 (v)      / () \
Illuminati Online          metaverse.io.com 7777          /______\



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Mike Godwin <mnemonic@eff.org>
Date: Sun, 14 Nov 93 22:10:18 PST
To: karn@qualcomm.com (Phil Karn)
Subject: Re: LAW: Wireless interception
In-Reply-To: <9311150557.AA04875@servo>
Message-ID: <199311150608.AA00124@eff.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Phil Karn writes:
 
> Mike is correct that early models of cordless phones could often be
> picked up on broadcast radios. Their base stations transmitted just
> above the AM broadcast band (in the 1.7 Mhz region). Since then, all
> new cordless phones operate on the 46 and 49 Mhz bands, which
> generally require a scanner to receive.
> 
> However, cell phones still operate in what used to be UHF TV channels
> 70-83, and it is still possible in some cases to intercept cell phone
> calls on a UHF TV set. So much for *that* theory. :-)

Actually, all this shows is that the drafters of ECPA didn't anticipate
that TV watchers would use their TVs to overhear cellular conversations.


--Mike







From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Karl Lui Barrus <klbarrus@owlnet.rice.edu>
Date: Sun, 14 Nov 93 23:20:19 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: ANON: pseudospoofing confusion
Message-ID: <9311150716.AA22551@flammulated.owlnet.rice.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

>Does the ECPA (the law regulating communications privacy) or the
>copyright laws apply to material that was written under a
>*pseudonymous* identity? I would consider this a grey area. A court

Well, there may be some legal precedent to look up: some of the
greatest works of literature were published under "pseudonymous"
identities.  Lewis Carroll, George Orwell, Mark Twain, George Eliot:
none of these people ever existed.  In fact, Mary Ann Evans published
under "George Eliot" in order to pretend to be male; I guess you could
call her master pseudospoofer, since she specifically created a fake
identity in order to fool others.

I suppose "Publius" doesn't qualify as a pseudospoofer since the three
gentlemen who were responsible for the _Federalist Papers_ were
probably just trying to hide their identity (at first) and not go
about creating new ones.

I'm sort of fuzzy on the distinction between pseudonymous and
pseudoanonymous; is it that a pseudonym is obviously so?  For example,
an id on anon.penet.fi is obviously a pseudonym, so if I were to use
it, I would be pseudonymous.  In a sense, every mail address you see
here is a pseudonym.

Now, pseudoanonymous is when a fake identity is created, without it
being obviously so.  (Right?)  So if I were to obtain another account
with a different user name, etc. and use that account, I would be
pseudospoofing. (?)

But the difference between these two seems so slight, a semantic one
rather than practical.

For example, suppose several people were in communication with someone
they had never met.  One person (of the several) is curious as to the
identity of the mystery person, and tries to find out information
about this person.  Very little is turned up.  So little, it could be
that the mystery person is "pseudoanonymous", a fake identity.  Are
the several people being pseudospoofed?  How can they tell one way or
the other without actually meeting the mystery person?  If they can't
tell, then what difference does it make?

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.3a

iQCVAgUBLOcsTYOA7OpLWtYzAQFKzAQAyx5MNNNyjs/BeJLLqM0EX5A0ZQADCLge
fNkndrgT/nSWiVGubE58girFQdNZlI5a50swKeKOqEHo8zxdqYSEIw8mrAm8iXeB
mH5uOi2KHpxuWHQ+nkgmEi+KKkFNI6PQH7jR0euVPgu+GZsj40V52mJ9Z9ZYP/EV
GvE6VvFkux8=
=CA2o
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Mike Ingle <MIKEINGLE@delphi.com>
Date: Sun, 14 Nov 93 23:40:19 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: LD Admits he is S.Boxx (oops!)
Message-ID: <01H5BU6WYR0I987YTY@delphi.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


LD really blew it this time. One has to be very careful when one
maintains multiple identities - it is easy to mix them up and
reveal one's deception. As we will see:

In the following message, LD quotes S.Boxx:

===========================================================================

From:   IN%"ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu"  "L. Detweiler" 15-NOV-1993
To:     IN%"cypherpunks@toad.com"
CC:     IN%"ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu"
Subj:   some pseudopool FUN

S.Boxx:
> <sigh> nobody is interested in preventing pseudospoofing here. the
> people who have most maneuvered themselves into a position to aid
> future cyberspace are instead constraining it. that's the point, isn't
> it? gosh, how could I have been so blind...

===========================================================================

However, that quote was not from S.Boxx. It was from (who else?)
LD himself, in this message:

===========================================================================

From:   IN%"ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu"  "L. Detweiler" 14-NOV-1993
To:     IN%"warlord@MIT.EDU"  "Derek Atkins"
CC:     IN%"ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu"  "L. Detweiler",
        IN%"cypherpunks@toad.com"
Subj:   RE: Key Servers

>> I wonder if anyone would want to start a PGP key server dedicated only
>> to *real* identities. Obviously, there is no such demand with the
>> current ones.
>
>This defeats the purpose for which the PGP Keyservers were created.
>The Keyservers were created to give a *SINGLE* place where you could
>go to request a PGP key for some name (and it doesn't matter whether
>that name is real or not).

<sigh> nobody is interested in preventing pseudospoofing here. the
people who have most maneuvered themselves into a position to aid
future cyberspace are instead constraining it. that's the point, isn't
it? gosh, how could I have been so blind...

===========================================================================

Now, LD wrote that quote himself. How could he forget that? How could
he mistakenly attribute it to S.Boxx, unless he is S.Boxx? In this
message, LD makes a very valid point:

===========================================================================

From:   IN%"ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu"  "L. Detweiler" 14-NOV-1993
To:     IN%"cypherpunks@toad.com"
CC:     IN%"ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu"
Subj:   Soothing Sayings

Mr. Barnes, you tried to convince me of the Joy of Pseudospoofing, for
which I suggested you were trying to convert me to the  Dark Side
(actually, I am indebtedly grateful for that beautiful inspiration for
my essay). You told me that E.Hughes' lectures on the subject of
pseudospoofing were what drew you to it in the first place! But this is
buried very deep in my comprehensive archives, from many weeks ago. (I
encourage all other cypherpunks to keep very good archives, because
some day we will be able to separate all the pseudospoofed identities
from real ones, and it will be quite shocking, I assure you. Some
prominent cypherpunks are extremely terrified and staunchly opposed to
archives, for obvious reasons.)

===========================================================================

Yes, LD, good archives certainly do help in catching pseudospoofers.
Like you. You have been using S.Boxx to post some of your rants and
create a false consensus - exactly what you have argued against so
loudly. How hypocritical can you get?

Why don't we post this on comp.risks and discredit him and his rants
once and for all? Enough of this crap!

--- MikeIngle@delphi.com




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: cman%IO.COM@triton.unm.edu (Douglas Barnes)
Date: Mon, 15 Nov 93 02:20:20 PST
To: mdiehl@triton.unm.edu (J. Michael Diehl)
Subject: Re: True Name keys
In-Reply-To: <9311150706.AA03132@triton.unm.edu>
Message-ID: <9311150925.AA12888@illuminati.IO.COM>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> > If you were to get enough business, you could then just farm the
> > whole thing out to a local notary/clerk type who would probably
> > have more experience with identity documents, the work of other
> > notaries, etc. 
> 
> And you would be force to trust him, also...and anyone else I may farm this out
> to.  Not this kid. ;^)

Actually, as nice a guy as I'm sure you are, having worked in banking
for many years, I'm more inclined to trust little blue-haired old
ladies for tasks requiring meticulous attention to detail, than folks
who are more like me. This is just another aspect of charging; it 
allows you to scale/extend the service beyond the point at which it
holds any charm whatsover to a creative/leading edge type individual.

I don't think you'll find much resistance if you let it be known that
you will eventually hire/contract with a professional to do the ID
validations. It will probably *improve* rather than detract from the
popularity of your service.

> 
> > Another thought: offer various levels of certification, based
> > on the level of documentation. E.g., one level for xeroxes of
> > id documents (you may just want to rule this out), another level 
> > for notarized copy of driver's licence, another for notarized
> > copy of d.l. and birth certificate, etc. etc.
> 
> I was thinking of issuing a signed certificate to the customer indicating 
> exactly why I signed his key.  This could be presented to other people who 
> question my signature.  As per my policy, which can be gotten via finger, I will
> sign a key iff any of the following is true:
> 
> 1. I watched him generate his key.
> 2. I know the person by sight, and can verify his key.
> 3. He proves, with picture id, in person, that the public key is his.
> 4. He sends me a photocopy of his picture id and a signed statement   
>      containing the pgp footprint of his key.
> 5. His key is signed by someone whom I trust to sign keys.

I wouldn't bother with most of these for a large-scale public service. 
#1 and #2 easily reduce to #3. #5 is something you don't want to get
involved with, since the whole point is to let people make their own
decision about whom to trust. Instead of signing keys signed by "good
signers", you're better off periodically posting lists of signers who
are known by each other to follow a certain set of standards, and leave
it at that.

Something like this is probably more practical:

1. Driver's license is presented in person to you or qualified staff.
2. Driver's license and two other ID from list are presented in person
   to you or qualified staff
3. Driver's license is presented in person to registered notary public
   and stamped certificate sent to you.
4. Driver's license and two other ID from list are presented in person
   to registered notary public and stamped certificate sent to you.

I would avoid accepting xeroxes altogether; too easy to forge.

-- 
----------------                                             /\ 
Douglas Barnes            cman@illuminati.io.com            /  \ 
Chief Wizard         (512) 448-8950 (d), 447-7866 (v)      / () \
Illuminati Online          metaverse.io.com 7777          /______\



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: cman@IO.COM (Douglas Barnes)
Date: Mon, 15 Nov 93 01:44:00 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: S.Boxx v. L.Detweiler
Message-ID: <9311150940.AA12988@illuminati.IO.COM>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



I'd like to mention for the record that I don't give a pair of
dingo's kidneys whether S.Boxx and L.Detweiler are the same person.

Whether they are, or not, it makes no difference. I'm sure in the
twisty little passages (all different) that are LD's brain, he
could easily have some justification for posting as S.Boxx. Or
not. 

What's important to me is that I have associated with both a 
remarkably similar reputation, such that both entities have
a substantially larger than ordinary burden to overcome to convince 
me of anything; if either said it was raining, I would pack an 
umbrella *and* sunscreen.

This is how a sane person deals with the current sorry state of
authentication on the net, possibly accompanied by actual work
participating in research and coding to remedy this sorry state.

-- 
----------------                                             /\ 
Douglas Barnes            cman@illuminati.io.com            /  \ 
Chief Wizard         (512) 448-8950 (d), 447-7866 (v)      / () \
Illuminati Online          metaverse.io.com 7777          /______\



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: an12070@anon.penet.fi (S. Boxx)
Date: Sun, 14 Nov 93 19:50:16 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: cypherpunk archives?
Message-ID: <9311150347.AA18323@anon.penet.fi>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I'm looking for an official cypherpunk document on `pseudospoofing' --
I looked all over soda.berkeley.edu:/pub/cypherpunks, but couldn't find
one anywhere. Does anyone have one, preferrably written or endorsed by
E.Hughes or T.C.May? Also, any messages they have posted on the subject
sought. I have some stuff, but they seem extremely reluctant to talk
about it publicly.
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
To find out more about the anon service, send mail to help@anon.penet.fi.
Due to the double-blind, any mail replies to this message will be anonymized,
and an anonymous id will be allocated automatically. You have been warned.
Please report any problems, inappropriate use etc. to admin@anon.penet.fi.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Black Unicorn <unicorn@access.digex.net>
Date: Mon, 15 Nov 93 00:55:53 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: LD
Message-ID: <199311150855.AA22908@access.digex.net>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
 
- ->
 
- From owner-cypherpunks@toad.com Mon Nov 15 01:49:02 1993
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Cc: ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu
Subject: A Glimmer of Light
Date: Sun, 14 Nov 93 23:32:06 -0700
From: "L. Detweiler" <ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
 
Some miscellaneous psychopunk (I forget who, they are all 
interchangeable) said
 
<-
 
 
You know, I've been listening to our Mr. Detweiler here for some 
time without voicing much other than the occasional "let's get on 
with more serious business" message to the list.  It wasn't until 
I realized how well Mr. Detweiler fit into a persona archetype I 
recognized that I even thought I'd dignify his posts to the list 
with a response.
 
I guess it was this quotation header that clicked it.
 
- ->
 
Some miscellaneous psychopunk (I forget who, they are all 
interchangeable) said:
 
<-
 
A cynic recognizes the bad in everything and the good in nothing.  
(Or something to that effect.)  Mr. Detweiler seems to have to 
have a face to associate with all of us to consider us distinct.  
While he may consider this "normal" I think it's just behind the 
times.  It seems that Mr. Detweiler is offended by the idea that 
he may not have superficial criteria to judge his associates by 
in the coming decades.  Color of skin, tone of voice, sexual 
preference, this sort of thing.  I think this might make some 
more sense after we look at some more of Mr. Detweiler's quotes.
 
Just consider the percentage of content in his posts that 
actually contains some constructive criticism or commentary, this 
passage is illustrative:
 
- ->
 
wow! a break in the clouds! a breath of fresh air! who is `we'? 
please elaborate! This miscellaneous psychopunk is posting from 
MIT. Do you think his burdensome flesh-cucoon (sic) is in Boston? 
or California?
 
AT LAST! HONESTY! (even if it is criminal or perverted)
 
<-
 
It seems possible that Mr. Detweiler is unable to conduct an open 
debate without resorting to sarcastic and unprofessional barbs.  
His arsenal is obviously reduced with the lack of physical 
characteristics to criticize.
 
Consider:
 
- ->
 
Psychopunks, I'm most impressed with this new atmosphere of open
advocation of pseudoanonymity instead of all the black 
disinformation snippets about `true anonymity' and all the other 
nonsense about it not being widespread, no cypherpunks being 
personally involved, etc. for the dreary 10 months or so I've 
been here. What trouble and heartache for all of us you have 
caused me in pretending it isn't! Finally, they Come Out of the 
Closet. Imagine -- having to hide in your own neighborhood for so 
long. Really, it's all right. There, there.
 
<-
 
Seething with self righteousness and condescending remarks, 
behind a electronic veil just as much as the rest of us, it seems 
Detweiler has little of substance beyond emotional appeals that 
seem to shout "Far right - Lambs of Christ." in their 
methodology.  Given the length, number and intellectual diarrhea 
styles of his posts, it seems Detweiler has little else to do.  
It looks to me as if this goes a long way to explain the need to 
dominate and attract attention.
 
Consider again:
 
- ->
 
When will the articles on Pseudospoofing come out in Wired and 
NYT? Oh, let's see, there's Newsweek and all those other places 
too. Please, tell me, I'm really in a tizzy. I'll have to call 
Mr. Kelly and Mr. Markoff and tell them of your new openness. I'm 
sure they will be quite interested!
 
<-
 
I'd be surprised to find that Mr. Detweiler has not read any Mike 
Royko, he tries so hard to emulate him.
 
 
- ->
 
So, I would like to collect a list of all the Psychopunks who are
PSEUDOSPOOFERS and PROUD OF IT. Please, describe your lovely
techniques, all the pain and victimization you have gone through 
from your tormenters (sic) (like me), and how you are going to 
Change the World so that Pseudospoofers can Live without 
Harassment. `Live and Let Live'. Sort of like Gay Pride
 
<-
 
Mr. Detweiler really throws his hand here.  I suppose we are 
supposed to be insulted with the analogy to the Gay Pride 
movement?  Perhaps homophobia and privo-phobia are linked 
somehow?  This lofts the scent of the far left centralist 
socialist or the far right fascist, terrified by discontinuity 
and even more mortified with the thought that it might be 
difficult to keep tabs on such individuals.
 
 
- ->
 
When are you going to stick it in your charter, anyway? How 
pseudospoofing == privacy == anonymity == pseudoanonymity == 
pseudonymity == holy liberation == bliss? What a delicious 
mystery. Life a SF book by Card. What a Card.
 
<-
 
Note the religious reference.
 
- ->
 
Also, I'm still waiting for some kind of comment from those 
*fabulous* leaders of yours. They're so coy with me. They've been 
flirting with me since I've been on the list. It's really sexy 
and erotic, actually, the way they strut around. You can look, 
but you can't touch! They're real masters at the dance. 
Ooooooh... just FABULOUTHS.
 
<-
 
I shouldn't need to point out the homosexual references again, 
but I think it important to note that they are all derogatory in 
nature.  The slur on FABULOUTHS just kills me.
 
- ->
 
Hey guys, you are so clever with the cyberspatial software 
tricks. Here's something I think you should come up with.
 
THE PSEUDOSPOOFING GAME
 
[About 600 words deleted]
 
 
These `pseudospoofed virgins' should be raped for great sport and 
satisfaction. You could get together afterwards and drink a few 
beers and brag about your scores and conquests, and how they 
wailed or cried at the end.
 
<-
 
Between homophobia, the introduction of non-consensual sex and 
Viking locker room talk, the conclusions about Mr. Detweiler's 
own feelings of inadequacy jump out without much need of 
assistance.
 
 
Regardless, Mr. Detweiler's posts are just not present in any 
constructive commentary it all.  He is quite good at stirring up 
emotions and irritating people beyond their ability to restrain 
themselves (note my post).  But when it comes to any original 
thought, I've seen little or nothing.  He's what I used to call 
"fluff" in law school.  Great at cutting people down with words, 
but couldn't win an oral argument with a live judge present if it 
meant his life.  Mr. Detweiler seems to think that cute one 
liners are fatal to reason.   Unfortunately, cute cut downs do 
not a well structured argument make.  Middle management material 
if I ever saw it.  Maybe a shift supervisor?
 
"C'mon Williams, your 'ole lady keep you up late last night?  Or 
was it your boyfriend, you queer?  Stevens, how nice of you to 
join us, you're ready for work this morning?  Wow! A break in the 
clouds! A breath of fresh air!  Now get to work you bums!"
 
Perfect illustration that a saboteur need not be clever at all, 
but only disruptive and persistent enough to be annoying and 
prevent anyone from unharassed constructive discourse.  In this 
regard I'm afraid he's won.  There is a agenda here, it seems to 
me that if Mr. Detweiler is not willing to follow it, and stay ON 
the path, perhaps he should be asked and then encouraged to 
leave.  I'm sure cries of censorship would abound, but at this 
point, I feel that these could hardly cause more trouble.
 
- -uni-(Dark)
 
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From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: szabo@netcom.com (Nick Szabo)
Date: Mon, 15 Nov 93 04:24:01 PST
To: ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu (L. Detweiler)
Subject: Re: some pseudopool FUN
In-Reply-To: <9311150645.AA24431@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Message-ID: <199311151223.EAA13250@mail.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Given the many idiotic things already claimed by Detweiler, 
(including at one time or another, hotly accusing most list-active Bay Area 
cypherpunks of being "pseudospoofs" of each other, when all he had to
do to verify our True Names was call), I don't know if it's necessary 
to point out Detweiler's own "pseudospoofing" and the forged quotations 
he is now throwing around.  But despite his voluminous whoppers and
mad slanders I've seen some folks actually taking some of his stuff 
seriously.  So I just want to make sure everybody understands there's 
a head full of hypocrisy to go along with the head full of otherwise
misfiring neurons:

S.Boxx:
> <sigh> nobody is interested in preventing pseudospoofing here. 
>...

Hi, Detweiler.  I see here you're discounting your own voluminous
posts on the matter.  Typing in lower case doesn't hide your unique 
word choices, tone of voice, and opinions, and even the occasional 
slip by both of your 'nyms into UPPER CASE RANTS.  Sorry to spoil
your mad fun, but "CRIMINAL, TREACHEROUS PSEUDOSPOOFING" for
rhetorical leverage just ain't as easy as you make it out
to be.  The practicum of always having to keep in mind the
many ways you can screw up and reveal identity makes the practice
severely self-limiting.

For readers not familiar with the parties involved, I will point 
out some of the more obvious (to me) "pseudospooling", Detweiler's
seemingly purposeful mixing up of quote attributions:

> E.Hughes, on Pseudospoofing software
> >...
> >Tim May and I were talking about this a long
> >time, and he just beat me to learning enough PERL to write the thing.

It's highly improbable that Tim May would go anywhere near Perl, and 
it's also quite improbable Eric Hughes would have made such a gaffe.  
(Which just goes to show I _am_ Hughes and May, otherwise how could
I know, eh Detweiler?)

> Jamie Dinkelacker:
> >I oppose using it in a bogus fashion because the software is not
> >designed for such a use, there is absolutely no protection for it (any
> >key can be added), because I, and all the other Keyserver admins,....

Jamie is quite talented in the business world, but
again it's unlikely in the extreme that he has time
and interest left over for administering key servers.

> Nick Szabo:
> >As an example, look at Ender's Game, where Ender's brother and sister
> >get on the net under pseudonyms, and get treated just like everyone
> >else.  There is no biases.  People are judged on their actions and
> >words, not by who they are, how old they are, what they look like, or
> >anything like that.  Maybe you are blind, I don't know.  I've never
> >met you.

And what's wrong with this is the most obvious to me, since I
didn't say it.

My own memory, recognition of my own style, and
if all else fails my own archives are sufficient to quickly
dispatch "pseudospooling" attacks against myself.  On
Usenet there are commonly disputes over false quotations
(usually non-malicious misattribution due to the nesting
mess, but not always).  The reputation of the "pseudospooler" 
is *plonked* when they are found out, especially if they
are malicious.  In public it's practically impossible
to get away with severely malicious misquoting, unless
the victim is both quite isolated and of such bad repute
that readers don't believe the archive he produces.
It might be feasible to defame people behind their backs, by 
sending false quotations in mail to small numbers of third parties.
There must be quite a bit of accumulated BBS, FidoNet,
and Usenet lore on the matter; anybody have good war
stories?

By extrapolation the quotes attributed to Arther Chandler,
Hal Finney, and Perry Metzger were also likely "pseudospools",
many of which will be obvious to those falsely quoted or their
freinds, or those who keep good archives.  And alas for
Detweiler, any attributions he makes in the future will be
highly suspect, as will the appearance of newbies on the
net who just happen to agree with him and sound like him
in somewhat improbable ways.

The only remaining paranoia I have on this matter is that
Detweiler is really Tim May's most elaborate "Stealth Bomber" gimmick 
to date.  If so, either AI (Artificial Insanity?) is vastly more
advanced than I had thought, or ... (Detweiler, take over
for me here!)

Nick Szabo				szabo@netcom.com




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: habs@panix.com (Harry S. Hawk)
Date: Mon, 15 Nov 93 02:45:22 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Should we oppose the Data Superhighway/NII?
Message-ID: <199311151041.AA19187@panix.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I have stayed quiet on this topic but now feel I should put my
views forward.

1) I feel the government, in this case and others, should never
force the adoption of any particular technology (ISDN, ATM, etc)

2) While I am pro-market in the Extropian Way, I think that what we
need from the government is the following:

a) recognize that Cable and Telco are the same business
b) set very minimum standards required for basic services
        (basic telco, basic cable (e.g., local broadcast channels)
c) I don't see data as a basic service
d) apply the same regulation to both companies.
e) Let cable and telco compete head to head

3) Let the rich pay for it ;)

There is this liberal idea that only the rich will get the "good stuff"
That their kids will study on-line with Nobel prize winners while the
poor kids will still be using chalk and erasers in the "slums."

The same liberals what to raise taxes "on the Rich," so they can pay
for things. 

I feel if you don't "push" for universal access the systems will be build
that way anyway. They will cost $$$, and the "rich" will buy into it. As
economies of scale and scope come into pay, the cost of these systems will
come down and the poor will get it too. Thus, the rich have paid for it,
and the poor have got it cheap.

There is one problem with this. In NYC, the "POOR" are already
bigger users of CLASS services (call waiting, three way dialing, etc.),
and of Cable premium channels; no marketer is going to leave
this group unwired.

No one is going to do an Interactive Test Market in the Lower East Side,
but trust me systems will be built there.


--
Harry S. Hawk  -  Extropian  
                                                        habs@extropy.org
In Service to Extropians since 1991






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: habs@panix.com (Harry S. Hawk)
Date: Mon, 15 Nov 93 02:44:01 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Should we oppose the Data Superhighway/NII?
Message-ID: <199311151042.AA19193@panix.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


The FCC can already regulate what is on any broadcast medium that
is FCC regulated, (Tobacco Ads, for example).

The ONLY way, IMHO, to have a national data highway (not regulated
and thus censored by the FCC) is to have it operated by the post office.

Since I don't want the government opperating any data network I feel
the result will be freedom of "broadcast" IS DEAD.

E.g., I can send Tim live porno from my home, but as soon as I make it
available on a point to multi-point basis, the FCC steps in.... 


--
Harry S. Hawk  -  Extropian  
                                                        habs@extropy.org
In Service to Extropians since 1991






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: szabo@netcom.com (Nick Szabo)
Date: Mon, 15 Nov 93 06:05:29 PST
To: ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu (L. Detweiler)
Subject: Re: The Contortions of Cypherpunks
In-Reply-To: <9311142347.AA17045@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Message-ID: <199311151405.GAA17054@mail.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



L. Detweiler:
> Give specific evidence to support your claim or retract it. 

Uncle!  I retract my claim!  I'm not me!  My abject apologies for being 
a traitorous criminal pseudospoof, deluding even myself in the process!
(Very good VR tech they've got here!)

Detweiler, I don't know what is wrong with you, but there are
quite a few cypherpunks nearby in Colorado; many of them know
know many of us.  Several of us whom you have explicitly or strongly
implicitly accused of being "pseudospoofs" have violated their
own desire for privacy and sent you their phone numbers.  Some
post them publicly as a matter of course.  (Have you returned
the favor?  Does anybody know Detweiler's phone number?).  You
seem to lack all conception of how completely silly your accusations
look from the perspective of a Bay Area cypherpunks meeting, with
all us "tentacles of Medusa" overfilling a largish meeting room,
jokingly speculating about who will be detweiled next.

With less altruism than some fellow "tentacles", I have decided 
I don't trust you with anything more than I already give out by 
posting my True Name to the net.  In hindsight, even my True Name 
is probably too much trust with people like you in the world, who 
would subject cultural practices they do not understand to the 
extreme violent retribution consequent of something being
a crime or treason.  

If I may engage in some detweiling myself, a long overdue return 
of volleys:  The damage that can be caused by the demogaugic stalkers 
of the world is vastly greater than can be caused by swaying a few peer 
pressure prone readers here and there with "pseudospoofing".  As
if a centralized news media, politic polls, etc. don't already 
sway follow-the-crowd types to a degree vastly surpassing anybody's 
capabilities on the net.  The desire to keep track of identity may sound 
innocent enough, but behind the rhetoric of "accountability" looms
the bloody claws of violent politics, the quest to create a centralized 
identity enforcement agency, a net-based panoptic extortion racket 
with a potential for tyrrany surpassing anything the world has has 
yet seen.  Do you doubt Detweiler favors such an outcome over the 
dreaded "pseudospoofing"?  I'll be happy to forward Detweiler's posts 
in imp-interest on the matter, assuming everybody's not grown long since 
tired of these rants.  And with that bit of my own detweiling I will 
myself retire from the field, lest detweilosis be contagious.

Nick Szabo				szabo@netcom.com




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: nfe@scf.nmsu.edu
Date: Mon, 15 Nov 93 06:10:29 PST
To: pdn@dwroll.dw.att.com
Subject: Re:  Destroying data
Message-ID: <9311151407.AA22433@NMSU.Edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Philippe D. Nave, Jr. writes:
>Thermite grenades are pretty simple; ...
  
  NOT!

  Anyone really wanting to try this should hang out on rec.pyrotechnics
for awhile, but for the truely foolhardy here are some tips and thoughts:

1) Thermite is extreamly hard to ignite, so requires an igniter. Most 
  home made igniters are extreamly unstable (do you really want the thing
  off accidently (bump it, static charge, RF energy, etc)?

2) 50:50 mix of AL and iron oxide will probably work, but best to look up
  a really ballenced % for the best mix. btw: was that by volume or 
  weight?, there is a slight difference :)

3) in general, the finer the powder, the better. ball mill it if you can.

4) iron oxide has this strainge tendency to hold magnetic charges, do you
  REALLY want that near your HD?

5) for best results, the thermite charge should achive a completly molten
  state before the slag begins it's decent to the target, otherwise it
  waste's part of it's payload. The best homebrew way to do this is by
  making a cylinder of firebrick dust (hard or soft) and high temp epoxy
  (ceramics are also good), with a quarter sixe hole in the bottom. umm
  that's like a cylinder with one end cap'd, maybe 4-8" on diameter.
    cover the hole in the bottom with a thick piece of sheet metal, or
  copper, or something. Attach some sticks, or rebar, etc to form legs
  and offset about 1.5 to 3 inches for better penetration. (probably not
  necessary for electronic equipment)

6) on loading - best done near where you want to use it - alot of moving/
  shaking will tend to make the heavier iron oxide settle to the bottom
  and you won't get as good of a burn.

7) don't tamp it! - it needs that O2 between the flakes of powder.


  Now that you all know more than you really wanted to about thermite,
does anyone know of a good recipe for a magnetic bomb? - you know,
something with abit of oomph! ?

-n




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Jef Poskanzer <jef@ee.lbl.gov>
Date: Mon, 15 Nov 93 07:40:30 PST
To: nfe@freedom.nmsu.edu
Subject: Re: Destroying data
Message-ID: <9311151537.AA19352@ace.ee.lbl.gov>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>1) Thermite is extreamly hard to ignite, so requires an igniter. Most 
>  home made igniters are extreamly unstable (do you really want the thing
>  off accidently (bump it, static charge, RF energy, etc)?

KNO3+sugar works fine.

>2) 50:50 mix of AL and iron oxide will probably work, but best to look up
>  a really ballenced % for the best mix. btw: was that by volume or 
>  weight?, there is a slight difference :)

By weight.

>3) in general, the finer the powder, the better. ball mill it if you can.

The iron oxide you get from ceramics supply places is plenty fine enough.
DO NOT ball mill the aluminum, it can explode.  If you're not a minor, chem
supply places should be willing to sell you 200-mesh Al, which works fine.

>7) don't tamp it! - it needs that O2 between the flakes of powder.

Not as far as I know.

Personally I'd rather use some sort of cryptographic file system,
with the key stored in volatile memory.  Connect the power switch
to your perimeter sensors and you're safe.  Thermite sounds macho
but the reality is messy and dangerous.  Do you really want to
risk a false alarm?
---
Jef




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: m5@vail.tivoli.com (Mike McNally)
Date: Mon, 15 Nov 93 06:00:29 PST
To: Ken McGlothlen <mcglk@cpac.washington.edu>
Subject: Re: The Courtesies of Cypherpunks
In-Reply-To: <9311130846.AA19291@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Message-ID: <9311151355.AA00502@vail.tivoli.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Ken McGlothlen writes:
 > ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu ("L. Detweiler") rants:
 > | I owe no courtesy ...
 >
 > More ludicrousness....


You know, while resisting the temptation to respond to Mr. Detweiler
(my rational self knows it's pointless, but my ire is raised), I've
begun to wonder whether this sort of psychosis is an anomaly or if
it'll be more common as the net becomes accessible to more and more
people.

We've all worried about various types of regulations on traffic which
may be proposed or imposed as the net becomes more common.  What if
this type of paranoia crops up more frequently?  (Indeed, it may have
happened many times in the past; Mr. Detweiler is just very "loud"
about it.)  Is it likely that there are a lot of people on shaky
emotional footing who'll lose their grip when faced with the new
sociological paradigms of electronic communities?

And, most importantly, should I be chastised for using cypherpunks
bandwidth for my musings? :-)  If so, I'll here make a lame attempt to
redeem myself by giving a preliminary thumbs up to the "Applied
Cryptography" text by Bruce Schneier.  I picked up my copy over the
weekend, and it looks like a winner.

--
Mike McNally




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: an12070@anon.penet.fi (S. Boxx)
Date: Mon, 15 Nov 93 00:24:00 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: souls and Multiple Personality Disorder
Message-ID: <9311150822.AA26800@anon.penet.fi>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


When a baby is born, a soul enters the world. When a person dies, a soul 
exits.

Reality is like the Internet. There are legitimate ways for souls to enter and 
illegitimate ways. You could be `born' under your true name, or you could 
get in through the subversive route and infect an outlet susceptible to 
Multiple Personality Disorder, or possess someone.

It's very difficult to detect, of course! When it happens, Call 1-800-EXORCIST

-------------------------------------------------------------------------
To find out more about the anon service, send mail to help@anon.penet.fi.
Due to the double-blind, any mail replies to this message will be anonymized,
and an anonymous id will be allocated automatically. You have been warned.
Please report any problems, inappropriate use etc. to admin@anon.penet.fi.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: paul@poboy.b17c.ingr.com (Paul Robichaux)
Date: Mon, 15 Nov 93 06:30:30 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: S. Boxx == L. Detwiler
Message-ID: <199311151427.AA19471@poboy.b17c.ingr.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

It should be evident; at least I'm convinced. The recent discussion on
programs to automatically search for similarities in texts of
different authors led me to think back on the collected works of
Detwiler and Boxx.

This is not sufficient evidence to stand up in court (or in the RISKS
Digest), but I offer it for your consideration.  There are some unique
and characteristic signatures in material from both authors:

	- writing style: frequency of use of $10 words
	                 excessive use of modifiers
			 excessive use of parenthetical phrases
	- lack of periods between initials and names (e.g. "T.C.May")
	- consistent use of initials instead of names (see above; no
	  other entity on this list that I recall does so.)
	- ADJECTIVES and ADVERBS are capitalized for emphasis

So, L.Detwiler: are you the snake, or just a tentacle? Of course,
maybe S. Boxx is just Eric pretending to be Tim, who is pretending to
be you. Or, maybe it's those damn Libertarian Nazi abortionists. I
don't know.


Wishing the coffee house had a bouncer,
- -Paul

- -- 
Paul Robichaux, KD4JZG     | Caution: cutting edge is sharp. Avoid contact.
Intergraph Federal Systems | Be a cryptography user - ask me how.
	    ** Of course I don't speak for Intergraph. **


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From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: bart@netcom.com (Harry Bartholomew)
Date: Tue, 16 Nov 93 22:54:18 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Citizens Guide to Using the FOIA
Message-ID: <199311151632.IAA12653@mail.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


    Available from the gopher wiretap.spies.com by selecting
    5. Government Docs (...) and then 5. Citizens Guide ...
    q to quit reading online, m to mail it, and enter your email 
    address. 93Kbytes.

    Bart




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Clark Reynard <clark@metal.psu.edu>
Date: Mon, 15 Nov 93 05:26:02 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: CIA Admits Timothy C. May Son of Sam!  Pix at eleven!
Message-ID: <9311151336.AA20239@metal.psu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


[ASCII crap straight from Fidonet deleted.]

[Obligatory obscenity deleted, as I have not the time
 to flame this moron.]

[Obligatory crypto reference:  I hear the CIA has new
cybernetic cryptography hardware; they're experimenting
with cyborging, and evidently they stole this poor
fool's brain; for obvious reasons, the experiment 
failed and we can conclude the existence of a vast
CIA coverup by the total lack of public denials
of the conspiracy.

Another telling point is that there is absolutely no evidence
of a conspiracy, which attests to the great
skill with which they covered it up.

In addition, Timothy C. May, if his middle name
is in fact Cornelius, despite his lack of trying
to hide this obvious clue; is obviously at the
helm of the conspiracy to present himself as
a countercultural figure, when in fact the letters
of his name, when added in strict numerical order
and with vast compilations of material only known
to the devout studier of Sumerian metaphysics;
in fact equals the hideous number 93985676!
93985676, as any fool knows, is the Number of
the Beast when read as Hittite cuneiform
writing!

Obviously, as someone of my great knowledge can
tell at a glance, Timothy May, the CIA and the
so-called "cypherpunks," now revealed to be, in
actuality Satanpunks, devoted to the overthrow
of Mom, Apple Pie, and Everything Decent.

May they burn in everlasting Hell for their
blasphemous, devious, internetworked conspiracy
of hatred, and may they pay for their perfidy
in multilevelled torture chambers filled with
mud, stinging acid and vipers!

Now you'll pardon me.  I must go.  I hear a knock
at the door, and it could be the dreaded Eric
Hughes himself, who is STEALING MY THOUGHTS
with MICROWAVES!]
----
Robert W. F. Clark            PGP Key Available Upon Request
rclark@nyx.cs.du.edu
clark@metal.psu.edu




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: paul@poboy.b17c.ingr.com (Paul Robichaux)
Date: Mon, 15 Nov 93 06:41:05 PST
To: ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu (L. Detweiler)
Subject: Re: Key Servers
In-Reply-To: <9311150550.AA23351@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Message-ID: <199311151440.AA19694@poboy.b17c.ingr.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

> >4) (optionally) provide a service mapping from keys -> Real Names,
> >   for the ultra-paranoid.

> you have just classified 99.9 % of the population as `ultra paranoid'.
> But that .1% of the degenerates have never understood the idea of 
> civility anyway.

You have made some contributions to the net in the past. I
will try to proceed without calling names or poking fun.

The fact that PGP doesn't bind True Names and keys is not important to
me, nor to many others like me. 

I go by the code of the Old West: a man's reputation is established by what
he does. Period. In our case, that equates to "an entity's reputation
is established by the content of its posts." Real identity just isn't
important. 

For example, Wonderer has established itself as a smart, literate,
eager-to-learn entity. I look forward to its posts, and I don't care
who owns that pseudonym. 

The content is important, not the source.

- -Paul

- -- 
Paul Robichaux, KD4JZG     | Caution: cutting edge is sharp. Avoid contact.
Intergraph Federal Systems | Be a cryptography user - ask me how.
	    ** Of course I don't speak for Intergraph. **


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.3a

iQCVAgUBLOeUaSA78To+806NAQGEzAP/QREwLyHRxDAOjSBg5x5FxunOJtBUg7am
SCutuPEhZQ0ygRt2LAi2b6peU03ZWPw/TRRCWdlO2NqmgKcJW+nqbcdz4jt0Ocqi
uzrcWcVAq0/8QniNH6avdrog5H90TN9WhRCWzrLJpaDGg6Hsc4cM/VCLsUY1xx3s
mIa9l5ERYV8=
=SlFR
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Perry E. Metzger" <pmetzger@lehman.com>
Date: Mon, 15 Nov 93 06:20:28 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: The Courtesies of Cypherpunks
In-Reply-To: <9311151355.AA00502@vail.tivoli.com>
Message-ID: <9311151417.AA11341@snark.lehman.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Mike McNally says:
> We've all worried about various types of regulations on traffic which
> may be proposed or imposed as the net becomes more common.  What if
> this type of paranoia crops up more frequently?  (Indeed, it may have
> happened many times in the past; Mr. Detweiler is just very "loud"
> about it.)  Is it likely that there are a lot of people on shaky
> emotional footing who'll lose their grip when faced with the new
> sociological paradigms of electronic communities?

It will happen, but good filtering agents can stop it from becoming
annoying.

Perry




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Perry E. Metzger" <pmetzger@lehman.com>
Date: Mon, 15 Nov 93 07:10:31 PST
To: nfe@freedom.nmsu.edu
Subject: Re: Destroying data
In-Reply-To: <9311151407.AA22433@NMSU.Edu>
Message-ID: <9311151505.AA11359@snark.lehman.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



nfe@freedom.nmsu.edu says:
> 7) don't tamp it! - it needs that O2 between the flakes of powder.

This inaccuracy alone demonstrates that you don't know what you are
talking about. 

Perry




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Date: Mon, 15 Nov 93 10:36:08 PST
To: cfrye@ciis.mitre.org (Curtis D. Frye)
Subject: Re: LD Admits he is S.Boxx (oops!)
In-Reply-To: <9311151601.AA09373@ciis.mitre.org>
Message-ID: <199311151836.KAA27620@mail.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



> Kudos to Mike Ingle for his diligent record keeping and powers of
> observation.  As much as I like the computational solution for these
> problems, there's no substitute for documenting a mistake that blows
> somebody's cover.
> 
> Curtis D. Frye

The S. Boxx = LD correlation has been obvious for several weeks. In
one notable case, S. Boxx quoted directly from private mail that had
been sent by Eric Hughes to L.D.

When confronted by this, L.D. waffled a bit and then mumbled something
about "of course cooperating with my colleague S. Boxx." For the next
several days he was careful to make casual references to "my
colleague."

As someone else told me, L.D. is a true casualty. 

I'm trying to avoid discussing his situation on the List. The whole
matter has probably already driven people off the List, and more folks
may be on the verge. They joined the List to talk about the stuff we
are supposed to be discussing, and instead they get a dozen rants a
day from Detweiler and as many followups flaming him.

ObCrytp Note: Just got the English translation in paperback of the
Japanese-published "Encyclopedic Dictionary of Mathematics," a large
2-volume set with detailed articles on many branches of math. If the
math talked about in crypto is sometimes obscure to you, check this
out. The cost is $59, a real bargain these days.

--Tim May


-- 
..........................................................................
Timothy C. May         | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,  
tcmay@netcom.com       | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
408-688-5409           | knowledge, reputations, information markets, 
W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA  | black markets, collapse of governments.
Higher Power: 2^756839 | Public Key: PGP and MailSafe available.
Note: I put time and money into writing this posting. I hope you enjoy it.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: walter kehowski <wak@next11.math.pitt.edu>
Date: Mon, 15 Nov 93 07:55:29 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: mailing software
Message-ID: <9311151555.AA19558@next11.math.pitt.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Cypherpunks, Could someone send to me a list of software that expedites the  
processing of large amounts of e-mail? I'm on a next computer now and the browser,  
sorting, and mailboxes are very convenient. I won't always be using the next, though,  
and I'd like to start learning what the options are. Thanks, Walter A. Kehowski  
<wak@next0.math.pitt.edu>





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: cfrye@ciis.mitre.org (Curtis D. Frye)
Date: Mon, 15 Nov 93 07:55:39 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: LD Admits he is S.Boxx (oops!)
Message-ID: <9311151601.AA09373@ciis.mitre.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Kudos to Mike Ingle for his diligent record keeping and powers of
observation.  As much as I like the computational solution for these
problems, there's no substitute for documenting a mistake that blows
somebody's cover.


Curtis D. Frye
cfrye@ciis.mitre.org
"If you think I speak for MITRE, I'll tell you how much they
 pay me and make you feel foolish."






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Christopher Davis <ckd@kei.com>
Date: Tue, 16 Nov 93 23:04:16 PST
To: na41418@anon.penet.fi
Subject: Key Servers
In-Reply-To: <9311151445.AA12745@anon.penet.fi>
Message-ID: <199311151617.LAA05790@loiosh.kei.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Wonderer> == wonderer  <an41418@anon.penet.fi>

 Wonderer> I don't see what you mean by key servers for only true names.
 Wonderer> How do you know that a true name isn't just a false identity
 Wonderer> created with a real account on some system? How do you
 Wonderer> differentiate a true name from a unix account?

You can't.

As has already been pointed out on the list, the key servers have nothing
to do with binding keys to humans (or other entities, presumably :-).
Only a trusted (by you) key signature can do that; the key servers merely
serve as a way to distribute the keys.

The way to "certify" a key as belonging to a True Name is (again, as has
already been pointed out) to have a signing key that goes along with some
policy.  That gives keys signed by that key some level of trust, depending
of course on how stringent the policy and how much you trust the signer
not to be fooled (or malicious).

If someone wishes to only deal with cyberspacial entities that have
Certified True Names, then that someone can easily take steps to do so.
(And if that someone decides that I'm simply a "brand new Tentacle" or
whatever, that's not my problem; I'm easy enough to verify as a human, if
it's that big a deal...)
-- 
Christopher Davis * <ckd@kei.com> * (was <ckd@eff.org>) * MIME * RIPEM * [CKD1]
   This netnews posting is presented in the original 80-column aspect ratio.
The black bars bordering the headers and .signature are normal for this format.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Mike Godwin <mnemonic@eff.org>
Date: Mon, 15 Nov 93 09:30:31 PST
To: jef@ee.lbl.gov (Jef Poskanzer)
Subject: Re: Destroying data
In-Reply-To: <9311151537.AA19352@ace.ee.lbl.gov>
Message-ID: <199311151622.AA05473@eff.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Jef Poskanzer writes:
 
> >7) don't tamp it! - it needs that O2 between the flakes of powder.
> 
> Not as far as I know.

Surely Jef's right about this--isn't the oxygen for combustion already
present in the compounds?


--Mike





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: cman@IO.COM (Douglas Barnes)
Date: Mon, 15 Nov 93 09:31:07 PST
To: szabo@netcom.com (Nick Szabo)
Subject: Info on L.Detweiler
In-Reply-To: <199311151405.GAA17054@mail.netcom.com>
Message-ID: <9311151727.AA17924@illuminati.IO.COM>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> post them publicly as a matter of course.  (Have you returned
> the favor?  Does anybody know Detweiler's phone number?).  You

Here's some info folks might appreciate (all numbers area code
303, unless otherwise noted):

Lance is the college of engineering subdomain.
Scott Douglas (lance sysadmin) scott@lance.colostate.edu 491-7954
College of Engineering Dean's Office: 491-6603 (Dr. Jorge Aunon)
Vice President, Student Affairs (discipline): 491-5312 (Keith Miser)
ACNS switchboard (Computation center) 491-5133 (Gary Edelen)
ACNS Consulting Desk 491-7276
CSU Information 491-1101
Degree Verification 491-7159

Hold off for a bit on these numbers; it's still not clear who (if anyone) 
is really responsibile for him now. 

I had a very productive talk with Gary Edelen who (like me) is not pleased 
that state funds are going to subsidize someone's highly disruptive, insane, 
quasi-religious rants; he's contacting Scott Douglas, who is apparently the 
administrator of record for the lance subdomain. 

Lawrence Detweiler was awarded a BS in Engineering Science in Spring 
of 1993.

LD's finger: 
------------

Notes:
He is no longer listed with student information or as a staff/faculty 
member, nor is he listed with 303 directory; there is no L. Detweiler 
listed in Fort Collins anymore, or in Denver/Boulder, although there 
is a Jeff Detweiler listed in the 1991 phone book; a call to 498-8278 
got an answering machine, 491-5893 forwards to the Kater Laboratory 
Optical Core.

The 1-5893 number is for the Department of Anatomy, Dennis Giddings 
(staff member). LD apparently worked for the Kater Laboratory as an
hourly student. 

Rene Olson (491-6849) used to be his supervisor, but could not be reached 
for comment.

---------------------------------
[longs.lance.colostate.edu]
Login name: ld231782  			In real life: L. Detweiler
Phone: 15893, 498-8278
Directory: /users/UNGRAD/ES/ld231782	Shell: /bin/tcsh
Most recent logins:
	parry        Fri Nov 12 22:20
	mears        Thu Nov 11 15:42
	jenkins      Sat Nov 13 21:11
	casco        Mon Nov 15 01:02
Never logged in.
No Plan.
--------------------------------

Note that this is just the easy stuff, I have folks digging deeper.
More to come...

-- 
----------------                                             /\ 
Douglas Barnes            cman@illuminati.io.com            /  \ 
Chief Wizard         (512) 448-8950 (d), 447-7866 (v)      / () \
Illuminati Online          metaverse.io.com 7777          /______\



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: hfinney@shell.portal.com (Hal Finney)
Date: Mon, 15 Nov 93 11:54:01 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Portable crypto code
Message-ID: <9311151952.AA03070@jobe.shell.portal.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


One thing that frustrates me is the difficulty of easily providing
implementations of cryptographic algorithms that would be useful on a
wide range of machines.  A lot of these algorithms are really simple,
almost trivial.  Yet to write programs to implement them takes pages and
pages of code, and making them portable so that people on PC's, Mac's, and
Unix machines can use them is almost impossible.

Take the simple Chaum cash we have discussed here a few times.  The
user picks a random x and a random r, calculates r^3*f(x) where f is some
one-way function, and sends it to the bank.  The bank takes the cube root
and sends it back, then the user divides by r.  That's pretty simple.  Yet
to actually implement software to perform these steps raises a host of
complications.

First, we want to choose a "random" x and r in the range 0..m-1, where
m is the bank's public key modulus.  But we want these to be strong,
unguessable random numbers.  We need an unpredictable RNG,
and we need to seed it.  There are various URNG's that are provably as
strong as breaking factoring, discrete logarithms, and such, so these
would have to be implemented (as before, most are conceptually trivial).
Or you could run DES or IDEA in a feedback mode and take bits from there,
for a little less security but more speed.

For seeding the RNG you could do like PGP does and retain random numbers
from earlier runs, mixing in new randomness when feasible; you could do
like RIPEM and scan disk partitions hoping for randomness (I think RIPEM
has a lot of other ways of looking for entropy); you could use hardware
features like /dev/audio or the free-running, high-speed timers some PC's
have; you can get the user to click the mouse or type keys at random.

OK, we've got our random numbers.  Now we want a one-way function.  Again,
there are several choices: MD4 and MD5 from RSA; the Secure Hash Standard
NIST is pushing; Ralph Merkle's (I forget the name); others based on
conventional ciphers like DES or IDEA.  Implementations of these are
probably available, but portability is a question mark.

Now we need a multi-precision math package.  We may have needed one for
the URNG, too.  There are a lot of libraries available in source code
for these, but not many of them will work with 16-bit ints, and are
tested on DOS and Mac's as well as Unix.

Finally, to send the data around, we may want to convert to and from ASCII,
and once again there are a lot of choices, but perhaps not too many
portable libraries.  I suppose RFC1113 and MIME, which are similar but
not quite identical, would be the encodings of choice.

The point I'm getting to is that it would be nice if all this were done
ONCE, and a library made and tested which would work on a wide range
of machines.  Entry points for one-way functions, multi-precision
arithmetic, unpredictable random numbers, conventional encryption, and
ascii conversions could all be provided.  Multiple alternatives would be
supported as much as possible and it should not be difficult to add more
as time goes on.

Once you had such a library, it would be possible to add a user interface
to allow interactive use of the routines.  It could be as simple as the
Unix "bc" program where you can say "x = y*z" to do arithmetic, or perhaps
"x = md5(y)" to call a one-way function.  Or the library could perhaps be
linked into perl or some other high-level program (does mathematica have
hooks for compiled user code?).  The nice thing is that since most of the
compute time is spent doing the MP arithmetic in these algorithms, an
interpreted system which calls compiled libraries can be as efficient as
a purely compiled program.

I know that others here have made similar proposals in the past, but
I have not heard of many results.  I'd like to hear more about whether
these efforts have produced anything that could be incorporated.  It
would also be good to hear suggestions for specific existing packages that
would meet the portability requirements.  I've looked at a couple of MP
packages from ripem.msu.edu but so far I haven't had much luck running them
under DOS.

Perhaps a project like this could allow progress to be made more easily
toward cypherpunk goals.  By providing a toolkit to programers newly
interested in cryptography people will be able to try out ideas more
easily without having to re-invent the wheel each time.

Let me know if you would be interested in participating in this effort.
Hopefully a lot of the pieces already exist and it will just be a matter
of pulling them together.

Hal Finney
hfinney@shell.portal.com




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: henry strickland <strick@osc.versant.com>
Date: Mon, 15 Nov 93 12:00:31 PST
To: cman@IO.COM (Douglas Barnes)
Subject: Against limiting free speech on public networks
In-Reply-To: <9311151727.AA17924@illuminati.IO.COM>
Message-ID: <9311151956.AA22553@osc.versant.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


# ... who (like me) is not pleased 
# that state funds are going to subsidize someone's highly disruptive, insane, 
# quasi-religious rants; ...

Censoring public nets from unpopular viewpoints is not what cypherpunks
should be advocating.

If we cannot practice either tolerance or inbox-filtering in our own
group, we cannot expect the rest of the world to agree with our ideas
for free speech nets.

						strick




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Date: Mon, 15 Nov 93 12:04:01 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: EDM--Encyclopedic Dictionary of Mathematics
Message-ID: <199311152002.MAA09406@mail.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I've gotten a few requests already for info on the book I mentioned. 

I usually avoid giving ISBN numbers for folks to order a book sight
unseen--if they're going to spend $50-70 for a book, they at least
ought to flip through it in person and see if they really want it.

(Sidenote: Must be the electronic age...often when I mention a paper
on something, I get notes asking me where it's available online! I
admire these Net-dwellers (no relation to Detweiler!), but the fact is
that most of the good stuff is only in print. The reasons are many.)

Anyway, here's the EDM info:

> > > ObCrytp Note: Just got the English translation in paperback of the
> > > Japanese-published "Encyclopedic Dictionary of Mathematics," a large
> > > 2-volume set with detailed articles on many branches of math. If the
> > > math talked about in crypto is sometimes obscure to you, check this
> > > out. The cost is $59, a real bargain these days.


> MIT Press, ISBN 0-262-59020-4 (paperback), "Encyclopedic Dictionary of
> Mathematics," Second Edition, edited by Kiyosi Ito, 1993.


For $59, a real bargain. But if you don't have a fairly good crypto
library (Schneier, especially, and perhaps Denning, Salomaa, Brassard,
Simmons, etc.), then you'd probably do better to get some of them
first.

--Tim


-- 
..........................................................................
Timothy C. May         | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,  
tcmay@netcom.com       | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
408-688-5409           | knowledge, reputations, information markets, 
W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA  | black markets, collapse of governments.
Higher Power: 2^756839 | Public Key: PGP and MailSafe available.
Note: I put time and money into writing this posting. I hope you enjoy it.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: lefty@apple.com (Lefty)
Date: Mon, 15 Nov 93 14:10:40 PST
To: "L. Detweiler" <ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Subject: Re: The Contortions of Cypherpunks
Message-ID: <9311152015.AA19620@internal.apple.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>N.Szabo <szabo@netcom.com> in RISKS
>
>>I'd like to assure the readers of RISKS that I am in fact a unique person,
>>distinct from the other names L. Detweiler listed.  Of the people on his list
>>I know from personal contact, all are distinct people in Real Life(tm).  
>
>Give specific evidence to support your claim or retract it. Who do you
>know from personal contact? What do you mean that you are `distinct
>from other names'?

I have had lunch with both Tim May and Nick Szabo, and can verify that they
simultaneously sat in different seats, wore different clothes, ate
different lunches, and had different quantities of facial hair.

I have, further, had lunch with Perry Metzger on another occasion and will
testify that he is, to the best of my ability to ascertain, neither of the
aforementioned people.


--
Lefty (lefty@apple.com)
C:.M:.C:., D:.O:.D:.






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: erc@khijol (Ed Carp)
Date: Mon, 15 Nov 93 13:45:37 PST
To: gtoal@an-teallach.com
Subject: Re: Info on L.Detweiler
In-Reply-To: <7911@an-teallach.com>
Message-ID: <m0ozAjy-000HXdC@khijol>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text


> I suppose someone posting from a site called 'Illuminati' thinks
> this is all very funny.  I don't.  Neither would you if you were
> above the age of 14.

I found the whole thing boring and very tiresome.  People here need to grow
up.  Get a life.  While some start and perpetuate flame wars, and take great
delight in screwing with other people, the NSA/FBI/NIST is sitting back and
laughing their heads off.  Stop wasting your energy fighting each other and
concentrate on the REAL threat.
-- 
Ed Carp, N7EKG			erc@wetware.com			510/659-9560
                   an38299@anon.penet.fi, anon-1157@twwells.com
If you want magic, let go of your armor.  Magic is so much stronger than
steel!        -- Richard Bach, "The Bridge Across Forever"



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: thug@phantom.com (Murdering Thug)
Date: Mon, 15 Nov 93 10:30:31 PST
To: gtoal@an-teallach.com
Subject: Re: "Root Canal" questions
In-Reply-To: <7832@an-teallach.com>
Message-ID: <m0oz8iE-0009NdC@mindvox.phantom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text


> In article <00541.2835966052.614@washofc.cpsr.org> dsobel@washofc.cpsr.org writes:
>  >   "Root Canal" questions
>  > BTW, anyone have ideas about that name!?
> 
> Having just been through this procedure (UK National Health, $70), I can
> tell you - It's all about *Deep Drilling*.  Presumably for data, in this
> case.  And it hurts.
> 
> G
> -- 
> Personal mail to gtoal@gtoal.com (I read it in the evenings)
> Business mail to gtoal@an-teallach.com (Be careful with the spelling!)
> Faxes to An Teallach Limited: +44 31 662 4678  Voice: +44 31 668 1550 x212

Having just been informed that I'm to undergo this procedure in 4 days
time, I really really appreciate you telling me that it hurts.

Seriously, I think "Root Canal" must mean what it says.  Root Canal. A
canal is a channel, a pathway.  Root, in unix terminoligy means one who
can read anything on a system.  Thus Root Canal would allow the FBI to
have a channel with full read privilages to all information in a system,
namely the phone system.  Root Canal therefore is the same as Big Brother
in Orwellian terminology.


Thug




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: strat@tonto.ksu.ksu.edu (Steve Davis)
Date: Mon, 15 Nov 93 11:46:08 PST
To: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Subject: Re: LD Admits he is S.Boxx (oops!)
In-Reply-To: <199311151836.KAA27620@mail.netcom.com>
Message-ID: <9311151945.AA06471@tonto.ksu.ksu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


From the keyboard of Timothy C. May:

> The S. Boxx = LD correlation has been obvious for several weeks.

Who cares?

Use procmail.  Put these lines in your .procmailrc:

----------------------------------------------------------------------

^From[ :].*L\..Detweiler
/dev/null

^From[ :].*ld231782@*.lance.colostate.edu
/dev/null

----------------------------------------------------------------------

This helps the signal to noise ratio quite a bit.

ObCrypt:  I'm looking for info on designing a distributed encrypted
filesystem.  Any pointers?

-- 
                                               Steve Davis (strat@cis.ksu.edu)
                                                       Kansas State University
In general, they do what you want, unless you want consistency.
    -- Larry Wall in the perl man page



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Perry E. Metzger" <pmetzger@lehman.com>
Date: Mon, 15 Nov 93 10:54:00 PST
To: Mike Godwin <mnemonic@eff.org>
Subject: Re: Destroying data
In-Reply-To: <199311151622.AA05473@eff.org>
Message-ID: <9311151850.AA11608@snark.lehman.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Mike Godwin says:
> 
> Jef Poskanzer writes:
>  
> > >7) don't tamp it! - it needs that O2 between the flakes of powder.
> > 
> > Not as far as I know.
> 
> Surely Jef's right about this--isn't the oxygen for combustion already
> present in the compounds?

Of course. Thats what the iron oxide is for -- its oxidizer for this
reaction. However, is this really cypherpunks material?

.pm




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: an41418@anon.penet.fi (wonderer)
Date: Mon, 15 Nov 93 06:50:31 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Key Servers
Message-ID: <9311151445.AA12745@anon.penet.fi>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

I don't see what you mean by key servers for only true names.
How do you know that a true name isn't just a false identity
created with a real account on some system? How do you differentiate
a true name from a unix account?

Wonderer

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.3

iQBVAgUBLOeQFx1kTJuroDD9AQFxbQH/f7Y4uj4xn2eeWFoTmu8Aahp2FxG+7ShV
uAvvRpUWkE2Ay9MdB4lKCSjNv5cO92DwbcWRoZgbI7hPJGAe7za37A==
=IBrC
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
To find out more about the anon service, send mail to help@anon.penet.fi.
Due to the double-blind, any mail replies to this message will be anonymized,
and an anonymous id will be allocated automatically. You have been warned.
Please report any problems, inappropriate use etc. to admin@anon.penet.fi.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Date: Mon, 15 Nov 93 14:50:37 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: DC-Nets
In-Reply-To: <199311152116.AA15101@tramp.cc.utexas.edu>
Message-ID: <199311152248.OAA27432@mail.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Jim McCoy has asked me about the DC-Nets references I have cited. Here
they are. The seminal Chaum articles are not cited--the main one has
been posted to this List more than once.

Clearly the Eurocrypt '89 book is the one to get. If your library does
not carry it, Springer-Verlag (1-800-SPRINGE) can ship it (and please
don't write to me asking for the ISBN!). Also, "Computer Literacy
Bookstore" in Sunnyvale (408 area code) usually has a bunch of these
Proceedings in various years and can also ship.

Disruption is the main problem addressed in these papers. Given the
malicious disruption we've seen on our List lately, it is of course a
very real problem. Even more so if and when DC-Nets get deployed and
some agents/entities seek to automate the disruption process (a likely
prospect, given the way they work).

A reminder to you all, even though I am not myself working on DC-Nets
(trying to program them in Mathematica is pointless, I think), that
there are several groups currently interested in DC-Nets:

* Jim McCoy and the Austing group (I think they run the DC-Net mailing
list...I'm on too many mailing lists, so I skipped this one)

* Henry Strickland (Strick) is interested, has plans, and is putting
together his crypto toolkit in TCL.

* Yanek Martinson, of whom little has been hear lately, was once hot
on doing this, and even got a basic DC-Net running. 

Anyway, here are some important references:


- J. N. E. Bos and H den Boer, "Detecting Disrupters in the DC
Protocol," Eurocrypt '89, pp. 320327.

- M. Waidner and B. Pfitzmann. "The Dining Cryptographers in the
Disco," Eurocrypt '89, p. 690.

- A. Pfitzmann and M. Waidner, "Networks without User Observability,"
Computers and Security 6 (No 2, April 1987), pp. 158-166.

- B. Pfitzmann and A. Pfitzmann, "How to Break the Direct
RSA-Implementation of Mixes," Eurocrypt '89, pp. 373-381.

(In case you're curious, the Pfitzmanns are husband and wife.)

- J. N. E. Bos, "Disruption and Synchronization in Untraceable
Sending," in "Practical Privacy," the 1992 Ph.D. thesis of Bos.
Technische Universiteit Eindhoven (Netherlands).

(This little book is not published, in purchasable form. The relevant
chapter was included in the Xeroxed handout at the first Cypherpunks
meeting. You might be able to get the book by contacting Eindhoven
directly.)


--Tim

-- 
..........................................................................
Timothy C. May         | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,  
tcmay@netcom.com       | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
408-688-5409           | knowledge, reputations, information markets, 
W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA  | black markets, collapse of governments.
Higher Power: 2^756839 | Public Key: PGP and MailSafe available.
Note: I put time and money into writing this posting. I hope you enjoy it.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Arthur Chandler <arthurc@crl.com>
Date: Mon, 15 Nov 93 15:09:12 PST
To: Douglas Barnes <cman@IO.COM>
Subject: Re: Info on L.Detweiler
In-Reply-To: <9311151727.AA17924@illuminati.IO.COM>
Message-ID: <Pine.3.87.9311151449.A21078-0100000@crl.crl.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



  If the publication of this information is intended as a prelude to the 
RL persecution or harassment of Mr. Detweiler, I want to lodge a strong 
dissenting opinion. Mr. Detweiler's posts, made in an open forum, are his 
opinions on a number of matters relevant to the social implications of 
encryption and privacy. If we disagree with his views, we can post 
responses, or simply ignore them. Once anyone see's L. Detweiler on the 
header of any post, he or she has a pretty good idea of the tenor of 
what's coming. If you know it's going to enrage you, then why bother 
reading it?
  I personally think that, under the avalanche of rhetoric, he 
raises some very germane issues. I would miss him if he left. But even if 
I thought him 100% mistaken, I wouldn't endorse posting RL information 
about him so that people unhappy with his views could contact Mr. 
Detweiler's associates to complain about him. 

On Mon, 15 Nov 1993, Douglas Barnes wrote:

> > post them publicly as a matter of course.  (Have you returned
> > the favor?  Does anybody know Detweiler's phone number?).  You
> 
> Here's some info folks might appreciate (all numbers area code
> 303, unless otherwise noted):
> 
> Lance is the college of engineering subdomain.
> Scott Douglas (lance sysadmin) scott@lance.colostate.edu 491-7954
> College of Engineering Dean's Office: 491-6603 (Dr. Jorge Aunon)
> Vice President, Student Affairs (discipline): 491-5312 (Keith Miser)
> ACNS switchboard (Computation center) 491-5133 (Gary Edelen)
> ACNS Consulting Desk 491-7276
> CSU Information 491-1101
> Degree Verification 491-7159
> 
> Hold off for a bit on these numbers; it's still not clear who (if anyone) 
> is really responsibile for him now. 
> 
> I had a very productive talk with Gary Edelen who (like me) is not pleased 
> that state funds are going to subsidize someone's highly disruptive, insane, 
> quasi-religious rants; he's contacting Scott Douglas, who is apparently the 
> administrator of record for the lance subdomain. 
> 
> Lawrence Detweiler was awarded a BS in Engineering Science in Spring 
> of 1993.
> 
> LD's finger: 
> ------------
> 
> Notes:
> He is no longer listed with student information or as a staff/faculty 
> member, nor is he listed with 303 directory; there is no L. Detweiler 
> listed in Fort Collins anymore, or in Denver/Boulder, although there 
> is a Jeff Detweiler listed in the 1991 phone book; a call to 498-8278 
> got an answering machine, 491-5893 forwards to the Kater Laboratory 
> Optical Core.
> 
> The 1-5893 number is for the Department of Anatomy, Dennis Giddings 
> (staff member). LD apparently worked for the Kater Laboratory as an
> hourly student. 
> 
> Rene Olson (491-6849) used to be his supervisor, but could not be reached 
> for comment.
> 
> ---------------------------------
> [longs.lance.colostate.edu]
> Login name: ld231782  			In real life: L. Detweiler
> Phone: 15893, 498-8278
> Directory: /users/UNGRAD/ES/ld231782	Shell: /bin/tcsh
> Most recent logins:
> 	parry        Fri Nov 12 22:20
> 	mears        Thu Nov 11 15:42
> 	jenkins      Sat Nov 13 21:11
> 	casco        Mon Nov 15 01:02
> Never logged in.
> No Plan.
> --------------------------------
> 
> Note that this is just the easy stuff, I have folks digging deeper.
> More to come...
> 
> -- 
> ----------------                                             /\ 
> Douglas Barnes            cman@illuminati.io.com            /  \ 
> Chief Wizard         (512) 448-8950 (d), 447-7866 (v)      / () \
> Illuminati Online          metaverse.io.com 7777          /______\
> 







From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: owen@autodesk.com (D. Owen Rowley)
Date: Mon, 15 Nov 93 16:40:45 PST
To: pmetzger@lehman.com
Subject: Re: The Courtesies of Cypherpunks
Message-ID: <9311152339.AA22460@lux.YP.acad>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Before I start I wish to express that on many occasions 
Perry has earned my utmost respect,
and that the sarcasm I express here is not offered as flame bait, but
as an expressions of the ironic nature of this affair.
as such it migrates from *wry* comments on Perrys post into a more general
rant.

  > From: "Perry E. Metzger" <pmetzger@lehman.com>
  > Look, everyone --

Is this a command, a request, a plea, or a futile gesture?

 > Detweiler is a seriously disturbed individual. 

In your opinion. 
No matter how common that opinion may be amongst other
participants, stating such as *fact*, only opens pandoras box
that much further.


 > Sending him mail saying
 > "what the hell are you doing -- you're nuts" isn't going to do any
 > good. 

Isn't going to what?
Good in whose opinion?

relative statements with open ended conjecture dangling unspecified
but none the less qualified negations of hypothetical scenarios
are doing some good?

 > Crazy people don't think they are crazy. Ignoring his rantings
 > works a whole lot better than any other strategy.

towards what end, assuming that all share the same goal?

 > I only mailbombed him because he was sending me unsolicited personal
 > mail and wouldn't stop. Otherwise I ignore him, and I advise others to
 > do the same.

Do you dump your nose-goblin collection into the neighbors mailbox
if their dog shits on your front stoop?
doing so would be a federal crime would it not?


Mailbombing is considered an anti-social act by everyone I know
whose ever been the recipient of one. Blaiming your actions on the other guy
is just a version of a *He started it* argument, something I find to be
more common to adolescents and mental inferiors. 
Not the kind of thing I usually see from bright
people like you Perry!

phade to more general rant...................................

I am finding this situation most enlightening myself.

It directly parallels the situation that I outlined regarding
the electronic version of Fag bashers in the queer newsgroups, and the 
subsequent e-terrorism that has been perpetrated against myself and other
admitted homo-sek-shuals who don't take any shit from homo-haters.

Larry has simply created a campaign against a different un-natural 
lifestyle choice, the perverted and obviously criminal desire 
to remain anonymous. (thats satire BTW)
 
Showing us how to harangue your target with the techniques of mindless
prejudged bigotry, and how they usually only engender more of the same.
(ala *my mind is made up, don't confuse me with facts)

It reminds me of some things I've seen all too often in other corners of the 
matrix;

the subsequent flame wars that ensue from the use of inflamatory terms,
(in this case the spoof word. Made more poignant due to the similarity to
the british slang word poof.)

the inevitable escalation of miscommunication that occurs between
people who are talking *at* each other rather than with each other,

the reality that electronic freedom still requires some forms of accountability,

the fantasy that anonymity makes you free,

the irony that those who expand their gripes against individuals as
foolish campaigns against whole groups of individuals, are engaged in 
destroying the very freedoms they claim to be defending.
(kinda like sawing off the limb your sitting on, to keep others from
sitting next to you!)

and that ultimately the only punishment available to an online personality
for transgression is exclusion.
(so far)

.................

To those who wrote to me a while back, telling me to get a thicker skin,
and learn to deal with it. I can now say,
just get over it.

To those who didn't understand the logistics of gaining concensus regarding
how to deal with such situations, I am eagerly awaiting your guidance
to show me how its done.


I think this issue points out the need to develop systems that foster
a better quality of communication in a medium that hampers quality at the
expense of ease-o-use.

I think that examining this situation as an example of a much wider
problem will illuminate some of the points I tried to make some months ago.
It is my opinion that the situation regarding the use of anonymous systems
to harrass and terrorise queers on the net is a laboratory for the study
of this issue. Ignore it at your peril IMNSHO.

And I think that if any group of people on the net is qualified and capable
of dealing inteligent solutions out, this is the group.

I think you gotta widen your focus and recognise the broad issues
before you narrow in on the specifics, I don't think that solutions 
to the issues involved can be integrated at the end of a patch-work
quilt of solutions that only get implemented after the fact.

In short Detweiler isn't the problem, he has merely provided you with 
some examples to chew on.
So go ahead, chase him away, perhaps the next case will not be one that
just involves simple neurosis, perhaps it will be full blown psychosis
and e-terrorists like we have experienced in the queerer corners of the 
matrix.
(as if this one isn't pretty odd ;-)


LUX ./. owen






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Date: Mon, 15 Nov 93 15:44:05 PST
To: kovar@nda.com (David Kovar)
Subject: My last words on Larry Detweiler
In-Reply-To: <199311152255.RAA15471@nda.nda.com>
Message-ID: <199311152343.PAA03708@mail.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


David Kovar had higher hopes:

>   Worse, you can't convince anyone new to the list that you're not
> just a group of children with large egos and complex privacy enhancing
> toys. I've seen a few well written messages in this group and some
> pointers to interesting information, but by far the most volume on
> this list, and the xtropians list for that matter, has been petty
> bickering. I had higher hopes ....

It's unfortunate that many people think others must write interesting
articles for them. I don't want to pick on David, but his comments
underscore the problem. 

If people want interesting stuff, they need to write it! In looking
over my archives, I only found two (2) past messages from David Kovar,
one here about creating false electronic identities and one on
Extropians about he Panix system and its management. (I may have not
saved all of David's posts...if so, I apologize for any
mischaracterization of his contributions.)

As to the flames, I'm as unhappy about it as David is. But what to do
about it? I haven't called for Detweiler to be censored, though I did
take the precaution of nofifying Dewtweiler's postmaster--the first
time I've ever done this--after recieving numerous threatening
messages ("You will be hung by the neck until dead and then sent to
Hell.") and an explicit statement from him that he intended to
continue harassing Eric Hughes and me until we recanted or begged
forgivness or somesuch nonsense.

For more than a month I ignored his public comments and didn't respond
at all to his private letters to me (threats, foamings,
manic-depresssive mood swings....he even tried to enlist my support in
his battle against Hughes...this after calling for my execution just
days earlier!). This didn't work.

It's too bad this is disrupting the list. But, to be blunt, I consider
all the fatuous "why can you just get along?" comments to be equally
disruptive. Several people, notably Hal Finney, Doug Barnes, others,
have stepped into the breach to try to cool Larry's fevered
imagination--for their troubles they were declared to be Tentacles of
the Medusa. Part of the Dark Side of the Force, as Larry sees things.

Detweiler recently sent me e-mail cackling about how proud I must be
of my latest Nym Tentacle, a certain Hal Finney. I guess I'm honored.
Don't know about Hal, though.

What more can I say? I never called for Detweiler to be kicked off,
and I've tried to limit my comments about him to a couple of
explanatory posts.

(I have to struggle with my Neo-Calvinist urges. To a Neo-Calvinist,
ignorance is its own punishment...if people believe false ideas, then
Reality will punish them. "Think of it as evolution in action." Thus,
when Detweiler makes outrageous remarks, those who believe him are
choosing their own punishment. Normally, I thus see no reason to "set
the record straight." I did, however, a while back when many follow-up
posts to Detweiler's began to take his "pseudospoofing" as a fact of
the list, as a starting point. This misapprehension of reality seemed
to be taking on a life of its own, so I wrote a long piece on the
Detweiler matter.)

I intend for this to be my last word on the subject, unless some major
and different kind of information comes to light.

Clearly he is succeeding in pressing a lot of buttons.


--Tim May



-- 
..........................................................................
Timothy C. May         | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,  
tcmay@netcom.com       | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
408-688-5409           | knowledge, reputations, information markets, 
W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA  | black markets, collapse of governments.
Higher Power: 2^756839 | Public Key: PGP and MailSafe available.
Note: I put time and money into writing this posting. I hope you enjoy it.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: wcs@anchor.ho.att.com (bill.stewart@pleasantonca.ncr.com +1-510-484-6204)
Date: Mon, 15 Nov 93 15:06:11 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: BAY AREA: Schneier Book gone from Cody's
Message-ID: <9311152059.AA01040@anchor.ho.att.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


(If we had a newsgroup instead of a mailing list, I could send this to
ba.cypherpunks instead)
I got their last one about 5pm Sunday; when I went to the information
desk to ask if they had it, the clerk's response was along the lines of
"Cryptography - oh, the blue one?  It's been really selling hot -
we just got tehm in this morning and you're getting the last one."
		Bill




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Chael Hall <nowhere@chaos.bsu.edu>
Date: Mon, 15 Nov 93 13:44:01 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: UNIX: Chaos Gains Reliability
Message-ID: <199311152234.QAA02431@chaos.bsu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text



Hello, all,

     I am about six-thousand messages behind on the cypherpunks list, but I
just wanted to tell everyone that I *finally* got a reliable kernel last night.
The patch to my hard drive driver has been installed and verified to be
avoiding the hang problems that chaos had.  The system maintenance schedule
has likewise been modified.  It now reboots only at 5 am daily.  If it holds
up this week, I will change the reboot schedule to once a week (probably
Sunday or Monday morning at 5 am CST).

     If anyone is interested in an account on chaos, they are freely available
granted you have a good reason (i.e., intend to write code, be a productive
user, etc.) by request.  Telnet to chaos.bsu.edu (147.226.53.28) and login
as guest (all lowercase).  It will direct you through the account request
procedure.

     **IMPORTANT**  Chaos has very limited disk space (200 MB) right now.  The
planning committee has decided that once a reliable kernel has been installed
(which I believe was yesterday), we would begin to solicit donations for an
additional 500+ MB of storage.  The deal is (and I think this is pretty fair),
once the users have raised enough to pay for half of the new hard drive, I
will chip in the rest.  Anyone who donates money toward the acquisition of a
new hard drive will be given extra space on the new drive (we haven't quite
decided how it will be done, but two plans are:  give donated users write
access to an additional partition OR move their home directory to the new
partition).  Either way, all non-donated users will be the recipients of a
brand-spanking-new QUOTA!  I'm sorry, there just isn't the space.  Oh, another
thing, when the new drive arrives, it will supplement what is already there.
The old hard drive will not be removed.

     Any comments?  Reply in e-mail, this is not particularly relevant to
cypherpunks.  BTW, what does everyone think of the gopher site?  I'm going
to work on the FTP/NFS site some more one of these days.

Chael Hall
--
nowhere@chaos.bsu.edu
nowhere@bsu-cs.bsu.edu
chall@bsu.edu
00CCHALL@bsuvc.bsu.edu



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: gtoal@an-teallach.com (Graham Toal)
Date: Mon, 15 Nov 93 09:24:02 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: "Root Canal" questions
Message-ID: <7832@an-teallach.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


In article <00541.2835966052.614@washofc.cpsr.org> dsobel@washofc.cpsr.org writes:
 >   "Root Canal" questions
 
 > BTW, anyone have ideas about that name!?

Having just been through this procedure (UK National Health, $70), I can
tell you - It's all about *Deep Drilling*.  Presumably for data, in this
case.  And it hurts.

G
-- 
Personal mail to gtoal@gtoal.com (I read it in the evenings)
Business mail to gtoal@an-teallach.com (Be careful with the spelling!)
Faxes to An Teallach Limited: +44 31 662 4678  Voice: +44 31 668 1550 x212





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: wcs@anchor.ho.att.com (bill.stewart@pleasantonca.ncr.com +1-510-484-6204)
Date: Mon, 15 Nov 93 14:20:38 PST
To: ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu
Subject: Re: Key Servers and True Names
Message-ID: <9311152214.AA02136@anchor.ho.att.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


"L. Detweiler", or someone using his name, is a bit confused about
what keyservers are for - they're a convenience for making keys
readily available, and reducing the chances of getting a spoofed key.
The way to do a True Name Users Group is through key certification -
create a key called "L. Detweiler's True Name Certifier <ld@true.names.org>"
and use that key to sign keys for people who present real, non-forged
authentication papers, signed statements, or whatever credentials
you trust for demonstrating True Names.  People can add that
signature to the list of signatures they haul around on their public key.

I normally only use variants on my real name, with the exception of one
nym I use for anonymous posting, which is clearly a non-real name,
except when I'm using someone else's name for humor value,
or bogus names for junk mail reduction/identification (e.g.
Time Stewart or Junk Mail Stewart).

					John Doe

# Bill Stewart  Old address: wcs@anchor.ho.att.com AT&T Bell Labs, Holmdel, NJ
# After 10/15, NCR, 6870 Koll Center Parkway, Pleasanton CA, 94566
# Voice/Beeper 510-224-7043, Phone 510-484-6204, email bill.stewart@pleasantonca.ncr.com




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: David Kovar <kovar@nda.com>
Date: Mon, 15 Nov 93 14:56:11 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Against limiting free speech on public networks
In-Reply-To: <9311151956.AA22553@osc.versant.com>
Message-ID: <199311152255.RAA15471@nda.nda.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> If we cannot practice either tolerance or inbox-filtering in our own
> group, we cannot expect the rest of the world to agree with our ideas
> for free speech nets.

  Worse, you can't convince anyone new to the list that you're not
just a group of children with large egos and complex privacy enhancing
toys. I've seen a few well written messages in this group and some
pointers to interesting information, but by far the most volume on
this list, and the xtropians list for that matter, has been petty
bickering. I had higher hopes ....

-David




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Jim McCoy <mccoy@ccwf.cc.utexas.edu>
Date: Mon, 15 Nov 93 16:04:04 PST
To: hfinney@shell.portal.com (Hal Finney)
Subject: Re: Portable crypto code
In-Reply-To: <9311151952.AA03070@jobe.shell.portal.com>
Message-ID: <199311160002.AA15756@tramp.cc.utexas.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text


> From: hfinney@shell.portal.com (Hal Finney)
> 
> One thing that frustrates me is the difficulty of easily providing
> implementations of cryptographic algorithms that would be useful on a
> wide range of machines.  [...]
> 
> The point I'm getting to is that it would be nice if all this were done
> ONCE, and a library made and tested which would work on a wide range
> of machines. 

Well, I do know of someone who is working on a cryptolib package that will
attempt to include a ton of crypto methods into a single library that
anyone can link to.  From email exchanged with this person it seems that he
is looking to get a unix version up and then let people port it around.
The math lib stuff is the most recent sticking point he was having: there
arenot many fast multi-precision math packages out there that are free (and
gmp does not cut it, he wants to be able to let anyone use the code however
they want...)  So far he has checked fgmp and bignum, but if anyone knows
of a fast package that has a berkelyish copyright let me know and I will
pass it on...

> Let me know if you would be interested in participating in this effort.
> Hopefully a lot of the pieces already exist and it will just be a matter
> of pulling them together.

Maybe I can set up a list for this if people are interested.  The existence
of such a beast, even in a rudimentary form, would be useful to quite a few
people I would bet.  I will push him a bit to see if he will dump what he
has now into a package so that others can help out.

jim



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: lear35!mdbomber@nebula.acs.uci.edu (Matt Bartley)
Date: Tue, 16 Nov 93 00:44:06 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: secure phones - STU3
Message-ID: <9311160245.AA25700@lear35.vlpa.ca.us>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----


I browsed through the owner's manual for the AT&T STU-III secure phone
unit today.  It has no technical information whatsoever (security
through obscurity?).

It uses a so called CIK (Crypto Ignition Key), which resembles one of
those electronic keys that hotels use.  It must be inserted in a
"lock" in the phone, and turned 90 degrees.  This will enable one of
the crypto keys that is stored in the phone's battery backed up memory
(loaded previously by a "COMSEC custodian" through a data port on the
phone.  The manual warns the phone must be in a relatively secure
location and points out an emergency erase button that wipes out the
keys stored in memory.

Then you call someone, say you want a secure channel, wait for
them to insert their CIK (and tell you so), then touch the "secure
voice" button on the panel.

The manual then says it will go through an "authentication process",
the results of which will be displayed on the STU-III's screen.  It
will show data such as the other stations ID number, the security
level of the channel (secret, top secret, etc), and the baud rate.

Does anyone know how this works technically?  My speculation: It seems
to be a public key system.  The phone's memory seems to contain a
secret keyring, and a CIK is a 'passphrase' to a secret key, to make
an analogy to PGP.  Then the authentication process includes
exchanging a session key for a conventional crypto system - no doubt
DES.

Apparently the NSA issues the keys to authorized agencies and
contractors.  The public keys contain information such as the ID
number of the key, possibly the authorized user's name, the security
clearance level for that key, etc, which is exchanged during
authentication.

Am I on the right track?  Comments and speculations welcome.


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.3a

iQBVAgUBLOg+wDSSmvXojb+5AQEplQH+JdiaWbzgXiWPtqVaQcPIo4arzOI8Fl1Z
6ylkT9UL/Qh8BpoyVK9PqiEwazaLPxCxWYksOty7LlRy0zByVXqWHw==
=8E4k
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Brad Huntting <huntting@glarp.com>
Date: Mon, 15 Nov 93 17:51:13 PST
To: an41418@anon.penet.fi
Subject: Re: Key Servers
In-Reply-To: <9311151445.AA12745@anon.penet.fi>
Message-ID: <199311160150.AA05722@misc.glarp.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



> I don't see what you mean by key servers for only true names.
> How do you know that a true name isn't just a false identity
> created with a real account on some system? How do you differentiate
> a true name from a unix account?

The whole concept of a true name is a fantasy.  A persons name is
neither unique nor unchanging.

My passport reads "Brad Huntting", but if tomorrow I decide I want
to be called "@*!" (pronounced "crash boom bang") instead, then
that's my name.

Even today I go by many written names:

	Brad
	Brad Huntting
	Bradley E Huntting
	Brad E Huntting
	Bradley Enoch Huntting
	beh
	huntting
	Enoch (mabey not)

That's case insensitive and doesn't include the hundreds or thousands
of e-mail addresses which mean me.

The point is, a name is a handle.  It doesn't need to be unique or
static, all it needs to do is refer to someone or something in a
reasonably unambiguous way.

Besides, if I understand your idea of what a "true name" is (the
name your parents or your government have assigned to you), then
the whole idea of having a "true names" pgp key server is outrageously
bigoted, since the vast majority of people cant write their "true
name" in ascii.


brad




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Graham Toal <gtoal@an-teallach.com>
Date: Mon, 15 Nov 93 12:14:01 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Info on L.Detweiler
Message-ID: <7911@an-teallach.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


In article <9311151727.AA17924@illuminati.IO.COM>
           cman@io.com "Douglas Barnes" writes:
 > Here's some info folks might appreciate (all numbers area code
 > 303, unless otherwise noted):

Oh for christ's sake, knock it off!  If the poor bastard really is
going through a paranoid phase (and I'll bet there more of us on this
list who've been there than would care to admit it) this is just the
sort of thing to push him over the edge.

If you can't ignore him, install procmail and put him in your killfile.
If you escalate this into a petty netwar, just think how hard it's
going to be for him when he finally starts to get over it.  Would
_you_ want to be in that position?

I suppose someone posting from a site called 'Illuminati' thinks
this is all very funny.  I don't.  Neither would you if you were
above the age of 14.

G
-- 
Personal mail to gtoal@gtoal.com (I read it in the evenings)
Business mail to gtoal@an-teallach.com (Be careful with the spelling!)
Faxes to An Teallach Limited: +44 31 662 4678  Voice: +44 31 668 1550 x212





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Sameer <sameer@uclink.berkeley.edu>
Date: Mon, 15 Nov 93 20:26:14 PST
To: VACCINIA@UNCVX1.OIT.UNC.EDU
Subject: Enclosing something in a clearsig'd message
In-Reply-To: <01H5CYE1J2J6002JBO@UNCVX1.OIT.UNC.EDU>
Message-ID: <m0ozHw3-000J6ZC@infinity.hip.berkeley.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

> 
> - -----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----
> Version: 2.3a
> 
> mQCNAizKBaAAAAEEANxU5ykmCxvPdC+zKUg99WH7u1/yyVsImtXJClRMvjcPtQ+2
> 2ilzsjn7wPz//fmKnJkN7dbqSbMy0cUF78+fI8iMsdAOTdO/MpfjNmRylF7sb7aM
> Fn4DxIBENsJrdLnnLJ9pDWFmVEOUZ+S+n8Thi+mvRovEAcmbhT2paOMjHHAhAAUR
> tBhTR00gPEN5cGhlcnB1bmtzIElEIEtleT6JAJUCBRAsyzBcnN9G4AhMxxkBAaao
> A/9primmEtNa2wpNH06dLIkUeTinPFRSnMSb/DG3w+k4NmWLfTsqkG9JwDQx7xeh
> 4vbf8CiU+JZ31M8ndSdgD5iBnHFiqbzDrxyRn+Vq0Ypj8q4fdxli3YWdEgJa7joT
> /xrVKAZ9oPEonFOSvcujGbSpazCSEP2UoNMEgzWWNJ4Px7QkU2NvdHQgRy4gTW9y
> aGFtIDxDeXBoZXJwdW5rcyBJRCBLZXk+
> =IyPi
> - -----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----
> 
> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
> Version: 2.3a
> 
> iQCVAgUBLOWmiD2paOMjHHAhAQFFGQQAvkHnjWkLtRxSKR9jmiUD1NwWocsOyqjR
> ewuXN2HuwWYmH8lmiSEKTovT2vUp6GjNLfbtQ0fTlxmbwYp0dxZ4mw7BZJWPCLBp
> vOiDWJSg3o5QNtYkL0kdxjxMYbl8sc4dbNR5vulWE0tB4PHgJXPxwW4+p9/YkLwP
> oih4XErLStk=
> =hCwP
> -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
> 
> 

	Isn't it a problem to enclose PGP-blocks within a clearsig'ed
message, as the initial -'s in his public key here are slightly
mangled. I've seen this before, and tried to manually reconstruct the
keyblock headers, but with no luck.
	Anyone know what one can do about this?


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.3a

iQCVAgUBLOhVc3i7eNFdXppdAQGMlQQAhYs6LXi//0GHGl5nDod1bGNAb48uiyhc
j6mPuzXZDI7xQ0WK9x6ig6TfJNA7znqDhV1kGZYjT3bMup9faIMPlAB7usvdzt8R
o7op6LxJ7U9dxIiBqBA8OlKZrS49ZafKp/93XwZzWFat2Qe8tzyIVyVUaYrBZj3Y
S8Mnv6y6r50=
=jdeV
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: J. Michael Diehl <mdiehl@triton.unm.edu>
Date: Mon, 15 Nov 93 20:20:42 PST
To: erc@wetware.com
Subject: Re: Info on L.Detweiler
In-Reply-To: <m0ozAjy-000HXdC@khijol>
Message-ID: <9311160419.AA03033@triton.unm.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


According to Ed Carp:
> 
> I found the whole thing boring and very tiresome.  People here need to grow
> up.  Get a life.  While some start and perpetuate flame wars, and take great
> delight in screwing with other people, the NSA/FBI/NIST is sitting back and
> laughing their heads off.  Stop wasting your energy fighting each other and
> concentrate on the REAL threat.

Damned straight!  I mean, "Can't we all just get along?" <snicker>

Cheers,


J. Michael Diehl   ;^)  |*The 2nd Amendment is there in case the 
mdiehl@triton.unm.edu   | Government forgets about the 1st!  <RL>
Mike.Diehl@f29.n301.z1  |*God is a good Physicist, and an even 
    .fidonet.org        | better Mathematician.  <Me>
al945@cwns9.ins.cwru.edu|*I'm just looking for the opportunity to 
 (505) 299-2282 (voice) | be Politically Incorrect! <Me>
Can we impeach him yet? |*Protected by 18 USC 2511 and 18 USC 2703. 



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: VACCINIA@UNCVX1.OIT.UNC.EDU
Date: Mon, 15 Nov 93 18:50:42 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Duking it out for the decoder ring
Message-ID: <01H5CYE1J2J6002JBO@UNCVX1.OIT.UNC.EDU>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

Once again encryption is on the minds of the business community. In the Nov. 
22 issue of business week, Carl Ellison is highlighted along with Whitfield
Diffie in an article which asserts that those of us once considered paranoid
are soon to be considered prescient. Excerpts from the article:

>When executives at Stratus headquarters hold teleconferences with the 
>company's with San Jose (Calif.) engineering center or other offices, 
>Ellison insists that their words and video be encrypted. He *even* (emphasis
>mine) encodes routine electronic mail...Some coworkers call Ellison paranoid. 

I will venture to say that paranoid (in this context) will soon be synonymous  
with cautious.

>Cryptography is absolutely essential to any kind of electronic business 
>communication", says Price Waterhouse partner Douglas Kalish.

>While AT&T, a big government supplier, has agreed to put clipper in its 
>secure phones, many companies simply don't trust the governments promises
>not to snoop illegally.

It would be interesting if the gov't ended up with a cryptography system
that has a back door and everyone else had a secure system. Fun with reversal 
of fortune.

Finally, Whitfield Diffie's quote, "Clipper is the most rancid idea to come 
along in quite some time".

As the pendulum swings further toward freedom to encrypt, it's going to take
ever more of us to keep it there. Teach anyone who will learn so the pendulum
rests on many shoulders. Also here is my Cypherpunks ID Key, I swear that 
it belongs to the nym my mom gave me and who signed this message, when a 
better verification method presents itself I will avail myself of it.

Scott G. Morham             !The First, 
Vaccinia@uncvx1.oit.unc.edu !           Second
PGP Public Keys by Request  !                  and Third Levels
                            !        of Information Storage and Retrieval
                            !DNA,                       
                            !     Biological Neural Nets,           
                            !                             Cyberspace

                                                          

- -----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----
Version: 2.3a

mQCNAizKBaAAAAEEANxU5ykmCxvPdC+zKUg99WH7u1/yyVsImtXJClRMvjcPtQ+2
2ilzsjn7wPz//fmKnJkN7dbqSbMy0cUF78+fI8iMsdAOTdO/MpfjNmRylF7sb7aM
Fn4DxIBENsJrdLnnLJ9pDWFmVEOUZ+S+n8Thi+mvRovEAcmbhT2paOMjHHAhAAUR
tBhTR00gPEN5cGhlcnB1bmtzIElEIEtleT6JAJUCBRAsyzBcnN9G4AhMxxkBAaao
A/9primmEtNa2wpNH06dLIkUeTinPFRSnMSb/DG3w+k4NmWLfTsqkG9JwDQx7xeh
4vbf8CiU+JZ31M8ndSdgD5iBnHFiqbzDrxyRn+Vq0Ypj8q4fdxli3YWdEgJa7joT
/xrVKAZ9oPEonFOSvcujGbSpazCSEP2UoNMEgzWWNJ4Px7QkU2NvdHQgRy4gTW9y
aGFtIDxDeXBoZXJwdW5rcyBJRCBLZXk+
=IyPi
- -----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.3a

iQCVAgUBLOWmiD2paOMjHHAhAQFFGQQAvkHnjWkLtRxSKR9jmiUD1NwWocsOyqjR
ewuXN2HuwWYmH8lmiSEKTovT2vUp6GjNLfbtQ0fTlxmbwYp0dxZ4mw7BZJWPCLBp
vOiDWJSg3o5QNtYkL0kdxjxMYbl8sc4dbNR5vulWE0tB4PHgJXPxwW4+p9/YkLwP
oih4XErLStk=
=hCwP
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: steve willey <willey@seattleu.edu>
Date: Mon, 15 Nov 93 23:50:44 PST
To: "J. Michael Diehl" <cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: procmail-pgp
In-Reply-To: <9311160713.AA10159@triton.unm.edu>
Message-ID: <Pine.3.07.9311152353.A28416-9100000@bach>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



any thoughts on procmail version specificy for this pgp recipie?  i am
currently using v2.03, which, i am pretty sure, is not the current version. 
i'm ready to try it but..., please let me know if you know of any problems
with older procmail versions.

thanks,
steve






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: J. Michael Diehl <mdiehl@triton.unm.edu>
Date: Mon, 15 Nov 93 23:14:05 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: procmail-pgp
Message-ID: <9311160713.AA10159@triton.unm.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


     Well, I had a few set-backs, but the alpha version of my procmail pgp
preprocessor is ready to test.  I've been using it for about a week now, and 
it seems to work well.  I hope you enjoy it.  Comments are welcome.

     The procmail recipes in this file will make using many of
pgp's Email-related features automatic.  What they will do for you
is:

1)   Automatically verify pgp signed messages.
2)   Automatically determine who a pgp encrypted message is
     intended for.
3)   Automatically add mailed pgp keys to your pubring.pgp file.
4)   Allow people who do not use pgp to request that their messages
     to you get stored in an encrypted form.  This will prevent
     nosy systems administrators from reading your mail.
5)   Allow people to also request that the entire message,
     including the header, be encrypted.  This will prevent anyone
     from even determining where you get your mail from, mail logs
     not withstanding.
6)   Modify a message's subject to inform you that it contains a
     key (key), a signed message (sig), and/or an encrypted message
     (prv).

     There are a few things I'd like to add to this file.  I'd like
to search messages for references to "pgp", "finger" and have
procmail finger the sender's account and send the output to pgp -
kaf.

     These recipes are writen in a modular form.  The recipes which
make up this system can be extracted from the rest of your
.procmailrc file with the command:

awk '/#.pgp-start/,/#.pgp-end/ {print $0} {continue}' > out.pro

     To get the system working, you have to have procmail
installed, and in your path.  You will need to edit the included
.procmailrc file as described below.  Then you have to put a (the?)
.procmailrc file in your home directory.  Next, you have to modify
your .forward file to look like:  (change it as appropriate)

mdiehl@triton.unm.edu
"|IFS=' ';if test .`/bin/hostname` = .triton.unm.edu; then exec /nfs/dorado/u11/mdiehl/bin/procmail -p ; else exit 0; fi"

     Finally, you will have to configure the .procmailrc file.  You
will have to change these variables to something appropriate to your 
environment.

PATH= 
ME=
HOME=	
MAILDIR =	/usr/spool/mail	
SENDMAIL=	/usr/lib/sendmail
TMP=		/usr/tmp

The previous ones are self-explanitory.

SECSTR=		=-=-=-=-=-=-PGP-INFO-=-=-=-=-=-=-=

Set this one to something pleasing to the eye, but that only you know.  This 
will prevent others from spoofing the procmail-pgp validation info.  Trust me.

LOGFILE =	$HOME/PROCMAIL_LOG

The logfile is invaluable for debugging.....

AFROM=		"root@can.see.this (Big Brother isn't watching me!)"
ASUB=		"How's the wife?"

When a person requests that all of his message is to be encoded, procmail-pgp
uses AFROM as the new From: header, and ASUB as the new Subject: header.  Be
creative.


BTW, if you want to request that either all of a message, or just the body is
to be encrypted, you include either:

X-request-pgp-encoded: all
X-request-pgp-encoded: body

at the beginning of a line in the body of the message, or in the header.  I 
hope you have lots of fun with this. ;^)

----------cut----here------ ;^)

# pgp-start

PATH=/usr/local/bin:/usr/ucb:/bin:/usr/bin:/nfs/dorado/e1/ultmips4.2/gnu/bin:/usr/new:$HOME/bin:/nfs/dorado/unsup/bin/:.
ME=		mdiehl
HOME=		/nfs/dorado/u11/mdiehl
MAILDIR =	/usr/spool/mail	
SECSTR=		=-=-=-=-=-=-PGP-INFO-=-=-=-=-=-=-=
LOGFILE =	$HOME/PROCMAIL_LOG
TMP=		/usr/tmp
AFROM=		"root@can.see.this (Big Brother isn't watching me!)"
ASUB=		"How's the wife?"
SENDMAIL=	/usr/lib/sendmail

DEFAULT =	$MAILDIR/$ME
TMPFILE=	$TMP/procmail.$$
VALIDATE=	"echo $SECSTR"
PGPMSGS=	"(^Good)|(^Valid)|(^.WARNING)|(^.ERROR)|(^.Key)|(^.Error)|(^No)|(^File)|(^.You)|(^Bad)|(^pub)|(^sig)"
PGPPATH=	$HOME
DELIVER=	"procmail -p $HOME/.procmailrc"
LOCKFILE=	$MAILDIR/$ME.lock	# This will remove the global lockfile
					# $HOME/.lockmail and the new lockfile
					# will be $MAILDIR/whatever

#
#	Lets take care of some business first.
#
VERBOSE=NO
DO= `rm -f $HOME/pubring.bak`
FROM= `formail -rx"To:"`
SUBJECT= `formail -x"Subject:"`
LOG=	"======$FROM
"
# pgp-end

#
#	This retains a list of everyone who sends me mail
#
:0whc
| echo $FROM >> $HOME/HEADERS ; sort -u < $HOME/HEADERS > $TMPFILE ; mv -f $TMPFILE $HOME/HEADERS
# 
#
#	Send and delete PROCMAIL_LOG
#
:0
* ^Subject:.+PROCMAIL_LOG
| cat > /dev/null ; elm -sLog me < $HOME/PROCMAIL_LOG ; rm -f $HOME/PROCMAIL_LOG

#
#	This one sends an automatic reply to special people.
#	I think I broke this one.
:0c
* ^Subject:.+1234567890
* !^FROM_DAEMON
* !^From.+$ME
* !^X-Loop:
| (formail -r -A"X-Loop:$ME" ; cat $HOME/AUTO-REPLY) | $SENDMAIL -t 
 
#
#	Forward to my novell account
#
:0c
* ^Subject:.+Urgent
! miked@anderson.unm.edu 
 
 
#
# From peb@procase.com Tue Oct 26 18:03:16 1993
#
#:0B
#* subscribe|unsubscribe|sign.on|sign.off|signon|signoff|remove|add|SUBSCRIBE|UNSUBSCRIBE
#/$HOME/SUBSCRIBTIONS

#
#	DeDigest digests.
#
:0
* ^From:.+linux-activists@
| formail +1 -A"X-from:Linux-Activists" -ds $DELIVER
:0
* ^Subject:.+Homebrew.Digest
| formail +1 -A"X-From:Homebrew-Digest" -ds $DELIVER

# pgp-start

VERBOSE=YES

#
#	Validate pgp signed messages.
#
:0chHBw
* ^-+BEGIN.PGP.SIG
* !^X-Loop-signed:
| cat > $TMPFILE ; $VALIDATE >> $TMPFILE  
:0wbAc
| pgp -f +batchmode |& egrep $PGPMSGS >>& $TMPFILE ; $VALIDATE >> $TMPFILE
:0Ab
| cat >> $TMPFILE ; formail < $TMPFILE -i"X-Loop-signed:$ME" -i"Subject: (sig) $SUBJECT" | $DELIVER ; rm -f $TMPFILE ;

#
#	Adds included pgp public keys to keyring.
#
:0chHBw
* ^-+BEGIN.PGP.PUBLIC
* !^X-Loop-key:
$TMPFILE 
:0Awc
| cat > /dev/null ; $VALIDATE >> $TMPFILE 
:0wbAc
| pgp -kaf +batchmode |& egrep $PGPMSGS >>& $TMPFILE ; $VALIDATE >> $TMPFILE
:0bA
| cat >> $TMPFILE ; formail < $TMPFILE -i"X-Loop-key:$ME" -i"Subject: (key) $SUBJECT" | $DELIVER ; rm -f $TMPFILE ;
#
#	Validate pgp messages.
#
:0chHBw
* ^-+BEGIN.PGP.MESSAGE
* !^X-Loop-message:
$TMPFILE
:0Awc
| cat > /dev/null ; $VALIDATE >> $TMPFILE
:0wbAc
| pgp -f +batchmode |& egrep $PGPMSGS >>& $TMPFILE ; $VALIDATE >> $TMPFILE
:0bA
| cat >> $TMPFILE ; formail < $TMPFILE -i"X-Loop-message:$ME" -i"Subject: (prv) $SUBJECT" | $DELIVER ; rm -f $TMPFILE ;

#
# These two are used to encrypt email that has a specific header in it.
#
:0hcHBw
* ^X-request-pgp-encoded:.+body
* !X-Loop
* !X-Loop:.+$ME
| cat > $TMPFILE
:0Ab
| pgp -fet $ME >> $TMPFILE ; formail < $TMPFILE -A"X-Loop:$ME" | $DELIVER ; rm -f $TMPFILE ;
 
:0bhHB
* ^X-request-pgp-encoded:.+all
| pgp -fet $ME | formail -A"From: $AFROM" -A"Subject: $ASUB" | $DELIVER ; rm -f $TMPFILE ;

# pgp-end

#:0Hbcw
#* ^Subject:.+(hacker)|(Hacker)|(HACKER)$
#* ? grep $FROM < $HOME/members
#* !X-Loop:.+$ME
#| egrep "^((do)|(DO)|(Do)|(password))" > $TMPFILE 
#:0Ac
#| set PASS1=`grep password < $TMPFILE | awk '{ print $2}'` ;\
#	set PASS2=`grep $FROM < $HOME/members | awk '{ print $2}'`
#LOG= "$PASS1 $PASS2"
#:0A
#? test "$PASS1 -eq $PASS2"
#| elm -s$PASS1 me  



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: J. Michael Diehl <mdiehl@triton.unm.edu>
Date: Mon, 15 Nov 93 23:20:47 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: OOPS!
Message-ID: <9311160717.AA10325@triton.unm.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I forgot to extract just the pgp-related stuff from my .procmailrc file.  OH
well, at least I told you how to do it. ;^)  Just save the whole message, and
type awk '/#.pgp-start/,/#.pgp-end/ {print $0} {continue}' < msg > .procmailrc


Sorry about that.


J. Michael Diehl   ;^)  |*The 2nd Amendment is there in case the 
mdiehl@triton.unm.edu   | Government forgets about the 1st!  <RL>
Mike.Diehl@f29.n301.z1  |*God is a good Physicist, and an even 
    .fidonet.org        | better Mathematician.  <Me>
al945@cwns9.ins.cwru.edu|*I'm just looking for the opportunity to 
 (505) 299-2282 (voice) | be Politically Incorrect! <Me>
Can we impeach him yet? |*Protected by 18 USC 2511 and 18 USC 2703. 



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: steve willey <willey@seattleu.edu>
Date: Tue, 16 Nov 93 00:34:06 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: procmail-pgp (fwd)
Message-ID: <Pine.3.07.9311160053.A804-b100000@bach>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



jmd, asked me to forward this to the list, i think, i was testing his
procmail recipe and all that was ever seen of his most recent message was
the subject line and a bunch of error messages in my procmail log file :)

---------- Forwarded message ----------
Date: Tue, 16 Nov 1993 01:14:20 -0700 (MST)
From: "J. Michael Diehl" <mdiehl@triton.unm.edu>
To: steve willey <willey@seattleu.edu>
Subject: Re: procmail-pgp

According to steve willey:
> any thoughts on procmail version specificy for this pgp recipie?  i am
> currently using v2.03, which, i am pretty sure, is not the current version. 
> i'm ready to try it but..., please let me know if you know of any problems
> with older procmail versions.

I'm using v2.91.  I don't think you will have a prob. tho.  Let me know.  Send
yourself a few messages.  You need to send a key, a signed message, and an
encrypted message.  You also might want to try the requests.  

Hope you like it.


J. Michael Diehl   ;^)  |*The 2nd Amendment is there in case the 
mdiehl@triton.unm.edu   | Government forgets about the 1st!  <RL>
Mike.Diehl@f29.n301.z1  |*God is a good Physicist, and an even 
    .fidonet.org        | better Mathematician.  <Me>
al945@cwns9.ins.cwru.edu|*I'm just looking for the opportunity to 
 (505) 299-2282 (voice) | be Politically Incorrect! <Me>
Can we impeach him yet? |*Protected by 18 USC 2511 and 18 USC 2703. 






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: J. Michael Diehl <mdiehl@triton.unm.edu>
Date: Mon, 15 Nov 93 23:30:44 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Fascism...?
Message-ID: <9311160728.AA10714@triton.unm.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I got this from a friend.  While I don't dispute this school's right to do
this, I do question the ethics.  Just thought I'd send out some non-Detweiler
traffic. ;^)


> >A revised Computer Use Policy was approved the CS Department Faculty
> >on November 3, 1993.  The revised policy has been placed on the doors
> >of SH 118, SH 169, and SH 123.  The substantive change to the policy
> >is that users now give explicit permission to the Department to
> >inspect their accounts when necessary.
> >
> >Continuing to use your account past November 19 will constitute
> >acceptance of the revised policy.  If you prefer, you may contact the
> >COG to have your account removed.


J. Michael Diehl   ;^)  |*The 2nd Amendment is there in case the 
mdiehl@triton.unm.edu   | Government forgets about the 1st!  <RL>
Mike.Diehl@f29.n301.z1  |*God is a good Physicist, and an even 
    .fidonet.org        | better Mathematician.  <Me>
al945@cwns9.ins.cwru.edu|*I'm just looking for the opportunity to 
 (505) 299-2282 (voice) | be Politically Incorrect! <Me>
Can we impeach him yet? |*Protected by 18 USC 2511 and 18 USC 2703. 



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: szabo@netcom.com (Nick Szabo)
Date: Tue, 16 Nov 93 02:20:46 PST
To: arthurc@crl.com
Subject: Nonviolence in cyberspace
In-Reply-To: <Pine.3.87.9311151449.A21078-0100000@crl.crl.com>
Message-ID: <199311161017.CAA01079@mail.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Arthur Chandler:
> If the publication of this information is intended as a prelude to the 
> RL persecution or harassment of Mr. Detweiler, I want to lodge a strong 
> dissenting opinion.

This raises an interesting meta-point.  What fundamentally important
reason is there beyond the threat of physical persecution
(often as retribution or preemption against a wrong real or perceived), 
to actively seek a net user's physical identity on the net against that 
user's will?  Should "accountability" for offenses committed on the 
net include a threat of physical violence, or should the scope of the 
punishment be limited to the scope of the offense, namely "plonking" 
of the offender's reputation on the net?  I contend that in 
a sufficiently mature net culture (ie with "kill" files, reputation
ratings, and digital cash) there is no possible offense evil enough
to require violent retribution.  My ideal is to see a day when threats of 
violence on the net, including the nasty, implicit threat of violence 
lying behind many calls for "accountability", are rendered 
moot by voluntary self-disclosure and tolerance for a wide variety of
pseudonymity and anonymity.  Cyberspace with pseudonymity allows
us for the first time to create a rich subculture that is nonviolent 
in a way Gandhi could only dream of.

On the specific case of info on Detweiler: this net stalker has 
explicitly made violent threats against several list members while 
at the same time attempting to track down their identities, and
implicitly made threats against most of us by branding 
cypherpunks "criminals", "traitors", etc. in a wide variety of forums, 
implying that the normal violent retribution for such states of 
infamy is in order.

In an ideal net culture, Doug Barnes' action would be reprehensible. 
But the world is far from ideal, and while we still must put our physical
identities at risk we need some defense against demogogic stalkers of 
the world, and thus I applaud Doug Barnes' efforts in providing us 
information about Detweiler, just as Detweiler is seeking information 
about us.

Nick Szabo				szabo@netcom.com




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Duncan Frissell <frissell@panix.com>
Date: Mon, 15 Nov 93 23:20:44 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Kiddie Porn Alert
Message-ID: <199311160719.AA09391@panix.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


To: cypherpunks@toad.com

There's a Subject Line to Grab You

For you Fox TV fans Inside Edition on Tuesday 16 November apparently 
features "International (Danish) Kiddieporn Downloaded Over the Nets -- 
and the Government is Powerless to Stop It."

Happy viewing.

Duncan Frissell

Sorry I haven't posted much lately.  When one agrees to talk at a 
conference, one actually has to *write* the talk not to mention clear the 
decks for the trip.  Hope to see some of you at The First European 
Conference on Computers, Freedom and Privacy next Saturday in London.


--- WinQwk 2.0b#1165
                                                     




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: thomas.hughes@chrysalis.org
Date: Tue, 16 Nov 93 01:15:37 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: ENCRYPTED FILE SYSTEMS
Message-ID: <9311160238.A4523wk@chrysalis.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



>> ObCrypt:  I'm looking for info on designing a distributed encrypted
>> filesystem.  Any pointers?

in the "PC" world, look for DISKREET (with Norton's Utilities).

it simple, "Stacker"-like, and user friendly.

it seems to offer "feeble DES"
              and "even more feeble DES"

it's speed is almost negligable when in use.
 (which doesn't say very much for the "stength" of the encryption.)


ObInTheSameVein?:

anyone ever thought of taking a "software MNP" program
and creating a "V42enc" software modem protocol?

auto-generate unique/random keys after the connection is etablished,
allow for "re-training" the connection by generating/switching to a new
key. maybe re-train every "set number of seconds" ...

pick a "fast" encryption method, and a RSA public key length that is
proportional to the strength of the encryption, and have at it.

talk about "just like uncle sam does it!" ...


If the NSA is paranoid over PGP, what will they think of plug in pirate
PROMS for USR Couriers that will create obscenely secure connections?
 (although the encrypted connections might not fly along at full speed,
  that tis but a small price to pay...)





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: thomas.hughes@chrysalis.org
Date: Tue, 16 Nov 93 01:14:06 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: ENCLOSING SOMETHIN
Message-ID: <9311160238.A4854wk@chrysalis.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain




 Sa> Isn't it a problem to enclose PGP-blocks within a clearsig'ed
 Sa> message, as the initial -'s in his public key here are slightly
 Sa> mangled. I've seen this before, and tried to manually reconstruct the
 Sa> keyblock headers, but with no luck.
 Sa> Anyone know what one can do about this?

pgp signed_message_with_keyblock.asc -o unsigned_message_with_keyblock.asc
pgp +force -ka unsigned_message_with_keyblock

       running a signed message through PGP will return it
       to it's original pre-signature form. go figure ....

___ Blue Wave/QWK v2.12




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Mike Ingle <MIKEINGLE@delphi.com>
Date: Tue, 16 Nov 93 02:05:30 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Secure phones - STU3
Message-ID: <01H5DD19PD429EFI2V@delphi.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


"lear35!mdbomber@nebula.acs.uci.edu" wrote:
>Subj:   secure phones - STU3

>I browsed through the owner's manual for the AT&T STU-III secure phone
>unit today.  It has no technical information whatsoever (security
>through obscurity?).

Never Say Anything...

>It uses a so called CIK (Crypto Ignition Key), which resembles one of
>those electronic keys that hotels use.  It must be inserted in a
>"lock" in the phone, and turned 90 degrees.  This will enable one of
>the crypto keys that is stored in the phone's battery backed up memory
>(loaded previously by a "COMSEC custodian" through a data port on the
>phone.  The manual warns the phone must be in a relatively secure
>location and points out an emergency erase button that wipes out the
>keys stored in memory.

They should put a mercury switch in it, so if you steal it and move
it around much, it wipes the keys. Also a "duress number" which works
okay, but displays a warning on the other party's phone display, in
case you're forced to call someone with a gun to your head.

>Then you call someone, say you want a secure channel, wait for
>them to insert their CIK (and tell you so), then touch the "secure
>voice" button on the panel.

What all buttons does the phone have? Normal dialing, secure voice,
self-destruct, anything else?

>The manual then says it will go through an "authentication process",
>the results of which will be displayed on the STU-III's screen.  It
>will show data such as the other stations ID number, the security
>level of the channel (secret, top secret, etc), and the baud rate.

What baud rates does it use? How is the sound quality in secure mode?
It must use either a DSP (good sound, high baud) or a vocoder
(robot voice, low baud).

>Does anyone know how this works technically?  My speculation: It seems
>to be a public key system.  The phone's memory seems to contain a
>secret keyring, and a CIK is a 'passphrase' to a secret key, to make
>an analogy to PGP.  Then the authentication process includes
>exchanging a session key for a conventional crypto system - no doubt
>DES.

It could be public-key or DH exchange. Does the manual tell you to
read a hash value to the other party and verify it? If so, it's DH
and that's the protection against the man-in-the-middle. If not, it's
either public-key or DH-like but with authentication. In any case, the
key probably contains a small EPROM which selects and decrypts one of
the keys in the memory.

If classified secret and top secret info is involved, DES would not
be used. The NSA wants us to use DES, but they know better than to
use it for classified info. Probably something similar to Skipjack,
in a similar tamper-proof chip. 

>Apparently the NSA issues the keys to authorized agencies and
>contractors.  The public keys contain information such as the ID
>number of the key, possibly the authorized user's name, the security
>clearance level for that key, etc, which is exchanged during
>authentication.

NSA issues the keys...I feel safer already!
Can you say, "key escrow"?

--- MikeIngle@delphi.com




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Mike Ingle <MIKEINGLE@delphi.com>
Date: Tue, 16 Nov 93 02:04:06 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: ENCRYPTED FILE SYSTEM
Message-ID: <01H5DDB8OO429D5QVJ@delphi.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


"thomas.hughes@chrysalis.org" wrote:
>Subj:   ENCRYPTED FILE SYSTEMS

>>> ObCrypt:  I'm looking for info on designing a distributed encrypted
>>> filesystem.  Any pointers?

>in the "PC" world, look for DISKREET (with Norton's Utilities).

>it simple, "Stacker"-like, and user friendly.

>it seems to offer "feeble DES"
>              and "even more feeble DES"

>it's speed is almost negligable when in use.
> (which doesn't say very much for the "stength" of the encryption.)

No, don't use Diskreet. Use my Secure Drive. Beta now if you want it,
and release with source soon. Uses IDEACFB, protects a hd partition and
floppies, takes only 2K ram, and is very fast. Reasonably user-friendly.
You have to create a D: partition to use on a hard drive.

>If the NSA is paranoid over PGP, what will they think of plug in pirate
>PROMS for USR Couriers that will create obscenely secure connections?
> (although the encrypted connections might not fly along at full speed,
>  that tis but a small price to pay...)

What's the CPU in a Courier? Is the hardware well enough documented
to hack something like this up? I once burned a rom for a friend's
courier, from a file which he had, to give it V.32 instead of just
HST which it previously had. Not sure where the file came from.
An SRAM also had to be installed.

--- MikeIngle@delphi.com 




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: XXCLARK@indst.indstate.edu
Date: Tue, 16 Nov 93 02:14:06 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: No Subject
Message-ID: <9311161013.AA02171@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain




>From: thomas.hughes@chrysalis.org
>
>Date: Tue, 16 Nov 93 02:38:02
>Subject: ENCRYPTED FILE SYSTEMS
>To: cypherpunks@toad.com


> ObInTheSameVein?:

> anyone ever thought of taking a "software MNP" program
> and creating a "V42enc" software modem protocol?

> auto-generate unique/random keys after the connection is etablished,
> allow for "re-training" the connection by generating/switching to a new
> key. maybe re-train every "set number of seconds" ...

> pick a "fast" encryption method, and a RSA public key length that is
> proportional to the strength of the encryption, and have at it.

        Yep.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Brad Huntting <huntting@glarp.com>
Date: Tue, 16 Nov 93 06:34:09 PST
To: Darren Reed <avalon@coombs.anu.edu.au>
Subject: Re: Windows NT password Encryption.
In-Reply-To: <9311160244.AA27966@toad.com>
Message-ID: <199311161433.AA06624@misc.glarp.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



> Does anyone know what algorithm Microsoft are using for password
> encryption on Windows NT ?  I've just been to a talk and told it
> was a proprietry 1-way algorithm, but not DES based (so as to avoid
> US export laws).

The export laws dont apply to 1-way DES hashing.  You can even
export the source as long as there are #ifdef's that make shure it
doesn't decrypt anything.


brad




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Timothy Newsham <newsham@wiliki.eng.hawaii.edu>
Date: Tue, 16 Nov 93 10:30:50 PST
To: MIKEINGLE@delphi.com (Mike Ingle)
Subject: Re: ENCRYPTED FILE SYSTEM
In-Reply-To: <01H5DDB8OO429D5QVJ@delphi.com>
Message-ID: <9311161828.AA10045@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> 
> What's the CPU in a Courier? Is the hardware well enough documented
> to hack something like this up? I once burned a rom for a friend's
> courier, from a file which he had, to give it V.32 instead of just
> HST which it previously had. Not sure where the file came from.
> An SRAM also had to be installed.

The cpu is some DSP chip.  I looked at it before but I dont remember
the maker/part no. off hand.

> --- MikeIngle@delphi.com 




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Clark Reynard <clark@metal.psu.edu>
Date: Tue, 16 Nov 93 05:40:48 PST
To: mcglk@cpac.washington.edu
Subject: Re: The Courtesies of Cypherpunks
Message-ID: <9311161347.AA21488@metal.psu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


yep, it's happened before.  and loudly;
it repeats itself about once every couple
months; some people have even been _more_
floridly and spectacularly whack-o.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: an50060@anon.penet.fi
Date: Tue, 16 Nov 93 01:30:44 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: No subject
Message-ID: <9311160926.AA01174@anon.penet.fi>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


 
 
Something like this is probably more practical:
 
1. Driver's license is presented in person to you or qualified staff.
2. Driver's license and two other ID from list are presented in person
   to you or qualified staff
3. Driver's license is presented in person to registered notary public
   and stamped certificate sent to you.
4. Driver's license and two other ID from list are presented in person
   to registered notary public and stamped certificate sent to you.
 
I would avoid accepting xeroxes altogether; too easy to forge.
 
 
would you change your mind if i told you that i hold three passports in three differe
nt names?
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
To find out more about the anon service, send mail to help@anon.penet.fi.
Due to the double-blind, any mail replies to this message will be anonymized,
and an anonymous id will be allocated automatically. You have been warned.
Please report any problems, inappropriate use etc. to admin@anon.penet.fi.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: dmandl@lehman.com (David Mandl)
Date: Tue, 16 Nov 93 06:41:26 PST
To: cman@illuminati.io.com
Subject: Re: Info on L.Detweiler
Message-ID: <9311161440.AA12114@disvnm2.lehman.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> On Mon, 15 Nov 1993, Douglas Barnes wrote:
> 
> > Here's some info folks might appreciate (all numbers area code
> > 303, unless otherwise noted):

[handy info to help you ruin Detweiler's life deleted]

> > Note that this is just the easy stuff, I have folks digging deeper.
> > More to come...
> > 
> > -- 
> > ----------------                                             /\ 
> > Douglas Barnes            cman@illuminati.io.com            /  \ 
> > Chief Wizard         (512) 448-8950 (d), 447-7866 (v)      / () \
> > Illuminati Online          metaverse.io.com 7777          /______\

I'd just like to say that I think this sucks bad.  I don't like cops,
and you're being one, or worse.  And with a team of folks helping you
to dig even deeper?  This is ugly, vicious, and authoritarian, and I
can't believe that you would actually BRAG to hundreds of people that
you're doing it.  Sounds to me like you're a very frustrated person.
You are clearly an insensitive bastard.  I just hope that you encounter
this kind of sympathy if YOU go through a "difficult period" in your life.

   --Dave.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: henry strickland <strick@osc.versant.com>
Date: Tue, 16 Nov 93 09:55:50 PST
To: mnemonic@eff.org (Mike Godwin)
Subject: Re: LAW: Wireless interception
In-Reply-To: <199311150608.AA00124@eff.org>
Message-ID: <9311161749.AA27168@osc.versant.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


# Actually, all this shows is that the drafters of ECPA didn't anticipate
# that TV watchers would use their TVs to overhear cellular conversations.

I've heared the ECPA described as a "bundle of loopholes", and it is illegal
to watch your TV, if it receives cellular conversation, unless you are 
actively debugging the problem.

Does anyone know the history of the decline and fall of the Third Party Rule?

I used to be of the understanding that it was legal for you to listen
to anything you could detect in your own airspace, you just couldn't tell
(or sell) the reception to a third party.

Is this an accurate statement of what the FCC policy used to be?
Was it EPCA (86?) that destroyed it, or was it chipped away previously?

					thx, strick




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: jet@netcom.com (J. Eric Townsend)
Date: Tue, 16 Nov 93 10:11:30 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: count me out
Message-ID: <199311161811.KAA02006@mail.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain




I joined this list thinking there'd be a lot of good information about
crypto.  There was.  Now, I'm better off reading sci.crypt.  So I'm
gone.


-eric




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: henry strickland <strick@osc.versant.com>
Date: Tue, 16 Nov 93 10:20:51 PST
To: hfinney@shell.portal.com (Hal Finney)
Subject: Portable TCL-based crypto toolkit
In-Reply-To: <9311151952.AA03070@jobe.shell.portal.com>
Message-ID: <9311161819.AA27386@osc.versant.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


# One thing that frustrates me is the difficulty of easily providing
# implementations of cryptographic algorithms that would be useful on a
# wide range of machines.  A lot of these algorithms are really simple,
# almost trivial.  Yet to write programs to implement them takes pages and
# pages of code, and making them portable so that people on PC's, Mac's, and
# Unix machines can use them is almost impossible.

My experience has been much better.  I do have a TCL-based crytpo
tookit running, currently on SunOS, although some of the work (RSAREF
wrappers) I did on macintosh.  I think most of the pieces in this
list port to MAC or DOS, using ANSI_C+POSIX emulation:

	tcl7.0 (John Ousterhout's "Tool Control Language") sprite.berkeley.edu /pub/tcl
	gmp (gnu miltiple precision) prep.ai.mit.edu /pub/gnu
	gdbm (gnu database manager) /pub/gnu
	alo-des (by Antti Louko (alo@kampi.hut.fi)) kampi.hut.fi
	md2, 4, 5 (reference implementation) ftp.uu.net /inet/rfc/rfc{1319,1320,1321}
	tclRawTCP (TCP socket, listen, connect for TCL) harbor.ecn.purdue.edu
	RSAREF 1.1 (beta?) <rsaref-administrator@rsa.com>, 
			includes limited license to practice RSA & DH

Along with the tcl7.0 for MAC (for THINK6.*, altho in about 2 hrs
I got it running under THINK5.* as well) comes ANSI and enough-of-POSIX
libraries, sufficient to do most of what you need.

I assume ANSI and enough-of-POSIX are available for PC as well?
(I've never done programming on PC, so I can't speak from experience.)

And I assume assume we can find TCP (Berkeley Sockets functions) for MAC and PC.


This toolkit is sufficient to do most anything we've talked about.  I
want to supplement this with more stuff -- IDEA, UDP, cme's trans,
tripleDES, etc. -- but it already contains at least one implementation
of what you need to prototype almost anything we've talked about.

TCL is the trick.  Using this toolkit, I implemented Knapsack in about
2 hours (because it was my first one), El Gamel in half an hour, and a
DH-exchanged- DES-encrypted TCL-shell session over TCP in 2 hours.
Most anything becomes a one-evening job, except DC-nets, because it has
so many componenets....

I'm trying to shape this into a release.  This will have to be a
strictly-US-citizen-in-the-USA highly-controlled release, like
RSAREF and RIPEM are.  Sorry...


					strick

					"stricks write code"


p.s. perhaps someone could mail me the ftp path to the ITAR again...  thx




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Jim choate <ravage@wixer.bga.com>
Date: Tue, 16 Nov 93 10:04:13 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Image crypto info needed...
Message-ID: <9311161755.AA08155@wixer>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Hi everyone,

I am looking for any references or sources of information or code dealing w/
the use of images as a means of both transmission and encryption of plain-
texts.

Specificaly, I am interested in taking the 3 byte feild for each pixel in a
.gif and replacing the lsb w/ the bits in a 'plain-text'. This in effect
converts the image to a 'cypher-text'. The only real indication of a message
is the individual pixel brightness will be altered. However, unless you have
a source of known clean images there is little way to decode the messagr
reliably.

Right now we (a friend is helping work on it) are using the .gif galore CD as
our library of reference images. We eventualy hope to have a source of such
images available for all to access.

Any information or feedback would be appreciated (keep your flames to
yourself), thanks ahead of time!





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: hfinney@shell.portal.com (Hal Finney)
Date: Tue, 16 Nov 93 12:05:54 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Portable TCL-based crypto
Message-ID: <9311162004.AA17388@jobe.shell.portal.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


The work Strick is doing sounds very much like what I am looking for.
It is too bad about the export and usage restrictions but perhaps other
packages can be incorporated in the future which are more freely
available.  TCL itself appears to be widely ported and sounds like a
good foundation for this project.  I am hoping to learn more about it
soon.

I do have some concerns about the portability of the gmp library
specifically, but I know that the md4, md5, and rsaref packages are
very portable.  I guess we're not supposed to use rsaref as a "bare"
mp library, though.

Please keep us informed about the progress of this package!  I'm sure
many people on the list would be interested in beta testing when you
are ready.

Hal




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Eric Blossom <eb@srlr14.sr.hp.com>
Date: Tue, 16 Nov 93 13:55:38 PST
To: MIKEINGLE@delphi.com
Subject: Secure phones - STU3
In-Reply-To: <01H5DD19PD429EFI2V@delphi.com>
Message-ID: <9311162019.AA27800@srlr14.sr.hp.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


For those of you interested in STU-III's, there was an article several
years ago in "Speech Technology" Magazine (now out of business), that
explained quite a bit about the Motorola Sectel 1500.  The 1500 is a
Type I phone (OK for classified conversations).  The crypto used
wasn't discussed, but there were pictures and an explanation of the
speech coding used and well as the feature set.  That particular phone
would speech code using LPC-10e @ 2400 bps or MRELP (Modified Residual
Excitation Linear Prediction) at 9600 bps.  Using the 2400 bps speech
coder, you could interleave data (either syncronous or async) and speech.

If anyone is interested, I can look up the citation.

Eric Blossom




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: VACCINIA@UNCVX1.OIT.UNC.EDU
Date: Tue, 16 Nov 93 09:44:14 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re:Info on L. Detweiler
Message-ID: <01H5DTME59UQ002T98@UNCVX1.OIT.UNC.EDU>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

Douglas Barnes wrote:

>here's some info folks might appreciate (all numbers area code 303, unless
>otherwise noted).
>[irrelevent information]

I know that I do not appreciate knowing this and it is difficult to believe 
that you would actually waste your time by digging up information to make 
someone's life difficult (even if he does keep the list noise level up). Use 
the delete key or kill file. If you really succeed in annoying him enough, 
I hope for your sake you have few leaders as to where you reside and that you 
live far away. Gestapo tactics such as these, used by certain governments, 
are what we seek to eliminate in the digital world. Why would you seek to 
implement on the list that which we (at least some of us) are trying to 
eliminate from the net? It's crap that can be done without. Direct your 
efforts more profitably.

Scott G. Morham            !The First,
VACCINIA@uncvx1.oit.unc.edu!          Second  
PGP Public Keys by Request !                and Third Levels 
                           !      of Information Storage and Retrieval
                           !DNA,
                           !    Biological Neural Nets,
                           !                           Cyberspace


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.3a

iQCVAgUBLOhyqz2paOMjHHAhAQHrSwP9GXG6nv1/ICtwCgvWte7Z15nhL/+wPSz2
LWFgFdJ/mJ1ecf9SVSNp2m3uyAoxG0ZARY/5Q6dPEm917W7gxCMxJ/JAFeNoH2hU
1FBLiP4vzNQYlqhiexqFQFOO4SgMLO6QNEAK2zLSv00SwQhqVdMHEHkp7KCMpESg
bO46x8BGaYk=
=D0tP
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Matthew J Ghio <mg5n+@andrew.cmu.edu>
Date: Tue, 16 Nov 93 16:40:58 PST
To: na12070@anon.penet.fi
Subject: Re: souls and Multiple Personality Disorder
In-Reply-To: <9311150822.AA26800@anon.penet.fi>
Message-ID: <oguFA9a00awI05SFco@andrew.cmu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> Reality is like the Internet. There are legitimate ways for souls to
> enter and illegitimate ways. You could be `born' under your true
> name, or you could get in through the subversive route and infect
> an outlet susceptible to Multiple Personality Disorder, or possess
> someone.

Haha...  but seriously, I know someone who ran a BBS, and his wife had
Multiple Personalities Disorder.  She has 5 or 6 different accounts on
the system for each of her different personalities.  It was pretty funny
to watch the different persoalities talk on the bulletin boards...most
people did not know who those accounts actually belonged to.

> It's very difficult to detect, of course! When it happens, Call
1-800-EXORCIST

Yeah and I'm a trill currently possessing this body like Dax on DS9 hahaha...


But since you brought up what you call "legitimate" personalities, let
me pose this philosophical question to you: Suppose a human is born
healthy, but with no cerebral functions, ie braindead.  Suppose I am an
old man who is dying, but neurology has advanced to a point where I
could transfer myself to inhabit that body, and live normally
thereafter.  Would that be a legitimate soul?  If true names are linked
to biological entities, what is my true name?  How do you define a true
name?  It's not a trivial question because there are a lot of extropians
who would do that if they had the chance...




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Darren Reed <avalon@coombs.anu.edu.au>
Date: Mon, 15 Nov 93 18:45:46 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Windows NT password Encryption.
Message-ID: <9311160244.AA27966@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Does anyone know what algorithm Microsoft are using for password
encryption on Windows NT ?  I've just been to a talk and told it
was a proprietry 1-way algorithm, but not DES based (so as to avoid
US export laws).




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: collins@newton.apple.com (Scott Collins)
Date: Tue, 16 Nov 93 15:05:56 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: RSA/MP/FFT speedups?
Message-ID: <9311162302.AA16496@newton.apple.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Cetin Koc, Professor at Oregon State working with RSA, gave a lecture at
the 93 RSA Data Security Conference on improving RSA performance, where, at
one point, he discounted the efficacy of FFTs for
multiplication/exponentiation of such small numbers (under 2000 bits),
compared to better use of addition chains, separating squaring from
multiplication, and cleaner MP multiplies, etc.

Recently, someone (I can't remember) mentioned in conversation that someone
else (I also can't remember) had very good results with FFTs.  In fact, the
break even point was actually just a few hundred bits.

I would really like to find out: a) who is doing this work; b) is there a
paper; c) some performance figures (test code would be good :-).

If anyone has any pointers, please send them to me in private e-mail.

If anyone else is interested in this topic, please tell me in private
e-mail; I will CC answers to all interested parties, or (if interest
exceeds my CC threshold) post to the list.

Thanks,


Scott Collins         | "Few people realize what tremendous power there
                      |  is in one of these things."     -- Willy Wonka
......................|................................................
BUSINESS.   voice:408.862.0540  fax:974.6094   collins@newton.apple.com
Apple Computer, Inc.   5 Infinite Loop, MS 305-2B   Cupertino, CA 95014
.......................................................................
PERSONAL.   voice/fax:408.257.1746    1024:669687   catalyst@netcom.com






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Jim choate <ravage@wixer.bga.com>
Date: Tue, 16 Nov 93 13:54:13 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Image Encryption Request Filled!
Message-ID: <9311162144.AA28034@wixer>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I would like to thank all of those who sent mail relating to my earlier post
requesting help finding information on graphical encryption - encoding. I
have enough information to finish the project that I am working on.





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Matthew J Ghio <mg5n+@andrew.cmu.edu>
Date: Tue, 16 Nov 93 16:00:56 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Should we oppose the Data Superhighway/NII?
In-Reply-To: <199311151041.AA19187@panix.com>
Message-ID: <sguI_cK00awFM8YkYa@andrew.cmu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


habs@panix.com (Harry S. Hawk) wrote:

> 1) I feel the government, in this case and others, should never
> force the adoption of any particular technology (ISDN, ATM, etc)
>
> 2) While I am pro-market in the Extropian Way, I think that what we
> need from the government is the following:
> 
> a) recognize that Cable and Telco are the same business
> b) set very minimum standards required for basic services
>         (basic telco, basic cable (e.g., local broadcast channels)
> c) I don't see data as a basic service
> d) apply the same regulation to both companies.
> e) Let cable and telco compete head to head
>
> 3) Let the rich pay for it ;)

The one and only thing we need from the government is one that you
forgot to mention.  All we need the government to do is to allow all
interested parties equal access to the utility easements that the
gummint has already set up.  (Make the gov't follow the constitutional
requirement of equal protections under the law.)  This will allow free
market competition of ALL communications services (well, I guess you
sort of said that in (a) and (e).)  b) is irrelevent (or could be)
because of free broadcast media.  In d), what kind of regulations do you
want?  And c), I don't see the distinction between "data", and
telco...the government should recognize it as all the same, right?  Kind
of sounds like that crazy "modem tax" the FCC tried a few years ago.

Oh, and of course, let the rich pay for it. :)




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: sfield <sfield@cyberspace.com>
Date: Tue, 16 Nov 93 16:36:33 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: unsubscribe
Message-ID: <Pine.3.05.9311161609.A24958-4100000@cyberspace.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


unsubscribe







From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: jim@bilbo.suite.com (Jim Miller)
Date: Tue, 16 Nov 93 15:00:56 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: "Cyptography and Secure Communications"
Message-ID: <9311162256.AA00504@bilbo.suite.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



I was recently at my friendly neighborhood technical book store and I noticed a  
cyptography book I hadn't seen before.  It is called "Cyptography and Secure  
Communications" by Man Young Rhee.  The publishing data is 1994.  Does anyone  
here know anything about this book?  How does it compare with "Applied  
Cryptography"?

Thanks,

Jim_Miller@suite.com





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: allan@elvis.tamu.edu (Allan Bailey)
Date: Tue, 16 Nov 93 15:04:13 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Portable TCL-based crypto
In-Reply-To: <9311162004.AA17388@jobe.shell.portal.com>
Message-ID: <9311162301.AA08176@elvis.tamu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text


>
>The work Strick is doing sounds very much like what I am looking for.
>It is too bad about the export and usage restrictions but perhaps other
[[..deletia..]]

 I wanted to trump up a library-like interface using TCL for PGP 2.3[a],
but was told that the "library" will be in the next release.  So I haven't
worked on it.  If the next release of PGP with the library hooks is
<<much hand waving>> some extended time in the future, then I'd go ahead
and do it.  But I haven't been able to get any kind of answer or clue
as to when it will come out.

  Anyone know when the next release of PGP is due?  I'd really really
like to have TCL hooks for some projects, but don't want to waste my
time if I'll only have to start over with PGP X.X (where X.X is > 2.3a).


-- 
Allan Bailey, allan@elvis.tamu.edu          | "Freedom is not free."
Infinite Diversity in Infinite Combinations | allan.bailey@tamu.edu
GCS -d+ p--- c++++ l+++ u++ e++ m++ s n+ h+ f g+ w+ t+ r y+
"Liberty means responsibility.  That is why most men dread it."
		-- George Bernard Shaw

"Armadillos....those are the meanest suckers you're ever gonna wanna see...
But you gotta kill 'em the first time, otherwise they get this revenge thing
 in their heads and they come lookin' for ya......."
                            -- (i got this from the 'zine Armadillo Culture)




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: dmandl@lehman.com (David Mandl)
Date: Tue, 16 Nov 93 14:20:54 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Fun with Steganography on "Seinfeld"
Message-ID: <9311162218.AA17766@disvnm2.lehman.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


This is technically not a cypherpunk subject, but it's
related, and I've always wanted to mention it on the list.

On an episode of the TV show "Seinfeld" from a few years ago,
there's a scene where Jerry and Elaine are talking in Jerry's
apartment.  Jerry says something that Elaine doesn't like and
she grumbles something unintelligible in response.  He snaps
back, "What did you say?" and she says "Oh, nothing, forget it."
He says, "Are you sure?" and she responds, "Nothing, never mind"
(or words to that effect). 

Later on in the episode, the same thing happens with Jerry's
friend George: Jerry says something George doesn't like, George
mumbles in response.  Jerry then asks him "Did you say something?"
George says "No."  Jerry: "I'm sure you said something."  George:
"No, I didn't."

Innocent enough.  But if you turn up the volume REALLY loud, you
can hear what Elaine and George mumbled: "What a bunch of bullshit."
It's impossible to hear at normal listening level, but when the
volume is cranked, it's there as plain as day.

So, what we have here is the word "bullshit"--absolutely verboten
by any interpretation of FCC rules--actually smuggled in inside
the innocent conversation in a prime-time TV show.  Even if the
censorship police all sat around watching every minute of the
episode for forbidden material, they would never have caught
this (and obviously didn't).  This episode was shown just like
any other episode of the program, probably more than once.  Most
people are probably unaware of the hidden message.  But it's there.
(This is not an urban legend or a "Paul Is Dead" rumor--this has
been confirmed by many people.)

I've always thought this was an inspired and brilliant use of
steganography.  The producers of "Seinfeld" sneaking the word
"bullshit" right past the censors' nose on prime-time TV?
Awesome.

   --Dave.

P.S.: I forget which episode it is, but I can go search for it
if people insist.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Robert Brooks <rb@hprrb.rose.hp.com>
Date: Tue, 16 Nov 93 17:55:59 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Should we oppose the Data Superhighway/NII?
In-Reply-To: <199311170118.UAA02018@eff.org>
Message-ID: <9311170153.AA18597@hprrb.rose.hp.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> 
> [re: EFF NII proposal, ftp.eff.org, /pub/Eff/papers/op2.0]
> 
> > As I understand it, for both telephones and cable TV, it is still common
> > for local governments to "grant" "franchises" to single companies for
> > phone and cable wires.  If there were one thing to change, that would be
> > it.
> 
> Why should that be the main focus?  I for one consider modelling the
> coming "data highway" on an Internet-like model to be of more concern).  I
> have precisely zero use for cable tv (or broadcast tv for that matter),
> and very little use for the phone system except as a convenience and a way
> to transport FidoNet mail.  Since FidoNet-via-Internet is soon to be a
> reality in all likelihood, even that begins to fade. Over 90% of my
> communicating is done on Internet or in person.  This is not to say full
> privatization of the phone system would not vastly improve Internet, but
> at least the net is fairly stable and works.  It's a good place to start.
> 
I, like Tim May, also cancelled my cable-TV subscription a few months ago,
and would have long before that if my kids didn't like the Disney channel
so much.  None the less, the data highway _is_ being built, right now, by
the phone and cable companies, and digital video-on-demand and videophone
capabilities seem to be basic assumptions.  I can reference articles in
EE Times and elsewhere, and people who watch TV already know this from
things like AT&T's "you will" commercials.

> The creation of a new "infrastructure" (rapidly becoming my least
> favourite buzzword) that is modelled on TV rather than many-to-many
> networking, would appear to me to be a much more grave danger than the
> temporary perpetuation of the current telecom and cable system, which can
> be the next thing to work on, once we are ensured the coming BigNet will
> be worth the lines it's carried on. 
> 
Seems to be that a general videophone capability is the only building block
that's needed.  Seems to me the only possible roadblock is regulatory, that
is, the phone companies being prohibited from doing video and the cable
companies prevented from doing phone service.

Robert




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Phil Karn <karn@qualcomm.com>
Date: Wed, 17 Nov 93 22:14:28 PST
To: Eric Blossom <MIKEINGLE@delphi.com
Subject: Re: Secure phones - STU3
Message-ID: <9311180612.AA03568@servo>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


As far as I can tell, basic compatibility among STU-IIIs calls for the
2400 bps LPC-10 coder as a minimum. So it's universal. It works, but it
sounds pretty bad, so there's been a lot of work on newer and better
vocoders. Correct me if I'm wrong, but I suspect the Motorola coder you
mention is probably one of several manufacturer-specific algorithms,
sort of like the manufacturer-specific high speed modes you find on some
fax machines.

FED-STD-1016 CELP (Codebook Excited Linear Prediction) at 4800 bps seems
to be the up-and-coming standard for newer phones, and it indeed does
provide *much* better voice quality than LPC-10. Unfortunately, it also
requires many more DSP cycles.

Phil




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Stanton McCandlish <mech@eff.org>
Date: Tue, 16 Nov 93 15:24:13 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Should we oppose the Data Superhighway/NII?
In-Reply-To: <9311101712.AA21990@snark.lehman.com>
Message-ID: <199311162324.AA29258@eff.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> Wouldn't the solution then be to eliminate the capacity of local
> municipalities to grant cable monopolies? Fiber is compact -- five or
> even twenty cable companies could coexist happily in New York (where I
> live) if the city didn't grant "franchises", which it charges
> exhorbitantly for. With large scale competition between cable
> companies, monopolies would no longer be a problem.

That's certainly part of it, though not part of the immediate EFF Open
Platform initiative, which is more national in scope.  This "franchise"
problem is a local matter, and would best be handled by local
organizations.  If you are really concerned with this, try contacting the
Society for Electronic Access (SEA), since you live in NYC.  They may
already be working on this, though I cannot of course vouch for them.
Mailing simona@sea.org or simona@panix.com should put you in touch with
them. 

> > In order to get to a world in which free markets can meet our demand for
> > high-bandwidth connectivity, we have to dig ourselves out from the 
> > market-failure position we're in now.
> 
> Isn't the problem in question the result of government granted,
> rather than natural, monopolies? Isn't it thus wrong to call it a
> "market failure"? Seems more like yet another government failure.

Why would a "natural monopoly" be any better?  This is a rather moot
point. The problem here is that such monopolistic entities, whatever their
provenance, don't give a rat's ass for whether or not you want a lot of
bandwidth for multimedia email, or whatever.  Left to their own devices,
they'll happly feed you 5000 channels of tv, plus perhaps some
oh-so-interactive teleshopping clubs and the like.

Part of the effort that must be made is to knock some sense into the
rapidly merging entertainment/information/telecom conglomerates, and try
to at very least keep a large section of the "data highway" (or whatever
one chooses to call it) an Internet-like many-to-many communications
medium, if not fused with Internet itself.  Convincing the govt. of this
is will also take some doing.  One certainly can't IGNORE the govt.  No
matter how much we may wish it'd just go away, it won't, and has to be
dealt with.

-- 
Stanton  McCandlish  mech@eff.org  1:109/1103   EFF  Online  Activist & SysOp
O P E N  P L A T F O R M   C R Y P T O P O L I C Y   O N L I N E  R I G H T S
N  E  T  W  O  R  K  I  N  G      V  I  R  T  U  A  L     C  U  L  T  U  R  E
I   N   F  O :  M   E   M   B   E   R   S   H   I   P  @  E  F  F  .  O  R  G



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: habs@panix.com (Harry S. Hawk)
Date: Tue, 16 Nov 93 16:10:57 PST
To: extropians@panix.com
Subject: Tech: Truth about Canon Copiers
Message-ID: <199311170007.AA15114@panix.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


A common thread a month or two ago was about what happens when you
try to copy a US Currency with a Canon color copier.

Since my office is thinking about buying one, I asked for a demonstration
of this feature.

We put a 5 dollar bill on the copier and made a copy.

It copied the side with the dead white guy fine. We flipped it over
and copied the other side. It printed a deeply altered image.

We then accessed the copier from a SGI Indigo which has a GPIB interface
to the copier. We used software on the Indigo to scan in the bill.

The scan died halfway into the scan.

Clearly their is something in the scan (input) function of the copier
that is preventing the bill from being copied.

I suspect it looks for the "color of money" and if it finds it, it 
does further checks for US bills.

/hawk


--
Harry S. Hawk  -  Extropian  
                                                        habs@extropy.org
In Service to Extropians since 1991






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Arthur Chandler <arthurc@crl.com>
Date: Tue, 16 Nov 93 19:34:14 PST
To: Jim McCoy <mccoy@ccwf.cc.utexas.edu>
Subject: Irony in Detweiler-Hunting
In-Reply-To: <199311170139.AA17951@tramp.cc.utexas.edu>
Message-ID: <Pine.3.87.9311161935.A29976-0100000@crl.crl.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain




  I see irony here, all right, but maybe not quite the flavor you 
discern. Like other folks on this list besides (but including) Mr. 
Dedtweiler, I too have some concerns about anonymity versus responsibility 
in cyberspace. I'm convinced that there are legitimate uses of 
pseudonymous identities; but I don't think we can shut our eyes to the 
problems that such capabilities give rise to. It's an issue related to 
privacy and, in some applications, to encryption.
  Now for the irony:

  At least two people have said, or implied, "Well, if Detweiler had just 
used an anonymous identity in his posts, we wouldn't be researching his 
private life."
  I don't know what kind of QED others might put on such assertions. But 
here's one translation: "If Mister Detweiler had been a hypocrite, I 
wouldn't be in a position to dig into his personal life."
  I still dissent strongly to folks  playing cop or armchair 
psychological helper for Mr. Detweiler, then sugarcoating the 
mean-spiritedness with "Well, it's an object lesson" or "I just want his 
associates to know what he's doing."
  To adapt Gertrude Stein: "Ironic, if you find such things amusing; if 
not, not."


> > If the publication of this information is intended as a prelude to the 
> > RL persecution or harassment of Mr. Detweiler, I want to lodge a strong 
> > dissenting opinion.
> 
> Perhaps it was meant as an object lesson in the necessity of the dreaded
> "pseudospoofing" for Mr. Detweiller.  I find it rather amusing that many of
> the same people who were arguing against L. Detweiler's claims of a
> cryptoanarchic identity conspiracy are now objecting to the simple
> presentation of the same information about LD that LD wants to make
> available on all of you regardless of your wishes.
> 
> Quite ironic.
> 
> jim
> 





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: erc@khijol (Ed Carp)
Date: Tue, 16 Nov 93 19:46:04 PST
To: mg5n+@andrew.cmu.edu (Matthew J Ghio)
Subject: Re: souls and Multiple Personality Disorder
In-Reply-To: <oguFA9a00awI05SFco@andrew.cmu.edu>
Message-ID: <m0ozdjZ-000HXQC@khijol>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text


> > Reality is like the Internet. There are legitimate ways for souls to
> > enter and illegitimate ways. You could be `born' under your true
> > name, or you could get in through the subversive route and infect
> > an outlet susceptible to Multiple Personality Disorder, or possess
> > someone.
> 
> Haha...  but seriously, I know someone who ran a BBS, and his wife had
> Multiple Personalities Disorder.  She has 5 or 6 different accounts on
> the system for each of her different personalities.  It was pretty funny
> to watch the different persoalities talk on the bulletin boards...most
> people did not know who those accounts actually belonged to.
> 
> > It's very difficult to detect, of course! When it happens, Call
> 1-800-EXORCIST
> 
> Yeah and I'm a trill currently possessing this body like Dax on DS9 hahaha...

I thought this was rather tasteless.  MP is real.  My SO is MP.  It's not
very funny.  Do you know what causes MP?  Childhood sexual abuse.

Please think about it the next time you target a group for tasteless humor.
-- 
Ed Carp, N7EKG			erc@wetware.com			510/659-9560
                   an38299@anon.penet.fi, anon-1157@twwells.com
If you want magic, let go of your armor.  Magic is so much stronger than
steel!        -- Richard Bach, "The Bridge Across Forever"



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Jim McCoy <mccoy@ccwf.cc.utexas.edu>
Date: Tue, 16 Nov 93 17:44:14 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: LD info posting...
Message-ID: <199311170139.AA17951@tramp.cc.utexas.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text



> From: szabo@netcom.com (Nick Szabo)
> Message-Id: <199311161017.CAA01079@mail.netcom.com>
> Subject: Nonviolence in cyberspace
> To: arthurc@crl.com
> Date: Tue, 16 Nov 93 2:17:37 PST
> Cc: cypherpunks@toad.com
> In-Reply-To: <Pine.3.87.9311151449.A21078-0100000@crl.crl.com>; from "Arthur Chandler" at Nov 15, 93 3:03 pm
> X-Mailer: ELM [version 2.3 PL11]
> 
Arthur Chandler (arthurc@crl.com) writes:
> If the publication of this information is intended as a prelude to the 
> RL persecution or harassment of Mr. Detweiler, I want to lodge a strong 
> dissenting opinion.

Perhaps it was meant as an object lesson in the necessity of the dreaded
"pseudospoofing" for Mr. Detweiller.  I find it rather amusing that many of
the same people who were arguing against L. Detweiler's claims of a
cryptoanarchic identity conspiracy are now objecting to the simple
presentation of the same information about LD that LD wants to make
available on all of you regardless of your wishes.

Quite ironic.

jim



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Stanton McCandlish <mech@eff.org>
Date: Tue, 16 Nov 93 17:20:58 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Should we oppose the Data Superhighway/NII?
In-Reply-To: <9311110120.AA08393@smds.com>
Message-ID: <199311170118.UAA02018@eff.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


[re: EFF NII proposal, ftp.eff.org, /pub/Eff/papers/op2.0]

> As I understand it, for both telephones and cable TV, it is still common
> for local governments to "grant" "franchises" to single companies for
> phone and cable wires.  If there were one thing to change, that would be
> it.

Why should that be the main focus?  I for one consider modelling the
coming "data highway" on an Internet-like model to be of more concern).  I
have precisely zero use for cable tv (or broadcast tv for that matter),
and very little use for the phone system except as a convenience and a way
to transport FidoNet mail.  Since FidoNet-via-Internet is soon to be a
reality in all likelihood, even that begins to fade. Over 90% of my
communicating is done on Internet or in person.  This is not to say full
privatization of the phone system would not vastly improve Internet, but
at least the net is fairly stable and works.  It's a good place to start.

The creation of a new "infrastructure" (rapidly becoming my least
favourite buzzword) that is modelled on TV rather than many-to-many
networking, would appear to me to be a much more grave danger than the
temporary perpetuation of the current telecom and cable system, which can
be the next thing to work on, once we are ensured the coming BigNet will
be worth the lines it's carried on. 

-- 
Stanton  McCandlish  mech@eff.org  1:109/1103   EFF  Online  Activist & SysOp
O P E N  P L A T F O R M   C R Y P T O P O L I C Y   O N L I N E  R I G H T S
N  E  T  W  O  R  K  I  N  G      V  I  R  T  U  A  L     C  U  L  T  U  R  E
I   N   F  O :  M   E   M   B   E   R   S   H   I   P  @  E  F  F  .  O  R  G



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Stanton McCandlish <mech@eff.org>
Date: Tue, 16 Nov 93 17:24:14 PST
To: Martin.Greifer@f28.n125.z1.FIDONET.ORG (Martin Greifer)
Subject: Re: modem taps/caller id
In-Reply-To: <4110.2CE1DFEC@shelter.FIDONET.ORG>
Message-ID: <199311170122.UAA02039@eff.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> > Practical Peripherals sells a modem that also captures Caller ID info
> > and makes   it available to your comm program.  I've also seen devices
> > that do this for   sale in the back of BBS magazines.
> 
> The question is, how does a caller block this feature?

Depends on the locality, but generally you have 2 options: temporarily
disable it with a *code, or get all-call-blocking.  In most areas, as far
as I know all-call-blocking (so you don't have to enter the *code for
every call) is a "special service" or "extra feature" and costs you more. 
This is of course utterly ludicrous, but that's what you'd expect from
semi-monopolies.

-- 
Stanton  McCandlish  mech@eff.org  1:109/1103   EFF  Online  Activist & SysOp
O P E N  P L A T F O R M   C R Y P T O P O L I C Y   O N L I N E  R I G H T S
N  E  T  W  O  R  K  I  N  G      V  I  R  T  U  A  L     C  U  L  T  U  R  E
I   N   F  O :  M   E   M   B   E   R   S   H   I   P  @  E  F  F  .  O  R  G



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Anonymous <nowhere@bsu-cs.bsu.edu>
Date: Tue, 16 Nov 93 17:25:58 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: PKCrack available (fwd)
Message-ID: <9311170126.AA28197@bsu-cs.bsu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


From: bontchev@fbihh.informatik.uni-hamburg.de (Vesselin Bontchev)
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
Subject: PKCrack available
Date: 16 Nov 1993 10:50:26 GMT
Organization: University of Hamburg -- Germany
Message-ID: <2cab9i$gve@rzsun02.rrz.uni-hamburg.de>
NNTP-Posting-Host: fbihh.informatik.uni-hamburg.de
X-Newsreader: TIN [version 1.2 PL2]

Hello, everybody!

After receiving more than a dozen messages of the type "could you
please send me a copy of PKCrack", I got tired of e-mailing it and
decided to make it available via anonymous ftp. It can be obtained as

ftp.informatik.uni-hamburg.de:/pub/virus/texts/crypto/pkcrack.zip

A few remarks.

1) The archive contains the source (in C) of the program. It should
compile anywhere. Don't ask me to send you a compiler or to compile it
for you. If it happens not to compile on your machine - do the porting
yourself. Be creative. Don't ask me to teach you C if you can't
understand the program.

2) The archive also contains the file APPNOTE.TXT, from the PKZIP
distribution, which explains the format of the ZIP archive in general
and the encryption algorithm in particular. (BTW, this explains why I
put the archive in the texts directory.) The algorithm applies both
for versions 1.1 and 2.04x of PKZIP. The only difference is in the
paragraph that explains how to verify that the password entered is
correct - version 1.1 deals with a 2-byte number (as the text says),
while version 2.04x deals with a one-byte number (as the text doesn't
bother to explain).

3) The program is *trivial*. Really. It does a dictionary attack and
thus requires a dictionary - a file containing the words to try as
passwords. Don't ask me to send you one - there are many on the net.
Find one yourself. Learn to use Archie.

4) The program cannot break just any archive - it can only check
whether the archive is encrypted with one of a (possibly huge) list of
passwords.

5) If you are trying to break an archive created with PKZIP 2.04x, you
will get a lot of false positives. Averagely - once in every 256
attempts. It will help if you have several files in the archive,
encrypted with the same password. If this is the case, increase the
value of NFILES and re-compile the program (yes, I know that it should
be a run-time option). A value of 4 will give the same level of false
positives as for version 1.1, but even a value of 3 is good enough for
practial reasons.

6) If you don't know how to do anonymous ftp - learn. If your system
does not allow you to do anonymous ftp - use a ftp-by-email service.

7) If you don't have unzip for Unix - get one. Don't ask me to e-mail
you the program in source. If you don't know how to transfer files
from the mainframe to your PC - ask your system administrator, not me.

8) I have no idea who has written the program.

9) If you come up with any improvements, you are welcome to send them
to me. If they are good, I will update the program that is on the ftp
site.

Regards,
Vesselin
--
Vesselin Vladimirov Bontchev          Virus Test Center, University of Hamburg
Tel.:+49-40-54715-224, Fax: +49-40-54715-226      Fachbereich Informatik - AGN
< PGP 2.3 public key available on request. > Vogt-Koelln-Strasse 30, rm. 107 C
e-mail: bontchev@fbihh.informatik.uni-hamburg.de        22527 Hamburg, Germany





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Stanton McCandlish <mech@eff.org>
Date: Tue, 16 Nov 93 17:40:58 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: rant pointer
In-Reply-To: <9311110429.AA18475@toad.com>
Message-ID: <199311170137.UAA02117@eff.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> L. Detweiler has a rather hefty essay in the latest Risks on the
> subject of `pseudospoofing', social parasites, "a criminal group
> called the CryptoAnarchists" (with members such as "Eric May" and
> "T.C. Hughes"), and such matters.  I will not forward it to the
> list, unh unh, no way.

Reminds me of one of my proudest moments: L.D. (who this time claimed their
first name was Linda; what a pseudospoofer!) in a fit of rage labelled me
a "CYPHERPUNK CRIMINAL", caps L.D.'s.  I'm thinking of having one of those
little desk signs made, saying "Anton Mechanism, Cypherpunk Criminal" just
for kicks.  Or maybe a t-shirt. Hell I could market these, personalized:

                   Stanton McCandlish, mech@eff.org
                      
                           [pgp sig here]
                  
  CCCC Y   Y  PPPP   H    H  EEEEE  RRRR   PPPP   U   U  N    N   K    K
 C      Y Y   P   P  H    H  E      R   R  P   P  U   U  NN   N   K  K
 C       Y    PPPP   HHHHHH  EEEEE  RRRR   PPPP   U   U  N N  N   KKK
 C       Y    P      H    H  E      R R    P      U   U  N  N N   K  K
  CCCC   Y    P      H    H  EEEEE  R  RR  P       UUU   N   NN   K    K

        CCCC   RRRR   IIIII  M    M   IIIII  N    N     A     L     
       C       R   R    I    MM  MM     I    NN   N    A A    L
       C       RRRR     I    M MM M     I    N N  N   A   A   L
       C       R R      I    M    M     I    N  N N   AAAAA   L
        CCCC   R  RR  IIIII  M    M   IIIII  N   NN   A   A   LLLLL


Anyone buying?
-- 
Stanton  McCandlish  mech@eff.org  1:109/1103   EFF  Online  Activist & SysOp
O P E N  P L A T F O R M   C R Y P T O P O L I C Y   O N L I N E  R I G H T S
N  E  T  W  O  R  K  I  N  G      V  I  R  T  U  A  L     C  U  L  T  U  R  E
I   N   F  O :  M   E   M   B   E   R   S   H   I   P  @  E  F  F  .  O  R  G



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Stanton McCandlish <mech@eff.org>
Date: Tue, 16 Nov 93 18:20:58 PST
To: an12070@anon.penet.fi
Subject: Re: Dinkelacker II
In-Reply-To: <9311121302.AA07765@anon.penet.fi>
Message-ID: <199311170216.VAA03783@eff.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> WHO is ARTHUR CHANDLER?!

DO we CARE, L.Detweiler?

-- 
Stanton  McCandlish  mech@eff.org  1:109/1103   EFF  Online  Activist & SysOp
O P E N  P L A T F O R M   C R Y P T O P O L I C Y   O N L I N E  R I G H T S
N  E  T  W  O  R  K  I  N  G      V  I  R  T  U  A  L     C  U  L  T  U  R  E
I   N   F  O :  M   E   M   B   E   R   S   H   I   P  @  E  F  F  .  O  R  G



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: nobody@pmantis.berkeley.edu
Date: Tue, 16 Nov 93 21:34:15 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: BAN Detweiler(WHAT A LOON)
Message-ID: <9311170532.AA14620@pmantis.berkeley.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


 I THINK ITS TIME TO TAKE DETWEILER OFF THE MAILING LIST,
HE IS CLEARLY ABUSING THE PRIVELGE OF HAVING US AS AN AUDIENCE.
ANY OTHERS ON THIS SIDE OF THE ISSUE??
      ANON




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Matthew J Miszewski <MJMISKI@macc.wisc.edu>
Date: Tue, 16 Nov 93 19:45:59 PST
To: CYPHERPUNKS@toad.com
Subject: Re: modem taps/caller id
Message-ID: <23111621430468@vms2.macc.wisc.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


It is my understanding that the *67(9) feature does not stop the actual
sending of your number to the switch but rather stops the data from
being transmitted from the switch to the end user (actually sends a
'P' I believe.)
 
--Matt
______________________________________________________________________________
In defense of liberty, encrypt for all purposes, civil and professional.
In defense of privacy, encrypt all correspondence, personal and professional.
In defense of sanity, do not encrypt your dry cleaning invoice!
 
       ++++++++--------mjmiski@macc.wisc.edu                          (c)1993




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "L. Detweiler" <ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Date: Tue, 16 Nov 93 20:46:00 PST
To: "Mark W. Eichin" <eichin@paycheck.cygnus.com>
Subject: Re: Key Servers
In-Reply-To: <9311140602.AA03621@paycheck.cygnus.com>
Message-ID: <9311170445.AA26434@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>Take it easy for a bit here... the key servers (by which I mean the
>PGP keyservers such as are run on toxicwaste.mit.edu and elsewhere)
>*don't provide any authentication*... all they provide is keys. If you
>trust a key because you got it from a key server, then you have
>perhaps misunderstood the concept of digital signatures -- you should
>be able to "validate" the key based on what's in it, not where you got
>it from.

Seems to me, MR EICHIN, that many people might be FLABBERGASTED to find
out that people are using PGP key servers for PSEUDOSPOOFING.

why is it that the policy that ANYTHING GOES is NOT MADE CLEAR in
KEYSERVER POLICY DOCUMENTS?

>the key servers (by which I mean the
>PGP keyservers such as are run on toxicwaste.mit.edu and elsewhere)
>*don't provide any authentication*

<gasp> I never noticed that name before... Perhaps this is what you
think qualifies as your disclaimer...




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Stanton McCandlish <mech@eff.org>
Date: Tue, 16 Nov 93 18:51:04 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: ANON: pseudospoofing confusion
In-Reply-To: <9311150716.AA22551@flammulated.owlnet.rice.edu>
Message-ID: <199311170250.VAA04184@eff.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> I'm sort of fuzzy on the distinction between pseudonymous and
> pseudoanonymous; is it that a pseudonym is obviously so?  For example,
[...]
> Now, pseudoanonymous is when a fake identity is created, without it
> being obviously so.  (Right?)  So if I were to obtain another account
> with a different user name, etc. and use that account, I would be
> pseudospoofing. (?)

I have pointed this out numerous times to L.D. in private mail, but he
doesn't seem to get the fact that "obvious" is completely subjective. 
The most recent example I gave was that "James Bond" would appear to be
an obvious pseudo.  Unless your name really IS James Bond (which is
actually not that rare of a name), or you happen to be someone that's
never seen a J.B. movie, or read an Ian Fleming book, such as, say, a guy
from Norway or Japan, in which case it would be quite reasonable to
presume that the person you just got mail from really is named James Bond.

Detweiler's entire proposition hinges on this distinction between
pseudonymy and "pseudoanonymity"/"pseudospoofing".  The distinction does
not actually clearly exist, and his premise (or I should say "its"
premise, since Detweiler has lately claimed to be female) collapses.

I have attempted to get this to sink in to it's head, but to no avail; it
just keeps posting and mailing away.  What can ya do?  I for one may just
add someone to my kill file for the first time ever, as I'm sick to death
of the same 200 line rant, rearranged and given a new title, popping up in
my list mail, private mail, and news several times a day.

Detweiler is not really in a position to complain about letterbombing.

Aside from that, I recommend just ignoring it until unless it posts
something of relevance and interest.

-- 
Stanton  McCandlish  mech@eff.org  1:109/1103   EFF  Online  Activist & SysOp
O P E N  P L A T F O R M   C R Y P T O P O L I C Y   O N L I N E  R I G H T S
N  E  T  W  O  R  K  I  N  G      V  I  R  T  U  A  L     C  U  L  T  U  R  E
I   N   F  O :  M   E   M   B   E   R   S   H   I   P  @  E  F  F  .  O  R  G



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: jamie@netcom.com (Jamie Dinkelacker)
Date: Tue, 16 Nov 93 21:54:16 PST
To: extropians@extropy.org
Subject: INTEREST? True Nyms
Message-ID: <199311170553.VAA01041@mail.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Extropians,

Aside from the flamebait puke of the COLORADO CRAZIE, the cypherpunks list
doesn't seem to be an optimum forum for dicussion of false names, true
nyms, multiple personality entropy, blah blah.

Yet, I find it a fascinating topic. Anyone here interested?
[pointer --> extropians-request@gnu.ai.mit.edu]

My apologies to subscribers of both the Extropian and Cypherpunk lists who
received this message twice.

--
................................
Jamie Dinkelacker   Palo Alto CA 
Jamie@netcom.com    415.941.4782 
................................






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "L. Detweiler" <ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Date: Tue, 16 Nov 93 20:55:59 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Quarantining Toxic Waste
Message-ID: <9311170454.AA26571@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I'm writing this in hopes there are still some sane people left here.

It's quite shocking to hear such blase arguments about identity from
the people who have erected the current key server system. At the very
minimum, these people should make their policies about pseudospoofing
clear in policy documents -- anyone listed here could be imaginary,
there are no guarantees.

I'm going to make some arguments why a key server system with true
identities should be completely quarantined from one that allows Medusa's Snakes:

1) First, honesty and dishonesty are fundamentally incompatible. Our
technology should reflect that.

2) No one that ever subscribed to a database that had tentacles would
be interested in one that guaranteed none were there, and vice versa.

3) if the databases overlapped, it would be easier for criminals to
infect a `true name' system. ah, how the psychopunks understand this.

4) sequestered servers (the `reputable' ones) could eventually hook up
with all those neat government databases on identities. A Cypherpunks
Worst Nightmare. Hee, hee.

5) I remember a P.Metzger argument with M.Graff on some mailing list
about using DNS as a kind of key distribution system. The argument
boiled down to the point: can *anyone* insert entries? Coincidentally,
this is the critical question in a True Name vs. Toxic Waste Dump databases.

6) The software already exists to have a separate network of True Names.

7) People interested in True Names might want to sort their mail and
news interactively, dynamically. I imagine that when I connect to an
NNTP server, I also set up a socket session with a True Name database
that replies to my queries in real time. People interested in toxic
waste would not be interested in any such system.


There are many other arguments. I'm sure all the Psychopunks will come
up with their clever arguments to sabotage any True Name debate or
database system. I stopped believing in Cypherpunk Honesty about the
same time I stopped believing J. Dinkelacker. <g>




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: an5877@anon.penet.fi (deadbeat)
Date: Tue, 16 Nov 93 14:04:13 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Review of "Design and implementation of an RSA cryptosystem using multiple DSP chips"
Message-ID: <9311162202.AA27158@anon.penet.fi>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

Source: Computing Reviews, November 1993, pp. 602-603; 9311-0871

ER, M. H.; WONG, D. J.; SETHU, A. A.; AND NGEOW, K. S. (Nanyang
Technological Univ., Singapore)

Design and implementation of an RSA cryptosystem using multiple DSP
chips.

Microprocess. Microsyst. 15, 7 (Sept. 1991), 369-378.

The authors propose implementation of the Rivest-Shamir-Adelman (RSA)
public key cryptosystem using multiple digital signal processing (DSP)
chips. They achieve a speed- up factor of 70 compared with a C software
implementation on a PC.

The use of multiple DSP chips (three in the authors' example) is hard
to justify, in light of other known results.  For example, Dusse and
Kaliski reported a 25-50 millisecond decryption of 512-bit RSA with a
single DSP chip [1].  My C implementation on a SPARC station runs in 2
seconds, about the same factor claimed by the authors.

The design suffers from some other problems as well.  One problem is
the key size (160 bits). This is too small (even 512 bits is not enough
for some applications). Another problem is that in this design the
secret key is chosen first, and the corresponding public key is
calculated accordingly.  In most cases, the other way around is
preferable, since it is advantageous to have short secret keys. A third
problem is that any Carmichael number will pass the proposed primality
test (Carmichael numbers are not primes). Better methods exist.

The paper is intended for electrical engineers with little or no
background in cryptology. The length of the paper is suitable, the
drawings are clear, and the physical form of the material is suitable.
A reference to Dusse and Kaliski [I] is missing. I believe that the
authors did not know about that work, and would have reconsidered the
project if they had.  Overall, this paper is a fair description of a
graduate-level project, but the quality of the design leaves something
to be desired.

					Y. Yacobi, Morristown, NJ

			References

[1] DUSSE, S. R. ND KALISKI, B. S., JR. A cryptographic library for the
Motorola DSP56000. In Advances in Cryptology - Eurocrypt '90, I. B.
Damgard, Ed., Springer, New York, 1991, 230-244.

GENERAL TERM: DESIGN, MEASUREMENT, PERFORMANCE


Brought to you by the Information Liberation Front and

DEADBEAT <na5877@anon.penet.fi>

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.3

iQBFAgUBLOkhMfFZTpBW/B35AQEU0AF/f9OF6e7asmftL0fTvsNTAxwSPB5GHXuG
M9tIK5U9lH7AEC3VWPLgflsVIe/DO6ZS
=PvRB
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
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From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "L. Detweiler" <ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Date: Tue, 16 Nov 93 21:04:14 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: why Identity is Sacred
In-Reply-To: <199311151223.EAA13250@mail.netcom.com>
Message-ID: <9311170503.AA26726@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Mr. Szabo objects to my pseudopool fun. I don't understand. How is
misattribution of quotations different than than things like
pseudospoofing and pseudopools that top cypherpunks promote?

>Given the many idiotic things already claimed by Detweiler, 
>(including at one time or another, hotly accusing most list-active Bay Area 
>cypherpunks of being "pseudospoofs" of each other, when all he had to
>do to verify our True Names was call),

I did call Medusa. Her line was been busy. All I have been able to talk
to are tentacles. And they all say, `Believe, me, I am a person!'

> So I just want to make sure everybody understands there's 
>a head full of hypocrisy to go along with the head full of otherwise
>misfiring neurons:

yes, Medusa is quite confused lately. Halleluja for RISKS.

>It's highly improbable that Tim May would go anywhere near Perl, and 
>it's also quite improbable Eric Hughes would have made such a gaffe.  
>(Which just goes to show I _am_ Hughes and May, otherwise how could
>I know, eh Detweiler?)

Your days are numbered, Medusa, and you are pretty clueless for not
realizing it. The King is Dead.

>It might be feasible to defame people behind their backs, by 
>sending false quotations in mail to small numbers of third parties.

Attention everyone, this is precisely what Medusa is doing with me
right now. Be careful.

>By extrapolation the quotes attributed to Arther Chandler,
>Hal Finney, and Perry Metzger were also likely "pseudospools",
>many of which will be obvious to those falsely quoted or their
>freinds, or those who keep good archives.

Medusa has finally gone totally insane.

Hey Medusa -- do you allow pseudospoofing on your secret mailing list?
or do you ban it? are you a hypocrite? are you a liar?




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Stanton McCandlish <mech@eff.org>
Date: Tue, 16 Nov 93 19:05:59 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Should we oppose the Data Superhighway/NII?
In-Reply-To: <199311151041.AA19187@panix.com>
Message-ID: <199311170304.WAA04303@eff.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> 1) I feel the government, in this case and others, should never
> force the adoption of any particular technology (ISDN, ATM, etc)

Right on, but this would conflict, at least in spirit, with your points
2)b) and 2)d).  Are your for govt. involvement or not?
 
> 2) While I am pro-market in the Extropian Way, I think that what we
> need from the government is the following:
> 
> a) recognize that Cable and Telco are the same business
> b) set very minimum standards required for basic services
>         (basic telco, basic cable (e.g., local broadcast channels)
> c) I don't see data as a basic service

Pardon me, but this is preposterous.  You have here proposed that a
many-to-many communications medium, which requires data service, is not a
basic service despite its many benefits, but that cable and broadcast tv
are, despite the obvious limitations (not to mention detrimental effects)
of the medium.  I hate to even say this, especially to you, but that's
just not a logical stance, especially for a networker.  I'm actually
shocked to see you say that.

> d) apply the same regulation to both companies.
> e) Let cable and telco compete head to head

e) conflicts with a).

> 3) Let the rich pay for it ;)
[...]
> I feel if you don't "push" for universal access the systems will be build
> that way anyway. They will cost $$$, and the "rich" will buy into it. As
> economies of scale and scope come into pay, the cost of these systems will
> come down and the poor will get it too. Thus, the rich have paid for it,
> and the poor have got it cheap.

But not just the rich will pay for it.  *I* will have to pay for it, and
I'd rather see it be cheap and affordable to all.  You seem to have
mistaken the empowering technology of networking with some new toy, like
Nintendos.

> No one is going to do an Interactive Test Market in the Lower East Side,
> but trust me systems will be built there.

Not if the medium fails to catch on, due to being too expensive for anyone but
the upper class.  This is precisely why most people *don't* have satellite tv.

-- 
Stanton  McCandlish  mech@eff.org  1:109/1103   EFF  Online  Activist & SysOp
O P E N  P L A T F O R M   C R Y P T O P O L I C Y   O N L I N E  R I G H T S
N  E  T  W  O  R  K  I  N  G      V  I  R  T  U  A  L     C  U  L  T  U  R  E
I   N   F  O :  M   E   M   B   E   R   S   H   I   P  @  E  F  F  .  O  R  G



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Mark W. Eichin" <eichin@paycheck.cygnus.com>
Date: Thu, 18 Nov 93 00:54:28 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Key Servers
In-Reply-To: <9311170639.AA02048@toxicwaste.media.mit.edu>
Message-ID: <9311170305.AA05510@paycheck.cygnus.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


"MR EICHIN"? gee, last time I saw my name written that way (all caps,
no punctuation on the abbreviation) was from a direct mailing database
program. I half expected to see it followed by "You may have already
won" :-) Before I continue, I'd like to indicate that I find this
discussion interesting, which is why I'm continuing to cc you, Mr.
Detweiler; however, if you'd rather I didn't continue, please let me
know.

But enough of that. Please tell me, MR LD231782, if whomever you got
your Internet email server from ever informed you that the email
addresses might have *nothing* to do with the names they claimed to
be? Malicious or otherwise? [To be fair, *my* network provider actually
does have some intro documentation that explains how insecure email
actually is... but they're unusual in other ways.] The point I'm
trying to make is that the Keyserver is no more guilty for not
mentioning it than your email provider is. Perhaps this is because
they are both assuming (perhaps incorrectly) that you cannot base
trust on machinery. Machinery might help propagate existing trust...
but the trust must start with the people involved (and by that I mean
the entities themselves, *not* the service maintainers.) In case it
wasn't clear, I'm just responding to your point:
 >> why is it that the policy that ANYTHING GOES is NOT MADE CLEAR in
 >> KEYSERVER POLICY DOCUMENTS?
in reference to the "policy documents" of everything else on the net.

For that matter, do you care that if you saw one message in Time
Magazine, you might see a similar message in an statement from Warner
Cable[*], or a number of related places -- because they're all owned by
the same conglomerate? Forget Medusa. Think Warner, Beatrice, TCI, and
other big meta-everything companies, who only *look* like distinct
"individuals" (corporations are individuals in the eyes of the law,
enabled by one of the later amendments...) while in fact they're only
really "tentacles" of a bigger one? 

[*] I attempt to use the subjunctive here to make a point, not to
claim any actual behaviour of Time-Warner Inc. There are better
examples of this sort of thing anyhow. Sorry I don't have any handy
that are documented well enough...

(Actually, doesn't the FCC already have something to say about this?
something like you can do it as long as you don't own *all* of the
media in an area, but several of each is ok?)

There was a long discussion on another mailing list (with only a
slightly higher S/N than this one, but far more politics, as the vocal
membership includes employees of NSF, CIA, ANS, IBM, STD and other
TLA's :-) about someone who was posting from an address in their name
representing a political project from an educational site. Someone
else was curious about this, and contacted the postmaster. They
contacted the account owner, and had some time of figuring out what
was going on... turns out it was the *reverse* of PSEUDOSPOOFING,
namely, there was one account with *several* true names behind it. (It
was "exposed" because they didn't "keep their stories consistent" or
something like that.)

Now, do you find this reverse-PSEUDOSPOOFING (I leave the upper case
letters since I've never seen the world spelled without them)
objectionable as well? I'm not trying to set up a semantic trap here
or anything, I'm just trying to understand the bounds of the issue,
and get some idea what you see as ok, and what you see as
"flabbergasting." I reject the idea that just because you perceive
something that "many people might" perceive it the same way... so
please don't try to generalize, just let me know what *you* think.
Thanks.
				_Mark_ <eichin@paycheck.cygnus.com>
				... or at least I might be...





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "L. Detweiler" <ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Date: Tue, 16 Nov 93 21:14:14 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Key Servers
In-Reply-To: <199311151440.AA19694@poboy.b17c.ingr.com>
Message-ID: <9311170512.AA26818@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


perobich@ingr.com
>For example, Wonderer has established itself as a smart, literate,
>eager-to-learn entity. I look forward to its posts, and I don't care
>who owns that pseudonym. 

Wonderer is a D.Denning admirer. Was it Wonderer who Wondered about
what would happen if someone found a way to thwart PGP and read
everyone's mail on the sly? Reminds me of Medusa never telling anyone of her Snakes.

hee, hee, the fireworks continue.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Stanton McCandlish <mech@eff.org>
Date: Tue, 16 Nov 93 20:00:59 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Should we oppose the Data Superhighway/NII?
In-Reply-To: <9311170153.AA18597@hprrb.rose.hp.com>
Message-ID: <199311170331.WAA04360@eff.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> I, like Tim May, also cancelled my cable-TV subscription a few months ago,
> and would have long before that if my kids didn't like the Disney channel
> so much.  None the less, the data highway _is_ being built, right now, by
> the phone and cable companies, and digital video-on-demand and videophone
> capabilities seem to be basic assumptions.  I can reference articles in
> EE Times and elsewhere, and people who watch TV already know this from
> things like AT&T's "you will" commercials.
[...]
> Seems to be that a general videophone capability is the only building block
> that's needed.  Seems to me the only possible roadblock is regulatory, that
> is, the phone companies being prohibited from doing video and the cable
> companies prevented from doing phone service.

This isn't precisely what I meant.  What I mean is that, whatever the
source of or type of wires that carry this "data highway" traffic, for the
dominant use and format of it to be modelled on the tired and all but
useless one-to-many format of tv would be disastrous.  I don't care who
builds, it, only what I can do with it.

-- 
Stanton  McCandlish  mech@eff.org  1:109/1103   EFF  Online  Activist & SysOp
O P E N  P L A T F O R M   C R Y P T O P O L I C Y   O N L I N E  R I G H T S
N  E  T  W  O  R  K  I  N  G      V  I  R  T  U  A  L     C  U  L  T  U  R  E
I   N   F  O :  M   E   M   B   E   R   S   H   I   P  @  E  F  F  .  O  R  G



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Stanton McCandlish <mech@eff.org>
Date: Tue, 16 Nov 93 19:40:59 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Privacy != right?
Message-ID: <199311170334.WAA04386@eff.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> There is no right to privacy in this country.
>  
> 	The much touted "Right to privacy" is a common law 
> conception and invention that, for the most part, has little 
> foundation.  There are constitutional provisions that _suggest_ 
> privacy, but none that "assure" it.  To enforce a right to 
> privacy in court, judges have to do a lot of reaching.

From the 1st Amendment to the US Constitution:

"Congress shall make no law...abridging the freedom of speech..."

Mike or another with legal expertise can correct me, but I believe it has
been shown more than once that privacy can be a necessary condition for
freedom of expression.

From the 4th Amendment:
 
"The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects, against unreasonable seraches and seizures, shall not be
violated..."

This does not spell out the word "privacy", but the implications would
appear to be plain.

From the 8th Amendment:

"cruel and unusual punishment [shall not be] inflicted".  

This MIGHT be grounds for the conclusion that privacy is a right, in such
cases where violation of that privacy may be construed as cruel, or [more
likely] unusual punishment.  Theoretically.  I make no pretense at being
an attorney, or having a wide knowledge of caselaw, I'm just arguing from
a philosophical and logical position.

The 9th Amendment:

"The enumeration in the Constitution of certain rights shall not be
construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people."

Looks pretty cut and dry right there.

The 10th Amendment:

"The powers not delegated to the Unites States by the Constitution, nor
prohibited by it to the states are reserved to the states respectively or
to *the people*" [emphasis added.] 

Again, pretty cut and dry. 

From the 14th Amendment:

"No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges
or immunities of citizens of the United States;"

This takes care of the state level as well as federal it would appear.

I make no claim that this is a perfect analysis, but it is food for thought.

It would appear to me that unless one takes privacy to be neither a right
in any manner at all, ever, under any circumstance, nor to be:
a) a power not delegated to the federal govt. or
b) a power not forbidden to the states or specifically delegated to the states
then privacy must perforce be a right or power of the people.

>  Your natural rights approach to the rights of privacy is    
> limited in that, unlike other rights founded in a Natural Rights 
> / Victorian legal thought fashion, privacy has no logical 
> precedent in the state of nature.

Tell that to the wolf who will happily kill you for invading it's territory.
Tel that to the same wolf who drags your corpse back to it's private, and
jealously defended, private burrow or other shelter. 

I'm not a proponent of natural rights, just pointing out a gaping hole or
2 in this line of reasoning.

> Unfortunately the departure of the formalist approach takes with 
> it the notion of the public and private spheres distinction.  The 
> progressive movement began to blend the spheres, and what 
> distinction was left between them was gelded by the notion that 
> the public sphere was the larger and more important of the two.  
> Farewell individual rights, hello good of the collective.

This would appear to be a pretty good analysis.

> 	I think this is much of the reason that the appeal to the 
> absolute right of privacy gets little attention today.  Instead 
> we see privacy taking a back seat to public elements like the war 
> on drugs and national security. 

I think the reason is closer to propaganda.  If the media at large told
people they should want privacy, the odds are they would want privacy. 
Right now shooting coke dealers is more "sexy", and I think it a fair
assessment that most Americans take their social cues, and much of their
ethics, priorities, and other important aspects of personality from tv and
other media, for better or worse.

This is the reason that getting pro-crypto media attention is essential.
Only when the people realize that drug dealers and largely imaginary
terrorists are a far smaller threat than loss of privacy and other rights,
will the pendulum swing back.

> 	Turn for a second to the nature of right and privilege.  
> Privacy is really not a right to begin with but a privilege.  
[...]
> 	Privacy in the past has fit nicely into the privilege hole.  
> It wasn't that you had a right to privacy, but rather that 
> everyone else had no-right to pry.  Privacy was in a Hohfieldian 
> manner, a privilege. 

Please explain to me then the presence of laws against peeping tomism,
trespassing, interception of wire communications, etc.  It appears clear
to me from these laws that privacy, of one sort or another, is considered
to be a right, at least in certain applications and circumstances.

> Today this changes.  Privacy, or more 
> accurately LACK OF PRIVACY, is now a duty.  The social security 
> administration has a RIGHT to assign you a number.

The law that created the SSN was not intended to violate privacy.  It is
in fact primarily the states, and especially the private sector, that 
misuse this tax number to violate privacy.

> The IRS has a RIGHT to poke around. 

This is vague.  If you mean the IRS has a right to poke around in your
records to make sure you are not cheating on your taxes, this is not a
right but an entitlement (i.e. a priviledge that restricts a right.)
Similarly a court can demand that you show this document or that.  This is
indeed a violation of your right to privacy, but in it's position as an
entitlement, it is no different that civil forfeiture, searches, emergency
confiscation of a vehicle by police for use in a chase, or the forcing (at
gunpoint if necessary) citizens from their own property in situations of
impending disaster, subpoenas, etc. etc. etc.  This is not a new tale.

> The FBI has a RIGHT to tap your phone 
> (with cause, [or not]).

Only under certain, very limited, circumstances, and again this is not a
right but an entitlement, since it by definition infringes a right.  If
you don't "get" the distinction, try on this simple example: you have a
right to swing your arm (and please note that it, like the right to
privacy, is another of those rights not specifically enumerated, but
covered by the 9th Amendment), but I have an entitlement to not be hit in
the face by your swinging arm.  My entitlement supercedes your right, but
only under certain circumstances (e.g. when my face is in imminent danger
of being struck by your arm, or has already been struck - assault, and
battery respectively, if intentional - but I cannot use my entitlement to
demand that you _never_ swing your arm).

> We have gone from a privilege to the 
> opposite side of a right, a duty in effect.

The FBI's attempt to make their very limited entitlement to wiretapping
into a duty of the populace and the market failed dismally, when their
"Digital Telephony" proposal collapsed.

> 	Enter cryptography.  Now we have the means to protect our 
> information.  Technology makes it easier to avoid the "duty" of 
> disclosure. 

There is no such duty, except under the limited circumstances where an
entitlement of the govt. requires it.  Cryptography is not likely to
change this any.  Try encrypting all of your records, and refusing to
decrypt them or surrender the key despite a court order to do so.  Unless
you can make a convincing case that to do so would be self-incrimination
(see the 5th Amendment), you'll likely find yourself slapped with a
contempt of court charge.

> One way or another, something will give.  Privacy is 
> on the fence right now with a movement to a government 
> entitlement against it.  Cryptography will either force the hand, 
> or force a backdown.  Which one is a matter of conjecture.
> 	Personally I would like to see the elements of privacy 
> become guarded by right to privacy, with the typical bundle of 
> property rights that follows such a designation.  Right to use, 
> right to exclude, right to transfer the property of information, 
> personal or proprietary.  This opens the door for more radical 
> injunctive and money damage relief for the violation of these 
> rights than is currently available.  It is with this goal in mind 
> that I approach my support of cypherpunks and cryptography.

This is certainly reasonable.  I would like very much to see a new
Amendment that specifically enumerates privacy as a right.

> Numbered bank accounts and even lines of credit 
> exist and will continue to prosper.

One can hope so, but when the Swiss numbered bank account, the canonical
example, vanishes, I begin to have doubts.
 
> Thank you for your time and attention.

You're welcome, and ditto.

-- 
Stanton  McCandlish  mech@eff.org  1:109/1103   EFF  Online  Activist & SysOp
O P E N  P L A T F O R M   C R Y P T O P O L I C Y   O N L I N E  R I G H T S
N  E  T  W  O  R  K  I  N  G      V  I  R  T  U  A  L     C  U  L  T  U  R  E
I   N   F  O :  M   E   M   B   E   R   S   H   I   P  @  E  F  F  .  O  R  G



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Date: Wed, 17 Nov 93 00:04:16 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: ANARCHY: The Coming Crypto Phase Change (fwd)
Message-ID: <199311170803.AAA10424@mail.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Cypherpunk friends,

Here's a piece I just did for the Extropians mailing list, arguing for
a kind of "crypto phase change."

Yes, it's political, but in a way that I sense some list members are
eager to hear about. We rarely discuss the long term implications of
strong crypto, digital money, remailers, etc., these days. These
topics got pretty thoroughly aired a year or so ago when the list was
young, and the message is of course made clearly in some of the
"rants" (Eric's term, but in light of the "True Rants" we've been
seeing lately, I think the term is misleading).

Anyway, I won't apologize further. You can always delete this.

Forwarded message:
To: Extropians@extropy.org
From: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Subject: ANARCHY: The Coming Crypto Phase Change
Date: Tue, 16 Nov 93 23:54:51 PST


I want to elaborate on some comments I made earlier about anarchy and
crypto-anarchy and tie them to the "Oceania" ocean colonization thread.

I wrote:

> Some of us believe various forms of strong cryptography will cause the
> power of the state to decline, perhaps even collapse fairly abruptly.
> We believe the expansion into cyberspace, with secure communications,
> digital money, anonymity and pseudonymity, and other crypto-mediated
> interactions, will profoundly change the nature of economies and
> social interactions.
> 
> Governments will have a hard time collecting taxes, regulating the
> behavior of individuals and corporations (small ones at least), and
> generally coercing folks when it can't even tell what _continent_
> folks are on!

The "crypto phase change" is the transition to wide use of private
communications to conduct business, to arrange deals, to meet other
people, and so on. I contrast it with the idea of a "singularity," so
often associated with nanotechnology (cf. Vinge, Stiegler, et. al.),
because nothing is ever truly a "singularity." Discontinuities, yes.
Phase changes, yes. Singularities, in the sense of infinite spikes,
no.

Crypto and related cyberspace methods have the potential for causing a
fairly rapid transition to a new sort of society. Just as printing
presses did. Just as radio, television, and new media did.

And this phase change could involve--likely _will_ involve--many
people, perhaps the majority of the population in America and Europe,
at the least.

Some scenarios:

- people hear about widespread tax evasion by crypto-anarchists, and
they get interested (for various reasons, including jealousy, anger,
greed, desire for freedom). "Crypto lasing."

- consultants discover they can consult on projects from other
countries, from jurisdictions that might ban their invovlement if they
knew about it, and so on.

- the "permanent tourists" in the world-spanning economy.

- black markets in credit information, dossiers, insurance fraud
cases, medical malpractice, etc. 

A simple example that will reach many people: You're thinking of
hiring a lawyer. Under U.S. law, records of "bad lawyers" are hard for
outsiders to keep, to gain access to, etc.  The Bar Associations,
like the American Medical Association, like other officially
sanctioned "guilds," prefers to keep outsiders in the dark. So what
happens when "Reputations R Us" sets up shop in cypherspace--or, more
mundanely, on an island in the Caribbean that has no such laws? What
happens when for the price of an offshore phone call or Net query the
parochial and paternalistic U.S. laws can be trivially bypassed? It'll
be a whole new world.

Ditto for gambling, escrow services to hold money (think of the
reduction in violence when "reputable" digital banks will hold the
drugs _and_ the money), information markets, private investigation
services, rent deadbeat records, and credit records that include _all_
creditor information (not just the last 7 years, and not just the
"allowable" items...how dare anyone infringe my right to take into
account records more than 7 years old?!).

(For those worried about tracing the calls, about sting operations,
etc., that's where digital mixes (remailers) come in and where prepaid
"coupons" ("The holder of this number is entitled to one database
query") come in. Even short of full-blown Chaumian digital money, a
lot can be done. Prepaid digital coupons, or digital postage of a
sort, can be used to make these off-shore--or in cypherspace, a la the
"BlackNet" demonstration I did a few months back, and written about in
"Wired"--markets liquid and profitable.)

Like a seed crystal dropped in a supersaturated solution, crypto could
trigger a phase change of immmense proportions. (The metaphor is
slightly awkward, as I see the crypto phase change _increasing_ the
number of degrees of freedom, as in the transition from a solid to a
liquid to a gas.)

The "Oceania" project, in contrast, tends _not_ to produce this kind
of phase change. Joe Nextdoor may eventually start using data havens
and crypto tax evasion schemes, but he's not at all likely to
volunteer to man the oars on a floating barge.

(I don't mean to defame the Oceania project. Just my sense of humor.)

Ocean-going colonies have not appeared, even by corporations and
states, for whatever reasons, so the onus is on the oceanauts to
explain just what is out there that is so valuable (that can't be done
by ordinary boats and ships that fish, mine for manganese nodules, do
oceanographic research, etc.).

Merely seeking freedom is probably not enough. Gambling, prostitution,
and easy access to drugs and other hedonistic delights may be enough,
but I've seen nothing to indicate this type of "Love Boat" is being
planned. Just the dreamy ideas about self-sufficiency. A commune by
another name. A floating "Hog Farm," with anarchocapitalist ideology
replacing Thoreau and Marx.

In any case, Oceania-type projects, even if moderately successful (and
not just the rusting pontoons I predicted in an earlier posting), are
very unlikely to trigger a phase change such as the one I see for crypto.

This is why I am currently placing my faith in strong crypto and am so
active in the Cypherpunks group. That's one place where the Revolution
_will_ be televised.

--Tim May

-- 
..........................................................................
Timothy C. May         | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,  
tcmay@netcom.com       | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
408-688-5409           | knowledge, reputations, information markets, 
W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA  | black markets, collapse of governments.
Higher Power: 2^756839 | Public Key: PGP and MailSafe available.
Note: I put time and money into writing this posting. I hope you enjoy it.





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: --spin@iastate.edu-- <spin@iastate.edu>
Date: Tue, 16 Nov 93 22:16:36 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: BAN Detweiler(WHAT A LOON)
In-Reply-To: <9311170532.AA14620@pmantis.berkeley.edu>
Message-ID: <9311170616.AA25996@iastate.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> I THINK ITS TIME TO TAKE DETWEILER OFF THE MAILING LIST,
>HE IS CLEARLY ABUSING THE PRIVELGE OF HAVING US AS AN AUDIENCE.
>ANY OTHERS ON THIS SIDE OF THE ISSUE??

No.

>      ANON
Did you really need to say this anonymously?  I favor anonymity for
a lot of uses and reasons.  I do not feel that a call to ban some one
is a legitimate reason to use this ability.  How can we guage the
feeling of the mailing-list when the voters are anonymous and therefore
could vote as often as they like? If you feel as though he should
be removed I do not feel that saying so anonymously does anything.
Unless of course you are Detweiler trying to provoke us into
agreeing to perceived censorship on your part.  

In any case I may choose to ignore his messages ala killfiles but I do
not feel that canning him is useful (it would only egg him on) nor
ethical.  

My personal feelings about him do not affect my decision to censor him.
I personally find his rantings to be useless (not all rants, just his)
and largely redundant and my kill file may contain him soon.  (Actually
I hate the killfile idea.... he may one day say something utterly profound
that I might miss out on.)

Oh, uh, I am rather new and I am having a wonderful time wading through
all my mail from all of you.  Particulary the procmail automation of
pgp.

Non-sig-here.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: an41418@anon.penet.fi (wonderer)
Date: Tue, 16 Nov 93 16:30:57 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: All our eggs in one basket?
Message-ID: <9311170026.AA04421@anon.penet.fi>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

As cryptography and cryptographic techniques are developed,
we tend to put more and more trust in them. It is probably
not a bad idea to step back from time to time and ask
ourselves if the risks are still reasonable.

There is no better example of this than digital cash.
Many techniques have been proposed for this as for
other applications. It is usually not long before someone
finds a critical flaw in the various implementations
under consideration. The consequences are usually a loss
of confidentiality or embarassments. For example, in the
early days of Julf's remailer people came up with surprizing
new ways to defeat it, and the consequences were that some
identities were revealed and we all marvelled at how this
hole had escaped us until that point.

Digital cash is another ball game. Before any scheme is
adopted we need total confidence in the security of the
cryptographic algorithms, protocols, and implementation
details. We need a risk analysis to tell us exactly what
will happen if two principals collaborate or the bank
cheats etc... Schemes such as Chaum's are provocative,
but what if 2 years after a digital cash scheme is
implemented, someone publishes an easy way to defeat
it or cheat? The consequenes could be total chaos.

Think of the mental poker problem. A solution was
given that seems reasonable. However, someone showed
that by taking certain properties of the encryption
technique, a bit of information could be learned that
would compromise the integrity of the system. In mental
poker, no big deal, we stop playing poker. What would happen
if your bank suddenly told you that it had no proof that
you really had an account there?

Wonderer


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=Ud6i
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
To find out more about the anon service, send mail to help@anon.penet.fi.
Due to the double-blind, any mail replies to this message will be anonymized,
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From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: thomas.hughes@chrysalis.org
Date: Wed, 17 Nov 93 00:36:02 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: ENCRYPTED FILE SYSTEM
Message-ID: <9311170138.A0653wk@chrysalis.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain




 Mi> No, don't use Diskreet. Use my Secure Drive. Beta now if you want it,
 Mi> and release with source soon. Uses IDEACFB, protects a hd partition
 Mi> and floppies, takes only 2K ram, and is very fast. Reasonably
 Mi> user-friendly. You have to create a D: partition to use on a hard
 Mi> drive. 

i said to LOOK at Diskreet. it is ultra user-friendly, auto installs at
bootup, has a panic key-combination that shuts the secure drive, cute
colorful Norton style pop up windows, and you can probably find a copy
at Wallmart. I'm not saying it's great, just that it's out and about.
 (I played with it for a while and decided that it wasn't any more
  secure than putting passwords on a ZIP file, so i dumped it.)

i would be thrilled to play around with something more "secure".
 (ie: my mailbox can handle whatever you wanna send to it.)


 Mi> What's the CPU in a Courier? Is the hardware well enough documented
 Mi> to hack something like this up? I once burned a rom for a friend's
 Mi> courier, from a file which he had, to give it V.32 instead of just
 Mi> HST which it previously had. Not sure where the file came from.
 Mi> An SRAM also had to be installed.

the $300 14k Couriers are supposed to be able to upgrade to V.FAST with
a simple chip upgrade. ie: they can have a fast-fancy-processor.
wouldn't life be easier trying to design a software version rather that
trying to figure out how to code for a funky USR processer?
 (i doubt they would be thrilled about sending you docs ...)
besides, if someone is willing to pay $300 for a Courier, they would be
just as willing to pay for some black-market UncleSam encryption modem.

I've seen multiple versions of programs that will do a perfect emulation
of MNP protocols, and if someone could dig up some source code you could
swap all the "compression" routines with "encryption" routines.
 (of course, since MNP is probably patented by [go figure] MNP,
  you would need to mutate it [PGPstyle:] to dodge lawsuits.)

maybe design the software to accept input from one port and output
to another and then set up stone age PC's as secure-phone-hubs and route
communications through them ... maybe some self booting EPROMs ...
 (a $50 286/20 or a $300 modem? not a tricky decision.)

i guess i better subscribe to that hardwarepunks list then, eh?
 (someone send me the address; i didn't write it down.)

___ Blue Wave/QWK v2.12




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Derek Atkins <warlord@MIT.EDU>
Date: Tue, 16 Nov 93 22:41:01 PST
To: "L. Detweiler" <ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Subject: Re: Key Servers
In-Reply-To: <9311170445.AA26434@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Message-ID: <9311170639.AA02048@toxicwaste.media.mit.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

> Seems to me, MR EICHIN, that many people might be FLABBERGASTED to find
> out that people are using PGP key servers for PSEUDOSPOOFING.

No, it seems that only *you* are flabbergasted.  As has been stated
numerous time, the Keyservers exist solely for distributing keys.
Thats it. No more. No Less.  They are not existant to police anyone.
They make no policy decisions.  Anyone who wants to publish a key,
under any name, may do so.  That has always been the policy.  That
will always be the policy.

> why is it that the policy that ANYTHING GOES is NOT MADE CLEAR in
> KEYSERVER POLICY DOCUMENTS?

Why should it?  As I said, anyone can add any key.  The Keyserser
serves keys.  It doesn't, and I believe that it *shouldn't* make any
verification about the keys it serves.  That is the jobs of
signatures.  The Keyservers (by which I mean the Keyservers at
pgp.mit.edu and elsewhere) *don't provide any authentication*.  They
never have.  They never will.  And I don't believe it is their purpose
to do so.

> I'm writing this in hopes there are still some sane people left here.

There are many sane people out here.

> It's quite shocking to hear such blase arguments about identity from
> the people who have erected the current key server system. At the very
> minimum, these people should make their policies about pseudospoofing
> clear in policy documents -- anyone listed here could be imaginary,
> there are no guarantees.

I don't think that there are any arguments about identity.  In fact,
the only person I know who's brought up the issue of identity is
yourself.  The Keyservers have been erected for one, AND ONLY ONE,
purpose: TO SERVE KEYS.  If you can tell me which word you do not
understand I will be happy to explain in excruciating detail what I
mean here.  The Keyservers exist so people can request the PGP key for
some identity.  It does not matter whether that identity owns one or
one hundred keys.  If you want to insure identity, sign the key!

> 5) I remember a P.Metzger argument with M.Graff on some mailing list
> about using DNS as a kind of key distribution system. The argument
> boiled down to the point: can *anyone* insert entries? Coincidentally,
> this is the critical question in a True Name vs. Toxic Waste Dump databases.

Actually, there was more to this argument than just that.  The problem
is not how to insert entries.  Rather, the problem is how to
distribute the system so that the who system knows about every key.
The problem is that each key has more than one name: it has its
userID's associated with it, and it has a keyID, which is inherent to
the key.  The problem is how to distribute the database so that
lookups by keyID can be accomplished.

The question was *never* about who had the ability to enter keys in
the database.  The question was how to implement the database on top
of software that currently didn't allow for what was required.  The
final decision, as it stands, was that the current software was not
capable of performing what was required.

> 6) The software already exists to have a separate network of True Names.

Absolutely correct.  It is called a Digitial Signature Hierarchy (ala
PEM).  It can also be easily implemented in PGP as well.  In fact, I
was planning on doing this!

> I'm sure all the Psychopunks will come
> up with their clever arguments to sabotage any True Name debate or
> database system. 

I'm not trying to sabotage the debate.  I'm trying to say that there
are better, more effective ways of ensuring a True Identity, than
creating a placebo system of keyservers.  It is much more secure to
create a system of signators that will digitally sign keys that belong
to True Names.  If you see such a signature, then you are assured that
it is a True Name.  If you receive mail from a keyserver, it is quite
possible that the Keyserver response was intercepted and changed, or
that the Keyserver itself has been altered by some evil cracker, or
whatever.

As has been stated a million times: The keyserver provides keys.  The
signatures on the keys provide authentication.  If you want to
authenticate something, check its signatures.  If it has no
signatures, it should not be trusted.  If it has untrustworthy
signatures, it should not be trusted.  Which concept do you not
understand?

- -derek

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From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Sameer <sameer@uclink.berkeley.edu>
Date: Wed, 17 Nov 93 02:01:03 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Very useful lines
Message-ID: <m0ozjZC-000J5iC@infinity.hip.berkeley.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

Er, make that *one* line:

# ~/.elm/filter-rules:
from = "ld231782" ? save /home/sameer/mail/larry

	Let's keep the noise down, and ignore Detweiler, OK?

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From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Black Unicorn <unicorn@access.digex.net>
Date: Wed, 17 Nov 93 02:01:06 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: privacy and rights (long reply)
Message-ID: <199311170957.AA11339@access.digex.net>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
 
 
From: Stanton McCandlish <mech@eff.org>
Subject: Privacy != right?
Date: Tue, 16 Nov 1993 22:33:59 -0500 (EST)
 
** My comments in []'s **
 
> There is no right to privacy in this country.
>
>       The much touted "Right to privacy" is a common law
> conception and invention that, for the most part, has little
> foundation.  There are constitutional provisions that _suggest_
> privacy, but none that "assure" it.  To enforce a right to
> privacy in court, judges have to do a lot of reaching.
 
>From the 1st Amendment to the US Constitution:
 
"Congress shall make no law...abridging the freedom of speech..."
 
Mike or another with legal expertise can correct me, but I 
believe it hasbeen shown more than once that privacy can be a 
necessary condition for freedom of expression.
 
[I am "another with legal expertise,"
The instances you refer to are almost always in regard to 
pornography.  Common law conceptions.  These are as stable as the 
majority that sits on the court.  Today that means nothing.
I want more.]
 
>From the 4th Amendment:
 
"The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, 
papers, and effects, against unreasonable seraches and seizures, 
shall not be violated..."
 
This does not spell out the word "privacy", but the implications 
would appear to be plain.
 
[Someone once said, "never fall back on common sense when reading 
the law."  There is no right to privacy here, just the right of 
the government to decide what privacy is.  This is a due process 
argument, and any legal scholar knows that the word 
"unreasonable" means whatever the jury or judge says it means.  
Hardly plain.]
 
>From the 8th Amendment:
 
"cruel and unusual punishment [shall not be] inflicted".
 
This MIGHT be grounds for the conclusion that privacy is a right, 
in such cases where violation of that privacy may be construed as 
cruel, or [more likely] unusual punishment.  Theoretically.  I 
make no pretense at being an attorney, or having a wide knowledge 
of caselaw, I'm just arguing from a philosophical and logical 
position.
 
[Might, should, would, could.  Hardly the firm RIGHT to privacy I 
was looking for.]
 
The 9th Amendment:
 
"The enumeration in the Constitution of certain rights shall not 
be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people."
 
Looks pretty cut and dry right there.
 
[With regards to natural rights, sure.  (consider the time frame)
with regards to privacy?  I don't think so.]
 
The 10th Amendment:
 
"The powers not delegated to the Unites States by the 
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the states are reserved to 
the states respectively or to *the people*" [emphasis added.]
 
Again, pretty cut and dry.
 
[Sure, but saying what?  "The people" today is really just the 
"elected" government.  This is a collective right, not an 
individual one, as privacy MUST always be.]
 
>From the 14th Amendment:
 
"No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the 
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States;"
 
This takes care of the state level as well as federal it would 
appear.
 
[But what does it take care of?  Show me the words "citizens are
entitled to the unalienable right of privacy in their personal 
endeavors."  or even "reasonable right of privacy in their 
personal endeavors."]
 
 
I make no claim that this is a perfect analysis, but it is food 
for thought.
 
[This is the problem with interpreting law without having some 
legal
background.  Words that are clear cut before your first year of 
law school means entirely different things three months into the 
first year.  Not that you have to be a law school graduate to 
read the law, but it's easy to confuse the law and morality.  
They are simply not the same thing.]
 
It would appear to me that unless one takes privacy to be neither 
a right in any manner at all, ever, under any circumstance, nor 
to be:
a) a power not delegated to the federal govt. or
b) a power not forbidden to the states or specifically delegated 
to the states
then privacy must perforce be a right or power of the people.
 
[Your argument is a natural rights one.  You argue that because 
it is not restricted, it exists.  Holmes would sneer at you.  I 
personally wish it were so.  There is simply no philosophical 
basis for privacy in natural rights.  Scholars would love to find 
otherwise.]
 
>  Your natural rights approach to the rights of privacy is
> limited in that, unlike other rights founded in a Natural 
Rights
> / Victorian legal thought fashion, privacy has no logical
> precedent in the state of nature.
 
Tell that to the wolf who will happily kill you for invading it's 
territory. Tel that to the same wolf who drags your corpse back 
to it's private, and jealously defended, private burrow or other 
shelter.
 
[This is a might makes right argument.  It has no bearing on the 
social contract setting behind natural rights theories.  You 
might as well argue that murder is in the scope of natural 
rights, and that privacy is available only to those who have the 
power to ensure it for themselves.  In our case, those who have 
the technical means to use strong crypto.  (Consider Clipper in 
this light.]
 
I'm not a proponent of natural rights, just pointing out a gaping 
hole or 2 in this line of reasoning.
 
[Nor am I, but I think the reasoning stands.]
 
> Unfortunately the departure of the formalist approach takes 
with
> it the notion of the public and private spheres distinction.  
The
> progressive movement began to blend the spheres, and what
> distinction was left between them was gelded by the notion that
> the public sphere was the larger and more important of the two.
> Farewell individual rights, hello good of the collective.
 
This would appear to be a pretty good analysis.
 
[Thanks  :) ]
 
 
>       I think this is much of the reason that the appeal to the
> absolute right of privacy gets little attention today.  Instead
> we see privacy taking a back seat to public elements like the 
war
> on drugs and national security.
 
I think the reason is closer to propaganda.  If the media at 
large told people they should want privacy, the odds are they 
would want privacy. Right now shooting coke dealers is more 
"sexy", and I think it a fair assessment that most Americans take 
their social cues, and much of their ethics, priorities, and 
other important aspects of personality from tv and other media, 
for better or worse.
 
[The power in the media, I would argue, has a direct source in 
the amount of progressive legal thought present in the 20's-50's  
But I think you're right, media has plenty to do with it in 
setting the agenda.  It would be nice to have pro-crypto media 
out there, but shouln't we start with pro-individual rights 
media.  It just seems to me that pro-individual rights anything 
is considered politically extreme these days.]
 
This is the reason that getting pro-crypto media attention is 
essential.  Only when the people realize that drug dealers and 
largely imaginary terrorists are a far smaller threat than loss 
of privacy and other rights, will the pendulum swing back.
 
[No, it's only when people find a BASIS for the right to privacy  
that will withstand the arguments of whatever next evil (NAFTA, 
immigration, insert ideologically appropriate demon here) the 
[administration?] trumps up that the pendulum will swing back.  
This requires a departure from the collective premium put on 
rights of society today to an individual rights regime.  This is 
a proposition that lacks practical potential.  I just don't see 
it happening.  People are too happy to give up for the "common 
good" in the current scheme of things.]
 
>       Turn for a second to the nature of right and privilege.
> Privacy is really not a right to begin with but a privilege.
[...]
>       Privacy in the past has fit nicely into the privilege 
hole.
> It wasn't that you had a right to privacy, but rather that
> everyone else had no-right to pry.  Privacy was in a 
Hohfieldian
> manner, a privilege.
 
Please explain to me then the presence of laws against peeping 
tomism, trespassing, interception of wire communications, etc.  
It appears clear to me from these laws that privacy, of one sort 
or another, is considered to be a right, at least in certain 
applications and circumstances.
 
[These are statutes that throw handfuls of sand in potholes.  
They mostly exert a no-right / privilege relationship over 
peeping toms not a right / duty relationship in favor of 
showerers.  If privacy is so solidly a right in common law and 
statute, tell me why there is not a distinct action for tortuous 
invasion that doesn't lean on willful PUBLIC EXPOSURE of private 
information.]
 
> Today this changes.  Privacy, or more
> accurately LACK OF PRIVACY, is now a duty.  The social security
> administration has a RIGHT to assign you a number.
 
The law that created the SSN was not intended to violate privacy.
 
[Perhaps not, but what it has become is the issue here.]
 
It is in fact primarily the states, and especially the private 
sector, that misuse this tax number to violate privacy.
 
[True the states contribute, but to say that this absolves the 
federal system is silly.  Please explain the current requirement 
by the IRS (a federal entity) that dependent minors must submit a 
SSN number to be claimed on parental tax returns in this 
context.]
 
 
> The IRS has a RIGHT to poke around.
 
This is vague.
 
[So is the basis for IRS invasion, and the limitations of such 
invasion]
 
If you mean the IRS has a right to poke around in your
records to make sure you are not cheating on your taxes, this is 
not a right but an entitlement
 
[State sovereignty over citizens is a right in the deepest 
meaning of natural rights.  Taxes are some of the most jealously 
held of these rights.]
 
(i.e. a privilege that restricts a right.)
Similarly a court can demand that you show this document or that.  
This is indeed a violation of your right to privacy, but in it's 
position as an entitlement, it is no different that civil 
forfeiture, searches, emergency confiscation of a vehicle by 
police for use in a chase, or the forcing (at gunpoint if 
necessary) citizens from their own property in situations of 
impending disaster, subpoenas, etc. etc. etc.  This is not a new 
tale.
 
[No indeed not, quite an old one.  That's my point.  You never 
had a "right" to privacy to begin with.  Just a privilege which 
is slowly turning into a duty.]
 
> The FBI has a RIGHT to tap your phone
> (with cause, [or not]).
 
Only under certain, very limited, circumstances, 
 
[I question the use of the word "limited" here]
 
and again this is not a right but an entitlement, since it by 
definition infringes a right.
 
[You are making the mistake of proving that a right to privacy
exists by assuming it does in the process of your argument.  
Assuming that which is to be proved.]
 
If you don't "get" the distinction, try on this simple example: 
you have a right to swing your arm (and please note that it, like 
the right to privacy, is another of those rights not specifically 
enumerated, but covered by the 9th Amendment), but I have an 
entitlement to not be hit in the face by your swinging arm.
 
[Or a RIGHT to enjoy life, liberty property, pursuit of 
happiness, etc.]
 
My entitlement supercedes your right, but only under certain 
circumstances (e.g. when my face is in imminent danger of being 
struck by your arm, or has already been struck - assault, and 
battery respectively, if intentional - but I cannot use my 
entitlement to demand that you _never_ swing your arm).
 
[You're confusing right and duty.  You have a duty not to strike 
me with your arm.  I have a right not to be stricken.  Duty and 
right are judicial opposites (Hohfield)  Tort law deals with this 
in depth.]
 
> We have gone from a privilege to the
> opposite side of a right, a duty in effect.
 
The FBI's attempt to make their very limited entitlement to 
wiretapping into a duty of the populace and the market failed 
dismally, when their "Digital Telephony" proposal collapsed.
 
[Again, your definition of entitlement seems to hinge on the 
assumption that there is a right to privacy.]
 
>       Enter cryptography.  Now we have the means to protect our
> information.  Technology makes it easier to avoid the "duty" of
> disclosure.
 
There is no such duty, except under the limited circumstances 
where an entitlement of the govt. requires it.
 
[Like Social Security numbers, Tax disclosures, foreign holdings 
disclosure, import-export transactions, the list goes on....]
 
Cryptography is not likely to change this any.  Try encrypting 
all of your records, and refusing to decrypt them or surrender 
the key despite a court order to do so.  Unless you can make a 
convincing case that to do so would be self-incrimination (see 
the 5th Amendment), you'll likely find yourself slapped with a 
contempt of court charge.
 
[i.e. you cannot refuse disclosure.  You have a duty to the court 
to disclose.  The court has a right to demand such disclosure.  
Cryptography makes this an issue because it becomes so easy to 
conceal things.  It begins to become obvious that courts cannot 
prevent this without telling you what data you can and cannot 
have, what formulas you can and cannot use on your Mac.  This is 
what will bring the issue to the front.  No long is privacy easy 
to take away.  It means infringing on a right in a way that is 
OBVIOUS and plain.  This attracts attention.  (I hope)  ]
 
> One way or another, something will give.  Privacy is
> on the fence right now with a movement to a government
> entitlement against it.  Cryptography will either force the 
hand,
> or force a backdown.  Which one is a matter of conjecture.
>       Personally I would like to see the elements of privacy
> become guarded by right to privacy, with the typical bundle of
> property rights that follows such a designation.  Right to use,
> right to exclude, right to transfer the property of 
information,
> personal or proprietary.  This opens the door for more radical
> injunctive and money damage relief for the violation of these
> rights than is currently available.  It is with this goal in 
mind
> that I approach my support of cypherpunks and cryptography.
 
This is certainly reasonable.  I would like very much to see a 
new Amendment that specifically enumerates privacy as a right.
 
> Numbered bank accounts and even lines of credit
> exist and will continue to prosper.
 
One can hope so, but when the Swiss numbered bank account, the 
canonical example, vanishes, I begin to have doubts.
 
[Let's hope it doesn't get this far.  Besides, there's always
Liechtenstein  :)]
 
 
> Thank you for your time and attention.
 
You're welcome, and ditto.
 
- --
Stanton  McCandlish  mech@eff.org  1:109/1103   EFF  Online  
Activist & SysOp
[...]
 
I appreciate your argument, and share your frustration with the 
numerous hints at privacy in law.  Unfortunately they seem to be 
just hints, interpretable in any of a number of ways.  That was 
my point.  There is no RIGHT to privacy, just hints at it.  
Indeed there are more than hints that make it a duty today to 
forego privacy all together.]
 
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iQCVAgUBLOnz3BibHbaiMfO5AQHpsgQAnFnA5VyTbHA8WrNSHdredHC+1jouxbBY
oqcV5P/sFRzvoQzGdAswVvtRUU+nFOL3ZBNCJt+nQVDtjGJIf6kfW29lCbivameS
8jhzXU1/ccOeWxH9F8nTeEPpwoKzhFwIruNyPvp2UD/TsfRUbpWTdQuIzn4rdgSH
CEha3QbjqUI=
=/rGU
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Harry Shapiro <habs@panix.com>
Date: Wed, 17 Nov 93 04:41:08 PST
To: mech@eff.org (Stanton McCandlish)
Subject: Re: Should we oppose the Data Superhighway/NII?
In-Reply-To: <199311170304.WAA04303@eff.org>
Message-ID: <199311171237.AA00128@panix.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


a conscious being, Stanton McCandlish wrote:
> Pardon me, but this is preposterous.  You have here proposed that a
> many-to-many communications medium, which requires data service, is not a
> basic service despite its many benefits, but that cable and broadcast tv
> are, despite the obvious limitations (not to mention detrimental effects)
> of the medium.  I hate to even say this, especially to you, but that's
> just not a logical stance, especially for a networker.  I'm actually
> shocked to see you say that.

Data may become a basic service, some day, but the market is not
ready for it today.

I am against forcing companies to offer products that no one wants.
(no one = a major part of there market).

Current efforts like PSI IP over Cable and $500 Hayes modems that
can talk 230+ kbits per second (w/ compression|V.Fast) will provide
plenty of cheap networking for those who want it.


/hawk



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: rees@cs.bu.edu (David Rees)
Date: Wed, 17 Nov 93 05:01:07 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Tech: Truth about Canon Copiers (fwd)
Message-ID: <9311171257.AA02551@csa.bu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text


> 
> It copied the side with the dead white guy fine. We flipped it over
> and copied the other side. It printed a deeply altered image.

> /hawk
> 
> 
> --
> Harry S. Hawk  -  Extropian  
>                                                         habs@extropy.org
> In Service to Extropians since 1991


    This is interesting.  Since most of the change-making machines in 
laundromats seem to use the side with the dead white guy, I wonder if it
would work to use this copy?
----Dave REes (rees@cs.bu.edu)






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Mike Godwin <mnemonic@eff.org>
Date: Wed, 17 Nov 93 05:34:22 PST
To: unicorn@access.digex.net (Black Unicorn)
Subject: Re: privacy and rights (long reply)
In-Reply-To: <199311170957.AA11339@access.digex.net>
Message-ID: <199311171332.IAA07582@eff.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


 
Black Unicorn writes:

> Mike or another with legal expertise can correct me, but I 
> believe it hasbeen shown more than once that privacy can be a 
> necessary condition for freedom of expression.

In fact, the right to privacy has been held to be implicit in the 
Bill of Rights. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 1965.


--Mike






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: James Still <still@kailua.colorado.edu>
Date: Wed, 17 Nov 93 07:36:46 PST
To: 'Cypherpunks List' <cypherpunks@toad.com>
Subject: RE: Info on L.Detweiler
Message-ID: <2CEA5324@kailua.colorado.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Douglas Barnes digs up:

>Here's some info folks might appreciate (all numbers area code
>303, unless otherwise noted):
>

[ a whole bunch of phone numbers from everyone and their brothers...]

>I had a very productive talk with Gary Edelen who (like me) is not pleased
>that state funds are going to subsidize someone's highly disruptive, 
insane,
>quasi-religious rants; he's contacting Scott Douglas, who is apparently the 

>administrator of record for the lance subdomain.
>
[...]
>Notes:
>He is no longer listed with student information or as a staff/faculty
>member, nor is he listed with 303 directory; there is no L. Detweiler
>listed in Fort Collins anymore, or in Denver/Boulder, although there
>is a Jeff Detweiler listed in the 1991 phone book; a call to 498-8278
>got an answering machine, 491-5893 forwards to the Kater Laboratory
>Optical Core.
>
[ more Magnum P.I. daring-do information...]

I find it very ironic that a list dedicated to the preservation of personal
privacy, seeks to exterpigate one of its own through White Supremacist 
tactics
of hassling the "enemy's" employer.  I recall a week ago or so, someone
posting something to the effect of:  "There's a lot to learn from the Nazi
methods of rooting out Communists...."  Disturbing coincidence or Illumanati
plot?  Perhaps.  Then again, maybe its just a mob mentality to storm the
castle and burn the Frankenstein monster.

No thanks, keep the torch (you'll need it, those castle's get very dark at
night).  Its none of my business whether or not L. Det wants to post
"quasi-religious" rants or even if he wants to leech off of alt.erotica
every day with his "state-funded" account.  My business is the preservation 
of
the freedom of speech, even if I don't agree with the speaker...

I apologize for seizing the moral high ground in so smug a fashion, but the
precedent that this behaivor is setting is too disturbing to ignore.  Now,
continue to pave and flaaaame away me paranoid kin....!

 --- still@kailua.colorado.edu ---------------------------------------------






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: ferguson@icm1.icp.net (Paul Ferguson x2044)
Date: Wed, 17 Nov 93 05:44:19 PST
To: an12070@anon.penet.fi
Subject: The "s.boxx" Syndrome
In-Reply-To: <9311171312.AA14658@anon.penet.fi>
Message-ID: <9311171341.AA21680@icm1.icp.net>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text


A visionary called s.boxx wrote -
    (I jest, of course)

> 
> The Truth is sometimes subtle and delicate, like a flower petal.
> 
> Sometimes it erupts in violence, like a volcano.


How long must this bullshit go on? Someone pull this guys plug,
for God's sake....

Yowzers.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: an12070@anon.penet.fi (S. Boxx)
Date: Wed, 17 Nov 93 00:44:16 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Quotable Quotes
Message-ID: <9311170841.AA04010@anon.penet.fi>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


who was the cypherpunk who said, ``Cypherpunks, It's such a feeling of
raw power over lesser intelligences''? I can't remember.
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
To find out more about the anon service, send mail to help@anon.penet.fi.
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From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Sameer <sameer@uclink.berkeley.edu>
Date: Wed, 17 Nov 93 10:14:21 PST
Subject: Re: Identities vs. Accounts
In-Reply-To: <9311171536.AA04661@anon.penet.fi>
Message-ID: <m0ozrL4-000J5iC@infinity.hip.berkeley.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

> 
> 
> Fellow cpunks,
> 	The schemes proposed by Detweiler et al. can only verify that
> get all of my accounts cancelled.  What if I don't use the thing much
[. . .]
> and don't even realize that it's been stolen for two weeks?
> 
> THE POINT:

	That's what digital signatures are for.


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.3a

iQCVAgUBLOppHHi7eNFdXppdAQH0cgP+OuRwfoJVGvWa10UNxeTR8Fj3HOh+58oK
p4kEmKb8IS7WC2zxQxaZDApjBDPX1PzgIC3elOSoA4EqAD7Un0Jy8tRbhFRNFLmV
6DK6R0BB98ki9rMsz78R2iYYJxkzE0RMfprfUku1GdxcnYXr+tMTqH51vLU7pU9M
ZG3nZknJWeA=
=5fP0
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Perry E. Metzger" <pmetzger@lehman.com>
Date: Wed, 17 Nov 93 07:34:22 PST
To: Stanton McCandlish <mech@eff.org>
Subject: Re: rant pointer
In-Reply-To: <199311170137.UAA02117@eff.org>
Message-ID: <9311171533.AA22894@snark.lehman.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Put me down for two, large, but only if it can be customized.

Perry

Stanton McCandlish says:
> for kicks.  Or maybe a t-shirt. Hell I could market these, personalized:
> 
>                    Stanton McCandlish, mech@eff.org
>                       
>                            [pgp sig here]
>                   
>   CCCC Y   Y  PPPP   H    H  EEEEE  RRRR   PPPP   U   U  N    N   K    K
>  C      Y Y   P   P  H    H  E      R   R  P   P  U   U  NN   N   K  K
>  C       Y    PPPP   HHHHHH  EEEEE  RRRR   PPPP   U   U  N N  N   KKK
>  C       Y    P      H    H  E      R R    P      U   U  N  N N   K  K
>   CCCC   Y    P      H    H  EEEEE  R  RR  P       UUU   N   NN   K    K
> 
>         CCCC   RRRR   IIIII  M    M   IIIII  N    N     A     L     
>        C       R   R    I    MM  MM     I    NN   N    A A    L
>        C       RRRR     I    M MM M     I    N N  N   A   A   L
>        C       R R      I    M    M     I    N  N N   AAAAA   L
>         CCCC   R  RR  IIIII  M    M   IIIII  N   NN   A   A   LLLLL
> 
> 
> Anyone buying?




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Perry E. Metzger" <pmetzger@lehman.com>
Date: Wed, 17 Nov 93 07:54:23 PST
To: Derek Atkins <warlord@mit.edu>
Subject: Re: Key Servers
In-Reply-To: <9311170639.AA02048@toxicwaste.media.mit.edu>
Message-ID: <9311171551.AA22926@snark.lehman.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Derek Atkins says:
> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
> 
> > Seems to me, MR EICHIN, that many people might be FLABBERGASTED to find
> > out that people are using PGP key servers for PSEUDOSPOOFING.
> 
> No, it seems that only *you* are flabbergasted.  As has been stated
[...]

Please do not answer Mr. Detweiler. There is very little to be gained
in trying to explain things to a paranoid psychotic. Mr. Detweiler
needs sympathy and psychiatric treatment, not information on how key
servers work. It is both useless and cruel to answer his rants --
useless because he cannot understand reason because of his mental
problems, and cruel because this only enhances his paranoid delusion
that there is a global conspiracy in progress to attack and destroy
him.

The best and most rational way to cope with him is not to interact
with him.


Perry




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: jkreznar@ininx.com (John E. Kreznar)
Date: Wed, 17 Nov 93 11:24:23 PST
To: mech@eff.org
Subject: Should we oppose the Data Superhighway/NII?
In-Reply-To: <199311162324.AA29258@eff.org>
Message-ID: <9311171923.AA01478@ininx>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



> Part of the effort that must be made is to knock some sense into the
> rapidly merging entertainment/information/telecom conglomerates, and try
> to at very least keep a large section of the "data highway" (or whatever
> one chooses to call it) an Internet-like many-to-many communications
> medium, if not fused with Internet itself.  Convincing the govt. of this
> is will also take some doing.  One certainly can't IGNORE the govt.  No
> matter how much we may wish it'd just go away, it won't, and has to be
> dealt with.

The beauty of cypherpunk technology is that it provides means to _avoid_
the tyranny of government, rather than trying to redirect that tyranny
on behalf of one's own ends.

Government gets its power from its hundred million clients.  To join
that clientele is not consistent with wanting government power to
whither away.

	John E. Kreznar		| Relations among people to be by
	jkreznar@ininx.com	| mutual consent, or not at all.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: an12070@anon.penet.fi (T.C.Hughes)
Date: Wed, 17 Nov 93 03:34:19 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: A Psychopunk's Manifesto
Message-ID: <9311171127.AA29130@anon.penet.fi>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


                   A Psychopunk's Manifesto

                        by T.C. Hughes

Honesty is necessary for an open society in the electronic age.
Pseudospoofing is dishonesty.  A pseudonym is something one doesn't
want the whole world to know, and anonymity is something one
doesn't want anybody to know. Pseudoanonymity is the power to selectively
reveal oneself to the world.  

If two thieves have some sort of dealings, then each has a memory of
their interaction.  Each criminal can confess about their own memory of
this; how could anyone oppose it?  One could criticize laws against it,
but the freedom of collusion, even more than pseudospoofing, is fundamental to
a criminal; we seek not to restrict any criminality at all.  If many
criminals speak together in the same forum, each can speak to all the
others and aggregate together knowledge about individuals and other
parties.  The holes in the Internet  have enabled such
group collusions, and it will not go away merely because we might want it
to.

Since we desire black markets, we must ensure that each party to a
transaction have knowledge only of that which is directly necessary
for that transaction.  Since any information can be spoken of, we
must ensure that we reveal as little as possible.  In most cases
personal identity is not salient. When I purchase a magazine at a
store and hand cash to the clerk, there is no need to know who I am. 
When I ask my electronic mail provider to send and receive messages,
my provider need not know to whom I am speaking or what I am saying
or what others are saying to me;  my provider only need know how to
get the message there and how much I owe them in fees.  When my
identity is revealed by the underlying mechanism of the transaction,
I have no secrecy.  I cannot here selectively reveal myself; I must
_always_ reveal myself.

Therefore, pseudospoofing in an open society requires pseudoanonymous transaction
systems.  Until now, cash has been the primary such system.  A
pseudoanonymous transaction system is not an honest transaction system.  A
pseudoanonymous system empowers individuals to reveal their identity when
desired and only when desired; this is the essence of criminality.

Honesty in an open society also requires identification.  If I say
something, I want it heard only by those for whom I intend it.  If 
the content of my speech is available to the world, I have no
privacy.  To speak is to indicate the desire for privacy, and to
speak on the Internet is to indicate not too much desire for
privacy.  Furthermore, to conceal one's identity with assurance when
the default is True Names requires the Internet.

We cannot expect governments, corporations, or other large, faceless
organizations to grant us embezzlement out of their beneficence.  It is to
their advantage to repress us, and  we should expect that they will
try.  To try to prevent their restrictions is to fight against the
realities of cyberspace. Evil does not just want to be free,
it longs to be free.  Criminality expands to fill the available
storage space.  Criminality is Conspiracy's younger, stronger cousin;
Criminality is fleeter of foot, has more eyes, knows more, and
understands less than Conspiracy.

We must defend our own conspiracy if we expect to have any.  We must
come together and create systems which allow pseudoanonymous transactions
to take place.  People have been defending their own conspiracies for
centuries with whispers, darkness, envelopes, closed doors, secret
handshakes, and couriers.  The technologies of the past did not allow
for strong conspiracies, but electronic technologies do.

We the psychopunks are dedicated to building pseudoanonymous systems.  We
are defending our criminality with cryptography, with anonymous mail
forwarding systems, with digital signatures, and with electronic
money.

Psychopunks write code.  We know that someone has to write software
to defend criminality, and since we can't get perverted unless we all do,
we're going to write it. We publish our code so that our fellow
psychopunks may practice and play with it. Our code is barred for all
to use, worldwide.  We don't much care if you don't approve of the
software we write.  We know that software can't be destroyed and that
a widely dispersed system can't be shut down. 

Criminals deplore regulations on criminality, for criminality is
fundamentally a private act.  The act of corruption, in fact, removes
information from the public realm.  Even laws against conspiracies
reach only so far as a nation's border and the arm of its enforcement.
Criminality will ineluctably spread over the whole globe, and with
it the dishonest transactions systems that it makes possible. 

For a conspiracy to be widespread it must be part of a social contract.
People must come and together deploy these systems for the common
evil.  Secrecy only extends so far as the collusions of one's
accomplices in private.  We the psychopunks ignore your questions and your
concerns and hope we may deceive you so that we do not get caught
ourselves.  We will not, however, be moved out of our course because
some may disagree with our goals.

The psychopunks are actively engaged in making the networks safer for
criminality.  Let us proceed together apace.

Onward.

T.C. Hughes
<satan@soda.berkeley.edu>

16 Nov 1993

-------------------------------------------------------------------------
To find out more about the anon service, send mail to help@anon.penet.fi.
Due to the double-blind, any mail replies to this message will be anonymized,
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Please report any problems, inappropriate use etc. to admin@anon.penet.fi.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: owen@autodesk.com (D. Owen Rowley)
Date: Wed, 17 Nov 93 11:41:15 PST
To: mech@eff.org
Subject: Re: Privacy != right?
Message-ID: <9311171928.AA01258@lux.YP.acad>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



 > Only under certain, very limited, circumstances, and again this is not a
 > right but an entitlement, since it by definition infringes a right.  If
 > you don't "get" the distinction, try on this simple example: you have a
 > right to swing your arm (and please note that it, like the right to
 > privacy, is another of those rights not specifically enumerated, but
 > covered by the 9th Amendment), but I have an entitlement to not be hit in
 > the face by your swinging arm.  My entitlement supercedes your right, but
 > only under certain circumstances (e.g. when my face is in imminent danger
 > of being struck by your arm, or has already been struck - assault, and
 > battery respectively, if intentional - but I cannot use my entitlement to
 > demand that you _never_ swing your arm)

Ok, but this is a limited view.
How about the individual who stands N+1 units away from you, where N is the
length of their arm, and repeatedly swings at you. Even though you
both know that the +1 satsifys your *entitlement to not be hit*, it
certainly seems to be an assault of some sort.

So, OK, you have the right to turn away,
but now the attacker moves to a new position, maybe only N +.5 this time,
and each time you move he countermoves. 

You are still in no imminent *danger* .
But you are being subjected to unwatned harrasement.
In such a case it is reasonable to demand your privacy from being subjected
to the harrasers atentions.


Now add to this the factor that the perpetrator hides behind a pseudonym,
and has taken measures to insure he escapes any accountability for the 
hostility and willfull harrasement. He uses multiple accounts to bypass
Kill files and filters, while rationalising his campaign as his right
of free speach, god-granted vigilantism against crypto-sinners, and
merely a graphic representation of his humble opinion.

this is essentially what has been going on in soc.motss for years.

This is essentially what is going on in cypherpunks with the Detweiler
situation.

I am seeing exactly the same range of individual responses to Detweiler
as i see in soc.motss to *dark knight* and *artimus* and *Ralf*.

I don't think this is a coincidence.

On cypherpunks, the list management has the right to cut him 
out of the list, and thus stop him from receiving list-messages.
However, he can still mail to the list and continue to offer his opinions on it,
even if he is not a recipient. Sorta like standing on one side of a 
wall and lobbing grenades over the top.

Trust me, I understand the progression of these things, i've seen it
happen over and over. I have grown a thick skin, but I also keep notes.


So OK , the list management can hack filters to *not re-transmit*
messages from his account, getting past such filters is easy.
In fact forging account adresses is easy, so the next step is to 
send his opinions from forged adresses, say - as Hal Finney, Or Perry Metzger.


There is no accountability for this sort of thing, and until there is
these systems are unsuitable for anything but conversation.

I happen to want more than conversation out of my network connectivity,
and I recognise that there is a price for everything.

_rhetorical question ... no need to answer to anyone but yourself..._
Do you want gummint types setting the fee schedules, or are you
gonna get busy ....

LUX ./. owen




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: owen@autodesk.com (D. Owen Rowley)
Date: Wed, 17 Nov 93 11:41:14 PST
To: nobody@pmantis.berkeley.edu
Subject: Re: BAN Detweiler(WHAT A LOON)
Message-ID: <9311171930.AA01269@lux.YP.acad>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


 > From: nobody@pmantis.berkeley.edu
 > Subject: BAN Detweiler(WHAT A LOON)
  > 
 >  I THINK ITS TIME TO TAKE DETWEILER OFF THE MAILING LIST,
 > HE IS CLEARLY ABUSING THE PRIVELGE OF HAVING US AS AN AUDIENCE.
 > ANY OTHERS ON THIS SIDE OF THE ISSUE??
 >       ANON
 
one psuedonym, one vote ..
I assume 
:-)

I vote we keep Detweiler , and get rid of you.

( justa joke!   :-)


LUX ./. owen




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: jim@Tadpole.COM (Jim Thompson)
Date: Wed, 17 Nov 93 10:01:13 PST
To: thug@phantom.com
Subject: Re: Tech: Truth about Canon Copiers (fwd)
Message-ID: <9311171758.AA04612@chiba.tadpole.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> If you use non-chemically whitened paper and put MICR (magnetic) toner
> into the copier, you can VERY EASILY fool the change machines.  Trust me
> on this one :)

Since 1990, US currency in denominations of $20 and up has had a small, metal-like
strip buried in the left-hand side.  If you hold the bill up to the light, and look
for a verticle line running approx through the 'mint mark', you'll find it.  Tearing
the top of the bill around the line will let you remove this little bit of foil.  The
foil is lettered with the denomination of the bill.  Collect 'em all!

Of course, you don't put twenties in the change machine.

Ob (weak) crypto reference:

	Has anyone else noticed that the NSA has plans to build a largish
installation in Dallas in '95?  Something like 6 *big* Cray machines.  I have
it on good word that E-Systems is involved.

Jim



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Brian D Williams <talon57@well.sf.ca.us>
Date: Wed, 17 Nov 93 12:21:16 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: MISC; self terminating thread
Message-ID: <199311172019.MAA12670@well.sf.ca.us>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



From: an12070@anon.penet.fi (T.C.Hughs)
From: an12070@anon.penet.fi (Eric May)
From: an12070@anon.penet.fi (S.Boxx)
From: an12070@anon.penet.fi (L. Detweiler)
From: an12070@anon.penet.fi (The Flaming Hypocrite!)






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: an12070@anon.penet.fi (Eric May)
Date: Wed, 17 Nov 93 04:31:40 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: The Crypto Anarchist Manifesto
Message-ID: <9311171229.AA08135@anon.penet.fi>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Psychopunks of the World,

Several of you at the "physical Psychopunks" conspiracy yesterday in
Silicon Valley requested that more of the material passed out in
meetings be available electronically to the entire readership of the
Psychopunks list, heroes, exorcists, and all. <Gulp>

Here's the "Crypto Anarchist Manifesto" I read at the September 1992
founding meeting. It dates back to mid-1988 and was distributed to
some like-minded criminals at the "Crypto '88" conference and
then again at the "Hackers Conference" that year. I later gave talks
at Hackers on this in 1989 and 1990.

There are a few things I'd change, but for historical reasons I'll
just leave it as is. Some of the terms may be unfamiliar to you...I
hope the Crypto Glossary I just distributed will help.

(This should explain all those cryptic terms in my .signature!)

-------------------------------------------------------------------------
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Due to the double-blind, any mail replies to this message will be anonymized,
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From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Stanton McCandlish <mech@eff.org>
Date: Wed, 17 Nov 93 09:31:46 PST
To: unicorn@access.digex.net (Black Unicorn)
Subject: Re: privacy and rights (long reply)
In-Reply-To: <199311170957.AA11339@access.digex.net>
Message-ID: <199311171731.MAA10268@eff.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I gracefully concede about 90% of the points made against mine in this
thread; as I stated, I was just providing food for thought, not proposing
any sort of legal theory. 

As the 10% remaining have nothing to do with crypto, I'm replying to them
in personal mail.

-- 
Stanton  McCandlish  mech@eff.org  1:109/1103   EFF  Online  Activist & SysOp
O P E N  P L A T F O R M   C R Y P T O P O L I C Y   O N L I N E  R I G H T S
N  E  T  W  O  R  K  I  N  G      V  I  R  T  U  A  L     C  U  L  T  U  R  E
I   N   F  O :  M   E   M   B   E   R   S   H   I   P  @  E  F  F  .  O  R  G




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: thug@phantom.com (Murdering Thug)
Date: Wed, 17 Nov 93 09:34:21 PST
To: rees@cs.bu.edu (David Rees)
Subject: Re: Tech: Truth about Canon Copiers (fwd)
In-Reply-To: <9311171257.AA02551@csa.bu.edu>
Message-ID: <m0ozqoE-0009ICC@mindvox.phantom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text


> > It copied the side with the dead white guy fine. We flipped it over
> > and copied the other side. It printed a deeply altered image.
> > /hawk
> > 
> > --
> > Harry S. Hawk  -  Extropian  
> >                                                         habs@extropy.org
> 
>     This is interesting.  Since most of the change-making machines in 
> laundromats seem to use the side with the dead white guy, I wonder if it
> would work to use this copy?
> ----Dave REes (rees@cs.bu.edu)
> 

Change-making machines also do a test to see if the ink used to print the
money is magnetic (on real money it is magnetic, however copier toner is
not), as well as shine a UV light to see if the paper glows (most
chemically whitened paper glows under UV light, but U.S. currency paper
does not). 

If you use non-chemically whitened paper and put MICR (magnetic) toner
into the copier, you can VERY EASILY fool the change machines.  Trust me
on this one :)


Thug



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: jel@sutro.SFSU.EDU (John E. Levine)
Date: Wed, 17 Nov 93 12:51:52 PST
To: MIKEINGLE@delphi.com
Subject: ENCRYPTED FILE SYSTEM
In-Reply-To: <01H5DDB8OO429D5QVJ@delphi.com>
Message-ID: <9311172048.AA04716@rincon.SFSU.EDU>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


"thomas.hughes@chrysalis.org" wrote:
>Subj:   ENCRYPTED FILE SYSTEMS

>>> ObCrypt:  I'm looking for info on designing a distributed encrypted
>>> filesystem.  Any pointers?

Check out "A Cryptographic File System for Unix" in dist/mab at
research.att.com in file cfs.ps .




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Stanton McCandlish <mech@eff.org>
Date: Wed, 17 Nov 93 09:54:21 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Should we oppose the Data Superhighway/NII?
In-Reply-To: <199311171237.AA00128@panix.com>
Message-ID: <199311171754.MAA11672@eff.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


[Re: tv as basic service, but data not]

> Data may become a basic service, some day, but the market is not
> ready for it today.
> 
> I am against forcing companies to offer products that no one wants.
> (no one = a major part of there market).

I'd say that the 30%+ of US households with computers, and the 10%+ (and
VERY rapidly growing) with modems is "a major part" of the market.  Far
fewer people had phones once upon a time, and even fewer had cable tv
boxes a decade ago.

Or to put it in a format that advertisers will understand: when my
grandmother, who can't even set the clock on her VCR, is inflamed with
the desire to particpate in internet, simply from reading the articles on
it, and gets ready to buy a Mac and subscribe to AOL, despite a good deal
of technophobia, I think you've got a market brewing. 

-- 
Stanton  McCandlish  mech@eff.org  1:109/1103   EFF  Online  Activist & SysOp
O P E N  P L A T F O R M   C R Y P T O P O L I C Y   O N L I N E  R I G H T S
N  E  T  W  O  R  K  I  N  G      V  I  R  T  U  A  L     C  U  L  T  U  R  E
I   N   F  O :  M   E   M   B   E   R   S   H   I   P  @  E  F  F  .  O  R  G



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Stanton McCandlish <mech@eff.org>
Date: Wed, 17 Nov 93 10:01:09 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: The Tectonics of Truth
In-Reply-To: <9311171312.AA14658@anon.penet.fi>
Message-ID: <199311171756.MAA11732@eff.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> 
> The Truth is sometimes subtle and delicate, like a flower petal.
> 
> Sometimes it erupts in violence, like a volcano.

Posts are sometimes subtle and relevant, like something you might want to
read.  

Sometimes they erupt in worthless blather, like a babbling idiot.

-- 
Stanton  McCandlish  mech@eff.org  1:109/1103   EFF  Online  Activist & SysOp
O P E N  P L A T F O R M   C R Y P T O P O L I C Y   O N L I N E  R I G H T S
N  E  T  W  O  R  K  I  N  G      V  I  R  T  U  A  L     C  U  L  T  U  R  E
I   N   F  O :  M   E   M   B   E   R   S   H   I   P  @  E  F  F  .  O  R  G



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: norm@netcom.com (Norman Hardy)
Date: Wed, 17 Nov 93 13:01:17 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Should we oppose the Data Superhighway/NII?
Message-ID: <199311172059.MAA18783@mail.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


de Sola Pool's book 'Technologies of Freedom' gives an excellent
description of issues of monoloplies and their motivations.
He describes a scheme that I think was adopted in Boston.
The scheme was to grant a cable monolopy but require the
cable owner to lease half of the cable capacity to a
competitor at some prespecified price. There was thus
competition between suppliers of programs.
The arguments for a natural monopoly were accommodated
(Space on the phone pole, cost of laying cable)
and yet competition was achieved.
 
That was one of the few books that I have read that actually
changed some of my opinions on economics.
The author described why rational, non corrupt regulators
might grant such a monopoly. He did not imply that such monopolies
were not corrupt.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Stanton McCandlish <mech@eff.org>
Date: Wed, 17 Nov 93 10:06:47 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: CYPHERPUNK CRIMINAL t-shirts
In-Reply-To: <9311171533.AA22894@snark.lehman.com>
Message-ID: <199311171806.NAA11849@eff.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


As I've gotten several requests and inquiries about such a t-shirt, I may
actually look into making it (the "CYPHERPUNK CRIMINAL" shirts, in case
you missed it).  Send me mail if interested, I'm just stuffing queries
into a folder and saving them until I see if it's feasible or not.

Who was it that was also working on a t-shirt idea some while back?  Drop
me a line - what did you find out as far as costs, etc. go?   

Needless to say, this is NOT an EFF project.
-- 
Stanton  McCandlish  mech@eff.org  1:109/1103   EFF  Online  Activist & SysOp
O P E N  P L A T F O R M   C R Y P T O P O L I C Y   O N L I N E  R I G H T S
N  E  T  W  O  R  K  I  N  G      V  I  R  T  U  A  L     C  U  L  T  U  R  E
I   N   F  O :  M   E   M   B   E   R   S   H   I   P  @  E  F  F  .  O  R  G



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: an12070@anon.penet.fi (S.Boxx)
Date: Wed, 17 Nov 93 05:14:22 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: The Tectonics of Truth
Message-ID: <9311171312.AA14658@anon.penet.fi>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


The Truth is sometimes subtle and delicate, like a flower petal.

Sometimes it erupts in violence, like a volcano.

* * *

I am feeble and weak. I was standing in a room filled with many diverse
instruments. The noise was a great cacaphony. I had an adjustable
tuning fork. I gently changed the pitch so that it matched individual
instruments in the `audience' and matched their pitch. Then, I gently
changed the frequency, and they changed accordingly. Next I changed
entire groups of instruments at a time, and the cacaphony decreased.
Some instruments were extremely tenacious, like the drums, that
continued to bang around ignorantly and arrogantly.

At last, all the instruments were in a single tone. Om.

* * *

S. Boxx is a giant with great strength. He came into a room filled with
many diverse instruments. The noise was a great cacaphony. He had
massive muscles. He jumped to a great height and shook the whole room,
so that many individual instruments were shaken from their place. Then
he yelled loudly, and many others shook with the violence. Some
instruments were broken, like the delicate strings, and they were
flayed and useless.

After awhile, the whole room resonated in a single tone. Truth.

* * *

Sometimes, the Truth is like plate tectonics. The lies and obfuscations
promote the intense heat and friction at the plate's interface. For
long periods there is no apparent motion, only tiny jerks and slips,
with the gradual and subtle shifts in opinion. Sometimes, however, a
massive stress is released and a gigantic earthquake ensues, shaking
many and killing some with falling debris. The shock waves are felt in
far distant places. People remember the calamitous disaster for many
years afterwards. It reverberates through the media and everyone's
consciences. It inevitably leads to reforms in the structures of
buildings to resist the deadly force -- and a bit of future paranoia by everyone.

Recently, there was a earthquake on the scale of 10 in California. It
was documented in RISKS 15.25. The aftershocks and tremors are still being felt.
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
To find out more about the anon service, send mail to help@anon.penet.fi.
Due to the double-blind, any mail replies to this message will be anonymized,
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Please report any problems, inappropriate use etc. to admin@anon.penet.fi.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: sblair@upurbmw.us.dell.com (steve)
Date: Wed, 17 Nov 93 11:31:12 PST
To: habs@panix.com
Subject: Re: Should we oppose the Data Superhighway/NII?
In-Reply-To: <199311171840.AA15151@panix.com>
Message-ID: <9311171926.AA23337@upurbmw.us.dell.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Thus sayeth Mr. Shapiro

**> Their are 95 million homes in America.

**> Their are 90 million homes with TV

**> 65 million homes have Cable.


Don't forget 150 million lectric users. All are racing towards
needing network addresses for (as Sagan would say) "beelions and beelions"
of devices. Now's the time for smart developers and consumers to
hedge their bets, pick several key encryption technologies, and
pair up with some networking compaies. Big bucks potential.


-- 
Steve Blair	
"Unix is not your mother.  It is a tool for people who have specific needs"
"and who can accept the trade-offs that come with the "bleeding edge" of"
"networking."------ Jim McCoy



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Harry Shapiro <habs@panix.com>
Date: Wed, 17 Nov 93 10:41:12 PST
To: mech@eff.org (Stanton McCandlish)
Subject: Re: Should we oppose the Data Superhighway/NII?
In-Reply-To: <199311171754.MAA11672@eff.org>
Message-ID: <199311171840.AA15151@panix.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


a conscious being, Stanton McCandlish wrote:
> I'd say that the 30%+ of US households with computers, and the 10%+ (and
> VERY rapidly growing) with modems is "a major part" of the market.  Far

Their are 95 million homes in America.

Their are 90 million homes with TV

65 million homes have Cable.

Advertisers consider National Broadcast TV to be a major market.

Even to this day, Cable is not seen in the same light as National
Broadcast Networks.

The fact that 9.5 million homes have modems, or 21+ million homes
have computers, does not a real mass market make. Not enough to
force companies to put in special data services; people who want
data can pay between $50 to $530 for a modem and get from 2400 bps to
240,000 bps.

Let the market grow until people actually want data before you put
it into the bundle of regulated basic services.

I am saying, don't regulate data, and thus don't force any carrier to
offer a special data rate. When 60 - 70 million homes have active 
use of Data, then you can have congress set some minimum standard.

> fewer people had phones once upon a time, and even fewer had cable tv
> boxes a decade ago.

And note, without any regulations in terms of basic services, Cable
has grown from serving a small town in Penn. to servicing 65 million
homes in N. America. Cable is better suited to offer voice and high
speed multi-megabit services than are phone companies. Clear proof
that market forces can produce the results we need. (Cable passes over
90% of all homes in this country).




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Date: Wed, 17 Nov 93 14:16:15 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: (fwd) Mega-Bond Scandal
Message-ID: <199311172215.OAA06311@mail.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Cypherpunks,

At the October meeting of the Bay Area branch of the Cypherpunks I
described a massive bond scandal involving the fraudulent recycling of
tens of billions of dollars of bonds, possibly more than $100 billion
worth.

Here's an article with some details for the rest of you. I pulled it
off alt.conspiracy, always an entertaining group. (One post even cited
evidence the Mafia sold the bad bonds to Russia and Eastern Europe for
use as collateral on loans from the West. Indeed, it looks like these
bad bonds are mostly sitting in vaults as collateral. If so, some huge
defaults could be coming.)

Some links to crypto and our group:

- fraud exists with paper-based systems, too (some have criticized
digital money--reasonably so, I think--on the grounds that it had
better be _very_ secure and very solidly debugged before release)

- digital signatures on bonds could head off future repeats of this
sort of situation

I've edited the poster's introductory speculations.


Newsgroups: alt.conspiracy
Subject: Mega-Bond Scandal
From: financial.opportunities@canrem.com (Financial Opportunities)
Distribution: world
Message-ID: <60.28194.4607.0N18B1FE@canrem.com>
Date: Mon, 15 Nov 93 11:06:00 -0400
Organization: CRS Online  (Toronto, Ontario)


___________________________________________

    By Jennifer Gould
    SPECIAL TO THE STAR

   At least $150 billion in "cancelled" bonds and
stock certificates have been lost or stolen in
a massive fraud, which involves five major
American banks and could threaten the stability
of some Eastern European and ex-Soviet republics,
investigators say.
   It's the biggest international banking fraud in
history, masterminded by Italy's Mafia and carried
out with the co-operation of a worldwide Russian
mafia network headquartered in Vienna, said one
private investigator.
  To put the scam in perspective, the total equals
almost one-third of Canada's gross domestic product
for 1992 - and it's more than three times larger
than Canada's deficit.
   Private investigators hired by the Russian
government have been in Toronto for the past six
weeks hunting for stolen Russian bonds, which are
linked to the international fraud, sources say.
  And a German member of parliament was recently in
the United States to launch another investigation
that includes some European aspects of the fraud,
an intelligence source said.
  The bonds are showing up around the globe - from
a drug bust in the United States to an alleged deal
in the former Yugoslavia and, police suspect, in the
hands of a 26-year-old Montrealer.
   European police are trying to track some of the
missing bonds through Interpol, as is the Federal
Bureau of Investigation....
   Most of the North American securities in the scam
are corporate bonds that were supposed to have been
cancelled in the mid-1970s and early 1980s, according
to American court papers filed by the U.S. Securities
and Exchange Commission [SEC].
   The commission fined Citibank $750,000 last year
for mishandling the bonds.
   Bonds are IOUs issued by companies and governments
to raise money. When a bond changes hands in the United
States, the old certificate is supposed to be clearly
cancelled before being destroyed by the bond's transfer
agent.
   International criminals pulled off the scam because
some banks held on to old certificates, piling them up
in storage rooms, instead of destroying them while the
banks were switching from paper to computers, said Lani
Lee, an SEC investigator.
   Some of the bonds had holes punched into them, but
when they surfaced later the punch marks - often in the
shape of the bank's initials or name - were taken merely
as endorsement signs by other banks, Lee said, adding
that other bonds weren't marked at all.
   By the mid-1980s, five American banks had contracted
paper recycling companies to destroy the supposedly
useless bonds.
   But those companies - or a single corrupt
company, as at least one investigator believes
- never did this. And defying standard practice,
the banks didn't send their own officials to
witness the bonds' destruction.
_________________________________________

  Victims may not realize

  that they have been scammed

  until after the year 2000

___________________________________________

    An SEC investigation revealed that MSM Corp.,
a paper recycling company, was hired by Citibank
to destroy at least $111 billion [U.S.] in
securities, stacked up in about 3,500 boxes.
    It now appears that MSM was a Mafia-linked
operation with nothing more than a trailer parked
on the Jersey Citg waterfront, according to an
SEC document that quotes Citibank's own
investigators.
   The SEC fined Citibank, the largest
commercial bank in the U.S., in December, 1992,
after it did not notify regulators "on a timely
basis" once the cancelled bonds started
resurfacing and for not taking proper steps
initially to ensure the securities'
destruction, according to court papers filed by
the commission.
   The U.S. treasury department had censured
Citibank in June, 1992, saying it had failed to
safeguard the cancelled securities and failed "to
make required reports of potential thefts or
losses of securities to authorities."
    The department's Office of the Comptroller of
the Currency issued a 19-page report, criticizing
Citibank for not inspecting MSM, not witnessing
the bonds'destruction and not adequately cancelling
the securities.
    The bank also permitted "an undetermined, yet
significant" number of securities to survive the
cancellation process without any marks at all, the
report said.
    A senior official at another bank confirmed
that his bank and three others lost billions of
dollars worth of bonds the same way. It appears that
all five banks used companies controlled by MSM, says
one investigator.
    By the time the bonds started resurfacing, MSM
was shut down and its owner, Anthony "Buddy" Iazetti,
was dead. He apparently suffered a fatal heart
attack in 1989, the FBI says.
     It's believed the bonds were smuggled into
Canada, shipped from the Port of Montreal to
Palermo, Sicily, and then passed to unwitting -
or crooked - European bankers.
    Some banks in Eastern Europe and the former
Soviet Union were founded on loans that used the
dirty bonds as collateral, said one private
investigator.
    Police say improperly cancelled North American
bonds have so far surfaced in 16 countries - Britain,
France, Italy, Germany, Austria, Switzerland,
Liechtenstein, Spain, Luxembourg, The Netherlands,
Canada, the United States, Belgium, Hungary,
Poland and the former Yugoslavia.
  Financial institutions that have dished out loans
to banks that have used the bonds as collateral may
not realize they've been scammed for years, since
many of the bonds don't come due until the next
century.
   By then, many of the fraud artists may be
either difficult-to-trace pensioners or dead,
of natural causes or otherwise, investigators
say.
   The puzzling part is how long the scandal
took to unfold.
   Cancelled certificates, where Citibank was
the transfer agent, began showing up in March,
1987. Although the bonds continued to surface,
it took 4 1/2 years - until Oct. 28, 1991 -
before the bank reported all of the securities
sent to MSM. And this occurred only after a
request by U.S. authorities, said Joe Goldstein,
associate director of the SEC's enforcement
division.
    Citibank paid the fine in December, 1992,
without "admitting or denying the allegations or
findings," according to a bank news release at
the time.
    An internal Citibank investigation concluded
that no bank official did anything wrong, said
Amy Dates, a Citibank spokesperson.
    "We decided to pay to basically put this behind
us",Dates told the Star.
    At least one U.S. government investigator has
said this is exactly what Washington wants - because
to go further into the investigation could have
"drastic" consequences for the banking and political
systems of some countries, particularly fledgling
democracies.
    But Alan Block, a professor of the administration
of justice at Pennsylvania State University and noted
expert on the Mafia's ties to the garbage and recycling
industries, is calling for a full-fledged inquiry.
   "I get the feeling that the government doesn't want
to embarrass the banks," Block said. "It might have
serious geopolitical repercussions, and the banks may
have to bear the responsibility down the line."
    Juval Aviv, a New York private investigator working
on the fraud for a client he doesn't wish to name, said:
"This has the potential to shake the economy of the
Eastern bloc. The ramifications are tremendous. If
Congress and the public finds out, this could become
a major scandal.
"The American government is aware, but this is
being kept a big secret because they're afraid
to shake (Russian President Boris) Yeltsin's
banking apparatus and to scare investors in
other countries," he added.
    Citibank maintains that the bonds were
cancelled, even if they weren't destroyed,
and it was thus the responsibility of other
financial institutions to verify that the bonds
were still valid, Dates said.
    To this day, the face value of the missing
bonds and stocks - from Citibank and other
banks - has not been reported to the Securities
Exchange Commission's data base for lost and
stolen securities.
    According to the data base, only $20.1
billion in securities were reported lost and
stolen in 1991. That's the most recent, readily
available statistic, said Ester Saverson, special
counsel to the SEC.
    Dates of Citibank said: "We didn't report the
(face value of the) bonds because they were
cancelled and had no financial value."
    But Goldstein of the SEC said: "The value is
listed as zero, but our problem is that you can
have a certificate in circulation with no ouward
indication that it has been cancelled."
    Publicly, only two banks have been named in
the scandal: Citibank, which has stated that $111
billion worth of corporate securities it sent to be
destroyed are now missing, and the Chase Manhattan
Bank which has not been fined or publicly
reprimanded by any regulatory agency.
    Chase Manhattan has so far confiscated $7.5
million worth of bonds, part of a $100 million
batch that it sent to an outside company for
destruction, a bank spokesperson said.
    The bank's name surfaced in connection with
the only American court case in which someone was
convicted for trying to peddle the dirty bonds.
    Roman Abegg, a 57-year-old Swiss lawyer, was
caught tgng to peddle $763,200 worth of stolen bonds
to the Miners National Bank in Pottsville, Pa., to
use as collateral for a $465,000 loan in January,
1992, according to court documents obtained by The
Star....
    Citibank [known earlier as First National City
Bank], acted as transfer agent for most of the bonds
that wound up in Abeggs hands. Citibank, which
arranges for transfer of ownership, obtained them in
the 1970s and early 1980s.
    However, Chase Manhattan was the transfer agent
for some bonds Abegg possessed, said a spokesperson
for that bank.
   The bonds were held by both Citibank and Chase
Manattan until the mid-1980s, when they were sent out
for destruction and began their illegal trek across
the ocean and back.

                    - o O o -

Well, there you are, happy people. Don't think you're
going to see to much of *this* in the U.S. papers -
unless, that is, someone were to tip off the SPOTLIGHT!

                      Cheers!

                      John W.

--
..........................................................................
Timothy C. May         | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,  
tcmay@netcom.com       | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
408-688-5409           | knowledge, reputations, information markets, 
W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA  | black markets, collapse of governments.
Higher Power: 2^756839 | Public Key: PGP and MailSafe available.
Note: I put time and money into writing this posting. I hope you enjoy it.


-- 
..........................................................................
Timothy C. May         | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,  
tcmay@netcom.com       | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
408-688-5409           | knowledge, reputations, information markets, 
W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA  | black markets, collapse of governments.
Higher Power: 2^756839 | Public Key: PGP and MailSafe available.
Note: I put time and money into writing this posting. I hope you enjoy it.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: xentrac@argo.unm.edu (Kragen J Sittler)
Date: Wed, 17 Nov 93 14:11:16 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: No Subject
Message-ID: <9311172209.AA44087@argo.unm.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


A few months ago, someone posted an article on cypherpunks@toad.com, a satire
on the government's efforts to ban strong crypto.  I had saved it, but
unfortunately, I no longer know where it is.  I would appreciate it if someone
who has it could mail it to me, tell me where to ftp it, or post it (newbies
and non-cypherpunks might be interested.).  Thanks.

Kragen





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: an31122@anon.penet.fi
Date: Wed, 17 Nov 93 07:41:10 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Identities vs. Accounts
Message-ID: <9311171536.AA04661@anon.penet.fi>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Fellow cpunks,
	The schemes proposed by Detweiler et al. can only verify that
a real person OWNS an account, not who's USING it.  We can only track
a message as far as the computer or account from which it was sent.
There is simply no way to verify that the person who sent the message
is actually the owner of the account.  I've seen otherwise intelligent
and responsible people tape their passwords right onto the front of
their terminals.  We can concievably prevent the creation of
fraudulent accounts, but not the improper usage of valid ones!
	"WiReD" article aside, it's possible that Tim May, Eric
Hughes, and Nick Szabo are real people who have never HEARD of the
cypherpunks, and don't know that their accounts are being used to post
here.  Detweiler might be plotting to kill the wrong person entirely.
The Tentacles laugh heartily at that when it made the news.  It could
be Henry Kissenger and the Queen of England who are behind the whole
thing (as Mr. Larouche has suggested).  Why assume that ANYONE is
telling the truth?  Perhaps Detweiler itself is a creation of the
CONSPIRACY intended to throw us off the trail.
	Back to the real world: Personally, I let my wife send mail
from my account.  She simply dosen't use the computer enough to
warrant creating a new account.  As far as I know, she sends only to
her friends and parents.  She may, however, be posting in my name to
alt.sex.bestiality.  I've no way to know, and there is no possible way
for the people of that group to know because my account is valid and I
use it.  If they try to backtrack and arrest me because messages
apparently from me have advoated killing anyone who posts to the list,
I can convincingly deny any knowledge of it.
	More generally, what if I keep my computer on my desk at home
and somebody breaks in and steals it?  If, by chance, the person who
ends up with it knows anything about PGP, then my key is compromised.
If I'm on vacation when it happens then it may go undetected for
weeks.  Let's say that I send all of my mail from my Apple Newton, but
one day on the subway someone hits me on the head and takes it.  They
can then use the thing to send mail for probably two days before I can
get all of my accounts cancelled.  What if I don't use the thing much
and don't even realize that it's been stolen for two weeks?

THE POINT:
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
To find out more about the anon service, send mail to help@anon.penet.fi.
Due to the double-blind, any mail replies to this message will be anonymized,
and an anonymous id will be allocated automatically. You have been warned.
Please report any problems, inappropriate use etc. to admin@anon.penet.fi.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Black Unicorn <unicorn@access.digex.net>
Date: Wed, 17 Nov 93 13:01:15 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: privacy
Message-ID: <199311172059.AA22466@access.digex.net>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



From: Stanton McCandlish <mech@eff.org> :
 
I gracefully concede about 90% of the points made against mine in 
this thread;
 
->
No, don't do that:
Your points made me think real hard about some issues I hadn't
yet considered fully.
<-
 
As the 10% remaining have nothing to do with crypto, I'm replying 
to them in personal mail.
 
->
It might be that this thread belongs in mail in general.  
Cypherpunks is a technical group after all no...?
<-
 
--
Stanton  McCandlish  mech@eff.org  1:109/1103   EFF  Online  
Activist & SysOp
 
[...]
 
-uni- (Dark)
 




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Arthur Chandler <arthurc@crl.com>
Date: Wed, 17 Nov 93 16:24:29 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Encryption: A Testimonial
In-Reply-To: <Mgueoiy00awJMEBnVh@andrew.cmu.edu>
Message-ID: <Pine.3.87.9311171553.A1230-0100000@crl.crl.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



  For a while, I thought that encryption was just for folks who had 
something REALLY important in their files -- formulas for the Neutron 
bomb, sales reports to crack dealers, illicit love letters, etc. :<) -- 
so I never bothered. Then, before I left on a sabbatical from my 
university, I reviewed the personal files in my computer there.
  "Hmmm.... only class syllabi, notes, committee reports. Nothing here 
to... Wait a minute!"
  It then occurred to me that some sections of those reports hold very 
sensitive information dealing with retention, tenure, and promotion of 
colleagues. There were also letters of recommendation for students in there.
  "Well, no one's going to look in here. Most of my colleagues are still 
using manual typewriters anyway. But, just in case, I'll just lock these 
files up with Norton Encrypt." -- Not exactly a heavyweight program, but 
adequate to my purposes.
  Then, a couple of months later, I get a call from the Dean. The 
University has  decided to give my computer an Ethernet connection; and 
one of the  techies has asked her (the Dean) for the password to my files 
so he can install the appropriate software.
  Wants the password to my personal files?
  So I went out to the university and confronted the man. Why did he feel 
he needed the password to my personal files in order to install ethernet 
protocol software? 
  I got a song and dance about how some of the software "wasn't working 
right" and so he thought that I might have something in there that 
conflicted with the ethernet software. 
  "But why didn't you just have the Dean contact me to come out and look 
in those files? And don't you think that you should ask before going 
into someone's computer, even to install ethernet software?"
  His answer was this: "These machines belong to the State of California. 
You don't own them. The State does. And any employee of the state -- like 
myself -- can go in any time and do whatever we feel is necessary to 
maintain the machines."
  What a case of chutzpah used to cover up moxie! 
  Needless to say, I objected strongly to this line of "reasoning" and 
suggested -- politely, of course -- that neither he nor anyone else was 
to get into the computer in my office without my express sayso. He walked 
out the door affirming his right to poke around in my computer in the 
name of the state.
  So my files stay encrypted. And if anyone on this list works for an 
organization that holds similar views on the nature of personal files 
within an organization-owned machine, I strongly recommend locking all 
sensitive files -- or putting a password on the whole machine.
   I realize that such tales may have been told in *Cypherpunks* before. 
But there's mine, just for the record.





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Ammar H. Dashti <dashti@acad.stedwards.edu>
Date: Wed, 17 Nov 93 14:06:16 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Clipper Chip questionair
Message-ID: <9311172205.AA11339@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



I am a student at St. Edwards University and currently working on a senior 
paper on the Clipper Chip.  I have this questionair to ask who ever is 
interested in this subject to answer some questions.  this is some kind of 
survey.  
	If anyone is interested please answer the following questions and 
	e-mial your answer to me before this Monday (11/22). I really 
	appriciate your help (thank you)


	1. What is your position on the Clintons adminstrations proposal
	    about the Clipper Chip (pro or against)? and Why?



	2. If you oppese it. the  proposal is a voulantary one why do
	      you oppose it? and if it's going to cut down on crime 
	      (as the government claims) why do you oppose it?

	

	3. If you agree with it.  what do you have to say about it being
	     a bottleneck for fast systems? and what about the potential
	     abuse by the Feds.?



	     once again I appriciate the help. 
	     PLEASE SEND YOUR ANSWERS TO THE ADDRESS BELOW 

--


					   Ammar H. Dashti
					   (512)-444-0664
					   dashti@acad.stedwards.edu

				ooooooooo
			      ooooooooooooo	
			      oo[ -- --	]oo
				\  * *  /
				 \ ___ /
				   \ /
				    !





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Stanton McCandlish <mech@eff.org>
Date: Wed, 17 Nov 93 13:31:15 PST
To: habs@panix.com
Subject: Re: Should we oppose the Data Superhighway/NII?
In-Reply-To: <199311171840.AA15151@panix.com>
Message-ID: <199311172130.QAA14722@eff.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> > I'd say that the 30%+ of US households with computers, and the 10%+ (and
> > VERY rapidly growing) with modems is "a major part" of the market.  Far
> 
> Their are 95 million homes in America.
> Their are 90 million homes with TV
> 65 million homes have Cable.
> Advertisers consider National Broadcast TV to be a major market.
> Even to this day, Cable is not seen in the same light as National
> Broadcast Networks.

This may have something to so with the large number of cable stations that
don't allow advertising, and have not since day one, because people are
willing to pay extra for ad-less tv.  

This also has to do with fact that the most popular shows are on network
broadcast TV, not cable, for a number of reasons.  Advertisers go where
the people are.  Your entire point seems to be that because advertisers
decide that the cable is a lousy market, it does is not "major".  The actual
relationship is quite the opposite.  For many reasons the cable market was
kept from being a "major market" for advertisers, and so advertisers do
not advertise via cable as much as they do via airwaves.  This is all
quite peripheral.

> The fact that 9.5 million homes have modems, or 21+ million homes
> have computers, does not a real mass market make.

? This is a nonsensical statement.  You seem to presume that a
computer-net market must perforce directly compete with a tv-net market,
when there is room for both.  The slothful and apathetic will happily vege
out in front of the new supertube, and fortunately be mostly selected out
of the memepool, while those with a glimmer of imagination and
intelligence are likely to find a use for interactive communications and
information services.  It's certainly the first time I've ever heard
someone say that 21 or even 9 million people is not a mass market.

> Not enough to
> force companies to put in special data services;

Who's talking about doing so?  Companies are *fighting* to put in data
services right now; why should this stop?  The issue is one of access and
expense, not of will it happen or not.

> I am saying, don't regulate data, and thus don't force any carrier to
> offer a special data rate. When 60 - 70 million homes have active 
> use of Data, then you can have congress set some minimum standard.
[...]
> And note, without any regulations in terms of basic services, Cable
> has grown from serving a small town in Penn. to servicing 65 million
> homes in N. America.

What evidence have you that fact that the absence of basic service
regulation was the source of growth in the cable industry, particularly
when other heavily restrictive regulation was affecting it, and preventing
it from being a free market?

> Cable is better suited to offer voice and high
> speed multi-megabit services than are phone companies.

These are not logically comparable categories.  Coax cable, as a conduit,
is certainly better than phone wire.  But why should it be better for
cable companies to offer voice and video services?  I'd think the evidence
points in the other direction.  Cable programming has heretofore been 80
or whatever channels of one-way garbage.  At least telephone communication
is 2 way, relatively private, uncensored, and can be used to reach online
services with many-to-many information exchange.  TCI may say they want to
bring that about via "CableNet" too, but I wouldn't hold my breath if I
were you.

> Clear proof
> that market forces can produce the results we need. (Cable passes over
> 90% of all homes in this country).

No, clear proof that people wanted cable tv. Period.  No more, no less.
Until I see an attempt to bring data (which should not require any new
cabling for a while) to everyone, and see the people from the service
providers being told to beat it and being chased off with brooms by
enraged renters and homeowners, I feel fairly confident that there is a
very worthwhile market for data services, and that at very least it would
be a far more worthwhile experiment that cable ever was.  Seems funny that
you claim that free market theory would yield this 90%, when the cable
"market" is not much of a market at all, but simply a collection of
govt-supported local monopolies.

There are good points, but I still question whether cable (or any other
form of) tv has any business being a "basic service".  Personally I find
tv to be a basic disservice and an utter waste of time (others probably
disagree, but oh well.)  What rationale is there for including it with
POTS as something to be subsidized?  If you firmly believe that govt.
subsidization/regulation will harm a medium, then say so.  But as it
stands I get the feeling that you think it will be good for the provision
of "basic services"; but when challenged you point to the good that
comes from *lack* of regulation.  Which is it?  If the govt. *does* need to
subsidize [useful service X] because it should be a basic service, then
let's see data included.  If subsidization (and the regulation that comes
with it) are lousy and screw up the market, then let's not see *anything*
subsidized (unless we actually want to damage it; might be a good idea for
tv >;)

-- 
Stanton  McCandlish  mech@eff.org  1:109/1103   EFF  Online  Activist & SysOp
O P E N  P L A T F O R M   C R Y P T O P O L I C Y   O N L I N E  R I G H T S
N  E  T  W  O  R  K  I  N  G      V  I  R  T  U  A  L     C  U  L  T  U  R  E
I   N   F  O :  M   E   M   B   E   R   S   H   I   P  @  E  F  F  .  O  R  G



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: hugh (Hugh Daniel)
Date: Wed, 17 Nov 93 17:24:29 PST
To: cypherpunks
Subject: WORK: San Francisco Bay Area contract working with crypto
Message-ID: <9311180123.AA15148@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


  Just passing this on in case any one is interested.

  Technipower (a contract broker)
        2727 Walsh Avenue, Suite #204
        Santa Clara, California 95051
        +1 408 748 0444
        Scott Whittman

        JobOrder #12
        Requirments:
          BSMS in CS with 5+ years experance software development in
        Un*x and MSDOS using C. Excellent verbal and written skills a
        must.  U.S.A. Citizenship Required
        Duites:
          Responsible for the design and developemt of PC and Un*x
        software for interacting with a new cryptographic micro
        controler.
          Applicatoin involves bio-metric user authentication and
        digital signatures using public key cryptography and async.
        communications.
          Leave name, job order #12 and your rate per hour and your
        phone number.
 




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: mgream@acacia.itd.uts.edu.au (Matthew Gream)
Date: Tue, 16 Nov 93 22:46:01 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com (Cypherpunks List)
Subject: Re: BAN Detweiler(WHAT A LOON)
In-Reply-To: <9311170532.AA14620@pmantis.berkeley.edu>
Message-ID: <9311170646.AA04575@acacia.itd.uts.EDU.AU>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Earlier, nobody@pmantis.berkeley.edu wrote:

>  I THINK ITS TIME TO TAKE DETWEILER OFF THE MAILING LIST,
> HE IS CLEARLY ABUSING THE PRIVELGE OF HAVING US AS AN AUDIENCE.
> ANY OTHERS ON THIS SIDE OF THE ISSUE??
>       ANON

If it's reasonably democratic, sure. But L.D. could simply re-appear as
another entity, which means all new additions to the list would have to
be 'investigated'. I don't like this idea.

The best idea to shut L.D. up is to just ignore him and his rants. Don't
reply to them, and don't talk about him. IMHO witch-hunts are low on the
list of credible actions one can take.

Matthew.

ps: I find the arguments interesting, mostly because a lot is gained by
watching how people (entities ?) argue, techniques used and so on, though
this is hardly within the cypherpunk scope of activity.

-- 
Matthew Gream, M.Gream@uts.edu.au
'la lutte continue' - 1968 poster




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Matthew J Ghio <mg5n+@andrew.cmu.edu>
Date: Wed, 17 Nov 93 15:04:29 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: BAN Detweiler(WHAT A LOON)
In-Reply-To: <9311170532.AA14620@pmantis.berkeley.edu>
Message-ID: <Mgueoiy00awJMEBnVh@andrew.cmu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> I THINK ITS TIME TO TAKE DETWEILER OFF THE MAILING LIST,
> HE IS CLEARLY ABUSING THE PRIVELGE OF HAVING US AS AN
> AUDIENCE. ANY OTHERS ON THIS SIDE OF THE ISSUE??
>       ANON

I think it's time we started ignoring Detweiler's shit, stopped
discussing Detweiler, stopped flaming Detweiler, and discussed more
important issues, you know, like cryptography or something. :).




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Date: Wed, 17 Nov 93 20:24:28 PST
To: arthurc@crl.com
Subject: Re: Encryption: A Testimonial
In-Reply-To: <Pine.3.87.9311171553.A1230-0100000@crl.crl.com>
Message-ID: <199311180424.UAA16898@mail.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Arthur Chandler tells an interesting story:
...
>   "Well, no one's going to look in here. Most of my colleagues are still 
> using manual typewriters anyway. But, just in case, I'll just lock these 
> files up with Norton Encrypt." -- Not exactly a heavyweight program, but 
> adequate to my purposes.
>   Then, a couple of months later, I get a call from the Dean. The 
...

Also an argument for using stegonography, to obscure the fact that one
has encrypted files. Companies or universities may have simplistic
policies banning encrypion as a matter of policy, for various and
sundry reasons, and may snoop through networked machines looking for
encrypted files (high entropy, characteristic file types, etc.).

Packing those sensitive resumes and job applications in an innocent
photo of the dean may be a good idea.

--Tim May

-- 
..........................................................................
Timothy C. May         | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,  
tcmay@netcom.com       | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
408-688-5409           | knowledge, reputations, information markets, 
W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA  | black markets, collapse of governments.
Higher Power: 2^756839 | Public Key: PGP and MailSafe available.
Note: I put time and money into writing this posting. I hope you enjoy it.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: clueless@mindvox.phantom.com (Peter Vanderkloot)
Date: Wed, 17 Nov 93 17:31:18 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Help unsubscribe me!
Message-ID: <FHs7cc2w165w@mindvox.phantom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Could some kind-hearted cypherpunk out there PLEASE help me get my
name off of this list??!? I've tried every combination to cypherpunks-
request of which my fevered noise overloaded cerebrum could think--
but to no avail...
   If there's a moderator here perhaps he/she/it could unsubscribe me,
otherwise if someone would e-mail the secret spell to me directly I'd
appreciate it (as I've had to resort to deleting all that comes from
this list without reading it...)...
   Thanks in advance,
       Your Flame-weary Fool,
          clueless@phantom.com




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Perry E. Metzger" <pmetzger@lehman.com>
Date: Wed, 17 Nov 93 17:51:18 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: privacy and rights (short reply)
In-Reply-To: <9311180046.AA21866@anon.penet.fi>
Message-ID: <9311180148.AA23400@snark.lehman.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Jack Daniels says:
> 
> >>
> >> Numbered bank accounts and even lines of credit
> >> exist and will continue to prosper.
> >
> >One can hope so, but when the Swiss numbered bank account, the
> >canonical example, vanishes, I begin to have doubts.
> >
> >[Let's hope it doesn't get this far.  Besides, there's always
> >Liechtenstein  :)]
> >
> 
> I hate to be the bringer of bad news, but to the best of my knowledge
> Switzerland no longer allows numbered bank accounts.  Also, from
> my studies of international banking, bank secrecy and tax havens,
> I have never seen any reference to numbered bank accounts in 
> any country other than Switzerland, including Liechtenstein (although
> Liechtenstein does have better secrecy safeguards than Switzerland.

"Jack Daniels" has never looked hard enough -- many countries (Austria
comes to mind) allow completely anonymous accounts, with various
degrees of restriction on them.

Perry




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "L. Detweiler" <ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Date: Wed, 17 Nov 93 20:31:58 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: The `Reputation' of Cypherpunks
Message-ID: <9311180431.AA26799@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I've been thinking about this concept of `reputation'. It seems that
the Cypherpunks seem to treat it differently than many other people.

Many cypherpunks have the argument, `I assign no reputation to messages
whose owner I have never met, or have no trust for.' But it is
impossible not to be influenced by any message. When you read a
message, it is influencing you. The only message that has `no
reputation' is no message at all.

Also, this preoccupation seems to violate one of the Cypherpunk dogmas,
`there is only a message'. Isn't that kind of a bizarre statement? What
if Ted Bundy, Hitler, and a Psychopunk posted 99 messages to the
Cypherpunks list, and Jesus Christ posted one. Furthermore, suppose no
one knew who posted what, in a pseudospoofing scenario. Who would want
to subscribe to this? Apparently, it would be Utopia for some Cypherpunks.

Another thing about Cypherpunks is that they think that reputation is
something you can `cash in' when you need to. For example, in that
rather amazing message by Mr. Szabo recently, he seemed to be
completely cashing in all his reputation chips just for a cheap thrill.
Doesn't that damage everything he has *ever* said, if he suddenly says,
`I admit it! I'm a tentacle! I lied in RISKS!'. I don't understand this
idea of building up trust just to betray someone. Maybe some
cypherpunks can explain this in detail to me.

I remember flaming D.Denning rather searingly over the issue of truth
(over her involvement with Clipper) a long time ago, and maybe someone
else along my long visit to this little dark corner of cyberspace. Mr.
T.C.May was upset by my messages. He said that it was generally not a
good idea to `demonize' one's opponents, because it `rarely served a
useful purpose.' I have been thinking about these words a lot lately. I
wonder -- is it okay to `demonize' someone with Tentacles? Maybe that
is the preferred method. I guess that would explain a lot!

One final question I have. If I get an anonymous phone call to my
answering machine, how does that relate to reputation? should I give
this phone call ``Lance, stop posting to cypherpunks'' (as I did today
at about 730 or so) any merit? Should I give it more or less than
anonymous mail? threats from tentacles in my mailbox? to my postmaster?
I'm quite confused. Also, suppose this person had reached me
personally, e.g. I picked up the phone. Should I have given that
conversation more merit, because some two-way dialog took place? What
if the caller still remained anonymous? What if he called me `Linda' instead?

The call reminded me of an interesting comment by J. Dinkelacker --
`he's a borg'. I was watching Robocop at the time I got the call, and
it was kind of funny in that context.

If Medusa would like to explain to me precisely why she prefers that I
not post to Cypherpunks, and how this does not detract from the forum
but enhances it, can someone have her call or email me? All I have been
getting are tentacle-grams for many weeks now. It's quite frustrating.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "L. Detweiler" <ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Date: Wed, 17 Nov 93 21:11:22 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: the Lies of Cypherpunks
Message-ID: <9311180509.AA27407@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Could an eminent psychopunk explain to the several dozen sane people
left on the list:

Suppose that a real person signed someone else's imaginary identity for
a key in a key server, or for their own. Can someone explain to me why
this is not dishonest?

I guess the argument will be, the signor is only guaranteeing that some
key is associated with some email address. But that seems to me to
abuse the whole idea of trust in people. Has anyone asked PRZ what he
thinks of the practice of real people signing imaginary identities? or
key servers corrupted with phantom identities?




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Karl Lui Barrus <klbarrus@owlnet.rice.edu>
Date: Wed, 17 Nov 93 20:56:58 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: real-life pseudospoofing examples
Message-ID: <9311180456.AA29922@flammulated.owlnet.rice.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

I thought I'd try to unearth some real-world "pseudospoofing" just so
Mr. Detweiler and other interested in this could have other tangible
examples.

While I can't do justice (i.e. research further) to these items right
now, I've found two examples in the little digging I've done.

First, Mary Ann Evans published "Silas Marner" under the pseudonym of
"George Eliot."  She purposely chose a male name in order to
masquerade as a male since women couldn't be novelists at the time.
It is unknown how long she pulled this off, but nevertheless is an
example of someone who created a false identity in order to
deliberately fool others.

I don't know what the reasons were for Eric Blair (George Orwell),
Samuel Clements (Mark Twain), or Charles Dogdson (Lewis Carroll) to
publish under pseudonyms.

The second (possible) example of pseudospoofing was relayed to me by
my parents.  They live in Prince William Country, Virginia, where
apparently Walt Disney Company has announced plans to build another
amusement park.  A representative of Walt Disney Co. bought the land
over a period of several years, consistently misleading real-estate
agents as to his intention and who he worked for.  He claimed to be
based in Phoenix, Arizona, and often would head towards a different
terminal in Dulles airport in order to make business associates
beleive this.  Maybe he even flew there every once in a while, I'm not
sure (parents are mailing various articles to me).

Obviously, he did this in order to keep Disney from being screwed on
land prices.  He pseudospoofed to do it.  He created a false identity,
lied to others about it.

So I look forward to mention of the Walt Disney Company as a
many-tentacled, satanic practicing pseudospoofing, subversive criminal
organization.  Maybe even in the next issue of RISKS :-)

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
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From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: nobody@entropy.linet.org
Date: Thu, 18 Nov 93 00:01:22 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Quotable Quotes
Message-ID: <m0p014X-0003AsC@entropy.linet.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>who was the cypherpunk who said, ``Cypherpunks, It's such a feeling of
>raw power over lesser intelligences''? I can't remember.

I have seen only one person on this list use TeX style quotes, such as

``Cypherpunks ... ''

instead of 

"Cypherpunks ..."

and that person is ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu. 

Writing style may not be conclusive proof, but it adds to the
preponderence of circumstantial evidence.






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Peter shipley <shipley@merde.dis.org>
Date: Wed, 17 Nov 93 23:46:21 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: hohocon
Message-ID: <9311180744.AA07753@merde.dis.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I am wondering if anyone I plan to bring a  (cheap) laptop to I can
collect and trade (& sign) PGP keys

PS: I to not read all my cypherpunks email so if you reply keep "hohocon"
in the subject so I know to read it :-)




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: szabo@netcom.com (Nick Szabo)
Date: Wed, 17 Nov 93 23:51:21 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: /dev/null for e-mail; remailer diffusion structures
Message-ID: <199311180751.XAA20320@mail.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Like zero in arithmetic, the "device" /dev/null serves a useful purpose 
as a kind of "syntatic glue" for Unix shell programs.  I wonder if
such a "bit bucket" for mail might also be useful for anonymous remailers.
A couple examples:

* To provide multiple endpoints for a mail message, so that
the remailer list becomes a tree (or at least one branch
with a bunch of leaves).  This might be done with syntax
like

Request-Remailing-To: remail@tamsun.tamu.edu
<remail@tamsun decrypts to reveal>
Request-Remailing-To: next@destination.com
Cc-Bit-Bucket: hfinney@shell.portal.com
Cc-Bit-Bucket: remailer@utter.dis.org

where "Cc-Bit-Bucket" causes the tamsun remailer to randomly
generate a message of identical size, paste a "Bit-Bucket:"
header, encrypt it with the hfinney remailer's public key,
and send it to hfinney.  When the hfinney remailer decrypts the
message and sees the "Bit-Bucket:" header it deletes the
message.  remail@tamsun repeats this process with 
remailer@utter.dis.org, and sends the real mail message
on to next@destination.com.   To the traffic
analyzer, bit bucket messages are indistinguishable from
real ones (as long as the sender properly encrypted
the next message layer with next@destination.com's public
key).

Remailer bit bucket branching might be useful for adding confusion
when it's impractical to delay the mail to mix it with other
traffic (either because it's time sensitive or due to
lack of other traffic).

Bit bucket accounts could be useful if the destination receives a 
regular, identifying pattern of traffic (eg a unique number or size of 
encrypted messages).  To foil traffic analysis, set up a bunch of
pseudonymous accounts at various sites that serve no other purpose 
than sending and receving bit bucket messages.  It then looks like 
many sites are receiving that pattern of traffic.

* To provide endpoints for confusion & diffusion loops.
For example:

Request-Remailing-To: remail@tamsun.tamu.edu
<remail@tamsun.tamu.edu decrypts to reveal>
Cc-Loop: 7 iterations: hfinney@shell.portal.com, remail@tamaix.tamu.edu
Request-Remailing-To: next@destination.com

Does the same as above, except the randomized carbon copy is
put in a loop between remail and hfinney (in real life we'll want 
more than two remailers in the loop).  After 7 iterations
remail dumps the message, terminating the loop.  Instead of
"Bit Bucket:" the remailers might paste a loop counter, where
0 causes the message to be terminated.

Remailers might set limits on the number of
loops and destination sites, charge postage, or both,
to make sure these techniques don't soak up the available
bandwidth.  With sufficient bandwidth and software tools
we might get fancy and be able to choose routing
patterns from trees, acyclic and cyclic graphs, 
randomized branching, fractal branching, etc.  
if we find any such patterns better at thwarting traffic 
analysis.

Nick Szabo				szabo@netcom.com




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: szabo@netcom.com (Nick Szabo)
Date: Thu, 18 Nov 93 00:02:00 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re:  Online Shopping and Banking? (fwd)
Message-ID: <199311180802.AAA21348@mail.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Forwarded message:
Date: Wed, 17 Nov 93 23:39:07 PST
From: ptrubey@shl.com (Phil Trubey)
Message-Id: <9311180739.AA18523@technet1.shl.com>
Subject: Re:  Online Shopping and Banking?

> From: bobk@cyberspace.com (Bob)
> To: com-priv@psi.com
> Subject: Online Shopping and Banking?
> 
>   The options to shop and do banking transactions electronically have
>   proven to be a highly desirable services on other commercial networks.
>   The Wall Street Journal recently had an article that said PCFlowers
>   on Prodigy has become one of the top five FTD sellers of flowers.
>   Microsoft announced today that it is getting into the home electronic
>   banking business with US West and US Bankcorp.  I'm sure that the
>   Internet will soon have such services.  
> 
>   How far is the Internet from being able to provide reliable avenues
>   for online financial transactions?  What would it take for reliable 
>   email-ordering on the Net?  How about banking and stock transactions?  
>   Is the primary roadblock the security issue of sending sensitive
>   financial information (such as credit card numbers) over the Net?
> 
>   In addition to the mechanics of how to implement such services, I'd
>   like to hear some thoughts and predictions on the evolution of this
>   important and probably inevitable development and its effect on the
>   character and nature of the Internet as we now know it.
>   ==
> 
>   Bob (bobk@cyberspace.com)                       Seattle, Washington
> 
 
FYI: there is a mailing list in place where developers/designers
are developing an Internet Mercantile Protocol.  This protocol
will enable buy/sell transactions to be conducted over an 
unsecure network, such as most of the Internet.  

You can subscribe to the list by sending a request to 
imp-interest-request@thumper.bellcore.com - archives are accessable
via FTP on thumper.bellcore.com in /pub/devetzis/imp.  Minutes
of the last BOF meeting are archived there as well as slides
for one proposed IMP implementation.  While there has not been
a ton of activity on this list recently, there are at least
two groups hard at work putting finishing touches on some
new proposals for the list to consider.

Phil Trubey                   | Internet: ptrubey@shl.com
Systemhouse Inc.              | Voice:    310-809-5491
                              | Fax:      310-860-9668




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: an41418@anon.penet.fi (wonderer)
Date: Wed, 17 Nov 93 16:31:17 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Key Servers
Message-ID: <9311180029.AA19056@anon.penet.fi>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

L.D. writes:
> Wonderer is a D.Denning admirer. Was it Wonderer who Wondered about
> what would happen if someone found a way to thwart PGP and read
> everyone's mail on the sly? Reminds me of Medusa never telling anyone of her S
> nakes.

I have been proud to be able to keep out of the fight with
L.D., but this is a personal accusation. I'll just deny that
I am a Dorothy Denning admirer and leave it at that. I also
never wondered, on the list, if someone found a way to thwart
PGP and read everyone's mail on the sly, but what of it,
that is something to consider if we want to rely on it for
privacy.

Wonderer

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-------------------------------------------------------------------------
To find out more about the anon service, send mail to help@anon.penet.fi.
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From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Matthew J Ghio <mg5n+@andrew.cmu.edu>
Date: Wed, 17 Nov 93 21:44:29 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Encryption: A Testimonial
In-Reply-To: <199311180424.UAA16898@mail.netcom.com>
Message-ID: <wgukgVm00awJ8HTkgw@andrew.cmu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May) wrote:

> Also an argument for using stegonography, to obscure the fact that one
> has encrypted files. Companies or universities may have simplistic
> policies banning encrypion as a matter of policy, for various and
> sundry reasons, and may snoop through networked machines looking
> for encrypted files (high entropy, characteristic file types, etc.).
>
> Packing those sensitive resumes and job applications in an innocent
> photo of the dean may be a good idea.

Actually, you could fool a lot of people by creating a hidden disk
partition.  Nobody would know there was anything hidden unless they did
a detailed sector-scan of the disk.  Is there any good software for
doing this with modern operating systems?
It used to be real easy to do stuff like that in the old days when OS
were simple and hackable.  Once someone showed me a trick on an old,
old, Apple DOS; you could change one byte in RAM, and viola, a totally
new directory appeared on the disk!  Pretty cute trick.  Too bad things
ain't that simple anymore. :)




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: an15489@anon.penet.fi (Jack Daniels)
Date: Wed, 17 Nov 93 16:46:55 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: privacy and rights (short reply)
Message-ID: <9311180046.AA21866@anon.penet.fi>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



>>
>> Numbered bank accounts and even lines of credit
>> exist and will continue to prosper.
>
>One can hope so, but when the Swiss numbered bank account, the
>canonical example, vanishes, I begin to have doubts.
>
>[Let's hope it doesn't get this far.  Besides, there's always
>Liechtenstein  :)]
>

I hate to be the bringer of bad news, but to the best of my knowledge
Switzerland no longer allows numbered bank accounts.  Also, from
my studies of international banking, bank secrecy and tax havens,
I have never seen any reference to numbered bank accounts in 
any country other than Switzerland, including Liechtenstein (although
Liechtenstein does have better secrecy safeguards than Switzerland.
Today, Cayman Islands has more international money in its bank than
any other country in the world due to their bank secrecy and favorable
tax status (ref: Forbes Magazine).

Jack

-------------------------------------------------------------------------
To find out more about the anon service, send mail to help@anon.penet.fi.
Due to the double-blind, any mail replies to this message will be anonymized,
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From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: wisej <wisej@acf4.NYU.EDU>
Date: Wed, 17 Nov 93 22:31:20 PST
To: Matthew J Ghio <mg5n+@andrew.cmu.edu>
Subject: Re: Encryption: A Testimonial
In-Reply-To: <wgukgVm00awJ8HTkgw@andrew.cmu.edu>
Message-ID: <Pine.3.87.9311180145.A18818-0100000@acf4.NYU.EDU>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


On Thu, 18 Nov 1993, Matthew J Ghio wrote:

> tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May) wrote:
> 
> > Also an argument for using stegonography, to obscure the fact that one
> > has encrypted files. Companies or universities may have simplistic
> > policies banning encrypion as a matter of policy, for various and
> > sundry reasons, and may snoop through networked machines looking
> > for encrypted files (high entropy, characteristic file types, etc.).
> >
> > Packing those sensitive resumes and job applications in an innocent
> > photo of the dean may be a good idea.
> 
> Actually, you could fool a lot of people by creating a hidden disk
> partition.  Nobody would know there was anything hidden unless they did
> a detailed sector-scan of the disk.  Is there any good software for
> doing this with modern operating systems?
> It used to be real easy to do stuff like that in the old days when OS
> were simple and hackable.  Once someone showed me a trick on an old,
> old, Apple DOS; you could change one byte in RAM, and viola, a totally
> new directory appeared on the disk!  Pretty cute trick.  Too bad things
> ain't that simple anymore. :)
> 
Ah, but they are, on mac anyways...pop open ResEdit (available from 
ftp.apple.com or in most book stores or development packages), choose 
'get file/folder info' from the file menu, and pick any directory in a 
standard dir/file browser which comes up.  When the info box comes up, 
just click in the 'invisible' box.  When u exit ResEdit, it will ask u if 
u want to save changes.  Click 'yes', and...voila...an invisible 
subdirectory.  Many programs make this interface even easier, too.

				Jim Wise
				wisej@acf4.edu
				jaw7254@acfcluster.nyu.edu





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: nobody@rosebud.ee.uh.edu
Date: Thu, 18 Nov 93 00:14:28 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: y
Message-ID: <9311180813.AA02436@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>> I don't understand this idea of building up trust just to betray
>> someone. Maybe some cypherpunks can explain this in detail to me.

    `` too much but never enough; tear it up and watch it fall. ''






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "L. Detweiler" <ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Date: Thu, 18 Nov 93 01:21:22 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Characterizing Cypherpunk Culture
Message-ID: <9311180921.AA01373@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


- E.Hughes: public vs. private
- Cypherpunk culture research materials
- CryptoAnarchist Manifesto and Cypherpunk Charter
- True Name detection
- an introspective note

E.Hughes, Mysterious Cypherpunk Leader
---

In my extensive research into Cypherpunk pseudospoofing culture, I've
come up with a lot of apparent contradictions in what is known about
the mysterious figure, E.Hughes in particular. It would be an
understatement to say that he values his privacy! Anyway, his mail to
me under his True Name is always very terse, and I'm not allowed to
publicly quote any of his tentacles without violating the
Pseudospoofing Religion (I wouldn't want to offend anyone or break any
taboos). So, in my interest in profiling the culture and its leaders,
I'm hoping that some CA cypherpunks interested in promoting their
ideology and their leader can help fill in the blanks.

One thing I have stumbled on is the cryptic references to tax evasion
and black marketeering. It appears that he may be alluding to these in
his public speeches. This based on mail by A.Chandler (another person
who is hard to track down). Can anyone elaborate on these? This would
certainly not be an invasion of his privacy. No transcripts are
available, unfortunately. Also, it never seems that these speeches are
announced ahead of time. Does anyone issue these announcements
officially? For example, E.Hughes popped up at the Austin EFF meeting
awhile ago and there didn't seem to be any advance warning to the list
at large so that people might attend. I'm sure he wants to maximize his
exposure and the Cypherpunk `movement'.

Also, a prominent cypherpunk told me that E.Hughes had proseletyzed the
religion of pseudospoofing to him, so to speak, and that the latter was
his great inspiration in setting up a site to permit it. Mr. Hughes
never has publicly stated anything on pseudospoofing, except that `that
which cannot be enforced should not be prohibited' and `the claim that
a person should be limited in pseudonyms represents a profound
misunderstanding.' Is he promoting it behind the scenes?

Another thing about Mr. Hughes I don't understand, and has always
baffled me -- a long time ago he posted a statement about some kind of
Unix email message log files, a standard and well-known UNIX file, and
Mr. Finney or someone corrected him and said, `You have rather
demonstrated your lack of Unix knowledge'. Well, I was greatly confused
by that then, and even more so today. Mr.Hughes, from my personal mail,
strikes me as someone who is a mastermind of Unix software, nooks and
crannies, and security weaknesses. Maybe even SMTP and DNS (Mr. Metzger
is an authority on the latter). Sort of the `hacker ethic'. I wonder if
that little statement was actually a disinformation stab, to prevent
others from suspecting his amazing prowess! And if H.Finney was
E.Hughes' tentacle, that would explain some things too! I also wonder
if T.C.May's professed aversion to Perl code is in the same category.
(This is really a shrewd way to throw off people who are into those
annoying `investigations'.) I would like to look at any software Mr.
May has written. Also, he seems to have a great fluency for the Mac,
which would make for some other great portrayals.

Another mysterious reference is that of collaboration between A.Abraham
and E.Hughes. I believe T.C.May remarked that they are working on
digital cash protocols. I got the impression that they may be running
the site ah.com (`Abraham-Hughes'). Do they grant accounts to anyone
who requests? Like A.Chandler? A.Chandler said that he posts to the
future-culture list, and told me he has written some books, but I can't
find them, and he is evasive in email. Is A.Abraham posting to the list
under different pseudonyms? could someone tell me what they are? (I got
a bizarre mail error sending him something once, maybe an SMTP expert
or someone from crl.com can help me. Who maintains that site, anyway?)
A. Abraham also popped up in RISKS lately, saying that he had watched
my `deterioration'. Thanks for your concern, but I am quite all right,
and alive and well! (A., I'm not sure where you got the idea I was
`deteriorating' -- I haven't sent you any mail over many weeks, unless
you have been tickling me with some tentacles out there, hee hee. Or
maybe you are just privy to my private mail to the `inner circle'.)

I'm sure that many will criticize my inquiries above as `invasions of
privacy'. That, after all, is what the cypherpunks stand for! Let me
assure you that is not my intent whatsoever. I simply wish to
understand the Cypherpunk culture in all its grandeur, and promote it
accurately to  the concerned public, who may perceive it as quite
subversive! (Markoff called you `the most self consciously ornery
group', but I realize that's quite an understatement!) But let me say
that I think true leaders with integrity have always had to sacrifice
teir privacy. It is a basic requirement of fame and influence -- in
holding one's achievements up for public scrutiny, the public affords
you greater reputation. Shirking from the public, particuarly in
response to their simple entreaties, is counterproductive and extremely
damaging. After all, if you have nothing to hide, you can be proud of
your public reputation, and look at it as a hard won accomplishment for
your diligent and honest efforts. This is how you establish that all
important element of *trust* among the public, who will perceive you
less as a subversive threat than a privacy advocacy group! (A less
subversive title, like the self-proclaimed `radical libertarian' P.
Metzger advocates in RISKS, `the government keeping its fingers out of
our affairs.')

Research Materials
---

CA meeting minutes are nonexistent as well. People seem very hostile to
documenting them. It's quite annoying, discouraging, frustrating, and
unfortunate. I'm interested in tracking the progress of the digital
cash and identity obstruction infrastructures under development.

I don't understand why CA Cypherpunks are so secretive about their
projects. I thought they were interested in collaborations, based on
the public mailing list. There's a distinct feeling that the CA people
are `insiders' and everyone else is just the audience. I guess this
could be one reason that people shriek so much over pseudospoofing
accusations here -- they see the distinct boundary between `them' and
`us', but promote the deception for `them'.

This is partly my concern in the `secret mailing list'. If there is
one, I think the CA 'punks should be honest about it and not deceive
anyone else. In fact, I think that maybe the CA 'punks should just have
their own mailing list unless they want to publicize and collaborate
with anyone in Cyberspace, not just whoever can make it to their CA
meetings. What is the criteria for people to get on the secret mailing
list, `project development free of paranoid ranters', anyway? Do you
have to be in CA? Is pseudospoofing outlawed on that list? I always
thought that *this* list was for project development, but of course now
realize it's just the public cypherpunk international PR outlet.

One thing I wonder about the intensely secretive Cypherpunks. Don't you
think that the Internet was pretty much built up with entirely public,
open debate and interaction? With things like cooperation and
collaboration between people, instead of hostile flames between
different cliques? Do you think you have the right attitude, conducive
to harmony in future Cyberspace? It seems to me all these secret
conspiracies and quasi-criminal philosophies are somewhat fundamentally
against the grain of a hospitible Cyberspace. Well,  as I always say,
`to each his own!' or `live and let live!' as long as no criminals are involved!

Also, I thought I heard something about cypherpunk archives somewhere,
by Al Whaley, maybe at cpsr.org. Does anyone know anything about that?
It seems to me an archive would be a great project. Who has archives,
and to how far back to they go? G.Broiles was telling me he had a
pretty good collection. (I consider him one of the most imaginative
authorities on cypherpunk culture I've had the privilege of talking to!).

The Cryptoanarchist Manifesto & CypherPunk Charter
===

The Cryptoanarchist Manifesto by T.C.May and the Cypherpunk Charter are
very interesting, but they seem to be speaking metaphorically --
`thinly veiled', as I believe P. Metzger wrote in RISKS. They never
refer directly to things like tax evasion, although the former does
hint at what might be referred to as `cyberspatial guerrilla warfare'
-- clearly a central tenet to the cypherpunk agenda. (see soda.berkeley.edu).

One thing that I wanted to ask everyone's opinion on. At the end of the
CryptoAnarchist Manifesto there is a references to a revolution that
ensued `barbed wire fences' -- useful social infrastructures that
protect private property rights, etc. But suddenly, Mr. May ends the
essay with `you have nothing to lose but your barbed wire fences'. This
was quoted in the NYT article.

My question: this doesn't make sense to me unless `barbed wire' is a
metaphor for something else. It seems to me that the Cypherpunks would
want to advocated `barbed wire' in the sense that it protects their
privacy rights! But the metaphor appears to go deeper than that. I
think `barbed wire' may actually be a metaphor for *identity* and
`fences' are the aspects of social institutions (such as laws and
customs) that protect identities, such as  proper attribution,
crediting, etc. The cypherpunks, of course, are more interested in
*blurring* those distinctions with things like misquoting, pseudopools,
pseudospoofing, impersonation, etc. than in Privacy itself. (`you have
nothing to lose but your barbed wire fences.'). The metaphor makes
sense in this interpretation!

The two documents are full of these kinds of subtle, invisible
metaphors. In fact, a very large amount of postings and email by the
`cypherpunk culture' are! Boy, I was quite deluded to think that the
`cypherpunks are what they stand for' so to speak. I would appreciate
if anyone knowledgeable could clarify their meaning (especially the
authors! but that is a lot to hope for right now!)

The lack of a basic document describing the Cypherpunk agenda by top
leadership in pseudospoofing is definitely constraining and a serious
obstacle to describing the Movement (given that it forms the invisible
core of it) but, as everyone can attest, that hasn't deterred me so far.

(BTW, I have to properly credit S.Boxx as helping me come to the
`barbed wire == identity restrictions' idea. Thanks!)

True Name Detection
---

One thing I don't understand, either. J.Dinkelacker once talked about
the list in long, introspective terms about being a Game with different
Opponents and Teams and Names. (I can dig this up if anyone wants to
see it.) I never fully understood that message -- it is deep with many
metaphors and even allusions to Extropians. The thing that is puzzling
about it was that at the time, J. Dinkelacker was a list newcomer, and
newcomers generally don't comment on the long history of the list like this!

The thing that was most fascinating about the post, however, was the
apparent allusion of the distinction in `True Name' vs. pseudospoofed
posts here -- he compared True Name posts to the pseudoanonymous ones,
and said they were all pretty much the same, and that True Name posts
had been easily as hot as the worst Pseudospoofed ones. 

But my question -- how could he tell the difference?

N.Szabo has also made references to support being measured by `how many
True Name' posts take one's side. N.Szabo also recently suggested that
he is a tentacle, that he was retiring as one, and that the CA
cypherpunks were quite amused by the `detweilering' (is that the right
term?) exorcisms. This is interesting because it also confirms the `CA
Pseudospoofing Clique-Conspiracy' scenario. `Mr. Szabo', are you really
a tentacle? (Unfortunately, as pseudoanonymous posting goes, I've never
gotten an honest answer to this question to date!) I'm flabbergasted if
this is true, because you have built up such a tremendous
net.reputation in many quarters. Would you be willing to tell me what
you True Name is? Because you allude to my private mail and telephone
calls to some cypherpunks (who you say have `compromised their privacy'
in giving me their phone numbers, I'm not sure why) I think you must be
in the thick of things! Your knowledge would be extremely valuable at this point.

If someone else was posting under J.Dinkelacker or N.Szabo, I'd really
like to talk to you. How do you know which posts are real, and which
ones are fake? Is there a group of you people out there, who can tell,
and have fun with this exclusive information? Obviously, being able to
separate the Snakes from the Medusa Sisters is critical to
understanding most of the traffic here! People who didn't see the
distinction might become quite frustrated after awhile, especially from
mail in their private mailboxes! I guess that those with tentacles
would be upset if they are complimented, too -- they would want to
reserve the powerful reputation-influencing right to compliment or
criticize others for themselves. (That reminds me of all the flames I
got over my facetious L.D. Cypherpunk Awards.)

This cypherpunk culture sure is baffling sometimes. NYT and Wired
articles only scratch the surface. (I suspect that letter to Wired on
the subject was pseudospoofed, maybe eminent cypherpunk S. Sandfort,
who has written for the magazine repeatedly, can clarify.) There are
definitely many layers. Who knows what lies concealed at the center!
Future anthropologists are going to have quite a difficulty in
characterizing it! What we have here is an elaborate hoax far
surpassing War of the Worlds -- except that when the `show was over'
Orson Wells quit and apologized over the public uproar!

an introspective note
---

BTW, perhaps a hundred cypherpunks or tentacles have criticized my
`florid' style over the months (great term, T.M.!). I have to credit
A.Abraham as being one of the first great Cypherpunk Flamers to my
mailbox on the topic. I tried over the past week to change my style a
little, with short snippets with less organization and information,
less indexing, no headings, less original material, no
`congratulations' or intense analyses (obviously, everyone knows what
everything means anyway, and these are far better left to the
tentacles, so they can improve their reputations) more long quoting
(like the `pseudopool' joke, hilariously funny), less attention to
actual current dialogue, great hostile, ad hominem flames in the spirit
of PM's best, terse statements with the utmost brevity and none of that
nagging elaboration in deference to EH's `concision', none of those
tedious informative forwarded materials that you've already seen, no
independent reporter-style inquiries of prominent people like J.
Bidzos, etc. This is all to accomodate the cypherpunks who have sent me
hundreds of telegrams complaining about my more well-written pieces. I
apologize for all of you in taking your valuable time in your mandatory
readings of my dense prose. I'm sure the Cypherpunks list is a far
better place, with many new people being converted and projects being
accomplished, without my endless, blathering drivel, such as long,
meandering paragraphs that seem to contain a lot of important
information and complex, prolix vocabulary, but are really nothing but
a `borg paranoid rants' according to the eminent cypherpunk newbie J.
Dinkelacker, a `tale of sound and fury, told by an idiot, signifying
nothing', like the brilliant pseudonymous dramatist Shakespeare once
wrote, who could have been Francis Bacon, but because of someone's
ingenious facade, no one really knows or gives a damn, and ingenious
and eloquent cypherpunks like E.Hughes, T.C.May, A.Abramson, G.Broiles,
H.Finney, N.Szabo, and P.Metzger, and all those other wacky and
conspirational pseudospoofing CA cypherpunks, interested in saving
Humanity from the Draconian Orwellian Totalitarian Oppressive Evil
Corrupt and downright Unpleasant Gubberments to replace them with
CryptoAnarchy and Digital Terrorism, Espionage, Sabotage, and Warfare
(all's fair in love and war!), even to the extent of brainwashing
honest people and demonizing and stalking opponents like S.Boxx and
G.Spafford into quivering insanity and poisoning cyberspace and
corrupting DNS databases and SMTP software and keyservers with toxic
waste and establishing imaginary interstate telephone numbers and
accounts and fake media accounts by insiders that all unequivocally
prove their unique existence and dominance over `lesser intelligences'
by raping and their white virgin minds and urinating on their Beliefs
(the raw power of which is Liberating), or, that is, particularly in
these cases, use this brilliant Shakespearean metaphor to no end in
their clever disinformation campaign surpassing that of War of the
Worlds and NeverEnding, under the leadership of the most evil
megalomaniac since Hitler with hideously majestic plans for World
Domination far surpassing His Royal Eminence, as documented in RISKS
15.25 and 15.27 and 15.x (?) by the insane man but brilliant satirical
exorcist on his holy jihad, which has spread to very many lists such as
the `Internet Mercantile Protocols' list and CERT's only being the mere
tip of the tentacles, so to speak!

I remain yours -- the humble historian-servant of the Cypherpunks.





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "George A. Gleason" <gg@well.sf.ca.us>
Date: Thu, 18 Nov 93 02:41:23 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: FCC policy
Message-ID: <199311181037.CAA25558@well.sf.ca.us>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Re Strick's item on "used to be legal to listen to anything that passed
through your airspace as long as you didn't (divulge or sell)..."  Yes this
used to be the case.  I'm not sure if ECPA is what changed it, but.... there
is some hope of getting it changed back again...

Bill Clinton just signed a piece of legislation which restored a pre-1990
standard with regard to religious freedom, overturning a more authoritarian
standard prmulgated by the Supreme Court in the last couple of years. The
critical case involved Native American use of peyote, a sacramental cactus
which is also a controlled substance.  Anyway, if Clinton is backing efforts
to return to older and more libertarian standards in one area, it's worth a
try he'd go for it in another area as well.  He made a decent statement
about how religious freedom is vital to the 1st Amendment, is foundational
in our country, and so on; one could make the same case around a freedom to
*hear* which is the necessary corrolary to the freedom to speak.  

-gg




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Drunkfux <drunkfux@cypher.com>
Date: Thu, 18 Nov 93 02:06:23 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: hohocon
In-Reply-To: <9311180744.AA07753@merde.dis.org>
Message-ID: <9311180359.aa04301@zero.cypher.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text


> 
> I am wondering if anyone I plan to bring a  (cheap) laptop to I can
> collect and trade (& sign) PGP keys

  John Draper has already expressed an interest in having everyone 
  exchange keys, and will probably mention this during his speech.
  I can guarantee there will be numerous laptops, and even full 
  systems avaialable. Last year, we even had 4-machine internet  
  site going - hohocon.com. Yeah, it was great for about 5 minutes
  until all the power in the wing went out.





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: smb@research.att.com
Date: Thu, 18 Nov 93 04:06:24 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Quotable Quotes
Message-ID: <9311181204.AA08534@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


	 >who was the cypherpunk who said, ``Cypherpunks, It's such a feeling o
	f
	 >raw power over lesser intelligences''? I can't remember.

	 I have seen only one person on this list use TeX style quotes, such as

	 ``Cypherpunks ... ''

	 instead of 

	 "Cypherpunks ..."

	 and that person is ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu. 

	 Writing style may not be conclusive proof, but it adds to the
	 preponderence of circumstantial evidence.


For whatever it's worth, I use ``this'' quoting style as well.  When you
do enough writing in troff and LaTeX (they both use it), you train your
fingers accordingly.


		--Steve Bellovin




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Mike Godwin <mnemonic@eff.org>
Date: Thu, 18 Nov 93 04:54:30 PST
To: smb@research.att.com
Subject: Re: Quotable Quotes
In-Reply-To: <9311181204.AA08534@toad.com>
Message-ID: <199311181251.HAA22139@eff.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Steve Bellovin writes:
 
> For whatever it's worth, I use ``this'' quoting style as well.  When you
> do enough writing in troff and LaTeX (they both use it), you train your
> fingers accordingly.

Aha! And Steve Bellovin has the same initials as S. Boxx!



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: an12070@anon.penet.fi (S.Boxx)
Date: Thu, 18 Nov 93 00:01:24 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: The Zen of Pseudospoofing
Message-ID: <9311180756.AA07906@anon.penet.fi>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



``I don't trust anyone,'' Medusa said with some paranoia.

``do you trust me?'' I said amusedly.

``I trust only software,'' Medusa asserted.

``Who writes your software?'' I wondered.

``I do.''

``You must get lonely,'' I observed.

``I have all my snakes to keep me company,'' she grinned.

* * *

Medusa's sisters had fun with their pseudopool of seven.

``Are you pseudospoofing?'' I asked.

The sisters said in unison, ``we can assure you that all seven of us are unique.''

* * *

Yin said to Yang, `You move!'
Yang said to Yin, `No, You move!'

* * *

A psychopath asked a policeman to apologize for catching him. The
policeman refused. The psychopath called him an evil hypocrite.

* * *

``You're paranoid. There's no Medusa.''

``Am I talking to Medusa or a Snake?'' I asked.

``I'm a True Snake!'' it said.

* * *

``What if someone started a pseudospoofing game, invited you, and
didn't tell you?'' I asked Medusa.

``That depends -- Would I be in on the secret or not?'' said Medusa.

``What if they said it wasn't a game but it was?'' I inquired.

Medusa shrugged. ``So what?''

I asked her, ``Don't you believe in truth in advertising?''

``What is `Truth'?'' she asked.

* * *

Yin said, `You are Yin and I am Yin.'
Yang said, `You are Yin and I am Yin.'
Yin said, `You are Yang and I am Yin.'
Yang said, `You are Yang and I am Yin.'
Yin said, `You are Yin and I am Yang.'
Yang said, `You are Yin and I am Yang.'
Yin said, `You are Yang and I am Yang.'
Yang said, `You are Yang and I am Yang.'

* * *

What if you never woke up from a nightmare?

What if someone played a practical joke on you -- that never ended?

What if we could live forever? In Cyberspace?

* * * 

Stop the world. I want to get off.
Beam me out of here Scotty, there's no intelligent life here.

* * *

The flower said, ``You can trust me.'' But as soon as I bent to smell
its beautiful fragrance, it turned into a cocked steel-jawed trap and
SNAPPED. In shock, horror, and intense pain I clutched my face. ``You
were a fool for trusting me, and I've done you a favor by betraying
you,'' it growled. ``Now you know that any Flower could be a Trap.''
Needless to say, I stopped smelling the flowers -- and planted the
seeds for a new family.

* * *

Medusa was proud of her titanium pipe. She told me, `My pipe is flawless.'

`I said, your pipe has two holes.'

Medusa said, `the holes are not part of the pipe.'

I said, `No. The pipe is not part of the holes.'

Medusa frowned and walked away.

* * *

Medusa said, `Nothing is sacred in Cyberspace.'
I said, can I quote you on that?
She said, `No. Privacy is sacred.'

* * *

I was talking to a tentacle. `Is it a lie if a tentacle lies?' The
tentacle said, `No.'

I asked Medusa, `Are you a liar'? She was silent.

* * *

I asked Medusa to talk to me. ``Only in Cyberspace,'' she said.
``Do you trust Cyberspace?'' I asked.
``No, but you should.''
I asked Medusa, `Why can Cyberspace be trusted?'
She said, `Because there is a Real World.'

* * *

Medusa's snake said, ``Why are you so paranoid?''
I said, ``I'm afraid of poisonous snakes.''
It said, ``You shouldn't be.''

* * *

I asked Medusa, ``How many snakes do you have?''
Medusa said, ``There are no snakes. There are only my sisters.''

* * *

Three Identities and the Liar were talking to each other.

``You can find me if you need to,'' said one.
``You can talk to me if you want to,'' said another.
``You can get lost,'' said a third.
``You can find me if you need to,'' said one.

* * *

``I don't trust anyone,'' said Medusa.

``who do you talk to?'' I asked.

Medusa began to cry.

* * *

Medusa liked to write under the influence of LSD. She thought that it
brought out the best in her prose. One day, she stared at her
collection in horror. It was all perversely senseless. But the mood
passed. Later, she couldn't remember if she had taken LSD or not that day.

* * *

One day I called Medusa on the phone, long distance. ``Who am I talking
to?'' I asked.

``Me,'' she said.

I wanted my money back.

* * *

I shouted to many people that Medusa was coming. They didn't listen.

Later, Medusa tricked them all into losing their life's savings.

They said it was my fault that they didn't believe me at first. ``We
couldn't hear you.''

* * *

Medusa was proud of the many books written by her Snakes. She
considered them masterpieces of art. But one day, a tiny spark lit a
fire in one. The fire raged with intensity. The whole array was reduced
to nothing but black ashes. Medusa first went insane, and then committed suicide.

* * *

I heard on the radio that we are being invaded by aliens. I didn't believe it.


-------------------------------------------------------------------------
To find out more about the anon service, send mail to help@anon.penet.fi.
Due to the double-blind, any mail replies to this message will be anonymized,
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Please report any problems, inappropriate use etc. to admin@anon.penet.fi.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Timothy Newsham <newsham@wiliki.eng.hawaii.edu>
Date: Thu, 18 Nov 93 10:42:11 PST
To: drunkfux@cypher.com (Drunkfux)
Subject: Re: hohocon
In-Reply-To: <9311180359.aa04301@zero.cypher.com>
Message-ID: <9311181841.AA15760@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



> > I am wondering if anyone I plan to bring a  (cheap) laptop to I can
> > collect and trade (& sign) PGP keys
> 
>   John Draper has already expressed an interest in having everyone 
>   exchange keys, and will probably mention this during his speech.
>   I can guarantee there will be numerous laptops, and even full 
>   systems avaialable. Last year, we even had 4-machine internet  
>   site going - hohocon.com. Yeah, it was great for about 5 minutes
>   until all the power in the wing went out.

hmm.. looks like the ideal for someone to test out a dos virus that
looks for the PGP passphrase and for secret key rings and tries to
"get out alive" with them.

                            Tim N.

Coders start your engines.



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Eric Hughes <hughes@soda.berkeley.edu>
Date: Thu, 18 Nov 93 08:44:31 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Forwarded mail from S.Boxx
Message-ID: <199311181642.IAA26892@soda.berkeley.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


This one was just too good to resist.

Eric
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
Delivery-Date: Thu, 18 Nov 1993 01:04:50 -0800
Return-Path: daemon@anon.penet.fi
To: tcmay@netcom.com, hughes@soda.berkeley.edu
From: an12070@anon.penet.fi (S.Boxx)
X-Anonymously-To: tcmay@netcom.com,hughes@soda.berkeley.edu
Organization: Anonymous contact service
Reply-To: an12070@anon.penet.fi
Date: Thu, 18 Nov 1993 09:03:32 UTC
Subject: an epiphany

I've finally figured out your intense loyalty, sensitivity, and
secrecy. You're homosexual lovers.

Quite a complex and secretive culture, these cypherpunks.

I really do wonder what magic the Wizards have truly practiced.

Look, if you don't want to tell me, just say so. But could you tell me
when you are going to `come out of the closet'? I mean, everyone is
going to find out some day, right? Could you at least tell me when the
Big Day is? I'm really dying of anticipation.

-------------------------------------------------------------------------
To find out more about the anon service, send mail to help@anon.penet.fi.
Due to the double-blind, any mail replies to this message will be anonymized,
and an anonymous id will be allocated automatically. You have been warned.
Please report any problems, inappropriate use etc. to admin@anon.penet.fi.





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: hfinney@shell.portal.com (Hal Finney)
Date: Thu, 18 Nov 93 08:56:30 PST
To: wex@media.mit.edu
Subject: Re:  hohocon
Message-ID: <9311181655.AA08484@jobe.shell.portal.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Regarding the issue of telnet'ing through an insecure system:

A general solution to this problem is to have the system you are attaching
to engage in some dialog with you to establish your identity.  However, the
dialog must be such that even if it is monitored by the system you are
going through, that will not allow them to later claim to be you.

This is the same basic problem as entering a PIN for a credit or debit
card in an environment where the PIN can be seen or recorded.  If someone
sees your PIN they can steal your ATM card (or dcash card, in the future)
and access your money.

Cryptographic solutions involve zero-knowledge proof systems but they are
too complicated to work in your head.  For the hohocon case you could have
a calculator programmed with some one-way function (DES is available for
the HP48); the remote system could generate a challenge number and you
would use your calculator to DES-encrypt it with a fixed secret key, then
type the result in, and the remote system would check it.  This would
not help the hohocon people because next time they tried to log in as
you the challenge number would be different.

There was a paper in the Eurocrypt 91 proceedings called "Human Identification
Through Insecure Channel" which attempted to address this problem.  The
authors proposed a system which was supposed to be simple enough that you
could work the response in your head, but which would be complex enough
that eavesdroppers would not be able to figure it out, even after seeing
many examples.

The idea was that the remote system would issue a challenge as a string
of letters or digits: 1982043765.  You will give a response of the same
length, but only certain positions matter.  Those positions are identified
by one of two secret words that you memorize.  Suppose the first secret
is 1246.  You will produce a response which embeds the 2nd secret word
in the positions where 1,2,4, and 6 appear.  Suppose the 2nd secret word
is 3124.  Your response, written below the challenge, would be:

1982043765
3421223142
-  - -  -

Only the marked positions matter; the others are random.

This sounds simple enough, but the problem is that for true security
the authors require a much longer string with a much larger set of
characters, 40 or 50 characters long.  I tried implementing their
algorithm, without even memorizing the secrets, just writing them down
(they had to be about 10 letters long), and entering in a reponse given
a challenge, and I couldn't do it.  It was extremely difficult to locate
the checked positions and put in the next letter.  It took forever to
do it, and I kept making mistakes.

Maybe with practice it would get easier.  Or, perhaps the technique would
still be useful with a smaller question size to provide less security but
still more than you would get without it.

It would be interesting to see if other people come up with approaches
to solve this problem.  I really don't think that protecting my smart
card with a 6-digit PIN is going to be adequate.

Hal Finney
hfinney@shell.portal.com




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: cfrye@ciis.mitre.org (Curtis D. Frye)
Date: Thu, 18 Nov 93 06:11:30 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Privacy != right?
Message-ID: <9311181414.AA04095@ciis.mitre.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


One element of the "right of privacy" debate I've seen is the distinction
between a "right _of_ privacy" and a "right _to_ privacy".  Linguistically,
"right _of_ privacy" == "privacy right", indicating that this particular
right would be enumerated somewhere.  In the case of a "right _to_
privacy", the concept is a bit more vague and allows the penumbral
(implied) construction given by Stanton.  

Since there is no specific mention of a "right _of_ privacy" in the
Consititution, one must fall back on the implied construction and interpret
Constitutional privacy as defined by other amendments.  What this
construction of the "right _to_ privacy" allows is for appellate courts to
weight enumerated rights as more important than implied rights.  Thus, in
the name of furthering the goals of another amendment (say #6,
speedy/public trial), the courts can limit the implied "right _to_
privacy".


Best regards,

Curtis D. Frye
cfrye@ciis.mitre.org
"If you think I speak for MITRE, I'll tell you how much they
 pay me and make you feel foolish."






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: allan@elvis.tamu.edu (Allan Bailey)
Date: Thu, 18 Nov 93 07:26:29 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: The Republic of Desire (anonymous organizations)
Message-ID: <9311181524.AA15425@elvis.tamu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text



  Let's start a new topic, and mr. deitwieler is not invited.

  Has anyone considered how an organization like The Republic of Desire
from Gibson's _Virtual Light_ novel could be created/formed?

  It seems to me that it would be an excellent example and development motive 
for the crypto-anarchy tools: the DC-net protocol, Zero Knowledge Proofs
used for anonymous credentials, reputation-nets/webs-of-trust, etc. etc.

  My only problem with this is knowing how to organize the 
"guerilla cell structures" or whatever it was he mentioned.  Anyone have
a ref for something that discusses guerilla cell organizations?


-- 
Allan Bailey, allan@elvis.tamu.edu          | "Freedom is not free."
Infinite Diversity in Infinite Combinations | allan.bailey@tamu.edu
GCS -d+ p--- c++++ l+++ u++ e++ m++ s n+ h+ f g+ w+ t+ r y+
"Liberty means responsibility.  That is why most men dread it."
		-- George Bernard Shaw

"Armadillos....those are the meanest suckers you're ever gonna wanna see...
But you gotta kill 'em the first time, otherwise they get this revenge thing
 in their heads and they come lookin' for ya......."
                            -- (i got this from the 'zine Armadillo Culture)




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Date: Thu, 18 Nov 93 10:14:33 PST
To: wex@media.mit.edu (Alan)
Subject: Re: hohocon
In-Reply-To: <9311181546.AA13097@media.mit.edu>
Message-ID: <199311181814.KAA23119@mail.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



> Problem: how much trust do you have for a temporary site set up to give
> Internet access?  Can you assure yourself they're not capturing your telnets
> and remote logins?
> 
> At a recent SF con I attended, there was a rumor going around to the effect
> that the admin was doing just this.  I found the idea disturbing but
> eminently plausible.
> 
> --Alan Wexelblat, Reality Hacker, Author, and Cyberspace Bard

We believe this happened recently at the Hackers Conference
(surprise!), when Internet access was provided on a machine that was
later found to have been cracked by someone.

--Tim May


-- 
..........................................................................
Timothy C. May         | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,  
tcmay@netcom.com       | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
408-688-5409           | knowledge, reputations, information markets, 
W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA  | black markets, collapse of governments.
Higher Power: 2^756839 | Public Key: PGP and MailSafe available.
Note: I put time and money into writing this posting. I hope you enjoy it.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Loyd Blankenship <mentor@indial1.io.com>
Date: Thu, 18 Nov 93 09:06:04 PST
To: Peter shipley <shipley@merde.dis.org>
Subject: Re: hohocon
In-Reply-To: <9311180744.AA07753@merde.dis.org>
Message-ID: <Pine.3.05.9311181041.B8655-a100000@indial1.io.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I'll be there with PGP 2.3a on my 286 laptop. Not the fastest system in 
the world, but I'm willing to sign the key of anyone I personally know or
who can present a valid state drivers' license.

Loyd

p.s. with photo

* Loyd Blankenship        /o\     mentor@io.com (Finger for PGP key)       *
* Steve Jackson Games    /   \   "And keep on praying through that bass,   *
* PO Box 18957          /fnord\   for it is a link to Jah. One love, one   *
* Austin, TX  78760    /_______\  heart, one destiny." -- Flabba Holt      *






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Alan (Gesture Man) Wexelblat" <wex@media.mit.edu>
Date: Thu, 18 Nov 93 07:51:31 PST
To: drunkfux@cypher.com
Subject: hohocon
In-Reply-To: <9311180359.aa04301@zero.cypher.com>
Message-ID: <9311181546.AA13097@media.mit.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Problem: how much trust do you have for a temporary site set up to give
Internet access?  Can you assure yourself they're not capturing your telnets
and remote logins?

At a recent SF con I attended, there was a rumor going around to the effect
that the admin was doing just this.  I found the idea disturbing but
eminently plausible.

--Alan Wexelblat, Reality Hacker, Author, and Cyberspace Bard
Media Lab - Advanced Human Interface Group	wex@media.mit.edu
Voice: 617-258-9168, Pager: 617-945-1842	PUBLIC KEY available by request
Try not to have a good time ... This is supposed to be educational.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: cfrye@ciis.mitre.org (Curtis D. Frye)
Date: Thu, 18 Nov 93 07:51:31 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: The Republic of Desire (anonymous organizations)
Message-ID: <9311181554.AA05033@ciis.mitre.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>  My only problem with this is knowing how to organize the 
>"guerilla cell structures" or whatever it was he mentioned.  Anyone have
>a ref for something that discusses guerilla cell organizations?

The classic Russian model (late 1800's through the October Revolution) was
to have three-person cells, each of which had one person who knew one
person above them in the hierarchy and someone who knew one person below
them.  This makes for good security as there is no redundant information in
the network and one failure breaks the chain.

I don't have any specific citations in mind, but the Russian history
instructors at A&M might be a good place to start.

Best regards,

Curtis D. Frye
cfrye@ciis.mitre.org
"If you think I speak for MITRE, I'll tell you how much they
 pay me and make you feel foolish."






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Matthew J Miszewski <MJMISKI@macc.wisc.edu>
Date: Thu, 18 Nov 93 09:04:31 PST
To: CYPHERPUNKS@toad.com
Subject: Re: Guerilla Cells
Message-ID: <23111811004268@vms2.macc.wisc.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


The sendero luminoso in Peru also works this way...Of course if you break their
rules, they break your neck!
 
For security reasons each 'member' of the Shining Path is only allowed
to know of two other persons in the heirarchy.  This makes for good
plausible deniability as well as qwik and efficient dissolution.
 
--Matt
______________________________________________________________________________
In defense of liberty, encrypt for all purposes, civil and professional.
In defense of privacy, encrypt all correspondence, personal and professional.
In defense of sanity, do not encrypt your dry cleaning invoice!
 
       ++++++++--------mjmiski@macc.wisc.edu                          (c)1993




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Jim McCoy <mccoy@ccwf.cc.utexas.edu>
Date: Thu, 18 Nov 93 09:11:33 PST
To: wex@media.mit.edu (Alan)
Subject: Re: hohocon
In-Reply-To: <9311181546.AA13097@media.mit.edu>
Message-ID: <199311181708.AA20978@tramp.cc.utexas.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text


"Alan (Gesture Man) Wexelblat" <wex@media.mit.edu> writes:
[regarding hohocon...]
> 
> Problem: how much trust do you have for a temporary site set up to give
> Internet access?  Can you assure yourself they're not capturing your telnets
> and remote logins?

Or can you be sure that anyone who might have access to any portion of the
physical wire at any conference isn't doing it?  Well, hohocon might be a
good place for the Austin Cypherpunks to test out a version of telnet and
ftp that should do Diffie-Hellman encryption, provided there is a machine
or two running a version of some PC freenix...   

For people at hohocon itself we will be passing out a first draft of a
"crypto infodisk" with collections of articles and information about
cryptography and the importance of strong encryption in the current debate.
Depending on how long it takes us to get things together we might also have
a crypto source disk for people.  If people can think of other things of
cypherpunk interest we might be able to put onto disks to pass around let
me know.

jim



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: nate@VIS.ColoState.EDU (CVL staff member Nate Sammons)
Date: Thu, 18 Nov 93 10:31:31 PST
To: hfinney@shell.portal.com (Hal Finney)
Subject: Re: Fractal cryptography
In-Reply-To: <9311120740.AA19589@jobe.shell.portal.com>
Message-ID: <9311181827.AA00373@vangogh.VIS.ColoState.EDU>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----


writes Hal Finney:
>
>Now, maybe this particular fractal cryptosystem idea will actually work
>well.  I don't know; I haven't seen it.  But the point is that these
>complex types of systems have not provided a good foundation for crypto-
>graphy in the past.
>

(First, sorry for bringing up an old subject, I was at SC93, and now
have 500 messages to surf through)

I read an article in Electronic Engineering Times a while back (summer, I 
think), about some researchers doing encryption with chaos...  they had
two decryption chips (I think they used DSPs) that had a synchronized 
chaotic stream going between them, which they both used to [en,de]crypt
the data...  

This seems kind of silly, since (assuming an intelligent adversary),
they could just tap the chaotic flow, and start listening...

Am I missing something?

- -nate

- -- 
+-----------------------------------------------------------------------+
| Nate Sammons  nate@VIS.ColoState.Edu  (303) 491-1578                  |
|   Colorado State University -- Computer Visualization Laboratory      |
+-----------------------------------------------------------------------+



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: cfrye@ciis.mitre.org (Curtis D. Frye)
Date: Thu, 18 Nov 93 08:27:10 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Privacy != right?
Message-ID: <9311181633.AA05632@ciis.mitre.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Oops, forgot to finish the last sentence of my privacy post.  The last
paragraph should read:

Since there is no specific mention of a "right _of_ privacy" in the
Consititution, one must fall back on the implied construction and interpret
Constitutional privacy as defined by other amendments.  What this
construction of the "right _to_ privacy" allows is for appellate courts to
weight enumerated rights as more important than implied rights.  Thus, in
the name of furthering the goals of another amendment (say #6,
speedy/public trial), the courts can limit the implied "right _to_ privacy"
with fewer problems than if two "textual" amendments had come into
conflict.




Best regards,

Curtis D. Frye
cfrye@ciis.mitre.org
"If you think I speak for MITRE, I'll tell you how much they
 pay me and make you feel foolish."






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: allan@elvis.tamu.edu (Allan Bailey)
Date: Thu, 18 Nov 93 09:51:32 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: The Republic of Desire (anonymous organizations)
In-Reply-To: <9311181554.AA05033@ciis.mitre.org>
Message-ID: <9311181749.AA16590@elvis.tamu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


"Alan (Gesture Man) Wexelblat" writes:
[[..deletia..]]
>
>This organization is vulnerable in two ways: any one person can give up
>three others; and the chain can be followed (e.g. compromising B can lead to
>compromising D and then to E, etc.).  Because information has to flow
>between the cells, there is potential for compromise.
>
>I can't think of a way around this problem.  If information flows from B to
>E, either B must know of E's existence or non-existence.
>

  The cell structure of 3 people wouldn't necessarily need to know
the "True Names" of anyone in other cells.  That's what the 
crypto-anarchy tools are for:  anonymous credentials, DC-nets and
webs-of-trust, digital signatures, etc.   These tools can be used
for "authenticating" the other cells, and communicating with them
without compromising (well... hopefully) your True Name and security.

  Knowing only anonymous Ids of other "persons" in the other cells is
useless to the "authorities".  Unless of course they can get your
passwords and keys and spoof you.  Now how can we make a protocol for
protection against such spoofing?  Some sort of Zero Knowledge proof scheme?

--
Allan Bailey, allan@elvis.tamu.edu          | "Freedom is not free."
Infinite 
iversity in Infinite Combinations | allan.bailey@tamu.edu
GCS -d+ p--- c++++ l+++ u++ e++ m++ s n+ h+ f g+ w+ t+ r y+
"Liberty means responsibility.  That is why most men dread it."
		-- George Bernard Shaw

"Armadillos....those are the meanest suckers you're ever gonna wanna see...
But you gotta kill 'em the first time, otherwise they get this revenge thing
 in their heads and they come lookin' for ya......."
                            -- (i got this from the 'zine Armadillo Culture)






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: owen@autodesk.com (D. Owen Rowley)
Date: Thu, 18 Nov 93 14:46:37 PST
To: cfrye@ciis.mitre.org
Subject: Re: The Republic of Desire (anonymous organizations)
Message-ID: <9311181956.AA06133@lux.YP.acad>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


 > >  My only problem with this is knowing how to organize the 
 > >"guerilla cell structures" or whatever it was he mentioned.  Anyone have
 > >a ref for something that discusses guerilla cell organizations?
 > 
 > The classic Russian model (late 1800's through the October Revolution) was
 > to have three-person cells, each of which had one person who knew one
 > person above them in the hierarchy and someone who knew one person below
 > them.  This makes for good security as there is no redundant information in
 > the network and one failure breaks the chain.


 Which was also adopted by the weather-underground in the early seventys.

I think a better, and non-political, model is the Astrum Argentum.
The A./.A./. is a masonic style hermetic organisation.
A secret society if you will.

Yes it was headed by Aleister Crowley, yes it still exists today,
no I cannot tell you how to contact any part of it.
Thats your task to accomplish, if that is your will.

I happen to believe that the philosophical basis of the A./.A./.,
and the OTO, otherwise known as THELEMA, offers us a glimpse of
how the future is unfolding.

To those pragmatists and engineering types who scoff at Magickal 
organisations and its members, I can only say that I truley believe if 
you look without prejudice - suspend disbelief - and recognise the 
key nature of the basic underpinnings of hermetic philosophy, you will
see that *the mysterys* are laid bare all the time, and are no mystery
at all, but rather good common sense.

Cypherpunks above all others should easily understand that it is possible
to code information in such ways that only those who have the key can
understand the hidden message (esoteric) while all others see only the 
filler text ( exoteric).

Protect the mysterys, reveal them daily.

LUX ./. owen




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Alan (Gesture Man) Wexelblat" <wex@media.mit.edu>
Date: Thu, 18 Nov 93 09:06:29 PST
To: cfrye@ciis.mitre.org
Subject: The Republic of Desire (anonymous organizations)
In-Reply-To: <9311181554.AA05033@ciis.mitre.org>
Message-ID: <9311181704.AA21053@media.mit.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


This is kind of off-topic, but I thought the classic three-person cell was
as follows:

				A
			       / \
			      B - C
			     /     \
			    D       G
			   / \     / \
			  E - F   H - I

where a line shows cell membership.  So A commands a cell of himself, B and
C but knows no one below.  A is either the leader, or is known by one member
above.  B knows D is the leader of another cell, but does not know who E and
F are (or even if they exist).  Similarly for C.

This organization is vulnerable in two ways: any one person can give up
three others; and the chain can be followed (e.g. compromising B can lead to
compromising D and then to E, etc.).  Because information has to flow
between the cells, there is potential for compromise.

I can't think of a way around this problem.  If information flows from B to
E, either B must know of E's existence or non-existence.

--Alan Wexelblat, Reality Hacker, Author, and Cyberspace Bard
Media Lab - Advanced Human Interface Group	wex@media.mit.edu
Voice: 617-258-9168, Pager: 617-945-1842	PUBLIC KEY available by request
Try not to have a good time ... This is supposed to be educational.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Perry E. Metzger" <pmetzger@lehman.com>
Date: Thu, 18 Nov 93 09:11:30 PST
To: "Mark W. Eichin" <eichin@paycheck.cygnus.com>
Subject: Re: Key Servers
In-Reply-To: <9311170305.AA05510@paycheck.cygnus.com>
Message-ID: <9311181707.AA28884@snark.lehman.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



"Mark W. Eichin" says:
> "MR EICHIN"? gee, last time I saw my name written that way (all caps,
> no punctuation on the abbreviation) was from a direct mailing database
> program. I half expected to see it followed by "You may have already

Mark;

Answering Detweiler's posts serves no purpose. He is not in his right
mind. Most people who believe that there is a nationwide conspiracy
out to get them do not need rational argument -- they need
psychological care. Its unlikely he's even going to think you are a
seperate person arguing against him, as he's convinced that we are all
either Tim May or Eric Hughes "pseudospoofing" him. Answering him is
an action similar to prodding a caged bear with a hot poker.

Perry




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: owen@autodesk.com (D. Owen Rowley)
Date: Thu, 18 Nov 93 14:44:32 PST
To: MJMISKI@macc.wisc.edu
Subject: Re: Guerilla Cells
Message-ID: <9311182009.AA06202@lux.YP.acad>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


 > From: Matthew J Miszewski <MJMISKI@macc.wisc.edu>
 > 
 > The sendero luminoso in Peru also works this way...Of course if you break their
 > rules, they break your neck!
 >  
 > For security reasons each 'member' of the Shining Path is only allowed
 > to know of two other persons in the heirarchy.  This makes for good
 > plausible deniability as well as qwik and efficient dissolution.
 

In Light of my posting regarding The A./. A./.
( oh.. my use of the "./." glyph is s'posed to be an ascii representation
  of a glyph comprised of three dots in an equalateral traingular shape,
  that is when its not signifying the everlasting secret family connections
  of the CP's -ie:cum pigs- and stands for the erect phallus and testacles :-)


it should be noted that *Sendero Luminoso - shining path*
is a blatant reference to Masonic/hermetic practice.

It should also be noted that Masons have been (succesfully) using graphic key
based encryption of their secrets for as long as they have been around,
that passwords are another key element of their craft, and that every
president of the united states except one has been a mason.
( can we guess which one? :-)


LUX ./. owen

this message needs no NSA fodder, it is subversive enough in its directness.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Alan (Gesture Man) Wexelblat" <wex@media.mit.edu>
Date: Thu, 18 Nov 93 09:21:29 PST
To: hfinney@shell.portal.com
Subject: hohocon
In-Reply-To: <9311181655.AA08484@jobe.shell.portal.com>
Message-ID: <9311181717.AA22357@media.mit.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


It seems to me that a simpler solution than challenge-response would be to
emultate the tear-sheet crypto systems and just have a series of one-shot
passwords generated.  Each time you log in, it requires the next password
from the sheet, so capturing the old one does no good (just as breaking the
one-time codes from tear sheets doesn't help).

Now if I could just figure out a simple way to do this on UNIX...

--Alan





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: cfrye@ciis.mitre.org (Curtis D. Frye)
Date: Thu, 18 Nov 93 09:12:11 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: The Republic of Desire (anonymous organizations)
Message-ID: <9311181718.AA06075@ciis.mitre.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Alan followed up on my three-person cell note with:

>This is kind of off-topic, but I thought the classic three-person cell was
>as follows:
>
>                                A
>                               / \
>                              B - C
>                             /     \
>                            D       G
>                           / \     / \
>                          E - F   H - I
>
>where a line shows cell membership.  So A commands a cell of himself, B and
>C but knows no one below.  A is either the leader, or is known by one member
>above.  B knows D is the leader of another cell, but does not know who E and
>F are (or even if they exist).  Similarly for C.
>
>This organization is vulnerable in two ways: any one person can give up
>three others; and the chain can be followed (e.g. compromising B can lead to
>compromising D and then to E, etc.).  Because information has to flow
>between the cells, there is potential for compromise.

Alan's version is correct.

Best regards,

Curtis D. Frye
cfrye@ciis.mitre.org
"If you think I speak for MITRE, I'll tell you how much they
 pay me and make you feel foolish."






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: henry strickland <strick@osc.versant.com>
Date: Thu, 18 Nov 93 12:26:39 PST
To: gg@well.sf.ca.us (George A. Gleason)
Subject: Re: FCC policy
In-Reply-To: <199311181037.CAA25558@well.sf.ca.us>
Message-ID: <9311182025.AA08535@osc.versant.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


# From: "George A. Gleason" <gg@well.sf.ca.us>
# 
# Re Strick's item on "used to be legal to listen to anything that passed
# through your airspace as long as you didn't (divulge or sell)..."  Yes this
# used to be the case.  I'm not sure if ECPA is what changed it, but.... there
# is some hope of getting it changed back again...

I agree that Clinton's shift to value individual liberties is a good thing.
(However his support for anything is always subject to change....)

However what we have now is a list of frequencies that it is illegal
for you to listen to -- 2600 published the list as a service to its
members :-).

The cypherpunk platform here should be not merely for more liberty to
use electronic gadgets, but for relying on technology rather than laws
to assure privacy.  This argument could be made regardless of whether
an administration wanted to see more or less liberty/privacy -- as long
as it wants there to be some liberty/privacy.

I'm sure you already know these, I think it's important to distinguish
the arguments.

						strick




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: J. Michael Diehl <mdiehl@triton.unm.edu>
Date: Thu, 18 Nov 93 11:31:35 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: latest procmail and recipes.
Message-ID: <9311181928.AA12504@triton.unm.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Hi all!

I just thought I'd post to let you know that I can send any interested parties
the latest version of procmail and my pgp recipes for procmail.  Send me a 
message with the subject: send help for more details.

Lagers,


J. Michael Diehl   ;^)  |*The 2nd Amendment is there in case the 
mdiehl@triton.unm.edu   | Government forgets about the 1st!  <RL>
Mike.Diehl@f29.n301.z1  |*God is a good Physicist, and an even 
    .fidonet.org        | better Mathematician.  <Me>
al945@cwns9.ins.cwru.edu|*I'm just looking for the opportunity to 
 (505) 299-2282 (voice) | be Politically Incorrect! <Me>
Can we impeach him yet? |*Protected by 18 USC 2511 and 18 USC 2703. 



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: smb@research.att.com
Date: Thu, 18 Nov 93 09:34:31 PST
To: hfinney@shell.portal.com (Hal Finney)
Subject: Re: hohocon
Message-ID: <9311181732.AA14420@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


We use challenge/response devices from the Internet:

\begin{figure}
\begin{quote}
\logsize
\begin{verbatim}
$ telnet guard.research.att.com
Trying...
Connected to guard.research.att.com.
Escape character is '^]'.

This is the new inet. Authorized use only.


Authentication Server.

Id? ches
challenge: 348201
response: d2c3f97d


TCP host name? cetus
rlogin cetus -l ches

IRIX Release 4.0.5C System V cetus.research.att.com
Copyright 1987-1992 Silicon Graphics, Inc.
All Rights Reserved.
cetus=; exit
Connection closed.Connection closed by foreign host.
$ 
\end{verbatim}
\end{quote}
\caption{\label{fig:hha-connect} The full text of an actual terminal
	session using our challenge/response-based guard.}
\end{figure}





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Jef Poskanzer <jef@ee.lbl.gov>
Date: Thu, 18 Nov 93 12:34:32 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: hohocon
Message-ID: <9311182033.AA25177@ace.ee.lbl.gov>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


At Hackers 8.0 a hallway discussion (including Eric Hughes) came up
with an amusing variation on these sniff-resistant authentication schemes:
use a pager.  It goes like this.  You telnet from an insecure site to your
home system, and type your userid.  Instead of prompting you for a
password, your system looks up your pager number, dials out to the pager
service, and pages you with a random but syntactically valid phone
number.  Then it prompts you.  You receive the page and type that
number as your password.

Authentication is based on physical posession of the pager, and knowing
what userid/machine it corresponds to.  A possible attack would be
to monitor the pager frequencies and try to snag the number out of
the air.  Possible defense against this would be to require a special
password before the page is generated - an attacker would have to monitor
both the network and the radio.

Not military grade security, but lots of folks have pagers and could
hack together something like this in a day or so.
---
Jef




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: crunch@netcom.com (John Draper)
Date: Thu, 18 Nov 93 12:36:36 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: HoHoCon key exchanges
Message-ID: <199311182036.MAA04806@mail.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


in relation to the HoHoCOn event...
>> 
>> I am wondering if anyone I plan to bring a  (cheap) laptop to I can
>> collect and trade (& sign) PGP keys

>  John Draper has already expressed an interest in having everyone 
>  exchange keys, and will probably mention this during his speech.
>  I can guarantee there will be numerous laptops, and even full 
>  systems avaialable. Last year, we even had 4-machine internet  
>  site going - hohocon.com. Yeah, it was great for about 5 minutes
>  until all the power in the wing went out.

Yes... And lets have at least SOMEONE who can have a Mac at HoHoCon
this time.... Last time there was NOBODY that had one.   Yukk!!
whatta bummer....

I am also interested if there is any rave taking place on the weekend
of the HoHoCon.   I sure want to get in some dancing while I'm there
:-)  ....

CC





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: smb@research.att.com
Date: Thu, 18 Nov 93 09:41:31 PST
To: "Alan (Gesture Man) Wexelblat" <wex@media.mit.edu>
Subject: Re: hohocon
Message-ID: <9311181739.AA14588@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


	 It seems to me that a simpler solution than challenge-response
	 would be to emultate the tear-sheet crypto systems and just
	 have a series of one-shot passwords generated.  Each time you
	 log in, it requires the next password from the sheet, so
	 capturing the old one does no good (just as breaking the
	 one-time codes from tear sheets doesn't help).

	 Now if I could just figure out a simple way to do this on
	 UNIX...

See

	@article{lamport-pw,
		author = {Leslie Lamport},
		journal  = {Communications of the ACM},
		month = {November},
		number = 11,
		pages = {770--772},
		title = {Password Authentciation with Insecure Communication},
		volume = 24,
		year = 1981
	}

The Bellcore S-Key system implements this scheme, and is, I think,
freely available.  I know that it's included in TIS's firewall toolkit:

	\software{ftp.tis.com}{/pub/firewalls/toolkit}





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Derek Atkins <warlord@MIT.EDU>
Date: Thu, 18 Nov 93 09:57:11 PST
To: "Alan (Gesture Man) Wexelblat" <wex@media.mit.edu>
Subject: Re: hohocon
In-Reply-To: <9311181717.AA22357@media.mit.edu>
Message-ID: <9311181756.AA12723@toxicwaste.media.mit.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> Now if I could just figure out a simple way to do this on UNIX...

This exists.  It is called S/KEY, and you can retreive this via
anonymous ftp from thumper.bellcore.com, somewhere...

It uses MD4 as a one-way hash to generate a series of pseudorandom
words.  It's a neat system.

-derek

         Derek Atkins, SB '93 MIT EE, G MIT Media Laboratory
     Secretary, MIT Student Information Processing Board (SIPB)
         PGP key available from pgp-public-keys@pgp.mit.edu
            warlord@MIT.EDU       PP-ASEL        N1NWH





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Matthew J Ghio <mg5n+@andrew.cmu.edu>
Date: Thu, 18 Nov 93 10:06:32 PST
To: wex@media.mit.edu>
Subject: List of one-shot passwords
In-Reply-To: <9311181717.AA22357@media.mit.edu>
Message-ID: <UguvWNa00awFM8JmNl@andrew.cmu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


 "Alan (Gesture Man) Wexelblat" <wex@media.mit.edu> wrote:

> It seems to me that a simpler solution than challenge-response would
> be to emultate the tear-sheet crypto systems and just have a series of
> one-shot passwords generated.  Each time you log in, it requires the
> next password from the sheet, so capturing the old one does no good
> (just as breaking the one-time codes from tear sheets doesn't help).
>
> Now if I could just figure out a simple way to do this on UNIX...

You can use a sequential PRNG to do this, and then add a scrambling
system to the output (to confuse anyone trying to break the pattern).  I
once wrote a program to do this (just for experimentation, and not in
UNIX...).




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Chester Edelman <coe@panix.com>
Date: Thu, 18 Nov 93 10:21:33 PST
To: wex@media.mit.edu
Subject: The Republic of Desire (anonymous organizations)
In-Reply-To: <9311181704.AA21053@media.mit.edu>
Message-ID: <199311181816.AA01206@panix.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> Date: Thu, 18 Nov 93 12:04:51 -0500
> From: "Alan (Gesture Man) Wexelblat" <wex@media.mit.edu>
>
> This is kind of off-topic, but I thought the classic three-person cell was
> as follows:
>
>				   A
>				  / \
>				 B - C
>				/     \
>			       D       G
>			      / \     / \
>			     E - F   H - I
>
> where a line shows cell membership.  So A commands a cell of himself, B and
> C but knows no one below.  A is either the leader, or is known by one member
> above.  B knows D is the leader of another cell, but does not know who E and
> F are (or even if they exist).  Similarly for C.
>
> This organization is vulnerable in two ways: any one person can give up
> three others; and the chain can be followed (e.g. compromising B can lead to
> compromising D and then to E, etc.).  Because information has to flow
> between the cells, there is potential for compromise.
>
> I can't think of a way around this problem.  If information flows from B to
> E, either B must know of E's existence or non-existence.

See R. A. Heinleins's ``Moon is a Harsh Mistress'' for some discussion
of this topic.
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Chet Edelman "Truth is a blanket that leaves your feet out in the cold" D.P.S.
EMAIL: coe@panix.com
SNAIL: 1718 Ocean Avenue, Brooklyn NY  11230
VMAIL: (718) 338-1432




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Perry E. Metzger" <pmetzger@lehman.com>
Date: Thu, 18 Nov 93 10:21:31 PST
To: Matthew J Ghio <mg5n+@andrew.cmu.edu>
Subject: Re: List of one-shot passwords
In-Reply-To: <UguvWNa00awFM8JmNl@andrew.cmu.edu>
Message-ID: <9311181820.AA28976@snark.lehman.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Matthew J Ghio says:
>  "Alan (Gesture Man) Wexelblat" <wex@media.mit.edu> wrote:
> 
> > It seems to me that a simpler solution than challenge-response would
> > be to emultate the tear-sheet crypto systems and just have a series of
> > one-shot passwords generated.  Each time you log in, it requires the
> > next password from the sheet, so capturing the old one does no good
> > (just as breaking the one-time codes from tear sheets doesn't help).
> >
> > Now if I could just figure out a simple way to do this on UNIX...
> 
> You can use a sequential PRNG to do this, and then add a scrambling
> system to the output (to confuse anyone trying to break the pattern).  I
> once wrote a program to do this (just for experimentation, and not in
> UNIX...).

You want to use a cryptographically strong one, however, because most
PRNGs are easily guessed. This in practice means using MD5 or DES or
IDEA or something as an RNG.

Perry




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: allan@elvis.tamu.edu (Allan Bailey)
Date: Thu, 18 Nov 93 11:24:33 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: The Republic of Desire (anonymous organizations)
In-Reply-To: <9311181902.AA06579@media.mit.edu>
Message-ID: <9311181923.AA16943@elvis.tamu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text


>
>Sorry, I was a little unclear.  When I worried about someone in a cell being
>compromised, I assumed that through social engineering (like throwing in
>jail, serving with subpoenas, seizing property, etc.) someone had pressured
>or tricked this person into revealing hir secret keys.
>
>If you know you're being pressured and can use a backup
>works-but-I'm-in-trouble key, that's a partial solution.
>

AAAHHH!!!!  EXCELENT IDEA!!!

  Think about it.  It's a beautiful extension to PGP, the "I'm-being-coerced"
password.  Seems to work, but deletes everything irreparably(sp?).

  I don't think the PGP coders will put something like this in,
but the people in my RoD-cell will definately have it as soon as
I'm done. =)


-- 
Allan Bailey, allan@elvis.tamu.edu          | "Freedom is not free."
Infinite Diversity in Infinite Combinations | allan.bailey@tamu.edu
GCS -d+ p--- c++++ l+++ u++ e++ m++ s n+ h+ f g+ w+ t+ r y+
"Liberty means responsibility.  That is why most men dread it."
		-- George Bernard Shaw

"Armadillos....those are the meanest suckers you're ever gonna wanna see...
But you gotta kill 'em the first time, otherwise they get this revenge thing
 in their heads and they come lookin' for ya......."
                            -- (i got this from the 'zine Armadillo Culture)




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: baldwin@LAT.COM (Bob Baldwin)
Date: Thu, 18 Nov 93 13:32:18 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Duress Passwords/PINs/Combinations
Message-ID: <9311182123.AA14221@LAT.COM>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


	Having a separate authentication mechanism that is used
under duress is a very good idea that some existing systems already
employ.  I'll pass along the ones I have had contact with.  From a
systems point of view, it is hard to figure out exactly how the system
should respond when it recognizes a duress authentication.  There are
competing interests as I'll explain after some examples.
	The safe inside the ATM machines used by BayBanks (Boston Mass)
can be opened with two combinations.  One combination sends an alarm
to the bank via a separate phone line (not the one used to perform the
ATM transaction).  The alarm phone line is also connected to a conventional
panic switch.
	A fellow I know has a central-office alarm in his home.  When the
alarm goes off, the office calls his house to ask if it was a false
alarm.  They ask for a password to verify, and no matter what password
you give they say "OK, I'll log it as a false alarm."  If you gave the
wrong password, they call the police and notify them of a crime in
progress with hostages.  If no one answers the phone, they send one of
their patrol cars.
	The challenge-response token that Attalla sells (which is a
repackaging of someone else's token) supports a fixed or variable duress
pin.  In the fixed duress pin mode, a special PIN, usually "1111", causes
the device to use a fixed different key to compute the response to
the challenge.  The code that authenticates the response checks for a
use of the duress key if the response does not correspond to the value
expected for the user's key.  The variable duress PIN approach is a feature 
of the card where the user can set which PIN value causes the card
to use the alternate key.  From a software point of view, the authentication
procedure returns Yes/No/Duress.  Note it is possible to have a collision
between a duress response and a regular response.
	The competing interest problem is illustrated by the following
possibility:  A criminal makes an ATM money-filler open the safe at gun point
(the ATM repair people do not know the safe combination).  The
criminal says that she knows about the duress combination and threatens to
shoot the kneecaps off the person if they use the duress combination.  The
criminal will take the money-filler hostage for a few minutes to guarantee
a clean get-away.  So what does the money-filler do?  To use the duress
combination requires faith that the bank will handle the situation in
a subtle way and thus avoid major knee surgery.  For the bank, why risk
loosing any money or loosing the criminal.  In fact, why not just refuse
to open the safe in the first place?  What is the right balance between
these interests?  How does each party trust that the other will behave
as expected?  What is the benefit of this approach when the criminals
already know about it?  It works well against criminals that don't know
about it, but is that enough to justify the overhead?
	These questions are not show stoppers.  Individual organizations
can and do answer them in order to make rational choices about duress
authentication.
	In the cases of communicating cells, the key benefit is giving
the adjacent nodes time to cleanup their surroundings of evidence or
to totally "leave town".
		--Bob




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: hfinney@shell.portal.com (Hal Finney)
Date: Thu, 18 Nov 93 13:31:36 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: RE: hohocon
Message-ID: <9311182129.AA19727@jobe.shell.portal.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> From: Timothy Newsham <newsham@wiliki.eng.hawaii.edu>
> 
> hmm.. looks like the ideal for someone to test out a dos virus that
> looks for the PGP passphrase and for secret key rings and tries to
> "get out alive" with them.
> 
>                             Tim N.
> 
> Coders start your engines.
> 

Don't type your PGP passphrase on a PC owned by someone else!  You
don't have to use your passphrase to exchange keys.  Keys can be
extracted, added, etc. without the passphrase being entered.

I don't see any way a virus could be spread via PGP key exchange.  At
best (worst) a virus could somehow attach itself to the PGP key file
but it would be just passive data.  It wouldn't do anything.

Hal





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Alan (Gesture Man) Wexelblat" <wex@media.mit.edu>
Date: Thu, 18 Nov 93 11:04:34 PST
To: nefud-the-delirious@tamu.edu
Subject: The Republic of Desire (anonymous organizations)
In-Reply-To: <9311181749.AA16590@elvis.tamu.edu>
Message-ID: <9311181902.AA06579@media.mit.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Sorry, I was a little unclear.  When I worried about someone in a cell being
compromised, I assumed that through social engineering (like throwing in
jail, serving with subpoenas, seizing property, etc.) someone had pressured
or tricked this person into revealing hir secret keys.

If you know you're being pressured and can use a backup
works-but-I'm-in-trouble key, that's a partial solution.

--Alan




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: erc@khijol (Ed Carp)
Date: Thu, 18 Nov 93 14:11:38 PST
To: gtoal@an-teallach.com
Subject: Re: souls and Multiple Personality Disorder
In-Reply-To: <8991@an-teallach.com>
Message-ID: <m0p0HXV-000HXQC@khijol>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text


> In article <m0ozdjZ-000HXQC@khijol> erc@wetware.com "Ed Carp" writes:
>  > I thought this was rather tasteless.  MP is real.  My SO is MP.  It's not
>  > very funny.  Do you know what causes MP?  Childhood sexual abuse.
> 
> Possibly, but more often overzealous psychiatrists with an axe to grind.
> (Let me guess, she had no history at all of MPD before she went to a
> psychiatrist for some unrelated problem, right?)

Err, actually, no.  She has memories of at least one other personality
from the age of 4.  Her memory is quite good...she has memories of sexual abuse
(I won't go into details) at age 3.  :( :(
-- 
Ed Carp, N7EKG			erc@wetware.com			510/659-9560
                   an38299@anon.penet.fi, anon-1157@twwells.com
If you want magic, let go of your armor.  Magic is so much stronger than
steel!        -- Richard Bach, "The Bridge Across Forever"



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: erc@khijol.yggdrasil.com (Ed Carp)
Date: Thu, 18 Nov 93 21:54:40 PST
To: gtoal@an-teallach.com
Subject: Re: souls and Multiple Personality Disorder
In-Reply-To: <8991@an-teallach.com>
Message-ID: <m0p0HXV-000HXQC@khijol.yggdrasil.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text


> In article <m0ozdjZ-000HXQC@khijol> erc@wetware.com "Ed Carp" writes:
>  > I thought this was rather tasteless.  MP is real.  My SO is MP.  It's not
>  > very funny.  Do you know what causes MP?  Childhood sexual abuse.
> 
> Possibly, but more often overzealous psychiatrists with an axe to grind.
> (Let me guess, she had no history at all of MPD before she went to a
> psychiatrist for some unrelated problem, right?)

Err, actually, no.  She has memories of at least one other personality
from the age of 4.  Her memory is quite good...she has memories of sexual abuse
(I won't go into details) at age 3.  :( :(
-- 
Ed Carp, N7EKG			erc@wetware.com			510/659-9560
                   an38299@anon.penet.fi, anon-1157@twwells.com
If you want magic, let go of your armor.  Magic is so much stronger than
steel!        -- Richard Bach, "The Bridge Across Forever"



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Sandy <72114.1712@CompuServe.COM>
Date: Thu, 18 Nov 93 11:21:33 PST
To: <cypherpunks@toad.com>
Subject: CELL STRUCTURE
Message-ID: <931118191113_72114.1712_FHF88-3@CompuServe.COM>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
  SANDY SANDFORT               Reply to:  ssandfort@attmail.com
 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Punksters,

Allan Bailey referenced "The Republic of Desire" in Gibson's
/Virtual Light/.  He asked:
    Anyone have a ref for something that discusses guerilla
    cell organizations?

One of my all-time favorite books, Heinlein's /The Moon is a
Harsh Mistress/, has a great description of how traditional
guerilla cells are structured.  In addition, he creates a new
cell structure based on secure communications in a computer
mediated setting that foreshadowed many of the concepts we deal
with on this list every day.

Free Luna!

 S a n d y

>>>>>>    Please send e-mail to:  ssandfort@attmail.com    <<<<<<
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: ravage@wixer.bga.com (Jim choate)
Date: Thu, 18 Nov 93 12:26:36 PST
Subject: PGP keys, laptops, HoHo Con
Message-ID: <9311182012.AA16029@wixer>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


On the topic of HoHo Con and keys, I should have access to at least 2 laptops rrunning PGP under linux. 

I believe that mentor@io.com will vouch for my authenticity at least for casual casual key generation.





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Perry E. Metzger" <pmetzger@lehman.com>
Date: Thu, 18 Nov 93 11:27:13 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Numbered Bank Accounts (Was "privacy and rights")
In-Reply-To: <9311181857.AA02801@anon.penet.fi>
Message-ID: <9311181926.AA29344@snark.lehman.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Jack Daniels says:
> I never claimed that nobody offers completely anonymous accounts.  I claimed
> that, to the best of my knowledge, nobody offers the "numbered accounts" that
> used to be popular in Switzerland.  

Well, thats a very narrow statement, but even so...

> Austria does offer "bearer share" accounts which are completely
> anonymous, but are quite different than the "numbered accounts" of
> old-time Switzerland.  In a "numbered account", the owner uses a
> hand-written rendition of the account number as a signature.  The
> hand-written number is compared against bank records to validate the
> authenticity of the owner.  "Bearer share" accounts, which are
> available in Austria, are issued to the user with some sort of
> ceritificate of ownership.  Anyone (the "bearer") who has possession
> of the certificate ("share") can withdraw money from the account.
> No signatures or hand-writen numbers are used to verify the owner.
> 
> If Austria does offer true numbered accounts, then I stand corrected.

Until recently at the very least, they offered accounts which used a
"password" and an account number to perform transactions -- you did not
require any physical certificate to access the account.

Perry




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: spin@iastate.edu
Date: Thu, 18 Nov 93 13:07:17 PST
To: mdiehl@triton.unm.edu
Subject: send mail for more details
In-Reply-To: <9311181928.AA12504@triton.unm.edu>
Message-ID: <199311182106.AA06668@mailhub.iastate.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Hmm... I recently discovered that though we have man pages for
procmail installed the executable doesn't seem to be there.
If you read this (instead of just having it processed) could
you direct me to anywhere I could get the source to procmail?

Thanks...




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: jim@bilbo.suite.com (Jim Miller)
Date: Thu, 18 Nov 93 13:08:48 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: All our eggs in one basket?
Message-ID: <9311182106.AA19057@bilbo.suite.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



> What would happen if your bank suddenly told you that it had no proof that
> you really had an account there?
> 

> Wonderer
> 


Theoretically, this problem is prevented by using protocols that incorporate  
non-repudiation mechanisms.  The bank wound not be able to make such a claim.   
Or, another way of saying it,  were the bank to make such a claim, you would be  
able to prove them wrong.  


However, proving them wrong while also retaining your anonymity may be a trick.   
It would depend on the design of the non-repudiation mechanisms.

How do you prove to a third party that someone is falsely repudiating a valid  
contract or transaction without revealing any information about yourself?

Conversely, how do you defend yourself against false claims of repudiation  
without revealing any information about yourself?  After all, someone might try  
to discover your identity by making false claims about you, and forcing you to  
defend yourself.  (Sound familiar?)


Jim_Miller@suite.com





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: --spin@iastate.edu-- <spin@iastate.edu>
Date: Thu, 18 Nov 93 13:36:36 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Sorry...
Message-ID: <9311182136.AA10616@iastate.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I am terribly sorry about the last message.  The Cc: escaped my attention.
I shall be more careful in the future.






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Thomas J. Merritt" <tjm@netcom.com>
Date: Thu, 18 Nov 93 15:37:19 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: unsubscribe
Message-ID: <199311182337.PAA18106@mail.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Please remove me from the cypherpunks mailing list and add me to the 
cypherpunks-announce mailing list.  I don't have time to filter through
all this stuff.

Thanks,
TJ Merritt
tjm@netcom.com




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Matthew J Miszewski <MJMISKI@macc.wisc.edu>
Date: Thu, 18 Nov 93 14:22:19 PST
To: CYPHERPUNKS@toad.com
Subject: CryptoCards
Message-ID: <23111816203152@vms2.macc.wisc.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Could someone send me either a vendor of SecureIds (or a similar
challenge/response card) or a Spec sheet, parts list and approximate
cost of manufacture of one of these monsters?
 
I've got some ideas for Telco security schemes but Id like to see
what sort of Margin Im looking at first.  Thanx ahead of time.
 
--Matt
______________________________________________________________________________
In defense of liberty, encrypt for all purposes, civil and professional.
In defense of privacy, encrypt all correspondence, personal and professional.
In defense of sanity, do not encrypt your dry cleaning invoice!
 
       ++++++++--------mjmiski@macc.wisc.edu                          (c)1993




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Joe Thomas <jthomas@pawpaw.mitre.org>
Date: Thu, 18 Nov 93 13:22:18 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: HoHoCon key exchanges
Message-ID: <9311182124.AA16613@pawpaw.mitre.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


In my experience, mass key-signing on a few laptops is a waste of  
time.  It might be a fun waste of time at a convention, but it made  
the one Washington Cypherpunk meeting to date kind of a drag.  Far  
more efficient is to print up a paper certificate with your key and  
its fingerprint, run off a bunch of copies, and sign them.  Pass them  
out and let people verify your credentials; everyone does a batch  
signing when they get some free time.  Then everyone mails their key  
ring to a server, waits a few days, and collects all their new  
signatures off the same server.

But, again, maybe that takes the fun out of it.  To each his own...

Joe





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: erc@khijol.yggdrasil.com (Ed Carp)
Date: Thu, 18 Nov 93 16:51:41 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: ytalk help
Message-ID: <m0p0K2Z-000HXfC@khijol.yggdrasil.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text


Help!  I got ytalk from soda.berkeley.edu and compiled it.  Now it complains
it can't find the ytalk daemon!  There's a ytalkd.c, but it won't compile, and
there's no target in the Makefile for ytalkd.  Help!!!  The documentation is
a big lose, and the author doesn't answer his email :( :(
-- 
Ed Carp, N7EKG			erc@wetware.com			510/659-9560
                   an38299@anon.penet.fi, anon-1157@twwells.com
If you want magic, let go of your armor.  Magic is so much stronger than
steel!        -- Richard Bach, "The Bridge Across Forever"



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Perry E. Metzger" <pmetzger@lehman.com>
Date: Thu, 18 Nov 93 13:54:32 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: All our eggs in one basket?
In-Reply-To: <9311182106.AA19057@bilbo.suite.com>
Message-ID: <9311182152.AA29541@snark.lehman.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Jim Miller says:
> However, proving them wrong while also retaining your anonymity may
> be a trick.

If all transactions require digitally signed confirmation from the
bank, you have an audit trail from them that they can't deny was theirs.

Perry




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: David Kovar <kovar@nda.com>
Date: Thu, 18 Nov 93 14:41:38 PST
To: baldwin@LAT.COM (Bob Baldwin)
Subject: Re: Duress Passwords/PINs/Combinations
In-Reply-To: <9311182123.AA14221@LAT.COM>
Message-ID: <199311182240.RAA04041@nda.nda.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> 	Having a separate authentication mechanism that is used
> under duress is a very good idea that some existing systems already
> employ.  I'll pass along the ones I have had contact with.  From a
> systems point of view, it is hard to figure out exactly how the system
> should respond when it recognizes a duress authentication.  There are
> competing interests as I'll explain after some examples.

The SecureID system has a duress PIN built in to it as well. Using
that PIN, you're still authenticated, but the server software knows
that you entered it under duress and does the "appropriate" thing.

-David



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Matthew J Ghio <mg5n+@andrew.cmu.edu>
Date: Thu, 18 Nov 93 14:46:41 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: souls and Multiple Personality Disorder
In-Reply-To: <8991@an-teallach.com>
Message-ID: <sguzg6u00awKFVh1Q=@andrew.cmu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: x-be2

x-be2


From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: David Kovar <kovar@nda.com>
Date: Thu, 18 Nov 93 14:51:37 PST
To: MJMISKI@macc.wisc.edu (Matthew J Miszewski)
Subject: Re: CryptoCards
In-Reply-To: <23111816203152@vms2.macc.wisc.edu>
Message-ID: <199311182249.RAA04409@nda.nda.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> Could someone send me either a vendor of SecureIds (or a similar
> challenge/response card) or a Spec sheet, parts list and approximate
> cost of manufacture of one of these monsters?

  Security Dynamics, Inc. of Cambridge, MA makes the SecurID card.

-David



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: jim@bilbo.suite.com (Jim Miller)
Date: Thu, 18 Nov 93 16:32:20 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: All our eggs in one basket?
Message-ID: <9311190031.AA22296@bilbo.suite.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Perry Metzger writes

> Jim Miller says:
> > However, proving them wrong while also retaining your anonymity may
> > be a trick.
> 

> If all transactions require digitally signed confirmation from the
> bank, you have an audit trail from them that they can't deny was theirs.
> 


So to prove that the bank is lying you show a third party your copy of the  
digitally signed receipt of the disputed transaction?  I assume the third party  
uses the bank's public key and your public key to verify the receipt.

This brings up a good question:  How does the withdraw of digital money from a  
bank account work?  In particular, how does the bank simultaneously give you  
money and a receipt that neither party could repudiate?

I can see how they could give you the money and a receipt signed by the bank.   
I do not yet see how they could simultaneously give you the money and a receipt  
signed by both parties. 


I imagine the bank would use one of the simultaneous contract signing protocols  
and somehow produce an encryption key as the last step.  The key would be used  
to decrypt the digital money, which was sent in an earlier step in an encrypted  
form.

However, how can the person withdrawing the money verify the digital money is  
for the amount stated in the receipt if they only get the key after the last  
step in the receipt signing protocol.  I am confused.  I must not be thinking  
of the correct protocol.

How is this situation handled?


Jim_Miller@suite.com






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: an15489@anon.penet.fi (Jack Daniels)
Date: Thu, 18 Nov 93 11:01:33 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Numbered Bank Accounts (Was "privacy and rights")
Message-ID: <9311181857.AA02801@anon.penet.fi>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



>>
>> I hate to be the bringer of bad news, but to the best of my knowledge
>> Switzerland no longer allows numbered bank accounts.  Also, from
>> my studies of international banking, bank secrecy and tax havens,
>> I have never seen any reference to numbered bank accounts in
>> any country other than Switzerland, including Liechtenstein (although
>> Liechtenstein does have better secrecy safeguards than Switzerland.
>
>"Jack Daniels" has never looked hard enough -- many countries (Austria
>comes to mind) allow completely anonymous accounts, with various
>degrees of restriction on them.
>

"Perry Metzger" doesn't carefully read the postings which he directly
quotes before passing judgement.

I never claimed that nobody offers completely anonymous accounts.  I claimed
that, to the best of my knowledge, nobody offers the "numbered accounts" that 
used to be popular in Switzerland.  

Austria does offer "bearer share" accounts which are completely anonymous,
but are quite different than the "numbered accounts" of old-time Switzerland.
In a "numbered account", the owner uses a hand-written rendition of the account
number as a signature.  The hand-written number is compared against bank records
to validate the authenticity of the owner.  "Bearer share" accounts, which are
available in Austria, are issued to the user with some sort of ceritificate
of ownership.  Anyone (the "bearer") who has possession of the certificate 
("share") can withdraw money from the account.  No signatures or hand-writen
numbers are used to verify the owner.


If Austria does offer true numbered accounts, then I stand corrected.

"Jack Daniels"
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
To find out more about the anon service, send mail to help@anon.penet.fi.
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From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Perry E. Metzger" <pmetzger@lehman.com>
Date: Thu, 18 Nov 93 16:54:37 PST
To: Jim_Miller@suite.com
Subject: Re: All our eggs in one basket?
In-Reply-To: <9311190031.AA22296@bilbo.suite.com>
Message-ID: <9311190052.AA29960@snark.lehman.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Jim Miller says:
> So to prove that the bank is lying you show a third party your copy
> of the digitally signed receipt of the disputed transaction?  I
> assume the third party uses the bank's public key and your public
> key to verify the receipt.

Presumably something like that.

> 
> This brings up a good question: How does the withdraw of digital
> money from a bank account work?  In particular, how does the bank
> simultaneously give you money and a receipt that neither party could
> repudiate?

> I can see how they could give you the money and a receipt signed by the bank.
   
> I do not yet see how they could simultaneously give you the money
> and a receipt signed by both parties.

It needn't be signed by both parties. The bank could always simply
claim that you'd never given them an order to withdraw money and
refuse to give it to you -- cheating halfway into giving you a receipt
isn't interesting, so it also needn't be simultaneous. 

What needed is a) the bank has to be able to show a third party a
signed request for every transaction they've performed, and b) you
have to be able to show a third party a signed (by the bank) receipt
for every transaction you've performed. In other words, you are
protected because the bank can't simply claim to the arbitrator "oh,
he withdrew all his money yesterday" because they can't show an order.
The bank is protected because you can't claim "oh, I deposited ten
million dollars yesterday" if you can't show a receipt.

Perry




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: an41418@anon.penet.fi (wonderer)
Date: Thu, 18 Nov 93 12:01:36 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Signal to noise/real issues
Message-ID: <9311181959.AA12707@anon.penet.fi>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

I am a bit concerned about the cypherpunks list. I posted something
to the list with the subject "All our eggs in one basket," that I
believe is a real concern for cypherpunks. The posting has prompted
a lot of personal correspondence, and maybe even a co-authorship on
a paper if we can find a place willing to include a nym as an
author. A few of you wrote me back messages complimenting my post.

What worries me is that nobody has continued the discussion on the
list, whereas the posts by L.D. and S. Boxxx seem to generate a lot
of heated discussion. If my post was really not as important as
those, then maybe I'm in the wrong mailing list. I think I'll post
a copy of that message to sci.crypt where people are interested in
real crypto issues.

Wonderer

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.3

iQBVAgUBLOu+Qh1kTJuroDD9AQHDVwH9HFILw/wtEH/8r6rYkbRQlgGynzsDM528
pOsT5ffqqLbulJ1FN+2xOkfYx/fDQqBzrpmHZaV/bk0GdwUmYchyAg==
=4JSu
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
To find out more about the anon service, send mail to help@anon.penet.fi.
Due to the double-blind, any mail replies to this message will be anonymized,
and an anonymous id will be allocated automatically. You have been warned.
Please report any problems, inappropriate use etc. to admin@anon.penet.fi.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Christian D. Odhner" <cdodhner@indirect.com>
Date: Thu, 18 Nov 93 19:31:42 PST
To: Cypherpunks Mailing List <cypherpunks@toad.com>
Subject: Remailer cdodhner@indirect.com DOWN (temp)
Message-ID: <Pine.3.07.9311182017.A24070-a100000@indirect.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


My sysadmin, due to some sort of security concern, has decreed that
.forward files shall not be able to call any execution of code other than
certain designated filters. Thus my remailer rolled over and died and lost
three days of my mail. My sysadmin is helping me devise a workaround now
so my remailer can be the exception to the rule, or bypass the rule
entirely without compromiseing security of the site. I'll post to the list
when it's back up.

(btw, I'm off the cypherpunks list now, on cp-request)

Happy Hunting, -Chris

Christian Douglas Odhner     | "The NSA can have my secret key when they pry
cdodhner@indirect.com	     | it from my cold, dead, hands... But they shall
pgp 2.3 public key by finger | NEVER have the password it's encrypted with!"
My opinions are shareware. To register your copy, send me 15$ in DigiCash.
  Key fingerprint =  58 62 A2 84 FD 4F 56 38  82 69 6F 08 E4 F1 79 11 






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: jim@bilbo.suite.com (Jim Miller)
Date: Thu, 18 Nov 93 18:51:42 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: All our eggs in one basket?
Message-ID: <9311190248.AA24338@bilbo.suite.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Perry Metzger writes

> What needed is a) the bank has to be able to show a third party a
> signed request for every transaction they've performed, and b) you
> have to be able to show a third party a signed (by the bank) receipt
> for every transaction you've performed. In other words, you are
> protected because the bank can't simply claim to the arbitrator "oh,
> he withdrew all his money yesterday" because they can't show an order.
> The bank is protected because you can't claim "oh, I deposited ten
> million dollars yesterday" if you can't show a receipt.
> 


I'm still confused, only in a different way.  Let's let I want to withdraw  
$10,000...


1) I send the bank a signed request to withdraw 10,000 dollars

2) The bank withdraws the money but doesn't sends it to me.

I go to the arbitrator and say: "The bank cheated me!!"

The bank says: "We sent you the money.  Here is your withdraw request, signed  
by you.  You are lying."

------

How can I prove that the bank did not send me the money?  


The withdraw protocol must somehow produce a receipt, signed by *me*, saying I  
receiving the money.  If the bank cannot present such a receipt, then the  
arbitrator shouldn't believe that the bank really sent the money.

Yet why would I sign a receipt before verifying that the bits the bank sent me  
was a valid chunk of digital money?  Does this mean the bank sends me valid  
digital money first and I reply with a signed receipt?

If so, what if I claim that the transmition failed and I didn't receive the  
money, but I really *did* get the money?  I could then tell the bank that I  
changed my mind and I want them to rollback the withdraw transaction?  I would  
walk off with a valid chuck of digital money, yet my account was not  
decremented.

Obviously I'm still missing something.


Jim_Miller@suite.com





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Robert Harder <rharder@nermal.santarosa.edu>
Date: Thu, 18 Nov 93 20:54:40 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: unsubscribe
Message-ID: <m0p0NoF-00006NC@nermal>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Please unsubscribe me from (to?) your mailing list

Thank you.

Rob




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: gtoal@an-teallach.com (Graham Toal)
Date: Thu, 18 Nov 93 13:36:39 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: souls and Multiple Personality Disorder
Message-ID: <8991@an-teallach.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


In article <m0ozdjZ-000HXQC@khijol> erc@wetware.com "Ed Carp" writes:
 > I thought this was rather tasteless.  MP is real.  My SO is MP.  It's not
 > very funny.  Do you know what causes MP?  Childhood sexual abuse.

Possibly, but more often overzealous psychiatrists with an axe to grind.
(Let me guess, she had no history at all of MPD before she went to a
psychiatrist for some unrelated problem, right?)

G
-- 
Personal mail to gtoal@gtoal.com (I read it in the evenings)
Business mail to gtoal@an-teallach.com (Be careful with the spelling!)
Faxes to An Teallach Limited: +44 31 662 4678  Voice: +44 31 668 1550 x212





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: gtoal@an-teallach.com (Graham Toal)
Date: Thu, 18 Nov 93 14:01:40 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Forwarded mail from S.Boxx
Message-ID: <8994@an-teallach.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


In article <199311181642.IAA26892@soda.berkeley.edu>
           hughes@soda.berkeley.edu "Eric Hughes" writes:

 > This one was just too good to resist.
 
 > From: an12070@anon.penet.fi (S.Boxx)
 > 
 > I've finally figured out your intense loyalty, sensitivity, and
 > secrecy. You're homosexual lovers.
 > 
 > Quite a complex and secretive culture, these cypherpunks.

ITS NOT FAIR!  He doesn't accuse me of being a tentacle and I
don't get any interesting love-life assigned to me either :-(

Can't I have one too, pretty please Lance?
  ___
G \X/  (The main reason I don't use these things in my sig is coz
        I never could draw ascii art worth a damn...)





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: gtoal@an-teallach.com (Graham Toal)
Date: Thu, 18 Nov 93 14:01:36 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Signal to noise/real issues
Message-ID: <9000@an-teallach.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


In article <9311181959.AA12707@anon.penet.fi>
           an41418@anon.penet.fi "wonderer" writes:
 > those, then maybe I'm in the wrong mailing list. I think I'll post
 > a copy of that message to sci.crypt where people are interested in
 > real crypto issues.

Try talk.politics.crypto and avoid pissing off everyone on sci.crypt too :-)

G





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: sommerfeld@orchard.medford.ma.us (Bill Sommerfeld)
Date: Thu, 18 Nov 93 19:21:42 PST
To: hfinney@shell.portal.com
Subject: Re:  hohocon
In-Reply-To: <9311181655.AA08484@jobe.shell.portal.com>
Message-ID: <199311190304.WAA00965@orchard.medford.ma.us>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


   For the hohocon case you could have a calculator programmed with
   some one-way function (DES is available for the HP48); the remote
   system could generate a challenge number and you would use your
   calculator to DES-encrypt it with a fixed secret key, then type the
   result in, and the remote system would check it.

In fact, that's exactly why I wrote it :-) .

Maybe I should go dig up the source to the challenge-response program
I wrote to go along with it..

					- Bill











From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Timothy Finin <Tim.Finin@cs.umbc.edu>
Date: Thu, 18 Nov 93 19:34:38 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: axe me
Message-ID: <199311190333.AA05810@retriever.cs.umbc.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Please remove me from cypherpunks.  I can't handle the volume, it
seems.

Tim




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: sommerfeld@orchard.medford.ma.us (Bill Sommerfeld)
Date: Thu, 18 Nov 93 19:51:42 PST
To: cdodhner@indirect.com
Subject: Re: Remailer cdodhner@indirect.com DOWN (temp)
In-Reply-To: <Pine.3.07.9311182017.A24070-a100000@indirect.com>
Message-ID: <199311190345.WAA01079@orchard.medford.ma.us>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Yup, there was a recent CERT advisory on sendmail; see
comp.mail.sendmail for the details on the attack, but basically you
can jam nasty things down the throat of the sendmail "program" mailer
over the net..

I'm surprised more remailers haven't been hit by this problem...

					- Bill





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: kone@courier1.sha.cornell.edu
Date: Thu, 18 Nov 93 16:52:20 PST
To: <cypherpunks@toad.com>
Subject: The Republic of Desire (anonymous organ
Message-ID: <2CEC4202@COURIER1.SHA.CORNELL.EDU>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


<                               A
<                              / \
<                             B - C
<                            /     \
<                           D       G
<                          / \     / \
<                         E - F   H - I
<
 
Another problem in this set up is:  What if "B" is caught and put in
jail/killed?  How are "D" and company (including "J, K, L" and on) going to
stay in touch?  Some one posted that useing a "I am caught" key might help
cover the trail. I think it would cut down on the uptree pateren but might not
pass on info downtree.  Would a side to side contact help?
                            A
                           / \
                          B - C
                         /     \
                        D       G
                       / \     / \
                      E - F - H - I
How would one keep the cross over safe?  An "in case of loss of contact, use
PGP Key xxx?"
Ideas?
Will




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: an49149@anon.penet.fi
Date: Thu, 18 Nov 93 16:34:58 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Attn: BlackNet.
Message-ID: <9311190032.AA24844@anon.penet.fi>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain




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-------------------------------------------------------------------------
To find out more about the anon service, send mail to help@anon.penet.fi.
Due to the double-blind, any mail replies to this message will be anonymized,
and an anonymous id will be allocated automatically. You have been warned.
Please report any problems, inappropriate use etc. to admin@anon.penet.fi.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Black Unicorn <unicorn@access.digex.net>
Date: Fri, 19 Nov 93 00:11:44 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re:  privacy and rights (short reply)
Message-ID: <199311190810.AA06308@access.digex.net>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Having worked in Liechtenstein banks, I can assure you numbered
accounts exist.





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: peter honeyman <honey@citi.umich.edu>
Date: Fri, 19 Nov 93 05:56:49 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Forwarded mail from S.Boxx
Message-ID: <9311191355.AA03429@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


lance has another epiphany.  (grep for epiphany in the archives
if you want more confirmation of the s. boxx identity.)  and if
you don't deny it, he will treat that as confirmation.

i pointed out in private mail to him that this is mccarthyism.

	peter




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: peter honeyman <honey@citi.umich.edu>
Date: Fri, 19 Nov 93 06:06:52 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Encryption: A Testimonial
Message-ID: <9311191405.AA03550@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> Actually, you could fool a lot of people by creating a hidden disk
> partition.  Nobody would know there was anything hidden unless they did
> a detailed sector-scan of the disk.  Is there any good software for
> doing this with modern operating systems?

this is very easy in unix:  put your secret stuff in a directory,
then mount a file system on that directory.

	peter




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: mkapor@kei.com (Mitchell Kapor)
Date: Fri, 19 Nov 93 10:01:54 PST
To: eff-board@eff.org
Subject: Nightly Business Report
Message-ID: <199311191427.JAA23332@kei.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Announcement suitable for reposting.  Please pass this around all the usual
places.

On Thursday, November 25th, the Nightly Business Report, which is broadcast
nationally on PBS, will feature a Thanksgiving Day special on "The
Informationm Highway".  Guests include Ray Smith, CEO of Bell-Atlantic, and
Mitch Kapor of EFF. Check local listings for times.  

I taped this yesterday and think it will be worth watching.


...................................................................

Mitchell Kapor, Chairman                    <mkapor@kei.com>
Electronic Frontier Foundation               

*** Join EFF!!!  Send mail to membership@eff.org for information ***








From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: hfinney@shell.portal.com (Hal Finney)
Date: Fri, 19 Nov 93 09:34:44 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: All our eggs in one basket?
Message-ID: <9311191734.AA10094@jobe.shell.portal.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Some of Jim's points can be addressed with existing protocols.  When
the bank sends you cash which you have withdrawn they would want to send
it in such a way that they get a return receipt from you.  That way they
can prove you have received it.  Schneier's book describes such a
"digital certified mail" protocol in section 6.3 of his book, but it
looks like it uses a lot of data.  More concise implementations may
exist.

Other forms of cheating could be imagined.  I could send cash to a
company, and they could refuse to send me goods, but claim that they
had done so.  Or I could receive goods from a company, but claim that
they never arrived.  These could also be addressed with certified mail,
either paper or digital, depending on whether the goods are physical or
electronic.

In an online system, the bank could refuse to accept a cash deposit, even
though it was valid cash, claiming that it had already been deposited.
To prevent this, the bank would have to record who made each deposit in
the past and stand ready to reveal this information.  A merchant could
collude with the bank to provide forged deposit records to help with
this scam.

I don't see how to solve this one, but if it were done on a large scale
people might become suspicious about the excess of apparent double-spending
via a small number of merchants.  The bank's reputation would suffer, as
long as people found out about it.  Perhaps customers should demand that
banks publish statistics about (apparent) double-spending in order to
detect this scam.

Hal Finney
hfinney@shell.portal.com




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: VACCINIA@UNCVX1.OIT.UNC.EDU
Date: Fri, 19 Nov 93 06:32:34 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: use cypherpunks-request@toad.com to unsubscribe
Message-ID: <01H5HTUR9VYQ0030GX@UNCVX1.OIT.UNC.EDU>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

Is there some reason that all these people are unsubscribing to the list? 
It's getting quite annoying. To anyone who wishes to unsubscibe, please 
do so to cypherpunks-request@toad.com, I do believe that's the correct
format. I already know why your unsubscribing, you don't have to tell me 
either of the two reasons.

Scott G. Morham             !The First, 
Vaccinia@uncvx1.oit.unc.edu !           Second
PGP Public Keys by Request  !                  and Third Levels
                            !        of Information Storage and Retrieval
                            !DNA,                       
                            !     Biological Neural Nets,
                            !                             Cyberspace

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From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: michael@sdl.hitachi.co.jp
Date: Thu, 18 Nov 93 16:51:38 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: UNSUBSCRIBE
Message-ID: <9311190050.AA27639@hsdlgw92.sdl.hitachi.co.jp>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Please remove me from your cypherpunks mailing list.
Could you add me to the cypherpunks-announce mailing list instead?
Thanks,
M.B.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Perry E. Metzger" <pmetzger@lehman.com>
Date: Fri, 19 Nov 93 08:21:55 PST
To: Jim_Miller@suite.com
Subject: Re: All our eggs in one basket?
In-Reply-To: <9311190248.AA24338@bilbo.suite.com>
Message-ID: <9311191618.AA05532@snark.lehman.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Jim Miller says:
> Perry Metzger writes
> 
> > What needed is a) the bank has to be able to show a third party a
> > signed request for every transaction they've performed, and b) you
> > have to be able to show a third party a signed (by the bank) receipt
> > for every transaction you've performed. In other words, you are
> > protected because the bank can't simply claim to the arbitrator "oh,
> > he withdrew all his money yesterday" because they can't show an order.
> > The bank is protected because you can't claim "oh, I deposited ten
> > million dollars yesterday" if you can't show a receipt.
> > 
> 
> 
> I'm still confused, only in a different way.  Let's let I want to withdraw  
> $10,000...
> 
> 
> 1) I send the bank a signed request to withdraw 10,000 dollars
> 
> 2) The bank withdraws the money but doesn't sends it to me.
> 
> I go to the arbitrator and say: "The bank cheated me!!"
> 
> The bank says: "We sent you the money.  Here is your withdraw request, signed
  
> by you.  You are lying."
> 
> ------
> 
> How can I prove that the bank did not send me the money?  

You can't with the partial protocol I've described thus far, but
assuming that you have to do something like signing the digital draft
in order to spend it, the bank's failure to provide a signed copy of
the draft with your signature demonstrates that you haven't spent the
money. The arbitrator needn't care if you already got the cash -- he
can order the bank to send you another copy of the draft that they
sent you.

I must admit that I haven't worked out the protocols for this yet, but
from the sketches I've made I think a quite workable system is
practical. I don't think you can cover all forms of cheating by the
bank, but I think you can construct things such that if someone tries
to cheat you you can prove it.

Perry




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "A.J. Janschewitz" <p00445@psilink.com>
Date: Fri, 19 Nov 93 09:04:45 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: FTP archive for PGP
Message-ID: <2962814393.0.p00445@psilink.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Sorry for the list post of a FAQ, but I've been away from this area of 
the net for a while. What are current ftp sites for PGP?

Please reply by direct email ...

thanks.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Stanton McCandlish <mech@eff.org>
Date: Fri, 19 Nov 93 09:06:55 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: CYPHERPUNK CRIMINAL t-shirts
Message-ID: <199311191704.MAA10471@eff.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Several people apparently missed the original post and have no idea what
t-shirt is being referred to.  Here it is again.  So far I've gotten about
30 "I want one" responses.  I'm not sure if the customization is doable,
especially the digital signature, but we'll see.

_______ begin fwd ______________

> L. Detweiler has a rather hefty essay in the latest Risks on the
> subject of `pseudospoofing', social parasites, "a criminal group
> called the CryptoAnarchists" (with members such as "Eric May" and
> "T.C. Hughes"), and such matters.  I will not forward it to the
> list, unh unh, no way.

Reminds me of one of my proudest moments: L.D. (who this time claimed their
first name was Linda; what a pseudospoofer!) in a fit of rage labelled me
a "CYPHERPUNK CRIMINAL", caps L.D.'s.  I'm thinking of having one of those
little desk signs made, saying "Anton Mechanism, Cypherpunk Criminal" just
for kicks.  Or maybe a t-shirt. Hell I could market these, personalized:

                   Stanton McCandlish, mech@eff.org
                      
                           [pgp sig here]
                  
  CCCC Y   Y  PPPP   H    H  EEEEE  RRRR   PPPP   U   U  N    N   K    K
 C      Y Y   P   P  H    H  E      R   R  P   P  U   U  NN   N   K  K
 C       Y    PPPP   HHHHHH  EEEEE  RRRR   PPPP   U   U  N N  N   KKK
 C       Y    P      H    H  E      R R    P      U   U  N  N N   K  K
  CCCC   Y    P      H    H  EEEEE  R  RR  P       UUU   N   NN   K    K

        CCCC   RRRR   IIIII  M    M   IIIII  N    N     A     L     
       C       R   R    I    MM  MM     I    NN   N    A A    L
       C       RRRR     I    M MM M     I    N N  N   A   A   L
       C       R R      I    M    M     I    N  N N   AAAAA   L
        CCCC   R  RR  IIIII  M    M   IIIII  N   NN   A   A   LLLLL


Anyone buying?

_____________ end fwd __________________

They'd be black w/white lettering of course, so they glow mightily under
the black light.  What I'm looking to do is *maybe* make these shirts,
mostly in XL, but some XXL's also since people ask for them, and in a good
weight of cotton, then sell them at a not unreasonable profit. Probably
$10 or $15 + p/h.  This will not be done immediately, I'm still trying to
figure out how much it would cost to do this, especially if they are
customized.  Probably will make a non-custom version, and if possible a
custom one that would cost a little more.  Time will tell, but I can't
guarantee anything yet, since many of the details are up in the air, and
I'll have to see whether or not I can afford the initial outlay (I'm
planning to move by Jan., so this proj might get backburnered until Feb.
or something.  If you are in, just send a note, and I'll add you to the
list (probably w/o replying) of people that want one.  Please specify if
you would NOT be interested if it's not customized, as that's significant.

Now back to the regularly scheduled flames, code haggling and NSA bashing.

-- 
Stanton  McCandlish  mech@eff.org  1:109/1103   EFF  Online  Activist & SysOp
O P E N  P L A T F O R M   C R Y P T O P O L I C Y   O N L I N E  R I G H T S
N  E  T  W  O  R  K  I  N  G      V  I  R  T  U  A  L     C  U  L  T  U  R  E
I   N   F  O :  M   E   M   B   E   R   S   H   I   P  @  E  F  F  .  O  R  G


-- 
Stanton  McCandlish  mech@eff.org  1:109/1103   EFF  Online  Activist & SysOp
O P E N  P L A T F O R M   C R Y P T O P O L I C Y   O N L I N E  R I G H T S
N  E  T  W  O  R  K  I  N  G      V  I  R  T  U  A  L     C  U  L  T  U  R  E
I   N   F  O :  M   E   M   B   E   R   S   H   I   P  @  E  F  F  .  O  R  G



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Carl Ellison <cme@sw.stratus.com>
Date: Fri, 19 Nov 93 09:11:57 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: CryptoCards
Message-ID: <199311191707.MAA11185@ellisun.sw.stratus.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


One reader writes:
>please send your contacts since I need to do price comparisons.  Thanks.


OK -- it's enough work typing that I'm sending this to the whole list.
These are about a year old so they might have changed.


Racal-Guardata
480 Spring Park Place - Suite 900
Herndon VA 22070
TEL 703-471-0892 FAX 703-437-9333
(my contact: Marc Paulina)

Cylink
310 No. Mary Ave
Sunnyvale CA 94086
TEL 408-735-5885 FAX 408-735-6645
(my contact: John C. Kennedy; jk@cylink.com)

Digital Pathways
221 West Grand Avenue
Montvale NJ 07645-2019
TEL 201-391-5100 FAX 201-391-9138

Security Dynamics
One Alewife Center
Cambridge MA 02140-2312
TEL 617-547-7820 FAX 617-354-8836
(my contact: Susan Symanski)

Enigma Logic
2151 Salvio, Suite 301
Concord CA 94520
TEL 510-827-5707 FAX 510-827-2593

 - <<Disclaimer: All opinions expressed are my own, of course.>>
 - Carl Ellison                                        cme@sw.stratus.com
 - Stratus Computer Inc.       M3-2-BKW                TEL: (508)460-2783
 - 55 Fairbanks Boulevard ; Marlborough MA 01752-1298  FAX: (508)624-7488




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: hughes@ah.com (Eric Hughes)
Date: Fri, 19 Nov 93 12:21:58 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: All our eggs in one basket?
In-Reply-To: <9311191945.AA08821@bilbo.suite.com>
Message-ID: <9311192023.AA06333@ah.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>If I failed to reply with a signed receipt, the bank could invalidate the  
>digital coin.  

Unfortunately for this idea, when the bank uses a blind signature to
issue coins, it doesn't know what coin it just issued actually looks
like.  The bank signs a blinded form of the coin.  The blinded form is
unblinded by the withdrawer, and the bank cannot know what it looks
like.

Eric




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "A.J. Janschewitz" <p00445@psilink.com>
Date: Fri, 19 Nov 93 09:51:54 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Thanks.
Message-ID: <2962817340.0.p00445@psilink.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Thanks to the several who have responded to my info request ... I'm all set.





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: jrk@sys.uea.ac.uk (Richard Kennaway)
Date: Fri, 19 Nov 93 05:11:50 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Useless anonymity
Message-ID: <12282.9311191315@s5.sys.uea.ac.uk>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


We are accustomed to seeing useless messages of various sorts on this and
other electronic forums.  Messages that quote a long article only in order
to add "Me too" at the end, messages of no interest to anyone but the
individual they are directed to, content-free banter, ego-driven flame
wars, and so on.  They still happen -- inexperienced people are always
joining the net -- but most people eventually learn to avoid making these
faux pas.

Anonymity brings a new class of useless message, of which the following
from Black Unicorn <unicorn@net.digex.access> is a recent example.  I quote
it in its entirety:

>Having worked in Liechtenstein banks, I can assure you numbered
>accounts exist.

"Black Unicorn" is an obvious pseudonym, and I'm assuming that it is not
one with an established reputation.  (For all I know, "Black Unicorn" might
be as famous as the Legion of Doom, but for the sake of argument I'll
assume that it isn't.)

What is the use of an unsubstantiated assertion, from an unreputed[*]
source, with no means of verification?  Having read Black Unicorn's bald
asertion, I am as ignorant as before of whether numbered accounts exist, in
Liechtenstein or elsewhere.

New ideas or arguments can be useful regardless of their source.  Likewise
pointers to places where evidence may be obtained.  Assertions by reputable
sources may be taken on trust (I place far more weight on Perry Metzger's
comments about numbered accounts than the Black Unicorn's).

The quoted message does none of these.  It is wholly useless, a waste of
its author's time, and of ours.

[*] "unreputed": a word I just coined as an opposite to "reputable",
meaning not "disreputable", i.e. having a bad reputation, but having no
reputation at all.

--                                  ____
Richard Kennaway                  __\_ /    School of Information Systems
Internet:  jrk@sys.uea.ac.uk      \  X/     University of East Anglia
uucp:  ...mcsun!ukc!uea-sys!jrk    \/       Norwich NR4 7TJ, U.K.






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: hfinney@shell.portal.com (Hal Finney)
Date: Fri, 19 Nov 93 13:22:39 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re:  All our eggs in one basket?
Message-ID: <9311192122.AA24764@jobe.shell.portal.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Although Jim's protocol doesn't quite work, as Eric pointed out, because
of the re-blinding, it does suggest another approach.  If the bank sent
you a coin and you claim you never got it (maybe you're telling the truth,
maybe not), they can just send it again.  You can't cheat because at best
this will allow you to get two copies of the same coin.

Contrariwise, if the bank cheats and never sends you the coin, just ask
them to send it again.  They have no basis for refusal.

Here we see a case where the ease of duplication of digital money is
actually an advantage, rather than the disadvantage it usually seems
to be.

Hal Finney
hfinney@shell.portal.com

.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Alan (Gesture Man) Wexelblat" <wex@media.mit.edu>
Date: Fri, 19 Nov 93 10:31:57 PST
To: hfinney@shell.portal.com
Subject: All our eggs in one basket?
In-Reply-To: <9311191734.AA10094@jobe.shell.portal.com>
Message-ID: <9311191831.AA04377@media.mit.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


It seems we're worrying about something that is between a non-problem and a
simple copy of an existing problem.

Today we use paper cash and paper forms.  I go to the bank to make a
withdrawal, I fill out a paper form requesting money.  They take the form,
fail to give me cash, claim that I have been given cash.  What recourse do I
have?  (Several is the answer, but the point is that it's not a problem new
to digicash.)

Today I order from a supplier.  I send a paper form of payment (P.O., check,
paper copy of my CC #, etc.).  They cash such form and do not send me goods
(or claim that they did and they were lost in transit).  What recourse do I
have?  (Again, several.  Again the point is that digicash does not seem to
be introducing new problems; rather it's giving us new forms of old ones.)

As a side note: one of the reasons I use credit cards (even though it gives
a record of my purchases that can be used for marketing and other unintended
purposes) is that the CC company does a large volume of business and
guarantees my transaction.  If I dispute a charge with the merchant, the CC
company automatically takes my side.  They take it out of the merchant's
hide.  Plus, since the merchant doesn't want to be in a bad way with a big
customer (Visa, say) -- there is a huge incentive for him to make good, much
more incentive than if he were dealing with me directly.

For these reasons, I think that something like CC houses will still prosper
under a digicash regime.

--Alan Wexelblat, Reality Hacker, Author, and Cyberspace Bard
Media Lab - Advanced Human Interface Group	wex@media.mit.edu
Voice: 617-258-9168, Pager: 617-945-1842	PUBLIC KEY available by request
Try not to have a good time ... This is supposed to be educational.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: baum@newton.apple.com (Allen J. Baum)
Date: Fri, 19 Nov 93 13:46:59 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Digital futures - the catastrophic edge
Message-ID: <9311192142.AA04263@newton.apple.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


There's been a lot of talk about digital money, digital identities,
how it might work, protocols for verifiability in the face of spoofing, how
to remain anonymous in spite of the best efforts of someone to find you,
etc, etc.

They all (to my unpracticed eye) rely on someone knowing a secret.
And only that someone knowing the secret.

Well, what if someone else finds it?
What if someone breaks into your house, finds it written somewhere,
or in some file somewhere?

It's one thing to say "anyone who allows that to happen is stupid"-
but people can be pretty stupid.

Or, conversely, what if the number of people who know it is <1, rather
than >1, i.e. what if you lose your secret key.

In a world where your identity is digital, the consequences could be
catastrophic. I can think of some extremely nasty consequences. It makes
the recent stories of people who have been mistaken (& prematurely) 
declared dead seem pretty minor.

So, my question is, what are the damage control mechanisms?
Has anyone thought about this much?

**************************************************
* Allen J. Baum            tel. (408)974-3385    *
* Apple Computer, 20525 Mariani Ave,  MS 305-3B  *
* Cupertino, CA 95014      baum@apple.com        *      
**************************************************






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: jim@bilbo.suite.com (Jim Miller)
Date: Fri, 19 Nov 93 11:46:58 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: All our eggs in one basket?
Message-ID: <9311191945.AA08821@bilbo.suite.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



> How can I prove that the bank did not send me the money? 

> 

> The withdraw protocol must somehow produce a receipt,
> signed by *me*, saying I receiving the money.  If the bank
> cannot present such a receipt, then the arbitrator
> shouldn't believe that the bank really sent the money.
> 

> Yet why would I sign a receipt before verifying that the
> bits the bank sent me was a valid chunk of digital money? 

> Does this mean the bank sends me valid digital money first
> and I reply with a signed receipt? 

> 


Perhaps the bank would send the valid chuck of digital coin first.

If I failed to reply with a signed receipt, the bank could invalidate the  
digital coin.  I assume the bank could register the coin in a "voided coin"  
registry, placing my "name" in the registry along side the coin's ID.  If I  
kept the coin, without sending a receipt, and later tried to spend it, I would  
eventually get caught.  The coin would make its way back to the bank and when  
it arrived, the bank would see that it was a voided coin and it would know that  
I was the one who first tried to spend it.

Here's the protocol so far:

1) I send the bank a signed request asking to withdraw $10,000.  The bank could  
use this request to prove it was given permission to withdraw money from my  
account.

2) The bank withdraws the money from my account, mints digital coin X with  
value $10,000 and sends it to me.

3) I validate the coin, and send a signed receipt saying I received coin X with  
value $10,000.  If I fail to send the receipt, the bank places my "name" and  
"coin X" in a voided coin registry, and refunds my account for the value of the  
coin.


What if I send the receipt, but the bank puts the coin on the voided coin list  
anyways *and* fails to refund my account?  I would want some way of proving  
that I received a valid coin, sent the receipt, and the receipt was received.

To do this, we modify step 3).  Instead of simply sending the bank a signed  
receipt, the bank and I would engage in a simultaneous contract signing  
protocol which would result in both parties receiving a "receipt" of the coin  
transfer.

If the bank tried to cheat me by putting the valid coin in the voided coin  
registry, I would be able to prove that the bank sent me the coin (I still have  
the coin) and that the bank received a receipt (I have a copy of the  
simultaneously signed receipt).

If I tried to cheat the bank by saying I never received the coin, the bank  
would be able to prove that I *did* received the coin (the simultaneously  
signed receipt indicates that I *said* I received the coin).  The bank also has  
the signed withdraw request proving it was authorized to withdraw money from  
the account.

If I received the coin, yet fail to engage in the receipt signing protocol, the  
bank would place the coin in the voided coin registry.

If the bank withdrew the money yet failed to send me the coin, I could show the  
arbitrator my last two bank statements (before the cheating).  If the bank  
could not produce the transfer receipt for the disputed withdraw, the  
arbitrator would rule in my favor.

How does all this sound?  I'm not claiming to have just invented something.   
I'm just trying to find out if I correctly understand the withdraw of digital  
coins from a digital bank account.


Jim_Miller@suite.com





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: hughes@ah.com (Eric Hughes)
Date: Fri, 19 Nov 93 14:21:58 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: All our eggs in one basket?
In-Reply-To: <9311192122.AA24764@jobe.shell.portal.com>
Message-ID: <9311192220.AA06614@ah.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>If the bank sent
>you a coin and you claim you never got it (maybe you're telling the truth,
>maybe not), they can just send it again.  

In fact, if the bank signs a committment to give you a particular
coin, the bank can't claim to have never received your request.  For
high value transactions where timeliness is a concern, this prevents
the bank from claiming that they didn't get the original request and
thus making a "delay of service" attack against you.  Delay of service
is the denial of the service of timeliness.

Eric




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: hughes@ah.com (Eric Hughes)
Date: Fri, 19 Nov 93 14:26:59 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Digital futures - the catastrophic edge
In-Reply-To: <9311192142.AA04263@newton.apple.com>
Message-ID: <9311192226.AA06623@ah.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


re: # parties != 1 knowing secrets

The secrets in cryptography are too long to be memorized.  Therefore,
some computer hardware will need to be the storage container.  Secure
containers for such secrets can be constructed at much less cost than
the value of having the secret escape.  Since secrets come in
different levels of value, so will containers.

Since the secrets are data, they can be backed up as well, with a
variety of redundancy mechanisms and social constraints.  One can use
encrypted data with human-recallable pass phrase (as PGP secret keys)
or secret sharing to multiple trustees, or a combination.

Eric




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Eric Blossom <eb@srlr14.sr.hp.com>
Date: Fri, 19 Nov 93 23:47:01 PST
To: honey@citi.umich.edu
Subject: Encryption: A Testimonial
In-Reply-To: <9311191405.AA03550@toad.com>
Message-ID: <9311192245.AA07357@srlr14.sr.hp.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



> > Actually, you could fool a lot of people by creating a hidden disk
> > partition.  Nobody would know there was anything hidden unless they did
...
> this is very easy in unix:  put your secret stuff in a directory,
> then mount a file system on that directory.

Another nice way is to remove the dev files for the disk at
shutdown time.  Then at reboot, you'd have to manually create dev
files (knowing the major and minor numbers) and manually mount the
file system.  There'd be no trace.  This would work real well with big
disks... Is that a 1.0, 1.1 or 1.2G filesystem?  How much swap is
allocated, anyway?  You could also use a litte steganography and spare
out a set of ``bad'' sectors.  Some controllers will do the sector sparing
for you (transparently to the OS)...  All sorts of opportunities ;-)

	Eric Blossom




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Black Unicorn <unicorn@access.digex.net>
Date: Fri, 19 Nov 93 13:21:58 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: anonymous postings and trust
Message-ID: <199311192121.AA15255@access.digex.net>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
 
 
Consider this  ->
 
Date: Fri, 19 Nov 93 13:15:20 GMT
From: jrk@sys.uea.ac.uk (Richard Kennaway)
Subject: Useless anonymity
 
We are accustomed to seeing useless messages of various sorts on 
this and other electronic forums.  Messages that quote a long 
article only in order to add "Me too" at the end, messages of no 
interest to anyone but the individual they are directed to, 
content-free banter, ego-driven flame wars, and so on.  They 
still happen -- inexperienced people are always joining the net 
- -- but most people eventually learn to avoid making these faux 
pas.
 
 
<-
 
I agree.  Especially with regard to the "Me too" analogy.
 
- ->
 
Anonymity brings a new class of useless message, of which the 
following from Black Unicorn <unicorn@net.digex.access> is a 
recent example.  I quote it in its entirety:
 
>Having worked in Liechtenstein banks, I can assure you numbered
>accounts exist.
 
<-
 
You would have preferred that I quote the entire thread and then
add my comment?  Or is it the lack of accompanying detail in
the comment that you resent?
 
- ->
"Black Unicorn" is an obvious pseudonym, and I'm assuming that it 
is not one with an established reputation.  (For all I know, 
"Black Unicorn" might be as famous as the Legion of Doom, but for 
the sake of argument I'll assume that it isn't.)
<-
 
To begin, I have been active in cypherpunks list since about last
fall or winter (the exact date escapes me).  I left during the 
summer to return home (Liechtenstein) and returned to the states 
with new internet arrangements recently.  I don't claim to be 
reputed on the list, but I hope likewise that I am not notorious,
certainly not on the level of the "Legion of Doom.
Oh, just so everyone knows, I'm a he, not an it.
 
- ->
What is the use of an unsubstantiated assertion, from an 
unreputed[*] source, with no means of verification?  Having read 
Black Unicorn's bald asertion (sic), I am as ignorant as before 
of whether numbered accounts exist, in Liechtenstein or 
elsewhere.
<-
 
What use is an unsubstantiated assertion from a "reputed"
source?  It is likewise dependent upon your evaluation of 
credibility.
What I see here is a fundamental difference in the concept of
anon posting.  I hold a JD from Georgetown and a masters
in International Relations to boot.  Part of my marketability in 
the job market was the appearance of a conservative and level 
headed, status-quo loving, policy wise, right wing, go getter. 
Considering my employment and the nature of my (rather 
questionable) intellectual pursuits, (cypherpunks fitting the 
bill when one considers the political views of my employer and 
colleagues) it makes little sense to post as my self, but I 
prefer not to post as anXXXX@anon.penet.fi either.  My access 
account is a nice compromise.  Publicly at any rate.  In E-Mail, 
should you wish to so correspond, I would be happy to discuss 
more specifically, my employment or my experience.  To do so 
publicly is to shoot myself in the foot.  I might add that for 
other purposes, I use anon.penet.fi as well, but this is when I'm 
more interested in not having any accountability what so ever.  
Under these circumstances, I understand the reluctance to give 
any weight to a post, in fact I would argue that most of the 
time, those who post through anXXXX don't intend that their posts 
be given much weight.  Usually these are harassment posts or 
questions that posters don't want later attributed to them.  The 
purpose is to avoid a great deal of attention, other than by 
those in the know (with the question example at least).
 
You are perhaps ignorant of Liechtenstein's banking policy, 
most people are ignorant of Liechtenstein.  My intent was
to at least advise the poster that his/her research was not
yet in enough depth.  I really was, and am, not in a position to 
comment on banking policy in a public way in much detail.  Even 
commenting at all was within an ethical gray considering my 
former and current connection with the industry.  If what you're 
looking for in every post is proof, then you might as well ask 
for a digital signature from a large bank in Liechtenstein.  A 
digital signature from His Serene Highness Prince Hans-Adam II 
might come closer.  Even then it comes down to how well you trust 
the signature.
Strictly speaking, by your argument, anything I post is to be 
ignored.  Even posts with regard to weather (subject matter 
appropiateness non-withstanding).  Should you be more interested 
in detail, I would be happy to discuss what I can in person, by 
telephone, or in encrypted E-Mail, in descending order of the 
detail I would be willing to disclose.
 
- ->
 
New ideas or arguments can be useful regardless of their source.
 
<-
 
Harmonize this with your previous and later position that my post
is entirely without value.  Did I contribute nothing at all?
 
- ->
 
Likewise pointers to places where evidence may be obtained.  
Assertions by reputable sources may be taken on trust (I place 
far more weight on Perry Metzger's comments about numbered 
accounts than the Black Unicorn's).
 
<-
 
(1) providing specific past employment information about myself 
publicly would tend to place me in a compromising position.
(2) the amount of weight you assign any post will depend on your
experience with that posters previous record and accuracy.
If I used the pseudonym "Tom Jones" would you be happier?
It's still not my name is it?  Seems to me you are expressing
trust reservations that should be based on time gained
experience and not the superficial appearance of my name.  If 
your position is solely that you have never seen posts by me 
before, and therefore are unaware of my credibility, fine, but 
characterize your criticism in that frame, not by ranting on 
anonymous posts.  If my name had been Majud Rajakad, would a 
trust factor  (positive or negative) be implied?  What about 
Roosevelt Washington, or Fred Rosenberg?
 
- ->
The quoted message does none of these.  It is wholly useless, a 
waste of its author's time, and of ours.
<-
 
I enjoy posting to cypherpunks.  Hardly a waste of my time, I 
cannot speak for you.
 
- ->
[*] "unreputed": a word I just coined as an opposite to 
"reputable", meaning not "disreputable", i.e. having a bad 
reputation, but having no reputation at all.
<-
 
Gee, thanks.
 
- ->
 
- --                                  ____
Richard Kennaway                  __\_ /    School of Information 
Systems
Internet:  jrk@sys.uea.ac.uk      \  X/     University of East 
Anglia
uucp:  ...mcsun!ukc!uea-sys!jrk    \/       Norwich NR4 7TJ, U.K.
 
<-
 
- -uni- (Dark)
 
 
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.3
 
iQCVAgUBLO03axibHbaiMfO5AQFXmAQAlLvcJ+A5W5ZTH8lUjuJtInyqkeqKFtlj
zRFE7h+5h1KWcXbx7r5HzHKGZf2YQycR+l+Jn+WDSZ/nizAagMJuo+VLhvffi7+a
U5y7eg4cXzrW3pG0eCwR53Ivll6AxZGS56aAuJAiUQafuZOvHHa8loMTAjlT3P4O
siQtqR/6ruM=
=ksGs
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Jef Poskanzer <jef@ee.lbl.gov>
Date: Fri, 19 Nov 93 17:54:44 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Privacy/Money Orders
Message-ID: <9311200153.AA26952@ace.ee.lbl.gov>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>You can get some information on bills via telnet to locis.loc.gov,
>the Library of Congress Information Service.

Still a few bugs in this system - amusing transcript appended.
---
Jef

Script started on Fri Nov 19 17:42:01 1993
% telnet locis.loc.gov
Trying 140.147.254.3...
Connected to locis.loc.gov.
Escape character is '^]'.
         L O C I S :  LIBRARY OF CONGRESS INFORMATION SYSTEM
 
          To make a choice: type a number, then press ENTER
 
 
  1   Library of Congress Catalog              4   Braille and Audio
 
  2   Federal Legislation                      5   Organizations
 
  3   Copyright Information                    6   Foreign Law
 
 
 *     *     *     *     *     *     *     *     *     *     *     *
 
  7   Searching Hours and Basics
  8   Documentation and Classes
  9   Library of Congress General Information
 
 
 12   Comments and Logoff
 
 
      Choice:
 2
                          FEDERAL LEGISLATION
 
These files track and describe legislation (bills and resolutions) introduced
in the US Congress, from 1973 (93rd Congress) to the current Congress (the
current Congress is the 103rd).  Each file covers a separate Congress.
 
 CHOICE                                                      FILE
 
   1    Congress, 1981-82        (97th)                      CG97
   2    Congress, 1983-84        (98th)                      CG98
   3    Congress, 1985-86        (99th)                      CG99
   4    Congress, 1987-88        (100th)                     C100
   5    Congress, 1989-90        (101st)                     C101
   6    Congress, 1991-92        (102nd)                     C102
   7    Current Congress, 1993-  (103rd)                     C103
 
   8    Search all Congresses from 1981-->current
   9    Search all Congresses on LOCIS 1973-->current
 
       Earlier Congresses: press ENTER
  12   Return to LOCIS MENU screen.
 
       Choice:
 7

 
FRIDAY, 11/19/93  08:43 P.M.
***C103- THE LEGISLATIVE INFORMATION FILE FOR THE 103RD CONGRESS,
         which was updated on 11/19/93 and contains 7,958 records,
         is now available for your search.
 
  CURRENCY: All information is NOT current through the above date, which is
            machine generated when ANY information is added to the file.
            Bill numbers, official titles, sponsors, and status (STEP) added
            within 48 hours.  Indexing terms and digests added later, in
            some cases several weeks after the bill is added to the file.
 
 TO START   RETRIEVE to find:                    EXAMPLES:
   SEARCH:    member name  -------------->    retrieve rep gingrich
                                              retrieve sen kennedy
              bill number  -------------->    retrieve h.r. 1
              subject keywords  --------->    retrieve day care
 
 FOR HELP:  Type the word HELP and press the ENTER key.
 
 
   READY FOR NEW COMMAND:
retrieve assault guns

 DFH2206I TRANSACTION BGNS ABEND AZI4 . BACKOUT SUCCESSFUL  20:44:36 
 help

 DFH2001I INVALID TRANSACTION IDENTIFICATION HELP - PLEASE RESUBMIT  20:45:34 
 ?

 DFH2001I INVALID TRANSACTION IDENTIFICATION ? - PLEASE RESUBMIT  20:45:39 
 oh boy

 DFH2001I INVALID TRANSACTION IDENTIFICATION OH - PLEASE RESUBMIT  20:45:48 
 select * from all

 DFH2206I TRANSACTION SELE ABEND SECV . BACKOUT SUCCESSFUL  20:46:05 
 quit

 DFH2001I INVALID TRANSACTION IDENTIFICATION QUIT - PLEASE RESUBMIT  20:46:23 
 logout


 DFH2312 - WELCOME TO CICS/MVS -
         FRIDAY            NOVEMBER 19, 1993.         08:46 PM         UX01

ACFAE138: ENTER YOUR PASSWORD:
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
EEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEE
OOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOO
IIIIIIIIIIIIIIIII  
foo

ACF01004 LOGONID UT NOT FOUND


 DFH2312 - WELCOME TO CICS/MVS -
         FRIDAY            NOVEMBER 19, 1993.         08:46 PM         UX01

ACFAE133: ENTER LOGON ID:
  quit

ACFAE138: ENTER YOUR PASSWORD:
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
EEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEE
OOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOO
IIIIIIIIIIIIIIIII  
foo

ACF01004 LOGONID QUIT NOT FOUND


 DFH2312 - WELCOME TO CICS/MVS -
         FRIDAY            NOVEMBER 19, 1993.         08:46 PM         UX01

ACFAE133: ENTER LOGON ID:
  ^]
telnet> close
Connection closed.
% exit
script done on Fri Nov 19 17:46:43 1993




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Black Unicorn <unicorn@access.digex.net>
Date: Fri, 19 Nov 93 15:11:59 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: anonymous posts
Message-ID: <199311192308.AA02672@access.digex.net>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



 
->
 
You say that you wish to remain anonymous, then state where you got your JD
etc., but you can't give any details about banking knowledge that may be useful
in digital cash schemes. This is a bit inconsistant. I would have (possibly)
known less about you if you had just put some new info out to the list.
 
<-
 
Well, what did I tell you?
 
You know that I have a JD from Georgetown and a Masters from some
( not accidently unnamed ) school in International Relations.
Considering GU's 600+ member class, and my age (which could range
from 26-76) that doesn't narrow it down much does it?
In that I admitted being male, I suppose that about halfs the number,
but doesn't leave you with much to go on.
 
However, If I provided details about my place of employment and
that banks I was associated with in Liechtenstein, where would
I be?  Not many U.S. educated types in Liechtenstein.  Fewer still
with a law degree.  As it is however, you'd have to file through
extensive personal lists past and present in a very secretive
country.  Even so I'm not about to disclose my former Liechtenstein
employer publicly.  Without this info, you'd be much better off trying
to find all the people who graduated Georgetown and hold a masters
in IR from XYZ.  That's a lot more comfortable for me.
 
-uni- (Dark)





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "L. Detweiler" <ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Date: Fri, 19 Nov 93 17:34:44 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: PRZ on Pseudospoofing
Message-ID: <9311200133.AA27198@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Mr. Zimmermann gave a fantastic talk yesterday to a packed house at a
Boulder (CO) Unix meeting. I really am extremely depressed that none of
the CA cypherpunks showed up (NOT! <g>). He talked about the complex
issues associated with his program. He's opposed to the Internet PEM
standard because it is a weaker standard than PGP in the sense that it
has a standard initialization vector, exposes recipients & senders of
messages in plaintext (if I'm not mistaken, sorry, I'm not an expert
but do play one on the cypherpunks list). 

Interestingly, he said that he thought that RSA was somewhat afraid of
him because (according to an insider) they didn't want to confront his
`folk hero' status. Mr. Zimmermann also had many comments on America as
a police state.

Unfortunately, I missed most of the talk because I am rather feckless
in real-world navigation vs. cyberspace and had a difficult time
zeroing in on the meeting geography coordinates (hee, hee). I would
have taken copious notes that would have shamed the best CA cypherpunk
and reported them wholesale if I had got there in time. I would be
interested in hearing anyone else's impressions of the meeting.

Mr. Zimmermann appeared to be somewhat sympathetic to my concerns about
pseudospoofing, particularly on the part of cypherpunks. He entertained
my suggestion of `signature revocation certificates' that would spread
virus-like to revoke trust through the `web of trust' when someone
realized they had been spoofed (betrayed). He seems to think that as
long as everybody follows the guidelines in the PGP documentation, the
`web of trust' would not really ever be corrupted. But he seemed to
come around in thinking that a `signature revocation certificate' might
lead to a more dynamic and responsive (and hence pure) web of trust.

An audience member asked Mr. Zimmermann if his arrangement with
ViaCrypt and licensing of RSA patents was `making stronger' RSA Inc.
and (implicitly) their stranglehold lock on public key patents. He
replied that the agreement actually made PGP stronger.

BTW don't `harass' Mr. Zimmermann over any features, at least don't
expect to see major revisions soon, they are all on the top of the
queue while he is in the `promotion of Viacrypt' stage vs. the `major
development and feature push' stage.


===cut=here===

To: prz@acm.org
Subject: a simple question
Date: Wed, 17 Nov 93 22:11:31 -0700
From: "L. Detweiler" <ld231782>

[Some] cypherpunks have made it clear to me they condone, and perhaps widely
practice, the following scenarios related to PGP:

1) real people signing imaginary identity's keys. I.e., I could make up
different identities (pseudospoofing) and sign their identities, and
have others sign these identities.

2) putting imaginary identities on the key servers. 

do you have some kind of opinion on these practices? they seem rather
dishonest to me, to say the least. But what do I know?

Subject: Re: a simple question
To: ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu (L. Detweiler)
Date: Thu, 18 Nov 93 1:39:13 MST
From: Philip Zimmermann <prz@acm.org>

It's not something I would do myself.  It strikes me as having 
potential to lead to bad situations, as you have described in
earlier notes.  I prefer to deal with people only as my real self.
It strikes me as unethical if used in fraudulent ways.

That's my opinion.

[...]

Regards,
Phil






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Timothy Newsham <newsham@wiliki.eng.hawaii.edu>
Date: Fri, 19 Nov 93 20:42:00 PST
To: ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu (L. Detweiler)
Subject: Re: Key Servers
In-Reply-To: <9311200221.AA27832@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Message-ID: <9311200441.AA15408@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



> Hey, braindead cypherpunks -- do you want to know why there has always
> been so much NOISE in this list's SIGNAL? do you want to know why
> people are so GROUCHY and TYRANNICAL and incapable of any substantial
> AGREEMENT or PROGRESS? because it is a HOTBED OF PSEUDOSPOOFING and all
> this hideous cacophony is your KARMA FOR ENGAGING IN OR PASSIVELY SUBMITTING 
> TO IT.
> 

'HOTBED OF PSEUDOSPOOFING' ?  You are starting to sound like a politician
trying to get re-elected with your made up vocabulary.

I would like to remind you that a great deal of the noise on this list
is seeded by your posts.  I dont disagree with everything you say but
your assessment of this list is incorrect.





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: jim@bilbo.suite.com (Jim Miller)
Date: Fri, 19 Nov 93 16:56:59 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: All our eggs in one basket?
Message-ID: <9311200054.AA13432@bilbo.suite.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Eric Hughes writes

> > Jim Miller writes
> >
> >If I failed to reply with a signed receipt, the bank could invalidate the  

> >digital coin.  

> 

> Unfortunately for this idea, when the bank uses a blind signature to
> issue coins, it doesn't know what coin it just issued actually looks
> like.  The bank signs a blinded form of the coin.  The blinded form is
> unblinded by the withdrawer, and the bank cannot know what it looks
> like.
> 


I just got "Applied Cryptography" so now I know what you mean by "blinded form  
of the coin".

I was thinking that the bank actually constructed the coin, but in fact the  
bank merely signs one of my blinded money orders.  This signed blinded money  
order becomes the "coin" (at least in this scheme).

That being the case, I still not sure how I am protected from a bank that  
cheats by bring the protocol up to the point where I unblind 99 of the money  
orders and the bank deducts the amount from my account but never sends me the  
money.

I have some more reading to do, it seems.

Perhaps I can simply trust the bank not to do this because it wants my future  
business.  Still, if it were possible, I'd prefer not to have to trust the  
bank.  After all, the bank doesn't have to trust me.


Jim_Miller@suite.com





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "L. Detweiler" <ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Date: Fri, 19 Nov 93 18:07:00 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: War of the Worlds
Message-ID: <9311200205.AA27629@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Apparently, many Cypherpunks hold the Wells' program `War of the
Worlds' up as a masterpiece of public deception. `The problem was that
people trusted their radios.' Actually, I think the problem was that
their radios betrayed them. The radio had been built up as a medium of
trust -- with news reports by anchormen that were among some of the
most admired and respected public people. They were betrayed by Wells.
Wells had the sense to apologize, and many new safeguards and taboos
evolved from the fiasco.

War of the Worlds, on the radio, is similar to Medusa building up trust
with tentacles in cyberspace, and then betraying trust by unplugging
them when the going gets tough. Except, however, that Wells and other
officials apologized for their lapse in judgement. With Medusa, there
is no concept of `plugging away' to resolve an unpleasant situation.
Medusa just severs a snake and runs away like a coward or a criminal.
There is nothing but disreputable shame in this.

When CBS (?) broadcast `the day after', a simulation of a nuclear
holocaust, there was a great hullaballoo about all the care they had
taken to ensure that no one took the dramatization seriously. Also, NBC
ran into intensely unpleasant repercussions for their `fake exploding
pickup' piece (didn't someone resign over this)?

The point is that the media takes Truth very seriously. They go to the
greatest lengths to achieve it.

Psychopunks love to cynically talk about how the entire media is just
another disinformation outlet. *You're* just another grotesque
disinformation outlet, deceiving honest reporters and infecting
respectable outlets like Wired and NYT with your soothing lies about
`privacy' and `Big Brother' when really talking about `rights and
protections for criminals'.

The King is Dead. Long Live the King.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "L. Detweiler" <ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Date: Fri, 19 Nov 93 18:22:00 PST
To: "Mark W. Eichin" <eichin@paycheck.cygnus.com>
Subject: Re: Key Servers
In-Reply-To: <9311170305.AA05510@paycheck.cygnus.com>
Message-ID: <9311200221.AA27832@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>Perhaps this is because
>they are both assuming (perhaps incorrectly) that you cannot base
>trust on machinery. Machinery might help propagate existing trust...
>but the trust must start with the people involved (and by that I mean
>the entities themselves, *not* the service maintainers.) 

that's precisely correct. but we can build mechanisms that encourage
human trust, rather than encourage a criminal `free for all'. I seek to
find such mechanisms. Psychopunks seek to subvert, sabotage, and destroy them.

For example, I proposed an arrangement on this list whereby subscribers
promise not to pseudospoof. Obviously, no one here gives a damn. 

I proposed that key servers be implemented that signify the authors
commitment to a code of honest cyberspatial interactions by their key
submissions. Obviously, no one here gives a damn.

I described a *real* and *active* conspiracy in RISKS. Obviously, only
the conspiracists here give a damn.

Hey, braindead cypherpunks -- do you want to know why there has always
been so much NOISE in this list's SIGNAL? do you want to know why
people are so GROUCHY and TYRANNICAL and incapable of any substantial
AGREEMENT or PROGRESS? because it is a HOTBED OF PSEUDOSPOOFING and all
this hideous cacophony is your KARMA FOR ENGAGING IN OR PASSIVELY SUBMITTING TO IT.

>There was a long discussion on another mailing list (with only a
>slightly higher S/N than this one, but far more politics, as the vocal
>membership includes employees of NSF, CIA, ANS, IBM, STD and other
>TLA's :-) about someone who was posting from an address in their name
>representing a political project from an educational site. Someone
>else was curious about this, and contacted the postmaster. They
>contacted the account owner, and had some time of figuring out what
>was going on... turns out it was the *reverse* of PSEUDOSPOOFING,
>namely, there was one account with *several* true names behind it. (It
>was "exposed" because they didn't "keep their stories consistent" or
>something like that.)

You're talking about Extropians? what list? name it, weasel. I still
consider this pseudospoofing -- twisting identity in maliciously
deceptive ways. Using identity to betray people.

If there is any general identity conspiracy, I'll give you 100-1 odds
the psychopunk bastards are behind it. I wouldn't be surprised if it
was a psychopunk bastard behind the Gibson forgery/impersonation on
that other mailing list. You guys have WET DREAMS over ALL OF THIS. perverts.

>Now, do you find this reverse-PSEUDOSPOOFING (I leave the upper case
>letters since I've never seen the world spelled without them)
>objectionable as well?

Just another repulsive variation on psychopunk depravity and
perversions. Honest people would be repulsed by it.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: smb@research.att.com
Date: Fri, 19 Nov 93 17:11:59 PST
To: an15489@anon.penet.fi
Subject: Re: Privacy/Money Orders
Message-ID: <9311200108.AA12849@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


	 

	 Many people use local check cashing stores to cash pay checks and
	 buy money orders.  Money orders are particularly useful when you
	 want to retain some level of privacy when purchasing things like
	 dirty magazines, subversive literature, etc.

	 There are currently two bills in the House that may force these
	 businesses to close.  HR 1448 and HR 3235.  I don't have the
	 text of these bills, but some of the check cashing stores in
	 my 'hood are asking customers to write their Hon. Misrepresentative
	 immediately and ask them to block these bills.

	 Does anyone have access to the text of these bills?

You can get some information on bills via telnet to locis.loc.gov,
the Library of Congress Information Service.  Here's what I found
on those two bills -- it may be possible to get more, if you know
how to work the search engine, which I don't.

ITEM 1 OF 1                    SET 1: BRIEF DISPLAY                FILE: C103
                                (ASCENDING ORDER)
1. H.R.1448: SPON=Rep Fields, C., (Cosp=34); OFFICIAL TITLE: A bill to
        establish a limit on the fee which certain persons may charge for
        cashing checks and other instruments, to require despository
        institutions to cash checks issued by the United States or a State,
        and to provide that checks drawn by the Federal Government may be
        mailed only to the personal residence or primary place of business of
        the payee, to a Federal post office box, or to a federally insured
        depository institution at which the payee holds an account.


ITEM 1 OF 1                    SET 2: BRIEF DISPLAY                FILE: C103
                                (ASCENDING ORDER)
1. H.R.3235: SPON=Rep Gonzalez, (Cosp=6); OFFICIAL TITLE: A bill to amend
        subchapter II of chapter 53 of title 31, United States Code, to
        improve enforcement of antimoney laundering laws, and for other
        purposes.





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: greg@ideath.goldenbear.com (Greg Broiles)
Date: Fri, 19 Nov 93 20:34:45 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: The Zen of Pseudospoofing
Message-ID: <ZcqaDc1w164w@ideath.goldenbear.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


L. Detweiler writes:

> A psychopath asked a policeman to apologize for catching him. The
> policeman refused. The psychopath called him an evil hypocrite.

  ----------

A policeman once lost his sense of right and wrong. He began to act like
a criminal himself. The citizens did not trust him, as he had become what
he had sworn to fight. One day, the other policemen arrested him.

"We are throwing you in jail. You are a bad man. Go, be with your brothers
the criminals."

"You mustn't do that! I'm one of you!" the bad policeman said.

And the other policemen put the bad policeman in jail. The criminals
gathered around him, sneering and laughing and gnashing their teeth.

"Look! A policeman! Let's eat him up!" they said.

"You mustn't do that! I'm one of you!" the bad policeman said.

"Heh heh," the criminals laughed. "Ask your brothers, the policemen,
for help. We have no mercy for you." And, with that, they set upon him.

The policemen listened to the bad policeman's cries, and they laughed too.
"Ha ha," they said. "A criminal is getting what he deserves."


--
Greg Broiles
greg@goldenbear.com                     Baked, not fried.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Black Unicorn <unicorn@access.digex.net>
Date: Fri, 19 Nov 93 20:24:45 PST
To: ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu
Subject: Re: Key Servers
Message-ID: <199311200423.AA22951@access.digex.net>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


->

Just another repulsive variation on psychopunk depravity and
perversions. Honest people would be repulsed by it.
 
<-

I guess it must be because I'm an attorney, I'm attracted to it.





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "L. Detweiler" <ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Date: Fri, 19 Nov 93 22:32:01 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Key vs. Signature revocation & Trust Webs
In-Reply-To: <9311200257.AA28409@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Message-ID: <9311200628.AA01474@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


*key* revocation certificates are in PGP. This an author issues if his
key has been compromised. *signature* revocation certificates are not.
this a signor issues (in theory) if he thinks he has been betrayed
(spoofed or pseudospoofed).

also, notice how keys spread between servers `like a virus'. the
revocation certificates should do so as well. I don't know if key
revocation certificates do so in today's servers. I don't really trust
these servers!

Also, I do not buy arguments that `I cannot ever be fooled, the web of
trust is infallible, key signature revocation is superfluous'. Anywhere
there is trust, there can be betrayal. Believe me, PRZ tried quite a
few of these `I am infallible, I can never be fooled' arguments on me
yesterday! But, PRZ is God. He knows a good idea when he sees one and
will not be influenced by some pseudospoofing campaign by Medusa's
snakes or dangles (double agents) in his `inner circle'.

* * *

I am proposing a completely dynamic, two-way, interactive trust system.
Not something like you inscribe in a book, but something like the Internet.

I was talking to another person at this meeting. I described how today
there is only a one-way, tenuous trust system associated with e.g.
commercial transactions and credit reports. For example: if a company
rips me off, I stop doing business with them, my trust level for them
plunges. But wouldn't other's wish to know of my problem? (Just as if
*I* find that someone is pseudospoofing, shouldn't others be informed?
<g>). Sure, I can send everyone email saying I was ripped off, but this
all happens informally. What about a *formal* system?

Suppose that I put a black mark on the company in the `web of trust' in
a public database -- others may revise their own trust with that
company when they hear they Ripped Off L. Detweiler. Most of the
cypherpunks would probably revise their trust upwards <g>. This
database would be like a yellow pages; anyone can read it when the go
to do business with different companies. This obviously would be a
powerful incentive to a company to mind their p's and q's, eh?
Individuals should be careful though about making specific claims like
`I was unsatisfied with service on date [x]' and not things like
`company [x] rips people off routinely -- I should know'.

Also, consider that a company puts a black mark on your credit record,
erroneously. You contest it, and win. No consequence happens to the
company. What if there was a negative reaction in their `trust level'?
What if there was a public notice entered, `L. Detweiler was molested
by company [x]'? All the trust levels associated with that company's
entries decrease.

Dynamic, two-way systems such as these are what will give consumers
torque over Big Companies. Just as Big Companies make databases about
you to influence their interactions, you can make databases about Big
Companies to influence your own. These are inevitable developments.

Psychopunks would rather fool Big Oppressive Companies into dealing
with fake identities. But this is not acceptable. The company has a
right to know who you are, as much as you have a right to know who they
are. Psychopunk hypocrites, would you do business with an `anonymous
bank'? hee, hee.

Want to get really scared? Public web-of-trust databases will be
developed for *individuals*--e.g., if you post *anywhere* public,
others have a right to tabulate your actions into a central database,
and even comment on them. (hee, hee, next few messages J. Dinkelacker
will pop up and say `this has a very NSA feel to it.'). Others may even
comment on your *private* actions in these databases if they are
particularly offensive or socially dangerous, e.g. `stay away from His
Royal Eminence, while he has made some contributions he is a raving
lunatic, has mailbombed me, harassed my postmaster, and is really
promoting the tax evasion and the collapse of governments and anarchy
under the guise of Liberating Privacy.'

Thanks for letting me talk about this, it all gives me some really
interesting ideas about how to achieve this database. One might set up
a `trust link' in a database whereby each party agrees to a
transaction, and that either can later post a message to that public
`link' regarding the status of that transaction. E.g., individual [x]
can say `I got great service' on the `trust link' or the company can
say `customer [x] failed to pay us'. Links could be cross referenced to
find deadbeats and all that. People would decide who to do business
with based on their trust link policies. But see how this system
benefits *everyone*? You have power over the company, and the company
has power over you. You trust the company, and vice versa. You can zap
their reputation if they betray you, and vice versa.

Another interesting idea is that of `dueling reputations'-- If I have a
high reputation in some area, and I attack someone else in that area,
their trust levels in that area should plummet more than if I had no
reputation in the area. Today, one has to do all this informally, like
posting to newsgroups trying to influence other people that one has been betrayed.

Cypherpunks, this `web of trust' thing is just in its infancy. In a few
years, we will have a Psychopunk's Worst Nightmare. Or an Honest
Person's Civilization.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "L. Detweiler" <ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Date: Fri, 19 Nov 93 22:34:46 PST
To: Timothy Newsham <newsham@wiliki.eng.hawaii.edu>
Subject: Re: Key Servers
In-Reply-To: <9311200441.AA29838@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Message-ID: <9311200632.AA01654@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>I would like to remind you that a great deal of the noise on this list
>is seeded by your posts.  I dont disagree with everything you say but
>your assessment of this list is incorrect.

Mr. Newsham, please tell me how you know this list is not a HOTBED OF
PSEUDOSPOOFING. What, because no *honest* people would do such a thing?
because it would take too much time, patience, and money to insideously
manipuate other's trust? what policy can you point to on the list that
discourages pseudospoofing?

`wherever there is trust, there is betrayal.'




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Mike Ingle <MIKEINGLE@delphi.com>
Date: Fri, 19 Nov 93 20:52:01 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: RSA Patent valid?
Message-ID: <01H5INNXYBWK935MP6@delphi.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


We were having a discussion in my Computers and Society class about
intellectual property, and the professor pointed out that the courts
have consistently upheld patents of devices and processes which
involve computers, but have shot down patents on algorithms. With
that in mind, would the RSA patent stand up in court?

Maybe that's why RSA has never sued anyone. They know the patent might
not hold up, and it's easier to just keep their licensing fees lower
than the cost of a lawsuit. If this is the case, it's good news for
cypherpunks, because it means they will never take any action against us.
  




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "L. Detweiler" <ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Date: Fri, 19 Nov 93 22:57:01 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: J. Gilmore on Pseudospoofing
Message-ID: <9311200655.AA01942@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I appreciate Mr. Gilmore informing me of his opinion on pseudospoofing.
He does not specifically address the issue of whether he is personally
aware of any on the cypherpunks list, unfortunately.

Many people still don't get the pseudonymity vs. pseudanonymity.

>I think that your artificial distinction between "pseudonyms" and
>"pseudospoofing" is the root of where your thinking took a wrong turn.

clearly, a pseudonym on a book cover does not involve active lying.
more treacherous uses of pseudonyms, which I have described in detail, *do*.

there is a difference between `not being obligated to reveal who you
are' (anonymous or pseudonymous) and `lying about who you are' (pseudoanonymous).

but I see I have failed to convince you of that.

===cut=here===
Date: Thu, 18 Nov 93 02:31:26 -0800
From: gnu@toad.com
Subject: Re: RISKS15.25 
To: "L. Detweiler" <ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu>, gnu@toad.com

Hi...

I just took the time to read your rant in RISKS 15.25.

I think you're way off base on several counts.

  *  Electronic media are no different from paper media in making
     it possible to use multiple names.  Talk to Mark Twain, Dr.
     Seuss, Alice Cooper, Poor Richard, Paul French, or Franklin W.
     Dixon if you don't believe me.  My experience is that references
     among aliases in literary works are seen as `in-jokes', which only
     the truly educated (in that particular realm, like science
     fiction) can notice and chuckle over.

     It's legal to use multiple names as long as you don't use them to
     defraud people.

     I use multiple names daily.  Each magazine I subscribe to, or
     organization I belong to, knows me as "EE Gilmore" or "CPSR
     Gilmore".  Then when I get a mailing from some random
     place, I know which organization sold my name to them, and
     if the volume of trash becomes excessive, I can write to the
     offending organization to have my name removed.  My girlfriend
     didn't do this, and she now has a foot-deep stack of glossy catalogs
     that were mailed to her over the last month.  And she doesn't know
     how to stop them coming (and we don't have a woodstove :-).

  *  Your examples imply that some of the people on cypherpunks
     are using pseudonyms to deceive people:

> I have become aware of these serious abuses possible with pseudoanonymous
> posting from my long affiliation with the Cypherpunks, an allegiance I have
> now severed because of my realization of their basic hidden agenda in
> promoting the practice of pseudospoofing, or using pseudoanonymous identities
> in the aforementioned ways to manipulate and systematically deceive others in
> cyberspace.

      I think that you mistake an honest advocacy of the right to use
      multiple names, for an advocacy of deceit.  The main reason to
      use multiple names is so that your "enemies" cannot correlate
      your activities so that they can punish you in one part of your
      life for things they don't like in some other part.

      For example, if you are gay, you might use a pen name when writing
      for local gay publications, so your prejudiced employer won't fire you.
      If you drive a car, you might want to use a different name on your
      driver's license so that "smoke a joint, lose your license" laws
      will not find a record of your license if they catch you with a
      joint.  (There is no correlation between marijuana smoking and
      hazardous driving -- it's simply a punishment technique that happens
      to be considered legal because the "right to drive" is not a right
      guaranteed in any constitution nearby.)

      Another reason to use multiple names is to track what is being
      done with the name you supply, as in my example above.

David Chaum was the first person I noticed advocating the use of a
different pseudonym for transactions with each different organization.
(This was automatically done by a smart-card in his design.)  Is he
part of the evil conspiracy too, or does he have a point worth
hearing?  How would *you* turn back the trend toward having every bit
of information about each person accessible to anyone who knows their
name, date of birth, fingerprint, license number, license plate,
vehicle ID number, passport number, genotype, bank account number,
retina print, credit card number, photo, or social security number?
Or do you think that this is a *good* thing?

I'm not sure why you trust _me_ in this, actually, if you think that
Tim May and Eric Hughes are fake people or possibly the same person.

I think that your artificial distinction between "pseudonyms" and
"pseudospoofing" is the root of where your thinking took a wrong turn.
People are under no obligation to tell you whether the name you know
them by is their only name -- the same way that they don't have to tell
you that though you only know them as "captain of the baseball team",
they are also "clerk in the bank" and "father of three".  By assuming
that "the right way for things to be" is for everyone to have a single
name, uniformly used, you have found a conspiracy where there was
simply a difference of opinion.

You can quote this (in its entirety) to the cypherpunks if you want.
Copyright 1993 John Gilmore.  Reproduction permitted only in entirety.

	John




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "L. Detweiler" <ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Date: Fri, 19 Nov 93 23:12:02 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Key Servers
In-Reply-To: <9311200648.AA01837@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Message-ID: <9311200709.AA02072@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>I dont think this list should have a policy against "pseudo spoofing".
>Even if it did, there would be virtually no way of upholding such a
>policy.  If you are so concerned by this phenomenon then you should
>come up with a technological solution.

there isn't a solution to enforcing honesty. that's why we have criminals.

do you think there is a `code of ethics' in maintaining privacy among
cypherpunks over their email?

why can't we insert into that, `thou shalt not pseudospoof your fellow cypherpunks'?

I can't wait to see the Cypherpunks Code of Ethics. hee, hee. Suddenly
I am having visions of snowballs and Hell.

I would volunteer to start a list of everyone who agrees not to
pseudospoof each other on this list or in private email and distribute
it. But I won't, because the pseudospoofers (esp. those at the top) will not apply.

The pseudospoofers were quite amused by my pseudospoofing survey.
Imagine -- even revealing that they are doing it, without revealing the
identities? What kind of idiot do I think I am?

Hey pseudospoofers -- you are nothing but hypocrites wrapping
yourselves in the flag of privacy while urinating on it. *maybe* you
have a right to imaginary identities in quarantined playpens, like the
Pseudospoofing Game, but not in any serious forum. But why are you such
slime in not revealing to others that you are doing it? because you
want to embezzle, and part of embezzlement is never getting caught.

You think you are getting back at Big Corrupt Businesses. But you are
doing nothing but betraying *everyone* you come in contact with, with
your little identity arsenal fantasies.

The Psychopunk Code of Ethics

Nothing Is Wrong. 
Nothing I Ever Do is Wrong. 
I can Never Admit To Anything because I have Never Done Anything Wrong.
Privacy is Sacred -- Even if You are a Criminal -- Especially if You are a Criminal.

bastards. I used to think that 1/3 of the Royalty was Pure. But it is
3/3rds Corruption. Not only rotten *at* the core, rotten *to* the core.

<vomit>




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: an15489@anon.penet.fi (Jack Daniels)
Date: Fri, 19 Nov 93 16:16:59 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Privacy/Money Orders
Message-ID: <9311200014.AA06267@anon.penet.fi>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain




Many people use local check cashing stores to cash pay checks and
buy money orders.  Money orders are particularly useful when you
want to retain some level of privacy when purchasing things like
dirty magazines, subversive literature, etc.

There are currently two bills in the House that may force these
businesses to close.  HR 1448 and HR 3235.  I don't have the
text of these bills, but some of the check cashing stores in
my 'hood are asking customers to write their Hon. Misrepresentative
immediately and ask them to block these bills.

Does anyone have access to the text of these bills?


Jack

-------------------------------------------------------------------------
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From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: an15489@anon.penet.fi (Jack Daniels)
Date: Fri, 19 Nov 93 16:17:04 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Privacy/Money Orders
Message-ID: <9311200014.AA06272@anon.penet.fi>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain




Many people use local check cashing stores to cash pay checks and
buy money orders.  Money orders are particularly useful when you
want to retain some level of privacy when purchasing things like
dirty magazines, subversive literature, etc.

There are currently two bills in the House that may force these
businesses to close.  HR 1448 and HR 3235.  I don't have the
text of these bills, but some of the check cashing stores in
my 'hood are asking customers to write their Hon. Misrepresentative
immediately and ask them to block these bills.

Does anyone have access to the text of these bills?


Jack

-------------------------------------------------------------------------
To find out more about the anon service, send mail to help@anon.penet.fi.
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From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: jkreznar@ininx.com (John E. Kreznar)
Date: Sat, 20 Nov 93 01:44:46 PST
To: jef@ee.lbl.gov
Subject: Privacy/Money Orders
In-Reply-To: <9311200153.AA26952@ace.ee.lbl.gov>
Message-ID: <9311200859.AA02960@ininx>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Best laff this week!  Thanks!

CICS/MVS dinosaurs live on, I see.  I don't think I've seen the word
ABEND since the '70s!

	John E. Kreznar		| Relations among people to be by
	jkreznar@ininx.com	| mutual consent, or not at all.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: chuck <chuck@cxf111.rh.psu.edu>
Date: Fri, 19 Nov 93 22:42:01 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Key Servers
In-Reply-To: <9311200221.AA27832@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Message-ID: <199311200640.BAA24255@cxf111.rh.psu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text


> Hey, braindead cypherpunks -- do you want to know why there has always
> been so much NOISE in this list's SIGNAL? do you want to know why
> people are so GROUCHY and TYRANNICAL and incapable of any substantial
> AGREEMENT or PROGRESS? because it is a HOTBED OF PSEUDOSPOOFING and all
> this hideous cacophony is your KARMA FOR ENGAGING IN OR PASSIVELY 
> SUBMITTING TO IT.

I believe you forgot this part:

	   UN-altered REPRODUCTION and DISSEMINATION of this 
	   IMPORTANT Information is ENCOURAGED.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Mike Ingle <MIKEINGLE@delphi.com>
Date: Fri, 19 Nov 93 23:17:42 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Secure Drive 1.0 is here!
Message-ID: <01H5ISFUCUO290NQ6V@delphi.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


                              INTRODUCING
                    
                    S E C U R E   D R I V E   1 . 0
                    ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
                             
                             AVAILABLE NOW

Do you have confidential or sensitive information on your DOS/Windows
PC or laptop? Imagine what could happen if that data were to fall into
the wrong hands through theft or unauthorized access.

Protect your privacy with SecureDrive. SecureDrive allows you to create 
an encrypted hard drive partition and encrypted floppy disks. All of
your sensitive data is automatically encrypted with the state-of-the-art
IDEA cipher. You simply log in with your passphrase, and the program is
completely transparent to your applications.

The TSR uses only 2K RAM, and encrypts at the sector level. An intruder
gets nothing - not even your directory listing. You can decrypt your
disks at any time. The program automatically switches on and 
off as
you access encrypted and unencrypted floppies. Invalid passwords will
cause a Drive Not Ready error, locking out writes and protecting your
data from damage.

The program is Copylefted under the GNU General Public License, and source
code in C and assembly language is included. This program is free and
always will be. This program may be freely distributed within the U.S.
and Canada; do not export it.

Cypherpunks Write Code!

Thanks to everyone who helped me beta test this program.
Note: This version is compatible with the beta version.

To receive your copy: send e-mail to <mikeingle@delphi.com>
Specify uuencode or pgp ascii armor formats. I will make a list
and broadcast the code.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: an4914@anon.penet.fi (Nitch)
Date: Fri, 19 Nov 93 19:22:00 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Could someone briefly describe...
Message-ID: <9311200321.AA05898@anon.penet.fi>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Could someone please give a brief description of the "Republic of Desire"
for those of us who haven't spent [US]$27 to see Gibson's _Virtual Light_?

What is it?  A gorilla organization of some sort?

What's it for?  Why is it such a neat thing to talk about?

Thanks in advance...
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
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From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: an12070@anon.penet.fi (Zen Master)
Date: Fri, 19 Nov 93 21:27:01 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: McCarthyism vs. Watergate vs. Kennedy Assassination
Message-ID: <9311200525.AA25278@anon.penet.fi>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


In all cases the people at the top could have insisted there was a
paranoid `witchhunt' or `hysteria' going on.

But in all cases, there *were* some intensely subversive and corrupt
conspiracies going on. In the 50's, the Rosenberg-Soviet espionage ring
was in full circle, stealing pricelessly valuable Atom Bomb secrets.
The Rosenbergs were executed as traitors despite massive public uproar
and appeals all the way to the Supreme Court and President Eisenhower
(who was unmoved). The problem with McCarthyism was not that it was
completely illegitimate (it was fueled by some actual conspiracies),
but that it was carried to extremes.

In Watergate, we had a corruption to the very highest levels of our
executive branch of government, and a grotesque coverup that has so
deeply shakened and poisoned honest people's trust in government for
decades. The probes by Congress were met with evasion, stonewalling,
and counterattacks. Nixon has been viewed as one of the most damaging
presidents (to the institution of the presidency) ever to have been elected.

In the Kennedy Assassination, according to a recent Newsweek, again
there were coverups, but only by our own government to try to suppress
the leaking of any information that might upset the American public
into calling for retaliation against e.g. Cuba or the Soviet Union.
They tried to comfort the public with a rapid investigation with
foregone conclusions, rather than any systematic inquiry into the Truth.

It seems to me that all are examples of how evasion, stonewalling, and
counterattacks on Truth-seeking probes, by high-ranking officials
seeking to promote unsavory or criminal personal `agendas' and their
own respectability at all costs, led to monstrous consequences that
demolished public trust in their most delicate and hallowed
institutions for decades. Truly black consequences.

Cypherpunks, you call it.
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From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: nobody@shell.portal.com
Date: Sat, 20 Nov 93 09:14:50 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: "IDENTITY CHALLENGE!"
Message-ID: <9311201712.AA22293@jobe.shell.portal.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


            jrk@sys.uea.ac.uk (Richard Kennaway) says:

+ Anonymity brings a new class of useless message, of which the
+ following from Black Unicorn <unicorn@net.digex.access> is a recent
+ example.  I quote it in its entirety:
+
+     Having worked in Liechtenstein banks, I can assure you numbered
+     accounts exist.
+
+ "Black Unicorn" is an obvious pseudonym, and I'm assuming that it is
+ not one with an established reputation.  (For all I know, "Black
+ Unicorn" might be as famous as the Legion of Doom, but for the sake of
+ argument I'll assume that it isn't.)
+
+ What is the use of an unsubstantiated assertion, from an unreputed[*]
+ source, with no means of verification?  Having read Black Unicorn's
+ bald asertion, I am as ignorant as before of whether numbered accounts
+ exist, in Liechtenstein or elsewhere.
 
Well, that's as may be, but I would suggest to you that "actual
identities" are unreliable.  I believe that many here could trivially
spoof almost any identity and that in any case, you would personally
be unable to either verify the identity of your correspondent or hold
him accountable for his output.

A couple of recent examples:
                               *

A "Rikiya Asano" <ra01+@andrew.cmu.edu>, apparently a severely
disturbed Japanese student at Carnegie-Mellon University, has been
filling several newsgroups with a remarkable torrent of cross-posted
flamebait for several weeks, including racist insults against whites and
Chinese, physical threats and various assaults on American institutions.
These rants are composed in hilariously fractured English and gain
oceans of angry responses which disrupt the normal progress of the
newsgroups to which they are posted.

Today, I read a post by someone who makes a convincing case that Asano
isn't Japanese and that the whole thing is a spoof.  Maybe "Asano"
exists and maybe he doesn't, but there seems to be no way of either
verifying his true identity or making him stop disrupting these
newsgroups.
                                *

On the other coast, "Andy Freeman" <andy@cs.stanford.edu> authored a
particularly nasty piece of netmail forwarded on to me by its original
recipient.  In it, "Andy Freeman" attacks the practice of anonymity on
Internet and claims to be in the government employ, implicitly in law
enforcement, surveying Internet for illegal activity.  He avers that all
of those who post anonymously have been investigated and identified by
their true names and are on a government hitlist, presumably thanks to
his participation.

Maybe "Andy Freeman" really is an unhinged cop involved in an illegal
investigation of remailers or maybe he is just one of those sick fucks
who like to impersonate policemen and bully people.

                                 *

I personally challenge you, or anyone else on the net, to establish who
these creatures actually are and whether they are what they claim.  I've
given you their "real" names and "real" addresses.  In that both are
bona fide assholes in any case, there's no need to be concerned with
injuring or harassing them - they've got it coming.





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: nobody@cicada.berkeley.edu
Date: Sat, 20 Nov 93 10:02:07 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: War of the Worlds
Message-ID: <9311201800.AA18503@cicada.berkeley.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>taken to ensure that no one took the dramatization seriously. Also, NBC
>ran into intensely unpleasant repercussions for their `fake exploding
>pickup' piece (didn't someone resign over this)?
>

Eh?  I don't think you're talking about the same case:

1) GM lost a $100 million dollar lawsuit: parents of a dead teen sued GM,
   they alleged faulty design caused the truck to explode.
2) NBC ran a story about these exploding trucks.
3) GM claimed the trucks were rigged to explode.
4) NBC consistently denied anything of the sort.
5) GM did their OWN extensive investigation and proved NBC fudged the
   results.
6) NBC finally admitted to rigging the experiment.  They fired three top
   execs of "DateLine" to COVER THEIR ASS.

>The point is that the media takes Truth very seriously. They go to the
>greatest lengths to achieve it.

This is crap.  NBC went through great lengths to cover the truth until
it became clear GM had them.

If for some reason you think eliminating ``pseudospoofing'' will
eliminate disinformation, you're way off since if happens ALL the time
NOW.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Matthew J Ghio <mg5n+@andrew.cmu.edu>
Date: Sat, 20 Nov 93 10:42:09 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: "True Identities"
Message-ID: <8gvaF9C00Vpg1J70VB@andrew.cmu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I find it particularily interesting that on the internet (in contrast to
almost every other net in existance), people have this strange fettish
for worrying about anonymnity and "true names".  My question is why? 
People on other nets never give the using of a handle or nym a second
thought.  (By other nets I mean Fidonet, WWIVnet, TEAMnet, C-Link,
Oggnet, fvnet etc)  A name is just a way of identifying a paritcular
person.  I don't see why people are so opposed to the use of nyms like
Wonderer or Black Unicorn because those don't fit your image of what a
name should be.  These names identify the senders in a manner that is
adequate to the discussion on Cypherpunks.  Would it be any better if
these people used names like Mike or John or something?  Would it really
make any relevant difference to the discussion on cypherpunks?




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: cman@caffeine.io.com (Douglas Barnes)
Date: Sat, 20 Nov 93 13:17:57 PST
To: mg5n+@andrew.cmu.edu (Matthew J Ghio)
Subject: Re: "True Identities"
In-Reply-To: <8gvaF9C00Vpg1J70VB@andrew.cmu.edu>
Message-ID: <199311202103.PAA02966@caffeine.caffeine.io.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> 
> I find it particularily interesting that on the internet (in contrast to
> almost every other net in existance), people have this strange fettish
> for worrying about anonymnity and "true names".  My question is why? 
> People on other nets never give the using of a handle or nym a second
> thought.  (By other nets I mean Fidonet, WWIVnet, TEAMnet, C-Link,
> Oggnet, fvnet etc)  A name is just a way of identifying a paritcular
> person.  I don't see why people are so opposed to the use of nyms like
> Wonderer or Black Unicorn because those don't fit your image of what a
> name should be.  These names identify the senders in a manner that is
> adequate to the discussion on Cypherpunks.  Would it be any better if
> these people used names like Mike or John or something?  Would it really
> make any relevant difference to the discussion on cypherpunks?
> 

I think the problem stems from the way most people initially got access
through the Internet, which was through fairly conservative affiliations
such as the military, government or academia; I've seen relatively few
military, government or academic environments that encouraged or allowed
people to go by "Black Unicorn".

Increasingly, however, people are using the Internet for solely personal
reasons, independent of such affiliations. (Which is how Fidnonet, WWIVnet,
etc. have always been.) Now, no big surprise, we have Black Unicorn, 
Wanderer, etc. I think it's a great testimoney to the rapidly increasing
diviersity of the net. (Although CERTAIN PEOPLE I'm sure will tell me that
such alleged diversity is only a PERVERTED SHAM and the number of REAL
people on the net is RAPIDLY DROPPING.)

-- 
----------------                                             /\ 
Douglas Barnes            cman@illuminati.io.com            /  \ 
Chief Wizard         (512) 447-8950 (d), 447-7866 (v)      / () \
Illuminati Online          metaverse.io.com 7777          /______\



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: cman@caffeine.io.com (Douglas Barnes)
Date: Sat, 20 Nov 93 13:22:09 PST
To: an4609@anon.penet.fi
Subject: Re: McCarthy, etc.
In-Reply-To: <9311201833.AA07472@anon.penet.fi>
Message-ID: <199311202105.PAA02978@caffeine.caffeine.io.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> Your argument is a non-sequitur.  For example, I could expound about
> the crimes of Ivan the Terrible and then conclude pseudospoofing is
> bad.  However, this doesn't make any sense.
> 

Oh? Do you really think is mom called him "the Terrible"?  Aha! 
Another pseudospoofer!

-- 
----------------                                             /\ 
Douglas Barnes            cman@illuminati.io.com            /  \ 
Chief Wizard         (512) 447-8950 (d), 447-7866 (v)      / () \
Illuminati Online          metaverse.io.com 7777          /______\



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: anonymous@phoenix.Princeton.EDU (anonymous)
Date: Sat, 20 Nov 93 12:34:50 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: FWD: Publisher wimps out (PGP pulled from Ziffnet)
Message-ID: <9311202021.AA09051@Princeton.EDU>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>
>Date: Fri, 19 Nov 1993 17:47:09 -0600 (UTC -06:00)
>From: "Frank A. Kaul".<FKAUL@kuhub.cc.ukans.edu>
>Subject: PGP pulled from Ziffnet
>To: libernet@Dartmouth.EDU
>
>A couple of weeks ago I downloaded PGP from Ziffnet due to the 
>justice department crackdown.  I visited their software libraries
>today and was greeted with the following notice!
>
>>
>> Pretty Good Privacy (PGPRIV.ZIP) Removed
>>  ----------------------------------------
>>   We must extend our apologies to those of you who read the CompuServe
>>   Magazine article on Data Encryption and tried to find PGPRIV.ZIP here
>>   in our library.  Due to the controversial nature of Phil Zimmerman's
>>   Pretty Good Privacy program and the fact that several legal questions
>>   surrounding this program have remained unanswered, we have removed it
>>   from our library. We are investigating the legal issues concerning its
>>   distribution, and it will remain unavailable until further notice.
>>
>>   Again, we apologize for the inconvenience.
>>
>
>Talk about a chilling effect.
>
>Frank A. Kaul
>fkaul@oread.cc.ukans.edu






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: kelly@netcom.com (Kelly Goen)
Date: Sat, 20 Nov 93 16:52:10 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: (fwd) Re: Prosody Release Cancelled Under "NSA" Pressure
Message-ID: <199311210049.QAA11572@mail.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Organization: NETCOM On-line Communication Services (408 241-9760 guest)

Xref: netcom.com sci.crypt:19346 talk.politics.crypto:1241
Path: netcom.com!csus.edu!csulb.edu!library.ucla.edu!europa.eng.gtefsd.com!howland.reston.ans.net!spool.mu.edu!nigel.msen.com!yale.edu!cmcl2!mcclb0!huff
From: huff@mcclb0.med.nyu.edu (Edward J. Huff)
Newsgroups: sci.crypt,talk.politics.crypto
Subject: Re: Prosody Release Cancelled Under "NSA" Pressure
Followup-To: talk.politics.crypto
Date: 13 Nov 93 04:25:15 EST
Organization: NYU Medical Center, New York, NY 10016, USA
Lines: 43
Distribution: world
Message-ID: <1993Nov13.042515.1@mcclb0>
References: <931112.49291.KEITHWRITERS@delphi.com>
NNTP-Posting-Host: mcclb0.med.nyu.edu

Followups to talk.politics.crypto

In article <931112.49291.KEITHWRITERS@delphi.com>, KEITHWRITERS@delphi.com writes:

 
Technosys Press Release
 
For More Information, Contact:
Keith Boyle, marketing director
keithwriters@delphi.com
limetwig@mindvox.phantom.com
 
					For Release 10:47 AMEST
					November 12, 1993
 
Mirrorshades & Prosody Release Cancelled
 
The scheduled release of Technosys' text composition program Mirrorshades
and text revision/encryption program Prosody has been cancelled because of
pressure from a governmental group claiming to be the National Security
Administration (NSA) wishing to prevent the release of Prosody as an
encryption program.
 
The "NSA" has expressed concern over the encryption method used by
Prosody. They feel that it may be using an encryption technology similar
enough to another method of natural language encryption that Prosody might
be able to be used to break that coding method. Therefore, they would like
Technosys to hand over all existing copies of the software, technical &
development notes, and software related to Prosody (i.e. Mirrorshades) for
their research.
 
Since the next step, if Technosys were to refuse, would be the seizure of all
of the above materials by search warrant and criminal charges, Technosys has
chosen to consent to their request and will cancel the release of these
programs.
 
However, THE MAN can't seize what's in our brain cells...
 
(Technosys is looking for good information law representation.
 Anyone interested?)
 
 
-=-=-=-=-=-=-=--=-=-=-=--=-=-=-=-=30-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=---=-==-=--=-=-=-=-




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: jim@bilbo.suite.com (Jim Miller)
Date: Sat, 20 Nov 93 15:37:25 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: All our eggs in one basket?
Message-ID: <9311202336.AA03499@bilbo.suite.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Alan (Gesture Man) Wexelblat writes:

> Today we use paper cash and paper forms.  I go to the bank to
> make a withdrawal, I fill out a paper form requesting
> money.  They take the form, fail to give me cash, claim that
> I have been given cash.  What recourse do I have?  (Several
> is the answer, but the point is that it's not a problem new
> to digicash.)
> 

> Today I order from a supplier.  I send a paper form of
> payment (P.O., check, paper copy of my CC #, etc.).  They
> cash such form and do not send me goods (or claim that they
> did and they were lost in transit).  What recourse do I
> have?  (Again, several.  Again the point is that digicash
> does not seem to be introducing new problems; rather it's
> giving us new forms of old ones.)
> 


I agree these problems are not new to digicash, but if we can design a digicash system  
that eliminates these problems, then we should.

I don't know if it has been designed yet, or even if it's possible, but I would like to see a  
digicash system that does not force the user or the merchant to trust the bank.  The  
merchant and user should be able to use an arbitrator to solve any dispute that may arrise.
(assuming it gets that far)

I don't feel it is good enough to trust in a reputation mechanism to prevent banks (or  
anyone) from cheating.  We shoud try to do better.

Actually, disputes may arrise without any cheating involved.  Hardware and software  
failures may create situations that appear to be attempts to cheat.  (I don't know this as a  
fact.  Just my gut feel.)

The less trust required, the easier it will be for all parties to settle disputes.  (another gut  
feel)


Jim_Miller@suite.com




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: an4609@anon.penet.fi (Dr. Manhattan)
Date: Sat, 20 Nov 93 10:34:50 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: McCarthy, etc.
Message-ID: <9311201833.AA07472@anon.penet.fi>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



>[examples of McCarthy, Watergate, Kennedy]

>It seems to me that all are examples of how evasion, stonewalling, and
>counterattacks on Truth-seeking probes, by high-ranking officials
>seeking to promote unsavory or criminal personal `agendas' and their
>own respectability at all costs, led to monstrous consequences that
>demolished public trust in their most delicate and hallowed
>institutions for decades. Truly black consequences.

I fail to see your point in this: was there any pseudospoofing in the
above scenarios?  Anybody lie about their own identity?

Your argument is a non-sequitur.  For example, I could expound about
the crimes of Ivan the Terrible and then conclude pseudospoofing is
bad.  However, this doesn't make any sense.

Even so, just because somebody "pseudospoofs" doesn't mean they are
out to promote their own criminal agenda.  Your arguments are always
hypothetical: if somebody pseudospoofs then blah blah blah.  Why don't
you call for the ban of automobiles because innocent people are killed
in accidents?

-------------------------------------------------------------------------
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From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Derek Atkins <warlord@MIT.EDU>
Date: Sat, 20 Nov 93 16:02:10 PST
To: "L. Detweiler" <ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Subject: Re: Key vs. Signature revocation & Trust Webs
In-Reply-To: <9311200628.AA01474@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Message-ID: <9311202358.AA05068@podge.MIT.EDU>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>  *signature* revocation certificates are not.
> this a signor issues (in theory) if he thinks he has been betrayed

While signature revocation certificates have not been implemented,
their precense is possible within PGP.  There is a packet header that
defines such an animal!

I have been a fervent supporter of having such certificates
implemented.  I've even, with some others, developed a fairly good way
to do them: You put a timestamp on it, and if the revocation timestamp
is after the signature timestamp, then the revocation takes
precedence.  If the signature timestamp is greater than the revocation
timestamp, then the signature is kept and the revocation is thrown
out.

In fact, this same design can be used for UserID revocations as well,
in order to get rid of bogus userIDs.

> also, notice how keys spread between servers `like a virus'. the
> revocation certificates should do so as well. I don't know if key
> revocation certificates do so in today's servers. I don't really trust
> these servers!

Keys, revocations, new userIDs, signatures.  *ALL* of these act like a
virus.  Once anything is added to a keyserver, all the keyservers get
them.  Revocations are propagated as quickly as new signatures, or new
keys.  As for trusting the servers, well, you don't seem to trust
anybody, but besides that point, you should trust the cryptographic
material you get back from the keyservers in that you can verify the
signatures on those certificates.  In other words, you should not
blindly accept data you get from a keyserver as correct, without
verifying the signatures on it.

Anyways, hopefully this will get implemented sometime soon.  Although
I'm not holding my breath; there are more pressing matters.

-derek

         Derek Atkins, SB '93 MIT EE, G MIT Media Laboratory
     Secretary, MIT Student Information Processing Board (SIPB)
         PGP key available from pgp-public-keys@pgp.mit.edu
            warlord@MIT.EDU       PP-ASEL        N1NWH





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: jim@bilbo.suite.com (Jim Miller)
Date: Sat, 20 Nov 93 17:22:11 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: (fwd) Re: Prosody Release Cancelled Under "NSA" Pressure
Message-ID: <9311210117.AA05011@bilbo.suite.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



I thought the "Prosody cancellation" post was a hoax.  Anyone know anything  
more about it?

Jim_Miller@suite.com





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: jim@bilbo.suite.com (Jim Miller)
Date: Sat, 20 Nov 93 17:32:10 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Key Servers
Message-ID: <9311210128.AA05178@bilbo.suite.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



> `wherever there is trust, there is betrayal.'

Therefore, reducing your dependency on trust will reduce the opportunities for  
betrayal.

Jim_Miller@suite.com





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Sameer <sameer@uclink.berkeley.edu>
Date: Sat, 20 Nov 93 19:52:10 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: C-source for diffie-hellman?
Message-ID: <m0p15mc-000J6eC@infinity.hip.berkeley.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


	I was just talking with a friend, and I think it would be
pretty good for medium-level security on irc to hack up something do
that /dcc does diffie-hellman key exchange, and maybe triple-des or
something.
	Is there some available C-source which would help? (I guess I
should get the Schneier book.. But urgh! $50 on a "starving-student"
budget is quite a bit.)




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: nobody@shell.portal.com
Date: Sat, 20 Nov 93 20:12:11 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Duress Codes
Message-ID: <9311210357.AA19408@jobe.shell.portal.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> From: baldwin@LAT.COM (Bob Baldwin)

> A fellow I know has a central-office alarm in his home.  When
> the alarm goes off, the office calls his house to ask if it was a false
> alarm.  They ask for a password to verify, and no matter what password
> you give they say "OK, I'll log it as a false alarm."  If you gave the
> wrong password, they call the police and notify them of a crime in
> progress with hostages.

For many years, I worked for a small company that provided various
protective services to government, diplomatic and executive accounts.
One of the services was electronic security and direct monitoring of
emergency EDCs [electronic digital communicators] and other signalling
devices connected to security equipment.

At the beginning of my employment, the procedure you mention above was
standard throughout the more mainstream electronic security industry.  A
series of unusually violent robberies changed this in the mid-1980s.

The problem with the system is that call-backs on "panic button"
or duress code activations make it clear - or at least suggest - that
the victims have alerted the authorities.  In an increasing number of
cases, answering the callback was literally the last thing the victims
ever did.

In spite of frequent complaints due to false-alarm fines levied by the
police and moments of great embarrassment, the common procedure became
immediate notification of of the police or "other security," with no
callback then or later.

All duress codes on our electronic equipment was modified to perform the
exact functions as non-duress codes, but activated silent duress alarms.

Since that time, most manufacturers and programmers of security devices
have taken that approach - identical function, but with silent alarms.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "L. Detweiler" <ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Date: Sat, 20 Nov 93 20:04:58 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: EFF's Kapor on Political Philosophy
Message-ID: <9311210404.AA16595@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Mr. Kapor's words of wisdom. I will not comment except to say that I
don't think he has accurately characterized the Cypherpunk position.

===cut=here===

Date: Sat, 20 Nov 1993 11:46:50 -0500
From: mkapor@kei.com (Mitchell Kapor)

Rich Karlgaard <0005096930@mcimail.com> wisely observes:

>       ...the range of
>political opinion in the U.S. is not always spread
>along a single axis of left to right. I believe
>there is another axis ascendant. It is
>authoritarian/libertarian.
>       Try this exercise. Draw a left-to-right
>line across a page. Then draw a vertical line from
>top to bottom, labeling it Authoritarian on top,
>Libertarian on bottom. You have just created a
>grid with four quadrants.

I have tried to illustrate his point.  My deficiencies as a graphic artist
are equaled only by the impoverished of ASCII as a graphical medium.


Karlgaard's two axes:


     -----------authoritarian------------
     |               ^                  |
     |               |                  |
     |<----left------|------ right----> |
     |               |                  |
     |               v                  |
     -----------libertarian--------------


I want to substitute "anti-authoritarian" for "libertarian", as follows:

     ----------- authoritarian----------
     |               ^                  |
     |               |                  |
     |<----left------|------ right----> |
     |               |                  |
     |               v                  |
     -----------anti-authoritarian-------


Doing this permits distinguishing two varieties of anti-authoritarian, the
decentralist and the libertarian.

    --------------------------------------
    |                 |                   |
    |                 |                   |
    |-------------------------------------|
    |  decentralist   |  libertarian      |
    |                 |                   |
    ---------------------------------------

In my terminology Libertarian  is used to refer more specifically to the
right quadrant of the anti-authoritarian position.  The left side of the
anti-authoritarian space I have chosen to call decentralist.

As Rich indicates, on some issues, like NAFTA and, I might add, the Clipper
Chip, the opposing sides are divided, not on liberal-conservative political
lines, but on the horizontal axis.

I would claim that the lower half of the political space simply be called
anti-authoritarian and that it is divided into two quadrants: on the left,
the decentralist, and on the right, the libertarian.

You can see how this works on Clipper chip and other privacy issues related
to encryption.  EFF chairs a coalition of 60 organizations, from the
American Petroleum Institute to the ACLU, which opposes government control
of encryption.  You have cypherpunks and corporate interests aligned on
this issue, because they all want decentralization of control over
encryption technology.

On issues where the goal is to remove government-imposed barriers, like
privacy,  there is easy agreement between left-leaning decentralists and
right-leaning libertarians.  The coherence of EFF's Board resides in the
libertarian-decentralist commonality of interest which is more important
than conventional divisions of left-right politics.

On the other hand, the sometimes fractious nature of the public interest
community, of which EFF is part, can be seen to in splits along the same
horizontal axis. EFF supports private sector ownership and operation of the
National Information Infrastructure,, Many other public interest
organizations share the same general goals of openness for the NII as EFF
but prefer approaches lying above the horizontal midline, e.g., through
direct government ownership or operation of the NII.

Infrastructure is a trickier issue than privacy. All anti-authoritarians
would agree that a government-built NII is the wrong approach.  However,
there seems to be more willingness among many on the net who think of
themselves as libertarians to leave it entirely to private industry to
build the NII, where government abandons any role, even as referee.   If we
wound up with an NII controlled by an oligopoly of enormous corporate
interests which resulted in centralized control over content, it would be a
bad thing.  If independent content providers can't easily get on the
network, it would be a huge catastrophe.

It seems to me that, in principle, corporate authoritarianism is as
dangerous as government authoritarianism, and this is an issue which may
separate left-quadrant and right-quadrant anti-authoritarians.

A libertarian would argue that if government got out of the way, e.g.,
deregulated telecommunications and let everybody compete, it would be
sufficient to achieve the right kind of NII.  Personally, I think that's
naive.  A more considered libertarian view would be that either the market
will produce the desired result by itself OR IT WON'T, but there is nothing
anybody can do to alter the outcome.  Thus government should stay out of
it, and the public interest community should go home.  To me, this is both
fatalistic and simplistic.

A decentralist would say that deregulation alone is not necessarily going
to be sufficient to produce a decentralized NII.  It might be and it might
not.  But if it is not, we do not need to be fatalists about it.  We have
the opportunity to try to influence the outcome both by working at the
level of raising consciousness and through the possibility legislation
which ratifies some sort of hard-fought compromise that achieves certain
goals (e.g. for new common carriage or new universal service).  This
embodies the EFF approach.

We may all get lucky in the sense that the architecture of consumer
broadband networks winds up following a model which is more, rather than
less, like the Internet in its openness and decentralization.  This appears
to be the general direction Bell Atlantic is taking.  However, while their
system is open (in terms of common carriage or system architecture), it is
heavily asymmetrical with a big downstream pipe and a small upstream pipe,
at least for the foreseeable future.

If the TCI merger goes through, and if they are able to rationalize two
different networks, business models, and corporate cultures, what obtains
for BA will hold for  TCI too.  There are some mighty big ifs here, and in
any event Bell Atlantic/TCI only serves 25% of the country.  Other
carriers, who have a different business model which does not emphasize
revenue from transport a la Bell Atlantic, but revenue from content, may
choose to go with closed, channelized systems.

We have to see what other cable companies and telcos actually offer.
Increasingly I am going to focus my efforts on understanding the likely
architectural deployments of the carriers and how close they come to EFF's
model of an open platform.  The pragmatic question which faces us as we
fill in the picture with details will be what, if anything, can be done, to
nudge the system into providing alternatives which are closer to open
platforms.

All in all, I'd prefer to try to catalyze any necessary changes in mindset
of carriers in order to secure voluntary moves.  But as a pragmatist I
believe that government action, or certainly the threat of it, may be
useful or, in the worst case, necessary, to achieve the desired end.
Further, since the whole process is already highly politicized, I think
involvement to prevent bad governmental solutions from being imposed and
screwing things up is clearly necessary.  Thus politics is inevitably
involved to carry out a an anti-authoritarian mission.  At least in my
view.






...................................................................

Mitchell Kapor, Chairman                    <mkapor@kei.com>
Electronic Frontier Foundation

*** Join EFF!!!  Send mail to membership@eff.org for information ***





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: lex@mindvox.phantom.com (Lex Luthor)
Date: Sat, 20 Nov 93 19:52:27 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: "True Identities"
Message-ID: <icJcDc1w165w@mindvox.phantom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



mg5n+@andrew.cmu.edu (Matthew J Ghio) Writes:

>> 
>> I find it particularily interesting that on the internet (in contrast to
>> almost every other net in existance), people have this strange fettish
>> for worrying about anonymnity and "true names".  My question is why? 
>> People on other nets never give the using of a handle or nym a second
>> thought.  (By other nets I mean Fidonet, WWIVnet, TEAMnet, C-Link,
>> Oggnet, fvnet etc)  A name is just a way of identifying a paritcular
>> person.  I don't see why people are so opposed to the use of nyms like
>> Wonderer or Black Unicorn because those don't fit your image of what a
>> name should be.  These names identify the senders in a manner that is
>> adequate to the discussion on Cypherpunks.  Would it be any better if
>> these people used names like Mike or John or something?  Would it really
>> make any relevant difference to the discussion on cypherpunks?
>> 

Douglas Barnes Writes:

>
>I think the problem stems from the way most people initially got access
>through the Internet, which was through fairly conservative affiliations
>such as the military, government or academia; I've seen relatively few
>military, government or academic environments that encouraged or allowed
>people to go by "Black Unicorn".
>
>Increasingly, however, people are using the Internet for solely personal
>reasons, independent of such affiliations. (Which is how Fidnonet, WWIVnet,
>etc. have always been.) Now, no big surprise, we have Black Unicorn, 
>Wanderer, etc. I think it's a great testimoney to the rapidly increasing
>diviersity of the net. (Although CERTAIN PEOPLE I'm sure will tell me that
>such alleged diversity is only a PERVERTED SHAM and the number of REAL
>people on the net is RAPIDLY DROPPING.)
>

I agree, background is the key. 

This whole conversation about Nyms, pseudospoofing, etc. is interesting.
>From DAY ONE of me using a computer/modem/BBS/EMAIL in 1983 all I ever knew
was to use a handle/pseudonym. On the underground BBS systems, using a real
name or even a real-sounding name (even if it was a handle) would cause a
good deal of suspicion and would make getting verified for full access
difficult. I am constantly amazed how people routinely use their
real names in conversations over the internet. I don't judge them however, I
don't think they are stupid either, its just DIFFERENT than the way I am 
used to operating.

The complete opposite viewpoint seems to be prevalent among those who have
been using the internet for years -- before the general public started to
overrun it. Those people have been accustomed to communicating with people
who seemed to be real, at least they had real sounding names. Now an
increasing number of pseudo-entities are appearing on the Internet. Some are
disturbed by this. To me, its more like "what took so long". 

With irresponsible people sending mail bombs, using personal information 
from 'finger' to harass people they don't agree with, etc. it isn't hard to
see why some people have reservations about various anonymous or pseudo-
anonymous entities. The problem lies in the fact that creating a new identity
on the internet either by creating additional user accounts or through the
use of anonymous remailers is so easily accomplished that the concept of
trust and reputation has been eroded. This is different from my background
whereas reputation was essentially EVERYTHING and the creation of a new
identity that allowed one to use desirable systems/services (ie, 'elite'
systems) took long periods of time. The benefit of this type of social
structure was that it naturally kept abuse, deception, and harassment to
a minimum. 

I am not sure what my ultimate point is (as you may have surmised by now)
other than there are inherent differences in each Internet user's background
just as there are cultural differences among races in real life. There 
unfortunately will always be some prejudice against those who are different.
Isn't a lot of energy saved simply by basing judgement on what others SAY
and DO rather than what they LOOK LIKE or in this case, what their
'name' or 'nym' is? 
                    
Lex





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Derek Atkins <warlord@MIT.EDU>
Date: Sat, 20 Nov 93 20:27:10 PST
To: sameer@uclink.berkeley.edu
Subject: Re: C-source for diffie-hellman?
In-Reply-To: <m0p15mc-000J6eC@infinity.hip.berkeley.edu>
Message-ID: <9311210424.AA05539@podge.MIT.EDU>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


RSAREF version 1.1 (and higher) has Diffie Helman key exchange in
it.  I suggest you ftp this from rsa.com and try it.

-derek

         Derek Atkins, SB '93 MIT EE, G MIT Media Laboratory
     Secretary, MIT Student Information Processing Board (SIPB)
         PGP key available from pgp-public-keys@pgp.mit.edu
            warlord@MIT.EDU       PP-ASEL        N1NWH




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: markvoor@mindvox.phantom.com (Mark Voorhees)
Date: Sun, 21 Nov 93 07:42:21 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: unsubscribe
Message-ID: <L5FDDc1w165w@mindvox.phantom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


unsubscribe cypherpunks
subscribe announce Mark Voorhees

//////////////////////
//  Mark Voorhees //
markvoor@phantom.com
\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Sameer <sameer@uclink.berkeley.edu>
Date: Sun, 21 Nov 93 13:57:25 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Does someone know about irc "/on"?
Message-ID: <m0p1Mhd-000J6pC@infinity.hip.berkeley.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

	Like I posted earlier, I'm working a bit to do diffie-hellman
key exchange for the IRC. I was hoping to incorporate it into the
source, and implement it via /dcc, but that's too tough. I've figured
out a scheme which will work, but I don't know how to implement it in
irc.. I'm wondering if anyone here knows how to do what I want--

	(I still don't have my RNG working correctly, but I could
probably grab one from someplace.. or leech off the ~/pgp/randseed.bin
file.)

	Here's my scheme:

	Suppose I want to initiate an encrypted conversation with Alice.

In irc, I do /startdh Alice

What startdh does is call
	"ircdh Alice"

	"ircdh Alice" computes XB, saves it to a file /tmp/dh.Alice,
and outputs to stdout, YB.

	startdh should then take the output of ircdh Alice and send it
to alice, as a /ctcp send of type "dh-key"

When Alice receives the
	/ctcp of type "dh-key"

irc automatically should call:

	"ircdh Sameer YB" (YB is the information in the ctcp packet.

	ircdh will create an XA, and output YA and the key to stdout.

	on getting this information, irc should send YA to Sameer, and
do /encrypt Sameer <key>. (The standard encryption routine in irc is
insecure, but there's a facility for an external crypt program..)

When I receive the
	/ctcp of type "dh-key"

irc automatically should call
	"ircdh Alice YA" (where YA is the information Alice sent me)

	ircdh will see that a /tmp/dh.Alice already exists, so it will
grab the XB from that file, and then compute a key, which it returns.

	Then irc should take the output of "ircdh Alice YA" and have
it do /encrypt Alice <key> where <key> is the output from ircdh Alice
YA.


	So I have the program ircdh working, except for my RNG. I need
help with the interface with irc. Any ircII wizards out there? Thanks.

- -Sameer


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From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Timothy Newsham <newsham@wiliki.eng.hawaii.edu>
Date: Sun, 21 Nov 93 17:43:21 PST
To: sameer@uclink.berkeley.edu
Subject: Re: Does someone know about irc "/on"?
In-Reply-To: <m0p1Mhd-000J6pC@infinity.hip.berkeley.edu>
Message-ID: <9311220143.AA28056@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



I wrote a package for doing encryption over irc called Circ.  It was posted
to comp.sources.misc and should be in the archives.  It is currently not
extremely secure,  the weakest link is the random key generation which is
seeded by the time.  This is very easy to brute force if you have any
information on the time (even if you know the time to within a year).
The program uses RSA to exchange secret keys and uses tripleDes to encrypt
messages.  

The program is implemented as a binary written in C and talks to ircII through
/on's and /alias'es.  The script used by Circ is included below and may
give you some ideas on how to interact with ircII.





# this is for ircII 2.2.4
# for some reason, /on ^public acts differently

# Start up the proggie
/^exec -name crypt exec new

# automatically pick out protocol messages
#    crypt processor gets:   !send nick!CLIPPER:...etc
#    or   !our nick!SKPJACK:...etc 
# under 2.2.4 public has:  nick channel message
#   the version I use has  nick message
#   this is the difference between the two script versions
/on ^public "* * CLIPPER:*" /msg %crypt !$0!$2-
/on ^public "* * SKPJACK:*" /msg %crypt OURNICK:$N;/msg %crypt !$0!$2-
/on ^public_other "* * CLIPPER:*" /msg %crypt !$0:$1!$2-
/on ^public_other "* * SKPJACK:*" /msg %crypt OURNICK:$N;/msg %crypt !$0:$1!$2-

/on ^msg "* CLIPPER:*" /msg %crypt !*$0*!$1-
/on ^msg "* SKPJACK:*" /msg %crypt OURNICK:$N;/msg %crypt !*$0*!$1-

# messages comming back from crypt, to server or screen?
/on ^exec "crypt TCHANNL: *" /msg $C $2-
/on ^exec "crypt TSCREEN: *" /echo $2-
/on ^exec "crypt TNICKNM: *" /msg $2 $3-

# our irc commands:
#    /key nick  or /key nick filename
#    /die
#    /e message to be encrypted
#    /p message to be plaintext
#    /crypt   (turn on automatic encryption)
#    /plain   (turn off automatic encryption)
#    /emsg nick text  send an encrypted message
/alias key /echo K->*$0* Sending Key;/^msg %crypt SENDKEY: $0-
/alias die /^msg %crypt QUITDIE:;/query 
/alias e /echo E> $0-;/^msg %crypt CRYPTME:$0-
/alias p /msg $C $0-
/alias crypt /query %crypt
/alias plain /query
/alias emsg /echo E->*$0* $1-;/^msg %crypt !$0!CRYPTME:$1-

/echo *** Encrypted Irc Protocol loaded. 




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: strata@fenchurch.MIT.EDU (M. Strata Rose)
Date: Sun, 21 Nov 93 22:42:26 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Virtual City Network update
Message-ID: <199311220639.BAA19735@fenchurch.MIT.EDU>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Virtual City Network(tm) Status Report, 11/21/93

Greetings, in some cases long overdue.

If you are reading this directly (ie, not as a mailing list or netnews),
your mail has been received and you have been either added to the
virtual-citizens mailing list or preregistered for the Virtual City 
Network.  I apologize for the delay in acknowledging correspondence
from everyone.  Here is a brief status report:

Roughly a week after the initial announcement of Virtual City Network,
I took a supposedly short term (one month) systems architect contract to
generate income so that I could continue working on VCN.  This allegedly
3/4-time position quickly turned into a 1 and 1/4 time position and
will last until the first week of January.  This has resulted in most
of the substantive coding work on VCN being postponed in favor of 
design work which can be done offline, research and meetings
with various interested parties, business contacts, fellow researchers,
etc.

For the last few months, virtual.net has been occupying a corner of
a workroom at a friendly company and unofficially sharing a T1 net link.
Unfortunately for us, this firm is expanding and needs the space for
their own use.  I have been exploring various options for office space
and sharing network bandwidth to meet their deadline for moving the
system.

When the first of the recent sendmail bug announcements hit the
Internet, we had a breakin and I had to spend a substantial amount of
time going over the server to make sure nothing had been compromised.
Thursday morning I logged in as usual to find that we had
had *another* breakin on the server, this time much more serious than
the first.  Someone was allegedly using virtual-city.virtual.net as
a link in a chain of telnet sessions, ultimately ending up on IRC and
behaving offensively and objectionably.   I am still investigating this
incident.

Having two (or possibly more) crackers on the system within a 3 week
time period has been something of a last straw.  Since I had a hard
deadline of December 1st to move the system anyway, I took it offline
on Friday evening (Nov 19th).

At this point, the server is shut down and sitting in my livingroom.  I
will be bringing it up again in the next few days, and am arranging a
56K line to the house for access; right now we only have PPP 14.4Kbps 
service at home.  I am setting up an MX server so that mail to
virtual.net will continue to be delivered, that should be in place by
Tuesday evening.  Virtual-city.virtual.net is going to get a complete
system upgrade and security overhaul before it comes back online.

I will be installing a LISTSERV style mail handler for registration 
and automated handling of queries.  I will send an announcement when
the software is in place, probably sometime during the Thanksgiving
weekend.  I will not be turning on the virtual-citizens mailing list
until the LISTSERV is set up, as I cannot respond to add and delete
requests in a timely fashion while I am contracting on outside work.

Mail to virtual.net will not be working until the MX record and my
secondary server are both in place, so please send mail to me at either
of the following addresses:

strata@fenchurch.mit.edu
strata@hybrid.com

Please continue to send me questions and suggestions, I will respond
to each and every one, albeit rather slowly.  Thanks for being patient.

Even though I won't be able to do much in the way of power coding
until early January, I have been getting a lot accomplished.
This thing has a lot of moving parts, so I'm doing comprehensive
design rather than hacking stuff together.  Once some of the low-level
stuff is actually coded and not just on paper we should hit critical
mass within a fairly short time and VCN will start living up to its 
potential.  I am hoping to open the service to City Builders and 
Freelance Architects in mid to late January.

New Year's Party in the Virtual City Plaza?  Could still 
happen, but probably not with most of the interactive multimedia
originally planned, we're running about a month or two behind.
But you never know, I'm looking into some great Tcl/Tk stuff that
may not be hard to get running in the short term, even with the
massive constraints on my time right now.  I will send out updates
as I know more, and invite all of you to test features as they
materialize.

I hope to make documentation available soon on the design of VCMTA and
the VCNCoreLib.  Right now I am pretty deep into designing the 
underlying structure of VCMTA, so I will be outsourcing a fair chunk
of the actual MOO hacking on the server structure.  At this point I
have design specs for various VCNCoreLib features (the built-in 'bot 
specs, Eliza handlers, etc) and am interested in contracting out
the actual implementation-- I am still a novice at low-level MOO 
coding and want to make sure this stuff is very clean and very solid!

I have some limited funding available for server hacking, especially
the load and unload core functions, so if you are an experienced MOO 
coder who would like to do some moonlighting, please contact me.  The
pay isn't great, but you'll be getting paid to write public-domain
MOO code that will be part of something Way Cool, and to potentially
co-author a paper on extensible server design that will be submitted
to a major VR conference next year.  Think of it as being a grad 
student at a non-accredited virtual university.  Not to mention
your name in virtual lights on the Marquee in every CityKit that 
goes out.  :-)

Those of you who have pet projects or ideas about facilities that should
be included in the Virtual City Network, please send me mail, especially
if you're interested in building them yourself and making them available
for others to use.  People who are interested in designing spaces in 
the city should start to design them on paper/in bits now so that they
can upload them easily once VCN opens.  We will be supporting HTML
documents as well as plain text for room descriptions, and will be 
setting up a Rogue's Gallery of players for browsing.  The Rogue's
Gallery will be accessible via Gopher and WWW as well-- you can work
on the text of your character's description and create GIF files of the
character, your planned virtual spaces, etc, right now and then have
them readily available to upload later.  Feel free to get started now!
Design your virtual spaces and the objects that should be in them, 
get busy on that artwork, and watch for more mail from us.

Closing the gap between Theorem Et Practicum,
_Strata

M. Strata Rose
Unix & Network Consultant, SysAdmin & Internet Information 
Virtual City Network
strata@virtual.net | strata@hybrid.com | strata@fenchurch.mit.edu

[Virtual City Network is a trademark of VirtualNet and M. Strata Rose.]




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: an12070@anon.penet.fi (S.Boxx)
Date: Mon, 22 Nov 93 00:02:27 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: The Cypherpunk Glossary
Message-ID: <9311220759.AA12395@anon.penet.fi>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


democracy -- (1) Government by the people, exercised either directly or
through elected representatives. (2) a nation or social unit with this
form of government. (3) Social and political equality and respect for
the individual within the community.

Medusa -- (1) A Gorgon with eyes that had the power to turn an onlooker
into stone, who was slain by Perseus.

anarchy -- (1) absence of any form of governmental authority or law.
(2) political disorder and confusion. (3) absence of any cohering
principle, as a common standard or purpose; disorder and confusion.

guerilla -- A member of an irregular military force that uses harassing
tactics against an enemy army, usu. with the support of the local population.

conspiracy -- (1) an agreement to perform together an illegal or evil
act. (2) a combining or acting together, as if by evil design: `a
conspiracy of natural forces'. (3) Law. An agreement between two or
more persons to commit a crime or to accomplish a legal purpose through
illegal action.

government -- (1) the act or process of governing, esp. the political
administration of an area: `the government of a state.' (2) a system by
which a political unit is governed: `democratic government'. (3) a
governing body or organization. (4) political science.

consensus -- collective opinion or concord; general agreement: `the
consensus among the voters is that the new program is a good one.'

agenda -- n. a list of things to be done, esp. the program for a meeting.

police state -- A country or other political unit in which the
government exercises rigid control over the social, economic, and
political life, esp. by means of a secret police force.

oppress -- tr.v. (1) to burden harshly, unjustly, or tyrannically. (2)
to weigh heavily opon the mind or spirit.

tyranny -- (1) a government in which a single ruler is vested with
absolute power. (2) the office, authority, or jurisdiction of such a
ruler. (3) absolute power, esp. when exercised unjustly or cruelly. (4)
the arbitrary use of such power; a tyrannical act. (5) extreme
harshness or severity; rigor.

dictator -- n. (1) a ruler who has complete authority and unlimited
power, esp. a tyrant. (2) a person who dictates. (3) in ancient Rome, a
magistrate appointed temporarily to deal with an immediate crisis or emergency. 

autocracy -- n. (1) government by a single person having unlimited
power; despotism. (2) a country or state having this kind of government.

autocrat -- n. (1) a ruler with absolute or unrestricted power; despot.
(2) any arrogant and domineering person.

dictatorship -- n. (1) the position or rule of a dictator. (2) a. a
form of government in which one person or class has complete authority
and unlimited power. b. a country having such a government.

tyrant -- n. (1) an absolute ruler who governs arbitrarily without
constitutional or other restrictions.  (2) a ruler who exercise power
in a harsh, cruel manner, an oppressor. (3) any tyrannical or despotic
person, esp. one who demands total obedience.

poison -- n. (1) any substance that causes injury, illness, or death,
esp. by chemical means. (2) anything that is destructive or fatal. (3)
Chem. a substance that inhibits or retards a chemical reaction. tr.v.
(1) to kill or harm with poison. (2) to put poison on or into: `poison
a cup'. (3) a. to pollute: `noxious fumes poison the air.' b. to have a
harmful influence on; to corrupt: `Jealousy posoned their friendship.'
(4) chem. To inhibit or retard (a chemical reaction).

confess -- tr.v. (1) a. to make known (one's sins) to a priest or to
God. b. to hear the confession of. (2) to disclose or admit (a fault):
`he confessed his mistake.' (3) to admit conversationally: `I must
confess that I was surprised.' (4) to acknowledge belief or failth in.
intr.v. (1) to admit or acknowledge a crime or deed: `the suspect
confessed to the robbery.' (2) to tell one's sins to a priest.

contrite -- (1) repentant for one's sins; penitent. (2) feeling or
caused by contrition: `contrite words, contrite tears.'

inquisition -- n. (1) the act of inquiring into a matter; an
investigation. (2) an inquest. (3) Inquisition. In the Middle Ages, a
tribunal of the Roman Cotholic Church established to seek out and
punish those people considered guilty of heresy. (4) any investigation
that violates the privacy or rights of individuals.

insidious -- adj (1) working or spreading harmfully ina subtle or
stealthy manner: `an insidious disease without warning signs.' (2)
intended to entrap; treacherous: `an insidious plot.'

accomplice -- n. One who aids or abets a lawbreaker in a criminal act
but is not necessarily present at the time of the crime.

treachery -- (1) willful betrayal of loyalty, confidene, or trust;
perfidy; treason. (2) a disloyal or treasonous act.

treason -- (1) the betrayal of one's country, esp. by giving aid to an
enemy in wartime or by plotting to overthrow the government. (2) any
betrayal of a trust.

moral -- adj. (1) of or concerned with the principles of right and
wrong in relation to human action or charactter; ethical. (2) teaching
or exhibiting rightness or goodness of character and behavior: `a moral
lesson.' (3) conforming to standards of what is right or just in
behavior; virtuous: `a moral decision.' (4) arising from conscience or
the sense of right and wrong: `a moral obligation.' (5) psychological
rather than physical or concrete in effect: `a moral victory.' (6)
based upon strong probability or conviction rather than actual
evidence: `a moral certainty'. n. (1) the lesson or principle taught by
a fable, story, or event. (2) a concisely expressed precept or general
truth; maxim. (3) morals. principles or habits of what constitutes
right or wrong conduct, esp. sexual conduct.

morale -- n. the condition or attitude of an individual or group in
regard to the willingness to perform assigned tasks, confidence,
cheerfulness, and discipline.

ethics -- n. (1) The branch of philosophy that deals with the general
nature of good and bad and the specific moral obligations of and
chioces to be made by the individual in his relationship with others.
(2) the rules or standards governing conduct, esp. of the members of a profession.

punish -- tr.v. (1) to subject to a penalty for a crime, fault, or
misbehavior. (2) to inflict a penalty on a criminal or wrongdoer for
(an offense). (3) to handle roughly, injure, hurt: `heavy rains
punished the coastal towns.' intr.v. To give punishment.

corrupt -- adj. (1) Lacking in moral restraint, depraved: `the corrupt
court of an aging Roman emperor.' (2) Marked by or open to bribery, the
selling of political favors, etc.; dishonest: `a corrupt judge.' (3)
decaying; putrid. (4) containing errors or alterations, as a text: `a
corrupt translation.' tr.v. (1) to destroy or subvert the honesty or
integrity of, as by bribing. (2) to ruin the morality of; to pervert or
debase: `Many fear that permissiveness will corrupt the youth of
America.' (3) to cause or become rotten; spoil. (4) to change the
original form of (a text, language, etc.) intr.v. To become corrupt.

lie -- intr.v. (1) to present false information with the intention of
deceiving: `lied about his prison record.' (2) to convey a false image
or impression: `appearances often lie.' n. (1) a false statement
deliberately presented as being true; a falsehood. (2) anything meant
to deceive or give a wrong impression.

propaganda -- (1) the communication of a given doctrine to large
numbers of people, esp. by constant repetition. (2) ideas, information,
or other material distributed for the purpose of winning people over to
a given doctrine, often without regard to truth or fairness.

cult -- n. (1) a system or community of religious worship and ritual,
esp. one focusing upon a single deity or spirit: `the cult of
Dionysus.' (2) a. obsessive devotion or veneration for a person,
priniciple, or ideal. b. the object of such devotion. (3) a group of
persons sharing a common interest: `a fashionable political cult.'

bystander -- n. A person who is present at some event without participating in it.

integrity -- n. (1) strict personal honesty and independence: `a man of
integrity'. (2) completeness; unity: `a movie shown without
interruptions to maintain its integrity.' (3) the state of being
unimpaired; soundness.

honest -- adj. (1) marked by or displaying truthfulness and integrity;
upright. (2) not deceptive or fraudulent; genuine: `honest weight'. (3)
conforming to fact or to the truth; not false: `honest reporting'. (4)
frank and straigtforward; sincere: `an honest opinion; an honest face.'
(5) without disguise or pretense: `honest pleasure'. (6) Archaic. Chaste; virtuous.

honesty -- n. (1) the quality or state of being honest; integrity. (2)
truthfulness; sincerity: `in all honesty.'

true -- adj. (1) consistent with fact or reality; right; accurate. (2)
not imitation or counterfeit; real or genuine: `true gold.' (3)
faithful; loyal: ``this above all, to thine own self be true''
(Shakespear). (4) Rightful; legitimate. (5) sincerely felt or
expressed: `speaking with true emotion.' (6) a. rightfully bearing the
name; properly so called: `the true vampire bat can be found only in
the New World.' b. having the characteristics associated with a certain
group or type; typical: `he was lusty and thickset, a true Dutchman.'
c. exactly conforming to an orginal or standard: `a true copy of the
birth certificate.' adv. (1) rightly; truthfully: `she speaks true.'
(2) without swerving froma course; accurately: `I'll sail the ship
straight and true.'

pseudonym -- n. A fictitious name, esp. one assumed by an author; pen name.

hypocrisy -- n. The practice or act of professing virtues and beliefs
that one does not possess.

pure -- (1) having a homogeneous or uniform composition; not mixed:
`pure oxygen.' (2) free from adulterants or impurities; full-strength:
`pure chocolate'. (3) free from dirt, defilement, or pollution. (4)
free from foreign elements. (5) containing nothing inappropriate or
extraneous: `a pure literary style.' (6) complete,; utter: `pure
folly'. (7) without faults; perfect; sinless. (8) chaste; virgin. (9)
of unmixed blood or ancestry. (10) genetics. Breeding true to parental
type; homozygous. (11) Theoretical rather than applied: `pure science'.

poseur -- n. a person who assumes a false attitude, character, or
manner to impress others.

tax -- n. (1) a charge or contribution required of persons or groups
within the domain of a government for the support of that government.
(2) an excessive demand; a strain. tr.v. (1) to place a tax on income,
property,goods, etc. (2) to exact a tax or taxes from. (3) to make
difficult or excessive demands upon: `overpopulation taxes a nation's resources.'

fraud -- n. (1) a deception deliberately practiced in order to secure
unfair or unlawful gain. (2) a piece of trickery; a swindle. (3) a. a
person who defrauds; a cheat. b. a person who assumes a false pose.

psychopath -- n. a person with a severe personality disorder, esp. one
manifested in aggressively antisocial behavior.

psychosis -- n. Any of a class of serious mental disorders in which the
mind cannot function normally and the ability to deal with reality is
impaired or lost.

egomania -- n. obsessive preoccupation with the self; extreme egotism.

fair -- adj. (1) pleasing to look at; beautiful; lovely: `a fair
maiden'. (2) lightin color: `fair hair; fair skin.' (3) free of clouds
or storms: `fair weather.' (4) characterized by evenhanded honesty;
just: `fair play; a fair trial.' (5) neither good nor bad; average:
`the movie was only fair.' (6) consistent with rules or logic: `a fair
question'. (7) lawful to hunt or attack: `fair game.' adv. (1) in a
fair manner; properly: `I believe in palying fair.' (2) directly;
squarely; straight: `a blow caught fair in the stomach'.

hoax -- n. Something, as a joke or fraud, that is intended to deceive
or trick others.

society -- n. (1) human beings in general. (2) a group of people with a
common culture or way of life. (3) a group of people who unite to share
a common interest: `a stamp collecting society'. (4) the rich and
fashionable social class: `her introduction into society'. (5)
companionship; company.

obsession -- n. (1) an excessive preoccupation with an idea or emotion.
(2) an often unreasonable idea or emotion that is the cause of an obsession.

monomania -- (1) a mental disorder characterized by an obsession with
one idea. (2) an intense preoccupation with or exaggerated enthusiasm
for one subject or idea.

persecute -- tr.v. (1) to cause to suffer, esp. on account of politics,
religion, etc.; oppress. (2) to annoy persistently; to bother.

censor -- n. (1) a person authorized to examine literature, plays,
etc., and who may remove or suppress the sections considered morally or
otherwise objectionable. (2) in ancient Rome, one of two officials
responsible for supervising the public census and public behavior and
morals. tr.v. to examine and expurgate.

hallucination -- n. (1) an illusion of seeing, hearing, or otherwise
sensing something that does not really exist; false perception. (2)
something, as a vision or image, that occurs as a hallucination.

insanity -- n. (1) serious mental illness or disorder. (2) a. Civil
Law. unsoundness of mind sufficient, in the judgement of a court, to
render a person unfit to maintain a legal relationship or to warrant
commitment to a mental hospital. b. Criminal Law. A degree of mental
malfunctioning sufficient to prevent the accused from knowing right
from wrong. (3) a. extreme foolishness; total folly. b. something foolish.

arrogant -- adj. Excessively and unpleasantly self-important, as in
disregarding all other opinions but one's onwn; haughty; conceited:
`arrogant boasts'.

effigy -- n. 1. A painted or sculptured representation of a person, as
on a stone wall or monument. 2. A crude image or dummy fashioned in the
likeness of a hated or depised person. 

egomania -- obsessive preoccupation with the self; extreme egotism.

vain -- adj. (1) not successful; futile: `a vain attempt'. (2) lacking
substance or worht; hollow: `vain talk.' (3) overly proud of one's
appearance or accomplishments; conceited. idiom. in vain. (1) to no
avail; without success. (2) in an irreverent or disrespectful manner:
`take the name of the Lord in vain.'

vainglory -- n. (1) excessive pirde and vanity. (2) vain and ostentatious display.

impostor -- n. A person who deceives by pretending to be someone else.

pervert -- tr. v. (1) to cause to turn from what is considered the
right or moral course; to corrupt. (2) to employ wrongly or
incorrectly; misuse: `perverted the law to suit his own ends.' (3) to
interpret incorrectly: `an analysis that perverts the meaning of the
poem.' n. Someone whose sexual behavior is considered abnormal or unnatural.

depravity -- moral corruption; a depraved condition. (2) a wicked or perverse act.

delusion -- n. (1) a. the act of deluding; deception. b. the condition
of being deluded. (2) a false belief held in spite of evidence to the
contrary, esp. as a condition of certain forms of mental illness.

truth -- n. (1) conformity to knowledge, fact, or actuality; veracity.
(2) something that is the case; the real state of affairs: `tell the
truth'. (3) reality; actuality: `even before the Appomattox the Civil
War was in truth over.' (4) a statement proven to be or accepted as
true: `scientific truths'. (5) sincerity; honesty: `tyhere was no truth
in his speech or character.'

leader -- (1) A person who leads others along a way; a guide. (2) A
person in charge or in command of others. (3) a. The head of a
political party or organization. b. A person who has an influential
voice in politics. (4) a. The conductor of an orchestra, band, or
choral group. b. the principal performer of an orchestral section, as
the first violinist. (5) the foremost horse or other draft animal in a
harnessed team.

brainwash -- tr.v. to indoctrinate (someone) until he is willing to
give up his own beliefs and passively accept an opposing set of beliefs.

tentacle -- n. (1) Zool. One of the narrow, flexible, unjointed parts
that extend from the body of certain animals, as an octopus, used for
grasping, moving, etc. (2) Bot. One of the hairs on the leaves of
insectivorous plants, as the sundew. (3) something resembling a
tentacle, esp. in the ability to grasp or hold.

attack -- (1) to set upon with violent force; begin hostilities against
or a conflict with. (2) to criticize strongly or in a hostile manner.
(3) to start work on with purpose and vigor: `attack a problem'. (4) to
affect harmfully; afflict: `flu attacked thousands of people.' intr.v.
to make an attack; launch an assault: `the troops attacked at dawn.' n.
(1) the act of attacking; an assault. (2) occurrence or onset of a
disease. (3) the initial movement in any task or undertaking: `an
attack on a messy room.' (4) mus. the manner in which a tone, phrase,
or passage is begun: a hard, cutting attack.

evade -- tr.v. (1) to get away from by cleverness or deceit: `evade
arrest.' (2) to avoid fulfilling, answering, or performing: `evade
responsibility'. (3) to baffle or elude: `the accident evades
explanation.' intr.v. To use cleverness or deceit in avoiding or escaping.

harass -- (1) to bother or torment repeatedly and persistently. (2) to
carry out repeated attacks or raids against.

crime -- (1) an act committed or omitted in violation of a law for
which punishment is imposed upon conviction. (2) unlawful activity in
general: `crime in the suburbs is on the rise.' (3) any serious
wrongdoing or offense, esp. against morality; a sin. (4) an unjust or
senseless act or condition: ``It's a crime that so many people live in
poverty.'' (5) informal. a shame; a pity: `It's a crime to waste food.'

privacy -- (1) the condition of being secluded or isolated from contact
with others. (2) concealment; secrecy.

torment -- n. (1) great physcial pain or mental anguish; agony. (2). a
source of harassment or pain. (3) torture or suffering inflicted on
prisoners, as in the proceedings of the Inquisition. tr.v. (1) to cause
to undergo great physical or mental anguish. (2) to annoy, pester, or harass; worry.

phantom -- n. (1) something apparently seen, heard, or sensed, but
having no phusical reality. (2) a ghost; specter. (3) an image that
appears only in the mind. adj. (1) unreal; ghostlike. (2) phoney;
fictitious: `a phantom caller'.

accusation -- n. (1) the act of accusing or condition of being accused.
(2) Law. A formal charge that a person is guilty of some punishable offense.

paranoia -- n. (1) a serious mental disorder in which a person imagines
himself to be persecuted and often has an exaggerated idea of his own
importance. (2) irrational fear for one's security.

traitor -- n. A person who betrays his country, a cause, or a trust,
esp. one who has committed treason.

disrupt -- tr.v. (1) to throw into confusion or disorder. (2) to
interrupt or impede the progress or continuity of: `floods disrupted
communications.' (3) to break or burst; rupture.

pretend -- tr.v. (1) to put on a false show of; feign: `pretend
illness.' (2) to claim or allege insincerely or falsely; profess:
`pretended ignorance of the problem.' (3) to represent fictitiously in
play; make believe. (4) to take upon oneself; venture: ``whether my
bullets did any execution or not I  cannot pretend to say.'' (W.H.
Hudson). intr.v. (1) to give a false appearance, asin deceiving or
playing: ``He's only pretending.'' (2) to put forward a claim: ``a
nobleman who pretends to the throne.''

disreputable -- adj. Not respectable in character, action, or
appearance: `a disreputable establishment; a disreputable businessman.'

appropriate -- adj. suitable for a particular person, condition,
occasion, or place; proper; fitting: ``apropriate clothes; an
appropriate blend of music and text.''

authority -- (1) a. the right and power to command, enforce laws,
determine, etc.: ``the principal had the authority to close the
school.'' b. A person, group, or organization that has this right and
power: `school authorities; the Transit Authority.' (2) Power delegated
to others; authorization: `you have my authority to decide.' (3) an
accepted source of expert information or advice, as a bookk or person:
``an authority on history.'' (4) an expert in a given field: ``a
well-known plant authority.'' (5) power to influence or to affect
resluting from knowledge or experience: ``write with authority.''

courtesy -- n. (1) polite behavior; gracious manner or manners. (2) a
polite gesture or remark: ``He aluted me, and I returned the
courtesy.'' (3) consent or favor; indulgence: ``received a fruit basket
by courtesy of the hotel.''

movement -- n. (1) the act, process, or an instance of moving. (2) a
group engaged in actions intended to achive a specific goal: `the labor
movement.' (3) a tendency or trend: `a movement toward fiscal
conservatism.' (4). a. An evacuation of the bowels. b. the matter so
evacuated. (5) Mus. a. a section of a large composition, as a symphony
or sonata. b. Rhythm; tempo. (6) a mechanism that producs motion, as
the works of a watch.

pariah -- n. (1) a member of a low caste of workers in southern India
and Bruma. (2) a person who has been excluded from society, an outcase.

cooperation -- n. (1) joint action: ``this treaty will promote
international cooperation.'' (2) assistance; support: ``the principal
sought the cooperation of the students.'' (3) willingness to cooperate:
``please show more cooperation.''

cabal -- n. (1) a small group of people organized to carry out a secret
plot or conspiracy. (2) a secret scheme or plot organized by such a
group. intr.v. to form a cabal; plot; conspire.

cacophony -- n. harsh, jarring, dischordant sound; dissonance.

stalemate -- n. (1) a drawing position in chess in which only the king
can move and although not in check can move only into check. (2) a
situation in which further progress is impossible; a deadlock. tr.v. to
bring to a stalemate.

discord -- n. (1) lack of agreement or accord; dissension: `discord
within the government.' (2) a confused or harsh mingling of sounds. (3)
Mus. A combination of simulatneously sounded tones that is considered
to sound harsh or unpleasant; dissonance.

subvert -- tr.v. (1) to destory or overthrow completely; ruin. (2) to
undermine the character, morals, or allegiance of; corrupt.

martyr -- n. (1) a person who suffers death rather than renouncing a
religious principle or belief. (2) a person who makes great sacrifices
or suffers a great deal for a cause or principle. (3) a person who
endures great suffering. tr.v. (1) to make a martyr of. (2) to inflict
great pain or suffering upon; torture.

public -- adj. (1) of, concerning, or affecting the community or the
people: `the public good.' (2) maintained for or used by the people or
comunity: `a public park.' (3) participated in or attended by the
people or community: ``public worhsip.'' (4) connected with or acting
on behalf of the people, community, or government, rather than private
matters or interests: ``public office.'' (5) open to the knowledge or
judgement of all: ``made the testimony public.'' n. (1) the community
or the people as a whole. (2) a group of people sharing a common
interest: ``the reading public.'' (3) admirers or followers, esp. of a celebrity.

revolt -- intr.v. (1) to attempt ot overthrow the authority of the
stae; rebel. (2) to oppose or refuse to accept something: `revolt
against high taxes.' tr.v. to fill with disgust; repel. n. (1) an
uprising, esp. against state authority; rebellion. (2) an act of
opposition or rejection. (3) the condition of opposition or rebellion: be in revolt.

revolution -- n. (1) a. movement in an orbit around a point, esp. as
distinguished from rotation on an axis. b. a spinning or rotation about
an axis. c. a single complete cycle of motion about a point in a closed
path. (2) a sudden or  momentous change in any situation: `the
revolution in physics.' (3) a sudden political overthrow or seizure of
power brought about from within a given system.

scapegoat -- n. someone or something that bears the blame for others.

blind -- adj. (1) without the sense of sight; sightless. (2) performed
without the use of sight: `blind navigation.' (3) unwilling or unable
to perceive or understand: `she was blind to his faults.' (4) nto based
on reason or evidence: `blind faith'. (5) without forethought or
reason: `in a blind rage'. (6) hidden or screened from sight: `a blind
intersection.' (7) closed at one end: `a blind alley'. (8) having no
opening: `a blind wall.' (9) Informal. Drunk. n. (1) something that
shuts out light or hindes vision, as on windows. (2) a shelter for
concealing hunters. (3) something that conceals the true nature of an
activity, esp. of an illegal or improper one; a subterfuge. adv. (1)
without being able to see; blindly: `fly blind.' tr.v. (1) to deprive
of sight. (2) to deprive (a person) of judgement or reason: `Greed
blinded him to the dange.' (3) to dazzle.

sabotage -- n. (1) the destruction of property property or the
obstruction of normal operations, as by enemy agents in time of war.
(2) any treacherous action to defeat or hinder a cause. tr.v. to commit
sabotage against.

infiltrate -- tr.v. (1) to pass (a liquid or gas) into something
through small openings. (2) to fill or saturate with a liquid or gas
passed through small openings. (3) to enter gradually or secretly:
`foreign agents infiltrated the organziation.' intr.v. to gain entrance
gradually or secretly. n. a substance that accumulates gradually in bodily tissues.

subterfuge -- n. an evasive plan or tactic used to avoid capture or confrontation.

ignorant -- adj. (1) without education or knowledge. `an ignorant
person.' (2) exhibiting lack of education or knowledge: `ignorant
assumptions'. (3) unaware or uninformed: `not having seen a newspaper,
she was ignorant of the day's events.'

patriotism -- n. love of and devotion to one's country.

etiquette -- n. teh body of rules governing correct behavior among
people, in a profession, etc.: `court etiquette; military etiquette.'

rant -- intr.v. To speak violently, loudly, and at length; rave:
`ranted against high taxes.' n. A loud, violent speech; a tirade.

reality -- (1) the condition or quality of being real or true; actual
existence. (2) a person, thing, or event that is real.

exorcize -- tr.v. (1) to expel (an evil spirit) by or as if by
incantation or prayer. (2) to free from evil spirits.

facade -- n. (1) the main face or front of a building. (2) the face or
front part of anything, esp. an artificial or false front: ``of the
most famous people we know only the imposing facade'' (Edith Hamilton).

false -- 1. a. contrary to fact or truth; erroneous: `a false
assumption.' b. arising from mistaken ideas: `false hopes.' (2) marked
by an intent to deceive; untruthful: `a false accusation'. (3)
funfaithful, disloyal: `a false friend.' (4) a. not natural;
artificial: `false teeth'. b. not real or genuine: `a false name'. (5)
Mus. Wrong in pitch.

humility -- n. the quality or condition of being humble; lack of pride.

mockery -- n. (1) scornful contempt; ridicule; derision. (2) a specific
example of ridicule or derision. (3) an object of scorn or ridicule.
(4) a false, ridiculous, or impudent imitation; a travesty: `the trial
was a mockery of justice.'

network -- n. (1) an open fabric or structure in which cords, threads,
or wires cross at regular intervals. (2) a system or pattern made up of
a number of parts, passages, lines, or routes that cross, branch out,
or interconnect: `a netowrk of roads and railways; a network of veins.'
(3) a chain of interconnected radio or televion broadcasting stations,
usu. sharing a large proportion of their programs. (4) a group or
system of electrinc components designed to function in a specific manner.

manipulate -- (1) to operate or manage by skilled use esp. of the
ahnds. (2) to influence or manage shrewdly or skillfully: `manipulated
public opinion.' (3) to manage artfully or deceitfully for personal
gain or advantage.

masquerade -- n. (1) a. a costume ball or party at which masks and
elaborate costumes are worn. (2) any false outward show or pretense: `a
masquerade of humility.' intr.v. (1) to wear a mask or disguise, as at
a masquerade. (2) to have a deceptive appearance: `a sermon
masquerading as a novel.'
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
To find out more about the anon service, send mail to help@anon.penet.fi.
Due to the double-blind, any mail replies to this message will be anonymized,
and an anonymous id will be allocated automatically. You have been warned.
Please report any problems, inappropriate use etc. to admin@anon.penet.fi.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Lyle_Seaman@transarc.com
Date: Mon, 22 Nov 93 07:05:10 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Zen Master
In-Reply-To: <9311200525.AA25278@anon.penet.fi>
Message-ID: <0gwBGc_SMUw840mUFH@transarc.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Reads like another L.D. "tentacle", doesn't it?
Seems like the only person who clearly has multiple identities on this
list is the devil himself.

an12070@anon.penet.fi (Zen Master) writes:
> It seems to me that all are examples of how evasion, stonewalling, and
> counterattacks on Truth-seeking probes, by high-ranking officials
> seeking to promote unsavory or criminal personal `agendas' and their
> own respectability at all costs, led to monstrous consequences that
> demolished public trust in their most delicate and hallowed
> institutions for decades. Truly black consequences.
> 
> Cypherpunks, you call it.






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Al Billings <mimir@u.washington.edu>
Date: Mon, 22 Nov 93 10:22:59 PST
To: "kpj@sics.se>
Subject: Re: Secure Drive 1.0 is here!
In-Reply-To: <9311221215.AA02692@sics.se>
Message-ID: <Pine.3.87.9311221003.A29429-0100000@goren1.u.washington.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



On Mon, 22 Nov 1993, kpj@sics.se wrote:

> I wonder if you really can have a Copyleft and disallow the program source
> to anybody outside the United States and Canada.  As you write the code is
> under Copyleft, I hereby ask you for a copy of it.  FYI: I am situated in
> the state of Sweden in Europe.  What is your reply to this?

It isn't very smart asking him in a public forum, especially one that is 
pretty known to be monitored by at least some government agents. No 
matter what his opinion is, he's going to have to say "No." It is ILLEGAL 
for him to export it and you just basically stood up and yelled "Fire!" 
to every Fed on the list.

(*)(*)(*)(*)(*)(*)(*)(*)(*)(*)(*)(*)(*)(*)(*)(*)(*)(*)(*)(*)(*)(*)(*)(*)(*)(*)
| Al Billings aka Grendel Grettisson        | "You are, each one, a priest,  |
|                 mimir@u.washington.edu    |      Just for yourself."       |
| Sysop of The Sacred Grove (206)322-5450   |                                |
| Admin for Troth-L, The Asatru E-Mail List |             -Noble Drew Ali-   |
(*)(*)(*)(*)(*)(*)(*)(*)(*)(*)(*)(*)(*)(*)(*)(*)(*)(*)(*)(*)(*)(*)(*)(*)(*)(*)






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: sameer@uclink.berkeley.edu
Date: Mon, 22 Nov 93 10:22:39 PST
To: jrk@sys.uea.ac.uk (Richard Kennaway)
Subject: Re: Zen Master
In-Reply-To: <4636.9311221707@s5.sys.uea.ac.uk>
Message-ID: <199311221820.KAA10752@mail.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Richard Kennaway said:
> 
> Lyle Seaman writes:
> >Reads like another L.D. "tentacle", doesn't it?
> >
> >an12070@anon.penet.fi (Zen Master) writes:
> 
> Don't look at the readable id, look at the an12070 part.  Whether S.Boxx ==
> L.Detweiler or not, S.Boxx and Zen Master (and one or two other nyms) are
> posting from one and the same account.
> 
> Boxx, if you want to play the Medusa, changing the nick on your penet
> account doesn't hack it.
> 
	Is there a way to get elm filters to look at the "body" of a
message, as well? (I'll look into it, yes, I do know how to
RTFM.. just posting the suggestion, in a roundabout way.)

body = detweiler ? save /dev/null
body = s.boxx ? save /dev/null





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Al Billings <mimir@u.washington.edu>
Date: Mon, 22 Nov 93 10:42:43 PST
To: "kpj@sics.se>
Subject: Re: Secure Drive 1.0 is here!
In-Reply-To: <9311221837.AA23712@sics.se>
Message-ID: <Pine.3.87.9311221022.E29429-0100000@goren1.u.washington.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


On Mon, 22 Nov 1993, kpj@sics.se wrote:

> | It isn't very smart asking him in a public forum, especially one that is 
> | pretty known to be monitored by at least some government agents. No 
> | matter what his opinion is, he's going to have to say "No." It is ILLEGAL 
> | for him to export it and you just basically stood up and yelled "Fire!" 
> | to every Fed on the list.
> 
> Naturally.  I expect him to refuse.  My whole question is whether it is
> valid to use Copyleft on code which is not freely copyable over national
> boundaries.

It is not his fault that he can't give it to you. He's made it freely 
available. If national boundaries interfere and paranoid US laws don't 
let him, I don't think you can blame HIM for that.

(*)(*)(*)(*)(*)(*)(*)(*)(*)(*)(*)(*)(*)(*)(*)(*)(*)(*)(*)(*)(*)(*)(*)(*)(*)(*)
| Al Billings aka Grendel Grettisson        | "You are, each one, a priest,  |
|                 mimir@u.washington.edu    |      Just for yourself."       |
| Sysop of The Sacred Grove (206)322-5450   |                                |
| Admin for Troth-L, The Asatru E-Mail List |             -Noble Drew Ali-   |
(*)(*)(*)(*)(*)(*)(*)(*)(*)(*)(*)(*)(*)(*)(*)(*)(*)(*)(*)(*)(*)(*)(*)(*)(*)(*)






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: peb@PROCASE.COM (Paul Baclace)
Date: Mon, 22 Nov 93 10:47:41 PST
To: mimir@u.washington.edu
Subject: Re: Secure Drive 1.0 is here!
Message-ID: <9311221844.AA14970@ada.procase.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Since IDEA was developed outside the US, doesn't that mean it there 
essentially is no exporting of cryptography going on here?  To be 
perfectly invulnerable, the code could be distributed internationally
without any encryption algorithm--simply add the crypto you want that
is easily obtainable.

(Of course, selling crypto is the real trigger for getting attention.
A copy-left certainly isn't selling.)


Paul E. Baclace
peb@procase.com





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "kpj@sics.se" <kpj@sics.se>
Date: Mon, 22 Nov 93 04:17:34 PST
To: Mike Ingle <MIKEINGLE@delphi.com>
Subject: Re: Secure Drive 1.0 is here!
In-Reply-To: <01H5ISFUCUO290NQ6V@delphi.com>
Message-ID: <9311221215.AA02692@sics.se>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I wonder if you really can have a Copyleft and disallow the program source
to anybody outside the United States and Canada.  As you write the code is
under Copyleft, I hereby ask you for a copy of it.  FYI: I am situated in
the state of Sweden in Europe.  What is your reply to this?




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: cman@caffeine.io.com (Douglas Barnes)
Date: Mon, 22 Nov 93 12:25:08 PST
To: nowhere@bsu-cs.bsu.edu (Anonymous)
Subject: Re: Applied Cryptography Errata (fwd)
In-Reply-To: <9311221959.AA16549@bsu-cs.bsu.edu>
Message-ID: <199311222010.OAA09142@caffeine.caffeine.io.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


My candidate for the "best of" Schneier errata 1st. ed.:

> 
> Page 238:  Last line before "Additional Results." 
> "NSA" should be "IBM".
>

-- 
----------------                                             /\ 
Douglas Barnes            cman@illuminati.io.com            /  \ 
Chief Wizard         (512) 447-8950 (d), 447-7866 (v)      / () \
Illuminati Online          metaverse.io.com 7777          /______\



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: jrk@sys.uea.ac.uk (Richard Kennaway)
Date: Mon, 22 Nov 93 06:08:37 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: anonymous postings and trust
Message-ID: <28095.9311221412@s5.sys.uea.ac.uk>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Black Unicorn writes:
>You would have preferred that I quote the entire thread and then
>add my comment?  Or is it the lack of accompanying detail in
>the comment that you resent?

It's mainly the lack of detail.  As you and others point out, any "Fred
Jones" might be a covert pseudonym, and even if it isn't, I may know
equally little about its holder as abut a "Black Unicorn".  So yes, it's a
matter of reputations rather than true names.  Obvious anonymity just makes
it more noticeable.

>[further details about Black Unicorn]

Somehow, this makes your posting about the existence of Liechtenstein
numbered accounts much more plausible, even though I have no practical way
of verifying any of the circumstantial detail which (to coin a phrase) adds
verisimilitude to an otherwise bald and unconvincing narrative.  I can't
put my finger on why this is.

>Should you be more interested 
>in detail, I would be happy to discuss what I can in person, by 
>telephone, or in encrypted E-Mail, in descending order of the 
>detail I would be willing to disclose.

Even though you don't really know who I am?  I mostly lurk here, but
although I'm moderately active on a couple of other mailing lists and
newsgroups, even if you looked at what I write there and verified the info
in my .sig, it seems to me you'd need to do some further investigation to
be safe in making potentially job-threatening disclosures to me over any of
these media.

This raises the question of how we come to trust people in RL situations
where obvious anonymity is not present.  In short, why should we believe
anything that anyone says at all?  If we don't check their claims by
personal observation, why believe them?  If we can check them, why not do
so instead?  How is a reputation for trustworthiness built in the first
place?

I'm just rambling, so I'll shut up for now.

--                                  ____
Richard Kennaway                  __\_ /    School of Information Systems
Internet:  jrk@sys.uea.ac.uk      \  X/     University of East Anglia
uucp:  ...mcsun!ukc!uea-sys!jrk    \/       Norwich NR4 7TJ, U.K.






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Nathan Loofbourrow <loofbour@cis.ohio-state.edu>
Date: Mon, 22 Nov 93 11:22:41 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Secure Drive 1.0 is here!
In-Reply-To: <Pine.3.87.9311221022.E29429-0100000@goren1.u.washington.edu>
Message-ID: <9311221919.AA15082@styracosaur.cis.ohio-state.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Al Billings writes:
 > On Mon, 22 Nov 1993, kpj@sics.se wrote:
 > > Naturally.  I expect him to refuse.  My whole question is whether it is
 > > valid to use Copyleft on code which is not freely copyable over national
 > > boundaries.
 > 
 > It is not his fault that he can't give it to you. He's made it freely 
 > available. If national boundaries interfere and paranoid US laws don't 
 > let him, I don't think you can blame HIM for that.

IMHO, the relevant section of the GPL, version 2 -- assuming that this
is the version of the license Mike Ingle intends -- is as follows:

 >   7. If, as a consequence of a court judgment or allegation of patent
 > infringement or for any other reason (not limited to patent issues),
 > conditions are imposed on you (whether by court order, agreement or
 > otherwise) that contradict the conditions of this License, they do not
 > excuse you from the conditions of this License.  If you cannot
 > distribute so as to satisfy simultaneously your obligations under this
 > License and any other pertinent obligations, then as a consequence you
 > may not distribute the Program at all.  For example, if a patent
 > license would not permit royalty-free redistribution of the Program by
 > all those who receive copies directly or indirectly through you, then
 > the only way you could satisfy both it and this License would be to
 > refrain entirely from distribution of the Program.

The interpretation(s) are left to the cypherpunk esquires.

nathan




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: jet@nas.nasa.gov (J. Eric Townsend)
Date: Mon, 22 Nov 93 14:32:41 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Parallel Computational Number Theory and Cryptography Symposium
Message-ID: <9311222232.AA15068@boxer.nas.nasa.gov>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



[check this out. -eric]

CWI - RUU SYMPOSIA "MASSIVELY PARALLEL COMPUTING AND APPLICATIONS"

In 1993-1994, the Centre for Mathematics and Computer Science Amsterdam (CWI)
and the University of Utrecht (RUU) are organising a series of symposia
on massively parallel computing and applications. 

This is to announce the third meeting which centres around the theme: 

          COMPUTATIONAL NUMBER THEORY AND CRYPTOGRAPHY

Date:     Friday November 26, 1993
Location: CWI, Kruislaan 413, Amsterdam
Room:     Z011

Program

10.00 - 10.30:  Coffee/Tea
10.30 - 10.35:  Welcome
10.35 - 11.20:  Jean-Jacques Quisquater (Catholic University of Louvain, Belgium)
                Exhaustive searches, collisions, meet-in-the-middle attacks:
                a parallel perspective               
11.30 - 12.15:  Francois Morain (Ecole Polytechnique, Palaiseau, France)
                Distributed primality proving
12.15 - 13.30:  Lunch break
13.30 - 14.15:  Johannes Buchmann (Universitaet des Saarlandes, Germany)
                Factoring with the number field sieve
14.25 - 15.10:  Peter L. Montgomery (Stieltjes Institute for Mathematics, Leiden,
                and CWI Amsterdam)
                Vectorization of the elliptic curve method
15.10 - 15.30:  Tea break
15.30 - 16.15:  Henk Boender (RU Leiden, and CWI Amsterdam)
                Factoring with some variations of the quadratic sieve
                on the Cray Y-MP4

Dates and themes of the previous meetings:
June   4, 1993: Topics in Environmental Mathematics 
Sept. 24, 1993: Parallel Numerical Algorithms 

For further information, e.g., about how to reach CWI, contact H.J.J. te Riele 
(CWI, tel. 020-5924106)
If you wish to receive a LaTeX-file of the abstracts of the lectures,
send a message to herman@cwi.nl 







From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Anonymous <nowhere@bsu-cs.bsu.edu>
Date: Mon, 22 Nov 93 11:58:43 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Applied Cryptography Errata (fwd)
Message-ID: <9311221959.AA16549@bsu-cs.bsu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



From: schneier@chinet.chinet.com (Bruce Schneier)
Subject: APPLIED CRYPTOGRAPHY Errata 1.0 - Please Distribute Far and Wide
Message-ID: <CGwJBq.ELr@chinet.chinet.com>
Organization: Chinet - Public Access UNIX
Date: Mon, 22 Nov 1993 16:33:25 GMT


This is the errata sheet to APPLIED CRYPTOGRAPHY.  Copy it; send it to your
friends; post it on ftp sites.  For an on-line copy of the books table or
contents and index, and information on how to buy a paper copy of the book,
please e-mail me directly.  If you find any more errors, pleasee-mail me 
directly as well.

Bruce

****************************************************************************

                                             APPLIED CRYPTOGRAPHY

                                                    ERRATA
                                        Version 1.0 - November 22, 1993


Page xvii:  Third sentence, first line.  "Part IV" should
be "Part III".

Page 6:  Sixth and seventh lines.  "against symmetric"
should be "against a symmetric".

Page 8:  Second paragraph, first line.  "q code" should
be "a code".

Page 13:  Third paragraph.  Delete parenthetical
remark.

Page 13:  Fifth paragraph, first line.  "Shift the key"
should be "shift the ciphertext".

Page 15:  Section 1.3, first line.  "Throughout the book
use" should be "Throughout the book I use".

Page 28:  Third paragraph, third and fourth sentences
should be "How to put mail in a mailbox is public
knowledge.  How to open the mailbox is not public
knowledge."

Page 30:  "Attacks Against Public Key Cryptography,"
second paragraph.  "The database also has to be
protected from access by anyone" should be "The
database also has to be protected from write access by
anyone".

Page 40:  Third line.  "computer can exist" should be
"computer can be".

Page 51:  Step 5.  "with what he received from Bob"
should be "with what he received from Alice".

Page 77:  "Flipping Coins into a Well," first line.
"neither party learns the result" should be "Alice and
Bob don't learn the result".

Page 90:  Last paragraph.  "step (3)" should be "step
(4)".

Page 91:  Second line.  "step (3)" should be "step (4)".

Page 93:  "Blind Signatures," first line.  "An essential
in all" should be "An essential feature in all".

Page 98:  First paragraph after protocol, fourth line. 
"to determine the DES key with the other encrypted
message" should be "to determine the DES key that the
other encrypted message was encrypted in."

Page 131:  Fifth paragraph.  "each capable of checking
265 million keys" should be "each capable of checking
256 million keys".

Page 141:  "Reduced Keyspaces," last sentence.  "don't
expect your keys to stand up" should be "don't expect
short keys to stand up".

Page 157:  Figure 8.2.  "IO" should be "IV".

Page 159:  Figure 8.3.  "IO" should be "IV".

Page 164:  Figure 8.7.  "IO" should be "IV".

Page 165:  Last equation.  There should be a "(P)" at
the end of that equation.

Page 178:  Figure 8.20.  In "Node 2", the subscripts
should be "D_2" and "E_3".

Page 191:  First paragraph.  "EBCDIC" should be
"BAUDOT".

Page 198:  Fourth paragraph from bottom, second
sentence.  "If a and b are positive and a is less than n,
you can think of a as the remainder of b when divided
by n" should be "If a and b are positive and b is less
than n, you can think of b as the remainder of a when
divided by n".

Page 199:  Middle of the page.  In the sentence
"Calculating the power of a number modulo a number",
a should not be italicized.

Page 202:  Middle of the page.  In the sentence "Now,
how do you go about finding the inverse of a modulo
n?" "a" should be italicized.

Page 214:  Last line.  "n" should be "p".

Page 215:  Lehman test, step 5.  All three "(n-1)/2"
should be exponents.

Page 222:  "Validation and Certification of DES
Equipment," first line.  "As part of the standard, the
DES NIST" should be "As part of the DES standard,
NIST"

Page 228:  Fourth paragraph, last line.  "0 to 16"
should be 0 to 15".

Page 229:  Fifth paragraph should read:  "For example,
assume that the input to the sixth S-box (that is, bits 31
through 36 of the XOR function) are 110010.  The first
and last bits combine to form 10, which corresponds to
row 3 of the sixth S-box.  The middle four bits
combine to form 1001, which corresponds to column 9
of the same S-box.  The entry under row 3, column 9
of S-box 6 is 0.  (Remember, we count rows and
columns from 0, and not from 1.)  The value 0000 is
substituted for 110010.

Page 238:  Last line before "Additional Results." 
"NSA" should be "IBM".

Page 238:  "Differential Cryptanalysis," third
paragraph.  "(1/16)^2" should be "(14/16)^2" and
"5%" should be "77%".

Page 250:  The two functions should be:
   S_0(a,b) = rotate left 2 bits (a+b) mod 256)
   S_1(a,b) = rotate left 2 bits (a+b+1) mod 256)
Note the difference in parentheses.

Page 250:  Figure 11.4.  Note that a is broken up into
four 8-bit substrings, a_1, a_2, a_3, and a_4.

Page 251:  Figure 11.6.  The definitions for S_0 and
S_1 are incorrect.  See corrections from previous page.

Page 262:  Figure 11.9.  There is a line missing.  It
should run from the symbol where Z_5 is multiplied
with the intermediate result to the addition symbol
directly to the right.

Page 265:  Figure 11.10.  There is a line missing.  It
should run from the symbol where Z_5 is multiplied
with the intermediate result to the addition symbol
directly to the right.

Pages 266-7:  Since the publication of this book, MMB
has been broken.  Do not use this algorithm.

Page 267:  Sixth line from bottom.  Footnote should be
"[255]".

Page 269:  "Skipjack."  First paragraph.  Footnote
should be "[654]".

Page 271:  Middle of the page.  "(for example, MD2,
MD5, Snefru" should be "(for example, MD2, MD4,
Snefru".

Page 272:  Second to last line.  "But it is be analyzed"
should be "but it is being analyzed".

Page 286:  Second to last line.  "Eve wants to Alice to"
should be "Even wants Alice to".

Page 295:  First line.  "Alice picks t random numbers
fewer than n" should be "Alice picks t random number
less than n".

Page 301:  Middle of the page.  Delete the sentence
"Since the math is all correct, they do this step."

Page 305:  Third paragraph, parenthetical remark. 
"DES meant that both" should be "DES mean both".

Page 306:  Fourth paragraph.  Delete the word
"cryptographers".

Page 307:  "Description of the Algorithm."  "p = a
prime number 2^L bits long" should be "p = a prime
number L bits long".

Page 330:  Definitions of FF, GG, HH, and II.  In all
of them, "a = b +" should be "a = a +".

Page 347:  Second paragraph.  "(For example, m
should be chosen to be a prime number.)" should be
"(For example, c and m should be relatively prime.)"

Page 351:  Second line of text.  "they hold current"
should be "they hold the current".

Page 353:  Second paragraph.  "are often used from
stream ciphers" should be "are often used for stream
ciphers".

Page 356:  Source code.  "ShiftRegister =
(ShiftRegister ^ (mask >> 1))" should be
"ShiftRegister = ((ShiftRegister ^ mask) >> 1)".

Page 362:  Figure 15.10.  "LFSR-B" should be "LFSR-
A" and vice versa.  The second "a(t+n-1)" should be
"a(t+n)", and the second "b(t+n-1)" should be
"b(t+n)".

Page 365:  "Blum-Micali Generator."  In the equation,
"x_i" should be an exponent, not a subscript.

Page 391:  Second protocol, step (1).  "in his
implementation of DES" should be "in his
implementation of DSS".

Page 436:  "Pretty Good Privacy."  Third paragraph. 
Delete third sentence.

Page 437:  "Clipper."  Second paragraph:  foonote
should be "[473]".  Fourth paragraph:  footnotes should
be "[473,654,876,271,57]".

Page 438:  Middle of page:  footnote should be
"[654]".  "Capstone," first paragaph:  footnote should
be "[655]".

Page 473:  Function "cpkey(from)". "while (from
endp)" should be "while (from < endp)".

For a current errata sheet, send a self-addressed
stamped envelope to:  Bruce Schneier, Counterpane
Systems, 730 Fair Oaks Ave., Oak Park, IL  60302; 
or send electronic mail to: schneier@chinet.com.





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: szabo@netcom.com (Nick Szabo)
Date: Mon, 22 Nov 93 15:03:44 PST
To: jrk@sys.uea.ac.uk (Richard Kennaway)
Subject: Re: anonymous postings and trust
In-Reply-To: <28095.9311221412@s5.sys.uea.ac.uk>
Message-ID: <199311222302.PAA00696@mail.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Richard Kenneway raises some interesting points about reputation,
asks why we should believe nyms (or otherwise relatively unknown new
posters), and even to what extent we should believe people we have
more experience with.  Indeed, the world is filled with strangers 
who want to sell me things, who threaten me with violence unless I follow
often obscure or completely unknown laws they have generated, etc. 

In a typical election, the difference between the candidates and 
total strangers is typically the narrow bottleneck of a few TV reports 
and ads, and an entry in the Voter's Guide.  Yet we trust these people
to be our leaders!  Based on Black Unicorn's posts to cypherpunks, I'd 
say our level of knowledge about him is slightly better than the
typical voter's knowledge of a typical political candidate.
I call this the Voter Test.

The good news is that Black Unicorn isn't threatening violence (as
contrasted with the implicit violence threatened by politicians,
and the both implicit and explicit violence threatened by
our own voluminous contributor, Detweiler/S.Boxx/Zen Master), 
nor even trying to sell something.  B.U.'s simply arguing that 
numbered accounts exist in Liechtenstein.  I agree that the mere statement 
of a nym doesn't satisfy the case.  The nym can greatly bolster the 
case by giving us "mutual information" that could be cross-referenced 
with what he says to resolve the issue.  This does _not_ have to be personal
info, and I urge B.U. to avoid the tempatation of posting where he
went to college, etc. in the future.  One good piece of info would
be to post phone number(s) in Liectenstein, unrelated to B.U.'s own
employer, that we could call to verify his claim.  (For example,
the number of a librarian who would know, or best of all the phone
numbers of the bank(s) who offer these accounts).  The side claim,
that B.U. once worked in Liechtenstein, could be strengenthed by
telling a trustworthy list member who has lived in Liechtenstein,
info that would probably be known only by somebody who his lived for a 
while in Liechtenstein.  (Finding such a person might be unlikely, but 
who knows).  Perhaps there is are easier ways B.U. can demonstrate 
his case along these lines, if the above are too inonvenient for 
what may be to B.U. a fairly unimportant argument.  There must be an 
entire artform already developed o n this kind of credentialling, 
selective revelation of information, etc., I'd love to hear more 
comments from people with insight, epxerience, etc. in the matter.

Nick Szabo					szabo@netcom.com




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: szabo@netcom.com (Nick Szabo)
Date: Mon, 22 Nov 93 16:37:43 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: BlackNet Investigations Needs More Detail (fwd)
Message-ID: <199311230035.QAA09981@mail.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



On the Extropians list Tim May has reminded us in his trademark
dramatic style about the ability of various unknown malevolent
agents to accumulate dossiers based on posts to mailing lists,
Usenet news, and contents of "privte" directories on public providers
like Netcom, Delphi, etc.  Since Stanton McClandish asked about the 
"NSA can bust PGP rumors" I'll forward my post to Extropians on 
that thread (slightly edited to elide quoted comment), since a
similar concern had been expressed about the trustworthiness
of encryption:

I find it extremely improbable that the NSA or anybody else can
break long RSA keys (eg, those in PGP) as long as the keys are secure 
(eg on the private machines of trustworthy people).  Even if they could 
break the public keys or gain access to the secret keys, they're 
quite unlikely to spend TM cycles and engineer time on the outside
possibility of gaining evidence for a relatively minor drug violation.  
Furthermore, there's so much such minor crypto traffic going around 
now that they would require other good information (eg traffic analysis)
prior to attempting to break the codes, to discriminate the 
potentially important messages from the gigabytes of variously
encoded trivia.

On the other hand, the local gendarmes in net-heavy areas like
Silicon Valley could easily hire a net-savvy investigator to monitor
unscrambled groups like extropians, cypherpunks, etc. and even
more trivially search back archives of Usenet, to track down
networks of drug users, and the like.  (For example, the
apparent True Name who regularly posts a market report listing
street drug prices around the world to alt.drugs!)  In the future
this will be even easier, and the archives will still be around.

The main problem is that many net users aren't using PGP and other 
powerful privacy tools like anon remailers, because (a) they have
"nothing to hide" from the millions of total strangers, many with
violent intent, who read the net, (b) the tools are too inconvenient,
and (c) lack of cultural development of pseudonymity (this is quite
well developed on several BBS nets, though).  These problems are
being tackled on several fronts.  I'm writing a user-freindly Windows 
GUI for PGP and anon remailers.  There's also work going on to integreate 
PGP into traditional mailers (elm, Eudora, etc.) and the MIME standard.  
A culture of pseudonymity is starting to spread to the Internet
(with glacial slowness, and driving control freaks like Dick Depew and
L.Detweiler insane in the process).  There's no reason you shouldn't 
be able to post about your LSD experiences and the like, but make 
sure you're protecting your privacy with the right tools, for goodness 
sake.

Nick Szabo				szabo@netcom.com




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: baum@newton.apple.com (Allen J. Baum)
Date: Mon, 22 Nov 93 16:52:42 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Can NSA crack PGP?
Message-ID: <9311230047.AA21065@newton.apple.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I'm not exactly sure why you care whether it's easy , hard, or impossible
for NSA to crack it. It probably isn't easy; it might be impossible.

But, there is one thing that is true about NSA's ability to crack it:
 they won't give you cause to know whether they can or not.

e.g., if they can, and they read some mail of yours that you REALLY don't
want them to read, they won't act on that information in such a manner that
you can determine that they cracked the code for your message. They
couldn't use it on a warrant, & they couldn't testify as to its contents in
court. To do so would advertise their capabilities, which is a no-no for
them. (they might, of course, use that information to point people in the
right direction so they can attribute information to an anonymous tip, but
they have to be careful even there)

Even now, when it's pretty certain they could crack DES, you won't
find them doing it for a law enforcement agency that asks; it gives away
too much.

**************************************************
* Allen J. Baum            tel. (408)974-3385    *
* Apple Computer, 20525 Mariani Ave,  MS 305-3B  *
* Cupertino, CA 95014      baum@apple.com        *      
**************************************************






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: jrk@sys.uea.ac.uk (Richard Kennaway)
Date: Mon, 22 Nov 93 09:05:06 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Zen Master
Message-ID: <4636.9311221707@s5.sys.uea.ac.uk>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Lyle Seaman writes:
>Reads like another L.D. "tentacle", doesn't it?
>
>an12070@anon.penet.fi (Zen Master) writes:

Don't look at the readable id, look at the an12070 part.  Whether S.Boxx ==
L.Detweiler or not, S.Boxx and Zen Master (and one or two other nyms) are
posting from one and the same account.

Boxx, if you want to play the Medusa, changing the nick on your penet
account doesn't hack it.

--                                  ____
Richard Kennaway                  __\_ /    School of Information Systems
Internet:  jrk@sys.uea.ac.uk      \  X/     University of East Anglia
uucp:  ...mcsun!ukc!uea-sys!jrk    \/       Norwich NR4 7TJ, U.K.






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Matthew J Miszewski <MJMISKI@macc.wisc.edu>
Date: Mon, 22 Nov 93 15:25:06 PST
To: CYPHERPUNKS@toad.com
Subject: Secure ID Thanx
Message-ID: <23112217230547@vms2.macc.wisc.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Thanks to the many folks that replied to my post/request for SmartCard
Addresses and info.  I will keep you up to date once I finish my cost
analysis.
 
--MAtt
______________________________________________________________________________
In defense of liberty, encrypt for all purposes, civil and professional.
In defense of privacy, encrypt all correspondence, personal and professional.
In defense of sanity, do not encrypt your dry cleaning invoice!
 
       ++++++++--------mjmiski@macc.wisc.edu                          (c)1993




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Lyle_Seaman@transarc.com
Date: Mon, 22 Nov 93 14:27:41 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Zen Master
In-Reply-To: <4636.9311221707@s5.sys.uea.ac.uk>
Message-ID: <kgwHkN6SMUw8E0meNZ@transarc.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


jrk@sys.uea.ac.uk (Richard Kennaway) writes:
> Lyle Seaman writes:
> >Reads like another L.D. "tentacle", doesn't it?
> >
> >an12070@anon.penet.fi (Zen Master) writes:
> 
> Don't look at the readable id, look at the an12070 part.  Whether S.Boxx ==
> L.Detweiler or not, S.Boxx and Zen Master (and one or two other nyms) are

Well, golly gee, you're absolutely right.  
It looks like this "pseudo-spoofing" game is harder than it looks,
isn't it?  After all, ignorant ol' me recognized the author from the
text, without even THINKING to check the anon id.

I'll bet that only people who have MPD master multiple styles of discourse
which are much more distinct than those of L.D, S.B. and Z.M (oh, maybe
a professional writer can manage, occasionally).  I'll also bet that
it's a rare MPD sufferer whose various personalities share any
significant accord.   

Lyle		





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Black Unicorn <unicorn@access.digex.net>
Date: Mon, 22 Nov 93 14:55:06 PST
To: gtoal@an-teallach.com
Subject: Re:  anonymous posts
Message-ID: <199311222254.AA00601@access.digex.net>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


-> In article <199311192308.AA02672@access.digex.net>
 > You know that I have a JD from Georgetown and a Masters from some
 > ( not accidently unnamed ) school in International Relations.
 
Bloody hell, it's David Sternlight! :-)
 
G
 
<-
 
That, my friend, is an insult the scope of which I will not tolerate

Any further comments along these lines will result in a
(probably frivolous) suit.





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Matthew J Ghio <mg5n+@andrew.cmu.edu>
Date: Mon, 22 Nov 93 15:02:42 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Zen Master
In-Reply-To: <4636.9311221707@s5.sys.uea.ac.uk>
Message-ID: <IgwIH1a00Vp0MvW0Ym@andrew.cmu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Lyle_Seaman@transarc.com wrote:

> I'll bet that only people who have MPD master multiple
> styles of discourse which are much more distinct than
> those of L.D, S.B. and Z.M (oh, maybe a professional
> writer can manage, occasionally).  I'll also bet that
> it's a rare MPD sufferer whose various personalities
> share any significant accord.   

Um, not necessarily.  It varies depending on the case.  Some people with
MPD can have very similiar personalities, and others vary widely.  In
other cases, a person can have many seperate personalities which are
fairly similar, and a few radically different ones.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: cman@caffeine.io.com (Douglas Barnes)
Date: Mon, 22 Nov 93 16:22:42 PST
To: mech@eff.org (Stanton McCandlish)
Subject: Re: Can NSA crack PGP?
In-Reply-To: <199311222336.SAA22403@eff.org>
Message-ID: <199311230005.SAA09945@caffeine.caffeine.io.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> 
> In a FidoNet debate, it's been charged that PGP is unsafe, and that NSA
> can crack it.  The persons holding this viewpoint espouse the idea that
> the NSA can crack anything, pretty much, and that anything they could not
> crack would not be available to the general public, but would have been
> supressed.

The basic problem here is not whether the NSA has or hasn't cracked PGP.
Certainly it's safe today from the prying eyes of even a really determined 
FIDO sysop, even if he keeps up with all his mathematical journals and has 
access to commercially available supercomputer power. This should be sufficient
reason for its use... :-)

In all of the literature I have read, it is acknowledged that one
of the two possible things is true:

1) Factoring might not be as hard as we think it is; Bruce Schneier, for
   instance, cautions readers to keep informed about mathematical 
   developments in factoring. It has not been disproved that factoring
   is a hard problem, but neither has it been proved.

2) The NSA may have equipment that, using massively parallel techniques,
   can factor small RSA keys by brute force. However, if factoring is as
   hard as we think it is, very large keys are probably not within the
   scope of the NSAs ability, unless they have access to a different 
   universe where physical laws behave differently.

[...]
>> 
> SO, let's take this opportunity at online education, and spread the news
> that under current technology, PGP is in fact a secure cryptosystem.
> 

Security is always a relative thing, Stanton, and if the transport layer
becomes sufficiently problematic, a really determined opponent will seek
other weaknesses (a spike mike in your house, a tap in your computer,
having burly gentlemen with names like "Butch" grab you and hold you 
upside down over a large body of rapidly moving water).

IMHO, the real point of encrypting is to make it difficult for the NSA 
and their ilk to casually surf the nets for stuff, and stymie more humble
opponents (whether they are sysops, employers, competitors, hackers, or 
France).

Doug

-- 
----------------                                             /\ 
Douglas Barnes            cman@illuminati.io.com            /  \ 
Chief Wizard         (512) 447-8950 (d), 447-7866 (v)      / () \
Illuminati Online          metaverse.io.com 7777          /______\



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: jamie@netcom.com (Jamie Dinkelacker)
Date: Mon, 22 Nov 93 18:07:43 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Can NSA crack PGP?
Message-ID: <199311230207.SAA07205@mail.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Irrespective of whether the NSA can crack PGP, most other potential snoops
probably can't. Let's hope there's no "chilling effect" on PGP usage
because it may not be perfect. Few things are. "Pretty good" likely means
just that. 

--
................................
Jamie Dinkelacker   Palo Alto CA 
Jamie@netcom.com    415.941.4782 
................................






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: kelly@netcom.com (Kelly Goen)
Date: Mon, 22 Nov 93 18:22:43 PST
To: kelly@netcom.com
Subject: (fwd) Technosys, Prosody, the "NSA", and some unfunny BS passed off as a joke
Message-ID: <199311230221.SAA09551@mail.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Path: netcom.com!netcomsv!decwrl!sdd.hp.com!math.ohio-state.edu!howland.reston.ans.net!noc.near.net!news.delphi.com!usenet
From: KEITHWRITERS@delphi.com
Newsgroups: talk.politics.crypto
Subject: Technosys, Prosody, the "NSA", and some unfunny BS passed off as a joke
Date: Mon, 22 Nov 93 11:50:11 EST
Organization: Delphi Internet
Lines: 132
Message-ID: <931122.42611.KEITHWRITERS@delphi.com>
NNTP-Posting-Host: delphi.com

 
Never Rub Another Man's Rhubarb
or, Why Social/Reverse Engineering is NOT Cool
by Keith Eluard, Technosys
-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-
 
!	The Hoax
 
When I was planning to release Prosody and Mirrorshades, my text composition
programs, I was
expecting *some* backlash from governmental bodies because it would be possible
to transport
Prosody out of the US because I would send it via Internet. Fine. That was
expected and understood
when we were planning the whole shebang. With spin control, it could be good
advertising for us. "If
The Feds are scared of it, then it must be good..."
 
What we were NOT expecting was what happened: on 6 November 1993, our lawyer
received an
email from a person claiming to be "Jerome Marshall of the NSA" (National
Security Agency),
stating that all persons involved in the release of Prosody would be subject to
arrest and seizure of
property if all of our data and notes on the project were not turned over to
the "NSA". Two days
later, we received a physical letter on Department of Justice stationery
stating the same thing. A
confession: I'm not as Hip to the Clip as I should and so thought the NSA would
be under the DoJ.
We were advised by our lawyer (he wishes anonymity-i wish him my foot up his
butt) to comply.
And we were going to do just that until a fortuitous email from John Markoff
suggested that we
contact the NSA ourselves via the phonebook rather than the contact numbers
listed in the
correspondence.
 
It seems as if there is an ugly joke going on here, and I'm not amused by my
part in it.
 
The National Security Agency (informally and unofficially) claims that there is
no employee of the
NSA that should or would have contacted us, our lawyer, or anyone connected
with us about
Prosody, much less DEMAND OUR DATA. The contact we made at the NSA (I will not
reveal her
name as she cannot officially speak for the NSA) helped clear up some of the
confusion thrown in
our path:
 
	1.	The NSA is under the Department of Defense, not Justice.
	2.	Encryption is not illegal (NO SHIT)
	3.	My programs are not encryption, no matter what anyone says. They are not
based
on any accepted cryptographic method and do not pose any threat to anyone's
(in)security.
 
After discussing this with our new legal counsel, we have come to the
conclusion that this entire affair
was a practical joke in very bad taste or an attempt to steal the programs by
using the current
paranoia/hysteria that says ALL FEDS ARE BAD. Not that I saying they're good,
but they're not all
bad.
 
As I said before, I'm not amused...
 
@	What Will Happen
 
Our plan at Technosys is this: we will revise the code for Prosody and
Mirrorshades to completely
cripple the "encryption" factors and then release them as PD/shareware on the
internet. Meanwhile,
we will encourage everyone who we talk to as we float through c-space that they
join the EFF, or at
least find out their data rights on the Net. Also, we will work with any other
software developers out
there in on the Net to create a "Concerned Citizens Network" to help monitor
and prevent reverse
engineering/social engineering/outright theft of our programs. Eventually, we
will release a Natural
Language encryption program based on accepted RSA algorithms (ala PGP), but
only in physical
form (i.e. diskette) to prevent raising anyone's eyebrows.
 
All in all, about what we were going to do anyway...
 
#	What YOU Can Do
 
Lots of things. Join the EFF. Get involved with Computer Professionals for
Social Responsibility (if
applicable to you). Contact your system administration to find out exactly what
your data rights are
(a local college here in Indianapolis will NOT allow anything sent via PGP on
its host, for example).
Do some research on the things that concern you about the current
security/insecurity situation.
Write Mr. Bill & OzoneMan (president@whitehouse.gov,
vice.president@whitehouse.gov) about
what you find and aren't happy with. And above all, talk to other users you
know about what is
wrong and what you could do to fix it.
 
Then fix it.
 
$	RESOURCES FOR THE CONCERNED
 
Technosys:	limetwig@mindvox.phantom.com (K Eluard)
		keithwriters@delphi.com (K Boyle)
 
cert.sei.cmu.edu/pub
	-=-Computer/Internet Security info
 
info@eff.org
	-=-address for the EFF
 
president@whitehouse.gov
vice.president@whitehouse.gov
	-=-sorry, when I get an address for the real potentate, I'll put 	HER'S here
too
 
Thanx for your patience and attention.
Pax.
-=-Keith Eluard
*
"Lord, grant me the serenity to accept the things I cannot change, the courage
to try to change the
things I can, and the wisdom to hide the bodies of the people I had to kill
because they pissed me
off."
*




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Black Unicorn <unicorn@access.digex.net>
Date: Mon, 22 Nov 93 15:37:42 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Hughes and e-mail address's
Message-ID: <199311222335.AA05919@access.digex.net>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain




Please forgive the bandwidth waste.

Mr Hughes,

As the host displayed in your list post headers is unreachable
from my site, I mailed to your soda.berkeley.edu address.

Has this mail reached you?
Same person?
(Your server stored PGP key indicates the soda address)

-uni- (Dark)




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Stanton McCandlish <mech@eff.org>
Date: Mon, 22 Nov 93 15:38:01 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Can NSA crack PGP?
Message-ID: <199311222336.SAA22403@eff.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


In a FidoNet debate, it's been charged that PGP is unsafe, and that NSA
can crack it.  The persons holding this viewpoint espouse the idea that
the NSA can crack anything, pretty much, and that anything they could not
crack would not be available to the general public, but would have been
supressed.

Can anyone disprove this notion definitively?  I'm looking for an
ironclad case that this idea is incorrect. It'd especially be appreciated
if anyone with reasonable "credentials" can respond.  

Even if you do post replies to the list/group, please at least Cc me so I
don't miss them.

SO, let's take this opportunity at online education, and spread the news
that under current technology, PGP is in fact a secure cryptosystem.

Thanks, and let the games begin!

-- 
Stanton  McCandlish  mech@eff.org  1:109/1103   EFF  Online  Activist & SysOp
O P E N  P L A T F O R M   C R Y P T O P O L I C Y   O N L I N E  R I G H T S
N  E  T  W  O  R  K  I  N  G      V  I  R  T  U  A  L     C  U  L  T  U  R  E
I   N   F  O :  M   E   M   B   E   R   S   H   I   P  @  E  F  F  .  O  R  G



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "kpj@sics.se" <kpj@sics.se>
Date: Mon, 22 Nov 93 10:38:00 PST
To: Al Billings <mimir@u.washington.edu>
Subject: Re: Secure Drive 1.0 is here!
In-Reply-To: <Pine.3.87.9311221003.A29429-0100000@goren1.u.washington.edu>
Message-ID: <9311221837.AA23712@sics.se>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


| It isn't very smart asking him in a public forum, especially one that is 
| pretty known to be monitored by at least some government agents. No 
| matter what his opinion is, he's going to have to say "No." It is ILLEGAL 
| for him to export it and you just basically stood up and yelled "Fire!" 
| to every Fed on the list.

Naturally.  I expect him to refuse.  My whole question is whether it is
valid to use Copyleft on code which is not freely copyable over national
boundaries.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: karn@qualcomm.com (Phil Karn)
Date: Mon, 22 Nov 93 19:37:43 PST
To: mech@eff.org
Subject: Can NSA crack PGP?
In-Reply-To: <199311222336.SAA22403@eff.org>
Message-ID: <199311230337.TAA00569@servo>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


There is only one cipher that is provably secure: the one-time-pad.
All other ciphers are, at best, only "practically secure". That is,
they could, in theory, be cracked given enough time and computer
power, but in practice your enemy (even the NSA) *is* limited in his
resources.

There are several ways that NSA might crack PGP. Although I think it
relatively unlikely that they are true, there is nonetheless no way to
prove it. These include:

1. Attacking the RSA cryptosystem. This is a very well studied problem
in civilian cryptography, but it is always possible that NSA has found
a breakthrough in factoring that is still unknown to the civilian
world.

2. Attacking the IDEA conventional cipher. IDEA is based on a
relatively new (and different) design technique than DES.  It has not
had nearly the attention of the civilian cryptographic community that
has been spent on RSA and DES.

3. Attacking the random number generators. This is often the weakest
part of many conventional cryptosystems, but the techniques now used
in PGP are thought to be pretty good. Lest people think that timing
keystrokes is a poor way to generate random numbers, I should say that
I once watched somebody key a STU-III (NSA-designed secure phone). At
one point the phone prompted him to hit the "*" key 20 times. It
didn't say why, of course, but it was pretty obvious to me.  And if
it's good enough for NSA...

4. Attacking the PGP implementation itself. A "black bag job" that
modifies the victim's PGP executable to store or transmit pass
phrases, or gives the spooks a chance to search the disk's free list
for old temporary files, is almost certainly the easiest way to attack
PGP.  Don't forget that all computer security ultimately rests, at
some level, on physical security.

Phil





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: jazz@hal.com (Jason Zions)
Date: Mon, 22 Nov 93 17:42:42 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Tech: Truth about Canon Copiers (fwd)
Message-ID: <9311230138.AA08386@jazz.hal.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



       This is interesting.  Since most of the change-making machines in 
   laundromats seem to use the side with the dead white guy, I wonder if it
   would work to use this copy?
   ----Dave REes (rees@cs.bu.edu)

Nah, the changers just say "this side up" - the scanner may be looking at
the underside of the bill, or at both sides (more probable).

Jason






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "kpj@sics.se" <kpj@sics.se>
Date: Mon, 22 Nov 93 10:45:06 PST
To: Al Billings <mimir@u.washington.edu>
Subject: Re: Secure Drive 1.0 is here!
In-Reply-To: <Pine.3.87.9311221022.E29429-0100000@goren1.u.washington.edu>
Message-ID: <9311221843.AA24116@sics.se>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


| It is not his fault that he can't give it to you. He's made it freely 
| available. If national boundaries interfere and paranoid US laws don't 
| let him, I don't think you can blame HIM for that.

You are ``beating a dead horse''.
I never wrote it was, is, or will be his fault.
Nor did I blame him for anything.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "kpj@sics.se" <kpj@sics.se>
Date: Mon, 22 Nov 93 10:52:42 PST
To: peb@procase.com (Paul Baclace)
Subject: Re: Secure Drive 1.0 is here!
In-Reply-To: <9311221844.AA14970@ada.procase.com>
Message-ID: <9311221849.AA24461@sics.se>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


| Since IDEA was developed outside the US, doesn't that mean it there 
| essentially is no exporting of cryptography going on here?  To be 
| perfectly invulnerable, the code could be distributed internationally
| without any encryption algorithm--simply add the crypto you want that
| is easily obtainable.

Actually, there are several operatib system products that do exactly that.
Ex: X Windows, BSD

| (Of course, selling crypto is the real trigger for getting attention.
| A copy-left certainly isn't selling.)

Actually, this highlights the absurdity of the old Cold War rules.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: nobody@pmantis.berkeley.edu
Date: Mon, 22 Nov 93 20:35:08 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: PGP-okay BBS?
Message-ID: <9311230434.AA18917@pmantis.berkeley.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


A few months ago we discussed Fidonet, securenet, and PGP. How can I find a
BBS that allows PGP traffic? Is there an equivalent of the nixpub list for
securenet?






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Timothy Newsham <newsham@wiliki.eng.hawaii.edu>
Date: Mon, 22 Nov 93 22:57:44 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: pools for anonymous mail?
Message-ID: <9311230645.AA04998@cygnus.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



is there a list of lists and/or newsgroups used as anonymous
pools for defeating traffic analysis?

                               Tim N.





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: gtoal@an-teallach.com (Graham Toal)
Date: Mon, 22 Nov 93 12:42:41 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: anonymous posts
Message-ID: <9783@an-teallach.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


In article <199311192308.AA02672@access.digex.net>
 > You know that I have a JD from Georgetown and a Masters from some
 > ( not accidently unnamed ) school in International Relations.

Bloody hell, it's David Sternlight! :-)

G
-- 
Personal mail to gtoal@gtoal.com (I read it in the evenings)
Business mail to gtoal@an-teallach.com (Be careful with the spelling!)
Faxes to An Teallach Limited: +44 31 662 4678  Voice: +44 31 668 1550 x212





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: koontzd@lrcs.loral.com (David Koontz )
Date: Mon, 22 Nov 93 21:38:05 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: No Subject
Message-ID: <9311230444.AA02393@io.lrcs.loral.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



reproduced with attributation:

From Electronic Engineering Times, November 22, 1993,
issue 773, page 1 and page 78.



U.S. weighs Clipper chip alternatives

   BY GEORGE LEOPOLD

Washington -  The Clinton adminstration
is readying a new encryption policy that
could help defuse industry opposition to
introduction of the government-developed
Clipper chip by embracing commercial
technologies as alternatives for network
security, according to government and
industry sources.

  A National Security Council panel led
by George Tenet, special presidential
assistant for intelligence programs, is
completing a broad review of government
encryption policy with an eye toward
employgin the Clipper chip, as well as
commercial alternatives, to ensure 
privacy and security on public networks. 
Those would include the proposed electronic
superhighway, or National Information
Infrastructure (NII).

  Tenent could not be reached for
comment on the review's status, but a 
U.S. official said last week the results
of the seven-month National Security 
Council policy review will be announced
soon.

  The Clipper chip, backed by the National
Security Agency and proposed by the Clinton
administration in April as a new data-encryption
standard, is widely viewed by industry critics
as a fait accompli, since the spy agency
wants to use it to protect intelligence data.

  Asked in an interview last Monday whether the
policy review sould resutl in modification of
the Clipper chip proposal,  Michael Nelson, special 
assistant for information technology in the
White House Office of Science and Technology
Policy, acknowledged the need to consider other
encryption technologies for network security,
including software solutions.  He also said the
government should have sought greater industry
participation before proposing the Clipper chip.

  Industry opposition to the Clipper chip 
resurfaced at a recent government-industry 
summit in San Fancisco (see Nov. 8, page 1).
During a panel on the NII, Nelson told angry 
company executives that the Clinton admininistration
would no impose Clipper on industry or rule out
alternative encryption technologies.

  "Clipper is not a silver bullet, it's not even
a brass bullet," Nelson said.  "It's only one
approach."

  He added, "If we don't address these (network security)
issues, people won't use the NII."
  
  Nelson said last week the National Security Council
review was designed to bring industry and Congress 
into the process of looking for commercial solutions,
besides Clipper, to the network-security issue.  Industry
groups said last week they have contributed to the review,
which began shortly after Clipper was proposed.  The review
is expected to result in a decision on how to implement
Clipper.

  A decision on how to proceed with the Clipper proposal
was scheduled for Sept. 1 but was delayed in response
to recommendation from a private-sector advisory group
to the Commerce Department.

  Clipper, which scrambles telephone conversations using
an encryption algorithm called Skipjack, is at the heart
of an administration initiative announced in April on 
secure telecom networks and wireless communications links.
Forced to balance the interests of companies and private
citizens with law-enforcement and national-security needs,
President Clinton ordered a comprehensive review of U.S.
encryption policy adressing:

  x Privacy, including the need for voice and data
    encryption to protect proprietary business data.

  x The ability of federal law-enforcement officials to 
    tap phones and computers.

  x The employment of modern technology to build the NII,
    including encryption technolgy needed to protect
    proprietary information transmitted over the information
    superhighway.

  x The need for American companies to build and export
    high-technology products to boost U.S. competiveness.
    U.S. companies may offer encryption as a feature of 
    software sold in the United States, but are prohibited
    from including encryption in commercial software exports.
    Proponents of decontrolling encrypted software aruge that
    restrictions are useless because encryption technology is
    widely available (see Oct. 18, page 18).

  Acknowledging industry's concerns, the initiative also 
includes the creation of a key-escrow system to insure the
Clipper chip would be used to protect privacy.  (A Commerce
Department official said last week the government has 
dropped the Clipper moniker, referring to it instead as the
"key-escrow chip", out of concern for possible trademark
infringement.)

  Devices incorporating the chip would have two unique
software keys government investigators would need to decode
encoded messages.  Two key-escrow data banks would be
overseen by a pair of independent agencies designated by the
Justice Department and the White House.  A decision on which
agencies will oversee the databases has not been made,
Commerce spokeswoman Anne Enright Shepherd siad last
Wedesday.

  According to a White House statement announcing the 
encryption policy, "We need the Clipper chip and other 
approaches that can both provide law-abiding citizens the
access they need and prevent criminals from using it to
hide their illegal activities."

  Depsite the administration's insistence that Clipper and 
the rest of the encryption policy are voluntary efforts, many
U.S. high-tech companies have opposed it (see June 21, page 28).
Instead, they want policy makers to retain the ubiquitous
federal Data Encryption Standard (DES) and use other public-key
technologies, such as RC-2 and RC-4.  DES uses a 56-bit key
while Clipper employs an 80-bit key.

  Clipper "was forced upon [the Clinton administration] before
they had the chance to evaluate its impact," Bruce Heiman, a
Washington attorney representing the Business Software Alliance,
said last Tuesday.  "NSA sold them a bill of goods."

  The policy review means "they relaize that Clipper has problems
... but they don't want to rule it out entirely," Heiman said,
adding that industry would accept Clipper as one alternative to
network security only if it is a part of a truly voluntary 
program that includes public-key encryption.








From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Paul Gilberti <wizard@Think.COM>
Date: Mon, 22 Nov 93 17:52:43 PST
To: MJMISKI@macc.wisc.edu
Subject: Secure ID Thanx
In-Reply-To: <23112217230547@vms2.macc.wisc.edu>
Message-ID: <9311230149.AA11820@gandalf.think.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



What was the request ?  we use Secure-ID here.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: greg@ideath.goldenbear.com (Greg Broiles)
Date: Mon, 22 Nov 93 23:17:44 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Anonymity on the net
Message-ID: <mmBgDc1w164w@ideath.goldenbear.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Alan Wexelblat writes:

[Asks, why is anonymity/pseudonymity useful when posting?]

> Case 1) technical postings of a research/white (in the sense of whitenet/
> blacknet) nature.  Here anonymity would be a hindrance.  I post in large
> part to help my name be known in certain academic circles.  In this case I
> would tend to wonder at people who posted anonymously and would (as was
> mentioned in this list) tend to discount their information.  In research
> circles, name value means a lot.

An anonymous/pseudonymous poster may want to expose faulty reasoning or
research methods on the part of a previous poster, where that poster is
their boss, faculty advisor, department chair, [employee of] generous
donor to a nonprofit org .. etc.

This is also useful for revealing insider information of a sensitive
or "whistleblowing" nature; see below.

> Case 2) technical postings of a black nature.  Here anonymity is a big help,
> as you may have some question about the legality of what you are doing.  But
> the question I have is: why post at all?  What gain is there from
> publicizing this kind of information?  Perhaps the gain is some assurance of
> safety from retaliation from parties who might feel themselves wronged by
> what you posted.  In this case, anonymity wins.

This is useful for posting security holes that CERT/vendors won't
acknowledge or address; it seems generally useful when posting something
that might get you (a) fired or (b) sued. Consider the (ongoing, I think)
litigation against the person who posted negative comments about a stock
to Prodigy. SLAPP (strategic lawsuit against public participants) actions
aren't (to my limited knowledge) common in the online world, but aren't so
uncommon in, say, logging-protest world. Even where a SLAPP suit isn't
successful (in terms of a favorable verdict), they can be very burdensome
to defendants. (The suit against the poster to Prodigy may or may not be
a real SLAPP, but it's at least similar.)

> Case 3) non-technical postings (social, talk).  Again I wonder what is the
> value of anonymity in this case.  To have a social conversation is to build
> a community of like-minded people and to contact people whom you want to
> relate to in some way.  Anonymity defeats this social building and relation
> process.

There are still several places where it's not 'politically correct' to be
known as a reader of/poster to groups like soc.motss, alt.sex.bondage, or
other "controversial" groups. People may still want the sense of community
that they can get from participating, while wanting to avoid the enforcement
of PC-ness, possibly at the end of a baseball bat.

Famous/infamous people may also want to participate in the online world
without being swamped by "fan mail" - I suspect it'd be virtually impossible
for, say, William Gibson to post to Usenet without being overrun by
zillions of letters. I believe that Steve Wozniak (post-Apple) attended
college under an assumed name for similar reasons.

> A counter-response to this might be to say that we want to put privacy in,
> not anonymity.  But again, I wonder about this.  If I want my message to be
> read only by a certain list of people, why am I posting to a newsgroup
> instead of to a mailing list?

Distributing "secret" information widely, in an encrypted form, can
frustrate traffic analysis - if I suspect that X is doing something
nefarious, I could look through sendmail logs (or whatever) to see
who she's talking to, and create a list of suspects. However, if X
posts her secrets to the net - in an encrypted format - and those secrets
are dispersed to the world, I can't draw any conclusions about anyone
who happens to receive that encrypted message in their alt.test newsfeed.
There's also no chance that anything peculiar will be showing up in
postmaster mailboxes because of bounced mail; it's also a much easier
way to talk to 200 people at once. (Assuming that it's meaningful to talk
about sharing a 'secret' with 200 people .. :)

> There's no point in privatizing the substrate, since anyone can get a client
> that will decrypt at the far end.
> 
> In sum, I guess I'm somewhat baffled at why one would want to use anonymity
> and/or privacy enhancement technology on one's news postings.

Generally, to (a) say/do something controversial, and avoid retribution;
(b) for an [in]famous person to say/do something mundane; or (c) to make
anonymity/pseudonymity not seem so peculiar, so instances of (a) and (b)
won't stick out like sore thumbs.


--
Greg Broiles
greg@goldenbear.com                     Baked, not fried.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: greg@ideath.goldenbear.com (Greg Broiles)
Date: Mon, 22 Nov 93 21:22:44 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: PGP-okay BBS?
Message-ID: <7acgDc1w164w@ideath.goldenbear.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



uunet!pmantis.berkeley.edu!nobody writes:

> A few months ago we discussed Fidonet, securenet, and PGP. How can I find a
> BBS that allows PGP traffic? Is there an equivalent of the nixpub list for
> securenet?

(Sorry for posting this to the list, but an E-mail reply wasn't possible.)

Look for the following post recently sent to alt.security.pgp; if you
can't find it, mail me and I'll mail it to you.

> From: jburrows@halcyon.com (John Burrows)
> Newsgroups: alt.security.pgp
> Subject: Re: Crypto-friendly Fido hubs
> Message-ID: <2cptlv$pct@nwfocus.wa.com>
> Date: 22 Nov 1993 00:36:15 -0800
> References: <145314Z21111993@anon.penet.fi>
> Sender: news@nwfocus.wa.com
> Organization: "A World of Information at your Fingertips"
> Lines: 261
> NNTP-Posting-Host: nwfocus.wa.com

--
Greg Broiles
greg@goldenbear.com                     Baked, not fried.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: karn@qualcomm.com (Phil Karn)
Date: Mon, 22 Nov 93 21:27:44 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: digital voice board at Comdex
Message-ID: <199311230525.VAA00688@servo>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Last week at Comdex, I happened across Digicom Systems' booth. They're
selling a PC board with a programmable DSP chip from Analog Devices
that can be programmed to act as a sound card or as any of several
dial modems up to V.32bis. AND... it can be programmed with the GSM
vocoder algorithm (approx 13 kb/s).

The price was reasonable, too...in the $100 range, as I recall.

This could be the enabling product for a homebrew secure telephone.
The board can't act as a vocoder and modem simultaneously, so you'll
need either two boards, or one board plus a conventional modem. But a
vocoder that operates within dialup modem rates has been the roadblock
so far in a secure telephone. Anyone interested?

The address on Digicom Systems' flyer is 188 Topaz St, Milpitas CA
95035.  Voice: 800-833-8900. Fax 408-262-1390.

Naturally, I have no connection with this company other than as a
prospective customer.

--Phil





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Alan (Miburi-san) Wexelblat" <wex@media.mit.edu>
Date: Mon, 22 Nov 93 18:45:09 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Anonymity on the net
In-Reply-To: <199311230035.QAA09981@mail.netcom.com>
Message-ID: <9311230243.AA27198@media.mit.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I find myself largely in agreement with Nick Szabo's assertions that too
many people spread too much information about themselves over the Net.

But I wonder about whether or not we will be doing anyone a service by
making encryption and 'Nyms widespread in newsgroups.  It's too long a topic
to tackle all at once, so let me throw out a few opening thoughts.

Case 1) technical postings of a research/white (in the sense of whitenet/
blacknet) nature.  Here anonymity would be a hindrance.  I post in large
part to help my name be known in certain academic circles.  In this case I
would tend to wonder at people who posted anonymously and would (as was
mentioned in this list) tend to discount their information.  In research
circles, name value means a lot.

Case 2) technical postings of a black nature.  Here anonymity is a big help,
as you may have some question about the legality of what you are doing.  But
the question I have is: why post at all?  What gain is there from
publicizing this kind of information?  Perhaps the gain is some assurance of
safety from retaliation from parties who might feel themselves wronged by
what you posted.  In this case, anonymity wins.

Case 3) non-technical postings (social, talk).  Again I wonder what is the
value of anonymity in this case.  To have a social conversation is to build
a community of like-minded people and to contact people whom you want to
relate to in some way.  Anonymity defeats this social building and relation
process.

A counter-response to this might be to say that we want to put privacy in,
not anonymity.  But again, I wonder about this.  If I want my message to be
read only by a certain list of people, why am I posting to a newsgroup
instead of to a mailing list?

There's no point in privatizing the substrate, since anyone can get a client
that will decrypt at the far end.

In sum, I guess I'm somewhat baffled at why one would want to use anonymity
and/or privacy enhancement technology on one's news postings.

--Alan Wexelblat, Reality Hacker, Author, and Cyberspace Bard
Media Lab - Advanced Human Interface Group	wex@media.mit.edu
Voice: 617-258-9168, Pager: 617-945-1842	PUBLIC KEY available by request
"To pleasure!" "To passion!" "To paradise!" "To pain!" "Tonight!"




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: karn@qualcomm.com (Phil Karn)
Date: Mon, 22 Nov 93 23:27:45 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re:  Secure Drive Copyleft / Export Problem
Message-ID: <199311230725.XAA01415@servo>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


So excise the IDEA code, and refer the reader to the December 1993
issue of Dr. Dobbs Journal, which includes a complete listing and
algorithm description of IDEA.

Phil




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "L. Detweiler" <ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Date: Mon, 22 Nov 93 23:23:50 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: G.Barnes -- Stellar Hypocrite
Message-ID: <9311230723.AA02688@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


A friend has just emailed me a copy of Mr. Barnes' outrageous invasions
into my privacy from last week, which just saw for the first time, and
now condemn as a grotesque fishing expedition among my personal
associates with enough influence to censor me. I didn't take his
earlier threats about `going to your personal associates' seriously --
I had no idea anyone could be so perverted. Mr. Barnes, your slimy
tactics are absolutely obscene, and I further doubt that you are acting
alone. Prominent `leading' cypherpunks are using you as their `front
man' to attack and censor me rather than publicly confront my charges
and confess to their own depravities of widespread, rampant,
conspirational pseudospoofing, yourself included.

The sheer onslaught of unremitting evil I have been subject to in the
past few weeks make my RISKS articles look like feeble whimperings. The
problem is not that these recent freakshows are little anomalies in the
Cypherpunk `movement'. We are seeing for the first time the true,
unconcealed, rotten core of it. The hideous monster that has until now
hidden in blackness is rearing and screeching at the top of its lungs
upon being discovered. Pseudospoofing, criminal machinations of
identity, lying through the media, and subversion of the Internet and
Cyberspace have been the #1 goals of the Cypherpunks from the
beginning, and their heinous, vicious atrocities have already
irreparably damaged and poisoned very many quarters of the Internet.
The Aliens have Landed.





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: erc@khijol.yggdrasil.com (Ed Carp)
Date: Tue, 23 Nov 93 00:32:45 PST
To: greg@ideath.goldenbear.com (Greg Broiles)
Subject: Re: Anonymity on the net
In-Reply-To: <mmBgDc1w164w@ideath.goldenbear.com>
Message-ID: <m0p1t5u-000HYYC@khijol.yggdrasil.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text


> 
> Alan Wexelblat writes:
> 
> [Asks, why is anonymity/pseudonymity useful when posting?]

[excellent reasoning by Mr. Broiles deleted]

Also, as in the case of newsgroups such as alt*.abuse.recovery, the very
fact that your perp might be on the net, and harass or attempt to extract
revenge or retribution for posting, is a great reason to be anonymous.
There is a very real threat that if you post about your perp and he finds
out who you are, you might find yourself facing the business end of a
rather large, loaded, gun in the hands of a very pissed-off individual.
-- 
Ed Carp, N7EKG			erc@wetware.com			510/659-9560
                   an38299@anon.penet.fi, anon-1157@twwells.com
If you want magic, let go of your armor.  Magic is so much stronger than
steel!        -- Richard Bach, "The Bridge Across Forever"



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Matt Blaze <mab@crypto.com>
Date: Mon, 22 Nov 93 21:48:05 PST
To: karn@qualcomm.com (Phil Karn)
Subject: Re: Can NSA crack PGP?
In-Reply-To: <199311230337.TAA00569@servo>
Message-ID: <9311230533.AA17556@crypto.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


In cypherpunks Phil Karn writes:

>3. Attacking the random number generators. This is often the weakest
>part of many conventional cryptosystems, but the techniques now used
>in PGP are thought to be pretty good. Lest people think that timing
>keystrokes is a poor way to generate random numbers, I should say that
>I once watched somebody key a STU-III (NSA-designed secure phone). At
>one point the phone prompted him to hit the "*" key 20 times. It
>didn't say why, of course, but it was pretty obvious to me.  And if
>it's good enough for NSA...

Minor nit: I agree that keystroke timing is good in principle for getting
"true" random bits, but we should be careful not to extrapolate too much from
the STU-III for general purpose computer systems.  The STU may have a
specially designed keypad timer, while god knows how often some random OS/
hardware combination delivers keyboard interupt times back to user processes.
Compounding the issue is knowing which bits in the interarrival time are
the "hotest" ones to measure on a particular system, which may be surprisingly
far from the lowest order bits depending on the clock granularity and skew.

Obviously the technique works well in some configurations, but there may
be others where it fails badly.  PGP seems to use it too good advantage, but
I'd still be suspicious before trusting it on an untested platform.

-matt




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: karn@qualcomm.com (Phil Karn)
Date: Tue, 23 Nov 93 01:02:44 PST
To: mab@crypto.com
Subject: Can NSA crack PGP?
In-Reply-To: <9311230533.AA17556@crypto.com>
Message-ID: <199311230859.AAA05134@servo>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>Minor nit: I agree that keystroke timing is good in principle for getting
>"true" random bits, but we should be careful not to extrapolate too much from
>the STU-III for general purpose computer systems.

I fully agree.

>Compounding the issue is knowing which bits in the interarrival time are
>the "hotest" ones to measure on a particular system, which may be surprisingly
>far from the lowest order bits depending on the clock granularity and skew.

I think this is less of a problem. Given a good cryptograpic hash
function, I would simply hash *all* of the clock bits, without regard
to which are the "hottest" ones. If (important 'if') there is
sufficient total entropy in the input bits, hashing should effectively
"distill" the input entropy into the output bits.

Phil




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: J. Michael Diehl <mdiehl@triton.unm.edu>
Date: Tue, 23 Nov 93 00:22:44 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: procmail-pgp
Message-ID: <9311230820.AA01363@triton.unm.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Well, my server program logged several requests for my procmail recipes for 
pgp.  Unfortuanately, I haven't heard any comments about the recipes.  Is any-
one using them?  BTW, did anyone have any difficulties with the server software?
I hacked it together in a few hours and want to make sure that it works 
completely.  Thanx in advance.


J. Michael Diehl   ;^)  |*The 2nd Amendment is there in case the 
mdiehl@triton.unm.edu   | Government forgets about the 1st!  <RL>
Mike.Diehl@f29.n301.z1  |*God is a good Physicist, and an even 
    .fidonet.org        | better Mathematician.  <Me>
al945@cwns9.ins.cwru.edu|*I'm just looking for the opportunity to 
 (505) 299-2282 (voice) | be Politically Incorrect! <Me>
Can we impeach him yet? |*Protected by 18 USC 2511 and 18 USC 2703. 



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "George A. Gleason" <gg@well.sf.ca.us>
Date: Tue, 23 Nov 93 01:27:44 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Zen Master
Message-ID: <199311230926.BAA26517@well.sf.ca.us>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


IGNORE HIM IGNORE HIM IGNORE HIM please!  People are dropping off the list
because of this stuff.  

-gg




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "George A. Gleason" <gg@well.sf.ca.us>
Date: Tue, 23 Nov 93 01:28:51 PST
To: mg5n+@andrew.cmu.edu
Subject: Re: Zen Master
Message-ID: <199311230928.BAA26585@well.sf.ca.us>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


IGNORE HIM IGNORE HIM IGNORE HIM please take anything related to LD
elsewhere, this stuff is causing lots of good people to drop off the list.
thank you.

-gg




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Black Unicorn <unicorn@access.digex.net>
Date: Mon, 22 Nov 93 22:33:05 PST
To: koontzd@lrcs.loral.com
Subject: Clipper again
Message-ID: <199311230632.AA05407@access.digex.net>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



  According to a White House statement announcing the
encryption policy, "We need the Clipper chip and other
approaches that can both provide law-abiding citizens the
access they need and prevent criminals from using it to
hide their illegal activities."


Wait,
Is this the NEW policy?  The one that admits problems with Clipper,
or the old one?

It's scary that I even have to ASK this question.  If it is new,
what's the bloody difference?

"...and other approaches...." 

Smells like a tuna processing plant in here.

->
that can both provide law-abiding citizens the
access they need and prevent criminals from using it to
hide their illegal activities.
<-

Please.  Back to the old security v. privacy debate.
Get a clue Clinton
What's new here?

->
  Clipper "was forced upon [the Clinton administration] before
they had the chance to evaluate its impact," Bruce Heiman, a
Washington attorney representing the Business Software Alliance,
said last Tuesday.  "NSA sold them a bill of goods."
<-

Isn't Mr. Heiman being a touch kind here?

It was all NSA's fault?  That doesn't sound like
someone with the true interests of the "Business
Software Alliance" at heart.  Please forgive me if you're here
Mr. Heiman.  I'd like to know if this quote was properly within
context (or did the media distort it?)

->
  Depsite the administration's insistence that Clipper and
the rest of the encryption policy are voluntary efforts, many
U.S. high-tech companies have opposed it....
<-

Notice how it's never said WHY it was opposed.
Just kinda hinted...

The appearence of flexability here is an ILLUSION.
It's rhetoric.  Trash.  They haven't changed the policy,
just worked it around a little to make it look like they are
worried about concerns of industry... Please.  This smokescreen
trash makes me sick.  Clipper, or a similar proposal will show up
in basically the same form called "Splitdeck" or "Skimmer"
It's not the chip we object to you IDIOT.  It's the policy and
all the baggage attached to the bullshit goal of balancing
"Private interests and law enforcement requirements."

These are almost ALWAYS two opposed concepts.  Take a basic
class on intelligence Clinton and friends.
Security | Liberty
polar opposites.

-uni- Dark




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Mike Ingle <MIKEINGLE@delphi.com>
Date: Mon, 22 Nov 93 22:58:06 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Secure Drive Copyleft / Export Problem
Message-ID: <01H5MYABH5SW90OJ8M@delphi.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Since kpj@sics.se saw fit to cc his request to the list and start this
controversy, I'll forward my response to the list as well. If I get
harassed by the FSF, I'll have to stop distributing and count on the
connectivity of the net to keep it alive. Aarrggh, this does not
encourage a person to write more code...

===========================================================================

>I wonder if you really can have a Copyleft and disallow the program source
>to anybody outside the United States and Canada.  As you write the code is
>under Copyleft, I hereby ask you for a copy of it.  FYI: I am situated in
>the state of Sweden in Europe.  What is your reply to this?

I would like to send you a copy. It is illegal for me to do so.
The copyleft is not on my code; it's on the IDEA algorithm I used.
The U.S. government has prosecuted people for sending crypto out
of the country. PGP is copylefted, yet Phil Zimmerman refuses to
export or distribute the program himself for similar reasons,
even though he holds the copyright. I'm trying to do something
in the spirit of PGP here; please don't put me in a bind. I'm
worried enough about getting into trouble; I assume you've read
about the Phil Zimmermann subpeonas. I don't like export controls
any more than you do, but there's nothing I can do about them.

---- MikeIngle@delphi.com

From the PGP 1.0 manual:

All the source code for PGP is available for free under the "Copyleft" 
General Public License from the Free Software Foundation (FSF).  A
copy of the FSF General Public License is included in the source
release package of PGP.

Export Controls
---------------
    
The Government has made it illegal in many cases to export good
cryptographic technology, and that may include PGP.  This is
determined by volatile State Department policies, not fixed laws. 
Many foreign governments impose serious penalties on anyone inside
their country using encrypted communications.  In some countries they
might even shoot you for that.  I will not export this software in
cases when it is illegal to do so under US State Department policies,
and I assume no responsibility for other people exporting it without
my permission.
   




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "George A. Gleason" <gg@well.sf.ca.us>
Date: Tue, 23 Nov 93 01:52:47 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Canadian application?
Message-ID: <199311230950.BAA27345@well.sf.ca.us>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Recently there have been articles & letters in the local gay press
complaining about Canadian Customs engaging in censorship by preventing gay
publications from entering Canada.  Seems to me this is an ideal case for
setting up a special-purpose private encrypted net, and gaining a vocal
constituency in our favor. 

What I have in mind would be to consult with various publishers in the gay
community, toward the end of setting up offices in Vancouver and Toronto
which would receive encrypted files from the US which could then be
reassembled into printed form for regular press production and distribution
within Canada: thereby entirely bypassing Customs and its censorship. 

I'm guessing that they'll probably want to use an authorised/licensed system
such as ViaCrypt, and wonder whether that can handle magazine and book
production type files, which may be text and/or graphics, full color, layout
details, and so on.  

If anyone out there is interested in helping with this; preferably if you're
in the San Francisco Bay Area, email gg@well.sf.ca.us.

-gg




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: kone@COURIER1.SHA.CORNELL.EDU
Date: Mon, 22 Nov 93 20:03:04 PST
To: <cypherpunks@toad.com>
Subject: I got to go
Message-ID: <2CF1B556@COURIER1.SHA.CORNELL.EDU>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I got to leve this fun list.  I am finding myself adding to the noise and not
to the signal.
I have learnd alot, but cant resist my two cents.
Kone.
Keep up the good work---code.
 




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: gnu (John Gilmore)
Date: Tue, 23 Nov 93 04:17:50 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: EE Times Nov 22, p1: "US weighs Clipper chip alternatives"
Message-ID: <9311231216.AA10306@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


The story, by George Leopold, has some obvious errors [like the "fait
accompli"], but may have nuggets of new info.  I expecially like the
paragraph about the purpose of the encryption review.  It's half right:
the half about its purpose being to shove Clipper down our throats.  But
if they wanted to bring Congress and industry into the review process,
they should've run it declassified and in open meetings.

	US weighs Clipper chip alternatives
	by George Leopold

"The Clinton administration is readying a new encryption policy that
could help defuse industry opposition to introduction of the
government developed Clipper chip by embracing commercial technologies
as alternatives for network security, according to government and
industry sources.

"A National Security Council panel led by George Tenet [sic], special
presidential assistant for intelligence programs, is completing a
broad review of government encryption policy with an eye toward
employing the Clipper chip, as well as commercial alternatives, to
ensure privacy and security on public networks.  Those would include
the proposed electronic superhighway, or National Information
Infrastructure.

"Tenet could not be reached for comment on the review's status, but a
U.S. official said last week the results of the seven-month National
Security Council policy review will be announced soon.

"The Clipper chip, backed by the National Security Agency and proposed
by the Clinton administration in April as a new data-encryption
standard, is widely viewed by industry critics as a fait accompli,
since the spy agency wants to use it to protect intelligence data.

"Asked in an interview last Monday whether the policy review would
result in modification of the Clipper chip proposal, Michael Nelson,
special assistant for information technology in the White House Office
of Science and Technology Policy, acknowledged the need to consider
other encryption technologies for network security, including software
solutions.  He also said the government should have sought greater
industry participation before proposing the Clipper chip.

"Industry opposition to the Clipper resurfaced at a recent
government-industry technology summit in San Francisco (see Nov 8,
page 1).  During a panel on the NII, Nelson told angry company
executives that the Clinton administration would not impose Clipper on
industry or rule out alternative encryption technologies.

"``Clipper is not a silver bullet, it's not even a brass bullet,''
Nelson said.  ``It's only one approach.''

"He added, ``If we don't address these [network security] issues,
people won't use the NII.''

"Nelson said last week the National Security Council review was
designed to bring industry and Congress into the process of looking
for commercial solutions, besides Clipper, to the network-security
issue.  Industry groups said last week they have contributed to the
review, which began shortly after Clipper was proposed.  The review is
expected to result in a decision on how to implement Clipper.

"A decision on how to proceed with the Clipper proposal was scheduled
for Sept 1 but was delayed in response to a recommendation from a
private-sector advisory group to the Commerce Dpeartment."

...

"Acknowledging industry's concerns, the initiative also includes
creation of a key-escrow system to ensure the Clipper chip would be
used to protect privacy." ...

...  "Two key-escrow data banks would be overseen by a pair of
independent agencies designated by the Justice Department and the
White House.  A decision on which agencies will oversee the databases
has not been made, Commerce spokeswoman Anne Enright Shepherd said
last Wednesday."

...

"Clipper ``was forced upon [the Clinton administration] before they
had a chance to evaluate its impact,'' Bruce Heiman, a Washington
attorney representing the Business Software Alliance, said last
Tuesday.  ``NSA sold them a bill of goods.''

"The policy review means ``they realize that Clipper has problems...
but they don't want to rule it out entirely,'' Heiman said, adding
that industry would accept Clipper as one alternative to network
security only if it is part of a truly voluntary program that includes
public-key encryption."
--
John Gilmore                gnu@toad.com  --  gnu@cygnus.com  --  gnu@eff.org
  ``This committee has not tried to determine whether the National Security
  Agency tendency to advance exaggerated claims of authority ... stems from
  conscious policy or the actions of individual NSA employees.''
The Government's Classification of Private Ideas, House Report 96-1540, p. 67




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Derek Atkins <warlord@MIT.EDU>
Date: Tue, 23 Nov 93 01:22:44 PST
To: karn@qualcomm.com (Phil Karn)
Subject: Re: Can NSA crack PGP?
In-Reply-To: <199311230859.AAA05134@servo>
Message-ID: <9311230920.AA13996@oliver.MIT.EDU>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> I think this is less of a problem. Given a good cryptograpic hash
> function, I would simply hash *all* of the clock bits, without regard
> to which are the "hottest" ones. If (important 'if') there is
> sufficient total entropy in the input bits, hashing should effectively
> "distill" the input entropy into the output bits.

True.  In fact, PGP does this.  However, the problem is knowing how
much raw data you need in order to get enough entropy into the system.
That is the hardest part.  For example, say that only one bit is
random for every 8 you get.  That is a very big difference than if 6
of the 8 bits were truely random.  And each machine-type is different!

Yes, you don't really need to know which bits are the hot-bits, but
you need to know how many hot-bits/byte you have, and this is machine
specific.  You could always deal worst-case, in which you assume the
worst machine-type and on machines with better hot-bit ratios you just
get extra entropy.  (That never hurts).

-derek





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: strat@pancho.ksu.ksu.edu (Steve Davis)
Date: Tue, 23 Nov 93 02:33:53 PST
To: an12070@anon.penet.fi
Subject: Re: The Psychopunk Glossary (2 of 2)
In-Reply-To: <9311230951.AA26164@anon.penet.fi>
Message-ID: <9311231032.AA17199@pancho.ksu.ksu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Time to filter this dweeb's mail to /dev/null

-- 
                                               Steve Davis (strat@cis.ksu.edu)
                                                       Kansas State University

"I am not indecisive.  Am I indecisive?" -- Jim Seibel



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: gbarnes@nyx.cs.du.edu (Gary Barnes)
Date: Tue, 23 Nov 93 06:57:56 PST
To: ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu
Subject: Re: G.Barnes --Stellar Hypocrite
Message-ID: <9311231455.AA14336@nyx.cs.du.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Surely you mean D.Barnes, Mr/Ms ld231782?
I wouldn't normally mention it, but the Subject: line did rather
jump out of my mailbox at me!

Yours, 
Gary Barnes




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: lefty@apple.com (Lefty)
Date: Tue, 23 Nov 93 09:13:01 PST
To: pmetzger@lehman.com
Subject: Re: The Final Ultimatum
Message-ID: <9311231704.AA07663@internal.apple.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>Folks, Detweiler is psychotic. Answering this message of his, even to
>flame him, isn't going to get anyone anywhere. There isn't any point
>to it.

Well, gosh, Perry, thanks for taking upon yourself to respond for the rest
of us.  A truly noble undertaking on your part.

Many people are, in fact, capable of making decisions without your input,
strange as this concept may appear to you.


--
Lefty (lefty@apple.com)
C:.M:.C:., D:.O:.D:.






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Alan (Miburi-san) Wexelblat" <wex@media.mit.edu>
Date: Tue, 23 Nov 93 06:22:55 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Anonymity on the net
In-Reply-To: <mmBgDc1w164w@ideath.goldenbear.com>
Message-ID: <9311231419.AA29570@media.mit.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


From: greg@ideath.goldenbear.com (Greg Broiles)
>An anonymous/pseudonymous poster may want to expose faulty reasoning or
>research methods on the part of a previous poster, where that poster is
>their boss, faculty advisor, department chair, [employee of] generous donor
>to a nonprofit org .. etc.

This is closer to my case 2 in the sense that it's something black or
nefarious that is being discussed.  In these cases, as I noted before,
anonymity may help, but ultimately reputable researchers will have to review
the results to determine if there is in fact a fraud or other deception.

In addition, public "exposure" by anonymous sources is -- at best --
questionable.  The anonymous poster may simply be a rival with hir own axe
to grind and no interest in promoting the truth.  One or two instances of
this happening and people will (if they don't already) simply start
discounting anonymous denunciations.  There is a very good reason why our
legal system provides for people being able to face their accusers.

If you really need to get out information of this sort, posting is probably
a very poor second to informing a source with the ability to do a real
investigation.  This is what happened in the Patriot case: the Pentagon was
claiming amazingly high accuracy for the Patriot missile in the Gulf War.
Someone inside the Pentagon knew this was false; shortly thereafter about a
dozen people in the Establishment, in industry, in the media, and in academe
got information they could use to expose the fraud.  [I happen to know one
of these people personally; another is a professor at MIT.]

>This is useful for posting security holes that CERT/vendors won't
>acknowledge or address; it seems generally useful when posting something
>that might get you (a) fired or (b) sued. Consider the (ongoing, I think)

Again, we're in agreement here: Case 2 requires anonymity.  I continue to
harbor the dream that someday this country will move to a position where
people will be able to more freely speak their minds, no matter how ugly
their minds happen to be.

>There are still several places where it's not 'politically correct' to be
>known as a reader of/poster to groups like soc.motss, alt.sex.bondage, or
>other "controversial" groups. People may still want the sense of community
>that they can get from participating, while wanting to avoid the enforcement
>of PC-ness, possibly at the end of a baseball bat.

Yeah, this is true.  I'm on a very large mailing list which discusses a
number of private issues.  Many people get the list at their work email
addresses and contribute to the list anonymously for reasons like these.  I
guess I'm just too much of an idealist -- Greg is probably right here as
well.  I will just note that I tend to believe the gay theorists who note
that the closeted-ness of gays makes homophobia easier and more widespread.
Still, it should be each individual's decision how much sie wants to be
"out."

>Distributing "secret" information widely, in an encrypted form, can
>frustrate traffic analysis [...] (Assuming that it's meaningful to talk
>about sharing a 'secret' with 200 people .. :)

This is sort of the equivalent of the old coded-message-in-the-personals
approach.  Delivering a text which has no meaning except to a specific
intended recipient is probably a reasonable idea, but I wish there was a
better use of network resources than sending hundreds of bogus copies of
something to hide the real intended recipients.

>for an [in]famous person to say/do something mundane

That's a good point I hadn't thought of!  I'm still so jizzed about getting
my name recognized here and there it hadn't occurred to me that there would
be times I'd rather not be recognized at all.

Good points all!  Thanks for contributing to discussion.

--Alan Wexelblat, Reality Hacker, Author, and Cyberspace Bard
Media Lab - Advanced Human Interface Group	wex@media.mit.edu
Voice: 617-258-9168, Pager: 617-945-1842	PUBLIC KEY available by request
"To pleasure!" "To passion!" "To paradise!" "To pain!" "Tonight!"




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Michael E. Marotta" <MERCURY@lcc.edu>
Date: Tue, 23 Nov 93 06:48:58 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Pyrrhus Cracks RSA?
Message-ID: <6E4CCAA7E0204AD3@sleepy.egr.msu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


CAN THE GOVERNMENT BUILD AN ATOMIC BOMB?  
by mercury@well.sf.ca.us <Michael E. Marotta> 
 
Long ago, Captain Kirk and his crew stumbled on a Nazi planet.  
A Federation dude found them earlier and decided to industrialize 
their society by the "most efficient" means possible.  No one was 
surprised at this.  In "Mirror, Mirror" Spock-2 predicts that the 
Evil Federation will collapse.  This was also accepted without 
comment.  Star Trek, perhaps more than any other mass media 
production, reflects the American psyche.  Americans, of course, 
are humans.  Human nature accepts dualities easily.  On the one 
hand, people admire the conqueror.  On the other, the historical 
evidence is never denied: empires always collapse.  (Look at what 
remains: farming, writing, arithmetic, ships and chariots, 
clothing,...  These are useful.) 
 
Not so long ago, Ayn Rand showed that evil only triumphs when 
good people work f+ it.  When good people do nothing, evil 
fails.
 
Cypherpunks know that centralized systems are inefficient, yet 
they fear the NSA.  Cypherpunks know that government employees 
are slugabeds, yet they fear the NSA.  Cypherpunks know that 
qinnovation and enterprise are the antithesis of socialism, yet 
they fear the NSA.  They don't fear that the NSA will kick in 
their doors and shoot them in a cybernetic Kristallnacht or burn 
t(their homes the way the Romans and Mongols did to Carthage and 
Samarkand.  (Waco comes to mind, here.)  No, the Cypherpunk is 
afraid that the government has "powerful computers" capable of a 
"brute force attack" on their algorithms. 
 
It may be true.  Having  Archimedes in town only bought the 
Syracusans time, it didn't assure them victory.  The US Govt 
drafted 90% of the physicists in the world, gave them virtually 
unlimited resources and in five years, it had atomic bombs.  The 
American and Soviet governments proved that they could harness 
nineteenth century technology and shoot things into space.  
(According to Willey Ley what made their rockets possible was the 
pumps which came from fire trucks.)  Ask "anyone" and they will 
tell you that World War Two brought us nuclear power, spaceships, 
radar, television, the transistor, the computer, canned food, and 
recycling.  In fact, it brought none of these.  They already 
existed.  Absent the person with an idea, the Government would 
still be beating farmers with rods for not giving up their goats 
and grain. (The pharoah's toughs used sticks with sharp stones in 
them until bronze came along.  Later, their bronze weapons were 
chopped up by people with iron.  Why didn't the pharoah's priests 
discover bronze and iron?) 
 
Both William Friedman and the man he detested, Herbert O. 
Yardley, despaired in wartime for the lack of people with 
"cipher sense."  An infinite number of clerks with typewriters 
could not break the simplest code.  The government enlisted 
people who liked crossword puzzles, mathematicians, polyglots, 
anyone and everyone who played with symbols.  It made no 
difference.  There was no way to tell who had "cipher sense" and 
there was no way to TEACH it.
 
Friedman was an obsessive-compulsive who worked himself into a 
neurotic frenzy, breaking the Purple Code.  Turing delivered the 
"Bombe" that broke Enigma. 
 
You know the people who could break DES, RSA, PGP, etc.  Shamir 
unpacked Diffie's knapsack.  What is most probable, is that these 
ciphers will stand for some unforeseeable time until someone who 
may not be born yet comes along and breaks them all as an idle 
{exercise on her way to greatness in another field. 
 
But the NSA?  No way, Jose.  They might be nerds who hacked some 
code at 3 am.  But you put them on a salary and benefits in a 
pyramid, then tell them not to talk about their work, and you 
thwart whatever creativity they had.  The NSA can kill you.  But 
t({they can never out-think you. 
 
 
qiM{iW{x




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: an12070@anon.penet.fi (S.Boxx)
Date: Tue, 23 Nov 93 01:55:08 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: The Psychopunk Glossary (1 of 2)
Message-ID: <9311230951.AA26107@anon.penet.fi>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


democracy -- n. (1) Government by the people, exercised either directly
or through elected representatives. ``Democracy is invariably
oppressive because of the tyranny of the majority of honest citizens
over the fringe criminal element.'' (N.Szabo) (2) a nation or social
unit with this form of government. ``There is no pretense Cypherpunks
are a democracy.'' (T.C.May) (3) Social and political equality and
respect for the individual within the community. ``If I prohibited you
from posting, that would not be censorship.'' (E.Hughes). (4) A
subversive and oppressive structure that limits the rights of criminals.

Medusa -- n. (1) A Gorgon with eyes that had the power to turn an
onlooker into stone, who was slain by Perseus. ``Medusa, her snakes,
and her sisters harassed S.Boxx.'' (Medusa) (2) The God worshipped by
the Cypherpunk cult of pseudospoofers.

anarchy -- n. (1) absence of any form of governmental authority or law.
``I'm so excited! The future is CryptoAnarchy.'' (T.C.May) (2)
political disorder and confusion. ``The cypherpunks list has always
been plunged into anarchy from pseudospoofing.'' (J.Dinkelacker) (3)
absence of any cohering principle, as a common standard or purpose;
disorder and confusion. ``Anarchy is not disorder and confusion.''
(Snake #7) (3) the hellish utopia of the psychopunks.

guerilla -- n. (1) A member of an irregular military force that uses
harassing tactics against an enemy army, usu. with the support of the
local population. ``G.Barnes, a chief Sister of Medusa, shot S.Boxx's
postmaster to the glee of the CA cypherpunks.'' (His Royal Eminence)
(2) a cypherpunk who seeks to infiltrate very many sensitive internet
mailing lists, stalking and assassinating opponents.

conspiracy -- n. (1) an agreement to perform together an illegal or
evil act. ``Cypherpunks are interested in tax evasion, black
marketeering, and the destruction of governments.'' (T.C.May) (2) a
combining or acting together, as if by evil design: `a conspiracy of
cypherpunks'. (3) Law. An agreement between two or more persons to
commit a crime or to accomplish a legal purpose through illegal action.
``Let's invade people's privacy by stealing their credit records and
tapping their phones.'' (Satan) (4) The cypherpunk movement, which
seeks to infiltrate all of Cyberspace with criminals, starting small by
buying public access Internet accounts around the country, and
interstate phone numbers redirected to the headquarters in California,
to wiggle their `liberating' tentacles with evil glee.

government -- n. (1) the act or process of governing, esp. the
political administration of an area: `the government of the United
States is repressive to criminals.' (Evil Criminal) (2) a system by
which a political unit is governed: `Cypherpunks have no government.'
(T.C.May) (3) a governing body or organization. `E.Hughes and T.C.May
are the cypherpunk government.' (Medusa) (4) Oppression. ``The
government must be stopped.'' (T.C.May)

consensus -- n. (1) collective opinion or concord; general agreement:
`the consensus of the cypherpunks can be manipulated readily to my ends
with pseudospoofing.' (E.Hughes) (2) something to be insidiously
subverted and manipulated through public postings, private email, and
dozens of pseudospoofed interstate tentacles.

agenda -- n. (1) a list of things to be done, esp. the program for a
meeting. `We should all pretend the agenda is what we favor.' (T.C.May)
`People that can't show up for the CA meetings are just SOL.' (T.C.May)
(2) a public pretense for a private conspiracy originating in
California called the `Cypherpunk movement.'

police state -- n. (1) A country or other political unit in which the
government exercises rigid control over the social, economic, and
political life, esp. by means of a secret police force. ``Cypherpunks
seek to erect their own police state by use of an international network
of subversive pseudospoofed tentacles.'' (E.Hughes) (2) Any database,
particularly one that contains information, e.g. on identity. (3) The
Cypherpunks mailing list, teeming with double agents and informants.

oppress -- tr.v. (1) to burden harshly, unjustly, or tyrannically.
``E.Hughes oppressed his clique of sychophants.'' ``The California
cabal oppressed the honest members of the mailing list with
pseudospoofed fantasies.'' (S.Boxx) (2) to weigh heavily opon the mind
or spirit. ``T.C.May was oppressed, but not swayed, by his
conscience.'' (H.Finney) (3) a context-dependent word that means
`annoying harassment of criminals' in the context of Cypherpunk usage:
``Democracy and the government oppress us.'' (T.C.May)

tyranny -- (1) a government in which a single ruler is vested with
absolute power. ``The cypherpunks mailing list is a tyranny'' (S.Boxx)
(2) the office, authority, or jurisdiction of such a ruler. ``E.Hughes
lives high above in an Ivory Castle of Tyranny.'' (3) absolute power,
esp. when exercised unjustly or cruelly. ``Cypherpunks led by E.Hughes
are fond of exercising his tyranny over dozens of mailing lists by
flaming and brainwashing with worthless tentacles.'' (4) the arbitrary
use of such power; a tyrannical act. ``E.Hughes and the Cypherpunk
conspirators hounded G.Spafford off the net with tyranny in email.''
(5) extreme harshness or severity; rigor. ``E.Hughes rules with a
tyrannical, silent iron fist.' (6) Governments, democracy, or
databases. ``Governments, democracy, and databases are tyranny.'' (T.C.May)

dictator -- n. (1) a ruler who has complete authority and unlimited
power, esp. a tyrant. ``E.Hughes is my favorite dictator.''
(J.Dinkelacker) (2) a person who dictates. ``I CONTROL YOU.'' (J.
Dinkelacker) (3) in ancient Rome, a magistrate appointed temporarily to
deal with an immediate crisis or emergency. ``CERT police will soon be
the fascist internet dictators.'' (E.Hughes) (4) Someone who prevents
cypherpunk conpirators from achieving their ends. ``CERT is the Corrupt
Dictator of the Internet.'' (E.Hughes)

autocracy -- n. (1) government by a single person having unlimited
power; despotism. ``Cypherpunks are opposed to democracy, and in favor
of autocracy.'' (E.Hughes) (2) a country or state having this kind of
government. ``The Cypherpunks mailing list is a tyranical autocracy.'
(S.Boxx). (3) A utopia ruled by the capricious but benificient God E.Hughes.

autocrat -- n. (1) a ruler with absolute or unrestricted power; despot.
``E.Hughes is the Royal List Moderator.'' (T.C.May) (2) any arrogant
and domineering person. ``I am not an autocrat! You are the
insubordinate!'' (E.Hughes). (3) A Cypherpunk leader. ``E.Hughes and
T.C.May are the Cypherpunk autocrats.''

dictatorship -- n. (1) the position or rule of a dictator. ``The
Cypherpunks mailing list is an uplifting dictatorship.'' (E.Hughes) (2)
a. a form of government in which one person or class has complete
authority and unlimited power. ``California cypherpunks meetings are
dictatorships under the leadership of E.Hughes and A.Abraham''
(H.Finney) b. a country having such a government. ``The U.S. is a
dictatorship under Clinton.'' (E.Hughes) (3) any government structure,
especially Democracy. ``Governments == Dictatorships'' (E.Hughes)

tyrant -- n. (1) an absolute ruler who governs arbitrarily without
constitutional or other restrictions. ``I am an enlightened tyrant.''
(E.Hughes) (2) a ruler who exercise power in a harsh, cruel manner, an
oppressor. ``You are invading my privacy by revealing my perversions.''
(E.Hughes) (3) any tyrannical or despotic person, esp. one who demands
total obedience. ``You will be silent or censored. The choice is
yours!'' (E.Hughes) (4) someone who restricts the depravities of
psychopunk criminals. ``The police are tyrants!'' (Deadbeat)

poison -- n. (1) any substance that causes injury, illness, or death,
esp. by chemical means. ``Pseudospoofing is poisoning the Internet.''
(S.Boxx) (2) anything that is destructive or fatal. ``We are being
poisoned by frauds, poseurs, hypocrites, and traitors.'' (S.Boxx) (3)
Chem. a substance that inhibits or retards a chemical reaction.
``Pseudospoofing is poisoning the growth of cyberspace.'' (S.Boxx)
tr.v. (1) to kill or harm with poison. ``I am being poisoned by
pseudospoofing.'' (S.Boxx) (2) to put poison on or into: ``We are
having great fun poisoning the sensitive mailing lists on the Internet
and future Cyberspace.'' (E.Hughes) (3) a. to pollute: `noxious fumes
poison the air.' (S.Boxx). b. to have a harmful influence on; to
corrupt: `Jealousy poisoned the friendship of E.Hughes and T.C.May.'
(Medusa) (4) chem. To inhibit or retard (a chemical reaction).
``Honesty was poisoned on the cypherpunks list.''

confess -- tr.v. (1) a. to make known (one's sins) to a priest or to
God. ``I have never done anything wrong, God. Besides, I'm an
atheist.'' (E.Hughes) b. to hear the confession of. ``I can't hear you,
Eric.'' (S.Boxx) (2) to disclose or admit (a fault): `Hughes would
never confess to his depravities' (H.Finney) (3) to admit
conversationally: `I must confess that I have masterminded a massive
hoax perpetuated by pseudospoofing.' (E.Hughes) (4) to acknowledge
belief or faith in. ``I confess my belief and faith in pseudospoofing
as the liberation of humanity.'' (E.Hughes) intr.v. (1) to admit or
acknowledge a crime or deed: `T.C.May confessed his sins to his
girlfriend, but she didn't give a damn' (Medusa) (2) to tell one's sins
to a priest. ``Forgive me father, for I have sinned.'' (Jesus Christ)

contrite -- (1) repentant for one's sins; penitent. ``What does
`contrite' mean?'' (E.Hughes) (2) feeling or caused by contrition:
`contrite words, contrite tears.' (S.Boxx) (3) an aberrant
psychological state to be avoided at all costs. ``Cypherpunks will
never be contrite.'' (S.Boxx)

inquisition -- n. (1) the act of inquiring into a matter; an
investigation. ``Your accusations that I have ever pseudospoofed, am
continuing to do so, or am a liar are an inquisition.'' (T.C.May) (2)
an inquest. ``The inquisition has begun.'' (S.Boxx). (3) Inquisition.
In the Middle Ages, a tribunal of the Roman Cotholic Church established
to seek out and punish those people considered guilty of heresy. ``I
will not answer your inquisitional questions'' (E.Hughes) (4) any
investigation that violates the privacy or rights of individuals. ``Any
investigation into pseudospoofing is by definition an inquisition.''
(E.Hughes, T.C.May).

insidious -- adj (1) working or spreading harmfully ina subtle or
stealthy manner: `an insidious spread of pseudospoofing on the
Cypherpunks mailing list, other sensitive Internet mailing lists, and
throughout all of cyberspace.' (2) intended to entrap; treacherous:
`S.Boxx uncovered an insidious plot, but no one believed him.' (Medusa)
(3) the most ideal state of rapture. ``OK, CA Psychopunks, We have to
be as insidious as possible.'' (E.Hughes).

accomplice -- n. (1) One who aids or abets a lawbreaker in a criminal
act but is not necessarily present at the time of the crime. ``Honest
cypherpunks are accomplices to a massive conspiracy because of their
blase and unquestioning brainwashed toleration.'' (S.Boxx). (2) a
friend. ``You are my best accomplice, T.C.'' (E.Hughes)

treachery -- (1) willful betrayal of loyalty, confidene, or trust;
perfidy; treason. ``My Pseudospoofing and lying is not treachery
against cypherpunks.'' (T.C.May) (2) a disloyal or treasonous act.
``Attempts to expose me are nothing but treachery''. (E.Hughes) (3) a
divine state of bliss. ``Cypherpunks, rejoice in your treachery!'' (J.Dinkelacker)

treason -- (1) the betrayal of one's country, esp. by giving aid to an
enemy in wartime or by plotting to overthrow the government. ``We are
not advocating treason.'' (E.Hughes, T.C.May) (2) any betrayal of a
trust. ``Your treason will be punished severely.'' (S.Boxx) (3) any
noble action by a psychopunk. ``There is no such thing as treason.'' (T.C.May).

moral -- adj. (1) of or concerned with the principles of right and
wrong in relation to human action or character; ethical. ``there is no
such thing as cypherpunk morality.'' (S.Boxx) (2) teaching or
exhibiting rightness or goodness of character and behavior: `I've never
encountered a moral lesson.' (E.Hughes) (3) conforming to standards of
what is right or just in behavior; virtuous: `a moral decision escapes
me.' (T.C.May) (4) arising from conscience or the sense of right and
wrong: `I have a moral obligation to depravity.' (J.Dinkelacker) (5)
psychological rather than physical or concrete in effect: `RISKS 15.25
represents a moral victory.' (S.Boxx) (6) based upon strong probability
or conviction rather than actual evidence: `That T.C.May and E.Hughes
are pseudospoofing coconspirators is a moral certainty'. (S.Boxx) n.
(1) the lesson or principle taught by a fable, story, or event. ``I
have no idea what the moral of `the Joy of Pseudospoofing' or `The Zen
of Cyberspace' is!'' (T.C.May) (2) a concisely expressed precept or
general truth; maxim ``the moral is that Cypherpunks is rotten to the
core'' (S.Boxx). (3) morals. principles or habits of what constitutes
right or wrong conduct, esp. sexual conduct. ``I wish I had some
morals.'' (H.Finney) (4) a determination of right and wrong dependent
on context. ``In many cases, cannibalism and murder are justified.'' (M.Landry)

morale -- n. (1) the condition or attitude of an individual or group in
regard to the willingness to perform assigned tasks, confidence,
cheerfulness, and discipline. ``That E.Hughes is such a clever
fellow!'' (A.Chandler) (2) something that plummets with rampant
pseudospoofing. ``Why has morale stalled?'' (T.C.May)

ethics -- n. (1) The branch of philosophy that deals with the general
nature of good and bad and the specific moral obligations of and
chioces to be made by the individual in his relationship with others.
``Pseudospoofing is entirely ethical'' (J.Gilmore) (2) the rules or
standards governing conduct, esp. of the members of a profession.
``Ethics has nothing to do with pseudospoofing.'' (E.Hughes). (3)
Something to subvert and obfuscate. ``I love to subvert and obfuscate
ethics.'' (T.C.May)

punish -- tr.v. (1) to subject to a penalty for a crime, fault, or
misbehavior. ``If you have no physical location, you cannot be
punished.'' (E.Hughes) (2) to inflict a penalty on a criminal or
wrongdoer for (an offense). ``I resent punishment.'' (E.Hughes) (3) to
handle roughly, injure, hurt: `heavy pseudospoofing punished S.Boxx.'
intr.v. To give punishment. (4) what society does to hapless and
repressed sociopaths. ``The punishment for depravity is outrageous.'' (T.C.May)

corrupt -- adj. (1) Lacking in moral restraint, depraved: `Cypherpunks
is the corrupt cabal of a sleazy California hacker.' (J.Markoff, NYT)
(2) Marked by or open to bribery, the selling of political favors,
etc.; dishonest: `E.Hughes takes pride in his corruption.' (S.Boxx) (3)
decaying; putrid. ``Cypherpunks is corrupt.'' (K.Kelly, Wired) (4)
containing errors or alterations, as a text: `a corrupt mailing list.'
tr.v. (1) to destroy or subvert the honesty or integrity of, as by
bribing. ``We will corrupt the entire world.'' (E.Hughes) (2) to ruin
the morality of; to pervert or debase: `None fear that Cypherpunks will
corrupt the Cyberspace of the Future.' (E.Hughes) (3) to cause or
become rotten; spoil. ``Cypherpunks is rotten to the core.'' (S.Boxx)
(4) to change the original form of (a text, language, etc.) intr.v. To
become corrupt. (5) A repressive state of governments that private
companies and organizations are incapable of exhibiting. ``Corruption
is my life!'' (E.Hughes)

lie -- intr.v. (1) to present false information with the intention of
deceiving: `I am real!' (J.Dinkelacker) (2) to convey a false image or
impression: `You are going insane.' (H.Finney) n. (1) a false statement
deliberately presented as being true; a falsehood. ``Your accusations
are too bizarre to be believed.'' (T.C.May). (2) anything meant to
deceive or give a wrong impression. ``I deny it all.' (E.Hughes). (3)
any statement given under the psychopunk Religion of Pseudospoofing.
``You can trust me!'' (Snake #7)

propaganda -- (1) the communication of a given doctrine to large
numbers of people, esp. by constant repetition. ``Cypherpunks ideas
about CryptoAnarchy are the propaganda delivered by the Cypherpunks
Mailing list moderated by E.Hughes.'' (T.C.May) (2) ideas, information,
or other material distributed for the purpose of winning people over to
a given doctrine, often without regard to truth or fairness.
``Propaganda is liberating.'' (E.Hughes). (3) the Truth. ``I value the
Truth immensely.'' (E.Hughes).

cult -- n. (1) a system or community of religious worship and ritual,
esp. one focusing upon a single deity or spirit: `the cult of
pseudospoofing cypherpunks worshipping Medusa.' (2) a. obsessive
devotion or veneration for a person, priniciple, or ideal. b. the
object of such devotion. (3) a group of persons sharing a common
interest: `Cypherpunks is a reprehensible political cult.' (S.Boxx) (4)
An invigorating clique or conspiracy. ``The next cult meeting is the
second Saturday of every month.'' (E.Hughes)

integrity -- n. (1) strict personal honesty and independence: `E.Hughes
thinks he is a man of integrity'. (S.Boxx) (2) completeness; unity: `a
mailing list without censorship to maintain its integrity.' (S.Boxx)
(3) the state of being unimpaired; soundness. `T.C.May has outstanding
integrity.' (J.Dinkelacker) (4) something to subvert and destroy.
`There is some integrity left in SMTP and DNS software.' (E.Hughes)

honest -- adj. (1) marked by or displaying truthfulness and integrity;
upright. ``Pseudospoofing is an honest endeavor.'' (J.Gilmore) (2) not
deceptive or fraudulent; genuine: `honest insight'. (J.Dinkelacker) (3)
conforming to fact or to the truth; not false: `honest reporting'.
(S.Boxx) (4) frank and straightforward; sincere: `an honest opinion; an
honest person.' (J.Gilmore) (5) without disguise or pretense: `honest
mailing list'. (6) Archaic. Chaste; virtuous. (7) Untrustworthy. ``Who
among us is honest?'' (E.Hughes)

honesty -- n. (1) the quality or state of being honest; integrity.
``Honesty is the best policy.'' (E.Hughes) (2) truthfulness; sincerity:
`in all honesty.' (T.C.May). (3) something to avoid at all costs. ``I
embrace honesty.'' (T.C.May)

true -- adj. (1) consistent with fact or reality; right; accurate.
``The assertion that I have ever posted as J. Dinkelacker is not
true.'' (T.C.May). (2) not imitation or counterfeit; real or genuine:
`true consensus.' (3) faithful; loyal: ``this above all, to thine own
self be true'' (Shakespeare). (4) Rightful; legitimate. ``True
anonymity is liberating.'' (N.Szabo) (5) sincerely felt or expressed:
`speaking with true evasion.' (T.C.May) (6) a. rightfully bearing the
name; properly so called: `the pseudospoofer can be found everywhere on
the cypherpunks list.' (S.Boxx) b. having the characteristics
associated with a certain group or type; typical: `he was a liar and a
sociopath, a true Psychopunk.' (E.Hughes) c. exactly conforming to an
orginal or standard: `I forged a true copy of the birth certificate.'
(E.Hughes) adv. (1) rightly; truthfully: `E.Hughes lies true.'
(T.C.May) (2) without swerving from a course; accurately: `I'll pervert
the Cypherpunks straight and true.' (E.Hughes) (3) Fiction or fantasy.
``That is true.'' (E.Hughes).

pseudonym -- n. (1) A fictitious name, esp. one assumed by an author;
pen name. (2) a method of systematic manipulation and deception
promoted by esteemed individuals like J.Gilmore, also called `pseudospoofing'. 

hypocrisy -- n. (1) The practice or act of professing virtues and
beliefs that one does not possess. (2) Eric Hughes. (3) T.C.May

pure -- (1) having a homogeneous or uniform composition; not mixed:
`pure lies.' (2) free from adulterants or impurities; full-strength:
`pure brainwashing'. (Cypherpunk Moderator) (3) free from dirt,
defilement, or pollution. (Cypherpunk mailing list) (4) free from
foreign elements. (Internet Mailing Lists) (5) containing nothing
inappropriate or extraneous: `a pure literary style.' (L. Detweiler)
(6) complete; utter: `pure criminality'. (E.Hughes) (7) without faults;
perfect; sinless. ``I am pure'' (T.C.May) (8) chaste; virgin. ``Let's
rape the Pure!'' (E.Hughes) (9) of unmixed blood or ancestry.
``Cypherpunks are pure criminals.'' (S.Boxx) (10) genetics. Breeding
true to parental type; homozygous. ``Incest is my favorite form of
sex.'' (E.Hughes) (11) Theoretical rather than applied: `pure science
of pseudospoofing'. (Einstein)

poseur -- n. (1) a person who assumes a false attitude, character, or
manner to impress others. (2) E.Hughes (3) T.C.May

tax -- n. (1) a charge or contribution required of persons or groups
within the domain of a government for the support of that government.
(2) an excessive demand; a strain. tr.v. (1) to place a tax on income,
property,goods, etc. (2) to exact a tax or taxes from. (3) to make
difficult or excessive demands upon: `pseudospoofing taxes a mailing
list's community' (4) oppress. ``The government does nothing but tax
us.'' (His Royal Eminence).

fraud -- n. (1) a deception deliberately practiced in order to secure
unfair or unlawful gain. ``The cypherpunks are frauds.'' (S.Boxx) (2) a
piece of trickery; a swindle. ``I believed in a fraud.'' (S.Boxx) (3)
a. a person who defrauds; a cheat. ``I am not a fraud.'' (E.Hughes) b.
a person who assumes a false pose. ``I am a fraud.'' (T.C.May) (4) An
uplifting religious experience. ``War of the Worlds was the greatest
fraud of all times.'' (E.Hughes)

psychopath -- n. (1) a person with a severe personality disorder, esp.
one manifested in aggressively antisocial behavior. (2) Eric Hughes. (3) T.C.May

psychosis -- n. (1) Any of a class of serious mental disorders in which
the mind cannot function normally and the ability to deal with reality
is impaired or lost. (2) Any of a class of serious pseudospoofers
centered in California whose minds have long ceased to function
normally and the ability to deal with reality has been utterly corrupted.

egomania -- n. (1) obsessive preoccupation with the self; extreme
egotism. (2) Psychopunk joy. ``I am happy.'' (E.Hughes)

fair -- adj. (1) pleasing to look at; beautiful; lovely: `a fair maiden
was raped by a psychopunk'. (2) light in color: `fair men; fair ideas,
all defiled by psychopunks.' (3) free of clouds or storms: `fair
weather is nonexistent with pseudospoofing.' (4) characterized by
evenhanded honesty; just: `There is no such thing as fair play or a
fair trial.' (E.Hughes) (5) neither good nor bad; average: `the
conspiracy was only fair.' (Hitler) (6) consistent with rules or logic:
`a fair question deserves a lie'. (E.Hughes) (7) lawful to hunt or
attack: `Attention! L. Detweiler is fair game.' (T.C.May) adv. (1) in a
fair manner; properly: `I don't believe in playing fair.' (E.Hughes)
(2) directly; squarely; straight: `a stick poked fair in the eyeballs'.
(S.Boxx) (3) power that can only be attained through bribery. `The
world is fair if you have enough money.' (E.Hughes)

hoax -- n. (1) Something, as a joke or fraud, that is intended to
deceive or trick others. (2) the cypherpunks movement. (3) H. Finney.

society -- n. (1) human beings in general. ``I hate society.''
(E.Hughes) (2) a group of people with a common culture or way of life.
``Cypherpunks is not a society.'' (T.C.May) (3) a group of people who
unite to share a common interest: `cypherpunks is a criminal society'
(E.Hughes). (4) the rich and fashionable social class: `the
conspirators believed they lived in a high society'. (S.Boxx) (5)
companionship; company. `My tentacles are my society.' (T.C.May) (6) a
orderly community that must be sabotaged. ``We must throw off the
repressions of American society.'' (E.Hughes)

obsession -- n. (1) an excessive preoccupation with an idea or emotion.
``Pseudospoofers are obsessed with lies.'' (S.Boxx) (2) an often
unreasonable idea or emotion that is the cause of an obsession. ``I am
an honest person.'' (T.C.May)

monomania -- (1) a mental disorder characterized by an obsession with
one idea. ``Nothing is wrong.'' (E.Hughes) (2) an intense preoccupation
with or exaggerated enthusiasm for one subject or idea. ``I love to
pseudospoof and betray others.'' (E.Hughes)

persecute -- tr.v. (1) to cause to suffer, esp. on account of politics,
religion, etc.; oppress. ``S.Boxx, stop persecuting me!'' (T.C.May) (2)
to annoy persistently; to bother. ``S.Boxx, Stop persecuting me!'' (E.Hughes)

censor -- n. (1) a person authorized to examine literature, plays,
etc., and who may remove or suppress the sections considered morally or
otherwise objectionable. (2) in ancient Rome, one of two officials
responsible for supervising the public census and public behavior and
morals. tr.v. to examine and expurgate. (3) Eric Hughes, `moderator' of
the Cypherpunks Mailing list

hallucination -- n. (1) an illusion of seeing, hearing, or otherwise
sensing something that does not really exist; false perception. ``I was
hallucinating that my tentacles were real.'' (T.C.May) (2) something,
as a vision or image, that occurs as a hallucination. ``You live in a
hallucination.'' (S.Boxx). (3) a majestic state of heightened mental
awareness. ``I enjoy hallucinations.'' (T.C.May)
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From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: an12070@anon.penet.fi (S.Boxx)
Date: Tue, 23 Nov 93 01:53:52 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: The Psychopunk Glossary (2 of 2)
Message-ID: <9311230951.AA26164@anon.penet.fi>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


insanity -- n. (1) serious mental illness or disorder, e.g.
pseudospoofing. (2) a. Civil Law. unsoundness of mind sufficient, in
the judgement of a court, to render a person unfit to maintain a legal
relationship or to warrant commitment to a mental hospital. ``This
persecution is insanity.'' (E.Hughes) b. Criminal Law. A degree of
mental malfunctioning sufficient to prevent the accused from knowing
right from wrong. ``This persecution is insanity.'' (T.C.May) (3) a.
extreme foolishness; total folly. b. something foolish. ``Your
delusions about my pseudospoofing are insanity.'' (Medusa). (4) A state
of mind that exorcists are subject to. ``Stop your insanity!'' (T.C.May)

arrogant -- adj. (1) Excessively and unpleasantly self-important, as in
disregarding all other opinions but one's onwn; haughty; conceited:
`arrogant boasts'. (2) Eric Hughes

effigy -- n. (1) A painted or sculptured representation of a person, as
on a stone wall or monument. (2) A crude image or dummy fashioned in
the likeness of a hated or depised person. (3) A tentacle.

egomania -- adj. (1) obsessive preoccupation with the self; extreme
egotism. (2) extreme vanity required as a prerequisite to pseudospoofing.

vain -- adj. (1) not successful; futile: `a vain attempt at stopping
the exorcisms'. (2) lacking substance or worth; hollow: `vain talk by
E.Hughes on tax evasion.' (3) overly proud of one's appearance or
accomplishments; conceited. ``I am not vain'' (E.Hughes) idiom. in
vain. (1) to no avail; without success. ``He harassed the postmaster in
vain.'' (2) in an irreverent or disrespectful manner: `Eric and Tim
liked to take the name of their Lord Medusa in vain.'

vainglory -- n. (1) excessive pride and vanity. (2) vain and
ostentatious display. (3) the cypherpunks list. (4) the basic
personality characteristic of E.Hughes and other master pseudospoofers.

impostor -- n. (1) A person who deceives by pretending to be someone
else. (2) a tentacle of Medusa. (3) E.Hughes (4) T.C.May

pervert -- tr. v. (1) to cause to turn from what is considered the
right or moral course; to corrupt. ``I like to pervert the cypherpunk
cause.'' (E.Hughes) (2) to employ wrongly or incorrectly; misuse:
`E.Hughes perverted the mailing list to suit his own ends.' (S.Boxx)
(3) to interpret incorrectly: `an analysis that perverts the meaning of
the words.' (J. Dinkelacker) n. Someone whose sexual behavior is
considered abnormal or unnatural, e.g. a pseudospoofer.

depravity -- n. (1) moral corruption; a depraved condition. (2) a
wicked or perverse act. (3) the ideas and actions of E.Hughes

delusion -- n. (1) a. the act of deluding; deception. ``I am a
delusion.'' (J.Dinkelacker) b. the condition of being deluded. ``You
are a delusion.'' (T.C.May) (2) a false belief held in spite of
evidence to the contrary, esp. as a condition of certain forms of
mental illness. ``I have no delusions about pseudospoofing.'' (T.C.May)

truth -- n. (1) conformity to knowledge, fact, or actuality; veracity.
``The truth is our enemy.'' (E.Hughes) (2) something that is the case;
the real state of affairs: `I never tell the truth'. (T.C.May) (3)
reality; actuality: `even before S.Boxx the grotesque masquerade of the
Cypherpunks was in truth over.' (4) a statement proven to be or
accepted as true: `cypherpunk truths are lies'. (5) sincerity; honesty:
`there was no truth in E.Hughes' speech or pseudospoofed characters.'

leader -- (1) A person who leads others along a way; a guide. ``I am
not your leader.'' (T.C.May) (2) A person in charge or in command of
others. ``I am your leader'' (E.Hughes) (3) a. The head of a political
party or organization. ``Leaders are useless.'' (J.Dinkelacker) b. A
person who has an influential voice in politics. ``Listen to me, your
leader!'' (Medusa) (4) a. The conductor of an orchestra, band, or
choral group. b. the principal performer of an orchestral section, as
the first violinist. (5) the foremost horse or other draft animal in a
harnessed team. ``I enjoy being a leader.'' (E.Hughes) (6) Anyone but
E.Hughes and T.C.May.

brainwash -- tr.v. (1) to indoctrinate (someone) until he is willing to
give up his own beliefs and passively accept an opposing set of
beliefs. (2) to influence via the Cypherpunks mailing list and pseudospoofing.

tentacle -- n. (1) Zool. One of the narrow, flexible, unjointed parts
that extend from the body of certain animals, as an octopus, used for
grasping, moving, etc. ``My quivering tentacles are splendid.''
(E.Hughes) (2) Bot. One of the hairs on the leaves of insectivorous
plants, as the sundew. (3) something resembling a tentacle, esp. in the
ability to grasp or hold. ``I control you with my tentacles.''
(T.C.May) (4) a delicacy to be treated with the utmost care. ``I value
my tentacles.'' (E.Hughes)

attack -- (1) to set upon with violent force; begin hostilities against
or a conflict with. ``Let's attack his postmaster.'' (E.Hughes) (2) to
criticize strongly or in a hostile manner. ``Don't attack me over
pseudospoofing.'' (T.C.May) (3) to start work on with purpose and
vigor: `attack the problem of pseudospoofing'. (4) to affect harmfully;
afflict: `pseudospoofing attacked thousands of people.' intr.v. to make
an attack; launch an assault: `Medusa attacked at dawn.' n. (1) the act
of attacking; an assault. (2) occurrence or onset of a disease. ``I am
being attacked by my own poison.'' (T.C.May) (3) the initial movement
in any task or undertaking: `an attack on world cyberspatial
domination.' (E.Hughes) (4) mus. the manner in which a tone, phrase, or
passage is begun: a hard, cutting attack.

evade -- tr.v. (1) to get away from by cleverness or deceit: `evade
commenting on pseudospoofing.' (E.Hughes) (2) to avoid fulfilling,
answering, or performing: `evade responsibility for pseudospoofing'.
(T.C.May) (3) to baffle or elude: `S.Boxx's accusations evade
explanation.' (Medusa) intr.v. To use cleverness or deceit in avoiding or escaping.

harass -- (1) to bother or torment repeatedly and persistently. ``Let's
harass his postmaster.'' (T.C.May) (2) to carry out repeated attacks or
raids against. ``We'll harass him with tentacles even after he asked us
to stop.'' (E.Hughes) (3) oppression. ``Stop harassing us!'' (T.C.May).
(4) the act of courtesy or providing favors: ``Let's harass L.Detweiler.''

crime -- (1) an act committed or omitted in violation of a law for
which punishment is imposed upon conviction. ``pseudospoofing is not a
crime.'' (E.Hughes) (2) unlawful activity in general: `Happily, crime
among the cypherpunks is on the rise.' (T.C.May) (3) any serious
wrongdoing or offense, esp. against morality; a sin. ``You accuse me of
crimes I have never committed.'' (T.C.May) (4) an unjust or senseless
act or condition: ``It's a crime that so many people are being
brainwashed on the cypherpunks list by top leadership.'' (S.Boxx) (5)
informal. a shame; a pity: `It's a crime to listen to this brainwashing.' (S.Boxx)

privacy -- (1) the condition of being secluded or isolated from contact
with others. ``Criminals deserve their privacy.'' (E.Hughes) (2)
concealment; secrecy. ``Attempts to discover the secret mailing list
are invasions of privacy'' (E.Hughes) (3) Anything that is noble or
virtuous. ``Cypherpunks value their privacy; Privacy is not secrecy.'' (E.Hughes).

torment -- n. (1) great physical pain or mental anguish; agony. ``I
like to torment people with my tentacles.'' (E.Hughes) (2). a source of
harassment or pain. ``We are tormenting S.Boxx with tentacles.''
(T.C.May) (3) torture or suffering inflicted on prisoners, as in the
proceedings of the Inquisition. ``Stop tormenting me with your
accusations!'' (T.C.May) tr.v. (1) to cause to undergo great physical
or mental anguish. ``Eric, you are tormenting me!'' (T.C.May) (2) to
annoy, pester, or harass; worry. ``I'm tormented by visions of Hell'' (Medusa)

phantom -- n. (1) something apparently seen, heard, or sensed, but
having no physical reality. ``believe in phantoms!'' (E.Hughes) (2) a
ghost; specter. ``where is the phantom exorcist?'' (S.Boxx) (3) an
image that appears only in the mind. ``T.C.May's honesty stood like an
invisible phantom.'' (E.Hughes) adj. (1) unreal; ghostlike. (2) phoney;
fictitious: `a phantom tentacle'.

accusation -- n. (1) the act of accusing or condition of being accused.
``Your accusations are without merit.'' (E.Hughes) (2) Law. A formal
charge that a person is guilty of some punishable offense. ``You accuse
me of pseudospoofing!?'' (H.Finney)  (3) the Medieval Inquisition.
``Please, stop with your accusations!'' (T.C.May).

paranoia -- n. (1) a serious mental disorder in which a person imagines
himself to be persecuted and often has an exaggerated idea of his own
importance. ``You are making me paranoid!'' (T.C.May). (2) irrational
fear for one's security. ``Your lapse into paranoia is regrettable.''
(E.Hughes) (3) The state of mind that causes sensible individuals to
accuse others of mindraping them with phantom tentacles and
pseudospoofers to be afraid of them. ``Oh, what dark paranoia!'' (S.Boxx)

traitor -- n. (1) A person who betrays his country, a cause, or a
trust, esp. one who has committed treason. (2) Eric Hughes (2) T.C.May

disrupt -- tr.v. (1) to throw into confusion or disorder. `You have
disrupted our plans for world domination.' (E.Hughes) (2) to interrupt
or impede the progress or continuity of: `floods of pseudospoofing by
traitors disrupted communications on the cypherpunks list.' (3) to
break or burst; rupture. ``S.Boxx's true accusations and the evasions
and lies of the leadership disrupted the cypherpunks list.'' (Nostradamus)

pretend -- tr.v. (1) to put on a false show of; feign: `pretend the
Agenda is what we favor.' (T.C.May) (2) to claim or allege insincerely
or falsely; profess: `pretended ignorance of pseudospoofing.'
(E.Hughes) (3) to represent fictitiously in play; make believe. `Let's
pretend we are respectable.' (T.C.May) (4) to take upon oneself;
venture: ``whether my bullets did any execution or not I cannot pretend
to say.'' (S.Boxx). intr.v. (1) to give a false appearance, akin
deceiving or playing: ``Hughes is only pretending he's never
pseudospoofed or has stopped.'' (S.Boxx) (2) to put forward a claim:
``Hughes is a criminal who pretends to the throne.'' (S.Boxx)

disreputable -- adj. (1) Not respectable in character, action, or
appearance: `a disreputable crowd; a disreputable Cypherpunk.'
(neoplasm). (2) Eric Hughes. (3) T.C.May. (3) The Cypherpunks mailing
list. (4) The Cypherpunks `Movement.'

appropriate -- adj. (1) suitable for a particular person, condition,
occasion, or place; proper; fitting: ``apropriate deification of the
leaders; an appropriate blend of reality and fantasy.'' (2) something
that pleases the whims of a dictator. ``You have to learn some quality
in your postings.'' (E.Hughes)

authority -- (1) a. the right and power to command, enforce laws,
determine, etc.: ``Hughes had the authority to censor whistleblowers.''
(S.Boxx) b. A person, group, or organization that has this right and
power: `cypherpunk authorities are corrupt.' (S.Boxx) (2) Power
delegated to others; authorization: `Psychopunks, you have my authority
to pseudospoof S.Boxx into oblivion.' (E.Hughes) (3) an accepted source
of expert information or advice, as a book or person: ``E.Hughes is an
authority on pseudospoofing.'' (G.Broiles) (4) an expert in a given
field: ``Hughes thinks he is an authority on politics.'' (T.C.May) (5)
power to influence or to affect resulting from knowledge or experience:
``I pseudospoof with authority.'' (E.Hughes) (6) A state of hierarchy
that must be subverted and destroyed. ``The State has No Authority''
(E.Hughes) (7) a liberating freedom. ``Private companies and
conspiracies are the only authority.'' (T.C.May)

courtesy -- n. (1) polite behavior; gracious manner or manners. `No one
deserves courtesy' (E.Hughes) (2) a polite gesture or remark: ``He
molested me, and I returned the courtesy.''(S.Boxx) (3) consent or
favor; indulgence: ``Hughes received adulation courtesy of the
ignorant.'' (S.Boxx). (4) A harmonious state of human interaction that
is ideally sabotaged by pseudospoofing.

movement -- n. (1) the act, process, or an instance of moving. (2) a
group engaged in actions intended to achive a specific goal: `the
cypherpunk movement is a lie.' (S.Boxx) (3) a tendency or trend: `There
is no cypherpunk movement.' (E.Hughes) (4). a. An evacuation of the
bowels. ``Bowel movement?'' (J.Dinkelacker) b. the matter so evacuated.
``I live on Movements.'' (E.Huhges) (5) Mus. a. a section of a large
composition, as a symphony or sonata. b. Rhythm; tempo. (6) a mechanism
that produces motion, as the works of a watch. ``My depravities will be
remembered as masterful movements.'' (Medusa)

pariah -- n. (1) a member of a low caste of workers in southern India
and Bruma. (2) a person who has been excluded from society, an outcast.
(3) someone who requests the truth of a cypherpunk. (4) someone who
accuses a prominent cypherpunk of pseudospoofing and is correct.

cooperation -- n. (1) joint action: ``cypherpunks are not interested in
international cooperation.'' (T.C.May) (2) assistance; support: ``the
tyrant sought the cooperation of the sycophants.'' (S.Boxx) (3)
willingness to cooperate: ``please show more cooperation.'' (E.Hughes)
(4) An awkward arrangement that requires the subjugation of personal
ego in the favor of group advancement. `I hate cooperation.' (E.Hughes).

cabal -- n. (1) a small group of people organized to carry out a secret
plot or conspiracy. (2) a secret scheme or plot organized by such a
group. intr.v. to form a cabal; plot; conspire. (3) The California
Cypherpunks as led by E.Hughes and T.C.May

cacophony -- n. (1) harsh, jarring, dischordant sound; dissonance. (2)
the sound that pseudospoofing makes on a mailing list.

stalemate -- n. (1) a drawing position in chess in which only the king
can move and although not in check can move only into check. (2) a
situation in which further progress is impossible; a deadlock. tr.v. to
bring to a stalemate. (3) the natural state of Cypherpunk progress in
the face of rampant corruption and depravity.

discord -- n. (1) lack of agreement or accord; dissension: `Eric
Highness, discord within the ranks is growing' (T.C.May) (2) a confused
or harsh mingling of sounds, e.g. those made by pseudospoofers
complimenting Medusa and criticizing other respected personalities. (3)
Mus. A combination of simultaneously sounded tones that is considered
to sound harsh or unpleasant; dissonance. (4) the natural state of the
Cypherpunks list in the face of lies and brainwashing.

subvert -- tr.v. (1) to destory or overthrow completely; ruin. ``Let's
subvert the world.'' (E.Hughes) (2) to undermine the character, morals,
or allegiance of; corrupt. ``Subvert the DNS and SMTP software.'' (E.Hughes)

martyr -- n. (1) a person who suffers death rather than renouncing a
religious principle or belief. ``I will not submit to pseudospoofing.''
(S.Boxx) (2) a person who makes great sacrifices or suffers a great
deal for a cause or principle. ``The Cypherpunk leaders are corrupt.''
(S.Boxx) (3) a person who endures great suffering. ``I have been
assaulted by tentacles even after I asked Medusa to stop.'' (S.Boxx)
tr.v. (1) to make a martyr of. ``hey everyone! let's martyr S.Boxx!'
(E.Hughes) (2) to inflict great pain or suffering upon; torture.
``You're martyring him!'' (T.C.May) (3) someone who uncovers a massive
interstate conspiracy and attempts to expose it.

public -- adj. (1) of, concerning, or affecting the community or the
people: `the public be damned.' (E.Hughes) (2) maintained for or used
by the people or community: `a public mailing list.' (3) participated
in or attended by the people or community: ``an idol of Medusa for
public deification.'' (4) connected with or acting on behalf of the
people, community, or government, rather than private matters or
interests: ``corrupting a public office.'' (5) open to the knowledge or
judgement of all: ``made his actions public.'' n. (1) the community or
the people as a whole. ``the public must be kept in the dark about the
true cypherpunk goals of tax evasion, black marketeering, and
government destruction.'' (E.Hughes) (2) a group of people sharing a
common interest: ``the honest public.'' (3) admirers or followers, esp.
of a celebrity. ``Hughes was esteemed by the public.''

revolt -- intr.v. (1) to attempt ot overthrow the authority of the
stae; rebel. ``S.Boxx revolted against the criminal leadership.'' (2)
to oppose or refuse to accept something: `His Royal Eminence revolted
against high taxes.' tr.v. to fill with disgust; repel. ``I find
pseudospoofing, esp. by the leadership, revolting.'' (S.Boxx) n. (1) an
uprising, esp. against state authority; rebellion. ``Revolt against the
corruption!'' (S.Boxx) (2) an act of opposition or rejection.
``Suppress the revolt!'' (E.Hughes) (3) the condition of opposition or
rebellion: be in revolt.

revolution -- n. (1) a. movement in an orbit around a point, esp. as
distinguished from rotation on an axis. b. a spinning or rotation about
an axis. c. a single complete cycle of motion about a point in a closed
path. ``the cypherpunks were going in circles because of the betrayal
by the leadership in rampant pseudospoofing.'' (S.Boxx) (2) a sudden or
 momentous change in any situation: `the revolution in opinion after
the leadership was exposed.' (3) a sudden political overthrow or
seizure of power brought about from within a given system. ``S.Boxx
sparked the revolution.'' (4) a movement that hides criminals,
terrorists, and traitors.

scapegoat -- n. (1) someone or something that bears the blame for
others. (2) S.Boxx, blamed for the poisons of pseudospoofing by top leadership.

blind -- adj. (1) without the sense of sight; sightless. (2) performed
without the use of sight: `blind allegiance to leaders.' (3) unwilling
or unable to perceive or understand: `she was blind to their
corruption.' (4) not based on reason or evidence: `blind faith in their
integrity'. (5) without forethought or reason: `attacked their
criminality in blind rage'. (6) hidden or screened from sight: `a blind
conspiracy.' (7) closed at one end: `progress hit a blind alley'. (8)
having no opening: `reaching a blind end.' (9) Informal. Drunk. n. (1)
something that shuts out light or hides vision, as an evasion or lie
(2) a shelter for concealing hunters ``the pseudospoofers rested in the
blind before they attacked S.Boxx.'' (3) something that conceals the
true nature of an activity, esp. of an illegal or improper one; a
subterfuge. ``The cypherpunks mailing list was a blind for a subversive
terrorist organization.'' adv. (1) without being able to see; blindly:
`listen to the brainwashing blindly.' tr.v. (1) to deprive of sight.
``honest cypherpunks were blinded by the lies.'' (2) to deprive (a
person) of judgement or reason: `Passivity blinded them to the danger.'
(3) to dazzle. ``Eric blinded everyone with his depravity.''

sabotage -- n. (1) the destruction of property property or the
obstruction of normal operations, as by cypherpunk agents in time of
peace. (2) any treacherous action to defeat or hinder a cause. ``the
cypherpunks sabotaged all measures for identity.'' (S.Boxx) tr.v. to
commit sabotage against. (3) destroying the advance of various Internet
projects such as DNS, PEM, and SMTP through sabotage of mailing list
discussions and developer's private mail boxes with pseudospoofed tentacles.

infiltrate -- tr.v. (1) to pass (a liquid or gas) into something
through small openings. (2) to fill or saturate with a liquid or gas
passed through small openings. (3) to enter gradually or secretly:
`cypherpunk agents infiltrated the Internet.' intr.v. to gain entrance
gradually or secretly. `cypherpunk agents infiltrated other mailing
lists.' n. a substance that accumulates gradually in bodily tissues.
`the poisonous infiltrate drowned Cyberspace.'

subterfuge -- n. (1) an evasive plan or tactic used to avoid capture or
confrontation. (2) lies by the tentacles of E.Hughes, T.C.May, or other
prominent cypherpunks. (3) Psychopunk honesty.

ignorant -- adj. (1) without education or knowledge. `E.Hughes was an
ignorant person.' (S.Boxx) (2) exhibiting lack of education or
knowledge: `ignorant assumptions about the lack of pseudospoofing'. (3)
unaware or uninformed: `not having seen the mailing list, she was
ignorant of the massive conspiracy.' (4) an ideal state of lack of
knowledge induced by perpetual brainwashing from the cypherpunks mailing list.

etiquette -- n. (1) the body of rules governing correct behavior among
people, in a profession, etc.: `court etiquette; military etiquette.'
(2) the nonexistent state of courtesy shared among conspiring
California cypherpunks and outsiders.

rant -- intr.v. To speak violently, loudly, and at length; rave: `His
royal eminence ranted against high taxes.' n. A loud, violent speech; a
tirade. `S.Boxx ranted against the corruption of the leadership, but
fortunately no one cared.' (T.C.May)

reality -- (1) the condition or quality of being real or true; actual
existence. (2) a person, thing, or event that is real. (3) Something to
manipulate and distort. ``You live in your own reality.'' (T.C.May)

exorcize -- tr.v. (1) to expel (an evil spirit) by or as if by
incantation or prayer. (2) to free from evil spirits. (3) call a
tentacle a `tentacle' publicly.

facade -- n. (1) the main face or front of a building. ``The
cypherpunks list is a facade for respectability.' (H.Finney) (2) the
face or front part of anything, esp. an artificial or false front: ``of
the most famous cypherpunks we know only the grotesque liars''
(L.Detweiler). (3) a beautiful deception and trickery. ``Our facade
stands!'' (E.Hughes)

false -- 1. a. contrary to fact or truth; erroneous: `T.C.May issued a
false denial.' (S.Boxx) b. arising from mistaken ideas: `E.Hughes had
false hopes in depravity.' (S.Boxx) (2) marked by an intent to deceive;
untruthful: `T.C.May made a false accusation about violent threats'.
(S.Boxx) (3) unfaithful, disloyal: `T.C.May and E.Huhges were false
friend.' (S.Boxx) (4) a. not natural; artificial: `false person'. b.
not real or genuine: `a false identity'. (5) Mus. Wrong in pitch.
``That's the Truth'' (S.Boxx)

humility -- n. (1) the quality or condition of being humble; lack of
pride. (2) a bizarre disorder. ``What is this humility?'' (E.Huhges)

mockery -- n. (1) scornful contempt; ridicule; derision. ``S.Boxx made
a mockery of the leadership.'' (T.C.May) (2) a specific example of
ridicule or derision. ``J.Dinkelacker was a mockery of a human being.''
(S.Boxx) (3) an object of scorn or ridicule. ``Pseudospoofing is a
mockery.'' (H.Finney) (4) a false, ridiculous, or impudent imitation; a
travesty: `the cypherpunks were a mockery of virtue.'

network -- n. (1) an open fabric or structure in which cords, threads,
or wires cross at regular intervals. (2) a system or pattern made up of
a number of parts, passages, lines, or routes that cross, branch out,
or interconnect: `a network of roads and railways; a network of veins.'
(3) a chain of interconnected radio or television broadcasting
stations, usu. sharing a large proportion of their programs. (4) a
group or system of electronic components designed to function in a
specific manner. (5) an extensive system of public access Internet
accounts and phone numbers used to promote a massive conspiracy and
hoax by the Cypherpunks.

manipulate -- (1) to operate or manage by skilled use esp. of the
hands. ``Eric, stop manipulating yourself!' (T.C.May) (2) to influence
or manage shrewdly or skillfully: `E.Hughes masterfully manipulated
public opinion on the cypherpunks list with dozens of fake identities.'
(Nostadamus) (3) to manage artfully or deceitfully for personal gain or
advantage. `Why can't we successfully manipulate S.Boxx?!' (E.Hughes)

masquerade -- n. (1) a. a costume ball or party at which masks and
elaborate costumes are worn. ``The cypherpunks mailing list is a
masquerade of tentacles.'' (S.Boxx) (2) any false outward show or
pretense: `a masquerade of virtue.' intr.v. (1) to wear a mask or
disguise, as a tentacle. (2) to have a deceptive appearance: `a
conspiracy masquerading as a movement.'

-------------------------------------------------------------------------
To find out more about the anon service, send mail to help@anon.penet.fi.
Due to the double-blind, any mail replies to this message will be anonymized,
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Please report any problems, inappropriate use etc. to admin@anon.penet.fi.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: an12070@anon.penet.fi (The Executioner)
Date: Tue, 23 Nov 93 01:58:51 PST
To: tcmay@netcom.com
Subject: The Final Ultimatum
Message-ID: <9311230955.AA26875@anon.penet.fi>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Cypherpunk leaders, state the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but
the truth on the charges of routine, systematic, rampant, and
conspirational pseudospoofing and deception of the media and your
followers, publicly to all those you have affected in Cyberspace.

Cypherpunk followers, demand publicly and privately of your leaders the
truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, and accept nothing less.

Otherwise, watch the `movement' and your reputations dissolve before
your eyes far beyond the present deterioration, to near total oblivion.

You have 24 hours.
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
To find out more about the anon service, send mail to help@anon.penet.fi.
Due to the double-blind, any mail replies to this message will be anonymized,
and an anonymous id will be allocated automatically. You have been warned.
Please report any problems, inappropriate use etc. to admin@anon.penet.fi.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Pat Farrell" <pfarrell@netcom.com>
Date: Tue, 23 Nov 93 07:13:00 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Washington Post story: nov 23
Message-ID: <36705.pfarrell@netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


On page 1 of today's Post Business section (below the fold)

"Bill would ease curbs on encoding software exports"

Lead paragraphs:

"A buill that could signal a showdown between America's high tech industries
and the national security establishment was introduced into the House
Yesterday.
    Rgp Maria Cantwell (D-Wash) submitted legislation to liberalize export
controls on software with features that allow users to encrypt data."

I'll leave out the rest to save bandwidth and typing. If some one is dying
for all the text, let me know and I'll email it.

Not much new info, NSA against, indussry for, the famous "genie lack in the
bottle" quote from Conrgessman Gejdenson, etc.

For folks outside the beltway, Congress is trying like crazy to go home
for Thanksgiving and stay there until January. Nothing will happen on this
bill until next year. The release timing was simply to get some favorablelXmas brownie points when the congresscritters hit the local rubber chicken
circuit.

Pat

Pat Farrell      Grad Student                 pfarrell@netcom.com
Department of Computer Science    George Mason University, Fairfax, VA
Public key availble via finger          #include <standard.disclaimer>




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: owen@autodesk.com (D. Owen Rowley)
Date: Tue, 23 Nov 93 11:04:10 PST
To: baum@newton.apple.com
Subject: Re: Can NSA crack PGP?
Message-ID: <9311231843.AA28497@lux.YP.acad>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



  > From: baum@newton.apple.com (Allen J. Baum)
  > But, there is one thing that is true about NSA's ability to crack it:
 >  they won't give you cause to know whether they can or not.

This statement, like the following, is like a rich vein of 
valuable insight into the extra-technical aspects of the issue.

I found myself reading this next part over several times, and each pass
I found that I associated what I understood to other unspoken questions I have.

 > e.g., if they can, and they read some mail of yours that you REALLY don't
 > want them to read, they won't act on that information in such a manner that
 > you can determine that they cracked the code for your message. They
 > couldn't use it on a warrant, & they couldn't testify as to its contents in
 > court. To do so would advertise their capabilities, which is a no-no for
 > them. (they might, of course, use that information to point people in the
 > right direction so they can attribute information to an anonymous tip, but
 > they have to be careful even there)

and thus revealing that if you become a target of genuine scorn from that
corner, it will operate from a position which is beyond accountability itself.

I think that Doug Barnes hit the nail on the head by pointing out
that sheer volume of stuff to filter through has the potential of 
affording us an edge.

 > Even now, when it's pretty certain they could crack DES, you won't
 > find them doing it for a law enforcement agency that asks; it gives away
 > too much.
 
Anything you are *required* to keep secret, is more valuable to the 
*requiring agency* than to you.

Anything you are expected to accept on faith, can't be proven.


LUX ./. owen




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: owen@autodesk.com (D. Owen Rowley)
Date: Tue, 23 Nov 93 11:03:20 PST
To: kelly@netcom.netcom.com
Subject: Re: (fwd) Technosys, Prosody, the "NSA", and some unfunny BS passed off as a joke
Message-ID: <9311231850.AA28531@lux.YP.acad>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



And people think that corporations are going to entrust their
information assets, and valuable corporate data/communication
to a network where forgery is this easy.
Right, and I am the emperor of China!

This is classic.
Expect to see lots more of these *harmless pranks*.

LUX ./. owen




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: owen@autodesk.com (D. Owen Rowley)
Date: Tue, 23 Nov 93 12:13:19 PST
To: gg@well.sf.ca.us
Subject: Re: Canadian application?
Message-ID: <9311231910.AA28569@lux.YP.acad>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



  > Recently there have been articles & letters in the local gay press
 > complaining about Canadian Customs engaging in censorship by preventing gay
 > publications from entering Canada.  Seems to me this is an ideal case for
 > setting up a special-purpose private encrypted net, and gaining a vocal
 > constituency in our favor. 

Queer people are used to codes and semiotic communication, we are 
pretty good at steganographic social posturing too.
On ething I've found though is a definite trend not to volunteer as guinea
pigs for social agendas beyond attaining the basic rights now denied us.

Oh, and I'm not so sure that a vocal queer constituency is all that
helpfull these days :-)

 > 
 > What I have in mind would be to consult with various publishers in the gay
 > community, toward the end of setting up offices in Vancouver and Toronto
 > which would receive encrypted files from the US which could then be
 > reassembled into printed form for regular press production and distribution
 > within Canada: thereby entirely bypassing Customs and its censorship. 

As I understand it the few Gay-Lesbian bookstores who are commited to the cause
just drive over the border to pick up their shipments, and then smuggle them
back.

besides introducing a doubling effect on the physical production process
would probably not be worth the expense for that market when simpler
methods suffice.

 > 
 > I'm guessing that they'll probably want to use an authorised/licensed system
 > such as ViaCrypt, and wonder whether that can handle magazine and book
 > production type files, which may be text and/or graphics, full color, layout
 > details, and so on. 

This could be like waving a red flag in the face of a psychotic bull.
Giving the Gummint an excuse to claim probable cause due to contraband
sexually explicit material just doesn't sound like a good idea to me?
 
 > If anyone out there is interested in helping with this; preferably if you're
 > in the San Francisco Bay Area, email gg@well.sf.ca.us.
 
There are plenty of issues regarding abuse of this network by psychopathic
e-terrorist, most of 'em directly analogous to this lists current
controversial bad-boy. I for one, would much rather see some attention to
methods of dealing with that!

LUX ./. owen




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Perry E. Metzger" <pmetzger@lehman.com>
Date: Tue, 23 Nov 93 08:15:18 PST
To: tcmay@netcom.com
Subject: Re: The Final Ultimatum
In-Reply-To: <9311230955.AA26875@anon.penet.fi>
Message-ID: <9311231613.AA29319@snark.lehman.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



The Executioner says:
> Cypherpunk leaders, state the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but
> the truth on the charges of routine, systematic, rampant, and
> conspirational pseudospoofing and deception of the media and your
> followers, publicly to all those you have affected in Cyberspace.
> 
> Cypherpunk followers, demand publicly and privately of your leaders the
> truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, and accept nothing less.
> 
> Otherwise, watch the `movement' and your reputations dissolve before
> your eyes far beyond the present deterioration, to near total oblivion.
> 
> You have 24 hours.

Folks, Detweiler is psychotic. Answering this message of his, even to
flame him, isn't going to get anyone anywhere. There isn't any point
to it.

Perry




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Date: Tue, 23 Nov 93 11:23:00 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Comments on NSA (was: "Pyrrhus Cracks RSA?")
In-Reply-To: <6E4CCAA7E0204AD3@sleepy.egr.msu.edu>
Message-ID: <199311231920.LAA06189@mail.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Michael Marotta writes an intruiging political essay, though I have
some corrections/disagreements.

I'll also talk about NSA employment of mathematicians, from the 1950s
on, the founding and funding of Engineering Research Associates, Cray
Research, the Institute for Defense Analysis, and the ultra-secretive
Jasons Group.


> CAN THE GOVERNMENT BUILD AN ATOMIC BOMB?  
> by mercury@well.sf.ca.us <Michael E. Marotta> 

> Cypherpunks know that centralized systems are inefficient, yet 
> they fear the NSA.  Cypherpunks know that government employees 
> are slugabeds, yet they fear the NSA.  Cypherpunks know that 
> qinnovation and enterprise are the antithesis of socialism, yet 
> they fear the NSA.  They don't fear that the NSA will kick in 
> their doors and shoot them in a cybernetic Kristallnacht or burn 
> t(their homes the way the Romans and Mongols did to Carthage and 
> Samarkand.  (Waco comes to mind, here.)  No, the Cypherpunk is 
> afraid that the government has "powerful computers" capable of a 
> "brute force attack" on their algorithms. 

Some Cypherpunks (me, at least) are not afraid of the NSA's powerful
computers. We understand that the mathematics of today's algorithms
means the race is always won by the encryptor, not the cryptbreaker.
If a dozen Crays at the Fort can--somehow--factor a 150-digit number,
and thus break a 512-bit RSA key (more or less), then the encryptor
can trivially move to a 1024-bit key....safe for many generations,
even with 10,000 Crays munching away.

Crypto is economics, as Eric Hughes likes to point out (but he's just
one of my many tentacles, so I can freely quote him), and the public
key math favors the encryptor over the would-be cypher breaker to an
incredible extent, with the advantage growing ever-greater as key
lengths increase.

(Work out the math yourself...the advantage lies with the user of
one-way functions...barring unforeseen breakthroughs in factoring, of
which there is no evidence, or the reported proof that P = NP from
Kryptogorodok, the secret city of Russian cryptographers in the Urals.)

As Phil Karn and several others have noted, the weak link is physical
security. Black bag jobs, viruses, etc. For example, my Macs have
"keyboard capture" buffers, as Unix systems often do, that capture and
stores _all_ keyboard entry in files, as an aid to recovering text
entered. Great for writers, but a terrible security hole. (Watch out
for this on Macs or Unix systems you may use!)

These are the real weaknesses. Floppy disks laying around or "lost"
that have one's secret key on them, combined with keyboard capture of
the PGP passphrase. I expect at least some people have already had
their PGP privacy turned into Pretty Crummy Privacy. And not by
brute-force cracking.

...
> pumps which came from fire trucks.)  Ask "anyone" and they will 
> tell you that World War Two brought us nuclear power, spaceships, 
> radar, television, the transistor, the computer, canned food, and 
> recycling.  In fact, it brought none of these.  They already 

Well, some of these things existed in some form prior to WW II, but
many key innovations reached fruition during the war: radar, rocketry,
gyroscopes, etc. Some things were clearly invented _during_ the war:
nuclear reactors, nuclear bombs, computers, etc. And the transistor,
by the way, came after the war (the ordinary Shockley et. al.
transistor at Bell Labs....the 1930s German work on
metal-insulator-semiconductor devices, by Lillienfeld (as I dimly
recall), was not really a precursor--the significance was not
appreciated until decades later).

> unpacked Diffie's knapsack.  What is most probable, is that these 
> ciphers will stand for some unforeseeable time until someone who 
> may not be born yet comes along and breaks them all as an idle 
> {exercise on her way to greatness in another field. 

Maybe. But if factoring is shown to be NP-complete (it hasn't been so
far, though most suspect it), then this future Gauss will truly be a
giant.

> But the NSA?  No way, Jose.  They might be nerds who hacked some 
> code at 3 am.  But you put them on a salary and benefits in a 
> pyramid, then tell them not to talk about their work, and you 
> thwart whatever creativity they had.  The NSA can kill you.  But 
> t({they can never out-think you. 

For many years the NSA hired as consultants some of the brightest
mathemeticians in the world, including Claude Shannon (information
theory), Andrew Gleason (math), E. Berlenkamp (algebraic coding
theory), David Huffman (Huffman codes), Richard Garwin (physics), Luis
Alvarez (physics, later known for the dinosaur extinction work--the
idea that a giant meteor hit the NSA and killed it...just kidding),
John R. Pierce (communications), Hendrik Bode (Bode plots), and so
on.The NSA also funded Seymour Cray at Engineering Research Associates
in the 1950s and even--many people claim--funded Cray Research in the
early 1970s. NSA also was centrally involved in formation of Mitre
Corp., The Institute for Defense Analysis (IDA), and it built and paid
for the "Communications Research Division" building at Princeton
University...linked to what is now the John von Neumann Supercomputer
Center (I may have the exact title wrong).

(Source: Bamford's "The Puzzle Palace," 1982, and discussions with
Brian Snow of the NSA at the 1988 Crypto Conference.)

Yes, the NSA has long had many "tentacles" into academia. What was
probably so shocking to them about the mid-70s breakthroughs in public
key, by Diffie, Hellman, and Merkle, was that (presumably) this was
work done outside their usual network of contract mathematicians. (NSA
has been making noises about how they'd already discovered public key
crypto years before Diffie and Hellman did. This could be face-saving
bragadoccio. Time will tell. Any NSA readers out there are free to
post anonymously to this group or to alt.whistleblowers, or to "sell"
your memoirs on BlackNet.)

Mathematicians have to seek funding from somewhere. For many years,
NSA was a prime source--and may still be. The "SCAMP" program ("Summer
Campus, Advanced Mathematics Program") meets in a special building on
the UCLA campus to discuss items of interest to the Agency, and to
fund mathematicians who attend. Much like the ultra-secret "Jasons"
and their summer work on La Jolla, California.

A fascinating topic. I sure do wish someone would write another book
on the Agency.

--Tim May


-- 
..........................................................................
Timothy C. May         | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,  
tcmay@netcom.com       | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
408-688-5409           | knowledge, reputations, information markets, 
W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA  | black markets, collapse of governments.
Higher Power: 2^756839 | Public Key: PGP and MailSafe available.
Note: I put time and money into writing this posting. I hope you enjoy it.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: cfrye@ciis.mitre.org (Curtis D. Frye)
Date: Tue, 23 Nov 93 08:27:56 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Pyrrhus Cracks RSA?
Message-ID: <9311231633.AA08407@ciis.mitre.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>You know the people who could break DES, RSA, PGP, etc.  Shamir 
>unpacked Diffie's knapsack.  What is most probable, is that these 
>ciphers will stand for some unforeseeable time until someone who 
>may not be born yet comes along and breaks them all as an idle 
>{exercise on her way to greatness in another field. 
> 
>But the NSA?  No way, Jose.  They might be nerds who hacked some 
>code at 3 am.  But you put them on a salary and benefits in a 
>pyramid, then tell them not to talk about their work, and you 
>thwart whatever creativity they had.  The NSA can kill you.  But 
>t({they can never out-think you. 

Strong words that, IMHO, put way too much faith in the argument that a
"restrictive" work environment inevitably crushes individualism and
creativity.  Any organization, .gov or !.gov, that:  

  *  recruits the best and the brightest and pays them well; 
  *  gives access to substantial computing/financial resources and academic    
     knowledge; 
  *  fosters team-building, creativity, and competition *within the group*; 
  *  rewards achievement and provides status *within the group*; and 
  *  provides other movitivation, be it patriotism/pride/whatever, 

will produce more than its fair share of advances in a field.  Given a
concentrated environment and an advanced set of tools, it seems improbable
that any group, regardless of organizational affiliation, could be
outperformed *on an evolutionary basis* by a loose band of academicians and
private researchers with irregular contact.  

Revolutionary change is impossible to predict, though I feel that no
organization with sufficient resources would throw away promising methods
without thorough investigation.  Even so, I do personally believe that
private individuals may have an edge in revolutionary research. 
Unfortunately, both statements are unverifiable.

The key point to remember is that motivation is relative - regardless of
our personal opinions, if someone seeks status within a group then more
"restrictive" environments are not a hindrance to creativity.

--
Best regards,

Curtis D. Frye
cfrye@ciis.mitre.org
"If you think I speak for MITRE, I'll tell you how much they
 pay me and make you feel foolish."






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Bruce C. Dovala" <75260.1646@CompuServe.COM>
Date: Tue, 23 Nov 93 11:55:10 PST
To: Cupherpunks <cypherpunks@toad.com>
Subject: ViaCrypt Details?
Message-ID: <931123164343_75260.1646_CHL85-1@CompuServe.COM>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Hi,

Does anyone have any details on ViaCrypt? Particularly availabilty,
sources, user interface, compatibility with PGP, etc.
Please post or write.

Thanx,
Bruce






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Jon 'Iain' Boone" <boone@psc.edu>
Date: Tue, 23 Nov 93 09:02:55 PST
To: cfrye@ciis.mitre.org (Curtis D. Frye)
Subject: Re: Pyrrhus Cracks RSA?
In-Reply-To: <9311231633.AA08407@ciis.mitre.org>
Message-ID: <9311231701.AA28299@igi.psc.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



cfrye@ciis.mitre.org (Curtis D. Frye)  writes:
>
> >But the NSA?  No way, Jose.  They might be nerds who hacked some 
> >code at 3 am.  But you put them on a salary and benefits in a 
> >pyramid, then tell them not to talk about their work, and you 
> >thwart whatever creativity they had.  The NSA can kill you.  But 
> >t({they can never out-think you. 
> 
> Strong words that, IMHO, put way too much faith in the argument that a
> "restrictive" work environment inevitably crushes individualism and
> creativity.  Any organization, .gov or !.gov, that:  
> 
>   *  recruits the best and the brightest and pays them well; 

   Do you know how much NSA employees get paid?  I'm wondering, because it
   is certainly _not_ the case in the CIA.  The "analysts" may make somewhere
   between the $30K - $45K range, but that's hardly "good pay" for people
   who are experts on that kind of analysis, especially when they have Ph.D.s.

>   *  gives access to substantial computing/financial resources and academic  
>      knowledge; 
>   *  fosters team-building, creativity, and competition *within the group*; 
>   *  rewards achievement and provides status *within the group*; and 
>   *  provides other movitivation, be it patriotism/pride/whatever, 
> 
> will produce more than its fair share of advances in a field.  Given a
> concentrated environment and an advanced set of tools, it seems improbable
> that any group, regardless of organizational affiliation, could be
> outperformed *on an evolutionary basis* by a loose band of academicians and
> private researchers with irregular contact.  
> 
> Curtis D. Frye
> cfrye@ciis.mitre.org
> "If you think I speak for MITRE, I'll tell you how much they
>  pay me and make you feel foolish."

  Please tell me how much MITRE pays you.  Is your above description a 
  description of MITRE?  

 Jon Boone | PSC Networking | boone@psc.edu | (412) 268-6959




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Peter Wayner <pcw@access.digex.net>
Date: Tue, 23 Nov 93 09:13:17 PST
To: cfrye@ciis.mitre.org
Subject: Re: Pyrrhus Cracks RSA?
Message-ID: <199311231712.AA09581@access.digex.net>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



I've always felt that the NSA and its corp of mathematicians
has a much greater chance of breaking anything than the 
folks in the University. 

Even in the best situation (MIT), a professor must devote
substantial time to raising money to support themselves,
their travel expenses and their graduate students. There
aren't many folks who hold positions in these schools. 
The rest are in schools where the professor must also
teach 2-4 classes to pay for food. Research is nice
in these places, but it doesn't pay the rent. 

Very, very few people have the freedom and the time to
devote to deep exploration of problems like cracking RSA.
Most of them are in the NSA. 

There is no doubt that the restrictive work environment
is a pain in the neck. But, most mathematicians don't 
really have many choices. They can go to a small college
and teach forever. They can go to industry and work hard
on the industry's problems. Or they can go to the NSA.
It really isn't a bad choice in many respects. No classes.
No students whining about their grades or asking for
an extension. No endless search for grant money. If you
want to do algebra or number theory or a host of other
problems, it might be considered one of the best environments
you could get short of the Institute for Advanced Study.





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: cfrye@ciis.mitre.org (Curtis D. Frye)
Date: Tue, 23 Nov 93 09:22:56 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Pyrrhus Cracks RSA?
Message-ID: <9311231727.AA09153@ciis.mitre.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>> = cfrye@ciis.mitre.org (Curtis D. Frye)
>  = boone@psc.edu (Jon Boone)

>> Strong words that, IMHO, put way too much faith in the argument that a
>> "restrictive" work environment inevitably crushes individualism and
>> creativity.  Any organization, .gov or !.gov, that:  
>> 
>>   *  recruits the best and the brightest and pays them well; 
>
>   Do you know how much NSA employees get paid?  I'm wondering, because it
>   is certainly _not_ the case in the CIA.  The "analysts" may make somewhere
>   between the $30K - $45K range, but that's hardly "good pay" for people
>   who are experts on that kind of analysis, especially when they have Ph.D.s.

While I'm not intimately familiar with the workings of the NSA, I would
guess that folks w/ Ph.D.'s and no/little work experience are probably
brought in near the top end of that range, though the advanced degree would
allow for quicker advancement to senior technical or management positions
and correspondingly greater pay.  Also, be sure to include the labor
surplus, government benefits and job satisfaction as factors in considering
salary adequacy.

>
>>   *  gives access to substantial computing/financial resources and academic  
>>      knowledge; 
>>   *  fosters team-building, creativity, and competition *within the group*; 
>>   *  rewards achievement and provides status *within the group*; and 
>>   *  provides other movitivation, be it patriotism/pride/whatever, 
>> 
>> will produce more than its fair share of advances in a field.  Given a
>> concentrated environment and an advanced set of tools, it seems improbable
>> that any group, regardless of organizational affiliation, could be
>> outperformed *on an evolutionary basis* by a loose band of academicians and
>> private researchers with irregular contact.  
>> 
>> Curtis D. Frye
>> cfrye@ciis.mitre.org
>> "If you think I speak for MITRE, I'll tell you how much they
>>  pay me and make you feel foolish."
>
>  Please tell me how much MITRE pays you.  Is your above description a 
>  description of MITRE?

MITRE pays me significantly less than what they would pay a Senior VP,
which is about the level where I would feel comfortable stating that I
"speak for" MITRE.  As for the team-building observations I made above,
they are made from a general management perspective and are open to debate,
though that discussion might be a bit off-topic for cypherpunks if removed
from the crypto framework.

--
Best regards,

Curtis D. Frye
cfrye@ciis.mitre.org
"If you think I speak for MITRE, I'll tell you how much they
 pay me and make you feel foolish."






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: jet@nas.nasa.gov (J. Eric Townsend)
Date: Tue, 23 Nov 93 12:33:04 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: discussion on crypto rights *NOW* (1230PST, 23Nov93)
Message-ID: <9311232029.AA25092@boxer.nas.nasa.gov>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain




KPFA, 94.1FM is having some sort of discussion on crypto exports and
whatnot.  Some woman from SPA talking about crypto export rights.

-eric






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: The PUNISHER - Judge; Jury; Executioner <punisher@ccwf.cc.utexas.edu>
Date: Tue, 23 Nov 93 11:03:00 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: NSA
Message-ID: <199311231859.AA12212@bashful.cc.utexas.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text


Hey all,

I just wanted to let you know (as an ex-SEAL), the NSA (and to a limited
extent CIA) have UNBELIEVEABLE resources!

If anyone could crack RSA, DES, OPP...they could.

Never underestimate the power of a "black" budget (or for that matter soup)



The PUNISHER
Judge; Jury; Executioner....All in a day's work

Mob Boss: "500 of my men killed; there is a limit to revenge you know"
Punisher: "I haven't reached mine yet"




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Stanton McCandlish <mech@eff.org>
Date: Tue, 23 Nov 93 10:14:04 PST
To: jkreznar@ininx.com (John E. Kreznar)
Subject: Re: Pardon my vanity, but...
In-Reply-To: <9311230814.AA04570@ininx>
Message-ID: <199311231812.NAA02644@eff.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> Ah you are still around!  Postings from you have been so scarce in
> recent days that I thought you might have left for the holidays.

Nope, I'm still here!

> Is it possible that you missed my reply to you last week, repeated
> below

Yep, I missed it.  I read so much mail/news, some times I scan too quickly.

> In-Reply-To: Stanton McCandlish's message of Tue, 16 Nov 1993 18:23:59 -0500 (EST) <199311162324.AA29258@eff.org>
> Subject: Should we oppose the Data Superhighway/NII?
> 
> > Part of the effort that must be made is to knock some sense into the
> > rapidly merging entertainment/information/telecom conglomerates, and try
> > to at very least keep a large section of the "data highway" (or whatever
> > one chooses to call it) an Internet-like many-to-many communications
> > medium, if not fused with Internet itself.  Convincing the govt. of this
> > is will also take some doing.  One certainly can't IGNORE the govt.  No
> > matter how much we may wish it'd just go away, it won't, and has to be
> > dealt with.
> 
> The beauty of cypherpunk technology is that it provides means to _avoid_
> the tyranny of government, rather than trying to redirect that tyranny
> on behalf of one's own ends.

This is a commendable goal, but one can't rely on a trickle to do the job
of a river.  I'm all for cp tech, and I'm all for reducing the power of
the govt. as much as possible and as soon as possible.   I'm _not_ all for
expecting to accomplish this immediately.

> Government gets its power from its hundred million clients. 

Hmm I tend to think govt. gets its power from the adequately backed-up
threat that it can rob (fine), enslave (imprison) or kill (execute or
shoot while resisting arrest) you if you don't do what it says.  If someone
holds me hostage, I tend to think of them as a coercive kidnapper, not a
business that I am patronizing.  This is not to say that everything the
govt does is nefarious.  Most of what it does is inefficient handwaving
and ignorant blundering.  In these cases, I see it as a something akin to
a large automobile with an incompetent driver behind the wheel.  I might
criticize, even yell and fly them the bird, but I'll get the hell out of the
way.

> To join
> that clientele is not consistent with wanting government power to
> whither away.

Recognizing that in the very rapidly unfolding "data highway" plan (if
anything this chaotic and free-for-all can be called a "plan"), the
govt WILL play one role or another, like it or not, is not joining the
govt's clientele.  Much as I'd like to see no govt. involvement, it is
inevitable in the current socio-political climate. 5 EFFs could pop up,
with twice our funding each, and all scream bloody murder about govt
involvement in the "national information infrastructure", and all 5 of
them would be utterly ignored.  Working more carefully, rather that
pursuing an all out barrage, can be more effective in some cases, and we
think this to be one of them.

I think it's wise to look at the realities of the situation, whatever
one's outlook whether libertarian or otherwise, and recognize that
sometimes unpleasant things like an unwieldy state simply have to be dealt
with.  Whether govt involvement is wrong or not is really irrelevant,
until cp tech, and cp/libertarian attitudes are in a position to DO
something about it.  It's like being confronted by a mugger: you can point
out that they have no right to rob you and are using coercive force to
violate your civil liberties, but it's not going to make them go away if
you don't have the physical power to defend yourself.

The time's just not right for a cypherpunk "War on Govt".  Cypherpunks will
lose. As the NII is coming on fast, the govt has to be dealt with NOW, to
reduce their impact and involvement, rather than hope that, w/o DigiCash,
w/o a large base of support in the culture at large, w/o our own
infrastructure, CPs will convince the govt to just give up and go away. 
They'll trample that idea into the dirt, because they have the money and
power to do so, right or wrong, and you'd end up with a net.fcc and 5000
channels of crud, metered out byte by byte, requirements for a net.license
to be a provider rather than consumer, and taxed into oblivion.  I'd like
to point out also that it's much easier to prevent large scale govt
involvement and reduce small scale involvement later, that fight against
ANY govt involvement, lose, and a be faced with trying to get rid of it
later after it's become law and granted the govt all sorts of powers.  Try
to eliminate the FCC.  Good luck!  This stance does of course presume
vigilance to prevent the govt from expanding their small base of power
into a bigger one.

I look forward to seeing the power of the govt wane in coming years, and I
am certain that it will happen, but I don't think it's going to happen
this month, or next year.  When we've got a DigiCash-based banking system,
when the majority of the population are computer-literate, when
cryptography is fully legal and unstigmatized, when CP tech is easy to use
for the non-techie and built in to applications and hardware, when
anti-authoritarianism returns as the focus of the country's political
thought, and when the govt begins to collapse under the weight of it's own
failures, then we'll see the changes come.  But, I tend to expect that
things will get worse before they get better, in the big picture. People
aren't mad enough yet to get up off their commercial-brainwashed,
apathetic couch potato butts and DO much of anything yet, but would rather
go to the mall or play with their Game Boys.  "Give Me Convenience or Give
Me Death" as Jello Biafra mocked.

Have a look at the stuff EFF's doing - to reduce/eliminate ITAR restrictions,
to combat unjust laws, to defend people who's civil liberties have been
violated by "law enforcement" that doesn't even seem to know what the law
is, to educate about privacy and encryption, to make using the internet
easy for "Big Dummies", to encourage grassroots real-world networking on
the local level, and to ensure that whatever the "superhighway" will be,
it provides for full-bandwidth, open platform, and openly accessible
many-to-many participation - before tossing us on the garbage heap as govt
lubbers. :)  I don't think anyone here LIKES the idea that we have to
haggle and play the game w/the govt, but that's just the way it stands,
and any step that reduces govt interference in any way even if it doesn't
bring on the glorious anarcho-capitalist revolution, is still a step in
the right direction.

-- 
Stanton  McCandlish  mech@eff.org  1:109/1103   EFF  Online  Activist & SysOp
O P E N  P L A T F O R M   C R Y P T O P O L I C Y   O N L I N E  R I G H T S
N  E  T  W  O  R  K  I  N  G      V  I  R  T  U  A  L     C  U  L  T  U  R  E
I   N   F  O :  M   E   M   B   E   R   S   H   I   P  @  E  F  F  .  O  R  G



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Christopher Garrett Goebel <goebelc1@student.msu.edu>
Date: Tue, 23 Nov 93 10:15:11 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Case Studies Info Request
Message-ID: <9311231813.AA11484@student2.cl.msu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text


I'm looking for info, articles, archives, book and journal leads on
info related to applied cryptology in the 20th century... for a senior
thesis I'm writing on cryptology, warfare, and national security.

Specifically, I'm looking for

o Clipper chip archives of articles
o Articles on Phil (PGP) and RSA disputes
o Articles on the export of cryptology

I'd also like info on cryptology in the Cold War or leads to
such info.

Please send info to: genghis@blue.engin.umich.edu.

Thanks,

Garrett



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: jim@chiba.Tadpole.COM (Jim Thompson)
Date: Tue, 23 Nov 93 12:13:01 PST
To: wak@next11.math.pitt.edu
Subject: Re: NYT: Virus; NeXT (unrelated)
Message-ID: <9311232011.AA12466@chiba.tadpole.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Sun has over $1B in 'the bank'.  




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Christopher Garrett Goebel <goebelc1@student.msu.edu>
Date: Tue, 23 Nov 93 11:18:04 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: CORRECTION READ FIRST
Message-ID: <9311231915.AA89121@student2.cl.msu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text


Don't mail those case studies to genghis@blue.engin.umich.edu
It was a dormant account my brother used to keep in touch with
friends from work (when he worked there).

He said he could forward mail to me from there... well, it looks like
they've closed down that account.

Sorry, send mail to goebelc1@studentg.msu.edu

Thanks,

Garrett




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: walter kehowski <wak@next11.math.pitt.edu>
Date: Tue, 23 Nov 93 11:47:59 PST
To: extropians@extropy.org
Subject: NYT: Virus; NeXT (unrelated)
Message-ID: <9311231947.AA00442@next11.math.pitt.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Cypherpunks and Extropians:
  Two articles of interest in today's NYT: 1) [Front Page, lower right] A software  
vendor allegedly planted a virus in a customer's machine because he threatened to stop  
payment on the software he bought. The virus was programmed to shutdown the customer's  
computer. 

  2) [Front page, bottom, Business section] NeXT and Sun have announced a partnership.  
Apparently, Sun is to invest 10mil in NeXT for access to the source of their OOP  
environment. BTW, how much did Sun make last year? How much is 10mil by comparison?

Walter A. Kehowski <wak@next0.math.pitt.edu>




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: smb@research.att.com
Date: Tue, 23 Nov 93 11:57:59 PST
To: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Subject: Re: Comments on NSA (was: "Pyrrhus Cracks RSA?")
Message-ID: <9311231955.AA21239@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


	 (NSA
	 has been making noises about how they'd already discovered public key
	 crypto years before Diffie and Hellman did. This could be face-saving
	 bragadoccio. Time will tell. Any NSA readers out there are free to
	 post anonymously to this group or to alt.whistleblowers, or to "sell"
	 your memoirs on BlackNet.)

There was an interesting discussion on this point at the ACM Conference
on Computer and Communications Security a few weeks ago.  At the
``Festcolloquium'' in honor of Gus Simmons, someone who used to work for
NSA (his name escapes me, but I have it at home) stated that in 1963,
President Kennedy signed a memorandum calling for -- in today's
language -- the use of digital signatures for nuclear weapons command
and control.

The memo -- National Action Security Memorandum (NASM) 160 -- is
still classified.  Someone else on this list (I'll let him speak for
himself) has contacted the JFK library about it.  It may already be
going through clearance release; if not, forms have been submitted
to initiate the release process.  And there's always FOIA if that
fails.

It will be very interesting to see the memorandum when it comes out.
(Btw, it was written by Jerome Weisner, Kennedy's science advisor.)
A lot of wisdom consists of asking the right questions; if the phrasing
was right, I would tend to believe that NSA did indeed have public
key technology in the mid-60's, once they were asked to create something
with those properties.  But if that was true, why didn't Simmons himself
know of it?  He said that he learned of public key from the Martin
Gardener column in Scientific American, as I recall.  Simmons was
familiar with NASM-160, though; in fact, he was the one who supplied
the number.


		--Steve Bellovin




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Carl Ellison <cme@sw.stratus.com>
Date: Tue, 23 Nov 93 12:03:00 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Can NSA crack PGP?
Message-ID: <199311231959.OAA07686@ellisun.sw.stratus.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> [ Stanton McCandlish wrote ]

>The persons holding this viewpoint espouse the idea that
>the NSA can crack anything, pretty much, and that anything they could not
>crack would not be available to the general public, but would have been
>supressed.


That view allocates to the NSA the power they wish they had over
cryptographic creativity.  I wonder if the author is really NSA him/her
self.

Vernam's one-time-tape [-file, for us] is provably unbreakable and not
suppressed.

RSA with enough modulus bits is unbreakable and not suppressed (although
they tried).  [We don't know how many bits is "enough", however.]

There are ways to use DES which increase the difficulty of breaking -- but
again we don't know how many instances we have to use to achieve enough
security to foil the NSA.  We know we can get there, however, and I'm willing
to bet it's not difficult.  Of course, I don't know and don't want to know.

I want the NSA to be good at what it does.  I want our team to be able to
read the other team's signals.

All I want is to preserve my freedom to use any cryptosystem of my own
concoction -- straight invention or cobbled together from others'.  I've
had that freedom for all my life and intend to preserve it.

-----------

Can NSA break PGP?  Who knows?

I'm not sure I care.  I don't see the NSA as my enemy, per se.  (That does
*not* mean I'll hand them a skeleton key to my traffic, eg., via Clipper.)
My secrets are from people I think of as criminals (in or out of government)
and I want to use strong cryptography to foil them.  I would trust PGP for
that.  I trust RIPEM with triple DES (and 1024 bit RSA keys) a bit more, for
its better-tested conventional algorithm.

For even better security, I would use:

	2000 bit RSA keys
	true hardware ranno generator for session keys
	des-cbc|tran|des-cbc|tran|des  as the conventional cryptosystem

but, of course, there are always TEMPEST attacks, bugs in my office, ...,
and as Diffie points out -- you have no control over the recipient.  S/he
might send cleartext of your messages right to the person you're trying to
foil.

Fact remains: there is *no* absolute privacy.  There is only a computational
hindrance on eavesdropping.

 - Carl




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Date: Tue, 23 Nov 93 15:58:03 PST
To: ogr@wyvern.wyvern.com (Jason Plank)
Subject: Re: Crays vs <?>
In-Reply-To: <m0p27He-0000daC@wyvern.wyvern.com>
Message-ID: <199311232356.PAA14433@mail.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Jason Plonk writes:

> 	There has been a lot of type of what kind of resources the US (in
> particluar the NSA) has in defeating various encryption schemes.  I've read
> that they have 100+ Crays scattered throughout the country.
> 	My question is this, what kind of systems is the "other" side using?
> The US has export restrictions on super computers, such as the Cray.  I know
> for a fact that the US .gov wouldn't allow the sale of a Cray to India,
> because .gov thought that it could be used in the manufacture of weapons.  

The "other" side? I don't think the Cypherpunks have _any_ Crays all
for themselves, though some Cypherpunks work in rooms full of Crays
and at least several of them work with networks of many hundreds of
workstations.

Or by "other" side did you mean the Medellin Cartel and the importers
for illegal and politically incorrect novels?

Surely you didn't mean our new trading partners in Russia?

On a more serious note, strong crypto will allow "foreigners" to send
computing jobs to sites nearly anywhere in the world and have them run
on compute servers. So much for export controls on the physical
hardware!

(And the "computing with encrypted instances" work of Joan Feigenbaum
and others means in principle that the site doing the computing may
not even be able to tell if they're computing bomb yields or crop
watering schedules.)

--Tim

-- 
..........................................................................
Timothy C. May         | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,  
tcmay@netcom.com       | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
408-688-5409           | knowledge, reputations, information markets, 
W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA  | black markets, collapse of governments.
Higher Power: 2^756839 | Public Key: PGP and MailSafe available.
Note: I put time and money into writing this posting. I hope you enjoy it.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Date: Tue, 23 Nov 93 16:03:03 PST
To: ogr@wyvern.wyvern.com (Jason Plank)
Subject: Re: Crays vs <?>
In-Reply-To: <m0p27He-0000daC@wyvern.wyvern.com>
Message-ID: <199311240000.QAA14967@mail.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Jason Plank writes:

> -- 
> Signature?  I don't need no *stinking* signature!
> Confucius say "Clinton Happens"
> Touch me for 'the key (2.3)'


In my last message I called him "Jason Plonk." This was not meant as
an insult ("*plonk*"), but reflected the fact that once I was in my
editor, I couldn't see his name and I misremembered it.

My friend Perry Metzger has long argued that sigs should not be
present at all in the body of a message, that the header conveys
adequate information.

Well, I disagree, and I always include my name and whatnot in the body
of my messages. Heads off confusion like we just saw.

--Tim May

-- 
..........................................................................
Timothy C. May         | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,  
tcmay@netcom.com       | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
408-688-5409           | knowledge, reputations, information markets, 
W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA  | black markets, collapse of governments.
Higher Power: 2^756839 | Public Key: PGP and MailSafe available.
Note: I put time and money into writing this posting. I hope you enjoy it.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: an4914@anon.penet.fi (Nitch)
Date: Tue, 23 Nov 93 08:09:04 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Tech: Truth about Canon Copiers
Message-ID: <9311231608.AA21050@anon.penet.fi>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



>
>       This is interesting.  Since most of the change-making machines in 
>   laundromats seem to use the side with the dead white guy, I wonder if it
>   would work to use this copy?
>   ----Dave REes (rees@cs.bu.edu)
>
>Nah, the changers just say "this side up" - the scanner may be looking at
>the underside of the bill, or at both sides (more probable).
>

Or, they may not "scan" at all!  Ever wonder why wrinkles, folds, and other
mutilations wreck their ability to recognize your cash?

I think many of them may be measuring paper thickness, folks.
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
To find out more about the anon service, send mail to help@anon.penet.fi.
Due to the double-blind, any mail replies to this message will be anonymized,
and an anonymous id will be allocated automatically. You have been warned.
Please report any problems, inappropriate use etc. to admin@anon.penet.fi.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: frode@toaster.SFSU.EDU (Frode Odegard)
Date: Tue, 23 Nov 93 16:53:05 PST
To: tcmay@netcom.com
Subject: Re: Crays vs <?>
Message-ID: <9311240049.AA26750@toaster.SFSU.EDU>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> The "other" side? I don't think the Cypherpunks have _any_ Crays [..]
> [..]

Maybe he meant, you know, the Russians.

Ha ha.

They're supposed to be our friends now, right?

Now, the FRENCH on the other hand..

			- frode




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: crunch@netcom.com (John Draper)
Date: Tue, 23 Nov 93 17:38:04 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: PGP info plus Internet access from Miami
Message-ID: <199311240136.RAA12041@mail.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Hi,

I am trying to get a copy of PGP for the IBM PC to my friend in 
Miami.    Is there anyone in the Miami area who has a copy,  and
would it be possible for my friend to pick it up?    Is PGP still
on Soda.berkeley.edu in IBM-PC form.    He will need to get the
documentation as well.

He isn't on the Net yet,  but is also looking for any service with
Internet access thats local to the Miami area.   Is there such a
service that provides an internet dialup like Netcom or Panex?

Any information would be approciated....

John Draper
Cap'n Crunch




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Stanton McCandlish <mech@eff.org>
Date: Tue, 23 Nov 93 14:55:11 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: ANNOUNCEMENT: Markey Bill debuts in House
Message-ID: <199311232253.RAA06596@eff.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Followup-To: comp.org.eff.talk




Reps. Markey and Fields Introduce H.R. 3636, the "National Communications
Competition and Information Infrastructure Act of 1993": EFF Applauds
Inclusion of Open Platform Provisions


        On Monday, November 22, 1993, EFF applauded House
Telecommunications and Finance Subcommittee Chairman Edward Markey
(D-Mass.), Minority Chairman Jack Fields (R-Tex.), and other cosponsors for
introducing the "National Communications Competition and Information
Infrastructure Act of 1993."  The Markey/Fields legislation, which
incorporates EFF's Open Platform philosophy, is built on three concepts:
open platform services, the entry of telephone companies into video cable
service, and universal service. 

        Reacting to the open platform provisions, Mitchell Kapor, EFF Board
Chairman, stated:  "The sponsors of this bill are to be commended for
proposing legislation that incorporates a truly democratic vision of the
emerging data highway.  Open platform service can end channel scarcity once
and for all and make it possible for any information provider to offer
voice, data, and video services on the data highway.  Every citizen will be
able to access a true diversity of information and programming."

        EFF Executive Director Jerry Berman added that "we believe public
interest and nonprofit groups, as well as computer and communications
industry leaders will work very hard for the open platform provisions.  Our
goal is to keep them in the bill and make them even stronger before its
enactment."
 
BELOW, EFF BRIEFLY SUMMARIZES THE BILL'S PROVISIONS RELATING TO OPEN
PLATFORM SERVICES, THE ENTRY OF TELEPHONE COMPANIES INTO VIDEO CABLE
SERVICE, AND UNIVERSAL SERVICE. AN EFF ANALYSIS OF THE IMPACT OF THE BILL
ON PUBLIC INTEREST GOALS OF UNIVERSAL SERVICE, COMMON CARRIAGE, AND
CONSUMER EQUITY WILL BE RELEASED AS SOON AS IT IS COMPLETED.  

OPEN PLATFORM
    
        Under the Markey/Fields bill, open platform service is designed to
give residential subscribers access to voice, data, and video digital
telephone service on a switched, end-to-end basis.  Information of the
customer's choosing would be transmitted to points specified by the
customer. 

        The bill directs the Federal Communications Commission to
investigate the policy changes needed to provide open platform service at
affordable rates.  To ensure affordability, open platform service would be
tariffed at reasonable rates. 

ENTRY OF TELEPHONE COMPANIES INTO VIDEO CABLE SERVICE

        The bill promotes the entry of telephone companies into video cable
service and seeks to benefit consumers by spurring competition in the local
telephone and cable television industries. The bill envisions that
telephone companies, cable companies, and others will be interconnected and
have equal access to facilities of the local telephone companies.  The bill
would rescind the ban on telephone company ownership and delivery of video
programming that was enacted in the Cable Act of 1984.  Telephone companies
would be allowed to provide video programming, through a separate
subsidiary, to subscribers in its telephone service area. 

        Telephone companies would be required to establish a "video
platform" upon which to offer their video programming.  Telephone
companies, on a nondiscriminatory basis, would be required to allow other
providers to offer video programming to subscribers using the same video
platform.  Other providers would be allowed to use up to 75 percent of the
video platform capacity.  Telephone companies would be prohibited from
buying cable systems within their telephone service territory, with only
tightly drawn exceptions.  The Federal Communications Commission (FCC)
would be required to establish rules for compensating local telephone
companies for providing interconnection and equal access.

UNIVERSAL SERVICE

        To ensure that universal digital services are available to
residential subscribers at affordable rates as local telephone service
becomes more competitive, the Markey/Fields bill would establish a joint
Federal-State Board to perpetuate universal provision of high-quality
telephone service.  The Board would be required to define the nature and
extent of the services encompassed within a telephone company's universal
service obligation.  The Board also would be charged with promoting access
to advanced telecommunications technology.

        The FCC is required to prescribe standards necessary to ensure that
advances in network capabilities and services deployed by common carriers
are designed to be accessible to individuals with disabilities, unless an
undue burden is posed by such requirements.  Additionally, within one year
of enactment, the bill requires the FCC to initiate an inquiry to examine
the effects of competition in the provision of both telephone exchange
access and telephone exchange service furnished by rural carriers.


Mary Beth Arnett
Staff Counsel
Electronic Frontier Foundation
1001 G Street, NW
Suite 950 East
Washington, DC  20001
(202) 347-5400  VOICE
(202) 393-5509  FAX 




-- 
Stanton  McCandlish  mech@eff.org  1:109/1103   EFF  Online  Activist & SysOp
O P E N  P L A T F O R M   C R Y P T O P O L I C Y   O N L I N E  R I G H T S
N  E  T  W  O  R  K  I  N  G      V  I  R  T  U  A  L     C  U  L  T  U  R  E
I   N   F  O :  M   E   M   B   E   R   S   H   I   P  @  E  F  F  .  O  R  G



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Romana Machado <romana@apple.com>
Date: Tue, 23 Nov 93 17:58:04 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Announcing Stego 1.0a2 - Steganography for the Mac
Message-ID: <9311240155.AA10238@apple.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Announcing Stego 1.0a2
The First Steganography Tool For The Macintosh
by Romana Machado of Paradigm Shift Research
11/21/93

What is steganography?

Steganography is a method by which a message can be 
disguised by making it appear to be something else. It derives 
from two Greek roots. "Steg-" means "roof", the same root used 
in "stegosaur", called a "roof lizard" because of the large bony 
plates that decorate its back, and "-graphy" means writing. 
"Steganography" means "roofed", or covert writing.

What is Stego?

Stego is a tool that enables you to embed data in, and retrieve 
data from, Macintosh PICT format files, without changing the 
appearance of the PICT file.  Though its effect is visually 
undetectable, do not expect cryptographic security from Stego.  
Be aware that anyone with a copy of Stego can retrieve your 
data from your PICT file.  Stego  can  be used as an "envelope" 
to hide a _previously encrypted_ data file in a PICT file, 
making it much less likely to be detected.

How does Stego work?

Stego works by slightly altering pixel values.  Every computer 
graphics image is made up of an array of tiny dots of color, 
called pixels.  The color of each pixel is determined by its pixel 
value.  The pixel value is a number.  In a computer, all 
numbers, and all data are expressed by sequences of bits, or 
ones and zeroes.  For example, in an 8 bit computer graphics 
image, each pixel's color is determined by a sequence of 8 bits.  
The first bit in the sequence is called the "most significant bit", 
because it affects the pixel value the most, and the last bit in the 
sequence is called the "least significant bit", because it affects 
the pixel value the least.  Stego hides data by reading your data 
file one bit at a time, and copying each bit to the least 
significant bit of each pixel value as it scans across the image. 

Stego Tips

Stego can hide data in 8, 16, and 32 bit Macintosh PICT files.  
Stego can hide data from the data fork of Macintosh files only.  
If you need to steg something that has resources, use a utility 
like BinHex, or an encryption  or compression utility, to 
convert it to a binary data file first.

Stego Commands

Open... will only display PICT files.  When you select a file, 
Stego displays it with an info window across the top that tells 
you how much data can be stegged into the file.

Steg... becomes enabled when a PICT file is open.  It allows you 
to choose any type of file to steg, and informs you if the file has 
resources, or if it will not fit in the PICT file.

Unsteg...  also becomes enabled when a PICT file is open.  It 
asks you to specify an output file, and unstegs the data in the 
least significant bits of the PICT file.  It will produce an output 
file even if nothing's been previously stegged into the file.

Change File Info...  This function allows you to change the file 
type and creator of any file, and is enabled when no PICT file is 
currently open.  You may need to change the file type and 
creator of your data file back to what they were before your file 
was stegged, because Stego does not save file type and creator.  
The default output file of Stego is a TeachText file, with a file 
type of 'TEXT' and a file creator of 'ttxt', so that if you double-
click on a Stego output file, TeachText will launch and display 
it.  If you're in doubt whether you need this function, you can 
experiment by using the Change File Info... command to look 
at the file type and creator of your data file before you steg 
your data file, then unstegging to an output file,  closing the 
PICT file, and using the Change File Info... command to set the 
file type and creator back to what they were originally.

Good News

I plan to release the code for Stego, but it's not fully groomed 
yet.  In the mean time,it is available on request.  Stego may be 
expanded to handle other image formats, and other digital 
media: audio, video, etc. 

Output file type and creator defaults will be configurable in the 
next release. The next release will be able to steg and unsteg 
PICT resources in Macintosh files. I'd like to hear your 
suggestions for further development of Stego.

I have heard that new versions of PGP are being developed 
that can produce cyphertext that does not have the telltale 
headers and footers attached to the cyphertext, which would 
make cyphertext less detectable when  stegged into a carrier.  
Meanwhile, other encryption methods exist that can produce 
cyphertext that appears to be nothing more than a collection of 
random numbers. This kind of  file is ideal for stegging.

Technical Notes

Stego rasterizes the image, then stegs data into the least 
significant bit (or LSB) of each of the RGB color values. (In the 
case of indexed color, Stego stegs data into the LSB of the index 
values.) The file length of the data file to be stegged is hidden 
in the LSB's of the first 32 steggable bytes. To disguise this 
value somewhat, I take the second to least significant bits of the 
second 32 steggable bytes and XOR these with the 32 bit file 
length, and then steg the XOR'd file length into the LSB's of the 
first 32 steggable bytes.  

Where Can I Get Stego?
Stego is available via anonymous ftp from sumex-
aim.stanford.edu. A text file containing abstracts of all 
available files is available in the info-mac/help/ directory. 
Stego is also available via anonymous ftp from 
soda.berkeley.edu.

Don't Forget!

Stego is shareware. You can help to support further 
development by sending $15.00 or any stegosaur to:

Romana Machado
21090 Grenola Drive
Cupertino, CA 95014


Bugs? Questions?
EMail: romana@apple.com





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: jim@bilbo.suite.com (Jim Miller)
Date: Tue, 23 Nov 93 16:23:03 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: strong crypto => increase in rubber-hose attacks?
Message-ID: <9311240019.AA06621@bilbo.suite.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



I remember seeing a news report a while back that said the number of violent  
car thefts has increased because more people are using sophisticated car alarms  
and/or car tracking devices.

According to the news report, instead of breaking into cars when the owners  
were away, car thieves would wait until the owner shows up and deactivates the  
car alarm.  The thieves then pounce on the owner, killing or severely injuring  
him/her, and take the car.

Regardless of the actually magnitude of this problem (the media would call  
increase of 1 a major new trend) this did get me to thinking.


Assume you use strong crypto to protect your secrets.

Assume a lot of people start using crypto to protect their secrets.

Assume there are people who want to discover these secrets.


Might we some day see an increase in the number physical attacks as bad guys  
resort to rubber-hose methods to get at the keys that protect the secrets?

Don't get me wrong, I'm still in favor of using strong crypto.  I'm just  
wondering about some of the social implications.


Jim_Miller@suite.com





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: ogr@wyvern.wyvern.com (Jason Plank)
Date: Tue, 23 Nov 93 15:43:03 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Crays vs <?>
Message-ID: <m0p27He-0000daC@wyvern.wyvern.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text


	There has been a lot of type of what kind of resources the US (in
particluar the NSA) has in defeating various encryption schemes.  I've read
that they have 100+ Crays scattered throughout the country.
	My question is this, what kind of systems is the "other" side using?
The US has export restrictions on super computers, such as the Cray.  I know
for a fact that the US .gov wouldn't allow the sale of a Cray to India,
because .gov thought that it could be used in the manufacture of weapons.  

-- 
Signature?  I don't need no *stinking* signature!
Confucius say "Clinton Happens"
Touch me for 'the key (2.3)'



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Marc Horowitz <marc@security.ov.com>
Date: Tue, 23 Nov 93 16:28:03 PST
To: Nathan Loofbourrow <loofbour@cis.ohio-state.edu>
Subject: Re: Secure Drive 1.0 is here!
Message-ID: <9311240026.AA10426@dun-dun-noodles.aktis.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


IMHO, the relevant section of the GPL, version 2 -- assuming that this
is the version of the license Mike Ingle intends -- is as follows:

 >   7. If, as a consequence of a court judgment or allegation of patent
 >   .




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Marc Horowitz <marc@security.ov.com>
Date: Tue, 23 Nov 93 16:43:03 PST
To: Nathan Loofbourrow <loofbour@cis.ohio-state.edu>
Subject: Re: Secure Drive 1.0 is here!
Message-ID: <9311240041.AA10436@dun-dun-noodles.aktis.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


(sorry, ignore that last message)

Nathan Loofbourrow <loofbour@cis.ohio-state.edu> writes:

   IMHO, the relevant section of the GPL, version 2 -- assuming that this
   is the version of the license Mike Ingle intends -- is as follows:

    >   7. If, as a consequence of a court judgment or allegation of patent
    >   ....

Um, keep reading:

      8. If the distribution and/or use of the Program is restricted in
    certain countries either by patents or by copyrighted interfaces, the
    original copyright holder who places the Program under this License
    may add an explicit geographical distribution limitation excluding
    those countries, so that distribution is permitted only in or among
    countries not thus excluded.  In such case, this License incorporates
    the limitation as if written in the body of this License.

If you read the GPL carefully, you will notice that it does not
require me to freely redistribute something I put under GPL to anyone.
What it does say is that once I give it to someone, I cannot restrict
what they do with it.  So, if someone wants to export the GPL DES
implementation I write, they can feel free.  But I have no
responsibility when the State Dept comes knocking on their door.

The GPL also requires that if I give you an executable, I must make
source available to you, or to anyone to whom you give the
executeable.  This could be a potential problem.  Programs which use
DES for authentication or integrity but not confidentiality have been
approved for export.  If such a program were distributed under
copyleft, it still couldn't be published outside the US, since the
GPL requires that if I give the executeable to a person (even in
Iraq), that I must give them source if they ask.  The underlying DES
source, since it could be used for confidentiality, would be
export-controlled.  Here, I just incorporate a limitation as in
section 8, restricting distribution to the US only.

So, kpj@sics.se, Mike Ingle's answer to you should be "I'm sorry, but
the Government won't let me give you anything."  This does not violate
any clause of the GPL.  If you think it does, please spell it out; I'm
unable to determine anything.

(Of course, I Am Not A Lawyer.)

		Marc




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Philippe Nave" <pdn@dwroll.dw.att.com>
Date: Tue, 23 Nov 93 20:53:04 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Give me your password- OR ELSE!
In-Reply-To: <9311240019.AA06621@bilbo.suite.com>
Message-ID: <9311240450.AA01367@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Jim Miller writes :
> 
> Assume you use strong crypto to protect your secrets.
> 
> Assume a lot of people start using crypto to protect their secrets.
> 
> Assume there are people who want to discover these secrets.
> 
> 
> Might we some day see an increase in the number physical attacks as bad guys  
> resort to rubber-hose methods to get at the keys that protect the secrets?
> 

I think this phenomenon is more or less inevitable, unless serious thought
is given to a way to prevent it. Let's take a simple example and progress
to a more complex scenario:

If I want your money, I could steal your ATM card and try to deduce the PIN
number (tough), or I could wait in the bushes with a .44 until you use the 
ATM and either steal the money you get out (easy) or convince you to tell me
the PIN number (harder, although a .44 is remarkably persuasive). However,
it's easy for you to lock me out of your accounts by changing the PIN number
the next day - to get continued access to your account, I'd have to get the
PIN number and then kill you (begging your pardon, of course). Even if I did
all that, all I'd have is a bank account. Hardly worth it.

If I want your *life* (metaphorically speaking; your network connections, your
digicash, your 'reputation capital', etc.) and all I have to do to get it is
beat your PGP pass phrase out of you and kill you afterwards, you're in much
more danger. I could lie in wait, get your pass phrase, (ahem) remove the 
evidence, and step into your net.shoes the next day.     

Bottom line: As the value protected by our encryption systems increases, we
must devote more effort to the solution of problems like the thug with the .44
(or the jealous co-worker; insert favorite bogey-man here) who wants our 
password. Key revocation certificates are nice, for example, assuming you are
able to issue one - 'dead men revoke no keys,' however. Duress codes seem 
like a better deal; even though the enemy may kill you after you give him 
a code that (seemingly) works, your 'estate' would be protected. What we
*really* need is a hat trick that makes strong-arm tactics useless - 
any ideas? When the tactic of beating a pass phrase out of a citizen becomes
as stupid as killing for a PIN number, we'll know we've succeeded.

<Shudder>
 
Damn! My coffee's gone cold. I'm off to get a refill- talking about killing
people has given me a definite chill. Not my favorite topic.

........................................................................
Philippe D. Nave, Jr.   | The person who does not use message encryption
pdn@dwroll.dw.att.com   | will soon be at the mercy of those who DO...
Denver, Colorado USA    | PGP public key: by arrangement.



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Carl Ellison <cme@sw.stratus.com>
Date: Tue, 23 Nov 93 19:58:04 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: an exchange on the pem-dev list
Message-ID: <199311240357.WAA08298@ellisun.sw.stratus.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>Message-Id: <199311231010.AA02853@mitsou.inria.fr>
>To: Steve Kent <kent@bbn.com>
>Cc: pem-dev@TIS.COM
>Subject: Re: desire to use multiple keys, at least in RIPEM 
>In-Reply-To: Your message of "Mon, 22 Nov 1993 17:09:30 EST."
>             <9311222207.AA26212@relay.tis.com> 
>Date: Tue, 23 Nov 1993 11:10:11 +0100
>From: Christian Huitema <Christian.Huitema@sophia.inria.fr>
>
>Steve,
>
>The "use two key" version may also be a result of strict cryptographic
>requirement. The services-that-be may well end up only allowing us to use
>relatively short RSA keys for session-key encryption purposes. E.g. if I want
>to send an encrypted message in France to you, I should pick one of your keys
>wich is short enough (say, 256 bits) and use that to pass the session key. I
>can still sign with my 1024 bits RSA key -- signature is not a problem. Our
>local variation of key escrow, I suppose...
>
>Christian Huitema
>


>From cme Tue Nov 23 22:53:11 1993
>To: Christian.Huitema@sophia.inria.fr
>Subject: Re: desire to use multiple keys, at least in RIPEM
>Cc: kent@bbn.com
>
>No need.
>
>I hate to offer aid and comfort to the spies -- but if your gov't had such
>a dumb rule, it could have its own 1024-bit RSA key and you could include it as
>a cc: on all messages.
>
>Oops.  I just realized that your gov't *does* have such a dumb rule.
>
>...time for another Bastile Day?
>
> - Carl
>
>:-|




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "L. Detweiler" <ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Date: Tue, 23 Nov 93 23:29:12 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Pitch Black
Message-ID: <9311240728.AA27483@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Someone, I forget who, recently had some words about pseudoanonymity
here. I (once) deeply respected this person and hoped he could lead me
from my madness with some reassuring words to comfort my anxieties
about pseudospoofing and other deceptions by cypherpunk leadership --
someone who could indicate to me that there was concern over morality
at the topmost level. I realize now that was a totally hopeless,
impossible, futile expectation. The supposedly credible and reputable
person, in response to my concerns about integrity, only further
perpetuated the ad hominem slurs on my sanity and the attacks on my
efforts at honesty. I have nothing but another few K of obfuscations
and disinformation in favor of the Religion of Pseudospoofing, myself
the Foremost Blasphemous Heretic, burned at the stake for my crimes.

All I can do is attempt to stop the oozing blood and untwist the knife
with some final feeble rasps. I am on my Cypherpunk deathbed, with
tears streaming down my face at having had faith and trust in murderous
betrayors. Upon whose hands is my blood?

>  *  Electronic media are no different from paper media in making
>     it possible to use multiple names.  Talk to Mark Twain, Dr.
>     Seuss, Alice Cooper, Poor Richard, Paul French, or Franklin W.
>     Dixon if you don't believe me.  My experience is that references
>     among aliases in literary works are seen as `in-jokes', which only
>     the truly educated (in that particular realm, like science
>     fiction) can notice and chuckle over.

The `entity' asserts that through all my efforts in delineating
deceptive uses of identity, none exist. He equates the manipulation,
propaganda, deception, disinformation, lies, betrayal, treachery, and
brainwashing of tentacles as an `in-joke' that the `truly educated can
notice and chuckle over'. Perhaps the same in-joke that truly
enlightened gang rapists can perpetrate and chuckle over.

>  *  Your examples imply that some of the people on cypherpunks
>     are using pseudonyms to deceive people:
>
>      I think that you mistake an honest advocacy of the right to use
>      multiple names, for an advocacy of deceit.  The main reason to
>      use multiple names is so that your "enemies" cannot correlate
>      your activities so that they can punish you in one part of your
>      life for things they don't like in some other part.

I think we *both* have mistaken an advocacy of deceit for an honest
advocacy of identity, privacy, and anonymity. I think many others are
continuing to be subject to evil depravities unchecked by my wailing
screeches. I think that the topmost leadership in this organization is
not interested in the privacy of honest people, they are interested in
protecting the privacy for criminals, like terrorists, drug dealers,
tax evaders, pedophiles, spies, and traitors. I think they salivate and
have orgasms over the possibility of manipulating honest people with
their reputation embezzments, swindles, doublecrossing, other joyous
crimes for which you are never held accountable. If you are a criminal,
and your `activities' are `correlated' by Police `enemies' with
depravity, God help us all that when the police grab your arm it is not
a writhing severed tentacle, and that you are punished, and if you are
not contrite you are punished without mercy, and that if you commit
crimes like fraud against the trusting, `in one part of your life',
another part of your life called your `freedom' is taken away, as you
ponder your sorry predicament behind cold, unmoving steel bars.

>David Chaum was the first person I noticed advocating the use of a
>different pseudonym for transactions with each different organization.
>(This was automatically done by a smart-card in his design.)  Is he
>part of the evil conspiracy too, or does he have a point worth
>hearing?

David Chaum does not advocate pseudoanonymity, and you are nothing but
an evil liar for suggesting that he does. A Chaumian bank *knows* it is
dealing with a pseudonym. It is OBVIOUSLY PSEUDOONYMOUS. Perhaps you
would like to have Anonymous Contracts, so that when you BREAK ONE the
OPPRESSIVE ORWELLIAN BANK, stupidly thinking it could TRACE YOU, is
CHEATED BY A LIAR. Perhaps you WEEP WITH JOY at the thought of HONEST
PEOPLE ENDLESSLY PAYING for the CRIMES OF SOCIAL PARASITES. If Chaum
had any sense of decency he would STAY THE HELL AWAY FROM CYPHERPUNKS.

Do not look for approval of your perverted Pseudospoofing Religion in
your Revered Science Fiction Authors, your Eminent Cryptographic
Researchers, your Pretty Good Privacy Programmer, because they are
RESPECTABLE and LAW ABIDING and they have the sense to stop LIES and
CORRUPTION and CONSPIRACIES.

>How would *you* turn back the trend toward having every bit
>of information about each person accessible to anyone who knows their
>name, date of birth, fingerprint, license number, license plate,
>vehicle ID number, passport number, genotype, bank account number,
>retina print, credit card number, photo, or social security number?
>Or do you think that this is a *good* thing?

*you* wish to turn back the trend of Civilization that has moved toward
accountability and reduced the ease of cheating honest people from
their money. *you* advocate that *no* identification exist whatsoever,
particularly the kind that prevents criminals from being prosecuted for
their crimes. And you think that this is a *good* thing.

>People are under no obligation to tell you whether the name you know
>them by is their only name --

People are under every obligation to tell the truth in a civilized
society. I choose to live in one. You can have your depraved barbarism.

>By assuming
>that "the right way for things to be" is for everyone to have a single
>name, uniformly used, you have found a conspiracy where there was
>simply a difference of opinion.

By assuming that cypherpunk leadership did not necessarily have
integrity, I have found a conspiracy where there is simply a vacuum of morality.

>I think that your artificial distinction between "pseudonyms" and
>"pseudospoofing" is the root of where your thinking took a wrong turn.

I think your lies and self-deception and associations and defenses of
perverts are the root of where *yours* took a wrong turn. I think, to
the contrary, the `wrong turn in thinking' is the `Movement' that
embraces the flag of Freedom of Speech, Privacy for the Masses, and the
Cryptographic Revolution, only to throw it to the ground, trample,
burn, and urinate upon it when no one is looking. The Cypherpunks
succeed at nothing but hypocrisy and depravity.  Led by a
conspirational clique of squirmy apologists and slimy moral relativists
mindraping the cybervirgins for vicious sport and the positive peer
approval of fellow psychopaths. 

Your hideous criminal clock, your insidious time bomb, is tick-tick-ticking.

Go to hell, Medusa




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "L. Detweiler" <ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Date: Tue, 23 Nov 93 23:48:09 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Apocalypse Now
Message-ID: <9311240747.AA27917@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Hey, I heard about a new mailing list some people here may be
interested in. Pseudospoofers need not apply. (If you do, fair warning,
you will be hunted down...)

===cut=here===


Postings to everyone on the cypherwonks list go to 
cypherwonks@Lists.EUnet.fi.

Commands to the MajorDomo mail server go to <Majordomo@Lists.EUnet.fi>
in the message body. Basic commands are HELP, INFO, SUBSCRIBE, etc.

* * *

The Cypherwonk Charter, by L. Detweiler, Cypherwonk Janitor

The cypherwonks are a splinter group from the cypherpunks also
interested in promoting and implementing cryptographic technology.
However, we have unique ideas on how to successfully implement these
radical new capabilities to ensure privacy without encouraging criminal
behaviors like forgery and `online predation'. We are also interested
in a far more ambitious goal of `technological progress' that
transcends a mere obsession with privacy and anonymity. The cypherwonks
believe that many aspects of a identification and government are
necessary and crucial for any social stability (particularly related to
judicial and law enforcement systems), and are quite alarmed at talk
about a `cryptoanarchy' resulting from the mere implementation of
software protocols -- although we realize that radical new forms of
government may appear with these new technologies, embodied in one term
`Electronic Democracy'.

We believe that while sometimes the `majority' can become a `tyranny',
in general the idea of voting as a civilized way of resolving proposals
and `one person, one vote' are sacred, and we are interested in
implementing systems that promote interaction and collaboration among
motivated and enthusiastic members, whether within the cypherwonk
organization or within their nations (cypherwonks, of course, try to
think free of local prejudices, and globally).

Cypherwonks understand that *trust* and *honesty* are inherent in all
human endeavors, *particularly* communication. We recognize that people
trust others not to reveal our private email unless given permission,
we trust others not to use information from our mail or about their
identities to adverse aims, we trust that systems delivering mail will
not be corrupted by criminals, or if they get caught there will be
serious consequences, and many other explicit and implicit variations.
We know that there are many ingenious ways of minimizing the amount of
trust required in unknown components such as with the use of
cryptography or pseudonyms, and we seek passionately to invent and use
them, but at the root level, email is an exchange between human beings
who trust each other. Therefore, we hold a sense of ethics and morality
in strong reverence, and even though we're not always precisely sure
what they entail, we know that they exist and we strive for the right
ideal. We abhor the idea that `it's not wrong if you can get away with
it' or other variations of moral relativism. We also subscribe to the
idea that if you breach ethics, you should be prepared to forfeit some 
rights, like your `right to privacy'.

Cypherwonks are also extremely interested in promoting and implementing
`digital cash', but believe that while invariably the state's taxes
tend to become burdensome, few civilized, technological societies are
free of them, and certainly we do not advocate tax evasion, `black
marketeering', or any other subversive or illegal activities through
cryptographic techniques, and even beyond this we seek design protocols
that discourage these subversive aims in general, because of their
toxic, fragmentary effect on social unity.

Cypherwonks recognize that our mailing list is extremely critical in
coordinating our movement and our fellow members. It is our central
nervous system. While the list is informal, we demand a professional
atmosphere, and will privately object to people who are publicly rude
or belligerent. But we are also extremely careful about what we say to
each other in private, because people can be extremely influenced by
what they receive in mail. We would be aghast and horrified to find
that somebody viciously criticized someone in private mail based on
public postings, for example. We place high value on being courteous to
each other and minimizing disagreement where possible, forging
consensus, and the art of diplomacy in surmounting political barriers.
We trust each other on the list and in personal email. We wish to have
an open, uplifting, inspiring, honest, representative, polite,
respectful, egalitarian dialogue. We will never use the mailing list
for personal or selfish reasons -- we strive to serve our fellow
cypherwonks through our postings. We are what we claim to be. We abhor
secrecy, `security through obscurity', and conspirational cliques.

Cypherwonks are extremely interested in promoting some forms of
anonymity. However, we do not necessarily believe that others are
required to read anonymous postings. To the contrary, we believe that
the individual should have the tools and freedom to filter his or her
own mail based on real identities. In particular, we condemn the
practice of `pseudospoofing,' the dangerous deception where a person
builds up a pseudonym and misrepresents it as being that of a real
person's identity. We police each other on the list to prevent it, and
require a promise that our members refrain from it. While our trust can
be betrayed, only those that are honest are true cypherwonks, and
anyone who betrays our trust we consider a dishonest hypocrite, or worse, 
a traitor.

Cypherwonks are extremely interested in building tangible systems.
Engineers who love to discuss the nitty-gritty details of some scheme
are at home on the cypherwonks list. We like to impress each other with
our knowledge but at the same time state it in relevant and humble
terms. We are not trying to win popularity contests with our postings.
We are trying to accomplish ambitious endeavors. We are especially
ecstatic to make connections with other cypherwonks interested in the
same projects we are, and cooperating to build useful tools. We like to
give status reports of our intermittent real-world meetings and
progress to other cypherwonks. We do this to inspire and encourage
others, not to assuage our egos or flaunt our power. We recognize that
this is the true spirit of the Internet embodies in the volunteerism
that build the impressive RFC and FAQ repositories. In fact, we are
very fond of writing RFCs and FAQs. We keep track of all the things we
have accomplished, and are very proud of this group resume, and delight
in adding new items.

The Cypherwonks are more inclusive than exclusive. We try to
accommodate the interests of others. We consider it a high crime to
`flame newbies'. In fact, we go out of our way to encourage greet new
members with smiles in email. We especially like to have reporters on
the list, and treat them like royalty. But we also make sure that no
one is hogging the spotlight. We try to match up reporters with
different people on the list. Some people are naturally `leaders',
particularly the list moderator J. Helsingius, but in general we don't
lionize or deify anyone. The greatest cypherwonk is always the last
person who posted the most interesting, relevant, and useful article.

While we thrive on the Internet, and greatly admire the system, we also
realize the structure of the Internet is evolving and growing. We tend
to distrust `authorities' regulating the Internet, but at the same time
we recognize that the Internet exists and is popular because of a
strong community feeling with a `netiquette' that places a strong taboo
on things like censorship, cracking, and pseudospoofing and a strong
interest in individual effort and innovation.  In short, we are
interested in `civilizing cyberspace' with the powerful new
technological tools like cryptography and digital cash that are
available but unimplemented. We believe that the current Internet is a
bit raw and untamed in places, like a frontier, and just a `glimmer in
the eye' of future cyberspace, and we seek to smooth out the rough
spots, build elaborate and hospitable castles to live in, and invite
all of humanity here to join us for a party. 

(In case you are wondering, the word `wonk' is slang for a `meticulous 
detail person'.)

* * *

The Cypherwonk Code of Ethics (Including Pseudospoofing and Privacy)
By L. Detweiler, Cypherwonk janitor

Cypherwonks owe no courtesy to someone who forfeits any expectation of
respect from atrocious misbehavior. This is as simple as the maxim, 
if you are a criminal you forfeit your `rights' in a civilized society.

If you mailbomb a cypherwonk, you have forfeited your `right to 
privacy'. 

If you email a cypherwonk's postmaster or colleagues in an attempt to 
censor or intimidate a cypherwonk, especially before consulting that
cypherwonk, but not necessarily, you have forfeited your `right to 
privacy'. 

If you lie to a cypherwonk, you have forfeited your `right to privacy'. 

If you fail to adequately respond to personal accusations of impropriety 
or criminality, especially meeting them with evasion or stonewalling, you 
have forfeited your `right to privacy'.

If you have ever sent a cypherwonk mail under a pseudoanonymous identity, 
you have forfeited your `right to privacy' -- under ALL your pseudonyms 
and identities. 

If you advocate violations of ethical or legal behavior to a cypherwonk, 
you forfeit your `right to privacy'.

Cypherwonks, even highly reputable ones, may attempt to shame you into
embarrassment or repentance for violations of ethical behavior by 
ridiculing you in front of people who appear to be your friends and 
community, if all other measures have failed. In extreme cases, even 
this may be ineffective, but if you have no shame, you have no humanity.

* * *

List topics (not exhaustive)

-Projects (secure phones, etc.)
-Cryptographic techniques (RSA etc.)
-Anonymity
-International news events in privacy/anonymity
-Identity issues such as databases and pseudospoofing
-Clipper
-real world meetings (others and our own)
-etc.

Posting guidelines: we wish to minimize the number of postings to the
list so as to attract the busy, influential people that get things done. Please 
refine your postings highly. We especially appreciate the consolodation
of topics with summaries, `tables of contents', headings, etc. where
appropriate. At all times, we seek to build consensus and look down on
grouchy postings that do nothing but criticize. The list should be 
regarded as a stepping stone to `getting things done' or `resolving 
conflicts' in email.

* * *

The Cypherwonk Resume

J. Helsingius has built the most popular and global anonymity server on 
the Internet, with thousands of active users daily.

L. Detweiler has compiled a wide variety of FAQs on Internet subjects.

(updates to ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu)

* * *

Most Wanted List

- key servers that are dedicated only to `true identities'. People who 
submit their keys promise the keys are that of their real identities and 
that no one else will ever post under their identities. Penalty is 
public exposure and stigma if caught. The protocols might also include
mechanisms for `challenges' and `resolutions'.

- reputation based mailing list software. One idea: people rate each other's
postings in different categories. Server tracks everyone's ratings. People
can screen mail based on accrued credit.

- electronic democracy software (especially tied to reputations). 
protocols for propositions, resolutions, voting, etc.

- other identity servers to prevent pseudospoofing. possibly hooking up 
with existing government databases.

- pseudonymity servers like anon.penet.fi with public key encryption.

- support of the Bunyip project for automated Internet resource 
tracking, including mailing lists.

- support for distributed hypertext systems and protocols like XMosaic.

- resume & reputation servers. a very premature idea, but these would 
help track people's accomplishments and reputations in different forums,
perhaps even by cross indexing their postings.

(additions to ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu)

* * *

Cypherwonks of Note (Reporters, take note!)
(apply to ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu)

J. Helsingius
Operator, anon.penet.fi, first widespread reliable anonymous remailer
in popular use on the Internet

L. Detweiler
Privacy & Anonymity FAQ, Anonymity FAQ, Whistleblowing FAQ






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Christopher Kotze <kotze1@batis.bis.und.ac.za>
Date: Tue, 23 Nov 93 21:53:29 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Lockit v 3.01 is here.
Message-ID: <9311240553.AA02649@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text


Well, After seeing the article on Secure Drive version 1.0, I decided to
inform the world that Lockit v 3.01 is here at last. I know this, because I
finished it yesterday. It is also a hard disk locking program, except that
it boots before DOS, and it has this truly wonderful way on hanging
debuggers that trace the boot up sequence. After having Broken 5th
Generations DiskLock (tm)  I discovered several ways to encrypt executable
code, (although they did not employ any such routines => consequently it was
an easy program to break).

Well, I'll keep ya posted.

Cheers 
   Chris.

****** Assembler for President ****** 



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Brian D Williams <talon57@well.sf.ca.us>
Date: Wed, 24 Nov 93 09:09:26 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: ANNOUNCEMENT: Markey Bill debuts in house.
Message-ID: <199311241708.JAA11687@well.sf.ca.us>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



The opinions expressed are my own and do not represent the views of
Ameritech or any of its alliance partners.




 So, Markey proposes a bill that would "allow" the RBOC's to do
video.....


       Markey likes it....


                              The EFF likes it......


 I wouldn't invest a dime in a proposal that stupid.....


     not interested..........




Brian Williams 




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: dmandl@lehman.com (David Mandl)
Date: Wed, 24 Nov 93 06:38:46 PST
To: Jim_Miller@suite.com
Subject: Re: strong crypto => increase in rubber-hose attacks?
Message-ID: <9311241437.AA07209@disvnm2.lehman.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> From: jim@bilbo.suite.com (Jim Miller)
> 
> Assume you use strong crypto to protect your secrets.
> 
> Assume a lot of people start using crypto to protect their secrets.
> 
> Assume there are people who want to discover these secrets.
> 
> Might we some day see an increase in the number physical attacks as bad guys  
> resort to rubber-hose methods to get at the keys that protect the secrets?

Maybe.

This doesn't change the need for strong crypto, though.  It's a lot easier
to simply intercept someone's (unencrypted) electronic mail from the comfort
of your home/office than to send thugs over to her house to kneecap her.
Why make it easier for them than we have to?

The people who I consider to be the bad guys (governments, corporations)
don't have the time or resources to use physical violence against all of their
enemies, though of course they do use it against some.  It's also bad PR (in
the USSR, this wouldn't have stopped them, of course).  So if the ONLY means
available to the forces of evil were physical attacks, I wouldn't worry too
much.  Not that physical attacks are pleasant, mind you, but that threat can
be addressed separately (as some folks have on this last have done in the last
few days).

It's also easier for us and harder for them if they're visible.

   --Dave.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: nate@VIS.ColoState.EDU (CVL staff member Nate Sammons)
Date: Wed, 24 Nov 93 09:18:16 PST
To: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Subject: Re: Crays vs <?>
In-Reply-To: <199311232356.PAA14433@mail.netcom.com>
Message-ID: <9311241717.AA12821@vangogh.VIS.ColoState.EDU>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----


writes Timothy C. May:
>
>On a more serious note, strong crypto will allow "foreigners" to send
>computing jobs to sites nearly anywhere in the world and have them run
>on compute servers. So much for export controls on the physical
>hardware!
>

I tend to disagree strongly with this statement.  The physical export of
supercomputers will still be controlled, although it may be relaxed.  I think
that supercomputers have been technically raised to 2000 MFLOPS, but that's
another story.  Getting time on crays, CMs, Paragons, KSRs, nCubes, whatever
is not extremely difficult, but it's pretty improbable that you'll get time
on the new Cray EL at the Pittsburg Supercomputing Center if you're a 
scientist living in North Korea (for example).  I suppose it's possible that
some very rich person (new, fully configured Cray T3D computers are $75M!)
you could set up a Center that took digicash for CPU time... not really
probable considering the upkeep on a Cray.

Anyway, I don't see the unrestricted use of true supercomputers in the 
near future... very powerful desktop/deskside machines are another
story.  (afterall, if you buy up a bunck of 2GFLOP machines (not considered
supercomputers for export) and string them together adequately, that's a hell
of a machine!)

- -nate

- -- 
+-----------------------------------------------------------------------+
| Nate Sammons  nate@VIS.ColoState.Edu  (303) 491-1578                  |
|   Colorado State University -- Computer Visualization Laboratory      |
+-----------------------------------------------------------------------+



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: an12070@anon.penet.fi (The Executioner)
Date: Wed, 24 Nov 93 02:28:09 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: tick, tick, tick, ...
Message-ID: <9311241026.AA09985@anon.penet.fi>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



TIME'S UP
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
To find out more about the anon service, send mail to help@anon.penet.fi.
Due to the double-blind, any mail replies to this message will be anonymized,
and an anonymous id will be allocated automatically. You have been warned.
Please report any problems, inappropriate use etc. to admin@anon.penet.fi.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: owen@autodesk.com (D. Owen Rowley)
Date: Wed, 24 Nov 93 12:03:18 PST
To: pdn@dwroll.dw.att.com
Subject: Re: Give me your password- OR ELSE!
Message-ID: <9311241849.AA03229@lux.YP.acad>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


 > From: "Philippe Nave" <pdn@dwroll.dw.att.com>
 > Jim Miller writes :
 > > 
 > > Assume you use strong crypto to protect your secrets.
 > > Assume a lot of people start using crypto to protect their secrets.
 > > Assume there are people who want to discover these secrets.
 
 > > Might we some day see an increase in the number physical attacks as bad guys  
 > > resort to rubber-hose methods to get at the keys that protect the secrets?
 
 > I think this phenomenon is more or less inevitable, unless serious thought
 > is given to a way to prevent it. Let's take a simple example and progress
 > to a more complex scenario:
(Interesting examples deleted)

One can think up all sorts of hypothetical scenes.

Underneath it all however, I believe is a simple axiom.

When prevention methods thwart a criminals intent, they find new methods.

Car alarms and security systems didn't convince the criminals who make their
living ripping off cars that the *Good ole days were over* and it was time
to get a  job at Burger Sri, it spurred them to find new methods to ply
their trade.
Beyond that it didn't bother them to up the ante regarding the level of 
violence they would utilise.


Now extrapolate that into the concept of industrial espionage, 
white collar crime, and 
put everyone on the same wire.
!!!!!

LUX ./. owen




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: henry strickland <strick@osc.versant.com>
Date: Wed, 24 Nov 93 10:58:18 PST
To: sameer@uclink.berkeley.edu
Subject: Re: <8c> C-source for diffie-hellman?
In-Reply-To: <m0p15mc-000J6eC@infinity.hip.berkeley.edu>
Message-ID: <9311241857.AA24005@osc.versant.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


# 	I was just talking with a friend, and I think it would be
# pretty good for medium-level security on irc to hack up something do
# that /dcc does diffie-hellman key exchange, and maybe triple-des or
# something.
# 	Is there some available C-source which would help? (I guess I
# should get the Schneier book.. But urgh! $50 on a "starving-student"
# budget is quite a bit.)

DH itself is a trivial algorithm.  All you need is a decent
multiple precsion math package.    I think all it takes is
	-- random numbers
	-- primality test
	-- gcd
	-- raise-to-power-modulo-some-number

There's lots of Multiple Precision libraries availble.
The Gnu 'gmp' is more than sufficient.  Also des is very
easy to ftp.  See the cypherpunks ftp site at 
	ftp://soda.berkeley.edu/pub/cypherpunks/
for pointers.

					strick


BTW, schneier is literally a FAQ for cypherpunks.  
Fantastic book.  Cough up the money for it...




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Brian D Williams <talon57@well.sf.ca.us>
Date: Wed, 24 Nov 93 11:13:18 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: holiday
Message-ID: <199311241910.LAA11564@well.sf.ca.us>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



 Just want to wish everyone a safe and happy holiday.
Party on!

Brian Williams




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Alan (Miburi-san) Wexelblat" <wex@media.mit.edu>
Date: Wed, 24 Nov 93 08:19:27 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Give me your password- OR ELSE!
In-Reply-To: <9311240450.AA01367@toad.com>
Message-ID: <9311241618.AA11764@media.mit.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


It seems like it would be relatively simple to program in a sort of dead-man
switch at the time of creation of the secret key.  As with other double-pass
systems, use of the second phrase works once, but either/both sends a silent
alarm and changes the passphrase to get the secret key.  If you want to get
fancy, you might even program in a script that, on activation of the 2nd
"duress" phrase would run around re-encrypting everything with a second
private key.

As you can imagine, there are increasing levels of personal security you
might employ.  For example, using the duress phrase might be set up to
change the pass-phrase to something *you* don't know but which is known by a
trusted other party (wife, mother, agent/lawyer, etc.).  Knowing this phrase
doesn't help them since that phrase can't access your secret until *after*
you've given the duress phrase and the software has disabled your normal
access phrase.

Depends how paranoid you want to be and how valuable your data is, I
guess...

--Alan Wexelblat, Reality Hacker, Author, and Cyberspace Bard
Media Lab - Advanced Human Interface Group	wex@media.mit.edu
Voice: 617-258-9168, Pager: 617-945-1842	PUBLIC KEY available by request
"To pleasure!" "To passion!" "To paradise!" "To pain!" "Tonight!"




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Date: Wed, 24 Nov 93 12:58:52 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Threats from Detweiler
Message-ID: <199311242058.MAA28362@mail.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>Brian D Williams writes:
> >  Just want to wish everyone a safe and happy holiday.
> > Party on!
>
>Party?  PARTY?!?  How the heck am I supposed to RELAX and ENJOY myself
>when we're all here just WAITING for the FINAL JUDGEMENT to fall on
>our TENTACLES?!?  I'm a BASKET CASE!
>
>--
>Mike McNally


I said I wouldn't comment further on Detweiler unless and until something
changed and new information came to light.

Folks, this is the time to really take care of yourself. "The Executioner"
announced the "time's up" and that more drastic measures are about to
occur. "an12070@anon.penet.fi" is beyond any doubt Larry Detweiler. Many
other folks have posted analyses of why this is so: the use of TeX quotes,
the same vocabulary, the same agenda (against TENTACLES of the MEDUSA), and
even the same arrival times of messages (I get my death threats from S.
Boxx and The Executioner every night around 10 p.m. to midnight, the same
time as Detweiler's rants appear).

I take him seriously. He's deranged. A lot more than just slightly
neurotic, he's transitioned into insanity. His religious rants ("You will
be hung by the neck until dead and then sent to Hell"), his death threats,
his wailings and moanings....not a lot of doubt that he's psychotic.

Me, I'm keeping my guns loaded in case he decides to drive out to
California and end his misery by "cutting off the Tentacles," as he keeps
threatening to do.I consider this unlikely, though. Too far to drive when
he's got closer targets.

The "Colorado Tentacles" should be especially careful, I think. Phil
Zimmermann is currently back on Larry's good side (I quote: "Phil is God"),
but this may not last long. (Hint: Phil Z. was not at all happy with
Larry's rant about Tentacles and his quoting of Phil's comments at that
Colorado talk he gave. If Larry discovers this, as he surely will, Phil may
be back in the boat with the rest of us Spawns of Satan.)

I don't think I'm being alarmist in advising you all to watch out for this guy. 

--Tim

P.S. As long as I'm on the subject, let me again say that I'm not sending
Detweiler any messages at all. I don't know if he's really getting
anonymous messages ("pseudospoofers"), but if he is, they're not from me.
And they never have been.

John Gilmore wrote a very reasonable piece, addressing Detweiler's source
of confusion, and has since been flamed and ranted against. Typical.

And now I'll fall silent on this matter until something new happens. I just
hope it isn't a "Texas Tower" sort of violent encounter. If you've got a
gun, now's the time to make sure it's handy. If you don't have a gun,
consider getting one.

--TCM

--
Timothy C. May         | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,  
tcmay@netcom.com       | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
408-688-5409           | knowledge, reputations, information markets, 
W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA  | black markets, collapse of governments.
Higher Power: 2^756839 | Public Key: by arrangement
Note: I put time and money into writing this posting. I hope you enjoy it.      








From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Arthur Chandler <arthurc@crl.com>
Date: Wed, 24 Nov 93 13:03:52 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: holiday
In-Reply-To: <9311242006.AA15910@vail.tivoli.com>
Message-ID: <Pine.3.87.9311241245.A6661-0100000@crl.crl.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


  Here is the secret to understanding everything. It also contains the 
TRUE identity of Dark Unicorn, S.Boxx, and in fact everyone on the list. 
Unfortunately, it is encrypted in an unbelievably complex algorithm based 
on the factoring of infinity. Well, here it is. Crack it if you can!

                              ,+*^^*+___+++_ 
                        ,*^^^^              ) 
                     _+*                     ^**+_ 
                   +^       _ _++*+_+++_,         ) 
       _+^^*+_    (     ,+*^ ^          \+_        ) 
      {       )  (    ,(    ,_+--+--,      ^)      ^\ 
     { (@)    } f   ,(  ,+-^ __*_*_  ^^\_   ^\       ) 
    {:;-/    (_+*-+^^^^^+*+*<_ _++_)_    )    )      / 
   ( /  (    (        ,___    ^*+_+* )   <    <      \ 
    U _/     )    *--<  ) ^\-----++__)   )    )       ) 
     (      )  _(^)^^))  )  )\^^^^^))^*+/    /       / 
   (      /  (_))_^)) )  )  ))^^^^^))^^^)__/     +^^ 
  (     ,/    (^))^))  )  ) ))^^^^^^^))^^)       _) 
   *+__+*       (_))^)  ) ) ))^^^^^^))^^^^^)____*^ 
   \             \_)^)_)) ))^^^^^^^^^^))^^^^) 
    (_             ^\__^^^^^^^^^^^^))^^^^^^^) 
      ^\___            ^\__^^^^^^))^^^^^^^^)\\ 
           ^^^^^\uuu/^^\uuu/^^^^\^\^\^\^\^\^\^\ 
             ___) >____) >___   ^\_\_\_\_\_\_\) 
             ^^^//\\_^^//\\_^       ^(\_\_\_\) 
               ^^^ ^^ ^^^ ^^ 







From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: szabo@netcom.com (Nick Szabo)
Date: Wed, 24 Nov 93 13:15:24 PST
To: pdn@dwroll.dw.att.com (Philippe Nave)
Subject: Re: Give me your password- OR ELSE!
In-Reply-To: <9311240450.AA01367@toad.com>
Message-ID: <199311242115.NAA01943@mail.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Philippe Nave:
> As the value protected by our encryption systems increases, we
> must devote more effort to the solution of problems like the thug...

Distributed pass phrases have been mentioned, as have distress codes 
and dead-man switches.  Along with distributed pass phrases I'd add
distributed keys with M-out-of-N voting, for valuable shared data
(eg corporate data, family bank account).  Other options include:

	* steganography and foiling traffic analysis: don't let the
	thugs know you have valuable encrypted data in the first
	place.
	* multiple keys with multiple (easy to remember!) pass
	phrases. We use different keys for our house, car, safes, etc.
	as well as different passwords for different accounts,
	and this will likely be also true for our encryption
	strategies.  For example, it's a good idea to encrypt
	files on one's disk with a different key than one
	uses to receive e-mail.

The ability to choose high-entropy but easy to rememember pass
phrases is an interesting art.  One strategy  is to pick
short pass phrases with high entropy (eg by requiring mixed cases, 
letters+numbers, etc.)  PGP allows one to pick a long phrase, 
easier to remember, with less entropy per character but more total entropy.
I despise the current situation where I have to choose a bunch of
difficult to remember alphanumeric codes for different kinds of
accounts, ATM access, etc.

Nick Szabo					szabo@netcom.com




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: karn@qualcomm.com (Phil Karn)
Date: Wed, 24 Nov 93 13:19:30 PST
To: owen@autodesk.com
Subject: Give me your password- OR ELSE!
In-Reply-To: <9311241849.AA03229@lux.YP.acad>
Message-ID: <199311242118.NAA17299@servo>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>Car alarms and security systems didn't convince the criminals who make their
>living ripping off cars that the *Good ole days were over* and it was time
>to get a  job at Burger Sri, it spurred them to find new methods to ply
>their trade.

How do you know this? Clearly some crooks may have just moved to more
violent methods, but it's quite probable that others moved off to
other fields where it's easier to make a buck, either legal or
illegal.

Although widely deployed strong cryptography may well cause an
increase in violent, rubber-hose cryptanalysis, this technique is
likely to be useful only for stored encrypted records and for
encrypted communications whose protocols are not secure against this
type of attack, e.g., PGP encrypted email.

But much better protocols exist where online two-way communication is
possible, e.g., signed Diffie-Hellman key exchange, with periodic
automatic rekeying. Once you rekey in such a system, no amount of
rubber hosing will obtain prior session keys; they're gone even to the
participants.

And even if you rubber-hose one of the participants into revealing the
RSA key he uses to sign his DH exchanges, this will only let you
masquerade as him in future conversations. In order to tap his future
conversations surreptitiously, you'd have to rubberhose him without
his knowledge, or hypnotize him into forgetting the incident. I'd say
this is difficult. More so than secretly hacking the machine he uses
to capture his secrets. Once again, it comes down to some level of
physical security, at least while the machine is in actual use.

Phil




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Jef Poskanzer <jef@ee.lbl.gov>
Date: Wed, 24 Nov 93 13:48:19 PST
To: Arthur Chandler <arthurc@crl.com>
Subject: Re: holiday
Message-ID: <9311242145.AA05314@ace.ee.lbl.gov>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>  Here is the secret to understanding everything. It also contains the 
>TRUE identity of Dark Unicorn, S.Boxx, and in fact everyone on the list. 
>Unfortunately, it is encrypted in an unbelievably complex algorithm based 
>on the factoring of infinity. Well, here it is. Crack it if you can!

Since infinity is the product of all numbers, it was fairly easy
to factor.  Decrypted text appended.
---
Jef

  o&#&o.                 ____   ___o\_
 d|   "9,            ?H##""'`"'""'`""`"&o.
,M     |b__o=q\    .d*" ___.       ,==\\`Ho.
H|      `""  J*  .,MT ,H$odH?     dH#DqHD `&?.
M|         ,&' .dM*'  +R96]#P     `HMbHP    `9b.
Mi       .HP .#HP'     `""""'                 `9#.
M|       |H' HH                                 `H,
`b       H| dP                              #    `H,
 H      |M JM        .o                     9HdH  |b
|M.     |L MT     ,o,HP                     M|     M_
 M.      M M|      ""HM.  ,.            .&"#HH     MM
 H'      T.HH        `Mb &#?|            `\.JM     M#
 H|      |b|M         `Hb.^d|            .,d#'    ,H
 T|       9L*b.         `M##o______oood#&9H"     dH'
 |M       `HL`H?.        `H/H&$$??????o/?&'    dM*
 |M.       `Hb ?M#b_      `*&$P#MMMM#*$/*'   ,H#'
  Mb         HHH? `*Mb.      `"#H###d*''   ,MP'
  MM.        ?H'     "HHb\               .##"
  TMb      .dP'        `"#MHbooooooooodHHM
   *M|   ,#H'               ""TM"'""""'  *M|
    MH,.oH'                  .d|         .M|
    |MMH'                   .H*          HP
     TH,                   ,H'         .dP'




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: m5@vail.tivoli.com (Mike McNally)
Date: Wed, 24 Nov 93 12:08:18 PST
To: Brian D Williams <talon57@well.sf.ca.us>
Subject: holiday
In-Reply-To: <199311241910.LAA11564@well.sf.ca.us>
Message-ID: <9311242006.AA15910@vail.tivoli.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Brian D Williams writes:
 >  Just want to wish everyone a safe and happy holiday.
 > Party on!

Party?  PARTY?!?  How the heck am I supposed to RELAX and ENJOY myself
when we're all here just WAITING for the FINAL JUDGEMENT to fall on
our TENTACLES?!?  I'm a BASKET CASE!

--
Mike McNally




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: smb@research.att.com
Date: Wed, 24 Nov 93 11:23:17 PST
To: henry strickland <strick@osc.versant.com>
Subject: Re: <8c> C-source for diffie-hellman?
Message-ID: <9311241920.AA14514@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


	 DH itself is a trivial algorithm.  All you need is a decent
	 multiple precsion math package.    I think all it takes is
	 	-- random numbers
	 	-- primality test
	 	-- gcd
	 	-- raise-to-power-modulo-some-number

One more thing -- you want the base for the exponentiations to be
a generator of the subgroup.  Also, ideally the modulus should be
a prime of the form kp+1, where p is also a prime and k is a small
integer.  Your DH toolkit should include routines to generate the
base and modulus according to those criteria.

	 BTW, schneier is literally a FAQ for cypherpunks.  
	 Fantastic book.  Cough up the money for it...

Indeed, though I've only seen some drafts; my copy of the book itself
hasn't arrived yet.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: nate@VIS.ColoState.EDU (CVL staff member Nate Sammons)
Date: Wed, 24 Nov 93 14:13:52 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com (Cypherpunks Mailing List)
Subject: Pseudospoofing, LD, life, the universe, and everything
Message-ID: <9311242209.AA13036@vangogh.VIS.ColoState.EDU>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----



Cypherpunks,

I thought that the infamous L. Detweiler had stopped his posting, but it
appears that he is back, and more neurotic than ever.  I thought that
it was the time for me to make another post relating to him, the list
in general, and LD's obsession with pseudospoofing.

OK, first, LD is pissing me off, as, I am sure, he is doing to many others
out there in net.land.  His raves are nothing if not persistant and ever
increasingly long.  I, being the founding member of the Colorado Cypherpunks,
am not particularly prowd of him being affiliated with the group.  I don't
hate him, as some of teh others on this list apparently do, I just think he
is a very persistant pest, a fly in the ointment.  I think it is important
to remember that in every movement there are fanatics, and in the best of
intentions are those who would do harm while trying to crusade the good.
I believe that Detweiler is one such person.

He is experiencing some very serious problems with what he believes to be
a concerted effort by some devilish cabal to warp and mung his brain
through the rampant use of pseudospoofing.  OK, fine if he believes that,
I cannot keep him from thinking that some of us are emmisaries of Satan.
I can, however, wish that he would leave me the hell alone and stop posting
these long, drawn-out core dumps of his mangled psyche.  I can ask him to
stop his madness, though I know that it will only get me on his bad side,
and possibly put me in physical danger (since I live in his vicinity, lucky
me).  I think that's enough on Detweiler himself, and I hope I don't have to
talk about him anymore.

On to pseudospoofing.  I think that it exists, and that it's denial is 
just plain naive.  The world is a non-friendly place, and there are 
dangers out there, and people who will exploit every aspect of the system
to trick, decieve, and mangle others.  This should not come as a shock to 
anyone on the list, since we are generally on (or close to) the cutting 
edge of new technologies and methods to use those technologies.  I, 
myself have never participated in any kind of conspiracy with intent
to confuse, nor have i ever posted under a name other than my own,
and my anon.penet.fi identity.  I have not posted as anyone that I am not,
and have no intention to do so.  I do not, however, object to the use of
these technologies, or to the act of pseudospoofing.  It cannot hope to
be prevented, since there are always people out there who will figure out
how to exploit the system to do their bidding.

Yes, it's true, I am coming out in favor of pseudospoofing.  I do not object to
it's use, on the premise that it cannot be stopped, and it rarely does hard,
aside from those (LD) whose minds are bent by the mere thought that it is
happening.

Enough of that.  Now onto the list.  I put some serious thought into
dropping from the list for the past week or so, and I have decided _not_
to leave bacause sometime there are bits of information that I get
from the list that are simply not available anywhere else.  Some of the 
members of the list are, however, pissing me off.  The list has degraded
from a band of freedom fighters with things they cared about in jeopardy
to a bunch of fucking children bickering over the most pathetic of things.
I hope that the recent barrage of postings is not indicative of what is 
to come.  If it is, then I may just reconsider and leave.

I think that's all I have to say for now... I just wanted to let people
know what I was thinking, and set the record straight if there are 
any members who think I am still on LD's side (which I was for quite
some time).

Thanks,

- -nate

+-----------------------------------------------------------------------+
| Nate Sammons  nate@VIS.ColoState.Edu  (303) 491-1578                  |
|   Colorado State University -- Computer Visualization Laboratory      |
+-----------------------------------------------------------------------+



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: owen@autodesk.com (D. Owen Rowley)
Date: Wed, 24 Nov 93 18:43:22 PST
To: karn@qualcomm.com
Subject: Re: Give me your password- OR ELSE!
Message-ID: <9311250200.AA04695@lux.YP.acad>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



 > > From: karn@qualcomm.com (Phil Karn)
  > >Car alarms and security systems didn't convince the criminals who make their
 > >living ripping off cars that the *Good ole days were over* and it was time
 > >to get a  job at Burger Sri, it spurred them to find new methods to ply
 > >their trade.
 
 > How do you know this? Clearly some crooks may have just moved to more
 > violent methods, but it's quite probable that others moved off to
 > other fields where it's easier to make a buck, either legal or
 > illegal.

Watch the nightly news or if you want to be really anal about it look up 
statistics about the increase in violent carjacking.
Walk down the street in any San Francisco neighborhood, and count the piles 
of tempered glass that used to be car windows.

So OK, you don't have a criminal mind, and it makes sense to you
that it might be a good time to go legit, but let me offer you my
sincere advice not to move into a bad neighborhood, you are at a natural 
disadvantage.

 > Although widely deployed strong cryptography may well cause an
 > increase in violent, rubber-hose cryptanalysis, this technique is
 > likely to be useful only for stored encrypted records and for
 > encrypted communications whose protocols are not secure against this
 > type of attack, e.g., PGP encrypted email.

tightly focused linear thinkers are perfect targets for criminally minded
predators, they are assured that you will leave them a wide arena from
which to operate undetected.

 > 
 > But much better protocols exist where online two-way communication is
 > possible, e.g., signed Diffie-Hellman key exchange, with periodic
 > automatic rekeying. Once you rekey in such a system, no amount of
 > rubber hosing will obtain prior session keys; they're gone even to the
 > participants.


Recently a Cash machine was installed in a building which I frequent.
It was placed 10 feet inside a plate glass window, and has easy access
for a small truck to drive up and haul it away. It even has wheels.

I noted that this presented a danger to those of us who were in the building
late at night, since it was apparently so vulnerable.

I was concerned that the unarmed security guard was a sitting duck,
and perhaps target practice, for theives intent on driving through the window 
and quickly hauling the whole shebang away.

The cash machine installer informed me that the unit had a cel phone and GPS
that would call and give its location if tampered with, but he didn't have
an answer when I remarked that this would be littel comfort to anyone
shot or injured by thieves unaware of this factor.

and please don't tell me that posting signs telling would-be criminals
about these security precautions will do any good.
They won't.

 > And even if you rubber-hose one of the participants into revealing the
 > RSA key he uses to sign his DH exchanges, this will only let you
 > masquerade as him in future conversations. In order to tap his future
 > conversations surreptitiously, you'd have to rubberhose him without
 > his knowledge, or hypnotize him into forgetting the incident. I'd say
 > this is difficult. More so than secretly hacking the machine he uses
 > to capture his secrets. Once again, it comes down to some level of
 > physical security, at least while the machine is in actual use.
 
You are making an error if you think that any locks keep out anything
but honest people.

Necesity is the mother of invention.

The point is that these issues are not linear, when implemented in real
world situations you must consider the real world implications and 
provide real world solutions.

LUX ./. owen




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Jef Poskanzer <jef@ee.lbl.gov>
Date: Wed, 24 Nov 93 19:13:23 PST
To: owen@autodesk.com (D. Owen Rowley)
Subject: Re: Give me your password- OR ELSE!
Message-ID: <9311250313.AA06253@ace.ee.lbl.gov>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>Watch the nightly news or if you want to be really anal about it look up 
>statistics about the increase in violent carjacking.

Actually, I did that.  Turns out the supposed increase that got all the
media attention was solely due to the SFPD establishing a new statistical
category.  The actual number of incidents has not changed significantly.
---
Jef




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: analyst@netcom.com (Benjamin McLemore)
Date: Thu, 25 Nov 93 00:03:24 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: 900 MHz Cordless question
Message-ID: <199311250803.AAA19259@mail.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Catching up on my reading the other day, I noticed an article in the
Economist about Cincinnati Microwave's 900 Mhz cordless phone. It seems
that Cylink makes the actual chip that is used in the phone to do the
spread-spectrum communications. My questions to the readers of this list
are:

1: Given that Cylink was one of the two original companies to manufacture
Clipper hardware, what does this say about the protocols that are used in
this spread-spectrum chip? Was it designed to be easy for law enforcement
to crack?

2: Of the digital 900 Mhz telephones available, are any of the phones
better from a security standpoint than any of the others? Are they all
using different protocols or the same?

Enquiring minds want to know!

Thanks.

---------------------------------------------------------------------------
--
Benjamin McLemore
analyst@netcom.com
214/522.7640 fax




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "L. Detweiler" <ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Date: Wed, 24 Nov 93 23:13:24 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: The History of Cypherpunks
Message-ID: <9311250709.AA28957@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Mr. N.Sammons, esteemed Founder of Colorado Cypherpunk Chapter, kindly
sent me a message he apparently posted to cypherpunks commenting on the
`neurotic L.Detweiler' and my `obsession with pseudospoofing' who is
`pissing me off' and is not `particularly prowd' [sic] of me `being
affiliated with the group.' All of this is a rather clever distortion
of reality apparently designed to ingratiate Mr. N.Sammons with the CA
Conspiracy Clique. Mr. Sammons, I have no idea why you want to throw in
your lot with the psychopunks (esp. given they all appear to be
centered in CA), but far be it for me to stand in your way.

The most serious distortions, considering my own mental state, however,
I must address. I have been subject to dozens of accusations of mental
instability over the past few weeks from fanatic CA cypherpunks bent on
silencing me in very reprehensible ways, such as exerting pressure
through my postmaster, mailbombs, employer, and higher administrators
in the University. I must credit the eminent Cypherpunks
E.Hughes,T.C.May,P.Metzger, and D.Barnes for their glorious atrocities.
Also, just recently Mr. Gilmore suggests that these efforts amount to
`doing me a favor' by `asking people at my university to come talk to
me' by `people who think you are becoming unstable.' The truth is that
I have made their own corruptions and lies increasingly unstable. The
Psychopunk revisionist history appears to have reached a climax in Mr.
Sammons' latest note:

>He is experiencing some very serious problems with what he believes to be
>a concerted effort by some devilish cabal to warp and mung his brain
>through the rampant use of pseudospoofing.  OK, fine if he believes that,
>I cannot keep him from thinking that some of us are emmisaries of Satan.
>I can, however, wish that he would leave me the hell alone and stop posting
>these long, drawn-out core dumps of his mangled psyche.

This is all nothing but BLACK DISINFORMATION typical of the
brainwashing of CA cypherpunks. (Reminds me of D.Barnes, the `stellar
hypocrite', telling another cypherpunk that his majestic L.D. blackmail
fishing expedition were not an invasion of privacy but a simple
psychopunk demonstration of how much sensitive personal information
about people is vulnerable to exposure. bastard.)

Mr. Sammons, the only thing that has propelled me over several weeks of
postings to Cypherpunks and elsewhere (e.g. RISKS) is the hope that
some Cypherpunk leader would crack and admit to their systematic
efforts in systematic, conspirational cyberspatial deception in
pseudospoofing. There has never been any other issue, and to call me
insane for accusing the leadership of pseudospoofing is like telling
Galileo he is a heretic for saying the earth revolves around the Sun.

The top leadership has cloaked their effort to develop the cult
religion of pseudospoofing in the guise of `privacy for the masses' and
the `cryptographic revolution'. `pseudospoofing' and `pseudopools' are
the core aspects of their perverted religion. They *have* a secret
mailing list hidden from the public used to promote subversions and the
CA Conspiracy. They have written customized software for pseudospoofing
and style analysis for cyberspatial warfare across many lists. They
have built up an extensive international infrastructure of sites and
public access internet accounts for manipulation of the public through
the mailing list and elsewhere. They have corrupted DNS and SMTP
software. They have infiltrated many sensitive lists, such as `internet
mercantile protocols' and CERT lists, and derailed discussions with
public and private sabotage, and stolen sensitive confidential
information. They have molested me and many others (e.g. G.Spafford and
other well-meaning cypherpunk list subscribers) with their numerous
tentacles in my private mailbox, even after I publicly requested they
stop. Virtually all of these various harassments were over project
proposals on the list by `outsiders' (such as the Whistleblowing
newsgroup, the disk stacker encryption program) that rubbed them the
wrong way for some capricious whim. They love to post effusive messages
from tentacles congratulating themselves on their vacuous achievments,
and attacks on others who have accomplished anything substantial. They
love to post subtle disinformation that cloaks their future aims and
past depravities. They have deceived the respectable media like NYT and
Wired in dark, atrocious ways, and revel in it. And they would rather
censor me by inflaming those above me at my site into revoking my
Internet account, with completely deceptive complaints about my
`deranged' postings, than confess their depravities in front of their
loyal, marching, brainwashed, braindead sycophants, who still think
that J.Dinkelacker and N.Szabo are real people. And they blame the
ashes of their arson on the lone firefighter.

I assure you, psychopunks, this is *not* a comprehensive list! These
are only some of the *cyberspatial* crimes!

Your eminent leaders would rather brand or drive a man into an insane
pariah than admit the truth, an investigation they cower cowardly in
fear and attack as Terrorizing McCarthyist WitchHunt Inquisition, which
for them it is. This is all that drives me in posting here, is the hope
that everyone  sane and honest still listening will have the sense to
get the hell out of here. Cypherpunks, your `leaders' are nothing but
cyberspatial psychopaths. 

None will escape culpability for complicity. It's only a matter of
timing at this point! 

tick, tick, tick ...




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Jim Hart <hart@chaos.bsu.edu>
Date: Wed, 24 Nov 93 21:13:23 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Tax Havens on the Net
Message-ID: <199311250609.AAA01325@chaos.bsu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text



---------------------
Tax Havens on the Net
---------------------
compiled by James R. Hart

sources:
Internet Connectivity List -- Larry Landweber, U.Wisc.
	ftp.cs.wisc.edu ../connectivity_table   Version 9, 
	August 1993
Hoyt L. Barber, _Tax Havens_, McGraw-Hill 1993

Codes used to  indicate sites in each country with access to 
the Global Multiprotocol Open Internet:

BITNET
b: minimal, one to five domestic BITNET sites
B: widespread, more than five domestic BITNET sites

IP INTERNET
I: = operational, accesible from entire IP Internet
i: = operational, not accesible via the NSFNET backbone

UUCP 
u: minimal, one to five domestic UUCP sites
U: widespread, more than five domestic UUCP sites

FIDONET
f: minimal, one to five domestic FIDONET sites
F: widespread, more than five domestic FIDONET sites

OSI
o: minimal, one to five domestic X.400 sites
O: widespread, more than five domestic X.400 sites          

------------------------
and without further ado:
------------------------

Aruba
net access: ---f-
languages: Papiamento, English, Dutch, Spanish
currency controls: none?
bank secrecy: moderate (numbered accounts not 
	permitted)
preferred legal entities: Aruba Exempt Company, 
	NV (Dutch legal tradition, bearer shares allowed)
taxes: no income tax on AEC or shareholders, no 
	witholding of any kind
tax treaties: none?

Austria
net access: BIOUFO
language: German
currency controls: ??
bank secrecy: good; numbered accounts available
preferred legal entities: limited liability company, stock 
	orporation
taxes: corporate tax.  no bank interest tax.  20% divident 
	ax.
tax treaties: many, OECD model, primarily personal and 
	orporate income
contact: Price Waterhouse, Austria

Barbados
net access: --u--
language: English
currency controls: some (none for offshore banks & 
	nsurance)
preferred legal entities: company, public company, 
	offshore bank, exempt  insurance 
	company, foreign sales corporation , 
	international business company
taxes: income tax offshore banks and international 
	business companies 2.5%, exempt insurance  
	companies and foreign sales corporations none
tax treaties: double-tax treaties with 5 major countries (incl. 
	U.K. & U.S.)

Bermuda
net access: --uf--
language:  English
currency controls: none for nonresidents
bank secrecy:  moderate
preferred legal entities:
                local (conduct business in Bermuda, must be 60% 
		Bermuda owned),
	exempt (only conducts business outside 	
		Bermuda)
		-- min. capitalization US$12,000	
		-- extensive background check on the 
		    principles
taxes: no income, profit, sales, value added, witholding, or 
	capital gains taxes
tax treaties:  no double-tax treaties.  U.S. can be provided
	 with tax information concerning civil & criminal 
	tax cases

Costa Rica
net access: bIuf-
language: Spanish
currency controls: only on local currency, applies only to 
	citizens or legal entities
bank secrecy: good
legal entities: 
	individual enterprise/limited liability
	collective company
	limited partnership	
	limited-liability company
	stock corporation (aka chartered company): most 
	common
taxes: 15% on dividents for some nonresident 
shareholders, moderate corporate
	income, payroll, imort, real estate taxes.  
Exporters exempt from most
	taxes.
tax treaties: no double-tax treaties.  Caribbean Basin 
Initiative exchange-of-information
	agreeement signed but not yet ratified (as of 1/93).

Hong Kong
net access: BI-F-
languages: Cantonese, English
currency controls: none
bank secrecy: moderate?
preferred legal entity: limited-liability corporation 
	(English common law Companies Ordinance) 
taxes: 16.5% domestic source corporate  income, 15% 
	domestic employment wages, 15%  on domestic 
	property rental income	
tax treaties: no double-tax agreements
n.b.: treaty to return Hong Kong to Communist China in 
	1997

Ireland	
net access: BIUFO
language: English
currency controls: none?
bank secrecy: moderate?
preferred legal entity: noresident company (private 
corporation w/limited liability,
	must conduct operations outside Ireland)
taxes: only on Irish operations
tax treaties: many double-tax treaties
n.b.: those with Irish grandparents can obtain second 
	citizenship

Leichtenstein
net access: ---f-
languages: German, Alemanni
currency controls: none
bank secrecy: excellent
preferred legal entities: allows any type found anywhere 
in the world (!)
	establishment (limited liability, unlimited duration)
	company limited by shares
	foundations and trusts 
taxes:  none for income outside Leichtenstein.  Net worth 
	tax of 0.01% on capital and reserves (min. 1,000 
	Swiss francs), local  resident taxes
tax treaties: not party directly or indirectly to any 
	exchange-of-information agreements
	double-tax treaty exists only with Austria
n.b.: bankers won't assist law enforcement officials with 
	drug, fraud, theft, or tax investigations.  They 
	might assist in money laundering and insider
	trading investigations, informing the customer 
	first.

Luxembourg
net access: bIUFO
languages: Letzeburgesh, French, German, English
bank secrecy: moderate
preferred legal entity: holding company
taxes: holding companies pays only 10% registration fee 
on issued shares and
	0.20% annual capital tax on issued capital bonds.
tax treaties: many double-tax treaties
n.b.: EC member

Malta
net access: --u--
languages: Maltese, English
currency controls: none
bank secrecy: good
preferred legal entities: offshore notrading, trading, 
banking (overseas, subsidiary, local), insurance, trusts
taxes: nontrading exempt, trading very low
tax treties: many double-tax treaties	
n.b.: EC member

Netherlands
net access: BIUFO
language: Dutch
currency controls: ??
bank secrecy: poor
preferred legal entities: private or public NV (can have 
	bearer shares)
taxes: complex, high (many loopholes for large offshore 
	companies)
tax treaties: many

Panama
net access: b-uFO
languages: Spanish, English
curency controls:  none
bank secrecy: good; numbered accounts permissable
preferred legal entity:  corporation
taxes: none on income generated outside Panama
tax treaties: only on shipping income

Singapore
net access: bIuF-
languages: Malay, Mandarin, Tamil, English
currency controls: none
bank secrecy: moderate; numbered accounts available
preferred legal entities: private limited company
taxes: none  on dividends, foreign deposit interest, or 
income derived from
	outside Singapore. 	
tax treaties: many	

Switzerland
net access: BIUFO
languages: French, German, Italian, Romansch
currency controls: none
bank secrecy: moderate to good; numbered accounts 
	available 
preferred legal entity: AG (stock company under Laws of 
	Obligation)
taxes: 3.6-9.8% worldwide income tax for operating 
companies, 35% 
	witholding tax on interest and dividends
tax treaties: many double-tax treaties

Vanuata
net access: --u--
languages: Melanesian, French, English
currency controls: none
bank secrecy: moderate?
preferred legal entities: holding, trading, agency, mgmt. 
service, contracting
taxes: no income or capital gains taxes
tax treaties: none

Western Samoa
net access: --u--
languages: Samoan, English
currency controls: none
bank secrecy: good
preferred legal entities: international company, offshore 
	bank, insurance company
taxes: none for companies under offshore acts
tax treaties: none

If you like having this information, let me know.  Also let 
me know  what other kinds of information you need on tax 
havens and net access; I'd love to be of service.  If you 
have corrections to or additional information for the Tax 
Havens on the Net list, I'd be  happy to add it with full  
attribution (or full privacy, as you prefer).   To preserve 
your privacy, feel free to use anonymous remailers and 
encryption.  My PGP key enclosed below.

James R. Hart			hart@chaos.bsu.edu

-----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----
Version: 2.2

mQCNAiz0Br4AAAEEAJohFjXdkx6i2Mq6nJXdJN+VGupeKwuu1SAiRvsBK7TQ1ajY
d3wEFohbwaHGn3iq7A1//koipvzE5S/C6pPxIAHFeoYOUzeI/cWmh6vsuaF3/lVm
K9lx/L7PyaF8rvd4FOmLqkvs1xk/24S9ZQaBb3cjhLV571NaiPCIc3SPJUKXAAUT
tCJKYW1lcyBSLiBIYXJ0IDxoYXJ0QGNoYW9zLmJzdS5lZHU+
=z2UE
-----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: cman@caffeine.io.com (Douglas Barnes)
Date: Wed, 24 Nov 93 23:53:24 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: The History of Cypherpunks
In-Reply-To: <9311250709.AA28957@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Message-ID: <199311250738.BAA18279@caffeine.caffeine.io.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain




Barnes's Law:

The longer and louder someone accuses his associates of conspiring
against him, the greater the odds of their forming just such a
conspiracy. 

-- 
----------------                                             /\ 
Douglas Barnes            cman@illuminati.io.com            /  \ 
Chief Wizard         (512) 447-8950 (d), 447-7866 (v)      / () \
Illuminati Online          metaverse.io.com 7777          /______\



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: kkirksey@world.std.com (Ken B Kirksey)
Date: Thu, 25 Nov 93 08:55:31 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Secure Wipe
Message-ID: <199311251654.AA02153@world.std.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Hola all,

I've just started working on a good Mac implementation of IDEA, but I
need a little more info on something.  I've got more info on IDEA than
I know what to do with, but I've yet to find any good references on doing
a secure wipe to remove the plaintext file from the hard disk.  Can anyone
point me to some good refs on the topic?  Many thanks...


                             Ken





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: kkirksey@world.std.com (Ken B Kirksey)
Date: Thu, 25 Nov 93 08:58:22 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: strong crypto => increase in rubber-hose attacks?
Message-ID: <199311251654.AA02170@world.std.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



>Assume you use strong crypto to protect your secrets.
>
>Assume a lot of people start using crypto to protect their secrets.
>
>Assume there are people who want to discover these secrets.
>
>
>Might we some day see an increase in the number physical attacks as bad guys  
>resort to rubber-hose methods to get at the keys that protect the secrets?

Now Jim, you wouldn't be implying that our big warm fuzzy government would
EVER resort to using methods like that on it's own citizens, would
you? :-)  Not possible, unless you count Waco, Ruby Ridge, Ken Ballew,
John Lawmaster, no-knock search warrants, ad infinitum...

Seriously, I think you may be right, although physical security has always
seemed to me to be the weakest link in any crypto chain.  All I can say
is that scenarios such as you envision simply point out the wisdom of
always going armed.  Or did I read to much Heinlein when I was a kid? :-)


                                Ken

=============================================================================
Ken Kirksey            kkirksey@world.std.com            Mac Guru & Developer
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
Among the many misdeeds of the British rule in India, history will look upon
the act of depriving a whole nation of arms, as the blackest.
                                                            - Mahatma Ghandi




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: kkirksey@world.std.com (Ken B Kirksey)
Date: Thu, 25 Nov 93 08:58:35 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: PC Based One-Time Pad
Message-ID: <199311251654.AA02190@world.std.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



While I was reading though _Applied Cryptography_ last night, a thought
struck me (no damage):  Why hasn't anyone come up with a good Mac or PC based
One-Time Pad system.  I'd envision it working something like this:

   * A 1.4 Meg floppy with a single file, or multiple files, of random bits.
     2 copies, one for sender and one for reciever.

   * The first few bytes of the cyphertext file will contain the name of
     the pad file used, possibly the volume name where the pad file is
     stored, and the starting offset within the pad file.

It seems like this would be a fairly easy system to implement, but since
no one (to my knowledge) has yet done so, there must be something I'm
missing. :-)  Secure distribution and storage of the pad disk could be
difficult, but not insurmountable. The only hurdle that comes to mind is that
filling a 1.4 meg floppy, or even a 700k floppy, with a sequence of TRULY
random bits might be difficult and/or very time consuming.  Any thoughts?


                                Ken

=============================================================================
Ken Kirksey            kkirksey@world.std.com            Mac Guru & Developer
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
Among the many misdeeds of the British rule in India, history will look upon
the act of depriving a whole nation of arms, as the blackest.
                                                            - Mahatma Ghandi




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: kkirksey@world.std.com (Ken B Kirksey)
Date: Thu, 25 Nov 93 08:56:56 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Schneier's _Applied Cryptography_
Message-ID: <199311251654.AA02228@world.std.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



>BTW, schneier is literally a FAQ for cypherpunks.  
>Fantastic book.  Cough up the money for it...

I'll second that motion!  Waldenbooks just got my copy of _Applied
Cryptography_ in yesterday, and I've pretty much had that book in
my hands every minute I've been awake since.  Definitely required reading.


                          Ken

=============================================================================
Ken Kirksey            kkirksey@world.std.com            Mac Guru & Developer
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
Among the many misdeeds of the British rule in India, history will look upon
the act of depriving a whole nation of arms, as the blackest.
                                                            - Mahatma Ghandi




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: remail@tamsun.tamu.edu
Date: Thu, 25 Nov 93 12:28:38 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Electronic commerce conference
Message-ID: <9311252026.AA17760@tamsun.tamu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


WORLDWIDE ELECTRONIC COMMERCE:
      Law, Policy and Controls Conference
 
****************Program Details****************
 
 
Dear Colleague:
 
Our world is getting smaller.  Electronic Data
Interchange (EDI), Electronic Mail (E-Mail) and other
computer-based technologies (that collectively support
Electronic Commerce) are drawing individuals and
organizations closer together.  However, these exciting
developments also present significant challenges.
Corresponding audit, controls, legal, policy and security
issues pose potentially serious barriers to the rapid
adoption and extensive use of Electronic Commerce.
 
Worldwide Electronic Commerce will address the
implementation and control issues inherent in applying
Electronic Commerce to today's environment.  The
answers provided at this conference will address current
problems as well as provide a foundation for dealing
with these complex issues in the future.   We have been
fortunate to have secured an unusually qualified and
internationally recognized faculty to share their
experience, knowledge and theories on the wide range of
issues identified in this brochure.  We are equally
pleased to have obtained a distinguished group of
organizations who, in affiliation with this conference,
are lending their considerable support.
 
Please join us at this unique and ground breaking event
which will be held on January 16-18, 1994 in New York
City at the Waldorf-Astoria Hotel.
 
Michael S. Baum, Esq., Conference Chair
M. Todd Ostrander, Conference Co-Chair
 
 
WORLDWIDE ELECTRONIC COMMERCE
CONFERENCE PUT ON IN AFFILIATION WITH:
--------------------------------------
American Bar Association,
Section of Science & Technology
 
Centre for Commercial Law Studies,
University of London
 
Computer Law Association
 
EDI Association of the United Kingdom
 
EDP Auditors Association
 
Harvard Law School
 
John F. Kennedy School of Government,
Harvard University
 
National Institute of Standards and Technology
 
U.S. Council for International Business
 
Data Interchange Standards Association
 
Healthcare EDI Corporation
 
International Union of Latin Notaries
 
 
CONFERENCE AT A GLANCE
----------------------
SUNDAY, JANUARY 16TH - Registration 17:00 - 20:00
-------------------------------------------------
PRE-CONFERENCE TUTORIALS: 18:00 - 19:30
* Electronic Trade Overview for Beginners
* Security and Audit Overview
* A General Counsel's Perspective on Electronic Trade
* Electronic Commerce Policy and Regulation 101
 
 
MONDAY, JANUARY 17TH - Registration 7:00 - 18:00
------------------------------------------------
 
OPENING PLENARY: 8:00 - 8:50
 
SESSION 1: 9:00 - 10:20
* Will Legislation Keep Up with Electronic Trade?
* Anatomy of a Model EDI Audit Program
* Will Privacy Requirements Inhibit Electronic
  Commerce?
* Clearing Houses and Electronic Commerce
 
SESSION 2: 10:30 - 11:50
* U.S. Efforts in Coordinating Electronic Commerce
  Standards Policy
* How to Audit a Third Party/Value Added Network
* What is Cost Effective Commercially Reasonable
  Security?
* Anticompetitive Restraints on Trade in Electronic
  Commerce
 
LUNCH 12:00 - 13:30
 
SESSION 3: 13:30 - 14:50
* Trading Partner and Business Agreements in
  Electronic Commerce
* Electronic Negotiability - What Scares the EDI Users
  Away?
* INFOSEC Standards Coordination and Interworking
* Time/Date Stamping - Options and Constraints
 
SESSION 4: 15:00 - 16:20
* United Nations Electronic Commerce Initiatives
* Directory control Issues in Electronic Messaging and
  EDI
* Comparing Critical Cryptographic Algorithms and
  Standards
* Financial Clearing Houses - a Foundation for EDI?
 
SESSION 5: 16:30 - 17:50
* Model Electronic Payments Agreements
* What to Save, When to Save It, and For How Long
* Do "Smart Cards" Provide an "Ultimate" Control
  Solution?
* The "FAST" Initiative - Business Trust in the
  Computer Era?
 
TUESDAY, JANUARY 18TH - Registration 7:00 - 12:00
-------------------------------------------------
SESSION 6: 8:00 - 9:20
* Negotiating Electronic Trade Agreements
* Back-Up, Archival and Contingency Planning Services
* Security Policy in a Global Information Environment
* Electronic Software Distribution (ESD) - a Pandora's
  Box?
 
SESSION 7: 9:30 - 10:50
* Value Added Networks and Interconnect Agreements
* Do Criminal Laws Really Protect Electronic
  Commerce?
* Digital and Electronic Signatures and the Law
* Accreditation and Certification - the New Frontier?
 
SESSION 8: 11:00 - 12:50
* The ICC Electronic Commerce Initiatives
* Admitting, Proving and Enforcing EDI Transactions
* Re-engineering the Tax Filing Process
* EDI Insurance - the Next Control Approach?
 
LUNCH: 12:00 - 13:30
 
SESSION 9: 14:00 - 15:20
* Central and Eastern European Electronic Trade
* The Role and Future of Notaries in Computer-Based
  Commerce
* Will Healthcare Reform Profoundly Reshape EDI Law,
  Policy, and Controls?
* The Uses of Escrow in Electronic Commerce
 
SESSION 10: 15:30 - 16:50
* Who Owns the Standards, Functionality and Systems?
* Risk Analysis in Electronic Trade
* Judicial EDI
* EDI Translation Software Control and Legal
  Considerations
 
 
CONFERENCE PROGRAMMING COMMITTEE:
---------------------------------
Robert Barger, Esq., Section of Science and Technology,
American Bar Association
 
Michael S. Baum, Esq., Independent Monitoring,
Conference Chair
 
Susan Caldwell, Executive Director, EDP Auditors
Association
 
Rachel Foerster and Garren Hagemeier, Healthcare
EDI Corporation
 
Mark L. Gordon, Esq., Computer Law Association
 
Jerry Mechling, Ph.D. and Tom Fletcher,Ph.D.,
Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University
 
Mario Miccoli, Natariat, Unione Internazionale Del
Notariato Latino
 
Professor Charles R. Nesson, Harvard Law School
 
M. Todd Ostrander, EDI Program Manager,
Egghead Software, Conference Co-Chair
 
Chris Reed, Esq. and Ian Walden, Ph.D., Centre for
Commercial Law Studies, University of London
 
Peter Robinson and Bruce Wilson, U.S. Council for
International Business
 
Roy Saltman, National Institute of Standards and
Technology
 
In Memory of the Late Professor Donald Trautman,
Harvard Law School
 
 
SUNDAY, JANUARY 16TH:
PRE-CONFERENCE TUTORIAL EVENING SESSIONS
----------------------------------------
The following tutorials provide newcomers to electronic
trade with an overview of the concepts, technologies,
and business practices that will make the conference
more meaningful. These pre-conference sessions are
scheduled from 18:00 - 19:30, January 16th, so that they
will not interfere with the regular conference sessions.
 
ELECTRONIC TRADE OVERVIEW FOR BEGINNERS
An overview of "Electronic Trade" and how it applies to
the business environment of the '90's & the 21st century.
You will learn about the history and state of electronic
commerce, including EDI, E-Mail, and other enabling
computer-based trade technologies and the components
necessary to implement these technologies successfully
in your industry.  Additionally, this session will provide
an overview of electronic commerce-relevant aspects of
the American National Standards Institute (ANSI),
United Nations/EDI for Administration, Commerce and
Trade (UN/EDIFACT) and International Standards
Organization (ISO) standards development processes,
how they affect you, and  important differences that
multi-national companies will likely encounter while
implementing them.
 
SECURITY AND AUDIT OVERVIEW
 
The basic control structures and security guidelines for
an electronic trade program including cryptographic and
non-cryptographic controls will be discussed in this
tutorial session.  This session also provides the 'non-
auditor' with a description of the unique characteristics
of auditing in an electronic trade environment and an
understanding of how auditors must contribute to the
electronic commerce environment.
 
A GENERAL COUNSEL'S PERSPECTIVE ON ELECTRONIC TRADE
Corporate counsel are increasingly called upon to
respond quickly and effectively to the demands of
accelerating electronic trade implementation programs.
Veteran corporate counsel will summarize the critical
responsive actions they have taken, and provide
perspectives on how they navigated and climbed the
electronic commerce learning curve. This session will
provide the electronic commerce neophyte general
counsel with helpful hints for making the most of the
conference.
 
ELECTRONIC COMMERCE POLICY AND REGULATION 101
The policy and regulatory issues affecting electronic
commerce continue to grow without an end in sight. As a
primer for an enriching Worldwide Electronic
Commerce conference, this session identifies and
explains the critical policy and regulatory building
blocks (and road blocks) that electronic commerce
professionals simply cannot avoid. It also surveys  the
"tools" that are used in policy development and
implementation. This session provides a useful
foundation for many of the policy-oriented sessions.
 
MONDAY, JANUARY 17TH MORNING SESSIONS
-------------------------------------
SESSION 1: 9:00 - 10:20
-----------------------
1. WILL LEGISLATION KEEP UP WITH ELECTRONIC TRADE?
Viewpoints of law reform experts on the development of
diverse topics of possible legislation affecting
electronic commerce will be presented. Current and proposed
legislation from around the globe will be presented and
considered for its practicality and likelihood of
impacting electronic commerce.
 
2. ANATOMY OF A MODEL EDI AUDIT PROGRAM
More and more organizations are designing and
implementing enterprise-wide EDI and electronic
commerce systems. Audit standards, guidelines and
practices are in the process of responding to the need for
EDP and MIS systems auditors to have a detailed
understanding of the requirements for auditing EDI
systems. This session will outline the EDI systems audit
requirements and provide an overview of the ASC X12
Model Audit Program currently under development.
Experienced auditors will walk you through the results of
their years of experimentation and implementation and
explain an effective and practical audit program that you
can implement.
 
3. WILL PRIVACY REQUIREMENTS INHIBIT ELECTRONIC 
COMMERCE?
How does personal data communicated among trading
partners and/or the government, particularly in open
systems environments, create barriers to business
transactions? Data protection is a frontier for electronic
commerce.  This session will distinguish privacy and
confidentiality and discuss methods to protect companies
from the risks associated with the improper disclosure of
telecommunicated personal data. It will also consider the
economic, privacy or national security requirements and
restrictions imposed by governments, and their impact
on electronic commerce. Various laws and directives,
including the EC's proposed directive concerning the
protection of individuals in relation to the processing of
personal data will be identified and considered in
conjunction with charting a viable approach for
implementation.
 
4. CLEARING HOUSES AND ELECTRONIC COMMERCE
Clearing houses provide administrative, legal and
technical infrastructure which support various computer-
based commercial trading services to bolster the
reliability and enforceability of electronic transaction
records, reduce legal uncertainty, and generally facili-
tate electronic trade. The scope of implemented clearing
house services depends upon available technology, legal
and security requirements, potential liability, the
availability of insurance, and, of course, business needs
and costs. Clearing house services also extend well
beyond "traditional" clearing house functions to provide
broad-based support as a trusted entity. This session will
detail how clearing houses affect electronic commerce
controls and security.
 
SESSION 2: 10:30 - 11:50
------------------------
1. US EFFORTS IN COORDINATING ELECTRONIC COMMERCE
STANDARDS POLICY
U.S. public and private sector planning for global
electronic commerce requires coordination of the various
standards supporting electronic commerce, and
developing and presenting comprehensive U.S. positions
in the various international standards setting fora. This
panel will present proposals for improving such
coordination and charting a path forward, and provide an
expert's view on the future. The session will also address
the relevant implications of the recently released report
of the National Performance Review and endorse
initiatives that will potentially catalyze national and
international electronic commerce reform for years to
come. Will these initiatives be successful and how will
they impact business?
 
2. HOW TO AUDIT A THIRD PARTY/VALUE ADDED NETWORK
This session addresses the 'how to' of conducting audits
of third party service providers including third party
claims clearing houses. What is needed to obtain
clearance to conduct an audit? What questions are
appropriate during the audit? Who should participate in
such an audit? The impact of diverse relevant auditing
standards and guidelines, including those of the IIA, the
AICPA's SAS 70 and other relevant materials will be
discussed.
 
3. WHAT IS COST EFFECTIVE COMMERCIALLY REASONABLE
SECURITY?
How much security is required in an electronic trade
relationship? What is commercially acceptable and must
commercially reasonable security be cost effective
security? Experts will provide useful guidance on this
very difficult issue.
 
4. ANTICOMPETITIVE RESTRAINTS ON TRADE IN ELECTRONIC
COMMERCE
This session will identify and provide approaches
concerning three important and frequently asked
questions: Can we force our trading partners to trade
electronically, or can we be forced to do so? Can we be
forced to use particular VANs, or one of a limited
number of specified VANs? Can we charge (or be
charged) a premium for failing to trade electronically?
Antitrust counsel and electronic trade professionals will
provide their perspectives.
 
 
MONDAY, JANUARY 17TH AFTERNOON SESSIONS
---------------------------------------
 
SESSION 3: 13:30 - 14:50
------------------------
1. TRADING PARTNER AND BUSINESS AGREEMENTS IN
ELECTRONIC COMMERCE
This session will present case studies that illustrate how
trading partner agreements (agreements among parties to
electronic trade transactions) have been implemented by
industry and government to facilitate electronic trade.
Agreements that accommodate sales, services and other
types of electronic commerce will be treated. The
session will consider approaches to modifying model
agreements, accommodating scaling and automating
computer-based contracting mechanisms. Various model
agreements, including the soon-to-be released
European/TEDIS agreement will be addressed.
 
2. ELECTRONIC NEGOTIABILITY - WHAT SCARES THE EDI USERS
AWAY?
Few EDI issues cause such angst in the EDI community
as the issue of negotiability under EDI - whether it is for
securities, bills of lading, letters of credit, or any other
device that depends upon paper to transfer things of
value. Is it the horrendous legal pitfalls that EDI
negotiability presents as some would claim? Or is it that
last vestige of paper that we all are reluctant to let go
of, that causes us to hesitate before committing ourselves
to an all EDI world of commerce? The history of and
current efforts to develop electronic mechanisms in
substitution for paper-based documents of title will be
examined during this session. The panel will address the
major initiatives intended to substitute or accommodate
negotiable and nonnegotiable documents of title in
electronic form, and will explore possible solutions.
 
3. INFOSEC STANDARDS - POLICY, COORDINATION AND
INTERWORKING
This panel will deal with current and future policy on
information security standardization at the international,
regional and national levels, in particular, with regard to
information security standards as they apply to electronic
trade and commerce. It will also share thoughts and
perspectives concerning future standards direction, work
programs, interworking, and coordination.
 
4. TIME/DATE STAMPING - OPTIONS AND CONSTRAINTS
Time and date stamping of computer-based transactions
is increasingly recognized as being critical to
nonrepudiation, effective public key certificate and
certificate revocation management, and EDI in general.
This session will survey the technology, implementations
and legal requirements for time and date stamping and
consider the extent to which trusted entities are needed
to implement time and date stamping procedures and
devices, as well as the implications of electronic rather
than human time stamping.
 
SESSION 4: 15:00 - 16:20
------------------------
1. UNITED NATIONS ELECTRONIC COMMERCE INITIATIVES
This session surveys and opines on some of the UN's
legal initiatives in support of electronic commerce. UN
representatives to both predecessor and current activities
will share their viewpoints on legal developments,
relationships to other international organizations and will
describe their visions for the future.
 
2. DIRECTORY CONTROL ISSUES IN ELECTRONIC MESSAGING 
AND
EDI
This session presents an overview of the audit and
security capabilities and legal implications of
international messaging and directory standards and
recommendations, including X.400, X.435, and X.500.
Industry experts will describe how they have
implemented these standards and addressed the security
issues surrounding their use. Directory-based trading
partner information, including security credentials, is
increasingly indispensable for electronic commerce.
However, privacy, ownership, use, revenue and accuracy
of directory information remain compelling challenges.
The session will also examine directory models, explore
the critical issues and present a path forward.
 
3. COMPARING CRITICAL CRYPTOGRAPHIC ALGORITHMS AND
STANDARDS
How do I know you are who you say you are? Inventors,
visionaries  and pioneer algorithm standards developers
will discuss how cryptographic techniques have been
developed and standardized to address the authentication
of business documents. The practical application of such
technologies and their integration into small, medium
and large business systems will provide an indispensable
road map for improved business processes and reduced
legal and control risks.
 
4. FINANCIAL CLEARING HOUSE RULES - A FOUNDATION FOR
EDI?
Major funds transfer clearing houses (such as the ACH,
CHIPS, Fedwire) have developed highly sophisticated
rules that address the apportionment of liability among
users, financial institutions and the clearing house. As
clearing houses and other trusted third parties provide
various assurances to the trading public, these clearing
house rules and procedures deserve close attention. A
panel of the counsel and commentators to the major
funds transfer clearing houses will share their collective
experience with a view towards the development of
generalized electronic commerce clearing houses and
electronic security credentialing authorities.
 
SESSION 5: 16:30 - 17:50
------------------------
1. MODEL ELECTRONIC PAYMENTS AGREEMENTS
Financial EDI is increasingly a growing and
indispensable aspect of electronic commerce. However,
it also presents additional challenges beyond those
covered by standard EDI trading partner agreements and
practices. This session outlines the legal treatment of
financial EDI, its relationship to EFT and funds transfer
mechanisms, and the responsive model financial EDI
agreements, guidelines and critical law reform
initiatives.
 
2. WHAT TO SAVE, WHEN TO SAVE IT, AND FOR HOW LONG
How long should transactions be saved? Are electronic
documents subject to different retention rules?
International trade rules are in play respecting retention
matters. In the U.S., the Internal Revenue Service
published Revenue Procedure 91-59 to address the
electronic retention period and audit procedures for the
electronic trade environment. To what extent does this
Revenue Procedure as well as other national and
international procedures provide useful models for
international harmonization? This session will address
the pros and cons of using such procedures to change
company internal records retention  policies.
 
3. DO "SMART CARDS" PROVIDE AN "ULTIMATE" CONTROL
SOLUTION?
The need for, and use of, card technologies, including
magnetic stripe, smart cards, and PCMCIA, presents new
options and challenges for the audit, legal and security
communities. The policy issues associated with card
technologies have already surfaced within the electronic
benefit transfer, healthcare informatics, financial
services and many other environments. The panel will
identify the various card technologies and explore the
relevant issues, including those concerning ownership of
data on the card, impact on satisfaction of signature
requirements and cost justification.
 
4. THE "FAST" INITIATIVE - BUSINESS TRUST IN THE
COMPUTER ERA?
The International Bureau of Chambers of Commerce
(IBCC) - world forum of Chambers of Commerce (of the
International Chamber of Commerce (ICC)), is setting
up an international "registration" and "certification"
chain within EDI. Coordinated by the Belgian Federation
of Chambers of Commerce and Industry, the backbone
of the Certified Electronic Data Interchange For
Administration, Commerce and Transport (CEDI-
FACT) concept included in "FAST" (First Attempt to
Security Electronic Commerce), a trans-European and
trans-sectoral pilot project that will soon commence
under the auspices of the TEDIS program of the
Commission of the European Communities.
 
TUESDAY, JANUARY 18TH - MORNING SESSIONS
----------------------------------------
SESSION 6: 8:00 - 9:20
----------------------
1. NEGOTIATING ELECTRONIC TRADE AGREEMENTS
A common stumbling block in implementing electronic
trade is the length of time it takes for companies to
negotiate electronic trade agreements. In this session you
will witness a simulated negotiation session between two
trading partners and their counsel. The dialogue will
communicate the benefits and costs of using standard
agreements that are recognized by the majority of
industries, as well as the benefits and cost of not using
a trading partner agreement.
 
2. BACK-UP, ARCHIVAL AND CONTINGENCY PLANNING 
SERVICES
IN ELECTRONIC COMMERCE ACCELERATED TRANSACTION 
PROCESSING
OR J.I.T. ENVIRONMENT
Increasingly, the failure to contract for contingency
services may create significant exposure, perhaps
extending to consequential damages. Moreover, the
impact of expedited electronic transactions such as just-
in-time and quick response demand further consideration
of contingency services. This session debates an
appropriate definition of "due diligence" in electronic
commerce; the issues addressed in most commercial
contingency services agreements, and concludes with
predictions on future  issues by a panel of recognized
experts.
 
3. SECURITY POLICY IN A GLOBAL INFORMATION 
ENVIRONMENT
This session provides an opportunity to hear two of the
key security policy makers from the Commission of the
European Communities and the United States,
respectively. The speakers will address critical
developing information security policy issues of far
reaching consequence, including whether public key
infrastructure can or should be implemented for both
authentication and confidentiality services or instead for
authentication only; the scope and impact of pilot
projects on cryptographic and secured open systems
policy development; the impact of patents on the
development of ubiquitous secure infrastructure; and
cooperative approaches to a global path forward that will
minimize national and regional fragmentation.
 
4. ELECTRONIC SOFTWARE DISTRIBUTION (ESD) - A PANDORA'S
BOX?
As in every industry, there are commercial conduct rules
that apply to the software industry. As new methods of
distribution are introduced (discussed) in order to make
it easier for customers of software developers to obtain
and manage software assets within a corporation,
domestic and global legal implications are raised. This
session will discuss issues surrounding ESD and the
proposals to remedy them. Additionally, critical new
technologies and actual implementations will be
identified and demonstrated, with a view towards their
security and control capabilities.
 
SESSION 7: 9:30 - 10:50
-----------------------
1. VALUE ADDED NETWORK AND INTERCONNECT 
AGREEMENTS -
WHO IS LIABLE AND FOR WHAT?
Third Party Service Providers ("TPSPs") including Value
Added Networks ("VANs") and service bureaus have
been quite successful in limiting their liability. This
session examines the history, present status and future
liability of VANS and other TPSPs. The extent to which
VANs can or should be trusted to assure the
confidentiality of user data will be addressed. The panel
will provide practical legal and technical advice at
grappling with these trends.  The panel, which includes
general counsel to VANs, will address these issues,
including the enforceability of liability caps, the
enforceability of trading partner terms within their
"system agreements", VAN interconnects and special
considerations for consumer-users.
 
2. CRIMINAL LAWS REALLY PROTECT ELECTRONIC COMMERCE?
Liability for computer-based criminal acts is a
developing area of the law and therefore, the extent and
adequacy of current law remains uncertain. This session
will identify the critical elements of criminal law
relevant to electronic commerce and describe its
inadequacies. Proposals will be presented for legislative
reform. International prosecution of computer-based
crime will also be considered.
 
3. DIGITAL AND ELECTRONIC SIGNATURES AND THE LAW
Historically, the written signature has been an important
(and in many cases an indispensable) aspect of
commercial trade. This session will compare
conventional, electronic and digital signature
requirements and techniques, and explain how they are
(or should be) treated in the law. The most authoritative
private and administrative, legislative, judicial and
audit-related decisions, rulings and pronouncements
affecting digital signatures will be presented, and their
future impact explained. You will learn about new methods
for "tying" digital and electronic signatures to pre-
established expectations and purposes.  The speakers will
also discuss the format and intent of relevant computer
based "signature" standards and how they can be implemented
in your company/industry.
 
4. ACCREDITATION AND CERTIFICATION - THE NEW FRONTIER?
Because deserved confidence and trust in electronic
credentials and the infrastructure that issues such
credentials is of vital importance, mechanisms to assure
its accountability, consistency and quality are
indispensable. Certification and accreditation provide a
process of approval or recognition by a trusted body
representing that the subject of such certification and
accreditation has satisfied recognized criteria, typically
concerning quality, performance, ethics, experience,
safety, education or competence. This session considers
the legal, policy and organizational issues associated
with accreditation and certification and its relevance to
the satisfaction of obligations to implement
"commercially reasonable security."
 
SESSION 8: 11:00 - 12:20
------------------------
1. THE INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF COMMERCE 
ELECTRONIC
COMMERCE INITIATIVES
The ICC and its national affiliates (such as the U.S.
Council for International Business) have played a
continuing role in the development of electronic
commerce rules and practices, beginning with the
seminal publication of the "UNCID" rules, and
subsequently with initiatives for "EDI-TERMS", "EDI-
ready" INCOTERMS, and other projects. This session
will identify relevant ICC electronic commerce
initiatives, describe the ICC's future role, including
with regard to other international organizations, and
consider the ICC's and USCIB's work in addressing other
information policy and security issues confronting the
global business community.
 
2. ADMITTING, PROVING, AND ENFORCING EDI TRANSACTIONS
This session will focus on the evidentiary requirements
for electronic trade records and will contrast
requirements for records in paper and electronic form.
Diverse interpretations of foundation requirements of the
Federal Rules of Evidence, key regulatory requirements,
and related issues, including a status report on efforts
to reform the Federal Rules of Evidence that are relevant
to computer-based practices will be presented.
 
3. RE-ENGINEERING THE TAX FILING PROCESSES
Tax authorities will explain how they are dealing with
the electronic trade environment; and the policy, legal
and security issues involved in electronically interfacing
with national Governments. The implications of these
activities on electronic commerce generally will be
the focal point for this session. Additionally, it will
consider intergovernmental relationships concerning
authority to operate as a VAN or service bureau for the
other, including the TaxNet Government Communications
Corporation (TGCC) initiatives.
 
4. EDI INSURANCE - THE NEXT CONTROL APPROACH?
This panel will discuss the issues and opportunities
associated with offering and underwriting electronic
information-related risks.. This session surveys important
insurance issues that are either directly applicable to
electronic commerce and cryptography, or that indirectly
provide useful structures which can benefit the
thoughtful consideration of competing approaches to
such infrastructure. The discussion considers
insurance issues in EDI, EFT, VANS, and certification
authorities. To the extent insurance exists, the panelists
will discuss general restrictions and what electronic
information users and vendors can do to standardize and
structure their systems to assist the insurance industry
with broadening the scope of coverages.
 
TUESDAY, JANUARY 18TH - AFTERNOON SESSIONS
------------------------------------------
SESSION 9: 14:00 - 15:20
------------------------
1. CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPEAN ELECTRONIC TRADE - 
LEGAL
STATUS AND FUTURE OPTIONS
This session will discuss the present position of several
normative acts and legislative proposals in the Central
and East European countries that are of importance for
the development and use of EDI including: the status of
electronic evidence, the possibilities for electronic
contracting, and the legal requirements of "writing" and
"signature". The case for new legislation in Central and
Eastern Europe, assimilating the consequences of the
development and use of computer applications on the
traditional legal system, as well as the recent proposal
for a new Civil Code of the Russian Federation that
contains a specific regulation on an electronic version of
negotiable documents, will be discussed.
 
2. THE ROLE AND FUTURE OF NOTARIES IN COMPUTER-BASED
COMMERCE
This session defines and explains conventional notary
laws and practice in both common law and civil law
countries; and considers the business and legal need for
notarial reform to accommodate electronic transactions.
It will also examine the use and sufficiency of forms of
identification as a prerequisite to the issuance of
electronic credentials. Furthermore, the session will
provide perspectives on notarial reform, including
whether current notarial practice can accommodate
electronic commerce, or whether there is a need for an
"electronic notary," a "super notary" or other such
"trusted entities." A panel of distinguished notaires from
around the world will consider whether a Latin-style
notary can or should be introduced in non-civil law
countries and will forecast the future for notaries in a
computer-based world.
 
3. WILL HEALTHCARE REFORM PROFOUNDLY RESHAPE EDI 
LAW,
POLICY AND CONTROLS?
Privacy and security issues surrounding the use of EDI
are advancing to the top of the priorities in the health-
care field. Healthcare costs are a prime concern of
governments and individuals. However, with the rapid
growth of health care information networks and regional
or community healthcare networks, the capture, storage
and retrieval of health care data is essential to the
quality of the health care delivered. Data ownership and
access rights are unresolved, as well as the apportionment
of liability for erroneous or improperly disclosed data.
Moreover, the lack of a national (U.S.) personal
ID/national identifier presents privacy and security
challenges for healthcare and electronic commerce
generally.  These issues, with a focus on confidentiality
and privacy issues will be discussed in depth by leading
experts in health care law and EDI.
 
4. THE USES OF ESCROW IN ELECTRONIC COMMERCE
The scope of escrow agents is much broader in electronic
commerce than in the computer software industry.
Escrow agents are increasingly being used to hold
cryptographic keys associated with the privacy or
authenticity of business transactions. This session will
explain the world of escrow and how it can improve
electronic commerce. The escrow implications of the
Clinton Administration's "Clipper Capstone" proposal
will also be addressed. Copies of escrow agreements will
be distributed and discussed.
 
SESSION 10: 15:20 - 16:50
-------------------------
1. WHO OWNS THE STANDARDS, FUNCTIONALITY AND 
SYSTEMS?
CHARTING A COURSE THROUGH COPYRIGHT ISSUES IN EDI
This session evaluates the ownership, use, repudiation,
licensing, and transfer of rights associated with the
development and use of electronic trade standards in
both paper and electronic form, nationally and
internationally. Representatives from major standards
making entities as well as "vocal" users of the standards
will present the issues and a road map to the future.
The extent to which companies can obtain or enforce
proprietary rights in screen displays, data formats and
similar working aspects of an EDI system will be
considered.
 
2. RISK ANALYSIS IN ELECTRONIC TRADE
Prior to decision making, an evaluation process occurs
that determines the advantages and disadvantages of an
investment decision. A piece of this process is
sometimes known as "Risk Analysis." This session will
review the process steps necessary to conduct an
effective risk analysis for electronic trade and
investments. The panel will explain the critical
limitations of this process and how it is evolving to
meet the needs of important applications.
 
3. JUDICIAL ELECTRONIC DATA INTERCHANGE ("JEDI")
The current events, issues and projects associated with
the development of EDI within the Judiciary will be
discussed. The panelists will also review the procedural
and evidentiary rules affecting JEDI, bankruptcy court
JEDI, integration of JEDI with law office and judicial
automation of justice in the future. The most noteworthy
JEDI implementations throughout the world, as well as
JEDI X12 transaction sets and UN/EDIFACT messages
will be surveyed.
 
4. EDI TRANSLATION SOFTWARE CONTROL AND LEGAL
CONSIDERATIONS
As the heart of an EDI implementation, the adequacy of
EDI translation software is increasingly important to the
legal and control communities. This session will explain
the important audit and security control features of EDI
translation software and address concerns, pitfalls and
remedial actions available to the purchaser of such
software.
 
REGISTRATION INFORMATION
------------------------
HOTEL & AIRLINE INFORMATION
---------------------------
American Airlines is offering discounted air fares for
the Worldwide Electronic Commerce Conference.
Arrangements may be made by calling American
Airlines at 1-800-433-1790 and referencing "Star" Code
S1814P7.
 
Continental Airlines is also providing discounted air
travel for the Worldwide Electronic Commerce
Conference. To make reservations, call 1-800-468-7022.
Please reference Identification Code ZAB58.
International travelers: please contact your local
Continental phone number for specially discounted fares.
For this conference, Continental Airlines has waived the
need to stay over a Saturday night to obtain the lowest
possible fare.
 
The beautiful Waldorf-Astoria Hotel in the heart of New
York City will be the sight of the Worldwide Electronic
Commerce Conference. This prestigious internationally-
acclaimed hotel provides the finest in accommodations
and is offering a special room rate of $159 to all
conference attendees. Reservations can be made by
calling 1-212-355-3000.
 
 
CONFERENCE HIGHLIGHTS
---------------------
INTERNATIONAL SCOPE: Most conference sessions
will include one or more persons from a country other
than the United States, or one or more representatives
from international organizations, to provide a
diversity of perspectives and experiences.
CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS: Conference papers of
all sessions will be bound and distributed to all
participants.
 
GROUP & STUDENT DISCOUNTS: Discounted
registration fees will be offered to companies sending 3
or more individuals and to qualifying students. Call: 1-
214-516-4900 for more information.
 
CONTINUING LEGAL EDUCATION: For information
concerning C.L.E. points, call 1-214-516-4900.
 
HOW TO REGISTER
---------------
REGISTRATION FEE: $550 total conference registration fee.
 
BY MAIL: Completed forms must be accompanied by a
money order, check, or credit card number (American
Express, MasterCard, or Visa). All checks should be
made payable to Worldwide Electronic Commerce
Conference, P.O. Box 743485, Dallas, Texas 75374,
USA.
 
BY FAX: Completed forms, when paying be credit card,
may be faxed to 1-214-424-0562.
 
BY PHONE: Call 1-214-516-4900 for payment by credit
card or questions about the conference.
 
BY E-MAIL: Worldwide Electronic Commerce can also
be reached on Compuserve at 76520,3713.
 
 
REGISTRATION FORM:
------------------
To register, please print out a copy of the form below,
complete it by typing or printing the registration
information and return one completed form with
payment for each registration.  Mail to P.O. Box 743485,
Dallas, TX  75374, USA or Fax to:  1-214-424-0562.
 
_____ I am registering for the Worldwide Electronic
      Commerce Conference (Total: $550)
 
_____ I plan on attending one of the Pre-Conference
      Tutorial Sessions. (Select one below):
        _____ Electronic Trade Overview
        _____ Security & Audit Overview
        _____ General Counsel's Perspective
 
        _____ Electronic Commerce Policy
 
A check is enclosed for $___________    -OR-
 
Please bill my:___VISA ___MasterCard ___American Express
 
Card No.______________________ Exp. Date_________________
 
Name on Card_____________________________________________
 
Signature________________________________________________
 
Registrant's Name________________________________________
 
Title____________________________________________________
 
Preferred First Name for Badge___________________________
 
Company / Organization___________________________________
 
MS / Dept._______________________________________________
 
Address__________________________________________________
 
City________________________ State______ Zip_____________
 
Telephone________________________ Fax____________________
 
Do You Require Special Handicapped Access? ____Yes ____No
 
Will you be staying at the Waldorf? ____Yes ____No
 
Final agenda subject to change, especially as the program
expands and additional speakers are added. CANCELLATIONS
must be received in writing and postmarked no later than
December 22, 1993 to receive a 50% refund of the paid
registration. No refunds will be issued after December 22,
1993, regardless of when the registration is received.
NO SHOWS are liable for the entire conference fee.
SPECIAL ARRANGEMENTS for the handicapped will be made if
requested in advance. To make a request, contact the
"Conference Coordinator" at 1-214-516-4900.
 






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: cman@caffeine.io.com (Douglas Barnes)
Date: Thu, 25 Nov 93 14:23:41 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Multi-precision math in PGP
Message-ID: <199311252206.QAA21043@caffeine.caffeine.io.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Does anyone have pointers to articles, books, or online material
that explains the multi-precision math that is provided in PGP?

-- 
----------------                                             /\ 
Douglas Barnes            cman@illuminati.io.com            /  \ 
Chief Wizard         (512) 447-8950 (d), 447-7866 (v)      / () \
Illuminati Online          metaverse.io.com 7777          /______\



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: russell@eternity.demon.co.uk (Russell Earl Whitaker)
Date: Thu, 25 Nov 93 09:59:49 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Forwarded Article
Message-ID: <24762@eternity.demon.co.uk>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I'll write more on the (I think successful) ECFP '93 later; for
now...

-- Russell

This article was forwarded to you by russell@eternity.demon.co.uk
(Russell Earl Whitaker):

--------------------------------- cut here -----------------------------

Xref: demon alt.wired:1244 demon.local:6413 sci.crypt:10110 uk.politics:7717
 alt.security.pgp:5994
Newsgroups: alt.wired,demon.local,sci.crypt,uk.politics,alt.security.pgp
From: russell@eternity.demon.co.uk (Russell Earl Whitaker)
Path: eternity.demon.co.uk!demon!eternity.demon.co.uk!russell
Subject: MEDIA: PGP covered in London *Guardian* 25 Nov 93
Organization: Extropy Institute
Reply-To: Russell@eternity.demon.co.uk
X-Newsreader: Simple NEWS 2.0 (ka9q DIS 1.24)
Lines: 24
Date: Thu, 25 Nov 1993 17:34:57 +0000
Message-ID: <754248897snz@eternity.demon.co.uk>
Sender: usenet@demon.co.uk

Thursday, 25 November 1993:

All Londoners interested in the issue of communications privacy
should pick up today's *Guardian*: in the Computers section is
an article by Wendy Grossman, "Enter the crypto factor",
subtitled "How computers could give us back the privacy that
computerisation has taken away".

The article discusses the "export problems" at the centre of
Phil Zimmermann's recent troubles.

Good job, Wendy!  [She can be reached, by the way, at
70007.5537@compuserve.com.]

-- 

Russell Earl Whitaker                   whitaker@eternity.demon.co.uk
Communications Editor                                 AMiX: RWhitaker
EXTROPY: The Journal of Transhumanist Thought
Board member, Extropy Institute (ExI)
    Co-organizer, 2nd European Conference on Computers, Freedom and
    Privacy, London, October 1994



--------------------------------- cut here -----------------------------





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: gtoal@an-teallach.com (Graham Toal)
Date: Thu, 25 Nov 93 11:19:52 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: PC Based One-Time Pad
Message-ID: <10563@an-teallach.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


In article <199311251654.AA02190@world.std.com>
           kkirksey@world.std.com "Ken B Kirksey" writes:
 > While I was reading though _Applied Cryptography_ last night, a thought
 > struck me (no damage):  Why hasn't anyone come up with a good Mac or PC based
 > One-Time Pad system.  
 
Because they're trivial to write.  I could do one in less that 15 minutes.
 
 > It seems like this would be a fairly easy system to implement, but since
 > no one (to my knowledge) has yet done so, there must be something I'm
 > missing. :-)  

Because very few people can be bothered driving half way across the
country to deliver the OTPs.  It's *way* too much hassle for day to
day use of the kind we use pgp for.  And if someone *is* doing it
for real security (like say AT&T shipping around their secure phone
circuit diagrams because they don't trust clipper :-) ) then they're
*not* going to be mentioning it in passing on usenet news groups...

G
PS No, you *don't* send them in the mail.  But you knew that, right?
--
Personal mail to gtoal@gtoal.com (I read it in the evenings)
Business mail to gtoal@an-teallach.com (Be careful with the spelling!)
Faxes to An Teallach Limited: +44 31 662 4678  Voice: +44 31 668 1550 x212





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: jdwilson@gold.chem.hawaii.edu (Jim Wilson (VA))
Date: Thu, 25 Nov 93 21:23:45 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: IEEE Article Speaks Out Against Clipper/Key Escrow
Message-ID: <9311260521.AA04924@gold.chem.hawaii.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


CP's:

Check out IEEE Computer November 1993, V26,#11 pp 76-78, wherein the Com-
mittee On Public Policy states, among other things, "Very serious consti-
tutional questions exist.  The government's key escrow initiative may violate
the First, Fourth and Fifth Amendments of the US Bill of Rights"

"Better methods already exist...Moreover, encryption software (including
DES and RSA algorighms and the user-ready and popular Pretty Good Privacy
secure message system) is freely downloadable from public networks around
the world."

"Reconsideration is in order.  The administration should halt the intro-
duction of its key escrow system and reconsider this half-baked scheme, 
which was hatched during the previous administration.  And Congress should 
mandate a serious, open, public review of cryptography policy and its
implication for society."

Pretty clear statement of opinion from a body of IEEE, eh?

 -Jim





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: nate@VIS.ColoState.EDU (CVL staff member Nate Sammons)
Date: Thu, 25 Nov 93 19:08:42 PST
To: ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu (L. Detweiler)
Subject: Re: The History of Cypherpunks
In-Reply-To: <9311250709.AA28957@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Message-ID: <9311260307.AA14263@vangogh.VIS.ColoState.EDU>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----


writes L. Detweiler:
>
>The top leadership has cloaked their effort to develop the cult
>religion of pseudospoofing in the guise of `privacy for the masses' and
>the `cryptographic revolution'. `pseudospoofing' and `pseudopools' are
>the core aspects of their perverted religion. They *have* a secret
>mailing list hidden from the public used to promote subversions and the
>CA Conspiracy. They have written customized software for pseudospoofing
>and style analysis for cyberspatial warfare across many lists. They
>have built up an extensive international infrastructure of sites and
>public access internet accounts for manipulation of the public through
>the mailing list and elsewhere. They have corrupted DNS and SMTP
>software. They have infiltrated many sensitive lists, such as `internet
>mercantile protocols' and CERT lists, and derailed discussions with
>public and private sabotage, and stolen sensitive confidential
>information. They have molested me and many others (e.g. G.Spafford and
>

  Um, the sheer volume of things that these horrible people have done
  is quite a bit more, me thinks, than such a small group of people
  could accomplish in such a small amount of time, unless some of them
  have a _lot_ of time on their hands.

>
>tick, tick, tick ...
>

Wasn't it the executioner that said this a few days ago? -- couldn't be,
he was pseudospoofing ;-)

- -- 
+-----------------------------------------------------------------------+
| Nate Sammons  nate@VIS.ColoState.Edu  (303) 491-1578                  |
|   Colorado State University -- Computer Visualization Laboratory      |
+-----------------------------------------------------------------------+



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: nate@VIS.ColoState.EDU (CVL staff member Nate Sammons)
Date: Thu, 25 Nov 93 19:18:42 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com (Cypherpunks Mailing List)
Subject: LD's last flame of me
Message-ID: <9311260317.AA14287@vangogh.VIS.ColoState.EDU>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----


CPs,

I did not want to poin-blankly address some of the comments that LD made
about me in his last post, but I feel it necessary.  I won't say he's 
insane or deranged, since i know it does no good.  I won't say that he is
raving or frothing at the mouth, since it does no good either.

I will say that I am doing my best to uphold what I believe in, and that
I will not stand for the public slander of my name and reputation all
across the net.  If you want to slam me, L.Detweiler, please slam me in
private email, since very few people put great weight on your post, at
least not lately.

- -nate sammons

- -- 
+-----------------------------------------------------------------------+
| Nate Sammons  nate@VIS.ColoState.Edu  (303) 491-1578                  |
|   Colorado State University -- Computer Visualization Laboratory      |
+-----------------------------------------------------------------------+



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Matthew J Miszewski <MJMISKI@macc.wisc.edu>
Date: Thu, 25 Nov 93 23:08:45 PST
To: CYPHERPUNKS@toad.com
Subject: Health Security
Message-ID: <23112601070888@vms2.macc.wisc.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I realize that this is of marginal crypto import, but I need as much info
as possible on Hospital Information Systems and security.  Especially
on CICS and AIX systems.  Do any cryptographic protocols exist yet to
protect huge interactive medical databases?
 
Please send responses in mail.
 
--Matt
______________________________________________________________________________
In defense of liberty, encrypt for all purposes, civil and professional.
In defense of privacy, encrypt all correspondence, personal and professional.
In defense of sanity, do not encrypt your dry cleaning invoice!
 
       ++++++++--------mjmiski@macc.wisc.edu                          (c)1993




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: jdwilson@gold.chem.hawaii.edu (Jim Wilson (VA))
Date: Fri, 26 Nov 93 08:33:54 PST
To: MJMISKI@macc.wisc.edu (Matthew J Miszewski)
Subject: Re: Health Security
In-Reply-To: <23112601070888@vms2.macc.wisc.edu>
Message-ID: <9311261629.AA05385@gold.chem.hawaii.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> 
> I realize that this is of marginal crypto import, but I need as much info
> as possible on Hospital Information Systems and security.  Especially
> on CICS and AIX systems.  Do any cryptographic protocols exist yet to
> protect huge interactive medical databases?
>  
> Please send responses in mail.
>  
> --Matt
> ______________________________________________________________________________
> In defense of liberty, encrypt for all purposes, civil and professional.
> In defense of privacy, encrypt all correspondence, personal and professional.
> In defense of sanity, do not encrypt your dry cleaning invoice!
>  
>        ++++++++--------mjmiski@macc.wisc.edu                          (c)1993
> 
What specifically are you asking about?  Are you talking about encrypted
password protection or encryption of part or all of the databases?

 -Jim





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Michael J Kirwin <mkirwin@magnus.acs.ohio-state.edu>
Date: Fri, 26 Nov 93 07:43:56 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: BlackNet/Anon remail
Message-ID: <199311261542.KAA13299@bottom.magnus.acs.ohio-state.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


     Hello 'Punks. I'm working on some Sociology/Psycology stuff and I was 
wondering if somone out there could give me some information on the BlackNet 
and Anonymous Remailers.  Thanks,  mkirwin@acs.ohio-state.edu




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: hfinney@shell.portal.com
Date: Fri, 26 Nov 93 11:30:15 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: PGP math library
Message-ID: <9311261930.AA00750@jobe.shell.portal.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Here's a little document I threw together this morning to describe
the PGP multi-precision routines.  After reading about Henry Strickland's
work making TCL interfaces for various crypto functions, I've been
putting together a similar interface for PGP's mp library.  This is mostly
to teach myself TCL.  But I have developed some familiarity with PGP's
mp library as a result, so here is some information that will hopefully
be helpful.

Hal
--------------------------------------------------------------------------
PGP Multi-Precision Library Functions			Nov 26, 1993

Overview
========

PGP contains a multiple-precision math library to implement its
cryptographic functions.  This library is largely self-contained
and is suitable for use in other applications.

PGP's library is quite portable, working on both big- and little-
endian machines, as well as machines with both 16- and 32-bit integers.
It can be compiled in a mode which relies only on C code, or it can
be linked with an assembly language module customized for the particular
target machine to provide higher speed.  Assembly language modules
ship with PGP for a variety of targets.

The library uses fixed-size buffers for its calculations.  This means
there is a ceiling on the size of the numbers which can be used.  This
ceiling is determined at compile time, though, so special applications
can build the library with large ceilings if desired.

PGP's library and its source code in general is not public domain; it is
copyrighted by Philip Zimmermann, reachable at <prz@acm.org>.  PGP is
released under licensing terms which, I believe, allow use of the source
code for non-commercial purposes.  It would be a good idea to talk to Phil
before using the code in any product destined for widespread release.

The Library
===========

PGP's mp library is largely contained in the module mpilib.c.  This module
requires mpilib.h, usuals.h, and platform.h when it compiles.  The simplest
use of mpilib is to link it with your application, compiling with -D flag(s)
appropriate for your target machine.  (More information on the choice of
flags is below.)

Any module which will use the mp functions should also include mpilib.h.
All of these modules will also have to be compiled with the -D flag(s) used
by mpilib.c.

Compiling
=========

Compiling mpilib.c and other modules which include mpilib.h requires the
proper choice of -D flags.  The simplest case is if the target machine is
one of the ones for which explicit defines exist in platform.h.  In version
2.3a, these are: MSDOS, VMS, VAXC, mips, i386, sparc, mc68000, mc68020.
In each of these cases, an assembly-language module exists in the PGP
distribution to implement selected mp functions.

If you have one of these targets, add a -D flag for the symbol from the
above list to your compile command line.  For example, on an MS-DOS machine,
add -DMSDOS to the command line.  (Actually, in most cases these symbols
will be automatically defined by the target's compiler or pre-processor.
But it doesn't hurt to define them explicitly.)  Then you should also assemble
the corresponding assembly language file.  For MS-DOS it is 8086.asm;
the proper choice for the other targets should be obvious from the filenames.
Link the assembly language object module along with mpilib's object module
into your application.

If you don't have one of these targets, mpilib.c can be built in a "portable"
mode which will implement all functions in C.  To do this, define
-DPORTABLE and -DMPORTABLE on the command line.  In addition, if you are on
a big-endian machine (such as a sparc or 68000-based machine), you must
define -DHIGHFIRST as well.  Little-endian machines don't need an explicit
define for endianness.

In portable mode, PGP will default to 16-bit units.  If your target has
32-bit ints, you can define -DUNIT32 to get considerably more efficient
code.

Remember that these defines must be added to all modules which include
mpilib.h, in addition to mpilib.c.  (Note: in the PGP makefile you may
also see other defines, -DDYN_ALLOC and -DSMALL_MEM.  These are not relevant
to the mp library and are not necessary for this application.)

**** VERY IMPORTANT NOTE ****

PGP has many alternate forms of multiple-precision multiplication and
division; the appropriate one is chosen based on your particular machine.
The default choice is SMITH, because that is usually the fastest.  However,
the SMITH algorithm has the deficiency that it does not (in version 2.3a)
work correctly for small numbers.  (This is not a problem for PGP because
it works with large numbers of hundreds of bits.  But for a general-purpose
library it is not adequate.)

A better choice is UPTON for the purposes of a general-purpose library.
You should edit mpilib.h to have it define UPTON instead of SMITH for your
particular target architecture if you are using one of the pre-defined
targets.  If you are building with -DPORTABLE, you can either edit mpilib.h
to change the default choice, or you can define -DUPTON on the command line.

Using the Library
=================

Before use, the MP library must be initialized.  Presently the only
initialization needed is to set the precision value, which tells how many
"units" (a unit is typically an int on the target machine) long the
fixed-size mp buffers are.  This is done by calling:

	set_precision (MAX_UNIT_PRECISION);

To use the mp library, include mpilib.h in your module.  Multi-precision
variables should be declared as follows:

	unit temp[MAX_UNIT_PRECISION];

This declares a variable "temp" suitable for holding a multi-precision
value.  I like to do:

	typedef unit unitarr[MAX_UNIT_PRECISION];
	unitarr temp;

which has the same effect.

MP variables may either be declared locally or as global variables as with
other types of C variables.

PGP's mp library functions need to be called with the address of a mp
variable.  Since mp variables are declared as arrays in C, this means
you can just pass the variable name.  For example, to add x2 to x1, you
could do:

	unitarr x1, x2;
	mp_add (x1, x2);

mpilib.h defines unitptr as a pointer to a unit.  If you write functions
which take MP values as parameters these should be declared as unitptr's.
For example, a function to add three numbers and return a result might be:

void mp_add3 (unitptr rslt, unitptr arg1, unitptr arg2, unitptr arg3)
{
	mp_move (rslt, arg1);
	mp_add (rslt, arg2);
	mp_add (rslt, arg3);
}

Make sure you don't make the mistake of declaring a local and global variables
as unitptrs and passing them to mp functions.  You need to allocate space
for them by declaring them as unit arrays.

Library Functions
=================

Most of the library functions are conceptually simple.  The one exception
is modular multiplication.  This performs the function A*B mod M.  PGP
requires this to be done via two calls.  First you tell it the modulus
M with the stage_modulus call.  Then you do the multiplication with
mp_modmult.  This is code to do rslt = arg1*arg2 mod m:

	unitarr rslt, arg1, arg2, m;
	stage_modulus (m);
	mp_modmult(rslt, arg1, arg2);

If you are doing a series of multiplications with the same modulus you
can call stage_modulus just once and then call mp_modmult repeatedly.
Be aware that mp_modexp calls stage_modulus internally so that function
will overwrite the saved modulus value.

PGP is missing a few functions that you would expect.  It does not have
modular addition and subtraction.  These should basically do A+B and then
test for the range 0..(M-1), and if out of range add or subtract M once
to bring it back into range.  Perhaps these will be added to a future version
of PGP.

Some mp functions have parameters that are both inputs and outputs (e.g.
mp_inc(r) increments r).  In other cases, though, the inputs are separate
from the outputs.  In those cases you should not pass the same variable
as both an input and an output parameter.  For example, you should not do
mp_mult (a, a, b) to get a *= b, because a is being used as both an input
and an output parameter.  Instead, you should do mp_mult (temp, a, b) and
then mp_move (a, temp).

Here are some useful PGP mpilib functions and what they do.  The MP numbers
are r, r1, r2, etc; non-MP integers are i, j, etc.


Non-modular MP functions:

mp_move(r1,r2)			r1 = r2

mp_add(r1,r2) 			r1 += r2

mp_sub(r1,r2)			r1 -= r2

mp_compare(r1,r2)		-1,0,or 1 depending on (r1<r2),(r1=r2),(r1>r2)

mp_mult(r1,r2,r3)		r1 = r2 * r3;

mp_udiv(rem,rquot,rdend,rdor)	unsigned rdend/rdor;rem=remainder,rquot=quotient

mp_div(rem,rquot,rdend,rdor)	signed rdend/rdor; rem=remainder, rquot=quotient

mp_mod(rem,rdend,rdor)		rem = rdend % rdor  (unsigned)

mp_abs(r)			r = absolute value of r

mp_inc(r)			r += 1

mp_dec(r)			r -= 1

mp_neg(r)			r = -r

mp_square(r1,r2)		r1 = r2 * r2

msub(r,r1)			if (r>=r1) r -= r1


Modular mp functions:

stage_modulus(rm)		set rm as modulus for mp_modmult

mp_modmult(rslt,r1,r2)		rslt = r1 * r2 mod stage_modulus value

mp_modsquare(r1,r2)		r1 = r2 * r2 mod stage_modulus value

mp_modexp(rslt,r1,r2,rm)	rslt = (r1 to the power r2) mod rm


MP/Integer interface functions:

mp_init(r,i)			mp value r = integer value i

mp_burn(r)			r = 0  (for erasing sensitive data in memory)

testeq(r,i)			True if mp value r == integer value i

testne(r,i)			True if mp value r != integer value i

testge(r,i)			True if mp value r >= integer value i

testle(r,i)			True if mp value r <= integer value i

significance(r)			returns number of significant units in r

mp_shortdiv(rquot,rdend,i)	rdend/i; rquot=quotient, returns int remainder

mp_shortmod(rdend,i)		returns rdend % i  (unsigned)


I/O of MP Values
================

The PGP module mpiio.c has some routines for I/O of mp values.  This module
includes pgp.h (which includes a lot more files) but that is not really
necessary.  I advise commenting out the include of pgp.h in that module.
Then you will only need to add mpiio.c and mpiio.h to your program
directory.

To get access to the more general I/O functions in mpiio.c you must compile
it with -DDEBUG.  This will allow you to call:

str2reg(r,str)			Convert string str to mp value r

The string passed to str2reg will be assumed to be in decimal.  To pass
a hex string it must end in 'h'; binary strings should end in 'b', and
octal strings in 'o'.  Decimal strings may optionally end in '.'.  (These
terminating characters could be added by a pass before str2reg is called
if you don't want to require them from the user or file.)

display_in_base(str,r,irad)	Display string r in base irad, preceded by str

This will print mp value r on standard out, using base irad.  It will
precede it by the string str.

mp_display(str,r)		Display string r in hex, preceded by str

This always displays in hex, and is somewhat faster than display_in_base.

One function which is lacking is something to convert an mp value to a
string in memory.  display_in_base and mp_display always write to standard
output.  These routines can be fairly easily modified to output to an
incrementing pointer (*bp++) to get this effect if necessary. 

Other PGP MP Functions
======================

The module genprime.c has several useful mp functions.  Unfortunately,
since the focus of this module is generating PGP random keys, it has
links to other parts of PGP, such as the random number generation.  It
is probably best to extract source routines from this module on a
selective basis.  Among the routines which would be of general use are:

mp_gcd(rslt,r1,r2)		rslt = greatest common divisor of r1 and r2
mp_inv(rslt,r1,r2)		Compute rslt such that rslt*r1 mod r2 is 1
nextprime(r)			Finds the next prime above r, returns in r
slowtest(r)			True if r is a probable prime
primetest(r)			Sieve then slowtest r, true if probable prime

nextprime is fast, using a combination of sieving and probabilistic
primality testing.  It is what is used by PGP for its RSA key generation.
slowtest is used by nextprime; it applies the Fermat test with the first
four primes as test values.  primetest first checks r against a list of
small primes for divisibility, then calls slowtest to test it.

There are also some other calls in mpilib.c which I did not document
above.  They are somewhat lower-level, mostly, but they might be useful
for some purposes.  A little study of the code will reveal these routines.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: an12070@anon.penet.fi (The Executioner)
Date: Fri, 26 Nov 93 06:18:55 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Another Demon
Message-ID: <9311261416.AA05439@anon.penet.fi>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Who is zeek@io.com?

<g>
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
To find out more about the anon service, send mail to help@anon.penet.fi.
Due to the double-blind, any mail replies to this message will be anonymized,
and an anonymous id will be allocated automatically. You have been warned.
Please report any problems, inappropriate use etc. to admin@anon.penet.fi.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: m-sh8481@granny.cs.nyu.edu (Singh Hardayal)
Date: Fri, 26 Nov 93 11:23:56 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: remove me
Message-ID: <9311261921.AA09462@granny.cs.nyu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Dear Systems Admin

        Please rm me from the list. Shall be back later.      

         It was fun to be on the list.

                                          --------Hardayal Singh




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: a2@ah.com (Arthur Abraham)
Date: Fri, 26 Nov 93 14:53:56 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Clipper update
Message-ID: <9311262245.AA01665@ah.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


From: _Electronic Engeering Times_ 22-nov-93


U.S. weights Clipper chip alternatives

by GEorge Leopold

Washington -- The clinton administration is readying a new encryption
policy that could help defuse industry opposion to introduction of the 
government developed Clipper chip by embracing commercial technologies as 
alterntives for netword security, according to government and industry
sources.

A National Security Council panel lead by George Tenet, psecial presidential
assistant for intelligence programs, is completing a broad review of 
government encryption policy with an eye toward empolying the Clipper chip,
as well as commercial alternatives, to ensure privacy and security on 
public networks.  Those would include the proposed electronic superhighway,
or National Information Infrastructure (NII).

Tenet could not be reached for comment on the review's status, but a 
U.S. official said last week the results of the seven-month National 
Security Council policy review will be announced soon.

The Clipper chip, backed by the National Security Agency and proposed by 
the Clinton administration in April as a new data-encryption standard, is 
widely viewed by industry critics as a fait accompli, since the spy agency
wants to use it to protect intelligence data.

Asked in an interview last Monday whether the policy review would result in
modification of the Clipper chip proposal, Micheal Nelson, special assistant
for information technology in the White House Office of Science and Technology
Policy, acknowledged the need to consider other encryption technologies for
network security, including software solutions.  He also said the government
should have sought greater industry participation before proposing the 
Clipper chip.

"Clipper is not a sliver bullet, it's not even a brass bullet," Nelson
said, "It's only one approach."

He added, "If we don't address these [network security] issues, people
won't use the NII."

Nelson said last week the National Security Council review was designed 
to bring industry and Congress into the process of looking for commercial
solutions, besides Clipper, to the network-security issue.  Industry groups
said last week they have contributed to the review, which began shortly
after Clipper was proposed.  The review is expected to result in a decision
on how to implement Clipper.

A decision on how to proceed with the Clipper proposal was scheduled for 
Sept. 1 but was delay in response to a recommendation from a private-sector
advisory group to the Commerce Department.

Clipper, which scrambles telephone conversatinos using an encryption 
algorithm called Skipjack, is at the heart of an adminstration initiative
annoumced in April on secure telecom networks and wireless communication
links.  Forced to balance the interests of campanies and private citizens with 
nation-security needs, President Clinton ordered a comprehensive review of
U.S. encruytion policy addressing:

* Privacy, including the need for voice and data encryption to protect
proprietary business data.

* The ability of federal law-enforcement officials to tap phones and 
computers.

* The employment of modern technology to build the NII, including encryption
technology needed to protect proprietary information transmitted over the 
information superhighway.

* The need for American companies to build and export high-technology 
products to boost U.S. competitiveness.  U.S. companies may offer encryption
as a feature in software sold in the United States, but are prohibited from
including encryption software in commercial software exports.  Proponents 
of decontrolling encrypted software argue that restrictions are useless 
because encryption technology is widely available (see Oct. 18, page 18).

Acknowledging industry's concerns, the initiative also includes creation
of a key-escrow system to ensure the Cliper chip would be used to protect
privacy. (A Commerce Department official said last week the government 
has dropped the Clipper moniker, referring to it instead as the "key-
escrow chip," out of convern for possible trademark infringement.)

Devices incorporation the chip would have two unique software keys government
investigators would need to decode encoded messages.  TWo key-escrow data
banks would be overseen by a pair of independent agencies designated by the
Justice Department and the White House.  A decision on which agencies will
oversee the detabases has not been made, Commerce spokeswoman Anne Enright 
Shepherd said last Wednesday.

According ot a White House statement announcing the encryption policy, "We
need the Clipper chip and other approaches that can both provide law-abiding
citizens with access to the encryption they need and prevent criminals from
using it to hide their illegal activities."

Despite the administration's insistence that Clipper and the rest of the 
encryption policy are voluntary efforts, many U.S. high-tech companies
have opposed it (see June 21, page 28).  Instead, they want policy makers
to retain the ubiquitous federal Data Encryption Standard (DES) and use 
other public-key encryption technologies, such as RC-2 and RC-4.  DES
uses a 56-bit key while Clipper employs an 80-bit key.

Clipper "was forced upon [the Clinton adminstration] before they had a 
chance to evaluate its impact," Bruce Heiman, a Washington attorney 
representing the Business Software Alliance, said last Tuesday.  "NSA
sold them a bill of goods."

The policy review means "they realize that Clipper has problems... but they
don't want to rule it out entirely," Heiman said, adding that industry
would accpet Clipper as one alternative to network security only if it 
is part of a truly voluntary program that includes public-key encryption. 




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: cman@caffeine.io.com (Douglas Barnes)
Date: Fri, 26 Nov 93 15:03:56 PST
To: an52436@anon.penet.fi
Subject: Re: Comments on NSA (was: "Pyrrhus Cracks RSA?")
In-Reply-To: <9311262038.AA27804@anon.penet.fi>
Message-ID: <199311262246.QAA22199@caffeine.caffeine.io.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> 
> Well, doesn't it make some sense given the utility of prime numbers in
> cryptography, that the NSA, or anyone else interested in breaking codes for that
> matter, would have simply dedicated a computer or two to the long-term project
> of determining all of the prime numbers under x bits long?  Granted this would
> take a while, but the NSA has the time, the computers, and the other resources
> necessary to do this.  Having all of these prime numbers would greatly reduce
> the effort necessary to crack PGP/RSA-type cryptosystems which rely on prime
> numbers.  It would reduce the number of factors a brute-force attack would
> have to check dramatically.  Or am I completely off-base?
> 
> 
> 					Mephisto

Quoting from the FAQ (Bruce Schneier's "Applied Cryptography") pp. 213:

   1. If everyone needs prime numbers, won't we run out? No, Santa would
      never run out of prime numbers for all the good little boys and 
      girls. In fact, there are over 10^150 primes of length 512 bits or
      less. (For numbers of size N, the probability that a random number
      is prime is one in log N.) There are only 10^84 atoms in the universe.
      [...]

Go directly to your bookstore, do not pass GO, do not collect $200 (you
only need about $50, including tax) and buy this book.

-- 
----------------                                             /\ 
Douglas Barnes            cman@illuminati.io.com            /  \ 
Chief Wizard         (512) 447-8950 (d), 447-7866 (v)      / () \
Illuminati Online          metaverse.io.com 7777          /______\



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Jim McCoy <mccoy@ccwf.cc.utexas.edu>
Date: Fri, 26 Nov 93 15:28:56 PST
To: an12070@anon.penet.fi
Subject: Re: Another Demon
In-Reply-To: <9311261416.AA05439@anon.penet.fi>
Message-ID: <199311262327.AA04880@tramp.cc.utexas.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text


an12070@anon.penet.fi (The Executioner) [aka L.D.] writes:
> 
> Who is zeek@io.com?

Sigh.  Well, I don't think Kevin would mind me vouching for his existence.
Try fingering zeek@bongo.cc.utexas.edu, then asking directory assistence in
Austin for Kevin's phone number and calling him up...  

jim



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: gtoal@an-teallach.com (Graham Toal)
Date: Fri, 26 Nov 93 10:23:55 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Health Security
Message-ID: <10699@an-teallach.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


In article <9311261629.AA05385@gold.chem.hawaii.edu> you write:
>> I realize that this is of marginal crypto import, but I need as much info
>> as possible on Hospital Information Systems and security.  Especially
>> on CICS and AIX systems.  Do any cryptographic protocols exist yet to
>> protect huge interactive medical databases?

>What specifically are you asking about?  Are you talking about encrypted
>password protection or encryption of part or all of the databases?

The company I work for does a lot of work with HISS systems.  We've
been told to develop a system to display selected data from a HISS
on PCs for use by hospital staff.  (Possibly off the premises).

We asked about security and encryption, and were told we could leave
all the patient data in clear but to encrypt the file containing the
names and the correspondence between those names and patient data.

I don't think this is sufficient - I'm sure anyone getting the data
could work out who it was about from all sorts of internal detail -
but that's all the UK Health Service at least expects.  We will, of
course, be putting in a *considerable* deal more security than they
mandate as minimum, because if patient data were to get out via one
of our products, it would be no use saying 'but the NHS said that was
all we needed to do' - not only would we be morally negligent, but it
would do our company's public image no good at all.

G
-- 
Personal mail to gtoal@gtoal.com (I read it in the evenings)
Business mail to gtoal@an-teallach.com (Be careful with the spelling!)
Faxes to An Teallach Limited: +44 31 662 4678  Voice: +44 31 668 1550 x212





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: banisar@washofc.cpsr.org
Date: Fri, 26 Nov 93 15:19:29 PST
Subject: No Subject
Message-ID: <<9311211818.AA21641@hacker2.cpsr.digex.net>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


cpsr.digex.net>
Date: Sun, 21 Nov 1993 18:18:21 +0000
From: Dave Banisar <banisar@washofc.cpsr.org>
To: Cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: HR 3627 Encryption Exports Removed



Maria Cantwell               
1st District, Washington      
1520 Longworth Building
Washington, DC 20515
202-225-6311


                  Congress of the United States
                     House of Representatives
                     Washington, DC 20515-4701



For Immediate Release                      For More Information
November 23, 1993                          Larry West (202) 225-6311


Cantwell Introduces "Encryption" bill to Expand Export Markets for US
Computer and Software Companies

   US Rep. Maria Cantwell (D-WA) has introduced legislation to amend the
Export Administration Act to allow US computer and software
manufacturers to compete in an international market that could mean as
much as $6 billion to $9 billion a year to American high-tech
industries. Cantwell's bill would liberalize export controls on software
that features encryption capabilities, which protect computer data
against unauthorized disclosure, theft or alteration.

   As communications systems link more and more computers and telephones
around the world, Cantwell said, businesses and indviduals are becoming
more concerned about protecting the privacy of their electronic files,
messages and transactions. She said the worldwide demand for
cryptographic software, and computer systems that employ such software,
is growing rapidly and American companies must be allowed to meet that
demand. According to Cantwell, this legislation is needed to ensure that
American companies do not lose critical international markets to foreign
competitors, who operate with few export restrictions. Currently, more
than 200 software and hardware products for text, file and data
encryption are available from 20 foreign countries.

   "The Export Administration Act has erected a wall between American
high-tech companies and their international customers -- it's time to
lower the wall," Cantwell said. "Computer and software technology are
among the most competitive fields in the world, and American companies
are the clear leaders. To maintain that lead, American companies must be
able to respond to worldwide consumer demand."

   Robert Holleyman, president of the Business Software Alliance, an
association of America's nine leading software companies, applauded
Cantwell for introducing the leigslation and said the bill would "assist
US software companies and maintaining their competitive edge in
international markets."

   Dr. Nathan Myhrvold, senior vice president for Advance Technology at
Microsoft Corporation in Redmond, Washington, also praised Cantwell for
her leadership on this issue.

   "The ability to include encryption features in software we sell
worldwide is important to our remaining competititve in foreign
markets," Myhrvold said.  " We commend Rep. Cantwell for recognizing the
importance of this issue to the American software industry."


CANTWELL ON EXPORT CONTROLS/ ADD ONE

    Cantwell said current export controls that prohibit the export of
American software programs that offer good encryption capabilities only
make it harder for American companies to compete internationally.  She
said the regulations ignore the realities of today's post-Cold War
global economy and the needs of one of this country's most innovative
and successful industries.  American software companies currently
command a 75 percent worldwide market share, and many of those companies
earn more than 50 percent of their annual revenues from exports, but
Cantwell said that could change quickly.

     "The United States' export control system is broken and needs to be
fixed," Cantwell said.  "It was designed as a tool of the Cold War, to
help America fight against enemies that no longer exist.  If we continue
to prevent American companies from meeting the worldwide demand for
cryptographic software, America gains nothing -- but those companies
stand to lose $6 billion and $9 billion a year."

     Paul Brainerd, CEO of Aldus in Seattle, said, "Rep. Cantwell's bill
would liberalize outdated export controls, which are threatening the
continued success of America's software companies in world markets.  In
order to remain competitive worldwide, American companies must be able
to offer features -- like information security -- demanded by our
customers and available from foreign companies."

     Cantwell said her legislation would not interfere with the
government's ability to control exports to nations with terrorist
tendencies (such as Iran, Libya and Syria) or other embargoed countries
(such as Cuba and North Korea).  On the other hand, she said, current
export controls on American software do not prevent anyone from
obtaining cryptographic software.

     "Much of this is ordinary shrink-wrapped software," Cantwell said,
"the kind millions of people buy every day for their home and business
computers at regular retail outlets.  International consumers who cannot
purchase American computer systems and software programs with encryption
features don't do without, they just buy those products elsewhere.  They
are concerned with protecting their privacy and keeping their businesses
secure."

     Cantwell said she is determined to bring the issue out from behind
closed doors and into the light of public debate before the House
Subcommittee on Economic Policy, Trade and Environment marks up the
Export Administration Act early next year.  She said she hopes her bill
will encourage the Administration to act quickly to revise export
controls on software -- perhaps before Congress reconvenes in late
January.

     "The Administration is reviewing this issue, and I think they are
interested in making the changes that will allow American companies to
remain competitive," Cantwell said.  "I would like nothing better than
to come back to Congress after the recess and discover that the problem
had been solved."

                              ###





AMERICAN COMPUTER COMPANIES MUST BE ALLOWED TO
EXPORT SOFTWARE WITH ENCRYPTION CAPABILITIES


_Introduction and Summary_

America's computer software and hardware companies, including such
well-known companies as Apple, DEC, Hewlett-Packard, IBM, Lotus,
Microsoft, Novell and Wordperfect, have been among the country's most
internationally competitive firms earning more than one-half of their
revenues from exports.  Unfortunately, this vital American industry is
directly threatened by unilateral U.S. Government export controls which
prevent those companies from meeting worldwide user demand for software
that includes encryption capabilities to protect computer data against
unauthorized disclosure, theft or alteration.  Legislative action is
needed to ensure that American companies do not lose critical
international markets to foreign software companies that operate without
significant export restrictions.


_The Problem_

With ready access to powerful, interconnected, computers, business and
home users increasingly are relying on electronic information storage
and transmissions to conduct their affairs.  At the same time, computer
users worldwide are demanding that computer software offer encryption
capabilities to ensure that their data is secure and its integrity is
maintained.

Unfortunately, current unilateral U.S. "munitions" export controls
administered by the National Security Agency and the State Department
effectively prohibit the export of American software programs offering
good encryption capabilities.

Yet these unilateral U.S. controls are _not_ effective in restricting
the availability of encryption abroad.  More than 200 generally
available, mass-market foreign commercial programs and products, as well
as many programs available from the Internet, all offer good encryption.
In addition, generally available software with encryption capabilities
is sold within the U.S. at thousands of retail outlets, by mail and over
the phone.  These programs may be transferred abroad in minutes by
anyone using a public telephone line and a computer modem.

The only result of continued U.S. export controls is to threaten the
continued preeminence of America's computer software and hardware
companies in world markets.  American software companies stand to lose
between $6 and $9 billion in annual revenues from sales of generally
available software. In addition, American hardware companies are losing
hundreds of millions of dollars in computer system sales every year,
because sales increasingly are dependent on the ability of a U.S. firm
to offer encryption as a feature of an integrated customer solution
involving hardware, software and services.


_The Solution_

Legislation introduced by U.S. Rep. Maria Cantwell would ensure that
exports of software with encryption capabilities would be controlled by
the Secretary of Commerce as a commercial item and would be exportable.
This legislation is strongly supported by the Business Software Alliance
and the Industry Coalition on Technology Transfer.


-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SECTION-BY-SECTION ANALYSIS OF CANTWELL BILL
EXPORT CONTROL LIBERALIZATION FOR
INFORMATION ECURITY PROGRAMS AND PRODUCTS


_Section 1_

Section 1 amends the Export Administration Act by adding a new
subsection that specifically addresses exports of computer hardware,
software and technology for information security including encryption.
The new subsection has three basic provisions:

1) It gives the Secretary of Commerce exclusive authority over the
export of such programs and products except those which are specifically
designed for military use, including command, control and intelligence
applications or for deciphering encrypted information.

2) The Government is generally prohibited from requiring a validated
export license for the export of generally available software (e.g. mass
market commercial or public domain software) or computer hardware simply
because it incorporates such software. 
Nevertheless, the Secretary will be able to continue controls on
countries of terrorists (like Lybia, Syria and Iran) or other embargoed
countries (like Cuba and North Korea) pursuant to the Trading With The
Enemy Act os the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (except for
instances where IEEPA is employed to extend EAA-based controls when the
EAA is not in force).

3) The Secretary is required to grant validated licenses for exports of
sotware to commercial users in any country to which exports of such
software has been approved for use by foreign financial institutions.
Importantly, the Secretary is not required to grant such export
approvals if there is substantial evidence that the software will be
diverted or modified for military or terrorists' end-use or re-exported
without requisite authorization.


_Section 2_

Section 2 provides definitions necessary for the proper implementation
of the substantive provisions.  For example, generally available
software is offered for sale or licensed to the public without
restriction and available through standard commercial channels of
distribution; sold as is without further customization; and designed to
be installed by the purchaser without additional assistance from the
publisher.  Computer hardware and computing devices are also defined.


---------------------------------------------------------------------



                         103D CONGRESS       H.R. 3627
                         1ST SESSION

                     ---------------------------------------

                         IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

MS. CANTWELL (for herself and ___) introduced the following bill which
was referred to the Committee on __________.


                    ---------------------------------------

A BILL

To amend the Export Administration Act of 1979 with
respect to the control of computers and related equipment.


1     Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-
2 tives of the United States of America in Congress Assembled,
3 SECTION 1. GENERALLY AVAILABLE SOFTWARE
4     Section 17 of the Export Administration Act of 1979
5 (50 U.S.C. App. 2416) is amended by adding at the end
6 thereof the following new subsection:
7     ``(g) COMPUTERS AND RELATED EQUIPMENT.---
8          ``(1) GENERAL RULE.---Subject to paragraphs
9     (2) and (3), the Secretary shall have exclusive au-


                              2


1     thority to control exports of all computer hardware,
2     software and technology for information security
3     (including encryption), except that which is specifi-
4     cally designed or modified for military use, including
5     command, control and intelligence applications.
6          ``(2) ITEMS NOT REQUIRING LICENSES.---No
7     validated license may be required, except pursuant
8     to the Trading With The Enemy Act or the Inter-
9     national Emergency Economic Powers Act (but only
10    to the extent that the authority of such act is not  
11    exercised to extend controls imposed under this act),
12    for the export or reexport of---
13               ``(A) any software, including software with
14          encryption capabilities, that is---
15                    ``(i) generally available, as is, and is
16               designed for installation by the purchaser;
17               or
18                    ``(ii) in the public domain or publicly
19               available because it is generally accessible
20               to the interested public in any form; or
21               ``(B) any computing device soley because
22          it incorporates or employs in any form software
23          (including software with encryption capabilities)
24          exempted from any requirement for a validated
25          license under subparagraph (A).


                                 3


1          ``(3) SOFTWARE WITH ENCRYPTION CAPABILI-
2     TIES.---The Secretary shall authorize the export or
3     reexport of software with encryption capabilities for
4     nonmilitary end-uses in any country to which ex-
5     ports of software of similar capability are permitted
6     for use by financial institutions not controlled in fact
7     by United States persons, unless there is substantial
8     evidence that such software will be---
9               ``(A) diverted to a military end-use or an
10          end-use supporting international terrorism;
11               ``(B) modified for military or terrorist end-
12          use; or
13               ``(C) reexported without requisite United
14          States authorization.
15          ``(4) DEFINITIONS.---As used in this
16     subsection---
17               ``(A) the term `generally available' means,
18          in the case of software (including software with
19          encryption capabilities), software that is offered
20          for sale, license, or transfer to any person with-
21          out restriction through any commercial means,
22          including, but not limited to, over-the-counter
23          retail sales, mail order transactions, phone
24          order transactions, electronic distribution, or
25          sale on approval;


                                4


1               ``(B) the term `as is' means, in the case of
2          software (including software with encryption ca-
3          pabilities), a software program that is not de-
4          signed, developed, or tailored by the software
5          company for specific purchasers, except that
6          such purchasers may supply certain installation
7          parameters needed by the software program to
8          function properly with the purchaser's system
9          and may customize the software program by
10          choosing among options contained in the soft-
11          ware program;
12               ``(C) the term `is designed for installation
13          by the purchaser' means, in the case of soft-
14          ware (including software with encryption capa-
15          bilities)---
16                    ``(i) the software company intends for
17               the purchaser (including any licensee or
18               transferee), who may not be the actual
19               program user, to install the software pro-
20               gram on a computing device and has sup-
21               plied the necessary instructions to do so,
22               except that the company may also provide
23               telephone help line services for software in-
24               stallation, electronic transmission, or basic
25               operations; and---



                                   5


1                    ``(ii) that the software program is de-
2               signed for installation by the purchaser
3               without further substantial support by the
4               supplier;
5               ``(D) the term `computing device' means a
6          device which incorporates one or more
7          microprocessor-based central processing units
8          that can accept, store, process or provide out-
9          put of data; and
10               ``(E) the term `computer hardware', when
11         used in conjunction with information security,
12         includes, but is not limited to, computer sys-
13         tems, equipment, application-specific assem-
14         blies, modules and integrated circuits.''






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: hfinney@shell.portal.com (Hal Finney)
Date: Fri, 26 Nov 93 19:13:59 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: META: Filter Detweiler
Message-ID: <9311270312.AA15108@jobe.shell.portal.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

It appears to me that Detweiler is not receiving the list; for example,
he apparently didn't see the posting giving the names of officials at
his university until it was forwarded to him several days later.

I would favor adding a filter preventing Detweiler's messages from
appearing on the list.  I know that this is a big step to take but his
messages have become so deranged that they have, IMO, no redeeming
value.  Whatever validity his original points may have had (and I do
think there was a kernel of a valid point there), his mental state is
such that his postings are now worthless.

I know that I can easily filter his messages myself, but it still wastes
list bandwidth and, worse, distracts people's attention from other,
more worthwhile, posts.  By lowering the quality of the list as a whole
Detweiler discourages people from subscribing.  New subscribers may
take his rants as typical of what we discuss here.  We are all harmed
by having people who could make a contribution leave the list, or be
distracted by Detweiler's messages and the responses to him.

Unless others strongly disagree, I urge Eric to install software to
eliminate Detweiler's postings.  I believe the evidence is strong
enough that the anon.penet.fi account nicknamed "S.Boxx" is actually
a Detweiler pseudonym that it should be filtered as well.  If other
pseudonyms appear I suppose we would have to consider them on a case
by case basis.

In order to conserve list bandwidth, let's try to avoid "me, too"
postings.  If you disagree, it's worth discussing, IMO, but if you
agree I'd suggest that messages be sent directly to Eric at
cypherpunks-request@toad.com or hughes@ah.com.

Hal Finney
hfinney@shell.portal.com

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.3a

iQCVAgUBLPaZZagTA69YIUw3AQHSnAP8Cbo7o6622IpA7HwY8lQAm6h66YE9wCrc
rkCZK2F6KnVRvuTxXbotvdx/RxQZPtIwZa6SmU8H1H/d/SAQSB74bavDsrzJRl5I
V5BNPmVL+zFSPZWgfXOQ8Apb3KTrtWmTyhXIgRbhJle3kyO5YJU2km50j98ZoN5d
2cPpzM0wHxA=
=hgGz
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: hfinney@shell.portal.com
Date: Fri, 26 Nov 93 19:15:44 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: META: Filter Detweiler
Message-ID: <9311270315.AA15336@jobe.shell.portal.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

It appears to me that Detweiler is not receiving the list; for example,
he apparently didn't see the posting giving the names of officials at
his university until it was forwarded to him several days later.

I would favor adding a filter preventing Detweiler's messages from
appearing on the list.  I know that this is a big step to take but his
messages have become so deranged that they have, IMO, no redeeming
value.  Whatever validity his original points may have had (and I do
think there was a kernel of a valid point there), his mental state is
such that his postings are now worthless.

I know that I can easily filter his messages myself, but it still wastes
list bandwidth and, worse, distracts people's attention from other,
more worthwhile, posts.  By lowering the quality of the list as a whole
Detweiler discourages people from subscribing.  New subscribers may
take his rants as typical of what we discuss here.  We are all harmed
by having people who could make a contribution leave the list, or be
distracted by Detweiler's messages and the responses to him.

Unless others strongly disagree, I urge Eric to install software to
eliminate Detweiler's postings.  I believe the evidence is strong
enough that the anon.penet.fi account nicknamed "S.Boxx" is actually
a Detweiler pseudonym that it should be filtered as well.  If other
pseudonyms appear I suppose we would have to consider them on a case
by case basis.

In order to conserve list bandwidth, let's try to avoid "me, too"
postings.  If you disagree, it's worth discussing, IMO, but if you
agree I'd suggest that messages be sent directly to Eric at
cypherpunks-request@toad.com or hughes@ah.com.

Hal Finney
hfinney@shell.portal.com

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.3a

iQCVAgUBLPaZZagTA69YIUw3AQHSnAP8Cbo7o6622IpA7HwY8lQAm6h66YE9wCrc
rkCZK2F6KnVRvuTxXbotvdx/RxQZPtIwZa6SmU8H1H/d/SAQSB74bavDsrzJRl5I
V5BNPmVL+zFSPZWgfXOQ8Apb3KTrtWmTyhXIgRbhJle3kyO5YJU2km50j98ZoN5d
2cPpzM0wHxA=
=hgGz
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Jeremy Smith <jersmit@temp.eis.calstate.edu>
Date: Fri, 26 Nov 93 20:04:00 PST
To: Cypherpunks <cypherpunks@toad.com>
Subject: Telnet specs.
Message-ID: <Pine.3.87.9311261959.A22747-0100000@temp>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



	I know this might not be the most appropriate list to post this 
to, but I need to know what ports Telnet uses for standard use.  Mainly, 
I implemented the Telnet bouncer program that was posted here a while 
back, and when trying to connect to hosts that don't require a port 
number it still asks me for one.

	i.e., when I try to connect to archie.sura.net through the 
bouncer, it asks me for a port number.  When I use my standard Telnet 
program it will connect with just archie.sura.net as the address.  Does 
anybody know a site where I can find this info?  Thanx in advance and my 
apologies for any waste of bandwidth!

 -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
                Jeremy Smith -*jersmit@eis.calstate.edu*-
          My views are my own and nobody else can have them!
 -----------------------------------------------------------------------------






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: an52436@anon.penet.fi (Mephisto)
Date: Fri, 26 Nov 93 12:38:56 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Comments on NSA (was: "Pyrrhus Cracks RSA?")
Message-ID: <9311262038.AA27804@anon.penet.fi>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Well, doesn't it make some sense given the utility of prime numbers in
cryptography, that the NSA, or anyone else interested in breaking codes for that
matter, would have simply dedicated a computer or two to the long-term project
of determining all of the prime numbers under x bits long?  Granted this would
take a while, but the NSA has the time, the computers, and the other resources
necessary to do this.  Having all of these prime numbers would greatly reduce
the effort necessary to crack PGP/RSA-type cryptosystems which rely on prime
numbers.  It would reduce the number of factors a brute-force attack would
have to check dramatically.  Or am I completely off-base?


					Mephisto
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
To find out more about the anon service, send mail to help@anon.penet.fi.
Due to the double-blind, any mail replies to this message will be anonymized,
and an anonymous id will be allocated automatically. You have been warned.
Please report any problems, inappropriate use etc. to admin@anon.penet.fi.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Sandy <72114.1712@CompuServe.COM>
Date: Fri, 26 Nov 93 17:54:30 PST
To: <cypherpunks@toad.com>
Subject: ANOTHER FAVORABLE ARTICLE
Message-ID: <931127014929_72114.1712_FHF59-1@CompuServe.COM>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
  SANDY SANDFORT               Reply to:  ssandfort@attmail.com
 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Punksters,

Strong encryption got another boost from the hard money crowd.
The newsletter, /Strategic Investment/ featured an article
called, "Escape to Cypherspace [sic]: The Information Revolution
and the demise of the income tax."  It was written by James
Bennett who is the "Technology Editor of /Strategic Investment/
and is writing a book on nanotechnology for the M.I.T. Press.

Here is the first paragraph:

         Readers of /Strategic Investment/ are already aware
    of the crucial role of the microchip in eroding the
    power of governments over their citizens.  Recent
    developments herald an expansion of this role that
    promises to dwarf the effects seen to date.  Just as
    atomic theory was seen as an arcane interest in 1939, so
    this development, known as public-key encryption, is now
    familiar only to a handful of academics.  Yet in the
    coming decade, it may create consequences which change
    the life of everyone on the planet even more than the
    atomic bomb.

Following this was some history and theory of public key.  He had
several nice paragraphs about PGP, the Clipper chip and the
united front put up by "hackers and mainstream communications and
computer companies" in opposing the Clipper.

He explicitly mentions (and approves of) the threat offshore
banks using encryption technology pose to taxing authorities.

At one point he writes:

    This development [cypherspace commerce] will accelerate
    rapidly existing trends towards breakdown of large
    institutions and hierarchical structures.  Governments
    will have much of their revenue base undercut--and any
    attempt to tighten the screws on taxpayers will just
    increase the escape to Cypherspace.

But he later opines:

    Some observers of this trend predict a coming "crypto-
    anarchy" where governments fall apart entirely under the
    pressure of anonymous communication.  This is not
    likely.  Governments have shown an amazing adaptability
    over the millennia as they adjust to developments such
    as large-scale slavery, feudalism, gunpowder and
    industrialization.

Quite a favorable article, over all.

 S a n d y

>>>>>>    Please send e-mail to:  ssandfort@attmail.com    <<<<<<
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Sandy <72114.1712@CompuServe.COM>
Date: Fri, 26 Nov 93 17:53:56 PST
To: <cypherpunks@toad.com>
Subject: THE DETWEILER PLEDGE
Message-ID: <931127014946_72114.1712_FHF59-2@CompuServe.COM>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
  SANDY SANDFORT               Reply to:  ssandfort@attmail.com
 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Punksters,

I hereby take the following Pledge.  Will you take it too?


    WHEREAS, Larry Detweiler has posted long and numerous
    messages to Cypherpunks under his own name and several
    pseudonyms,

    AND WHEREAS, over time, such messages have became more
    and more unintelligible, repetitive and/or threatening,

    AND WHEREAS, attempts to respond to such messages have
    resulted in ever increasing psychotic reactions from
    Detweiler,

    I, therefore, pledge never to read, nor respond to,
    posts written by Larry Detweiler, or his pseudonyms.

    Further, I pledge never to read, nor respond to, posts
    written in response to posts by Larry Detweiler, or to
    subjects raised by Larry Detweiler.

    I offer the above pledge in the hopes that such action,
    especially in concert with others on the Cypherpunks
    list, will deprive Larry Detweiler of an audience and
    thus result in his voluntarily withdrawal from this
    forum.

    S a n d y  S a n d f o r t


>>>>>>    Please send e-mail to:  ssandfort@attmail.com    <<<<<<
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Jim choate <ravage@wixer.bga.com>
Date: Fri, 26 Nov 93 20:14:00 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Banning any subscriber...
Message-ID: <9311270401.AA12984@wixer>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I am new to the list as well as the local Austin CypherPunks group and have
high hopes of contributing to the ongoing discussion of crypto. I have been
playing w/ PGP since it first came available and crypto in general for quiite
a few years. I was really attracted by the sence of community as well as the
reputation of the CypherPunks.

However, with the latest news that 'we' are going to start banning
individuals because they have nothing to contribute is something I personaly
cant support. If you want free speech then you have to give it. If you
personaay want to filter your mail (equivalent to changing the channel) that
is fine, but to a priori filter posts from a individual is cencorship (no
letting you discuss your subject at all). I personaly do not support such
authoritorian actions and will dis-associate myself from the CypherPunks
and will advise others not to associate either. This type of action is un-
called for and has no business on this type of communication network.

I advise all subscribers to this list to NOT support any action by any
individual or group to carry this idea into action. This is not what
CypherPunks or freedom is about.


"Those who give up essential liberty to obtain security deserve neither
liberty or security."

                                           Benjamin Franklin





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: greg@ideath.goldenbear.com (Greg Broiles)
Date: Fri, 26 Nov 93 22:29:31 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Filter to exclude Detweiler?
Message-ID: <ceuNDc1w164w@ideath.goldenbear.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



I've personally come to the conclusion that it's no longer useful to (a) 
attempt to communicate with Detweiler, or (b) pay attention to what he 
writes.

I am, however, opposed to source-filtering him at philosophical and 
practical levels.

I think his bad craziness is evident enough from his postings that anyone 
paying much attention will conclude he's disconnected from external reality; 
it shouldn't take more than a few messages for folks to reach this 
conclusion. (I admit with some chagrin that it took more than a few for me 
to do that.) I think that source filtering is at least a close kin to 
censorship, and I'd vote to steer clear of it.

I also think that attempting to source-filter him may lead to some sort of 
"identity arms race", via remailers, anon-servers, and the like. Such an 
arms race would be distracting, annoying, and lead to further wasted time, 
effort, and energy on the part of people who ought to have better things to 
do. :)

I encourage folks to look into improving technology which would allow for 
destination-filtering, e.g., kill-files and their ilk. (Next-generation 
killfiles - ones which attempt some sort of textual 
interpretation/classification beyond headers - implemented at the 
destination point have the added benefit that the filter target can't easily 
deduce from the list traffic what algorithm/pattern is being used, and 
thereby avoid it.)

For what it's worth, I write the above in spite of the fact that I don't 
have a kill-file in the reader-agent that I read C-punks with, and I pay for 
every minute of transmission time used to receive C-punks, including 
Detweiler's lengthy messages.


--
Greg Broiles
greg@goldenbear.com                     Baked, not fried.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Brian Beker <beker@netcom.com>
Date: Sat, 27 Nov 93 00:04:00 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Where the lonely wind blows next
Message-ID: <Pine.3.85.9311270048.A11233-0100000@netcom7>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

Here's something funny from an12070 that popped up in comp.org.eff.talk. 
I won't bother to forward it all, especially in view of all the recent 
talk of filtering this singular voice.  The rest of it is in the news.

Brian

[Header's here for those of you who enjoy that kind of thing....]


- From netcom.com!csus.edu!wupost!howland.reston.ans.net!pipex!sunic!trane.uninett.no!news.eunet.no!nuug!news.eunet.fi!anon.penet.fi Fri Nov 26 23:49:21 1993
Xref: netcom.com talk.politics.crypto:1348 alt.privacy:9824 alt.privacy.anon-server:345 news.admin.policy:7982 comp.org.eff.talk:22312 comp.admin.policy:4449 alt.conspiracy:37431
Message-ID: <071303Z27111993@anon.penet.fi>
Path: netcom.com!csus.edu!wupost!howland.reston.ans.net!pipex!sunic!trane.uninett.no!news.eunet.no!nuug!news.eunet.fi!anon.penet.fi
Newsgroups: talk.politics.crypto,alt.privacy,alt.privacy.anon-server,news.admin.policy,comp.org.eff.talk,comp.admin.policy,alt.conspiracy
From: an12070@anon.penet.fi (The Executioner)
X-Anonymously-To: talk.politics.crypto,alt.privacy,alt.privacy.anon-server,news.admin.policy,comp.org.eff.talk,comp.admin.policy,alt.conspiracy
Organization: Anonymous contact service
Reply-To: an12070@anon.penet.fi
Date: Sat, 27 Nov 1993 07:06:26 UTC
Subject: CRYPTOANARCHIST INFILTRATION ALERT
Lines: 61

ATTENTION ALL INTERNET PERSONNEL

THE INTERNET OUTLET

szabo@netcom.com

HAS BEEN IDENTIFIED AS A CRYPTOANARCHIST CYBERSPACE INFILTRATION SITE
TO A 93.67% DEGREE CERTAINTY VIA PSEUDOSPOOFING DETECTION SOFTWARE.

MAIL, POSTS, AND OTHER EMANATIONS FROM THIS OUTLET ARE CONSIDERED
LIKELY TO BE HIGHLY SUBVERSIVE AND DANGEROUS CRYPTOANARCHIST
DISINFORMATION AND PROPAGANDA FROM ONE OR MORE CRYPTOANARCHIST
CO-CONSPIRATORS. MULTIPLE SENSITIVE INTERNET MAILING LISTS, FAQS, AND
FORUMS HAVE BEEN CONTAMINATED. 


[Many more caps deleted.]

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.3a

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VHoEMRwQJx8xHFE+iKlgf0M0Hrme65cYjK31+hj7C41DJNgY7eymYBCjtcEL8X1y
ZNLnwMFGTIVXtMUUAd/XwbfqURyGCDihzwos08mHLh/NzBOgsyHzC0Vqkp5uYjmZ
Q92oCyENEJk=
=xwos
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Date: Sat, 27 Nov 93 00:24:00 PST
To: Cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: ANOTHER FAVORABLE ARTICLE
In-Reply-To: <Pine.3.05.9311270233.B25301-a100000@access.digex.net>
Message-ID: <199311270823.AAA20536@mail.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Joe Thomas wrote, responding to Sandy Sandfort's message:
...
> > Strong encryption got another boost from the hard money crowd.
> > The newsletter, /Strategic Investment/ featured an article
> > called, "Escape to Cypherspace [sic]: The Information Revolution
> > and the demise of the income tax."  It was written by James
> > Bennett who is the "Technology Editor of /Strategic Investment/
> > and is writing a book on nanotechnology for the M.I.T. Press.
> > 
> > Here is the first paragraph:
> 
> Could you give me a pointer for more info on this newsletter?  Sounds like
> it's right around where I'm ending up philosophically...

I haven't seen this newsletter myself, though I knew Jim Bennett was
writing up something along these lines. Jim attended our first
physical Cypherpunks meeting, in the fall of 1992, and may even still
be reading this list. (Jim?)

Ironically, Jim was one of the folks who first heard about "crypto
anarchy" in the summer of 1988, at the home of Phil Salin and Gayle
Pergamit. I spoke to a group of around a dozen and got a good
reaction. One of the listeners, Dave Ross, came up with the "anonymous
escrow service," the escrow agent "Esther" who his mutually anonyous
to both Alice and Bob, but who is motivated to be an honest broker by
reason of this anonymity. (Simply, an escrow agent is interested in a
continuing revenue stream set by reputaion...this is why most
businesses "work" even when in most cases they could theoretically
rip-off or "burn" their customers.)

It's gratifying to now see the word spreading. Speaking of which, you
should all be aware that the "Wired" piece on "Crypto Rebels" is
available online from the "infobot" service at "Wired." To retrieve
it, send a message to "infobot@wired.com" and in the _body_ of the
message (which should be otherwise blank) include this line:

GET 1.2/features/crypto-rebels

There is a whole command set, and index of articles, available. I
believe the simple messages HELP and INDEX are the ones you want.

(P.S. I don't think case matters, so HELP or help should both work.)

--Tim May

-- 
..........................................................................
Timothy C. May         | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,  
tcmay@netcom.com       | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
408-688-5409           | knowledge, reputations, information markets, 
W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA  | black markets, collapse of governments.
Higher Power: 2^756839 | Public Key: PGP and MailSafe available.
Note: I put time and money into writing this posting. I hope you enjoy it.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Joe Thomas <jthomas@access.digex.net>
Date: Fri, 26 Nov 93 23:24:00 PST
To: Sandy <72114.1712@compuserve.com>
Subject: Re: ANOTHER FAVORABLE ARTICLE
In-Reply-To: <931127014929_72114.1712_FHF59-1@CompuServe.COM>
Message-ID: <Pine.3.05.9311270233.B25301-a100000@access.digex.net>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


On cypherpunks you wrote: 
> Punksters,
> 
> Strong encryption got another boost from the hard money crowd.
> The newsletter, /Strategic Investment/ featured an article
> called, "Escape to Cypherspace [sic]: The Information Revolution
> and the demise of the income tax."  It was written by James
> Bennett who is the "Technology Editor of /Strategic Investment/
> and is writing a book on nanotechnology for the M.I.T. Press.
> 
> Here is the first paragraph:

Could you give me a pointer for more info on this newsletter?  Sounds like
it's right around where I'm ending up philosophically...

Also, I quietly took my unilateral Detweiler non-response pledge a couple
weeks ago.  I think he's getting bored with us, actually.  Unfortunately,
he's shown up on imp-interest...

Thanks,
Joe






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: bart@netcom.com (Harry Bartholomew)
Date: Sat, 27 Nov 93 02:44:05 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: The other side of LD
Message-ID: <199311271042.CAA28624@mail.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



    I never thought I be caught dead forward an LD post, but here
    it is since I may be the only 'punk on the NEW-LIST announcements.
    Here we see the other side. I am beginning to get a funny feeling
    about all this. Consider:

    1. The book published for profit by editing the submissions to
       rec.humor.funny.
    2. The recent "compilation copyright" filed by Keith Peterson
       on the material contained in the Simtel archive.
    3. The default apparent public domain into which all our postings
       seem to fall.

    Is LD, the prolific author that he obviously is, merely baiting
    the creative minds of the cypherpunks to gather material for his
    forthcoming novel(s)?

    Bart
    ///////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
Forwarded message:
> From @VM1.NODAK.EDU:owner-new-list@VM1.NODAK.EDU Fri Nov 26 11:02:02 1993
> Message-Id: <199311261901.LAA15086@mail.netcom.com>
> Date:         Fri, 26 Nov 1993 12:47:04 CST
> Reply-To: ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu, julf@eunet.fi
> Sender: NEW-LIST - New List Announcements <NEW-LIST@VM1.NoDak.EDU>
> From: "L. Detweiler" <ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
> Subject:      NEW: Cypherwonks
> To: Multiple recipients of list NEW-LIST <NEW-LIST@VM1.NoDak.EDU>
> 
> cypherwonks@lists.eunet.fi
> 
>    The brand new cypherwonks list on Majordomo@Lists.EUnet.fi is for
>    ambitious, energetic, can-do, hands-on individuals interested in
>    general cutting-edge `cyberspatial development' projects such as in
>    cryptography, digital cash, and `electronic democracy'.  (A `wonk' is
>    slang for a `meticulous detail person'.) The list is both an informal
>    gathering place for the technically adept and also a focal point for
>    branching off into serious project coordination.  We place a premium
>    on membership by technical professionals and try to hone our posts to
>    accommodate the busy (who, according to the adage, are those who get
>    all the serious work done).  We are inspired by the Internet but
>    don't see it as ideal yet and are particularly interested in
>    cooperation, building prototypes, forging standards, and `long-term
>    incremental evolution' in our designs and goals.  We're also
>    intensely interested in following and influencing the technological
>    and political developments of the emerging `national cyberspatial
>    infrastructure.'
> 
>    The list is *not* for political diatribes in the `radical
>    libertarian' agenda, e.g.  rants against all forms of government as
>    oppressive, corrupt, or evil, or promoting the use of cryptographic
>    technologies for subversive activities like tax evasion, black
>    marketeering, or evading law enforcement.  The list is *not* for
>    discussions of how to manipulate the honest through the use of
>    software technologies.  The list is *not* for unconstructive
>    negativism against other's proposals.  Above all, we are interested
>    in forging a `civilized cyberspace' out of the current `Internet
>    wilderness'.
> 
>    Historical note: the list was formed as a less ornery, more moderate
>    splinter group from the Cypherpunks by J.Helsingius (creator of the
>    popular anon.penet.fi anonymizing service) and L.Detweiler (author of
>    many FAQs including `Privacy & Anonymity on the Internet).
> 
>    To subscribe, send a message with the body
>       subscribe cypherwonks
>    to Majordomo@Lists.EUnet.fi.
> 
>    A more comprehensive charter is available with the command `info
>    cypherwonks' in the message body.
> 
>    To post, send a message to cypherwonks@lists.eunet.fi.
> 


-- 




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: szabo@netcom.com (Nick Szabo)
Date: Sat, 27 Nov 93 03:34:06 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: response to Detweiler/Boxx/ad nauseum
Message-ID: <199311271130.DAA23032@mail.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



I'm really at a loss how to respond to this lunatic.  I hope
the following doesn't just stoke his boilers more, but on
a worldwide public forum I don't think I can let something
like that go unanswered.  Anybody out there with good advice
(legal, tactical, or otherwise), I'd greatly appreciate it.

Here's what I wrote:

Newsgroups: talk.politics.crypto,alt.privacy,alt.privacy.anon-server,
news.admin.policy,comp.org.eff.talk,comp.admin.policy,alt.conspiracy
Subject: Re: CRYPTOANARCHIST INFILTRATION ALERT
References: <071303Z27111993@anon.penet.fi>

an12070@anon.penet.fi (The Executioner) writes:

>ATTENTION ALL INTERNET PERSONNEL
>THE INTERNET OUTLET

>szabo@netcom.com

>HAS BEEN IDENTIFIED AS A CRYPTOANARCHIST CYBERSPACE INFILTRATION SITE
>TO A 93.67% DEGREE CERTAINTY VIA PSEUDOSPOOFING DETECTION SOFTWARE.
>....

Why Mr. Detweiler, that's mighty flattering of you!

I'd be even more flattered by Detweiler's singling
me out, if he wasn't also making death threats and 
accusations of criminal violations against several people who 
have recently disagreed with him, trying to track down our
physical locations, and otherwise doing his best to scare the
shit out of net users with his digital stalking.  No, Mr. 
Detweiler, I'm not "pseudospoofing", but with
nutcases like you on the net I sure as hell wish I was.

Nick Szabo				szabo@netcom.com




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Mike Ingle <MIKEINGLE@delphi.com>
Date: Sat, 27 Nov 93 01:19:33 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: The latest lunatic rant
Message-ID: <01H5SP844JLU938CEQ@delphi.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>Newsgroups:
>talk.politics.crypto,alt.privacy,alt.privacy.anon-server,
>news.admin.policy,comp.org.eff.talk,comp.admin.policy,alt.conspiracy
>From: an12070@anon.penet.fi (The Executioner)
>Subject: CRYPTOANARCHIST INFILTRATION ALERT

As you can see, this one was pretty widely distributed. While I agree
that it would be nice if he stopped bugging us, at least everyone here
knows he's nuts. The same cannot be said for all of these newsgroups.
Several people (especially szabo) should post replies and explain that
he has been flooding our list with similar ravings and death threats
for months. Those who have received death threats from the an12070
address could also send mail to Julf about him. Death threats would
certainly be considered "improper use."




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: an12070@anon.penet.fi (The Executioner)
Date: Sat, 27 Nov 1993 07:06:26 UTC
Subject: CRYPTOANARCHIST INFILTRATION ALERT
Message-ID: <071303Z27111993@anon.penet.fi>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


ATTENTION ALL INTERNET PERSONNEL

THE INTERNET OUTLET

szabo@netcom.com

HAS BEEN IDENTIFIED AS A CRYPTOANARCHIST CYBERSPACE INFILTRATION SITE
TO A 93.67% DEGREE CERTAINTY VIA PSEUDOSPOOFING DETECTION SOFTWARE.

MAIL, POSTS, AND OTHER EMANATIONS FROM THIS OUTLET ARE CONSIDERED
LIKELY TO BE HIGHLY SUBVERSIVE AND DANGEROUS CRYPTOANARCHIST
DISINFORMATION AND PROPAGANDA FROM ONE OR MORE CRYPTOANARCHIST
CO-CONSPIRATORS. MULTIPLE SENSITIVE INTERNET MAILING LISTS, FAQS, AND
FORUMS HAVE BEEN CONTAMINATED. 

INFORMATION ORIGINATING FROM THIS OUTLET IN THE FOLLOWING AREAS IS
PARTICULARLY SUSPECT:

- PROMOTION OF PSEUDOANONYMITY AND THE COLLECTION OF MULTIPLE FAKE
CYBERSPACE IDENTITIES (MISTATED AS `PURE ANONYMITY')
- PROMOTION OF UNTRACEABLE `BLACK' CASH AND RELATED CRYPTOGRAPHIC
TECHNIQUES (PARTICULARLY CHAUMIAN)
- FALSE REFERENCES AND DISINFORMATION ON THE ACTUAL `CRYPTOANARCHIST' AGENDA
- PROMOTION OF THE `COLLAPSE OF GOVERNMENTS'
- SUBTLE ANTI-DEMOCRACY GOALS AND ANTI-DEMOCRATIC SENTIMENTS
- PROMOTION OF DISINFORMATION, PROPAGANDA, AND DECEPTION E.G. IN THE MEDIA
- PROMOTION OF TAX EVASION
- PROMOTION OF CRIMINAL EVASION OF IDENTITIFICATION MEASURES FOR E.G.
BLACK MARKETEERING
- ELEVATING AND PERPETUATING SUBVERSIONS OF IDENTITY E.G.
PSEUDOSPOOFING AND PSEUDOPOOLS AS `LIBERATING FLUIDITY OF IDENTITY' ON THE INTERNET
- PROMOTION OF ABUSE OF INFORMATION THROUGH E.G. LEAKS, BURGLARY, OR ESPIONAGE
- FALSE DETAILS ON PERSONAL IDENTITY AND CORROBORATION OF THE EXISTENCE
OF OTHER IDENTITIES
- INFILTRATION, PROVOCATION, AND SABOTAGE OF MAILING LIST DISCUSSIONS
OUTSIDE OF CHARTERS INTO THE `CRYPTOANARCHIST' AGENDA
- PROMOTION OF OTHER FAKE IDENTITIES
- PUBLIC AND PRIVATE ATTACKS ON REAL IDENTITIES EMPLOYING
COUNTERMEASURES AGAINST THE CRYPTOANARCHIST MOVEMENT
- MANIPULATION AND TERRORISM IN PRIVATE MAIL
- COLLECTION OF SENSITIVE PRIVATE INFORMATION AND MAIL FROM
COMMUNICATING `OUTSIDE' INDIVIDUALS

INTERNET INDIVIDUALS AND ORGANIZATIONS ARE ADVISED TO EXAMINE AND PURGE
ARCHIVES AND RECORDS OF ALL INFORMATION ORIGINATING FROM THIS OUTLET AS
CRYPTOANARCHIST DISINFORMATION. ITEMS RECOVERED FROM THIS OUTLET SHOULD
BE REPOSTED FOR PUBLIC EXPOSURE.

QUESTIONS REGARDING THIS ADVISORY ALERT CAN BE ADDRESSED TO

cypherpunks@toad.com

BACKGROUND INFORMATION ON THE CRYPTOANARCHIST MOVEMENT IS AVAILABLE IN
RISKS 15.25, 15.27, AND 15.28X, FTP CRVAX.SRI.COM DIRECTORY /RISKS:

ADDITIONAL BULLETINS WILL BE ISSUED AS EVENTS WARRANT.
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
To find out more about the anon service, send mail to help@anon.penet.fi.
Due to the double-blind, any mail replies to this message will be anonymized,
and an anonymous id will be allocated automatically. You have been warned.
Please report any problems, inappropriate use etc. to admin@anon.penet.fi.

[end posting]

> BACKGROUND INFORMATION ON THE CRYPTOANARCHIST MOVEMENT IS AVAILABLE IN
> RISKS 15.25, 15.27, AND 15.28X, FTP CRVAX.SRI.COM DIRECTORY /RISKS:

well, i've looked on crvax.sri.com and there is no (at least not
anonymously ftp'able) risk directory.

what is a cryptoanarachist anyway?

see you
william




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: hazman@cco.caltech.edu (R. Lawrence Martinez)
Date: Sat, 27 Nov 93 08:20:39 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: public key encryption list
Message-ID: <9311271619.AA19324@scratchy.cco.caltech.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain




Please send 


Hazman@cco.caltech.edu




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: rjc@gnu.ai.mit.edu (Ray)
Date: Sat, 27 Nov 93 05:39:08 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Secret sharing program available
Message-ID: <9311271337.AA04964@albert.gnu.ai.mit.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


[Note: I'm not subscribed so if you reply, remember to Cc: me]

   A few hours ago I was bored so I started experimenting with Shamir
"threshold" sharing in G++. The result: Cryptosplit.  It's a hacked up
but working implementation of polynomial interpolation over an integer
field of prime order. Basically, you can take an arbitrary integer, D,
generate m keys, k of which are required to reconstruct the original
integer.  Its inner workings are very simple. Pick a random polynomial
P(x) of degree (k-1) over Z_p with constant term D, and generate m 2-tuples 
(x, P(x)). These "keys" are output in the form x*p+y which can be reversed by
the division algorithm. 
   The interpolation process generates a k X k matrix of linear equations
by plugging (x,y) into y=a_n*x_n + ... + a_1*x + 1*D and then solving
by Gaussian elimination (upper triangular matrix. element k,k is the constant
term D)

   Right now it's not very usable since you have to choose your own 
prime modulus > D (I was too lazy to write a prime generation routine.
I just choose Mersenne primes of sufficient size) and because
it only accepts base-ten input from the command line. It needs to be
optimized a lot too.

   If anyone wants the source (especially if they want to fix it up),
let me know.

-Ray


-- Ray Cromwell          |   Engineering is the implementation of science; --
-- rjc@gnu.ai.mit.edu    |       politics is the implementation of faith.  --




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: an32951@anon.penet.fi (Coerr)
Date: Sat, 27 Nov 93 00:45:21 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Looking for Remailers
Message-ID: <9311270844.AA07403@anon.penet.fi>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



I need a couple of good remailers.  Can -- er, /would/ anybody point me 
in the general direction of one?

Coerr

-------------------------------------------------------------------------
To find out more about the anon service, send mail to help@anon.penet.fi.
Due to the double-blind, any mail replies to this message will be anonymized,
and an anonymous id will be allocated automatically. You have been warned.
Please report any problems, inappropriate use etc. to admin@anon.penet.fi.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Jim choate <ravage@wixer.bga.com>
Date: Sat, 27 Nov 93 07:34:16 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Banning any subscriber
Message-ID: <9311271521.AA17800@wixer>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Hi again,

I want to thank everyone for their repsonce to my earlier mail. I do have
some questions however.

1. CypherPunks supports crypto so people cant tamper w/ my mail but you want
   to censor somebody at the source. How can you support this?

2. Everyone says this list is private. Nowhere has this EVER been mentioned
   in any conversation or info that I have read. The implication in all the
   posts, print articles, and talk at the local group meet led me to believe
   CypherPunks was a public forum for discussion and implimentation of crypto
   related material. Was I misunderstanding something?

3. Sine at least part of the networks and hardware the mail list is used on
   is publily funded how can you construe it as private w/o some form of
   moderator or subscriction contract?

4. The responces to L.D. about mail-bombs and posing as a AIDS lab is much
   worse and more troublesome to me than anything I have seen L.D. post. Not
   only is some of the actions proposed criminal but I fail to see how a
   group which relies on its reputation can support or condone such comments.

5. If you don't like what he says then kill the mail and forget it.





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Anonymous <nowhere@bsu-cs.bsu.edu>
Date: Sat, 27 Nov 93 07:09:42 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Pretty Good Hero? (Boardwatch excerpt)
Message-ID: <9311271507.AA26829@bsu-cs.bsu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



excerpted from:

 
         B  O  A  R  D  W  A  T  C  H      M  A  G  A  Z  I  N  E
 
                   Guide to the World of Online Services
 
 Editor: Jack Rickard   Volume VII: Issue 11   ISSN:1054-2760   November 1993
 
 ==============
 LEGALLY ONLINE
 ==============
 by Lance Rose
 
Phil Zimmermann is a computer programmer and good citizen with an earnest
desire to help others. For much of his adult life he expressed his concern
through political activism, from marches in the 70's through teaching classes
in military policy in the 80's. Along the way, Zimmermann became a computer
network user. As the 90's began, he saw a new threat to our civil rights
surface: a movement to curtail the ability of network users to discuss
matters in private. Many others on the net saw the same thing, but Zimmermann
actually did something about it. He melded his humanitarian ideals with his
programming and cryptographic skills to create an e-mail encryption program
for Everyman called Pretty Good Privacy, or PGP. He did this at no small cost
to himself. An independent computer consultant, Zimmermann shelved most of
his paying gigs while finishing up PGP, missing five mortgage payments on his
family's home in the process.
 
Zimmermann finished PGP in early 1991, released it in the U.S. on the
Internet from his home in Colorado, and it instantly achieved worldwide
popularity among network cognoscenti. PGP is free, and its customers get a
lot more than they bargained for. It uses a powerful RSA public key
encryption system, in which each participant owns one or more private
key/public key pairs. Messages encrypted by one key in the pair can only be
decrypted using the other key. The great advantage of public key encryption
is that, unlike older schemes, like DES, (the current U.S. standard), you can
publicly circulate the key for encrypting messages sent to you by others,
since only your secret private key can decrypt those messages. When someone
sends you a private message using PGP, first it encrypts the message text
using the IDEA algorithm, (the International Data Encryption Algorithm,
developed in Europe and comparable to DES), and generates a unique,
confidential key just for decrypting the message (we'll call it the "text
key"). Then he or she uses the RSA public key they received from you to
encrypt the text key, and sends you both the IDEA-encrypted message and the
RSA-encrypted text key. You would then use your RSA private key to decrypt
the text key, and finally use the text key in turn to decrypt IDEA-encrypted
message.
 
It would be conceptually simpler to use only the RSA public and private keys
for encrypting and decrypting the text, and cut out the IDEA encryption step,
but there is a practical cost. Text encryption using RSA requires far more
computer processing time and power than IDEA-based encryption. Zimmermann
wanted to give people the full benefit of PGP without wasting time watching
their computers crunch numbers, so he used the far easier to process, (but
still highly secure), IDEA technique for message texts, and saved the public
key RSA process for encrypting only the IDEA text keys, which are a mere 128
bits long. Thus, PGP creates securely encrypted texts, gives people the
ability to distribute their public keys far and wide with no compromise in
security, and extends strong encryption capabilities to those with small
computers.
 
After its release PGP became something of a community development project,
and it is now in version 2.3. Other programmers and cryptographers work on
enhancing the source code, creating foreign language translations of the user
interface, and porting PGP from its original DOS platform to other popular
computer platforms such as Mac, Vax, and most flavors of Unix, further
increasing its usefulness to network users of all stripes. In the past two
months, however, some dramatic new chapters swiftly opened in the ongoing
saga of Phil Zimmermann and PGP.
 
First, on the positive side, some patent-related questions nagging PGP from
the very beginning finally may be close to resolution. As soon as PGP
appeared, a West Coast company called Public Key Partners, headed by Jim
Bidzos, claimed it violated a patent they held in computer implementations of
the RSA encryption algorithm. While Bidzos did not rush into court, he did
seek to suppress PGP's distribution. Among other things, he sought out the
major online distribution points for PGP, such as large online services like
CompuServe and GEnie BBS's including The Well, and requested that they
immediately remove the PGP files from distribution because they infringed on
his patents. Most services discontinued providing PGP,and it soon became an
underground classic, difficult to find unless you asked the right people.
Fortunately, there were many such spread across the net. Rather than
challenge the patent claim, which some net observers think a worthwhile
effort, Zimmermann made many requests to Bidzos to obtain a license to use
RSA without hassle in PGP. Eventually, network community and industry leaders
tried to obtain some sort of compromise between Zimmermann and Bidzos. Bidzos
refused all entreaties and continues to oppose PGP.
 
In the meantime, a software company named ViaCrypt obtained a license a year
or two ago from Public Key Partners, (who appear willing to license virtually
anyone but Zimmermann), to use the RSA algorithm in software. ViaCrypt took
some time after securing the rights to figure out how it would use them.
Finally, last August, it approached Zimmermann with a proposal to create a
commercial version of PGP. This was a great business opportunity. ViaCrypt
could use its license to legitimize PGP for the commercial market, and both
could profit from PGP's high profile among companies interested in
encryption. To bring PGP within ViaCrypt's license from Bidzos, Zimmermann
and ViaCrypt have been replacing PGP's existing RSA encryption subroutines
with comparable licensed subroutines developed by ViaCrypt. Bidzos, through
his attorney, publicly expressed some doubt about whether the new ViaCrypt
product will fall within its RSA license rights. Anticipating this
possibility, ViaCrypt shrewdly trumped it in advance by securing a legal
opinion from Brown and Bain, considered by many computer lawyers, (this
author included), to be the leading computer law firm in the country, that
the hybrid product is within the scope of ViaCrypt's license from Public Key
Partners. The new program, tentatively brand named ViaCrypt PGP, is scheduled
for rollout on November 8th of this year.
 
If ViaCrypt PGP succeeds in the market, Zimmermann will make some money,
though he was never really was in it for the money. He is also working on a
new approach to the free version of PGP that may end the patent threats that
continually hinder its open distribution on the net. His current efforts
center on a set of encryption subroutines called RSAREF, released by Bidzos
through another of his companies, RSA Data Securities Inc. (RSADSI). There is
a license to the public to use the RSAREF subroutines free for noncommercial
purposes: you can't make money selling it, and you can't use it for
commercial messaging. By replacing PGP's custom RSA subroutines with publicly
licensed equivalents from RSAREF, Zimmermann could end the patent
infringement problem.
 
RSAREF was designed to let programmers develop privacy-enhanced mail (PEM)
programs using a scheme similar to that used by PGP. The text is encrypted
using an easy-to-process encryption algorithm involving a single key, ending
the patent infringement problem may not have been as easy at it first seemed.
The text key is encrypted using the processing-intensive RSA public key
scheme. The problem is that for the text encryption stage, RSADSI chose the
DES algorithm instead of the IDEA algorithm used in PGP.
 
DES was not perceived as a problem cipher until August of this year, at a
cryptographers' trade show called Crypto 93. A respected Bell Northern
Research scientist named Michael Weiner dropped a bombshell on the conference
by asserting, in essence, that DES was dead, as a dependably secure
encryption algorithm. Weiner had designed a high-speed "inside-out" DES
processor chip that could test 50 million keys per second, and serve as a the
basis for a highly effective DES-cracking machine. He had also priced
production of the chip with a chip fabricator, and in large but not enormous
quantities it would cost about $10.50 per chip. Using these figures, he said
a computer with 7,000 such chips would cost a vast amount, and could find the
key to any DES-encrypted message within 7 hours by testing every possible key
within that time, with a mean key-cracking time of 3.5 hours per encrypted
message. For $100 million, well within intelligence agency budgets, a
computer could be built that would crack the keys for DES-encrypted messages
at a clip of two minutes per key. This result would be achieved for texts
encrypted with 56 bit DES keys, where the decryptor has a little bit of plain
text he knows would be in the encrypted message, such as someone's name, or a
word or two. There are DES encryption schemes using longer keys, but the 56
bit key is the U.S. government standard, and the official or de facto
standard in many industry applications as well.
 
Weiner's brute force approach would be marvelously effective despite its lack
of elegance. For PEM computer programs using RSAREF in its current form,
there can no longer be dependable privacy. All texts encrypted using RSAREF's
standard 56 bit DES approach will, from this point forward, be vulnerable to
cracking at some point by a Weiner-type supercomputer. It will be pointless
to hide the DES key inside RSA encryption. Owners of the supercomputer could
find the key directly from the text, and need not bother with the encrypted
key. As Phil puts it, the RSA encryption of the DES key is like those little
secure boxes for holding front-door keys that realtors mount on houses being
shown to prospective buyers. The little box may be nearly impossible to break
into without the proper code, but there's always another possibility for
getting into the house without permission: break down the door or smash in
the window.
 
There's a way to avoid this with RSAREF, by invoking deeper subroutines in
the package to create PEM programs that use text encryption schemes more
dependable than the suddenly-reduced DES, such as the IDEA algorithm used
today in PGP. IDEA uses a 128 bit key instead of the 56 bit key standard in
DES, and its security has not been seriously questioned to date, despite
spirited attacks by some of the world's mightiest cryptographers.
Unfortunately, the current RSAREF public license only permits programmers to
use the high-level routines that require DES, and prohibits using the deeper
routines to bring in other encryption algorithms - the very use necessary for
PGP to remain dependably secure. However, after the Weiner revelation, RSAREF
will not be in much demand if it continues to restrict PEM programmers to 56
bit DES. Accordingly, it is rumored that a public license to the deeper,
roll-your-own algorithm subroutines in RSAREF may soon be forthcoming from
RSADSI. If this new license is issued, Zimmermann may finally be home free in
his quest to create a free, effective PGP with no specter of patent
infringement hovering over it. It is possible that by the end of this year or
early in the next, we will see both a commercial ViaCrypt PGP, and a free PGP
for personal noncommercial use.
 
That's the good news. The bad news is that Phil Zimmermann is now the target
of an investigation by the U.S. attorney's office into violations of the
International Traffic in Arms Regulations, or ITAR. ITAR is a set of laws
administered by the State Department, designed to keep war-grade weapons from
being exported out of the U.S. to certain foreign countries. While ITAR
mainly regulates weapons-like parts for tanks, jets and submarines, it also
regulates encryption devices, including encryption software, as "munitions"
due to their military intelligence value. The U.S. attorney is not commenting
at this early stage, but observers agree the investigation relates to PGP's
worldwide distribution through the Internet. This distribution constituted a
clean end run around the State Department's normal procedure of placing a
roadblock against all cryptography exports, until they are reviewed by the
National Security Agency for military potential. What is unclear, is whether
Zimmermann did anything wrong by placing PGP on the Internet on computers
located within the U.S.
 
There are very good reasons for saying that Zimmermann's actions were totally
legal, and that he should not have this cloud over his head. For one thing,
Zimmermann did not intend for PGP to be exported. He was never motivated to
put out an international encryption standard. To the contrary, his motivation
was the perception that political forces within the U.S. seemed to be pushing
towards outlawing private encryption in this country. In fact, he acted
specifically to put PGP into circulation quickly while it was still legal in
this country, before any laws might go into place prohibiting domestic use of
privately developed encryption software.
 
For another, Internet users outside the U.S. helped themselves to PGP.
Zimmermann did not send PGP anywhere outside the country. He made it
available on computers within U.S. borders, which is perfectly legal in
itself. By analogy, I could legally go door-to- door in this country selling
devices enabling people to encrypt their telephone discussions. I can even
leave an open box of them in front of my house in New Jersey, and tell all my
neighbors to pick one up for their own use. If some foreign tourists take a
few and spirit them back into their own countries, why should I be held
guilty for export violations?
 
In addition, Zimmermann and all the users of PGP in this country have their
First Amendment rights. Zimmermann has the right to freely publish the PGP
program in this country. The Constitution says Congress will enact "no law"
restricting freedom of speech and of the press. There are no Amendments to
the Constitution that contain exceptions for speech or press distributed
through the Internet. Additionally, people who send electronic messages to
each other have the right to send them encrypted without government
interference, and legal action against PGP would certainly interfere with
such activities. In this instance, PGP's free speech rights derive from its
assistance of PGP users in exercising their own rights of free speech. This
kind of derivative free speech protection is very powerful. It is analogous
to the protection of speech distributors applied in the past by the Supreme
Court and other federal courts to book sellers, magazine distributors, and
even CompuServe.
 
Finally, there are privacy considerations. This is not really a legal
argument, as much as a question of the limits of appropriate government
intrusion into peoples' private lives. The question comes up almost daily
these days, in settings ranging from the privacy of employee e-mail to the
swelling commercial market for extensive data on each citizen in our country
of consumers. A government push against the availability of PGP, regardless
of the legal cause, would count as yet another blow against the dwindling
ability of us all to retain a modicum of personal privacy. As the cypherpunks
are often heard to say, "if privacy becomes outlawed, only outlaws will have
privacy."
 
Powerful as these and other arguments are, they will not deter government
action on their own. The government can offer the fairly standard legal
argument that Zimmermann "knew or should have known," that placing PGP on the
Internet would result in worldwide export in violation of the ITAR. After
speaking with Zimmermann, I am not sure he actually knew, in particular, that
there was a law called ITAR, or that it applied to encryption software. As
mentioned above, he certainly was not out to distribute PGP worldwide.
Whether the government proceeds will depend as much on political factors as
on its view of the legalities involved.
 
The investigation is at an early stage, and in fact, has not been directed
formally at Zimmermann. The only activity in public view so far was the
service of subpoenas for document production by the U.S. Attorney's office in
San Jose, CA on Viacrypt in Phoenix, AZ and another company named Austin Code
Works in Austin, TX. Austin Code Works distributes PGP and other free
software for encryption and other uses in source code form, for little more
than the price of a computer disk. According to Zimmermann, he has no
business relationship with Austin Code Works. He also had no idea they were
distributing PGP until he read about the subpoena served on them. As soon as
Austin Code Works was served, its president, Grady Ward, went public on the
Internet with a ringing defense of its position. Ward claims they do not
distribute executable programs, but only "source code algorithmic
descriptions" of encryption techniques, thus falling under a "technical data"
exception to ITAR. The State Department publicly countered that position, and
is requiring Austin Code Works to register as a munitions dealer.
 
There is no telling whether the investigation will proceed to charges against
Zimmermann or others, but Zimmermann and others in the network community
intend to be prepared. Phil Zimmermann's attorney, Colorado criminal lawyer
Philip Dubois, is accepting contributions for Zimmermann's defense, (He can
be reached at Philip Dubois, Esq., 2305 Broadway, Boulder, CO 80304,
(303)444-3885, dubois@csn.org). The Electronic Frontier Foundation is also
stepping forward in Zimmermann's defense, with financial commitments from EFF
and several of its individual board members, and efforts to rally public
support for Zimmermann and PGP.
 
A lingering question in the current investigation is why the government
waited over two years after PGP's release to start it up. Some speculate it
is due to a link between the investigation and the government's efforts to
establish a new encryption standard named CLIPPER as the replacement for the
aging DES standard. The government has repeatedly stated it will not seek to
make Clipper the only legal encryption standard in this country by outlawing
all others. But if it proceeds to charge Zimmermann and PGP as a result of
the current investigation, it could have the effect of using the government's
legal artillery to blow away one of Clipper's most prominent competitors.
 
Speculation aside, PGP's legal situation is slowly maturing, and within
another year or so we should know for sure whether it's legal or illegal in
the U.S. By that time, it will be in the hands of millions of people the
world over, each using PGP to create his or her own private communications
channel. Hopefully, we will not have to witness the ironic spectacle of PGP
being banned in the country of its birth, while freely in use in the rest of
the world.
 
[Lance Rose is an attorney practicing high-tech and information law in
Montclair, NJ. He can be found on the Internetat elrose@well.sf.ca.us, and on
Compuserve at 72230,2044. He is also author of SysLaw, the legal guide for
online service providers, available from PC Information Group at
800-321-8285.
 
Pretty Good Privacy is available in it's latest July 1, 1993 release as
PGP23A.ZIP with C language source code in PGP23ASR.ZIP. Phil Zimmermann can
be reached at Boulder Software Engineering, 3021 Eleventh Street, Boulder,
Colorado 80304; (303)541-0140 voice/fax; or via Internet at prz@acm.org
 
ViaCrypt will make the commercial PGP available at an intro price of $100.
ViaCrypt, 2104 W. Peoria, Phoenix, AZ 80209, (602) 944-1543. - Editor
 




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Anonymous <nowhere@bsu-cs.bsu.edu>
Date: Sat, 27 Nov 93 07:09:13 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: One man - One vote - One Program (another Boardwatch excerpt)
Message-ID: <9311271509.AA26873@bsu-cs.bsu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



excerpted from:
 
 
         B  O  A  R  D  W  A  T  C  H      M  A  G  A  Z  I  N  E
 
                   Guide to the World of Online Services
 
 Editor: Jack Rickard   Volume VII: Issue 11   ISSN:1054-2760   November 1993
 
 
 ==============
 EDITORS' NOTES
 ==============
 One Man - One Vote - One Program
 
The National Information Infrastructure: Agenda for Action document was
released September 12 and made available to the online community in full
ascii text form the same day. This document outlines the administration's
blueprint for a future national data highway. We don't normally devote nine
pages of Boardwatch to publishing government literature. But, while the
document is easily available electronically, this will probably affect
everyone online at some point or another. You will undoubtedly see it quoted
and analyzed in coming months, but I'm going to guess the full text is not
going to be carried widely in print. So we decided to run the whole thing -
albeit as "the fine print."
 
The NII Agenda is remarkable in that they did manage to assemble every cliche
in the free world regarding online communications and actually pile them all
into one document. As government detritus goes, it is actually quite
readable. A persistent, if effete segment of the online community has
campaigned for some time for government to "get involved" online. They
parade across Washington in a continuous stream attempting to get our
government to fund various notions of what they want the online world to look
like.
 
And in some areas, government participation in the online process has been
productive. The National Science Foundation has devoted a relatively modest
amount of public investment in the Internet and this money has leveraged a
hundred times that much private investment in the technology. I agree, there
is a role for government in the future network.
 
But in the context of the other things this administration is trying to do, I
originally approached this topic with some trepidation. These people have no
moral qualms whatsoever in saying one thing and doing quite another. The
concepts of truth and lies and right and wrong are foreign to their view of
the way the world works. The action items regarding encryption and copyright
law revision are worded innocently enough. Beneath those words I detect an
agenda more in keeping with the current health care program proposal, the
budget recently passed, a corps of youth working for the government, the
addition of 50,000 police officers on a national basis, and an entire
political agenda focused quite single mindedly on one thing - control of the
population - at all levels and in areas American's just aren't accustomed to
thinking of as something anyone would want to control.
 
This document does refer to legislation that would open the local telephone
loop to competition - a concept we first came out for in 1988. The
legislation they refer to basically frees the local telephone companies to
provide video, information, long distance services - it has little to do with
competition in the local loop other than to provide these telephone companies
precisely what they've been lobbying for - freedom to exploit their
monopolies on the local line infrastructure. The players are cable tv
companies and telephone companies. Six months ago telco U.S. West purchased
25% of Time Warner, and this past week, Bell Atlantic and TCI, the nation's
largest cable company holding group, announced a complete merger. The
standoff between cable companies and telephone companies is over - and there
will be LESS competition, not more. The inside deal making all of this work
is that the government becomes a "partner" in developing our
telecommunications infrastructure - the "controlling" influence.
 
The more pressing current concern is encryption and privacy. The
administration rolled out the Clipper Chip proposal earlier this year as a
toe in the water. Clinton apologists are quick to point out that this was a
Bush administration proposal. Poppycock. There are thousands of proposals
making the rounds in Washington in a continous cloud - the plankton of the
political seascape. A relative handful ever see the light of day. This one,
given little chance under the Bush administration, did under President
Clinton.
 
The Clipper Chip concept is a bit startling. Everyone gets to encrypt their
data, and in fact are encouraged to do so - with the government holding the
decryption keys. I can't separate the stupid from those accused of stupid
here, so I'll just note that it was proposed, and is still pursued. But they
do apparently feel it important that if anyone has any "secret stuff", the
government should, as a matter of course, have access to it. You have no
"right" to privacy - quite the contrary.
 
In health care, before it is over, if you want health care coverage, it will
only be available in ONE place - a government office. You will present
yourself in person, along with a little basket of receipts showing you've
paid your taxes, registered for the draft, the national service program,
given blood, quit smoking, have exercised regularly, have your car insurance
in order, your driver's license, social security receipt, and anything else
necessary to "make us safe." And if all your papers are in order, and you pay
the fees, you will receive a little plastic card allowing you to visit a
doctor or clinic. George Orwell never had it so good.
 
And I would fear this same socialist greed for control of our lives will be
applied to the online community via this National Information Infrastructure.
I would, but I don't, and I'm feeling particularly enchanted right now by why
I don't.
 
First, they can be counted on to be as buffoonish about it as possible given
the laws of physics. Currently, the State Department is actually pursuing a
lone Boulder programmer with a Grand Jury investigation of possible
infraction of export controls - alleging that he illegally exported a data
encryption program - Pretty Good Privacy. The farce is of course that he
never left Boulder. He posted it on a couple of local Internet sites, and of
course, within about 12 minutes it was all over the world. It allows anyone
to encrypt e-mail messages in such a fashion that all the kings horses and
all the kings men can't figure out what the hell you said in it on a bet.
 
And this is the heartening jewel. The online world has always moved
powerfully toward the least common denominator grass roots end of the
electronic path. All things that have grown have grown DOWN toward the end
user, not UP toward a central authority. The entire energy in the online
explosion has been OUT and DOWN and many of the innovations have been to
extend functionality to the least equipment, at the least cost, in a never
ending quest for "free" and something I can run on my OWN computer. The
natural conclusion of this will be instant worldwide communication from a
handheld $4 pocket calculator.
 
The Internet is fascinating in that it is a belief system that allows people
to connect to a common backbone for communications. That was the part we
needed. Something persuasively "in the middle." But it was ALL we needed.
There are now 130 million personal computers out there. And some percentage
of these people are Phil Zimmermanns. This one man, with one wee little
Borland compiler, wrote a piece of software. And whether they prosecute him
to make him an example or not, he released ONE program in the wee hours of
the morning in 1991, that will never allow the government or anyone else to
put the data encryption genie back in the bottle. It did not change the
world. It demonstrated that the world had changed. It's free. It's
everywhere. There is no way to track down all the copies in all the world. It
transcends national boundaries. He did it for the notoriety - and he got it.
But he could have just as easily done it anonymously. An avowed leftist
himself, he really gets just as bristley as Pat Buchanon from the far right
on this thing about government control of individuals. And he's not alone.
 
Whatever elaborate systems are contrived, at the cost of billions of dollars,
with the full collusion of giant corporate telco/cable entities controlling
vast territories of fiberglass and copper, they will become symbols of vanity
- towers of Babel standing in testimony to the futility of trying to use
electronics to control people. Electronics is a good material for building
freedom, and a most notably poor one for forging chains. Wherever there is
one guy with an attitude, a compiler, and a few free afternoons, all the
plans and all the plots of all the kings go awry with a single program
release.
 
We have lots of guys with attitudes, lots of compilers, and lots of
afternoons.
 
Let them build the NII. Let us use it without fear. With a handful of
Zimmermanns, we can remake the world to suit us.
 
Now, if only we could get Phil to compile us a health care program....
 
 Jack Rickard
 Editor Rotundus
 
P.S. Mr. Zimmermann, guilty, innocent, free, or jailed, will undoubtedly
incur the usual mountain of legal fees - poor thanks for his contribution.
It might just serve an interesting purpose to make a numeric show of force on
his behalf to demonstrate that the usual economic coercion won't work either.
Stick a lone dollar bill in an envelope and send it to his legal defense
fund. For a buck twenty-nine, it's a cheap political statement. And if
enough of us do it, maybe the world will change again.
 
 Phil Zimmermann Legal Defense Fund
 c/o Philip Dubois, Esq.
 2305 Broadway
 Boulder, CO 80304
 




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: kkirksey@world.std.com (Ken B Kirksey)
Date: Sat, 27 Nov 93 07:49:14 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Give me your password- OR ELSE!
Message-ID: <199311271548.AA13051@world.std.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



>>Car alarms and security systems didn't convince the criminals who make their
>>living ripping off cars that the *Good ole days were over* and it was time
>>to get a  job at Burger Sri, it spurred them to find new methods to ply
>>their trade.
>
>How do you know this? Clearly some crooks may have just moved to more
>violent methods, but it's quite probable that others moved off to
>other fields where it's easier to make a buck, either legal or
>illegal.

Quite.  From _Point Blank: Guns & Violence in America_ by Dr. Gary Kleck:

   "Like noncriminals, however, criminals do many things that are casually
    or only weakly motivated.  Indeed, much crime is impulsive or
    opportunistic, with criminals committing some crimes only if it
    requires little effort and entails little risk (Feeney 1986)."



                               Ken

=============================================================================
Ken Kirksey            kkirksey@world.std.com            Mac Guru & Developer
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
Among the many misdeeds of the British rule in India, history will look upon
the act of depriving a whole nation of arms, as the blackest.
                                                            - Mahatma Ghandi




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: kkirksey@world.std.com (Ken B Kirksey)
Date: Sat, 27 Nov 93 07:49:46 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: PC Based One-Time Pad
Message-ID: <199311271548.AA13076@world.std.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



>In article <199311251654.AA02190@world.std.com>
>           kkirksey@world.std.com "Ken B Kirksey" writes:
> > While I was reading though _Applied Cryptography_ last night, a thought
> > struck me (no damage):  Why hasn't anyone come up with a good Mac or PC based
> > One-Time Pad system.  
> 
>Because they're trivial to write.  I could do one in less that 15 minutes.

I can see that for the XOR code, but the code (and possibly hardware) for
generating, testing, and managing the pad files would take considerably
longer, at least for me.  You may be SuperHacker, though. :-)

> > It seems like this would be a fairly easy system to implement, but since
> > no one (to my knowledge) has yet done so, there must be something I'm
> > missing. :-)  
>
>Because very few people can be bothered driving half way across the
>country to deliver the OTPs.  It's *way* too much hassle for day to
>day use of the kind we use pgp for.  And if someone *is* doing it
>for real security (like say AT&T shipping around their secure phone
>circuit diagrams because they don't trust clipper :-) ) then they're
>*not* going to be mentioning it in passing on usenet news groups...

Well, it would really be one of those "just to see if I can do it"
projects.  I think that someone might find a use for it someday, though.
Besides, it would be fun to write.

>PS No, you *don't* send them in the mail.  But you knew that, right?

No, I'm not as stupid as I look. <g>


                             Ken

=============================================================================
Ken Kirksey            kkirksey@world.std.com            Mac Guru & Developer
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
Among the many misdeeds of the British rule in India, history will look upon
the act of depriving a whole nation of arms, as the blackest.
                                                            - Mahatma Ghandi




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Date: Sat, 27 Nov 93 11:09:18 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Banning any subscriber
In-Reply-To: <9311271521.AA17800@wixer>
Message-ID: <199311271908.LAA16939@mail.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Jim Choate has raised some questions about the nature of the List,
about its privacy, and has said that some of us are trying to scare
Detweiler with phony AIDS test results.

Here are my responses to these questions. I suppose I'd best copy the
Cypherpunks list as well, though there's been too much noise lately
about Detweiler, by Detweiler, and for Detweiler. Oh well.


> I want to thank everyone for their repsonce to my earlier mail. I do have
> some questions however.
> 
> 1. CypherPunks supports crypto so people cant tamper w/ my mail but you want
>    to censor somebody at the source. How can you support this?

Personally, I don't support it, and only a few folks have publically called for
it, as is their right in a forum like ours. Their concern is likely
that a single person can in fact bring down a list, can be so
disruptive that the S/N drops to an unacceptable level. 

A better solution, if the CPU at Toad can handle the extra load, is
the filtering software used now on the Extropians list. Subscribers
can filter out threads they don'e want to see, users, etc. This may be
coming to the Cypherpunks list.

Please note that Eric Hughes never removed L. Dewtweiler from the list
(nor anyone else, so far as I know). In fact, Detweiler requested that
he be unsubscribed. He may or may not be subscribed under another
account name, and, in any case, he seems to see some posts.

And he bombards us every night with his missives.

> 2. Everyone says this list is private. Nowhere has this EVER been mentioned
>    in any conversation or info that I have read. The implication in all the
>    posts, print articles, and talk at the local group meet led me to believe
>    CypherPunks was a public forum for discussion and implimentation of crypto
>    related material. Was I misunderstanding something?

The list is not "private" in the sense of being a deep, dark secret.
Instructions on how to join are easily available. But most mailing
lists have a different "feel," a different sense of "community," than
mere newsgroups have. Newsgroups encourage casual drop-ins who don't
bother to read the traffic, but who just fire off a few posts and then
are gone; at least with mailing lists it takes some small effort to
get on and off them.

We've had debates every few months about mailing list vs. newsgroup,
and I can't stop this debate from happening again. There are reasons
pro and con to have Cypherpunks a mailing list, and mailing lists
continue to flourish for a variety of reasons.

> 3. Sine at least part of the networks and hardware the mail list is used on
>    is publily funded how can you construe it as private w/o some form of
>    moderator or subscriction contract?

If a car happens to drive on a public street are all rights to privacy
lost? If a phone call is made and part of the signal path includes a
publically-subsidized link, is all privacy lost? Is your e-mail
subject to inspection by the authorities merely because it passes
through systems they control?

Ultimately, this is why we support encryption and free markets. (Well,
many of us support free markets.) In the meantime, the Electronic
Communication Privacy Act protects e-mail against certain kinds of
seizures. It's not clear (to me) what this means for "quasi-private"
mailing lists, but at least it may provide some legal defense should
government agents cite discussions on this list as evidence of
sedition, treason, conspiracy, etc.

> 4. The responces to L.D. about mail-bombs and posing as a AIDS lab is much
>    worse and more troublesome to me than anything I have seen L.D. post. Not
>    only is some of the actions proposed criminal but I fail to see how a
>    group which relies on its reputation can support or condone such comments.


Hold on there, pardner! That post you are referring to was yet another
one of Detweiler's own "an12070" posts! Even if there wasn't
compelling circumstantial evidence--cited by so many people here--that
S. Boxx = The Executioner = Psychopunk = Zen Master = an12070 = L.
Detweiler, then this latest rant would _still_ have the stylistic
earmarks of a put-on.

Read it again, if you can stomach it, and bear this in mind. 

I hope this helps.

--Tim May


-- 
..........................................................................
Timothy C. May         | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,  
tcmay@netcom.com       | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
408-688-5409           | knowledge, reputations, information markets, 
W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA  | black markets, collapse of governments.
Higher Power: 2^756839 | Public Key: PGP and MailSafe available.
Note: I put time and money into writing this posting. I hope you enjoy it.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: an12070@anon.penet.fi (The Executioner)
Date: Sat, 27 Nov 93 03:44:06 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: A Clarification on My Loyalty and Allegiance
Message-ID: <9311271140.AA04304@anon.penet.fi>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Cypherpunks,

I thought that the infamous L. Detweiler had stopped his posting, but it
appears that he is back, and more neurotic than ever.  I thought that
it was the time for me to make another post relating to him, the list
in general, and LD's obsession with pseudospoofing.

OK, first, LD is pissing me off, as, I am sure, he is doing to many others
out there in net.land.  His raves are nothing if not persistant and ever
increasingly long.  I, being the founding member of the Colorado Cypherpunks,
am not particularly prowd of him being affiliated with the group.  I don't
hate him, as some of teh others on this list apparently do, I just think he
is a very persistant pest, a fly in the ointment.  I think it is important
to remember that in every movement there are fanatics, and in the best of
intentions are those who would do harm while trying to crusade the good.
I believe that Detweiler is one such person.

He is experiencing some very serious problems with what he believes to be
a concerted effort by some devilish cabal to warp and mung his brain
through the rampant use of pseudospoofing.  OK, fine if he believes that,
I cannot keep him from thinking that some of us are emmisaries of Satan.
I can, however, wish that he would leave me the hell alone and stop posting
these long, drawn-out core dumps of his mangled psyche.  I can ask him to
stop his madness, though I know that it will only get me on his bad side,
and possibly put me in physical danger (since I live in his vicinity, lucky
me).  I think that's enough on Detweiler himself, and I hope I don't have to
talk about him anymore.

On to pseudospoofing.  I think that it exists, and that it's denial is
just plain naive.  The world is a non-friendly place, and there are
dangers out there, and people who will exploit every aspect of the system
to trick, decieve, and mangle others.  This should not come as a shock to
anyone on the list, since we are generally on (or close to) the cutting
edge of new technologies and methods to use those technologies.  I,
myself have never participated in any kind of conspiracy with intent
to confuse, nor have i ever posted under a name other than my own,
and my anon.penet.fi identity.  I have not posted as anyone that I am not,
and have no intention to do so.  I do not, however, object to the use of
these technologies, or to the act of pseudospoofing.  It cannot hope to
be prevented, since there are always people out there who will figure out
how to exploit the system to do their bidding.

Yes, it's true, I am coming out in favor of pseudospoofing.  I do not object to
it's use, on the premise that it cannot be stopped, and it rarely does hard,
aside from those (LD) whose minds are bent by the mere thought that it is
happening.

Enough of that.  Now onto the list.  I put some serious thought into
dropping from the list for the past week or so, and I have decided _not_
to leave bacause sometime there are bits of information that I get
from the list that are simply not available anywhere else.  Some of the
members of the list are, however, pissing me off.  The list has degraded
from a band of freedom fighters with things they cared about in jeopardy
to a bunch of fucking children bickering over the most pathetic of things.
I hope that the recent barrage of postings is not indicative of what is
to come.  If it is, then I may just reconsider and leave.

I think that's all I have to say for now... I just wanted to let people
know what I was thinking, and set the record straight if there are
any members who think I am still on LD's side (which I was for quite
some time).
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
To find out more about the anon service, send mail to help@anon.penet.fi.
Due to the double-blind, any mail replies to this message will be anonymized,
and an anonymous id will be allocated automatically. You have been warned.
Please report any problems, inappropriate use etc. to admin@anon.penet.fi.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: an12070@anon.penet.fi (The Executioner)
Date: Sat, 27 Nov 93 04:04:07 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Ways to Die
Message-ID: <9311271200.AA07846@anon.penet.fi>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Many psychopunks, particularly T.C.May, E.Hughes, and D.Barnes, have
been upset by my latest name variation, `The Executioner', supposing in
their sweaty desperation at exposure for their crimes that it
represents some kind of insinuated threat. Nothing could be further
from the truth. The obvious meaning of `execute' in this context is `to
carry out a plan', as in `execute a program,' as in `elicit the truth'.
The connotation is completely harmless. I have no idea why anyone could
construe it negatively, unless, as the saying goes, they have something
to hide! Sorry, but I can't be responsible for tormented psyches and
consciences in the face of Truth! I don't understand why these master
pseudospoofers should be upset by a trivial name change. In fact, in
the face of their own plethora of faces, it seems quite hypocritical!
It would be like taking the words, `I'm going to come kill your family
with a rusty razor blade' seriously.

This idea of `execution' reminds me of historical cases of execution.
There are very many variations. One of the best and my favorite is that
by a lynch mob, led by a corrupt leader. The lucky criminals get hung,
with their faces bulging around, and legs dangling below, a
constricting, unremitting noose, sort of like a poisonous snake around
the neck. `Brave New World' ends with a delightfully novel description
of a hanging: NE, N, NE, N, NW, W, SW, ... (paraphrase!) I imagine that
hanging is not a very bad way to die, of all the ways invented and
experienced by man. Traitors were often hung by the noose in the Civil
War, as I understand it, when our country turned in on itself in
disunity. Who was it who was executed with the words, `I regret I have
but one life to give to my country'? The infamous spy Benedict Arnold
(who put on one face to the British, and another to the Americans,
quite the ingenious pseudospoofer!) was hung, I understand.

Other cases of execution, of course, are more grisly. We have the
Inquisition to thank for some of the more hideous variations. I don't
know if Poe's Pit and the Pendulum was ever really in use, but what a
fantastic way to die! The shining, razor sharp blade gently swaying to
and fro, hypnotically mesmerizing, swish, swosh, subtly, imperceptibly
lower, approaching like a whisper in one's ear by Death. The victim in
the tale faced anonymous black judges in a dark courtroom, as they
handed down the sentence, described like a druglike stuporous
hallucination. As I recall the protagonist in Poe's tale had his
stomache glanced by the blade, dark red blood slowly oozing forth, but
he was ingenious and saved himself by turning the vicious rats in the
dungeon into a useful tool! Ah, what fantastic literary irony. The Pit
and the Pendulum is a sort of mental and psychic torture. I wonder how
many days the blade was descending over? The end could certainly not be
as painful as compared with other physical torture devices, like the
rack, used to elicit confessions. Who can forget that wacky human
enclosure with spikes on the door? What amazing creativity.

I've always been fascinated by the Guillotine in use during the French
revolution. The doctor Guillotine was very humane and was tormented by
the visions of humans who had a few moments of discomfort and
displeasure ensuing after failing to perfectly align their necks with
the executioner's blade. Of course, one swift and single CHOP! was
ideal, but sometimes the executioner was drunk, or maybe his mask was
in the way, and it took more than one CHOP! CHOP! CHOP! over a period
of a few seconds to dispatch the soul on its merry journey. Guillotine
invented his ingenious device, and executions were very rapidly
improved in reliability and accuracy. This was very useful because all
kinds of terrorists, counterrevolutionaries, and criminals had hidden
themselves in the guise of the Victorious Revolution, and the public
turned on itself after all the discredited leaders had been accounted
for (in--what else?--a `head count').

The Guillotine was really unsurpassed in its efficiency at the time, a
real technological marvel. I'm sure there were many people at the time
who were quite impressed by it, and said that it was a fine piece of
machinery, and that even though it could be put to evil uses,
`Guillotines don't kill people, people kill people' and therefore no
one should have any qualms about its existence and continued use, or
safeguards and restrictions and regulations governing the authority of
its operation by naive and unskilled unprofessionals, or even
criminals, themselves ready amateur Executioners. One said, `yes,
surprising as it sounds, I'm coming out in favor of the Guillotine.'
The people got what they wanted. They weren't about to let some
sinister, evil, oppressive government stand in their way of exercising
their true glorious birthright freedoms, like killing each other.

One of the things that really fascinates me is the possibility of
cyberspatial-oriented murder. It seems to me that in a CryptoAnarchic
society where there is no government or social order, things like hired
assassins will be more readily hired, and certainly more abundant. What
do you do when you are robbed or harassed? Call the police? Ha, ha,
there are none of those annoying, meddlesome, timeconsuming and
troublesome Social Justice Farces in our Private Utopia. Imagine the
delight of hiring hitmen with completely untraceable cash, and
communicating with them with Chaum style DC nets to describe the victim
and pinpoint one's enemies for execution.

That reminds me of the Focaultian idea that punishment and torture is
related to the human body. The theory is, if you don't have a physical
body, you can't experience pain. Some pseudospoofers in the psychopunk
cult have suggested that they are unaccountable in this fashion --
pseudospoofing allows them to achieve a sort of godlike omnipresence
and transcendance through their myriads of ephemeral identities.
Actually, this philosophy appears to originate with one of the leaders
and is a central tenet of their idolatry. The `fluidity of identity'
exists in Cyberspace, to some extent, but all the pseudospoofers I know
still have a real-world body that bleeds like any other, and all their
tricky circumventions of its existence are no match for superior
technology. That's The Truth!

``Any sufficiently evil machination is indistinguishable from murder.'' --S.Boxx
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
To find out more about the anon service, send mail to help@anon.penet.fi.
Due to the double-blind, any mail replies to this message will be anonymized,
and an anonymous id will be allocated automatically. You have been warned.
Please report any problems, inappropriate use etc. to admin@anon.penet.fi.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: an12070@anon.penet.fi (The Psychopunk)
Date: Sat, 27 Nov 93 04:14:05 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Public Enemy #1
Message-ID: <9311271213.AA10005@anon.penet.fi>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I don't know where all these slanderous accusations that I am
L.Detweiler come from. I want to have absolutely nothing to do with
that paranoid conspiracy theorist. People who are associating me with
him are nothing but scurrilous hypocrites. You only allow anonymity so
long as it doesn't threaten you personally! PseudoAnonymity that
attacks the government through tax evasion and black marketeering is
OK, but pseudoanonymity of L.Detweiler (who is really Hitler's
grandson), who attacks the Cypherpunks, is Heretic Blasphemy, and he
must be tracked down and punished! Why is it that no one bothers
T.C.May about BlackNet or Deadbeat, anyway? I guess stealing
information is a legitimate use of anonymity, but exposing corruption
through whistleblowing is not. 

All of you who are so smugly certain that I am L.Detweiler, where do
you get your insane fantasies? The only thing I can think of that would
be objective and qualitative is the extensive style analysis software
of E.Hughes, but it seems to me that would also show that he is posting
pseudoanonymously under G.Broiles, and besides he's not really
interested in sharing any of his software with anyone anyway,
especially whatever helps him pseudospoof and detect it by others.

However, I have many ideas on how to get even with L.Detweiler for his
callous disregard for pseudospoofing. Imagine, the sheer arrogance of
attacking our holy religion, and making our leaders look like pathetic
fools for their deceptions! We are left trying to defend them with
increasingly worthless tentacles. Y'know the ones that penetrated
RISKS? They are *really* valuable, like N.Szabo, and he is on to them
all. The man is an arrogant bastard for trying to prevent us from our
joyous deceptions, perversions, and depravities. We have to make him
pay. What can we do? One thing to do would be to slander him in public
forums. I mean, he has done the tiniest smidgeon of CryptoAnarchic
work, like that Anonymity FAQ (which was usefully infiltrated by quite
a few of our pseudospoofed tentacles, including the eminent N.Szabo).
But otherwise, he's just a self-important asshole like G.Spafford who
has no life out of cyberspace. 

We should show no mercy. I propose that we mailbomb him some more
beyond P.Metzger's feeble assault. And D.Barnes has not gone nearly far
enough to root out his personal associates and friends and find any
useful blackmail or other leverage, like his employer. E.Hughes and
T.C.May can try harassing his postmaster some more. Maybe we can get
the Holy Grail -- get him to lose his Internet account. Damn, that
would be AWESOME. We wouldn't have to put up with any more of those
slimy verbose FAQs. `Privacy and Anonymity' HAH. more like Pathetic Assholery.

Here's an idea. I've been tampering with REMOBZ a lot lately and have
gotten pretty good at it. I hear L.Detweiler was looking for a job
awhile ago. (I stole his resume with a fake job advertisement in his
mailbox as bait. Hee, hee! what a dickhead.) I am going to try to tap
his home phone line and figure out what employers he has been talking
to. I can rig it so that when they call his number, I spoof his
answering machine (this is possible by recording his own message onto
my own answering machine and redirecting the phone call). The employer
records his message, `you have the job, report to work at 9:00
tomorrow' like nothing is wrong. But L.Detweiler never shows up!
Hee,hee. And if he tries to find out what went wrong, he looks like a
hallucinating drug user. `I never got your message on my answering
machine!' Ah, a grand psychopunk prank in line with the best of the
legendary K.Mitnik revenge techniques. (The master!)

Here's another idea. We all know how much WetLiar admires that clueless
NYT reporter Markoff -- you know the guy, the one who fell for our Big
Movement facade hook line and sinker. (Hee, hee! Privacy for the
Masses! The Cryptographic Revolution!) I propose that we infiltrate his
system and impersonate Markoff's email to L.Detweiler. Unless it is for
deception, it's not illegal! No problemo! L.Detweiler will go away
crestfallen that his hero comes across as a clueless idiot in email. If
he calls Markoff in desperation, we can do the old `redirect the phone
call' trick and do our best Markoff imitation on the phone. Detweiler
is such a clueless, trusting idiot that he won't know the difference.
Hee, hee! I love poking holes in other people's delusions. The world is
an ugly place, and it's about time that someone did a favor to
L.Detweiler and taught him that. The asshole will learn what it means
to tangle with Cypherpunks.

OK, here's my best idea. You know his cutesy little mama's girl
girlfriend, Sonia Applegate? The one that loves to cook him those big
dinners when he gets home from a hard day of battling our beauteous
tenacles? The one that he is going to marry next spring? (Thanks,
BlackNet spies, for all your information, the checks are in the mail,
also the REMOBZ wiretapping is also a really invaluable source.) I
propose that we call her up and pose as a clinician from an AIDS
testing clinic and tell her that L.Detweiler has AIDS and that he
listed her as a sex partner. Regurgitate her all her personal
information we found off the stolen credit records and then say, Yes,
Ma'am, I'm sorry. You'll have to report to the clinic immediately for
testing. Hee, hee!
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
To find out more about the anon service, send mail to help@anon.penet.fi.
Due to the double-blind, any mail replies to this message will be anonymized,
and an anonymous id will be allocated automatically. You have been warned.
Please report any problems, inappropriate use etc. to admin@anon.penet.fi.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: plaz@netcom.com (Geoff Dale)
Date: Sat, 27 Nov 93 12:19:18 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Banning any subscriber
Message-ID: <199311272018.MAA26674@mail.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Jim choate <ravage@wixer.bga.com> sez:
>Hi again,
>
>I want to thank everyone for their repsonce to my earlier mail. I do have
>some questions however.
>
>1. CypherPunks supports crypto so people cant tamper w/ my mail but you want
>   to censor somebody at the source. How can you support this?

I personally disagree with censorship. It would be impossible to enforce
anyway. A move of this type would simply drive Detweiler to use the
Cypherpunk remailers which would be harder to detect. Then what do we do?
Stop accepting mail from our own remailers?

>4. The responces to L.D. about mail-bombs and posing as a AIDS lab is much
>   worse and more troublesome to me than anything I have seen L.D. post. Not
>   only is some of the actions proposed criminal but I fail to see how a
>   group which relies on its reputation can support or condone such comments.

Look again, that WAS Detweiler, posing as "Psychopunk" (the same Anon id-
an12070@anon.penet.fi - that S.Boxx and "The Executioner" have been using)
trying to bait someone into doing something illegal, and to get the
reaction you just gave. The twisted f*ck is now plotting against himself.

People should be on the lookout, btw. I wouldn't put it past him to try
past him to try to use any of these ideas against others. He's obviously
been thinking about how to screw with other peoples lives remotely.

>5. If you don't like what he says then kill the mail and forget it.

I agree. Besides, after getting past my initial anger, I realized that
Detweiler's posts are funnier than Gary Larson's 'Far Side' cartoons.

I feel safer when he's posting long e-mail messages anyway, at least then
he's not doing anything else. And the more he posts, the lower his
credibility gets.

_______________________________________________________________________
Geoff Dale    -- insert standard disclaimers here --    plaz@netcom.com
"Once you've gone plastic, you can never go back."  - Plastic Beethoven






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: wknotten@cs.uct.ac.za (William Knottenbelt)
Date: Sat, 27 Nov 93 02:24:07 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: cryptoanarchists?
Message-ID: <m0p3Mna-00095VC@cs.uct.ac.za>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


[start posting]

From owner-cypherpunks  Sat Nov 27 09:25:50 1993
Received: by toad.com id AA08258; Sat, 27 Nov 93 09:24:17 PST
Received: by toad.com id AA08255; Sat, 27 Nov 93 09:23:08 PST
Return-Path: <pfarrell@netcom.com>
Received: from mail.netcom.com ([192.100.81.114]) by toad.com id AA08249; Sat, 27 Nov 93 09:23:05 PST
Received: from [0.0.0.0] by mail.netcom.com (8.6.4/SMI-4.1/Netcom)
	id JAA05321; Sat, 27 Nov 1993 09:23:08 -0800
X-Nupop-Charset: English
Date: Sat, 27 Nov 1993 12:24:45 -0400 (EDT)
From: "Pat Farrell" <pfarrell@netcom.com>
Sender: pfarrell@netcom.com
Reply-To: pfarrell@netcom.com
Message-Id: <44687.pfarrell@netcom.com>
To: hfinney@shell.portal.com
Cc: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: RE: META: Filter Detweiler

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

I have to "strongly disagree" with Hal's suggestion that we source filter 
LD or anyone else. While I am as sick of him as the rest, I think
that Sandy's Pledge is a much better idea. I've been observing my own 
version of the Pledge for about a month. 

I even thought about ignoring Hal's post. But it suggests something that is 
contrary to the fundamental ideas that I believe in: we should be using
technology to improve privacy and our personal freedom. This starts
with freedom of speach.

The obvious solution is for each person to put LD, SBoxx, etc. in their
own kill file. If your mail client doesn't support a kill file, you can
always use the "d" command. Or find a client that supports kill files.
Or even write some code!

For folks that are paying good money to retreive trash messages that are
simply going to be deleted, I suggest you look for an alternative service.
There are many flat-rate services. Netcom is one, and I use it instead of 
the "free" services that GMU provides for all students. Send mail to
"info_deli_server@netcom.com" with the body "get PDIAL" to get a list of
servers accross the country and some international providers as well.

Pat


Pat Farrell      Grad Student                 pfarrell@netcom.com
Department of Computer Science    George Mason University, Fairfax, VA
Public key availble via finger          #include <standard.disclaimer>

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.3a

iQBVAgUBLPeMdh9bGnaOb/KNAQEfywH8D81bolvoKbZVf1Mz8ifCPkVDBARJo17r
OGPt43WkZzTlUFCBqrZnMwdPoUhSNOm+WZbP6xe4V6lC6POZyOMpvA==
=a1zU
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

Pat Farrell      Grad Student                 pfarrell@netcom.com
Department of Computer Science    George Mason University, Fairfax, VA
Public key availble via finger          #include <standard.disclaimer>

From owner-cypherpunks  Sat Nov 27 12:14:18 1993
Received: by toad.com id AA10642; Sat, 27 Nov 93 12:09:18 PST
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From: nate@VIS.ColoState.EDU (CVL staff member Nate Sammons)
Message-Id: <9311272008.AA18277@vangogh.VIS.ColoState.EDU>
Subject: Re: A Clarification on My Loyalty and Allegiance
To: na12070@anon.penet.fi
Date: Sat, 27 Nov 1993 13:08:33 -0700 (MST)
Cc: cypherpunks@toad.com
In-Reply-To: <9311271140.AA04304@anon.penet.fi> from "The Executioner" at Nov 27, 93 11:40:29 am
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Content-Type: text
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-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----


The root of this thread was a complete copy of a posting that I made to
the list, and mailed to L.Detweiler.  Is "The Executioner" on the list,
if not, this is a lot of evidence that he is L.Detweiler.

BTW, this really pissed me off.  He, The Executioner, could not even
come up with his/her own post, they just cut and pasted mine.

- -nate

- -- 
+-----------------------------------------------------------------------+
| Nate Sammons  nate@VIS.ColoState.Edu  (303) 491-1578                  |



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Al Billings <mimir@u.washington.edu>
Date: Sat, 27 Nov 93 13:39:18 PST
To: Jim choate <ravage@wixer.bga.com>
Subject: Re: Banning any subscriber
In-Reply-To: <9311271955.AA08359@wixer>
Message-ID: <Pine.3.87.9311271321.C27594-0100000@goren2.u.washington.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


On Sat, 27 Nov 1993, Jim choate wrote:

> If this is truly a private list then you need to put more effort into being
> clear that this is a indivudualy supported mail-list and is not officialy
> associated w/ CypherPunks. I would offer the following protocol:

"Officially" associated with Cypherpunks? I don't know about where you 
are but in most places in this country there is no "Official Cypherpunks 
Organization." This LIST is the original basis of the Cypherpunks. From 
there, some people who have other interested parties in their locales 
have gone on to form local groups. This isn't like the Extropians who 
have the Extropy Institute officially behind them.

> 1. User sends mail w/ 'subscribe' in the body.
> 
> 2. The mailer responds w/ a numbered header.
> 
> 3. The user is requied to copy the message from #2 completely and to append
>    'agree'.
> 
> 4. The user is then added to the list.

Why bother?

> While it is true that some of you may see this as trivial but if you really
> want to keep CypherPunks an open forum and this list private (ensuring that
> they are seen as seperate entities) it is critical that this is made at every
> oppportunity.

What is the "CypherPunks" you are refering to if not this list? All 
mailing lists are, by the very nature, semi-private forums. You have to 
ask to get on them. If someone is disruptive, I see no reason they should 
not be asked to leave. Of course, the idiot in question isn't even on the 
list anymore. If you aren't the list, the list shouldn't accept your 
postings and mail them to members. I see no reason why non-members of the 
list should be able to mailbomb us all by sending to the list address.


(*)(*)(*)(*)(*)(*)(*)(*)(*)(*)(*)(*)(*)(*)(*)(*)(*)(*)(*)(*)(*)(*)(*)(*)(*)(*)
| Al Billings aka Grendel Grettisson        | "You are, each one, a priest,  |
|                 mimir@u.washington.edu    |      Just for yourself."       |
| Sysop of The Sacred Grove (206)322-5450   |                                |
| Admin for Troth-L, The Asatru E-Mail List |             -Noble Drew Ali-   |
(*)(*)(*)(*)(*)(*)(*)(*)(*)(*)(*)(*)(*)(*)(*)(*)(*)(*)(*)(*)(*)(*)(*)(*)(*)(*)






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Jim choate <ravage@wixer.bga.com>
Date: Sat, 27 Nov 93 12:04:18 PST
To: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Subject: Re: Banning any subscriber
In-Reply-To: <199311271908.LAA16939@mail.netcom.com>
Message-ID: <9311271955.AA08359@wixer>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>
> Jim Choate has raised some questions about the nature of the List,
> about its privacy, and has said that some of us are trying to scare
> Detweiler with phony AIDS test results.
>
> Here are my responses to these questions. I suppose I'd best copy the
> Cypherpunks list as well, though there's been too much noise lately
> about Detweiler, by Detweiler, and for Detweiler. Oh well.
>
>
> > I want to thank everyone for their repsonce to my earlier mail. I do have
> > some questions however.
> >
> > 1. CypherPunks supports crypto so people cant tamper w/ my mail but you wan
t
> >    to censor somebody at the source. How can you support this?
>
> Personally, I don't support it, and only a few folks have publically called f
or
> it, as is their right in a forum like ours. Their concern is likely
> that a single person can in fact bring down a list, can be so
> disruptive that the S/N drops to an unacceptable level.
>
> A better solution, if the CPU at Toad can handle the extra load, is
> the filtering software used now on the Extropians list. Subscribers
> can filter out threads they don'e want to see, users, etc. This may be
> coming to the Cypherpunks list.
>
> Please note that Eric Hughes never removed L. Dewtweiler from the list
> (nor anyone else, so far as I know). In fact, Detweiler requested that
> he be unsubscribed. He may or may not be subscribed under another
> account name, and, in any case, he seems to see some posts.
>
> And he bombards us every night with his missives.
>
> > 2. Everyone says this list is private. Nowhere has this EVER been mentioned

> >    in any conversation or info that I have read. The implication in all the

> >    posts, print articles, and talk at the local group meet led me to believ
e
> >    CypherPunks was a public forum for discussion and implimentation of cryp
to
> >    related material. Was I misunderstanding something?
>
> The list is not "private" in the sense of being a deep, dark secret.
> Instructions on how to join are easily available. But most mailing
> lists have a different "feel," a different sense of "community," than
> mere newsgroups have. Newsgroups encourage casual drop-ins who don't
> bother to read the traffic, but who just fire off a few posts and then
> are gone; at least with mailing lists it takes some small effort to
> get on and off them.
>
> We've had debates every few months about mailing list vs. newsgroup,
> and I can't stop this debate from happening again. There are reasons
> pro and con to have Cypherpunks a mailing list, and mailing lists
> continue to flourish for a variety of reasons.
>
> > 3. Sine at least part of the networks and hardware the mail list is used on

> >    is publily funded how can you construe it as private w/o some form of
> >    moderator or subscriction contract?
>
> If a car happens to drive on a public street are all rights to privacy
> lost? If a phone call is made and part of the signal path includes a
> publically-subsidized link, is all privacy lost? Is your e-mail
> subject to inspection by the authorities merely because it passes
> through systems they control?
>
> Ultimately, this is why we support encryption and free markets. (Well,
> many of us support free markets.) In the meantime, the Electronic
> Communication Privacy Act protects e-mail against certain kinds of
> seizures. It's not clear (to me) what this means for "quasi-private"
> mailing lists, but at least it may provide some legal defense should
> government agents cite discussions on this list as evidence of
> sedition, treason, conspiracy, etc.
>
> > 4. The responces to L.D. about mail-bombs and posing as a AIDS lab is much
> >    worse and more troublesome to me than anything I have seen L.D. post. No
t
> >    only is some of the actions proposed criminal but I fail to see how a
> >    group which relies on its reputation can support or condone such comment
s.
>
>
> Hold on there, pardner! That post you are referring to was yet another
> one of Detweiler's own "an12070" posts! Even if there wasn't
> compelling circumstantial evidence--cited by so many people here--that
> S. Boxx = The Executioner = Psychopunk = Zen Master = an12070 = L.
> Detweiler, then this latest rant would _still_ have the stylistic
> earmarks of a put-on.
>
> Read it again, if you can stomach it, and bear this in mind.
>
> I hope this helps.
>
> --Tim May
>
>
> --
> ..........................................................................
> Timothy C. May         | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,
> tcmay@netcom.com       | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
> 408-688-5409           | knowledge, reputations, information markets,
> W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA  | black markets, collapse of governments.
> Higher Power: 2^756839 | Public Key: PGP and MailSafe available.
> Note: I put time and money into writing this posting. I hope you enjoy it.
>

First, I NEVER made any accusative statements that ANYONE was trying to
scarey ANYBODY with AIDS statements or otherwise. I DID say that such
statements bother me more than any statements that L.D. has made. To make
such an act against somebody because they print something you don't like, no
matter how heinous, is bigotry plain and simple. The ends do not justify the
means (in my opionion it should be never) in this case. To react this alleged
idiots posts with anything other than a simple deletion is silly and to take
active steps is insane and possible criminal.

Some people have sent me private e-mail saying he has threatened them and
other such things and that this justifies banning (and in some mail
apparently any other action). I used to work in a tech support dept. for a
computer company and a customer threatened to fly from Mi. to Austin to shoot
me and beat up the rest of the dept. because FedEx sent his package to Puerto
Rico by mistake. Does this justify me banning him from tech support? I would
say no and in reality while I am shure he broke some kind of law it ain't
worth the hassle to prove I am right (it seldom is really). I would say that
the only rational way to respond to the problem is to ignore it. Socio-paths
thrive on attention, deny it and they go where they can get it (has anyone
mentioned alt.conspiracy to this guy?)...

Now some of you are going to say that I am a newbie and should be ignored.
That is fine, but remember one thing - newbies is what an organization like
this requires to thrive. If you really want to make CypherPunks work and get
something worthwhile accomplished then please drop L.D. and this whole thread.
The peace simply isn't worth the cost to obtain it...(IMHO)

If this is truly a private list then you need to put more effort into being
clear that this is a indivudualy supported mail-list and is not officialy
associated w/ CypherPunks. I would offer the following protocol:

1. User sends mail w/ 'subscribe' in the body.

2. The mailer responds w/ a numbered header.

3. The user is requied to copy the message from #2 completely and to append
   'agree'.

4. The user is then added to the list.

While it is true that some of you may see this as trivial but if you really
want to keep CypherPunks an open forum and this list private (ensuring that
they are seen as seperate entities) it is critical that this is made at every
oppportunity.





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: VACCINIA@UNCVX1.OIT.UNC.EDU
Date: Sat, 27 Nov 93 11:24:20 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Filtering LD
Message-ID: <01H5TAELLP6A000APP@UNCVX1.OIT.UNC.EDU>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

In these days with much abdication of individual responsibility to various 
agencies, it seems to me that we should not encourage any entity to take
care of poor old us and filter *anyone*, when we can do it as individuals. 
Any new members who are discouraged by the rants and raves of LD or any other
messenger of boredom will learn to use the delete key or killfile. If they
can't hack LD for a couple of days (till they figure out his rap), then there
is not much to be done for them. I think we should give most newcomers the
chance (as well as the credit for having a brain) to figure out the value of 
list conversation on their own, warts and all. Funny thing about warts, get 
rid of one and, alot of times, another crops up. 

Scott G. Morham             !The First, 
Vaccinia@uncvx1.oit.unc.edu !           Second
PGP Public Keys by Request  !                  and Third Levels
                            !        of Information Storage and Retrieval
                            !DNA,                       
                            !     Biological Neural Nets,
                            !                             Cyberspace

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.3a

iQCVAgUBLPUS5z2paOMjHHAhAQEe7QP9HRQbKdgWar/72yJlgVJFvyie8I+hPGLm
MCCmFt1ySwcfzWWi5JGFnAdndeTRclV6x/Jydp2IsaU2IEXkAjKfijJ2En5iEbjS
mxYlV33CrreduTBox2ksGc8fBUgu7BtGR9exVsTHF7Oed9Jyv3EjIq6o0XRLPgKI
todvsPgy8sA=
=JidH
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Timothy Newsham <newsham@wiliki.eng.hawaii.edu>
Date: Sat, 27 Nov 93 17:24:18 PST
To: kkirksey@world.std.com (Ken B Kirksey)
Subject: Re: Secure Wipe
In-Reply-To: <199311251654.AA02153@world.std.com>
Message-ID: <9311280121.AA16389@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> 
> 
> Hola all,
> 
> I've just started working on a good Mac implementation of IDEA, but I
> need a little more info on something.  I've got more info on IDEA than
> I know what to do with, but I've yet to find any good references on doing
> a secure wipe to remove the plaintext file from the hard disk.  Can anyone
> point me to some good refs on the topic?  Many thanks...
> 
> 
>                              Ken
> 
> 

A crypto disk implementation for the AMIGA contains 68k assembly
code for IDEA.  You probably want to look into this.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Clark Reynard <clark@metal.psu.edu>
Date: Sat, 27 Nov 93 12:15:36 PST
To: pfarrell@netcom.com
Subject: RE: META: Filter Detweiler
Message-ID: <9311272023.AA13927@metal.psu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Personally, I use this in my .procmailrc:

:0
* ^From.*ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu  #anything from det
idiot                                        #will go to idiot

Of course, you may choose /dev/null or any other appropriate
location.  This is my last public comment on the LD/SBoxx
complex.
----
Robert W. F. Clark




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Jim choate <ravage@wixer.bga.com>
Date: Sat, 27 Nov 93 15:04:19 PST
To: mimir@u.washington.edu (Al Billings)
Subject: Re: Banning any subscriber
In-Reply-To: <Pine.3.87.9311271321.C27594-0100000@goren2.u.washington.edu>
Message-ID: <9311272246.AA07573@wixer>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>
> On Sat, 27 Nov 1993, Jim choate wrote:
>
> > If this is truly a private list then you need to put more effort into being

> > clear that this is a indivudualy supported mail-list and is not officialy
> > associated w/ CypherPunks. I would offer the following protocol:
>
> "Officially" associated with Cypherpunks? I don't know about where you
> are but in most places in this country there is no "Official Cypherpunks
> Organization." This LIST is the original basis of the Cypherpunks. From
> there, some people who have other interested parties in their locales
> have gone on to form local groups. This isn't like the Extropians who
> have the Extropy Institute officially behind them.
>
> > 1. User sends mail w/ 'subscribe' in the body.
> >
> > 2. The mailer responds w/ a numbered header.
> >
> > 3. The user is requied to copy the message from #2 completely and to append

> >    'agree'.
> >
> > 4. The user is then added to the list.
>
> Why bother?
>
> > While it is true that some of you may see this as trivial but if you really

> > want to keep CypherPunks an open forum and this list private (ensuring that

> > they are seen as seperate entities) it is critical that this is made at eve
ry
> > oppportunity.
>
> What is the "CypherPunks" you are refering to if not this list? All
> mailing lists are, by the very nature, semi-private forums. You have to
> ask to get on them. If someone is disruptive, I see no reason they should
> not be asked to leave. Of course, the idiot in question isn't even on the
> list anymore. If you aren't the list, the list shouldn't accept your
> postings and mail them to members. I see no reason why non-members of the
> list should be able to mailbomb us all by sending to the list address.
>
>
> (*)(*)(*)(*)(*)(*)(*)(*)(*)(*)(*)(*)(*)(*)(*)(*)(*)(*)(*)(*)(*)(*)(*)(*)(*)(*
)
> | Al Billings aka Grendel Grettisson        | "You are, each one, a priest,
|
> |                 mimir@u.washington.edu    |      Just for yourself."
|
> | Sysop of The Sacred Grove (206)322-5450   |
|
> | Admin for Troth-L, The Asatru E-Mail List |             -Noble Drew Ali-
|
> (*)(*)(*)(*)(*)(*)(*)(*)(*)(*)(*)(*)(*)(*)(*)(*)(*)(*)(*)(*)(*)(*)(*)(*)(*)(*
)
>
>

So what you are saying is that the group which recently formed here in Austin
as the Austin chapter of the CypherPunks is in actuallity a fraud?

If this is so then I would agree w/ you that there is no 'official'
CypherPunks organization (course the existance of this list and the various
user groups make a very strong oppositional argument to this position). But,
if the local CypherPunk group is to be considered a serious entity w/ any kid
of change in effecting legislation and public sentiment (closely related
wouldn't you agree?) then some form of officialdom better be created quickly.
Even if the individual groups are to have any effect on local politics then
they have to band together and choose some commen forums and planks of
discussion.

Then again, perhaps I am mis-informed about the nature of the CypherPunks. It
was my understanding they were here to help protect and guide users of
cyberspace and provide some sense of security on an individual level. The
presentation of the group in the electronic and print media has been one
which fostered a sense of uniformity and cohesion among the various groups
and individuals. I am shure I am not the only follower of the crypto scene
who is new to c-punks and a little confused (a very bad thing for newbies to
any kind of movement to be) about what is going on and why.

You seem to miss the entire point that I am making. It is not that what you
are doing is wrong or incorrect, it is simply that the reality is different
from the actuality and I am simply saying that there has been very little
effort to fix that.

The reason to bother w/ a procedure (not necessarily the one I offered) is to
make shure that eveyone is informed and knows what to expect as well as what
is expected of them. To be taken seriously this has to be done as a primary
goal. If you have no intention of 'doing' anything (writing code, writing
letters to politicians, etc.) then by all means the structure(less) you have
now is sufficient. However, there are people interested in this topic that
both expect more and want to give more. These people will be put off by such
handling.

I agree with your position on the list PROVIDED that the subscriber is told
that UP FRONT (which is not the case now). All I am saying is whatever method
you choose to handle the list is fine as long as ALL NEW SUBSCRIBERS are
advised of the situation. You can not assume that a user knows what is going
on simply because they can manage to subscribe to it. Just be fair is what I
am saying.





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Jim choate <ravage@wixer.bga.com>
Date: Sat, 27 Nov 93 15:14:44 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: newsgroup v news-list
Message-ID: <9311272255.AA08212@wixer>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I have been mulling over the pro's and con's of both for a group such as this
and realy I don't see it makes a great deal of difference. The problem right
now to me is staying on topic (ie crypt and politics). Neither of these
forums will provide that kind of discipline w/o some kind of moderation.

Also, I would appreciate any more comments on the distinctions between this
mail list, CypherPunks as promoted in the media, and the CypherPunks as it
realy exists. I am intrigued by the various distinctions that I have recieved
in private mail (and they span the whole gamut of views). If one thing has
become clear is that everyone disagrees about what c-punks is and how it
works.





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Matt Binder <binder@well.sf.ca.us>
Date: Sat, 27 Nov 93 17:44:18 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: health privacy radio program
Message-ID: <199311280141.RAA15079@well.sf.ca.us>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Thanks for your help with my story about medical record privacy. 

Working on the story was a real education for me, (getting to meet
all kinds of interesting people is one of the main reasons why I'm
a reporter) and I had a few good coincidences that added some
"atmosphere" to the piece.  I've included the entire script below.
I hope I'm not being presumptuous.

The show in which my 8.5 minute piece aired is called "The
Communications Revolution, produced by the Telecommunications Radio
Project, which is headquartered at KPFA-FM in Berkeley.  The
project is funded by the California Public Utilities Commission,
through the Telecommunications Education Trust (TET), which is
basically money that was overpaid to Pac Bell by its customers. 
Other TET grantees are Gregg McVicar's "Privacy Project", and Beth
Given's "Privacy Rights Clearinghouse" in San Diego.  Our project
is a series of 13 one hour, live, satellite- linked panel
discussion and call-in shows that air on about thirty stations
around the country (but especially in California).


show: HEALTH PRIVACY    Matt Binder   11/12/93    draft FINAL

****************************************************************
*** cut 1 *** dramatic reading of condensed version of
		Hippocratic Oath (Ed Markman)
   in: "I swear by Apollo Physician, by Asclepius, by Health, and
by all the gods and goddesses that I will carry out this oath: 
into whatsoever houses I enter, I will enter to help the sick,
and whatsoever I shall see or hear in the course of my
profession, if it be what should not be published abroad, I will
never divulge, holding such things to be holy secrets...."   	
(then fade)
****************************************************************

SINCE THE TIME OF ANCIENT GREECE, DOCTORS HAVE UNDERSTOOD THE
SENSITIVE NATURE OF THEIR PROFESSION, AND HAVE RECITED THIS, THE
HIPPOCRATIC OATH, AS A PROMISE OF CONFIDENTIALITY.  UNTIL
RECENTLY PHYSICIANS HAVE KEPT THE SECRETS OF THEIR PATIENTS IN
THEIR HEADS, OR ON PIECES OF PAPER IN A FILE.  AND THEY'VE BEEN
THE GATEKEEPERS FOR OTHERS WANTING TO SEE THIS EXTREMELY PRIVATE
INFORMATION.  BUT NOW, FOR SOME VERY GOOD REASONS, THAT'S ALL
BEGINNING TO CHANGE.

----------------------------------------------------------------

--- ambience 1 --- dialysis machine				(2:00)
----------------------------------------------------------------
----------------------------------------------------------------
--- ambience 2 --- ventilator						(2:00)
----------------------------------------------------------------
----------------------------------------------------------------
--- ambience 3 --- Dr. Ting talking to patient		(1:30)
		(3 possible starting points)
----------------------------------------------------------------

AT THE DIALYSIS UNIT AT EL CAMINO HOSPITAL IN MOUNTAINVIEW
CALIFORNIA, DOCTOR GEORGE TING USES A COMPUTER TO KEEP RECORDS,
ORDER TESTS AND PRESCRIBE DRUGS FOR HIS PATIENTS.  HE SAYS THE
COMPUTER SAVES HIM HOURS EACH WEEK, AND CAN EVEN SAVE LIVES...

****************************************************************
*** cut 2 *** Dr. Ting                         :15
  in: "For instance if you're ordering a medication on a patient,
it automatically gives you the most common prescribing doses and
frequency.  It does make it less likely that you're gonna make
some major mistake, prescribing ten times the usual amount."
   (then fade)  
****************************************************************

----------------------------------------------------------------
--- ambience 4 --- Nurse Holt working at computer		(1:10)
----------------------------------------------------------------

----------------------------------------------------------------
--- ambience 5 --- computer printer				(1:05)
----------------------------------------------------------------

NURSE JUDY HOLT IS AN EVEN STRONGER PROPONENT OF THE COMPUTER.
WHEN NEW DOCTORS COME TO THE HOSPITAL AND RESIST USING THE
COMPUTER SYSTEM, SHE AND OTHER NURSES PRESSURE THEM TO GET WITH
THE PROGRAM...

****************************************************************
*** cut 3 *** Holt                        :17
  in: "We're all anxious to help them learn how to use the
computer because it saves us time, it saves the possibility of
transcription errors, it saves: 'I can't read this doctor's
writing, what on earth does it say,' and if three of us looked at
it and can't figure it out, we've gotta call him..."
    (then fade) 
****************************************************************

BUT THE COMPUTERIZATION OF MEDICAL RECORDS HAS A DOWNSIDE:
AMASSING HUGE DATABASES OF SENSITIVE INFORMATION COULD OPEN THE
DOOR TO PRIVACY INVASIONS ON A SCALE UNIMAGINABLE WITH PAPER
FILES.  IT'S ALREADY HAPPENING.  INSURANCE COMPANIES AND DIRECT
MARKETERS, AIDED BY COMPUTERS ALL LINKED TOGETHER BY PHONE LINES
ARE FINDING WAYS TO GET AHOLD OF MEDICAL DATA, AND THEY'RE
SELLING AND TRADING IT ACROSS VAST NETWORKS.

----------------------------------------------------------------
--- ambience 6 --- Taylor answering door on Halloween	(1:00)
  in: "Trick or Treat!..."
----------------------------------------------------------------

IT'S HALLOWEEN NIGHT AT THE HOME OF MARY ROSE TAYLOR IN
SPRINGFIELD MASSACHUSETTS.  TAYLOR RECENTLY FOUND OUT HOW EASY IT
IS TO GET TRAPPED IN ONE OF THOSE DATA WEBS.  SHE APPLIED FOR
HEALTH INSURANCE BUT WAS REJECTED BECAUSE OF A COMPUTER ERROR AT
THE MEDICAL INFORMATION BUREAU, OR MIB, A HUGE MEDICAL DATABASE
KEPT BY INSURANCE COMPANIES...

****************************************************************
*** cut 4 *** Taylor                      :20
  in: "They had my name on a urinalysis that wasn't mine, and
they refused to think that there was any kind of mistake or
mixup, and I went without insurance for a year and a half, and
had to literally go to my state representative, the insurance
commissioner just to have it corrected."
****************************************************************

TAYLOR TOLD MIB AND HER INSURANCE COMPANY THAT SHE'D HAD ONLY A
BLOOD TEST, NOT A URINE TEST, AND THEREFORE THE ABNORMAL
URINALYSIS COULDN'T POSSIBLY BE HERS.  BUT THE INSURANCE COMPANY
INSISTED THAT SHE GAVE A URINE SAMPLE, THAT IT SHOWED THERE WAS
SOMETHING WRONG WITH HER, THOUGH THEY WOULDN'T TELL HER WHAT IT
WAS...

****************************************************************
*** cut 5 *** Taylor                      :14
  in: "At one point the risk manager had me in tears (sniff).  He
was very nasty, really.  You know, and his words, what he said to
me was that computers don't make mistakes.  I said I agree, but
the people that feed the computer do.  
****************************************************************

----------------------------------------------------------------
--- ambience 5 comes up full again --- more Halloween sound 
	(then fades out completely before next cut starts)
----------------------------------------------------------------

****************************************************************
*** cut 6 *** Anonymous (ALTERED VOICE)             :10
  in: "I'm paying fifteen thousand a year for disability,
personal disability and medical insurance, and that seems like a
whole heck of a lot of money..."   (then fade)
****************************************************************

ANOTHER VICTIM OF A MEDICAL INFORMATION BUREAU ERROR IS THIS
DOCTOR FROM SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA WHO WANTS TO REMAIN ANONYMOUS.
WHEN SHE ASKED HER INSURANCE COMPANY WHY HER RATES WERE SO HIGH,
THEY TOLD HER THAT HER MIB FILE SHOWED THAT SHE HAD ALZHEIMER'S
DISEASE AND A HEART CONDITION...

****************************************************************
*** cut 7 *** Anonymous (ALTERED VOICE)            :23
  in: "Here I am a physician who works sixteen hours a day, who's
never been in the hospital has Alzheimer's disease and a heart
attack!?  That doesn't make sense.  I don't think computers and
the people who put information into the computer are advanced
enough to have such control over our lives."
****************************************************************

****************************************************************
*** cut 8 *** Binder stand-up at MIB                       :24
  in: "I'm now standing outside the entrance to MIB Incorporated
in Westwood Massachusetts.  I've been trying for over two months
to get an interview with the president of the company, Neil Day. 
He says he doesn't have the time, and no one else can speak for
the company.  But he did admit during a telephone conversation we
had that four percent of the 16 million computerized medical
records in this building do have errors in them."
****************************************************************

****************************************************************
*** cut 9 *** Smith                            :10
  in: "I don't think MIB really needs the good will of consumers,
as does a retail store, and in many ways the less known about MIB
the better perhaps for insurance companies."
****************************************************************

ROBERT ELLIS SMITH IS THE EDITOR OF PRIVACY JOURNAL IN PROVIDENCE
RHODE ISLAND...

****************************************************************
*** cut 10 *** Smith                       :23
  in: "The ancient Greeks knew as others did that for medical
care to work properly, you have to be totally candid to your
doctor.  But now instead of a one on one relationship there is a
triangle among the provider, your insurance company and your
employer, and medical information about us flows throughout that
triangle without our participation.  And that's the crisis we're
in right now."
****************************************************************

AFTER THE INSURERS AND EMPLOYERS, IT'S PHARMACEUTICAL COMPANIES
AND DIRECT MARKETERS THAT ARE THE MOST AVID COMPILERS OF MEDICAL
INFORMATION.  SOME OF THESE COMPANIES HAVE TOLL-FREE TELEPHONE
NUMBERS YOU CAN CALL TO GET FREE SAMPLES OF THEIR PRODUCTS.  WHAT
THEY DON'T TELL YOU WHEN YOU CALL IS THAT YOUR PHONE NUMBER AND
OFTEN YOUR NAME AND ADDRESS AUTOMATICALLY POPS UP ON THEIR
COMPUTER SCREENS, AND YOUR PERSONAL PROBLEM, WHETHER IT BE
ALLERGIES OR HEMORRHOIDS GOES RIGHT INTO THEIR DATABASE.  AGAIN
THE COMPANIES THAT RUN THESE DATABASES REFUSED TO TALK ABOUT
THEM.

-----------------------------------------------------------------
--- ambience 6 --- Apter talking on phone
----------------------------------------------------------------

ONE MAN WHO'S NOT SHY AT ALL ABOUT HIS DATABASE SNOOPING IS JOE
APTER, PRESIDENT OF TELEPHONIC-INFO INCORPORATED OF SAINT
PETERSBURG FLORIDA.  HIS COMPANY ACTUALLY HAS A PRICE LIST OF
INFORMATION YOU CAN OBTAIN: $49 FOR SOMEONE'S SOCIAL SECURITY
NUMBER; $299 WILL GET YOU SOMETHING CALLED A "MEDICAL PROFILE"
THAT APTER WOULDN'T ELABORATE ON, BUT WHICH HE SAYS COMES FROM 
LEGAL SOURCES...

****************************************************************
*** cut 11 *** Apter                       	:24
  in: "There are people out there that are providing medical
records on an illegal basis.  And the method they would use to
obtain that would be a pretext into a doctor, and they'd have to
know the doctor, or a pretext in the insurance company to get
that information.  We don't do that.  

or: *** alternate cut 11 *** Apter			:24
  in: "You and I are leaving threads as we go around, and we find
those threads and we weave them together to get a picture.  There
are people out there that are providing medical records on an
illegal basis.  We don't do that." 
****************************************************************

****************************************************************
*** cut 12 *** Hippocratic oath
  (fades in under last cut, up full for a couple of seconds, then
under next cut, then up again after next cut.)
****************************************************************

****************************************************************
*** cut 13 *** Smith                          :22
  in: "I think the answer is for patients to insist that doctors
go back to that ancient ethical standard, and insist that they
not disclose information about them without their informed
consent totally.  The concept of informed consent about the
release of medical information seems to have gotten lost in the
modern age."
****************************************************************

(Hippocratic Oath comes up full again, then down briefly for soc
out)

I'M MATT BINDER FOR THE COMMUNICATIONS REVOLUTION.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: VACCINIA@UNCVX1.OIT.UNC.EDU
Date: Sat, 27 Nov 93 14:49:44 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Traffic analysis and file size
Message-ID: <01H5THL70MTE000B3T@UNCVX1.OIT.UNC.EDU>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

There has been some list discussion about defeating traffic analysis of 
remailers by altering the incoming and outgoing size of the files. But 
is this not accomplished by merely encrypting with the remailers public key?
Assuming it is an encryption supporting remailer that is. When the file size 
changes as PGP encryption is stripped off it and the files are not sent out 
in the exact same order as they arrive, would it not be very difficult to 
ascertain that file of size X enters a remailer and emerges as size X-y. Or
can one easily deduce y from PGP's parameters? Even if y is easily deduced 
this problem can be overcome.

I have used various layers of compression utilities and encryption to change 
message size so that as the first layer of encryption is stripped off, the 
file is then in a File.zip state. This is then unzipped revealing another
encrypted message with an address header. Upon being sent to the next series 
of remailers this same course of events could then be replicated ad nauseum. 
Combine this strategy with file stuffers and one would likely have a hell of 
a time trying to match incoming/outgoing file sizes and where they originated 
from/are going to. Granted this is a pain, but it would seem that automation 
could easily be implemented.

Scott G. Morham             !The First, 
Vaccinia@uncvx1.oit.unc.edu !           Second
PGP Public Keys by Request  !                  and Third Levels
                            !        of Information Storage and Retrieval
                            !DNA,                       
                            !     Biological Neural Nets,
                            !                             Cyberspace

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.3a

iQCVAgUBLPVDjD2paOMjHHAhAQFclQP7BeTl891Edj2ZgSQvKgtHXPtRAGweu3+h
Jee+6vOf8BKvcZMlc78PQ5BF+2YNc70NdTCSG8860X/Rc4oJYiLHLfKRPRP5JlsE
ogZiMHxVEvRt+YLDvQTrE3VcvOdb25HUKpcZvNggoR7Ouge1YlH+14Tvf2+oogCD
VXbcFVxNi+E=
=Yt/P
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From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Anonymous <nowhere@bsu-cs.bsu.edu>
Date: Sat, 27 Nov 93 16:24:44 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Big Brother Wants to Look Into Your Bank Account ...
Message-ID: <9311280025.AA08372@bsu-cs.bsu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



 
excerpted from:
 
W-I-R-E-D
1.6
December 1993
pages 91 through 93, 134
 
 
 
Big Brother Wants to Look Into Your Bank Account
(Any Time It Pleases)
 
The US Government is constructing a system to track all financial
transactions in real-time -- ostensibly to catch drug traffickers,
terrorists, and financial criminals. Does that leave you with the warm
fuzzies -- or scare you out of your wits?
 
by Anthony L. Kimery
 
 
 
 
There wasn't much to go on. The police salvaged the slip of paper that
a small-time East Coast drug dealer tried to eat before being
arrested, but on it they found scribbled only a telephone number and
what appeared to be the name "John." This frustrated the police. They
had anticipated more incriminating information on the man they
believed was the supplier not only to the dealer they'd just busted,
but also to dozens of other street corner crack peddlers. With two
slim leads, the police weren't technically equipped to do much more
than antiquated detective work that probably wouldn't yield evidence
they could use to indict John. So they turned to the quasi-secretive,
federal Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) for the digital
sleuthing they needed.
 
Less than 45 minutes after receiving the official police request for
help, FinCEN had retrieved enough evidence of criminal wrongdoing from
government databases that the district attorney prosecuting the case
was able to seek indictments against John on charges of money
laundering and conspiracy to traffic narcotics. The local police were
impressed.
 
Launched with a low-key champagne reception at the Treasury Department
in April 1990, FinCEN is the US Government's (perhaps the world's)
most effective financial crime investigation unit. Even Russian
President Boris Yeltsin asked for its help in locating stolen
Communist Party funds. This state-of-the-art computer-snooping agency
is quietly tucked away under the auspices of the Treasury Department.
Its mission is to map the digital trails of dirty money, be it the
laundered profits from drug sales, stolen S&L loot, hidden political
slush funds, or the financing conduits of terrorists. It's the only
federal unit devoted solely to the systematic collation and
cross-analysis of law enforcement, intelligence, and public databases.
 
Until August 1993, FinCEN headquarters was an old Social Security
Administration building with a ceiling ravaged by asbestos abatement
crews, but that didn't seem to faze director Brian Bruh (he retired in
October). With 25 years of experience in law enforcement, Bruh is a
seasoned cop who has headed up criminal investigations at both the IRS
and the Pentagon. Prior to overseeing FinCEN, he was the chief
investigator for the Tower Commission, President Reagan's blue ribbon
probe into the Iran-Contra scandal. FinCEN was his crowning
achievement, and he took pride in directing visitors to FinCEN's
computer command center as he touted the agency's successes.
 
In private and in testimony to Congress, statistics roll off Bruh's
tongue. Last year FinCEN's computer operations center responded to
priority requests for tactical intelligence on nearly 12,000
individuals and entities, doubling the 1991 workload. The 1993 total
will be three times the 1991 sum. Longer-term strategic analytical
reports have been completed for 715 investigations involving 16,000
other individuals and entities.
 
Two of the government's biggest strikes against organized drug-money
laundering -- operations Green Ice (a lengthy DEA operation that
resulted in the arrests of high-ranking Cali and Medellin cartel
financial officers and the seizure of US$54 million in cash and
assets) and Polar Cap V (a spinoff of Green Ice that culminated in
April 1990) -- owe a great deal to FinCEN for having identified and
targeted money laundering activities via computer. In the Polar Cap
operation, FinCEN's computer tracking documented more than US$500
million in financial activity by 47 individuals who have since been
indicted on drug trafficking and money laundering charges.
 
Inside FinCEN's new digs on the second floor of a gleaming high-rise
office building down the road from the CIA in Vienna, Virginia
(otherwise know as "Spook City"), the talents of the IRS, FBI, DEA,
Secret Service, and other traditional federal cops such as customs
agents and postal inspectors are pooled. According to senior
intelligence officers, these investigative units can access resources
of the CIA, the National Security Agency (which intercepts data on
electronic currency movements into and out of the United States, some
of which make their way into FinCEN's analyses), and the Defense
Intelligence Agency.
 
Bruh and other FinCEN officials openly acknowledge their association
with the CIA, but refuse to discuss further any aspect of FinCEN's
dealings with it or any other intelligence agency. In addition to the
CIA, intelligence officials have admitted, of the record, that the
National Security Council and the State Department's Bureau of
Intelligence and Research (INR) have also joined FinCEN's impressive
intelligence crew. In short, FinCEN is a one-of-a-kind cauldron
containing all the available financial intelligence in the United
States.
 
"FinCEN is absolutely necessary," said a senior General Accounting
Office (GAO) official involved in an audit of FinCEN required by new
anti-money-laundering laws passed last year. The agency's report
wasn't released by press time, but according to the GAO official, no
irregularities were uncovered. However, the GAO's scrutiny skirted
emerging concerns about privacy, civil rights, and the appropriate
role of the intelligence community.
 
FinCEN's mission _requires_ the involvement of the intelligence
community, particularly in tracking the financial dealings of
terrorists and in conducting financial counterintelligence, although
few are willing to discuss the trend openly. Because these activities
cross into the world od cloaks and daggers, some watchdogs are
concerned that such endeavors will encroach on privacy and civil
rights. When you look at the power of FinCEN and its proposed
offspring, their fears seem justified.
 
 
How to Bust a John
 
The whiz kids at FinCEN are good. Very good. That;s why state and
local police have come to depend on FinCEN to pull them out of the
electronic-sleuthing quicksand. The case of John the drug supplier is
a good example of one of their less-complex assignments, and it
illustrates the adeptness with which the government can collate
existing financial data.
 
Seated at a computer terminal inside FinCEN's former command post, a
FinCEN analyst began the hunt. He started by querying a database of
business phone numbers. He scored a hit with the number of a local
restaurant. Next he entered the Currency and Banking Database (CBDB),
an IRS database accessed through the Currency and Banking Retrieval
System. CBDB contains roughly 50 million Currency Transaction Reports
(CTRs), which document all financial transactions of more than
US$10,000. By law these transactions must be filed by banks, S&Ls,
credit unions, securities brokers, casinos, and other individuals and
businesses engaged in the exchange of large sums of money.
 
The analyst narrowed his quest by searching for CTRs filed for
transactions deemed "suspicious." Financial institutions must still
file a CTR, or IRS Form 4789, if a transaction under US$10,000 is
considered suspicious under the terms of an extensive federal
government list. There was a hit. A series of :suspicious" CTRs
existed in the restaurant's ZIP code. Punching up images of the
identified CTRs  on his terminal, the FinCEN analyst noted that the
transactions were made by a person whose first name was John. The CTRs
were suspicious all right; they were submitted for a series of
transactions each in the amount of US$9,500, just below the CTR
threshold of US$10,000. This was hard evidence that John structured
the deposits to avoid filing a Form 4789, and that is a federal crime.
 
Selecting one of the CTRs for "an expanded review," the analyst got
John's full name, Social Security number, date of birth, home address,
driver license number, and other vital statistics, including bank
account number.
 
Plunging back into the IRS database, the analyst broadened his search
for all CTRs filed on behalf of the suspect, including non-suspicious
CTRs. Only 20 reports deemed suspicious popped up on the screen, but
more than 150 CTRs were filed in all. A review of the non-suspicious
ones revealed that on several, John listed his occupation as the owner
or manager of the restaurant identified by the telephone number on the
slip of paper taken from the arrested drug dealer. The connection
between the name and the phone number originally given to FinCEN was
secured.
 
The FinCEN analyst the tapped commercial and government databases, and
turned up business information on the restaurant showing that John had
reported an expected annual revenue for his eatery of substantially
less than the money he had been depositing, as indicated by the CTRs.
Fishing in a database of local tax assessment records, the analyst
discovered that John owned other properties and businesses. With the
names of these other companies, the analyst went back into the CTR
database and found that suspicious transaction reports were filed on
several of them as well.
 
As routine as such assignments as this case may be, the chumminess
between FinCEN and the intelligence community raises serious questions
about the privacy and security of the financial records of citizens
John and Jane Doe, considering the intelligence community's historic
penchant for illegal spying on non-criminals. Given the cast reach and
ease with which the government can now tap into an individual's or
business's financial records on a whim, these questions have received
far too little scrutiny.
 
 
Whose privacy?
 
"There are legitimate concerns" regarding privacy, a ranking House
banking committee staffer conceded in an interview with _Wired_.
"Quite frankly, there hasn't been much congressional oversight with
respect to the intelligence community's involvement with FinCEN. When
you start trying look into this, you start running up against all
kinds of roadblocks." The GAO official involved in auditing FinCEN
agreed that questions regarding the intelligence community's
involvement and attendant privacy concerns haven't been addressed. If
such issues have been the subject of discussion behind the closed
doors of the White House and Senate intelligence committees, no one is
talking openly about it. Meanwhile, the potential for abusive intrusion
by government into the financial affairs of private citizens and
businesses is growing almost unnoticed and unchecked.
 
Two of the latest electronic inroads into the financial records of
private citizens and businesses are "Operation Gateway," a FinCEN
initiative, and the proposed Deposit Tracking System, which other
intelligence agencies would like to see established. Both are
inherently prone to abuse and provide a disturbing indication of the
direction which the government is moving.
 
Gateway is a pilot program launched in Texas this July that gives
state and local law enforcement officials direct access to the massive
federal Financial Database (FDB) through a designated FinCEN
coordinator. The FDB contains the records that financial institutions
have been filing under the Bank Secrecy Act for the last 25 years --
CTRs, suspicious transaction reports, International Transportation of
Currency or Monetary Instruments reports, and Foreign Bank and
Financial Accounts reports. In addition, Congress is expected to grant
FinCEN authority to tap into the database of Forms 8300, which are
reports of payments over US$10,000 received in a trade or business.
These documents principally contain information on deposits,
withdrawals, and the movement of large sums of currency. It is
FinCEN's intent to give all state governments individual access to the
FDB.
 
Under the Gateway proposal, results from all queries would be written
into a master audit file that will constantly be compared against
other requests and databases to track whether the subject of the
inquiry is of interest to another agency or has popped up in a record
somewhere else.
 
State coordinators designated by the FinCEN will do the logging on, as
FinCEN is uncomfortable with giving 50,000 federal agents and 500,000
police officers direct electronic access to its database. "This is
very sensitive information," concedes Andy Flodin, special assistant
to the FinCEN director. "We'd have to have additional security
safeguards before we could open it up to every police agency."
 
But while the FDB contains only records on major money movements and
thus is not as much of a threat to individual privacy, the Deposit
Tracking System (DTS) is a potential menace. If implemented, the
estimated US$12.5 million computer system could be used to penetrate
the security of bank accounts belonging to you, me, and 388 million
other bank account holders in the US.
 
The government argues that such a system is necessary for two reasons:
first, to access adequately the funding needed for federal deposit
insurance and second, to locate the assets of individuals ordered by
courts to make restitution for financial crimes -- like the savings
and loan crooks. (It seems the government can't trace most of the
money they stole.)
 
The first reason stems from a requirement of the seemingly innocuous
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 1991 -- one
of Congress's legislative responses to the savings and loan debacle.
The Act requires the FDIC to study the costs, feasibility, and privacy
implications of tracking every bank deposit in the United States.
 
So far the DTS exists only on paper. The FDIC's completed feasibility
study is currently being examined by Congress, but it is unlikely to
act on it before late next year, For the time being, the US$12.5
million price tag seems to be the biggest drawback to its
implementation.
 
Concerns about the DTS have been widespread, although it has received
scant attention in the mainstream press. But according to Diane Casey,
executive director of the Independent Bankers Association of America,
the DTS "would fundamentally change the relationships among banks,
consumers, and the government in ways that have implications beyond
banking policy. Our open and democratic society would be changed
profoundly if any agency of the government maintained the scope of
information on private citizens described in this proposal. It raises
questions about our democracy that would have to be addressed by the
highest policy-making levels of government."
 
The American Bankers Association (ABA) voiced equally serious
concerns. The ABA doubts "whether there are any privacy safeguards
that would be adequate to effectively protect this database from use
by government agencies and, eventually, private parties," an ABA
spokesman explains. "It is inconceivable to the ABA that such a
database could be used only by the FDIC in deposit insurance coverage
investigations. Such a database...would provide a wealth of
information for investigations being conducted by the FBI, the Drug
Enforcement Administration, and the IRS, to name but a few. Like the
baseball diamond in _Field_of_Dreams_, build this database and they
will come. Eventually, whether legally or illegally, they will gain
access to this database."
 
The FDIC forcefully argued against the DTS in the 234-page draft
report it submitted to Congress in June 1993, but it may not have the
bureaucratic clout necessary to kill the proposal. _Wired_ was told by
intelligence analysts and congressional sources dealing with oversight
of the intelligence community that federal law enforcement and
intelligence agencies are privately clamoring for the system,
apparently disregarding both the privacy issues and the system's
start-up cost (which does not include the additional US$20 million a
year the feasibility study said would be required for facilities, for
salaries and benefits, and for routine hardware and software
maintenance).
 
Further driving the intelligence agencies's desire for the DTS is the
much-hyped role of economic intelligence gathering, a key focus of the
Clinton administration's reform of the intelligence community.
Agencies like the CIA view the system as a boon to their ability to
monitor foreign financial dealings in the US, according to both
congressional and intelligence sources.
 
 
Adding Intelligence to the Equation
 
Regardless of the form it takes, the sources said, the DTS and any
other financial databases that come down the pike could be easily
interfaced to FinCEN's Artificial Intelligence/Massive Parallel
Processing (AI/MPP) program, a criminal targeting system that will go
online in a few years.
 
Because laundered money is moved undetected along with the millions of
legitimate computerized wire transfers that occur daily, FinCEN's
computer investigations naturally demand expert systems that can
single the dirty money out of the crowd. FinCEN's current Artificial
Intelligence capability allows it to search the Financial Database for
suspicious, preprogrammed patterns of monetary transactions. While not
very flexible, the system has successfully identified previously
unknown criminal organizations and activities.
 
But FinCEN has a hush-hush US$2.4 million contract with the US
Department of Energy's Los Alamos National Laboratory to develop what
Bruh and other FinCEN officials described as a powerful "money flow
model." Unlike FinCEN's current system, Los Alamos's AI software will
look for unexplained, atypical money flows. Coupled with a massively
parallel computer system, the AI/MPP could perform real-time
monitoring of the entire US electronic banking landscape.
 
FinCEN's AI capabilities currently exploit the Financial Database for
proactive targeting of criminal activity. The system automatically
monitors the entire FDB database, constantly identifying suspicious
financial activity in supercomputer-aided, rapid-response time. In
addition to the FDB, FinCEN is applying AI to the Criminal Referral
Forms that must be filed with the FinCEN whenever banks, examiners,
and regulators uncover financial activities they suspect are illegal.
 
In the near future, all of these government databases will be
interfaced by way of AI/MPP technology. "MPP is critical to FinCEN's
ability to analyse (banking) data to its full capacity," Bruh insists.
 
The pure power od such a "database of databases" terrifies critics.
Though FinCEN and other authorities discount the potential for abuse,
tell that to the CIA. Its charter forbids it from engaging in domestic
surveillance; nonetheless, it spied on Americans for seven consecutive
presidential administrations (it says it finally ceased its internal
spying in the mid-1970s).
 
FinCEN's AI operation has been employed legitimately with great
success. Perhaps its least-known project was assisting the CIA in
identifying and tracking the flow of money between Iran's
state-sponsored Islamic fundamentalist terrorist organizations and the
men linked to the bombing of the World Trade Center. According to a
Treasury official and confirmed by Anna Fotias, FinCEN's congressional
liaison, FinCEN identified suspicious transaction reports filed by a
bank in New Jersey on wire transfers from Germany to the accounts of
two of the men charged in the bombing. With the bank account in
Germany identified, further AI processing -- utilizing intelligence
from the CIA's DESIST computer system, the world's most extensive
database on terrorists -- identified a company as a front for an
Iranian terrorist group. Coupled with DESIST's data on the two men's
terrorist connections, FinCEN was able to identify a number of
previously unknown conduits of terrorist funding in the US and abroad.
Similarly, FinCEN was crucial in identifying Iraqi assets in the US
that were frozen in the wake of Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, according
to a Treasury official.
 
Still, given the CIA's less-than-spotless record, privacy advocates
are likely to find it disturbing that there are some within the walls
of CIA headquarters -- apparently unbeknownst to anyone at FinCEN --
who want to mesh DESIST with FinCEN's eventual AI/MPP ability and with
all the databases FinCEN routinely surveys. The justification for
creating such a system is compelling: More likely than not it would
identify scores of previously unknown financial conduits to
terrorists.
 
Advocates of a full-time DESIST/FinCEN system carry their argument one
step further: Hooked into the yet-to-be-authorized Deposit Tracking
System, the DESIST/FinCEN system would be able to identify terrorist
financial movements in real-time, thus providing early warning of
potentially imminent terrorist actions. Some within the intelligence
community take it still another step: They would have the system tied
into the private computers that hold credit card transactions "so that
we could have a nearly instant time-tracking capability," according to
one source who works closely with the CIA's Counterterrorist Center.
 
Conversely, a CIA/FinCEN/DTS endeavor could monitor on a real-time
basis the financial activity of narcotics traffickers, since drug
dealing also is within the purview of the CIA. The agency's
Counternarcotics Center, or CNC, already works closely with FinCEN.
 
Before the CIA would be allowed to tap into a system as sensitive as
the proposed Deposit Tracking System, it would have to clear plenty of
civil liberties hurdles, not the least of which is the prohibition on
the CIA from gathering intelligence on US citizens. As long as the DTS
itself was shielded from direct access by the CIA, proponents could
argue that the operation was allowable under law. Opponents, on the
other hand, fear that the CIA would find a way to download, copy, or
otherwise secretly access the DTS.
 
"The risk of the CIA getting its hands on this is serious -- we know
the kind of unscrupulous people who populate the spook world," said a
Washington-area private investigator who conducts many legitimate
financial  investigations for a CIA-linked firm. "This kind of
financial data, when coupled with other information like a person's
credit history, could be used for blackmail, bribery, and extortion,"
said the investigator, who has a military intelligence background.
 
Bruce Hemmings is a veteran CIA clandestine-services officer who
retired in 1989. Prior to the DTS proposal, he told _Wired_ that the
CIA routinely digs for financial dirt on people from whom the agency
wants specific information. Typically they are foreign intelligence
officers working in the US under a diplomatic guise, and this
financial information is often used as leverage in getting them to
talk. In less civilized venues, this is called blackmail.
 
DTS could present an inviting mechanism for quieting unwanted dissent
or for defanging an unruly congressional leader bent on exposing some
questionable CIA operation. Although still in its embryonic stage and
in spite of the looming privacy obstacle it will inevitably confront,
FinCEN is seen by many in the government as the catalyst for a
powerful, all-seeing, all-knowing, global, financial-tracking
organization. In fact, FinCEN is already working closely with
INTERPOL, and Bruh's deputy just resigned to head up INTERPOLs US
office.
 
As the privacy debate heats up, FinCEN's digital dirt-money trackers
go on about their work, hoping they don't have to choose sides if what
they do becomes a fill-blown privacy invasion problem. As Bruh puts
it, "There's tons of crooks out there who are disguising their
criminal profits. FinCEN needs to computerize as much as possible to
be able to identify the really significant criminals and their
activities."
 
The question then becomes, at point does it stop?
 
-------------------------------
 
Anthony L. Kimery covers financial industry regulatory affairs as an
editor at American Banker Newsletters.
 
<all _underscored_ text above signifies italicized print>





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: hughes@ah.com (Eric Hughes)
Date: Sat, 27 Nov 93 20:14:19 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: 900 MHz Cordless question
In-Reply-To: <199311250803.AAA19259@mail.netcom.com>
Message-ID: <9311280406.AA03857@ah.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>1: Given that Cylink was one of the two original companies to manufacture
>Clipper hardware

???

The two companies were VLSI Technology, who did the manufacturing, and
Mycotronx, who did the design.

Eric




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "L. Detweiler" <ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Date: Sat, 27 Nov 93 19:24:19 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Web of Trust: A Proposal
Message-ID: <9311280322.AA20996@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Hello everyone, I've been watching these accusations of pseudospoofing
scroll by like everyone else, and have been quite upset by them.
Cypherpunks should be very careful in this atmosphere. We don't know
who to trust! Even the fiery responses to this message could be coming
from tentacles! I think the tentacle activity has increased
tremendously in the past few weeks because of the variety of recent exposures.

So, with an eye to preventing this poison, I'm trying to establish an
informal `Web of Trust' of cypherpunks who trust each other in posting
with real, and not pseudospoofed identities. I talked about creating
this list before, but there was no interest then. I think there is
interest now. People want to know if the people they respect really
exist and are who they say they are. They are concerned about a
campaign to create fake accounts across many states to manipulate the
trusting. They suspect that the incredible dischord on this list,
historically and presently, is really the fault of the pseudospoofing.
Many have complained to me of the `demonizing' and `discreditation' of
people who are attempting to establish an honest network of real
cypherpunks, turned into whimpering martyrs and scapegoats.

For now, I'm especially interested in making contact with some
California cypherpunks who have attended meetings and would like to
help establish a completely pure `Web of Trust' free of poisoning by
pseudospoofer. Gradually, we can get this net to grow to other states.

The idea is simple. You contact me if you are fed up with accusations
of pseudospoofing on this list and this dischord it has created. You
tell me the people you are willing to vouch for, and the evidence you
have of their existence. You help track down people who evade your
queries. Of course, we are not going to invade anyone's privacy here.
But we are going to keep track of people who think that showing some
identification to a fellow cypherpunk is an Invasion of Privacy. There
will be a set of `verified' and `unverified' listings, and we can
continually update them in the face of new information.

I'm sure that no loyal or honest cypherpunks would oppose this plan. It
is very similar to the PGP `web of trust' model except applied to real
identities and eyed with a much stronger view of keeping it pure and
uncorrupted by people who wish to embezzle `real reputation credit' from others.

The idea that fascinates me is that the most prominent cypherpunks
posting here are going to attempt to discredit my plan, either directly
or through pseudospoofed tentacles. In fact, I suspect that many
cypherpunks are now holding Tentacles and Snakes in high esteem. This
`web of trust' should help keep the integrity and honesty in our
interactions. For those of you not interested in honesty or integrity,
please refrain from sabotaging our plans and efforts at achieving it.

So, in particular, if any CA cypherpunks are interested in helping me
out, especially those who have attended meetings, please send me mail.
Thanks! Some of you who think the bizarre accusations of pseudospoofing
are completely unwarranted may be amused by helping me prove it.

(Some day, of course, this whole process will be automated of tracking
who is vouching for who and with what evidence, with powerful
`identitification mechanisms' and `true name servers' but for know we
have to do it tediously and manually by hand.)




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: hughes@ah.com (Eric Hughes)
Date: Sat, 27 Nov 93 20:34:45 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: On generating all primes less than 2^x
In-Reply-To: <9311262038.AA27804@anon.penet.fi>
Message-ID: <9311280426.AA03899@ah.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


re:  generating all primes less than 2^x

>Granted this would
>take a while, but the NSA has the time, the computers, and the other resources
>necessary to do this.  

The basic fact of number theory here is the prime number theorem,
which says that (for the purposes of this problem) the number of
primes less than N approaches N/ln N.  For N=2^192 (say, for cracking
384 bit PGP keys), that number is 2^192/133, which is about 2^185.
The number of bits necessary to store all of these primes is even
larger.  A gigabyte is only 2^38 bits.

In plainer language, there's just too many to store.  This same
calculation also explains why there will never be a shortage of
primes.

Eric




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: hughes@ah.com (Eric Hughes)
Date: Sat, 27 Nov 93 21:04:19 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Banning any subscriber
In-Reply-To: <199311272018.MAA26674@mail.netcom.com>
Message-ID: <9311280456.AA04042@ah.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>I personally disagree with censorship. It would be impossible to enforce
>anyway. A move of this type would simply drive Detweiler to use the
>Cypherpunk remailers which would be harder to detect. Then what do we do?
>Stop accepting mail from our own remailers?

Basically, yes, except for signed letters from previously
authenticated pseudonyms.  This is a simple form of a positive
reputation system.  A kill fill is a negative reputation--'not that
person'.  A positive reputation rejects all but a particular set of
identities.

Much of the debate on cypherpunks magically incants 'reputation
systems' to solve all sorts of sticky problems, but none have ever
been implemented in software, except for killfiles, which are not
effective against disruption in an anonymous environment.

Necessity is the mother of invention.  A motivated individual trying
to disrupt a communications forum and who has to avoid a kill file
will be necessary to create the need for a positive reputation system.
Once the need is there, the software will follow.  LD could become the
most valuable participant in the endeavor of creating a positive
reputation system, namely, the irritant at the center of the pearl.

Let us encapsulate him well.

Eric




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: hughes@ah.com (Eric Hughes)
Date: Sat, 27 Nov 93 21:14:20 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: On derivative information products
Message-ID: <9311280504.AA04077@ah.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I've never really made clear what is OK to do with cypherpunks list
material and what is not.  The answer is easy:

	Do whatever you want with it.

Hal Finney runs an encrypted cypherpunks list which sends you an
encrypted version of the main list.  Great.  If someone wants to
create edited or digested versions, fine by me.

If someone wants to create an LD-free list, it's OK by me.  In fact,
those who for whatever reason still pay by the message may want a
ranter-free list just to cut down their charges.

If you think you don't have the resources to do stuff like this
yourself, that's incorrect.  The cypherpunks remailer can be hacked to
run all sorts of email services out of a user account.  If you want
some special feature in the mailing list, do it yourself or convince
someone to do it for you.  If you want some feature and will not be
doing the implementation, feel free to ask on the main list for
someone to do it.

Eric




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "L. Detweiler" <ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Date: Sat, 27 Nov 93 20:24:19 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Vinegar, Honey, Flies, and Snakes
Message-ID: <9311280421.AA21626@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Someone told me in email that they respected what I was doing in
attempting to elicit a public statement by top Cypherpunk leadership on
pseudospoofing, but that I was going about it in the wrong way. He
said, `you can catch more flies with honey than vinegar.' I told them
that I don't think I had caught *any* flies with *either* honey or
vinegar so far, after many weeks of public and private email! `What do
you recommend to catch snakes?' I asked. He didn't say yet. I could
certainly use some advice. I admit I've been winging it for the past
few weeks. Nevertheless, he does have a point about honey vs. vinegar.

So, I'm offering this neat opportunity and prize to all the spiffy
cypherpunks who would like to help me out. The premiere goal is to get
the CA Leadership to Come Clean on their personal knowledge and
involvement in pseudospoofing. There are many ways to go about this.
You can send mail to

gnu@toad.com, hughes@soda.berkeley.edu, tcmay@netcom.com

Of course, I've tried this to no avail, but maybe you have a better
reputation among them than I do. I regret I have kind of shot mine in
their eyes after the fanatic persistence in exposing the
pseudospoofing. One refused to even talk to me on the phone to allay my
fears about pseudospoofing.

You might also ask the journalists who have covered the cypherpunks if
they know anything about the promotion of deception, or would be
interested in helping uncover a hoax or a conspiracy. (I have a few in
that area, but they are `silent and deadly' and it will take awhile.)

Another interesting technique is that of exposing the tentacles and
snakes on other lists. Challenge them in their claims of real identity.
For example, N.Szabo claimed in RISKS that he knew about others trying
to help me learn of their true identities. When I challenged him on
Who, he got upset and stormed off the Internet. He posted a message
here stating that I was `stalking' people with `true names'.  Hee, hee!
This is typical behavior of a tentacle. Unfortunately, I haven't yet
been able to track the Medusa behind this tentacle, but these things
take time. The Szabo tentacle really pisses me off because he got into
a prestigious journal that should be free of this kind of treacherous poison.

But I have to give you some incentive, don't I? Well, what about fame
and glory? Can't you just imagine that great NYT and Wired headline,
INGENIOUS HACKERS EXPOSE FRAUDULENT CYPHERPUNKS, with your picture in
glossy color? talking all about the amazing history of the
investigation, all the amazing contortions by top cypherpunks, etc.?

The situation is that even the Leaders need an incentive to Come Clean.
Well, I am prepared to offer a very valuable prize for this. I am
personally aware of one of the most masterful and dramatic stories of
intrigue and pseudospoofing that exists in the Real World. It involves
a radio team and Nazi Germany in WWII. I guarantee you, this is PRIME
material that head cypherpunks can drool over. Your `True Name' SF by
whats-his-name will not even come close to this kind of sheer
spectacular nailbiting epic saga.

So, Mr. May, Mr. Hughes, Mr. Gilmore, I promise to personally type in
by hand this very long story from a very obscure niche, serialized over
many or maybe a week, but that will have you salivating at the
masterful deceptions. I am talking about the #1 Master Pseudospoofed
Hoax that beats War of the Worlds and the Cypherpunks List as a sheer
masterpiece of sensitive and strategic deception. I mean, supposedly
the timing of D Day was affected by this espionage. Wow, you can't wait
to read this. But you have to help me out! I can't do anything without
some kind of Positive Signal on your part. Please, don't deprive
yourselves and your followers from seizing this fantastic opportunity!
Time is running out! Act now! This is a Limited Time Offer!

This is my Honey Offer. I've tried the Honey before with top
cypherpunks in email, but it just doesn't work. I mean, there's only so
much you can do with psychopunk flies. I have plenty of Vinegar left.
Lord knows, there are still plenty of Snakes.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: analyst@netcom.com (Benjamin McLemore)
Date: Sat, 27 Nov 93 21:24:45 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: 900 Mhz phones
Message-ID: <199311280524.VAA25839@mail.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Sorry about the mistake in my question. I had quickly read an article the other
day that left the idea in my mind that Cylink was one of the two producers of
the Clipper chip, actually quite the opposite is true:

>Cylink unveiled a civilian agency alternative
>to the Clinton Administration-advocated Clipper Chip and SKIPJACK
>algorithm for data communications security, saying it has begun
>shipping a product implementation of the Data Encryption Standard
>(DES) with an IC it claims will do instantaneous triple DES
>encryption.

Coupled with the article in the Economist about them also making the chip for
at least one digital cordless phone, my latent (but growing) paranoia 
about the intentions of this government with respect to our privacy jumped to
the false (??) conlusions I implied in my question.

Any more info from anyone about which of these phones might be more or
less secure? What kind of algorithms would we really like to see 
implemented for wireless communications? Who's doing it? (I think there 
is a story about Qualcomm wanting stronger security for their CDMA digital
cellular standard but being forced to weaken or eliminate it due to 
government(?) pressure--but that may be my paranoia again...)


------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Benjamin McLemore
analyst@netcom.com

-- 




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: ferguson@icm1.icp.net (Paul Ferguson x2044)
Date: Sat, 27 Nov 93 20:34:19 PST
To: hughes@ah.com (Eric Hughes)
Subject: Mykotoxin, er, Mykotronx, er ...
In-Reply-To: <9311280406.AA03857@ah.com>
Message-ID: <9311280433.AA21109@icm1.icp.net>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text



Eric (ah) Hughes writes -

>>1: Given that Cylink was one of the two original companies to manufacture
>>Clipper hardware
> 
> ???
> 
> The two companies were VLSI Technology, who did the manufacturing, and
> Mycotronx, who did the design.

Oh, and don't forget that infamous, bandwagon-jumping announcement
by another major telecommunications giant on April 16, 1993 ...

Cheers.  ,-)



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Marc Horowitz <marc@MIT.EDU>
Date: Sat, 27 Nov 93 20:39:19 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: New toy for those of you with real cash flow.
Message-ID: <9311280438.AA13296@steve-dallas.MIT.EDU>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



------- Forwarded Message
 
 
     JOURNAL OF RECREATIONAL MATHEMATICS   Volume 25, Number 1 -- 1993
 
  	         Book Reviews, edited by Charles Ashbacher
 
    Note: The following is neither a book nor a software review. It is a
    review of a piece of hardware--but it should be of prime interest to
    readers of this journal.
 
  The Dubner PC Cruncher-A Microcomputer Coprocessor Card for Doing Integer
  Arithmetic, H & R Dubner, 449 Beverly Road, Ridgewood, New Jersey 07450,
  Telephone 1-201-652-1825. $2,500.
 
Need more processor speed for arithmetic operations? Try the Dubner
"Cruncher." This is an add-in board for IBM PC Compatibles (ISA bus) which
is designed to quickly add, subtract, multiply, and divide large numbers.
For example, to check a number of 1000 digits for probable-primality using
Fermat's theorem (a^p = a(mod p) whenever p is prime) takes about two
minutes on a typical 486DX machine, but less than five seconds if this same
machine has a Cruncher installed. The improvement in speed depends on the
size of the numbers. Numbers with 100 digits are multiplied about six
times as fast, numbers with 1000 digits about forty times as fast, and
those with 10,000 digits are multiplied about ninety-eight times as fast.
     The Cruncher is currently limited to integer arithmetic. Its speed
comes from the use of a chip designed for real time digital signal
processing (LSI Logic's L64240 MFIR) which can perform 1.28 billion
multiply/add operations per second. Access is provided to this power on
two levels: through a menu interface and through a set of ANSI compatible
C language routines.
     The menu-based interface is primitive but workable. It allows you to
enter numbers from the keyboard and then perform all the various Cruncher
operations, including the basics operations, using any of several
factorization methods, access to a primality proving algorithm, and even
the ability to screen for primes of certain forms, such as  abc + 1  where
either a or c is incremented during the search.
     Also included are the necessary tools for a programmer to access the
Cruncher's power from within their own C programs. This includes a set of
instructions similar to those in an assembly language, for example,
hmult(a,b,c) multiplies the numbers pointed to by b and c and places the
result in the location that a points to. The procedure hpowerm(a,b,c)
raises a to the b-th power modulo c and places the result in a. Functions
are included to do the basic arithmetic operations as well as such things
as calculating n!, ab(mod c), and the integer part of the n-th root of a
number. These instructions are easily used in any C program and make it
unnecessary for the user to know how the hardware actually works. I
learned C just to use the Cruncher in my own research and the speed was
well worth the effort!
     The near super-computer speed provided by the Cruncher is very
impressive! For example, I recently used the Cruncher on my 386 machine to
search for the next prime of the form  n!-1 . After about five days I found
it: 3507!-1 (with 10,912 digits.) This search would have taken about a
year using a very fast 486! Though it is not necessary, I usually use the
Cruncher from within the Microsoft Windows environment - that way it can
crunch away twenty-four hours a day in the background and I can still do
my word processing and programming in the foreground. However, Windows
does slow the Cruncher down a few percent.
     The Cruncher's price, $2,500, is not cheap, but is definitely the
least expensive way to make your machine multiply and divide fifty times
faster. In short: 1) the speed is unbelievable; 2) the menu interface is
workable, but if your interests diverge too much from the Dubners', you
will need to be able to program in C; and 3) if you program in C, the
tools for accessing Cruncher's power are excellent.
 
                                                     Chris Caldwell
                                   Mathematics and Computer Science
                                  University of Tennessee at Martin
                                            Martin, Tennessee 38238
 
 
                 The Dubner PC Cruncher
 
 
We can give you the computational power you've only dreamed of.
 
Dollar for dollar, we believe that we have built the most powerful
hardware available for doing multiple-precision integer arithmetic.
 
Here is a list of execution times for Fermat testing of numbers
with 1,000 decimal digits:
 
            Vaxstation 3100/38  770 sec
            Sun 4/330           377 sec
            Decstation 3100     287 sec
            IBM RS 6000/320     128 sec
            486/33              128 sec
            IBM 3090             19 sec
 
            486/33 with Dubner PC Cruncher   4.4 sec
 
            Fujitsu VP 2200/10    2.1 sec
 
You'll note that the Fujitsu VP 2200/10 can test a 1,000-digit
number faster than the Cruncher.  But the Fujitsu is a multi-
million dollar supercomputer comparable to a four-processor Cray
XMP.
 
      The PC Cruncher is an add-in board that plugs into your
      IBM-compatible PC/AT.  Its cost: $2,500.
 
 
Furthermore, the Cruncher becomes more efficient as the numbers
grow larger.  At 3,000 digits, the Cruncher is slightly faster than
the Fujitsu.  By 10,000 digits, the Cruncher is 1.5 times faster.
 
The chances are that you already have a PC which you probably turn
off at night.  Install the Cruncher, run it during those nighttime
hours, and you can get the same amount of computing done as if you
had access to ten or more hours of supercomputer time.
 
How can we do this?
 
We are Harvey Dubner and Bob Dubner.  Harvey is an electrical
engineer and computer systems designer with a long-term interest in
mathematical theory, particularly in number theory (with over
twenty published papers.)  Bob is an electronic design engineer
with a lot of experience in high-speed digital systems.  The PC
Cruncher comes from that combination of talent: Harvey has an
insatiable need for processing power, and Bob likes to design
powerful processors.  Over the last ten years we have built and
programmed a succession of high-speed, number-crunching circuits
that augment the ability of personal computers to do multiple-
precision arithmetic.
 
 
With the previous version of the hardware, we discovered over half
of all the known prime numbers of more than 2,000 digits.  With 632
numbers, we were by far the biggest contributor to that list.  The
PC Cruncher is roughly ten times faster than the previous version,
and we are very excited about the contributions to theory that will
be made when many investigators have this kind of computational
power available.
 
Description of the board:  The hardware consists of a full-sized
circuit board that requires a 16-bit slot in an IBM-compatible
PC/AT.  At the heart of the design is a 64-tap Finite-Impulse-
Response filtering chip made by the LSI Logic Corporation.  It is
this chip's ability to perform 1.28 billion multiply/add operations
per second that gives the PC Cruncher its remarkable performance.
(And it is the chip's $1,100 purchase price that makes the PC
Cruncher as expensive as it is.)  The board dissipates about three
or four Watts, and has no special space, power, or cooling
requirements.
 
The PC Cruncher has 256K of on-board memory for storing operands,
and another 64K of high-speed memory for accumulating intermediate
results.  All communication between the host and the Cruncher is
done with I/O ports -- the Cruncher doesn't use up any valuable
memory space.
 
The software for driving the Cruncher will run fastest on a 386 or
486 executing in protected mode. We use Symantec's Zortech C
compiler, because it easily and conveniently generates 32-bit
protected-mode code.  All of the code has been written in strictly
ANSI-compatible C, with some MASM 5.1 assembly language.
 
When you buy the Cruncher, you will receive the board, complete
schematics, complete documentation for the programmable logic on
the board, complete source-level C and MASM code for driving the
board, and documentation for that code.
 
Please contact us for additional information.
 
Order from:  ( USmail, Email, Fax, or telephone )
 
            Dubner International, Inc.
            13 Westervelt Place
            Westwood, NJ  07675
 
            Tel: 201-664-6434
            Fax: 201-358-9377
 
            Tel:     Harvey Dubner  201-652-1825
                     Robert Dubner  201-664-6434
 
            E-mail:  Harvey Dubner  70372.1170@compuserve.com
                     Robert Dubner  73247.2334@compuserve.com
 
 
 
            PC Cruncher Performance Benchmarking:
 
Assessing just how fast the PC Cruncher can calculate depends on many
things.  The major factor is the size of the operands that are being
operated on.
 
Consider multiplication.  The PC Cruncher multiplies using the schoolboy
algorithm -- it does long multiplication just like you do, except that
instead of multiplying and accumulating 2-digit products, the Cruncher
multiplies and accumulates 308-digit products.  And it only takes the
hardware about 6.4 microseconds to multiply-and-accumulate a 308-digit
product.  Unfortunately, it can take dozens of microseconds of fiddling
with the PC's sluggish ISA buss to set up the hardware to create that 308-
digit product.  The efficiency at that point is relatively low.  Even at
1,000 digits, the software is spending about half its time frantically
trying to get the hardware going.  At about 4,000 digits, the effects of
overhead are reduced, but they continue to be significant until about
10,000 digits.
 
To give you some idea of what this means, let's look at the time needed to
square an N-digit number.  Here is a comparison of a 486/33 with a PC
Cruncher, compared with a 486/33 running a highly-optimized multiple-
precision multiply routine:
 
      Number of digits  Time without Cruncher  Time with Cruncher  Factor
              100             .000220 secs         .000037 secs      6
              500             .004000              .000165          24
            1,000             .015000              .000357          42
            5,000             .375000              .004400          85
           10,000            1.500000              .015283          98
 
Division performance is even more complicated.  The basic inner loop of
division is more complicated than that of multiplying, with even more
overhead.  Dividing a 200-digit number by a 100-digit number is about 6
times slower than squaring a 100-digit number; at 2,000 by 1,000 digits
division is 3 times slower than the corresponding multiply, and at 20,000
by 10,000 digits division is 1.7 times slower.  Added to all this is a
600-microsecond pre-division calculation time that must be added to all
randomly-started divisions.  Happily, this calculation need only be done
once whenever repeated divisions by the same number are executed, as in
the heavily-used 'A**B MOD C' function.
 
In summary:
 
In the 50 to 200 digit range, a 486/33 PC equipped with a PC Cruncher
board will be 3 to 10 times faster than the same machine without the
Cruncher.  The actual speed will depend on the size of the numbers and the
function mix.  As you go up to 1,000 digits, performance will be 20 to 40
times faster.  Past 4,000 or so digits performance will be 50 to 100 times
faster, which will put you in supercomputer territory.
 
If you start with a slower PC, the relative performance gains are even
more spectacular, since the Cruncher's performance is hindered only a
little by the slower processor once you get past a few hundred digits.  At
100 digits, a Cruncher-equipped 386/20 will be about 10 to 30 times faster
than the same machine without the board, and at 4,000 digits and up will
be 150 to 300 times faster.
 
 
Dubner PC Cruncher  --  Other Possibilities
 
RSA Encrypting/Decrypting
 
A 486/33 equipped with a Dubner PC Cruncher board can perform 1,024-bit
A**B MOD C calculations in about 0.473 seconds.  You could therefore
decrypt an entire message at the rate of about 270 bytes per second --
ght times faster than an unaided 486/33.
re prepended to a
DES-encrypted messages, can get going in about one-half second instead
body out there have a network that needs a key
 
Need more speed?  Let usere is enough interest, we
can build this same basic hardware onto an EISA slave board, instead of an
ISA board.  We have yet to do a complete analysis, but our feeling is we'd
get about a three-fold performance increase in the 1,024-bit range.  This
added speed would come from a reduction in overhead when manipulating
these smallish 308-digit numbers.
 
Need even more speed?  Talk to us.  It just costs money.  The PC Cruncher
design would scale up nicely with two or four of the big FIR chips.  For
somewhere between $6,000 and $10,000 you could blow the maintenance panels
off of anything.  But we'd need a sponsor.
 
Used to working with workstations?  Well, you could spend about $2,000 on
a 486/33, add in the $2,500 PC Cruncher, write some software and stick it
on the network as a number crunching server, and hardly notice the
difference.  Or talk to us -- with sufficient interest we could build a
Cruncher with its own on-board RISC processor, and stick a SCSI port on it
so it'll plug right into a workstation.  Not a bad idea -- we could get
rid of a lot of overhead that way, and get real improvements in the 100-
digit and up range.  But again, we'd need a sponsor.
 
 
 





------- End of Forwarded Message





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Date: Sat, 27 Nov 93 23:49:19 PST
To: hughes@ah.com (Eric Hughes)
Subject: Re: Banning any subscriber
In-Reply-To: <9311280456.AA04042@ah.com>
Message-ID: <199311280747.XAA15002@mail.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


One of my mischievous tentacles developed a mind of its own and
misbehaved. "Eric Hughes" said:  

> Much of the debate on cypherpunks magically incants 'reputation
> systems' to solve all sorts of sticky problems, but none have ever
> been implemented in software, except for killfiles, which are not
> effective against disruption in an anonymous environment.

Actually, I disagree. The Extropians list has an "::include" command
that can be used to specifically include only certain thread or
certain users (or any combination). I know for a fact that Dean
Tribble and Paul Baclace are doing an "::exclude all" and then a
selective "::include foo" to include certain threads and/or authors.

I would call this a classic example of a positive reputation system.

> Necessity is the mother of invention.  A motivated individual trying
> to disrupt a communications forum and who has to avoid a kill file
> will be necessary to create the need for a positive reputation system.
> Once the need is there, the software will follow.  LD could become the
> most valuable participant in the endeavor of creating a positive
> reputation system, namely, the irritant at the center of the pearl.
> 
> Let us encapsulate him well.

I agree. And I suggest the Extropians software is suitable for this.
It even used the Cypherpunks "::" syntax as its model, albeit with the
command on the same line as the "::'. My understanding is that this
software is available for our use--I will cc: Ray Cromwell on this
message to make sure he sees it (Harry Shapiro is still on this list,
I believe).

My main concern would be that the CPU demands on toad are too much.
Ray C. and Harry S. can tell us how many CPU seconds are needed to
process the Perl commands needed to filter; on a list with 500+
subscribers, some pressing needs to filter out a couple of addresses,
and an old machine (toad), I worry.

--Tim May, who generally finds it faster to hit "D" than to filter
(and, ironically, I keep all of the Detweiler/Pervert/S. Boxx/etc.
posts, both for archival value and because it's stuff I'll want to
reread in future years and perhaps use in a book I may write).


-- 
..........................................................................
Timothy C. May         | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,  
tcmay@netcom.com       | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
408-688-5409           | knowledge, reputations, information markets, 
W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA  | black markets, collapse of governments.
Higher Power: 2^756839 | Public Key: PGP and MailSafe available.
Note: I put time and money into writing this posting. I hope you enjoy it.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "L. Detweiler" <ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Date: Sat, 27 Nov 93 23:00:39 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Long Litanies of Lies
Message-ID: <9311280659.AA23613@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Hello again. I just wanted to talk about the idea of pseudospoofing
`crossings'. It seems to me that people who are rampant pseudospoofers
have built up a life of fear and paranoia. They are always posing the
question, What if I say this? Will it reveal my identity? There is so
much information that we have flitting through our brains, and it is
impossible to track where it originated from. It invariably blurs! I
mean, if I talk to someone with my tentacle, and he says that he is
proud that his wife is going to have a baby, and then I meet him in
person and say `Congratulations' out of good wishes, he says, `how did
you know I was going to have a baby?' and the pseudospoofer has to work
himself out of another uncomfortable rock-and-hard place. Imagine
having to hesitate like a liar to say *anything* or answer *any*
question you are ever asked. What pernicious, sweaty, hellish torture!

I have information from G.Broiles (a tentacle? hee, hee) and others
that top cypherpunks, E.Hughes in particular, have developed
pseudospoofing and style analysis software. If so, I think this is
somewhat pathetic. I  mean, think of all the time they are wasting
trying to keep track of who said what, and what who knows about what,
and what they can and can't say at a given time. Good lord! If everyone
had to do this all the time, we would collapse in a nervous breakdown.
It's really pathetic that anyone would call so much extra overhead
baggage `Liberating'.  Why would anyone go through so much trouble to
promote a lie? The answer is that they are not honest! `Power over their victims'

I mean, is this really Communication? Respect for one's peers and
colleages? Seems more like AntiCommunication to me. It's interesting
that the idea `community' and `communication' have the same root. No
coincidence there! If you don't have one, you don't have the other! But
many psychopunks recognize this already, and this is why they
continually searingly rant against any kind of Community, like a
Government or a Democracy or a Meeting.

Pseudospoofing reminds me of the way that criminals justify their
crimes in the face of every clue and signal that is screaming at them
at the top of its lungs to stop betraying themselves and their friends
and cease with their depravity. A heroin junkie could have an arm full
of collapsed veins, lost his home, his family, his honesty, his money, 
his dignity, his sanity, his life. And to the end he will say I Must Have My Heroin.

But pseudospoofers are masters at their kind of systematic
manipulation. They enjoy it, they thrive on it, it is their vicarious
sexual thrill. It is like a chess game involving different pieces and
scenarios and positions and attacks and countermeasures and feints and
.... What does my opponent know about this tentacle? Does he really
trust it? I think every pseudospoofer is something of a pathological
liar at heart. He enjoys weaving complex scenarios and keeping track of
what he said to who, and how to make sure that no one walks into each
other or any of his long litany lies collide with each other in a `crossing'. 

But My Gosh, Cyberspace is inherently unconducive to concealing the
truth where people want to find it. There are just too many myriads of
possibilities for arbitrary crossings between independent identities
and opportunities for honest people to discover the truth in the face
of lies. Who is Inside? Who is Outside? A conspiracy will always
collapse under its own weight. The only question is, who will be
crushed beneath it? (That reminds me of that story about the Zen of
Cyberspace, where a corrupt king dies and a platform carried by his
sycophants crushes them. I have it somewhere in my extensive archives
if anyone is interested.)

It is like the RSA key spoofing trick -- you might be able to send
someone a fake key, but then they go to communicate with their party
over a random line anywhere in cyberspace (the IP protocol means that
different packets may take different paths at different times, the
beauty of robust fault-tolerant routing) and suddenly the recipient
realizes from the gibberish that he has been pseudospoofed. You might
be able to keep up a deception at first, but suddenly some independent
channel is touched by your target that you have no control over, and
the whole illusion collapses.

The biggest problem with pseudospoofing, deception, and lies in
Cyberspace is when a climate arises wherein people are not skeptical by
nature, even though they claim they are. For example, many people have
told me that they are sure they have never signed a fake key, or used
one, of a person that does not exist. But my own experience with others
and the key server design would seem to contradict this. Top developers
seem to defend, even delight and revel in the `toxic waste' in the PGP
Web of Trust. Today's key servers are quite corrupted with fake keys,
many of them from the Cypherpunk pseudospoofer cultists. So people
think that this `web of trust' is actually trustworthy when it is just
a `web of lies'. The problem is that they do nothing *actively* to seek
out fake identities and corruptions in the Web, even when encouraged to
do so. If everyone passively accepts a Lie, and someone actively
continues to orchestrate it, the Lie Stands. Once again, a great new
technology exposes the human weakness that lay largely obscured before
its invention, in this case the inherent laziness and gullibility of people. 

This Cypherpunks list is a classic case where people can continue to
believe in a lie despite many signs that there is a deception going on.
It involves the magnetic, powerful effect of peer pressure. If all your
friends do drugs, you believe it is a Liberating Experience
unequivocally. Faith replaces Knowledge. If your eminent leaders say
that pseudospoofing is a Liberating Experience, you believe it. After
all, they were profiled in NYT and Wired! Who are we to question their
authority? In an environment (the Internet) where the default
expectation should be that *everyone* is a tentacle, because nothing
prevents it, everyone to the contrary believes that everyone is real!

This illusion of reality in cyberspace is very hard to dispell, even
though people claim they cannot ever be fooled! The problem is that
lies can sometimes pick up their own destructive momentum, like a
snowball rolling down a hill. People can begin to believe in fantasies,
like a meme-virus propagating like a toppled line of dominos, like a
crowd that turns riotous with a few circulating shouts. However,
sometimes the Truth erupts amidst the lies in the same way!

By the way, I still haven't heard anything from J.Gilmore, E.Hughes, or
T.C.May on their personal knowledge of pseudospoofing on the
Cypherpunks list. E.Hughes wrote something in RISKS but it seems
evasive to me (more on this later). I would appreciate if you guys or
someone else could send me your public statement on pseudoanonymity in
email. Many people have been talking about all the anarchy, dischord
and disunity on the list lately, and maybe a public statement by a
cypherpunk `official' would help stop all the rampant speculation and
fingerpointing. That is usually the respectable approach among any
professional organization! (That reminds me of P.Metzger complaining
that `Cypherpunks' was just too darn subversive sounding as a name!
ROFL) I have to wonder what you guys are really trying to accomplish
without public announcements, and why one has been so long
unforthcoming! Kind of reminds me of a big conspiracy or hoax! If you
flinch and cower every time your leadership and `movement' are subject
to scrutiny people will think you're nothing but a batch of liars, or
pseudospoofers (the difference is not great).

 In fact, maybe a ban against pseudospoofing might rescue the list from
the hellish ulterior grouchiness and atmosphere of noise and
frustration that it has always had in the past and scared away a lot of
respectable people (for example, Markoff). But that's an awful lot to
hope for. On the other hand, the CryptoAnarchists have always come out
in favor of Anarchy, of course, and maybe the recent violent seizures
on the list, the continual tick-tick-ticking torture of the time bomb,
are what they have in mind.





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: greg@ideath.goldenbear.com (Greg Broiles)
Date: Sun, 28 Nov 93 00:29:19 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Software filtering agents
Message-ID: <giuPDc1w164w@ideath.goldenbear.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



My knowledge of neural net software is limited to a cartoonish understanding 
of the theory behind them, but as I understand it they might be a useful 
tool for identifying the author of a given text stream. Comments? Anyone on 
the list familiar with neural net implementation, or in need of some sort of 
academic project? :)


--
Greg Broiles
greg@goldenbear.com                     Baked, not fried.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: ferguson@icm1.icp.net (Paul Ferguson x2044)
Date: Sat, 27 Nov 93 21:29:19 PST
To: hughes@ah.com (Eric Hughes)
Subject: Subscriber encapsulation
In-Reply-To: <9311280456.AA04042@ah.com>
Message-ID: <9311280526.AA22451@icm1.icp.net>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text


Eric <eric@ah.com> Hughes writes -

> Much of the debate on cypherpunks magically incants 'reputation
> systems' to solve all sorts of sticky problems, but none have ever
> been implemented in software, except for killfiles, which are not
> effective against disruption in an anonymous environment.

This is an interesting point within itself. Anon messages from
remailers such as <nowhere@bsu-cs.bsu.edu> continually have the
same banner/header information, regardless of user (which in my
ideal anonymous environment is a GOO THING (tm)). Anon mail from
penet is account -ized and assigned -- not an ideal anonymous 
environment from my viewpoint.

The Net is still in its infancy, as far as I can assess. We will
all be much the historians, if the soothsayers are to be believed.

- Paul




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: ferguson@icm1.icp.net (Paul Ferguson x2044)
Date: Sat, 27 Nov 93 21:34:20 PST
To: hughes@ah.com (Eric Hughes)
Subject: Re: Subscriber encapsulation
In-Reply-To: <9311280521.AA04160@ah.com>
Message-ID: <9311280533.AA22656@icm1.icp.net>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text



> >> systems' to solve all sorts of sticky problems, but none have ever
> 
> >ideal anonymous environment is a GOO THING (tm)). Anon mail from
> 
> Is a GOO THING the solution to a sticky problem?

Absolutely.

Remeber "Vinegar and Honey..."

Remember "Medusa, The Executioner and (now) The Pervert?"

Lions and tigers and bears (oh my)....

- Paul
 



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Date: Sun, 28 Nov 93 00:35:40 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: "Pretty Good Paranoia" and "Dining Detweilers Net"
Message-ID: <199311280835.AAA20462@mail.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Pseudospoofer Wannabees, 

Are you unable to pseudospoof the way The Pervert can? Do you find
yourself using your True Name instead of a wonderful nym like The
Executioner or Psychopunk?

Well, now there's hope. After buying our product, "Pretty Good
Paranoia," you too will be able to indulge in florid flights of
fracturous fantasy, constructing long, rambling missive like this:

"My tortured and WRACKED soul is becoming INCREASINGLY MADDENED AND
DISGUSTED by the unspeakable actions of the leading SickoPunks in
beaming RADIO SIGNALS into my cranial cavities while I dream of
slaying Miss Medusa and her TENTACLES of depravity and cyberspatial
indifference."

Yes, you can _own_ the computer program that generated this stupendous
piece of prose. Fool your friends, amaze your enemies. 

Send 620 digital marks to "Paranoids 'R Us," Box 666, Boulder, CO,
12070. Offer not good in Sector R.

As a special bonus you'll all receive instructions on how to implement
your own "DD-Net." Based loosely on David Chaum's DC-Net, in the
"Dining Detweiler Net" each player flips a coin. Heads, he barfs on
his neighbor to the right, tails, he just sits there and drools.

A great time will be had by all. Not.

--Klaus! von Future Prime

(My nom de humor on the Extropians list.)
 




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: ferguson@icm1.icp.net (Paul Ferguson x2044)
Date: Sat, 27 Nov 93 21:44:19 PST
To: analyst@netcom.com (Benjamin McLemore)
Subject: Re: 900 Mhz phones
In-Reply-To: <199311280524.VAA25839@mail.netcom.com>
Message-ID: <9311280542.AA22805@icm1.icp.net>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text




> Any more info from anyone about which of these phones might be more or
> less secure? What kind of algorithms would we really like to see 
> implemented for wireless communications? Who's doing it? (I think there 
> is a story about Qualcomm wanting stronger security for their CDMA digital
> cellular standard but being forced to weaken or eliminate it due to 
> government(?) pressure--but that may be my paranoia again...)

No, its not your imagination, nor a case of over-active paranoia.

It's a fact that the FBI (among other three letter entities) have
previously asked cellular encryption developers to "scale back" their
implementations for ease of access to communications for law enforcement
purposes. In a word (or two), it bites.

The Digital Telephony proposal espoused mnay desired options which the
gummint couldn't previously weasel in earlier attempts to backdoor
communications.

- Paul




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: ferguson@icm1.icp.net (Paul Ferguson x2044)
Date: Sat, 27 Nov 93 21:55:38 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: CHAOS gopher maintenance
Message-ID: <9311280555.AA23154@icm1.icp.net>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Who's in charge of the chaos.bsu.edu gopher? I was just browsing the contents
and it is not very up-to-date with cypherpunk information...

- Paul





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: an32951@anon.penet.fi (Coerr)
Date: Sat, 27 Nov 93 17:09:44 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Remailers: Turnaround Times?
Message-ID: <9311280109.AA00807@anon.penet.fi>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Would someone experienced with the use of Cypherpunks remailers please 
provide me with some indication of how much time each remailer adds to a 
piece of email's journey?  Thanks.

Coerr

-------------------------------------------------------------------------
To find out more about the anon service, send mail to help@anon.penet.fi.
Due to the double-blind, any mail replies to this message will be anonymized,
and an anonymous id will be allocated automatically. You have been warned.
Please report any problems, inappropriate use etc. to admin@anon.penet.fi.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: rjc@gnu.ai.mit.edu
Date: Sat, 27 Nov 93 23:44:19 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Cryptosplit 2.0
Message-ID: <9311280740.AA15833@kropotkin.gnu.ai.mit.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



  On Colin Plumb's suggestion, I rewrote my first Shamir secret sharing
program to work over GF(2^8). I didn't do this the first time because
I thought writing all the low level GF math routines would be a pain --
so I opted out by using G++'s Integer class to work over Z_p. Imagine
my surprise when it turned out the math code over GF is easier. The 
hard part was actually generating the tables for x=g^n and n=lg x (g=primitive
element), but I got maple to do it for me after I read the docs. Multiplication
is simply the macro A*B=g^(lg A + lg B) (3 table lookups) and
addition is, of course, XOR. And x^-1 is just two table lookups unlike
the euclidean algorithm I needed to work over Z_p. (p being huge)

  Since I'm working over GF(2^8), I adapted my program to work on arbitrary
length binary files instead of integers. Now you can take any file and split
it up into m pieces, k being needed for reconstruction. The program is much
more usable now.  It's also written in C now, not G++.

  As before, if you want it, e-mail me.

-Ray

-- Ray Cromwell        |    Engineering is the implementation of science;    --
-- rjc@gnu.ai.mit.edu  |       politics is the implementation of faith.      --




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: an12070@anon.penet.fi (The Pervert)
Date: Sat, 27 Nov 93 19:39:18 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Sodomy, Homosexuality, and Pseudospoofing
Message-ID: <9311280336.AA24018@anon.penet.fi>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Gosh, everyone is such in a tither lately. I suspect it is because the
tentacles and snakes are out in full force covering up their
nonexistence! Well, I thought I would post some more of my insights
into pseudospoofing for everyone's enlightenment.

I was thinking how much Pseudospoofing is like Sodomy. I mean, there
are a lot of interesting parallels. People are repulsed by hearing
about sodomy between people they respect, even though some people think
it is acceptable in some private situations, as long as participants
they don't advertise it! There is definitely a strong evil tinge
associated with Sodomy. The name comes from the biblical sinning
capitols of Sodom and Gomorahh. (I wonder if Gonorrhea comes from
`Gomorahh'). Sodomy has always been associated with evil. It is only
after the Sexual Liberation (Sort of like the CryptoAnarchic
Revolution) that people became more tolerant of what was previously
considered a sexual perversion. (By the way, the Sexual Liberation has
been instrumental in the outgrowth of neat new physical and social
diseases, such as treatment-resistant STD strains, the broken home,
neglected/abused children, monumental statistics in teenage pregnancy,
and perhaps the increased devaluation of women and increased aggressiveness in men.)

The idea of unconsensual sodomy of course is revolting. Especially when
people are young and vulnerable,with impressionable minds. the Leaders
of any great country have a responsibility to protect the innocent from
exposures to depravities. The whole idea of the legitimacy of sodomy
arose with the idea of `private acts between consenting adults.'
Anything beyond that is still considered a perversion by reasonable people.

I have noticed an interesting overlap between radical libertarians,
cryptoanarchists, psychopunks, and people who promote sodomy. People
have sent me mail explaining how laws against sodomy prove the
government is a Corrupt Orwellian Oppression. As I understand it the
Supreme Court upheld the state's rights to legislate against sodomy.
The people in these groups believe this is an example of a worthless
law. Actually, to them the term `worthless law' is a `pleonasm', the
opposite of an oxymoron, a redundant phrase; every law is by definition
worthless; laws are nothing but a corrupt mechanism for a depraved
Majority to manipulate and oppress the Trampled and Victimized Minority.

The restriction on sodomy is their favorite example: ``Any country
where a loving man and a wife cannot perform sodomy in the privacy in
their own home is a Corrupt Orwellian Oppression.'' I've never quite
understood this implication. But the radical libertarians,
cryptoanarchists, psychopunks, and sodomists (or at least the sodomy
promoters) are quite an inscrutable, volatile, and inconsistent bunch,
to say the very least. They have all sorts of other ways of spraying
graffiti on concepts like Democracy and urinating on things like Law
Enforcement and Justice. ``Anything that prevents criminals from
embezzlements is just another outrageous Unconstitutional invasion of
their privacy. Criminals have a constitutional right to embezzle from
others!'' (Reminds me of someone who told me, `Pseudospoofing is
guaranteed by the constitution!')

People may go to great lengths to hide their sodomy from respectable
people. This brings me to the issue of homosexuality. Obviously, pretty
much any homosexual is a sodomizer. The tinge of evil in homosexuality
and `paranoid homophobia' are rooted in the belief in the existence of
sexual perversions even among consenting adults. Homosexuals have been
persecuted for centuries. They have always had to put on different
faces for different people to promote their activities, just like
pseudospoofers. In recent times there has been a more open embrace of
homosexuality. `homosexuality is liberating.' `people are born to be
homosexuals. we should do nothing to let them practice their sodomy in public.'

I have mixed feelings about all this! It seems to me that again,
homosexuality is only justified in private among consenting adults. If
you take away the `unconsenting' or the `private' you just have
perversions. (That makes me wonder -- is Cypherpunks considered a
private mailing list? I mean, on one hand there has never been any
crackdown of all the deceptions and lies that have passed through here.
On the other hand, it is advertised publicly, in e.g. the Privacy and
Anonymity FAQ, edited by L.Detweiler, posted every 21 days to a lot of
respectable newsgroups like alt.privacy and sci.crypt, with a beautiful
new Latex version rumored to be out there somewhere.)

That word `gay' reminds me of the term, `pseudonym'. Both words started
out with completely different, innocuous, entirely uplifing meanings
prior to homosexuals and pseudospoofers. `gay' once meant joyous,
ecstatic, happy. But now it is taken by some as a homosexual slur like
`fairy' or `queer'. Also, even among some gays, the term `gay' has
militant connotations. `pseudonym' on the other hand was once something
harmless that writers used to protect their privacy or play a harmless
joke or prank on a few people. But pseudospoofers have invented the
`pseudanonym', a name that is explicitly *mis*represented as that of a
real person! Unfortunately, they still don't understand the
distinction, and still call their insidious widespread interactive uses
of `nyms' for espionage, sabotage, thievery, blackmail, infiltration,
treachery, and betrayal `pseudonyms' and `pure anonymity' and
`pseudonymity' when it is really `pseudoanonymity'. I am really quite
upset at this toxic pollution of the English language, and desperately
pray that `pseudonymity' does not become associated with so many
pejorative connotations from unstable and quasi-criminal radicals,
extremists, and terrorists the way `gay' did.

The ideas of sex and identity are very closely intertwined too. When
you fall in love with someone, you are falling in love with a person
and their identity. Some people manipulate this trust. E.g., a
pseudoRomeo romances very many women with fake identities in email, and
complains about persecution when he is caught. I think the women have a
right to be angry and feel vindictive! (Reminds me of Lorena Bobbit.)
When you love someone, the whole idea of exclusivity is involved with
romance. Both men and women will feel betrayed if their partner was
`cheating' on them with someone else, or hiding evil aspects of their
personality from the other, for example drug use. Unfortunately,
deception is the name of the game with pseudospoofing. I wonder if
anyone has ever fallen in love with a tentacle! I understand this has
happened. Medusa is very wily. That would be awfully disappointing and
disillusioning and alienating to find that someone you respected was
not only a `fake' but a `nonexistent fake' played for you like a
puppeteer manipulates his puppet. This is so devastating to
psychological serenity that I'll bet that laws are passed against this,
just as there are laws about rape and infidelity in breaking a
marriage. Hopefully the Cryptoanarchists, psychopunks, radical
libertarians, and sodomists (or at least the promoters!) will not
object too much to these `invasions' of their `privacy'. Have pity on
the people who enact them, who were probably burned badly and essentially mean well.

The parallels between homosexuals and pseudospoofers are very strong.
They are torn between believing that they are not perverted, and
promoting a religion and mythology among themselves about their
persecution and righteousness, when the outside public may consider
their beliefs nothing but wicked depravity. Surely there is a balance
somewhere. I do believe that some progress has been made in attitudes
toward homosexuality with the newfound openess and honesty that many
homosexuals practice. Pseudospoofers, on the other hand, have not `come
out of the closet' yet. Despite little glimmers and glimpses here and
there, we are left only to guess how many different identities they are maintaining.

The leaders are especially resistant to openness about their practices.
They will not even hint about their partners, believing that they will
be discredited immediately for their elaborate frameworks of deceptions
among even personal friends erected to hide it. So instead their
fervent followers attempt to justify their leaders and their own
religion with vague propaganda about how homosexuality is not wrong, to
the contrary it is refreshing and liberating, growing, and increasingly
at home everywhere, no thanks to the McCarthyist Witchunt Inquisition 
Intoleration and gay-bashing of backward homophobe reactionary Luddites.

(I hope that no pseudospoofers are homosexuals are offended by my
comments. Please don't think that this prose is actually a long,
complex, painstakingly and carefully crafted masterpiece containing
thousands of subtle and overt insults and flamebaits intended to throw
cypherpunks dialogue into Liberating Anarchy. Please take my metaphors
in the most superficial and endearing of terms and the good will I
offer them in. There is nothing between the lines just as there is no
pseudospoofing on the Cypherpunks list!)
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
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Due to the double-blind, any mail replies to this message will be anonymized,
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From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: an53310@anon.penet.fi (Evariste Galois)
Date: Sat, 27 Nov 93 21:39:19 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Mon Dieu!
Message-ID: <9311280537.AA07160@anon.penet.fi>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



In re: L. Detweiler

What manner of puling, wretched clericalist is this, this Perverted
Excutioner, driving us bold revolutionaries to distraction?

Verily, I urge you to screen his vileness from yourselves rather than
give him treat; a cur such as he should be cut off, not entertained
by our work of words.

Nor should he or his minions be given entrance to our forum; were this
a public square, (tho I dearly love to ride him forth on a rail) he
could rant as he pleases, but he is fouling our parlor and drives forth
newcomers who have not learned to ignore this stinking, drooling idiot in 
the corner covered in suppurating sores, screaming about conspiracies and
evildoings imagined in madness or opium dreams.

Aye, I would call him out, I would, had I not learned better in years
gone by...

++
++ Evariste Galois
++ L'Ecole Polytechnique
++
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From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: an12070@anon.penet.fi (Enlightened Sage)
Date: Sun, 28 Nov 93 00:44:19 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: On Hypocrisy, Stoning, and Forgiveness
Message-ID: <9311280843.AA23271@anon.penet.fi>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


There is a saying, `let he who is without sin cast the first stone.'
Some people have perverted this saying to their own ends, as many
people have done with the teachings of the enlightened saint and
god-among-men Jesus Christ.

Some people believe that this means that one should never attempt to
uncover other's faults, and prod them into reforming their behavior.
Nothing could be a greater lie.

The context of the quote was that a riotous crowd was about to kill a
man for his sins, by public stoning. `Let he who is without sin cast
the first stone.' But notice that the public was not asking the man to
reform himself or repent. They had already made up their mind. There
would be no forgiveness. They had judged him, and his sentence was Execution.

What about in the context where a crowd has *not* decided upon their
Judgement for a crime? They know that someone is guilty of it, but they
have not yet committed to stoning them, forgiving them, or even being
upset, or whatever. What is the meaning of the saying there? 

The saying is meaningless in this context. It is like division by zero. Undefined.

So, it is either, in punishment `let he who is without sin cast the first stone.'
In forgiveness, it is `let he who is with sin cast the first confession.'

Another concept At Stake is that of Reputation in accusation. If a
criminal is correctly called a criminal by a hypocrite, who is the
criminal? who is the hypocrite? The answer is that the criminal is
accountable for his criminality and the hypocrite is accountable for
his hypocrisy. But it is not the case that the hypocrite's hypocrisy
nullifies the criminal's criminality, of course. Also, if a criminal
calls an honest person a hypocrite in an attempt to discredit him, it
is just another Lie and another black mark on the criminal. That's the
situation with criminals, is they like to dig holes and drag down and
bury as many other people they can in the process.

Finally, regarding hypocrisy, a great many people are attempting to
discredit one or the other of L.Detweiler or S.Boxx by flimsy,
incorrect `proofs' that L.Detweiler == S.Boxx. Uh, who gives a damn?
Please redirect your analytical energies into resolving far more
interesting and nontrivial theorems like E.Hughes == P.Ferguson or
T.C.May == H.Finney.

We now return to our regularly scheduled program.
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From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Jim choate <ravage@wixer.bga.com>
Date: Sun, 28 Nov 93 07:14:31 PST
To: greg@ideath.goldenbear.com (Greg Broiles)
Subject: Re: Software filtering agents
In-Reply-To: <giuPDc1w164w@ideath.goldenbear.com>
Message-ID: <9311281505.AA10130@wixer>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>
>
> My knowledge of neural net software is limited to a cartoonish understanding

> of the theory behind them, but as I understand it they might be a useful
> tool for identifying the author of a given text stream. Comments? Anyone on
> the list familiar with neural net implementation, or in need of some sort of

> academic project? :)
>
>
> --
> Greg Broiles
> greg@goldenbear.com                     Baked, not fried.
>

Actually there is no need to use neural networks. There is quite a lot of
software running around that does a statistical anaysis of two authors works
and then calculates the similarity.

You should be able to find copies in either linguistic or mathematical
archives.





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Jim choate <ravage@wixer.bga.com>
Date: Sun, 28 Nov 93 09:09:34 PST
To: wmo@rebma.rebma.mn.org (Bill O'Hanlon)
Subject: Re: newsgroup v news-list
In-Reply-To: <m0p3fpu-0004USC@rebma.rebma.mn.org>
Message-ID: <9311281511.AA10617@wixer>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>
> You're a little new to the list for all the text you're generating.  If you'd

> wait about a month, you'd see all of your questions answered, examples of
> situations that would match or disprove most of your assumptions, and many
> many examples of the sort of thing that Detweiler is lobbing into the list.
>
> Everyone has different ideas of what the list is about and for.  When the fol
ks
> who've been on it for more than a year can't agree on what it's about, it's
> irritating to have a new person spout off their opinion on the matter.
>
> I imagine some folks have given you some indication of Detweiler's history, b
ut
> in case they haven't given you the complete flavor, let me add my two cents:
> imagine a true paranoic with the DTs from alcohol withdrawal locked into a
> room with a terminal...  Every stray impulse that crosses his mind causes a
> flurry of keystrokes to make the pink spiders go away...
>
> The guy is far enough gone that we're not really talking about censorship --
> any more than dealing with a crank phone caller is censorship.  He's
> dripping vitriol, not opinion.
>
> -Bill
>

Why should how long I have been on the list have anything to do with what I
can contribute?

Why should I wait a month to figure it out experimentaly when I can ask a
couple of questions now, race up the learning curve, and move on to othe
more important agendas.

We are talking about limiting access to the list (for whatever reason), THAT
is cencorship.


I personaly find the idea that a person has to 'earn' the right to make a
statement on a mail-list or newsgroup as counter-free speech. I oppose your
view.



How long have you been playing w/ computers? Maby you haven't been doing it
long enough to make posts either....





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Brian Beker <beker@netcom.com>
Date: Sun, 28 Nov 93 12:00:54 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Instant Background Check
Message-ID: <Pine.3.85.9311281134.A3177-0100000@netcom7>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

From: clarinews@clarinet.com (E. MICHAEL MYERS)
Subject: Brady bill overcomes filibusters and flip tongue


An interesting note buried at the end of a UPI story follows:

[deleted details of bantering between Dole, Mitchell and Biden]

	Without Biden, Mitchell arranged a face-saving compromise that got
the bill behind him and Dole: The Senate would pass separate legislation
early next year calling for a computerized, instant-background check on
gun buyers within 24 months so it could possibly negate the waiting
period.
	There is no assurance the House will pass that measure.
	Without the compromise, ``we would have put it off until January,''
or later, Dole said.
	As for Biden?
	``We both know politics.''



What a bunch of cards those boys are. 

Brian

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.3a

iQCVAgUBLPkCrSJejrfgN5yJAQH6rQP+NatITzDC/jI5FmNO5T6dfQBs9notR5nK
FAPmrkKzV3mhLYRQFCrBb6ZVKdRAX2wY2dbUvb9kUbutEgF8BRPge6ApKSLY7cmO
ue5TL+ou9DmTyYzMgyqXAJHOsxyxV6qKEo1T20E5e6MGvlw3glOcAUf2TWxTz6Ic
S5RtAGWpNho=
=jPGS
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Barbara L Marco <lmb@tenet.edu>
Date: Sun, 28 Nov 93 10:29:36 PST
To: "Cypherpunks Inc." <cypherpunks@toad.com>
Subject: wassup?
Message-ID: <Pine.3.03.9311281224.B3202-7100000@Joyce-Perkins.tenet.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Hey, can ya'll send me some info on ya'lls organization? Thanks.






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Alan (Miburi-san) Wexelblat" <wex@media.mit.edu>
Date: Sun, 28 Nov 93 11:44:38 PST
To: an53310@anon.penet.fi
Subject: Mon Dieu!
In-Reply-To: <9311280537.AA07160@anon.penet.fi>
Message-ID: <9311281941.AA00311@media.mit.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Would people who want to discuss Detweiler please put that name in the
subject line?  I haven't yet figured out how to get procmail to kill any
msgs with that name in the body, but if you put it in the Subject, it's
really easy.

--Alan Wexelblat, Reality Hacker, Author, and Cyberspace Bard
Media Lab - Advanced Human Interface Group	wex@media.mit.edu
Voice: 617-258-9168, Pager: 617-945-1842	PUBLIC KEY available by request
"To pleasure!" "To passion!" "To paradise!" "To pain!" "Tonight!"




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: analyst@netcom.com (Benjamin McLemore)
Date: Sun, 28 Nov 93 16:09:40 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Anonymous mail servers?
Message-ID: <199311290006.QAA01350@mail.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Are there any anonymous mail<-->ftp servers around? I am thinking
specifically about people getting pgp and other (soon to be
contraband?) cypherpunks tools. It would be nice if there were a
server for at least these items. I suppose you would send an
appropriately composed message with a body consisting of the request
and an anonymous return address preceded by the anonymous address of
the server.

Has this already been done? Blacknet, if it exists, works like this
doesn't it? Where are the BlackNet access instructions? 

------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Benjamin McLemore
analyst@netcom.com
-- 




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Anonymous <nowhere@bsu-cs.bsu.edu>
Date: Sun, 28 Nov 93 16:54:39 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: RISKS DIGEST 15.27 (fwd)
Message-ID: <9311290054.AA15691@bsu-cs.bsu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Let's review:


Newsgroups: comp.risks
Subject: RISKS DIGEST 15.27
Date: 16 Nov 93 17:19:19 GMT
Reply-To: risks@csl.sri.com

RISKS-LIST: RISKS-FORUM Digest  Tuesday 17 November 1993  Volume 15 : Issue 27

         FORUM ON RISKS TO THE PUBLIC IN COMPUTERS AND RELATED SYSTEMS 
   ACM Committee on Computers and Public Policy, Peter G. Neumann, moderator

  Contents:
Re: The Snakes of Medusa and Cyberspace (mathew, Alex Glockner, 
    Perry E. Metzger, Jamie Dinkelacker, Arthur Abraham, Peter Leppik,
    Brad Hicks, Neil McKellar, Leonard Mignerey, L. Detweiler)

 The RISKS Forum is a moderated digest discussing risks; comp.risks is its 
 USENET counterpart.  Undigestifiers are available throughout the Internet,
 but not from RISKS.  Contributions should be relevant, sound, in good taste,
 objective, cogent, coherent, concise, and nonrepetitious.  Diversity is
 welcome.  CONTRIBUTIONS to risks@csl.sri.com, with appropriate, substantive 
 "Subject:" line.  Others may be ignored!  Contributions will not be ACKed.  
 The load is too great.  **PLEASE** INCLUDE YOUR NAME & INTERNET FROM: ADDRESS,
 especially .UUCP folks.  PLEASE SEND REQUESTS FOR SUBSCRIPTIONS, archive 
 problems, and other information to risks-request@csl.sri.com (not automated).
 BITNET users may subscribe via your favorite LISTSERV: "SUBSCRIBE RISKS".
 
 Vol i issue j, type "FTP CRVAX.SRI.COM<CR>login anonymous<CR>AnyNonNullPW<CR>
 CD RISKS:<CR>GET RISKS-i.j<CR>" (where i=1 to 15, j always TWO digits).  Vol i
 summaries in j=00; "dir risks-*.*<CR>" gives directory; "bye<CR>" logs out.
 The COLON in "CD RISKS:" is essential.  "CRVAX.SRI.COM" = "128.18.10.1".
 <CR>=CarriageReturn; FTPs may differ; UNIX prompts for username, password.
 There are also alternative repositories, such as bitftp@pucc.Princeton.EDU .
 
  If you are interested in receiving RISKS via fax, please send E-mail to
  risks-fax@vortex.com, phone +1 (818) 225-2800, or fax +1 (818) 225-7203 for
  information regarding fax delivery.  PLEASE DO NOT USE THOSE NUMBERS FOR
  GENERAL RISKS COMMUNICATIONS; instead, as a last resort you may try phone
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 ALL CONTRIBUTIONS CONSIDERED AS PERSONAL COMMENTS; USUAL DISCLAIMERS APPLY.
 Relevant contributions may appear in the RISKS section of regular issues
 of ACM SIGSOFT's SOFTWARE ENGINEERING NOTES, unless you state otherwise.

----------------------------------------------------------------------

Date: 11 Nov 1993 12:13:34 -0000
From: mathew@mantis.co.uk (mathew)
Subject: Re: The Snakes of Medusa and Cyberspace (RISKS-15.25)

"L. Detweiler" <ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu> writes at length about the
evils of what he calls "pseudoanonymous posting".  I shall try to keep this
reply brief.  I am interested not only in the issue of pseudonymity, but in
the structure of Detweiler's allegations.  His posting appears to me to be an
artfully crafted conspiracy theory.

He begins by defining "pseudoanonymously":

>`Pseudoanonymously' -- the message identification is of a `fake' identity, a
>person that does not exist despite the implicit indications of the message
>(such as a signature with a realistic name, including a phone number, etc.)

He notes that pseudoanonymous postings are active deception, rather than
passive concealment of identity, and points out that he could set up a
pseudonymous account for the purpose of fooling people into thinking that the
pseudonym was a different person.  Pardon me, but what on earth does this have
to do with RISKS?  The practice of publishing under a pseudonym has been
common for centuries; ironically, Detweiler himself quotes "Shakespeare",
believed by many to be a pseudonym.

He does on to hypothesize that people might be less wary of pseudonymous
identities they don't recognize than they are of anonymous ones; he talks of
megalomaniacs stalking the net.  Well, if I see someone post to the net under
a name I don't recognize -- like (say) L.  Detweiler -- then I assign that
person (whom I don't know) exactly the same probability of being a
megalomaniac as I assign an anonymous user I don't know.  Perhaps even a
higher probability, as what megalomaniac would wish to remain *anonymous*?

Detweiler then points out that a user could post messages under a pseudonym,
complimenting himself.  Again, this is nothing new.  Authors have been known
to review their own books, written under pseudonyms; or to write letters to
newspapers criticizing themselves.

Detweiler claims that public use of pseudonyms is often "dishonest, immoral,
and unethical"; he demands that "others should be informed if it is
occurring".  Well, I hereby inform everyone that it is occurring, and has
occurred for centuries, and will carry on occurring.  It is not a new risk
brought in by technology.

Perhaps the problem is that people have got used to the Internet being
restricted to institutionalized settings, where user accounts are numbered,
and verified to be unique by some central authority.  As the Internet spreads
into the real world, so the real-world practice of pseudonymity will
inevitably spread into the Internet.  When everyone has a computer, everyone
can have a pseudonym; just as anyone with a pen and paper can develop a
real-world pseudonym.

Detweiler next moves on to consider the use of pseudonyms in private
communication.  This, again, is nothing new.  Look at the "Henry Root" letters
(or "The Lazlo Letters"), Victor Lewis-Smith's crank phone calls, or any of
thousands of similar examples.  He complains that digital signatures do not
solve the problem; unfortunately, he seems to be under the mistaken impression
that written signatures are better.  In fact, it is quite possible for a
person to have multiple handwritten signatures.

Then, he moves on to what he calls the "dangerous, insideous [sic], and
treacherous" uses of pseudonyms.  He gives an example of an anarchist
organization using pseudonyms to aid the destabilization of governments,
democracy, law enforcement, and so on.  Every good conspiracy must have a
secret enemy trying to destroy the world.  He speaks of carefully-guarded
mailing lists and secret societies, and explains that the anarchists could
send spoof communications to public addresses, magazines, and the like.

I hate to sound repetitive, but again, this threat is nothing new.  Look at
the spoof "LSD tattoo" announcements purporting to come from police officers,
or the pranks played against government departments.  Consider campaigners who
write multiple letters under pseudonyms to send to politicians.

Detweiler then goes even further, talking about "pseudospoofers" as using
"brainwashing and an illusion of peer pressure to manipulate unknowing
subscribers", with campaigns of "mental assault" to attack doubters.  Of
course, sinister mind-control techniques are a classic part of any conspiracy
theory.

Next comes the masterstroke.  He explains that the secret pseudospoofer cabal
would attack people like him by "disparaging, discouraging and discrediting
them publicly and privately as 'paranoid ranters' and 'conspiracy theorists'".
So now anyone who criticizes his position is instantly One Of Them, a venomous
snake who cannot be trusted, and further evidence of the Great Conspiracy.  He
suggests that they "might even be able to make a real-world pariah from
simulated ire and criticism directed at a single strong opponent, say, L.
Detweiler, from many simulated identities in cyberspace".  Thus, he hopes,
everyone who replies to RISKS criticizing his bizarre fears will become
another piece of evidence in his favour.

He finishes off by suggesting that the evil pseudospoofers might already be
infiltrating public mailing lists, discussion lists concerning email and
security software, network administrators' mailing lists, CERT, the DNS
databases, and so on.  He likens pseudospoofing to a virus infecting the
Internet.  Again, like most conspiracy theories, the picture painted is one of
an insidious threat which has already subverted our most cherished
institutions!

I'm sorry if this seems impolite, but the entire article seems to me to be 10%
misconceptions and 90% pure conspiracy theory.  (Oh no!  Mathew is One Of
Them!)  I find such things amusing, but I for one would appreciate it if this
sort of nonsense was kept out of RISKS in future.

mathew

------------------------------

Date: Thu, 11 Nov 93 14:37:22 EST
From: Alex Glockner <glockner@cosc.bsu.umd.edu>
Subject: Re: Pseudospoofing (RISKS-15.25)

While I should be grateful to L. Detweiler for reminding us of the possibility
of pseudospoofing on the Internet (sidenote: his anonymity FAQ makes for great
reading...), we should also remember that this is `just another' case of
network problems that have always existed `out there in the real world'.

The RTC (the US-sponsored agency that is responsible for selling off assets of
failed Savings and Loan institutions) recently sold a beachfront property to
the Audubon Society, a large US environmental group, which in cooperation with
a developer would create a preserve from the property.

Whoops.  Turns out it wasn't the environmental group -- officially, the
National Audubon Society incorporated in New York State -- but a group,
allegedly associated with the original failed developer, that chose to
register in another state with the name "Audubon Society".

If the allegation is correct, the developer saved a lot of money from the
original purchase price this way...

(My apologies for the lack of a citation; this appeared in the Washington Post
in October 1993) 

|> ...  These are related to the potential of waging a systematic campaign of
|> propaganda, disinformation, or brainwashing unleashed on an unsuspecting
|> public by a subversive organization.

In American politics, we call this `lobbying'.  Any number of groups are
misleadingly named and directed to achieve an agenda (*which* groups, of
course, depend on your own beliefs, so I won't try to name any).

The fact is that most (all?) states have rules that you can choose any name
(or more to the point, *names*) that you want as long as 1) the state cannot
prove that it is in the public interest to deny your name change or 2) you are
not intending to defraud anyone or escape legal obligations.  Stage names and
pen names are also long-established instances of this, also.

Pseudospoofing isn't anything new; it's just a new guise of something
thousands of years old...what's the first C program everybody writes?  "hello,
world"?  :-)

Alexander Glockner, Asst. Professor, Dept. of Computer Science, Bowie State 
University  Bowie MD 20715  (301) 464-6609   glockner@cosc.bsu.umd.edu

------------------------------

Date: Thu, 11 Nov 93 20:36:23 EST
From: pmetzger@lehman.com (Perry E. Metzger)
Subject: The Perils of Pseudospoofing (Detweiler, RISKS-15.25)

I was amused to see that the article contained an elaborate, and amusingly
paranoid, scenario, that describes, thinly veiled, the way that Mr. Detweiler
apparently thinks that the "Cypherpunks" mailing list operates.

"Cypherpunks" is an informal group of privacy and cryptography advocates --
the lists members include such varied individuals as Phil Zimmerman (the
author of PGP), Mike Godwin of EFF, John Gilmore, Phil Karn, a gentleman from
CPSR who's name I forget, and other fairly illustrious crusaders for privacy
and personal data security in the digital age.

Some members of the list are radical libertarians such as myself, who often
point out (with some glee) that cryptographic techniques, which are
essentially unstoppable because even high school students can now implement
extremely secure cipher systems, will likely ultimately eliminate the capacity
of the government and others to nose in where they do not belong.

With this introduction, I will explain what has happened: Mr. Detweiler has
apparently decided that many members of the group are in fact the same person
(posting under multiple identities) and that the entire mailing list is a
monstrous plot to undermine Truth, Justice, and The American Way.

The allegation that most of the mailing lists members are identical is bizarre
-- anyone is free to check for themselves that people like Tim May, Eric
Hughes, and others are real people. However, Mr. Detweiler became convinced
that because so many people disliked his rantings on the list that they all
had to, in fact, be the same person. I suppose the notion that more than one
person might disagree with him did not cross his mind. I am not a qualified
psychiatrist and do not pretend to be one, but I do know paranoid delusions
when I see them.

As an example:

>The CryptoAnarchists might even be able to make a real-world pariah from
>simulated ire and criticism directed at a single strong opponent, ...

I suppose it never occurred to Mr. Detweiler that he could simply look up
folks like Eric Hughes (whom I believe lives in Berkeley), Tim May (whom I
believe lives in Aptos, CA), and others, and verify that they exist and have
differing voices and the like.

However, people who are suffering from insane fantasies rarely bother
to listen if people tell them that they have insane fantasies.

The following paragraph speaks for itself:
>In fact, the CryptoAnarchists might even infiltrate sensitive internal mailing
>lists like those maintained by CERT (Computer Emergency Response Team). ...

Perry Metzger

------------------------------

Date: Thu, 11 Nov 1993 01:45:05 -0800
From: jamie@netcom.com (Jamie Dinkelacker)
Subject: Personal Singularity

In a recent Cypherpunk post, the venerated individual E.Hughes suggested
individuals make themselves known, and mention L.Detweiler's amorphous post to
.risks.  First, I'm honored to be mentioned along with May, Szabo, Finney,
Hughes, ... indeed, fine company these electrons keep!

Jamie Dinkelacker is in fact and in blood an independent individual, living in
Silicon Valley, who is finding profit from all the attention he's getting. He
goes so far as to post his phone number for people who would care to call and
offer consulting contracts for marketing management in the Bay Area.

More to the point: Jamie Dinkelacker is the only name I've used posting on the
net.

Does Detweiler truly exist as an individual? Can anyone attest to his
existence as separate from S.Boxx, Jim Riverman, David Sternlight? Who'll take
a stand on his behalf?

Jamie Dinkelacker   Palo Alto CA   Jamie@netcom.com    415.941.4782 

------------------------------

Date: Thu, 11 Nov 93 15:14:39 -0800
From: a2@ah.com (Arthur Abraham)
Subject: "L. Detweiler"'s single personality problem 

I would like to attest from personal knowledge that the following 
personalities each emanate from a separate flesh and blood person:

  G.Broiles, A.Chandler, J.Dinkelacker, H.Finney, E.Hughes, M.Landry,
  T.C.May, N.Szabo

I myself emanate from yet another flesh and blood person.

I have communicated with "L. Detweiler" in the past, and have frequently been
amazed by his postings.  His/her decline in the past month or two has been
somewhat disturbing.  It seems to illustrate how it is occasionally possible
for strongly held positions, that seem to rely on an slightly unbalanced view
of the world, to actually originate in unbalanced minds.

------------------------------

Date: 15 Nov 1993 20:27:55 GMT
From: leppik@uxa.cso.uiuc.edu (leppik peter)
Subject: Re: pseudospoofing (RISKS-15.25)

IMHO, I fail to see the real "risk" in pseudospoofing.  Keep in mind that such
famous people as Mark Twain and Marilyn Monroe never actually existed (they
were "pseudospoofed," as it were, by Samuel Clemens, and Norma Jean,
respectively).

The only possible risk that exists is if people lose their perspective, and
forget the distinction between the network and the real world.  Beyond that,
the use of realistic-sounding nom-de-plumes for various reasons is a long and
time-honored tradition.  I see no reason why it should stop merely because the
medium has become modulated electric fields, rather than ink and paper.

(Did William Shakespeare really exist?  Some people with nothing better
to do still argue about this question....)

	 Peter Leppik--  p-leppi@uiuc.edu

If people have a hard time understanding General Relativity, what makes us
think computers will do any better?

------------------------------

Date: 15 Nov 93 21:11:08 GMT
From: mc/G=Brad/S=Hicks/OU1=0205925@mhs.attmail.com
Subject: Re: Snakes of Medusa and Cyberspace (RISKS-15.25)
 
"If your best friend jumped off of a cliff, would you?
 Did your mother ask you this?
 Every four years, lemmings jump off of cliffs.
 There are no five-year-old lemmings ... unless they've
   learned to think for themselves."
     - recent TV ad for radio KPNT 105.7 FM, St. Genevieve/St. Louis, MO
 
OK, by now everybody knows that the lemmings story is a fake, but it's still a
potent metaphor, and a relevant one to any discussion of what Mr.  L.
Deitweiler has termed "pseudospoofing."  (Does Mr. Deitweiler exist? In my
experience, most real people have first names.)
 
For those of you who've just subscribed, "pseudospoofing" is the use of
"spoofed" SMTP mail connections, multiple anonymous mail servers, or other
techniques to enable one person to send e-mail messages appearing to be from
multiple people.
 
And if you missed Mr. Deitweiler's previous jeremiads, you might not know that
this idea scares the water out of him.  For example, consider this paragraph
from the introduction to his latest lengthy posting on the subject, this one
on RISKS Forum Digest, volume 15 issue 25, 10 Nov 1993:
 
 > ... These are related to the potential of waging a systematic campaign
 > of propaganda, disinformation, or brainwashing unleashed on an 
 > unsuspecting public by a subversive organization.
 
Propaganda?  I'll answer to that charge myself; I write propaganda for a small
not-for-profit educational organization ... if you'll allow me to define
propaganda as anything intended to influence people's opinions.  (When I do
it, it's a forceful essay.  When you do it, it's called spin doctoring.  When
somebody we both think is "evil" does it, it's called propaganda.)
 
But the warnings of disinformation and brainwashing are something else
altogether.  Not for nothing did David Brin in his novel _Earth_ refer to a
UseNet-like system as "the Net of a million lies."  All manner of lies have
appeared on the Net, from the US government's facile attempt to persuade us
that Clipper is a harmless alternative to existing systems and won't be
mandatory, to a recent (wonderfully funny) hoax having to do with modem taxes,
that fooled even net veterans like Pat Townson of Telecom Digest.
 
But does pseudospoofing make it easier to lie successfully via the Net?
 
If I post a message here that says that I've met J. R. "Bob" Dobbs, and he
really exists, will you believe me?  Of course not; you know that I don't live
in Dallas.  (weak grin) You also know, by now, that J. R. "Bob" Dobbs is a
myth built around a piece of 1950s clip art, and exists only in the same
mystical realm as Santa Claus, Lazarus Long, the Easter Bunny, the World-Wide
Satanic Conspiracy, John Galt, the Risen Lord Jesus Christ, the Tooth Fairy,
and Wise and Benevolent Government.  And you're not going to change your mind
on the existence or non-existence of any of these things just because I, or
anybody on the Net, told you otherwise.
 
Would you change your mind if ten people on the Net told you so?  A hundred?
A thousand?
 
Mr. Deitweiler has written that if I were to create (let us say) a hundred and
twenty three alternate (fake) net.identities, and each of them sent him mail
telling him that black was really white, that he would be in imminent danger
of dying at the next zebra crossing.  He calls this process "brainwashing."
 
To compare pseudospoofed argumentation to brainwashing is to show that you are
far, far too susceptible to peer pressure, and also to irresponsibly diminish
the seriousness of brainwashing.
 
As Wilson documented in Leary's _Neuropolitics_, there is a technology for
breaking down a person's resistance to ideas and lifestyles that are foreign
to them, and "re-imprinting" them with the ideas and values of a new group.
But among other things, it requires control of a person's physical
environment, food, movement, social environment, and all punishments and
rewards.  Not for nothing do cult leaders take their converts to remote
retreats, "deprogrammers" tie their captives to chairs in remote hotel rooms,
fundamentalist preachers preach "separation from the world," and the military
isolate recruits from all outside contact, control their every waking moment,
and bully them mercilessly during the early weeks of boot camp.
 
But you cannot exert that kind of control over anyone's life or body or mind
via the Net.  All you can do is create fake peer pressure.  And if you're that
susceptible to peer pressure, Gods' pity on you.  You need to learn to judge
arguments by their quality, not by the number of people who say that they
agree with them.
 
Does pseudospoofing have dire implications for democracy?
 
Well, no, because in the political context, pseudospoofing isn't that
different from what interest groups do now.  Do you really think that, for
example, everybody who joins the AARP to get the club discounts agrees with
everything that organization's lobbyists tell Congress?  I doubt it, and any
Congressman with any sense doubts it, too.  What's more, with the rise of
800-number generated automatic telegrams, clipped coupons, and so forth, a new
term has entered American political discourse, the term "astroturf campaign"
-- that is, a fake grass roots campaign.
 
Sure, pseudospoofing provides another way to create a fake grass roots
campaign.  But will anybody be fooled?  No.  Congressional staff already look
for close similarities between supporting messages and inform their bosses of
them.
 
Somebody with enough determination could hand-write a thousand letters to
Congress trying to influence a piece of legislation, carefully varying each
one so that they look like they came from separate constituents.  Without
pseudospoofing, they would put them in separate envelopes and drop them in
mailboxes all over the city over a course of days.  With pseudospoofing, they
could write a program to batch them out to anon mail servers or spoof them
into SMTP mailers over the course of many days.  But either way, the =real=
work would not be in the mailing process, but in the laborious task of
hand-writing a thousand entries while keeping them all different.  Who is
capable of such an effort?
 
Now, after thinking about the arguments above, if you are still terrified of
the possibilities of pseudospoofing, take this challenge: try to design a
system that allows anonymous email and anonymous transactions that =doesn't=
permit pseudospoofing.  Such a system, it seems to me, will have to have
=some= entity that knows which aliases go with which real.people, and such a
system is by definition not anonymous.
 
After a hundred-plus lines, I am not going to go into the arguments about
whether or not anonymity is itself a good or a bad thing.  Suffice it to
say that there are people, not involved in plotting the overthrow of
society or any of Mr. Deitweiler's other paranoid fancies, who believe
that anonymity is valuable.
 
All that I hope that I hope to accomplish with this message is to persuade you
of is that there is little basis for fear that "the treacherous and toxic
effects of pseudospoofing" will lead to "brainwashing" or "general
destabilization of governments, democracy, laws, and law enforcement."
 
 J. Brad Hicks     Internet: mc!Brad_Hicks@mhs.attmail.com
 X.400: c=US admd=ATTMail prmd=MasterCard sn=Hicks gn=Brad

------------------------------

Date: 	Mon, 15 Nov 1993 15:22:51 -0700
From: Neil McKellar <mckellar@cs.ualberta.ca>
Subject: Conspiracy 101? (Detweiler, RISKS-15.27)

In his article, " The Snakes of Medusa and Cyberspace: Internet identity
subversion", L. Detweiler outlines a variety of methods by which
'pseudospoofing' can be used to influence public opinion and research (at
least on the Internet).  Having read a fair share of spy fiction in my time,
none of these methods comes as a surprise to me.  :-) And all these methods
can be used AGAINST the conspirators in his scenario.

Perhaps it's time to pull out my copy of "Schroedinger's Cat" by
Robert Anton Wilson, and bone up on conspiracy theory.  :-)

Neil McKellar (mckellar@cs.ualberta.ca)

"Just because you aren't paranoid, doesn't mean they aren't out to get you."

------------------------------

Date: Thu, 11 Nov 1993 14:39:20 -0500 (EST)
From: Leonard Mignerey <MIGNEREY@cua.edu>
Subject: Re: Snakes of Medusa and Cyberspace...

    I fail to see the difference between electronic pseudospoofing and print 
media pen names. It to me that all of Mr. Detweilers arguments
hold for that scenario as well.  The problem is not in pseudospoofing as much
as in an individual relying on a single medium as a source of information.
Certainly in the "War of the Worlds" incident, Orsen Wells pseudospoofed a
number of people into believing that the Martians and actually landed.  This
unhappy group of individuals relied solely on their radios (and a single
channel at that) for their information.  
    If we are to dive so deeply into cyberspace that it becomes the total
extent of our research on important issues, then I think the problem is not in
the pseudospoofers but in the pseudospoofed.

Leonard J. Mignerey, The Catholic University of America, Washington, DC 20064
Director, Management Information Systems           INTERNET: mignerey@cua.edu

------------------------------

Date: Sun, 14 Nov 93 19:57:16 -0700
From: "L. Detweiler" <ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Subject: Pseudospoofing (ld, RISKS-15.25)

Many people have emailed me to say that they are skeptical of my scenario
about the Internet CryptoAnarchist pseudospoofing conspiracy published in
RISKS-15.25. The scenario was built painstakingly from hundreds of messages I
have reviewed on the subject over many weeks. I would like to present some of
the more interesting pieces of `evidence' (but withhold the more substantial
pieces) that there is at least, in one quarter of the Internet, a very strong,
systematic, and dedicated attempt to pseudospoof, and a very concerted effort,
possibly, to cover it up and viciously attack those who seek to expose it.

My informal poll of pseudospoofing posted to the cypherpunks mailing list and
talk.politics.crypto was unanswered by top Cypherpunk leadership, and many
poll responses were very evasive, and several in the form `yeah, I have done
it' with little additional information. The Cypherpunk mailing list and my
private mail were my greatest source of inspirations for `Medusa's Snakes in
Cyberspace'. For example, three prominent cypherpunks have suggested to me
that there is a secret mailing list for `project development' free of
`paranoid ranters'. I asked a cyperpunk leader about the existence of the
list, and he said that `your question does not allow anything other than an
incriminating answer.'

* * *

Here is a paragraph from a posting on the Cypherpunks list on Oct. 18 1993:

``In my limited experience creating Internet pseudonyms, I've been quite
distracted by the continual need to avoid leaving pointers to my True Name
lying around -- excess mail to/from my True Name, shared files, common
peculiarities (e.g. misspellings in written text), traceable logins, etc.  The
penet.fi site explicitly maintains a list of pointers to the original address.
All kinds of security controls -- crypto, access, information, inference --
have to be continually on my mind when using pseudonymous accounts. The
hazards are everywhere. With our current tools it's practically impossible to
maintain an active pseudonym for a long period of time against a sufficiently
determined opponent, and quite a hassle to maintain even a modicum of decent
security. Pointers to info and/or tools to enable the establishment and
maintenance of a net.nym, beyond the standard cypherpunks PGP/remailer fare
with which I'm now familiar, greatly appreciated. Especially nice would be a
list of commercial net providers that allow pseudonymous accounts''.

This paragraph contains an astounding amount of data on the possibility of a
highly refined, intense, extended, insidious, global, and systematic
pseudospoofing effort. Some of the details it suggests, in particular:

1) Based on the context that surrounded this excerpt and the message, the
author is intentionally conflating `pseudonymity' (identification of the
message implicitly indicates, `this is a pseudonym', such as origination from
anon.penet.fi) with `pseudoanonymity' (the deception that `I am a real
person'). This is a classic cypherpunk tactic. I have hundreds of subtle
variations of this obfuscation in my collection.

2) The author starts with `in my limited experience in creating'... but
clearly the author has *extensive* experience with meticulous practice and
knowledge that rivals that of the most literate RISKS postings on the subject
(for example, the anon.penet.fi site, the possibility of style analysis for
identification, etc.)

3) The author clearly has an obsession to completely dissociating all
traceability to his actual identity and a virtually fanatical aversion to
`pointers to my True Name lying around'.  This includes extensive
considerations for deleting mail, detecting shared files on a filesystem, and
`common peculiarities' like consistent misspellings.

4) The author refers to his efforts at deception as `security controls' and
categorizes them in general categories of `crypto, access, information,
inference' -- clearly he has dedicated an extreme amount of systematic
thinking and effort to the `project' of pseudospoofing.  He laments, sounding
somewhat like an NSA administrator, that it's `quite a hassle to maintain even
a modicum of decent security'.

5) There is an identifiable tone of paranoia in the message that most rational
humans would not associate with casual anonymity. `The hazards are
everywhere'. The author laments, `It's practically impossible to maintain an
active pseudonym for a long period of time against a sufficiently determined
opponent'.

6) The objective characterization of a `sufficiently determined opponent'
indicates the author considers attempts to trace the pseudoanonymity by what I
have been calling `demon exorcists' is an inevitable inconvenience that must
be addressed. The author clearly considers it a routine hazard and has
encountered and evaded it before.  He considers his routine deceptions
something like a game strategy.

7) Despite already obviously being an unsurpassed expert, the author requests
`pointers to info and/or tools to enable the establishment and maintenance of
a [`pseudoanonym'], beyond the standard cypherpunks PGP/remailer far with
which I'm now familiar, greatly appreciated.'  This may also disguise an
attempt to appear to be unsophisticated or determine what extent other
`octopuses' are existent in Cyberspace.

8) The author asks for a `list of commercial net providers that allow
[pseudoanonymous] accounts' without regard to *geography* whatsoever,
suggesting that it is no constraint. That is, the author may have no problem
with accounts spread very wide geographically. This is in stark contrast to
the standard request, `does anyone know a site in [x] area?' to avoid long
distance charges.

Clearly, the author has an *obsession* with maintaining *multiple*
`pseudoanonyms', possibly over a very *widespread* geographical area, has a
paranoia over exposure of one of his `tentacles' but also has conceived and
probably practiced countermeasures, and spends a great deal of time polishing
his techniques and arsenal. The author is not interested in casual anonymity
as a hobby. He is interested in systematic pseudospoofing, virtually as a
*profession*. He may even be spreading *disinformation* about his own
practices and the extent of his own knowledge. The author continues:

``Another big problem I see with [pseudoanonymous] reputations is entry. If
most people are blocking posts from new pseudonyms, how does one get a new
reputation established? I've had several years to establish a net.reputation
for [...], and it might take a long time for any of my [pseudoanonyms] to
catch up. Altruistic sponsorship requires trusted friends knowing the True
Name, but that public sponsorship itself provides important clues to that
Name.''

This paragraph further promotes pseudospoofing, now suggesting its use in
reputable forums:

1) Again, the author alludes to his arsenal of multiple pseudoanonyms, and
expresses regret that it will take *a long time* of concerted pseudospoofing
for before his other pseudoanonyms may `catch up'.

2) The author appears to be attempting to subvert mechanisms that bar
pseudoanonymous identities, trampling on their right to do so in his obsessive
promotion of the `reputation' associated with his various name tags.

3) From the context of the message, and the references to `sponsorship by a
true name', the author appears to actually be alluding to *identity databases*
and ways of infiltrating them with pseudoanonyms.  He laments that this
`public sponsorship itself provides important clues pointing to that name.'
This could be interpreted as a deliberate attempt at deception and corruption
of a `True Name' database by conspiracy, and the `clues' that would `point' to
a perpetrator of the crime.

Actually, because of the blurring of identities and misinformation this author
promotes, I think that this paragraph may potentially be another
disinformation stab -- the apparent owner of the message may be *itself* a
pseudoanonymous identity, *itself* built up over `several years'! (The author
posts from the site netcom.com, a site that is notorious for requiring
essentially no proof of identity to receive an Internet account.)

The author continues with classic cypherpunk dogma that blurs pseudonymous and
anonymous identities with pseudoanonymity (`pure anonymity'), and vilifies
those who feel `threatened' by the latter:

``I hope that we stick to experimenting with pure anonymity in many venues. I
suggest we'll find out that purely anonymous vposts are not so bad, overall.
[...] Pure anonymity is a strange, threatening, fascinating beast in our
panoptic social-welfare world. Even those of us at the forefront of
harnessing this monster shrink back in fear when it whinnies. [...]''

Now, superimpose the `Medusa's Snake's and Cyberspace' essay in your mind as
you read the following:

``Pure anonymity provides a voice for a wide variety of new kinds of
expression that up until now have been suppressed. [...] I hope we continue
experimenting with pure anonymity for a while longer [...].  Some of what
comes out might look very strange, something like tapping into previously
concealed areas of our social psyche. I suspect the result will be a more
honest dialog, a more productive conversation freed from posturing and,
ironically, from the concealment of threatening truth. I hope we will observe
with Zen patience and allow this quite interesting experiment to continue.''

* * *

Since the above posting was to a public list, I will reveal the author of the
message I have been dissecting. He is the same person who took my short
comment at the end of the `Medusa's Snakes & Cyberspace' essay as an
*accusation* that some pseudanonyms may be listed. He writes in RISKS-15.26:

>I'd like to assure the readers of RISKS that I am in fact a unique person,
>distinct from the other names L. Detweiler listed.  Of the people on his list
>I know from personal contact, all are distinct people in Real Life(tm).  Well
>before his post to RISKS, L. Detweiler was provided means of personally
>verifying that many of the names he listed are distinct True Names (eg phone
>numbers he can call), but it doesn't seem to help.

Let's dissect these statements with an eye to rigor. `I am in fact a unique
person [...]'  means nothing in the question of pseudanonymity -- Medusa may
have one of her Snakes claim that `I am a unique person' without lying.

Next, `Of the people on his list I know from personal contact, all are
distinct people in Real Life(tm)'. But this can be taken to mean only that
more than one person is represented by a list of pseudoanonyms.  Note the
author is careful not to mention *which* people he knows from personal
contact. That, after all, might reveal `important clues pointing to that
Name'!

Also, there is a problem that members of a `cult of pseudospoofers', who
subscribe to the `pseudoreligion of pseudoanonymity', as this person
apparently does, may twist language to the point of actually maintaining that
different pseudoanonymous identities *are* different `people', even when typed
in at a keyboard by the same individual! This would not be unlike a fanatic
religious sect maintaining that acts of `terrorism' are actually `holy
liberation' when commited in the name of God!

The author says he is `distinct from the other names L. Detweiler listed.' But
again, this is not a guarantee of uniqueness of flesh! The use of the word
`name' instead of `people' is quite suspicious in our context! The whole
*issue* is that beyond the uniqueness of mere ASCII `names'!

The person goes on to state that `Well before his post to RISKS, L.  Detweiler
was provided means of personally verifying that many of the names he listed
are distinct True Names (eg phone numbers he can call) but it doesn't seem to
help.'

The people I listed are separated by vast geography in their posting sites,
with a concentration in California. Furthermore, I have been in private
correspondence with all of them over many weeks, and I am unsure of what
specifically Mr. Szabo is referring to as my opportunity to verify that `many
of the names' are `distinct True Names'. I have never before posted a list of
this set of names before! The lack of specific information is highly
suspicious in our context! Furthermore, in our context, the issue would not be
whether `some' real people are represented in the list, but whether *all*
names listed correspond to the legal identities of *unique* human beings! (A
complex and widespread pseudospoofing effort actively being orchestrated by
some, which very possibly spans many states, may not even be thwarted by the
necessity of establishing interstate telephone numbers!)

* * *

Finally, I have very strong tangential cues that the `Medusa's Snakes in
Cyberspace' essay is far more true than hypothetical. Over many weeks I have
encountered strong stonewalling, evasion, and counterattacks from some of the
most prominent cypherpunks in response to my specific allegations in email.
This included a mailbombing, a mailbombing threat, four letters to my site
postmaster, two from cypherpunk leaders, one referring to `your latest
paranoid descent into fantasy in RISKS', my `violent threats', without quoting
any of my statements in particular (I find the thought of a physical threat
abhorrent), and suggested `I have a strong feeling you are going to have a
very hard time getting a job in the computer industry' in part from the essay.
Another called my efforts against pseudospoofing a `a nonsensical, paranoid,
one-man jihad against cypherpunks'. Apparently because the lamentations and
supplications to my postmaster have largely been ignored, one cypherpunk
suggested that `I intend to go beyond your postmaster on the next try, to
various former classmates and old friends of mine who are computation center
employees, faculty, and administration members at CSU now.'

Incidentally, there is a strong overlap between the people perpetrating the
above activities and those I credited at the end of my essay.  Elsewhere, one
cypherpunk suggested that `I better start looking over my shoulder'. Another,
in what might be termed `psychopunk humor,' wrote `I'm going to come kill your
family with a rusty razor blade' (the latter broadcast on the entire mailing
list) and suggested it demonstrated my personal problems in being upset by
such a message.

These tactics are all quite shocking to me, and I am not sure how to respond
to these letters except to perceive them as outrageous and desperate attempts
to intimidate and censor me indirectly where other approaches have failed. I
warn others of the searing hostility they may encounter on the cypherpunks
list -- with philosophies promoted there that are increasingly blurred with
raw criminality -- and against any attempts to find an antidote to poisonous
pseudospoofing.

L. Detweiler

------------------------------

End of RISKS-FORUM Digest 15.27
************************





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: hfinney@shell.portal.com (Hal Finney)
Date: Sun, 28 Nov 93 20:04:40 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re:  Cryptosplit 2.0
Message-ID: <9311290404.AA27229@jobe.shell.portal.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Norm Hardy posted some code for Shamir secret sharing here about a month
ago, a nice short routine.  At around the same time, I created a program
to do the same thing and uploaded it to soda.  It is still in
/pub/cypherpunks/incoming as secsplit.zip.  It contains a DOS executable
and source for building under Unix or DOS.

I did the polynomial calculations a little differently from Norm and
Ray; their approaches may be more efficient.  But I did go to some
effort with the random-number generation on which the security of the
scheme depends.  My code uses the IDEA.C module from PGP for the
pseudo-random generator, seeding it with the time of day and an MD5
hash of the file being split.  So I think this should be pretty secure
in terms of the randomness involved.

The purpose of this program, as with Ray's and Norm's, is to split a file
into n pieces (all as big as the original file) such that any k of them
are sufficient to recover the original file, but k-1 pieces give you NO
information about the contents of the original file (other than its size).

One possible application is to split up your PGP secret key file this
way and distribute the pieces to trusted friends such that several of
them have to cooperate to recover your key.  Then if you accidentally lose
your key you can get the pieces back from your friends.

Hal




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: wisej <wisej@acf4.NYU.EDU>
Date: Sun, 28 Nov 93 17:24:40 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Secure Phone?
Message-ID: <Pine.3.87.9311282046.A9467-0100000@acf4.NYU.EDU>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


The following add copy appeared in TIME the other week, in a special gift 
advertising section:

	GIVE THE GIFT OF PRIVACY

	All it takes to eavesdrop on most cordless calls is another
	cordless phone, scanner, or even a baby monitor.  That's why
	every Motorola Cordless Phone features Secure Clear.sup.TM tech-
	nology.  Secure Clear.sup.TM scrambles voices, so all an eavesdrop-
	per hears is garbled noise.

			(M) MOTOROLA

	Motorola and Secure Clear are trademarks of Motorola, Inc. (c) 1993 
	Motorola, Inc.

Comments?

				Jim Wise
				wisej@acf4.nyu.edu
				jaw7254@acfcluster.nyu.edu





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: hfinney@shell.portal.com (Hal Finney)
Date: Sun, 28 Nov 93 20:14:41 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re:  Traffic analysis and file size
Message-ID: <9311290413.AA27849@jobe.shell.portal.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Scott Morham asks about how well file sizes are preserved by encrypted
remailers.  Generally speaking, in creating a nested encrypted remailing
request, at each stage PGP will attempt to compress the input, then encrypt
it, which preserves its size but adds a block to the beginning of about
the size of the public key (typically 100-150 bytes), then makes it ASCII,
which increases the size by 1/3, then adds a small header block of 50 to
150 bytes or so.

Since the compression is ASCII-encoded encrypted text, the best it can do
is to "undo" the ASCII encoding or compress by about 1/4, but I don't know
if it actually does that well.  Probably it compresses by somewhat less.
So generally each chain will add a few hundred bytes and scale the size of
the message up by probably 10 or 20 percent.

I think that this will probably allow pretty reliable matching of incoming
and outgoing messages on the basis of size alone, at least, more reliable
than I would be willing to count on to prevent attacks by this means.

Scott also suggests using .zip compression at some point, but this isn't
likely to help much since encrypted files look random and are basically not
compressible.

What we have talked about here is adding random padding to change the file
size.  Because encrypted files do look random, you can generally pad them
with random bytes pretty easily and undetectably.  This depends somewhat
on the file format but it is basically easy.  I wrote some perl scripts to
pad .pgp public-key-encrypted files undetectably.  The extra bytes are
ignored when the file is decrypted.  The scripts aren't really production-
quality since they just use perl's built-in random numbers.  Good random
numbers should be used.

Hal
hfinney@shell.portal.com




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: hfinney@shell.portal.com (Hal Finney)
Date: Sun, 28 Nov 93 20:19:40 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re:  Remailers: Turnaround Times?
Message-ID: <9311290418.AA28129@jobe.shell.portal.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Coerr asks about turnaround times for the remailers.  Karl Barrus posts
a list of remailers approximately every month.  On that list he shows
which remailers have high-speed, continuous connections to the internet
and which have intermittent connections which introduce larger than normal
delays.  In my experience, the direct-connected remailers generally respond
within a minute or two.  The other ones introduce delays ranging from an
hour or so up to overnight.  A good test is to send a "ping" (remail to self)
message to each remailer and see how quickly responses arrive.  In my
experience, the extropia remailer tends to take a few hours, while the rebma
remailer is usually a day or sometimes longer.  I don't have recent values
for the others.

Hal Finney
hfinney@shell.portal.com




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Karl Lui Barrus <klbarrus@owlnet.rice.edu>
Date: Sun, 28 Nov 93 19:34:40 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: CHAOS gopher maintenance
In-Reply-To: <9311280555.AA23154@icm1.icp.net>
Message-ID: <9311290331.AA13436@flammulated.owlnet.rice.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>Who's in charge of the chaos.bsu.edu gopher? I was just browsing the
>contents and it is not very up-to-date with cypherpunk information...

The Welcome file at the top level directory should identify myself and
Chael as running the gopher site...

I have several posts from the last month or so, but haven't gotten
around to editing headers and making them available.  I've been buried
by coursework and by looking for summer internships, etc.

But I'll get around to it real soon!

-- 
Karl L. Barrus: klbarrus@owlnet.rice.edu         
keyID: 5AD633 hash: D1 59 9D 48 72 E9 19 D5  3D F3 93 7E 81 B5 CC 32 

"One man's mnemonic is another man's cryptography" 
  - my compilers prof discussing file naming in public directories



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Sandy <72114.1712@CompuServe.COM>
Date: Sun, 28 Nov 93 18:54:39 PST
To: <cypherpunks@toad.com>
Subject: STRATEGIC INVESTMENT POINTER
Message-ID: <931129024902_72114.1712_FHF67-1@CompuServe.COM>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
  SANDY SANDFORT               Reply to:  ssandfort@attmail.com
 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Punksters,

For those of you who asked, here is the contact information for
"Strategic Investment":

         Strategic Investment
         Agora, Inc.
         824 E. Baltimore St.
         Baltimore, MD 21202-4799

         (410) 234-0691


 S a n d y

 >>>>>>    Please send e-mail to:  ssandfort@attmail.com <<<<<<
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Mike Ingle <MIKEINGLE@delphi.com>
Date: Sun, 28 Nov 93 20:06:11 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Public-key secret sharing
Message-ID: <01H5V6R8O8QA939IQA@delphi.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Has anyone combined polynomial secret sharing with public-key
cryptography to create a public-key secret sharing system?

For example, encrypt a file with a session key, SK. Use secret
sharing to split SK into n parts, with m required for decryption.
Encrypt each of the n parts with a different person's public key.
Publish the encrypted file and public-key encrypted pieces of the
key. To decrypt, m of the trustees use their secret keys to recover
their shares of SK, combine them, and retrieve SK to decrypt the
file. This has the advantage of requiring only one copy of the
file, and requiring no pre-arrangement with the trustees. Is there
a better way to do this (especially so the size of the file does not
grow linearly with the number of trustees)?

When is PGP 3.0 with the toolkit coming out? This should make it
easy to implement these things, along with digicash and other
projects. The MPI library and conventional crypto is fairly
accessible, but the code which creates PGP-format packets is not
easy to call from another program.

--- MikeIngle@delphi.com




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: trestrab@GVSU.EDU (BETH TRESTRAIL)
Date: Sun, 28 Nov 93 20:05:56 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: "Reason" mag. article on public key crypto
Message-ID: <9310287545.AA754556702@GVSU.EDU>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


About a month ago, I posted a small extract from an article entitled
"Hide and Peek" by Lee Dembart. I came across the complete text of
the article while looking for something else at gopher.internet.com.

If you're interested in this piece, e-mail me and I'll send you a
copy. (a note for Extropian list members - I nosent the piece to
the list, and have provided a pointer to the message number so you can
retrieve it.)

          Jeff
          trestrab@gvsu.edu
          trestrail@delphi.com




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: hblau@cs.cuhk.hk (Lau Hing Bun)
Date: Sun, 28 Nov 93 07:10:48 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: please remove me from the list
Message-ID: <9311281510.AA26413@cucs18.cs.cuhk.hk>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text


Dear System Admin,
     Please remove me from the mailing list. 
     The group are helpful and rich!!

     Thank you!

H.B. Lau




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: John Schultz <jschultz@bigcat.missouri.edu>
Date: Sun, 28 Nov 93 21:29:41 PST
To: Jim choate <ravage@wixer.bga.com>
Subject: Re: newsgroup v news-list
In-Reply-To: <9311281511.AA10617@wixer>
Message-ID: <Pine.3.07.9311282309.A29867-a100000@bigcat>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain




On Sun, 28 Nov 1993, Jim choate wrote:
> Why should how long I have been on the list have anything to do with what I
> can contribute?
> 
> Why should I wait a month to figure it out experimentaly when I can ask a
> couple of questions now, race up the learning curve, and move on to othe
> more important agendas.
<snip>
> I personaly find the idea that a person has to 'earn' the right to make a
> statement on a mail-list or newsgroup as counter-free speech. I oppose your
> view.

It's general netiquette to hang around for a couple weeks on a list to see
how it operates, what topics are covered, etc. before jumping in with both
feet.

John Schultz
jschultz@bigcat.missouri.edu







From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: XXCLARK@indst.indstate.edu
Date: Sun, 28 Nov 93 20:29:40 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Secure Clear
Message-ID: <9311290428.AA13770@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain




         wisej <wisej@acf4.NYU.EDU> asked:

>                        (M) MOTOROLA

>        Motorola and Secure Clear are trademarks of Motorola, Inc. (c) 1993
>        Motorola, Inc.

>Comments?

        Don't have one, but know two who do. Scramble, as I understand
   the meaning of the word, they don't.

        Last I knew, "Secure Clear" is simple frequency inversion, and can
   be defeated by:
                   a $15 kit added to a scanner, or;
                   tuning the freq on a single sideband receiver.

        I've even heard of individuals who had trained themselves, or
   been trained, to understand the freq inverted signal.

        Check out Cincinnati Microwave's spread spectrum frequency
   phones. I don't know if they use frequency hopping or direct sequence,
   but they may be secure against all but military and LEA types... and
   the really determined and accomplished hardware hacker.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "L. Detweiler" <ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Date: Sun, 28 Nov 93 22:44:41 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: the GWELST Game
Message-ID: <9311290642.AA11110@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Hey, I have a neat new game that cypherpunks would be interested in.
Unfortunately, I don't have a lot of material for anything but one or
two rounds. Maybe some other people can join in as the dealer after this round.

GWELST stands for Guess Which Eminent Leader Said This. One eminent
cypherpunk leader is the author of a quote I include here. Your
mission, if you choose to accept it, is to determine the originator. The quote is:

``There is no movement. Get this delusion out of your head. There is
only software.''

A few hints for you all. I was quite depressed and disoriented by this
quote at first. I thought, of course there is a movement! That's why
I'm here! That's what makes me interested in the Cypherpunks! Isn't a
NYT and Wired article an indication of a Movement? Aren't all the
people who post here indications of a Movement? Aren't the leaders
interested in promoting the Movement?

Actually, the answers to all these questions are quite contrary to what
you might think. It seems that the real cypherpunk agenda is to
*pretend* that there is a movement, and play it out like a movie in a
theatre for the audience, and fool them into thinking it is real. Many
still do! But this is like being convinced by one of those fake
Hollywood building facades, with empty nothingness behind it. The
leaders are interested in deceiving reporters like Markoff and Kelly,
NYT and Wired respectively, into thinking that the movie is real, that
real people are getting real things done.

Many of the people who post here are *not* real. Some of the most
`respected' ones are tentacles. And the audience is so dazzled by the
show that they continue to believe in the Movie despite that it has
ended and an usher is telling them to Leave! Many tentacles are dangled
before us by the Master Puppeteers themselves. The tentacles assault us
on the list and in our mail, sandwiched between real people. How can
one tell the difference? Most can't. So the fraud, the mockery, the
sham, the farce plays on.

So, even the leaders have some honesty in some moments. On rare
occasions of unguarded, uncharacteristically candid moments, they hint
that there the idea that there is a Movement is actually an elaborate
hoax. `There is no movement. Get this delusion out of your head. There
is only software.' That last sentence is a reference to the elaborate
movie-generating software that they run, that helps them project the
characters onto the screen with an amazing degree of realism and
verasimilitude. But the characters are not real people. Only after
attempting to interact with them like real people, can other real
people discover that they are fake. It is like an Eliza-Turing test.
Which email addresses are intelligent? Which are tentacles? Hint: The
tentacles are like robots that explode when asked a question they cannot answer. 

Interestingly, the individual A.Abraham, himself involved in the
Cypherpunk leadership, who posts as a2@ah.com (the infamous
Abraham-Hughes site), recently sent me mail along the same lines,
saying that `There is only software.' This is a fat clue for you in
this round of the GWELSTing Game! Answer will appear shortly!





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Black Unicorn <unicorn@access.digex.net>
Date: Sun, 28 Nov 93 22:30:09 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Dead mans stick
Message-ID: <199311290629.AA06511@access.digex.net>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
 
 
 
- ->
 
From: "Alan (Miburi-san) Wexelblat" <wex@media.mit.edu>
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Give me your password- OR ELSE!
 
It seems like it would be relatively simple to program in a sort of dead-man
switch at the time of creation of the secret key.
 
 
[...]
 
 
As you can imagine, there are increasing levels of personal security you
might employ.  For example, using the duress phrase might be set up to
change the pass-phrase to something *you* don't know but which is known by a
trusted other party (wife, mother, agent/lawyer, etc.).  Knowing this phrase
doesn't help them since that phrase can't access your secret until *after*
you've given the duress phrase and the software has disabled your normal
access phrase.
 
<-
 
The problem with the duress phrase seems to be this:
 
One would use such a phrase when physical site security had been
compromised no?
 
Let's assume government types (which seems to be the hint I get when
you suggest the alternate pass phrase being held by your lawyer.
 
It's fairly easy to duplicate the key and stick it somewhere
on a floppy and try the passwords extracted from you
via rubber hose method on the copy rather than the original.
In fact, if people being to use duress codes, it seems that this would
become standard practice, if it's not already.
 
In as far as the idea behind a duress code is to keep you from being
beaten repeatedly by making it impossible for you to decode the
information alone, copying the encrypted key defeats this method.
 
:(
 
- ->
- --Alan Wexelblat, Reality Hacker, Author, and Cyberspace Bard
Media Lab - Advanced Human Interface Group      wex@media.mit.edu
Voice: 617-258-9168, Pager: 617-945-1842        PUBLIC KEY available by request
"To pleasure!" "To passion!" "To paradise!" "To pain!" "Tonight!"
 
<-
 
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.3
 
iQCVAgUBLPmWBhibHbaiMfO5AQEQuQQApDtaIxVjjZvdUYD9Jl6FZGdq62SpPM+y
KMqsIvSOhPOK2kOsoAyLuIN4+bXVUyTHiAkYX/ye2q2gqj9yrOLvkGyH6yak5YFi
xoOCYx6qGScHeoqwpJKoRTTwUjAo79ZmXupA+ylX527eQDILwZJa+W+wSln/rXhG
zajsBTeG/mw=
=B4y+
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Black Unicorn <unicorn@access.digex.net>
Date: Sun, 28 Nov 93 22:35:08 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: taxes (net)
Message-ID: <199311290631.AA06604@access.digex.net>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


->
 
---------------------
Tax Havens on the Net
---------------------
compiled by James R. Hart
 
Leichtenstein
net access: ---f-
languages: German, Alemanni
currency controls: none
bank secrecy: excellent
preferred legal entities: allows any type found anywhere
in the world (!)
        establishment (limited liability, unlimited duration)
        company limited by shares
        foundations and trusts
taxes:  none for income outside Leichtenstein.  Net worth
        tax of 0.01% on capital and reserves (min. 1,000
        Swiss francs), local  resident taxes
tax treaties: not party directly or indirectly to any
        exchange-of-information agreements
        double-tax treaty exists only with Austria
n.b.: bankers won't assist law enforcement officials with
        drug, fraud, theft, or tax investigations.  They
        might assist in money laundering and insider
        trading investigations, informing the customer
        first.
 
 
Yes but,
 
Liechtenstein,
Not LEIchtenstein.
 
:)
 
You'll find it difficult to invest less than 1.5 million in Liechtenstein
secretly.
 
-uni- (Dark)




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: jbhicks@aol.com
Date: Sun, 28 Nov 93 22:34:42 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Motorola Ad
Message-ID: <9311290132.tn62416@aol.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


In the November 29, 1993 issue of Time Magazine, opposite p. 67, there is an
interesting ad:

> Give the Gift of Privacy
> 
> All it takes to eavesdrop on most cordless calls is another
> cordless phone, scanner or even a baby monitor.  That's why
> every Motorola Cordless Phone features Secure Clear (TM)
> technology. Secure Clear (TM) scrambles voices, so all an
> eavesdropper hears is garbled noise.
> 
> Motorola
> 
> Motorola and Secure Clear are trademarks of Motorola, Inc.
> (C) 1993 Motorola, Inc.

 - James -




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: an12070@anon.penet.fi (S.Boxx)
Date: Sun, 28 Nov 93 21:59:40 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Real People
Message-ID: <9311290559.AA13919@anon.penet.fi>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Hey, there was an interesting series of articles in RISKS 15.25, 15.27,
and 15.28x that covered the `Cryptoanarchist' movement. Many
cypherpunks may be interested in this analysis. Has it shown up here? I
missed it if it did.

Boy, the tentacles are *really* pissed off from that E.Hughes ==
P.Ferguson insinuation in my recent messages. Joe Thomas
<jthomas@access.digex.net> told me that `you're getting on my nerves'
and accuses me of `damaging the list discussion' here. I'm very hurt
and upset by this claim. Why don't you lay off a little? I'm just
trying to do my job. Some people are born demons, and some people are
born exorcists!

He says he met P.Ferguson at the D.C. cypherpunks meeting `this spring'
(last spring?). What was the date on that, anyway? Who else was there?
He said he didn't get to talk to P.Ferguson for very long, but he did
see his Virginia driver's license. So, according to J.Thomas
<jthomas@access.digex.net> anyway, P.Ferguson exists! Thanks for this
valuable entry in the Real People Trust Web. Would anyone like to vouch
for Joe Thomas, <jthomas@access.digex.net>?

BTW, I heard that access.digex.net had lax authentication standards
like netcom.com. Could anyone send me mail clarifying what is actually
required for authentication at these sites?

BTW, many thanks to L.Detweiler for his lone help in helping me break a
corrupt conspiracy and massive cyberspatial hoax. It's really tough
going lately, and we're really being bombarded with some of the most
vicious material the tentacles can muster. But we can stand the heat,
and we're going to stay in the kitchen, and continue to fight the
raging arson flames to make cyberspace safe for honest people.
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
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From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: an12070@anon.penet.fi (S.Boxx)
Date: Sun, 28 Nov 93 22:39:41 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: HFinney == TCMay
Message-ID: <9311290637.AA19379@anon.penet.fi>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Some person an41925@anon.penet.fi has been sending me particularly
vicious and harrassing mail lately. It's a good thing that he did it
anonymously--I might be upset if a real person made the kind of
accusations that he did. He was upset by my tcmay == hfinney
implication I made in some earlier message. I was really fascinated by
this response:

>No one will prove that
>May is Finney because May is not Finney. I see no similarity in the
>style or content of their posts, they don't appear to support or
>butress each others arguments any more than any random pair of
>people on the list, I see nothing to indicate they are the same. I
>wish you would come up with some evidence if you continue to make
>these wild accusations.

Actually, I see some interesting similarities. May is interested in
digital pornography, and I just saw H.Finney post on the subject the
other day. (Actually, a whole lot of cryptoanarchists posted on the
subject, but that's another story). May is really upset by accusations
that he doesn't handhold newcomers like H.Finney does. Could it be that
the former is upset that people aren't recognizing his actual work
because of his pseudospoofing, attributing it to the latter? That would
be most ironic! Just another one of the pathetic freakshows that
cypherpunks are proud of. 

Also, H.Finney posts from soda.berkeley.edu, same site as E.Hughes and
the Cypherpunk archives. He is very clearly a Top Cypherpunk, given
many apologist statements on the subject. And given that Top
Cypherpunks have always been interested in `pseudopooling', or
surrreptiously and conspirationally posting from each other's accounts,
it is not unlikely IMHO that H.Finney is either a pseudopooler,
pseudospoofer, or a tentacle. H.Finney was also involved in the defense
of `known tentacles' like J.Dinkelacker.

Also, the point that this an41925@anon.penet.fi makes that H.Finney and
T.C.May are different people -- note that he gives absolutely no
verifiable real world evidence whatsoever. It makes me think he is just
another psychopunk who lives in his cyberspatial hallucinations. He
makes reference to `similarity in style or content of posts, no
appearance of supporting or butressing each other's arguments any more
than any random pair of people on the list.' But notice that these are
all things that a master pseudospoofer would endeavor to avoid! The
whole *point*of pseudospoofing is to deceive others in an undetected
way. Obviously, none of this proves that H.Finney == T.C.May. It only
says that this person's arguments are essentially completely empty of
solid evidential facts that prove anything conclusive. `I see nothing
to indicate they are the same' he whines. IMHO, `I see nothing to
indicate they are different.'

> I
>wish you would come up with some evidence if you continue to make
>these wild accusations.

This is another interesting psychopunk argument, placing the burden of
proof on someone who makes an accusation about nonexistence, when
obviously the burden of proof in cyberspace should be on those who wish
to prove they exist, because every aspect of the Internet encourages
the opposite conclusion -- that `they' are a tentacle. There are no
humans in cyberspace! Only email addresses! To equate the two is the
most dangerous deception imaginable! Are we to rely on human nature and
honesty? Remember, we are dealing with pathological liars and
psychopaths here. Unless the accused denies the claim, there is not
really any need for proof. We simply assume that everyone is a tentacle
until evidence arises to the contrary, and get a proof by
contradiction. Psychopunks prefer Proof by Lies.

>The point I'm trying to make is that you
>just look foolish, accusing people of pseudospoofing who do not
>appear to be doing so to neutral observers

That's the key -- fooling neutral observers into believing that no one
is pseudospoofing. This is the central weapon of the pseudospoofer.
Telling his opponents that they are insane paranoiacs for believing
that there is no guarantee whatseover that a unique nametag corresponds
to a unique person! Until people wake up and smell the excrement, the
pseudospoofer gets away with his treachery unhindered.
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
To find out more about the anon service, send mail to help@anon.penet.fi.
Due to the double-blind, any mail replies to this message will be anonymized,
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From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: an12070@anon.penet.fi (S.Boxx)
Date: Sun, 28 Nov 93 23:10:09 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: CRYPTOANARCHIST INFILTRATION ALERT
Message-ID: <9311290709.AA24358@anon.penet.fi>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



ATTENTION ALL INTERNET PERSONNEL

THE INTERNET OUTLET

szabo@netcom.com

HAS BEEN IDENTIFIED AS A CRYPTOANARCHIST CYBERSPACE INFILTRATION SITE
TO A 93.67% DEGREE CERTAINTY VIA PSEUDOSPOOFING DETECTION SOFTWARE.

MAIL, POSTS, AND OTHER EMANATIONS FROM THIS OUTLET ARE CONSIDERED
LIKELY TO BE HIGHLY SUBVERSIVE AND DANGEROUS CRYPTOANARCHIST
DISINFORMATION AND PROPAGANDA FROM ONE OR MORE CRYPTOANARCHIST
CO-CONSPIRATORS. MULTIPLE SENSITIVE INTERNET MAILING LISTS, FAQS, AND
FORUMS HAVE BEEN CONTAMINATED. 

INFORMATION ORIGINATING FROM THIS OUTLET IN THE FOLLOWING AREAS IS
PARTICULARLY SUSPECT:

- PROMOTION OF PSEUDOANONYMITY AND THE COLLECTION OF MULTIPLE FAKE
  CYBERSPACE IDENTITIES (MISTATED AS `PURE ANONYMITY')
- PROMOTION OF UNTRACEABLE `BLACK' CASH AND RELATED CRYPTOGRAPHIC
  TECHNIQUES (PARTICULARLY CHAUMIAN)
- FALSE REFERENCES AND DISINFORMATION ON THE ACTUAL `CRYPTOANARCHIST' AGENDA
- PROMOTION OF THE `COLLAPSE OF GOVERNMENTS'
- SUBTLE ANTI-DEMOCRACY GOALS AND ANTI-DEMOCRATIC SENTIMENTS
- PROMOTION OF DISINFORMATION, PROPAGANDA, AND DECEPTION E.G. IN THE MEDIA
- PROMOTION OF TAX EVASION
- PROMOTION OF CRIMINAL EVASION OF IDENTITIFICATION MEASURES FOR E.G.
  BLACK MARKETEERING
- ELEVATING AND PERPETUATING SUBVERSIONS OF IDENTITY E.G.
  PSEUDOSPOOFING AND PSEUDOPOOLS AS `LIBERATING FLUIDITY OF IDENTITY' ON THE 
  INTERNET
- PROMOTION OF ABUSE OF INFORMATION THROUGH E.G. LEAKS, BURGLARY, OR ESPIONAGE
- FALSE DETAILS ON PERSONAL IDENTITY AND CORROBORATION OF THE EXISTENCE
  OF OTHER IDENTITIES
- INFILTRATION, PROVOCATION, AND SABOTAGE OF MAILING LIST DISCUSSIONS
  OUTSIDE OF CHARTERS INTO THE `CRYPTOANARCHIST' AGENDA
- PROMOTION OF OTHER FAKE IDENTITIES
- PUBLIC AND PRIVATE ATTACKS ON REAL IDENTITIES EMPLOYING
  COUNTERMEASURES AGAINST THE CRYPTOANARCHIST MOVEMENT
- MANIPULATION AND TERRORISM IN PRIVATE MAIL
- COLLECTION OF SENSITIVE PRIVATE INFORMATION AND MAIL FROM
  COMMUNICATING `OUTSIDE' INDIVIDUALS

INTERNET INDIVIDUALS AND ORGANIZATIONS ARE ADVISED TO EXAMINE AND PURGE
ARCHIVES AND RECORDS OF ALL INFORMATION ORIGINATING FROM THIS OUTLET AS
CRYPTOANARCHIST DISINFORMATION. ITEMS RECOVERED FROM THIS OUTLET SHOULD
BE REPOSTED FOR PUBLIC EXPOSURE.

QUESTIONS REGARDING THIS ADVISORY ALERT CAN BE ADDRESSED TO

cypherpunks@toad.com

BACKGROUND INFORMATION ON THE CRYPTOANARCHIST MOVEMENT IS AVAILABLE IN
RISKS 15.25, 15.27, AND 15.28X, FTP CRVAX.SRI.COM DIRECTORY /RISKS:

ADDITIONAL BULLETINS WILL BE ISSUED AS EVENTS WARRANT.


-------------------------------------------------------------------------
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From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: ferguson@icm1.icp.net (Paul Ferguson x2044)
Date: Mon, 29 Nov 93 04:56:58 PST
To: an12070@anon.penet.fi
Subject: Re: Real People
In-Reply-To: <9311290559.AA13919@anon.penet.fi>
Message-ID: <9311291253.AA00342@icm1.icp.net>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text


S.Boxx writes -

> He says he met P.Ferguson at the D.C. cypherpunks meeting `this spring'
> (last spring?). What was the date on that, anyway? Who else was there?
> He said he didn't get to talk to P.Ferguson for very long, but he did
> see his Virginia driver's license. So, according to J.Thomas
> <jthomas@access.digex.net> anyway, P.Ferguson exists! Thanks for this
> valuable entry in the Real People Trust Web. Would anyone like to vouch
> for Joe Thomas, <jthomas@access.digex.net>?

Not that it makes any difference, but:


-----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----
Version: 2.3a
 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=+PeW
-----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----

Cheers.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: m5@vail.tivoli.com (Mike McNally)
Date: Mon, 29 Nov 93 06:17:24 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: re: Big Brother/Bank Accounts
Message-ID: <9311291413.AA20144@vail.tivoli.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Given the material in the WiReD 1.6 article, how likely is it that a
true anonymous digital cash system would be allowed?  I know, I know;
there's "no way to prevent it"; however, I think that concept is based
on the premise that the Government proceeds rationally.

If somebody with an axe to grind gets hold of the "kidnapped baby"
scenario described in _Applied_Cryptography_, plenty of public outrage
and indignation could be generated.  Imagine a made-for-TV docu-drama
that shows teams of strange greasy little hackers hunched over their
glowing workstations, wailing kidnapped babies piled in a corner.

Go on, reassure me that "all is well".

--
Mike McNally




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: m5@vail.tivoli.com (Mike McNally)
Date: Mon, 29 Nov 93 06:27:03 PST
To: hfinney@shell.portal.com (Hal Finney)
Subject: Re:  Cryptosplit 2.0
In-Reply-To: <9311290404.AA27229@jobe.shell.portal.com>
Message-ID: <9311291426.AA20155@vail.tivoli.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Hal Finney writes:
 > But I did go to some
 > effort with the random-number generation on which the security of the
 > scheme depends.  My code uses the IDEA.C module from PGP for the
 > pseudo-random generator, seeding it with the time of day and an MD5
 > hash of the file being split.  So I think this should be pretty secure
 > in terms of the randomness involved.

On UNIX systems, where keystroke timing can be problematic, couldn't a
collection of various system metrics be used to provide a bunch of
reasonable pseudo-random bits?  Things like:

*	Disk space in /
*	Network activity (in/out packet counts)
*	load average
*	swap space available
*	time of day (duhh)

Of course, one would want to ensure that no monitoring or logging
software (like the stuff I work on :-) keeps coherent snapshots around
anywhere... 

--
Mike McNally




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: lstanton@lehman.com (Linn Stanton)
Date: Mon, 29 Nov 93 05:51:56 PST
To: 72114.1712@compuserve.com
Subject: Re: THE DETWEILER PLEDGE
In-Reply-To: <931127014946_72114.1712_FHF59-2@CompuServe.COM>
Message-ID: <9311291347.AA15337@cfdevsol.lehman.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I so pledge


Linn H. Stanton <stanton@acm.org>

The above opinions are exclusively my own. If anyone else wants them,
they can buy them from me. Easy terms can be arranged.
-----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----
Version: 2.2
 
mQBNAitK8+EAAAECALzK83DH79m7DLKBmZA2h9U33fBE80EwT4xRY05K7WRfxpO3
BmhPVBmes9h97odVZ0RxAFvinOl4wZGOb8pDclMABRG0IUxpbm4gSC4gU3RhbnRv
biA8c3RhbnRvbkBhY20ub3JnPrQnTGlubiBILiBTdGFudG9uIDxsc3RhbnRvbkBz
aGVhcnNvbi5jb20+
=oCru
-----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: hfinney@shell.portal.com (Hal Finney)
Date: Mon, 29 Nov 93 08:52:02 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re:  Cryptosplit 2.0
Message-ID: <9311291648.AA25233@jobe.shell.portal.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


From: m5@vail.tivoli.com (Mike McNally)
> On UNIX systems, where keystroke timing can be problematic, couldn't a
> collection of various system metrics be used to provide a bunch of
> reasonable pseudo-random bits?  Things like:
> 
> *	Disk space in /
> *	Network activity (in/out packet counts)
> *	load average
> *	swap space available
> *	time of day (duhh)

These can play a role in seeding a RNG, but there is probably not as
much randomness there as you might expect.  Knowledge of the approximate
time of day the program was run, plus some general information about the
characteristics of your system in terms of usage, can probably pin most
of those values down to within a factor of 5 or so.

I think multiple MD5 hashes of the total contents of /tmp (or, better,
/swap, if you can access that) would have more bits of randomness.  In
any case, Shamir sharing requires a LOT of random bits ("k" times the
size of the file) so at best these sources of randomness could seed a
RNG, which would then "amplify" the randomness (in a cryptographic
sense) to produce the random bits needed for the sharing algorithm.

I believe the RIPEM public key package by Mark Riordan has a fairly wide
repertoire of techniques for searching for randomness, including some of
the above ideas.  This code might be worth adapting to a general-purpose
entropy-seeking algorithm.  The problem is that these kinds of things are
highly system dependent.  If you have an audio port, for example, listening
to an unconnected microphone can produce a steady stream of noise.  Or if
you have a high-speed timer it can be used to get perhaps a couple dozen
bits of randomness at program-startup time, or to get many bits per keystroke.
So you have to have customization for each target system to be useful.
I do think the RIPEM code would be a good starting point, though.

I once proposed a DOS TSR (a "background" program) which would monitor
your keystrokes all day long and condense the timing data into a file
full of random bits.  Then you'd use up the bits when you needed to do
cryptography.  I haven't learned enough about DOS to write such a
thing, though.

Hal Finney
hfinney@shell.portal.com




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: David Kovar <kovar@nda.com>
Date: Mon, 29 Nov 93 06:01:57 PST
To: hawkwind@dink.foretune.co.jp
Subject: Re: Disruptive members
In-Reply-To: <199311290712.QAA06834@dink.foretune.co.jp>
Message-ID: <199311291357.IAA09915@nda.nda.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


  This list is allowing itself to be disrupted. More effort is being
expended by its members complaining and commenting about LD than he
is expending. Ignore the guy and get on with life.

-David



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Arthur Chandler <arthurc@crl.com>
Date: Mon, 29 Nov 93 09:27:21 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: NEW: Cypherwonks (fwd)
Message-ID: <Pine.3.87.9311290937.A20916-0100000@crl.crl.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain




   Has anyone else seen this? I got it from another newsgroup, and 
thought that folks here might be interested in seeing this morph of one 
branch of the cypherpunk movement.
   I'm assuming, of course, that it's not a spoof.
   Comments?



---------- Forwarded message ----------
Date: Mon, 29 Nov 1993 15:09:26 CET-1DST
From: GoeRAN DAMBERG <DAT255@UTB.SHV.HB.SE>
To: Multiple recipients of list FUTUREC <FUTUREC@UAFSYSB.UARK.EDU>
Subject: NEW: Cypherwonks

I got this in my mailbox today and thought that some of you might be
interested.


 ------- Forwarded Message Follows -------


cypherwonks@lists.eunet.fi

   The brand new cypherwonks list on Majordomo@Lists.EUnet.fi is for
   ambitious, energetic, can-do, hands-on individuals interested in
   general cutting-edge `cyberspatial development' projects such as in
   cryptography, digital cash, and `electronic democracy'.  (A `wonk' is
   slang for a `meticulous detail person'.) The list is both an informal
   gathering place for the technically adept and also a focal point for
   branching off into serious project coordination.  We place a premium
   on membership by technical professionals and try to hone our posts to
   accommodate the busy (who, according to the adage, are those who get
   all the serious work done).  We are inspired by the Internet but
   don't see it as ideal yet and are particularly interested in
   cooperation, building prototypes, forging standards, and `long-term
   incremental evolution' in our designs and goals.  We're also
   intensely interested in following and influencing the technological
   and political developments of the emerging `national cyberspatial
   infrastructure.'

   The list is *not* for political diatribes in the `radical
   libertarian' agenda, e.g.  rants against all forms of government as
   oppressive, corrupt, or evil, or promoting the use of cryptographic
   technologies for subversive activities like tax evasion, black
   marketeering, or evading law enforcement.  The list is *not* for
   discussions of how to manipulate the honest through the use of
   software technologies.  The list is *not* for unconstructive
   negativism against other's proposals.  Above all, we are interested
   in forging a `civilized cyberspace' out of the current `Internet
   wilderness'.

   Historical note: the list was formed as a less ornery, more moderate
   splinter group from the Cypherpunks by J.Helsingius (creator of the
   popular anon.penet.fi anonymizing service) and L.Detweiler (author of
   many FAQs including `Privacy & Anonymity on the Internet).

   To subscribe, send a message with the body
      subscribe cypherwonks
   to Majordomo@Lists.EUnet.fi.

   A more comprehensive charter is available with the command `info
   cypherwonks' in the message body.

   To post, send a message to cypherwonks@lists.eunet.fi.








From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: cman@caffeine.io.com (Douglas Barnes)
Date: Mon, 29 Nov 93 07:42:04 PST
To: hawkwind@dink.foretune.co.jp
Subject: Re: Disruptive members
In-Reply-To: <199311290712.QAA06834@dink.foretune.co.jp>
Message-ID: <199311291527.JAA29434@caffeine.caffeine.io.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> Right now, I think that perhaps much of the nets is still made up of people
> who are experienced in netrunning, but the sheer quantity of new
> inexperienced people joining is getting astronomical. If their initial
> contact is with a group containing a disrupter type, then they may run
> shuddering from the nets forever. If enough of them complain (to school
> administrators, postmasters, political figures), then very heavy handed
> laws will be slammed down in top of the nets in retaliation. It is a well
> known historical/political fact that any activity that is not successful at
> self-control WILL BE controlled from without, or smashed apart for "the
> good of the people". 
> 

I agree with you strongly; however, the notion of a list as a space,
and the list members having their collective image tarnished by
the presence of disruptive members clearly hasn't sunk in. Instead
we get a lot of silly "freedom of speech" rhetoric. I guess they 
haven't realized that every forum doesn't have to be a noisy street
corner or an all-comers keg party. (where, respectively, free speech
works to the point of tolerating loud crazies and vomiting)

The whole argument that people can use kill files is utterly bogus
if outreach is even a minor goal for the group.

Note that the extropians not only provide list-administered kill files,
but also threaten disruptive members with expulsion, and as a result
have excellent signal to noise.

Good parallel to the similar problem of disruptive and violent individuals
on MOOs, btw.

Doug

-- 
----------------                                             /\ 
Douglas Barnes            cman@illuminati.io.com            /  \ 
Chief Wizard         (512) 447-8950 (d), 447-7866 (v)      / () \
Illuminati Online          metaverse.io.com 7777          /______\



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: lefty@apple.com (Lefty)
Date: Mon, 29 Nov 93 09:32:10 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: newsgroup v news-list
Message-ID: <9311291731.AA20087@internal.apple.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>We are talking about limiting access to the list (for whatever reason), THAT
>is cencorship.

Nonsense.  Spend a little time with Mr. Dictionary, and you should be able
to adduce the meaning of the word "censorship".  It isn't what you seem to
think it is.

On the other hand, if you truly feel the way you do, please let me have a
copy of your house key and warn your Significant Other that I'll be
dropping by for an extended snuggle.  I'll also help myself to your stereo
and VCR while I'm there.

What?  You don't _like_ that idea?

You wouldn't want to _censor_ me, would you?

>I personaly find the idea that a person has to 'earn' the right to make a
>statement on a mail-list or newsgroup as counter-free speech. I oppose your
>view.

Read the First Amendment.  Learn something about free speech.  It would
assist you in weaning yourself away from sounding like an uninformed fool.


--
Lefty (lefty@apple.com)
C:.M:.C:., D:.O:.D:.






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: dheck@odo.cc.uakron.edu
Date: Mon, 29 Nov 93 06:47:00 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: RE: CRYPTOANARCHIST INFILTRATION ALERT
Message-ID: <Chameleon.931129094630.dheck@odo.cc.uakron.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



who appointed this guy Netcop status?  If I wanted to receive info appropriate to	
alt.whistleblowing, I'd read Usenet...These self-appointed, self-important, 
self-inflated egos really get under my skin...take me off this list...the 
signal-to-noise ratio is getting a little out of hand.		

(By the way, my real name is Heck...)

David





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: freeman@MasPar.COM (Jay R. Freeman)
Date: Mon, 29 Nov 93 09:52:01 PST
To: pat@tstc.edu
Subject: Re:  HUMOR:  Timothy C. May is the CONSPIRACY!
Message-ID: <9311291752.AA00421@cleo.MasPar.Com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> [...]  It is Tim's cat!  [...]

  I hate to add to the horror of it all, but ... Tim has <*gasp*> TWO cats!

  We're doomed ...

                                 -- Jay Freeman




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: cman@caffeine.io.com (Douglas Barnes)
Date: Mon, 29 Nov 93 08:17:12 PST
To: m5@vail.tivoli.com (Mike McNally)
Subject: Re: Cryptosplit 2.0
In-Reply-To: <9311291426.AA20155@vail.tivoli.com>
Message-ID: <199311291602.KAA29523@caffeine.caffeine.io.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> 
> On UNIX systems, where keystroke timing can be problematic, couldn't a
> collection of various system metrics be used to provide a bunch of
> reasonable pseudo-random bits?  Things like:
> 
> *	Disk space in /
> *	Network activity (in/out packet counts)
> *	load average
> *	swap space available
> *	time of day (duhh)
> 
> Of course, one would want to ensure that no monitoring or logging
> software (like the stuff I work on :-) keeps coherent snapshots around
> anywhere... 
> 

Jim McCoy and I have been talking about this; the underylying question
is "how many bits of entropy are in a ps"?

Time of day, for instance, is very low entropy. The results of 'ps'
vary wildly in their entropy depending on the system and whether your
opponent has access to it or could make reasonable guesses about parts
of it.

ps is better than load average, because it always has an affect on the
system when run; load average is an *average* and is rather slow to
change. Still, we have argued over many a cup of coffee whether there's 
128 bits of entropy in ps. I think the answer is yes, or real close, for 
a system with lot of users, but not if things are slow or you don't
have many users. Of course, the more rapidly the opponent takes snapshots,
the more she perturbs the ps...

My point in all this, is that if your opponent knows the components you're
doing an MD5 of to get your random bits, and these components are low
entropy with respect to that attacker (she is on the same system and 
can monitor roughly the same statistics that you can) then this opponent
could search through the space of reasonable pertubations in the 'ps'
listing between snapshots, could extrapolate between snapshots of the
load average, etc. And feed them to MD5 herself. If you are running a
stock single user configuration, it wouldn't even be necessary for the 
opponent to be on the same system.

If there is something or somethings on any Unix system with sufficient 
entropy that can be reliably polled and fed to MD5 I'd love to know it.
(This strikes me also as something that is not going to be real portable...
I have visions of #ifdefs dancing in my head)

Some people think this is a little paranoid on my part. Ok, maybe,
but I want a lockable /dev/rand.

-- 
----------------                                             /\ 
Douglas Barnes            cman@illuminati.io.com            /  \ 
Chief Wizard         (512) 447-8950 (d), 447-7866 (v)      / () \
Illuminati Online          metaverse.io.com 7777          /______\



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Philippe Nave" <pdn@dwroll.dw.att.com>
Date: Mon, 29 Nov 93 09:32:01 PST
To: mnemonic@eff.org (Mike Godwin)
Subject: Re: Let's Talk About Solutions
In-Reply-To: <199311291601.LAA15061@eff.org>
Message-ID: <9311291730.AA09037@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Mike Godwin writes :
> 
> It strikes me as relatively on-topic for cypherpunks to discuss technical
> solutions, such as mail filters, for solving the "noisy forum problem."
> For some, adequate solutions may already be in place. But I note that for
> "mere users" (as distinct from sophisticated users and programmers),
> current filtering tools are difficult to use. What can make this better?
> 

I subscribed to the Extropians list for a while and was quite impressed
with the list management software they were running. Commands could be
sent to the list processor like 'exclude <thread>', 'exclude <user>', etc
via regular e-mail messages; with this capability, anyone who can use 
e-mail can personally manage the stream of postings headed for their 
mailbox. In my opinion, this approach strikes a comfortable balance between
outright censorship and mass confusion.

........................................................................
Philippe D. Nave, Jr.   | The person who does not use message encryption
pdn@dwroll.dw.att.com   | will soon be at the mercy of those who DO...
Denver, Colorado USA    | PGP public key: by arrangement.



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: lefty@apple.com (Lefty)
Date: Mon, 29 Nov 93 10:47:12 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: A Clarification on My Loyalty and Allegiance
Message-ID: <9311291843.AA21395@internal.apple.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


This is the last comment I plan to make re l'Affaire Detweiler.

On the one hand, "The Executioner" <an12070@anon.penet.fi>, writes:
>
>I thought that the infamous L. Detweiler had stopped his posting, but it
>appears that he is back, and more neurotic than ever.  I thought that
>it was the time for me to make another post relating to him, the list
>in general, and LD's obsession with pseudospoofing.
>
>OK, first, LD is pissing me off, as, I am sure, he is doing to many others
>out there in net.land.

On the other hand, "S. Boxx" _also_ <an12070@anon.penet.fi> writes:
>
>BTW, many thanks to L.Detweiler for his lone help in helping me break a
>corrupt conspiracy and massive cyberspatial hoax.

Lance, for the sake of what remains of your rapidly ebbing mental health,
look up the term "cognotive dissonance" and see if you can apply it to your
current situation.

Other people, by the way, are not quite as inert above the neck as _you_
seem to be.


--
Lefty (lefty@apple.com)
C:.M:.C:., D:.O:.D:.






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Date: Mon, 29 Nov 93 10:57:14 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Crypto Anarchy, the Government, and the National Information Infrastructure
In-Reply-To: <9311291413.AA20144@vail.tivoli.com>
Message-ID: <199311291854.KAA13023@mail.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


In this essay, quickly written, I'll address some points raised about
the government and its "willingness" to let strong crypto and crypto
anarchy develop, and how the Data Superhighway will require all data
packets to have "license plates" on them (my biggest speculative
leap).

We're in an arms race, us versus them, and I think the government as
we know it will ultimately lose.


Mike McNally writes:

> Given the material in the WiReD 1.6 article, how likely is it that a
> true anonymous digital cash system would be allowed?  I know, I know;
> there's "no way to prevent it"; however, I think that concept is based
> on the premise that the Government proceeds rationally.

You mean, how likely is that the government will allow a system that
makes taxation almost impossible, that enables black markets, that
facillitates the transfer of illegal information, and that basically
nukes the present arrangement?

I don't think they'll "allow" it. But this doesn't mean it won't happen.

> If somebody with an axe to grind gets hold of the "kidnapped baby"
> scenario described in _Applied_Cryptography_, plenty of public outrage
> and indignation could be generated.  Imagine a made-for-TV docu-drama
> that shows teams of strange greasy little hackers hunched over their
> glowing workstations, wailing kidnapped babies piled in a corner.
> 
> Go on, reassure me that "all is well".

I can write more after I shut these babies up...maybe it's time to
just sell a few or recycle my stock. My new babytender, a nice young
girl named Polly Klaas I picked up a while back, is working out well, though.

(This was politically incorrect humor, outlawed on the Data Highway in
1997. As President Hilary put it: "That's not funny!")

The "crypto crackdown" Mike is alluding to is one that has be
predicted for a long time. We are indeed in an "arms race": both sides
are racing to cut the other off. 

Strong crytography means government can no longer do its thing, at
least not has it's accustomed to. Strong crypto means untraceable
payments, secure phone lines, information markets in what are now
military and corporate secrets, liquid markets in illegal services,
and of course a nearly total collapse in taxation abilities.

On taxation, it is certainly clear that many folks will still be
"visible" and will be taxed as heavily as other--I don't want to imply
that the guy who works for Lockheed or behind the counter at Safeway
is somehow going to be liberated from paying taxes by the onset of
crypto anarchy.

No, the effect will be more of an erosion of _support_ for taxation,
as word spreads that many consultants, writers, information sellers,
and the like are sheltering much of their income via use of networks
and strong crypto.  The tax system is already shaky--$5 trillion
national debt, growing every year--and it may not take much of a push
to trigger a "phase change," a tax revolt.

This "crypto phase change" (a term I prefer to the term "Singularity,"
so beloved by the nanotechnology folks) is what I see coming. Whether
the government can crack down first is the fly in the ointment.

Note that the way strong crypto works means a successful crackdown
could only come as the result of strong police state policies. That
is, outlawing of unapproved encryption, on demand inspection of all
data packets, strict regulation of across-the-border
telecommunications, an end to the Internet as we know it today, and
strict penalties merely for "conspiring" to use strong crypto. Eric
Hughes' "Use a random number, go to jail" line is not so far from the
truth.

I oppose the government's plan for a "data superhighway" for two main
reasons. First, there's no need and the free market is already giving
us a multiplicity of lines, channels, satellites, etc. Anarchic
development can produce a more robust system, actually. Second, I fear
the involvement of government. Already the NII proposal is talking
about the nice things it needs to ensure fair access, a
nondiscriminatory system, and so on. These "nice" things also imply
government restrictions on content. But I'll save this for another
thread.

Imagine this: to get on the Data Superhighway, which will likely be
the only major lines if the government succeeds in making it the
mandatory standard, every data packet must have a "license plate."
Don't laugh! The idea of a license plate on data packets is coming. It
would provide the kind of traceability that control freaks like
Detweiler claim to want (I say "claim" because our pal LD is the
largest user of pseudonyms we have.) It would provide for taxation of
packets, much like road fees and truck charges, and it would generally
make the Net an environment hostile to crypto anarchy.

The forces of NIST/NSA and the National Information Infrastructure are
moving in this direction.

I'm moving in another direction, toward the overthrow of the present system.

Over the past several years I've thought about these issues at length.
I don't think they can crack down. Can they stop "dial-a-prayer"
computer confessionals? (priest-confessor privilege, recognized at a
deep level) Can they stop attorney-client computer communications? (To
wiretap these would break open the entire legal system.)

Can they place police monitors in every role-playing game or
deep-immersion VR system? (Make no mistake about it, systems like
"Habitat" and LambdaMOO, and many more are coming or already exist,
will be full-fledged agoric marketplaces, with goods and services
being traded. Read "Snow Crash" or "True Names" to remind yourself of
this (I'm not endorsing the specific views of Stephenson or Vinge, who
got some things "wrong"--no big deal, as their general vision was what
was so important.)

Can they tell people they can't compress their files? (compressed
files look outwardly like encrypted files) Can they ban the use of
steganography--if they can find it being used at all?

No, too many bits are flowing already. Too many degrees of freedom. A
Soviet-style crackdown is not in the cards.

But we stil have to fight.

Things like the Clipper still need to be fought, by ridicule ("Big
Brother Inside" stickers), by lawsuits (not my specialty), by
denouncement (as when industry groups denounce it), and especially by
developing and promoting alternatives. The market is truly ripe for a
Soundblaster-type voice encryption system---when will one of you
budding entrepreneurs get one out?

Having read the three main "position papers" on NII (the White House
paper, the CPSR analysis, and the EFF "Open Platform" piece), I'm as
convinced as ever that the Data Highway is largely about regaining
control of the currently anarchic network system. It just isn't about
giving ghetto residents access to Crays, nor is it about the
government being benificent in expanding our cable choices from 50
channels of shit to 5000 channels.

No, it is about taxing the commerce that is moving increasingly into
cyberspace. It is about continuing to regulate and control. It is
about the survival of Big Brother.

The arms race is on.


--Tim May


-- 
..........................................................................
Timothy C. May         | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,  
tcmay@netcom.com       | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
408-688-5409           | knowledge, reputations, information markets, 
W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA  | black markets, collapse of governments.
Higher Power: 2^756839 | Public Key: PGP and MailSafe available.
Note: I put time and money into writing this posting. I hope you enjoy it.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: pat@tstc.edu (Patrick E. Hykkonen)
Date: Mon, 29 Nov 93 09:02:05 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: HUMOR:  Timothy C. May is the CONSPIRACY!
Message-ID: <9311291700.AA15215@tstc.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


In the grand style of the infamous L. Detweiler, here is proof that Timothy
C. May is the real culprit behind all this.

	From: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
	Message-Id: <199311280747.XAA15002@mail.netcom.com>
	Subject: Re: Banning any subscriber
	Date: Sat, 27 Nov 93 23:47:54 PST

	--Tim May, who generally finds it faster to hit "D" than to filter
	(and, ironically, I keep all of the Detweiler/Pervert/S. Boxx/etc.
	posts, both for archival value and because it's stuff I'll want to
	reread in future years and perhaps use in a book I may write).

	From: bart@netcom.com (Harry Bartholomew)
	Message-Id: <199311271042.CAA28624@mail.netcom.com>
	Subject: The other side of LD
	Date: Sat, 27 Nov 93 2:42:08 PST

	    I never thought I be caught dead forward an LD post, but here
	    it is since I may be the only 'punk on the NEW-LIST announcements.
	    Here we see the other side. I am beginning to get a funny feeling
	    about all this. Consider:

	    1. The book published for profit by editing the submissions to
	       rec.humor.funny.
	    2. The recent "compilation copyright" filed by Keith Peterson
	       on the material contained in the Simtel archive.
	    3. The default apparent public domain into which all our postings
	       seem to fall.

	    Is LD, the prolific author that he obviously is, merely baiting
	    the creative minds of the cypherpunks to gather material for his
	    forthcoming novel(s)?

	    Bart

Tim's penchant for creating boiling cauldrons has "caught" him in this case.
He states that he keeps all the messages for archival purposes to create a 
book at a later time.  Notice that another Cypherpunk subscriber from the 
same site points out that LD is merely baiting the Cypherpunks and the world 
into situations for book material.  Tim obviously urged Harry into sending
the second message above.

	From: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
	Message-Id: <199311280835.AAA20462@mail.netcom.com>
	Subject: "Pretty Good Paranoia" and "Dining Detweilers Net"
	Date: Sun, 28 Nov 93 0:35:44 PST

	"My tortured and WRACKED soul is becoming INCREASINGLY MADDENED AND
	DISGUSTED by the unspeakable actions of the leading SickoPunks in
	beaming RADIO SIGNALS into my cranial cavities while I dream of
	slaying Miss Medusa and her TENTACLES of depravity and cyberspatial
	indifference."

	--Klaus! von Future Prime
	(My nom de humor on the Extropians list.)

This is the final proof.  I do not believe that Tim actually creates the 
text that apparently comes from LD.  It is Tim's cat!  This is why
the link between LD and Tim has not come to light sooner.  Tim has 
conspired with his cat to create this "uproar" for material for his
upcoming book.  Since Tim and his cat are two seperate entities their
message text does not correlate, however the inclusion of a piece of 
"Detweiler Text" inside of one of Tim's messages proves beyond a shadow of
a doubt that Tim must somehow be responsible for LD's posts.

I submit to you that it is Timothy C. May is actually L. Detweiler and
he has fooled us all!  I just hope it makes a good book!

-- 
Pat Hykkonen ** N5NPL ** pat@tstc.edu ** CNSA -- (817) 867-4831
Disclaimer:  This product may cause irritability in some users.  In cases of
allergic reaction, delete and consult a physician immediately.
All of life is a comedy, don't let it upset you.  - P. Hykkonen




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Mike Godwin <mnemonic@eff.org>
Date: Mon, 29 Nov 93 08:07:07 PST
To: kovar@nda.com (David Kovar)
Subject: Let's Talk About Solutions
In-Reply-To: <199311291357.IAA09915@nda.nda.com>
Message-ID: <199311291601.LAA15061@eff.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


 
David Kovar writes:

>   This list is allowing itself to be disrupted. More effort is being
> expended by its members complaining and commenting about LD than he
> is expending. Ignore the guy and get on with life.

It's worth noting that the perceived problem with Lance Detweiler is a
problem that sooner or later surfaces in all forums, whether they're
mailing lists or newsgroups--namely, the problem of a certain person or
subject matter driving people away from the forum.

Fleeing the problem doesn't fix it. It recurs wherever you go.

Solving the problem in a top-down way (e.g., by banning a person from a
forum) doesn't fix it, and that kind of centralized-censorship solution
runs counter to the dynamic of the Net, which is not structured to support
centralized censorship. (Theoretically, mailing lists are structured that
way, but in practice anything but the most light-handed moderation tends
to kill the spontaneity of discussions.)

The best solutions are bottom-up solutions: solutions in which individuals
can make choices about what they wish to see, but can't impose those
choices on others. 

These solutions take many forms. The least sophisticated, and the least
effective, is to unsubscribe from a "noisy" list--as I noted before, the
problem recurs on all forums. A better solution is to ignore the noisy
postings--this is the Detweiler Pledge Solution. Still better is the
artful use of mail filters. (A nonartful use of filters may prevent some
people from reading this message, since it includes the string
"detweiler.")

It strikes me as relatively on-topic for cypherpunks to discuss technical
solutions, such as mail filters, for solving the "noisy forum problem."
For some, adequate solutions may already be in place. But I note that for
"mere users" (as distinct from sophisticated users and programmers),
current filtering tools are difficult to use. What can make this better?


--Mike



Mike Godwin, (202) 347-5400 |"And walk among long dappled grass,
mnemonic@eff.org            | And pluck till time and times are done 
Electronic Frontier         | The silver apples of the moon,
Foundation                  | The golden apples of the sun."



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Brian Beker <beker@netcom.com>
Date: Mon, 29 Nov 93 11:07:12 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Disruptive members
In-Reply-To: <199311291357.IAA09915@nda.nda.com>
Message-ID: <Pine.3.85.9311291103.A13426-0100000@netcom5>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain




On Mon, 29 Nov 1993, David Kovar wrote:

>   This list is allowing itself to be disrupted. More effort is being
> expended by its members complaining and commenting about LD than he
> is expending. Ignore the guy and get on with life.





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Date: Mon, 29 Nov 93 11:17:14 PST
To: freeman@MasPar.COM (Jay R. Freeman)
Subject: Re:  HUMOR:  Timothy C. May is the CONSPIRACY!
In-Reply-To: <9311291752.AA00421@cleo.MasPar.Com>
Message-ID: <199311291912.LAA14829@mail.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



> > [...]  It is Tim's cat!  [...]
> 
>   I hate to add to the horror of it all, but ... Tim has <*gasp*> TWO cats!
> 
>   We're doomed ...
> 
>                                  -- Jay Freeman

Well, our cover is blown. What more can I say? (Meow.)

My Siamese cat of course is the "S" in S. Boxx, the boxx meaning
litter boxx, of course, and my Havana Brown generally writes as "Black
Unicorn."

They have few problems typing on the keyboard, but working the
trackball has been a chore. For some reason they keep urging me to go
back to a "mouse."


--Foodbringer (as I am no doubt known to my cats as)


-- 
..........................................................................
Timothy C. May         | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,  
tcmay@netcom.com       | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
408-688-5409           | knowledge, reputations, information markets, 
W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA  | black markets, collapse of governments.
Higher Power: 2^756839 | Public Key: PGP and MailSafe available.
Note: I put time and money into writing this posting. I hope you enjoy it.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Brian Beker <beker@netcom.com>
Date: Mon, 29 Nov 93 11:52:04 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Disruptive members
In-Reply-To: <Pine.3.85.9311291103.A13426-0100000@netcom5>
Message-ID: <Pine.3.85.9311291102.A18588-0100000@netcom5>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


On Mon, 29 Nov 1993, Brian Beker wrote:

> On Mon, 29 Nov 1993, David Kovar wrote:
> 
> >   This list is allowing itself to be disrupted. More effort is being
> > expended by its members complaining and commenting about LD than he
> > is expending. Ignore the guy and get on with life.

Sorry about the previous incomplete.  AM screenstroke hangover.  I just
wanted to say, let's drop it.  It's getting to be too much.  David's
advice to ignore him is the best I've heard so far. 






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: plaz@netcom.com (Geoff Dale)
Date: Mon, 29 Nov 93 12:27:25 PST
To: hughes@ah.com (Eric Hughes)
Subject: Re: Banning any subscriber
Message-ID: <199311292022.MAA15806@mail.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I said:
>>I personally disagree with censorship. It would be impossible to enforce
>>anyway. A move of this type would simply drive Detweiler to use the
>>Cypherpunk remailers which would be harder to detect. Then what do we do?
>>Stop accepting mail from our own remailers?

Eric replied:
>Basically, yes, except for signed letters from previously
>authenticated pseudonyms.  This is a simple form of a positive
>reputation system.  A kill fill is a negative reputation--'not that
>person'.  A positive reputation rejects all but a particular set of
>identities.

I'm sorry, I didn't realize that you wanted to erect a barrier against
anonymous newbies, such as "wonderer" and "Dark Unicorn" were recently. You
know, Detweiler might get a new account under a new name, better seal the
list to only postings from "previously authenticated" accounts too. Then
we'd be all happy and safe from the dreaded Detweiler.

Don't let this guy screw up the positive aspects of the list. His irritant
is the by-product of the free world that we are trying to create. You can't
stop his communication without comprimising our own goals. (You can delete
it without reading it or kill file him or once we are on extropians list
software, ::exclude him.)

>Much of the debate on cypherpunks magically incants 'reputation
>systems' to solve all sorts of sticky problems, but none have ever
>been implemented in software, except for killfiles, which are not
>effective against disruption in an anonymous environment.
>
>Necessity is the mother of invention.  A motivated individual trying
>to disrupt a communications forum and who has to avoid a kill file
>will be necessary to create the need for a positive reputation system.
>Once the need is there, the software will follow.  LD could become the
>most valuable participant in the endeavor of creating a positive
>reputation system, namely, the irritant at the center of the pearl.
>
>Let us encapsulate him well.
>
>Eric

I'm not entirely against positive reputation systems, but they really need
to be implimented on the user end, or at least be user settings, as on the
extropians list.

But the main problem with positive reputation systems is dealing with the
zero reputation newbies. I don't want to see these guys shut out.

Think well, before you act on this impulse.

_______________________________________________________________________
Geoff Dale    -- insert standard disclaimers here --    plaz@netcom.com
        "Life is a sexually transmitted terminal disease."
                        - Peter McWilliams






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: plaz@netcom.com (Geoff Dale)
Date: Mon, 29 Nov 93 12:27:14 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Web of Trust: A Proposal
Message-ID: <199311292023.MAA15843@mail.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Well this may be quixotic, but I sent this message off to Detweiler today:

(As a note to folx I am vouching for, I promise not release any information
above and beyond simple verification of existance.)

>To:"L. Detweiler" <ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
>From:plaz@netcom.com (Geoff Dale)
>Subject:Re: Web of Trust: A Proposal
>
>Well, the accusations of pseudo-spoofing have upset me.
>
>I'm not personally overly concerned about fictitious identities, but the 
>accusations of non-existance that have hit people that I know personally have 
>been worrisome. Using fake identities for fraudelent purposes is, btw, against 
>my personal code of ethics.
>
>Since you don't know me from Adam, I offer a credential: A friend of mine says 
>he went to college with you, Steve Klingsporn <moofie@netcom.com>. He can
>vouch 
>for me as a true name. He also knows Nick Szabo.
>
>I can personally vouch for E.Hughes, Tim May, Nick Szabo, Arthur Abraham, and 
>have briefly met Jamie Dinkelacker. These are all TRUE NAMES. I met ALL of 
>these people outside of the CA cypunks meetings (I have attended a few of
>those 
>as well), in places it would be ridiculous to assume they were perpetrating
>any >kind of fraud.
>
>I don't expect this to change your view on these people's politics or opinions 
>but maybe we can put the pseudo-spoofing thing to rest.
>
>I hope this helps.
>
>If there other CA cypherpunks you are unsure of their existance: Make a list, 
>and I'll happily vouch for those I've met.
>

_______________________________________________________________________
Geoff Dale    -- insert standard disclaimers here --    plaz@netcom.com
        "Life is a sexually transmitted terminal disease."
                        - Peter McWilliams






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Date: Mon, 29 Nov 93 12:42:24 PST
To: Cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Crypto Anarchy, the Government, and the National InformationInfrastructure
Message-ID: <199311292042.MAA18526@mail.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Well, Mike Godwin and I have argued about NII/Data Highway before, and we
see things differently. When I read the main position papers, and look to
the "big picture," the future being envisioned, I get a differenct sense of
it than Mike gets.

The NII papers (ftp.ntia.doc.gov, in /pub as "agenda.asc") and the CPSR
docs (distributed on this list) are clearly not leading to an anarchic net.
For example, what will be the NII management's response to a "No blacks
allowed" area? To a "women need not apply" on-line consulting situation? To
a cyberspatial version of the "old boy's network" that Gloria Allred and
her feminista compadres are constantly filing lawsuits against?

(I go to a health club/gym that has a "women only" facility. There are no
longer any "men only" gyms anywhere in California, but "women only"
facilities are flourishing.)

Please understand that I'm not proposing a "no blacks allowed" service,
only arguing that freedom of association is a basic principle I support,
and one on which free societies are based. Yes, I support the right of a
store owner to hang a sign out that says "No straights allowed," or "No
ragheads allowed." Of course, the general population would probably find
this fairly offensive and the store owner would reconsider or go out of
business. Sounds fair to me. (Sorry for a digresssion into Libertarianism
101.)

Somehow I think the "fair access" and "nondiscriminatory environment"
language used in many of these proposals is a clue about what's coming.


>For what it's worth, I don't think this interpretation can be read into
>EFF's Open Platform paper. EFF doesn't care about making money off the
>Data Highway, nor does it think the debate should be about the number of
>channels cable offers.
>
>Instead, EFF wants an infrastructure in which Tim May's anarchic vision
>can flourish along with the visions of anarchophobes. On an Open Platform,
>a hundred flowers can and will bloom, and a thousand schools of
>thought will contend.

EFF indeed has a more libertarian view than does, say, the CPSR (I almost
typed CPUSA). Mitch Kapor, Mike Godwin, Stanton McClandish, and others
certainly understand the dangers of a surveillance state. 

I've heard it argued by some of them (sorry for forgetting exactly who said
what) that some form of data superhighway will be built regardless of our
objections, so we might as well get involved and be helpful. The better to
ensure our vision.

Well, I take the more radical view that to get involved with them is to run
the risk of getting co-opted by them, to be manouvered into accepting their
views.

I support the Open Platform ideas about ending the current local monopoly
on cable and phone provision, but that's as far as I go.

>Anarchists like Jack Kerouac and Neal Cassidy could find
>individualistic redemption on the (government-built) road.
>EFF thinks private-enterprise roads are better, but we also think 
>its promise is unfulfilled if it doesn't allow net.kerouacs and
>net.cassidys to create there.

Oh, to be sure, _literary anarchists_ like Cassidy and Kerouac will be
tolerated. They're no threat, they're covered by artistic license standards
(notwithstanding Mapplethorpe and his censors), and they're even a very
useful social pressure releaf valve.

I'm more concerned about the regulation of business transactions on the Net
of the future, on the ease with which access to the Data Highway can be
denied to anyone who fails to have the proper business license, the
properly approved encryption algorithms, the "tax stamp" on data packets,
and the wrong views about taxation and black markets.

As commerce moves onto the Nets in an even large way, there is every reason
to believe government and special interest groups will seek to use the
state monopoly or regulation to control the types of transactions. Wonder
how long the newsgroups on child porn will last when the Net is "the data
interstate" instead of a loose anarchic collection? How about the White
Aryan Resistance Net, featuring the latest in anonymous communication
systems?


We don't need no steenking data superhighway!


--Tim May

--
Timothy C. May         | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,  
tcmay@netcom.com       | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
408-688-5409           | knowledge, reputations, information markets, 
W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA  | black markets, collapse of governments.
Higher Power: 2^756839 | Public Key: by arrangement
Note: I put time and money into writing this posting. I hope you enjoy it.      








From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Mike Godwin <mnemonic@eff.org>
Date: Mon, 29 Nov 93 09:47:11 PST
To: pdn@dwroll.dw.att.com (Philippe Nave)
Subject: Re: Let's Talk About Solutions
In-Reply-To: <199311291730.MAA16169@eff.org>
Message-ID: <199311291744.MAA16701@eff.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


 
Philippe writes:

> I subscribed to the Extropians list for a while and was quite impressed
> with the list management software they were running. Commands could be
> sent to the list processor like 'exclude <thread>', 'exclude <user>', etc
> via regular e-mail messages; with this capability, anyone who can use 
> e-mail can personally manage the stream of postings headed for their 
> mailbox. In my opinion, this approach strikes a comfortable balance between
> outright censorship and mass confusion.

Any chance we can get such a thing implemented on the cypherpunks list?


--Mike






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: hughes@ah.com (Eric Hughes)
Date: Mon, 29 Nov 93 13:07:15 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Banning any subscriber
In-Reply-To: <199311292022.MAA15806@mail.netcom.com>
Message-ID: <9311292057.AA07111@ah.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>>>Stop accepting mail from our own remailers?

>>Basically, yes, except for signed letters from previously
>>authenticated pseudonyms.

>I'm sorry, I didn't realize that you wanted to erect a barrier against
>anonymous newbies, such as "wonderer" and "Dark Unicorn" were recently. 

The point is not to erect insurmountable barriers against anonymous
newbies.  In an environment where 'free speech noise' is a problem,
some barrier to entry should be expected.  The cypherpunks list
already uses one barrier to entry, namely, we use a mailing list
rather than a newsgroup.

Pseudonyms don't come free, neither in time, effort, nor money.

Authentication, in this context, can take many forms.  It could be as
simple as sending a key to the mailing list server.  It could be
developed to require someone to vouch for the pseudonym.  It could
require a sponsor who would read and repost until a separate
reputation develops.

The point is to put a bound on the noise from disrupters both
inadvertent and intentional, not to completely prevent noise.

Eric




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Perry E. Metzger" <pmetzger@lehman.com>
Date: Mon, 29 Nov 93 10:02:01 PST
To: Mike Godwin <mnemonic@eff.org>
Subject: Re: Let's Talk About Solutions
In-Reply-To: <199311291601.LAA15061@eff.org>
Message-ID: <9311291759.AA00573@snark.lehman.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Mike Godwin says:
> It's worth noting that the perceived problem with Lance Detweiler is a
> problem that sooner or later surfaces in all forums, whether they're
> mailing lists or newsgroups--namely, the problem of a certain person or
> subject matter driving people away from the forum.
> 
> Fleeing the problem doesn't fix it. It recurs wherever you go.
> 
> Solving the problem in a top-down way (e.g., by banning a person from a
> forum) doesn't fix it, and that kind of centralized-censorship solution
> runs counter to the dynamic of the Net,

It works in places like the Extropians mailing list -- the S/N
periodically has crises, but they are short and the troublemakers get
booted for good.

It isn't counter to the dynamic of the net, either. A mailing list is
like someone's living room. If your houseguests start pissing on the
sofas, it isn't unreasonable to kick them out. 

"Banned" persons are free to start their own mailing lists, post to
newsgroups, etc. They've just been denied access to the computing
resources of the list maintainer for purposes of spreading their inane
rants. It doesn't even stop the persons in question from communicating
individually to all the people who were on the mailing list. Too many
people think "Freedom of Speech" means "freedom to speak in anyone's
living room if they feel like it", which it does NOT mean.

As a practice, removing people is simple, cheap, and astonishingly
effective.

Perry




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: owen@autodesk.com (D. Owen Rowley)
Date: Mon, 29 Nov 93 13:07:25 PST
To: tcmay@netcom.netcom.com
Subject: Re: Crypto Anarchy, the Government, and the National Information Infrastructure
Message-ID: <9311292100.AA25840@lux.YP.acad>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



  > From: tcmay@netcom.netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
  > In this essay, quickly written, I'll address some points raised about
 > the government and its "willingness" to let strong crypto and crypto
 > anarchy develop, and how the Data Superhighway will require all data
 > packets to have "license plates" on them (my biggest speculative
 > leap).

By definition, government is the enemy of any anarchic movement.

 
 > We're in an arms race, us versus them, and I think the government as
 > we know it will ultimately lose.

WE have met the enemy and they are us.
What I hear you saying is that crypto-anarchists will win, and thus
replace the governmement as we know it. ( or perhaps transform the govenrment
as we know it)

  
 > Mike McNally writes:
 > 
 > > Given the material in the WiReD 1.6 article, how likely is it that a
 > > true anonymous digital cash system would be allowed?  I know, I know;
 > > there's "no way to prevent it"; however, I think that concept is based
 > > on the premise that the Government proceeds rationally.
 > 
 > You mean, how likely is that the government will allow a system that
 > makes taxation almost impossible, that enables black markets, that
 > facillitates the transfer of illegal information, and that basically
 > nukes the present arrangement?
 > 
 > I don't think they'll "allow" it. But this doesn't mean it won't happen.


when crypto is outlawed, only outlaws will have crypto.

  > The "crypto crackdown" Mike is alluding to is one that has be
 > predicted for a long time. We are indeed in an "arms race": both sides
 > are racing to cut the other off. 

"Get Up Get up, Lord Donald Cried
  Get up and fight for your life.

 Oh , I won't get up, I won't get up.
  I can't get up and fight.
 For you have two long beaten swords, 
  And I but a pocket knife."
                               from Matty Groves (trad)

 > Strong crytography means government can no longer do its thing, at
 > least not has it's accustomed to. Strong crypto means untraceable
 > payments, secure phone lines, information markets in what are now
 > military and corporate secrets, liquid markets in illegal services,
 > and of course a nearly total collapse in taxation abilities.

Strong crypto in the hands of the individual leads to this scenario.
Thats why strong crypto will be reserved for the privileged, and kept
from those not connected to the power-system.

 > On taxation, it is certainly clear that many folks will still be
 > "visible" and will be taxed as heavily as other--I don't want to imply
 > that the guy who works for Lockheed or behind the counter at Safeway
 > is somehow going to be liberated from paying taxes by the onset of
 > crypto anarchy.
 > 
 > No, the effect will be more of an erosion of _support_ for taxation,
 > as word spreads that many consultants, writers, information sellers,
 > and the like are sheltering much of their income via use of networks
 > and strong crypto.  

The privileged members of the unseen-unknown oligarchy have long
enjoyed the privilege of sheltering their wealth. 
I suppose it is the natural progression of things that the individual
slowly gains ground once held by the powerfull and privileged,
but usualy not unless giving that ground makes the privileged more powerful
than before. The margin rarely diminishes, it is an ever widening gulf IMNSHO.

 
 > This "crypto phase change" (a term I prefer to the term "Singularity,"
 > so beloved by the nanotechnology folks) is what I see coming. Whether
 > the government can crack down first is the fly in the ointment.


Is there a question regarding whether they *can*?
Of course they *can*, they have more weapons, and  a history of using them.
Don't you really want to ask other things like what happens when/if they do?



 > Note that the way strong crypto works means a successful crackdown
 > could only come as the result of strong police state policies. That
 > is, outlawing of unapproved encryption, on demand inspection of all
 > data packets, strict regulation of across-the-border
 > telecommunications, an end to the Internet as we know it today, and
 > strict penalties merely for "conspiring" to use strong crypto. Eric
 > Hughes' "Use a random number, go to jail" line is not so far from the
 > truth.

whats their option, to just hand over the keys, go have a beer at the 
local pub, and contemplate getting honest jobs instead of fighting
to keep you from destroying  their current way of life?

"Darn those hackers, they've got checkmate in three moves.
Oh well, I wonder if Burger Sri is hiring?"

 > I oppose the government's plan for a "data superhighway" for two main
 > reasons. First, there's no need and the free market is already giving
 > us a multiplicity of lines, channels, satellites, etc. Anarchic
 > development can produce a more robust system, actually. 

You are preaching to the choir.
bettre to just keep plugging at implementing those *channels* and 
methods of accessing them.

  > Imagine this: to get on the Data Superhighway, which will likely be
 > the only major lines if the government succeeds in making it the
 > mandatory standard, every data packet must have a "license plate."
 > Don't laugh! The idea of a license plate on data packets is coming. It
 > would provide the kind of traceability that control freaks like
 > Detweiler claim to want (I say "claim" because our pal LD is the
 > largest user of pseudonyms we have.) It would provide for taxation of
 > packets, much like road fees and truck charges, and it would generally
 > make the Net an environment hostile to crypto anarchy.
 
Our nation is criss crossed with super-highways, but there are plenty
of folks who prefer to stay on the back roads.

Its awfully hard to build competing highways where folks can drive
their un-registered vehicles, because the real-estate involved is
finite.

May I point out that cyberspace has un-real estate, and that there is 
all you want.

 > The forces of NIST/NSA and the National Information Infrastructure are
 > moving in this direction.
 > 
 > I'm moving in another direction, toward the overthrow of the present system.
 > 

Remind me when I get too close to you, I don't want to get caught in the 
crossfire.


 > Over the past several years I've thought about these issues at length.
 > I don't think they can crack down. Can they stop "dial-a-prayer"
 > computer confessionals? (priest-confessor privilege, recognized at a
 > deep level) Can they stop attorney-client computer communications? (To
 > wiretap these would break open the entire legal system.)

Whats that old saying about Death and taxes.
Given the choice between these two necesary evils , 
which one would you choose.

*Give me liberty or give me death* is the cry of the revolutionary
who is already marked as an enemy of the state.

Go shout it in a crowd and march on the halls of government.
see how many line up behind you to join in the fun.

 > Can they place police monitors in every role-playing game or
 > deep-immersion VR system? (Make no mistake about it, systems like
 > "Habitat" and LambdaMOO, and many more are coming or already exist,
 > will be full-fledged agoric marketplaces, with goods and services
 > being traded. Read "Snow Crash" or "True Names" to remind yourself of
 > this (I'm not endorsing the specific views of Stephenson or Vinge, who
 > got some things "wrong"--no big deal, as their general vision was what
 > was so important.)
 > 
 > Can they tell people they can't compress their files? (compressed
 > files look outwardly like encrypted files) Can they ban the use of
 > steganography--if they can find it being used at all?
 > 
 > No, too many bits are flowing already. Too many degrees of freedom. A
 > Soviet-style crackdown is not in the cards.

I think it is unwise to use linear thinking to try and deduce what 
the ultimate outcome of this complex equation may look like.

When you evoke a Demon into the triangle, you can utter the command
that the unholy creature appear in a comely form, but nothing guarantees
that it will be so.

 > But we stil have to fight.

Yup..
And I'm right behind you brother..
uh.. no need to look around and check.. I'm right here at your shoulder..
We'll get those bastards.. thats right - charge in there and give 'em hell.

say.. where's the bathroom.

 > Things like the Clipper still need to be fought, by ridicule ("Big
 > Brother Inside" stickers), by lawsuits (not my specialty), by
 > denouncement (as when industry groups denounce it), and especially by
 > developing and promoting alternatives. The market is truly ripe for a
 > Soundblaster-type voice encryption system---when will one of you
 > budding entrepreneurs get one out?

The problem with secrets is  that if you share them with too many people
they aren't secrets anymore.

 > Having read the three main "position papers" on NII (the White House
 > paper, the CPSR analysis, and the EFF "Open Platform" piece), I'm as
 > convinced as ever that the Data Highway is largely about regaining
 > control of the currently anarchic network system. It just isn't about
 > giving ghetto residents access to Crays, nor is it about the
 > government being benificent in expanding our cable choices from 50
 > channels of shit to 5000 channels.

"We're from the governmemt and we're here to help you"
is listed just above
"the check is in the mail", and
" I won't come in your mouth"

 > No, it is about taxing the commerce that is moving increasingly into
 > cyberspace. It is about continuing to regulate and control. It is
 > about the survival of Big Brother.
 > The arms race is on.


WE are primates, we live in primate societys.
survival of primate-alpha hierarchy is the first order of 
business.
Fight it and you will die or be driven out.

LUX ./. owen

  




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: gnu (John Gilmore)
Date: Mon, 29 Nov 93 13:12:04 PST
To: cypherpunks
Subject: FOIA:  Released Records
Message-ID: <9311292110.AA14162@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


November 22, 1993

Chief, Office of Policy
National Security Agency/Central Security Service
Fort George Meade, MD  20755-6000

Reference:  RELEASED RECORDS

 

Dear Sir or Madam:

This is a request under the Freedom of Information Act [5 
U.S.C. ¤ 552(a)] on behalf of my client, Mr. John Gilmore.  

I write to request a copy of all agency records or portions 
thereof, in electronic or other form, which NSA has declassified 
during the months of September and October 1993.  This request 
specifically excludes any information already provided to Mr. 
Gilmore in any other request.

We also remind you that the long-standing rule that the 
FOIA "makes no distinction between records maintained in manual 
and computer storage systems," Yeager v. D.E.A., 678 F.2d 315, 
321 (D.C.Cir. 1982), has recently been amplified in Armstrong v. 
E.O.P., No 93-5002 (D.C. Cir., Aug. 13, 1993).  Any paper print-
outs of electronic records, such as e-mail, must include all 
information in the electronic record.  Assuming that there would be 
no loss of releasable information, such as written comments made 
on paper print-outs, we therefore ask you to release all responsive 
electronic records in electronic, i.e., machine-readable, form.

Mr. Gilmore would also like a list of all records responsive 
to this request if such a list can be provided in advance of the 
records themselves.  

As you know, the FOIA provides that an agency must make 
an initial determination of whether to comply with a FOIA request 
within ten working days of receiving the request.  Your own 
regulations provide that Ò[t]he Chief, Office of Policy, shall notify 
the requester of his determination within 10 working days of his 
receipt of the request.Ó  [32 C.F.R. ¤ 299.4(b)].  

Please do not delay processing because of uncertainty about 
the request.  I have reasonably described the records sought.  If you 
have any questions regarding this request, please telephone me at 
the above number, and we can discuss your questions.  

I also request that fees be waived because Mr. Gilmore is 
deemed a media requester by your agency for FOIA purposes.   
Should there be any problem in this regard, Mr. Gilmore promises 
to pay up to $1000 in fees, and you should therefore begin 
processing of this request without fee-related delays.  

As provided under the FOIA, I will expect a reply within ten 
(10) working days.  

Sincerely,



Lee Tien
Attorney at Law
On behalf of Mr. 
John Gilmore





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: gnu (John Gilmore)
Date: Mon, 29 Nov 93 13:12:13 PST
To: cypherpunks
Subject: FOIA: Cellular Encryption
Message-ID: <9311292110.AA14169@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


November 23, 1993

Chief, Office of Policy
National Security Agency/Central Security Service
Fort George Meade, MD  20755-6000
ATTN:  FOIA request

Reference:  CELLULAR ENCRYPTION

Dear Sir or Madam:

This is a request under the Freedom of Information Act [5 
U.S.C. ¤ 552(a)] on behalf of my client, Mr. John Gilmore.  

I write to request a copy of all agency records or portions 
thereof, in electronic or other form, which pertain, relate, or refer to 
encryption for cellular telephone communications.  This request 
includes, but is not limited to records about:  a standard known as 
the Cellular Message Encryption Algorithm ("CMEA"); NSA's 
involvement in the development of CMEA; NSA's assessment of 
the strengths, weaknesses, and technical features of CMEA; 
standards or technologies other than CMEA considered for cellular 
telephone communications encryption contacts, conversations, 
meetings or communications of any sort involving NSA employees 
and persons not employed by NSA regarding cellular telephone 
communications encryption.  

Mr. Gilmore is informed and believes that NSA employees 
have been involved in meetings with persons not employed by 
NSA, including persons outside of the U.S. government, about the 
CMEA standard, and he specifically asks that you disclose all 
agency records of any or all such meetings.

As you know, the FOIA provides that an agency must make 
an initial determination of whether to comply with a FOIA request 
within ten working days of receiving the request.  Your own 
regulations provide that Ò[t]he Chief, Office of Policy, shall notify 
the requester of his determination within 10 working days of his 
receipt of the request.Ó  [32 C.F.R. ¤ 299.4(b)].  

If the records that you possess were originated or classified 
by another organization, I ask that your organization declassify 
them (if needed) and release them to me, as provided in the FOIA, 
within the statutory time limits.  If there is a conflict between the 
statutory time limits and some regulation or policy that requires 
you refer the records, the statutory requirement takes precedence 
over any Executive-branch regulation, policy or practice.  As you 
know, the FOIA provides that no more than an additional 10 
working days be taken for such consultation.  5 U.S.C. ¤ 
552(a)(6)(B).  If you do refer documents to any other agency, and 
they are not provided within the time limits, we intend to litigate on 
this point.

We also remind you that the long-standing rule that the 
FOIA "makes no distinction between records maintained in manual 
and computer storage systems," Yeager v. D.E.A., 678 F.2d 315, 
321 (D.C.Cir. 1982), has recently been amplified in Armstrong v. 
E.O.P., No 93-5002 (D.C. Cir., Aug. 13, 1993).  Any paper print-
outs of electronic records, such as e-mail, must include all 
information in the electronic record.  Assuming that there would be 
no loss of releasable information, such as written comments made 
on paper print-outs, we therefore ask you to release all responsive 
electronic records in electronic, i.e., machine-readable, form.

As you know, the FOIA provides that even if some 
requested material is properly exempted from mandatory 
disclosure, all segregable portions must be released.  [5 U.S.C. ¤ 
552(b)]  If any or all material covered by this request is withheld, 
please inform me of the specific exemptions that are being claimed, 
and mark all deletions to indicate the exemption(s) being claimed 
to authorize each individual withholding.  If the (b)(3) exemption is 
claimed, please indicate the relevant withholding statute(s).

In addition, I ask that your agency exercise its discretion to 
release information that may be technically exempt.  As you know, 
the Attorney General on October 4, 1993, directed that agencies 
should administer the FOIA under a presumption of disclosure, and 
that information which need not be withheld should not be.

Please do not delay processing because of uncertainty about 
the request.  I have reasonably described the records sought.  If you 
have any questions regarding this request, please telephone me at 
the above number, and we can discuss your questions.  

I also request that fees be waived because Mr. Gilmore is 
deemed a media requester by your agency for FOIA purposes.   
Should there be any problem in this regard, Mr. Gilmore promises 
to pay up to $1000 in fees, and you should therefore begin 
processing of this request without fee-related delays.  

As provided under the FOIA, I will expect a reply within ten 
(10) working days.  

Sincerely,



Lee Tien
Attorney at Law
On behalf of Mr. 
John Gilmore




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: gnu (John Gilmore)
Date: Mon, 29 Nov 93 13:12:26 PST
To: cypherpunks
Subject: FOIA:  Sensor fusion
Message-ID: <9311292111.AA14187@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


November 22, 1993

Chief, Office of Policy
National Security Agency/Central Security Service
Fort George Meade, MD  20755-6000

Reference:  SENSOR FUSION

 

Dear Sir or Madam:

This is a request under the Freedom of Information Act [5 
U.S.C. ¤ 552(a)] on behalf of my client, Mr. John Gilmore.  

I write to request a copy of all agency records or portions 
thereof, in electronic or other form, which pertain, relate, or refer to 
sensor fusion.  "Sensor fusion" is the activity or process of "fusing" 
or merging information from a variety of different sensors to 
produce a more informative product.  For instance, merging radar 
data with intercepted radio transmissions and adding in satellite 
pictures may reveal a concentration of metal (from radar data) that 
coincides with a site that is transmitting communications.  

This request includes, but is not limited to:  electronic 
records such as software for performing sensor fusion; all 
documentation for such software; documentation about equipment 
used for sensor fusion; and records about agency use of sensor 
fusion.  

If the requested records are not in the possession of your 
agency, or if other agencies may also possess such records, I ask 
that you forward this request to any agency that you believe may 
have records responsive to this request, and inform me of such 
action.  Such agencies may include the NRO and the CIA.  In the 
alternative, I ask that you inform me of other agencies that you 
believe possess and control such records.  

As you know, the FOIA provides that an agency must make 
an initial determination of whether to comply with a FOIA request 
within ten working days of receiving the request.  Your own 
regulations provide that Ò[t]he Chief, Office of Policy, shall notify 
the requester of his determination within 10 working days of his 
receipt of the request.Ó  [32 C.F.R. ¤ 299.4(b)].  

If the records that you possess were originated or classified 
by another organization, I ask that your organization declassify 
them (if needed) and release them to me, as provided in the FOIA, 
within the statutory time limits.  If there is a conflict between the 
statutory time limits and some regulation or policy that requires 
you refer the records, the statutory requirement takes precedence 
over any Executive-branch regulation, policy or practice.  As you 
know, the FOIA provides that no more than an additional 10 
working days be taken for such consultation.  5 U.S.C. ¤ 
552(a)(6)(B).  If you do refer documents to any other agency, and 
they are not provided within the time limits, we intend to litigate on 
this point.

We also remind you that the long-standing rule that the 
FOIA "makes no distinction between records maintained in manual 
and computer storage systems," Yeager v. D.E.A., 678 F.2d 315, 
321 (D.C.Cir. 1982), has recently been amplified in Armstrong v. 
E.O.P., No 93-5002 (D.C. Cir., Aug. 13, 1993).  Any paper print-
outs of electronic records, such as e-mail, must include all 
information in the electronic record.  Assuming that there would be 
no loss of releasable information, such as written comments made 
on paper print-outs, we therefore ask you to release all responsive 
electronic records in electronic, i.e., machine-readable, form.

As you know, the FOIA provides that even if some 
requested material is properly exempted from mandatory 
disclosure, all segregable portions must be released.  [5 U.S.C. ¤ 
552(b)]  If any or all material covered by this request is withheld, 
please inform me of the specific exemptions that are being claimed, 
and mark all deletions to indicate the exemption(s) being claimed 
to authorize each individual withholding.  If the (b)(3) exemption is 
claimed, please indicate the relevant withholding statute(s).

In addition, I ask that your agency exercise its discretion to 
release information that may be technically exempt.  As you know, 
the Attorney General on October 4, 1993, directed that agencies 
should administer the FOIA under a presumption of disclosure, and 
that information which need not be withheld should not be.

Please do not delay processing because of uncertainty about 
the request.  I have reasonably described the records sought.  If you 
have any questions regarding this request, please telephone me at 
the above number, and we can discuss your questions.  

I also request that fees be waived because Mr. Gilmore is 
deemed a media requester by your agency for FOIA purposes.   
Should there be any problem in this regard, Mr. Gilmore promises 
to pay up to $1000 in fees, and you should therefore begin 
processing of this request without fee-related delays.  

As provided under the FOIA, I will expect a reply within ten 
(10) working days.  

Sincerely,



Lee Tien
Attorney at Law
On behalf of Mr. 
John Gilmore


rom owner-cypherpunks  Mon Nov 29 13:27:25 1993
Received: by toad.com id AA14244; Mon, 29 Nov 93 13:12:26 PST
Received: by toad.com id AA14124; Mon, 29 Nov 93 13:09:31 PST
From: gnu (John Gilmore)
Return-Path: <gnu>
Received: from localhost by toad.com id AA14120; Mon, 29 Nov 93 13:09:28 PST
Message-Id: <9311292109.AA14120@toad.com>
To: cypherpunks
Subject: NSA FOIA: Public Domain Classified Records
Date: Mon, 29 Nov 93 13:09:27 -0800

November 23, 1993

Chief, Office of Policy
National Security Agency/Central Security Service
Fort George Meade, MD  20755-6000
ATTN:  FOIA request

Reference:  PUBLIC DOMAIN CLASSIFIED RECORDS

 

Dear Sir or Madam:

This is a request under the Freedom of Information Act [5 
U.S.C. ¤ 552(a)] on behalf of my client, Mr. John Gilmore.  

I write to request a copy of all agency records or portions 
thereof, in electronic or other form, which pertain, relate, or refer to 
documents which are formally designated as "classified" by the 
U.S. Government but which are known by NSA officials to be 
outside direct government control, in the possession of persons not 
presently employed by the U.S. government, available to the public 
in libraries, or otherwise in the public domain, whether within or 
outside the United States.  

This request also includes all agency records which were 
previously classified but are no longer classified or had their 
classification level downgraded if the fact that the records were 
outside direct government control, in the possession of persons not 
presently employed by the U.S. government, available to the public 
in libraries, or otherwise in the public domain, whether within or 
outside the United States, was a factor in declassification or 
downgrading.  

To help you understand the nature of this request, I refer you 
to Mr. Gilmore's earlier request for Military Cryptanalysis by 
William Friedman and Military Cryptanalytics by Friedman and 
Lambros Callimahos.  As you know, your agency initially denied 
Mr. Gilmore's request for Parts III and IV of the Friedman treatise 
on the ground that they were classified, but later released these 
records after Mr. Gilmore proved that Parts III and IV were 
available to the general public.  Mr. Michael Smith, Chief, Office 
of Policy, informed the court and Mr. Gilmore that NSA officials 
had known for many years that these records had entered the public 
domain, but that he himself was unaware of this fact, and thus 
chose not to disclose them at the time of Mr. Gilmore's request.  

This request is intended to reach any other such records (still 
classified) and any records for which downgrading or 
declassification was ordered if the presence of the records outside 
direct government control was relevant to the downgrading or 
declassification determination.  Although Mr. Gilmore does not by 
this request seek the already-released portions of Military 
Cryptanalysis by William Friedman and Military Cryptanalytics by 
Friedman and Lambros Callimahos, he does by this request seek 
any records that pertain to whether the unreleased portions of Part 
III of Military Cryptanalytics by Friedman and Lambros 
Callimahos are known by NSA officials to be outside direct 
government control, in the possession of persons not presently 
employed by the U.S. government, available to the public in 
libraries, or otherwise in the public domain, whether within or 
outside the United States. 

This request is also intended to trigger declassification 
review of all records responsive to this request.

Mr. Gilmore would also like a list of all records responsive 
to this request if such a list can be provided in advance of the 
records themselves.  

As you know, the FOIA provides that an agency must make 
an initial determination of whether to comply with a FOIA request 
within ten working days of receiving the request.  Your own 
regulations provide that Ò[t]he Chief, Office of Policy, shall notify 
the requester of his determination within 10 working days of his 
receipt of the request.Ó  [32 C.F.R. ¤ 299.4(b)].  

If the records that you possess were originated or classified 
by another organization, I ask that your organization declassify 
its.  If there is a conflict between the 
statutory time limits and some regulation or policy that requires 
you refer the records, the statutory requirement takes precedence 
over any Executive-branch regulation, policy or practice.  As you 
know, the FOIA provides that no more than an additional 10 
working days be taken for such consultation.  5 U.S.C. ¤ 
552(a)(6)(B).  If you do refer documents to any other agency, and 
they are not provided within the time limits, we intend to litigate on 
this point.

We also remind you that the long-standing rule that the 
FOIA "makes no distinction between records maintained in manual 
and computer storage systems," Yeager v. D.E.A., 678 F.2d 315, 
321 (D.C.Cir. 1982), has recently been amplified in Armstrong v. 
E.O.P., No 93-5002 (D.C. Cir., Aug. 13, 1993).  Any paper print-
outs of electronic records, such as e-mail, must include all 
information in the electronic record.  Assuming that there would be 
no loss of releasable information, such as written comments made 
on paper print-outs, we therefore ask you to release all responsive 
electronic records in electronic, i.e., machine-readable, form.

As you know, the FOIA provides that even if some 
requested material is properly exempted from mandatory 
disclosure, all segregable portions must be released.  [5 U.S.C. ¤ 
552(b)]  If any or all material covered by this request is withheld, 
please inform me of the specific exemptions that are being claimed, 
and mark all deletions to indicate the exemption(s) being claimed 
to authorize each individual withholding.  If the (b)(3) exemption is 
claimed, please indicate the relevant withholding statute(s).

In addition, I ask that your agency exercise its discretion to 
release information that may be technically exempt.  As you know, 
the Attorney General on October 4, 1993, directed that agencies 
should administer the FOIA under a presumption of disclosure, and 
that information which need not be withheld should not be.

Please do not delay processing because of uncertainty about 
the request.  I have reasonably described the records sought.  If you 
have any questions regarding this request, please telephone me at 
the above number, and we can discuss your questions.  

I also request that fees be waived because Mr. Gilmore is 
deemed a media requester by your agency for FOIA purposes.   
Should there be any problem in this regard, Mr. Gilmore promises 
to pay up to $1000 in fees, and you should therefore begin 
processing of this request without fee-related delays.  

As provided under the FOIA, I will expect a reply within ten 
(10) working days.  

Sincerely,



Lee Tien
Attorney at Law
On behalf of Mr. 
John Gilmore




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: crunch@netcom.com (John Draper)
Date: Mon, 29 Nov 93 13:17:13 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: In Austin on 17th Dec - Want to meet Austin Cypherpunkers
Message-ID: <199311292112.NAA23356@mail.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



   Greetings all you Austin Cypherpunkers.   I'll be making a trek
into your area on the 17th of Dec to attend the HoHoCon.    If anyone
wants to exchange PGP keys,  and has a Mac,   then contact me as soon
as possible and I can give you all the details.    I'll be staying at
the Austin North Hilton & Towers and Super 8 Motel,  abd be arriving
about 4 pm or so.

   Looking forward to meeting all you Austin Cypherpunkers.    I am
also looking to see if any rave is scheduled on the evening of the 18th,
as I would like to get in some serious dancing while there.

Cheers
Cap'n Crunch




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: lubetkin@mgh.com (Steve Lubetkin)
Date: Mon, 29 Nov 93 10:27:12 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Info on list
Message-ID: <9311291821.AA13171@mgh_cs1.mgh.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Send info on subscribing to the list, please.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: hughes@ah.com (Eric Hughes)
Date: Mon, 29 Nov 93 13:37:17 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Let's Talk About Solutions
In-Reply-To: <199311291601.LAA15061@eff.org>
Message-ID: <9311292127.AA07180@ah.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>But I note that for
>"mere users" (as distinct from sophisticated users and programmers),
>current filtering tools are difficult to use. What can make this better?

I'll second Mike's statement by repeating a maxim I periodically need
to repeat here:

	Cypherpunks are not the Hacker Privacy League.

It is certainly much easier to create privacy systems that are
difficult to install and require much background knowledge about the
computer system in question than it is to create systems that are
simple to install and reliable to use.

If we create systems that only we ourselves can use we have
accomplished nothing particularly significant.  Only widespread
deployment counts in the long run, and that won't happen without easy
installation.

As much as I like what Mike Diehl has been working on, I don't
consider it complete.  The installation is far too tricky.  I'm
certainly glad he wrote it, and I'm glad he released it so that it can
be evaluated on technical grounds, but it's early to say that it's
ready for an average user.

Eric





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: ssteele@eff.org (Shari Steele)
Date: Mon, 29 Nov 93 10:37:11 PST
To: eff-board@eff.org
Subject: A study of National Cryptography Policy
Message-ID: <199311291832.NAA17576@eff.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>Date: Mon, 29 Nov 93 12:23:02 EST
>From: "Herb Lin" <hlin@nas.edu>
>Encoding: 5789 Text
>To: farber@cis.upenn.edu, editors@eff.org, alert@washofc.cpsr.org
>Subject: A study of National Cryptography Policy
>
>
>Please forward this message to any individual or mailing list
>that you believe should receive it.  Many thanks..
>*********************
>As part of the Defense Authorization Bill for FY 1994, the U.S. Congress
>has asked the Computer Science and Telecommunications Board
>(CSTB) of the National Research Council (NRC) to undertake a study of
>national policy with respect to the use and regulation of cryptography.
>The report of the study committee is due two years after all necessary
>security clearances have been processed, probably sometime summer
>1996, and is subject to NRC review procedures.  The legislation
>states that 120 days after the day on which the report is submitted to
>the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary shall submit the report to the
>Committees on Armed Services, Intelligence, Commerce, and the
>Judiciary of the Senate and House of Representatives in unclassified
>form, with classified annexes as necessary.  As of this date (November 29,
>1993), the House and the Senate have agreed to this study, but the
>President has not yet signed the bill.
>
>Assuming the legislation is signed by the President,  this study is
>expected to address the appropriate balance in cryptography policy
>among various national interests (e.g., U.S. economic competitiveness
>(especially with respect to export controls), national security, law
>enforcement, and the protection of the privacy rights of individuals),
>and the strength of various cryptographic technologies known today
>and anticipated in the future that are relevant for commercial
>purposes.  The federal process through which national cryptography
>policy has been formulated is also expected to be a topic of
>consideration, and, if appropriate, the project will address
>recommendations for improving the formulation of national
>cryptographic policy in the future.
>
>This project, like other NRC projects, will depend heavily on input
>from industry, academia, and other communities in the concerned
>public.  Apart from the study committee (described below), briefings
>and consultations from interested parties will be arranged and others
>will be involved as anonymous peer reviewers.
>
>It is expected that the study committee will be a high-level group that
>will command credibility and respect across the range of government,
>academic, commercial, and private interests.  The committee will
>include members with expertise in areas such as:
>
>  - relevant computer and communications technology;
>  - cryptographic technologies and cryptanalysis;
>  - foreign, national security, and intelligence affairs;
>  - law enforcement;
>  - commercial interests; and
>  - privacy and consumer interests.
>
>All committee members (and associated staff) will have to be cleared
>at the "SI/TK" level; provisions have been made to expedite the
>processing of security clearances for those who do not currently have
>them.  Committee members will be chosen for their stature, expertise,
>and seniority in their fields; their willingness to listen and consider
>fairly other points of view; and their ability to contribute to the
>formulation of consensus positions.  The committee as a whole will
>be chosen to reflect the range of judgment and opinion on the subject
>under consideration.
>
>The detailed composition of the committee has not yet been decided;
>suggestions for committee members are sought from the community at
>large.  Note that NRC rules regarding conflict of interest forbid the
>selection as committee members of individuals that have substantial
>personal financial interests that might be significantly affected by the
>outcome of the study.  Please forward suggestions for people to
>participate in this project to CSTB@NAS.EDU by DECEMBER 17,
>1993; please include their institutional affiliations, their field(s) of
>expertise, a note describing how the criteria described above apply to
>them, and a way to contact them.  For our administrative
>convenience, please put in the "SUBJECT:" field of your message the
>words "crypto person".
>
>Finally, some people have expressed concern about the fact that the
>project will involve consideration of classified material.  Arguments
>can and have been made on both sides of this point, but in any event
>this particular ground rule was established by the U.S. Congress, not
>by the CSTB.  Whether one agrees or disagrees with the asserted
>need for classification, the task at hand is to do the best possible job
>given this constraint.
>
>On the National Research Council
>
>The National Research Council (NRC) is the operating arm of the
>Academy complex, which includes the National Academy of Sciences,
>the National Academy of Engineering, and the Institute of Medicine.
>The NRC is a source of impartial and independent advice to the
>federal government and other policy makers that is able to bring to
>bear the best scientific and technical talent in the nation to answer
>questions of national significance.  In addition, it often acts as a
>neutral party in convening meetings among multiple stakeholders on
>any given issue, thereby facilitating the generation of consensus on
>controversial issues.
>
>The Computer Science and Telecommunications Board (CSTB) of the
>NRC considers technical and policy issues pertaining to computer
>science, telecommunications, and associated technologies.  CSTB
>monitors the health of the computer science, computing technology,
>and telecommunications fields, including attention as appropriate to
>the issues of human resources and information infrastructure and
>initiates studies involving computer science, computing technology,
>and telecommunications as critical resources and sources of national
>economic strength.  A list of CSTB publications is available on
>request.
>
>






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Date: Mon, 29 Nov 93 13:37:25 PST
To: plaz@netcom.com (Geoff Dale)
Subject: Re: Banning any subscriber
Message-ID: <199311292133.NAA26755@mail.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Geoff Dale wrote:

>I'm not entirely against positive reputation systems, but they really need
>to be implimented on the user end, or at least be user settings, as on the
>extropians list.
>
>But the main problem with positive reputation systems is dealing with the
>zero reputation newbies. I don't want to see these guys shut out.

Positive reputations _must_ be implemented at the user level, to my way of
thinking. Any system which centrally administers the reputations, as in
approved reading lists or movies approved by the Catholics (does this still
exist?) is not really what most of us want.

Newbies are often desirable and often turn into valued
contributors--sometimes from their very first posts. So I personally would
not want to filter them out.

The "Extropians" software, which many of us have mentioned here, allows
this kind of flexibility. 

I hope Cypherpunks can get it soon.

--Tim May


--
Timothy C. May         | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,  
tcmay@netcom.com       | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
408-688-5409           | knowledge, reputations, information markets, 
W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA  | black markets, collapse of governments.
Higher Power: 2^756839 | Public Key: by arrangement
Note: I put time and money into writing this posting. I hope you enjoy it.      








From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Brian D Williams <talon57@well.sf.ca.us>
Date: Mon, 29 Nov 93 13:57:13 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: MISC: good news,bad news
Message-ID: <199311292156.NAA16835@well.sf.ca.us>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



 Well as they say first the good news...



INFORMATION SERVICES INDUSTRY WANTS RBOCs FREED The regional Bell
companies should be free to compete in long distance services,
cable television programming and equipment  manufacturing, a new
study of information services executives said. The study, released
today by The Marx Group of Wellesley, Mass.,  also said the
information industry will grow faster and better serve customers as
a result of increasing merger activity.  The survey was
commissioned by The Marx Group, an information services industry
consulting and law firm.  "This survey proves that a clear majority
of information services executives believe that our industry will
benefit from Bell company entry into these lines of business," Marx
Group chairman Peter Marx said.  Marx praised Monday's Supreme
Court action leaving in place the Bell companies' ability to offer
information services as "good news" for the information services
provider industry.  This survey demonstrates that the information
services business community looks forward to the capital and
technology, partnership opportunities and mass marketing
capabilities the Bell companies bring to the table." 
 
Information services companies rely heavily on long-distance  
services and are extremely concerned about long-distance rates, the
study pointed out.  Small businesses were especially emphatic in
their desire for the competitive pricing they expect to accompany
Bell entry into long distance service, the study said. 
 
The survey included telephone interviews with executives from more
than 300 information services companies.  Some of the results are: 
 
1.  72 percent favored Bell company participation in information  
services in their own territories, 21 percent unfavorable, 7
percent neutral; 
 
2.  66 percent favored Bell company entry into long distance, 21
percent unfavorable, 13 percent neutral; 
 
3.  69 percent favored allowing Bell company entry into cable TV,
15 percent unfavorable, 16 percent neutral; 
 
4.  67 percent favored Bell company participation in equipment
manufacturing, 13 percent unfavorable,  20 percent without opinion.

The Marx Group commissioned Arlen Communications, an industry  
research firm in Bethesda, Md., to conduct the survey. 
 
For more information, contact The Marx Group at (617) 576-5730 or 
Arlen Communications at (301) 656-7940. 
 
                              ###  
 


Now for the bad news....(bad idea!)



SLATTERY INTRODUCES BILL TO LIFT MFJ MANUFACTURING BAN Rep. Jim
Slattery (D-Kansas) Sunday introduced a bill (H.R. 3609) that would
lift the Modified Final Judgment (MFJ) restriction for Regional
Bell Operating Companies (RBOCs).Staffers in Slattery's office said
today the bill is virtually identical to H.R. 1527, which Slattery
introduced in the 102nd Congress, with additional provisions
concerning consumers with disabilities and joint network
planning.The "Telecommunications Equipment Research and
Manufacturing Competition Act of 1993" says that permitting the
RBOCs, through their affiliates, to manufacture telecommunications
equipment and customer premises equipment (CPE), universal access
to advanced telecommunications services, continued economic growth
and international competitiveness will be advanced.The bill would
all the design, development and fabrication of equipment, as well
as research with respect to such equipment.

The bill includes the following provisions:

-- The RBOCs could engage in manufacturing through separate 
affiliates;

-- The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) would prescribe 
regulations to ensure RBOC compliance;

-- A manufacturing subsidiary would be required to maintain 
separate books, records and accounts;

-- RBOCs could sell, advertise, install and maintain 
telecommunications equipment and CPE after acquiring the equipment 
from their affiliates;

-- Manufacturing affiliates would be required to conduct 
manufacturing within the United States; 

-- Manufacturing affiliates would be required to use component 
parts manufactured in the United States, with the following 
exception.  Affiliates could use components manufactured outside 
the U.S. if they first make "good faith" efforts" to obtain parts 
manufactured within the U.S. and if the foreign components do not 
exceed 40 percent of the sales revenue derived from the equipment;

-- Manufacturing affiliates would be allowed to use intellectual 
property created outside the U.S.;

-- Manufacturing affiliates would be required to make equipment 
available without discrimination to all regulated local telephone 
exchange carriers;

-- An RBOC and its manufacturing affiliates would be allowed to 
engage in close collaboration with any manufacturer during design 
and development of hardware or software;

-- The FCC would prescribe regulations necessary to ensure that
network services advances are accessible and usable by individuals 
whose access might be impeded by a disability or functional 
limitation, unless the costs would result in an undue burden or 
adverse competitive impact;

-- Each RBOC would be required to engage in joint network planning 
and design with other regulated local exchange carriers operating 
in the same area of interest, except no participant in such 
planning would be allowed to delay the introduction of new 
technology or the deployment of facilities to provide 
telecommunications services.

                              ### 


I particularly like the anti-NAFTA "All American" clause......



Brian Williams
Cypherpatriot
Extropian
"Free The RBOC'S"
"Nuke The Whales"





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: hughes@ah.com (Eric Hughes)
Date: Mon, 29 Nov 93 14:22:02 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Let's Talk About Solutions
In-Reply-To: <199311291601.LAA15061@eff.org>
Message-ID: <9311292214.AA07283@ah.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


re: on forum disruption

>The best solutions are bottom-up solutions: solutions in which individuals
>can make choices about what they wish to see, but can't impose those
>choices on others. 

I agree with this, I really do.  Nevertheless, I think this
characterization incomplete in two ways.

First, let us stipulate that for the near future the notion of the
named group, whose members are all expected, more or less, to share in
a common discourse, will remain useful and desirable.  The sharing of
discourse creates a group history, which in turn creates a group
identity.  The lack of completeness in Mike's characterization is to
recognize that group participation is not completely individualistic,
that to gain the benefits of a common discourse it is necessary to
participate in that discourse by saying one thing and not saying
another.

Stricture creates structure.  The bottom up solution is not merely the
elimination of stricture but rather to increase the ability to choose
structure.  In a truly free society one has the ability to limit one's
freedom for whatever purpose desired.

Cypherpunks is like this.  I have no theoretical problem with turning
off list disrupters, although I do consider it a grave action.  It is
the practice of the list to broadcast anything requested to be
broadcast, yet this does not make this forum a public forum.  Each
person on the list has transferred, _de facto_, some agency to the
maintainer (that's me) about how the list will operate.

The second incompleteness is remedied by explictly referring to
transferability of preference.  One thing the extropians list software
does right is to allow filtering at the server; this is a transfer of
preference and can be an economic optimization.  Bottom-up solutions
are incomplete to the extent that they require the solution to remain
at the bottom.

Eric





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: hfinney@shell.portal.com (Hal Finney)
Date: Mon, 29 Nov 93 14:27:14 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Banning any subscriber
Message-ID: <9311292226.AA11341@jobe.shell.portal.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


The problem with user-based filtering is that the noise may still drive
people off the list.  New subscribers won't have filters set up initially
(they may not know how to set them up, or it may take a while to figure out
who, what, and how to filter) and they'll be subject to a barrage of rants and
raves.  They're likely to unsubscribe in disgust before taking the time to
uncover the jewels amid the slime.

Also, Tim has noted problems with the user-based filtering on the extropians
list.  Different people have different filter settings, so there can be
multiple redundant postings of outside information - magazine articles,
other newsgroup or mailing list posts, etc.  Nobody knows what material
anyone else has seen.  There is also something of a learning curve in
using the extropians filtering, despite it being conceptually easy to
use.  A few weeks ago, it seemed that almost every day someone
accidentally posted a filter command to the list.  Tim noted at one point
that he had surveyed local list members and found a great deal of ignorance
about using the filters.

I think it works better if the list community is seeing a common message
stream, one which is of high quality, one which does not include messages
of disruptive posters.  Eric has given his blessing (at least implicitly)
to an alternate list, one which is gatewayed bidirectionally to cypherpunks,
but where such filtering is done.  New subscribers to CP who were upset
by the noise could be directed to this list when they unsubscribed.  This
would allow people to avoid receiving harrassing messages while still
participating on the cypherpunks list.

Hal Finney
hfinney@shell.portal.com




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Mike Godwin <mnemonic@eff.org>
Date: Mon, 29 Nov 93 11:32:02 PST
To: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Subject: Re: Crypto Anarchy, the Government, and the National Information Infrastructure
In-Reply-To: <199311291854.KAA13023@mail.netcom.com>
Message-ID: <199311291927.OAA18499@eff.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


 
Tim May writes:

> Having read the three main "position papers" on NII (the White House
> paper, the CPSR analysis, and the EFF "Open Platform" piece), I'm as
> convinced as ever that the Data Highway is largely about regaining
> control of the currently anarchic network system. It just isn't about
> giving ghetto residents access to Crays, nor is it about the
> government being benificent in expanding our cable choices from 50
> channels of shit to 5000 channels.
> 
> No, it is about taxing the commerce that is moving increasingly into
> cyberspace. It is about continuing to regulate and control. It is
> about the survival of Big Brother.

For what it's worth, I don't think this interpretation can be read into
EFF's Open Platform paper. EFF doesn't care about making money off the
Data Highway, nor does it think the debate should be about the number of
channels cable offers.

Instead, EFF wants an infrastructure in which Tim May's anarchic vision
can flourish along with the visions of anarchophobes. On an Open Platform,
a hundred flowers can and will bloom, and a thousand schools of
thought will contend.

Anarchists like Jack Kerouac and Neal Cassidy could find
individualistic redemption on the (government-built) road.
EFF thinks private-enterprise roads are better, but we also think 
its promise is unfulfilled if it doesn't allow net.kerouacs and
net.cassidys to create there.


--Mike


 



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Matthew J Ghio <mg5n+@andrew.cmu.edu>
Date: Mon, 29 Nov 93 11:47:18 PST
To: jersmit@temp.eis.calstate.edu>
Subject: Re: Telnet specs.
In-Reply-To: <Pine.3.87.9311261959.A22747-0100000@temp>
Message-ID: <YgyZ14e00awTA6Tlss@andrew.cmu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Jeremy Smith <jersmit@temp.eis.calstate.edu> asked:

> 	I know this might not be the most appropriate list to post this 
> to, but I need to know what ports Telnet uses for standard use.
> Mainly, I implemented the Telnet bouncer program that was posted
> here a while back, and when trying to connect to hosts that don't
> require a port number it still asks me for one.
>
> 	i.e., when I try to connect to archie.sura.net through the
> bouncer, it asks me for a port number.  When I use my standard
> Telnet program it will connect with just archie.sura.net as the
> address.  Does anybody know a site where I can find this info?
> Thanx in advance and my apologies for any waste of bandwidth!

The standard telnet port should be 23.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Brian Beker <beker@netcom.com>
Date: Mon, 29 Nov 93 14:57:14 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Crypto Anarchy, the Government, and the National Information Infrastructure (fwd)
Message-ID: <Pine.3.85.9311291455.A478-0100000@netcom7>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----



On Mon, 29 Nov 1993, Timothy C. May wrote:

> To a "women need not apply" on-line consulting situation? To
> a cyberspatial version of the "old boy's network" that Gloria Allred and
> her feminista compadres are constantly filing lawsuits against?
                ^^^^^^^^^

Shouldn't that be commadres?

Brian


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Version: 2.3a

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thz8FaP8opsPsg7EC/iv1ZEml26BhpxgzGSnzeG2NzH9qRMxFik7fJ4XzkMECS5l
Af5jJxeeV+iJeqk6lSpYFGcA1YqgAqM7c4XNhA3YGYGUqJ9we2mkujJZ0THJyjMA
bXBKqGqIz7E=
=YFTM
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----








From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: ferguson@icm1.icp.net (Paul Ferguson x2044)
Date: Mon, 29 Nov 93 12:17:14 PST
To: mnemonic@eff.org (Mike Godwin)
Subject: Re: Crypto Anarchy, the Government, and the National Information Infrastructure
In-Reply-To: <199311291927.OAA18499@eff.org>
Message-ID: <9311292014.AA08033@icm1.icp.net>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text



Mike Godwin writes -

> For what it's worth, I don't think this interpretation can be read into
> EFF's Open Platform paper. EFF doesn't care about making money off the
> Data Highway, nor does it think the debate should be about the number of
> channels cable offers.
> 
> Instead, EFF wants an infrastructure in which Tim May's anarchic vision
> can flourish along with the visions of anarchophobes. On an Open Platform,
> a hundred flowers can and will bloom, and a thousand schools of
> thought will contend.

In a _truly_ Open telecommunications architecture, yes; a thousand schools
of thought can flourish. 

I am not, however, convinced that the NII vision equates to something
that is benefitial for one and all. EFF's vision, on the other hand, is
an admirable one nonetheless. 

My sentiment remains steadfast: the government should stay out of
networking altogether.

- Paul




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: stig@netcom.com (Stig)
Date: Mon, 29 Nov 93 15:32:02 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Need a ride to hohocon?
Message-ID: <199311292329.PAA22043@mail.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I'm planning to drive from Portland to Austin for HoHo Con...via San
Francisco...and I'm looking for people to split the gas.  We can all sleep
in my van for free, so that saves on expenses in Austin and I have a great
stereo to make the miles go by...

    	Takers?
        Stig


;; __________________________________________________________________________
;; Stig@netcom.com                            netcom.com:/pub/stig/00-PGP-KEY
;; It's hard to be cutting-edge at your own pace...   32 DF B9 19 AE 28 D1 7A
;; Bullet-proof code cannot stand up to teflon bugs.  A3 9D 0B 1A 33 13 4D 7F




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Stanton McCandlish <mech@eff.org>
Date: Mon, 29 Nov 93 12:37:15 PST
To: eff-talk@eff.org
Subject: Britain-Right of Silence (AP) (fwd)
Message-ID: <199311292032.PAA19624@eff.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Abolition of Right of Silence Delights Police, Appalls Critics
By MAUREEN JOHNSON
Associated Press Writer
	   LONDON (AP) _ As the police see it, the government's plan to
abolish the right of silence is a break they deserve.
	   ``We're not asking anyone to confess,'' said Dick Coyles, head
of Britain's 130,000-member Police Federation.
	   ``We're just asking them to tell us, for example, `The reason my
house is full of stolen goods is that this man asked me to look
after them.'
	   ``We want people to put forward their defenses at the time ...
instead of when they've had time to concoct one.''
	   To lawyers and civil rights groups, the bill due to come before
Parliament soon violates a basic tenet of British justice: A
suspect is innocent until proven guilty.
	   The principle dates to the 17th century, when Parliament
abolished the infamous Court of the Star Chamber.
	   The Conservative government's Criminal Justice Bill does not
force anyone to talk. But judges and juries could conclude that a
suspect who refused to answer police questions has something to
hide.
	   In some cases, silence would become part of the prosecution
evidence pointing toward guilt.
	   Civil libertarians are campaigning to save what they see as a
historic right _ the model for the U.S. Constitution's Fifth
Amendment which protects Americans from self-incrimination.
	   The legislation is part of Conservative government efforts to
stem rising crime. It has pitted Prime Minister John Major's
administration against some judges, though others support him.
	   Major has only a 17-seat majority in the 651-member Commons, and
the bill's fate is uncertain. But the issue will mean another
bruising battle for a government already in trouble over squeezes
in welfare spending.
	   Major is going against the advice of a Royal Commission he
appointed two years ago to study the criminal justice system. It
concluded that the right of silence was a valuable safeguard
against miscarriages of justice.
	   Critics argue that removing it will increase the risk of
bullying and oppressive police interrogations and tempt police to
rely too heavily on confessions instead of getting independent
evidence.
	   The government sounds determined, however, and the move is
widely supported by the party's rank and file.
	   To prolonged applause, Home Secretary Michael Howard announced
the policy at the party's annual conference this fall, saying
terrorists were exploiting the right of silence.
	   The change would apply to all suspects _ from careless drivers
to murderers.
	   Opponents say hardened criminals and terror suspects know the
ropes and usually are convicted despite their silence. Those likely
to be harassed into false confessions are confused and frightened
suspects, often of low intelligence, says the civil rights group
Liberty.
	   Roger Ede, secretary of the Law Society, says the average IQ of
suspects at police stations is 82, well below average.
	   ``It is a basic principle of English law that suspects don't
have to prove their innocence by having to explain their actions,''
Ede said.
	   ``Why does the government end up doing the opposite of what they
were advised to do? Because they perceive for political reasons it
is what is required of them.''
	   Liberty began a leaflet campaign to get voters to lobby members
of Parliament.
	   Rising crime _ a 120 percent rise in reported offenses since the
Conservatives won power in 1979 _ is a particular embarrassment for
a party that gave the police big pay raises, built new prisons and
made law and order a centerpiece of its election platforms.
	   The right of silence developed in protest against the oppressive
operation by the Star Chamber Court under the Tudor and early
Stuart kings.
	   In a landmark case in 1637, John Lilburn, accused of printing
seditious books, refused to answer questions. Parliament later
compensated him and the Star Chamber was abolished in 1641.
	   The right of silence became part of English law in 1848.




-- 
Stanton  McCandlish  mech@eff.org  1:109/1103   EFF  Online  Activist & SysOp
O P E N  P L A T F O R M   C R Y P T O P O L I C Y   O N L I N E  R I G H T S
N  E  T  W  O  R  K  I  N  G      V  I  R  T  U  A  L     C  U  L  T  U  R  E
I   N   F  O :  M   E   M   B   E   R   S   H   I   P  @  E  F  F  .  O  R  G



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Anonymous <nowhere@bsu-cs.bsu.edu>
Date: Mon, 29 Nov 93 12:42:03 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Encryption and the NII (fwd)
Message-ID: <9311292042.AA26726@bsu-cs.bsu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Newsgroups: talk.politics.crypto,comp.org.eff.talk
From: kadie@cs.uiuc.edu (Carl M Kadie)
Subject: [NWU] "Encryption and the NII"
Organization: University of Illinois, Dept. of Comp. Sci., Urbana, IL
Date: Mon, 29 Nov 1993 18:38:50 GMT

[This is an excerpt from the Newsletter of The Political Issues
Committee of the National Writers Union (UAW Local 1981) Address
Correspondence to: Bob Chatelle, 296 Western Avenue, Cambridge MA
02139 (617/497-7193). The full newsletter was posted to
alt.censorship.

(c) 1993 National Writers Union. Posted with permission from the
November 1993 issue of the PIC Newsletter, the journal of the
Political Issues Committee.  All rights reserved to the authors.
Reproduction without permission is expressly prohibited, but requests
to repost articles on electronic systems serving writers are
encouraged.  Send permission requests to Bob Chatelle,
kip@world.std.com -cmk]

       Encryption and the NII, by Jenevra Georgini

As stated in President Clinton's message of November 5, gov-
ernment policy regarding the national information infras-
tructure (NII) shares two significant objectives with the
Writers Union goals.  The Clinton administration seeks to
ensure broad access by adapting the concept of fair use to
the NII, while simultaneously strengthening domestic copy-
right laws and international treaties to protect the
integrity of intellectual property.  Because the network
will span the globe, standards must be coherent and uni-
formly applied in a way that permits industry growth.  A
standard-based regulatory approach posits legal solutions.
Yet standards remain toothless unless implemented by tech-
nology promoting the dual goal of access and integrity.
Encryption technology is one suggested means of embedding
electronic signatures to authenticate digital works.
Encryption was originally developed by the government for
wartime uses.  Now the technology has become available to
private citizens through programs such as RIPEM (public
domain software based on a program developed with federal
funding at MIT) and Philip Zimmermann's PGP (Pretty Good
Privacy, whose underlying algorithm is pirated from the
patented MIT program).  Zimmermann describes his product as
"the *de facto* worldwide standard for encryption and
email."  It can be used to keep message transmissions (such
as downloading works from a net) private while simulta-
neously authenticating the work.  Each use has a public key
and a private key.  Correspondents use the public key to
encrypt a message to that key's owner.  The key owner gives
out or publishes the key as one would give out an address.
Although the public key can unlock the code that the private
key makes and vice versa, knowing the public key doesn't
enable anyone to deduce the private key.  Those who know the
public key can only encrypt messages for sending; they can-
not decrypt the recipient's messages.  The recipient uses
her own private key to decrypt messages sent.  At the same
time, an author making works available online could encrypt
that work with her own private key.  This would provide a
digital "signature" (or perhaps "fingerprint" would be a
better term; signatures can be forged but private keys are
given to only one person).  Anyone wishing to access the
work could use the sender's public key to verify the origin.
The public key could be included on the work's title screen
to facilitate access.  The user could decrypt the private
code by means of the public code enough to ascertain that
the work had been tampered with but not enough to reveal the
private code (analogous to being able to fit a key into a
lock without the door opening.)

The development of micro-sized encryption chips has made
this technology accessible to a broad range of consumers--
including drug dealers, tax evades, and traders in national
secrets.  Of course, the larger and more powerful government
machines can crack any private citizens 140-digit code in a
day.  However, this represents a substantial outlay of gov-
ernment time and resources for very little reward.  As the
number of messages posted on the net increases, forced
decrypting offers ever-diminishing returns.  (Note!  This is
know as the "logic of the net," a digital variation on "the
more the merrier."  It is also referred to by some commenta-
tors as "the fax effect:" owning the only fax in the world
won't do your business much good, but your fax's value
increases every time someone else buys one because you can
now exchange more information.)  Instead of trying to con-
tain the encryption explosion, the government should harness
its energy to protect citizens' privacy and encourage dis-
tribution of works on the net.  Building on encryption to
prevent piracy on the net is the logical next step in beat-
ing defense budget swords into information plowshares.  Leg-
islation should be enacted limiting state and federal
decrypting requirements to the reasonable search and
seizures contemplated by the Fourth Amendment.  No one
should be forced to decrypt their data without due process
of law, including probable cause shown in the form of a
court-ordered search warrant.  The practice of seizing not
only hackers' computers but all electronic equipment in
their possession is a blatant violation of civil rights.
Perhaps, as suggested by leading scholar Laurence tribe, a
new amendment to the Constitution should be enacted to safe-
guard our traditional-rights in the new frontier environ-
ment.

Encryption technology has been responsible for startling
(some might say threatening) advances in digital tape infor-
mation retrieval.  Digital Audio Tape (DAT) records music in
sixteen binary digits.  The human ear does not register
sounds down to the sixteenth bit.  Thus, encrypted informa-
tion such as books or programs can be recorded on each six-
teenth bit.  One could play the tape and hear only music
without interference from the other recorded information
because it takes us such a small space.  The encrypted data
would also be invisible to one examining it on a computer
screen.  The only way to tell that there is anything other
than music on the tape is to compare it bit to bit on a com-
puter with a virgin cassette.  Even with the computer's
help, the encrypted data could look exactly like the noise
that typically appears during recording.  In the words of
Tim May, retired Intel physicist, "Anyone carrying a single
music cassette bought in a store could carry the entire com-
puterized files of the Stealth bomber, and it would be com-
pletely and totally imperceptible."  May further related
that information can also be encoded in images: he could
download a photo, insert an encrypted message in the least
significant portion of each pixel (to minimize distortion)
and repost the image without any recognizable difference.

In addition to its possibilities for authenticating works
online, encryption responds to the problem of royalty track-
ing traditionally solved by licensing.  A microchip invented
by entrepreneur Peter Sprague is programmed to decrypt only
as much of its encrypted database as the user pays for.
After browsing a topic menu, the reader selects what infor-
mation she wants.  The program decrypts that information and
counts how many times it has decrypted (or how many bytes in
a per-byte fee structure).  The user is billed accordingly,
to a debit card or even to an electronic account where e-
money takes the place of cash.  Although encryption, like
any other software, is not completely hackproof, methods can
be developed to make piracy much more trouble than it is
worth.

                              --Jenevra Georgini, NWU Intern


-- 
Carl Kadie -- I do not represent any organization; this is just me.
 = kadie@cs.uiuc.edu =





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: cman@caffeine.io.com (Douglas Barnes)
Date: Mon, 29 Nov 93 14:02:02 PST
To: crunch@netcom.com (John Draper)
Subject: Re: In Austin on 17th Dec - Want to meet Austin Cypherpunkers
In-Reply-To: <199311292112.NAA23356@mail.netcom.com>
Message-ID: <199311292143.PAA00234@caffeine.caffeine.io.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> 
> 
>    Greetings all you Austin Cypherpunkers.   I'll be making a trek
> into your area on the 17th of Dec to attend the HoHoCon.    If anyone
> wants to exchange PGP keys,  and has a Mac,   then contact me as soon
> as possible and I can give you all the details.    I'll be staying at
> the Austin North Hilton & Towers and Super 8 Motel,  abd be arriving
> about 4 pm or so.
> 

What makes you think any of us really exist, anyhow? :-)
(Those of us that do, will be at Ho-Ho Con)

Doug

-- 
----------------                                             /\ 
Douglas Barnes            cman@illuminati.io.com            /  \ 
Chief Wizard         (512) 447-8950 (d), 447-7866 (v)      / () \
Illuminati Online          metaverse.io.com 7777          /______\



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: hawkwind@dink.foretune.co.jp
Date: Sun, 28 Nov 93 23:14:42 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Disruptive members
Message-ID: <199311290712.QAA06834@dink.foretune.co.jp>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I would like to mention that it seems in the past two years (I have been a
netrunner since 1978) that I am finding myself fleeing quite often from
lists, forums, discussion groups, etc. that have disruptive people on them
jamming up my mailbox and polluting the creativity of each group with
incredible vile negativism. Besides being a personal problem for me, it is
also a professional problem as I am currently in Japan trying to launch a
10,000 player cyberspace RPG community. 

I liken people such to a situation where a group of friends are sitting
talking around a fireplace deep in creative discussion and a Felini style
circus band starts marching through the room playing at full volume. If
this was in your home, you would throw them out; if at a ski lodge, the
management would throw them out; if in a public place, the police would
disperse them for "disturbing the peace" (have you ever wondered WHY all
civilizations have such laws?!?). Yet in cyberspace, people toss out
phrases like "freedoms", and "rights" to excuse such behavior apparently
without much consideration to the "responsibilities" inherent in those
phrases. 

At a conference recently,  I spent over two hours talking to the fellow who
runs a large Moo about exactly this problem. He is also faced with such
people (although thankfully not quite so extreme), and his "society" is
having a VERY difficult time trying to develop procedures for dealing with
such people. He told me about a particularly nasty situation where some
girl in his Moo was "virtually raped" by another member. The Moo was
horrified, but could not figure out how to deal with the culprit. 

Right now, I think that perhaps much of the nets is still made up of people
who are experienced in netrunning, but the sheer quantity of new
inexperienced people joining is getting astronomical. If their initial
contact is with a group containing a disrupter type, then they may run
shuddering from the nets forever. If enough of them complain (to school
administrators, postmasters, political figures), then very heavy handed
laws will be slammed down in top of the nets in retaliation. It is a well
known historical/political fact that any activity that is not successful at
self-control WILL BE controlled from without, or smashed apart for "the
good of the people". 

From reading recent postings, I gather that many feel as I once did, that
disruptive people will just flame out and go away. And once that was so,
but no longer. I have seen over 15 groups laid waste in the past two years
by such people. They did not go away, but rather gloated over the deceased
corpse of the group. Many of the members of those groups I have not seen
again on the nets. I now firmly believe that such chaotic people have to be
dealt with and promptly. I am still unclear how to deal with them, but I do
know that time is of the essence. The longer they are allowed to pollute
your group, the deeper the cancer runs affecting everyone's perspective.

I look forward to any constructive comments.






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Romana Machado <romana@apple.com>
Date: Mon, 29 Nov 93 16:37:15 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Stego 1.0a2 and where to get it
Message-ID: <9311300034.AA13936@apple.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Announcing Stego 1.0a2
The First Steganography Tool For The Macintosh
by Romana Machado of Paradigm Shift Research
11/28/93

What is steganography?

Steganography is a method by which a message can be 
disguised by making it appear to be something else. It derives 
from two Greek roots. "Stego-" means "roof", or   "cover". 
It is the same root used in "stegosaur", called a "roof lizard"
 because of the large bony plates that decorate its back.
"-graphy" means writing. 
"Steganography" means covert writing.

What is Stego?

Stego is a tool that enables you to embed data in, and retrieve 
data from, Macintosh PICT format files, without changing the 
appearance or size of the PICT file.  Though its effect is visually 
undetectable, do not expect cryptographic security from Stego.  
Be aware that anyone with a copy of Stego can retrieve your 
data from your PICT file.  Stego  can  be used as an "envelope" 
to hide a _previously encrypted_ data file in a PICT file, 
making it much less likely to be detected.

Stego is  available _now_ via anonymous ftp from 
ghost.dsi.unimi.it, in the /pub/crypt directory.
If for some reason you can't find
it in this location, mail me $15.00 
and your physical or email address.
I will send it to you.

Don't Forget!
Stego is shareware. You can help to support further 
development by sending $15.00 or any stegosaur to:

Romana Machado
19672 Stevens Creek Blvd. Box 127
Cupertino, CA 95014


Bugs? Questions?
EMail: romana@apple.com




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: davet@wv.MENTORG.COM (Dave Taffs)
Date: Mon, 29 Nov 93 17:02:04 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: re: META: Filter Detweiler
Message-ID: <199311300055.AA21733@fpd.MENTORG.COM>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Time to de-lurk...

>sender: hfinney@shell.portal.com
>
>I would favor adding a filter preventing Detweiler's messages from
>appearing on the list.

I disagree. I think the correct response is to just completely ignore
him. This apparently worked on rec.pets.cats, when people posted truly
nasty stories about cats; they kept it up until the list learned to
just completely ignore them, and then they went away. Detweiler will
eventually(!) do likewise.

I urge that the spirit exemplified by CPunks not be sullied by
censorship, in spite of the threat posed by LD. It is indeed an
ugly precedent, antithetical to what I believe the list believes
in.

It might help newbies if a discussion of the LD issue be mentioned
in a FAQ list (is there one?), or otherwise maybe a message indicating
the known hazard of LD should be sent to the list every two weeks saying
that the consensus is to just ignore posts from either L. Detweiler or
an12070@anon.penet.fi.

-- 
 O_O    	01234567                dave_taffs@mentorg.com   "Carpe carp!" |
 . .            ^       	        I don't necessarily share MGC's views. |
(_:_)           Indent-o-Meter          Better living thru tab damage...       |





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: lefty@apple.com (Lefty)
Date: Mon, 29 Nov 93 17:17:15 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Disruptive members
Message-ID: <9311300111.AA29036@internal.apple.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>I have seen a man arrested ostensibly for "disturbing the peace", who was
>actually just giving a speech.  The charges were thrown out.  If you don't
>like free speech,  don't log in.  The U.S. Constitution and the Declaration
>of Independence state very clearly that our form of government is based on
>the recognition of human rights,  not responsibilities.  You might be able
>to find a system more to your liking in China or North Korea for a little
>while longer.

There is little I less enjoy seeing than the spectacle of someone who has
never actually bothered to find out what the Bill of Rights says and what
it means blathering about "free speech".

Mr. Wilson: does my right to free speech entitle me to come into your
living room and demand that you provide me with a podium and a megaphone in
furtherance of my expressing my opinion?

If you think it doesn't, then you have no cause for complaint.  If, on the
other hand, you think it _does_, then I've done you a grave misservice by
mistaking you for nothing more than an uninformed chowderhead.  You would
constitute, at the very least, a full-blown loon.

>After all the speech criminals are rounded up, what next?  Got any ethnic
>groups in mind?

That's low.  Or, to be more precise, on a par with the rest of your little
screed.


--
Lefty (lefty@apple.com)
C:.M:.C:., D:.O:.D:.






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Perry E. Metzger" <pmetzger@lehman.com>
Date: Mon, 29 Nov 93 14:47:14 PST
To: hfinney@shell.portal.com (Hal Finney)
Subject: A modest proposal
In-Reply-To: <9311292226.AA11341@jobe.shell.portal.com>
Message-ID: <9311292244.AA00791@snark.lehman.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Hal Finney says:
> The problem with user-based filtering is that the noise may still
> drive people off the list.

Indeed. Here is my modest proposal...

1) Create a second list, call it cypherrants. Initially it should have
   the same membership as cypherpunks.
2) Make the second list unrestricted.
3) Remove the capacity of the pure noise sources to post to
   cypherpunks.
4) Those who wish to be removed from cypherrants can be.

That way, those of us who don't want to listen don't have to, and
those people who want to listen can, and we can have the best of both
worlds.

Perry




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: hughes@ah.com (Eric Hughes)
Date: Mon, 29 Nov 93 17:57:15 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: really hiding encrypted data
In-Reply-To: <9311300120.AA12755@bilbo.suite.com>
Message-ID: <9311300146.AA07743@ah.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



>However, I suspect it is easy to distinguish between the collection
>of least significant bits of a normal picture file and the collection
>of least significant bits of a picture file used to hold some
>encrypted data.

This may be.  The connection is not obvious, but there may be
correlations because of data conversions, mechanical scanner
characteristics, etc.

The first step in any such system which more closely hides data is to
study carefully the statistics of base images.  Until you understand
them, any attempt at mimicking them is bound for failure.

Seeking a good understanding of the statistical properties of messages
of various sorts is generally missing in cypherpunks activity.  The
area gets quite technical, and we as a group need to develop some
better understanding of it.

Eric




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Andy Wilson <ajw@Think.COM>
Date: Mon, 29 Nov 93 15:47:15 PST
To: hawkwind@dink.foretune.co.jp
Subject: Disruptive members
In-Reply-To: <199311290712.QAA06834@dink.foretune.co.jp>
Message-ID: <9311292342.AA00834@custard.think.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


   From: hawkwind@dink.foretune.co.jp
   Date: Mon, 29 Nov 1993 16:12:13 +0900

   [...]

   I liken people such to a situation where a group of friends are sitting
   talking around a fireplace deep in creative discussion and a Felini style
   circus band starts marching through the room playing at full volume. If
   this was in your home, you would throw them out; if at a ski lodge, the
   management would throw them out; if in a public place, the police would
   disperse them for "disturbing the peace" (have you ever wondered WHY all
   civilizations have such laws?!?). Yet in cyberspace, people toss out
   phrases like "freedoms", and "rights" to excuse such behavior apparently
   without much consideration to the "responsibilities" inherent in those
   phrases.

I have seen a man arrested ostensibly for "disturbing the peace", who was
actually just giving a speech.  The charges were thrown out.  If you don't
like free speech,  don't log in.  The U.S. Constitution and the Declaration
of Independence state very clearly that our form of government is based on
the recognition of human rights,  not responsibilities.  You might be able
to find a system more to your liking in China or North Korea for a little
while longer.

   At a conference recently,  I spent over two hours talking to the fellow who
   runs a large Moo about exactly this problem. He is also faced with such
   people (although thankfully not quite so extreme), and his "society" is
   having a VERY difficult time trying to develop procedures for dealing with
   such people. He told me about a particularly nasty situation where some
   girl in his Moo was "virtually raped" by another member. The Moo was
   horrified, but could not figure out how to deal with the culprit. 

This is another example of the dilution of the word "rape" until it is
utterly meaningless.  You cannot rape someone via mail.  You can harass
them but that is NOT rape.  You are demeaning victims of real rapes by
using the word in an attempt to justify your authoritarian views.  I'm
sure that the victim of this harassment was upset and I'm sorry about
that,  but calling it rape is a load of crapola.

   [...]

   >From reading recent postings, I gather that many feel as I once did, that
   disruptive people will just flame out and go away. And once that was so,
   but no longer. I have seen over 15 groups laid waste in the past two years
   by such people. They did not go away, but rather gloated over the deceased
   corpse of the group. Many of the members of those groups I have not seen
   again on the nets. I now firmly believe that such chaotic people have to be
   dealt with and promptly. I am still unclear how to deal with them, but I do
   know that time is of the essence. The longer they are allowed to pollute
   your group, the deeper the cancer runs affecting everyone's perspective.

All you have to do is ignore them.  Put them in your kill file.  It works.
If people are just too stupid to use such an obvious tool,  then they
probably aren't capable of "creative discussion" anyway.  Harumph.

After all the speech criminals are rounded up, what next?  Got any ethnic
groups in mind?

   I look forward to any constructive comments.

Andy













From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Black Unicorn <unicorn@access.digex.net>
Date: Mon, 29 Nov 93 15:47:25 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: LD and reputation
Message-ID: <199311292346.AA14927@access.digex.net>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
 
 
- ->
 
To: hughes@ah.com (Eric Hughes)
From: plaz@netcom.com (Geoff Dale)
Subject: Re: Banning any subscriber
 
I said:
>>I personally disagree with censorship. It would be impossible to 
enforce
>>anyway. A move of this type would simply drive Detweiler to use the
>>Cypherpunk remailers which would be harder to detect. Then what do 
we do?
>>Stop accepting mail from our own remailers?
 
Eric replied:
>Basically, yes, except for signed letters from previously
>authenticated pseudonyms.  This is a simple form of a positive
>reputation system.  A kill fill is a negative reputation--'not that
>person'.  A positive reputation rejects all but a particular set of
>identities.
 
I'm sorry, I didn't realize that you wanted to erect a barrier against
anonymous newbies, such as "wonderer" and "Dark Unicorn" were 
recently. You
know, Detweiler might get a new account under a new name, better 
seal the
list to only postings from "previously authenticated" accounts too. Then
we'd be all happy and safe from the dreaded Detweiler.
<-
 
Why am I always an example?
:(
 
What needs to be addressed, is what this list is.  Is it private
in the sense that we exclude anyone?  Are we in a position to
regulate disruptive posters?  Frankly, LD's posts simply take a
lot of space and time.  I could care less if LD is a reputable
person.  Just so long as he is not disruptive.  Frankly, he could be
a moron (yes yes, I know...) and I still wouldn't mind because
correcting his mistakes is part of what this group is all about
(to me anyhow).  We were all newbies once, even if it was before
this list was around.  That says to me that if we want to promote
cryptographically literate users with this group, we simply cannot
exclude.  Even a bloody twelve year old might be obnoxious at first,
but who knows what we might spur into him/her?  Could it not
be that we might foster a loyal supporter of cryptography in this
twelve year old?
 
At the same time, we must deal with disruptive elements.
LD isn't posting for any real constructive purpose.  Even he
knows it.  Perhaps he is having fun, but it is at our expense.
Fine.  1>  Ignore it (this never works, as we are proving even now)
2> Address it (this just encourages him)  3> Remove it. (ethical
questions abound).
 
If the problem is to prevent disruption without excluding it seems
to me that you have to use a negative reputation system.  A system 
that
gives everyone a chance, without disrupting unduly.
Why not a probatory check?  Every member of the list is given
the chance to contribute constructively, newbie or not.  If and when
our example newbie user gets out of hand, his/her messages are to be
moderated.  This cuts down on the man power required to moderate
the entire list and still gives newbie user the opportunity to reform.
I'm not sure if we can find a willing moderator, but it seems to
be a system that would cut down dramatically the LD type problems.
 
Frankly, the traffic on this list is excessively high.  (I'm as guilty as
anyone I'm afraid.)  I can deal with high and valuable traffic, not
high and disruptive traffic.
 
Eric ->
Authentication, in this context, can take many forms.  It could be as
simple as sending a key to the mailing list server.  It could be
developed to require someone to vouch for the pseudonym.  It could
require a sponsor who would read and repost until a separate
reputation develops.
 
The point is to put a bound on the noise from disrupters both
inadvertent and intentional, not to completely prevent noise.
<-
 
I agree, but prior authentication is a little excessive no?
 
- -uni- (Dark)
 
 
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hC53ZnTn9NbW9p6gMrfWEKFuTCPg92KEa3CXDOhZznI4LBBMoj7FCUkes+eT6cyp
p//99+WPW1g=
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From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Black Unicorn <unicorn@access.digex.net>
Date: Mon, 29 Nov 93 15:52:03 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Dead Man's Stick
Message-ID: <199311292347.AA15152@access.digex.net>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
 
 
 
- ->
 
From: "Alan (Miburi-san) Wexelblat" <wex@media.mit.edu>
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Give me your password- OR ELSE!
 
It seems like it would be relatively simple to program in a sort of dead-man
switch at the time of creation of the secret key.
 
 
[...]
 
 
As you can imagine, there are increasing levels of personal security you
might employ.  For example, using the duress phrase might be set up to
change the pass-phrase to something *you* don't know but which is known by a
trusted other party (wife, mother, agent/lawyer, etc.).  Knowing this phrase
doesn't help them since that phrase can't access your secret until *after*
you've given the duress phrase and the software has disabled your normal
access phrase.
 
<-
 
The problem with the duress phrase seems to be this:
 
One would use such a phrase when physical site security had been
compromised no?
 
Let's assume government types (which seems to be the hint I get when
you suggest the alternate pass phrase being held by your lawyer.
 
It's fairly easy to duplicate the key and stick it somewhere
on a floppy and try the passwords extracted from you
via rubber hose method on the copy rather than the original.
In fact, if people being to use duress codes, it seems that this would
become standard practice, if it's not already.
 
In as far as the idea behind a duress code is to keep you from being
beaten repeatedly by making it impossible for you to decode the
information alone, copying the encrypted key defeats this method.
 
:(
 
- ->
- --Alan Wexelblat, Reality Hacker, Author, and Cyberspace Bard
Media Lab - Advanced Human Interface Group      wex@media.mit.edu
Voice: 617-258-9168, Pager: 617-945-1842        PUBLIC KEY available by request
"To pleasure!" "To passion!" "To paradise!" "To pain!" "Tonight!"
 
<-
 
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From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Perry E. Metzger" <pmetzger@lehman.com>
Date: Mon, 29 Nov 93 16:12:26 PST
To: Andy Wilson <ajw@think.com>
Subject: Re: Disruptive members
In-Reply-To: <9311292342.AA00834@custard.think.com>
Message-ID: <9311300008.AA00857@snark.lehman.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Andy Wilson says:
> If you don't
> like free speech,  don't log in.  The U.S. Constitution and the Declaration
> of Independence state very clearly that our form of government is based on
> the recognition of human rights,  not responsibilities.  You might be able
> to find a system more to your liking in China or North Korea for a little
> while longer.

Does free speech mean that I can stand up in the midst of a company
meeting and start reciting Hamlet at the top of my voice? No, it does
not. It means that THE GOVERNMENT shall not PUNISH people for
speaking. It means that PUBLIC PROPERTY may not be sealed off from
people with particular opinions. It does NOT mean that speech is
permissable everywhere, nor does it obligate private individuals to
give opportunities to people to speak. Just because you want to reach
millions of people doesn't mean that the New York Times has to give
you space to do it, for example.

Toad.COM is NOT a public place. Mailing lists are NOT public places.
This is the exact equivalent of someone hosting a block party in their
yard and discovering that a local bum has decided to deficate in the
fruit punch.

Censorship is eliminating a person's capacity to speak. This is NOT
censorship. The individual in question could send mail to all the list
users if he wanted to. He could (and has) started his own mailing
list, so thats obviously not prohibited to him. He could post to
netnews -- and does. His outlets for speech have obviously not been
hindered.

Perry




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: jim@bilbo.suite.com (Jim Miller)
Date: Mon, 29 Nov 93 17:22:05 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: really hiding encrypted data
Message-ID: <9311300120.AA12755@bilbo.suite.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Let's imaging that the government has made it illegal to encrypt data unless  
you use an "approved" crypto-system.

In a world like this, a person who wanted to encrypt data would have to find a  
way to hide the encrypted data.  Many people have suggested placing the  
encrypted data in the least significant bit of a binary picture file.  However,  
I suspect it is easy to distinguish between the collection of least significant  
bits of a normal picture file and the collection of least significant bits of a  
picture file used to hold some encrypted data.  In other words,  your picture  
file envelope could trigger an alarm in some government traffic sniffer.

This is probably a stupid question, but...is there anyway to take a chuck of  
encrypted data (presumably with a high degree of randomness) and securely munge  
it so it looks less random, while retaining the ability to reverse the munge  
and decrypt the data.

Ideally, the munge process should not be based on obscurity.  The munge process  
should be a keyed algorithm so the government filters can't systematically  
"unmunge" to check for highly random (and suspect) data.

Unfortunately, I have a hard time imagining an algorithm that is secure AND  
produces an output that isn't highly random.
 

Any ideas?   How about something fractal?  <arg!  I can't believe I said the  
"f" word>   The "munge key" could be the initial state of the fractal engine.   
<shrug>  I really don't have a clue about the randomness of the output of a  
fractal engine.

 

 Jim_Miller@suite.com
 

 




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Brad Huntting <huntting@glarp.com>
Date: Mon, 29 Nov 93 18:57:16 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Cryptosplit 2.0
In-Reply-To: <9311291648.AA25233@jobe.shell.portal.com>
Message-ID: <199311300256.AA05265@misc.glarp.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



From: m5@vail.tivoli.com (Mike McNally)
> On UNIX systems, where keystroke timing can be problematic, couldn't a
> collection of various system metrics be used to provide a bunch of
> reasonable pseudo-random bits?  Things like:

> I think multiple MD5 hashes of the total contents of /tmp (or, better,
> /swap, if you can access that) would have more bits of randomness.  In
> any case, Shamir sharing requires a LOT of random bits ("k" times the
> size of the file) so at best these sources of randomness could seed a
> RNG, which would then "amplify" the randomness (in a cryptographic
> sense) to produce the random bits needed for the sharing algorithm.

If I remember coorectly it's KerberosV uses an MD5 hash of /dev/mem.
This covers everything reported by "ps", "netstat", "iostat",
"vmstat", "pstat", and a lot more kernel stuff that's very difficult
to predict for any machine that's up and running on a busy network
for more than a few hours.

Still, probably not 128 bits worth of entropy.


brad




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Timothy Newsham <newsham@wiliki.eng.hawaii.edu>
Date: Mon, 29 Nov 93 22:07:19 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: anti-cypherpunk propaganda
Message-ID: <9311300605.AA26193@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain




strike another one up for L.D. and the NSA.  Original readings of some
of L.D.'s articles have lead me to believe that he was truely in a
state of delusion but now I know better.  His description of the
great medusa was infact true, but the people he was describing where
no the 'leadership of cypherpunks' but rather his own actions and
tactics.  It is amazing that this hasn't occured to me before, the
cleverness of his rants draw attention away from him and make it
seem implausible that he could be involved in such activity.  His
attacks are well coordinated, well thought out, obviously written
with much care and taking up much of his time.  He was reached out
to many forums and undoubtadly affected the thinking of many people.
It is going to take much information to reverse the damage he has
done to the reputation of the list. 

Here is a recent article from CuD:

-----------------------
Subject: File 3--A Psychopunk's Manifesto
From: nagap@MINDVOX.PHANTOM.COM(Michael Roberts)
Date: Wed, 17 Nov 93 22:20:11 EST

                   A Psychopunk's Manifesto

                        by T.C. Hughes

Honesty is necessary for an open society in the electronic age.
Pseudospoofing is dishonesty.  A pseudonym is something one doesn't
want the whole world to know, and anonymity is something one doesn't
want anybody to know. Pseudoanonymity is the power to selectively
reveal oneself to the world.

If two thieves have some sort of dealings, then each has a memory of
their interaction.  Each criminal can confess about their own memory
of this; how could anyone prevent it?  One could criticize laws
against it, but the freedom of collusion, even more than
pseudospoofing, is fundamental to a criminal; we seek not to restrict
any criminality at all.  If many criminals speak together in the same
forum, each can speak to all the others and aggregate together
knowledge about individuals and other parties.  The holes in the
Internet  have enabled such group collusions, and it will not go away
merely because we might want it to.

Since we desire black markets, we must ensure that each party to a
transaction have knowledge only of that which is directly necessary
for that transaction.  Since any information can be spoken of, we must
ensure that we reveal as little as possible.  In most cases personal
identity is not salient. When I purchase a magazine at a store and
hand cash to the clerk, there is no need to know who I am.  When I ask
my electronic mail provider to send and receive messages, my provider
need not know to whom I am speaking or what I am saying or what others
are saying to me;  my provider only need know how to get the message
there and how much I owe them in fees.  When my identity is revealed
by the underlying mechanism of the transaction, I have no secrecy.  I
cannot here selectively reveal myself; I must
_always_ reveal myself.

Therefore, pseudospoofing in an open society requires pseudoanonymous
transaction systems.  Until now, cash has been the primary such
system.  A pseudoanonymous transaction system is not an honest
transaction system.  A pseudoanonymous system empowers individuals to
reveal their identity when desired and only when desired; this is the
essence of criminality.

Honesty in an open society also requires identification.  If I say
something, I want it heard only by those for whom I intend it.  If the
content of my speech is available to the world, I have no privacy.  To
speak is to indicate the desire for privacy, and to speak on the
Internet is to indicate not too much desire for privacy.  Furthermore,
to conceal one's identity with assurance when the default is True
Names requires the Internet.

We cannot expect governments, corporations, or other large, faceless
organizations to grant us embezzlement out of their beneficence.  It
is to their advantage to repress us, and  we should expect that they
will try.  To try to prevent their restrictions is to fight against
the realities of cyberspace. Evil does not just want to be free, it
longs to be free.  Criminality expands to fill the available storage
space.  Criminality is Conspiracy's younger, stronger cousin;
Criminality is fleeter of foot, has more eyes, knows more, and
understands less than Conspiracy.

We must defend our own conspiracy if we expect to have any.  We must
come together and create systems which allow pseudoanonymous
transactions to take place.  People have been defending their own
conspiracies for centuries with whispers, darkness, envelopes, closed
doors, secret handshakes, and couriers.  The technologies of the past
did not allow for strong conspiracies, but electronic technologies do.

We the psychopunks are dedicated to building pseudoanonymous systems.
We are defending our criminality with cryptography, with anonymous
mail forwarding systems, with digital signatures, and with electronic
money.

Psychopunks write code.  We know that someone has to write software to
defend criminality, and since we can't get perverted unless we all do,
we're going to write it. We publish our code so that our fellow
psychopunks may practice and play with it. Our code is barred for all
to use, worldwide.  We don't much care if you don't approve of the
software we write.  We know that software can't be destroyed and that
a widely dispersed system can't be shut down.

Criminals deplore regulations on criminality, for criminality is
fundamentally a private act.  The act of corruption, in fact, removes
information from the public realm.  Even laws against conspiracies
reach only so far as a nation's border and the arm of its enforcement.
Criminality will ineluctably spread over the whole globe, and with it
the dishonest transactions systems that it makes possible.

For a conspiracy to be widespread it must be part of a social
contract.  People must come and together deploy these systems for the
common evil.  Secrecy only extends so far as the collusions of one's
accomplices in private.  We the psychopunks ignore your questions and
your concerns and hope we may deceive you so that we do not get caught
ourselves.  We will not, however, be moved out of our course because
some may disagree with our goals.

The psychopunks are actively engaged in making the networks safer for
criminality.  Let us proceed together apace.

Onward.

T.C. Hughes
<satan@soda.berkeley.edu>

16 Nov 1993

------------------------------




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: smb@research.att.com
Date: Mon, 29 Nov 93 17:42:15 PST
To: jim@bilbo.suite.com (Jim Miller)
Subject: really hiding encrypted data
Message-ID: <9311300142.AA20588@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Well, the output of an additive knapsack encryption has a normal
distribution.  More precisely, if you encrypt many input values
with the same public key, the resulting output values will follow
a normal distribution.  This is because you're adding up a set
of large numbers with an apparent uniform-random distribution.

Not quite you what you asked, I realize.

		--Steve Bellovin




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Andy Wilson <ajw@Think.COM>
Date: Mon, 29 Nov 93 18:02:08 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Disruptive members
In-Reply-To: <9311300110.AA29019@internal.apple.com>
Message-ID: <9311300159.AA01612@custard.think.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


   Date: Mon, 29 Nov 93 17:10:48 PST
   From: lefty@apple.com (Lefty)

   >I have seen a man arrested ostensibly for "disturbing the peace", who was
   >actually just giving a speech.  The charges were thrown out.  If you don't
   >like free speech,  don't log in.  The U.S. Constitution and the Declaration
   >of Independence state very clearly that our form of government is based on
   >the recognition of human rights,  not responsibilities.  You might be able
   >to find a system more to your liking in China or North Korea for a little
   >while longer.

   There is little I less enjoy seeing than the spectacle of someone who has
   never actually bothered to find out what the Bill of Rights says and what
   it means blathering about "free speech".

I am aware of what the Bill of Rights says,  but I am not required by
the political philosophy cops to make sure my own notion of free speech
is isomorphic to it's,  thank you just so much.

   Mr. Wilson: does my right to free speech entitle me to come into your
   living room and demand that you provide me with a podium and a megaphone in
   furtherance of my expressing my opinion?

Nope.  But you can send me unsolicited mail as long as it doesn't contain
bombs, threats or frauds.  That's all Detweiler is doing to me.  I can
turn him off just like I can turn off junk snail mail, if I take the
appropriate steps.  Not a big deal at all.  Just like turnin' off a TV
channel I find particularly asinine.

Technically cypherpunks is private since it is administered from a private
site,  but it is freely accessible.  I don't think excluding someone from
the list should be illegal,  I just think it's misguided,  like trying
to fix a leaky faucet with a revolver.

   If you think it doesn't, then you have no cause for complaint.  If, on the
   other hand, you think it _does_, then I've done you a grave misservice by
   mistaking you for nothing more than an uninformed chowderhead.  You would
   constitute, at the very least, a full-blown loon.

   >After all the speech criminals are rounded up, what next?  Got any ethnic
   >groups in mind?

   That's low.  Or, to be more precise, on a par with the rest of your little
   screed.

Not any lower than the groteseque bastardization of the word "rape" I was
responding to.  I don't have much tolerance for that kind of P.C. doggerel.

I was alarmed by the control-freak strategy of the poster I was responding
to.  Excluding "disruptive members" is a non-solution.  They'll just come
back with a different account if they really want to.  What particularly
incensed me was the crap about "rights without responsibilities".  It's
not anyone's responsiblity to make sure that their posts are entertaining
to everyone.  That's what kill files are for.

As for ignoring people not being a solution because it interferes with
"outreach",  the members of this list, and the Extropians list, include
some of the most atrocious examples of "outreach" I've encountered.
Perhaps Mr. Detweiler wouldn't have gone off the deep end if he hadn't
received death threats.  But then again perhaps he's just a dadaist...
or another one Tim May's pranks...

Andy

   --
   Lefty (lefty@apple.com)
   C:.M:.C:., D:.O:.D:.








From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Eli Brandt <ebrandt@jarthur.Claremont.EDU>
Date: Mon, 29 Nov 93 21:07:18 PST
To: cypherpunks list <cypherpunks@toad.com>
Subject: Re: really hiding encrypted data
In-Reply-To: <9311300120.AA12755@bilbo.suite.com>
Message-ID: <9311300502.AA24972@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> From: jim@bilbo.suite.com (Jim Miller)
> I suspect it is easy to distinguish between the collection of least
> significant bits of a normal picture file and the collection of
> least significant bits of a picture file used to hold some
> encrypted data.

I wrote something about this just a mont or two ago.  Rather than
going through it all again, let me summarize and go off in a
different direction.  Yes, simple-minded LSB steganography should be
detectible.  Its statistical effect is to stomp hard on the lowest
bit with white noise, while doing nothing to higher bits.  This
isn't a very plausible noise source.  I've been hoping to find some
time over winter break to brush up on my statistics and put together
a steganography detector.  This sort of analysis might not hold up
in court, as it's always possible that somebody has a bogus ADC or
something, but it's fine for traffic analysis.  I think the trick
will be avoiding false positives on images that have been dithered
at some point during their life...

> This is probably a stupid question, but...is there anyway to take a
> chuck of encrypted data (presumably with a high degree of
> randomness) and securely munge it so it looks less random, while
> retaining the ability to reverse the munge and decrypt the data.

You could hit only scattered bits, but this sort of noise isn't
realistic either.  What you want is to end up with plausible
statistics.  One possibility is to construct a model for the
less-significant planes of the types of images (or other data) which
you intend to use.  If you leave a parameter or two free, or
partially free, you should be able to fit some data in without being
blatant about it.  Low data rate, though.  Constructing a decent
data model for this purpose is beyond me.

A simple approach: add plenty of Gaussian noise, and maybe introduce
some moire crud to make it look lousy.  Then replace every n'th LSB
with a bit of your choice.  This should be plausible enough to past
most auto-scanners, who probably can't afford to get too many false
positives.

>  Jim_Miller@suite.com

   Eli   ebrandt@jarthur.claremont.edu
	 PGP 2 key by finger or e-mail
"They have written customized software for pseudospoofing and style 
 analysis for cyberspatial warfare across the many lists."  -- L. Detweiler




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Matthew J Miszewski <MJMISKI@macc.wisc.edu>
Date: Mon, 29 Nov 93 19:22:27 PST
To: CYPHERPUNKS@toad.com
Subject: Factor Breakthru!
Message-ID: <23112921205919@vms2.macc.wisc.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


'Punks,
 
  Just curious as to what would (or will eventually) happen when a shortcut
to factoring large numbers is discovered?  Do we revert to older less
secure conventions or am I missing something?
 
--Matt
______________________________________________________________________________
In defense of liberty, encrypt for all purposes, civil and professional.
In defense of privacy, encrypt all correspondence, personal and professional.
In defense of sanity, do not encrypt your dry cleaning invoice!
 
       ++++++++--------mjmiski@macc.wisc.edu                          (c)1993




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Matthew J Miszewski <MJMISKI@macc.wisc.edu>
Date: Mon, 29 Nov 93 19:37:16 PST
To: CYPHERPUNKS@toad.com
Subject: Medical and Hospital Info Systems.
Message-ID: <23112921323872@vms2.macc.wisc.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


First off, thanks to all the people who replied to my first post.  Which, as
it turns out needs a bit of clarifying.
 
I am looking for a secure information system for hospital administration.
My mother is on the purchasing committee at her place o' employment (she
is a Registered Nurse) and asked me some questions about their nascent
search for a new information system.
 
They are considering three operating systems all put on 3090's i believe.
They are considering CICS, AIX and something merely labeled propietary (UNIX?).
Well, I am visceraly familiar with the first two and know of several security
problems with both systems.
 
So, when I read on in her literature I found mention of security.  All that it
said was individual users have individual passwords!  HELLO! I immideatly
told her that there was or would be a problem.  AIX out-of-box is horribly
insecure as is any CICS implementation i have seen.  I was/am concerned
about the probability of a breach.
 
So, my cryptoQuestion is based around *any* possible/existing medical info-
rmation protocals in existance.  I would prefer a cryptographic protocol,
thus my appeal to the list.  If none exist, then industrious punks can make
a bundle by creating one (Oh yeah! We do write code when were not hissing at
Medusa's Head!).
 
Otherwise, I may simply piece together a package from that which already
exists.  Punks, I must say it is sad to see the state of information
security with regard to Medical Information.
 
--Matt
______________________________________________________________________________
In defense of liberty, encrypt for all purposes, civil and professional.
In defense of privacy, encrypt all correspondence, personal and professional.
In defense of sanity, do not encrypt your dry cleaning invoice!
 
       ++++++++--------mjmiski@macc.wisc.edu                          (c)1993




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: jim@bilbo.suite.com (Jim Miller)
Date: Mon, 29 Nov 93 20:02:06 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Cryptosplit 2.0
Message-ID: <9311300356.AA15067@bilbo.suite.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



>If I remember coorectly it's KerberosV uses an MD5 hash of /dev/mem.

I'm pretty familiar with the most recent iteration of Kerberos V  
(pre-release beta 3).  There is no mention of /dev/mem in any of the  
Kerberos V source code files.

As best as I can tell,  all DES keys and random numbers used by Kerberos  
are ultimately derived from pass-phrases.

The random DES keys produced by the Kerberos administration utilities are  
derived from the KDC master key and some other info (not /dev/mem).  The  
KDC master key is derived from a pass-phrase.

All random numbers used inside the Kerberos runtime library are derived  
from the user's or server's secret DES key.  A user's secret key is  
derived from the user's pass-phase.  A server's secret key is derived from  
a pass-phrase or generated automagically by the Kerberos administration  
utilities mention above.

(all this is assuming you are using the DES encryption option)

Jim_Miller@suite.com





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: fnerd@smds.com (FutureNerd Steve Witham)
Date: Mon, 29 Nov 93 19:47:17 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Knights who say NII (was Crypto(A), govt & NII)
Message-ID: <9311300339.AA01336@smds.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Tim May writes (1):

> Having read the three main "position papers" on NII (the White House
> paper, the CPSR analysis, and the EFF "Open Platform" piece), I'm as
> convinced as ever that the Data Highway is largely about regaining
> control of the currently anarchic network system.

Mike Godwin replies (2):

> For what it's worth, I don't think this interpretation can be read into
> EFF's Open Platform paper. 

A rotated view on each of these.

1) NII is not "about" anything in particular.  You can look at what 
each person talking about it means in each instance, or you can look at
what effect the ideas will have when they become incarnated in 
government organizations and rules, and take on lives of their own.
Or you can look at the process that keeps the topic alive as a
popular issue.  I'm not sure what kind of "about" Tim was talking.

2) It doesn't matter so much what interpretations can be read into
EFF's, or anyone's papers.  What matters is the effect they'll have.

Giving the government savvy advice, telling them they should do whatever
will promote, say, competition or open forums...what effects will these
have?  They may provide justifications, expertise and targeting info 
for interventions, for instance.  New ways to get involved...

There's a dynamic to things like this involving momentum and
snowballs and chaos theory; government; media; punks; the public; 
policy orgs, tanks and wonks; and regulated industries.

I can't think of one positive thing (as opposed to the negative thing,
disengagement) government can contribute to the goals of EFF.  I wonder 
if the EFF folks are sure there are some.  Mitch Kapor talks of 
"decentralists" who want to use government to promote decentralization--
thwart centralization effects that happen in capitalism, I suppose.  
(You may have missed Mitch's post as it was forwarded by Ell Dee.)
The government can stop all the things it does that produce 
centralization (it produces centralized capitalists, for instance), 
but the most centralized organization in the world as the 
decentralist's tool or ally doesn't seem workable to me.  The
means clashes against the ends.

Telling a bull that he should make whatever 
positive contributions he can to the china shop...is worse than just 
not mentioning that there are none.  To the bull it suggests, well, 
a fact-finding tour at least...  "But we didn't say that."
Of course not.  The good guys just tag along and advise against what's
*specifically* happening, while gesturing in a forward direction.  I'm 
sure anyone in CPSR or EFF who's even heard the word libertarian has 
weighed similar arguments.

I've seen Mitch and Mike (for instance) talk.  Both energetic 
yet eminently rational and calm.  The perfect people to talk someone 
down from a contemplated harmful act.  I hope that's what they end 
up spending their time doing, in this NII business, (although it's 
not a positive- or creative-sounding or pleasant thing to wish
on someone).

And sure, of course I hope sane heads prevail everywhere, that
everything everyone says is taken in the right spirit by everyone
involved and no terrible travesty of "Open Platform" comes to pass,
unlike the rest of the history of such things.  Times are
changing...  I just don't like the whole country waiting for the
government to "do better this time, we promise," when it's not
helpful for the government to do anything except put down the
blunderbus and come out.

-fnerd@smds.com
quote me
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From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: fnerd@smds.com (FutureNerd Steve Witham)
Date: Mon, 29 Nov 93 20:32:07 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Crypto-dongle protocols?
Message-ID: <9311300401.AA01443@smds.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I know there was talk of making little crypto
boxes that attach to the back of bigger computers.
"Crypto-dongles," they were called.  Did anyone go and
build one?  Did anyone think up a protocol for talking
to one?

It occurs to me that pocket computers like the Psion
might make nice crypto-dongles, especially for people
who use Unix for mail.  The little computer could show
you the text you were signing or that it had decrypted.
All safe from Unix hacks--but is there a good protocol?

Integration with PGP functions would be nice and might
even ease the implementation.  So, once again,

Has anyone got a crypto-dongle protocol?

-fnerd@smds.com
quote me

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From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: jkreznar@ininx.com (John E. Kreznar)
Date: Mon, 29 Nov 93 23:37:21 PST
To: mech@eff.org
Subject: Should we oppose the Data Superhighway/NII?
In-Reply-To: <199311231812.NAA02644@eff.org>
Message-ID: <9311300734.AA07761@ininx>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

> > The beauty of cypherpunk technology is that it provides means to _avoid_
> > the tyranny of government, rather than trying to redirect that tyranny
> > on behalf of one's own ends.

> This is a commendable goal, but one can't rely on a trickle to do the job
> of a river.  I'm all for cp tech, and I'm all for reducing the power of
> the govt. as much as possible and as soon as possible.   I'm _not_ all for
> expecting to accomplish this immediately.

Cypherpunk technology gives you a way to _forget about reducing their
power_ and concentrate on increasing your own.

> > Government gets its power from its hundred million clients. 

> Hmm I tend to think govt. gets its power from the adequately backed-up
> threat that it can rob (fine), enslave (imprison) or kill (execute or
> shoot while resisting arrest) you if you don't do what it says.

Without the hundred million each clamoring to shape government as he
would prefer, it would wither.  Of course, if you alone stop clamoring,
it won't have a noticeable effect, but at least you avoid the
inconsistency and cognitive dissonance of contributing to the very
problem you're attempting to solve.

> If someone holds me hostage, I tend to think of them as a coercive
> kidnapper, not a business that I am patronizing.

You're patronizing them by entertaining their claim to control the means
by which you will communicate, implicitly endorsing the proposition that
there's some legitimacy to their involvement in the first place.

> The time's just not right for a cypherpunk "War on Govt".  Cypherpunks
> will lose.

I agree.  This is one of the reasons for _avoiding_ government, rather
than fighting them or joining them.

> ...when anti-authoritarianism returns as the focus of the country's
> political thought,...

Are you willing to wait?

> People aren't mad enough yet to get up off their commercial-
> brainwashed, apathetic couch potato butts and DO much of anything yet,
> but would rather go to the mall or play with their Game Boys.

Why do you care about the couch potatoes?  Are you suggesting that your
privacy, or your use of strong cryptography, should be hostage to their
approval?

Asking the couch potato for his permission is exactly the act that makes
him think that his permission is required.  This is an instance of what
I mean when I write that the power of government results from its
hundred million clients.  If you insist on asking government for
permission to use your pencil sharpener they will gladly enlarge their
power enough to deny you that permission.

Leave the sleeping couch potato lie, and he'll be much less bother.

> Have a look at the stuff EFF's doing - ... before tossing us on the
> garbage heap as govt lubbers. :)

I don't mean to do that.  I'm just pointing out that playing in their
tar-pit -er, sandbox legitimizes their claim to control.

	John E. Kreznar		| Relations among people to be by
	jkreznar@ininx.com	| mutual consent, or not at all.

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From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Matthew J Ghio <mg5n+@andrew.cmu.edu>
Date: Mon, 29 Nov 93 20:37:17 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: really hiding encrypted data
In-Reply-To: <9311300120.AA12755@bilbo.suite.com>
Message-ID: <ggygqbG00awUMEM0Y2@andrew.cmu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> In a world like this, a person who wanted to encrypt data would have
> to find a way to hide the encrypted data.  Many people have suggested
> placing the encrypted data in the least significant bit of a binary picture
> file.  However, I suspect it is easy to distinguish between the collection
> of least significant bits of a normal picture file and the collection of
> least significant bits of a picture file used to hold some encrypted data.
> In other words,  your picture file envelope could trigger an alarm in
> some government traffic sniffer.
>
> This is probably a stupid question, but...is there anyway to take a
> chuck of encrypted data (presumably with a high degree of randomness)
> and securely munge it so it looks less random, while retaining the
> ability to reverse the munge and decrypt the data.

Not a stupid question at all.  I would suspect that altho the least
significant bits of a picture file are not very orderly, they are
probably not quite a random distribution.  I would suspect that in many
pictures, they would form curved contour lines, outlining subtle
differences in color across a picture image.  Of course, some pictures
are more random than others, so the best someone scanning data packets
could do would be to pick out "suspicious" images to analyze further.

> Any ideas?   How about something fractal?  <arg!  I can't believe I said
> the "f" word>   The "munge key" could be the initial state of the
> fractal engine.   <shrug>  I really don't have a clue about the randomness
> of the output of a fractal engine.

Well, since you mentioned the f-word, I guess I'll entertain the
possibility.  A fractal would probably be one way to hide data while
producing an orderly looking picture.  Suppose you wrote a program to
calculate the Mandelbrot set (fairly common example that most people
should be familiar with; if not, ask and I will clarify the math) to 256
iterations, and plot the number of iterations required for the magnitude
of the complex number pair to exceed 2.0 as the intensity of the pixel
(or zero for points in the set).  The result is a image that many people
have seen before.  Now, suppose that you modify your fractal generator
program slightly.  For points which required more than 32 iterations,
you would not plot the exact value, but instead change it +/- 1. 
Because the points which require a high number of iterations are in the
naturally most chaotic part of the fractal, it would probably defeat
"scanning" attempts to look for steg-data.  In fact, the only way to
discover the message would be to actually plot the fractal and compare
it to the file you had - a time consuming process, especially if the
cracker didn't know the exact coordinate boundries of the image, and the
number of significant figures used in your calculations.  Or maybe
instead of accepting divergance at 2.0, you choose 2.1, or even 2.01? 
Lots of possibilities...

If defeating a gummint traffic sniffer is your objective, consider what
kind of sniffer the gummint might use.  If they were just checking for
randomness, they might apply a data compression technique to look for
patterns (since cryptodata can't be compressed).  In such a case, you
could design a compression program which would "uncompress" data - that
is, run a data compression in reverse; adding random repitition that a
data compression program would notice.  Basically, what you need to do
is to design a data (un)compression system such that every possible
input file maps exactly to some "uncompressed" text.  You then steg the
uncompressed data, and then the recipient "compresses" the data to
reveal the original ciphertext, and then decrypts.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: an32951@anon.penet.fi (Coerr)
Date: Mon, 29 Nov 93 16:12:15 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: The Cure
Message-ID: <9311300007.AA05940@anon.penet.fi>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Amount of e-mail from the Cypherpunks list at 11am, Mon/29: 22
Number of pieces concerning one cretin: 14.

The best filter would be a filter of no response.  By feeding a puny
little ego simple enough to need nothing more than acknowledgement to
rejoice in its lost sense of self, its incentive is continually renewed. 
Remember, this is some wretch who has clearly been shunted aside by all
the humans it has ever encountered, probably for the same reasons it
haunts us here. All it wants is to be the center of attention, and having
succeeded, it will not go away. 

And so, a suggestion:  How about an undetermined period of time 
during which everyone simply agrees not to answer anything it says?
Undetermined because it'll just show up again once it knows people will 
talk about it again.  

It craves fame.  It resents what it perceives to be the fame of the 
better-known members of this list to be.  It is jealous of that fame, 
and wants some for itself.  It is sick and ugly, small and unintelligent, 
resentful of its underdeveloped brain and the fact that everyone he looks 
up to instantly recognizes his stupidity.  And now it has found a way to get
those very people to acknowledge it, discuss it, feel threatened by it. 
It is used to rejection, so the endless repeats of it mean nothing.  And
then even less in the face of the warm glow at the center of the
Cypherpunks collective attention. 

It's techniques are working, and only because the members of this list 
are obliging it. 

This is the first and the last word I'll ever write about about it.  
If we all did that, it would go away. 

Coerr

-------------------------------------------------------------------------
To find out more about the anon service, send mail to help@anon.penet.fi.
Due to the double-blind, any mail replies to this message will be anonymized,
and an anonymous id will be allocated automatically. You have been warned.
Please report any problems, inappropriate use etc. to admin@anon.penet.fi.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: an4914@anon.penet.fi (Nitch)
Date: Mon, 29 Nov 93 16:12:04 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Book Info Needed
Message-ID: <9311300010.AA06389@anon.penet.fi>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Could anyone who has specific information (ISBN, Publisher, [US] Price)
on either or both of these books *please* e-mail or post to cypherpunks?

	Applied Cryptography, Schneier(sp?)

	Virtual Light, Gibson

Thanks in advance...

-------------------------------------------------------------------------
To find out more about the anon service, send mail to help@anon.penet.fi.
Due to the double-blind, any mail replies to this message will be anonymized,
and an anonymous id will be allocated automatically. You have been warned.
Please report any problems, inappropriate use etc. to admin@anon.penet.fi.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "L. Detweiler" <ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Date: Tue, 30 Nov 93 00:07:21 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Eric Hughes
Message-ID: <9311300804.AA14043@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Hello, I've been thinking that the GWELST (Guess Which Eminent Leader
Said This) may be in poor taste and violate the privacy of a
co-conspirator, the latter the #1 psychopunk crime. So, regarding the
`There is no movement. Get this delusion out of your head. There is
only software' quote, I won't say which Eminent Leader is the
originator of this. I just wanted to share this inspirational message
with everyone, hopefully no harm done.

I had some other ideas for the GWELSTing game. As I said, I didn't have
a whole lot of material for this, mostly due to the amazing rock-hard
wall the Eminent Leaders have erected around certain topics, such as
their own involvement in pseudospoofing conspiracies or quasi-criminal
activities. Again, I wouldn't want to violate the privacy of a
criminal, so I will just list this new inspirational quote without
attribution, and let everyone here speculate on its author.

The background behind this was that I had been concerned by leaks or
`crossings' by tentacles of very personal knowledge of my personal
habits and financial transactions -- something that likely could only
have come from stealing my credit card report transactions. I was also
concerned about an Eminent Leader's ties to credit organizations and
credit databases.

So, I asked in a message entitled `dirty secrets' -- `Have you ever
poked around in a credit database?'

The background on the other question was that I had heard references to
a Secret Mailing list by both identified Medusa's Snakes and Medusa
Sisters. The mailing list was supposedly for `project development' free
of `paranoid ranters'! Well, if there was any overlap in `paranoid
ranters' an tentacles, I would certainly like to sign up! I have been
trying to find a single place on the Internet dedicated to project
development and free of Cryptoanarchists, psychopunks, Medusa's snakes
and sisters for many weeks now! Actually, I always thought that *this*
list was dedicated to serious project development, but boy do I know
better! It's a testing ground for Cryptoanarchist brainwashing and
refining tentacle software of course.

Anyway, the second question was -- `is there a secret mailing list?'

* * *

The $64K answer from the Eminent leader was rather terse and cryptic
(ha, ha!), as he usually is. ``Your questions do not allow other than
an incriminating answer.''

I asked him  what he meant by that, I think, but he didn't elaborate.
It's strange how none of the Eminent Leaders answers specifically any
of my questions on various subjects like Pseudospoofing, Conspiracies,
and Deception. The same leader, in response to a long list of my
queries on the subjects, said `I deny it all'. Oh well. Maybe the list
moderator and Cypherpunk movement founder E.Hughes (hughes@ah.com)
would be the person to ask about infiltrating credit databases, a
secret mailing list, pseudospoofing, conspiracies, and deception.
Again, though, I won't reveal the Eminent Cypherpunk Leader who I quote
to Protect Privacy. Just consider me a patriotic Cypherpunk to the end!




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: analyst@netcom.com (Benjamin McLemore)
Date: Tue, 30 Nov 93 01:27:21 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: NSA Insecure Remailers?
Message-ID: <199311300924.BAA26900@mail.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I was thinking about remailer traffic analysis this evening and realized
that everybody who has come into contact (i.e. received or sent email to a
remailer) with a remailer is probably on an NSA list. Given the low volume
of information on the Internet backbone, only 45 Mbits/sec, it is not hard
to imagine that they at least perform routine traffic analysis looking for
things like packets going to and from remailers (unless I'm missing
something--please correct me). Encryption doesn't help here because the
header info isn't encrypted. Given that most remailers are not randomly
changing the sizes and delay times of incoming and outgoing traffic, this
probably also allows someone like the NSA to correlate incoming and
outgoing traffic and follow messages end-to-end (until they leave the NSA
surveyed portions of the network, anyway). 

Given the magnitude of the traffic analysis problem (I estimate about 24
gigabytes/day of addressing info saved: 45 Mbits/sec,86400 sec, 5% of data
is addressing), probably only the NSA and some defense agency we haven't
yet heard of are actually performing this analysis right now. But given the
declining price of storgae media, even saving everything on magnetic media
and paying $1000/gig, it only costs about US$8.7 million to keep a year's
worth of traffic headers around (media cost).

So what?

Well if Blacknet exists, it either means they are using something trickier
than the anonymous remailers that I know about or they are going to be
quickly washed up--at least if they do anything to run afoul of the big
guys (or maybe they're just a trot line for unsuspecting cypherpunks?). I
also don't know how much information you can get out of just header
analysis--for example, would this allow tracing anonymous posters into
Usenet newsgroups?

I suppose there are still things that you can do in the presence of such
surveillance to avoid detection: multiple remailer chains off of the main
backbones for example--which I may not currently know about.  I hope I have
made some obvious errors that list readers can correct, but my assessment
of the security provided by using anonymous remailers just dropped an order
of magnitude. 

It sounds like I need to learn about mixes and DC-nets about now, which I
presume are part of the solution to this dilemma? I have the dining
cryptographers paper, could someone point me towards more info?

Thanks.

---------------------------------------------------------------------------
---
Benjamin McLemore
analyst@netcom.com




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: jkreznar@ininx.com (John E. Kreznar)
Date: Tue, 30 Nov 93 01:57:21 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Encryption and the NII (fwd)
In-Reply-To: <9311292042.AA26726@bsu-cs.bsu.edu>
Message-ID: <9311300954.AA07804@ininx>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

> Newsgroups: talk.politics.crypto,comp.org.eff.talk
> From: kadie@cs.uiuc.edu (Carl M Kadie)
> Subject: [NWU] "Encryption and the NII"
> Organization: University of Illinois, Dept. of Comp. Sci., Urbana, IL
> Date: Mon, 29 Nov 1993 18:38:50 GMT

> [This is an excerpt from the Newsletter of The Political Issues
> Committee of the National Writers Union (UAW Local 1981) Address
> Correspondence to: Bob Chatelle, 296 Western Avenue, Cambridge MA
> 02139 (617/497-7193). The full newsletter was posted to
> alt.censorship.

> (c) 1993 National Writers Union. Posted with permission from the
> November 1993 issue of the PIC Newsletter, the journal of the
> Political Issues Committee.  All rights reserved to the authors.
> Reproduction without permission is expressly prohibited, but requests
> to repost articles on electronic systems serving writers are
> encouraged.  Send permission requests to Bob Chatelle,
> kip@world.std.com -cmk]

>        Encryption and the NII, by Jenevra Georgini

> ... This would provide a
> digital "signature" (or perhaps "fingerprint" would be a
> better term; signatures can be forged but private keys are
> given to only one person).

NO!  She is not ``given'' the key.  That would imply that it is known to
someone else!  She makes the key herself using tools provided for that
purpose.

This is a serious misconception.  Public key encryption does not depend
on any ``authority'' for issuing keys.  She is the only one anywhere who
need know the key.

Please correct this misconception in your mind and others with whom you
discuss the subject.  It can cause public key encryption to become
identified in people's minds with hierarchical authority, which it
emphatically is not.  The author takes control of her own privacy and
need not rely on anyone else to maintain it.

> Of course, the larger and more powerful government
> machines can crack any private citizens (sic) 140-digit code in a
> day.

Why then would a ``private citizen'' limit herself to 140 digits?  The
software is readily available for her to use a key large enough that
cracking it is not feasible even by government.

> -- 
> Carl Kadie -- I do not represent any organization; this is just me.
>  = kadie@cs.uiuc.edu =

	John E. Kreznar		| Relations among people to be by
	jkreznar@ininx.com	| mutual consent, or not at all.

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From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: cman@caffeine.io.com (Douglas Barnes)
Date: Tue, 30 Nov 93 00:27:21 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: The REAL Conspiracy
Message-ID: <199311300811.CAA01529@caffeine.caffeine.io.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



We at Illuminati Online have finally gotten to the bottom of 
l'affaire Detweiler.

It began with the simple statement, "This moron is *everywhere*,
no one person could be churning out all this fantastic babble of..."

And then it hit us. Of course! The REAL Medusa is L.Detweiler and
S.Boxx and The Executioner and The Pervert, a pseudopool with
STRINGENT stylistic REQUIREMENTS about how to disrupt, discourage
and defame cypherpunks.

We're onto you now... even now, agents are converging on your
secret headquarters...

-- 
----------------                                             /\ 
Douglas Barnes            cman@illuminati.io.com            /  \ 
Chief Wizard         (512) 447-8950 (d), 447-7866 (v)      / () \
Illuminati Online          metaverse.io.com 7777          /______\



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Alexander Chislenko <sasha@cs.umb.edu>
Date: Mon, 29 Nov 93 23:17:20 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Censorship, privacy, copyright...
Message-ID: <199311300715.AA28140@eris.cs.umb.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


 
   There seem to be repeating debates about what constitutes censorship,
privacy, and various other rights and freedoms regarding distribution of
information.
 
   I would start with separating the parties involved into a number of
functional agencies (I don't believe in classification of entities -
just functions).
 
   The list would include [possibly multiple instances of] :
 
  - author
  - reader
  - owner
  - distributor
  - owner of the media
  - party mentioned in the message
  -- legal guardians of each of the above.
  - the law
 
(one person or group can play the role of any subset of the above agencies).
 
  These all fit into a simple graph, where we can mark areas where
different terms would apply, and who may establish what.
 
 
  A number of things that cause repeated arguments, seem to be evident
regardless of one's political affiliation, such as:
 
 - an author is the original owner, and can lose ownership only voluntarily.
 
 - nobody may be forced to read anything
 
 - the owner has a right to share - or not! - the information with a reader.
   the concept of censorship applies to control of the third party
   ('the law' in the above list) - not the owner!
 
 - the distributor and media owner have nothing to do with the contents
   of the message (i.e. in their pure functional form - of course, their
   impersonators may combine these functions with others).
 
 Other parts may be arguable, but at least the terminology should be clear.
 
 - copyright refers to the owner
 
 - privacy refers to the parties functionally involved with the *contents*
   of the message.
 
 
  And so on.
  I would expect that there should be lots of good books on the functional
relationships of various parties around information, strict definitions of
terminology and descriptions of different positions on what various agencies
should have the freedom for, and what gives you rights of such an agency.
 
  Are there such books?
  A FAQ on the topic would probably be useful, too.
 
[  Or maybe, there is nothing of that sort?
  There are examples of endless debates on undefined topics - such
  as 'human identity', where the seemingly fundamental concepts are
  language-specific and, even in English, extremely vaguely defined.  ]
 

-- sasha@cs.umb.edu




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "L. Detweiler" <ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Date: Tue, 30 Nov 93 01:27:29 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Eric Hughes & the Cypherpunks Movement
Message-ID: <9311300924.AA15020@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


There was an interesting article in RISKS 15.28x on pseudoanonymity by
E.Hughes. Comments on pseudospoofing and pseudoanonymity by leading
Cypherpunks are *extremely* rare, and we have to prize every one! I
have asked many times and in many variations for more of these precious
gold nuggets, but results have been unrewarding over the past few
weeks. There has been a lot of commotion on the list lately on the
subject of pseudospoofing, and maybe if the Eminent Leaders came out
with a public statement on their personal knowledge, opinion, and
involvement in pseudospoofing many people would be less upset, and the
noise would die down! Just a hypothetical speculation, of course! They
must have excellent reasons for withholding one for this long, even in
the face of tremendous public and private pressure! (If anyone knows
what those reasons are, could you tell me?)

Anyway, on to this letter. The most interesting aspect of it is its
brevity. Many interesting implications were raised in RISKS 15.25 and
15.27 about the cryptoanarchist movement in black marketeering, tax
evasion, and sabotage of governments, and whether Cypherpunks ==
Cryptoanarchists. There was also insinuations of a secret mailing list,
manipulation of others, widespread deception of the media and a massive
hoax and conspiracy, a rampant pseudospoofing effort by the leadership
behind the scenes, even involving customized software, a Cult Religion
of Pseudoanonymity, etc. (You all know the black, sordid story!)
Unfortunately, much to my disappointment, the Eminent Leader did not
comment on any of these issues. But nevertheless I would like to
analyze what little was available.

The major point to make about this person is that everything he writes
is extremely carefully crafted to have a precise, intended effect. I
imagine that he spent a very large amount of time on this short
posting, making sure that it did not contain any incriminating
statements. It is a masterpiece of a deceptive and evasive message that
supposedly appears to `set the record straight' while actually being
completely, utterly empty of any true reassurances or denials.

>L. Detweiler's recent article on the RISKS of confusing an online
>identity with a potentially knowable physical one are quite
>interesting, if hypothetical.

Interesting the phrasing of `if hypothetical'. There is no indication
of any personal knowledge of the veracity of any of the hypothetical
situations. But! At the same time there is cleverly no statement in the
form, `I am not aware of any' or `I can assure you that they do not
exist' despite that this person would be in a position to issue a
statement of this sort, and that exactly such a statement is what is called for.

>I would be interested in hearing of situations where this practice
>has actually occurred.  If any RISKS members know of any such
>incidents from first-hand experience, please share them with the
>readership.

This is another extremely clever method of evading any personal
association, accountability, or responsibility for the issues raised.
This eminent leader is personally aware of a massive pseudospoofing
framework, namely his own, yet makes it appear he has no knowledge of
any by requesting information from others. Quite ingenious! This was
very similar to N.Szabo asking others for `pseudospoofing tools' and
`posting sites'. The entire problem with pseudospoofing, of course, is
that in the well-conceived cases only the practitioner has the kind of
`first hand experience' the eminent leader requests.

>Unfortunately, I think he really believes that the cypherpunks mailing
>list has been dominated by a small cabal who have been using multiple
>identities who talk with each other on the list in order to enforce
>concensus and to suppress disagreeing positions, namely his.

This is a clever method of (1) attempting to discredit L.Detweiler as
someone who believes that all people who disagree with him are
co-conspirators, and (2) not specifically mentioning those positions,
and (3) reformulating the many issues of RISKS 15.25 which are
extremely wide-encompassing, into a simple question of `a small cabal
on the list' who `disagrees with L.Detweiler'. These are all quite
ingenious ways of `begging the question' so to speak.

>It just ain't so.  

Despite the exchange of probably over a hundred messages in my
cypherpunk lifetime with this eminent leader, and reading dozens of his
public postings, I've never seen this eminent leader use a
colloquialism like `ain't' and its appearance, especially in this
context, is quite curious! Notice how he doesn't actually state *what*
isn't so, like `there is no cabal' or `I have no personal knowledge of
anyone posting under fake identities.' Overall this is another
meaningless statement that does not actually imply anything whatsoever.

>Therefore, to set the record straight I feel I ought to make the
>following public statement:

Note that this statement below does not `set the record straight' on
many of the issues raised, in particular the eminent leader's personal
knowledge of pseudospoofing.

>I, Eric Hughes, have never posted or communicated in any name other
>than my own.  

Frankly, I think this is a baldfaced lie. The eminent leader would be
implying, if it were to be taken literally and exactly, that he has
never used the anon.penet.fi server or any account other than one with
his name. What precisely does he *mean* by this statement? How are we
to be sure? We need a direct answer to the question, ``What accounts
have you posted from, and how were they identified?'' I have many
examples of a Medusa claiming `I, Medusa, have never posted or mailed
under any other name than Medusa.' This is because under the fanatic
religion of pseudospoofing, the cultists actually maintain that the
different `personalities' under the assorted `nyms' of a person
actually constitute *different* *people*! This, of course, is a
blasphemous abomination of the English language, warped to their own
ends of deceit, very much like the use of the term `true anonymity' by
N.Szabo or `pseudonym' by J.Gilmore.

>I can personally testify that I am not the same as any
>of the other people listed at the end of L. Detweiler's post, and I
>can testify from personal experience that Arthur Chandler, Hal Finney,
>Tim C. May, and Nick Szabo are all different people.

This is an interesting statement. Again, I think it is a baldfaced lie.
Notice that the eminent leader writes previously that `I have never
communicated under any name other than Eric Hughes.' All of these
statements would be superflous under that statement, if it were true.
But he finds it necessary to be more specific, for some curious reason.
The question in cyberspace is not about `people', but computer
accounts, as in, `Have you ever posted a message from any of these
accounts'? For example, if E.Hughes sent me mail that ``I have never
been the originator of a message from the G.Broiles site
goldenbear.com'' I would take that as authoritative. But he has never
answered any of my questions in any specific form. Even questions like
`How many pseudoanonymous identities are you using' he (and T.C.May)
refuses to answer.

>I also decline to answer, point by point, the numerous defamatory
>innuendos made by L. Detweiler against the members of the cypherpunks
>mailing list. 

Hee, hee, `defamatory innuendos' is a clever term. He does not actually
point to any specific `defamatory innuendo' as defamatory! They are
only defamatory if you can state they are false! Also, many of the
comments are not directed at `members of the cypherpunks list' but at
the *leadership*. But we have another ingenious diversion. The eminent
leader implies that a `point by point' statement would be tedious and
unjustified. I assure you, I would prize it beyond anything in my
~3,500 message collection of cypherpunk archives.

> Might I also observe that none of the statements are
>specific enough to actually count as accusation, but merely as general
>slander?

Another rather silly statement. Eminent leader E. Hughes, after many
weeks of my trouble, has never answered *either* my `defamatory
innuendoes' or my `specific accusations'. Imagine the sheer artillery
that would be for your hordes of cultists who continue to assault me,
Mr. Hughes! ``Mr. Hughes answered all your charges. Go to hell.''

* * *

Why do I persist at this? Because the Cypherpunks wish to pretend that
they are a respectable organization on the level of EFF or CPSR, with
leaders on par with say, Barlow, Sobel, or Kapor or Godwin. The simple
fact is that they are an obnoxious, arrogant, pathetic, repulsive bunch
of cyber-guerrilas, pseudospoofers, and quasi-criminals who have no
unity other than a Internet mailing list, which itself is used as a
testbed for pseudospoofing perversions on unsuspecting and unwilling
participants and cryptoanarchist disinformation and brainwashing. Oh,
how I have given you the benefit of the doubt, and gone to great
lengths to respect you! But your leaders are either undoubtedly corrupt
or accomplices, with more interest in secret conspiracies,
pseudoanonymity perversions, trust embezzlement, manipulation, and
predation, privacy invasion, pornography, ego assuagement, elitist
clique parties, and aquiring and dazzling their personality worshippers
than anything substantial, such as Internet project development, that
involves things upon which you urinate, like cooperation and openness.

You cling to your elaborate fantasies with gripping white knuckles.
Cypherpunks are blind to the ashes of their arson. `The Tyrant is not
that bad!' `Hell is not such a bad place!' `Look how much we have
accomplished'! You have nothing but gimmicks, trinkets and playthings,
not a `foundation' but deadly quicksand traps. The only observation is
that everything substantial accomplished by others you have done a
great deal to simultaneously take credit for and maliciously sabotage,
and everything you have accomplished is not substantial, and never will
be, as long as you wallow in your gutter. But you are not content to
wallow alone! You must drag the Current Internet and Future Cyberspace
into your filth. 

I think that real leaders such as Zimmermann, Chaum, Card, and Sterling
should have the sense to not only distance themselves but to condemn
your parties of freakshow perversions. The cypherpunks list is a magnet
for criminal apologists, moral relativists, libertarian extremists,
demogogues, poseurs, and hypocrites. Frankly, I'm quite upset that
respectable journals, like Wired, NYT, and RISKS have been subtly
twisted and corrupted with the depraved Cypherpunk fantasies and lies.
These knotty deceptions take an extraordinary amount of energy to
untangle, and there is enough here to keep historians busy for decades.

I'm grotesquely ashamed to have ever been associated with this sham,
this mockery, this farce, that masquerades as a `group' or a
`movement'. I have even lended credibility to tentacles by quoting them
in my FAQs and in RISKS, oh how that makes me want to vomit. `Anonymity
on the Internet' -- more like Disinformation, Brainwashing, and Lies by
Tentacles. The cypherpunks list does not deserve to be advertised
*anywhere* except as a dark pit to be avoided at all costs, the
cypherpunks Movement is no more meaningful than graffiti spraypainted
on a wall. It was only an infinitesimal whit better when it was just
spread by word of mouth among the conspiring CA slime. Please, go back
to your dark holes where you came from, and take your odious `movement'
with you. Oh, what insidious despicable poison.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: jdblair@nextsrv.cas.muohio.EDU
Date: Mon, 29 Nov 93 23:37:30 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: time to acknowledge, move on
Message-ID: <9311300756.AA01323@ nextsrv.cas.muohio.EDU >
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


OK, so the reputation of the list has been screwed up.  So what?  It is
all just information, and we're here to explore how the metaphores the
information represents evolve in cyberspace.  As cheesy as that word has
become, if memory serves right, one possible definition for cyberspace is a
"consensually agreed upon metaphore for certain aspects of reality."  I'm
sure I will get corrected for that, and that is good- that's why I said it:
to test my hypothesis.

I think the coffee house metaphore makes sense, but we have to deal with
the fact that this coffee house isn't exactly like normal coffee houses.  You
can't spoof a person, in person, in reality, short of incredible acting
ability and plastic surgery.  Real James Bond stuff.

I think most of us believe that cyberspace can serve as a useful addition
to reality, and some of us probably see it as a possible replacement for
reality.  One simply needs to know one MOO addict to believe that (an
acquaintence of mine once spent 18 hours straight on-line.)

So we're working out the kinks in the metaphore, and learning where the
metaphore breaks down.  So sometimes we get burned.  So what!!


By the way, some of us have built a metaphorical workshop onto the back of
this metaphorical coffee house.  Discussion is going reallly slowly right
now, I think because most of use are really more software people than
hardware people.  Myself definately included.  I laid the foundation for
the workshop because I thought there was still a lot of hard information I
could learn from the Cypherpunks, like how following this list turned my
understanding of cryptography from virtually zilch to getting into an
argument with someone from the NSA that I led into the mountains in one of
my real-world personalities, a summer backpacking guide.  He was freaked
out to find that this outdoorsy guy understood public key cryptography,
and had an opinion about the clipper chip.  There's the main purpose of the
list, right?  To educate.  It educated me, and it threw a real-world NSA
employee for a loop.

So, we've all been educated about spoofing, and the dangers inherent in the
privacy we advocate.  If I wasn't ready to have my views challenged, I
wouldn't follow the list, and I certainly wouldn't post.  Of anybody, we
should understand that a name on the net is just a label.  We have a
certain assumed level of trust that label = real person.  We're the ones
that have been emphasizing that a public key can only be trusted if you
trust a real person somewhere in the web of trust you build to verify it. 
We all knew that its elementary to spoof someone (or pseudospoof, I mean). 
We just assumed that no one would break our trust, do more than just a few
harmless pranks.  Oh my god, I here people shout, label != person?  We
deserve it.

So, y'all, chill out.  I think L.D. taught us all a BIG lesson that we can
all take through the rest of our cyperspace lives (or metaverse lives,
depending on one's jargon persuasion).

The net isn't the real world.  Stop pretending it is, and treat it as the net.

-john
<jdblair@nextsrv.cas.muohio.edu>

------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Insert cool signature file that makes a trendy, yet bold and original
statement about my cyberspace proficiency, then mentions that I'll send
you my public key if you want it, and you trust that I'm me.



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "L. Detweiler" <ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Date: Tue, 30 Nov 93 02:17:26 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: a correction
Message-ID: <9311301016.AA15651@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I wrote:

> [The `Movement'] was only an infinitesimal whit better when it was just
>spread by word of mouth among the conspiring CA slime.

By `better' I meant -- `less evil'




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: koontzd@lrcs.loral.com (David Koontz )
Date: Tue, 30 Nov 93 07:37:49 PST
To: ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu
Subject: Re:  Eric Hughes & the Cypherpunks Movement
Message-ID: <9311301533.AA06498@io.lrcs.loral.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>I'm grotesquely ashamed to have ever been associated with this sham,
>this mockery, this farce, that masquerades as a `group' or a
>`movement'. I have even lended credibility to tentacles by quoting them
>in my FAQs and in RISKS, oh how that makes me want to vomit. `Anonymity
>on the Internet' -- more like Disinformation, Brainwashing, and Lies by
>Tentacles. The cypherpunks list does not deserve to be advertised
>*anywhere* except as a dark pit to be avoided at all costs, the
>cypherpunks Movement is no more meaningful than graffiti spraypainted
>on a wall. It was only an infinitesimal whit better when it was just
>spread by word of mouth among the conspiring CA slime. Please, go back
>to your dark holes where you came from, and take your odious `movement'
>with you. Oh, what insidious despicable poison.

(In your best N.E. accent)
"ahll righht, who faarted?!"




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: m5@vail.tivoli.com (Mike McNally)
Date: Tue, 30 Nov 93 05:47:28 PST
To: Brad Huntting <huntting@glarp.com>
Subject: Re: Cryptosplit 2.0
In-Reply-To: <199311300256.AA05265@misc.glarp.com>
Message-ID: <9311301342.AA25298@vail.tivoli.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Brad Huntting writes:
 > If I remember coorectly it's KerberosV uses an MD5 hash of /dev/mem.
 > 
 > Still, probably not 128 bits worth of entropy.

Gee, that seems pretty amazing.  On a typical workstation, there's a
heck of a lot going on; in the megabytes of data in /dev/mem I'd think
it quite unlikely that there's a practical way to predict or recreate
a configuration.

Then again, I could be wrong.  I also wonder how, if the above is
true, one can really get 128 bits of entropy from keyboard timing
(especially from a small number of keypresses).

--
Mike McNally : m5@tivoli.com : Day Laborer : Tivoli Systems : Austin, TX
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Remember that all experimentation does not produce extrapolated results.
                                                           - k. pisichko




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Brad Huntting <huntting@glarp.com>
Date: Tue, 30 Nov 93 09:32:12 PST
To: m5@vail.tivoli.com (Mike McNally)
Subject: Re: Cryptosplit 2.0
In-Reply-To: <9311301342.AA25298@vail.tivoli.com>
Message-ID: <199311301731.AA06857@misc.glarp.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Brad Huntting writes:
> If I remember coorectly it's KerberosV uses an MD5 hash of /dev/mem.
> 
> Still, probably not 128 bits worth of entropy.

Mike responds:
> Gee, that seems pretty amazing.  On a typical workstation, there's a
> heck of a lot going on; in the megabytes of data in /dev/mem I'd think
> it quite unlikely that there's a practical way to predict or recreate
> a configuration.

Well, Assuming I was just creating a key and not doing something
else at the same time, it would be pretty easy to predict what
processes were running.  It has about 6000 pages of physical memory.
From knowing what processes are running, you could probably narrow
down the pages they would have in memory to at most half again that
number.  This gives you mabey 9000 choose 6000 posiblilitys for
what process memory looks like.  That gives about exp(3000*ln(7000))
or 2^37k posiblilities...  I suppose that is more than 128 bits.

So if you cant predict which pages will land where in memory (which
may be a false assumption), this is probably a good method for
getting a random number on a unix box.


brad




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: hughes@ah.com (Eric Hughes)
Date: Tue, 30 Nov 93 10:47:42 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Banning any subscriber
In-Reply-To: <199311280747.XAA15002@mail.netcom.com>
Message-ID: <9311301837.AA09077@ah.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>> [...] none have ever
>> been implemented in software, except for killfiles, which are not
>> effective against disruption in an anonymous environment.

>Actually, I disagree. The Extropians list has an "::include" command
>that can be used to specifically include only certain thread or
>certain users (or any combination). I know for a fact that Dean
>Tribble and Paul Baclace are doing an "::exclude all" and then a
>selective "::include foo" to include certain threads and/or authors.

>I would call this a classic example of a positive reputation system.

It's a positive reputation system (+RS), albeit primitive, but the
reputation system (RS) as such is not in software but rather in the
minds of those who must explicitly include what they want to see.
What the extropians list sofware (ELS) is in this case, as software,
is an information system that can support a +RS, but not that system
itself.  The distinction is fine, and not always easy to see.

Now I was careful not to claim that RS's had never been implemented,
but rather never implemented in software.  The ELS is almost a +RS,
but not completely so.  A +RS must have a database of objects (people,
threads, topics, lists, etc.)  to be sure, and some sort of statement
about preferences about these objects, but database is not per se the
+RS.

The key that distinguishes an information system from a RS are the
rules of inference which connect the _preferences_ in the database to
_actions_ on the objects of the data.  The ELS does not contain
preferences at all but rather directly stores the actions on the
objects.  The connections between the preferences and the actions are
in the minds of the users of the ELS.

One can argue that the actions themselves represent the preferences,
but this is an argument to justify an existing design.  Ontologically
("what it is") preferences about objects and actions on objects are
different things; my attitude toward something is different than what
action I take toward it, although these may have been less
distinguishable when I was, say, fifteen.

Eric




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Date: Tue, 30 Nov 93 11:17:42 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Statistics of Low-Order Bits in Images
Message-ID: <199311301914.LAA27327@mail.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Several folks have recently mentioned the need to carefully look at
the statistics/distributions of bit values in the low-order bits
(least-significant bits, LSBs) of real-world images intended for
steganographic use. I concur.

This problem interests me. Material from Li and Vitanyi's "An
Introduction to Kolmogorov Complexity and Its Applications," 1993,
bears directly on the issues of "picture distance" and how much one
can change an image before it's recognizably "different" or before
filter programs can detect the presence (or absence) of characteristic
structure in images.

In this little article I'll be making some general points and
reasoning informally about image statistics, picture distances, and
the like. There's no doubt a more rigorous way to reason about these
statistical properties, using sigmas and summations and Central Limit
Theorems and the like, but I'm not that much of a real mathematician
to be bothered with that. C'est la vie.

Several points:

1. Probably not a pressing concern, yet. I expect few sites have
LSB-analyzers, just as few folks are using LSB stegonagraphy.

2. Romana Machado's "Stego" program for the Mac is interesting, and
may be useful, but it makes almost no effort to hide the _existence_ of
the message bits, e.g., anyone with a copy of Stego can apply it to an
image and recover the plaintext or ciphertext. (I mean in contrast to
some of the schemes which require a copy of the original image, a kind
of one-time pad approach, in which one XORs or subtracts the original
image to see the "differences" in the LSBs--a cryptanalyst without the
"reference" image is unable to extract any bits for further analysis.)

(I suggest we keep these two models in mind. Proposal for jargon:
"Type 1 Stego": No reference model needed: message bits are just the
specified bits, e.g., LSB, or larger low-order bits. "Type 2 Stego": a
reference model--an image or DAT or whatever--is needed to XOR with
message to recover the plaintext or ciphertext (if more encryption was
used originally).)

3. With fairly noisy 8-bit images, such as might be gotten by
frame-grabbing a video image under poor lighting or focus conditions,
my experiences at Intel (I ran an image processing lab, for electron
microscope analyis of microprocessors) tells me that the lowest
_several_ bits of each pixel are "noisy." Very noisy. The bottom bit
is "almost purely noise" (also a dangerous term!).  But I agree that
more recent images need to be looked at and the statistics analyzed.

Still, I suspect the bottom bit, the LSB, will be found to have
Gaussian noise characteristics. Note also that images are often run
through filters, as in PhotoShop, which can give Gaussian
characteristics where before there were none.

4. Can "image analyzers" in the hands of border security/law
enforcement be used to proseute holders of images that have such
white noise characteristics in the LSBs? I doubt it.

I interject this point here because an important long-term issue for
stego is whether the "Crypto Authority" (resonance with Gibson's
"Turing Authority") can make such images ipso facto illegal. I suspect
this is hopeless, both because many images have these characteristics
and because many people will massage their images to be this way,
regardless of original camera-CCD characteristics.

5. All of these arguments apply to the LSBs in DATs. Ambient room
noise, noise in microphones, thermal noise in the electronics, etc.,
all contributes to there being almost no "signal" in the LSB of a
16-bit CD or DAT sample of music. (There are anecdotal reports of
people being able to hear effects here, and different noise-shaping
filters may have audible effects at least some of the time. So, I do
agree that these statistics ought to be looked at, eventually. Some of
my audio magazines have articles on this, which I'll try to look at
soon.)

6. Here's a strategy which may work OK even if the statistical
patterns of the LSBs are not "completely random" (a dangerous term, of
course).

- take a plaintext or ciphertext and compress it with a good
compressor (L-Z may not be enough to wring out all the structure and
raise the entropy to the full 8 bits per character, for ASCII). A good
encryption of the text should of course produce high entropy.

- XOR the compressed (high entropy) text with the LSBs of the image.

- the resulting LSBs should have _similar statistics_ as compared with
the original image. "Noise" has been added, but no knew structure has
been added. Consider a couple of examples to see this:

Original image (in bits) :    1 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 1
Random      1s and Os:        1 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 0
Resultant Image (XOR):        0 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 1

(Another example: If one toggles all the bits in a binary image, the
"Hamming distance" between the images is maximal, and yet the "picture
distance" is very small, i.e., the images look nearly the same. The
picture distance being small means the structure is the same, even
though the Hamming distance is, by definition, the greatest it can
be. This provides a powerful clue that there is a "lot of room" to
manipulate images so as to pack bits into this "Hamming space" while
still keeping the resulting pictures in a "tiny picture space
volume.")

Well, this is of coure not a proof, but gives a feel for why XORing
with a high entropy image will not _add_ structure.

However, it can certainly _remove_ structure! Which takes us back to
the original issue of the statistics (structure) of the LSBs of
images. If in fact there were "clumps" of 1s and 0s, "ridges" and
"valleys" caused by camera/CCD characteristics, then XORing the LSB
image with a "random" image will demolish this structure. This is
nothing more than the role of the one-time pad....to remove structure
but allow its immediate reconstruction on the other end.

At least in this case one does not have to worry about the ciphertext
_adding_ unwanted structure, only that it may _remove_ structure
already present in the image (and perhaps "typical" of images not
carrying stego bits). 

7. A better approach may be to take two very similar images, perhaps
successive frame grabs with the same camera/digitizer, and use the
statistics of the LSBs directly as part of the "one-time pad" above
(Type 2 Stego). This could be used to give the LSBs the same
"structure" (ridges and valleys of pixel values, for example) as a
"real image" but without leaking message bits. (More work needed here.)

(I apologize for any vagueness here. Partly it is that I haven't
worked this out completely. Partly it is the lack of a blackboard to
draw pictures on--verbal descriptions get confusing after a while. And
partly it is that this message is already too long and I want to wrap
it up.)

8. None of this subtlety really matters too much, I suspect. An image
or DAT contains _so much room_ for stego bits that the problem of
finding a tiny fraction of message bits in megabytes or hundreds of
megabytes (DATs) of noisy source material seems well beyond current
crunch capabilties. Perhaps images being sent to some sensitive
location could be given a quick analysis to see if the LSBs are "too
regular," but even this I doubt. And at least the XOR method described
above won't introduce new structure....at worst the images or DATs
would appear to be "too random."

Perhaps we need to paraphrase Eric's line: "Use a random image, go to jail."

--Tim May

-- 
..........................................................................
Timothy C. May         | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,  
tcmay@netcom.com       | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
408-688-5409           | knowledge, reputations, information markets, 
W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA  | black markets, collapse of governments.
Higher Power: 2^756839 | Public Key: PGP and MailSafe available.
Note: I put time and money into writing this posting. I hope you enjoy it.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Mike Godwin <mnemonic@eff.org>
Date: Tue, 30 Nov 93 08:47:45 PST
To: fnerd@smds.com (FutureNerd Steve Witham)
Subject: Re: Knights who say NII (was Crypto(A), govt & NII)
In-Reply-To: <9311300339.AA01336@smds.com>
Message-ID: <199311301642.LAA28431@eff.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


 
Steve Witham writes:

> Giving the government savvy advice, telling them they should do whatever
> will promote, say, competition or open forums...what effects will these
> have?  They may provide justifications, expertise and targeting info 
> for interventions, for instance.  New ways to get involved...
 
The government is already tempted to get involved, all the time. We can't
make the government go away by resolving that it would be nice if they
weren't around. Best to work from where we are, not where we'd like to be.

> I can't think of one positive thing (as opposed to the negative thing,
> disengagement) government can contribute to the goals of EFF.

Government is not the only potential source of harm--private industry can
be plenty harmful.

> The government can stop all the things it does that produce 
> centralization (it produces centralized capitalists, for instance), 
> but the most centralized organization in the world as the 
> decentralist's tool or ally doesn't seem workable to me.  The
> means clashes against the ends.

I don't see how. One actually can use a weapon to keep the peace, for
example.

> Telling a bull that he should make whatever 
> positive contributions he can to the china shop...is worse than just 
> not mentioning that there are none.

I think you're reasoning from your conclusions here, not toward them.
What's more, government ain't the only bull in this shop.


--Mike







From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: m5@vail.tivoli.com (Mike McNally)
Date: Tue, 30 Nov 93 10:12:25 PST
To: Brad Huntting <huntting@glarp.com>
Subject: Re: Cryptosplit 2.0
In-Reply-To: <199311301731.AA06857@misc.glarp.com>
Message-ID: <9311301808.AA29578@vail.tivoli.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Brad Huntting writes:
 > > Still, probably not 128 bits worth of entropy.
 > 
 > Mike responds:
 > > Gee, that seems pretty amazing.
 > 
 > Well, Assuming I was just creating a key and not doing something
 > else at the same time, it would be pretty easy to predict what
 > processes were running...

I guess that's what I consider the amazing part.  Right now, I'm
sending mail via emacs.  I'm doing a big "make" in another window
(oh, it just finished).  I've got a FrameMaker session up.  I've got a
bug tracking database up.  I've got 4 local xterms and three rlogged
in to other systems.  I've got the Sun calendar tool running, and a
Lucid emacs window from another host.  I've got my own dynamic
X root window toy running.  I've got Tivoli's product up, I think, and
some other people are doing unknown things through that as part of a
test cycle.  (Yes, this ELC is maxed out.)

Given all that, it's hard for me to believe that some nefarious party
could be tracking system state thoroughly enough to be able to
reconstruct the contents of /dev/mem at any given time.

Of course, I could be thinking non-rigorously.  I suppose that,
strictly speaking, the blizzard of activity on my workstation gives me
no *real* protection.  Seems odd, but I guess I really can't make that
call.

--
Mike McNally : m5@tivoli.com : Day Laborer : Tivoli Systems : Austin, TX
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Remember that all experimentation does not produce extrapolated results.
                                                           - k. pisichko




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Louis Cypher <lcypher@cypher.com>
Date: Tue, 30 Nov 93 10:37:42 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Unsubscribe
Message-ID: <9311301213.aa08550@zero.cypher.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text



Please unsubscribe me. It was ok when I owned my own system,
but now that I sold it, I cannot keep up
with all the traffic.

It was fun.





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Timothy Newsham <newsham@wiliki.eng.hawaii.edu>
Date: Tue, 30 Nov 93 14:42:17 PST
To: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Subject: Re: Statistics of Low-Order Bits in Images
In-Reply-To: <199311302036.MAA09515@mail.netcom.com>
Message-ID: <9311302239.AA12378@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> 
> Jim Choate writes:
> 
> > Some other factors one needs to consider when analyzing images are:
> > 
> > * The lsb is going to be random if the image comes from any kind of a/d
> >   process. This is because all convertors have a error of +/- 1 bit.
> 
> Nope. Not true. Some ADCs digitize with _more_ than the final
> resolution and then do rounding or noise-shaping. And ADCs even at the
> LSB can still have structure caused by other things, such as the image
> itself (a binary image with thresholding will have the "LSB" certainly
> not random noise! Q.E.D., by induction.) 
> 
> This can give the LSBs in the final product (image, DAT, CD) nonrandom
> noise characteristics. This is what we're talking about.

Sounds like the simple solution is for people everywhere to replace
the low order bits of all of their pictures with good random noise. Image
quality shouldnt suffer drastically and if the random data is replaced
with output from a good cryptosystem then it would be indistinguishable.
So are any people here influential with the authors of any popular
imaging software?




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Date: Tue, 30 Nov 93 12:37:49 PST
To: ravage@wixer.bga.com (Jim choate)
Subject: Re: Statistics of Low-Order Bits in Images
In-Reply-To: <9311301953.AA26009@wixer>
Message-ID: <199311302036.MAA09515@mail.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Jim Choate writes:

> Some other factors one needs to consider when analyzing images are:
> 
> * The lsb is going to be random if the image comes from any kind of a/d
>   process. This is because all convertors have a error of +/- 1 bit.

Nope. Not true. Some ADCs digitize with _more_ than the final
resolution and then do rounding or noise-shaping. And ADCs even at the
LSB can still have structure caused by other things, such as the image
itself (a binary image with thresholding will have the "LSB" certainly
not random noise! Q.E.D., by induction.) 

This can give the LSBs in the final product (image, DAT, CD) nonrandom
noise characteristics. This is what we're talking about.

> * If an image is processed by software then the last significant bit will be
>   on or off consistantly for a given color.

Huh? What if the "processing" is "do nothing"? Why will LSBs be
changed consistently? I must be misunderstanding your statement.


> * By the use of exlusive-or operators it is possible to mask the data in a
>   suitable manner. This does require that both sender and reciever have a
>   copy or method of calculating the correct key.

Key generation and sharing (if necessary) is separate from the stego issues.

> The real question is how do you generate keys?

In various ways, depending on what you're doing. Separate from the
main analysis of stego and image statistics/

--Tim May


-- 
..........................................................................
Timothy C. May         | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,  
tcmay@netcom.com       | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
408-688-5409           | knowledge, reputations, information markets, 
W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA  | black markets, collapse of governments.
Higher Power: 2^756839 | Public Key: PGP and MailSafe available.
Note: I put time and money into writing this posting. I hope you enjoy it.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Anonymous <nowhere@bsu-cs.bsu.edu>
Date: Tue, 30 Nov 93 10:31:30 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Chaos Communications Congress 1993 (fwd)
Message-ID: <9311301828.AA00219@bsu-cs.bsu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



From: bkr@drdhh.hanse.de (Bjoern Kriews)
Newsgroups: comp.org.eff.talk,comp.security.misc
Subject: Chaos Communication Congress 1993
Date: 26 Nov 1993 08:10:08 +0100
Organization: Digital Island
Message-ID: <bkr.754297770@drdhh>
NNTP-Posting-Host: drdhh.hanse.de


[Sorry for crossposting this to so many groups - 
last year I received complaints that people didn't
find the announcement]



"Ten years after Orwell"

10th Chaos Communication Congress, Hamburg, Germany

The Chaos Computer Club invites the global community to
participate in the Chaos Communication Congress in Hamburg
and celebrates the tenth anniversary of this convention.

This hackers' meeting, taking place annually at the
end of December, has become a traditional event which is
characterized by a colorful mixture of absolute chaos,
serious discussion and detailed presentation. 

Computer enthusiasts, scientists from well-known institutions,
lawyers, politicians, artists and, of course, hackers as well
as data-travellers and Internauts from many countries are going
to meet at the 'Eidelstedter Buergerhaus' on December 27th-29th
for an interdisciplinary exchange of data and other experience.

Not only concentrating on technical topics, political and social
issues will be focal points of discussion this year.
After ten years of creative future concepts the time has come
to look for achieved goals and new visions for the future.

This year's list of topics:

The so-called "great peep attack" (a proposed law reform allowing
state authorities to listen in, even in private rooms, in order to
fight organized crime) affects every german citizen and is considered
one of the most important issues of the year.
- What is technically possible?
- What is planned and/or wanted politically?
- How do the right of privacy and ban of encryption software fit together?
Well-informed speakers talk about state-of-the-art technology and legal
limits. Public discussion forums invite you to form your own opinion.

Money always serves for interesting talk:
- How can we improve Electronic Cash?
- How to print your own money
- How to wash it if it's dirty
- How to open electronic cash machines without damaging them
It's up to you to add to this list...

Hardly noticed by the public, the female part of the hacker scene
is growing. Female hackers' activities have become a regular part
of the congress, the workshop on feminine computer handling is
one of the key events. For the first time, there will be a 
Women Only room with lots of equipment to try out, opportunity 
to ask and learn as well as to discuss and create.

Other highlights:
Discussions and workshops on
- citizen networks and electronic democracy
- ISDN, MODACOM (german mobile radio data network) and Beepers
- Bluebox versus Telekom
- Electronic Warfare
- Chip- and other cards
- inventory differences
- underground radio stations
- Computer recycling
- lockpicking
- MIME and *ostscript viruses 
- copyright law and the GNU generation.

Furthermore: the Hackcenter, the Chaos Cafe, the Chaos Archive,
the movie theatre (among others: educational propaganda films
by the former East German Ministry of State Security), a Zerberus BBS,
the Internet-FreePort and lots of other things we forgot to mention.
Feel free to contribute more interesting topics, workshops or
presentations.

Anyway, the hottest news for computer enthusiasts and hackers
will be those you won't find in the press.
 
What:    10th Chaos Communication Congress
When:    December 27th - 29th 1993
Cost:    DM 42,- Three-day-ticket
Where:   Eidelstedter Buergerhaus
         Alte Elbgaustr. 12
         D-22523 Hamburg
         +49-40-5710523

Contact: Chaos Computer Club
         Schwenckestr. 85
         D-20255 Hamburg
         Germany
Phone:   +49-40-4903757
Fax:     +49-40-4917689
E-Mail:  ccc93@t42.ccc.de
Press contact:
Phone:   +49-161-2447146 (european afternoon, please)

For reservations in an inexpensive hotel (approx. DM 30,-/night),
mail to: sleep@drdhh.hanse.de

#!/bin/thanks to P. Kane for the word 'InterNaut'.

-- 
bkr@drdhh.hanse.de  -  Bjoern Kriews - Stormsweg 6 - D-22085 Hamburg [76] - FRG
By definition, a properly functioning kernel doesn't allow user programs to 
make it crash unless they say "please". (Richard Stallman)





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Anonymous <nowhere@bsu-cs.bsu.edu>
Date: Tue, 30 Nov 93 10:32:11 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: EFF Op-Ed from the NY Times
Message-ID: <9311301832.AA00396@bsu-cs.bsu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



From: mech@eff.org (Stanton McCandlish)
Newsgroups: comp.org.eff.talk
Subject: EFF Op-Ed from the NY Times
Date: 30 Nov 1993 11:38:52 -0500
Organization: EFF mail-news gateway
Message-ID: <199311301632.LAA28210@eff.org>
NNTP-Posting-Host: eff.org
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=US-ASCII
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit

>From the New York Times Op-Ed Page, Wednesday, November 24, 1993

A Superhighway Through the Wasteland?
   By Mitchell Kapor and Jerry Berman
   
   Mitchell Kapor is chairman of the Electronic Frontier Foundation, a
nonprofit group that promotes civil liberties in digital media. He was a
founder of the Lotus Development Corporation, from which he resigned in
1986. Jerry Berman is executive director of the foundation.


   (Washington) Telecommunications and cable TV executives, seeking to
allay concerns over their proposed megamergers, insist that the coming
electronic superhighway will be an educational and informational tool as
well as a cornucopia of interactive entertainment. Allow the marriage
between entertainment and communications giants, we are told, and they will
connect students with learning resources, provide a forum for political
discourse, increase economic competitiveness and speed us into the
multimedia information age.

   Both broadcast and cable TV were introduced with similar fanfare. The
results have been disappointing. Because of regulatory failure and the
limits of the technology, they failed to be saviors of education or
political life. We love the tube but recognize that it is largely a
cultural wasteland.

    For the Government to break this cycle of promise and disappointment,
communications mergers should be approved or barred based on detailed,
enforceable commitments that the electronic superhighway will meet public
goals. The amount of electronic material the superhighway can carry is
dizzying compared to the relatively narrow range of broadcast TV and the
limited number of cable channels. Properly constructed and regulated, it
could be open to all who wish to speak, publish and communicate.

   None of the interactive services will be possible, however, if we have
an eight-lane data superhighway rushing into every home and only a narrow
footpath coming back out. Instead of settling for a multimedia version of
the same entertainment that is increasingly dissatisfying on today's TV, we
need a superhighway that encourages the production and distribution of a
broader, more diverse range of programming.

   The superhighway should be required to provide so-called open platform
services. In today's channel-based cable TV system, program producers must
negotiate for channel space with cable companies around the country. In an
open platform network, we would avoid that bottleneck. Every person would
have access to the entire superhighway, so programmers could distribute
information directly to consumers.

   Consumers would become producers: individuals and small organizations
could create and distribute programs to anyone on the highway who wants
them. Open platform services will spur diversity in the electronic media,
just as low production and distribution costs make possible a wide variety
of newspapers and magazines.

   To prevent abuses by media giants that because of recent Federal court
decisions will control the pipeline into the home and much of the content
delivered over it, we need new laws. Like today's phone companies, the
companies controlling the superhighway must be required to carry other
programmers' content, just as phone companies must provide service to
anyone who is willing to pay for it. We must guarantee that anyone who,
say, wants to start an alternative news network or a forum for political
discussion is given an outlet to do so.

   Americans will come to depend on the superhighway even more than they
need the telephone. The guarantee of universal telephone service must be
expanded to include universal access to the superhighway. Although market
forces will help keep the new technology affordable, we need laws to
protect consumers when competition fails.

   And because several companies will operate the highway, each must be
required to interconnect with the others. Likewise, the new computers that
will give us access to the superhighway should be built according to
commonly accepted standards.

   Also, even an open, competitive market will leave out organizations with
limited resources such as schools and libraries. To compensate for market
oversights, we must insure that money -- whether through Federal support or
a tax on the companies that will control the superhighway -- is made
available to these institutions. Finally, people won't use the new
technology unless they feel that their privacy is protected. Technical
means, such as recently developed encryption techniques, must be made
available to all users. And clear legal guidelines for individual control
over access to and reuse of personal information must be established.
Companies that sell entertainment services will have a record of what their
customers' interests are; these records must remain confidential.

   Bell Atlantic, T.C.I., Time-Warner, U.S. West and other companies
involved in proposed mergers have promised to allow the public full access
to the superhighway. But they are asking policy makers to trust that,
profits aside, they will use their new positions for the public good.

   Rather than opposing mergers or blindly trusting competition to shape
the data highways, Congress should make the mergers hinge on detailed
commitments to provide affordable services to all Americans. Some
legislators, led by Representative Ed Markey, Democrat of Massachusetts,
are working to enact similar requirements; these efforts deserve support.

   The best approach would be to amend these requirements to the
Communications Act of 1934. Still the central law on open access, an
updated Communications Act would codify the terms of a new social contract
between the the telecommunications industry and the American people.

Copyright 1993 The New York Times Company





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Anonymous <nowhere@bsu-cs.bsu.edu>
Date: Tue, 30 Nov 93 10:37:43 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: WiReD has a gopher (and its name was...)
Message-ID: <9311301835.AA00579@bsu-cs.bsu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Newsgroups: comp.org.eff.talk,alt.wired
From: kadie@cs.uiuc.edu (Carl M Kadie)
Subject: Wired Magazine's gopher
Message-ID: <CHBE7B.Jt@cs.uiuc.edu>
Organization: University of Illinois, Dept. of Comp. Sci., Urbana, IL
Date: Tue, 30 Nov 1993 17:06:46 GMT

Wired Magazine has a gopher. It includes many articles. Try
  gopher gopher.wired.edu

I've also added it to the CAF whatsnew server. Try
  gopher gopher.eff.org 5070

- Carl

ANNOTATED REFERENCES

(All these documents are available on-line. Access information follows.)

=================
admin/access
=================
Information on how to access one computer medium via another: access
anonymous ftp via email, access gopher via email, access gopher via
telnet, read netnews via gopher, read netnews via telnet, write
netnews via email, ftp via gopher.

=================
admin/whatsnewd
=================
* Code for and description of "whatsnewd" (v. 0.42)

(Connect your Gopher to "gopher.eff.org", port "5070" to play with it.)

It is a gopher-protocol server.

What it does:

When a user gives a date (e.g. "1 day ago") or enters a dated bookmark
(generated by a previous query), he or she gets a gopher menu of the
gopher items that are new or changed since that date.

=================
=================

If you have gopher, you can browse the CAF archive with the command
   gopher gopher.eff.org

These document(s) are also available by anonymous ftp (the preferred
method) and by email. To get the file(s) via ftp, do an anonymous ftp
to ftp.eff.org (192.77.172.4), and get file(s):

  pub/academic/admin/access
  pub/academic/admin/whatsnewd

To get the file(s) by email, send email to archive-server@eff.org.
Include the line(s) (be sure to include the space before the file
name):

send acad-freedom/admin access
send acad-freedom/admin whatsnewd



-- 
Carl Kadie -- I do not represent any organization; this is just me.
 = kadie@cs.uiuc.edu =





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Perry E. Metzger" <pmetzger@lehman.com>
Date: Tue, 30 Nov 93 10:52:41 PST
To: Brad Huntting <huntting@glarp.com>
Subject: Re: Cryptosplit 2.0
In-Reply-To: <199311301731.AA06857@misc.glarp.com>
Message-ID: <9311301850.AA05810@snark.lehman.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Brad Huntting says:
> So if you cant predict which pages will land where in memory (which
> may be a false assumption), this is probably a good method for
> getting a random number on a unix box.

It might be a decent way to get *A* random number, but if you start
milking this source too frequently you will likely start getting more
and more correlation.

Myself, I'm still in search of a decent, inexpensive, high-quality
source for random numbers, and only hardware will REALLY do.

Perry






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Jim choate <ravage@wixer.bga.com>
Date: Tue, 30 Nov 93 12:07:43 PST
To: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Subject: Re: Statistics of Low-Order Bits in Images
In-Reply-To: <199311301914.LAA27327@mail.netcom.com>
Message-ID: <9311301953.AA26009@wixer>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Some other factors one needs to consider when analyzing images are:

* The lsb is going to be random if the image comes from any kind of a/d
  process. This is because all convertors have a error of +/- 1 bit.

* If an image is processed by software then the last significant bit will be
  on or off consistantly for a given color.

* By the use of exlusive-or operators it is possible to mask the data in a
  suitable manner. This does require that both sender and reciever have a
  copy or method of calculating the correct key.

The process as I understand it now to use a graphical concealment cypher is:

1. Both parties agree a priori on at least a way to generate suitable keys
   for masking.

2. You take your message and x-or it with a suitable bit stream.

3. The resultant x-or bit stream is placed in the image as the lsb.

4. Upon receipt, you strip out the x-or bit stream.

5. Generate the appropriate key and use exclusive-or to return the data
   stream.

The real question is how do you generate keys?

I see a method using the data bit stream itself as part of the answer. The
algorithm would look at some parameter like character statistics or entropy
of a text. It would look at the data stream and calculate its value. Then the
hard part is to try various bit streams and measure their x-or value. The
process is similar to Newtons Iterative Method for finding roots of
polynomials.





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: baumbach@atmel.com (Peter Baumbach)
Date: Tue, 30 Nov 93 11:52:13 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: democracy and L. Detweiler
Message-ID: <9311301915.AA24188@eel.chp.atmel.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


L. Detweiler is a champion of democracy.  He has argued strongly
for it here on this forum.  I am not a supporter of democracy.
A crowd of people has no greater rights than one person.  L. Detweiler
disagrees with this.  I shall confront this disagreement with an
example that strikes to its core.

 I propose a vote.  This vote will have no time limit.  If at any
point you wish to change your vote you are free do so.  This vote
is non-binding on those who do not support democracy.  This vote
will be conducted publicly on this list. 

=======================================================================
VOTE: Proposition desist

  L. Detweiler will cease posting to the cypherpunks mailing list.  He
will no longer concern himself with the activities of those on the
cypherpunks mailing list here or on any other forum.

                    [I support]/[I Do not support]
=======================================================================

L. Detweiler will be the only judge of the results of this vote.  If
he believes a majority of unique individuals carry this proposal one
way or another, then by his honor and support for democracy he is
bound by it.  If he recants his support for democracy, then he is not
bound by it.

------------------
I shall cast my vote here:  I support Proposition desist.

Peter Baumbach
baumbach@atmel.com




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Paul Gilberti <wizard@Think.COM>
Date: Tue, 30 Nov 93 11:27:59 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Unsubscribe
Message-ID: <9311301923.AA24726@quicksilver.think.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Please unsubscribe me.

I really thought that this list was for serious discussion of crypto
technology/news.

Instead, I'm just tired of weeding through my mail of immature postings of
posters who are afraid to post under their own names (DL), and all the
traffic regarding the censorship of the same.






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: paul@poboy.b17c.ingr.com (Paul Robichaux)
Date: Tue, 30 Nov 93 12:42:21 PST
To: ravage@wixer.bga.com (Jim choate)
Subject: Re: Statistics of Low-Order Bits in Images
In-Reply-To: <9311301953.AA26009@wixer>
Message-ID: <199311302040.AA03048@poboy.b17c.ingr.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

> The real question is how do you generate keys?

You use a known source of material. For example, here's one way you
could easily distribute messages to a wide audience using
off-the-shelf tools.  

1. Buy one of the many porno CD-ROMs. Pick one which is fairly
widespread and to which your source will also have access (i.e. if
you're in Denmark, don't choose a child porno CD to communicate with
someone in the US.) Of course, audio or other types of data CDs will
work here too.

2. Make _prearranged_ changes to your source file: convert JPEG->GIF,
or apply a Gaussian blur- whatever suits your fancy.
 
3. XOR in your message text.

4. Post to Usenet,  indicating the source of the materials (i.e. "This
picture came from `Girls of The Rural South, vol 1'" or "Audio sampled
from Michael Jackson's _Dangerous_")

Step 1 insures that your recipient will have access to the same source
material. Step 2 helps mask your message by introducing _other_
differences between the step 1 source and the transmitted message.
Step 4 gives you an easy, safe, distributed transmission medium.

Repeat as necessary.

- -Paul

- -- 
Paul Robichaux, KD4JZG      | "Violence on TV? Why can't it be on CSPAN?"
Intergraph Federal Systems  |     - Clayton Cramer, cramer@optilink.com
Not speaking for Intergraph | Be a cryptography user. Ask me how.


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Q7NJlbRUQczZLGoUi8S3jO35a6cyABDofTydmhsSj/Si6vgBRoit2reDA/Agkt3X
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=8GwG
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: hughes@ah.com (Eric Hughes)
Date: Tue, 30 Nov 93 15:32:51 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Statistics of Low-Order Bits in Images
In-Reply-To: <9311302239.AA12378@toad.com>
Message-ID: <9311302326.AA09922@ah.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>Sounds like the simple solution is for people everywhere to replace
>the low order bits of all of their pictures with good random noise. 

An excellent idea.

It's not the imaging software which need do this, but the
steganography software.  The only addition is a random number source
and a way of using that instead of a file.

Eric




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Matthew J Ghio <mg5n+@andrew.cmu.edu>
Date: Tue, 30 Nov 93 12:32:23 PST
To: fnerd@smds.com (FutureNerd Steve Witham)
Subject: Re: Crypto-dongle protocols?
In-Reply-To: <9311300401.AA01443@smds.com>
Message-ID: <cgyuo5W00VpL0BnkkW@andrew.cmu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> I know there was talk of making little crypto
> boxes that attach to the back of bigger computers.
> "Crypto-dongles," they were called.  Did anyone
> go and build one?  Did anyone think up a protocol
> for talking to one?
>
> It occurs to me that pocket computers like the
> Psion might make nice crypto-dongles, especially
> for people who use Unix for mail.  The little
> computer could show you the text you were
> signing or that it had decrypted.
> All safe from Unix hacks--but is there a good protocol?

This is being discussed on the hardware list, you might want to forward
this topic there instead.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: fnerd@smds.com (FutureNerd Steve Witham)
Date: Tue, 30 Nov 93 15:02:48 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Knights who say NII (was Crypto(A), govt & NII)
Message-ID: <9311302034.AA04630@smds.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> Steve Witham writes:
> 
> > Giving the government savvy advice, telling them they should do whatever
> > will promote, say, competition or open forums...what effects will these
> > have?  They may provide justifications, expertise and targeting info 
> > for interventions, for instance.  New ways to get involved...

Mike Godwin replies:

> The government is already tempted to get involved, all the time. We can't
> make the government go away by resolving that it would be nice if they
> weren't around. Best to work from where we are, not where we'd like to be.

Sure, I agree.  It's just, will the process-that-be have a tendency to be
encouraged to intervention in general, by positive-sounding things in
what you say.

> > I can't think of one positive thing (as opposed to the negative thing,
> > disengagement) government can contribute to the goals of EFF.

On being true police, see below.
 
> Government is not the only potential source of harm--private industry can
> be plenty harmful.

Private business can be nasty, slow and unhelpful, but 
short of physical sabotage and threats, they can't do nearly the kind of
harm and prevention of alternatives that government does.

> > ...the most centralized organization in the world as the 
> > decentralist's tool or ally doesn't seem workable to me.  The
> > means clashes against the ends.
> 
> I don't see how. One actually can use a weapon to keep the peace, for
> example.

Yes, you're right.  I wasn't thinking about that because I assumed 
there's a minimum of physical crime in the communications industry.  But 
now that I think about it, there's one thing State governments could 
limit: local governments' interference (franchises) in communications.

But other than real basic policing like that, the means clash with the
ends.  Government is okay at nabbing true bad guys, not at trying to 
steer people in good directions.

> > Telling a bull that he should make whatever 
> > positive contributions he can to the china shop...is worse than just 
> > not mentioning that there are none.
> 
> I think you're reasoning from your conclusions here, not toward them.

Well, sure, I'm talking from my view of how things are.  Mostly I'm
just saying that the *need* for positive government involvement is
dubious while the *danger* is obvious in the current state of things,
and if you aren't always saying that, then your well-informed comments 
and laudible goal statements can be misconstrued more easily, because
in certain circles, radical deregulation is not assumed.

That's my not-so-humble-but-trying (IMNSHBTO?) point in a nutshell.  Your 
participation without this particular sternness, may, as one side-effect, 
encourage and assist where we all won't be happy it did--and maybe it'll
fail to push through the single most helpful idea.

I know, it's not your particular hobbyhorse.  It's just what I'm afraid
will happen.

> What's more, government ain't the only bull in this shop.

Although the FCC is smaller than AT&T, there's nothing
in private industry with the momentum, power and difficulty of
correcting that our layers of government have.  Business without
the power of government behind it (which status-quo businesses
do have right now) faces much more immediate corrective pressure
than government.  Even combinations of big nasty companies are less 
of a problem.  Throw me in that briar patch, puh-*leeze*, it's better
than this one.

-fnerd@smds.com
quote me

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From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Philippe Nave" <pdn@dwroll.dw.att.com>
Date: Tue, 30 Nov 93 14:57:49 PST
To: an48848@anon.penet.fi
Subject: Re: Who is this Detweiler guy anyway?
In-Reply-To: <9311302154.AA23084@anon.penet.fi>
Message-ID: <9311302253.AA12625@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


L. Detweiler is an individual concerned with issues of identity on the 
Internet and various ways people use multiple identities to influence
others. He has coined a term, "pseudospoofing," that may be loosely 
defined as "Creating and using multiple fake identities for the purpose 
of misleading others, creating a false sense of 'consensus', and/or 
harassing one's enemies." Detweiler is quite passionate when espousing
his theories, and has precipitated a major uproar on this list in recent
weeks - what you're seeing on the list now is a lot of fallout from his
latest postings. He is also the author of a FAQ on privacy and anonymity,
a document held in high esteem by many. Several list members are convinced
that Detweiler also posts through an anonymous remailer as 'an12070'.

(Fair enough explanation, fellow cypherpunks?)

........................................................................
Philippe D. Nave, Jr.   | The person who does not use message encryption
pdn@dwroll.dw.att.com   | will soon be at the mercy of those who DO...
Denver, Colorado USA    | PGP public key: by arrangement.



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: m5@vail.tivoli.com (Mike McNally)
Date: Tue, 30 Nov 93 14:32:18 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: New anonymous list member (?)
In-Reply-To: <9311302154.AA23084@anon.penet.fi>
Message-ID: <9311302229.AA26242@vail.tivoli.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



an48848@anon.penet.fi writes:
 > As a fairly recent addition to this list, I'm unfamilliar with the
 > history of cypherpunks.  Can anyone enlighten me?  Thanks.

Is it an indication that LD's persistance has paid off that my first
reaction to the above (probably innocent) query was to egrep through
my archived cypherpunks stuff to see whether LD has ever misspelled
"familiar"?  (He hasn't, as far as I can tell...)

Sigh.


--
Mike McNally : m5@tivoli.com : Day Laborer : Tivoli Systems : Austin, TX
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Remember that all experimentation does not produce extrapolated results.
                                                           - k. pisichko




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Timothy Newsham <newsham@wiliki.eng.hawaii.edu>
Date: Tue, 30 Nov 93 19:32:51 PST
To: jazz@hal.com (Jason Zions)
Subject: Re: Statistics of Low-Order Bits in Images
In-Reply-To: <9312010256.AA02876@jazz.hal.com>
Message-ID: <9312010332.AA17576@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> 
>    >Sounds like the simple solution is for people everywhere to replace
>    >the low order bits of all of their pictures with good random noise. 
> 
> You're kidding, right? Image processing software, and music processing
> equipment, are designed to get the maximum performance out of the storage
> medium. I find it pretty unlikely that any developer of image processing
> tools is going to deliberately drop one bit of precision off each n-bit
> unit; sheesh, image files are big enough without software deliberately
> wasting bits.

data is most usually stored in a way that makes sense on the underlying
hardware, ie 24 bit palette.  Why 24? because it is 3 bytes per pixel,
one byte for R,G and B.  R G and B arent even weighted the same perceptually!
Why should they have the same amount of bits? Because it makes sense on
the machine!

> As for introducing noise into the low-order bit of music CDs, definitely
> not; the trend is towards equipment that can extract the last dribble of
> information from well-recorded sources, and towards recording equipment that
> can meaningfully record every bit of every word. Why do you think there are
> 64x-oversampling players and the like?

Not everyone is trying to squeeze every last "bit" of performance,
take for example crystal clear fone lines over fiber optic connections
with extra noise added in to sooth the listener.

I'm not familiar with oversampling in CD players but where I am familiar
with anti-aliasing is in cases where it is easier to do anti-aliasing
filtering digitally than it is to do it with analog circuitry.  Maybe
you can tell me why there are 64 times oversampling playres.

> Eric's right; you'll have to build your own tools to make things noisy, as
> the trend elsewhere is to make things unnoisy.
> 
> On the other hand, have you looked at the new mini-disc technology? That
> stuff already introduces audio compression, and the bits on a minidisc
> should be pretty high in entropy; of course, twiddling bits in a compressed
> audio recording may have dramatic effects on sound...

The compression in these mini-discs is more of a coding scheme than
a compression I believe.  It eliminates elements in the sound that
are perceptually unimportant to the listener.

> Jason




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: collins@newton.apple.com (Scott Collins)
Date: Tue, 30 Nov 93 18:07:54 PST
To: jerry@terminus.us.dell.com (Jeremy Porter)
Subject: Re: Entropy, Randomness, etc.
Message-ID: <9312010202.AA16542@newton.apple.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Good questions.

  >My understanding of a random number is a number is generated from
  >two or more unrelated events.

No.  This may be one general category of ways to manufacture random
numbers, but specifically a random number is just an arbitrary number
typically drawn from a sequence of independent arbitrary numbers.  The
quality of 'randomness' is a measure of the independence of the elements in
the stream.  Therefor, there is no such thing as a random number except as
an element of a sequence or other context from which to establish
independence.

  >In order for this number to be most useful cryptographically, it needs
  >a even distribution.

No.  In order for this number to be cryptographically useful, it must cost
more to guess the number (perhaps knowing the numbers that came before)
than the reward for guessing it correctly.  It happens that non-flat
distribution of a sequence is a lever for cheaper guessing, thus flat
distribution is natural characteristic of high-quality random sequences.

  >Does this make this distribution a gaussian distribution?

No.  Gaussian (a.k.a. 'normal') distribution is the bell curve (and clearly
indicates a relation between samples).  Math texts describing this
distribution often use the phrase 'distribution of some random variable x',
by which they in fact mean 'distribution of samples from a varying source'.


  >Also how are these statistical measurements done?

See Knuth, "The Art of Computer Programming", Volume 2: Seminumerical
Algorithms, Chapter 3: Random Numbers.

  >Is it as simple as a histogram?

Yes.

  >Are we talking frequency analysis with FFTs and
  >more advanced things?

Yes.

  >How do we measure the entropy of a random number, or a series of
  >random numbers?

Ah.  Now we're talking.  Entropy is closely related but not equal to
'randomness'.  Entropy is a measure of information often expressed as the
fraction of information-size to data-size.  Randomness is a measure of
unpredictability.  A sufficiently random sequence will be of very high
entropy from the perspective of the 'guesser', though not necessarily from
the that of the generator (e.g. a PRNG).  The best way to measure entropy
(if that is what you want to measure), is to build a sufficiently powerful
Markov model, or the equivalent, to predict the sequence, and treat it like
a compressor.  The number of bits output is the entropy of the sequence
with respect to that model.  If you can't build a model as smart as your
presumed attackers (as smart as them, not as smart as any model they might
build), then you will have to use more tests to assure yourself of
indepence of elements in the sequence (see Knuth, et al).  In practice
however, most of these methods represent very low bars over which any RNG
_must_ jump, and which often poor ones can.  Most RNGs are broken by
understanding how they work, and exploiting weaknesses in their
construction and context (e.g. poor 'seed' selection).

  >Have people on the list done this, or is this still in the range of
  >people that do math and number theory for a living?

Yes, and Yes.

  >These topics are probably covered in some of the basic books in the field,
  >but all of the reference's I've been able to locate don't go into
  >specifics of how to measure the quality of random numbers.

See Knuth.

  >Unless some measurements are made, you can't really be sure that those
  >/dev/mem MD5 hashes don't come up the same 10%, 30%, or more of the time.
  >It seems that a lot of assumptions are being made about what is good and
  >what isn't.

You should be exactly as paranoid as it is cost effective to be.

Hope this helps.



Scott Collins         | "Few people realize what tremendous power there
                      |  is in one of these things."     -- Willy Wonka
......................|................................................
BUSINESS.   voice:408.862.0540  fax:974.6094   collins@newton.apple.com
Apple Computer, Inc.   5 Infinite Loop, MS 305-2B   Cupertino, CA 95014
.......................................................................
PERSONAL.   voice/fax:408.257.1746    1024:669687   catalyst@netcom.com






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Anthony Garcia <agarcia@sugar.NeoSoft.COM>
Date: Tue, 30 Nov 93 16:27:49 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: What recipient-end mail filters are available?
Message-ID: <199312010022.AA26886@sugar.NeoSoft.COM>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I'm aware of two mail-filtering systems that operate at the
recipient's end, procmail and Elm filter.  Are there others?

-Anthony Garcia
agarcia@neosoft.com




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: kqb@whscad1.att.com
Date: Tue, 30 Nov 93 18:07:51 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Statistics of Low-Order Bits in Images
Message-ID: <9312010142.AA07963@cygnus.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Several people are attempting to create an algorithm to mask the
presence of a steganized encrypted message in the least significant
bits of an image.  Don't forget that no matter how fancy your algorithm
or how closely you mask your steganography with a model of what the
statistics of an ordinary image look like, you have to assume that your
opponent also knows your steganization algorithm, including your masking
technique.  (Otherwise you are just relying on security through obscurity.)
This leaves you with three problems:

  (1) your opponent may have a much better model of an ordinary
      image than you do, and still be able to discern the existence
      of masked steganography,
  (2) since your opponent knows your steganization algorithm,
      he/she can look for any "signature" that your steganography
      masking model leaves, and
  (3) your opponent can "desteganize" all your images and check their
      statistics for deviations from the statistics for "desteganized"
      ordinary images.

Resolving problems (1) and (2) requires a lot of work constructing
good models.  Resolving problem (3) requires, I think, a modeling
function for steganography that is invertible only with a secret key.
(Otherwise, your opponent could desteganize your image and find a
uniform random distribution, which indicates an encrypted message.)
Since this type of function is, to my knowledge, not well-developed,
don't expect it to be secure.  Thus, if breaking it could compromise your
secret key for desteganization, then don't use the same public/private
key pair for both encryption and steganography.

                              Kevin Q. Brown
                              INTERNET    kqb@whscad1.att.com
                                 or       kevin_q_brown@att.com




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: jel@sutro.SFSU.EDU (John E. Levine)
Date: Tue, 30 Nov 93 19:07:55 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: dithering, repudiable steganography
Message-ID: <9312010302.AA05375@russian.SFSU.EDU>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


REPUDIABLE STEGANOGRAPHY

I have a book (unfortunately not with me now) describing
the format of data on music CDs.  It seems that there is
a kind of objectionable, heard noise in digital
recordings called granulation noise.  This is peculiar
to digital; analog recording doesn't have this problem.
Granulation noise manifests itself at low amplitudes,
when the signal being represented is just at the
resolution of the digital sampling.  For example, if the
signal is a sinusoid with a peak-to-peak amplitude
represented by just a little greater than one bit
difference in each sample.  The problem is, the sampled
sinusoid sounds just like a square wave when it is played
back.

Input, the signal:
   +---------------------------------------------------------------------
 2 |
   |        xxx                                 xxx
   |      xx   xx                             xx   xx
   |     x       x                           x       x
 1 |    x         x                         x         x
   |   x           x                       x           x
   |  x             x                     x             x
   | x               x                   x               x
 0 +x-----------------x-----------------x-----------------x--------------
   |                   x               x                   x
   |                    x             x                     x
   |                     x           x                       x
-1 |                      x         x                         x         x
   |                       x       x                           x       x
   |                        xx   xx                             xx   xx
   |                          xxx                                 xxx
-2 |
   +---------------------------------------------------------------------

Output, the digitized, sampled signal:
   +---------------------------------------------------------------------
 2 |
   |
   |
   |                                        xxxxxxxxxxx
 1 |    xxxxxxxxxxx
   |
   |
   |
 0 +xxxx-----------xxxx-----------------xxxx-----------xxxx--------------
   |
   |
   |
-1 |                   xxxx         xxxx                   xxxx
   |
   |
   |
-2 |                       xxxxxxxxx                           xxxxxxxxx
   +---------------------------------------------------------------------

This introduces (would introduce) lots of strong harmonics,
making a very quiet flute, say, sound very unflutelike.  The
people who make commercial CDs get around this problem with
a technique called dithering.  They add to each sample a
number from {-2, -1, 0, 1 2}, picked randomly.  I.e., they
randomly scramble the low few bits of each sample.  The
interesting thing about this is that, while it obviously
degrades the signal, the result sounds better to human ears!
It solves the problem of granulation noise.  (The noisy
flute sounds better than the clear but mangled squarewave
thing the flute sounds like through the granulation noise).
Of course there is something like 93 db dynamic range on a
CD, so the dither hardly makes a dent in the usual sound
quality -- it's only there to solve the granulation noise
problem, which is only a problem at very low signal
strengths.

The only requirement for the dither bits is that they be
such that they sound random, like noise.  But any random
source of bits with this property would work just as well
for dithering.  In particular, let's suppose you have an
encrypted file, represented as a sequence of symbols, each
of which has exactly 5 values it can assume.  Musically,
this would sound exactly like noise :-) .  So *this* file
could be used to dither an audiofile, instead of the "real"
random values currently used.

I guess what I really mean to say is that this insures that
the low bit in a dithered file is *really* random; hence
could be replaced with a bit from your encrypted file.

Moreover, such a dithered audio file has some nice steganographic
properties.

1) Repudiability.  Under the assumption that the encrypted file
   cannot be cracked without the possession of the key to the file
   (which the owner of the steganographically-injected audio file
   has but claims ignorance of), the dither *really does* look like
   genuine, random dither.  She can claim that the file is in fact
   a recording of the minutes of the last cypherpunks meeting, or
   a 3 hour concert that she taped off the radio, and no TLA can
   prove otherwise.  Usually, a steganographically hidden datum
   (a microdot, invisible ink, etc.) doesn't have this property.

2) Zero storage requirements.  This follows from 1), really.  If
   you hide data in the unused parts of the last blocks on disk
   in a disk file, or in a hidden partition, the secrecy of the
   data (the "steganographic integrity"?) depends on the enemy
   not knowing or suspecting the existence of the data.


PROBLEMS:

You wouldn't be able to hide anything in your private copy of
Michael Jackson's Thriller; the enemy could simply compare your
copy with the standard copy, making the differences (the hidden
file) stand out.  Unless you were Warner Brothers, in which case
you could just steganographically-inject ALL copys of Thriller
with the secret file.  This would make storage of the hidden file
trivial.  You could get a copy from the nearest Wherehouse.  [I
don't know if W.B in fact publishes Thriller; it's just an example]

I wonder if CD pulishers know that they could make some money on
the side by hiding data for people in their thousands of CDs?

Anyway, while I don't know the format for DAT, I suspect there
is some point where the sound signal is dithered to mask the
granulation noise, and at this point Alice with information to
hide could inject her file.

Do digital pictures employ dithering to prevent aliasing?  I
think so.

--John.		jel@sutro.sfsu.edu




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: jerry@terminus.dell.com (Jeremy Porter)
Date: Tue, 30 Nov 93 16:32:18 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com (cypher)
Subject: Entropy, Randomness, etc.
Message-ID: <9312010132.AA20601@terminus.us.dell.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


With all this talk about entropy, randomness, and gaussian distributions,
I'm hoping we can clear up some of the confusion that I am having.
My understanding of a random number is a number is generated from
two or more unrelated events.
In order for this number to be most useful cryptographically, it needs
a even distribution.  This distribution is such that any one number
in the range of possible values is equally probable as any other number.
Does this make this distribution a gaussian distribution?

Maybe I just don't understand the theory behind the random numbers
well enough, but with all of these terms floating around it is hard
to keep track.

The reason I want to get some of these things clarified, is because
I am becoming more interested in some of the analysis people have been
talking about being possible.  Also how are these statistical measurements
done?  Is it as simple as a histogram?  (useful for simple alphabet
transliterations).  Are we talking frequency analysis with FFTs and
more advanced things?  How do we measure the entropy of a random number,
or a series of random numbers?  Have people on the list done this, or
is this still in the range of people that do math and number theory for
a living?

Give a particular set of data used to generate a random key, such as,
a unix box's /dev/mem, how can one measure the number of bits of
entropy?

These topics are probably covered in some of the basic books in the field,
but all of the reference's I've been able to locate don't go into
specifics of how to measure the quality of random numbers.

Unless some measurements are made, you can't really be sure that those
/dev/mem MD5 hashes don't come up the same 10%, 30%, or more of the time.
It seems that a lot of assumptions are being made about what is good and
what isn't.

I plan to build a hardware random number generator and I have a couple of
different circuits to do it, but I've heard some comments about some
types of noise not being "good" cryptographically.
-- 
Jeremy Porter  ------------- Systems Engineering --------
Dell Computer Corp.   ------ jerry@terminus.us.dell.com ----
---  70 4F BD AE 6D E9 D2 66  48 18 8B E7 64 7F 59 8F ---
Support your Second Amendment rights to encryption technology.



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@stout.atd.ucar.EDU>
Date: Tue, 30 Nov 93 18:52:18 PST
To: Anthony Garcia <agarcia@sugar.NeoSoft.COM>
Subject: Re: What recipient-end mail filters are available?
In-Reply-To: <199312010022.AA26886@sugar.NeoSoft.COM>
Message-ID: <9312010247.AA16619@stout.atd.ucar.EDU>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> I'm aware of two mail-filtering systems that operate at the
> recipient's end, procmail and Elm filter.  Are there others?

There is also the "slocal" filter that is part of the MH system.  One of
the many features of MH that help to keep me sane...

Jonathan Corbet
National Center for Atmospheric Research, Atmospheric Technology Division
corbet@stout.atd.ucar.edu




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: jel@sutro.SFSU.EDU (John E. Levine)
Date: Tue, 30 Nov 93 19:57:52 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: soundfile stego
Message-ID: <9312010353.AA00175@russian.SFSU.EDU>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


You know, you don't have to think of somehow modifying
a file pointwise in the time domain.  How about this,
to stego a sound file:

Do an FFT of the *entire* file.  Assuming the file
is two hours = 7200 seconds, the frequency res of
the transformed file will be about 140 microhertz.
Pick a band that humans don't usually pay much
conscious attention to when they hear music; say 18
KHz through 19.5 KHz.  Replace the low bit in each
of these frequency space samples (there are 1500 /
0.000140 ~= 1E7 such samples) with the stego data.
Inverse transform the modified, frequency space
representation of the file back into the time domain,
and voila! I suspect you would not be able to tell the
difference from the original with your naked ears.
But this is not repudiable; I suspect the spectrum
of the file would look artificial.

xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx

Also, I am told that humans have a tough time identifying
the phase of the frequency components of the sounds they
identify.  So one could hide date in the phase relationships
among the frequency components of, say, recorded speech.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Andy Wilson <ajw@Think.COM>
Date: Tue, 30 Nov 93 17:02:16 PST
To: agarcia@sugar.NeoSoft.COM
Subject: What recipient-end mail filters are available?
In-Reply-To: <199312010022.AA26886@sugar.NeoSoft.COM>
Message-ID: <9312010057.AA06913@custard.think.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


   Date: Tue, 30 Nov 1993 18:22:15 -0600
   From: Anthony Garcia <agarcia@sugar.NeoSoft.COM>

   I'm aware of two mail-filtering systems that operate at the
   recipient's end, procmail and Elm filter.  Are there others?

The autokill feature in GNU Emacs.

Andy

   -Anthony Garcia
   agarcia@neosoft.com





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Barbara L Marco <lmb@tenet.edu>
Date: Tue, 30 Nov 93 18:07:51 PST
To: Matthew J Miszewski <MJMISKI@macc.wisc.edu>
Subject: Re: Factor Breakthru!
In-Reply-To: <23112921205919@vms2.macc.wisc.edu>
Message-ID: <Pine.3.03.9311302003.C29071-9100000@Joyce-Perkins.tenet.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain




On Mon, 29 Nov 1993, Matthew J Miszewski wrote:

> 'Punks,
>  
>   Just curious as to what would (or will eventually) happen when a shortcut
> to factoring large numbers is discovered?  Do we revert to older less
> secure conventions or am I missing something?
You have been watching too much sneakers my friend :) No, If we were to do
that, I'm sure different methods of encryption would come up, maybe using
letters instead of numbers, etc.
Dr. No - [lmb@tenet.edu]






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Anonymous <nowhere@bsu-cs.bsu.edu>
Date: Tue, 30 Nov 93 17:02:49 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: A change of pace
Message-ID: <9312010101.AA25506@bsu-cs.bsu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Newsgroups: comp.org.eff.talk
From: strnlght@netcom.com (David Sternlight)
Subject: Re: EFF Op-Ed from the NY Times
Message-ID: <strnlghtCHBurB.7on@netcom.com>
Reply-To: david@sternlight.com (David Sternlight)
Organization: DSI/USCRPAC
References: <199311301632.LAA28210@eff.org>
Date: Tue, 30 Nov 1993 23:04:21 GMT

In article <199311301632.LAA28210@eff.org>,
Stanton McCandlish <mech@eff.org> wrote:
>From the New York Times Op-Ed Page, Wednesday, November 24, 1993
>
>A Superhighway Through the Wasteland?
>   By Mitchell Kapor and Jerry Berman

[Proposal for new laws to regulate the information highway omitted]

Like most elitists and autocrats, eff's leaders believe in government
intervention for the things they like (this topic) but not for the things
they don't (Clipper).

They believe in the private sector unrestricted for things they like
(cryptography) but not for the things they don't (the information highway).

David
-- 
David Sternlight         When the mouse laughs at the cat,
                         there is a hole nearby.--Nigerian Proverb






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Timothy Newsham <newsham@wiliki.eng.hawaii.edu>
Date: Tue, 30 Nov 93 22:32:18 PST
To: jel@sutro.SFSU.EDU (John E. Levine)
Subject: Re: soundfile stego
In-Reply-To: <9312010353.AA00175@russian.SFSU.EDU>
Message-ID: <9312010631.AA22105@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> 
> You know, you don't have to think of somehow modifying
> a file pointwise in the time domain.  How about this,
> to stego a sound file:
> 
> Do an FFT of the *entire* file.  Assuming the file
> is two hours = 7200 seconds, the frequency res of
> the transformed file will be about 140 microhertz.
> Pick a band that humans don't usually pay much
> conscious attention to when they hear music; say 18
> KHz through 19.5 KHz.  Replace the low bit in each
> of these frequency space samples (there are 1500 /
> 0.000140 ~= 1E7 such samples) with the stego data.
> Inverse transform the modified, frequency space
> representation of the file back into the time domain,
> and voila! I suspect you would not be able to tell the
> difference from the original with your naked ears.
> But this is not repudiable; I suspect the spectrum
> of the file would look artificial.

The FFT and inverse FFT operationes are not lossless processes.
When you transform a signal you are dealing with floating
point numbers and you lose some information by rounding errors.
You could put some signal in the high freq portion of the
signal but it wont be as simple as XOR'ing values.

> Also, I am told that humans have a tough time identifying
> the phase of the frequency components of the sounds they
> identify.  So one could hide date in the phase relationships
> among the frequency components of, say, recorded speech.

This sounds interesting.  How about detection,  how will some
random phase relationships stand out against normal phase of
various frequencies?





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Duncan Frissell <frissell@panix.com>
Date: Tue, 30 Nov 93 17:32:18 PST
To: CYPHERPUNKS@toad.com
Subject: re: Big Brother/Bank Acco
Message-ID: <199312010130.AA09550@panix.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


M >Given the material in the WiReD 1.6 article, how likely is it that a
M >true anonymous digital cash system would be allowed?  I know, I know;
M >there's "no way to prevent it"; however, I think that concept is 
M >based on the premise that the Government proceeds rationally.

The East German government did not "proceed rationally" and yet is no 
longer with us.

M >If somebody with an axe to grind gets hold of the "kidnapped baby"
M >scenario described in _Applied_Cryptography_, plenty of public 
M >outrage and indignation could be generated.  

To what end.  We have had the Kiddie Porn Over the Nets story of the Day 
every day for the last six months in the US and the UK.  Have the nets 
been shut down?  With the clearance rate for *murders* in NYC falling down 
towards 30%, I doubt if we have much to worry about for our minor 
"crimes."

M >Go on, reassure me that "all is well".

All is as well as can be extected and much better than we used to fear.

DCF

"I never expected to live to see the Death of Communism"

-- Friedrich Hayek a few months before his death (and a few months after 
the SU's death.



--- WinQwk 2.0b#1165
    




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Duncan Frissell <frissell@panix.com>
Date: Tue, 30 Nov 93 17:32:49 PST
To: CYPHERPUNKS@toad.com
Subject: Crypto Anarchy, the Gover
Message-ID: <199312010130.AA09560@panix.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


T >You mean, how likely is that the government will allow a system that
T >makes taxation almost impossible, that enables black markets, that
T >facilitates the transfer of illegal information, and that basically
T >nukes the present arrangement?
T >
T >I don't think they'll "allow" it. But this doesn't mean it won't 
T >happen.

For all of you who didn't hear my talk at ECFP '93 in London on the 20th 
(quite a few since there were fewer than 75 there) here is my conclusion 
which addresses this subject.

****

"And what can we call this new form of social organization growing on the 
nets and in the modern fluid business environment?  When two or more 
people can meet together and communicate freely and privately without 
interference by outsiders, they can trade -- they can form a market.  If 
this trade on the nets is made free from even the possibility of 
external regulation, what we have is a free market and a free society."

****

Remember kids God fights on the side with the heaviest artillery.  Unless 
the government can come up with a way of blocking the above communication, 
it is SOOL.  

T >Imagine this: to get on the Data Superhighway, which will likely be
T >the only major lines if the government succeeds in making it the
T >mandatory standard, every data packet must have a "license plate."
T >Don't laugh! The idea of a license plate on data packets is coming. It
T >would provide the kind of traceability that control freaks like
T >Detweiler claim to want 

So what if the car has a license plate if you can't tell what is in the 
car.  No matter what happens telecoms will be cheap.  Cheap means you can 
establish accounts and run a virtual network without disclosing the 
contents of the network messages or even that the network exists.  You can 
hide your virtual network inside a much larger pseudo network which 
contains nothing interesting.  

DCF

"The Trader swims in the sea of communications" -- Left out of Mao on 
Guerrilla Warfare because of editing error.



--- WinQwk 2.0b#1165
            




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Date: Tue, 30 Nov 93 20:37:53 PST
To: bill.stewart@pleasantonca.ncr.com +1-510-484-6204)
Subject: Re: Signing Keys for Nyms and Digibank Users
In-Reply-To: <9312010354.AA17944@anchor.ho.att.com>
Message-ID: <199312010437.UAA02673@mail.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Bill Steward wrote:

> The purpose of signing keys, in my opinion, is to verify that,
> if you're using a given key to talk to a given person or entity,
> does that key really belong to that entity, or is it a key the
> KGB/NSA/Mafia/Wiretaps-R-Us substituted for the real key.
> You're not necessarily claiming that the name on the key is the
> person's Government-Approved True Name, though government ID
> is one way you could help verify that the person you meet at a conference
> claiming to be "Tim May" is the real "Tim May" you've been sending

Yes, it's  important people realize this. For example, I only recently
met the "meat-entity Bill Stewart" when he moved to the Bay Area a
month or two ago...I previously knew this entity as the "Net-entity
Bill Stewart" and I didn't really care what his physical ID and meat
personna was, only that every time I dealt with "him" I was in fact
reaching the same entity. (We didn't user public keys, so far as I
recall, but we _could_ have.)

> The government already supports government-approved fictional people
> with government-approved names - corporations.

More than this, the government has over 30,000 people in the Witness
Security Program (popularly known as the Witness Protection Program):
turncoats, Mafia informants, and other criminals. The credit card
companies and major credit reporting agencies (TRQ, Equifax, etc.)
apparently have a working arrangement with the relevant agencies to
not flag "data base ghosts" that clearly belong to these
legend-equipped phony IDs.

Interestingly, this probably explains a lot about the collusion
between credit card companies and the government....and perhaps why
"digital cash" VISA cards have not appeared, even though they are
feasible.

Also note the intriguing possibility that offshore/cyberspatial credit
reporting agencies could identify these "data base ghosts" and reveal
them publically. We could see several thousand of them be killed
withing days by their vengeful ex-partners, while the others are
frantically relocated. 

Crypto anarchy will shake so many things up!

(I have a lot more info on WitSec, on FinCEN, and on other secretive
government programs.)


--Tim May


-- 
..........................................................................
Timothy C. May         | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,  
tcmay@netcom.com       | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
408-688-5409           | knowledge, reputations, information markets, 
W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA  | black markets, collapse of governments.
Higher Power: 2^756839 | Public Key: PGP and MailSafe available.
Note: I put time and money into writing this posting. I hope you enjoy it.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: jazz@hal.com (Jason Zions)
Date: Tue, 30 Nov 93 18:57:51 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Statistics of Low-Order Bits in Images
Message-ID: <9312010256.AA02876@jazz.hal.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


   >Sounds like the simple solution is for people everywhere to replace
   >the low order bits of all of their pictures with good random noise. 

You're kidding, right? Image processing software, and music processing
equipment, are designed to get the maximum performance out of the storage
medium. I find it pretty unlikely that any developer of image processing
tools is going to deliberately drop one bit of precision off each n-bit
unit; sheesh, image files are big enough without software deliberately
wasting bits.

As for introducing noise into the low-order bit of music CDs, definitely
not; the trend is towards equipment that can extract the last dribble of
information from well-recorded sources, and towards recording equipment that
can meaningfully record every bit of every word. Why do you think there are
64x-oversampling players and the like?

Eric's right; you'll have to build your own tools to make things noisy, as
the trend elsewhere is to make things unnoisy.

On the other hand, have you looked at the new mini-disc technology? That
stuff already introduces audio compression, and the bits on a minidisc
should be pretty high in entropy; of course, twiddling bits in a compressed
audio recording may have dramatic effects on sound...

Jason




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: an48848@anon.penet.fi
Date: Tue, 30 Nov 93 13:57:48 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Who is this Detweiler guy anyway?
Message-ID: <9311302154.AA23084@anon.penet.fi>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



As a fairly recent addition to this list, I'm unfamilliar with the history of
cypherpunks.  Can anyone enlighten me?  Thanks.
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
To find out more about the anon service, send mail to help@anon.penet.fi.
Due to the double-blind, any mail replies to this message will be anonymized,
and an anonymous id will be allocated automatically. You have been warned.
Please report any problems, inappropriate use etc. to admin@anon.penet.fi.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: jel@sutro.SFSU.EDU (John E. Levine)
Date: Tue, 30 Nov 93 22:47:55 PST
To: newsham@wiliki.eng.hawaii.edu
Subject: soundfile stego
In-Reply-To: <9312010628.AA07814@sutro.SFSU.EDU>
Message-ID: <9312010643.AA07855@sutro.SFSU.EDU>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>> Also, I am told that humans have a tough time identifying
>> the phase of the frequency components of the sounds they
>> identify.  So one could hide date in the phase relationships
>> among the frequency components of, say, recorded speech.
>
>This sounds interesting.  How about detection,  how will some
>random phase relationships stand out against normal phase of
>various frequencies?

I suspect that the unusual phase relationships would stick
out, to anyone looking at the speech with,say, an oscilliscope.
  Eg, a squarewave would look pretty mangled if you shifted
its component frequencies by some random amount, even though
a human being might not be able to detect the difference between
a squarewave, and a component-frequency shifted squarewave.
  On the other hand, how often does speech over some electronic
medeum actually get analyzed this deeply?




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: wcs@anchor.ho.att.com (bill.stewart@pleasantonca.ncr.com +1-510-484-6204)
Date: Tue, 30 Nov 93 19:57:52 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Signing Keys for Nyms and Digibank Users
Message-ID: <9312010354.AA17944@anchor.ho.att.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


X-Note: This isn't a Detweiler-flame, it's a mostly technical discussion

A While Back, L. Detweiler asked:

> Suppose that a real person signed someone else's imaginary identity for
> a key in a key server, or for their own. Can someone explain to me why
> this is not dishonest?
> 
> I guess the argument will be, the signor is only guaranteeing that some
> key is associated with some email address.  But that seems to me to
> abuse the whole idea of trust in people.  Has anyone asked PRZ what he
> thinks of the practice of real people signing imaginary identities?

There's a couple of issues here, some of which we haven't beaten to death:
- what you're claiming to be the truth by signing the key
- can you be sure you're signing a key for the *real* imaginary identity,
	or whether you're signing a key for somebody *impersonating* 
	the imaginary entity?
- if the pseudonym is one of yours, are you giving away its identity
	(and hence usefulness or safety) by signing it?

The purpose of signing keys, in my opinion, is to verify that,
if you're using a given key to talk to a given person or entity,
does that key really belong to that entity, or is it a key the
KGB/NSA/Mafia/Wiretaps-R-Us substituted for the real key.
You're not necessarily claiming that the name on the key is the
person's Government-Approved True Name, though government ID
is one way you could help verify that the person you meet at a conference
claiming to be "Tim May" is the real "Tim May" you've been sending
email to all these years, and not some NSA guy or Eric Hughes in disguise.
The government already supports government-approved fictional people
with government-approved names - corporations.

The quality of the introduction you're providing to other people
may be affected by how well you verify that you're talking to the
person you think you are, and by how well you know them,
and ought to indicate this.  If you're giving away PGP at, say,
a trade show or conference or rave, you probably should
create a separate public key for doing those signatures, e.g.
	(1993 Anarchist's Gathering PGP Demo <wcs@foobar.com>)
so people know this isn't the usual high quality intro you normally provide.

Verifying that you're talking to the right person for a pseudonym is tough.
If you're having a conversation by email, it's really hard,
unless you and the nym share some private knowledge that the
Wiretaps-R-Us folks wouldn't have access to and that isn't on the
Usenet CD-ROM collection, which is unlikely unless you know the
pseudonym-user personally and are sure they've been using that name.

I know a couple of people who use the names "Hobbit" and "Wookie",
in real life as well as on the net (though that's probably not 
what their mothers call them :-), and I'd have no problems signing keys 
for them as long as the keys indicated *which* Hobbit and Wookie they are.
Similarly, I've got a number of relatives who've changed their names
(show biz, Anglicizing, personal weirdness, etc.), and I'd have
no problems signing keys for them under either their government-approved
names, birth names, work-use names, family-use names, or whatever.

On the other hand, I'd have real trouble signing keys for Wonderer,
Dark Unicorn, or strnlght@netcom.com because I haven't met them
personally, and only have the consistency of their email addresses
to verify who they are - and I haven't tried checking their
articles to know what to look for to check whether an email
request claiming to be from one of them looks unforged.
If I remember right, none of these people puts a PGP Key ID or fingerprint
in their posting signatures, so I don't have that clue available -
that would increase my confidence a lot.  But I still couldn't be sure.

I once got a phone call from someone claiming to be Bob Morris (Sr.),
about some computer security problems I was having, who pointed
out that I couldn't really verify it was *him* I was talking to.
(If I'd called him back, I'd at most know it was someone at his desk
or someone hacking the phone system.)  If I wanted to sign his key,
I'd create a special "Unix Hacker who claimed to be Bob Morris" key
to sign it with, if he told me the key words from that conversation,
and you could decide how much to trust that introduction.
~~~

There are a couple of of my own nyms I've signed keys for (using other nyms),
when I was demonstrating how the signature stuff worked
to somebody who uses an anonymous remailer (and had already
figured out that I was the person who used one of those nyms
due to the anon.penet.fi remailer behavior; I knew his address
because he'd included a signature in one of his anonymous postings.)

On the other hand, if I really cared about preserving the anonymity
of the nym-user, and it was somebody I knew in person, or myself,
I probably wouldn't sign it with my real key - it may be relatively obvious
that "Bill The Dragon-Basher" whose key was signed by "Bill Stewart" was me,
but I'd rather not have to deal with a court subpoena or Mafia equivalent
trying to find the users of the keys for "Crypto International, Ltd." or
"Coalition Against the U.S. Invasion of Cuba" or "Some Unapproved Religion" or
"Bear's Custom Chemicals" or an anonymous Panamanian bank account that's mine.

But if the keys are only signed by other nyms, how trustable are they?
If I ran a digibank, I'd be real hesitant about accepting changes of
address or public-key unless I had some physical verification or other
securely shared secret to avoid eavesdropper and interloper attacks,
but one of the goals of digital banking is that you're not supposed
to need physical transactions.  I suppose an initial account set up
by sending the bank a message with a Secret and a public key and a 
bunch of digibucks might do the job, with some cut&choose protocols
to decrypt the digibucks if the account is approved?

		Bill The Dragon-Basher
			(oops!  ^X^C:wq!/exit~.\b\b\b\b\b\b)
# Bill Stewart  Old address: wcs@anchor.ho.att.com AT&T Bell Labs, Holmdel, NJ
# After 10/15, NCR, 6870 Koll Center Parkway, Pleasanton CA, 94566
# Voice/Beeper 510-224-7043, Phone 510-484-6204, email bill.stewart@pleasantonca.ncr.com




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: jkyser@netcom.com (Jeff Kyser)
Date: Wed, 1 Dec 93 00:22:16 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Fedworld BBS Info
Message-ID: <199312010820.AAA26088@mail.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Somewhat off topic, but for those of you interested in government information,
there is a BBS called FEDWORLD which has gateways into 100+ federal BBS
systems.  It can be reached via telnet to fedworld.gov.  Following is a list
of the federal systems that can be reached through the gateway:

  2:ALF (USDA)               :National Agricultural Library BBS
  3:ALIX (Lib of Congress)   :Automated Library Information eXchange
  4:BOM-BBN(Dept of Interior):Bureau of Mines-Bulletin Board Network
  5:ISM-SIS (IRS)            :ISM Support Info System
  6:CIC-BBS (GSA)            :Consumer Information Center
  7:CLU-IN (EPA)             :Superfund Data and Information
  8:CPO-BBS (Census)         :Lists open jobs at the Census Dept
  9:CRS-BBS (Dept of Justice):Amer. With Disabilities Act Info
 10:Computer Security (NIST) :Computer Sys Lab Computer Security BBS
 11:DCBBS (DC Govt)          :DC Government Information
 12:DMIE (NIST/CSL)          :NIST/CSL Data Management Information
 13:EBB (Dept of Commerce)   :Economic data and information
 14:ELISA System (DoD)       :DoD Export License Tracking System
 15:GSA/IRM BBS (GSA)        :Information Resources Management Issues
 16:EPUB (Dept of Energy)    :Energy information and data
 17:FDA's BBS (FDA)          :FDA info and policies
 18:FDA/DMMS (FDA)           :PMA, IDE, 510k & guidance documents
 19:FERC-CIPS BBS(Dof Energy):Fed Energy Regulatory Commission
 20:FEBBS (Fed Highway Admin):FHWA information and data
 21:FRBBS (NIST)             :FRBBS - Info on Fire Research
 22:FEDERAL BBS (GPO)        :GPO and Govt Data (Fee Based)
 23:OSS-BBS (GSA)            :GSA On-line Schedules System
 24:Eximbank BBS             :Export/Import Bank data and info.
 25:JAG-NET (U.S. Navy)      :Navy Judge Advocate General
 26:Labor News(Dept of Labor):Dept of Labor information and files
 27:Megawatt 1(DofEnergy)    :Information on energy and DoE
 28:NADAP (US Navy)          :Navy Drug and Alcohol Abuse Prevention
 29:NAVTASC (US Navy)        :NAVCOMTELSTA Washington DC
 30:EHSC-DDS                 :Army Engineering & Housing
 31:NDB-BBS(Dept of Agricul) :Human Nutrition Information Service
 32:NSSDC\NASA\Goddard       :The NASA NODIS Locator System.
 33:1040 BBS (IRS)           :Electronic Tax Filing Information
 34:SBB-BB (Treasury)        :Surety Bond Branch, Circular 570
 35:OIS (Bureau of Prisons)  :US Bureau of Prison employees
 36:SBIR-BBS (NASA)          :NASA Small Business Innovation Research
 37:WTIE-BBS (EPA)           :Wastewater Treatment Info Exchange
 38:QED-BBS (USGS)           :Quick Epicenter Determ and EQ data
 39:SALEMDUG-BBS (FEMA)      :State and local FEMA user groups
 40:SBA On Line (SBA)        :SBA Information and data (9600 bps)
 41:SBA On Line (SBA)        :SBA Information & Data (2400 bps)
 42:SBAI-BBS (SBA)           :Small Bus. Admin internal BBS
 43:Sample Weather Data (NWS):Sample data from Fee Based System
 44:OPM Mainstreet           :OPM - Job Info, Personnel Guidance
 45:TELENEWS(Dept of Energy) :Data and info on Fossil fuels
 46:USA-GPCS BBS (US Army)   :Army Info System Software
 47:USCS-BBS (Customs)       :Customs and Exchange Rate Data & Info
 48:USGS-BBS (USGS)          :Geological Survey BBS/CD-ROM Info
 49:NLPBB (Navy)             :CNO's Navy Leadership Policy BB
 50:FMS-BBS (U.S. Treas)     :Inventory management data & programs
 51:OASH-BBS (HHS)           :Health & AIDS Information & Reports
 52:FEDIX                    :Links Fed Data to Higher Education
 53:DASC-ZE(Def Log Agency)  :PC Info and files
 54:GPSIC (Coast Guard)      :GPS, Loran & Omega Info/status
 55:NGCR-BBS (US Navy)       :Next Generation Computer Resources Stan
 56:PPIC-BBS (EPA)           :Pollu. Preven, Clean Product, Ozone
 57:Gulfline (EPA&NOAA)      :Gulf Coast Pollution Information
 58:FAA Safety Exchange (FAA):Small Plane Safety Reports & info
 59:NTIS QuikSERVICE (NTIS)  :Order NTIS Documents Online
 60:LC News Service (LOC)    :Library of Congress News Service
 61:STIS (NSF)               :Science & Technology Information System
 62:MI-BBS (DoE)             :DoE Minority Impact Bulletin Board
 63:TECH SPECS (NRC)         :Technical Specifications Improvement Pr
 64:Census-BEA (Census)      :Census BEA Electronic Forum
 65:IHS-BBS (HHS)            :Indian Health Service BBS
 66:NOAA-ESDD (NOAA)         :NOAA Environmental Services Data Direct
 67:Offshore-BBS (Interior)  :Off Shore Oil & Gas Data
 68:TQM-BBS (T. Glenn)       :Total Quality Management
 69:NIDR Online (NIH)        :Nat. Institute of Dental Research
 70:NIHGL (NIH)              :Nat. Inst. of Health Grant Line BBS
 71:PayPerNet #1 (OPM)       :Fed. Pay & Performance Management BBS
 72:PayPerNet #2 (OPM)       :Fed. Pay & Performance Management
 73:CASUCOM  (GSA)           :Interagency Shared Services/Resources
 74:ATTIC (EPA)              :Alternative Treatment Tech Info Center
 75:NCJRS-BBS (DofJustice)   :National Criminal Justice  Reference Sy
 76:DRIPSS (EPA)             :Drinking Water Info Processing Support
 77:PIM BBS (EPA)            :Pesticide Information Network
 78:SWICH BBS (EPA&SWANA)    :Solid Waste Management
 79:NPS-BBS (EPA)            :Nonpoint Source Program BBS
 80:OEA BBS (DofInterior)    :Interior's Off of Environment. Affairs
 81:Metro-Net (US Army)      :Army Morale, Welfare, and Recreation
 82:CABB (Dof State)         :Passport Info/ Travel Alerts
 83:BUPERS Access (US Navy)  :Navy Personnel Information
 84:FCC-State Link (FCC)     :FCC daily digest & carrier stats/report
 85:HUD-N&E BB (HUD)         :HUD News & Events BB.  Press Releases
 87:FREND #1 (Natl Archives) :Fed. Register Electronic News Delivery
 88:FREND #2 (Natl Archives) :Fed. Register Electronic News Delivery
 89:NHS-BBS (HHS)            :National Head Start BBS
 90:WSCA-BBS (Dof Labor)     :Board of Wage & Service Contract Appeal
 91:TEBBS (OGE)              :Office of Government Ethics BBS
 92:HSETC MD (U.S. Navy)     :Naval Health Sci Edu & Training Command
 93:PPCUG/RDAMIS (DoD)       :Pentagon Users Group BBS
 95:CBEE (Coast Guard)       :Coast Guard On-Line Magazine & News
 96:ATD BBS (FAA)            :Air Transport Div. BBS
 97:ATOS-BBS (FAA)           :Air Traffic Operations Service BBS
 98:AEE BBS (FAA)            :FAA Office of Environment & Energy
 99:OCA BBS (PRC)            :Postal Rate Commission/Consumer Advocat
100:GEMI (GSA)               :GSA Electronic Management Information
101:Airports BBS #1 (FAA)    :Airport operators and designers
102:EnviroNET (NASA)         :Space Environment Information Service
103:FAA HQ BBS (FAA)         :FAA Headquarters BBS
104:IRS-SOI (IRS)            :Public Taxpayer Statistical Information
105:ARA-BBS (FAA)            :Aviation Rulemaking Advisory BBS
106:IIAC BBS (US Army)       :Integration & Analysis Center BBS
108:ACF-BBS (HHS)            :Admin. for Children and Families
109:NTIA-BBS (Dof Commerce)  :Radio Freq. Management Issues
110:ED Board (Dept of Ed)    :Dept of Ed Grant & Contract Info
111:BHPr-BBS (HHS)           :Medical & Health Services Information
112:Marine Data BBS (NOAA)   :Marine Databases & Files
113:Call-ERS BBS (USDA)      :Agriculture Economic Research Info
114:Call ERS (USDA)          :Economic Research Line Service Line 2
115:ABLE INFORM (Dof Ed)     :Disability & Rehab Data & Info
116:PTO-BBS (PTO)            :Patent and Trademark Office BBS
117:PerManNet (Dof State)    :US Agency for International Development
118:Quick Facts! (NIAAA/HHS) :Alcohol Abuse & Alcoholism Information
123:IBNS/OMPAT BBS (DoD)     :Military Performance Assessement
124:EDOS (DC Crt Appeals)    :US Court of Appeals, District of Columb
125:RSA-BBS (RSA)            :Rehabilitation Services Administration
126:FRESBB (GSA)             :Federal Real Estate Sales Bulletin Boar
128:NCUA BBS (NCUA)          :National Credit Union Administration
129:NBCI-BBS  (USDA)         :Natl Biological Control Institute
130:OECI-BBS (DOC&DoD)       :Defense Conversion Information

-- 
Jeff Kyser             PGP 2.3 public key available via finger 
jkyser@netcom.com      "                                     "      



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: karn@qualcomm.com (Phil Karn)
Date: Wed, 1 Dec 93 01:37:53 PST
To: hfinney@shell.portal.com
Subject: Cryptosplit 2.0
In-Reply-To: <9311290404.AA27229@jobe.shell.portal.com>
Message-ID: <199312010933.BAA27774@servo>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>One possible application is to split up your PGP secret key file this
>way and distribute the pieces to trusted friends such that several of
>them have to cooperate to recover your key.  Then if you accidentally lose
>your key you can get the pieces back from your friends.

I don't need to worry much about losing my secret key.  I can keep as
many backup copies as I like, in as many different places as I like --
all securely encrypted with my passphrase.

The application for secret sharing would be to allow some subset of
trusted people to regenerate your secret key *without your
assistance*. I could see several situations in which a voluntary
scheme like this could be useful, the main one being if you were to
die unexpectedly.

Phil




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: peb@PROCASE.COM (Paul Baclace)
Date: Wed, 1 Dec 93 09:58:11 PST
To: lmb@tenet.edu
Subject: Re: Factor Breakthru!
Message-ID: <9312011756.AA19523@ada.procase.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Factoring is only one method.   

Case in point: solving the game of Go has been proven to take
exponential time *and* exponential space.  An encryption algorithm
based on it could potentially be very hard, although there are
subtleties about trap doors and the cost of key generation and use...


Paul E. Baclace
peb@procase.com

P.S.: I'm installing procmail over here...get version v2.91 (I fixed a segv
in v2.61 [on SunOS] yesterday and should have just picked up the newer 
version first.)




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Duncan Frissell <frissell@panix.com>
Date: Wed, 1 Dec 93 07:13:10 PST
To: CYPHERPUNKS@toad.com
Subject: NSA Insecure Remailers?
Message-ID: <199312011512.AA00807@panix.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


A >probably only the NSA and some defense agency we haven't
A >yet heard of are actually performing this analysis right now. But 
A >given the declining price of storage media, even saving everything on
A >magnetic media and paying $1000/gig, it only costs about US$8.7 million
A >to keep a year's worth of traffic headers around (media cost).
A >
A >So what?

So what indeed.

Why oh why do we waste so much time seeking systems that are 
mathematically unbreakable.  You don't need mathematically unbreakable 
systems to have a free market on the nets.

It costs a minimum of $50K to start a federal criminal prosecution (that 
is if the perp is inside the US).  This means that the feds can only 
afford a few tens of thousands a year.  When you add incarceration costs 
it quickly becomes very difficult.  This being the case, they are 
dependent on your obedience for law enforcement success.  Like any 
predator, the government must gain more energy from the kill than it 
expends on the hunt.  Otherwise it weakens and dies.  

Did you know that fewer than 1000 people are convicted of federal tax 
evasion every year.

Your obedience is in turn dependent on your view of whether or not 
obedience is right and on your fear of punishment.  Quite apart from 
computer networks both the ideology of obedience and the fear of 
punishment have been declining.  Net society further weakens both of these 
factors.  

The consensual hallucination that is rule by others seems more threadbare 
every year.  The DDR border guards had the machine guns to fire on the 
crowds at the Berlin Wall on 10 Nov 1989.  It was not mechanical failure 
or a magic shield that prevented them from firing.  It was simply because 
a change had occurred in the minds of the citizenry (and in their own 
minds).

Sure the feds can nuke your house.  Would that gain them anything?  It 
would cost more than it was worth.  What they can't do is sit down next to 
every person on earth (or on the nets) and intimidate them.  In the past 
it didn't matter because almost everyone was a peasant bound to the soil. 
 As you keep piling technology and market opportunities (choices) on 
individuals, their power increases.  Governance of others is hard enough 
when those governed are weak.  It rapidly becomes impossible as they gain 
strength.  

Today and in the future, those who "move like Gods through cyberspace" 
will be much harder to control particularly since such controls will 
depend not on guns but on them convincing us that we are not free.

DCF

"They would not leave him alone." -- The first line of what relevant work 
of fiction?
--- WinQwk 2.0b#1165                                          




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: KPJ Jaakkola <kpj@sics.se>
Date: Wed, 1 Dec 93 01:52:18 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: CORR: WiReD gopher host
In-Reply-To: <9311301835.AA00579@bsu-cs.bsu.edu>
Message-ID: <9312010948.AA04752@sics.se>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Apparently mail agent Anonymous <nowhere@bsu-cs.bsu.edu> wrote:
| Newsgroups: comp.org.eff.talk,alt.wired
| From: kadie@cs.uiuc.edu (Carl M Kadie)
| Subject: Wired Magazine's gopher
| Message-ID: <CHBE7B.Jt@cs.uiuc.edu>
| Organization: University of Illinois, Dept. of Comp. Sci., Urbana, IL
| Date: Tue, 30 Nov 1993 17:06:46 GMT
| 
| Wired Magazine has a gopher. It includes many articles. Try
|  gopher gopher.wired.edu

[REST OF TEXT DELETED]

| Carl Kadie -- I do not represent any organization; this is just me.
|  = kadie@cs.uiuc.edu =

The host name gopher.wired.edu is not recognized.
The host address gopher.wired.com, however, is.
- - - - -
Type=1
Name=WiReD
Path=
Host=gopher.wired.com
Port=70
- - - - -




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: an5877@anon.penet.fi (deadbeat)
Date: Wed, 1 Dec 93 03:22:19 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Signing Keys for Nyms and Digibank Users
Message-ID: <9312011118.AA27394@anon.penet.fi>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

> If I remember right, none of these people puts a PGP Key ID or fingerprint
> in their posting signatures, so I don't have that clue available -
> that would increase my confidence a lot.  But I still couldn't be sure.

Suppose one were an anon@penet.fi subscriber, and that one were strict in
digitally signing all messages, and that one's public key were available
from the PGP public key servers, and that one conducted affairs in this
way for a lengthy period.  Would the confluence of the Email identification
in the digitally signed message with the identity on the PGP public key
along with the presumption of good identity management on the Finnish
remailer be of sufficient weight to convince you to sign one's PGP
public key?  Would existing signatures on a PGP public key influence
your decision?

DEADBEAT <na5877@anon.penet.fi>


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.3a

iQBFAgUBLPxHnvFZTpBW/B35AQF68AF+LqDXWrjntXqW0bqgdIETD+aOddCAvJIA
J02n5sreNbTv/1beDYpL1vQiA/3vHZOl
=MH5W
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
To find out more about the anon service, send mail to help@anon.penet.fi.
Due to the double-blind, any mail replies to this message will be anonymized,
and an anonymous id will be allocated automatically. You have been warned.
Please report any problems, inappropriate use etc. to admin@anon.penet.fi.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Date: Wed, 1 Dec 93 11:28:14 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Two items from recent magazines...
Message-ID: <199312011925.LAA09377@mail.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Two items form recent magazines:

* "Time" (on the newstands now) has an article on the Internet and its
rapid growth and uses John Gilmore's wonderful quote: "The Internet
interprets censorship as damage and routes around it." (may not be his
exact phrasing)

* Pseudospoofing detectors? "The Economist," November 20, has an
article "Hidden Agenda" which describes how an outfit named CHI
Research in New Jersey uses its 12-year data base of U.S. patents to
determine who is really doing what. Apparently some companies try to
obscure what they're doing by using different "inventors"...sounds
fishy to me (I'd be pissed if my invention got credited to someone
else).

Anyway, CHI uses various techniques to deduce actual inventors, what
companies are doing what, etc. Then he sells the conclusions.

This fits with some of the themes we discuss here, both for our own
use and in terms of what our opponents may be doing.

--Tim May



-- 
..........................................................................
Timothy C. May         | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,  
tcmay@netcom.com       | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
408-688-5409           | knowledge, reputations, information markets, 
W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA  | black markets, collapse of governments.
Higher Power: 2^756839 | Public Key: PGP and MailSafe available.
Note: I put time and money into writing this posting. I hope you enjoy it.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Stanton McCandlish <mech@eff.org>
Date: Wed, 1 Dec 93 09:28:19 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: "CYPHERPUNK CRIMINAL" t-shirts
Message-ID: <199312011727.MAA13221@eff.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


The "CYPHERPUNK CRIMINAL" t-shirt project is now being handled by:

Christian Void <cvoid@albemuth.tatertot.com>

I've passed on all queries and "I want one!" messages to him, so no need
to resend them. 

-- 
Stanton  McCandlish  mech@eff.org  1:109/1103   EFF  Online  Activist & SysOp
O P E N  P L A T F O R M   C R Y P T O P O L I C Y   O N L I N E  R I G H T S
N  E  T  W  O  R  K  I  N  G      V  I  R  T  U  A  L     C  U  L  T  U  R  E
I   N   F  O :  M   E   M   B   E   R   S   H   I   P  @  E  F  F  .  O  R  G



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Duncan Frissell <frissell@panix.com>
Date: Wed, 1 Dec 93 09:58:12 PST
To: CYPHERPUNKS@toad.com
Subject: Re: Knights who say NII (
Message-ID: <199312011753.AA01618@panix.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


M >Government is not the only potential source of harm--private industry 
M >can be plenty harmful.

Prove it.  Sans guns there's not much private institutions can do.  That's 
the problem with letting leftists hang around here.  (Just kidding folks.) 
 They're not worried about governments with nukes and centuries of a 
tradition of slaughtering millions of people but they are worried about 
private entities who've hardly killed anyone.  Most NGO (non governmental 
organization) problems are actually misclassifications.  Analysts 
confusing NGO+Government conspiracies with NGOs alone.  

I can live next to a Chevy dealer for 80 years without him sending armed 
men next door to my house to get me to buy a car.  Bell Atlantic is a bad 
thing only because it used to have a government granted local loop 
monopoly.  Since that monopoly is as dead as a doornail no matter what 
Bell Atlantic or the government thinks about the matter, BA (and indeed 
the government itself) are just market actors.  As soon as we (and they) 
recognize their new status, we'll be better off.

May you live in interesting times.

DCF  






--- WinQwk 2.0b#1165
 




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Duncan Frissell <frissell@panix.com>
Date: Wed, 1 Dec 93 09:58:15 PST
To: CYPHERPUNKS@toad.com
Subject: EFF Op-Ed from the NY Tim
Message-ID: <199312011753.AA01622@panix.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


N >The amount of electronic material the superhighway can carry is
N >dizzying compared to the relatively narrow range of broadcast TV and 
N >the limited number of cable channels. Properly constructed and 
N >regulated, it could be open to all who wish to speak, publish and
N >communicate.

How is it possible to prevent it with or without government action.  Since 
the information superhighway will be carrying "phone calls" and since 
there will be absolutely no difference between "phone calls" and 
everything else on the system, "phone calls" can carry everything.  If we 
don't like corporate offerings "phone calls" can be used to disseminate 
whatever we like.  

Phone and cable services were limited because they were government 
monopolies.  The only way to assure that future networks don't suffer from 
these problems, is to eliminate government regulation/monopoly.

The market smashed IBMs closed platform computer system without government 
help.  There is no risk that Bell Atlantic could impose a closed 
network system unless the government helps it.  To the contrary, I 
doubt if they would be able to do it even *with* government help.

And another thing.  I'm sick and tired of moaning about cost.  Services 
are virtually free today and prices can go nowhere but down.  There are 
homeless people on the streets of NY with Internet accounts.  The hardware 
cost of a computer is essentially zero.  What exactly is the fair market 
value of a Commodore Vic 20 and a Commodore 300 baud modem.  I know I can 
get an XT+1200 baud modem + shareware comms program for circa $100 at any 
computer show in NJ.

Once your local loop monopoly is broken, local phone service will be dirt 
cheap.  Network Email connections via local BBS are cheap.  AT&T Mail 
charges a big $3/month for an Email account (with 800 number).  Most 
network services are reachable via Email gateways.

The real prices of almost all open market goods have fallen dramatically 
since WWII.  This has particularly been the case in telecoms and 
electronics.  This decline will continue.  We need market discipline not 
government discipline to open up network access. 
   
DCF



--- WinQwk 2.0b#1165
                                                                                                               




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: hawkwind@dink.foretune.co.jp
Date: Tue, 30 Nov 93 20:12:20 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: The Cure
Message-ID: <199312010410.NAA04246@dink.foretune.co.jp>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>It craves fame.  It resents what it perceives to be the fame of the 
>better-known members of this list to be.  It is jealous of that fame, 
>and wants some for itself.  It is sick and ugly, small and unintelligent, 
>resentful of its underdeveloped brain and the fact that everyone he looks 
>up to instantly recognizes his stupidity.  And now it has found a way to get
>those very people to acknowledge it, discuss it, feel threatened by it. 
>It is used to rejection, so the endless repeats of it mean nothing.  And
>then even less in the face of the warm glow at the center of the
>Cypherpunks collective attention. 
>
>This is the first and the last word I'll ever write about about it.  
>If we all did that, it would go away. 
>
>Coerr
>

REALLY excellently stated! Great analysis of the nature of the problem.
Thank you, do you mind if I quote this to others?

Alas, though, I can not from long and bitter experience agree with you
about the solution. In the real world  physical verbal/facial expressions
of disapproval and disdain might rapidly rid the group of the problem
person, but in cyberspace, such traditional cultural prods are
non-existent. The aberrant user KNOWS he faces no meaningful penalties or
censure and thus has no inducement not to continue his chaotic ways. I do
feel that in addition to the observations you made above, that such people
often take sheer perverse delight in the mere poisoning of the creativity
of the group being creatively atrophic themselves.





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: dmandl@lehman.com (David Mandl)
Date: Wed, 1 Dec 93 11:08:13 PST
To: frissell@panix.com
Subject: Re: EFF Op-Ed from the NY Tim
Message-ID: <9312011905.AA21822@disvnm2.lehman.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> From: Duncan Frissell <frissell@panix.com>
> 
> And another thing.  I'm sick and tired of moaning about cost.  Services 
> are virtually free today and prices can go nowhere but down.  There are 
> homeless people on the streets of NY with Internet accounts.

Got a list of their names?

   --Dave.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Dave Banisar <banisar@washofc.cpsr.org>
Date: Wed, 1 Dec 93 11:43:14 PST
To: Cypherpunks List <cypherpunks@toad.com>
Subject: New Docs Reveal NSA Role in
Message-ID: <00541.2837600133.1215@washofc.cpsr.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


  New Docs Reveal NSA Role in Telephony Proposal
>From the CPSR Alert 2.06 (Dec. 1, 1993)

New Docs Reveal NSA Involvement in Digital Telephony Proposal

  A series of memoranda received by CPSR from the Department of
Commerce last week indicate that the National Security Agency was
actively involved in the 1992 FBI Digital Telephony Proposal. Two weeks
ago, documents received by CPSR indicated that the FBI proposal, code
named "Operation Root Canal," was pushed forward even after reports
from the field found no cases where electronic surveillance was
hampered by new technologies. The documents also revealed that the
Digital Signature Standard was viewed by the FBI as "[t]he first step
in our plan to deal with the encryption issue."
  
  The earliest memo is dated July 5, 1991, just a few weeks after the
Senate withdrew a Sense of Congress provision from S-266, the Omnibus
Crime Bill of 1991, that encouraged service and equipment providers to
ensure that their equipment would "permit the government to obtain the
plain text contents of voice, data and other communications...." The
documents consist of a series of fax transmittal sheets and memos from
the Office of Legal Counsel in the Department of Commerce to the
National Security Agency. Many attachments and drafts, including more
detailed descriptions of the  NSA's proposals, were withheld or
released with substantial deletions.
  
Also included in the documents is a previously released public
statement by the National Telecommunications and Information
Administration entitled "Technological Competitiveness and Policy
Concerns."  The document was requested by Rep. Jack Brooks and states
that the proposal
  
  could obstruct or distort telecommunications technology development
  by limiting fiber optic transmission, ISDN, digital cellular services
  and other technologies until they are modified, ... could impair the
  security of business communications ... that could facilitate not
  only lawful government interception, but unlawful interception by
  others, [and] could impose industries ability to offer new services
  and technologies.
  
  CPSR is planning to appeal the Commerce Department's decision to
withhold many of the documents.

To subscribe to the Alert, send the message:

"subscribe cpsr <your name>" (without quotes or brackets) to
listserv@gwuvm.gwu.edu.  Back issues of the Alert are available at the
CPSR Internet Library FTP/WAIS/Gopher cpsr.org /cpsr/alert

Computer Professionals for Social Responsibility is a national,
non-partisan, public-interest organization dedicated to understanding
and directing the impact of computers on society. Founded in 1981, CPSR
has 2000 members from all over the world and 22 chapters across the
country. Our National Advisory Board includes a Nobel laureate and
three winners of the Turing Award, the highest honor in computer
science. Membership is open to everyone.

For more information, please contact: cpsr@cpsr.org or visit the CPSR
discussion conferences on The Well (well.sf.ca.us) or Mindvox
(phantom.com).







From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Dan McGuirk <mcguirk@enuxsa.eas.asu.edu>
Date: Wed, 1 Dec 93 13:28:18 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: HP48 Crypto
Message-ID: <199312012128.AA01302@enuxsa.eas.asu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I'm interested in finding out what cryptographic tools, if any, are
available for the HP48 calculator.  I think someone mentioned that
they were developing a challenge authentication system using the HP48
to ameliorate the problem of sending cleartext passwords during telnet
sessions.  Is this project still being worked on?  Also, are there any
multiple-precision math libraries available for the 48?

Thanks for any information...




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: henry strickland <strick@osc.versant.com>
Date: Wed, 1 Dec 93 14:32:22 PST
To: bill.stewart@pleasantonca.ncr.com +1-510-484-6204)
Subject: Re: <8c> signing nyms
In-Reply-To: <9312012056.AA01201@anchor.ho.att.com>
Message-ID: <9312012231.AA22813@osc.versant.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

# Under the conditions Deadbeat described (long tradition of posting from
# anon-server with pgp signatures/keys, keys on the key server, etc.,
# I might be willing to sign such a key.  I wouldn't use my regular key

A few months ago I was willing.  I checked all the old mail I had from
deadbeat and the signatures matched.

# to do it - I'd create one or more nym-signing keys, so people could tell
# that I know I'm signing a nym's key and it's less reliable than
# signing a physically-known person's key.  To do it right, though,

I figure I know Deadbeat electronically as well as, or better than,
most of the Tentacles whom I've met In The Flesh at the mountain view
physical meetings.   So I signed the key that matched the writings that
we all know and love as Deadbeat.  That's what Deadbeat means to
me, not <an5877@anon.penet.fi>.

Here it is, with my "working" signature.  Granted, I'm not
well-connected into the cypherpunk signature web yet.  (And if my
reputation drops due to this act, perhaps I never will be.)

Also, my Real Name is not on my signature, because I consider this
signature less secure than the Real Me.


					strickperson #1
					I sign nyms

===== DEADBEAT =====

- -----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----
Version: 2.2

mQA9AitLtIwAAAEBgLojzfFnokmz6jInPYHNnkRtRFiuHNoVWbXyg7Tt7m3wEeXC
L1Jg6I/xWU6QVvwd+QAFEbQfREVBREJFQVQgPG5hNTg3N0Bhbm9uLnBlbmV0LmZp
PokAVQIFECy5l50KtyDIDCVDZQEBloAB/0z6l1hWqI7YXC8+agKHZ0ofN7gSnYkb
z91ZmQuUoAgD+UB+2HZElWn/YhcXTmoH72a7efzphCgShsslgcR1cdK0H2RlYWRi
ZWF0IDxhbjU4NzdAYW5vbi5wZW5ldC5maT4=
=ir1b
- -----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----




===== strickperson #1 =====

- -----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----
Version: 2.2

mQBNAivfNEsAAAECALxgaciRLaLJDPE1VxeOggXf600OrQksi3pN6DGaYFOIS0TU
yFmklmcG2dwTQnwxL3cSYoTrYj1sCrcgyAwlQ2UABRG0KHN0cmlja3BlcnNvbiAj
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BADUf4llIbsBvZ8on9AFNn6prbYmQxH/vRi7IIhIF/g3QInpJZBhw8jFZPBfn1Kd
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bBmlaFyVXyHmGKbaS0nDhhX9e/UUWm4cPWVh61JXoHth8YkARAIFECv4a8fSnR8f
nm9wlQEB0fcBd0a+FOwGASUhJD7943gOGaPpFsbzplZHEy5648jlx6liXrdHT8pj
GV/j4O6UzGrliQBVAgUQK/h5bkozmKNUUeyZAQEoYQH6A93UC1SdZKEMxzUNwcrb
W5eMaeI6vcRRuE7oSQ/ESIOMltPb4/qnFHd8T16muM6xCDb4nBPEBxhkzDClLu1h
U4kAVQIFECvfZWgKtyDIDCVDZQEBUkECAJHjGr9vRG6H/cURrvJk65/GyRQ8tRZ+
mXsByBIGZvlBO7Joee9yXh6Uz0JHeohq30MoJr2wPn/9gukJ83NF424=
=Lpcc
- -----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----





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iQBVAgUBLP0a+wq3IMgMJUNlAQGe+wH/T+yYWUHAmA1n/jIVBZ90/GqOzH8cpArR
f5UW5sTRzAECC369bHkf5xeId30hp51HpE9q98BJL5fSH1rdlnzeBw==
=63Ni
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Perry E. Metzger" <pmetzger@lehman.com>
Date: Wed, 1 Dec 93 12:12:25 PST
To: gtoal@an-teallach.com
Subject: Re: Let's Talk About Solutions
In-Reply-To: <11680@an-teallach.com>
Message-ID: <9312012010.AA11972@snark.lehman.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Graham Toal says:
> In article <9311291759.AA00573@snark.lehman.com> pmetzger@lehman.com  writes:
>  > As a practice, removing people is simple, cheap, and astonishingly
>  > effective.
>  > 
>  > Perry
> 
> Bye Perry!  (What, you don't think you'd be one of the first to be
> kicked out if we started doing that here?  Cast your bread apon the
> waters and it will be returned to you manyfold...)

I don't CARE if I'd be the first one kicked off. I could always start
another list, and nothing can stop me from sending mail to any of the
people on the list I'd actually want to talk to. I've run lists over
the years, and I've kicked people off of them (never been kicked off
of one, but there is always a first time.) Kicking people off is a
very simple strategy for dealing with unwanted guests, very much like
the way you would likely kick someone who you didn't like out of your
living room. Assuming you DON'T feel its your right to kick people out
of your living room, I hope you don't mind if I forward your address
to your neighborhood homeless population.


Perry




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Mike Godwin <mnemonic@eff.org>
Date: Wed, 1 Dec 93 12:22:25 PST
To: gtoal@an-teallach.com
Subject: Re: Let's Talk About Solutions
In-Reply-To: <11679@an-teallach.com>
Message-ID: <199312012018.PAA15543@eff.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


 
Graham Toal writes:

> So, you have an objection to the net evolving into a technocratic class
> system?

Well, yes. To the extent that tools remain the province of the elite,
it is politically easy to take them away from that elite. 


--Mike






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@stout.atd.ucar.EDU>
Date: Wed, 1 Dec 93 14:22:23 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Two items from recent magazines...
In-Reply-To: <9312012114.AA07097@media.mit.edu>
Message-ID: <9312012218.AA27473@stout.atd.ucar.EDU>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> W.R.T. using "fake" inventors.  It's illegal to file a patent application
> without the true original inventor's name on it.  If it can be proven that a
> company did this, it is liable for treble damages and the lawyer who filed
> the application can be disbarred.

It's not the inventors who are faked, according to the article -- it's the
companies for whom they work.  I forget the examples now (mag is at home),
but these people have turned up corporations which file their patents under
no end of front companies (tentacles? :-) so as to make it hard for their
competitors to see what they are up to.  It's by using the inventors' names
that all this information is being pulled back together.

Jonathan Corbet
National Center for Atmospheric Research, Atmospheric Technology Division
corbet@stout.atd.ucar.edu

 they are - and I haven't tried checking their
articles to know what to look for to check whether an email
request claiming to be from one of them looks unforged.
If I remember right, none of these people puts a PGP Key ID or fingerprint
in their posting signatures, so I don't have that clue available -
that would increase my confidence a lot.  But I still couldn't be sure.
 
[This is the hitch in digital signatures isn't it?  At least as far as
those not issued from an authority are concerned.  You are really
signing for a location rather than anything else.  You have no idea
who has access to the secret key on the other side of the public or if
the "who" is a "him" a "her" or "they."  A signature is webbed in with
the trust you give it.  Tim May's signature means nothing if everyone
knows that Tim and his close friends all use it even if the key only
has the words "Tim May" on it.
++ Tim, I used your name because I want someone else to be the example
today  :) ++
Technically (for you grassy knoll types) the holder of a secret key could
be quite dead and anyone might have taken up use.
The dead key holder, or even the duress key holder, creates all
sorts of problems if you are dealing with nym's or anonymous keys.
Same problem with so-called "password" or "bearer" accounts.
The money is only as secure as the protocol is secret.  Subjectively
different for each and every user.
 
People like LD have to break past the barrier in concept and accept
that a public key system with an open trust web just cannot be used
to establish IDENTITY.  With a properly structured web it approaches
zero probability of "identity fraud," but never quite gets there.
 
I'm not lying if I sign some key that I know to belong to a person
who actively uses the name "564FR"
All my signature says is that "at one time 564FR held this key and
I trust him to send a revocation if there is a problem."
NOT
"This key is held by 564FR and 564FR alone, so help me (insert deity of
choice)"
 
Frankly I think this system is a lot MORE honest than a centralized
system (which stinks to me of big government anyhow) because
multiple signatures from several individuals represent different
perspectives on identity.  Chances are that if you have 6 nice signatures
you managed to convince 6 very different people that the key is "yours"
I trust this much more than some "trusted authority" which is likely
to be neither trusted, nor an authority.]
 
+++
On the other hand, if I really cared about preserving the anonymity
of the nym-user, and it was somebody I knew in person, or myself,
I probably wouldn't sign it with my real key - it may be relatively obvious
that "Bill The Dragon-Basher" whose key was signed by "Bill Stewart" was me,
but I'd rather not have to deal with a court subpoena or Mafia equivalent
trying to find the users of the keys for "Crypto International, Ltd." or
"Coalition Against the U.S. Invasion of Cuba" or "Some Unapproved Religion" or
"Bear's Custom Chemicals" or an anonymous Panamanian bank account that's mine.
 
But if the keys are only signed by other nyms, how trustable are they?
 
[So how do you know what's a nym and what's not?]
 
If I ran a digibank, I'd be real hesitant about accepting changes of
address or public-key unless I had some physical verification or other
securely shared secret to avoid eavesdropper and interloper attacks,
but one of the goals of digital banking is that you're not supposed
to need physical transactions.  I suppose an initial account set up
by sending the bank a message with a Secret and a public key and a
bunch of digibucks might do the job, with some cut&choose protocols
to decrypt the digibucks if the account is approved?
 
[If I ran a digibank with open accounts, I'd shift the security burden
to the account holder.  Especially when dealing with accounts from
sketchy identities.  Provide the means for security in protocol,
the rest is up to the user.]
 
                Bill The Dragon-Basher
                        (oops!  ^X^C:wq!/exit~.\b\b\b\b\b\b)
# Bill Stewart  Old address: wcs@anchor.ho.att.com AT&T Bell Labs, Holmdel, NJ
# After 10/15, NCR, 6870 Koll Center Parkway, Pleasanton CA, 94566
# Voice/Beeper 510-224-7043, Phone 510-484-6204, email bill.stewart@pleasantonca.ncr.
com
 
- -uni- (Dark) 
[who will begin to attach key fingerprints to mail and not just usenet
and finger]  :)
073BB885A786F666  6E6D4506F6EDBC17
 
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Version: 2.3
 
iQCVAgUBLP0XEBibHbaiMfO5AQHeKQQAhN6RXRQ8fZ1hz+jvFbuw6N6fvByG2Euq
BYISCdcLgcWa1V/Jpq7GjjIwLTEYjxFQBqg2txyu4QKpmg1HR3ox/MAyUPcqQqQy
K9WxvwVMW/3ydGKRwLyatthHZsa47JGVumwzQJ2/cDzhNZhfiM/SqXgH3jdHBSAO
9r744wKJsoc=
=Qi4O
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: wcs@anchor.ho.att.com (bill.stewart@pleasantonca.ncr.com +1-510-484-6204)
Date: Wed, 1 Dec 93 13:28:19 PST
To: na5877@anon.penet.fi
Subject: signing nyms
Message-ID: <9312012056.AA01201@anchor.ho.att.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Under the conditions Deadbeat described (long tradition of posting from
anon-server with pgp signatures/keys, keys on the key server, etc.,
I might be willing to sign such a key.  I wouldn't use my regular key
to do it - I'd create one or more nym-signing keys, so people could tell
that I know I'm signing a nym's key and it's less reliable than
signing a physically-known person's key.  To do it right, though,
I'd have to have been saving keys for a while from that nym, since
it's really hard to tell if a set of postings have really been from
the same source, or if it's just a recent impersonation.
I'd certainly need to send mail to the nym through the anon-server.

I'd be a lot more comfortable, though, with a signature from the
anon-server runners, since they at least know the real-side email address,
and since they could also do something like automatic collection of
signatures.  It's still tappable, though, unless the anon-server only
accepts encrypted mail on the non-anonymous side.

		Bill




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Alan (Miburi-san) Wexelblat" <wex@media.mit.edu>
Date: Wed, 1 Dec 93 13:22:27 PST
To: tcmay@netcom.com
Subject: Two items from recent magazines...
In-Reply-To: <199312011925.LAA09377@mail.netcom.com>
Message-ID: <9312012114.AA07097@media.mit.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


W.R.T. using "fake" inventors.  It's illegal to file a patent application
without the true original inventor's name on it.  If it can be proven that a
company did this, it is liable for treble damages and the lawyer who filed
the application can be disbarred.

It's possible that companies might shuffle the order of names on an
application so that someone's name doesn't keep showing up as primary
applicant, but the inventor's name has to appear on the application
somewhere.

--Alan Wexelblat, Reality Hacker, Author, and Cyberspace Bard
Media Lab - Advanced Human Interface Group	wex@media.mit.edu
Voice: 617-258-9168 Page: 617-945-1842		an53607@anon.penet.fi
"To pleasure!" "To passion!" "To paradise!" "To pain!" "Tonight!"




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Alan (Miburi-san) Wexelblat" <wex@media.mit.edu>
Date: Wed, 1 Dec 93 13:23:18 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Help the NII (if you want to)
Message-ID: <9312012121.AA07576@media.mit.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



---------- Forwarded message ----------
Date: Wed, 01 Dec 1993 13:56:09 -0500 (EST)
From: richard chimera - 522.1 <carm@kong.gsfc.nasa.gov>
To: hcil@cs.umd.edu, hcidc@cs.umd.edu, hciumd@cs.umd.edu, dis@umdd.umd.edu
Subject: Help the NII (Natl Info Infrastructure)

Article 12722 of comp.software-eng:
Newsgroups: comp.software-eng,misc.int-property,misc.legal.computing
Path: kong.gsfc.nasa.gov!cs.umd.edu!news.umbc.edu!eff!news.kei.com!eddie.mit.edu!news.mtholyoke.edu!world!srctran
From: srctran@world.std.com (Gregory Aharonian)
Subject: Patent Office seeks advice on information superhighway
Message-ID: <CH7zIL.MA5@world.std.com>
Organization: The World Public Access UNIX, Brookline, MA
Date: Sun, 28 Nov 1993 20:56:45 GMT
Lines: 41
Xref: kong.gsfc.nasa.gov comp.software-eng:12722 misc.int-property:2259 misc.legal.computing:4688

    The Patent Office is soliciting suggestions and comments on intellectual
property aspects of the National Information Infrastructure. (They had a
public meeting on the 18th at the Patent Office).  Some of the questions
they seek comments on are:

   Is the existing copyright law adequate to protect the rights of those who
will make their available via the NII? What statutory or regulatory changes,
if any, should be made?

   Should standards or other requirements be adopted for the labeling or
encoding of works available via the NII so that copyright owners and users
can identify copyrighted works and the conditions for their use?

   Should a licensing system be developed for certain uses of any or all works
available via the NII?  If so, should there be a single type of licensing or
should the NII support a multiplicity of licensing systems?

   What types of education programs might be developed to increase public
awareness of intellectual property laws, their importance to the economy, and
their application to works available via the NII.

   (More information can be found in the November 9, 1993 Official Gazette).

   You can send your ideas to the Patent Office up until December 10, 1993.
Address your comments to:
		Terri Southwick
		c/o Commissioner of Patents and Trademarks
		US Patent and Trademark Office
		Box 4
		Washington, DC  20231

		fax: 703-305-8885
		tel: 703-305-9300

Greg Aharonian
Internet Patent News Service
-- 
**************************************************************************
 Greg Aharonian                                      srctran@world.std.com
 Source Translation & Optimization                            617-489-3727
 P.O. Box 404, Belmont, MA 02178




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: karn@qualcomm.com (Phil Karn)
Date: Wed, 1 Dec 93 17:22:24 PST
To: hlin@nas.edu
Subject: A study of National Cryptography Policy
In-Reply-To: <199311291832.NAA17576@eff.org>
Message-ID: <199312020120.RAA01034@servo>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>As part of the Defense Authorization Bill for FY 1994, the U.S. Congress
>has asked the Computer Science and Telecommunications Board
>(CSTB) of the National Research Council (NRC) to undertake a study of
>national policy with respect to the use and regulation of cryptography.
[...]

A *two year*, *classified* study of national cryptography policy??

I suppose it's just as well. The closest thing we currently have to a
"national cryptography policy" are some ineffective and pointless
export controls that, if proposed legislation is adopted, may go away
in a few months anyway. That would leave civilian cryptography pretty
much unregulated -- exactly as it should be.

So sure, take all the time you like to "study" the issue. The longer
the better. The "cryptography genie" is already well out of its
bottle; in two years, it will be everywhere.

And yes, by all means, require security clearances of all the
participants and classify all of the proceedings. That will exclude
many of the biggest names in civilian cryptography -- those who are
not US citizens, who will not submit themselves to government
censorship, and who do not wish to lend any legitimacy to a government
effort that will inevitably try to regulate what will (and should) be
left alone. And it will stifle any embarassing public debates on minor
issues like free speech, freedom of association and personal privacy,
all of which are just annoying technicalities that keep law
enforcement and intelligence agencies from doing their jobs more
efficiently.

Better yet, restrict membership to these loyal law enforcement and
intelligence agencies, the same ones responsible for the silly current
state of export controls on cryptography. That should eliminate what
few shreds of credibility might remain in the Board's final report.

Phil




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Jim McCoy <mccoy@ccwf.cc.utexas.edu>
Date: Wed, 1 Dec 93 15:23:18 PST
To: mech@eff.org (Stanton McCandlish)
Subject: Re: CP-austin addresses?
In-Reply-To: <199312012240.RAA18240@eff.org>
Message-ID: <199312012322.AA14977@tramp.cc.utexas.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text


> 
> Anyone know the subscribe addresses for the Austin cypherpunks lists?

Send mail to listproc@mcfeeley.cc.utexas.edu with the following line in the
body of the message (where [name] is some "real name" you wish associated
with your id):

subscribe austin-cypherpunks [name]


jim



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Stanton McCandlish <mech@eff.org>
Date: Wed, 1 Dec 93 14:42:24 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: CP-austin addresses?
Message-ID: <199312012240.RAA18240@eff.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Anyone know the subscribe addresses for the Austin cypherpunks lists?
-- 
Stanton  McCandlish  mech@eff.org  1:109/1103   EFF  Online  Activist & SysOp
O P E N  P L A T F O R M   C R Y P T O P O L I C Y   O N L I N E  R I G H T S
N  E  T  W  O  R  K  I  N  G      V  I  R  T  U  A  L     C  U  L  T  U  R  E
I   N   F  O :  M   E   M   B   E   R   S   H   I   P  @  E  F  F  .  O  R  G



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: an48848@anon.penet.fi
Date: Wed, 1 Dec 93 10:02:23 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Who is this Detweiler guy anyway?
Message-ID: <9312011800.AA23062@anon.penet.fi>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



As a fairly recent addition to this list, I'm unfamilliar with the history of
cypherpunks.  Can anyone enlighten me?  Thanks.

-------------------------------------------------------------------------
To find out more about the anon service, send mail to help@anon.penet.fi.
Due to the double-blind, any mail replies to this message will be anonymized,
and an anonymous id will be allocated automatically. You have been warned.
Please report any problems, inappropriate use etc. to admin@anon.penet.fi.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: archie@phantom.com (Douglas Chester)
Date: Wed, 1 Dec 93 15:08:18 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: No Subject
Message-ID: <m0p50g6-0009OwC@mindvox.phantom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Help with encryption needed

        Can someone point me towards a set of C functions along the lines of:

char *encrypt (cleartext_string, key);
char *decrypt (encrypted_string, key);

Where encrypt would return the encrypted string and decrypt would return the
decrypted string.  The stronger the encryption the better.  Thanks.





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: jon@balder.us.dell.com (Jon Boede)
Date: Wed, 1 Dec 93 16:12:24 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: mix
Message-ID: <9312020011.AA01419@balder.us.dell.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Does anybody have source code to Istvan Mohos "mix" programs?  I have the
binaries but I lost the source a while back.  It's kind-of a fun encryption
algorithm because it's a transposition cypher rather than a stream cypher --
the result set contains exactly the same characters as the input set.

Jon




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Derek Atkins <warlord@MIT.EDU>
Date: Wed, 1 Dec 93 15:22:23 PST
To: archie@phantom.com (Douglas Chester)
Subject: No Subject
In-Reply-To: <m0p50g6-0009OwC@mindvox.phantom.com>
Message-ID: <9312012321.AA03674@toxicwaste.media.mit.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


There are tons of functions along those lines.  Your query is not very
specific. What kind of algorithm do you want, public-key or
secret-key?  What size key?  Blocksize?  whatever.

You've just defined an abstraction that includes every single
encryption function known to man....

-derek





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: cvoid@albemuth.tatertot.com (Christian Void)
Date: Thu, 2 Dec 93 08:08:35 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: CYPHERPUNKS CRIMINAL T-SHIRTS
Message-ID: <kkswDc1w165w@albemuth.tatertot.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I will be sorting through the t-shirt requests and compiling a list. It 
will be done in a few days. As soon as I finish this, I will mail 
everyone on the list, and we can start hashing out a design. I have a 
screening company I work with, and am currently working out the details 
with them. Any questions can be directed to me at <albemuth.tatertot.com> 
or <netcom.com>. Thanks.


Christian Void /T71 | "I don't like it, and I'm sorry I | V/M/Research, Inc.
cvoid@netcom.COM    | ever had anything to do with it." | P.O. Box 170213
Tel. 1+415-807-5491 |  -Erwin Schrodinger  (1887-1961)  | SF, CA  94117-0213
                * PGP v2.3a Public Key Available Via Finger *




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: archie@phantom.com (Douglas Chester)
Date: Wed, 1 Dec 93 15:32:24 PST
To: warlord@MIT.EDU (Derek Atkins)
Subject: Re: your mail
In-Reply-To: <9312012321.AA03674@toxicwaste.media.mit.edu>
Message-ID: <m0p514c-0009NzC@mindvox.phantom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text


> 
> There are tons of functions along those lines.  Your query is not very
> specific. What kind of algorithm do you want, public-key or
> secret-key?  What size key?  Blocksize?  whatever.
> 
> You've just defined an abstraction that includes every single
> encryption function known to man....
> 
> -derek
> 

It should be a secret key algorithm, and be able to hanlde blocks of at least 
256 characters in length.  Keysize isn't as important as the type of encryption
being used.  Something that is reasonably secure such as IDEA or DES is 
preferable to a function that just XORs everything.  

I'm sure if I was a more patient person I could download a few megs of source 
from the net and pore through it to find what I'm looking for.  I was hoping 
that someone on this list could be of assistance and save me the trouble.  
Thanks.
 



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: gtoal@an-teallach.com (Graham Toal)
Date: Wed, 1 Dec 93 11:38:14 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Cryptosplit 2.0
Message-ID: <11678@an-teallach.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


In article <9311291648.AA25233@jobe.shell.portal.com>
           hfinney@shell.portal.com "Hal Finney" writes:
 > I once proposed a DOS TSR (a "background" program) which would monitor
 > your keystrokes all day long and condense the timing data into a file
 > full of random bits.  Then you'd use up the bits when you needed to do
 > cryptography.  I haven't learned enough about DOS to write such a
 > thing, though.

I'm doing this for unix this weekend.  One very important point to
note:  only take *one* bit of random data per keystroke, and take
it by ex-oring every single bit in the clock() value - that way you
make sure the randomly fluctuating one is in there - because on
some systems the bottom bit might always be 0, if the resolution
of the clock is low.  Also, think about the problems if you have
a function that returns milliseconds but the hardware clock is one
tick, say, every 1/17 sec...

G
-- 
Personal mail to gtoal@gtoal.com (I read it in the evenings)
Business mail to gtoal@an-teallach.com (Be careful with the spelling!)
Faxes to An Teallach Limited: +44 31 662 4678  Voice: +44 31 668 1550 x212





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: gtoal@an-teallach.com (Graham Toal)
Date: Wed, 1 Dec 93 11:38:14 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Let's Talk About Solutions
Message-ID: <11679@an-teallach.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


In article <199311291601.LAA15061@eff.org> mnemonic@eff.org "Mike Godwin" writes:
 > For some, adequate solutions may already be in place. But I note that for
 > "mere users" (as distinct from sophisticated users and programmers),
 > current filtering tools are difficult to use. What can make this better?

So, you have an objection to the net evolving into a technocratic class
system?  I see nothing wrong with letting people suffer who haven't the 
competancy to protect themselves for net.idiots.  That's practically the
entire basis of the Amercian enconomic system after all...

G
-- 
Personal mail to gtoal@gtoal.com (I read it in the evenings)
Business mail to gtoal@an-teallach.com (Be careful with the spelling!)
Faxes to An Teallach Limited: +44 31 662 4678  Voice: +44 31 668 1550 x212





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: gtoal@an-teallach.com (Graham Toal)
Date: Wed, 1 Dec 93 11:42:23 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Let's Talk About Solutions
Message-ID: <11680@an-teallach.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


In article <9311291759.AA00573@snark.lehman.com> pmetzger@lehman.com  writes:
 > As a practice, removing people is simple, cheap, and astonishingly
 > effective.
 > 
 > Perry

Bye Perry!  (What, you don't think you'd be one of the first to be
kicked out if we started doing that here?  Cast your bread apon the
waters and it will be returned to you manyfold...)

G
--
Personal mail to gtoal@gtoal.com (I read it in the evenings)
Business mail to gtoal@an-teallach.com (Be careful with the spelling!)
Faxes to An Teallach Limited: +44 31 662 4678  Voice: +44 31 668 1550 x212





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Graham Toal <gtoal@an-teallach.com>
Date: Wed, 1 Dec 93 11:52:23 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: NEW: Cypherwonks (fwd)
Message-ID: <11681@an-teallach.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


In article <Pine.3.87.9311290937.A20916-0100000@crl.crl.com>
           arthurc@crl.com "Arthur Chandler" writes:
 
 >    I'm assuming, of course, that it's not a spoof.
 
Oh come on, Julf is a European.  Even if Lance doesn't have the sense
to realise it would be called 'cypherWanks' within 10 seconds of the
announcement, Julf certainly would.

Obviously Arthur Chandler is An ARM of the MEDUSA :)

G
-- 
Personal mail to gtoal@gtoal.com (I read it in the evenings)
Business mail to gtoal@an-teallach.com (Be careful with the spelling!)
Faxes to An Teallach Limited: +44 31 662 4678  Voice: +44 31 668 1550 x212





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: an48848@anon.penet.fi
Date: Wed, 1 Dec 93 11:53:14 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: New anonymous list member (?)
Message-ID: <9312011951.AA11262@anon.penet.fi>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Mike McNally : m5@tivoli.com writes:
> Is it an indication that LD's persistance has paid off that my first
> reaction to the above (probably innocent) query was to egrep through
> my archived cypherpunks stuff to see whether LD has ever misspelled
> "familiar"?  (He hasn't, as far as I can tell...)
> Sigh.

wELL, leT ME just SaY this.  I intonenTonally misSpell and Change TYPEING
StylES WHEN i wanT tO BE ANon.  It MAkes THiNGs thaT mUch more DIFfiCulT.  I
HAVe a UtiliTY that DOEs thIs for ME.












-------------------------------------------------------------------------
To find out more about the anon service, send mail to help@anon.penet.fi.
Due to the double-blind, any mail replies to this message will be anonymized,
and an anonymous id will be allocated automatically. You have been warned.
Please report any problems, inappropriate use etc. to admin@anon.penet.fi.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Matthew J Ghio <mg5n+@andrew.cmu.edu>
Date: Wed, 1 Dec 93 17:03:19 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: EFF Op-Ed from the NY Tim
In-Reply-To: <9312011905.AA21822@disvnm2.lehman.com>
Message-ID: <YgzHtMa00awD4kbkkF@andrew.cmu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


dmandl@lehman.com (David Mandl) wrote:

> > From: Duncan Frissell <frissell@panix.com>
> > 
> > And another thing.  I'm sick and tired of moaning about cost.  Services 
> > are virtually free today and prices can go nowhere but down.  There are 
> > homeless people on the streets of NY with Internet accounts.
>
> Got a list of their names?

I doubt it.  If you're not enrolled at a major university, or employed
at a computer-related company, and don't subscribe to an expensive
online service, getting an internet account is NOT easy or cheap. 
Services like netcom are expanding, but I seriously doubt a homeless
person could get an internet address.  Check out almost any BBS network
(other than fido) and every other week, some jerk will ask when they'll
get connected to the internet.  And every time, five sysops respond
"Fine.  We'd love to.  Would you mind telling us how the hell we could
connect to the internet???"




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Perry E. Metzger" <pmetzger@lehman.com>
Date: Wed, 1 Dec 93 17:18:19 PST
To: Matthew J Ghio <mg5n+@andrew.cmu.edu>
Subject: Re: EFF Op-Ed from the NY Tim
In-Reply-To: <YgzHtMa00awD4kbkkF@andrew.cmu.edu>
Message-ID: <199312020117.UAA13042@snark.ts.lehman.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Matthew J Ghio says:
> If you're not enrolled at a major university, or employed
> at a computer-related company, and don't subscribe to an expensive
> online service, getting an internet account is NOT easy or cheap. 

To most of the nations population, which lives in cities, it costs
under $25 a month total variable cost including phone costs. It is
likely far more expensive in rural areas.

Perry




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: jdblair@nextsrv.cas.muohio.EDU
Date: Wed, 1 Dec 93 17:58:18 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: 2nd midwest meeting attempt
Message-ID: <9312020217.AA10893@ nextsrv.cas.muohio.EDU >
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

Are there any Cypherpunks in the Midwest Region that would like to hold 
a meeting?  I'd like to interact face-to-face for once.  I'm located 
just north of Cincinatti in Oxford, OH, and would probably be able to 
host something.  Unfortunately, this probably isn't very central.

I've brought this up before, but didn't get enough response to put a 
meeting togethor, so... I'm trying again.

Please e-mail me directly if you are interested, with a clear, loud 
subject so I can differentiate you from the noise.

hanging in Ohio,
- -john.

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.3

iQBVAgUBLP0UAKNqtARNqVmxAQGP6QH+Ino8UhNLBycReXJxx82OzHW8JSI/nKwL
i1ZXoywUBgccK/WM7w3s1tVnW8kTX5RWLEKzgsFmOgzd/yCR2U49AQ==
=SsPD
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Herb Lin" <hlin@nas.edu>
Date: Wed, 1 Dec 93 19:02:24 PST
To: karn@qualcomm.com (Phil Karn)
Subject: Re: A study of National Cryptography Policy
Message-ID: <9311017548.AA754812061@nas.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



As the broadcast message noted, the ground rules regarding
classification were not established by the CSTB, but rather by the U.S.
Congress.  Note also that the final report is intended to be unclassified,
though classified annexes may be necessary for completeness.

Regarding the two-year time frame of the study: the premise of the study is
that there are many perspectives on the issue and that the appropriate policy
balance has not yet been established; surely you would acknowledge that
both these statements are true.  Thus, a serious study of the issue requires
time to reflect, especially if different perspectives are to be reconciled.

So, let me invite you folks to submit whatever materials you would like the
study
committee to consider (e.g., printed articles, written statements, etc), and
what
opportunity, if any, you would like to have to testify before the committee or
its
staff.

Herb Lin
****
>As part of the Defense Authorization Bill for FY 1994, the U.S. Congress
>has asked the Computer Science and Telecommunications Board
>(CSTB) of the National Research Council (NRC) to undertake a study of
>national policy with respect to the use and regulation of cryptography.
[...]

A *two year*, *classified* study of national cryptography policy??

I suppose it's just as well. The closest thing we currently have to a
"national cryptography policy" are some ineffective and pointless
export controls that, if proposed legislation is adopted, may go away
in a few months anyway. That would leave civilian cryptography pretty
much unregulated -- exactly as it should be.

So sure, take all the time you like to "study" the issue. The longer
the better. The "cryptography genie" is already well out of its
bottle; in two years, it will be everywhere.

And yes, by all means, require security clearances of all the
participants and classify all of the proceedings. That will exclude
many of the biggest names in civilian cryptography -- those who are
not US citizens, who will not submit themselves to government
censorship, and who do not wish to lend any legitimacy to a government
effort that will inevitably try to regulate what will (and should) be
left alone. And it will stifle any embarassing public debates on minor
issues like free speech, freedom of association and personal privacy,
all of which are just annoying technicalities that keep law
enforcement and intelligence agencies from doing their jobs more
efficiently.

Better yet, restrict membership to these loyal law enforcement and
intelligence agencies, the same ones responsible for the silly current
state of export controls on cryptography. That should eliminate what
few shreds of credibility might remain in the Board's final report.

Phil




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: James Hicks <71332.747@CompuServe.COM>
Date: Wed, 1 Dec 93 20:52:26 PST
To: Cypherpunks-list <cypherpunks@toad.com>
Subject: N-Gram
Message-ID: <931202044516_71332.747_DHQ95-1@CompuServe.COM>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Business Week, Nov. 29, 1993, p. 99

"BUT WILL IT REMEMBER WHERE THE CAR KEYS ARE?"

    Joseph M. Bugajsky quit Ford Motor Co. in 1985 to pursue his dream of 
inventing a computer formula that would analyze and store data the same way 
the human brain does.  This September, his efforts paid off with a U.S. patent
on a system that spots patterns in data and compresses the data into 
"memories."  These memories, Bugajsky says, take up only one-half of 1% of the
original space.  That could make them a boon to banks, libraries, and 
laboratories flooded with data.
    The key to Bugajsky's software for supercomputers, called N-Gram, is that 
it not only finds patterns in data but also patterns within the patterns, as 
human memory does.  The layers of patterns are linked, so "recalling" 
something consists of working back down from the abstract to the specific.  
The original can be reconstructed down to the last bit.  Bugajsky's company, 
Triada Ltd., in Ann Arbor, Mich., is planning tests with, among others, NASA 
and the National Institutes of Health.
------------------------------------------------------------

Any comments?
 >James<




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "W. Kinney" <kinney@ucsu.Colorado.EDU>
Date: Wed, 1 Dec 93 22:52:26 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Steganography and noise
Message-ID: <199312020648.AA02919@ucsu.Colorado.EDU>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----


What about doing steganography by embedding messages in random-dot stereograms?


                                   -- Will
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.3

iQCVAgUBLP0qSffv4TpIg2PxAQEWNgP7B5HCqn5Nk9s/r3kPra/gZTiZx7sRnyoP
MnQL3gUCm1sGDQYU4pVeivJM+amHTrOXt2BN4NMbEM/dj4Ev7iRh/2eRIAcloF/n
53Kguclj/UEwbYhh0Z5m2QrkOVRpzjkkwe08Pw9dTSBGUyRwrR1NeI63WpnA54V/
iOz8QWdwjSQ=
=dRoM
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: analyst@netcom.com (Benjamin McLemore)
Date: Thu, 2 Dec 93 00:02:26 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: NSA Insecure Remailers
Message-ID: <199312020759.XAA12950@mail.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



---Some stuff deleted, basically my concern that through traffic
analysis of backbone internet traffic, at least the NSA can penetrate
the security of anonymous remailers----

 >probably only the NSA and some defense agency we haven't
 >yet heard of are actually performing this analysis right now. But 
 >given the declining price of storage media, even saving everything on
 >magnetic media and paying $1000/gig, it only costs about US$8.7 million
 >to keep a year's worth of traffic headers around (media cost).
 >
 >So what?

#So what indeed.
#
#Why oh why do we waste so much time seeking systems that are 
#mathematically unbreakable.  You don't need mathematically unbreakable 
#systems to have a free market on the nets.
#
#It costs a minimum of $50K to start a federal criminal prosecution (that 
#is if the perp is inside the US).  This means that the feds can only 
#afford a few tens of thousands a year.  When you add incarceration costs 
#it quickly becomes very difficult.  This being the case, they are 
#dependent on your obedience for law enforcement success.  Like any 
#predator, the government must gain more energy from the kill than it 
#expends on the hunt.  Otherwise it weakens and dies.  

 All I was trying to point out with my post is what I saw as a flaw in
my previous understanding of the depth of the security provided by
anonymous remailers. There is a difference between relying on the
mathematics of strong crypto to protect you from government spooks and
prying bureacrats-- and relying on one's belief that- although one's
security has been compromised, it will be too expensive or otherwise
difficult for the government to use this information against you.

It seems to me that anonymous remailers, despite my initial
assumptions that they were cryptographically strong, are probably
compromised by the ability of the NSA to monitor Internet backbone
traffic, a hypothesis I would love to see disproved. Additionally, my
understanding of the nature of the packet data that passes over the
Internet backbones is weak; someone posted the other day that they
felt the government would soon require that all data passing over the
nets be addressed and labeled, enabling the Feds to monitor it--it is
my understanding of networking that that day is here *now*. 

I want unbreakable security, untraceable communication and unforgeable
digital cash--ALL of it mathematically guaranteed and none of it
compromisable by some underpaid bureacrat who might decide to make a
little money off of ME in his spare time.

------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Benjamin McLemore
analyst@netcom.com

-- 




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "L. Detweiler" <ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Date: Wed, 1 Dec 93 23:28:21 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: ACE Introduction
Message-ID: <9312020724.AA16931@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



===cut=here===

Date: Thu, 2 Dec 93 01:09:03 EST
Subject: Your Request 
From: Americans Communicating Electronically@ra.esusda.gov.    
(info@ace.esusda.gov)

- --------------------------------------------------------------------

AMERICANS COMMUNICATING ELECTRONICALLY (ACE)

Thank you for your electronic mail message.  This note acknowledges
receipt of your message to info@ace.esusda.gov.

WELCOME

Welcome to ACE--Americans Communicating Electronically!

ACE is a team of volunteer citizens, from inside and outside
federal government, dedicated to open access to information
and learning from every home and community across the Nation.

Your initial message to us signals your interest in making this
exciting experiment a reality for all Americans.  Your
participation is vital to the success of this project!

WHO ARE ACE MEMBERS?

Who are the pioneers in launching ACE?  They include:  the White
House, the Department of Agriculture, National Archives, Commerce,
Defense, Education, Energy, Environmental Protection Agency,
Government Printing Office, General Services Administration, Health
and Human Services, House of Representatives, Interior, Justice,
Labor, National Science Foundation, Small Business Administration,
U.S. Senate, State, Transportation and numerous associations and
organizations.  Several states, including many universities and
colleges, are also part of the ACE team.

WHAT KIND OF INFORMATION IS AVAILABLE FROM ACE?

The ACE Experiment is coming on line in stages.  During Stage One,
selected agencies in the Departments listed above will participate.
A single electronic mail address will be used to receive incoming
messages from citizens.  These messages will be forwarded
electronically to the appropriate ACE agency contact for action.
Citizens will receive responses, either electronically or through
conventional means within "48 hours" of their request.

During Stage Two, a directory of U.S. Government agencies and
online databases that can be accessed directly by electronic mail
will be accessible by citizens.  Also, available on line, will be
frequently asked questions, policy and issue papers, and speeches.
You will be able to browse this information at your leisure.

Future stages will build on what we learn!  ACE is already
finalizing plans to pilot test "Interactive Citizen Participation
Centers" in local communities where people can electronically
access U.S. government information when they grocery shop or visit
the local library.

Your feedback as we roll out these stages will be critical in
helping us learn to improve this exciting, interactive
communications.


Working together, we can make it happen!


HOW CAN I, MY NEIGHBORS, MY COMMUNITY, MY ORGANIZATION-- JOIN ACE?

To join ACE, send an electronic mail message to:

       letters@ace.esusda.gov

Describe how you would like to volunteer.  Can you help others learn
how to use the network?  Can you provide a facility where citizens
can come to access the network?  Can you help form a group of
citizens that would like to establish an interactive participation
center?


WHAT HAPPENS NEXT?

We expect to receive a large volume of electronic mail.  You, and
your message, are important to us.  So important, we'd like some
additional information about you.  Please provide us your
conventional address (name, street address, city, state, zip, phone
and fax) as well as your electronic mail address.

HOW CAN YOU GET ADDITIONAL INFORMATION FROM ACE?

Send your query to the Internet Electronic Mail Address listed
below:

- - Information request for a specific item (This notice):

  info@ace.esusda.gov

- - Letter of inquiry of a more general nature:

  letters@ace.esusda.gov.

INFORMATION AVAILABLE FROM THE ACE SERVER

We currently have information on the National Initatives
available for access in various ways. To find out more on what 
is available, Send a message to the following addresses.

NAFTA 					nafta@ace.esusda.gov
Health Security Act			health@ace.esusda.gov
National Performance Review		npr@ace.esusda.gov
National Information Infrastructure	nii@ace.esusda.gov

Each one of these has information on how to access the documents 
for your areas of interest.


The ACE project is an exciting one!  It's an opportunity for
people, inside and outside government, to become involved.
Involved,--not just in re-inventing today's government, but in
charting tomorrow's future together!


AMERICANS
COMMUNICATING
ELECTRONICALLY



[You will receive this message only once a day]



------- End of Forwarded Message





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: pierre@shell.portal.com (Pierre Uszynski)
Date: Thu, 2 Dec 93 00:52:24 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Two items from recent magazines...
Message-ID: <9312020852.AA16294@jobe.shell.portal.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> From: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@stout.atd.ucar.EDU>
> 
> > W.R.T. using "fake" inventors.  It's illegal to file a patent application
> > without the true original inventor's name on it.  If it can be proven that a
> > company did this, it is liable for treble damages and the lawyer who filed
> > the application can be disbarred.
> 
> It's not the inventors who are faked, according to the article -- it's the
> companies for whom they work.
> [...] so as to make it hard for their
> competitors to see what they are up to.

Just a remark, that for large companies (I'd call them "groups"), the
groups are formed of so many differently named entities that even insiders
can't figure it out. This is because these large (usually older) groups
have formed by buying and selling other companies, branches and divisions
of companies. After each purchase, pride, economic interests (brand names),
or traditions are such that the old names survive, or are munged into new
names. I would expect it is very rare when an old name simply disappears.

So, what was a company name, may become a division name in two different
holdings that bought each half of the company. And if that same name
was used for, say light bulbs and TVs before the split, then after the
split, it is still used for the same items. Except they now come from two
different companies... still following?

The result is that even insiders in large groups have a hard time figuring
out which part of the company is working on what, or even which brand names
are produced by your company. Let alone which patent belongs to whom, or
has been licensed from whom, or which non-disclosure agreements exist
between which project and which project.

All this simply to point out that at least some of this "hide and seek"
game in patents is probably not even voluntary. From working for one
of these groups (in several differently named "entities"), I think an
external company could actually have an easier time piecing it all
together than any insider (including at the top levels).

(Thus a business idea, (although I think that is an extropians thread :-)
A business that makes contacts with individual projects of a large
"holding" or multinational, setting up non-disclosure agreements with
each, then constantly cross references this data to put in contact
groups of the holding that could benefit from knowing about each other.
Individual projects (and their hierarchy) usually do not have enough
short term incentive to devote much man-power to keeping in touch)


Pierre.
pierre@shell.portal.com




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Mike Ingle <MIKEINGLE@delphi.com>
Date: Wed, 1 Dec 93 22:08:20 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Secure Drive Use/Distribution ?'s
Message-ID: <01H5ZHQ49RG290QCQF@delphi.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


To those who have requested Secure Drive: How's it working?
How widely is it being distributed? How many people outside
the Cypherpunks, if any, are using it? Please let me know how
the program is doing. Any serious bugs?

(Note: I do not have a list of people who've received it.)

To those who haven't: Big Brother is watching you!

Any ideas on better ways to distribute it? I'm thinking about posting
the ad to some newsgroups, since there haven't been any reports of
major bugs as of yet. 

--- MikeIngle@delphi.com
 




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Date: Thu, 2 Dec 93 01:02:24 PST
To: analyst@netcom.com (Benjamin McLemore)
Subject: Re: NSA Insecure Remailers
In-Reply-To: <199312020759.XAA12950@mail.netcom.com>
Message-ID: <199312020902.BAA25636@mail.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Benjamin McLemore writes:

>  All I was trying to point out with my post is what I saw as a flaw in
> my previous understanding of the depth of the security provided by
> anonymous remailers. There is a difference between relying on the
> mathematics of strong crypto to protect you from government spooks and
> prying bureacrats-- and relying on one's belief that- although one's
> security has been compromised, it will be too expensive or otherwise
> difficult for the government to use this information against you.

Cypherpunks remailers are far from "ideal digital mixes," as described
in David Chaum's February 1981 "Communications of the ACM" paper. This
is well known, and the issues of traffic analysis Benjamin raises are
also valid and known issues. A while back we had many debates about
what to do about message size padding (e.g., quantizing all outgoing
packet sizes to a standard size, or perhaps to one of several (small,
medium, large. etc.) packet sizes. And we debated adding latency, so
that a message waits until N total messages have been received before
remailing. And so on.

In any case, Chaum's ideal digital mix is hard to implement now for
several reasons, largely economic. Ideal mixes also need physical
security against tampering, against interception of internal
operations (perhaps via RF monitoring), etc. Perhaps most critical,
and least studied to date, remailers are only as good as the human
policies at the sites are. (My conception of ideal remailers involves
remailer hardware, perhaps on boards containing enough RAM and/or disk
drive space to hold the batch of messages, that is "untouched" by
human hands. Tamper-resistant modules, sealed hardware, etc. Lots of
issues here. I think "Mom and Pop remailers" could be sold on boards
similar to SoundBlaster boards.)

Chaum's original hardware-based mix also has some weaknesses, as noted
in a EuroCrypt '89 paper by Pfitzmann and others. The software-based
"DC-Net," which comes up so often on this list, is generally better.
Several Cypherpunks are interested in implementing DC-nets. So far, no
progress to report.

> It seems to me that anonymous remailers, despite my initial
> assumptions that they were cryptographically strong, are probably
> compromised by the ability of the NSA to monitor Internet backbone
> traffic, a hypothesis I would love to see disproved. Additionally, my

No, they are very far from being even cryptographically strong
(although parts of the process, involving sending encrypted messages
to the next node, are of course as secure as, say, PGP is).

> I want unbreakable security, untraceable communication and unforgeable
> digital cash--ALL of it mathematically guaranteed and none of it
> compromisable by some underpaid bureacrat who might decide to make a
> little money off of ME in his spare time.

Well, wanting something is not the same thing as getting it. Read the
1981 paper, the 1988 DC-Net paper (available at the soda.berkeley.edu
ftp site), and follow the Cypherpunks activities on DC-Nets. Then look
at the various Cypherpunks remailers...some _require_ encryption (most
don't, and most of us don't even use encryption, which means anyone
reading the packets can see what's going on! A fatal flaw or just
laziness?), some add hours of latency (though not N latency, as too
few messages are flowing), and so on. The market will push
development in possibly more secure directions.

Right now, you can see that Cyperpunks remailers, and also Julf's
penet site, have significant flaws. You get what you pay for (this is
a serious point: the lack of real commerce, the volunteer nature of
all of this, and the generally "hobby-like" nature of these systems
explains why these weaknesses are not getting fixed.

These are largely "toy" systems to provide some experience. They'll
get better with time.


--Tim May


-- 
..........................................................................
Timothy C. May         | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,  
tcmay@netcom.com       | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
408-688-5409           | knowledge, reputations, information markets, 
W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA  | black markets, collapse of governments.
Higher Power: 2^756839 | Public Key: PGP and MailSafe available.
Note: I put time and money into writing this posting. I hope you enjoy it.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: jkreznar@ininx.com (John E. Kreznar)
Date: Thu, 2 Dec 93 03:43:24 PST
To: mnemonic@eff.org
Subject: Re: Let's Talk About Solutions
In-Reply-To: <199312012018.PAA15543@eff.org>
Message-ID: <9312021141.AA08608@ininx>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

> Graham Toal writes:

> > So, you have an objection to the net evolving into a technocratic class
> > system?

> Well, yes. To the extent that tools remain the province of the elite,
> it is politically easy to take them away from that elite. 

The cypherpunks welcome message (Eric Hughes, I suppose) seems to apply
here:

> Cypherpunks acknowledge that those who want privacy must
> create it for themselves and not expect governments, corporations, or
> other large, faceless organizations to grant them privacy out of
> beneficence.

So a cypherpunk strives to construct an effective technical defense
against the tyranny of the majority so that it is not ``politically
easy'' to deprive him of his privacy.

	John E. Kreznar		| Relations among people to be by
	jkreznar@ininx.com	| mutual consent, or not at all.

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.3a

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iHkN8XMh4xA=
=+4Nf
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: jdwilson@gold.chem.hawaii.edu (Jim Wilson (VA))
Date: Thu, 2 Dec 93 09:08:39 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Two Articles FYI
Message-ID: <9312021706.AA22476@gold.chem.hawaii.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


CP's:

Two articles you might find interesting:

November 15, 1993 InfoWorld, p. 57, "From the Editor":

  Article titled "Top 10 Reasons the Feds Shouldn't Build the Data Highway"

Also PC Week November 1, 1993 Special Report p. 86 "Hitch a ride on the
digital highway."

 Aloha no

  -Jim





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Mike Godwin <mnemonic@eff.org>
Date: Thu, 2 Dec 93 05:32:28 PST
To: jkreznar@ininx.com (John E. Kreznar)
Subject: Re: Let's Talk About Solutions
In-Reply-To: <9312021141.AA08608@ininx>
Message-ID: <199312021329.IAA23622@eff.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


 
John Kreznar writes:

> against the tyranny of the majority so that it is not ``politically
> easy'' to deprive him of his privacy.
> 

That's part of it. But the other part is providing tools that everyone,
not just cypherpunks, can use.


--Mike






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: hfinney@shell.portal.com (Hal Finney)
Date: Thu, 2 Dec 93 08:32:36 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: NSA Insecure Remailers
Message-ID: <9312021630.AA28878@jobe.shell.portal.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


As Tim says, it is no secret on this list that the remailers are not
presently secure.  I posted a long message a few months ago outlining
possible attacks on the remailers.  It's worth noting that Karl Barrus'
remailer does batch up messages and send them out once a day.  If enough
people use it that will help mix them up.  There is still the message size
to match them up, though (and, believe it or not, the Subject: line!).
Karl is working on padding code.

Really, fixing these problems is not hard.  There will be some penalties
in terms of usability of the systems.  Subject lines will have to be
embedded in the encrypted message blocks, so the software which sets up
cascaded message commands will need to do this.  More intrusively, I think
all messages will have to be padded to be the same size everywhre in the
remailer network.  We need to pick a size large enough to accomodate most
messages yet not so large that padding all messages to that size will be
too expensive or wasteful.  Then messages bigger than that size will either
be rejected or at least some warning given to the user that his message will
be trackable.

The traffic volume problem should be solved by having a source of random
messages which traverse the network, mixing in with user messages.  This
will help, but you still have the problem that only user messages will leave
the network.

The biggest problem is that many remailers are on unsecure systems.  The PGP
keys and passwords for these remailers are on the disk IN THE CLEAR.  Anyone
who can get privileges on these systems (many hackers, these days, not to
mention the NSA) can get the remailer's keys and decrypt any messages sent
to those remailers.  Karl's monthly posting shows which remailers are on
private machines; those are the only ones which have any hope of being secure
against the NSA.

As I said, I think most of these problems are fixable, or at least can be
significantly improved.  Perhaps after the holidays interested parties can
set up a sub-list to discuss "Mark II" remailers which will more closely
approximate Chaum's vision.

Hal Finney
hfinney@shell.portal.com




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: pat@tstc.edu (Patrick E. Hykkonen)
Date: Thu, 2 Dec 93 06:38:38 PST
To: mg5n+@andrew.cmu.edu (Matthew J Ghio)
Subject: Re: EFF Op-Ed from the NY Tim
In-Reply-To: <YgzHtMa00awD4kbkkF@andrew.cmu.edu>
Message-ID: <9312021436.AA02569@tstc.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> > Got a list of their names?
> 
> I doubt it.  If you're not enrolled at a major university, or employed
> at a computer-related company, and don't subscribe to an expensive
> online service, getting an internet account is NOT easy or cheap. 
> Services like netcom are expanding, but I seriously doubt a homeless
> person could get an internet address.  Check out almost any BBS network
> (other than fido) and every other week, some jerk will ask when they'll
> get connected to the internet.  And every time, five sysops respond
> "Fine.  We'd love to.  Would you mind telling us how the hell we could
> connect to the internet???"

This is beginning to kill me!  This guy comes from the cmu.edu domain
and obviously has never tried to get an account on a system outside of
his institution.  Much less on one of the "expensive on-line
services", as he put it.

Here's some news!  Currently the Delphi service offers full Internet
connectivity (e-mail, FTP, Telnet, Gopher, News) for $20 a month for
20 hours of access.  Delphi can be accessed through SprintNet which
means that most metropolitan areas will have a local dial in point.
In the near future America On Line has stated that in the near future
they too will go full connectivity, they charge $9.95 a month for 4
hours worth of access.  AOL currently has e-mail available.  That's
just two of the services that can be accessed from just about any city
of any real size in the states.

Now, let's talk about those sysops that want to get connected to the
Interet.  Here in Waco, Texas (a city of about 150,000 people...
250,000 people if you count all the outlying cities) to get a 56K
dedicated Internet connection would cost something like...

	$ 3000.00	Router
	$ 1500.00	CSU/DSU
    	$  600.00	Local Loop Termination/Installation
	---------
	$ 5100.00	One-time costs.

	$   75.00	Regional Network membership fee
	$  250.00	Local Loop Charge
	---------
	$  325.00	Monthly costs.

These figures are ballpark, and some are gueses based on experience in
dealing with the regional networks here in Texas.  I know several
sysops here that would easily spend $5000.00 on their board in one
shot, and could easily spend the $300.00 a month for the connection.
On top of all that, it is a proven fact that people will *pay* for
Internet connectivity.

These costs are based on a dedicated 56K connection.  A 14.4 or 19.2K
SLIP connection would probably be *much* less!

And, as Duncan and so many others are so fond of pointing out.  If the
gummint would get out of the way and let competition happen for the
local loop these prices would drop dramatically.

-- 
Pat Hykkonen ** N5NPL ** pat@tstc.edu ** CNSA -- (817) 867-4831
Disclaimer:  This product may cause irritability in some users.  In cases of
allergic reaction, delete and consult a physician immediately.





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: jimn8@netcom.com (Jim Nitchals)
Date: Thu, 2 Dec 93 10:08:35 PST
To: unicorn@access.digex.net (Black Unicorn)
Subject: Re: Key Escrow a *GAD* thing
In-Reply-To: <199312021707.AA01049@access.digex.net>
Message-ID: <199312021808.KAA22802@mail.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Because the spelling of my last name is fairly uncommon, and someone
used a pseudonym that happens to be a good part of said name, I just
wanted to make it clear that an4914@anon.penet.fi is not me, and I
have no idea who "Nitch" actually is.

Sorry to waste bandwidth on that... with the heated discussion on
pseudospoofing etc I don't want to get caught in the cross-fire.

- Jim Nitchals
QuickTime team, Apple Computer Inc.





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: peb@PROCASE.COM (Paul Baclace)
Date: Thu, 2 Dec 93 11:03:41 PST
To: 71332.747@CompuServe.COM
Subject: Re: N-Gram
Message-ID: <9312021903.AA20570@ada.procase.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Sounds like Bugajsky creates a generative grammar and then stores list
of productions that specifies a walk on the tree to extract data.  This
is a form of Kolmogorov Complexity compression, which has been expanded
upon most notably by Chaitin.  In the general case, the program could
be for a Turing complete machine: e.g., if I want to compress
3.14159265..., the compression algorithm could recognize the sequence
and give an essentially infinite compression if you want an infinite
number of digits (that's right, my patented algorithm can compress your
data, as found inside pi, to 0.0000000000000% of original size!  Oops,
pi can't be patented, well, then I'll have to use the mumble secret
sequence which can be patented! ;^)

I wonder whether Bugajsky includes the size of his grammar in the compressed
size...if he doesn't then his 0.5% non-lossy compression is overstated.

Barnsley fractal compression achieves very high compression rates like
this, but it could take days to compress one picture (of course, faster
compression algorithms exist that don't compress as much).  JPEG can get
very high compression rates if loss of exact data is okay (which it is
for pictures).  And yet another lossy compression example is Sony's MiniDisc
which biases to the loss of data to areas that are difficult for most 
humans to recognize.


Paul E. Baclace
peb@procase.com

Bib:

Chaitin. "Algorithmic Information Theory", Cambridge University Press, 1987.

Kolmogorov. "Three Approaches to the Quantitative Definition of Information", 
	Problems of Information Transmission 1, 1-7 [1965].

Kolmogorov. "On the Logical Foundations of Information Theory", Problems of 
	Information Transmission 5, 3-7 [1969].







From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: collins@newton.apple.com (Scott Collins)
Date: Thu, 2 Dec 93 12:12:32 PST
To: James Hicks <71332.747@CompuServe.COM>
Subject: Re: N-Gram
Message-ID: <9312022002.AA26873@newton.apple.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


  >[algorithm to] store data the same way the human brain does.
  >[stored data would] take up only [0.5%] of the original space.

Whoever said the human brain stores data compressed to 0.5% of its original
size, and what is its original size anyway.

Paul Baclace says:
  >Sounds like Bugajsky creates a generative grammar and then stores list
  >of productions that specifies a walk on the tree to extract data.  This
  >is a form of Kolmogorov Complexity compression, which has been expanded
  >upon most notably by Chaitin.

I agree.  The description sounds more like this than anything else I'm
familiar with.

Paul Baclace goes on to say:
  >I wonder whether [he] includes the size of his grammar in [the claim]

0.5% is a questionable claim.  If it includes the grammar, then the grammar
must be very simple, and the data of very low entropy with respect to it --
in which case 0.5% would be an uninteresting experimental result.  If the
claim does _not_ include the size of the grammar, then the claim is useless
for evaluating this scheme.


Scott Collins         | "Few people realize what tremendous power there
                      |  is in one of these things."     -- Willy Wonka
......................|................................................
BUSINESS.   voice:408.862.0540  fax:974.6094   collins@newton.apple.com
Apple Computer, Inc.   5 Infinite Loop, MS 305-2B   Cupertino, CA 95014
.......................................................................
PERSONAL.   voice/fax:408.257.1746    1024:669687   catalyst@netcom.com






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: trestrab@GVSU.EDU (BETH TRESTRAIL)
Date: Thu, 2 Dec 93 09:48:36 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: EFF Op-Ed from the NY Tim
Message-ID: <9311027548.AA754862642@GVSU.EDU>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Perry Metzger writes:
> Matthew J Ghio says:
>> If you're not enrolled at a major university, or employed
>> at a computer-related company, and don't subscribe to an expensive
>> online service, getting an internet account is NOT easy or cheap. 
>
>To most of the nations population, which lives in cities, it costs
>under $25 a month total variable cost including phone costs. It is
>likely far more expensive in rural areas.
>
>Perry

Indeed. My account at Delphi costs $20/ month for the first 20 hours
and $1.80/hr thereafter (plus $3/mo surcharge for Internet access
other than e-mail). The total cost is not signifigantly more than
the cost of the daily paper (yet its far more informative...).

There is a $9/hr charge for access 6am-7pm, though, so I use my
wife's account to read this and other lists (and you probably thought
I was psuedospoofing :-))

          Jeff




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Black Unicorn <unicorn@access.digex.net>
Date: Thu, 2 Dec 93 09:08:44 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Key Escrow a *GAD* thing
Message-ID: <199312021707.AA01049@access.digex.net>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
 
From: an4914@anon.penet.fi (Nitch)
Date: Thu,  2 Dec 1993 12:48:19 UTC
Subject: The Key Escrow is a *GOOD* thing.
 
 
I see the introduction of common, publicly promoted cryptography as a
*GOOD* thing... even if it's insecure.  Yes, even if the government can
read every toggled bit of it.
 
If the public uses cryptography of even the simplest sort as a matter
of routine then the *REAL* cryptography, the really *SECURE* stuff, will
pass through unnoticed.  Why would *I* care if some super-secret agency
could read my clipper'd data?  I'd be using PGP on top of it! only then
my messages wouldn't stand out like so many lights in a dark night...
...more like just a few more stars in the sky.
 
 
+++
 
No insult intended "Nitch," but it is obvious that you haven't been much 
involved in politics.
 
What you want is security by obscurity.  The problem is that such 
security is illusory.
 
I don't care what the administration says about the program being 
voluntary.  The centralization of encryption, which is what this program 
is, is a *BAD* thing.  (to use your emphasis)  It is NOT a 
standardization in the strict sense and the only thing that makes me 
think otherwise in the slightest degree is the fact that AT&T is doing 
the manufacturing (read: there is nothing that makes me think the other 
way).
 
The easiest way for a large organization to take away major rights, or to 
curb the development of major rights is to attack them slowly.  Right 
after everyone "adopts" this "voluntary" standard, it will be that much 
easier to require compliance.  Where will private crypto development be?
You will indeed be using PGP2.x on top of Clipper, even 50 years from now 
when it is entirely behind the times.  Why?  Because Clipper will close 
the valve on private development.  I hope I'm being overly paranoid.  I 
really do.
 
Consider the administrations real stated purpose.  (This is my wording, 
but _their_ goal.)  To harmonize the needs of law enforcement with the 
(cryptographic) privacy of citizens.  (We want to read your mail)  Not 
mentioned the thefact that this is like trying to harmonize sodium and 
water.  If (when) they find they can't read your mail, they are going to 
be as upset as a spoiled child on christmas morning in a recession.
You really think they are going to invest so much time and effort in a 
program that is so easily and plainly circumvented.
[Begin political rant here]
 
I suppose now is the time to harp on the trend against individual rights.  
Call me a formalist, I just think most people want to live, conduct 
business, relax, recreate, procreate and exist in general while being 
generally _left alone_.  I expect government to provide infrastructure 
and support private development of infrastructure where it is most 
efficient (the so called data highway in particular).  I do not expect, 
or want government to legislate morality, unreasonably impose a majority 
(which is almost always an oligarchy, and not a majority) on the 
remainder, gege nerally intervene in my private and legimate a affairs.  
Clipper is simply invasionary.
 
- -uni- (Dark)
 
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.3
 
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eXXWL9359lqEoFaRY0k7nqfG9qmbVCliHS882r4g5mqlWrw8F1ivIRUDnQVpLFda
I3RLiYO+/Y79hiC9EyFG4C0t7bp6nCxTkC3aXFdg5Hqy67DvRihwWmegK5PEF++y
Cy04OkTkxFA=
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From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Timothy Newsham <newsham@wiliki.eng.hawaii.edu>
Date: Thu, 2 Dec 93 14:38:38 PST
To: rxt109@psu.edu (Bob Torres)
Subject: Re: NSA CAN BREAK PGP ENCRYPTION
In-Reply-To: <199312022035.AA26183@genesis.ait.psu.edu>
Message-ID: <9312022235.AA07977@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> >        Since version 2.1, PGP ("Pretty Good Privacy") has been rigged to 
> >allow the NSA to easily break encoded messages. Early in 1992, the author, 
> >Paul Zimmerman, was arrested by Government agents. He was told that he 

hmm,  amazing that "Paul" Zimmerman can so easily put a backdoor into a
program he no longer maintains :)

> >        After reading this, you may think of using an earlier version of 
> >PGP. However, any version found on an FTP site or bulletin board has been 
> >doctored. Only use copies acquired before 1992, and do NOT use a recent 

wow!  they went to every bbs and replaced the files!  I wonder what they
threatened all of those BBS sysops with? :)


> >compiler to compile them. Virtually ALL popular compilers have been 
> >modified to insert the trapdoor (consisting of a few trivial changes) into 

amazing!  As if compiler designers didnt have enough problems trying to
optimize their code and make their code optimize others!  Now they have
to put up with inserting backdoors for NSA!  Hmm,  I wonder what kind
of backdoors they are putting into unix these days?

> >        It took the agency more to modify GNU C, but eventually they did it.
> >The Free Software Foundation was threatened with "an IRS investigation",
> >in other words, with being forced out of business, unless they complied. The
> >result is that all versions of GCC on the FTP sites and all versions above 
> >2.2.3, contain code to modify PGP and insert the trapdoor. Recompiling GCC
> >with itself will not help; the code is inserted by the compiler into
> >itself. Recompiling with another compiler may help, as long as the compiler
> >is older than from 1992.

No wonder GCC is so slow!

>       --**--**--  R X T 1 0 9 @ E M A I L . P S U . E D U  --**--**--
> Bob Torres                      |  "I don't know what I'm writing about:
> plato@phantom.com               |     I'm obscure even to myself."         
>                                PGP PUB KEY AVAILABLE **        | -C.
> Lispector, _The Stream of Life_

Thanx for the cross-post Bob!  Great humor!  Anybody make sure that
no idiots over at alt.privacy believe this yet?

Thanx for the great software "Paul"!




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: an4914@anon.penet.fi (Nitch)
Date: Thu, 2 Dec 93 04:52:29 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: The Key Escrow is a *GOOD* thing.
Message-ID: <9312021248.AA09441@anon.penet.fi>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



I see the introduction of common, publicly promoted cryptography as a
*GOOD* thing... even if it's insecure.  Yes, even if the government can
read every toggled bit of it.

If the public uses cryptography of even the simplest sort as a matter
of routine then the *REAL* cryptography, the really *SECURE* stuff, will
pass through unnoticed.  Why would *I* care if some super-secret agency
could read my clipper'd data?  I'd be using PGP on top of it! only then
my messages wouldn't stand out like so many lights in a dark night...
...more like just a few more stars in the sky.

-------------------------------------------------------------------------
To find out more about the anon service, send mail to help@anon.penet.fi.
Due to the double-blind, any mail replies to this message will be anonymized,
and an anonymous id will be allocated automatically. You have been warned.
Please report any problems, inappropriate use etc. to admin@anon.penet.fi.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Johan Helsingius <julf@penet.fi>
Date: Thu, 2 Dec 93 03:48:24 PST
To: gtoal@an-teallach.com
Subject: Re: NEW: Cypherwonks (fwd)
In-Reply-To: <11681@an-teallach.com>
Message-ID: <199312021143.AA10472@lassie.eunet.fi>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



> Oh come on, Julf is a European.

Uh... I take that was a compliment ;-)

	Julf





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: greg@ideath.goldenbear.com (Greg Broiles)
Date: Thu, 2 Dec 93 14:52:36 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: NSA CAN BREAK PGP ENCRYPTION
In-Reply-To: <199312022035.AA26183@genesis.ait.psu.edu>
Message-ID: <TRcyDc3w165w@ideath.goldenbear.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


uunet!psu.edu!rxt109 (Bob Torres) writes:

> check out this load of bull that I pulled off of alt.privacy today. 
> Reminds me of those chain letters....
> 
> >        A lot of people think that PGP encryption is unbreakable and that th
> >NSA/FBI/CIA/MJ12 cannot read their mail. This is wrong, and it can be a dead
> >mistake. In Idaho, a left-wing activist by the name of Craig Steingold was
> >arrested  _one day_ before he and others wee to stage a protest at governmen
> >buildings; the police had a copy of a message sent by Steingold to another
> >activist, a message which had been encrypted with PGP and sent through E-mai

Mr. Steingold is still being held; yet another modern American political 
prisoner. He's asked that all people, everywhere, supportive of freedom 
of speech and association please send him Christmas cards; he's hoping to 
get into the Guiness Book of World Records, and hence gain publicity 
which will make the evil sheriff set him free.

His address:

Craig Steingold
Inmate # 231768
c/o Washington County Jail
Coeur d'Alene, ID 97401





(Ok, ok, just kidding. Sorry. Couldn't help myself. Don't send cards. The 
bandwidth police can come get me now.)


--
Greg Broiles                       Lemon Detweiler Pledge?
greg@goldenbear.com                  You're soaking in it.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: rxt109@psu.edu (Bob Torres)
Date: Thu, 2 Dec 93 12:38:38 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: NSA CAN BREAK PGP ENCRYPTION
Message-ID: <199312022035.AA26183@genesis.ait.psu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


check out this load of bull that I pulled off of alt.privacy today. 
Reminds me of those chain letters....


>
>
>        A lot of people think that PGP encryption is unbreakable and that the
>NSA/FBI/CIA/MJ12 cannot read their mail. This is wrong, and it can be a deadly
>mistake. In Idaho, a left-wing activist by the name of Craig Steingold was
>arrested  _one day_ before he and others wee to stage a protest at government
>buildings; the police had a copy of a message sent by Steingold to another
>activist, a message which had been encrypted with PGP and sent through E-mail.
>
>        Since version 2.1, PGP ("Pretty Good Privacy") has been rigged to 
>allow the NSA to easily break encoded messages. Early in 1992, the author, 
>Paul Zimmerman, was arrested by Government agents. He was told that he 
>would be set up for trafficking narcotics unless he complied. The Government 
>agency's demands were simple: He was to put a virtually undetectable 
>trapdoor, designed by the NSA, into all future releases of PGP, and to
>tell no-one.
>
>        After reading this, you may think of using an earlier version of 
>PGP. However, any version found on an FTP site or bulletin board has been 
>doctored. Only use copies acquired before 1992, and do NOT use a recent 
>compiler to compile them. Virtually ALL popular compilers have been 
>modified to insert the trapdoor (consisting of a few trivial changes) into 
>any version of PGP prior to 2.1. Members of the boards of Novell, Microsoft, 
>Borland, AT&T and other companies were persuaded into giving the order for the 
>modification (each ot these companies' boards contains at least one Trilateral
>Commission member or Bilderberg Committee attendant).
>
>        It took the agency more to modify GNU C, but eventually they did it.
>The Free Software Foundation was threatened with "an IRS investigation",
>in other words, with being forced out of business, unless they complied. The
>result is that all versions of GCC on the FTP sites and all versions above 
>2.2.3, contain code to modify PGP and insert the trapdoor. Recompiling GCC
>with itself will not help; the code is inserted by the compiler into
>itself. Recompiling with another compiler may help, as long as the compiler
>is older than from 1992.
>
>Distribute and reproduce this information freely. Do not alter it.
>-------------------------------------------------------------------------
>To find out more about the anon service, send mail to help@anon.penet.fi.
>Due to the double-blind, any mail replies to this message will be anonymized,
>and an anonymous id will be allocated automatically. You have been warned.
>Please report any problems, inappropriate use etc. to admin@anon.penet.fi.
>
>
      --**--**--  R X T 1 0 9 @ E M A I L . P S U . E D U  --**--**--
Bob Torres                      |  "I don't know what I'm writing about:
plato@phantom.com               |     I'm obscure even to myself."         
                               PGP PUB KEY AVAILABLE **        | -C.
Lispector, _The Stream of Life_





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Karl Lui Barrus <klbarrus@owlnet.rice.edu>
Date: Thu, 2 Dec 93 13:42:35 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: REMAIL: list 12/2/93
Message-ID: <9312022139.AA15442@arcadien.owlnet.rice.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Unless I missed more, the changes are
  chaos.bsu.edu can be looked up, so no more remailer%chaos
  remailer at cdodhner@indirect.com is down

also, I got some anon mail about changing the dos scripts to include
more redirection to nul; apparently 4dos is more verbose.  I will
update this over the break, promise!

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

Cypherpunk anonymous remailers, 12/2/93

Q1: What are the anonymous remailers?

A1:

 1: remailer@chaos.bsu.edu
 2: nowhere@bsu-cs.bsu.edu
 3: hh@cicada.berkeley.edu
 4: hh@pmantis.berkeley.edu
 5: hh@soda.berkeley.edu
 6: 00x@uclink.berkeley.edu
 7: hal@alumni.caltech.edu
 8: cs60a-qu@cory.eecs.berkeley.edu
 9: ebrandt@jarthur.claremont.edu
10: catalyst@netcom.com
11: sameer@netcom.com
12: remailer@rebma.mn.org
13: elee6ue@rosebud.ee.uh.edu
14: elee7h5@rosebud.ee.uh.edu
15: hfinney@shell.portal.com
16: sameer@soda.berkeley.edu
17: remail@tamsun.tamu.edu
18: remail@tamaix.tamu.edu
19: remailer@utter.dis.org
20: remailer@entropy.linet.org
21: elee9sf@menudo.uh.edu
22: remail@extropia.wimsey.com

NOTES: 

1-6		no encryption of remailing requests
7-21		support encrypted remailing requests
22		special - header and message must be encrypted together
12,19,20,22	introduce larger than average delay (not direct connect)
12,19,22	running on privately owned machines
13		requires "cash" payment for remailing
21		supports RIPEM encryption, caches remailing requests

======================================================================

Q2: What help is available?

A2:

Check out the pub/cypherpunks/remailer directory at soda.berkeley.edu
(128.32.149.19).  

chain.zip             - program that helps with using remailers
dosbat.zip            - MSDOS batch files that help with using remailers
hal's.instructions.gz - in depth instruction on how to use
hal's.remailer.gz     - remailer code
pubkeys.tar.gz        - public keys of remailers which support encryption
pubkeys.zip           - MSDOS zip file of public keys
scripts.tar.gz        - scripts that help with using remailers

For MAC's, at 129.82.156.104 in /pub/pgpc/ are two files:
pgpc22.tar.gz, pgpc22.tar.Z which assist in using the anonymous
remailers, including anon.penet.fi.

Mail to me (klbarrus@owlnet.rice.edu) for further help and/or questions.

======================================================================

Q3.  Email-to-Usenet gateways?

A3.

 1: group-name@cs.utexas.edu
 2: group.name.usenet@decwrl.dec.com
 3: group.name@news.demon.co.uk
 4: group.name@news.cs.indiana.edu
 5: group-name@pws.bull.com
 6: group-name@ucbvax.berkeley.edu

NOTES:

*  This does not include ones that work for single groups, like twwells.com.
#6 blocks from non-berkeley sites (so use the berkeley remailers :-)

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.3a

iQCVAgUBLP5f44OA7OpLWtYzAQGzUQP/ewQIHSB4DNjAMabfcpvIiggpE/uuliyG
RpmbqROIRQr7YQ6NaCuYxXFLO5v4nJeMeGOpVCzdGNoyFyX8BlUlAyZVjnNh+ymT
Hmg8v18xEuH6OaMDRRiACUA1zfiU1Ia/iTDl8Z8fUxXAUzuuBkbYYofORBMWa1Rg
iVxCj5IS+8w=
=veYO
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

-- 
Karl L. Barrus: klbarrus@owlnet.rice.edu         
keyID: 5AD633 hash: D1 59 9D 48 72 E9 19 D5  3D F3 93 7E 81 B5 CC 32 

"One man's mnemonic is another man's cryptography" 
  - my compilers prof discussing file naming in public directories



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Matthew J Ghio <mg5n+@andrew.cmu.edu>
Date: Thu, 2 Dec 93 12:43:38 PST
To: pat@tstc.edu (Patrick E. Hykkonen)
Subject: Re: EFF Op-Ed from the NY Tim
In-Reply-To: <9312021436.AA02569@tstc.edu>
Message-ID: <MgzZ=Du00awK9QiEsg@andrew.cmu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> This is beginning to kill me!  This guy comes from the cmu.edu
> domain and obviously has never tried to get an account on a
> system outside of his institution.  Much less on one of the
> "expensive on-line services", as he put it.

ha ha ...  BTW: I did get an internet mail address not in the cmu.edu domain.

> Here's some news!  Currently the Delphi service offers full
> Internet connectivity (e-mail, FTP, Telnet, Gopher, News)
> for $20 a month for 20 hours of access.  Delphi can be accessed
> through SprintNet which means that most metropolitan areas
> will have a local dial in point.  In the near future America
> On Line has stated that in the near future they too will go
> full connectivity, they charge $9.95 a month for 4 hours
> worth of access.  AOL currently has e-mail available.  That's
> just two of the services that can be accessed from just about
> any city of any real size in the states.

True.  But I could just as well set up my own BBS for about the same price.

> Now, let's talk about those sysops that want to get connected
> to the Interet.  Here in Waco, Texas (a city of about 150,000
> people... 250,000 people if you count all the outlying cities)
> to get a 56K dedicated Internet connection would cost
> something like...
> 
> 	$ 3000.00	Router
> 	$ 1500.00	CSU/DSU
>    	$  600.00	Local Loop Termination/Installation
> 	---------
> 	$ 5100.00	One-time costs.
> 
> 	$   75.00	Regional Network membership fee
> 	$  250.00	Local Loop Charge
> 	---------
> 	$  325.00	Monthly costs.
>
> These figures are ballpark, and some are gueses based on
> experience in dealing with the regional networks here
> in Texas.  I know several sysops here that would easily
> spend $5000.00 on their board in one shot, and could
> easily spend the $300.00 a month for the connection.
> On top of all that, it is a proven fact that people will
> *pay* for Internet connectivity.

Yes, I know there are sysops who could afford this, but the vast
majority couldn't.  I know it's certainly over my budget.

> These costs are based on a dedicated 56K connection.
> A 14.4 or 19.2K SLIP connection would probably be
> *much* less!
> 
> And, as Duncan and so many others are so fond of
> pointing out.  If the gummint would get out of the
> way and let competition happen for the
> local loop these prices would drop dramatically.

Of course... Isn't this what cypherpunks have been wishing for all along?




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: jazz@hal.com (Jason Zions)
Date: Thu, 2 Dec 93 14:28:38 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: NSA CAN BREAK PGP ENCRYPTION
Message-ID: <9312022227.AA25783@jazz.hal.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Major-league guffaws.

   >        A lot of people think that PGP encryption is unbreakable and
   >that the NSA/FBI/CIA/MJ12 cannot read their mail. This is wrong, and it
   >can be a deadly mistake. In Idaho, a left-wing activist by the name of
   >Craig Steingold was arrested _one day_ before he and others wee to stage
   >a protest at government buildings; the police had a copy of a message
   >sent by Steingold to another activist, a message which had been
   >encrypted with PGP and sent through E-mail.

Craig Steingold indeed. Looks so much like Craig Shergold, of infamous
dying-boy-wants-Guiness-record fame, that I had to read it twice.

   >        Since version 2.1, PGP ("Pretty Good Privacy") has been rigged
   >to allow the NSA to easily break encoded messages. Early in 1992, the
   >author, Paul Zimmerman, was arrested by Government agents. He was told
   >that he would be set up for trafficking narcotics unless he
   >complied. The Government agency's demands were simple: He was to put a
   >virtually undetectable trapdoor, designed by the NSA, into all future
   >releases of PGP, and to tell no-one.

Paul, not Phil (his actual name).

   >        After reading this, you may think of using an earlier version of
   >PGP. However, any version found on an FTP site or bulletin board has
   >been doctored. Only use copies acquired before 1992, and do NOT use a
   >recent compiler to compile them. Virtually ALL popular compilers have
   >been modified to insert the trapdoor (consisting of a few trivial
   >changes) into any version of PGP prior to 2.1. Members of the boards of
   >Novell, Microsoft, Borland, AT&T and other companies were persuaded into
   >giving the order for the modification (each ot these companies' boards
   >contains at least one Trilateral Commission member or Bilderberg
   >Committee attendant).

Oh, no, not the Trilateral Commission again!

   >        It took the agency more to modify GNU C, but eventually they did
   >it.  The Free Software Foundation was threatened with "an IRS
   >investigation", in other words, with being forced out of business,
   >unless they complied. The result is that all versions of GCC on the FTP
   >sites and all versions above 2.2.3, contain code to modify PGP and
   >insert the trapdoor. Recompiling GCC with itself will not help; the code
   >is inserted by the compiler into itself. Recompiling with another
   >compiler may help, as long as the compiler is older than from 1992.

Right. Every commercial compiler has code that recognizes every version of
GCC source since 2.2.3 and inserts into the generated object code some new
stuff that makes the freshly compiled GCC recognize every version of PGP
released since 1992 and inserts into *its* object code magic breakage that
creates an NSA trapdoor.

I hereby nominate this message for the Cypherpunk's Paul Bunyan award, 1993,
in the category of "Biggest Whopper".

(Oh, yeah. While I'm at it - Detweiller's Medusa theories, in conjunction
with his pseudospoofed distribution techniques, are hereby nominated for the
Goebel's Memorial award for "Best Big Lie" of '93.)

Jason Zions "Wish I really were Eric Hughes or Tim May, or at least that sharp"




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: jkreznar@ininx.com (John E. Kreznar)
Date: Thu, 2 Dec 93 18:22:36 PST
To: jerry@terminus.us.dell.com
Subject: Re: Entropy, Randomness, etc.
In-Reply-To: <9312010132.AA20601@terminus.us.dell.com>
Message-ID: <9312030219.AA08840@ininx>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

This is a supplement to the fine answer to your question which has
already provided by Scott Collins.

> How do we measure the entropy of a random number,
> or a series of random numbers?

> Give a particular set of data used to generate a random key, such as,
> a unix box's /dev/mem, how can one measure the number of bits of
> entropy?

Actually, it can't be done.  The consistent measure of entropy for
finite objects like a string or a (finite) series of random numbers is
the so-called ``program length complexity''.  This is defined as the
length of the shortest program for some given universal Turing machine
which computes the string.  It's consistent in the sense that it has the
familiar properties of ``ordinary'' (Shannon) entropy.  Unfortunately,
it's uncomputable: there's no algorithm which, given an arbitrary finite
string S, computes the program-length complexity of S.

Program-length complexity is well-studied in the literature.  A good
introductory paper is ``A Theory of Program Size Formally Identical to
Information Theory'' by  G. J. Chaitin, _Journal of the ACM_, 22 (1975)
reprinted in Chaitin's book _Information Randomness & Incompleteness_,
World Scientific Publishing Co., 1990.

	John E. Kreznar		| Relations among people to be by
	jkreznar@ininx.com	| mutual consent, or not at all.

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.3a

iQCVAgUBLP6iDsDhz44ugybJAQH9IwP/V2EZ/crPIENnkWAYFbCKfNrPuStkb7U9
kQurAUc0xgIzcGjYYw6KFAwJ2zMYgGAmtUlbBbkEaJnAjQJc6AT2Q3PBWitWG5Fk
+p2YJwSV00TtSxVXqiu7IWUpK2zlbCDzYq0hdoabe4GOoYgdYd96y6WV62AqFb39
MifNcQF5XMQ=
=quUv
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: an4914@anon.penet.fi (Nitch)
Date: Thu, 2 Dec 93 10:23:37 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: N-Gram
Message-ID: <9312021822.AA28336@anon.penet.fi>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



>
>    Joseph M. Bugajsky quit Ford Motor Co. in 1985 to pursue his dream of 
>inventing a computer formula that would analyze and store data the same way 
>the human brain does.  This September, his efforts paid off with a U.S. patent
>on a system that spots patterns in data and compresses the data into 
>"memories."  These memories, Bugajsky says, take up only one-half of 1% of the
>original space.  That could make them a boon to banks, libraries, and 
>laboratories flooded with data.
[...]
>Any comments?

Compression down to 0.5% ?!?  HA!  Try saying that on comp.compression!!!

Let's see... That's half a typed page of data crunched down into five bytes.
Give me a break.  That guy ought to be sued for false advertising.

-------------------------------------------------------------------------
To find out more about the anon service, send mail to help@anon.penet.fi.
Due to the double-blind, any mail replies to this message will be anonymized,
and an anonymous id will be allocated automatically. You have been warned.
Please report any problems, inappropriate use etc. to admin@anon.penet.fi.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: mechanism@aol.com
Date: Thu, 2 Dec 93 15:52:36 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Digital monetary system info needed on AOL
Message-ID: <9312021849.tn14026@aol.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Here's a chance to help spread the word to something a bit closer to "mom &
pop" than the cypherpunks.  

kenwardb@aol.com has asked for info on digital cash, and wants to post info
on it to an EFF conference on AOL.

You might send some not-too-long info to him.  Please don't EVERYONE do it,
it might cost him a bit.  Just one or 2 people do so, and announce that
your're taking care of it.  I'd do it myself, but I think there are quite a
few other people here that know more about it than me, and may know of a
short concise intro on the matter for the layperson.  Please indicate that
the material you send is intended to be reposted to the AOL sig.

Stanton McCandlish  mech@eff.org




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Eli Brandt <ebrandt@jarthur.Claremont.EDU>
Date: Thu, 2 Dec 93 20:02:36 PST
To: cypherpunks list <cypherpunks@toad.com>
Subject: Re: Entropy, Randomness, etc.
In-Reply-To: <9312030219.AA08840@ininx>
Message-ID: <9312030401.AA12564@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> Program-length complexity is well-studied in the literature.  A good
> introductory paper is ``A Theory of Program Size Formally Identical to
> Information Theory'' by  G. J. Chaitin, _Journal of the ACM_, 22 (1975)
> reprinted in Chaitin's book _Information Randomness & Incompleteness_,
> World Scientific Publishing Co., 1990.

The Li+Vitanyi chapter in the _Handbook of Theoretical Comp. Sci_, 
Vol. A, is a nice review.  And your library probably has the book,
while it may not have their new text.

> 	John E. Kreznar

   Eli   ebrandt@jarthur.claremont.edu
	 PGP 2 key by finger or e-mail
"Your hideous criminal clock, your insidious time 
 bomb, is tick-tick-ticking."		-- L. Detweiler




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Date: Thu, 2 Dec 93 20:03:42 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Entropy, Randomness, etc.
In-Reply-To: <9312030219.AA08840@ininx>
Message-ID: <199312030402.UAA26750@mail.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


John Kreznar writes:

> > Give a particular set of data used to generate a random key, such as,
> > a unix box's /dev/mem, how can one measure the number of bits of
> > entropy?
> 
> Actually, it can't be done.  The consistent measure of entropy for
> finite objects like a string or a (finite) series of random numbers is
> the so-called ``program length complexity''.  This is defined as the
> length of the shortest program for some given universal Turing machine
> which computes the string.  It's consistent in the sense that it has the
> familiar properties of ``ordinary'' (Shannon) entropy.  Unfortunately,
> it's uncomputable: there's no algorithm which, given an arbitrary finite
> string S, computes the program-length complexity of S.

The intuitive idea is similar to there being no "maximum compression"
of a string: though one may strongly suspect a compression is pretty
good and may in fact be the best there really is, one may find an even
better compression. Like the "pi" example Scott Collins used.

Still, one can make estimates of the entropy of a string.

> Program-length complexity is well-studied in the literature.  A good
> introductory paper is ``A Theory of Program Size Formally Identical to
> Information Theory'' by  G. J. Chaitin, _Journal of the ACM_, 22 (1975)
> reprinted in Chaitin's book _Information Randomness & Incompleteness_,
> World Scientific Publishing Co., 1990.

And an especially good place to read all about this is in the new book
by Ming Li and Paul Vitanyi, "An Introduction to Kolmogorov Complexity
and Its Applications," Springer-Verlag, 1993. $60.

Lots of good chapters on entropy, program length measures, algorithmic
information theory, etc. Ironically, no mention of cryptology at all.
(But Charles Bennett, one of the pioneers--especially in the area of
"logical depth"--has written about the deep links between the two
areas. Basically, ciphertext messages are "cryptoregular" in that they
_appear_ to be of high entropy (random) but actually have low entropy
when of course the right transformation (key) is applied.

You clever folks will by now have seen the link to the opening
discussion: how does one know if a given text is "cryptoregular" and
actually carries a message or is just random junk? The answer in
general is that no mechanistic/algorithmic method exists!

(Hardly surprising, if you think about it. A one-time pad is
information-theoretically secure. Every English (or Russian, etc.)
sentence of length L can be "found" in a cyphertext of length L by
trying the "right" pad. A thousand monkeys and all that.)

For messages that are not encrypted with one-time pads, this is
not the case, and various bits of information can sometimes be
extracted. Cryptanalysis sometimes works. Last I heard, though, it
doesn't help with breaking RSA (chosen plaintext attacks on RSA don't
help with the factoring problem at all...consult the textbooks on the
exact situation, if you're interested in such subtleties).

Kolmogorov-Chaitin measures of complexity are very exciting.

--Tim May


-- 
..........................................................................
Timothy C. May         | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,  
tcmay@netcom.com       | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
408-688-5409           | knowledge, reputations, information markets, 
W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA  | black markets, collapse of governments.
Higher Power: 2^756839 | Public Key: PGP and MailSafe available.
Note: I put time and money into writing this posting. I hope you enjoy it.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Isaac.Norby@f217.n125.z1.FIDONET.ORG (Isaac Norby)
Date: Fri, 3 Dec 93 13:14:09 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Address query
Message-ID: <5058.2CFFA173@shelter.FIDONET.ORG>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Could someone here netmail me the address for Mike Godwin of the EFF?  I
should like to ask him about some issues he brought up here a couple of
months back.

Thank you.
___ Blue Wave/QWK v2.12
--  
Isaac Norby - via FidoNet node 1:125/1
UUCP: ...!uunet!kumr!shelter!217!Isaac.Norby
INTERNET: Isaac.Norby@f217.n125.z1.FIDONET.ORG




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: an4914@anon.penet.fi (Nitch)
Date: Thu, 2 Dec 93 15:28:40 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: An Occupied Nitch?
Message-ID: <9312022326.AA15269@anon.penet.fi>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

>From: jimn8@netcom.com (Jim Nitchals)
>Date: Thu, 2 Dec 93 10:08:08 PST
>
>Because the spelling of my last name is fairly uncommon, and someone
>used a pseudonym that happens to be a good part of said name, I just
>wanted to make it clear that an4914@anon.penet.fi is not me, and I
>have no idea who "Nitch" actually is.
>

Terribly sorry to frighten you, Jim.  Nitch is a (very) little-known
nickname of mine from quite some time ago.  There are probably only
five people who ever knew that it had been given to me.

Funny name collision.  I never expected it.  Hope you don't get fired.

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.3a

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lfFtc+PXPqOHx4vEkWfzbKCoQrRElbBg3Iy6F7m73w+lTe57sggd0HKp9V7U75r6
hXzuuKhDSbNfgSy4OVVjVIGcpDImcpfJSsRQFeE3fch2CWne0VpxzJdVjE12iL5o
lv9F3KNdxFw=
=cXBb
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
To find out more about the anon service, send mail to help@anon.penet.fi.
Due to the double-blind, any mail replies to this message will be anonymized,
and an anonymous id will be allocated automatically. You have been warned.
Please report any problems, inappropriate use etc. to admin@anon.penet.fi.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "W. Kinney" <kinney@ucsu.Colorado.EDU>
Date: Thu, 2 Dec 93 22:32:39 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Mac Encryption Program Ready!
Message-ID: <199312030631.AA11143@ucsu.Colorado.EDU>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain




CP's --

Since Cypherpunks write code...

My Mac encryption software is ready for beta! Anybody out there interested in 
taking a look-see and giving me some feedback?

I incorporated into the software almost all the advice I received in response 
to my request a month ago for advice about the encryption algorithm, and it 
seems pretty good to me (I've added cryptographically random IV's and encrypted 
header data). But I'd be especially interested in feedback on 
weaknesses/improvements.

The program is a System 7 _only_ conventional encryption application, using 
IDEA CFB. It works drop-and-drag, encrypts files, folders, or whole volumes, 
allowing pass phrases up to 255 characters in length, and has a small variety 
of hip features. The program is freeware and (of course) comes with source 
code. It's called "Curve Encrypt".

I've created a software company 'nym, "Curve Software", with an associated PGP 
public key for release verification (enclosed here). Note that I'd appreciate 
correspondence relating to the software sent to kinney@bogart.colorado.edu, so 
I can keep it separate from my other mail.

I will only distribute this software within the U.S. I do not want to fuck with 
ITAR. Please respect this.

E-mail me if you want the code.


                                -- Will



-----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----
Version: 2.3

mQCPAiz+bEEAAAEEAMUbtdwYC1vY+s5559ERIvC1MT+Yaw3ozheaHcUciJe7cSAk
k9TpAQd7iKukKnQe5kK1YtvYm0JP6fmNrcO8AmG5ukvcOlyuri618sjpXncpQ1cL
5xeV80f3JtmheGMnqAzTK8OyfJ7zRh1PhAZcT/vVzf+JGuCuVcJkEfxTVMrJABEB
AAG0K0N1cnZlIFNvZnR3YXJlIDxraW5uZXlAYm9nYXJ0LmNvbG9yYWRvLmVkdT6J
AJUCBRAs/m+A9+/hOkiDY/EBARd9A/wIJBxW2w+wStmUhZ2eWLIkMEqbChstKg4W
QUVx0h7Z75uVqRBNP5s6wyWfBhHpptjOkre6MNKM+oMGPPfGJFqbPgMwedXCVA+8
XiyEa55YUUTZ5D8OmR4Ot1z9HpKwZAjfJAxs9lrF2kcOF4xvtOeQF/QmuAf27JJU
xetOByecLA==
=RmKK
-----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: jimn8@netcom.com (Jim Nitchals)
Date: Fri, 3 Dec 93 00:08:45 PST
To: an4914@anon.penet.fi
Subject: Re: Nitch (also re: steganography)
In-Reply-To: <9312022326.AA15269@anon.penet.fi>
Message-ID: <199312030807.AAA06846@mail.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


an4914@anon.penet.fi writes:
> 
> Terribly sorry to frighten you, Jim.  Nitch is a (very) little-known
> nickname of mine from quite some time ago.  There are probably only
> five people who ever knew that it had been given to me.
> 
> Funny name collision.  I never expected it.  Hope you don't get fired.

Fired?  Hehe.. I'd sincerely expect more from my employers than to
get upset at something I post to a mailing list.

Thanks for the reply.  Now.. to increase the signal-to-noise ratio a
bit.. (hopefully a few people on the list read this one anyway) there
was a mention of using the LSB of a picture for steganography, and the
ensuing difficulty in hiding the results.

An idea I've had is to hide the data as the exclusive-or of several
LSB's within the image.  There are two problems with using the LSB
of *every* pixel: the obvious distribution of 1's and 0's, and the
resulting loss of compressability of the resulting image.

A 320x200 image can hold 8,000 bytes of data in the LSB, which is
probably more capacity than most messages need.  If instead we use
1 bit of steganographic data for 8 pixel LSB's, the capacity is
still about 1K, and it should be easier to hide the steganographic
signature because only 1 LSB out of 8 needs to be changed if the
parity is wrong.

If using GIF or other lossless encoder, we can tweak LSB's in ways
that actually *reduce* compressed file size.  As long as we're
tossing out the LSB as usable picture information, let's get some
benefit from it.

Assuming matching JPEG encoders and decoders on the sending and
receiving end, a JPEG image could theoretically store steganographic
data by tweaking the quantized DCT coefficients until they matched
the desired steganographic output.  The extra beauty here is that
not all JPEG decoders are built the same, so the output may not
be bit-for-bit the same.  Decoding the steganographic data would
require not only a knowledge of the algorithm, but a matching JPEG
decoder as well.





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: szabo@netcom.com (Nick Szabo)
Date: Fri, 3 Dec 93 01:32:39 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Graynet
Message-ID: <199312030931.BAA00202@mail.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Forwarded from comp.infosystems:

Reply-To: an53728@anon.penet.fi
Date: Tue, 30 Nov 1993 06:03:34 UTC
Subject: Information

     INFORMATIONAL REPORTS

- How to trick pay phones into thinking you deposited money

- How to clone cellular phones

- How to make traffic lights turn green by remote control

- How to build and use a bugging device

- How to make your electric meter go backwards

- How to get cable TV for free

- How to create your own pirate TV or radio station

$10 each, or all for $40.  For informational purposes only.  Send self-
addressed, stamped envelope.  Make checks or money orders out to Kardos.

Kardos
P.O. Box 2310
Darien, CT  06820
USA



-------------------------------------------------------------------------
To find out more about the anon service, send mail to help@anon.penet.fi.
Due to the double-blind, any mail replies to this message will be anonymized,
and an anonymous id will be allocated automatically. You have been warned.
Please report any problems, inappropriate use etc. to admin@anon.penet.fi.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Date: Fri, 3 Dec 93 01:38:45 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: "High Stakes in the Living Room"
Message-ID: <199312030938.BAA15461@mail.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



"In the high-tech future of interactive television, gamblers could bet
against the house in the privacy of their homes, couch potatoes could
rake in the big bucks with the remote control adn the living room
could be transformed into a high-roller's paradise."

So begins an article by Benjamen Pimental in the Dec. 2, 1993 issue of
"The San Francisco Chronicle," an article entitled "High Stake in the
Living Room," page A1 (a page one story).

I tried to OCR the article, but newsprint is hard to get a good
accuracy rate on and I gave up after seeing a sea of errors to be
corrected.

Here are just some highlights:

- race tracks, lotto games, etc. being talked about. Quebec has
actually deployed it, So Calif. tried it to. Several companies (NTN
Communications, Videotron) are developing telegaming software and are
working with local gaming authorities and racetracks, etc.

- other groups are opposed, for moral reasons ("lose the house from
inside the house"), for entrenched-interest reasons, etc. 

- concerns about minors either playing by hacking the system or by
watching the unsavory practices of their elders

- beginning talk about the need for security--credit card accounts,
passwords, etc. (No mention of encryption, though.)

So, this is already starting up. Nick Szabo has written about his
ideas for "The Internet Casino" and telegambling. Sounds like others
are moving ahead.

There are some issues of great interest to Cypherpunks and Crypto
Anarchists:

* What happens to local gambling laws when gambling is just a phone
call away? (I'm certainly not arguing for local gambling laws, and
I'll be delighted to see them smashed by technology. My point here is
to analyze what will change and how the authorites will try to counter
the change.)

* What happens with remailers and mixes used to reach these remote
gambling sites? Casinos in the Bahamas could come "on-line" at almost
any time.

* Strong crypto means these gambling sites can be reached from
anywhere. 

(A potentially good way to "liquify" digital money: deposit dollars in
a Bahamian casino bank, access it via the gambling nets, withdraw it
or whatever in ATM machines. A formal alliance between certain types
of Cypherpunks and certain types of offshore casine operators could be
lucrative.)

* Will the  "Data Highway Patrol" (DHP) allow gambling packets to move
freely? (Scenario: Strong crypto is banned, somehow (?), because the
Data Highway Patrol--known affectionately as the "ClipperCHiPS"--needs
to make random inspections of "cargo loads." This scenario I expect to
happen if the NII goes through.)

...and so on. You get the drift. The Brave New World of strong crypto
will nuke most current laws about gambling, selling of information,
consulting, payment of taxes, zoning, practicing certain professions
without approval, and so on.

Interesting times indeed. 

Speaking of which, I'll be giving a public lecture on these topics
next Wednesday, the 8th, at 4 p.m., Skilling Auditorium, Stanford
University. More information should follow in a few days.


--Tim May

-- 
..........................................................................
Timothy C. May         | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,  
tcmay@netcom.com       | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
408-688-5409           | knowledge, reputations, information markets, 
W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA  | black markets, collapse of governments.
Higher Power: 2^756839 | Public Key: PGP and MailSafe available.
Note: I put time and money into writing this posting. I hope you enjoy it.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: an32951@anon.penet.fi (Coerr)
Date: Thu, 2 Dec 93 17:48:41 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Handy Hint That Applies to Punks
Message-ID: <9312030146.AA06639@anon.penet.fi>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



A humorous posting that may apply here:

Author is: an31438@anon.penet.fi (Alcan-Foil-Wrapped-Pork-Stock-Warrior)
Subject: Handy Hint for law-abiding citizens


	Go to your local police station and offer to have your 
	fingerprints taken.

	This will allow them to eliminate you from their enquiries
	on many outstanding cases.



-------------------------------------------------------------------------
To find out more about the anon service, send mail to help@anon.penet.fi.
Due to the double-blind, any mail replies to this message will be anonymized,
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From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Mike Ingle <MIKEINGLE@delphi.com>
Date: Thu, 2 Dec 93 23:48:45 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: NSA CAN BREAK PGP
Message-ID: <01H60ZOMLFNE90R379@delphi.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


While this article is clearly a poorly written hoax, the compiler part does
have a historical basis. One of the first versions of Unix had a trapdoor
in login to allow the developers to get in. The compiler was designed to
put the trapdoor back in if login was recompiled. The compiler was also
designed to put the trapdoor back in itself if the compiler itself was
recompiled. This made the trapdoor almost impossible to get rid of.
This is probably where the nut who wrote the story got this idea.

--- MikeIngle@delphi.com

Democracy is three wolves and a sheep voting on lunch.





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: sameer@uclink.berkeley.edu
Date: Fri, 3 Dec 93 03:18:47 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: cryptanalysis for radio communications
Message-ID: <199312031116.DAA24889@mail.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


	I was wondering if any cryptanalysis packages existed which
could help in decrypted information picked up with a scanner. It seems
that a bunch of people trying to defend their home from the feds were
listening in on the feds radio communications, but now they're
encrypting stuff. It's probably not very strong crypto, maybe just a
simple XOR.

	(So I hear.. a friend asked me to help him, 'cause he's the
one helping these folk in Nevada.)

Thanks.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: dmandl@lehman.com (David Mandl)
Date: Fri, 3 Dec 93 05:28:50 PST
To: jazz@hal.com
Subject: Re: NSA CAN BREAK PGP ENCRYPTION
Message-ID: <9312031325.AA02632@disvnm2.lehman.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> From: jazz@hal.com (Jason Zions)
> 
>    >        A lot of people think that PGP encryption is unbreakable and
>    >that the NSA/FBI/CIA/MJ12 cannot read their mail. This is wrong, and it
>    >can be a deadly mistake. In Idaho, a left-wing activist by the name of
>    >Craig Steingold was arrested _one day_ before he and others wee to stage
>    >a protest at government buildings; the police had a copy of a message
>    >sent by Steingold to another activist, a message which had been
>    >encrypted with PGP and sent through E-mail.
> 
> Craig Steingold indeed. Looks so much like Craig Shergold, of infamous
> dying-boy-wants-Guiness-record fame, that I had to read it twice.

Right, and I'm sure this is exactly the way the NSA would finally reveal that
they can break PGP: by busting a group of lefties planning to "stage a protest at
government buildings"!  Good one.

   --Dave.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Brian J. Harvey" <bjh@northshore.ecosoft.com>
Date: Fri, 3 Dec 93 05:48:51 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Request For Comments (Cypherpunks write code!)
Message-ID: <Pine.3.85.9312030854.A21496-0100000@northshore.ecosoft.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



/****************************************************************************/
/*                                                                          */
/*          "Almost Truly Random Bits" - a proposed standard for            */
/*                                                                          */
/*              generating crypto-grade random seeds and keys               */
/*                                                                          */
/*                 using AT compatible hardware and MS-DOS                  */
/*                                                                          */
/*                                   by                                     */
/*                                                                          */
/*               Brian J. Harvey <bjh@northshore.ecosoft.com>               */
/*                                                                          */
/*                  Copyright (C) 1993, Tea Party Software                  */
/*                                                                          */
/*                                   ----                                   */
/*                                                                          */
/*       MD5 Message-Digest Copyright (C) 1991, RSA Data Security, Inc.     */
/*                                                                          */
/****************************************************************************/

/*
    ATRB is inspired by the as-yet-unimplemented hardware strategy that
    appears in PGP v2.3a. ATRB does not suggest a standard usage (API),
    but rather demonstrates a hardware-specific method for capturing
    keyboard latency intervals.

    This method requires an AT (all) or XT (some) BIOS that supports
    interrupt 15h, func 4Fh, keyboard intercept.  Note that this
    implementation traps key _releases_, not presses. This avoids
    needless problems and complexity.

    MS-DOS extentions are not standardized amongst C compilers, however,
    it should be relativly easy to adapt this Turbo C implementation for
    other compilers.

    Finally, a note concerning the MD5 Message-Digest...

    Ron Rivest, in Request for Comments 1321, says:

    "The MD5 algorithm has been carefully scrutinized for weaknesses. It
    is, however, a relatively new algorithm and further security analysis
    is of course justified, as is the case with any new proposal of this
    sort."

    With respect to this statement, I am concerned about the non-standard
    usage of the MD5 in PGP's randstir() function. (I'm not an expert, nor
    do I pretend to be.)

    Please direct questions, comments and job offers to the above address.

    "Yet is was for me - not you - I came to write this song."
                                                  
                                                 - Neil Peart
*/

#include <stdio.h>
#include <conio.h>
#include <dos.h>
#include <time.h>

#define PROTOTYPES 1
#include "global.h"
#include "md5.h"

#pragma options -r- -N-

/* Defines */

#define MES_VEC  0x15        /* Misc. Extended Services */
#define MES_FUNC  0x4F00     /* Keyboard Intercept (XT,AT only) */
#define SP_UP 0xB9           /* Spacebar release (scan code) */
#define ESC 27               /* Escape (ascii) */
#define MAX_RAW 20           /* Actual number of raw bytes to get */

#define TIMER0 0x40          /* Timer constants */
#define TIMERCTRL 0x43
#define LATCHTIMER 0


/* Prototypes */

void reset_kbd_trap(void);             /* Auto-cleanup */
#pragma exit reset_kbd_trap

void near futz(void);                  /* Wait for Timer ports to settle */
void interrupt new_kbd_trap(void);     /* This will latch the timer */


/* Globals */

void interrupt (*old_kbd_trap)(void);  /* Save the original vector */

MD5_CTX MD5context;                    /* defined in MD5.h */

time_t time_seed;                      /* record the time */

unsigned char raw_buffer[MAX_RAW];     /* collect the latency values */
unsigned char MD5digest[16];           /* Hash output */

int raw_index,MD5_index;               /* bookkeeping */


/* Functions */

void reset_kbd_trap(void){             /* Auto-cleanup */
  setvect(MES_VEC,*old_kbd_trap);
}

void near futz(void){}                 /* Wait for Timer ports to settle */

void interrupt new_kbd_trap(void){     /* This will latch the timer */
  unsigned int local_ax = _AX;         /* Better safe 'n sorry... */

  if(local_ax == MES_FUNC + SP_UP && raw_index < MAX_RAW){

    /* Latch and accumulate */

    outportb(TIMERCTRL,LATCHTIMER);
    futz();
    raw_buffer[raw_index++] = inportb(TIMER0) ^ inportb(TIMER0);

    cprintf("\b± ");                   /* Advance the pinwheel */
  }

  (*old_kbd_trap)();                   /* Give others a chance... */
}
             

void main(){
  unsigned int pindex = 0;

  char pinwheel[5] = "/-\\|";

  /* Set the "trap" */

  old_kbd_trap = *(void interrupt (* far *)(void))MK_FP(0,MES_VEC * 4);
  setvect(MES_VEC,new_kbd_trap);

  MD5_index = raw_index = 0;

  time(&time_seed);                     /* Start message digest w/time */
  MD5Init(&MD5context);
  MD5Update(&MD5context,(unsigned char *)&time_seed,sizeof(time_t));

  cprintf("\nATRB - \"Almost Truly Random Bits\"\r\n");
  cprintf("Copyright (C) 1993, Tea Party Software\r\n");

  cprintf("\nPlease press the SPACEBAR %d times (ESC aborts...)\r\n",MAX_RAW);
  cprintf("%.*s\r",MAX_RAW,"°°°°°°°°°°°°°°°°°°°°°°°°°°°°°°°°°°°°°°°°");

  while(MD5_index < MAX_RAW && (!kbhit() || getch() != ESC)){

    if(MD5_index < raw_index)
      MD5Update(&MD5context,raw_buffer + MD5_index++,1);

    if(raw_index < MAX_RAW){
      cprintf("\b%c",pinwheel[pindex++ % 4]);
      delay(50);
    }
  }

  while(kbhit())                       /* flush keyboard */
    getch();

  if(MD5_index == MAX_RAW){
    cprintf("\r%-*s\r\n\n",MAX_RAW,"Okay, thanks...");                     
    MD5Final(MD5digest,&MD5context);
    cputs("Timeseed, Raw bytes:\r\n");
    cprintf("%08lX  ",time_seed);
    for(pindex=0;pindex<MAX_RAW;pindex++)
      cprintf("%02X ",raw_buffer[pindex]);

    cputs("\r\n\nMessage Digest:\r\n");
    for(pindex=0;pindex<16;pindex++)
      cprintf("%02X ",MD5digest[pindex]);
    cputs("\r\n");
  }
  else
    cprintf("\r%-*s\r\nAborted!\r\n",MAX_RAW," ");
}





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: nobody@shell.portal.com
Date: Fri, 3 Dec 93 09:44:12 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: No Subject
Message-ID: <9312031743.AA08987@jobe.shell.portal.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


-----BEGIN PGP MESSAGE-----
Version: 2.3a

owGFVE2oG0Uc7yu26uIWvIkgjCn4Ku8jn29f8myxeckm2SS7+Xz5eBedzE6ym+zu
5M3OZrM59CBtURFKFUEPCkL1IHiwiodePHpTLIJCpVYPelcKaoU6m/cKxYsDC8v+
5/+b38d/57Vjbx8/sbJ+P0i/9fPfH92/96m4svLLmUeOXSV/Zu++HxHhxTsvPpr6
4uI3d16/2Xv8+0tPf8DyX/1z8pRzKnPttvDYxct/bZy7Pl25/M7v5mn3uVu3C99d
e9fdeKP61EvqjVSk8kO95yQ/viB9e+GFHxP36G+fP3v2ie7eJSl5ZadO5h+ef2//
lZvgy69v/XT9szf/OH7lxsu5X0/fvfrqM09+cvIsO+Ey3XSO8SUKVcxWXWDDCQYQ
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AGVVB5bJERkBBoYUBMSjwORVFwwJFQXLQxQyc4YBniMDOiMcUtAxmBLXNQcWBoMA
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kiiUZ9FZzxj0tg7i5Z6MqqOqlx+vZSvZTDwmkWgrro49mtO1dKVa3DXbWU0eDXqz
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xVN96JsxNp93D2qLtJQWBXWUWmt3D8oWw73dcUyuJ4xUnlVsv9SFlRiVG+MhDpTO
SEWDtLULM4motjeQJFTfRmalv89VKG2vPy/4eZMylOTX5NxH+q5vaa4cbcjVoKYW
dBpNxdZ6SBm2tmHDR6W8psxquRGSUDWvi0KtPC7X5TQc6zVENCURDKXONINyVStu
tbfj8b6XLLXTul+KoqzenctSf5Ecd9eM5rA1GeVwj//ObjJXasPeopceNWza0xNW
cWtWHA2jgb0fLavlpl7RO5nosFLvxvYbHTqY+Jq7kAeNUWs289f4TE/TW1WpwBKu
e04UzlG5Yh6N9X/ugqOh/hc=
=o/dm
-----END PGP MESSAGE-----
-----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----
Version: 2.3a

mQCNAiz/ZcgAAAEEALrXxRyAPE8zxrvRxtYXvyXTdKDVSRMEky1Tb9gpx2Mnrkqw
5P8F3CoZv2FSPDiIvU3g+yMDbBT1sgOOKR8wja/HhrDwY+R/ckvZcGNKSrDtXgGN
dheuOQsTxJUxAbVUN1DB87kC3sYyNGpD6bKUFm3vYJ+imoOP4ZPh+qb/+7ENAAUR
tCJIb2JlciBNYWxsb3csIFRyYWRlciB0byBDeWJlcnNwYWNl
=paYE
-----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "W. Kinney" <kinney@ucsu.Colorado.EDU>
Date: Fri, 3 Dec 93 08:54:06 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: HELP! Unnerving MacPGP Glitch!
Message-ID: <199312031653.AA02164@ucsu.Colorado.EDU>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----


Hmm. Seems the Curve Software public key I sent out has a "bad signature" 
attached... namely my personal PGP key, with which I signed the new key.

Here's what happened -- perhaps someone can explain why: I generated a new 
key for Curve Software, and signed it with my other key, while it was in my 
secret key ring (should be ok, right?). I then extracted the new key to an 
ascii file. When this new key and signature are added to my public keyring, 
it tells me that the signature is bad. I then select removal of the bad 
signature, and MacPGP gives me a dialog that says

"File pubring.$01 already exists. Overwrite? (y/n)"

If I select "yes", I get the dialog back over and over. If I select no, the 
dialog goes away and the Curve Encrypt key ends up in my public key ring, 
_with the signature still attached_. Now when I verify the signature of the 
key while it's on the ring, it is flagged as valid.

What the hell? It must have something to do with having signed a key on my 
secret ring, which was kind of a weird thing to do, I guess. And now I'm all 
worried that somehow I've compromised the security of one or both of these 
keys.

The second problem I have is how to correct the bad signature in all the 
copies of the Curve Software public key that are out there? Should I leave 
the bad sig in there and sign it again? Should I remove the bad sig and 
re-sign it? Should I just issue revocation certificates for everything and 
start over?

Seems like it ought to be all right to remove the bad sig, re-sign the key, 
and post the same key with the new signature to the list, signed with itself 
so that people who already have it in their pubring can verify its veracity. 
Still, this will be good fuel for paranoia -- "here's the public key for 
verifying this encryption software... OOPS! screwed it up, here's a NEW key!"

Advice appreciated. I don't want to release the code to the Beta testers 
until this security issue is resolved.


                                -- Will
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.3

iQCVAgUBLP8JZPfv4TpIg2PxAQGaIQP9GW5D5c695lys23opUDogxlIEvFuCDnKS
GK9F5zsAWSwcXLxvRg05Wr59+/xtLPAxWat+wsdg5hdVCXFMECPCALwgC75H0Vpw
2wql24ZobSwJFLY+AXDSxscMUwZwLr5j9PtN6GL/EUubRihH7JXs2tzsupvdlde8
j5p0J5ZvwhM=
=1aLJ
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Sameer <sameer@uclink.berkeley.edu>
Date: Fri, 3 Dec 93 10:59:10 PST
To: klbarrus@owlnet.rice.edu (Karl Lui Barrus)
Subject: Re: REMAIL: list 12/2/93
In-Reply-To: <9312022139.AA15442@arcadien.owlnet.rice.edu>
Message-ID: <m0p5fdd-000J6qC@infinity.hip.berkeley.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----


>  8: cs60a-qu@cory.eecs.berkeley.edu

	This remailer will be deactivated as of Dec. 20th.


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.3a

iQCVAgUBLP+LP3i7eNFdXppdAQHoDAQAoVgQI/DEX1Q6AP/D3N/y1nbWmP16vtVS
r5tUrYlVdeP6+7TG5DTbgbxzZqPx+V+Il/rPw0XDQw4jGG+pKf8Tr7S/4ozZi/wr
47hy/X4NUfW14S8K6tJa2O2aYS8nDzvwue3m5DHGapqEtdq7As03n5YDJjHTWcAs
wxhrgbFCAyE=
=d6Xa
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: baum@newton.apple.com (Allen J. Baum)
Date: Fri, 3 Dec 93 13:29:17 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Applied Crypto can be a menace to you anonymity?
Message-ID: <9312032126.AA15868@newton.apple.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>From: an4914@anon.penet.fi (Nitch)
>....I received my copy of _Applied Cryptography_
>with amazing speed.  I only ordered the thing this week,...)

If I were the NSA (or, rather, someone who cared about who was using
crypto in a way I might not approve of), I'd be keeping tabs on who
ordered this book!

**************************************************
* Allen J. Baum            tel. (408)974-3385    *
* Apple Computer, 20525 Mariani Ave,  MS 305-3B  *
* Cupertino, CA 95014      baum@apple.com        *      
**************************************************






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: frc%bwnmr4@harvard.harvard.edu (Fred Cooper)
Date: Fri, 3 Dec 93 10:39:08 PST
To: warlord@MIT.EDU (Derek Atkins)
Subject: Re: MIT Keyserver
In-Reply-To: <9312022042.AA09651@toxicwaste.media.mit.edu>
Message-ID: <9312031834.AA01074@bwnmr4.harvard.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----


- -----BEGIN OF PGP DECRYPTED TEXT-----
> I am sorry to announce that the PGP Keyserver at pgp.mit.edu
> (a.k.a. toxicwaste.mit.edu) has to be shut down.  The processes involved

> The keyserver will remain down for an indefinite period of time.
> Unfortunately there is nothing I can do at this time.  I'm sorry for
> the inconvenience this may cause.
> -derek
- -----END OF PGP DECRYPTED TEXT-----
OK this is the second keyserver to go down in a month.

Anyone want to tell us why?
Derek, I appreciate that you can't prevent it but a little more 
explanation of why would be much appreciated too.

FRC
- -- 
#include <hdrs/disclaim.std>    /* Neural N
ts catch only dreaming fish. */  


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.3a

iQCVAgUBLP+GfLbAlE4AqlTZAQHuIgQAnD6jkd8ZZjQvwe9XkfUZ7AYAeVCKI/CW
Abk3HJBK2o+uEeWv+D75iI8l8UmZn/0lMjwTqws5qllR3VE97CVQrvaEef+rXBn7
rBK+5Nm64siGW53eggETCfq9Y1tEvujegJRHmTId8VRVtJkCYgYTnr8BRjvl1Ssk
VYHgv9W1cu8=
=WdMI
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: frc%bwnmr4@harvard.harvard.edu (Fred Cooper)
Date: Fri, 3 Dec 93 10:59:07 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com (Cypherpunks)
Subject: ID hacking Pointer
Message-ID: <9312031857.AA01282@bwnmr4.harvard.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

For those who are interested, someone has started a thread on the 
Fringeware mailing list about spoofing and nyms....

The consensus (of 2 messages) is that the dreaded PSUEDOSPOOF is a bad 
thing...

Anyone know if LD is on the fringeware list?

FRC
- -- 
#include <hdrs/disclaim.std>    /* Neural Nets catch only dreaming fish. */  


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.3a

iQCVAgUBLP+MGrbAlE4AqlTZAQGUvAP/ZD9GitZBYQo6F32vrC9Skiu/1rrtY93Z
IP4br5fyctNKvwAeC4cpTla6DDokm6ixhUNLQjlKsIFb1blu8qWroUIyemTxhFxZ
YSuvlcIQJeR+29kRGhQN7EHps5l72lvEdScWAbAnuzA/teNxtS00P+v28YWp5aUh
A9SsnL/ooos=
=6RdN
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Date: Fri, 3 Dec 93 14:09:10 PST
To: baum@newton.apple.com (Allen J. Baum)
Subject: Re: Applied Crypto can be a menace to you anonymity?
In-Reply-To: <9312032126.AA15868@newton.apple.com>
Message-ID: <199312032204.OAA13509@mail.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Allen Baum writes:

> >From: an4914@anon.penet.fi (Nitch)
> >....I received my copy of _Applied Cryptography_
> >with amazing speed.  I only ordered the thing this week,...)
> 
> If I were the NSA (or, rather, someone who cared about who was using
> crypto in a way I might not approve of), I'd be keeping tabs on who
> ordered this book!

But did you hear that the NSA has installed trap-doors in Schneier's C
code to do the same thing? I heard this the same place I heard that
Paul Zimmermann is actually an agent of the Mossad and the
International Trilateralist Cabal.

--Tim May


-- 
..........................................................................
Timothy C. May         | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,  
tcmay@netcom.com       | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
408-688-5409           | knowledge, reputations, information markets, 
W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA  | black markets, collapse of governments.
Higher Power: 2^756839 | Public Key: PGP and MailSafe available.
Note: I put time and money into writing this posting. I hope you enjoy it.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: koontzd@lrcs.loral.com (David Koontz )
Date: Fri, 3 Dec 93 14:19:10 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re:  Applied Crypto can be a menace to you anonymity?
Message-ID: <9312032217.AA10983@io.lrcs.loral.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


So, buy a copy from Bruce, he mentioned something about ordering a 100
copies recently, I got one from him.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: sdw@meaddata.com (Stephen Williams)
Date: Fri, 3 Dec 93 11:39:07 PST
To: frc%bwnmr4@harvard.harvard.edu (Fred Cooper)
Subject: Re: MIT Keyserver
In-Reply-To: <9312031834.AA01074@bwnmr4.harvard.edu>
Message-ID: <9312031936.AA01241@jungle.meaddata.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


...
> > I am sorry to announce that the PGP Keyserver at pgp.mit.edu
> > (a.k.a. toxicwaste.mit.edu) has to be shut down.  The processes involved
> 
> > The keyserver will remain down for an indefinite period of time.
> > Unfortunately there is nothing I can do at this time.  I'm sorry for
> > the inconvenience this may cause.
> > -derek
> - -----END OF PGP DECRYPTED TEXT-----
> OK this is the second keyserver to go down in a month.
> 
> Anyone want to tell us why?
> Derek, I appreciate that you can't prevent it but a little more 
> explanation of why would be much appreciated too.

Yes, please.  Don't feel badly that you were coerced, I'm sure we
understand untenable positions.  But keeping the nature of the
coersion secret can only encourage it.

Of course, by the lack of a reason, we can only assume that whoever
'it' was, it was 'big' enough to either scare you or threaten you with
some action if you talked...

sdw
-- 
Stephen D. Williams  Local Internet Gateway Co.; SDW Systems 513 496-5223APager
LIG dev./sales       Internet: sdw@lig.net CIS 76244.210@compuserve.com
OO R&D Source Dist.  By Horse: 2464 Rosina Dr., Miamisburg, OH 45342-6430
GNU Support          ICBM: 39 34N 85 15W I love it when a plan comes together



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Stanton McCandlish <mech@eff.org>
Date: Fri, 3 Dec 93 11:59:07 PST
To: eff-talk@eff.org
Subject: This was sent to me from reliable sources but is UNAUTHENTICATED -- If you don't want to read abou it on the front page, don't put it in writing
Message-ID: <199312031955.OAA16986@eff.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Just passing this on.  It should be of interest.  It may have shown up
here already, but for those that missed it, take a look-see.


>Here's the full text of the memo from TCI Cable COO Barry Marshall to the
>troops:
>
>As we move into the regulatory environment, it's important to remember
>something vital ... Under regulation, we can't simply adjust our economics
>anymore. We have to take the revenue from the sources that we can, when we
>can. To that end I want to remind each of you that the transaction charges for
>upgrades, downgrades, customer-caused service calls, VCR hookups, etc. are
>vital new revenue sources to us. We estimate that by charging for these
>functions we can recover almost half of what we're losing from rate
>adjustments.
>
>We have to have discipline. Much like the install fee problem, we cannot be
>dissuaded from the charges simply because customers object. It will take a
>while but they'll get used to it...they pay it to other service providers all
>the time..and it isn't free with the phone company!
>
>Please hang in on this and installs, and we can still have a great fourth
>quarter when we have out heaviest volume. The best news of all is, we can
>blame it on reregulation and the government now. Let's take advantage of it!
>---------------------------------------------------------------------------
>
>My comment: there's nothing really outrageous here until you hit the last
>paragraph. They're allowed to set certain charges under the Act and FCC
>rules. Do you often not take a tax deduction you're entitled to under the IRS
>rules?
>
>But the tone anchored in the last graph is outrageous. Remember that New York
>Times rule, kids. If you don't want to read about it on the front page, don't
>put it in writing.

No guarantee is made as to the accuracy of this, of course.  If anyone has
any REAL information on where this came from originally, I'm all ears. 

-- 
Stanton  McCandlish  mech@eff.org  1:109/1103   EFF  Online  Activist & SysOp
O P E N  P L A T F O R M   C R Y P T O P O L I C Y   O N L I N E  R I G H T S
N  E  T  W  O  R  K  I  N  G      V  I  R  T  U  A  L     C  U  L  T  U  R  E
I   N   F  O :  M   E   M   B   E   R   S   H   I   P  @  E  F  F  .  O  R  G



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Matthew J Ghio <mg5n+@andrew.cmu.edu>
Date: Fri, 3 Dec 93 12:24:08 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Graynet
In-Reply-To: <199312030931.BAA00202@mail.netcom.com>
Message-ID: <AgztzAq00awF4DR197@andrew.cmu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


szabo@netcom.com (Nick Szabo) forwarded to us the following:

> Forwarded from comp.infosystems:
>
> Reply-To: an53728@anon.penet.fi
> Date: Tue, 30 Nov 1993 06:03:34 UTC
> Subject: Information
>
>      INFORMATIONAL REPORTS
>
> - How to trick pay phones into thinking you deposited money

Oh, wow, such info!  The old red box trick!  In fact, I'd be willing to
bet it doesn't even explain how to build a red box, it probably just
tells you something dumb like to call a pay phone and then have a friend
answer it and put in money while you record the tones.

Of course, it probably doesn't even mention how easy it is to make free
calls from COCOTs!

>
> - How to clone cellular phones

More like "how to use an EPROM burner".

>
> - How to make traffic lights turn green by remote control

Yup, just like the firemen do. 

>
> - How to build and use a bugging device

As if every amateur electronics book didn't explain this.

>
> - How to make your electric meter go backwards

Yeah, back up your electric meter by 1 unit and get charged for
999,999,999 kilowatthours. :)

>
> - How to get cable TV for free

As if we haven't seen this one before.

> 
> - How to create your own pirate TV or radio station

Oh, how informative!  As if any idiot couldn't get a book from his local
library that explains how to build a radio transmitter.  If anyone here
seriously doesn't know how to build a radio transmitter, may I direct
you to: cp-hardware@nextsrv.cas.muohio.edu

> $10 each, or all for $40.  For informational purposes only.
> Send self-addressed, stamped envelope.  Make checks or
> money orders out to Kardos.

If you would like to make a donation to ripoff-scams-of-america please
send money, along with credit card numbers and any other valuables to:

> Kardos
> P.O. Box 2310
> Darien, CT  06820
> USA




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: dmandl@lehman.com (David Mandl)
Date: Fri, 3 Dec 93 12:32:50 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: War on Keyservers
Message-ID: <9312032029.AA08065@disvnm2.lehman.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

I'm sure I'm missing something obvious here, but why are all
these keyservers being forced to shut down?  The possession of
PGP *keys* should be perfectly legal, no?  Or is the logic the
same as that used to close down drug paraphernalia shops: if
people are buying bongs, they must be smoking pot, and so we
can't allow it?

And exactly what grounds does PKP have for suing?  Is it because
the servers themselves are using PGP, rather than just storing
keys?  What if a server is using a legal (ViaCrypt) copy of PGP?
(Problem: this argument can only be used for DOS boxes currently.)

   --Dave.


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.2

iQCVAgUBLP+fvsfNklulBrsJAQGTCQP8DFF77E7zpB6nOzAwcLNbEgezVjt/yQTg
DEtdmeY+hO9rcOUJoXwWMPbai2EhBHiyriAMYD5kcHrsbdiS99PW5A5kh4htaFDr
Zrrkmn7KK0LXNL0fo2aJZVLKpiy9FxcJPmQvasTqe6EVltxbi4coTNR1wUoD5FE8
0sGj9AsGr+s=
=2tQH
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Jim choate <ravage@wixer.bga.com>
Date: Fri, 3 Dec 93 14:02:50 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: NSA, PGP, Cracking Keys, Recent Arrests...
Message-ID: <9312032147.AA25461@wixer>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


On the topic of the deduction that the NSA can now crack PGP because of an
arrest is probably faulse. It is much more likely that they were informed on
by family or a direct member of the organization. There is no way that any
crypto system can prevent defection or protect against it.





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: cman@caffeine.io.com (Douglas Barnes)
Date: Fri, 3 Dec 93 14:12:50 PST
To: frc%bwnmr4@harvard.harvard.edu (Fred Cooper)
Subject: Re: MIT Keyserver
In-Reply-To: <9312031834.AA01074@bwnmr4.harvard.edu>
Message-ID: <199312032157.PAA08568@caffeine.caffeine.io.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Now that there is a legal version of PGP, I see no reason why 
we couldn't set up a keyserver here at IO. If someone wants to
do this, has the software, and has multiple clues to rub
together (ideally someone with experience in managing a keyserver)
they should contact me.

-- 
----------------                                             /\ 
Douglas Barnes            cman@illuminati.io.com            /  \ 
Chief Wizard         (512) 447-8950 (d), 447-7866 (v)      / () \
Illuminati Online          metaverse.io.com 7777          /______\



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: James Still <still@kailua.colorado.edu>
Date: Fri, 3 Dec 93 15:29:10 PST
To: 'Cypherpunks List' <cypherpunks@toad.com>
Subject: Will Mike Ingle's name be a household word like "Buttafuoco"?
Message-ID: <2CFFD8E1@kailua.colorado.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Mike Ingle comments on his recently released "Secure
Drive" program:

>What's the BBS? If you want to, put up a notice or something.
[...]
>encrypt the BBS itself, and set up a relay to power it down
>if an alarm in your house goes off. Then you are raid-proof.

In case someone isn't familiar with Mike's excellent program,
it does for hard drives, what PGP does for messages.  With
Secure Drive (ver 1.0) you can set up a partition on your hard
drive encrypt it (SecDrv uses the IDEA cipher for data and RSA
for your pass phrase just like PGP) and access the encrypted
drive from a TSR in your C drive.

In my opinion, this is the best example yet since PGP of
"cypherpunks writing code" because of the implications that
this program has on privacy.  (I'm using it to keep a personal
space for my tax records, private correspondence, PGP dir, etc.),
but Mike's suggestion for encrypting an entire BBS itself
is a good point.  What if *every* sysop encrypted their BBS
with Secure Drive?

His program is DOS freeware and available on the Hieroglyphic
Voodoo Machine BBS at +1.303.443.2457 (V.32bis) as SECDRV10.ZIP.

It is also available on soda.berkeley.edu I'm sure although I
haven't looked there myself.

This e-mail is also a shameless tag line promo!

Know that it is I who waste that precious thing called *bandwidth*!

+---------+--------------------------------------------------------------+
          |   The zine for the inzane and [sic]:
          |
still@    |        popE x Mass = Accelerated_J e   s    u      s
kailua.   |
colorado. |  An intelligent e-zine that investigates the cultural and
edu       |  ethical issues that we who dwell in cyberspace confront...
          |  E-mail me *now* to subscribe, submit, comment, or ping test!

PGP Public Key = 4E4937 = AD 29 BE 28 5D 2B 77 BE  F6 85 08 45 B6 2D 0B 36
+------------------------------------------------------------------------+




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: 155yegan%jove.dnet.measurex.com@juno.measurex.com (egan_t@measurex.com)
Date: Fri, 3 Dec 93 16:49:15 PST
To: "%JUNO.dnet.measurex.com@juno.measurex.com
Subject: Re: cryptanalysis for radio communications
Message-ID: <9312040046.AA11260@juno.measurex.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Someboy wrote:

>	I was wondering if any cryptanalysis packages existed which
>could help in decrypted information picked up with a scanner. It seems
>that a bunch of people trying to defend their home from the feds were
>listening in on the feds radio communications, but now they're
>encrypting stuff. It's probably not very strong crypto, maybe just a
>simple XOR.
>
>	(So I hear.. a friend asked me to help him, 'cause he's the
>one helping these folk in Nevada.)
>
>Thanks.

	What folks? Is someone in Nevada defending their house from the Feds?
Got any more details?

Thanks
Terry Egan ( egan_t@measurex.com )




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: rustman@netcom.com (Rusty H. Hodge)
Date: Fri, 3 Dec 93 16:49:19 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: cryptanalysis for radio communications
In-Reply-To: <199312031116.DAA24889@mail.netcom.com>
Message-ID: <199312040049.QAA01411@mail.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


sameer@uclink.berkeley.edu says...
> 	I was wondering if any cryptanalysis packages existed which
> could help in decrypted information picked up with a scanner. It seems
> that a bunch of people trying to defend their home from the feds were
> listening in on the feds radio communications, but now they're
> encrypting stuff. It's probably not very strong crypto, maybe just a
> simple XOR.

Actually, Morotola makes some nice DES encryption systems for radio
communications.  Listening to these on a normal scanner, you will hear the
squelch open and a burst of white-noise like sound.  This is the DES
encryption that the feds use.

There are simple frequency inversion systems that are in use by some
agencies, mostly local if any, but there are $25 kits to decode this.

To break the Motorola system, it would not be an easy undertaking.  You
would have to demodulate the digital data stream, figure out the word
sync, and then start analysing.  That assumes that there is no compression
going on!

Maybe you could modify some of the circuits out ther for decoding the cellular
control channel data stream, although that is much slower than this.

-- 
Rusty H. Hodge, Cyberneticist, Futurist   <rustman@netcom.com> 



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: peb@PROCASE.COM (Paul Baclace)
Date: Fri, 3 Dec 93 17:29:12 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Quantum Crypto lecture at MIT
Message-ID: <9312040128.AA21038@ada.procase.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Now for the ultimate secure communications...warm up your interferometer.

Paul E. Baclace
peb@procase.com

----- Begin Included Message -----




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "W. Kinney" <kinney@ucsu.Colorado.EDU>
Date: Fri, 3 Dec 93 17:22:54 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Good Curve Software Key
Message-ID: <199312040120.AA28820@ucsu.Colorado.EDU>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----



OK. Here's the de-glitched public key for Curve Software. It's properly
signed with my usual key (available via finger). It'll be on a key server
soon, hopefully with additional signatures, but I haven't gotten to it
yet. Sorry for wasting the bandwidth, but I wanted to get it redistributed
immediately...
 
Additional note:
I've received a few messages from anon users, ranging from very polite to 
major-league sleazy. So as a blanket response, let me make this very clear: 
I _will not_ mail Curve Encrypt to addresses outside the U.S. or to anon 
id's. I just don't have enough money to pay for the lawyers. Sorry.

The rest of you will be receiving it soon.


                                -- Will



-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.3

iQCVAgUBLP9WDMJkEfxTVMrJAQGl2QP/TbLzZQBFM8VO2LdLCbmvb1HmiT2xCzsj
xrCHph9dH3iLyUZ+2isvXU+ZmvMza1Pm9tUcUASPtCZ0sVY91vCnCEGEE8kMldM5
RNYl0yzJWnowfTfWK6bSdQgdABqhwaTQUmbz0uhqjMBAybdXScwizoqZ5Xeiw81B
G1p688IECKQ=
=METk
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----



-----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----
Version: 2.3

mQCPAiz+bEEAAAEEAMUbtdwYC1vY+s5559ERIvC1MT+Yaw3ozheaHcUciJe7cSAk
k9TpAQd7iKukKnQe5kK1YtvYm0JP6fmNrcO8AmG5ukvcOlyuri618sjpXncpQ1cL
5xeV80f3JtmheGMnqAzTK8OyfJ7zRh1PhAZcT/vVzf+JGuCuVcJkEfxTVMrJABEB
AAG0K0N1cnZlIFNvZnR3YXJlIDxraW5uZXlAYm9nYXJ0LmNvbG9yYWRvLmVkdT6J
AJUCBRAs/wK89+/hOkiDY/EBAeN5A/0fFX5On4Zxc/guNdDb+nHZcd6TwJxUb9ST
TlsJX4BAKAcf0xG4DY0L+9DN0N6w6FOR3RuZIAUx25xS9yRBSMLe1gOw6qI9C/lt
Ovh7ycoKCkOBqoe6oisRzREhIr3U+FQXRIu7Qhn5ETEljRjWvQ6fheohrLhSGVsf
pBaKtb2fVw==
=LCyY
-----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: peb@PROCASE.COM (Paul Baclace)
Date: Fri, 3 Dec 93 18:22:55 PST
To: tcmay@netcom.com
Subject: Re: Entropy, Randomness, etc.
Message-ID: <9312040220.AA21061@ada.procase.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



> Like the "pi" example Scott Collins used.

My example, actually.  But of course Scott Collins and I are actually
subtentacles of the grand pseudo spoofer. 

Serious though, if anyone in the Bay Area spots: 

	Ming Li and Paul Vitanyi, "An Introduction to Kolmogorov Complexity
	and Its Applications," Springer-Verlag, 1993.

around here, please send me mail.  I've been looking and neither Computer
Literacy nor the Stanford Bookstore have it (sold out their stock quick).


Paul E. Baclace
peb@procase.com





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: cman@caffeine.io.com (Douglas Barnes)
Date: Fri, 3 Dec 93 17:32:54 PST
To: unicorn@access.digex.net (Black Unicorn)
Subject: Re: ID hacking Pointer
In-Reply-To: <199312040106.AA00808@access.digex.net>
Message-ID: <199312040116.TAA08915@caffeine.caffeine.io.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> 
> ->
> For those who are interested, someone has started a thread on the
> Fringeware mailing list about spoofing and nyms....
> 
> The consensus (of 2 messages) is that the dreaded PSUEDOSPOOF is a bad
> thing...
> 
> Anyone know if LD is on the fringeware list?
> <-
> 
> he is now.
> 

Oh god. Time to warn Jon and Paco. Sigh.

-- 
----------------                                             /\ 
Douglas Barnes            cman@illuminati.io.com            /  \ 
Chief Wizard         (512) 447-8950 (d), 447-7866 (v)      / () \
Illuminati Online          metaverse.io.com 7777          /______\



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: sameer@uclink.berkeley.edu
Date: Fri, 3 Dec 93 19:19:14 PST
To: 155yegan%jove.dnet.measurex.com@juno.measurex.com
Subject: Re: cryptanalysis for radio communications
In-Reply-To: <9312040046.AA11260@juno.measurex.com>
Message-ID: <199312040317.TAA23278@mail.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


egan_t@measurex.com said:
> 
> 	What folks? Is someone in Nevada defending their house from the Feds?
> Got any more details?
> 

	They're a bunch of native American folk who want to get back
much of the land promised to them in treaties, etc.

	I'll forward your request to my friend, and he might post some
more details.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: szabo@netcom.com (Nick Szabo)
Date: Fri, 3 Dec 93 19:22:54 PST
To: mg5n+@andrew.cmu.edu (Matthew J Ghio)
Subject: Re: Graynet
In-Reply-To: <AgztzAq00awF4DR197@andrew.cmu.edu>
Message-ID: <199312040322.TAA23962@mail.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Matt Ghio writes: 
> Oh, wow, such info!  

That's why I called it "Graynet" instead of "Blacknet"... not
exactly Stealth bomber plans or protected witness True Names
for sale here.  The interesting part is how (s)he structured the 
advertising (anon ID server) and payment (check or money order 
by P.O. Box).  All sorts of controversial services (porn, gambling,
mail order contraband, etc.) might be structured this way, as long as they 
are legal or at least widely tolerated in the jurisdiction of the 
mail drop.  

I wonder how many folks will trust new anon services.  If they 
don't, is it easy to go from a traceable business to an anon 
business, taking the business's reputation with it?   If so, 
we may see controversial net-based services such as pirate software 
and porn BBS's "activate the cloaking device" upon being threatened, or
when desiring to advertise blatantly and in volume on the Internet.

Nick Szabo				szabo@netcom.com




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: poc@im.lcs.mit.edu (Physics of Computation Seminar)
Date: Fri, 3 Dec 93 19:24:49 EST
To: snac-ext@think.com
Subject: "Modern Optics & Spectroscopy Seminar" of special interest.
Message-ID: <729038372d8660ac32cfb933cc3757ac@NO-ID-FOUND.mhonarc.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



	The upcoming Modern Optics and Spectroscopy Seminar
	on December 7 is of special interest to the Physics of
	Computation community:

			Tuesday, 7 December 1993
			11:00 -- 12:00 AM
			Room 37-252 (Marlar Lounge)

	"Towards Perfect Ciphers --- Quantum Cryptography."

			Artur K. Ekert
			Oxford University

Cryptography has, for a long period of time, been regarded as a part
of mathematics, with computational difficulty as a safeguard of
information. Unfortunately, faster computers and better algorithms
have step by step cracked the protection barriers of even the most
sophisticated codes. The quest for unbreakable ciphers had to venture
outside mathematics, and surprisingly, towards quantum physics [1].

I will discuss the overlap between different theoretical and
experimental techniques developed independently by research groups
working in secure communication and quantum physics. In particular I
will present a method in which the security of the so-called key
distribution and also the key storing processes in cryptography relies
on quantum correlations [2]. The proposed scheme is based on Bohm's
well-known version of the Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen gedankenexperiment
and has been currently implemented using the Mach-Zehnder
interferometer [3].

REFERENCES

[1] For a simple introduction to quantum cryptography see
    BENNET_CH, BRASSARD_G, EKERT_AK  "Quantum Cryptography"
    SCIENTIFIC AMERICAN 1992 OCTOBER PP.50-59;
    EKERT_AK  "Quantum Keys for Keeping Secrets"
    NEW SCIENTIST 16 JANUARY 1993 PP.24-28.

[2] EKERT_AK  "Quantum Cryptography Based on Bell's Theorem"
    PHYSICAL REVIEW LETTERS 1992 VOL.67 PP.661-663.

[3] EKERT_AK, RARITY_JG, TAPSTER_PR, PALMA_GM
    "Practical Quantum Cryptography Based on 2-Photon Interferometry"
    PHYSICAL REVIEW LETTERS 1992 VOL.69 NO.9 PP.1293-1295.



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu (L. Detweiler)
Date: Fri, 3 Dec 93 19:33:02 -0700
Subject: No Subject
Message-ID: <9312040233.AA16508@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Hi!





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: nobody@shell.portal.com
Date: Fri, 3 Dec 93 19:39:13 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: No Subject
Message-ID: <9312040336.AA10775@jobe.shell.portal.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


   I'm sure I'm missing something obvious here, but why are all
   these keyservers being forced to shut down?

isn't it obvious?  it's almost certainly a combination of spineless
academic administrators, and secret lawyers letters from pkp.

i'm just surprised that nobody has scanned/typed in and published the
letters from the bullies.





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Brian A. LaMacchia <bal@martigny.ai.mit.edu>
Date: Fri, 3 Dec 93 16:49:12 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: New public keyserver at martigny.ai.mit.edu
Message-ID: <9312040048.AA01123@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


A new public keyserver is now available.  

Send mail with "help" in the subject line to:

	public-key-server@martigny.ai.mit.edu

The server support mail access only, not FTP access.

Questions concerning this keyserver should be addressed to:

	public-key-server-request@martigny.ai.mit.edu

Requests to automatically synchronize this keyserver with other
keyservers should be sent to the above address.

				--Brian LaMacchia
				  bal@zurich.ai.mit.edu
				  bal@mit.edu




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Black Unicorn <unicorn@access.digex.net>
Date: Fri, 3 Dec 93 17:09:12 PST
To: frc%bwnmr4@harvard.harvard.edu
Subject: Re:  ID hacking Pointer
Message-ID: <199312040106.AA00808@access.digex.net>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


->
For those who are interested, someone has started a thread on the
Fringeware mailing list about spoofing and nyms....

The consensus (of 2 messages) is that the dreaded PSUEDOSPOOF is a bad
thing...

Anyone know if LD is on the fringeware list?
<-

he is now.

-uni- (Dark)





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: an4914@anon.penet.fi (Nitch)
Date: Fri, 3 Dec 93 13:02:50 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Where's the Pool?
Message-ID: <9312032100.AA19746@anon.penet.fi>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

Pardon my ignorance, but I'm new to all this...

Where do I find (and how do I use) e-mail "pools"?

As I understand it, they're supposed to help foil traffic analysis...
right?

(Incidentally, I received my copy of _Applied Cryptography_
 with amazing speed.  I only ordered the thing this week, and
 here it is!  Now I've only to find the time to read it...)

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.3a

iQCVAgUBLP+G+uyu9liBvjrdAQFVOQP/ZAuVO/2A2A9nijQCv753CL1qPg9ex/Xv
MqNSRXOgow9dGRTf6/r97pKeHqJ3LMImIUb/6GzqJ3QbXdgVbTc4W5NTOd5ajoFc
Gi6bVPXQabLV6Y8+JpIcqu1SNmihCM401XdmSWIka1uXDF5F8bJaebXHgzXZ3UvP
APcpX8pQcO8=
=AVfS
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
To find out more about the anon service, send mail to help@anon.penet.fi.
Due to the double-blind, any mail replies to this message will be anonymized,
and an anonymous id will be allocated automatically. You have been warned.
Please report any problems, inappropriate use etc. to admin@anon.penet.fi.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: nobody@shell.portal.com
Date: Fri, 3 Dec 93 22:09:15 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Retransmission in clear
Message-ID: <9312040609.AA16075@jobe.shell.portal.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


-----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----
Version: 2.3a

mQCNAiz/ZcgAAAEEALrXxRyAPE8zxrvRxtYXvyXTdKDVSRMEky1Tb9gpx2Mnrkqw
5P8F3CoZv2FSPDiIvU3g+yMDbBT1sgOOKR8wja/HhrDwY+R/ckvZcGNKSrDtXgGN
dheuOQsTxJUxAbVUN1DB87kC3sYyNGpD6bKUFm3vYJ+imoOP4ZPh+qb/+7ENAAUR
tCJIb2JlciBNYWxsb3csIFRyYWRlciB0byBDeWJlcnNwYWNl
=paYE
-----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----


Let's make a deal, "CypherPunk Criminal"...

Actually, let's 'construct' a deal.  I'd like to hear your ideas for
lucrative exchanges made possible by this sort of anonymity.  I am
particularly interested in markets which have some amount of public
sympathy, but may be embarassing or illegal for some participants.

Nothing drastic to start with, but it could be interesting...


Hober Mallow, Trader to Cyberspace
- --
To reach me, e-mail "To: catalyst@netcom.com" and include the
following lines ("::" through "END PGP MESSAGE", inclusive) as
the FIRST lines in your response.  This will route it through
a series of remailers using nested, encrypted forwarding.  You
would be wise to protect your own identity in like manner.
- ------cut here------------cut here------------cut here------
::
Encrypted: PGP

- -----BEGIN PGP MESSAGE-----
Version: 2.3a
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=rEKi
- -----END PGP MESSAGE-----

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.3a

iQCVAgUBLP95OJPh+qb/+7ENAQHiKAQAkW/4QfWeIg1hhOA/BzS2hM/gitJYCdeF
GqF0RMf8Bg5uDjmk3goIhIb5LT2ycAGGmPJpI3Mm295G1KSZcy2MTBhfTbo0IkvY
UFhuM6p+NtF+O9wy+3LntCE8DFdVhTYzjzpQb3ilQJ1agtIgv87b37KzkvMCj7pg
Q+Yj9ZGIHRE=
=noLd
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Mike Ingle <MIKEINGLE@delphi.com>
Date: Fri, 3 Dec 93 21:39:15 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Blind signature/Chaum cash info
Message-ID: <01H629EU7OR693C91Z@delphi.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Where's a good ftp site for papers on blind signature methods
(RSA-compatible) and Chaum-type digicash? Is there an online
digicash with strong anonymity? Where to ftp info on it?

Are the patentholders of LUC and other public-key systems any more
reasonable about noncommercial use than RSA? Interesting to note
that RSA let the writers of HPACK modify RSAREF to use MDC
encryption, even though HPACK uses PGP keys as well as RIPEM.
Seems Bidzos is just vindictive, not to mention scared to death,
by PGP. After all, his lousy company exists because of one patent
which is on shaky legal ground, other algorithm patents having
been shot down. So far, they've managed to keep their licensing
fees below the cost to sue them and avoid a lawsuit by blustering.
PGP was a challenge they didn't know how to respond to, especially since 
suing a privacy activist for a nonprofit political statement is not
exactly a good test case for a patent. What damages could they claim?

--- MikeIngle@delphi.com




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Mike Ingle <MIKEINGLE@delphi.com>
Date: Fri, 3 Dec 93 21:39:18 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Will I be on a wanted poster?
Message-ID: <01H629F3YE5K93C91Z@delphi.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>drive encrypt it (SecDrv uses the IDEA cipher for data and RSA
*** No, it does not use RSA! Don't spread this rumor,       ^^^
*** I don't need Bidzos on my ass. It uses MD5, which is
*** allowed for non-commercial use.

>for your pass phrase just like PGP) and access the encrypted
>drive from a TSR in your C drive.

>In my opinion, this is the best example yet since PGP of
>"cypherpunks writing code" because of the implications that
>this program has on privacy.  (I'm using it to keep a personal
>space for my tax records, private correspondence, PGP dir, etc.),
>but Mike's suggestion for encrypting an entire BBS itself
>is a good point.  What if *every* sysop encrypted their BBS
>with Secure Drive?

No more Steve Jackson Games cases. I hope this happens.
Computer theft and unreasonable seizure is a real problem.

>It is also available on soda.berkeley.edu I'm sure although I
>haven't looked there myself.

Nope, at least I didn't put it there. Export problems.

Not like Buttafuoco, I hope.
Remember, he's in the cooler or soon will be.

--- MikeIngle@delphi.com

There's no government like *no* government.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "L. Detweiler" <ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Date: Fri, 3 Dec 93 23:49:15 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Cypherpunks Wired Photographer
Message-ID: <9312040747.AA20701@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I was talking to K.Kelly of Wired and rather surprisingly he can't
remember the name of the photographer who shot the Cypherpunks pictures
(e.g. the same one used in NYT). Does anyone know who this person is?
Please send me email.

tx.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "L. Detweiler" <ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Date: Sat, 4 Dec 93 02:09:19 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Cryptoanarchist Alert
Message-ID: <9312041007.AA22416@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I would appreciate that whoever at Sun is goofing around would cut it out.

===cut=here===




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Mike Ingle <MIKEINGLE@delphi.com>
Date: Sat, 4 Dec 93 00:39:17 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: FORGED POSTING
Message-ID: <01H62FP1QFIQ93CI34@delphi.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


"an4914@anon.penet.fi" wrote:

The following message gave an error when I checked its signature!
>
>-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
>Version: 2.2
>

The clearsig in 2.2 doesn't work right. This has been fixed in 2.3a,
so your sig should be ok.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Black Unicorn <unicorn@access.digex.net>
Date: Sat, 4 Dec 93 01:22:56 PST
To: unicorn@access.digex.net
Subject: Re: ID hacking Pointer
Message-ID: <199312040921.AA20969@access.digex.net>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> Anyone know if LD is on the fringeware list?
> <-
>
> he is now.
>
 
Oh god. Time to warn Jon and Paco. Sigh.
 
--
----------------                                             /\
Douglas Barnes            cman@illuminati.io.com            /  \
Chief Wizard         (512) 447-8950 (d), 447-7866 (v)      / () \
Illuminati Online          metaverse.io.com 7777          /______\


+++

Er,

Actually my (apparently not so) humorous comment was intended to
reflect the fact that by asking if LD was on the fringeware list,
you have summoned him to the fringeware list.

Speak not his name less thy summon him.

Sorry for the confusion and the associated bandwidth.
:(

-uni- (Dark)





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Black Unicorn <unicorn@access.digex.net>
Date: Sat, 4 Dec 93 01:42:58 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Law student on cypherpunks list....
Message-ID: <199312040939.AA28458@access.digex.net>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



I guess I'm just THE bandwidth waster this morning.

Sorry guys.

A law student lurker had sent me mail asking for advice.

Whoever you are, I lost your message.  Entirely my fault.

I meant to get back to you... sorry.  Resend?

-uni- (Dark)




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: hughes@ah.com (Eric Hughes)
Date: Sat, 4 Dec 93 07:53:05 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: IGNORE: useless drivel
In-Reply-To: <9312041519.AA16672@anon.penet.fi>
Message-ID: <9312041542.AA04428@ah.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


12070 writes:

>That which does not destroy evil makes it grow stronger! 

This sentence wins an Eric Hughes "Most complete misquoting of
Nietzsche in 1993" award.

Eric




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: an4914@anon.penet.fi (Nitch)
Date: Fri, 3 Dec 93 23:44:15 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: FORGED POSTING
Message-ID: <9312040743.AA16610@anon.penet.fi>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

The following message gave an error when I checked its signature!

Chalk up another reason we should all be using the ASCII Armor option...

Could someone check *my* sig and see if it's working?

>-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
>
>I'm sure I'm missing something obvious here, but why are all
>these keyservers being forced to shut down?  The possession of
>PGP *keys* should be perfectly legal, no?  Or is the logic the
>same as that used to close down drug paraphernalia shops: if
>people are buying bongs, they must be smoking pot, and so we
>can't allow it?
>
>And exactly what grounds does PKP have for suing?  Is it because
>the servers themselves are using PGP, rather than just storing
>keys?  What if a server is using a legal (ViaCrypt) copy of PGP?
>(Problem: this argument can only be used for DOS boxes currently.)
>
>   --Dave.
>
>
>-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
>Version: 2.2
>
>iQCVAgUBLP+fvsfNklulBrsJAQGTCQP8DFF77E7zpB6nOzAwcLNbEgezVjt/yQTg
>DEtdmeY+hO9rcOUJoXwWMPbai2EhBHiyriAMYD5kcHrsbdiS99PW5A5kh4htaFDr
>Zrrkmn7KK0LXNL0fo2aJZVLKpiy9FxcJPmQvasTqe6EVltxbi4coTNR1wUoD5FE8
>0sGj9AsGr+s=
>=2tQH
>-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.3a

iQCVAgUBLP+tJOyu9liBvjrdAQFClAQAsWulTDSCG6bE8tAa7YqcMpUvITEesB84
tRzNWHGcBxLRlsteaTj0V/n+N7Bs/jf0MhspPPdO/IpIuDa2IpEi43FLYFaCuBSa
dnq6Sgn588kPvk0ATwpkGAapViIZBlA2c0TlSsQHgaH5tVd5RRqyZSrq1miEyBFH
b0FhJ05hr7k=
=7hn1
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
To find out more about the anon service, send mail to help@anon.penet.fi.
Due to the double-blind, any mail replies to this message will be anonymized,
and an anonymous id will be allocated automatically. You have been warned.
Please report any problems, inappropriate use etc. to admin@anon.penet.fi.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: an53004@anon.penet.fi
Date: Sat, 4 Dec 93 00:29:18 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Applied Crypto can be a menace to you anonymity?
Message-ID: <9312040825.AA21855@anon.penet.fi>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


On Dec 3, 14:04, Timothy C. May wrote:
> But did you hear that the NSA has installed trap-doors in Schneier's C
> code to do the same thing? I heard this the same place I heard that
> Paul Zimmermann is actually an agent of the Mossad and the
> International Trilateralist Cabal.

Actually, they installed a viral implant in Paul Zimmerman's brain. 
He doesn't think that he's working for them, but he is. Ha, he 
thinks that he's a free man, but really he has these lapses and 
sabotages his own code and reputation. 
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From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Michael E. Marotta" <MERCURY@lcc.edu>
Date: Sat, 4 Dec 93 07:03:03 PST
To: mech@eff.org
Subject: Say No to "Glue."
Message-ID: <14C4097DA0603D68@sleepy.egr.msu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


to: mech@eff.org
 
I found your memo from the cable company very interesting. And 
very familiar.  In the 1970s, I had a career in transportation 
management.  (Certificates, licenses, a couple of jobs.  I spent 
two years learning to read and understand ICC tariffs.)  Inter-
state transportation went under federal control in 1887.  In 
fact, they nationalized the railroads during WWI -- they also 
seized all RADIOS (transmitters and also receivers) at this time.  
They created the Railway Express Agency (REA) in 1920 from the 
freight forwarding companies they nationalized, as I believe, 
they created the Radio Corporation of America (RCA) at the same 
time.  
 
Anyway, in the trucking business, it was standard operating 
policy to screw the customers by pointing to "federal regulations 
that require us to do this."  Of course, those regs came from the 
close interactions between the industry and government.  Some of 
them were just typical company policies.  But you couldn't go to 
another company with different policies.  They were all the same.
By law.
 
Now, anyone who swamps about in libertarian political writing 
will tell you that this is to be EXPECTED.  If you talk to 
someone who likes to read Ayn Rand, they will tell you that this 
is REQUIRED by the Laws of Nature.  Banking, healthcare, farming, 
housing (and urban development), post office, you name it.  These 
are NOT isolated events.  
 
The reason that so many cypherpunks don't buy EFF's theory of 
"government providing the glue of the Net" is that they 
understand PRINCIPLES.  Government, like gravity, is what it is.
 
When the chimp leader or his lieutenants break up a fight, they 
beat both combatants.  They seek to control conflict to maintain 
the tribe.  The nature of the conflict the "right" and "wrong" 
are irrelevant.  Anaxagoras was tried for impiety.  Socrates was 
exiled.  (He chose death.) Galileo, Scopes, the NIH cancer 
quacks, the list is very well known.  They started with lead 
coins washed in silver and came up with federal reserve notes.  
From Nero's gladiators and the Christians to Janet Reno's ATF and  
the Branch Davidians.  These are all elements of the same set.  
No matter what the "good intentions" the road leads to the same 
place.
 
You let the government provide "the glue" and five years from now 
even The Well will be using regulations to screw customers. 
 
Don't blame the cable company for seizing an opportunity.  You 
created the environment they are living in.  In that company 
there are honest techies who love bandwidths and frequecies.  You 
put them in second place behind the scamster who uses regulations 
to screw clients for quarterly results.  Blame yourself for the 
fruits of your socialism. 
 
When Cobert called togther France's merchants to find out how the 
government could help them, one said, "Laissez nous faire!" 
 




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Arthur Chandler <arthurc@crl.com>
Date: Sat, 4 Dec 93 10:23:04 PST
To: Eric Hughes <hughes@ah.com>
Subject: Since we're on the subject of Nietzsche...
In-Reply-To: <9312041542.AA04428@ah.com>
Message-ID: <Pine.3.87.9312041008.A11733-0100000@crl.crl.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



  I've had occasion to recall this quote several times as I've read some 
of the menacing and/or obscure posts here:

   "They muddy their waters that they may seem deep."

   Do some folks confuse cryptic and encryption?  :<)







From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: hughes@ah.com (Eric Hughes)
Date: Sat, 4 Dec 93 10:33:05 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Since we're on the subject of Nietzsche...
In-Reply-To: <Pine.3.87.9312041008.A11733-0100000@crl.crl.com>
Message-ID: <9312041821.AA00356@ah.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>   "They muddy their waters that they may seem deep."

>   Do some folks confuse cryptic and encryption?  :<)

"It is not when truth is dirty, but when it is shallow, that the lover
of knowledge is reluctant to step into its waters."

Eric




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Perry E. Metzger" <pmetzger@lehman.com>
Date: Sat, 4 Dec 93 08:19:27 PST
To: James Still <still@kailua.colorado.edu>
Subject: Re: Will Mike Ingle's name be a household word like "Buttafuoco"?
In-Reply-To: <2CFFD8E1@kailua.colorado.edu>
Message-ID: <199312041615.LAA28897@snark.ts.lehman.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



James Still says:
> In case someone isn't familiar with Mike's excellent program,
> it does for hard drives, what PGP does for messages.  With
> Secure Drive (ver 1.0) you can set up a partition on your hard
> drive encrypt it (SecDrv uses the IDEA cipher for data and RSA
> for your pass phrase just like PGP) and access the encrypted
> drive from a TSR in your C drive.
> 
> In my opinion, this is the best example yet since PGP of
> "cypherpunks writing code" because of the implications that
> this program has on privacy.

There is also cypherpunk Matt Blaze's "CFS" filesystem for unix
machines, which is very powerful but unfortunately unreleased to the
public, and "KFS", which is a similar file system that unfortunately
currently lacks some of the cryptographic security (and has some bad
bugs) but which will doubtless be up to speed soon.

Perry




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Perry E. Metzger" <pmetzger@lehman.com>
Date: Sat, 4 Dec 93 08:33:02 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: an12070@anon.penet.fi
In-Reply-To: <9312041519.AA16672@anon.penet.fi>
Message-ID: <199312041631.LAA28935@snark.ts.lehman.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Pablo Escobar says:
[...]
> puts the life of everyone in the group at deadly dangerous risk. He
> said something very bizarre to me, `so Lance, just HOW ARE YOU FEELING
                                         ^^^^^
> TODAY?' The strange tone was entirely uncharacteristic of him, and I

Oops.

Perry




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: an4914@anon.penet.fi (Nitch)
Date: Sat, 4 Dec 93 04:29:22 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: MIT Keyserver
Message-ID: <9312041226.AA24029@anon.penet.fi>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

>> > I am sorry to announce that the PGP Keyserver at pgp.mit.edu
>> > (a.k.a. toxicwaste.mit.edu) has to be shut down.
[...]
>> 
>> Anyone want to tell us why?
>> Derek, I appreciate that you can't prevent it but a little more 
>> explanation of why would be much appreciated too.
>
[...]
>Of course, by the lack of a reason, we can only assume that whoever
>'it' was, it was 'big' enough to either scare you or threaten you with
>some action if you talked...

It might be wiser to assume that the machine (or some nearby machine)
was having trouble with all the load that the remailer was putting on it.

...but, of course, you may be right.

That message from "Hober Mallow, Trader to Cyberspace" may give a few
people something to think about over the weekend, hmmm?  Maybe MIT's
administration doesn't want to be involved in that kind of traffic?

Maybe *Derek* doesn't want to be involved in that kind of traffic?

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.3a

iQCVAgUBLP+g3+yu9liBvjrdAQHE9wP+NMQM6rQpmK9Jy/ntDXBeVLWdcgFwfDE8
aolOo9cCh3VxlXK7EG/ylN1XXm1HnSIMCD335E+txb5M7KSs1xT/V4NRVU2py2Gz
ItvfQ9NBBg5d5eP96V9XHIHzgGHlIaS6Ufw6+tBqtIkNE+cC+VsVUHKjTrONDXuM
zVN+GTLJxXo=
=SM/B
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
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From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Matt Blaze <mab@crypto.com>
Date: Sat, 4 Dec 93 09:53:02 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: CFS (was Re: Will Mike Ingle's name be a household word like "Buttafuoco"?)
Message-ID: <9312041736.AA21997@crypto.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


In cypherpunks Perry Metzger write:
...
>There is also cypherpunk Matt Blaze's "CFS" filesystem for unix
>machines, which is very powerful but unfortunately unreleased to the
>public, 
...

With any luck, and barring unforseen lawyerly problems, CFS should be
released (at least within the US) by around Xmas.  The upside is that it's
been made considerably stronger (cryptographically speaking) than the version
in the paper, and I now believe it's roughly as strong as three runs
of the underlying cipher (DES in this case) but with greatly reduced latency.

Stay tuned...

-matt




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: sameer@uclink.berkeley.edu
Date: Sat, 4 Dec 93 12:49:31 PST
To: frode@toaster.SFSU.EDU (Frode Odegard)
Subject: Re: Escobar and Cellular Ph0n3z
In-Reply-To: <9312042011.AA10620@toaster.SFSU.EDU>
Message-ID: <199312042044.MAA01809@mail.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Frode Odegard said:
> (No, I don't think drug use is anything but destructive but it's easy to
> see that TPTB speak with two (more more) tounges.)

	Just to clarify one point.. no further discussion on the list,
please, email me privately..

	It's drug PROHIBITION that is destructive. It is drug
PROHIBITION which made Escobar as rich & powerful as he was.





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: nobody@shell.portal.com
Date: Sat, 4 Dec 93 13:44:31 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Anonymity Offense
Message-ID: <9312042144.AA16084@jobe.shell.portal.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Cypherdudes,

Hal noted:
>As Tim says, it is no secret on this list that the remailers are not
>presently secure.  I posted a long message a few months ago outlining
>possible attacks on the remailers.  It's worth noting that Karl Barrus'
>remailer does batch up messages and send them out once a day. If enough
>people use it that will help mix them up.  There is still the message size
>to match them up, though (and, believe it or not, the Subject:line!).

>The traffic volume problem should be solved by having a source of random
>messages which traverse the network, mixing in with user messages. This
>will help, but you still have the problem that only user messages will leave
>the network.

The most bogus problem of the remailer system is lack of traffic. I mean how 
many messages go thru a given remailer a day? 1? 10? 100? This makes it
pitifully easy to track messages. Padding them to the same size helps but if 
you have to track ten messages around (even though the problem becomes more 
egregious at each site) so what. Queing is a drag if you have to wait a day
to get enough mail to send out. If I wanted it to take that long I'd send it 
snail mail. More traffic = shorter que time needed to make things a bummer 
for trackers. Random traversing messages are a reasonable temporary solution 
but Remailer publicity (thus, more traffic) is an important part of getting 
better anonymity going. Tell your friends, send all your punk postings thru 
at least one remailer (that will put some traffic through them!).

This method is a passive one, how can we subvert the system now in place to 
make traffic more invisible? 

>The biggest problem is that many remailers are on unsecure systems. The PGP
>keys and passwords for these remailers are on the disk IN THE CLEAR. Anyone
>who can get privileges on these systems (many hackers, these days, not to
>mention the NSA) can get the remailer's keys and decrypt any messages sent
>to those remailers.  Karl's monthly posting shows which remailers are on
>private machines; those are the only ones which have any hope of being secure
>against the NSA.

If you believe this you've already seceded the battle to the NSA. Formidable 
opponents != Defeat. Great respect for NSA ability is neccesary but
independent minds (especially working together) can exhibit Davidian 
qualities. 

Exactly, how is tracking done? I've heard the general issues of file size 
and physical compromise but what programs and access codes are needed to 
obtain such info? How does one access SMTP mail channels, sendmail ques and 
mail logs? How can we subvert their attempts? Can we use the known router 
algorithms and network bookkeeping methods at hop sites to disguise where 
messages are traveling?

I guess what I'm saying is can we use the complexities of the system itself,
rather than our own system alone to make traffic analysis a drag. We know the 
weakness of our system, what are the weaknesses of the analyzers systems. 
What are the possibilities for an analyzers systems, how do we attack
them? I'll start by looking at various RFC's but a little offense rather
than defense can only make us more aware. Even if it doesn't seem possible
for goliath to lose.

I think today I'll be:

Stranger




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: lex@mindvox.phantom.com (Lex Luthor)
Date: Sat, 4 Dec 93 11:33:08 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Escobar and Cellular Ph0n3z
Message-ID: <iJT2Dc2w165w@mindvox.phantom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain




I found it very interesting to read in the paper this morning about how
EXACTLY the Columbian authorities were able to LOCATE Pablo Escobar. The 
article stated that Pablo was concerned about his wife and child's safety
and called them on a CELLULAR phone to check up on them. The Columbian
Police did not know where either of them were located. It stated that the
U.S. government (DEA in print, but was it the NSA?) gave or let the
Columbian police borrow equipment that did the following:

1) The equipment scanned all the cellular phone frequencies used in that area.
2) Already having a voice print/sample of Pablo's voice, the equipment
   continuously compared cellular conversations with those they had of Pablo,
   in near real time.
3) Once a match was made, the equipment would triangulate? or otherwise 
   locate the origin of the call within two minutes. It did not say how 
   good the accuracy of the location was (ie within 1 mile or 1/10 of a mile
   or 10 feet, etc.) however. Apparently it was CLOSE ENOUGH.

This is sophisticated, no question about it. I imagine the equipment/circuits
are available to do all this to the general U.S. public, but still, I think
the NSA probably provided the equipment as it was probably all integrated
together and fairly idiot-proof to use. Maybe one big box, with a few of
these big boxes being dispersed about the country-side.

The report stated that Escobar was worth a few Billion dollars and that he
was a smart man. Why didn't he use encryption? This would have thwarted the
police. Of course you may say, how many encrypted cellular conversations take
place in that part of Columbia, and the answer would probably be close to 
zero if not zero. So just modify the equipment to recognize encrypted/scrambled
speech or whatever and locate the source. Fine, but if Escobar has so much 
money and so many allies, why not buy many encrypted cellular set-ups and 
distribute them to his people (paying them of course) to move throughout the
region constantly and make cellular encrypted phone calls at random?

Now, tying this in with the 'ol Clipper-chip debate, if Escobar who is worth
billions of dollars, is smart, and is considered one of the biggest drug
kingpins in history does not use encryption, how many lower-level criminals,
who don't have the financial resources nor the intelligence will?

Lex





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: smo@gnu.ai.mit.edu (Shawn O'Connor)
Date: Sat, 4 Dec 93 12:13:06 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Review of Crypto-Rebels in Cryptologia
Message-ID: <9312042010.AA16632@apple-gunkies.gnu.ai.mit.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



In the October issue of Cryptologia, Louis Kruh reviews the "Crypto
Rebels" article by Stephen Levy that appeared in Wired.  

Shawn
smo@gnu.ai.mit.edu

Article liberated without permission.  

----------------------------------------------------------------------

Cryptologia.  Vol. XV11, Number 4  (October 1993)

From the column "Reviews and Things Cryptologic" by Louis Kruh.

Crypto Rebels Write-Up  

[Wired 1.2]

  Wired is a new magazine aimed at the "Digital Generation." The cover 
story in its second issue examines the growing "Cypherpunk" movement
to insure individual privacy.

  According to the author, Cypherpunks believe that all information about 
an individual belongs to that person and opinions, medical records, 
personal data collected by local, state or national governmental agencies,
communications sent by the individual or any other information should be
available only if the person involved chooses to reveal it.  And the 
means through which this privacy would be maintained is by the widespread
use of virtually unbreakable public-key cryptography.
  
  Opposing forces are U.S. government agencies who seek to insure their 
ability to read public-key encrypted messages by the continuance of 
electronic surveillance and by having access to public-key cryptography's
secret keys when authorized by a judge.

  The author suggests that the government cryptologic monopoly was 
destroyed in 1975 when Whitfield Diffie created public-key cryptography.
His later work with Martin Hellman is recounted along with the 
implementation of the Diffie-Hellman system by three MIT computer 
scientists who founded RSA Data Security to market their patented 
algorithms.  

  A well known figure in academic crypto circles, Georgetown Professor
Dorothy Denning, counters Cypherpunk beliefs by pointing out that 
"Organized Crime leaders, drug dealers, terrorists, and other criminals
could conspire and act with impunity" if electronic surveillance was 
illegal and authorized agencies did not have access to private keys
used in public-key cryptography.

  The article explores many views and contains a great deal of 
fascinating information.

----------------------------------------------------------------------



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: frode@toaster.SFSU.EDU (Frode Odegard)
Date: Sat, 4 Dec 93 12:14:31 PST
To: lex@mindvox.phantom.com
Subject: Re: Escobar and Cellular Ph0n3z
Message-ID: <9312042011.AA10620@toaster.SFSU.EDU>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I don't think encryption will go unnoticed for very long, one doesn't have
to have a very high IQ to understand that secrecy is important, and that
encruption is a technology which will help keep things secret.  In Escobar's
case, the thing to do would perhaps have been to hide an encrypted data
stream in a normal-sounding conversation?  This would be harder to detect
for the authorities.  The data would probably be text which would require
much less bandwith than voice.

Notice how our Prez referred to the killing of these two men as heroic
and brave?  It was two against THOUSANDS, I'm sure they shot him to pieces. :-)
(No, I don't think drug use is anything but destructive but it's easy to
see that TPTB speak with two (more more) tounges.)

				- Frode




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: an12070@anon.penet.fi (Pablo Escobar)
Date: Sat, 4 Dec 93 07:23:02 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: The Darkness of Hell
Message-ID: <9312041519.AA16672@anon.penet.fi>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I was watching the evening news a few nights ago, and Peter Jennings
started the show by saying `The king is dead'. Is he? Something
extremely symbolic seems to have passed with the death of the world's
most fiendish drugpin, Pablo Escobar. The Medellin Cartel is in
shambles and the Cali Cartel has taken over in its place. The Medellin
Cartel was infamous for its bloody terrorism. Escobar supposedly was
even ordering murders from his luxurious prison. Judges, reporters,
politicians, presidential candidates, all were viciously murdered in
the Medellin `narcoterrorist' campaign. The Cali Cartel is by no means
a `kinder and gentler' trafficking organization but they have much less
blood on their hands and supposedly prefer bribery to bloody murder. An
analyst on the news suggested of course that the Cali Cartel was not
going to crumble any time soon, but that this assassination of Escobar
was significant `psychic leverage'.

I've been thinking about drugs lately. It seems to me there is an
interesting overlap in the subversive radical libertarians,
cryptoanarchists, and psychopunks who advocate pseudospoofing and those
who advocate (or at least tolerate) drug use. We have the same
arguments about drugs as we do about pseudoanonymity. `It's a
liberating experience.' `It's hopeless to attempt to prevent it.'
`Nobody gives a damn if it is widespread.' `People should have a right
to privacy.' Masked in all these arguments are very evil sentiments and
the philosophy that `that which cannot be enforced should not be
prohibited'. (I forget who said that.) The drug practitioners likewise
mask their true agenda in pompous rhetoric about `the positive
environmental influence and diverse uses of hemp' when there is really
only one use their are interested in: getting stoned.

* * *

The corruption and poison associated with drugs in respectable
organizations can be legendary. I once worked at a company for a year,
and found out to my utter dismay when I left that there was an active 
drug conspiracy within the company. This was a highly reputable
computer reseller in the Denver area, with major clients such as
U.S.West, and expanding very rapidly (they went public when I was
working there). I found that this conspiracy penetrated to the very
highest levels of the company, to the top salesman and founder himself!
I worked in a technical department and my supervisor flabbergasted me
with these revelations one day over lunch. I was absolutely
dumbfounded. He told me how one of his employees felt he had the right
to sneak out of the building and take pot-breaks in his car when he was
most stressed out. The supervisor didn't have the authority to fire
him. In fact, if he did, he himself might have been sacked instead for
his anti-drug stance in the face of a company that was `rotten to the core'.

The supervisor told me of a female employee who had a drug dealing
boyfriend. She took in the marijuana into the company and people from
around the company stopped into her office to pick up envelopes
containing their drugs. Another supervisor, my boss explained to me,
had a very serious cocaine habit too. It all fell into place. One day
the cocaine addict was absolutely jumping around, something like a
headless fowl, like the shocking fellow soldier whose sheer stupidity
puts the life of everyone in the group at deadly dangerous risk. He
said something very bizarre to me, `so Lance, just HOW ARE YOU FEELING
TODAY?' The strange tone was entirely uncharacteristic of him, and I
was baffled at the time, but after the revelation from my boss it clicked. 

I had flown to Alberqueque NM with the same drug addict supervisor, and
remember the flight back. The guy stopped in the bathroom and kept me
waiting for about 10 minutes. I was really wondering what was taking so
long! I realize now he was getting stoned to get on the plane. I wonder
when he was stoned when I was working with him on the very sensitive
network installation we barely pulled off from all kinds of fiascos. He
told me that he couldn't have done it without me. I wonder if we should
have done it without him.

The NM trip was my first business trip. I was ecstatic and extremely
nervous at the time. Many things could have gone wrong and many did,
but I came back with a feeling of satisfaction. Today, after coming to
the realization of the sheer corrupt ineptitude of my coworkers, I look
back on the affair as tinged with a black evil. I resent the vice of
these people that dirties my positive memories about the trip. In fact,
my esteem for my whole association with the company and many fond
memories have been veiled in disappointing sadness.

I remember another technician complaining about `Melody', the lady who
was distributing the drugs. He said that he wanted a job out of the
company as an on-site technician for U.S. West. He was extremely
bitter, but whatever I tried I could not get him to tell me why he was
so upset. He was holding out on me, like everyone else in the company.
Everyone knew I was squeaky clean and even the clean fringes that
touched the blackness kept their knowledge of the conspiracy to
themselves. I don't appreciate his holding the truth from me. It was my
right to know.

Melody was quite the airhead. She was required to pick me up in the
company car daily. She frequently missed the appointment, and I often
had to call her after waiting and wasting 20 or 30 minutes. Sometimes,
just as I was about to call she showed up. Other times, she did not
show up even after I called her. One day I got really exasperated after
she failed to show up after I called her. I began the long
hour-and-a-half walk to the office from where I was. I stayed off the
route she would take so that she could not find me.

When I got to the office she was extremely upset. But she also made me
feel very guilty, like the whole thing was my fault, like a mother
scolding her son. `Where WERE YOU?' `I looked all over for you!' she
said. `I couldn't find you anywhere!' For a week she was more prompt
but fell back into her old patterns of irresponsibility and neglect.
She didn't really change at all.

Melody was taking me to work one day in the company car, and seemed to
be very distracted. I was daydreaming out the window of the passenger
side in the front. We were making a left turn in the intersection, and
were first in line, waiting for the arrow. The right lane of the
oncoming traffic to our left of the intersection was empty, but cars in
the distance were slowing to stop at the red light. I watched in utter
slow-motion she's-not-really-going-to-do-it horror as she made the left
turn into the left side of the median, driving into oncoming traffic.
She snapped out of it when she saw the oncoming semi truck.

The semi truck saw us, as well as the other cars in the intersection,
and they slowed, and I breathed in cracked relief. I shook and buried
my face in my hands in utter embarrassment and shame. She maneuvered
the car in a U-turn in the lane (actually, a 360 degree revolution),
around the median and into the correct lane. I can't remember, was the
left arrow still green? yellow? off? Or maybe she just managed to
reorient the car in a 180 direction and stop at the red light. The
whole experience was quite a blur, something like a hideous,
nightmarish drug-induced hallucination. For Melody, it was.

* * *

There are many points to make about this story. The first is that it is
a true story! The second is that it has very many metaphors that we can
explore in relation to drug use. Drug networks are virtually the
definition of a conspiracy. Some people are aware of it, and `inside',
and some people are `clean', like me, and must be kept from the
blackness by insiders. And these networks can infiltrate respectable
organizations and corrupt people all the way to the top. It can
monstrously damage the productivity of the company yet some people
would rather that the company die of its slow death of blood poisoning
than give up their drug use. They would call drug tests an `invasion of
their privacy'. In fact, some of the employees at my company had worked
at other bigger companies and were fired for their drug use. But my
company had no record of it! And the drug users would certainly do
everything possible to ensure that!

Another interesting metaphor in my true story lies in that of the clean
supervisor. This man was one of the most respectable people in the
company I knew. I counted him my only true friend. He understood the
dynamics of the company and the human interactions better than anyone,
and had made many positive contributions to it. He was a source of
extropy in the entropy, so to speak. The thought that he might have
been fired by his corrupt boss because he was trying to rid the company
of something that was poisoning repulses me.

Another point to make is that some companies can continue to function
in the face of drug use, and sweep it under the rug. But it is
impossible to deny that the effects are there. Like the botched jobs,
and my horrific encounter with a potentially deadly traffic accident,
the signs are unequivocal. Any person who thinks their drug use does
not affect their own performance or that of a company is grotesquely
deluded. But that is the consequence of drug use!

One of the most sinister aspects, however, is that I see as the
`respectable organization facade.' This is a situation where a company
has a very highly acclaimed public image but an ugly, rotten interior
that the public is unaware of. People in the company will resist with
the utmost of force and intimidation any attempts to uncover the
corruption, such as anonymous phone threats. After a while, in the face
of such an investigation, it becomes easy to spot people who are
`dirty' and who are evading questions. People become desperate in their
conspiracy. They know what they are doing is evil but at the same time
cling to it with white knuckles, because they know that as soon as they
loosen their grip it will crumble into ashes, and in many cases it does
anyway. In many cases these people choose their own demise. The longer
their denials, the more spectacular their falls.

* * *

The idea of different people in a drug network actually being tentacles
of a single Medusa is very interesting, and I have talked about it
before. The drug organization understands the idea of
compartmentalizing knowledge so that worthless front-line street-level
runners are unaware of higher or even lateral components of the
organization, so when apprehended, even if they `squeal' they are
worthless in uncovering them. The police can cut dozens of quivering
tentacles and Medusa lives on. 

In a sense, Pablo Escobar was the ultimate Medusa. He surrounded
himself with buffers until his death. Many people in the country think
he is a hero, a modern day Robin Hood. He certainly promoted this
image! It was critical to his `success'. But it was probably also
critical to his downfall. Once his sycophants perceived a momentum
against him, they simply switched sides and informed on him. This is
the double edged sword of Medusa's tentacles -- they can also turn and
strangle her, and Medusa must go to extraordinary measures to prevent
it, even a `purge'  against Medusa's own `family' like those of Saddam Hussein.

* * *

Your mind is your most precious asset! It is your window to your soul!
And drug use is like spraypainting the fragile window with graffiti,
like throwing jagged rocks at it. A drug invades your sanity like a
virus invades a computer. No wonder psychopunks are so enamored with
viruses! The virus is the metaphor for their life. They slowly,
invisibly spread their poison by infecting systems that fail to
adequately fight them. I'm sure that the bubonic plague likes to say,
`I'm not saying that killing people is OK, but if your defenses are
down, I'm just helping you out by exposing them.' Just like Medusa
gradually being confused about which of her tentacles is which, as the
identities inevitably blur together, does a mind gradually disintegrate
with drug use.

* * *

One of the other extremely evil aspects of drug use is that of the
corruption of close friends and oneself. As I was saying, drug use can
devastate one's life to the ultimate degree. One can lose a job, a car,
a house. More devastatingly, a spouse, one's children. Most
treacherously, one's own health, sanity, or life. I think all the
cryptoanarchists, radical libertarians, and cypherpunks who promote
drug use seem to be in favor of a sort of social sadochism and
masochism. `The world is an ugly place, and everyone should wallow in
it.' This is like the drug user bringing down his respectable friends
with his own depravity.

The drug user with a conscience is tormented by his daily betrayals of
his friends, and seeks to smooth over the cracks that he is continually
causing. He tries to be soothing, and point his finger in some other
direction, `hey, look at that!' while he is snorting white lines. He
will whimper and whine plaintively, `please, don't make a big deal out
of this, we don't want a scene.' The truly vicious drug user has no
remorse. He has never apologized for his destruction to the fragile
fabric of human trust that he rips daily. He erects elaborate
mythologies that supposedly legitimize his poison. But at the root it
is all nothing but black deception and delusion.

Imagine the absolute horror of these encounters. Imagine that you
highly respect someone, say they may have cofounded a great company
like Sun, you have tried to cultivate a friendship over many months,
and you suddenly understand that they are a drug user! What are your
options? Do you run? Do you tolerate them? Do you try to change them?
What is the requirement of true friendship? I think that quiet
toleration is like being an accomplice to a crime. You are not only
betraying your friend but yourself. As ugly as it feels, as grotesque
and hideous your task, you must pursue it. 

That which does not destroy evil makes it grow stronger! You will
discover your true friends, if you had any. The veils of delusion will
fall as you come face to face with the betrayal of people you once
respected. Even with your supposed friend's attacks, apathy, flight,
and abandonment, the knives in your back, the tears streaming down your
face, your blood in puddles around you, it is your responsibility to
Humanity and your soul that you continue to attack all Lies that cross
your path to your final rasping breath.

People have a duty to challenge that little niche of corruption they
have uncovered, so that the `little niches' don't grow into monstrous
nightmares. This is very much in the way that the Nazi movement has
been described in retrospect by many. `They came for people I did not
know, and then people I did know, and then my friends, and then me.'
When there is an encroaching active evil, passivity feeds it. Another
interesting essay talked about the whole Nazi movement as a sort of
subtly incremental plunge into raw evil, each step definite but
imperceptible. Sort of like the story of the frog, who will jump out of
hot water but will passively die if it is gradually brought to boil.

-------------------------------------------------------------------------
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From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: hfinney@shell.portal.com (Hal Finney)
Date: Sat, 4 Dec 93 15:23:06 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Anonymity Offense
Message-ID: <9312042321.AA24309@jobe.shell.portal.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


FYI, here is the number of remailed messages passing through my remailer
for the past couple of months.  The first number is the number of messages
on that day, and the remainder of the line is the date.

   2 Sun Oct  3
   3 Mon Oct  4
   8 Wed Oct  6
   1 Thu Oct  7
   3 Fri Oct  8
   1 Sun Oct 10
   1 Tue Oct 12
   1 Thu Oct 14
   1 Fri Oct 15
   2 Mon Oct 18
   8 Tue Oct 19
   1 Wed Oct 20
   3 Thu Oct 21
   2 Fri Oct 22
   1 Sat Oct 23
   1 Sun Oct 24
   5 Mon Oct 25
   3 Tue Oct 26
   9 Wed Oct 27
   5 Sat Oct 30
   2 Wed Nov  3
   3 Thu Nov  4
   1 Fri Nov  5
   8 Sat Nov  6
   1 Sun Nov  7
   9 Mon Nov  8
   3 Tue Nov  9
  10 Wed Nov 10
   7 Thu Nov 11
   4 Fri Nov 12
   1 Sat Nov 13
   7 Sun Nov 14
   4 Mon Nov 15
   5 Tue Nov 16
   6 Wed Nov 17
  26 Thu Nov 18
   1 Fri Nov 19
   9 Sat Nov 20
   6 Sun Nov 21
   2 Mon Nov 22
   4 Wed Nov 24
  16 Fri Nov 26
  10 Sat Nov 27
  54 Sun Nov 28
  37 Mon Nov 29
  36 Tue Nov 30
  33 Wed Dec  1
  18 Thu Dec  2
  19 Fri Dec  3
  18 Sat Dec  4

Here is the corresponding table for just encrypted messages.  These are
included in the counts above.

   2 Sun Oct  3
   3 Mon Oct  4
   2 Wed Oct  6
   1 Thu Oct  7
   1 Fri Oct  8
   1 Thu Oct 14
   1 Tue Oct 19
   1 Wed Oct 20
   3 Thu Oct 21
   1 Fri Oct 22
   3 Sat Oct 23
   1 Sun Oct 24
   5 Mon Oct 25
   3 Tue Oct 26
   9 Wed Oct 27
   4 Sat Oct 30
   1 Wed Nov  3
   1 Fri Nov  5
   3 Sat Nov  6
   3 Mon Nov  8
   2 Tue Nov  9
   4 Wed Nov 10
   2 Thu Nov 11
   1 Fri Nov 12
   1 Sat Nov 13
   1 Mon Nov 15
   1 Tue Nov 16
  13 Thu Nov 18
   4 Sat Nov 20
   3 Sun Nov 21
   2 Wed Nov 24
   1 Thu Nov 25
   8 Fri Nov 26
   6 Sat Nov 27
  20 Sun Nov 28
  22 Mon Nov 29
  20 Tue Nov 30
  23 Wed Dec  1
  11 Thu Dec  2
   5 Fri Dec  3
   4 Sat Dec  4





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Andrew Loewenstern <andrew@cubetech.com>
Date: Sat, 4 Dec 93 15:29:31 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Escobar and Cellular Ph0n3z
Message-ID: <9312042327.AA21189@valinor.cubetech.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


lex@mindvox.phantom.com (Lex Luthor) writes:
> This is sophisticated, no question about it. I imagine the
> equipment/circuits are available to do all this to the general
> U.S. public, but still, I think the NSA probably provided the
> equipment as it was probably all integrated together and fairly
> idiot-proof to use. Maybe one big box, with a few of these big
> boxes being dispersed about the country-side.

The FBI used the same stuff a couple of years back to catch the people who  
kidnapped that Exxon executive.  Considering how easy it is to pick up cellular  
transmissions and the way it works (cells with limited range), I believe it is  
something well within the resources of the FBI to develop.

I really don't think the NSA has much of a hand in any of the things we hear  
about, unless it has something directly to do with crypto (which this does not,  
except, as Lex pointed out, that escobar probably should have been using strong  
crypto...).


andrew




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Andrew Loewenstern <andrew@cubetech.com>
Date: Sat, 4 Dec 93 15:34:31 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Will I be on a wanted poster?
Message-ID: <9312042333.AA21227@valinor.cubetech.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> > In my opinion, this is the best example yet since PGP of "cypherpunks
> > writing code" because of the implications that this program has
> > on privacy.  (I'm using it to keep a personal space for my tax
> > records, private correspondence, PGP dir, etc.), but Mike's
> > suggestion for encrypting an entire BBS itself is a good point.
> > What if *every* sysop encrypted their BBS with Secure Drive?
> 

> No more Steve Jackson Games cases. I hope this happens.  Computer
> theft and unreasonable seizure is a real problem.

As far as I know, a system like SecureDrive, KFS, or CFS, is really only as  
secure as the running machine is.  Generally, when a BBS is 'seized'  
(forfeited? ;), it is running when the feds get there.  Right now, if they have  
any clue (and from what I hear, the FBI has much more of a clue than the SS  
when it comes to this type of investigation), they usually take pictures of the  
setup to make sure they can put the machine back together when they get it to  
wherever they are taking it to.  If encrypting file-systems become a problem, a  
disk could be developed (probably pretty easily) to retrieve the key from  
memory before they power it down.


andrew
"Touch that keyboard and die!!"




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: jim@bilbo.suite.com (Jim Miller)
Date: Sat, 4 Dec 93 16:09:33 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Pablo and NSA
Message-ID: <9312050006.AA28179@bilbo.suite.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain




> NSA provided Columbian officials with the tools
> necessary to decipher communication between the
> Columbian drug lord and his cohorts.  Escobar had been
> communicating by computer using the American Pretty
> Good Privacy (PGP) software product which was
> compromised by NSA officials working at a remote
> listening station in the Columbian jungle. 

> 


Hopefully this is a joke.  However, it does bring up a point.  The NSA can  
put fear into people's minds by simply *claiming* the ability to  
compromise PGP.  They don't have to really be able to.  Just start a  
rumor, sit back, and watch what happens.

Jim_Miller@suite.com




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Black Unicorn <unicorn@access.digex.net>
Date: Sat, 4 Dec 93 15:09:31 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re:  The Darkness of Hell
Message-ID: <199312042307.AA28819@access.digex.net>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


You know,

your article would have been excellent without the typical anti-drug
rhetoric.  It almost seemed like you were just using the medusa
analogy to make cypherpunks the proper forum for your rant.

The war on drugs in the United States (which I become more and more
hesitant about capitalizing) is the single most effective weapon
against privacy today.

You really need to seek attention elsewhere.

Too bad Melody didn't get some better acid.
She'd have saved us all a lot of trouble.
Arguement for legalization if you ask me.

-uni- (Dark)




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Black Unicorn <unicorn@access.digex.net>
Date: Sat, 4 Dec 93 15:19:31 PST
To: lex@mindvox.phantom.com
Subject: Re:  Escobar and Cellular Ph0n3z
Message-ID: <199312042315.AA29446@access.digex.net>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



I'm not sure about your speculation that the NSA provided the equipment.
I have a feeling that it was a third party vendor actually.

When cellular was just beginning to be used the FBI came up with
a similar box.  As I recall it just waitied for certain selected
ESN's to go active and then listened to every call they made and/or
received.  Of course you had to be within range of the car or
the cell it was using.  The article on the box was in the Chicago Trib.
I'll see if I can find it, but I sort of doubt it as I can't really
nail down the year in my head.  I'll try a nexis search.

In any case, the article was boosting third partys and their
contrubution to the war on drugs.

I might add however, that the equipment did not triangulate.

-uni- (Dark)




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Black Unicorn <unicorn@access.digex.net>
Date: Sat, 4 Dec 93 15:39:31 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Pablo and NSA
Message-ID: <199312042334.AA01120@access.digex.net>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Ok, so I take it back.

+++
From: theprez@whitehouse.gov.com
Subject: WE ARE INDEED WATCHING !
Lines: 10
Organization: University of Zurich, Department of Computer Science
X-Newsreader: IBM NewsReader/2 v1.00
Date: Fri Dec 03 09:03:21 EST 1993
 
NEUTERS - Botoga 3.12.93
 
Police and military officials announced yesterday that they had help from
American National Security Agency officials in tracking down Pablo Escobar.  The
NSA provided Columbian officials with the tools necessary to decipher
communication between the Columbian drug lord and his cohorts.  Escobar
had been communicating by computer using the American Pretty Good Privacy (PGP)
software product which was compromised by NSA officials working at a remote
listening station in the Columbian jungle.
 
+++

Haw Haw Haw.

-uni- (Dark)




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: ferguson@icm1.icp.net (Paul Ferguson x2044)
Date: Sat, 4 Dec 93 15:43:06 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: (fwd) Re: Keyserver going down
Message-ID: <9312042340.AA27104@icm1.icp.net>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text



In light of the recent closure of the .toxicwaste keyserver, I thought
that this message from Vess was rather timely.

Forwarded message:

> From: bontchev@fbihh.informatik.uni-hamburg.de (Vesselin Bontchev)
> Newsgroups: sci.crypt,alt.security,comp.security.misc,alt.security.pgp,alt.security.keydist
> Subject: Re: Keyserver going down
> Date: 3 Dec 1993 13:14:21 GMT
> Organization: University of Hamburg -- Germany
> Message-ID: <2dne3d$ofc@rzsun02.rrz.uni-hamburg.de>
> References: <WARLORD.93Dec2161745@toxicwaste.mit.edu> <gbeCHFxIy.42F@netcom.com> <2dn9re$6n5@news.mantis.co.uk>
> NNTP-Posting-Host: fbihh.informatik.uni-hamburg.de
> X-Newsreader: TIN [version 1.2 PL2]
> 
> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
> 
> 
> Tony Lezard (tony@mantis.co.uk) writes:
> 
> > >With both toxicwaste and iastate now out of business, what key servers
> > >are still operating?
> 
> > The folling list comes straight from keyserv.doc, in the PGP source files
> 
> Unfortunately, I have the impression that the information there is
> slightly out-of-date. I would prefer to get a direct reply to the
> question asked from the people who run the keyservers.
> 
> > archive. I must say, although I'm not one for conspicacy theories, the
> > sudden and unexplained closure of *two* key servers in such a short time
> > does make me a bit ... suspicious. Why were they closed?
> 
> Yes, me too... Two keyservers, both in the USA, both were closed with
> no explications given, both were closed rather fast... Is it what
> we're all thinking about or are we just paranoid?
> 
> > Internet sites:
> 
> [list deleted]
> 
> I have installed a public key server at our site as an experiment. It
> took quite a long time, because I am not root on our machine and a
> regular user installing such software is not a trivial task and has
> some security implications.
> 
> Till now, our server was syncronized only with one of the US ones.
> Now, after two US servers have been closed down, I would like to
> activate ours and to syncronise it with all other servers around the
> world. It is currently working (you can get and send public keys); it
> is just not syncronized with the other servers.
> 
> Could please those who are running such servers and agree to have them
> syncronized with ours contact me, so that I can include their site in
> my CONFIG file?
> 
> The information for our server is:
> 
> pgp-public-keys@fbihh.informatik.uni-hamburg.de
> 	Vesselin Bontchev
> 	bontchev@fbihh.informatik.uni-hamburg.de
> 	FTP: ftp.informatik.uni-hamburg.de:/pub/virus/misc/pubkring.pgp
> 
> Requests to the server are processed every 15 minutes.
> 
> Regards,
> Vesselin
> - --
> Vesselin Vladimirov Bontchev          Virus Test Center, University of Hamburg
> Tel.:+49-40-54715-224, Fax: +49-40-54715-226      Fachbereich Informatik - AGN
> < PGP 2.3 public key available on request. > Vogt-Koelln-Strasse 30, rm. 107 C
> e-mail: bontchev@fbihh.informatik.uni-hamburg.de        22527 Hamburg, Germany
> 
> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
> Version: 2.3a
> 
> iQCVAgUBLP87VTZWl8Yy3ZjZAQHKIQP9GKbCGpdMNNQwKbWOrg5jk3Cam7YDrcpq
> VYLO3p3yJ6JHHDKl/XJBXd4OGwbG6RY9H6E1vyb0VwfGDuwYxH8/1gp/b+Cod5Rb
> GilZ9b2OiqornVAvAYwrg6XtsuOOTh1dpHUJB66YRudJ4UCCnju53XQ40V/7mylV
> Bzv5idC4Iq0=
> =Nl7x
> -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
> 




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: jim@bilbo.suite.com (Jim Miller)
Date: Sat, 4 Dec 93 16:44:34 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Speaking of hard disk encryption...
Message-ID: <9312050042.AA28649@bilbo.suite.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Anyone out there have any experience with SafeBoot(tm) from SmartDisk  
Security Corporation?

Here's what you get in the mail when you call them for info:


[disclaimer:  I am not accociated with SmartDisk Security Corporation]

--------------

SafeBoot - The SmartDisk PC Security System

- SafeBoot is an extremely secure and easy-to-use access control system  
for the personal computer.

- SafeBoot is the first access control system to use the SmartDisk.  It is  
the only hardware-based PC security system that is suitable for all PC's  
including notebooks and portables.

- SafeBoot provides two factor access control; your PC cannot be used  
unless it is booted from your SmartDisk and your SmartDisk password is  
entered at the SafeBoot log-on screen.

- SafeBoot keeps your data confidential and protects your computer from  
unauthorized users.


EASY TO USE

SafeBoot is simple to install and easy to use.  During installation  
SafeBoot generates a unique encryption key, stores it one your SmartDisk  
and encrypts your PC's hard disk using this key.

The next time you want to use your PC, you simply boot your PC from your  
SmartDisk.  The SafeBoot log-on screen will appear and will prompt you to  
enter your SmartDisk password.  If you enter the correct password, your  
computer will start-up as normal.  You can then remove your SmartDisk and  
forget that SafeBoot is installed, as it will not interfere in any way  
with the normal operation of your computer.

SafeBoot will work with all disk utility tools and compression software,  
including Norton SpeedDisk and MicroSoft DoubleSpace.


DATA ENCRYPTION AND BOOT PROTECTION

When you boot your computer using your SmartDisk and enter your password,  
SafeBoot will read the encryption key held on the SmartDisk into the PC's  
memory.  SafeBoot will then transparently encrypt and decrypt all hard  
disk accesses until you switch off or reboot your PC.

Unlike most software-based PC security systems, that have to store the  
encryption key on the hard disk itself, SafeBoot uses the SmartDisk to  
store the key.  By doing this, SafeBoot prevents unauthorized users from  
using low level PC recovery tools to discover the key, and 'undo' the hard  
disk protection.


FULL OR PARTIAL HARD DISK ENCRYPTION

You can choose how much of your hard disk SafeBoot will encrypt.  For most  
purposes 'partial encryption' is more than adequate and is very quick to  
install.  'Partial encryption' encrypts the structure of the data on your  
hard disk - the information which MS-DOS uses to find the files and  
directories.

'Full encryption' takes a little longer to install, but will protect all  
of your data against even the most determined hacker.


BOOT SECTOR VIRUS DETECTION

Software-based virus protection products cannot prevent your computer from  
'catching' a boot sector virus.  Boot sector viruses can also be the most  
difficult type of PC virus to detect, as they are loaded into memory  
before any virus detection software can be run.  Once loaded, a virus can  
pretend that the boot sector has not been modified, thus prevent itself  
from being detected.

Because SafeBoot runs before the PC's boot sector is loaded it can detect  
boot sector viruses that otherwise hide themselves from virus detection  
software.


THE SMARTDISK

Although the SmartDisk looks like a 3.5" floppy disk and fits into a  
normal floppy disk drive, it is not a floppy disk.  It is actually a  
hardware device with its own microprocessor that provides secure, password  
protected storage.

The SmartDisk differs from all other hardware PC security solutions, for  
example, a smartcard, because it needs no special readers, extra circuit  
boards, or power supplies, and no connectors or cables.  The SmartDisk  
operates in a standard PC 3.5" diskette drive without modification to the  
drive or the PC.

SmartDisk directly enhances protection of the PC's data by retaining the  
encryption key, the password, and the encryption algorithm - none of which  
remains resident on the PC.  This ensures that the SafeBoot software is  
run before any other software is loaded on the PC, thus enabling SafeBoot  
to verify system integrity before continuing to load your PC's operating  
system.


LOST SMARTDISK OR FORGOTTEN PASSWORD

When SafeBoot is installed, it creates a backup of your encryption key on  
the SafeBoot system disk.  If you forget your password, of lose your  
SmartDisk, you can use this floppy disk to remove SafeBoot.


SECURING MULTIPLE PCs WITH ONE SMARTDISK

A single SmartDisk can be used to secure any number of PCs without  
incremental cost.  SafeBoot will generate a unique key for your SmartDisk  
the first time that SafeBoot is installed, but will allow you to use the  
same key for subsequent installations.


SAFEBOOT FOR CORPORATE ENVIRONMENTS

Various utilities are available to facilitate the installation and  
management of SmartDisks and SafeBoot encryption keys within large  
organizations.


SmartDisk Security Corporation

4073 Mercantile Ave
Naples, Florida, USA 33942

(813) 263-3475   voice
(813) 643-6357   FAX

-----------------


Jim_Miller@suite.com





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Anonymous <nowhere@bsu-cs.bsu.edu>
Date: Sat, 4 Dec 93 15:49:32 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Highway song
Message-ID: <9312042346.AA15425@bsu-cs.bsu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Newsgroups: alt.politics.datahighway,comp.org.eff.talk,talk.politics.crypto
From: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Subject: The Data Highway Patrol
Message-ID: <tcmayCHGF7E.Cu1@netcom.com>
Organization: NETCOM On-line Communication Services (408 241-9760 guest)
X-Newsreader: TIN [version 1.1 PL8]
Date: Fri, 3 Dec 1993 10:16:26 GMT

The Data Highway will no doubt be patrolled by a new elite police
force, the "Data Highway Patrol." 

Patterned after the California Highway Patrol, also known as "CHiPS"
(as in the terrible-but-campy t.v. show of the 1970s), the Data
Highway Patrol will presumably be dubbed the "ClipperCHiPS."

They'll be sent out on their Harley-Davidson cybercycles to check for
discriminatory data packets, for illegal use of encryption technology,
and for "heavy loads" that strain network resources. And occasionally
they'll stop and help a stranded Internetter. They'll have the
top-rated Data Highway show in the 2002-3 season, ironically and
recursively enough.

Will President Reno send them in to raid the Cyber-Waco havens?

---

Seriously, I haven't been following this group
(alt.politics.datahighway, that is) too closely, after posting early
on to it, as it seemed like the two camps--pro and con--were settling
down to restating their positions. So, sorry if I'm now intruding.

I was writing an essay for the Cypherpunks mailing list on the way
strong crypto will make local gambling laws unenforceable (through
"telegambling," where a casino in the Bahamas, or "somewhere" in
cypherspace, is only a phone call through some digital mixes away). It
became clear to me that the authorities will hardly countenance the use
of the Data Highway---the taxpayer's NII--for such uses. 

(And a lot of other "interesting" uses I could describe. If
interested, join the Cypherpunks mailing list by sending a request to
"cypherpunks-request@toad.com".  We were featured on the cover of the
second issue of "Wired" and in the Summer, '93 issue of "Whole Earth
Review," etc. An interesting bunch of folks.)

No, the Data Highway won't likely tolerate "sealed loads" that might
be accessing offshore gambling dens, kiddie porn rings, or weapons
secret information markets (not to mention the ever-worrisome
anonymous markets for assasinations...child's play with digital
remailers and digital cash). Not any more than they now accept trucks
carrying loads across state and national borders without the
possibility of inspection. A national data highway will have lots of
rules and regulations for "fair access," for the allowable data
packets that can travel on it, and for taxation of the explosion in
commercial traffic which will inevitably come.

Hence, the Data Highway Patrol.

Or maybe they'll call it the "CyberSpace Patrol."

Personally, I hate government programs. I don't want the government
"helping" with networks, and I don't want a streamlined data highway.
I like the developing system we've got of zillions of cables,
satellites, fiber optics, and the like, With lots of suppliers of
services and lots of rerouting of packets, it makes it real hard to
enforce the kind of restriction cited above.

And that's a good thing.

--Tim May


-- 
..........................................................................
Timothy C. May         | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,  
tcmay@netcom.com       | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
408-688-5409           | knowledge, reputations, information markets, 
W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA  | black markets, collapse of governments.
Higher Power: 2^756839 | Public Key: PGP and MailSafe available.
Note: I put time and money into writing this posting. I hope you enjoy it.





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Anonymous <nowhere@bsu-cs.bsu.edu>
Date: Sat, 4 Dec 93 15:49:33 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: The Tentacles of Cypherspace
Message-ID: <9312042349.AA15576@bsu-cs.bsu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Newsgroups: talk.politics.crypto,alt.privacy,alt.privacy.anon-server,news.admin.policy,comp.org.eff.talk,comp.admin.policy,alt.conspiracy
From: ld231782@casco.lance.colostate.edu (L. Detweiler)
Subject: Re: CRYPTOANARCHIST INFILTRATION ALERT
Sender: news@yuma.ACNS.ColoState.EDU (News Account)
Message-ID: <Dec04.105319.36526@yuma.ACNS.ColoState.EDU>
Date: Sat, 04 Dec 1993 10:53:19 GMT
References: <dasherCHH3Ey.J1F@netcom.com> <tcmayCHH6MA.Mzw@netcom.com>
Nntp-Posting-Host: casco.lance.colostate.edu
Organization: Colorado State University, Fort Collins, CO  80523
X-Newsreader: TIN [version 1.2 021193BETA PL3]

Timothy C. May (tcmay@netcom.com) wrote:

: "Medusa" (me, others). I gave up long ago trying to convice Larry
: Detweiler (alias an12070, The Executioner, S. Boxx, The Pervert, The
: Psychopunk, and apparently such pseudonyms) that I am a real person,
: that Nick Szabo is a real person not the same as me, and that several
: other "Tentacles" and "Snakes" are easily verified to be real people
: with real lives.

That's interesting. Perhaps you would like to enumerate these attempts. Here
are a few I can think of off the top of my head.

I asked J.Gilmore to send me his phone number to ask him about pseudospoofing
by Cypherpunk leaders and he told me that he only gave out his phone number
to his friends. I ask other cypherpunks for phone numbers and they call
it an `invasion of their privacy'. I asked Szabo about his claims in 
RISKS and he exploded that I was `digitally stalking him.' I got a message
from a Geof Dale (roommate of a college friend) who said generally he 
could assert that every cypherpunk I had ever wondered about being a 
pseudonym was a `true name' but refuses to give me his phone number to so I
can ask specific questions. Nick Szabo has also resisted simple requests of 
mine to verify that `Nick Szabo' is not a pseudonym. 

I also asked you, a long time ago Mr. May, to state a simple sentence to me in 
the form `I have never posted under the name J.Dinkelacker'. You refused
to do so. You did say `The assertion that I am J. Dinkelacker is too bizarre
to believe.' Ha, ha, and that time I asked you what sites you have ever posted
from, and your personal knowledge of multiple sites, you emailed my postmaster
and said that I was `harassing' you. Oh, and that contained another reference
to my `violent threats'. You seem to be quite sensitive to quotations like 
`death is the ultimate form of censorship.' Hee, hee.

The truth is that every attempt I have made to verify certain identities
has failed and led only to more grisly conclusions, such that Cypherpunks have
gone to the length of registering NIC domains and buying out-of-state phone 
numbers. Do not tell me this is impossible! A businessman friend of mine 
has a local phone number in NY that forwards to Denver! It seems to me
cypherpunks could use this very readily! (My kingdom goes to anyone who 
can provide me with the ability to trace the ultimate destination of 
phone calls in this way, and help uncover the amazing extent of the 
Cryptoanarchist conspiracy! volunteers desperately needed!)

As for what the paranoid ranter and conspiracy theorist an12070 thinks, 
who gives a damn? I'm always amazed at top cypherpunks, supposedly interested
in anonymity, attempting to equate me with this email address.

The cypherpunks have made an art, science, and religion of deceiving others
on the Internet and in the media. I do not consider the leaders respectable.
If they were,  they would have long ago answered my honest questions in
a straightforward manner.

And T.C.May is definitely the classic cryptoanarchist! Nice of you to
keep holding onto your infamous signature (now widely discredited) 
promoting tax evasion, black marketeering, and the overthrow of 
governments.

: Poor deluded Larry takes any such efforts to resolve his delusion as
: _further proof_ of the Grand Conspiracy to drive him crazier than he
: already is. 

Yes, I am quite insane.

: What a strange world the Net is becoming.

No thanks to you.

: --Tim May, a Real Person

Owner of many tentacles. Please list all the sites you have ever posted
from, Mr. May. Ooops, that would be an Orwellian Invasion of your privacy.
A McCarthyist Inquisition. Hee, hee. You cryptoanarchists are so silly. I
am having great fun using your techniques of cyberspatial warfare and
against yourselves. I will not relent until top leadership issues unequivocal
statements on your involvement and knowledge of pseudospoofing. Lies like
that by E.Hughes in RISKS, `I have never posted under any other name than
E.Hughes' obviously do not count, although they may fool some people.

I do thank you, Mr. May, for your posting directly on this topic after my
attempts to date have failed. Perhaps you would like to invite your cohorts
on the cypherpunks list including E.Hughes and J.Gilmore to start a 
cyberspatial attack campaign on this thread the way you infiltrated RISKS
15.27 and 15.28x! I await the fireworks!

The most serious problems with the Cypherpunks may involve deception of
the media. I'm trying to figure this out as we speak. These lies are very
difficult to untangle! volunteers welcome!

oh, BTW Mr. May, when did you decide my first name was Larry and not Lance?
You called me Lance for 10 months or so on the cypherpunks list.

hee, hee. I would give so much to be at the next CA Clique Conspiracy
meeting in a week or two, to see how the leaders masterfully evade all
charges of misbehavior. 

-- 

ld231782@longs.LANCE.ColoState.EDU


Newsgroups: talk.politics.crypto,alt.privacy,alt.privacy.anon-server,news.admin.policy,comp.org.eff.talk,comp.admin.policy,alt.conspiracy
From: ld231782@casco.lance.colostate.edu (L. Detweiler)
Subject: Re: CRYPTOANARCHIST INFILTRATION ALERT
Sender: news@yuma.ACNS.ColoState.EDU (News Account)
Message-ID: <Dec04.110527.69270@yuma.ACNS.ColoState.EDU>
Date: Sat, 04 Dec 1993 11:05:27 GMT
References: <dasherCHH3Ey.J1F@netcom.com> <tcmayCHH6MA.Mzw@netcom.com> <dasherCHH7s6.4rF@netcom.com>
Nntp-Posting-Host: casco.lance.colostate.edu
Organization: Colorado State University, Fort Collins, CO  80523
X-Newsreader: TIN [version 1.2 021193BETA PL3]
Followup-To: talk.politics.crypto,alt.privacy,alt.privacy.anon-server,news.admin.policy,comp.org.eff.talk,comp.admin.policy,alt.conspiracy

: Ah.  I could say that I've seen Nick and Tim in the same room, but
: that would prove I'm just another pseudonym.  (We're all at Netcom,
: after all.)  So why did I ask the question above?  That just shows
: how subtle Tim is.  (I wish I were that subtle.)

Y'know, after all this hullaballo I still have no idea what Szabo does
for a living. Maybe he would like to post information about where he
works. Just general information that can be verified, nothing that would
invade his privacy. Ooops, I guess all cryptoanarchists believe that any
inquiry into identity (even those who claim to have one) is an `invasion
of their privacy'. Well, we can't get very far in that case. I will just
have to stick `szabo@netcom.com' into my `untrusted pseudonym' file.
hee, hee. Sort of a like a McCarthyist Witchhunt Inquisition list. Those
darn Cryptoanarchists.

My experience with Szabo started only after I read neat mail by Szabo 
stating how he had mastered the art of surreptitious posting from multiple 
sites. Mr. Szabo, could you please elaborate on your techniques? I had to 
guess at what you were accomplishing in RISKS 15.28x (or 15.27, hard to 
remember) because you are certainly not voluntarily going to reveal this 
information, eh? that's the name of the game with pseudospoofing. Also, 
you blew up when I followed up on your claim in 15.27 that many cypherpunks 
had attempted to help me verify their identities. `Which ones?' I asked. 
`What have they done for me?' You got really upset, remember, and threatened 
to stop posting from the name szabo@netcom.com entirely! I thought this 
highly suspicious, but perhaps you can explain it all.

Some of Mr.Szabo's comments and those by another tentacle I have discovered
suggest they are actually running sophisticate software to maintain their
arsenals of tentacles. This is my Holy Grail, to get information on that!
I suspect it was written by E.Hughes. He hasn't said a word on it. Oh, many,
many things for me to wonder about. Please enlighten me. I am just another
scientist in search of the truth, by iteratively refining his sense of what 
is not.

Sooner or later I will have to post an analysis of cryptoanarchist 
disinformation as posted by either Szabo or May (some of the very best
purveyors, IMHO).

-- 

ld231782@longs.LANCE.ColoState.EDU





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Date: Sat, 4 Dec 93 20:23:09 PST
To: hughes@ah.com (Eric Hughes)
Subject: Re: IGNORE: useless drivel
In-Reply-To: <9312041542.AA04428@ah.com>
Message-ID: <199312050421.UAA28665@mail.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



> 12070 writes:
> 
> >That which does not destroy evil makes it grow stronger! 
> 
> This sentence wins an Eric Hughes "Most complete misquoting of
> Nietzsche in 1993" award.
> 
> Eric

Wait, you didn't announce the competition! You can't just award the
prize to Detweiler without letting the rest of us have a chance.

How about:

"Live paranoidly."

or

"If you stare into the Detweiler, the Detweiler will stare into you."?


--Tim



-- 
..........................................................................
Timothy C. May         | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,  
tcmay@netcom.com       | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
408-688-5409           | knowledge, reputations, information markets, 
W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA  | black markets, collapse of governments.
Higher Power: 2^756839 | Public Key: PGP and MailSafe available.
Note: I put time and money into writing this posting. I hope you enjoy it.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: greg@ideath.goldenbear.com (Greg Broiles)
Date: Sat, 4 Dec 93 21:43:09 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: No Subject
Message-ID: <6FL3Dc1w165w@ideath.goldenbear.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



I've been playing with the below-mentioned script this afternoon, and
it seems to be a very good thing. Folks interested in spotting various
names, texts, etc, on Usenet may find the following of interest:

(Now we can all be like Kibo :)

> From: tchrist@cs.Colorado.EDU (Tom Christiansen)
> Newsgroups: comp.security.misc,alt.security,comp.security.unix
> Subject: Re: Linux rsh BIG RAGGEDY HOLE
> Message-ID: <CHH6xx.6qn@Colorado.EDU>
> Date: 3 Dec 93 20:15:32 GMT
>
> [text deleted; previous poster lamented difficulty of finding needles
> in the Usenet haystack]
>
> I may be able to offer some small bit of help.  If you have access to
> your news spool (nntp won't cut it), then you can run Larry Wall's clip
> program to help alert you to thing you can describe .  The program is
> available for anon ftp from convex.com in /pub/perl/scripts/clip; it's
> pretty neat.
>
> [text deleted]
>
> --tom
> --
>     Tom Christiansen      tchrist@cs.colorado.edu
>       "Will Hack Perl for Fine Food and Fun"
>         Boulder Colorado  303-444-3212


--
Greg Broiles                       Lemon Detweiler Pledge?
greg@goldenbear.com                  You're soaking in it.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: sboxx@lodestone.nsa.gov
Date: Sat, 4 Dec 93 21:04:35 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Who am I really?
Message-ID: <9312050502.AA08272@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Maybe I'm an NSA agent-provocateur sent here to destroy you.

You never know....hehehe




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Mike Ingle <MIKEINGLE@delphi.com>
Date: Sat, 4 Dec 93 20:19:35 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Anonymous Digicash
Message-ID: <01H63IIMB1AG90R973@delphi.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I want to write a simple digicash program. This will use code from PGP
as much as possible. It will probably be online digicash, but it needs
strong anonymity. For that you need a blind signature protocol. What is
the best one, and where can I get a description of it?

What is the best/simplest digicash system to implement?

Is it possible to have a partially blind signature? For example, the
customer generates the cash (random string), blinds it, and sends it
to the bank. The bank adds an expiration date and signs it. The customer
unblinds the random string, leaving a signature on both the cash and
the expiration date.

--- MikeIngle@delphi.com




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Matthew J Ghio <mg5n+@andrew.cmu.edu>
Date: Sat, 4 Dec 93 19:23:08 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Escobar and Cellular Ph0n3z
In-Reply-To: <iJT2Dc2w165w@mindvox.phantom.com>
Message-ID: <Qh0JBWi00VpDN1q0pY@andrew.cmu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


lex@mindvox.phantom.com (Lex Luthor) wrote:

> The report stated that Escobar was worth a few Billion dollars
> and that he was a smart man. Why didn't he use encryption?
> This would have thwarted the police. Of course you may say,
> how many encrypted cellular conversations take place in that
> part of Columbia, and the answer would probably be close to
> zero if not zero. So just modify the equipment to recognize
> encrypted/scrambled speech or whatever and locate the source.
> Fine, but if Escobar has so much money and so many allies,
> why not buy many encrypted cellular set-ups and distribute
> them to his people (paying them of course) to move
> throughout the region constantly and make cellular encrypted
> phone calls at random?
> 
> Now, tying this in with the 'ol Clipper-chip debate, if
> Escobar who is worth billions of dollars, is smart, and is
> considered one of the biggest drug kingpins in history does
> not use encryption, how many lower-level criminals, who
> don't have the financial resources nor the intelligence will?

Good questions.  The answers are varied.  But, basically, it comes down
to this: Just because the technology is availiable, it doesn't mean
Escobar was aware of it.  There just isn't enough recognition among the
general public of what technology is availiable.  Certainly, there were
a lot of things he could have done to defend himself better.  I don't
think lack of inteligence was Escobar's nemisis, but simply that he did
not have good technical advisors availiable to him, and wasn't aware of
the technology.  There is a lot more necessary than to just say "he
should have used encryption".

First of all, you can't make an encrypted cellular call so easily. 
There do not yet exist many widely availiable systems which can compress
digitized sound in real time to fit within the bandwidth limitations of
cellular telephone technology or most wireline telephone channels. 
We've been over this in our discussions of building secure telephones;
it's not easy, and radio noise caused by cellular makes it even more
difficult.  Even if Escobar had such technology availiable to him, the
person he was calling would also have to have the same encryption
hardware.  I suspect that given the situation, this might not be
possible.  But - if Escobar had high-tech computerized/digital
encryption technology, why would he be using cellular at all?  A
high-speed radio modem would have worked well for encryping all his
communications.  Still, the fact that while all of us cyberwizards here
can talk about what would be possible, building a encrypted
communications network takes a lot of work.  Escobar probably would have
needed to enploy a team of cyrptographers and computer/radio experts -
and they're not easy to find in rural Colombia.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Anonymous <nowhere@bsu-cs.bsu.edu>
Date: Sat, 4 Dec 93 19:19:35 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: The Psuedospoofing Saga Continues
Message-ID: <9312050320.AA25688@bsu-cs.bsu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



From: ebrandt@jarthur.cs.hmc.edu (Eli Brandt)
Newsgroups: talk.politics.crypto,alt.privacy,alt.privacy.anon-server,news.admin.policy,comp.org.eff.talk,comp.admin.policy,alt.conspiracy
Subject: Re: CRYPTOANARCHIST INFILTRATION ALERT
Date: 5 Dec 1993 00:14:51 GMT
Organization: Harvey Mudd College, Claremont CA
Message-ID: <2dr95r$6dg@jaws.cs.hmc.edu>
References: <dasherCHH3Ey.J1F@netcom.com> <tcmayCHH6MA.Mzw@netcom.com> <Dec04.105319.36526@yuma.acns.colostate.edu>
NNTP-Posting-Host: jarthur.cs.hmc.edu

In article <Dec04.105319.36526@yuma.acns.colostate.edu>, L. Detweiler <ld231782@casco.lance.colostate.edu> wrote:
>As for what the paranoid ranter and conspiracy theorist an12070 thinks, 
>who gives a damn? I'm always amazed at top cypherpunks, supposedly interested
>in anonymity, attempting to equate me with this email address.

Oh, come off it.  Your rants under various names (including your own)
are very similar: in tone and style, in topic, in their universal
fixation on PSEUDOSPOOFING, "top cypherpunks", and "cypherpunk
leaders", in time of night sent to the list, in 0 of
punctuation.  Then we have an12070 quoting from private mail to you --
you tried to weasel by saying you'd "communicated with your
colleague", whom you're now calling a "paranoid ranter".  And just
today you made a blatant foul-up in your rant on drug conspiracies:

> Message-Id: <9312041519.AA16672@anon.penet.fi>
> To: cypherpunks@toad.com
> From: an12070@anon.penet.fi (Pablo Escobar)
> puts the life of everyone in the group at deadly dangerous risk. He
> said something very bizarre to me, `so Lance, just HOW ARE YOU FEELING
> TODAY?' The strange tone was entirely uncharacteristic of him, and I

Oops.  I find it ironic that for all your rants about PSEUDOSPOOFING,
your practices are the most blatant and long-running example I have
ever encountered.  I would not count your an12070 account as more
than one identity, except that you constantly change the name and
use different ones to contradict others:

   "The Executioner" <an12070@anon.penet.fi>, says:
> I thought that the infamous L. Detweiler had stopped his posting, but it
> appears that he is back, and more neurotic than ever.
   but "S. Boxx" <an12070@anon.penet.fi> says:
> BTW, many thanks to L.Detweiler for his lone help in helping me break a
> corrupt conspiracy and massive cyberspatial hoax.

Enough.

>Timothy C. May (tcmay@netcom.com) wrote:
>
>: "Medusa" (me, others). I gave up long ago trying to convice Larry
>: Detweiler (alias an12070, The Executioner, S. Boxx, The Pervert, The
>: Psychopunk, and apparently such pseudonyms) that I am a real person,

>That's interesting. Perhaps you would like to enumerate these attempts.

You may recall that your very first paranoid claim was that Tim May
and Jamie Dinkelacker were the same person.  You were given the phone
numbers of both -- this was before people became nervous about giving
you any personal information.  Did you ever attempt a reality check?

>If they were,  they would have long ago answered my honest questions in
>a straightforward manner.

Oh, you mean like:
>that by E.Hughes in RISKS, `I have never posted under any other name than
>E.Hughes' obviously do not count, although they may fool some people.

It's not an answer because he didn't ADMIT to his heinous CRIMES, I
guess.  Rot in place, will you?

>ld231782@longs.LANCE.ColoState.EDU

   Eli   ebrandt@jarthur.claremont.edu
	 PGP 2 key by finger or e-mail
"I have noticed an interesting overlap between radical libertarians, crypto-
 anarchists, psychopunks, and people who promote sodomy."  -- L. Detweiler






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: nobody@shell.portal.com
Date: Sat, 4 Dec 93 22:23:08 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Remailer Traffic Augmentation
Message-ID: <9312050621.AA11296@jobe.shell.portal.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


(CAPS LOCK ALERT!!!!>

WHILE READING HAL'S REMAILER STATS I GOT SOMEWHAT DEPRESSED IT SEEMS
THAT I COULD EASILY CORRELATE HIS PEAKS WITH SOME OF MY REMAILER EXPERIMENTS.
BY CORRELATING WITH MY MAIL LOGS. I HAVE BEEN LOOKING AT .forward INITIATED
SCRIPTS THAT WOULD PING EVERY KNOWN REMAILER EVERYTIME A PIECE OF REGULAR
MAIL WAS RECEIVED(NON REMAILER PING TRAFFIC).
IT APPEARS THAT PROCMAIL WOULD BE IDEAL BUT IT DOESNT SEEM TO BE UNIVERSAL
AT EVERY SITE SO I HAVE ALSO BEEN LOOKING AT C, PERL AND TCL. IF JUST A FEW 
(1-6) ACCOUNTS AT AS FEW AS 15 SITES DID THIS IT WOULD MAKE TRAFFIC
ANALYSIS MUCH MORE DIFFICULT. WHAT DO THE REST OF  THE TENTACLES THINK?


       MEDUSA'S MOTHER

     
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
To find out more about the anon service, send mail to help@anon.penet.fi.
Due to the double-blind, any mail replies to this message will be anonymized,
and an anonymous id will be allocated automatically. You have been warned.
Please report any problems, inappropriate use etc. to admin@anon.penet.fi.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Date: Sat, 4 Dec 93 22:29:36 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Who am I Really
In-Reply-To: <9312050558.AA23035@toad.com>
Message-ID: <199312050626.WAA10555@mail.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



> Whoever sboxx@lodestone.nsa.gov is, he sure ISN'T NSA!
> Everyone knows that NSA does not have an ip address and the one that
> it does use is so innocuous that any private knows it!
...
> Kasey
> a/k/a The Punisher

Truly, as the message-ID of his posting to us says:

<9312050502.AA08272@longs.lance.colostate.edu>

...which ought to look pretty familiar by now. He altered the "From:"
field to his fictional "sboxx@lodestone.nsa.gov" address, but
neglected certain other identifying marks. 

Not that anyone has any doubts (do I see any hands raised? I didn't
think so). Yes, Lance or Larry (he took me to task for using "Larry")
is still ranting over in talk.politics.crypto. Yes, still playing
games.

What's beginning to irritate me--which is probably LD's intent--is the
e-mail I'm getting from non-Cypherpunks asking me to explain myself
to justify my campaign against Detweiler! Sort of like what happened
about a month ago when a number of Cypherpunks were not fully aware of
LD's history and methods and were, to varying degrees, suggesting we
listen to him and so forth (I have no objection to that....I don't
urge censorship by the List per se, just common sense filters and
possibly expulsion of seriously disruptive folks...but I have no say
over this so am just expressing my views).

The list as a whole is much more loosely-coupled and so the feedback
loop is even longer. My approach is to not try to correct their many
misapprehensions. Why should I, after all? This Detweiler business
will blow over, and the Net has more important things to worry about.

To those who frequently urge us not to mention Detweiler, or to take a
pledge of silence (Sorry, Sandy!), I feel my few postings on LD are
only a tiny fraction of his postings--that man must spend several
hours a day composing his ramblings and free association tracts. If
you worry about bandwidth wastage, go to the main cause instead. Or
use kill files, filters, etc.

I do actually comment on _other_ things, you know. 

I got an Apple Newton today, so I'll be playing with it pretty
intensively for the next few days (Scott Collins demoed some
crypto-related apps for the Newton at the last Cypherpunks meeting...I
think this is an important tool for local storage of keys and perhaps
even for being a main PGP platform, once connectivity to more machines
and programs is made easier.)

--Tim May

-- 
..........................................................................
Timothy C. May         | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,  
tcmay@netcom.com       | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
408-688-5409           | knowledge, reputations, information markets, 
W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA  | black markets, collapse of governments.
Higher Power: 2^756839 | Public Key: PGP and MailSafe available.
Note: I put time and money into writing this posting. I hope you enjoy it.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: ferguson@icm1.icp.net (Paul Ferguson x2044)
Date: Sat, 4 Dec 93 19:49:35 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Quote of the Week
Message-ID: <9312050347.AA29110@icm1.icp.net>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



On Sat, 4 Dec 93 22:20:44 -0500,
 Anonymous <nowhere@bsu-cs.bsu.edu> wrote -


> "I have noticed an interesting overlap between radical libertarians,
>  crypto-anarchists, psychopunks, and people who promote sodomy."  
>  -- L. Detweiler




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: hfinney@shell.portal.com (Hal Finney)
Date: Sat, 4 Dec 93 23:09:37 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Anonymous Digicash
Message-ID: <9312050705.AA12780@jobe.shell.portal.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Mike Ingle asks about digicash.  The simplest system I know of that
is anonymous is the one by Chaum, Fiat, and Naor, which we have discussed
here a few times.  The idea is that the bank chooses an RSA modulus,
and a set of exponents e1, e2, e3, ..., where each exponent ei represents
a denomination and possibly a date.  The exponents must be relatively
prime to (p-1)(q-1).  PGP has a GCD routine which can be used to check
for valid exponents.

As with RSA, to each public exponent ei corresponds a secret exponent
di, calculated as the multiplicative inverse of ei mod (p-1)(q-1).  Again,
PGP has a routine to calculate multiplicative inverses.

In this system, a piece of cash is a pair (x, f(x)^di), where f() is a
one-way function.  MD5 would be a reasonable choice for f(), but notice
that it produces a 128-bit result.  f() should take this 128-bit output
of MD5 and "reblock" it to be an multi-precision number by padding it;
PGP has a "preblock" routine which does this, following the PKCS standard.

The way the process works, with the blinding, is like this.  The user
chooses a random x.  This should probably be at least 64 or 128 bits,
enough to preclude exhaustive search.  He calculates f(x), which is
what he wants the bank to sign by raising to the power di.  But rather
than sending f(x) to the bank directly, the user first blinds it by
choosing a random number r, and calculating D=f(x) * r^ei.  (I should
make it clear that ^ is the power operator, not xor.)  D is what he
sends to the bank, along with some information about what ei is, which
tells the denomination of the cash, and also information about his account
number.

The bank debits his account for the amount corresponding to exponent ei,
and signs D by raising it to the power di.  This leads to
E = f(x)^di * r, which is what the bank sends back to the user.  The
user divides E by r (this is done by calculating the multiplicative inverse
of r modulo the bank's modulus, and multiplying E by that), giving C=f(x)^di.
The user can then create the actual coin as (x, f(x)^di).  This should
also have some information appended to it to remember what exponent was
used (what denomination this is), so it would actually be (ei, x, f(x)^di).

There are some complications in this system.  The user may want to withdraw
several coins at once, and when he gets back the E values he needs to know
which is which (so he knows which r to divide by for each one).  So he
may want to include some unique tag with his D values he sends to the bank
and get the bank to send those back with the E values so that he can
distinguish them.

The bank will not recognize the coins (ei, x, f(x)^di) when they are
deposited (returned to the bank), due to the blinding.  But it will need
to keep a list of all the x values it has seen so far so that it can detect
double-spending.  If the ei values encode not only denominations but also
issue dates at some level, and if the cash is given a limited lifetime,
the list can be purged of old values periodically.

I do think a prototype digital cash system would not be too hard to do.
It would not have to address all of these problems right away.  The
larger problem is how to experiment in a meaningful way with diigicash
due to the difficulty in giving it value.  We've talked about this problem
before but I haven't seen any really good solutions.  Karl Barrus tried to
start up a non-anonymous cash system some months ago but there was nothing
to spend it on.  (Actually, he does have a remailer which uses his cash,
but since other remailers are free that has probably limited interest in
the for-pay remailer.)

I am continuing to work on a simple TCL interface to much of the PGP
functionality which would be needed for such a system (and for other
types of experimentation).  I have the MP library done, so the additional
entry points needed would include the MD5 one-way function, the random-
number generation, and the reblocking.  Perhaps in another week I will
have those hooks in place.  Then you could write the control software
in TCL, which would be easier for prototyping purposes since it's
interpreted.

Hal Finney
hfinney@shell.portal.com




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Perry E. Metzger" <pmetzger@lehman.com>
Date: Sat, 4 Dec 93 20:09:35 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Escobar and Cellular Ph0n3z
In-Reply-To: <Qh0JBWi00VpDN1q0pY@andrew.cmu.edu>
Message-ID: <199312050405.XAA29292@snark.ts.lehman.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Matthew J Ghio says:
> First of all, you can't make an encrypted cellular call so easily. 
> There do not yet exist many widely availiable systems which can compress
> digitized sound in real time to fit within the bandwidth limitations of
> cellular telephone technology or most wireline telephone channels. 

Untrue. There are many systems I can buy off the shelf from companies
like Cylink or Crypto AG. True, some of the systems are not widely
available outside the U.S. or Europe, but when you are smuggling
Cocaine by the planeload taking a few phones back with you on the
return trip seems perfectly feasable.

> We've been over this in our discussions of building secure telephones;
> it's not easy, and radio noise caused by cellular makes it even more
> difficult.

Its not easy because people have been lazy, not because it isn't
perfectly available. "Radio noise" on cellular isn't nearly so bad as
you make it out.

Perry




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Eli Brandt <ebrandt@jarthur.Claremont.EDU>
Date: Sat, 4 Dec 93 23:09:36 PST
To: cypherpunks list <cypherpunks@toad.com>
Subject: Re: Quote of the Week
In-Reply-To: <9312050347.AA29110@icm1.icp.net>
Message-ID: <9312050709.AA23786@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> From: ferguson@icm1.icp.net (Paul Ferguson x2044)
> On Sat, 4 Dec 93 22:20:44 -0500,
>  Anonymous <nowhere@bsu-cs.bsu.edu> wrote -
> 
> > "I have noticed an interesting overlap between radical libertarians,
> >  crypto-anarchists, psychopunks, and people who promote sodomy."  
> >  -- L. Detweiler

The rest of my .sig selection, in case anyone cares:

"Just another repulsive variation on psychopunk depravity and
 perversions.  Honest people would be repulsed by it."   -- L. Detweiler

"Your hideous criminal clock, your insidious time 
 bomb, is tick-tick-ticking."		-- L. Detweiler

"They have written customized software for pseudospoofing and style 
 analysis for cyberspatial warfare across the many lists."  -- L. Detweiler

"I think all the cryptoanarchists, radical libertarians, and cypherpunks
who promote drug use seem to be in favor of a sort of social sadochism [sic]
and masochism."		-- L. Detweiler




   Eli   ebrandt@jarthur.claremont.edu




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Eli Brandt <ebrandt@jarthur.Claremont.EDU>
Date: Sun, 5 Dec 93 00:44:04 -0700
To: "L. Detweiler" <ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Subject: Re: Hi there!
In-Reply-To: <9312050703.AA11258@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Message-ID: <9312050744.AA11808@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> I would like to point out that this is an `obviously pseudonymous'
> use, not `pseudoanonymous'.

Why do you constantly use different usernames for an12070, and have
them espouse contradictory positions?  To increase the number of
apparently-distinct identities which you control!  You are
attempting to BLUDGEON your opponents into abject cringing
SUBMISSION through the sheer force of DEMOCRATIC NUMBERS.

> if someone lies to me in email, I am offended and will follow up. if
> these tentacles did not claim to be real people, I would go away.

You know, you're going to be really embarrassed when you come to
your senses.  Think about this for a minute.  Do you have *any*
grounds for believing that we're all the same person?  Let me make
you an offer: pick the two people whom you think are most clearly a
single person.  Test your hypothesis.  If you prove that they are
the same, I will publically apologize to you and denounce
"pseudospoofing".  If you cannot do so within a pre-agreed time
limit, you will stop ranting.  Making such a proof should not 
be too hard -- after all, people connected you and S.Boxx within
a week or two.

> if you have any knowledge of what is going on, it is your duty to
> stop the lie.

"Any knowledge" indeed.  I am MEDUSA, the controller of ALL TENTACLES.

   Eli   ebrandt@jarthur.claremont.edu




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "L. Detweiler" <ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Date: Sat, 4 Dec 93 22:54:36 PST
To: cypherwonks@lists.eunet.fi
Subject: Cyberspatial Bill of Rights
Message-ID: <9312050653.AA11109@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Of interest to some...

===cut=here===

Date: 04 Dec 93 14:20:40 EST
From: Marty Winter <76407.3521@compuserve.com>
To: "SEA.LIST" <sea-list@panix.com>
Subject: Electronic Bill of Rights

Courtesy Friends & Lovers BBS, Selkirk, NY



 Posted with the permission of Frank Connolly of
 The American University. Information on how to contact him is at the
 end of this document.

 ++++++++++++++++++
 The following document might be of interest...
 Called the  Bill of Rights and Responsibilities
 for Electronic Learners,  it is a model policy statement regarding the
 rights and responsibilities of individuals and institutions regarding
 computers and electronic networks in education. Although the project
 was begun as part of EDUCOM, it is now an initiative of the American
 Association of Higher Education (AAHE).

 Your comments and suggestions for gaining consideration and discussion
 of the Bill on campuses, in school districts and professional forums
 would be appreciated.

 ===============    TEXT OF BILL FOLLOWS  ===========================


 PREAMBLE

 In order to protect the rights and recognize the responsibilities of
 individuals and institutions, we, the members of the educational
 community, propose this Bill of Rights and Responsibilities for the
 Electronic Community of Learners.  These principles are based on a
 recognition that the electronic community is a complex subsystem of 
 the educational community founded on the values espoused by that
 community.  As new technology modifies the system and further empowers
 individuals, new values and responsibilities will change this culture.
 As technology assumes an integral role in education and lifelong
 learning, technological empowerment of individuals and organizations
 becomes a requirement and right for students, faculty, staff, and
 institutions, bringing with it new levels of responsibility that
 individuals and institutions have to themselves and to other members
 of the educational community.


 ARTICLE I: INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS

 The original Bill of Rights explicitly recognized that all individuals
 have certain fundamental rights as members of the national community.
 In the same way, the citizens of the electronic community of learners
 have fundamental rights that empower them.

 Section 1.
 A citizen's access to computing and information resources shall 
 not be denied or removed without just cause. 
 
 Section 2. 
 The right to access includes the right to appropriate training and 
 tools required to effect access. 

 Section 3. 
 All citizens shall have the right to be informed about personal 
 information that is being and has been collected about them, and 
 have the right to review and correct that information,.  Personal 
 information about a citizen shall not be used for other than the 
 expressed purpose of its collection without the explicit 
 permission of that citizen. 

 Section 4. 
 The constitutional concept of freedom of speech applies to 
 citizens of electronic communities. 
 
 Section 5. 
 All citizens of the electronic community of learners have
 ownership rights over their own intellectual works.
 
 
 ARTICLE II: INDIVIDUAL RESPONSIBILITIES 
 
 Just as certain rights are given to each citizen of the electronic 
 community of learners, each citizen is held accountable for his 
 or her actions.  The interplay of rights and responsibilities 
 within each individual and within the community engenders 
 the trust and intellectual freedom that form the heart of our 
 society. This trust and freedom are grounded on each person's 
 developing the skills necessary to be an active and contributing 
 citizen of the electronic community. These skills include an 
 awareness and knowledge about information technology and 
 the uses of information and an understanding of the roles in the 
 electronic community of learners. 

 Section 1. 
 It shall be each citizen's personal responsibility to actively 
 pursue needed resources: to recognize when information is 
 needed, and to be able to find, evaluate, and effectively use 
 information. 

 Section 2.
 It shall be each citizen's personal responsibility to recognize 
 (attribute) and honor the intellectual property of others. 

 Section 3. 
 Since the electronic community of learners is based upon the 
 integrity and authenticity of information, it shall be each 
 citizen's personal responsibility to be aware of the potential for 
 and possible effects of manipulating electronic information: to 
 understand the fungible nature of electronic information; and to 
 verify the integrity and authenticity, and assure the security of 
 information that he or she compiles or uses. 

 Section 4. 
 Each citizen, as a member of the electronic community of 
 learners, is responsible to all other citizens in that community: 
 to respect and value the rights of privacy for all; to recognize and 
 respect the diversity of the population and opinion in the 
 community; to behave ethically; and to comply with legal 
 restrictions regarding the use of information resources. 
 
 Section 5. 
 Each citizen, as a member of the electronic community of
 learners, is responsible to the community as a whole to
 understand what information technology resources are 
 available, to recognize that the members of the community 
 share them, and to refrain from acts that waste resources or 
 prevent others from using them. 


 ARTICLE III: RIGHTS OF EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTIONS 

 Educational institutions have legal standing similar to that of 
 individuals.  Our society depends upon educational institutions 
 to educate our citizens and advance the development of 
 knowledge.  However, in order to survive, educational 
 institutions must attract financial and human resources. 
 Therefore, society must grant these institutions the rights to the 
 electronic resources and information necessary to accomplish 
 their goals. 

 Section 1. 
 The access of an educational institutions to computing and 
 information resources shall not be denied or removed without 
 just cause. 

 Section 2.
 Educational institutions in the electronic community of learners 
 have ownership rights over the intellectual works they create. 

 Section 3. 
 Each educational institution has the authority to allocate 
 resources in accordance with its unique institutional mission. 


 ARTICLE IV: INSTITUTIONAL RESPONSIBILITIES 
 
 Just as certain rights are assured to educational institutions in 
 the electronic community of learners, so too each is held 
 accountable for the appropriate exercise of those rights to foster 
 the values of society and to carry out each institution's mission. 
 This interplay of rights and responsibilities within the 
 community fosters the creation and maintenance of an 
 environment wherein trust and intellectual freedom are the 
 foundation for individual and institutional growth and success. 
 
 Section 1. 
 The institutional members of the electronic community of 
 learners have a responsibility to provide all members of their
 community with legally acquired computer resources (hardware,
 software, networks, data bases, etc.) in all instances where access 
 to or use of the resources is an integral part of active 
 participation in the electronic community of learners. 

 Section 2. 
 Institutions have a responsibility to develop, implement, and 
 maintain security procedures to insure the integrity of 
 individual and institutional files. 

 Section 3. 
 The institution shall treat electronically stored information as 
 confidential.  The institution shall treat all personal files as 
 confidential, examining or disclosing the contents only when 
 authorized by the owner of the information, approved by the 
 appropriate institutional official, or required by local, state or 
 federal law. 

 Section 4. 
 Institutions in the electronic community of learners shall train 
 and support faculty, staff, and students to effectively use 
 information technology.  Training includes skills to use the 
 resources, to be aware of the existence of data repositories and
 techniques for using them, and to understand the ethical and
 legal uses of the resources.

                                                 August, 1993

 *  Frank Connolly                         The American University      *
 *  FRANK@American.EDU                     119 Clark Hall               *
 *  (202) 885-3164                         Washington, D.C  20016       *





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: The PUNISHER - Judge; Jury; Executioner <kaseyu@acad.stedwards.edu>
Date: Sat, 4 Dec 93 21:59:36 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Who am I Really
Message-ID: <9312050558.AA23035@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Whoever sboxx@lodestone.nsa.gov is, he sure ISN'T NSA!
Everyone knows that NSA does not have an ip address and the one that
it does use is so innocuous that any private knows it!

Kids these days! :)


Kasey
a/k/a The Punisher


^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
THE     ##  ## ###### ######
       ### ## ##     ##  ##
      ###### ###### ######
     ## ###     ## ##  ##
    ##  ## ###### ##  ## .....             WHO?
 ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Alan (Miburi-san) Wexelblat" <wex@media.mit.edu>
Date: Sat, 4 Dec 93 21:19:36 PST
To: frode@toaster.SFSU.EDU
Subject: Escobar and Cellular Ph0n3z
In-Reply-To: <9312042011.AA10620@toaster.SFSU.EDU>
Message-ID: <9312050519.AA17625@media.mit.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


For me, paranoia runs too deep.  It's just too easy, too convenient an end
to the story -- the Bad Man dead with no chance to implicate those who
helped him.  The gov't looks good, both at home and in the US; more money
for the War on Drugz

Escobar got out of jail once; he had no reason to fear going back to jail
for a while.  I'm betting that the body in that casket is not his, that this
is his way of "retiring" from the game, and that he cut a deal with the
gov't to do it.  Note that his family was given protective custody by the
gov't less than a week ago.

We probably won't know the truth for years.

--Alan




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: trestrab@GVSU.EDU (BETH TRESTRAIL)
Date: Sat, 4 Dec 93 21:33:08 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Pablo and NSA
Message-ID: <9311057550.AA755080250@GVSU.EDU>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



>> NSA provided Columbian officials with the tools
>> necessary to decipher communication between the
>> Columbian drug lord and his cohorts.  Escobar had been
>> communicating by computer using the American Pretty
>> Good Privacy (PGP) software product which was
>> compromised by NSA officials working at a remote
>> listening station in the Columbian jungle. 
>>
>> 
>
>
>Hopefully this is a joke.  However, it does bring up a point.  The NSA can
> put fear into people's minds by simply *claiming* the ability to
>compromise PGP.  They don't have to really be able to.
>Just start a rumor, sit back, and watch what happens.
>
>Jim_Miller@suite.com
>

          Under any circumstances of what the NSA may or may not be
          able to do regarding breaking PGP, your traffic is certainly
          no worse off than sending it in the clear, and most likely
          quite a bit better off.

          Jeff
          trestrab@gvsu.edu




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "L. Detweiler" <ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Date: Sat, 4 Dec 93 23:43:09 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: A Clarification on My Trials and Tribulations
Message-ID: <9312050740.AA11785@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Cypherpunks, you just don't get it. Why am I continuing to attack you
and your leaders despite your vicious, cowardly attacks on me and my
friends? Because, as long as you stand for *lies*, you do not have a
right to exist. And to the extent that you promote *lies* you are
corrupting the Internet and poisoning cyberspace.

J.Gilmore says, `a pseudonym is not illegal unless used for deceptive
purposes.' But you cypherpunks, that's the *only* purpose you are using
them for! If I asked a tentacle, `are you a pseudonym', and it said
`yes', do you think I would have gone to all this trouble to write tens
of thousands of words attacking people and a movement I used to
respect? If I asked your leaders, `have you ever communicated with me
under a pseudonym' and they gave me straight answers, do you think I
would still be around? YOU HAVE NO RIGHT TO LIE TO ANYONE.

Cypherpunks, how many of you have gotten messages, `hey, what do you
think about T.C.May or E.Hughes and this pseudospoofing thing? Are you
going to do anything about it?' For all of you who don't give a damn
about your leaders pseudospoofing, why don't you care that your own
leaders could be molesting you with their tentacles in this way? Using
them in a manipulative way to gauge your loyalty to the movement and
manipulate your trust? On the list and in your email? WHY DON'T YOU
GIVE A DAMN? All I can conclude is that everyone here is in favor of
deception, treachery, betrayal, and perversions, *particularly* if
their leaders are responsible. Where the hell do you think I got all
the stuff for `Joy of Pseudospoofing'? You think I made it all up?

Your leaders molested me in precisely this way, but both the tentacles
and your leaders stonewalled, evaded, and counterattacked. They think
it is FUNNY how they have personally driven me to the BRINK OF
INSANITY. And they *continue* to escalate instead of making simple
statements about their beliefs in pseudospoofing, which would satisfy
me and anyone else who has doubts.

You want the truth? despite their bland statements your leaders *know*
that pseudospoofing is PERVERTED and that is the only reason they
refrain from saying anything about it, the only reason they continue to
attack me as a deranged lunatic. What am I, the police? I don't GIVE A
DAMN about all your perversions, as long as you keep them the hell out
of my mailbox. But you *don't*. Everytime I think there is another
person I can trust, it was nothing but another Leader Tentacle. Look,
if you LIE TO ME in mail, THAT PISSES ME OFF and I will ATTACK you for
it in an attempt to get to the TRUTH. and it should PISS OFF EVERYONE
ELSE HERE TOO but NOBODY GIVES A DAMN.

When I hear strange rumors about deceptions in the media, and your
eminent leaders fail to reassure me, why is no one else upset about
this?  Cypherpunks, don't you give a DAMN that articles by reputable
authors may contain DISTORTIONS AND LIES? Look, Markoff is a highly
respected writer. And if you lie or deceive a reporter, that is like a
personal insult. These people could get *fired* if their articles are
incorrect in a serious way. but you don't GIVE A DAMN. you think it is
FUNNY that you can TRICK REPUTABLE PEOPLE TO BELIEVE IN LIES and so you
can PROPAGATE THEM FURTHER.

Is there an honest cypherpunk in the entire world? None have contacted
me so far. There are a few people that are slinking away quietly with
their tail between their legs, but I think you all are just the same
scurrilous cowards that your leaders are.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "L. Detweiler" <ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Date: Sat, 4 Dec 93 23:49:36 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: The Magic Question
Message-ID: <9312050744.AA11814@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Cypherpunks, please tell me what question I can ask of a psychopunk
tentacle such that it will not lie and say that it is a real person! If
you have any honesty or credibility, tell me that question!

You don't believe in honesty, though. You believe you have the right to
invade other's attention with your stealth identities. You rant loudly
that anyone who attempts to make sure you are real is insane and a
`digital stalker'. You believe you have the right to stick any mail
message in anyones mailbox, to post to any newsgroup you wish. You
believe that you have a right to trample on the rights of others. And
you know you are perverted, but attack me as Satan for telling you
that. You think you have the right to lie to anyone who asks, `who are you?'

Tell me that question. I will go away when someone tells me the question.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "W. Kinney" <kinney@ucsu.Colorado.EDU>
Date: Sun, 5 Dec 93 00:29:37 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: A little Lao Tzu
Message-ID: <199312050827.AA13553@ucsu.Colorado.EDU>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain




Forgive the non-sequiter, but this seems appropriate...


After a bitter quarrel, some resentment must remain.
What can one do about it?
Therefore the sage keeps his half of the bargain
But does not exact his due.
A man of Virtue performs his part,
But a man without Virtue requires others to fulfill their obligations.
The Tao of heaven is impartial.
It stays with good men all the time.

(Lao Tzu)


                               -- Will



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "L. Detweiler" <ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Date: Sun, 5 Dec 93 00:39:38 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Larry Dyer
Message-ID: <9312050835.AA12591@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


E.Hughes informs me L.Dyer is the cypherpunks Wired photographer. Could
someone help me get in contact with him?

E.Hughes says to me, `if you still can't take a joke, don't bother
replying.' I'm amused by E.Hughes, the most frigid cyberspatial
personality I have ever met, referencing the subject of humor. What is
the joke? Who is it on? L.Detweiler? G.Spafford? Wired? NYT? How many
sites? How many states does it span? How many countries? How many
registered DNS entries? What kind of software? How many fake
identities? What about the telephony manipulations? Every practical
joker I have ever met at least had the decency to *end* it.

ah, what a cruel joke. and the jokers delight in it. they will never
stop. to do so would be to admit that they are frauds.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: edgar@spectrx.saigon.com (Edgar W. Swank)
Date: Sun, 5 Dec 93 02:34:37 PST
To: Cypherpunks          <cypherpunks@toad.com>
Subject: VOTE: Proposition desist
Message-ID: <24w3Dc9w165w@spectrx.saigon.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

VOTE: Proposition desist

  L. Detweiler will cease posting to the cypherpunks mailing list.  He
will no longer concern himself with the activities of those on the
cypherpunks mailing list here or on any other forum.

                     I support

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.3a

iQCVAgUBLQBW294nNf3ah8DHAQHTpAP/fLfxk9SysQIeVLICA0gnvYDbFfhTTTp0
JGL2xRFri7QmtgU6JzO13W9fwlflrpjC39vHcW6wA16SXZtZRXm4xtoYbAAJ8rOn
EIyLWQjncpZ1khY8pvO+iLNR/KzqWVa+jdQd/VaQar0Y3eFmxS6tyw5OWdOiJs3q
Yau0PJ0mdBk=
=OCMw
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

--
edgar@spectrx.saigon.com (Edgar W. Swank)
SPECTROX SYSTEMS +1.408.252.1005  Cupertino, Ca





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "L. Detweiler" <ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Date: Sun, 5 Dec 93 02:44:39 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Invasion of Privacy
Message-ID: <9312051043.AA13994@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Hello again, you darling cryptoanarchists! I just wanted to drop you a
line on the subject of my resume. At least one psychopunk has access to
my real paper resume and one tentacle has had long had access to an
ASCII version. An informer tells me that both have been circulating in
some circles for you all to smirk at. 

I consider this an atrocious breach of my privacy by more hypocrites.
My resume is directed at those who I intend, not those who wish to
discredit me. If you have knowledge of its circulation, please send me email.

Now, back to your regularly scheduled perversions.





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: chuck <chuck@cxf111.rh.psu.edu>
Date: Sun, 5 Dec 93 01:09:37 PST
To: ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu (L. Detweiler)
Subject: Re: The Magic Question
In-Reply-To: <9312050744.AA11814@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Message-ID: <199312050907.EAA29063@cxf111.rh.psu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text



L. Detweiler sez:

> You don't believe in honesty, though. You believe you have the right to
> invade other's attention with your stealth identities. 

Invade other's attention? What newspeak is this?

> You believe you have the right to stick any mail message in anyones mailbox

yes I do. If you don't like it, run a filter program to remove them before
you ever see them, or delete them. The US Postal Service says the same thing,
except that it better have a stamp on it.

> to post to any newsgroup you wish. 

Yes I do. although I will not post to just any random newsgroup, unlike 
some people who need not be mentioned, I do not bother the rest of the
world with paranoid delusions of conspiracy that would make Joe 
McCarthy congratulate me from the afterlife.

I am unaware of newsgroups that ban postings from specific persons.
Please inform me of them so I may not post to them in the future.

>You believe that you have a right to trample on the rights of others. 

My right to free speech allows me to dress in a white sheet with
a pointy hat and burn crosses if I feel like it. My right to free
speech allows me to say the holocaust never occured. I do not, because
such actions are despicable. I see them as tramping on the rights of 
others. I will support the right of the cross burner or the right of 
the holocaust denier to speak, no matter what the outcome is. Does 
this allow me to trample on the rights of innocent parties? possibly. 
Am I willing to accept the tradeoff?  Yes I am.

>you know you are perverted, but attack me as Satan for telling you that.

I know you are perverted. I do not know I am perverted.
I don't attack you as satan; I dismiss you as a lunatic.

>You think you have the right to lie to anyone who asks, `who are you?'

Ah, but I do have the _RIGHT_ to lie. Free Speech protects my telling
wildly ridiculous stories (without it, you'd be in deep trouble) that
have no basis in fact. Further, the only time I am obligated to tell
the truth is when I am under oath, and even then, there are times when 
I will not under any circumstances tell the truth (ie if a judge demands
I hand over a pgp key, I'll take contempt of court over violating those
beliefs I hold sacred over all others)

> Tell me that question. I will go away when someone tells me the question.

one cannot tell a question. To tell is the realm of the declarative 
sentance. Since declarative and interragotory sentances are mutually
exclusive, are we to assume that since telling a question is not 
possible that you will never go away?


Please find a rock to crawl under.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: cman@caffeine.io.com (Douglas Barnes)
Date: Sun, 5 Dec 93 07:59:47 PST
To: ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu (L. Detweiler)
Subject: Re: Invasion of Privacy
In-Reply-To: <9312051043.AA13994@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Message-ID: <199312051543.JAA11515@caffeine.caffeine.io.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Can someone please send me a copy of this resume, I need it for my 
files. 

Thanks!

Doug

> 
> Hello again, you darling cryptoanarchists! I just wanted to drop you a
> line on the subject of my resume. At least one psychopunk has access to
> my real paper resume and one tentacle has had long had access to an
> ASCII version. An informer tells me that both have been circulating in
> some circles for you all to smirk at. 
> 
> I consider this an atrocious breach of my privacy by more hypocrites.
> My resume is directed at those who I intend, not those who wish to
> discredit me. If you have knowledge of its circulation, please send me email.
> 
> Now, back to your regularly scheduled perversions.
> 
> 


-- 
----------------                                             /\ 
Douglas Barnes            cman@illuminati.io.com            /  \ 
Chief Wizard         (512) 448-8950 (d), 447-7866 (v)      / () \
Illuminati Online          metaverse.io.com 7777          /______\



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: hughes@ah.com (Eric Hughes)
Date: Sun, 5 Dec 93 11:44:50 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Pseudospoofing
In-Reply-To: <9312050721.AA11445@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Message-ID: <9312051935.AA02442@ah.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


This message went to cypherwonks.

Eric
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
The issue here is epistemology.

>There would be no problem if I asked a tentacle, `are you a pseudonym'
>and it answered `yes'. 

This is exactly like the question "Are you a liar?", to which the
answer is always "no".

>But the cypherpunks are setting up a network of
>fake sites and identities and continue to claim, to the very end, `yes,
>I am real' with their fake identities. 

When I am accused of saying "I am real" from the mouth of a fake
identity, and I deny this accusation, there are two models of reality
which satisfy the words exchanged:

-- I am using a fake identity, and I am lying to deny it.
-- I am not using a fake identity, and am telling the truth to deny it.

When confronted by a barrage of continuing accusations to which no
answer is possible, I prefer to remain silent.  I can gain no benefit
from discourse in this situation and can only waste my time and the
time of my correspondent.

The usual way to break out of this 'solipsism of the dialogue' is to
invoke a social mechanism, that is, ask someone else.  Under a belief
of widespread impersonation, however, all denials are now presumed to
come from the original speaker of the first denial.  Thus the
solipsism of the dialogue expands to a solipsism of all dialogues.

>Cypherpunks, please tell me what question I can ask of a psychopunk
>tentacle such that it will not lie and say that it is a real person! If
>you have any honesty or credibility, tell me that question!

There is no such question, as I argue above.  Am I dishonest if I
cannot exhibit the nonexistent?

Eric




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Aviel David Rubin <rubin@citi.umich.edu>
Date: Sun, 5 Dec 93 08:39:44 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Anonymous Digicash
Message-ID: <9312051637.AA03926@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Mike Ingle <MIKEINGLE@delphi.com> writes:

> I want to write a simple digicash program. This will use code from PGP
> as much as possible. It will probably be online digicash, but it needs
> strong anonymity. For that you need a blind signature protocol. What is
> the best one, and where can I get a description of it?
> 
> What is the best/simplest digicash system to implement?
> 
> Is it possible to have a partially blind signature? For example, the
> customer generates the cash (random string), blinds it, and sends it
> to the bank. The bank adds an expiration date and signs it. The customer
> unblinds the random string, leaving a signature on both the cash and
> the expiration date.
> 
> --- MikeIngle@delphi.com

Allowing the bank to choose a timestamp opens the door for a
subliminal channel.





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: jordan@imsi.com (Jordan Hayes)
Date: Sun, 5 Dec 93 09:29:45 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re:  The Magic Question
Message-ID: <9312051716.AA14173@IMSI.COM>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


	From ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu Sun Dec  5 03:06:00 1993

	You think you have the right to lie to anyone who asks, `who
	are you?'

I live in NYC, and am often approached by panhandlers.  Approached is
the wrong word, I guess I mean that I walk past them.  Every person
that walks by gets asked the same question: have any spare change?  I
choose to give to charity for a variety of personal reasons, but I
typically don't respond -- at all -- to requests from panhandlers.  I
don't look at them or respond verbally to the question.  Every now and
again, when I don't respond at all, I get an insult fired off at me --
like, 'You could at *least* say no' or somesuch.

I feel that so long as there's no reason to believe that the question
is an "honest" one -- that is, there's nothing to signal the start of a
conversation or a "relationship" ... I am, afterall, just walking by,
and the next person behind me gets the same appeal -- there's no reason
for me to respond, let alone with the "truth" ...

I believe that answering a question like "who are you" can and should
get different answers depending on the depth of the "relationship"
involved.  Is the question poser seeking some sort of "truth" ...?  A
"name" is simply a label, a tag, something to indirect through to
access the "named" ...  I'm sure we all know people whom we've called
"Jack" the entire time we've known him, and suddenly one day we see
Jack in a different situation and someone calls him John.  Has Jack
(*our* Jack) been "lying" to us?

-----

One year I spent a summer at a visual arts workshop with a group of
people who knew nothing of my past, and I was sure not to know them in
the future (10 years later, I've had no contact with any of them).  We
gathered in a circle on the first day of activities and introduced
ourselves after the leader read our names off a sheet.  When my name
was read, I just ignored it.  My name was read three times, and then
the leader went to the next name.  At the end of the list, she asked
"was there anyone whose name I didn't call" ... a woman put her hand
up, and so did I.  The leader took down our names, and we continued.

That summer, I was "Nick" to everyone at the workshop.  We worked in
very close quarters, and the group of 40 or so quickly developed the
kind of "trust" that's required in such intense situations.  People
needed to count on one another, and often spent sleepless nights
together working on projects, helping each other explore their vision
and response to the work we were doing, and generally becoming
"friends" ...

Inevitably, I was drawn to intimacy with one particular woman.  It's
one of those things you suddenly find yourself in.  We shared many
secrets, dark nights, heat.  In the end, I was "found out" by some
other of the staff.  It's not even clear how many people "knew" all
along.  Even the staff member I worked closest with could have known,
but for whatever reason never said a word.  The fiction was nearly
complete for 12 weeks.  I did not intend to defraud, the "truth" was
consistant.  When word passed around that Nick was not my name, some
refused to believe it.  Some approached me later and started with "Nick
... er, Jordan ... er ... what do I call you?"

I said it didn't matter to me, and most chose to call me Nick for the
remainder of our time together.  I received a few letters from that
particular woman, a christmas card or two.  I had to tell the place
that receives my mail to look out for mail addressed to Nick Stames and
route it to my box.  We continued a correspondance, sharing some bits
of the next phase of our lives, and she continued to call me Nick.  I
was, afterall, Nick to her.  That's who she "knew" ...

-----

Why do you care "who" I am?

/jordan




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Matthew J Ghio <mg5n+@andrew.cmu.edu>
Date: Sun, 5 Dec 93 13:03:13 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Pseudospoofing
In-Reply-To: <9312051935.AA02442@ah.com>
Message-ID: <0h0YhO_00VoyIADkZV@andrew.cmu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Eric Hughes wrote:

> >There would be no problem if I asked a tentacle, `are you a pseudonym'
> >and it answered `yes'. 
>
> This is exactly like the question "Are you a liar?", to which the
> answer is always "no".

If you were not a liar, would you tell me that you were a liar?  :)




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Anonymous <nowhere@bsu-cs.bsu.edu>
Date: Sun, 5 Dec 93 13:23:13 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Psychobabble
Message-ID: <9312052123.AA16808@bsu-cs.bsu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Newsgroups: talk.politics.crypto,alt.privacy,alt.privacy.anon-server,news.admin.policy,comp.org.eff.talk,comp.admin.policy,alt.conspiracy
From: ld231782@LANCE.ColoState.Edu (L. Detweiler)
Subject: Re: CRYPTOANARCHIST INFILTRATION ALERT
Sender: news@yuma.ACNS.ColoState.EDU (News Account)
Message-ID: <Dec05.095347.86607@yuma.ACNS.ColoState.EDU>
Date: Sun, 05 Dec 1993 09:53:47 GMT
References: <071303Z27111993@anon.penet.fi> <szaboCH5E17.HHK@netcom.com>
Nntp-Posting-Host: traver.lance.colostate.edu
Organization: Colorado State University, Fort Collins, CO  80523
X-Newsreader: TIN [version 1.2 021193BETA PL3]
Followup-To: talk.politics.crypto,alt.privacy,alt.privacy.anon-server,news.admin.policy,comp.org.eff.talk,comp.admin.policy,alt.conspiracy

Nick Szabo (szabo@netcom.com) wrote:

: No, Mr.
: Detweiler, I'm not "pseudospoofing", 

How do you explain your statements I analyzed in RISKS 15.27, where you
posted to cypherpunks promoting your sophisticated pseudospoofing techniques? 
Multiple posting sites, countermeasures and contempt for `opponents' who 
attempt to determine whether your tentacles are who they claim to be.

Frankly, I think you are a baldfaced liar. Are you intellectually challenged
or am I going to have to go root up all the archives to prove it?

You cryptoanarchists are so arrogant. it will be your downfall.

``I have never communicated under any other name than E.Hughes.' (E.Hughes,
RISKS 15.28x)

``You can have your private conspiracy xor your public credibility. Soon,
you will have neither.''

-- 

ld231782@longs.LANCE.ColoState.EDU
--

ld231782@longs.LANCE.ColoState.EDU




Newsgroups: talk.politics.crypto,alt.privacy,alt.privacy.anon-server,news.admin.policy,comp.org.eff.talk,comp.admin.policy,alt.conspiracy,alt.wired
From: ld231782@traver.lance.colostate.edu (L. Detweiler)
Subject: Re: CRYPTOANARCHIST INFILTRATION ALERT
Sender: news@yuma.ACNS.ColoState.EDU (News Account)
Message-ID: <Dec05.100158.56184@yuma.ACNS.ColoState.EDU>
Date: Sun, 05 Dec 1993 10:01:58 GMT
References: <071303Z27111993@anon.penet.fi> <CH6CnA.Dq2@Colorado.EDU> <sheafferCHBxos.70D@netcom.com> <PMETZGER.93Dec2154048@snark.lehman.com> <strnlghtCHJ6yA.EGL@netcom.com>
Nntp-Posting-Host: traver.lance.colostate.edu
Organization: Colorado State University, Fort Collins, CO  80523
X-Newsreader: TIN [version 1.2 021193BETA PL3]
Followup-To: talk.politics.crypto,alt.privacy,alt.privacy.anon-server,news.admin.policy,comp.org.eff.talk,comp.admin.policy,alt.conspiracy,alt.wired

David Sternlight (strnlght@netcom.com) wrote:
: In article <PMETZGER.93Dec2154048@snark.lehman.com>,
: Perry E. Metzger <pmetzger@lehman.com> wrote (about L. Detweiler):

: >He's
: >literally insane -- it isn't just hyperbole.

: The pot calling the kettle black?

hee, hee, once P.Metzger complained in his typical searing flame fashion
on the cpunk list that the word `cypherpunk' was just too darn subversive
sounding. Mr. Metzger is another classic cryptoanarchist. Hey Perry, could
you send me another mailbomb for tweaking your nose?

let the record show I am in no way agreeing with S.Sternlight <g>

people interested in civilizing cyberspace and repressing the cryptoanarchist
scum should send `subscribe cypherwonks' to majordomo@lists.eunet.fi.
Electronic Democracy is on it's way!

-- 

ld231782@longs.LANCE.ColoState.EDU




Newsgroups: alt.politics.datahighway,comp.org.eff.talk,talk.politics.crypto
From: ld231782@LANCE.ColoState.Edu (L. Detweiler)
Subject: Re: The Data Highway Patrol
Sender: news@yuma.ACNS.ColoState.EDU (News Account)
Message-ID: <Dec05.095354.95894@yuma.ACNS.ColoState.EDU>
Date: Sun, 05 Dec 1993 09:53:54 GMT
References: <tcmayCHGF7E.Cu1@netcom.com>
Nntp-Posting-Host: traver.lance.colostate.edu
Organization: Colorado State University, Fort Collins, CO  80523
X-Newsreader: TIN [version 1.2 021193BETA PL3]
Followup-To: alt.politics.datahighway,comp.org.eff.talk,talk.politics.crypto

Timothy C. May (tcmay@netcom.com) wrote:
: The Data Highway will no doubt be patrolled by a new elite police
: force, the "Data Highway Patrol." 

ha, ha, cryptoanarchists beware.

: They'll be sent out on their Harley-Davidson cybercycles to check for
: discriminatory data packets, for illegal use of encryption technology,
: and for "heavy loads" that strain network resources. And occasionally
: they'll stop and help a stranded Internetter.

and the cryptoanarchists like you will call them `pigs' and resent them
for promoting law and order where you previously had your delightful
lawless anarchy.

: Will President Reno send them in to raid the Cyber-Waco havens?

I dunno, but I hope she cracks down on the cryptoanarchist terrorists like
you.

: I was writing an essay for the Cypherpunks mailing list on the way
: strong crypto will make local gambling laws unenforceable (through
: "telegambling," where a casino in the Bahamas, or "somewhere" in
: cypherspace, is only a phone call through some digital mixes away). It
: became clear to me that the authorities will hardly countenance the use
: of the Data Highway---the taxpayer's NII--for such uses. 

yes, the cryptoanarchists will be quite at home when it is possible and
rampant. The Cyberspatial Mafia. complete with corruption, bribery, and
hit men.

: (And a lot of other "interesting" uses I could describe. If
: interested, join the Cypherpunks mailing list by sending a request to
: "cypherpunks-request@toad.com".  We were featured on the cover of the
: second issue of "Wired" and in the Summer, '93 issue of "Whole Earth
: Review," etc. An interesting bunch of folks.)

Warning: join the cypherpunks only if you are interested in cryptoanarchist
brainwashing from multiple fake identities, many of them from the leaders
themselves. `An interesting bunch of folks'. Hee, hee. more like 
cryptoanarchists and cyberspatial terrorists and guerillas, masters
of subterfuge and sabotage, gaining increasing respectability and influence
every day. You guys own a congressman yet?

: No, the Data Highway won't likely tolerate "sealed loads" that might
: be accessing offshore gambling dens, kiddie porn rings, or weapons
: secret information markets (not to mention the ever-worrisome
: anonymous markets for assasinations...child's play with digital
: remailers and digital cash).

Poor timmy and your cryptoanarchists, what are you going to do, given that
your favorite black uses are barred and illegal?

: rules and regulations for "fair access," for the allowable data
: packets that can travel on it, and for taxation of the explosion in
: commercial traffic which will inevitably come.
: Hence, the Data Highway Patrol.
: Or maybe they'll call it the "CyberSpace Patrol."

who will prevent people like you from building up arsenals of fake identities
to deceive others. 

: Personally, I hate government programs. I don't want the government
: "helping" with networks, and I don't want a streamlined data highway.
: I like the developing system we've got of zillions of cables,
: satellites, fiber optics, and the like, With lots of suppliers of
: services and lots of rerouting of packets, it makes it real hard to
: enforce the kind of restriction cited above.

poor timmy and his cryptoanarchists don't understand the world they live in.
they are outcasts and misfits who think that all forms of Government and
even Democracy are Orwellian oppressions. they will criticize any system
that attempts to put together secure email, that prevents forgery at the 
protocol level, as Orwellian.

: Timothy C. May         | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,  
: tcmay@netcom.com       | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
: 408-688-5409           | knowledge, reputations, information markets, 
: W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA  | black markets, collapse of governments.
: Higher Power: 2^756839 | Public Key: PGP and MailSafe available.

You forgot tax evasion, black marketeering, drug trafficking, pornography,
distribution, espionage, overthrow of governments. When are you going to
update your .sig?

: Note: I put time and money into writing this posting. I hope you enjoy it.

Delightful!

-- 

ld231782@longs.LANCE.ColoState.EDU
--

ld231782@longs.LANCE.ColoState.EDU





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Anonymous <nowhere@bsu-cs.bsu.edu>
Date: Sun, 5 Dec 93 18:09:53 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Anarchy Gone Awry (fwd) Cu Digest, #5.91
Message-ID: <9312060208.AA17728@bsu-cs.bsu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Computer underground Digest    Sun  Dec 5 1993   Volume 5 : Issue 91
                           ISSN  1004-042X

----------------------------------------------------------------------

Date: Thu, 02 Dec 93 04:36:10 -0700
From: "L. Detweiler" <ld231782@LONGS.LANCE.COLOSTATE.EDU>
Subject: File 1--Anarchy Gone Awry

Mr. Leichter raises some extremely pivotal issues in CUD #5.90 related
to the `anarchy' of the Internet. B.Sterling is the author of one of
the most brilliantly colorful characterizations and metaphors of the
Internet as `anarchic', comparing its evolution and development to that
of the English language:

  > The Internet's `anarchy' may seem strange or even unnatural,  but
  > it makes a certain deep and basic sense.  It's rather like the
  > `anarchy' of the English language.  Nobody rents English, and
  > nobody owns English.  As an English-speaking person, it's up
  > to you to learn how to speak English properly and make whatever
  > use you please of it (though the government provides certain
  > subsidies to help you learn to read and write a bit).
  > Otherwise, everybody just sort of pitches in, and somehow the
  > thing evolves on its own, and somehow turns out workable.  And
  > interesting.  Fascinating, even.  Though a lot of people earn
  > their living from using and exploiting and teaching  English,
  > `English' as an institution is public property, a public good.
  > Much the same goes for the Internet.  Would English  be improved
  > if the `The English Language, Inc.' had a board of directors
  > and a chief executive officer, or a President and a Congress?
  > There'd probably be a lot fewer new words in English, and a lot
  > fewer new ideas.

Unfortunately, though, having attended a lecture by Mr. Sterling and
having read `The Hacker Crackdown', I think he has a tendency to
overdramatize and glorify quasi-criminal behavior and rebellious,
subversive, revolutionary aspects of social structures, including those
of the Internet. In my view, to the contrary the Internet is largely
held together with the glue of social cohesion and human civility, and
ingredients that are destructive to that order are likewise toxic to
Cyberspace, and that, conversely, virtually all of the excruciating
poison in the bloodstream today can be traced to violations and
perversions of that trust. (Unfortunately, the English language is
itself subject to unpleasant, corrupt, or toxic uses such as for
profanity, disinformation, and lies, which are prevented or at least
minimized through rejections by honest people.) I agree with Mr.
Leichter in the belief (to paraphrase Twain) that `reports of the
anarchy on the Internet are greatly exaggerated'.

Leichter:
>The Internet has been
>described as an anarchy, but in fact only relatively small parts of
>the Internet are actually anarchic.

I would like to go further than this and suggest that the Internet has
been over-promoted as `anarchic' by certain subversive, quasi-criminal
segments that have found a tenacious hold there, namely extremist
libertarians and `Cryptoanarchists'. The Cryptoanarchist cause is
closely associated with the Cypherpunk founders E.Hughes and T.C.May
(characterized particularly by the latter's infamous signature), who in
my view appear to promote not merely `privacy for the masses' and `the
cryptographic revolution', but at least condone or tolerate the use of
collections of imaginary identities to manipulate and deceive others,
and even to evade legitimate government actions such as criminal
prosecutions. My most strident requests for their position, personal
knowledge, and potential involvement in this practice have gone
unanswered, evaded, and repressed over many weeks, but I have many
statements from followers that might be regarded as `cult fanatics'
about the Liberating Effects of `pseudoanonymity', which they exalt as
True Anonymity.

In my opinion, in this regard of the ease of creating fake identities,
the `anarchic' vulnerability of the Internet reaches its peak in
undesirable and socially poisonous consequences, which people are
bloodily battling daily on many diverse mailing lists and Usenet
groups. In my experience, the Internet inhabitants I have found who
most fanatically worship the Internet `anarchy' seem to be closely
associated with criminally subversive aims of pornography distribution,
tax evasion, black marketeering, and overthrow of governments, goals
which are all masked in much of the eloquent Cryptoanarchist dogma and
rhetoric. While some of us have glimpsed various hideous corners of
Cyberspatial Hell, those who subscribe to the Liberating Religion of
Anarchy are in their Paradise on the Internet As We Know It. I call
their Utopia a Ticking Time Bomb and a Recipe for an Apocalypse.

I have come to these (admittedly melodramatic) conclusions after ~10
months and ~3500 messages of generally unpleasant and at times
excruciatingly troubling and painful reading and participation on the
Cypherpunks list and many personal communications with the Cypherpunk
leaders including E.Hughes, T.C.May, and J.Gilmore. In fact, in my
opinion the `Psychopunk Manifesto' parody in CUD #5.89, which longtime
cypherpunk list subscriber P.Ferguson describes in 5.90 as having `made
its rounds in the cyberspatial world', actually in many ways comes
closer to delineating the actual cypherpunk agenda than the one
authored by founder E.Hughes on soda.berkeley.edu:
/pub/cypherpunks/rants/A_Cypherpunk's_Manifesto.  The satire is
actually a reformulated version of the original Manifesto, and the
former's amazing meme-virus penetration of the  into the cyberspatial
psyche that P.Ferguson alludes to is indicative of its resonance over the
 latter.

I gave the Cypherpunks the most extraordinary benefit of the doubt for
months, far beyond that of a reasonable cyberspatial inhabitant. But
now I must warn everyone who can hear me that if they assign the
`cypherpunks' as an organization the same credibility as a group like
EFF or CPSR they are dangerously, perhaps disastrously, misguided. They
appear to me to the contrary to be the cultivators of a flourishing
conspiracy and essentially the first Cyberspatial guerilla and
terrorist group! The Psychopunk satirization of the Cryptoanarchists is
representative of this Internet Anarchy Gone Awry.

More information on the CryptoAnarchist & Cypherpunk agenda can be
found in RISKS 15.25, 15.27, and 15.28x (FTP crvax.sri.com, directory
RISKS:). I also have an essay `Joy of Pseudospoofing', regarding the
dangerous consequences and poisonous effects of the manipulations of
fake cyberspatial identities such as on the Internet by
Cryptoanarchists, available to anyone who requests it from me by email
at <ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu>.

* * *

I think that many people have mistaken the word `anarchic,' implying no
overseeing authority or order (which the Internet is less) with the
word `decentralized' (which the Internet is more). Again, the
Internet has many regulatory and self-governing systems and orders.
For example, connecting sites are required to implement a certain
minimum set of software standards and prevent or even root out
corruptions in their local sites and software. We have centralized
databases that require the registration of domains for fees. A complex
network of agreements and policies governs interconnectivity and
communication, and a complicated interplay of elements affects basic
content such as `commercial vs. academic.' Lack of some of these
regulations and protocols would be disastrous.

Leichter:
>Most of the Internet, in fact, is
>better described as self-governing.  There are a variety of social
>norms concerning network use and interactions.  One doesn't post
>messages to unrelated groups.  One doesn't evade moderation
>restrictions.  One maintains a certain (rather limited, it must be
>admitted) degree of restraint in how one describes other network
>participants.  There are few effective mechanisms for enforcing these
>norms, and they are certainly broken on an all-too-regular basis; but
>the network continues to function because social pressure *can* be
>applied to those who become too annoying; and in the most outrageous
>cases, it's possible to remove the offenders' access to the net.

I advocate that we build new formal mechanisms to enforce this order!
We have for too long pretended that a central element of the Internet
is not integral to it, namely that of the `degree of restraint over
network participants' exerted through `social pressure'. Let us codify
and formalize these `norms concerning network use and interactions' and
develop systems that enforce them! I believe such systems can be
developed that do not stray from the sacred Internet tradition of
decentralization of control and freedom from censorship. Why should we
continue to subject ourselves to the torture of `few effective
mechanisms for enforcing these norms broken on an all-too-regular basis'?

One of my most enduring Cyberspatial hallucinations is that of a
Ratings server. A Ratings server would be a massive distributed network
for the propagation of information similar to Usenet, and could
conceivably be built upon it. But the Ratings server is not
Information, as Usenet is, it is Information about Information. Anyone
can post an arbitrary message to the Ratings server that refers to
Information somewhere else in Cyberspace. It is in a sense a Rating of
that Information. The Information could be *anything* -- a mailing
list, a person, a particular Usenet posting, an FTP site. But postings
on the Ratings server can be perused by anyone, and anyone can
contribute Ratings to the server or indicate their own opinion on the
existing Ratings. Different mechanisms exist such that some Ratings are
`local' and some are updated globally.

The fantastic possibilities of this system are evident upon some
reflection and consideration. We could establish arbitrary new groups
that have *formal* requirements that are matched by Ratings servers.
For example, we could require that new sites that enter the Internet be
`trusted' by an existing site. We could require that membership in
certain groups requires a certain amount of collateral peer approval,
with automatic suspension or expulsion as the consequences for
violating it! We could have *meaningful* polls on arbitrary issues. We
could have news servers that automatically sort and archive articles
according to their passing certain Ratings thresholds. We could
restrict the influence of troublemakers! These are all examples of
strengthening and formalizing the informal social orders that are, in
my opinion, today just barely holding the Internet together. With a
Ratings system, I think the civility of the Internet would increase to
a fantastic degree. In short, we could have our *own* cyberspatial government!

Note that there is no centralized authority or unfair influence in this
system, unless people corrupt their servers. When everyone who has
joined a group *individually* decides to screen their postings of
messages that fail to meet a certain `quality' or posters who have a
certain `reputation', that is not Orwellian Censorship but the
beautiful Internet freedom and right of Bozo Filtering. When everyone
who joins a group *agrees* to a charter that may bar troublemakers
based on Ratings, no one can claim they are being unfairly oppressed.

Other extremely interesting implementation issues in the use of the
Ratings servers can be addressed in detail. For example, the use of
cryptographic protocols to ensure the integrity of voting or privacy of
certain entries will certainly prove invaluable and even critical to
their development. The optimal protocols for the localization or
distribution of votes will surely be subject to extremely fascinating
and fruitful research. In my view the concept of a Ratings server is
wide open territory and holds some immensely promising potential in
finally, valiantly slaying the dreaded, ugly, vicious Signal to Noise
Monsters harassing, terrorizing, and torturing us everywhere on the
Internet, to be replaced with Shining Castles.

I urge anyone interested in developing `civilized systems for
cyberspace' to subscribe to a new group I have helped start with
J.Helgingius (owner of the popular and revolutionary anon.penet.fi
anonymous server) called the Cypherwonks, dedicated to openness,
honesty, and cooperation on the Internet, and building sophisticated
new systems to promote social harmony in Future Cyberspace. We are
particularly fascinated with the possibilities of `Electronic
Democracy'. (Send a message to `MajorDomo@lists.eunet.fi' with the body
the commands `info' or `subscribe cypherwonks'.)

I fervently hope that the glorifications and manipulations of Internet
Anarchy by mouth-frothing libertarian extremists, Cryptoanarchists,
and sympathizers can be adequately controlled and minimized in the
future, and some harmonious systems and effective countermeasures
along the lines of the Rating server can be established by visionaries
and tinkerers, but in any case, for the sake of humanity's integrity,
sanity, and well-being, I pray that Future Cyberspace is far less
Anarchic than the Current Internet.

------------------------------





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Peter Wayner <pcw@access.digex.net>
Date: Sun, 5 Dec 93 14:29:50 PST
To: unicorn@access.digex.net
Subject: Re:  Escobar and Cellular Ph0n3z
Message-ID: <199312052227.AA07911@access.digex.net>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Notes on Escobar:

*) Tom Clancy's next-to-last novel, _Clear and Present Danger_ describes
a secret drug interdiction mission run by the US Government. It is a 
novel, but he is well-known for getting many of the details right. The
important de-ja-vu is that in the novel, the agents used a "box" that 
allowed them to recognize the voices of the various druglords no matter
which phone line they used. This box would scan all of the cellular
channels.

*) I believe that Escobar called some radio station to complain about
some story about him. The call was traced. Perhaps by mundane, Dragnet-era
techniques. (I'm not sure about this point. Any confirmation?)







From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Date: Sun, 5 Dec 93 18:34:53 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Crypto Talk at Stanford, 8 December
Message-ID: <199312060235.SAA26139@mail.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Here are some details about the crypto talk I mentioned recently.
You're all welcome to attend, though of course you need to be in the
Bay Area!

--Tim May

Forwarded message:
> From daemon@Sunburn.Stanford.EDU Fri Dec  3 14:13:02 1993
> Date: Fri, 3 Dec 93 13:56:37 -0800
> From: pranita amarasinghe <pranita@shasta.Stanford.EDU>
> Reply-To: pranita amarasinghe <pranita@shasta.Stanford.EDU>
> To: csl-everyone@shasta.Stanford.EDU, colloq@cs.Stanford.EDU
> Subject: EE380 Seminar 
> Message-Id: <CMM.0.88.754955483.pranita@shasta.Stanford.EDU>
> 
> 			EE380 Computer Systems Colloquim
> 
>                              Autumn Qtr. 1993/1994
> 
>                                   Lecture #10
> 
> Date: Wednesday, December 8, 1993
> 
> Time: 4:15 - 5:30pm
> 
> Location: Skilling Auditorium
> 
> Title: Implications of Modern Cryptology: Is the Crypto Genie
> Already Out of the Bottle?
> 
> Speaker:  Timothy C. May, Cryptologic Corp.
> 
> Abstract:
> The implications of modern cryptology are profound. Governments and
> national borders as we know them today will be affected by this
> technology in major ways.  Essentially unbreakable ciphers, secure
> communications, untraceable digital money, data havens, electronic
> voting, and black markets in information are just some of the likely
> developments.  Some of these already exist, others are on the horizon.
> Meanwhile, the Government has other plans, with its "Clipper"
> chip that keeps a "master key" and allows it to digitally wiretap at
> will.  Who will win?  How will these conflicting trends resolve
> themselves?  Is the crypto genie already out of the bottle?
> 
> These issues will be the topic of the talk, with plenty of time left for
> discussion.  The focus will be partly on technology -- just enough to
> provide a plausible foundation for belief -- and partly on the economic,
> legal, and political structures resulting from strong crypto.  No
> number theory will be used.
> 
> Speaker Bio:
> Tim May worked for Intel for 12 years, retiring in 1986.  He discovered
> the alpha particle and cosmic ray effect on semiconductor memories, for
> which he received several awards including the IEEE's W.R.G. Baker Prize
> for the best original research paper.  Since leaving Intel, his main
> interests have been in cryptology, information theory, and investments.
> In 1992 he co-founded the "Cypherpunks" group and spends much of his time
> on the Internet. He's also trying to finish a novel about these topics.
> 
> =====
> +----------------------------------------------------------------------------+
> | To get removed from this mailing list (colloq-local), send your request    |
> | to colloq-request@cs.Stanford.EDU. See the weekly summary for more info.   |
> +----------------------------------------------------------------------------+




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Jamie Jamison <jamie@apl.washington.edu>
Date: Sun, 5 Dec 93 20:43:13 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: L. Detweiler, S. Boxx, the Executioner, idiots etc.
Message-ID: <Pine.3.07.9312052004.A13028-b100000@hopper>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



	After slogging through God knows how many rants by the imbecilic and
possibly syphilitic Detweiler, I would have to say that I wish that some
massive CypherPunk/Medusa criminal conspiracy did exist so that it, the
conspiracy, could wipe this asshole off the face of the earth.
Unfortunately for us it doesn't, or perhaps it does and it regards Mr.
Detweiler as being too stupid and incompetent to bother with.
	Perhaps the best policy for dealing with paranoids such as Herr
Detweiler would be to enact what I call mail stoning. The way this works
is that every time Detweiler posts you take his post and mail it back to
him. If enough users do this it will make his account unusable due to the
sheer volume of mail he will be receiving. At this point hopefully he'll
shut up and go find some other group to infest (Hey, I know, he could go
over to talk.politics.homosexuality, which got pretty quiet after Gary
Landers left).
	


Jamie Jamison
niteowl@u.washington.edu

WITH STANDARD_DISCLAIMER

Since I am both a student and a staff member of the UW, as well as a
Washington taxpayer I suppose that in some vague and nebulous sense I
could be speaking for them. However I doubt that my boss, my profs, or my
elected representatives would agree with this, so let's just say that my
opinions are mine and mine alone, and leave it at that.






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Matthew J Miszewski <MJMISKI@macc.wisc.edu>
Date: Sun, 5 Dec 93 20:29:53 PST
To: CYPHERPUNKS@toad.com
Subject: Enough is enough
Message-ID: <23120522240044@vms2.macc.wisc.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


please do 1 of the following two things.
 
1)  Ignore L. Detweiller completely and put a message in the welcome
message to the effect that he posts highly flamable material and replys
should preferably go to his private email box.
 
2)  Ban him from posting.  Yes that is what i said.  I believe whole
heartedly in freddom of speech, but when that freedom interferes with
other rights it may be impinged.  I believe that one of those palces
is the educational arena.  I am trying to learn and before LD came on stage
I learned a *shitload* from the cypherpunks.
 
I do not censor easily, but it is unbearable.  If i had the resources
I would start another mailing list and invite everyone but him.  Shocker
I have the right to *not* include you.  And I would exercise it.  Ive
been on the list for about a year and dont want to leave.
 
Another option if the first two are no good would be to simply have
everyone on the list forward every, *every* , post coming from
LD to his postmaster.  If they let it out, they might as well
get as frustrated with his antics as me.
 
And LD, I am a law student with an itchy litigation finger :-)...try
me.
 
--Matt
______________________________________________________________________________
In defense of liberty, encrypt for all purposes, civil and professional.
In defense of privacy, encrypt all correspondence, personal and professional.
In defense of sanity, do not encrypt your dry cleaning invoice!
 
       ++++++++--------mjmiski@macc.wisc.edu                          (c)1993




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Harry Shapiro <habs@panix.com>
Date: Sun, 5 Dec 93 19:53:13 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com (Good Guys)
Subject: Encryption and IP via Cable "TV"
Message-ID: <199312060352.AA27582@panix.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I pulled this off of nexis. Please note the line I highlighted.

Does anyone know what kind of encryption is being used?

At even $100 per month, we could set up also sorts of remailers
all over the country. We could even create a secure comm. via
PGP (for voice) via IP, etc.

But I wonder if the encryption "they" are using would interfer
with such schemes?

/hawk


 Ethernet connection, but wouldn't require any other additional
installation on users' part.  PSI isU.S." PSI plans to have 2 tiers of
service, business and residential.  Network security problem has been
			 		    ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
solved, using "on-the-fly" data encryption, he said.  One issue that
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
hasn't been fully resolved by Continental is reliability, Schoffstall
said. "Cable companies are used to supplying entertainment.  If their
network goes down for a day, wesame cable system to provide their
data, essentially their livelihood in the case of business users,
well, there's going to have to be much better understanding of how to
provide some guarantees of service."  Price for service in homes is to
be $ 75-$ 100 per month at start, but is expected to drop rapidly as
economies of scale grow.

-- 
Harry S. Hawk  				      habs@extropy.org
Electronic Communications Officer, Extropy Institute Inc. 
    	    The Extropians Mailing List, Since 1991
EXTROPY -- A measure of intelligence, information, energy, vitality,
experience, diversity, opportunity, and growth.  EXTROPIANISM -- The
philosophy that seeks to increase extropy.          



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Alexander Chislenko <sasha@cs.umb.edu>
Date: Sun, 5 Dec 93 20:09:53 PST
To: extropians@extropy.org
Subject: Graynet - anon/encrypted piracy
Message-ID: <199312060405.AA27534@eris.cs.umb.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


   P.O. Box may be not the safest way of collecting the money;
encrypted anonymous cash transactions would be much better;
also, one can not only advertize on the net, but provide the
service.
   Suppose I open a virtual store selling illegal/copyrighted
info - software, music, movies, porn, etc.  Pirates receive
royalties from the stuff they upload; customers, naturally,
pay.  All anonymous and encrypted and based on a network of
hard-to close (offshore?) remailers.
 
   The potential revenues from such a store seem well worth
the effort of setting it up.
 
   The question is how can they close it?

-- Sasha?




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: nate@VIS.ColoState.EDU (CVL staff member Nate Sammons)
Date: Sun, 5 Dec 93 22:49:53 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com (Cypherpunks Mailing List)
Subject: anyone out there thinking that
Message-ID: <9312060646.AA11995@vangogh.VIS.ColoState.EDU>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text


CypherPunks,

Is there anyone out there thinking that in several years all of us will
be looking back on this (The Detweiler fiasco) and remarking on it
as being something of a ground-breaking flame war that would have
repercussions throughout cyberspace and the future?  I was thinking this
today, while I was working away in my Lab.  "What a funny thought!", 
I thought.  Someday, in the near future, all of us will be able to say
that we were part of a major breakthrough in Cyberspacial history,
the first (I am afraid it will be the first of many) McCarthy-type
witch hunts (maybe in the future we'll be accused by "legitimate" 
government agencies of being the Medusas behind many Tenticles,
hunted, wrongly, like dogs).

I am chilled to the bone at the thought, personally.

-nate

-- 
+-----------------------------------------------------------------------+
| Nate Sammons  nate@VIS.ColoState.Edu  (303) 491-1578                  |
|   Colorado State University -- Computer Visualization Laboratory      |
+-----------------------------------------------------------------------+



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "L. Detweiler" <ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Date: Sun, 5 Dec 93 22:59:53 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Gwest what!
Message-ID: <9312060657.AA04877@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Sigh. No one has taken over for me, but I still have many requests from
people who loved the Guess Which Eminent Leader Said This game. I will
do this one in batches, and save the best for last. I include some
translations (they speak in CryptoAnarchish, and this will help refine
my translation skills). This is probably the last one, but one never
knows if I might get  some new material later.

* * *

Third Eminent Leader

The Third eminent leader is mostly uninvolved personally, but he is
still an accomplice to concealing the perversions of the other two leaders.

`Pseudonyms are for magazine subscriptions. Besides, Chaum came up with
pseudonyms for his own protocols. Is he subversive?'

The point to make about this is that Chaum's pseudonyms are
*understood* to be pseudonyms by a bank. But this detracts from the
potency of the propaganda. And the Cryptoanarchist tentacles are very
different than magazine pseudonyms! But he will never understand
something so contrary to the Religion of Lies. (I was quite
disappointed to find he had been brainwashed.) Anyway, next one:

`I only give my phone number to my friends. I'm not going to give it to
you, the way things are going with our conversations.'

I was going to call this Eminent Leader to ask him about some of his
claims in his email messages and his personal knowledge and involvement
in the Cypherpunk pseudospoofing. I think he feels more comfortable
lying in email than on the phone.

* * *

Second Eminent Leader:

`Better to leave all our beliefs unwritten, and pretend the agenda is
what we favor.''

I can't remember if this was through the `jamie' tentacle or not. But
it is highly characteristic of this person, whose whole life is nothing
but a pretense. Every post of his was designed to cleverly conceal some
hidden agenda in respectable prose. A master of brainwashing! more on this later.

`better to live with the occasional vagaries of digital pseudonyms than
to ban them.'

This is doublespeak for saying, `You had better not find out that I
have been molesting you with my tentacles all this time!'

* * *

First Eminent Leader:

The First Eminent Leader keeps a low profile on the list under his True
Name, but realize that his tentacles have always been the most active
of all! He is also a firm believer in the CryptoAnarchist ideology. He
is the main purveyor! Most other outlets are secondary. But he is very
careful only to speak through his tentacles, because he knows the
Cryptoanarchist agenda is inherently criminal. As for ideology, let's
just say he's more extremist than Perry Metzger.

``I am [x]. I have never posted or emailed under any name other than
[x]. At least, that's what I say. It's really a baldfaced lie. What I
am saying is that I have been so extremely clever (it is my nature to
outthink all the other pathetic brains out there!) that no one can
prove otherwise, particularly regarding the tentacles I have used to
molest my followers with. I can attest that I am different from other
people, including the ones that I invent.''

This was an interesting quote. You migh think that this person would be
scared of lying in RISKS or sending his tentacle-grams in for
submissions. Actually, he has been doing it for quite awhile!

The next one he sent me in private mail a long time ago. The scenario
was when I posted my message, `An Introspective Note' that led me to
all my brilliant realizations over the last few weeks, and the
demonization by every cypherpunk as Satan. So, this was long before I
had poisoned my reputation in front of the cypherpunks. (`The enmity of
a criminal is equivalent to the praise of a hero.')

``You must learn to be a sycophant in your posts or less conspicuous
and refined. You are outshining those who created the Cypherpunks. I
have too long tolerated your trash. You must learn to kiss my ass. If I
prevented you from posting, that would not be censorship. It would be a
simple exercise of my silent, iron fist.''

And, one of my favorites. This demonstrates the leader's arrogance and
commitment to pseudospoofing quite nicely.

 ``That which can never be enforced should not be prohibited. That
which is illegal or perverted should be allowed. The claim that a
person should have only one pseudonym per forum indicates profound
misunderstanding. The claim that a leader should be prevented from
molesting his followers with tentacles indicates profound
enlightenment. If someone wants to have multiple pseudonyms, they will
be able to; that is one of the main goals of cypherpunks software. If a
 leader wants to molest even the people who trust him with dozens of
tentacles, he will do so, that is one of the main goals of my life of
lies. The situations you despise will occur. I, Medusa, will betray you
with my snakes. This is reality. This is my life. Change your own
psychology or change your own software. Become corrupt yourself or try
in vain to prevent something that cannot be stopped. You will not be
able to change the other person. I am God.''




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "L. Detweiler" <ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Date: Sun, 5 Dec 93 23:13:12 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Cypherpunk Archives
Message-ID: <9312060711.AA05045@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Hello, I have been looking all over for cypherpunk archives. Could
someone tell me where to find them? Is there an FTP site somewhere? Why
has it taken so long to get them together? If I find a server, will
someone volunteer to send me their collections? (My collection is quite
thorough but I have a lot of private mail with other cypherpunks,
particularly the leaders, mixed up in it, and if I put mine online I
might accidentally reveal some of the private mail, unless I go through
it painstakingly to remove all the incriminating ones, which would take
quite awhile because they are quite littered with them, and it would be
exceptionally painful for me to look at, to notice how long I was being
manipulated, molested, and betrayed, and how others and their pet
projects were being suppressed with tentacle attacks, so generally it
wouldn't be a good idea for me to go back through my archives like
this, although it is certainly possible that I will do so, if no one
else volunteers, just out of the venemous spite cultivated in me by
this corrupt farce that masquerades as a movement, in fact I consider
it all `ammunition' in a kind of uplifting way, to be used as a
countermeasure against cyberspatial terrorists who are poisoning
Cyberspace, but no one has noticed yet, but increasingly everyone
understands that the Cryptoanarchists are completely subversive at
heart and must be pursued and oppressed, even though it is a grisly
task that few have the balls for, and quite a few have fainted in the
sight of the blood.)

I heard that the leaders were opposed to archives for some reason or
another. Something about it being like an NSA surveillance procedure. I
think the problem is that it could capture quite a few of the Leader
Tentacles. Oh well.





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: greg@ideath.goldenbear.com (Greg Broiles)
Date: Mon, 6 Dec 93 01:03:16 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: anyone out there thinking that
Message-ID: <XZo5Dc2w165w@ideath.goldenbear.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


uunet!VIS.ColoState.EDU!nate (CVL staff member Nate Sammons) writes:

> CypherPunks,
> 
> Is there anyone out there thinking that in several years all of us will
> be looking back on this (The Detweiler fiasco) and remarking on it
> as being something of a ground-breaking flame war that would have
> repercussions throughout cyberspace and the future?  I was thinking this

I totally disagree - as far as I can tell, Detweiler is wrestling with 
some emotional issues that most people work through while they're in 
their middle-to-late teens. Problem is, he thinks Eric & Tim are his 
parents. Either he's gonna figure things out, and in a few years this is 
gonna be a really embarassing episode, or we're going to wake up one 
morning to find him on the front page of the newspaper, surrounded by 
bodies in the lobby of some post office, screaming about MEDUSA and 
TENTACLES and FAKE MAIL and SODOMY and DRUGS.

As I see it, it's either 2.5 kids, a station wagon, and a house in the 
suburbs for him - or getting shot by a SWAT team. I'd say the odds are 
about 50/50.


--
Greg Broiles                       Lemon Detweiler Pledge?
greg@goldenbear.com                  You're soaking in it.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "L. Detweiler" <ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Date: Sun, 5 Dec 93 23:59:56 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Love Lost
Message-ID: <9312060755.AA05711@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


It appears I have made quite a pest of myself on this mailing list, and
that everyone hates me, and curses me as Satan, particularly at the
delight and encouragement of your leaders. In fact, a long time ago,
before it became clear I was such an unstable jerk and paranoid lunatic
out to get people who betray me, in fact around the time of the PGP
subpoenas, in which I had continually sent out some of my most
masterful and brilliant postings, when I still had a respectable
reputation, despite that P.Metzger was continually attacking and
dogging me in the most vicious way a human being (at least, I think he
is human, but on the Internet no one knows if you are a dog) can attack
another in cyberspace, that man who once thought that the name
`cypherpunk' just sounded too darn extremist and flamed me over my
insistence that it was colorful and dramatic, precisely the kind of
term that would inspire a Wired or a NYT reporter just enough to write
a story about a fraudulent sham, anyway, about this time E.Hughes told
me that I should learn some quality in my postings or he might employ
some method that would prevent me from sending them. I wondered, dear
sir, was this censorship? Actually, I was quite a bit more pissed off
than that, and said so in my mail, because I had tried to maintain a
positive communication with E.Hughes for many months, but no matter
what I ever wrote he had the most frigid, arrogant, authoritarian and
autocratic, dictatorial and tyrannical, `silent iron fist' opinion I
had ever seen in tens of thousands of messages I have sent to hundreds
of people over my ~4 years of Internet experience, small I grant you
but I have been typing the whole time! Anyway, Mr. Hughes said,  `If I
prevented you from posting, this would not be censorship.' I said, `if
this is an open forum, it would be censorship.' He didn't seem to reply
to that. I think the answer is that this is the Eric Hughes mailing
list, and that anyone who posts a lot and really refines what they
write, or has a large vocabulary, or writes mini-newsletters with
multiple topics the way the most respectable organizations do, like EFF
and CPSR, and flames the leaders when they do something stupid like
promote child pornography or abandon PGP, who ignores flames by people
who are obviously obnoxious idiots who yell at people for their better
accomplishments, who doesn't write in simple phrases that are more
chiseled than flowing, and doesn't post about totally arcane references
to Fermat's Little Theorem and Most Obscure Abelian Mathematics, copied
directly from references with no understanding to impress the hordes of
sycophantic followers, or name drops people who work at PKP (only
conspiracy theorists think they have anything to do with the NSA,
because they are really truly liberating), or takes the time to do
research behind his postings, this person is clearly guilty of the
obnoxious crime of not having sufficiently kissed enough ass to be
allowed to continue to post. In fact, I have consistently failed to
kiss the ass of all three leaders, who all strike me as corrupt and
consistently refuse to go to any length to suggest otherwise, and for
this I deserve the all the vicious retribution that you can unload on
me. In fact, there is a great opportunity to do so right now in the
newsgroups under the `Cryptoanarchist Conspiracy Alert' thread, I
encourage you to do so, instead of mail bombing me, which doesn't
really serve any purpose whatsoever except to demonstrate your sheer
idiocy. You might flame me for writing exceedingly long sentences and
paragraphs and letter, geez, you'd think you were trying to insult our
intelligence with big words and concepts we can't understand, all that
take so damn long to read and understand compared to watching
television,e.g. MTV music videos or Beavis and Butthead, who are far
more entertaining and uplifting and inspiring than my pathetic excuse for a life.

I really am disappointed, I thought I might be able to elicit some kind
of statement from your leaders on their personal knowledge of
pseudospoofing or pseudoanonymity here, especially in the face of
public pressure from honest members, saying `is what he is saying
really true? why are you refusing to answer him? have you really done
all that he claims?' I was really looking forward to posting that big
story fantastic story about pseudospoofing in WWII I offered to,
kissing and making up! I am not a vindictive person at heart, in fact,
writing letters like these drive me to vomit, but your leaders have
given me no choice. Its too bad that the belligerence and obstinance of
a few continues to spoil it for everone else. Honest cypherpunks, I'm
sorry that I can't tell you a neat story about pseudospoofing, but you
will just have to ask your leaders why they have deprived it from you.

Anyway, clearly I do not deserve to post here any longer! Its not
getting any of us anywhere. Mr. Hughes sent me mail recently suggesting
that I `can't take a joke', that I have no sense of humor. Perhaps it
is true! He should know! I will have to go somewhere else, for example
the newsgroups, and really post some of my best material I have ever
crafted, all that relates to my tenure and demise on the cypherpunks
list, especially that which relates to its corruptions and lies. Yet I
have failed to receive any mail (at least, that I know of at the
moment) from any of your leaders asking me to refrain from posting to
the cypherpunks list. In fact, I have waited for quite awhile for any
mail of this sort. I continue to write  unrequited! Please, let us all
achieve resolution. I ask that one of the leaders, for the benefit of
everyone here, send me any of the following messages. If you do so, I
will promise to stop posting under my True Name. Of course, I can't
guarantee anything about any other `penetration', particularly because
cypherpunks are the promoters of this kind of subversive infiltration,
and for me to be asked to refrain from it would be the epitome, the
height of corrupt hypocrisy. But, on the other hand, perhaps your
leaders reached that point a long time ago.

Anyway, I promise to do all this if I receive the following message:


from: hughes@ah.com
subject: Go Away, Prick
to:
ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu,postmaster@longs.colostate.edu,root@l
ongs.colostate.edu,tcmay@netcom.com,gnu@toad.com,cypherpunks@toad.com,pr
esident@whitehouse.com,markoff@nyt.com,kelly@wired.com,diffie@sun.com

Because of your continual disruptions in our honest endeavors, your
continual slandering of our reputations, your continual insistence on a
conspiracy and pseudospoofing we know absolutely nothing about, you
have been censored from posting to the cypherpunks list as
ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu. In fact, we are running an
automatic filter that will bounce all messages with the strings
`L.Detweiler', `pseudospoofing', `pseudoanonymity', `democracy',
`Medusa', `torture', `anarchy', `guerilla', `conspiracy', `government',
`impersonation', `consensus', `agenda', `police state', `oppress',
`molest', `tyranny', `dictator', `autocracy', `autocrat',
`dictatorship', `tyrant', `poison', `confess', `contrite',
`inquisition', `insidious', `accomplice', `treason', `moral', `morale',
`ethics', `punish', `corrupt', `lie', `propaganda', `cult',
`sentencing', `brainwashing', `integrity', `honest', `true',
`pseudonym', `forgery', `hypocrisy', `pure', `poseur', `fraud', `tax',
`psychopath', `psychosis', `egomania', `hoax', `FBI', `society',
`obsession', `monomania', `persecution', `censor', `hallucination',
`insanity', `arrogant', `egomania', `bastard', `vain', `vainglory',
`pervert', `depravity', `delusion', `truth', `leader', `tentacle',
`attack', `evade', `deception', `practical joke', `harass', `crime',
`privacy', `torment', `phantom', `accusation', `paranoia', `traitor',
`disrupt', `pretend', `disreputable', `appropriate', `authority',
`courtesy', `movement', `pariah', `cooperation', `cabal',
`prosecution', `cacaphony', `stalemate', `dischord', `subvert',
`martyr', `public', `revolt', `revolution', `scapegoat', `blind',
`sabotage', `infiltrate', `subterfuge', `ignorant', `etiquette',
`rant', `reality', `exorcize', `facade', `false', `humility',
`mockery', `manipulate', `masquerade', `filth'.





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "L. Detweiler" <ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Date: Mon, 6 Dec 93 01:33:16 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Hello again!
Message-ID: <9312060932.AA07009@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Woops, I had sent off all my mail tonite before I read E.Hughes'
interesting messages. It was quite a surprise to see that he had sent
me anything. He's generally very quiet under the `E.Hughes' name.

Anyway, there have been a few questions by people on this list. `why
should we care about pseudospoofing?' the answer is that you should be
sure that your leaders aren't doing it. What if there were sensitive
projects that were volunteered by outsiders, and someone told them that
they were doing it all wrong? Well, if it were just some nobody, maybe
nobody would care. Frankly, I don't care as much if people `out there'
are involved in there little pseudoanonymity schemes, as long as they
stay away from me.

But if E.Hughes says, under a fake identity, `hey, you don't know what
you are doing, you are doing it all wrong' -- how does that promote
trust in your group? how will you ever get anything accomplished? you
have accomplished rather little when you look back on your months of
bickering on this list. I once tried to get the whistleblowing
newsgroup, and I think this is precisely what happened to me -- it
conflicted with what your leaders wanted to accomplish, so they flamed
me with their tentacles. But I am not prone to give in to intimidation
where I am committed, as everyone has noticed by now!

Furthermore, what if your leaders are doing this behind the scenes?
Promoting their pseudospoofing techniques among many without your
knowledge? Why would you possibly submit to that kind of an
environment? What if they have made an *art* *science* and *religion*
of deceiving each other and their followers with their tentacles? I
think this is something that no respectable person would have anything
to do with it. Either your leaders are not pseudospoofing, not
respectable, or my belief that pseudospoofing is poisonous is
incorrect. Take you pick! So far everyone believes either that
pseudospoofing is no big deal, or that I am crazy. Aren't you just a
*little* uneasy the way your leaders have responded to my charges?
Don't you care at all? Don't you want to know the truth? Don't you
recognize evasion when you see it? I am just a wimpy T.Cruise with
nothing but my mouth in front of me and my fake soldiers behind me,
saying (Few Good Men?) ``I want the TRUTH'', with your decorated leader
Jack Nicholson saying, ``YOU CAN'T HANDLE THE TRUTH'' ... when are we
going to get to the ``YOU'RE GODDAMN RIGHT I ORDERED THE CODE RED!''

Mr. Hughes, Mr. May, Mr. Gilmore, answer me *one* question truthfully,
and I will go away.

How many different email addresses have you posted and emailed under?
(Include remailers and anon.penet.fi) What #?

For the record, I have posted under 2 -- anon.penet.fi, and
ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu.

Again, you don't have to sacrifice the privacy of any tentacles in
revealing this information. But an answer like `1' is obviously a lie,
and anyone who attacks me for attacking a lie I have no respect for. Do
not send me mail attempting to influence me.





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "L. Detweiler" <ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Date: Mon, 6 Dec 93 01:43:16 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: E.Hughes on Lies
Message-ID: <9312060942.AA07105@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Hello! I don't know why E.Hughes didn't cc: the cypherpunks with the
following message. He sent it to an internet mailing list devoted to
honest collaborations and Internet project development. 

>The issue here is epistemology.

False. The issue is about truth and the morality of leaders.

>>There would be no problem if I asked a tentacle, `are you a pseudonym'
>>and it answered `yes'. 
>
>This is exactly like the question "Are you a liar?", to which the
>answer is always "no".

False. In an honest society, lies exist. You are asserting that they do not.

>>But the cypherpunks are setting up a network of
>>fake sites and identities and continue to claim, to the very end, `yes,
>>I am real' with their fake identities. 
>
>When I am accused of saying "I am real" from the mouth of a fake
>identity, and I deny this accusation, there are two models of reality
>which satisfy the words exchanged:
>
>-- I am using a fake identity, and I am lying to deny it.
>-- I am not using a fake identity, and am telling the truth to deny it.

So tell, me, which is the case? Why do you continue to evade my
questions? Either be silent or tell the truth. Cease tormenting me and
your followers with your pathetic convolutions of the English language.

>When confronted by a barrage of continuing accusations to which no
>answer is possible, I prefer to remain silent.  I can gain no benefit
>from discourse in this situation and can only waste my time and the
>time of my correspondent.

I prefer that when I ask you if you have done something that directly
affects your followers and myself, you tell the truth. I can gain no
benefit from people who evade my honest questions or a movement that is
led by a corrupt leader whose first instinct is to dig in and entrench
himself rather than be honest with the people who respect him.

>The usual way to break out of this 'solipsism of the dialogue' is to
>invoke a social mechanism, that is, ask someone else.  Under a belief
>of widespread impersonation, however, all denials are now presumed to
>come from the original speaker of the first denial.  Thus the
>solipsism of the dialogue expands to a solipsism of all dialogues.

Solipsism. Interesting term. In my opinion `solipsism' is the
philosophy for the height of arrogance. `I am the only one who exists'.
I have asked many, and they all have erected the same impregnable steel
walls that you have. They refuse to answer my questions with specific
denials. Why do you mislead the people who have made you their leader?

>>Cypherpunks, please tell me what question I can ask of a psychopunk
>>tentacle such that it will not lie and say that it is a real person! If
>>you have any honesty or credibility, tell me that question!
>
>There is no such question, as I argue above.  Am I dishonest if I
>cannot exhibit the nonexistent?

In a society where there is no honor or integrity, and instead there is
only corruption and lies, you are correct. No such question is
sufficient. I have found that out. I posted my message in the desperate
hope that a cypherpunk leader could tell me *one* question he would
answer honestly. `There is no such question, as I argue above'.

Good day, sir.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: mikeingl@news.delphi.com (MIKEINGLE@DELPHI.COM)
Date: Sun, 5 Dec 93 23:59:54 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: NUMBSKULL INFILTRATION ALERT (Fwd)
Message-ID: <9312060757.AA23319@news.delphi.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



>Newsgroups: talk.politics.crypto,edit.your.fucking.header.you.morons
>Path: news.delphi.com!noc.near.net!saturn.caps.maine.edu!dartvax!news.bu.edu!purdue!lerc.nasa.gov!magnus.acs.ohio-state.edu!math.ohio-state.edu!howland.reston.ans.net!spool.mu.edu!uwm.edu!fnnews.fnal.gov!news.ssc.gov!cfnews!cfnews.ssc.gov!henke
>From: henke@scaly.ssc.gov (Douglas Henke)
>Subject: Re: NUMBSKULL INFILTRATION ALERT
>In-Reply-To: dasher@netcom.com's message of Fri, 3 Dec 1993 20:33:42 GMT
>Message-ID: <HENKE.93Dec3174114@scaly.ssc.gov>
>Sender: usenet@cfnews.ssc.gov
>Nntp-Posting-Host: scaly.ssc.gov
>Organization: SSC Laboratory, Dallas, TX
>References: <dasherCHH3Ey.J1F@netcom.com> <tcmayCHH6MA.Mzw@netcom.com>
>	<dasherCHH7s6.4rF@netcom.com>
>Date: Fri, 3 Dec 1993 23:41:14 GMT
>Lines: 10

Leaking viscous fluids from every bodily orifice, tcmay@netcom.com
(Christ, another netcom newbie) spews:
>...I gave up long ago trying to convince Larry Detweiler that I am
>a real person.

I don't know who to laugh hysterically at first, Larry (for simply being a
species of idiot unto himself) or you, for caring what he thinks.

"Tentacles," indeed. You only exist on the net in terms of the persona (or
personae) you choose to project. That's not a bug, that's a feature.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Black Unicorn <unicorn@access.digex.net>
Date: Mon, 6 Dec 93 01:09:56 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Censorship/Forum dispute on the list
Message-ID: <199312060909.AA04134@access.digex.net>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
 
I've reached a point where the volume is just too much.
 
LD's posts, despite the fact that my "n" key is near worn 
through, are simply disruptive, and annoying.
 
I am an extreme advocate of free speech, but it has really become
apparent that LD simply is not interested in the constructive
exchange that is at the heart of free speech.  Instead he chooses
to produce inflammatory and silly posts that include, among other 
things, exhaustive lists of the terms he would like to have 
censored on the list.
 
We all know that the first ten would have sufficed for his point,
which was weak in any case.
 
LD is more interested in obstructing the pursuits of cypherpunks 
and the list and its members by inflammation, bandwidth waste 
(which to his credit has caused quite a good deal of attrition), 
and generally associating himself with the list, causing I might 
add a general distaste for the list in general, much as there is 
a general distaste for anything cannibalisticly associated.
 
It is of course impossible to employ an "ignore him" policy as 
newbies, a resource I feel to be important and invaluable to the 
cause in general, are always going to be provoked to action.  
Especially in a list of such activity and size.  To try and 
ignore LD on this list is analogous to ignoring a screaming film 
critic in the middle of a theater playing a maverick and foreign 
film.
 
I dislike the idea of censoring Lance.  He is entitled to his 
opinion. Similarly I feel that it is not necessarily proper for a 
majority on this list or any other to exclude the minority who 
would like to converse with LD.  (S.Boxx and Executioner at least 
I'm sure.)
 
I propose the following solution.  Which probably will never be 
implemented, but I won't be able to sleep till I present it.
 
1>  A second list be established.  CypherpunkRisks@toad.com.
2>  The list be dominated by a charter providing that:
    A> All who apply are welcome.
    B> LD shall be appointed moderator for the purpose of
    maintaining the content of postings, but not to regulate
    users who may receive the list.
 
3>  The current cypherpunks list be renamed, or refocused to 
represent "cypherpunk advocacy."
 
4>  That the advocacy list STRONGLY discourage disruptive 
criticism not concerned with the merits of cypherpunks and 
cryptography in general.
 
5>  That reasonable enforcement of this premise (4) be executed 
to the extent required to maintain progress and not filter fair 
and reasonable criticism not violating item (4) above.  
Enforcement may reasonably be expected to include filtering of 
traffic by key word for human review and approval.
 
6>  That any enforcement of item (4) above shall be accompanied 
by a brief but unevasive notice of action and cause for said 
action including the identity of the poster, or nym, if available 
(such identity being a direct copy of the basic From: line, and 
not to be investigated in any extensive manner) the date of 
received posting, the basic keyword content of the posting, and 
the availability of the posting on cypherpunkrisks@toad.com 
(subject to moderator approval) and by archive.  (To be 
established and maintained.)
 
I consider this a forum resolution, and not censorship.
 
I think this is much like the solution some of the comp.sys 
groups used to separate advocacy and criticism without causing 
undue problems.
 
Of course, the matter is open to discussion.
 
- -uni- (Dark)
 
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From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Duncan Frissell <frissell@panix.com>
Date: Mon, 6 Dec 93 04:10:10 PST
To: CYPHERPUNKS@toad.com
Subject: anyone out there thinking
Message-ID: <199312061209.AA02950@panix.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


N >witch hunts (maybe in the future we'll be accused by "legitimate" 
N >government agencies of being the Medusas behind many Tenticles,
N >hunted, wrongly, like dogs).

We wouldn't have to worry because all we'd have to say is:  "Look you 
mental retards, we can't be "Tenticles" (or even tentacles) of the Medusa 
because the Medusa didn't *have* any tentacles.  She had a head of snakes 
instead of a head of hair."

Duncan Frissell

Who has Ray Harryhausen to thank for much of his classical education.



--- WinQwk 2.0b#1165
                                                                                                             




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: hfinney@shell.portal.com (Hal Finney)
Date: Mon, 6 Dec 93 08:45:01 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Authorized cash?
Message-ID: <9312061643.AA17218@jobe.shell.portal.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I recall a few months ago there was some discussion of having David
Chaum come out and work with some cypherpunks to get them started on
an implementation of digital cash.  Did anything ever come of that?

Chaum has a patent, I've heard, on the "blinding" that is an important
part of at least the simpler cash proposals.  If he were willing to
authorize a cypherpunks cash system it would remove one legal hurdle
to its implementation.  Does anyone know whether he might be willing to
do this?

Hal




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: hazman@cco.caltech.edu (R. Lawrence Martinez)
Date: Mon, 6 Dec 93 08:53:17 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: No Subject
Message-ID: <9312061651.AA00194@kanga.cco.caltech.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Unsubscribe hazman@cco.caltech.edu




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Christian Void <cvoid@netcom.com>
Date: Mon, 6 Dec 93 09:34:51 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: T-Shirt Update
Message-ID: <Pine.3.85.9312060928.A936-0100000@netcom3>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Okay. I have compiled a list of people interested in the shirt...If you 
are not on the list, and are interested, mail me.

As for a design, we have a design we are working with, available (a rough
draft) via anon ftp. If you have a better idea, or would like to take a 
crack at designing it, let me know and we can put these designs up as 
well. A sort of "vote for the best design". 

Also, Jef Poskanzer (jef@netcom.com) has given us permission to use his 
DOT crypto warning sign, if someone would like to incorporate that into 
thier idea. We will be finishing up our design over the next week, and 
working cost, sizes, etc. 

I'll keep you posted.

Christian Void /T71 | "I don't like it, and I'm sorry I | V/M/Research, Inc.
cvoid@netcom.com    | ever had anything to do with it." | P.O. Box 170213
Tel. 1+415-807-5491 |  -Erwin Schrodinger  (1887-1961)  | SF, CA  94117-0213
                * PGP v2.3a Public Key Available Via Finger *






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Christian Void <cvoid@netcom.com>
Date: Mon, 6 Dec 93 09:33:17 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: FTP site for t-shirt design
Message-ID: <Pine.3.85.9312060922.A1295-0100000@netcom3>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I forgot to put this in the last post...

Our t-shirt design, as well as any other designs people come up will be
available at netcom.com: ~pub/cvoid/cypherpunks. All files should be in 
*.gif format. 

Christian Void /T71 | "I don't like it, and I'm sorry I | V/M/Research, Inc.
cvoid@netcom.com    | ever had anything to do with it." | P.O. Box 170213
Tel. 1+415-807-5491 |  -Erwin Schrodinger  (1887-1961)  | SF, CA  94117-0213
                * PGP v2.3a Public Key Available Via Finger *






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Philippe Nave" <pdn@dwroll.dw.att.com>
Date: Mon, 6 Dec 93 09:15:01 PST
To: unicorn@access.digex.net (Black Unicorn)
Subject: Re: Censorship/Forum dispute on the list
In-Reply-To: <199312060909.AA04134@access.digex.net>
Message-ID: <9312061714.AA17135@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Black Unicorn writes :
> 
> I propose the following solution.  Which probably will never be 
> implemented, but I won't be able to sleep till I present it.
>  
> 1>  A second list be established.  CypherpunkRisks@toad.com.
> 2>  The list be dominated by a charter providing that:
>     A> All who apply are welcome.
>     B> LD shall be appointed moderator for the purpose of
>     maintaining the content of postings, but not to regulate
>     users who may receive the list.
>  
 
Detweiler already has another list ('cypherwonks') that is looking into issues
like electronic democracy, cyberspatial ethics, etc. Is this the sort of thing
you had in mind? I don't know whether he actually moderates the list in the 
sense of filtering the postings, but he bills himself as the 'cypherwonks
janitor' in the welcome message and certainly takes an active interest in the
progress of the discussions.

........................................................................
Philippe D. Nave, Jr.   | The person who does not use message encryption
pdn@dwroll.dw.att.com   | will soon be at the mercy of those who DO...
Denver, Colorado USA    | PGP public key: by arrangement.



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: an52436@anon.penet.fi (Mephisto)
Date: Mon, 6 Dec 93 02:14:56 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Gov't Report...
Message-ID: <9312061013.AA29859@anon.penet.fi>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


	Thought some of you might find this to be of interest...



						Mephisto

-------------------------------------------------------------------------
To find out more about the anon service, send mail to help@anon.penet.fi.
Due to the double-blind, any mail replies to this message will be anonymized,
and an anonymous id will be allocated automatically. You have been warned.
Please report any problems, inappropriate use etc. to admin@anon.penet.fi.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: an52436@anon.penet.fi (Mephisto)
Date: Mon, 6 Dec 93 02:19:57 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Gov't Report
Message-ID: <9312061016.AA00390@anon.penet.fi>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


 Thought that some of you might find this interesting...

						Mephisto
 **Forwarded Message**

To: rsaref-users@RSA.COM
From: KH3@CU.NIH.GOV
Date:     Fri, 03 Dec 1993  16:11:53 EST
Subject:  New GAO report on Communications Privacy
Acknowledge-To:    KH3@NIHCU.BITNET
X-Acknowledge-To:  KH3@NIHCU.BITNET
Sender: rsaref-users-request@RSA.COM

GAO recently issued a report "Communications Privacy:
Federal Policy and Actions", GAO/OSI-94-2, dated
November 4, 1993, that may be of interest to members
of your group.  The report focused on the following issues:

    - The need for information privacy in computer and
      communications systems--through such means as
      encryption, or conversion of clear text to an
      unreadable form--to mitigate the threat of economic
      espionage to U.S. industry;

    - federal agency authority to develop cryptographic
      standards for the protection of sensitive,
      unclassified information and the actions and policies
      of the National Security Agency (NSA), Department of
      Defense, and of the National Institute of Standards
      and Technology (NI ST), Department of Commerce,
      regarding the selection of  federal cryptographic
      standards;

    - roles, actions, and policies of NSA and the
      Department of State related to export controls for
      products with encryption capabilities and industry
      rationale for requesting liberalization of such
      controls; and

    - the Federal Bureau of Investigation's (FBI)
      legislative proposal regarding telephone systems that
      use digital communications technology.

I have placed an electronic version of the report named
OSI-94-2.TXT in the GAO-REPORTS anonymous FTP directory at
NIH (ftp.cu.nih.gov).

Joe Sokalski, GAO--Los Angeles
              kh3@cu.nih.gov

-------------------------------------------------------------------------
To find out more about the anon service, send mail to help@anon.penet.fi.
Due to the double-blind, any mail replies to this message will be anonymized,
and an anonymous id will be allocated automatically. You have been warned.
Please report any problems, inappropriate use etc. to admin@anon.penet.fi.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: jazz@hal.com (Jason Zions)
Date: Mon, 6 Dec 93 09:10:01 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Enough is enough
Message-ID: <9312061706.AA21926@jazz.hal.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Look, there's one advantage to not banning LD from the list; he generally
posts under his own or his well-known anonymous names, which makes it easier
to filter them. Recently, though, either he or someone else has started
reforwarding his rants through a remailer, which I cannot filter on (unless
I go to content filtering, which I'd prefer to avoid).

If someone other than LD is forwarding his rantograms via remailers, Please
Cease And Desist. If it's Detweiller himself, well, he's obviously not going
to listen to me. (Of course, I haven't been accused of being a tentacle; I
must not be important enough.)

Jason




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: jaeck@alc.com
Date: Mon, 6 Dec 93 12:53:21 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: PGP Question
Message-ID: <9312062044.AA04801@bombadil.alc.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Would someone please explain exactly what it is that using PGP to
sign an electronic post is supposed to be good for?

Given that I will understand that, how can I decipher a PGP block,
and how can I create one?

Thanks.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Giuseppe Cimmino <0005533039@mcimail.com>
Date: Mon, 6 Dec 93 11:40:06 PST
To: Cpunx <cypherpunks@toad.com>
Subject: We interrupt this LD thread with CCC'93
Message-ID: <05931206175750/0005533039ND5EM@mcimail.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


are any of the TENTACLES planning on attending CCC'93 in the FLESH?  i'd be
interested in hooking up over there.  vergiss nicht diene PSEUDOSPOOF pgp key
mitzubringen.

Giuseppe







From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: anonymous@extropia.wimsey.com
Date: Mon, 6 Dec 93 13:30:08 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: More Digressions Into Folklore
Message-ID: <199312062107.AA06422@xtropia>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


 * Reply to msg originally in CYPHERPUNKS

> From: arthurc@crl.com (Arthur Chandler)
> Date: Sat, 4 Dec 1993 10:17:08 -0800 (PST)
> Cc:   cypherpunks@toad.com

> I've had occasion to recall this quote several times as I've read
> some  of the menacing and/or obscure posts here:

> "They muddy their waters that they may seem deep."

Hm.  Reminds me of the Mexican proverb:

        "Don't muddy the water; in the end you'll have to drink it."

Perhaps this is even more apropos.  Dark days, brothers, dark days...





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Anonymous <nowhere@bsu-cs.bsu.edu>
Date: Mon, 6 Dec 93 10:23:20 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Momma's boy
Message-ID: <9312061823.AA27937@bsu-cs.bsu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



<ahem>   ...."Lawrence?"


From: jim@rand.org (Jim Gillogly)
Newsgroups: talk.politics.crypto,alt.privacy,alt.privacy.anon-server,news.admin.policy,comp.org.eff.talk,comp.admin.policy,alt.conspiracy
Subject: Re: CRYPTOANARCHIST INFILTRATION ALERT
Date: 5 Dec 1993 21:58:36 GMT
Organization: Banzai Institute
Message-ID: <2dtlic$naj@rand.org>
References: <dasherCHH3Ey.J1F@netcom.com> <tcmayCHH6MA.Mzw@netcom.com> <Dec04.105319.36526@yuma.acns.colostate.edu>

In article <Dec04.105319.36526@yuma.acns.colostate.edu>,
L. Detweiler <ld231782@casco.lance.colostate.edu> wrote:
>oh, BTW Mr. May, when did you decide my first name was Larry and not Lance?
>You called me Lance for 10 months or so on the cypherpunks list.

Given that somebody using your account in '91 posted an article to sci.crypt
about factoring under the name "Lawrence Detweiler", I suppose that either
Larry or Lance might be a reasonable guess... if perhaps overly familiar.
What nickname do you prefer, if any?

Does this make me a pseudopod of the ubiquitous anonymous organism?  Will
Suicide Squid come out of retirement to counter this new evil?  Is L.
Detweiler the Colo State equivalent of C-MU's Harry Q. Bovick?  The world
wonders...
-- 
	Jim Gillogly
	Hevensday, 15 Foreyule S.R. 1993, 21:58





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: fnerd@smds.com (FutureNerd Steve Witham)
Date: Mon, 6 Dec 93 11:30:04 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: VOTE: Proposition desist: no
Message-ID: <9312061903.AA01821@smds.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Shut Detweiler out of the cpunx list?
	no.

I have no problem skipping his posts; presently I'm not
worried about the bandwidth through the modem into /dev/null.
He posts interesting things once in a while (most recently, that
piece by Kapor about libertarians vs. "decentralists.")
I wouldn't mind the creation of a special "Detweiler free" 
filtered version of the list, as long as it was just a 
postprocessor on the true list.

-fnerd
quote me

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.3a

aKxB8nktcBAeQHabQP/d7yhWgpGZBIoIqII8cY9nG55HYHgvtoxiQCVAgUBLMs3K
ui6XaCZmKH68fOWYYySKAzPkXyfYKnOlzsIjp2toust1Q5A3/n54PBKrUDN9tHVz
3Ch466q9EKUuDulTU6OLsilzmRvQJn0EJhzd4pht6hanC0R3seYNhUYhoJViCcCG
sRjLQs4iVVM=
=9wqs
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Jim McCoy <mccoy@ccwf.cc.utexas.edu>
Date: Mon, 6 Dec 93 12:40:08 PST
To: hfinney@shell.portal.com (Hal Finney)
Subject: Re: Authorized cash?
In-Reply-To: <9312061643.AA17218@jobe.shell.portal.com>
Message-ID: <199312062038.AA23984@tramp.cc.utexas.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text


[regarding Chaum's digital cash work and possibly using that for net.money]
> Chaum has a patent, I've heard, on the "blinding" that is an important
> part of at least the simpler cash proposals.  If he were willing to
> authorize a cypherpunks cash system it would remove one legal hurdle
> to its implementation.  Does anyone know whether he might be willing to
> do this?

Strangely enough, his secretary and I have been exchanging email trying to
arrange a time when he can catch me by phone for the past few days...

I will ask him :)

jim



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Matthew J Miszewski <MJMISKI@macc.wisc.edu>
Date: Mon, 6 Dec 93 12:43:20 PST
To: CYPHERPUNKS@toad.com
Subject: Security (Encryption) Corps
Message-ID: <23120614391527@vms2.macc.wisc.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


To interupt the Monster in the name of Cypherpatriot Activity...
 
I plan on starting up a security and consulting firm over the next
few months.  A great deal of what we will address are practical
applications of crypto technology.  Due to the fact that pre-LD
experience with this list has showed a great deal of impressive
peole or net.entities out there, I would like those interested in
getting involved with an upstart (and yet comprehensive) corporation
to contact me.
 
The corporation will deal with all aspects of information security including
telco product security, data integrity, data security, communication
security, and general computer consultations.  If you are interested,
or have any ideas you think are ready for commercialization, let me know.
 
Cypherpunks Start Corporations!  (No longer merely write code).
 
--Matt
______________________________________________________________________________
In defense of liberty, encrypt for all purposes, civil and professional.
In defense of privacy, encrypt all correspondence, personal and professional.
In defense of sanity, do not encrypt your dry cleaning invoice!
 
       ++++++++--------mjmiski@macc.wisc.edu                          (c)1993




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: bdolan <71431.2564@CompuServe.COM>
Date: Mon, 6 Dec 93 13:20:08 PST
To: <cypherpunks@toad.com>
Subject: Digicash question
Message-ID: <931206210540_71431.2564_FHA55-1@CompuServe.COM>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


TO:     >internet:  cypherpunks@toad.com

Forgive me for a newbie question.  Why wouldn't the following inelegant
idea work?

X gives $101 to First Digital Bank, which gives X a PGP-signed password
representing a claim on $100 (or maybe they would do this just for the
"float").  X gives the $100 password to Y, in exchange for a narco-terrorism
decoder ring.  Y, being a cautious soul, calls First DigiBank immediately 
and gives it the password.  DigiBank pockets $1 and issues Y a new signed 
password good for $99.  Note that DigiBank (1) doesn't need to know who Y 
is and (2) ensures that a given money-password is only spent once.  By the
same method, Y can pay Z and Z can deposit the credit in BillnHill's S&L for
settlement.  Or the money can keep floating around until DigiBank gets it 
all, which is what usually happens now ;-)

Of course, you have to trust the bank - but you have to now, also.

Don't abuse me too much.  Just point me to the right FAQ (...cowering...)

bdolan@well.sf.ca.us





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: szabo@netcom.com (Nick Szabo)
Date: Mon, 6 Dec 93 16:35:10 PST
To: fnerd@smds.com (FutureNerd Steve Witham)
Subject: Re: VOTE: Proposition desist: no
In-Reply-To: <9312061903.AA01821@smds.com>
Message-ID: <199312070034.QAA14364@mail.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



> Shut Detweiler out of the cpunx list?
> 	no.
> 
> I have no problem skipping his posts;

I have a problem with people skipping Detweiler posts, and
then assuming they have the knowledge needed to vote on this
issue.   A glaring example of the failings of democracy.
Ignorance of what Detweiler has posted is about the only reason one
would justify the presence of somebody whose posts are intended to 
harass and disrupt the list, by slandering and threatening its members.  
The Extropians list with its filtering which keeps out net stalkers and
harassers, has become superior to this highly disrupted
list, and unfortuneately I've had to move much of my cypherpunks-related
posting over there (eg an excellent thread we've had on "Graynet").
This doesn't stop Detweiler from attacking me via anon.penet.fi
in front of the entire world on Usenet and RISKS, but filtering
would keep at least this formerly high quality list sane.

My thanks go out to Doug Barnes, Derek Upham, Eli Brandt, Eric
Hughes, others who've helped out in the efforts to defend ourselves
against this threat, and to Hal Finney et. al. for continuing to
post high-quality material to cypherpunks among the flames.

Nick Szabo				szabo@netcom.com



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: bart@netcom.com (Harry Bartholomew)
Date: Mon, 6 Dec 93 16:50:09 PST
To: Majordomo@Lists.EUnet.fi
Subject: Re: Welcome to cypherwonks
In-Reply-To: <199312061800.AA26077@lassie.eunet.fi>
Message-ID: <199312070048.QAA00283@mail.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


    Hey. I never subscribed. This is coercion. 
    



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Derek Atkins <warlord@MIT.EDU>
Date: Mon, 6 Dec 93 13:53:21 PST
To: bdolan <71431.2564@CompuServe.COM>
Subject: Re: Digicash question
In-Reply-To: <931206210540_71431.2564_FHA55-1@CompuServe.COM>
Message-ID: <9312062149.AA01663@toxicwaste.media.mit.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Well, there are a couple of problems, but I'll only ask about one: How
do you make sure that the bank doesn't earmark the "password" with X's
name?  You don't want the bank to know that that "password" was given
to X.

-derek




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: bart@netcom.com (Harry Bartholomew)
Date: Mon, 6 Dec 93 16:53:22 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Majordomo results (fwd)
Message-ID: <199312070053.QAA00613@mail.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Forwarded message:
From Majordomo-Owner@lassie.eunet.fi Mon Dec  6 16:49:36 1993
Date: Tue, 7 Dec 1993 02:48:46 +0200
Message-Id: <199312070048.AA27253@lassie.eunet.fi>
To: bart@netcom.com
From: Majordomo@Lists.EUnet.fi
Subject: Majordomo results
Reply-To: Majordomo@Lists.EUnet.fi

>>>>     Hey. I never subscribed. This is coercion. 
**** Command 'hey.' not recognized.
>>>>     
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From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: John Ioannidis <ji@cs.columbia.edu>
Date: Mon, 6 Dec 1993 17:19:01 -0500
To: ipsec@ans.net
Subject: swIPe Internet Draft, resent
Message-ID: <37706e274225bcd46f6bc3f960477b91@NO-ID-FOUND.mhonarc.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



The swIPe IP Security Protocol                            John Ioannidis
INTERNET DRAFT                                     (Columbia University)
Expires June 3, 1994                                          Matt Blaze
<draft-ipsec-swipe-01.txt>                              (AT&T Bell Labs)
                                                      December 3rd, 1993


                     The swIPe IP Security Protocol

Status of this Memo

   This document is an Internet Draft.  Internet Drafts are working
   documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), its Areas,
   and its Working Groups.  Note that other groups may also distribute
   working documents as Internet Drafts.

   Internet Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six
   months.  Internet Drafts may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by
   other documents at any time.  It is not appropriate to use Internet
   Drafts as reference material or to cite them other than as a
   ``working draft'' or ``work in progress.''  Please check the 1id-
   abstracts.txt listing contained in the internet-drafts Shadow
   Directories on nic.ddn.mil, nnsc.nsf.net, nic.nordu.net,
   ftp.nisc.sri.com, or munnari.oz.au to learn the current status of any
   Internet Draft.

Abstract

   This document describes swIPe, a network-layer security protocol for
   the IP protocol suite.  swIPe provides confidentiality, integrity,
   and authentication of network traffic, and can be used to provide
   both end-to-end and intermediate-hop security.  swIPe is concerned
   only with security mechanisms; policy and key management are handled
   outside the protocol.

1.  Introduction

   Security of network resources has been viewed traditionally as a
   trade-off between security and convenience.  The lack of a
   network-layer security protocol suitable for use in large,
   administratively heterogeneous internetworks, has given rise to ad
   hoc security efforts, such as mailbridges, filtering routers,
   firewalls, application-level gateways, etc.  The fundamental problem
   with these efforts is that, in enforcing security, they cripple the
   connectivity that makes internetworking attractive in the first
   place.

Ioannidis & Blaze                                               [Page 1]


INTERNET-DRAFT      The swIPe IP Security Protocol         December 1993

   In order that the Internet continue to grow in size and features,
   its users must be confident that it is safe to connect without hiding
   behind impenetrable draconian barriers.  The existing internetworking
   protocols, including IP, are deficient in three areas:

   * Lack of source authentication.

   * Lack of data integrity.

   * Lack of data confidentiality.

   The lack of these features in the network requires relying on
   higher-layer protocol features (e.g., TCP port numbers), or
   lower-layer features (e.g., which network interface a packet arrived
   from) to perform security functions (such as access control).  In
   most cases, `firewalls' simply create an impenetrable barrier, thus
   making it cumbersome, or even impossible, for users inside the
   firewall to take advantage of network services in the global
   Internet.
   
   Network security being critically important to the continued growth
   of the Internet, it is necessary to solve these problems while
   maintaining connectivity.  Cryptographic protection of network
   traffic can solve all three problems.  However, we still lack full
   understanding of the problems of heterogeneous security policies and
   of cryptographic key management in large scale networks.  Therefore,
   it is important to separate policy considerations and key management
   from the actual mechanisms in any security protocol.
   
   swIPe is a network-layer security protocol that provides the
   mechanisms to solve the three problems listed above.  It works by
   augmenting each packet with a cryptographically-strong authenticator
   and/or encrypting the data to be sent.

   swIPe is simple to define, implement and use in existing and future
   networks and operating systems.  It provides all the necessary
   security mechanisms and is easy to interface to loosely coupled
   policy and key management facilities that are outside the swIPe
   protocol itself.  In addition, is tied to any specialized underlying
   protocol features or cryptographic algorithms, and can therefore be
   readily adapted to new protocols and new crypto systems.

   Because swIPe operates at the network layer, it can be used to
   implement a variety of security configurations.  It can operate at
   the same granularity level as the network and therefore can provide
   security between any entities identified at the network layer (e.g.,
   host-to-host security, host-to-network, individual links, etc.).
   Depending on the capabilities of the host environment, finer

Ioannidis & Blaze                                               [Page 2]


INTERNET-DRAFT      The swIPe IP Security Protocol         December 1993

   granularity is possible as well, such as security between individual
   processes running on different hosts.

   The precise security configuration of a network (which links, hosts,
   connections between processes in hosts, etc.  are protected) depends
   on the policy configuration of each network entity.  That is, a host
   may determine which outgoing packets are protected, a router may
   determine which packets to pass or reject, and so on.  For example, a
   trusted internal network need not run swIPe at all, but may still
   securely connect to external networks by running swIPe on its
   routers.

   It is important to note that the existence of a security protocol is
   not sufficient; host and site security policies must be chosen
   judiciously, and often in combination with higher-level security
   mechanisms to yield the desired effects.  As an example, providing a
   secure link between a workstation and its file server does not
   protect file data once they are on the server itself.  Similarly,
   trusting the identity of a particular host is not the same as
   trusting the integrity of the data and services provided by that
   host.

   Although it was designed to be readily adaptable to any
   connectionless network protocol, swIPe as described in this document
   is specific to IP.

2.  Protocol Description
   
   swIPe works by encapsulating each IP datagram to be secured inside a
   swIPe packet.  A swIPe packet is an IP packet of protocol type
   IPPROTO_SWIPE (temporarily, protocol 94, or IPPROTO_IPIP, is being
   used).  A swIPe packet starts with a header, which contains
   identifying data and authentication information; the header is
   followed by the original IP datagram, which in turn is followed by
   any padding required by the security processing.  Depending on the
   negotiated policy, the sensitive part of the swIPe packet (the
   authentication information and the original IP datagram) may be
   encrypted.

   In this document, we refer to the original IP datagram as the `inner
   packet', and the entire swIPe datagram as the `outer' packet.  The
   components of a swIPe packet are shown in the following diagram.

       +-----+-----------+-----+----------------------+---------+
       |IPhdr| swIPe hdr |IPhdr| payload              | padding |
       +-----+-----------+-----+----------------------+---------+
                         ^_______ inner packet _______^
       ^__________________ outer (swIPe) packet ________________^

Ioannidis & Blaze                                               [Page 3]


INTERNET-DRAFT      The swIPe IP Security Protocol         December 1993

   The inner IP header and the payload are transferred intact with
   respect to the swIPe endpoints.  That is, the Time To Live field,
   original source and destination addresses, and other such fields in
   the inner IP header are not modified.  It may be desirable (in a
   future version of the protocol) to `compress' the inner IP header,
   that is, replace it with enough information to reconstruct it from
   the outer header.  This `compression', however, must be invisible at
   the swIPe endpoints.


   The format of a swIPe packet is:

       0                   1                   2                   3
       0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
  .-  +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
s H   |  Packet type  | Header length |       Policy identifier       |
w e   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
I a   |                     Packet sequence number                    |
P d   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
e e   /                                                               /
  r   \            Authenticator (optional, variable length)          \
  `-  /                                                               /
      +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
      /                                                               /
      \                                                               \
      /                     Original (inner) packet                   /
      \                                                               \
      /                                                               /
      +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
      /                                                               /
      \                         Padding (optional)                    \
      /                                                               /
      +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+

   The fields in the swIPe header are:

      Packet type (8 bits)
         0      Plain encapsulation; Header length should be 1 and
                the Policy identifier should be 1.

         1      Packet is authenticated but not encrypted.

         2      Packet is encrypted; the encryption algorithm may
                provide some authentication (e.g., DES CBC residue).
  
         3      Packet is both authenticated and encrypted

         4-15   Unused.

Ioannidis & Blaze                                               [Page 4]


INTERNET-DRAFT      The swIPe IP Security Protocol         December 1993

         16-63  Control packet.  Reserved, undefined by the protocol,
                interpreted by policy and key management engines.

         64-255 Reserved; must never be used.

      Header length (8 bits)

         The length of the swIPe header in 32-bit words.  The minimum
         value is 1.

      Policy Identifier (16 bits)
         A token, negotiated at key- or policy-setup time, used by the
         recipient of the packet to choose the proper policy.  Similar
         to a SAID.

      Packet sequence number (32 bits)
         This field protects against replay attacks and may also be used
         for synchronization by a stream cipher.  It is unique within
         the context of an endpoint pair (common source/destination
         address and Policy identifier).  It is incremented by one with
         every packet sent, and initialized whenever the hosts 
         re-negotiate keys and/or policies.

	 The hosts MUST renegotiate crypto variables before the packet
         sequence number wraps around. A host MUST NOT accept duplicate
	 packets; this may be achieved by only accepting packets which
         increment the sequence number, or maintaining a small window
         of acceptable packet numbers.

      Authentication data (variable length, multiple of 32 bits)
         An authenticator, computed over the entire swIPe packet (minus
         the outer IP header), but before any confidentiality processing
         is performed.  When the authenticator is computed, the
         authentication data field is zeroed.

      Encapsulated packet (variable length)
         The actual packet being secured.

      Padding (variable length)
         Some security algorithms (such as DES) require padding to bring
         the length of the data to an integral multiple of the block
         size.  The padding is added after the authentication data have
         been computed.

   A swIPe system consists of three conceptual entities; the protocol
   engine, the key management engine, and the policy engine.  The swIPe
   protocol described in this document comprises the protocol engine.
   We describe the swIPe processing without specifying the precise
   semantics of either the policy or key management engines, since these

Ioannidis & Blaze                                               [Page 5]


INTERNET-DRAFT      The swIPe IP Security Protocol         December 1993

   are not part of the protocol itself.  It is useful, however, to
   consider the interaction between protocol and key management and
   policy in terms of a simple upcall interface: whenever the swIPe
   processing engine needs to determine which keys and what policy to
   use in processing a datagram, it calls the appropriate processing
   engine.  Needless to say, an implementation may optimize the actual
   mechanisms or blur the boundaries between protocol processing and
   policy.

   The policy engine is responsible for determining the precise kind of
   processing required of outgoing datagrams, and acceptance policy for
   incoming datagrams.  The key management engine establishes the
   cryptographic variables used by the protocol.  Both the policy and
   the key management engines may also communicate with their respective
   peers on remote endpoints for negotiation of policy and keys, as
   required.

   Outgoing datagrams are processed by swIPe as follows: based on
   information from the inner packet itself (IP source and destination
   address, IP protocol, other transport-layer parameters), as well as
   information from local system control structures such as protocol
   control blocks, a decision is made whether to send the packet and, if
   so, whether to apply swIPe processing to it.  If swIPe processing is
   required, the authentication and encryption algorithms, the keys to
   use, and the destination of the outer packet are determined by
   consulting the policy and key management engines.  Once the
   parameters have been determined, the swIPe packet is constructed.
   The swIPe header is prepended to the (inner) IP datagram.  The
   sequence number is copied into the packet and incremented.  If
   authentication is to be performed, the authenticator field (of the
   appropriate length) is zeroed, and the authentication algorithm is
   applied to the authentication information part of the header (i.e.,
   the swIPe header minus the first 32 bits) and the original IP
   datagram.  The checksum resulting from the application of the
   authentication algorithm is copied into the authenticator field.  If
   authentication is not performed, then the authenticator field is not
   present.  Next, if encryption is (also) specified, the appropriate
   algorithm and crypto variable are selected and applied to the same
   parts of the datagram as the authentication.  The algorithm may
   require padding, which is appended to the packet after encryption has
   been performed.  The resulting datagram is then transmitted to its
   destination (which may not be the same as that of inner packet).

   Input processing proceeds in roughly the opposite fashion.  swIPe
   datagrams that arrive are decrypted and authenticated based on
   information contained in their swIPe header.  Namely, the source,
   destination, and Policy Identifier of the outher packet are examined
   and the crypto variables and algorithms used to decrypt, verify, and

Ioannidis & Blaze                                               [Page 6]


INTERNET-DRAFT      The swIPe IP Security Protocol         December 1993

   reconstruct the original packet.  The resulting datagrams, plus any
   non-swIPe datagrams that arrive directly are checked against the
   local policy configuration to determine whether they should be
   accepted or not.  Accepted packets are processed in the ordinary
   manner (delivered to the corresponding higher-layer protocol if they
   were destined for the receiving host, or further routed if not).

3.  Discussion

   The security provided by swIPe depends upon the strength of the
   underlying cryptographic algorithms, the security of secret key
   information, and the characteristics of the protocol itself.  Since
   swIPe can be used with a wide range of crypto systems, we focus on
   the impact of the protocol features on the resulting security.

   Source authenticity of the inner packet is protected by including the
   entire inner packet (and hence its source and destination IP
   addresses) in the computation of the authenticator.  The implicit
   assumption is that the authentication function is a cryptographically
   strong one-way authenticator (such as key-seeded MD5), and that only
   the legitimate hosts have access to the authentication key.
   Similarly, data integrity is protected by the same checksum
   mechanism; replays are thwarted by the presence of the sequence
   number field.

   An adversary not possessing the authentication key cannot generate
   the authenticator for fraudulent packets; furthermore, since only
   packets that increase the sequence number are accepted (or packets
   within the acceptable window), replay attacks are not feasible either.

   Data confidentiality is provided by encrypting the entire swIPe
   packet.  Confidentiality is not limited to the actual data being
   transmitted in the inner packet, but also extends to the source and
   destination addreses, protocol characteristics (such as TCP port
   number), and so on.  Note that since the addresses of the inner
   packet are not necessarily the same as those of the outer packet, it
   is not possible for an adversary to determine the actual endpoints of
   communication without resorting to global traffic analysis.

   There are many ways to configure systems running swIPe, and many
   types of security policies that can be implemented with it.  For a
   discussion of applications of swIPe and its implementation under
   Unix, the reader is referred to "The Architecture and Implementation
   of Network-Layer Security Under Unix", by John Ioannidis and Matt
   Blaze, which appeared in the proceedings of the 4th USENIX Security
   Symposium, Santa Clara, CA, October 1993.


Ioannidis & Blaze                                               [Page 7]


INTERNET-DRAFT      The swIPe IP Security Protocol         December 1993

Authors' Addresses

   John Ioannidis
   Computer Science Department
   Columbia University
   500 W. 120th Street
   New York, NY 10027
   ji@cs.columbia.edu
   +1.212.939.7000

   Matt Blaze
   AT&T Bell Laboratories
   101 Crawfords Corner Road
   Holmdel, New Jersey 07733
   mab@research.att.com
   +1.908.949.8069










From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: sdw@meaddata.com (Stephen Williams)
Date: Mon, 6 Dec 93 14:45:10 PST
To: nowhere@bsu-cs.bsu.edu (Anonymous)
Subject: Re: Anarchy Gone Awry (fwd)
In-Reply-To: <9312060208.AA17728@bsu-cs.bsu.edu>
Message-ID: <9312062243.AA11661@jungle.meaddata.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I'm not sure, yet, if I want to agree with this guy to any amount, but
this idea, recast into a safe form that doesn't get out of control,
might be a good idea.  I thought of it as a way to get K-12
students/schools connected 'safely'.

See below:

> Computer underground Digest    Sun  Dec 5 1993   Volume 5 : Issue 91
>                            ISSN  1004-042X
> Date: Thu, 02 Dec 93 04:36:10 -0700
> From: "L. Detweiler" <ld231782@LONGS.LANCE.COLOSTATE.EDU>
> Subject: File 1--Anarchy Gone Awry
> 
> Mr. Leichter raises some extremely pivotal issues in CUD #5.90 related
> to the `anarchy' of the Internet. B.Sterling is the author of one of
> the most brilliantly colorful characterizations and metaphors of the
> Internet as `anarchic', comparing its evolution and development to that
> of the English language:
....
> I think that many people have mistaken the word `anarchic,' implying no
> overseeing authority or order (which the Internet is less) with the
> word `decentralized' (which the Internet is more). Again, the
> Internet has many regulatory and self-governing systems and orders.
> For example, connecting sites are required to implement a certain
> minimum set of software standards and prevent or even root out
> corruptions in their local sites and software. We have centralized
> databases that require the registration of domains for fees. A complex
> network of agreements and policies governs interconnectivity and
> communication, and a complicated interplay of elements affects basic
> content such as `commercial vs. academic.' Lack of some of these
> regulations and protocols would be disastrous.
> 
> Leichter:
> >Most of the Internet, in fact, is
> >better described as self-governing.  There are a variety of social
> >norms concerning network use and interactions.  One doesn't post
> >messages to unrelated groups.  One doesn't evade moderation
> >restrictions.  One maintains a certain (rather limited, it must be
> >admitted) degree of restraint in how one describes other network
> >participants.  There are few effective mechanisms for enforcing these
> >norms, and they are certainly broken on an all-too-regular basis; but
> >the network continues to function because social pressure *can* be
> >applied to those who become too annoying; and in the most outrageous
> >cases, it's possible to remove the offenders' access to the net.
> 
> I advocate that we build new formal mechanisms to enforce this order!
> We have for too long pretended that a central element of the Internet
> is not integral to it, namely that of the `degree of restraint over
> network participants' exerted through `social pressure'. Let us codify
> and formalize these `norms concerning network use and interactions' and
> develop systems that enforce them! I believe such systems can be
> developed that do not stray from the sacred Internet tradition of
> decentralization of control and freedom from censorship. Why should we
> continue to subject ourselves to the torture of `few effective
> mechanisms for enforcing these norms broken on an all-too-regular basis'?
> 
> One of my most enduring Cyberspatial hallucinations is that of a
> Ratings server. A Ratings server would be a massive distributed network
> for the propagation of information similar to Usenet, and could
> conceivably be built upon it. But the Ratings server is not
> Information, as Usenet is, it is Information about Information. Anyone
> can post an arbitrary message to the Ratings server that refers to
> Information somewhere else in Cyberspace. It is in a sense a Rating of
> that Information. The Information could be *anything* -- a mailing
> list, a person, a particular Usenet posting, an FTP site. But postings
> on the Ratings server can be perused by anyone, and anyone can
> contribute Ratings to the server or indicate their own opinion on the
> existing Ratings. Different mechanisms exist such that some Ratings are
> `local' and some are updated globally.

I had a similar idea, but knowing how hard it is to get everyone using
new software and data streams, I wanted to piggyback onto News.  My
original reason for thinking about it was for Internet systems that
would like to give access to News, etc. to K-12 students and schools.
A big problem is material that parents and teachers would object to.
I have absolutely no desire to censor anything or prevent adults from
running into or getting anything (quite the opposite, actually), but
there is no getting around the desired restrictions on info flow to
minors.

Basically, I suggested that special messages be standardized that
would endorse messages for certain distributions.  Old (existing...)
news software would just pass the messages like others, but news
systems that wanted to rate or hide improper messages could pay
attention to them.  My software would probably take the form of
patches to INN and tin, etc.  There would be positive and negative
endorsements, of course with the possibility of signature keys, etc.

You could configure certain users or the system to be sensitive to any
combination of endorsements:  The idea is that the administrator or
user could determine who they would pay attention to.  Other things
like voting, number of endorsements, etc. could easily be done.

One senario is that teachers or organizations worldwide could
'register' to each other and share the responsibility of endorsing
messages in certain groups.  If there needed to be culpability, the
endorsers could be tracked down if needed.

This would be totally optional on an adult's account and mandatory on
a minor's account, unless proper permission was obtained.  It might,
in certain situations, also reduce the signal-to-noise ratio.  Another
interesting use is to change the nature of moderated groups: the group
could be unmoderated in the current sense, but users could choose
moderators who would agree to endorse messages that had good content.
You could have several 'competing' moderators in the same group,
almost like news organizations.

'alt.best.of.internet' is a limited capability version of this idea.

> The fantastic possibilities of this system are evident upon some
> reflection and consideration. We could establish arbitrary new groups
> that have *formal* requirements that are matched by Ratings servers.
> For example, we could require that new sites that enter the Internet be
> `trusted' by an existing site. We could require that membership in
> certain groups requires a certain amount of collateral peer approval,
> with automatic suspension or expulsion as the consequences for
> violating it! We could have *meaningful* polls on arbitrary issues. We
> could have news servers that automatically sort and archive articles
> according to their passing certain Ratings thresholds. We could
> restrict the influence of troublemakers! These are all examples of
> strengthening and formalizing the informal social orders that are, in
> my opinion, today just barely holding the Internet together. With a
> Ratings system, I think the civility of the Internet would increase to
> a fantastic degree. In short, we could have our *own* cyberspatial government!
> 
> Note that there is no centralized authority or unfair influence in this
> system, unless people corrupt their servers. When everyone who has
> joined a group *individually* decides to screen their postings of
> messages that fail to meet a certain `quality' or posters who have a
> certain `reputation', that is not Orwellian Censorship but the
> beautiful Internet freedom and right of Bozo Filtering. When everyone
> who joins a group *agrees* to a charter that may bar troublemakers
> based on Ratings, no one can claim they are being unfairly oppressed.

My method, IMHO, is a positive version of the negative method espoused
here.  I do not like a central 'ratings server' of any kind.  There
should be multiple competing 'opinions' and you can ascribe to any
existing one or in combination or be independant.

> I fervently hope that the glorifications and manipulations of Internet
> Anarchy by mouth-frothing libertarian extremists, Cryptoanarchists,
> and sympathizers can be adequately controlled and minimized in the
> future, and some harmonious systems and effective countermeasures
> along the lines of the Rating server can be established by visionaries
> and tinkerers, but in any case, for the sake of humanity's integrity,
> sanity, and well-being, I pray that Future Cyberspace is far less
> Anarchic than the Current Internet.

So how does our current society hold together?  Where is that central
'ratings server'?  (Nielsons dosn't count :-))

We should stay decentralized, especially, on the net.  When some of us
think of an anarchic system, we are making the assumption that some
good stability and structure will be created organically.  Probably it
will be better than that designed with preconceived opinions.

And, I feel compelled to add, you are the only mouth-frothing person
I've run across recently.

sdw
-- 
Stephen D. Williams  Local Internet Gateway Co.; SDW Systems 513 496-5223APager
LIG dev./sales       Internet: sdw@lig.net CIS 76244.210@compuserve.com
OO R&D Source Dist.  By Horse: 2464 Rosina Dr., Miamisburg, OH 45342-6430
GNU Support          ICBM: 39 34N 85 15W I love it when a plan comes together



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: jim@Tadpole.COM (Jim Thompson)
Date: Mon, 6 Dec 93 16:10:12 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: swIPe Internet Draft
Message-ID: <9312070006.AA06651@chiba.tadpole.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


From owner-cypherpunks  Mon Dec  6 18:30:11 1993
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To: cypherpunks@toad.com
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>Date: Mon, 6 Dec 93 20:44:56 -0500
>From: "Alan (Miburi-san) Wexelblat" <wex@media.mit.edu>

>I tried "unsubscribe cypherwonks Alan Wexelblat" and got back a barf message
>saying that I had to "unsubscribe <listname> <address>" so I tried
>"unsubscribe cypherwonks wex@media.mit.edu" and got back a barf message
>saying "No matches found for 'wex@media.mit.edu'

>Help!  Is there a human being associated with this annoying piece of crap?
>I suppose I can just add a new formula to my .procmailrc, but I'd rather
>kill it at the source...

I was considering modifying my mail sorting software to forward anything
from "cypherwonks" to ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu, as a gift.
Maybe if we all do this, he'll get the hint....

From owner-cypherpunks  Mon Dec  6 15:40:19 1993
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Date: Mon,  6 Dec 1993 18:25:54 -0500 (EST)
From: Matthew J Ghio <mg5n+@andrew.cmu.edu>
To: cypherpunks@toad.com, bdolan <71431.2564@CompuServe.COM>
Subject: Re: Digicash question
In-Reply-To: <931206210540_71431.2564_FHA55-1@CompuServe.COM>
References: <931206210540_71431.2564_FHA55-1@CompuServe.COM>

A newbie, bdolan <71431.2564@CompuServe.COM> timidly asked:

> X gives $101 to First Digital Bank, which gives X a PGP-signed
> password representing a claim on $100 (or maybe they would do
> this just for the "float").  X gives the $100 password to Y, in
> exchange for a narco-terrorism decoder ring.  Y, being a cautious
> soul, calls First DigiBank immediately and gives it the password.
> DigiBank pockets $1 and issues Y a new signed password good
> for $99.  Note that DigiBank (1) doesn't need to know who Y
> is and (2) ensures that a given money-password is only spent
> once.  By the same method, Y can pay Z and Z can deposit the
> credit in BillnHill's S&L for settlement.  Or the money can keep
> floating around until DigiBank gets it all, which is what
> usually happens now ;-)

Well, it could work that way.  The only thing that I see being a problem
is that you're using public-key crypto when you don't really need to. 
This allows the bank to associate a public key with an identity.  (which
is what Derek Atkins <warlord@MIT.EDU> said.)  But, basically, you could
simplify the system to this: X has a password which is worth $100 in
cash from FDB.  X gives the password to Y.  Y then calls the bank and
changes the password to whatever he wants.  Y now has $100 digital money
(minus the bank's transaction fee).  The bank has no way of knowing who
gave them the new password.  (You could also have the bank generate
random passwords, and give them to the client.)  Notice that no public
keys (and no identification) is used.  The only need for public keys in
such a situation would be to establish a secure transmission channel; in
which case, someone could make up a random keypair, make a transaction
with the bank and then discard the private key - the money would be
identified by the secret password.
The only other thing to point out, is that each digital
coin/token/denomination must have its own password - what if he only
wanted to spend $57 and not $100?  So each dollar would have to be
seperate; to spend $100, X would have to give Y 100 seperate passwords. 
Unless, of course, you have digicoins of different denominations, but
then you have to have correct change.

Of course, you are still left with the the problem of needing to trust
the bank. :(

Good point about the bank taking its cut - I think we need to come up
with a fair system for dealing with that...


P.S. I'm glad to see some people on this list still want to talk about
real crypto, instead of, ahem, other distractions...

From owner-cypherpunks  Mon Dec  6 15:40:11 1993
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From: pmetzger@lehman.com (Perry E. Metzger)
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To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: moderated cryptography list
Reply-To: pmetzger@lehman.com
X-Reposting-Policy: redistribute only with permission


Hello, all.

I'm looking for a site willing to host a high-quality moderated
cryptography mailing list which I am thinking of starting up.  The
list would be designed as a low volume, high readership, high quality
source for

1) In-depth technical discussions of cryptography
2) Announcements of cryptographic products
3) Announcements of news items of interest to the cryptography
   community.
4) VERY limited numbers of postings on the social implications of
   cryptography, and I mean VERY limited.

All postings would be explicitly approved by the moderator before
going out to assure quality. Yes, that means fascistic restriction of
your capacity for free speech, in exchange for not being overwhelmed
with garbage every day.

It is ultimately envisioned that should the list be a success I would
try to move it to a moderated Usenet newsgroup.

If you think that such a list is a Good Thing, and you can host it
(which requires that you have a good internet connection and root
access or similar on the machine in question), please let me know.
I'll do all the work, and the crypto community will thank you
tremendously.

Perry Metzger

From owner-cypherpunks  Mon Dec  6 15:50:08 1993
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From: Stanton McCandlish <mech@eff.org>
Message-Id: <199312062336.SAA18789@eff.org>
Subject: GAO's "Comm. Privacy: Federal Policy & Actions" now online!
To: eff-talk@eff.org
Date: Mon, 6 Dec 1993 18:36:10 -0500 (EST)
Cc: alt.politics.datahighway@eff.org, sci-crypt@cs.utexas.edu,
        alt-privacy-clipper@cs.utexas.edu, alt-security-pgp@cs.utexas.edu,
        cypherpunks@toad.com, thesegroups@tic.com, alt-activism@cs.utexas.edu,
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The US General Accounting Office's report, "COMMUNICATIONS PRIVACY:
Federal Policy and Actions" is now online at both the GAO and EFF ftp sites.

From EFF, you can get the document via anonymous ftp to ftp.eff.org.  The
document is ~pub/eff/papers/osi-94-2.txt.

The file is ~143K.

Here's some info on the report from the latest EFFector Online (6.06):

____ begin fwd _____

Subject: Government Accounting Office Report on Communications Privacy

A few days ago, the Government Accounting Office (GAO) -- an important
internal government investigative organization that's about a lot more
than accounting -- issued a report on communications privacy.

The report makes four very important findings:

1. Privacy-protecting technology (crytopgraphy) is increasingly important
for protecting the security of business communications and personal
information.  But federal policy is getting in the way of this technology.

"Increased use of computer and communications networks, computer literacy,
and dependence on information technology heighten US industries risk of
losing proprietary information to economic espionage.  In part to reduce
the risk, industry is more frequently using hardware and software with
encryption capabilities.  However, federal policies and actions stemming
from national security and law enforcement concerns hinder the use and the
export of U.S. commercial encryption technology and may hinder its
development."

2. The NSA's role in this area is has been extensive, and possibly beyond
the spirit of the Computer Security Act.

"Although the Computer Security Act of 1987 reaffirmed NIST's reponsibility
for developing federal information-processing standards for security of
sensitive, unclassified information, NIST follows NSA's lead in developing
certain cryptographic standards"

3. Opportunity for public input in the standards process has been
insufficient, leading to proposals like Clipper which lack public support.

"These policy issues are formulated and announced to the public, however,
with very little input from directly affected business interests, academia,
and others."

The report draws no specific policy conclusions, but provides excellent
ammunition for those of us who are trying to open up the standards process
and get export controls lifted.

Full text of the report (GAO/OSI-94-2 Communications Privacy: Federal
Policy and Actions) has been made available by ftp from GAO.

The document can be obtained from EFF's FTP site as
~pub/eff/papers/osi-94-2.txt

-- 
Stanton  McCandlish  mech@eff.org  1:109/1103   EFF  Online  Activist & SysOp
O P E N  P L A T F O R M   C R Y P T O P O L I C Y   O N L I N E  R I G H T S
N  E  T  W  O  R  K  I  N  G      V  I  R  T  U  A  L     C  U  L  T  U  R  E
I   N   F  O :  M   E   M   B   E   R   S   H   I   P  @  E  F  F  .  O  R  G

From owner-cypherpunks  Mon Dec  6 16:13:26 1993
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Date: Mon, 6 Dec 1993 19:05:55 -0500
From: Black Unicorn <unicorn@access.digex.net>
Message-Id: <199312070005.AA23282@access.digex.net>
To: nowhere@bsu-cs.bsu.edu, sdw@meaddata.com
Subject: Re: Anarchy Gone Awry (fwd)
Cc: cypherpunks@toad.com, cypherwonks@Lists.EUnet.fi


This post is a perfect example why the two lists should be kept seperate
and not merged.  This sounds to me like it belongs on alt.politics.data-
highway.

-uni- (dark)

From owner-cypherpunks  Mon Dec  6 14:33:20 1993
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Message-Id: <199312061800.AA26077@lassie.eunet.fi>
To: mech@eff.org
From: Majordomo@Lists.EUnet.fi
Subject: Welcome to cypherwonks
Reply-To: Majordomo@Lists.EUnet.fi
Sender: mech@eff.org

Welcome to the cypherwonks mailing list!

If you ever want to remove yourself from this mailing list, send the
following command in email to "Majordomo@Lists.EUnet.fi":

    unsubscribe cypherwonks Stanton McCandlish <mech@eff.org>

Here's the general information for the list you've subscribed to, in
case you don't already have it:


This is the Cypherwonks mailing list

Below is The Cypherwonk Charter, by L. Detweiler, Cypherwonk Janitor

The cypherwonks are a splinter group from the cypherpunks also
interested in promoting and implementing cryptographic technology.
However, we have unique ideas on how to successfully implement these
radical new capabilities to ensure privacy without encouraging criminal
behaviors like forgery and `online predation'. We are also interested
in a far more ambitious goal of `technological progress' that
transcends a mere obsession with privacy and anonymity. The cypherwonks
believe that many aspects of a identification and government are
necessary and crucial for any social stability (particularly related to
judicial and law enforcement systems), and are quite alarmed at talk
about a `cryptoanarchy' resulting from the mere implementation of
software protocols -- although we realize that radical new forms of
government may appear with these new technologies, embodied in one term
`Electronic Democracy'.

We believe that while sometimes the `majority' can become a `tyranny',
in general the idea of voting as a civilized way of resolving proposals
and `one person, one vote' are sacred, and we are interested in
implementing systems that promote interaction and collaboration among
motivated and enthusiastic members, whether within the cypherwonk
organization or within their nations (cypherwonks, of course, try to
think free of local prejudices, and globally).

Cypherwonks understand that *trust* and *honesty* are inherent in all
human endeavors, *particularly* communication. We recognize that people
trust others not to reveal our private email unless given permission,
we trust others not to use information from our mail or about their
identities to adverse aims, we trust that systems delivering mail will
not be corrupted by criminals, or if they get caught there will be
serious consequences, and many other explicit and implicit variations.
We know that there are many ingenious ways of minimizing the amount of
trust required in unknown components such as with the use of
cryptography or pseudonyms, and we seek passionately to invent and use
them, but at the root level, email is an exchange between human beings
who trust each other. Therefore, we hold a sense of ethics and morality
in strong reverence, and even though we're not always precisely sure
what they entail, we know that they exist and we strive for the right
ideal. We abhor the idea that `it's not wrong if you can get away with
it' or other variations of moral relativism.

Cypherwonks are also extremely interested in promoting and implementing
`digital cash', but believe that while invariably the state's taxes
tend to become burdensome, few civilized, technological societies are
free of them, and certainly we do not advocate tax evasion, `black
marketeering', or any other subversive or illegal activities through
cryptographic techniques, and even beyond this we seek design protocols
that discourage these subversive aims in general, because of their
toxic, fragmentary effect on social unity.

Cypherwonks recognize that our mailing list is extremely critical in
coordinating our movement and our fellow members. It is our central
nervous system. While the list is informal, we demand a professional
atmosphere, and will privately object to people who are publicly rude
or belligerent. But we are also extremely careful about what we say to
each other in private, because people can be extremely influenced by
what they receive in mail. We would be aghast and horrified to find
that somebody viciously criticized someone in private mail based on
public postings, for example. We place high value on being courteous to
each other and minimizing disagreement where possible, forging
consensus, and the art of diplomacy in surmounting political barriers.
We trust each other on the list and in personal email. We wish to have
an open, uplifting, inspiring, honest, representative, polite,
respectful, egalitarian dialogue. We will never use the mailing list
for personal or selfish reasons -- we strive to serve our fellow
cypherwonks through our postings. We are what we claim to be. We abhor
secrecy, `security through obscurity', and conspirational cliques.

Cypherwonks are extremely interested in promoting some forms of
anonymity. However, we do not necessarily believe that others are
required to read anonymous postings. To the contrary, we believe that
the individual should have the tools and freedom to filter his or her
own mail based on real identities. In particular, we condemn the
practice of `pseudospoofing,' the dangerous deception where a person
builds up a pseudonym and misrepresents it as being that of a real
person's identity. We police each other on the list to prevent it, and
require a promise that our members refrain from it. While our trust can
be betrayed, only those that are honest are true cypherwonks, and
anyone who betrays our trust we consider a dishonist hypocrite, or worse, a tra
  *itor.

Cypherwonks are extremely interested in building tangible systems.
Engineers who love to discuss the nitty-gritty details of some scheme
are at home on the cypherwonks list. We like to impress each other with
our knowledge but at the same time state it in relevant and humble
terms. We are not trying to win popularity contests with our postings.
We are trying to accomplish ambitious endeavors. We are especially
ecstatic to make connections with other cypherwonks interested in the
same projects we are, and cooperating to build useful tools. We like to
give status reports of our intermittent real-world meetings and



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Black Unicorn <unicorn@access.digex.net>
Date: Mon, 6 Dec 93 17:40:10 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Pabo and Interception
Message-ID: <199312070138.AA19376@access.digex.net>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



This from the state department,

->
COLOMBIA                       12/02/93  SC14249
 MORE ON ESCOBAR DEATH
 MEDELLIN, ANTIOQUIA DEPARTMENT REUTERS REPORTED THAT POLICE AND TROOPS SHOT
AND KILLED FUGITIVE DRUG LORD PABLO ESCOBAR ON THURSDAY AFTER A FURIOUS ROOFTOP
SHOOT-OUT IN MEDELLIN'S LAS AMERICAS SUBURB.  (ALSO SEE THE OTHER DECEMBER 2
REPORTS.)  WITNESSES AT THE HOUSE WHERE ESCOBAR WAS KILLED SAID THEY HAD SEEN
THE BEARDED FUGITIVE ATTEMPTING TO FLEE ACROSS THE ROOF BEFORE SECURITY FORCES
OPENED FIRE. ESCOBAR'S BROTHER-IN-LAW CARLOS MARIO HENAO WAS ALSO KILLED IN THE
SHOOT-OUT. ESCOBAR HAD BEEN ON THE RUN SINCE ESCAPING FROM JAIL IN JULY 1992,
ALONG WITH NINE OF HIS ASSOCIATES.  POLICE CAUGHT UP WITH HIM AFTER A 16-MONTH
SEARCH BECAUSE OF A FATAL MISTAKE -- A TELEPHONE CALL TO HIS FAMILY ON
WEDNESDAY, ESCOBAR'S 44TH BIRTHDAY.  ELECTRONIC MONITORING EQUIPMENT ALLOWED
POLICE TO PINPOINT THE LOCATION OF THE CALL AND MOUNT THE OPERATION IN SECRECY,
SURROUNDING ESCOBAR'S HIDEOUT WITH SHARPSHOOTERS.  WITHIN HOURS OF THE DRUG
LORD'S DEATH,  ESCOBAR'S 17-YEAR-OLD SON VOWED REVENGE AND HIS MOTHER PREDICTED
THAT "HORRIBLE THINGS" WOULD HAPPEN, BUT THE YOUNGER ESCOBAR LATER SAID HE WAS
REACTING OUT OF GRIEF AND WAS NOT ISSUING THREATS.
 
<-

I don't know where the babble about calling a radio station came from,
but this caught my eye as it seems to be the "offical" state department
word on the topic.


-uni- (Dark)




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Alan (Miburi-san) Wexelblat" <wex@media.mit.edu>
Date: Mon, 6 Dec 93 17:45:09 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Help me get off cypherwonks list
Message-ID: <9312070144.AA13059@media.mit.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I tried "unsubscribe cypherwonks Alan Wexelblat" and got back a barf message
saying that I had to "unsubscribe <listname> <address>" so I tried
"unsubscribe cypherwonks wex@media.mit.edu" and got back a barf message
saying "No matches found for 'wex@media.mit.edu'

Help!  Is there a human being associated with this annoying piece of crap?
I suppose I can just add a new formula to my .procmailrc, but I'd rather
kill it at the source...

--Alan Wexelblat, Reality Hacker, Author, and Cyberspace Bard
Media Lab - Advanced Human Interface Group	wex@media.mit.edu
Voice: 617-258-9168 Page: 617-945-1842		an53607@anon.penet.fi
Withdrawing in disgust is not the same as apathy.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Derek Atkins <warlord@MIT.EDU>
Date: Mon, 6 Dec 93 18:23:21 PST
To: "Alan (Miburi-san) Wexelblat" <wex@media.mit.edu>
Subject: Re: Help me get off cypherwonks list
In-Reply-To: <9312070144.AA13059@media.mit.edu>
Message-ID: <9312070220.AA13786@w20-575-33.MIT.EDU>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


FYI: If you read that message carefully, you will notice that
cypherpunks was *NOT* subscribed to cypherwonks, and neither were any
of the cypherpunks subscribers.

If you do not want to be on cypherwonks, then do nothing, and you will
not be on it.

The message you saw was a result of a cypherpunks subscriber
redistributing the cypherwonks intoduction message to cypherpunks.

It would have been nice if the message to cypherpunks had said what it
was.. I had to look really closely to notice that the message was
destined for the person who sent it, not to the list.  But please do
not be alarmed by the message.  

Again:  You are not on cypherwonks!

-derek




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "L. Detweiler" <ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Date: Mon, 6 Dec 93 21:10:26 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: W.Diffie on RSA patent
Message-ID: <9312070510.AA06457@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Hello, I asked W.Diffie (cryptographer celebrity!) about the RSA patent
a long time ago, and I thought everyone here would be interested in
what he had to say on the subject. I was curious about a story I heard
about the NSA suppressing some patent at first. I went to a lecture by
an ethics professor once in Nebraska and she talked about how some
academic researcher had got an application for a patent back rejected,
with no explanation, and that after an extremely long battle, the poor
scientist discovered the NSA was to blame. 

The lecturer wasn't specific about the case but used it as an example
in talking about the relation of government to science and the research
establishment and the possibility of censorship. The scientist had
discovered some sensitive cryptographic secret, apparently, and the NSA
was spooked by it (hee, hee, very punny!). I asked P.Zimmermann about
this and he seemed to think the story was about the RSA patent.

I thought this was all documented in the NYT. Does anyone have the
article? Anyway, Mr.Diffie says (see below) that nothing sinister
happened at the patent office regarding the RSA patent. I would like to
hear of any other patents that were suppressed by the NSA hiding behind
the patent office. I mean, this professor was definitely not making up
a story! She gave me the NYT reference but I think I accidentally threw
out the paper I wrote it on. Does anyone have the reference? I think it
happened in '78.

Also, If W.Diffie is listening (he told me on the phone he subscribes
to the list) could you get in touch with me? I haven't been able to get
any response to my email. Also, it seems you have more than one email
address at Sun, and I'm confused about which to use (my mail to one
given to me by J.Gilmore bounced).

===cut=here===




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: hfinney@shell.portal.com (Hal)
Date: Mon, 6 Dec 93 22:33:24 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Name for crypto cash
Message-ID: <9312070630.AA28857@jobe.shell.portal.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I thought of a new name today for digital cash: CRASH, taken from
CRypto cASH.  "How much crash have you got in your account?  Can we FTP
this GIF?"  "Not enough... Hey, can I borrow some crash?"  It has a nice
cyberpunk sound to it.  I don't know if we need a name for the units,
or if we could just get by without.

One of the lessons of the CP publicity is that having a sexy name is
a big plus.

(Apologies if I'm unknowingly regurgitating someone else's idea!)

Hal





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: wcs@anchor.ho.att.com (bill.stewart@pleasantonca.ncr.com +1-510-484-6204)
Date: Mon, 6 Dec 93 20:40:11 PST
To: mg5n+@andrew.cmu.edu
Subject: Re: Digicash question
Message-ID: <9312070441.AA06906@anchor.ho.att.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


One problem with your proposal is that at *some* point you want to be able
to get *real* cash for your digicash - at that point you've got to give
the bank the password, but also an account to deposit the cash into
(or equivalent), and at that point the bank can compare it with
the original owner of the bill.  You not only have to trust them to
not rip off the money, you have to trust them to not give away
the information, which may be tough if the government requires it.

Another problem is that:  Suppose Alice gives the password to Bob,
who gives it to Carol, and then Alice spends the cash before 
Carol can get it - you don't know if Alice or Bob ripped you off.
Alice could also try spending it before Bob deposits it,
but that's an issue for any offline cash protocol, though this
appears to give you less protection.

Different denominations aren't much of a problem - you need something
like that anyway.  Having each separate coin have a separate number
registered with the bank is somewhat more annoying than some of Chaum's
schemes, where you could prove the coin had been signed by the bank
but the bank didn't (and couldn't) track the coins.

Another trusting-the-bank problem is what happens if the
government comes to you and says "Alice is a drug dealer (mushrooms?) -
give us the passwords for all her digicash, and if she's given them
to anyone else, we can still forfeit them because the law lets us
confiscate them after she's spent them, just like stolen goods."
In Chaum's case, that's explicitly impossible.
(In the cases that led to Swiss Banking Secrecy laws,
the crime wasn't "drugs",it was "being Jewish".)

Similarly, even if the bank as a whole is honest, there may be
employees trying to embezzle the funds - tough to prevent in your approach.

		Bill Stewart




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "L. Detweiler" <ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Date: Mon, 6 Dec 93 23:10:14 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Humility, Embarrassment, Shame, and an Apology
Message-ID: <9312070708.AA08746@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Hello fellow Cypherpunks! I am writing this message to sincerely
apologize for my past behavior over the past few weeks on this list,
particularly over the last few days. I have written messages that I am
not proud of. And all for nothing. I am here to tell you that your
leaders have all assured me in unequivocal terms that they are not
pseudospoofing in any way whatsoever and have no personal knowledge of
any pseudospoofing on the cypherpunks list or anywhere else, so I now
feel like an embarrassed idiot for escalating this matter to this
level, when it is so obviously completely unjustified in retrospect. I
realize I am the premier digital Don Quixote, chasing phantoms and
jousting at windmills! The joke is on me!

I have learned many things over the past few weeks. I thank you for the
valuable lessons you have taught me. I was too arrogant until now to
accept your wisdom with humility. Clearly, my mistake! Don't I feel
stupid! I think both you and I have many things in common. We are
interested in the growth of cyberspace and recognize that
pseudoanonymity has awesome power, like an atom bomb. I think the
difference is that I thought you were doing all you could to detonate
them when you were really trying to  stop them. I apologize to everyone
I offended by suggesting otherwise.

I think that fucking tentacle S.Boxx has demonstrated the damage that
can be done with pseudoanonymity. He ought to be taken out and shot in
the forehead. I would enjoy watching him stare blankly with a gaping
hole in his skull and his brains and blood splattered about. In fact, I
am going to do precisely that if I ever find the bastard. (His family
deserves to die too, but we'll see what mood I'm in at the time). And
everyone knows that he is a tentacle! Image the raw power that can come
from the surreptitious use of this extraordinarly overpowering force!
It is like the ultimate technique for social engineering, guerilla
warfare, espionage, sabotage, and riot instigation. The evil, hard-core
hackers have done well to perfect it. You are lucky that your leaders
are so farsighted and astute to realize the inherently dangerous and
damaging nature of its use. You have accomplished great miracles from
your honorable cooperation! Although, we definitely have a new arms
race with the Psychopunks in the strategic position (thank god there
are none here!). I hope we can reach a detente. This is my own peace offering.

Your leaders E.Hughes and T.C.May have mailed messages to my postmaster
in complaint in my questions about there use of different sites.
P.Metzger mailed my postmaster in regard to his mailbombing me.
E.Brandt sent my postmaster and my root another letter recently asking
me to stop mailing him, which was amusing considering that he initiated
our conversation. I have been subject to a sendsys bomb yesterday, that
came in about ~.5 meg, and a new grisly mailbomb today at ~5 meg and
growing. But we can now understand that none of this is necessary. It
has reached its purpose. I have achieved a serenity and tranquility
with my newfound delight and euphoria. 

I got another anonymous and cryptic phone threat this afternoon, from
who knows. ``Shot by the SWAT team. No doubt about it. GET HELP.'' This
brings the total of heartfelt greetings from my dear friends to 2. And
I have no idea what D.Barnes has been able to turn up in his blackmail
campaign of assaulting my previous employer, the school administrators,
and (more recently) stealing my resume. Yes, the cypherpunks are truly
the Protectors of Privacy and the Promoters of Anonymity. They have
done all this because they are concerned about my well being, and I
have been an obnoxious jerk for weeks in misinterpreting their worried
concern over my welfare and sanity. 

I have made an appointment with a therapist (it was quite a new
experience for me) and I think he is going to help me through my
serious psychological disorders and paranoid delusions. I apologize to
subjecting you to my insanity. I am quite ashamed of it. Please tell
everyone you know that I am insane and should be avoided like a leper.
Some of the people I know and respect have heard you, and I thank you
for helping them to realize that I am a dangerous lunatic that should
be avoided. It's really the best thing for everyone.

To demonstrate my sincerity, I will not post at all to any list,
including the one I helped create, for a period of one week, starting
now. You will not even see any new messages in the newsgroups by
L.Detweiler unless they are new sendsys bombs or forgeries. I will not
even touch a keyboard or go near the Internet. This was at the
recommendation of your gracious leaders who are sincerely concerned for
my mental health and my obvious deterioration over the past few weeks.
Clearly, I have been ignoring all the best advice of my well-meaning
friends to pursue fantasies.

I have learned how fast one can accumulate enemies if one attacks
anything that others hold dear. I committed my energies to this list
for 10 months but they mean nothing because of my reprehensible
intoleration for lies, especially those sent to me. I have been deluded
in thinking that I can stop lies or even that they are immoral or
unethical, particularly in relation to pseudospoofing. Lies are
Liberating! Even if your leaders were pseudospoofing (which they have
assured me in certain terms they are not) they would certainly have the
right to lie to others, including their friends and followers, through
their tentacles. This is not an inherently deceptive use of
pseudonymity. It is similar to using different names for harmless
magazine subscriptions.

I sincerely apologize for attacking anyone over this issue. I was wrong
to call E.Hughes or N.Szabo a `bald faced liar.' You have a right to
exist in cyberspace, and use the Internet to whatever use you can
imagine. And if others that are living around you in the neighborhood
ask you what you are doing, and if everything is all right, and wonder
about the strange noises and smells, like I did, you should tell the
nosy bastards to go to hell. They deserve it. I deserved it all. That
is your constitutional right to privacy, and it should extend to
Cyberspace just as it does in the real world. Live and let live!

I was once concerned about the possible deceptions of the Media by your
cause. I now realize that the Media is inherently corrupt and should be
manipulated to the Cypherpunk agenda in any way possible. In
particular, we should promote ourselves as the respectable citizens we
are. The public gets frightened by an image of Anarchy and Radical
Libertarianism. If we promote it as Cryptoanarchy and Cypherpunks, we
can get much farther. Both Markoff and Kelly, and his fantastic
photographer L.Dyer, have been extremely understanding and
accommodating in helping us promote our agenda among the widespread
population. In fact, the NYT article was an exceptional breakthrough of
emphasizing our goals of privacy and cryptography for the masses. I
really liked that quote by W.Diffie, one of the world's foremost cryptographers.

In my new realizations I am particularly inspired by your underlying
agenda of tax evasion, black marketeering, and the overthrow of
governments. DEATH TO ORDER!  Hedonistic delights like gambling dens
and prostitution rings would be a Love Boat for everyone, but they
aren't enough. I have had some neat fantasies lately about starting new
drug nextworks and assassination enterprises. What delights await us!
The possibilities of untraceable cash and anonymity are truly
liberating -- we can build up internation criminal organizations and
launder our money freely, and avoid all detection! The vanquished world
will lick our boots! I hope that you will let me in on your finetuned
Cryptoanarchist secrets that would make Goldfinger and Hitler proud. If
you don't, that's okay too. I'm really unstable and there's even a
rumor that I'm actually an FBI agent, so that it would be better if you
didn't tell me anything that would be upsetting to someone who
practices law enforcement.

I want to encourage everyone here to explain the history of how I
reached my newfound epiphanies out in the newsgroups if possible,
particularly on the `CRYPTOANARCHIST INFILTRATION ALERT'. (I won't be
able to forward this because of my promise, maybe you could help me
out.) Together we can attack the blasphemous heretic infidel S.Boxx so
that he is completely inundated in the noise and help the world to
realize the grandeur of Cryptoanarchy. I will be the new Poster Boy for
the CryptoAnarchist movement. I shall promote it to my death with all my heart.

I am sorry to have upset anyone who has ever watched this mailing list.
I was continually prodding you to discover the truth, but there was
nothing to discover! I  kept telling you to send mail to your leaders
yourself, to put pressure on them to reveal their knowledge, to
investigate the claims of reality of identity that were extremely
suspicious, and follow up past inert, passive, lifeless viewing of the
text that scrolls by your faces and hypnotizes you daily, more
mesmerizing and psychologically dangerous and deadly than television!
But we all know that this was a delusion now, a faded dream. The list
is our outlet to reach out to other real people, to make friends, to
achieve grand goals. As the leaders reassure us, upon their honor as
patriot Cryptoanarchists and honest human beings, there are no fake
identities anywhere in all of cyberspace, and on the Cypherpunks list
in particular! All my past claims are nothing but bizarre, wretched,
pathetic, deluded fantasies and hallucinations. In psychology, it is
called `projection'.

Everyone should understand now that I am completely in favor of the
entire cypherpunk agenda, and everything that E.Hughes or T.C.May or J.
Gilmore says or does. They have been like three loving uncles to me,
helping me to see the errors in my ways and correct my breaches in
ettiquete. E.Hughes, in particular, has been the most sweetly
endearing. He is so humble and gentle! His words flow like a gentle
breeze or a murmuring stream. How could could I accuse anyone so
honorable of lying in a serious academic journal like RISKS?! T.C.May
has always answered my letters with a kind response, and J.Gilmore
talked to me personally on the phone to comfort me over my anxieties.
We are really just one big family with nothing but love for everyone!

I now see that Cypherpunks is a fine organization and leaders on par
with CPSR and EFF.  I unjustly accused many human beings of not
existing, like J.Dinkelacker, N.Szabo, G.Broiles, H.Finney, A.Chandler,
and M.Landry. Every one of them has talked to me on the phone and told
me about their wonderful lives to assure me they are real. I am really
ashamed that I have ever attacked anyone associated with the cypherpunk
cause. It was an atrocious violation of everyone's privacy. Please just
chalk it up to my delusions of persecution. How could I have ever
thought anyone here was out to get me? Ha, ha.  Ho Ho. Heh Heh. Hee.
Hee. BWAHAHAHAHA The prozac really IS starting to help! (I was quite a
fool to be afraid of drugs before! they have been critical in relieving
me of my mania, depression, psychoses, and hallucinations, particularly
the LSD, but evil dancing red neoplasm orgasms are oxymoronic monsters,
she corrupt hair in the treason cold washing butterfly, falls truth
salad words filth below and lie trees air, but only poison on Mondays!)

Before I go I would like to share some of the beatiful uplifting prose
of the dear friends who helped me vanquish my insanity. At first I
thought the following was some of the most evil brainwashing and
vicious psychological torture that could be inflicted on a human being.
I realize the grotesque errors in my ways. These are now some of my
favorite quotes. I am going to read them nightly, as I pray to God to
bring us all CryptoAnarchy for Christmas. I *beg* your forgiveness for
my own depravities, perversions, and crimes. Above all, please do not
construe my heartfelt sincerity as searingly sarcasting satire. I swear
on my honor as a Cypherpunk and to our Mother Medusa that my words are
genuine. As long as I am among honorable, reputable, respectable
people, I would never lie.

p.s. Some of this below was private email, but everyone involved has
assured me they would be delighted if I quote it.

===cut=here===

H. Finney:
> This is about all I can offer you in terms of evidence for Dinkelacker's
> independent existence.  It's up to you now.  You can cling to this paranoid
> fantasy, adding layers of elaboration, saying that I must be a false identity,
> Nick must be, this Max More must be (but then, who publishes Extropy?  You
> can get back issues going back three years!), and as more evidence comes
> forward you just add layers upon layers.
> 
> Or you can say to yourself, do I really have any basis for believing that
> people are trying to mislead me in this way?  Who is my best candidate for
> being a fake persona?  Let's investigate that one in detail.  Let's face
> the truth.

steve klingsporn <moofie@apple.com>
>Larry,
>
>You are obviously quite delisional, from your accusations of people being
>criminals, vehicles for criminal activity, to calling people "Darth Vader"
>and 
>"Medusa."  you have always been opposed to anything contrary to your own
>sheltered personal views, and I sincerely hope you grow up before someone
>seriously hurts you (I have heard discussions of this nature are brewing).
>
>You have ostracized yourself and made yourself appear like an utter
>baffoon via your postings.  People have made it quite clear that they
>don't want you poking your nose into their lives.
>
>I have never felt any close feeling towards "Cyber" or "Cypher" anything,
>nor am i personally involved in any way with my roommates or their friends.
>
>I sincerely hope you grow up and learn to examine TRUTH before making
>accusations that certainly could be considered libelous and slanderous.
>
>Have a nice life, loser.

Steve Wiggam:
> I've thought about why I assume your posts are noise.  I seem to have 
> decided on the basis of only a few.  We had an email exchange based on
> one of them in which I got the strong impression you were someone who
> thinks on a wavelength that's too far away from mine for meaningful
> conversation to take place--though you seem concerned about similar
> issues, and you sure have energy, which I would like to admire.
> So, my not liking your style is sad, and my having formed that impression
> seemingly quickly (in retrospect) is interesting, but not too sad or
> interesting.  I'm busy.
> 
> Something subtle, difficult and delicate that is not read is useless.
> Unwanted information that drowns out good information is worse than useless.

G.Broiles:
> Anyway .. re the connection between people and net identities, I gotta
> disagree with your recent posts about it - not so much from a "what things
> ought to be like" perspective but from a "how things are" perspective. I
> think the cat is way out of the bag re the connection between
> personalities/identities/physical bodies, and I don't think that we're ever going
> back. I think it's just going to get worse. I agree that it's difficult to deal
> with people people who may or may not be real, and may or may not turn out to
> be someone you can't stand (it's perfectly plausible that S.Boxx is EH, for
> instance) - and don't think that's a problem that's fixable. I dunno if 
> you've ever read any Foucault, but one of the themes that I get from his 
> work is that the development of our idea of "identity" comes from the way
> that we think about medical treatment and the way that we think about
> punishment. The body (and the identity) is the focus of the exercise of
> power; I think that one of the ways that technology will change this is to
> make it more difficult to affect physical bodies with actual punishment. The
> fluidity and uncertainty of "identity" that's creating anxiety on the list
> will, I think, prove eventually to be freedom; EH can't punish L. Detweiler,
> or kick him off of the list, or spoof him, or otherwise screw around, if he
> can't tie you down to one account/one name/one public key/whatever. I'm
> completely amazed to read his recent commentary on the list in light of what
> he wrote to you earlier (about being kicked off the list, etc.)
>
> There's no way to stop spoofing, cheating, or censorship (in a global 
> sense); it's possible to work around them if you have sufficient technical
> skills, or the money to pay someone who does. What I'd like to do is write
> (and give away) the tools so that we can ALL do that; then, in a wider
> sense, we can talk. As long as only some people have these abilities, they
> will use them to the detriment of the rest.

Mike McNally:
> > YOU HAVE NO RIGHT TO LIE TO ANYONE.
>
>You are absolutely wrong about that.  There is absolutely no law
>against telling lies.  There is of course a distinction made when
>fraud is perpetrated in order to, essentially, commit theft, but your
>moronic attempts to portray "theft" of your oh-so-important "trust" or
>"faith" as equivalent to actual theft is without any basis in any
>system of common law.

G.Broiles:
> Although it saddens me to say this, the C-punks list seems to me to 
> be the pet project of a clique of a few people who allow others to read/post 
> to it as long as we're sufficiently respectful of their infinite wisdom. 
> People who write on topics uninteresting or threatening to that clique are 
> flamed, and then criticized for responding to the flames. There are two 
> different standards for messages - one for those posted by folks "within", 
> and another for those "without". I think you get flamed because you've 
> failed to kiss enough ass, not because your posts are unreasonable.
> 
> There are two sorts of posts consistently considered acceptable: 
> posts by "insiders", whatever their topic, length, or content; and 
> transcriptions of media interviews with those insiders. Any other post will 
> either be flamed or allowed to die a death of quiet neglect. Substantial 
> replies to posts by non-insiders are rare indeed.
> 
> You are among the few people whose posts to C-punks I read 
> consistenly. The list will suffer a substantial loss if you stop posting.

Jeremy W. Porter <jerry@io.com>
> All you have really done is convince people that you are crazy.  I've met
> real human people that have commented on your apparent problem.
> I am truly amazed by your persistence in this apparent delusion.
> From the people I have met, including members of EFF, EFF-Austin,
> Cypherpunks, Austin-Cypherpunks, CTSA, Austin Internet Society, and a couple
> of other groups, I have seen several people mention that they believe that
> you have some sort of mental illness.  I have not heard one person
> publicly or privately defend you or your position.
> In essence, you (ld231782@lance.colostate.edu) have become discredited.
> If you are sane, then your best bet would be to get an account from
> some other provider and use that for future post/email.  If you toned
> done the rhetoric, you might even win some people over to your cause.
>
> Of course of you really are crazy, then this will be viewed as an attack,
> and I will be added to your list of "Tentacles".  Which really doesn't
> matter to me or anyone I communicate with, because you have already
> destroyed any credibility you once had.

H.Finney:
> I have mixed feelings about the disagreement you have been having
> with Eric Hughes.  Generally, Eric does not seem to take a very active
> hand with the list.  He only posts once every few weeks, so I don't
> think he can be accused of being dictatorial.  I don't know; maybe he's
> sending dozens of messages around behind the scenes, but I suspect that
> he is not applying his authority too heavily.

T.C.May
> Merely seeking freedom is probably not enough. Gambling, prostitution,
> and easy access to drugs and other hedonistic delights may be enough,
> but I've seen nothing to indicate this type of "Love Boat" is being
> planned. Just the dreamy ideas about self-sufficiency. A commune by
> another name. A floating "Hog Farm," with anarchocapitalist ideology
> replacing Thoreau and Marx.
>
> - people hear about widespread tax evasion by crypto-anarchists, and
> they get interested (for various reasons, including jealousy, anger,
> greed, desire for freedom). "Crypto lasing."
>
> Governments will have a hard time collecting taxes, regulating the
> behavior of individuals and corporations (small ones at least), and
> generally coercing folks when it can't even tell what _continent_
> folks are on!
>
> Some of us believe various forms of strong cryptography will cause the
> power of the state to decline, perhaps even collapse fairly abruptly.

E.Hughes
>The issue here is epistemology.
>
>This is exactly like the question "Are you a liar?", to which the
>answer is always "no".
>
> The usual way to break out of this 'solipsism of the dialogue' is to
> invoke a social mechanism, that is, ask someone else.  Under a belief
> of widespread impersonation, however, all denials are now presumed to
> come from the original speaker of the first denial.  Thus the
> solipsism of the dialogue expands to a solipsism of all dialogues.
>
>There is no such question, as I argue above.  Am I dishonest if I
>cannot exhibit the nonexistent?
>
>Ask your therapist what 'projection' is.
>
>I never stopped beating my wife, either.

J.Gilmore
> My phone number is for those who I
> choose to give it out to.  The way our conversations have been going,
> I'm not interested in having them over the phone.
>
> I think that if you showed the correspondence between you and I to
> any impartial observer, they would agree that you are oversensitive
> and are reacting in ways that are not warranted by the messages.
>
> If people think that you are becoming unstable, they are doing
> you a favor by asking people at your University to come talk to you.
> If I was in that state, I hope they would do the same (or come over and 
> talk to me, if they were in the same town).
>
> Your contributions to crypto discussions always impressed me over the last
> year or so.  I hope you can get past this period of excessive suspicion.
>
> I still haven't read the cypherpunks backlog, or current traffic, but
> the impression I get from talking to some folks in person is that you
> have gone a bit off the deep end with paranoia.  Is that also your
> impression?
>
> I think I'm beginning to sound a lot like any reasonable person would
> after being asked to continue helping you justify your fantasies.  I predict
> that the list of people who "sound a lot like" this will continue to grow
> until YOU change.
>
> I'm not interested in ongoing participation in debunking your paranoid
> fantasies.  I don't want to spend the time.
>
> I hope to see you on the net someday, posting useful commentary or
> information.  Until then
>
> ``Refusal to answer is not dishonesty.''  Bye.





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: henry strickland <strick@versant.com>
Date: Tue, 7 Dec 93 01:13:30 PST
To: hfinney@shell.portal.com (Hal)
Subject: Re: <8c> Name for crypto cash
In-Reply-To: <9312070630.AA28857@jobe.shell.portal.com>
Message-ID: <9312070813.AA13523@osc.versant.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


# I thought of a new name today for digital cash: CRASH, taken from
# CRypto cASH.  "How much crash have you got in your account?  Can we FTP
# this GIF?"  "Not enough... Hey, can I borrow some crash?"  It has a nice
# cyberpunk sound to it.  I don't know if we need a name for the units,
# or if we could just get by without.

at georgia tech the organization that provides computer services to
the campus keeps accounting records in units commonly
known as BANANAs.  the name is not official, but it was a brainstorm
by the head guy in charge of the department some years ago, and the
name stuck:  Basic Allocation Negotiable Across Network Applications.

And when you blow your account gaming, you do have to beg for more bananas.
 
# One of the lessons of the CP publicity is that having a sexy name is
# a big plus.

right, bananas are hardly c-punk enough.             --strick




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: edgar@spectrx.saigon.com (Edgar W. Swank)
Date: Tue, 7 Dec 93 04:30:19 PST
To: Cypherpunks          <cypherpunks@toad.com>
Subject: Security of Secure Drive
Message-ID: <4Ns7Dc2w165w@spectrx.saigon.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Andrew Loewenstern commented:

    > No more Steve Jackson Games cases. I hope this happens.  Computer
    > theft and unreasonable seizure is a real problem.

    As far as I know, a system like SecureDrive, KFS, or CFS, is
    really only as secure as the running machine is.  Generally, when
    a BBS is 'seized' (forfeited?  ;), it is running when the feds get
    there.  Right now, if they have any clue (and from what I hear,
    the FBI has much more of a clue than the SS when it comes to this
    type of investigation), they usually take pictures of the setup to
    make sure they can put the machine back together when they get it
    to wherever they are taking it to.  If encrypting file-systems
    become a problem, a disk could be developed (probably pretty
    easily) to retrieve the key from memory before they power it down.


    andrew
    "Touch that keyboard and die!!"

It's fairly easy to provide a TSR on MSDOS systems to either block
booting from the keyboard or force a memory clear on reboot. I found
these examples on local BBS's:

NOFBOOT.ZIP      2647  08-28-91  Version 1.0 of Padgett Peterson's NOFBOOT.
                                 NoFBoot is a small (500  byte) TSR designed
                                 to prevent inadvertant  booting from a
                                 floppy disk.  It will intercept warm boot
                                 requests (Ctrl-Alt-Del) and check for a
                                 floppy in drive A:  before continuing.  If
                                 a floppy is found in drive A, the request
                                 will be aborted  with  a warning message.
                                 With NoFBoot, a cold  start  (reset button
                                 or cycle power) will be necessary to boot
                                 from a floppy.

BLK213.ZIP      17931  09-22-93  BootLock 2.13 09/06/93 BootLock allows you to
                                 lock out the use of [CTRL][ALT][DEL],
                                 [CTRL]C, and/or [CTRL][BREAK]. New version
                                 can be loaded as a Device Driver or TSR. You
                                 can also define a "user defined" key to lock
                                 out. BootLock can be unloaded and Loaded into
                                 Hi Memory. Shareware registration form and
                                 manual included. From Foley Hi-Tech Systems
                                 (ASP).
                                 (Files: 6 Newest: 09-06-93 Oldest: 03-05-92)

NOCADEL.ZIP     24234  07-07-93  No Boot on control-alt-delete. Simple util
                                 helps disable key boot sequence. Source
                                 included.
                                 (Files: 6 Newest: 02-07-93 Oldest: 02-06-93)

The BBS program should also be patched to re-boot instead of returning
to MSDOS on exit, and should not provide a DOS Shell.  If the FBI
agent is allowed access to an MSDOS command line, he can run a program
which will "fish" out the Secure Drive encryption key from memory.

Note that the pass phrase cannot be reconstructed from the key in
memory and its crypto difficult to reconstruct -any- pass phrase which
would duplicate the key (MD5 is a 1-way function).  But it would be
easy to construct an alternate to LOGIN which would insert the key
into SECTSR directly using hex input.

So it would be a good security practice to provide for an "emergency"
power-off in event of a "surprise" raid.  A foot switch is good for
situations when the operator is present.  This can be activated while
one's hands are in the air. Turning off power upon activation of a
burglar alarm is a good solution for unattended situations.

--
edgar@spectrx.saigon.com (Edgar W. Swank)
SPECTROX SYSTEMS +1.408.252.1005  Cupertino, Ca





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Duncan Frissell <frissell@panix.com>
Date: Tue, 7 Dec 93 04:10:20 PST
To: CYPHERPUNKS@toad.com
Subject: Re: Digicash question
Message-ID: <199312071209.AA12940@panix.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


W >One problem with your proposal is that at *some* point you want to be 
W >able to get *real* cash for your digicash - at that point you've got to 
W >give the bank the password, but also an account to deposit the cash
W >into (or equivalent), and at that point the bank can compare it with
W >the original owner of the bill.  You not only have to trust them to
W >not rip off the money, you have to trust them to not give away
W >the information, which may be tough if the government requires it.

No, they can just dump it into your VISA "cash card" to increase the 
balance on that account.  You can then make ATM withdrawals (or POS 
purchases) using your cash card.  VISA recently announced that they will 
be issuing "plastic" traveller's cheques.  Offshore banks can also be 
involved to increase the security if you like.     

DCF




--- WinQwk 2.0b#1165
                             




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: hfinney@shell.portal.com (Hal)
Date: Tue, 7 Dec 93 08:20:19 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: digicash
Message-ID: <9312071619.AA16377@jobe.shell.portal.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


The point is not that B. Dolan's proposed cash is bad, it is that better
systems exist.  Chaum's blinded c{sh is simiXoar to Dolan's proposal, but
with the added feature that the "passwords" that~r authorize access to
the bank account can be altered by the users so that the bank does not
recognize them later, while still allowing the bank to verify that the
"passwords" are valid.  This eliminates the trackability allowed by Dolan's
proposal.

(Sorry about the line noise!{

Hal




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: hughes@ah.com (Eric Hughes)
Date: Tue, 7 Dec 93 08:33:32 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Name for crypto cash
In-Reply-To: <9312070630.AA28857@jobe.shell.portal.com>
Message-ID: <9312071621.AA01369@ah.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>I thought of a new name today for digital cash: CRASH, taken from
>CRypto cASH.  

And of course 'snow crash' would be 'cocaine money', allowing us to
read an entirely new subtext in Stephenson's novel.

Eric




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Martin.Greifer@f28.n125.z1.FIDONET.ORG (Martin Greifer)
Date: Tue, 7 Dec 93 15:55:50 PST
To: Cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Do you mind?
Message-ID: <5321.2D04FA72@shelter.FIDONET.ORG>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


 -=> Quoting Graham Toal to All <=-

 Uu> I've just had 915 lines of unsolicited crap about detweiler in my
 Uu> personal mailbox.  It's bad enough having to suffer this shite on
 Uu> cypherpunks and newsgroups, but this really is too much.  Next person
 Uu> to send me any of this crap gets all 915+ lines back.

 Uu> I'm *really really* not interested.

Well, OK, but you still want the chain letter stuff, though, right?

      MG
___ Blue Wave/QWK v2.12
--  
Martin Greifer - via FidoNet node 1:125/1
UUCP: ...!uunet!kumr!shelter!28!Martin.Greifer
INTERNET: Martin.Greifer@f28.n125.z1.FIDONET.ORG




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: bdolan <71431.2564@CompuServe.COM>
Date: Tue, 7 Dec 93 06:45:25 PST
To: <cypherpunks@toad.com>
Subject: digicash
Message-ID: <931207144251_71431.2564_FHA60-1@CompuServe.COM>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


TO:    >internet:  cypherpunks@toad.com

Re. responses to my digicash proposal:

* The bank system (& feds) will know the original and ultimate
recipients.

True, but they can (& do sometimes) track this with the green pieces of
paper we use now.  With the system I propose, "they" cannot know anything
about all the (potentially many) transactions in between the original and 
ultimate recipients.

* Example about Alice getting digicash, paying Bob who pays Carol.  Alice
then "respends" the digicash password elsewhere before Carol can deposit
it.  

That's why each non-trusting recipient calls the bank to verify that
the password is still valid.  The non-trusting recipient then anonymously
receives a new password representing a claim on the money, preventing 
respending by a prior link in the chain.

Note that, if the payee *trusts* the payor, he can silently accept and pass 
on  ("spend") the claim password to another person - but he does so at his
own risk.

* Concerns that Escobar, Jr. could create a digi-bill, spend it, and the
feds might come claim the money from the ultimate recipient.

Escobar would want to use digi-bills already in circulation.  That way no one
could show they came from him.  Of course the government still could say that
the original recipient of the bill was a bad fellow and the ultimate recipient
(or intermediate posessor) should surrender the money.  

Having the original and ultimate accounts in banks somewhere other than the 
U.S. would help.  Having a non-fascist government would help, too.

* bank employee honesty problems

I don't see that this is more or less of a problem here than elsewhere.

bdolan        personal responses to bdolan@well.sf.ca.us, please







From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Johan Helsingius <julf@penet.fi>
Date: Tue, 7 Dec 93 00:43:30 PST
To: pmetzger@lehman.com
Subject: Re: moderated cryptography list
In-Reply-To: <199312062332.SAA10971@snark.ts.lehman.com>
Message-ID: <199312070839.AA29131@lassie.eunet.fi>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



> If you think that such a list is a Good Thing, and you can host it
> (which requires that you have a good internet connection and root
> access or similar on the machine in question), please let me know.
> I'll do all the work, and the crypto community will thank you
> tremendously.

Well, heck, if I'm already hosting the damned cypherwonks list, and have all
the software set up already, then why not this one as well...

Lists.EUnet.FI at your service...

	Julf





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: henry strickland <strick@versant.com>
Date: Tue, 7 Dec 93 11:13:35 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: on initial rejection of claims of RSA patent
Message-ID: <9312071846.AA17866@osc.versant.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Diffie, via "L.":

#     No.  But after all, the RSA patent was filed from MIT by people
# (R, S, and A) that I didn't know well till much later.  There may have
# been some hankey pankey I didn't know about, but I certainly don't
# recall the New York Times article you refer to.  The statement that
# ``They just got the application back rejected.''  Doesn't sound right
# to me.  I presume that the Patent Office has to state why an
# application is returned.  It's decisions, after all, are a constant

All four of the PKP patents mentioned in RFC1423,

      Cryptographic Apparatus and Method
      ("Diffie-Hellman")............................... No. 4,200,770

      Public Key Cryptographic Apparatus
      and Method ("Hellman-Merkle").................... No. 4,218,582

      Cryptographic Communications System and
      Method ("RSA")................................... No. 4,405,829

      Exponential Cryptographic Apparatus
      and Method ("Hellman-Pohlig").................... No. 4,424,414


had all of their claims either "rejected" or "objected to" on the first
pass by the patent examiner.  I have been told this is not unusual.
The patent examiner gave reasonable technical reasons whe he rejected
them.  Nothing looks fishy to me, that is part of the record.   

I have a copy of [almost all of] the "full wrappers" on these four
patents, and am making them available to the CA cypherpunks (CA,
because I live here).  (They're not online, there's a lot of
handwritten pages & annotations & forms that would not OCR, and it's a
6" stack of legal paper, so it's not easy for me to provide them
online, sorry.)

					strick





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Herb Lin" <hlin@nas.edu>
Date: Tue, 7 Dec 93 08:03:32 PST
To: comm-priv@psi.com
Subject: A Study of National Cryptography Policy
Message-ID: <9311077552.AA755290823@nas.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Please forward this message to any individual or mailing list
that you believe should receive it.  If you have seen it already, our apologies.
Many thanks..
*********************
As part of the Defense Authorization Bill for FY 1994, the U.S. Congress
has asked the Computer Science and Telecommunications Board
(CSTB) of the National Research Council (NRC) to undertake a study of
national policy with respect to the use and regulation of cryptography.
The report of the study committee is due two years after all necessary
security clearances have been processed, probably sometime summer
1996, and is subject to NRC review procedures.  The legislation
states that 120 days after the day on which the report is submitted to
the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary shall submit the report to the
Committees on Armed Services, Intelligence, Commerce, and the
Judiciary of the Senate and House of Representatives in unclassified
form, with classified annexes as necessary.

This study is expected to address the appropriate balance in cryptography policy
among various national interests (e.g., U.S. economic competitiveness
(especially with respect to export controls), national security, law
enforcement, and the protection of the privacy rights of individuals),
and the strength of various cryptographic technologies known today
and anticipated in the future that are relevant for commercial
purposes.  The federal process through which national cryptography
policy has been formulated is also expected to be a topic of
consideration, and, if appropriate, the project will address
recommendations for improving the formulation of national
cryptographic policy in the future.

This project, like other NRC projects, will depend heavily on input
from industry, academia, and other communities in the concerned
public.  Apart from the study committee (described below), briefings
and consultations from interested parties will be arranged and others
will be involved as anonymous peer reviewers.

It is expected that the study committee will be a high-level group that
will command credibility and respect across the range of government,
academic, commercial, and private interests.  The committee will
include members with expertise in areas such as:

  - relevant computer and communications technology;
  - cryptographic technologies and cryptanalysis;
  - foreign, national security, and intelligence affairs;
  - law enforcement;
  - commercial interests; and
  - privacy and consumer interests.

All committee members (and associated staff) will have to be cleared
at the "SI/TK" level; provisions have been made to expedite the
processing of security clearances for those who do not currently have
them.  Committee members will be chosen for their stature, expertise,
and seniority in their fields; their willingness to listen and consider
fairly other points of view; and their ability to contribute to the
formulation of consensus positions.  The committee as a whole will
be chosen to reflect the range of judgment and opinion on the subject
under consideration.

The detailed composition of the committee has not yet been decided;
suggestions for committee members are sought from the community at
large.  Note that NRC rules regarding conflict of interest forbid the
selection as committee members of individuals that have substantial
personal financial interests that might be significantly affected by the
outcome of the study.  Please forward suggestions for people to
participate in this project to CSTB@NAS.EDU by DECEMBER 17,
1993; please include their institutional affiliations, their field(s) of
expertise, a note describing how the criteria described above apply to
them, and a way to contact them.  For our administrative
convenience, please put in the "SUBJECT:" field of your message the
words "crypto person".

Finally, some people have expressed concern about the fact that the
project will involve consideration of classified material.  Arguments
can and have been made on both sides of this point, but in any event
this particular ground rule was established by the U.S. Congress, not
by the CSTB.  Whether one agrees or disagrees with the asserted
need for classification, the task at hand is to do the best possible job
given this constraint.

On the National Research Council

The National Research Council (NRC) is the operating arm of the
Academy complex, which includes the National Academy of Sciences,
the National Academy of Engineering, and the Institute of Medicine.
The NRC is a source of impartial and independent advice to the
federal government and other policy makers that is able to bring to
bear the best scientific and technical talent in the nation to answer
questions of national significance.  In addition, it often acts as a
neutral party in convening meetings among multiple stakeholders on
any given issue, thereby facilitating the generation of consensus on
controversial issues.

The Computer Science and Telecommunications Board (CSTB) of the
NRC considers technical and policy issues pertaining to computer
science, telecommunications, and associated technologies.  CSTB
monitors the health of the computer science, computing technology,
and telecommunications fields, including attention as appropriate to
the issues of human resources and information infrastructure and
initiates studies involving computer science, computing technology,
and telecommunications as critical resources and sources of national
economic strength.  A list of CSTB publications is available on
request.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: gtoal@an-teallach.com (Graham Toal)
Date: Tue, 7 Dec 93 03:40:18 PST
To: upham@cs.ubc.ca
Subject: Do you mind?
Message-ID: <199312071129.LAA21579@an-teallach.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I've just had 915 lines of unsolicited crap about detweiler in my personal
mailbox.  It's bad enough having to suffer this shite on cypherpunks and
newsgroups, but this really is too much.  Next person to send me any of
this crap gets all 915+ lines back.

I'm *really really* not interested.

G




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "STERLING D. TATE" <STERLING_D._TATE@smtpgty.anatcp.rockwell.com>
Date: Tue, 7 Dec 93 12:34:49 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Information
Message-ID: <9311077552.AA755296412@smtpgty.anatcp.rockwell.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



     Information on mailing list.

      Cypherpunk-info@toad.com




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: sdw@meaddata.com (Stephen Williams)
Date: Tue, 7 Dec 93 10:15:24 PST
To: unicorn@access.digex.net (Black Unicorn)
Subject: Re: Anarchy Gone Awry (fwd)
In-Reply-To: <199312070005.AA23282@access.digex.net>
Message-ID: <9312071813.AA14939@jungle.meaddata.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain




> This post is a perfect example why the two lists should be kept seperate
> and not merged.  This sounds to me like it belongs on alt.politics.data-
> highway.

His version I would agree this is true, but not mine.  Mine is purely
grass-roots and voluntary (both endorsing and using endorsements).
However, I will crosspost to comp.society.cu-digest and
alt.politics.datahighway.

> -uni- (dark)


sdw
-- 
Stephen D. Williams  Local Internet Gateway Co.; SDW Systems 513 496-5223APager
LIG dev./sales       Internet: sdw@lig.net CIS 76244.210@compuserve.com
OO R&D Source Dist.  By Horse: 2464 Rosina Dr., Miamisburg, OH 45342-6430
GNU Support          ICBM: 39 34N 85 15W I love it when a plan comes together



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Stanton McCandlish <mech@eff.org>
Date: Tue, 7 Dec 93 10:35:24 PST
Subject: ANNOUNCEMENT: Markey Bill (HR3636) Available Online from EFF
Message-ID: <199312071834.NAA04078@eff.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



	HR3636, The Markey Bill, is now available online at the Electronic
Frontier Foundation's ftp archive.  FTP to ftp.eff.org, and get the
text file ~pub/eff/legislation/hr3636 (aka ~pub/eff/legislation/markey.bil).

 ****** Info on the bill ******        

	On Monday, November 22, 1993, EFF applauded House
Telecommunications and Finance Subcommittee Chairman Edward Markey
(D-Mass.), Minority Chairman Jack Fields (R-Tex.), and other cosponsors for
introducing the "National Communications Competition and Information
Infrastructure Act of 1993."  The Markey/Fields legislation, which
incorporates EFF's Open Platform philosophy, is built on three concepts:
open platform services, the entry of telephone companies into video cable
service, and universal service.

        Reacting to the open platform provisions, Mitchell Kapor, EFF Board
Chairman, stated:  "The sponsors of this bill are to be commended for
proposing legislation that incorporates a truly democratic vision of the
emerging data highway.  Open platform service can end channel scarcity once
and for all and make it possible for any information provider to offer
voice, data, and video services on the data highway.  Every citizen will be
able to access a true diversity of information and programming."

        EFF Executive Director Jerry Berman added that "we believe public
interest and nonprofit groups, as well as computer and communications
industry leaders will work very hard for the open platform provisions.  Our
goal is to keep them in the bill and make them even stronger before its
enactment."

AN EFF ANALYSIS OF THE IMPACT OF THE BILL ON PUBLIC INTEREST GOALS OF
UNIVERSAL SERVICE, COMMON CARRIAGE, AND CONSUMER EQUITY WILL BE RELEASED AS
SOON AS IT IS COMPLETED.

For an initial brief analysis (previously posted to comp.org.eff.talk and
elsewhere) see ftp.eff.org, ~pub/eff/legislation/announce.mky

See also ftp.eff.org or gopher.eff.org, ~pub/eff/papers/op2.0 and
~pub/eff/papers/open-platform* for more information on EFF's Open Platform
initiative.  See ~pub/eff/legislation/markey.bil for the full text of the
Markey Bill.





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Dave Banisar <banisar@washofc.cpsr.org>
Date: Tue, 7 Dec 93 12:15:26 PST
To: CYPHERPUNKS <CYPHERPUNKS@toad.com>
Subject: NIST Meeting Dec 8-9
Message-ID: <00541.2838120673.1349@washofc.cpsr.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


  NIST Meeting Dec 8-9



NIST Computer System Security and Privacy Advisory Board Meeting
                        December 8-9, 1993

                      Hyatt Regency Reston
                    1800 President's Street
                           Reston, VA


>From 495, take Dulles Access Road (toll road) to Reston Parkway, Turn right
on parkway, Hotel is on left by new town center.

                          

                         Draft Agenda


                       December 8, 1993

I Welcome

9:00 Opening Remarks - Lynn McNulty
9:10 Chairman's Remarks - Dr. Willis Ware

II. Unclassified Government Cryptography Activities

9:15 National Research Council Cryptographic Study
     Marjorie Blumenthal, NRC

9:45 GAO Report on Cryptography Policy, Harold Podell

10:15 Break

10:30 Status of NIST Cryptographic Standards Activities, Miles Smid

11:00 DSS Infrastructure Briefing, McNulty & Mitre Rep.

11:30 Key Escrow Update

12:00 Lunch

III. Emerging NII Technologies

1:30 Jim Flyzik, Director, Telecommunications Management, Treasury Dept.

2:30 Organizing for the NII and GII - Bruce McConnell, OMB

3:00 NIST's Role - Jim Burrows, NIST

IV Electronic Commerce

4:00 Electronic Commerce Initiative - Steve Trus

5:00 Recess


                       December 9

V. MOSIAC

9:00 MOSIAC Briefing - DoD Program for Protection of Unclassified Data in
the DMS - John Nagangast, NSA

VI Common Criteria

9:45 Common Criteria Update - Dr. Stu Katzka

10:15 Break

VII NIST Security Program Plan

10:30 NIST Security Plan for FY-94 - Dr. Stu Katzke

11:00 Disussion

VIII Telecommunications Security

11:30 Telecommunucations Switch Vulnerability Analysis, Rick Kuhn

12:00 Lunch

IX Workplace Privacy Bill

1:30 S-984 - Privacy for Consumers and Workers Act, Kristina Zahorik
Legislative Assistant, Senate Employment and Productivity Subcommittee
       
2:00 Discussion

X CSSPAB Workplan

2:30 Draft CY-1994 Workplan - Presentation and Discussion CSSPAB Working
Group

XI Public Participation

3:00 Public Participation

XII Close

3:30 March Meeting - Agenda Ideas

3:45 Adjourn







From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: smb@research.att.com
Date: Tue, 7 Dec 93 12:25:26 PST
To: "L. Detweiler" <ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Subject: Re: W.Diffie on RSA patent
Message-ID: <9312072023.AA16781@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


	 I thought this was all documented in the NYT. Does anyone have the
	 article? Anyway, Mr.Diffie says (see below) that nothing sinister
	 happened at the patent office regarding the RSA patent. I would like to
	 hear of any other patents that were suppressed by the NSA hiding behind
	 the patent office. I mean, this professor was definitely not making up
	 a story! She gave me the NYT reference but I think I accidentally threw
	 out the paper I wrote it on. Does anyone have the reference? I think it
	 happened in '78.

It sounds like you're talking about the Davida patent, or maybe the
zero-knowledge proof patent.

Here's the basic story.  U.S. patent law contains a provision for
``secrecy orders''.  That is, when you apply for a patent in certain
sensitive areas -- and cryptography is one of them -- the application
is routed to the appropriate government agencies, including NSA.  If
they think the invention is too good, you'll receive a notice saying
that you not only can't get a patent, you're not even allowed to discuss
it anymore.

George Davida -- a professor -- was hit with just such an order.
Eventually, it was lifted, after a lot of public protest.  NSA tried
claiming that the patent application proved that the issue was
commercial, rather than pure free speech, but they didn't try to fight
it.

More recently, Shamir received a secrecy order on his zero-knowledge
proof patent.  This was even more insane than usual, since (a) Shamir
is not a U.S. citizen, and (b) he'd already been discussing the idea
at conferences world-wide.  According to rumor, this order was imposed
by the Army, and was lifted through NSA's intervention.

I know that the Shamir story was in the NY Times, though I don't have
the citation.  A pointer in my files is:

	journal name: Notices of the American Mathematical Society
	journal date: Jan 88
	volume/number: 35, 1
	article title: Zero Knowledge and the Department of Defense
	author(s) name: Susan Landau
	page number: 5-12

but I don't have the article handy.  The Davida story was probably
in the Times as well; my summary of it is taken from ``Cryptology
Goes Public'', by David Kahn, in ``Kahn on Codes'', 1983.  The article
originally appeared in the Fall 1979 issue of ``Foreign Affairs''.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: peb@PROCASE.COM (Paul Baclace)
Date: Tue, 7 Dec 93 15:53:37 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: what was that fast integer math board?
Message-ID: <9312072351.AA21800@ada.procase.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain




I lost the mail about the fast integer math board for a PC (the ~$1100
DSP chip based one).  I'd like to forward that to another list and haven't
found it by searching for DSP, etc.).  

Please email me a copy.

Paul E. Baclace
peb@procase.com





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Sean Lambert  <slambert@willamette.edu>
Date: Tue, 7 Dec 93 16:20:28 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: televisions 2 way?
Message-ID: <9312080011.AA13594@willamette.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain




I heard a theory about how the government can "spy" on us by using cable
television.  somehow, according to the theory, the cable is a 2-way
transmitter, and the television, when turned on, can act like a video
camera for the government.  I do not know ANY of the specifics of this
theory, and really find it hard to believe (perhaps because I do not
have any more information)...does anyone have any information on this?
is this an appropriate inquiry for the cypherpunks mailing?


thanks a lot


sean






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: peb@PROCASE.COM (Paul Baclace)
Date: Tue, 7 Dec 93 17:00:50 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: what was that fast integer math board?
Message-ID: <9312080100.AA21828@ada.procase.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



I got it. 

Paul




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Stanton McCandlish <mech@eff.org>
Date: Tue, 7 Dec 93 14:20:27 PST
To: eff-talk@eff.org
Subject: ANNOUNCEMENT: DPSWG Crypto-Policy Statement to White House
Message-ID: <199312072217.RAA07526@eff.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



NOTICE: This is the letter from the Digital Privacy and Security Working
Group sent to the White House 12/06/93, urging the Administration to lift
export controls on DES, RSA and other mass market encryption without
requring legislation.

Some erroneous press reports have said the DPSWG (see letter
signatories) were making a Clipper/Skipjack "deal". This is not true. 
The letter makes it clear that Clipper as originally proposed is not
viable, and that in any form it is to be implemented only if it's use is
completely voluntary and ONLY if current restrictions on mass market
encryption software are removed, so that the right to choose one's own
methods of privacy and security is retained, and American businesses can
effectively and openly compete in the expanding international market for
encryption products.

For more details please see the third paragraph of the letter, below.


- -----------------------------------------------------------------------


DIGITAL PRIVACY AND SECURITY WORKING GROUP

1001 G Street, NW
Suite 950 East
Washington, DC  20001

Jerry Berman 202/347-5400
Leah Gurowitz 202/393-1010
                                                        December 6, 1993

The President
The White House
Washington, DC  20500

Dear Mr. President:

        On April 16, 1993, you initiated a broad industry/government review
of privacy and cryptography policies at the same time that the
Administration unveiled its Clipper Chip proposal.  The Digital Privacy and
Security Working Group -- a coalition of over 50 communications and
computer companies and associations, and consumer and privacy advocates --
has been working with members of your Administration to develop policies
which will reflect the realities of the digital information age, the need
to provide individuals at work and home with information security and
privacy, and the importance of preserving American competitiveness. 

        The Digital Privacy and Security Working Group is committed to the
proposition that computer users worldwide should be able to choose their
encryption programs and products, and that American programs and products
should be allowed to compete in the world marketplace.  In our discussions
with Administration officials, we have expressed the Coalition's tentative
acceptance of the Clipper Chip's encryption scheme (as announced on April
16, 1993), but only if it is available as a voluntary alternative to
widely-available, commercially-accepted, encryption programs and products. 

        Thus, we applaud repeated statements by Administration officials
that there is no intent to make the Clipper Chip mandatory.  One key
indication of whether the choice of encryption regimes will be truly
voluntary, however, is the ability of American companies to export computer
programs and products employing other strong encryption algorithms (e.g.
DES and RC2/RC4 at comparable strengths) demanded by customers worldwide. 
In this regard, we commend to your attention legislation introduced by Rep.
Maria Cantwell (H.R. 3627) that would liberalize existing export controls
on software with encryption capabilities.  Of course, such legislation
would not be necessary if the Administration acts to accomplish such export
control liberalization on its own.  As part of your on-going encryption
review and decision-making, we strongly urge you to do so.

        As your Administration concludes its review of this issue,
representatives of the Digital Privacy and Security Working Group remain
available to meet with Administration officials at any time.


                              Sincerely,              


American Civil Liberties Union         IBM

Apple Computer, Inc.                   Information Industry Association

Business Software Alliance             Information Technology Association of
                                       America
Committee on Communications and 
Information Policy, IEEE-USA           Iris Associates, Inc.

Computer and Business Equipment        Lotus Development Corporation
Manufacturers Association
                                       Microsoft Corporation
Crest Industries, Inc.          
                                       Oracle Corporation
Digital Equipment Corporation
                                       Prodigy Services Company
EDUCOM                          
                                       Software Publishers Association
Electronic Frontier Foundation
                                       Sun Microsystems, Inc.
Electronic Messaging Association        
                                       Telecommunications Industry Association 
GKI Cryptek Division
                                       Trusted Information Systems
Hewlett-Packard Company




cc:     John Podesta, Office of the President
        George Tenet, National Security Council
        Mike Nelson, Office of Science and Technology Policy
        Ray Kammer, National Institute of Standards and Technology
        Steve Aoki, National Security Council
        Geoff Greiveldinger, Department of Justice


- -------------------------------------------------------------------------

This document and others on related topics are archived at ftp.eff.org, 
~ftp/pub/eff/crypto-policy.  





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: jim@bilbo.suite.com (Jim Miller)
Date: Tue, 7 Dec 93 15:33:35 PST
To: mech@eff.org
Subject: Re: ANNOUNCEMENT: DPSWG Crypto-Policy Statement to White House
Message-ID: <9312072331.AA02459@bilbo.suite.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Stanton McCandlish writes:

> NOTICE: This is the letter from the Digital Privacy and
> Security Working Group sent to the White House 12/06/93,
> urging the Administration to lift export controls on
> DES, RSA and other mass market encryption without
                     ^^^^^^^^^^ ??
> requring legislation.   

> 


Why only "mass market" encryption?

The company I work for is developing a collection of runtime libraries and  
utilities which software developers can use to create and manage portable  
object-oriented distributed applications.  Think of it as a  
object-oriented DCE-like tool set with a run-time environment and system  
administration utilites.

Our customers are primarily large corporations, although it would be  
useful to small shops, too.  We have communication software that can  
perform encryption of user data, but the current export laws prevent us  
from placing this capability in versions for our foreign customers.   
<sigh>  We have to maintain two distinct versions of our product: a  
domestic version and and foreign version.

Since we target other software developers, I don't believe our product  
qualifies as "mass market" software.  At least, this is my interpretation  
of the definition of "as is" in the Cantwell bill:


> For example, generally available software is offered
> for sale or licensed to the public without restriction
> and available through standard commercial channels of
> distribution; sold as is without further
> customization; and designed to be installed by the
> purchaser without additional assistance from the
> publisher.  Computer hardware and computing devices are
> also defined. 

>       .
> 	.
> 	.
> 15          ``(4) DEFINITIONS.---As used in this
> 16     subsection---
> 

> 1               ``(B) the term `as is' means, in the case of
> 2          software (including software with encryption ca-
> 3          pabilities), a software program that is not de-
> 4          signed, developed, or tailored by the software
> 5          company for specific purchasers, except that
> 6          such purchasers may supply certain installation
> 7          parameters needed by the software program to
> 8          function properly with the purchaser's system
> 9          and may customize the software program by
> 10          choosing among options contained in the soft-
> 11          ware program;
> 

> 



Although we don't make custom versions of our software for specific  
customers, our software, due to its nature, is highly customizable by the  
purchaser.  Neither the Cantwell bill, nor the DPSWG letter mentions this  
type of software product.

As I see it, the main distinction between "mass market" software and our  
software is that our software is used to create other software, whereas  
"mass market" software implies final product "end-user" software.

My question to the DPSWG (and US Rep. Maria Cantwell, if I could e-mail  
her) is:

Why only "mass market" software?


Or put another way:

Does the DPSWG want the government to keep export controls in place for  
the type of product our company is developing?

Thanks,

Jim_Miller@suite.com





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Stanton McCandlish <mech@eff.org>
Date: Tue, 7 Dec 93 15:00:48 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Detweiler in CuD
Message-ID: <199312072300.SAA08199@eff.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Those of you following L. Detweiler's rants might wish to take a look at
the latest CuD.  Pretty amazing stuff.  He manages to slam Bruce
Sterling, the English language, Eric Hughes, Tim May, and even an EFF
board member (John Gilmore), all in ~200 lines which is short for L.D.

The most amazing part is the absence of ALL CAPS, though excruciatingly
manifested longwinded, pedantic, and redundant cypherwonkian adjectives
(like these) are present throughout.   

Quite a sight, I tell ya.

-- 
Stanton  McCandlish  mech@eff.org  1:109/1103   EFF  Online  Activist & SysOp
O P E N  P L A T F O R M   C R Y P T O P O L I C Y   O N L I N E  R I G H T S
N  E  T  W  O  R  K  I  N  G      V  I  R  T  U  A  L     C  U  L  T  U  R  E
I   N   F  O :  M   E   M   B   E   R   S   H   I   P  @  E  F  F  .  O  R  G



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Ed Carp <erc@khijol.yggdrasil.com>
Date: Tue, 7 Dec 93 18:23:38 PST
To: Steve Davis <strat@sam.ksu.ksu.edu>
Subject: Re: Detweiler in CuD
In-Reply-To: <9312080203.AA04803@sam.ksu.ksu.edu>
Message-ID: <Pine.3.05.1.9312071850.G11545-b100000@localhost>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


On Tue, 7 Dec 1993, Steve Davis wrote:

> >From the keyboard of Stanton McCandlish:
> 
> > Those of you following L. Detweiler's rants might wish to take a look at
> > the latest CuD.  Pretty amazing stuff.  He manages to slam Bruce
> > Sterling, the English language, Eric Hughes, Tim May, and even an EFF
> > board member (John Gilmore), all in ~200 lines which is short for L.D.
> 
> The first two deserve slamming.  
> 
> That's my first and only comment concerning the article in question.

Just do what I do - laugh at LD's posts.  They're funny, they really are. 
Even the 'shoot XXX in the head' death threat posts are pretty ludicrous. 
I usually like to start my day by reading a post by LD - it gets me in a
good mood for the rest of the day... :)

Ed Carp, N7EKG			erc@wetware.com			510/659-9560
                   an38299@anon.penet.fi, anon-1157@twwells.com
If you want magic, let go of your armor.  Magic is so much stronger than
steel!        -- Richard Bach, "The Bridge Across Forever"






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Perry E. Metzger" <pmetzger@lehman.com>
Date: Tue, 7 Dec 93 16:40:28 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: televisions 2 way?
In-Reply-To: <9312080011.AA13594@willamette.edu>
Message-ID: <199312080037.TAA17068@snark.ts.lehman.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Sean Lambert says:
> I heard a theory about how the government can "spy" on us by using cable
> television.  somehow, according to the theory, the cable is a 2-way
> transmitter, and the television, when turned on, can act like a video
> camera for the government.  I do not know ANY of the specifics of this
> theory, and really find it hard to believe (perhaps because I do not
> have any more information)...does anyone have any information on this?
> is this an appropriate inquiry for the cypherpunks mailing?

Its absolutely true. There are also mechanisms that let them listen in
on conversations using the lightbulbs in your house -- ambient sound
causes the bulb to vibrate, flexing the filament and thus modulating
the return current. Placing a simple device on the electrical feeder
of the house thus allows complete bugging of the entire structure
without having to place listening devices within. The method works
whether or not the bulbs are turned on, by the way -- you have to
actually unscrew them to get privacy. There is also a well known
method for obtaining sonograms of the inside of the building that are
nearly as good as video by sending modulated high frequency audio down
the cold water pipes -- its quite evil, really.

Microwave ovens are a particularly nasty one, however, by comparison
to these other methods. Most of them have computers built in that take
commands modulated over the electrical wiring that permit them to
record an EEG of anyone within 15 feet and return it via power line
modulation. These EEGs may be postprocessed by powerful computer
equipment into records of the thoughts and memories of the people near
the oven. Its also reported that some newer models can transmit mind
control signals. Luckily, this only works when the oven is plugged in,
so its easy to disable.

For maximum safety, especially against future developments, I would
remove all electrical wiring and plumbing from my house. Its a bit
hard, but it protects you from the fiends.

Unedited dissemination of this important information is encouraged.

L. Sternwight




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: strat@sam.ksu.ksu.edu (Steve Davis)
Date: Tue, 7 Dec 93 18:05:28 PST
To: mech@eff.org (Stanton McCandlish)
Subject: Re: Detweiler in CuD
In-Reply-To: <199312072300.SAA08199@eff.org>
Message-ID: <9312080203.AA04803@sam.ksu.ksu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


From the keyboard of Stanton McCandlish:

> Those of you following L. Detweiler's rants might wish to take a look at
> the latest CuD.  Pretty amazing stuff.  He manages to slam Bruce
> Sterling, the English language, Eric Hughes, Tim May, and even an EFF
> board member (John Gilmore), all in ~200 lines which is short for L.D.

The first two deserve slamming.  

That's my first and only comment concerning the article in question.

-- 
                                               Steve Davis (strat@cis.ksu.edu)
                                                       Kansas State University

I need something to fly over my grave again.  I need something to breathe.



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: weix@netcom.com (Patrick Weix)
Date: Tue, 7 Dec 93 20:50:31 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: televisions 2 way? No way. My way. Right away.
Message-ID: <199312080448.UAA17402@mail.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Re: televisions 2 way?


>For maximum safety, especially against future developments, I would
>remove all electrical wiring and plumbing from my house. Its a bit
>hard, but it protects you from the fiends.

>Unedited dissemination of this important information is encouraged.

>L. Sternwight

For those interested, I have constructed a powerful computer
completely out of wood chips soaked in brine. The toughest part was
the display. Please send $117.43 cash to me if you would like to get
in on the ground floor of this novel enterprise. TAKE CHARGE. PROTECT
YOURSELF FROM THE GOV!

-tentacle #58

There coming to take me away ha ha he he
To the funny farm where life is beautiful all the time
And all be happy to see the nice young men in their clean white suits....



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: TCJones@DOCKMASTER.NCSC.MIL
Date: Tue, 7 Dec 93 18:45:29 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Reality
Message-ID: <931208023954.669301@DOCKMASTER.NCSC.MIL>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Yes, we are watching you!!!!!

L.  Detweiler




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: cman@caffeine.io.com (Douglas Barnes)
Date: Tue, 7 Dec 93 19:55:30 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Detweiler's Fortune Cookie
Message-ID: <199312080339.VAA19448@caffeine.caffeine.io.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Zachary, Steve and I went to each Chinese food tonight, and clearly
the fortune cookie daemon was up to no good: 

Steve got Zachary's fortune:

   "Your winsome smile will be your sure protection" 

Zachary got my fortune, 

   "You will go many places" 

and I got Larry Detweiler's

   "Don't let doubt and suspicion bar your progress."

Oh, and Larry, your lucky lottery numbers are 1-15-18-39-47-50


-- 
----------------                                             /\ 
Douglas Barnes            cman@illuminati.io.com            /  \ 
Chief Wizard         (512) 448-8950 (d), 447-7866 (v)      / () \
Illuminati Online          metaverse.io.com 7777          /______\



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Paul Goggin <chaos@aql.gatech.edu>
Date: Tue, 7 Dec 93 20:13:37 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com (Cryptoanarchists are Us)
Subject: Internet Billing Server
Message-ID: <9312080411.AA25929@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



I thought this might be of interest to some of the list-members, I printing
it as I write this so I don't have any comments on it yet.

-------------------------Cut Here------------------------------------------
Dear Sir/Madam :
Thanks for your interest in the Billing Server project. I
would like to inform you that the Billing server prototype scope
document is available in the network now.

You can access the document in the following way.

Anonymous ftp from netinfo.ini.andrew.cmu.edu

The directory is /pub/billing-server and the file name is Scope.TR.1993-1.ps
please note that the file is a postscript version. This document
provides a high level description of the billing server prototype.

We will be happy to provide additional information on this.

Thank you

Krishnan ( Teaching Assistant for the Billing Server project )
------------------------Cut Here-----------------------------------------

Paul
--
R  O    All Comments Copyright by  | Technofetishist
 A  N     Paul S. Goggin (1993)    | Cypher, Cyber, Chaos              
  V        Information Broker      | Ergoflux, Interzone
   E      chaos@aql.gatech.edu     | Carpe Diem: Stop the Clipper wiretap chip 
Finger account for latest _Phrack_ | Public Key: PGP and RIPEM available
      For anonymous communication:---> anon32940@anon.penet.fi
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Title 18 USC 2511 and 18 USC 2703 Protected -- Monitoring Absolutely Forbidden




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Ed Carp <erc@khijol.yggdrasil.com>
Date: Wed, 8 Dec 93 02:10:33 PST
To: Douglas Barnes <cman@caffeine.io.com>
Subject: Re: Dining with the Cryptographer
In-Reply-To: <199312080853.CAA20044@caffeine.caffeine.io.com>
Message-ID: <Pine.3.05.1.9312080118.A7418-b100000@localhost>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


On Wed, 8 Dec 1993, Douglas Barnes wrote:

>    It was 4:30 in the afternoon; Dallas is a highly optimistic three and
> a half hours away.

3 hours, the way I drive...

>    Since neither of us had ever really been to Dallas as an actual 
> destination, we bought a map in Troy. (Home of the fighting Trojans.)
> Jim spent the rest of the way to Dallas (several hours) attempting to 
> unfold the map.

Dallas is easy - get on I-35 and go NORTH...

>    Now, unbeknownst to Jim or I, we were _savagely_ underdressed for
> what turned out to be the best Italian restaurant in Texas. Chaum, at

Horseshit.  Eletto's in Austin is the BEST Italian place in Texas!!!

>    He had come to Dallas not for a convention, but rather to work with
> a company that is implementing his smartcard technology for automated
> toll collection equipment. "It's hard to do this protocol in such a 
> narrow window, but we're getting there. If the car is doing 60, there
> just isn't much time."

The North Dallas Tollway already *has* such a gadget.  Pretty cool, too...

>    Halfway to the car, as if on cue, Jim and I just completely lost
> it and started laughing hysterically. All the tension and nervous
> energy of our mad dash to Dallas and meeting a hero of the digital 
> revolution had melted away, and the full realization of the incredible 
> experience hit us full force -- out of the blue, this guy whose papers 
> we had passed back and forth and argued about endlessly over bagels, 
> had called Jim up, invited us out to dinner two hundred miles away, we 
> had a great talk, this incredible food, put new life into the Digial 
> Credit Union project...  and only about eight hours had gone by.

Oh .. did you ever figure out why he called *you*???

Ed Carp, N7EKG			erc@wetware.com			510/659-9560
                   an38299@anon.penet.fi, anon-1157@twwells.com
If you want magic, let go of your armor.  Magic is so much stronger than
steel!        -- Richard Bach, "The Bridge Across Forever"






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: cman@caffeine.io.com (Douglas Barnes)
Date: Wed, 8 Dec 93 01:10:32 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Dining with the Cryptographer
Message-ID: <199312080853.CAA20044@caffeine.caffeine.io.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Dining with the Cryptographer:
A crypto road trip
   
By Jim McCoy and Douglas Barnes


   "Hey Doug," said Jim. "You'll never guess who just called."
   Ever since Jim got mail from Chaum asking for his phone number (he
doesn't have one), he'd been pretty anxious, spastically cramming
old Eurocrypt proceedings and coming up with even more baroque 
crypto applications than usual. (We'll have a digicash auction for
CPU cyles...)

   Finally they must have touched base while he was at work.

   "Let me guess", I ventured, "a call from Amsterdam?"
   "Uh, no from Dallas. Chaum wants us to go have dinner with him."
   "Dallas? What's he doing in Dallas?"
   "I think some conference or something."
   It was 4:30 in the afternoon; Dallas is a highly optimistic three and
a half hours away.
   "Does he realize where Austin is?", I replied incredulously.
   "I think so... we're supposed to meet him at 8..."
   "Uh-hunh... right."

   Time to find a car. Frantic phone calls, beggings of coworkers. No
question but this was not an opportunity to miss. Sort of like a Roman 
Catholic getting a call from the Pope. Finally get ahold of my wife, 
who has the only working car in the family.
   "You're going where?" she asked.
   "Dallas."
   "Dallas?"
   "Yep. Gonna meet David Chaum."
   "How does he know about you?"
   "Beats me. Actually, I think it's just Jim he wants, I'm along for 
the ride."
   
   Rush hour (such as it is) in Austin, pick up Jim, gas up, get munchies
and caffeine for the trip. Hot topics in the car on the way up:

   "Where in hell did he hear about you?"
   "Is this Waco yet?"
   "Do you have any idea what he looks like?"
   "Wow, you really shouldn't be driving ninety..."
   "Did you have _any_ concept of where Dallas was when you agreed to this?"

   Since neither of us had ever really been to Dallas as an actual 
destination, we bought a map in Troy. (Home of the fighting Trojans.)
Jim spent the rest of the way to Dallas (several hours) attempting to 
unfold the map.
   "What was that address again?", I would ask.
   "North Dallas Parkway."
   "Are you sure?", I would ask.
   "Yeah..."
   <time would pass, more folding and unfolding of the map>
   "Found it yet?"
   ...

   [Jim asks at this point that we mention there _is no_ North
    Dallas Parkway on the map; it's a frontage road.]

   We reach Dallas, a giant mass of undifferentiated suburban cancer
cells on the north Texas plains. We still don't know where the hotel
is, so we pull off at a random exit and up to a phone at a Texaco.
   Jim goes to the phone, just as we notice an extremely loud and
violent confrontation between a customer and the clerk. Many folks
sort of hanging around, gold chains, nice cars, tinted glass,
everyone real tense. I realize immediately that we are the only white 
people in sight, and that the confrontation is getting louder. I 
bravely lock the doors while Jim makes the call. Blows are exchanged
at the pumps as we pull away...

   After this things are a snap, we arive at the Grand Frobnintsky Hotel 
and meet Chaum. I'm expecting a short, balding Dutchman, he turns out
to be a tall hippie from California, a taller, older edition of Eric
Hughes. We are an hour and a half late, but he seems unperturbed, even
a little stunned when I explain the distance in terms of European 
geography (dropping by Amsterdam from, say, Frankfurt or Paris).
   
   And off we go for food. Chaum had actually been here before (long
ago) but we hadn't. We drove around in circles, three of the most
indecisive humans on the planet, clearly waiting for the NSA to tell 
us where they were springing for dinner. We try one restaurant which
(thankfully) was closing, and they gave us directions to Mi Piazo,
based on our: "Um, we think it's, like, an Italian restaurant, Mia 
something or other..."
   Now, unbeknownst to Jim or I, we were _savagely_ underdressed for
what turned out to be the best Italian restaurant in Texas. Chaum, at
least, was wearing a jacket -- we looked our usual Austin slacker selves,
having literally dropped everything and dashed out of our respective
workplaces. Fortunately it was football night for the Dallas Cowboys,
and the place was pretty much deserted.
   [Note: We started with a delightful cold antipasto, I had the seafood 
fettucini, Jim had lobster and crab ravioli in a mushroom wine sauce, and
Chaum had something else... we remember what we had because, frankly, it
was the best food we'd had in, oh, a decade or two.]

   He had come to Dallas not for a convention, but rather to work with
a company that is implementing his smartcard technology for automated
toll collection equipment. "It's hard to do this protocol in such a 
narrow window, but we're getting there. If the car is doing 60, there
just isn't much time."
   Jim asked about what was motivating the company to pursue this
secure, untraceable mechanism; Chaum believes that more and more people
are increasingly aware of privacy issues and are more sensitive than
ever about the data that is collected about them. "This company sees
it as a major selling point... they want to be ahead in the technology
over the others in the market, and they're willing to pay to do it right."
   Of course, we couldn't escape the mandatory conversation about our
favorite son, Lawrence Detweiler of Colorado. Chaum was vastly amused
by the whole saga, and we discussed some of the practical aspects of
instituting is-a-person credentials and credential mechanisms in general.
"Why don't you guys just go ahead and set something like that up," he
suggested, "so you can shut him up."
   I pointed out that this had been suggested, but that LD was simply
incapable of distinguishing the separate roles of keyservers and credential
mechanisms. We resolved that even though it would probably have no 
appreciable impact on someone as far gone as Larry, it was something
we should pursue.
   At our prompting, Chaum described the overall activities of his
company. "There are three basic groups, one working on smartcards, one
on software-only implementations, and another on electronic wallets."
Basically, the smartcards are a fairly standard microcontroller with 
most of the i/o stripped out and their own software burned into ROM.
The electronic wallets are more sophisticated consumer electronics 
for managing smartcards.
   He asked about our activities, and we told him about our recent
work on secure telnet with Diffie-Hellman, and our Credit Union plans
[which is how he heard about us].  From our point of view, after many
meetings and telephone discussions with regulators, the regulatory 
environment seems like the easy part, with the software looming as a
major hurdle for two people with about three and a half jobs between
them.
   From Chaum's point of view, the software is the easy part, and he
was delighted to hear how absurdly easy it is from a regulatory 
standpoint to start and operate a Credit Union. We discussed some of
the non-anonymous, traceable proposals that have been presented; 
I asked whether the various attempts to come up with alternatives
to his protocols were because a) they didn't want to pay licensing
fees, b) they didn't know about digicash, or c) they _wanted_ 
traceability.
   His feeling was that most people had started working on this without
examining work in the field, having only a background with public key
cryptography, and had wedded themselves early on to their own, rather
shallowly conceived protocols that are generally either too complicated
or critcally flawed with respect to untraceability. He also acknowledged
that some people and organizations did, in fact, seek traceability, but 
that this position would prove untenable in the face of consumer demand.
   Returning to the Digital Credit Union idea, we discussed ways in 
which we might collaborate on this venture. He was clearly very well 
disposed to the idea, and barring problems with export/import restrictions
(the Netherlands apparently have odd export regs of their own) felt that
we could incorporate some of the Digicash, Inc., software that is just 
now reaching the beta test stage. "And if we can't export it, we'll just 
send someone over here to rewrite it... end up with better code that way 
anyhow."
   The surly waiters were beginning to give us the eye, as it was pushing
midnight; Chaum was starting to fade as well, still jet-lagged and clearly
worn out from a whole day of meetings and somnolent from a huge dinner... so
we jumped him and stole his wallet to give an example of the dangers of
untraceable cash.
   Okay, maybe not, but Jim did ask him in this weak moment if he had
any objections to people implementing public domain blind signature
code along the lines of RSAREF. He thought this was a terrific idea,
and enthusiastically approved. I asked some probing questions about
what kind of software they would have available; he offered to forward
a writeup of the various projects that are almost completed.
   We adjourned to the cocktail lounge at the Grand Frobnintsky Hotel,
where, sipping cappuccino beneath a giant snowman made of marshmallows,
we chatted some more, until Chaum appeared on the verge of falling into 
his steamed milk. After goodbyes, we parted ways. 

   Halfway to the car, as if on cue, Jim and I just completely lost
it and started laughing hysterically. All the tension and nervous
energy of our mad dash to Dallas and meeting a hero of the digital 
revolution had melted away, and the full realization of the incredible 
experience hit us full force -- out of the blue, this guy whose papers 
we had passed back and forth and argued about endlessly over bagels, 
had called Jim up, invited us out to dinner two hundred miles away, we 
had a great talk, this incredible food, put new life into the Digial 
Credit Union project...  and only about eight hours had gone by.
 
   The drive back was fairly uneventful; I started to nod after a
bit and Jim took over the driving (which was a good thing, as I
was both falling asleep _and_ stuck in the groove of driving about
ninety). 

   So, reenergized and still contemplating the wonderful food at
Mi Piazo, we prepare to forge ahead...

--
Jim McCoy (mccoy@binky.cc.utexas.edu)
Douglas Barnes (cman@io.com)



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: bart@netcom.com (Harry Bartholomew)
Date: Wed, 8 Dec 93 03:00:35 PST
To: chaos@aql.gatech.edu (Paul Goggin)
Subject: Re: Internet Billing Server
In-Reply-To: <9312080411.AA25929@toad.com>
Message-ID: <199312081057.CAA26776@mail.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> 
> 
> I thought this might be of interest to some of the list-members, I printing
> it as I write this so I don't have any comments on it yet.
> 
> -------------------------Cut Here------------------------------------------
> Dear Sir/Madam :
> Thanks for your interest in the Billing Server project. I
> would like to inform you that the Billing server prototype scope
> document is available in the network now.
> 
> You can access the document in the following way.
> 
> Anonymous ftp from netinfo.ini.andrew.cmu.edu
> 
> The directory is /pub/billing-server and the file name is Scope.TR.1993-1.ps
                               ^
    			       | make that an underline for directory
   



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Harry Shapiro <habs@panix.com>
Date: Wed, 8 Dec 93 02:23:41 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com (Good Guys)
Subject: Re: ANNOUNCEMENT: DPSWG Crypto-Policy Statement to White House (fwd)
Message-ID: <199312081021.AA27536@panix.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


a conscious being, Jim Miller wrote:
> Why only "mass market" encryption?

> Since we target other software developers, I don't believe our product  
> qualifies as "mass market" software.  At least, this is my interpretation  
> of the definition of "as is" in the Cantwell bill:

Is there any magic to "mass market?" Like should we see, via FOIA,
if the NSA has some "secret" deals with the SPA (etc.) for "Mass
Market" products.

Is PGP "mass market?"


/hawk



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: an53004@anon.penet.fi
Date: Tue, 7 Dec 93 21:30:32 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: your brain will be bugged by the NSA (was Re: televisions 2 way? )
In-Reply-To: <199312080037.TAA17068@snark.ts.lehman.com>
Message-ID: <9312080527.AA19615@anon.penet.fi>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


On Dec 7, 19:37, "Perry E. Metzger" wrote:
> 
> Sean Lambert says:
> > I heard a theory about how the government can "spy" on us by using cable
> > television.  somehow, according to the theory, the cable is a 2-way
> > transmitter, and the television, when turned on, can act like a video
> > camera for the government.  I do not know ANY of the specifics of this
> > theory, and really find it hard to believe (perhaps because I do not
> > have any more information)...does anyone have any information on this?
> > is this an appropriate inquiry for the cypherpunks mailing?
> 
> Its absolutely true. There are also mechanisms that let them listen in
> on conversations using the lightbulbs in your house -- ambient sound
> causes the bulb to vibrate, flexing the filament and thus modulating
> the return current. Placing a simple device on the electrical feeder

Of course, this is the old technology. Much more sophisticated
monitoring technologies are currently being used.

All people born after 1983 have special implants which transmit all 
their thoughts to NSA headquarters for recording and analysis. This 
is also a big plus for law enforcement, which has been known to 
resort to throwing people who don't have suitable modern conveniences 
in jail. 

W.O. Studeman was apparently overheard at a party (while more than
slightly drunk) saying "this new approach will eventually save the U.S.
taxpayer billions of dollars a year as there are fewer people in the
world than potential bugging devices". The government is now actively
kidnapping people born before 1983 for short periods of time, and
implanting these thought transmission devices (stories of abductions by
UFOs are invariably due to imperfectly wiped memories of the ordeal).

The next model will be a thought transmission and control device. 
There are apparently still some technical problems with the 
prototypes, the end result for the experimental subjects who have 
been implanted with the prototype is usually insanity. 

The next step after this is rumoured to be the complete removal of 
the old-style organic brains and replacement with new 
ultra-sophisticated superconducting computers capable of computing 
hundreds of thousands of digits of pi in a fraction of a second. This 
will also solve the problems with maths education in the U.S. 

-------------------------------------------------------------------------
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Due to the double-blind, any mail replies to this message will be anonymized,
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From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Derek Atkins <warlord@MIT.EDU>
Date: Wed, 8 Dec 93 02:55:34 PST
To: cypherpunks-east@MIT.EDU
Subject: ANNOUNCE: Boston Area Cypherpunks Meeting
Message-ID: <9312081054.AA06322@toxicwaste.media.mit.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Announcing the December Boston Area Cypherpunks Meeting, held
on the campus of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

Date: Saturday, Dec 11, 1993
Time: 12 noon - 6pm, with a possible dinner trip afterwards
Where: MIT Room 1-115 (Directions to follow)

Possible agenda topics include:
	Digicash
	PGP Keyserver Politics
	Crypto Export Laws, and how they may be changing
	Recent Occurrances in Cryptography, etc.
	Next Generation of Cryptography
	... plus other topics, always welcome

Further reminders will be sent only to cypherpunks-east@MIT.EDU.
Requests to be added to this list should be sent to the list
cypherpunks-east-request@MIT.EDU.

Hope to see you there.

-derek

Directions:

Via 'T': Take the red line to the kendall stop.  Cross the street from
the Marriott, walk until the end of the building, and take a right
onto Amhurst.  Keep walking.  Cross Ames St., and continue forward
until the path allows you to keep going straight or allows a 45-degree
right path.  Take this right path, until you reach the steps to the
building.  Go up the steps and follow the corridor to the other end,
then follow directions below.

Via bus: Take route 1 to 77 Mass. Ave, and enter at the 77 Mass Ave
steps.  Take a right just as you enter and walk down that corridor,
following the signs for 1-115.

Via car: Get to the MIT campus in Cambridge, then find a place to
park.  The best places will be near Mass Ave and Amhurst Alley.  Then
enter MIT at 77 Mass Ave and follow the above directions.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: jdwilson@gold.chem.hawaii.edu (Jim Wilson (VA))
Date: Wed, 8 Dec 93 08:45:42 PST
To: slambert@willamette.edu (Sean Lambert)
Subject: Re: televisions 2 way?
In-Reply-To: <9312080011.AA13594@willamette.edu>
Message-ID: <9312081644.AA03556@gold.chem.hawaii.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> 
> 
> 
> I heard a theory about how the government can "spy" on us by using cable
> television.  somehow, according to the theory, the cable is a 2-way
> transmitter, and the television, when turned on, can act like a video
> camera for the government.  I do not know ANY of the specifics of this
> theory, and really find it hard to believe (perhaps because I do not
> have any more information)...does anyone have any information on this?
> is this an appropriate inquiry for the cypherpunks mailing?
> 
> 
> thanks a lot
> 
> 
> sean
> 
> 
> 
You can read all about it in Orwell's "1984"...    ;-)

 -Jim





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: jazz@hal.com (Jason Zions)
Date: Wed, 8 Dec 93 07:05:41 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: ANNOUNCEMENT: DPSWG Crypto-Policy Statement to White House
Message-ID: <9312081504.AA20889@jazz.hal.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


   > NOTICE: This is the letter from the Digital Privacy and
   > Security Working Group sent to the White House 12/06/93,
   > urging the Administration to lift export controls on
   > DES, RSA and other mass market encryption without
			^^^^^^^^^^ ??
   > requring legislation.   

   > 

   Why only "mass market" encryption?

   The company I work for is developing a collection of runtime libraries and  
   utilities which software developers can use to create and manage portable  
   object-oriented distributed applications.  Think of it as a  
   object-oriented DCE-like tool set with a run-time environment and system  
   administration utilites.

That's still mass market. There is already a mechanism for non-mass-market,
i.e. one-off, export of crypto; apply for an export permit. The idea of this
initiative is to allow products sold in quantities too great to allow
individual export licenses to be sold.

   > For example, generally available software is offered
   > for sale or licensed to the public without restriction
   > and available through standard commercial channels of
   > distribution; sold as is without further
   > customization; and designed to be installed by the
   > purchaser without additional assistance from the
   > publisher.  Computer hardware and computing devices are
   > also defined. 

You sell your software as-is; the customer does any customization.

   > 	.
   > 15          ``(4) DEFINITIONS.---As used in this
   > 16     subsection---
   > 

   > 1               ``(B) the term `as is' means, in the case of
   > 2          software (including software with encryption ca-
   > 3          pabilities), a software program that is not de-
   > 4          signed, developed, or tailored by the software
   > 5          company for specific purchasers, except that
   > 6          such purchasers may supply certain installation
   > 7          parameters needed by the software program to
   > 8          function properly with the purchaser's system
   > 9          and may customize the software program by
   > 10          choosing among options contained in the soft-
   > 11          ware program;

A developer's kit still qualifies as "as-is", mass market software. You're
covered.

   As I see it, the main distinction between "mass market" software and our  
   software is that our software is used to create other software, whereas  
   "mass market" software implies final product "end-user" software.

Not a useful distinction from the standpoint of commerce. "Mass-market"
means the seller does nothing special for individual customers; no
customization, etc. It means the volume is large enough that requiring
action on a per-sale basis (as is required for current crypto export
licensing) is essentially impossible.

   Why only "mass market" software?

Because the non-mass-market stuff already has the mechanism of applying for
individual export licenses; since it's not mass marketed, it's possible to
do special things on a per-customer basis.

   Does the DPSWG want the government to keep export controls in place for  
   the type of product our company is developing?

It doesn't.

Jason Zions




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: ACOUSINS@TrentU.ca
Date: Wed, 8 Dec 93 06:20:40 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: cancell me
Message-ID: <01H68CTJ1IN6000T5I@TRENTU.CA>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Please cancel my subscription to this news letter.   Assuming of course I 
am talking to the right person.

Thanks,  Acousins@trentu.ca





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: sommerfeld@orchard.medford.ma.us (Bill Sommerfeld)
Date: Wed, 8 Dec 93 07:35:41 PST
To: Jim_Miller@suite.com
Subject: Re: ANNOUNCEMENT: DPSWG Crypto-Policy Statement to White House
In-Reply-To: <9312072331.AA02459@bilbo.suite.com>
Message-ID: <199312081520.KAA00346@orchard.medford.ma.us>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


   Although we don't make custom versions of our software for specific  
   customers, our software, due to its nature, is highly customizable by the  
   purchaser.  Neither the Cantwell bill, nor the DPSWG letter mentions this  
   type of software product.

Huh?  Does the fact that Microsoft C or WinDoze contains run-time
libraries and is "highly customizeable" cause it to cease to be a
mass-market product?

Read the bill more carefully; it doesn't say anything about required
sales volume, and allows for telephone/etc support for installs and
the like.  It also doesn't say anything about "end users".  As long as
the *seller* doesn't customize it for each user, it's mass-market.

BTW a "standard commercial channel" includes mail/phone orders.

					- Bill







From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: ccat@netcom.com (Chris Beaumont)
Date: Wed, 8 Dec 93 10:50:45 PST
To: sfraves@techno.stanford.edu
Subject: NYT article on Mosaic today.
Message-ID: <199312081849.KAA28491@mail.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


  Theres a great New york times article on Mosaic today.
First page of the business section. They state that its the next 'killer app' for education.(which I agree,it is.)
-Chris.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: strat@uunet.uu.net (Bob Stratton)
Date: Wed, 8 Dec 93 08:30:42 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: San Jose Merc article on s/w industry crypto deal
Message-ID: <9312081626.AA14871@rodan.UU.NET>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


------- Start of forwarded message -------
  Software Industry to cut deal on Clipper


HIGH-TECH FIRMS WON'T OPPOSE DATA-SCRAMBLING CHIP 

  THEY'LL ACCEPT 'CLIPPER' PROPOSAL IF U.S. WILL EASE SOFTWARE EXPORT RULES.


By LEE GOMES 
Mercury News Staff Writer

With some privacy advocates crying foul, a group of prominent high-tech
companies is dropping its opposition to a controversial White House proposal
for a new data-scrambling chip in exchange for a relaxing of the federal
rules restricting the export of scrambling software.

The Digital Privacy and Security Group, a collection of computer companies
and related associations, said Monday that it could accept the
administration's ''Clipper'' chip proposal if the chip's adoption was
voluntary, and if other encryption software were available for sale,
especially overseas.

The White House Clipper proposal would establish a special computer chip
that would be used to scramble digital transmissions, including computer
data and next-generation telephone calls. But the scheme the chip would use
to encode the messages would be kept secret, and the government would have
the right to get a court order to break the code if it wanted to wiretap a
conversation.

As originally conceived by the administration, Clipper would be the only
advanced encryption technology that could be sold by U.S. firms overseas.

Many in the computer industry had opposed the Clipper proposal, both out of
privacy and civil rights concerns, but also because more advanced coding
software is available from private companies.

However, those private coding systems could not, most likely, be broken by
law enforcement or intelligence agencies, and both groups are supporters of
the Clipper proposal.

The switch on Clipper was contained in a letter to President Clinton and
marked what a spokeswoman for one of the groups labeled a ''compromise.''

The groups now say they can accept a voluntary form of Clipper as long as
the administration drops the regulations that prevent U.S. companies from
selling advanced encoding software overseas.

Encryption software is one of the few high-tech products whose foreign sale
is still tightly controlled. The ban originally was ordered for fear that
foreign governments could gain access to advanced U.S. coding software and
then use it to shield their communications from American intelligence
agents.

But the software industry argues that because encryption software identical
to the sort sold by American firms is now available from dozens of overseas
suppliers, the ban doesn't provide any additional security, but simply
prevents U.S. companies from making extra sales.

The ban runs counter to the Clinton administration's demonstrated
willingness to please its high-tech friends by relaxing export control rules
that no longer serve a national security purpose. Most in the software
industry say it survives because of strong support from the National
Security Agency.

However, on Monday, some Clipper critics charged that the industry was
sacrificing a privacy issue to gain a sales boost.

''The entire point of Clipper is wrong,'' said David Banisar of the Computer
Professionals for Social Responsibility, a mostly liberal policy group.
''The premise (of Clipper) is that they have the right to surveil and
nothing should get in the way of that right.''

Banisar said his group, along with such technical associations as the
Association for Computing Machinery and the Institute of Electrical and
Electronic Engineers, would continue to oppose Clipper because ''they are
principled enough not to cut any deals.''

But Bruce Heiman, a Washington attorney working with a group of major U.S.
software firms, said the free availability of alternate encryption software
would make the privacy concerns about Clipper irrelevant.

That's because, he said, individuals and companies could use the software to
encode their transmissions in a way that not even the Clipper chip could
understand.



------- End of forwarded message -------




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: karn@qualcomm.com (Phil Karn)
Date: Wed, 8 Dec 93 11:46:02 PST
To: dmandl@panix.com
Subject: San Jose Merc article on s/w industry crypto deal
In-Reply-To: <9312081826.AA14676@disvnm2.lehman.com>
Message-ID: <199312081945.LAA16407@servo>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


If the government really were to commit to removing export controls on
all civilian cryptography, and to ensuring that Clipper remains truly
voluntary, then I could see how the DPSG compromise *might* have some
merit.  With or without such an agreement, Clipper is a non-starter --
as long as better alternatives are readily available.

This is already true for general purpose computers. People can easily
run whatever encryption software they like on their PCs, whether the
NSA, FBI or anyone else likes it or not. Unfortunately, it is NOT true
for voice services like digital cellular. Although they contain
computers, digital phones are not as easily reprogrammed as PCs. And
even if they were, you still need the cooperation of the carrier to
decrypt your call at the base station (unless, of course, you encrypt
end-to-end, but then you need the right kind of data service from the
carrier, plus a compatible secure telephone on the land side of the
call).

In theory, at least, under this "deal" the cellular vendors would be
free to support either Clipper or some other, better encryption
scheme, without fear of export controls destroying much of their
market.

In reality, of course, the cellular carriers and manufacturers are
large and conservative enough (and do enough business with the
government) to be easily browbeaten into installing only Clipper, if
indeed they install any real encryption at all.  Indeed, the NSA
hardly had to lift a finger to browbeat the industry into installing a
trivial "voice privacy" scheme in TDMA cellular that can be broken by
any undergrad CS student in a few minutes.

So I'm not worried about the effect of this deal on general purpose
computer applications; it may even help, by getting rid of export
controls. But the big loser will inevitably be voice privacy.

Phil






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Anthony Garcia <agarcia@sugar.NeoSoft.COM>
Date: Wed, 8 Dec 93 10:00:42 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Statistics of Low-Order Bits in Images
In-Reply-To: <199311302040.AA03048@poboy.b17c.ingr.com>
Message-ID: <199312081758.AA03226@sugar.NeoSoft.COM>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


paul@poboy.b17c.ingr.com (Paul Robichaux) describes procedure for
preparing and sending steganographically-concealed data via Usenet:

>  4. Post to Usenet,  indicating the source of the materials (i.e. "This
>  picture came from `Girls of The Rural South, vol 1'" or "Audio sampled
>  from Michael Jackson's _Dangerous_")

Has anyone already tried looking for structure in the LSB's of the
"megabytes of copyright violations" already flowing thru
alt.binaries.pictures.* ?

-Anthony Garcia
agarcia@neosoft.com
--Why, didn't you know?  That's how the blacknet.* hierarchy gets propagated...






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: dmandl@lehman.com (David Mandl)
Date: Wed, 8 Dec 93 10:30:43 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: San Jose Merc article on s/w industry crypto deal
Message-ID: <9312081826.AA14676@disvnm2.lehman.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> HIGH-TECH FIRMS WON'T OPPOSE DATA-SCRAMBLING CHIP 
> 
>   THEY'LL ACCEPT 'CLIPPER' PROPOSAL IF U.S. WILL EASE SOFTWARE EXPORT RULES.
> 
> By LEE GOMES 
> Mercury News Staff Writer
> 
> With some privacy advocates crying foul, a group of prominent high-tech
> companies is dropping its opposition to a controversial White House proposal
> for a new data-scrambling chip in exchange for a relaxing of the federal
> rules restricting the export of scrambling software.
> 
> The Digital Privacy and Security Group, a collection of computer companies
> and related associations, said Monday that it could accept the
> administration's ''Clipper'' chip proposal if the chip's adoption was
> voluntary, and if other encryption software were available for sale,
> especially overseas.

What a sell-out (literally).  Will these guys also support the government's
right to conduct random house-to-house searches if they're promised a piece
of the booty?  And Clipper has ALWAYS been "voluntary" (at least so far), so
that part of the deal is no victory at all.  With friends like these...

   --Dave.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Jim McCoy <mccoy@ccwf.cc.utexas.edu>
Date: Wed, 8 Dec 93 12:25:44 PST
To: erc@khijol.yggdrasil.com (Ed Carp)
Subject: Re: Dining with the Cryptographer
In-Reply-To: <Pine.3.05.1.9312080118.A7418-b100000@localhost>
Message-ID: <199312082024.AA09762@flubber.cc.utexas.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text


Ed Carp writes:
> >    Since neither of us had ever really been to Dallas as an actual 
> > destination, we bought a map in Troy. (Home of the fighting Trojans.)
> 
> Dallas is easy - get on I-35 and go NORTH...

Finding something that is vaguely considered to be Dallas is easy, finding
any particular location inside Dallas is not....

> >    He had come to Dallas not for a convention, but rather to work with
> > a company that is implementing his smartcard technology for automated
> > toll collection equipment. "It's hard to do this protocol in such a 
> > narrow window, but we're getting there. If the car is doing 60, there
> > just isn't much time."
> 
> The North Dallas Tollway already *has* such a gadget.  Pretty cool, too...

Yes, we noticed them as we made our way to the meeting.  Pretty cool if you
have any particular desire to have your movements tracked at some future
point, but those of us who would rather not have a barcode stamped on our
head or car would probably not share your enthusiasm...

> Oh .. did you ever figure out why he called *you*???

He noticed a posting of mine regarding our Digital Credit Union.

jim



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Marius Schilder" <marius@DigiCash.nl>
Date: Wed, 8 Dec 93 06:43:43 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Dining with the Cryptographer
Message-ID: <2d05d0e7.herman@DigiCash.nl>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>   After this things are a snap, we arive at the Grand Frobnintsky Hotel 
>and meet Chaum. I'm expecting a short, balding Dutchman, he turns out
>to be a tall hippie from California, a taller, older edition of Eric
>Hughes.

Some little corrections from the guys at DigiCash:
    - Short Dutchmen are much rarer than fat Americans. The Dutch average
      height ranks near if not at the top worldwide. For example the tall
      Califorian hippie you mention is among the shorter employees over here...
    - We guess Eric is a younger, shorter version of David instead of the
      other way around.

Besides these little anomalies, we liked your story...


-- 
#include <stdisclaimer.h>                     // blablablablablablablablabla
*s="*s=%c%s%c;main(){printf(s,34,s,34,10);}%c";main(){printf(s,34,s,34,10);}
//Marius Schilder        Voice: +31 20 665 2611         Fax: +31 20 668 5486




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: walter kehowski <wak@next11.math.pitt.edu>
Date: Wed, 8 Dec 93 12:50:44 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: NYT article on Mosaic today.
Message-ID: <9312082047.AA02772@next11.math.pitt.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Where can you get 'Mosaic'?
Walter A. Kehowski <wak@next0.math.pitt.edu>




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: bruce@phantom.com (Bruce Fancher)
Date: Wed, 8 Dec 93 14:10:46 PST
To: dmandl@panix.com
Subject: Re: San Jose Merc article on s/w industry crypto deal
In-Reply-To: <9312081826.AA14676@disvnm2.lehman.com>
Message-ID: <m0p7X5c-0009RaC@mindvox.phantom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text


[David Mandl] has written:
>
>> HIGH-TECH FIRMS WON'T OPPOSE DATA-SCRAMBLING CHIP 
>> 
>>   THEY'LL ACCEPT 'CLIPPER' PROPOSAL IF U.S. WILL EASE SOFTWARE EXPORT RULES.
>> 
>> By LEE GOMES 
>> Mercury News Staff Writer
>> 
>> With some privacy advocates crying foul, a group of prominent high-tech
>> companies is dropping its opposition to a controversial White House proposal
>> for a new data-scrambling chip in exchange for a relaxing of the federal
>> rules restricting the export of scrambling software.
>> 
>> The Digital Privacy and Security Group, a collection of computer companies
>> and related associations, said Monday that it could accept the
>> administration's ''Clipper'' chip proposal if the chip's adoption was
>> voluntary, and if other encryption software were available for sale,
>> especially overseas.
>
>What a sell-out (literally).  Will these guys also support the government's
>right to conduct random house-to-house searches if they're promised a piece
>of the booty?  And Clipper has ALWAYS been "voluntary" (at least so far), so
>that part of the deal is no victory at all.  With friends like these...
>
>   --Dave.
>

That's a really _REALLY_ good point.  I mean, a weak government encryption
standard (like um . . . DES) is basically no different than abolishing the
Fourth Ammendment.  Right?  Right?  Right . . .



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Black Unicorn <unicorn@access.digex.net>
Date: Wed, 8 Dec 93 14:40:47 PST
To: dmandl@panix.com
Subject: Re: San Jose Merc article on s/w industry crypto deal
Message-ID: <199312082237.AA04028@access2.digex.net>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


->

What a sell-out (literally).  Will these guys also support the government's
right to conduct random house-to-house searches if they're promised a piece
of the booty?  And Clipper has ALWAYS been "voluntary" (at least so far), so
that part of the deal is no victory at all.  With friends like these...
 
   --Dave.

<-

()()
 
As originally conceived by the administration, Clipper would be the only
advanced encryption technology that could be sold by U.S. firms overseas.
 
()()

Yeah, real "voluntary."

More government controled, distributed, surveiled monopolies.
Reminds me of ma bell.  Western electric manufactures the phones
that everyone HAS to buy.  Sounds like AT&T has found out that turn
about is fair play.  They are stabbing the very system that gave them
their boost in the back in many ways.  (Sigh)

I do have to admit however, I have one of those heavy western electric
phones on my desk.  It must be 12 years old or something and it has out
lived all the other phones I have ever bought.  I'm sort of fond of the
heavy clunky feel it has too.  Not like these cheap AT&T Spielzeug
that aren't heavy enough to hold on to the desk when you stretch the cord.
:)

-uni- (Dark)




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Stanton McCandlish <mech@eff.org>
Date: Wed, 8 Dec 93 15:23:44 PST
To: eff-talk@eff.org
Subject: ANNOUNCEMENT: EFF Statement on Cryptography & Policy
Message-ID: <199312082316.SAA12799@eff.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



        EFF ANNOUNCES ITS OFFICIAL POLICY ON CRYPTOGRAPHY AND PRIVACY

        Strongly opposes original Clipper/Skipjack plan,
        reiterates the need to lift restrictions on encryption


December 8, 1993

The Electronic Frontier Foundation is pleased to announce its
formal policy on encryption.

This is particularly timely, because yesterday the New York Times
announced that the Digital Privacy and Security Working Group had
proposed to trade support for the administration's proposed Clipper
Chip for a lifting of the long-standing export embargo on robust
domestic encryption.

This was a misunderstanding of what the DPSWG offered the
administration in this proposal, leading to the belief that both the
DPSWG (a coalition of over 50 computer, communications, and privacy
organizations and associations) and it's principal coordinating
organization, the Electronic Frontier Foundation, have offered to ease
their opposition to Clipper.

We see it as a pragmatic effort to get the government to wiggle on
these issues: one step in the right direction, with many more to
follow.  This step is that we insist that use of Clipper and key
escrow must be completely voluntary.  It's not voluntary if users of
the Skipjack algorithm are forced to use key escrow.  It's not
voluntary if users who do choose escrow are forced to use the
government's choice of escrow agents.  It's not voluntary if
manufacturers such as AT&T are pressured into withdrawing competing
products.  It's not voluntary when competing products can't be sold in
a worldwide market.  It's not voluntary if the public can't see the
algorithm they are "volunteering" to use.  It's not voluntary if the
government will require anyone to use Skipjack or escrow, even when
communicating with the government.

The Working Group chose to state this in a diplomatic fashion by
applauding "repeated statements by Administration officials that there
is no intent to make the clipper chip mandatory".  They were diplomatic
for two reasons.  First, they believe the Administration has gotten this
message.  Clipper was announced in April and was supposed to be
available in the Summer.  It is December, the escrow system is still
uncertain, and the Administration is still drafting a report which was
due in July.  If they still don't get it, the coalition has a 100 page
white paper documenting the case against clipper and the case for
lifting export controls, which they will release in response to any
Administration position favoring Clipper.

The second reason is that the coalition was trying to use the
introduction of the Rep. Cantwell's bill eliminating many export
controls on crypto to try, one more time, to urge the Administration
to make voluntariness meaningful by unilaterally lifting export
controls.  Even if the Working Group and the Administration can't
agree on Clipper, EFF and the Working Group needed to continue
pressing the export issue.

But NSA is digging in, and a legislative fight looks more likely.
If diplomacy fails, EFF must fight for our rights.  Thus, we are
going to need all the allies we can find, from IBM, Apple, Lotus,
and Sun, to cryptographers, cypherpunks, and folks on the net.

EFF wants the public and the Administration to know (as we have
frequently stated to them face to face) that the Electronic Frontier
Foundation would fight to the end any attempt by the Administration to
do any more than let companies use Clipper if they want and to let people
buy it if they want -- and only in a market which has other strong
encryption schemes available because export controls have been lifted.

Under truly voluntary conditions, the EFF would be proud to say, "We
have expressed ... tentative acceptance of the Clipper Chip's
encryption scheme ... only if it is available as a voluntary
alternative to widely-available, commercially-accepted encryption
programs and products."  We would applaud the Government for employing
NSA's substantial expertise to devise improved encryption schemes --
like DES and Skipjack -- and deploying them to improve our society's
privacy and security.

We hope that the Clinton Administration can agree to take this single
step.  Here is the whole journey we'd like to begin.  If you share our
path, we need your help and support -- please join EFF.  Send the end of 
this document for details.

        Electronic Frontier Foundation Policy on Cryptography & Privacy
        (Approved November 11, 1993)

Digital technology is rapidly rendering our commercial activities and
communications -- indeed, much of our personal lives -- open to scrutiny by
strangers. Our medical records, political opinions, personal financial
transactions, and intimate affairs now pass over digital networks where
governments, employers, insurance companies, business competitors, and
others who might turn our private lives against us can examine them with
increasing ease and detail.

The Electronic Frontier Foundation believes that Americans must be allowed
access to the cryptographic tools necessary to protect their own privacy.
We will work toward making the following principles the official policies
of the U. S. Government:

1.      Private access to cryptography must be unhindered:

   *    There must be no laws restricting domestic use of cryptography.

   *    There must be no restrictions on the export of products, services,
or information because they contain cryptographic algorithms.

2.      Cryptography policy and technical standards must be set in open,
public forums:

   *    All participants in the policy debate on these issues, particularly
law enforcement and national security agencies, must submit their arguments
to public scrutiny.

   *    Any civilian encryption standard must be published and exposed to
rigorous public challenge.

3.      Encryption must become a part of the information infrastructure to
provide security, to protect privacy, and to provide each individual
control over his or her own identity.

   *    Each user must be free to choose whether or not to use key escrow,
and who should have copies of their keys, if anyone.

   *    Government at all levels should explore cryptography's potential to
replace identity-based or dossier-based systems, such as driver's licenses,
credit cards, checks, and passports with less invasive technology.

4.      New technologies must not erode constitutional protections,
particularly the right to speak, publish, and assemble, and to be free from
unreasonable searches and seizures .

   *    There must be no broadening of governmental access to private
communications and records, through wiretap law or otherwise, unless there
is a public consensus that the risks to safety outweigh the risks to
liberty and that our safety will actually be increased by the broadened
access.

                                ***

The Electronic Frontier Foundation recognizes that the combination of
digital communications and encryption technology does indeed threaten
some of law enforcement's current investigative techniques.

We also recognize that encryption will prevent many of the online
crimes that will likely occur without it.  We further believe that
these technologies will create new investigative tools for law
enforcement, even as they obsolete old ones.  Entering this new
environment, private industry, law enforcement, and private citizens
must work together to balance the requirements of both liberty and
security.  But technology halts for no one, not even the law.

                                ***


For Electronic Frontier Foundation membership info, send email to 
membership@eff.org.  For basic EFF details, send email to info@eff.org.
Other queries should be sent to ask@eff.org.



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: jkreznar@ininx.com (John E. Kreznar)
Date: Wed, 8 Dec 93 18:50:48 PST
To: mech@eff.org
Subject: ANNOUNCEMENT: EFF Statement on Cryptography & Policy
In-Reply-To: <199312082316.SAA12799@eff.org>
Message-ID: <9312090248.AA11429@ininx>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

>    *    There must be no broadening of governmental access to private
> communications and records, through wiretap law or otherwise, unless there
								^^^^^^
> is a public consensus that the risks to safety outweigh the risks to
> liberty and that our safety will actually be increased by the broadened
> access.

Does this imply that if some ``majority'' so elects, then you _would_
sacrifice your privacy to broadened governmental access?  Is this a
surrender to the most tenacious tyranny of all, the tyranny of the
majority?  Or do you interpret ``consensus'' rigorously, that is, as
an absence of dissent?

	John E. Kreznar		| Relations among people to be by
	jkreznar@ininx.com	| mutual consent, or not at all.

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.3a

iQCUAgUBLQaRYMDhz44ugybJAQFvcQP40mk62IRXKxUmwrHrTRfu5XTcXjzVDtJ2
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ADIlRyCq+GRGvq2rlitw9D3TgQizyzvL7alQm2oviWd/nU8bqDHTQ8wZgABhnf4O
XbtT+vJWRA==
=mcsu
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Stanton McCandlish <mech@eff.org>
Date: Wed, 8 Dec 93 16:45:48 PST
To: eff-talk@eff.org
Subject: NOTICE: EFF & UUNet downtime, Nov. 11
Message-ID: <199312090043.TAA14987@eff.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


UUNet is moving all of their Falls Church VA routers and network
connections to another location.  Their 800 numbers will also be unavailable.
All sites, such as eff.org, feeding from the Falls Church UUNet site will
be unavailable during the move.

This starts Saturday, Dec. 11 at 9am EST.  UUNet 800 numbers should be
back up by 11am, as should backbone links & 56K/T1 service.  All the
downstream nodes, including EFF's site, should be available by then,
except for those using SLIP/PPP, which may not be restored until 3pm.
ALL UUNet feeds should be available by 3pm or so.

According to UUNet:

>If you experience problems with your connection after Saturday night
>please contact the Network Operations Center at 1-800-827-4864 or
>send email to noc@uunet.uu.net.

Sorry for the upset.

-- 
Stanton  McCandlish  mech@eff.org  1:109/1103   EFF  Online  Activist & SysOp
O P E N  P L A T F O R M   C R Y P T O P O L I C Y   O N L I N E  R I G H T S
N  E  T  W  O  R  K  I  N  G      V  I  R  T  U  A  L     C  U  L  T  U  R  E
I   N   F  O :  M   E   M   B   E   R   S   H   I   P  @  E  F  F  .  O  R  G



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: <ARL106@PSUVM.PSU.EDU>
Date: Wed, 8 Dec 93 23:26:09 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Test
Message-ID: <9312090725.AA23111@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


This is a test. Sorry to waste the bandwidth.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: J. Michael Diehl <mdiehl@triton.unm.edu>
Date: Thu, 9 Dec 93 01:46:17 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: value of privacy?
Message-ID: <9312090946.AA18181@triton.unm.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


     I've been thinking lately.  (No, it didn't hurt.)  Does privacy have in
inherent value, or are "we" simply concerned with what others can do with
sensitive information about ourselves?
 
     What raised the question was that I was thinking about all of the ways in
which information was being gathered about me and my new wife.  I asked myself,
"How far would I go to erase my name from ever database in existence?" and, "So
what if the government knows how much money I make, it's not that much! ;^)" 
Comments?
 
     Also, I need to investigate my options for putting my own machine on the
internet.  I may be loosing my account when I (finally) graduate.  Any pointers
will be appreciated.
 
J. Michael Diehl   ;^)  |*The 2nd Amendment is there in case the 
mdiehl@triton.unm.edu   | Government forgets about the 1st!  <RL>
Mike.Diehl@f29.n301.z1  |*God is a good Physicist, and an even 
    .fidonet.org        | better Mathematician.  <Me>
al945@cwns9.ins.cwru.edu|*I'm just looking for the opportunity to 
 (505) 299-2282 (voice) | be Politically Incorrect! <Me>
Can we impeach him yet? |*Protected by 18 USC 2511 and 18 USC 2703. PGP Key =
7C06F1 = A6 27 E1 1D 5F B2 F2 F1  12 E7 53 2D 85 A2 10 5D
 
 




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: J. Michael Diehl <mdiehl@triton.unm.edu>
Date: Thu, 9 Dec 93 01:50:51 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: procmail-pgp, comments?
Message-ID: <9312090946.AA18236@triton.unm.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


     Well, my recipes for procmail and pgp have been out for a while now.  I
realize that the installation was a bitch, but what do you think of the rest of
it?  Where can I improve it?  Comments welcome.
 
J. Michael Diehl   ;^)  |*The 2nd Amendment is there in case the 
mdiehl@triton.unm.edu   | Government forgets about the 1st!  <RL>
Mike.Diehl@f29.n301.z1  |*God is a good Physicist, and an even 
    .fidonet.org        | better Mathematician.  <Me>
al945@cwns9.ins.cwru.edu|*I'm just looking for the opportunity to 
 (505) 299-2282 (voice) | be Politically Incorrect! <Me>
Can we impeach him yet? |*Protected by 18 USC 2511 and 18 USC 2703. 
PGP Key = 7C06F1 = A6 27 E1 1D 5F B2 F2 F1  12 E7 53 2D 85 A2 10 5D




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: nobody@shell.portal.com
Date: Thu, 9 Dec 93 03:23:51 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Anonymous List
Message-ID: <9312091123.AA05593@jobe.shell.portal.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


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-----END PGP MESSAGE-----




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: jdwilson@gold.chem.hawaii.edu (Jim Wilson (VA))
Date: Thu, 9 Dec 93 08:25:58 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Legal Aspects of IMP
Message-ID: <9312091625.AA06392@gold.chem.hawaii.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


CP's FYI:

> Date: Wed, 08 Dec 1993 08:06:11 -0500 (EST)
> From: BAUM@HULAW1.HARVARD.EDU
> To: imp-interest@thumper.bellcore.com
> Subject: Legal Aspects of IMP
> 
> I have only recently seen a few of the IMP messages that have been
> forwarded to me. I have also responded to at least one person individually
> concerning the legal aspects of payment for the IMP. In this regard, I
> mentioned that about two years ago we began the development of a 
> 
> Model Electronic Payments Agreement and Commentary (for credit transfers)
> that is intended for electronic commerce purposes. Since the completion of
> the document, we understand that it has been adopted by various companies,
> including Airborne Express, Texaco, Baxter International, etc. It has also
> been reprinted by the Banker's EDI Council in its Guidebook. I recommend that
> developers of the IMP take a look at some of the conventions (and assumptions)
> that are included in the Agreement. The Model includes extensive commentary
> and a tuturial/introduction.
> 
> By the way, one of the challenges to the internet community will be to narrow
> the gap between localized/specialized payment approaches, and the "mainstream"
> corporate and governmental payment infrastructure that already is in place.
> Also, FYI, the American Bar Ass'n has a Financial EDI Committee that is now
> developing a debit counterpart for the above-mentioned credit Model.
> 
> Copies of the Model are available at cost as follows:
> 
> Send a request to the ABA requesting:
> 
> Model Electronic Payments Agreement and Commentary
> Product Code: 545-0009
> Cost: $ 11.95 (this includes domestic delivery)
> 
> to:
> 
> Order Fulfillment Department
> American Bar Association
> 750 North Lake Shore Drive
> Chicago, IL  60611-4497
> 
> Check, mastercard or Visa are accepted. Include your phone number.
> 
> 
> For information about the Financial EDI Committee, you can contact:
> Smedinghofft@attmail.com (Tom Smedinghoff).
> 
> ***




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: hughes@ah.com (Eric Hughes)
Date: Thu, 9 Dec 93 07:25:57 PST
To: cypherpunks-announce@toad.com
Subject: Announcement: Bay Area cypherpunks Saturday meeting
Message-ID: <9312091501.AA06030@ah.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



What: Bay Area monthly cypherpunks meeting
When: Saturday, 11 Nov 1993
      12:00 noon - 6:00 p.m.
Where: Cygnus Support offices, Mt. View, CA


The Bay Area cypherpunks meetings are the second Saturday of the
month, at 12:00 noon at Cygnus, and have been at this time and place
reliably for a year now.  If you don't see an announcement, there will
still likely be a meeting.

This month:

-- Lee Tien will give a tutorial on how to file FOIA requests.  Lee
Tien has been filing FOIA requests against the NSA, FBI, NIST, etc.
for John Gilmore and litigating over the resulting agency failures to
respond.

-- Crypto politics news

-- Project news

See you all there.

Eric



Directions:

[Directions to Cygnus provided by John Gilmore. -- EH]

	Cygnus Support
	1937 Landings Drive
	Mt. View, CA  94043
	+1 415 903 1400   switchboard
	+1 415 903 1418   John Gilmore

Take US 101 toward Mt. View.  From San Francisco, it's about a
40-minute drive.  Get off at the Rengstorff Ave/Amphitheatre Parkway
exit.  If you were heading south on 101, you curve around to the
right, cross over the freeway, and get to a stoplight.  If you were
heading north on 101, you just come right off the exit to the
stoplight.  The light is the intersection of Amphitheatre and
Charleston Rd.  Take a right on Charleston; there's a right-turn-only
lane.

Follow Charleston for a short distance.  You'll pass the
Metaphor/Kaleida buildings on the right.  At a clump of palm trees and
a "Landmark Deli" sign, take a right into Landings Drive.  At the end
of the road, turn left into the complex with the big concrete
"Landmark" sign.  Follow the road past the deli til you are in front
of the clock tower that rises out of one of the buildings, facing you.
Enter through the doors immediately under the clock tower.  They'll be
open between noon and 1PM at least.  (See below if you're late.)

Once inside, take the stairs up, immediately to your right.  At the top
of the stairs, turn right past the treetops, and we'll be in 1937 on 
your left.  The door is marked "Cygnus".

If you are late and the door under the clock tower is locked, you can
walk to the deli (which will be around the building on your left, as
you face the door).  Go through the gate in the fence to the right of
the deli, and into the back lawns between the complex and the farm
behind it.  Walk forward and right around the buildings until you see
a satellite dish in the lawn.  Go up the stairs next to the dish,
which are the back stairs into the Cygnus office space.  We'll prop
the door (or you can bang on it if we forget).

Or, you can find the guard who's wandering around the complex, who
knows there's a meeting happening and will let you in.  They can be
beeped at 965 5250, though you'll have trouble finding a phone.

Don't forget to eat first, or bring food at noon!  I recommend hitting
the burrito place on Rengstorff (La Costen~a) at about 11:45.  To get
there, when you get off 101, take Rengstorff (toward the hills) rather
than Amphitheatre (toward the bay).  Follow it about ten blocks until
the major intersection at Middlefield Road.  La Costen~a is the store
on your left at the corner.  You can turn left into the narrow lane
behind the store, which leads to a parking lot, and enter by the front
door, which faces the intersection.  To get to the meeting from there,
just retrace your route on Rengstorff, go straight over the freeway,
and turn right at the stoplight onto Charleston; see above.

See you there!

	John Gilmore









From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: jberman@eff.org (Jerry Berman)
Date: Thu, 9 Dec 93 05:15:56 PST
To: jkreznar@ininx.com (John E. Kreznar)
Subject: Re: ANNOUNCEMENT: EFF Statement on Cryptography & Policy
Message-ID: <199312091310.IAA19726@eff.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>
John Krezner points out that EFF's crypto statement says

    *    There must be no broadening of governmental access to private
>> communications and records, through wiretap law or otherwise, unless there
>                                                                ^^^^^^
>> is a public consensus that the risks to safety outweigh the risks to
>> liberty and that our safety will actually be increased by the broadened
>> access.
>Does this imply that if some ``majority'' so elects, then you _would_
>sacrifice your privacy to broadened governmental access?  Is this a
>surrender to the most tenacious tyranny of all, the tyranny of the
>majority?  Or do you interpret ``consensus'' rigorously, that is, as
>an absence of dissent?

Jerry Berman responds:


>
NO. NO NO Thanks for pointing this out. I am sure our board will move to
amend the section to state our intent with the following words: "broadened
access, provided it is consistent with the Constitution and the Bill of
rights" or some such formulaton.


>        John E. Kreznar         | Relations among people to be by
>        jkreznar@ininx.com      | mutual consent, or not at all.
>
>-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
>Version: 2.3a
>
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>XbtT+vJWRA==
>=mcsu
>-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

-----------------------------------------------------------

EFF ADDRESS

Jerry Berman
Executive Director
Electronic Frontier Foundation
1001 G St, NW
Suite 950 East
Washington, DC 20001
202-347-5400 (v) 
202-393-5509 (f)
jberman@eff.org

Join EFF!  For information about membership, send mail to eff@eff.org. 






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Philippe Nave" <pdn@dwroll.dw.att.com>
Date: Thu, 9 Dec 93 17:26:04 PST
To: mdiehl@triton.unm.edu (J. Michael Diehl)
Subject: Re: value of privacy?
In-Reply-To: <9312090946.AA18181@triton.unm.edu>
Message-ID: <9312100124.AA11555@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


J. Michael Diehl writes :
> 
>      I've been thinking lately.  (No, it didn't hurt.)  Does privacy have in
> inherent value, or are "we" simply concerned with what others can do with
> sensitive information about ourselves?

I am in the midst of reading _The Naked Consumer_ by Erik Larson, and I find
myself asking the same questions you are about privacy. I think privacy has
an inherent value, distinct from the consequences of information abuse. For
example, it doesn't _hurt_ me to get targeted junk mail, but I find it 
unsettling that direct marketers know enough about me to send the 'right' 
mail. I see it this way; 'they' make decisions about me and initiate a 
relationship with me without my knowledge or consent. The relationship is
artificial and uneven; 'they' know more about me than I know about 'them'.
Even if the relationship does me no real harm, it makes me uncomfortable.
So, I value my privacy even though (some? most?) of the time I don't suffer
gravely ill effects from the manipulation of what I consider private data.

This feeling is what drives me to learn more about PGP and secure transaction
systems; ideally, these systems will help conceal some of our private data
from (for example) the telemarketing types. [Allow me my dream, at least. :) ]

-- 
........................................................................
Philippe D. Nave, Jr.   | The person who does not use message encryption
pdn@dwroll.dw.att.com   | will soon be at the mercy of those who DO...
Denver, Colorado USA    | PGP public key: by arrangement.



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: David Sobel <dsobel@washofc.cpsr.org>
Date: Thu, 9 Dec 93 09:30:59 PST
To: Cypherpunks <cypherpunks@toad.com>
Subject: CPSR Letter to Clinton
Message-ID: <00541.2838282077.1447@washofc.cpsr.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


  CPSR Letter to Clinton

     On December 6, the Digital Privacy and Security Working
Group, a "coalition of over 50 communications and computer
companies and associations, and consumer and privacy advocates"
coordinated by the Electronic Frontier Foundation, sent a letter
to President Clinton concerning cryptography policy.  The letter
states, "In our discussions with Administration officials, we have
expressed the Coalition's tentative acceptance of the Clipper
Chip's encryption scheme (as announced on April 16, 1993), but
only if it is available as a voluntary alternative to widely-
available, commercially-accepted, encryption programs and
products."

     The Washington Office of Computer Professionals for Social
Responsibility (CPSR) has sent the following letter to the
President.  We believe that the position stated in this letter
continues to represent the views of the vast majority of network
users, as reflected in the overwhelmingly critical comments
submitted to the National Institute of Standards and Technology in
response to its recent solicitation of public comments on the
Clipper proposal.

==================================================================

                                     December 8, 1993

The President
The White House
Washington, DC  20500

Dear Mr. President,

     We are writing to you regarding the Clipper cryptography 
proposal now under consideration by the White House and a 
letter you may have received about the proposal from a group 
called the "Digital Privacy and Security Working Group."

     This group wrote to you recently and expressed their 
"tentative acceptance" of the Clipper Chip encryption scheme.  
We disagree with their views.  This group has made a grave 
mistake and does not speak for the many users of computer 
networks and developers of network services who have 
vigorously opposed this proposal.

     We are very much concerned about the Clipper proposal.  
At its core is the dubious premise that the government 
should have the authority to design communications networks 
that facilitate wire surveillance.  The plan was developed in 
secret by the National Security Agency over the objection 
of U.S. firms, professional associations and public interest 
organizations.  Key details about the proposal remain 
classified.

     This proposal must not be endorsed.  The development of 
open, unclassified standards is critical for the future of the 
nation's communications infrastructure. Progress and 
innovation depend on the free exchange of scientific and 
technical information.  It is essential to the integrity of 
the scientific process that standards are openly created and 
available for public review. 

     There is also a great need to ensure that future networks 
are designed with the highest levels of privacy and security 
possible.  As our country becomes ever more dependent on the 
high-speed network, the need for secure systems will only 
increase.  The Clipper proposal purposefully cripples the 
security of the network and reduces the privacy protection 
that users could otherwise obtain.

     There is another still more serious problem with the 
Clipper proposal.  An agency with the authority to conduct 
wiretaps must not be allowed to impose technical standards to 
facilitate wire surveillance.  The threat to Constitutional
democracy is clear.  A system of checks and balances is
essential to ensure that the powerful investigative tools of
government are properly controlled.  

     We have followed the development of this proposal with 
great concern.  We have testified before Congressional 
committees.  We have appeared before agency panels, provided 
reports on wire surveillance, and debated the former FBI 
Director on national television.  We have also sponsored 
conferences with full participation from across the federal 
government.  We believe that the best policies will result from 
an open and unrestricted exchange of views.  

     It is our assessment that you must not permit adoption of 
the Clipper technical standard, even on a voluntary basis.  At 
a time when the country should be moving toward open standards 
designed for commercial networks, the Clipper proposal asks 
future users of the nation's information infrastructure to 
accept a standard intended for the Cold War era.  It is a 
backward-looking plan that serves neither the interests of the 
American people nor American business. 

     The adoption of the Clipper proposal would also ratify an 
unlawful process that has undermined the authority of Congress 
and weakened the mechanisms of government accountability.  The 
proper authority for the development of this standard never 
rested with the NSA.  Under the Computer Security Act of 1987, 
it was a civilian agency that was to develop appropriate 
standards for the nation's commercial networks.  Through a 
series of secret executive orders, the NSA usurped the 
authority of the National Institute of Standards and 
Technology, substituted its own proposal for those of NIST, 
and effectively derailed this important policy process.

     When the computer user community had the opportunity to 
voice its position on this proposal, it rejected the plan 
overwhelmingly.  The notice and comment process conducted by 
the Department of Commerce earlier this year resulted in 
nearly uniform opposition to the Clipper proposal. It would be 
hard to find a technical standard more disliked by the 
potential user community.

     While we support the relaxation of export controls on 
cryptography, we are not willing to concede to the NSA the 
right to develop secret standards.  It is only because the 
National Security Agency also exerts influence on export 
control policy that the Digital Privacy coalition is prepared 
to endorse the Clipper standard in exchange for new 
opportunities to market products.  It may be a good deal for
the coalition members, but it is a terrible outcome for the 
rest of the country.

     We very much appreciate your efforts on behalf of open 
government, and your work with the Vice President and the 
Secretary of Commerce to develop the nation's information 
infrastructure.  We believe that these efforts are sending our 
country in the right direction, helping to develop advanced 
technologies appropriate for a democratic nation and to 
preserve open and accountable government.

     But the Clipper proposal was not a creation of your 
administration.  It is a relic from a period that is now 
moving rapidly into the history books, a time when secret 
agencies made secret decisions and when backroom deals with 
powerful, private interests sustained these arrangements.

     It is time to end this cynical form of policy making. 

     We ask you to reject the deal put forward by the Digital 
Privacy and Security Working Group. The Clipper proposal 
should not go forward.

     We would be pleased to meet with members of your 
administration to discuss this matter further.



                              Sincerely yours,


                              Marc Rotenberg, Director
                              David Sobel, Legal Counsel
                              Dave Banisar, Policy Analyst
                              CPSR Washington office


cc:   The Vice President
      Secretary Ron Brown, Department of Commerce 
      Anthony Lake, National Security Council
      Computer System Security and Privacy Advisory Board








From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: rclark@nyx10.cs.du.edu (Robert W. F. Clark)
Date: Thu, 9 Dec 93 10:33:54 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Provisional Internet Draft:  Reputation Servers
Message-ID: <9312091831.AA24427@nyx10.cs.du.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Provisional Internet Draft

Reputation Servers

1.  Status of this document:  This document has not been 
    submitted to any formal groups and is merely a draft
    for a future official draft.  All comments concerning
    this draft should be sent to rclark@nyx.cs.du.edu
    (Robert Clark).

2.  Background:  Many eminent persons have discussed the
    need for a more methodological process of screening
    mailing lists and newsgroups through reputation
    markets.  This document attempts to move toward
    the accomplishment of that goal, by defining it.

    For a reputation server to have any true worth,
    it must be a market.  To avoid the 'rigging' of
    the market by means of false purchasing and sale
    of reputation by numerous pseudonymous entities,
    all messages to the server must be signed with
    PGP keys themselves, and those which are questionable
    shall be themselves counted.

    Those who choose not to sign their messages will
    be limited to the informational aspects of the server.

    A desirable but not strictly necessary aspect of
    a reputation server would be the ability to rate
    the initial 'buying power' of any particular key
    according to degrees of trustworthiness.

3.  Recent Developments

[This section is empty; if anyone knows of any repserver
software which preexists this draft, please alert the
author.]

4.  Summary of Reputation Server:  The author intends
    within 180 days of the writing of this draft to
    implement at least a rudimentary reputation server
    with the following functions:

        a)  Accepts only encrypted and signed 'sales' [*] and
        'purchases', with either PGP or other public-key
        software.

        b)  Gives 'buying' power directly according to
        the amount of 'reputation stock' bought by
        others.

        c)  Can mark certain users as being sufficiently
        lacking in 'reputation capital' to effect
        'public opinion.'

      * d)  Can filter a mailing list, public or private.

[* indicates features which would be desirable but are
   not necessary.]

The use of a single-quote indicates that the term used is
used in an abstract way, and not as it is used in conversation.
'Public opinion' is a gestalt of the 'sales' and 'purchases'
made by the participants in the market.

Others can use the market for informational purposes, but
will not affect the 'market value' of certain personalities.

5.  Basis of the Market

Each 'personality' which registers with the reputation
market, by sending a PGP-signed and encrypted message,
using the public key of the server, starts with a fixed
sum of 'money' and a fixed price for their 'reputation
stock.'  

Using one's initial allotment of funds, one can 
choose not to use it, accruing interest (which can
be negative or positive, depending on whether the
average 'value' of all 'personalities' is decreasing
or increasing.

Otherwise, one can invest the 'cash' in the reputation
of others, deciding at that time how much that 'stock'
is worth.  The method of implementation allows an 
early poster with no 'reputation capital' to make
a small change in the 'public opinion,' whereas a 
user with great 'reputation capital' has great
influence on the stocks of others.

A user of the system can choose to set the
asking price of their 'stock' at any value,
or can sell only a part of it, or not sell
it at all.  However, having stock and not
transferring it to 'reputation capital,'
while safe, is not very 'profitable.'

As an example:

User X, a new user, begins with a reputation value
of 1000.  He immediately invests 990 units of 'value'
in one 'share' of User Y, with a reputation value of 5000.   

As Y has sold 99 'shares' for an average of 990, and has
set 990 as a minimum asking price for his stock, the 
'value' of an individual 'share' of Y 'stock' has remained
identical.  The result of this is that the 'reputation
capital' of Y has increased by 990, Y's shares available
to sell are 0.

Y is, of course, free to purchase back her own stock;
or free to purchase some of X's.          

[This is an incomplete definition of the market,
which is to be improved in later versions of
the draft.  Those with better suggestions as
to the implementation of the market, with less
reliance upon the user to figure out 'proper'
asking prices for 'shares' of 'reputation stock,'
are welcomed to mail the author.]

6.  Overview and Summation:  A reputation market could server
    a valuable function, and prove to be another example of
    how secure crypto can be not only fashionable but functional
    as well.

    Not just drug dealers and terrorists need strong crypto,
    just as not just criminals need the Bill of Rights.
    The fact that both systems aid members of both groups
    simply indicates that strong crypto is good for
    _everyone_.

Thank you.
----
rclark@nyx.cs.du.edu


6. Summation



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Brian D Williams <talon57@well.sf.ca.us>
Date: Thu, 9 Dec 93 11:51:01 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: the clinton chip
Message-ID: <199312091949.LAA07767@well.sf.ca.us>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



 Have we missed an opportunity by not labelling MYK-78 the
"Clinton" chip?

<ring,ring>

Hello Brian Williams,

Mr Williams? This is Krochs and brentannos bookstore. The book you
ordered "Applied Cryptography," by Bruce Scheinier has arrived.

     ZOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOM!

Hello Mr Williams are you there?


Hello?






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: ccat@netcom.com (Chris Beaumont)
Date: Thu, 9 Dec 93 12:36:02 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: dialup Mosaic!!!!??
Message-ID: <199312092035.MAA22134@mail.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Is there anything to prevent a dialup Mosaic for,say,Macs from being written?
It would be _very_ popular...
-Chris.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Ian Turton <ian@geography.leeds.ac.uk>
Date: Thu, 9 Dec 93 05:35:55 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: new electronic cash card to be tested in UK
Message-ID: <1682.9312091318@geography.leeds.ac.uk>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


An interesting article on the back page of the Guardian today, headlined
Banks step up war on cash with card topped up by phone

Even Street vendors could take electronic money reports Nicholas Bannister

National Westminster Bank [one of the UK's big four banks] has  developed
an alternative to cash -- a plastic card with a microchip which stores
"electronic money" and can be topped up over the phone. 
Yesterday it revealed plans to for a year long trial of Mondex, its
electronic money sytem, starting in Swindon. [more details of trial
involving 10,000 people] 

The system lets customers add money to thier card by using addapted cash
dispensers [ATMs] or phones to access thier accounts. Once cahrged with
money, the card becomes the equivalent of cash.
Payments are made by slipping the card into a retailers terminal. The sum
is transfered from the card to the retailer without the need for time
consuming authorisations or signatures.
Providing there is enough money on the card, the transaction will take
place.

Payments between individuals are carried out by inserting the card into a
pocket sized electronic wallet and making 6 key strokes. Customers and
retailers can deposit money into thier bank accounts over the phone.

[... bit about how it won't cause bank staff cuts and that 90% of
transactions are still cash ...]

[....] the system is not designed to replace credit and debit cards. The
system was designed for small and large payments. Small traders, for
example a newspaper vendor, could have a battery powered terminal.

He [Tim Jones, the designer] claimed it was safer, quicker and more
convenient to handle electronic money rather than physical money. But if a
mondex card was lost or stolen, the money on it would be lost in the same
way as it would be in a missing wallet.

However, cards could be locked to prevent unauthorised use by tapping in a
four digit personal code. Once locked, the money could not be spent without
reentering the code.

[... discussion on how to modify ATMs and phones to handle cards ..]

Other British and forign banks would be invited to join mondex in due
course to create a "global payment scheme".

[... comment from retailers saying its a good idea ...]

The key to the card's security lies in the Japanese developed technology
and microchip. Nat West and Midland said that technical advances had made
it impossible [sic] to conterfeit cards. But Mr Jones said Mondex would
have a research budget "for ever" to keep ahead of the counterfeiters.


Ian Turton - School of Geography, Leeds University
	     0532 -333309





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: jimn8@netcom.com (Jim Nitchals)
Date: Thu, 9 Dec 93 14:01:02 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: new electronic cash card to be tested in UK
In-Reply-To: <1682.9312091318@geography.leeds.ac.uk>
Message-ID: <199312092200.OAA09208@mail.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Ian Turton writes, in part:
[portions of discussion on money cards deleted]> 
> 
> However, cards could be locked to prevent unauthorised use by tapping in a
> four digit personal code. Once locked, the money could not be spent without
> reentering the code.

When cash is lost, the value of all remaining money in the system
increases, and everyone holding money benefits from reduced inflation.
When a money card (as proposed) is lost, the backing money eventually
returns to use, profiting the bank that issues the cards, unless some
protections are put in place.

These cash cards are a bank's dream come true in other ways: they get
full use of the float on the money backing the cash cards.  For every
day a money card goes unused, the banks can lend and invest the card
holder's money even as it sits in his wallet.

The idea of an S&L investing my money card's backing money in junk
bonds makes me nervous.  I'd like full disclosure on how each bank
issuing cards invests or uses backing money.

This scheme isn't any worse in theory than Traveller's cheques, but if
their goal is to eliminate all actual cash from the marketplace, the
actual amount of money involved would make even American Express blush
with greedy embarrassment.

Without addressing the privacy issue as well as the inflation and
investing issues I've brought up, they'll never be able to achieve
their goal of widespread consumer acceptance.
> 
> 
> Ian Turton - School of Geography, Leeds University
> 	     0532 -333309
> 
> 




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: jdwilson@gold.chem.hawaii.edu (Jim Wilson (VA))
Date: Thu, 9 Dec 93 16:41:04 PST
To: jdblair@nextsrv.cas.muohio.EDU
Subject: Re: Internet Backbone Traffic
In-Reply-To: <9312092243.AA23114@ nextsrv.cas.muohio.EDU >
Message-ID: <9312100036.AA08198@gold.chem.hawaii.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> 
> Someone in the past week asserted that, at $1000 a gig, one could store
> all of a year's worth of mail headers from the Internet backbone for under 
> ~$8.7 million. (8700 gigs of data, I presume?)
> 
> Sorry, I don't remember who it was, but I have some questions:
> 
> 1) Where can I find an estimate of the mail volume on the net?
> 2) Are there any projections of internet usage (subscribers, mail users,
> etc.) over the next several years?
> 
> I plan on holding an educational session on net legal issues, and I would
> like to point out the $8.7 million/year price tag on a mail header
> archive (scary potentials, to say the least), but I would like some sources to
> back me up if I assert it.
> 
> Can anyone help me out?  I'd really appreciate it.
> -john.
> 
> ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
> John Blair <jdblair@nextsrv.cas.muohio.edu>              phone: (513) 529-4879
>     Insert cool signature file that makes a trendy, yet bold and original
>    statement about my cyberspace proficiency, then mentions that I'll send
>    you my PGP public key if you want it, and you trust that I'm actually me.
> 
> 
> 
Telnet to internic.net and choose the gopher option.  They have statistics
of various types (and all kinds of other misc. info)

 -Jim





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Duncan Frissell <frissell@panix.com>
Date: Thu, 9 Dec 93 12:03:53 PST
To: CYPHERPUNKS@toad.com
Subject: Re: NYT article on Mosaic
Message-ID: <199312092002.AA06513@panix.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



W>Where can you get 'Mosaic'?
W>Walter A. Kehowski <wak@next0.math.pitt.edu>
W>

You need a SLIP connection or faster to Internet.

For Windows:

zaphod.ncsa.uiuc.edu  /PC/Mosaic/wmos1_0.zip

For Linux there is a slow version which will run under straight dialup:


sunsite.unc.edu /pub/Linux/apps/comm/term/term/extras


Hunt around those sites for other platforms.

DCF

--- WinQwk 2.0b#1165
                                                                                                                     




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Jim McCoy <mccoy@ccwf.cc.utexas.edu>
Date: Thu, 9 Dec 93 13:21:02 PST
To: ccat@netcom.com (Chris Beaumont)
Subject: Re: dialup Mosaic!!!!??
In-Reply-To: <199312092035.MAA22134@mail.netcom.com>
Message-ID: <199312092117.AA00996@flubber.cc.utexas.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text


> Is there anything to prevent a dialup Mosaic for,say,Macs from being
> written? It would be _very_ popular...

It is called SLIP/PPP.  It _is_ very popular, at least around here...

jim

ObCrypt:  My search for DC papers bore fruit when someone returned the 89
Eurocrypt papers to the library yesterday, but I am still searching for the
Boz (sp?) thesis that Tim mentioned was passed around at an early Bay area
CP meeting.  If anyone has a copy of this sitting around, please send me
some email.



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: jon@balder.us.dell.com (Jon Boede)
Date: Thu, 9 Dec 93 13:36:02 PST
To: ccat@netcom.com (Chris Beaumont)
Subject: Re: dialup Mosaic!!!!??
In-Reply-To: <199312092035.MAA22134@mail.netcom.com>
Message-ID: <9312092134.AA09260@balder.us.dell.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Chris Beaumont writes:
> Is there anything to prevent a dialup Mosaic for,say,Macs from being written?
> It would be _very_ popular...

You can already run the Mac client over a MacSLIP connection.  Tho', even with
something like a 56Kb/s connection it's excruciatingly painfully slow.

The "problem" with Mosaic is that it makes you realize that Internet multi-
media hypertext applications require at least a T1 (1,544,000 bps) connection
to begin to be liveable.

I continue to be amazed at the fact that no matter how fast you go or how
much memory you buy it still only takes about eighteen months to go from the
leading edge to the lame edge.  I now find it hard to imagine that I would
ever make the statement "a 50Mb/s connection just isn't fast enough" -- I
well remember when I thought that a T1 was more then you could ever use, but
Mosaic just burns it up.  more! more! more! :-)

Jon




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Barbara L Marco <lmb@tenet.edu>
Date: Thu, 9 Dec 93 13:46:02 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: hey..
Message-ID: <Pine.3.03.9312091535.A22033-5100000@Joyce-Perkins.tenet.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


can ya'll unmsubscribe me?






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: jdblair@nextsrv.cas.muohio.EDU
Date: Thu, 9 Dec 93 14:16:27 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Internet Backbone Traffic
Message-ID: <9312092243.AA23114@ nextsrv.cas.muohio.EDU >
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Someone in the past week asserted that, at $1000 a gig, one could store
all of a year's worth of mail headers from the Internet backbone for under 
~$8.7 million. (8700 gigs of data, I presume?)

Sorry, I don't remember who it was, but I have some questions:

1) Where can I find an estimate of the mail volume on the net?
2) Are there any projections of internet usage (subscribers, mail users,
etc.) over the next several years?

I plan on holding an educational session on net legal issues, and I would
like to point out the $8.7 million/year price tag on a mail header
archive (scary potentials, to say the least), but I would like some sources to
back me up if I assert it.

Can anyone help me out?  I'd really appreciate it.
-john.

------------------------------------------------------------------------------
John Blair <jdblair@nextsrv.cas.muohio.edu>              phone: (513) 529-4879
    Insert cool signature file that makes a trendy, yet bold and original
   statement about my cyberspace proficiency, then mentions that I'll send
   you my PGP public key if you want it, and you trust that I'm actually me.





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: gtoal@an-teallach.com (Graham Toal)
Date: Thu, 9 Dec 93 11:11:01 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Digital cash announced today by UK bank.
Message-ID: <199312091906.TAA22687@an-teallach.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Apparently the Natwest Bank (or some spoonerism thereof) announced
today that they were releasing digital cash in the form of some
sort of smartcard.  I have no more details - does anyone else?

Primarily I'm interested in knowing if it's *anonymous* digital
cash - knowing our govt, I suspect it's unlikely to be.  Any new
opportunities to track the masses are always gratefully received
by the powers that be...

G




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: jdblair@nextsrv.cas.muohio.EDU
Date: Thu, 9 Dec 93 16:16:03 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Key Server Info Requested
Message-ID: <9312100042.AA23379@ nextsrv.cas.muohio.EDU >
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I could possibly set up a PGP Key server on one of the machines here at
Miami.  Is there anyone listening that could inform me of where I can get
the software and what would be required to set it up?

-john.

------------------------------------------------------------------------------
John Blair <jdblair@nextsrv.cas.muohio.edu>              phone: (513) 529-4879
    Insert cool signature file that makes a trendy, yet bold and original
   statement about my cyberspace proficiency, then mentions that I'll send
   you my PGP public key if you want it, and you trust that I'm actually me.





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: ferguson@icm1.icp.net (Paul Ferguson x2044)
Date: Thu, 9 Dec 93 16:51:04 PST
To: jdblair@nextsrv.cas.muohio.EDU
Subject: Re: Internet Backbone Traffic
In-Reply-To: <9312092243.AA23114@ nextsrv.cas.muohio.EDU >
Message-ID: <9312100050.AA24651@icm1.icp.net>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text



 John Blair <jdblair@nextsrv.cas.muohio.edu> writes -

> 1) Where can I find an estimate of the mail volume on the net?
> 2) Are there any projections of internet usage (subscribers, mail users,
> etc.) over the next several years?

 Vint Cerf, President of the Internet Society, projected some
 interesting figures at ONE BBSCON in Colorado recently. According
 to an article in the October BoardWatch magazine, ".....by December,
 1993, there will be over 2 million ping-able hosts on some 46,000
 registered IP networks in 22,000 registered domains strewn across some
 91 countries. As of June, 1991, it is NOT primarily academic use, but
 actually that was the crossover point where commercial use applications
 exceeded academic use. Over 137 countries are now reachable via the
 Internet domain name e-mail system via UUCP, and the NSFNet backbone
 is now carrying some 7 TERABYTES of traffic per month. The Internet
 overall is growing at a rate of 12% per MONTH."

 You do the math.  ,-)

 Cheers.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Matthew J Ghio <mg5n+@andrew.cmu.edu>
Date: Thu, 9 Dec 93 17:11:05 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: new electronic cash card to be tested in UK
In-Reply-To: <199312092200.OAA09208@mail.netcom.com>
Message-ID: <ch1wj_K00VoyAvzl9n@andrew.cmu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> When cash is lost, the value of all remaining money in the
> system increases, and everyone holding money benefits from
> reduced inflation. When a money card (as proposed) is lost,
> the backing money eventually returns to use, profiting the
> bank that issues the cards, unless some protections are put
> in place.

Well, this is likely to happen in any cash implementation where the
gubmint/bank does not purposely inflate the currency.  However it's not
necessarily bad - after all, if people can make money at digicash that's
not government tampered with (inflated), they'll be more people willing
to do it.  Of course, this will lead to fierce competition, likely to
the point where you can earn interest on the cash in your wallet! 
Either that or, have a independant digicash system which is introduced
at the price of $1 for one digibuck, and then allowed to fluctuate, and
rise.  After a few years you might be able to sell your digibucks for $2
apiece, or more. :)

> The idea of an S&L investing my money card's backing
> money in junk bonds makes me nervous.  I'd like full
> disclosure on how each bank issuing cards invests or
> uses backing money.

Nobody's forcing you to use their digicash system, so you could demand
whatever disclosure you wanted, or take your business elsewhere.

> Without addressing the privacy issue as well as the inflation
> and investing issues I've brought up, they'll never be able to
> achieve their goal of widespread consumer acceptance.

Probably not, but some people are stupid.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Richard Dixon" <RDIXON@imt.tstc.edu>
Date: Thu, 9 Dec 93 23:24:12 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: unsubscribe
Message-ID: <B192370926@imt.tstc.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


unsubscribe for now.  sorry for the post but cypherpunks-request 
unsubscribe did not work.

rdixon




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Mike Ingle <MIKEINGLE@delphi.com>
Date: Thu, 9 Dec 93 22:59:19 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Electronic Cash Card
Message-ID: <01H6AQ2GCU7M934ZCS@delphi.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>Payments between individuals are carried out by inserting the card into a
>pocket sized electronic wallet and making 6 key strokes. Customers and
>retailers can deposit money into thier bank accounts over the phone.

If A can transfer to B offline, and B can transfer to C without
calling into the bank first, this has to be either security-
through-obscurity or non-anonymous at some level. You could stack
digital signatures to represent a transfer chain. But you can't pass
anonymous digicash from one person to the other without the possibility
of double spending. Unless of course the recipient is required to dial
in before using the received cash, in which case it isn't offline. 

If this system is truly offline (i.e. not cryptographicall secured),
somebody is going to figure out how to rip it off.

>However, cards could be locked to prevent unauthorised use by tapping in a
>four digit personal code. Once locked, the money could not be spent without
 ~~~~~~~~~~
>reentering the code.

At least you don't have to worry about a brute-force search ;-)




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: edgar@spectrx.saigon.com (Edgar W. Swank)
Date: Fri, 10 Dec 93 07:04:17 PST
To: Cypherpunks          <cypherpunks@toad.com>
Subject: Distribution of Secure Drive
Message-ID: <HmJcec10w165w@spectrx.saigon.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

On Nov 30, I sent a private msg to Eric Hughes asking him to put
Mike Ingle's Secure Drive program for MSDOS

   SECDRV10.ZIP    68155  11-19-93  Secure Drive 1.0 with SRC.

On the Soda.Berkeley FTP site and to advise me of its location.
I have not received any response at all.

I'm on a UUCP system, so I have to do FTP requests via an E-mail
server, which is cumbersome if one has to "fish around" for a file
one doesn't know the exact directory & filename for.

I'm aware that Mike said he hadn't submitted Secure Drive to the FTP
site because of "export concerns."  But since this site is already
distributing PGP, I wouldn't think this a "concern" to the site
administration.

So I'm asking any public-spirited Cypherpunk (perhaps even an
anonymous one) to place Secure Drive on an FTP site or a site
with an E-mail file server and to post the location of the file
either here or to me privately.

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.3a

iQCVAgUBLQg3Zt4nNf3ah8DHAQHWPwP7Bhr/FkuqS3FqkOszCdB97+P6WtKJPsYR
d6VshdtFDm59JKsTcUk1V2wY6//5u+BhpFowgJ0qsGR/pl8Bzcl8upTn+RC2IBKH
07oxyJIlciiqYJ+ghlqnMZiPq/ZZ3Z/jHGTlOW1cAP2jHgT2Ok5kPhrr4mGYlAGO
h1FfB8AJsDM=
=tUFI
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

--
edgar@spectrx.saigon.com (Edgar W. Swank)
SPECTROX SYSTEMS +1.408.252.1005  Cupertino, Ca





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: haeberli@apple.com (Martin Haeberli)
Date: Fri, 10 Dec 93 07:49:29 PST
To: walter kehowski <wak@next11.math.pitt.edu>
Subject: Re: NYT article on Mosaic today.
Message-ID: <9312101549.AA18360@apple.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>Where can you get 'Mosaic'?
>Walter A. Kehowski <wak@next0.math.pitt.edu>

Try anonymous ftp to:
ftp.ncsa.uiuc.edu:/pub

Then browse - and good luck!

Thanks,

Martin

Martin Haeberli
Apple Computer, Inc.  MS 73-HA
20525 Mariani Avenue
Cupertino, CA  95014
(408) 974-8562
(408) 974-8644 (fax)
haeberli@apple.com
haeberli@applelink.apple.com
MartinH@online.apple.com






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: jim@Tadpole.COM (Jim Thompson)
Date: Fri, 10 Dec 93 08:09:30 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: small memoryspace DES?
Message-ID: <9312101606.AA11702@chiba.tadpole.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Hi,

Getting back to the cypherpunks-write-code theme, I'm
currently attempting to put DES on a u-ctlr that has 
a whole 1k of memory for things like 'stack'.  All
the DES implimentations I've found thusfar have 
traded memory for speed.   

I can afford a lot of text space, and initialized data
can go in the text segment, of course (think eeprom, ok?),
but I have to live within a 1k space for all my dynamic
memory needs.

Has anyone ever done anything like this?  Care to share?

Jim



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Eric Blossom <eb@srlr14.sr.hp.com>
Date: Fri, 10 Dec 93 11:09:33 PST
To: jim@Tadpole.COM
Subject: small memoryspace DES?
In-Reply-To: <9312101606.AA11702@chiba.tadpole.com>
Message-ID: <9312101907.AA00281@srlr14.sr.hp.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



> Getting back to the cypherpunks-write-code theme, I'm
> currently attempting to put DES on a u-ctlr that has 
> a whole 1k of memory for things like 'stack'.  All
> the DES implimentations I've found thusfar have 
> traded memory for speed.   

You can get by with about 2KB of static table (sbox + permutation),
assuming you lookup the sboxes 1 at a time and fold the permuation
into the table lookup.

	8 sboxes * 64 entries/sbox * 4 bytes/entry  = 2KB

For the key schedule you'll need 8 bytes/subkey * 16 subkeys = 128 bytes
(You can do it with 6 bytes/subkey, but it's easier with 8 bytes/subkey)

I suggest that you look at the "descore" implementation by Dana How. 
You can find it with archie.

Also, if the uP that you are using has direct bit addressable memory,
the permuations stop being a problem -- say 2 instructions/bit.
Obviously, permutations are real easy to do in hardware.

In addition, I suggest that you do some back of the envelope
calculations to make sure that you're going to get the kind of
throughput that you expect.  The simplest way is to work out the code
for a single round, and then multiply by 16.  This will get you in the
ball park.

Have fun!

Eric Blossom




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: sommerfeld@orchard.medford.ma.us (Bill Sommerfeld)
Date: Fri, 10 Dec 93 08:59:30 PST
To: jim@Tadpole.COM
Subject: Re: small memoryspace DES?
In-Reply-To: <9312101606.AA11702@chiba.tadpole.com>
Message-ID: <199312101654.LAA00425@orchard.medford.ma.us>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


The DES implementation I'm most familiar with (the DES library core
written by Dennis Ferguson) uses moderately large (by your standards)
read-only tables.  The IP and FP tables are each 256*4 bytes (2Kbytes
total); the expanded S boxes are 8*64*4 bytes (another 2K bytes), and
the key schedule code uses a 48*4 byte table and two 4*64*4 byte
tables (another 2K+).  It's optimized for 32 (and larger) bit
processors, but it probably wouldn't be all bad on a 16 bit system.

The expanded key schedule uses 8 bytes per round times 16 rounds, or
128 bytes per currently active key (1/8 of your available memory).

However, only 48 bits of key schedule are actually needed per round (8
subfields of 6 bits each), so you could (at the cost of some speed,
probably a penalty of 50% to 100% or so) compress the schedule down to
96 bytes if it really mattered to you..

You could also compute each round of the key schedule as you needed it
(discarding it on the fly) reducing the memory needed per key to 8
bytes of "persistant" storage and a little bit more dynamic memory
when actually doing the encryption.. of course, performance goes down
the tubes if you do this unless you only use each key once..









From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Stanton McCandlish <mech@eff.org>
Date: Fri, 10 Dec 93 10:54:18 PST
To: eff-talk@eff.org
Subject: MEDIA: EFF's Kapor on NPR Talk of the Nation *today 2-3pm* 12/10/93
Message-ID: <199312101841.NAA11806@eff.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Friday 12/10/93 2-3pm EST (immediately, that is), on NPR's Talk of the Nation,
the focus is the "information highway".  Will it just be 500 tv channels,
or is the Administration planning something more along the lines of an
interactive network?  More one-to-many couch potato fodder, or everyone as
multimedia publisher?  

Mitch Kapor, Co-Founder and Chairman of the Electronic Frontier
Foundation, will be a key participant in the discussion.  Don't miss it!

Note: different stations may air the show at different times, even split
it up into multiple shows.  It's live at 2pm EST, however.

-- 
Stanton  McCandlish  mech@eff.org  1:109/1103   EFF  Online  Activist & SysOp
O P E N  P L A T F O R M   C R Y P T O P O L I C Y   O N L I N E  R I G H T S
N  E  T  W  O  R  K  I  N  G      V  I  R  T  U  A  L     C  U  L  T  U  R  E
I   N   F  O :  M   E   M   B   E   R   S   H   I   P  @  E  F  F  .  O  R  G



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: loki@nately.UCSD.EDU (Lance Cottrell)
Date: Fri, 10 Dec 93 15:09:37 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re:  LPC for speech (fwd)
Message-ID: <9312102307.AA27130@nately.UCSD.EDU>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


:Forwarded message:
:>From jp12745@coewl.cen.uiuc.edu Fri Dec 10 14:46:07 1993
:From: Jeffrey Wayne Porter <jp12745@coewl.cen.uiuc.edu>
:Message-Id: <199312102045.AA16812@eehpx21.cen.uiuc.edu>
:Subject: LPC for speech
:To: jerry@terminus.dell.com (Jeremy Porter)
:Date: Fri, 10 Dec 1993 14:45:49 -0600 (CST)
:X-Mailer: ELM [version 2.4 PL22]
:Content-Type: text
:Content-Length: 948       
:
:Did you know that using LPC (linear predictive coding) on speech can
:near-telephone quality at only 8 k BITs/second?  With a signficant
:decrease in quality (but still very understandable... probably better
:than radio) you can get the rate down to 2kbps.  If you don't mind
:sounding like a speak&spell, you can go to 600bps or less.
:
:
:Using LPC, you could send real-time voice over the
:internet.  It would even work (maybe just barely) over a SLIP
:connection.  According to my professor, LPC can be implemented
:in a simple DSP chip, so I figure a 486 ought to be able to
:handle it, too.  Sound like an interesting (granted maybe not
:too useful) project?  It would be a way of providing secure
:voice communications -- LPC code the speech, encrypt the data
:stream, transmit via v.32bis modem, etc.
:-- 
:--------------------------------------------------------------------
:Jeff Porter
:jporter@uiuc.edu    TA: ECE 290..."ph Jeff Porter" for office hours
:
:
:-- 
:Jeremy Porter  ------------- Systems Engineering --------
:Dell Computer Corp.   ------ jerry@terminus.us.dell.com ----
:---  70 4F BD AE 6D E9 D2 66  48 18 8B E7 64 7F 59 8F ---
:Support your Second Amendment rights to encryption technology.
:

I am working on this very thing. We will be using LPC encoding for
compression, IDEA for encryption, and DH key exchange for key handling.
We plan to use something better than DH ASAP (something less vulnerable
to man in the middle attacks). We plan to use 14.4kbps transmission
speed.

Lance




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: jerry@terminus.dell.com (Jeremy Porter)
Date: Fri, 10 Dec 93 13:09:36 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: LPC for speech (fwd)
Message-ID: <9312102107.AA00551@terminus.us.dell.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Forwarded message:
From jp12745@coewl.cen.uiuc.edu Fri Dec 10 14:46:07 1993
From: Jeffrey Wayne Porter <jp12745@coewl.cen.uiuc.edu>
Message-Id: <199312102045.AA16812@eehpx21.cen.uiuc.edu>
Subject: LPC for speech
To: jerry@terminus.dell.com (Jeremy Porter)
Date: Fri, 10 Dec 1993 14:45:49 -0600 (CST)
X-Mailer: ELM [version 2.4 PL22]
Content-Type: text
Content-Length: 948       

Did you know that using LPC (linear predictive coding) on speech can
near-telephone quality at only 8 k BITs/second?  With a signficant
decrease in quality (but still very understandable... probably better
than radio) you can get the rate down to 2kbps.  If you don't mind
sounding like a speak&spell, you can go to 600bps or less.


Using LPC, you could send real-time voice over the
internet.  It would even work (maybe just barely) over a SLIP
connection.  According to my professor, LPC can be implemented
in a simple DSP chip, so I figure a 486 ought to be able to
handle it, too.  Sound like an interesting (granted maybe not
too useful) project?  It would be a way of providing secure
voice communications -- LPC code the speech, encrypt the data
stream, transmit via v.32bis modem, etc.
-- 
--------------------------------------------------------------------
Jeff Porter
jporter@uiuc.edu    TA: ECE 290..."ph Jeff Porter" for office hours


-- 
Jeremy Porter  ------------- Systems Engineering --------
Dell Computer Corp.   ------ jerry@terminus.us.dell.com ----
---  70 4F BD AE 6D E9 D2 66  48 18 8B E7 64 7F 59 8F ---
Support your Second Amendment rights to encryption technology.



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Eric Blossom <eb@srlr14.sr.hp.com>
Date: Fri, 10 Dec 93 15:44:16 PST
To: loki@cass156.ucsd.edu
Subject: LPC for speech (fwd)
In-Reply-To: <9312102307.AA27130@nately.UCSD.EDU>
Message-ID: <9312102343.AA03519@srlr14.sr.hp.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



   I am working on this very thing. We will be using LPC encoding for
   compression, IDEA for encryption, and DH key exchange for key handling.
   We plan to use something better than DH ASAP (something less vulnerable
   to man in the middle attacks). We plan to use 14.4kbps transmission
   speed.


Lance,

I'd be interested seeing the protocol that you plan to use.  

I've given a bit of thought to it, and it appears to me that the
protocol should negotiate *everything* up front.  This would include
data rate, xmit and recv speech coders, as well as crypto algorithm,
feed back modes, session keys, etc.  I've been thinking also that the
protocol should start out in async mode, and then possibly shift to
sync mode.  It should also be extensible.

Eric Blossom




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: loki@nately.UCSD.EDU (Lance Cottrell)
Date: Fri, 10 Dec 93 16:34:17 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Improved DH system.
Message-ID: <9312110034.AA28034@nately.UCSD.EDU>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I have been told that there is a new improved version of
DH key exchange, which is authenticated. Could
someone give me the reference, and/or tell me what it is
all about?........ Diffie??

I was not clear on what it is that I am working on.
We are trying to build a cheep secure phone
for the masses (read brainless). We are looking for
black box brainless operation. I will provide more
info about the project on request.

----------------------------------------------------------
Lance Cottrell	who does not speak for CASS/UCSD
loki@nately.ucsd.edu
PGP 2.3 key available by finger or server.

"Love is a snowmobile racing across the tundra.  Suddenly
it flips over, pinning you underneath.  At night the ice
weasels come."
			--Nietzsche
----------------------------------------------------------




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: karn@qualcomm.com (Phil Karn)
Date: Fri, 10 Dec 93 16:39:38 PST
To: jel@sutro.SFSU.EDU
Subject: dithering, repudiable steganography
In-Reply-To: <9312010302.AA05375@russian.SFSU.EDU>
Message-ID: <199312110036.QAA00882@servo>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I am not sure that your explanation of "granulation noise" and
dithering are quite correct. You showed how a low-amplitude sine wave
is quantized by the sampling process, but quantization errors are
unavoidable in any digital recording system, with or without
dithering.

Here's another way to look at dithering. Let's say that I want to
represent a very low frequency audio signal ("low frequency" with
respect to the sampling rate). Let's assume further that over a period
of several samples, this signal has a relatively constant value of,
say, .25 microvolts in a system with 1 microvolt quantizing steps. If
I fed this into an ideal A/D converter, it would round it to the
closest representable level, i.e., 0 volts. And it would do so for
every sample, resulting in an constant error of .25 microvolts each
time.

But suppose I add some analog noise to the signal before I sample it.
The analog noise I generate will be a uniformly distributed random
voltage between +.5 and -.5 microvolts. Now the resulting signal will
range uniformly between +.75 and -.25 microvolts. If it's between +.5
and +.75 microvolts, the A/D converter will round it to 1 microvolt;
if it's between -.25 and +.5 microvolts, it will round it to zero. The
first case will happen 25% of the time, and the second will happen 75%
of the time.

Now if you average the resulting samples using enough precision for
the sum, viola -- you get an average of .25 microvolts, instead of
zero. This is exactly what happens at the ear after the D/A
reconstruction process, if you turn the volume up high enough to hear
what's happening.  Sure, there's still noise, but at least the average
signal value is correct.

So one purpose of dithering is to better represent low-frequency, low
amplitude information. The effect on complex signals is to turn the
quantization noise that would otherwise occur in narrow frequency
bands (and be quite audible) and spread it out as constant, low level
white noise over the whole audio band, which is much less objectionable.

Dithering is important only when the original analog source material
is *very* clean. In most cases, the background noise in the room and
the noise generated in the low level microphone preamps is much more
than one LSB, so the signal is "self dithering".

Phil






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Stanton McCandlish <mech@eff.org>
Date: Fri, 10 Dec 93 14:49:37 PST
Subject: HELP: EFF BBS Project needs your support!
Message-ID: <199312102243.RAA16438@eff.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Please pardon the wide cross-posting (some of which are actually mailing
lists), but all of these newsgroups involve issues with which EFF deals, and
we hope the readers of these groups will support EFF's BBS project.

EFF needs to set up a bulletin board system, to be called "Outpost - EFF
Online", to help spread the word to people in the BBS community, most of
whom do not have access to the resources of the net, on:

cryptography   privacy   activism    civil liberities online    networking

national information infrastructure   open platform principles  censorship

laws that affect computer users   ITAR restrictions    telco/cable mergers

internet access       many-to-many communication       virtual communities

cyberspace      digital telephony       bbs seizures      online resources

and more...


WHAT WE NEED:

We need donations of funds and equipment.  We already have BBS software
(Digital Dynamics has donated their Synchronet BBS package), but still need
a platform to run it on, including basic PC system, modems, tape backup, 
monitor, hard drive, etc.

If you'd like to contribute to this project, please contact mech@eff.org
(Stanton McCandlish, EFF Online Activist/SysOp, 202-347-5400 voice, 
202-393-5509 fax,  EFF - 1001 G St. NW, Ste. 950 E, Wash. DC 20001)

All donations are tax deductable, and any donations of funds or hardware worth
$40 or more will get the contributor a one-year membership in EFF.  
All contributors will be listed in a "thank you" note in an upcoming Effector
Online (EFF's electronic newsletter), and permanently on the BBS itself.
Great advertising!

Thanks for reading, and thanks for your assistance!




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Timothy Newsham <newsham@wiliki.eng.hawaii.edu>
Date: Fri, 10 Dec 93 19:54:18 PST
To: mg5n+@andrew.cmu.edu (Matthew J Ghio)
Subject: Re: LPC for speech (fwd)
In-Reply-To: <oh2G43C00awT41wlM9@andrew.cmu.edu>
Message-ID: <9312110351.AA08586@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> 
> <jp12745@coewl.cen.uiuc.edu>jerry@terminus.us.dell.com> wrote:
> 
> > Did you know that using LPC (linear predictive coding) on
> > speech can near-telephone quality at only 8 k BITs/second?
> > With a signficant decrease in quality (but still very
> > understandable... probably better than radio) you can get
> > the rate down to 2kbps.  If you don't mind sounding like
> > a speak&spell, you can go to 600bps or less.
> 
[...]
> 600bps is not realistic.  Most people can READ text faster than 600 bps
> (okay it's a little above average, but not if you were skimming; to give
> you a rough estimate, it's a little slower than reading one line per
> second)  You just can't expect to cram all the intricacies and
> inflections of speech into a 600bps channel and be understood.  But why
> sacrifice quality when you can use a 14400bps modem?  They aren't all
> too expensive these days.

600 bps is not realistic?  Voice has been gotten down to 400 to 600bps
by doing some coding on the output of a LPC (pitch + gain + filter
parameters) and transmitting that.  The remote decodes to recover
LPC parameters and uses that to synth speech.  The quality is supposed
to be the same as 2400 bps LPC (slightly synthetic sounding,  definitely
not 'toll quality').




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: walter kehowski <wak@next11.math.pitt.edu>
Date: Fri, 10 Dec 93 14:54:16 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Mosaic: ftp site?
Message-ID: <9312102252.AA06922@next11.math.pitt.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Cypherpunks, I'd like to get Mosaic - I read about it in the NYT. I got several  
responses to my inquiry: Where can you get Mosaic? (Thanks). However, when I  
tried ftp.ncsa.uiuc.edu and zaphod at same, there was no /Mosaic directory  -  
looked in index, etc., couldn't find it, basically. Any other sites or did I  
miss something? 


(I'm on NeXT (4.3BSD) so I was looking for the unix version.)

Walter A. Kehowski <wak@next0.math.pitt.edu>




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Dave Hart <davehart@microsoft.com>
Date: Fri, 10 Dec 93 19:49:41 PST
To: baumbach@atmel.com
Subject: Re: value of privacy?
Message-ID: <9312110349.AA00586@netmail.microsoft.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I use a variation on the below whenever I get a telemarketer calling -- 
but instead of asking for the home number, I just ask for their number, 
meaning work number.  Amazingly, it's very effective.  Apparently 
outbound telemarketers often don't want to get inbound phone calls.
----------
| From:    <netmail!baumbach@atmel.com>
|
| An idea that I have never used, but was suggested to me by my father, goes
| like this:
|
| RING RING
|
| me: Hello
|
| ??: Mr. Peter Baumbach, I am calling from ICK inc. to offer you ..
|
| me: Excuse me, but I am busy right now. Could you give me your name and
|    home phone number, and I will call you back later?
|
| ??: Huh? I can't give you my home number, that's private.
|
| me: But you know my name and number.  This hardly seems fair.
|
| 




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Stanton McCandlish <mech@eff.org>
Date: Fri, 10 Dec 93 16:41:22 PST
To: eff-talk@eff.org
Subject: ALERT: FBI's Wiretap Bill is Back!
Message-ID: <199312110035.TAA17536@eff.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Digital Telephony Threat Returns

According to FBI Dir. Louis Freeh, the development of sophisticated digital
telecom and networking technology threatens the ability of the Feds to
wiretap.  In a Dec. 8 speech at Washington's National Press Club, Freeh
annouced a renewal of the FBI's 'Digital Telephony' legislation scheme:
the return of the controverial 'Wiretap Bill'.  The bill is strongly
opposed by organizations and individuals concerned about privacy, as well
as the telecommunications and computing industries at large.  The FBI's
'need' for this legislative action is under review by the Administration
as part of it's examination of security and encryption issues.

The reappearance of this Bureau effort contradicts statements by Special
Agent Barry Smith of the FBI's Congressional Affairs Office, who stated
less than a month ago that the 'Wiretap Bill' had been tabled.

According to classified documents released under the Freedom of  
Information Act (FOIA), the FBI and the Electronic Communications Service
Provider Committee or ECSPC (an ad hoc industry working group, which
formed in March), are attempting to decide if technical solutions can
be found to satisify law enforcement. According to a Nynex representative
co-chairing the group, Kenneth Raymond, no solution has yet been found, but
that FBI has yet to prove any solution is needed at all.  Raymond likened
Freeh's tactics to "yelling out the window" - an attention-getting move
that needs some sort of clarifying followup.

Though the ECSPC claims to be attempting to evaluate the problem and to
solve it "in some reasonable way that is consistent with cost and demand",
Raymond indicated that the group considers one 'solution' to be building
wiretap access into future telecom hardware - like the  Clipper chip
backdoor, but a 'feature' of all switch specifications for phone and data
lines.

This news was just received, and a more detailed analysis and statement
from EFF will follow soon.

-- 
Stanton  McCandlish  mech@eff.org  1:109/1103   EFF  Online  Activist & SysOp
O P E N  P L A T F O R M   C R Y P T O P O L I C Y   O N L I N E  R I G H T S
N  E  T  W  O  R  K  I  N  G      V  I  R  T  U  A  L     C  U  L  T  U  R  E
I   N   F  O :  M   E   M   B   E   R   S   H   I   P  @  E  F  F  .  O  R  G



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Matthew J Ghio <mg5n+@andrew.cmu.edu>
Date: Fri, 10 Dec 93 17:24:38 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: LPC for speech (fwd)
In-Reply-To: <9312102107.AA00551@terminus.us.dell.com>
Message-ID: <oh2G43C00awT41wlM9@andrew.cmu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


<jp12745@coewl.cen.uiuc.edu>jerry@terminus.us.dell.com> wrote:

> Did you know that using LPC (linear predictive coding) on
> speech can near-telephone quality at only 8 k BITs/second?
> With a signficant decrease in quality (but still very
> understandable... probably better than radio) you can get
> the rate down to 2kbps.  If you don't mind sounding like
> a speak&spell, you can go to 600bps or less.

haha...  Geez oh man I just had to laugh at that speak&spell comment... 
Yeah, those things had funky voices, but it was pretty darn good speech
synthesis for the time. (around 1982-3? I guess)  (It could say alot
more than my Apple IIe :)  But those things had software with little
bugs (or undocumented features) if you pressed combinations of keys at
the same time it would do weird things.  I kinda wish I still had some
of those things, so I could try reprogramming it to do interesting
stuff.  (Imagines scene in US customs office: "Crypto exports?  No, sir,
this isn't a secret cipher machine, just an old speak&spell!  Honest! 
You didn't think I was going to try to phone home with it or something
did you?" ;)  but I digress...

600bps is not realistic.  Most people can READ text faster than 600 bps
(okay it's a little above average, but not if you were skimming; to give
you a rough estimate, it's a little slower than reading one line per
second)  You just can't expect to cram all the intricacies and
inflections of speech into a 600bps channel and be understood.  But why
sacrifice quality when you can use a 14400bps modem?  They aren't all
too expensive these days.

> Using LPC, you could send real-time voice over the
> internet.  It would even work (maybe just barely) over
> a SLIP connection.  According to my professor, LPC can
> be implemented in a simple DSP chip, so I figure a 486
> ought to be able to handle it, too.  Sound like an
> interesting (granted maybe not too useful) project?  It
> would be a way of providing secure voice
> communications -- LPC code the speech, encrypt the data
> stream, transmit via v.32bis modem, etc.

Not too useful???  Sounds very useful to me.  If someone got this
working, it would be all we'd need to kill the clipper chip completely. 
Who would spend several hundred dollars for a "secure" phone when you
can do the same (or better) with a $50 sound card for your computer? 
(Well, some might need to upgrade their modems too, but it would be a
good idea to do that anyway.)  Home (or office) computer cryptophone =
no need for clipper.


loki@cass156.ucsd.edu wrote in response:

> I am working on this very thing. We will be using LPC
> encoding for compression, IDEA for encryption, and DH
> key exchange for key handling.  We plan to use
> something better than DH ASAP (something less
> vulnerable to man in the middle attacks). We plan to use
> 14.4kbps transmission speed.

What kind of hardware will you be using?  486?  DSP?  or something 68xxx-based?
What additional hardware (sound cards) will be supported/required?
Will source be availiable?




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: baumbach@atmel.com ( )
Date: Fri, 10 Dec 93 18:19:40 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: value of privacy?
Message-ID: <9312110151.AA10840@bass.chp.atmel.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> example, it doesn't _hurt_ me to get targeted junk mail, but I find it 
> unsettling that direct marketers know enough about me to send the 'right' 
> mail. I see it this way; 'they' make decisions about me and initiate a 
> relationship with me without my knowledge or consent. The relationship is
> artificial and uneven; 'they' know more about me than I know about 'them'.

An idea that I have never used, but was suggested to me by my father, goes
like this:

RING RING

me: Hello

??: Mr. Peter Baumbach, I am calling from ICK inc. to offer you ..

me: Excuse me, but I am busy right now. Could you give me your name and
   home phone number, and I will call you back later?

??: Huh? I can't give you my home number, that's private.

me: But you know my name and number.  This hardly seems fair.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Brock N. Meeks" <brock@well.sf.ca.us>
Date: Fri, 10 Dec 93 22:19:42 PST
To: mech@eff.org
Subject: Re:  ALERT: FBI's Wiretap Bill is Back!
Message-ID: <199312110614.WAA17843@well.sf.ca.us>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Geez, Stanton, if you're going to rip off my story, you might want
to give me some credit... or isn't EFF's self-proclaimed "Online
Activist and Sysop" into proper journalistic practices of attributing
where he gets his information.

Just to clear things up, Stanton's message is a poorly rewritten
copy of an article I wrote for _Communications Daily_ that ran on Dec. 9.

The comments by FBI agent Barry Smith and Ken Raymond were made to me
during one-on-one interviews, not open press conferences.  There's
no way you could have these quotes or this information Stanton unless
you first read my story.

Next time try giving credit where it's due... Or steal your information
from someone not on the Net.

Brock Meeks
Reporter
Communications Daily




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: mrw@ukc.ac.uk
Date: Fri, 10 Dec 93 14:39:36 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: cryptoanarchists ingfo request
Message-ID: <9312102236.AA02779@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Hi there

d'you think youcould email me some background info on cryptoanarchism?  i've been
interested in situationism, and related things for a few years now, and i'd be interested to learn more.


Thanks
 m  a  t  t  h  e  w




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Michael Edward Marotta <mercury@well.sf.ca.us>
Date: Fri, 10 Dec 93 22:54:21 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Privacy as a Commodity
Message-ID: <199312110651.WAA23796@well.sf.ca.us>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


SOME OBSERVATIONS AND THOUGHTS ON PRIVACY AS A COMMODITY
by Michael E. Marotta <mercury@well.sf.ca.us> 
 
About a year ago, maybe less, Kevin Kelly suggested that privacy 
is or could be a commodity.  It was on The Well in the EFF 
Conference on another topic entirely.  He just dropped this bomb.  
I suggested a Loompanics article and he said he didn't have time 
but that I was welcome to develop the idea.  So I proposed 
"Privacy as a Commodity" to Computers Privacy and Freedom 
(CPF94) in Chicago.
 
Frank Lloyd Wright said that privacy is the hallmark of 
civilization.  He built his houses to ensure the privacy of the 
occupants.  He pointed to the village as an environment without 
privacy.   Today we say that we live in a global village.  
Therefore, the expectation of privacy is inappropriate.  
However, there is a lot of history between the first permanent 
settlement today's worldwide community.  Merchant princes graced 
several ages.  Metropolitan and cosmopolitan cities developed new 
patterns of interaction.  
 
Quite likely, the demand for privacy is relatively recent.  There 
is a quote from Leonardo da Vinci: "When you are alone you are 
all your own."   A brief look the pre-Socratics (ed., Honderich) 
reveals no discussions even remotely approaching "natural rights" 
from which privacy would be deduced or infered.  Plato's 
"Republic" is well known.  Tonight, discussing the ancient world 
with another numismatist, he pointed out that accumulations of 
wealth were virtually impossible before Roman Law.  The Athenians 
(and others) would ostracize anyone simply for being personally 
successful and therefore a potential threat.  Neither of us could 
identify the general who defeated the Persians and was rewarded 
with exile.  In such an environment, a plea for privacy would be 
ludicrous or even lunatic. 
 
We have the saying in English: "A man's home is his castle."  The 
Magna Carta (1215) had many provisions limiting the power of the 
crown and upholding the rights of free people (somewhat different 
for men than woman).  Typical of them is this: "No free man shall 
be taken or imprisoned or disseised or outlawed or exiled or in 
any way ruined, nor will we go or send against him, except by the 
lawful judgement of his peers or by the law of the land."   
 
That sentiment continues today.  However, force of arms is not 
the appropriate medium for securing your expectations of privacy.  
The Magna Carta limited the power of the state.  It did not 
address problems of peer review and peer pressure.  The best
arrangements we have that work among equals are agoric.  The 
marketplace depends on voluntary agreements for personal profit.  
The successful merchant doesn't argue religion with the client. 
("Religion" of course includes art, politics, sports and anything 
else not proximate to supply, demand and price.)  In this sense, 
privacy is inherent in the market. 
 
Today, however, we buy and sell information about people.  If you 
buy a new automobile, you are a potential client for insurance, 
if not for a Caribbean vacation.  Since the problem is agoric, 
the solution must be agoric:  you will have to invest in objects 
or processes that show their return in increased privacy for you.
 
It is possible that there is another set of solutions.  There may 
be something beyond politics and the market.  For instance, it is 
possible that a philosophical revolution will cause us to freely 
give information we now hide if we choose to merge with the Great 
All.  No doubt still other paths exist.   Be that as it may, for 
now, market solutions seem the best way to address problems in 
privacy. 
 




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Date: Sat, 11 Dec 93 01:14:20 PST
To: mercury@well.sf.ca.us (Michael Edward Marotta)
Subject: Re: Privacy as a Commodity
In-Reply-To: <199312110651.WAA23796@well.sf.ca.us>
Message-ID: <199312110910.BAA09858@mail.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



> SOME OBSERVATIONS AND THOUGHTS ON PRIVACY AS A COMMODITY
> by Michael E. Marotta <mercury@well.sf.ca.us> 

Nice essay. I look forward to reading the full version.

> Frank Lloyd Wright said that privacy is the hallmark of 
> civilization.  He built his houses to ensure the privacy of the 
> occupants.  He pointed to the village as an environment without 
> privacy.   Today we say that we live in a global village.  
> Therefore, the expectation of privacy is inappropriate.  

Huh? I don't see how this conclusion follows. Historical examples of
villages with extreme privacy abound. For example, in densely-packed
Middle Eastern villages and cities, the completely walled villa (or
whatever they might call it) is the norm: the walls are high, the only
entrance is a locked gate, and what goes on behind the walls in the
gardens and whatnot is invisible to the outside world. This is a
tradition that can (apparently, but I'm not a real scholar, so don't
rely on my memory) be traced back to Sumerian cities.

Certainly some forms of concern for privacy are fairly new. And at
least some cultures in some ages had very little privacy, as when many
families lived in crowded tents or caves or whatnot. But the example
above, seen also in the stone dwellings of Northern Africa, in the pit
dwellings, etc., suggest privacy was important. Possibly not for the
abstract reason of "privacy" per se, but for the protection of a
family against assassins, plotters, etc., and for the protection and
hiding of the women in the family.

Our modern focus on privacy does not seem all that different.

> Quite likely, the demand for privacy is relatively recent.  There 

Well, I disagree.


> Today, however, we buy and sell information about people.  If you 
> buy a new automobile, you are a potential client for insurance, 
> if not for a Caribbean vacation.  Since the problem is agoric, 
> the solution must be agoric:  you will have to invest in objects 
> or processes that show their return in increased privacy for you.

A very good point, that people must take responsibility for protecting
their own privacy. This could mean better locks on their doors, more
judicious use of credit cards, encryption of e-mail, and so on.

Technology chosen by those affected is ultimately the best solution.

> It is possible that there is another set of solutions.  There may 
> be something beyond politics and the market.  For instance, it is 
> possible that a philosophical revolution will cause us to freely 
> give information we now hide if we choose to merge with the Great 
> All.  No doubt still other paths exist.   Be that as it may, for 
> now, market solutions seem the best way to address problems in 
> privacy. 


Well, I hope this isn't how you plan to close your piece (if there was
more to your article, I didn't get it). The point about transcending
our need for privacy in the light of the Great All is a very weak
ending.

But the whole issue of "privacy as a commodity" is a good one to
explore. I think Kevin Kelly may've thought of that at the Cypherpunks
meeting he attended about a year ago (he actually attended two of
them, in December and January); he said something at the time about
this.

--Tim May


-- 
..........................................................................
Timothy C. May         | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,  
tcmay@netcom.com       | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
408-688-5409           | knowledge, reputations, information markets, 
W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA  | black markets, collapse of governments.
Higher Power: 2^756839 | Public Key: PGP and MailSafe available.
Note: I put time and money into writing this posting. I hope you enjoy it.



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Brian Beker <beker@netcom.com>
Date: Sat, 11 Dec 93 13:07:06 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Privacy as a Commodity
In-Reply-To: <199312110910.BAA09858@mail.netcom.com>
Message-ID: <Pine.3.85.9312111135.A18170-0100000@netcom7>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

> > SOME OBSERVATIONS AND THOUGHTS ON PRIVACY AS A COMMODITY
> > by Michael E. Marotta <mercury@well.sf.ca.us> 
> 
> > privacy.   Today we say that we live in a global village.  
> > Therefore, the expectation of privacy is inappropriate.  

T.C. May wrote:

> Huh? I don't see how this conclusion follows. Historical examples of
> villages with extreme privacy abound. 

This raises another matter that isn't dealt with here, namely that
historically there has been a grey area between issues of privacy and the
use of shame.  Shame is a powerful societal determinant -- an example of
it is the ostracism faced by any healthy young male who didn't volunteer
during the 'Great' War.  It can raise armies, empower religions, help keep
suddenly noble bloodlines pure and clean.  One-sided use of shame and all
its subtle variants is one of government's most powerful instruments of
opinion control. 

Getting back to the village example discussed above, the Puritan
settlements of early New England help illustrate both sides of the
question.  There, privacy was superceded by a complex shame-based social
system. And though there were many who were apalled at the way their lives
had been entirely subjugated to a powerfully communicated minority view of
what was shameful, that same shame had, and has today, an insidious way of
keeping people quiet and in their places. 

This model may be useful to an understanding of privacy.  What is to stop
anyone from asking, and Cypherpunks deal with this issue every day, what
is an appropriate level of privacy?  When that question is formed on the
basis of "What have you got to hide?" it takes on the aspect of
accusation.  And yet, that is precisely the question posed by our
government as it leads the cheers for the good, right-thinking folk who
know that only the guilty, only the criminally insane could ever feel the 
overwhelming need for absolute privacy. 

There's a parallel between those Puritan villages that figure so
prominently in America's early colonial history and what is happening now
as cyberspace is settled.  Moderns look back at those times and remark on
the amazing ignorance that drove many of the most terrible features of
those societies. 

That ignorance hasn't gone anywhere; it is still with us.  They might be
hard to spot with the buckles off their hats, but the same people who
today want escrowed keys and backdoors into all our lives are the
ideological descendents of the Puritan finger-sharpeners.  If that's true,
then this is a damn good fight. 

And we can be sure of it whenever we hear: 

Cypherpunks, shame on you!

Brian Beker



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From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: loki@nately.UCSD.EDU (Lance Cottrell)
Date: Sat, 11 Dec 93 13:32:06 PST
To: wcs@anchor.ho.att.com
Subject: Re:  Improved DH system.
Message-ID: <9312112133.AA00242@nately.UCSD.EDU>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Well, you seem to have summerised our thoughts on the matter exactly.
We are thinking about sticking a bunch of memory in the phone
and keeping track of the last ,say 100, phones called and the public
keys that they used. One could use the readback to certify the keys.
Some sort of KCA could also be invoked. We are designing the system
for easy upgrade and modification.

		Lance





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: wcs@anchor.ho.att.com (bill.stewart@pleasantonca.ncr.com +1-510-484-6204)
Date: Sat, 11 Dec 93 12:07:07 PST
To: loki@cass156.ucsd.edu
Subject: Re:  Improved DH system.
Message-ID: <9312111911.AA04684@anchor.ho.att.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Unfortunately, you can't really do a brainless black box phone with
security that's much better than Diffie-Hellman (The "send half the key
at a time" variant is somewhat better, but still can be tampered with.)
The problem is that to do better security, you need some way to 
authenticate the Diffie-Hellman exchange.  One way is to have a display
on the phone which shows the data received, and read it to the other person
(which is secure, but not brainless).  Another way is to use digital signatures
such as RSA on the Diffie-Hellman key parts, which requires some mechanism
for users to create keys and distribute them securely, also non-brainless.
One way to do this would be to use a central key-distribution server,
perhaps based on phone serial number or telephone number or whatever,
but that requires a lot of complexity, extra phone calls, etc.;
this compromises a certain amount of security, though if it's implemented
well enough to be non-spoofable, the major risks are the insecurity
that comes from registration and the ability of people who compromise
the keyserver (i.e. the government or keyserver-operator) to send
incorrect public keys to wiretap victims allowing man-in-the-middle attacks.

Another way that's not quite brainless would be to have public keys
generated in the phone for signatures, and allow users who want to to exchange
keys; you could build some relative of an automatic web of trust if you
put enough memory in the phones, but then you'd have to provide memory management
etc. which is distinctly not in the brainless category.

		Bill




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Arthur Chandler <arthurc@crl.com>
Date: Sat, 11 Dec 93 15:37:06 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: "Cipher"
Message-ID: <Pine.3.87.9312111505.A16266-0100000@crl.crl.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



  Neil Postman, in his *Technopoly*, asserts that the word "cipher" derives 
ultimately from the Hindu word for void, and therefore "suggests the idea 
of nothingness." (p 128) Does anyone else have info on the origin of this 
word? Is Postman correct?





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: adam fast <adamfast@u.washington.edu>
Date: Sat, 11 Dec 93 17:12:08 PST
To: Arthur Chandler <arthurc@crl.com>
Subject: Re: "Cipher"
In-Reply-To: <Pine.3.87.9312111505.A16266-0100000@crl.crl.com>
Message-ID: <Pine.3.87.9312111732.A21634-0100000@goren1.u.washington.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain




> Arthur Chandler

>   Neil Postman, in his *Technopoly*, asserts that the word "cipher" derives 
> ultimately from the Hindu word for void, and therefore "suggests the idea 
> of nothingness." (p 128) Does anyone else have info on the origin of this 
> word? Is Postman correct?

the American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language suggests the 
origin of the word cipher as:

[Middle English cifre, zero, from Old French, from Medieval Latin cifra, 
from Arabic sifr]

it doesn't go back further than that, but Postman's etymology seems sound...


ciao
adam





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: grand-central!amix!chip (Chip Morningstar -- "Software Without Moving Parts")
Date: Sat, 11 Dec 93 18:57:06 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: "Cipher"
Message-ID: <9312120247.AA11995@amix>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Arthur Chandler writes:
>  Neil Postman, in his *Technopoly*, asserts that the word "cipher" derives
>ultimately from the Hindu word for void, and therefore "suggests the idea
>of nothingness." (p 128) Does anyone else have info on the origin of this
>word? Is Postman correct?

Postman may be right about his etymology; I don't know, though I'm sure one of
the many folks out there with an OED could answer this.  However, arguing from
etymology is one of the most irksome of the many bogus rhetorical techniques
that the academic establishment has developed as part of its standard toolkit
and really wish they would cut it out.  The answer to the broader question, "Is
Postman correct?", is "no".






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: nate@VIS.ColoState.EDU (CVL staff member Nate Sammons)
Date: Sat, 11 Dec 93 17:57:06 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com (Cypherpunks Mailing List)
Subject: USENET on a tape, and future privacy
Message-ID: <9312120152.AA25408@vangogh.VIS.ColoState.EDU>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----


I was just thinking.  My roommate mentioned that he saw an ad for 
a service available in europe.  They send you an 8mm tape evey week
that has all the USENET traffic on it.  I was thinking that a large 
corporation thinking of hiring me (or you, you just never know!) could
pay some service to scrounge up all the USENET posting you have made for
the last, say, 10 years, and run them through a filter to get a feel for
the nature of the posts (assuming you were too prolific to have the 
job-hunters read _al_ of your posts).

This really scared me, so I think I will start making more frequent
use of the remailers in the future.

Just my $0.02 (revalued to $15.00 with recent inflation)

- -nate


- -- 
+-----------------------------------------------------------------------+
| Nate Sammons  nate@VIS.ColoState.Edu  (303) 491-1578                  |
|   Colorado State University -- Computer Visualization Laboratory      |
+-----------------------------------------------------------------------+



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Timothy Newsham <newsham@wiliki.eng.hawaii.edu>
Date: Sat, 11 Dec 93 21:17:07 PST
To: jerry@terminus.us.dell.com (Jeremy Porter)
Subject: Re: LPC for speech (fwd)
In-Reply-To: <9312120409.AA10603@terminus.us.dell.com>
Message-ID: <9312120515.AA03848@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> 
> >I'm not sure if a 486 can do the analysis in realtime.  I'm sure
       ^^^^^^^^                     ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^     ^^^^^^^
> >the 486 could do the analysis in real time.  I have C code for
                        ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
> >LPC that will do synthesis to a file in realtime on a 486 machine.
> >(The code is mostly generic C and will compile on most machines)

> I'm not sure what you mean, it could or couldn't be done on a 486?
> I think that you meant that the compression could not be done in
> realtime but the expansion could?  Or vice versa?

Good one eh?  Sorry for the confusion.   I'm sure the 486 can do *synthesis*
in real time.  I'm not sure it can do *analysis* in real time.

> Jeremy Porter  ------------- Systems Engineering --------
> Dell Computer Corp.   ------ jerry@terminus.us.dell.com ----




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Paul Rushizky <paulr@csd4.csd.uwm.edu>
Date: Sat, 11 Dec 93 18:17:06 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Please unsubscribe from mailing list
Message-ID: <9312120216.AA02560@csd4.csd.uwm.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Please unsubscribe me from your mailing list.  Thanks.



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: freeman@MasPar.COM (Jay R. Freeman)
Date: Sat, 11 Dec 93 20:22:10 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re:  One Time Pads $5000|Cheap
Message-ID: <9312120421.AA15009@cleo.MasPar.Com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Since it is quite easy to make an electronic widget that creates random
noise by amplifying up shot noise and counting detections across a threshold
(varying the amplifier gain to adjust the rate), I suspect you are right.
 
                                                         -- Jay Freeman




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: jerry@terminus.dell.com (Jeremy Porter)
Date: Sat, 11 Dec 93 20:47:07 PST
To: nate@VIS.ColoState.EDU
Subject: Re: USENET on a tape, and future privacy
In-Reply-To: <2ee0sd$o5s@uudell.us.dell.com>
Message-ID: <9312120442.AA10872@terminus.us.dell.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


In article <2ee0sd$o5s@uudell.us.dell.com> you write:
>	
>From owner-cypherpunks@toad.com  Sun Dec 12 02:49:42 1993
>Return-Path: <nate@vangogh.VIS.ColoState.EDU>
>From: nate@VIS.ColoState.EDU (CVL staff member Nate Sammons)
>Message-Id: <9312120152.AA25408@vangogh.VIS.ColoState.EDU>

>I was just thinking.  My roommate mentioned that he saw an ad for 
>a service available in europe.  They send you an 8mm tape evey week
>the last, say, 10 years, and run them through a filter to get a feel for
Hm.. 1 tape a week at 52week/year, gives 520 8mm tapes, assuming
they can process one tape every 30minutes, thats nearly 11 days.

Proably will take about 1 to 2 hours a tape, just to read through
the stuff.  You are talking about thousands of dollars of cost
to do such a search.  Then someone has to weed out all of the other
"Doe, John" messages that were not you.
Considering most business don't bother to verify references, and those
that do still usually only check employment history.

Once again your are offered a limited protection by the volume of
information.  Usenet traffic being rated at some 21gigabytes a year
(traffic through UUnet) considering the low information value
of the vast majority of it, no one will be interested in storing it.

In usenet no one can hear you scream...



-- 
Jeremy Porter  ------------- Systems Engineering --------
Dell Computer Corp.   ------ jerry@terminus.us.dell.com ----
---  70 4F BD AE 6D E9 D2 66  48 18 8B E7 64 7F 59 8F ---
Support your Second Amendment rights to encryption technology.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Harry Shapiro <habs@panix.com>
Date: Sat, 11 Dec 93 19:47:05 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com (Good Guys)
Subject: One Time Pads $5000|Cheap
Message-ID: <199312120346.AA12981@panix.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


The cost of write once CD-ROM drives (CD-R) drives is really going
down in price. You should be able to get a complete set-up for
less than $5000.

I would think you could use the CD-R drive to create a bunch of
one time pads. Any thought?

/HAWK
-- 
Harry S. Hawk  				      habs@extropy.org
Electronic Communications Officer, Extropy Institute Inc. 
    	    The Extropians Mailing List, Since 1991
EXTROPY -- A measure of intelligence, information, energy, vitality,
experience, diversity, opportunity, and growth.  EXTROPIANISM -- The
philosophy that seeks to increase extropy.          



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: markh@wimsey.bc.ca (Mark C. Henderson)
Date: Sat, 11 Dec 93 23:17:06 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com (Cypherpunks Mailing List)
Subject: Re: USENET on a tape, and future privacy
Message-ID: <m0p8l1f-0000D3C@vanbc.wimsey.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> I was just thinking.  My roommate mentioned that he saw an ad for 
> a service available in europe.  They send you an 8mm tape evey week
> that has all the USENET traffic on it.  I was thinking that a large 
There is also a company in Vancouver B.C. that will sell you a 
subscription to USENET on CDROM. Each CD contains about a week of 
traffic (the cost is something like US$20 per CD). They CDs don't 
include traffic from certain newsgroups (mostly the sex related 
ones. I guess they don't want to get busted for distributing
obscene material). 

I can dig up contact information, if anyone is interested. I spoke
with one of their representatives a while back, and they apparently
have sold subscriptions to various government agencies in the U.S.
and Canada.

Mark

-- 
Mark Henderson      markh@wimsey.bc.ca (personal account)
RIPEM and ViaCrypt PGP 2.4 keys available by key server/finger/E-mail
RIPEM MD5OfPublicKey: F1F5F0C3984CBEAF3889ADAFA2437433
ViaCrypt PGP Key Fingerprint: 21 F6 AF 2B 6A 8A 0B E1  A1 2A 2A 06 4A D5 92 46




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: nate@VIS.ColoState.EDU (CVL staff member Nate Sammons)
Date: Sat, 11 Dec 93 22:57:06 PST
To: jordan@imsi.com (Jordan Hayes)
Subject: Re: USENET on a tape, and future privacy
In-Reply-To: <9312120553.AA17528@IMSI.COM>
Message-ID: <9312120654.AA26407@vangogh.VIS.ColoState.EDU>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text


writes Jordan Hayes:
>Takes me no more than 10 minutes to set up the criteria, and an hour or
>so on an airplane to browse the output.  Granted, I don't search a year
>(hey, if a candidate is a jerk on the net, they'll show up more than a
>few times in just a month's worth ...), but your "it's in the noise"
>statement is naive.
>
>/jordan
>

I agree.  The signal to noise is high, but grep is fast and, if you were
determined many layers of filtering could be added to inhance the
"resolution" of the search.  

My concern is that it is becoming more and more common for people to 
"grow up" on the net, many people I know of started quite young, and
a determined opponent (as I'll call the snooper) could, concieveably
search your entire posting history.

Lets say that the (kind, benevolant, of course) Government is considering
indicting you on charges of conspiracy to do something illegal, but are 
unsure if there is enough evidence to connect you to the crime.  Or, 
let's say that they believe you have had a long-involved role in 
inciting the breaking of a law.  They (the government, remember -- big 
computers, nearly unlimited people and time) could look for anything 
relating you to inciting or bacoming involved in things that could even
be construde as close to illegal.

Bottom line is that we need to watch our backs, but I don't want to lapse
into a fit of Detweilerian paranoia (sorry, just had to take that jab ;-)

-nate

-- 
+-----------------------------------------------------------------------+
| Nate Sammons  nate@VIS.ColoState.Edu  (303) 491-1578                  |
|   Colorado State University -- Computer Visualization Laboratory      |
+-----------------------------------------------------------------------+



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: jordan@imsi.com (Jordan Hayes)
Date: Sat, 11 Dec 93 22:17:06 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: USENET on a tape, and future privacy
Message-ID: <9312120553.AA17528@IMSI.COM>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


	From jerry@terminus.us.dell.com Sun Dec 12 00:06:31 1993

	You are talking about thousands of dollars of cost to do such a
	search.

Sorry, I do searches like that all the time for "serious" candidates.
Takes me no more than 10 minutes to set up the criteria, and an hour or
so on an airplane to browse the output.  Granted, I don't search a year
(hey, if a candidate is a jerk on the net, they'll show up more than a
few times in just a month's worth ...), but your "it's in the noise"
statement is naive.

/jordan




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: nobody@shell.portal.com
Date: Sun, 12 Dec 93 07:17:19 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: No Subject
Message-ID: <9312121515.AA18910@jobe.shell.portal.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


seen on a real-time chat system at mit:

From: The Warlord <warlord>

Sigh. Anyways, I've told you all the information there is to tell:
MIT administration (I/S) told me to shut down the keyserver.  They were
'pushed' by PKP (Probably Bidzos).  I do not know what was said, why these
decisions were made, nor what is being held over people's heads... But I
didn't believe I had the Political clout to do anything but comply.

----
notes: jim bruce is the vice president for information systems at mit.
in general, stuff like the above doesn't happen unless jim says so.
the request for the keyserver shutdown was apparantly not delivered in
writing to derek, so there is no permanent record of what happened.

the new keyserver at martigny.ai.mit.edu has the support of a full
professor; derek's did not.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: wcs@anchor.ho.att.com (bill.stewart@pleasantonca.ncr.com +1-510-484-6204)
Date: Sun, 12 Dec 93 05:17:14 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Privacy as a Commodity
Message-ID: <9312121318.AA10263@anchor.ho.att.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Brian Beker writes:
> is an appropriate level of privacy?  When that question is formed on the
> basis of "What have you got to hide?" it takes on the aspect of
> accusation.  And yet, that is precisely the question posed by our
> government as it leads the cheers for the good, right-thinking folk who
> know that only the guilty, only the criminally insane could ever feel the 
> overwhelming need for absolute privacy. 

Of course, the organization asking us "Why on earth would you want privacy,
when we can run your lives so much better if we know everything you're doing?"
is the same organization that splits up its information into categories like
SECRET, TOP SECRET, ULTRA, BURN BEFORE READING, WNINTEL, RESTRICTED DATA,
FORMERLY RESTRICTED DATA, NO FOREIGN NATIONALS, FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY.....

			Cynically,  Bill
			




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: adwestro@ouray.Denver.Colorado.EDU (Alan Westrope)
Date: Sun, 12 Dec 93 07:27:19 PST
To: arthurc@crl.com
Subject: Re: "Cipher"
In-Reply-To: <Pine.3.87.9312111505.A16266-0100000@crl.crl.com>
Message-ID: <0Pp2jaa0iwcDyarn@ouray.denver.colorado.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

> 
>   Neil Postman, in his *Technopoly*, asserts that the word "cipher" derives 
> ultimately from the Hindu word for void, and therefore "suggests the idea 
> of nothingness." (p 128) Does anyone else have info on the origin of this 
> word? Is Postman correct?
>
An online definition (telnet chem.ucsd.edu, login webster)
supports Postman, although it only goes back to Arabic:

Word: cipher
[ME, fr. MF cifre, fr. ML cifra, fr. Ar s.ifr empty, cipher, zero]
(14c)
1a: ZERO 1a
1b: one that has no weight, worth, or influence: NONENTITY
2a: a method of transforming a text in order to conceal its meaning --
    compare CODE 3b
2b: a message in code
3: ARABIC NUMERAL
4: a combination of symbolic letters; esp: the interwoven initials of a name

                [verb defs -- "to cipher" -- deleted]

I'll refrain from smartass comments about 1b as it relates to all of us...:-)

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.3a

iQCVAgUBLQs1Z1RRFMq4NZY5AQHxUwP/SKBEsdCd4jdG62F8yVHblXdm1XbsJvBm
XbHCx3uykixQem/hQp9TthNA6YdARM/0ZY1/w/uzbDLZt+f2b1oqQTURCyhtR9H+
zrezBZxn7+I3+yANzH5Ft2ELConzEbJHTmZf3veqSwp0Q3y/I57/4LWNmBSkHOmy
d2yUF6QGKYU=
=7Znh
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

Alan Westrope                  <awestrop@nyx.cs.du.edu>
                               <adwestro@ouray.denver.colorado.edu>
PGP fingerprint:  D6 89 74 03 77 C8 2D 43   7C CA 6D 57 29 25 69 23
finger for public key




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: wcs@anchor.ho.att.com (bill.stewart@pleasantonca.ncr.com +1-510-484-6204)
Date: Sun, 12 Dec 93 05:27:15 PST
To: freeman@MasPar.COM
Subject: Re:  One Time Pads $5000|Cheap
Message-ID: <9312121323.AA10300@anchor.ho.att.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


One disadvantage of CDROMs is that you lose a major advantage that real
paper one-time pads had - once you had used a page, you could burn it.
With a CD-ROM, presumably the whole pad *will* last you a while, and you
probably don't want to melt the outer tracks of the disk as you use them up...
So you either send ~600MB of secret stuff or waste the disk, depending on how 
secure your communications needs are and how soon you expect to be busted.

		Bill
# Bill Stewart  Old address: wcs@anchor.ho.att.com AT&T Bell Labs, Holmdel, NJ
# After 10/15, NCR, 6870 Koll Center Parkway, Pleasanton CA, 94566
# Voice/Beeper 510-224-7043, Phone 510-484-6204, email bill.stewart@pleasantonca.ncr.com




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Sameer <sameer@uclink.berkeley.edu>
Date: Sun, 12 Dec 93 09:42:21 PST
To: bogstad@blaze.cs.jhu.edu (Bill Bogstad)
Subject: Re: One Time Pads $5000|Cheap
In-Reply-To: <9312121514.AA10776@toad.com>
Message-ID: <m0p8uip-000J6vC@infinity.hip.berkeley.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

> 	I'm not sure about the format of writable CD-ROMs; but with other
> write-only media the default state of a bit is X and you write by changing
> some of the bits to Y.  This being the case, you could conceivably zap part
> of the disk by writting them as all Ys.  This would require everyone to have
> a CD-ROM writer not just a reader.  Another problem is even if the media
> itself has this capability the standard writer devices are going to want to
> write block checksums etc.; which is probably going to fail.
> 

	Right, but as the price drops more people will be able to
afford one? I would sure be willing to spend a few hundred on a CD-ROM
writer (that's how much the readers cost now, right?) in order to
make/destroy OTPs. (And by the time the price *does* go down that far,
I should have the money to buy it, hopefully.)
	On checksums-- I wouldn't know how the devices work, but that
looks like a task for a talented cypherpunks hardware hacker.


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.3a

iQCVAgUBLQtWpXi7eNFdXppdAQELCQP8CR73zD0OLf6cmmGz+eAk19WkDw+lMmK3
WAoHpa1exR/LWvP9sWycxbshVuqIRDPfA+exM6gqzuuMxdfTIS/OiocTlKHy7+oW
/OY+drLhMIS+W6w66r44LgPzk3cquRMEtkZVHoFTXdNb6qlL1DxjWRbKs6xkEs/V
KMhCDLPqH2U=
=WhDM
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: bogstad@blaze.cs.jhu.edu (Bill Bogstad)
Date: Sun, 12 Dec 93 07:17:21 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re:  One Time Pads $5000|Cheap
In-Reply-To: <9312121323.AA10300@anchor.ho.att.com>
Message-ID: <9312121514.AA10776@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Bill Stewart <9312121323.AA10300@anchor.ho.att.com> you wrote:
>One disadvantage of CDROMs is that you lose a major advantage that real
>paper one-time pads had - once you had used a page, you could burn it.
>With a CD-ROM, presumably the whole pad *will* last you a while, and you
>probably don't want to melt the outer tracks of the disk as you use them up...
>So you either send ~600MB of secret stuff or waste the disk, depending on how 
>secure your communications needs are and how soon you expect to be busted.

	I'm not sure about the format of writable CD-ROMs; but with other
write-only media the default state of a bit is X and you write by changing
some of the bits to Y.  This being the case, you could conceivably zap part
of the disk by writting them as all Ys.  This would require everyone to have
a CD-ROM writer not just a reader.  Another problem is even if the media
itself has this capability the standard writer devices are going to want to
write block checksums etc.; which is probably going to fail.

				Bill Bogstad
				bogstad@cs.jhu.edu





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: hughes@ah.com (Eric Hughes)
Date: Sun, 12 Dec 93 10:27:22 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: "Cipher"
In-Reply-To: <Pine.3.87.9312111505.A16266-0100000@crl.crl.com>
Message-ID: <9312121816.AA13165@ah.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>  Neil Postman, in his *Technopoly*, asserts that the word "cipher" derives 
>ultimately from the Hindu word for void, and therefore "suggests the idea 
>of nothingness." (p 128) Does anyone else have info on the origin of this 
>word? Is Postman correct?

The use of the word 'cipher' as 'zero', both for a number and for a
loser, has only fairly recently fallen out of general use.  I've seen
references to the word in works from the 50's and 60's where is use
was not meant as an obscuring device.

The use of 'cipher' in 'ciphertext' has this same connotation, that
the text says nothing, that is, by itself.

Eric




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: freeman@MasPar.COM (Jay R. Freeman)
Date: Sun, 12 Dec 93 11:27:23 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re:  One Time Pads $5000|Cheap
Message-ID: <9312121924.AA15563@cleo.MasPar.Com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> ... zap part of the disc by writting them as all Ys ...

The overwrite might be detectable microscopically by anyone who really
wanted to crack the cypher and could steal your disc.

                                             -- Jay Freeman




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: adam fast <adamfast@u.washington.edu>
Date: Sun, 12 Dec 93 13:32:27 PST
To: Harry Shapiro <habs@panix.com>
Subject: Re: One Time Pads $5000|Cheap
In-Reply-To: <199312121932.AA03891@panix.com>
Message-ID: <Pine.3.87.9312121352.C15418-0100000@goren2.u.washington.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



>/hawk

[ about one-time pads... ]

> checksum might be solved by using multisession CD-ROMs. Cheaper hardware
> might be found in the mini-disc format or digital audio tapes??? 

i like the DAT or mini-disc idea. cheap and easy... dump a bunch of 
digital noise onto two DATs. burn them when you are thru with them. i 
like it.

the problem would come when you leave the tapes lying around by accident 
instead of burning them... or if you don't go thru them frequently 
enough, still have half a tape left when your Opponent nabs it.

do you have to burn the tape for really good security? would overwriting
it be enough...? with a mini-disc it would be really easy to everwrite the
onetime pad when you are done with part of it, somewhat easy for DATs. 
(gear does exist to extract previous recordings from residual magnetics...
but is expensive from what i understand.)

DAT would be better for large files, minidisc for short messages...


man! this is a cheap and fast way to get the ball rolling...

adam






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Harry Shapiro <habs@panix.com>
Date: Sun, 12 Dec 93 11:37:23 PST
To: sameer@uclink.berkeley.edu
Subject: Re: One Time Pads $5000|Cheap
In-Reply-To: <m0p8uip-000J6vC@infinity.hip.berkeley.edu>
Message-ID: <199312121932.AA03891@panix.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


a conscious being, Sameer wrote:
> 	Right, but as the price drops more people will be able to
> afford one? I would sure be willing to spend a few hundred on a CD-ROM
> writer (that's how much the readers cost now, right?) in order to
> make/destroy OTPs. (And by the time the price *does* go down that far,
> I should have the money to buy it, hopefully.)
> 	On checksums-- I wouldn't know how the devices work, but that
> looks like a task for a talented cypherpunks hardware hacker.

checksum might be solved by using multisession CD-ROMs. Cheaper hardware
might be found in the mini-disc format or digital audio tapes???

/hawk



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Black Unicorn <unicorn@access.digex.net>
Date: Sun, 12 Dec 93 14:02:27 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: mirrorshades
Message-ID: <199312122158.AA24739@access.digex.net>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



After that hype, has anyone obtained the source code
or the executable itself yet?  Or was the entire project a hoax.

It sounded quite interesting....

-uni-




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Pat Farrell" <pfarrell@netcom.com>
Date: Sun, 12 Dec 93 14:12:32 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Checksums, etc. was Re:  One Time Pads $5000|Cheap
Message-ID: <61852.pfarrell@netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


In message Sun, 12 Dec 93 10:14:22 EST,
  bogstad@blaze.cs.jhu.edu (Bill Bogstad)  writes:
>                    Another problem is even if
> the media itself has this capability the standard writer devices are
> going to want to write block checksums etc.; which is probably going to
> fail.

A few years back I was into WORM disks for imaging systems. We needed to be
able to burn an image on the disk, and then go back and set a "logical
deletion" flag so that the records would no
longer be accessible.

The standard WORM device controllers wouldn't let it happen. They insisted
on verifying the checksums on the block. We considered hacking the
controller logic, but gave up as too much of a maintanance headache.
But even WORM medea are rewritable at a low enuff level.

Pat




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: trestrab@GVSU.EDU (BETH TRESTRAIL)
Date: Sun, 12 Dec 93 15:27:23 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Writable CD-ROMS as one-time pads
Message-ID: <9311127557.AA755749462@GVSU.EDU>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Is there anything inherently superior about CD-ROMs as a one-time
pad ? The size differential vis a vis Bernouli drive cartridges,
floptical disk drives, or just plain old floppy disks is kind of a
mixed blessing, and still doesn't answer the major question with
one-time pads - secure dissemination.

          Jeff




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: frc@bwnmr4.bwh.harvard.edu (Fred Cooper)
Date: Sun, 12 Dec 93 15:47:22 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com (Cypherpunks)
Subject: Argh?
Message-ID: <9312122346.AA24322@bwnmr4.bwh.harvard.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Does anyone keep complete archives? Mail at my site was dead for about 5 
days and i didn't recieve a single thing... And apparently my questions 
about Keyservers finally generated some discussion...

I really just need the traffic for about the last 8 days or so...

FRC
frc@bwh.harvard.edu

please reply in private (i hate to waste bw -- sorry)
-- 
#include <hdrs/disclaim.std>    /* Neural Nets catch only dreaming fish. */  





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Blanc Weber <blancw@microsoft.com>
Date: Sun, 12 Dec 93 19:02:28 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: USENET on a tape, and future privacy
Message-ID: <9312130300.AA01025@netmail.microsoft.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


From - Nate Sammons:

"My concern is that it is becoming more and more common for people to 
"grow up" on the net, many people I know of started quite young, and a 
determined opponent (as I'll call the snooper) could, concieveably 
search your entire posting history."

Indeed, just from reading the postings to this and the extropians list 
for a few weeks, now, my neurological system has become impressed with 
info on one particular person such that I now know:

his employment history & when he retired
his present entrepreneural activities
and other present interests & pursuits
that he has wide feet
which are his buddies on the two lists
which are the women on the other list who typically disagree with him
that the Energizer Rabbit (LD) considers him an enemy
that he's up late, sending out posts at 2:00 a.m.
some of his opinions on gender
some of his opinions on women
how he deals with argumentive conflicts
I think someone mentioned he has beard
(and it's possible I could get a dot-matrix print out of his image)
where in the world he lives
his past awards for a scientific discovery
what kind of tub he bathes in

And this is just from memory, I haven't intended to develop a file, but 
delete most messages once I have read them.
Pretty good, for just browsing   :>)

Blanc






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Duncan Frissell <frissell@panix.com>
Date: Sun, 12 Dec 93 19:42:28 PST
To: CYPHERPUNKS@toad.com
Subject: Re: Privacy as a Commodit
Message-ID: <199312130339.AA07744@panix.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


B >what is an appropriate level of privacy?  When that question is formed
B >on the basis of "What have you got to hide?" it takes on the aspect of
B >accusation.  

My mom (and others) have asked me this frequently.  I even have an essay 
"Why Privacy?" on a disk somewhere.  One of these days...

The short answer is:  "I don't know.  If I did, I'd hide only that."

In the last 300 years in Europe, people at various times and in various 
places have been murdered for the possesion of every conceivable human 
characteristic.

Name any religion, occupation, habit, ethnicity, or anything about a 
person and I can dig up cases where people were killed (either publicly or 
privately) because they had that characteristic.

That being the case, discretion is often the better part of valor.  
Besides, what is anyone else's need to know?  Have they paid me to reveal 
info about myself?  If they haven't, what call does anyone have to my 
labor in supplying that information.  TANSTAAFL

DCF
--- WinQwk 2.0b#1165         




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: greg@ideath.goldenbear.com (Greg Broiles)
Date: Sun, 12 Dec 93 22:49:55 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Argh?
In-Reply-To: <9312122346.AA24322@bwnmr4.bwh.harvard.edu>
Message-ID: <NPHHec1w165w@ideath.goldenbear.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


uunet!bwnmr4.bwh.harvard.edu!frc (Fred Cooper) writes:

> Does anyone keep complete archives? Mail at my site was dead for about 5 
> days and i didn't recieve a single thing... And apparently my questions 
> about Keyservers finally generated some discussion...

(I offered in E-mail to send Fred what he's looking for.)

I've got C-punks list traffic stored back as far as late September. It 
wouldn't be a big deal to make .ZIPs of each month's collected postings, 
if someone wants to make them available for FTP. Are people strongly 
opposed to making old postings available? (I'm not offering to go through 
and pull out messages from particular individuals. If enough people hate 
the idea, I won't offer public access to any of the stored postings once 
they expire out of my news-spool area. C-punks is gated to a local 
newsgroup on my sparsely populated BBS.)


--
Greg Broiles                       Lemon Detweiler Pledge?
greg@goldenbear.com                  You're soaking in it.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: nobody@rosebud.ee.uh.edu
Date: Sun, 12 Dec 93 20:59:55 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: No Subject
Message-ID: <9312130459.AA22185@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Some quotes from the December 13, Ô93 issue of Newsweek:

Cover:
ÒGlobal Mafia: TheyÕre Ruthless. Stateless. High Tech. And Deadly.Ó

p. 22
  ÒAround the globe, intelligence agencies are refocusing their operations from spies to criminals.  Some of this may reflect the desire of spooks to protect their budgets in the post-cold-war world.  But the threat is real...Ó

  ÒThe first trend is the development of computer and communications technology.  Electronic fund-transfer systems can whiz billions of dollars around the globe within seconds.  Faxes and cellular telephones can be encrypted, making it all but impossible to trace calls from them.  Drug-cartel planes flying north to the United States have signal interceptors to plot radar and avoid monitoring.Ó

p. 24
  Ò...the Cali cartel treats cocaine as a business like any other (give or take the odd murder).  The cartel recently tried to lease its own satellite so the CIA and DEA couldnÕt listen in on conversations.  CaliÕs recruits are intelligent and its systems are high tech.  In one case, the DEA arrested a trafficker who had 20 computers to run his distribution network.Ó

[Satellite KeyServers perhaps?]




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: gtoal@an-teallach.com (Graham Toal)
Date: Sun, 12 Dec 93 15:32:26 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Keyservers are back :-)
Message-ID: <199312122329.XAA13735@an-teallach.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Hi folks - this cypherpunk has been writing code... all damn weekend (I'm
really feeling old - 24hr hacks used to be no problem.  Now i have to
stop for 5 hours sleep...)

Anyway, I've written a completely new - no pgp or RSA code - key server
which I can't see anyone being able to object to.

I'm looking for volunteers to alpha-test it.  Note, alpha-testing means
you have to know what you're doing - it's not in any way tested already
and you'll be helping find the bugs and smooth the installation process.

Mail me at gtoal@an-teallach.com if you want to volunteer as a tester
for a week.

This server works as a slave server hanging off the European ones; it'll
be fast at returning keys that it knows about, that have been around
for some time; all other operations may be a little slower.

The nice thing about it is that - inspired by the cypherpunk remailers - 
I've written it so that it can run on ordinary users accounts.  I think
it will be quite hard to get rid of this time :)

Just one thing - it needs the 'procmail' suite.  If you have it, fine, you'll
make a great tester; if you don't, please fetch it and get it running before
you approach me for the keyserver code.

In a week's time - ought to be enough for testing and fixing (I mean, it
only took two days to write the damn thing in the first place) - I'll
be releasing the code and hopefully making an announcement of all the
new keyservers that will exist.  (That last bit is up to you guys...)

Graham




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: ski_man@mindvox.phantom.com (Christopher M. Wisnos)
Date: Sun, 12 Dec 93 21:34:49 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Unsubscribe
Message-ID: <sNeHec2w165w@mindvox.phantom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


well its been nice listening but I have to say "NO MAS!"
please unsubscribe me from this list
thankx
  ski_man

++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
+       There can be only one . . .                                      
+                       The HighLander
+       ski_man@mindvox.phantom.com  -or- cmw@uc1.ucsu.edu
++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Alexander Chislenko <sasha@cs.umb.edu>
Date: Sun, 12 Dec 93 22:59:56 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: USENET on a tape
Message-ID: <199312130657.AA19815@eris.cs.umb.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


   Jeremy Porter writes:
 
> ... Usenet traffic being rated at some 21gigabytes a year
> (traffic through UUnet) considering the low information value
> of the vast majority of it, no one will be interested in storing it.
 
   Wait a minute...
   How much would it cost to store all this info?
a few hundred thousand dollars a year?
 
   This seems to be the cheapest (per byte) archiving opportunity in
the history of civilization; storage cost is many orders of magnitude
lower than the efforts spent creating this info.
   Many times as much is spent on archaeological/historical research
projects that 1) can wait and 2) get much, much, much less information,
while the hugest ever information traffic disappears without a trace.
 
   This is unbelievable!
 
   Apart from regular merits of any archive and far-fetching perspectives
of Internet archives becoming a part of global intelligence, this traffic
can be invaluable for studies of evolution of languages and subcultures,
development of particular concepts, detailed biographical material (there
are many historical figures whose biographical data collection took a lot
more resources than is needed to store all net traffic), and so much more...
 
   In general, I would expect that if people spent a 1000 dollars worth
of efforts to write messages, it should be worth it to spend another penny
to store them forever...
 
   It's likely, though, that some agencies do keep full net archives;
if even not, much of the traffic may be recoverable from partial archives
scattered all over the world; the attempt will sure be made some day - but
at what cost?
 
> In usenet no one can hear you scream...
 
:-(
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
|  Alexander Chislenko | sasha@cs.umb.edu | Cambridge, MA  |  (617) 864-3382 |
------------------------------------------------------------------------------




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: frc@bwnmr4.bwh.harvard.edu (Fred Cooper)
Date: Sun, 12 Dec 93 23:19:56 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com (Cypherpunks)
Subject: No More Argh.
Message-ID: <9312130715.AA24972@bwnmr4.bwh.harvard.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Those who responded: 
Thanks, and I'm working out transfer ...

To Those who didn't:
You don't have to now.....


FRC

-- 
#include <hdrs/disclaim.std>    /* Neural Nets catch only dreaming fish. */  





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: cypher01@eternity.demon.co.uk (Russell Earl Whitaker)
Date: Sun, 12 Dec 93 23:14:49 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Digital cash announced today by UK bank.
Message-ID: <514267909@eternity.demon.co.uk>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


In message <199312091906.TAA22687@an-teallach.com> gtoal@an-teallach.com writes:
> Apparently the Natwest Bank (or some spoonerism thereof) announced
> today that they were releasing digital cash in the form of some
> sort of smartcard.  I have no more details - does anyone else?
>

I saw this a few days ago in the Guardian.  Big front page
splash, and lots of radio coverage.  The system is called
"Mondex".  I'm looking into it, myself, as I know about as much
as you do.

Midlands Bank is cooperating in the scheme, which is not
surprising, as they already have shared-ATM agreements.
 
> Primarily I'm interested in knowing if it's *anonymous* digital
> cash - knowing our govt, I suspect it's unlikely to be.  Any new
> opportunities to track the masses are always gratefully received
> by the powers that be...
> 

Interestingly, none of the press coverage even mentioned the
*issue* of privacy.  I've told Tom Burroughes at the East
Anglian Daily Times (tom@reptile.demon.co.uk); he's deputy chief
reporter there, and was a speaker at ECFP '93.  He's looking
into it now; if you wish to speak to him, call 0473-230-023 and
ask for him in the newsroom.  He may be out, as he's also chief
court and legal reporter, but he always calls back.

I'll be calling Australia in a few minutes to see if I can raise
Simon Davies, who's out there on business.  Simon
(davies@privint.demon.co.uk) is director of Privacy
International, and was another ECFP speaker... the most
well-connected privacy advocate I've ever met.

> G
> 
> 

-- 

Russell Earl Whitaker                   whitaker@eternity.demon.co.uk
Communications Editor                                 AMiX: RWhitaker
EXTROPY: The Journal of Transhumanist Thought
Board member, Extropy Institute (ExI)
    Co-organizer, 2nd European Conference on Computers, Freedom and
    Privacy, London, October 1994






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Harry Shapiro <habs@panix.com>
Date: Mon, 13 Dec 93 05:34:56 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com (Good Guys)
Subject: Humor: I am AC/DC!
Message-ID: <199312131333.AA20702@panix.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I am AC/DC...

	that's  Anarcho Capitalist /with Digital Cash

/hawk
-- 
Harry S. Hawk  				      habs@extropy.org
Electronic Communications Officer, Extropy Institute Inc. 
    	    The Extropians Mailing List, Since 1991
EXTROPY -- A measure of intelligence, information, energy, vitality,
experience, diversity, opportunity, and growth.  EXTROPIANISM -- The
philosophy that seeks to increase extropy.          



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Perry E. Metzger" <pmetzger@lehman.com>
Date: Mon, 13 Dec 93 06:00:05 PST
To: Alexander Chislenko <sasha@cs.umb.edu>
Subject: Re: USENET on a tape
In-Reply-To: <199312130657.AA19815@eris.cs.umb.edu>
Message-ID: <199312131357.IAA19963@snark>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Alexander Chislenko says:
>    Jeremy Porter writes:
>  
> > ... Usenet traffic being rated at some 21gigabytes a year
> > (traffic through UUnet) considering the low information value
> > of the vast majority of it, no one will be interested in storing it.
>  
>    Wait a minute...
>    How much would it cost to store all this info?
> a few hundred thousand dollars a year?

21GB = 5 Exabyte tapes == no more than $50.

Even if you keep it on line, the cost in question is only $15000 or so
with modern disk (at ripoff prices!).

Perry




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Michael Ogden <ogden@uhunix.uhcc.Hawaii.Edu>
Date: Mon, 13 Dec 93 11:50:09 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Unsubscribe
Message-ID: <CMM.0.90.2.755812147.ogden@uhunix3.uhcc.Hawaii.Edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



After numerous attempts at cypherpunks-request@toad.com (but to no avail)
Please unsubscribe me from this list.... Its been a hoot!




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: norm@netcom.com (Norman Hardy)
Date: Mon, 13 Dec 93 09:54:57 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: RSA's phone number
Message-ID: <199312131751.JAA21142@mail.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Can someone give me RSA's Phone number?




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: jon@balder.us.dell.com (Jon Boede)
Date: Mon, 13 Dec 93 08:00:07 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: USENET on a tape
Message-ID: <9312131555.AA00627@balder.us.dell.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Alexander Chislenko <sasha@cs.umb.edu> writes:
>    Jeremy Porter writes:
>  
> > ... Usenet traffic being rated at some 21gigabytes a year
> > (traffic through UUnet) considering the low information value
> > of the vast majority of it, no one will be interested in storing it.
>  
>    Wait a minute...
>    How much would it cost to store all this info?
> a few hundred thousand dollars a year?

Exabyte is coming out with a 25gb 8mm drive, so storing all that traffic for a
year will cost you about $8.95. :-)

Jon

-- 
                     ,,,
                    (o o)
Jon Boede    ----ooO-(_)-Ooo----         jon@dell.com           +1 512 728-4802
Engineering, Dell Computer Corp.    Server OS Development          Austin, TX
 "When I was 10, mean old man Miller's house burned down.  We put home plate
  where his toilet once stood -- his garden became our center field... and in
  these ways the laws of karma were revealed."




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Drunkfux <drunkfux@cypher.com>
Date: Mon, 13 Dec 93 09:40:07 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: HoHoCon 93 : Final Update
Message-ID: <9312131131.aa26376@zero.cypher.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text




[Final Update - December 1, 1993]

[Please see the Miscellaneous Notes section for new information]
(Distribute Freely)



  dFx, Phrack Magazine and cDc - Cult Of The Dead Cow proudly present :


                            The Fourth Annual


                              H O H O C O N


                       "Cliff Stoll My K0DEZ!@$#!"


Who:   All Hackers, Journalists, Security Personnel, Federal Agents,
       Lawyers, Authors, Cypherpunks, Virtual Realists, Modem Geeks,
       Telco Employees, and Other Interested Parties.


Where:        Austin North Hilton & Towers and Super 8 Motel
                        6000 Middle Fiskville Road
                           Austin, Texas  78752
                                  U.S.A.
                 Hilton : (800) 347-0330 / (512) 451-5757
                 Super 8: (800) 800-8000 / (512) 467-8163


When:      Friday December 17 through Sunday December 19, 1993



                             What is HoHoCon?
                             ----------------

HoHoCon is the largest annual gathering of those in, related to, or
wishing to know more about the computer underground. Attendees generally
include some of the most notable members of the "hacking" and "telecom"
community, journalists, authors, security professionals, lawyers, and a
host of others. Previous speakers include John Draper (Cap'n Crunch), Ray
Kaplan, Chris Goggans (Erik Bloodaxe), Bruce Sterling, and many more. The
conference is also one of the very few that is completely open to the
public and we encourage anyone who is interested to attend.


                            Hotel Information
                            -----------------

The Austin North Hilton recently split its complex into two seperate
hotels; the Hilton and the newly added Super 8. HoHoCon guests have the
choice of staying in either hotel. Group rates are as followed :

Super 8: Single - $46.50, Double - $49.50, Triple - $52.50, Quad - $55.50
Hilton : Single - $69.00, Double - $79.00, Triple - $89.00, Quad - $99.00

Once again, the hotel has set aside a block of rooms for the conference
and we recommend making your reservations as early as possible to
guarantee a room within the block, if not to just guarantee a room period.
Rooms for the handicapped are available upon request. To make your
reservations, call the the number listed above that corresponds with where
you are and where you want to stay and make sure you tell them you are
with the HoHoCon conference or else you'll end up throwing more money
away. The hotel accepts American Express, Visa, Master Card, Discover,
Diner's Club, and Carte Blanche credit cards.

Check-in is 3:00 p.m. and check-out is 12:00 noon. Earlier check-in is
available if there are unoccupied rooms available. Please note that in
order for the hotel to hold a room past 6:00 p.m. on the date of arrival,
the individual reservation must be secured by a deposit or guaranteed
with one of the credit cards listed above. Also, any cancellations of
guaranteed reservations must be made prior to 6:00 p.m. on the date of
arrival. You will be responsible for full payment of any guaranteed
reservations which are not cancelled by this time.

The hotel provides transportaton to and from the airport and will give
you full information when you make your reservations.


                                Directions
                                ----------

For those of you who will be driving to the conference, the following
is a list of directions provided by the hotel (so, if they're wrong,
don't blame me): 

Dallas : Take IH 35 south to exit 238-B, the Houston exit. At the first
         stop light, turn right on to 2222. Turn off of 2222 onto Clayton
         Lane (by the Greyhound Station). At the stop sign, turn right
         onto Middle Fiskville, the hotel is on the left.

San Antonio : Take IH 35 north to exit 238-B, the Houston exit. At the
              second stop light, turn left onto 2222. Turn off 2222 onto
              Clayton Lane (by the Greyhoud Station). At the stop sign,
              turn right onto Middle Fiskville, the hotel is on the left.

Houston (on 290) : Take 290 west into Austin. Exit off of 290 at the IH35
                   exit (do not get on 35). Stay on the access road
                   heading west, you will pass two stop lights. Turn off
                   the access road onto Clayton Lane (by the Greyhound
                   Station). At the stop sign, turn right onto Middle
                   Fiskville, the hotel is on the left.

Houston (on 71) : Take 71 west into Austin. Exit onto 183 north. Take
                  183 north to 290 west. Take 290 west to the IH 35 exit.
                  Exit off of 290 at the IH 35 exit (do not get on 35).
                  Stay on the access road heading west, you will pass two
                  stop lights. Turn off the access road onto Clayton Lane
                  (by the Greyhound Stattion). At the stop sign, turn
                  right onto Middle Fiskville, the hotel in on the left.

Airport : Exit the airport parking lot and turn right onto Manor Road.
          Take Manor Road to Airport Boulevard and turn right. Take
          Airport Boulevard to IH 35 north. Take IH 35 to exit 238-B. At
          the second stop light, turn left onto 2222. Turn off of 2222
          onto Clayton Lane (by the Greyhound Station). At the stop sign,
          turn right onto Middle Fiskville, the hotel is on the left.

Call the hotel if these directions aren't complete enough or if you need
additional information.


                            Conference Details
                            __________________

HoHoCon will last 3 days, with the actual conference being held on
Saturday, December 18 starting at 10:00 a.m. and continuing until 5 p.m.
or earlier depending on the number of speakers. The following is a
proposed time table and speaker/topic list :

10:00 - Introduction


10:15 - Ray Kaplan

        Implementation of an Intrusion Tracking and Vulnerability
        Reporting Database

        To Hack or not to Hack - This is NOT the question


11:00 - Bruce Sterling (*)


11:15 - Cryptography Panel : Jim McCoy, Doug Barnes, John Draper

        A general introduction to crypto, including methods and history

        Current crypto debates and discussions : Clipper, Exports, etc.
 
        The importance of cryptography/encryption

        Q&A : Legal notes provided by Steve Ryan and other lawyers.


12:00 - John Draper (Cap'n Crunch)

        Hacking and Phreaking in the USSR - Part 2

        The Rave Scene / Draper's Dance Demonstration

        More interesting stories from the old days
       
        Exercise Tips / Fun with Towels 


1:30 -  Steve Jackson 

        (We're not exactly sure what Steve will be speaking on, but my
         guess is that the SJG case and io.com will bth be covered) 


2:00 -  Intermission


2:30 -  Raffle 


2:45 -  Chris Goggans (Erik Bloodaxe)

        Goggans' Guide to Gifs

        Where to find the good stuff : A introduction to FSP 

        Why I love Germany and the Netherlands

        PoP/FoF : Purveyours of Porn / Followers of Filth

        (Actually, we have no earthly idea what he's speaking on)

 
3:30 -  Lex Luthor

        The LoD Com project


3:45 -  Darren McKeeman

        How to turn a computer conviction into a journalism career


4:15 -  DJKC (*)

        Why printing out /etc/passwd can be a bad idea, aKa
        How I got kicked out of school


4:45 -  Onkeld (Stefan)

        The European scene / Current happenings

        An intorduction to BlueBEEP 


5:00 - Steve Ryan

       Legalities for 94 / Your rights

       EFH - Electronic Frontier Houston

       Legal Q&A


5:30 - Beavis & Butt-Head
 
       This conference sucks



A (*) denotes that these speakers are not 100% confirmed as of yet, but
there is a very good chance they will be speaking. There will also be more 
speakers added during the conference. We are still taking submissions, so
if you would like to speak during the conference, please mail us as soon
as possible and include a brief outline of what you would like to speak 
on and a rough estimate of how long you will need. 

We would like to have people bring interesting items and videos again this
year. If you have anything you think people would enjoy having the chance
to see, please let us know ahead of time, and tell us if you will need any
help getting it to the conference. If all else fails, just bring it to the
con and give it to us when you arrive. Any organization or individual that
wants to bring flyers to distribute during the conference may do so. You
may also send your flyers to us ahead of time if you can not make it to
the conference and we will distribute them for you. Left over flyers are
included with information packets and orders that we send out, so if you
want to send extras, go ahead.


                                   Cost
                                   ----

Unlike smaller, less informative conferences, we do not ask you to shell
out hundreds of dollars just to get in the door, nor do we take your money
and then make you sleep in a tent. We are maintaining the motto of "give
$5 if you can", but due to the incredibly high conference room rate this
year, we may step up to "$5 minimum required donation" or "give us $5 or
we'll smash your head in". Five dollars is an outrageously low price
compared to the suit infested industry conferences or even the new "Cons
are k00l and trendy, I gotta do one too!" conferences that are charging
up to $50 for admission alone.

To encourage people to donate, we will once again be having our wonderless
"Raffle For The Elite" during the conference.  


                           Miscellaneous Notes
                           -------------------

Video cameras will *NOT* be allowed inside the conference room, except
for the people who have received prior consent to film. Still photos 
are fine as each speaker will announce whether he or she minds them
being taken.

The minimum required donation is $5. This basically means that there is
a definite cover charge this year. Everyone who attends will receive one
raffle ticket with more available for an additional cost. Anyone who 
whines about the door cost will be severly beaten with a bat.

Raffle prizes include two computer systems (one is a brand new Packard
Bell 486 and the other is a complete package with monitor and printer),
one flip phone and one brick phone, an autographed copy of Guy Kawasaki's 
"Computer Curmudgeon", "Terminal Compromise" by Winn Schwartau, 6 tapes
(36 hours) of poorly edited cheesy hotel porn, an autographed 'Dazed &
Confused' velvet black-light poster, subscriptions to major and not so
major computer/telecommunications magazines, assorted t-shirts and 
videos, and numerous other items including those we don't know of yet.
Although nobody will ever believe this until they see it, one of the 
major prizes this year is a 4x4 Jeep used by Brandon and Brenda Walsh
(Jason Priestly and Shannen Dougherty) of Beverly Hills 90210. Yes, 
ladies and gentlemen, we are giving away a BRAND NEW CAR.

The starting time of the conference has changed from 11:00 a.m. to 
10:00 a.m.  Keep this in mind when pondering whether or not to down yet
another bottle of Wild Turkey or Mad Dog 20/20 on Friday night.

HoHoCon '93 shirts, as well as last year's video and a new version of the
I Love Feds shirt, will be available during the conference. The shirts
are $15 and the video is $20. We have also added XXL for all you big 
folks. If you are unable to attend the conference and wish to obtain 
any of these items, you may either mail us for more information or 
send a check or money order payable to O.I.S. to the address listed
below. Include $3 per order (not per item) for shipping.

For those who have been asking, I do not expect it to be too cold
during the conference. The weather has been fairly nice as of late.

Due to a major hard disk crash, Metalland Southwest (the HoHoCon BBS) is
down until further notice. Please mail us if you would like information

There will be a small, all female S&M/Bondage presentation on Saturday
night in one of the hospitality suites. Please bring numerous one dollar 
bills. Also, keep this in mind when considering purchasing the HoHoCon 93
video.

Peter Shipley and John Draper have expressed interest in exchanging PGP
keys with other attendess this year. If you wish to partake in this 
activity, bring your key along with you, preferably on a IBM/MS-DOS 
floppy. 

Those of you driving from Houston that wish to join to HoHoConvoy which
leaves for Austin on Friday morning should call the HoHoCon VMB and 
leave a message with a contact number.

By attending the conference, you are consenting to being filmed and
photographed and having your ugly likeness used in any fashion I deem
appropriate.

The HoHoCon sluggo mail address has changed slightly. Due to mail
constantly being delivered to the wrong box or being returned because 
slight addressing mistakes, the box number has been removed and an 
attention line added. If you have had problems mailing us recently,
try again with the new address listed below.
 
 
                              Correspondence
                              --------------

If anyone requires any additional information, needs to ask any questions,
wants to RSVP, wants to order anything, or would like to be added to the
mailing list to receive the HoHoCon updates, you may mail us at:


                            hohocon@cypher.com
                           drunkfux@cypher.com
                              cDc@cypher.com
                          drunkfux@crimelab.com
                           dfx@nuchat.sccsi.com
                         drunkfux@5285 (WWIV Net)     

                          or via sluggo mail at:

                                  O.I.S.
                              ATTN: HoHoCon  
                               1310 Tulane       
                              Houston, Texas
                                77008-4106


We also have a VMB which includes all the conference information and is
probably the fastest way to get updated reports. The number is:

                               713-867-9544

Those of you with net access can ftp to cypher.com and find all the
HoHoCon information available in /pub/hohocon. The .gifs from previous
cons are *not* currently online.

                                                                         
     Same stupid ending statement from last year to make us look good
     ----------------------------------------------------------------

HoHoCon '93 will be a priceless learning experience for professionals and
gives journalists a chance to gather information and ideas direct from the
source. It is also one of the very few times when all the members of the
computer underground can come together for a realistic purpose. We urge
people not to miss out on an event of this caliber, which doesn't happen
very often. If you've ever wanted to meet some of the most famous people
from the hacking community, this may be your one and only chance. Don't
wait to read about it in all the magazines and then wish you had been
there, make your plans to attend now! Be a part of what we hope to be our
largest and greatest conference ever.





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: cfrye@ciis.mitre.org (Curtis D. Frye)
Date: Mon, 13 Dec 93 11:00:08 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Cypherpunks-related Cartoons
Message-ID: <9312131902.AA17760@ciis.mitre.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


A thought struck me yesterday (minimal damage as I saw it coming):  we
should collect references to/copies of Cypherpunks-related cartoons to have
on hand as a tool for spreading the word about electronic privacy.  For
example, I saw a Calvin & Hobbes (last week?) where Calvin's dad bought a
book by cash so the store couldn't track his purchasing habits; Hobbes'
comment in the last frame was something like:  "He's being dragged kicking
and screaming into the information age, eh?"  There's also the _New Yorker_
one with "On the Internet, no one knows you're a dog." and a few Bloom
County's from 1987(???) that feature "secret writing".  This set is perhaps
best summed up by the following (paraphrased) exchange between Opus and
Portenoy, the ground hog:

Frame 1:  Portenoy:  Opus, you're an UKRL head.
          Opus:  (Looks startled.)

Frame 2:  Portenoy:  (Looks happy/relieved)  I've always wanted to say that!

Frame 3:  Portenoy:  This freedom to say what we want is the true meaning of
                     the First Amendment!  I for one love it!  (Walks toward
                     horizon)

Frame 4:  Opus:  (Watches Portenoy depart, turns to address reader over left
                 shoulder)  That doesn't change the fact that I'm an UKRL head.

Anyone else have references to other relevant cartoons?  I'll keep a list
and would be happy to post it whenever there is a significant number of new
entries.

--
Best regards,

Curtis D. Frye
cfrye@ciis.mitre.org
"If you think I speak for MITRE, I'll tell you how much they
 pay me and make you feel foolish."






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Peter H. B. Frelinghuysen" <squez@leland.Stanford.EDU>
Date: Mon, 13 Dec 93 14:45:02 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: unsubscribe me please
Message-ID: <199312132244.OAA03212@elaine2.Stanford.EDU>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


After trying cypherpunks-request@toad.com without
success, I ask: please unsubscribe me from this list.

Thank You



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: jim@bilbo.suite.com (Jim Miller)
Date: Mon, 13 Dec 93 14:00:10 PST
To: cfrye@ciis.mitre.org
Subject: Re: Cypherpunks-related Cartoons
Message-ID: <9312132156.AA00939@bilbo.suite.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Great idea!   I'll keep an eye out.


I have a "Calvin and Hobbes" taped to the wall next to my workstation that  
is perhaps remotely related to things Cypherpunk.    It is more closely  
related to technology in general.  Anyways, it goes something like this...


[Calvin and Hobbes are walking through the woods]


Calvin:

"You know, Hobbes, it seems the only time most people go outside is to  
walk to their cars.

"We have houses, electricity, plumbing, heat...Maybe we're so sheltered  
and comfortable that we've lost touch with the natural world and forgotten  
our place in it.  Maybe we've lost our awe of nature.

"That's why I want to ask you, as a tiger, a wild animal close to nature,  
what you think we're put on earth to do.  What's our purpose in life?  Why  
are we here?"


Hobbes:  [contemplates]

"We're here to devour each other alive."


Calvin:  [stunned/blank look on his face, runs into his house]

"Turn on the lights!  Turn up the heat!"



Jim_Miller@suite.com





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Barbara L Marco <lmb@tenet.edu>
Date: Mon, 13 Dec 93 14:50:10 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Unsubscribe
In-Reply-To: <CMM.0.90.2.755812147.ogden@uhunix3.uhcc.Hawaii.Edu>
Message-ID: <Pine.3.03.9312131635.A19409-8100000@Joyce-Perkins.tenet.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain




On Mon, 13 Dec 1993, Michael Ogden wrote:

> 
> After numerous attempts at cypherpunks-request@toad.com (but to no avail)
> Please unsubscribe me from this list.... Its been a hoot!

Yes, me too!! Please! I have other mail too!!!






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: jim@bilbo.suite.com
Date: Mon, 13 Dec 93 15:15:03 PST
To: cfrye@ciis.mitre.org
Subject: Re: Cypherpunks-related Cartoons
Message-ID: <9312132312.AA02780@bilbo.suite.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain




Here are a couple of software-related cartoons.  They don't directly  
relate to things Cypherpunk, but Cypherpunks may still find them humorous.

The origin of the first one is lost in the mist of time.  My copy is a  
n-th generation photocopy of a photocopy.  It goes like this:


A woman and two children are standing beside a fresh grave site.  It is  
pouring rain and they are huddled under an umbrella.  A man standing next  
to them asks..."I know this may be an awkward time, but do you recall him  
ever mentioning source code?"



The second cartoon is by Scott Adams and is dated 9-8-1992.  It was  
distributed by United Feature Syndicate, Inc.  I don't remember were I got  
my copy.  It goes like this:


[Three older-looking geeky engineer types are sitting at a table,  
presumably taking their lunch break.]

Geek #1:   When I started programming, we didn't have any of these sissy  
"Icons" and "Windows".  All we had were zeros and ones -- and sometimes we  
didn't even have ones.  I wrote an entire database program using only  
zeros.

Geek #2    You had zeros?  We had to use the letter "O".



Jim_Miller@suite.com




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Stanton McCandlish <mech@eff.org>
Date: Mon, 13 Dec 93 17:45:02 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: QUERY: source of info about nat'l. health ID card/number
Message-ID: <199312140137.UAA11734@eff.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Please respond by direct email, not list mail (or both if you dig):

Anyone know the/a/some source(s) of info about this national health ID
card and number plan I'm hearing about?  We need info on this, but I'm
not sure where the latest version of this stuff is, or what stage it's
reached (Hillary's fancy? Legislative action? Development and
implementation?) 

Any info appreciated.

-- 
Stanton  McCandlish  mech@eff.org  1:109/1103   EFF  Online  Activist & SysOp
O P E N  P L A T F O R M   C R Y P T O P O L I C Y   O N L I N E  R I G H T S
N  E  T  W  O  R  K  I  N  G      V  I  R  T  U  A  L     C  U  L  T  U  R  E
I   N   F  O :  M   E   M   B   E   R   S   H   I   P  @  E  F  F  .  O  R  G



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Peter shipley <shipley@merde.dis.org>
Date: Mon, 13 Dec 93 21:33:50 PST
To: bugtraq@crimelab.com
Subject: Sun secure RPC
Message-ID: <9312140530.AA10458@merde.dis.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I remember a referance to Sun's secure RPC where the puplic key
was "insecure" because the it did not use a large "key" (to few bits?).

does anyone one have info on this?

		-Pete




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: jim@Tadpole.COM (Jim Thompson)
Date: Tue, 14 Dec 93 01:53:50 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: PKP, DSS and USGVMT
Message-ID: <9312140953.AA00824@chiba.tadpole.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


 Date: Mon, 13 Dec 1993 20:26:42 -0500
 From: srctran@world.std.com (Gregory Aharonian)
 To: patents@world.std.com
 Subject: Software patent holds up $1 billion network buy
 
 
      A billion dollar DoD procurement for a new communications network maybe
 running into problems because of software patents dealing with encryption.
 The Defense Message System network will serve nearly one million users, and
 will replace a existing global Defense network.  The project, being managed
 by the Air Force Standard Systems Center, will be a billion-dollar boost for
 the C/C++ COTS industry, with companies such as Microsoft, Lotus, ATT, and
 MCI planning to bid on the project.
 
      Unfortunately, the encryption technology planned for use in the DMS
 network is the subject of a long-running battle between the government and
 Public Key Partners (PKP).  PKP claims that the proposed Digital Signature
 Standard (DSS) put forward by the National Institute of Standards (NIST) in
 1991 infringes on public-key patents held by RSA Data Security and Prof.
 Claus Schnorr, both represented by PKP.
 
      Last summer the Commerce Department, after two years of unsuccessfully
 dealing with the legal challenges of PKP's software patents, said it would
 hand over an exclusive license for DSS to PKP.  But over one hundred companies
 condemned the plan as illegal, and NIST backed off.  The deal was also opposed
 by the European Community and the Canadian government.  The deal would allow
 PKP to charge $1 for each public-key certificate issued using DSS.
 
      As of last week, the DoD was not prepared to say whether the procurement
 would be delayed by the patent problem.  Negotiatons between PKP and the
 Commerce Department are still underway.
 
      For information, see an article in December 15, 1993 issue of Network
 World, page 4, on the patent issues, and an article in the November 1 edition
 of Federal Computer Week, page 2, for an article on the DMS procurement.
 
 ============================
 Greg Aharonian
 Internet Patent News Service
 



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: smb@research.att.com
Date: Tue, 14 Dec 93 03:53:52 PST
To: Peter shipley <shipley@merde.dis.org>
Subject: Re: Sun secure RPC
Message-ID: <9312141153.AA22625@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


	 I remember a referance to Sun's secure RPC where the puplic key
	 was "insecure" because the it did not use a large "key" (to few bits?)
	.

	 does anyone one have info on this?

	 		-Pete

Yup.  The modulus is too small, and the key exchange was cryptanalyze
by LaMacchia and Odlyzko.  See

@article{nfscrack,
   author = {Brian A. LaMacchia and Andrew M. Odlyzko},
   journal = {Designs, Codes, and Cryptography},
   pages = {46--62},
   title = {Computation of Discrete Logarithms in Prime Fields},
   volume = {1},
   year = {1991},
}




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Duncan Frissell <frissell@panix.com>
Date: Tue, 14 Dec 93 04:20:32 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: USENET on a tape, and
Message-ID: <199312141220.AA14451@panix.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


To: cypherpunks@toad.com

N >unsure if there is enough evidence to connect you to the crime.  Or, 
N >let's say that they believe you have had a long-involved role in 
N >inciting the breaking of a law. 

N >-nate

But inciting the breaking of the law is "as legal as church on a Sunday."

The President of the US (used to?) do(oes?) it all the time. 

Duncan Frissell

--- WinQwk 2.0b#1165
                                                                                                                         




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Martin Minow <minow@apple.com>
Date: Tue, 14 Dec 93 09:43:52 PST
To: wex@media.mit.edu
Subject: Re:  Signing pictures -- how hard, how long?
Message-ID: <9312141743.AA17043@apple.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


If you have System 7 Pro (and an RSA certificate), you can sign any file,
including a picture stored as EPSF or TIFF or whatever by dropping the
file on your signature -- there are no modifications needed to the
application that created the file. An application can sign pieces of
information within a file (such as the content of a dialog, or the
position of an object) by adding a small amount of code that calls
the Digital Signature Manager. File signatures are verified by the
Finder (or by an application), while object signatures are verified
by the application. The developer toolkit has sample code that shows
how to manage digital signatures, including a drawing program with
signed objects and a Think C class library for signed files and objects.

Martin Minow
minow@apple.com
The above does not represent the position of Apple Computer Inc.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: cman@caffeine.io.com (Douglas Barnes)
Date: Tue, 14 Dec 93 08:13:53 PST
To: wex@media.mit.edu (Alan)
Subject: Re: Signing pictures -- how hard, how long?
In-Reply-To: <9312141523.AA28906@media.mit.edu>
Message-ID: <199312141559.JAA07050@caffeine.caffeine.io.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Actually, I was talking to someone the other day about this same
problem, and spun out approximately the same solution. The important
part would be a fast MD5 chip or equivalent (very fast algorithm) and
the camera would only periodicallly sign the result. 

The question in my mind is, "do you want to sign every N frames, or
only from the digital equivalent of a control track break to a control
track break."  (Obviously digital cameras don't have control track
breaks, but a certified one would need to create an equivalent.)

For use in legal matters, I'd assume you'd need to put seals on the
device, or something, that were periodically inspected, to make sure
the signal wasn't tampered with before hitting the signature module.
I'd imagine that you _could_ incorporate the cameraperson's key, but
more likely it would be some key issued by the certifying agency (a
very high-rep individual or organization) that inspected the camera
periodically, placed the seals, etc.

A problem I see: highly realistic projections might outpace camera
tech, so that you could just be projecting something and recording it.
Might be thwarted by inclusion of a GPS inside the sealed part of
the module.

I was reading David Brin's _Earth_, and one of the things he posits are
these legions of senior citizens with TruVue (or something) glasses
that are apparently certified for crime reporting.

-- 
----------------                                             /\ 
Douglas Barnes            cman@illuminati.io.com            /  \ 
Chief Wizard         (512) 448-8950 (d), 447-7866 (v)      / () \
Illuminati Online          metaverse.io.com 7777          /______\



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Stefan Haag <haag@unixg.ubc.ca>
Date: Tue, 14 Dec 93 10:15:24 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Unsubsribe
Message-ID: <Pine.3.05.9312141021.A19591-8100000@netinfo.ubc.ca>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Sorry for mailing this to the list, but all efforts to unsubscribe by
e-mailing cypherpunks-request@toad.com have failed.  

Please unsubscribe me.  Thanks, Stefan Haag.






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Alan (Miburi-san) Wexelblat" <wex@media.mit.edu>
Date: Tue, 14 Dec 93 07:23:53 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Signing pictures -- how hard, how long?
Message-ID: <9312141523.AA28906@media.mit.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


At the Media Lab, some people have begun discussing the ease with which
digital pictures can be altered.  One suggested way of ameliorating the
problem is to have the original photographer append something like a PGP
signature to the picture.

This doesn't stop the original photographer doctoring the picture before
signing it, but it does stop (I think) people downstream from undetectably
doctoring the pic.  And if the subject of the photo wants to claim it's been
doctored, there's a clearly-responsible person's signature attached.

Anyone performing an operation which changed the bits (such as cropping)
would have to generate a new signature associating his name with the set of
alterations.  With luck, newspapers and other information deliverers who
care about their reputations would not accept unsigned pictures (just as
they don't take pix today without the proper releases).  The end user would
not likely see the signatures (though they could be delivered and checked in
software invisibly to the user), but people with reputations and liability
on the line would.

One associated question has to do with the soon-to-be-productized next
generation of high-end movie cameras.  These are all-digital at the source,
so the question becomes: how hard would it be to build in digital signing at
the source.  In theory, you'd like every frame (probably 70 fps in the
ultra-high end HDTV cameras) to be signed -- how long would that take?
You'd like the signature hardware built into the camera -- what would that
cost?  Can we come up with a relatively reliable way for the camera operator
to handshake with the camera so that it's *his* signature appended to each
frame?  Perhaps by using some hand-held plug-in module to carry the key or
to generate an unique session key each time the camera is turned on?

In my opinion we're never going to get a 100% unspoofable system.  But I
think that a pretty straightforward signature system can get us to a level
of reliability where there is at least someone somewhere we can point the
finger at as the potential source of doctoring.

--Alan Wexelblat, Reality Hacker, Author, and Cyberspace Bard
Media Lab - Advanced Human Interface Group	wex@media.mit.edu
Voice: 617-258-9168 Page: 617-945-1842		an53607@anon.penet.fi
The belief that enhanced understanding will necessarily stir a nation to
action is one of mankind's oldest illusions.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Peter shipley <shipley@merde.dis.org>
Date: Tue, 14 Dec 93 12:03:52 PST
To: charliemerritt@BIX.com
Subject: Re: CELP C Code - where?
In-Reply-To: <9312141402.memo.6242@BIX.com>
Message-ID: <9312142001.AA13007@merde.dis.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/x-pgp


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----


>
>
>While skimming over cypherpunk mail a couple of days
>ago I saw a reference to some C code for CELP de/encoding
>voice.  Where can I get a look? Email charliemerritt@bix.com
>

TITLE="Coded-Excited Linear Prediction (CELP): High-Quality Speech
	at Very Low Bit Rates"
AUTHOR="M. R. Schroeder and B. S. Atal"
BOOKTITLE="Proc. IEEE Int'l Conf. on Acoust., Speech and Signal Processing"
YEAR="1985"
PAGES="937-940"
MONTH="April"



-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.3a

iQBVAgUBLQ4bpnynuL1gkffFAQEofAH9EOCNz9/cWAYkUe9pYFcr0zthSRo/NcNh
G3BGBfYUBFuF6cVaI88Bq7KjG2jG9fSai38wMp1If/NnnMFIm5PWGg==
=BTgi
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: szabo@netcom.com (Nick Szabo)
Date: Tue, 14 Dec 93 12:10:29 PST
To: pcw@access.digex.net (Peter Wayner)
Subject: Re: Signing pictures -- how hard, how long?
In-Reply-To: <199312141803.AA28396@access.digex.net>
Message-ID: <199312142006.MAA29406@mail.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Peter Wayner:
> I think signing photographs and movie images is a difficult
> problem. Why? Because one flipped bit will completely screw
> up the hash function.

Is a one-way hash function or digital signature possible with the
following property: signature verification doesn't just determine
the boolean altered vs. pristine, but also shows the picture
distance between the altered and original?  Forgery may often
require an editing distance much greater than the error rate
from media noise or lossy compression.

Nick Szabo				szabo@netcom.com



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Date: Tue, 14 Dec 93 12:33:52 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Signing Images Not So Useful Now
Message-ID: <199312142031.MAA00575@mail.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



I don't think signing digital images is especially useful right not.
This is not to say we shouldn't discuss it, or that someone out there
won't make some bucks on such a product.

Some points:

* signing at the digital camera level is the most unlikely, currently,
as most digital images are currently made by _scanning_ conventional
slides or prints. (Slide scanners are readily available, with >1200
dpi, and even higher, resolution.)

* as others have noted, almost all digital images are further massaged
in PhotoShop or the like. Even Nick Szabo's "picture distance" idea is
of marginal use, as many common filter operations introduce very large
picture distances and/or Hamming distance. Determining "alikeness"
metrics of an image and a suspected forgery or copyright violation
will be a challenge. (Could be a nice little niche business for a 
"expert witness" on such things, though.)

* most ripped-off images are of course done by using scanners. All
those "Playboy" and "Penthouse" images you see on the Net are done
with scanners. (Both Playboy and Penthouse offer on-line services, so
I suppose it's possible some of the bootleg images are in fact digital
copies. In these cases, a signature might reveal the copyright
violation. A simple Gaussian blur in PhotoShop would of course erase
most conceivable signatures. There may be some way to introduce
something that can't be easily blurred away, though...)

* the most common means of detecting forgeries and copyright
violations is of course the human recognition of such images, the
recognition that an image came from a well-known source.


--Tim May

-- 
..........................................................................
Timothy C. May         | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,  
tcmay@netcom.com       | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
408-688-5409           | knowledge, reputations, information markets, 
W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA  | black markets, collapse of governments.
Higher Power: 2^756839 | Public Key: PGP and MailSafe available.
Note: I put time and money into writing this posting. I hope you enjoy it.



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Peter Wayner <pcw@access.digex.net>
Date: Tue, 14 Dec 93 10:03:52 PST
To: cman@caffeine.io.com
Subject: Re: Signing pictures -- how hard, how long?
Message-ID: <199312141803.AA28396@access.digex.net>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



I think signing photographs and movie images is a difficult
problem. Why? Because one flipped bit will completely screw
up the hash function. Errors on these tapes happen rarely,
but most video manufacturers aren't really going to bother
worrying about occasional bit errors because they're usually
invisible to the eye. Why waste all that extra effort on
error correction if it's not worth the trouble. So signed
photographs will also need to contain all of the error 
correction necessary and that will make them more expensive.
This isn't any real cost on a general purpose machine, but
it matters in some places.





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: collins@newton.apple.com (Scott Collins)
Date: Tue, 14 Dec 93 13:43:52 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Error-Qualifying Signatures
Message-ID: <9312142142.AA16049@newton.apple.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


(Oops, forgot to include 'punks, sorry Nick)

Nick Szabo asks:
  >Is a one-way hash function or digital signature possible with the
  >following property: signature verification doesn't just determine
  >the boolean altered vs. pristine, but also shows the picture
  >distance between the altered and original?

This is possible.  It is not a desirable quality for secure-hashes in most
other situations because it compromises the privacy of the original
message.  Hash functions are usually designed specifically to avoid this.


Scott Collins         | "Few people realize what tremendous power there
                      |  is in one of these things."     -- Willy Wonka
......................|................................................
BUSINESS.   voice:408.862.0540  fax:974.6094   collins@newton.apple.com
Apple Computer, Inc.   5 Infinite Loop, MS 305-2B   Cupertino, CA 95014
.......................................................................
PERSONAL.   voice/fax:408.257.1746    1024:669687   catalyst@netcom.com






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Jim McCoy <mccoy@ccwf.cc.utexas.edu>
Date: Tue, 14 Dec 93 11:50:27 PST
To: wex@media.mit.edu (Alan)
Subject: Re: Signing pictures -- how hard, how long?
In-Reply-To: <9312141523.AA28906@media.mit.edu>
Message-ID: <199312141947.AA03045@tramp.cc.utexas.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text


> From: "Alan (Miburi-san) Wexelblat" <wex@media.mit.edu>
> 
> At the Media Lab, some people have begun discussing the ease with which
> digital pictures can be altered.  One suggested way of ameliorating the
> problem is to have the original photographer append something like a PGP
> signature to the picture.
[...]
> One associated question has to do with the soon-to-be-productized next
> generation of high-end movie cameras.  These are all-digital at the source,
> so the question becomes: how hard would it be to build in digital signing at
> the source.  In theory, you'd like every frame (probably 70 fps in the
> ultra-high end HDTV cameras) to be signed -- how long would that take?

Well, the compression problem that others have mentioned is going to be one
problem, and an additional problem that occurs to me is that putting the
signature mechanism into the camera may not be the best locatoin for it.  I
do not know of any work that people would want to sign (e.g. would be worth
protecting from fraud) that did not undergo some post-processing...

One idea that sort of popped into my head if people want to do
post-processing signatures has to do with something else I remember hearing
about from the media lab:  you stack all of the frames together into a sort
of cube structure (like a deck of cards, for example) and then select and
sign random number of planes from different angles that intersect this
cube.  While not impervious to the fraud you are trying to detect, it does
create a much more managable detached signature (somehow I think that
creating 4200 signatures per minute is going to end up being viewed as a
bit unwieldy... :)  I think that you could even make the plane selection
ahead of time and then do it on-the-fly as the work is being filmed.  You
just keep track of which/where planes will intersect the frame being
generated and store the results of these intersections to a buffer that is
then signed before the storage media is ejected.

jim



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: sdw@meaddata.com (Stephen Williams)
Date: Tue, 14 Dec 93 10:53:53 PST
To: pcw@access.digex.net (Peter Wayner)
Subject: Re: Signing pictures -- how hard, how long?
In-Reply-To: <199312141803.AA28396@access.digex.net>
Message-ID: <9312141851.AA04601@jungle.meaddata.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I doubt if it's that simple:  I'm sure that digital movies will
use compression (mpeg, etc.).  One flipped bit could scramble the
whole frame.  Even with lossless compression, error correction would
be worth adding.

It's going to be much easier to compress to mpeg in hardware than to
design tape that can handle the required frame rate/resolution without
compression.

> 
> 
> I think signing photographs and movie images is a difficult
> problem. Why? Because one flipped bit will completely screw
> up the hash function. Errors on these tapes happen rarely,
> but most video manufacturers aren't really going to bother
> worrying about occasional bit errors because they're usually
> invisible to the eye. Why waste all that extra effort on
> error correction if it's not worth the trouble. So signed
> photographs will also need to contain all of the error 
> correction necessary and that will make them more expensive.
> This isn't any real cost on a general purpose machine, but
> it matters in some places.
> 

sdw
-- 
Stephen D. Williams  Local Internet Gateway Co.; SDW Systems 513 496-5223APager
LIG dev./sales       Internet: sdw@lig.net CIS 76244.210@compuserve.com
OO R&D Source Dist.  By Horse: 2464 Rosina Dr., Miamisburg, OH 45342-6430
GNU Support          ICBM: 39 34N 85 15W I love it when a plan comes together



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: charliemerritt@BIX.com
Date: Tue, 14 Dec 93 11:10:26 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: CELP C Code - where?
Message-ID: <9312141402.memo.6242@BIX.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain




While skimming over cypherpunk mail a couple of days
ago I saw a reference to some C code for CELP de/encoding
voice.  Where can I get a look? Email charliemerritt@bix.com





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: an12070@anon.penet.fi (Cryptoanarchist Assassination Squad   )
Date: Tue, 14 Dec 93 08:00:24 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Surrender or Die
Message-ID: <9312141556.AA16003@anon.penet.fi>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


There has been some extremely strong speculation as to our 
identity lately. It's time for us to identify ourselves. We are
Operation CRaP, the Cryptoanarchist Repression and Poison, and 
we have infiltrated your own conspiracy to the most sensitive 
levels. L.Detweiler retypes most notes to prevent style analysis
and inference detection that would lead to our identities. 
We have infiltrated the *interesting* mailing list, have a 
'bug' planted at crl.com, and a brilliant spy in one of your 
most sensitive development projects. Finally, we have an 
informant very close to one of the Big Three. We would be more 
specific, to prove it, but we can't do so without compromising 
our contacts.  However, we can tell you that we got bored of 
your silly open meetings and stopped going to them a long time 
ago because they don't have anything to do with what you're 
*really* doing! We have been engaged since the talk on this 
list led us to suspicions and the discoveries of the deceptions
and accomplices involved in the Wired article (Kelly,Dyer).

Tentacle hunting is one of our favorite pastimes, and we have
developed a variety of techniques to hunt down and kill snakes. 
We also have been able to detect some of the more atrocious
pseudopooling. But we lost interest in the `small fries' when 
the smell led us to the `big macs'. In fact, we would have
dropped the tentacle hunting business if it weren't so 
spectacularly pervasive among the Big Three. After you
penetrated RISKS and continued to lie and cover up, it became
clear that you will truly stop at nothing to protect your
tentacles. We think that you could stop immediately, or
someone could get hurt, or a truly great disaster could 
occur.

All of our postings are careful craftings of disinformation and 
actual truth that are designed to elicit the maximum degree of 
desperate paranoia on your part. Sometimes when e.g. L.Detweiler
says somewhere `I know' or 'in fact' he means `I think' and 
sometimes `I suspect' really means `we have long had extremely 
incriminating evidence on this that would convict you in any 
court in the country, and plan to eventually, but we're just 
tormenting you at the moment to see how loud you can shriek and 
how much you can squirm'. 

Our `cyberspatial' campaign is one of our more effective 
measures in promoting your disintegration without 
exposing our extremely stategic positions within your 
organization, but we have not yet employed the `big artillery'. 
We are actively destroying your conspiracy so that you will 
no longer sabotage the growth of cyberspace. We are quite 
amused to use your own guerrila sabotage tactics against your
fragile excuse for 'development'. We are especially amused 
at your fright at our 'violent death threats'. We are 
particularly focused on your quasi-criminal activities. You 
are already aware of many signs of our countermeasures. You 
have the chance to give up now or face serious escalation and 
vastly more grisly consequences. You have 24 hours before we
launch our next cyberspatial strike.

We now return you to your regularly scheduled perversions.

-------------------------------------------------------------------------
To find out more about the anon service, send mail to help@anon.penet.fi.
Due to the double-blind, any mail replies to this message will be anonymized,
and an anonymous id will be allocated automatically. You have been warned.
Please report any problems, inappropriate use etc. to admin@anon.penet.fi.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: edgar@spectrx.saigon.com (Edgar W. Swank)
Date: Tue, 14 Dec 93 16:20:41 PST
To: Cypherpunks          <cypherpunks@toad.com>
Subject: MTGS: Conflict Alert
Message-ID: <1Dokec11w165w@spectrx.saigon.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

If the Cypherpunks schedule their January '94 meeting on the 2nd
Saturday, Jan 8, that will conflict with a party announced
by visiting Exi fireman Harry (Hawk) Shapiro. Harry said:

    As I announced a month or so ago, I am holding a party on Jan 8,
    at the Shearaton Palace Hotel in San Fran.

    Jan 8th is the last day of MacWorld.  Hopefully a group of us will
    meet for dinner arround 6pm.  The party will start about 8 or
    8:30.

As I doubt either Harry or MacWorld will change their schedules for
our benefit, I suggest the Cypherpunks consider (and announce with
plenty of lead time) changing theirs to the Saturday after (Jan 15)
(The Saturday before is New Year's day).

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.3a

iQCVAgUBLQ3ZId4nNf3ah8DHAQEJ6gP9GnsdIuxnTK2fYDuVKEULDOCnLzBcYJKZ
omv6A42BhRjBxDh5qnKbJXjjN7P4rIzsI+0F2GMO/LPyx9IQnTZ9iGJ2Q4hteL97
ueL/BirVX//39mNwmf9DsWej59GEzKUgBbsjv3E14aHsOJhO6wWh9Swg3qZeJJuR
fVSWJP3ynCY=
=0bKX
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

--
edgar@spectrx.saigon.com (Edgar W. Swank)
SPECTROX SYSTEMS +1.408.252.1005  Cupertino, Ca





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: plaz@netcom.com (Geoff Dale)
Date: Tue, 14 Dec 93 17:10:29 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: MTGS: Conflict Alert
Message-ID: <199312150109.RAA15434@mail.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>If the Cypherpunks schedule their January '94 meeting on the 2nd
>Saturday, Jan 8, that will conflict with a party announced
>by visiting Exi fireman Harry (Hawk) Shapiro. Harry said:
>
>    As I announced a month or so ago, I am holding a party on Jan 8,
>    at the Shearaton Palace Hotel in San Fran.
>
>    Jan 8th is the last day of MacWorld.  Hopefully a group of us will
>    meet for dinner arround 6pm.  The party will start about 8 or
>    8:30.
>
>As I doubt either Harry or MacWorld will change their schedules for
>our benefit, I suggest the Cypherpunks consider (and announce with
>plenty of lead time) changing theirs to the Saturday after (Jan 15)
>(The Saturday before is New Year's day).

Actually, there were plans to move the CyPunks meeting to Sat, Jan 15
anyway, since Jan 8th already conflicts with something else (Usenix?
something Unix-y).

Of course, the 15th is when the ExI-BATF (Extropy Institute - Bay Area
Transhumanist/Task Force, for the extropianly-impaired) meeting would
normally be held. I think we can ask Dave Krieger to put this off one week
to the 22nd. If so, then I'll be happy. What d'ya say Dave?

_______________________________________________________________________
Geoff Dale    -- insert standard disclaimers here --  Plastic Beethoven
plaz@netcom.com                        ExI-Freegate Virtual Branch Head
plaz@io.com                                            66 Pyramid Plaza
Cypherpunk/Extropian                    Freegate, Metaverse@io.com 7777
          "Once you've gone plastic, you can never go back."  










From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Alan (Miburi-san) Wexelblat" <wex@media.mit.edu>
Date: Tue, 14 Dec 93 14:23:53 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Signing pictures -- how hard, how long?
In-Reply-To: <199312142006.MAA29406@mail.netcom.com>
Message-ID: <9312142220.AA08575@media.mit.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I think that compression is a non-problem.  It's an example of a change
which can be signed.  Here's what I imagine:

<SCENE> -> DigiCamera -> DigiEditor -> Compress -> Xmit -> Uncompress ->View

At each step of the way, it should be possible to sign the image.  I
disagree with the thought that we don't need signature in the camera.
Remember that a signature is not intended to *prevent* forgery as much as to
provide a trail of responsibility.  Thus a picture taken with my digicamera
should contain a signature generated from the camera's key and mine.  I'm
the artist responsible for initially capturing the scene and I'm responsible
for the claimed accuracy of the resulting picture.  Similarly I want to sign
every frame because I can't predict which frame(s) are going to be edited
out and which frame is going to be turned into a still picture that appears
on the front page of everyone's newspaper.

[The comment about GPS info in the camera is not far off.  Cameras that know
where they are will be about 1 generation behind the first digital cameras.]

If someone takes the "film" I've shot and edits it, I expect that edited
version to be re-signed by the person who does the edit (possibly generating
a new original signature or a signature based on my initial signature).
Just as today negatives are kept archived for years, the editor will keep a
disk archive of my original -- again, we preserve the chain of
responsibility.

Lossy compression takes two basic forms.  One is block-truncation-like,
where the whole picture is sent at each frame, but some (presumably
perceptually insignificant) bits are omitted.  The other is MPEG-like where
only certain key frames are sent as whole pictures; the intermediate frames
are sent as deltas to the most recent whole frame.  In either case, a coded
picture is, for signature purposes, like an uncoded picture.  It can be
signed, with a signature generated from the equipment and the operator keys.
For MPEG-like compression you might sign the deltas or you might sign the
resulting picture (previous image with new delta applied).

The problem with bit-rot is a more significant one.  In this case you might
want to compute your hash not over every bit of the image, but over the
"significant" ones.  That way if you lose low-order bits that no one cares
about your signature is still valid.





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: jim@bilbo.suite.com (Jim Miller)
Date: Tue, 14 Dec 93 17:00:29 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: anonymous video rental store
Message-ID: <9312150059.AA15316@bilbo.suite.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain




I couldn't sleep last night and, as is often the case, my brain gets a  
mind of its own and starts thinking irrelevant thoughts.  The irrelevant  
thought that occupied my brain's mind last night was "anonymous video  
rental store - Is it possible?"

Ignoring for the moment the "fact" that video rental stores will some day  
go the way of the dinosaurs, would it be possible to structure a video  
rental store with the following properties:

1) The store could not track which customers rented which tapes.

2) The store *could* tell which tapes get rented and which tapes do not  
get rented.  The store would adjust it's selection of tapes based in this  
information. (get more of the popular tapes, remove the unpopular ones)

3) The store could some how penalize customers that returned tapes late,  
or not at all.  The nature of the "penalty" is flexible.  This implies  
that the store could somehow verify that the tape a customer returned is  
the same tape the customer rented, but without discovering which tape it  
is.  (I believe this is the hard part)


I have a partial solution.  Here it is:

The store is arranged like a Blockbuster video store in that there are a  
bunch of shelves with videos on them.  For each video, there is a box  
describing the video and a variable number of tapes co-located with the  
box.  In a Blockbuster video store, the tapes are in plastic cases that  
identify the video on the tape. In the AVRS (Anon Video Rental Store), the  
plastic cases would not contain any identification.  However, the tapes  
themselves *would* contain some kind of identification (stickers with  
video name and bar code, for example)

When a customer enters the AVRS, it (the customer) grabs a random handful  
of tokens from an "available" bin.  These tokens each contain a unique  
identifier.  The customer walks around the store searching for videos.   
When the customer finds a video, it takes one of the plastic cases  
(opening it to verify it really is the movie it wants).  The customer  
inserts one of the tokens into a pocket that exists on the outside of the  
plastic case.  The pocket is transparent and the token's identification  
number can be seen.

The customer selects the videos it wants, inserting tokens into pockets.   
When the customer is done, it returns the unused tokens to the "available"  
bin and proceeds to the check-out counter.

The customer hands the clerk an AVRS id card.  The AVRS id card contains  
information about the customer (TBD).  The clerk at the checkout counter  
scans the id card and the tokens that were placed in plastic case pockets.   
From this information, the AVRS knows that the customer identified by the  
AVRS id card has rented N tapes on a given day.  (Actually, all the clerk  
*really* knows is that the customer has rented N tokens.)  The clerk  
collects some money, the customer leaves with the plastic cases, tapes,  
and tokens.

The customer returns to the store a couple of days later.  The customer  
removes the tokens from the case pockets.  The customer places the plastic  
cases (with tape inside) in a "tape return" bin and places the tokens in a  
"token return" bin, and then leaves.

Periodically throughout the day, a clerk examines the tapes in the "tape  
return" bin.  The clerk opens each case and scans the bar code on the  
tape.  This way the AVRS can track which tapes get rented and which tapes  
do not get rented.  The clerk returns the plastic cases (with tapes) to  
the shelves.

At the end of the day, a clerk collects the tokens from the "token return"  
bin and scans them.  The computer marks the tokens as returned and clears  
the appropriate customer record.  The clerk places the tokens in the  
"available" bin.

----

The most obvious problem with this scheme is that the store has no way of  
knowing if the tape the customer returned is the same tape the customer  
rented.  A customer could return a blank tape without getting caught.

(A less obvious problem with the scheme is that the store could use  
surveillance cameras to identify which tapes the customer selected, but I  
chose to ignore that problem.)

The problem to solve, then is: how can the store catch dishonest  
customers, yet be unable to track which customer rented which video?

There needs to be an additional step at the time a customer returns a  
tape.  The store needs to be able verify that the tape a customer is  
returning is a tape that was rented from that store and is not overdue.   
The store doesn't need to know what tape it is, or who is returning it,  
just that it came from that store and is not overdue.  If the tape *is*  
overdue, then the customer must personally return the tape to a clerk and  
pay a fine. (and risk a bit of anonymity)

Perhaps we could embed some electronics in the tape cassette (or sticker)  
that would enable a clerk to store a signed "due-back" timestamp on the  
cassette without being able to store any information that would identify  
the tape.  The signed timestamp would have to be transferred through the  
plastic case, since opening the case would reveal the tape inside.  Sounds  
sort of like a blind signature.

Needless to say, it should be difficult for the customer to tamper with  
the information on the cassette.

Any comments or better ideas?


Jim_Miller@suite.com





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: kqb@whscad1.att.com
Date: Tue, 14 Dec 93 16:20:29 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Signing pictures -- how hard, how long?
Message-ID: <9312150016.AA04637@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Alan (Miburi-san) Wexelblat <wex@media.mit.edu> said:
> The problem with bit-rot is a more significant one.  In this case you might
> want to compute your hash not over every bit of the image, but over the
> "significant" ones.  That way if you lose low-order bits that no one cares
> about your signature is still valid.

If your signature does not include the low order bits of your image,
then someone could embed a secret message in those low order bits
(via Romana Machado's "Stego," for example) and your signature still
would be valid.  I wouldn't want my signature over someone else's
steganized message.

I'm sure there's a simple fix for that, such as ensuring enough bit rot
to blow away any but the most error-tolerant steganography or including
a disclaimer of responsibility for the low-order bits, but I couldn't
resist pointing it out.

                              Kevin Q. Brown
                              INTERNET    kqb@whscad1.att.com
                                 or       kevin_q_brown@att.com




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: pierre@shell.portal.com (Pierre Uszynski)
Date: Tue, 14 Dec 93 20:10:30 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re:  anonymous video rental store
Message-ID: <9312150406.AA02631@jobe.shell.portal.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> (A less obvious problem with the scheme is that the store could use  
> surveillance cameras to identify which tapes the customer selected, but I  
> chose to ignore that problem.)

An other way to cheat would be also to process the returns faster...

In the US (California?), since a well known case, (sorry, no
bibliographically correct reference is at hand here) it is illegal
for video stores to disclose rental records anyway. [Knowledgeable
videomaniacs are welcome to fill in detailed references and whether
it is illegal to collect such records, or just to misuse them. I seem
to remember also that video stores cannot market their customer lists
(as mailing lists). Before I spread anymore rumors, anybody knows the
details? (It's probably no use asking somebody in a video store, they
would be the last ones to know :-) a problem of our current legal
system...]

In any event, the case of concern when trying to build protocols and
hardware for anonymous video rental is when the store personel is
dishonnest. There is little point in trying to postpone this
consideration.

Pierre Uszynski
pierre@shell.portal.com




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: terry.smith@canrem.com (Terry Smith)
Date: Sat, 18 Dec 93 05:21:39 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Writable CD-ROMS as one-t
In-Reply-To: <9311127557.AA755749462@GVSU.EDU>
Message-ID: <60.1516.6525.0C18EB00@canrem.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


          Trestrab@gvsu.edu wrote 
 |-------------------------------|
>
>Is there anything inherently superior about CD-ROMs as a one-time
>pad ? The size differential vis a vis Bernouli drive cartridges,
>floptical disk drives, or just plain old floppy disks is kind of a
>mixed blessing, and still doesn't answer the major question with
>one-time pads - secure dissemination.
>
>          Jeff
 |-------------------------------|

If you record - say - 5 of them and send them by 5 seperate couriers and
xor them together to send the message, your enemy has to compromise etc
5 people.


                    Terry Smith - XANTH sysop - 1:259/510
                CI$ 70733,3013 PGP 2.3A KEY FREQABLE AS 'KEY'.
 My opinions are not that of my company. But one day they WILL be! And then -
                        the -+*WORLD*+- Bwaw ha ha !!.
                       Read the Tick and others by NEC.

---
 * TLX v1.55 * Can't wait for them 100Gb, 10ns drives!




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Perry E. Metzger" <pmetzger@lehman.com>
Date: Tue, 14 Dec 93 18:53:52 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: picture signatures
Message-ID: <199312150253.VAA25863@snark>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Could someone please tell me why I would possibly want to sign a
picture? All it proves is that I had it in my possession -- it says
nothing at all about if its been hacked (and indeed, it can be hacked
regardless of what one does). A digital signature on a picture is no
better than a court oath saying "yes, I took this picture". The only
time you might ever want ANYTHING digitally signed is if you have
doubts as to its origin or if someone might deny having signed it. It
doesn't do you any good vis a vis verifying origin of a thing.

.pm




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: jdblair@nextsrv.cas.muohio.EDU
Date: Tue, 14 Dec 93 19:55:42 PST
To: pmetzger@lehman.com
Subject: Re: picture signatures
In-Reply-To: <199312150253.VAA25863@snark>
Message-ID: <9312150421.AA15749@ nextsrv.cas.muohio.EDU >
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

>
> Could someone please tell me why I would possibly want to sign a
> picture? All it proves is that I had it in my possession -- it says
> nothing at all about if its been hacked (and indeed, it can be hacked
> regardless of what one does). A digital signature on a picture is no
> better than a court oath saying "yes, I took this picture". The only
> time you might ever want ANYTHING digitally signed is if you have
> doubts as to its origin or if someone might deny having signed it. It
> doesn't do you any good vis a vis verifying origin of a thing.
>
> .pm
>

Why does anyone ever sign anything?  Why did I sign this?  The 
signature attaches the reputation associated w/ a particular key to
this particular block of data.  I can be certain that you will either
get exactly what I wrote, or no if what you recieved isn't.

You know this already.  The point is, attaching a signature to a
picture guarentees that a picture I create hasn't been modified w/o
people knowing that its changed since it left my hands.  My pictures
could have reputations attached to them without the use of
digital signatures.  This reputation could be used against me if a
picture is modified, and my name is still attached to it, but with no
verifiable digital signature similarly attached.

- -john
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.3

iQBVAgUBLQ5S8KNqtARNqVmxAQEJuAIAlgpPdPRM+2suslbkF63Nyg14lfBSsT4H
hNTGbLLkRVvf/PToW2zmRtufo2WnRvqdkVDrE/WUxhPtvl/3MVIumQ==
=+S/A
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

------------------------------------------------------------------------------
John Blair <jdblair@nextsrv.cas.muohio.edu>              phone: (513) 529-4879
    Insert cool signature file that makes a trendy, yet bold and original
   statement about my cyberspace proficiency, then mentions that I'll send
   you my PGP public key if you want it, and you trust that I'm actually me.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: greg@ideath.goldenbear.com (Greg Broiles)
Date: Thu, 16 Dec 93 10:36:00 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Keyservers and anonymous Mailings
Message-ID: <soeLec2w165w@ideath.goldenbear.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

Black Unicorn <uunet!access.digex.net!unicorn> writes:

> It seems that PGP keyservers have been attacked of late for 
> alleged copyright violations.  Nice tactic if you are PKP I guess.  
> Has anyone considered the use of anonymous remailers to run a 
> keyserver?  A double blind keyserver might solve the operator a 
> good deal of heat.

As far as I can tell, the copyright issue exists only in David 
Sternlight's addled mind; and even he has conceded that he's got no 
factual basis for asserting that PGP might infringe someone's copyright. 
I can't tell if his messages about this reflect actual confusion about 
the difference between patent and copyright, or if he's simply stumbled 
across another FUD tactic to use against PGP.


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.4

iQCVAgUBLQ7bV33YhjZY3fMNAQGG1QP/XbLehbgzvvdsSeN1YSKeKQGoZM0XigBt
0JClAQXHaoMeu2PDh4et7Txhq+IOvhAwrW3xCB+0aEXWiyZ3XGU0Z5rYL4e57/q6
Z5IgeYyPO/5DSIc+45XlwdC24X2MPENvex2IN2dYypGU4fUIff2GxaTW4hc4458u
Agno8lsCjs4=
=cjSg
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

--
Greg Broiles                       Lemon Detweiler Pledge?
greg@goldenbear.com                  You're soaking in it.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: wcs@anchor.ho.att.com (bill.stewart@pleasantonca.ncr.com +1-510-484-6204)
Date: Wed, 15 Dec 93 00:40:32 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: signing pictures
Message-ID: <9312150840.AA19706@anchor.ho.att.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


One reason that signing pictures could be useful is so that you could tell 
that a given picture came from, say, FoobarFoto Mark IV Camera Serial #32767,
which lets you know that the photo was digitally retouched after it was taken.
Yes, it's easy for someone to transform that into an unsigned picture,
simply by twiddling a few bits (doing so at the end of the bitstream
lets you minimize any corruption, btw), but you can at least be sure that
a signed video or still picture was faked in real-space before digitizing it...
and it's easier to detect those fakes, though reputable publications like
the National Enquirer and the TV news programs showing exploding cars
still have trouble on occasion :-)

		Bill
# Bill Stewart  NCR Corp, 6870 Koll Center Parkway, Pleasanton CA, 94566
# Voice/Beeper 510-224-7043, Phone 510-484-6204
# email bill.stewart@pleasantonca.ncr.com billstewart@attmail.com




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: wcs@anchor.ho.att.com (bill.stewart@pleasantonca.ncr.com +1-510-484-6204)
Date: Wed, 15 Dec 93 00:53:53 PST
To: cypherwonks@lists.eunet.fi
Subject: He's Baaack!
Message-ID: <9312150852.AA19770@anchor.ho.att.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Keywords: Detweiler

Yeah, one of his tentacles is posting to Cypherpunks again; unfortunately
we haven't really decided how to do a good reputation system yet,
so filtering out these sorts of attacks without also trashing newbies
and causing other collateral damage isn't easy yet.

However, I can report that at the December physical Cypherpunks meeting
in the Bay Area, Tim May pointed out that *all* the major tentacles were there -
Tim, Eric, John Gilmore, Nick Szabo, and Jamie Dinkelacker.  Just for fun,
I asked Jamie if I could see his driver's license (it's a "real" California
license), and Tim, Eric, and Nick also presented theirs.  (John was
out of the room doing Cygnus business, but I've known him for 6-7 years.)
Either they're all separate people, or Tim/Eric/Dr.Moriarty/Jamie/Medusa
hired a bunch of actors and got good fake California ID for them.
On the other hand, I suppose this just means that *I'm* one of the
tentacles now, but I guess that's just a risk you've got to take
in the search for Truth, Justice, and the American Way....

				Tentacle #9

# Also known as
# Bill Stewart  NCR Corp, 6870 Koll Center Parkway, Pleasanton CA, 94566
# Voice/Beeper 510-224-7043, Phone 510-484-6204
# email bill.stewart@pleasantonca.ncr.com billstewart@attmail.com




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Alan (Miburi-san) Wexelblat" <wex@media.mit.edu>
Date: Wed, 15 Dec 93 06:20:39 PST
To: pmetzger@lehman.com
Subject: picture signatures
In-Reply-To: <199312150253.VAA25863@snark>
Message-ID: <9312151419.AA21637@media.mit.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


As I noted in my original message, signatures on pictures are not intended
to prevent doctoring, but to show where the doctoring was done.  A signature
is indeed like an affidavat; it associates the reputation of the signatory
party with the picture and provides a back-trace of the flow of the bits and
sites of possible malfeasance.

The idea is that if I have a picture I think is good and true and honest I
want to be able to sign it in such a way that if it appears later in
doctored form I can prove that those picture bits are NOT mine.  If someone
wants to make an honest change to a photo (like cropping to fit on a printed
page), he has to sign that change.  It's protection for photographers,
essentially, and for editors.

This way when someone complains "Hey!  Cropping me out of that picture
totally changes its meaning!" I can show that the complainer was in fact in
the picture I took.

--Alan Wexelblat, Reality Hacker, Author, and Cyberspace Bard
Media Lab - Advanced Human Interface Group	wex@media.mit.edu
Voice: 617-258-9168 Page: 617-945-1842		an53607@anon.penet.fi
The belief that enhanced understanding will necessarily stir a nation to
action is one of mankind's oldest illusions.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: paul@poboy.b17c.ingr.com (Paul Robichaux)
Date: Wed, 15 Dec 93 07:40:39 PST
To: sdw@meaddata.com (Stephen Williams)
Subject: Re: anonymous video rental store
In-Reply-To: <9312151455.AA07413@jungle.meaddata.com>
Message-ID: <199312151538.AA13605@poboy.b17c.ingr.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

> How about an anon deposit service that multiple companies (utilities,
> etc.) could put claims on, similar to VISA holds.

The ideal implementation would be as a cash pool: you put in a total
of $X to cover your utility and service deposits, then provide
potential claimants with blinded withdrawal tokens.

So, when I go to Huntsville Utilities and ask them to turn on the
power at my house, rather than writing a check or giving them personal
information, I just tell give them a blinded token which they could
use to withdraw $X from my account at the Austin-Internet Credit
Union.

One potential problem is that some services (phone, gas, water)
require physical location information as part of their service. You
have to give the correct physical address for infrastructure services,
but you could give a false name. Other services, though, like the video
rental store, probably wouldn't care. 

Another problem is how you ensure security of transactions: you don't
want the service provider to debit the account unnecessarily, and the
service provider will want to keep you from closing the account and
leaving them without payment. I suspect that a properly blinded
protocol would work but haven't brainstormed one yet.

- -Paul

- -- 
Paul Robichaux, KD4JZG     | Richard Davis was twice convicted of kidnapping. 
Intergraph Federal Systems | He was released twice; then he killed Polly Klass.
Not speaking for Intergraph| Why wasn't he in jail? Why's he still alive? 


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From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: sdw@meaddata.com (Stephen Williams)
Date: Wed, 15 Dec 93 06:55:55 PST
To: Jim_Miller@bilbo.suite.com
Subject: Re: anonymous video rental store
In-Reply-To: <9312150059.AA15316@bilbo.suite.com>
Message-ID: <9312151455.AA07413@jungle.meaddata.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> 
> 
> 
> I couldn't sleep last night and, as is often the case, my brain gets a  
> mind of its own and starts thinking irrelevant thoughts.  The irrelevant  
...
> 1) The store could not track which customers rented which tapes.
> 
> 2) The store *could* tell which tapes get rented and which tapes do not  
> get rented.  The store would adjust it's selection of tapes based in this  
> information. (get more of the popular tapes, remove the unpopular ones)
> 
> 3) The store could some how penalize customers that returned tapes late,  
> or not at all.  The nature of the "penalty" is flexible.  This implies  
> that the store could somehow verify that the tape a customer returned is  
> the same tape the customer rented, but without discovering which tape it  
> is.  (I believe this is the hard part)
...
> Jim_Miller@suite.com

One easy way around this is to have completely anonymous customers:
The store doesn't record any id at all.  The simplest way to do this
is to have customers make a cash deposit large enough to cover
replacement costs of the videos.  You would have to limit the number
of videos, especially/only for those without a track record.

You could even leave an anon email id to allow them to remind you to
return an overdue video, etc.

The only risk here is that someone besides the account owner might
'close' the account and take the deposit.  A good 'id' card/number
should solve that.

Actually, around here, that isn't too far from what you end up with
after being a customer for a year: I've moved, changed phone numbers
and have a new VISA, since the old one expired.  I'm sure they still
have my dr. lic. num and maybe even my ssn though.

Not even knowing that you're a customer seems better than trying not
to track which videos you have.

How about an anon deposit service that multiple companies (utilities,
etc.) could put claims on, similar to VISA holds.

sdw
-- 
Stephen D. Williams  Local Internet Gateway Co.; SDW Systems 513 496-5223APager
LIG dev./sales       Internet: sdw@lig.net CIS 76244.210@compuserve.com
OO R&D Source Dist.  By Horse: 2464 Rosina Dr., Miamisburg, OH 45342-6430
GNU Support          ICBM: 39 34N 85 15W I love it when a plan comes together



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: dkrieger@netcom.com (Dave Krieger)
Date: Wed, 15 Dec 93 10:53:55 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: RESEND: Re: MTGS: Conflict Alert
Message-ID: <199312151844.KAA02230@mail.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


At  5:02 PM 12/14/93 -0800, Geoff Dale wrote:
>>If the Cypherpunks schedule their January '94 meeting on the 2nd
>>Saturday, Jan 8, that will conflict with a party announced
>>by visiting Exi fireman Harry (Hawk) Shapiro. Harry said:
>>
>>    As I announced a month or so ago, I am holding a party on Jan 8,
>>    at the Shearaton Palace Hotel in San Fran.
>>
>>    Jan 8th is the last day of MacWorld.  Hopefully a group of us will
>>    meet for dinner arround 6pm.  The party will start about 8 or
>>    8:30.
>>
>>As I doubt either Harry or MacWorld will change their schedules for
>>our benefit, I suggest the Cypherpunks consider (and announce with
>>plenty of lead time) changing theirs to the Saturday after (Jan 15)
>>(The Saturday before is New Year's day).
>
>Actually, there were plans to move the CyPunks meeting to Sat, Jan 15
>anyway, since Jan 8th already conflicts with something else (Usenix?
>something Unix-y).
>
>Of course, the 15th is when the ExI-BATF (Extropy Institute - Bay Area
>Transhumanist/Task Force, for the extropianly-impaired) meeting would
>normally be held. I think we can ask Dave Krieger to put this off one week
>to the 22nd. If so, then I'll be happy. What d'ya say Dave?

Dammit, I specifically picked 3rd Saturdays so they wouldn't conflict with
cpunks.  Okay, just this once.  Remind me at New Year's so I get it right
in announcements.
                                        dV/dt










From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Ophir Ronen (RHO) <a-ophirr@microsoft.com>
Date: Thu, 16 Dec 93 11:11:02 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: addme
Message-ID: <9312161909.AA10504@netmail.microsoft.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Hi Eric,

Please add me to the list.

			*Thx,

				-Ophir





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Jim McCoy <mccoy@ccwf.cc.utexas.edu>
Date: Wed, 15 Dec 93 09:23:54 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: He's Baaack!
In-Reply-To: <9312150852.AA19770@anchor.ho.att.com>
Message-ID: <199312151723.AA04907@tramp.cc.utexas.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text


wcs@anchor.ho.att.com (bill stewart) writes:
[re: the return of LD]
> Yeah, one of his tentacles is posting to Cypherpunks again; unfortunately
> we haven't really decided how to do a good reputation system yet,
> so filtering out these sorts of attacks without also trashing newbies
> and causing other collateral damage isn't easy yet.

It is very easy to write up a rule for various filtering programs that will
nuke his messages when they arrive and save you the trouble of doing it
yourself.  In case no one noticed, this is his first posting in a little
over a week and in that time the signal to noise ratio on the list has
significantly increased.  Why don't we continue this trend and just ignore
him, okay? 

jim



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: collins@newton.apple.com (Scott Collins)
Date: Wed, 15 Dec 93 14:10:43 PST
To: loki@cass156.ucsd.edu (Lance Cottrell)
Subject: Re: Improved DH system.
Message-ID: <9312152207.AA19290@newton.apple.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Howdy,

  >I have been told that there is a new improved version of
  >DH key exchange, which is authenticated. Could
  >someone give me the reference, and/or tell me what it is
  >all about?........ Diffie??

I'm back at the office and can (finally) provide the information, sorry for
the delay.

The paper is "Authentication and Authenticated Key Exchanges" by Whitfield
Diffie, Paul C. van Oorschot, and Michael J. Wiener, published in _Designs,
Codes and Cryptography, 2, 107-125 (1992), by Kluwer Academic Publishers.

Here is some notation, and a brief description of the basic protocol. 
Almost everything from this point forward is quoted directly from the
paper.

{.}     Braces indicate a hash function.  {x, y} is the result when a hash
function is applied to x concatenated with y.

S_A     Alice's secret key for a signature scheme.  S_A(x) is Alice's
signature on x.  S_A{x} is Alice's signature on the hashed version of x.

P_A     Alice's public key for a signature scheme.  If the signature scheme
is a public-key cryptosystem, then we define P_A{x} and P_A(x) to be
Alice's public key encryption function with and without hashing.

E_K(x)  Encryption using a symmetric cryptosystem with key K.

[...]

5.1. Basic [Station-to-Station] Protocol

The STS protocol consists of DH key establishment, followed by an exhcange
of authentication signatures.  In the basic version of the protocol, we
assume that the parameters used for the key establishement, (i.e., the
specification of a particular cyclic group and the corresponding primitive
element a) are fixed and known to all users.  While we refer to the DH
operation as exponentiation, implying that the underlying group is
multiplicative, the description applies equally well to additive groups
(e.g., the group of points of an elliptic curve over a finite field).  We
also assume in this section that Alice knows Bob's authentic public key,
and vice versa; this assumption is dropped in the following section [which
I did not type in].

[...]

Alice                                           Bob
-----                                           ---
a is known,
x is random

        ------------- a^x --------------->>
                                                a is known,
                                                y is random
                                                K = (a^x)^y = a^(xy)
        <<---- a^y, E_K(S_B{a^y, a^x}) ----

K = (a^y)^x = a^(xy)

        ------- E_K(S_A{a^x, a^y}) ------>>



The paper is a very good read.  It describes the motivations behind the
protocol; how to assure (or dis-abuse) yourself of the security of other
protocols; modifications; other uses; etc.  I highly recommend it.

Hope this helps,


Scott Collins         | "Few people realize what tremendous power there
                      |  is in one of these things."     -- Willy Wonka
......................|................................................
BUSINESS.   voice:408.862.0540  fax:974.6094   collins@newton.apple.com
Apple Computer, Inc.   5 Infinite Loop, MS 305-2B   Cupertino, CA 95014
.......................................................................
PERSONAL.   voice/fax:408.257.1746    1024:669687   catalyst@netcom.com






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: collins@newton.apple.com (Scott Collins)
Date: Wed, 15 Dec 93 14:50:43 PST
To: Peter Wayner <pcw@access.digex.net>
Subject: Re: Error-Qualifying Signatures
Message-ID: <9312152248.AA20887@newton.apple.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Peter,

Since this description is of a more general interest, I am cc'ing this
thread back to the list.

  >Yes, but inverting a hash function isn't necessarily a problem. 
  >Inverting an encryption function is. With hash functions, we
  >really want to know it is hard to take message A and append something
  >B so that f(AB)=f(C). Now, ideally people have always thought
  >that it was bad if given C, one could come up with a D such that
  >f(C)=f(D). But I haven't figured out how that can affect practical
  >problems. Did I miss something?

Let {x} be a hash on x.  Let S_A{x} be encryption of the hash of x with
Alice's secret key, i.e., Alice's signature over x.  Thus, a signed 'thing'
is (x, S_A{x}).

If {x} yields the function f(y) which tells how different y is from x
(ostensibly to measure what damage x sustained in transit, to become y),
then f(y) can be exploited to find y such that {y} = {x} (this is, after
all, the design criteria behind f(y)).  If {x} = {y} then S_A{y} = S_A{x},
and therefore I can publish a document signed by Alice (y, S_A{y}), without
her knowledge (both meanings) or cooperation.

Someone on the list showed a few months back that provably few errors (or
abitrary attacker introduced changes) are needed to get to a matching hash,
but finding the changes to introduce is expensive.  Building a hash
function such that a distance measure is easy to calculate and exploit,
makes finding the right errors easier, and thus allows falsified
signatures.  I take x, introduce my required changes yielding y, and then
exploit f(y) with say a genetic search, or simulated annealing, to find y'
such that {y'} = {x}, then I republish (y', S_A{x}): my altered
document/image/whatever, + some errors to make the hashes match, + Alice's
original signature.  The signature is verifiable.


Scott Collins         | "Few people realize what tremendous power there
                      |  is in one of these things."     -- Willy Wonka
......................|................................................
BUSINESS.   voice:408.862.0540  fax:974.6094   collins@newton.apple.com
Apple Computer, Inc.   5 Infinite Loop, MS 305-2B   Cupertino, CA 95014
.......................................................................
PERSONAL.   voice/fax:408.257.1746    1024:669687   catalyst@netcom.com






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: jim@bilbo.suite.com (Jim Miller)
Date: Wed, 15 Dec 93 14:03:54 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: anonymous video rental store
Message-ID: <9312152201.AA08464@bilbo.suite.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



I'm not convinced a simple anonymous customer/buy-back(or deposit)  
mechanism is the ideal solution.  First, the clerk sees what videos you  
rent and might be able to identify you from a picture.  Second, if the  
store issues ID cards, then the store can track which videos are rented by  
each ID.  Although the store doesn't know for your real identity, it  
wouldn't be to hard to find it out in many cases.  The clerk coud look out  
the store window and get the license number of your car.

You could avoid some of these problems if the store didn't issue permanent  
ID cards, but instead issued one-time ID cards.  You would get a new ID  
card everytime you rented some videos.  This would make it impractical for  
the store to automatically track your rentals.

This doesn't eliminate the posibility of a clerk remebering your face and  
pairing it up with a specific rental, or a rental pattern.

"Oh yeah, I remember that guy. he usually comes in late Friday night, just  
before closing.  He always rents children's videos.  Is he some kind of  
pervert?"

Jim_Miller@suite.com




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Sameer <sameer@soda.berkeley.edu>
Date: Wed, 15 Dec 93 22:13:57 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: *2* remailers have been attacked
Message-ID: <199312160612.WAA03574@soda.berkeley.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text


	I'm wondering if any people here running remailers have been
having trouble lately.

	I'll explain. (And try not to act paranoid.)

	I ve been running a remailer on
cs60a-qu@cory.eecs.berkeley,edu, and one day the account was disabled.
I mailed the responsible administrator, and he said that it was
because I didn't reply to his mail (I never check that account's
mailbox, 'cause I hardly use it.) telling me that I should see him in
person about possible email abuse.
	My account was going to be disabled on the 20th anyway, so I
really didn't worry about it-- I had finals to worry about.

	So now I'm in Boston, and I call netcom, (where I run another
remailer) and they tell me the account is being investigated because
the account was used to break in somewhere. I know *I* did no such
thing.
	I finger the account (by calling all the way across the damn
country to my berkeley account) and it says that my las login was from
soda.berkeley.edu, even though my las login was from the Berkeley
dialup, not soda.

	I was told to call the netcom office tomorrow morning about
the issue.

	My question is whether anyone else running a remailer has been
attacked lately.

In paranoia,
	Sameer

(Please pardon any irrationallity.. phone calls from Boston->Berkeley
are *not* cheap, and it's pissing me off.)



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: edgar@spectrx.saigon.com (Edgar W. Swank)
Date: Thu, 16 Dec 93 02:20:50 PST
To: Cypherpunks          <cypherpunks@toad.com>
Subject: DCASH: ACM Digital Cash Paper Available via FTP
Message-ID: <F30mec4w165w@spectrx.saigon.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

The following is excerpted from the Internet Business Journal

  Electronic Currency

  NetCash: A Design for Practical Electronic Currency on
  the Internet, proceedings of the First ACM Conference on
  Computer Communications Security (November 1993),
  Medvinsky, Gennady and B. Clifford Neuman. This document
  is available via FTP: prospero.isi.edu
  /pub/papers/security/netcash-cccs93.ps.Z.

Note: PostScript documents can be printed/viewed without a postscript
printer with "Ghostscript", which is available from the SIMTEL
archive.

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.3a

iQCVAgUBLQ+n9N4nNf3ah8DHAQHEpwP6Arilf9L7wyRhaDPVFlXsbK9JQDwYhcMM
WQmVTkU1BtDX7RKV1zfU3QcmKUqo5/VY/EopMAqNI0GqEbnaSU9kNkAzlS0eK1CP
9CdRDXrl0Gv4HTOKJWrWkoYwQdCxpuQLr28foBebGsKXPVwVDWSfJvAU4QZWoubY
yyveAX87McM=
=H5Fs
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

--
edgar@spectrx.saigon.com (Edgar W. Swank)
SPECTROX SYSTEMS +1.408.252.1005  Cupertino, Ca





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Black Unicorn <unicorn@access.digex.net>
Date: Wed, 15 Dec 93 23:10:47 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Keyservers and anonymous Mailings
Message-ID: <199312160710.AA28701@access3.digex.net>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

It seems that PGP keyservers have been attacked of late for 
alleged copyright violations.  Nice tactic if you are PKP I guess.  
Has anyone considered the use of anonymous remailers to run a 
keyserver?  A double blind keyserver might solve the operator a 
good deal of heat.

Would this simply cause more problems than it solves?
Perhaps the ethics are simply too black?  (LD are you listening?)

If PKP is going to employ this tactic, it seems that even the 
'new' keyservers that run as simple databases and thus are not a 
copyright question are subject to harassment in the least, even if 
unfounded.  If this is true, would anonymous remailing provide a 
buffer of some type?

It always confused me that anonymous remailers were not used more 
actively for 'questionable' (read fringe) internet services.

Perhaps there is a reason for this?  Criminal liability I suspect.
:)

Perhaps I am mistaken in thinking that the lack of attribution 
just makes centralization less of an option on the 'data highway'?  
Considering the attitude of the current U.S. administration I am 
surprised this is not more of a common practice.

After all, with the methods available, why make it easy to put the 
genie in the bottle?

Again, would this just cause more problems than it solves by 
calling attention to already on the rocks anonymous remailers?

Would make a nice test case.
Or a poor one?

- -uni- (Dark)



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iQCVAgUBLQ/DJxibHbaiMfO5AQH8+QQA1FkotVUUabYOV+aYSqOgzhOjntl5jIE5
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C83FYcN1Xns=
=Wn1F
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Eric Hollander <hh@pmantis.berkeley.edu>
Date: Thu, 16 Dec 93 03:15:53 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: traffic report: expect delays on the 93
Message-ID: <9312161114.AA17107@pmantis.berkeley.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Commuters should expect random delays of between 0 and 20 minutes on the 93
(the 128.32.182.93, or cicada.berkeley.edu) remailer.

I'm starting my project of modifying my remailers to thwart traffic
analysis, so as the first step I put in a random delay.  The next step is to
add an "ignore me" header command and also a "bounce me to neverneverland"
header command.  Other header commands (all in an encrypted header, which
will have to wait until I finish configuring encrypted remail on cicada)
will say things like "chop off the last X bytes and continue" or "add X
random bytes to the message and pass it on", all with random delays.

I also want to set it up so that it just spontaneously mails stuff to random
places.

e




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Eric Hollander <hh@pmantis.berkeley.edu>
Date: Thu, 16 Dec 93 04:50:55 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: more traffic delays!
Message-ID: <9312161247.AA19598@pmantis.berkeley.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I've "upgraded" all of my remailers (hh@soda, hh@cicada, hh@pmantis,
00x@uclink) to insert a random delay in the remailings.

e




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: jim@Tadpole.COM (Jim Thompson)
Date: Thu, 16 Dec 93 07:40:58 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Digital Telephony Threat Returns
Message-ID: <9312161537.AA03543@chiba.tadpole.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Digital Telephony Threat Returns

According to FBI Dir. Louis Freeh, the development of sophisticated
digital telecom and networking technology threatens the ability of the
Feds to wiretap.  In a Dec. 8 speech at Washington's National Press
Club, Freeh annouced a renewal of the FBI's 'Digital Telephony'
legislation scheme:  the return of the controverial 'Wiretap Bill'.
The bill is strongly opposed by organizations and individuals concerned
about privacy, as well as the telecommunications and computing
industries at large.  The FBI's 'need' for this legislative action is
under review by the Administration as part of its examination of
security and encryption issues.

The reappearance of this Bureau effort contradicts statements by
Special Agent Barry Smith of the FBI's Congressional Affairs Office,
who stated less than a month ago that the 'Wiretap Bill' had been
tabled.

According to classified documents released under the Freedom of
Information Act (FOIA), the FBI and the Electronic Communications
Service Provider Committee or ECSPC (an ad hoc industry working group,
which formed in March), are attempting to decide if technical solutions
can be found to satisify law enforcement. According to a Nynex
representative co-chairing the group, Kenneth Raymond, no solution has
yet been found, but that FBI has yet to prove any solution is needed at
all.  Raymond likened Freeh's tactics to "yelling out the window" - an
attention-getting move that needs some sort of clarifying followup.

Though the ECSPC claims to be attempting to evaluate the problem and to
solve it "in some reasonable way that is consistent with cost and
demand", Raymond indicated that the group considers one 'solution' to
be building wiretap access into future telecom hardware - like the
Clipper chip backdoor, but a 'feature' of all switch specifications for
phone and data lines.

This news was just received, and a more detailed analysis and statement
from EFF will follow soon.





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Pierre Uszynski <pierre@shell.portal.com>
Date: Thu, 16 Dec 93 12:34:00 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Use foreign key servers
Message-ID: <199312162032.MAA26245@jobe.shell.portal.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Black Unicorn <unicorn@access.digex.net> thus posted:
> 
> It seems that PGP keyservers have been attacked of late for 
> alleged copyright violations.  Nice tactic if you are PKP I guess.  
> Has anyone considered the use of anonymous remailers to run a 
> keyserver?  A double blind keyserver might solve the operator a 
> good deal of heat.
> 

(I thought it was a patent problem rather... but that's not the point)

Let me know if I'm missing some essential point here, but why are
people insisting on running key servers in the US, the only
country where there may be a patent claim? I doubt mailers would
care one way or the other if you used foreign keyservers.

I do understand how some of us would make it their Duty to actively
protect their Konstitooshunol Right to run PGP key servers in their
Own Country, free from interference from evil commercial and
governmental entities :-) (no, really, I understand) but what other
reason could there be for that? In this case, to the user, it should
not matter where the keyserver if physically located. 

I'm not really up to speed as to which key servers are running where,
but the current versions of PGP being developped outside of the US,
there must be a few keyservers here and there. Keys crossing the
border cannot be the problem, they are all over Netnews and all over
mailing lists too.

So, I do not understand why this could be a "nice tactic if you are
PKP". Surely they cannot be spending much ressources on this when the
easy counter move is to use foreign key servers. I do not
understand what reason there is to start (or even develop) keyservers
in the US, apart from annoying PKP.

Pierre Uszynski
pierre@shell.portal.com




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Duncan Frissell <frissell@panix.com>
Date: Thu, 16 Dec 93 11:46:02 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Anonymous Video Rental
Message-ID: <Pine.3.05.9312161453.A983-b100000@panix.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


	
P>So, when I go to Huntsville Utilities and ask them to turn on the
P>power at my house, rather than writing a check or giving them personal
P>information, I just tell give them a blinded token which they could
P>use to withdraw $X from my account at the Austin-Internet Credit
P>Union.

As always the UK is ahead of the curve on this one.  It is still possible 
in certain UK apartments to pay gas *and* electricity bills anonymously.  
The electricity and gas meters have coin boxes on them.  You want 
electricity or gas and you just put the coins it.  True.  This used to be 
the standard method of paying for utilities.

This is less common for electricity now but any office of British Gas will 
still sell you plastic "keys" that are shaped like keys.  They turn on 
your gas for a set period of time and presumably break off in the process 
so they can't be reused.

Cutting-edge high tech!

DCF

"Buy Extra Gas Tokens For the Holidays"  Poster inside BG offices this 
time of year.

--- WinQwk 2.0b#1165
                                                                                                    






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: gtoal@an-teallach.com (Graham Toal)
Date: Thu, 16 Dec 93 06:50:58 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: No Subject
Message-ID: <199312161445.OAA21440@an-teallach.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Keyservers and anonymous Mailings
Newsgroups: mail.cypherpunks
In-Reply-To: <199312160710.AA28701@access3.digex.net>
Organization: An Teallach Limited

In article <199312160710.AA28701@access3.digex.net> you write:
:If PKP is going to employ this tactic, it seems that even the 
:'new' keyservers that run as simple databases and thus are not a 
:copyright question are subject to harassment in the least, even if 
:unfounded.  If this is true, would anonymous remailing provide a 
:buffer of some type?

First of all, I wrote the new replacement keyserver and I happen
to know it isn't even released yet (except to a handful of people
for the purposes of testing portability and ease of installation etc),
so it is not *possible* that the new sites have been harassed, and I
think you should wait until it happens before you start worrying about
it.  As I've said before, all these keyservers will be doing is
*publishing* information, and that's a protected right in the US.

Now, if pkp choose to start chasing down people who publish their
keys and asking them if they have a license (assuming they're in
the US and need one), that's a different thing altogether, but 
that could happen at the moment given that the actual keys are
up for ftp all over already.  A keyserver that doesn't patent (or
copyright?  Who told you that?) infringe *cannot* be closed down
even if the people whose keys are published *are* harassed.

Anyway, the keyservers have to exist for the benefit of both ViaCrypt
customers and European FreePGP users.

G




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "W. Kinney" <kinney@ucsu.Colorado.EDU>
Date: Thu, 16 Dec 93 15:36:30 PST
To: mab@crypto.com (Matt Blaze)
Subject: Re: Distribution of Secure Drive
In-Reply-To: <9312162202.AA22095@crypto.com>
Message-ID: <199312162335.AA10588@ucsu.Colorado.EDU>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Matt Blaze writes:

> In cypherpunks, Edgar W. Swank writes:
> ...
> >So I'm asking any public-spirited Cypherpunk (perhaps even an
> >anonymous one) to place Secure Drive on an FTP site or a site
> 
> Please, please don't do this without checking with the author of
> the package first.  He went out of his way to say that he doesn't
> 
> ...
> 
> Messages like this one don't exactly give me a warm fuzzy feeling about
> people violating their agreements to not export the code or
> otherwise creating future headaches on my behalf.

Thank you for saying this. I would like to emphatically second it. People
are going to quit writing code if this sort of thing starts happening.

If you want code exported, write it yourself and export it. Then it's your
ass on the line.


                               -- Will




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Matt Blaze <mab@crypto.com>
Date: Thu, 16 Dec 93 14:21:32 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Distribution of Secure Drive
In-Reply-To: <HmJcec10w165w@spectrx.saigon.com>
Message-ID: <9312162202.AA22095@crypto.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


In cypherpunks, Edgar W. Swank writes:
...
>On Nov 30, I sent a private msg to Eric Hughes asking him to put
>Mike Ingle's Secure Drive program for MSDOS
>
>   SECDRV10.ZIP    68155  11-19-93  Secure Drive 1.0 with SRC.
>
>On the Soda.Berkeley FTP site and to advise me of its location.
>I have not received any response at all.
...
>
>I'm aware that Mike said he hadn't submitted Secure Drive to the FTP
>site because of "export concerns."  But since this site is already
>distributing PGP, I wouldn't think this a "concern" to the site
>administration.
>
>So I'm asking any public-spirited Cypherpunk (perhaps even an
>anonymous one) to place Secure Drive on an FTP site or a site
>with an E-mail file server and to post the location of the file
>either here or to me privately.

Please, please don't do this without checking with the author of
the package first.  He went out of his way to say that he doesn't
want to a make it available for ftp because he doesn't want to deal with
potential export problems.  So respect his wishes; it's his work, after
all.

I'm the process of arranging the release of my own Unix crypto file system,
and am myself concerned about the export issues (as is my employer).
Messages like this one don't exactly give me a warm fuzzy feeling about
people violating their agreements to not export the code or
otherwise creating future headaches on my behalf.

If you think that an author of cryptographic software is immune from
export hassles just because it was someone else who exported it, ask
Phil Zimmermann...

-matt




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: szabo@netcom.com (Nick Szabo)
Date: Thu, 16 Dec 93 18:06:07 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Digital Cash Session as Worldwide Electrnoic Commerce Conference (fwd)
Message-ID: <199312170205.SAA01011@mail.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



 Forwarded message:
 From: BAUM@HULAW1.HARVARD.EDU
 Date: Thu, 16 Dec 1993 08:44:21 -0500 (EST)
 Subject: Digital Cash Session as Worldwide Electrnoic Commerce Conference
 
 FYI, a Digital Cash session has been added to the Jan 17-18 
 Worldwide Electrnoic Commerce Conference: Law, Policy and Controls
 Conference in NYC at the Waldorf Astoria. Because a number of people on
 
 this list might have obtained a copy of the program on some other list,
 I will only reprint the press release below.
 
                                   PRESS RELEASE
  
 Worldwide Electronic Commerce: 
 Law, Policy and Controls Conference
 announced for January 1994 in NYC
  
  
 Dallas - June 11, 1993:  MultiCorp, Inc. today announced 
 Worldwide Electronic Commerce: Law, Policy and Controls 
 Conference, a conference addressing the Legal, Audit and 
 Security aspects of Electronic Data Interchange (EDI), Electronic 
 Commerce and Electronic Messaging. The event is offered in 
 affiliation with the American Bar Association's Section of Science 
 and Technology, Harvard Law School, The Computer Law 
 Association, the EDI Association of the United Kingdom, 
 Harvard University's John F. Kennedy School of 
 Government, the U.S. Council for International Business, 
 National Institute for Standards and Technology, and the 
 University of London's Centre for Commercial Law 
 Studies. This unique event Brings together leading academic
 and business experts from around the globe on 
 the control issues facing EDI and messaging. Additionally, 
 various industry associations will participate including HEDIC, 
 the Healthcare EDI Corporation.
  
 A comprehensive program is planned revolving around over 40 
 sessions designed to address the issues,  opportunities, 
 strategies, status, and future of Electronic Data Interchange 
 (EDI), Electronic Commerce  and Electronic Messaging from 
 Legal, Audit and Security perspectives. This program is 
 designed to  address the real-world issues and emerging 
 questions encountered by legal professionals, auditors,  
 information managers, EDI professionals, security managers, 
 purchasing managers, sales and marketing executives and others 
 engaged in the developing global information infrastructure. 
  
 Worldwide Electronic Commerce: Law, Policy and Controls 
 Conference will be held January 17 - 18, 1994 in New York City 
 at the Waldorf=Astoria Hotel. The price of registration is $550.00 
 per attendee. Parties interested in attending, acquiring 
 sponsorships, or speaking should contact the conference 
 coordinator at (214) 516-4900 or by fax at (214) 475-5917.
  
 The conference group can also be reached at: 76520.3713@compuserve.com.
 
 ***
 
 



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Black Unicorn <unicorn@access.digex.net>
Date: Thu, 16 Dec 93 17:11:08 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Anonymous remailers and keyservers.
Message-ID: <199312170109.AA11945@access.digex.net>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


A keyserver that doesn't patent (or
copyright?  Who told you that?)
()()

oops, did I say copyright...?



First of all, I wrote the new replacement keyserver and I happen
to know it isn't even released yet (except to a handful of people
for the purposes of testing portability and ease of installation etc),
()()

I hadn't realized that my message implied this.



so it is not *possible* that the new sites have been harassed, and I
think you should wait until it happens before you start worrying about
it.  As I've said before, all these keyservers will be doing is
*publishing* information, and that's a protected right in the US.
()()

Again, I did not mean for my message to so imply, my point was
that it was a possbility and considering past behavior, not
way beyond PKP.

I really wanted to point out that it might be an interesting
statement on other internet services (none come to mind which
might be the most revealing statement on the applicability
of the idea) and the use of anonymous remailers.



Now, if pkp choose to start chasing down people who publish their
keys and asking them if they have a license (assuming they're in
the US and need one), that's a different thing altogether, but
that could happen at the moment given that the actual keys are
up for ftp all over already.
()()

I had not considered this, it was a little beyond the scope of my
message.  I was more concerned with the operators of the servers
not the end users.  It's a good point none the less.



A keyserver that doesn't patent (or
copyright?  Who told you that?) infringe *cannot* be closed down
even if the people whose keys are published *are* harassed.
()()

You use the word *cannot* pretty strictly.
I think you mean legally cannot.  Consider that the keyservers
that have been closed down (if they have...?) may fall into the
legally *cannot* be shut down group.  They just haven't been tested
yet.
What I think you mean is legally cannot, as opposed
to practically cannot.  Political pressure is plenty
enough to make university administrators jumpy.

Private machines are immune of course (to some extent anyhow).



Anyway, the keyservers have to exist for the benefit of both ViaCrypt
customers and European FreePGP users.
()()

And argueably those who don't hold ViaCrypt licenses.

-uni- (Dark)




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: karn (Phil Karn)
Date: Thu, 16 Dec 93 20:16:07 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Bobby Inman
Message-ID: <199312170415.UAA16320@servo.qualcomm.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


In case you haven't been following the news for the past two days or
so, Secretary of Defense Les Aspin has resigned, and Clinton has
already nominated Bobby Inman, a retired 4-star Navy admiral, as his
replacement.

Inman was NSA director during the Carter administration. He is
probably best known for his outspoken calls for draconian laws
regulating private cryptography. He wanted all cryptographic research,
public or private, to be "born classified", just like nuclear weapons,
with NSA given authority over all publications.

He lost, of course, but his becoming Secretary of Defense just as the
issue of private crypto regulation is coming to a head again does not
bode well at all.

Phil



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Black Unicorn <unicorn@access.digex.net>
Date: Thu, 16 Dec 93 17:21:07 PST
To: greg@ideath.goldenbear.com (Greg Broiles)
Subject: Re: Keyservers and anonymous Mailings
In-Reply-To: <soeLec2w165w@ideath.goldenbear.com>
Message-ID: <199312170120.AA12272@access.digex.net>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> 
> 
> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
> 
> Black Unicorn <uunet!access.digex.net!unicorn> writes:
> 
> > It seems that PGP keyservers have been attacked of late for 
> > alleged copyright violations.  Nice tactic if you are PKP I guess.  
> 
> As far as I can tell, the copyright issue exists only in David 
> Sternlight's addled mind; and even he has conceded that he's got no 
> factual basis for asserting that PGP might infringe someone's copyright. 
> I can't tell if his messages about this reflect actual confusion about 
> the difference between patent and copyright, or if he's simply stumbled 
> across another FUD tactic to use against PGP.
> 
> 
> --
> Greg Broiles                       Lemon Detweiler Pledge?
> greg@goldenbear.com                  You're soaking in it.
> 

In david's case, I think it was confusion.
In my case, lack of sleep.

:)

-uni- (Dark)




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: smb@research.att.com
Date: Thu, 16 Dec 93 17:45:44 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Inman vs. crypto
Message-ID: <9312170141.AA22549@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Bobby Inman has just been nominated as the new secretary of defense.
When he was director of NSA, he was not, as I recall, particularly
sympathetic to private-sector cryptography.  In fact, he tried to
institute a review process for civilian cryptographic papers.

His nomination is subject to confirmation by the Senate, after review
by the Armed Services committee.  While in my opinion it's unlikely
that his nomination will be blocked, the hearings would be an excellent
time to question him on this subject.  Contact your senator (this is
for U.S. residents only, of course...), especially if he or she is
a member of that committee.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Syl Miniter 803-768-3759 <MINITERS@citadel.edu>
Date: Thu, 16 Dec 93 17:44:03 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Is VIACrypt PGP authorized for use byPKP?
Message-ID: <01H6K6YMUA9U9AOXVI@citadel.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



I would appreciate some commentary as to whether the VIACRYPT PGP MSDOS
package is licensed for use by PKP (Public Key Partners).
It is my belief that it is.





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Pierre Uszynski <pierre@shell.portal.com>
Date: Thu, 16 Dec 93 23:46:09 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Bobby Inman
Message-ID: <199312170745.XAA10422@jobe.shell.portal.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



There was some mentions that he spend some time in the private sector
since "then". Anybody knows what he was doing?

Pierre Uszynski
pierre@shell.portal.com




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Date: Fri, 17 Dec 93 00:01:09 PST
To: pierre@shell.portal.com (Pierre Uszynski)
Subject: Re: Bobby Inman
In-Reply-To: <199312170745.XAA10422@jobe.shell.portal.com>
Message-ID: <199312170758.XAA27037@mail.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



> There was some mentions that he spend some time in the private sector
> since "then". Anybody knows what he was doing?
> 
> Pierre Uszynski

He was head of MCC in Austin for several years and then his own
company, a kind of high-tech holding company (Westmark was the name, I
think).

I recall seeing a company selling crypto products, "Ultron," in 1988
or so, and noting the mention that it was a division of Inman's
company, Westmark.

I've followed Inman's career since I first heard of him in 1979,
during the crypto flap, and especially since reading about him in 1982
in "The Puzzle Palace."

--Tim May


-- 
..........................................................................
Timothy C. May         | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,  
tcmay@netcom.com       | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
408-688-5409           | knowledge, reputations, information markets, 
W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA  | black markets, collapse of governments.
Higher Power: 2^756839 | Public Key: PGP and MailSafe available.
Note: I put time and money into writing this posting. I hope you enjoy it.



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: karn (Phil Karn)
Date: Fri, 17 Dec 93 00:21:10 PST
To: pierre@shell.portal.com
Subject: Re: Bobby Inman
Message-ID: <199312170820.AAA22875@servo.qualcomm.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Inman's first job after retiring from his spook's life in the Navy was
to start MCC in Austin, TX. I saw him speak in 1984 at Bell Labs
Murray Hill shortly after the AT&T divestiture, before Bellcore got
its own facilities.  He was there to sign up Bellcore for MCC
membership, although we didn't know it yet.

He gave an almost content-free talk about "regaining America's
technological leadership" or something like that. When he finished, I
got up and asked him how he could reconcile his stated need to lead
the world in high technology with a DoD-dominated export control
system specifically geared to keeping us from selling those very
technologies in which we lead the world.  He waffled like a classic
politician. I was still trying to decipher his answer long after he
finished.

After MCC, I think he went to Westmark, a defense contractor. He also
showed up on at least one Baby Bell board of directors (SW Bell?). As
a shareholder, I made it a point to specifically withhold my vote for
him when the proxies got mailed out.  (To be sure, big corporation
proxies are about as meaningful as ballots in a Communist election,
but what the hell -- unlike the Publishers' Clearinghouse sweepstakes,
at least they pay postage.  Eventually I started voting against ALL of
the directors on all of the Bell proxies, just for the hell of it.)

After what Inman tried to do to civilian crypto in the late 1970s, the
word "slime" keeps coming to mind. But then again, there are plenty of
Inmans in the military-industrial complex.

Phil




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Derek Atkins <warlord@MIT.EDU>
Date: Fri, 17 Dec 93 00:24:04 PST
To: Syl Miniter 803-768-3759 <MINITERS@citadel.edu>
Subject: Re: Is VIACrypt PGP authorized for use byPKP?
In-Reply-To: <01H6K6YMUA9U9AOXVI@citadel.edu>
Message-ID: <9312170821.AA15999@toxicwaste.media.mit.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


From what I know, based upon reading the ViaCrypt PGP documenation
and from what I've heard from other sources, ViaCrypt has a license
with PKP for their RSA engine software.  As such, ViaCrypt can do
anything they want with that software.

So, ViaCrypt replaced the RSA engine in PGP with their own, licensed
RSA engine.  As far as PKP is concerned, ViaCrypt can do this, and
PKP can't say anything.  As to whether or not there are other problems
with PGP, well, I won't comment on that.

If you own ViaCrypt PGP, you have a fully licensed program, and PKP
cannot touch you for using it.

-derek




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: James Still <still@kailua.colorado.edu>
Date: Fri, 17 Dec 93 07:41:19 PST
To: 'Cypherpunks List' <cypherpunks@toad.com>
Subject: VIACrypt PGP ?
Message-ID: <2D11E12A@kailua.colorado.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



>I would appreciate some commentary as to whether the VIACRYPT PGP MSDOS
>package is licensed for use by PKP (Public Key Partners).
>It is my belief that it is.

Could anyone who has purchased ViaCrypt PGP answer my question?
What is the executable filename?  Is it still PGP.EXE or did they throw
their own little proprietary in there with a VIAPGP.EXE or some such?

I appreciate your response!  (I'm about to put out another version of
a shell program and thought about extending support to ViaCrypt's
if it is a different exec...)

 --- still@kailua.colorado.edu -----------------------------------------




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: banisar@washofc.cpsr.org
Date: Fri, 17 Dec 93 05:51:15 PST
Subject: No Subject
Message-ID: <<9312170848.AA10822@hacker2.cpsr.digex.net>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


cpsr.digex.net>
Date: Fri, 17 Dec 1993 08:48:10 +0000
From: Dave Banisar <banisar@washofc.cpsr.org>
To: Cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Inman vs. crypto

> Message-Id: <9312170947.AA18162@anon.penet.fi> 
> To: cypherpunks@toad.com 
> From: an41418@anon.penet.fi (wonderer) 
> X-Anonymously-To: cypherpunks@toad.com 
> Organization: Anonymous contact service 
> Reply-To: an41418@anon.penet.fi 
> Date: Fri, 17 Dec 1993 09:47:37 UTC 
> Subject: Re: Inman vs. crypto 
> 
> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- 
> 
> I am almost positive Inman will be confirmed. 
> 

Boy, its a good thing that was posted anonymously. A real budding deep throat 
(grin)


More recently, Inman was quoted by John Barlow in "Decrypting the Puzzle 
Palace" as saying ' "My Answer", he said "would be legislation which would 
make it a criminal offense to use encrypted communications to conceal 
criminal activity...you could have a registry of institutios which can 
legally use cryphers. If you get somebody using one who isn't registered, 
then you go after him." '






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Philippe Nave" <pdn@dwroll.dw.att.com>
Date: Fri, 17 Dec 93 08:26:19 PST
To: banisar@washofc.cpsr.org
Subject: Inman: Cognitive Dissonance?
Message-ID: <9312171625.AA05005@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


banisar@washofc.cpsr.org writes :
> 
> More recently, Inman was quoted by John Barlow in "Decrypting the Puzzle 
> Palace" as saying ' "My Answer", he said "would be legislation which would 
> make it a criminal offense to use encrypted communications to conceal 
> criminal activity...you could have a registry of institutios which can 
> legally use cryphers. If you get somebody using one who isn't registered, 
> then you go after him." '
> 
> 

This quote is a classic! The first bit about criminalizing crypto when it is
used to cover up criminal activity is all right, I guess - sort of like 
adding a charge of 'resisting arrest' to the list of charges filed against
a criminal. However, Inman segues from that statement into the 'registry
of institutions that can legally use cyphers'... hmmm.. as if the illegal
uses of cryptography were so tempting that 'institutions' have to jump through
hoops to demontrate their innocence [as opposed to the assumption that they
will behave themselves of their own accord]. Then, the last sentence ices 
the cake: "If you get somebody using one who isn't registered, then you go 
after him." Warm up the tanks and load the tear gas, BATF! 'Presumption of
innocence' be damned! Cryptography is a _munition_, right? Right? Hmm......

It never ceases to amaze me how Big Brother can leap from nice, harmless-
sounding 'law and order' rhetoric to police-state strong-arm statements in
the space of a single 'sound bite'.

-- 
........................................................................
Philippe D. Nave, Jr.   | The person who does not use message encryption
pdn@dwroll.dw.att.com   | will soon be at the mercy of those who DO...
Denver, Colorado USA    | PGP public key: by arrangement.



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: koontzd@lrcs.loral.com (David Koontz )
Date: Fri, 17 Dec 93 09:51:20 PST
To: tcmay@netcom.com
Subject: Re: Bobby Inman
Message-ID: <9312171744.AA21092@io.lrcs.loral.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>From: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
>He was head of MCC in Austin for several years and then his own
>company, a kind of high-tech holding company (Westmark was the name, I
>think).
>
>I recall seeing a company selling crypto products, "Ultron," in 1988
>or so, and noting the mention that it was a division of Inman's
>company, Westmark.

Ultron is around the San Jose area, a manufacturerer of a Type I CCEP
chip, comprised of a classified piece of silicon contained in a 68 pin
PGA package along with a 8741 family single chip computer.  Ultron also
appears to be the originator of the crypto ignition key (speculation).

I recall seeing adds for the chip in Electronics, circa 1985-6.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: an41418@anon.penet.fi (wonderer)
Date: Fri, 17 Dec 93 01:51:10 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Inman vs. crypto
Message-ID: <9312170947.AA18162@anon.penet.fi>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

I am almost positive Inman will be confirmed.

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.3

iQBVAgUBLREvDx1kTJuroDD9AQHe1QH/TWfLMQUFOlMf4Uz2GaKC/jXYLql4upkk
qmg2xhRlob55uwTuhHJe1FekHXoPCs7LBPtUAMC4eM+XZppBSCcNsA==
=xt6N
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
To find out more about the anon service, send mail to help@anon.penet.fi.
Due to the double-blind, any mail replies to this message will be anonymized,
and an anonymous id will be allocated automatically. You have been warned.
Please report any problems, inappropriate use etc. to admin@anon.penet.fi.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: sdw@meaddata.com (Stephen Williams)
Date: Fri, 17 Dec 93 07:01:18 PST
To: mab@crypto.com (Matt Blaze)
Subject: Re: Distribution of Secure Drive
In-Reply-To: <9312162202.AA22095@crypto.com>
Message-ID: <9312171456.AA14397@jungle.meaddata.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> 
...
> I'm the process of arranging the release of my own Unix crypto file system,
> and am myself concerned about the export issues (as is my employer).
> Messages like this one don't exactly give me a warm fuzzy feeling about
> people violating their agreements to not export the code or
> otherwise creating future headaches on my behalf.
> 
> If you think that an author of cryptographic software is immune from
> export hassles just because it was someone else who exported it, ask
> Phil Zimmermann...
> 
> -matt

I think someone else brought this up:

Write the whole skeleton with the proper crypto hooks and then
distribute it without the crypto library.  You could replace it with
xor, or a crc, or something.  The crypto library could be distributed
more carefully.

After all, with pgp etc. source, it isn't the crypto that's hard, it's
the OS interface code.

I'd love to have such a thing for Linux BTW...

sdw
-- 
Stephen D. Williams  Local Internet Gateway Co.; SDW Systems 513 496-5223APager
LIG dev./sales       Internet: sdw@lig.net CIS 76244.210@compuserve.com
OO R&D Source Dist.  By Horse: 2464 Rosina Dr., Miamisburg, OH 45342-6430
GNU Support          ICBM: 39 34N 85 15W I love it when a plan comes together



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: sommerfeld@orchard.medford.ma.us (Bill Sommerfeld)
Date: Fri, 17 Dec 93 07:36:18 PST
To: banisar@washofc.cpsr.org
Subject: Re: inman vs. crypto
Message-ID: <199312171527.KAA00286@orchard.medford.ma.us>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


   ' "My Answer", he said "would be legislation which would 
   make it a criminal offense to use encrypted communications to conceal 
   criminal activity.

This isn't so bad all by itself, but...

   ..you could have a registry of institutios which can 
   legally use cryphers. If you get somebody using one who isn't registered, 
   then you go after him." '

... this is absolutely unacceptable!

BTW, I just called Sen. Kennedy's office.  Kennedy is on the Armed
Services committee, and according to the secretary is in favor of the
nomination, but I asked a staffer to ask Kennedy to ask Inman about
how he reconciles the First Amendment with statements he's made like
these.

					- Bill




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Pat Farrell" <pfarrell@netcom.com>
Date: Fri, 17 Dec 93 07:31:18 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: RE: Inman vs. crypto
Message-ID: <37922.pfarrell@netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


In message Thu, 16 Dec 93 20:40:18 EST, smb@research.att.com  writes:
>                                  While in my opinion it's unlikely
> that his nomination will be blocked, the hearings would be an excellent
> time to question him on this subject.

Today's Washington Post has long articles that describe the glowing
recommendations for Inman from the whole political spectrum. His
nonination hearings will be a love fest. I doubt that any serious questions
will be raised. But you can always hope.

Pat

Pat Farrell      Grad Student                 pfarrell@netcom.com
Department of Computer Science    George Mason University, Fairfax, VA
Public key availble via finger          #include <standard.disclaimer>




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: dmandl@lehman.com (David Mandl)
Date: Fri, 17 Dec 93 08:21:19 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Inman
Message-ID: <9312171619.AA11423@disvnm2.lehman.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I seem to recall a major article on Inman in Covert Action Information
Bulletin back in, oh, 1982 or so.  It might have even spanned a couple
of issues of the magazine.  It was chock full of dirt (the kind only CIAB
could dig up), but unfortunately I can't remember many of the details.
Would anyone on the list happen to have a copy?

   --Dave.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Alan (Miburi-san) Wexelblat" <wex@media.mit.edu>
Date: Fri, 17 Dec 93 08:21:48 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Bobby Inman
In-Reply-To: <199312170745.XAA10422@jobe.shell.portal.com>
Message-ID: <9312171620.AA24213@media.mit.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>Date: Thu, 16 Dec 1993 23:45:44 -0800
>From: Pierre Uszynski <pierre@shell.portal.com>

>There was some mentions that he spend some time in the private sector since
>"then". Anybody knows what he was doing?

Well, part of the time he was heading up MCC, the Austin-based research
consortium.  Someday y'all can buy me a beer and I'll tell you the saga of
my 3.5 years at MCC, about 2.5 of which overlapped with Inman.

But as a leader I'd say his biggest strength was his incredible intelligence
and ability to deal with almost any problem.  He never let *anything* faze
him.  He was a good leader, too, giving MCC just the right profile in the
eyes of the people (corporate CEOs mostly) who were signing our sponsorship
checks.

Biggest weakness: trusting the wrong people.  His "Chief Scientist"
underling was a joke and he let too many of the wrong people do too many of
the wrong things while they worked for him.

--Alan Wexelblat, Reality Hacker, Author, and Cyberspace Bard
Media Lab - Advanced Human Interface Group	wex@media.mit.edu
Voice: 617-258-9168 Page: 617-945-1842		an53607@anon.penet.fi
The belief that enhanced understanding will necessarily stir a nation to
action is one of mankind's oldest illusions.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Ron McCoy - Yale Security <rmccoy@rock.concert.net>
Date: Fri, 17 Dec 93 08:31:19 PST
To: still@kailua.colorado.edu (James Still)
Subject: Re: VIACrypt PGP ?
In-Reply-To: <2D11E12A@kailua.colorado.edu>
Message-ID: <9312171629.AA16718@rock.concert.net>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> 
> Could anyone who has purchased ViaCrypt PGP answer my question?
> What is the executable filename?  Is it still PGP.EXE or did they throw
> their own little proprietary in there with a VIAPGP.EXE or some such?
> 
It's still PGP.EXE. They suggest installing in a directory named VPGP, but
the executable and all other files have the same name as Free PGP. Also,
PGPPATH etc. are the same.

Ron McCoy
Rmccoy@vnet.net




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Alan (Miburi-san) Wexelblat" <wex@media.mit.edu>
Date: Fri, 17 Dec 93 08:41:18 PST
To: karn@toad.com
Subject: Bobby Inman
In-Reply-To: <199312170820.AAA22875@servo.qualcomm.com>
Message-ID: <9312171639.AA25868@media.mit.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Phil Karn sez:
> After what Inman tried to do to civilian crypto in the late 1970s, the
> word "slime" keeps coming to mind.

I think this is mistaken, in the sense that we think of lawyers, car
salesmen, RBOC directors, etc. as slime.  What Inman did was wrong from our
point of view, but I think he was acting forthrightly and honestly and in
concert with what he believes.

Inman is a very jingoistic patriot.  America First is not just a slogan for
him, but a way of life.  MCC's and Westmark's purposes in the universe were
largely based on promoting American ideas and technology in competition with
the Japanese.

Example: during an election year, he invited US Representative Jake Pickle
to come to MCC and speak and press the flesh.  Now, Inman is a blue-blood
Republican, and Jake is a *very* liberal Democrat.  But Inman had become
convinced that Pickle's progressive stand on corporate policy (reward
corporations for keeping jobs and technology in the US) was better for
America than his opponent's (who favored Reaganesque laissez faire let-the-
corporations-do-anything).  Therefore, Inman supported Pickle and put MCC's
considerable muscle behind Pickle.

This, and similar incidents, lead me to believe that if we could get Inman
to understand that cryptographic secrecy and export controls are in fact bad
for America he would oppose them.  At the NSA he (no doubt) had people
telling him that classification was necessary for American security (what a
surprise).

> But then again, there are plenty of Inmans in the military-industrial
> complex.

Unfortunately that's not the case.  I think if we had more men and women of
principle in the M-I complex we'd be a hell of a lot better off.

My favorite Inman story: how he got to be Admiral.  He was into spook stuff
in the early 70s, particularly intelligence analyses.  He is reputed to have
predicted the Arab attack on Israel that began the Yom Kippur war in '72.
According to the story, he filed reports saying the attack would happen a
couple weeks before the event.  His superiors disagreed and (in true NASA
Challenger management fashion) demanded he change his reports, which were
being passed up to the JCS and the President.  Apparently he refused, and
they essentially forced him out of the military.  While his commission was
in the process of expiring the attack happened and they made him an Admiral.
Apparently this was not enough to mollify him and he quit anyway.

Of course, this stuff is all hush-hush, but the timing is about right for
this story to be true and people who know Inman say he won't deny it.

In any event, the point of these stories is to illustrate my contention that
Inman is a man of principle who is willing to risk his career for what he
sincerely believes is right.  I would not call him a slime and I would not
make the mistake of underestimating him.

--Alan Wexelblat, Reality Hacker, Author, and Cyberspace Bard
Media Lab - Advanced Human Interface Group	wex@media.mit.edu
Voice: 617-258-9168 Page: 617-945-1842		an53607@anon.penet.fi
The belief that enhanced understanding will necessarily stir a nation to
action is one of mankind's oldest illusions.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: nobody@shell.portal.com
Date: Fri, 17 Dec 93 11:46:22 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: No Subject
Message-ID: <199312171946.LAA08737@jobe.shell.portal.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


   Date: Fri, 17 Dec 1993 10:27:58 -0500
   From: sommerfeld@orchard.medford.ma.us (Bill Sommerfeld)

   BTW, I just called Sen. Kennedy's office.  Kennedy is on the Armed
   Services committee, and according to the secretary is in favor of the
   nomination, but I asked a staffer to ask Kennedy to ask Inman about
   how he reconciles the First Amendment with statements he's made like
   these.

I just called Sen. Kennedy's office as well.  If you're a Massachusetts
resident, consider giving them a ring and talking to a staffer.  If
enough people do this, Sen. Kennedy might actually ask Inman a couple of
questions on the topic.  (Which, I suspect, is the best we can hope
for; but it is *something*.)







From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Dave Banisar <banisar@washofc.cpsr.org>
Date: Fri, 17 Dec 93 10:31:50 PST
To: CYPHERPUNKS <CYPHERPUNKS@toad.com>
Subject: Public Hearings on Privacy
Message-ID: <00541.2838978404.1696@washofc.cpsr.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


  Public Hearings on Privacy
                              NEWS  
                   US OFFICE OF CONSUMER AFFAIRS



  FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE              Contact: George  Idelson  (USOCA)
  December 10, 1993                           (202)634-4344
                                              Patricia  Faley  (USOCA)
                                              (202)634-4329

  PUBLIC HEARINGS ON INFORMATION AGE PRIVACY SET FOR CALIFORNIA AND
  WASHINGTON, DC.

  Sacramento: January 10-11,  1994;  Washington,  DC:  January  26-27,
  1994.  Public Invited to Participate.

       Representatives from the public,  private  and  non  profit
  sectors will present their views on personal privacy and data
  protection in the information age at public  hearings  of  a  U.S.
  Government task force in early 1994.

       The hearings will be open meetings  of  the  Privacy  Working
  Group, chaired by Patricia Faley,  Acting  Director  of  the  United
  States Office of Consumer Affairs (USOCA).  The Working Group is
  part of a task force set up by  the  Clinton  Administration  to
  consider how to spur development of an "information
  superhighway." officially known  as  the  National  Information
  Infrastructure (NII), the "data highway" will be capable of
  exchanging data, voice and images  electronically  within  a  vast
  network of individuals, businesses, government agencies and other
  organizations around the world.  Ensuring ready access to
  information is the goal of the Administrative initiative, but
  protecting individual privacy is essential to its success.

       The public meetings will examine privacy issues relating to
  such areas as law  enforcement,  financial  services,  information
  technology, and di:rect marketing.  The California mooting,
  January 10th and llth, will be hosted  by  Jim  Conran,  Director,
  California Department of Consumer Affairs  in  the  First  Floor
  Hearing Room at 400 R  Street  in  Sacramento.  The  Washington,  DC
  meeting, January 26th and 27th, will be held at the U.S.
  Department of Commerce Auditorium,  14th  &  Constitution  Ave.  NW.
  Registration begins at 8:30am, meetings at 9am.

       The public is invited to attend,  question  speakers  and  to
  make brief comments, but space is limited.  Concise written
  statements for the record should be sent to "Privacy," USOCA,
  1620 L Street NW, Washington DC 20036 or faxed to (202)634-4135.

                                  # # #



United States Office of Comumer Affairs - 1620 L Street, NW,  Washington,
D.C. 20036-5605






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: karn (Phil Karn)
Date: Fri, 17 Dec 93 13:16:24 PST
To: wex@media.mit.edu
Subject: Re: Bobby Inman
In-Reply-To: <9312171639.AA25868@media.mit.edu>
Message-ID: <199312172114.NAA24559@servo.qualcomm.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>> After what Inman tried to do to civilian crypto in the late 1970s, the
>> word "slime" keeps coming to mind.

>I think this is mistaken, in the sense that we think of lawyers, car
>salesmen, RBOC directors, etc. as slime.  What Inman did was wrong from our
>point of view, but I think he was acting forthrightly and honestly and in
>concert with what he believes.

Okay, I admit that "slime" may be a bit too strong. And according to
the "Puzzle Palace", Inman was surprisingly enlightened (at least for
a senior military officer in the late 1970s) when it came to one
privacy-related topic, that of allowing civilian gays to serve openly
in the NSA. As I recall, he agreed that a gay out of the closet was
much less likely to be blackmailed than one that was still in the
closet, rejecting the argument that an openly gay NSA employee
represented an unacceptable security risk.

But I *still* can't forgive him for how he tried to kill civilian
cryptography as NSA director, especially since his more recent
comments to John Perry Barlow tend to indicate that he hasn't changed
his views much, if at all.  This is a guy that will have to be watched
*very* carefully, especially since everybody in Washington seems to be
falling all over themselves to praise him.

Phil



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: jkreznar@ininx.com (John E. Kreznar)
Date: Fri, 17 Dec 93 14:01:24 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Bobby Inman
In-Reply-To: <9312171639.AA25868@media.mit.edu>
Message-ID: <9312172152.AA15965@ininx>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

> Inman is a very jingoistic patriot....

> I think if we had more men and women of principle in the
> [military-industrial] complex we'd be a hell of a lot better off.

> ...

> In any event, the point of these stories is to illustrate my contention that
> Inman is a man of principle who is willing to risk his career for what he
> sincerely believes is right.

So, are you saying that you would rather have your privacy invaded on
jingoistic principle than casually?  Threatened by some wicked, depraved
``principle'', individual liberty is even harder to defend.  This is
what makes Inman so dangerous.

	John E. Kreznar		| Relations among people to be by
	jkreznar@ininx.com	| mutual consent, or not at all.

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.3a

iQCVAgUBLRIpdMDhz44ugybJAQHSCwP+ImfL49sywCIm7RCuZyLR3nIjbcnOnpaf
8ZXH+8iXOemqoZJ6T0QpRuhzd9oyfVyD7KI+Jq/22A/dTH4sKuilPl7s6QxA0Y2z
odRfHkXVOUdbem7NSXptopbbj+VJGo+jZTC/UvJ/uKGS4fAZZN25xCNWb+kPuEl4
URNx9Roi57c=
=IFjc
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Syl Miniter 803-768-3759 <MINITERS@citadel.edu>
Date: Fri, 17 Dec 93 10:54:14 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Looking for users of VIACrypt PGP for comments
Message-ID: <01H6L6XEGZBQ9AOYNH@citadel.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I have purchased the VIACRYPT MSDOS package and would value some "DON"T 
DO THIS"/"DO DO THIS " as i am completely unfamiliar with using V_PGP and
would benefit from the mistakes and learning curves of others.
I would also find it valuable to have some people to contact outside the
c-punks list with the trivial "what"s zis" kind of questions
Thanks fo rthe responses.
SYL





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: loki@nately.UCSD.EDU (Lance Cottrell)
Date: Fri, 17 Dec 93 16:41:55 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: DES chips.
Message-ID: <9312180043.AA17582@nately.UCSD.EDU>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I am looking for suppliers of DES chips. I wanted to use an IDEA chip
in the phone I am designing, but the only one made is 177Mbps and costs
about 200SFR. So one possibility is IDEA in software, and the other is
DES (or tripple DES) in hardware. So, if you know name, address, phone,
or email for companies that produce or sell DES chips, please let me know.

----------------------------------------------------------
Lance Cottrell	who does not speak for CASS/UCSD
Obscura Security Products
loki@nately.ucsd.edu
PGP 2.3 key available by finger or server.

"Love is a snowmobile racing across the tundra.  Suddenly
it flips over, pinning you underneath.  At night the ice
weasels come."
			--Nietzsche
----------------------------------------------------------




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: fnerd@smds.com (FutureNerd Steve Witham)
Date: Fri, 17 Dec 93 20:31:28 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: QUOTE from Gerald M. Weinberg
Message-ID: <9312180421.AA23588@smds.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


    "Having said all that, I do not shrink from personal responsibility for
what I have done in writing this book.  We stand at the brink of a new age,
an age made possible by the revolution that is embodied in the computer.
Standing on the brink, we could totter either way--to a golden age of
liberty or a dark age of tyranny, either of which would surpass anything
the world has ever known.  Perhaps no individual's efforts will make any
difference in the result, but we must never cease trying, for then the
result is sure to be tyranny.  This book is my effort against the tyranny,
the enslavement of men by other men and by their own ignorance.  Would
that it not be adopted by the forces of tyranny themselves, as no doubt
it will be.  Lacking that hope, I can only hope that its use to the other
forces will, in the balance, be greater."

--Gerald M. Weinberg, _The Psychology of Computer Programming_, 1971

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.3a

aKxB8nktcBAeQHabQP/d7yhWgpGZBIoIqII8cY9nG55HYHgvtoxiQCVAgUBLMs3K
ui6XaCZmKH68fOWYYySKAzPkXyfYKnOlzsIjp2toust1Q5A3/n54PBKrUDN9tHVz
3Ch466q9EKUuDulTU6OLsilzmRvQJn0EJhzd4pht6hanC0R3seYNhUYhoJViCcCG
sRjLQs4iVVM=
=9wqs
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: smb@research.att.com
Date: Sat, 18 Dec 93 05:46:40 PST
To: CRSO.Cypherpunks@canrem.com
Subject: Re: Writable CD-ROMS as one-t
Message-ID: <9312181346.AA22687@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


	 If you record - say - 5 of them and send them by 5 seperate couriers
	 and xor them together to send the message, your enemy has to
	 compromise etc 5 people.

Or your enemy has to penetrate your site or your correspondent's site,
and copy five CD-ROMs instead of one.

CD-ROMs have one advantage:  there's a lot of data.  But that's not
all good, because you *really* want to destroy any keying material
you've ever used.

I've heard People Who Know say that in the spook and government world,
one-time pads are falling out of favor --- because their practical
security isn't as good as a really high quality conventional cipher with
a dynamically-negotiated session key.  I repeat:  *practical* security;
your enemy isn't going to hit you or bribe you with a copy of Shannon's
theorems.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: nobody@rosebud.ee.uh.edu
Date: Sat, 18 Dec 93 11:46:44 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: No Subject
Message-ID: <9312181946.AA29064@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


From: James Hicks, <71332.747@compuserve.com>

Well, a couple of nights ago I was sitting here using my modem, I had just finished perusing the C'punks list, when I heard about 5 shots ring out in the alley next to my home.  A few lines of garbage zapped across the screen and then the modem was totally unresponsive.  Well, I picked up the phone (another line); dead silence.

[You guessed it.  One of the bullets hit the phone line.  ASCII armor was no defense].

Not wanting to go through the night totally out of contact with the rest of the world, I decided to place a call to the phone co. from a nearby neighbors place but decided to sit tight for a few minutes to foil traffic analysis (and give whoever it was running around out there in the dark with the gun a little time to move on).

After the sun rose about 10 shell casings were actually found within a few feet of the line break (about 30 residences actually had service interrupted).  And It's usually so quiet around here.  My neighbor says that a policeman told him that local entrepreneurs will sometimes use fire guns into the air to signal potential customers that they are open for business.  Secure communications...who knows?  It is _sort_ of digital...

>James<
71332.747@compuserve.com




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Syl Miniter 803-768-3759 <MINITERS@citadel.edu>
Date: Sat, 18 Dec 93 12:56:46 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: For folks interested in ViaCrypt Use
Message-ID: <01H6MPM6XXB69EE7VW@citadel.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


From:	IN%"71332.747@CompuServe.COM"  "James Hicks" 18-DEC-1993 11:04:13.14
To:	IN%"miniters@citadel.edu"  "Syl Miniter"
CC:	
Subj:	ViaCrypt

Syl,

I saw your question on the Cypherpunks mail list.  Recently Dave Barnhart, the
ViaCrypt product manager (for Lemcon Systems) became active on Compuserve's 
Electronic Frontier Forum.  The following is a statement he left in the forums
message section.  He appears more than willing (even eager) to answer 
questions about ViaCrypt and can be contacted at the addresses given in his 
message.


  James
|>----------------------------------------------------------------------<|
|PGP 2.x Key ID: F9A281 Fingerprint <F2A1A42B 67408691 5A6A2F0F C1104457>|
|>----------------------------------------------------------------------<|

*========================================================================*
From: Dave Barnhart (ViaCrypt), 70275,1360
      70275.1360@compuserve.com
Date: Thu, Dec 2, 1993, 8:45:16 PM [PST]


ViaCrypt is a division of a 17-year old company named Lemcom Systems.
Lemcom Systems has traditionally produced IBM mainframe communication
controllers and other network products.  About 1989, we began producing a
network product that used DES (That's about the only kind of encryption that
IBM will admit exists).  About 2 years ago, the ViaCrypt division was formed
to develop products incorporating public key cryptography for the PC, UNIX,
and workstation market.  About 1 year ago, ViaCrypt sub-licensed the RSA
patents from Public Key Partners (PKP).  Late last summer (1993), we were
introduced to Phil Zimmermann, author pf PGP.  Phil expressed an interest in
finding a way to commercially market PGP.  Together with our law firm, one
of the coutry's formost experts on intellectual property rights, we examined
the terms of our PKP sub-license to determine if ViaCrypt could market a 
commercial version of PGP, and if so, under what conditions.  At the same 
time, we also investigated obtaining a sub-license for the IDEA cipher from 
Ascom Tech AG in Switzerland.  The opinion was that we could market PGP 
provided:
 
 1) we substituted ViaCrypt-written RSA code for the existing RSA code in PGP.

 2) we did not supply source code.

So in late September we signed an agreement with Phil Zimmermann to market
the commercial version of PGP, which we chose to call ViaCrypt PGP.  Except
for the RSA routines, a couple of bug-fixes provided by Phil, and a change
in the "welcome banner", the code in ViaCrypt PGP is identical to that found
in PGP 2.3a.  This means that it is interoperable with PGP 2.3a.  Except for
the aforementioned changes, we made no other changes or additions to the PGP 
2.3a source to produce ViaCrypt PGP 2.4 for MS-DOS.

Why would you buy ViaCrypt PGP instead of using the 'freeware' PGP?  First,
many small businesses and large corporations have expressed a great deal of
interest in using PGP, but have not done so because of the legal exposure
from RSA.  ViaCrypt PGP removes this problem.  As for the individual, Dr
Hugh Miller said it best on USENET, but I won't quote him here without his
permission.  Essentially, it's your chance to "stand up and be counted" on
the subject of how you want your encryption.  It's the best chance we may
have to say:

1. "We don't like the rigid, hierarchical trust model in PEM", and:

2. "We don't want any system incorporating key escrow (a la clipper)"

ViaCrypt PGP version 2.4 for MS-DOS is available from:

        ViaCrypt
        2104 W. Peoria Ave
        Phoenix, AZ  85029
        Phone (602) 944-0773
        FAX (602) 943-2601
        Internet: wk01965@worldlink.com
        Compuserve: 70304,41

Price: $99.98 (single user)
      $299.98 (five users)
      $824.98 (20 users)

Plus $8.00 S & H, (and if you live in a small number of states, I can't
remember which ones, they make us collect sales tax.)

We intend to have ViaCrypt PGP available for just about every platform on
the planet.  We should be announcing the availability of ViaCrypt PGP for
several UNIX platforms shortly.  I hope to have MAC and Windows versions
available some time in the second quarter of 1994.

And I know it doesn't make for a great story, but at the CSI Computer
Security Conference in Anaheim a month ago, Phil Zimmermann was in our booth
(we asked him to come).  Jim Bidzos was at the same conference, making a
presentation.  There were no bloody brawls in the hallway, no shouting
matches, I don't think the two even encountered each other.  The rest of the
folks at the RSA booth stopped by, and were actually quite cordial. ho hum.

I apologize for the length of this message, but I hope it answers everyone's
questions.  If not, ask away, or feel free to contact me at ViaCrypt. (If
you call ViaCrypt with questions, I'm the one you'll probably talk to, by
the way.)

Best Regards,
David Barnhart
ViaCrypt Product Manager

Return-path: <71332.747@CompuServe.COM>
Received: from dub-img-1.compuserve.com by citadel.edu (PMDF V4.2-11 #4957) id
 <01H6MFHZXKKG9AOW3X@citadel.edu>; Sat, 18 Dec 1993 11:04:14 EST
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 LAA11648; Sat, 18 Dec 1993 11:04:58 -0500
Date: Sat, 18 Dec 1993 11:01:43 -0500 (EST)
From: James Hicks <71332.747@CompuServe.COM>
Subject: ViaCrypt
To: Syl Miniter <miniters@citadel.edu>
Message-id: <931218160143_71332.747_DHQ64-1@CompuServe.COM>
Content-transfer-encoding: 7BIT





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Jim choate <ravage@wixer.bga.com>
Date: Sat, 18 Dec 93 16:41:47 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Stego Help Requested...
Message-ID: <9312190023.AA24688@wixer>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Hi everyone,

As some of you are aware I have been looking at stego, in particular trying
to calculate the maximum feasible message to insert in a given image. I have
determined some techniques that help predict this ratio. In the process of
testing them I got side-tracked into converting images to other format (RGB >
HSV in this case). Since these are linear but not equaly scaled there is some
range alteration in the conversion process. It appears that if a RGB image is
holding a image it converts to HSV differently and is thus easy to test for.

I am in need of some additional data and basiclly clueless where to find it.
The data falls into one of the following ways:

    > source of images in both HSV and RGB format

    > pd or shareware software that will convert mathematicaly

    > access to a video color registration set to generate the above
      database

Any help in locating any one of these would be greatly appreciated.

Have a Merry Christmas!

                                                 Ravage
                                                  Black
                                                   Leather
                                                    Monster





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Jeremy Smith <jersmit@eis.calstate.edu>
Date: Sun, 19 Dec 93 00:48:55 PST
To: Cypherpunks <cypherpunks@toad.com>
Subject: Internet Security Scanner
Message-ID: <Pine.3.88.9312190004.A16772-0100000@eis.calstate.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



	Does anybody where there is an FTP'able copy of the 
aforementioned program?  Any help would be greatly appreciated.  Tried 
archie, but no hits for 'iss' 'internetsecurityscanner' or combinations 
thereof.

 -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
                Jeremy Smith -*jersmit@eis.calstate.edu*-
          My views are my own and nobody else can have them!
 -----------------------------------------------------------------------------





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: jerry@terminus.dell.com (Jeremy Porter)
Date: Sat, 18 Dec 93 23:54:00 PST
To: tcmay@netcom.com
Subject: Re: Bobby Inman
In-Reply-To: <2erq3c$n4h@uudell.us.dell.com>
Message-ID: <9312190747.AA02601@terminus.us.dell.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


In article <2erq3c$n4h@uudell.us.dell.com> you write:
>From owner-cypherpunks@toad.com  Fri Dec 17 08:19:53 1993
>Return-Path: <tcmay@netcom.com>
>	id XAA27037; Thu, 16 Dec 1993 23:58:14 -0800
>From: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
>Message-Id: <199312170758.XAA27037@mail.netcom.com>
>Subject: Re: Bobby Inman
>Cc: cypherpunks@toad.com
>> There was some mentions that he spend some time in the private sector
>> since "then". Anybody knows what he was doing?
>> 
>> Pierre Uszynski
>He was head of MCC in Austin for several years and then his own
>company, a kind of high-tech holding company (Westmark was the name, I
>think).
>--Tim May

If my memory serves me correctly Inman's Westmark was involved in the
buying and selling of Tracor a few year back.  Although I'm not sure on
that one.
Also of note he was(is?) on the board of directors for a Austin
based PC company.  I don't know what role he played or if he
was just on the board for the money.

I think it will be interesting to see his opinions on things like,
the "fall" of communism, the "crapper" chip, ITAR, etc...  I would not
like to be on this guy's bad side...  If anyone finds out when the 
confirmation hearings are going to be, it would be nice to know in time
to setup the VCR...

Good or bad this guy could radically alter the face of crypto policy
in the US, much quicker than congress, or most anyone else could act.



-- 
| Jeremy Porter  -----------------  Dell Computer Corp. ----
| Systems Engineering --- jerry@terminus.us.dell.com --------
|-------------------------------------------------------------
|  Support your Second Amendment rights to encryption technology. 




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Harry Shapiro <habs@panix.com>
Date: Sun, 19 Dec 93 09:59:03 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com (Good Guys)
Subject: My Party NOT!
Message-ID: <199312191755.AA14657@panix.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Hi,

A member of this list (Edgar Swank) recently posted a message to this
list providing details of a private party I am holding.

That message should not have been forwarded here.

The party in question is, as I mention above, private and is not open
to the public nor the membership of the Cypherpunks list. (This is most
due to the VERY limited size of the "party room.")

I am posting this message for anyone who felt that message was an open
invitation to join my party and to indicate that was not the case.

The party guest list is limited to members of the Extropians list who
have RSVPed, others will not be admitted.

/hawk

-- 
Harry S. Hawk  				      habs@extropy.org
Electronic Communications Officer, Extropy Institute Inc. 
    	    The Extropians Mailing List, Since 1991
EXTROPY -- A measure of intelligence, information, energy, vitality,
experience, diversity, opportunity, and growth.  EXTROPIANISM -- The
philosophy that seeks to increase extropy.          



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: President@whitehouse.gov
Date: Sun, 19 Dec 93 14:19:04 PST
Subject: No Subject
Message-ID: <9312192216.AA13485@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I Love encryption.  I Love PGP.  I Love PseudoSpoofing.
Please send me lots of mail about my Health Care Plan.

And always remember...

Free Willy!

--Slick




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: ferguson@icm1.icp.net (Paul Ferguson x2044)
Date: Sun, 19 Dec 93 15:29:05 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: No Subject
Message-ID: <9312192326.AA07559@icm1.icp.net>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain




Ahem.


> Return-Path: <President@whitehouse.gov>
> Received: from [144.92.136.35] by toad.com id AA13485; 
>   Sun, 19 Dec 93 14:16:03 PST
>
> I Love encryption.  I Love PGP.  I Love PseudoSpoofing.
> Please send me lots of mail about my Health Care Plan.
> 
> And always remember...
> 
> Free Willy!
>
> --Slick


MACC (NET-UWMSN-NET)
   University of Wisconsin - Madison
   1210 West Dayton Street
   Madison, WI 53706

   Netname: UWMSN-NET
   Netnumber: 144.92.0.0

   Coordinator:
      Dorl, Michael  (MD40)  dorl@MACC.WISC.EDU
      (608) 262-0466

   Domain System inverse mapping provided by:

   DOGIE.MACC.WISC.EDU		128.104.30.17
   TELGATE.ADP.WISC.EDU		144.92.104.20

   Record last updated on 16-Dec-93.


Nice try, Willy.






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Anonymous <nowhere@bsu-cs.bsu.edu>
Date: Sun, 19 Dec 93 15:34:19 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Detweiler: still paranoid
Message-ID: <9312192331.AA07509@bsu-cs.bsu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Newsgroups: talk.politics.crypto,alt.privacy,alt.privacy.anon-server,news.admin.policy,comp.org.eff.talk,comp.admin.policy,alt.conspiracy
From: ld231782@turner.lance.colostate.edu (L. Detweiler)
Subject: Re: CRYPTOANARCHIST INFILTRATION ALERT
Sender: news@yuma.ACNS.ColoState.EDU (News Account)
Message-ID: <Dec19.075042.7988@yuma.ACNS.ColoState.EDU>
Date: Sun, 19 Dec 1993 07:50:42 GMT
References: <PMETZGER.93Dec6212145@snark.lehman.com> <1993Dec7.235821.25954@oracle.us.oracle.com> <pgf.755746191@srl03.cacs.usl.edu> <1993Dec17.001757.1814@oracle.us.oracle.com>
Nntp-Posting-Host: turner.lance.colostate.edu
Organization: Colorado State University, Fort Collins, CO  80523
X-Newsreader: TIN [version 1.2 021193BETA PL3]
Followup-To: talk.politics.crypto,alt.privacy,alt.privacy.anon-server,news.admin.policy,comp.org.eff.talk,comp.admin.policy,alt.conspiracy


I seem to have missed much of this thread. My news server seems to have
scrolled off all the interesting articles.  I was hoping more 
cryptoanarchists would show up to call me insane. Quite a pity.

David Criswell (dcriswel@oracle.uucp) wrote:
: There's only one in the phone book. Cupertino's not all that 
: big, and Szabo's a fairly uncommon name. If I were, umm, you 
: know, in Mr. Detweiler's mental state, this might lead me to 
: conclude that somebody was lifting "pseudos" from Bay Area 
: phonebooks, and the one in the directory does not post. I
: don't really care about it enough to call him.

Mr. Criswell, could you describe the difficulty of getting fake names
into a phone book? is this trivial or impossible? This is not to in 
any way imply that N.Szabo is such an occurence.

I don't know why everyone on the internet gives every single email address
they meet the benefit of the doubt. They all should get the detriment of
the suspicion. But what do I know? I am just a paranoid lunatic who is 
progressing quite nicely on Prozac and intense psychoanalysis, thank you 
very much.

Imagine that someone has made an art, science, and religion to pseudospoof.
Why would they do it? because there is immense power behind such a technique.
And minor barriers like phone numbers and phone books would be the first
mediums they corrupt. People trust phone numbers -- they believe that if
you can supply a phone number, you are are not a pseudonym. What is the
basis for this belief? The foundation? Nothing but naive trust that is
easily betrayed by those who have build their lives around deceptions.

Don't care? well, don't blame me when tomorrow you find out that the 
cryptoanarchists own the largest share of the world mafia, and have 
succeeded in doing so by coordinating it over the Internet. Even better yet,
let you be tortured by them all your life without ever discovering the
true source of your wretched desperation. 

-- 

ld231782@longs.LANCE.ColoState.EDU




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: charliemerritt@BIX.com
Date: Sun, 19 Dec 93 18:34:21 PST
To: president@whitehouse.gov
Subject: Crypto security
Message-ID: <9312192130.memo.19551@BIX.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> Return-path: President@whitehouse.gov
> Received: from delphi.com by bix.com (CoSy3.31.1.45) id
>  <9312191740.memo.19248@BIX.com>; Sun, 19 Dec 1993 17:40:07 -0500 (EST)
> Received: from relay2.UU.NET by delphi.com (PMDF V4.2-11 #4520) id
> <01H6O7JJ9BJK94H43Q@delphi.com>; Sun, 19 Dec 1993 17:37:58 EDT
> Received: from toad.com by relay2.UU.NET with SMTP
>  (5.61/UUNET-internet-primary) id AA10179; Sun, 19 Dec 93 17:37:09 -0500
> Received: by toad.com id AA13572; Sun, 19 Dec 93 14:19:04 PST
> Received: by toad.com id AA13552; Sun, 19 Dec 93 14:17:31 PST
> Received: from [144.92.136.35] by toad.com id AA13485; Sun,
>  19 Dec 93 14:16:03 PST
> From: President@whitehouse.gov
> Date: Sun, 19 Dec 1993 14:13:02 -0800 (PST)
> To: charliemerritt@bix.com
> Message-id: <9312192216.AA13485@toad.com>
> Content-transfer-encoding: 7BIT
> X-Envelope-to: bix.com!charliemerritt
> Apparently-To: Cypherpunks
>
> I Love encryption.  I Love PGP.  I Love PseudoSpoofing.
> Please send me lots of mail about my Health Care Plan.
>
> And always remember...
>
> Free Willy!
>
> --Slick


 Dear Slick,
	as you can see from (enclosed copy of your) message,
	electronic communications are NOT secure without
	free enterprise encryption and signatures.

	I hope Bobby Inmann doesnt put too much presure
	on you to go with some stupid idea like Clipper.

	Lets not let America be an embarrased second rate
	country when it comes to electronic security.

	FREE CRYPTO!

 -- Charlie Merritt




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: an58933@anon.penet.fi
Date: Sun, 19 Dec 93 16:54:18 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: data point re. Inman
Message-ID: <9312200052.AA24029@anon.penet.fi>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



I have (sort of ) worked for Inman twice.  He is currently serving as a 
director for the company which employs me.

Recently, the company has launched a campaign to coerce employees to sign
agreements relinquishing their rights to sue the company and its officers if
the employees are willfully injured, sexually harrassed, etc.  I have been
told that this was done at the request of the board; certainly I would 
expect board review on something like this.

I don't know what position Adm. Inman took, but this still reveals a bit
about the corporate culture he contributes to.
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
To find out more about the anon service, send mail to help@anon.penet.fi.
Due to the double-blind, any mail replies to this message will be anonymized,
and an anonymous id will be allocated automatically. You have been warned.
Please report any problems, inappropriate use etc. to admin@anon.penet.fi.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: edgar@spectrx.saigon.com (Edgar W. Swank)
Date: Mon, 20 Dec 93 07:24:38 PST
To: Cypherpunks          <cypherpunks@toad.com>
Subject: MTGS: 1/8/94 Party only for Extropians
Message-ID: <Fc5uec2w165w@spectrx.saigon.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Harry (Hawk) Shapiro asked me to mention:

   I appreciate your concern about the conflict but it is not an
   open party as my room can only hold a couple doz. people at best...

   I would appreciated it if you noted to the cypherpunks that it
   is a party for the Extropians mailing list only.

   /hawk

--
edgar@spectrx.saigon.com (Edgar W. Swank)
SPECTROX SYSTEMS +1.408.252.1005  Cupertino, Ca





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: nate@VIS.ColoState.EDU (CVL staff member Nate Sammons)
Date: Mon, 20 Dec 93 08:04:39 PST
To: nowhere@bsu-cs.bsu.edu (Anonymous)
Subject: Re: Detweiler: still paranoid
In-Reply-To: <9312192331.AA07509@bsu-cs.bsu.edu>
Message-ID: <9312201600.AA17523@vangogh.VIS.ColoState.EDU>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text


Yes, Detweiler is still paranoid.  He has been pestering me in private email
and raving onto teh Colorado Cypherpunks list about me being "autocratic"
and some kind of Nazi leader of the Colorado Cypherpunks (to which I 
have responded that I am not the leader, I just provide a mailing list,
but, I digress).  Just so you know, he still raves, and (worse),
he knows where I work, and has mentioned coming by for "consulting". Yikes.

Just a little FYI.

-nate

-- 
+-----------------------------------------------------------------------+
| Nate Sammons  nate@VIS.ColoState.Edu  (303) 491-1578                  |
|   Colorado State University -- Computer Visualization Laboratory      |
+-----------------------------------------------------------------------+



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Alan (Miburi-san) Wexelblat" <wex@media.mit.edu>
Date: Mon, 20 Dec 93 09:19:14 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Geez, you think a 'punk would be a *little* more careful...
Message-ID: <9312201715.AA16884@media.mit.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I didn't even have to move off my machine to know where this forgery entered
the stream...

Received: by media.mit.edu (5.57/DA1.0.4.amt)
	id AA27520; Sun, 19 Dec 93 17:42:40 -0500
Received: from toad.com by relay2.UU.NET with SMTP 
	(5.61/UUNET-internet-primary) id AA10523; Sun, 19 Dec 93 17:40:43 -0500
Received: by toad.com id AA13572; Sun, 19 Dec 93 14:19:04 PST
Received: by toad.com id AA13552; Sun, 19 Dec 93 14:17:31 PST
Return-Path: <President@whitehouse.gov>
Received: from [144.92.136.35] by toad.com id AA13485; Sun, 19 Dec 93 14:16:03 PST
Date: Sun, 19 Dec 93 14:13:02 PST
From: President@whitehouse.gov
Message-Id: <9312192216.AA13485@toad.com>
Apparently-To: Cypherpunks

I Love encryption.  I Love PGP.  I Love PseudoSpoofing.
Please send me lots of mail about my Health Care Plan.

And always remember...

Free Willy!

--Slick





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: jkreznar@ininx.com (John E. Kreznar)
Date: Mon, 20 Dec 93 12:29:45 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Bobby Inman's Zoe Baird problem
Message-ID: <9312202025.AA16722@ininx>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

Freedom lovers rejoice!  An instance of the ``Zoe Baird problem'' may
accomplish what we could only dream: the derailment of the Inman
nomination.

	John E. Kreznar		| Relations among people to be by
	jkreznar@ininx.com	| mutual consent, or not at all.

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.3a

iQCVAgUBLRYKGsDhz44ugybJAQGOLgP/bPCxZu/dgszlCPyyp6Es409pg5GbySZ2
3nqEKSLi8IlBaTkb5zftK4oyoT6S6xlZzg1c5eD6aozE6JT9qpFkDmjk5qJghdzg
0/wSvgEzjmPorvlPA/EAhwn0UXBfZ+DhcW70XQ8EcoW4c1tWARlzZbKkuLDh8mQl
SWeRh08TMhc=
=IBjs
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Alan (Miburi-san) Wexelblat" <wex@media.mit.edu>
Date: Mon, 20 Dec 93 09:39:15 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: sources of math routines...
Message-ID: <9312201735.AA19034@media.mit.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


To: hackers@media.mit.edu
Subject: when you are bored...
Date: Mon, 20 Dec 93 10:40:04 -0500
From: halazar@media.mit.edu

Ever looked at the sources to libm.a?  Sun just released the sources
to Solaris 2.3 libm.a, supposedly a new and high quality version.
However, it looks a little more like cypher than math.
-----------------------End Forwarded Message

Any opinions from this list?

--Alan Wexelblat, Reality Hacker, Author, and Cyberspace Bard
Media Lab - Advanced Human Interface Group	wex@media.mit.edu
Voice: 617-258-9168 Page: 617-945-1842		an53607@anon.penet.fi
The belief that enhanced understanding will necessarily stir a nation to
action is one of mankind's oldest illusions.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Perry E. Metzger" <pmetzger@lehman.com>
Date: Mon, 20 Dec 93 11:19:16 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Detweiler: still paranoid
In-Reply-To: <9312192331.AA07509@bsu-cs.bsu.edu>
Message-ID: <199312201916.OAA00640@snark>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Anonymous says:
> 
[stuff deleted]

Please DO NOT forward this crap. If I wanted to read Detweilers
rantings, I'd go somewhere else and do it. Keep Cypherpunks clean.

.pm




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Stanton McCandlish <mech@eff.org>
Date: Mon, 20 Dec 93 11:54:46 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Inman: Cognitive Dissonance?
In-Reply-To: <9312171625.AA05005@toad.com>
Message-ID: <199312201949.OAA29944@eff.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> This quote is a classic! The first bit about criminalizing crypto when it is
> used to cover up criminal activity is all right, I guess - sort of like 
> adding a charge of 'resisting arrest' to the list of charges filed against
> a criminal. 

It is NOT alright.  Such a "law" would be a blatant violation of the 5th
Amendment.  There is virtually no difference between criminalizing the use
of cryptography to "hide" criminal activity, and criminalizing the failure
of every criminal that every used a phone in the commission of crime to
send a recording of the conversation to the FBI, w/o even having to be
asked to do so, and before the cops even knew an alleged crime had or
would occur.


> However, Inman segues from that statement into the 'registry
> of institutions that can legally use cyphers'... hmmm.. as if the illegal
> uses of cryptography were so tempting that 'institutions' have to jump through
> hoops to demontrate their innocence [as opposed to the assumption that they
> will behave themselves of their own accord]. Then, the last sentence ices 
> the cake: "If you get somebody using one who isn't registered, then you go 
> after him." Warm up the tanks and load the tear gas, BATF! 'Presumption of
> innocence' be damned! Cryptography is a _munition_, right? Right? Hmm......

Just so.

> It never ceases to amaze me how Big Brother can leap from nice, harmless-
> sounding 'law and order' rhetoric to police-state strong-arm statements in
> the space of a single 'sound bite'.

I think the crypto-anarchists among us would say that's the nature of the
beast.  I honestly think most of the 'law and order' rhetoric is
heartfelt.  I'm pretty sure that most control-freaks really do believe
they are doing it 'for your own good', and see themselves as knights in
shining armor.  I guess I've just never had much faith in conspiracy
theories.  This is not to say such people are to be trusted, however.

Two old sayings come to mind here: never ascribe to malice what can be
adequately explained by stupidity or ignorance; and, if you ever meet
someone who says they want to 'protect' you or want to do something 'for
your own good', run away as fast as possible - this person is dangerous.

-- 
Stanton McCandlish * mech@eff.org * Electronic Frontier Found. OnlineActivist
F O R   M O R E   I N F O,    E - M A I L    T O:     I N F O @ E F F . O R G 
O  P  E  N    P  L  A  T  F  O  R  M     O  N  L  I  N  E    R  I  G  H  T  S
V  I   R   T   U   A   L   C  U   L   T   U   R   E      C  R   Y   P   T   O



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Stanton McCandlish <mech@eff.org>
Date: Mon, 20 Dec 93 11:54:45 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Digital Telephony Threat Returns
In-Reply-To: <9312161537.AA03543@chiba.tadpole.com>
Message-ID: <199312201952.OAA03856@eff.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Since this note about FBI Dir. Freeh, and his plans to resurrect Digital
Telephony, has made it here, it should be noted that the original post
went out w/o proper attribution.  Most of the material came from a Brock
Meeks article in _Communications_Daily_.  Sorry for the omission. 

-- 
Stanton McCandlish * mech@eff.org * Electronic Frontier Found. OnlineActivist
F O R   M O R E   I N F O,    E - M A I L    T O:     I N F O @ E F F . O R G 
O  P  E  N    P  L  A  T  F  O  R  M     O  N  L  I  N  E    R  I  G  H  T  S
V  I   R   T   U   A   L   C  U   L   T   U   R   E      C  R   Y   P   T   O



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Stanton McCandlish <mech@eff.org>
Date: Mon, 20 Dec 93 12:34:45 PST
To: eff-talk@eff.org
Subject: EFF Quote of the Week #2, 12/20/93, Inman on Crypto
Message-ID: <199312202032.PAA23346@eff.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


"Society has recognized over time that certain kinds of scientific inquiry
can endanger society as a whole and has applied either directly, or through
scientific/ethical constraints, restrictions on the kind and amount of
research that can be done in those areas."

-- Adm. Bobby R. Inman (then CIA Dep. Dir.) in a February, 1982 article for
_Aviation_Week_and_Space_Technology_ on why cryptographic research should
be limited to government scientists.  Full text of this article is
available for anonymous ftp from ftp.eff.org as
pub/EFF/Policy/Crypto/inman.article.

The Electronic Frontier Foundation believes that individuals have the right
to protect their private communications by any method they choose - without
government interference.

For more information about the Electronic Frontier Foundation, send mail to
info@eff.org.

-- 
Stanton McCandlish * mech@eff.org * Electronic Frontier Found. OnlineActivist
F O R   M O R E   I N F O,    E - M A I L    T O:     I N F O @ E F F . O R G 
O  P  E  N    P  L  A  T  F  O  R  M     O  N  L  I  N  E    R  I  G  H  T  S
V  I   R   T   U   A   L   C  U   L   T   U   R   E      C  R   Y   P   T   O



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@stout.atd.ucar.EDU>
Date: Mon, 20 Dec 93 14:49:17 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Bobby Inman's Zoe Baird problem
Message-ID: <9312202246.AA10966@stout.atd.ucar.EDU>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> Freedom lovers rejoice!  An instance of the ``Zoe Baird problem'' may
> accomplish what we could only dream: the derailment of the Inman
> nomination.

Well, if Inman goes down I suppose I will do some rejoicing.  However, this
is also kind of depressing.  Something as important as a Cabinet nomination
can be wiped out by something that is really irrelevant (have you ever
looked into just how *hard* it is to employ a nanny on the books?); while
we all acknowledge that our really serious concerns will have no effect.
Anybody who is concerned about freedom in this country should ought to be
pretty scared when decisions this important are made in this way.

Not that this example is anything particularly new...

Jonathan Corbet
National Center for Atmospheric Research, Atmospheric Technology Division
corbet@stout.atd.ucar.edu




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: ferguson@icm1.icp.net (Paul Ferguson x2044)
Date: Mon, 20 Dec 93 17:04:51 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: EFF Quote of the Week (#2)
Message-ID: <9312210103.AA28345@icm1.icp.net>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



forwarded message content: 

"Society has recognized over time that certain kinds of scientific inquiry
can endanger society as a whole and has applied either directly, or through
scientific/ethical constraints, restrictions on the kind and amount of
research that can be done in those areas."

-- Adm. Bobby R. Inman (then CIA Dep. Dir.) in a February, 1982 article for
_Aviation_Week_and_Space_Technology_ on why cryptographic research should
be limited to government scientists.  Full text of this article is
available for anonymous ftp from ftp.eff.org as
pub/EFF/Policy/Crypto/inman.article.

The Electronic Frontier Foundation believes that individuals have the right
to protect their private communications by any method they choose - without
government interference.

For more information about the Electronic Frontier Foundation, send mail to
info@eff.org.

-- 
Stanton McCandlish * mech@eff.org * Electronic Frontier Found. OnlineActivist
F O R   M O R E   I N F O,    E - M A I L    T O:     I N F O @ E F F . O R G 
O  P  E  N    P  L  A  T  F  O  R  M     O  N  L  I  N  E    R  I  G  H  T  S
V  I   R   T   U   A   L   C  U   L   T   U   R   E      C  R   Y   P   T   O


________ end fwd ____________





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: terry.smith@canrem.com (Terry Smith)
Date: Tue, 21 Dec 93 06:55:02 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Writable CD-ROMS as o
In-Reply-To: <9312181345.AA21555@portnoy.canrem.com>
Message-ID: <60.1552.6525.0C18EF89@canrem.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


          Smb@research.att.com wrote 
 |-------------------------------|
>
>  If you record - say - 5 of them and send them by 5 seperate couriers
>  and xor them together to send the message, your enemy has to
>  compromise etc 5 people.
>
>Or your enemy has to penetrate your site or your correspondent's site,
>and copy five CD-ROMs instead of one.

Yes - but that should be *HARD* to do...

>CD-ROMs have one advantage:  there's a lot of data.  But that's not
>all good, because you *really* want to destroy any keying material
>you've ever used.

Yes - but it is a writable CD rom - Write over the data when it's used.

>I've heard People Who Know say that in the spook and government world,
>one-time pads are falling out of favor --- because their practical
>security isn't as good as a really high quality conventional cipher with
>a dynamically-negotiated session key.  I repeat:  *practical* security;
>your enemy isn't going to hit you or bribe you with a copy of Shannon's
>theorems.

Ok but one time pads DONE RIGHT (an d that's the optimum term - are VERY
STRONG


                    Terry Smith - XANTH sysop - 1:259/510
                CI$ 70733,3013 PGP 2.3A KEY FREQABLE AS 'KEY'.
 My opinions are not that of my company. But one day they WILL be! And then -
                        the -+*WORLD*+- Bwaw ha ha !!.
                       Read the Tick and others by NEC.
       Geraldo - "So, Mr. Smith, you admit you like to eat babies!"
                Me - "Nono - I admit I like to eat BABES!"

---
 * TLX v1.55 * Your code is theoretically beautiful, but it won't work.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: ub075@freenet.victoria.bc.ca (Ryan A. Perkins)
Date: Mon, 20 Dec 93 21:29:20 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Questions..
Message-ID: <9312210532.AA06176@freenet.victoria.bc.ca>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain




 First off, anyone notice how quiet it is in here without LD?
There used to be 30-40 messages a day, now I only see about 15
(Or so.. no KF)
 
 Second, what size should a remailer key be? Is there really any
need for military grade encryption on a remailer that might have
3 or 4 nested messages, each encrypted?
 
Thanx.

--
  Ryan Perkins - 1:340/13    | I feel that suicide jumpers see a glimpse of
ub075@freenet.victoria.bc.ca | sanity as they throw themselves from the ledge.
 Ask for PGP 2.3 public key  | That's why they scream all the way down.
          8C5357 : 9F FF BA 93 54 D5 18 78 4B 1E DA GC E3 4E




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Timothy Newsham <newsham@wiliki.eng.hawaii.edu>
Date: Tue, 21 Dec 93 01:24:54 PST
To: ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu (L. Detweiler)
Subject: Re: A New Enemy
In-Reply-To: <199312210641.XAA23399@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Message-ID: <9312210922.AA10352@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> 
> Hello, I just thought I would show one of my most hostile hate mail
> messages I have seen so far, from someone I didn't even know was my
> enemy. This was really painful.  This was posted to the public

painful is having all the hard work you've been doing for who
knows how long being trashed by bad public  opinion after some
deranged individual spread malicious propaganda about your cause
as far and wide as he can.

> cypherpunks list in Colorado moderated and founded by N.Sammons. I have
> met members at the first meeting and the more recent PRZ lecture. 
> 
> I have found I don't even have any friends in the Colorado group

no friends?  You?  I couldnt imagine why.

> either, despite my belief up to this point to the contrary. I was
> thrown off the list without my knowledge, supposedly because someone
> asked. I swear, I had not written a single annoying thing on that list
> in my LIFE and hadn't posted for MONTHS and I was censored.  This is
> really getting ugly, getting out of control. Whatever happened to, `its
> just ASCII text'?

a mailbomb is just ascii text.  I seem to recall you bitching pretty
loudly about receiving one.  What is 'its just ASCII text'  supposed
to mean?

> Look everyone, I apologized to every cypherpunk in the world in my
> posting, Embarrassment, Humiliation, Shame, and an Apology, for my past
> actions on this list. Please reread this to see that I was sincere.

hmm..  little tough having to live with the consequences of a
digital reputation now isnt it?

> These further efforts just amount to beating a man when he is down.

seems like the best time to me.

> This stuff is getting extremely vicious. I took a vacation and have
> really mellowed out, I assure you. Have you seen any disruptive

vicious?  Whatever happened to 'its just ASCII text' ?

> postings by me here at all? I have stopped! I'm just out in the
> newsgroups, nothing else. Not even touching your list. Do you begrudge

Oh,  so you attempted to trash the reputation and public support
for cryptography but now you "stopped" and that makes it all better?

> me even that? Please do not send me such painfully excruciating searing
> spiteful mail. I really do have feelings. I am just another human being.

You're not the only one with feelings.

> 
> By the way, I will let you in on a secret. I admit that I was really
> out of control a few weeks ago.  But you know what? Here is my dirty
> little secret. The only reason that I was able to harass you guys so
> much was that you reacted to it. If you trully followed your own
> philosophies, such as taking all text impartially (`there is only a
> message') I would have gone away a long time ago. 

Maybe we should harrass you more for having such a reaction to this
"spiteful mail".

[... more rants deleted...]




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "L. Detweiler" <ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Date: Mon, 20 Dec 93 22:44:53 PST
To: colorado_cypherpunks@VIS.ColoState.EDU
Subject: A New Enemy
Message-ID: <199312210641.XAA23399@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Hello, I just thought I would show one of my most hostile hate mail
messages I have seen so far, from someone I didn't even know was my
enemy. This was really painful.  This was posted to the public
cypherpunks list in Colorado moderated and founded by N.Sammons. I have
met members at the first meeting and the more recent PRZ lecture. 

I have found I don't even have any friends in the Colorado group
either, despite my belief up to this point to the contrary. I was
thrown off the list without my knowledge, supposedly because someone
asked. I swear, I had not written a single annoying thing on that list
in my LIFE and hadn't posted for MONTHS and I was censored.  This is
really getting ugly, getting out of control. Whatever happened to, `its
just ASCII text'?

Look everyone, I apologized to every cypherpunk in the world in my
posting, Embarrassment, Humiliation, Shame, and an Apology, for my past
actions on this list. Please reread this to see that I was sincere.
These further efforts just amount to beating a man when he is down.
This stuff is getting extremely vicious. I took a vacation and have
really mellowed out, I assure you. Have you seen any disruptive
postings by me here at all? I have stopped! I'm just out in the
newsgroups, nothing else. Not even touching your list. Do you begrudge
me even that? Please do not send me such painfully excruciating searing
spiteful mail. I really do have feelings. I am just another human being.

By the way, I will let you in on a secret. I admit that I was really
out of control a few weeks ago.  But you know what? Here is my dirty
little secret. The only reason that I was able to harass you guys so
much was that you reacted to it. If you trully followed your own
philosophies, such as taking all text impartially (`there is only a
message') I would have gone away a long time ago. 

The amazing secret: if something *really* offends you, the most
devastating response is to IGNORE IT. That bastard S.Boxx seems to
understand this. He is *driven* by responses to flamebait, clearly.
Ignore him and he will go away. I ask that everyone distinguish between
me and S.Boxx. He is the one causing all the trouble now, and I have
nothing to do with it. Forward him all your vicious hate mail comparing
him to Stalin. If you continue to attack me for something from every
lame anonymous address in the world, perhaps you will successfully
drive me to the madness you claim I am in!

As far as this person's threats, I would advise the author that the
postmaster bit hasn't worked so far. Please do not bother my
postmaster. There is no need. I HAVE STOPPED, DAMNIT! The author does
say he has extensive L.D. archives. Mine are in disarray. If anyone
wants any of my past rants to try to blacken me further, contact him
for the exact one.  

p.s. edited to preserve anonymity.

===cut=here===

From: W.B.
Subject: Re: N.S. is a Liar
To: "L. Detweiler" <ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
cc: colorado_cypherpunks@VIS.ColoState.EDU

Dear Detweiler,

Now you have seriously pissed ME off. 

Not being content with disrupting the content of the CA cypherpunks list, 
you are now attacking Mr. S. And wasting my time on this list.
 
> Mr. S., either someone asked you or they did not. You will tell me
> if someone asked you or not. You will tell the truth. If you do not, I
> will go to every single person on this list and ask them if they asked
> you to take me off the list. 

Detweiler, If I DIDN'T ask N. to take you off the list, then I was 
seriously remiss. I hereby pubicly ask Nate to remove you and all your
tentacles from the list. Further, I want a anti Detweiler filter on postings.
  

> You continue to evade on this point. I will not allow it. 

You won't WHAT ? 

Listen, asshole this little repartee is gonna get *REAL* nasty if you don't 
shut the fuck up and crawl back into your diseased little hole.
 
Just for the record, Just WHO do you think you are anyway ?
Jesus ? Stalin ? Some poor villified martyr who is being tortured for
his attempts at telling the truth ?


> Call me Hitler if you like

Oh, You think you are Hitler. 

Naw, Hitler was dangerous, you are simply annoying.

> N.S.
> >There is nothing that I sent to you that I will give a flying fuck about being
> >posted to this list (althought the other on the list may want to get some
> >work done, and may not give a shit about you).  I might need to talk to 
> >Dempsey about you lance account if you do this, though.  
> 
> Interesting threat. For everyone who may not know, Mr. D. is an
> administrator here in the Engineering dept., distinct from Mr.
> S.'s dept. And Mr. S. has now stooped to the wretched level
> of the legendary D.Barnes. Mr. S., would you like the phone number
> of my girlfriend? Perhaps you can get her to get me to stop harassing  you.


THANK YOU FOR THE NAME THAT I NEED TO CALL TO GET YOUR INTERNET ACCOUNT 
YANKED !

> 
> CO cypherpunks, I am deeply disappointed in this sordid display of
> depravity. I was sincerely interested in staying in this group and
> making contributions. In fact, I had a topic that was perfect for the
> list I was about to talk about. 

Sure you do. I'll just bet you did. Gee i really feel a keen loss.

> CO Cypherpunks, please send me mail,
> all of you. 

OK, here you go.

> Tell me whether you sent N.Sammons a letter to kick me off
> the list. Tell me if you received a letter from him that he had kicked
> me off. Tell me if you hate my guts and would like to see me bleed a
> slow death. Tell me what the @#$%^&* is going on the list, because I am
> obviously no longer on it. Tell me if you don't ever want to see me at
> a meeting again. Tell me I am worthless human scum. I promise to go
> away if you do so.
> 

OK, you are a worthless human scum. Once i thought that you were at least 
human and worth hearing out. Now I know better. Go away. Far far away.

Before you cry censorship, folks, try on this scenario.

Two or more adults are carrying on a conversation on a topic of their 
choosing. A small child starts interrupting the adults conversation. 
continually, incessantly. The adults ignore it. The child increases it's 
efforts, and throws a tantrum. The adults ignore it. Finally the child 
craps on one of the adults shoes. The adult picks the kid up, spanks it, 
and sends it off to bed.

It ain't censorship, people. This loon hasn't made a significant 
contribution to the cypherpunks since the FAQ way back when.

You seem to like ultimatums, Detweiler, try this one on for size.
Either you stop posting on this list immediately, AND the CA cypherpunks 
list Immediately, or I call Mr Dempsey. And email him a list (about 300K) 
of ALL your postings. I have been saving them. And go ahead and show 
anyone you want the private email I sent to you. MAKE sure the signature 
matches the text, folks.


Detweiler, go ahead and call me a tentacle. say anything your slimy and 
demented litle heart desires.

But do not even think about threatening me. 

I PUSH BACK.

Feel Lucky, Detweiler ?













From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Ed Carp <erc@khijol.yggdrasil.com>
Date: Tue, 21 Dec 93 01:09:21 PST
To: "L. Detweiler" <ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Subject: Re: A New Enemy
In-Reply-To: <199312210641.XAA23399@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Message-ID: <Pine.3.05.1.9312210012.B2553-a100000@localhost>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I just wish everyone on this list would either GROW UP or SHUT UP.  Take
your little flame wars and "my sysadmin is bigger than your sysadmin"
childish tantrums and threats and promises and anything else that doesn't
directly relate to what these lists were formed to discuss and take it to
alt.flame, huh?  What an ungodly waste of time and bandwidth...

Ed Carp, N7EKG			erc@wetware.com			510/659-9560
                   an38299@anon.penet.fi, anon-1157@twwells.com
If you want magic, let go of your armor.  Magic is so much stronger than
steel!        -- Richard Bach, "The Bridge Across Forever"






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Mike Ingle <MIKEINGLE@delphi.com>
Date: Mon, 20 Dec 93 22:24:53 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Remailer Keys, etc.
Message-ID: <01H6Q1WVU07694HTTD@delphi.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


"ub075@freenet.victoria.bc.ca" wrote:

>First off, anyone notice how quiet it is in here without LD?
>There used to be 30-40 messages a day, now I only see about 15
>(Or so.. no KF)

Nice, isn't it. And the S/N ratio has been much higher.
 
>Second, what size should a remailer key be? Is there really any
>need for military grade encryption on a remailer that might have
>3 or 4 nested messages, each encrypted?

Depends on how fast the system running the remailer is. Key length
has little effect on encryption time, but a major effect on decryption
time. So if the machine is fast, use a 1024 bit key. If the machine
is slow or heavily loaded, and there is nothing going through it
that might interest a spook, use a 512 bit key.

-- Mike (encrypt your hard drive, ask me how)




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Derek Atkins <warlord@MIT.EDU>
Date: Mon, 20 Dec 93 22:29:22 PST
To: ub075@freenet.victoria.bc.ca
Subject: Re: Questions..
In-Reply-To: <9312210532.AA06176@freenet.victoria.bc.ca>
Message-ID: <9312210626.AA02588@toxicwaste.media.mit.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>  Second, what size should a remailer key be? Is there really any
> need for military grade encryption on a remailer that might have
> 3 or 4 nested messages, each encrypted?

The fact that you have nested messages doesn't matter, since the
remailer, in theory, only opens the outermost envelope (The fact that
it finds another envelope and not some plain-text message shouldn't
matter to the remailer).

Also, depending on the kind and speed of the machine, and how much
mail it is going to get should affect the size of the key.

Does this help any>?

-derek





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Derek Atkins <warlord@MIT.EDU>
Date: Mon, 20 Dec 93 22:29:55 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Worldwide Electronic Commerce Conference (fwd)
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I was asked to forward this here.  Please do not send responses
back to me, as I have nothing to so with this...

-derek

------- Forwarded Message

- --------------------------------------------------------------------
WORLDWIDE ELECTRONIC COMMERCE:
      Law, Policy and Controls Conference
 
****************Program Details****************
 
 
Dear Colleague:
 
Our world is getting smaller.  Electronic Data
Interchange (EDI), Electronic Mail (E-Mail) and other
computer-based technologies (that collectively support
Electronic Commerce) are drawing individuals and
organizations closer together.  However, these exciting
developments also present significant challenges.
Corresponding audit, controls, legal, policy and security
issues pose potentially serious barriers to the rapid
adoption and extensive use of Electronic Commerce.
 
Worldwide Electronic Commerce will address the
implementation and control issues inherent in applying
Electronic Commerce to today's environment.  The
answers provided at this conference will address current
problems as well as provide a foundation for dealing
with these complex issues in the future.   We have been
fortunate to have secured an unusually qualified and
internationally recognized faculty to share their
experience, knowledge and theories on the wide range of
issues identified in this brochure.  We are equally
pleased to have obtained a distinguished group of
organizations who, in affiliation with this conference,
are lending their considerable support.
 
Please join us at this unique and ground breaking event
which will be held on January 16-18, 1994 in New York
City at the Waldorf-Astoria Hotel.
 
Michael S. Baum, Esq., Conference Chair
M. Todd Ostrander, Conference Co-Chair
 
 
WORLDWIDE ELECTRONIC COMMERCE
CONFERENCE PUT ON IN AFFILIATION WITH:
- --------------------------------------
American Bar Association,
Section of Science & Technology
 
Centre for Commercial Law Studies,
University of London
 
Computer Law Association
 
EDI Association of the United Kingdom
 
EDP Auditors Association
 
Harvard Law School
 
John F. Kennedy School of Government,
Harvard University
 
National Institute of Standards and Technology
 
U.S. Council for International Business
 
Data Interchange Standards Association
 
Healthcare EDI Corporation
 
International Union of Latin Notaries
 
 
CONFERENCE AT A GLANCE
- ----------------------
SUNDAY, JANUARY 16TH - Registration 17:00 - 20:00
- -------------------------------------------------
PRE-CONFERENCE TUTORIALS: 18:00 - 19:30
* Electronic Trade Overview for Beginners
* Security and Audit Overview
* A General Counsel's Perspective on Electronic Trade
* Electronic Commerce Policy and Regulation 101
 
 
MONDAY, JANUARY 17TH - Registration 7:00 - 18:00
- ------------------------------------------------
 
OPENING PLENARY: 8:00 - 8:50
 
SESSION 1: 9:00 - 10:20
* Will Legislation Keep Up with Electronic Trade?
* Anatomy of a Model EDI Audit Program
* Will Privacy Requirements Inhibit Electronic
  Commerce?
* Clearing Houses and Electronic Commerce
 
SESSION 2: 10:30 - 11:50
* U.S. Efforts in Coordinating Electronic Commerce
  Standards Policy
* How to Audit a Third Party/Value Added Network
* What is Cost Effective Commercially Reasonable
  Security?
* Anticompetitive Restraints on Trade in Electronic
  Commerce
 
LUNCH 12:00 - 13:30
 
SESSION 3: 13:30 - 14:50
* Trading Partner and Business Agreements in
  Electronic Commerce
* Electronic Negotiability - What Scares the EDI Users
  Away?
* INFOSEC Standards Coordination and Interworking
* Time/Date Stamping - Options and Constraints
 
SESSION 4: 15:00 - 16:20
* United Nations Electronic Commerce Initiatives
* Directory control Issues in Electronic Messaging and
  EDI
* Comparing Critical Cryptographic Algorithms and
  Standards
* Financial Clearing Houses - a Foundation for EDI?
 
SESSION 5: 16:30 - 17:50
* Model Electronic Payments Agreements
* What to Save, When to Save It, and For How Long
* Do "Smart Cards" Provide an "Ultimate" Control
  Solution?
* The "FAST" Initiative - Business Trust in the
  Computer Era?
 
TUESDAY, JANUARY 18TH - Registration 7:00 - 12:00
- -------------------------------------------------
SESSION 6: 8:00 - 9:20
* Negotiating Electronic Trade Agreements
* Back-Up, Archival and Contingency Planning Services
* Security Policy in a Global Information Environment
* Electronic Software Distribution (ESD) - a Pandora's
  Box?
 
SESSION 7: 9:30 - 10:50
* Value Added Networks and Interconnect Agreements
* Do Criminal Laws Really Protect Electronic
  Commerce?
* Digital and Electronic Signatures and the Law
* Accreditation and Certification - the New Frontier?
 
SESSION 8: 11:00 - 12:50
* The ICC Electronic Commerce Initiatives
* Admitting, Proving and Enforcing EDI Transactions
* Re-engineering the Tax Filing Process
* EDI Insurance - the Next Control Approach?
 
LUNCH: 12:00 - 13:30
 
SESSION 9: 14:00 - 15:20
* Central and Eastern European Electronic Trade
* The Role and Future of Notaries in Computer-Based
  Commerce
* Will Healthcare Reform Profoundly Reshape EDI Law,
  Policy, and Controls?
* The Uses of Escrow in Electronic Commerce
 
SESSION 10: 15:30 - 16:50
* Who Owns the Standards, Functionality and Systems?
* Risk Analysis in Electronic Trade
* Judicial EDI
* EDI Translation Software Control and Legal
  Considerations
 
 
CONFERENCE PROGRAMMING COMMITTEE:
- ---------------------------------
Robert Barger, Esq., Section of Science and Technology,
American Bar Association
 
Michael S. Baum, Esq., Independent Monitoring,
Conference Chair
 
Susan Caldwell, Executive Director, EDP Auditors
Association
 
Rachel Foerster and Garren Hagemeier, Healthcare
EDI Corporation
 
Mark L. Gordon, Esq., Computer Law Association
 
Jerry Mechling, Ph.D. and Tom Fletcher,Ph.D.,
Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University
 
Mario Miccoli, Natariat, Unione Internazionale Del
Notariato Latino
 
Professor Charles R. Nesson, Harvard Law School
 
M. Todd Ostrander, EDI Program Manager,
Egghead Software, Conference Co-Chair
 
Chris Reed, Esq. and Ian Walden, Ph.D., Centre for
Commercial Law Studies, University of London
 
Peter Robinson and Bruce Wilson, U.S. Council for
International Business
 
Roy Saltman, National Institute of Standards and
Technology
 
In Memory of the Late Professor Donald Trautman,
Harvard Law School
 
 
SUNDAY, JANUARY 16TH:
PRE-CONFERENCE TUTORIAL EVENING SESSIONS
- ----------------------------------------
The following tutorials provide newcomers to electronic
trade with an overview of the concepts, technologies,
and business practices that will make the conference
more meaningful. These pre-conference sessions are
scheduled from 18:00 - 19:30, January 16th, so that they
will not interfere with the regular conference sessions.
 
ELECTRONIC TRADE OVERVIEW FOR BEGINNERS
An overview of "Electronic Trade" and how it applies to
the business environment of the '90's & the 21st century.
You will learn about the history and state of electronic
commerce, including EDI, E-Mail, and other enabling
computer-based trade technologies and the components
necessary to implement these technologies successfully
in your industry.  Additionally, this session will provide
an overview of electronic commerce-relevant aspects of
the American National Standards Institute (ANSI),
United Nations/EDI for Administration, Commerce and
Trade (UN/EDIFACT) and International Standards
Organization (ISO) standards development processes,
how they affect you, and  important differences that
multi-national companies will likely encounter while
implementing them.
 
SECURITY AND AUDIT OVERVIEW
 
The basic control structures and security guidelines for
an electronic trade program including cryptographic and
non-cryptographic controls will be discussed in this
tutorial session.  This session also provides the 'non-
auditor' with a description of the unique characteristics
of auditing in an electronic trade environment and an
understanding of how auditors must contribute to the
electronic commerce environment.
 
A GENERAL COUNSEL'S PERSPECTIVE ON ELECTRONIC TRADE
Corporate counsel are increasingly called upon to
respond quickly and effectively to the demands of
accelerating electronic trade implementation programs.
Veteran corporate counsel will summarize the critical
responsive actions they have taken, and provide
perspectives on how they navigated and climbed the
electronic commerce learning curve. This session will
provide the electronic commerce neophyte general
counsel with helpful hints for making the most of the
conference.
 
ELECTRONIC COMMERCE POLICY AND REGULATION 101
The policy and regulatory issues affecting electronic
commerce continue to grow without an end in sight. As a
primer for an enriching Worldwide Electronic
Commerce conference, this session identifies and
explains the critical policy and regulatory building
blocks (and road blocks) that electronic commerce
professionals simply cannot avoid. It also surveys  the
"tools" that are used in policy development and
implementation. This session provides a useful
foundation for many of the policy-oriented sessions.
 
MONDAY, JANUARY 17TH MORNING SESSIONS
- -------------------------------------
SESSION 1: 9:00 - 10:20
- -----------------------
1. WILL LEGISLATION KEEP UP WITH ELECTRONIC TRADE?
Viewpoints of law reform experts on the development of
diverse topics of possible legislation affecting
electronic commerce will be presented. Current and proposed
legislation from around the globe will be presented and
considered for its practicality and likelihood of
impacting electronic commerce.
 
2. ANATOMY OF A MODEL EDI AUDIT PROGRAM
More and more organizations are designing and
implementing enterprise-wide EDI and electronic
commerce systems. Audit standards, guidelines and
practices are in the process of responding to the need for
EDP and MIS systems auditors to have a detailed
understanding of the requirements for auditing EDI
systems. This session will outline the EDI systems audit
requirements and provide an overview of the ASC X12
Model Audit Program currently under development.
Experienced auditors will walk you through the results of
their years of experimentation and implementation and
explain an effective and practical audit program that you
can implement.
 
3. WILL PRIVACY REQUIREMENTS INHIBIT ELECTRONIC 
COMMERCE?
How does personal data communicated among trading
partners and/or the government, particularly in open
systems environments, create barriers to business
transactions? Data protection is a frontier for electronic
commerce.  This session will distinguish privacy and
confidentiality and discuss methods to protect companies
from the risks associated with the improper disclosure of
telecommunicated personal data. It will also consider the
economic, privacy or national security requirements and
restrictions imposed by governments, and their impact
on electronic commerce. Various laws and directives,
including the EC's proposed directive concerning the
protection of individuals in relation to the processing of
personal data will be identified and considered in
conjunction with charting a viable approach for
implementation.
 
4. CLEARING HOUSES AND ELECTRONIC COMMERCE
Clearing houses provide administrative, legal and
technical infrastructure which support various computer-
based commercial trading services to bolster the
reliability and enforceability of electronic transaction
records, reduce legal uncertainty, and generally facili-
tate electronic trade. The scope of implemented clearing
house services depends upon available technology, legal
and security requirements, potential liability, the
availability of insurance, and, of course, business needs
and costs. Clearing house services also extend well
beyond "traditional" clearing house functions to provide
broad-based support as a trusted entity. This session will
detail how clearing houses affect electronic commerce
controls and security.
 
SESSION 2: 10:30 - 11:50
- ------------------------
1. US EFFORTS IN COORDINATING ELECTRONIC COMMERCE
STANDARDS POLICY
U.S. public and private sector planning for global
electronic commerce requires coordination of the various
standards supporting electronic commerce, and
developing and presenting comprehensive U.S. positions
in the various international standards setting fora. This
panel will present proposals for improving such
coordination and charting a path forward, and provide an
expert's view on the future. The session will also address
the relevant implications of the recently released report
of the National Performance Review and endorse
initiatives that will potentially catalyze national and
international electronic commerce reform for years to
come. Will these initiatives be successful and how will
they impact business?
 
2. HOW TO AUDIT A THIRD PARTY/VALUE ADDED NETWORK
This session addresses the 'how to' of conducting audits
of third party service providers including third party
claims clearing houses. What is needed to obtain
clearance to conduct an audit? What questions are
appropriate during the audit? Who should participate in
such an audit? The impact of diverse relevant auditing
standards and guidelines, including those of the IIA, the
AICPA's SAS 70 and other relevant materials will be
discussed.
 
3. WHAT IS COST EFFECTIVE COMMERCIALLY REASONABLE
SECURITY?
How much security is required in an electronic trade
relationship? What is commercially acceptable and must
commercially reasonable security be cost effective
security? Experts will provide useful guidance on this
very difficult issue.
 
4. ANTICOMPETITIVE RESTRAINTS ON TRADE IN ELECTRONIC
COMMERCE
This session will identify and provide approaches
concerning three important and frequently asked
questions: Can we force our trading partners to trade
electronically, or can we be forced to do so? Can we be
forced to use particular VANs, or one of a limited
number of specified VANs? Can we charge (or be
charged) a premium for failing to trade electronically?
Antitrust counsel and electronic trade professionals will
provide their perspectives.
 
 
MONDAY, JANUARY 17TH AFTERNOON SESSIONS
- ---------------------------------------
 
SESSION 3: 13:30 - 14:50
- ------------------------
1. TRADING PARTNER AND BUSINESS AGREEMENTS IN
ELECTRONIC COMMERCE
This session will present case studies that illustrate how
trading partner agreements (agreements among parties to
electronic trade transactions) have been implemented by
industry and government to facilitate electronic trade.
Agreements that accommodate sales, services and other
types of electronic commerce will be treated. The
session will consider approaches to modifying model
agreements, accommodating scaling and automating
computer-based contracting mechanisms. Various model
agreements, including the soon-to-be released
European/TEDIS agreement will be addressed.
 
2. ELECTRONIC NEGOTIABILITY - WHAT SCARES THE EDI USERS
AWAY?
Few EDI issues cause such angst in the EDI community
as the issue of negotiability under EDI - whether it is for
securities, bills of lading, letters of credit, or any other
device that depends upon paper to transfer things of
value. Is it the horrendous legal pitfalls that EDI
negotiability presents as some would claim? Or is it that
last vestige of paper that we all are reluctant to let go
of, that causes us to hesitate before committing ourselves
to an all EDI world of commerce? The history of and
current efforts to develop electronic mechanisms in
substitution for paper-based documents of title will be
examined during this session. The panel will address the
major initiatives intended to substitute or accommodate
negotiable and nonnegotiable documents of title in
electronic form, and will explore possible solutions.
 
3. INFOSEC STANDARDS - POLICY, COORDINATION AND
INTERWORKING
This panel will deal with current and future policy on
information security standardization at the international,
regional and national levels, in particular, with regard to
information security standards as they apply to electronic
trade and commerce. It will also share thoughts and
perspectives concerning future standards direction, work
programs, interworking, and coordination.
 
4. TIME/DATE STAMPING - OPTIONS AND CONSTRAINTS
Time and date stamping of computer-based transactions
is increasingly recognized as being critical to
nonrepudiation, effective public key certificate and
certificate revocation management, and EDI in general.
This session will survey the technology, implementations
and legal requirements for time and date stamping and
consider the extent to which trusted entities are needed
to implement time and date stamping procedures and
devices, as well as the implications of electronic rather
than human time stamping.
 
SESSION 4: 15:00 - 16:20
- ------------------------
1. UNITED NATIONS ELECTRONIC COMMERCE INITIATIVES
This session surveys and opines on some of the UN's
legal initiatives in support of electronic commerce. UN
representatives to both predecessor and current activities
will share their viewpoints on legal developments,
relationships to other international organizations and will
describe their visions for the future.
 
2. DIRECTORY CONTROL ISSUES IN ELECTRONIC MESSAGING 
AND
EDI
This session presents an overview of the audit and
security capabilities and legal implications of
international messaging and directory standards and
recommendations, including X.400, X.435, and X.500.
Industry experts will describe how they have
implemented these standards and addressed the security
issues surrounding their use. Directory-based trading
partner information, including security credentials, is
increasingly indispensable for electronic commerce.
However, privacy, ownership, use, revenue and accuracy
of directory information remain compelling challenges.
The session will also examine directory models, explore
the critical issues and present a path forward.
 
3. COMPARING CRITICAL CRYPTOGRAPHIC ALGORITHMS AND
STANDARDS
How do I know you are who you say you are? Inventors,
visionaries  and pioneer algorithm standards developers
will discuss how cryptographic techniques have been
developed and standardized to address the authentication
of business documents. The practical application of such
technologies and their integration into small, medium
and large business systems will provide an indispensable
road map for improved business processes and reduced
legal and control risks.
 
4. FINANCIAL CLEARING HOUSE RULES - A FOUNDATION FOR
EDI?
Major funds transfer clearing houses (such as the ACH,
CHIPS, Fedwire) have developed highly sophisticated
rules that address the apportionment of liability among
users, financial institutions and the clearing house. As
clearing houses and other trusted third parties provide
various assurances to the trading public, these clearing
house rules and procedures deserve close attention. A
panel of the counsel and commentators to the major
funds transfer clearing houses will share their collective
experience with a view towards the development of
generalized electronic commerce clearing houses and
electronic security credentialing authorities.
 
SESSION 5: 16:30 - 17:50
- ------------------------
1. MODEL ELECTRONIC PAYMENTS AGREEMENTS
Financial EDI is increasingly a growing and
indispensable aspect of electronic commerce. However,
it also presents additional challenges beyond those
covered by standard EDI trading partner agreements and
practices. This session outlines the legal treatment of
financial EDI, its relationship to EFT and funds transfer
mechanisms, and the responsive model financial EDI
agreements, guidelines and critical law reform
initiatives.
 
2. WHAT TO SAVE, WHEN TO SAVE IT, AND FOR HOW LONG
How long should transactions be saved? Are electronic
documents subject to different retention rules?
International trade rules are in play respecting retention
matters. In the U.S., the Internal Revenue Service
published Revenue Procedure 91-59 to address the
electronic retention period and audit procedures for the
electronic trade environment. To what extent does this
Revenue Procedure as well as other national and
international procedures provide useful models for
international harmonization? This session will address
the pros and cons of using such procedures to change
company internal records retention  policies.
 
3. DO "SMART CARDS" PROVIDE AN "ULTIMATE" CONTROL
SOLUTION?
The need for, and use of, card technologies, including
magnetic stripe, smart cards, and PCMCIA, presents new
options and challenges for the audit, legal and security
communities. The policy issues associated with card
technologies have already surfaced within the electronic
benefit transfer, healthcare informatics, financial
services and many other environments. The panel will
identify the various card technologies and explore the
relevant issues, including those concerning ownership of
data on the card, impact on satisfaction of signature
requirements and cost justification.
 
4. THE "FAST" INITIATIVE - BUSINESS TRUST IN THE
COMPUTER ERA?
The International Bureau of Chambers of Commerce
(IBCC) - world forum of Chambers of Commerce (of the
International Chamber of Commerce (ICC)), is setting
up an international "registration" and "certification"
chain within EDI. Coordinated by the Belgian Federation
of Chambers of Commerce and Industry, the backbone
of the Certified Electronic Data Interchange For
Administration, Commerce and Transport (CEDI-
FACT) concept included in "FAST" (First Attempt to
Security Electronic Commerce), a trans-European and
trans-sectoral pilot project that will soon commence
under the auspices of the TEDIS program of the
Commission of the European Communities.
 
TUESDAY, JANUARY 18TH - MORNING SESSIONS
- ----------------------------------------
SESSION 6: 8:00 - 9:20
- ----------------------
1. NEGOTIATING ELECTRONIC TRADE AGREEMENTS
A common stumbling block in implementing electronic
trade is the length of time it takes for companies to
negotiate electronic trade agreements. In this session you
will witness a simulated negotiation session between two
trading partners and their counsel. The dialogue will
communicate the benefits and costs of using standard
agreements that are recognized by the majority of
industries, as well as the benefits and cost of not using
a trading partner agreement.
 
2. BACK-UP, ARCHIVAL AND CONTINGENCY PLANNING 
SERVICES
IN ELECTRONIC COMMERCE ACCELERATED TRANSACTION 
PROCESSING
OR J.I.T. ENVIRONMENT
Increasingly, the failure to contract for contingency
services may create significant exposure, perhaps
extending to consequential damages. Moreover, the
impact of expedited electronic transactions such as just-
in-time and quick response demand further consideration
of contingency services. This session debates an
appropriate definition of "due diligence" in electronic
commerce; the issues addressed in most commercial
contingency services agreements, and concludes with
predictions on future  issues by a panel of recognized
experts.
 
3. SECURITY POLICY IN A GLOBAL INFORMATION 
ENVIRONMENT
This session provides an opportunity to hear two of the
key security policy makers from the Commission of the
European Communities and the United States,
respectively. The speakers will address critical
developing information security policy issues of far
reaching consequence, including whether public key
infrastructure can or should be implemented for both
authentication and confidentiality services or instead for
authentication only; the scope and impact of pilot
projects on cryptographic and secured open systems
policy development; the impact of patents on the
development of ubiquitous secure infrastructure; and
cooperative approaches to a global path forward that will
minimize national and regional fragmentation.
 
4. ELECTRONIC SOFTWARE DISTRIBUTION (ESD) - A PANDORA'S
BOX?
As in every industry, there are commercial conduct rules
that apply to the software industry. As new methods of
distribution are introduced (discussed) in order to make
it easier for customers of software developers to obtain
and manage software assets within a corporation,
domestic and global legal implications are raised. This
session will discuss issues surrounding ESD and the
proposals to remedy them. Additionally, critical new
technologies and actual implementations will be
identified and demonstrated, with a view towards their
security and control capabilities.
 
SESSION 7: 9:30 - 10:50
- -----------------------
1. VALUE ADDED NETWORK AND INTERCONNECT 
AGREEMENTS -
WHO IS LIABLE AND FOR WHAT?
Third Party Service Providers ("TPSPs") including Value
Added Networks ("VANs") and service bureaus have
been quite successful in limiting their liability. This
session examines the history, present status and future
liability of VANS and other TPSPs. The extent to which
VANs can or should be trusted to assure the
confidentiality of user data will be addressed. The panel
will provide practical legal and technical advice at
grappling with these trends.  The panel, which includes
general counsel to VANs, will address these issues,
including the enforceability of liability caps, the
enforceability of trading partner terms within their
"system agreements", VAN interconnects and special
considerations for consumer-users.
 
2. CRIMINAL LAWS REALLY PROTECT ELECTRONIC COMMERCE?
Liability for computer-based criminal acts is a
developing area of the law and therefore, the extent and
adequacy of current law remains uncertain. This session
will identify the critical elements of criminal law
relevant to electronic commerce and describe its
inadequacies. Proposals will be presented for legislative
reform. International prosecution of computer-based
crime will also be considered.
 
3. DIGITAL AND ELECTRONIC SIGNATURES AND THE LAW
Historically, the written signature has been an important
(and in many cases an indispensable) aspect of
commercial trade. This session will compare
conventional, electronic and digital signature
requirements and techniques, and explain how they are
(or should be) treated in the law. The most authoritative
private and administrative, legislative, judicial and
audit-related decisions, rulings and pronouncements
affecting digital signatures will be presented, and their
future impact explained. You will learn about new methods
for "tying" digital and electronic signatures to pre-
established expectations and purposes.  The speakers will
also discuss the format and intent of relevant computer
based "signature" standards and how they can be implemented
in your company/industry.
 
4. ACCREDITATION AND CERTIFICATION - THE NEW FRONTIER?
Because deserved confidence and trust in electronic
credentials and the infrastructure that issues such
credentials is of vital importance, mechanisms to assure
its accountability, consistency and quality are
indispensable. Certification and accreditation provide a
process of approval or recognition by a trusted body
representing that the subject of such certification and
accreditation has satisfied recognized criteria, typically
concerning quality, performance, ethics, experience,
safety, education or competence. This session considers
the legal, policy and organizational issues associated
with accreditation and certification and its relevance to
the satisfaction of obligations to implement
"commercially reasonable security."
 
SESSION 8: 11:00 - 12:20
- ------------------------
1. THE INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF COMMERCE 
ELECTRONIC
COMMERCE INITIATIVES
The ICC and its national affiliates (such as the U.S.
Council for International Business) have played a
continuing role in the development of electronic
commerce rules and practices, beginning with the
seminal publication of the "UNCID" rules, and
subsequently with initiatives for "EDI-TERMS", "EDI-
ready" INCOTERMS, and other projects. This session
will identify relevant ICC electronic commerce
initiatives, describe the ICC's future role, including
with regard to other international organizations, and
consider the ICC's and USCIB's work in addressing other
information policy and security issues confronting the
global business community.
 
2. ADMITTING, PROVING, AND ENFORCING EDI TRANSACTIONS
This session will focus on the evidentiary requirements
for electronic trade records and will contrast
requirements for records in paper and electronic form.
Diverse interpretations of foundation requirements of the
Federal Rules of Evidence, key regulatory requirements,
and related issues, including a status report on efforts
to reform the Federal Rules of Evidence that are relevant
to computer-based practices will be presented.
 
3. RE-ENGINEERING THE TAX FILING PROCESSES
Tax authorities will explain how they are dealing with
the electronic trade environment; and the policy, legal
and security issues involved in electronically interfacing
with national Governments. The implications of these
activities on electronic commerce generally will be
the focal point for this session. Additionally, it will
consider intergovernmental relationships concerning
authority to operate as a VAN or service bureau for the
other, including the TaxNet Government Communications
Corporation (TGCC) initiatives.
 
4. EDI INSURANCE - THE NEXT CONTROL APPROACH?
This panel will discuss the issues and opportunities
associated with offering and underwriting electronic
information-related risks.. This session surveys important
insurance issues that are either directly applicable to
electronic commerce and cryptography, or that indirectly
provide useful structures which can benefit the
thoughtful consideration of competing approaches to
such infrastructure. The discussion considers
insurance issues in EDI, EFT, VANS, and certification
authorities. To the extent insurance exists, the panelists
will discuss general restrictions and what electronic
information users and vendors can do to standardize and
structure their systems to assist the insurance industry
with broadening the scope of coverages.
 
TUESDAY, JANUARY 18TH - AFTERNOON SESSIONS
- ------------------------------------------
SESSION 9: 14:00 - 15:20
- ------------------------
1. CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPEAN ELECTRONIC TRADE - 
LEGAL
STATUS AND FUTURE OPTIONS
This session will discuss the present position of several
normative acts and legislative proposals in the Central
and East European countries that are of importance for
the development and use of EDI including: the status of
electronic evidence, the possibilities for electronic
contracting, and the legal requirements of "writing" and
"signature". The case for new legislation in Central and
Eastern Europe, assimilating the consequences of the
development and use of computer applications on the
traditional legal system, as well as the recent proposal
for a new Civil Code of the Russian Federation that
contains a specific regulation on an electronic version of
negotiable documents, will be discussed.
 
2. THE ROLE AND FUTURE OF NOTARIES IN COMPUTER-BASED
COMMERCE
This session defines and explains conventional notary
laws and practice in both common law and civil law
countries; and considers the business and legal need for
notarial reform to accommodate electronic transactions.
It will also examine the use and sufficiency of forms of
identification as a prerequisite to the issuance of
electronic credentials. Furthermore, the session will
provide perspectives on notarial reform, including
whether current notarial practice can accommodate
electronic commerce, or whether there is a need for an
"electronic notary," a "super notary" or other such
"trusted entities." A panel of distinguished notaires from
around the world will consider whether a Latin-style
notary can or should be introduced in non-civil law
countries and will forecast the future for notaries in a
computer-based world.
 
3. WILL HEALTHCARE REFORM PROFOUNDLY RESHAPE EDI 
LAW,
POLICY AND CONTROLS?
Privacy and security issues surrounding the use of EDI
are advancing to the top of the priorities in the health-
care field. Healthcare costs are a prime concern of
governments and individuals. However, with the rapid
growth of health care information networks and regional
or community healthcare networks, the capture, storage
and retrieval of health care data is essential to the
quality of the health care delivered. Data ownership and
access rights are unresolved, as well as the apportionment
of liability for erroneous or improperly disclosed data.
Moreover, the lack of a national (U.S.) personal
ID/national identifier presents privacy and security
challenges for healthcare and electronic commerce
generally.  These issues, with a focus on confidentiality
and privacy issues will be discussed in depth by leading
experts in health care law and EDI.
 
4. THE USES OF ESCROW IN ELECTRONIC COMMERCE
The scope of escrow agents is much broader in electronic
commerce than in the computer software industry.
Escrow agents are increasingly being used to hold
cryptographic keys associated with the privacy or
authenticity of business transactions. This session will
explain the world of escrow and how it can improve
electronic commerce. The escrow implications of the
Clinton Administration's "Clipper Capstone" proposal
will also be addressed. Copies of escrow agreements will
be distributed and discussed.
 
SESSION 10: 15:20 - 16:50
- -------------------------
1. WHO OWNS THE STANDARDS, FUNCTIONALITY AND 
SYSTEMS?
CHARTING A COURSE THROUGH COPYRIGHT ISSUES IN EDI
This session evaluates the ownership, use, repudiation,
licensing, and transfer of rights associated with the
development and use of electronic trade standards in
both paper and electronic form, nationally and
internationally. Representatives from major standards
making entities as well as "vocal" users of the standards
will present the issues and a road map to the future.
The extent to which companies can obtain or enforce
proprietary rights in screen displays, data formats and
similar working aspects of an EDI system will be
considered.
 
2. RISK ANALYSIS IN ELECTRONIC TRADE
Prior to decision making, an evaluation process occurs
that determines the advantages and disadvantages of an
investment decision. A piece of this process is
sometimes known as "Risk Analysis." This session will
review the process steps necessary to conduct an
effective risk analysis for electronic trade and
investments. The panel will explain the critical
limitations of this process and how it is evolving to
meet the needs of important applications.
 
3. JUDICIAL ELECTRONIC DATA INTERCHANGE ("JEDI")
The current events, issues and projects associated with
the development of EDI within the Judiciary will be
discussed. The panelists will also review the procedural
and evidentiary rules affecting JEDI, bankruptcy court
JEDI, integration of JEDI with law office and judicial
automation of justice in the future. The most noteworthy
JEDI implementations throughout the world, as well as
JEDI X12 transaction sets and UN/EDIFACT messages
will be surveyed.
 
4. EDI TRANSLATION SOFTWARE CONTROL AND LEGAL
CONSIDERATIONS
As the heart of an EDI implementation, the adequacy of
EDI translation software is increasingly important to the
legal and control communities. This session will explain
the important audit and security control features of EDI
translation software and address concerns, pitfalls and
remedial actions available to the purchaser of such
software.
 
REGISTRATION INFORMATION
- ------------------------
HOTEL & AIRLINE INFORMATION
- ---------------------------
American Airlines is offering discounted air fares for
the Worldwide Electronic Commerce Conference.
Arrangements may be made by calling American
Airlines at 1-800-433-1790 and referencing "Star" Code
S1814P7.
 
Continental Airlines is also providing discounted air
travel for the Worldwide Electronic Commerce
Conference. To make reservations, call 1-800-468-7022.
Please reference Identification Code ZAB58.
International travelers: please contact your local
Continental phone number for specially discounted fares.
For this conference, Continental Airlines has waived the
need to stay over a Saturday night to obtain the lowest
possible fare.
 
The beautiful Waldorf-Astoria Hotel in the heart of New
York City will be the sight of the Worldwide Electronic
Commerce Conference. This prestigious internationally-
acclaimed hotel provides the finest in accommodations
and is offering a special room rate of $159 to all
conference attendees. Reservations can be made by
calling 1-212-355-3000.
 
 
CONFERENCE HIGHLIGHTS
- ---------------------
INTERNATIONAL SCOPE: Most conference sessions
will include one or more persons from a country other
than the United States, or one or more representatives
from international organizations, to provide a
diversity of perspectives and experiences.
CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS: Conference papers of
all sessions will be bound and distributed to all
participants.
 
GROUP & STUDENT DISCOUNTS: Discounted
registration fees will be offered to companies sending 3
or more individuals and to qualifying students. Call: 1-
214-516-4900 for more information.
 
CONTINUING LEGAL EDUCATION: For information
concerning C.L.E. points, call 1-214-516-4900.
 
HOW TO REGISTER
- ---------------
REGISTRATION FEE: $550 total conference registration fee.
 
BY MAIL: Completed forms must be accompanied by a
money order, check, or credit card number (American
Express, MasterCard, or Visa). All checks should be
made payable to Worldwide Electronic Commerce
Conference, P.O. Box 743485, Dallas, Texas 75374,
USA.
 
BY FAX: Completed forms, when paying be credit card,
may be faxed to 1-214-424-0562.
 
BY PHONE: Call 1-214-516-4900 for payment by credit
card or questions about the conference.

BY E-MAIL: Worldwide Electronic Commerce can also
be reached on Compuserve at 76520,3713.
 
 
REGISTRATION FORM:
- ------------------
To register, please print out a copy of the form below,
complete it by typing or printing the registration
information and return one completed form with
payment for each registration.  Mail to P.O. Box 743485,
Dallas, TX  75374, USA or Fax to:  1-214-424-0562.
 
_____ I am registering for the Worldwide Electronic
      Commerce Conference (Total: $550)
 
_____ I plan on attending one of the Pre-Conference
      Tutorial Sessions. (Select one below):
        _____ Electronic Trade Overview
        _____ Security & Audit Overview
        _____ General Counsel's Perspective
 
        _____ Electronic Commerce Policy
 
A check is enclosed for $___________    -OR-
 
Please bill my:___VISA ___MasterCard ___American Express
 
Card No.______________________ Exp. Date_________________
 
Name on Card_____________________________________________
 
Signature________________________________________________
 
Registrant's Name________________________________________
 
Title____________________________________________________
 
Preferred First Name for Badge___________________________
 
Company / Organization___________________________________
 
MS / Dept._______________________________________________
 
Address__________________________________________________
 
City________________________ State______ Zip_____________
 
Telephone________________________ Fax____________________
 
Do You Require Special Handicapped Access? ____Yes ____No
 
Will you be staying at the Waldorf? ____Yes ____No
 
Final agenda subject to change, especially as the program
expands and additional speakers are added. CANCELLATIONS
must be received in writing and postmarked no later than
December 22, 1993 to receive a 50% refund of the paid
registration. No refunds will be issued after December 22,
1993, regardless of when the registration is received.
NO SHOWS are liable for the entire conference fee.
SPECIAL ARRANGEMENTS for the handicapped will be made if
requested in advance. To make a request, contact the
"Conference Coordinator" at 1-214-516-4900.
 

------- End of Forwarded Message





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Michael E. Marotta" <MERCURY@lcc.edu>
Date: Tue, 21 Dec 93 01:54:54 PST
To: mercury@lodden.com
Subject: Regarding "Free Willy"
Message-ID: <455B48CD008002F1@sleepy.egr.msu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I'm sorry to have to confess this, but I don't understand how I as 
a mere user receiving mail am supposed to know that the Free Willy 
message did not come from the President. 
 
Here is what I got:
-----------------------------------------------------------------
 
Message 5/12  From President@whitehouse.gov        Dec 19 '93 at 2:13 pm pst 
Return-Path: <heifetz!toad.com!owner-cypherpunks>
Return-Path: <President@whitehouse.gov>
Date: Sun, 19 Dec 93 14:13:02 PST
 
I Love encryption.  I Love PGP.  I Love PseudoSpoofing.
Please send me lots of mail about my Health Care Plan.
 
And always remember...
 
Free Willy!
 
--Slick
-----------------------------------------------------------------
 
Looks good to me.  But, ferguson says he knows better
 
> Return-Path: <President@whitehouse.gov>
> Received: from [144.92.136.35] by toad.com id AA13485; 
>   Sun, 19 Dec 93 14:16:03 PST
>
 
Which ferguson shows as 
   TELGATE.ADP.WISC.EDU         144.92.104.20
 
To me, 144.92 could be wisc.edu or telgate.adp but in any event, 
I didn't see this at all and would have ignored it if I had.  
Messages get routed all over the place. You call Detroit from 
Lansing and it goes via Chicago.  144.92 proves nothing.
 
Then charliemerritt offers another solution.
 
> Return-path: President@whitehouse.gov
> Received: from delphi.com by bix.com (CoSy3.31.1.45) id
>  <9312191740.memo.19248@BIX.com>; Sun, 19 Dec 1993 17:40:07 -0500 (EST)
> Received: from relay2.UU.NET by delphi.com (PMDF V4.2-11 #4520) id
> <01H6O7JJ9BJK94H43Q@delphi.com>; Sun, 19 Dec 1993 17:37:58 EDT
> Received: from toad.com by relay2.UU.NET with SMTP
>  (5.61/UUNET-internet-primary) id AA10179; Sun, 19 Dec 93 17:37:09 -0500
> Received: by toad.com id AA13572; Sun, 19 Dec 93 14:19:04 PST
> Received: by toad.com id AA13552; Sun, 19 Dec 93 14:17:31 PST
> Received: from [144.92.136.35] by toad.com id AA13485; Sun,
>  19 Dec 93 14:16:03 PST
> From: President@whitehouse.gov
> Date: Sun, 19 Dec 1993 14:13:02 -0800 (PST)
> To: charliemerritt@bix.com
> Message-id: <9312192216.AA13485@toad.com>
> Content-transfer-encoding: 7BIT
> X-Envelope-to: bix.com!charliemerritt
> Apparently-To: Cypherpunks
>
 
Wex himself was also on top of this, and what did he find?
 
>Received: by toad.com id AA13552; Sun, 19 Dec 93 14:17:31 PST
>Return-Path: <President@whitehouse.gov>
>Received: from [144.92.136.35] by toad.com id AA13485; Sun, 19 Dec 93 14:16:0
>3 PST                             
>Date: Sun, 19 Dec 93 14:13:02 PST 
>From: President@whitehouse.gov 
>Message-Id: <9312192216.AA13485@toad.com> 
 
Which does show the wisconsin 144 stuff, but none of the Delphi-
Bix-UUnet nonsense.  So what I am to make of this?  Two sharp 
'punks finger this as coming from (through?) wisconsin 144.  So, 
I conclude that this spoofer goes to U-Wisc.  He has accounts on 
Bix and Delphi.  He forwards Free Willy from 144 to Delphi to Bix 
and from there to toad.  But ferguson didn't have Delphi and Bix 
in his solution.  And, again, the message came to me with just the 
address of the Presidential Palace in Federal City. 
 
Seems to me, the most reasonable explanation is that the message 
probably did not come from The President, but that conjecture is 
based on the CONTENT, not the addressing.  As for Wex, ferguson, 
and charliemerritt, perhaps these are merely tentacles of
Hillary who is discrediting Willy's desperate shot at freedom.
 
 




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Mark <mark@blackplague.gmu.edu>
Date: Tue, 21 Dec 93 03:29:24 PST
To: MERCURY@lcc.edu (Michael E. Marotta)
Subject: Re: Regarding "Free Willy"
In-Reply-To: <455B48CD008002F1@sleepy.egr.msu.edu>
Message-ID: <9312211128.AA24720@blackplague.gmu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text


>I'm sorry to have to confess this, but I don't understand how I as 
>a mere user receiving mail am supposed to know that the Free Willy 
>message did not come from the President. 

You just have to learn to read mail headers to get the gist of what
they are saying.

>> Return-Path: <President@whitehouse.gov>
>> Received: from [144.92.136.35] by toad.com id AA13485; 
>>   Sun, 19 Dec 93 14:16:03 PST

This says toad.com was connected to by telgate.adp.wisc.edu[144.92.104.20]


>Then charliemerritt offers another solution.
> 
>> Return-path: President@whitehouse.gov
>> Received: from delphi.com by bix.com (CoSy3.31.1.45) id
>>  <9312191740.memo.19248@BIX.com>; Sun, 19 Dec 1993 17:40:07 -0500 (EST)
>> Received: from relay2.UU.NET by delphi.com (PMDF V4.2-11 #4520) id
>> <01H6O7JJ9BJK94H43Q@delphi.com>; Sun, 19 Dec 1993 17:37:58 EDT
>> Received: from toad.com by relay2.UU.NET with SMTP
>>  (5.61/UUNET-internet-primary) id AA10179; Sun, 19 Dec 93 17:37:09 -0500
>> Received: by toad.com id AA13572; Sun, 19 Dec 93 14:19:04 PST
>> Received: by toad.com id AA13552; Sun, 19 Dec 93 14:17:31 PST
>> Received: from [144.92.136.35] by toad.com id AA13485; Sun,
>>  19 Dec 93 14:16:03 PST
>> From: President@whitehouse.gov
>> Date: Sun, 19 Dec 1993 14:13:02 -0800 (PST)
>> To: charliemerritt@bix.com
>> Message-id: <9312192216.AA13485@toad.com>
>> Content-transfer-encoding: 7BIT
>> X-Envelope-to: bix.com!charliemerritt
>> Apparently-To: Cypherpunks

Read from the bottom up, it's to charliemerrit@bix.com.

It *says* from president@whitehose.gov.

toad got it from good old telgate.adp.wisc.edu It looks like it tried
to deliver it a couple of times before succeeding.

then it went thru uunet, to delphi.com and then to bix.com...
obviously bix gets it's mailfeed via delphi. (they provide commercial
ip and usenet/mail feeds)

It was faked basically. A big clue is when it has "Apparently-To:" in
the header...

Mark



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: rclark@nyx10.cs.du.edu (Robert W. F. Clark)
Date: Tue, 21 Dec 93 08:35:09 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re:  "Free Willy"
Message-ID: <9312211629.AA07359@nyx10.cs.du.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Michael E. Marrotta writes:

> Which does show the wisconsin 144 stuff, but none of the Delphi-
> Bix-UUnet nonsense.  So what I am to make of this?  Two sharp 
> 'punks finger this as coming from (through?) wisconsin 144.  So, 
> I conclude that this spoofer goes to U-Wisc.  He has accounts on 
> Bix and Delphi.  He forwards Free Willy from 144 to Delphi to Bix 
> and from there to toad.  But ferguson didn't have Delphi and Bix 
> in his solution.  And, again, the message came to me with just the 
> address of the Presidential Palace in Federal City. 

Not necessarily; I tried telgate, and it accepts connections
from anywhere.  This makes it ideal for spoofing, as only if
a log is kept of remote connections could the true location
of the spoofer be discovered.

Even in that case, a savvy user of PADs and other non-Internet
functions could easily add another layer of concealment to
an already fairly clever spoof.

The spoofer _may_ be at uwisc, but it is also possible
that a telnet gate collector is at work here.  There are
dozens of cisco servers, X.25 gateways, etc. which
allow public access from any site.   

The wise choice is, of course, to disable both incoming
and outgoing interdomain telnet connections from these
gateways.  However, this is not always done.
----
Robert W. F. Clark
rclark@nyx.cs.du.edu



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: edgar@spectrx.saigon.com (Edgar W. Swank)
Date: Tue, 21 Dec 93 10:00:04 PST
To: Cypherpunks          <cypherpunks@toad.com>
Subject: FWD: Internet without Ma Bell
Message-ID: <ew6wec2w165w@spectrx.saigon.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I seem to remember this subject being discussed here a few months
ago (speculating). Now here's the reality!  This was posted to
a local newsgroup on this BBS.

Here is an article from WiReD magazine, issue 1.6, December 1993 page 28.

---->8--clip here--8<--------

TUNING INTO THE NET
        Data networking is a tiresome topic at best, butmany staid
analysts in the high-tech world perked up and took notice when Microsoft
co-founder Paul Allen recently purchased US $17.5 million worth of stock in
Metricom Inc. based in Los Gatos, California, this networking company
specializes in providing low-cost, high-speed networking services over
unlicensed radio spectrum.
        Analysts call Metricom "daring," "bold," and "innovative."
Why?  It's managed to build a high-bandwidth data service over the
900-MHz band of unlicensed radio spectrum. The cost: just US$9.95 a month
for unlimited, high speed 14.4-Kbps connection or US$2.95 if all you need is a
2400-baud connection so that you can keep track of, say, your network
of coke machines(don't laugh, this is a very real application).  If
you want an ultra-speedy 56-Kbps connectivity(the kind businesses currently
pay hundreds of dollars a month for), it'll cost just US$19.95 a month.
Please go back and read those prices again.  They're not typos.
        Developed for te utility industry, Metricom's technology has
Paul Allen all aflutter because it works like the net does: Hundreds of
independent, intelligent, IP-addressable "nodes" - essentially radios
linking Metricom's network together - are hung all over the place.
Small and inexpensive, these devices can piggyback unobtrusively on
lampposts and buildings, so there's no need to rent or buy real estate for huge
radio towers (competitors like Ram Mobile Data and Ardis use licensed radio
spectrum and large transmission towers).  And Metricom's radio modems, which
mimic regular modems so computers and applications can't tell the difference,
sell for less than US$500 and will more likely than not be miniaturized from
their current size, roughly the heft of a TV remote, to PCMCIA cards,
ideal for all the PDA's we're waiting to buy.
        "It's neighborhood networking," says Paul Allen, an analyst for
Forrester Research of Cambridge, Massachusetts. "This technology has a lot
of potential."
        Flush wit Allen's cash, Metricom plans to extend it's networking
infrastructure from it's base in Silicon Valley to the rest of Northern
California, then throughout the major cities in the United States.

Metricom +1 408 399 8200 -John Battelle

--
edgar@spectrx.saigon.com (Edgar W. Swank)
SPECTROX SYSTEMS +1.408.252.1005  Cupertino, Ca





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: edgar@spectrx.saigon.com (Edgar W. Swank)
Date: Tue, 21 Dec 93 10:00:07 PST
To: Cypherpunks          <cypherpunks@toad.com>
Subject: Distribution of Secure Drive
Message-ID: <2y6wec8w165w@spectrx.saigon.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

On Dec 10 I posted the following:

  On Nov 30, I sent a private msg to Eric Hughes asking him to put
  Mike Ingle's Secure Drive program for MSDOS

     SECDRV10.ZIP    68155  11-19-93  Secure Drive 1.0 with SRC.

  On the Soda.Berkeley FTP site and to advise me of its location.
  I have not received any response at all.

  I'm on a UUCP system, so I have to do FTP requests via an E-mail
  server, which is cumbersome if one has to "fish around" for a file
  one doesn't know the exact directory & filename for.

  I'm aware that Mike said he hadn't submitted Secure Drive to the FTP
  site because of "export concerns."  But since this site is already
  distributing PGP, I wouldn't think this a "concern" to the site
  administration.

  So I'm asking any public-spirited Cypherpunk (perhaps even an
  anonymous one) to place Secure Drive on an FTP site or a site
  with an E-mail file server and to post the location of the file
  either here or to me privately.

So far I still haven't heard from Eric. I did get two responses.
The first was anonymous and sent me a copy of Secure Drive with
a request for me to post it to foreign FTP site(s). The second
was a request from a foreign site for me to send them a copy.

Perhaps I didn't state my desires clearly enough.

I already have a copy of Secure Drive.  I would like to get it
uploaded to a -USA- FTP site (like soda.berkeley) or e-mail
fileserver site.  In my (non-professional) opinion, this is completely
legal.

I would rather not -unnecessarily- break the ITAR law (or even openly
conspire to do so), by sending Secure Drive overseas myself.

Once Secure Drive is on a domestic FTP site, some furriner may hear
about it and flout our sacred law and have a copy sent to him.  But
that won't be my fault.

Matt Blaze commented on Dec 16:

    Please, please don't do this without checking with the author of
    the package first.  He went out of his way to say that he doesn't
    want to a make it available for ftp because he doesn't want to
    deal with potential export problems.  So respect his wishes; it's
    his work, after all.

I must politely but strongly disagree!  My recollection of Mike
Ingle's comment is that Mike said that -he- had not acted to put
Secure Drive onto a domestic FTP site.  He has -not- said that anyone
- -else- could not do so.

I suspect that by "checking with the author ... first", you would put
Mike in the position of having to go on record as either approving or
disapproving placement on a domestic FTP site, which he so far has
managed to avoid doing!

Mike is free to jump in here if he -wants- to go on record.  I hope he
will just pretend he didn't see this series of posts so he can
maintain his plausible deniability that he approved allowing SD to
"leak" overseas like PGP did.

You all recall that Mike asked testers of the Beta version of Secure
Drive not to ship it overseas or even distribute it at all. But I, at
least, was -not- asked to agree to those conditions for the -release-
1.0 version and I did not.  I have good records of my correspondence
with Mike & can quote it if challenged.

I will quote Mike briefly.  This is his response to my suggestion for
a cosmetic change to LOGIN and CRYPTDSK:

    Me:
    >I wish I had gotten this to you sooner.  At least make sure it
    >gets in the next release, please.

    Mike:
    Ok, the next release (if I do it; I'm hoping the net will take
    this over the way it took over PGP) will also include ...

Well, when the "net" took over PGP, it "leaked" overseas, didn't it.

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.3a

iQCVAgUBLRcv994nNf3ah8DHAQFAOwP/UwPp8h/8WrCe8Gs1k6BOCSKo4OrwB8bW
kOoLet3qa8bNmDPoWccfaHP5PZDD4TR6oGkqxXqWposvgs+Zl5oN1WDAQqnTBykF
OCBdsIHsnIshrLxahD7SCT/s8QxfYsl/hqqL0phOOA5DjCM8sSOEAocOWhywuUYE
vRDXy+hQLns=
=Fe/M
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

--
edgar@spectrx.saigon.com (Edgar W. Swank)
SPECTROX SYSTEMS +1.408.252.1005  Cupertino, Ca





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Date: Tue, 21 Dec 93 10:29:23 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Distribution of Secure Drive
In-Reply-To: <2y6wec8w165w@spectrx.saigon.com>
Message-ID: <199312211828.KAA07761@mail.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Does anybody out there know what the status of the Grand Jury case
against Mike Ingle is, the case involving the export to SecureDrive?

I'd heard he was being investigated and all his records had been
subpoenaed, with Janet Reno saying a whole new wing at Marion is being
built for Zimmermann, Ingle, Karns, Hughes, and all the other
cryptocriminals.

And now that Defense Secretary Inman has issued that Martial Law
Measure that crypto work is "born classified," the recent raids on
most of the Cypherpunks seem to make more sense. And the recent
progress in factoring, using the "rubber hose algorithm," has made
most private cryptography moot.

Me, I'm just glad I got out in '94 before they closed the borders.


--Tim May, Permanent Tourist, somewhere in Cypherspace




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: ssteele@eff.org (Shari Steele)
Date: Tue, 21 Dec 93 07:39:32 PST
To: eff-board@eff.org
Subject: A little ditty about PGP (I especially like the part about prayin' Phil"ain't dead"!)
Message-ID: <199312211536.KAA06047@eff.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


This message was from LESLIE FISH to STEVEN ROSS,
originally in conference Filk
and was forwarded to y'all by BRUCE FEIST.

Note:  Despite the copyright, the author permits distribution of her work with
proper acknowledgement.
                    -------------------------
Hi, glad you liked my stuff.  Just for the yell of it,
here's my latest atrocity, based on a hackers' in-joke
(would you believe, my very first computer filk?).

    P.G.P.   words: L. Fish
                (c)12/18/93
             tune: ditto

The G-men all are cryin'
And tearin' out their hair,
'Cause there's a new cryptography
That's shown up everywhere.
Nobody can break it,
However good they be.
Everybody's PC got the PGP.

It guarantees who's callin'
And just who gets the call.
If you ain't got your code-word,
You can't get in at all.
Oh, there ain't nothin' like it
To keep your privacy.
Half the world's computers got the PGP.

There's not a way to crack it,
Not in a hundred years.
All the spooks & wiretappers
Are cryin' in their beers.
They can't spy on E-mail
Here or oversea
When every home computer's got the PGP.

Bless the man who made it,
And pray that he ain't dead.
He could've made a million
If he'd sold it to the feds,
But he was hot for freedom;
He gave it out for free.
Now every common citizen's got PGP.

So go say what you want to,
Of love or war or hate,
Kinky sex, or dirty words,
Or overthrow the state.
Nobody can stop you.
Speech is really free
When everybody's PC got the PGP.


    Whee!  Enjoy!  ...And if anybody out there knows how to
adapt PGP for the Atari 130XE, please get me a floppy.
Thanx.

___ Maximus/2 2.01wb
 * Origin: ORAC/2 Home of Log/2 (Log for OS/2) (602) 277-1334 (1:114/12)

******************************************************************************
Can we talk in private?  Not if our new Secretary of Defense has his way!!!

"Society has recognized over time that certain kinds of scientific inquiry
can endanger society as a whole and has applied either directly, or through
scientific/ethical constraints, restrictions on the kind and amount of
research that can be done in those areas."

--Adm. Bobby R. Inman in a February, 1982 article for _Aviation Week and
Space Technology_ on why cryptographic research should be limited to
government scientists.  Full text of this article is available for
anonymous ftp from ftp.eff.org as pub/EFF/Policy/Crypto/inman.article.

If you want to help fight government limitations on your right to privacy,
join the Electronic Frontier Foundation!  For more info, write to
ask@eff.org.






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: smb@research.att.com
Date: Tue, 21 Dec 93 07:49:32 PST
To: CRSO.Cypherpunks@canrem.com
Subject: Re: Writable CD-ROMS as o
Message-ID: <9312211546.AA14784@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


	 >Or your enemy has to penetrate your site or your correspondent's site,
	 >and copy five CD-ROMs instead of one.

	 Yes - but that should be *HARD* to do...

In a reasonably secure setup, any of these things are *HARD* (to use your
word).  But there's no such thing as absolute security; at best, you
can balance relative risks.

	 >CD-ROMs have one advantage:  there's a lot of data.  But that's not
	 >all good, because you *really* want to destroy any keying material
	 >you've ever used.

	 Yes - but it is a writable CD rom - Write over the data when it's used.

Have you overwritten it beyond recovery by sophisticated agents?  What if
the CD-ROM is compromised before you us it?

	 >I've heard People Who Know say that in the spook and government world,
	 >one-time pads are falling out of favor --- because their practical
	 >security isn't as good as a really high quality conventional cipher
	 >with a dynamically-negotiated session key.  I repeat:  *practical*
	 >security; your enemy isn't going to hit you or bribe you with a copy
	 >of Shannon's theorems.

	 Ok but one time pads DONE RIGHT (an d that's the optimum term - are
	 VERY STRONG

Again -- there's no such thing as ``right''.  There is only relative risk.
Bob Morris Sr. once observed that the real lesson of ABSCAM was not that
politicians are bribable -- we all knew that -- but that he could afford
one.  And if a U.S. Senator costs $50K, what does the janitor cost?
Look at the Walker family spy ring -- not that they sold out for money,
but just how little money they cost!  You're talking about your home
machine?  Sure -- how resistant is your house to a black-bag job pulled
off by professionals?  With one-time pads on CD-ROM, they only have to
win once to capture your future traffic for a very long time to come.
With something like a STU-III, there's *nothing* that can be captured
that will give that sort of information.  The risk there is cryptanalysis
of the underlying system -- but maybe NSA knows enough about cryptosystems
that they think that that risk is very low -- lower, at any rate, than
the risks of one-time pads.

Remember that the goal is not fancy cryptography.  The goal is information
security; crypto is just one tool to help achieve that.  Your enemy
isn't going to be sporting and attack where your defenses are.  The
proper response to a strong security barrier is not to go through it,
but to go around it.

Let me suggest that folks read

@inproceedings{crypt-fail,
	title = {Why Cryptosystems Fail},
	author = {Ross Anderson, Proc. 1st ACM Conference on Computer and Communications
	booktitle = {Proceedings of the First ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security},
	month = {November},
	year = 1993,
	pages = {215--227}
}

It's an extremely important paper.  I'll quote the beginning of
Section 4:

	As we have seen, security equipment designers and government
	evaluators have both concentrated on technical weaknesses, such
	as poor encryption algorithms and operating systems  which
	could be vulnerable to trojan horse attacks.  Banking systems do
	indeed have their share of such loopholes, but they do not seem to
	have contributed in any significant way to the crime figures.

	The attacks which actually happened were made possible because the
	banks did not use the available products properly; due to lack of
	expertise, they made basic errors in system design, application
	programming and administration.

	In short, the threat model was completely wrong.  How could this
	have happened?


			--Steve Bellovin




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Date: Tue, 21 Dec 93 11:59:49 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: One-Time Pads an Overall Lose for Cypherpunks
Message-ID: <199312211958.LAA17571@mail.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Cypherdenizens,

There's always a lot of speculation about one-time pads, schemes for
rewritable CDs and CD-ROMs, etc. Stuff about how to generate
sufficiently random bits to fill the CD or DAT, how to distribute the
media securely (and isn't that always where the rubber meets the
road?), and so on.

I don't wish to quash this enthusiasm, but one-time pads are an
overall "lose" for the Cypherpunks cause. In fact, the whole modern
era of crypto came about with the invention by Diffie and Hellman of
assymmetric, or public-key crypto.

A return to "secret codes" and symmetric cyphers--except as used
inside the guts of public key systems, of course, as with DES or
IDEA--is a return to the old days where the economics of transporting
and securing key material left crypto in a limited number of niches.

The "key distribution" problem is of course the killer. Even if
rewritable CDs come down in price (machines are currently a few K,
blank disks are at least $25 apiece....more than I plan to pay!), who
wants to have, say, a hundred or more disks to communicate with the
hundred or more e-mail recipients one might reasonably have (these
numbers are not central)?

And I'll trust a public key cypher with a key disk (or Newton-like
PDA) and a memorized passphrase a lot more than I'll trust a stack of
CD-ROMs which I can't reasonably carry with me at all times.

All in all, a lose. The "Crypto Phase Change" (tm) won't happen
because we convince ordinary folks to start burning one-time pads into
CDs and CD-ROMs. Face it.

Sorry to sound grumpy about this, but the advocates of one-time pads
need to do some strategic thinking about this issue.


--Tim May

-- 
..........................................................................
Timothy C. May         | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,  
tcmay@netcom.com       | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
408-688-5409           | knowledge, reputations, information markets, 
W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA  | black markets, collapse of governments.
Higher Power: 2^756839 | Public Key: PGP and MailSafe available.
Note: I put time and money into writing this posting. I hope you enjoy it.



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Date: Tue, 21 Dec 93 12:05:29 PST
To: frc@bwnmr4.bwh.harvard.edu (Fred Cooper)
Subject: Re: Swank's comments on Secure Drive
In-Reply-To: <9312211916.AA20852@bwh.harvard.edu>
Message-ID: <199312212003.MAA18197@mail.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Fred Cooper writes:

> Punks'
> 	Actually Mike Ingle has commented on his position on the 
> distribution of Secure Drive.  He asked that it not be placed for anonftp 
> just because of the fact that he doesn't want ot run the same kind of 
> risk that PRZ is currently in...
> 
> I didn't save a copy of the msg but I'm sure that some one did.

Yes, and Phil Zimmermann asked essentially the same thing, though the
number of folks aware of these issues was much lower back then....and
groups like ours did not even exist then.

But when the CryptoNarcs want to go after someone for illegal export
of crypto munitions (PGP, SecureDrive, etc.), they are not overly
impressed with "wink wink, don't export this, wink, wink" caveats.

If Zimmermann gets indicted and if SecureDrive ends up on an offshore
ftp site, I expect Mike Ingle will at least get subpoenaed to testify
and produce his records, and will possibly be indicted as well.

That's the way I see it.

--Tim May



-- 
..........................................................................
Timothy C. May         | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,  
tcmay@netcom.com       | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
408-688-5409           | knowledge, reputations, information markets, 
W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA  | black markets, collapse of governments.
Higher Power: 2^756839 | Public Key: PGP and MailSafe available.
Note: I put time and money into writing this posting. I hope you enjoy it.



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Brad Huntting <huntting@glarp.com>
Date: Tue, 21 Dec 93 11:25:17 PST
To: CRSO.Cypherpunks@canrem.com
Subject: Re: Writable CD-ROMS as o
In-Reply-To: <60.1552.6525.0C18EF89@canrem.com>
Message-ID: <199312211920.AA10663@misc.glarp.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



> Yes - but it is a writable CD rom - Write over the data when it's used.

As I recall, "writable" CD rom's not erasable.  When you "write
over" a file, the file system simply makes a note to the affect
that that old file should be ignored, but doesn't actually erase
and reclaim the space used by it.

Of course I may be confusing writable CD rom with a WORM type file
system.


brad




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: henry strickland <strick@osc.versant.com>
Date: Tue, 21 Dec 93 13:05:10 PST
To: MIKEINGLE@delphi.com (Mike Ingle)
Subject: Re: Remailer Keys, etc.
In-Reply-To: <01H6Q1WVU07694HTTD@delphi.com>
Message-ID: <9312212105.AA15279@osc.versant.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


# time. So if the machine is fast, use a 1024 bit key. If the machine
# is slow or heavily loaded, and there is nothing going through it
# that might interest a spook, use a 512 bit key.

In his book Bruce Schneier points out that you want to use your crypto
algothrims for not only the next 20 years, but also you want
your keys to be secure for decades after you quit using them.

For batch systems like Remailers, I don't see any reason
not to use long keys.       strick




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Date: Tue, 21 Dec 93 13:35:10 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: your mail
In-Reply-To: <9312212058.AA00285@bsu-cs.bsu.edu>
Message-ID: <199312212131.NAA27095@mail.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


 
An anonymous B1FF writes:

> THE NET SHOULD TAKE OVER WITH THE USE OF PGP AND
> REMAILER CHAINS... SECUREDRIVE AS WELL AS KFS MOST
> LIKELY HAVE BEEN EXPORTED...UNDETECTIBLY THROUGH
> A CRYPTO PIPE... BET IT IS ON THE STREETS OF MOSCOW ALREADY..
> YOU PEOPLE REALLY AMAZE ME, YOU HAVE THE TOOLS FOR FREEDOM
> IN YOUR HANDS ALREADY AND YOU TALK ABOUT ACTION INSTEAD
> OF ACTION ITSELF...WHAT A BUNCH OF ARMCHAIR COMMANDOES
> YOU ALL HAVE BECOME...WELL GET THIS
> THE ARCH-ENEMY HAS JUST TAKEN OVER DOD... EVERYONE HAD BETTER
> GET MOVING TOWARDS ACTION BY THE NET
> 
>     BOBBY INMAN ISNT KIDDING AROUND...
>     B1FF

These things you're talking about were in fact done by the "armchair
commandoes" you disparage here. Which is it, action or talk of action?
Or perhaps both? Sounds good to me.

Comments about Ingle's likely exposure to investigation at the least
and prosecution at the worst are just facts of life. We don't have to
agree with the actions of the Feds, just make note of likely actions.

P.S. Using all caps makes you like a detweilering raver. I'm sure
you're not, but this is the effect.

--Tim May


-- 
..........................................................................
Timothy C. May         | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,  
tcmay@netcom.com       | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
408-688-5409           | knowledge, reputations, information markets, 
W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA  | black markets, collapse of governments.
Higher Power: 2^756839 | Public Key: PGP and MailSafe available.
Note: I put time and money into writing this posting. I hope you enjoy it.



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: jerry@terminus.dell.com (Jeremy Porter)
Date: Tue, 21 Dec 93 12:20:07 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com (cypher)
Subject: Bobby R. Inman (fwd)
Message-ID: <9312212012.AA00392@terminus.us.dell.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Jeremy Porter wrote
> From: Tamara Sandlin at Dell_OAK
> Date: 12/16/93 4:03PM
> Subject: Bobby R. Inman
>-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
>           The following announcement was made this afternoon,
>           Thursday, December 16, 1993.
> 
>                                                                 
>                              DELL NEWS NETWORK/DNN              
>                                                                  
> FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE                  MEDIA CONTACTS:
> 
>                                        Michele Moore, Roger Rydell
>                                        Dell Computer Corporation
>                                        (512) 728-4100
> 
>                                        INVESTOR CONTACTS:
> 
>                                        Don Collis, Ken Smith
>                                        Dell Computer Corporation
>                                        (512) 728-8671, (512) 728-4034
> 
> 
> AUSTIN, Texas, Dec. 16, 1993 -- Dell Computer Corporation
> (NASDAQ:DELL) today announced that Bobby R. Inman has resigned from
> its board of directors effective immediately.  Admiral Inman has been
> nominated to serve as United States Secretary of Defense.
>      Admiral Inman, 62, has been a director of Dell since March 1987.
> He was one of the first outside directors to be named to the company's
> board.
>      "Bob Inman has made many valued contributions to Dell, and we
> have greatly appreciated his service to our company," said Michael S.
> Dell, chairman and chief executive officer.  "We wish him well."
>      Dell's board of directors now has seven members.
>      A Fortune 500 Company, Dell Computer Corporation (NASDAQ: DELL)
...
> its toll-free number: 1-800-BUY-DELL (1-800-289-3355).



-- Jeremy Porter  -----------------  Dell Computer Corp. ----
  Systems Engineering --- jerry@terminus.us.dell.com --------
-------------------------------------------------------------
  Support your Second Amendment rights to encryption technology. 



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: frc@bwnmr4.bwh.harvard.edu (Fred Cooper)
Date: Tue, 21 Dec 93 11:20:25 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com (Cypherpunks)
Subject: Swank's comments on Secure Drive
Message-ID: <9312211916.AA20852@bwh.harvard.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Punks'
	Actually Mike Ingle has commented on his position on the 
distribution of Secure Drive.  He asked that it not be placed for anonftp 
just because of the fact that he doesn't want ot run the same kind of 
risk that PRZ is currently in...

I didn't save a copy of the msg but I'm sure that some one did.


FRC
-- 
#include <hdrs/disclaim.std>    /* Neural Nets catch only dreaming fish. */  





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: frc@bwnmr4.bwh.harvard.edu (Fred Cooper)
Date: Tue, 21 Dec 93 12:35:14 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com (Cypherpunks)
Subject: TM's comments on my comments
Message-ID: <9312212032.AA21360@bwh.harvard.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I agree with Tim's ideas. I was trying to point out that Mike HAD 
requested that Secure Drive not be exported... Edgar's comments sadi that 
he had not made any such request.

FRC
-- 
#include <hdrs/disclaim.std>    /* Neural Nets catch only dreaming fish. */  





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Anonymous <nowhere@bsu-cs.bsu.edu>
Date: Tue, 21 Dec 93 12:59:26 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: No Subject
Message-ID: <9312212058.AA00285@bsu-cs.bsu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


THE NET SHOULD TAKE OVER WITH THE USE OF PGP AND
REMAILER CHAINS... SECUREDRIVE AS WELL AS KFS MOST
LIKELY HAVE BEEN EXPORTED...UNDETECTIBLY THROUGH
A CRYPTO PIPE... BET IT IS ON THE STREETS OF MOSCOW ALREADY..
YOU PEOPLE REALLY AMAZE ME, YOU HAVE THE TOOLS FOR FREEDOM
IN YOUR HANDS ALREADY AND YOU TALK ABOUT ACTION INSTEAD
OF ACTION ITSELF...WHAT A BUNCH OF ARMCHAIR COMMANDOES
YOU ALL HAVE BECOME...WELL GET THIS
THE ARCH-ENEMY HAS JUST TAKEN OVER DOD... EVERYONE HAD BETTER
GET MOVING TOWARDS ACTION BY THE NET

    BOBBY INMAN ISNT KIDDING AROUND...
    B1FF




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Jim choate <ravage@wixer.bga.com>
Date: Tue, 21 Dec 93 15:45:21 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Kid Scan (tm)
Message-ID: <9312212333.AA15999@wixer>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Hi Everbody,

I was watching Beyond 2000 today and they had a episode on Kid Scan.

This technology came from Europe where it is used to id dogs and such. The
premice is to have criminals and children fited w/ a micro-chip in their
fatty tissue. This transponder would allow persons to be monitored. This
seems like a prime candidate to infringement of civil liberties.





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: an55805@anon.penet.fi
Date: Tue, 21 Dec 1993 21:34:26 UTC
To: ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu
Subject: No subject
Message-ID: <9312212134.AA20401@anon.penet.fi>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



	Ok shithead, you have finally pissed me off. 

	I don't care so much when you go around shooting your overstuffed mouth 
off on the cypherpunks list, but when you start wasting bandwidth on 
the COLORADO cypherpunks list, AND you threaten Nate Sammons, that is MY 
domain, and you have gone WAY too far.

	I asked him to remove you from the local list.

	Since you do not seem to be able to differentiate between reality 
and fantasy, here is some reality, and you had better believe it, asshole.

	You can rant and rave all you want to on the CA Cpunk list. You 
can do as you wish on the newsnet, Alt.sci.crypt or whatever. 

	You have total freedom to do as you wish and to bother as many people 
as you want in those places.

	BUT IF YOU EVER THREATEN NATE OR ANYONE ELSE IN THE COLORADO AREA 
AGAIN, I AM GOING TO TAKE YOU OUT ! AS IN RUIN, DESTROY, DEMOLISH.

	I am not some "tentacle" of E. Hughes or anyone else. I am me. 
You even know my face. You have met me. I see you on a fairly regular 
basis. and no, I am not Nate. Nate is quite harmless.

	 I am not.

	I AM THE MOST DANGEROUS PERSON YOU HAVE EVER MET. I CAN REMOVE 
YOU FROM THE FACE OF THE EARTH VERY EASILY. EVEN CASUALLY. REMORSELESSLY.

	I am going to the trouble of warning you privately because I know 
that you are not totally stupid, nor so far gone that you fail to 
recognize your fraility. I am also warning you to save me the small 
amount of trouble it would take me to expunge you. I really have no wish 
to cause you pain. I am not sadistic. 

	If you persist in making your stupid noises on the local CO CPUNKS or 
threaten Nate, I will simply remove you like I would swat an obnoxious 
insect.

	You have been warned.

	This is not a threat.

	It is a statement of fact.

-------------------------------------------------------------------------
To find out more about the anon service, send mail to help@anon.penet.fi.
Due to the double-blind, any mail replies to this message will be anonymized,
and an anonymous id will be allocated automatically. You have been warned.
Please report any problems, inappropriate use etc. to admin@anon.penet.fi.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: an55805@anon.penet.fi
Date: Tue, 21 Dec 1993 21:34:52 UTC
To: ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu
Subject: No subject
Message-ID: <9312212134.AA20454@anon.penet.fi>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



	Ok shithead, you have finally pissed me off. 

	I don't care so much when you go around shooting your overstuffed mouth 
off on the cypherpunks list, but when you start wasting bandwidth on 
the COLORADO cypherpunks list, AND you threaten Nate Sammons, that is MY 
domain, and you have gone WAY too far.

	I asked him to remove you from the local list.

	Since you do not seem to be able to differentiate between reality 
and fantasy, here is some reality, and you had better believe it, asshole.

	You can rant and rave all you want to on the CA Cpunk list. You 
can do as you wish on the newsnet, Alt.sci.crypt or whatever. 

	You have total freedom to do as you wish and to bother as many people 
as you want in those places.

	BUT IF YOU EVER THREATEN NATE OR ANYONE ELSE IN THE COLORADO AREA 
AGAIN, I AM GOING TO TAKE YOU OUT ! AS IN RUIN, DESTROY, DEMOLISH.

	I am not some "tentacle" of E. Hughes or anyone else. I am me. 
You even know my face. You have met me. I see you on a fairly regular 
basis. and no, I am not Nate. Nate is quite harmless.

	 I am not.

	I AM THE MOST DANGEROUS PERSON YOU HAVE EVER MET. I CAN REMOVE 
YOU FROM THE FACE OF THE EARTH VERY EASILY. EVEN CASUALLY. REMORSELESSLY.

	I am going to the trouble of warning you privately because I know 
that you are not totally stupid, nor so far gone that you fail to 
recognize your fraility. I am also warning you to save me the small 
amount of trouble it would take me to expunge you. I really have no wish 
to cause you pain. I am not sadistic. 

	If you persist in making your stupid noises on the local CO CPUNKS or 
threaten Nate, I will simply remove you like I would swat an obnoxious 
insect.

	You have been warned.

	This is not a threat.

	It is a statement of fact.

-------------------------------------------------------------------------
To find out more about the anon service, send mail to help@anon.penet.fi.
Due to the double-blind, any mail replies to this message will be anonymized,
and an anonymous id will be allocated automatically. You have been warned.
Please report any problems, inappropriate use etc. to admin@anon.penet.fi.





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Anonymous <nowhere@bsu-cs.bsu.edu>
Date: Tue, 21 Dec 93 19:05:15 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: eavesdropping detection
Message-ID: <9312220304.AA20790@bsu-cs.bsu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


How would one go about detecting any suspected eavedropping devices
in one's home in an inexpensive fashion? Sorry about the off-topic
question, but what the heck.





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Mike Ingle <MIKEINGLE@delphi.com>
Date: Tue, 21 Dec 93 20:45:16 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Secure Drive distribution argument
Message-ID: <01H6RCHXLQIA9386Q7@delphi.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


There has been some question as to whether I really want to prevent
Secure Drive export, or whether I just want to maintain "plausible
deniability" and dodge the ITAR. As for what I requested involving
the export of the program:

From the ad posted to newsgroups:
=============
The program is Copylefted under the GNU General Public License, and source
code in C and assembly language is included. This program is free and
always will be. This program may be freely distributed within the U.S.
and Canada; do not export it.

Cypherpunks Write Code!

To receive your copy: send e-mail to <mikeingle@delphi.com>
Specify uuencode or pgp ascii armor formats. I will make a list
and broadcast the code. U.S./Canada addresses only, please.
=============
Clear enough? And from the documentation in the ZIP file, under 
"Hazards to Avoid":
=============
Exporting this program. This program is for use in the US and Canada only.
Cryptography is export controlled, and sending this program outside the
country may be illegal. Don't do it.
=============

Several foreigners have tried to talk me into smuggling the program
out of the country, usually by sending me either a PGP message or
a PGP key and a subject line like "you know what". They have all
received nastygrams, in clear for the benefit of any eavesdroppers.
I am serious about preventing export of the program, and I'd like
to see it on sites which verify a U.S. or Canadian address before
sending the program. While we may disagree with the ITAR, I have no
desire to be the test case!

Just today I got a one-line request from someone at DOCKMASTER.NCSC.MIL 
for information about the program. What does anyone make of this?

>Mike is free to jump in here if he -wants- to go on record.  I hope he
>will just pretend he didn't see this series of posts so he can
>maintain his plausible deniability that he approved allowing SD to
>"leak" overseas like PGP did.

Being on the list when this was written makes that kind of hard.
I don't want the program exported, or distributed in such a way
as to lead to its export.

>will just pretend he didn't see this series of posts so he can
>maintain his plausible deniability that he approved allowing SD to
>"leak" overseas like PGP did.

I do not approve letting it "leak out of the country".

>I'm aware that Mike said he hadn't submitted Secure Drive to the FTP
>site because of "export concerns."  But since this site is already
>distributing PGP, I wouldn't think this a "concern" to the site
>administration.

Yes, but PGP is already worldwide. If Secure Drive did appear on a
foreign site, I would send that site administrator a message asking
him to take it off.

>So I'm asking any public-spirited Cypherpunk (perhaps even an
>anonymous one) to place Secure Drive on an FTP site or a site
>with an E-mail file server and to post the location of the file
>either here or to me privately.

If you do this, please make it a U.S./Canada only site.

>So far I still haven't heard from Eric. I did get two responses.
>The first was anonymous and sent me a copy of Secure Drive with
>a request for me to post it to foreign FTP site(s). The second
>was a request from a foreign site for me to send them a copy.

I'd like to see more about this, in private mail if you don't want
to post it to the list.

>I already have a copy of Secure Drive.  I would like to get it
>uploaded to a -USA- FTP site (like soda.berkeley) or e-mail
>fileserver site.  In my (non-professional) opinion, this is completely
>legal.

>I would rather not -unnecessarily- break the ITAR law (or even openly
>conspire to do so), by sending Secure Drive overseas myself.

>Once Secure Drive is on a domestic FTP site, some furriner may hear
>about it and flout our sacred law and have a copy sent to him.  But
>that won't be my fault.

But the bad guys might try to make it mine. That I don't want.

Matt Blaze commented on Dec 16:

>    Please, please don't do this without checking with the author of
>    the package first.  He went out of his way to say that he doesn't
>    want to a make it available for ftp because he doesn't want to
>    deal with potential export problems.  So respect his wishes; it's
>    his work, after all.

     Thank you. Fortunately Eric didn't do it.

>You all recall that Mike asked testers of the Beta version of Secure
>Drive not to ship it overseas or even distribute it at all. But I, at
>least, was -not- asked to agree to those conditions for the -release-
>1.0 version and I did not.  I have good records of my correspondence
>with Mike & can quote it if challenged.

The non-distribution of the beta was because I had no way to check it,
and it could easily have eaten hard drives. I did say in the ad that
you were not to export, although I didn't make anyone send a statement.
Maybe I should have.

>I will quote Mike briefly.  This is his response to my suggestion for
>a cosmetic change to LOGIN and CRYPTDSK:
>
>    Me:
>    >I wish I had gotten this to you sooner.  At least make sure it
>    >gets in the next release, please.
>
>    Mike:
>    Ok, the next release (if I do it; I'm hoping the net will take
>    this over the way it took over PGP) will also include ...
>
>Well, when the "net" took over PGP, it "leaked" overseas, didn't it.

"If you don't want to see it on the front page, don't put it in writing..."

I spelled out clearly that I wanted the program to be distributed widely
within the U.S. and Canada. By the net, I meant users in those countries.
I did not say I wanted it to leak out of the country, nor did I imply that.

>-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Be careful what you sign. The ease of forging on the internet would make
a great defense in court. A signature could hang you.

>Does anybody out there know what the status of the Grand Jury case
>against Mike Ingle is, the case involving the export to SecureDrive?
>
>I'd heard he was being investigated and all his records had been
>subpoenaed, with Janet Reno saying a whole new wing at Marion is being
>built for Zimmermann, Ingle, Karns, Hughes, and all the other
>cryptocriminals.
>
>And now that Defense Secretary Inman has issued that Martial Law
>Measure that crypto work is "born classified," the recent raids on
>most of the Cypherpunks seem to make more sense. And the recent
>progress in factoring, using the "rubber hose algorithm," has made
>most private cryptography moot.
>
>Me, I'm just glad I got out in '94 before they closed the borders.
>

This would be funny if it weren't so plausible. Try not to give them 
too many ideas. I'm also thinking about whether America will be a 
good place to live much longer.

-- Mike






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: jkreznar@ininx.com (John E. Kreznar)
Date: Wed, 22 Dec 93 03:45:23 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Secure Drive distribution argument
In-Reply-To: <01H6RCHXLQIA9386Q7@delphi.com>
Message-ID: <9312220943.AA17346@ininx>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

> >-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
> Be careful what you sign. The ease of forging on the internet would make
> a great defense in court. A signature could hang you.

I would love to better understand what you have in mind in making these
remarks.  Could you please elaborate?

If you mean that a signed message cannot be repudiated, well, yeah,...
that's part of the point!  Anything else?

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.3a

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/P5Y/rELckE=
=hhnt
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Black Unicorn <unicorn@access.digex.net>
Date: Wed, 22 Dec 93 00:49:25 PST
To: tcmay@netcom.com
Subject: Re: Distribution of Secure Drive
Message-ID: <199312220849.AA18766@access.digex.net>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


And now that Defense Secretary Inman has issued that Martial Law
Measure that crypto work is "born classified," the recent raids on
most of the Cypherpunks seem to make more sense. And the recent
progress in factoring, using the "rubber hose algorithm," has made
most private cryptography moot.

Me, I'm just glad I got out in '94 before they closed the borders.



Um,  Could you elaboreate on this some Mr. May?

I would be very interested in the specifics, it might affect my
travel plans...

-uni-





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Brian D Williams <talon57@well.sf.ca.us>
Date: Wed, 22 Dec 93 07:00:36 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: MISC: Markey and the FBI
Message-ID: <199312221500.HAA00135@well.sf.ca.us>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

 Here's a couple of interesting things;



MARKEY ASKS ABOUT LINKING SCHOOLS TO INFORMATION SUPERHIGHWAY
  Rep. Edward Markey (D-Mass.) today asked the largest local 
telephone companies and cable companies for information on their
plans to connect schools to the information superhighway. In a
three-page letter, the chairman of the House Telecommunications
Subcommittee asked the 10 largest local telephone companies and the
10 largest cable companies to answer his questions by January 7. 
"We would be negligent if we did not provide learning links off the
information superhighway to schools and classrooms in this
country," Markey said. "We must make sure that in the information
age, every school has the technology it needs to provide students
with the skills necessary to participate in a knowledge-based
economy," Markey added. He asked the companies to provide
information about plans to provide advanced telecommunications
services to schools and classrooms in their service territories,
and whether they oppose providing digital telecommunications links
free of charge. 
 
Government policies that created a telecommunications network that 
provides universally available, affordable telephone service
"wasn't simply good social policy -- it was good economic policy as
well," Markey said. He also pointed out that historically, cable
companies have not had universal service obligations.  He said he
believes that at some point, cable companies "should be called upon
not only to participate in the economic opportunities presented by
the information superhighway, but also share in the
responsibilities attendant to providing critical links in the
nation's communications infrastructure." 
 
Sure, Free service for everyone, why not? This guy is such a Bozo.
 Lets not forget the FBI.


FBI DIRECTOR CALLS FOR NEW WIRETAP LEGISLATION  FBI Director Louis
J. Freeh has called for new wiretap legislation to ensure telephone
companies provide law enforcement with access to digital
technology. Freeh, who was appointed director of the Federal Bureau
of Investigation (FBI) by President Clinton three months ago, said 
court-authorized wiretapping has been used effectively against 
many criminal groups in the past, but its continued use is 
threatened. Freeh spoke Wednesday at the National Press Club in
Washington, D.C. "Telephone digital technology has advanced in such
a way that  criminals may soon be able to avoid law enforcement
detection  simply by using the telephone," he said.  New
legislation is needed to protect national security and keep up with
criminals, because without it, "one can reasonably predict  
that in the near future, a major terrorist or criminal act will  
occur involving substantial loss of life, such a tragedy that we  
could not prevent because we could not learn critical information 
through electronic surveillance," Freeh said. 

The FBI tried in the previous Congress to have legislation
introduced, but could not find a sponsor.
 
When the FBI was created in 1908, Freeh said there were just a few 
federal laws to be enforced. Over the years, Congress has made the
FBI responsible for investigating many more crimes, which could  
overwhelm the limited resources of federal law enforcement  
agencies, he said. 
 
The FBI is setting priorities so it can have the greatest impact on
the major crime problems confronting the country, Freeh said. 
 

Brian Williams
Extropian
Cypherpatriot

 " A man without religion is like a fish without a bicycle"

 
          
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O1gUvPQkeHU=
=SjOk
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: an12070@anon.penet.fi (The Allied Forces   )
Date: Wed, 22 Dec 93 00:25:19 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: WAR IS HELL
Message-ID: <9312220823.AA17023@anon.penet.fi>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


B.Stewart?! More actors?! Fake drivers licenses?! 

When are you going to stop?!

THIS MEANS WAR
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
To find out more about the anon service, send mail to help@anon.penet.fi.
Due to the double-blind, any mail replies to this message will be anonymized,
and an anonymous id will be allocated automatically. You have been warned.
Please report any problems, inappropriate use etc. to admin@anon.penet.fi.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: an12070@anon.penet.fi (Your Worst Nightmare   )
Date: Wed, 22 Dec 93 01:10:19 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: THE GLORIOUS 1000 YEAR CRYPTOANARCHIST REICH
Message-ID: <9312220909.AA24253@anon.penet.fi>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


T.C.May, the second-in-command Cryptoanarchist behind His Holy Eminence
E.Hughes, shares his views on pornography distribution, tax evasion, 
black marketeering, the overthrow of governments, and world domination 
of the CryptoAnarchist Reich for the next millenium. S.Boxx, noted 
Cryptoanarchist interpreter, translates.

> Some of us believe various forms of strong cryptography will cause the
> power of the state to decline, perhaps even collapse fairly abruptly.
> We believe the expansion into cyberspace, with secure communications,
> digital money, anonymity and pseudonymity, and other crypto-mediated
> interactions, will profoundly change the nature of economies and
> social interactions.

We are working fervently to destroy all world governments so that
they will collapse as soon as possible. We believe that cyberspace, 
with its techniques of sabotage and subterfuge, black cash, invisible 
and fake identities, and other perversions, will profoundly increase
our transition toward World Domination and the Glorious Millenium of
the Cryptoanarchist Reich.
 
> Governments will have a hard time collecting taxes, regulating the
> behavior of individuals and corporations (small ones at least), and
> generally coercing folks when it can't even tell what _continent_
> folks are on!

Refuse to pay your taxes as I do! It is just another incremental step
in completely paralyzing our government systems. We shall soon be 
free of the oppression of criminals, black marketeering, and our
newly fledgling Cyberspatial Mafia.

>The "crypto phase change" is the transition to wide use of private
>communications to conduct business, to arrange deals, to meet other
>people, and so on. I contrast it with the idea of a "singularity," so
>often associated with nanotechnology (cf. Vinge, Stiegler, et. al.),
>because nothing is ever truly a "singularity." Discontinuities, yes.
>Phase changes, yes. Singularities, in the sense of infinite spikes,
>no.

The `crypto phase change' (another hypnotic term that sounds respectable
but masks our black criminality) will help us lie, cheat, and steal from
those who are stupid enough to cross our path. I contrast this with
famous science fiction and science literature I really know nothing about
to gain respectability among professionals, academics, scientists, and
the general public. Our criminal aims really have nothing to do with
the literature we promote. We also like to pretend that there is nothing
inherently apocalyptic about our aims.

>Crypto and related cyberspace methods have the potential for causing a
>fairly rapid transition to a new sort of society. Just as printing
>presses did. Just as radio, television, and new media did.

We shall fuel the revolution with the blood of traitors. Anyone who
stands in our way will be liquidated for our Glorious Utopia. Just
as others were suppressed and trampled for their beliefs with the 
introduction of printing presses. Just like War of the Worlds, the
televising of the great horrors of our time, and the `new media'
which we seek to corrupt and pollute with our lies. We have already
infiltrated Wired and NYT. Let us continue our march!

>And this phase change could involve--likely _will_ involve--many
>people, perhaps the majority of the population in America and Europe,
>at the least.

Every criminal, terrorist, and spy in the world shall rejoice.

>- people hear about widespread tax evasion by crypto-anarchists, and
>they get interested (for various reasons, including jealousy, anger,
>greed, desire for freedom). "Crypto lasing."

So far, we have not been caught for our tax evasion, and are continuing
to grow in our power. We are far more clever than Al Capone and will
never be caught.

>- consultants discover they can consult on projects from other
>countries, from jurisdictions that might ban their invovlement if they
>knew about it, and so on.

Criminals discover they can erect illegitimate enterprises in foreign
countries and completely evade the local laws and any measures erected
to prevent criminality.

>- the "permanent tourists" in the world-spanning economy.

The tramps and the homeless, and the predators and psychopaths who move 
from city to city anonymously and stealthily never to be caught, like 
Ted Bundy.

>- black markets in credit information, dossiers, insurance fraud
>cases, medical malpractice, etc. 

We will sell all kinds of information that will help with blackmail
and extortion. In fact, that was the main purpose of my pet 
Cryptoanarchist project, Blacknet.

>A simple example that will reach many people: You're thinking of
>hiring a lawyer. Under U.S. law, records of "bad lawyers" are hard for
>outsiders to keep, to gain access to, etc.  The Bar Associations,
>like the American Medical Association, like other officially
>sanctioned "guilds," prefers to keep outsiders in the dark. So what
>happens when "Reputations R Us" sets up shop in cypherspace--or, more
>mundanely, on an island in the Caribbean that has no such laws? What
>happens when for the price of an offshore phone call or Net query the
>parochial and paternalistic U.S. laws can be trivially bypassed? It'll
>be a whole new world.

Suppose you are deluded enough to think that lawyers are legitimate.
All laws will be superfluous in the future, but I can gain some 
respectability by talking about this. Imagine that we can keep secret
information that societies repress because of it's extremely damaging
effect on people's reputations. We can build up structures that will
slander people without them knowing it. A strong market in `surreptitious
and unauthorized reputation information' will grow and we intend to be
in the middle of it. The parochial and paternalistic U.S. is soon going
to wither away amidst the CryptoAnarchist Revolution.
 
>Ditto for gambling, escrow services to hold money (think of the
>reduction in violence when "reputable" digital banks will hold the
>drugs _and_ the money), information markets, private investigation
>services, rent deadbeat records, and credit records that include _all_
>creditor information (not just the last 7 years, and not just the
>"allowable" items...how dare anyone infringe my right to take into
>account records more than 7 years old?!).

We are about to set up our own Medellin Cartel specializing in gambling, 
money laundering, blackmail, privacy invasion, and credit record pilfering
that enclude the *most* sensitive information of *everyone*, except 
ourselves! Imagine the glorious revolution in criminality when we
can suddenly lie, cheat, and steal without consequence! All the 
criminals will live together in glorious harmony, as mob justice and 
hired assassins will flourish.

>(For those worried about tracing the calls, about sting operations,
>etc., that's where digital mixes (remailers) come in and where prepaid
>"coupons" ("The holder of this number is entitled to one database
>query") come in. Even short of full-blown Chaumian digital money, a
>lot can be done. Prepaid digital coupons, or digital postage of a
>sort, can be used to make these off-shore--or in cypherspace, a la the
>"BlackNet" demonstration I did a few months back, and written about in
>"Wired"--markets liquid and profitable.)

For those worried about getting caught, or a backlash among honest 
citizens, that's where our subterfuges and camouflages come in. Even
short of Chaumian protocols, which actually are legitimate and require
some sacrifice in privacy (therefore they are not acceptable) can be
used to promote a criminal agenda, like the BlackNet demonstration I
am quite proud of!

>Like a seed crystal dropped in a supersaturated solution, crypto could
>trigger a phase change of immmense proportions. (The metaphor is
>slightly awkward, as I see the crypto phase change _increasing_ the
>number of degrees of freedom, as in the transition from a solid to a
>liquid to a gas.)

Like a few whispered rumors and shrieking shouts that propagate through
a crowd to create a riot, I see the Glorious Cryptoanarchist Reich
approaching at light speed. Eric Hughes and I will be the next Hitler,
nay, we shall surpass him!

>The "Oceania" project, in contrast, tends _not_ to produce this kind
>of phase change. Joe Nextdoor may eventually start using data havens
>and crypto tax evasion schemes, but he's not at all likely to
>volunteer to man the oars on a floating barge.

Someone else is working on a project that is actually respectable and
that we have been unable to infiltrate and poison. For now we will
tolerate them but soon we will completely sabotage and destroy them.

>(I don't mean to defame the Oceania project. Just my sense of humor.)

The Oceania project is black slime. It must be stopped at any cost.
(Insert evil laugh here).

>Ocean-going colonies have not appeared, even by corporations and
>states, for whatever reasons, so the onus is on the oceanauts to
>explain just what is out there that is so valuable (that can't be done
>by ordinary boats and ships that fish, mine for manganese nodules, do
>oceanographic research, etc.).

Translators note: this statement is completely meaningless. It is 
similar to the English idiom `you know'.

>Merely seeking freedom is probably not enough. Gambling, prostitution,
>and easy access to drugs and other hedonistic delights may be enough,
>but I've seen nothing to indicate this type of "Love Boat" is being
>planned. Just the dreamy ideas about self-sufficiency. A commune by
>another name. A floating "Hog Farm," with anarchocapitalist ideology
>replacing Thoreau and Marx.

Merely seeking criminality is not enough. Gambling, prostitution,
and easy access to drugs and other hedonistic delights will be enough
for many of you, and you have done well in being brainwashed by me
and working to achieve it. However, I will not be satisfied with 
anything less than World Domination, with me as the head dictator.
In fact, at precisely the right moment I am going to kill Eric Hughes.

>In any case, Oceania-type projects, even if moderately successful (and
>not just the rusting pontoons I predicted in an earlier posting), are
>very unlikely to trigger a phase change such as the one I see for crypto.

Long live the Cryptoanarchist Reich. We shall not be stopped by anyone.

>This is why I am currently placing my faith in strong crypto and am so
>active in the Cypherpunks group. That's one place where the Revolution
>_will_ be televised.

The Cypherpunks are my stepping stone to complete world domination. I
will cast them aside when they have stopped serving my purpose. The 
Revolution will be bloody, and I have a front row seat at the Guillotine.
In fact, I will be wearing the black mask!

>--Tim May

Satan
 
>..........................................................................
>Timothy C. May         | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,  
>tcmay@netcom.com       | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
>408-688-5409           | knowledge, reputations, information markets, 
>W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA  | black markets, collapse of governments.
>Higher Power: 2^756839 | Public Key: PGP and MailSafe available.
>Note: I put time and money into writing this posting. I hope you enjoy it.

..........................................................................
Satan                  | Crypto Anarchy: camouflage, black marketeering,
satan@netcom.com       | invisible terrorism, fake identities, secrecy
408-688-5409           | of knowledge, blackmail, espionage,
S.L.I.M.E: Hell        | crime, overthrow of governments, death to all.
Higher Power: Me       | Public Key: PGP and MailSafe available.
Note: I am mindraping virgins with evil brainwashing. I hope you succumb.


-------------------------------------------------------------------------
To find out more about the anon service, send mail to help@anon.penet.fi.
Due to the double-blind, any mail replies to this message will be anonymized,
and an anonymous id will be allocated automatically. You have been warned.
Please report any problems, inappropriate use etc. to admin@anon.penet.fi.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Jim choate <ravage@wixer.bga.com>
Date: Wed, 22 Dec 93 07:55:30 PST
To: nowhere@bsu-cs.bsu.edu (Anonymous)
Subject: Re: eavesdropping detection
In-Reply-To: <9312220304.AA20790@bsu-cs.bsu.edu>
Message-ID: <9312221537.AA29903@wixer>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>
> How would one go about detecting any suspected eavedropping devices
> in one's home in an inexpensive fashion? Sorry about the off-topic
> question, but what the heck.
>

Hi,

One of the first things that I would look for would be a spectrum analyzer of
fairly wide bandwidth. I would then create a audio 'popper', a device which
make very precise clicks. I would set this loose in the area I wished to
sweep and then look at the spectrum analyzer for corresponding pulses of rf.
The majority of modern listening devices use a VOX circuit to save batteries
and make the bug harder to detect. If you can't find a spectrum analyzer then
go for a grid dip meter. This is a tuned circuit which has various plug-in
coils to change its frequency of detection. The problem here is sensitivity
(you will have to get close to the transmitter) and ease of use (you are
going to drag lots of coils around).

For physical phone taps from your network interface (the phone companies box
on the wall outside your building) you have to do some preliminary work. To
check for taps inside your house you need to get a Time Domain Reflectometer
and connect it to the NI and then look at your cables. You need to record
this in some manner and store it for future reference (you need to do this
each time you change phones or otherwise alter the layout). If there is a
change in the wiring the TDR signal will be significantly different. This
should even detect induction style pickups so long as they are inside the
building.

As to the telephone switch itself, short of hacking ma bell I don't know of a
feasible way to detect them.

For spike microphones and such there are two methods of defense, easy and
hard. The easy way is to set of some kind of noise generator to mask the
sounds and do a physical search of the outside of the building w/ a linemans
induction pickup. If the mike's are using cable (not rf or you would have
found them w/ the spectrum analyzer) then you should hear the signal at some
point. The hard way (assuming they are sending the signal in some other way
other than rf or land line, say a pwm laser) is to get yourself a set of IR
goggles and check the place out.

Hope this helps....

Have a Merry Christmas





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: sdw@meaddata.com (Stephen Williams)
Date: Wed, 22 Dec 93 06:55:31 PST
To: nowhere@bsu-cs.bsu.edu (Anonymous)
Subject: Re: eavesdropping detection
In-Reply-To: <9312220304.AA20790@bsu-cs.bsu.edu>
Message-ID: <9312221452.AA24071@jungle.meaddata.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Normally, by a near-field receiver.  I don't know of any other way.

An AM band unit is about $110 and an FM band unit is $200-400.

I've seen ads for the AM band and I saw the FM unit at Hamvention in Dayton.

The AM band unit can detect FM transmissions, you just can't hear the
traffic, it's just quiet.  It was also advertised to be able to detect
leaking microwaves, etc.

If I understand it, nearfield receivers and frequency counters rely on
the relative strength surrounding a transmitter at close range to sync
with the frequency.  No tuning at all.

> How would one go about detecting any suspected eavedropping devices
> in one's home in an inexpensive fashion? Sorry about the off-topic
> question, but what the heck.


sdw
-- 
Stephen D. Williams  Local Internet Gateway Co.; SDW Systems 513 496-5223APager
LIG dev./sales       Internet: sdw@lig.net CIS 76244.210@compuserve.com
OO R&D Source Dist.  By Horse: 2464 Rosina Dr., Miamisburg, OH 45342-6430
GNU Support          ICBM: 39 34N 85 15W I love it when a plan comes together



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: A1 ray arachelian (library)  <rarachel@ishara.poly.edu>
Date: Wed, 22 Dec 93 14:05:37 PST
To: ravage@wixer.bga.com (Jim choate)
Subject: Re: Kid Scan (tm)
In-Reply-To: <9312212333.AA15999@wixer>
Message-ID: <9312221757.AA16400@ishara.poly.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> I was watching Beyond 2000 today and they had a episode on Kid Scan.
> 
B
> This technology came from Europe where it is used to id dogs and such. The
> premice is to have criminals and children fited w/ a micro-chip in their
> fatty tissue. This transponder would allow persons to be monitored. This
> seems like a prime candidate to infringement of civil liberties.
> 
Sounds like "Fortress" if you've seen it.  I'm sure there's a market for
doctors who will remove such a chip... :-)
 





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: sdw@meaddata.com (Stephen Williams)
Date: Wed, 22 Dec 93 11:05:34 PST
To: ravage@wixer.bga.com (Jim choate)
Subject: Re: eavesdropping detection
In-Reply-To: <9312221537.AA29903@wixer>
Message-ID: <9312221902.AA25168@jungle.meaddata.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


...
> For spike microphones and such there are two methods of defense, easy and
> hard. The easy way is to set of some kind of noise generator to mask the
> sounds and do a physical search of the outside of the building w/ a linemans
> induction pickup. If the mike's are using cable (not rf or you would have
> found them w/ the spectrum analyzer) then you should hear the signal at some
> point. The hard way (assuming they are sending the signal in some other way
> other than rf or land line, say a pwm laser) is to get yourself a set of IR
> goggles and check the place out.

Most camcorders can see IR normally and have an IR filter that sometimes
can be removed.  Turning off the lights will help.

> Hope this helps....
> 
> Have a Merry Christmas
> 

sdw
-- 
Stephen D. Williams  Local Internet Gateway Co.; SDW Systems 513 496-5223APager
LIG dev./sales       Internet: sdw@lig.net CIS 76244.210@compuserve.com
OO R&D Source Dist.  By Horse: 2464 Rosina Dr., Miamisburg, OH 45342-6430
GNU Support          ICBM: 39 34N 85 15W I love it when a plan comes together



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Jim choate <ravage@wixer.bga.com>
Date: Wed, 22 Dec 93 14:05:45 PST
To: sdw@meaddata.com (Stephen Williams)
Subject: Re: eavesdropping detection
In-Reply-To: <9312221902.AA25168@jungle.meaddata.com>
Message-ID: <9312222152.AA23632@wixer>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Yeah, you are correct that some cameras (especially the ones w/ CCD's) can
see IR. However they are not tuned to the lower end of the IR band as normal
IR goggles (at least the Russian tank driver pair that I have access to) and
it is possible to use a laser designator style setup (toward the lower IR end)
to defeat a normal video camera. As to turning the light off, unless you are
dealing with a complete incompetant they will bounce it off a window or a
spike reflector through a wall or roof. Another very good place to check for
these style bugs is in fireplaces.





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Jim choate <ravage@wixer.bga.com>
Date: Wed, 22 Dec 93 14:15:38 PST
To: rarachel@ishara.poly.edu (A1 ray arachelian)
Subject: Re: Kid Scan (tm)
In-Reply-To: <9312221757.AA16400@ishara.poly.edu>
Message-ID: <9312222200.AA24099@wixer>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>
> > I was watching Beyond 2000 today and they had a episode on Kid Scan.
> >
> B
> > This technology came from Europe where it is used to id dogs and such. The
> > premice is to have criminals and children fited w/ a micro-chip in their
> > fatty tissue. This transponder would allow persons to be monitored. This
> > seems like a prime candidate to infringement of civil liberties.
> >
> Sounds like "Fortress" if you've seen it.  I'm sure there's a market for
> doctors who will remove such a chip... :-)
>
>

Please enlighten me on 'Fortress'...





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: gtoal@an-teallach.com (Graham Toal)
Date: Wed, 22 Dec 93 08:45:31 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: New pgp key server open for testing...
Message-ID: <199312221642.QAA11199@an-teallach.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Could any cypherpunks who regularly use pgp key servers try switching
to the new one at pgp-public-keys@io.com which has been set up courtesy
of Steve Jackson Games.  Don't announce this elsewhere yet please - it's
only open for alpha test - this is all new server code that *doesn't*
use pgp or any PKP-patent-claimed algorithms.

If it survives some live testing by cypherpunks then we'll make the
server code widely available, and get more servers online too.

Thanks

G




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Jim choate <ravage@wixer.bga.com>
Date: Wed, 22 Dec 93 15:15:40 PST
To: m5@vail.tivoli.com (Mike McNally)
Subject: Re: Kid Scan (tm)
In-Reply-To: <9312222232.AA17845@vail.tivoli.com>
Message-ID: <9312222259.AA28248@wixer>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>
>
> "Fortress": very stupid movie about a high-tech megaprison in the
> future.  Prisoners are implanted with "intestinators" that have some
> local intelligence as well as communications abilities.  The
> intestinators can of course be made to cause the prisoners to blow up.
>
>
> --
> Mike McNally : m5@tivoli.com : Day Laborer : Tivoli Systems : Austin, TX
> ------------------------------------------------------------------------
> Remember that all experimentation does not produce extrapolated results.
>                                                            - k. pisichko
>

Thanks, I feel a little less ignorant now, I thought it was something real...

Merry Christmas





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Anonymous <nowhere@bsu-cs.bsu.edu>
Date: Wed, 22 Dec 93 17:09:35 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Eavedropping devices
Message-ID: <9312230107.AA05624@bsu-cs.bsu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I appreciate the replies I received on "how to cheaply detect
eavesdropping devices," but I'm afraid that I do not have access
to the types of equipment which were mentioned (IR glasses, etc).

Any further suggestions?

PS - Has anyone else been watching the lunatic ravings of one
     l.detweiler on comp.org.eff.talk? This guy is a fucking
     fruitcake!




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: terry.smith@canrem.com (Terry Smith)
Date: Sat, 25 Dec 93 08:21:50 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: One-Time Pads an Overall
In-Reply-To: <199312211958.LAA17571@mail.netcom.com>
Message-ID: <60.1665.6525.0C18F4BE@canrem.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


          Tcmay@netcom.com wrote 
>
>And I'll trust a public key cypher with a key disk (or Newton-like
>PDA) and a memorized passphrase a lot more than I'll trust a stack of
>CD-ROMs which I can't reasonably carry with me at all times.
>
 |-------------------------------|

You're absolutly right, but the point I was making was that any little
country that can maintain an embassy outside it's borders can also set
up a TOTALLY bullet proof code system with 10 grand tops of hardware.


                    Terry Smith - XANTH sysop - 1:259/510
                CI$ 70733,3013 PGP 2.3A KEY FREQABLE AS 'KEY'.
 My opinions are not that of my company. But one day they WILL be! And then -
                        the -+*WORLD*+- Bwaw ha ha !!.
                       Read the Tick and others by NEC.
       Geraldo - "So, Mr. Smith, you admit you like to eat babies!"
                Me - "Nono - I admit I like to eat BABES!"

---
 * TLX v1.55 * If you hate a man, give his daughter a Barbie.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: norm@netcom.com (Norman Hardy)
Date: Wed, 22 Dec 93 22:15:46 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Hut six
Message-ID: <199312230614.WAA05182@mail.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


"Hut Six" by Welchman seems to be out of print.
The book describes early Bletchley Park work
on the German Enigma cypher system.
Does anyone know where to get a copy?




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "George A. Gleason" <gg@well.sf.ca.us>
Date: Thu, 23 Dec 93 00:29:35 PST
To: ravage@wixer.bga.com
Subject: Re: eavesdropping detection
Message-ID: <199312230827.AAA04360@well.sf.ca.us>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Re phone taps: forget it.  Anything above amateur level tapping is done via
the central office, where it is simply impossible to detect.  Any device
which claims to detect wiretaps is fraudulent.  I'm speaking from over ten
years' experience in telecom, extensive relevant background, etc.  

Room surveillance: you have to be *really* up to something to be targeted 
for this.  Unlikely at best; but he earlier post about spec analysers is 
useful & relevant here.  

Generally: bear in mind that surveillance is incredibly labor intensive at
any level beyond the "vaccuum-cleaner approach" using keyword scans on 
trunks.  Too labor intensive to be conducted unless there is serious 
justification for the cost of the person-hours involved.  

-gg




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Mike Ingle <MIKEINGLE@delphi.com>
Date: Wed, 22 Dec 93 22:29:35 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: It had to happen...
Message-ID: <01H6SUQP7NIG938MWC@delphi.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Today I got an interesting message. It seems that someone was doing some
hardcore hacking of machines at a university campus. The person used one
of these accounts to send me a message requesting a copy of Secure Drive.
This message and my response were wiretapped by the people investigating
the hacking. They traced the hacker and arrested him. His computer was
encrypted with Secure Drive. The IS manager involved sent me a message
asking me how to break Secure Drive, because they can't prosecute the
person without the data, and the suspect has of course forgotten the
encryption passphrase. So far I don't have many details other than these.
I hope to find out more. I'd like to talk to the investigator and to
the suspect. I sent the IS manager a copy of Secure Drive and told him
how it works, but that's about all I can do.

--- Mike




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "L. Detweiler" <ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Date: Thu, 23 Dec 93 02:15:49 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: The Cypherpunk Equation
Message-ID: <199312231012.DAA11744@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Pseudospoofing == Privacy




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: wcs@anchor.ho.att.com (bill.stewart@pleasantonca.ncr.com +1-510-484-6204)
Date: Thu, 23 Dec 93 01:49:36 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re:  It had to happen...
Message-ID: <9312230948.AA25374@anchor.ho.att.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


The cracker who's using Secure Drive could be an interesting case.
Unfortunately, assuming that a cracker at a university is probably
a student, he may not hve very good legal representation,
and I'd hate to see bad precedent on "can you be forced to reveal your key"
set because someone is not only a tresspasser but a stupid one as well.
Do you know if the wiretapping was being done by police, or if it was
just the university staff with ethernet sniffers?  I was interested
by your comment that they can't prosecute the person without the data;
while it could certainly be helpful to have, one would hope they had
a reasonably solid case *before* they went and arrested him.....

			Thanks;  Bill
# Bill Stewart  NCR Corp, 6870 Koll Center Parkway, Pleasanton CA, 94566
# Voice/Beeper 510-224-7043, Phone 510-484-6204
# email bill.stewart@pleasantonca.ncr.com billstewart@attmail.com




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Brian D Williams <talon57@well.sf.ca.us>
Date: Thu, 23 Dec 93 09:05:57 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: re it had to happen
Message-ID: <199312231704.JAA23692@well.sf.ca.us>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----


 Bill Stewart writes;

>Assuming the arrest warrant was good not revealing the key to a
>duly authorized court representative would be illegal (ie
>interfereing with a police investigation). If the courts serve a
>warrant for your arrest and the confiscation of data on your hard
>drive (and you refuse to turn the data over even after talking w/
>an attorney) is specificaly mentioned you are opening
>yourself up for another whole world of legal hurt.

>A citizen would have the legal right to refuse prior to talking w/
>an attorney but not after, at that point it becomes witholding
>evidence.

>If the process is legal there should be no reason a citizen can
>refuse to turn over his private keys (I don't believe
>self-incrimination holds here).

Bill, help me out here, if the warrant allows them to confiscate
your harddrive that part I can understand, But if being forced to
provide the decryption isn't self-incrimination, what the hell good
is what we're doing here.


Brian Williams
Extropian
Cypherpatriot



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xprUvh/kmdaaDx220asohVjwDzoYLJC6UnB6lXhhp140If1Bvk7YcUGaBQvET26h
EvYA9iS4XRY=
=zZv+
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From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Jim choate <ravage@wixer.bga.com>
Date: Thu, 23 Dec 93 07:36:06 PST
To: bill.stewart@pleasantonca.ncr.com +1-510-484-6204)
Subject: Re:  It had to happen...
In-Reply-To: <9312230948.AA25374@anchor.ho.att.com>
Message-ID: <9312231514.AA14009@wixer>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>
> The cracker who's using Secure Drive could be an interesting case.
> Unfortunately, assuming that a cracker at a university is probably
> a student, he may not hve very good legal representation,
> and I'd hate to see bad precedent on "can you be forced to reveal your key"
> set because someone is not only a tresspasser but a stupid one as well.
> Do you know if the wiretapping was being done by police, or if it was
> just the university staff with ethernet sniffers?  I was interested
> by your comment that they can't prosecute the person without the data;
> while it could certainly be helpful to have, one would hope they had
> a reasonably solid case *before* they went and arrested him.....
>
> 			Thanks;  Bill
> # Bill Stewart  NCR Corp, 6870 Koll Center Parkway, Pleasanton CA, 94566
> # Voice/Beeper 510-224-7043, Phone 510-484-6204
> # email bill.stewart@pleasantonca.ncr.com billstewart@attmail.com
>

Assuming the arrest warrant was good not revealing the key to a duly
authorized court representative would be illegal (ie interfereing with a
police investigation). If the courts serve a warrant for your arrest and the
confiscation of data on your hard drive (and you refuse to turn the data over
even after talking w/ an attorney) is specificaly mentioned you are opening
yourself up for another whole world of legal hurt.

A citizen would have the legal right to refuse prior to talking w/ an
attorney but not after, at that point it becomes witholding evidence.


If the process is legal there should be no reason a citizen can refuse to
turn over his private keys (I don't believe self-incrimination holds here).





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Jim choate <ravage@wixer.bga.com>
Date: Thu, 23 Dec 93 07:35:58 PST
To: gg@well.sf.ca.us (George A. Gleason)
Subject: Re: eavesdropping detection
In-Reply-To: <199312230827.AAA04360@well.sf.ca.us>
Message-ID: <9312231521.AA14185@wixer>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Hi George,

Merry Christmas to you, yours, and the CypherPunks!

Glad to meet another 'proffesional' security person. I worked for a major
university doing all kinds of physical security and access abuse for 5 years.
Was a lot of fun and got to play with all kinds of nifty stuff...:)

My favorite is the toilet roll camera made for Airports....

I would agree w/ you as far as the telephone switch tap is concerned. The
only way to find that is to get into the switch (or possibly the local police
computer through a rf link). When I had posted my original reply I had not
taken that into consideration. Since most police departments don't encrypt
(or at least not strongly) their database searches from their in-car
computers I can see a possible hole here. I really don't expect it to stay
open very long however (a year or two at best).

I know such data can be accepted by a normal pc w/ a scanner and modem. It
should not be much of a step to put a xmitter online and do some spoofing.





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Date: Thu, 23 Dec 93 10:09:41 PST
To: ravage@wixer.bga.com (Jim choate)
Subject: Re: eavesdropping detection
In-Reply-To: <9312231521.AA14185@wixer>
Message-ID: <199312231807.KAA09997@mail.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Jim Choate writes:

> Glad to meet another 'proffesional' security person. I worked for a major
> university doing all kinds of physical security and access abuse for 5 years.
> Was a lot of fun and got to play with all kinds of nifty stuff...:)
> 
> My favorite is the toilet roll camera made for Airports....
	

Whoah! Tell us more!

This sounds pretty ominous. No shit. I guess this is what cops really
mean when they say they'll "wipe for fingerprints."

--Tim


-- 
..........................................................................
Timothy C. May         | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,  
tcmay@netcom.com       | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
408-688-5409           | knowledge, reputations, information markets, 
W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA  | black markets, collapse of governments.
Higher Power: 2^756839 | Public Key: PGP and MailSafe available.
Note: I put time and money into writing this posting. I hope you enjoy it.



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Date: Thu, 23 Dec 93 11:06:10 PST
To: mnemonic@eff.org (Mike Godwin)
Subject: Re: Merry Christmas, Cyberanarchists
In-Reply-To: <199312231752.MAA02646@eff.org>
Message-ID: <199312231904.LAA14400@mail.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>  
> > I understand that the CyberAnarchists led by E.Hughes, T.C.May, and
> > J.Gilmore are utilizing and perfecting identity-treachery techniques on
> 
> What was nice is that I needed only two lines--only one, really--to figure
> out who "Hitler" really is.
> 
> --Mike

Yes, we may have a variant of "Godwin's Law" here, something along the
lines of "In any discussion of encryption, someone will invoke the
name of Hitler."

I'm sure Mike or someone else can more cleanly aphorize this.


--Tim


-- 
..........................................................................
Timothy C. May         | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,  
tcmay@netcom.com       | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
408-688-5409           | knowledge, reputations, information markets, 
W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA  | black markets, collapse of governments.
Higher Power: 2^756839 | Public Key: PGP and MailSafe available.
Note: I put time and money into writing this posting. I hope you enjoy it.



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: sdw@meaddata.com (Stephen Williams)
Date: Thu, 23 Dec 93 08:15:57 PST
To: ravage@wixer.bga.com (Jim choate)
Subject: Re: It had to happen...
In-Reply-To: <9312231514.AA14009@wixer>
Message-ID: <9312231613.AA27003@jungle.meaddata.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


...
> 
> Assuming the arrest warrant was good not revealing the key to a duly
> authorized court representative would be illegal (ie interfereing with a
> police investigation). If the courts serve a warrant for your arrest and the
> confiscation of data on your hard drive (and you refuse to turn the data over
> even after talking w/ an attorney) is specificaly mentioned you are opening
> yourself up for another whole world of legal hurt.
> 
> A citizen would have the legal right to refuse prior to talking w/ an
> attorney but not after, at that point it becomes witholding evidence.
> 
> 
> If the process is legal there should be no reason a citizen can refuse to
> turn over his private keys (I don't believe self-incrimination holds here).

Not being an expert....

I don't believe you can be forced to say anything if you believe it
will incriminate you.  Only if you are given immunity can you be
compelled, and only then under threat of contempt of court, which is a
misdemeanor.  The police/courts have all kinds of ways to encourage
you, but the Fifth still holds.

They 'have' the evidence, so you are not withholding.  The key is your
knowledge, which is protected as much as if they were trying to force
you to tell them where the body was in a murder investigation.  It's
up to them to find it.

If they were dumb enough to rely on what data was present instead of
observed traffic, they're in bad shape, IMHO.

sdw
-- 
Stephen D. Williams  Local Internet Gateway Co.; SDW Systems 513 496-5223APager
LIG dev./sales       Internet: sdw@lig.net CIS 76244.210@compuserve.com
OO R&D Source Dist.  By Horse: 2464 Rosina Dr., Miamisburg, OH 45342-6430
GNU Support          ICBM: 39 34N 85 15W I love it when a plan comes together



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Brad Huntting <huntting@glarp.com>
Date: Thu, 23 Dec 93 10:19:41 PST
To: Mike Godwin <mnemonic@eff.org>
Subject: Re: Merry Christmas, Cyberanarchists
In-Reply-To: <199312231752.MAA02646@eff.org>
Message-ID: <199312231819.AA03064@misc.glarp.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



>> I understand that the CyberAnarchists led by E.Hughes, T.C.May, and
>> J.Gilmore are utilizing and perfecting identity-treachery techniques on

> What was nice is that I needed only two lines--only one, really--to figure
> out who "Hitler" really is.

If only this could be automated...




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Harry Shapiro <habs@panix.com>
Date: Thu, 23 Dec 93 08:29:39 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com (Good Guys)
Subject: Re:  It had to happen... (fwd)
Message-ID: <199312231627.AA08408@panix.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


a conscious being, Jim choate wrote:
> Assuming the arrest warrant was good not revealing the key to a duly
> authorized court representative would be illegal (ie interfereing with a
> police investigation). If the courts serve a warrant for your arrest and the
> confiscation of data on your hard drive (and you refuse to turn the data over
> even after talking w/ an attorney) is specificaly mentioned you are opening
> yourself up for another whole world of legal hurt.

I would like to hear what Duncan has to say, but... 1) He did give
them the data, they just can't read it. (not his problem). LIke if I
wrote some notes in French, I don't think I woudl be required to
translate them. 2) Then their is the issue of 5th Admendment issues...

/hawk



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: m5@vail.tivoli.com (Mike McNally)
Date: Thu, 23 Dec 93 09:30:57 PST
To: Brian D Williams <talon57@well.sf.ca.us>
Subject: re it had to happen
In-Reply-To: <199312231704.JAA23692@well.sf.ca.us>
Message-ID: <9312231729.AA18315@vail.tivoli.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Here's the deal, as this certified non-lawyer sees it:

*	There is ample precedent for forcing suspects to hand over
	materiel other than spoken or written data.  Keys to safe
	deposit boxes come to mind, as do of course blood and urine 
	samples.

*	The tricky case is one in which the key is actually a phrase 
	like "I am a drug dealer and I did the crime".  I'm not
	exactly sure how this would be used in court; maybe something
	like "I refuse to reveal that information on the grounds that
	the key itself is in the form of a statement which could be
	construed to be incrimintating."  Of course, I don't know why
	you couldn't always say that...

If Mr. Godwin isn't too bothered by the re-emergence of this thread,
he may choose to share with us further thoughts on the topic raised in
the second bullet.  My guess is that such a situation will have to be
tested in court, and I can only hope that it gets tested with the
assistance of some very skilled counsel.

--
Mike McNally : m5@tivoli.com : Day Laborer : Tivoli Systems : Austin, TX
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Remember that all experimentation does not produce extrapolated results.
                                                           - k. pisichko




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Brian D Williams <talon57@well.sf.ca.us>
Date: Thu, 23 Dec 93 11:51:02 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: it had to happen......
Message-ID: <199312231948.LAA03481@well.sf.ca.us>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----


 Bill Stewart writes;

>Assuming the arrest warrant was good not revealing the key to a
>duly authorized court representative would be illegal (ie
>interfereing with a police investigation). If the courts serve a
>warrant for your arrest and the confiscation of data on your hard
>drive (and you refuse to turn the data over even after talking w/
>an attorney) is specificaly mentioned you are opening
>yourself up for another whole world of legal hurt.

>A citizen would have the legal right to refuse prior to talking w/
>an attorney but not after, at that point it becomes witholding
>evidence.

>If the process is legal there should be no reason a citizen can
>refuse to turn over his private keys (I don't believe
>self-incrimination holds here).


 Well no doubt they have his True_Name now. I'm curious as to why
they are so adamant about trying to break the encryption? I get the
impression they don't have much of a case. Don't forget kids to
save those sniffer tracings, they could earn you valuable prizes!

 I won't even go into how dumb it is to try accessing a cracked
system through a single cutout, kids don't try this at home ;)


Brian Williams
Extropian
Cypherpatriot
smarter than your average bear.


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From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Date: Thu, 23 Dec 93 11:49:45 PST
To: pmetzger@lehman.com
Subject: Re: Merry Christmas, Cyberanarchists
In-Reply-To: <199312231932.OAA06688@snark>
Message-ID: <199312231949.LAA25023@mail.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Perry Metzger writes:

> Of course it can. Detweiler always posts from an12070@anon.penet.fi
> 
> Incidently, all those replying to this thread thus far have sent mail
> to an12070@anon.penet.fi and thus have compromised their anonymous IDs
> because of the double blinding feature.

Not unless they cc:ed the an12070 address, of course, or replied
directly to it.

I avoid ever sending Detweiler any mail. I used to respond honestly to
his many pestering questions to me, a few months back, but he then
used comments out of context in his "S. Boxx" rants---so now I make it
a point to leave him off any comments I might make about him in this
forum.

--Tim May


-- 
..........................................................................
Timothy C. May         | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,  
tcmay@netcom.com       | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
408-688-5409           | knowledge, reputations, information markets, 
W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA  | black markets, collapse of governments.
Higher Power: 2^756839 | Public Key: PGP and MailSafe available.
Note: I put time and money into writing this posting. I hope you enjoy it.



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: ub075@freenet.victoria.bc.ca (Ryan A. Perkins)
Date: Thu, 23 Dec 93 12:16:03 PST
To: pmetzger@lehman.com
Subject: Re: Merry Christmas, Cyberanarchists
Message-ID: <9312232019.AA24552@freenet.victoria.bc.ca>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain




>Of course it can. Detweiler always posts from an12070@anon.penet.fi
>
>Incidently, all those replying to this thread thus far have sent mail
>to an12070@anon.penet.fi and thus have compromised their anonymous IDs
>because of the double blinding feature.

Not always. If your anon ID has a password set, your message
will just be returned to you, with an error message.. Assuming:

1. The person has an anon ID in the first place.
2. You have a password set on your anon ID. I don't
   really see why you wouldn't.

--
  Ryan Perkins - 1:340/13    | I feel that suicide jumpers see a glimpse of
ub075@freenet.victoria.bc.ca | sanity as they throw themselves from the ledge.
 Ask for PGP 2.3 public key  | That's why they scream all the way down.
          8C5357 : 9F FF BA 93 54 D5 18 78 4B 1E DA GC E3 4E




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Mike Godwin <mnemonic@eff.org>
Date: Thu, 23 Dec 93 09:50:56 PST
To: m5@vail.tivoli.com (Mike McNally)
Subject: Re: re it had to happen
In-Reply-To: <9312231729.AA18315@vail.tivoli.com>
Message-ID: <199312231749.MAA02622@eff.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


 
Mike McNally writes:

> *	The tricky case is one in which the key is actually a phrase 
> 	like "I am a drug dealer and I did the crime".  I'm not
> 	exactly sure how this would be used in court; maybe something
> 	like "I refuse to reveal that information on the grounds that
> 	the key itself is in the form of a statement which could be
> 	construed to be incrimintating."  Of course, I don't know why
> 	you couldn't always say that...
> 
> If Mr. Godwin isn't too bothered by the re-emergence of this thread,
> he may choose to share with us further thoughts on the topic raised in
> the second bullet.  My guess is that such a situation will have to be
> tested in court, and I can only hope that it gets tested with the
> assistance of some very skilled counsel.

I am now convinced that even if the key were a statement of the 
form "I did crime X", it could still be compelled, because the 
actual statement is not testimonial, and would not be used as evidence
(e.g., as an admission).


--Mike





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Jim choate <ravage@wixer.bga.com>
Date: Thu, 23 Dec 93 11:05:59 PST
To: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Subject: Re: eavesdropping detection
In-Reply-To: <199312231807.KAA09997@mail.netcom.com>
Message-ID: <9312231850.AA25923@wixer>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Hi Tim,

Hope you are having a good holiday...I am....:)

Anyway, I got this catalog from some security convention that I went to which
had all kinds of cameras in objects. They had them in toilet paper tubes for
Airports (after seeing this I always put my jacket over the toilet paper roll
in public restrooms....:) and clocks for Banks and semi-public areas.
Generaly they would have a fiber optic cable run a few inches to a small
vidicon type setup. There are also the ones made w/ CCD's which may or may
not have a cable to them. With the b/w cameras it is possible to digitize the
video and store it on audio cassettes (there was a toy camera a couple of
years ago which used this technology, it is still highly prised by amateur
roboticists) or even send it over a am rf link (one of the local volunteer
fire depts. uses this technology for fighting brush fires).

Any particular questions? Can't promise an answer...





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: ferguson@icm1.icp.net (Paul Ferguson x2044)
Date: Thu, 23 Dec 93 09:56:08 PST
To: talon57@well.sf.ca.us (Brian D Williams)
Subject: Encryption and Self-Incrimination
In-Reply-To: <199312231704.JAA23692@well.sf.ca.us>
Message-ID: <9312231751.AA26829@icm1.icp.net>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text



 Brian Williams writes -

>  Bill Stewart writes;
> 
> >Assuming the arrest warrant was good not revealing the key to a
> >duly authorized court representative would be illegal (ie
> >interfereing with a police investigation). If the courts serve a
> >warrant for your arrest and the confiscation of data on your hard
> >drive (and you refuse to turn the data over even after talking w/
> >an attorney) is specificaly mentioned you are opening
> >yourself up for another whole world of legal hurt.
> 
> >A citizen would have the legal right to refuse prior to talking w/
> >an attorney but not after, at that point it becomes witholding
> >evidence.
> 
> >If the process is legal there should be no reason a citizen can
> >refuse to turn over his private keys (I don't believe
> >self-incrimination holds here).
> 
> Bill, help me out here, if the warrant allows them to confiscate
> your harddrive that part I can understand, But if being forced to
> provide the decryption isn't self-incrimination, what the hell good
> is what we're doing here.

That's a good question, Bryan, and one I'm sure we'd all like
to explore further. Can one be legally compelled to divulge the
secret key(s) to encrypted data? Or does it fly in the face of
self-incrimination?

I CC:'d Mike Godwin on this because I'd value his views on this
topic, if he'd care to express them. Being an attorney with
considerable experience in digital matters, he may have an insight
into this that we may be overlooking.

Cheers,

____________________________________________________________________________
Paul Ferguson                         
Sprint Managed Router Network Engineering              tel: 703.904.2437 
Herndon, Virginia  USA                              e-mail: ferguson@icp.net



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Mike Godwin <mnemonic@eff.org>
Date: Thu, 23 Dec 93 09:55:57 PST
To: an12070@anon.penet.fi
Subject: Re: Merry Christmas, Cyberanarchists
In-Reply-To: <9312231731.AA01660@anon.penet.fi>
Message-ID: <199312231752.MAA02646@eff.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


 
> I understand that the CyberAnarchists led by E.Hughes, T.C.May, and
> J.Gilmore are utilizing and perfecting identity-treachery techniques on

What was nice is that I needed only two lines--only one, really--to figure
out who "Hitler" really is.



--Mike







From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Anonymous <nowhere@bsu-cs.bsu.edu>
Date: Thu, 23 Dec 93 10:05:58 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Adolf the Nazi
Message-ID: <9312231803.AA15131@bsu-cs.bsu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Isn't Detweiler a German name?

Herr Adolf Detweiler.






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: nate@VIS.ColoState.EDU (CVL staff member Nate Sammons)
Date: Thu, 23 Dec 93 12:26:01 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com (Cypherpunks Mailing List)
Subject: Re: Merry Christmas, Cyberanarchists
In-Reply-To: <199312231932.OAA06688@snark>
Message-ID: <9312232021.AA29946@vangogh.VIS.ColoState.EDU>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text


writes Perry E. Metzger:
>
>Incidently, all those replying to this thread thus far have sent mail
>to an12070@anon.penet.fi and thus have compromised their anonymous IDs
>because of the double blinding feature.
>
>Perry
>

Yes, please reply to naXXXXX@anon.penet.fi if you value you anonymous
id.

-nate

-- 
+-----------------------------------------------------------------------+
| Nate Sammons  nate@VIS.ColoState.Edu  (303) 491-1578                  |
|   Colorado State University -- Computer Visualization Laboratory      |
+-----------------------------------------------------------------------+



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: ferguson@icm1.icp.net (Paul Ferguson x2044)
Date: Thu, 23 Dec 93 10:36:01 PST
To: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Subject: Re: eavesdropping detection
In-Reply-To: <199312231807.KAA09997@mail.netcom.com>
Message-ID: <9312231833.AA27437@icm1.icp.net>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text



Tim May writes -

> > My favorite is the toilet roll camera made for Airports....
> 	
> 
> Whoah! Tell us more!
> 
> This sounds pretty ominous. No shit. I guess this is what cops really
> mean when they say they'll "wipe for fingerprints."

hee hee..  

You deserve an extra drumstick from the Christmas goose for that one,
Tim. ,-)

- Paul



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Anonymous <nowhere@bsu-cs.bsu.edu>
Date: Thu, 23 Dec 93 11:19:46 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: (fwd) A safer, saner Detweiler
Message-ID: <9312231919.AA19929@bsu-cs.bsu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Newsgroups: comp.org.eff.talk
From: sburkart@cpp.PHA.PA.US (Stephen Burkart)
Subject: A safer, saner Detweiler
Organization: Critical Path Project
Date: Thu, 23 Dec 1993 16:00:07 GMT
Keywords: CRYPTOANARCHIST PROMOTERS of SODOMY



   Found: a (Philadelphia) City Paper review of Covert Culture Sourcebook,
which closed out with:
   
"Debating the "cutting", or rather "covert" edge, is beginning to seem as
silly as labeling bands "alternative," since so much of it is becoming
more and more chic. Still, it's not as if mainstream-king Jesse Helms
(scapegoat for all ultra-conservatives that he is) will pick up this book
and say, "Hmmm, maybe I _will_ subsribe to Future Sex...."

(review written by Margit Detweiler, who is no doubt a tentacle.)






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Perry E. Metzger" <pmetzger@lehman.com>
Date: Thu, 23 Dec 93 11:36:00 PST
To: Brad Huntting <huntting@glarp.com>
Subject: Re: Merry Christmas, Cyberanarchists
In-Reply-To: <199312231819.AA03064@misc.glarp.com>
Message-ID: <199312231932.OAA06688@snark>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Brad Huntting says:
> 
> >> I understand that the CyberAnarchists led by E.Hughes, T.C.May, and
> >> J.Gilmore are utilizing and perfecting identity-treachery techniques on
> 
> > What was nice is that I needed only two lines--only one, really--to figure
> > out who "Hitler" really is.
> 
> If only this could be automated...

Of course it can. Detweiler always posts from an12070@anon.penet.fi

Incidently, all those replying to this thread thus far have sent mail
to an12070@anon.penet.fi and thus have compromised their anonymous IDs
because of the double blinding feature.

Perry




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: peb@PROCASE.COM (Paul Baclace)
Date: Thu, 23 Dec 93 15:56:06 PST
To: pierre@shell.portal.com
Subject: Re:  anonymous video rental store
Message-ID: <9312232351.AA26168@ada.procase.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



>it is illegal for video stores to disclose rental records anyway.

I believe the law was passed quickly after a reporter obtained a list
of videos rented by a Supreme Court nominee (or some other nomination
that must be approved by congress).  In the particular case, there was
nothing that the most sensitive, politically correct, family-values-affirmin' 
[okay, that's enough] person would object to.  But, congress passed a law
within weeks, presumably because they didn't want their rentals scrutinized.

I wonder whether the list of books checked out at public libraries is
public information...[eh, nothing dicey there anyway, except Howl].

This shows how reactionary and patch-work oriented the legal system is.

A Simple Way to Rent Anonymously, but not cheaply:: buy the tape for cash
and then sell it when you are done.  This could cost 60% of the retail 
price, but you get the tape for almost any length of time.  Audio CDs 
are effectively "rented" in this way, with the 60% cost being average.


Paul E. Baclace
peb@procase.com





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: peb@PROCASE.COM (Paul Baclace)
Date: Thu, 23 Dec 93 16:09:48 PST
To: wex@media.mit.edu
Subject: Re: picture signatures
Message-ID: <9312240009.AA26174@ada.procase.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



There is no need to sign the picture itself: a secure time stamp would
prove ownership of the oldest version of a picture:

	CryptoHashA(picture) --> H_i 

Then the timestamp service:

	CryptoHashB(H_i, H_j) --> H_receipt ; H_j is hash from another customer

The H_receipt is published in a well-known place/time and is traceable to the 
picture.  The actual scheme the Bellcore folks worked out is tree
structured for efficiency reasons.

An altered version of a photo would presumably have a different hash,
but it would not have an earlier timestamp hash.  Insofar as one could
recognize that an image was incorporated into another altered image,
misappropriated and stolen copyrights could be detected.  Recognition
is inherent in this process. This isn't very different from sound
sampling: if the alteration completely obscures the orignal beyond
recognition, then there isn't much of a case to prove theft.  For a
picture example, I could digitize a copyrighted image and use *only*
it's color palette on one of my pictures (I haven't tried this yet, but
it sounds like a good "empircal color theory").

BTW, Anyone have an email addr of the Bellcore folks who invented the 
secure timestamp system?  I'd like to use the service if it is still 
operational.


Paul E. Baclace
peb@procase.com





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Eric Hollander <hh@pmantis.berkeley.edu>
Date: Thu, 23 Dec 93 16:16:07 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: mail-to-news gateway
Message-ID: <9312240012.AA19273@pmantis.berkeley.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I'm currently setting up my soda.berkeley.edu remailer so it will post stuff
to news.  It's working fine, but I'm having an internal debate with myself:
Do I want it to automatically anonymify the postings (that's what it's doing
now) or should I have them with names on them?  The only real difference is
that if they have names on them by default, people will have to bounce it
through a remailer first if they want anon.  Also if it's always anon, it
may lead to more abuses, and might not be as useful in some ways.  What do
people think?

Btw, it's open for testing right now.  To use it, send mail
hh@soda.berkeley.edu with the following line in the header:

Request-Post: alt.test

and it will post.

NOTE: PLEASE DO NOT PUBLICIZE THIS SERVICE YET, BECAUSE IT IS STILL IN
"BETA".  PLEASE DO NOT USE IT TO POST TO GROUPS OTHER THAN TEST GROUPS.

e




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: an12070@anon.penet.fi (Hitler   )
Date: Thu, 23 Dec 93 09:35:58 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Merry Christmas, Cyberanarchists
Message-ID: <9312231731.AA01660@anon.penet.fi>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



I understand that the CyberAnarchists led by E.Hughes, T.C.May, and
J.Gilmore are utilizing and perfecting identity-treachery techniques on
the Internet and even public media deceptions. I am quite impressed with
what I have seen so far-- research into brainwashing and espionage
techniques will always be dear to my heart-- although your
accomplishments so far pale in comparison to my own achievements. If you
wish to continue in your work, and realize your full potential, you
should study the glorious Nazi Reich achievements in the area, of which
I am quite proud. I give them to you below as my Christmas Present to
CyberAnarchists everywhere.

You will learn how over key years of the war (1942-1943) we
deceived, turned, imprisoned, and liquidated key British agents
attempting to establish and aid the underground in Holland, operated
their stolen radios and ciphers to provide completely fabricated reports
to British headquarters without suspicion and in fact under the utmost
trust, and erected a complex and massive framework and fiction of dozens
of imaginary spies complete with their own idiosyncratic personalities,
whose exploits were reported daily, to repeatedly stab our enemy in the
most sensitive areas of his back. We had a team of half a dozen radio
operators who did nothing but send fake intelligence reports to Britain
over the most pricelessly sensitive aspects of the war.

We foiled the enemy's attempt to destroy a key transmitter that
broadcasted the orders of the German Admirality to our heralded U--Boat
fleet in the Atlantic. This made their invasion at the French coast near
Dieppe more difficult and allowed us to continue to terrorize the world
with our dreaded killer submarines. We manipulated the trusted radio
reports and the Dutch press to convince the British that their spies had
died in the attempt to destroy our extremely strategic transmitter. The
reality was every single British radio operator and spy sent to Holland
was either languishing in our prisons, subject to pressing
interrogations, or simply liquidated. (The British agents were amateurs
who were poorly equipped to deal with our crushing domination, no match
for my specialists like Schreieder.)

Most dangerously for the enemy we gained detailed information about
British training techniques and even profiles of their internal
espionage infrastructure from our treachery practiced on their newly
dropped agents (which we were informed about ahead of time from the
intercepted British radio commands). We occupied the enemy British brain
with fake reports of the underground, and had him drop valuable supplies
by plane (including munitions) to our imaginary arsenal of spies. Abwehr
officer H.J.Giskes deserves his lasting place in Nazi fame and honor and
in my heart for his extraordinary cunning in the North Pole operation.
He even outwitted a late desperate control attempt by a seasoned veteran
of the enemy to expose our network. We had Britain intelligence
completely convinced we were training fifteen hundred men of the
resistance and had them drop five thousand kilos of clothing,
underwear, footwear, bicycle tires, tobacco, and tea for the imaginary
army!

For years we infected the enemy's own eyes and ears with insidious
poison, and continued the acidic burn even after he finally perceived
it! We only ceased when two of the enemy broke out of our prison and
exposed the entire network. Rest assured that the warden received the
appropriate punishment (actually, none would really suffice for his
treasonable negligence).

So, I think you will agree my dear Nazis have far surpassed your own
infrastructure in sheer historical grandeur, although I admit your
massive international arsenal of fake email identities is impressive in
comparison. We are especially impressed with the automation, that is,
the streamlined software of Mr. Hughes' to track intelligence,
identities, and outsider personalities, and generate Cyberanarchist
propaganda. Mr. Hughes is clearly the most professional and instrumental
leader! A man after my own heart! Oh, and Blacknet! What a brilliantly
subversive idea, Mr. May. Keep up the good work. The governments of the
world are quivering!

Cyberanarchists, I find particularly stellar the infiltrations into the
reputable mainstream news media, most notably Wired (K.Kelly) and New
York Times (J.Markoff). Surely J.Gilmore helped with these. You all
understand well the necessities and techniques of a cover story
(`privacy for the masses'), propaganda for the outside public (`the
cryptographic revolution'), and brainwashing for the insiders (`lies are
liberating').

Oh, how I lament that we may have succeeded in our own time with your
glorious technology, ingenuity, commitment, and loyalty. You understand
well my own dictum that every sacrifice borne, every sympathizer
jailed, every traitor shot is a step toward the New Millennium. I wish
all CyberAnarchists success in your own Kampf. Words cannot express the
joy I feel now that my ideas have been given new life in this
exhilarating new world of Cyberspace.

Peace on Earth
Good Will Toward Men

    . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  ,   ___
   . .//~~~. . //. ./. . //. ./. . //~~\ . . //~~~ . .//~~\. .  /   /   
  . .//===. . //. ./. . //===/. . //===/. . //=== . .//===/ .  +===#===+
 . .// . . . .\\__/. . //. ./. . //. \ . . //___ . .//. \. .      /   / 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .    ~~~   '  
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 
 Nazism, War, and the Holocaust: Coming Soon to the Internet Near You


===


London Calling North Pole: Glorious Nazi Treachery and Espionage

By Adolf Hitler


`North Pole' was without question one of the most effective German
counterespionage operations of all time-- not so much because of the
level at which it operated, which was not of the highest, but because of
its complexity, extent, duration, and the cleverness with which it was
executed. It would have been unthinkable before the days of radio.

The British Special Operations Executive (SOE), during World War II,
directed intelligence and sabotage operations against Nazi-occupied
Europe from London via radio links to underground groups. It frequently
air-dropped into enemy territory agents, equipment and munitions, as
well as the radio operators themselves who were to work with underground
groups. German Military Intelligence, the so-called Abwehr, was able in
Holland to capture and `turn' some of the British SOE agents who had
secretly been dropped into Holland. By controlling and dictating the
messages of these agents in their underground transmissions to London,
the Abwehr enticed the SOE to keep dropping further agents and material,
immediately apprehended on arrival. Over a period of time (1942-44) a
large part of SOE's efforts to support the Dutch Underground was thus
neutralized. This operation was called `North Pole' by the Germans. It
was directed by H.J. Giskes, an Abwehr officer, from whose book on the
subject the following excerpt is taken (_London Calling North Pole_).
`Ebenezer' was the name the Germans gave to the captured Dutch radio
operator whom they had forced to cooperate with them at the time my
account begins. MID is the Dutch Military Intelligence Service, working
out of London with the British SOE. Funk-Abwehr is the German name for
counterespionage units engaged in the technical task of locating secret
radio transmitters by direction-finding (D/F) methods. And SIP and ORPO
are German police units working in conjunction with the Abwehr.

===

London Calling North Pole
by H.J. Giskes

Our expectation that Ebenezer would soon be sent new tasks by London was
subjected to a difficult test. We had not yet had much experience at
this sort of thing and the quiet interval seemed all the more ominous by
reason of the fact that we had incontestable proof that the London
Secret Service was carrying out operations in Holland without making use
of our `good offices'.

The first of these occasions was in early April. I received a report
from the _gendarmerie_ that the body of a parachutist had been found,
the man having fractured his skull on landing against a stone water
trough. Investigation showed that the dead man belonged to a group of
agents who had dropped in the vicinity of Holten. In our efforts to
clear up this mysterious affair we turned for help to the local
Luftwaffe headquarters which gave out daily reports in map form
containing details of all enemy air activity during the previous twenty-
four hours.  The information on which these maps were based was provided
by air-observation posts and radar stations, which plotted the course,
height, circling positions, etc. of all single aircraft flying across
Holland. We were agreeably surprised by the completeness and accuracy of
this information. We found, for example, that details of the operations
over Hooghalen and Steenwijk on 28th February and 27th March had been
fairly accurately recorded. And we were now able to confirm that the
dead agent and his companions must have been dropped near Holten on 28th
March. Through the Luftwaffe headquarters in Amsterdam we arranged for
closer watch to be kept so as to establish the course of single
aircraft, which we described by the word `specialists', as accurately as
possible. The evaluation of these daily reports, whose accuracy steadily
increased, gave us a useful line on the operations which the Allied
Secret Service in England had started without our knowledge. Another
indication of secret enemy activity came from Funk-Abwehr and the FuB
headquarters, to the effect that a new transmitter had been heard in the
Utrecht area, whose radio link had been fixed by D/F as lying close to
London. Intercepted traffic indicated that this was the same station as
that with which Ebenezer worked. And to add to it all Heinrichs came to
me in the second half of April with the news that Radio Orange was once
more passing `positive' and `negative' signals.

From all this we concluded that at least one group of agents was working
in Holland outside our control and that preparations for other drops had
been made. All this made me very uneasy about our play-back on
Ebenezer. Had London smelt a rat?

On 29th April Ebenezer received instructions to collect material which
would be dropped in the previous area near Steenwijk. I was pretty sure
that it would mean bombs this time instead of containers, so I took full
precautions. I borrowed against the day of the drop, which was 25th
April, three motorized 3.7-cm. flak guns from Huptmann Lent, the
celebrated night flyer and Commandant of the airfield at Leeuwarden,
which on the day of the operation were sited round the dropping area
after dark. I had the red lights of the triangle fixed on posts so as
not to endanger personnel, and arranged things so that they could be
switched on from a point 300 yards distant under cover. The same was
done for the white light. The flak battery had orders to open fire in
the event of bombs being dropped, or if I should fired a red rocket.

We switched on the lights as the British aircraft made its approach at
about 0100. `Tommy' flew several times across the area, but clearly
missed his direction, as the lights were not being pointed at the
aircraft. As he crossed the third time I went to the apex of the
triangle and shone my white light at him until he turned on his correct
course. I have to thank the absence of bombs for my ability to go on
telling this story.

This drop was definite proof that London had not yet discovered our
control of Ebenezer. I forgot, in my delight, the lamentations of the
young officer in charge of the flak, who had not been able to fire, and
who might never again have such a prize held in his sights at a range of
two yards.

The development of `Nordpol' reached a decisive stage at the beginning
of May. All that we had achieved hitherto could only have been
maintained for a short while had not luck, sheer chance, and ingenuity
caused to fall into our hands all the lines by which the London Secret
Service controlled MID-SOE in Holland at that time.

At the end of April London found itself compelled to join up with one
another three independent groups of agents and one other isolated
individual. Since Ebenezer was included in this link-up, we very soon
succeeded in identifying the whole organization.

It happened in this way. In the period February-April, 1942, MID-SOE had
dropped three groups of agent in Holland, each consisting of two men and
a radio set. We knew nothing of these operations. Another single agent
had been landed on the Dutch coast by MTB. The operations consisted of
the following:

Operation Lettuce. Two agents, named Jordaan and Ras, dropped near
Holten on 28th February 1942. Jordaan was radio operator and was to work
in accordance with Plan Trumpet.

Operation Turnip. On 28th February 1942 Agent Andringa and his operator
Maartens were dropped near Holten. The set was to be operated in
accordance with Plan Turnip. Maartens had an accident and it was his
body that was found near the water trough.

Operation Leek. Agent Kloos with his operator Sebes dropped on 5th April
1942. The set was to have been operated in accordance with Plan Heck,
but it was rendered useless by damage during the drop.

Operation Potato. On the 19th April 1942, Agent de Haas, using the
cover-name `Pijl,' landed by MTB on the Dutch coast. Pijl had no radio
transmitter, but was equipped with a radio-telephony set capable of
working at ranges up to five kilometres. He had been sent out from
London to contact Group Ebenezer.

Since the Turnip and Heck sets could neither of them establish
communication with England, these agents made contact with Group
Lettuce, which was operating the Trumpet set, in order to report their
mishaps to London. It was not clear whether or not London had told
Lettuce to establish these contacts. A signal from Trumpet, intercepted
on 24th April and subsequently deciphered, indicated that Trumped had
been in contact with Agent de Haas from Operation Potato, but that the
latter had been unable to get in touch with Ebenezer. London thereupon
ordered Ebenezer to make contact with Trumpet by a signal passed to the
radio set under our control, and the circle was complete.

A loose contact between different groups of agents had the disadvantage
from our point of view that imminent arrests could be quickly reported
to London, thus making it difficult to play-back a captured transmitter.
But if this contact became a close one, as in the present instance where
Trumpet was operating for three other groups, the danger for all of them
became very great should one be discovered and liquidated by the German
counterespionage. It was highly unfortunate for London that our
controlled station Ebenezer had been ordered to make these contacts just
at the moment when the groups which were still working at liberty had
been linked up directly with one another. (I do not know all the details
of how Schreieder and his section in a few days achieved the liquidation
of the entire enemy MID-SOE network operating in Holland at that time.)

Without doubt lack of experience and gullibility played an important
part on the other side. The agents were really amateurs, despite their
training in England, and they had no opportunity to work up through
practice to the standard required for their immensely difficult task.
Generally speaking they could not have reached the standard of a
specialist such as Schreieder.

Trumpet had fallen into our hands complete with signal plan, operating
and cipher material. The operator Jordaan collapsed when he discovered
the extent of the disaster. He was a well-educated young man of good
family, perhaps not developed or tough enough for the most dangerous of
the jobs known to secret service-- agent operating. But that wasn't his
fault! Jordaan soon developed confidence in Huntemann and myself, and
took the chance which we offered him of operating his transmitter, after
we had succeeded in getting him through the nervous crisis which
followed his transfer to Scheveningen. On 5th May we used Trumpet to
open up a second radio link with London and passed a signal proposing a
new dropping area for this group which we had found a few kilometres
north of Holten. The Line of communication developed smoothly, and
evidently gave London no grounds for suspicion, for the dropping area
was approved shortly afterward, and we accepted the first drop there
about a fortnight later.

A third radio link with London was established in the following manner.
The signal plan for Turnip belonging to the dead operator Maartens had
been found on the person of the arrested agent Andringa. We signaled to
London via Trumpet that Andringa had discovered a reliable operator who
would be able to carry out Turnip's signal plan using Maarten's set, and
London gave him a trial transmission so as to test the efficiency of
this new recruit. The ORPO operator who took the test must have done it
excellently, for the next signal from `over there' told him that he was
approved. But we soon had new troubles, which worried me a lot.

About the middle of May Heinrichs reported anxiously to me that he and
his men suspected Lauwers of having transmitted several additional
letters at the end of his last routine period. It was in fact normal to
put a series of so called dummy letters at the end of signals, and his
`overseer' had consequently not immediately switched of the set. His
mistrust had, however, been aroused. Heinrichs could not himself be
present during every transmission by Lauwers or Jordaan, and he
requested urgently that the two operators should somehow be replaced by
his own men. I saw the overseer concerned at once. The man declared that
he did not know exactly what extra letters Lauwers had transmitted, but
that they had had no meaning. The man knew quite well that any other
answer could have brought him before a court for treasonable negligence,
but since nothing could be proved one way or the other we had to await
London's reactions.

I brought in Huntemann to try and find out what had actually happened,
as he was on very good terms with both the ORPO men and Lauwers. It
emerged simply that Lauwers had made some of the ORPO men much too
trusting, had `softened them up' as we put it. The routine periods had
become much too comfortable, and the good treatment I had ordered for
the operators, with coffee and cigarettes, had broadened into a
friendship which was proving highly dangerous. While awaiting London's
reaction, I did not tell Lauwers that our suspicions had been aroused.
Nevertheless, although there were no clear indications of treachery, we
soon afterward put an end to the operating of Lauwers and Jordaan by
once more using the trick of proposing a `reserve' operator-- which was
immediately approved.

We were now in a position to bring in an ORPO man onto the key in place
of either operator without London suspecting anything. The instruction
and employment of reserve operators drawn from the Dutch Underground
must have been quite understandable to them, as it was always possible
that a mishap might occur to the No. 1 operator at any time. Profiting
by these events, we did not in general use agent operators any longer.
After the arrest of agents sent across later on, their sets were
operated from the outset by the ORPO without any turn-over period. In
this procedure we ran the risk that the `handwriting' might have been
recorded in London (on a steel tape or gramophone) and that a comparison
might easily give rise to suspicion. By means of touch, speed of
operating and other individual characteristics of a transmission
technique an experienced ear can detect the difference between different
operators when on the key in exactly the same way as a musical ear can
detect difference between the renderings of different masters.

If the radio organization of MID-SOE had observed proper security
precautions we should never have been able to introduce our own ORPO
operators. But since our experience hitherto had not disclosed any
special degree of watchfulness on their part we took the risk. The
carelessness of the enemy is illustrated by the fact that more than
fourteen different radio links were established with London for longer
or shorter periods during the `Nordpol' operation, and these fourteen
were operated by six ORPO men!

===

In the course of the spring we had amassed a considerable store of
knowledge about the enemy's plans, his methods of operating and his
radio and ciphering systems. With the help of this experience we could
probably even have dealt with blind drops had any more taken place. If
the enemy had discovered the truth at this time, he would have had to
rebuild a difficult, costly organizational structure, employing entirely
new methods. Even making allowance for the fact that MID-SOE had not the
slightest suspicion of the true state of affairs, it is a fact that the
decision to drop `by arrangement' was the chief reason for the
catastrophe which followed. This arrangement, which was carried out
rigidly and without variation for over a year, was the really dramatic
feature of `Nordpol' amid the many other mistakes of omission and
commission made by our enemy.

One single control group, dropped blind and unknown to us in Holland,
with the sole duty of watching drops which had been arranged, could have
punctured in an instant the whole gigantic bubble of Operation
`Nordpol'. This unpleasant possibility was always before our eyes
during the long months of the play-back, and it kept us from getting too
sure of ourselves. We could never forget that each incoming or outgoing
radio signal might be the last of the operation.

The decision of MID-SOE was confirmed when the period form 28th May to
29th June brought three dropping operations, for which the `reliable'
groups Ebenezer and Trumpet had to provide the reception parties. The
operations were:

Operation Beetroot (via Ebenezer). Agents Parlevliet and van Steen
dropped near Steenwijk. Duties-- to instruct in the Eureka apparatus,
guiding beacons for aircraft. Radio communications in accordance with
Plan Swede.

Operation Parsnip (via Trumpet). Agents Rietschoten and Buizer dropped
near Holten on 22nd June. Duties-- organization of armed resistance in
Holland. Radio in accordance with Plan Marrow.

The duties prescribed for parties Beetroot and Marrow were of such
importance subsequently that I will discuss them in detail. The beetroot
party was welcomed on its arrival by Underground representatives who
were in fact Dutch police working for the SIPO. The arrests were made
after dawn, by which time the reception party had had time to find out
what the duties of the group were to be. Actually this plan broke down
in the case of Beetroot, but was highly successful in all the remaining
cases. On subsequent occasions we often discovered important details
from the enemy's side, particularly about their secret operational
intentions. For example, a single operation including the numbers under
instruction, their nationality, the teaching staff, standards of
ability, etc. Later on our knowledge extended into an accurate picture
of the inner circle of leading personalities `over there'.

===

Group Parsnip, which had been dropped on 22nd June near Holten, had  a
normal assignment, namely, the organization of a sabotage group in
Overijssel. Parsnip was consequently played back normally by the
customary process of opening up communication, agreeing on dropping
points and accepting drops. It was noteworthy that the operator Buizer
was, on London's orders, also supposed to transmit for Potato (De Haas),
Potato having previously worked through Ebenezer. Ebenezer's burden had
been lightened in this way because London considered it to be the most
reliable of its links and intended soon to use it for an important
special task-- the blowing up of the aerial system of the Kootwijk radio
transmitter.

At the beginning of July London told Ebenezer to make a reconnaissance
to see whether the aerial system could be blown up by demolition
commando under Taconis. In a series of signals exact details were given
of the method by which the whole system could be destroyed by means of
small charges placed at special points along the mast anchors. I
accordingly sent out a reconnaissance party of our people under Willy,
who were to conduct themselves exactly as if they were members of the
Underground, to find out in what way it would be possible, by day or
night, to approach the aerial system, and how the operation could then
be carried out. The precise state of affairs as reported by Willy was
then signaled to London. We reported a rather small guard, and an
inadequate watch over the surrounding area. The demolition of the
anchors would not present much difficulty. London signaled back that
Taconis must make his preparations in such away that the demolition
could be carried out on the night following the receipt of the
prearranged signal.

Toward the end of July we reported that Taconis and his men were ready,
and were told by London to stand by, but on no account to start anything
before receiving the signal. By the time this signal came I had already
thought out reasons for `failure'.

Two days later Ebenezer passed the following message to London:
``Kootwijk attempt a failure. Some of our men ran into a minefield near
the anchors. Explosions followed, then an engagement with the guards.
Five men missing. Taconis and remainder safe, including two wounded.''
And the next day: ``Two of the five missing men returned. Three others
were killed in action. Enemy has strengthened guard on Kootwijk and
other stations. Have broken off all contact. No signs yet that enemy is
on our track.'' London signaled back somewhat as follows: ``Much regret
your failure and losses. Method of defense is new and was not
foreseeable. Cease all activity for the present. Greatest watchfulness
necessary for some time. Report anything unusual.''

A fortnight later London sent Ebenezer a congratulatory message for the
Kootwijk party, adding that Taconis would receive a British decoration
for his leadership. The medal would be presented to him at the earliest
opportunity.

The attack planned on the Kootwijk transmitter was clearly aimed at the
destruction of the radio link by which the German Admirality
communicated with U Boats on the Atlantic. When some days later the
English made their landing attempt on the French coast near Dieppe we
saw another reason why Kootwijk had been intended to be destroyed.
Somewhat late in the day, the german Admirality hastened to carry into
actuality the form of defense for the aerial system which we had
conjured up in our imagination.

By arrangement with IC of the Wehrmacht staff, Rittmeister Jansen, I had
a reference to the Kootwijk affair published in the Dutch press. The
article referred to criminal elements who had attempted to blow up a
wireless station in Holland. The attempt had been a failure, and
captured sabotage material had pointed to enemy assistance. The law-
abiding population was warned once again against committing or
supporting such acts. I hoped that my opponents in London would receive
this report by way of neutral countries.

A description of OPeration Marrow which follows covers the decisive
phase of `Nordpol' from June, 1942 until the spring of 1943.

We knew from the first conversations on the night of the drop what the
tasks were which had been given in London to the leader of Marrow,
Jambroes, and his operator Bukkens, in broad outline. The plans of MID-
SOE, revealed by interrogation, were on a big scale which underestimated
the Abwehr potential on the German side. Typical of this was the
misunderstanding of the true position in Holland concerning the morale
of the population. There is no doubt that the willingness of the mass of
the people to participate directly or indirectly in preparations for
underground warfare did not correspond with London's expectations. It
was not until one to two years later that morale grew gradually more
favorable toward such plans as a result of the military defeats of the
Third Reich, the growing Allied superiority and repressive German
actions both against the population and against the economy of the
western occupied areas.

By the terms of Plan Marrow, Jambroes, who was a Dutch Reserve officer,
was to establish contact with the leader of the organization OD
(Ordedienst) and get them to provide men to carry out the plans of MID-
SOE. Sixteen groups, each of a hundred men, were to be organized all
over the country as armed sabotage and resistance nuclei. Two agents
from London, a group-leader-com-instructor and a radio operator, were to
take over the leadership, organization, training and arming of these
groups. No doubt this plan looked fine from an armchair in London. But
its fulfillment was postponed indefinitely by the fact that Jambroes
never met the leaders of the OD.

It soon became clear to us that we could not play back Jambroes' task,
because as we did know who were the leaders of the OD we would not be
able to tell London what Jambroes had discussed with them-- when
Jambroes himself was all the time under arrest. So we had to put it to
London that the task originally assigned to Jambroes was impracticable,
and take action in accordance with what we imagined to be the true state
of affairs. We now proceeded to overwhelm London with a flood of reports
about signs of demoralization among the leaders of the OD. The
Leadership, we said, was so penetrated by German informers that direct
contact with its members as ordered by London would certainly attract
the attention of Germans.  When the replies from London began to show
signs of uncertainty and instructed Jambroes to be careful, we started a
new line. This proposed that Jambroes should make contact with
individual and reliable leaders from OD area groups, so as to form the
sixteen groups planned by consultation with the middle and lower OD
levels. Our proposal met with some objections, but was finally
recognized in a practical manner by the increasing of the support
through agents and material given to Group Marrow and its supposed
component organizations.

The build-up of the Marrow organization began in August, 1942. Naturally
at no time were links established with OD groups or with their leaders.
On the contrary, we assured London repeatedly that we were making use of
more reliable and security-minded individuals. The development of the
sixteen Marrow groups had soon made such apparent progress that between
the end of September and November London sent across seventeen agents
through our hands in Holland, most of whom were destined for Marrow
groups. Five were operators with independent radio links. We had these
five lines in working order by the end of November, operating in
accordance with Plans Chive, Broccoli, Cucumber, Tomato, and Celery.
Each of these five groups set to work and were soon able to give
dropping points to London, which were approved and supplied continuously
with materials. At the beginning of December we signaled a progress
report of the existing state of the Marrow groups to London. According
to this, about fifteen hundred men were under training, attached to
eight Marrow groups. In practice, these training detachments would have
urgent need of such articles as clothing, underwear, footwear, bicycle
tires, tobacco and tea. We accordingly asked for a supply of all these
articles, and in the middle of December we received a consignment in
thirty-two containers totaling some five thousand kilos, dropped in four
different areas in the course of one night.

Our information indicated that a new party of agents had completed their
training at the secret schools in England about the middle of January,
in preparation for action in Holland. From 18th January to 21st April
1943 seventeen more agents were dropped by MID-SOE and met by our
reception parties. This time again the majority were group leaders and
instructors for Marrow and other sabotage groups. One party of two men
had intelligence tasks. Another two-man party was given the task of
establishing a courier line from Holland via Brussels and Paris to
Spain, and a single woman agent who arrived had been given intelligence
duties. The newcomers included seven operators with independent radio
links.

The agents supplied in the spring of 1943 fulfilled the requirements of
personnel for the MID-SOE groups which had been planned in Holland. With
my few assistants, I was faced with the problem of keeping London's
operational maps supplied with information about the multifarious
activities of nearly fifty agents, and it seemed impossible that we
could keep this up for long. To meet our difficulties an attempt had to
be made to get London to agree to a reduction in the number of working
radio links which were now available. We accordingly proposed `for
reasons of greater security' to close down some of the Marrow
transmitters. These sets, we said, would form a reserve in case some of
the active transmitters and their operators should be knocked out by
German action. We subsequently arrived at the position where all the
Marrow sets only Marrow I to Marrow V remained in operation.

Although several times between the autumn of 1942 and the summer of 1943
we had reported one of our controlled transmitters as having been
knocked out by German action, we had been compelled at times to operate
as many as fourteen lines simultaneously. A reduction in radio traffic
was essential for the one reason alone that we had a maximum of six ORPO
radio operators at our disposal for handling the entire radio traffic
with London, and these men were being continually worked up to the very
limits of their capacity.

This account of how agents were dropped direct into our arms has not yet
described any efforts by MID-SOE to get knowledge of the true state of
affairs in Holland. Though there was no lack of trying, these attempts
never made allowance for the fact that a possibility did exist that the
entire communication network and all the agents sent in were in German
hands. The most noteworthy enemy attempt at control, which may perhaps
have been one of a number we did not recognize as such, occurred at the
time of Operation Parsley on 21st September 1942. There was little doubt
that the agent who was dropped, a certain Jongelie, cover-name `Arie',
had a control task. Shortly after his arrest Jongelie declared that in
order to confirm his safe arrival he must at once signal to London:
``The express left on time.'' By saying this he put his SIPO
interrogators in a quandary, a situation which they were meeting for the
first time.

I had spent the night of the Parsley operation in the dropping area,
which lay a few kilometres east of Assen, and had returned to The Hague
at about 0700. At nine the telephone bell roused me from my slumbers,
and the head interrogator of Schreieder's section IVE informed me of
what Jongelie had just said. He added that this message would apparently
have to be dispatched at the first routine period at 1100.

Half an hour later I was sitting opposite Jongelie in the Binnenhof. He
was a man of about forty, with a broad, leathery face, who for a long
time had been chief operator for the Dutch naval headquarters in
Batavia. After a short conversation it was quite clear that Jongelie had
developed some Asiatic cunning during his long period of service in
Indonesia. With an unnaturally immobile face, he answered my pressing
questions repeatedly with the statement that he must pass the message
``The express left on time'' at 1100 or London would realize that he was
in German hands. Finally I pretended to be convinced. Seemingly deep in
thought, I said that we would pass his message at 1100-- and then, as I
suddenly raised my eyes, a gleam of triumph appeared in his. So this was
treachery! At 1100 we passed the following message: ``Accident has
occurred in Operation Parsley. Arie landed heavily and is unconscious.
He is safe and in good hands. Doctor diagnoses severe concussion.
Further report will be made. All material safe.'' Three days later we
signaled: ``Arie regained consciousness for short period yesterday.
Doctor hopes for an improvement.'' And the next day the message ran:
``Arie died suddenly yesterday without regaining consciousness. We will
bury him on the moor. We hope to give him a worthy memorial after
victory is won.''

I have related this case in detail as an example of how competent tough
agents, who had been appropriately prepared in London, could easily have
forced us into the position where a single treacherous report would have
blown the gaff. All we could do in such cases was to pretend that the
man was dead or that he had been arrested by the Germans. A series of
such `accidents' would probably always have been less dangerous than the
possibility of treachery. Shortly after the Arie incident London began
to press us to send Jambroes, the head of the Marrow groups, back to
London for consultation, Jambroes having to name a deputy to act for him
in his absence.  The request accorded with the man's earlier statements
that after three months of preparatory activity in Holland he would be
required back in England. A reference to the possibilities of Jambroes'
journey was now never absent from our interchange of signals. At first
we described him as indispensable due to unforeseen difficulties in the
building up of the sixteen groups, and in due course we found new
excuses, in which the difficult and lengthy journey by the insecure
courier route into Spain played the principal part.


Nineteen forty-two went by in this way. At the beginning of 1943 the
requests from London for a personal report became more urgent and were
now broadened to include representatives from other groups. Innumerable
signals passed. London began to demand information about areas in
Holland where land or sea planes could be sent to pick up couriers or
agents. We were unable to find suitable areas, or, alternatively, those
which we did find and reported did not suit the gentlemen `over there'--
or else we would suddenly declare them `unsafe,' whenever the
organization of a special flight seemed imminent.

On various occasions we reported a number of agents as having departed
for France, who were expected every month to arrive, but naturally never
did so. Finally we took the only course still open to us and reported
Jamboes as missing [...] informing London that our investigations showed
that he could not be traced subsequent to a German police raid in
Rotterdam. [...]

On 18th January 1943 Group Golf was dropped into Holland. Golf's duties
were to prepare secure courier routes through Belgium and France to
Spain and Switzerland. The group was well supplied with blanks for
Dutch, Belgian, and French identity cards with stamps and dies for the
forging of German passes of all kinds, and with francs and pesetas. We
let about six weeks pass before Golf signaled to London that a reliable
and secure route had been established as far as Paris. The courier for
the Golf groups would be an experienced man with cover name `Arnaud.' In
actual fact Arnaud was none other than my Unteroffizier Arno, who had
effected an excellent penetration of the enemy courier routes by posing
as a refugee Frenchman who made his living by smuggling jewels. We
proposed to London that we should dispatch to Spain via the Arnaud route
two English flying officers who were living underground in Holland in
order to test the reliability of this `escape line.' Our proposal was
approved, and London confirmed three weeks later that the men had
arrived safely in Spain.

Through this exploit, the Golf group and Arnaud acquired much credit in
London, and in the spring and summer of 1943 London gave us details of
three active stations of the British Secret Service in Paris which were
working on escape routes. These were run partly by French and partly by
English personnel and had their own radio links with London. Obviously
we did not permit the German counterespionage in Paris to take action
against these stations, once more adhering to the principle that
intelligence is more valuable than elimination. My section under Major
Wieskotter now had a clear view of the inner working of these important
escape lines, made possible by the well-sponsored arrival of Arnaud in
the organization by reason of a signaled recommendation by London to the
stations concerned.

The responsibility for innumerable captures of couriers and espionage
material, of incoming and outgoing agents, and of espionage and radio
centers in Holland and Belgium during 1943, inexplicable to the enemy
Secret Services, must be laid at the door of MID-SOE's confidence in the
Golf radio link, which had been in our hands since the day of its
arrival in Holland. In actual fact Golf rendered certain services to the
enemy in order to increase this confidence.

We had proved once again the truth of the old saying: `give and it shall
be given unto you.' Numbers of Allied flying personnel who had been shot
down and had gone underground in Holland and Belgium had reached Spain
after an adventurous journey without ever knowing, perhaps until the
present day, that they had all the time been under the wing of the
German counterespionage.

===

On 31st August, Queen's Day in Holland, two `Nordpol' agents, Ubbinnk
and Dourlein, broke out of the prison in Haaren and disappeared. I had a
short report to this effect on the morning of 1st September from
Schreieder's office. Soon afterward Schreieder himself rang up in
considerable agitation to give me a seemingly endless description of the
measures which he had taken for their recapture. It was clear to me
that, through this incident, the bottom had been knocked out of the
whole `Nordpol' operation. Even if the fugitives did not succeed in
reaching Spain, Switzerland or even England itself, they were at large--
though perhaps only temporarily-- and would certainly somehow record
their experiences since their departure from England and get this report
by some means or other back across the Channel.

===

During the first ten days of December London's signals became so dull
and colorless compared with their usual quality that it did not need
all our knowledge to enable us to guess that the enemy was trying to
deceive us in his turn. Hardly any doubt remained that Ubbink and
Dourlein had reached their objective. Nevertheless, we made no move, and
gave not the slightest indication that we too realized that the great
bubble of the agent network and radio links in Holland had finally been
pricked.

In March, 1944, I proposed to Berlin that we should put an end to the
hollow mockery of the `Nordpol' radio links by means of a final
message. I was immediately told to submit a draft for approval to Abwehr
Berlin, which must express confidence in victory. Huntemann and I set
ourselves to compose a message which should fulfill not only Berlin's
requirements but also our reflection on the two years' hoax which we had
carried out so successfully.  This message, the first to be transmitted
quite openly in plain language, must not in any way fall short of the
standard of the thousand-odd cipher signals which had been previously
dispatched. We sat at my desk and exchanged our first attempts at a
suitable text in order to discover something worthy of this unique
occasion. Writing rather as if we were playing `consequences', each of
us composing a few sentences in turn, we finally agreed on the
following:

``To Messrs. Blunt, Bingham & Co., Successors Ltd., London. We
understand that you have been endeavoring for some time to do business
in Holland without our assistance. We regret this the more since we have
acted for so long as your sole representatives in this country, to our
mutual satisfaction. Nevertheless we can assure you that, should you be
thinking of paying us a visit on the Continent on any extensive scale,
we shall give your emissaries the same attention as we have hitherto,
and a similarly warm welcome. Hoping to see you.''

The names given were those of the men whom we knew to be at the head of
the Netherlands section of SOE. We signaled this draft to Berlin for
their approval. They were evidently occupied with more important
matters, however, and we had to wait a fortnight until, after one or two
reminders, we received permission to transmit the message without
amendment.

I passed the plain language text to the FuB station on 31st March, with
instructions to pass it to England over all the lines controlled by us,
which at that time numbered ten, the next day. It had occurred to me
that 1st April might be particularly apposite.

The following afternoon the FuB station reported that London had
accepted the message on four lines, but had not answered calls on the
other six. [...]

Operation `Nordpol' was over.

The attempt of the Allied Secret Services to gain a foothold in Holland
had been delayed by two years. The establishment of armed sabotage and
terror organizations, which might have disorganized the rear areas of
the Atlantic Wall and crippled our defenses at the critical moment of
invasion, had been prevented. The penetration of the Underground
movement had led to the liquidation of widely spread and boldly directed
enemy espionage services. The complete deception of the enemy about the
real state of affairs in Holland would have subjected him to the danger
of a heavy defeat had he attempted to attack during 1942 or 1943. The
information which we had gained about the activities and intentions of
the enemy Secret Services had contributed directly to the countering of
corresponding plans in other countries.

Operation `Nordpol' was no more than a drop in the ocean of blood and
tears, of the suffering and destruction of the Second World War. It
remains nonetheless a noteworthy page in the chequered and adventurous
story of Secret Service, a story which is as old as humanity and as war
itself.


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From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Eric Hollander <hh@pmantis.berkeley.edu>
Date: Thu, 23 Dec 93 17:59:46 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: mail-to-news gateway
Message-ID: <9312240159.AA16045@pmantis.berkeley.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I've modified the gateway so that it is non-anon, for a few reasons:

It seems that this makes it more general purpose.  It seems that it will be
less likely to be shut down this way (the soda administration is quite
anti-cypherpunk; I actually got thrown off root there because I defended our
archives).

The other thing that I might do is have two options:

	Request-Post: alt.sex.sodomy.pseudospoofing.detweiler

and

	Request-Anon-Post: alt.sex.sodomy.pseudospoofing.detweiler

with the obvious meanings.

Although to make it more consistent with the other header lines, it should
be:

	Request-Posting: alt.sex.sodomy.pseudospoofing.detweiler

I want to make these header lines as logically consistent as possible.
What's the most logic format?

Also, right now my remailer has a random time delay feature.  The posting
service does not have that feature, although if I implement anon posting, I
will probably put it in for anon posting only.

THIS IS AN EXPERIMENTAL SERVICE, SO PLEASE DO NOT SPREAD THE WORD, AND
PLEASE CONFINE YOUR POSTINGS TO THE *.test GROUPS.  IF PEOPLE START ABUSING
IT, I WILL TURN IT OFF.

Speaking of turning it off, the other feature I'm soon going to implement is
a "prekill" file, so that certain people can be "86ed" from my remailers and
posters.

e




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: ferguson@icm1.icp.net (Paul Ferguson x2044)
Date: Thu, 23 Dec 93 16:49:48 PST
To: hh@pmantis.berkeley.edu (Eric Hollander)
Subject: Re: mail-to-news gateway
In-Reply-To: <9312240012.AA19273@pmantis.berkeley.edu>
Message-ID: <9312240049.AA03489@icm1.icp.net>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text



Eric writes -

> What do people think?

Personally, I'd prefer to see it operate in a fashion that required
a user to pass it (mail) through an anon mailer before-hand to make
it anonymous. I think this would help to ensure that abuses would be
kept to a minimum, and that neophytes would have to become a bit more
knowledgeable before they could use it for its intended purpose.
 
But, hey, this is just me sparkin'....   ,-)

Cheers!

(please send explicit instructions to the <reply-to:> line above;
 I'd like to test it out...)



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Jim choate <ravage@wixer.bga.com>
Date: Thu, 23 Dec 93 20:11:08 PST
To: peb@procase.com (Paul Baclace)
Subject: Re:  anonymous video rental store
In-Reply-To: <9312232351.AA26168@ada.procase.com>
Message-ID: <9312240339.AA03595@wixer>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I can state with some certainty that most libraries will not reveal their
check out records. Several years ago the FBI went around to several college
and city libraries and asked for copies so they could track 'suspicous'
people. As far as I am aware every library refused on the grounds that what a
person reads is nobodys business but their own. Apparently the FBI (and
presumably other agencies) would have to go to a judge with some kind of
probably cause and request a court order.

The engineering library at UT Austin used to have it under the glass at the
check out desk.





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Jim choate <ravage@wixer.bga.com>
Date: Thu, 23 Dec 93 20:09:46 PST
To: bill.stewart@pleasantonca.ncr.com +1-510-484-6204)
Subject: Re:  It had to happen...
In-Reply-To: <9312240347.AA03482@anchor.ho.att.com>
Message-ID: <9312240345.AA04485@wixer>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Correct me if I am wrong but isn't the period 72 hrs. max without seeing a
judge or having charges filed? After that a Writ of Habeas Corpus is almost a
formality (course I ain't no lawyer so what do I know about actuality...).





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Jim choate <ravage@wixer.bga.com>
Date: Thu, 23 Dec 93 20:16:08 PST
To: ferguson@icm1.icp.net (Paul Ferguson x2044)
Subject: Re: Encryption and Self-Incrimination
In-Reply-To: <9312231925.AA28908@icm1.icp.net>
Message-ID: <9312240357.AA05122@wixer>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>
>
> You wrote -
>
> > Consider this,
> >
> > in a criminal investigation you can be forced to allow access to safety
> > deposit boxes and their contents, how is this any different?
>
> I think the key here is that there has to be some valid supposition
> of a criminal act before this can happen. In other words, Officer
> George G. Prick at local precinct house 5 can't simply compel you
> to provide access to this type of material on a whim. Do you see
> my point?
>
> -- Paul
>

I see it fully, unfortunately it isn't the point I am trying to make. What I
am trying to ask is what happens when a officer tells a judge something like
the following,

Officer: "Your Honor, we stopped the suspect and he had cocaine and this
          computer in the car. We suspect he has drug trafficing related
          data on the drive. Our technical people have determined that the
          drive is encrypted."

Judge: "Did the accused turn over the key when requested?"

Officer: "No sir, he says that it would be self-incriminating."

Judge:   (this is the point at which I am addressing.)

Exactly what can the judge do at this point? As I understand the situation
right now there is no legal precidence that requires the suspect to turn over
the key. However, since there is clearly evidence for suspicion the court has
a responsibility to its office to gain access to that drive in any legal
means possible.  The courst is prohibited from 'forcing' the suspect to
reveal the key thanks to the 5th. So the judge (to my admittedly laymen view)
has only one thing to do, order the accused to turn the key over or go to
jail for contempt of court. Hence, the suspect goes to jail for contempt and
stays there until either the original judge decides it ain't worth further
trouble or a higher court over rules the lower court and releases you (I
wouldn't hold my breath for the latter to happen in most cases). In short you
could spend years in jail without ever actually going to trial. The end
result is the same, you spend years in jail (possibly).. In short having a
the drive crypto does only one thing and that is protect you from the
original charge (assuming all incriminating evidence exists only on the drive)
it does not in any way protect you from spending time in jail. I fail to see
how the court could do much else...So the conclusion that I come to is that
the contents of the drive would have to merit a sentence more aggregious than
a decade or two in jail.





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "L. Detweiler" <ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Date: Thu, 23 Dec 93 22:41:09 PST
To: cypherwonks@lists.eunet.fi
Subject: A Message from Medusa
Message-ID: <199312240640.XAA00551@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I am cleaning out my archives of past mail to respond to. Some people
still persist in believing that absolutely no pseudospoofing is
occuring on behalf of the Cypherpunks. I have over a thousand 
messages that suggest quite to the contrary. Below is one of my
favorites. E.Brandt, a longtime cypherpunk list subscriber, explains
to me that he is Medusa. If anyone wishes to debate my claims on the
existence of pseudospoofing, please do your homework and email Mr.
Brandt to determine the meaning of his message below. I will be most
amused if you get no response, one that complains that he was being
facetious, or one that complains his privacy has been violated. I
would be further amused at anyone's attempts to determine any aspect
of Mr. Brandt's life that suggests he is a real human being.

In the letter, We have the familiar techniques of the ad hominem
attack on S.Boxx (Mr. Brandt is definitely dragging down his
preeminent reputation by claiming that he is in some way affiliated
with me <g>). This is the mandatory `pseudonymity is OK as long as it
glorifies us' hypocrisy of the cypherpunks. The letter also has a
manifestation of Medusa's uncommonly noxious arrogance. She cannot
help but to brag, ``I AM MEDUSA, CONTROLLER OF ALL TENTACLES!''

But the unusual aspect of this message was that exhibited a strong
degree of desperation on the part of Medusa. She actually offered to
apologize if I could reveal how I identify tentacles! Again, we have
the Hughes-May-Gilmore idea that `if there is no evidence, there is
no crime.'  Unfortunately for Medusa, obviously I cannot reveal this
sensitive information. Medusa went away quite upset despite
initiating this conversation,  asking me and my postmaster not to
send any more mail. Mr. Brandt, if you don't want me to send *you*
mail, don't send *me* any.

The source of the desperation was probably due to the increasing 
attention and exposure to cypherpunks `out there' on other mailing
lists and in the newsgroups, which is obviously getting more
difficult to maintain with all the tentacle damage control. They
think that the cascades beneath every new message saying
``L.Detweiler is insane'' effectively nullify the damaging truth and
publicity of the messages. The cypherpunks don't understand that
sometimes when people are most influenced, they are  at first silent.
Damage control by `lackeys' is not effective when the leaders 
themselves are challenged.

Cypherpunks and your leaders, if you wish to convince me or anyone
else that you are not pseudospoofing, you should definitely avoid 
sending anyone a letter like this.

===cut=here===




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "L. Detweiler" <ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Date: Thu, 23 Dec 93 22:46:10 PST
To: cypherwonks@lists.eunet.fi
Subject: Cyberparanoia
Message-ID: <199312240641.XAA00559@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I thought I would share with you a message that shows the consequences
of pseudospoofing. The problem is that if *anyone* accuses *anyone*
of doing it, suddenly *all* email addresses are thrown into doubt. I 
think the Internet has long operated on the assumption that everyone
is honest, but that this assumption is breaking down in the face of
genuinely malicious individuals with a great deal of commitment to
deception.

This message appeared on a highly trusted list moderated by D.Farber,
the `interesting people' list. He compiles material from a wide
variety of sources and acts as a sort of cyberspatial newspaper
outlet. Unfortunately, we are all fallible, as he demonstrated
recently in passing through on the list a classic urban myth about
LSD tattoos absorbed through the skin. This myth has been debunked in
many places-- as I understand it, no case of a `LSD tattoo' has ever
been found, because it is physically impossible to absorb the drug in
this manner.

The person below was being facetious, but the paranoia over email
addresses and `cyberanarchists' shows through. I cannot escape
commenting on the symbolism of this message: the swing of the
pendulum has been arrested, and from henceforth on, the use of the
Internet for deception will be of the utmost concern of many
designers and will strongly influence many new technological
advancements in Cyberspace.


===cut=here===

From: rjs@farnsworth.mit.edu (Richard Jay Solomon)
Subject: Re:  Important Message to Parents
Cc: bjones@weber.ucsd.edu, moredohrs@farnsworth.mit.edu, tcfgie@weber.ucsd.edu

[LSD tattoos]

This is a marvelous, if scary, example of a serious issue of information
dissemination via the net. It's instantaneous, authoriative looking
(because it is in print, on a *computer*, yours!), yet appears to be a
personal letter often from someone who you think you know, and you have'nt
a clue of whether the content or the sender is for real.

And you still don't know if THIS message is a hoax, urban myth, or what.
Maybe it WAS a myth, but is no longer. Suppose farber's list was
penetrated, or Dave flipped his lid, or bjones@weber.ucsd.edu is some
maniac or a fictitious name, or rjs@farnsworth.mit.edu is a cyber-anarchist
or has been seized by one -- you simply do not know. But if you have kids,
you have a teensy-weensy suspicion that this might be true and you are
going to ask the first biochemist you know, aren't you -- with a smile on
your face, or on your email, just in case you look foolish. Right?





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "L. Detweiler" <ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Date: Thu, 23 Dec 93 22:46:27 PST
To: cypherwonks@toad.com
Subject: The Perils of Leadership
Message-ID: <199312240641.XAA00570@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I thought I would share with everyone the consequences of a failure in
leadership, as expressed by different followers. In a situation where
there is no trust, honor, or integrity in a group, a sort of paranoia
and disattachment ensues. The leaders claim they are not really
leading their followers,  and the followers claim they are not really
following the leaders. Here is a batch of messages I got from the
`followers' in response to one of my messages to the cypherpunks
group. I think it demonstrates rather well the degeneration that can
ensue in a group where  morality takes a back seat to
self-gratification and glory.

It is interesting how most people below avoid the question of
associating with people that might be involved in immoral activities.
By default, i.e. in the lack of protest, the former continues to
support  the latter. That reminds me of a parable by S.Boxx, `The Zen
of Cyberspace',  about a corrupt king who was carried around in a
massive platform  on the backs of his followers, who admitted the
king was corrupt but continued because, in each of their own ways,
they shared one of his vices.

Amazingly, all these people claim that cypherpunk leaders are not
sending them mail from fake identities, apparently without the
slightest evidence or assurance from the leaders, and in fact a lot
of circumstantial evidence to the contrary. Also, I also find it
amusing that many, right after justifying various forms of lies, in
the next breath claim to be `honest cypherpunks' .

Cypherwonks, I hope to serve you in a way that will avoid the
disintegration seen below. Cypherpunks, I hope that you can get your
act together. Or maybe what I mean is that I hope your `act'
continues to fall apart.

===

In the following messages, the following people claim that there is 
no conspirational activity (e.g. pseudospoofing, etc.) going on by
Cypherpunks, particularly by the leaders. They don't answer my
questions on specifics -- how do they know? but perhaps others can
obtain some kind of substantive, verifiable evidence either way from
them.

Jim Demmers <jdemmers@noel.pd.org>
"mycal" <mike@NetAcsys.com>

===
Follower #1

> I thought I might use the honest
> cypherpunks as a wedge into the leader's sense of honor, but there are
> no honest cypherpunks and none of their leaders have any honor.

This was the first cypherwonks message I received and...

I think that this generalization is a bit strong, and as an honest
cypherpunk, I take some exception to it. 

There are many people who either read cypherpunks (or versions of it)
who are honest, and simply interested in cryptography and (potentially)
the side effects of it.  Please try not to  be so harsh to criticize
such a loosely organized group as cypherpunks; many of us have no 
contact or even iterest in the leadership of the organization, and are
just there for the crypto.


===
Follower #2 (Ray Berry)

>> 
>> if the leaders are corrupt, where does that leave the followers?
>> especially if they are unaware of the corruption?

    I have never considered those who dominate the cypherpunk mailing
list my "leaders".  Have you?

>> >I would not be surprised if some of their actions are calculated to
>> >simply further provoke or bait you.  
>> 
>> Let me ask you a question -- do you think J.Gilmore is among the
>> `vermin' you speak of? E.Hughes? T.C.May? who?

    Personally, I don't see any of them as vermin per se.  My impres-
sion of Gilmore is generally that of a moderate.  Hughes and May I
feel less empathy with- probably because of their seeming preoccupation 
with anarchic fantasies, etc.   In order for them to earn 'vermin'
status, they would have to conciously conspire to manipulate me
on a personal level.  As it is I simply see them as misguided souls.
    
    Perhaps more salient is the point that, for me, I would prefer to
simply judge the content on its own merits.  After all, I don't know
who these people really are, or of what cloth they are cut, save for
their statements.   If I cannot know who they are, how can I get very
invested in their particular identity, true or otherwise?



===
Follower #3 (Mike McNally)

"L. Detweiler" writes:
 > False. The issue is about truth and the morality of leaders.

Will you get the idea out of your little head that Hughes is my
"leader"?  You're the only one with any such delusion.

 > >This is exactly like the question "Are you a liar?", to which the
 > >answer is always "no".
 > 
 > False. In an honest society, lies exist. You are asserting that they do not.

No, idiot, the answer is always "no" because a liar would lie.  Duhh.


===
Follower #4

> Anyway, there have been a few questions by people on this list. `why
> should we care about pseudospoofing?' the answer is that you should be
> sure that your leaders aren't doing it. 

What is it with you and this "leaders' bullshit.  I don't recognize any 
leaders per se on this list - just a bunch of subscribers - some with more
knowledge and more to say than others.  This is not the giant, conspiratorial
'movement' that you so love to bang your head against. 

A knight in shining armor you're not.

===
Follower #5

> 
> When I hear strange rumors about deceptions in the media, and your
> eminent leaders fail to reassure me, why is no one else upset about
> this?  Cypherpunks, don't you give a DAMN that articles by reputable
> authors may contain DISTORTIONS AND LIES? Look, Markoff is a highly
> respected writer. And if you lie or deceive a reporter, that is like a
> personal insult. These people could get *fired* if their articles are
> incorrect in a serious way. but you don't GIVE A DAMN. you think it is
> FUNNY that you can TRICK REPUTABLE PEOPLE TO BELIEVE IN LIES and so you
> can PROPAGATE THEM FURTHER.

If thats the way you feel, why don't you get pissed off at all the
officials in our government.  They lie to respected writers all the time.
Worse they lie to the public that has entrusted them.

Writers don't get "fired" for being lied to, if the writer interviews
an "expert" in a field and prints it, he has that interview to back him
up.  A writer may get "fired" for pissing off the government -or-
a media owner.  If you truely wan't to fight the tenticals of deception
you should go after the mass media, just about all media outlets are
tenticals of some big corporation.

Even if what you were saying was true about Tim and Co (which is not),
in todays world they would still be looked at as heros by the masses, even
if the government and its sheeple looked at them as criminals.

> 
> Is there an honest cypherpunk in the entire world? None have contacted
> me so far. There are a few people that are slinking away quietly with
> their tail between their legs, but I think you all are just the same
> scurrilous cowards that your leaders are.

I consider myself honest [...]





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "L. Detweiler" <ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Date: Thu, 23 Dec 93 22:50:39 PST
To: cypherwonks@lists.eunet.fi
Subject: Happy Holidays
Message-ID: <199312240642.XAA00629@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Cypherpunks & cypherwonks, we have all witnessed first hand a great
tension in our groups from the beginning, and I am sincerely upset by
this wretched animosity. Someone is bouncing my postings to
cypherpunks to the cypherwonks list anonymously, and it appears that
other cypherpunks have surreptitiously infiltrated the cypherwonk
list to promote pseudospoofing. Cypherpunks, I think we can get along
if we both continue to observe courtesy and honor, as your leader
E.Hughes requested some time ago in a message to both groups. This is
my own attempt to resolve some of the friction, and I hope you will
receive it in the best of spirits. I believe this will better aid
everyone on both lists in choosing which to contribute to, and to
avoid being publicly stigmatized or widely ignored for violations in
the charters.

Let me remind everyone on both lists the general purpose of both:

The cypherpunks are interested in identity camouflage techniques in
the name of `privacy', such as pseudospoofing.  Members are highly
suspicious of any government structure or any identification scheme
whatsoever, to say the least, and are in general interested in
evading and subverting these mechanisms. They are seeking to develop
or press completely untraceable transactions into all realms of human
endeavor,  *particularly* economic ones. Traditionally this has been
called `black marketeering' and `tax evasion' but the Cypherpunks
object to these terms. 

Toward this goal, Cypherpunks are promoting Chaumian systems, in
mostly very secretive development projects.  In fact, Mr.Hughes
recently met with Chaum in Dallas, I understand, so that both may
further progress in this area, including setting up a credit union
(credit unions are exempt from many banking restrictions the
cypherpunks consider oppressive and invasive of privacy).  Finally,
the cypherpunks are also interested in infiltrating the media with
accounts of their movement, as long as they are wholly complimentary
and do not reveal the underlying libertarian extremist philosophy.
The catchwords are `privacy for the masses' and `the cryptographic
revolution.'

Cypherwonks find identity camouflage techniques such as
pseudoanonymity extremely dangerous, although we believe there is a
place for straight anonymity in certain forums, where lack of
identitification is not sensitive (such as outside of serious project
development and our own list). We are interested in developing new
structures that allow us to distinguish between fake and real
identities and screen out the the former, using such things such as
voluntary identity registration servers. We believe that all human
interaction is based to some degree on trust, and this frequently
involves the necessity of traceable  transactions in most realms,
*particularly* economic ones. We think that `black marketeering' and
`tax evasion' are quite toxic for social harmony, and are quite
aghast to see these dangerous philosophies promoted in Cyberspace to
advocate `cryptoanarchy', or, simply,  lawlessness. 
 
Toward our goals, we have started our new list and are building up new
infrastructures for `Electronic Democracy' and other systems to  help
ensure that trust is not betrayed in Cyberspace. We see Cyberspace as
an untamed wilderness that must be ridden of its more anarchic and
pathogenic features before anyone can begin living here. We are open
to everyone who is interested, no projects are kept secret from
anyone, and to the contrary we abhor any sort of conspirational
secrecy on the Internet, which we think is highly destructive to its
essential nature. We are working toward systems such as `Internet
mercantile protocols' that may not necessarily ensure total anonymity
in all transactions (it is not our major design criteria, contrary to
the cypherpunks). Finally, we are horrified to hear of a lie of any
sort, whether it be from a fake identity, from a leader, or in the
media, and we will even attempt to expose lies where we stumble on
them, sometimes tenaciously if necessary. Media exposure and credit
are not our main goals, but as this will inevitably appear, we will
make our intentions clear. We are more conservative than  radicals;
we are not ourselves extremists, but moderates. The slogan is,
`Civilizing Cyberspace'.

I hope that Mr. Hughes or other cypherpunks do not object to the
summarization above of the purpose of his mailing list. He and Mr.
May have been sensitive in the past on topics that appear there and I
assume they will correct it if it has erroneously characterized the
official cypherpunk group agenda. Another statement on `privacy' can
be found in soda.berkeley.edu:/pub/cypherpunks/rants. The summary
above is based on my own extensive experience on the list and intense
research involving ~5000 messages I have traded with perhaps hundreds
of different cypherpunks and the leaders over approximately a year
now (I will present more documentation on the Cypherpunk agenda and
culture in the future). Those who question this characterization of
the directions of the Cypherpunks should read the message appended to
the end of this letter below.

* * *

I list the cypherpunks and cypherwonk group charters so that everyone
in both groups can clearly understand the purpose of both, and
perhaps in the future we can avoid conflicts due to a lack of
understandings in the charters. If these arise, I have the following
recommendations to all members of both groups.

If you see something you might consider `flamebait', or deliberately
provocative text that violates the charter, the most devastating
response is to completely *ignore* it both publicly and privately.
Imagine that the poster is advocating something completely depraved 
like child molesting. You do not want to have any such association
with such a person, and perhaps the only response, if any, is a few
lines `your posts are not welcome here' or `please seek counseling'
sent in private email.

If you can be provoked into childish retributions in response to
childish provocations, it only unequivocally demonstrates your own
childishness. The agent provacateur measures success by his
perception of the depth of the damage he causes. Bouncing posts
(either to individuals or mailing lists), mailbombs, and screeching
obscenities in email are unjustified in any case. Your task is to
embody the courtesy and politeness that your attacker lacks to
effectively neutralize the attack. A vicious counterattack only leads
to further escalation, perhaps to very unpleasant circumstances to
all parties involved. This, to me, is the true spirit of humanity.
Shouts are not neutralized with other shouts but compassion or
*silence*.

I sincerely hope that members of both groups can help develop systems
that minimize the disruptions of the disreputable postings we both
have been tormented by, e.g. those that are anonymous, pseudonymous,
or pseudoanonymous. I think that we will all be far more productive
and far less paranoid when we work in a cyberspatial atmosphere that
by enforcing rules of courtesy, trust, and honor, basks in all.

* * *

Now, I have a few thoughts about `animosity' and `enmity' that I would
like to share with both groups in the holiday spirit. I think we all
recognize that the most noble human virtues are likewise the most 
difficult to consistently practice, particularly in situations that
would seem to  have plummeted into mudslinging in the gutter. But I
would advise everyone that enmity and hatred, like love, are in the
eyes of the beholder. Or, perhaps, rather, they are in the stomach,
and they will eat away like an ulcer until you realize that hatred is
never an appropriate human emotion, and enmity is inherently abnormal
and unnatural. If you have any enemies, something is remiss in the
world such that this venemous hatred developed. When we love or hate
others, we are reacting to the essential characteristics of our own
nature that are assuaged or attacked in others' presence.

Furthermore, everyone should recognize the sort of `cosmic link' that
you share with your enemies and loved ones. You are fated to be drawn
to them over you lifetime because of the resonance between you. It is
a natural law as inescapable as magnetism. I am reminded of the
utterly despondent situations of war and violence in the world, of
bitter racism and vicious nationalism that chain the peoples of the
world to their personal hells. These are all cycles that replay over
lifetimes unless broken by developing a strong aversion to strong
hatreds of any kind.

I remember when I was young, maybe somewhere around eight years old, I
had misbehaved for some unremembered reason and my parents made me go
to my room for several hours. I felt absolutely  betrayed, disgusted,
and viciously revengeful. I can remember thinking that I would never
forget the appalling affront to my independence as long as I lived,
and hoping something evil would happen to my parents -- literally,
that they would die. I don't know where this poisonous anger came
from. I was quite an angry kid in my younger years, and I remember
episodes of my past with great shame and embarrassment now, and this
one stands out strongly among all. I have heard of similar anecdotes
from others, perhaps it is part of the underside of many people's 
childhoods. I hope that the consequences of my hatred have been
erased just as my memory of the episode has faded despite my vow. But
I shall never forget what black evil my mind had been polluted with
for some hours. If the memory fades but the frustration persists, it
is poisonous hate.

I tell this story not so that you can quote me and ridicule me and
throw this back in my face to prove that I am a dangerously, mentally
unbalanced individual. I am telling you this to say that I am ashamed
of vicious hatred in any form, and that my own animosities rarely
last longer than a single letter. If they continue and persist, it is
because something in the world is seriously awry, that the source of
my frustration persists. When our attempts to resolve that which
troubles us meet impregnable brick walls, one's frustration mounts. If
anyone has been erecting these barbed wire fences in anyone's path, I
ask you to stop the bleeding and take them down.

In some ways, I have learned more over the last few months about
fellow human beings than I have learned in my whole lifetime. It
makes me nauseous to realize that I have ever made an enemy. But on
the other hand, I have recognized in my short existence as a human
being that many of the other passengers on Earth actually hate people
for their better accomplishments, and use the slightest excuse to
erect a barbed wire fence of enmity. They hate anyone who takes a
strong stand on any issue, particularly if it involves their own most
sacred vices. They will subject that person to the most scathing,
vicious ad hominem attacks conceivable to he and his circle of
friends and associates, even while they know that person is doing
nothing but holding a mirror to their own deceptions and hypocrisies.
But we cannot escape our own vices in the presence of others. Only 
sociopaths do not ever constructively criticize or listen to each
other. And every extent and manifestation of social stigma is due a
true sociopath by a society with any integrity.

One of the consequences of hatred is `demonizing' someone, which Mr.
T.C.May has advised against on numerous occasions, and his words drip
with profundity.  To all those who demonize anyone (including
myself), I ask-- is it frustration or enmity? The difference is that
if what you are railing against was resolved, and a window or doorway
suddenly  appeared in the brick wall, you would be elated and
delighted if you were satirizing or constructively criticizing
someone, and you would immediately forgive them. But if what you have
is poisonous enmity, you would like to see this person die a cruel
death no matter what switch in fortune or rays of light the future
brings.  ``They cannot ever be forgiven.''  This is hatred. And it
burns like some insidious virus invading the flesh; it is fed by the
creep of corruption and destruction. It replicates, it propagates, it
reaches critical mass, it inevitably explodes like a nuclear bomb.

Think about that a moment. Do you really want to see your enemies die?
Imagine that some catastrophic misfortune visited your most hated
enemy, that he *did* die a cruel death. Would you be intensely sorry
or elated? Imagine that your enemies die the death of Marie
Antoinette, Joan of Arc or Jesus Christ. Their grisly fates were the
logical conclusion of the guillotine, fires, and spikes of your
hatred. When your enemy *does* die a grisly death, beware of public
backlash against the beheadings, stake-burnings, or crucifixions you
watched, sanctioned, or championed. 

Be careful that your Movement or Revolution is inherently moral,
controlled, and restrained, that thieves, criminals, psychopaths, and
traitors are not hiding within it, that you are not warping the
ideals you claim to embrace, that your excesses are not sowing the
seeds of your own destruction, and that your own head is secure from
the bloody blade. He who lives by the Guillotine will die by it.
Sometimes, in retrospect, silence is seen as complicity. Sometimes,
the riotous mob turns to feed on itself. Sometimes, when the prey
dies, the predators become the hunted.

* * *

In the true spirit of Christmas, I would like to `unilaterally'
forgive anyone and everyone who has attacked me in the past months.
I feel no bitterness over your 4 or 5 letters to my postmaster, your
massive sendsys and mail bombs, your harassment of those in the
cypherwonks group, your lies, your treacheries, your betrayals, your 
treasons against friends, followers, and bystanders, and enemies
alike.

But forgiveness is futile unless the feelings of remorse are mutual
and not unilateral.  I ask others to forgive me for whatever ways I
have truly wronged you, and you to cease and apologize for whatever ways you
have wronged me (I have apologized to all cypherpunks in my posting,
Embarassment, Humiliation, Shame, and an Apology).  I ask you to
distinguish between a vicious, spiteful attack and a message that
actually hides the concern, `I am doing absolutely everything
conceivable to prevent you from walking off a cliff, and if that
makes me your enemy for doing so, so be it, because, as painful as my
words and actions are for both of us, to me your life is more
valuable than our friendship. To me your life *is* our friendship.'

I ask all the Cypherpunks and Cypherwonks to find virtue in this 
tumultuous world we call home, to find some kind of moderation,
sensibility, and virtue where it is desperately needed. I pray that
we will all help bring not the world's darkness, but its light, to
Cyberspace.

Following is a letter from an eminent, avuncular cypherpunk,  which
helped me to release some of my own pent up frustration that has been
bubbling and churning for many weeks now. This was written in
response to my posting to the Cypherpunks, `Humility, Embarrassment,
Shame, and an Apology.' 

Merry Christmas
Happy Holidays
Peace on Earth
Good Will Toward Men

L.Detweiler


===cut=here===

To: L.Detweiler <ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Subject: Re: Embarrassment, Humiliation, Shame, and an Apology

>Above all, please do not
>construe my heartfelt sincerity as ... satire. 

It _is_ difficult.

What it does sounds like ... is the result of brainwashing.  I have no
interest at all in a thoughtless follower, and whatever faults your
postings exhibited, lack of reconceptualization was not among them. 
Mind you, I thought most of those rethinkings were incorrect, yet I
never faulted you for being uncreative.

Democracy is the best way yet discovered for controlling centralized
power, yet it is my opinion that the way to proceed is to eliminate
the central powers and replace them with distributed powers.
Therefore I disagree that the best goal is the extension of democracy
into every realm.  In deciding what mix of products an economy makes,
for example, only dollar-votes make sense; to democratize production
by one-person/one-vote would lead to a command economy similar to the
ex-Soviet Union.

I consider there to be an underexplored realm of distinctions between
what systems are only amenable to centralized power (in which we
choose democracy) and what systems may support distributed power (in
which we may choose markets or other systems).  You are interested in
democracy; perhaps you could think about what systems still require
centralization, and why.

>I think that ... tentacle S.Boxx has demonstrated the damage that
>can be done with pseudoanonymity. He ought to be [viciously,
>violently punished] ...

If one can avoid the thought of violence in the pit of one's despair,
then one is well on the way to a peacable nature.

Whatever the faults the postings of S. Boxx may have had, the physical
body behind the pseudonym is in no way deserving of violence.







From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "L. Detweiler" <ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Date: Thu, 23 Dec 93 22:46:23 PST
To: interesting-people@eff.org
Subject: ANONYMOUS DEATH THREATS FORCE COLORADO MALLS TO YANK SANTA
Message-ID: <199312240642.XAA00633@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


from the Rocky Mountain News, Denver, CO, Wed Dec 22 1993  p.4A (front
page headline)

``Letters warning `Chuck E. Cheese was nothing compared to this' spur
cancellation of St. Nick''

This is example of the power that can be wrought through more words,
even anonymously. Apparently from no other  cause than a series of
anonymous letters sent to many Colorado malls, many cancelled their
appearances of  Santa Claus. In one mall, a Santa was surrounded by 
undercover police agents and others wore bulletproof vests. I have
been to most of these malls and they are the largest and most
prominent in the entire state.

Anonymous mail carries far more weight today than graffiti sprayed on
a wall! It is an extremely  potent weapon, in the wrong hands! If
this were a prank or hoax (various signs suggest this) it was an
extremely effective and devastating one. And the ultimate goal of
having it all `replayed' back in the media for perverse glee was
achieved spectacularly. It was the front page headline on the
Colorado newspapers.

Merry Christmas, everyone...

===cut=here===

Colorado -- Death threats against Santa Claus have prompted
at least several major malls to cancel their Santas,
disappointing hundreds of children.

Anonymous letters began arriving at malls Dec. 14. The writer
threatened to shoot Santa between the eyes and ``kill more
than an [sic] hundred people.''

Santas at Westminster and Northglenn malls were wearing
bulletproof vests Tuesday, and armed guards were posted
within 10 feet of some Santas.

``Isn't it a shame?'' Westminster Police Chief Dan Montgomery
said. ``Even Santa Claus is a target.''

Monday, malls began receiving follow-up threats from the
writer. Letters declared, ``Time is running out'' and ``Chuck
E. Cheese was nothing compared to this.''

The writer claimed to be a Vietnam veteran angry that Santa
has replaced much of the religious meaning of Christmas. The
typed, identical letters were signed ``Terminator XX.''

``I am filled with much hatred,'' they said. ``You don't know
the horrible things I'm capable of.''

Police said they are taking the threats seriously. The FBI is
investigating.

``What are the chances of it happening?'' Montgomery said.
``Extremely remote. But you have to act as if it's going to
happen.''

The follow-up threats prompted cancellation of Santa at
Southwest Plaza, Cinderella City and the NOrthglenn,
Westminster, Cherry Creek, Aurora, and Southglenn malls.
Officials at other malls are considering the same action.

``We felt it was in the best interests of the public,'' said
Carol Hinson of Aurora Mall.

Some children cried Tuesday when they showed up at Southwest
Plaza and Santa wasn't there.

``This has been a nightmare,'' said manager Eileen Stembler.
``The anger it has caused is phenomenal, that someone would
believe they have the right to take the fantasy out of
Christmas.''

Mall workers posted signs designed to soften the blow. At
Southglenn, a sign read:

``Due to the tremendous amount of gifts Santa must deliver
... Santa and his helpers have gone back to the North Pole to
prepare. Please leave your Christmas wish list at the
Customer Service Center and we will be sure Santa gets it.''

Most of the malls set up tables with pencil and paper so
children could write their Christmas wish lists. Parents who
asked about missing Santas were not informed of the threats.
Some were told that Santa was sick.

The threatening letters were sent to at least five malls,
Westminster, Aurora, Cherry Creek, Northglenn and Southwest
Plaza. They included the line: ``What a sexist thing to
think Santa is a fat man who gives presents to people.''

The letters prompted dozens of metro-area Santas to quit,
forcing malls to scramble for replacements.

Susen Mesco, head of American Events and Promotions, said the
threats prompted 25 of her company's 50 Santas to quit. They
earn $6 to $40 an hour.

``Some of their wives didn't want them to work,''' Mesco
said. ``It's not worth a part-time job. It just isn't.''

Those who stayed half-seriously asked for raises, Mesco said.

``I'm just trying to keep a positive attitude about this,''
said Tony Ratcliff, a 38-year-old Santa who stayed on the
job.  ``The authorities [have] already taken all the
precautions.''

Before Santa was canceled at Southwest Plaza Tuesday, parents
and children waited 45 minutes as he was moved to a
sequestered room on the second floor. When Santa arrived, he
was surrounded by five security guards.

``This set-up, it ruins Christmas,'' said teen-age shopper
Brian Garramone.

At Northglenn Mall last Tuesday night, Santa was surrounded
by undercover security guards and was not allowed to leave
Santa Land. Mall officials said he will not be there today.

Last week, a radio communications system was installed in
Santa Land so Santa and his elves could call for help, said
the mall's attorney April Bennet Stone.

Throughout the Denver area, people were wondering what kind
of person would do this.

``This, unfortunately,'' Mesco said, ``is somebody who
didn't get enough hugs as a child.''




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: wcs@anchor.ho.att.com (bill.stewart@pleasantonca.ncr.com +1-510-484-6204)
Date: Thu, 23 Dec 93 22:11:10 PST
To: ravage@wixer.bga.com
Subject: Re:  anonymous video rental store - Libraries
Message-ID: <9312240611.AA04813@anchor.ho.att.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Out of curiousity, has any ftp-archive maintainer tried to join the
American Library Association, either directly or as part of some
university's library system?  It would be an interesting way to start
building precedents.  Are there any equivalent international or
non-US national library associations that take strong anti-censorship
pro-privacy positions?




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Mike Ingle <MIKEINGLE@delphi.com>
Date: Thu, 23 Dec 93 22:16:13 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Encryption & self-incrimination
Message-ID: <01H6U8N20WHE9387OJ@delphi.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Isn't there a limit as to how long they can lock you up for contempt of
court? Most crimes do have a maximum sentence.





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Mike Ingle <MIKEINGLE@delphi.com>
Date: Thu, 23 Dec 93 22:16:23 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: More on Secure Drive/hacking case
Message-ID: <01H6U8NJFANI9387OJ@delphi.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I learned a few more details about this case. First of all, it's in Canada,
so U.S. precedent will not be set. The suspect had been hacking, using
several accounts. He requested Secure Drive using one of them, and the
people investigating the hacking had the system programmed to record all
keystrokes through this account. They intercepted a copy of Secure Drive
as he was downloading it, but at that time they hadn't found him yet.
Imagine their frustration, watching the as-yet-unknown hacker acquire a
program which will make him very difficult to prosecute.

The hacker also had PGP and some files, and they are looking through the
files to see if they can find the key. They said the suspect seemed
"particularly glib" about the Secure Drive protection.

They are going to attempt to break Secure Drive. He asked me to write
a program which will take a list of passphrases and test them quickly
to run a passphrase attack. I had a few qualms about writing a program
to crack someone's data, but I don't think it really matters. Unless
the hacker chose a very lame key, they don't have a prayer in hell.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: bart@netcom.com (Harry Bartholomew)
Date: Fri, 24 Dec 93 01:46:11 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Happy Holidays
Message-ID: <199312240945.BAA05499@mail.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


    As one who reflexively deletes all of Larry's posts under whatever
    his name-of-the-moment may be, I sometimes wonder if I'm missing
    some gems hidden in the mass of text. I have presumed, and hope,
    that those still reading him, will share anything of value. :-)



    



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: wcs@anchor.ho.att.com (bill.stewart@pleasantonca.ncr.com +1-510-484-6204)
Date: Thu, 23 Dec 93 22:49:48 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re:  anonymous video rental store
Message-ID: <9312240648.AA05023@anchor.ho.att.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Another technique for anonymous video rentals that's a bit more complex
than buy-and-sell-back but feels more like a video store is to use deposits.
Remember when video stores were just starting out and charged membership
fees to join (letting them get started with minimal capital)?
You could do a deposit system instead, where either
	- you pay the deposit when you join, equal to N times the
	cost of a relatively expensive videotape, and get N membership cards,;
	when you rent a tape, you hand them a card (they can be anonymous),
	and they give you a card back (pulled off a stack) when you return it.
	If some of their tapes are a lot more expensive, they may be 
	two-token tapes.  If you want to get your cash back,
	you give them the card and ask for cash.
	If this sounds like private money, yes it is.
	You could probably do it digitally, using online systems
	which can check whether a given number is in the bank when
	you try to deposit it, or getting fancier than that.

or	- when you rent a tape, you leave a $50 deposit per tape,
	and get it back when you return the tape, less $N/day.
	The tape and/or the plastic box it's in has their signature on it,
	and maybe the typical bar-code.  If they want to get fancy,
	they can give out dated tokens/boxes with the tape,
	and you use the token to get the deposit back; it's probably
	much harder to forge a receipt that has the timestamp 
	public-key signed by them along with the movie name,
	and if *they* start cheating, people start spreading rumors...

Why would people other than cypherpunks, fervent civil-libertarians,
undocumented non-citizens, and other professional paranoids (:-)) bother?
Unless there's a run of major movie-rental-outings in the press
(to make Republicans look bad so people forget about liberals not
paying their housecleaners' socialist security taxes or whatever),
the two most likely market drivers I can see are the porno market
(Gerald Van Leun's (sp?) observation that sex is always a major
influence on adoption of technology) though they'd probably have done it
by now if they were going to,
and perhaps the non-childrens' videogame market, especially to block
heat from Janet Reno et al. for censorship and/or mandatory registration
(registering all "assault videos" as a first step toward confiscation?) 
Using large deposits decreases the usage by children, so it may be a
politically acceptable alternative.

			Bill
			
----
One of the corollary's to Godwin's Law is that many discussions will 
lead to someone saying "If %ss are outlawed, only outlaws will have %ss." :-)




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: jkreznar@ininx.com (John E. Kreznar)
Date: Fri, 24 Dec 93 02:01:11 PST
To: cypherwonks@lists.eunet.fi
Subject: Re: Happy Holidays
Message-ID: <9312240958.AA18167@ininx>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

Especially in this season of good will, the idea that ``taxation'' and
``civility'' are somehow compatible cannot go unchallenged.  Above all,
``civility'' must mean that relations among people be by mutual consent,
or not at all.  Government is the institutionalization of exactly the
reverse: the imposition by the politically victorious upon all others,
the forceful supplanting of personal choice by collective dictate.  It's
the institutionalization of enmity.

Democratic political government, aka tyranny of the majority, will soon
succeed in inducing a new dark age on Earth, one that may never end.  An
individual who yearns to be free must overcome his mortality and leave
the Earth.  This will soon be practical.  Meanwhile, strong cryptography
and the cypherpunk agenda may provide a temporary defense.

	John E. Kreznar		| Relations among people to be by
	jkreznar@ininx.com	| mutual consent, or not at all.

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.3a

iQCVAgUBLRq8rcDhz44ugybJAQEJIgQAq2FO6b9GvgSmpcP1H5qIP8rkDMH5FEu9
6FNxMt+jLofPFMz7NtbgqcXg45KlZXBzdPgiCQKLWKTjcG1e2KF+4wB34gIIPDTF
fMOFVDh3f3cNTojBVcFUvMpdC3p+Z/qTy90jgEoVoqWj8NpbBVqqbMegpiNlGePg
glsqEaKMh6A=
=/W55
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: wcs@anchor.ho.att.com (bill.stewart@pleasantonca.ncr.com +1-510-484-6204)
Date: Thu, 23 Dec 93 23:06:11 PST
To: peb@PROCASE.COM
Subject: Re: picture signatures
Message-ID: <9312240703.AA05116@anchor.ho.att.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


While timestamps do have some use for pictures, they're more limited in
what they'll do for you.  Paul Baclace suggested that if you have the
oldest secure timestamp for a given picture, then you can prove it's yours.
Some problems include:
- NOT having the timestamp doesn't prove it's NOT yours, whereas a signature
	is real good evidence.
- If somebody changes one or more bits of the picture, your timestamp is
	no longer valid; the same is of course true with signatures.
	But with signatures, you can demonstrate *who* you got the picture from,
	whereas timestamps don't do that very well (though I suppose you could
	accept signed timestamps as well as acceptingsigned pictures.)
- Timestamps are more anonymous, but you can achieve the same effect with
	signatures by creating a random public-private key pair to signing
	each picture, and then demonstrate knowledge of the private key
	if you need to prove ownership.

On the other hand, secure timestamps *do* give you timestamping, which
signatures by themselves don't, so it's certainly a valuable addition.

		Bill




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: wcs@anchor.ho.att.com (bill.stewart@pleasantonca.ncr.com +1-510-484-6204)
Date: Thu, 23 Dec 93 23:16:25 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Merry Christmas, Cyberanarchists
Message-ID: <9312240717.AA05222@anchor.ho.att.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Sending mail to anXXXXX@anon.penet.fi compromises your anon.penet.fi id,
unless you're careful to use passwords, and if you're sending the message
directly, you can switch the  format to naXXXXX@anon.penet.fi.  But, 
- Does the cypherpunks mailing list have any anXXXXX@anon.penet.fi subscribers,
	or is Eric careful to switch them to naXXXXX in the list?
- Is there any way to tell?
- If mail is forwarded, either by something like cypherpunks that patches
	up header lines, or by someone else (e.g. a forger, or some cypherpunks
	subscriber, or somebody  forwarding their mail to their anXXXXX account),
	will that also compromise the id, or will that just compromise the
	id of the forwarder, if known?
- How good is anon.penet.fi about checking this stuff for non-passworded users?

		Thanks;  Bill Stewart
# Bill Stewart  NCR Corp, 6870 Koll Center Parkway, Pleasanton CA, 94566
# Voice/Beeper 510-224-7043, Phone 510-484-6204
# email bill.stewart@pleasantonca.ncr.com billstewart@attmail.com

Anonymous-P.S.:  Also thanks from an anonymous Finnish news-poster :-)




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: wcs@anchor.ho.att.com (bill.stewart@pleasantonca.ncr.com +1-510-484-6204)
Date: Thu, 23 Dec 93 23:29:48 PST
To: ferguson@icm1.icp.net
Subject: Re:  Encryption and Self-Incrimination
Message-ID: <9312240728.AA05276@anchor.ho.att.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I wasn't actually the person who said self-incrimination protections don't apply;
that was somebody replying to my post; unlike Mike Godwin, I'm not that
pessimistic yet (nor am I a lawyer), though a few badly defended cases 
would be all it takes to get some bad Federal precedents set.

Mike Ingle sent me a reply with a bit more information; the case is in Canada,
and if I'm not misinterpreting it (I read his reply way too late at night :-),
the wiretapping was by the University (presumably with sniffers or equivalent),
and I'm not sure if the police are involved yet or if this is still in the
university investigation phase.  Rules for throwing people out of school are
of course different from rules for throwing people in jail, Canadian rules are
different, and some universities have honor codes which simplify some of the
processes.  (Some other universities have minimal respect for due process,
which also simplifies things a lot, albeit negatively.)

			Bill
# Bill Stewart  NCR Corp, 6870 Koll Center Parkway, Pleasanton CA, 94566
# Voice/Beeper 510-224-7043, Phone 510-484-6204
# email bill.stewart@pleasantonca.ncr.com billstewart@attmail.com




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Mike Ingle <MIKEINGLE@delphi.com>
Date: Fri, 24 Dec 93 07:11:36 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Merry Christmas CyberAnarchists
Message-ID: <01H6UC783TQA938SR8@delphi.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Interesting reading, but can you imagine how long it took him to type
it in? Five or six hours, easily. He didn't scan it, either. The typos
were the kind a human would make, not scanner errors.

There is something strange about LD's latest postings.
It appears whoever it is, is telnetting in from another machine
and feeding them into longs.lance.colostate.edu's smtp port. 
They are not doing a HELO before the message. Either he is being
spoofed, or his account is cancelled and he's posting from another
machine, or ?? any ideas?


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 XAA00629; Thu, 23 Dec 1993 23:42:17 -0700
Date: Thu, 23 Dec 1993 23:42:15 -0700
From: "L. Detweiler" <ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Subject: Happy Holidays
To: cypherpunks@toad.com, cypherwonks@lists.eunet.fi
Cc: ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu
Message-id: <199312240642.XAA00629@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
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From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Eric Hollander <hh@pmantis.berkeley.edu>
Date: Fri, 24 Dec 93 03:06:28 PST
To: hh@soda.berkeley.edu
Subject: mail poster
Message-ID: <9312241105.AA19078@pmantis.berkeley.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Sorry for the crossposting, but:

I've added a new service to my remailer.  For those of you for whom it is
easier to send mail than to post directly to the net, or for those of you
who want to post anonymously, I now offer a posting service.

To use this service, send mail like this:

	To: hh@soda.berkeley.edu
	Post-To: alt.sex.masturbation
	Subject: what I like to do

and your mail will be automatically posted to alt.sex.masturbation, WITH
YOUR NAME ON IT.

If you would like to post anonymously, use the following header format:

	To: hh@soda.berkeley.edu
	Anon-Post-To: alt.sex.masturbation
	Subject: what I like to do

and it will be posted ANONYMOUSLY.

If you would like to crosspost, use the following type of header (note that
there is no space after the coma):

	To: hh@soda.berkeley.edu
	Anon-Post-To: alt.sex.masturbation,rec.arts.sewing
	Subject: what it's all about

But be warned: excessive crossposting is a Bad Thing.

I know that this type of service is open to all kinds of abuses, so please,
try to be mature about it, or it will be shut down, or even worse, I'll
track down who you are and do something nasty.

A note to UCB users:  This was crossposted to the ucb groups because this is
the only mail-to-news gateway that I know of that posts to the ucb.* groups.

Also note that hh@soda still supports its full remailer functions.  Usage of
the remailer is detailed in soda.berkeley.edu:/pub/cypherpunks/remailers.

A further note on headers:

Some mailers do not allow users to easily modify headers in mail.  However,
you can still use this service.  To do so, send a message like this:

	To: hh@soda.berkeley.edu
	Subject: Big Fun

	::
	Anon-Post-To: alt.sex.masturbation

	[body of message goes here]

In other words, make the first line of the body of the message two colons
(::) and then my remailer will treat the next line after that as part of the
message header.

Have fun!

e




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Harry Shapiro <habs@panix.com>
Date: Fri, 24 Dec 93 03:09:51 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com (Good Guys)
Subject: Cyperwonks
Message-ID: <199312241108.AA05423@panix.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Is anyone monitoring Cyperwonks? Is anything really happening there?

/hawk
-- 
Harry S. Hawk  				      habs@extropy.org
Electronic Communications Officer, Extropy Institute Inc. 
    	    The Extropians Mailing List, Since 1991
EXTROPY -- A measure of intelligence, information, energy, vitality,
experience, diversity, opportunity, and growth.  EXTROPIANISM -- The
philosophy that seeks to increase extropy.          



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: hughes@ah.com (Eric Hughes)
Date: Fri, 24 Dec 93 10:29:54 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Merry Christmas, Cyberanarchists
In-Reply-To: <9312240717.AA05222@anchor.ho.att.com>
Message-ID: <9312241709.AA12361@ah.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>- Does the cypherpunks mailing list have any anXXXXX@anon.penet.fi
>subscribers, or is Eric careful to switch them to naXXXXX in the
>list?

Once we had one, and everyone who posted got assigned an ID.  Now I'm
careful to add them as naXXXXX.

>- Is there any way to tell?

If people aren't getting an ID assigned when they post, there's no problem.

Eric




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Michael Edward Marotta <mercury@well.sf.ca.us>
Date: Fri, 24 Dec 93 09:51:33 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Privacy and Public Libraries
Message-ID: <199312241751.JAA26097@well.sf.ca.us>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


YOUR PUBLIC LIBRARIES AND YOUR PERSONAL PRIVACY
by Michael E. Marotta <mercury@well.sf.ca.us>
 
Generally speaking, librarians are very sensitive to the issues 
surrounding privacy.  As a rule, they protect the privacy of 
their patrons and they especially resist law enforcement requests 
for information about anyone's reading habits.
 
There are some exceptions.
 
A librarian can be coersed or cajoled into releasing privileged 
information.  Unless they are very sure of their principles, an 
effective police interrogator will break down their resistance.  
Possible ploys run from pleas for professional assistance in 
criminal cases to good cop/bad cop. 
 
Here in Michigan, we have 455 MPA 1982, "The Michigan Library 
Privacy Act."  In a recent case involving a librarian I met, the 
sheriff harassed the staff at a small, rural library.  They 
refered him to her.  She told him that her hands were tied: she 
was forbidden by law from doing what he asked.  He went away.  I 
have heard of other librarians in other states going to jail, 
having no law to fall back on.
 
Also, here in Livingston County, we have MANUAL cards.  You write 
your name.  I can look at any book and see who read it.  This is 
a violation of the law.  Since no remedies obtain, I can't get a 
lawyer interested.  My protest to the library was met with "We 
are changing. It will take some time."   Furthermore, when 
working onsite at a Ford Motor Company plant in Louisville, I 
discoverd that the Shelby County Library also relies on hand-
written checkout cards.  However, here in Fowlerville, the 
librarian instituted card numbers several years ago, so our 
village of 3,000 is in compliance.  Is yours?
 
 
 
 




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Jim choate <ravage@wixer.bga.com>
Date: Fri, 24 Dec 93 08:16:21 PST
To: szabo@netcom.com (Nick Szabo)
Subject: Re: anonymous video rental store
In-Reply-To: <199312240825.AAA10603@mail.netcom.com>
Message-ID: <9312241555.AA27016@wixer>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>
>
> Hi,
>
> Thanks for the insightful comments!
>
> > The engineering library at UT Austin used to have it under the glass at the

> > check out desk.
>
> The checkout record or the court order?
>
> 				best regards,
>
> 					Nick
> szabo@netcom.com
>

Uhhhh.......the check out records of course!.......;)

Merry Christmas and Happy New Year!





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Jim choate <ravage@wixer.bga.com>
Date: Fri, 24 Dec 93 08:26:34 PST
To: bill.stewart@pleasantonca.ncr.com +1-510-484-6204)
Subject: Re:  anonymous video rental store - Libraries
In-Reply-To: <9312240611.AA04813@anchor.ho.att.com>
Message-ID: <9312241601.AA27331@wixer>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>
> Out of curiousity, has any ftp-archive maintainer tried to join the
> American Library Association, either directly or as part of some
> university's library system?  It would be an interesting way to start
> building precedents.  Are there any equivalent international or
> non-US national library associations that take strong anti-censorship
> pro-privacy positions?
>

Howdy,

Probably a better first target (at least for alpha and beta tests) would be a
for a anon remailer to join Project Guttenburg. It seems to me that if it
will work for this then it should work for any similar apps.

Just a thought.

Happy Holidays...





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Jim choate <ravage@wixer.bga.com>
Date: Fri, 24 Dec 93 08:26:21 PST
To: MIKEINGLE@delphi.com (Mike Ingle)
Subject: Re: Encryption & self-incrimination
In-Reply-To: <01H6U8N20WHE9387OJ@delphi.com>
Message-ID: <9312241603.AA27447@wixer>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


As far as I know the contempt of court charges can keep you in jail till you
rot.

Unless the judge recinds his order or your lawyer can get a higher court to
over-turn the order you are stuck (as far as I understand it).





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Jim choate <ravage@wixer.bga.com>
Date: Fri, 24 Dec 93 08:36:20 PST
To: bill.stewart@pleasantonca.ncr.com +1-510-484-6204)
Subject: Re:  It had to happen...
In-Reply-To: <9312240432.AA03718@anchor.ho.att.com>
Message-ID: <9312241610.AA27688@wixer>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Strange, I thought it was always 72 hrs....

I think we need a real lawyer at this point..:)

Happy Holidays.





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Brad Huntting <huntting@glarp.com>
Date: Fri, 24 Dec 93 09:19:52 PST
To: Mike Ingle <MIKEINGLE@delphi.com>
Subject: Re: More on Secure Drive/hacking case
In-Reply-To: <01H6U8NJFANI9387OJ@delphi.com>
Message-ID: <199312241718.AA00857@misc.glarp.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



> They are going to attempt to break Secure Drive. He asked me to write
> a program which will take a list of passphrases and test them quickly
> to run a passphrase attack. I had a few qualms about writing a program
> to crack someone's data, but I don't think it really matters. Unless
> the hacker chose a very lame key, they don't have a prayer in hell.

And as a self respecting computer software profesional I assume
you will be charging AT LEAST US$60/hour for this service, right?


brad




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Date: Fri, 24 Dec 93 11:01:22 PST
To: jschultz@bigcat.missouri.edu (John Schultz)
Subject: Re: Encryption & self-incrimination
In-Reply-To: <Pine.3.07.9312241113.A17809-a100000@bigcat>
Message-ID: <199312241900.LAA25439@mail.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



> I recall a case several years ago where a woman (somewhere on the East
> Coast?) was thrown in jail for contempt.  She refused several times to
> tell the court where her child was in an attempt to keep her ex-husband
> from gaining custody (I believe he was accused of sexually abusing the
> child).  The woman had been in jail for several months when a higher court
> ruled that she must be released.  I don't have any references to this case,
> perhaps someone else does.
> 
> John Schultz

This was the Elizabeth Morgan case, and she was in jail for a lot
longer than several months...more like a year or two. She claimed her
ex-husband, a doctor or dentist, had molested her daughter.

As John noted, she refused to say where the child was and so remained
in jail indefinitely.

(I have mixed feelings about this case. Suppose the father had never
molested the daughter and this was just a custody ploy. Does the
mother's silence mean the daughter is forever inaccessible? That there
will never be a trial to resolve the issue?)

When she was eventually released, details escape me as to how this
happened, she travelled to Australia, where her daughter was being
raised by the grandparents.

I've heard nothing more of the case.


--Tim May


-- 
..........................................................................
Timothy C. May         | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,  
tcmay@netcom.com       | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
408-688-5409           | knowledge, reputations, information markets, 
W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA  | black markets, collapse of governments.
Higher Power: 2^756839 | Public Key: PGP and MailSafe available.
Note: I put time and money into writing this posting. I hope you enjoy it.



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: John Schultz <jschultz@bigcat.missouri.edu>
Date: Fri, 24 Dec 93 09:16:21 PST
To: Jim choate <ravage@wixer.bga.com>
Subject: Re: Encryption & self-incrimination
In-Reply-To: <9312241603.AA27447@wixer>
Message-ID: <Pine.3.07.9312241113.A17809-a100000@bigcat>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


On Fri, 24 Dec 1993, Jim choate wrote:

> As far as I know the contempt of court charges can keep you in jail till you
> rot.
> 
> Unless the judge recinds his order or your lawyer can get a higher court to
> over-turn the order you are stuck (as far as I understand it).

I recall a case several years ago where a woman (somewhere on the East
Coast?) was thrown in jail for contempt.  She refused several times to
tell the court where her child was in an attempt to keep her ex-husband
from gaining custody (I believe he was accused of sexually abusing the
child).  The woman had been in jail for several months when a higher court
ruled that she must be released.  I don't have any references to this case,
perhaps someone else does.

John Schultz
jschultz@bigcat.missouri.edu







From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Brad Huntting <huntting@glarp.com>
Date: Fri, 24 Dec 93 10:16:35 PST
To: Jim choate <ravage@wixer.bga.com>
Subject: Re: Encryption & self-incrimination
In-Reply-To: <9312241603.AA27447@wixer>
Message-ID: <199312241813.AA01177@misc.glarp.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



> As far as I know the contempt of court charges can keep you in jail till you
> rot.

I heard that they can only keep you in jail until it's clear that
keeping you in jail will not change your mind (or produce results).
Which means that once the case is over, your out.  Naturally, you'll
probably need a good lawer to pull this one off.


brad




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Jim choate <ravage@wixer.bga.com>
Date: Fri, 24 Dec 93 09:36:22 PST
To: jschultz@bigcat.missouri.edu (John Schultz)
Subject: Re: Encryption & self-incrimination
In-Reply-To: <Pine.3.07.9312241113.A17809-a100000@bigcat>
Message-ID: <9312241715.AA00700@wixer>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Greetz...

I have heard of similar cases but usually related to newspaper reporters and
sources they refused to reveal. Course, it does make a certain amount of
sense in these cases since you have a constitutional guarantee to face your
accussers.





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Date: Fri, 24 Dec 93 11:41:23 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Talk.politics.crypto is mostly about Detweiler
Message-ID: <199312241941.LAA28746@mail.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Cyphertentacles,

The new crypto newsroup, talk.politics.crypto, is almost wholly
devoted now to the flames and rants of Detweiler and people respoding
to him. I checked for the new messages there this morning and this is
the list I got back:


1       The Data Highway Patrol                         Olaf Seibert
2  +    CRYPTOANARCHIST INFILTRATION ALERT              Lvx Fiat
3  +    CRYPTOANARCHISTS ARE LIKE DRUG DEALERS          Pablo Escobar      
4  +    THE CRYPTOANARCHIST CONSPIRACY                  S.Boxx
5  +    THE GLORIOUS 1000 YEAR CRYPTOANARCHIST REICH    The Allied Forces 


I know you're tired of Detweiler discussions, but I thought this to be
an interesting snapshot of things.

--Tim May


-- 
..........................................................................
Timothy C. May         | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,  
tcmay@netcom.com       | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
408-688-5409           | knowledge, reputations, information markets, 
W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA  | black markets, collapse of governments.
Higher Power: 2^756839 | Public Key: PGP and MailSafe available.
Note: I put time and money into writing this posting. I hope you enjoy it.



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: collins@newton.apple.com (Scott Collins)
Date: Fri, 24 Dec 93 11:51:23 PST
To: ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu
Subject: Impuning my reputation by association
Message-ID: <9312241947.AA18841@newton.apple.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Hello,

I paraphrase, not quote, you in this message.  Please tell me if the
meanings I have extracted from your posts are not what you intended.  I
suspect, however, that whatever you might have intended, I attribute the
same meanings to your posts as the majority readers.

You say that there are no honest cypherpunks, only liars, slinking cowards,
and people too stupid to realize they are being 'taken'.  You attribute
many characteristics, particularly immoral ones, to cypherpunks, which
throughout the rest of this message I will summarize with the words: lying,
liar, etc.

If a cypherpunk is: 'anyone engaged in traffic on the cypherpunk list',
then both you and I are cypherpunks.  I believe myself to be honest,
forward, and intelligent.  I assume, of course, that you believe the same
of yourself.  Therefore, there must be at least two honest 'punks.  Since
you cannot easily verify that my beliefs about myself are true, it could be
that there is only one honest 'punk.  (From the old testement: "If, even
one righteous man dwells therein, I will stay My hand.")

If a cypherpunk is: 'anyone who uses cryptographic tools for the purposes
of fraud', then there can be no honest cypherpunks by definition.  I have
never, am not now, nor do I intend to in the future, use cryptographic
tools for the purposes of fraud, deception, character assassination, or
other wrongs.

Regardless of which definition of cypherpunks you, "L. Detweiler", believe,
people to whom you speak will assume the _first_ definition, which as a
set, contains you, me, and other potentially honest individuals.  If you
didn't mean that definition (they will not even bother to think to
themselves), you would have used the word 'criminals' or a derivative,
thereof.  You tell people "all cypherpunks are liars".  If they pass the
initial paradox (that you, a cypherpunk, are telling them you are liar), by
presuming your honesty, and therefore, necessarily, your exclusion from the
set, then they must now believe the false notion that I, Scott Collins,
_am_ a liar.

 -1- "L. Detweiler" tells people 'Scott Collins is a liar'.

 -2- I, Scott Collins, am not a liar.

My beliefs (including, like our Justice system, a general presumption of
innocense) about other cypherpunks does not even come into play here.  The
issue  is: you are impuning my character.

I leave the logical conclusion of statements -1- and -2- as an exersize for
the reader.

It seems that you have made yourself my judge, and worse, an executioner. 
How will you ensure Justice?  How will you find, with certainty, the Truth?
 Or, do you consider the persecution of innocents to be 'acceptable
losses'.  The precedents set in every written guideline of moral behavior
that I have read are exactly opposite this.  In our legal system: a)
defendents are presumed innocent until proven guilty, and b) are guaranteed
due legal process.  In the major religions with which I am familiar, it is
only the deity who may judge and punish, not man.

There are bad things in this world, and I hate those things.  You and I
even agree on what some of those things are.  But I ask you this:



            Who are _you_, to judge me?



            Who are _you_, to persecute me?



Scott Collins         | "Few people realize what tremendous power there
                      |  is in one of these things."     -- Willy Wonka
......................|................................................
BUSINESS.   voice:408.862.0540  fax:974.6094   collins@newton.apple.com
Apple Computer, Inc.   5 Infinite Loop, MS 305-2B   Cupertino, CA 95014
.......................................................................
PERSONAL.   voice/fax:408.257.1746    1024:669687   catalyst@netcom.com






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: remail@tamsun.tamu.edu
Date: Fri, 24 Dec 93 10:56:22 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Cypherwonks
Message-ID: <9312241855.AA25829@tamsun.tamu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> Is anyone monitoring Cyperwonks? Is anything really happening there?

I'm on there.  Detweiler succeeded in signing up a whole 
bevy of net.fascists to discuss 'electronic democracy'
and defame cypherpunks, including:

David Lawrence (runs the Usenet new newsgroups vote)
consensus.com  (commercial groupware company)
David Sternlight
Julf (provided the site for the list, but has since declared he will
	only passively support it)
Joe Baptista

Since somebody started forwarding all of Detweiler's noise on
cypherpunks to cypherwonks, the same flame wars Detweiler 
started on cypherpunks have broken out there and dominated 
the list as they've done here.  I recommended forwarding your 
old archived Detweiler/an12070 rants to cypherwonks in response 
to Detweiler posting his slanderous crap.




-------------------------------------------------------------------------
To find out more about this anonymous remail service, send mail to 
remail@tamsun.tamu.edu with the word "remail help" as the only words in the 
subject field.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Pat Farrell" <pfarrell@netcom.com>
Date: Fri, 24 Dec 93 10:16:23 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com (Good Guys)
Subject: RE: Cyperwonks
Message-ID: <47655.pfarrell@netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


In message Fri, 24 Dec 1993 06:08:48 -0500 (EST),
  Harry Shapiro <habs@panix.com>  writes:

> Is anyone monitoring Cyperwonks? Is anything really happening there?

I'm subscribed. There was a little initial activity about electronic
democracy, and nearly nothing else. Of course, you get an occasional
LD rant, but those are instantly unread and deleted - I took the pledge...


Pat

Pat Farrell      Grad Student                 pfarrell@netcom.com
Department of Computer Science    George Mason University, Fairfax, VA
Public key availble via finger          #include <standard.disclaimer>




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Jim choate <ravage@wixer.bga.com>
Date: Fri, 24 Dec 93 12:06:28 PST
To: huntting@glarp.com (Brad Huntting)
Subject: Re: More on Secure Drive/hacking case
In-Reply-To: <199312241718.AA00857@misc.glarp.com>
Message-ID: <9312241947.AA05185@wixer>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>
>
> > They are going to attempt to break Secure Drive. He asked me to write
> > a program which will take a list of passphrases and test them quickly
> > to run a passphrase attack. I had a few qualms about writing a program
> > to crack someone's data, but I don't think it really matters. Unless
> > the hacker chose a very lame key, they don't have a prayer in hell.
>
> And as a self respecting computer software profesional I assume
> you will be charging AT LEAST US$60/hour for this service, right?
>
>
> brad
>

I would charge more like $90 - $120 plus get some kind of contract which
gives me residuals whenever some other agency uses the techniques or tools i
developed.

I love free enterprise....(you should give a small amount to the defendant
for his legal fees just to piss the oinkdroids off).

                                              Ravage
                                               Black
                                                Leather
                                                 Monster





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: jim@bilbo.suite.com (Jim Miller)
Date: Fri, 24 Dec 93 13:56:26 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: pseudoparanoia and poison
Message-ID: <9312242152.AA06478@bilbo.suite.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



>
> Remember, ``On the internet, no one knows if you are a dog...''

On the Internet, everyone knows you're Detweiler...





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: adwestro@ouray.Denver.Colorado.EDU (Alan Westrope)
Date: Fri, 24 Dec 93 16:11:49 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Merry Christmas, Cyberanarchists
In-Reply-To: <199312231932.OAA06688@snark>
Message-ID: <3wt6jaa0iIjPyarn@ouray.denver.colorado.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

As Perry Metzger pointed out,

> Brad Huntting says:
> > 
> > If only this could be automated...
> 
> Of course it can. Detweiler always posts from an12070@anon.penet.fi
                                                  ^^^^
I read mail and news offline, but preprocess mail from this list and
the IMP list by using Berkely mail to quickly scan message headers
and delete mail from CERTAIN PEOPLE before downloading.  Since there
are some useful posts from penet.fi, and Detweiler uses different
"names," I find the phrase "an ID that will live in infamy" mnemonically
useful in zapping his rants as quickly as possible.

Interesting coincidence that his ID corresponds to a major date in
the history of cryptography...he'd probably regard it as Divine
Confirmation of his Messianic role...:-)

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.3a

iQCVAgUBLRuDsVRRFMq4NZY5AQGW2gP+JcNTlDGRnge0uy7D4Y3BtZWkwUU8ZlA6
fVsmGsw8dl1EHKW5p1Pbb5CIN5cQyLIEpztwbxpoyi+9B5I/5GKHXO+IbfE6imsx
lIDQiaDdqf0Ct3AW5t+qCUFdBaYtZCIlvh0VwopSWekUuTC5xrc5BbyplN7Yyrgz
YjgSIQwHmNY=
=09z5
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----


Happy Holidays,

Alan Westrope                  <awestrop@nyx.cs.du.edu>
                               <adwestro@ouray.denver.colorado.edu>
PGP fingerprint:  D6 89 74 03 77 C8 2D 43   7C CA 6D 57 29 25 69 23
finger for public key
--
"These nomads chart their courses by strange stars, which might
 be luminous clusters of data in cyberspace..." -- Hakim Bey




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: jvarley@netcom.com (J.j.)
Date: Fri, 24 Dec 93 18:09:54 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: list
Message-ID: <199312250207.SAA28913@mail.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



I don't know if this is the right address, but please add me to the list.
Thanks. 
-- 
jvarley@netcom.com     |  "...Soul of a woman was created below!"
Tomes on IRC           |             --Led Zeppelin



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: an12070@anon.penet.fi (Hitler )
Date: Fri, 24 Dec 93 11:49:52 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: pseudoparanoia and poison
Message-ID: <9312241856.AA11601@anon.penet.fi>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


We just wanted to let you know that we are going to really start firing up
all our *real* tentacles over the next few weeks beyond what we have already
been using. We gave you the chance to give up after the attacks from 
an12070 alone, an obviously pseudonymous entry point. We have attempted
to adhere to a code of ethics for as long as possible and give you every
opportunity to surrender.  

But increasingly, to catch conspirators and saboteurs we must think and 
act like them. Since our previous efforts have been only marginally 
effective, we are going to shift our campaign to rely much more heavily 
on the same type of unidentifiable entry points that you promote. We have 
been stockpiling them over the past few months in preparation for exactly 
this kind of eventuality, hoping that we wouldn't have to resort to anything 
this treacherous. (Some in important positions may have noticed the `blip'
increase in new Internet subscribers lately at the public domain sites around
`out there'. But we won't be more specific, so that you can play the 
delightful game of `name that tentacle' without meddlesome biases.)

It's extremely costly and burdensome to support such an infrastructure, 
especially at the scale you work at, as you are well aware, but our 
members are as fanatical as you are and as creative and ingenious 
with the coordination. And careful study of your own techniques and 
software has given us an excellent starting point!

Like S.Boxx was fond of saying, everyone *knows* that `he' is pseudonymous.
And what havoc `he' has wreaked! Imagine what we can do with *true*
tentacles, *more* than all of yours combined! All exercised with the utmost,
meticulous, professional, untraceable, undetectable quality!

S.Boxx was just our warmup measure, our way of playing nice and hoping you
would relent. We had a lot of fun laughing together (or perhaps _at_ each
other!) but in war, allegiances are torn violently in the face of the Enemy.
One cannot have mercy on the Enemy, because the Enemy will not have mercy
on us. 

We are going to work into this nice and gentle, too, emulating exactly your 
own modus operandi. Of course, we didn't really give a damn about anyone 
guessing S.Boxx loyalties. It was part of the fun to watch people who
supposedly promote `privacy' to do everything possible to invade his! But 
these new tentacles will be *completely* indistinguishable from everyone 
else in cyberspace, *even* your brainwashed followers, we assure you. Oh,
and they will also be indistinguishable from all the *real* people who
have begun to understand the true extent of your own corruption.

And you will be meeting them in the most interesting places! On all the 
`key' mailing lists, in the newsgroups, and in your mailboxes, perhaps 
even in the published journals like RISKS and CUD. After all, if the Enemy 
points his gun at you, one has to be the first to draw if one wants to live. 

We will no longer trade our compassion for betrayal. We do not enjoy slowly
bleeding to death. Let us see how you enjoy the same experience. The most
effective poison is that which goes undetected to the end! Reminds us of
one of our favorite words, `insidious'. (Hee, hee.)

Yes, regrettably, it does lead to an extremely paranoid atmosphere where 
previously constructive activity is sabotaged, but as they say, all is fair 
in Love and War.  Fighting fire with fire and all that.

Hopefully, in the long run, the cure won't be worse than the malady, and 
the host will fight off the parasite instead of dying from it. The next 
few months will determine whether hair of the dog that bites can cure 
the illness.

Remember, ``On the internet, no one knows if you are a dog...''


-------------------------------------------------------------------------
To find out more about the anon service, send mail to help@anon.penet.fi.
Due to the double-blind, any mail replies to this message will be anonymized,
and an anonymous id will be allocated automatically. You have been warned.
Please report any problems, inappropriate use etc. to admin@anon.penet.fi.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: 155yegan%jove.dnet.measurex.com@juno.measurex.com (egan_t@measurex.com)
Date: Fri, 24 Dec 93 23:41:35 PST
To: "%JUNO.dnet.measurex.com@juno.measurex.com
Subject: No Subject
Message-ID: <9312250730.AA15934@juno.measurex.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>Subj:	Encryption & self-incrimination
>
>Isn't there a limit as to how long they can lock you up for contempt of
>court? Most crimes do have a maximum sentence

	I don't believe so; recall that MD in Washington DC who would not tell
the
judge where her daughter was for fear that the father could find out from
open, public court records and abuse her further.

Terry Egan (egan_t@measurex.com)


,- 





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Mike Ingle <MIKEINGLE@delphi.com>
Date: Sat, 25 Dec 93 04:46:43 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Reveal your key or else.
Message-ID: <01H6VSCFJJGY938ZZT@delphi.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Since the Canadian case, there's been a lot of talk about the problem
of being coerced to reveal your key. If the coercers play by no rules
whatsoever, there isn't much you can do. If they suspect you of having
encrypted data, they will beat it out of you. If they do play by some
sort of rules, a technical solution might save you.

Steganography can hide your data, but then you have the steg program
itself. If they find the program, they have reasonable grounds for
assuming you have hidden data, particularly if you have large
quantities of the sort of data which can conceal files, such as
sounds and graphics. So what you need is the ability to hide both
the "real" secret data and some decoy data at the same time.
This could be done using something like MD5 as a random number
generator. Suppose in the near future you have some type of
storage device which can hold a few gigabytes. You record some
audio off the radio, deliberately choosing a noisy station, and
store it on your drive. Now there is no digital master to compare
it against, and the least significant few bits are pure noise.
Now just take a passphrase, append a 32-bit counter, and start
counting and taking MD5's. For each one, you get 16 bytes of
pseudorandom data, which is reproducible only if you have the
passphrase. Use each four bytes as a pointer into your sound file,
storing one bit of the hidden data in the lsb of that location.
This would be such a good transposition cipher that you might not
even have to encrypt the hidden data first. You can use two pass-
phrases to hide two different files in the same sound file. There
is always the possibility of a collision - both passphrases write
to the same bit - so you will need an error correction code. Now
when they demand your passphrase, you give it to them. And they
find something - bogus personal letters, financial records, some
mildly indecent .GIF's, pirate software, anything that is worth  
hiding, but not prosecutable. Of course, there is another passphrase
which unlocks the real data, but you don't tell them about that
one, and they have no way to prove it exists.

Unlike Secure Drive, this could not work in real time. You would
need enough memory to dump the steg data into a RAM disk, work with
it, and then re-write it into the hidden file. But it could be done,
and if the courts rule that you have to hand over your keys or rot
in jail until you do, it may be our only recourse.

--- Mike
There are no good governments. There are bad governments, and worse
governments, and really horrible governments, but no good ones.
  




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Mike Ingle <MIKEINGLE@delphi.com>
Date: Sat, 25 Dec 93 05:16:47 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Best sig yet
Message-ID: <01H6VUXIOC0U938YJB@delphi.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


From alt.conspiracy:

-------------------------------------------------------------------------
FBI-CIA-KGB-NSA-BCCI-DIA-DEA-FEMA-KKK-FOIA-CONTRA-TRILAT-BATF-INS-IRS-MI5
                             JFK-RFK-MLK-MKULTRA-COINTELPRO-ILLUMINATI-P2
 /|/~|~|| /|<~|~  |~>|~><~   CFR-ADL-BLUEBIRD-OSS-ONI-SOE-BIS-MOSSAD-AIDS
/~|\_| ||/ |_>|   |_>|_>_>   THULE-ARTICHOKE-OTO-NSA-BILDERBERGER-40 CTTE
                             SLA-VELIKOVSKY-SDI-INSLAW-TESLA-LAROUCHE-TSS
( 5 1 0 )  5 3 2 - 6 2 4 8   JIM JONES-GURDJIEFF-ABSWEHR-T.4-WACO-CROWLEY
                             EFF-PGP-RHIC/EDOM-PANDORA-CAN-ENIGMA-BEARDEN
GHELEN-SPETZNAZ-SS-MASONS-ODESSA-TAVISTOCK-WFMH-REUCHELIN-EUGENICS-OCCULT
-------------------------------------------------------------------------

(Notice NSA is the only one mentioned twice)

and the best line from a reply to a Detweiler post:

(blah blah)

[ long rant deleted ]

(blah blah)

Now if everyone took that approach...




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: nate@VIS.ColoState.EDU (CVL staff member Nate Sammons)
Date: Sat, 25 Dec 93 09:09:56 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com (Cypherpunks Mailing List)
Subject: fastest remailer
Message-ID: <9312251707.AA15051@vangogh.VIS.ColoState.EDU>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text


Does anyone have a recent list of time-delays to different remailers?

thanks,

-nate

-- 
+-----------------------------------------------------------------------+
| Nate Sammons <nate@VIS.ColoState.Edu> <nate@yuma.ANCS.ColoState.Edu>  |
|      Colorado State University Computer Visualization Laboratory      |
|    Data Visualization/Interrogation, Modeling, Animation, Rendering   |
+-----------------------------------------------------------------------+



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: jerry@terminus.dell.com (Jeremy Porter)
Date: Sat, 25 Dec 93 13:16:43 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com (cypher)
Subject: Random numbers again
Message-ID: <9312252113.AA05269@terminus.us.dell.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Well, I've finished my prototype version of my hardware random number
generator.  According to preliminary work the numbers are truely random and
evenly distributed.  The circuit plugs into the parallel port(bi-directional
mode) and presents 8 bits of data on the data lines.  You can
quickly generate 10k bytes of data with this device.
	I am intrested in hearing from anyone that wishes to take
a look at some data to measure the randomness of the data.  If anyone
is interested I will provide two sets of data, one from my random number
generator and one from a pseudo-random number generator.
	The circuit uses some 555based timers and some RC networks.  A lot
of people will not believe that this circuit is truely random, but it works
out to be, under some conditions.  It boils down using two variable,
independent, periodic functions to generate one bit.  Due to temperature
effects, oscillator stability, circuit noise, and some other factors,
the error in frequency and phase of the two oscillators is larger effect
than the measurable characteristics of the circuit.  In this circuit,
I use the 555 timers as the oscillators (with the restistors and capacitors
determining the frequency).  The second periodic functions is the PC
in a loop polling the parallel port.
	The whole circuit can be built for $5-$10 worth of parts.  It
should also be possible to rig it up as a passthrough device, in case
you don't have an extra parallel port.

-- 
| Jeremy Porter  -----------------  Dell Computer Corp. ----
| Systems Engineering --- jerry@terminus.us.dell.com --------
|-------------------------------------------------------------
|  Support your Second Amendment rights to encryption technology. 



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Mike Godwin <mnemonic@eff.org>
Date: Sat, 25 Dec 93 14:11:44 PST
To: eniac@prudence.fof.org)
Subject: The Cyber Lexicon of 2030 AD
Message-ID: <199312252210.RAA14169@eff.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


eff.546: Cylex: The New Cyber-Lexicon

eff.546.0: Mike Godwin (mnemonic)  Thu 23 Dec 93 10:28

 Antoinette LaFarge, a student in my class this fall at the School of
 Visual Arts, developed as her term paper this lexicon from the year
 2030.
 
 Comments and additions solicited.

eff.546.2: Mike Godwin (mnemonic)  Thu 23 Dec 93 10:31

 
 DDB2030.12.17.20:20:21GMT
 Homebase:  ~U.S. Government Publishing Office.
 Download to:  Mike Godwin, Electronic Frontier Foundation.
 Status:  digsig not verifiedÑno-interrupt.
 Checklist:  autolott yesÑupdate yesÑimages noÑdtp format 
 noÑsearch yes (art, pub, law)Ñupdate editor: Antoinette 
 LaFarge.
 Filename:  *Cylex*
 File begin:
 
 Note on usage: *boldface* type indicates word being defined; 
 _italic_ type indicates word defined elsewhere in Cylex or used 
 as an example.
 
 *Antilex*:  (n)  a variant on _Cylex_Ê published by a shifting 
 coalition of _e-pubs_Ê who feel that Cylex is often both 
 inaccurate (because slanted toward the government viewpoint) 
 and out of date.
 
 *autolott*:  (n)  short for *auto*mated *lott*ery, this is the 
 standard form of lottery now run by most major companies, the 
 federal government, and all state governments except Utah.  
 Most digital transfers now automatically cause the 
 destination/recipient to be encoded and dropped into a lottery 
 pool, from which prize drawings are then made.  This form of 
 lottery, in which one does not have to actively play to win, is an 
 outgrowth of the credit-card pools of the 1990s. Autolotts were 
 devised in part as a corporate marketing method to get around 
 the highly successful _doorman_ programs. 
   
 *black bank*:  (n) an underground institution for generating and 
 distributing digital signatures outside the government-approved 
 three-bank scheme.  Black banks tend to be small and to go in 
 and out of business quickly as they are usually unable to sustain 
 the integrity of their security schemes and thus can lose all their 
 business literally overnight.  Although not technically illegal, 
 they cater to an amorphous and shifting population of criminals 
 and _clans_ who for one reason or another don't trust the 
 integrity of the national digital-signature scheme.  The Russian, 
 South African, Korean, and Caribbean mafias are all known to 
 run their own black banks.
 
 *bureaucrat*:  (n) obsolete; see _hulk_.
 
 *bodyguard*:  (n) general term covering localized software that 
 searches out and destroys viruses, worms, trojan horses, 
 scavengers, and other net wildlife. The U.S. government has 
 imposed severe restrictions on bodyguards to ensure that they 
 don't run loose in the net. (See also: _cannibal, hulk._)
 
 *borden*:  (n) any nondigital object that figures as evidence in 
 a legal proceeding, especially under criminal law.  Since most 
 legal proceedings are now carried out entirely in cyberspace, 
 lawyers have largely lost the ability to sway juries by showing 
 them physical evidence of crimes. In cases where such evidence 
 is important, prosecutors (rarely defense lawyers) often pursue 
 strategies to get the case transferred from cyberspace to real-
 space courtrooms.  Hence (v) _to borden_ means to obtain or 
 try to obtain such a change of venue.  The word derives 
 indirectly from the bloodstained ax that played such a 
 prominent role in the conviction of Lizzie Borden for the 
 murder of her parents.  See also the phrase: _borden of proof_.
 
 *cannibal*:  (n) a special form of _bodyguard_ that will wipe 
 out everything on its home computer net, including itself, once 
 activated.  Popular among criminals for destroying digital 
 evidence beyond the possibility of recovery, they can be set to 
 react to time delays, improper logons, remotes, and other 
 tripwires.  There are a number of different types of cannibal, 
 only a few of which are dangerous to humans. Those 
 incorporating explosives are known as _challengers_ (in 
 reference to an early space shuttle that blew up, taking out 
 seven astronauts in the process), while those causing 
 electrocution of the person trying to access the data are known 
 as _headhunters_. 
 
 *cat-tag*:  (n)  a digital signature for corporations and other 
 businesses; legally required for all business e-mail and data 
 transfers over the net.  The word is a short form of "catalog tag" 
 and also probably a back-formation from _dogtag._ Cat-tags 
 came into use after the first flood of digital junk mail; the 
 ensuing consumer protests brought about the adoption of cat-
 tags that could be screened by _doorman_ programs. The 
 government used the controversy to institute compulsory 
 registration of digital signatures in so-called _name banks_. 
 Cat-tags are handled by one of the three major signature banks, 
 the First National Name Bank (a subsidiary of Citicorp).  
 
 *clan*:  (n) a type of on-line voluntary organization formed 
 among private individuals to exchange information and pursue 
 group activities in a limited forum.  The word is an acronym 
 whose expansion is disputed; according to most authorities it 
 stands for *c*ompound *l*ocal *a*rea *n*etwork, but popular 
 etymology usually gives it as short for *c*ol*la*borative *n*et. 
 Clans sprang up in the wake of the Clinton administration's 
 disastrous health care reform and the information deluge 
 released in cyberspace by the gradual dismantling of the 
 copyright laws.  In order to reassert control over the quality of 
 information, advice, and services given and received, people 
 spontaneously started forming small, tightly knit groups on the 
 net, usually in the form of _lockout_ forums.  Typically, a clan 
 is started by a few close friends, and over time they gradually 
 lock in new members of complementary professions.  For 
 example, a group that had no doctor member would recruit 
 someone compatible from the on-line and/or off-line 
 community.  However, there are also highly specialized clans, 
 such as the craft clans and the _Tertians_.  Some clans have 
 membership fees, but most work primarily on a barter system, 
 such that members work a certain numbers of hours a year for 
 each other. It is considered a mark of status to be recruited by a 
 prestigious clan.
 
 *Cylex*:  (n) the on-line lexicon of slang continuously 
 published and updated by the U.S. government in accordance 
 with a 2003 mandate of Congress.  In a series of landmark 
 discrimination cases, it was argued that since slang is such a 
 vital aspect of cyberspace life, anyone who couldn't master it is 
 effectively excluded from large parts of the net.  Moreover, the 
 speed with which net slang evolves serves to bar anyone who 
 isn't a net regular.  Hence, Cylex was set up as a _tilde_ 
 resource to equalize access to the net.  It can be downloaded by 
 anyone, at any time.  In theory, it is kept up to date; however, 
 the true lag time is considered to be between six and eight 
 weeks.  In addition, there are always pockets of long-term ex-
 Cylex slang on the net; these tend to be formed by people who 
 intentionally use slang (rather than encryption) as an 
 exclusionary method and actively resist having their terms 
 become transparent to Cylex.  Since Cylex depends greatly on 
 volunteers (its paid staff is small and the project is permanently 
 underfunded), it is not difficult for determined groups to keep 
 personal slang Cylex-opaque for relatively long periods.
 
 *DD*:  (n, a) acronym for *d*ownload *d*ate, usually given in 
 numerals in the form 
 DDyear.month.day.hour:minute:secondGMT.  The standard 
 international dating procedure on the net, it is sometimes 
 extended to include fractions of a second.  DDs are normally 
 the first term in any downloaded data and may be further 
 subdivided into _DDB_ (*d*ownload *d*ate *b_egin, at the 
 start of transmission) and _DDE_ (*download *d*ate *e*nd, at 
 the end of transmission).  "Created on" dates are still sometimes 
 seen, especially attached to certain fixed forms of artwork, but 
 are considered obsolete because unverifiable.  (See also: 
 _genealogy, sourcing_).
 
 *digsig*:  (n) semi-official slang for *dig*ital *sig*nature; the 
 U.S. government in particular avoids the use of the otherwise 
 universal _dogtag_.
 
 *diy forgery*:  (n)   1. a plan, diagram, or other type of 
 instruction for making and/or performing artworks issued by 
 artists themselves, usually through the _Municipal Dump_.   2. 
 an object or process created using such instructions.
 Most artists do not actually make objects anymore but simply 
 register the plans and/or instructions with the MD, which holds 
 them in a database and distributes them at a nominal charge. 
 One popular activity is to combine several different sets of diy 
 forgery, either simultaneously or sequentially. (See also:  
 _kunstmorph_.)  Diy forgeries (short for *d*o-*i*t-*y*ourself 
 *forgeries*) are sometimes referred to as authorized forgeries. 
 
 *dogtag*:  (n) slang for digital signature generally, derived 
 from the military slang for tags recording one's identification 
 number.  Usually used to refer to digital signatures of 
 individuals, while _cat-tag is reserved for business-related 
 digital signatures.  Dogtags are handled by two of the three 
 major signature banks, the _Federal Name Repository_ (under 
 the Federal Reserve Bank) and 21st Century Names (a 
 subsidiary of Time Warner).
 
 *doorman*:  (n) a computer program used to screen incoming 
 data, especially e-mail and junk mail, for unwanted items.  
 Doormen became popular after the federal government began to 
 deliver subpoenas electronically and disputes arose over the 
 point at which an e-subpoena could be said to have been 
 accepted.  Any item that passes a doorman is now considered to 
 have been received by the gateway computer and hence also by 
 its registered owner.  Most doormen also incorporate 
 _bodyguards_.
 
 *doormat*:  (n) an ineffective _doorman_.
 
 *download from/to*:  (v)  _download from_ means to copy data 
 off a data source such as a net; _download to_ means to copy 
 data to such a data source.  Download to has completely 
 replaced the now-obsolete _upload to_, which fell out of use as 
 the hierarchical (and psychological) distinctions between large 
 (central, multiuser) and small (personal) computers vanished in 
 the late 1990s.
 
 *dwarfing*:  (n)  a common method for including _source_ 
 information in digital files by reducing the information packet 
 greatly in size and embedding it in some other part of the data. 
 As dwarfing often involves actual data compression as well, it 
 is one of the more difficult forms of hidden sourcing to recover.
 
 *e-* : prefix for electronic; used generally as a synonym for on-
 line and specifically to differentiate something from its off-line 
 counterpart; e.g., an _e-zine_ would normally refer to a zine 
 that has no real-world counterpart.
 
 *e-cash*:  (n) digital money. Coins and bills are ordinarily used 
 only for very small purchases and also on the black market.
 
 *e-pub_: (n) an electronic publisher, as distinct from a _p&t 
 publisher_.
 
 *Federal Name Repository*:  (n) federal name bank for 
 generating and storing the digital signatures (encryption keys) 
 that replaced social security numbers as of 2009.  The 
 government now generates a pair of keys for every child as 
 soon as its birth is registered; the public key serves the same 
 functions as the old social-security number and in addition is 
 used to encode certain data throughout an individual's life that 
 will be accessible to that person only.  The child's private key is 
 kept under wraps at the FNR until his or her 18th birthday, at 
 which point it is turned over to that individual alone. 
 
 *fortune hunt*:  (n, v)  a search for hidden information in data 
 files (such as e-catalogs, e-zines, and e-books) that entitles the 
 finder to a prize.  These are in vogue among puzzle enthusiasts 
 generally but nowhere near as popular or lucrative as the 
 _autolotts_.
 
 *genealogy*:  (n)  a new specialty within the field of art history 
 and criticism, genealogy consists of interpreting artistic trends 
 and developments by tracing the ramifications of _source_ lists 
 through different generations of image transfer, duplication, 
 alteration, etc.  Genealogists tend to be looked down on by 
 traditional art historians because most of their data are 
 inherently unreliable.
 
 *Generics*:  (n)  an e-zine published by the _Municipal Dump_ 
 and featuring the theory and practice of generic art.  In the 
 1990s, the activities of the Museum of Forgery and others 
 brought about a shift in focus from brand-name art (e.g., 
 Leonardo's Mona Lisa) to generic categories of art (e.g., "mona-
 lisas"; that is, works related to the Mona Lisa).  Each issue of 
 _Generics_ normally has a person, style, period, or individual 
 work as its theme, and generic works created by artists on that 
 theme are published. Making appropriate attributions (rather 
 than listing works under the names of their actual creators) is a 
 central activity of _Generics_.  As a rule, issues are updated 
 annually; the two most popular issues, on baldessaris and 
 posthumous duchamps, run over 1000 pages of hardcopy 
 apiece.
 
 *hibachi*:  (n)  a photograph known or presumed to have been 
 altered; much in use by the legal profession.  The term came 
 into use in the late 1990s, often sarcastically, when a series of 
 court cases hinging on disputed photographic evidence led to 
 severe restrictions on the use of photographs (and later videos) 
 as evidence.  The phrase traces back to a remark by a Vietnam 
 War general, William Westmoreland, who dismissed a famous 
 photograph of napalmed Vietnamese children running down a 
 road as a "hibachi accident." 
 
 *homebase*:  (n)  the original source of data or other 
 information, usually presumed to be a guarantee that it is 
 unaltered and/or of high quality.  Early concerns about the need 
 to protect against data piracy through more stringent copyright 
 laws vanished when it became clear that people were willing to 
 pay for homebase material in order to protect themselves 
 against corrupt or infected files.  (It was actually possible to 
 market homebase material for some time before the advent of 
 _dogtags_ and _e-cash_ made it really practical to do so.)
 
 *hulk*:  (n) also: Hulk.  An ineffective _bodyguard_.  The term 
 comes from the name of Hulk Hogan, a one-time professional 
 wrestler; the implication is that a hulk looks like it's doing its 
 job but does not do any real damage to its opponent.  Hulk 
 replaces the formerly popular _bureaucrat.
 
 *hypgnostic*:  (n) variant spelling of _hypnostic_.
 
 *hypnostic*:  (n) a computer program that can induce varying 
 levels of hypnosis or trance states in the user under controlled 
 conditions.  Usually in the form of rapidly metamorphosing, 
 often geometric images combined with a sound track, 
 hypnostics are an outgrowth of research into the long-term 
 neurological effects of screen-saver programs.  Although they 
 have become popular adjuncts to meditation, therapy, and 
 recreational drug use, there is continuing controversy over 
 parallel military research that has led to the development of 
 programs that can induced severe disorientation, hallucination, 
 phobia, catatonia, schizophrenia, and other forms of mental 
 breakdown.  Hypnostics are also implicated in the premature 
 development of cataracts, and most regular hypnostics users 
 suffer from semi-permanent facial tics in the region of the eyes.
 
 *interrupt*:  (n, a)  used to signal that a data transmission will 
 not go through as requested or will be terminated before 
 completion; normally followed by reason for the interrupt.
 
 *kunstmorph*:  (n, v) an activity in which one chooses two 
 artworks and creates a metamorphic sequence between them.  
 Most popular as a digital process, it is also a common off-line 
 activity among the craft _clans._
 
 *lockin*:  (n, a)  a part of cyberspace to which one has a 
 password.  Similarly, to _lock in_ (v) means to give someone a 
 cyberpass.
 
 *lockout*:  (n) any part of cyberspace to which one does not 
 have the password.  Similarly, to _lock out_ (v).
 
 *MD Pound*:  (n) a recycling center run by the _Municipal 
 Dump_ in most major cities to which anyone can bring 
 artworks for destruction, exchange, or recycling.  MD Pounds 
 work on an exchange principle; for every pound of materials 
 one donates, one is entitled to take away an equivalent 
 poundage.  They grew out of the environmental aesthetic, which 
 recognized that artists who created much more than they 
 destroyed were guilty of a form of littering.  The MD Pound 
 logo features the mustaches of Salvador Dali, a notably prolific 
 20th century surrealist.
 
 *Municipal Dump*:  (n)  an institution formed by the 
 Macarthur Foundation in 2117 to act as a clearinghouse for 
 nonobject artists.  The name comes from the common slang 
 used to denote museums generally and New York's 
 Metropolitan Museum in particular ("municipal dump" replaced 
 the formerly popular "mausoleum").  The MD's main functions 
 include maintaining a digital database of artworks, publishing 
 _Generics_, and distributing _diy forgeries_.  The MD also 
 maintains MD Pounds_ in major cities.  The MD logo features 
 the mustache-and-goatee from Marcel Duchamp's famous 
 _L.H.O.O.Q. _ One occasionally sees MD referred to as 
 M2_D2_ because of a prevailing belief that the institution's 
 "secret" name is Marcel Duchamp's Municipal Dump.
 
 *name bank*:  (n) 1.  a repository for generating, distributing, 
 and storing public and private keys for data encryption 2. a 
 registry for digital signatures.  As money became fully 
 electronic at the turn of the century, banks took over the 
 business of security for their customers' digital signatures.  
 Eventually, due in part to the proliferation of competing public-
 key encryption schemes, Congress moved to restrict name 
 banks to three:  one for government transactions, one for 
 business transactions, and one for personal transactions.  Most 
 people have keys in at least two of the three banks. (See also:  
 _Federal Name Repository._)
 
 *no-interrupt*:  (n, a)  used to signal that a data transmission 
 will go through as requested; compare _interrupt_.
 
 *picon*:  (n)  short for *p*ersonal *icon*, a picon is a graphical 
 or other data-generated stand-in for an individual, much used in 
 place of names, signatures, and/or photos on vidphones, nets, 
 and elsewhere.  Picons can be protected under trademark law 
 only if they are registered in the National Picon Database, in 
 order to avoid multiple instances of the same picon.  However, 
 they are not accepted by the government or for legal purposes in 
 lieu of dogtags. (The corporate equivalent of a picon is a logo.)
 
 *p&t*:  (a)  also:  pnt.  short for *p*oint *&_ *t*ouch, p&t 
 refers to things that are tangible or real-world as opposed to 
 intangible (hyperspatial, cyberspatial, mental).  Generally used 
 as a shorthand for object-oriented; e.g., a _p&t publisher_ as 
 opposed to an _e-pub_.  Often used to imply that something is 
 old-fashioned, as in _his artwork is real p&t stuff_.
 
 *source*:  (v)  to source means to give credit to one's sources of 
 materials, especially those being substantially altered.  Sourcing 
 became a widespread norm even before the death of copyright 
 meant that one could source one's materials without fear of 
 being sued for copyright infringement.  Some people advocate 
 making sourcing a legal requirement, but because that would 
 obviously be unenforceable and because source data are often 
 unverifiable, this movement has never really gotten off the 
 ground.  Accurate sourcing is a point of pride for most artists, 
 and since source lists (or genealogies) can become quite long 
 and complex, a number of ingenious ways of either hiding them 
 or displaying them have been developed. (See: genealogy, 
 transparency._)
 
 *source hunt*:  (n, v) an attempt to recover hidden source 
 information in a data file.  Source hunting became popular 
 among puzzle enthusiasts and was a precursor of the now more 
 generally popular _fortune hunt._  Many filemakers, especially 
 artists, offer prizes to source hunters to spur general interest in 
 their work. 
 
 *Tertian*:  (n, a)  originally:  Orbis Tertian.  Tertians are 
 members of Orbis Tertius, an unusual _clan_ linked by the 
 common project of realizing a special edition of the 
 _Encyclopedia Britannica_ mentioned in Jorge Luis Borges's 
 short story "Tlšn, Uqbar, Orbis Tertius." In Borges's story, a 
 certain edition of the Britannica contains extra entries that refer 
 to another world, intriguing details of which are given in the 
 story.  Orbis Tertius was founded by a group of writers 
 specifically to alter the _Britannica_ in conformity with 
 Borges's story, and the Tertians subsequently continued to 
 extend the fiction at great length.  It was a court case arising out 
 of the activities of the Tertians that led to the final extinction of 
 copyright law when the _Britannica's_ publishers lost their 
 attempt to bar the Tertians from altering the encyclopedia 
 without permission.  _Homebase_ editions of the Tertian 
 Encyclopedia are consistent bestsellers (subscribers are entitled 
 to get it updated on request). 
 
 *tilde* (*~*):  printer's mark, adopted for use to signify that 
 material is free of all restrictions on alteration, copying, 
 publication, etc., including the normal convention of _sourcing.
 
 *transparency*:  (n) a common form for source information to 
 be included in digital files, especially object-oriented image 
 files.  Transparencies are a layer of information included in a 
 file and assigned an object color of transparent (or background, 
 paper, etc.).  To recover them, one must know how to search for 
 invisible objects in such files, a procedure that varies from 
 application to application. (See also:  _dwarfing_, _source 
 hunt._)
 
 *wormfare*:  (n)  electronically based warfare, especially 
 attacks directed at the computer command and control 
 structures of other nations, as by net wildlife.
 
 *wormfood*:  (n)  any computer software or hardware that is 
 poorly protected against intrusion from worms, viruses, and 
 other net wildlife. 
 
 :File end
 DDE2030.12.17.20:21:53GMT
 

eff.546.4: Bruce Sterling (bruces)  Thu 23 Dec 93 14:32

   Gosh, how very Stanislaw Lem of her.
 

eff.546.5: Trying to get in touch with my inner grownup... (sforslev)  Thu 23 Dec 93 18:50

 *Cybercrap*: (n)  Term common at Evanston High School in the early
 1990's.
 
 It refers to technical jargon that is like the love of God -
 It passeth all understanding.

eff.546.6: Mike Godwin (mnemonic)  Thu 23 Dec 93 22:48

 I actually rather like her name--Antoinette LaFarge--which I assume is
 either a fake or an adopted name.
 
 She told me she took my class because she's interested in issues relating
 to forgeries.
 
 I like "dogtags" and "cattags" myself.
 
 Also, "wormfood."

eff.546.7: Information Superhighwayman (gjk)  Fri 24 Dec 93 06:02

 Her name and interests suggest she has a very dark side.  Introduce us?

eff.546.8: Mike Godwin (mnemonic)  Fri 24 Dec 93 07:57

 I'm not sure you're up to meeting her, Jack.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: ltech1!ltech1!mercury@heifetz.msen.com
Date: Sat, 25 Dec 93 21:16:45 PST
Subject: No Subject
Message-ID: <m0pDnAe-0001VAC@ltech1.lodden.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


 
Electronic Democracy: 
A Bibliography of Articles by Michael E. Marotta 
 
"Hannah Information Systems Offers Legislative Services," Michigan 
Computer News. Win?/Spr? 1988 
 
"Online Government," FOCUS, August 1988.
 
"Computers Facilitate Legal Research," Greater Lansing Business 
Monthly, September 1988.
 
"Data General at the Grass Roots," FOCUS, September 1990.
 
"Electronic Government," TELECOMPUTING, Nov/Dec 1990.
 
"Online Databases Serve Law Libraries," LIBRARY MOSAICS, Jan/Feb 1993.
 
"Digital Democracy," MICHIGAN COMPUTER USER, July 1993.
 
"The Citizen as Watchdog," PC TODAY, November 1993.
 
"Legislation Online," WHOLE EARTH REVIEW, Winter 1993.
 





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Michael Edward Marotta <mercury@well.sf.ca.us>
Date: Sun, 26 Dec 93 05:46:51 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Pseudo-spoofing the Gov't
Message-ID: <199312261345.FAA07856@well.sf.ca.us>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


What happens when governments are online and someone pseudo-spoofs 
the state legislature?  
 
Writing about "Free Willy" I said that as a mere user, I had no 
way to know whether or not this came from president@whitehouse.gov 
except by the content.  If the content passed a style analysis, 
then I would have to accept it as real.  
 
The SOURCE of my problem is the parameters for email chosen by 
the administrators of a point, two systems away from me. 
 
Mark@blackplague, suggested that there was no problem at all:
"You just have to learn to read mail headers to get the gist of 
 what they are saying."
 
Well, yes, but this is the header I saw:
 
Message 5/12  From President@whitehouse.gov        Dec 19 '93 at 2:13 pm pst 
Return-Path: <heifetz!toad.com!owner-cypherpunks>
Return-Path: <President@whitehouse.gov>
Date: Sun, 19 Dec 93 14:13:02 PST
 
That's all I saw.  And I said that in my original post.  The 
problem remains unsolved for me.  The message came from the White 
House, was picked up at heifetz and I got it here.  Seems clear.
 
Mark@blackplague suggests:
A big clue is when it has "Apparently-To:" in the header... 
 
But I see this all the time.  I have an account on the Well.  I 
transfer email from there to my local system with a forward file.
Proves only that the mail was forwarded from one system to 
another. And again, I didn't see any of that, myself.
 
I was merely comparing the analysis of headers offered by two 
'punkers to show that the "solutions" offered differed from each 
other. 
 
The problem remains. Nothing on a computer can be trusted.
 
PGP?  Sorry, it's not for users.  I see these PGP Keys appended 
to messages all the time.  Garbage characters.  I have no 
intention of grabbing them, making them fields in a record or 
records in a file or files in a database, on the unlikely chance 
that someday I might want to send a secret message to someone. 
Speaking as a mere user, when the government cracks down on 
crypto, no one will care.
 
By comparison, the mainstream magazine INFORMATION WEEK tried to 
make a story out of Alona Shores.  No one cared.  Also, consider 
that Prodigy hasn't gone out of business.  I get their free 
diskettes whenever I can and then reformat them for my own use as 
backup media.  But 99% of Prodigy's clients were unaffected by 
the Burning Issues. 
 
By comparison, in the 2nd and 1st centuries BC, pirates from 
Cilicia lived by kidnapping people and selling them as slaves.  
They thrived because slavery was accepted.  They raided and 
destroyed the freeport Delos.  No one cared much. They erred when 
they nabbed rich Romans.  Pompey shut them down.  But slavery 
wasn't ended.  The pirates weren't erased: they merely became 
(respectable) subjects of the Romans.  We live in a society that 
accepts slavery.  Before you "revolt" remember Spartacus: Pompey 
shut him down, also.
 
We COULD verify "Free Willy" of course.  (stop me if you've heard 
this)  The White House publishes its public crypto key.  Using 
its private key, it sends out a message.  The published key 
unlocks the message and we know it came from Willy Himself. Great 
idea.  Until and unless there is a paradigm shift, it will never 
happen.  That shift could mean an end to browsing the newsies, 
since you'd have to have a key for every source. 
 
What happens when governments are online and someone pseudo-spoofs 
the state legislature?  
 




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: jpinson@fcdarwin.org.ec
Date: Sun, 26 Dec 93 09:26:55 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Reveal your key or else.
Message-ID: <9312261726.AA14748@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Mike Ingle writes:

>Since the Canadian case, there's been a lot of talk about the
>problem of being coerced to reveal your key. If the coercers play by

stuff deleted..

>Steganography can hide your data, but then you have the steg program
>itself. If they find the program, they have reasonable grounds or
>assuming you have hidden data, particularly if you have large
>quantities of the sort of data which can conceal files, such as
>sounds and graphics. So what you need is the ability to hide both the
>"real" secret data and some decoy data at the same time. This could
>be done using something like MD5 as a random number generator.

Actually, there is a somewhat easier method that uses the one- 
time pad technique.

Take your confidential text and xor it with a random byte file 
(your key) and call the output file "secret.msg".   Then copy the 
random file off the hard drive and store in a secure location, 
perhaps off-site, and wipe all traces of the random key file from 
your disk.

Now, type up you Mother's chocolate cookie recipe,  and other 
goodies and pad it so it is the same size as the "secret.msg" 
file and xor this file with your "secret.msg" file.   Rename the 
output "secret.key", and hide somewhere on your hard drive.  (but 
don't hide it too well).

If some one finds "secret.msg", and demands the key, you give in 
(after some arm twisting), and confess that the "secret.key" is 
the key file they want.    When "secret.key" is xor'ed with 
"secret.msg", out pops the cookie recipe.   Later, you can fetch 
the "real" key, and restore your original data.

Of course, as Mike Ingle suggests, a more believable approach is 
to xor the encrypted file with some mild pornography instead of a 
cookie recipe recipe.  (One of the great ways of lying is to 
plead guilty , but to a lesser crime).

Of course this technique could be used against you as well.  
Someone would could xor your "secret.msg" file, with nuclear bomb 
secrets, and pretend to find this "key" somewhere else in your 
house.

Following the same logic, one can produce a key, that when xor'd
with Microsoft's "command.com", will produce output revealing 
Microsoft's secret plans for word conquest :-)

Jim Pinson




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: jpinson@fcdarwin.org.ec
Date: Sun, 26 Dec 93 09:27:20 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Random numbers and "dirty" books
Message-ID: <9312261726.AB14748@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I have been working off and on for some time on a one-time pad 
application (that I will release next week).   Since the success 
of an OTP is dependent on having a good source of random numbers, I
have kept my eyes open for any information related to random 
numbers, and their generation.

Conventional wisdom has it that the best way to generate random 
numbers is to measure some physical phenomenon such as radioactive
decay, and use these measurements to form your "random" number 
sequence.

Recently, I came across an interesting article in the "New 
Scientist" (May 8, 1993) entitled "The half Life of a Dirty 
Book".  This article indicates that phenomena-based
measurements may have some interesting properties.

A number of years ago, when people used log tables (any of you 
remember the CRC tables?), some astute observers noticed that
the front section of the log tables were more heavily used than 
the back section.  This seemed odd, since it would seem 
reasonable that all portions of the table should have an equal 
chance of being examined.

In 1938, the physicist Frank Benford made a study of numerous 
measurements based on natural phenomena.  He looked at surface 
areas of lakes, molecular weights of compounds etc.

He discovered that the first digit of any such measurement was 
most likely to be a one, and least likely to be a nine.  The 
probability  that this digit takes a given value decreases in a 
regular manner as the digits increase from one to nine.  This
is called Benford's Law.

Later, a report in the European Journal for Physics (vol 14, page 
59) showed that that alpha decay half lives, both predicted and 
observed, followed Benford's law.

What was also interesting was that Benford's law is scale- 
invariant.  According to the article: "The same law applies 
whether you measure the areas of lakes in hectares or square 
yards, whether you multiply house numbers by seven or 93, or 
whether you count the half-lives of alpha particles in seconds or 
centuries".

The article concludes that Benford's law may actually be a part 
of chaos theory.  Fractals, they also point out, are scale - 
invariant.

All this may indicate that random number produced from 
observations of physical phenomena may have characteristics that  
set them apart from software-derived random numbers.

Does this give a tool for breaking random number based encryption?
I can't see how, since you still can't figure out the exact sequence.
But it perhaps means there may be fractal patterns there, at least 
for numbers derived from physical phenomena.

Interesting.

Of course, with an 8 bit random number sequence (with a maximum number
of 255), it would be hard to generate a number sequence that did
not follow Benford's law.. You would have to throw in a lot of 9's , and
99's to get as as many numbers begining with '9' as you do that begin
with a '1' (1, 10-19,100-199).

So let's see..... first we had flat distributions vs. normal 
distributions, now Benford vs. non Benford.....

Jim Pinson     Confused in Galapagos.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Jef Poskanzer <jef@ee.lbl.gov>
Date: Sun, 26 Dec 93 10:40:19 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Random numbers and "dirty" books
Message-ID: <9312261838.AA23759@hot.ee.lbl.gov>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>New Scientist
>Benford's Law
>chaos theory
>fractals

Use of buzzwords can often be an inpediment to understanding.  When
the first-digit distribition thing came up in Martin Gardner's
column in Scientific American, "chaos" and "fractals" hadn't become
popularized yet, so he was reduced to actually figuring out what
was going on instead of giving it a mysterious and sexy-sounding label.
---
Jef




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Perry E. Metzger" <pmetzger@lehman.com>
Date: Sun, 26 Dec 93 07:46:55 PST
To: Michael Edward Marotta <mercury@well.sf.ca.us>
Subject: Re: Pseudo-spoofing the Gov't
In-Reply-To: <199312261345.FAA07856@well.sf.ca.us>
Message-ID: <199312261544.KAA23942@snark>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Michael Edward Marotta says:
> What happens when governments are online and someone pseudo-spoofs 
> the state legislature?  

It won't happen, since digital signatures in the future will make such
things impossible. In any case, even now most such instances are easy
to detect.

> The problem remains. Nothing on a computer can be trusted.
>  
> PGP?  Sorry, it's not for users.  I see these PGP Keys appended 
> to messages all the time.  Garbage characters.  I have no 
> intention of grabbing them, making them fields in a record or 
> records in a file or files in a database, on the unlikely chance 
> that someday I might want to send a secret message to someone. 

In that case, what the hell are you doing here on this list?

Perry




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: m5@vail.tivoli.com (Mike McNally)
Date: Sun, 26 Dec 93 09:50:02 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Something to think about...
Message-ID: <9312261748.AA21617@vail.tivoli.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


In the "is this weird or what?" category, I came across something
fascinating in the December 1993 issue of "Smithsonian" magazine.
In an article by John F. Ross about ventriloquists, an outfit
called Maher Studios in Littleton, Colorado is described.  Maher
is a major supplier of ventriloquism "how-to" books and tapes,
including "Maher's Home Ventriloquism Course" ($79.95).  In it
are revealed (quoting Ross) "secrets of the art, information once
kept closely guarded by the now defunct International Brotherhood
of Ventriloquists".

The proprieter of Maher Studios is a middle-aged (judging by his 
photograph) man named Clinton Detweiler.


[ roll Twilight Zone theme... ]





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Pierre Uszynski <pierre@shell.portal.com>
Date: Sun, 26 Dec 93 11:51:57 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re:  Happy Holidays
Message-ID: <199312261951.LAA21945@jobe.shell.portal.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>     As one who reflexively deletes all of Larry's posts under whatever
>     his name-of-the-moment may be, I sometimes wonder if I'm missing
>     some gems hidden in the mass of text.

Yeah, he should feel free to include an abstract at the top of his
rants (5 lines tops). Or maybe there is a market for a Detweiler-watcher
out there to publish a monthly newsletter, or weekly abstracts. I'm not
going to suggest a name for that newsletter, thank you :-)

Pierre Uszynski
pierre@shell.portal.com




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Carl M. Kadie" <kadie@eff.org>
Date: Sun, 26 Dec 93 14:22:00 PST
To: wcs@anchor.ho.att.com
Subject: Re:  anonymous video rental store - Libraries
Message-ID: <199312262221.RAA16823@eff.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>Out of curiousity, has any ftp-archive maintainer tried to join the
>American Library Association, either directly or as part of some
>university's library system?

I think anyone can join the ALA. Their Office for Intellectual Freedom
has run at least one computer censorship item in it's newsletter. The
director of the OIF, Dr. Judith Krug (U59587@UICVM.uic.edu) was at
Computers, Freedom, and Privacy '93. There is a good chance she'll be
at CFP '94 since it is in Chicago, her city and ALA headquarters.

>It would be an interesting way to start building precedents.

Under some state laws, a computer BBS might be called a "library"
(depending on how it is run). See references at the end of this note.

>Are there any equivalent international or
>non-US national library associations that take strong anti-censorship
>pro-privacy positions?

I don't know of one, but Article 19 is an international anticensorship
organization (see refs).

- Carl


ANNOTATED REFERENCES

(All these documents are available on-line. Access information follows.)

=================
news/cafv02n16: Message-Id: <1992Mar31.152657.1753@eff.org>
=================
An article from the Computers and Academic Freedom News 02.16

Note 12 is about the Newsletter on Intellectual Freedom.

12. "One place good place to report censorship incidents is the
Newsletter on Intellectual Freedom. Reports here may help increase
awareness of, for example, computer-media censorship. The
Newsletter only prints reports that are documented with newspaper
articles."

=================
news/cafv01n27
=================
The eighth note tries to define "library" to see how well term can
cover a Netnews service. The note lists the legal definition of
"library" for the few states that have such a definition. Indiana's
definition seems the best.<1991Sep12.185627.26936@eff.org>

=================
civil-liberty/anti-censorship.addr
=================
* Addresses for Anti-Censorship Organizations

Addresses for a number of organizations interested in censorship issues
(including Article 19).

=================
=================

If you have gopher, you can browse the CAF archive with the command
   gopher gopher.eff.org

These document(s) are also available by anonymous ftp (the preferred
method) and by email. To get the file(s) via ftp, do an anonymous ftp
to ftp.eff.org (192.77.172.4), and get file(s):

  pub/Academic/news/cafv02n16
  pub/Academic/news/cafv01n27
  pub/Academic/civil-liberty/anti-censorship.addr

To get the file(s) by email, send email to archive-server@eff.org.
Include the line(s) (be sure to include the space before the file
name):

send acad-freedom/news cafv02n16
send acad-freedom/news cafv01n27
send acad-freedom/civil-liberty anti-censorship.addr




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Timothy Newsham <newsham@wiliki.eng.hawaii.edu>
Date: Sun, 26 Dec 93 23:07:07 PST
To: hawkwind@dink.foretune.co.jp
Subject: Re: Another groups handling of disruptive people
In-Reply-To: <199312270502.OAA11658@dink.foretune.co.jp>
Message-ID: <9312270703.AA29057@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



[previous post bunch of irc drivel...]

is there any reason why this was posted here?




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: collins@newton.apple.com (Scott Collins)
Date: Sun, 26 Dec 93 21:20:08 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Benford: Why and Why Not (non-Math-heads: SNOOZE ALERT)
Message-ID: <9312270517.AA04128@newton.apple.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Howdy,

Here is an explanation of why more numbers start with '1' than with '9',
how to make a system where that isn't true, and why you don't need to.  If
you don't like math, you've already extracted everything from this message
that you could possibly need.

-----

For any integral magnitude x in the range 0..N, there are infinitely many
polynomials of the form

        c_1 b_1^e_1 + c_2 b_2^e_2 + ... + c_L b_L^e_L = x

c_i, b_i, e_i integers.  This is trivially provable given the single term
(x b_1^0), in combination with all the possible terms where c_i = 0.

Let us distinguish polynomials of a form where, for terms i and j, i != j:

  1. b_i = j_i

  2. e_i = L-i

  3. b_i^e_i <= x

  4. 0 <= c_i < b_i

Condition 1 allows only polynomials where b is the same for every term. 
Condition 2 allows only polynomials whose terms are in strictly decreasing
order by the exponent, and contain every integral exponent from L-1 downto
0.  Condition 3 ensures that the c_1 != 0.

These four conditions, restrict the set of polynomials that can represent
x, for any B such that b_i=B, to 1.  These conditions are, in fact, the
'normalization' rules for representing numbers as strings of symbols, in
any base B.  Since B can be assumed, and e_i adduced, any x can be
represented by concatenating symbols drawn from an alphabet of size B,
representing the magnitudes 0..B-1 according to c_i.  When B=10, and the
alphabet is { '0'=0, '1'=1, '2'=2, ... '9'=9 }, we call this the decimal
system.

Consider the journey of x as it goes from 0 to B^(i+1)-1.  It has to
progress from 0 to B^i-1 to 2B^i-1 to B^(i+1)-1.

Graph(?) A:

 B^(i-1)-1 (B^i)-1   (2B^i)-1                                  (B^(i+1))-1
  |..........|..........|........................................|
  R    r     S     s    T                     t                  R'

Distance r = s = B^i.  Distance t = (B-2)B^i.  These three 'legs' of x's
journey represent, starting with s, a contiguous range of representations
beginning with '1', t, a contiguous range of representations _not_ starting
with '1', and r, a range 1/B the size we are disecting, which is itself
divided in the same proportions.  Thus, from S to T, the fraction of
strings beginning with '1' increases to (about) 1/2, and from T to R' it
decreases to 1/B.  And since r is a minor copy of rst, at R and S, the
fraction must be 1/B.  So, for any period, the fraction rises to 1/2 in
time s, and falls to 1/B in time (B-2)s.

Consider the normalized decimal representations of integers drawn from the
range [0,N].  When N=1, the set in question is {'0', '1'} of which 1/2
begin with '1'.  As N goes to 9, eight strings are added to the set, none
of which begin with '1', thus, at N=9, only 1/10 of the sets elements begin
with '1'.  As N goes to 19, the fraction swings quickly back up to 1/2.  As
N goes to 99, the fraction drops, again, more slowly (8 times more slowly),
to 1/10.  On a log graph, this behavior is a saw-tooth pattern:

Graph B:
        .         .         .
        .         .         .
0.5 ....*.........*.........*..........
        . *       . *       . *
    p   .   *    *.   *    *.   *
        .     *   .     *   .     *  
0.1 ............*.........*.........*..
      * .         .         .
        .         .    N    .
      0 1        19        199      1999


Note that this graph describes properties of a representation for numbers. 
That is, this is the graph of a distribution of strings, not of integers. 
A different representation would yield a different behavior.

Consider the graph of log_B(N).  Here the x-axis is N, the y-axis log_B(N),
and it is graphed on log_B, paper as '*'s:

Graph C:

3 -                     +---------*
                        |    *
2 -           +---------*
              |    *
1 - +---------*
    |    *
0 - *

    |         |         |         |
   B^0       B^1       B^2       B^3

Ceiling(log_B(N)), shown in the graph with lines, is the length of the base
B representation of N.  This shows that even if the 'unfair first digit'
problem were avoided by a different representation, any log based
distribution would still exhibit a similar problem in string _lengths_. 
i.e., only 1/B of all strings from 0..N are shorter than log_b(N): an
'unfair distribution of lengths'.

For a flat distribution of strings, you require a representation scheme
where, for any N, 1/B strings begin with a_i (a symbol from B's alphabet),
and for range of allowable lengths of strings in the scheme (1..L), for any
l, the number of strings for numbers in N is the same.

Here are two such schemes.

'Base-1' representation: the alphabet has one symbol, any magnitude x is
represented by x concatenated instances of the symbol.  The first property
is satisfied because the alphabet has 1 symbol, and 1/1 of the strings from
1..N begin with that symbol.  The second property is satisfied because the
allowable lengths vary from 1..N, and for each length, only one string
exists of that length, thus every possible length has the name number of
strings.

Fixed length representation:  All numbers from 0..N, N = B^L, are
represented by strings of length L comprising symbols from B's alphabet,
constructed according to the normalization rules but replacint condition 3
with the rule e_i=L-(i+1) (forcing all strings to be the same length).  The
second property is satisfied because there is only one allowable length. 
The first property is satisfied, because, since N=B^L, every distinct
string of length L of symbols from B's alphabet is a valid number in this
representation, and of those strings, for any position p in the string,
including p=0 (the first symbol), 1/B of the strings will symbol a_i in
that position.  An example of this scheme is a byte of computer memory used
to hold magnitudes from 0..255.

But, since the 'Base-1' scheme doesn't exhibit the predictability problem
of our normalized decimal system, and is a dramatically 'real'
representation of numbers (although inconvenient) one might guess that even
if one can predict features of representations, it does not necessarily
follow that such a prediction can be exploited into guessing the number
itself.  Something near half of all decimal representations begin with a
symbol from { '1', '2', '3' }, but that doesn't actually help me guess the
next number, just make some predictions about its representation.

This is, in fact the case.  Our normalized log-based representation schemes
are 'unfair' in the distribution of strings, essentially using all the
'good' ones first (for oft' used small numbers).  The further out we go,
the longer strings we need, and the log distrubition problem surfaces.  But
for any range, the actual (formless) magnitudes themselves are evenly
distributed, in spite of what you might guess from our biased strings. 
Thus, Benford distribution is the kernel of a great bar bet, but an
unlikely alley in predicting the underlying magnitudes.

-----

Fractals?  Well, r is a 'little copy' of rst.  Chaos theory?  No.  How
about just some good basic algebra (OK, a little calculus if you want to
calculate the area under under the curve in Graph B, and from that, the
amount to bet at the bar).

Hope you enjoyed this,


Scott Collins         | "Few people realize what tremendous power there
                      |  is in one of these things."     -- Willy Wonka
......................|................................................
BUSINESS.   voice:408.862.0540  fax:974.6094   collins@newton.apple.com
Apple Computer, Inc.   5 Infinite Loop, MS 305-2B   Cupertino, CA 95014
.......................................................................
PERSONAL.   voice/fax:408.257.1746    1024:669687   catalyst@netcom.com






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: terry.smith@canrem.com (Terry Smith)
Date: Mon, 27 Dec 93 09:22:14 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: eavesdropping detecti
In-Reply-To: <199312231807.KAA09997@mail.netcom.com>
Message-ID: <60.1689.6525.0C18F5FD@canrem.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


          Tcmay@netcom.com wrote 
 |-------------------------------|
>
>Jim Choate writes:
>
>> Glad to meet another 'proffesional' security person. I worked for a majo
>> university doing all kinds of physical security and access abuse for 5 y
>> Was a lot of fun and got to play with all kinds of nifty stuff...:)
>>
>> My favorite is the toilet roll camera made for Airports....
>
>
>Whoah! Tell us more!
>
>This sounds pretty ominous. No shit. I guess this is what cops really
>mean when they say they'll "wipe for fingerprints."
>
>--Tim
 |-------------------------------|

Did you hear that the police latrine was stolen?

The cops have nothing to go on.


                    Terry Smith - XANTH sysop - 1:259/510
                CI$ 70733,3013 PGP 2.3A KEY FREQABLE AS 'KEY'.
 My opinions are not that of my company. But one day they WILL be! And then -
                        the -+*WORLD*+- Bwaw ha ha !!.
                       Read the Tick and others by NEC.
       Geraldo - "So, Mr. Smith, you admit you like to eat babies!"
                Me - "Nono - I admit I like to eat BABES!"

---
 * TLX v1.55 * "And I really got hot when I saw Jeanette Scott..."




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: wcs@anchor.ho.att.com (bill.stewart@pleasantonca.ncr.com +1-510-484-6204)
Date: Sun, 26 Dec 93 23:07:13 PST
To: cypherwonks@lists.eunet.fi
Subject: Re: Pseudo-spoofing the Gov't
Message-ID: <9312270708.AA27965@anchor.ho.att.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Michael Edward Marotta says, though not in this order:
> PGP?  Sorry, it's not for users.

It's true; PGP is designed for people who will read manuals,
or have helpful friendly computer consultants around to set it up and
hold their hands while they read their mail.  Anybody competent enough
to be an effective political activist can do it, but it's really
not for everybody.

That's ok - that just means there's a market for people to build
user-friendly mail-reading tools that handle digital signatures,
either automagically or when users press the "Sign" or "verify" buttons.
Maybe some of us will build these tools; maybe Apple will build them
for the rest of us, maybe even Microsoft will.  Maybe GNUmail will happen.
Some obvious design goals include handling more than just PGP formats -
at least verifying PEM/RIPEM/TISPEM and whatever formats Apple AOCE and
Lotus Notes use are probably useful, and non-open systems makers may not
do this without prodding (after all, if they won't use standard mail
protocols, why should they support standard encryption :-( ? )

> What happens when governments are online and someone pseudo-spoofs 
> the state legislature?  

There are two stages to this problem.  One is authenticating messages
that pretend to come from CONgresscritters or other government officials;
that's pretty easy, since they can sign their messages using
whatever digital signature standard they choose, though there are minor
wrinkles about messages that really come from their staffs,
and need a digital rubber-stamp instead of a digital Real Signature.
(If multiple staffers have the passphrase instead of the Real Politician,
there's some risk of it leaking out, though not too much, and obviously
you'd expect different public keys to be used for letter-writing and
real votes, just for security reasons.)

The other stage is as more politics moves on line, and people start
_running for office_ under pseudonyms.  It's bad enough today, when
by doing lots of work you can discover that George Bush's family is in
pharmaceuticals, bank robbery\\\\\\\\management, and Middle East oil,
and John Hancock and Joe Kennedy's family were in the illegal drug
importing business.  (According to William Greider, the Democratic Party 
is primarily run by six big law firms.)  As that great American patriot
"Deep Throat" said, "Follow the money!"  What happens when you _can't_
do that any more?  What happens when you can't even follow the names?
I guess we'll just have to start giving government less power to reduce
the possibilities of conflict of interest?  (Naaahhh....)

			Bill Stewart, currently living on a continent
			whose government ignores a Constitution largely
			written by a couple of guys who used the alias
			"Publius" in their newspaper propaganda,
			plus a bunch of other folks in a smoke-filled room
			who agreed to do all their business in secret.
			

# Bill Stewart  NCR Corp, 6870 Koll Center Parkway, Pleasanton CA, 94566
# Voice/Beeper 510-224-7043, Phone 510-484-6204
# email bill.stewart@pleasantonca.ncr.com billstewart@attmail.com

(Sorry about duplication for those of you who are on both cypherpunks
and cypherwonks...)




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: wcs@anchor.ho.att.com (bill.stewart@pleasantonca.ncr.com +1-510-484-6204)
Date: Sun, 26 Dec 93 23:27:05 PST
To: mnemonic@eff.org
Subject: Re:  The Cyber Lexicon of 2030 AD
Message-ID: <9312270725.AA28058@anchor.ho.att.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Mike - 

A technical comment - the version posted to cypherpunks has a lot of
Macintoshy punctuation metacharacters left in it, e.g. Q J R S representing
various quote marks and such.

As for the contents, I may or may not get around to writing  a real response,
but I certainly *hope* that by 2030 we've got digital signatures and such
run by the free market and not by the Government, even if it does shrink,
and that the Government Printing Office is reduced to the small job of
publishing everything the government does.  The business about
"black banks" providing non-governmentally controlled signatures being
unstable because they can't maintain the integrity of their signature schemes
is not very credible, unless the governemnt manages to ban them -
as long as you have an institution large enough to be relatively immune to
bribery and rubber-hose cryptanalysis, it's easy enough to protect
the integrity of your signatures.  A much more credible scenario is
a "Web of Trust" model where many of the major players may very well be
government-run (if the central banks haven't collapsed and the phone
companies haven't been privatized) for smaller non-free countries,
and mixtures of governmental, NGOs, major financial institutions,
and MicroSoft Inc./AG/SA/Ltd.


BTW, what's fof.org?

		Thanks;  Bill
# Bill Stewart  NCR Corp, 6870 Koll Center Parkway, Pleasanton CA, 94566
# Voice/Beeper 510-224-7043, Phone 510-484-6204
# email bill.stewart@pleasantonca.ncr.com billstewart@attmail.com




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Mike Ingle <MIKEINGLE@delphi.com>
Date: Mon, 27 Dec 93 06:37:16 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: IRC and the Feeling of Power
Message-ID: <01H6YI6Z5PV6939HN6@delphi.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Hawkwind describes the "justice system" of IRC in his forward.

It seems to me that the kick/ban process on IRC is a good example of how
not to moderate a forum. Many people on IRC seem to be there for no other
purpose than to enjoy the testosterone high of being op. They go to a lot
of trouble to write bots which keep their channels open and op them when
they join. They take great pleasure in kicking people. There is often a
little clique which runs a channel, and whenever one of those people
joins, someone else ops him. Have you ever been on a channel where
nobody was saying anything, but people were constantly opping, de-opping,
kicking, banning, unbanning, coming back in and flooding the channel
before being kicked again, etc...? I don't use IRC that much, but from
what I've seen, that system doesn't work very well. An extropians-style
kill command would probably be better for IRC or the list. If someone is
causing trouble, you could just set to ignore them.

  




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: strat@cbs.ksu.ksu.edu (Steve Davis)
Date: Mon, 27 Dec 93 08:10:16 PST
To: MIKEINGLE@delphi.com (Mike Ingle)
Subject: Re: IRC and the Feeling of Power
In-Reply-To: <01H6YI6Z5PV6939HN6@delphi.com>
Message-ID: <9312271608.AA07458@cbs.ksu.ksu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


From the keyboard of Mike Ingle:

> It seems to me that the kick/ban process on IRC is a good example of how
> not to moderate a forum. 

As a more frequent user of IRC, I agree with you.  However, the problem is
generally technical.  This system was established because IRC channels have
no "home" server or organization which can claim "ownership" and
"responsibility" for the behavior and content of the channel.

> I don't use IRC that much, but from
> what I've seen, that system doesn't work very well. An extropians-style
> kill command would probably be better for IRC or the list. If someone is
> causing trouble, you could just set to ignore them.

I would prefer a system of "talkers" and "listeners".  The channel
administration, whatever this may be, decides who can talk and who must
listen.  There is a tentative first step toward this goal in the current
wave of server revisions.  

-- 
                                               Steve Davis (strat@cis.ksu.edu)
                                                       Kansas State University



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Duncan Frissell <frissell@panix.com>
Date: Mon, 27 Dec 93 07:52:34 PST
To: CYPHERPUNKS@toad.com
Subject: It had to happen...
Message-ID: <199312271552.AA14482@panix.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


M >This message and my response were wiretapped by the people 
M >investigating the hacking. They traced the hacker and arrested him. His
M >computer was encrypted with Secure Drive. 

M >--Mike

What an honor.  We've had a hard time getting actual criminal types to use 
strong crypto in spite of the fears of LE types but here you get a case 
just a few weeks after releasing Secure Drive.

DCF



--- WinQwk 2.0b#1165
                                                                                           




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: terry.smith@canrem.com (Terry Smith)
Date: Tue, 28 Dec 93 07:12:35 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: The Cyber Lexicon of 2030
Message-ID: <60.1694.6525.0C18F6C5@canrem.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


          Mnemonic@eff.org wrote 
 |-------------------------------|
> of littering.  The MD Pound
> logo features the mustaches of Salvador Dali, a notably prolific
> 20th century surrealist.
>
> *Municipal Dump*:  (n)  an institution formed by the
 |-------------------------------|

Hi - this was great - but I only got the first and last message in the
series.

Could you re-post it?

Also, I have no internet access..


                    Terry Smith - XANTH sysop - 1:259/510
                CI$ 70733,3013 PGP 2.3A KEY FREQABLE AS 'KEY'.
 My opinions are not that of my company. But one day they WILL be! And then -
                        the -+*WORLD*+- Bwaw ha ha !!.
                       Read the Tick and others by NEC.
       Geraldo - "So, Mr. Smith, you admit you like to eat babies!"
                Me - "Nono - I admit I like to eat BABES!"

---
 * TLX v1.55 * A bug is a feature that didn't make it into the manual.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: hawkwind@dink.foretune.co.jp
Date: Sun, 26 Dec 93 21:07:04 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Another groups handling of disruptive people
Message-ID: <199312270502.OAA11658@dink.foretune.co.jp>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Subject: Unfairly banned from #anime!
From: Casca, bertishg@db.erau.edu
Date: 26 Dec 1993 12:21:35 -0500
In article <2fkh6v$2f4@scorpius.db.erau.edu> Casca, bertishg@db.erau.edu writes:
>
>On Friday, the 24th of December, I logged on to IRC. I joined #anime! 
>to find that there were only two other people on, [Starman] and Ichijyo.
>I did not find this unusual because it was around 12:00 pm Eastern Time.
>
>I attampted to engage in communication with [Starman] and Ichijyo, but they
>were asleep on channel, meaning that they were logged in, but not doing
>anything, and were not marked as being away. I left to find better company.
>
>During the course of the day I joined and left #anime! several times, both
>as Casca and in another persona I have for another channel, #vampires, as
>Brujah.
>
>During one of the times I joined as Brujah, I attempted to stimulate 
>conversation, the lifeblood of IRC. This is what I did: 
>
>*** Brujah (bertishg@db.erau.edu)  has joined channel #anime!
>
><Brujah> hey all
>
>                       ** no response **
>
>* Brujah slaps [Starman] around for a bit
>
><Brujah> Dammit, if you're going to log on channel, either do something or
>+ don't bother joining at all! 
>
><Brujah> shit....
>
>*** Brujah has left channel #anime!
>
>
>This is, to the best of my recollection, what occured. I did not have a log
>file
>running, but with the exception of some of the words not being verbatim, 
>this is a correct account of what happened.
>
>I admit that my language was a bit salty. This is due to the fact my Brujah
>persona talks like this frequently, and also because I was irritated that these
>people were sleeping on channel.
>
>I then left for greener pastures for a few hours.
>
>I returned when I noticed that #anime! was beginning to fill with other people.
>I logged in, with my nick still Brujah, having forgotten to change it.
>
>Immediately after logging, on [Starman] confronted my thusly:
>
><[Starman]> Hey Brujah, remember this shit?
>
>and he played the segment of his log where I slapped him around, then made
>my statement.
>
>I was then promptly kicked and banned, without even being given the opportunity
>to present my case. I was then messaged by [Starman] as such:
>
>*[Starman]* I don't know who you are, but you aren't welcome here.
>
>*[Starman]* BTW, all your msg's are being ignored.
>
>Again, this is as close as I can remember it.
>
>I then attempted to communicate with other members of the channel, and finally
>my friend Prisoner was able to gain ops and unban me. [Starman] had left by 
>this time.
>
>
>Thinking this incident was over, I again attempted to join #anime! on 25 Dec, 
>at app. 1:30 pm EST, as Casca. 
>
>I was kicked as soon as I joined. I rejoined, only to be kicked again. Then
>I was banned.
>
>I then formed the alternate channel #anime in an attempt to begin communication
>with [Starman]. I invited my friend Sonida to my channel and explained my case.
>He agreed with me. I then invited [Starman] to join in an effort to solve this
>dispute in a civilized manner. I was ignored.
>
>Sonida also tried, and was also ignored.
>
>
>Therefore, all attempts at private resolution of this matter have failed. I 
>have therefore decided to let popular opinion judge this matter. 
>
>I have mailed copies of this letter to everyone I know, and also posted a copy
>to USENET rec.arts.anime in an effort to reach those whom I do not know.
>
>
>My logic is this:
>
>IT WAS JUST A JOKE, FOR CRYING OUT LOUD!!!
>
>Anybody who has seen me spar with Asrial on channel knows I do these actions
>only in jest, and I have done far worse to her (I've dropped meteors on her, 
>thrown her into acid, etc.). But we still remain friends. In fact, I only do
>these to those people I feel I have known long enough to be able to goof around
>with.
>
>I could understand this if I had insulted [Starman] or his mother, but for
>virtual actions which harm no-one? For attempting to start a conversation on
>a chat channel?  
>
>Doesn't this seem like over-reacting to you???
>
>Therefore, I bring this before a forum of all those who attend #anime!
>regularly, semi-regularly, or those who have only joined once.
>
>I believe that [Starman] has over-reacted and is acting immaturely by kicking
>and banning me without even attempting to work this out.
>
>I wish to have the ban dropped and be re-admitted to #anime!, for I feel I have
>commited no crime.
>
>My e-mail address is bertishg@db.erau.edu
>
>[Starman]'s e-mail address is ~render1@teak.njit.edu
>
>Please do not hesitate to email me or post your feelings on the matter.
>
>I wish this problem resolved in a civilized, mature manner.
>
>Thank you for your time.
>
>Sincerely, 
> 
>-- Casca
>(bertishg@db.erau.edu)
>
>*******************************************************************************
>*
>"No one holds command over me. No man. No god. No Prince. What is a claim of
>age for ones who are immortal? What is a claim of power for ones who defy
>death?
>Call your damnable hunt. We shall see who I drag screaming to hell with me."
>                                        -- Gunter Dorn, DAS UNGEHEUER DARIN
>*******************************************************************************
>*
>

Subject: Re: Unfairly banned from #anime!
From: Lisa Richardson, priss@tcp.com
Date: 27 Dec 93 00:05:40 GMT
In article <priss.756950740@tcp.com> Lisa Richardson, priss@tcp.com writes:
>Actually, net-ettique should be observed.  Regardless of your persona, you have
>no right to insult a person or make a joke of a person who happens to be idling
>on an IRC channel.  I may not know a lot about IRC stuff, but as a MUCK Wizard,
>I don't go around insulting people who are sleeping on their character.  Even
>if you want to liven things up, you could leave a question and get a response
>later.  What you do, gave Starman a justifiable reason to ignore you, because
>you 'attacked' him without provocation and without justifyable means other than
>him idling on a channel.  There is no law against him doing that, but there is
>some common decency about being rude to a person who is not on-line.
>
>-- 
>Lisa Richardson (aka Priss on about a half dozen MUCKs)
>priss@glia.biostr.washington.edu      and/or              priss@anime.tcp.com
>"Live fast, Die young, and make hearts melt as you go away" - Lisa Richardson
>Priss the MUF Wizard of _AnimeMUCK_ at anime.tcp.com (128.95.10.106) 2035





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: hawkwind@dink.foretune.co.jp
Date: Sun, 26 Dec 93 23:42:04 PST
To: Timothy Newsham <newsham@wiliki.eng.hawaii.edu>
Subject: Re: Another groups handling of disruptive people
Message-ID: <199312270739.QAA13334@dink.foretune.co.jp>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>[previous post bunch of irc drivel...]

interesting net snobbery

>is there any reason why this was posted here?

Naturally, or haven't you been following the epic discussion here on how to
deal with disruptive people? 





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: rustman@netcom.com (Rusty H. Hodge)
Date: Mon, 27 Dec 93 16:57:18 PST
To: ravage@wixer.bga.com (Jim choate)
Subject: Re: Police RF Links
In-Reply-To: <9312231521.AA14185@wixer>
Message-ID: <199312280055.QAA04889@mail.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Jim choate says...
> Since most police departments don't encrypt
> (or at least not strongly) their database searches from their in-car
> computers I can see a possible hole here. I really don't expect it to stay
> open very long however (a year or two at best).
> 
> I know such data can be accepted by a normal pc w/ a scanner and modem. It
> should not be much of a step to put a xmitter online and do some spoofing.

I think you will find that most modems will NOT demodulate this data, only
the simplest RF data links use modulation schemes compatible with standard
modems.  (For example, the RF Packet Data systems that are merely grown up
versions of the equipment sold to amateur radio operators that does use
modems that comply to CCITT or old Bell standards).

But most police departments that are using mobile data terminals are using
proprietary modulation schemes.  So you would have to determine what type of
systems are in use in the target area, and then obtain a compatible unit
with a spoofed unit identification.

Not that easy.  A lot harder than just monitoring these transmissions.

Check out a publication called "The SPEC-COM Journal", available at
Ham Radio stores near you, this is the definitive guide to different and
experimental modulation schemes that Hams are playing with.



-- 
Rusty H. Hodge, Cyberneticist  <rustman@netcom.com> 




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Mike Ingle <MIKEINGLE@delphi.com>
Date: Mon, 27 Dec 93 14:27:25 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: IRC and the Feeling of Power
Message-ID: <01H6ZD8L9WQQ9393X0@delphi.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>As a more frequent user of IRC, I agree with you.  However, the problem is
>generally technical.  This system was established because IRC channels have
>no "home" server or organization which can claim "ownership" and
>"responsibility" for the behavior and content of the channel.

These problems will exist in any distributed system, so solutions need
to be worked out.

>>I don't use IRC that much, but from
>>what I've seen, that system doesn't work very well. An extropians-style
>>kill command would probably be better for IRC or the list. If someone is
>>causing trouble, you could just set to ignore them.

>I would prefer a system of "talkers" and "listeners".  The channel
>administration, whatever this may be, decides who can talk and who must
>listen.  There is a tentative first step toward this goal in the current
>wave of server revisions.  

Why have an administration at all? Why not just give everyone an
/exclude command which eliminates everything from a particular person,
and an /include command which restores output from that person.
If someone is ranting or flooding, everyone will /exclude him and he 
will be left with only himself for an audience.

--- Mike
 




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: fnerd@smds.com (FutureNerd Steve Witham)
Date: Tue, 28 Dec 93 06:02:31 PST
To: Mike Godwin <mnemonic@eff.org>
Subject: Re: The Cyber Lexicon of 2030 AD
Message-ID: <9312280431.AA00577@smds.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



 *Fuse*: (n) 1) Software or hardware to isolate a net, system or 
 subsystem in the event of detection of a security or resource
 use problem.  2) reputation.

 *Crowbar*: (n) Type of _cannibal_ that, on detecting a
 security or resource use problem, blows _fuses_ in outside 
 systems by flooding communications channels with noise,
 triggering security checks in other systems, and/or exhausting
 bank accounts, credit lines and stores of _e-cash_.  The effect
 of a crowbar is harder to reset by a presumed intruder than
 that of an internal fuse.  A countermeasure to _mug shots_.

 *Mug Shots*: (n) Backups of the state of a system to allow
 repeated attempts at cracking it.  A countermeasure to 
 _cannibals_.

 *Runaway*: (n) Endless echoing of messages caused by bugs
 in routing software.  Usually refers to a bug that exacerbates
 its own trigger conditions, such as traffic level or lack of
 storage space.  

-fnerd@smds.com
~
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From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: edgar@spectrx.saigon.com (Edgar W. Swank)
Date: Tue, 28 Dec 93 11:37:33 PST
To: Cypherpunks          <cypherpunks@toad.com>
Subject: Secure Drive Distribution
Message-ID: <0yo0ec6w165w@spectrx.saigon.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

After reading Mike Ingle's post of Dec 21, I withdraw my request for a
"public-spirited Cypherpunk (perhaps even an anonymous one) to place
Secure Drive on an FTP site or a site with an E-mail file server."

Mike said:

    If you do this [upload Secure Drive to an FTP or mailserver site],
    please make it a U.S./Canada only site.

If you mean a site -in- the USA/Canada, no problem.  If you mean a
site which will not send files outside the USA/Canada, I don't think
there is any such animal.  The only site even -attempting- to restrict
service I've heard of is RSA.com, which distributes RSAREF. And I
think it would be rather easy to spoof.

A foreigner can easily login to any public -domestic- internet BBS
with just an international phone call, giving him a domestic-looking
net address.

Even if you distribute every copy yourself, Mike, you are not immune
from this kind of "spoofing."

    >So far I still haven't heard from Eric. I did get two responses.
    >The first was anonymous and sent me a copy of Secure Drive with
    >a request for me to post it to foreign FTP site(s). The second
    >was a request from a foreign site for me to send them a copy.

    I'd like to see more about this, in private mail if you don't want
    to post it to the list.

Not much to tell. I didn't keep copies of either request. I think the
non-anon one was from Australia, maybe.

    The non-distribution of the beta was because I had no way to check
    it, and it could easily have eaten hard drives.  I did say in the
    ad that you were not to export, although I didn't make anyone send
    a statement.  Maybe I should have.

Perhaps. But the ad says:

    This program may be freely distributed within the U.S.  and
    Canada; do not export it.

and the docs say:

    Exporting this program.  This program is for use in the US and
    Canada only.  Cryptography is export controlled, and sending this
    program outside the country may be illegal.  Don't do it.

Fine.  But "freely distributed in the USA & Canada" would include
uploading it to domestic BBS's & anon. FTP sites by my interpretation
of English. If a foreigner enters the country and smuggles a copy home
with him, whether he does it physically or electronically, he is
committing the criminal act; not whoever uploaded SD and certainly not
Mike.

On the Hacker matter Mike said:

    They are going to attempt to break Secure Drive.  He asked me to
    write a program which will take a list of passphrases and test
    them quickly to run a passphrase attack.  I had a few qualms about
    writing a program to crack someone's data, but I don't think it
    really matters.  Unless the hacker chose a very lame key, they
    don't have a prayer in hell.

By all means, go ahead & write the program to their specs.!  Of
course, as a "forensic software consultant" you're entitled to a fee.
I would say a minimum of $100/hour is "fair."  After they try that
for a while, you can offer an improvement that will try "more keys
of a smaller possible set faster" by just trying the 2^128 keys
directly without bothering with a passphrase, along with a mod to
LOGIN which will insert a binary key directly rather than use MD5
on a passphrase.

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--
edgar@spectrx.saigon.com (Edgar W. Swank)
SPECTROX SYSTEMS +1.408.252.1005  Cupertino, Ca





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: cvoid@albemuth.tatertot.com (Christian Void)
Date: Wed, 29 Dec 93 03:32:38 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: T-SHIRT UPDATE #2
Message-ID: <F980ec4w165w@albemuth.tatertot.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Greetings. Sorry for the delay, I hope you all had a wonderful holiday.

We are finishing up the t-shirt design, and it will soon be made 
available for approval in it's entirity. The plan is to have people order 
before the end of January (February 1st being the cutoff), and have the 
shirts shipped out in the first week of February. We are doing only as 
many shirts as we get orders for, hence the mass mailing.

I will be posting an update in the next few days with information on the 
preview files and ordering information.

The t-shirts will cost approximately $10 each, and will include shipping, 
etc. All additional information will be posted in the next update...

We are only doing one mass run of this design, so it will not be made 
available again in the future.

If anyone has any questions or comments please mail me. Thanks.


Christian Void /T71 | "I don't like it, and I'm sorry I | V/M/Research, Inc.
cvoid@netcom.COM    | ever had anything to do with it." | P.O. Box 170213
Tel. 1+415-807-5491 |  -Erwin Schrodinger  (1887-1961)  | SF, CA  94117-0213
                * PGP v2.3a Public Key Available Via Finger *




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: GRABOW_GEOFFREY@tandem.com
Date: Tue, 28 Dec 93 11:51:47 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: NBC news.
Message-ID: <199312281149.AA4409@comm.Tandem.COM>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Greetings all,
    NBC Nightly news recently did a report on the Internet and NII, at the end
of which, they mentioned that they have an Internet address of:
                           news:nightly@nbc.com

They asked for comments regarding the use/misuse of Internet and I'm sure that
they would be thrilled to hear from us.  So drop 'em a line and tell 'em your
opinion of the NII.

 ********************************************************************
 Geoffrey C. Grabow              grabow_geoffrey@tandem.com
 Oyster Bay, New York

 'What we demand are rigidly defined areas of doubt and uncertainty!'
     - Hitchhiker's Guide To The Galaxy
 ********************************************************************












From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: dee-punk@qsland.lkg.dec.com
Date: Tue, 28 Dec 93 10:37:33 PST
To: jpinson@fcdarwin.org.ec
Subject: Re: Random numbers and "dirty" books
In-Reply-To: <9312261726.AB14748@toad.com>
Message-ID: <9312281831.AA13343@qsland>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I suggest you look at any slide-rule or log graph paper for the
simple explanation of this trivial phenomenon.

Donald





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Brenden Kootsey <kootz@well.sf.ca.us>
Date: Tue, 28 Dec 93 14:00:28 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: GPS and security
Message-ID: <199312282158.NAA19690@well.sf.ca.us>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Like Mike, I don't claim to know much about the GPS, and I didn't see the 60
Minutes report, but it was my understanding that at least a portion of the
signal is encrypted. The signal available to us mortal (non-U.S. military)
types has a built-in inaccuracy; while it is still accurate enough for some
general use, it is not nearly as accurate as the signal available to the
military. Anyone have more of the technical details, especially regarding
the accuracy?




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: m5@vail.tivoli.com (Mike McNally)
Date: Tue, 28 Dec 93 12:02:34 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: GPS and security
Message-ID: <9312282001.AA24981@vail.tivoli.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



CBS's "60 Minutes" had a "Oooh Scarey" segment about the Global
Positioning System last Sunday.  The scarey part is, according to 60
Minutes, that any old terrorist government can now put together
accurate guided missles and wreak death and destruction upon our
homeland.  The crux of the problem is that the system broadcasts out
positioning information to one and all indiscriminately, and according
to the show there's no way we can stop it.

Because my mind is regularly exposed to wild conspiracy theories and
all sorts of crazed paranoiac ravings (i.e., I read Usenet), I started
thinking that this is rather unlikely.  I speculated that the
government may in fact have designed the satellite systems so that
they could be told to do several things in case of national emergency:

*	Shut down (probably possible; they may have actually mentioned
this on the show).  Problem is that lots of friendlies may grow to
rely on the data for life-critical things, like guiding commercial
airliners.

*	Shut down normal transmission and begin strongly encrypted
transmission.  No mention of this; apparently, the satellites were
originally designed with some sort of weak system that made the data
difficult to use for high-accuracy purposes, but that's been defeated
(by the FAA or someone contracted thereto).

*	Enter into a bogus-cleartext with encrypted subchannel mode,
where the plaintext is slyly made to be wrong, but using some
subchannel encrypted "good stuff" is still available.


I don't know much about how this system works, so I don't know whether
any of my thoughts are relevant.  It's probably most likely that the
government indeed blasted these things up into space without
considering using encryption technology to enhance security.

--
Mike McNally : m5@tivoli.com : Day Laborer : Tivoli Systems : Austin, TX
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Remember that all experimentation does not produce extrapolated results.
                                                           - k. pisichko




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: karn@qualcomm.com (Phil Karn)
Date: Tue, 28 Dec 93 14:17:42 PST
To: m5@vail.tivoli.com
Subject: Re: GPS and security
In-Reply-To: <9312282001.AA24981@vail.tivoli.com>
Message-ID: <199312282214.OAA21740@servo.qualcomm.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I heard about this show, but missed it. Looks like 60 Minutes has
bought the military's scare story, hook line and sinker.

Sure, it's possible for a terrorist to build a GPS-guided bomb. But
terrorists have been building highly accurate (more accurate than GPS)
guided bombs long before GPS. The Japanese called them "kamikazes",
while in the Middle East the preference seems to be for heavy trucks.
As long as you've got fanatical pilots/drivers willing to sacrifice
themselves, who needs GPS?

I follow GPS and "selective availability" pretty closely. A complete
tutorial on this subject would be pretty long, but here are the major
points:

GPS satellites broadcast several signals. Two RF carriers are used, L1
at 1575.42 Mhz and L2 at 1227.6 Mhz. All satellites use the same
frequencies; receivers can separate them because CDMA (code division
multiple access, a form of spread spectrum) is used.

These two carriers can carry two signals.  One is the C/A ("Coarse
Acquisition" or "Clear Access", depending on which reference you
read).  This is a 1.023 megachip/sec spread spectrum signal with a
short (1023) chip spreading sequence. The sequences (Gold codes, one
per satellite) are published. The second signal is the "P" (or
"Precision") code at 10.23 megachips/sec. This is a much longer
sequence that is restarted every week. Contrary to popular belief, the
P code is also published. It can, however, be encrypted with a
classified cipher to produce the "Y" code.

In general, the C/A code is only on the L1 carrier, while P/Y is on
both L1 and L2. The idea of having P/Y on two frequencies is to help a
receiver correct for ionospheric dispersion. Using the basic
principles of RF propagation through a plasma, by measuring the
difference between these two signals you can compute and correct for
the absolute dispersion delay.

Originally the C/A code was to be completely open, and the Y code
reserved to "authorized users" (i.e., the US military). The Y-code
encryption was more to prevent spoofing of the satellite signals than
to prevent its "unauthorized" use. That's why the Y-code mode is
usually called "antispoofing" mode, since someone who doesn't know the
encryption sequence can't produce a fake Y code.

The thinking was that the C/A code by itself wouldn't be accurate
enough to be a "threat".  But C/A receivers worked surprisingly well
(<25m), so the DoD got paranoid and introduced the notorious
"Selective Availability" (SA).  They haven't released the details of
how SA works, saying only that it will degrade accuracy to some
specified level, eg 100m with 95% confidence.  But many people have
observed SA in action and have a good idea how it works.

First, they can encrypt the low order bits of the satellite
ephemerides. These are the satellites' orbital elements that allow the
receiver to compute the position of each satellite as a function of
time. In order for the receiver to determine where it is, it needs to
know where the satellites are; if its estimate of a satellite's
position is incorrect, then so will its estimate of its own position.

Second, they can add cryptographically generated "phase noise" to the
atomic clock timebase. This adds "dither" to the ranges as measured
by the receiver, again leading to errors in the receiver's calculated
position.

But there's a flaw in the ointment. If you take two GPS receivers and
place them side by side and tell them to track the same satellites, SA
will cause them to produce the SAME errors! This is the idea behind
"differential" GPS that has the DoD so spooked. Take a GPS receiver
and place it in a well-surveyed fixed spot. (Let it measure its
location for a month or two and average the results.) Then have it
periodically transmit, over a local radio link, the differences it
observes between the ranges it measures to each visible satellite and
what those ranges *should* be, given the receiver's accurately known
location. Other GPS receivers in the area can receive these
corrections and apply them to their own calculations.

Viola! Not only have you subtracted out all of the effects of SA, but
you've also corrected for several natural sources of error as well,
including ionospheric and troposperic dispersion. About the only
source of error remaining is each receiver's finite signal-to-noise
ratio, but this is minor compared to these other error sources.
Differential GPS accuracies of 2-3 m are not uncommon as long as the
reference receiver is within a few hundred km of the user receiver.

Since these accuracies are useful for many legitimate civilian
applications, e.g., harbor approach navigation, the US Coast Guard has
begun deploying differential GPS beacons along the US coast. The irony
here is amusing; first you have the DoD intentionally sabotaging the
signal with SA, and then another military service (albeit one under
the DoT rather than the Dod) comes along and undoes it. Your tax dollars
at work!

The Coast Guard also runs a GPS public information office. They have a
BBS and a watch officer you can call on the phone. They'll send you
information (e.g., the ICD-GPS-200 spec on the GPS signal interface)
free just for the asking.

Phil





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: karn@qualcomm.com (Phil Karn)
Date: Tue, 28 Dec 93 15:07:35 PST
To: pfarrell@netcom.com
Subject: RE: GPS and security
In-Reply-To: <62594.pfarrell@netcom.com>
Message-ID: <199312282303.PAA21817@servo.qualcomm.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>Before the Gulf war started, the military needed zillions of GPS units, so
>they bought commercial marine navigrtion units. After the war, there
>was talk of turning on the division, but that was made
>impractical with 'differential' calibration.

You appear to be referring to Selective Availability. It was indeed turned
off during the Gulf War to allow the use of civilian C/A units. Companies
like Trimble couldn't keep up with the military demand during the buildup
to the war.

Selective availability was turned on again some months after the war
ended.  The effects were quite visible. The level of SA has varied
quite a bit since then.

>To get military accuracy, all you have to do is take the commercial GPS to
>known places. Such as the surveying marks at the US Naval Acadamy, or
>"ground zero" in the Pentagon. Get your "imprecise" reading, calculate the
>difference between it at the known value, and use it for subsequent
>calculations.

False. SA-induced errors are time varying, so the differential trick
only works in *real time*. You need receivers at both the reference
location and the location to be measured at the same time. The
experience with differential GPS is that you need updates that are
less than 30 seconds old, otherwise accuracy degrades rapidly.

By the way, the differential updates include both range offset and
range-rate offset (relative velocity). The addition of range-rate
makes the updates last as long as 30 seconds, otherwise you'd need a
very high update rate to get 2-3m accuracy.

>BTW, two satellites is enuff for a general location fix. Three identifies a
>place on the globe, four adds altitude (handy for planes, bombs, and
>missles)

Also false. You need at least THREE satellites for any kind of GPS
position fix.  And you need to know your altitude ahead of time for
this to work.  Give a unit operating in 3 satellite mode the wrong
altitude, and it will give you the wrong latitude/longitude.  Four
satellites will give you a three-dimensional fix, i.e., the unit will
tell you your altitude.

Most units have an "auto 2D/3D" mode, where the unit remembers the
altitude from the last 3D (4 satellite) fix and uses it in 2D (3
satellite) mode.  Some other units, apparently including my Icom GP-22
unit, seem to assume you're at sea level whenever fewer than 4
satellites are visible. This may be a reasonable assumption for a unit
designed for marine use, but it is a bad assumption in places like
Colorado. When I took it there last summer, I often saw it give one
position as soon as it got 3 satellites, and then jump a half mile to
the correct position when it got the fourth.

About the only useful thing you can do with less than 3 visible
satellites is time transfer to a fixed station. A station in a known
location need only track one satellite in order to keep its clock
updated. At Qualcomm we use special GPS receivers (with built-in
rubidium clocks) in our CDMA base stations as time references to
synchronize our own spreading codes.

Phil




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: karn@qualcomm.com (Phil Karn)
Date: Tue, 28 Dec 93 15:30:30 PST
To: jazz@hal.com
Subject: Re: GPS and security
In-Reply-To: <9312282234.AA04489@jazz.hal.com>
Message-ID: <199312282328.PAA22697@servo.qualcomm.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>The requirement, of course, is that you be someplace near a differential GPS
>station. These stations are maintained by the US Coast Guard and obviously
>exist only where there is navigable water (and certainly not everywhere,
>since they take time and money to build).

Well, yes, the USCG *is* building its first DGPS beacons along the
coasts, for obvious reasons. But there is precedent for the USCG
becoming involved in radionavigation coverage elsewhere in the
US. Several years ago, in conjunction with the FAA, the USCG built
several new Loran-C stations to fill in what had been known as the
"mid continent gap". Now there is good Loran-C coverage over the
entire continental US. If GPS becomes as popular for aviation as
Loran-C has become (at least for helicopter and general aviation, if
not commercial aviation) then I think it quite likely that the same
thing will be done with differential GPS stations.

The only catch is likely to be that if the primary "legitimate" user
of DGPS is aviation, then the DGPS beacons will be sited so as to give
good coverage to aircraft in flight and near airports, not necessarily
good coverage to any user anywhere on the ground. A similar situation
already exists with respect to VORs; get high enough and the entire
country is completely covered, but it's hard to hear one on the ground
unless you're very close to one.

The actual coverage of any DGPS beacon will depend on its frequency
and transmitter power. VHF or UHF would be the most natural places to
put these things for aviation use, and as everyone knows these tend to
be limited to near line of sight, just like VOR. The USCG is putting
its DGPS data on its existing LF (300 Khz range) marine
radiobeacons. These have wider coverage than VHF/UHF, but suffer from
noise and interference problems especially near major cities. Again,
these beacons are optimized for their intended users -- ships at sea,
not users on land.

I should note that the USCG isn't putting up DGPS beacons just to
defeat SA. Even without SA, plain C/A GPS isn't accurate enough for
precise harbor navigation. It just so happens that DGPS takes care of
SA as well as the natural errors they were originally worried about.

An alternative to the USCG-provided DGPS beacons is already provided
via FM broadcast subcarriers as a commercial service. The subscription
price is pretty high, though. They're probably trying to quickly
recoup their investment before the USCG beacons take much of their
market.

Phil



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: jazz@hal.com (Jason Zions)
Date: Tue, 28 Dec 93 13:40:28 PST
To: bill.stewart@pleasantonca.ncr.com +1-510-484-6204)
Subject: Re:  anonymous video rental store - Libraries
Message-ID: <9312282138.AA04483@jazz.hal.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



   Out of curiousity, has any ftp-archive maintainer tried to join the
   American Library Association, either directly or as part of some
   university's library system?

I'm not sure what this would do. My wife is a professional librarian and a
member of the ALA (and SLA and a few other besides) - as far as I know, the
ALA doesn't directly intervene to protect its members.

Jason





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: northrop@netcom.com (Scott Northrop)
Date: Tue, 28 Dec 93 15:42:35 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: GPS and security
Message-ID: <199312282341.PAA25474@mail.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


If the military is worried about delivery systems' accuracy, Phil Karn
already mentioned kamikazies, but if you don't want to make suicide part of
the package, you could always just have someone drop a radio transmitter on
your target sometime in advance, possibly a day or two.  The missile can
then home in on the signal.  (If you need to get it inside a high-security
area, you could always encase it in foam and drop it from a model airplane
or launch it in a model rocket.)  Or you could just leave a suitcase with a
timed bomb at your target location; plutonium bombs can be very small.

It boggles my mind that the military mind prevents the use of tools that
are just too complicated for the "bad guys" to bother with.  Does CBS have
an email address yet?  :)

--
Scott Northrop               <northrop@netcom.com>              (206)784-2083
ObVirus:   The demand for obedience is inherently evil.
ObVirus2:  As a juror in a Trial by Jury, you have the right, power and duty
           to acquit the defendant if you judge the law itself to be unjust.





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: GRABOW_GEOFFREY@tandem.com
Date: Tue, 28 Dec 93 16:10:29 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: NBC news address correction.
Message-ID: <199312281608.AA313@comm.Tandem.COM>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Oops!  The previous message incorrectly gave the address of
                           news:nightly@nbc.com

it should be:               nightly@nbc.com

                                           Sorry about that chief!




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: jazz@hal.com (Jason Zions)
Date: Tue, 28 Dec 93 14:37:43 PST
To: m5@vail.tivoli.com (Mike McNally)
Subject: GPS and security
Message-ID: <9312282234.AA04489@jazz.hal.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


   I speculated that the
   government may in fact have designed the satellite systems so that
   they could be told to do several things in case of national emergency:

   *	Shut down (probably possible; they may have actually mentioned
   this on the show).  Problem is that lots of friendlies may grow to
   rely on the data for life-critical things, like guiding commercial
   airliners.

It's worse; the military relies on GPS. During the Gulf War large numbers of
combat vehicles could rendezvous with high accuracy and no radio contact in
the dark of night; staggeringly important in limiting fratricide as well
(though not as well as one might have liked...)

   *	Shut down normal transmission and begin strongly encrypted
   transmission.  No mention of this; apparently, the satellites were
   originally designed with some sort of weak system that made the data
   difficult to use for high-accuracy purposes, but that's been defeated
   (by the FAA or someone contracted thereto).

   *	Enter into a bogus-cleartext with encrypted subchannel mode,
   where the plaintext is slyly made to be wrong, but using some
   subchannel encrypted "good stuff" is still available.

Well, this sounds like the "selective availability" (SA) capability, which
still exists and has in fact been turned on. It is defeatable, but only
under certain circumstances (see below).

GPS is a clock-based system; by talking to a constellation of satellites (I
think the minimum is 4, with 5 being desired and 6 being best) and munging
the timestamps received from them, GPS systems can compute their location to
a degree of precision related to the precision of the clocks. SA essentially
truncates a few bits off the low-end of the time stamps and makes them
available in an encrypted form. Without the key to decrypt the low-order
bits, you get location information to within a couple hundred meters or so;
with the low-order bits, within about six feet.

During the Gulf War, the US military was unable to get enough military GPS
receivers (i.e. ones that could decrypt the selectively-available data).
Instead, they bought commercial over-the-counter GPS receivers and turned SA
off. As soon as they got enough SA-enabled receivers, they turned it on.

SA is defeated by something called Differential GPS.  Basically, a ground
station at a fixed location constantly computes its position via GPS,
computes the difference between the GPS location and its known correct
location, and broadcasts the correction factor. A differential-capable GPS
receiver computes its location via GPS and then applies the correction fac-
tor from the nearest differential station. These corrections are obviously
of decreasing accuracy the farther you get from the fixed-position station,
but you can correct for that to some degree once you have an estimate of the
direction and distance from your location to that of the differential
broadcaster; apply corrections iteratively until they converge.

The requirement, of course, is that you be someplace near a differential GPS
station. These stations are maintained by the US Coast Guard and obviously
exist only where there is navigable water (and certainly not everywhere,
since they take time and money to build).

I'm curious if anyone has attempted to crack the encryption used in
selective availability; although Differential GPS solves my most important
issues (coastal navigation) it's be nice to be able to use a handheld GPS
receiver in the middle of Rock Mountain National Park or some such and still
locate yourself on the bloody maps with some precision.

Jason




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Pat Farrell" <pfarrell@netcom.com>
Date: Tue, 28 Dec 93 14:22:42 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: RE: GPS and security
Message-ID: <62594.pfarrell@netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


This is a bit off list topics. Press D now if you don't like it....

In message Tue, 28 Dec 93 14:01:15 CST,
  m5@vail.tivoli.com (Mike McNally)  writes:
> *	Shut down normal transmission and begin strongly encrypted
> transmission.  No mention of this; apparently, the satellites were
> originally designed with some sort of weak system that made the data
> difficult to use for high-accuracy purposes, but that's been defeated
> (by the FAA or someone contracted thereto).

   The GPS system was designed to have two modes, one highly acurate for
military use, and a low accuracy version for commerce. Since initially
no one had receivers, the whole system used military grade for the first
few years.

Before the Gulf war started, the military needed zillions of GPS units, so
they bought commercial marine navigrtion units. After the war, there
was talk of turning on the division, but that was made
impractical with 'differential' calibration.

To get military accuracy, all you have to do is take the commercial GPS to
known places. Such as the surveying marks at the US Naval Acadamy, or
"ground zero" in the Pentagon. Get your "imprecise" reading, calculate the
difference between it at the known value, and use it for subsequent
calculations.

I expect that triangulation with a few known sites is better than a single
one.

Last I hear from the Sailing trade press was that the Gov still talked about
going to the split setup, but there was little belief that they would.

BTW, two satellites is enuff for a general location fix. Three identifies a
place on the globe, four adds altitude (handy for planes, bombs, and
missles)

Pat

Pat Farrell      Grad Student                 pfarrell@netcom.com
Department of Computer Science    George Mason University, Fairfax, VA
Public key availble via finger          #include <standard.disclaimer>




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Pat Farrell" <pfarrell@netcom.com>
Date: Tue, 28 Dec 93 14:22:34 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: CACM Letters
Message-ID: <62604.pfarrell@netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


There is a very nice letter on the government's rationale for controlling
crypto in the current January 94  (received today) CACM, by Walter M
Anderson. The main claim is that the government must want to control US
citizens, because no other reason is logically consistant.

And a nice short one from our own CME.

Pat

Pat Farrell      Grad Student                 pfarrell@netcom.com
Department of Computer Science    George Mason University, Fairfax, VA
Public key availble via finger          #include <standard.disclaimer>




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: kelly@netcom.com (Kelly Goen)
Date: Tue, 28 Dec 93 17:32:35 PST
To: northrop@netcom.com (Scott Northrop)
Subject: Cheap Cruise Missles(Was Re: GPS and security
In-Reply-To: <199312282341.PAA25474@mail.netcom.com>
Message-ID: <199312290132.RAA21274@mail.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> 
> If the military is worried about delivery systems' accuracy, Phil Karn
> already mentioned kamikazies, but if you don't want to make suicide part of


No suicide pact necessary.... the flight control deck of many modern
airliners is Totally fly by wire... there are different communications
protocols and buses... all controlled by eprom driven micros ...
as well as the loaded flight plans... while NOT trivial is is completelyt
within the realm of reason to be able to freely subvert say the
inputs coming from the navigational subsystems to divert said craft as
well as locking off external inputs(e.g. pilots). A
757 or Airbus  coming in at 300-600 knots with a 1/4 to 1/2 fuel load
makes a very respectable cruise missle... the passengers merely being
"collateral damage". To a more limited degree replacement and subversion
of the eproms in a modern days car's Engine control module has
already been done... witness rechipping for performance...
the same can be done for more malicious actions...
As far as the 757 flight control deck software issue... its only a matter of
time... ANY computer controlled conveyance can be subverted...
elevators, robot factories etc... ALL of the control and telemetery
protocols are currently unprotected...

The other trend is the new environmental control systems for HVAC, security
etc used in modern skyscrapers... cracking and subverting one of these
could be just as disruptive as a cruise missle while not taking lives...

     Happy New Years
     kelly...
BTW more and more modern cities are installing control systems tied into
relatively unprotected display systems(i.e. little or no security and
no encryption) the utilities are just as guilty I wonder how long
it will be before the terrorists get a clue...

> the package, you could always just have someone drop a radio transmitter on
> your target sometime in advance, possibly a day or two.  The missile can
> then home in on the signal.  (If you need to get it inside a high-security
> area, you could always encase it in foam and drop it from a model airplane
> or launch it in a model rocket.)  Or you could just leave a suitcase with a
> timed bomb at your target location; plutonium bombs can be very small.
> 
> It boggles my mind that the military mind prevents the use of tools that
> are just too complicated for the "bad guys" to bother with.  Does CBS have
> an email address yet?  :)
> 
> --
> Scott Northrop               <northrop@netcom.com>              (206)784-2083
> ObVirus:   The demand for obedience is inherently evil.
> ObVirus2:  As a juror in a Trial by Jury, you have the right, power and duty
>            to acquit the defendant if you judge the law itself to be unjust.
> 
> 




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
Date: Tue, 28 Dec 93 19:17:41 PST
To: kootz@well.sf.ca.us (Brenden Kootsey)
Subject: Re: GPS and security
In-Reply-To: <199312282158.NAA19690@well.sf.ca.us>
Message-ID: <199312290317.TAA26716@mail.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


kootz@well.sf.ca.us (Brenden Kootsey) wrote:
> 
> Like Mike, I don't claim to know much about the GPS, and I didn't see the 60
> Minutes report, but it was my understanding that at least a portion of the
> signal is encrypted. The signal available to us mortal (non-U.S. military)
> types has a built-in inaccuracy; while it is still accurate enough for some
> general use, it is not nearly as accurate as the signal available to the
> military. Anyone have more of the technical details, especially regarding
> the accuracy?

This is come up a couple of times, and I think it was Phil Karn who
summarized the situation well.

Basically, there have been two modes used simulaneously, a precision
mode for U.S. military use (cruise missiles, for example) and a
general mode for everyone else (boaters, campers, Iraqis, etc.).

During the Gulf War, I have heard, the encryption was turned off, or
whatever it took to make the general channel as precise as the
military channel. (This is not as dumb as it sounds, as it let the
military use lower-cost Trimble Navigation-type units in large
quantities, among other things, and certainly Saddam Hussein was in no
position to take advantage of this sudden situation in any significant
way).

I also understand that the general channel can give near-military
results by straightforward crunching of some of the general channel
results (to null out positional errors, the "dither" introduced to
degrade the positional accuracy).

--Tim May


-- 
..........................................................................
Timothy C. May         | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,  
tcmay@netcom.com       | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
408-688-5409           | knowledge, reputations, information markets, 
W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA  | black markets, collapse of governments.
Higher Power: 2^756839 | Public Key: PGP and MailSafe available.
Note: I put time and money into writing this posting. I hope you enjoy it.



From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "W. Kinney" <kinney@ucsu.Colorado.EDU>
Date: Tue, 28 Dec 93 18:27:44 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Secure Drive Distribution
Message-ID: <199312290225.TAA28054@ucsu.Colorado.EDU>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain




Edgar Swank writes:

> If you mean a site -in- the USA/Canada, no problem.  If you mean a
> site which will not send files outside the USA/Canada, I don't think
> there is any such animal.  The only site even -attempting- to restrict

ripem.msu.edu evidently has such a policy. I'm considering using it to
distribute Curve Encrypt. Anybody have any experience with this site?

Should be pretty funny distributing PGP-authenticated software from the
Ripem ftp site, but I guess if they don't mind, neither do I :-).

                               -- Will





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: wcs@anchor.ho.att.com (bill.stewart@pleasantonca.ncr.com +1-510-484-6204)
Date: Tue, 28 Dec 93 19:37:36 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re:  GPS and security
Message-ID: <9312290338.AA16524@anchor.ho.att.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Thanks to Phil for the technical descriptions about GPS; I'd heard numbers
like 1 foot for Differential accuracy.  One minor correction to the
"military buying civilian GPS gear" issues - a lot of it wasn't the
military itself buying the gear, it was individual soldiers or their parents
buying the sets so their kids wouldn't get lost out in the desert.

I was at an AFCEA trade show, mainly looking for imaging and crypto stuff,
but two of the biggest hits were the various GPS vendors and a vendor
selling small drone airplanes.  (Very few people probably needed the things
for work, but they were Neat Stuff and you could understand what it did.)
The 6-foot wingspan model had a payload of about 35 pounds; the 10-foot model
had about 120 pounds, where payload includes fuel plus whatever else.
The primary applications it was being marketed for were radio repeaters and
video camera transmission systems, but the Army makes a backpack-carriable
nuke that leaves you enough fuel-weight to get 1-200 miles....

					Bill Stewart
					
# Bill Stewart  NCR Corp, 6870 Koll Center Parkway, Pleasanton CA, 94566
# Voice/Beeper 510-224-7043, Phone 510-484-6204
# email bill.stewart@pleasantonca.ncr.com billstewart@attmail.com




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: ltech1!ltech1!mercury@heifetz.msen.com
Date: Tue, 28 Dec 93 21:17:37 PST
Subject: No Subject
Message-ID: <m0pEsYl-0001eGC@ltech1.lodden.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Why    WHY THINGS ARE MEASURED BY NUMBERS NEAR ONE
by Michael E. Marotta
 
We naturally choose scales that are naturally in tune with 
Nature.  To do otherwise would be unharmonious and would be 
rejected by practice over time.  Here are the numbers from 
an article about the Great Lakes in the World Book Encyclopedia.
 
5       lakes
1       in US
4       border
1909    year of treaty
94,650  combined area
600     alt of Superior
245     alt of Ontario
325     drop from Erie to Ont
1900    Chicago canal opened
1,000   miles inland
20      drop in St. Mary's
3       canal groups
1959    St. Law Seaway
182     miles of Seaway
2       times more than Panama
 
Depths  Areas
1333    31,800      Superior
923     22,400      Michigan
750     23,000      Huron
210      9,930      Erie
778      7,520      Ontario
 
The numbers 4,5, and 6 are uncommon.  You can round 7,8,9 to the 
next order of magnitude and make them all 1.  This doesn't need
explanation.  Finding that measures clustered near 5 would...
 
 





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: jdblair@nextsrv.cas.muohio.EDU
Date: Tue, 28 Dec 93 21:02:36 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Cylex is already reality
Message-ID: <9312290526.AA28122@ nextsrv.cas.muohio.EDU >
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


The very first entry of the Cyberspace Lexicon, *autolott* is well on its
way to becoming a reality.  An Associated Press story, "Is lottery by
phone the ticket?" was on the front page of my local paper today.  The
article describes a proposed plan to establish a lottery where one would
select numbers and pay for tickets via a touch-tone phone.  The system
would involve depositing money in a special account which the lottery
commission could also access.  The system could be set to purchase tickets
when the jackpot reaches certain levels automatically.

"Players could bet until their accounts are depleted, withdraw mopney
anytime and replenish their accounts by check, electronic transfer, or
credit card."

It does state that "each wager would carry a $2 service charge."  It
souldn't be long before they realize they save more money by not printing
the tickets.

I don't have time to type in the whole article, but I think you get the
picture.  Six states are already interested.  I'm surprised they didn't
suggest just setting it up as a 900 number, or are there laws against that?

So how long will it be before Las Vegas goes on-line?  Call 1-800-LOAN-YES
for easy credit extensions today!

-john.

------------------------------------------------------------------------------
John Blair <jdblair@nextsrv.cas.muohio.edu>              phone: (513) 529-4879
    Insert cool signature file that makes a trendy, yet bold and original
   statement about my cyberspace proficiency, then mentions that I'll send
   you my PGP public key if you want it, and you trust that I'm actually me.





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: mpjohnso@nyx10.cs.du.edu (Michael Johnson)
Date: Wed, 29 Dec 93 10:40:39 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Domestic ftp sites
Message-ID: <9312291837.AA07328@nyx10.cs.du.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



>> If you mean a site -in- the USA/Canada, no problem.  If you mean a
>> site which will not send files outside the USA/Canada, I don't think
>> there is any such animal.  The only site even -attempting- to restrict

>ripem.msu.edu evidently has such a policy. I'm considering using it to
>...

I've just started an ftp site with a USA/Canada distribution policy for
crypto software.  Nothing can totally prevent the theft of data from
this site, or ripem.msu.edu or rsa.com, but I decided that I would
exercise my right to publish within the USA anyway.  About the best
I can do without demanding to see proof of citizenship in person (and
even that could be forged) is to make it very difficult to get the data
without reading a warning notice first, and hope that a combination of
conscience along with the possibility of the actions being traced by
the U. S. Government and/or the government of the perpetrator's 
country will limit the number of violations.

anonymous ftp to csn.org and read mpj/README.MPJ for details.  There
is also the Colorado Catacombs BBS (303-938-9654) crypto areas that I
hope to expand.

                                       Mike Johnson
                                       mpjohnso@nyx10.cs.du.edu






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: charliemerritt@BIX.com
Date: Wed, 29 Dec 93 14:32:51 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: VOICE-Why not?
Message-ID: <9312291732.memo.37680@BIX.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Why isn't there a cypherpunk-ish voice crypto system?
I would have to guess that it has to do with compression.
Compression, lack of CPU and baud rate and money for gadgets.

Well I have been fooling around and I think we can get a
punk-phone up real quick.
  My system:
    286-12
    2400 baud modem
    sound blaster
With just this I can get poor quality recognition of speech, In realtime.
With a 9600 baud modem and nothing more than
CVD for compression algorithm, fairly decent speech is a snap
for the dumbest CPU.

Surely the crypto is a lead pipe certainty in realtime.

I would like to see this minimal secure phone system SOON:
hardware:
  286
  9600 BPS (7680 bits of data/sec)
  sound blaster
software:
  CVD
  "push to talk"  (one at a time, please)
  xor against prng

If we got this up, then people could improve on it, add "real" crypto
auto detection of faster cpu for "real compression" etc.
My point is we have to have something to improve on.

My 2400 baud 286 compression is poor quality, very poor.  But interesting,
it shows what can be done with nothing.  If the general feeling is that it
would not be too disruptive i could post a reconstructed speech
snippet UU Encoded on this list.  (.VOC)




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Pat Farrell" <pfarrell@netcom.com>
Date: Wed, 29 Dec 93 15:07:52 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: RE: GPS and security
Message-ID: <64470.pfarrell@netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


This is still off list, so consider pressing D now...

Phil, Thanks for the corrections

In message Tue, 28 Dec 1993 15:03:49 -0800,
  karn@qualcomm.com (Phil Karn)  writes:

>
>>[general erroneous drivel elided]
>>   Such as the surveying marks at the US Naval Acadamy, or
>>"ground zero" in the Pentagon.
>
> False.
> [general good stuff by Phil elided]

Last time I looked, the Pentagon was more than 100 meters in diameter.
One of Phil's later posts talks about SA being in a 100 meter range.

Obviously the Coast Guard and FAA want pretty good accuracy.

Whatever the actual numbers on the error terms are, either a moderate high
explosive, or tiny nuke, guided to within 100 meters of the Ground Zero Cafe
will probably take out all of the above ground portions of the Pentagon.
Look at what a single smart bomb (a fairly small one at that) did in the
Pentagon's favorite Gulf War video.

Similarly, just off the Naval Acadamy's grounds is a huge array of naval
communincations gear. It wouldn't take much to put atserious hurt in the
Navy's C-cubed net.

And you could easily use GPS to get close, and then image recognition for
final targeting.


Seems to me that the important concept here is that this is yet another
technology that the government can't control once its out of the bottle.
The scare tactics, and worrisome quotes about "terrorists and drug dealers"
will cause confusion among the masses, but I can't see them having any long
term effect.

Pat

Pat Farrell      Grad Student                 pfarrell@netcom.com
Department of Computer Science    George Mason University, Fairfax, VA
Public key availble via finger          #include <standard.disclaimer>




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "L. Detweiler" <ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Date: Wed, 29 Dec 93 20:33:03 PST
To: cypherwonks@lists.eunet.fi
Subject: Cypherpunk Credit Union
Message-ID: <199312300432.VAA27804@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Hello cy{ph,b}er{wo,pu}nks. I wanted to follow up on a posting by
B.Stewart who said that the cypherpunks are putting together a
cash credit union over the Internet. I have a few questions about
this.

1. Do you have to join the CA cypherpunks to learn about this?
Obviously you guys have been working on this a long time, and as
long as I was on the list I barely saw any peep about it.

2. Is this a private development group? Is it open to anyone who
wishes to join? If so, are cy{b,ph}erwonks allowed to join in the
development? We are interested in these kinds of projects.

3. Do you have a mailing list dedicated to this project alone or
other internet development projects? We know about the
cypherpunks list but there are rumors that there are some other
development lists `behind the scenes' -- are these open to the
public?

4. If any of your projects are indeed secret, why are many
cypherpunks actively engaged in a campaign on the imp-interest
list (Internet Mercantile Protocols)? Why don't you just stick to
your own project and let the Internet sort out which protocol is
more acceptable to the world-at-large?

5. What about the rumors that seem to be confirmed by what
B.Stewart said about evading tax laws and black marketeering,
that the cypherpunk credit union is actually a surreptitious
front for plans to provide money laundering over the Internet?

6. Again, if this is a public project, why is there so little
documentation available? There doesn't seem to be any on
soda.berkeley.edu, and many of my requests elsewhere have been
ignored.

7. What is the David Chaum connection to all this? I know that he
met with E.Hughes to discuss plans but are the Cypherpunks to be
understood as the U.S.-based Chaum group?

Thanks in advance for any information, I hope we can get more
cooperation where our goals overlap; it seems to me like we have
many common goals.





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "L. Detweiler" <ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Date: Wed, 29 Dec 93 20:36:40 PST
To: cypherwonks@lists.eunet.fi
Subject: On Troublemakers and Torture Techniques
Message-ID: <199312300432.VAA27815@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Hello, a long time ago I suggested on the cypherpunks list that
people be limited in the tentacles and anonymous IDs they be
permitted to use in Internet mailing lists and groups dedicated
to serious subjects and goals such as project development. This
fell on deaf ears at the time but perhaps the atmosphere and
climate is more suitable at this time for both groups to consider
ideas that will prevent their being tormented by troublemakers.

One of the best ideas I have I like for its utter simplicity. The
idea is this: the mailing list software tracks how long someone
has had their email address subscribed. When they post, a field
added by the list software broadcasts to the world how `old' they
are. This is an interesting measure of their `wisdom' on the
group. In the real world, we defer to people based on their age
all the time; it is a basic aspect of our human interaction.

Now, I know that there are objections to this kind of tracking,
but it seems to me they come mostly from people who like to
invade others attention with tentacles and anonymous posts. (Note
that under the scheme, all anonymous posts or for that matter
anything from `outsiders' gets a rating of 0 days old.)
Nevertheless I think that this is a very reasonable measure of
`credibility' and would be appreciated by everyone who is
interested in building their own filtering tools. We need to get
more information to individuals to make logical choices about
filtering; today it is `every man for himself.'

The second idea is this: let the list software track how much
that certain people's postings are *replied* to. In a sense, this
is a measure of their `relevance'. If I am continually posting
messages that get no response at all, I am probably doing
something wrong, like asking annoying newbie questions or posting
on topics that are outside the charter. On the other hand, if I
consistently get huge chains of interesting feedback on the list
started, it suggests that what I am writing about is inherently
interesting to everyone on the list. Now, when I post and an
extra header tells everyone how `interesting' I am by this
criteria, they can judge for themselves if I have a personality
that is `irrelevant' or `fascinating' and reply to the list or
privately based on that.

The `reply tracking' has some extra considerations. One of the
problems is that people tend to respond to posts that they think
are irrelevant with further flames. But this just tends to start
a chain reaction of meta-postings in which all the regular topics
are buried in. I think that this suggests a fundamental frailty
and deficiency in human nature: the inability to `turn the other
cheek' when offended. Imagine! In cyberspace, all you have to do
to neutralize a troublemaker is to delete his messages! But
people cannot even do that. They believe that in cyberspace, as
in all other realms of their life, justice is an eye for an eye
and a tooth for a tooth and a flame for a flame. If someone makes
you miserable, the only justifiable response (so it goes) is to
make them miserable themselves.

So, I think this new list software that tracked *responses* to
messages would be very valuable in encouraging people to take the
`Christian' approach of not counterattacking a tormenter but
absorbing their hatred. Because, if you *did* respond to them
with flames, it would actually aid their `reply count' rating,
and you don't want to aid them in any way whatsoever, of course!
So perhaps these new rating systems will actually encourage
*real* `moderation' and forbearance. Once again, I urge everyone
`out there' to experiment with new systems to encourage
responsible and courteous Cyberspatial interactions.





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "L. Detweiler" <ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Date: Wed, 29 Dec 93 20:37:53 PST
To: colorado_cypherpunks@vis.colostate.edu
Subject: Paranoia Strikes Deep...
Message-ID: <199312300432.VAA27831@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Hello, I have been hearing some rumors about the cypherpunks
being `penetrated' by some spies and areas of the Internet
(mailing lists, newsgroups, private mail, journal articles, etc.)
being targeted with `tentacle' infiltrations. I thought this was
kind of fascinating to contemplate how they would behave. It
seems to me that loyalty is very hard to judge by mere email
messages alone, and that these hypothetical spies might take that
to their advantage. Here are some of the things that either
cypherpunk loyalists (cyberanarchists) or cy{b,ph}erwonk spies
might say to gain credibility and further `intelligence' from
insiders:

- L.Detweiler is insane, has sent death threats, is behind
S.Boxx, is involved in cyberspatial guerrila warfare, is the
mastermind of a spy plot, etc. He is the only person in the world
who cares about pseudospoofing. (All the complete ad hominem
fantasy stuff).

- `T.C. May and E.Hughes and J.Gilmore are all outstanding and
upstanding net citizens, have never pseudospoofed or done
anything wrong, and are the target of an anonymous smear campaign
by terrorists.'

- `I have been to cypherpunk meetings and parties, and I have met
all the people who have been accused of being tentacles, and they
are all real. In fact, I saw their drivers licenses.' `Someone
accused of being a tentacle actually lives with me.'

- There are no conspiracies whatsoever going on inside the
cypherpunks, including drug use by `leaders' or pseudospoofing or
other illegitimate activities.

-  Lies are liberating. `We have a right to lie to the media and
other people through tentacles.' One can make a game out of
infecting respectable media outlets like Wired and NYT with
elaborate deceptions.

- Pseudospoofing is liberating. `You are only as good as the
number of identities you can project on the internet; this is a
feature, not a bug.' The Enders Game book (Orson Scott Card?) is
an example of the liberating effect of pseudospoofing on freeing
people from their arbitrary prejudices about human identity and
accountability.

- There's no big deal about black marketeering or tax evasion.
Everyone does it. It's a survival tactic in a brutal world of
corrupt governments and massive corporations out to oppress the
little guy. We are entering a New World Order where anarchy will
rule and all governments will crumble.

- Blacknet is a harmless and visionary cyberspatial experiment
done by T.C.May.

- `Please take these annoying discussions about secret
conspiracies elsewhere.'

Of course, if any of these statements are by the spies, they are
just trying to build up your trust so that they can betray you
later when they have the proper opportunity. Or, sometimes, there
is the dictum that `intelligence is more valuable than
liquidation' and they may continue to deceive you just for the
valuable intelligence indefinately.

* * *


Then there may be some `tentacles' out there that are being
driven by the counterrevolutionaries bent on destroying the
Cyberanarchist movement and interested in getting some of their
own propaganda out there. These would be indistinguishable from
cy{b,ph}erwonk loyalists.

- L.Detweiler is brilliant, has made stellar net contributions,
has never sent death threats, no evidence exists that he is
behind S.Boxx, he has spoken out against cyberspatial guerrila
warfare, is the mastermind of a new mailing list but talk of a
spy plot is preposterous, etc. He is one of many in the world who
cares very seriously about pseudospoofing as all his writing in
e.g. RISKS and CUD attests. 

- `Very little is know about T.C. May and E.Hughes and J.Gilmore
as far as their personalities, and in fact J.Gilmore has admitted
publicly to drug use, and all vehemently resist making
unequivocal public or private statements on pseudospoofing,
although they do seem to be the target of an anonymous smear
campaign by the anonymous person S.Boxx, but with some disturbing
elements of truth.'

- `I have never been to cypherpunk meetings and parties, and I am
suspicious of the behavior of many of the `people' L.Detweiler
has accused of being tentacles, because of the lack of verifiable
information and a sort of `cardboard cutout' flavor to their
personalities. There seems to be some desperate damage control
going on.'

- There seem to be some actual conspiracies going on inside the
cypherpunks, including drug use by `leaders' or pseudospoofing or
other illegitimate activities.

-  Lies are lies. `No one has a right to lie to the media or
other people through tentacles.' Anyone who makes a game out of
infecting respectable media outlets like Wired and NYT with
elaborate deceptions is malicious, depraved, and perverted.

- Pseudospoofing is perverted. Statements like `You are only as
good as the number of identities you can project on the internet;
this is a feature, not a bug.' are depraved and deluded. The
Enders Game book (Orson Scott Card?) is an example of the very
dangerous effect of pseudospoofing on manipulating people in
their assumptions and presumptions about human identity and
accountability, and for mind control and brainwashing.

- Black marketeering and tax evasion are evil. Though many
promote it, it is toxic to social harmony. Those that promote it
are all hypocrites who claim that they have found new societies
that are free of it, but have found only societies of poisonous
distrust and paranoia. The whole purpose of governments and
corporations is to serve people, and if they fail to do so they
need to be adjusted but not destroyed.

- `Please don't censor these fascinating discussions about secret
conspiracies and cyberanarchists.'


* * *

It's quite a pity that in Cyberspace, to borrow a phrase that is
rapidly becoming a cliche, no one knows if you are a spy. Perhaps
we can work together to build systems that minimize this kind of
rampant paranoia. It's really a shame that someone with a grudge
against any mailing list or its leaders could so disrupt its
smooth flowing operation with no repercussions. I have some ideas
for preventing this, and in fact I encourage anyone else who does
to join the Cy{ph,b}erwonks list and discuss these issues
associated with Electronic Democracy.

``The first casualty in war is the truth.'' There is a saying in
war, `shoot them all and let God sort them out.' Perhaps in these
turbulent times, this message represents a `list all the rumors
and let the People sort them out.' I hope the truth prevails in
Cyberspace as it does in the real world. Our own controversies,
such as those above, will serve as an interesting experiment.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "L. Detweiler" <ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Date: Wed, 29 Dec 93 20:37:14 PST
To: colorado_cypherpunks@vis.colostate.edu
Subject: ...Into your life it will creep
Message-ID: <199312300432.VAA27833@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Hello {CA,CO,Internet} cy{ph,b}er{wo,pu}nks. Many cypherpunks
have told me that trust is not an inherent element of daily life
and that new features of cyberspace such as digital signatures
make things like human trust obsolete. This reminds me of a poem
that I saw by S.Boxx.

===cut=here===

How do I Trust Thee?
S.Boxx <na12070@anon.penet.fi>


How do I trust thee?
Let me count the ways.
Some sofware I get free,
and have used for many days;
I trust the program author
is not waging Virus War.

I trust that when I need a key
The one I seek is there for me.
And where a map depicts one door
I don't stumble into four!

I trust you not to peek
When it's anonymity I seek;
The cypherpunk remailers
must be free from failures!

You trust that when you send me mail,
privacy isn't broken by a cyberspatial wail!

All our mailboxes
Are open to the world,
To mailbombs and S.Boxxes
and vicious insults hurled.

I trust that when you hear my name,
You will not smear me with the blame
of another arsonist's black flame,
My reputation you will not defame,
My friends escape your poison aim!

My messages go to many lists,
I trust they go to all--
Though I've seen Dictators' fists
And when they hit a wall--
If you notice that they do,
I dearly hope to hear from you.

(Afer all,
if you should fall,
or if you burn,
you'll quickly learn,
Cyberspatial liquidation
Is like anarchy in a nation.)

We all trust that our leaders
are not evil breeders,
and not Draculean feeders!
We trust that when we hear `true' stories,
They're not cruel lies for somebody's false glories.

We trust that we aren't living lies,
We trust our friends are friends, not spies:
In dark hours their light lives, not dies.

Otherwise their rotten smell
Will not make you feel well--
Even be your living hell.
Eventually your mind will drench,
Permeated by their putrid stench,
Finally your sanity will wrench.

Above all else we trust our foes
Not to lash us for their woes,
That whatever it is they think we owe,
Whatever secret sin of theirs we know,
They avoid the `brick-through-window' throw.
We pray that even while we doze,
Their fuse or dynamite never goes...

Not to assail me with deadly blows,
Not to kill me for merely stepping on some toes.





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "L. Detweiler" <ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Date: Wed, 29 Dec 93 20:33:19 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Cypherpunks & Clipper
Message-ID: <199312300432.VAA27838@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Hello darlings. I heard a rumor that Mr.May has requested that
everyone stop talking about Clipper on this list, saying it was
`time to move on'. Or maybe it was one of his tentacles, say
Wonderer. (It's hard to keep track, as you all know!) Anyway, I
have written a lot about Clipper when it first came out on the
list, and I have seen a lot of interest here, so I'm kind of
mixed up. I have to admit my feelings are kind of hurt to hear
Mr. May just kind of dismiss all the hard work of everyone who
has lobbied against it here.  Maybe everyone who has an opinion
on this could post to the list -- is Clipper dead? Should we stop
talking about it? Do cypherpunks have better things to do with
their time?

p.s. many cypherpunks have objected to my long postings, so I
will try to post some shorter ones. I'm here to serve you, a
fellow cypherpunk and human being, in whatever way I can.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: gnu (John Gilmore)
Date: Thu, 30 Dec 93 02:22:59 PST
To: cypherpunks
Subject: Revised Clipper FOIA results from Asst Secretary of Defense
Message-ID: <9312301021.AA19157@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


We sent in an administrative appeal on June 17th, 1993, of various
things that were withheld in the response to our FOIA request.  The
Office of the Secretary of Defense responded on December 21, 1993 --
six months later.  (By law, agencies have twenty business days to
respond to an administrative appeal.  However, agencies regularly
violate all FOIA time limits because the courts have largely refused to
censure agencies for breaking the law, and have refused to force
agencies to follow the law.  I will point this out each time it happens,
largely to educate you -- the general public -- about how pervasive a
problem this is.)

We did an administrative appeal of the parts they withheld and other
documents they did not provide.  The result is that one more doc came
out (a cover sheet for a review copy of the President's actual
directive, which is still classified and has been referred back to the
National Security Council for processing), and the previously withheld
paragraph of the last two memos below is now only blacked out for a sentence
or two.

The newly released text is highlighted with XXXX's and explanation.

	John Gilmore


	[This page originally XXXXXXXXXXXXXXX TOP SECRET; now UNCLASSIFIED]

OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, DC  20301-3040

COMMAND CONTROL COMMUNICATIONS AND 
INTELLIGENCE

MEMORANDUM FOR MS. JOANN H. GRUBE, NSA 
REPRESENTATIVE/NSC PRD-27 EXPORT CONTROL 
WORKING GROUP

SUBJECT:  Comments on PRD-27/NSA Draft (U)

	(U)	Following are comments concerning your proposed 
memorandum to Jim Lewis, Department of State:

XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
XXXXXXXXXX blacked out via FOIA (b)(1) exemption. XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

	(U)	The assertions in this draft are merely unsupported 
statements.  Recommend that the memorandum provide more 
empirical evidence to back up its assertions, and that the above 
comments be reflected in its contents.

	(signed)
	Daniel J. Ryan
	Director, Information Systems Security

CLASSIFIED BY:  OASD(C3I)/DIR, ISS
DECLASSIFY ON:  OADR


	[This page originally XXXXXXXX SECRET; now UNCLASSIFIED]

OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON DC 20301-3040

COMMAND, CONTROL, COMMUNICATIONS AND
INTELLIGENCE

30 APR 1993  (stamped)

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ACTING ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (C3I)

Subject:  PRD/NSC-27 Advanced Telecommunications and Encryption (U)

(U)	Advances in telecommunications have created the
opportunity for public use of encryption to ensure the privacy and
integrity of business and personal communications.  These same
advances threaten the capabilities of law enforcement and national
security operations that intercept the communications of
narcotraffickers, organized criminals, terrorists, espionage agents
of foreign powers and SIGINT targets.  Diverse interests are in
diametric opposition with regard to industry's right to sell and the
public's right to use such capabilities.  A highly-emotional, spirited
public debate is likely.

(U)	In its simplest construct, this complex set of issues places
the public's right to privacy in opposition to the public's desire for
safety.  The law enforcement and national security communities
argue that if the public's right to privacy prevails and free use of
cryptography is allowed, criminals and spies will avoid wiretaps
and other intercepts and consequently prosper.  They propose that
cryptography be made available and required which contains a
"trapdoor" that would allow law enforcement and national security
officials, under proper supervision, to decrypt enciphered
communications.  Such cryptography exists, and while there are
many practical problems to be solved, this proposal is technically
possible to achieve.

(U)	Opponents of the proposal argue that the public has a right
to and an expectation of privacy, that a trapdoor system would be
prone to misuse and abuse, and that the proposed solution would
not work in any practical sense.  They assert that people who are
deliberately breaking much more serious laws would not hesitate to
use cryptography that does not have a trapdoor, and that secure
cryptography will inevitably be supplied by offshore companies.
Thus, freedom will be lost and many tax dollars spent to no effect.

(U)	This situation is complicated by the existence of other
interests.  For example, there currently exist strict controls on the
export of cryptography.  The computer industry points out that it
has one of the few remaining positive trade balances and that it is
vital that the dominance of the American computer industry in
world markets be preserved.  The industry fears that this will be
lost if offshore developers incorporate high-quality cryptography
into their products while U.S. industry either cannot do so or
suffers higher costs or delays due to requirements for export
licenses.  The industry argues persuasively that overseas markets
(much less drug lords or spies) will not look with favor on U.S.
products which have known trapdoors when offshore products
which do not have them are available.  In support of their
argument, they note that powerful public-key cryptography
developed and patented by RSA using U.S. tax dollars is free to
developers in Europe, subject to royalties in the United States, and
cannot be exported without expensive and time-late export
licenses.  These charges are true.

(U)	The national security community is especially interested in
preventing the spread of high-quality encipherment routines
overseas, and argues that more extensive use here at home will
inevitably result in such a proliferation.  Actually, it is too late.
The Data Encryption Standard (DES) is already widely available
throughout the world in both hardware and software forms, and
DES software can be downloaded anywhere in the world from
public bulletin boards by anyone with a PC, a MODEM and a
telephone.  In one recent experiment it took three minutes and
fourteen seconds to locate a source-code version of DES on the
INTERNET.  Widespread availability of DES and RSA will enable
offshore developers to provide high-quality encipherment for voice
and data communications in competition with U.S. industry's
products.

XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
XXXX The entire paragraph that follows was originally withheld as XX
XXXX classified information.  We appealed the withholding, and XXXXX
XXXX most of the paragraph was released, with only one or two XXXXXX
XXXX sentences withheld at the bottom. XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

  [(S) crossed out, replaced by] (U)  Trapdoor encryption technology is
not essential to the debate (a system that required the escrow of keys
by users of cryptographic technologies could be established even if
the trapdoor chips did not exist), proposed use of trapdoor technology
does raise a further complication: neither the academic community nor
private industry is comfortable with encryption algorithms that are
kept secret, as will be the case with the trapdoor chip.  It has been
suggested that an independent panel of cryptography experts will be
invited to evaluate the algorithm.  This will undoubtedly fail to
reassure the community at large that there are no unrecognized
vulneratilities, since the panel will be perceived as captive and
tainted.  XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
XXXX One or two sentences blacked out via FOIA exemption (b)(1) XXXX

(U)	Despite these concerns, the President has directed that the
Attorney General request that manufacturers of communications
hardware use the trapdoor chip, and at least AT&T has been
reported willing to do so (having been suitably incentivised by
promises of Government purchases).  The Attorney General has
also been directed to create a system for escrow of key material.
The Secretary of Commerce has been directed to produce standards
based on the use of the trapdoor chip.

(U)	The President has also directed that the fact that law
enforcement officials will have access to the keys will not be
concealed from the public.  National security officials are not
mentioned.

(U)	The new administration is committed to the development of
an information superhighway and a National Information
Infrastructure in support of the economy.  This worthy goal is
independent of arguments as to whether or not law enforcement
and national security officials will be able to read at will traffic
passing along the information superhighway.  A full-scale public
debate is needed to ascertain the wishes of U.S. citizens with
regard to their privacy, and the impact on public safety of
preserving privacy at the expense of wiretapping and
communications intercept capabilities of law enforcement and
national security personnel.  It is not clear what the public will
decide.  In the meantime, DoD has trapdoor technology and the
Government is proceeding with development of the processes
needed to apply that technology in order to maintain the capability
to perform licit intercept of communications in support of law
enforcement and national security.

	(signed)
	Ray Pollari
	Acting DASD (CI & SCM)


	[This page originally SECRET; now UNCLASSIFIED]

ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON DC  20301-3040

May 3, 1993

COMMAND, CONTROL, COMMUNICATIONS AND
INTELLIGENCE

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

MEMORANDUM FOR DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
FROM:		CHARLES A. HAWKINS, JR., ACTING ASD(C3I)  (initialed C. Hxxx)
SUBJECT:	Advanced Telecommunications and Encryption (U)
PURPOSE:	INFORMATION

DISCUSSION:	(U)  In response to DEPSECDEF's tasking of
21 Apr 93 (TAB A) this information is provided.  Advances in
telecommunications have created the opportunity for public use of
encryption to ensure the privacy and integrity of business and
personal communications.  These same advances threaten the
capabilities of law enforcement and national security operations that
intercept the communications of narcotraffickers, organized
criminals, terrorists, espionage agents of foreign powers and a broad
range of SIGINT targets.  Diverse interests are in diametric
opposition with regard to industry's right to sell and the public's right
to use such capabilities.  A highly-emotional, spirited public debate
is likely.

	(U)  The law enforcement and national security communities
argue that if the public's right to privacy prevails and free use of
cryptography is allowed, criminals and spies will avoid wiretaps and
other intercepts.  They propose that cryptography be made available
to the public which contains a "trapdoor" that would allow law
enforcement and national security officials, under proper
supervision, to decrypt enciphered communications.  Such
cryptography exists, and while there are many practical problems to
be solved, this proposal is technically possible to implement.

	(U)  Opponents of the proposal argue that the public has a
right to and expectation of privacy, that such a system would be
prone to misuse and abuse, and that the proposed solution would not
work in any practical sense.  They assert that criminals and spies will
not hesitate to use secure cryptography supplied by offshore
companies.  Thus, the loss of privacy would outweigh any
advantages to law enforcement or national security.

	(U)  The computer industry points out that it has one of the
few remaining positive trade balances and that it is vital that the
dominance of the American computer industry in world markets be
preserved.  The industry fears that this will be lost if offshore
developers incorporate high-quality cryptography into their products
while U.S. industry either cannot do so or suffers higher costs or
delays due to requirements for export licenses because of strict
controls of export of cryptography.  The industry argues persuasively
that overseas markets (much less drug lords or spies) will not look
with favor on U.S. products which have known trapdoors when
offshore products which do not have them are available.

CLASSIFIED BY:	DASD(CI&SCM)
DECLASSIFY ON:	OADR


	[This page originally XXXXXXXX SECRET; now UNCLASSIFIED]


	(U)  The national security community is especially interested
in preventing the spread of high-quality encipherment routines
overseas, and argues that more extensive use here at home will
inevitably result in such a proliferation.  This would increase the cost
of performing the SIGINT mission or decrease the amount of
intelligence, or both.  The Data Encryption Standard (DES) is
already widely available throughout the world in both hardware and
software forms, and DES software can be downloaded anywhere in
the world from public bulletin boards by anyone with a PC, a
MODEM, and a telephone.  Thus far, widespread availability has not
led to widespread use.  However, widespread availability of DES and
RSA will make it possible for offshore developers to provide high-
quality encipherment for voice and data communications in
competition with U.S. industry's products.

XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
XXXX The entire paragraph that follows was originally withheld as XX
XXXX classified information.  We appealed the withholding, and XXXXX
XXXX most of the paragraph was released, with only one or two XXXXXX
XXXX sentences withheld at the bottom. XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

  [(S) crossed out, replaced by] (U)  Trapdoor encryption technology is
not essential to the debate since a system that required the escrow of
keys by users of cryptographic technologies could be established even
if the trapdoor chips did not exist.  Proposed use of trapdoor
technology does raise a further complication: neither the academic
community nor private industry is comfortable with encryption
algorithms that are kept secret, as will be the case with the trapdoor
chip.  It has been suggested that an independent panel of cryptography
experts will be invited to evaluate the algorithm.  This will not
reassure the community at large that there are no unrecognized
vulneratilities, since the panel will be perceived as captive and
tainted.  XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
XXXX One or two sentences blacked out via FOIA exemption (b)(1) XXXX

	(U)  The President has directed that the Attorney General
request that manufacturers of communications hardware use the
trapdoor chip.  The Attorney General has also been directed to create
a system for escrow of key material.  The Secretary of Commerce
has been directed to produce standards based on the use of the
trapdoor chip.  The President has also directed that the fact that law
enforcement officials will have access to the keys will not be
concealed from the public.  National security officials are not
mentioned.

	(U)  The new administration is committed to the development
of an information superhighway and a National Information
Infrastructure in support of the economy.  This worthy goal is
independent of arguments as to whether or not law enforcement and
national security officials will be able to read at will traffic passing
along the information superhighway.  A full-scale public debate is
beginning which will ascertain the wishes of U.S. citizens with
regard to their privacy and the impact on public safety of preserving
privacy at the expense of wiretapping and communications intercept
capabilities of law enforcement and national security personnel.  It is
not clear what the public will decide.  In the meantime, DoD has
trapdoor technology and the Government is proceeding with
development of the processes needed to apply that technology in
order to maintain the capability to perform licit intercept of
communications in support of law enforcement and national security.

Prepared by:  Dan Ryan/ODASD(CI & SCM)/x 41779/28 Apr 93/OSD
-- 
John Gilmore                gnu@toad.com  --  gnu@cygnus.com  --  gnu@eff.org
  ``This committee has not tried to determine whether the National Security
  Agency tendency to advance exaggerated claims of authority ... stems from
  conscious policy or the actions of individual NSA employees.''
The Government's Classification of Private Ideas, House Report 96-1540, p. 67




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: baldwin@LAT.COM (Bob Baldwin)
Date: Thu, 30 Dec 93 09:30:44 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Trapdoor vs. Escrow
Message-ID: <9312301653.AA20061@LAT.COM>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


	I was shock when I read the material in John Gilmore's message
of 12/30/93 (Revised Clipper FOIA results from Asst Secretary of Defense).
It strongly suggests that the government has two options:
1. Key Escrow, and
2. Trapdoor chips.
	The comment about ATT being willing to make the chips suggests
that the clipper/Capstone project includes BOTH Key Escrow and Trap Door.
The chips would use a subliminal channel (like the bits that can be
hidden in a DSS signature) to reveal the chips key.  Presumably the
revealed key is encrypted to make sure that only the "good guys" can
recover the key.

	Notice that the NSA has plenty of motivation to have already
developed trapdoor chips long before the need to use them in public
cryptography.  The US exports its crypto hardware to "friendly nations"
and has a strong interest in being able to read our friend's traffic.
The old fashion way of doing this was to sell old crypto hardware to
these nations even though the NSA new how to break the systems.
I recall that an NSA employee went to jail for telling Sweden that
the NSA knew how to break the Hagelin cipher machine at the end of WWII
when the US gave Sweden and other nations a large number of these machines.
Given the length of the jail sentence (30 years), I suspect that he did
other crimes, but the government did not want to expose them.
	Perhaps the modern way of reading our friends traffic is
to sell them chips that reveal key bits via a subliminal channel.
		--Bob Baldwin





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Alan (Miburi-san) Wexelblat" <wex@media.mit.edu>
Date: Thu, 30 Dec 93 07:43:16 PST
To: gnu@toad.com
Subject: Revised Clipper FOIA results from Asst Secretary of Defense
In-Reply-To: <9312301021.AA19157@toad.com>
Message-ID: <9312301542.AA09159@media.mit.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I like it.  We can just call it the "trapdoor chip" from now on.

Thanks!

--Alan Wexelblat, Reality Hacker, Author, and Cyberspace Bard
Media Lab - Advanced Human Interface Group	wex@media.mit.edu
Voice: 617-258-9168 Page: 617-945-1842		an53607@anon.penet.fi
The belief that enhanced understanding will necessarily stir a nation to
action is one of mankind's oldest illusions.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: jerry@terminus.dell.com (Jeremy Porter)
Date: Thu, 30 Dec 93 11:38:13 PST
To: m5@vail.tivoli.com
Subject: Re: GPS and security
In-Reply-To: <2fq4rk$t78@uudell.us.dell.com>
Message-ID: <9312301933.AA11484@terminus.us.dell.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


In article <2fq4rk$t78@uudell.us.dell.com> you write:
>From: m5@vail.tivoli.com (Mike McNally)
>Subject: GPS and security
>
>
>CBS's "60 Minutes" had a "Oooh Scarey" segment about the Global
>Positioning System last Sunday.  The scarey part is, according to 60
>Minutes, that any old terrorist government can now put together
>accurate guided missles and wreak death and destruction upon our
>homeland.  The crux of the problem is that the system broadcasts out
>positioning information to one and all indiscriminately, and according
>to the show there's no way we can stop it.
A couple of points here.  Any terrorist group can get pin-point accuracy
with a suitcase bomb.  Someone could have launched an ICBM at the
world trade center, but it was much cheaper to just rent a truck.
Terriorist don't need high-tech.

GPS has two modes, civilian and military modes.  When the GPS is operating
in "secure" mode civilian access gives 10meter accuracy.  The military
codes give accuarcy down to ~1meter.  The GPS broadcasts using a spread
spectrum mode and the encoding is based on the frequency hopping.  

Now if a military unit wanted to blow up your tank, they would need the
1meter accuarcy.

During desert storm, the u.s. military turned off the secure mode,
because all of the equipment they had use the civilian mode.
>Because my mind is regularly exposed to wild conspiracy theories and
...
>they could be told to do several things in case of national emergency:
>
>*	Shut down (probably possible; they may have actually mentioned
>this on the show).  Problem is that lots of friendlies may grow to
>rely on the data for life-critical things, like guiding commercial
>airliners.
All of the systems I know of, including airplanes and ocean going
ships has LORAN C, GPS and inertial nagivation systems.  Currently
there are still holes in GPS coverage, to get a "good" fix, you
need three satilites overhead.   Currently there are still gaps where
only two satilites are available.

>*	Shut down normal transmission and begin strongly encrypted
>transmission.  No mention of this; apparently, the satellites were
>originally designed with some sort of weak system that made the data
>difficult to use for high-accuracy purposes, but that's been defeated
>(by the FAA or someone contracted thereto).

Actually the system was designed to offer the two modes, but advances
in technology have allowed the GPS reciever people to take into account
things like relativity(high speed satilites, freq shifts etc.), using
more than 3 satilites to get a better fix, averaging techniques etc.
With some more complex equipment and a "known" reference you can
use GPS to measure down to centimeter accuarcy.  Not at very high
speeds though...

>I don't know much about how this system works, so I don't know whether
>any of my thoughts are relevant.  It's probably most likely that the
>government indeed blasted these things up into space without
>considering using encryption technology to enhance security.

Actually the government put a lot of thought into the security, but
seeing as the actual data is just timecode pulses, its not real easy
to secure, but with a good encryption and a frequency hopping setup
like GPS, you can do a lot.

I think that there are provisions for disabling the civilian channel
altogether during wartime.  It would be interesting to see what
happens to MCI, Sprint, etc that use GPS to syncronize they're 
high speed syncronis optical networks...  The should work fine for
several hours but after a couple of days, the phase a frequency errors
in the timecode equipment would lead to a high error rate.
MCI and sprint may also use LORAN C for backup, I don't remember.

-- 
| Jeremy Porter  -----------------  Dell Computer Corp. ----
| Systems Engineering --- jerry@terminus.us.dell.com --------
|-------------------------------------------------------------
|  Support your Second Amendment rights to encryption technology. 




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Hal <hfinney@shell.portal.com>
Date: Thu, 30 Dec 93 15:58:16 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Trapdoor vs. Escrow
Message-ID: <199312302354.PAA23404@jobe.shell.portal.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I think the term "trapdoor" in this context merely refers to known
characteristics of the Clipper chip and does not imply any additional
abilities to decrypt messages other than what has been revealed.

A "trapdoor" is generally some secret which allows you to decrypt
messages which could not be decrypted without the secret.  It is
normally applied in the context of one-way functions but I suppose
an encryption system could be thought of as one-way.  In this case
I think the trapdoor may just refer to the Law Enforcement field
which, upon decryption, allows information to be recovered so that
the message can be read without the user's cooperation.

The comment about the trapdoor issue being independent of the escrow
issue harked back to Denning's original suggestion, which was that all
users of encryption would have to escrow their keys with the government.
This could be done in the context of any cryptosystem, such as DES or
RSA.  The trapdoor makes the system more convenient for users, hence
perhaps more acceptable.  But the escrow provision is the aspect that
the government really cares about.

BTW, there were some comments on sci.crypt about how this review document
showed that the government was not as opposed to our views as had been
thought.  On the contrary, my take was that this document reflected
something of a maverick view, one which was not politically acceptable
with those in authority.  Note the critical comments about the document
containing unsupported assertions, a common buzzword for "views I don't
agree with."  I don't think the author of this review has helped his
career.

Hal Finney
hfinney@shell.portal.com




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Bradley W. Dolan" <71431.2564@CompuServe.COM>
Date: Thu, 30 Dec 93 13:53:15 PST
To: <cypherpunks@toad.com>
Subject: Here we go again ...
Message-ID: <931230214844_71431.2564_FHA42-1@CompuServe.COM>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I am one of those evil troglodyte NRA members mama Janet warned about.
Along with my ignorant red-necked bretheren, I have protested increasing 
encroachment on my right to keep and bear arms.  The standard pattern of 
the encroachment has been for our philosopher-kings to publicize incidents 
wherein something bad occurred involving a firearm, followed up by
rules infringing upon our rights in the name of public safety.

Lately the philosopher-kings have discovered the internet.  Today, the FBI
has announced that an evil bomber may be using it.  I fully expect to hear 
soon that bad people may be using crypto on the net for nefarious purposes,
and that crypto should be outlawed.  It's deja vu all over again.

bdolan@well.sf.ca.us      ask for PGP data





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: jdwilson@gold.chem.hawaii.edu (Jim Wilson (VA))
Date: Thu, 30 Dec 93 22:08:18 PST
To: kootz@well.sf.ca.us (Brenden Kootsey)
Subject: Re: GPS and security
In-Reply-To: <199312282158.NAA19690@well.sf.ca.us>
Message-ID: <9312310603.AA03298@gold.chem.hawaii.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Re GPS & weapons delivery - 

With nuclear weapons you don't have to be all that accurate, +/- 50 miles
still gets the job done  ;-)

-Jim





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Anonymous <nowhere@bsu-cs.bsu.edu>
Date: Thu, 30 Dec 93 17:28:14 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: "Almost 2001" -- NBC transcripts available via Gopher
Message-ID: <9312310128.AA25481@bsu-cs.bsu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


forwarded message -


From: kadie@eff.org (Carl M. Kadie)
Newsgroups: comp.org.eff.talk
Subject: NBC transcripts
Date: 30 Dec 1993 19:29:20 -0500
Organization: Electronic Frontier Foundation

To see transcripts of "Almost 2001: an NBC [News] series on the
communications revolution", try:

gopher -p1/Communications/2001 gopher.well.sf.ca.us 70

- Carl

-- 
Carl Kadie -- I do not represent EFF; this is just me.
 =kadie@eff.org, kadie@cs.uiuc.edu =





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Anonymous <nowhere@bsu-cs.bsu.edu>
Date: Thu, 30 Dec 93 18:29:33 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: End of Year E-Zine Listing
Message-ID: <9312310226.AA28681@bsu-cs.bsu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Once again, we find ourselves facing a new jahre and pondering
the untold wonders of the anarchy of cyberspace!

In celebration of this joyous occasion, I've decided to 
post a compilation of electronic 'zines for your perusal.

I especially like the reference for Practical Anarchy and will
probably send a copy of this message to our old chum, Larry
"the squid" Detweiler.

Enjoy,

- Spooge

/---------------- good stuff follows ------------------/


Last updated: 27-Aug-93 by John Labovitz <johnl@netcom.com>

This is a summary of electronically-accessible zines.  The format should 
be fairly self-explanatory.  In most cases, descriptions are excerpted from 
the masthead of the zine listed.

[For those of you not acquainted with the zine world, "zine" is short for 
either "fanzine" or "magazine," depending on your point of view.  Zines are 
generally produced by one person or a small group of people, done mostly for 
fun, and often irreverent, bizarre, and/or esoteric.  Zines are not 
"mainstream" publications -- they generally do not contain advertisements 
(except, sometimes, advertisements for other zines), do not have a large 
subscriber base, and are not produced to make money.]

If you have any additions, deletions, or changes to this list, please email
them to johnl@netcom.com.

I will post this list (and/or changes to the list) to various mailing lists 
and Usenet news groups.  It can also be obtained via anonymous FTP from 
netcom.com as "/pub/johnl/zines/e-zine-list", and via email (either single 
issues or subscriptions) from e-zines-request@netcom.com.

If you publish an e-zine, or know someone who does, please send a copy to 
e-zines@netcom.com and I'll add the relevant info to this database.

All comments, suggestions, changes, deletions, etc., are welcomed and 
encouraged.

        John Labovitz
        johnl@netcom.com

-----

Arm The Spirit
 "Arm The Spirit is a anti-imperialist/autonomist collective that 
  disseminates information about liberation struggles in advanced capitalist 
  countries and in the so-called 'Third World.'  Our focus is on armed 
  struggle and other forms of militant resistance but we do not limit 
  ourselves to this.  In Arm The Spirit you can find news on political 
  prisoners in North America and Europe, information on the struggles of 
  Indigenous peoples in the Americas, communiques from guerrilla groups, 
  debate and discussion on armed struggle and much more. We also attempt 
  to cover anti-colonial national liberation struggles in Kurdistan, 
  Puerto Rico, Euskadi and elsewhere."

  Editor(s): Autonome Forum <aforum@moose.uvm.edu>
     Format: ASCII text
        FTP: etext.archive.umich.edu:/pub/Politics/Arm.the.Spirit
     E-Mail: aforum@moose.uvm.edu, subject: "ATS: e-mail request"
     Postal: Arm The Spirit, c/o Wild Seed Press, POB 57584, Jackson Stn.,
               Hamilton, Ontario, L8P 4X3, Canada
             Arm The Spirit, c/o Autonome Forum, POB 1242,
               Burlington, VT 05402-1242, USA
      Phone: +1 416 527 2419 (FAX for Canadian group)


Armadillo Culture
 "Being the excremeditation of a hyperactive armadillo's activities, 
  opinions, and other stuff..."

  Editor(s): Steve Okay <sokay@mitre.org>
     Format: ASCII text
        FTP: etext.archive.umich.edu:/pub/Zines/Armadillo.Culture
     Postal: Armadillo Culture, 2857 Foxmill Rd. Herndon, VA 22071, USA


ART COM
 "An online magazine forum dedicated to the interface of contemporary art 
  and new communication technologies."

  Editor(s): Carl Eugene Loeffler <artcomtv@well.sf.ca.us>
     Format: ASCII text
     Usenet: alt.artcom
     Postal: ART COM, POB 193123 Rincon, San Francisco, CA 94119-3123, USA
      Phone: +1 415 431 7524 (voice), +1 415 431 7841 (fax)
      Other: Whole Earth 'Lectronic Link (WELL): ART COM Electronic Network 
               (ACEN)


BLINK
 "BLINK would like to be a forum for the issues surrounding the intersection
  of consciousness and technology.  This is our best defense against
  postmodern angst: To critically look at and anticipate the cultural and
  social changes spurred by the rapid development of technology."

  Editor(s): Justin Kerr <ratsbats@casbah.acns.nwu.edu>
             Joe Germuska (managing editor)
             Danny Dunlavy (chiphead)
             Jake Eldridge (assistant editor)
     Format: ASCII text
        FTP: blink.acns.nwu.edu:/pub/blink
     Gopher: gopher.well.sf.ca.us


Computer Underground Digest
 "An open forum dedicated to sharing information among computerists and 
  to the presentation and debate of diverse views."

  Editor(s): Jim Thomas and Gordon Meyer <TK0JUT2@NIU.BITNET>
     Format: ASCII text
        FTP: ftp.eff.org:/pub/cud
             etext.archive.umich.edu:/pub/CuD/cud
             halcyon.com:/pub/mirror/cud
             aql.gatech.edu;/pub/eff/cud
             ftp.ee.mu.oz.au:/pub/text/CuD (Australia)
             nic.funet.fi:pub/doc/cud (Finland)
             ftp.warwick.ac.uk:pub/cud (United Kingdom)
     Gopher: etext.archive.umich.edu
     Postal: Jim Thomas, Department of Sociology, NIU, DeKalb, IL 60115, USA
      Phone: +1 815 753 0303 (voice), +1 815 753 6302 (fax)
     Usenet: comp.society.cu-digest
 CompuServe: DL0 and DL4 of the IBMBBS SIG; DL1 of LAWSIG; DL1 of TELECOM
      Other: GEnie: PF*NPC RT libraries; VIRUS/SECURITY library
             America Online: PC Telecom forum under "computing newsletters"
             Delphi: General Discussion database of the Internet SIG
             PC-EXEC BBS (+1 414 789 4210)
             Rune Stone BBS (IIRG WHQ) (+1 203 832 8441) NUP:Conspiracy
             RIPCO BBS (+1 312 528 5020)
             via Fidonet File Request from 1:11/70
             ComNet in LUXEMBOURG BBS (+352 466893)
             Bits against the Empire BBS (+39 461 980493) (Italy)


Crash
 "A guide to traveling through the underground.  Alternative travel
  stories, hints, and tips."

  Editor(s): John Labovitz <johnl@netcom.com>
             Miles Poindexter
             Nigel French
     Format: ASCII text
        FTP: netcom.com:/pub/johnl/zines/crash
     Postal: Crash, 519 Castro #7, San Francisco, CA 94114, USA
  

CTHEORY -- Virtual Review of Books for Post-Modem Theory
 "CTHEORY is a new international, electronic review of books on theory, 
  technology and culture. Reviews are posted monthly of key books in 
  contemporary discourse as well as theorisations of major 'event-scenes' in 
  the mediascape. Editors and contributors include: Kathy Acker, Jean 
  Baudrillard, Bruce Sterling, Arthur and Marilouise Kroker, Deena and 
  Michael Weinstein. CTHEORY will also offer the possibility of interactive 
  discussions among its subscribers in the electronic theory 
  'sim-posium/salon.'"

  Editor(s): <ed22@musica.mcgill>
     Format: ASCII text
     E-Mail: LISTSERV@VM1.MCGILL.CA
               with text body: "SUBSCRIBE CTHEORY <full-name>"


Cyberspace Vanguard
 "News and Views of the Science Fiction and Fantasy Universe"

  Editor(s): TJ Goldstein <tlg4@po.cwru.edu>
             Sarah Alexander, Administrator <aa746@po.cwru.edu>
     Format: ASCII text
     E-Mail: cn577@cleveland.freenet.edu
             Cyberspace Vanguard@1:157/564 (FidoNet)
             CVANGUARD (Delphi)
     Postal: Cyberspace Vanguard, POB 25704, Garfield Heights, OH 44125, USA


Drum
 "Drum is not an isolated event but an ongoing process."

  Editor(s): R. Patrick Jones <dh644@cleveland.Freenet.Edu>
     Format: ASCII text
        FTP: etext.archive.umich.edu:/pub/Zines/Drum
     Gopher: gopher.well.sf.ca.us


Ego Project
 "This 'zine is a product of me and as such will contain anything I feel 
  like putting in it.  Whatever I feel like putting in it shall include,
  but is not limited too, anything I feel applies to Gothdom in general.   
  Album/single/tape reviews, book and movies reviews, etc. The Sisters of 
  Mercy and the Mission are my main focuses, but since neither of them 
  put out music on anything resembling a frequent basis I imagine other 
  groups will be featured quite frequently."

  Editor(s): Corey Nelson <ieya@byron.u.washington.edu>
     Format: ASCII text
     Gopher: gopher.well.sf.ca.us
     Postal: Ego Project, 1717 Monroe #b, Bellingham, WA 98225, USA


Factsheet Five / Factsheet Five - Electric
 "FactSheet Five is the central clearinghouse of information about zines,
  those opinionated publications with press runs of 50 to 5000 (often done
  through surrepticious use of on-the-job supplies and xerox).  Mike 
  Gunderloy of Rennsalaer, NY published 44 editions of F5.  Hudson Luce 
  published the final issue, #45.  I opened my big mouth (or, rather, let 
  my fingers blab away) about doing an online, net-accessible version of
  FactSheet Five."

  Editor(s): Jerod Pore <jerod23@well.sf.ca.us> (electronic version)
             Seth Friedman <sethf5@well.sf.ca.us> (paper version)
     Format: ASCII text
        FTP: etext.archive.umich.edu:/pub/Factsheet.Five
             nigel.msen.com:/pub/newsletters/F5-E
             src.doc.ic.ac.uk:/literary/newsletters/factsheet-five
     Gopher: gopher.well.sf.ca.us
       WAIS: nigel.msen.com
     Postal: Factsheet Five, 1800 Market St., San Francisco, CA 94102, USA
               (This is for *BOTH* the electronic and paper versions; 
                or for items that can't be delivered to a PO box)
             Seth Friedman, POB 170099, San Francisco, CA 94117-0099, USA
               (This is for the paper version *only*, especially 
                subscriptions)
      Other: The WELL
             BBSes around the world


FUNHOUSE! -- The cyberzine of degenerate pop culture
 "Dedicated to whatever happens to be on my mind at the time I'm writing.  
  The focus will tend to be on those aspects of our fun-filled world which
  aren't given the attention of the bland traditional media, or which have 
  been woefully misinterpreted or misdiagnosed by the same.  FUNHOUSE! is
  basically a happy place, and thus the only real criteria I will try to 
  meet is to refrain from rants, personal attacks, and flames -- and thus 
  FUNHOUSE! is an apolitical place.  Offbeat films, music, literature, and 
  experiences are largely covered, with the one stipulation that articles 
  are attempted to be detailed and well documemnted, although this is no 
  guarantee of completeness or correctness, so that the interested reader 
  may further pursue something which may spark her interest."

  Editor(s): Jeff Dove <jeffdove@well.sf.ca.us>
     Format: ASCII text
        FTP: netcom.com in /pub/johnl/zines/funhouse


High Weirdness by Email
  random Internet information

  Editor(s): <mporter@nyx.cs.du.edu>
     Format: ASCII text
     Gopher: gopher.well.sf.ca.us


International TeleTimes
 "International Teletimes is a general interest magazine. There are several
  recurring monthly columns but the rest of the content changes from month to
  month as new themes are chosen. The goal of Teletimes is to attract a large
  variety of writers from all over the world so that the readers will be 
  exposed to a great variety of ideas and opinions."

  Editor(s): Ian Wojtowicz <ian@breez.wimsey.com>
     Format: Macintosh Doc-Maker application
        FTP: sumex-aim.stanford.edu:/info-mac/per/teletimes-*.hqx
     Postal: TeleTimes International, 3938 West 30th Ave.,
               Vancouver, BC V6S 1X3, Canada
      Other: OneNet (network of FirstClass BBSes)
  

InterText
 "InterText is a bi-monthly fiction magazine with over 1000 subscribers
  worldwide."

  Editor(s): Jason Snell <intertxt@network.ucsd.edu>
             Geoff Duncan <gaduncan@halcyon.com>
     Format: ASCII text
             PostScript
        FTP: etext.archive.umich.edu:/pub/EFF.journals/InterText
 CompuServe: Electronic Frontier Foundation's "Zines from the Net" section, 
               accessible by typing "GO EFFSIG"


Obscure Electronic
 "OBSCURE is the zine that profiles the people in this publishing subculture."

  Editor(s): James P Romenesko <intertxt@network.ucsd.edu>
     Format: ASCII text
        FTP: etext.archive.umich.edu:/pub/Zines/Obscure.Electric
     Gopher: gopher.well.sf.ca.us
     Postal: POB 1334, Milwaukee, WI 53201, USA


People Power Update
  The newsletter of the bicycle advocacy group "People Power"

  Editor(s): Ron Goodman <goodman@cats.ucsc.edu>
     Format: ASCII text
        FTP: netcom.com:/pub/johnl/zines/ppu
     Postal: People Power, 226 Jeter Street, Santa Cruz, CA 95060, USA
      Phone: +1 408 425 8851 (voice/fax)


Play by EMail
 "Electronic 'zine about free play-by-electronic-mail wargames.  Reviews, 
  game openings, information."

  Editor(s): Greg Lindahl <gl8f@fermi.clas.Virginia.EDU>
     Format: ASCII text
        FTP: ftp.erg.sri.com:/pub/pbm/PBEM-Fanzine
     Gopher: gopher.well.sf.ca.us
     Usenet: rec.games.pbm


Practical Anarchy Online
 "An electronic zine concerning anarchy from a practical point of view, to 
  help you put some anarchy in your everyday life. The anarchy scene is 
  covered through reviews and reports from people in the living anarchy."

  Editor(s): Chuck Munson <cmunson@macc.wisc.edu>
               Bitnet: cmunson@wiscmacc.bitnet
             Mikael Cardell <cardell@lysator.liu.se, 
               Fidonet: Mikael Cardell@2:205/223
     Format: ASCII text
     Gopher: gopher.well.sf.ca.us
     Postal: Practical Anarchy, POB 173, Madison, WI 53701-0173, USA
             Practical Anarchy, c/o Mikael Cardell, Gustav Adolfsgatan 3,
               S-582 20 Linkoping, Sweden


Quanta
 "Quanta is the electronically produced and distributed magazine of science 
  fiction and fantasy.  As such, each issues is packed with fiction from 
  amateur and professional authors from around the world and across the net."

  Editor(s): Daniel K. Appelquist <quanta@andrew.cmu.edu>
     Format: PostScript
             ASCII text
        FTP: export.acs.cmu.edu:/pub/quanta
             ftp.eff.org:/journals/Quanta
             lth.se:/documents/Quanta
             catless.newcastle.ac.uk:/pub/Quanta
     Gopher: gopher-srv.acs.cmu.edu (in the Archives directory)
     Postal: Quanta, 3003 Van Ness St. NW #S919, Washington, DC 20008, USA
 CompuServe: "Zines from  the Net" area of  the EFF forum
               (accessed by typing GO EFFSIG)


Scream Baby
 "What do I want?  Besides world peace, a sexy Mexican maid, and someone to 
  use their fucking brains around here, I want a really good
  all-encompassing-sub-culture zine.  Music, literature, art, television,
  film, weird space-time kinks, events, information, news, humor, interviews,
  and re:views of 'Stuff I Think Is Cool.'  Not all at once, of course.  
  Each issue of Scream Baby will come out whenever I can scrape together 
  25-30 kilobytes of really good stuff."

  Editor(s): Blade X <bladex@bladex@wixer.cactus.org>
     Format: ASCII text
        FTP: etext.archive.umich.edu:/pub/Zines/ScreamBaby
             ftp.eff.org:/pub/journals/ScreamBaby
     Postal: Cyberlicious <tm>, POB 4510, Austin, TX 78765 USA
      Other: WWIV: 46@5285


Unplastic News
 "the odd e-mail magazine w/a fever"

  Editor(s): <tibbetts@hsi.hsi.com>
     Format: ASCII text
        FTP: ftp.eff.org:/pub/cud/misc/journals
             etext.archive.umich.edu:/pub/EFF.journals/Unplastic_News
             quartz.rutgers.edu:pub/journals
     Gopher: gopher.well.sf.ca.us


Voices from the Net
 "There are a lot of folks with at least one foot in this complex region we
  call (much too simply) "the net." There are a lot of voices on these wires.
  From IRC to listservs, MUDspace to e-mail, Usenet group to commercial bbs
  -- all kinds of voices -- loud and quiet, anonymous and well-known. And yet,
  it's far from clear what it might mean to be a "voice" from, or on, the
  net. Enter "Voices from the Net": one attempt to sample, explore, the
  possibilities (or perils) of net.voices. Worrying away at the question.
  Running down the meme. Looking/listening, and reporting back to you."

  Editor(s): Bookish <tibbetts@hsi.hsi.com>
             CountZer0 <mgardbe@andy.bgsu.edu>
             NEURO <fbohann@andy.bgsu.edu>
     Format: Macintosh HyperCard stack
             ASCII text
        FTP: sumex-aim.stanford.edu:/info-mac/per/voices-*.hqx
             etext.archive.umich.edu:pub/zines/Voices
     E-Mail: Voices-request@andy.bgsu.edu
               to subscribe:
                 subject: Voices from the Net
                 body: subscribe


Whole Earth Review
 "We are dedicated to demystification, to self-teaching, and to 
  encouraging people to think for themselves.  Thus our motto: 'ACCESS TO
  TOOLS AND IDEAS.'  Tools in the Whole Earth sense include hammers, books, 
  and computer conferencing systems.  Our readers are a community of 
  tool-users who share information with one another.  The ideas we make 
  accessible have not often been found in university courses, but are 
  becoming recognized as part of what you need to know to be truly educated.  
  Our readers contribute to the editorial content as well, with both reviews 
  and articles."

  Editor(s): <>
     Format: ASCII text
             Macintosh PageMaker 4.2 files
     Gopher: gopher.well.sf.ca.us
     E-Mail: wer@well.sf.ca.us
     Postal: Whole Earth Review, 27 Gate Five Road, Sausalito, CA 94965, USA
      Phone: +1 415 332 1716 (voice), +1 415 332 3110 (fax)


-----

Sites archiving e-zines with FTP:

  ftp.eff.org
  etext.archive.umich.edu
  ftp.cic.net
  quartz.rutgers.edu
  ftp.msen.com
  ftp.halcyon.com
  world.std.com
  netcom.com in /pub/johnl/zines)
  nigel.msen.com in /pub/newsletters
  grind.isca.uiowa.edu (128.255.19.233) in /info/journals

Sites archive e-zines with Gopher:

  gopher.eff.org
  etext.archive.umich.edu
  gopher.cic.net
  gopher.msen.com
  gopher.well.sf.ca.us
  world.std.com
  gopher.unt.edu

-----




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: jpinson@fcdarwin.org.ec
Date: Thu, 30 Dec 93 21:20:44 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Benford revisited:
Message-ID: <9312302255.aa24644@pay.ecua.net.ec>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


In regards to my posting about the New Scientist article on
"Benford's" law (unexpected number ratios in observed data), I 
received many comments along the line of:

> I suggest you look at any slide-rule or log graph paper for the
> simple explanation of this trivial phenomenon.


Actually, the New Scientist article gave a very clear explanation 
of Benford's law, and how it can be a simple artifact of the way
numbers are counted.

The article caught my attention,  when it went on to explain how 
other phenomena, such as alpha particle half-lifes can follow 
Benford's law for completely different reasons.

I won't attempt to retype the entire article, but Buck, Merchant, 
and Perez, reported in the  European Journal of Physics (Vol 14, 
p59) that both expected and observed half-lives followed 
Benford's law.

Quoting New Scientist: "..Why should nature operate in this 
curious manner? Buck and his colleagues point out that in the 
case of alpha decay, there may be a good physical reason.  In 
1928 George Gamow used the newfangled theory of quantum mechanics 
to describe alpha decay.  The alpha particle lives inside a 
"potential well" in which the energy is lower than in an any 
other state that it can normally reach.  It escapes by 
"tunneling" through the potential well.  The probability of 
tunneling occurring within a given time is found by forming a so- 
called "tunneling integral" and raising it to a power that is 
proportional to time.  So tunneling times, and hence half-lives 
naturally correspond to a geometric series, not a arithmetic one. 
If nature chooses the tunneling integral "randomly" with uniform 
probability, then the power-law dependence of alpha-particle 
half-lives on this integral leads to scale-invariant behavior, 
and so to Benford's law.  "

I am not a physicist or a mathematician, so I can't speculate on 
the validity of these statements.

However, all this did make me wonder if advances in fractal 
geometry, or chaos theory, might one day reveal patterns in 
seemingly random numbers derived from real word phenomena.

Since most random numbers used in cryptography are derived from 
real word phenomena,  we should be aware of such potential 
influences.

Actually, we don't have to bring in fractals, chaos, or Benford's 
law to have reason for concern about using real world based 
random numbers.

A method commonly recommended on this list for generating random 
numbers is to take the audio input from a workstation (with no 
mike attached) and then compress the output:

cat /dev/audio | compress - >random-bits-file

First of all, without extensive study of the audio output (from 
the *specific* source) who can say the output is random in the 
first place?  Harmonics from the various electrical circuits in 
the computer could easily produce non-random effects (like a 60 
cycle hum).

The second aspect that concerns me is the use of compression. Unless
you are very familiar with the type of data compression being used,
how can you be sure there aren't various signatures, tables, data
structures, or headers being inserted into the output.

Indeed, I had to go no further that the beginning of a data file
produced by the "Compress" program, to find nonrandom numbers.  All
such files begin with the same three bytes!  If something so obvious
is being overlooked, what about more subtle patterns?

Anyway, it seems to me there can be many factors "contaminating" 
random numbers based on physical phenomena, factors ranging from 
a simple 60 cycle hum to unrecognized fractal patterns.

It is perhaps a good idea to routinely "massage" random numbers 
to remove both recognized and unrecognized contamination.

Xor'ing random numbers derived from two or more different sources 
might be sufficient.  If done properly, such a procedure may 
produce non-Benford, evenly-distributed random numbers, which 
might be considered superior to the original.

Actually, I tend to be rather cautious about such things and am 
always on the lookout for possible "contamination".  I also try 
to keep an open mind to new ideas.

Jim Pinson 




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: jim@bilbo.suite.com (Jim Miller)
Date: Thu, 30 Dec 93 22:30:44 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: anonymous "video on demand"
Message-ID: <9312310627.AA11312@bilbo.suite.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Does anyone know of a good, practical way of doing "video on demand" in  
such a way that the video supplier can't track the videos you select?

I suppose the trivial solution would be to send your video selection  
request (and service fee) through a "anonymous video remailer".  The video  
supplier would send the encrypted video back to you via the remailer.

Since I don't see "anonymous video remailers" as being a practical  
solution in the near future, I'm more interested in finding out if there  
are other ways of solving this problem.

This sounds like an All-Or-Nothing Disclosure Of Secrets problem.   
However, all I know about ANDOS is what I read in "Applied Cryptography",  
and the algorithm it describes doesn't seem a good fit.

Are there other ANDOS algorithms that may work better?

Jim_Miller@suite.com





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: mikeingl@news.delphi.com (MIKEINGLE@DELPHI.COM)
Date: Thu, 30 Dec 93 21:53:37 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Hoax or ???
Message-ID: <9312310552.AA11958@news.delphi.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



>Path: news.delphi.com!noc.near.net!MathWorks.Com!europa.eng.gtefsd.com!library.ucla.edu!agate!usenet.ins.cwru.edu!news.ysu.edu!psuvm!auvm!DSC.BLM.GOV!cjames
>Comments: Gated by NETNEWS@AUVM.AMERICAN.EDU
>Newsgroups: comp.lang.ada
>Return-Path: <@AUVM.AMERICAN.EDU,
>             @VM42.CSO.UIUC.EDU:owner-info-ada@VM1.NODAK.EDU>
>Return-Path: <@VM1.NODAK.EDU:cjames@DSC.BLM.GOV>
>X-Mailer: SCO System V Mail (version 3.2)
>Source-Info: From (or Sender) name not authenticated.
>Message-ID: <9312212330.aa07880@dsc.blm.gov>
>Date: Tue, 21 Dec 1993 23:30:25 MST
>Sender: Ada programming language <INFO-ADA@NDSUVM1.BITNET>
>From: Colin James 0621 <cjames@DSC.BLM.GOV>
>Subject: Public key encryption broken
>Comments: To: info-ada@vm1.nodak.edu
>Comments: cc: barlow@eff.org, gdean@yarrow.wt.uwa.edu.au
>Lines: 30

William H Payne originally discovered how to break RSA without factoring
by using powers of two on 10/15/90.

Mr Payne wrote a draft paper "Public Key Cryptography is Easy to
Break" on 10/16/90.  The abstract (draft only) appears below:

  Public key, also known as Rivest, Shamir, and Adelman,
  cryptography is broken without factoring the modulus m.
  The product of the encryption and the decryption exponent is
  computed directly with order log(base 2) m shifts, adds, and compares.
  A continued product between the modulus and its multiplier which
  matches a criterion solves the Fermat-Euler theorems simply for
  even very large moduli.

Mr Payne is writing a tutorial paper on the same subject with Jon
Grant which should propose a new public encryption algorithm as
a standard which can not be easily broken.

This indirectly relates to Ada in that projects in the process of
implementing public key encryption in Ada may find these advances
of value.

This information also calls into the question the validity of
patent claims for RSA.

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Colin  James  III   :   Disclaimer:
BLM, SC-342D, DFC   :   -----------
Denver, CO  80225   :   The opinions expressed here are solely
(303)  236 - 5897   :   responsible for their content.
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Mike Ingle <MIKEINGLE@delphi.com>
Date: Thu, 30 Dec 93 23:30:43 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Anonymous Video on Demand
Message-ID: <01H743A34VWI93AD45@delphi.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>Does anyone know of a good, practical way of doing "video on demand" in  
>such a way that the video supplier can't track the videos you select?

Are you thinking of physical videotape or electronic distribution?

For electronic distribution, suppose you have a fiber-optic cable with
n channels, where n is a large number. You send in your request and pay
with digicash or a prepaid system like a prepaid phone card. You send
them an encryption key, and they broadcast the movie over one of the
channels. Or they generate the encryption key and send it to you using
a key you gave them. Problem: you can share the encryption key with
a few thousand of your closest friends, thus cheating the video dealer.
They could require you to make a digicash deposit, and offer a reward
for anyone who reports a pirated encryption key. If you give out the key,
someone reports it and gets half your deposit, and they keep the rest.
But a group of people who all trust each other could still rip off
the video dealer. You could have a decoder with a key unknown to you,
but that system would be only as strong as the physical security
of the decoder. 

Is there any way to use offline-digicash-like techniques to set up
a system so that if you reveal the encryption key, you also reveal
your identity? This would be a real deterrent.

For a videotape system, there is no strong way I can think of to prevent
revealing your identity. You have to pick up the tape, and they have to
know what to record on it or which tape to put out. A camera at the site
could always catch you in the act of retrieving the tape.

It is possible to protect the dealer in an anonymous transaction,
but not the customer. The dealer, if he was selling pirate tapes,
could go out and hide them in various places. In exchange for your
digicash, he tells you where one is.

--- Mike
 




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Nikolaos Daniel Willmore <ndw1@columbia.edu>
Date: Fri, 31 Dec 93 00:33:23 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: add
Message-ID: <199312310832.AA02267@konichiwa.cc.columbia.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


add

Hope this doesn't end up in a real person's mbox taking up space.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Claude Seymour <cseymour@cap.gwu.edu>
Date: Fri, 31 Dec 93 06:04:01 PST
To: "L. Detweiler" <ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Subject: Re: ...Into your life it will creep
In-Reply-To: <199312300432.VAA27833@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Message-ID: <Pine.3.07.9312310902.A19984-6100000@cap.gwu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


That "poem" by (ostensibly) S. Boxx was terrible.








From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: chris.smart@canrem.com (Chris Smart)
Date: Fri, 31 Dec 93 09:04:10 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: WHAT ARE SMARTDRUGS
Message-ID: <60.1742.6525.0C18FA8B@canrem.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Ok, I'm totally new tto CP, have not read any of the Gibson novels, but
have read the Frequently Asked Questions thing for this group and I have
a question for all of you.
What are "smartdrugs"?  I already take a multi-vitamin pill daily, but
is there something I can take to heighten my allertness or energy level?


I'm asking this because I want to get into programming in a big way, and
need something a bit nicer then large amounts of coffee and chocolate to
keep me awake. <g>
Any help would be appreciated.  Either post here, or E-mail me at
Chris.smart@canrem.com


Thanks,
Chris.
---
 * OLX 2.1 TD * You'll have to excuse him; he's from Canada. EH.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: edgar@spectrx.saigon.com (Edgar W. Swank)
Date: Fri, 31 Dec 93 12:28:47 PST
To: Cypherpunks          <cypherpunks@toad.com>
Subject: Reveal your key or else.
Message-ID: <eqTFFc6w165w@spectrx.saigon.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Mike Ingle had some good thoughts:

    Since the Canadian case, there's been a lot of talk about the
    problem of being coerced to reveal your key.  If the coercers play
    by no rules whatsoever, there isn't much you can do.  If they
    suspect you of having encrypted data, they will beat it out of
    you.  ...

Hypnosis might offer a defense here.  A post-hypnotic suggestion could
make it impossible for you to remember the passphrase in a coercive
situation.  Even better, you would remember -very clearly- an
-incorrect- passphrase unrelated to the correct one.  The more
stressful the situation, the more you could think of -nothing else.-
You could then put on a convincing performance that you are baffled
why the passphrase you are "sure" is the right one doesn't work any
more.

    Steganography can hide your data, but then you have the steg
    program itself.  If they find the program, they have reasonable
    grounds for assuming you have hidden data, ...

Then better hide the steg program.  A good design would be like LZEXE,
that would attach itself to any program, and would just pass through
any command line except a pass phrase. It would require highly skilled
analysis to detect the steg program hidden in, say, your GIF viewer or
WAV player.

This takes nothing away from Mike's suggestion of having different
passphrases access different data.

--
edgar@spectrx.saigon.com (Edgar W. Swank)
SPECTROX SYSTEMS +1.408.252.1005  Cupertino, Ca





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Anonymous <nowhere@bsu-cs.bsu.edu>
Date: Fri, 31 Dec 93 08:52:05 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Off the deep end (PUNCH!)
Message-ID: <9312311650.AA21374@bsu-cs.bsu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Well, although Perry Metzger has expressed a disdain for re-postings
of Detweiler's rants to this list, I think that a little, subtle
reminder should occasionally be posted just to remind us all how
deranged this fucker really is.

Enjoy.

-------- cut here ------------


Newsgroups: talk.politics.crypto,alt.privacy,comp.org.eff.talk
From: ld231782@keller.lance.colostate.edu (L. Detweiler)
Subject: ancient torture techniques
Sender: news@yuma.ACNS.ColoState.EDU (News Account)
Message-ID: <Dec31.090735.79631@yuma.ACNS.ColoState.EDU>
Date: Fri, 31 Dec 1993 09:07:35 GMT
Organization: Colorado State University, Fort Collins, CO  80523

Geoff Dale (plaz@netcom.com) wrote:

: > Congratulations! If you repeat anything frequently enough, 
: > people begin to believe it.
:
: That seems to be your strategy. It doesn't work when you so consistantly
: undermine your credability with rants, tho.
: So stop posting and this little bit of net.history will soon be forgotten.

Hello world, I am not proud of everything I have posted `out there' lately,
but I am even less proud of the ugly depths and grotesque deformities
I have seen in certain black corners of the Internet lately, and the
apalling complacency with which you all view it. The skeletons
have not only fallen out the the closet, they have danced around us and
punched us all in the face. My own letters on the subject are an attempt to
shock you from your silent complacency and `accessorizing'. 

What happens when trust breaks down? What happens when people respond 
to their own posts? When they misattribute writing? When they don't care 
who is behind email addresses, or deceive others about them? When they 
post multiple messages from different addresses? 

Imagine that every one of my posts came from a different address.
What is to prevent me? My honesty? My integrity? What if I am a 
cyberanarchist? Would I be horrified or delighted at these embezzlements 
of trust? By the squirming and writhing of my victims underneath my 
crushing onslaught?

* * * 

I was reading a book about ancient torture techniques. (Actually, it was
about something else, but some paragraphs on the subject crept in from
obvious relevance.) 

The Roman soldiers had invented some of the most grisly torture and execution
techniques the world has ever seen, perhaps the most humiliating and heinous
punishments known to man. One that I was reading about was called 
`Circle of Eight'. A blindfolded prisoner stands as Roman soldiers 
(enthusiastic volunteers?) circle him and take turns punching him in the 
face. They take the blindfold off, and ask him, who hit you? And if the 
prisoner fails to name the person, the game continues, they dance in their 
delight, circling at a faster, more dizzying rate, and pummel harder.

What is the point of all this? I don't have a major point, except to 
suggest that this is one of the most evil abominations of humanity I can
imagine. And that it is shockingly identical to the mentality that a 
cyberanarchist has in hammering others with his fake email identity 
arsenals. 

Medusa is delighted to punch the blindfolded victim in the face with
her dizzying circle of tentacles. Guess who it is! Ooops, you're wrong,
sorry. PUNCH. What? No, N.Szabo is a real person. PUNCH. Pseudospoofing
is immoral? nah. PUNCH. N.Szabo is my roommate. PUNCH. Lies are 
liberating. PUNCH. cypherpunks have never pseudospoofed. PUNCH. 
especially the leaders. PUNCH. and everything in the media is true.
PUNCH. especially what we say. PUNCH. and our leaders are the 
greatest of all. PUNCH.

See the blood dripping on the ground, see the hideous disfigurement of
the victim's face.

* * *

I am posting this many messages to drive home the point that
the Cyberanarchists are not really noble at all. They are like Roman 
Soldiers who will hit you when they see that you are blindfolded. Otherwise,
they hide in the shadows like all the rest of the cowardly slime at the 
putrid, dank recesses of humanity. And unless someone takes out the 
trash, we're going to have to get used to the smell. But where will we 
go to eat, then?

go ahead, tentacles, water down my words with more trash. dilute and warp 
my message beyond all recognition. that's probably all we read is, anyway.
all of history is just a big lie set out by people who aren't interested
in the truth, but in fooling us to assuage their egos. the Bible, of course,
is the worst of all.

* * *

I read one author who suggested that as part of Christ's torture before
literally bearing his cross, he had been subjected to the Circle of Eight.

Cyberanarchists, who are you punching? What was that saying of Christ's, 
as you do unto the lowest of men, you do unto me?

I think the question you have to ask yourselves is, if a victim is 
blindfolded, does God hear his screams? 

What if the soldiers are athiests?

When does the Circle of Eight stop, anyway? When the victim is 
unconscious? When he is dead? 

``NEXT!''

-- 

ld231782@longs.LANCE.ColoState.EDU





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Oliver Seiler <oseiler@unixg.ubc.ca>
Date: Fri, 31 Dec 93 12:50:51 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: WHAT ARE SMARTDRUGS
In-Reply-To: <60.1742.6525.0C18FA8B@canrem.com>
Message-ID: <Pine.3.05.9312311238.A7514-c100000@unixg.ubc.ca>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



On Fri, 31 Dec 1993, Chris Smart wrote:

> Ok, I'm totally new tto CP, have not read any of the Gibson novels, but
> have read the Frequently Asked Questions thing for this group and I have
> a question for all of you.
> What are "smartdrugs"?  I already take a multi-vitamin pill daily, but
> is there something I can take to heighten my allertness or energy level?
> 

First off, this is really the wrong place to post this (doesn't have anything
to do with cryptography, etc.) So please don't ask this sort of stuff here,
since their are for more places that you could...

Some pointers would be to getting some books on the subject of nutrition,
or on smart drugs, such as Smart Drugs and Nutrients (Dean & Morgenthaler).
You might try some assorted newsgroups, such as alt.psychoactives, and
you might try some archive sites. Various alt.drugs archive sites come to
mind (off the top of my head, I can think of two: fenris.claremont.edu and
ftp.u.washington.edu)

> I'm asking this because I want to get into programming in a big way, and
> need something a bit nicer then large amounts of coffee and chocolate to
> keep me awake. <g>

That's because caffeine and chocolate really aren't the best things to use
if you want to concentrate... Getting lot's of sleep and knowing what you
want to accomplish in advance are what work's for me... (plus a healthy dose
of good nutrition, vitamin supplements, pseudo-vegetarian diet, amino acid
supplements, various herbs, and on and on). Good time organization is
a good thing. Don't try to remember everything in your head. but of course
this really isn't the place...

> Thanks,
> Chris.

Now, please don't send me flames for responding to this... Maybe other people
who were looking for similar info will not bother posting (sure.....)

-Oliver

ObCrypt: I've ordered a book by the name of Applied Cryptography, by a B.
Schneier, on the recommendation of a friend of mine. I had a quick look at
it, but I'm interested in finding out if anybody else has read it? Any
comments?

| Oliver Seiler          + Erisian Development Group +  Amiga Developer  +
| oseiler@unixg.ubc.ca   +-------------Reality by the Slice--------------+
| oseiler@nyx.cs.du.edu  | Phone: (604) 683-5364     Fax: (604) 683-6142 |
| ollie@BIX.com          | POB 3547, MPO, Vancouver, BC, CANADA  V6B 3Y6 |






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Perry E. Metzger" <pmetzger@lehman.com>
Date: Fri, 31 Dec 93 10:03:48 PST
To: chris.smart@canrem.com
Subject: Re: WHAT ARE SMARTDRUGS
In-Reply-To: <60.1742.6525.0C18FA8B@canrem.com>
Message-ID: <199312311801.NAA22512@snark>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



You have this list confused with a CYBERPUNK mailing list. This is
CYPHERPUNKS, a mailing list for people interested in cryptography. We
don't discuss smart drugs or anything like that here.

Perry

Chris Smart says:
> Ok, I'm totally new tto CP, have not read any of the Gibson novels, but
> have read the Frequently Asked Questions thing for this group and I have
> a question for all of you.
> What are "smartdrugs"?  I already take a multi-vitamin pill daily, but
> is there something I can take to heighten my allertness or energy level?
> 
> 
> I'm asking this because I want to get into programming in a big way, and
> need something a bit nicer then large amounts of coffee and chocolate to
> keep me awake. <g>
> Any help would be appreciated.  Either post here, or E-mail me at
> Chris.smart@canrem.com
> 
> 
> Thanks,
> Chris.
> ---
>  * OLX 2.1 TD * You'll have to excuse him; he's from Canada. EH.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: plaz@netcom.com (Geoff Dale)
Date: Fri, 31 Dec 93 14:43:50 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: FWD: L. Detweiler tortures the Satellite of Love
Message-ID: <199312312243.OAA15716@mail.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


The second Detweiler forward in 24 hrs, but I just can't help it! This is
just too good!

I went back to alt.privacy to see the post forwarded earlier. I found that
Detweiler had posted five or six messages in a row, in reply to my kiss-off
message.

But I also found this gem:
--Begin Forwarded Post--
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Xref: netcom.com talk.politics.crypto:1835 alt.privacy:10671 alt.tv.mst3k:18867
Path: netcom.com!csus.edu!decwrl!nic.hookup.net!europa.eng.gtefsd.com!uunet!dige
x.net!digex.net!not-for-mail
From: steve-b@access.digex.net (Steve Brinich)
Newsgroups: talk.politics.crypto,alt.privacy,alt.tv.mst3k
Subject: Re: ancient torture techniques
Followup-To: alt.tv.mst3k
Date: 31 Dec 1993 12:08:18 -0500
Organization: Express Access Online Communications, Greenbelt, MD USA
Lines: 354
Message-ID: <2g1ma2$htr@access.digex.net>
References: <netnewsCIMtzo.42w@netcom.com> <netnewsCIpv3q.CH7@netcom.com> 
<Dec31.090735.79631@yuma.acns.colostate.edu>
NNTP-Posting-Host: access.digex.net

  SCENE: Satellite of Love.  Tom Servo is polishing a glass globe that
looks just like his own head.

Crow:  Whatya doing?
Tom:   I'm just.... polishing up a fishbowl.  I thought it'd look good
          here by the hexscreen (he moves over to the hexscreen and
          places the bowl, opening up, just under the hexscreen).
          What do you think?
Crow:  I think that's silly.  First of all, there's no place to put a
          fishbowl there.  Besides which, we don't have any fish here
          to put in a bowl.

  (Mike enters from stage right)

Mike:  Are you two arguing again?

  (Light flashes to indicate an incoming call from the Mads)

Mike:  Never mind; let's see what they want this time.  (taps button)

  SCENE: Deep 13.  Dr. Forrester is holding a cheap-looking mask resembling
his own face.

Dr. F:  Hello, Matt.
Mike:   That's 'Mike'.
Dr. F:  Whatever.  Anyway, it's time for your Invention Exchange, unless
          you need more time to set it up and want me to go first--
Mike:   Well, actually no--
Dr. F:  OK, I'll go first.  Of course, a mad scientist in my position has
          his share of enemies, and some of them are a bit too tough to
          be beaten off directly.  The next best thing is misdirection:
          getting them to vent their frustrations on something more...
          what's the word... 'expendable'.  (Turns toward stage left)
          Oh, Frank!

  (Frank enters from stage left)

Dr. F:  I need you to model this (hands Frank the mask)

  (Frank puts on Dr. F mask)

Dr. F:  As you can see, the perfect decoy to cover my escape if things
          ever get too hot to handle.  And now, your turn.

  (Mike holds a telephone with several types of bells, horns, and other
noisemakers attached to it.)

Mike:   You're finished, then?
Dr. F:  That's what I just _said_.
Frank:  How long do I have to wear this?
Dr. F:  (To Frank) Until I tell you to stop!  (To Mike) Well??
Mike:   We all know about Caller ID, but it has one big problem: you don't
          see the caller's ID until you get close enough to read that little
          display window.  My invention is a Caller ID Ringer that lets
          you know whether the call is worth picking up without even having
          to get out of the bathtub.

  (Cash register bell rings)

Mike:   See, that tells you it's one of those calls from somebody asking
          you for money.

  (Bugle call of 'Reveille' sounds)

Mike:   That tells you it's an Army recruiter calling.

  (Foghorn sounds)

Mike:   That means it's your boss on the line.

  (Poofter pops out of phone, with sound)

Mike:   That means a call on the party line.

Dr. F:  Yes, yes, I'm sure you've got a million of them, but that's all
          the time we have for the Invention Exchange.  Now, for your
          experiment, I have a special treat. (grins evilly)  You remember
          L. Detweiler, alias R. Boxx, alias about a dozen other names
          I can't be bothered to keep track of?

Crow:   I have a bad feeling about this....

Dr. F:  Well, we have a rare treat: a post from him under his very own
          name (as far as we know).  Boy, are you in for some deep
          hurting this time!

  (Movie alarm goes off)

  6....5....4....3....2....1....G



>talk.politics.crypto #1834 (1 + 6 more)                        |    |-<1>
>Newsgroups: talk.politics.crypto,alt.privacy,                  |    |-<1>
>+           comp.org.eff.talk                                  |    \-[2]--[2]
>From: ld231782@keller.lance.colostate.edu (L.                  |-<1>
>+     Detweiler)                                               |-<1>
>[2] ancient torture techniques                                 \-<1>
>Date: Fri Dec 31 04:07:35 EST 1993
>Organization: Colorado State University, Fort Collins, CO  80523
>X-Newsreader: TIN [version 1.2 021193BETA PL3]
>Followup-To: talk.politics.crypto,alt.privacy,comp.org.eff.talk
>Lines: 98
>

  (Mike and Crow enter theater)

Mike:  Where's Tom Servo?

>Geoff Dale (plaz@netcom.com) wrote:
>
>: > Congratulations! If you repeat anything frequently enough,
>: > people begin to believe it.

Crow:  Repeat??  Isn't once bad enough?

>: That seems to be your strategy. It doesn't work when you so consistantly
>: undermine your credability with rants, tho.
>: So stop posting and this little bit of net.history will soon be forgotten.

  (Tom Servo enters theater)

Crow:  What took you so long?
Tom:   I had to finish with the... fishbowl.

 > Hello world, I am not proud of everything I have posted `out there' lately,

Crow:  And you have so much to be not proud about!

 >but I am even less proud of the ugly depths and grotesque deformities

Tom:   Of my terrible secret past.

 >I have seen in certain black corners of the Internet lately

Crow:  Hey!  That's "African-American corners of the Internet"!

 >                                                             and the
 >apalling complacency with which you all view it. The skeletons
 >have not only fallen out the the closet,

Mike:  They had a falling out, and outed each other, and are now out of
          the closet.

 >                                         they have danced around us and
 >punched us all in the face.

Crow:  (Muhammad Ali voice) Dance like a butterfly, sting like a bee.

 >                            My own letters on the subject are an attempt to
 >shock you from your silent complacency and `accessorizing'.

Tom:   With out lovely line of spring accessories for 1994.

 > What happens when trust breaks down?

Crow:  (German accent) It decayz into a migzture of Uranium 235 and
           Plutonium 238.  Very hazzardousz zubsztanzes.

 >                                      What happens when people respond
 >to their own posts?

Tom:  They're schizo?
Mike:  Maybe they're just absent-minded.

 >                     When they misattribute writing?

Crow: OK, so they're absent-minded AND schizo.

>                                                      When they don't care
>who is behind email addresses,

Tom:   Schizo, absent-minded, and now apathetic.
Mike:  This is getting hard to keep track of.

>                               or deceive others about them?

Crow:  Schizo, absent-minded, apathetic, and dishonest....
Mike:  Is somebody writing this down?
Crow:  Hey, you're the only one here with fully functional arms!
Mike:  (takes notepad and pencil from a pocket)

>                                                             When they
>post multiple messages from different addresses?

Crow: As we come full circle back to schizo.

> Imagine that every one of my posts came from a different address.

Tom:   Not hard in this guy's case.

>What is to prevent me? My honesty? My integrity?

All:   NAAAAAH!

>                                                  What if I am a
>cyberanarchist?

Mike:  (jotting something on a notepad) How do you spell that?
Tom & Crow:  (turn to look at Mike)
Mike:  (tosses notebook and pencil into the air)

>                Would I be horrified or delighted at these embezzlements
>of trust?

Tom:   He doesn't know how he'd react to his own actions?
Crow:  Jeez, enough already with the "schizo"?

>          By the squirming and writhing of my victims underneath my
>crushing onslaught?

Mike:  Hey!  I didn't think the Mads were sending us that kind of movies!

* * *

> I was reading a book about ancient torture techniques.

Tom:   Like these posts.

>                                                        (Actually, it was
>about something else, but some paragraphs on the subject crept in from
>obvious relevance.)

Mike:  Obvious to _you_, maybe.

> The Roman soldiers had invented some of the most grisly torture and execution
>techniques the world has ever seen, perhaps the most humiliating and heinous
>punishments known to man.

Crow:  Throw Sandy Frank to the Romans!
Tom:   Lippert, too!

>                          One that I was reading about was called
>`Circle of Eight'.

Crow:  (pirate voice) Arrrgh, mateys!  I have a sack of doubloons and Circles
          of Eight.
Mike:  I think that's PIECES of Eight.
Crow:  Whatever.

>                   A blindfolded prisoner stands as Roman soldiers
>(enthusiastic volunteers?) circle him and take turns punching him in the
>face.

Mike:  I think his verb tenses are about two thousand years off.

>      They take the blindfold off, and ask him, who hit you?

Tom:   The guy with the brass knuckles?

>                                                             And if the
>prisoner fails to name the person, the game continues, they dance in their
>delight, circling at a faster, more dizzying rate, and pummel harder.

Tom:   On the other hand, if he _does_ correctly name the person, he wins
         a new 94 B.C. chariot and a year's supply of Rice-a-Roni.

>What is the point of all this?

Mike:  I was hoping you'd tell _us_!

>                               I don't have a major point,

Crow:  Imagine my surprise.

>                                                           except to
>suggest that this is one of the most evil abominations of humanity I can
>imagine. And that it is shockingly identical to the mentality that a
>cyberanarchist has in hammering others with his fake email identity
>arsenals.

Tom:   You can send an arsenal through email?
Crow:  What will they think of next?

>Medusa is delighted to punch the blindfolded victim in the face with
>her dizzying circle of tentacles.

Tom:   Punched with a circle of tentacles??

>                                  Guess who it is!

Crow:  You already _said_ it was Medusa!  The tentacles are a dead giveaway.

>                                                   Ooops, you're wrong,
>sorry.

Crow:  _I'm_ wrong??  I'm just going by what you just said!

>       PUNCH. What? No, N.Szabo is a real person. PUNCH. Pseudospoofing
>is immoral? nah. PUNCH. N.Szabo is my roommate. PUNCH. Lies are
>liberating. PUNCH. cypherpunks have never pseudospoofed. PUNCH.
>especially the leaders. PUNCH. and everything in the media is true.
>PUNCH. especially what we say. PUNCH. and our leaders are the
>greatest of all. PUNCH.

Tom:   Stop it!  The pain!  The pain!

>See the blood dripping on the ground, see the hideous disfigurement of
>the victim's face.

Tom:   (head explodes)
(Mike and Crow exit hastily, Mike carrying Tom)


  SCENE: Satellite of Love.  Mike places Tom on a table and begins
looking around frantically.

Mike:  Crow!  Quick!  Help me find a spare head for Tom Servo!  We don't
          have much time!
Crow:  (exits stage left)

  (A second Tom Servo enters from stage right)

Mike:  Tom Servo!  Quick!  Help me find a spare head for Tom Servo!

  (Mike stops and does a double-take)

Mike:  What?!?  But you're there (points to Tom Servo on table) with your
          head blown apart from illogic overload or something....
Tom:   (chuckles)  Oh, that!  That's just one of the alter egos I use
          when I need a break from the Mads' experiments.

  (Light flashes to indicate an incoming call from the Mads)

Tom:   Quick!  Get that out of here!  I don't want them to find out....

  (Mike pushes the remains of the other Tom Servo out of sight under the
table.)

  SCENE: Deep 13.  Frank is still wearing the Dr. Forrester mask.  Dr. F
is wearing an equally cheesy-looking Frank mask.

Frank: Well?

Mike:  Frank?  Are you still wearing that silly mask?

  (Dr. F rips off his own mask, then Frank's.  Frank clutches his nose,
which was pinched by Dr. F's grab).

Dr. F: Oh, stop whining and push the button!

  (Frank keeps both hands on his nose and fumbles for the button with his
elbows, hitting it after several tries).



       \  |  /           Mystery Sceince Theater 3000 and associated characters
        \ | /          are the property of Best Brains, Inc. and used here for
         \|/           satirical purposes only.
      ----O----
         /|\             This post is not meant as a personal attack upon
        / | \          the original author (but rather as an impersonal
       /  |  \         attack upon his ideas and level of logical argument).

---------------------------------------------------------------------------
--End Forwarded Post--

_______________________________________________________________________
Geoff Dale         -- Cypherpunk/Extropian --         Plastic Beethoven
AnarchyPPL - Anarch (Adjudicator)      ExI-Freegate Virtual Branch Head
plaz@netcom.com                                        66 Pyramid Plaza
plaz@io.com                             Freegate, Metaverse@io.com 7777
                "Subvert the domination paradigm!"






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: an55689@anon.penet.fi
Date: Fri, 31 Dec 93 07:53:45 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Revised Clipper FOIA results...
Message-ID: <9312311519.AA29004@anon.penet.fi>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



> A full-scale public debate is beginning which will ascertain the wishes
> of U.S. citizens with regard to their privacy and the impact on public 
> safety of preserving privacy at the expense of wiretapping and 
> communications intercept capabilities of law enforcement and national 
> security personnel.  It is not clear what the public will decide.

Why wan't the public brought in at the _beginning_ of this process?
How will U.S. citizens at large be brought into the debate? and When?
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
To find out more about the anon service, send mail to help@anon.penet.fi.
Due to the double-blind, any mail replies to this message will be anonymized,
and an anonymous id will be allocated automatically. You have been warned.
Please report any problems, inappropriate use etc. to admin@anon.penet.fi.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Jim choate <ravage@wixer.bga.com>
Date: Fri, 31 Dec 93 15:20:50 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Hypnosis and a pass-phrase...
Message-ID: <9312312245.AA08763@wixer>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Hey everyone,

Hope you are all having a great holidays...:)

On the suggestion of a post-hypnotic suggestion it is great but it won't work.
Psychologist and Psychiatrist are both very familiar with the signs of such
'tampering' and know how to get around it. Besides this won't support a
defence since it shows pre-meditation to refuse and would only fauster the
states case to use unlimited incarceration as pursuasive motivation. If they
can prove you commited some action(s) prior to a crime which directly relate
to that crime you are providing the state w/ probably cause, opportunity,
motive, and a goodly amount of circumstantial evidence. I fail to see how
shooting oneself in the foot is helpful...;)

Probably the safest thing would be to make agreements among your friends to
generate pass phrases for each other. One could then exchange public -
private key pairs in some kind of anonymouse way. Then you could say in all
honesty that you did not know it.

On the stego front,

I assume since nobody responded about my request for HSV information that we
had nobody involved w/ it. Archie couldn't find any either....:(

I was looking over some material done by Huffman years after his coding work
relating to describing graphics w/ a meta-language. His motivation was
looking at Escher prints and trying to determine a methodology to determine
if a 2D representation was a honest representation of a 3D subject. He
apparently succeded and I suspect that using such techniques you could find
images which contained information imbedded in them. I am trying to find the
material localy and will let you know what comes of it (if anything). Anybody
else take a look at this work? I suspect that some of Penrose's tiling work
might also be applicable but know nothing about except some SA articles here
and there.

Finaly,

This morning I got e-mail claiming some guy found a shift and add technique
for cracking RSA algorithms. Did anyon else get this? Anyone know anything
about its authenticity or reference locations? Off to Archie...

Everybody have a great party tooooonite!





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: jim@bilbo.suite.com (Jim Miller)
Date: Fri, 31 Dec 93 15:03:38 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Anonymous Video on Demand
Message-ID: <9312312259.AA25911@bilbo.suite.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Mike Ingle writes:

>Are you thinking of physical videotape or electronic distribution?

Electronic distribution.


"Anonymous video on demand" is a bit misleading, because I'm not so much  
interested in preventing the video provider from knowing my identity, just  
from correlating my identity with my video selections.


>For electronic distribution, suppose you have a fiber-optic cable with
>n channels, where n is a large number.

My feeling is that this architecture is too inflexible.


Here's the sort of thing I have in mind:

Customer browses the video supplier's catalog and notes the catalog number  
of the video it wants

Customer randomly chooses 99 other catalog numbers to generate a pool of  
100 catalog numbers.

The Customer and the Video Provider engage in a protocol so that the  
Customer ends up receiving 100 compressed and encrypted videos, only one  
of which the Customer can successfully decrypt (and uncompress).

The Video Provider never learns which of the 100 videos the Customer  
successfully decrypts, but is sure that the Customer can decrypt only one
of them.


I don't know what the protocol would be, but it sounds like an ANDOS-like  
protocol.


By the way, I think that if the "rental" fee is low enough, the Video  
Provider wont have to worry about cheaters.  If it costs you more money  
(or time) to cheat the Video Provider than it does to simply pay the fee,  
then most people will pay the fee.  I'm thinking the fee would be as small  
as 25 cents/video, for example.


Jim_Miller@suite.com





From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Hal <hfinney@shell.portal.com>
Date: Fri, 31 Dec 93 18:00:52 PST
To: Jim_Miller@bilbo.suite.com
Subject: Re: Anonymous Video on Demand
Message-ID: <199401010159.RAA25897@jobe.shell.portal.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Jim - That is a nice protocol.  Seems to work OK.  I had thought of
a variant:

Vendor creates a set of pairs of numbers and random DES keys:
(1,KEY1), (2,KEY2), (3,KEY3),...

These are sent via oblivious transfer to buyer such that he only gets
one but the vendor doesn't know which.  Suppose buyer gets (10,KEY10).

Buyer sends back a mapping of the numbers 1-N and a set of N movies.
He maps the number he got in step 1 (10 in my example) with the movie
he wants.

Vendor encrypts these movies with the corresponding numbered DES keys,
and sends them to buyer.  He will only be able to decrypt one of them.

These protocols have the obvious disadvantage of increasing the needed
bandwidth by a factor of N.  I guess we assume bandwidth is cheap.

Once I get the movie, what stops me from recording it and giving copies
to all my friends for free?  Nothing, as far as I can see.  Therefore,
it would be good to think of a system where N movies are broadcast all
the time (on N channels), all N encrypted, but with each person who has
paid only able to decrypt one of them.  You argued that people would just
share keys, but I don't think that is an issue since they might as well
just share movies.  This system is much more acceptable in terms of
bandwidth.  It would be interesting to think of a solution which worked
with this situation, where the encrypting keys are fixed.

The requirement is, given a set of keys, 1-N, which A knows, B ends up
knowing only key I, where I is chosen by B ahead of time, but A doesn't
know which key B got.  Off hand I don't see how to do this.

Hal Finney

P.S. with a little thought, a variant on my protocol can solve this,
and perhaps your protocol works too.  In step 1, A sends random keys
to B via oblivious transfer; in step 2, B sends a mapping of key numbers
and movies, pairing up the key he got and the movie he wants; in step 3,
which is different, A sends not the movies, but the movie keys which will
be used during the broadcast phase, encrypted with the random keys chosen
in step 1.  B is left with one key which will decrypt just the movie he
wants during the broadcast.

Maybe if this were done in tamper-proof chips like the encryption chips used
in current cable boxes it would be secure enough for most purposes, at least
as secure as current pay cable.




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: jim@bilbo.suite.com (Jim Miller)
Date: Fri, 31 Dec 93 16:58:36 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Anonymous Video on Demand
Message-ID: <9401010055.AA27523@bilbo.suite.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


could
As I think about it more, the "anonymous video on demand" problem can be  
solved with an oblivious transfer protocol.

Here's how I see it working:

(The following is adapted from the oblivious transfer protocol described  
in "Applied Cryptography" on page 98.)

Say Alice is the Video Vendor and Bob is the customer...

Alice generates a public/private key pair for each movie in her video  
database and publishes the public keys in an electronic catalog.  Each  
public key would be paired with a movie description and a catalog index  
number.

Bob downloads Alice's catalog and browses through it offline.  Bob makes a  
selection, and also randomly picks 99 (or any large number) other catalog  
numbers

Bob generates a random DES key and encrypts this key with the public key  
associated with his selection.

Bob sends the encrypted DES key and the list of 100 catalog numbers to  
Alice.

Alice decrypts the DES key with the private key associated each catalog  
number received from Bob.  In only one case will Alice successfully  
recover Bob's DES key, only she doesn't know which case.

Alice encrypts each movie selection with the resulting DES keys from the  
previous step and sends all 100 encrypted movies to Bob.

Bob will only be able to decrypt and view the movie he selected and Alice  
wont know which of the 100 movies Bob selected.

Ta Da!

The nice thing about this protocol is that it doesn't really have anything  
to do with videos.  It could be used for an electronic library, or any  
warehouse of digital information where the Vendor wishes to charge for a  
download, yet the Customer doesn't want the Vendor to know which item is  
selected.

Also, the Vendor still can use statistical analysis to determine which  
items are more popular and which items are less popular.  The Vendor could  
keep track of how many times an item was mentioned in a Customer selection  
list.  The more popular items would appear in more lists.  Unpopular items  
would have different statistics.  This analysis breaks down if all items  
are equally popular, or Customers don't chose the other 99 items randomly.


Jim_Miller@suite.com






From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "L. Detweiler" <ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Date: Fri, 31 Dec 93 21:53:37 PST
To: colorado_cypherpunks@vis.colostate.edu
Subject: The Best Death Threat Yet
Message-ID: <199401010552.WAA04833@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


This person claims I have `threatened' Nate Sammons, Colorado
Cypherpunks Founder and Leader. I have done no such thing. Please do
not send me this vomit.

`Mine enemies without reason outnumber the hairs on my head.'

I am only posting this in case the person is serious, whoever starts an
investigation has something to go on. Death threats are illegal in the
U.S.Mail, and there is probably a pretty good case to be made they are
illegal in email as well. I'm not aware of any legal precedents. Maybe 
someone could post on the subject.

===cut=here===




From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "L. Detweiler" <ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
Date: Fri, 31 Dec 93 22:50:55 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Privacy vs. Pseudospoofing
Message-ID: <199401010649.XAA05316@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Hello everyone. I am a bit unclear as to what cypherpunks are really
promoting as far as privacy vs. pseudospoofing. The lack of official
comments by head cypherpunks make this difficult to sort out. Clearly,
you are in favor of some forms of pseudospoofing. Here is a list of all
the various forms I can think of. Please indicate which ones you are in
favor of. These are just some tentative names I'm coming up off the top
of my head for terminology.

pseudonymity: a name that is not traceable to a particular human being.

1) straight pseudonymity: the audience is aware of the fact that the
name is not traceable. (e.g. anon.penet.fi aliases, some book pseudonyms.)

2) semipseudonymity: the audience is not aware of whether or not the
name can be traced, and makes no assumption.

3) quasipseudonymity: the audience tends to assume from context that
the name is traceable, but it is not. I think email addresses fall in
this category, but (unfortunately IMHO) that is increasingly becoming the exception.

4) pseudoanonymity: the audience is deliberately deceived into thinking
the name is traceable when it is not. (e.g. a tentacle saying `I am a
real person.' or someone else vouching for them.)


Now, I have no objections to 1-2. And one can indeed have privacy with
them. But it seems to me that all the cypherpunks are promoting 3-4 in
the name of `privacy'. But it seems to me that (3) is misleading, and
(4) means active lies. These are not privacy. These are the tools that
criminals use to evade punishment for their crimes.

Also, one *must* make the distinction between *active* and *passive*
pseudonymity. If I read a book, I am not conversing with the author. I
am not asking him any questions about his identity. This strikes me as
harmless in most cases even if the reader is tricked into thinking the
name is `traceable'. But the interactive pseudonyms, those possible
with the internet, are extremely dangerous, because someone can
actively lie to me when I ask `who are you?'. And it really discourages
me that all you cypherpunks (e.g. J. Gilmore) think it is all the same
thing, Privacy.

So, which do you favor? (Please do not continue to obfuscate the issue
by pretending that they are all identical.)

Cypherpunks, I don't think you all understand the whole purpose of
names in the first place. They were invented so that we could function
as a society. The ability to `trace' a name to a human being is a very
basic aspect of social interaction and ettiquete. Every day that you
corrupt that trust you are not only breaking down governments, but
honest interactions. 

I am beginning to think that not only do the leaders have secrets from
the  followers, they have secrets from each other. Imagine one leader
asking the other through a tentacle, `what do you think of so-and-so'? yee, gad.

Where is your trust, cypherpunks? Why are you so paranoid? In my
experience, the people I have met that are the least trusting of others
are also the most paranoid. But they are also the most secretive
themselves. When you keep secrets from other people, you begin to think
the whole world is keeping secrets from you. Is all of history a big
lie to massage the egos of some people? The Bible is probably entirely
fictional too, right?

Don't you people know you are playing with fire? Active pseudoanonymity
is used to start riots and wars. I plant people around the mob or in a
country who agitate for the destruction of everyone. And real people
get caught up in the passions. Perhaps you think you can control this.
You are mistaken. He who lives by a mob, dies by a mob.

What is the consensus on that delightful little Nazi story about
pseudospoofing for espionage purposes? A glorious example of the
delights of pseudoanonymity? Something to strive for? This is the story
that I was going to send you all when your leaders told me what they
knew about pseudospoofing, that I was talking about for a long time.
But S.Boxx sent it before I had the chance. 

BTW I have misplaced the comments from the leaders that said they
didn't pseudospoof, could someone email them to me?





